Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/291/205/
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 13:15:20+00:00

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Justia › US Law › US Case Law › US Supreme Court › Volume 291 › Moore v. Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co.
Moore v. Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co.
1. The jurisdiction of the District Court is to be determined by the allegations of the complaint. P. 291 U. S. 210.
2. The Federal Employers' Liability Act, in providing that the employee shall not be held guilty of contributory negligence, nor to have assumed the risk, in any case under it where violation by the carrier of "any statute enacted for the safety of employees" contributed to the injury or death, embraces the Federal Safety Appliance Acts. P. 291 U. S. 210.
3. The Federal Employers' Liability Act and Safety Appliance Acts are in pari materia, and an action under the former in connection with the latter may be brought in the federal court of a district in which the carrier is doing business. P. 291 U. S. 211.
4. A state statute prescribing the liability of common carriers for negligence causing injuries to employees while engaged in intrastate commerce provided that no employee should be held guilty of contributory negligence, or to have assumed the risk, in any case where violation by the carrier "of any statute, state or federal, enacted for the safety of employees" contributed to the injury.
(1) That the provisions of the Federal Safety Appliance Acts for the safety of employees are in effect read into the state law. P. 291 U. S. 212.
(2) An action under the state statute against an interstate railroad for personal injuries suffered by an employee while engaged in intrastate commerce and caused by a violation of the Federal Safety Appliance Acts is not an action arising under the laws of the United States, and, diversity of citizenship being present, may be brought in the federal court in the district of the plaintiff's residence. Jud.Code, § 51; 28 U.S.C. § 112. P. 291 U. S. 211.
5. The Federal Safety Appliance Acts embrace all locomotives, cars, and similar vehicles used on any railroad which is a highway of interstate commerce, and the duty to protect employees by the appliances prescribed exists even where the vehicle and employee are engaged, at the time of his injury, in intrastate commerce. P. 291 U. S. 213.
6. Questions relating to the scope or construction of the Federal Safety Appliance Acts arising in actions in state courts for injuries sustained by employees in intrastate commerce are federal questions reviewable by this Court. P. 291 U. S. 214.
7. Where the Circuit Court of Appeals has erroneously reversed judgment upon the ground that jurisdiction was wanting, the case will be remanded to it for consideration of the other questions presented. P. 291 U. S. 217.
Certiorari, 290 U.S. 613, to review the reversal of a judgment for damages in an action for personal injuries.
at Russell, Kentucky. In his complaint, he set forth two "paragraphs" or counts, both being for the same injuries. In the first paragraph, petitioner alleged that, at the time of the injuries, he was employed in interstate commerce, and that he brought the action under the acts of Congress known as the Federal Employers' Liability Act [Footnote 1] and the Safety Appliance Acts, [Footnote 2] and the rules and orders which the Interstate Commerce Commission had promulgated under the latter. [Footnote 3] In the second paragraph, he alleged that, at the time of the injuries, he was employed in intrastate commerce, and he invoked the Safety Appliance Acts enacted by the Congress, and the rules and orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission thereunder, and the Employers' Liability Act of Kentucky. The provisions of the laws of Kentucky which were alleged to govern the rights of the parties at the time and place in question were set forth. [Footnote 4] In each count, petitioner stated that the injuries were received while he was engaged as a switchman in attempting to uncouple certain freight cars, and were due to a defective uncoupling lever.
either count, 64 F.2d 472. This Court granted certiorari.
Distinct questions are presented with respect to each count, and they will be considered separately.
First. By the first paragraph, the jurisdiction of the federal court was rested upon the sole ground that the injury had been sustained during petitioner's employment in interstate commerce, and that the cause of action arose under the pertinent federal legislation. To support the jurisdiction of the District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, the complaint alleged that respondent was engaged in business in that district at the time of the commencement of the action. Respondent's challenge to the jurisdiction was upon the grounds (1) that, at the time of the injuries, petitioner was not employed in interstate commerce, and hence the action would not lie under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, and (2) that respondent was a corporation organized under the laws of Virginia and an inhabitant of the Eastern District of Virginia, and hence, so far as the action rested upon the Safety Appliance Acts of Congress and the rules and orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission, it could not be brought in a federal court in any district other than the Eastern District of Virginia. Jud.Code § 51, 28 U.S.C. § 112.
the cause with instructions to grant permission to petitioner to amend his first paragraph to conform exclusively to the theory of a violation of the Federal Employers' Liability Act.
