Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=82118:56164&catid=1573&Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 20:21:11+00:00

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NATHANIEL N. DONGON, Petitioner, v. RAPID MOVERS AND FORWARDERS CO., INC., AND/OR NICANOR E. JAO, JR., Respondents.
The prerogative of the employer to dismiss an employee on the ground of willful disobedience to company policies must be exercised in good faith and with due regard to the rights of labor.
From the records, it appears that petitioner Rapid is engaged in the hauling and trucking business while private respondent Nathaniel T. Dongon is a former truck helper leadman.
Private respondent’s area of assignment is the Tanduay Otis Warehouse where he has a job of facilitating the loading and unloading [of the] petitioner’s trucks. On 23 April 2001, private respondent and his driver, Vicente Villaruz, were in the vicinity of Tanduay as they tried to get some goods to be distributed to their clients.
Tanduay’s security guard called the attention of private respondent as to the fact that Mr. Villaruz’[s] was not wearing an Identification Card (I.D. Card). Private respondent, then, assured the guard that he will secure a special permission from the management to warrant the orderly release of goods.
Instead of complying with his compromise, private respondent lent his I.D. Card to Villaruz; and by reason of such misrepresentation , private respondent and Mr. Villaruz got a clearance from Tanduay for the release of the goods. However, the security guard, who saw the misrepresentation committed by private respondent and Mr. Villaruz, accosted them and reported the matter to the management of Tanduay.
On 23 May 2001, after conducting an administrative investigation, private respondent was dismissed from the petitioning Company.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one ENTERED ordering the payment of his backwages from April 25, 2001 up to the finality of this decision and in lieu of reinstatement, he should be paid his separation pay from date of hire on May 2, 1994 up to the finality hereof.
There is no dispute that the private respondent lent his I.D. Card to another employee who used the same in entering the compound of the petitioner customer, Tanduay. Considering that this amounts to dishonesty and is provided for in the petitioning Company’s Manual of Discipline, its imposition is but proper and appropriate.
It is basic in any enterprise that an employee has the obligation of following the rules and regulations of its employer. More basic further is the elementary obligation of an employee to be honest and truthful in his work. It should be noted that honesty is one of the foremost criteria of an employer when hiring a prospective employee. Thus, we see employers requiring an NBI clearance or police clearance before formally accepting an applicant as their employee. Such rules and regulations are necessary for the efficient operation of the business.
Employees who violate such rules and regulations are liable for the penalties and sanctions so provided, e.g., the Company’s Manual of Discipline (as in this case) and the Labor Code.
The argument of the respondent commission that no pecuniary damage was sustained is off-tangent with the facts of the case. The act of lending an ID is an act of dishonesty to which no pecuniary estimate can be ascribed for the simple reason that no monetary equation is involved. What is involved is plain and simple adherence to truth and violation of the rules. The act of uttering or the making of a falsehood does not need any pecuniary estimate for the act to gestate to one punishable under the labor laws. In this case, the illegal use of the I.D. Card while it may appear to be initially trivial is of crucial relevance to the petitioner’s customer, Tanduay, which deals with drivers and leadmen withdrawing goods and merchandise from its warehouse. For those with criminal intentions can use another’s ID to asport goods and merchandise.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed 17 June 2002 Decision of respondent Commission in NLRC CA-029937-01 is hereby SET ASIDE and the 10 September 2001 Decision of Labor Arbiter Vicente R. Layawen is ordered REINSTATED. No costs.
Undaunted, the petitioner is now on appeal.
Petitioner argues that his dismissal was discriminatory because Villaruz was retained in his employment as driver; and that the CA gravely abused its discretion in disregarding his showing that he did not violate Rapid Movers’ rules and regulations but simply performed his work in line with the duties entrusted to him, and in not appreciating his good faith and lack of any intention to willfully disobey the company’s rules.
In its comment,11 Rapid Movers prays that the petition for certiorari be dismissed for being an improper remedy and apparently resorted to as a substitute for a lost appeal; and insists that the CA did not commit grave abuse of discretion.
In his reply,12 petitioner submits that his dismissal was a penalty too harsh and disproportionate to his supposed violation; and that his dismissal was inappropriate due to the violation being his first infraction that was even committed in good faith and without malice.
Based on the parties’ foregoing submissions, the issues to be resolved are, firstly: Was the petition improper and dismissible?; and, secondly: If the petition could prosper, was the dismissal of petitioner on the ground of willful disobedience to the company regulation lawful?
The petition filed here is self-styled as a petition for review on certiorari, but Rapid Movers points out that the petition was really one for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court due to its basis being the commission by the CA of a grave abuse of its discretion and because the petition was filed beyond the reglementary period of appeal under Rule 45. Hence, Rapid Movers insists that the Court should dismiss the petition because certiorari under Rule 65 could not be a substitute of a lost appeal under Rule 45.
Petitioner maintains that willful disobedience could not be a ground for his dismissal because he had acted in good faith and with the sole intention of facilitating deliveries for Rapid Movers when he allowed Villaruz to use his company ID.
