Source: https://www.bruerlaw.com/read/archives/08-2018
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 06:42:14+00:00

Document:
In the broadest sense, civil rights might be described as those rights which we grant one another in a civil society. These are rights designed to promote the general welfare and civility of a group of people living together in an organized society. Importantly, like Lady Justice herself, these rights might be perceived by the governed as blind to the improper influence of power or corruption – providing rights to the minority as well as the majority – allowing the society to exist together with a unifying fabric of rights.
Among those civil rights which might be important in our daily life, but perhaps overlooked or taken for granted in “modern” times, is the civil right which we have freely and voluntarily given to ourselves – the civil right to pursue a civil action against our own government for wrongs caused by the government. Without this important civil right, the governed might find themselves disconnected from the exercise of power and its consequent responsibility, and instead perceiving a double standard between what we expect of one another in conducting our daily lives, versus what we can expect from our government.
In Kansas, the civil right to pursue an action against our own government for wrongs caused by the government is codified by the Kansas State Legislature in K.S.A. 75-6101 et seq, labeled the Kansas Tort Claims Act.
As set forth in A Selection of Legal Maxims, by Herbert Broom, Esquire, in 1845, “It is an ancient and fundamental principle of the English constitution that the king can do no wrong.” Under this principle, the sovereign is not amenable to suit.
When the American states united and broke free from the authority of the crown, the concept of federal sovereign immunity was not specifically mentioned in the United States Constitution. Under Article III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution, “The judicial Power shall extend to . . . to Controversies . . . between a State and Citizens of another State . . . .” Arguably, the United States Constitution, by its apparent plain language, allowed the federal courts to hear cases between a state and citizens of another state, thus eliminating state sovereign immunity. Within a few years following ratification of the Constitution, Alexander Chisolm sued the state of Georgia in the United States Supreme Court for debts incurred during the Revolutionary War. The State of Georgia did not appear, and the plaintiff asked the Court to enter a show cause order for Georgia to appear and show cause why judgment should not be entered against it. Before entering the order, the Court indicated that “it is proper that this Court should be satisfied it hath cognizance of the suit.” Chisolm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 429 (1793).
Following a discussion of sovereign immunity and the presence of English common law in early American jurisprudence, the United States Supreme Court concluded that by the language of Article III, Section 2, the Constitution allowed the sovereign states to be sued in court.
With the absence of any override to federal sovereign immunity in the United States Constitution, as well as the passage of the Eleventh Amendment, sovereign immunity continued to remain the law of the land throughout the next century and a half.
Beginning early in the twentieth century, however, Congress began to reconsider federal sovereign immunity. The Federal Tort Claims Act was passed by the Seventy-ninth Congress in 1946 as Title IV of the Legislative Reorganization Act, 60 Stat. 842, after nearly thirty years of congressional consideration. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 24 (1953). It was the offspring of a feeling that the Government should assume the obligation to pay damages for the misfeasance of employees in carrying out its work. Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 24.
By the mid-twentieth century, with the enactment of the Federal Tort Claims Act, federal sovereign immunity for tort claims had eroded, and it was officially recognized that at least with respect to the United States Government, the king could do wrong.
Meanwhile, throughout much of the twentieth century, in the courts in the State of Kansas, sovereign immunity persisted with respect to the state itself, its counties, and its municipalities. Woods v. Kan. Tpk. Auth., 205 Kan. 770, 770-71, 472 P.2d 219, 220 (1970), Caywood v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 194 Kan. 419, 421-23, 399 P.2d 561, 562-64 (1965), and Jones v. City of Kansas City, 176 Kan. 406, 408-09, 271 P.2d 803, 805-06 (1954).
For a time, the Kansas courts and Kansas legislature battled the limits of the fundamental fairness of the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The Kansas Supreme Court rendered five decisions between 1969 and 1979 on the issue of governmental immunity, four of which abrogated governmental immunity, either partially or completely. Kansas Legislator Briefing Book (2015). Finally, in 1979, the legislature officially waived sovereign immunity in the State of Kansas with the passage of the Kansas Tort Claims Act. K.S.A. 75-6101 to 75-6120. It has been noted that the Kansas Tort Claims Act is patterned after the Federal Tort Claims Act. Westerbeke, The Immunity Provisions in the Kansas Tort Clams Act: The First Twenty-Five Years, 52 Kan. L. Rev. 939, 960 (2003).
