Source: http://masscases.com/cases/sjc/369/369mass125.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 20:28:44+00:00

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DAVID C. KATZ vs. SOPHIA KORONCHIK & others. (and two companion cases [Note 1]).
Present: TAURO, C.J., REARDON, HENNESSEY, BRAUCHER, KAPLAN, & WILKINS, JJ.
TWO PETITIONS filed in the Probate Court for the county of Berkshire on June 13, 1973, and July 17, 1973, respectively.
BILL IN EQUITY filed in the Probate Court for the county of Berkshire on September 10, 1973.
The proceedings were heard by Nuciforo, J.
Clement A. Ferris for the respondents.
David C. Katz, pro se.
natural kindred, applies to a person adopted before that amendment went into effect. We conclude that G. L. c. 210, Section 7, as amended in 1967, applies to a previously adopted child and that such an adopted child may not inherit from a natural relative who died after 1967.
When Andre Tremblay (Andre) was adopted on March 25, 1966, he was entitled to inherit as an intestate heir from or through a natural parent. See G. L. c. 210, Section 7, as then most recently amended by St. 1965, c. 252, which provided that a "person shall not by adoption lose his right to inherit from his natural parents or kindred" (emphasis supplied). In 1967, G. L. c. 210, Section 7, was amended by deleting the word "not" in the phrase quoted above so that an adopted child would lose his right to inherit from his natural parents or kindred. St. 1967, c. 114. In 1973, a sister of Andre's deceased natural father died intestate. The question is whether Andre, who would be her sole heir at law but for the adoption, may inherit from his natural aunt. If not, the respondent Anna Koronchik, a cousin of the deceased aunt, will take as her only heir at law. Put in other words, the question is whether the 1967 amendment of G. L. c. 210, Section 7, applies only to persons adopted on and after its effective date so as to bar only that class of adopted persons from inheriting from natural parents and kindred.
G. L. c. 210, Section 7, as amended on the date of the natural aunt's death in 1973, bars Andre from inheriting from her.
The application of the 1967 amendment of Section 7 to prospective, intestate inheritances by persons previously adopted raises no significant constitutional question. Much of the Justices' reasoning in approval of the constitutionality of proposed legislative restrictions on inchoate dower and inchoate curtesy expressed in Opinion of the Justices, 337 Mass. 786 (1958), is applicable as well to an adopted child's expectancy or possibility of inheritance from natural kindred. Of course, the waning value of inchoate rights of dower and curtesy influenced the Justices in reaching their conclusion. See Billings v. Fowler, 361 Mass. 230 , 240 n.8 (1972). However, in measuring the value of the interest affected by the statute involved here, we note that Andre's expectancy of intestate inheritence from his natural aunt was most uncertain at the time of his adoption. He would inherit from her by intestate succession (1) if he survived her, (2) if his father did not survive her, (3) if no other person having a closer kinship relationship to his natural aunt was alive at her death, (4) if she had a net estate of any value, and (5) if she did not leave a valid will. An adopted child's possibility of inheritance from his natural kindred hardly is an interest of such substance as to be entitled to constitutional protection (cf. Billings v. Fowler, supra at 239), particularly where the adopted child has in substitution a new set of expectancies. The ultimate question, therefore, is what did the Legislature intend by its 1967 amendment of Section 7.
The result we reach is the same as that reached generally in other States under statutes concerned with rights of inheritance with respect to adopted children, where the statute was not explicit as to its applicability to adoptions concluded prior to its effectiveness. See, e.g., Scott v. Scott, 238 Ind. 474, 478-479 (1958); Arciero v. Hager, 397 S.W. 2d 50, 52-53 (Ky. 1965); Williams, Appellant, 154 Me. 88, 91-94 (1958); In the Matter of Holibaugh, 18 N.J. 229, 234-236 (1955); In re Estate of Millward, 166 Ohio St. 243, 245-247 (1957). See also 7 R. Powell, Real Property par. 1007 (at 708.1-708.2) (P. Rohan ed. 1974). Contra, Nickell v. Gall, 49 N.J. 186 (1967).
result also assures equal treatment of adopted children within a family unit. See Conville v. Bakke, 400 P.2d 179, 192-193 (Okla. 1964).
[Note 1] The three proceedings are: (1) a petition for administration of the estate of Nellie Krasiewich filed by Sophia Koronchik, daughter of Anna Koronchik, (2) a petition for administration of the same estate filed by Mr. David C. Katz, counsel for Andre Tremblay, and (3) a bill in equity by Mr. Katz seeking various relief against Anna Koronchik and Sophia Koronchik.
[Note 2] Our opinions often have assumed without discussion that a statute affecting the rights of adopted children may apply to persons adopted prior to the effective date of the statute and have involved contests over the applicability, if any, of such a statute to wills or trusts executed prior to the statute. See, e.g., Davis v. Hannam, ante, 26 (1975); State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. D'Amario, 368 Mass. 542 (1975); Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Dean, 361 Mass. 244 (1972); Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Fleming, 361 Mass. 172 , 174-176 (1972); Perkins v. New England Trust Co., 344 Mass. 287 , 294 (1962).

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