Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/69/219/
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 04:49:12+00:00

Document:
1. Where several persons sign a bond to the government as surety for a government officer, which bond, statute requires shall be approved by a judge, before the officer enters on the duties of his office, an erasure by one of the sureties of his name from the bond -- though such erasure be made before the instrument is submitted to the judge for approval, and therefore while it is uncertain whether it will be accepted by the government, or ever take effect -- avoids the bond, after approval, as respects a surety who had not been informed that the name was thus erased, the case being one where, as the court assumed, the tendency of the evidence was that the person whose name was erased signed the bond before or at the same time with the other party, the defendant.
2. Any unauthorized variation in an agreement which a surety has signed, that may prejudice him, or may substitute an agreement different from that which he came into, discharges him.
An act of Congress, relating to marshals of the United States, [Footnote 1] provides, that "before" the marshal enters on the duties of his office, he shall become "bound" for the faithful performance of the same, before the judge of the District Court of the United States, jointly and severally, with sufficient sureties, "to be approved by the district judge."
With this act in force, Pine was appointed marshal and gave bond on which the name of Smith and others had been signed, and appeared as sureties. Suit having been brought against the marshal, Smith, and the others, his sureties, in the circuit court for the Northern District of Illinois, upon this bond, Smith pleaded that the bond was not his deed.
to him for approval, it presented the same appearance exactly as it did now at the trial, except that the names of the sureties were inserted by him in the first part of it; that it was brought either by one McGill or by the defendant, Pine; that Pine had difficulty in getting sureties, and had, some time before, told him, the witness, that Hoyne had objections to having his name on the bond, and Hoyne afterwards told him the same thing. The judge had not then seen it. Afterwards it was brought to him, with Hoyne's name erased. Not knowing the signatures of all the parties, he held the bond several days, and all the sureties came in and acknowledged the execution of it before him, except the defendant, Smith. He then approved the bond, and being personally acquainted with Smith's writing, certified to the genuineness of the signatures. The bond was then admitted in evidence, under objection.
At a subsequent stage of the trial the defendant, Smith, called the district judge as a witness, when he testified that some time before the approval of the bond by him, Hoyne stated to him that he had signed the bond, with others, for Pine, but that he had become dissatisfied, and that McGill and Pine had both agreed that his name should be taken off -- that he wanted it off, and was not willing it should remain on the bond. The witness said, further, that when the sureties who acknowledged the execution of the bond appeared before him, he might have called their attention to the erasure of the name of Hoyne, but was not positive; was inclined to think he did; thought he handed it to each one of them, and asked them if they signed it; he didn't know that they read it.
to have his name erased &c. The judge told him, that in justice to the other signers, he should tell them that he wanted his name off; that accordingly, in a very short time, he, the witness, spoke to all the parties who had signed, except Smith, who was absent, and told them that he wanted his name off. A few days after, in response to his inquiry, the judge told him that his name had been erased. When it was done, and by whom, he did not know.
This case comes before the Court upon a writ of error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Illinois. Suit was instituted by the United States, and the record shows that it was an action of debt on the official bond of Charles N. Pine, late marshal of the United States for the district where the suit was brought. Service was not made on the principal in the bond, nor on four of the sureties as named in the declaration. Of those served, three were defaulted, and the remaining three, Thomas Hoyne, William B. Snowhook, and Ezekiel S. Smith, appeared and made defense. First two pleaded -- 1, non est factum; 2, performance by principal. Smith filed separate pleas -- 1, nil debit; 2, non est factum. Issue was joined upon those several pleas, and the parties went to trial. Verdict and judgment were for the plaintiffs, and the defendants excepted and sued out this writ of error.
