Source: https://apanewslaw.wordpress.com/category/worthy-of-a-review/
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 01:00:02+00:00

Document:
A Provincial Court Judge in Newfoundland and Labrador has conducted an extensive review of cases that address the issue of restraint of in-custody accused in court. In R. v. Kalleo  N.J. No. 57, the accused faced charges of assaulting her domestic partner and for breaches of court orders. At the time of trial, she was in custody and had been denied bail. RCMP brought the accused to court in handcuffs and leg shackles. Defence counsel objected. From 2006 until February 2015, RCMP practice in Nain was to bring in-custody accused to court in leg shackles only. The new practice arose after police brought two male prisoners in both leg shackles and handcuffs. A police witness testified that the policy was necessary for security reasons given the layout of the courtroom exits and the fact that only one officer was available for court. The police witness testified that the practice was consistent with unwritten RCMP policy to keep all in-custody prisoners in handcuffs during all aspects of court proceedings to safeguard against escape attempts. Defence counsel submitted that the RCMP policy was not based on any kind of risk assessment of the accused. The Judge allowed defence’s objection.
(a) The defendant was entitled to maintain her dignity in the context of the presumption of innocence unless there was a valid reason for the use of restraints on her.
(b) In balancing the need for safety of all persons in the courtroom and the prevention of escape against the need to maintain the dignity of the defendant in the context of the presumption of innocence, the views and expertise of the security personnel must be given considerable weight. Deference to the opinions of the security personnel is inappropriate. The issue of restraint is a matter of judicial determination.
(c) This Court has no authority over security measures outside the courtroom but can provide guiding directions on security measures which may impact directly on the ability of the court to receive evidence and decide the issue of liberty and on the propriety and dignity of the proceeding when the court is in session.
(d) There is no onus or burden of proof on either party. A practical approach considering the context of the case and evidence before the court will assist the court in using its discretion in determining security issues.
(e) When the issue of restraints is raised, be it by the Crown, defence or the Court itself, a hearing is required.
(f) Restraints in a courtroom should be the exception not the rule.
(g) The use of restraints must be decided on a case-by-case basis.
(h) The unnecessary use of handcuffs constitutes a civil assault.
(i) This Court can set its own guidelines on procedures surrounding the defendant being brought into the courtroom in restraints.
(j) Provincial statutes, including the Ontario Police Services Act do not supercede the Court’s authority to determine the issue of restraints.
They [Magistrates], not the gaoler, must decide whether a prisoner should be handcuffed in court. No prisoner should be handcuffed in court unless there are reasonable grounds for the apprehending that he will be violent or will attempt to escape. If an application is made that a prisoner should be handcuffed, the magistrate must entertain it.
(4) A judicial decision is required to determine the issue.
Other decisions, such as R. v. Smith,  O.J. No. 3671, R. v. McArthur,  O.J. No. 2974, and R. v. Brown,  OJ No 4682, also ruled that a blanket policy to have all prisoners appear in court in restraints was not lawful. Recently, in R. v. Fortuin, 2015 ONCJ 116, Justice Schreck in six paragraphs confirmed, yet again, that it is against the law for police or sheriff’s officers to present in-custody accused in restraints of any kind, whether leg shackles, handcuffs, or other restraint.
lest there should be any doubt in this particular case, a blanket policy of presenting in-custody accused in leg shackles and handcuffs into court is illegal, may amount to a civil assault, and give rise to an award of damages. The person may also have other remedies under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
I recently had the opportunity (or misfortune, depending upon how you want to look at it) to spend some time with a number of nurses that were visiting my wife. Over time, as in most cases, the topic of the evening came around to “shop-talk”. I was surprised when a few of the nurses asked me to what extent we (police) can ask them personal and medical information of a patient in their care, the same person currently under investigation by us (e.g. impaired driving investigation). I was equally surprised when they said they often feel obligated to tell the officer the information, although they know there are privacy concerns.
I summed it up by saying that just because we get the information (from them), it does not mean we are legally entitled to have it. This years police cadets have heard me say this phrase on numerous occasions during our sessions on search and seizure this year. I am surprised that experienced officers are still taking the risks associated with asking information where there is a reasonable expectation of privacy and expect to use this information to form grounds for a breath or blood demand, or in a warrant application. I would hate to be the officer on the witness stand when defence counsel alludes, even in the slightest, that the information was illegally obtained and suggests that the officer used this information to formulate reasonable grounds.
This is not a new issue by any stretch of the imagination, and given the volumes of case law that have followed since, it warrants a quick review if this practice is still occurring. I will touch on one case that most others have cited since then.
