Source: https://www.thomaslaw.com/blog/category/endangered-species-act/
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 16:30:48+00:00

Document:
In Defenders of Wildlife v. United States Fish & Wildlife Service, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109509, the Northern District of California refused to preliminarily enjoin Panoche Valley Solar (PVS) from constructing a 247-megawatt solar facility comprised of approximately 1,529 acres of photovoltaic panels installed on a 2,154-acre site in the Panoche Valley in San Benito County.
The Panoche Valley is home to a variety of endangered species, such as the blunt-nosed leopard lizard, the San Joaquin kit fox, and the giant kangaroo rat. Each of these species has been in decline due to loss of habitat or fragmentation of existing habitat. The giant kangaroo rat, for example, survives in less than five percent of its historic geographic range.
In early 2016, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) issued a biological opinion (BO) under the Endangered Species Act, concluding that the project would not likely jeopardize the survival and recovery of any of the species identified above. Accordingly, FWS issued an incidental take statement, which authorized limited take of the listed species during the project construction, operation, and maintenance for the life of the project.
While the BO acknowledged that the solar facility would permanently impact 1,688 acres of habitat and temporarily impact 466 acres of habitat, such impacts were minimized by conditions to reduce the anticipated take. Conditions included designing the project to avoid areas with high densities of listed species, monitoring construction work by FWS-approved biologists, relocating species to nearby habitat, and preserving and managing conservation land for the species covered by the incidental take statement.
Based on the BO, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers issued a Section 404 permit pursuant to the Clean Water Act, authorizing PVS to discharge dredged or fill material into 0.121 acres of waters of the United States.
Both the BO and the Section 404 permit were challenged in federal court by the Defenders of Wildlife, Sierra Club, and the Santa Clara Valley Audubon Society. After finding it was unlikely that plaintiffs would succeed on the merits, the Court denied their request for a preliminary injunction. This decision allows PVS to rely on the BO and Section 404 permit while the matter is litigated.
In Imperial County, just north of the Mexican border, lies the Imperial Sand Dunes Planning Area, a 227,000-acre tract of desert, of which 214,930 acres is managed by the Bureau of Land Management (BLM). This swath of land is home to the Algodones Dunes, the largest active sand dune system in the United States. A 138,111-acre portion of the Planning Area, designated as the Imperial Sand Dunes Special Recreation Management Area (Dunes), is set aside for the protection of plants and wildlife, as well as for outdoor recreation. The Dunes attract over one million visitors annually, especially off-road vehicle enthusiasts. In Center for Biological Diversity v. Bureau of Land Management, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 14949, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed BLM’s proposal to expand access for off-road vehicle recreation in the Dunes (Proposal).
Center for Biological Diversity (CBD) contended that the plain language of the Endangered Species Act requires an Incidental Take Statement for threatened plants, rather than just fish and wildlife. In reviewing an agency’s interpretation of a statute it is charged with administering, the Court applied the two-step statute interpretation framework set forth in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (1984) 467 U.S. 837 (Chevron): (1) whether Congress has spoken on the issue in the statute; and (2) if the statute is ambiguous with respect to the issue, whether the agency’s interpretation is reasonable. The Court determined that the Endangered Species Act on its face does not require Biological Opinions to contain Incidental Take Statements for threatened or endangered plants. The Court did not proceed to the second step of the Chevron test, but it noted that its reading of the Endangered Species Act was consistent with the USFWS’ longstanding interpretation of the Incidental Take provision.
CBD also claimed that BLM’s conclusion that implementation of its Proposal would not increase ozone emissions was arbitrary and capricious and violated the Clean Air Act, the Federal Land Policy and Management Act, the National Environmental Policy Act, and the Administrative Procedure Act. Specifically, CBD took issue with BLM’s assumptions regarding the number of individuals who will visit the Dunes and how an average visitor will spend their time. The Court noted that BLM’s assumptions were entitled to deference so long as they are supported by “substantial evidence,” and found that the administrative record demonstrated that BLM “considered the relevant factors and articulated a rational connection between the facts found and the choices made.” Accordingly, the Court concluded that CBD had failed to demonstrate that BLM’s emissions analysis was arbitrary and capricious under this deferential standard.
Key Point: The Endangered Species Act does not require an Incidental Take Statement for threatened or endangered plants.
In 2005, the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) designated the Green Sturgeon as a threatened species under the Endangered Species Act (ESA). When a species is considered threatened, under ESA, agencies are required to designate critical habitat for that species. Critical habitat is land that is essential to the conservation of the species and may require special management considerations or protections. In determining whether or not to exclude an area from critical habitat ESA says an agency “may exclude any area from critical habitat if [it] determines that the benefits of such exclusion outweigh the benefits of specifying such area as part of the critical habitat.” (16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2).) In 2010, NMFS designated over 11,000 square miles of marine habitat, 897 square miles of estuary habitat, and riverine habitat as critical habitat for the Green Sturgeon.
Following the designation, the Building Industry Association of the Bay Area and Bay Planning Coalition (collectively BIABA) sued. The court granted summary judgment in favor of NMFS. It stated that NMFS had a nondiscretionary duty to consider the economic impact of all critical habitat designations, but was not required to use any particular methodology, NMFS had complied with that duty, and NMFS’s decision not to exclude areas was not reviewable. BIABA appealed, and, in Bldg. Industry Assn. of the Bay Area v. U.S. Dept. of Commerce (9th Cir., July 7, 2015, No. 13-15132) __ F.3d __ (2015 U.S.App.LEXIS 11645), the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision in its entirety.
