Source: http://www.juricaf.org/arret/CONSEILDELEUROPE-COUREUROPEENNEDESDROITSDELHOMME-19800304-838778
Timestamp: 2017-04-25 16:33:09+00:00

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Type d'affaire : DecisionType de recours : Radiation partielle du rôle ; Frais et dépens - demande rejetée (deuxième requérant)Numérotation : Numéro d'arrêt : 8387/78Identifiant URN:LEX : urn:lex;coe;cour.europeenne.droits.homme;arret;1980-03-04;8387.78 Parties : Demandeurs : X., Y. et Z.Défendeurs : REPUBLIQUE FEDERALE D'ALLEMAGNETexte : APPLICATION/REQUETE NÂ° 8387/7 8 X ., Y . and Z . v/the FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY X ., Y . and Z . c/REPUBLIQUE FEDERALE D'ALLEMAGN E DECISION of 4 March 1980 on the admissibility of the application DÃCISION du 4 mars 1980 sur la recevabilitÃ© de la requÃªt e
Article 10 of the Convention : Examination of the grounds upon which a Courr forbade the distribution of a circular critical of an industrial company's attitude, the author of which was not in a position to prove the accuracy of his allegations of the Convention : No duty to exhaust a remedy when the poin t .Article26 at issue has already been rejected by the competent authority at the request of a third pany .
Article 1, paragraph 1, of the First Protocol : a . An individuaf has contracted for the benefit of third panies. In the circumstances of the case the individual's rights cannot be regarded as his 'propeny". b . Transfer of a debt by leg/slation from one individual to another . No appearance of a violation of the original creditor's right to peaceful enjoyment of his possessionsLrl7in the light of the public interest in the transfer, and 2) in the absence of any loss .
Article 10 de le Convention : Examen des motifs qui ont conduit les tribunaux Ã interdire la diffusion d'une circulaire critiquant l'attitude d'une entrepnse industrielle, mais dont l'auteur n'avait pas Ã©tÃ© en mesure de prouver l'exactitude de ses allÃ©gations . Article 26 de la Convention : Dispense de l'obligation d'exercer un recours quand la question litigieuse a dÃ©jÃ Ã©tÃ© tranchÃ©e nÃ©gativement par l'autoritÃ© de recours Ã© la demande d'un tiers .
Article 1, paragraphe 1, du Protocole eddiUonef : a . Situation dans laquelle une personne a stipulÃ© en faveur d'autrui, En l'espÃ©ce, la crÃ©ance du stipulant ne peut Ãªtre considÃ©rÃ©e comme son "bien " . b . Reprise de dette par l'effet d'une loi . Aucune apparence de violation du droit des crÃ©anciers au respect de leurs biens, en raison 1) de l'utilitÃ© publique de la reprise, 2) de l'absence de toute perte .
Summary of the relevent facts I franpais : voir p . 239 1 The applicant, X ., applies in his own name and on behalf of 3000 children, born between 1957 and 19152 with serious deformities, resulting from the fact that their mothers had taken the tranquilliser "Contergan" (also known as "thalidomide'1 during pregnancy. In fact the applicant is only formally authorised to represent two of the children, T . and Z.
In April 1980, X . entemd into a contract with a company, G ., which had produced the drug, whereby the sum of DM 100 million was paid to X . and two others as trustees . The fund was to be applied to compensate as many victims as possible on condition that they waived any other claims against G . An initial payment of DM 50 million was made to the trustees and al1 the victims signed documents of waiver . On 17 December 1971, the Padiament adopted a law IBGBI . 1971, 1 p . 2078i establishing a public law foundation (Stiftung "Hilfswerk fÃ¼r Behindene Kinder") endowed with DM 100 million in addition to the DM 10 7 million contributed by G. under the terms of the settlement . The law came into force on 31 October 1972 . Of the three trustees only X. opposed the transfer of the funds held by them to the new foundarion, and attempted to persuade the parents of rhe victims that the settlement achieved with G . was preferable. G . apparently distributed information as to the fees which X. had received from them and X . prepared a circular letter to rhe parents of the victims, accusing G . of trying to avoid its obligations . G . obtained from a judge an interim injunction preventing X . from distributing the circular. This injunction was made absolute in July 1974 and this was confirmed on appeal in May 1975 .
