Source: http://ks.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20180411_0000556.DKS.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 02:49:10+00:00

Document:
Plaintiff seeks review of a partially favorable decision of the Acting Commissioner of Social Security (hereinafter Commissioner) denying Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) for 2007 and 2008 but awarding benefits thereafter pursuant to sections 216(i) and 223 of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i) and 423 (hereinafter the Act) continuing until the death of Plaintiff's decedent (hereinafter claimant) on May 27, 2016. Because both parties acknowledge error in the Commissioner's decision after remand, and finding no justification to remand for an immediate award of benefits as Plaintiff requests, the court ORDERS that the Commissioner's final decision after remand shall be REVERSED and that judgment shall be entered pursuant to the fourth sentence of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) REMANDING the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Plaintiff seeks judicial review of a decision of the Commissioner made after remand by another court of this district. (Doc. 1). Plaintiff argues that the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) erred in failing to comply with the order of the district court remanding the prior case. He argues that the ALJ failed to “determine whether [the claimant] engaged in SGA [(substantial gainful activity)] under Test One” of the regulation regarding evaluation of the work activity of a self-employed person, as required by the court's remand order. (Doc. 11, p.12 (hereinafter Pl. Br.) (emphasis in original) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1575(a)(2)). Plaintiff seeks remand for an immediate finding that the claimant was disabled beginning January 1, 2007, reinstatement of the overpayment claimed by the Social Security Administration (SSA), an order to reimburse Plaintiff with interest for the EAJA (Equal Access to Justice Act) fees wrongfully seized, and an award of attorney fees in this case pursuant to both the Social Security Act and the EAJA. Id. at 12-13.
The Commissioner uses the familiar five-step sequential process to evaluate a claim for disability. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520; Wilson v. Astrue, 602 F.3d 1136, 1139 (10th Cir. 2010) (citing Williams v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 748, 750 (10th Cir. 1988)). “If a determination can be made at any of the steps that a claimant is or is not disabled, evaluation under a subsequent step is not necessary.” Wilson, 602 F.3d at 1139 (quoting Lax, 489 F.3d at 1084). In the first three steps, the Commissioner determines whether the claimant has engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset, whether she has a severe impairment(s), and whether the severity of her impairment(s) meets or equals the severity of any impairment in the Listing of Impairments (20 C.F.R., Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1). Williams, 844 F.2d at 750-51. After evaluating step three, the Commissioner assesses claimant's residual functional capacity (RFC). 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). This assessment is used at both step four and step five of the sequential evaluation process. Id.
After Plaintiff filed his Social Security Brief, the Commissioner filed a Motion to Remand for Further Proceedings (Doc. 15) (hereinafter Comm'r Mot.), in which she conceded that remand pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) is appropriate and represented that upon remand “the ALJ will further evaluate the claimant's work activity in accordance with 20 CFR 404.1575 and Social Security Ruling 83-34 and make new findings regarding whether the claimant engaged in substantial gainful activity during the period from January 2007 through December 2008.” (Comm'r Mot. 1). She informed the court that Plaintiff opposed remand for further proceedings and wanted remand for an immediate award of benefits, but she argued that “further proceedings are necessary because there are unresolved factual issues.” Id. at 2. She argues that an immediate award is proper only where the record is clear that the claimant was disabled during the relevant period, and that further proceedings are necessary here because the record must be developed regarding what an unimpaired self-employed individual earned in a similar job in the relevant community during the relevant time, in accordance with test three of the regulation regarding evaluation of the work activity of a self-employed person, as applied by the ALJ on remand. Id. at 2-3.
Plaintiff responded that applying test three “was not the ALJ's assigned task, ” but he was required to apply test one in accordance with the remand order. (Pl. Resp. 1-2). He argues that because of the passage of time an ALJ will be unable to develop evidence regarding what an unimpaired self-employed individual earned in a similar job in the relevant community during the relevant time in accordance with test three of the regulation, and that the Commissioner should not “be given a third bite of the apple.” Id. at 3-4 (emphasis in original). He argues that reversal and remand for an immediate award of benefits is appropriate in this case because it has been more than eleven years since the claimant first applied for DIB in 2007, and she has died in the interim. (Pl. Resp. 5-9) (citing cases supporting the proposition). The Commissioner replies that on remand she was not precluded from considering all the tests regarding SGA, in accordance with the regulation, because the court in the prior case determined that the ALJ had not correctly applied test one, and the regulation requires that if test one is not met, the SSA “will consider tests two and three.” (Reply 2) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1575(a)(2)). She reiterates her argument that remand for additional fact finding is necessary, and distinguishes the cases cited by Plaintiff in seeking an immediate award of benefits. Id. at 4-6.
The court accepts the parties' representation that the ALJ erred in evaluating the claimant's work activity in 2007 and 2008 and that remand is necessary in this case. The issues are whether the ALJ exceeded the scope of the remand in this case and whether remand for an immediate award of benefits is appropriate in the circumstances.

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