Source: https://www.lawfareblog.com/ninth-circuit-mostly-upholds-preliminary-injunction-hawaii-v-trump-overview
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 02:25:05+00:00

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Yesterday the U.S. Court of Appeals of the Ninth Circuit, in a per curiam opinion, affirmed in part a preliminary injunction against the Trump administration's revised travel ban issued by a federal district court in Hawaii v. Trump. The decision comes on the heels of the Fourth Circuit’s decision in IRAP v. Trump, which we summarized for Lawfare here. The government has appealed that decision to the Supreme Court.
Below we summarize the factual and procedural history of the case and judgment of the court. We then discuss the decision’s potential implications for Supreme Court review of the travel ban.
The court rests its holding on statutory limits to the President’s immigration powers. Although the court recognizes the President’s broad powers to control an alien’s entry to the country and to protect the nation, the court concludes that Trump exceeded the authority given him by Congress when he suspended the entry of 180 million nationals from six countries, suspended the entry of all refugees, and reduced the admission cap of refugees from 110,000 to 50,000 because he did not make a sufficient finding that their entry would be “detrimental to the interests of the United States.” The court also finds that the executive order is also incongruent with other INA provisions, including anti-discrimination provisions, and upheld the preliminary enjoining of most of Sections 2 and 6 of the order.
The court recounts the history of the first executive order and explains that its purported purpose was to “protect the American people from terrorist attacks by foreign nationals admitted to the United States.” The court then explains that the first order, having caused a great deal of uncertainty, sparked suits from the states of Washington and Minnesota, resulting in a preliminary injunction from a Washington district court on February 3, 2017. The government appealed to the Ninth Circuit the following day, but the court denied the emergency motion, finding that the states had alleged harms to their proprietary interests and had demonstrated a likelihood of success on their Due Process claim.
The second executive order took effect on March 16 and included a 90-day ban on travel from six countries (this time excluding Iraq), as well as a suspension of the Refugee Assistance Program for 120 days. This latter Section calls for a review of the current processes, reduces the number of admitted refugees from 110,000 to 50,000 for 2017, excludes the provision for a persecution-related exception, and provides for a discretionary case-by-case waiver. The court concludes by citing the Department of State’s 2015 Country Reports on Terrorism and noting that the government did not discuss any instances of domestic terrorism involving individuals from five of the six countries: Iran, Libya, Sudan, Syria, or Yemen.
Having filed a suit in district court in the wake of the first executive order (which was put on hold after the Ninth Circuit’s decision), the state of Hawaii filed an amended complaint after the second order was issued to protect “its residents, employers, its educational institutions, and its sovereignty.” Hawaii was joined by Dr. Elshikh, the imam of the Muslim Association of Hawaii, whose wife previously filed an I-130 Petition for Alien Relative on behalf of her mother, a Syrian national in Syria.
On March 15, 2017, the district court found that the plaintiffs showed a likelihood of success on the merits of their Establishment Clause claim, granted the TRO, and entered a nationwide injunction against Sections 2 and 6 of the revised executive order. On March 29, 2017, the TRO was converted to a preliminary injunction, with the district court rejecting the government’s request to narrow the scope of the injunction, concluding that both sections “ran afoul of the Establishment Clause and that the Government did not provide a workable framework for narrowing the scope of the enjoined conduct.” The government appealed on March 30, asking the court to vacate the preliminary injunction—or at least narrow the injunction—and to stay the injunction pending the appeal.
The district court decided the constitutional claim without expressing its views on the statutory claims. In light of the Supreme Court’s admonition against issuing “unnecessary constitutional rulings” (American Foreign Service Association v. Garfinkel), the Ninth Circuit takes the opposite tack, resting its decision on the statutory claim under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and declining to reach the Establishment Clause claim.
The court turns to the government’s justiciability challenge. In order to demonstrate standing, the plaintiffs must show: (1) an concrete and imminent injury in fact; (2) that the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged actions of the president; and (3) that the injury will be likely be redressed by a favorable decision.