X. 's appeal to the Federal Court was rejected in June 1977 as was his appeal to the Constitutional Court in February 1978 . In the meantime G. brought an action against X. to compel him to transfer the trustees' fund to the new foundation alleging that the contract of 1970 had lost its legal basis by virtue of the creation of the foundation . _zgq_
X . counterclaimed that G. should be ordered to transfer the balance of DM 50 milfion to him . In May 1974 the Court rejected X.'s claim and upheld G.'s . X. appealed and the Court of Appeal referred the constitutionality of the law of 17 December 1971 to the Constitutional Court as a preffminary point . At the same time the Constitutional Court considered the appeal of one of the victims as to whether this law violated the right to property guaranteed by the Constitution (Article 14 of the Fundamental Law) . By its decision in July 1976, the Constitutional Court confirmed the conformity of the law of 17 December 1971 to the Constitution .
The Court of Appeal therefore confirmed the decision et first instance and X.'s appeal to the Federal Court was rejected in September 1977 as was his appeal to the Constitutional Court in February 1978 .
THE LAW IExtractsl â¢ 2 . It is alleged that the 1971 legislation as interpreted in the relevant court decisions deprived the first applicant and the Contergan children including the second and third applicants of their possessions, contrary to the provisions of Article 1 of the Protocol . The first paragraph of this Article reads as follows : "Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions . No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law . " a . As regards the first applicant, the Commission notes the competent courts' finding that his contractual rights under the agreement of April 1970 had lost their object because of the establishment of the foundation by the 1971 Act, and that also his right as a trustee to administer, jointly with others, the funds intended for the Contergan children's compensation, was thereby taken from him . Whether or not this amounted to a deprivation of the first applicant's possessions depends on the qualification of the rights in question as "his possessions" within the meaning of Article 1 .1 of the Protocol .
In this respect, the Commission observes that both as a party to the contract and as a trustee, the first applicant acquired a merely formal entitlement to these rights . The settlement of 1970 was concluded by him in the form of a contract in favour of third persons, namely the Contergan children some of whom had not been identified by that time . The firs t - 235 -
applicant's claim to the fulfilment of the contract cannot therefore be considered as his own personal right . Moreover, he could claim fulfilment not to himself but only to the board of trustees . It is true that in his capacity as trustee the first applicant was formally one of the joint owners of the funds administered by the trust . But again, this ownership cannot be considered as his own personal right . Apart from the fact that the property rights in the trust could only be exercised jointly by the three trustees, it is clear that the trust was established in the exclusive interest of the children who were the true subjects of the trust's property . The above measures had the effect of transferring this property as a whole to the foundation . While it is true that the first applicant was thereby deprived of his formal co-ownership, he was at the same time also relieved of his obligations towards the children which were likewise transferred to the foundation . The Commission considers that in these circumstances it cannot be said that the first applicant was deprived of "his possessions" in a way which would entitle him to be a victim of a violation (Art . 25 of the Convention) of his rights under Article 1 of the Protocol . This part of the application is therefore manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 .2 of the Convention . b . As regards the second and third applicants, being two of the Contergan children affected by the 1971 legislation, the Commission observes that this legislation transformed their claims against the trust into claims against the foundation . It has been alleged that s . 