Source: http://www.interfire.org/features/spoliation.asp
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 14:36:21+00:00

Document:
In either event, any particular state's definition of spoliation can be ambiguous and difficult to interpret while fashioning an investigation.
WHAT IMPACT ON INSURANCE INDUSTRY?
In order to deter spoliation, courts have fashioned sanctions to be imposed upon the spoliating party. These sanctions range from jury instructions which call for an inference that the spoliated evidence would have been damaging to the spoliating party,7 to completely barring any testimony by the spoliating party's experts,8 effectively resulting in an adverse finding against that party.
A court decision in Illinois considered the appropriateness of sanctions barring the testimony of a subrogation plaintiff insurer's expert, where the insurer allowed an automobile to be destroyed before the opposing party had an opportunity to examine it.9 In imposing the sanctions, the court held that the plaintiff, as an insurance company, "unquestionably knew the importance of the car to any products liability claims to allow potential defendants to prepare a defense". Even though the insurer saved suspect wires from the car, and photographed it, the court held that the insurer should have preserved the entire car to allow the opposing party to inspect it.
HOW MAY A DUTY ARISE?
A duty to preserve evidence may also be inferred through recommended practice. For example, the NFPA 921 Committee has recommendations for preservation of evidence in connection with the fire scene for investigation. Another such example is the National Institute of Justice/Office of Science and Technology and the National Center for Forensic Science which have begun a joint initiative to create National Guidelines for collecting and preserving evidence. The purpose of the Guidelines is to establish a standardized approach to collecting and preserving evidence in the area of arson and other crime scenes. It is therefore important to be aware of recommended guidelines or practices which may be used to create at least an inference of a duty to preserve evidence.
Several state court decisions have held that spoliation occurred when "crucial" evidence was destroyed or altered.18 Examples of crucial evidence include a heater that exploded,19 a furnace that malfunctioned,20 a car that caught on fire,21 or a crimping machine alleged to have caused an injury.22 In determining whether crucial evidence has been destroyed, an Alabama decision held that where a party saved a component part of a gas system, but failed to preserve the entire system, evidence was spoliated.23 The reasoning under these holdings is that if a product is the focus of an investigation, the entire product is crucial evidence.
HOW MUST EVIDENCE BE PRESERVED?
LIMITS ON THE DUTY TO PRESERVE?
WHEN CAN SUIT FOR SPOLIATION BE BROUGHT?
Recently, the California Supreme Court overruled a much-cited 1984 appellate court decision, Smith v. Superior Court of California, in which the appellate court recognized an independent cause of action for intentional first-party spoliation of evidence.39 The issue before the California Supreme Court was whether a party, who learns of spoliation during a lawsuit, may bring an independent cause of action for spoliation. The Court held that in such a situation, there is no need for an independent cause of action because the trial judge can impose sanctions, or give an adverse inference jury instruction to remedy the spoliation.
BEWARE OF VARIABILITY IN APPLICATION OF SANCTIONS !
In Illinois, for example, while its Supreme Court confirmed a "negligence" standard for determining spoliation40, the Illinois appellate decisions might be considered to be inconsistent, if not unclear in defining sanctionable conduct.
Consider however, a recent Illinois Second District case, which predated the Illinois Supreme Court decision confirming the negligence standard for spoliation. The Appellate Court considered the spoliator's good faith and reversed a trial court's imposition of sanctions for spoliation.43 The court considered the damage done to defendant's case as a result of not having access to the spoliated evidence, and additionally considered the intent of the party that spoliated the evidence. While finding there was no showing that the spoliator had not acted in good faith, the court further found no substantial harm to defendant's case, since experts for each party agreed that testing of acetylene torch hose was unnecessary.
A subsequent case from the Illinois First District (Second Division) explicitly rejected the idea that a court should consider the intent of the spoliating party, stating that the Second District "appears to have used the plaintiff's good faith as a gauge for measuring prejudice to the defendant."44 The First District further held that in determining the appropriateness of discovery sanctions, a court should consider whether defendant's case was substantially harmed by not having access to the spoliated evidence. In this case, the defendants' experts had not yet tested or examined evidence involved in an explosion when plaintiff allowed that evidence to be destroyed. The warehouse storage facility inadvertently disposed of the artifacts. The court held that it was appropriate to dismiss plaintiff's case because defendant was denied any chance of developing a defense.
Contrast the above First District Appellate decision with a Fifth District Appellate decision issued about five months earlier, also in which auto steering column evidence was destroyed. The court here found spoliation to exist.47 It should be noted that the court focused on the fact that the defendant spoliator had previously been served with a notice to preserve evidence by the plaintiff. There was no analysis as to whether there was a showing of prejudice to plaintiff's case. Rather, there was simply a deference to the trial judge in determining sanctions.
