Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/440/29/
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 20:44:12+00:00

Document:
The Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (Act) Amendments of 1972, to combat inflation, replaced the Act's $70 maximum limitation on weekly disability benefits with a four-step limitation scheme tied to specified percentages of the "applicable national average weekly wage" determined annually by the Secretary of Labor. § 6(b)(1). At the same time, death benefits to surviving spouses and children were increased, respectively, from 35% to 50% and from 15% to 163% of the deceased's average weekly wages. Total weekly death benefits were still limited to 663% of the deceased's average weekly wages, but the former specific dollar minimum and maximum limitations on average weekly wages were replaced by a provision dealing only with a minimum limitation tied to the applicable national average weekly wage. Thus, as amended, § 9(e) provides that.
"[i]n computing death benefits the average weekly wages of the deceased shall be considered to have been not less than the applicable national average weekly wage as prescribed in section 6(b) but the total weekly benefits shall not exceed the average weekly wages of the deceased."
Respondents, the widow and son of a covered employee, claimed combined death benefits ($532 per week) equal to 663% of the deceased's average weekly wages. The employer, its insurance carrier, and the Director of the Department of Labor's Office of Workers' Compensation Programs (petitioners) contended that § 6(b)(1)'s limitation on disability payments (then $167 per week), was meant to apply to death benefits as well as disability benefits, and that Congress' failure to place a maximum on death benefits when it amended § 9(e) was inadvertent. An administrative decision in respondents' favor was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
by § 6(b)(1). This conclusion is supported by both the language and legislative history of the 1972 Amendments. Pp. 440 U. S. 35-47.
(a) That the omission of a maximum limitation on death benefits was inadvertent is disproved by the legislative history of the 1972 Amendments, especially the pertinent Committee Reports, which clearly reflect the Committees' understanding that the minimum and maximum limitations on death benefits of former § 9(e) were being eliminated and that only a minimum benefits provision tied to the applicable national average weekly wage was being substituted in their place. Pp. 440 U. S. 37-41.
(b) Section 6(d), which provides that "determinations" under § 6 "with respect to a period" shall apply to employees currently receiving disability benefits or survivors currently receiving death benefits during such period, does not render the maximum limitations contained in § 6(b)(1) applicable to death benefits. Congress' use of the word "determinations" in § 6(d) and of its verb form elsewhere in § 6 strongly suggests that it intended the term to refer only to the Secretary of Labor's annual determination under § 6(b)(3) of the national average weekly wage, not to the mathematical computation of disability benefit maximums contemplated under § 6(b)(1). This view is confirmed by § 6(d)'s legislative history. Pp. 440 U. S. 41-44.
(c) Since both the language and legislative history of the 1972 Amendments show that Congress' omission of a ceiling on death benefits was intentional, this Court must reject petitioners' suggested interpretation of the Act. Pp. 440 U. S. 45-47.
In May, 1973 William Rasmussen was employed as a hydrologist by Geo Control, Inc., which was under contract with the United States to perform work in South Vietnam. Rasmussen was fatally injured during the course of his employment when the vehicle in which he was riding was blown up by a land mine. His employment was within the coverage of the Defense Base Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1651 et seq., which incorporates the provisions of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 44 Stat. 1424, as amended, 33 U.S.C. § 901 et seq. (Act). It is undisputed that Rasmussen's surviving widow and son, [Footnote 1] respondents here, are entitled to death benefits under § 9 of the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 909; the issue dividing the parties and the Courts of Appeals [Footnote 2] is whether death benefits payable under the Act are subject to the maximum limits expressly placed on disability payments by § 6(b)(1). The Act's language and legislative history persuade us that they are not.
ed.). Accordingly, weekly death benefits, like disability benefits, could not exceed $70 nor be less than $18. [Footnote 3] The $70 maximum on death and disability benefits, established in 1961, gradually lost real value as inflation exacted its annual toll, [Footnote 4] and, in 1972, Congress moved to give covered workers added protection.
following percentages of the applicable national average weekly wage as determined by the Secretary . . ."
"(A) 125 per centum or $167, whichever is greater, during the period ending September 30, 1973."
"(B) 150 per centum during the period beginning October 1, 1973, and ending September 30, 1974."
"(C) 175 per centum during the period beginning October 1, 1974, and ending September 30, 1975."
"(D) 200 per centum beginning October 1, 1975. 33 U.S.C. § 906(b)(1)."
