Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/california/supreme-court/3d/41/353.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 06:21:54+00:00

Document:
Dennis L. Woodman, under appointment by the Supreme Court, and Woodman & Woodman for Defendant and Appellant.
John K. Van de Kamp, Attorney General, Jay M. Bloom, John W. Carney and Frederick R. Millar, Jr., for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant initially pleaded not guilty but later moved to withdraw his plea. The trial court appointed a psychiatrist to examine him; following such an examination and a report confirming defendant's competence, the court found defendant competent to plead guilty, to waive jury trial, and to cooperate with counsel in the event his plea was withdrawn. Accordingly, the court permitted defendant to withdraw his plea of not guilty, to waive his rights, and to plead guilty to each count and admit the special circumstance allegation. His counsel concurred in the change of plea. Based on the transcript of the preliminary hearing, the court then found defendant guilty of one count of first degree murder and two counts of second degree murder; based on defendant's earlier admission, the court also found true the multiple-murder special circumstance allegation.
Because defendant does not deny responsibility for the three killings, there is no need to elaborate on the evidence linking him to those crimes. It is sufficient to state that defendant, evidently despondent about the termination of his relationship with Cindy Gleason, shot and killed the husband and two young children of Cindy's sister, Kathy Davis. Defendant had previously threatened to kill "everyone" in Cindy's family if she broke up with defendant. Shortly before the killings, Cindy received a telephone call from defendant telling her that "I'm not going to be responsible for what I do today." Later that night, Cindy discovered the bodies of Don, Michelle and Melissa Davis in Don's trailer. Defendant fled and hid from the police; he was arrested several days later.
Defendant asserts there were sufficient indications of his mental and emotional instability to trigger the court's obligation to order a competence hearing sua sponte. He emphasizes evidence disclosing that (1) shortly before the murders defendant had asked Kathy Davis, Cindy's sister, to kill him; (2) on prior occasions he had exhibited suicidal tendencies, including cutting himself with a razor blade; and (3) he was frequently intoxicated.
The record shows that before accepting the guilty plea the court ordered that defendant be examined by a board-certified psychiatrist, Dr. Bolger, who reported that defendant was mentally competent to plead guilty. Dr. Bolger described defendant as "cooperative," "stable" in mood, not depressed, possessing "high normal" I.Q., and "excellent" judgment as disclosed by verbal testing. According to Dr. Bolger, defendant displayed no evidence of psychosis, abnormal thinking or mental illness; he was "well aware of the charges facing him," was "well advised" of the significance of his waiver of a jury trial, and was able adequately to assist and cooperate with his counsel in his defense. Finally, Dr. Bolger noted that defendant fully appreciated the possibility, even the likelihood, that a death sentence might be imposed for his crimes.
[1b] The evidence in the present case falls far short of that which would require a competence hearing on the court's own motion. Certainly, neither the court nor defense counsel expressed any "doubt" regarding defendant's [41 Cal. 3d 359] competence. The court carefully explained that although it had appointed Dr. Bolger "to be certain" of defendant's ability to stand trial and cooperate with counsel (cf. People v. Teron (1979) 23 Cal. 3d 103, 114 [151 Cal. Rptr. 633, 588 P.2d 773], approving this practice), there was no evidence or any "possible grounds" for convening a formal competence hearing. Defense counsel agreed that "I have seen no evidence in Mr. Deere that would suggest that he's in any way incompetent."
[1c] Likewise, defendant's waiver of a penalty jury did not constitute "substantial" evidence of incompetence. The record shows that his waiver of such a jury was induced, at least in part, by his wish to bring the proceedings to a conclusion without the undue delay and expense occasioned by a jury trial. As defense counsel informed the court, defendant "knows what would happen if the case went to jury trial, and he feels that the expense of a circus or charade of a trial is not right for him or for the community." It is a matter of common knowledge that the process of "death qualifying" a jury in a capital case may consume a substantial amount of time and effort. It was not irrational for defendant to assert that he preferred not to waste his time listening to trial counsel "yak" about which prospective jurors were opposed to the death penalty and which were not.
We conclude that the court did not err in failing to order a competence hearing sua sponte.
 Section 190.4, subdivision (e), provides for an automatic review of the penalty verdict by the judge. Defendant complains that he was never told his waiver of a penalty jury would necessarily preclude an independent reevaluation of the verdict by the judge. The point is frivolous; defendant is deemed to have known that by waiving a jury trial he would lose his statutory right to a penalty decision by both the jury and the judge. When the judge renders a decision on penalty, and thereafter carefully reviews [41 Cal. 3d 360] that decision on motion for modification pursuant to section 190.4, the defendant is afforded ample due process.
