Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/97747/southern-pacific-co-vs-arizona
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 14:39:02+00:00

Document:
1. State power to regulate the length of railroad trains is not curtailed or superseded by § 1 of the Interstate Commerce Act (paragraphs 117) of itself, and in the absence of administrative implementation by the Interstate Commerce Commission; nor by provisions of the Safety Appliance Act for brakes on trains; nor by the provision of § 25 of Part I of the Interstate Commerce Act permitting the Commission to order the installation of train stop and control devices. Pp. 325 U. S. 765 -766.
conflicts with the Act of Congress or plainly and palpably infringes its policy. P. 325 U. S. 766 .
2. The Arizona Train Limit Law (Arizona Code Ann., 1939, § 69-119), making it unlawful to operate within the State a passenger train of more than fourteen cars or a freight train of more than seventy cars, held, as applied to interstate trains, invalid as contravening the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution. Pp. 325 U. S. 763 , 325 U. S. 781 .
3. The commerce clause, even without the aid of Congressional legislation, protects against state legislation which is inimical to the national commerce, and in such cases, where Congress has not acted, this Court, and not the state legislature, is the final arbiter of the competing demands of state and national interests. P. 325 U. S. 769 .
4. Although this Court, upon review of a decision of a state court, may determine for itself the facts upon which an asserted federal right depends, the crucial findings of the state court here are not challenged in material particulars, are supported by evidence, and supply an adequate basis for decision of the constitutional issue presented. P. 325 U. S. 771 .
5. The state regulation here involved, admittedly obstructive to interstate train operation, and having a seriously adverse effect on transportation efficiency and economy, passes beyond what is plainly essential for safety, since it does not appear that it will lessen, rather than increase, the danger of accident. Examination of all relevant factors makes it plain that the state interest here asserted is outweighed by the interest of the nation in an adequate, economical and efficient railway transportation service. P. 325 U. S. 781 .
6. The relative weights of the state and national interests involved are not such as to make inapplicable the rule, generally observed, that the free flow of interstate commerce and its freedom from local restraints in matters requiring uniformity of regulation are interests safeguarded by the commerce clause from state interference. Pp. 325 U. S. 770 , 325 U. S. 781 .
7. The "full train crew" cases and South Carolina Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U. S. 177 , distinguished. P. 325 U. S. 782 .
APPEAL from a judgment upholding the constitutionality of the Arizona Train Limit Law.
without a jury, the court made detailed findings of fact, on the basis of which it gave judgment for the railroad company. The Supreme Court of Arizona reversed, and directed judgment for the state. 61 Ariz. 66, 145 P.2d 530. The case comes here on appeal under § 237(a) of the Judicial Code, appellant raising by its assignments of error the questions presented here for decision.
section of the country," to make or suspend rules and practices "with respect to car service," which includes by paragraph 10 of § 1 "the use, control, supply, movement, distribution, exchange, interchange, and return" of locomotives and cars, and the "supply of trains." Paragraph 16 of § 1 provides that, when a carrier is unable properly to transport the traffic offered, the Commission may make reasonable directions "with respect to the handling, routing, and movement of the traffic of such carrier and its distribution over other lines of roads." The authority of the Commission to make Order No. 85 is currently under attack in Johnston v. United States, Civil Action No. 1408, pending in the Western District of Oklahoma.
The Commission's order was not in effect in 1940, when the present suit was brought for violations of the state law in that year, and the Commission's order is inapplicable to the train operations here charged as violations. Hence, the question here is not of the effect of the Commission's order, which we assume for purposes of decision to be valid, but whether the grant of power to the Commission operated to supersede the state act before the Commission's order. We are of opinion that, in the absence of administrative implementation by the Commission, § 1 does not, of itself, curtail state power to regulate train lengths. The provisions under which the Commission purported to act, phrased in broad and general language, do not, in terms, deal with that subject. We do not gain either from their words or from the legislative history any hint that Congress, in enacting them, intended, apart from Commission action, to supersede state laws regulating train lengths. We can hardly suppose that Congress, merely by conferring authority on the Commission to regulate car service in an "emergency," intended to restrict the exercise, otherwise lawful, of state power to regulate train lengths before the Commission finds an "emergency" to exist.
