Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/135/599/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 03:55:48+00:00

Document:
A court of admiralty has no equity power to wind up a trust concerning a licensed vessel, or to enforce an alleged contract of sale of it.
When an intervener in an admiralty suit in rem seeks a remedy concerning the vessel which is not maritime in its nature, the court is without jurisdiction over his claim, and the intervention should be dismissed.
A power was given to sell a vessel then lying in a dangerous position locked up in ice, in care of the master, who was part owner, for a specified sum. Held to have been executed with reference to the then condition of the vessel, and not to apply to a sale purporting to be made under it after it had been brought by the master to a port of safety, and not to warrant a conditional sale after extrication, dependent upon the amount of damage which it might be found to have suffered.
A vessel was conveyed to two trustees, one of whom was the master, in equal shares, to hold as trustees for the benefit of all the owners, cestuis que trustent. Held that the master was half owner of the legal title, and could not be removed under Rev.Stat. § 4250 on the application of cestuis que trustent, claiming to be a majority of the equitable owners.
being such owners, on or about the 10th day of March, 1881, appointed one William Braithwaite master of said vessel, to navigate and sail her for them, at the wages agreed upon between him and the said owners, and the said William Braithwaite continued to be such master until the 4th day of April, 1881, when the libellants removed him as master and appointed another as master in his place."
"Second, that when the new master so appointed by libellants went on board said vessel, by their orders, to enter upon his duties as such master, the said William Braithwaite refused to give up the possession of the papers of said vessel to the said master or to the libellants, who have demanded the same, to the great damage of the libellants."
Process was prayed against the vessel and Braithwaite, and was issued accordingly, returnable on the first Tuesday of June then next.
"managing owner and master of said steamer, and is entitled to the possession and command thereof, and that no other person is entitled to the possession or command thereof."
five hundred dollar interest in said steamboat."
Braithwaite filed an answer and exception on the 6th of May.
being the amount agreed upon between him and libellants, he had delivered the boat to Leighton. On the 25th of May, 1881, Leighton and Jordan filed their claim in intervention as purchasers under a bill of sale, bearing date March 31, 1881, and prayed for a decree directing Braithwaite to execute a bill of sale of the Eclipse and to deliver it and the papers of the steamboat to them, and on his refusal that all his interest in the boat be transferred to them, and for costs, and such other relief as a court of admiralty is competent to give.
"First. That the steamer Eclipse, at the time of the commencement of this action, was within the Third Judicial District of Dakota Territory."
"Second. That on February 4, 1880, the claimant, William Braithwaite, and libellants, with the exception of Joseph McC. Biggert, made and entered into an agreement in writing as set forth in the fourth allegation in claimant's answer."
"Third. That subsequent to the execution of that agreement by the claimant, a further clause was added, substituting the name of Joseph McC. Biggert for that of John D. Biggert, which was signed by all parties to the agreement except the claimant."
"Fourth. That subsequent to the execution of the agreement, the parties paid in eight thousand and fifty dollars, and no more, in amounts as follows:"
five dollars, on the credit of the said steamer, which was afterwards paid out of her earnings."
"Seventh. That the claimant, Wm. Braithwaite, and John D. Biggert, negotiated the purchase, and the marshal made the bill of sale to the claimant and John D. Biggert as trustees."
"Eighth. That the claimant, William Braithwaite, took possession of said steamer Eclipse as master, under and in pursuance of the said written agreement between him and libellants, and so continued in possession as master under said written agreement until he was removed by the United States marshal by virtue of the writ issued in this case."
"Ninth. That immediately after the United States marshal took possession of the said steamer, he removed the claimant and delivered the possession of the same to intervenors, without any order to do so from this court."
"Tenth. That said steamer was run by claimant during the navigation season of 1880 under said written agreement, and earned eight thousand dollars, which went in to the hands of the financial agent under said agreement, and the same has not been apportioned or distributed."
"Eleventh. That on February 2, 1881, libellants and claimant signed 'Exhibit A' of the intervention and petition of Joseph Leighton and Walter B. Jordan. At that time, said steamer was lying in the Missouri River, a little below Ft. Benton."
"Twelfth. That the committee named in said exhibit made a conditional agreement with Charles Batchelor, agent for Joseph Leighton, to sell said steamer for eleven thousand five hundred dollars if she should not be damaged to exceed five hundred dollars. "
"Thirteenth. That on April 1, 1881, a bill of sale was made for said steamer by libellants, transferring her to intervenors, but was not delivered, and the intervenors had not paid any money thereon, and the claimant never signed said bill of sale, but refused to sign the same, and notified intervenors and the committee that his interest in said steamer was not for sale, before any part of the purchase money had been paid by the intervenors, amounting to $2,500, before the commencement of this action -- was paid after they were notified that the claimant would not sell his interest in said steamer."
half interest therein, and part owner under and by virtue of the written agreement made with libellants."
"Fifteenth. That, at the time of the commencement of this action, libellants were not the owners of a majority interest in said steamer."