district judge, and examined him as a witness. He testified to the effect that the bond, when it was brought to him for approval, was precisely as it appeared when offered in evidence, except that the names of the sureties were inserted by him in the introductory part of the instrument. His statement was that it was brought to him for approval either by the marshal or his principal deputy, and that the erasure as described was there, just as it appeared at the time the witness was examined. Witness did not see the bond till it was brought to him for approval with the name erased; but he had previously been informed, both by the marshal and the person whose name was erased, that the latter had objections to having his name remain on the bond. Signatures of some of the parties not being known to the witness, he held the bond for several days after it was presented, and during that time all of the sureties, except the defendant, Smith, came in and acknowledged its execution. Whereupon the witness approved the bond agreeably to the certificate in the record, which is under his signature. Substance of the certificate is that all of the parties to the instrument, except the defendant, Smith, acknowledged the genuineness of their signatures; and that the district judge, being satisfied from his own knowledge and from evidence that the signature of Smith also was genuine, approved the bond. Being asked by the defendants if Smith had ever consented to the erasure, the witness answered that he had no knowledge upon the subject. Relying on the explanations given by the witness, the plaintiffs again offered the bond in evidence, and the court, overruling the objections of the defendants, admitted the same to be read to the jury, which constitutes the first exception of the defendants.
transcripts, was not correct. Most of the documents offered for that purpose were objected to by the plaintiffs, and were excluded by the court. Defendants excepted to the rulings in that behalf, but in the view taken of the case it will not be necessary to examine the questions which the exceptions present.
Having offered evidence upon the merits, they recalled the district judge, and examined him again as to the erasure. Among other things, he testified that before he approved the bond, the person whose name was erased told him that he had signed it with others for the marshal, and that he had become dissatisfied, and wanted his name taken off; that the marshal and his deputy had both agreed that his name should be erased, and that he was not willing that it should remain.
Same parties also called and examined Philip A. Hoyne, whose name was erased from the bond. Material statements of the witness are that the bond was circulated for signatures by the principal deputy of the marshal, and that the witness signed it with others at that time; that he, the witness, became dissatisfied some days before it was approved, and requested to have his name erased, and that the marshal and his deputy promised to do it; that not being able to get hold of the bond, he mentioned the subject to the district judge, and explained to him that he "could not consent to have it there at all." Suggestion of the judge was that he, the witness, in justice to the other signers of the bond, should see them and tell them what he wanted, and the witness stated that in a short time he spoke to all of them except defendant, Smith, who was then absent, and told them that he wanted his name erased, and that he was not willing to let it remain there as one of the sureties. Erasure was made before the bond was approved, but when, or by whom, the witness did not know.
believed from the evidence that the name of P. A. Hoyne was erased from the bond in suit, without the knowledge or consent of the defendant, and that he did not acknowledge the bond as his, subsequent to such erasure, the jury should find the issue in his favor.
2. That the law places the burden of proving such consent upon the plaintiffs, and if they have failed to make such proof they are not entitled to a verdict.
3. That notice of the erasure to the district judge who approved the bond was notice to the government. But the court refused so to instruct the jury, and the defendant excepted.
III. Principal question for decision arises upon the exception of the defendant to the refusal of the court to instruct the jury as requested in the first prayer presented by the defendant.
Tendency of the evidence plainly was to show that the person, whose name was erased, signed the bond before or at the same time with the defendant. Nothing else can be inferred from his own testimony, in which he states that he signed with others at the time the bond was circulated for signatures; and his ready acquiescence in the suggestion of the district judge, that in justice to the other signers he ought to see them and tell them what he wanted, strongly favors the same view. Testimony of the district judge also confirms that theory, and makes it certain that all had signed before the erasure and before any interview had taken place between him and the person whose name was erased. Record does not show who made the erasure, but the proof is satisfactory that the marshal and his deputy agreed to do it, and that it remained in the possession of one of them, until it was presented to the district judge for approval.
that the erasure was after the defendant had signed the bond, and that it was done without his knowledge or consent, yet insist, that inasmuch as the erasure was made before the bond was approved by the district judge, it left the liability of all concerned precisely as it would have stood, if the person whose name was erased had only promised to sign and had not fulfilled his engagement.
discharge anyone of the sureties, unless it be shown that it was made with the knowledge or consent of the obligees. Reason for the conclusion, as suggested by the plaintiffs, is that where the alteration precedes the approval, the presumption is that it was made by a stranger, and not by the party seeking to enforce the obligation.