Congress, in enacting legislation within its constitutional authority over interstate commerce, will not be deemed to have intended to strike down a state statute designed to protect the health and safety of the public unless its purpose to do so is clearly manifested, Reid v. Colorado, 187 U. S. 137 , 187 U. S. 148 ; Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Larabee Mills, 211 U. S. 61 , 211 U. S. 621 , et seq.; Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Harris, 234 U. S. 412 , 234 U. S. 418 -419; Welch Co. v. New Hampshire, 306 U. S. 79 , 306 U. S. 85 ; Allen-Bradley Local v. Board, 315 U. S. 740 , 315 U. S. 749 , or unless the state law, in terms or in its practical administration, conflicts with the Act of Congress or plainly and palpably infringes its policy. Sinnot v. Davenport, 22 How. 227, 63 U. S. 243 ; Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Haber, 169 U. S. 613 , 169 U. S. 623 ; Savage v. Jones, 225 U. S. 501 , 225 U. S. 533 ; Carey v. South Dakota, 250 U. S. 118 , 250 U. S. 122 ; Atchison, T. & S.F. R. Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 283 U. S. 380 , 283 U. S. 391 ; Townsend v. Yeomans, 301 U. S. 441 , 301 U. S. 454 .
The contention, faintly urged, that the provisions of the Safety Appliance Act, 45 U.S.C. § § 1 and 9, providing for brakes on trains, and of § 25 of Part I of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 26(b), permitting the Commission to order the installation of train stop and control devices, operate of their own force to exclude state regulation of train lengths, has even less support. Congress, although asked to do so, [ Footnote 1 ] has declined to pass legislation specifically limiting trains to seventy cars. We are therefore brought to appellant's principal contention, that the state statute contravenes the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution.
Co., 2 Pet. 245, and Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. 299, it has been recognized that, in the absence of conflicting legislation by Congress, there is a residuum of power in the state to make laws governing matters of local concern which nevertheless in some measure affect interstate commerce or even, to some extent, regulate it. Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352 , 230 U. S. 399 -400; South Carolina Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U. S. 177 , 303 U. S. 187 , et seq.; California v. Thompson, 313 U. S. 109 , 313 U. S. 113 -114, and cases cited; Parker v. Brown, 317 U. S. 341 , 317 U. S. 359 -360. Thus, the states may regulate matters which, because of their number and diversity, may never be adequately dealt with by Congress. Cooley v. Board of Wardens, supra, 53 U. S. 319 ; South Carolina Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., supra, 303 U. S. 185 ; California v. Thompson, supra, 313 U. S. 113 ; Duckworth v. Arkansas, 314 U. S. 390 , 314 U. S. 394 ; Parker v. Brown, supra, 317 U. S. 362 , 317 U. S. 363 . When the regulation of matters of local concern is local in character and effect, and its impact on the national commerce does not seriously interfere with its operation, and the consequent incentive to deal with them nationally is slight, such regulation has been generally held to be within state authority. South Carolina Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., supra, 303 U. S. 188 and cases cited; Lone Star Gas Co. v. Texas, 304 U. S. 224 , 304 U. S. 238 ; Milk Board v. Eisenberg Co., 306 U. S. 346 , 306 U. S. 351 ; Maurer v. Hamilton, 309 U. S. 598 , 309 U. S. 603 ; California v. Thompson, supra, 313 U. S. 113 -114, and cases cited.
v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100 , 135 U. S. 108 , 135 U. S. 109 ; Minnesota Rate Cases, supra, 230 U. S. 399 -400; Edwards v. California, 314 U. S. 160 , 314 U. S. 176 . Whether or not this long-recognized distribution of power between the national and the state governments is predicated upon the implications of the commerce clause itself, Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419, 25 U. S. 447 ; Minnesota Rate Cases, supra, 230 U. S. 399 , 230 U. S. 400 ; Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U. S. 553 , 262 U. S. 596 ; Baldwin v. Seelig, 294 U. S. 511 , 294 U. S. 522 ; South Carolina Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., supra, 303 U. S. 185 , or upon the presumed intention of Congress, where Congress has not spoken, Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 275 , 91 U. S. 282 ; Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U. S. 485 , 95 U. S. 490 ; Brown v. Houston, 114 U. S. 622 , 114 U. S. 631 ; Bowman v. Chicago & N.W. R. Co., 125 U. S. 465 , 125 U. S. 481 -2; Leisy v. Hardin, supra, 135 U. S. 109 ; In re Rahrer, 140 U. S. 545 , 140 U. S. 559 -560; Brennan v. Titusville, 153 U. S. 289 , 153 U. S. 302 ; Covington & C. Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 154 U. S. 204 , 154 U. S. 212 ; Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U. S. 466 , 306 U. S. 479 , n., Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State Power, 27 Va.Law Rev. 1, the result is the same.
