Source: https://wcc.state.ct.us/crb/2001/4142crb.htm
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 02:59:17+00:00

Document:
Barretta v. Thermal Acoustics, Inc.
The claimant was represented by Christopher Carveth, Esq., Stevens, Carroll & Carveth, 26 Cherry Street, P.O. Box 432, Milford, CT 06460.
The respondent was represented by James Carroll, Esq., McGrail, Carroll & Faris, 388 East Main Street, Branford, CT 06405.
This Petition for Review from the October 22, 1999 Finding and Dismissal of the Commissioner acting for the Fourth District was heard February 23, 2001 before a Compensation Review Board panel consisting of the Commission Chairman John A. Mastropietro and Commissioners George A. Waldron and Ernie R. Walker.
Initially, we do not agree with the claimant’s contention on appeal that the issue before the trial commissioner was limited to whether the claimant’s 1989 angina attack was compensable, as opposed to whether the claimant’s underlying cardiac disease was compensable.2 Regarding his contention that his angina was related to his accepted psychiatric condition, the claimant is essentially seeking to retry the facts of this case, which this board may not do. O’Reilly v. General Dynamics Corp., 52 Conn. App. 813, 816 (1999).
The determination of whether an injury arose out of and in the course of the employment requires a factual determination by the trial commissioner. O’Reilly, supra; McDonough v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 204 Conn. 104, 117 (1987). Moreover, the trial commissioner’s conclusion is entitled to the same deference as that of a trial judge or a jury on the issue of proximate cause. Burke v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 4037 CRB-2-99-4 (July 11, 2000), citing Rogers v. Laidlaw Transit, 45 Conn. App. 204, 206 (1997). “In reviewing the factual determinations of the commissioner, the review [board’s] scope of review is limited. The review [board] may not disturb the conclusions that the commissioner draws from the facts found unless they result from an incorrect application of the law to the subordinate facts or from an inference illegally or unreasonably drawn from them.” Ferrara v. Hospital of St. Raphael, 54 Conn. App. 345, 351 (1999) (citations omitted).
In the instant case, the evidence in the record, including the opinions of Dr. Lebowitz and to some extent the opinion of Dr. Cohen, amply supports the trial commissioner’s determination that the claimant’s cardiac condition was not caused by his employment or by his prior accepted injuries. Specifically, Dr. Lebowitz opined that although the claimant developed severe psychiatric problems following his cervical spine injury in 1980, and despite the appearance of angina pectoris during a particularly stressful time in his life in 1989, there is nothing in the claimant’s cardiovascular and psychiatric history or in the medical literature to support any causal relationship between the claimant’s accepted injuries or his ongoing stressful experience and the development of coronary heart disease. Finding ¶ 52. Dr. Lebowitz further opined that the claimant had multiple risk factors for the development of coronary heart disease, including heavy cigarette smoking, hypertension and hypercholesteremia, and a strong family history of heart disease, and that “the angina pectoris developed by the claimant in 1989 was the result of longstanding and pre-existing coronary artherosclerosis contributed to by the multiple risk factors.” Finding ¶ 53. Dr. Lebowitz concluded that the claimant’s emotional stress in 1989 merely unmasked the presence of his underlying disease, just as other triggers such as physical exertion, cold weather, or fear might have done. Finding ¶ 54. The doctor thus opined that the claimant’s impairment from coronary heart disease had no causal relationship to his accepted injuries or to his emotional stress.
It was certainly within the discretion of the trial commissioner, as the trier of fact, to accept the medical opinion of Dr. Lebowitz, as it is “the province of the commissioner to accept the evidence which impress[es] him as being most credible and more weighty.” Ferrara, supra, 349. The trial commissioner’s conclusion that the claimant’s episodic incident of angina in January of 1989 was merely a symptom of his underlying coronary disease, which was not compensable, is fully supported by the medical evidence in the record, including the opinion of Dr. Lebowitz. As the trial commissioner’s findings and conclusions are fully supported by the evidence in the record, we must affirm her decision. Ferrara, supra; see also Scrivano v. UTC/Pratt & Whitney, 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 87, 1501 CRB-1-92-9 (Feb. 14, 1994). Moreover, we find no error in the trial commissioner’s denial of the claimant’s Motion to Correct, as the requested corrections are largely based upon credibility determinations, which are the sole province of the trial commissioner, and as a Motion to Correct need not be granted where the requested corrections would not affect the outcome of the case. Sendra v. Plainville Board of Education, 3961 CRB-6-99-1 (Jan. 20, 2000).
COMMISSIONER: ...I understand that the sole issue before me to decide is whether or not the claimant’s cardiovascular problem is related to the compensable injury. Is that correct?
[ATTORNEY] CARVETH: That is correct.
[ATTORNEY] CARROLL: That is correct.

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