Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=82138:g-r-no-157943,-september-04,-2013-people-of-the-philippines,-plaintiff-appellee,-v-gilbert-reyes-wagas,-accused-appellant&catid=1574&Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 10:41:47+00:00

Document:
G.R. No. 157943, September 04, 2013 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GILBERT REYES WAGAS, Accused-Appellant.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GILBERT REYES WAGAS, Accused-Appellant.
The Bill of Rights guarantees the right of an accused to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. In order to overcome the presumption of innocence, the Prosecution is required to adduce against him nothing less than proof beyond reasonable doubt. Such proof is not only in relation to the elements of the offense, but also in relation to the identity of the offender. If the Prosecution fails to discharge its heavy burden, then it is not only the right of the accused to be freed, it becomes the Court’s constitutional duty to acquit him.
Gilbert R. Wagas appeals his conviction for estafa under the decision rendered on July 11, 2002 by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 58, in Cebu City (RTC), meting on him the indeterminate penalty of 12 years of prision mayor, as minimum, to 30 years of reclusion perpetua, as maximum.
That on or about the 30th day of April, 1997, and for sometime prior and subsequent thereto, in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with deliberate intent, with intent to gain and by means of false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud, to wit: knowing that he did not have sufficient funds deposited with the Bank of Philippine Islands, and without informing Alberto Ligaray of that circumstance, with intent to defraud the latter, did then and there issue Bank of the Philippine Islands Check No. 0011003, dated May 08, 1997 in the amount of P200,000.00, which check was issued in payment of an obligation, but which check when presented for encashment with the bank, was dishonored for the reason “drawn against insufficient funds” and inspite of notice and several demands made upon said accused to make good said check or replace the same with cash, he had failed and refused and up to the present time still fails and refuses to do so, to the damage and prejudice of Alberto Ligaray in the amount aforestated.
To arrest this problem, we decided to source some funds using the subject property as collateral. This other means is resorted to for the purpose of settling the herein obligation. And as to its status, said funds will be rele[a]sed within thirty (30) days from today.
In view of the foregoing, it is my sincere request and promise to settle said obligation on or before August 15, 1997.
Lastly, I would like to manifest that it is not my intention to shy away from any financial obligation.
The RTC held that the Prosecution had proved beyond reasonable doubt all the elements constituting the crime of estafa, namely: (a) that Wagas issued the postdated check as payment for an obligation contracted at the time the check was issued; (b) that he failed to deposit an amount sufficient to cover the check despite having been informed that the check had been dishonored; and (c) that Ligaray released the goods upon receipt of the postdated check and upon Wagas’ assurance that the check would be funded on its date.
Wagas filed a motion for new trial and/or reconsideration,15 arguing that the Prosecution did not establish that it was he who had transacted with Ligaray and who had negotiated the check to the latter; that the records showed that Ligaray did not meet him at any time; and that Ligaray’s testimony on their alleged telephone conversation was not reliable because it was not shown that Ligaray had been familiar with his voice. Wagas also sought the reopening of the case based on newly discovered evidence, specifically: (a) the testimony of Cañada who could not testify during the trial because he was then out of the country, and (b) Ligaray’s testimony given against Wagas in another criminal case for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.
In this appeal, Wagas insists that he and Ligaray were neither friends nor personally known to one other; that it was highly incredible that Ligaray, a businessman, would have entered into a transaction with him involving a huge amount of money only over the telephone; that on the contrary, the evidence pointed to Cañada as the person with whom Ligaray had transacted, considering that the delivery receipt, which had been signed by Cañada, indicated that the goods had been “Ordered by ROBERT CAÑADA,” that the goods had been received by Cañada in good order and condition, and that there was no showing that Cañada had been acting on behalf of Wagas; that he had issued the check to Cañada upon a different transaction; that Cañada had negotiated the check to Ligaray; and that the element of deceit had not been established because it had not been proved with certainty that it was him who had transacted with Ligaray over the telephone.
The circumstances beg the question: did the Prosecution establish beyond reasonable doubt the existence of all the elements of the crime of estafa as charged, as well as the identity of the perpetrator of the crime?
(d) By postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the offender had no funds in the bank, or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check. The failure of the drawer of the check to deposit the amount necessary to cover his check within three (3) days from receipt of notice from the bank and/or the payee or holder that said check has been dishonored for lack or insufficiency of funds shall be prima facie evidence of deceit constituting false pretense or fraudulent act.
The essential elements of the crime charged are that: (a) a check is postdated or issued in payment of an obligation contracted at the time the check is issued; (b) lack or insufficiency of funds to cover the check; and (c) damage to the payee thereof.26 It is the criminal fraud or deceit in the issuance of a check that is punishable, not the non-payment of a debt.27Prima facie evidence of deceit exists by law upon proof that the drawer of the check failed to deposit the amount necessary to cover his check within three days from receipt of the notice of dishonor.