Caution should be used when navigating from jurisdiction to jurisdiction in defining sanctionable conduct, since trial and appellate courts can be unpredictable in their rulings. Being proactive and consistent in preserving evidence is recommended.
DOES FEDERAL OR STATE LAW APPLY?
1.	Retain legal counsel to evaluate the state (or applicable federal) law before losses occur, if possible. In any event, retain counsel immediately after notice of loss to assist in evaluating spoliation (and other) issues.
3.	Preserve and carefully document chain of custody of evidence with photographs, videotapes, affidavits and/or written agreements. Ensure that storage of the evidence is not subject to potentially spoliating influences. Identify and specify persons with keys to storage facilities and evaluate the facility in terms of security.
4.	Work out written agreements with all potentially interested parties (to any extent possible) concerning inspection and/or destruction of evidence. Try to do this immediately after notice of loss, but in any event before debris removal if at all possible. Develop and agree to a written protocol for any "destructive testing" of the evidence, including a definition of destruction testing. Strive to make the definition and protocol as unambiguous as possible.
5.	Give all potentially interested parties to the loss reasonable written notice (consider by certified mail) of destructive testing, or any other significant action with respect to the evidence. Give reasonable time to respond.
6.	If your state allows for destruction of the evidence after some "reasonable time," try to do so by agreement, and in any event, give reasonable written notice to all potentially interested parties beforehand.
3.	Black's Law Dictionary 1401 (6th ed.1990).
5.	Federated Mutual Insurance v. Litchfield Precision Components, (Minnesota) 456 N.W.2d 434 (1990).
6.	Baugher v. Gates Rubber Co., (Missouri) 863 S.W.2d 905 (1993), Williford Energy Co. v. Submergible Cable Serv., (Texas) 895 S.W.2d 379 (1994).
8.	American Family Insurance v. Village Pontiac, (Illinois) 166 Ill.Dec. 93, 585 N.E.2d 1115 (2nd Dist.1992), Bolton v. Massachusetts Bay Trans. Author., (Massachusetts) 593 N.E.2d 248 (1992),Fire Insurance Exchange v. Zenith Radio Corp., (Nevada) 103 Nev. 648, 747 P.2d 911 (1987), Graves v. Daley, (Illinois) 122 Ill.Dec.420, 526 N.E.2d 679 (3rd Dist.1988), Nally v. Volkswagen of America, (Massachusetts) 405 Mass.191, 539 N.E.2d 1017 (1989), Shelbyville Mutual Insurance v. Sunbeam Leisure Products, (Illinois) 199 Ill.Dec.965, 634 N.E.2d 1319 (5th Dist.1994).
9.	American Family Insurance v. Village Pontiac, (Illinois) 166 Ill.Dec.93, 585 N.E.2d 1115 (2nd Dist.1992).
10.	Bolton v. Massachusetts Bay Trans. Author., (Massachusetts) 593 N.E.2d 248 (1992), Bondu v. Gurvich, (Florida) 473 So.2d 1307 (1984), Federated Mutual Insurance v. Litchfield Precision Components, (Minnesota) 456 N.W.2d 434 (1990), Fire Insurance Exchange v. Zenith Radio Corp., (Nevada) 103 Nev. 648, 747 P.2d 911 (1987), Graves v. Daley, (Illinois) 122 Ill.Dec. 420, 526 N.E.2d 679 (3rd Dist. 1988), Nally v. Volkswagen of America, (Massachusetts) 405 Mass.191, 539 N.E.2d 1017 (1989), Ralston v. Casanova, (Illinois) 85 Ill.Dec. 76, 473 N.E.2d 444 (1st Dist.1984), Shelbyville Mutual Insurance v. Sunbeam Leisure Products, (Illinois) 199 Ill.Dec.965, 634 N.E.2d 1319 (5th Dist. 1994).
11.	Continental Insurance Co. v. Herman, (Florida) 576 So.2d 313 (1990), Miller v. Allstate Insurance Co., (Florida) 573 So.2d 24 (1990).
12.	Koplin v. Rosel Well Perforators, (Kansas) 241 Kan.206, 734 P.2d. 1177 (1987), Murray v. Farmer's Insurance Co., (Idaho) 118 Idaho 224, 796 P.2d 101 (1990), Smith v. Superior Court of California, (California) 198 Cal.Rptr. 829 (1984); overrul'd on other grounds, Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County, (California), 74 Cal. Rptr, 2d 248 (1998).
13.	Farley Metals Inc. v. Barber Colman Co., (Illinois) 206 Ill. Dec. 712, 645 N.E.2d 964 (1st Dist. 1994), Ralston v.Casonova, (Illinois) 85 Ill. Dec. 76, 473 N.E.2d 444 (1st Dist. 1984).