23 of the Act of 17 December 1971 also deprived them of their original compensation claims against the company to which they had only renounced under the condition that they would get compensation from the trust, a condition which could no longer be fulfilled after the entry into force of the legislation . The Commission observes, however, that the applicants have not exhausted the domestic remedies in this respect because they have failed to lodge a constitutional appeal directly against the legislation in which they could have raised the above complaint . Insofar as the transformation of their claims against the trust is concerned, the second and third applicants may however be considered as being absolved from exhÃ¢usting themselves the domestic remedies at their disposal because the relevant issue has been decided by the Federal Constitutional Court in its decision of . . .July 1976 . The present application has, however, been introduced only on 28 July 1978, that is more than six months after the final domestic decision . Even if it could be said that the Constitutional Court's decision of . . .July 1976 was not the final domestic decision within the meaning of Article 26 of the Convention and that the final determination of the second and third applicants' property rights depended on the outcome of the civil proceedings against the first applicant, so that this complaint cannot be considered a s
having been filed out of time having regard to the six-months period envisaged in Article 26 of the Convention, the Commission nevertheless does not find any appearance of a violation of the second and third applicants' rights under Article 1 of the Protocol . While it is true that their claims against the trust although not fixed to a specific amount must be considered as their possessions within the meaning of the first paragraph of this Article, it appears that they have been deprived of these claims in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law . The Commission considers that it has been established that the 1971 legislation was not in the best interest of the children themselves and therefore in the public interest . In particular the Commission considers that the second and third applicants have not suffered any loss by the transformation of their claims into a legal claim to regular payments . The Commission notes in this context that the Federal Constitutional Court in its above judgment considered it as a constitutional requirement that the legal transformation of the claims should not affect the personal entitlement of the persons concerned and the substance of their claims . It further notes the Federal Constitutional Court's argument that the transformation of claims was justified under the exceptional circumstances of this case, having regard to the difficulties involved in the determination of the value of the original claims and the necessity to provide the children and their parents with swift and secure assistance . It is also relevant in this context that the State contributions to the public law foundation have subsequently been substantially increased (to a total amount of 220 million DM in addition to the 100 million DM contributed by Chemie G .) by two amendments of 1971 legislation (Fed . Law Gazette 1 1976, p . 1876 and 198o p . 111) . The Commission therefore concludes that the second and third applicants' above complaint would in any event be manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 .2 of the Convention
. b. Insofar as the applicant X . complains that the injunction prevented hi m .4
in particular from expressing in his relationship to the Contergan children's parents for whom he acted as a lawyer, his legal opinion that s . 23 of the 1971 Act constituted an expropriation of the children's claims, the Commission accepts that there has been an interference with the applicant's right to freedom of expression, including the right to hold opinions and impart information and ideas without interference by a public authority which is guaranteed by Article 10 .1 of the Convention . - 237 -