The Prosecution established that Ligaray had released the goods to Cañada because of the postdated check the latter had given to him; and that the check was dishonored when presented for payment because of the insufficiency of funds.
In every criminal prosecution, however, the identity of the offender, like the crime itself, must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt.28 In that regard, the Prosecution did not establish beyond reasonable doubt that it was Wagas who had defrauded Ligaray by issuing the check.
On April 30, 1997, do you remember having a transaction with the accused in this case?
Yes, sir. He purchased two hundred bags of rice from me.
After the check was (sic) bounced, what did you do next?
I made a demand on them.
How did you make a demand?
I called him over the phone.
Who is that “him” that you are referring to?
Secondly, the check delivered to Ligaray was made payable to cash. Under the Negotiable Instruments Law, this type of check was payable to the bearer and could be negotiated by mere delivery without the need of an indorsement.31 This rendered it highly probable that Wagas had issued the check not to Ligaray, but to somebody else like Cañada, his brother-in-law, who then negotiated it to Ligaray. Relevantly, Ligaray confirmed that he did not himself see or meet Wagas at the time of the transaction and thereafter, and expressly stated that the person who signed for and received the stocks of rice was Cañada.
It bears stressing that the accused, to be guilty of estafa as charged, must have used the check in order to defraud the complainant. What the law punishes is the fraud or deceit, not the mere issuance of the worthless check. Wagas could not be held guilty of estafa simply because he had issued the check used to defraud Ligaray. The proof of guilt must still clearly show that it had been Wagas as the drawer who had defrauded Ligaray by means of the check.
Thirdly, Ligaray admitted that it was Cañada who received the rice from him and who delivered the check to him. Considering that the records are bereft of any showing that Cañada was then acting on behalf of Wagas, the RTC had no factual and legal bases to conclude and find that Cañada had been acting for Wagas. This lack of factual and legal bases for the RTC to infer so obtained despite Wagas being Cañada’s brother-in-law.
Do you know the accused in this case?
No, sir. He is not around.
Why do you know him?
Mr. Witness, you mentioned that you and the accused entered into [a] transaction of rice selling, particularly with these 200 sacks of rice subject of this case, through telephone conversation?
But you cannot really ascertain that it was the accused whom you are talking with?
I know it was him because I know him.
Am I right to say [that] that was the first time that you had a transaction with the accused through telephone conversation, and as a consequence of that alleged conversation with the accused through telephone he issued a check in your favor?
No. Before that call I had a talk[ ] with the accused.
But still through the telephone?
There was no instant (sic) that the accused went to see you personally regarding the 200 bags rice transaction?
No. It was through telephone only.
In fact[,] you did not cause the delivery of these 200 bags of rice through the accused himself?
Yes. It was through Robert.
So, after that phone call[,] you deliver[ed] th[ose] 200 sacks of rice through somebody other than the accused?
Ligaray’s statement that he could tell that it was Wagas who had ordered the rice because he “know[s]” him was still vague and unreliable for not assuring the certainty of the identification, and should not support a finding of Ligaray’s familiarity with Wagas as the caller by his voice. It was evident from Ligaray’s answers that Wagas was not even an acquaintance of Ligaray’s prior to the transaction. Thus, the RTC’s conclusion that Ligaray had transacted with Wagas had no factual basis. Without that factual basis, the RTC was speculating on a matter as decisive as the identification of the buyer to be Wagas.
The letter of Wagas did not competently establish that he was the person who had conversed with Ligaray by telephone to place the order for the rice. The letter was admitted exclusively as the State’s rebuttal evidence to controvert or impeach the denial of Wagas of entering into any transaction with Ligaray on the rice; hence, it could be considered and appreciated only for that purpose. Under the law of evidence, the court shall consider evidence solely for the purpose for which it is offered,38 not for any other purpose.39 Fairness to the adverse party demands such exclusivity. Moreover, the high plausibility of the explanation of Wagas that he had signed the letter only because his sister and her husband had pleaded with him to do so could not be taken for granted.
Nevertheless, an accused, though acquitted of estafa, may still be held civilly liable where the preponderance of the established facts so warrants.46 Wagas as the admitted drawer of the check was legally liable to pay the amount of it to Ligaray, a holder in due course.47 Consequently, we pronounce and hold him fully liable to pay the amount of the dishonored check, plus legal interest of 6% per annum from the finality of this decision.