14.	Boyd v. Travelers Insurance, (Illinois) 166 Ill.2d 188, 652 N.E. 2d 267 (1995).
15.	American Family Insurance v. Village Pontiac, (Illinois) 166 Ill.Dec.93, 585 N.E.2d 1115 (2nd Dist.1992), Boyd v. Travelers Insurance, (Illinois) 166 Ill.2d 188, 652 N.E.2d 267 (1995), Fire Insurance Exchange v. Zenith Radio Corp., (Nevada) 103 Nev. 648, 747 P.2d 911 (1987), Hirsch v. General Motors Corp., (New Jersey) 266 N.J.Super.222, 628 A.2d 1108 (1993), Iowa Ham Canning, Inc. v. Handtmann, Inc., (Illinois) 870 F.Supp. 238 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (applying Illinois law), Solano v. Delaney, (California) 264 Cal.Rptr. 721 (1989) (unpublished opinion), Shimanovsky v. General Motors Corp, (Illinois) 271 Ill. App. 3d 1, 648 N.E.2d 91 (1st Dist. 1994), aff'd as modif'd 692 N.E.2d 286 (1998), Callahan v. Home Depot, (New Jersey) 306 N.J. Super. 488, 703 A.2d 1014 (1997).
16.	American Family Insurance v. Village Pontiac, (Illinois) 166 Ill.Dec.93, 585 N.E.2d 1115 (2nd Dist.1992), Boyd v. Travelers Insurance, (Illinois) 166 Ill.2d 188, 652 N.E.2d 267 (1995), Fire Insurance Exchange v. Zenith Radio Corp., (Nevada) 103 Nev. 648, 747 P.2d 911 (1987), Hirsch v. General Motors Corp., (New Jersey) 266 N.J.Super.222, 628 A.2d 1108 (1993), Solano v. Delaney, (California) 264 Cal.Rptr. 721 (1989) (unpublished opinion). Callahan v. Home Depot, (New Jersey) 306 N.J. Super. 488, 703 A.2d 1014 (1997).
17.	Cincinnati Insurance Co. v. Synergy Gas, (Alabama) 585 So.2d 822 (1991), Graves v. Daley, (Illinois) 122 Ill.Dec. 420, 526 N.E.2d 679 (3rd Dist.1988), Nally v. Volkswagen of America, (Massachusetts) 405 Mass.191, 539 N.E.2d 1017 (1989).
18.	American Family Insurance v. Village Pontiac, (Illinois) 166 Ill.Dec.93, 585 N.E.2d 1115 (2nd Dist.1992), Baugher v. Gates Rubber Co.,(Missouri) 863 S.W.2d 905 (1993), Boyd v. Travelers Insurance, (Illinois) 166 Ill.2d 188, 652 N.E.2d 267 (1995), Graves v. Daley, (Illinois) 122 Ill.Dec.420, 526 N.E.2d 679 (3rd Dist.1988).
19.	Boyd v. Travelers Insurance, (Illinois) 166 Ill.2d 188, 652 N.E.2d 267 (1995).
20.	Graves v. Daley, (Illinois) 122 Ill.Dec.420, 526 N.E.2d 679 (3rd Dist.1988).
21.	American Family Insurance v. Village Pontiac, (Illinois) 166 Ill.Dec.93, 585 N.E.2d 1115 (2nd Dist.1992).
22.	Baugher v. Gates Rubber Co., (Missouri) 863 S.W.2d 905 (1993).
23.	Cincinnati Insurance Company v. Synergy Gas, (Alabama) 585 So.2d 822 (1991).
24.	Nally v. Volkswagen of America, (Massachusetts) 405 Mass.191, 539 N.E.2d 1017 (1989), Shelbyville Mutual Insurance v. Sunbeam Leisure Products, (Illinois) 199 Ill.Dec.965, 634 N.E.2d 1319 (5th Dist.1994).
25.	Nally v. Volkswagen of America, (Massachusetts) 405 Mass.191, 539 N.E.2d 1017 (1989).
26.	Nally v. Volkswagen of America, (Massachusetts) 405 Mass.191, 539 N.E.2d 1017 (1989).
27.	Shelbyville Mutual Insurance v. Sunbeam Leisure Products, (Illinois) 199 Ill.Dec.965, 634 N.E.2d 1319 (5th Dist.1994).
28.	Bright v. Ford Motor Co., (Ohio) 63 Ohio App.3d 256, 578 N.E.2d 547 (1990).
29.	Solano v. Delaney, (California) 264 Cal.Rptr. 721 (1989) (unpublished opinion).
30.	H & H Sand and Gravel Haulers v. Coyne Cylinder, (Illinois) 198 Ill.Dec.367, 632 N.E.2d 697 (2nd Dist.1994), Solano v. Delaney, (California) 264 Cal.Rptr. 721 (1989) (unpublished opinion).
