Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/324/786/
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 04:32:32+00:00

Document:
Petitioner, an Indian under a state court sentence of imprisonment for one to seven years upon his plea of guilty to a charge of burglary, petitioned a state court for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that he had been deprived of due process of law in that the trial court failed to advise him of his constitutional rights to counsel and to call witnesses; that he had not waived those rights by word or action, and that the conviction was void because the alleged crime was committed on an Indian Reservation which was within exclusive federal jurisdiction.
1. The allegations of the petition showed a prima facie violation of petitioner's right to counsel, and he was entitled to a hearing upon them. Pp. 788, 791.
2. By his plea of guilty, petitioner had not waived his constitutional right to counsel. P. 324 U. S. 788.
3. The state court having placed its judgment of dismissal squarely on the absence of merit in the petition, this Court cannot conclude that the petition failed to satisfy procedural requirements. P. 324 U. S. 792.
144 Neb. 547, 14 N.W.2d 850, reversed.
Certiorari, 323 U.S. 696, to review a judgment affirming the dismissal of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
one to seven years. He petitioned another state District Court for a writ of habeas corpus seeking release from the penitentiary on the grounds, among others, [Footnote 1] that he had been deprived of his constitutional right of counsel, and that the state court lacked jurisdiction. He alleged that he was ignorant of the law, and that, in preparing his petition, he had no one to help him except a fellow inmate. Petitioner did not challenge the facts stated in the judgment entry, i.e., that, in the burglary proceedings, he was arraigned and pleaded guilty, that the burglary statute was read to him, and that he then reiterated his plea. He challenged the validity of the judgment, however, on the ground that, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, he had been deprived of due process of law in that the trial court failed to advise him of his constitutional rights to counsel and to call witnesses. Petitioner further alleged that he had not waived those rights by word or action. Finally, the petition alleged that the conviction was void because the alleged crime was committed on an Indian Reservation which was exclusively within federal jurisdiction.
rights are involved, we granted certiorari and appointed counsel to represent petitioner. 323 U.S. 696.
"It is not necessary that there be a formal waiver, and a waiver will ordinarily be implied where accused appears without counsel and fails to request that counsel be assigned to him, particularly where accused voluntarily pleads guilty."
It is apparent that the court's affirmance did not rest on its statement that a plea of guilty "ordinarily implied" a waiver of the right to counsel, but upon a holding that such a plea "absolutely" and finally waives that right. [Footnote 2] This is inconsistent with our interpretation of the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment.
charged with an offense of this character is incapable adequately of making his defense, that he is unable to get counsel, and that he does not intelligently and understandingly waive counsel. [Footnote 3] Whether all these conditions exist is a matter which must be determined by evidence where the facts are in dispute.
The petitioner's need for legal counsel in this case is strikingly emphasized by the allegation in his habeas corpus petition that the offense for which the state court convicted him was committed on a government Indian Reservation "without and beyond the jurisdiction of the Court." This raises an involved question of federal jurisdiction, posing a problem that is obviously beyond the capacity of even an intelligent and educated layman, and which clearly demands the counsel of experience and skill.
as are all other persons committing any of the above crimes within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States."
lands have been disposed of under this latter statute, the State finds support for its contention in this Court's interpretation of that Act in Matter of Heff, 197 U. S. 488. But later cases have cast considerable doubt on what was said in the Heff decision. United States v. Celestine, 215 U. S. 278, 215 U. S. 290-291; Hallowell v. United States, 221 U. S. 317, 221 U. S. 323; Tiger v. Western Investment Co., 221 U. S. 286, 221 U. S. 314; Donnelly v. United States, 228 U. S. 243, 228 U. S. 269-272; United States v. Chavez, 290 U. S. 357; United States v. McGowan, 302 U. S. 535, 302 U. S. 539.
