Source: https://www.ucmjdefense.com/resources/criminal-trial-advocacy/findings-argument/comments-that-implicate-fundamental-rights/right-to-remain-silent-at-trial.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 10:34:34+00:00

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Trial counsel may not argue that the prosecution’s evidence is unrebutted if the only rebuttal could come from the accused or if the members would naturally and necessarily interpret the summation as comment on the failure of the accused to testify. R.C.M. 919(b) discussion; United States v. Paige , 67 M.J. 442 (C.A.A.F. 2009); United States v. Flores , 69 M.J. 366 (C.A.A.F. 2011). Findings Argument (Art and Law) (1) To make sense of this statement, note that it applies when the defense presents its own evidence at trial. If the defense puts on some evidence, the government can generally say that the parts of its case that the defense did not respond to are unrebutted – unless the only way the defense could respond to the government’s case would be for the accused to testify, and the accused elected not to testify.
, 67 M.J. 442, 454 (C.A.A.F. 2009) (Stucky, J., dissenting). (2) Note that even if an argument does not comment on the right to remain silent, the same comment may improperly imply that the accused has the burden of proof (see paragraph 5 below).
Accused elects to testify on the merits. (1) If the accused elects to testify on the merits regarding an offense charged, and during that testimony, the accused does not deny or explain specific incrimination facts introduced by the government, the trial counsel may comment on that failure to explain those facts during closing argument on the findings. R.C.M. 919(b) discussion. (2) The “mendacious accused.” (a) If the accused elects to testify, the trial counsel may comment on the fact that the accused’s merits testimony differed from the ultimate findings. Here, the accused has testified on his own behalf on the merits and then the factfinder has found him guilty contrary to that testimony. Can the trial counsel state that the accused’s testimony was a lie and that he should get a greater sentence for lying? (b) Courts have held that the answer is yes, but only as an indication of the accused’s rehabilitative potential and Findings Argument (Art and Law) with a limiting instruction. Any over-emphasis by the trial counsel may be inflammatory argument. United States v. Warren , 13 M.J. 278 (C.M.A. 1982). (c) The “mendacious accused” instruction is found in the Military Judge’s Benchbook in paras. 2-5-23 and 2-6-1, and for capital cases at para. 8-3-38. (d) Military judges should act with caution when giving this instruction sua sponte over defense objection, but to do so is not error. United States v. Ryan , 21 M.J. 627 (A.C.M.R. 1985) (e) Trial counsel may should avoid language like “hasn’t accepted responsibility for his actions” and “hasn’t’ faced up to what he did” because that comes dangerously close to improper comment on accused’s exercise of fundamental rights. United States v. Standifer , 31 M.J. 742 (A.F.C.M.R. 1990). See also United States v. Jenkins , 54 M.J. 12 (C.A.A.F. 2000).
nature of an accused’s unsworn statement. Trial counsel can point out that the unsworn statement has less evidentiary value than a sworn statement but cannot ask the court to draw an adverse inference against the accused for making an unsworn rather than a sworn statement. United States v. Breese , 11 M.J. 17 (C.M.A. 1981). See also United States v. Marsh , __ M.J. __ (C.A.A.F. 2011).
If the accused elects to speak at trial, trial counsel may comment on the accused’s demeanor and lack of remorse. (1) Don’t confuse this type of demeanor (in-court physical responses to questioning) with the type of demeanor (out-of-court physical responses to questioning) described in United States v. Clark , 69 M.J. 438 (C.A.A.F. 2011). (2) Trial counsel may comment on the accused’s lack of remorse provided the trial counsel can do so without commenting on the accused’s exercise of a fundamental right. The argument must come from evidence that is before the court-martial and not arise because the accused did not do something while exercising a fundamental right.
United States v. Edwards , 35 M.J. 351 (C.M.A. 1992). See also United States v. Garren, 53 M.J. 142 (C.A.A.F. 2000). (3) The proper foundation for commenting on an accused’s lack of remorse is: the accused has either testified or made an unsworn statement, and has either expressed no remorse or his expressions of remorse can be arguably construed to be shallow, Findings Argument (Art and Law) artificial, or contrived. United States v. Edwards , 35 M.J. 351 (C.M.A. 1992). (4) United States v. Toro , 37 M.J. 313 (C.M.A. 1993). Trial counsel’s comment that the accused did notacknowledge [the] finding of guiltyin his unsworn statement was not plain error. Such argument may be a proper comment on the accused’s lack of remorse. (5) United States v. Carroll , 34 M.J. 843 (A.C.M.R. 1992). Demeanor of an accused who does testify is evidence.
see generally United States v. Cook , 48 M.J. 64 (C.A.A.F. 1998).

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