Source: https://www.ptab.us/2014/
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 08:16:00+00:00

Document:
If a Notice of Appeal is filed prior to January 23, 2012, then the 2004 version of the Board Rules last published in the 2011 edition of Title 37 of the Code of Federal Regulations (37 C.F.R. § 41.1 et seq.) applies to the appeal. See also Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP) 8th ed., Rev. 8, July 2010.
Whether the best mode requirement has been satisfied is a question of fact. Bayer AG v. Schein Pharms., Inc., 301 F.3d 1306, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Two specific factual questions must be answered to determine whether there has been a violation of the best mode requirement: The first is whether, at the time of filing the patent application, the inventor had a best mode of practicing the claimed invention—a subjective question. The second is whether, assuming the inventor had a preference for one mode over all others, the inventor objectively concealed his preferred mode from the public. See Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
See also Engel Indus., Inc. v. Lockformer Co., 946 F.2d 1528, 1531 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“invalidity for failure to set forth the best mode requires that (1) the inventors knew of a better mode of carrying out the claimed invention than they disclosed in the specification, and (2) the inventors concealed that better mode.”) .
We refer to a case on point, Takeda Pharmaceutical Co. v. Zydus Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., 743 F.3d 1359, 1366-1367 (Fed. Cir. 2014), wherein the Court determined that because there was no evidence that the differences between techniques used in measuring were in fact significant, and because there is evidence of a correlation for the results between techniques used, that the claims were not indefinite.
Appellant challenges the Examiner’s determination that “a set of rules qualifies as an abstract idea.” Br. 6 (citing Research Corp. Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859 (Fed. Cir. 2010)). See also id. at 8 (arguing that “the Examiner has not identified clearly what the ‘abstract idea’ is” and that “[g]ame rules are submitted to be concrete, rather than abstract, because game rules set out how the game is to be played by all of the players.”).
Appellant argues that the Examiner’s admission that the method of claim 1 sets out physical steps and the Examiner’s determination that claim 1 is claiming an abstract idea are contradictory. Br. 4. See also id. at 8 (arguing that because claim 1 contains physical steps, this should end the inquiry into whether claim 1 claims an abstract idea). We find no contradiction in the determination that a method claim which includes physical steps is wholly directed to a patent ineligible abstract idea. See, e.g., In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835, 840 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“The presence of a physical step in the claim to derive data for the algorithm will not render the claim statutory.”). Further, we agree with the Examiner that the claimed physical method steps are not tied to a particular machine and do not transform the cards into a different state or thing.
see also Par Pharmaceutical, Inc. v. TWI Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 2014 WL 6782649 at *6 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 3, 2014 ) (“We have, however, also explained that the use of inherency, a doctrine originally rooted in anticipation, must be carefully circumscribed in the context of obviousness. See, e.g., In re Rijckaert, 9 F.3d 1531, 1533–34 (Fed.Cir. 1993) (“The mere fact that a certain thing may result from a given set of circumstances is not sufficient [to establish inherency].” (internal quotation omitted)).
The mixed statutory classes of invention make it so that “a manufacturer or seller of the claimed apparatus would not know from the claim whether it might also be liable for contributory infringement because a buyer or user of the apparatus later performs the claimed method of using the apparatus.” IPXL Holdings, L.L.C. v Amazon.com, Inc., 430 F.3d 1377, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2005)(citing Ex parte Lyell, 17 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1548 (1990) and MPEP § 2173.05(p)(II) (1999)).
It is well established that a patentable invention may lie in the discovery of the source of a problem, even though the remedy may be obvious once the source of the problem is identified. See, e.g., In re Nomiya, 509 F.2d 566, 572 (CCPA 1975).
We also disagree with the Examiner’s treatment of the claimed functional language for the analyzing unit as merely an intended use that “does not differentiate the claimed apparatus from a prior art apparatus satisfying the claimed structural limitations” (Ans. 6). We consider the claimed “analyzing unit” to be akin to a processor programmed to perform the particular function of determining the direction of the capsule. When the functional language of a claim is associated with programming or some other structure required to perform the function, that programming or structure must be present in order to meet the claim limitation. See Typhoon Touch Techs., Inc. v. Dell, Inc., 659 F.3d 1376, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2011); see also Vizio, Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm’n, 605 F.3d 1330, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“[T]he ‘for decoding’ language . . . is properly construed as a limitation, and not merely a statement of purpose or intended use for the invention, because ‘decoding’ is the essence or a fundamental characteristic of the claimed invention.”).
“An examination for unexpected results is a factual, evidentiary inquiry . . . .” In re Mayne, 104 F.3d 1339, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
Furthermore, the artisan is not compelled to blindly follow the teaching of one prior art reference over the other without the exercise of independent judgment (See Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 733 F.2d 881, 889 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).

References: § 41
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 2173
 v. 
 v. 
 v.