national power is to be attained only by some appraisal and accommodation of the competing demands of the state and national interests involved. Parker v. Brown, supra, 317 U. S. 362 ; Terminal Railroad Assn. v. Brotherhood, 318 U. S. 1 , 318 U. S. 8 ; see DiSanto v. Pennsylvania, 273 U. S. 34 , 273 U. S. 44 ( and compare California v. Thompson, supra ); Illinois Gas Co. v. Public Service Co., 314 U. S. 498 , 314 U. S. 504 -505.
For a hundred years, it has been accepted constitutional doctrine that the commerce clause, without the aid of Congressional legislation, thus affords some protection from state legislation inimical to the national commerce, and that, in such cases, where Congress has not acted, this Court, and not the state legislature, is, under the commerce clause, the final arbiter of the competing demands of state and national interests. Cooley v. Board of Wardens, supra; Kansas City Southern R. Co. v. Kaw Valley District, 233 U. S. 75 , 233 U. S. 79 ; South Covington R. Co. v. Covington, 235 U. S. 537 , 235 U. S. 546 ; Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Texas, 245 U. S. 484 , 245 U. S. 488 ; St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 254 U. S. 535 , 254 U. S. 537 ; Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U. S. 1 , 278 U. S. 10 ; Gwin, White & Prince v. Henneford, 305 U. S. 434 , 305 U. S. 441 ; McCarroll v. Dixie Lines, 309 U. S. 176 .
Congress has undoubted power to redefine the distribution of power over interstate commerce. It may either permit the states to regulate the commerce in a manner which would otherwise not be permissible, In re Rahrer, supra, 140 U. S. 561 -562; Adams Express Co. v. Kentucky, 238 U. S. 190 , 238 U. S. 198 ; Rosenberger v. Pacific Express Co., 241 U. S. 48 , 241 U. S. 50 , 241 U. S. 51 ; Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland R. Co., 242 U. S. 311 , 242 U. S. 325 -326; Whitfield v. Ohio, 297 U. S. 431 , 297 U. S. 438 -440; Kentucky Whip & Collar Co. v. Illinois Central R. Co., 299 U. S. 334 , 299 U. S. 350 -51; Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U. S. 652 , 324 U. S. 679 , or exclude state regulation even of matters of peculiarly local concern which nevertheless affect interstate commerce. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v.
United States, 175 U. S. 211 , 175 U. S. 230 ; Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Mottley, 219 U. S. 467 ; Houston, E. & W.T. R. Co. v. United States, 234 U. S. 342 ; American Express Co. v. Caldwell, 244 U. S. 617 , 244 U. S. 626 ; Illinois Central R. Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 245 U. S. 493 , 245 U. S. 506 ; New York v. United States, 257 U. S. 591 , 257 U. S. 601 ; Louisiana Public Service Comm'n v. Texas & N.O. R. Co., 284 U. S. 125 , 284 U. S. 130 ; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Illinois Brick Co., 297 U. S. 447 , 297 U. S. 459 .
But, in general, Congress has left it to the courts to formulate the rules thus interpreting the commerce clause in its application, doubtless because it has appreciated the destructive consequences to the commerce of the nation if their protection were withdrawn, Gwin, White & Prince v. Henneford, supra, 305 U. S. 441 , and has been aware that, in their application, state laws will not be invalidated without the support of relevant factual material which will "afford a sure basis" for an informed judgment. Terminal Railroad Assn. v. Brotherhood, supra, 318 U. S. 8 ; Southern R. Co. v. King, 217 U. S. 524 . Meanwhile, Congress has accommodated its legislation, as have the states, to these rules as an established feature of our constitutional system. There has thus been left to the states wide scope for the regulation of matters of local state concern, even though it in some measure affects the commerce, provided it does not materially restrict the free flow of commerce across state lines, or interfere with it in matters with respect to which uniformity of regulation is of predominant national concern.
from local restraints in matters requiring uniformity of regulation are interests safeguarded by the commerce clause from state interference.