Defendant relies on People v. Granger (1980) 105 Cal. App. 3d 422 [164 Cal. Rptr. 363], but the case is inapposite. Granger held that the defendant's waiver of a jury trial in a murder case did not extend to the special circumstances phase of the case, because the trial court failed to adequately explain to the defendant the availability of a trial on that issue. In the present case, defendant pleaded guilty to the offenses charged and admitted the special circumstance allegation. Thus, unlike Granger, his jury waiver was necessarily confined to the penalty phase.
 Article I, section 16, of the Constitution requires the concurrence of counsel in a criminal defendant's waiver of jury trial. Although counsel did concur here, defendant now asserts that counsel's assent demonstrated his incompetence. As defendant states the argument, "Defense counsel should have refused to do anything to aid appellant to carry out his death wish."
[6a] Defendant next contends the sentence of death must be set aside because his counsel failed to offer any mitigating evidence during the penalty [41 Cal. 3d 361] phase apart from defendant's own statement and testimony at the preliminary examination and a suppression hearing. Counsel first permitted his client to make a brief statement to the court acknowledging that "I know what I done was wrong" and "I always believed [in] an eye for an eye. I feel I should die for the crimes I done." Counsel then explained at length the reasons that induced him to agree to the guilty plea, the jury waiver, and the failure to offer mitigating evidence. According to counsel, he argued with defendant about each of these decisions but finally grew to appreciate and concur with his client's point of view.
Counsel recognized at the outset that "it probably is unprecedented, at least in California, that a defense lawyer has permitted a defendant in a capital case to do what Mr. Deere has done." Counsel then took the "legal position" that the record does not support a finding that aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances, and hence that the penalty should not be death. He also expressly conceded that "It's not as if there is no mitigating evidence to offer. Ronnie knows that members of his family ... wanted him to fight; they wanted to come in and testify and tell the Court that there are good things about Ronnie Deere; there is a reason to let him live."
As Justice Rutledge wrote, "To state the question often is to decide it. And it may do this by failure to reveal fully what is at stake." (Yakus v. United States (1943) 321 U.S. 414, 482 [88 L. Ed. 834, 879, 64 S. Ct. 660] (dis. opn.).) The dilemma in the present case is that the question may be put in one of two ways, each deciding the issue differently.
We rejected Stanworth's attempt to dismiss his appeal, reiterating the longstanding rule that the statute providing for automatic appeals from judgments of death (§ 1239, subd. (b)) imposes a duty on this court in such cases to examine the complete record in order to determine whether the defendant has had a fair trial. As Justice Sullivan wrote for the court (id. at p. 833), "It is manifest that the state in its solicitude for a defendant under sentence of death has not only invoked on his behalf a right to review the conviction by means of an automatic appeal but has also imposed a duty upon this court to make such review. We cannot avoid or abdicate this duty merely because defendant desires to waive the right provided for him."
Stanworth cited People v. Werwee (1952) 112 Cal. App. 2d 494, 500 [246 P.2d 704], for the proposition that "'Although a defendant may waive [41 Cal. 3d 363] rights which exist for his own benefit, he may not waive those which belong also to the public generally.'" (People v. Stanworth, supra, 71 Cal.2d at p. 834.) It further quoted (ibid.) from People v. Blakeman (1959) 170 Cal. App. 2d 596, 598 [339 P.2d 202], the view that "'The fallacy of this argument is that we are not dealing with a right or privilege conferred by law upon the litigant for his sole personal benefit. We are concerned with a principle of fundamental public policy. The law cannot suffer the state's interest and concern in the observance and enforcement of this policy to be thwarted through the guise of waiver of a personal right by an individual. "Any one may waive the advantage of a law intended [solely] for his benefit. But a law established for a public reason cannot be contravened by a private agreement." (Civ. Code, § 3513.)'"
To permit a defendant convicted of a potentially capital crime to bar his counsel from introducing mitigating evidence at the penalty phase because he wants to die, as did this defendant, would likewise violate the fundamental public policy against misusing the judicial system to commit a state-aided suicide. It would also prevent this court from discharging its constitutional and statutory duty to review a judgment of death upon the complete record of the case, because a significant portion of the evidence of the appropriateness of the penalty would be missing.
There is no mystery as to the kind of evidence defense counsel should prepare and present at the penalty phase. As Professor Goodpaster explains, "First, counsel must portray the defendant as a human being with positive qualities. The prosecution will have selectively presented the judge or jury with evidence of defendant's criminal side, portraying him as evil and inhuman, perhaps monstrous. Defense counsel must make use of the fact that few people are thoroughly and one-sidedly evil. Every individual possesses some good qualities and has performed some kind deeds. Defense counsel must, therefore, by presenting positive evidence of the defendant's character and acts, attempt to convince the sentencer that the defendant has redeeming qualities. A true advocate cannot permit a capital case to go to the sentencer on the prosecution's one-sided portrayal alone and claim to be rendering effective assistance.
