Source: http://bc-injury-law.com/blog/category/bcsc-civil-rule-5
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 15:52:23+00:00

Document:
Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Victoria Registry, addressing when Case Planning Conferences are unnecessary and finding that a costs order is appropriate in the face of such a CPC.
In today’s case (Stewart v. Robinson) the Plaintiff was involved in a collision and sued for damages. The Defendant set down a CPC seeking an order requiring the Plaintiff to reveal the “the areas of expertise” of the experts the Plaintiff would rely on at trial. The Defendant also sought a few collateral orders such updated lists of documents and timelines for discoveries. The Court held that the first order was one the Court had no jurisdiction to make and that the further orders were unnecessary given that the Plaintiff was fulfilling their disclosure duties under the Rules of Court.
3. the court may order that the service requirements under Rule 11-6 (3) be abridged such that expert reports are to be served earlier than the 84 days before trial. Such an order will only be made in exceptional cases where a compelling reason for early disclosure is demonstrated.
 While a party may volunteer details of their expert evidence in advance of the 84-day deadline, a CPC is not required for that purpose. The information can simply be provided in correspondence without the necessity of judicial involvement. As the court determined in Dhugha, the omission of the name of an expert or his or her area of expertise from a case plan order does not preclude the admission of that expert evidence at trial.
 Thus, the order sought in the defendant’s case plan proposal with respect to experts could not be made by the court. The order proposed by the defence at the CPC with respect to experts is not necessary.
 That leads to the next question: was a CPC necessary for any other purpose? In my view, it was not.
 An order requiring the parties to exchange further amended lists of documents by certain dates is not necessary. Both counsel acknowledge the duty to provide ongoing document disclosure as required by theSCCR. The suggested deadlines micromanages a case that does not require such management.
 An order requiring delivery of a certain therapist’s records by a specified date is also not required. The plaintiff has volunteered to provide those records.
 An order identifying the timing and length of examinations for discovery is also unnecessary. The parties have agreed to examination dates. The length of these examinations was not seriously in dispute at this conference and did not require judicial management.
 Having already concluded that the CPC was unnecessary, I award the plaintiff costs related to counsel’s preparation and attendance and the conference. Those costs are fixed at $750 all inclusive, not payable forthwith.
Reasons for judgment were released today addressing the boundaries of the BC Supreme Court’s power to make orders respecting the identity of expert witnesses at a Case Planning Conference.
(v) any orders the judge or master considers will further the object of these Supreme Court Civil Rules.
 As pointed out in Amezcua, Rule 5-3(1)(k) sets out a number of specific orders that may be made in regard to experts, but those do not include an order disclosing an expert’s identity or the area of his or her expertise before the report is served, much less an order barring any additional experts or areas of expertise. If Rule 11-1(2) was intended to refer to such an order, I would have expected to see a corresponding provision in Rule 5-3(1)(k).
 Rule 11-1(2) cannot be used at a CPC to force a party to identify specific medical experts or areas of medical expertise or to limit the party’s case at trial to those experts.
Last year I highlighted a decision confirming that the Court’s powers under the new rules of court don’t allow orders to be made which will trump legitimate privilege claims. Reasons for judgement were released earlier this month by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, confirming this principle.
 The area of expertise of an intended expert witness is a matter of trial strategy. Trial strategy is a key component of a solicitor’s brief. It may well evolve as plaintiff’s counsel builds a case and makes decisions based upon a myriad of factors and considerations. Intentions may change as the process unfolds over time.
 In my view, unless and until the intention to rely upon a particular expert in a particular field is declared by delivery of a report in accordance with the timelines established by the Rules, in the absence of a compelling reason an early incursion into this aspect of the solicitor’s brief will not be justified.
 I note that in Nowe, the plaintiff argued that it was “not the kind of case in which a long period is required in advance of an appointment being made with a certain type of expert” (para. 7). Although possibly a longer period may be justified in some cases, I am not satisfied that a “departure from the usual timelines can be justified” in the case at bar.
 In my view, the defendants’ application should be rejected. I see no prejudice if the normal rules for delivery of expert reports apply. If the defendants choose to retain an expert to conduct an independent medical examination and prepare a report based on the plaintiff’s pleaded injuries, but no psychological injury is alleged at trial, an appropriate award of costs will afford the defendants the necessary relief.
 Not surprisingly, I cannot state matters better than Chief Justice McEachern in Hodgkinson: “While I favour full disclosure in proper circumstances, it will be rare, if ever, that the need for disclosure will displace privilege”.
