Source: https://cbaclelegalconnection.com/tag/mootness/
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 10:12:08+00:00

Document:
The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People in Interest of C.G. on Thursday, July 30, 2015.
Dependency and Neglect—Mootness Following Child’s Death—CRCP 60(b) Motion.
In March 2006, the Jefferson County Division of Children, Youth, and Families (Division) filed a dependency and neglect petition and assumed temporary custody of a 5-year-old child and his younger half-sibling. The petition asserted that father (“whereabouts unknown”) had abandoned him. Publication notice was completed.
In May 2006, the court placed the child in the temporary custody of Phillips, the father of the child’s half-sibling. In November 2006, the court adjudicated the child dependent and neglected by default as to father and granted an allocation of parental responsibilities (APR) for the child to Phillips. The child died a year later. Phillips was convicted of first-degree murder and child abuse resulting in death.
Several years later, father, the child’s mother, and the personal representative of the child’s estate commenced a federal court action against the Division, the Denver County Department of Human Services (Department), and two caseworkers from the Department. The claims were 42 USC §1983 claims for violations of the child’s substantive due process rights.
In June 2014, father moved for CRCP 60(b) relief in the dependency and neglect proceeding. He sought to vacate the trial court’s orders because the Division had failed to exercise due diligence to ascertain his identity before serving him by publication. The Division responded that the matter was moot, and father answered that it would have a practical effect on the §1983 action. The court denied father’s motion as moot without holding a hearing.
The Court of Appeals concluded that the request for relief was not moot because of the collateral consequence of the dependency and neglect orders in father’s federal action. The Court noted that an issue is not moot when the judgment may result in significant collateral consequences to a party. This decision turns on showing the reasonable possibility of such consequences. Here, the orders in the dependency and neglect proceeding were being used to impose a collateral consequence on father—the denial of relief in his federal action. If the child was not in the state’s custody after transferring custody and awarding APR to Phillips, then father’s only surviving claims in the federal action (against the caseworkers) would be dismissed. If, however, his CRCP 60(b) relief was granted, there would be a reasonable possibility that he could pursue his remaining claims in federal court.
Even if father’s motion were moot, the district court should have considered its merits because its substantive issues fell within the exceptions to the mootness doctrine. The order was reversed and the matter was remanded for consideration of the merits of the CRCP 60(b) motion.
The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People v. Garcia on Thursday, July 3, 2014.
In 2010, Garcia pleaded guilty to criminal impersonation for providing a false name and false identification documents to police officers when they pulled him over for driving under the influence (DUI). He was sentenced to sixty months’ probation and one year in jail, on condition that he leave the United States and not reenter without inspection and a visa. Garcia’s remaining jail time was waived and he was released to the custody of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) for deportation.
One year later, Garcia returned to the United States. He was arrested for a traffic violation and charged with violating the conditions of his probation. The trial court revoked his probation after finding he had reentered the United States without a valid passport or visa. He was resentenced to one year in the custody of the Department of Corrections, with credit for 211 days served. After he completed his sentence, ICE deported him. In 2012, Garcia returned to the United States and ICE deported him again.
Garcia filed a notice of appeal of the revocation of his probation and the People filed a motion to dismiss, arguing the appeal was moot. The Court of Appeals granted the People’s motion.
The doctrine of mootness precludes the Court from reviewing a case in which its decision will have no practical effect on an actual or existing controversy. Here, the Court found that the appeal was moot because: (1) Garcia had already served his sentence; (2) he was not contesting his conviction, which could affect his admission to the United States; and (3) he is permanently barred from reentering the United States because criminal impersonation is a crime involving moral turpitude.
Garcia argued that the Court should reach the merits of the appeal even if it is otherwise moot, because it is capable of repetition without conducting a review, and this presents a matter of public importance involving recurring constitutional violations. The Court disagreed. First, there is no chance that Garcia’s probation will be revoked again because he has completed his sentence, has been deported, and is permanently barred from reentry. Second, this case does not involve a matter of public importance because the appeal only concerned the revocation of Garcia’s probation. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed.
The Tenth Circuit issued its opinion in Valenzuela v. Silversmith on Wednesday, November 14, 2012.
Alvin Valenzuela, an enrolled member of the Tohono O’odham Nation (the Nation) accepted a plea agreement in which he waived his right to appeal his conviction and sentences. He later filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 25 U.S.C. § 1303 seeking relief from tribal court convictions and his sentence. Section 1303 is part of the Indian Civil Rights Act. While Valenzuela’s petition was pending in federal district court, he completed his sentence and was released from prison. The district court concluded that Valenzuela’s claims were moot because of his release. Alternatively, it concluded that Valenzuela had failed to exhaust his tribal remedies before seeking habeas relief in federal court. Based on these alternative grounds, the district court dismissed Mr. Valenzuela’s § 1303 petition.
The court also found that because Valenzuela’s appeal waiver did not expressly waive his right to collaterally attack his conviction in tribal court, he had failed to exhaust his tribal court remedies by not filing a habeas petition in that court. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal and remanded for that court to dismiss it without prejudice.

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