Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/352/220/
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 10:47:38+00:00

Document:
Petitioner filed a petitory action in a Louisiana state court against respondent mineral lessees of the United States, seeking to have itself declared owner of the mineral rights under land owned by the United States, and an accounting for oil and other minerals removed by respondent lessees under their lease from the United States. Petitioner's claim was founded on a Louisiana statute which allegedly made "imprescriptible" a reservation of mineral rights in a deed to the United States by its predecessor in title. The United States then brought suit against petitioner and other interested parties in the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana to quiet title in the mineral rights and for a preliminary injunction to restrain petitioner from prosecuting its action in the state court. The District Court issued the injunction, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
1. 28 U.S.C. § 2283, which restricts the granting of injunctions by federal courts to stay proceedings in state courts, is inapplicable to stays sought by the United States. Pp. 352 U. S. 224-226.
2. In the circumstances of this case, the granting of the injunction was proper. United States v. Bank of New York Trust Co., 296 U. S. 463, distinguished. Pp. 352 U. S. 226-228.
3. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is modified to permit an interpretation of the state statute to be sought with every expedition in the state court. Pp. 352 U. S. 228-230.
224 F.2d 381 modified and affirmed.
Respondent lessees filed exceptions in the state court proceedings, urging that, under Louisiana law, the lessor should be made a party and the lessees discharged from the suit, that this was essentially a suit against the United States, which had not consented to be sued, that the United States was an indispensable party, and that no cause of action had been stated. The state trial court found that a cause of action had been stated, and it overruled the exceptions.
suit in the District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana to quiet title to the mineral rights; it also sought a preliminary injunction to restrain petitioner from prosecuting its action in the state court. The United States based its claim of ownership on the provision in the 1938 deed from petitioner's predecessor in title that the reservation of mineral rights would expire on April 1, 1945, subject to certain conditions not material to this case. The United States claimed that irreparable injury in the form of loss of royalties would result from any temporary, wrongful dispossession of its lessees by the state court proceedings. Affidavits were also submitted in support of the claim that permanent loss of wells currently producing oil would probably result from any temporary cessation of production. The petitioner moved to dismiss the United States' complaint on the ground that the state court had already assumed jurisdiction over the property in question; in the alternative, petitioner moved to stay the federal proceedings pending determination of the state court action because questions of state law were involved.
"the district court under the clear provisions of the statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1345, became vested with exclusive jurisdiction to determine the title of the United States to the mineral rights claimed by appellant."
more difficult than the Government appears to have found them, we granted certiorari. 350 U.S. 964.
It must first be decided whether this section applies to stays sought by the United States, because different answers to this question will put different aspects on other issues in the case. An analogous problem was presented in United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U. S. 258, where the Court held that the provisions of the Norris-La Guardia Act, 47 Stat. 70, 29 U.S.C. § 101, that no federal court had jurisdiction, subject to qualifications, to issue an injunction in labor disputes to prohibit certain acts, did not apply to the United States. The Norris-La Guardia Act, like 28 U.S.C. § 2283, effected, in general language, a limitation on the jurisdiction of the federal courts. Furthermore, since it was largely the diversity jurisdiction which spawned the substantive problems that the Norris-La Guardia Act removed from the federal courts, the limitations on the federal courts imposed by the Norris-La Guardia Act, like those of 28 U.S.C. § 2283, were in an area of federal-state relations calling for particular circumspection in adjudication.
"that statutes which in general terms divest preexisting rights or privileges will not be applied to the sovereign without express words to that effect."
