Source: http://il.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20180302_0000649.SIL.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 15:14:26+00:00

Document:
TIMOTHY AMDAHL and DAVID RAINS, Defendants.
This matter has been referred to United States Magistrate Judge Donald G. Wilkerson by United States District David R. Herndon pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b), and SDIL-LR 72.1(a) for a Report and Recommendation on Defendant David Rains' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 19). For the reasons set forth below, it is RECOMMENDED the motion be GRANTED and that the Court adopts the following findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Count 1 - First Amendment claim against Amdahl for confiscating Plaintiff's prayer rug on June 29, 2017.
Count 2 - First Amendment retaliation claim against Amdahl for filing two unsubstantiated disciplinary charges against Plaintiff (June 29, 2017 and July 19, 2017) and for confiscating Plaintiff's prayer rug on June 29, 2017, after Plaintiff filed a civil rights lawsuit naming Amdahl as a defendant (No. 17-cv-66).
Prior to filing the instant action, Plaintiff filed a pro se civil rights action against numerous Robinson officials, including the three individuals named in this case. See Moir v. Amdahl et al., No. 3:17-cv-66-DRH-RJD (filed January 23, 2017) (Doc. 1, p. 3). In the instant action, Moir contends Defendants are harassing him in retaliation for filing the prior lawsuit. The allegations of harassment include taking Plaintiff's property without justification (a prayer mat and a hot plate), false disciplinary charges, and a threat to remove Plaintiff from the transitions program (Doc. 9, pp. 3-5).
In the original Complaint, Moir also raised a claim against Defendant Davis Rains. The Court dismissed Rains from the action in his individual capacity, but because Rains was the warden of Robinson Correctional Center, he remained as a defendant in his official capacity for purposes of any injunctive relief ordered by the Court (Doc. 9, p. 6).
On October 27, 2018 Moir filed a Notice of Change of Address providing with the Court with a personal address in Iowa (Doc. 12).
Summary judgment is proper only where there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Spurling v. C & M Fine Pack, Inc., 739 F.3d 1055, 1060 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a)). Courts review the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, to determine whether there are genuine issues of fact or the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Albiero v. City of Kankakee, 246 F.3d 927, 931-32 (7th Cir. 2001). The court must view the record, and any inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts, in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962); Albiero v. City of Kankakee, 246 F.3d 927, 931-32 (7th Cir. 2001) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)). If material issues of fact exist that would allow a reasonable jury to find in favor of the non-moving party, summary judgment is inappropriate. Spurling, 739 F.3d at 1060.
Once a party is transferred from state custody they no longer have a basis for obtaining injunctive relief against a prison. Wilke v. Cole, 630 Fed.Appx. 615, 619 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Pearson v. Welborn, 471 F.3d 732, 743 (7th Cir. 2006)); see also Easterling v. Pollard, 528 Fed.Appx. 653, 656 (7th Cir. 2013); Vinning-El v. Evans, 657 F.3d 591, 592 (7th Cir. 2011)). Such relief is considered moot unless the prisoner “can demonstrate that he is likely to be retransferred.” Higgason v. Farley, 83 F.3d 807, 811 (7th Cir. 1996).
Here, it is undisputed that Moir has been released from IDOC custody (Doc. 12, Doc. 19, p. 2). There is no evidence to suggest Moir will be remanded back to the custody of either the IDOC or Robinson Correctional Center. Thus, any claims for injunctive relief in the case are now moot. Since Defendant Rains remained as a Defendant solely in his official capacity for purposes of injunctive relief, the Court finds it proper to now dismiss him as a defendant.

References: § 636
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.