The Secretary shall designate critical habitat… on the basis of the best scientific data available and after taking into consideration the economic impact… The Secretary may exclude any area from critical habitat if he determines that the benefits of exclusion outweigh the benefits of specifying such area as part of critical habitat, unless he determines, based on the best scientific and commercial data available, that the failure to designate such an area as critical habitat will result in the extinction of the species concerned.
BIABA asserted that this section requires the agency to assess whether the economic benefits of excluding an area from designation outweigh the conservation benefits of including the area. The court was not convinced. The court stressed that the word “may” in the statute suggested that the agency has discretion in whether or not to balance economic benefits. NMFS’s interpretation was reasonable given the statute’s language, and the court was required to defer to NMFS’s interpretation.
BIABA also argued that NMFS violated ESA because it did not consider the economic impacts in all of the areas considered for designation, but only those that were considered high risk. The court said this approach was within NMFS’s powers because the Green Sturgeon was unlikely to survive without these high risk areas, and NMFS was only statutorily required to designate an area if extinction of the species would otherwise occur.
Finally, BIABA argued the district court incorrectly held decisions by NMFS not to exclude areas are not reviewable by courts. The court disagreed. Section 4(b)(2) explains that the decision to exclude areas from designation is always completely discretionary, and in no circumstance is exclusion required under section 4(b)(2). The court held there is no basis under section 4(b)(2) for reviewing the decision not to exclude areas from designation, so there is no basis for reviewing BIABA’s claim.
The dispute in Cottonwood Environmental Law Center v. U.S. Forest Service, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 10176 (Cottonwood), involved the ongoing battle over Federal protection of the Canada Lynx. In 2000, the Canada Lynx was listed as a threatened species under the Endangered Species Act (ESA). Six years later, the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) designated 1,841 square miles as critical habitat for the Canada Lynx, but did not designate any National Forest lands. Soon after, the Forest Service adopted the Northern Rocky Mountains Lynx Management Direction (Lynx Amendments), setting permitting standards on activities that affect the Canada Lynx, and completed Section 7 consultation with FWS.
In 2009, FWS revised its critical habitat designation to 39,000 square miles. Unlike the 2006 designation, the 2009 revised designation identified critical habitat in eleven National Forests. Despite this significant addition of critical habitat in the National Forests, the Forest Service declined to reinitiate Section 7 consultation with FWS on the Lynx Amendments. In 2012, The Cottonwood Environmental Law Center (Cottonwood) sued claiming the Forest Service violated ESA by failing to reinitiate consultation. The trial court granted summary judgement in favor of Cottonwood, but refused to enjoin any related projects. Both Cottonwood and the Forest Service appealed.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit considered whether Cottonwood had standing to bring the case, whether the issue was ripe for the courts, whether the Forest Service violated ESA section 7 by failing to reinitiate consultation on the Lynx Amendments with FWS, and whether an injunction was an appropriate remedy.
The court also noted that this was not the first time the Ninth Circuit found a plaintiff alleging a programmatic challenge had standing. A procedural injury exists after a Forest Plan is adopted, as long the plan is traceable to an action that affects the plaintiff’s interests. Uncertainty about whether reinitiating the consultation will benefit the plaintiff or not has no bearing on the plaintiff’s standing.
The Ninth Circuit next held the case was ripe for review. The Forest Service argued the issue was not ripe until a specific project was challenged. The court disagreed because Cottonwood had not sought any sort of substantive result, but had brought suit in order to enforce a procedural violation under Section 7.
The court reasoned that reinitiation of Section 7 consultation “could yield important actionable information.” FWS’s re-evaluation of the data generated a drastically different result that justified vast designation of previously unprotected critical habitat. These new protections triggered new obligations the Forest Service could not evade by relying on an analysis it completed before the protections were in place.
Finally, in a plurality ruling, the Ninth Circuit held that in the context of granting injunctive relief, the court’s nearly three-decade old holding that there is a presumption of irreparable injury where there has been a procedural violation in ESA cases is no longer good law.
The majority agreed with the Forest Service that the presumption of irreparable harm has been overruled by two decisions on the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). Like ESA, NEPA traditionally presumed environmental damage, warranting an injunction. But, in Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (2008) 555 U.S. 7, 22 (Winter), the Supreme Court ruled that this test for injunctions under NEPA was too lenient. Additionally, in Monsanto Co. v. Geerston Farms (2010) 561 U.S. 139, 157 (Monsanto), the Supreme Court disapproved of cases that did not use a traditional four-factor test for injunctions.
Judge Pregerson dissented to the court’s decision on the injunction. He reasoned that Winter and Monsanto were decisions under NEPA and not ESA. He argued that existing Supreme Court precedent favored the current standard for inunctions under ESA, and the majority’s ruling undermined the substantive purpose of ESA, conserving threatened species and ecosystems.
Thomas v. Peterson, 753 F.2d 754, 764 (9th Cir. 1985), which established an exception to the traditional test for injunctive relief when addressing procedural violations under the ESA and created a presumption of irreparable harm has been effectively overruled by two recent Supreme Court cases, Winter and Monsanto, addressing injunctive relief in the context of NEPA. The traditional four-factor test for granting injunctive relief applies in both ESA and NEPA litigation.

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