Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/241/103/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 08:34:31+00:00

Document:
1. It is insisted that no offense under the statute was stated in the indictment because a member of the House of Representatives of the United States is not an officer acting under the authority of the United States within the meaning of the provision of the Penal Code upon which the indictment was based. This contention is supported by reference to what is assumed to be the significance in one or more provisions of the Constitution of the words "civil officers," and reliance is specially placed upon the ruling made at an early day in the Blount case (Wharton's State Trials, p. 20) that a Senator of the United States was not a civil officer subject to impeachment within the meaning of § 4 of Article II of the Constitution. But, as previously held in sustaining the motion to dismiss the direct writ of error, the issue here is not a constitutional one, but who is an officer acting under the authority of the United States within the provisions of the section of the Penal Code under consideration? And that question must be solved by the text of the provision, not shutting out as an instrument of interpretation proper light which may be afforded by the Constitution, and not forgetting that a penal statute is not to be enlarged by interpretation, but also not unmindful of the fact that a statute, because it is penal, is not to be narrowed by construction so as to fail to give full effect to its plain terms as made manifest by its text and its context. United States v. Hartwell, 6 Wall. 385, 73 U. S. 395; United States v. Corbett, 215 U. S. 233, 215 U. S. 242-243.
we think is not the case -- all ground for doubt would be removed by the following considerations: (a) because, prior to and at the time of the original enactment in question, the common understanding that a member of the House of Representatives was a legislative officer of the United States was clearly expressed in the ordinary, as well as legal, dictionaries. See Webster, verbo "office;" Century Dictionary verbo "officer;" 2 Bouvier's Law Dict. 1897 ed. 540, verbo "legislative officers;" Black's Law Dict.2d ed. p. 710, verbo "legislative officer." (b) Because, at or before the same period in the Senate of the United States, after considering the ruling in the Blount case, it was concluded that a member of Congress was a civil officer of the United States within the purview of the law requiring the taking of an oath of office. (Cong.Globe, 38th Congress, 1st session, pt. 1, pp. 320-331). (c) Because also in various general statutes of the United States at the time of the enactment in question, a member of Congress was assumed to be a civil officer of the United States. Revised Statutes, §§ 1786, 2010, and subdivision 14 of § 563. (d) Because that conclusion is the necessary result of prior decisions of this Court, and harmonizes with the settled conception of the position of members of state legislative bodies as expressed in many state decisions. The Floyd Acceptances, 7 Wall. 666, 74 U. S. 676; Ex Parte Yarbrough, 110 U. S. 58, 110 U. S. 64; Wiley v. Sinkler, 179 U. S. 58, 179 U. S. 64; Swafford v. Templeton, 185 U. S. 487, 185 U. S. 492; People v. Common Council, 77 N.Y. 503, 507-508; Morrill v. Haines, 2 N.H. 246; Shelby v. Alcorn, 36 Miss. 273, 291; Parks v. Soldiers' & Home, 22 Colo. 86, 96.
the case is clearly covered by § 1025, Revised Statutes. Connors v. United States, 158 U. S. 408, 158 U. S. 411; Armour Packing Co. v. United States, 209 U. S. 56, 209 U. S. 84; New York Central R. Co. v. United States, 212 U. S. 481, 212 U. S. 497; Holmgren v. United States, 217 U. S. 509, 217 U. S. 523.

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