Source: https://eulaw.typepad.com/eulawblog/discrimination/
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 18:52:49+00:00

Document:
The Court of Justice has handed down a major judgment on the horizontal direct effect of directives. And on age discrimination, again.
The judgment of the Court in Case C-555/07 Seda Kücükdeveci is a difficult and subtle one and is sure to keep commentators busy for quite a while. Here's our take on it.
Our pals at Adjudicating Europe have written some very insightful stuff on the case here, here, and here.
First the story. The young Ms Kücükdeveci was employed from the age of 18 by a private German company called Swedex. In 2006, ten years after she started work for them in 1996, Swedex dismissed her. Swedex calculated that she had accumulated only three years of length of service, not ten years. How come ? Because German legislation stated that the employer should not take account of periods of employment prior to the employee's 25th year of age in calculating the length of employment. Ms Kücükdeveci challenged her dismissal before the German labor courts claiming that the German legislation which disregarded employment before the age of 25 constituted illegal age discrimination and that she was not given the proper period of notice corresponding to her length service.
The German court referred two questions to the Court of Justice: Whether the German legislation constituted illegal age discrimination according to EU primary law and Directive 2000/78 and if so, whether the national court should disapply national law in a dispute between two private individuals.
As to the first question, the Court of Justice held that it is a general principle of EU law that all discrimination on grounds of age is prohibited and Directive 2000/78 "gives expression" to that general principle. The Court refers to Case C-144/04 Mangold in which it had held that held that that directive does not itself lay down the principle of equal treatment in the field of employment and occupation, which derives from various international instruments and from the constitutional traditions common to the member States, but has the sole purpose of laying down, in that field, a general framework for combating discrimination on various grounds including age.
Significantly, the Court also refers to the Charter of Fundamental Rights which now has legal force since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. The Court held that Article 6(1) TEU provides that the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union is to have the same legal value as the Treaties. Under Article 21(1) of the charter, ‘[a]ny discrimination based on … age … shall be prohibited’.
But, for those general principles to apply, the case at hand must fall within the scope of EU law. The Court held that it does because the discriminatory conduct complained of in this case was adopted on the basis of national legislation and occurred after the expiry of the deadline for implementation of Directive 2000/78 by the member States. Consequently, this case could be distinguished from Case C-427/06 Bartsch  ECR I-7245.(For our post on that case, see here).
Having held that the discrimination in question was prohibited by EU law as a matter of principle, the Court then answered the second question on the consequences of such a finding. It held that the national court must ensure that the principle of non-discrimination is complied with by disapplying any contrary provision of domestic law.
The Court recalled the general rule that a directive cannot of itself impose obligations on an individual and cannot therefore be relied on as such against an individual (Case 152/84 Marshall  ECR 723, paragraph 48; Case C‑91/92 Faccini Dori  ECR I‑3325, paragraph 20; and Joined Cases C-397/01 to C-403/01 Pfeiffer and Others,  ECR I-8835, paragraph 108).
That is not the end of it, however. The Court went on recalling the member States’ obligation arising from a directive to achieve the result envisaged by that directive and their duty to take all appropriate measures, whether general or particular, to ensure the fulfillment of that obligation are binding on all the authorities of the Member States including, for matters within their jurisdiction, the courts (Case 14/83 von Colson and Kamann  ECR 1891, paragraph 26; Case C‑106/89 Marleasing  ECR I‑4135, paragraph 8; Case C‑91/92 Faccini Dori, paragraph 26; Case C‑129/96 Inter-Environnement Wallonie  ECR I‑7411, paragraph 40; Joined Cases C-397/01 to C-403/01 Pfeiffer and Others, paragraph 110; and Joined Cases C‑378/07 to C‑380/07 Angelidaki and Others  ECR I‑0000, paragraph 106).
The Court held that, as a consequence, when it applies national law the national court must ensure, as far as possible, in the light of the wording and the purpose of the directive in question, that the result pursued by the directive is achieved and thereby comply with the third paragraph of Article 288 TFEU (von Colson and Kamann, paragraph 26; Marleasing, paragraph 8; Faccini Dori, paragraph 26; and Pfeiffer and Others, paragraph 113). The requirement for national law to be interpreted in conformity with EU law is inherent in the system of the Treaty, since it permits the national court, within the limits of its jurisdiction, to ensure the full effectiveness of EU law when it determines the dispute before it ( Pfeiffer and Others, paragraph 114).