This right is, hoever, subject to the restrictions laid down in the second paragraph of Article 10 which reads as follows : "The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary . " The Commission observes that the applicant's statement was prohibited because it interfered in the courts' opinion with the rights of the G . company . The purpose of the injunction was therefore, in the terms of Article 10 .2 of the Convention, "the protection of the reputation or rights of others" . The injunction was also "prescribed by law" because it was based on the legal provision contained in s . 823 ( 1) of the Civil Code . The only remaining question is therefore whether the injunction can be justified as being necessary in a democratic society . In this respect, the Commission observes that the applicant's statement envisaged by the injunction was not limited to an expression of his legal opinion according to which there had been an expropriation of the children's claims . In fact, the Cour tof Appeal expressly recognised the applicant's right to express his legal opinion . The reason why the courts considered the restriction of the applicant's lreedom of expression to be necessary was not the tact that he believed that there had been an expropriation, but the fact that, among other criticism levelled at the company, he insinuated that it had fostered such expropriation for improper motives, namely for the purpose of gaining further advantages . The courts found that the applicant, though given the opportunity to do so, had failed to prove these allegations, and it is essentially for this reason that they granted the injunction restraining him from repeating the statement, but without ordering him to revoke it The Commission considers that in these circumstances the restriction is to be considered as necessary in a democratic society . The limitation of the first applicant's freedom of expression is therefore justified under Article 10 .2 of the Convention and his above complaint must accordingly be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 .2 of the Convention
RÃ©sumÃ© des faits pertinents Le requÃ©rant X. dÃ©clare agir en son nom comme au nom de 30270 enfants nÃ©s entre 1957 et 19 62 et prÃ©sentant de graves malformations dues au fait que leur mÃ¨re avait absorbÃ© au cours de la grossesse un tranquillisant appelÃ© Â« Contergan Â» (aussi appefÃ© x thalidomide Â») . Toutefols, seuls deux des enfants, les requÃ©rants Y. et Z., lui ont donnÃ© mandat de les reprÃ©senter. En avril 1970, X. conclut avec la firme G., fabriquant le Contergan, un contrat aux termes duquel la firme G . versait Ã trois rc trustees Â», dont X., une somme de 100 millions de DM destinÃ©e 8 indemniser le plus grand nombre possible de victimes, Ã condition qu'elles renoncent Ã toute autre rÃ©clamation contre la firme G . Un premier montant de 50 millions de DM fut versÃ© aux trustees et les reprÃ©sentants de toutes les victimes signÃ¨rent une dÃ©claration de renonciation . Le 17 dÃ©cembre 1971, le Parlement adopta une loi IBGBI . 1971, 1 p . 20181 instituant une fondation de droit public I Stiftung n Hilfswerk fÃ¼r Behinderre Kinder nl dotÃ©e de 100 millions de DM, plus les 1 07 millions que la firme G s'Ã©rait engagÃ©e Ã verser par contrat . La loi entra en vigueur le 31 octobre 1972. Seul des trois trustees, X . s'opposa au transfert des fonds Ã la nouvelle fondation et tenta de perauader les parents des victimes que l'arrangement qu'il avait conclu A l'origine avec la firme G . Ã©tait plus avantageux . La firme G . ayant apparemment diffusÃ© des informations sur les honoraires qu'X . avait exigÃ©s pour son entremise, X . adressa aux parents des victimes une circulaire accusant la firme G . de tenter de se soustraire Ã ses engagements . Celle-ci obtint du juge une ordonnance provisionnelle faisant interdiction Ã X . de diffuser cette circulaire . Une interdiction dÃ©finitive fut prononcÃ©e en jui0et 1974 et confirmÃ©e en appel en mai 1975 . Un recours d'X . fut rejetÃ© par la Cour fÃ©dÃ©rale en juin 1977 et un recours constitutionnel en fÃ©vrier 1978. D'autre part, la firme G ., estimant que le contrat de 1970 Ã©tait devenu sans objet depuis l'institution de fa fondation de droit public, assigna X. en justice pour obtenir de lui qu'il transfÃ©re Ã la fondation les fonds dÃ©jÃ reÃ§us . X. demanda reconventionnellement que fa firme G . lui verse le solde de 50 millions de DM . En mars 1974, le tribunal fit droit Ã fa demande de la firme G . et rejeta celle d'X . Le requÃ©rant interjeta appel. La cour d'appel suspendit la procÃ©dure le temps d'obtenir une dÃ©cision de la Cour constitutionnelle fÃ©dÃ©rdle sur la constitutionnalitÃ© de la loi du 17 dÃ©cembre 1971 . La Cour constitutionnelle examina en mÃªme temps un recours d'une des victimes portant sur le point de savoir si cette loi violait la garantie constitutionnelle de la propriÃ©t Ã©
