Source: http://masscases.com/cases/sjc/341/341mass534.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 10:17:47+00:00

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STEPHEN S. GORDON vs. SOUTHGATE PARK CORP. (and a companion case [Note 1]).
TWO ACTIONS OF CONTRACT. Writs in the Superior Court dated March 28, 1958, and May 19, 1958, respectively.
The actions were heard by Pecce, J., on the reports of an auditor.
Alan L. Lewis, for Southgate Park Corp.
John R. Ambrogne, (Philip D. Fine with him,) for Gordon.
for $36,800 two lots of land "together with the house to be constructed thereon" by Southgate in accordance with carefully drawn, detailed specifications. Conveyance was to be made on June 1, 1958. Under the contract Southgate agreed to allow Gordon "to have access to and inspect the work during its progress." A substantial number of items in the specifications were in one aspect or another to be accomplished in a manner "to be selected by" Gordon.
By the time he signed the contract Gordon had paid to Southgate a total of $4,500 and on March 12 and 13, 1958, Gordon paid for extra work and for better materials than those specified a total of $345. Early in April, Gordon claimed that Southgate was refusing to permit him to select certain materials as Gordon was permitted to do by the specifications. He brought a bill in equity against Southgate and obtained an order, of which Southgate learned on April 14, which restrained Southgate "from performing any work with respect to which the specifications and agreement provide that . . . [Gordon] shall have a right of choice." Thereafter Southgate refused to allow Gordon on the premises on which the house was being built. In numerous instances, many of them of substantial importance, "specifications [were] not carried out by . . . [Southgate] in whole or in part." On June 2, 1958, there were "no heating, no toilets, [and] no kitchen equipment other than part of . . . [certain] cabinets" on the premises. The "house was not completed by June 2, 1958, . . . and . . . the building had not been inspected and passed as of" that date.
work. Gordon filed an answer and declaration in set-off to recover the sum of $4,845 already mentioned and another item. By amendment Gordon sought a further recovery of $391.43 for payments made to an electrical company, for extra work, for which Gordon had become directly liable to that company.
The cases were referred to an auditor whose findings of fact were to be final. The auditor filed a report in each case. He found for Gordon in the case brought by him in the sum of $4,845, and also found for Gordon upon his declaration in set-off, in the case brought by Southgate, in the sum of $391.43. The facts have been stated in accordance with the findings of the auditor. Motions for judgment on the auditor's report were allowed. Southgate has appealed in each case from the order for judgment and from the denial of motions to recommit the auditor's report. Southgate in its brief, however, does not argue any question with respect to the motions to recommit.
that the building was built partly on land other than that designated in the agreement. As to some of these breaches, when Gordon complained, Southgate refused to make any change and its representative told Gordon "that he didn't want . . . [him] to be fussy and to use a ruler and to make so many complaints." Other substantial breaches, and such breaches were numerous, may have occurred after March 28, 1958, rather than before that date.
other remedies which Gordon may have had (see Carrig v. Gilbert-Varker Corp. 314 Mass. 351, 356-357), he at least became entitled to treat the agreement as broken and to recover all the payments he had made to Southgate. See Ballou v. Billings, 136 Mass. 307, 308-309; Orebaugh v. Badger, 279 Mass. 54, 61. See also Martin v. James Cunningham, Son & Co. 231 Mass. 280, 284; Wilkins v. Berkeley Realty Corp. 311 Mass. 148, 151; Carrig v. Gilbert-Varker Corp. 314 Mass. 351, 356; Restatement: Contracts, Section 347; Restatement: Restitution, Section 108; Corbin, Contracts, Sections 1104, 1106, 1107; Williston, Contracts (Rev. ed.) Sections 1316, 1331, 1467. Cf. Nevins v. Ward, 320 Mass. 70, 73-75.
2. Southgate contends that in early April, 1958, Gordon waived count 2 of his declaration by initiating his bill in equity to restrain Southgate from performing work with respect to which Gordon had a right of choice. We need not consider, however, whether the bill in equity may properly be regarded as merely a reasonable attempt by Gordon to preserve the then existing status of affairs pending further investigation of the alleged breaches of contract or whether it constituted a waiver of breaches prior to March 28, 1958. Waiver, an affirmative defence, was not pleaded by Southgate. The defence cannot be raised at this stage. See Nashua River Paper Co. v. Lindsay, 242 Mass. 206, 208; Siegel v. Shaw, 337 Mass. 170, 174. See also Akasu v. Power, 325 Mass. 497, 502-503.
[Note 1] An action by Southgate against Gordon to recover for alleged "extras."
[Note 2] After a restraining order was issued in the equity suit, Southgate refused at least from April 7 to May 31, 1958, to permit Gordon to come on the premises. This in itself was a substantial breach of the agreement in view of the then pending controversies between the parties. This breach constituted not only further basis for the declaration in set-off contained in Gordon's answer to Southgate's action against him but also a continuing confirmation of Southgate's unwillingness to perform obligations currently due under the contract. In the performance of this building contract, Gordon was entitled to have orderly and constant progress made from day to day in accordance with the plans and specifications. Denial of access to the work would necessarily have the effect of preventing Gordon from seasonably discovering any new breaches by Southgate and of delaying complaint about them.

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