The court begins with Dr. Elshikh, who asserted injury on the ground that the order prevented him from being reunited with his mother-in-law. The court agrees that the second executive order is a barrier to reunification with his mother-in-law. Briefly noting the Supreme Court’s decisions in Kerry v. Din and Kleindienst v. Mandel and its own decision in Cardenas v. United States, the court analogizes this case to Legal Assistance for Vietnamese Asylum Seekers v. Department of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs, a D.C. Circuit case which found that visa sponsors in the United States had standing to assert that the State Department’s refusal to process visa applications of Vietnamese citizens living in Hong Kong violated 8 U.S.C. § 1152. The court also determines that the fact that Elshikh’s mother-in-law’s visa application process was placed on hold when the first executive order came into effect constitutes evidence of concrete, real, and immediate harm. The court also determines that Dr. Elshikh established causation and redressability, since his injuries are traceable to the provisions of the executive order at issue.
The court then addresses Hawaii’s two theories of harm: harm to its proprietary interests and impairment of its sovereign interest. Because of the present impact on the university, the court determines that the state’s injury is concrete and imminent. The court rejects the government’s contention that the plaintiffs cannot rely on events that occurred after the filing of the complaint in order to establish standing, stating that the supplemental declaration that the state filed “merely provides greater detail regarding the students who may be unable to join the academic community this fall if EO2 takes effect.” As a result, the court determines that the state’s standing is grounded in its proprietary interests as the operator of the university, since students and faculty who are suspended from entry are deterred from studying or teaching and students who are unable to attend the university due to the travel restrictions in the executive order will not pay tuition or contribute to the diversity of the student body. The court determines that the order also impairs Hawaii’s sovereign interests in carrying out its refugee policies, as well as its ability to create and enforce its local laws that protect equal rights, prohibit discrimination, and fostering diversity.
The court determines that the plaintiffs “fall within the zone of interests protected by the law invoked,” per Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., because they have raised a statutory claim. As to Elshikh’s claim, the court explains that “[g]iven the nature and purpose of the statute [preservation of the family unit], the resident appellants fall well within the zone of interest Congress intended to protect.” As to Hawaii’s claim, the court concludes that “the State’s efforts to enroll students and hire faculty members who are nationals from the six designated countries fall within the zone of interests of the INA,” reasoning that “[t]he INA leaves no doubt that the State’s interests in student- and employment-based visa petitions for its students and faculty are related to the basic purposes of the INA.” The court also concludes that Hawaii’s interest in its refugee resettlement policies and programs also fall within the zone of interests protected by the INA. Thus all the plaintiffs’ injuries are “‘arguably within the zone of interests’ that the INA protects,” as per Bank of America Corp. v. City of Miami.
Whatever deference we accord to the President’s immigration and national security policy judgements does not preclude us from reviewing the policy at all. . . . We do not abdicate the judicial role, and we affirm our obligation ‘to say what the law is’ in this case.
To be granted a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff must establish that (1) they are likely to succeed on the merits; (2) they are likely to suffer irreparable harm absent relief; (3) that the balance of equities tips in their favor; and (4) that the injunction is in the public interest, all based on Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.
The court examines whether the second executive order violates certain provisions of the INA and the Refugee Act of 1980.
In a departure from its previous decision not to examine the basis upon which Trump based his authority (as Ben Wittes highlighted for Lawfare here), the court begins its examination of the merits by focusing on § 1182(f) of the INA. First, the court explains that Trump invoked the power delegated to him by Congress under § 1182(f) (suspension of entry) and § 1185(a) of the INA, but that he invoked neither section to suspend the travel of refuges and to suspend decisions on applications for refugees under Section 6(a) of the order. The court then points out that the language of the congressional grant of authority requires that the president make a finding that the entry of aliens into the United States would be detrimental to the interests of the United States, and proceeds to focus on the findings of Section 2(c).
The court explains that it rejects the first three reasons behind Section 2(c) (reducing investigative burdens; ensuring proper review and screening; and ensuring adequate standards to prevent infiltration by terrorists) because “[t]here is no finding that the present vetting standards are inadequate,” or that in the absence of improved ones there will be harm to national interests. The court then turns to the fourth reason (national security concerns), and also rejects this justification. The court, explaining that Section 1(d) lists country conditions as facilitating terrorism but does not identify the number of individuals in the six countries who have been convicted of terrorism-related crimes and citing to Judge Kennan’s concurrence in the Fourth Circuit’s decision in IRAP v. Trump, points out that the order “makes no finding that nationality alone renders entry of this broad class of individuals a heightened security risk to the United States.” The court, in a footnote, relies on tweets by President Trump to buttress its conclusion that the administration’s focus is on the listed countries, and not on the nationals of those countries, as threats.