The lack of testimony on this issue clearly impressed the trial court. In weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances preparatory to fixing the penalty, the court observed: "In mitigation, you elected to present very little. In small pieces, I came to the conclusion that you are a poet, a writer and have expressed your ability to love in the past. But that certainly wasn't demonstrated here." (Italics added.) The question is, why was it not "demonstrated here"? For the reasons given above, counsel should have exploited whatever talents his client possessed in the hope that they might reveal, as a mitigating circumstance, defendant's potential to ultimately make a constructive contribution to society. We need not be reminded of the literary figures who made their mark on history despite periods of penal confinement.
When the sentencer in a capital case is deprived of all or a substantial part of the available evidence in mitigation, "the potential for prejudice is too obvious to require proof." (Goodpaster, The Trial for Life, supra, p. 350.) Indeed, "short of substituting a verdict of its own, there is no way for a reviewing court to determine what effect unpresented mitigating evidence might have had on the sentencer's decision." (Id. at p. 354.) We have no doubt that a judgment of death imposed in such circumstances constitutes a miscarriage of justice (Cal.Const., art. VI, § 13): not only did defendant not have a fair penalty trial -- in effect he had no penalty trial at all.
The judgment is reversed as to penalty and affirmed in all other respects.
Bird, C. J., Reynoso, J., and Kaus, J., concurred.
I join with the majority in reversing the judgment as to penalty, but I write separately to state my reasons for doing so.
I hesitate, however, to describe this case as one involving "the ineffective assistance of counsel." The constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel belongs to defendant personally. A man facing the awful alternatives of execution or life imprisonment without possibility of parole could rationally prefer execution, or at least feel that the comparative advantage of life imprisonment was not worth the humiliation and loss of dignity he believes entailed in the presentation of mitigating evidence. Here counsel satisfied himself that his client was making a rational, knowing, and intelligent decision, and then acted in accord with his client's wishes. I do not believe his conduct violated any constitutional right of defendant.
Although counsel in this case fulfilled his obligations to his client, he failed to perform a role assigned to him by the state, that of presenting the mitigating evidence necessary to assure the reliability of the penalty determination. But the fact that the state assigns defense counsel a role which may require him to act contrary to his client's wishes on a matter of such vital importance to the client presents a troubling picture. The defense of a capital case often requires a close and trusting relationship between counsel and client; yet our decision requires counsel to violate that trust, to take a position against his client, and perhaps to present evidence revealed to him in confidence by his client.
Trial courts should explore methods of alleviating this conflict. In some cases it might be desirable for counsel, in addition to presenting mitigating evidence, to inform the jury of defendant's personal position. In other cases, the court might permit the defendant himself to address the jury. Alternatively, the court could call persons with mitigating evidence as its own witnesses, or appoint new counsel to call them, and thereby place on the record the mitigating evidence essential to a careful, balanced penalty determination.
In sum, both the state's need to assure the fairness and reliability of the penalty determination, and defendant's rights to personal choice and dignity, command respect. It is essential that the penalty trial constitute a balanced presentation of aggravating and mitigating evidence, but this goal should be achieved, as far as possible, with respect and accommodation for defendant's personal values and for his relationship with counsel.
I therefore join in reversing the penalty judgment, not on the ground of incompetency of counsel, but because no steps were taken to assure a fair [41 Cal. 3d 370] and balanced penalty trial. I am confident that we would not reverse a penalty judgment after the trial court had taken independent steps to assure a fair and balanced penalty trial, even though the mitigating evidence was not presented by defense counsel.
I concur in the judgment affirming defendant's conviction of first degree murder with special circumstances, and of second degree murder (two counts).
I respectfully dissent, however, to reversal of the penalty of death on the ground of trial counsel's incompetence in failing to offer mitigating evidence at the penalty phase. Although the majority fails to specify what evidence was available, apparently it faults counsel for failing to explore the "good things" in defendant's life. (Ante, p. 361.) In my view, counsel's prolonged consideration of the matter, resulting in his ultimate determination, expressed on the record, to respect his client's firm resolve to face his punishment without groveling for mercy, and without undergoing an awkward parade of defendant's friends and relatives at the penalty trial, cannot be deemed unreasonable or incompetent representation. The majority's contrary rule, requiring counsel to overrule his client and attempt to dredge up mitigating testimony despite the consequent loss of his client's dignity, and the probable serious invasion of his privacy, approaches an unconstitutional infringement of defendant's due process, privacy and self-representation rights.