R. v. Dersch  S.C.J. No. 116 – the accused was charged with criminal negligence causing death and bodily harm and having the care and control of a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol or drugs and thereby causing death and bodily harm. The motor vehicle he was operating had crossed the centre dividing line of a highway and collided head-on with another vehicle. The driver of the other vehicle was killed and three other persons, including the accused, were injured. A police officer at the accident scene observed a smell of alcohol from the accused and noticed that his eyes were glassy and bloodshot. The accused was taken to a hospital. The doctor who examined him attempted to insert an intravenous line into the accused’s arm, but the accused objected in strong language and refused to have a blood sample taken under any circumstances. The doctor requested the assistance of a surgeon present, who took a blood sample while the accused was unconscious, for medical reasons. One vial of the blood was used for a blood alcohol test. When the accused was subsequently asked by the police officer who had accompanied him to the hospital to provide a blood sample, he refused. In response to a written request by police, the doctor prepared a medical report which included the results of the blood alcohol test. A search warrant was later issued for the blood sample taken. The blood sample and blood alcohol test results were ruled admissible at the accused’s trial following a voir dire and the accused was convicted on all four counts. The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions. Defence appealed to the SCC, who allowed the appeal and directed a new trial.
Participation in the emergency treatment of the accused did not in itself render the physicians agents of government for the purposes of s. 32 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, nor were they acting as agents of government in taking the blood sample in this case solely for medical purposes. It is nonetheless clear that some of the physicians’ conduct was wrong. The blood sample taken despite the accused’s unequivocal instruction to the contrary was improper, and the provision to the police of specific medical information about the accused without his consent violated the doctor’s common law duty of confidentiality to the accused. Since the accused had a reasonable expectation of privacy in respect of the information revealed, the obtaining of that information by the police in the circumstances is analogous to a search or a seizure within the meaning of s. 8 of the Charter. The information was obtained without a warrant, rendering the search by the police prima facie unreasonable, and the Crown has not satisfied the burden of rebutting this presumption of unreasonableness. It has not been demonstrated that there is any basis in statute or under the common law for this search and seizure, nor was there any emergency in the sense of the evidence being in danger of being destroyed if the time were taken to obtain a warrant. In view of this conclusion, it is not necessary to determine whether there was also a violation of the accused’s rights under s. 7 of the Charter. Since it has not been established that there is any basis under statute or the common law for the conduct of the police, that conduct cannot be said to be “prescribed by law” within the meaning of s. 1 and therefore cannot be justified thereunder.
The net result of the Charter violation by police in this case was to take advantage of the physicians’ improper conduct in taking the blood sample contrary to the patient’s specific instructions. When this factor is considered together with the seriousness of the Charter violation and the importance of guarding against a free exchange of information between health care professionals and police, the impugned evidence should be excluded pursuant to s. 24(2) of the Charter. In the absence of the evidence of the accused’s blood alcohol level, there is no evidence sufficient to sustain convictions on the care and control charges, which should be dismissed. While there remains evidence to support the criminal negligence charges, this is not an appropriate case in which to apply the curative provision, and a new trial is directed.
In short, why obtain information illegally from the nurse or doctor; we obviously cannot use this information to formulate reasonable grounds for a demand or in a search warrant application? Getting the information in this way opens us up to attack from defence counsel and runs the high risk of losing the case. We have to get our grounds legally, which is not often the easiest route, but having a reason for doing something does not make that thing reasonable (or legal) to do in all cases.
A recent case, R. v. Day 2014 NLCA 14, out of the Newfoundland and Labrador Supreme Court – Court of Appeal, has prompted me to post a summary of some judicial decisions that may be of interest to the officers that handle informants (human sources) and then use that information to formulate reasonable grounds to arrest the suspect. I won’t get into the facts of the case; instead I will discuss the points and issues that were brought up in the appeal that are of importance to us in the field.
I am of the view that such a mere conclusory statement made by an informer to a police officer would not constitute reasonable grounds for conducting a warrantless search. … Highly relevant … are whether the informer’s ‘tip’ contains sufficient detail to ensure that it is based on more than mere rumour or gossip, whether the informer discloses his or her source or means of knowledge and whether there are any indicia of his or her reliability, such as the supplying of reliable information in the past or confirmation of part of his or her story by police surveillance.
“[t]he reliability of the tip is to be assessed by recourse to ‘the totality of the circumstances'”, and said “[t]here is no formulaic test as to what this entails. Rather, a court must look to a variety of factors including: 1) the degree of detail of the ‘tip’, 2) the informer’s source of knowledge, and 3) indicia of the tipster’s reliability”.
Debot directs that police must attempt to confirm details in an informant’s tip. However, in doing so, the court said it is not necessary to confirm each and every detail, although the level of verification required may be higher in cases where the informant’s own credibility cannot be assessed (page 1172). Both Garofoli (paragraph 67) and Debot (pages 1168 to 1171) stressed that the credibility of the informant and the source of his or her information are very important.
The proper test is twofold: (1) did the police officer, from a subjective perspective, have reasonable and probable grounds for arresting [the accused], and (2) could a reasonable person in the position of the officer conclude there were reasonable and probable grounds for the arrest?
The Crown has conceded that what the police had was insufficient to properly obtain a search warrant for Mr. Day’s residence. They now assert it was sufficient to arrest him. Must not the grounds for laying hands on a citizen, hand cuffing, searching and confining him be greater than for entering his house? Must they not at least be equal? I would say “yes”.
There you have it. Some things to consider if you are basing your RGs (or RPGs for the older officers out there) to arrest based upon source information.

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