Concluding that “national security is not a ‘talismanic incantation’” that can support any exercise of executive power, the court rules that the executive order has not met § 1182(f)’s requirements. The court also finds that the order “does not reveal any threat or harm to warrant suspension,” of the Refugee Assistance Program or that entry of refugees would be harmful, or that the present screening procedures are inadequate. Lastly, the court, relying on former President Barack Obama’s allowance of entry for 110,000 refugees, rules that the order does not provide any justification for only limiting the number to 50,000.
Next, the court explains that § 1157 of the Refugee Act of 1980 “contemplates that the President, after consultation with Congress, may increase the number of refugees admitted in the middle of fiscal year, but does not provide a mechanism for the President to decrease the number of refugees admitted mid-year” (emphasis original). The court concludes that this law was adopted later in time than § 1182(f) and that this provision is more specific than § 1182(f) based on the “appropriate consultation” language that requires a great deal of descriptive information about the proposed adjustment of entry numbers.
The court also acknowledges that the president’s authority here should be at its maximum under the tripartite framework set up by Justice Jackson’s concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, but that because his exercise of that power runs afoul of § 1152(a)(1)(A), § 1157, and § 1182(a)(3)(B), it is “incompatible with the express will of Congress.” The court therefore concludes that the plaintiffs have shown a likelihood of success on the merits on their nationality and refugee admission claims.
The court concludes that the record supports irreparable harm to the plaintiffs, based on harms such as “prolonged separation from family members, constraints to recruiting and attracting students and faculty members to the University of Hawaii, decreased tuition revenue, and the State’s inability to assist in refugee resettlement.” The court also concludes that the district court did not err in finding that the balance of competing claims of injury “tipped in the Plaintiffs’ favor,” because Trump did not make a “detrimentality finding” and because the government did not present evidence of injuries resulting from the injunction. Lastly, the court concludes that “the public interest is served by ‘curtailing unlawful executive action'” and that because the INA was intended to keep families together, it “should be construed in favor of family units and the acceptance of responsibility by family members.” Citing extensively to the amici briefs, the court then details all the harm that lifting the injunction would cause.
The court affirms in part and vacates in part the district court’s preliminary injunction and remands the case back to the district court to reissue an injunction consistent with its opinion.
For example, internal determinations regarding the necessary information for visa application adjudications do not have an obvious relationship to the constitutional rights at stake or statutory conflicts of issue here. Plaintiffs have not shown how the Government’s internal review of its vetting procedures will harm them.
Finally, like the Fourth Circuit in IRAP v. Trump, the Ninth Circuit panel vacates the injunction as it applies to the president but leaves it in place as it applies the rest of the named defendants (based on Franklin v. Massachusetts).
Now that the Ninth Circuit has reached largely the same conclusion as the Fourth Circuit in IRAP v. Trump, the plaintiffs in IRAP could argue that there is no need for Supreme Court review given that there is no split among the circuit courts. That said, the injunctions are of different scope and predicated on different legal grounds, which could prompt the Supreme Court to clarify these important questions of statutory and constitutional law.
Amira Mikhail is the co-founder and director of Eshhad, a nonprofit that is focused on the protection of religious and ethnic minorities in the Middle East. Amira has worked as a Non-Resident Fellow at the Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy (TIMEP) and as a legal fellow at Robert F. Kennedy Human Rights. She is a graduate of Washington College of Law at American University, where she worked with the UNROW Human Rights Impact Litigation Clinic, the Human Rights Brief, and as a research assistant to the Chairperson of the United Nations Committee against Torture. She has worked with the International Refugee Assistance Project and the International Justice Program at Human Rights Watch and has been published on a variety of legal and social issues relating to Egypt and the Middle East. After graduating from Covenant College, Amira worked for five years in Cairo, Egypt where she worked at the American University in Cairo. She has also worked in Jordan and India.

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