The "applicable national average weekly wage" is determined annually by the Secretary of Labor. 33 U.S.C. § 906(b)(3). The Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare estimated that approximately 90% of the disabled workers covered under the amended Act would receive benefits equal to a full 66 2/3% of their average weekly wages. S.Rep. No. 92-1125, p. 5 (1972), Legislative History of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Act Amendments of 1972 (Committee Print compiled for the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare by the Subcommittee on Labor), p. 67 (1972) (hereinafter Leg.Hist.). The four-step phase-in of the section's maximum limitation from 125% to 200% of the applicable national average weekly wage was designed to ease the impact on covered employers of the increase in compensation payments, which Congress expected to at least double for most covered workers. Ibid.
"In computing death benefits the average weekly wages of the deceased shall be considered to have been not less than the applicable national average weekly wage as prescribed in section 6(b) but the total weekly benefits shall not exceed the average weekly wages of the deceased."
dispute was submitted to an Administrative Law Judge, who sustained respondents' position. Petitioners appealed the adverse ruling to the Benefits Review Board, which affirmed. The legislative history of the 1972 Amendments convinced the Board that "elimination of the maximum benefit provision from Section 9(e) of the Act . . . was done consciously and intentionally," and that "failure to substitute a new maximum was . . . a deliberate action." App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 77-1465, pp. 22A-23A. Petitioners appealed the Board's order directly to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 33 U.S.C. § 921(c). The Court of Appeals affirmed, largely adopting the reasoning of the Review Board. We granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the Courts of Appeals on this issue, [Footnote 7] 436 U.S. 955 (1978), and we now affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
death benefits -- the Director of OWCP concedes that § 9(e) was "[u]ndeniably, the most obvious place to stipulate a maximum on death benefits," but suggests that Congress merely "overlooked" this fact when amending the death benefits provisions. Brief for Petitioner in No. 77-1465, pp. 28-29.
One need only state petitioners' argument to recognize its flaws. They suggest, on the one hand, that Congress forgot to stipulate a maximum on death benefits when it amended § 9(e), although that section had contained a fixed ceiling on death benefits since the Act's initial passage in 1927. [Footnote 8] On the other hand, petitioners urge that Congress remembered the question of death benefit maximums while considering § 6, and, rather than incorporate a death benefits ceiling in the section of the Act dealing with death benefits, Congress consciously decided to limit death benefits in the section dealing with disability compensation.
may be assumed to have been the congressional intent to avoid disparate treatment" of disability and death beneficiaries. Brief for Petitioner in No 77-1465, pp. 1, 32. We agree that petitioners' suggested interpretation of the Act is tortuous, and believe that it is refuted by the plain language and legislative history of the pertinent provisions of the 1972 Amendments.
The language of § g(e) is unambiguous: the average weekly wages on which death benefits are calculated can be no less than the applicable national average weekly wage. In amending § 9(e), Congress replaced specific minimum and maximum limitations on average weekly wages, and hence on death benefits, with a minimum limitation governed by the applicable national average weekly wage. That the omission of a maximum limitation on death benefits was inadvertent is disproved by the legislative history of the 1972 Amendments.
"S. 2318, which I cosponsored with Senator Williams, would eliminate the maximum payment limitations. . . ."
"The second bill, S. 525, introduced by the late Senator Prouty at the request of the administration, would also increase the benefits although retaining a maximum limitation."
congressional intent, we find it impossible to conclude that the absence of a fixed maximum limitation on death benefits in § 9(e) was the result of inadvertence.
The benefit maximums contained in § 6(b)(1) are plainly restricted to "compensation for disability." Petitioners argue, however, that Congress made § 6(b)(1)'s disability benefit maximums applicable to death benefits through § 6(d). Close examination of the wording used by Congress in the latter provision persuades us otherwise.
Since there are no "determinations" made under § 6(d), its reference to "this subsection" is plainly in error. The parties agree, and we conclude, that the words "this subsection" should read "this section." [Footnote 14] The question thus becomes what "determinations . . with respect to a period" did Congress have in mind when it enacted § 6(d).
