Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=83104:57102&catid=1584&Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 10:49:07+00:00

Document:
G.R. No. 194560, June 11, 2014 - NESTOR T. GADRINAB, Petitioner, v. NORA T. SALAMANCA, ANTONIO TALAO, AND ELENA LOPEZ, Respondent.
NESTOR T. GADRINAB, Petitioner, v. NORA T. SALAMANCA, ANTONIO TALAO, AND ELENA LOPEZ, Respondent.
A judgment on compromise agreement is a judgment on the merits. It has the effect of res judicata, and is immediately final and executory unless set aside because of falsity or vices of consent. The doctrine of immutability of judgments bars courts from modifying decisions that have already attained finality, even if the purpose of the modification is to correct errors of fact or law.
This Rule 45 petition seeks the review of the Court of Appeals’ decision1 dated July 22, 2010 and its resolution2 dated November 19, 2010. The Court of Appeals dismissed petitioner’s appeal and affirmed the Regional Trial Court’s decision granting respondent Salamanca’s motion for physical partition pending the execution of a judgment on compromise agreement between the parties.
On the violation of due process, respondents Salamanca and Talao argued that it was only before this court that this issue was raised.
The issue in this case is whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the Regional Trial Court’s decision allowing the physical partition of the property despite finality of a previous judgment on compromise agreement involving the division of the same property.
Respondent Salamanca filed two actions for physical partition. The two parties settled the first action through a judicial compromise agreement. The same respondent filed the second action after she had determined that her co-heirs were not being cooperative in complying with the compromise agreement.
In a compromise agreement, the parties freely enter into stipulations. “[A] judgment based on a compromise agreement is a judgment on the merits”52 of the case. It has the effect of res judicata. These principles are impressed both in our law and jurisprudence.
Article 2037. A compromise has upon the parties the effect and authority of res judicata; but there shall be no execution except in compliance with a judicial compromise.
This case involves “bar by prior judgment.” Respondents cannot file another action for partition after final judgment on compromise had already been rendered in a previous action for partition involving the same parties and property.
Doctrines on bar by prior judgment and immutability of judgment apply whether judgment is rendered after a full-blown trial or after the parties voluntarily execute a compromise agreement duly approved by the court.
Article 2038. A compromise in which there is mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation, undue influence, or falsity of documents is subject to the provisions of Article 1330 of this Code.
Article 1330. A contract where consent is given through mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence, or fraud is voidable.
Therefore, courts cannot entertain actions involving the same cause of action, parties, and subject matter without violating the doctrines on bar by prior judgment and immutability of judgments, unless there is evidence that the agreement was void, obtained through fraud, mistake or any vice of consent, or would disrupt substantial justice.
In this case, there was no issue as to the fact that the parties freely entered into the compromise agreement. There was also no dispute about the clarity of its terms. Some of the parties simply do not wish to abide by the compromise agreement’s terms.
This court does not see how substantial justice will be served by disturbing a previous final judgment on compromise when failure of its execution was caused by the parties themselves.
The subsequent disagreement among the parties did not cause any material change in the situation or in the relations among the parties. The situation and relations among the parties remained the same as the situation and their relations prior to the compromise agreement. They remained co-owners of the property, which they desired to partition.
Moreover, the parties voluntarily agreed to the compromise agreement, which was already stamped with judicial approval. The agreement’s execution would bring about the effects desired by all parties and the most just and equitable situation for all. On the other hand, the judgment granting the second action for partition filed by respondent Salamanca was obtained with opposition.
The issue in this case involves the non-compliance of some of the parties with the terms of the compromise agreement. The law affords complying parties with remedies in case one of the parties to an agreement fails to abide by its terms.
Respondent Salamanca knew that the only reason for the failed compromise agreement was the non-compliance with the agreement’s terms of some of her co-heirs. Particularly, it was stipulated that petitioner’s removal from the property was conditioned upon payment of an amount equivalent to his share. Respondent Talao refused to abide by his own undertaking to shoulder respondent Salamanca’s share. He also refused to acknowledge the appraisal of the appraiser appointed in the compromise agreement. This refusal caused the failure of the compromise agreement.
WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals’ decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The judgment on the compromise agreement is REINSTATED.
1 Rollo, p. 31-42. This decision was penned by Associate Justice Noel G. Tijam, with Associate Justices Marlene Gonzales-Sison and Danton Q. Bueser concurring.
2 Id. at 43-45. This resolution was penned by Associate Justice Noel G. Tijam, with Associate Justices Marlene Gonzales-Sison and Danton Q. Bueser concurring.
12 Id. at 33–34. The text of the compromise agreement reproduced above is based on the Court of Appeals’ decision.
45 Id. at 72 and 109.
47 Id. at 76 and 108.
52Spouses Romero v. Tan, 468 Phil. 224, 240 (2004) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division].
53 468 Phil. 224 (2004) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division].
54 Id. at 240; See also Aromin v. Floresca, 528 Phil. 1165, 1186 (2006) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., First Division].
55 See Heirs of Enrique Diaz v. Virata, 529 Phil. 799, 823-824 (2006) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, First Division].
56 See also Facura v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 166495, February 16, 2011, 643 SCRA 427, 458–460 [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division].
57 See also Facura v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 166495, February 16, 2011, 643 SCRA 427, 458–460 [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division].
58 See also Facura v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 166495, February 16, 2011, 643 SCRA 427, 458–460 [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division].
59 See also Facura v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 166495, February 16, 2011, 643 SCRA 427, 458–460 [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division].
60 G.R. No. 161282, February 23, 2011, 644 SCRA 50 [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division].
63 See Guiang v. Kintanar, 193 Phil. 251, 288–289 (1981) [Per J. Barredo, Second Division].
64 See Cachopero v. Celestial, G.R. No. 146754, March 21, 2012, 668 SCRA 619, 635 [Per J. Leonardo-De Castro, First Division].
65 Cachopero v. Celestial, G.R. No. 146754, March 21, 2012, 668 SCRA 619, 635 [Per J. Leonardo-De Castro, First Division].
66 Id. at 632, citing Philippine National Oil Company-Energy Development Corporation (PNOC-EDC) v. Abella, 489 Phil. 515 (2005) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Second Division].
67 See Viesca v. Gilinsky, 553 Phil. 498, 522–523 (2007) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Third Division]; Domingo Realty v. Court of Appeals, 542 Phil. 39, 65–66 (2007) [Per J. Velasco, Jr., Second Division]; Aromin v. Floresca, 528 Phil. 1165, 1190 (2006) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., First Division].
68Cachopero v. Celestial, G.R. No. 146754, March 21, 2012, 668 SCRA 619, 632 [Per J. Leonardo-De Castro, First Division], citing Air Transportation Office v. Gopuco, Jr., 501 Phil. 228, 239 (2005) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Second Division].
69Domingo Realty v. Court of Appeals, 542 Phil. 39, 66 (2007) [Per J. Velasco, Jr., Second Division].
71 See also Domingo Realty v. Court of Appeals, 542 Phil. 39, 55-56 (2007) [Per J. Velasco, Jr., Second Division].

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