"Sixteenth. That there was due to the claimant under the written agreement with the libellants the sum of eight hundred dollars for wages at the time of the commencement of this action, and that no money whatever has been paid or tendered to him by any of the parties to this action."
"As a conclusion of law, I find --"
"1st. That the claimant, Wm. Braithwaite, is entitled to the possession of the steamer Eclipse."
steamboat is about to be forced to marshal's sale, it being a well known and recognized fact the owners of said boat are unable to meet the indebtedness and prevent such sale, the parties hereto, fearing a sacrifice, to protect their several interests, prevent such a sacrifice, and form a fund for bidding up [in] said boat, and afterwards, if knocked down to them, to provide a working capital to manage and run said steamboat, covenant and agree as follows:"
"First. That each of said parties shall contribute into a general fund the respective amounts set opposite their names, viz.:"
"Which several amounts are to be paid in cash by the respective parties to said parties of the first part, in case said steamboat is purchased by them as herein provided, so much thereof as may be necessary to be used for paying such of the bid as may be necessary to be paid in cash, and the remainder to be used as working capital. "
"Second. That in addition to said cash fund, the second parties are to contribute as capital the amounts of their respective claims against said steamboat, and, in case said steamboat is bought by the parties hereto, their claims are not to be paid at once, but to be receipted for by them, and afterwards paid as hereinafter provided for. "
as captain, and John D. Biggert as financial agent; the said Braithwaite to receive a salary of $150 per month, and said John D. Biggert to receive a salary of $100 per month, during the time she is so run in the interest of the parties hereto."
"Fourth. Out of the earnings of said steamboat, the respective claims of the said parties of the second part are first to be paid, and, secondly, the full amount of their respective portions of said $10,000 advancement is to be paid, and, when said parties of the second part are fully paid, then this trust shall cease and determine, and the said steamboat shall remain wholly to the use and benefit of the said Wm. Braithwaite and J. D. Biggert, their executors, administrators, and assigns."
"Pittsburgh, Penn., February 2d, 1881"
"We, the undersigned, creditors and trustees of the steamer Eclipse, hereby appoint William Rea, John D. Biggert, and J. C. Kay our committee to effect sale of said steamer, granting unto them or a majority of them power to accept any offer which they may receive for the purchase of the steamer, it being expressly understood that they shall not accept any offer of less than eleven thousand five hundred dollars cash, or equivalent in approved paper."
Thereupon judgment was rendered dismissing the libel and also the intervening petition, with costs to be taxed against the libellants and intervenors, respectively, and ordering the marshal to deliver the possession of the steamboat Eclipse, her tackle, apparel, and furniture, to the claimant, William Braithwaite. This judgment was affirmed by the supreme court of the territory, and the cause brought to this court by appeal.
Circuit courts, in deciding causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction on the instance side of the court, are required to find the facts and the conclusions of law upon which their judgments and decrees are rendered, stating them separately, and we are limited, in reviewing such judgments and decrees, to a determination of the questions of law arising upon the record and to such rulings of the court, excepted to at the time, as may be presented by a bill of exceptions prepared as in actions at law. 18 Stat. 315; The Gazelle, 128 U. S. 474, 128 U. S. 484. And this judgment of the Supreme Court of Dakota Territory is subject to review in the same manner, and under the same regulations. Rev. Stat. § 702.
half interest in the steamer when the action was commenced; and that $800 was due to him for wages under the written agreement with the libellants, no part of which had been paid or tendered to him by any of the parties.
half ownership of any vessel shall have the same power to remove a master who is also part owner of such vessel as such majority owners have to remove a master not an owner,"
but that the section shall not apply "where there is a valid written agreement subsisting, by virtue of which such master would be entitled to possession."
So far as the creditors and intervenors were concerned, if the former desired to wind up the trust, or the latter to enforce an alleged contract of sale -- which is, indeed, what is asked by this intervention -- they should have resorted to a different tribunal. While the court of admiralty exercises its jurisdiction upon equitable principles, it has not the characteristic powers of a court of equity. It cannot entertain a bill or libel for specific performance, or to correct a mistake, Andrews v. Insurance Co., 3 Mason 6, 16, or declare or enforce a trust or an equitable title, Ward v. Thompson, 22 How. 330; The Amelia, 6 Ben. 475; Kellum v. Emerson, 2 Curtis 79, or exercise jurisdiction in matters of account merely, Grant v. Poillon, 20 How. 162; Minturn v. Maynard, 17 How. 477; The Ocean Belle, 6 Ben. 253, or decree the sale of a ship for an unpaid mortgage, or declare her to be the property of the mortgagees and direct possession of her to be given to them, Bogart v. The John Jay, 17 How. 399. The jurisdiction embraces all maritime contracts, torts, injuries, or offenses; and it depends, in cases of contract, upon the nature of the contract, and is limited to contracts, claims, and services purely maritime, and touching right and duties appertaining to commerce and navigation. People's Ferry Co. v. Beers, 20 How. 393, 61 U. S. 401. There was nothing maritime about the claims of the intervenors, and the intervention was properly dismissed for want of jursidiction over the subject matter.

References: § 4250
 § 702
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