All of these questions concerning the power of the State Courts to try this Indian petitioner for burglary indicate the complexities of the problem he would have found had he attempted to defend himself on this ground. And a decision by the State Court that it had jurisdiction might or might not have finally determined the issue. Cf. Toy Toy v. Hopkins, 212 U. S. 542, 212 U. S. 549, and Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U. S. 19.
We conclude that the petitioner is entitled to a hearing on his allegations that he did not, in the burglary proceedings, waive his constitutional right to have the benefit of counsel.
writ. [Footnote 5] And this treatment is in line with federal practice.
"A petition for habeas corpus ought not to be scrutinized with technical nicety. Even if it is insufficient in substance, it may be amended in the interest of justice."
Since the State Court placed its judgment precisely on the absence of merit in the petition, we could not, except by speculation, conclude that the petition failed to measure up to its procedural requirements. [Footnote 7] For the reasons given, we hold that the allegations of the petition showed a prima facie violation of the petitioner's right to counsel.
Allegations of the petition charging that the petitioner's imprisonment was illegal under state laws need not be set out, since those questions have been finally adjudicated by the state Supreme Court, and are not subject to review here. Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U. S. 329, 312 U. S. 330.
"A plea of guilty admits all facts sufficiently pleaded, . . . operates as a waiver of any defense, and . . . with it, of course, the constitutional guarantees with the respect to the conduct of criminal prosecutions."
The court therefore said that, since the record affirmatively showed "that the defendant had pleaded guilty, this absolutely waives this and all other preliminary steps in connection therewith. . . ."
Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U. S. 471; Tomkins v. Missouri, 323 U. S. 485; House v. Mayo, 324 U. S. 42.
Ex parte Cross, 20 Neb. 417, 30 N.W. 428; Kitto v. State, 98 Neb. 164, 152 N.W. 380; State v. Campbell, 53 Minn. 354, 55 N.W. 553; People v. Daly, 212 N.Y. 183, 105 N.E. 1048; United States v. Kagama, 118 U. S. 375.
"It must be conceded that the petition is not a skillfully drawn pleading, but, as it was not attacked in the district court, it must receive a liberal construction here. . . . Crocker made no appearance in the case, and the warrant was not set out in any of the pleadings. When attacked after judgment, the petition, though informal, must be held sufficient."
Urban v. Brailey, 85 Neb. 796, 798, 799, 124 N.W. 467, 468.
"It has been held that the proper method of attacking the petition is by motion to quash the writ, and that insufficiency in the petition is waived, unless that remedy be resorted to. McGlennan v. Margowski, 90 Ind. 150."
Nebraska Children's Home Society v. State, 57 Neb. 765, 769, 78 N.W. 267, 269. See also Chase v. State, 93 Fla. 963, 113 So. 103; State ex rel. Chase v. Calvird, 324 Mo. 429, 24 S.W.2d 111; Stuart v. State, 36 Ariz. 28, 282 P. 276; State ex rel. Davis v. Hardie, 108 Fla. 133, 146 So. 97; Ex parte Tipton, 83 Cal.App. 742, 257 P. 445; Deaver v. State, 24 Ala.App. 377, 135 So. 604; McDowell v. Gould, 166 Ga. 670, 144 S.E. 206; Ex parte Tollison, 73 Okl.Cr. 38, 117 P.2d 549; People v. Superior Court, 234 Ill. 186, 84 N.E. 875; Willis v. Bayles, 105 Ind. 363, 5 N.E. 8.
See also Cochran v. Kansas, 316 U. S. 255; Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U. S. 19.
See Smith v. O'Grady, supra; cf. United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U. S. 253, 198 U. S. 261.
petitions for habeas corpus, as laid before this Court by the Attorney General of Nebraska, the meager allegations of this petition for habeas corpus should preclude our attributing to the Supreme Court of Nebraska a disregard, in affirming a denial of the petition, of rights under the Constitution of the United States, rather than a denial on allowable state grounds. Accordingly, I believe the judgment should be affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE ROBERTS and MR. JUSTICE JACKSON join in this view.

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