"As soon as practicable after June 30 of each year, and in any event prior to October 1 of such year, the Secretary shall determine the national average weekly wage for the three consecutive calendar quarters ending June 30. Such determination shall be the applicable national average wage for the period beginning with October 1 of that year and ending with September 30 of the next year. The initial determination under this paragraph shall be made as soon as practicable after [October 27, 1972]."
for the first time during the period."
supra at 5-6, Leg.Hist. 67-68. We conclude that § 6(d) does not render the maximum limitations contained in § 6(b)(1) applicable to death benefits.
may well have retained maximum benefit limitations in § 6(b)(1) to discourage feigned disability, a consideration wholly inapplicable to death benefits. Nor is it inconceivable that the financial needs of the disabled worker's family could increase upon his death. The typical disabled worker, though no longer physically able to ply his trade, might be able to contribute to the family's livelihood by assuming a variety of domestic responsibilities, thus releasing his spouse into the workforce. The disabled worker's death would, under such circumstances, rob the family of an economic asset.
* Together with No. 77-1491, Geo Control, Inc., et al., v. Rasmussen et al., also on certiorari to the same court.
Rasmussen's surviving son is entitled to benefits until his 18th birthday, or, if he qualifies under the Act as a student, until his 23d birthday. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 902(14), (18), and 909(b).
Compare 567 F.2d 1385 (case below), with Director, Office of Workers' Comp. v. O'Keefe, 545 F.2d 337 (CA3 1976), and Director, Office of Workers' Comp. v. Boughman, 178 U.S.App.D.C. 132, 545 F.2d 210 (1976) .
Under former § 9(b), a surviving widow was entitled to 35% of her deceased husband's average wages and an additional 15% of the deceased's wages for each surviving child, subject to a limit of 662,% of the deceased's wages. Thus, a widow without children, although nominally entitled by former § 9(b) to 35% of her deceased husband's average weekly wages, was actually entitled only to 35% of $105. A widow with three or more children, however, was entitled to the maximum aggregate percentage of weekly wages (66 2/3%), which would result in an award of $70 in weekly death benefits. The 1972 Amendments increased the percentage shares of surviving widows and children to 50 and 16 2/3, respectively, although the maximum aggregate percentage limitation of 66 2/3 was retained.
According to 1972 congressional reports, the average weekly wage for private, nonagricultural employees was $135 a week, while longshoremen averaged over $200 per week in some ports. H.R.Rep. No. 92-1441, p. 1 (1972), Legislative History of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act Amendments of 1972 (Committee Print compiled for the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare by the Subcommittee on Labor), p. 207 (1972) (hereinafter Leg.Hist.); S.Rep. No. 92-1125, p. 4 (1972), Leg.Hist. 66. The $70 limitation on death and disability benefits precluded most employees and their survivors from receiving 66% of the employee's average weekly wages, and, in some cases, the $70 maximum constituted as little as 30% of the employee's average weekly wages. S.Rep. No. 92-1125, p. 5, Leg.Hist. 67.
The dispute was initially litigated before the Deputy Commissioner for the Fifteenth Compensation District of the Department of Labor's Office of Workers' Compensation Programs (OWCP), who ruled that § 6(b)(1)'s limitations on compensation apply to death benefits as well a to benefit for permanent total disability. On appeal the Benefits Review Board vacated the decision on the ground that the Deputy Commissioner lacked authority to resolve the issue.
The original Act provided that compensation benefits for disability were not to exceed $25 per week. Act of Mar. 4, 1927, § 6(b), 44 Stat. 1426. The maximum compensation benefit for death was 66 2/3% of the employee's average weekly wages, considered to be not more than $37.50 per week. § 9(c), 44 Stat. 1430. Thus, the maximum weekly benefit for both disability and death was $25. Subsequent amendments raised benefit levels, but did not disturb the relationship between disability and death compensation maximums. See Act of June 24, 1948, ch. 623, §§ 1, 3, 62 Stat. 602; Act of July 26, 1956, ch. 735, §§ 1, 4, 70 Stat. 654, 655; Act of July 14, 1961, Pub.L. 87-87, §§ 1, 2, 75 Stat. 203.
S. 525, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., §§ 4(a), 8(c) (1971), Leg.Hist. 395, 399; H.R. 3505, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., §§ 4(a), 8(c) (1971), Leg.Hist. 417, 421.
"Section 6(b) of such Act is amended to read as follows:"
"'Compensation for disability shall not exceed $119 a week and compensation for total disability shall not be less than $35 per week. . . .'"
"In computing death benefits the average weekly wages of the deceased shall be considered to have been not more than $178.50, nor less than $52.50, but the total weekly compensation shall not exceed the weekly wages of the deceased."