While this Court is not bound by the findings of the state court, and may determine for itself the facts of a case upon which an asserted federal right depends, Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, supra, p. 324 U. S. 659 , and cases cited, the facts found by the state trial court showing the nature of the interstate commerce involved, and the effect upon it of the train limit law, are not seriously questioned. Its findings with respect to the need for and effect of the statute as a safety measure, although challenged in some particulars which we do not regard as material to our decision, are likewise supported by evidence. Taken together, the findings supply an adequate basis for decision of the constitutional issue.
of the Train Limit Law appellant is required to haul over 300 more trains in Arizona than would otherwise have been necessary. The record shows a definite relationship between operating costs and the length of trains, the increase in length resulting in a reduction of operating costs per car. The additional cost of operation of trains complying with the Train Limit Law in Arizona amounts, for the two railroads traversing that state, to about $1,000,000 a year. The reduction in train lengths also impedes efficient operation. More locomotives and more manpower are required; the necessary conversion and reconversion of train lengths at terminals, and the delay caused by breaking up and remaking long trains upon entering and leaving the state in order to comply with the law, delay the traffic and diminishes its volume moved in a given time, especially when traffic is heavy.
"It was designed to save manpower, motive power, engine-miles and train-miles; to avoid delay in the movement of trains; to increase the efficient use of locomotives and cars and to augment the available supply thereof, and to relieve congestion at terminals caused by setting out and picking up cars on each side of the train-limit law States."
train operations to the best advantage only by rebuilding its road to some extent and by changing or adding to its motive power equipment, which it desires to do in order to secure more efficient and economical operation of its trains.
law as a safety measure in reducing accidents and casualties is so slight or problematical as not to outweigh the national interest in keeping interstate commerce free from interferences which seriously impede it and subject it to local regulation which does not have a uniform effect on the interstate train journey which it interrupts.
of short trains. On comparison of the number of slack action accidents in Arizona with those in Nevada, where the length of trains is now unregulated, the trial court found that, with substantially the same amount of traffic in each state, the number of accidents was relatively the same in long as in short train operations. While accidents from slack action do occur in the operation of passenger trains, it does not appear that they are more frequent, or the resulting shocks more severe, on long than on short passenger trains. Nor does it appear that slack action accidents occurring on passenger trains, whatever their length, are of sufficient severity to cause serious injury or damage.
of accidents not only to train operatives and other railroad employees, but to passengers and members of the public exposed to danger by train operations.
"if short-train operation may or should result in any decrease in the number or severity of the 'slack' or 'slack-surge' type of accidents or casualties, such decrease is substantially more than offset by the increased number of accidents and casualties from other causes that follow the arbitrary limitation of freight trains to 70 cars . . . and passenger trains to 14 cars."
We think, as the trial court found, that the Arizona Train Limit Law, viewed as a safety measure, affords, at most, slight and dubious advantage, if any, over unregulated train lengths, because it results in an increase in the number of trains and train operations and the consequent increase in train accidents of a character generally more severe than those due to slack action. Its undoubted effect on the commerce is the regulation, without securing uniformity, of the length of trains operated in interstate commerce, which lack is itself a primary cause of preventing the free flow of commerce by delaying it and by substantially increasing its cost and impairing its efficiency. In these respects, the case differs from those where a state, by regulatory measures affecting the commerce, has removed or reduced safety hazards without substantial interference with the interstate movement of trains. Such are measures abolishing the car stove, New York, N.H. & H. R. Co. v. New York, 165 U. S. 628 ; requiring locomotives to be supplied with electric headlights, Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Georgia, 234 U. S. 280 ; providing for full train crews, Chicago, R.I. & P. R. Co. v. Arkansas, 219 U. S. 453 ; St. Louis & I.M. R. Co. v. Arkansas, 240 U. S. 518 ; Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Norwood, 283 U. S. 249 , and for the equipment of freight trains with cabooses, Terminal Railroad Assn. v. Brotherhood, supra.
"not pretended that local welfare needs the removal of the defendants' bridges at the expense of the dominant requirements of commerce with other States, but merely that it would be helped by raising them."