Support to the proposition, as stated, is attempted to be drawn from the case of United States v. Linn, [Footnote 3] and it must be confessed that there are expressions in the opinion of the majority of the court which give some countenance to that view of the law. Question in that case arose upon the demurrer of the plaintiffs to the plea of the defendants, and the judgment of the court was in fact based upon the ground that the allegations of the plea were insufficient to establish the defense. Alteration charged in that case was that the seals had been attached to the signatures after the instrument was signed and before it was delivered, and the allegations of the plea were, that the alteration was made without the consent, direction, or authority of the surety, but it was not alleged that it was done without his knowledge, or by whom it was done.
two decided cases as asserting that doctrine, and it is clear that both the cases cited [Footnote 4] fully sustain the position.
a right to stand upon the very terms of his contract, and if he does not assent to any variation of it, and a variation is made, it is fatal.
consent of the sureties; and this Court held, that the bond was thereby rendered invalid against the sureties. Principle of these decisions is that the alteration varies the terms of the obligation, and that the contract thereby ceases to be the contract for the due performance of which the party became surety, and wherever that appears to be the fact, and the surety is without fault, he is discharged.
Correct rule, we think, is stated by Lord Brougham in Bonar v. Macdonald, [Footnote 25] and which is substantially the same as that adopted by Mr. Burge in his treatise on surety. Substance of the rule is that any variation in the agreement to which the surety has subscribed, which is made without the surety's knowledge or consent, and which may prejudice him, or which may amount to a substitution of a new agreement for the one he subscribed, will discharge the surety, upon the principle of the maxim non haec in foedera veni. Intentional error cannot be imputed to the district judge, but the undisputed facts show that the erasure was made after the defendant signed the instrument, and before its approval, and without the knowledge or consent of the defendant.
For these reasons, we are of the opinion that the first prayer for instruction, presented by the defendant, should have been given.
Judgment of the circuit court therefore is reversed and the cause remanded with direction to issue a new venire.
Act of 24th of September, 1789; 1 Stat. at Large 87.
1 Stat. at Large 87.
42 U. S. 1 How. 112.
Henman v. Dickinson, 5 Bingham 183; Taylor v. Mosely, 6 Carrington & Payne 273.
1 Greenleaf on Evidence 564.
Knight v. Clements, 8 Adolphus & Ellis' 215; Newcomb v. Presbrey, 8 Metcalf 406.
Pigot's Case, 11 Coke 27; Master v. Miller, 4 Term 330.
2 Taylor on Evidence § 1618.
Davidson v. Cooper, 11 Meeson & Welsby 778; Same v. Same, 13 id. 343; 2 Taylor on Evidence § 1624.
2 Parsons on Bills 574; 1 Greenleaf on Evidence (10th ed) § 567, p. 749.
Parsons on Bills 577; Greenleaf on Evidence (10th ed) § 564; Knight v. Clements, 8 Adolphus & Ellis 215; Clifford v. Parker, 2 Manning & Granger 909; Wilde v. Armsby, 6 Cushing 314.
Burge on Suretyship, p. 214.
Evans v. Whyte, 5 Bingham 485; Archer v. Hale, 4 id. 464; Eyre v. Bartrop, 3 Maddock 221; Bonser v. Cox, 6 Beavan 110; Archer v. Hudson, 7 id. 551.
Boston v. Benson, 12 Cushing 61.
22 U. S. 9 Wheat. 702.
3 Commentaries (10th ed) 183; Birkhead v. Brown, 5 Hill 635.
62 U. S. 21 How. 76.
United States v. Boyd, 15 Pet. 208; Kellog v. Stockton, 29 Pa.St. 460.
47 U. S. 6 How. 296.
Gass v. Stinson, 3 Story 452.
65 U. S. 24 How. 315.
1 English Law & Equity 1.

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