_2gg_
(article 14 de la Loi fondamentale) . Par arrÃ©t rendu en juillet 1976 la Cour constitutionnelle trouva la loi du 17 dÃ©cembre 7971 conforme Ã la Loi fondamentale . La cour d'appel confirma alors la dÃ©cision du premier juge. Un recours d'X. Ã la Cour fÃ©dÃ©rale fut rejetÃ© en septembre 1977 et un recours constitutionnel en fÃ©vrier 1978 .
(TRADUCTION ) EN DROIT IExtraits l 2 . II est allÃ©guÃ© que la lÃ©gislation de 1971, telle qu'interprÃ©tÃ©e dans les dÃ©cisions judiciaires pertinentes a privÃ© le premier requÃ©rant IX .I et les enfants victimes du Contergan, y compris les deuxiÃ¨me et troisiÃ¨me requÃ©, rants IY . et Z .), de leurs biens, contrairement aux dispositions de l'article 1^ . Le premier paragraphe de cet article est libellÃ© du Protocole additionnel comme suit : Â« Toute personne physique ou morale a droit au respect de ses biens . Nul ne peut Ã¨tre privÃ© de sa propriÃ©tÃ© que pour cause d'utilitÃ© publique et dans les conditions prAvues par la loi et les principes gÃ©nÃ©raux du droit international Â» a . S'agissant du premier requÃ©rant, la Commission relÃ©ve la dÃ©cision des tribunaux compÃ©tents selon laquelle les droits contractuels de l'intAressÃ© dÃ©coulant de l'accord d'avril 1970 ont perdu leur objet en raison de l'institution de la fondation par la loi de 1971 et que son droit de Â« trustee Â» d'administrer conjointement avec d'autres les fonds destinÃ©s Ã l'indemnisation des enfants victimes du Contergan lui a donc Ã©tÃ© retirÃ© . La question de savoir si ces faits s'analysent, pour le premier requÃ©rant, en une privation de ses blens dÃ©pend de la dÃ©finition des droits en question comme Â« ses biens Â» au sens de l'article 1, paragraphe 1, du Protocol e A cet Ã©gard, la Commission observe qu'en qualitÃ© tant de partie au contrat que de Â« trustee Â», le premier requÃ©rant n'est devenu que le titulaire formel de ces droits . L'arrangement de 1970 conclu par lui l'a Ã©tA sous la forme d'un contrat en faveur de tiers, les enfants victimes du Contergan, dont certains n'avaient pas encore Ã©tÃ© identifiÃ©s Ã l'Ã©poque . On ne peut don c
_2q0_
considÃ©rer le titre du premier requÃ©rant Ã l'exÃ©cution du contrat comme un droit qui lui soit personnel . De plus, il ne pouvait rÃ©clamer l'exÃ©cution qu'envers l'ensemble des Â« trustees Â» mais non envers lui-mÃ©'me seulement . Il est vrai qu'en sa capacitÃ© de Â« trustee Â», le premier requÃ©rant Ã©tait formellement l'un des co-propriÃ©taires des tonds administrÃ©s par le trust . Mais cette propriÃ©tÃ© ne saurait Ãªtre, elle non plus, considÃ©rÃ©e comme son droit personnel . IndÃ©pendamment du fait que les droits de propriÃ©tÃ© dans le trust ne pouvaient Ã©tre exercÃ©s que conjointement par les trois Â« trustees Â», il est clair que le trust avait Ã©tÃ© constituÃ© dans l'intÃ©rÃ©t exclusif des enfants, qui Ã©taient les vÃ©ritables bÃ©nÃ©ficiaires des biens du trust . Les mesures sus-rappelÃ©es ont eu pour effet de transfÃ©rer cette propriÃ©tÃ© dans son ensemble Ã la fondation . S'il est vrai que le premier requÃ©rant a ainsi Ã©tÃ© privÃ© de sa copropriÃ©tÃ© formelle, il a Ã©galement Ã©tÃ© relevÃ© en mÃªme temps de ses obligations Ã l'Ã©gard des enfants, lesquelles ont Ã©tÃ© transfÃ©rÃ©es de mÃªme Ã la fondation . La Commission estime que, dans ces circonstances, on ne peut pas dire que le premier requÃ©rant a Ã©tÃ© privÃ© de Â« ses biens Â» d'une faÃ§on qui lui permette de se prÃ©tendre victime (article 25 de la Convention) d'une violation des droits que lui reconnait l'article 1 du Protocole . Cette partie de la requÃªte est donc manifestement mal fondÃ©e, au sens de l'article 27, paragraphe 2, de la Convention . b. En ce qui concerne les deuxiÃ©me et troisiÃ©me requÃ©rants, qui sont deux des enfants victimes du Contergan et touchÃ©s par la lÃ©gislation de 1971, la Commission observe que cette lÃ©gislation a transformÃ© leurs crÃ©ances contre le trust en crÃ©ances contre la fondation . Il a Ã©tÃ© soutenu que l'article 23 de la loi du 17 dÃ©cembre 1971 les a privÃ©s Ã©galement de leur titre initial Ã Ã©tre dÃ©dommagÃ©s