And in Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Blackwell, 244 U. S. 310 , it was held that the interference with interstate rail transportation resulting from a state statute requiring, as a safety measure, that trains come almost to a stop at grade crossings outweighed the local interest in safety when it appeared that compliance increased the scheduled running time more than six hours in a distance of one hundred and twenty-three miles. Cf. Southern R. Co. v. King, supra, where the crossings were less numerous and the burden to interstate commerce was not shown to be heavy, and see Erb v. Morasch, 177 U. S. 584 .
218 U. S. 135 ; St. Louis-S.F. R. Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 261 U. S. 369 ; requiring an interstate railroad to detour its through passenger trains for the benefit of a small city, St. Louis & S.F. R. Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, supra; interfering with interstate commerce by requiring interstate trains to leave on time, Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Texas, 245 U. S. 484 ; regulating car distribution to interstate shippers, St. Louis S.W. R. Co. v. Arkansas, 217 U. S. 136 ; or establishing venue provisions requiring railroads to defend accident suits at points distant from the place of injury and the residence and activities of the parties, Davis v. Farmers Co-operative Co., 262 U. S. 312 ; Michigan Central R. Co. v. Mix, 278 U. S. 492 ; cf. Denver & R.G.W. R. Co. v. Terte, 284 U. S. 284 ; see also Buck v. Kuykendall, supra; Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, supra; Baldwin v. Seelig, supra, 294 U. S. 524 ; South Carolina Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., supra, 303 U. S. 185 n., and cases cited.
"attempts to impose particular standards as to structure, design, equipment and operation [of vessels plying interstate] which, in the judgment of its authorities, may be desirable but pass beyond what is plainly essential to safety and seaworthiness, the State will encounter the principle that such requirements, if imposed at all, must be through the action of Congress, which can establish a uniform rule. Whether the State in a particular matter goes too far must be left to be determined when the precise question arises."
not appear that it will lessen, rather than increase, the danger of accident. Its attempted regulation of the operation of interstate trains cannot establish nationwide control such as is essential to the maintenance of an efficient transportation system, which Congress alone can prescribe. The state interest cannot be preserved at the expense of the national interest by an enactment which regulates interstate train lengths without securing such control, which is a matter of national concern. To this, the interest of the state here asserted is subordinate.
Appellees especially rely on the full train crew cases, Chicago, R.I. & P. R. Co. v. Arkansas, supra; St. Louis & I.M. R. Co. v. Arkansas, supra; Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Norwood, supra, and also on South Carolina Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., supra, as supporting the state's authority to regulate the length of interstate trains. While the full train crew laws undoubtedly placed an added financial burden on the railroads in order to serve a local interest, they did not obstruct interstate transportation or seriously impede it. They had no effects outside the state beyond those of picking up and setting down the extra employees at the state boundaries; they involved no wasted use of facilities or serious impairment of transportation efficiency, which are among the factors of controlling weight here. In sustaining those laws, the Court considered the restriction a minimal burden on the commerce comparable to the law requiring the licensing of engineers as a safeguard against those of reckless and intemperate habits, sustained in Smith v. Alabama, 124 U. S. 465 , or those afflicted with color blindness, upheld in Nashville, C. & St.L. R. Co. v. Alabama, 128 U. S. 96 , and other similar regulations. New York, N.H. & H. R. Co. v. New York, supra; Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Georgia, supra; cf. County of Mobile v. Kimball, 102 U. S. 691 .
South Carolina Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., supra, was concerned with the power of the state to regulate the weight and width of motor cars passing interstate over its highways, a legislative field over which the state has a far more extensive control than over interstate railroads. In that case, and in Maurer v. Hamilton, supra, we were at pains to point out that there are few subjects of state regulation affecting interstate commerce which are so peculiarly of local concern as is the use of the state's highways. Unlike the railroads, local highways are built, owned and maintained by the state or its municipal subdivisions. The state is responsible for their safe and economical administration. Regulations affecting the safety of their use must be applied alike to intrastate and interstate traffic. The fact that they affect alike shippers in interstate and intrastate commerce in great numbers, within as well as without the state, is a safeguard against regulatory abuses. Their regulation is akin to quarantine measures, game laws, and like local regulations of rivers, harbors, piers, and docks, with respect to which the state has exceptional scope for the exercise of its regulatory power, and which, Congress not acting, have been sustained even though they materially interfere with interstate commerce (303 U.S. at 303 U. S. 187 -188, and cases cited).
and efficient railway transportation service, which must prevail.