S. 2318, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., §§ 4(a), 10(b) (1971), Leg.Hist. 6, 10; H.R. 12006, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., §§ 4(a), 10(b) (1971), Leg.Hist. 146, 149-150.
"In computing death benefits the average weekly wages of the deceased shall be considered to have been not less than $80 but the total weekly compensation shall not exceed the weekly wages of the deceased."
" (b) Compensation for total disability shall not be less than $64 per week: Provided, however, That, if the employee's average weekly wages as computed under section 10 are less than $64 per week, he shall receive as compensation for total disability his average weekly wages."
"We strongly support the enactment of S. 2318 as the most effective proposal to accomplish the long overdue increase in the benefit levels of injured longshoremen. First and foremost, that bill would eliminate the artificial and totally unrealistic restrictions on benefit amounts. This would enable compensation awards, for the first time, to reflect realistically the loss of earnings suffered by injured employees. . . ."
"The administration bill, S. 525, would also raise benefit levels. The proposed increase in maximum weekly compensation from $70.00 to $119.00 represents a substantial improvement, but one that is already obsolete. . . ."
"We urge that the Congress not adopt a benefit level grounded on built-in obsolescence. Far more equitable is the approach manifested in S. 2318."
Hearings 156-158. See id. at 63 (testimony of Howard McGuigan, Legislative Representative, AFL-CIO), 133 (testimony of Patrick Tobin, Washington Representative, International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union), 700 (testimony of Frank E. Fitzsimmons, General President, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America) .
"[W]e respectfully submit that it is not advisable to remove the monetary maximum benefits payable per week under the Longshoremen's Act, and therefore recommend that the provisions of Section 8 of S. 525 be retained in this regard."
"[W]e endorse the basic concepts of S. 2318, and propose innovations or variations which we consider urgent and demanding, yet equitable to all concerned."
"Of major impact and importance to the industry are the proposals to increase weekly benefits. One such proposal would amend section 6(b) of the act by increasing the minimum weekly rate from $18 to $54 and eliminating the present maximum weekly benefit rate of $70."
"We agreed that the minimum rate should be increased. However, this proposal leaves us with a weekly benefit rate of two-thirds of the employee's average weekly earnings without limitation."
"We recognize the intent of the proposal, and we suggest for your consideration that the maximum weekly benefit be predicated upon the average weekly wage in the shipbuilding and ship repair industry, that it be 66 and two-thirds percent of the injured employee's average weekly wage computed under section 10, subject to a maximum of 150 percent of the average weekly wage of the shipbuilding and ship repair industry."
It is inconceivable that Congress, with this debate on benefit maximums raging all about it, unwittingly omitted a death benefit ceiling in amended § 9(b).
S. 2318 was passed by the Senate on September 14, 1972. 118 Cong.Rec. 30670, 30674. H.R. 12006 was passed by the House on October 14, 1972, 118 Cong.Rec. 36376, 36389, and returned to the Senate, which concurred in the identical House version. 118 Cong.Rec. 36265, 36274 (1972).
"Subsection(d) of this section amends section 9(e) of the Act, eliminating the dollar minimum and maximum set out under persent [sic] law for the average weekly wages of the deceased to be used in computing death benefits. The minimum substituted by this amendment is the applicable national average weekly wage as prescribed in section 6(b) of the Act, except that the total weekly benefits may not exceed the actual average weekly wages of the deceased."
H.R.Rep. No. 92-1441, p. 19 (1972), Leg.Hist. 225.
Both the House and Senate Reports, in discussing the major provisions of the respective bills, deal expressly with the subject of minimum and maximum death benefits, noting that such benefits are "subject to a maximum of 66 2/3 percent of the [deceased's] average weekly wages" and to "[a] minimum . . . tied to the applicable national average weekly wage. . . ." S.Rep. No. 92-1125, p. 6 (1972), Leg.Hist. 68; H.R.Rep. No. 92-1441, p. 4 (1972), Leg.Hist. 210.
Section 6(d)'s reference to "this subsection" apparently refers to subsection(a) of § 5 of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act Amendments of 1972, 86 Stat. 1252, and hence to §§ 6(b)(d) of the Act. See Director, Office of Workers' Comp. Programs v. O'Keefe, 545 F.2d at 344; Director, Office of Workers' Comp. Programs v. Boughman, 178 App.D.C. at 137, 545 F.2d at 215.