Importantly, the Court stated that the German legislation in issue was perfectly clear and could not be interpreted in such a way as to comply with EU law.
Because Directive 2000/78 merely gives expression to, but does not lay down, the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age as it is a general principle of EU law ( Mangold, paragraphs 74 to 76), the national court, hearing a dispute involving the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age as given expression in Directive 2000/78, must provide, within the limits of its jurisdiction, the legal protection which individuals derive from EU law and to ensure the full effectiveness of that law, disapplying if need be any provision of national legislation contrary to that principle (see, to that effect, Mangold, paragraph 77).
That seems like a rather convoluted way of saying that even if a directive does not have horizontal direct effect, the national court should seek to achieve the same result as if it did have such an effect when the directive gives expression to a general principle of EU law.
Lastly, the Court looked at the question whether the national court must refer a preliminary question on the basis of Article 267 TFEU before disapplying national law contrary to EU law.
The Court held that the national court need not make such a reference. It stated that the need to ensure the full effectiveness of the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age means that the national court, faced with a national provision falling within the scope of EU law which it considers to be incompatible with that principle, and which cannot be interpreted in conformity with that principle, must decline to apply that provision, without being either compelled to make or prevented from making a reference to the Court for a preliminary ruling before doing so.
The Court of Justice has handed down two judgments on age discrimination: Case C-229/08 Colin Wolf concerns age limits for the employment of firemen and Case C-341/08 Domenica Petersen deals with age limits for panel dentists. In both judgments the Court held that age discrimination was permitted if done for the right reasons such as when it is required by the nature of the job (like being a fireman) or if it is necessary for the protection of health or if it is justified by a legitimate aim, including employment policy, labour market and vocational training objectives (such as in the case of dentists).
Council Directive 2000/78/EC of November 27th 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation prohibits many forms of discrimination in conditions of employment, self-employment and occupation, including discrimination based on age.
In Case C-229/08 Colin Wolf, Mr Wolf applied to become a fireman but when he was to be recruited he was 31 years old, over the age limit of 30 as laid down in the terms of the Frankfurt fire brigade to which he had applied. His application was rejected and he brought an action in the German courts claiming that he had been the victim of illegal age discrimination. The German court seised asked the Court of Justice whether the age limit in issue was a justified form of discrimination according to Directive 2000/78/EC.
The Court of Justice held that it was justified and thus not prohibited by the Directive. It held that the concern to ensure the operational capacity and proper functioning of the professional fire service constitutes a legitimate aim. In addition, the possession of especially high physical capacities may be regarded as a genuine and determining occupational requirement for carrying on the occupation of a fireman, who fights fires and rescues people. The Court referred to data provided by the German Government according to which very few officials over 45 years of age have sufficient physical capacity to perform the fire-fighting part of their activities.
An interesting little procedural point came up in that case. The referring German court asked whether the discrimination in issue was justified under Article 6 §1 of Directive 2000/78/EC (dealing with the justification of discrimination) but the Court of Justice considered whether setting an age limit for firemen was discrimination in the first place according to Article 4 §1 (which states that a difference of treatment is not discrimination if it constitutes a genuine and determining occupational requirement). The Court held that it could deal with Article 4 §1 of the Directive even if, formally, the referring court has limited its question to the interpretation of Article 6 §1 of the Directive because the Court of Justice must provide the referring court with all the elements of interpretation of EU law which may be of assistance in adjudicating in the case pending before it, whether or not it has referred to them in the wording of its question (Case C‑321/03 Dyson  ECR I‑687, paragraph 24; Case C‑392/05 Alevizos  ECR I‑3505, paragraph 64; and Case C‑532/06 Lianakis and Others  ECR I‑251, paragraph 23). The Court of Justice must extract from all the information provided by the national court, in particular from the grounds of the decision to make the reference, the points of EU law which require interpretation in view of the subject-matter of the dispute (Case C‑115/08 ČEZ  ECR I‑0000, paragraph 81).