See Senate Report No. 416, 75th Cong., 1st Sess.; 81 Cong.Rec. 7596, and Hearings before House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 75th Cong., 3d Sess., S. 69, Train Lengths.
In applying this rule, the Court has often recognized that, to the extent that the burden of state regulation falls on interests outside the state, it is unlikely to be alleviated by the operation of those political restraints normally exerted when interests within the state are affected. Cooley v. Board of Wardens, supra, 53 U. S. 315 ; Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall. 713, 70 U. S. 731 ; Escanaba Co. v. Chicago, 107 U. S. 678 , 107 U. S. 683 ; Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing Dist., 120 U. S. 489 , 120 U. S. 499 ; Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Ohio, 173 U. S. 285 , 173 U. S. 294 ; South Carolina Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros. supra, 303 U. S. 185 , n.; McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Co., 309 U. S. 33 , 309 U. S. 46 , n.; cf. 17 U. S. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 428; Pound v. Turck, 95 U. S. 459 , 95 U. S. 464 ; Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U. S. 196 , 114 U. S. 205 ; Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U. S. 405 , 304 U. S. 412 .
One hundred sixty-four bills limiting train lengths have been introduced in state legislatures since 1920, of which only three were passed, in Nevada, Louisiana and Oklahoma. The Nevada and Louisiana laws were held unconstitutional, and never enforced. Southern Pacific Co. v. Mashburn, 18 F.Supp. 393; Texas & N.O. R. Co. v. Martin (No. 428 -- Equity, E.D. of La.1936), unreported. The Arizona law, passed in 1912, was held unconstitutional in Atchison, T. & S.F. R. Co. v. La Prade, 2 F.Supp. 855, reversed on other grounds, 289 U. S. 289 U.S. 444.
Had these bills been passed, a freight train running over established routes (from Virginia to Michigan, for example) would normally proceed through states with a seventy-five car maximum (Virginia), a one hundred and twenty-five car maximum (West Virginia), a three thousand foot maximum (Ohio), and a seventy car limit (Michigan). A train from Arkansas to Wisconsin might be subjected to a fifty car maximum (Arkansas), one-half mile (Mississippi), three thousand feet (Iowa), one and a half miles (Minnesota), and thirty-three hundred feet (Wisconsin). A train running from Nebraska to California might be subject to a sixty, seventy-five or eighty-five maximum in Nebraska, to a limit fixed by commission in Kansas, to a sixty-five car limit in Colorado, to a seventy-five car limit in New Mexico, to a seventy car limit in Arizona, and to a seventy-four car limit in California. A passenger train might be limited to fourteen cars in New Jersey, ten in Pennsylvania, and eighteen in West Virginia.
In Oklahoma, three lines running from Chicago or Kansas City west pass through Oklahoma for distances of sixty, one hundred and seventeen, and one hundred and forty-three miles. Since no other state through which the traffic passes (except Arizona) restricts train lengths in any way, the effect of the Oklahoma law is to require through trains to be broken up for the short distances they pass through that state.
The record shows that, in 1939, the number of slack accident casualties in the United States, 399, was only 6% of the number of train and train service casualties to railroad employees, 6,713. In that year, three of the 399 slack accident casualties were fatal, whereas the average number of grade crossing casualties per year from 1935 to 1939 was 5,718. And in 1939, 1,398 persons were killed and 3,999 were injured in highway, grade crossing accidents. I.C.C. Bureau of Statistics, Accident Bulletin, No. 108, pp. 22-23.
With passenger traffic in Nevada 78% as heavy as in Arizona, from 1923 to 1938, two hundred and thirty-nine casualties were caused to persons by passenger trains in Arizona, and one hundred and nine in Nevada. Between 1923 and 1939, five persons in Nevada and fourteen in Arizona were injured by sudden stops or jerks on passenger trains.
Casualties to employees, occurring in freight train operations in New Mexico, have been substantially less in both number and frequency than in Arizona. From 1930 to 1940, there were one hundred and twenty-nine casualties to all classes of employees in New Mexico, at the rate of 7.97 per million train miles, 12.84 per hundred million car miles. In Arizona, there were two hundred and fifty-one casualties to employees, at the rate of 10.03 per million train miles, and 18.10 per hundred million car miles.
