Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&amp;view=article&amp;id=40335:a-m-no-rtj-00-1543-august-4,-2000-teresita-jason-v-briccio-c-yga-ntilde-a,-et-al&amp;catid=1396&amp;Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 02:28:20+00:00

Document:
TERESITA JASON, Complainant, v. JUDGE BRICCIO C. YGAÑA, Branch Clerk of Court, LEILANI M. RODRIGUEZ, and Sheriff MARIO S. PANGILINAN, Respondents.
4.	pay the costs of suit.
Complainant appealed the decision to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City. The appeal was docketed as Special Civil Action (SCA) No. 1480 and raffled to Branch 153. Respondents Judge Briccio C. Ygaña, Leilani M. Rodriguez and Mario P. Pangilinan are the Presiding Judge, Clerk of Court and Sheriff IV, respectively, of said Branch.
On 9 February 1998 plaintiff Alberto Huang filed a Motion for immediate Execution in SCA No. 1480 which respondent Judge Ygaña granted on 6 April 1998.
On 7 April 1998, respondent Clerk of Court Rodriguez issued a Writ of Execution (Annex "B" of Complaint), which was assigned to respondent Pangilinan for implementation. On 8 April 1998 Pangilinan levied on execution some personal properties of the complainant; issued a Notice to Vacate giving complainant a period of five days within which to vacate the premises and prepared a Notice of Levy and Sheriff’s Sale.
On 21 April 1998 complainant filed with the Office of the Court Administrator the complaint in this case charging respondents with ignorance, negligence, incompetence, grave abuse of duty, improvident issuance and implementation of a writ of execution, drastic execution of said writ in a manner most prejudicial to the best interest of service and property rights of complainant and her family.
Complainant alleges in her complaint that the writ of execution was improvidently issued because of the pendency before Branch 54 of the ICC of basis City of Civil Case No. 66714. Besides, the implementation or execution of the final decision must come from the court of origin and not the appellate court. Complainant further avers that the writ of execution, notice to vacate and notice of levy and sheriff’s sale were not properly served as these were merely served on the same date on 8 April 1998 to her children who were mostly minors and who did not know what to do with these court processes. Respondent sheriff together with SPO1 Arsenio Reyes and Soliven, younger brother of the plaintiff, levied and took some of complainant’s belongings listed in the Notice of Levy and Sheriff’s Sale in the absence of complainant.
In separate indorsements to the respondents, the OCA required the latter to comment on the complaint.
In her Comment dated 22 July 1998, respondent Leilani Rodriguez alleged that it was her ministerial duty to issue the writ of execution pursuant to the Order of the Court of 6 April 1998. Thus, she only acted within the confines of her duties in her official capacity as Branch Clerk of Court and further alleges that under Circular No. 24-94 now incorporated under Section 1, Rule 30 which should be Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, it is "the judgment obligee . . . is given the option to file motion for execution with the court of origin and the appellate court and the appellate court could only direct the court of origin to issue the writ of execution again on motion in the same case." In this case plaintiff did not exercise the option; instead he filed a Motion for Immediate Execution with the appellate court on 12 February 1998.
Further, respondent Rodriguez asserts that complainant was afforded ample opportunity to oppose the issuance of the writ; yet, she did not.
In his comment, respondent Sheriff Pangilinan claims that he properly served all the alleged documents to complainant’s son Michael who is of legal age; he gave her five (5) days within which to vacate the premises; in fact complainant padlocked the premises thereby compelling him to secure a special order from the court to break open. However, the order was rendered academic when complainant voluntarily vacated the premises. He properly implemented the writ of execution.
We referred the case to the OCA for evaluation, report and recommendation. It submitted its report and recommendation on 8 February 2000.
It cannot be said that the writ of execution in this case was issued by respondent judge pending appeal because according to him the decision was already final and executory. As such, respondent should have remanded the case to the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 69 of Pasig City for execution. (City of Manila v. Court of Appeals, 204 SCRA 362, 369).
As to respondent clerk of court and respondent sheriff, we find no fault on their part.
The function of ordering the execution of a judgment devolves upon the judge whereas the act of issuing the writ of execution can be performed by another person, viz., the clerk of court. As the rule now stands the clerk of court may, under the direction of the court or judge, make out and sign all writs and processes issuing from the court. (Viray v. Court of Appeals, 286 SCRA 475). in this case, respondent judge issued an order granting the plaintiff’s Motion for Immediate Execution and directing the issuance of a writ. (Annex A of Comment of Respondent Clerk of Court). Hence, respondent Clerk of court was left with no choice but to issue the writ as directed.