The record reflects that defendant, experiencing considerable remorse for his heinous misdeeds, sought to expedite the trial without undue delay and embarrassment for himself and his family, not to mention the victims' own family. Trial counsel first permitted his client to make a brief statement to the court which acknowledged that what he did was "wrong" and that "I feel I should die for the crimes I done." Next, counsel explained at length the reasons which induced him to agree to entry of a guilty plea, to waive a jury trial, and to decline to offer any further mitigating evidence. According to counsel, he strongly argued with defendant regarding each of these decisions but finally grew to appreciate and concur with his client's point of view.
Defense counsel did not affirmatively advocate the death penalty for his client. Indeed, he argued to the court that the record supported only a penalty of life without possibility of parole because the aggravating circumstances failed to outweigh the mitigating ones. Thereafter, counsel moved the court to modify its penalty decision, arguing at length defendant's mental and emotional distress during the offenses and the relatively painless method of executing his victims.
I believe that the state's interest in assuring the reliability of death judgments can be adequately served by assuring the accuracy of the guilt and [41 Cal. 3d 372] penalty determinations without, in effect, requiring an unwilling defendant and his acquaintances to plead for mercy. Moreover, the majority fails to consider the strong possibility that counsel's actions were indeed motivated by a sound tactical decision to present defendant as a person, replete with remorse and a sincere desire to atone for his terrible crimes. Counsel may well have believed that by presenting defendant in that light, the sentencing court would be more inclined to exercise mercy than if defendant and his family openly begged for it.
I also observe that defendant has not filed a habeas corpus petition specifying precisely what mitigating evidence was available to trial counsel, as required by us in People v. Jackson (1980) 28 Cal. 3d 264, 293-296 [168 Cal. Rptr. 603, 618 P.2d 149]. How can we find counsel incompetent for failing to introduce mitigating evidence in the absence of any proof that such evidence was available? Does the majority intend to overrule Jackson sub silentio?
FN 1. All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
FN 2. While it might have been preferable for the judge to have declined to accept the waiver and to have impanelled a jury, as occurred in People v. Stanworth (1969) 71 Cal. 2d 820, 829 [80 Cal. Rptr. 49, 457 P.2d 889], we cannot fault this exercise of his discretion. The judge made every reasonable effort to ascertain defendant's competence to waive; a reviewing court should not second-guess that factual determination.
FN 3. Defendant does not contend -- and we do not hold -- that this interest compels the introduction in capital cases of every conceivable item of arguably mitigating evidence. As defendant explains, "Ordinarily that interest can be amply protected by reliance upon competent counsel to sift through the available evidence and present that which in counsel's judgment makes the most compelling case in mitigation." An appellate court will not second-guess the judgment of competent counsel. (See, e.g., People v. Jackson (1980) 28 Cal. 3d 264, 294-296 [168 Cal. Rptr. 603, 618 P.2d 149].) In the case at bar, however, the mitigating evidence was excluded not because of an attorney's tactical decision that other evidence would be more likely to avoid a death penalty but because a defendant seeking that penalty barred his counsel from offering any mitigating evidence at all.
FN 5. The concurring opinion misunderstands the full responsibilities of counsel. True, he has a duty to represent the views of defendant, however bizarre. But he is also an officer of the court (Hickman v. Taylor (1947) 329 U.S. 495, 510 [91 L. Ed. 451, 462, 67 S.Ct. 385]) with a duty to assure that the court has all relevant information to be able to perform its mandatory consideration of mitigating circumstances.
To propose that "the court might permit the defendant himself to address the jury" would be unprecedented when he has counsel. The additional suggestion that "the court could call persons with mitigating evidence as its own witnesses" implies that the court can determine who and where those witnesses are without the help of defendant and his counsel.
The suggestion that additional counsel might be appointed by the court is impractical. Defendant may be entitled to two attorneys in a capital case (Keenan v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal. 3d 424 [180 Cal. Rptr. 489, 640 P.2d 108]). Entry of a third attorney in the concluding phases of a lengthy trial would require a substantial delay in order to enable him to familiarize himself with the entire case, ascertain what witnesses might be available, determine what their testimony would be, and then subpoena them to appear. In addition the third attorney would require an award of attorney's fees and funds for an adequate investigation. Capital cases are sufficiently complicated now and take long enough, without injection of new personnel and unnecessary additional delay. The more rational solution is to impose the duty to present mitigating factors on counsel who are already familiar with the case and all its implications.

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