On a national basis, the findings show that, while the national accident rate per hundred million car miles for all railroad employees and for trainmen decreased 70% to 66% respectively between 1923-1928 and 1935-1940, the rate for the Southern Pacific in Arizona declined 52.3% and 53.3%. Appellant's rate in Nevada decreased 71.1% and 69.1 %.
"The whole theory of our government, federal and state, is hostile to the idea that questions of legislative authority may depend . . . upon opinions of judges as to the wisdom or want of wisdom in the enactment of laws under powers clearly conferred upon the legislature."
shock or jar to cars, particularly those in the rear of a train. It has always been the position of the employees that the dangers from "slack action" correspond to, and are proportionate with, the length of the train. The argument that "slack movements" are more dangerous in long trains than in short trains seems never to have been denied. The railroads have answered it by what is, in effect, a plea of confession and avoidance. They say that the added cost of running short trains places an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce. Their second answer is that the operation of short trains requires the use of more separate train units; that a certain number of accidents resulting in injury are inherent in the operation of each unit, injuries which may be inflicted either on employees or on the public; consequently, they have asserted that it is not in the public interest to prohibit the operation of long trains.
This controversy between the railroads and their employees, which was nationwide, was carried to Congress. Extensive hearings took place. The employees' position was urged by members of the various Brotherhoods. The railroads' viewpoint was presented through representatives of their National Association. In 1937, the Senate Interstate Commerce Committee, after its own exhaustive hearings, unanimously recommended that trains be limited to 70 cars as a safety measure. [ Footnote 2/2 ] The Committee, in its Report, reviewed the evidence and specifically referred to the large and increasing number of injuries and deaths suffered by railroad employees; it concluded that the admitted danger from slack movement was greatly intensified by the operation of long trains; that short trains reduce this danger; that the added cost of short trains to the railroad was no justification for jeopardizing the safety of railroad employees, and that the legislation would provide a greater degree of safety for persons and property, increase protection for railway employees and the public, and improve transportation services for shippers and consumers. The Senate passed the bill, [ Footnote 2/3 ] but the House Committee failed to report it out.
Arizona law. That which, for some unexplained reason, they did not ask Congress to do when it had the very subject of train length limitations under consideration, they shortly thereafter asked an Arizona state court to do.
element of danger which is itself subject to legislative regulation. For legislatures may, if necessary, require railroads to take appropriate steps to reduce the likelihood of injuries at grade crossings. Denver & R.G. R. Co. v. Denver, 250 U. S. 241 . And the fact that grade crossing improvements may be expensive is no sufficient reason to say that an unconstitutional "burden" is put upon a railroad, even though it be an interstate road. Erie R. Co. v. Public Utility Commissioners, 254 U. S. 394 , 254 U. S. 408 -411.
since the beginning of railroad transportation."
Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Georgia, 234 U. S. 280 , 234 U. S. 91 . Until today, the oft-repeated principles of that case have never been repudiated in whole or in part.
"if state requirements conflict, it will be necessary to carry additional apparatus and to make various adjustments at state lines which would delay and inconvenience interstate traffic."
"[i]f there is a conflict in such local regulations, by which interstate commerce may be inconvenienced -- if there appears to be need of standardization of safety appliances and of providing rules of operation which will govern the entire interstate road irrespective of state boundaries -- there is a simple remedy, and it cannot be assumed that it will not be readily applied if there be real occasion for it. That remedy does not rest in a denial to the state, in the absence of conflicting federal action, of its power to protect life and property within its borders, but it does lie in the exercise of the paramount authority of Congress, in its control of interstate commerce, to establish such regulations as, in its judgment, may be deemed appropriate and sufficient. Congress, when it pleases, may give the rule and make the standard to be observed on the interstate highway."
P. 234 U. S. 292 .
"a wide range of legislative discretion, . . . and their conclusions respecting the wisdom of their legislative acts are not reviewable by the courts."