par la compagnie, titre auquel ils n'avaient renoncÃ© qu'8 la condition qu'ils seraient indemnisÃ©s par le trust, condition qui ne pouvait plus Ãªtre remplie aprÃ¨s l'entrÃ©e en vigueur de la loi . La Commission observe toutefois que les requÃ©rants n'ont pas Ã©puisÃ© les voies de recours internes Ã cet Ã©gard, parce qu'ils n'ont pas formÃ© un recours constitutionnel contre la loi elle-mÃªme, recours Ã l'occasion duquel ils auraient pu faire valoir ce grief . En ce qui concerne le transfert de leurs crÃ©ances contre le trust, les deuxiÃ©me et troisiÃ©me requÃ©rants peuvent toutefois Ãªtre considÃ©rÃ©s comme relevÃ©s de l'obligation d'exercer eux-mÃªmes les recours internes dont ils disposaient parce que la questiona Ã©tÃ© tranchÃ©e par la Cour constitutionnelle fÃ©dÃ©rale dans son arrÃ©t du . . . juillet 1976 . Toutefois, la prÃ©sente requÃ©te n'a Ã©tÃ© introduite que le 28 juillet 1978 ,
soit plus de six mois aprÃ©s la dÃ©cision interne dÃ©finitive . , MÃ¨me si l'on contestait que l'ar Ãªt de la Cour constitutionnelle d u . . . juillet 1976 ait Ã©tÃ© la dÃ©cision interne dÃ©finitive, au sens de l'article 26 de la Convention, et si l'on admettait que la dÃ©cision finale quant aux droits de propriÃ©tÃ© des deuxiÃ©me et troisiÃ©me requÃ©rants dÃ©pend de l'issue de l a - 241 -
procÃ©dure civile contre le premier requÃ©rant len sorte que la requÃªte ne pourrait Ãªtre considÃ©rÃ©e comme ayant Ã©tÃ© introduite aprÃ¨s l'Ã©chÃ©ance du dÃ©lai de six mois prÃ©vu par l'article 26 de la Convention), la Commission estime nÃ©anmoins qu'il n'y aurait aucune apparence de violation des droits reconnus aux deuxiÃ©me et troisiÃ©me requÃ©rants par l'article 1 - du Protocole . Quand bien mÃ¨me leurs crÃ©ances contre le trust, mÃªme d'un montant indÃ©terminÃ©, doivent Ãªtre considÃ©rÃ©es comme leurs biens, au sens du premier paragraphe de cet article, il apparaÃ®t qu'ils ont Ã©tÃ© privÃ©s de ces crÃ©ances dans l'intÃ©rÃ©t public et dans les conditions prÃ©vues par la loi . De l'avis de la Commission, il n'a pas Ã©tÃ© Ã©tabli que la lÃ©gislation de 1971 n'allait pas dans le sens du meilleur intÃ©rÃ©t des enfants eux-mÃ¨mes, et, partant, Ã©galement de l'intÃ©rÃ©t public . En particulier, la Commission estime que les deuxiÃ©me et troisiÃ¨me requÃ©rants n'ont subi aucune perte en raison de la transformation de leurs crÃ©ances en un titre juridique Ã des paiements pÃ©riodiques La Commission note Ã ce propos que la Cour constitutionnelle fÃ©dÃ©rale dans son arrÃªt susmentionnÃ© a considÃ©rÃ© comme une exigence constitutionnelle le fait que la transformation juridique des crÃ©ances ne devait pas affecter le droit personnel des intÃ©ressÃ©s et la substance de leurs crÃ©ances . Elle note en outre l'argument de la Cour constitutionnelle fÃ©dÃ©rale selon lequel la transformation des titres Ã©tait justifiÃ©e dans les circonstances exceptionnelles de l'affaire en raison des difficultÃ©s rencontrÃ©es dans la dÃ©termination de la valeur des crÃ©ances initiales et de la nÃ©cessitÃ© d'assurer aux enfants et Ã leurs parents une aide rapide et sÃ»re . Doit aussi Ã¨tre pris en considÃ©ration le fait que les contributions de l'Etat Ã la fondation de droit public aient Ã©tÃ© ultÃ©rieurement accrues de facon substantielle Ipour atteindre un montant total de 220 millions de DM en plus des 100 mlllions versÃ©s par la firme GI par deux amendements de la loi de 1971 (Journal officiel fÃ©dÃ©ral I 1976, p . 1876 et 1980, p . 1111 . La Commission conclut en consÃ©quence que le grief des deuxiÃ©me et troisiÃ©me requÃ©rants serait de toute faÃ§on manifestement mal fondÃ©, au sens de l'article 27, paragraphe 2, de la Convention .
4 .b . Dans la mesure oÃ¹ le requÃ©rant X . se plaint qu'une ordonnance judiciaire l'a empÃ¨chÃ© spÃ©cialement d'exprimer, dans ses relations avec les parents victimes du Contergan pour lesquels il agissait en qualitÃ© d'avocat, son opinion juridique selon laquelle l'article 23 de la loi de 1971 constituait une spoliation des enfants, la Commission admet qu'il y a eu ingÃ©rence dans l'exercice du droit du requÃ©rant Ã la libertÃ© d'expression, y compris le droit Ã la libertÃ© d'opinion et Ã la libertÃ© de recevoir, de communiquer des informations ou des idÃ©es sans qu'il pÃ»isse y avoir une ingÃ©rence des autoritÃ©s publiques, droit garanti par l'article 10, paragraphe 1, de la Convention .