"where the Employers' Liability Act refers to 'any defect or insufficiency, due to its negligence, in its cars, engines, appliances,' etc., it clearly is the legislative intent to treat a violation of the Safety Appliance Act as 'negligence,' what is sometimes called negligence per se."
"in a District Court of the United States, in the district of the residence of the defendant, or in which the cause of action arose, or in which the defendant shall be doing business at the time of commencing such action."
45 U.S.C. § 56. It follows that, upon the allegations of the complaint, the action on the claim set forth in the first paragraph was properly brought in the District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, where respondent was doing business when the action was begun.
in any district other than the Eastern District of Virginia. The District Court took evidence on the issue of fact, found that the petitioner was a citizen of Indiana and a resident of Fort Wayne, and overruled the plea. The Circuit Court of Appeals held that the District Court of the Northern District of Indiana was without jurisdiction, in the view that the second count attempted to set forth a cause of action "under the Federal Safety Appliance Act as well as under the statutes of Kentucky," and hence that jurisdiction did not rest solely on diversity of citizenship. Jud.Code § 51, 28 U.S.C. § 112. In remanding the cause, the Circuit Court of Appeals directed that petitioner be allowed to amend the second paragraph of his complaint so as to conform exclusively to the theory of a violation of the Kentucky statute.
such common carrier of any statute, state or federal, enacted for the safety of employees contributed to the injury or death of such employee."
Id. The Kentucky Legislature read into its statute the provisions of statutes both state and federal which were enacted for the safety of employees, and the Federal Safety Appliance Acts were manifestly embraced in this description. Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Layton, 243 U. S. 617, 243 U. S. 619. Thus, the second count of the complaint, in invoking the Federal Safety Appliance Acts, while declaring on the Kentucky Employers' Liability Act, cannot be regarded as setting up a claim which lay outside the purview of the state statute. As in the analogous case under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, a violation of the acts for the safety of employees was to constitute negligence per se in applying the state statute, and was to furnish the ground for precluding the defense of contributory negligence as well as that of assumption of risk.
The Circuit Court of Appeals took the view that, if it were assumed that the second count was based exclusively upon the Kentucky statute, that statute and the federal requirements could not be considered as being in pari materia, because the latter applied only to interstate commerce, and that, if the petitioner was permitted to establish the negligence required by the state statute by showing the violation of the federal requirements, the court would thereby be placed "in the anomalous position of extending the benefits of the Safety Appliance Act to intrastate commerce."
engaged in interstate commerce." The statute as amended was intended to embrace all locomotives, cars, and similar vehicles used on any railroad which is a highway of interstate commerce. Southern Ry. Co. v. United States, 222 U. S. 20. With respect to such vehicles, the duty to protect employees by the prescribed safety appliances exists even though the vehicles and the employee injured through the failure to provide such protection are at the time engaged in intrastate commerce. Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U. S. 33; Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Layton, supra. The federal Act, in its application to such a case, is thus in pari materia with the statute of Kentucky which prescribes the liability of carriers for injuries to employees while employed in intrastate commerce, and which, in effect, reads into the provisions of the statute the requirements of the federal Act for the safety of employees. There appears to be no anomaly in enforcing the state law with this defined content.
