Source: https://case-law.vlex.com/vid/405-u-s-278-606759298
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 00:16:16+00:00

Document:
Petitioner's pretrial motion to dismiss the indictment against him because of the court's failure to appoint counsel to represent him at the preliminary hearing in 1967 was denied, and petitioner was tried and convicted. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed on the ground that Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, in which this Court held that a preliminary hearing is a critical stage of the criminal process at which the accused is constitutionally entitled to assistance of counsel, did not have retroactive application.
Held: The judgment is affirmed. Pp. 280-286.
46 Ill.2d 200, 263 N.E.2d 490, affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, joined by MR. JUSTICE STEWART and MR. JUSTICE WHITE, concluded that Coleman v. Alabama, supra, does not apply retroactively to preliminary hearings conducted before June 22, 1970, when Coleman was decided. Pp. 281-285.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER concurred in the result, concluding, as set forth in his dissent in Coleman, that there is no constitutional requirement that counsel should be provided at preliminary hearings. Pp. 285-286.
MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN concurred in the result, concluding that Coleman was wrongly decided. P. 286.
BRENNAN, J., announced the Court's judgment and delivered an opinion, in which STEWART and WHITE, JJ., joined. BURGER, C.J., filed an opinion concurring in the result, post, p. 285. BLACKMUN, J., filed a statement concurring in the result, post, p. 286. DOUGLAS J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which MARSHALL, J., joined, post, p. 286. POWELL and REHNQUIST, JJ., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN announced the judgment of the Court and an opinion, in which MR. JUSTICE STEWART and MR. JUSTICE WHITE join.
In Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, decided June 22, 1970, we held that a preliminary hearing is a critical stage of the criminal process at which the accused is constitutionally entitled to the assistance of counsel. This case presents the question whether that constitutional doctrine applies retroactively to preliminary hearings conducted prior to June 22, 1970.
held that Coleman applied only to preliminary hearings conducted after June 22, 1970, the date Coleman was decided. 46 Ill.2d 200, 263 N.E.2d 490 (1970). We granted certiorari limited to the question of the retroactivity of Coleman. 401 U.S. 953 (1971). We affirm.
implicate (a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new standards.
major purpose of new constitutional doctrine is to overcome an aspect of the criminal trial that substantially impairs its truthfinding function and so raises serious questions about the accuracy of guilty verdicts in past trials. . . .
Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646, 653 (1971). Examples are the right to counsel at trial, Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); on appeal, Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); or at some forms of arraignment, Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961). See generally Stovall v. Denno, supra, at 297-298; Williams v. United States, supra, at 653 n. 6.
must, in turn, be weighed against the prior justified reliance upon the old standard and the impact of retroactivity upon the administration of justice.
Stovall v. Denno, supra, at 298.
tool for use in cross-examination of the State's witnesses at the trial," to "discover the case the State has against his client," "making effective arguments for the accused on such matters as the necessity for an early psychiatric examination . . . ," ibid. -- impeachment and discovery may make particularly significant contribution to the enhancement of the factfinding process, since they materially affect an accused's ability to present an effective defense at trial. But because of limitations upon the use of the preliminary hearing for discovery and impeachment purposes, counsel cannot be as effectual as at trial or on appeal. The authority of the court to terminate the preliminary hearing once probable cause is established, see People v. Bonner, 37 Ill.2d 553, 560, 229 N.E.2d 527, 531 (1967), means that the degree of discovery obtained will vary depending on how much evidence the presiding judge receives. Too, the preliminary hearing is held at an early stage of the prosecution, when the evidence ultimately gathered by the prosecution may not be complete. Cf. S.Rep. No. 371, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 33, on amending 18 U.S.C. § 3060. Counsel must also avail himself of alternative procedures, always a significant factor to be weighed in the scales. Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. at 730. Illinois provides, for example, bills of particulars and discovery of the names of prosecution witnesses. Ill.Rev.Stat., c. 38, §§ 114-2, 114-9, 114-10 (1971). Pretrial statements of prosecution witnesses may also be obtained for use for impeachment purposes. See, e.g., People v. Johnson, 31 Ill.2d 602, 203 N.E.2d 399 (1964).
itself or on appeal. Such danger is not ordinarily greater, we consider, at a preliminary hearing at which the accused is unrepresented than at a pretrial line-up or at an interrogation conducted without presence of an attorney.

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