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision rendered on July 11, 2002 by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 58, in Cebu City; and ACQUITS Gilbert R. Wagas of the crime of estafa on the ground of reasonable doubt, but ORDERS him to pay Alberto Ligaray the amount of P200,000.00 as actual damages, plus interest of 6% per annum from the finality of this decision.
No pronouncement on costs of suit.
Sereno, C.J., Villarama, Jr., Reyes, and Perlas-Bernabe,*JJ., concur.
* Vice Associate Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, who is on official trip for the Court to attend the Southeast Asia Regional Judicial Colloquium on Gender Equality Jurisprudence and the Role of the Judiciary in Promoting Women’s Access to Justice, in Bangkok, Thailand, per Special Order No. 1529 dated August 29, 2013.
5 TSN, May 4, 2000.
6 TSN, May 25, 2000.
9 TSN, October 5, 2000.
11 TSN, August 20, 2001, pp. 2-5.
25Timbal v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 136487, December 14, 2001, 372 SCRA 358, 362-363.
26Dy v. People, G.R. No. 158312, November 14, 2008, 571 SCRA 59, 70.
27Recuerdo v. People, G.R. No. 168217, June 27, 2006, 493 SCRA 517, 532.
28People v. Caliso, G.R. No. 183830, October 19, 2011, 659 SCRA 666, 675; People v. Pineda, G.R. No. 141644, May 27, 2004, 429 SCRA 478; Tuason v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 113779-80, February 23, 1995, 241 SCRA 695.
29 TSN, May 4, 2000, lines 54-57.
30 TSN, May 25, 2000, p. 4.
(e) When the only or last indorsement is an indorsement in blank.
Section 30. What constitutes negotiation. - An instrument is negotiated when it is transferred from one person to another in such manner as to constitute the transferee the holder thereof. If payable to bearer, it is negotiated by delivery; if payable to order, it is negotiated by the indorsement of the holder and completed by delivery.
32Sandoval II v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 149380, July 3, 2002, 383 SCRA 770, 784.
33 29A Am Jur 2d Evidence § 1403.
34United States v. Orozco-Santillan, 903 F.2d 1262 (9th Cir. Cal. 1990).
35State v. Williamson, 210 Kan. 501 (Kan 1972).
36 TSN, May 4, 2000, lines 41-47 (emphasis supplied).
37 TSN, May 25, 2000, pp. 7-8.
38Ragudo v. Fabella Estate Tenants Association, Inc., G.R. No. 146823, August 9, 2005, 466 SCRA 136, 148; People v. Lapay, G.R. No. 123072, October 14, 1998, 298 SCRA 62, 79.
39Uniwide Sales Realty and Resources Corporation v. Titan-Ikeda Construction and Development Corporation, G.R. No. 126619, December 20, 2006, 511 SCRA 335, 357.
40People v. Subingsubing, G.R. Nos. 104942-43, November 25, 1993, 228 SCRA 168, 174 .
41People v. Arapok, G.R. No. 134974, December 8, 2000, 347 SCRA 479, 498.
42People v. Esmale, G.R. Nos. 102981-82, April 21, 1995, 243 SCRA 578, 592.
43Natividad v. Court of Appeals, No. L-40233, June 25, 1980, 98 SCRA 335, 346, citing People v. Beltran, No. L-31860, November 29, 1974, 61 SCRA 246, 250; People v. Manambit, G.R. Nos. 72744-45, April 18, 1997, 271 SCRA 344, 377, citing People v. Maongco, G.R. Nos. 108963-65, March 1, 1994, 230 SCRA 562, 575.
44Natividad v. Court of Appeals, No. L-40233, June 25, 1980, 98 SCRA 335, 346.
45Pecho v. People, G.R. No. 111399, September 27, 1996, 262 SCRA 518, 533; United States v. Gutierrez, 4 Phil. 493 (1905); People v. Sadie, No. L-66907, April 14, 1987, 149 SCRA 240, 244; Perez v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 76203-04, December 6, 1989, 180 SCRA 9, 13.
46People v. Reyes, G.R. No. 154159, March 31, 2005, 454 SCRA 635, 651; Eusebio-Calderon v. People, G.R. No. 158495, October 21, 2004, 441 SCRA 137, 147; Serona v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 130423, November 18, 2002, 392 SCRA 35, 45; Sapiera v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128927, September 14, 1999, 314 SCRA 370, 378.
Section 61. Liability of Drawer.—The drawer by drawing the instrument admits the existence of the payee and his then capacity to indorse; and engages that, on due presentment, the instrument will be accepted or paid, or both, according to its tenor, and that if it be dishonoured and the necessary proceedings on dishonour be duly taken, he will pay the amount thereof to the holder or to any subsequent indorser who may be compelled to pay it. But the drawer may insert in the instrument an express stipulation negativing or limiting his own liability to the holder.

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