Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/119/110/
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 09:11:08+00:00

Document:
"The act of the people of the State of New York passed May 11, 1865, three-fifths being present, being chapter 694 of the Laws of 1865, entitled 'An act in relation to the deposits required to be made, and the taxes, fines, fees, and other charges payable by insurance companies of sister states,' as amended by the act of 1875, c. 60, provides as follows, viz.,"
"The State of Pennsylvania, by an act passed April 4, 1873, and ever since in force, enacted as follows, viz.,"
agreed statement of facts. But all that is there said is that the defendant insists that the statute is "unconstitutional and void, and not a legitimate exercise of legislative power." The question was considered in both the supreme court and the Court of Appeals as to the validity of the statute under the Constitution of New York as being a law made to depend for its operation on the legislation of a foreign state, and thus an illegitimate exercise of legislative power. This contention is fairly within the words of the agreed statement, and if it depended wholly on that statement to determine whether the record raises a federal question, some doubt might exist. But in view of what was said in Murdock v. Memphis, 20 Wall. 590, 87 U. S. 633, in Gross v. United States Mortgage Co., 108 U. S. 477; and in Adams County v. Burlington & Missouri Railroad Co., 112 U. S. 123, we think that we are at liberty to look into the opinion of the Court of Appeals, a copy of which, duly authenticated by the proper officer, is transmitted to us with the record in compliance with our eighth rule, for the purpose of aiding in determining what was decided by that court. From that opinion it appears that the court not only decided against the defendant all the questions other than federal which were raised, including two under the Constitution of New York, but also decided against it the federal question referred to. If the court had decided in its favor any one of the other questions which went to the whole cause of action, there would have been no necessity for considering the federal question. But as it was, the decision of that question became necessary to the disposition of the case, and was fully considered, not sua sponte, but as a point presented by the defendant.
As to the power of Congress to regulate commerce among the several states, the Court said that while the power conferred included commerce carried on by corporations as well as that carried on by individuals, "issuing a policy of insurance is not a transaction of commerce." This decision only followed the principles laid down in the earlier cases of Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet. 519, 38 U. S. 588, and Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 18 How. 404.
The same rulings were followed in Ducat v. Chicago, 10 Wall. 410, where it was said that the power of a state to discriminate between her own corporations and those of other states desirous of transacting business within her jurisdiction being clearly established, it belonged to the state to determine as to the nature or degree of discrimination, "subject only to such limitations on her sovereignty as may be found in the fundamental law of the union." Other cases to the same effect are Liverpool Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 10 Wall. 566; Doyle v. Continental Ins. Co., 94 U. S. 535, and Cooper Mfg. Co. v. Ferguson, 113 U. S. 727.
"has uniformly complied with all the requirements and conditions imposed by the laws of this state upon fire insurance companies from other states establishing and maintaining agencies in this state, except the payment of the tax now in dispute, upon premiums received by it in 1881 upon risks located within the State of New York, and which is the subject of this controversy, and has received from year to year certificates of authority from the Superintendent of the Insurance Department of this state, as provided to be issued under the act, c. 466 of the Laws of 1853, and the subsequent acts amendatory thereof."
Schollenberger, 96 U. S. 374, it was decided that a foreign insurance company doing business in Pennsylvania under the authority of a statute of that commonwealth requiring, as a condition precedent to its being there, an agreement that judicial process served upon its agent should have the same effect as if served upon the corporation, was, within the meaning of the act of Congress of 1875, "found" in that state so as to give jurisdiction to the courts of the United States sitting in that state of suits brought there against such company accompanied by service of process upon its agent. The subject was again considered in St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U. S. 357, where it was said that there was no sound reason why, in the case of an insurance company doing business in another state by an agent under statutes such as those referred to should not be deemed to be represented in the latter by such agent and held responsible for its obligations and liabilities there incurred. See also Railroad Co. v. Harris, 12 Wall. 65; Railway Co. v. Whitton, 13 Wall. 285.

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