federal court in the absence of diversity of citizenship. The Federal Safety Appliance Acts, while prescribing absolute duties, and thus creating correlative rights in favor of injured employees, did not attempt to lay down rules governing actions for enforcing these rights. The original Act of 1893 made no provision for suits, except for penalties. That Act did impliedly recognize the employee's right of action by providing in § 8 that he should not be deemed to have assumed the risk of injury occasioned by the breach of duty. But the Act made no provision as to the place of suit or the time within which it should be brought, or as to the right to recover, or as to those who should be the beneficiaries of recovery, in case of the death of the employee. While dealing with assumption of risk, the statute did not affect the defense of contributory negligence, and hence that defense was still available according to the applicable state law. Schlemmer v. Buffalo, R. & P. Ry. Co., 220 U. S. 590; Minneapolis, St..P. & S.S.M. Ry. Co. v. Popplar, 237 U. S. 369, 237 U. S. 371-372. In these respects, the amended Act of 1903 made no change, notwithstanding the enlargement of the scope of the statutory requirements. The Act of 1910, by a proviso in § 4 relating to penalties, provided that nothing in that section should "be construed to relieve such carrier from liability in any remedial action for the death or injury of any railroad employee" caused by the use of the prohibited equipment.
plaintiff to recover was left to be determined by the law of the state."
We are of the opinion that the second paragraph of the complaint set forth a cause of action under the Kentucky statute, and, as to this cause of action, the suit is not to be regarded as one arising under the laws of the United States. In view of the diversity of citizenship and the residence of petitioner, the District Court of the Northern District of Indiana had jurisdiction.
As the Circuit Court of Appeals did not consider any questions save those relating to the jurisdiction of the District Court, the judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals will be reversed, and the cause remanded to that court with directions to consider such other questions as may be presented by the appeal.
Act of April 22, 1908, c. 149, 35 Stat. 65, 45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq.; Act of April 5, 1910, c. 143, 36 Stat. 291, 45 U.S.C. § 56.
Acts of March 2, 1893, c.196, 27 Stat. 531, 45 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.; April 1, 1896, c. 87, 29 Stat. 85, 45 U.S.C. § 6; March 2, 1903, c. 976, 32 Stat. 943, 45 U.S.C. §§ 8, 9, 10; April 14, 1910, c. 160, 36 Stat. 298, 45 U.S.C. § 11 et seq..
Order of March 13, 1911; Roberts' Federal Liabilities of Carriers, vol. 2, pp. 2010, 2016.
Ky.Acts, 1918, c. 52, §§ 1-3, p. 153; Carroll's Ky. Statutes, §§ 820b-1, 820b-2, 820b-3.
See Southern Ry. Co. v. Crockett, 234 U. S. 725, 234 U. S. 727; St. Louis & San Francisco R. Co. v. Conarty, 238 U. S. 243, 238 U. S. 248; Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Otos, 239 U. S. 349, 239 U. S. 350; San Antonio & Aransas Pass Ry. Co. v. Wagner, 241 U. S. 476, 241 U. S. 484; Spokane & I.E. R. Co. v. Campbell, 241 U. S. 497, 241 U. S. 498; Atlantic City R. Co. v. Parker, 242 U. S. 56, 242 U. S. 58; St. Joseph & G.I. Ry. Co. v. Moore, 243 U. S. 311, 243 U. S. 312; Minneapolis & St. Louis R. Co. v. Gotschall, 244 U. S. 66; Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Donaldson, 246 U. S. 121, 246 U. S. 124; Davis v. Wolfe, 263 U. S. 239, 263 U. S. 240; Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Groeger, 266 U. S. 521, 266 U. S. 528; Chicago, Great Western R. Co. v. Schendel, 267 U. S. 287, 267 U. S. 289; Minneapolis, St.P, & S.S.M. Ry. Co. v. Goneau, 269 U. S. 406, 269 U. S. 407.
In Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U. S. 33, the action was brought in the state court and was removed to the federal court upon the ground that the defendant was a federal corporation.
"The accident by which the plaintiff's intestate lost his life occurred in the Indian territory, where, contrary to the doctrine of the common law, a right of action for death exists. The cause of action arose under the laws of the territory, and was enforced in the courts of Arkansas."
The question whether the action was triable in those courts was held not to present a federal question, but the question as to the interpretation of the Safety Appliance Act of 1893 did present the federal question which was reviewed by this Court.

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