Arizona Employers' Liability Cases, 250 U. S. 400 , 250 U. S. 419 .
the Court's action in requiring that money costs outweigh human values is sought to be buttressed by a reference to the express policy of Congress to promote an "economical national railroad system." I cannot believe that, if Congress had defined what it meant by "economical," it would have required money to be saved at the expense of the personal safety of railway employees. Its whole history for the past 25 years belies such an interpretation of its language. Judicial opinions, rather than legislative enactments, have tended to emphasize costs. See Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., supra, 318 U. S. 560 . A different congressional attitude has been shown by the passage of numerous safety appliance provisions, a federal employees' compensation act, abolition of the judicially created doctrine of assumption of risk and contributory negligence, and various other types of legislation. Unfortunately, the record shows, as pointed out in the Tiller case, that the courts have, by narrow and restricted interpretation, too frequently reduced the full scope of protection which Congress intended to provide.
society rests. I would affirm the judgment of the Supreme Court of Arizona.
A resume of these laws and their reception by the courts is set out in the opinion of the Supreme Court of Arizona in this case, 61 Ariz. 66, 145 P.2d 530.
Senate Report No. 416, 75th Cong., 1st Sess.
81 Cong.Rec. 7596. The record does not show any dissenting votes cast against the bill. The debate on the measure appears at pp. 7564-7595.
"To decide, as a fact, that the prohibition of excess weights 'is not necessary for the protection of the purchasers against imposition and fraud by short weights;' that it 'is not calculated to effectuate that purpose,' and that it 'subjects bakers and sellers of bread' to heavy burdens, is, in my opinion, an exercise of the powers of a super legislature -- not the performance of the constitutional function of judicial review."
The use of the "super legislature" technique has been repeated to strike down other statutes. See e.g., Chicago, M. & St.P. R. Co. v. Wisconsin, 238 U. S. 491 , 238 U. S. 499 ; Weaver v. Palmer Bros. Co., 270 U. S. 402 , dissent at 270 U. S. 415 . See also dissents in Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, 270 U. S. 230 , 241, 270 U. S. 242 ; New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U. S. 262 , 285 U. S. 284 -285. For a case in which this Court declined to review the "economics or the facts" behind a legislative enactment, see Central Lumber Co. v. South Dakota, 226 U. S. 157 , 226 U. S. 161 ; cf. Standard Oil Co. v. Marysville, 279 U. S. 582 , 279 U. S. 586 . See also Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U. S. 678 , 127 U. S. 686 ; dissenting opinion, Polk Co. v. Glover, 305 U. S. 5 , 305 U. S. 10 -19.
These figures appear to be considerably less than those later reported. See Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 318 U. S. 54 , 318 U. S. 59 , note 4.
I have expressed my doubts whether the courts should intervene in situations like the present and strike down state legislation on the grounds that it burdens interstate commerce. McCarroll v. Dixie Greyhound Lines, 309 U. S. 176 , 309 U. S. 183 -189. My view has been that the courts should intervene only where the state legislation discriminated against interstate commerce or was out of harmony with laws which Congress had enacted. P. 308 U. S. 184 . It seems to me particularly appropriate that that course be followed here. For Congress has given the Interstate Commerce Commission broad powers of regulation over interstate carriers. The Commission is the national agency which has been entrusted with the task of promoting a safe, adequate, efficient, and economical transportation service. It is the expert on this subject. It is in a position to police the field. And if its powers prove inadequate for the task, Congress, which has paramount authority in this field, can implement them.
train limit law infringes "the national interest in maintaining the free flow of commerce under the present emergency war conditions," I would accept its expert appraisal of the facts, assuming it had the authority to act. But that order is not before us. And the present case deals with a period of time which antedates the war emergency. Moreover, we are dealing here with state legislation in the field of safety where the propriety of local regulation has long been recognized. See Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Georgia, 234 U. S. 280 , 234 U. S. 291 , and cases collected in California v. Thompson, 313 U. S. 109 , 313 U. S. 113 -114. Whether the question arises under the Commerce Clause or the Fourteenth Amendment, I think the legislation is entitled to a presumption of validity. If a State passed a law prohibiting the hauling of more than one freight car at a time, we would have a situation comparable in effect to a state law requiring all railroads within its borders to operate on narrow gauge tracks. The question is one of degree, and calls for a close appraisal of the facts. * I am not persuaded that the evidence adduced by the railroads overcomes the presumption of validity to which this train limit law is entitled. For the reasons stated by MR. JUSTICE BLACK, Arizona's train limit law should stand as an allowable regulation enacted to protect the lives and limbs of the men who operate the trains.

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