330 U.S. at 330 U. S. 272.
While, strictly speaking, any "preexisting" rights would have to be found in the 1789-1793 pre-statute period, [Footnote 2] the rationale of the rule requires not that the rights be "preexisting," but rather that they would exist apart from the statute. There can be no doubt, apart from the restrictions of 28 U.S.C. § 2283, of the right of the United States to enjoin state court proceedings whenever the prerequisites for relief by way of injunction be present. Treating the rule invoked in the United Mine Workers case merely as an aid to construction, it would, by itself, lead us to hold that the general language of 28 U.S.C. § 2283 did not apply to the United States in the absence of countervailing considerations such as significant legislative history pointing toward its inclusion or inferences clearly to be drawn from relevant presuppositions for so including it.
suit to try title into a suit for possession, or might merely order respondent lessees to account for minerals removed, nevertheless such proceedings could not settle the basic issue in the litigation, and might well cause confusion if they resulted in a judgment inconsistent with that subsequently rendered by the federal court.
Petitioner relies heavily on United States v. Bank of New York & Trust Co., 296 U. S. 463. There, in a federal district court proceeding, the United States was claiming by assignment certain funds of three Russian insurance companies that were being held in the custody of a state court, in connection with the liquidation of the companies, subject to court orders concerning distribution to claimants under the state insurance laws. On the basis of this claim, the United States sought to enjoin distribution of the funds, and to require payment of them to it. This Court, affirming dismissal of the complaints and denial of the injunction, held that the state court had obtained jurisdiction over the funds first, and that the litigation should be resolved in that court. The Court also noted that there were numerous other claimants, indispensable parties, who had not been made parties to the federal court suit. In remitting the United States to the state court, the Court saw no "impairment of any rights" of the United States or "any sacrifice of its proper dignity as a sovereign." Id. at 296 U. S. 480-481.
persons holding under the United States; the United States is seeking to protect that possession and quiet title by a federal court proceeding. Therefore, since the position of the United States is essentially a defensive one, we think that it should be permitted to choose the forum in this case, even though the state litigation has the elements of an action characterized as quasi in rem. We therefore hold that the District Court properly exercised its jurisdiction to entertain the suit in the federal court and to prevent the effectuation of state court proceedings that might conflict with the ultimate federal court judgment.
"Moreover, if the state court suit is allowed to proceed to final judgment, the rights of the United States to the property in question will actually be determined 'behind its back' . . . for the reason that, since ownership of these mineral rights will turn on an interpretation of a state statute . . . , this court and the appellate federal courts may be required, under Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, to follow that judgment in spite of the fact that the United States is not a party to those proceedings. . . ."
and more intertwined with preliminary doubts about local law, we have insisted that federal courts do not decide questions of constitutionality on the basis of preliminary guesses regarding local law."
Spector Motor Service v. McLaughlin, 323 U. S. 101, 323 U. S. 105; see Stainback v. Mo Hock Ke Lok Po, 336 U. S. 368, 336 U. S. 383; Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U. S. 496, 312 U. S. 498-502.
questions of state law that are not subject to overriding federal law.
We therefore modify the judgment of the Court of Appeals to permit an interpretation of the state statute to be sought with every expedition in the state court in conformity with this opinion.
"The Vendor reserves from this sale the right to mine and remove, or to grant to others the right to mine and remove, all oil, gas, and other valuable minerals which may be deposited in or under said lands, and to remove any oil, gas, or other valuable minerals from the premises; the right to enter upon said lands at any time for the purpose of mining and removing said oil, gas, and minerals, said right, subject to the conditions hereinafter set forth, to expire April 1, 1945, it being understood, however, that the vendors will pay to the United States of America 5% of the gross proceeds received by them as royalties or otherwise from all oil or minerals so removed from in or under the aforedescribed lands until such time as the vendors shall have paid to the United States of America, the sum of $25,000, being the purchase price paid by said United States of America for the aforedescribed properties."
"Provided that, at the termination of the ten (10) year period of reservation, if not extended, or at the termination of any extended period in case the operation has not been carried on for the number of days stated, the right to mine shall terminate, and complete fee in the land become vested in the United States."
"The reservation of the oil and mineral rights herein made for the original period of ten (10) years and for any extended period or periods in accordance with the above provisions shall not be affected by any subsequent conveyance of all or any of the aforementioned properties by the United States of America, but said mineral rights shall, subject to the conditions above . . . set forth, remain vested in the vendors."
