Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=83217:57202&catid=1585&Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 04:36:40+00:00

Document:
PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY, Petitioner, v. MILLARD R. OCAMPO, CIPRIANO REY R. HIPOLITO, ERIC F. MERJILLA AND JOSE R. CARANDANG, Respondents.
This Petition for Review on Certiorari2 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the Decision3 dated February 18, 2004 and the Resolution4 dated June 11, 2004 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 74990.
(2) The [RTC] of Manila, Branch 23, is hereby ORDERED to forward the records of the case to the [RTC] of Makati Branch 60, for proper consolidation thereof.
On November 29, 2002, the RTC proceeded to hear the Motion to Suppress, which was revived pursuant to the CA’s Decision dated July 13, 1998 in CA-G.R. SP No. 47265.36 But since respondents failed to appear and present evidence to substantiate their Motion, the RTC denied the Motion in open court and issued the corresponding Order37 to that effect.
Aggrieved, respondents elevated the case to the CA via a Petition for Certiorari,38 docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 74990, assailing the Orders dated July 11, 2002, October 10, 2002, and November 29, 2002.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is given due course. The assailed Orders dated November 29, 2002 and July 11, 2002 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Public respondent Presiding Judge is hereby ordered to grant [respondents’] application for subpoena duces tecum and to continue with the hearing on [respondents’] Motion to Suppress and Exclude Inadmissible Evidence Seized by the reception of evidence from both parties in support of or in opposition to said motion.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration45 but the CA denied the same in its Resolution46 dated June 11, 2004.
1. SAID ORDERS HAVE LONG BEEN FINAL AND EXECUTORY AND THE PERIOD FOR FILING A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI ASSAILING THESE ORDERS HAS ALREADY LAPSED. THUS, THE [CA] SHOULD NOT HAVE DISTURBED THE FIRST AND SECOND RTC ORDERS.
2. THE RTC-MAKATI PROPERLY DENIED THE APPLICATION FOR SUBPOENA AS THERE WAS NO PROPER GROUND FOR GRANTING THE SAME.
1. RESPONDENTS FAILED TO FILE A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE THIRD RTC ORDER WITHOUT CITING ANY JUSTIFIABLE REASON BEFORE FILING A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI QUESTIONING SAID ORDER.
2. DESPITE SEVERAL OPPORTUNITIES GRANTED TO THEM BY, AND REPEATED WARNINGS FROM, THE RTC-MAKATI, RESPONDENTS FAILED TO SUBSTANTIATE THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS.
3. THE ISSUES RAISED IN THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS ARE THE SAME ISSUES IN A MOTION TO QUASH WHICH HAVE ALREADY BEEN RULED UPON BY THE RTC-MANILA, A COURT OF COORDINATE JURISDICTION.
Stripped of the non-essentials, the core issue is whether the CA erred in giving due course to the Petition for Certiorari, and in subsequently granting the same despite evident procedural lapses.
Petitioner assails the propriety of the CA’s reversal of the Orders of the RTC, positing that in filing the Petition for Certiorari, respondents failed to observe procedural rules. First, no motion for reconsideration of the Order dated November 29, 2002, denying respondents’ Motion to Suppress, was filed prior to the filing of the Petition for Certiorari.48 Second, more than 60-days had lapsed from the time respondents were notified of the denial of their Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated July 11, 2002, which denied their application for subpoena duces tecum.49 Third, respondents failed to indicate the date they received the Orders dated July 11, 2002 and October 10, 2002.50 Given the foregoing procedural infirmities, petitioner contends the CA should not have entertained the Petition for Certiorari much more granted affirmative relief.
3) The Order dated November 29, 2002, denying respondents’ Motion to Suppress.
We shall first discuss the Orders dated July 11, 2002 and October 10, 2002.
In this case, respondents were notified of the denial of their Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated July 11, 2002, denying their application for subpoena duces tecum, on October 18, 2002.58 Accordingly, they had until December 17, 2002 within which to file a Petition for Certiorari with the CA. Records, however, show that it was only on January 20, 2003 that respondents filed their Petition for Certiorari to assail the Orders dated July 11, 2002 and October 10, 2002.59 Instead of admitting that more than 60 days had lapsed, respondents kept silent about it in their Petition for Certiorari. When petitioner brought up the issue, respondents’ reply60 was unresponsive. In fact, they did not even confirm or deny the alleged lapse of the 60-day period. Siding with respondent, the CA opted not to discuss the issue and resolved to reverse the Order dated July 11, 2002 on the ground that the granting of the subpoena duces tecum was necessary in order for respondents to substantiate their Motion to Suppress.