Ce droit est toutefois soumis aux restrictions Ã© noncÃ©es dans le deuxiÃ¨me paragraphe de l'article 10, qui est libellÃ© comme sui t Â« L'exercice de ces libertÃ©s comportant des devoirs et des responsabilitÃ©s peut Ãªtre soumis Ã certaines formalitÃ©s, conditions, restrictions ou sanctions, prÃ©vues par la loi, qui constituent des mesures nÃ©cessaires, dans une sociÃ©tÃ© dÃ©mocratique, Ã la sÃ©curitÃ© nationale, Ã l'intÃ©gritÃ© territoriale ou Ã© la sÃ¹retÃ© publique, Ã© la dÃ©lense de l'ordre et Ã la prÃ©vention du crime, Ã la protection de la santÃ© ou de la morale, Ã la protection de la rÃ©putation ou des droits d'autrui, pour empÃªcher la divulgation d'informations confidentielles ou pour garantir l'autoritÃ© et l'impaÂ«ialitÃ© du pouvoir judiciaire . n La Commission observe que les dÃ©clarations du requÃ©rant ont Ã©t Ã© interdites parce que, de l'avis des tribunaux, elles portaient atteinte aux droits de la firme G . Le but de l'interdiction Ã© tait donc, au sens de l'article 10, paragraphe 2, de la Convention, Â« la protection de la rÃ©putation ou des droits d'autrui Â» . L'interdiction Ã© tait Ã©galement Â« prÃ©vue par la loi n, puisqu'elle Ã©tait fondÃ©e sur la disposition juridique contenue dans l'article 823, paragraphe 1, du code civil . La seule question restant Ã examiner est donc de savoir si l'interdiction pouvait Ãªtre justifiÃ©e comme Ã© tant nÃ©cessaire dans une sociÃ©tÃ© dÃ©mocratique . A cet Ã©gard, la Commission observe que les dÃ©clarations du requÃ©rant visÃ©es par l'ordonnance n'Ã©taient pas limitÃ©es Ã l'expression de son opinion juridique selon laquelle il y avait eu spoliation des enfants . En'1ait, la cour d'appel a expressÃ©ment reconnu le droit du requÃ©rant d'exprimer son opinion juridique . La raison pour laquelle les tribunaux ont estimÃ© qu'il Ã©tait nÃ©cessaire de limiter la libertÃ© d'expression du requÃ©rant n'Ã©tait pas le fait que ce dernier croyait qu'il y avait eu spoliation, mais le fait que, parmi d'autres reproches adressÃ©s Ã© la sociÃ©tÃ© G ., il insinuait que celleci avait encouragÃ© cette spoliation pour des motifs inavouÃ©s, Ã savoir afin d'obtenir d'autres avantages . Les tribunaux ont jugÃ© que, bien qu'il ait eu l'occasion de le faire, le requÃ©rant n'avait pas apportÃ© la preuve de telles allÃ©gations ; aussi est-ce essentiellement pour cette raison qu'ils ont rendu l'ordonnance l'empBchant de rÃ©itÃ©rer ces dÃ©clarations, mais sans lui ordonner de les .retirer . La Commission estime que, dans ces circonstances, la restriction doit Ãªtre considÃ©rÃ©e comme nÃ©cessaire dans une sociÃ©tÃ© dÃ©mocratique . La limitationde la libertÃ© d'expression du premier requÃ©rant est donc justifiÃ©e aux termes de l'article 10, paragraphe 2, de la Convention et le prÃ©sent grief doit en consÃ©quence Ãªtre rejetÃ© comme Ã©tant manifestement mal fondÃ©, au sens de l'article 27, paragraphe 2, de la Convention .
- 243 -Origine de la décision Pays : Conseil de l'EuropeJuridiction : Cour européenne des droits de l'hommeFormation : Cour (chambre)Date de la décision : 04/03/1980Fonds documentaire : HUDOC Haut de page

References: l'article 1
 l'article 1
 l'article 1
 l'article 27
 l'article 23
 l'article 26
 l'article 26
 l'article 1
 l'article 27
 l'article 23
 l'article 10
 l'article 10
 l'article 10
 l'article 823
 l'article 10
 l'article 27