". . . when land is acquired by conventional deed or contract, condemnation or expropriation proceedings by the United States of America, or any of its subdivisions or agencies, from any person, firm or corporation, and by the act of acquisition, verdict or judgment, oil, gas, and/or other minerals or royalties are reserved, or the land so acquired is by the act of acquisition conveyed subject to a prior sale or reservation of oil, gas and/or other minerals or royalties, still in force and effect, said rights so reserved or previously sold shall be imprescriptible."
See also the prior Act No. 151 of 1938 providing that prescription should not run against a reservation of mineral rights in real estate acquired by the United States or the State of Louisiana.
The basic provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2283 go back to 1793, 1 Stat. 335.
Most of the lower federal courts that have considered this problem have, without much discussion, reached the same result. E.g., United States v. Taylor's Oak Ridge Corp., 89 F.Supp. 28; United States v. Cain, 72 F.Supp. 897; United States v. Phillips, 33 F.Supp. 261, reversed on other grounds, 312 U. S. 312 U.S. 246; United States v. McIntosh, 57 F.2d 573; United States v. Babcock, 6 F.2d 160, reversed for modification, 9 F.2d 905; United States v. Inaba, 291 F. 416. But see United States v. Land Title Bank & Trust Co., 90 F.2d 970; United States v. Certain Parcels of Land, 62 F.Supp. 1017, appeal dismissed by stipulation, 151 F.2d 1022.
I agree that the state action was properly enjoined, and so I concur in the opinion of the Court to that extent. But I dissent from the direction to the District Court to hold the case while the parties repair to the state court to get an interpretation of the Louisiana statute around which this litigation turns.
That procedure is an advisable one where private parties question the constitutionality of a state statute. An authoritative construction of the state law may avoid the constitutional issue or put it in new perspective. See Spector Motor Service v. McLaughlin, 323 U. S. 101, 323 U. S. 104-105. In the Spector case, the plaintiff's claim was within the jurisdiction of the federal court solely because of the attack on the constitutionality of a state statute. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the federal district court has jurisdiction where the matter in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional amount "and arises under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States." In litigation in the federal courts under that statute, the necessity of construing state law arises because of the federal court's duty to avoid if possible a federal constitutional question. Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 213 U. S. 175. In the Spector case, then, matters of state law were only ancillary to the primary responsibility of the federal court to resolve the constitutional issues.
But here, although potential constitutional questions may lurk in the background, this litigation primarily concerns not federal questions, but title to land claimed by the United States. It is litigation which Congress, by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1345, 1346, has entrusted to the federal district court. Those sections allow civil litigation of the United States -- whether it involves federal or state law questions -- to be conducted in the federal courts. In that situation, it is the duty of the federal court to decide all issues in the case -- those turning on state law as well as those turning on federal law. In Meredith v. City of Winter Haven, 320 U. S. 228, a case in the federal courts by reason of diversity of citizenship, we refused to remit the parties to the state court for decision of difficult state law questions. We held that it was the duty of the federal court to decide all issues in the case -- state or federal, difficult or easy. And see Propper v. Clark, 337 U. S. 472. There have been exceptions to this policy, notably in bankruptcy proceedings where trustees are sometimes sent into state courts to obtain adjudications on local law questions pertinent to the administration of the bankrupt's estate. See Thompson v. Magnolia Co., 309 U. S. 478. It is peculiarly inappropriate to follow that course here. Congress has decided that the United States should have the benefit of the protection of its own courts in this type of litigation. We properly hold that the District Court, not the state court, has jurisdiction of the controversy. But we beat the devil around the bush when, having taken the litigation out of the state court, we send the parties back to the state court for its construction of Louisiana law which is the most significant issue in the case. The problem is not only to construe the state statute, but to construe it constitutionally. The federal court can make that construction as readily as the state court. That is the congressional scheme, and we should not change it by judicial fiat.

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