The origins of sovereign immunity appear to be based in part on the infallibility of the monarch, but nonetheless, the doctrine persisted for a time in this country. There is no question that shielding the government from some wrongs, while allowing redress for other wrongs, seems fundamentally unfair, especially to victims who did not choose their wrongdoer.
Each governmental entity shall be liable for damages caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any of its employees while acting within the scope of their employment under circumstances where the governmental entity, if a private person, would be liable under the laws of this state.
[T]he most serious threat to a broadly based system of governmental liability for damages caused by tortious conduct . . . is the KCTA’s express retention of a series of specifically enumerated exceptions set forth in section 75-6104. Initial drafts of the KCTA preserved immunity for only a limited number of fundamental government functions. Yet before the legislation was final, the Kansas League of Municipalities successfully convinced legislators to add a number of additional immunities. In the twenty-five years since enactment, the KCTA has been repeatedly amended to add new immunities, and today the KCTA contains twenty-five specific immunities.
Westerbeke, The Immunity Provisions in the Kansas Tort Clams Act: The First Twenty-Five Years, 52 Kan. L. Rev. 939, 945-46 (2003).
- A limit of $500,000 for any number of claims arising out of a single occurrence or accident, unless insurance has been purchased. K.S.A. 75-6105(a) and 75-6111(b).
- No punitive or exemplary damages, except for acts or omissions of employees because of actual fraud or actual malice. K.S.A. 75-6105(c).
- Allowing payment of judgments by periodic payments. K.S.A. 75-6112.
- Excepting certain health care providers from the Act. K.S.A. 75-6115.
- Providing a framework for defending and indemnifying employees for claims based on violations of the civil rights laws of the United States or of the state of Kansas. K.S.A. 75-6116.
- Establishment of a tort claims fund in the state treasury, administered by the Attorney General. K.S.A. 75-6117.
- Excepting members of: any governing body of a municipality, appointive board, commission, committee, or council. K.S.A. 65-6119.
- Discussing the actions of charitable health care providers. K.S.A. 75-6120.
Under K.S.A. 12-105b(d), a notice of claim must be filed with the clerk or governing body of the entity prior to the filing of the claim.
Under K.S.A. 12-105a, a “municipality” means and includes county, township, city, school district of whatever name or nature, community junior college, municipal university, city, county, or district hospital, drainage district, cemetery district, fire district, and other political subdivision or taxing unit, and including their boards, bureaus, commissions, committees and other agencies, such as, but not limited to, library board, park board, recreation commission, hospital board of trustees having power to create indebtedness and make payment of the same independently of the parent unit.
Under K.S.A. 75-6102(c), a municipality includes any county, township, city, school district or other political or taxing subdivisions of the state, or any agency, authority, institution, or other instrumentality thereof.
The notice requirement does not apply to the state itself and its agencies.
(5) a statement of the amount of monetary damages that is being requested.
In the filing of a notice of claim, substantial compliance with the provisions and requirements of this subsection shall constitute valid filing of a claim. The contents of such notice shall not be admissible in any subsequent action arising out of the claim.
Once notice of the claim is filed, no action shall be commenced until after the claimant has received notice from the municipality that it has denied the claim or until after 120 days has passed following the filing of the notice of claim, whichever occurs first.
A claim is deemed denied if the municipality fails to approve the claim in its entirety within 120 days unless the interested parties have reached a settlement before the expiration of that period. No person may initiate an action against a municipality unless the claim has been denied in whole or part.
Any action brought pursuant to the Kansas tort claims act shall be commenced within the time period provided for in the code of civil procedure or it shall be forever barred, except that, a claimant shall have no less than 90 days from the date the claim is denied or deemed denied in which to commence an action.
“Against a municipality” - The jurisdictional bar in K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 12-105b(d) unambiguously applies only to lawsuits against municipalities. Failure to comply with the statute does not deprive a district court of jurisdiction over a lawsuit against a municipal employee. Whaley v. Sharp, 301 Kan. 192, 201, 343 P.3d 63, 69 (2014).