In Case C-341/08 Domnica Petersen, Ms Petersen was admitted in Germany to provide panel dental care from 1974. She reached the age of 68 in April 2007. The competent Admissions Board for Dentists decided that her license to practice would expire at the end of June 2007. She challenged that decision before the Administrative court in Dortmund which then questioned whether the age limit of 68 laid down in German law for dentists providing care under the statutory health insurance scheme was compatible with Directive 2000/78/EC. (In Germany 90% of patients are covered by the statutory health insurance scheme. Outside the panel system, dentists can practise their profession whatever their age).
The Court of Justice held that a member State may legitimately consider it necessary to set an age limit for the practice of a medical profession such as that of a dentist.
The age limit must be set for the right reasons, however. The Court pointed out that the directive precludes a national measure setting a maximum age for practising as a panel dentist, in this case 68 years, where the sole aim of that measure is to protect the health of patients against the decline in performance of those dentists after that age, since that age limit does not apply to non-panel dentists. Such a measure lacks consistency and cannot therefore be necessary for the protection of health.
On the other hand, the directive allows such an age limit where its aim is to share out employment opportunities among the generations within the profession of panel dentist, if, taking into account the situation in the labour market concerned, the measure is appropriate and necessary for achieving that aim. The age of 68 would appear to be sufficiently high to serve as the endpoint of admission to practise as a panel dentist.
It is for the national court to identify the aim pursued by the age limit for panel dentists. If the age limit, having regard to its objective, were contrary to the directive, it would be for the national court hearing a dispute between an individual and an administrative body such as the Admissions Board for Dentists to decline to apply it, even if it had been introduced before the directive and national law made no provision for disapplying it.
Pregnant women must be entitled to effective judicial protection. So holds the Court of Justice in its judgment in Case C-63/08 Virginie Pontin v. T-Comalux SA. Thus, if national law lays down a time-limit for a pregnant woman dismissed from employment during pregnancy which is too short and also bars pregnant women from obtaining damages when other employees can get them, the law in question discriminates against women employees.
The story goes like this. Ms Pontin worked for T-Comalux in Luxembourg from November 2005. In January 2007 she was dismissed with immediate effect ‘on grounds of serious misconduct’ consisting of ‘unauthorised absence for more than three days’. The day following her dismissal Ms Pontin informed T-Comalux that she was pregnant and that her dismissal was null and void by virtue of the legal protection enjoyed by pregnant workers. Her employers did not respond. She considered that she was the victim of wrongful dismissal and thus brought proceedings in April - more than 15 days after her notice of dismissal - before the Employment Tribunal of Esch-sur- Alzette, Luxembourg, seeking a declaration that her dismissal was null and void.
The problem was that the Luxembourg Labor Code, which transposes Council Directive 76/207/EEC (the Pregnant Workers Directive), prohibits the dismissal of an employee where she has been medically certified as being pregnant or within twelve weeks of her giving birth. It makes legal action by an employee dismissed during pregnancy, who wishes to bring an action for nullity of the dismissal and for reinstatement within the undertaking concerned, subject to a time-limit of 15 days from the date on which her contract is terminated.
The Employment Tribunal asked the Court of Justice whether EU law precludes national legislation which, first, makes legal action brought by a pregnant employee who has been dismissed during her pregnancy subject to short time-limits likely to deny her the opportunity to take legal proceedings to safeguard her rights and, second, denies her the possibility of bringing an action for damages against her employer, which is available to other employees who have been dismissed.
The Court of Justice answered that in principle a 15 day limitation seems to constitute discrimination against pregnant women as it seems to infringe the principles of equivalence and of effectiveness as regards judicial protection. The Court went on, however, that it is for the national referring court to determine whether there has in fact been a breach of those principles in this particular case.
The Court recalled that the detailed procedural rules governing actions for safeguarding an individual’s rights under EU law must be no less favorable than those governing similar domestic actions (principle of equivalence) and must not render practically impossible or excessively difficult the exercise of rights conferred by Community law (principle of effectiveness) (Case C‑268/06 Impact  ECR I‑2483, paragraph 46).