The CA’s reasoning, however, even if true, does not excuse respondents from complying with the 60-day period rule, especially since they have not offered any plausible justification for their non-compliance. In fact, their adamant refusal to admit the obvious truth as well as their deliberate attempt to hide this procedural lapse cannot be ignored. Leniency is given only to those deserving of it. In this case, respondents are not entitled to any because they intentionally omitted to indicate in their Petition for Certiorari the date they were notified of the Order dated October 10, 2002 in order to mislead the CA. Besides, relaxing the rule would not only be unfair and unjust but would also be prejudicial to petitioner, who had every right to believe that the Orders dated July 11, 2002 and October 10, 2002 had attained finality and may no longer be altered, modified, or reversed. As we have said, the 60-day limitation may be relaxed only for the most persuasive reasons and only in meritorious cases, which must be sufficiently shown by the party invoking liberality. Such is not the situation in this case.
In view of the foregoing, we find that the CA erred in giving due course to the Petition and in reversing the Orders dated July 11, 2002 and October 10, 2002, as they may no longer be disturbed, after having attained finality.
Certiorari should have been dismissed.
Jurisprudence consistently holds that the filing of a motion for reconsideration is a prerequisite to the institution of a petition for certiorari.61 Although this rule is subject to certain exceptions,62 none of which is present in this case.
Respondents admit that they failed to file a motion for reconsideration of the Order dated November 29, 2002 prior to filing the Petition for Certiorari. As an excuse, they alleged that their counsel verbally moved for a reconsideration of the denial of their Motion to Suppress, which the RTC flatly denied in open court. Such allegation, however, as aptly pointed out by petitioner,63 is not supported by the evidence as the Order dated November 29, 2002 made no mention of such fact.64 It is also unlikely for respondents’ counsel to have moved for a reconsideration of the said Order considering that, as stated in the Order, he appeared only after the hearings were over.65 Besides, the lower court should first be informed of its supposed error and be allowed to correct or rectify the same through a re-examination of the legal and factual aspects of the case, which could only be done by filing a motion for reconsideration of the assailed order.66 This respondents failed to do. Thus, in the absence of a motion for reconsideration, the CA erred in giving due course to the Petition and in reversing the Order dated November 29, 2002.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated February 18, 2004 and the Resolution dated June 11, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 74990 are hereby SET ASIDE. The Orders dated July 11, 2002, October 10, 2002 and November 29, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 60, in Criminal Case No. 96-1590, are hereby REINSTATED.
1Batugan v. Judge Balindong, 600 Phil. 518, 527 (2009).
3 CA rollo, pp. 429-436; penned by Associate Justice Sergio L. Pestaño and concurred in by Associate Justices Marina L. Buzon and Aurora S. Lagman.
4 Id. at 475-476; penned by Associate Justice Marina L. Buzon and concurred in by Associate Justices Eloy R. Bello, Jr. and Aurora S. Lagman.
8 CA rollo, p. 430.
9 Referred to as Emergency Monitoring Services in petitioner’s pleadings.
10 CA rollo, p. 430.
14 Then presided by Executive Judge William M. Bayhon; CA rollo, p. 430.
21 CA rollo, p. 430.
22 Id. at 431 and rollo, pp. 120-121; Order dated February 21, 1997; penned by Judge Pedro N. Laggui.
23 Id. at 431 and id. at 126-132; Order dated December 2, 1997; penned by Judge Pedro N. Laggui.
25 CA rollo, p. 431.
26Rollo, pp. 156-166; penned by Associate Justice Ramon A. Barcelona and concurred in by Associate Justices Jorge S. Imperial and Demetrio G. Demetria.
30 CA rollo, p. 431.
31Rollo, pp. 187-188; penned by Judge Marissa Macaraig-Guillen.
32 CA rollo, p. 431.
34 Id. at 213; penned by Judge Marissa Macaraig-Guillen.
35 See Order dated October 18, 2002; penned by Judge Marissa Macaraig-Guillen, id. at 215-216.
36 CA rollo, p. 431.
37Rollo, pp. 217-218; penned by Judge Marissa Macaraig-Guillen.
38 CA rollo, pp. 2-24.
46 CA rollo, pp. 475-476.
54 Section 4. When and where to file the petition. — The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days counted from the notice of the denial of the motion.
55Mallari v. Government Service Insurance System, G.R. No. 157659, 611 SCRA 32, 43, January 25, 2010.
56Prudential Guarantee and Assurance, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 480 Phil. 134,140 (2004).
58 See Order dated October 18, 2002, rollo, pp. 215-216.
59 CA rollo, p. 2.
61Novateknika Land Corporation v. Philippine National Bank, G.R. No. 194104, March 13, 2013, 693 SCRA 423, 432.
66Novateknika Land Corporation v. Philippine National Bank, supra note 61 at 433.
67Sea Power Shipping Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 412 Phil. 603, 611 (2001).
68Lazaro v. Court of Appeals, 386 Phil. 412, 414 and 417 (2000) and Pinakamasarap Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, 534 Phil. 222, 232 (2006).
69Barcenas v. Sps. Anastacio Tomas, 494 Phil. 565, 575 (2005).

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