31.	H & H Sand and Gravel Haulers v. Coyne Cylinder, (Illinois) 198 Ill.Dec. 367, 632 N.E.2d 697 (2nd Dist.1994).
32.	H & H Sand and Gravel Haulers v. Coyne Cylinder, (Illinois) 198 Ill.Dec.367, 632 N.E.2d 697 (2nd Dist.1994).
33.	Murray v. Farmer's Insurance Co., (Idaho) 118 Idaho 224, 796 P.2d 101 (1990), Solano v. Delaney, (California) 264 Cal.Rptr.721 (1989) (unpublished opinion).
34.	Murray v. Farmer's Insurance Co., (Idaho) 118 Idaho 224, 796 P.2d 101 (1990).
35.	Baugher v. Gates Rubber Co., (Missouri) 863 S.W.2d 905 (1993), Tomas v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance, (Ohio) 79 Ohio App.3d 624, 607 N.E.2d 944 (1992).
36.	Hazen v. Municipality of Anchorage, (Alaska) 718 P.2d 456 (1986), Miller v. Allstate Insurance Co., (Florida) 573 So.2d 24 (1990), Boyd v. Travelers Insurance, (Illinois) 166 Ill.2d 188, 652 N.E.2d 267 (1995).
37.	Hazen v. Municipality of Anchorage, (Alaska) 718 P.2d 456 (1986), Miller v. Allstate Insurance Co., (Florida) 573 So.2d 24 (1990), Boyd v. Travelers Insurance, (Illinois) 166 Ill.2d 188, 652 N.E.2d 267 (1995).
38.	Boyd v. Travelers Insurance Co, (Illinois) 166 Ill.2d 188, 652 N.E.2d 267 (1995).
39.	Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County, (California), 74 Cal. Rptr, 2d 248 (1998).
40.	Boyd v. Travelers Insurance Co, (Illinois) 166 Ill.2d 188, 652 N.E.2d 267 (1995).
41.	Graves v. Daley, (Illinois) 122 Ill.Dec.420, 526 N.E.2d 679 (3rd Dist. 1988); American Family Insurance v. Village Pontiac, (Illinois) 166 Ill.Dec. 93, 585 N.E.2d 1115 (2nd Dist. 1992); Shelbyville Mutual Insurance v. Sunbeam Leisure Products, (Illinois) 199 Ill.Dec. 965, 634 N.E. 2d 1319 (5th Dist. 1994); Farley Metals, Inc. v. Barber Colman Co., (Illinois) 269 Ill.App.3d 104, 645 N.E.2d 964 (1st Dist. 1994); Shimanovsky v. General Motors Corp., (Illinois) 271 Ill.App.3d 1, 648 N.E.2d 91 (1st Dist. 1994), aff'd as modif'd 692 N.E.2d 286 (1998); H&H Sand and Gravel Haulers Co. v. Coyne Cylinder Co., (Illinois) 260 Ill.App.3d 235, 632 N.E.2d 367 (2nd Dist. 1994).
43.	H&H Sand and Gravel Haulers v. Coyne Cylinder, (Illinois) 260 Ill.App.3d. 235, 632 N.E.2d 697 (2nd Dist. 1994).
44.	Farley Metals, Inc. v. Barber Colman Co., (Illinois) 269 Ill.App.3d 104, 645 N.E.2d 964 (1st Dist. 1994).
45.	Shimanovsky v. General Motors Corp., (Illinois) 271 Ill.App.3d 1, 648 N.E.2d 91 (1st Dist. 1994), aff'd as modif'd 692 N.E.2d 286 (1998).
46.	Shimanovsky v. General Motors, (Illinois) 271 Ill.App.3d 1, 648 N.E.2d 91 (1st Dist. 1994), aff'd as modif'd 692 N.E.2d 286 (1998).
47.	King v. Clemons, (Illinois), 264 Ill. App. 3d 138, 636 N.E.2d 1062 (5th dist. 1994).
48.	Schmid v. Milwaukee Electric Tools, 13 F.3d 76 (3rd Cir.1994).
49.	Allstate Insurance Co. v. Sunbeam Corp., 53 F. 3d 804 (7th Cir. 1995).
50.	Allstate Insurance Co. v. Sunbeam Corp., 53 F.3d 804 (7th Cir. 1995).
51.	Glover v. Bic Corp., 987 F.2d 1410 (9th Cir.1993), superceded by 6 F.3d 1318 (9th Cir.1993).
52.	Glover v. Bic Corp., 987 F.2d 1410 (9th Cir. 1993), superceded by 6 F.3d 1318 (9th Cir.1993).
53.	Glover v. Bic Corp., 987 F.2d 1410 (9th Cir. 1993), superceded by 6 F.3d 1318 (9th Cir. 1993).

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