Willful disobedience to the lawful orders of an employer is one of the valid grounds to terminate an employee under Article 296 (formerly Article 282) of the Labor Code.19 For willful disobedience to be a ground, it is required that: (a) the conduct of the employee must be willful or intentional; and (b) the order the employee violated must have been reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee, and must pertain to the duties that he had been engaged to discharge.20 Willfulness must be attended by a wrongful and perverse mental attitude rendering the employee’s act inconsistent with proper subordination.21 In any case, the conduct of the employee that is a valid ground for dismissal under the Labor Code constitutes harmful behavior against the business interest or person of his employer.22 It is implied that in every act of willful disobedience, the erring employee obtains undue advantage detrimental to the business interest of the employer.
Under the foregoing standards, the disobedience attributed to petitioner could not be justly characterized as willful within the contemplation of Article 296 of the Labor Code. He neither benefitted from it, nor thereby prejudiced the business interest of Rapid Movers. His explanation that his deed had been intended to benefit Rapid Movers was credible. There could be no wrong or perversity on his part that warranted the termination of his employment based on willful disobedience.
We cannot sustain the argument of Rapid Movers.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition; REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated by the Court of Appeals on October 24, 2003; REINSTATES the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission rendered on June 17, 2002; and ORDERS respondents to pay the costs of suit.
* Vice Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr., who is on leave, per Special Order No. 1502 dated August 8, 2013.
1Rollo, at 21-30; penned by Associate Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr. (now Presiding Justice), and concurred in by Associate Justice Buenaventura J. Guerrero (retired/deceased) and Associate Justice Regalado E. Maambong (retired/deceased).
2 Id. at 46-55; penned by Commissioner Victoriano R. Calaycay, and concurred in by Presiding Commissioner Raul T. Aquino and Commissioner Angelita A. Gacutan (now a Member of the Court of Appeals).
13 G.R. No. 130866, September 16, 1998, 295 SCRA 494, 503-504.
14 See Talidano v. Falcon Maritime & Allied Services, Inc., G.R. No. 172031, July 14, 2008, 558 SCRA 279, 291; Iloilo La Filipina Uygongco Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 170244, November 28, 2007, 539 SCRA 178, 187-188; Hanjin Engineering and Construction Co., Ltd., v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 165910, April 10, 2006, 487 SCRA 78, 96.
15Tible & Tible Company, Inc. v. Royal Savings and Loan Association, G.R. No. 155806, April 8, 2008, 550 SCRA 562, 575; Madrigal Transport, Inc. v. Lapanday Holdings Corporation, G.R. No. 156067, August 11, 2004, 436 SCRA 123, 136.
16Nuñez v. GSIS Family Bank, G.R. No. 163988, November 17, 2005, 475 SCRA 305, 316; Tichangco v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 150629, June 30, 2004, 433 SCRA 324, 333.
17Leyte IV Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Leyeco IV Employees Union-ALU, G.R. No. 157775, October 19, 2007, 537 SCRA 154, 166.
18Dalton-Reyes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 149580, March 16, 2005, 453 SCRA 498, 509-510.
19 Renumbered pursuant to Republic Act No. 10151 (An Act Allowing The Employment of Night Workers, Thereby Repealing Articles 130 and 131 of Presidential Decree Number Four Hundred Forty-Two, As Amended, Otherwise Known As The Labor Code of the Philippines).
20Coca-Cola Bottlers, Phils., Inc. v. Kapisanan ng Malayang Manggagawa sa Coca-Cola-FFW, G.R. No. 148205, February 28, 2005, 452 SCRA 480, 497; Dimabayao v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 122178, February 25, 1999, 303 SCRA 655, 659; Carlos A. Gothong Lines, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 96685, February 15, 1999, 303 SCRA 164, 170; Lagatic v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 121004, January 28, 1998, 285 SCRA 251, 257.
21Lakpue Drug, Inc. v. Belga, G.R. No. 166379, October 20, 2005, 473 SCRA 617, 624; St. Michael’s Institute v. Santos, G.R. No. 145280, December 4, 2001, 371 SCRA 383, 393; Escobin v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 118159, April 15, 1998, 289 SCRA 48, 67.
22 Separate Opinion of J. Tinga in Agabon v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 158693, November 17, 2004, 442 SCRA 573, 693.
25Mendiola v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 159333, July 31, 2006, 497 SCRA 346, 360; Unicorn Safety Glass, Inc. v. Basarte, G.R. No. 154689, November 25, 2004, 444 SCRA 287, 297.
26Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corp. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 116542, July 30, 1996, 260 SCRA 49, 56.
27Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils., Inc. v. Daniel, G.R. No. 156893, June 21, 2005, 460 SCRA 494, 509-510.
28Pioneer Texturizing Corp. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 118651, October 16, 1997, 280 SCRA 806, 816.
29Almira v. B.F. Goodrich Philippines, Inc., No. L-34974, July 25, 1974, 58 SCRA 120, 131.
30Varias v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 189078, March 30, 2010, 617 SCRA 214, 229.

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