Source: https://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-supreme-court/241/432.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 20:51:56+00:00

Document:
Mr. H. P. White for plaintiffs in error.
Charles Coleman, the defendant in error, brought this suit to set aside a conveyance of an undivided interest in lands inherited from his Indian wife and child, who were members of the Osage Tribe. Judgment was entered annulling the conveyance upon the ground that it was executed in violation of restrictions imposed by Congress. The judgment was affirmed by the supreme court of the state (43 Okla. 13, 140 Pac. 607), and this writ of error has been sued out.
The case was decided upon a motion for judgment on the pleadings, and there were special findings of the facts which the pleadings disclosed. It appears that the plaintiff, Charles Coleman, was a white man, lawfully married to an Indian woman, Mary Chesewalla; that their child, Joseph Coleman, was born on February 27, 1906, and died on the same day, leaving his father and mother his sole heirs; that his mother died intestate on February 28, 1906, leaving as her sole heirs Charles Coleman, Herbert Chesewalla, and Floyd Chesewalla; that both decedents were duly enrolled as members of the Osage Tribe, and were entitled to allotments under the act of Congress of June 28, 1906 (34 Stat. at L. 539, chap. 3572); and that, after their death, allotments were made in their right to the heirs of each respectively, the allotment deeds being approved by the Secretary of the Interior and recorded in the year 1909. By the death of his wife and child the plaintiff took title as heir to an undivided one-half interest in the lands allotted in the right of the former, and to an undivided three-fourths interest in lands allotted in the right of the latter. These lands have not been partitioned. In February, 1909, Charles Coleman conveyed by warranty deed his undivided interest to the defendant ( plaintiff in error) the Levindale Lead & Zinc Mining Company. It is further set forth that his wife had not received [241 U.S. 432, 434] a certificate of competency. There was no finding and no basis in the record for a finding that Charles Coleman was a member of the Osage Tribe by adoption, enrolment, or otherwise.
'Sec. 6. That the lands, moneys, and mineral interests, herein provided for, of any deceased member of the Osage Tribe shall descend to his or her legal heirs, according to the laws of the territory of Oklahoma, or of the state in which said reservation may be hereinafter incorporated, except where the decedent leaves no issue, nor husband nor wife, in which case said lands, moneys, and mineral interests, must go to the mother and father equally.
The provisions of the allotment act must be construed in the light of the policy they were obviously intended to execute. It was a policy relating to the welfare of Indians,-wards of the United States. The establishment of restrictions against alienation 'evinced the continuance, to this extent, at least, of the guardianship which the United States had exercised from the beginning.' Heckman v. United States, 224 U.S. 413, 436 , 56 S. L. ed. 820, 829, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 424; United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 , 30 S. L. ed. 228, 230, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1109; United States v. Rickert, 188 U.S. 432, 437 , 438 S., 47 L. ed. 532, 536, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 478; Marchie Tiger v. Western Invest. Co. 221 U.S. 286, 316 , 55 S. L. ed. 738, 749, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 578; Williams v. Johnson, 239 U.S. 414, 420 , 60 S. L. ed. --, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 150. This policy did not embrace white men,-persons not of Indian blood,-who were not as Indians under national protection, although they might inherit lands from Indians; and, with respect to such persons, it would require clear language to show an intent to impose restrictions.
Taken in thier natural sense, the provisions of the fourth paragraph of 2 apply only to allotments made to members of the tribe. There is nothing to suggest that a nonmember should designate a 'homestead,' and unless lands were thus segregated the restrictions as to 'homesteads' would not apply. With respect to 'surplus lands,' it will be observed that it is only selections of each 'member,' and the share of remaining lands 'allotted to the member,' which constitute lands so described and thus come under the stated restrictions. It was early ruled administratively that under 6 the right to the member's share, though unallotted in his lifetime, passed to his legal heirs as there [241 U.S. 432, 438] defined, and this we assume to be the meaning of the statute. But the fact that the nonmember takes in the right of the deceased member is not enough to subject him to restrictions which are plainly imposed for the protection of members. It is urged that the restrictions, by virtue of their terms, were to run with the land until they expired by limitation or were removed (Bowling v. United States, 233 U.S. 528 , 58 L. ed. 1080, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 659), but restrictions would not run with the land unless they had attached. And, even where they had attached, they would run only according to the intendment of the statute. We find no indication of an intent that they should apply to lands, or an interest in lands, which had come lawfully into the ownership of white men who were nonmembers of the tribe. Emphasis is placed by the defendant in error on the provisions of 7 as to leases; but it would be an inadmissible construction of this section to say that the word 'heirs' was there used in contradistinction to 'members.' This provision as to leases, in the light of the purpose of the act, had reference, we think, to the 'individual members' who received allotments and the Indian heirs of such members.
The view we have taken of the inapplicability of the restrictions upon alienation in a case like the present finds support in the fact that there was no provision for giving to nonmembers certificates of competency. Under the seventh paragraph of 2, any 'adult member' of the tribe, although a full-blood Indian, who could satisfy the Secretary of the Interior of his ability to transact his own business, might obtain a certificate and thus be enabled to dispose of his 'surplus land;' but a competent white man, not a member, could not be relieved. It would seem to be evident that such an incongruous result was not intended, the language plainly showing that Indians alone were deemed to be subjected to the restrictions.
It is insisted that subsequent legislation in pari materia indicates the contrary. Reference is made to the acts [241 U.S. 432, 439] of March 3, 1909 (35 Stat. at L. 778, chap. 256), and of April 18, 1912 ( 37 Stat. at L. 86, chap. 83). The former does not aid this contention, but is rather opposed to it: The statute authorized the Secretary of the Interior to sell 'part or all of the surplus lands of any member' of the Osage Tribe, but contained no authority to deal with lands of nonmembers. It will also be observed that prior to this act there was a joint resolution of February 27, 1909 (35 Stat. at L. 1167), providing that 'homesteads of members of the Osage Tribe' may consist of land designated from any one or more 'of their first three allotment selections;' this does not suggest that nonmembers were supposed to designate 'homesteads.' But it is the act of 1912 upon which chief reliance is placed. This was 'supplementary to and amendatory of' the act of 1906, and provides, among other things, in 6, relating to the lands 'of deceased Osage allottees,' that 'when the heirs of such deceased allottees have certificates of competency or are not members of the tribe, the restrictions on alienation are hereby removed.' We lay aside the suggestion that 'deceased Osage allottees' may be taken to mean only members who received allotments in their own right while living, expressing no opinion upon that point. For not only is a legislative declaration of the intent of a previous act not absolutely controlling, but we think that in the present instance the purpose of Congress is manifest. This suit had been decided in the district court of the state in December, 1910, and it had been there held that the restriction applied to nonmembers. The case had been appealed, but it may well be supposed that Congress intended to remove the restriction upon a nonmember, if such a restriction could be deemed to exist. That, we are satisfied, was the object of the provision, and it was not an attempt to import into the earlier act a restriction which lay wholly outside its express terms and the policy of guardianship it was intended to execute.
We confine ourselves to the single point presented. There is no controversy whatever as to the authority of the Secretary of the Interior, where there are undivided interests belonging to Indians, adequately to protect those interests according to the statutory provisions to this end. Our conclusion simply is that the act of 1906 placed no restrictions upon the alienation of land, or undivided interests in land, of which white men who were not members of the tribe became owners.
The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

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