Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&amp;view=article&amp;id=40400:g-r-no-140863-august-22,-2000-solar-team-entertainment,-et-al-v-rolando-how,-et-al&amp;catid=1396&amp;Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 21:49:43+00:00

Document:
SOLAR TEAM ENTERTAINMENT, INC. and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioners, v. HON. ROLANDO HOW, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court Branch 257 of Parañaque and MA. FE F. BARREIRO, Respondents.
The question raised in this instant petition for certiorari and mandamus is whether or not the trial court can indefinitely suspend the arraignment of the accused until the petition for review with the Secretary of Justice (SOJ) has been resolved.
The facts of this case are not disputed.
Before the scheduled arraignment of private respondent on August 5, 1999 could take place, respondent court issued an Order 3 dated June 29, 1999, resetting the arraignment of private respondent on September 2, 1999 on the ground that private respondent had "filed an appeal with the Department of Justice (DOJ)." 4 Private respondent manifested in the same Order that she would submit a certification from the DOJ granting due course to her appeal on or before the second scheduled arraignment. 5 On September 24, 1999, respondent court issued an Order 6 denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the order that previously reset the arraignment of private Respondent. Said order further rescheduled the arraignment of private’ respondent to November 18, 1999.
Petitioner is convinced that the twin orders further delaying the arraignment of private respondent and denying the motion for reconsideration of petitioner violate Section 7, of the Speedy Trial Act of 1998 (RA 8493) and Section 12, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.
By issuing the assailed order, respondent court allegedly committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack/excess of jurisdiction. 16 Hence, this petition for certiorari and mandamus to nullify and set aside the order of respondent court dated November 15, 1999.
"Decisions or resolutions of prosecutors are subject to appeal to the secretary of justice who, under the Revised Administrative Code, 23 exercises the power of direct control and supervision over said prosecutors; and who may thus affirm, nullify, reverse or modify their rulings.
‘Section 3. . . . .
Procedurally speaking, after the filing of the information, the court is in complete control of the case and any disposition therein is subject to its sound discretion. 25 The decision to suspend arraignment to await the resolution of an appeal with the Secretary of Justice is an exercise of such discretion. Consistent with our ruling in Marcelo, 26 we have since then held in a number of cases that a court can defer to the authority of the prosecution arm to resolve, once and for all, the issue of whether or not sufficient ground existed to file the information. 27 This is in line with our general pronouncement in Crespo 28 that courts cannot interfere with the prosecutor’s discretion over criminal prosecution. 29 Thus, public respondent did not act with grave abuse of discretion when it suspended the arraignment of private respondent to await the resolution of her petition for review with the Secretary of Justice.
Petitioner insists that in view of the passage of the Speedy Trial Act of 1998, the review authority of the Secretary of Justice after an information has been already filed in court may possibly transgress the right of a party to a speedy disposition of his case, in light of the mandatory tenor of the Speedy Trial Act of 1998 requiring that the accused must be arraigned within thirty (30) days from the filing of an information against him. Petitioner then impresses upon this Court that there is a need to reconcile the review authority of the Secretary of Justice and the Speedy Trial Act of 1998, and submits that "the Secretary of Justice must review the appeal and rule thereon within a period of thirty (30) days from the date the information was filed or from the date the accused appeared in court (surrendered or arrested)" 36 if only to give meaning to the Speedy Trial Act.
We are not persuaded. The authority of the Secretary of Justice to review resolutions of his subordinates even after an information has already been filed in court does not present an irreconcilable conflict with the thirty- day period prescribed by Section 7 of the Speedy Trial Act.
The fact that public respondent issued the assailed order suspending the arraignment of private respondent before the "Motion to Defer Arraignment" of private respondent could be heard is not tantamount to grave abuse of discretion. It was well within the power of public respondent to grant the continuance since Section 10(f) of the Speedy Trial Act of 1998 clearly confers this authority.
(a)	The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition which effectively renders him unable to fully understand the case against him and to plead intelligently thereto. In such case, the court shall order his mental examination and, if necessary, his confinement for such purpose.
1.	ANNEX "G" ; Rollo, p. 53.
2.	ANNEX "C-1" ; Rollo, p. 24.
3.	ANNEX "K" ; Rollo, p.71.
6.	ANNEX "P" ; Rollo, p. 84.
7.	ANNEX "Q" ; Rollo, p. 86.
8.	ANNEX "A" ; Rollo, p. 21.
10.	ANNEX "B" ; Rollo, p. 22.
18.	235 SCRA 39 (1994).
19.	254 SCRA 307 (1996).
20.	151 SCRA 462 (1987).
21.	Dimatulac v. Villon, 297 SCRA 679 (1998), pp. 709-710.
22.	278 SCRA 656 (1997).
23.	The 1987 Revised Administrative Code, Executive Order No 292.
24.	Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, supra note 22, pp. 676-678.
25.	Dimatulac v. Villon, supra note 21, p.712.
27.	Venus v. Desierto, 298 SCRA 196 (1998); and Dimatulac v. Villon, supra note 21.
29.	Venus v. Desierto, supra note 27, p. 214.
30.	See Bonifacio v. Tolentino, 139 SCRA 307 (1985) and Dimatulac v. Villon, supra note 21.
33.	Dimatulac v. Villon, supra note 21, p. 712.
34.	Venus v. Desierto, supra note 27, p. 220.
35.	Perez v. Hagonoy Rural Bank, Inc., G.R. No. 126210, March 9, 2000.
37.	JOAQUIN G. BERNAS, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, A COMMENTARY, Vol. 1, (1987), p. 421.
38.	Dansal v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 126814 March 2, 2000 - 39.	Dimatulac v. Villon, supra note 21; pp. 707-708.
40.	BERNAS, supra note 37, p. 388.
"Sec. 4.	Non-Appealable Cases: Exceptions. — No appeal may be taken from a resolution of the Chief State Prosecutor finding probable cause except upon showing of manifest error or grave abuse of discretion. Notwithstanding the showing of manifest error or grave abuse of discretion, no appeal shall be entertained where the appellant had already been arraigned. If the appellant is arraigned during the pendency of the appeal, said appellant said appeal shall be dismissed motu propio by the Secretary of Justice.
42.	Dimatulac v. Villon, supra note 21, p. 709.
43.	Supra note 18, p. 50.
46.	Supra note 6; p. 85.
48.	Supra note 10, p. 22.
50.	Memorandum Circular No. 12 also prescribes that the period for the disposition of Motions for Reconsideration on Denial of Due Course and Motions for Reconsideration on Extended Resolutions shall be ten (10) days and fifteen (15) days, respectively.
51.	Cabral v. Puno, 70 SCRA 606 (1976), p. 610.
52.	FLORENZ D. REGALADO, REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM, VOL. II, 7TH REV. ED., p. 236.
53.	See Bonifacio v. Tolentino, supra note 30 and Dimatulac v. Villon, supra note 21.

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.