As to the implementation of the writ, we likewise find respondent sheriff faultless. Complainant is complaining that respondent sheriff levied her personal property which disregarded the five-day grace period provided in the notice to vacate. It must be remembered that the Writ of Execution and the Notice to Vacate were served on the same day, April 8, 1998. Having properly served the writ, respondent was duty bound to implement the same by levying the personal property of complainant in order to satisfy the money judgment. Well-settled is the rule that when a writ is placed in the hands of the sheriff, it is his ministerial duty to proceed with reasonable celerity and promptness to execute in accordance with its mandate. (Onquit v. Binamira-Parcia, 297 SCRA 354, 264). The grace period referred to by complainant is given to them only with respect to that part of decision ordering them to vacate the premises. (San Manuel Wood products, Inc. v. Tupas,249 SCRA 466, 476). if we accept the opinion of complainant it is quite possible that respondent sheriff would not be able to levy anything since herein complainant would use the grace period to defeat the judgment by hiding his property.
Finally, the fact that respondent erred in granting the Motion for Immediate Execution does not necessarily mean that since the acts of respondent clerk of court and respondent sheriff are based on the said erroneous order, they too similarly erred. In the first place, on its face there is nothing patently erroneous in the order of respondent as to put the other respondents on guard. Second, they merely implemented the order of respondent judge for which they can not be blamed. (Bobis v. Provincial Sheriff of Camarines Norte, 121 SCRA 28, 39).
2.	. . . the complaint against Branch Clerk of Court Leilani M. Rodriguez and Sheriff Mariano S. Pangilinan be DISMISSED for lack of merit.
We agree with the conclusion of the Office of the Court Administrator that respondent Judge Ygaña is liable for gross ignorance of the law. Since his decision in SCA 1480 affirmed in toto the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City in an ejectment case, Civil Case No. 5335, and the affirming decision had become final and executory, the case should have been remanded to the Metropolitan Trial Court for execution.
. . . In an ejectment case, the appellate court which affirms a decision brought before it on appeal cannot decree its execution in the guise of an execution of the affirming decision. The only exception to that is when said appellate court grants an execution pending appeal.
SEC. 21.	Immediate execution on appeal to Court of Appeals on Supreme Court. — The judgment of the Regional Trial Court against the defendant shall be imply executory without prejudice to a further appeal that may be taken therefrom.
SEC. 1.	Execution upon judgments or final orders. — Execution shall issue as a matter of right, or on motion, upon a judgment or order that disposes of the action or proceeding upon the expiration of the period to appeal therefrom if no appeal has been duly perfected. (1a).
If the appeal has been duly perfected and finally resolved, the execution may forthwith be applied for in the court of origin, on motion of the judgment obligee, submitting therewith certified true copies of the judgment or final order or orders sought to be enforced and of the entry thereof, with notice to the adverse party.
The second paragraph of this on is an innovation in respond to complaints over delay caused by the former procedure in obtaining a writ of execution of a judgment, which has already been affirmed on appeal, with notice to the parties. As things then stood, after the entry of judgment in the appellate court, the prevailing party had to wait for the records of the case to be remanded to the court of origin when and where he could then move for the issuance of a writ of execution. The intervening time could sometimes be substantial, especially if the court a quo is in a remote province, and could also be availed of by the losing party to delay or thwart actual execution.
Howsoever viewed, respondent Judge Ygaña either deliberately disregarded our ruling in City of Manila v. Court of Appeals, (supra), and Sy v. Romero (supra), or was totally unaware thereof. The Court Administrator is of the opinion that it was more of the latter and considers it "gross ignorance of the law." We agree for we cannot expect a judge to deliberately disregard an unequivocal rule on execution of judgment and a doctrine laid down by this Court. Time and again we have stressed that a judge is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules; it is imperative that he be conversant with basic legal principles. Canon 4 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics requires that the judge should be studious of the principles of law, and Canon 18 mandates that he should administer his office with due regard to the integrity of the system of the law itself, remembering that he is not a depository of arbitrary power, but a judge under the sanction of law. (Estoya v. Abraham Singson, 237 SCRA 1, 21 119941, citing authorities).
Respondent Branch Clerk of Court Rodriguez, as a lawyer, cannot be exonerated solely on the basis of having performed a ministerial duty. Being a lawyer and a Clerk of Court for sometime she was expected to know the basic law and doctrines on execution of judgment in ejectment cases appealed from the courts of origin. She ought to know that her court cannot issue a writ of execution on its final judgment affirming that of the court of origin. Consequently, she could have caught the attention of respondent Judge Ygaña. Her failure to do so amounted to neglect of duty for which she should be censured.
Sheriff Pangilinan, however, may be exonerated because he merely implemented the writ of execution and at the same time he cannot be expected to hold the same degree of discretion as his co-respondents.
Let copies of this resolution be attached to the personal records of respondents in the Office of the Court Administrator.

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