The principle of equivalence requires that the national rule at issue be applied without distinction, whether the infringement alleged is of EU law or national law, where the purpose and cause of action are similar (Case C-326/96 Levez  ECR I-7835, paragraph 41). However, that principle is not to be interpreted as requiring member States to extend their most favorable rules to all actions brought in the field of employment law (see Levez, paragraph 42). The national court, which alone has direct knowledge of the procedural rules governing actions in the field of domestic law, must determine whether the procedural rules intended to ensure that the rights derived by individuals from EU law are safeguarded under domestic law comply with that principle and to consider both the purpose and the essential characteristics of allegedly similar domestic actions (Levez, paragraphs 39 and 43, and Case C‑78/98 Preston and Others  ECR I‑3201, paragraph 49). For that purpose, the national court must consider whether the actions concerned are similar as regards their purpose, cause of action and essential characteristics (Preston and Others, paragraph 57).
To decide whether procedural rules are equivalent, the national court must establish objectively, in the abstract, whether the rules at issue are similar taking into account the role played by those rules in the procedure as a whole, the conduct of that procedure and any special features of those rules (Preston and Others, paragraphs 61 to 63).
As regards the principle of effectiveness, the Court of Justice recalled that cases which raise the question whether a national procedural provision renders the exercise of an individual’s rights under the EU legal order practically impossible or excessively difficult must similarly be analyzed by reference to the role of that provision in the procedure, its conduct and its special features, viewed as a whole, before the various national instances. In that context, it is necessary to take into consideration, where relevant, the principles which lie at the basis of the national legal system, such as the protection of the rights of the defense, the principle of legal certainty and the proper conduct of the proceedings (Case C‑426/05 Tele2 Telecommunication  ECR I‑685, paragraph 55).
The Court has thus recognised that it is compatible with EU law to lay down reasonable time-limits for bringing proceedings in the interests of legal certainty, since such time-limits are not liable to render practically impossible or excessively difficult the exercise of rights conferred by EU law (Case C‑255/00 Grundig Italiana  ECR I‑8003, paragraph 34, and Case C‑2/06 Kempter  ECR I‑411, paragraph 58 - see our post on that case here). As regards limitation periods, the Court has also held that, in respect of national legislation which comes within the scope of EU law, it is for the member States to establish those periods in the light of, inter alia, the significance for the parties concerned of the decisions to be taken, the complexities of the procedures and of the legislation to be applied, the number of persons who may be affected and any other public or private interests which must be taken into consideration (Case C‑349/07 Sopropé  ECR I-0000, paragraph 40).
Having recalled those principles, the Court of Justice examined the national legislation as interpreted by the referring court and came to the conclusion, subject to an examination of the facts of the case by the referring court, that the national legislation did indeed breach those principles.
The former President of Germany, Roman Herzog, and Lüder Gerken of the Centre for European Policy have launched recently a strongly worded attack against the Court of Justice.
You can read a summary here. The full article is available here or here.
"Judicial decision-making in Europe is in deep trouble. The reason is to be found in the European Court of Justice (ECJ), whose justifications for depriving member states of their very own fundamental competences and interfering heavily in their legal systems are becoming increasingly astonishing. In so doing, it has squandered a great deal of the trust it used to enjoy.
Hence, it is only logical that the German Federal Constitutional Court recently decided to intervene. Very soon it will have to render a judgement that will be of fundamental importance for the further development of European jurisdiction, since it concerns the question of whether the excessive legal practice of the ECJ should in future once again be subject to stricter controls by the German Federal Constitutional Court, or whether the Federal Constitutional Court should resign once and for all from its watchdog position."
The authors take exception to the judgment of the Court of Justice in Case C-144/04 Werner Mangold v. Rüdiger Helm. That judgment was handed down a while ago on November 22nd 2005.
Read the whole article and make up your own minds. Read also the judgment in Case C-144/04 and decide for yourselves if the judgment is as broad as the authors of the article aver.

References: §1
 §1
 §1
 §1
 v. 
 v.