“Clerk or governing body” - K.S.A.2011 Supp. 12-105b(d) requires a notice of claim against a county to be served on the county clerk or the board of county commissioners. Here, there is no evidence in the record that Huehl furnished a written notice of claim on either the clerk or the board of county commissioners. Because Huehl failed to provide written notice of his claim as required by K.S.A.2011 Supp. 12-105b(d), the trial court lacked jurisdiction over his claims against the defendants. As a result, the trial court properly dismissed the case with prejudice. Huehl v. Board of County Com’rs of County of Lincoln, 298 P.3d 1139 (Kan. App. 2013); see also Meara v. Douglas County, 293 P.3d 168 (Kan. App. 2013); Steed v. McPherson Area Solid Waste Utility, 43 Kan.App.2d 75, 221 P.3d 11 (2010); and Orr v. Heiman, 270 Kan. 109, 114-15, 12 P.3d 387 (2000) (filing with school superintendent complied with clerk requirement); Smith v. Kennedy, 26 Kan.App.2d 351, 361, 985 P.2d 715, rev. denied 268 Kan. 848 (1999) (filing with CEO of entity complied with clerk requirement).
When considering whether a notice substantially complies with the requirements found in K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 12-105b(d), the Kansas Supreme Court has held that "substantial compliance means ‘compliance in respect to the essential matters necessary to assure every reasonable objective of the statute.’ 297 Kan. at 775 (quoting Dodge City Implement, Inc. v. Board of Barber County Comm'rs, 288 Kan. 619, 639, 205 P.3d 1265 ). Further, "the question of compliance is not based upon a 'mechanical counting' of information addressing each enumerated category in the statute. Instead, notice is sufficient if it gives the municipality what it needs for a 'full investigation and understanding of the merits of the claims advanced.' [Citations omitted.] This is achieved when the notice advises the municipality of the time and place of the injury, affords the municipality an opportunity to ascertain the character and extent of the injury sustained, and allows for the early investigation and resolution of claim disputes. [Citation omitted.]" Sleeth v. Sedan City Hospital (Sleeth II), 298 Kan. 853, 865, 317 P.3d 782 (2014).
“Until after . . . 120 days” - We hold that the 120-day review period requirement of K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 12-105b(d) establishes a statutory condition precedent that must be met before a court has subject matter jurisdiction over a claim against a municipality under the Kansas Tort Claims Act. Its time constraint may be shortened only if a municipality acts to deny the claim in whole or in part before a petition is filed in the district court. The 120-day review period cannot be waived to give a court subject matter jurisdiction over a prematurely filed lawsuit. Sleeth v. Sedan City Hosp., 298 Kan. 853, 871, 317 P.3d 782 (2014).
VI. What Is Not Covered by the Kansas Tort Claims Act.
Babbs v. Block, Case No. 15-00194-CV-W-HFS (W.D. Mo. Mar. 10, 2016) (dismissing plaintiff’s complaint) (“The dispositive issue for me is comity, that is, whether Kansas governmental immunity law should be applied when the alleged injury occurred in Missouri.”) In Babbs, a Kansas police officer entered Missouri bar with his weapon, consumed several alcoholic beverages, flashed his weapon, was asked to leave, was escorted out of the bar by plaintiff (who was a security guard) and others, and in the process, his weapon went off, striking plaintiff in the torso. The Missouri federal court used comity to apply Kansas law.
Patterson v. Cowley County, 388 P.3d 923 (Kan. App. 2017) – SUV with two intoxicated passengers drove into Arkansas River after travelling down an road within a recreation area; an action was brought under the Kansas Tort Claims Act. The Court of Appeals discussed various immunity exceptions to the Act, and allowed the case to proceed on the grounds that the recreational use immunity exception did not apply to the County.
Cullison v. City of Salina, 371 P.3d 374 (Kan. App. 2016) – 12-year old slipped and fell and was electrocuted on exposed electrical junction box, causing her death. The Court of Appeals also discussed the recreational use exception, allowing the case to proceed.
Keiswetter v. Kansas, 304 Kan. 362, 373 P.3d 803 (2016) – Inmate escaped while on a work detail, hid during the search, entered a woman’s house at night to attempt to steal her car keys, and encountered the woman, kicking her, causing her to fall and hit her head, and as a result, she passed away. The Supreme Court of Kansas held that the State was entitled to summary judgment because it was immune from liability under the KCTA’s police protection exception.
One final practice point – as suits against the government often involve both violations of federal laws as well as state torts, remember that federal courts may accept ancillary jurisdiction over the state law claims, and there will be federal decisions interpreting the Kansas Tort Claims Act.

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