Source: http://al.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20180326_0000339.MAL.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 02:59:19+00:00

Document:
DERRICK CUNNINGHAM, D.T. MARSHALL, WANDA J. ROBINSON, BARBARA PALMER, KEVIN J. MURPHY, MELVIN TURNER, QCHC, INC., JOHNNY BATES, DONALD KERN, JERRY GURLEY, DR. WHITE, DIONNE BAKER, SHARON SMITH, TERESA VARDEN, DAFFANY ABBINGTON, TIFFANY CLARK, DEBORAH MUSE, KIM PATTERSON, and MICHELLE BEASLEY, Defendants.
These are a few of the well-pleaded factual allegations contained in Mr. Hutchinson's Amended Complaint, in which he brings claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the jail staff responsible for his placement, the company- QCHC, Inc.-that contracted with the County to provide medical services to inmates, and the individual QCHC nurses and physicians responsible for medical treatment at the jail. All defendants move to dismiss. Before the court is the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation (Doc. # 116), to which Mr. Hutchinson has timely filed objections (Doc. # 117). Upon an independent review of the record and a de novo determination of those issues to which Mr. Hutchinson objects, the court finds that the Magistrate Judge's Recommendation is due to be adopted.
The court reviews objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation de novo, and it “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure tests the sufficiency of the complaint against the legal standard set forth in Rule 8: “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, ” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). In ruling on a motion to dismiss, courts “must accept the well pleaded facts as true and resolve them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Paradise Divers, Inc. v. Upmal, 402 F.3d 1087, 1089 (11th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). To survive Rule 12(b)(6) scrutiny, however, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). If there are “enough fact[s] to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence” to support the claim, there are “plausible” grounds for recovery, and a motion to dismiss should be denied. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.
The Magistrate Judge provided a thorough recitation of the factual and procedural history of this case, which Mr. Hutchinson does not dispute and which the court need not repeat. (See Doc. # 116, at 4-11.) Mr. Hutchinson objects to two of the Magistrate Judge's recommendations: first, that his § 1983 claim for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs against QCHC be dismissed with prejudice; and second, that his § 1983 deliberate indifference claims against the Sheriff Defendants be dismissed with prejudice. Each objection will be considered in turn.
The Supreme Court has explained that the “final policymaker” theory of municipal liability attaches “only where the decisionmaker possesses final authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the action ordered.” Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481 (1986) (emphasis added). In other words, the theory provides a plausible claim for relief “where-and only where-a deliberate choice to follow a course of action is made from among various alternatives by the official or officials responsible for establishing final policy with respect to the subject matter in question.” Id. at 483.

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