 The Court declines to make the order sought.
Earlier this year I highlighted two judgements (here and here) discussing that the New Rules of Court don’t allow the Court to override solicitor’s privilege. Further reasons for judgement were recently released by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, confirming this principle.
In the recent case (Nowe v. Bowerman) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2008 motor vehicle collision and sued for damages. The Defendant set down a Case Planning Conference asking for an order that “Plaintiff’s counsel advise the defence of the areas of expertise of his proposed experts“.
 That being said, there may well be cases in which a departure from the usual timelines can be justified. For example, in complex cases such as those involving brain injuries as a matter of fairness it may be necessary to provide defence counsel with a longer period than would be available under the usual regime in order to schedule appointments with certain kinds of experts. In this case, however, I am unable to identify such a compelling reason. In these circumstances, I decline to make the order sought.
To my knowledge these reasons for judgement are not publicly available but, as always, I’m happy to provide a copy to anyone who contacts me and requests one.
Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, ordering a Plaintiff to provide particulars of claimed special damages.
Special damages must explicitly be claimed and proved.
…but the weight of the authority treats these as special damages which therefore must be specifically pleaded; the defendant is also entitled to particulars.
I cite this latter quote not in respect of wage losses per se, but for the implicit assumption that a defendant is entitled to particulars of special damages.
 I cannot see, then, why a party should not be required to particularize his or her special damages to date. The same, of course, cannot be said for general damages, but the defence is not asking for that. The plaintiff will therefore give particulars of her special damages to date.
Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, New Westminster Registry, discussing the scope of appropriate applications at Case Planning Conferences and further the prohibition of affidavit evidence in this venue.
In today’s case (Gill v. A&P Fruit Growers Ltd.) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2004 slip and fall incident. The Defendant was found 70% at fault for this incident.
 There is still some uncertainty with respect to the scope of the prohibition against hearing applications supported by affidavit evidence on a case planning conference. In order to effect the objectives of the Rules by making orders designed to resolve disputes efficiently and in a cost-effective manner on the merits, in my view, it will occasionally be necessary to rule on the manner in which evidence will be adduced at trial. In some circumstances, even when such matters are hotly contested, they may be determined without affidavit evidence. That may be the case where the issue may be determined on the basis of representations of counsel as officers of the court.
 It has long been the case that the courts have given evidentiary weight to the representations of counsel with respect to evidence to be called at trial, availability of witnesses and procedural questions going to trial management. In Nichols v. Gray (1978), 9 B.C.L.R. 5 (C.A.), the Court of Appeal reaffirmed a chambers judge’s discretion to give weight to statements of counsel relating to the evidence and the conduct of trial. It is in that context that the new Supreme Court Rules were enacted. The prohibition against hearing applications supported by affidavit evidence must be interpreted in the light of that practice.
 I adopt as applicable to case planning conferences the views expressed by N. Smith J. in Jurczak v. Mauro, 2011 BCSC 512, and by Gray J. in Enns v. Cahan, 2011 BCSC 54, in addressing the similar provision in the trial management rule prohibiting the granting of orders requiring affidavit evidence: that it is for the trial management judge to decide whether a particular application requires affidavit evidence and whether any affidavits that have been tendered are relevant.
 All of that relates to matters of evidence that counsel expected or wanted to put before the trial judge, the availability of that evidence, and the readiness of the defendant to proceed to trial. Those are matters of which counsel are expected to advise the court at the TMC and the court is, of course, entitled to assume counsel’s statements are true. Affidavits in which their legal assistants simply say the same thing about these procedural matters are of no further assistance.
 The enumeration of orders that may be made at a case planning conference is exhaustive but Rule 5-3(1)(k) confers a broad discretion on the case planning judge to make orders respecting expert witnesses and Rule 5-3(1)(v) confers a broad discretion to make any order that advances the objectives of the Rules. The judicial exercise of these discretionary powers requires that some consideration be given to the nature of the orders more specifically enumerated in Rule 5-3. The Rules contemplate active judicial management of litigation and, in particular, judicial regulation of the role of expert witnesses at trial. The Rules require that case planning and trial management be conducted with an eye to efficiency and the proportionality of the expense of the process to the value, importance and complexity of the matters in issue. In my view, an application for an order that expert witnesses be deposed before trial rather than testifying by a video conference at trial is clearly an order of the type that may be made at a case planning or trial management conference, if the factual matrix necessary for making such an order can be established. Such an order is in the nature of the procedural orders enumerated in Rule 5-3.