"To the extent that employees receiving compensation for total permanment [sic] disability or survivors receiving death benefits receive less than the compensation they would receive if there were no phase-in, their compensation is to be increased as the ceiling moves to 200 percent."
"The bill also requires an annual redetermination by the Secretary which will allow any increase in the national average weekly wage to be reflected by an appropriate increase in compensation payable under the Act."
S.Rep. No. 1125, supra, at 5-6, Leg.Hist. 67-68; see n. 17, infra. This latter statement is consistent with our reading of § 6, and, to the extent the earlier statement is an indication of legislative intent, we agree with the Court of Appeals that "it is overwhelmingly outweighed by the contrary purport of the legislative history as a whole." 567 F.2d at 1388 n. 5.
"Effective October 1 of each year, the compensation or death benefits payable for permanent total disability or death arising out of injuries sustained after [October 27, 1972], shall be increased by a percentage equal to the percentage (if any) by which the applicable national weekly wage for the period beginning on such October 1, as determined under section 6(b), exceeds the applicable national average weekly wage, as so determined, for the period beginning with the preceding October 1."
This provision makes clear that, in cases of permanent total disability and death, benefits are adjusted upward each year that the national average wage rises. Although § 10(f) gives the incremental increase in compensation payments to all beneficiaries in death and permanent total disability cases, including those unaffected by a statutory minimum or maximum, the incidental effect is partially to lift any ceiling and, to the same extent, any floor applicable to such benefits.
Although § 6(d) and § 10(f) overlap substantially, they are not entirely duplicative. The latter section applies only when benefits of a particular type are received in two consecutive years. If an employee receiving benefits for total and permanent disability in year 1 died in year 2, his survivors must look to § 6(d) to determine whether the "applicable" national average weekly wage for purposes of computing minimum death benefits under § 9(e) is the national average wage determined by the Secretary for year 1, when the employee's injury occurred, or that determined for year 2, when the employee died. For example, suppose that a covered worker was permanently and totally disabled in year 1. Suppose further that, at the time of the injury, his average weekly wages were $90, and that the national average weekly wage was $100. The worker would be entitled under § 8(a) to disability benefits of $60 per week (66 2/3% of $90), significantly more than the minimum payment of $50 per week (50% of $100) provided under § 6(b)(2). If the worker died during the following year, leaving a widow and one or more children, his survivors would be entitled to death benefits amounting to 66 2/3% of the national average weekly wage. Assuming the national average weekly wage had increased 5% in year 2, the question would arise whether the worker's survivors were entitled to death benefits calculated on the higher national average weekly wage. Reference to § 6(d) reveals that the worker's widow and children, having been "newly awarded" death benefits during year 2, would be entitled to calculate their benefits on the higher national average weekly wage.
"The bill also requires an annual redetermination by the Secretary which will allow any increase in the national average weekly wage to be reflected by an appropriate increase in compensation payable under the Act. A similar provision for upgrading benefits in future years for cases of permanent total disability or death benefits is contained in section 10 of the Act (Section 11 of the bill)."
S.Rep. No. 92-1125, pp. 5-6 (1972), Leg.Hist. 67-68 (emphasis added).
"If we assume the Secretary has determined that the applicable national average weekly wage is $100, the compensation for an employee whose actual average weekly wage was $60 would be determined as follows:"
"Under [33 U.S.C.] § 908(a), the employee would normally receive 66 2/3 percent of his average weekly wage, or $40. However, § 906(b)(2) states that the minimum compensation shall be 50 percent of the national average weekly wage, or $50. An employee in this situation would receive $50 compensation for total disability."
"Under [33 U.S.C.] § 909(b), if, for example, the employee is survived by a widow or widower and one or more children, the total amount payable is 66 2/3 percent of the average weekly wage of the deceased, or $40. However, § 909(e) states that, where the average weekly wage is less than the national average weekly wage, the national average should be used in place of the employee's actual average, and here we should take 66 2/3 percent of $100, or $66.66. § 909(e) then limits this minimum compensation to the actual average weekly wage, so the survivors would receive $60 compensation."
"Making these same assumptions, the minimum compensation calculations for employees with average weekly wages greater than half the national average weekly wage and less than the national average weekly wage result in greater compensation for death than disability, as the following chart indicates:"
567 F.2d at 1390, n.9.

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