As discussed earlier this year, Rule 5-2(7) states that “proceedings at a case planning conference must be recorded, but no part of that recording may be made available to or used by any person without court order“. Reasons for judgement were released last month by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, addressing the test to be met for production of these transcripts when opposed by other litigants.
 The words of R. 5-2(7) in their grammatical and ordinary sense support the view that a production order may be granted only exceptionally on reasonable grounds to support the making of the order. The wording of R. 5-2(7) is prohibitory in nature: “no part of that recording [of a CPC] may be made available to or used by any person without court order”. The legislature expressly required that the court exercise discretion before allowing access to or use of the recording. The legislature must have intended that the court exercise its discretion on reasonable grounds. Thus, the order permitting access to the recording or for a transcript must only be made where there are reasonable grounds to do so….
 Litigants and counsel attending a CPC should be free to discuss openly and candidly all aspects of the case, including matters relating to the narrowing of the issues, the merits of the case and the issues, management of the case, or settlement prospects and procedures, without concern that some unguarded comment made during the course of the conference may later be sought to be used to their detriment. The ready availability of transcripts of the proceedings would inevitably inhibit such discussions and frustrate the objectives of the CPC procedures as well as the object of the Rules.
 I reject the argument of the defendant that there ought to be a presumption in favour of production of the CPC transcript. The defendant’s application fails as it has not established any compelling grounds for the exercise of the court’s discretion for the order sought.
 The plaintiff argued that there should be a presumption against the making of an order for the availability or use of a CPC recording. Strictly speaking, the application of the rule does not require a presumption. I simply interpret the rule to require compelling grounds for the exercise of the court’s discretion to make the order. It makes no difference whether that is considered a presumption.
 The plaintiff also argues that the necessary grounds arise out of the specific case before the court. That would seem logical; however, that is not an issue I need to decide as the defendant has not demonstrated any compelling grounds for the order, whether arising out of this case or not.
 The application of the defendant for an order pursuant to R. 5-2(7) is dismissed, with costs.
 Even though the Supreme Court Civil Rules do not expressly provide for consent case plan orders, permitting the parties to file a consent case plan order is not prohibited and is entirely consistent with the object of the rules to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every proceeding on its merits (Rule 1?3(1)). Further, under sub-rule (2), the object is to be achieved, “so far as is practicable,” by conducting the proceedings in a proportionate manner.
 It is important, in considering proportionality, to keep in mind that every court appearance adds a layer of cost for the litigants. Part 5 of the rules, which governs case planning conferences, recognizes this factor. It does not require a case planning conference in every proceeding. In short, the parties may conduct a proceeding entirely without a case plan order if they so choose and the court finds no basis upon which to intervene and direct that a case planning conference take place.
 The foregoing is evident from Rule 5-1(1) which permits any party of record to request a case planning conference and Rule 5-1(2) which permits the court, any time after the pleading period has expired, to direct that a case planning conference take place. I see no reason for refusing parties the opportunity to consent to a proposed case plan without adding the cost of what may well be an entirely unnecessary hearing.
 Nothing in the rules prohibits a consent case plan order. If a party requests, or the court directs, that a case planning conference take place, Rule 5-3(3) requires that the judge or master conducting the case planning conference “must, at the conclusion of the case planning conference, make a case plan order.” I do not interpret that sub-rule as excluding a consent case plan order absent a case planning conference.
 Further, Rule 8-3 governs applications for orders by consent. An application for an order by consent, in the ordinary course, is made by filing a requisition, a draft of the proposed order and evidence that the application is consented to (Rule 8?3(1)(a)-(c)). Sub-rule (2) provides that a registrar may, upon being satisfied that the application is by consent and the appropriate materials filed, refer the application to a judge or master, depending on the jurisdiction necessary to make the particular order. Rule 8-3 does not give rise to an inconsistency with Rule 5-3(3).
 I observe that Rule 5-3(4) requires that case planning orders are to be in Form 21. Form 21 includes a case plan. Rule 8-3, on the other hand, provides for an order in Form 34. Form 34 is easily adaptable, as the parties sought to do here, to incorporate a case plan in compliance with Form 21. The solution is, in my view, adequate, proportionate and cost effective for the parties.
 Even if there is some inconsistency in the forms as drafted, Rule 1-2(3) permits the court to order that any provision of the rules does not apply “if all parties to a proceeding agree.” If necessary, I would apply this sub-rule to permit consent case plan orders.

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