Source: https://www.fearnotlaw.com/wsnkb/articles/rivera_v_velo_promo_llc_ca-68654.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 09:07:03+00:00

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Rodriguez & Associates, Daniel Rodriguez and Chantal A. Trujillo; Esner, Chang & Boyer and Andrew N. Chang for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Pagliero & Associates, James R. Pagliero and Candace M. Pagliero for Defendants and Respondents.
Suzanne Rivera (decedent) competed in the Mariposa Women’s Stage Race, a bicycling race coordinated and organized by respondents Velo Promo, LLC (Velo Promo) and USA Cycling, Inc. (USA Cycling). During the race, a support van operated by Velo Promo stopped to assist a rider and parked the vehicle in the lane of the road designated for the cyclists on a downhill, curved section of the course. As the support vehicle was stopped, a pack of riders from the next heat, including decedent, rounded the blind turn with only a few seconds to avoid the parked vehicle. Other riders in the pack avoided the vehicle by swerving into the opposite lane of the road, which was open to motor vehicle traffic traveling in the opposite direction. Decedent was not able to avoid the support vehicle, crashed and succumbed to her injuries. The heirs of decedent (collectively referred to as appellants) sued defendants Velo Promo, USA Cycling and Richard Ciccarelli (the driver of the support van) alleging a single cause of action for negligence.
The trial court granted defendants Velo Promo and Ciccarelli’s (collectively referred to as respondents) motion for summary judgment. After independently reviewing the record, we conclude that there are triable issues of material fact whether respondents’ actions increased the risk of injury over that inherent in the activity and, therefore, whether the doctrine of primary assumption of risk bars appellants’ cause of action for negligence. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment.
Velo Promo organized and conducted a three-day, competitive cycling race called the Mariposa Women’s Stage Race starting on May 11, 2012. The event took place on two-lane unincorporated county roads in the Sierra Nevada foothills in the area surrounding Mariposa, California. It was an “‘[o]pen course’” race in which the road used for the cycling race was not closed to other vehicular traffic. USA Cycling sanctioned and permitted the event, and provided the rule book setting forth the manner in which the race was to be conducted. Prior to entering into the race, decedent signed the “‘2012 USA Cycling Competitive and Non-Competitive Event Release Form’” provided by race organizers. The release included an assumption of risk provision, acknowledging that cycling is an inherently dangerous activity and releasing respondents from negligence “‘to the maximum extent permitted by law’” (capitalization omitted).
In the event scheduled on the last day of the race (May 13, 2012), the riders were placed in different heats based on skill and experience levels. Decedent was racing in the beginner heat with approximately 15 total participants. Before the race, the president of Velo Promo realized he needed a support vehicle driver. He found Ciccarelli about 20 minutes before the race and assigned him to drive a support vehicle behind the racers in the heat preceding decedent’s. The interval between different heats of cyclists was two minutes.
Roughly three miles into the race, in a curved downhill section of road, a cyclist signaled to Ciccarelli that she needed assistance. Ciccarelli stopped, provided assistance, and the cyclist rejoined the race. Soon thereafter, the cyclist again experienced problems and signaled for assistance. Ciccarelli stopped the support van in the lane of travel less than 200 feet past a curve and on a section of road with a 9 percent downhill grade and prepared to assist the rider with a change of tire. He did so inside the blind curve unaware of the two-minute interval and that he could have pulled off of the road and stopped safely a relatively short distance ahead.
Before Ciccarelli could finish assisting the rider, cyclists from decedent’s heat approached at speeds nearing 40 miles per hour. In order to avoid the support vehicle, many riders crossed the double yellow lines in the road and entered the opposing lane of traffic. Decedent was unable to avoid the support van, crashed and fell to the ground. Despite efforts otherwise, at least one other cyclist ran over decedent while she was lying on the roadway. Decedent died as a result of her injuries shortly thereafter.
Decedent’s husband and minor children, as heirs to decedent, filed the instant wrongful death lawsuit alleging negligence against respondents. Appellants alleged that respondents were grossly negligent with respect to the supervision, control and training of the support van driver. They contend that Ciccarelli’s actions of stopping the support van in the lane of travel in a downhill curved section of the racecourse resulted in a risk of injury to decedent beyond that inherent in the activity.
Respondents Velo Promo and Ciccarelli moved for summary judgment. They argued that the release of liability signed by decedent discharged respondents’ liability or, alternatively, the undisputed facts proved that appellants’ claims were barred by the primary assumption of risk doctrine. Appellants contended otherwise and asserted that there were triable issues of fact regarding whether respondents violated statutory law or were grossly negligent, making summary judgment improper. On March 5, 2015, the trial court granted the motion, resulting in the dismissal of the action. Appellants brought this appeal.
In opposition to the motion for summary judgment, appellants presented evidence to establish that there were triable issues of fact that made summary judgment improper. A fact sheet from USA Cycling indicated that it is a member-based organization comprising over 2,700 clubs and 62,000 members. USA Cycling sanctions over 3,000 events and manages 18 national championship events each year. A copy of USA Cycling’s 2012 rules were presented. USA Cycling rules include the following: (1) the race director shall be responsible for specifying and directing the general aspects of the race and shall take acts reasonably necessary to promote the safety of participants and spectators (USA Cycling Rule 1G2); (2) that if there are multiple fields of riders in an event, the starting intervals should be chosen such that different groups do not overlap (USA Cycling Rule 3A2); (3) feeding stations and repair pits shall be located at points wide enough to allow passage of riders with one clear lane at all times (USA Cycling Rule 3A4); (4) support vehicles should be less than 1.6 meters in height (USA Cycling Rule 3C4(b)); (5) drivers of support vehicles shall keep to the right of the road and shall follow the rules of the road (USA Cycling Rule 3C4(h)); (6) should a support vehicle need to stop, it shall always pull off the road on the right side (ibid.); and (7) no supplies may be provided or sought from a vehicle during a hill climb or on dangerous bends or descents (USA Cycling Rule 3C5(b)).
Additionally, a 2012 memo from USA Cycling regarding course safety guidelines sets forth safety recommendations to race organizers. The memo advised not to use last-minute volunteers for support vehicle drivers, and that “[y]our drivers hold the riders’ lives in their hands” and must be experienced both at driving a vehicle and driving a vehicle around cyclists. The memo further states that driver’s licenses and insurance should be checked before the race, and that the drivers should be trained in their jobs.
Excerpts from the deposition of the manager and owner of Velo Promo, Robert Leibold, were submitted. He testified that all of the bicycle races that Velo Promo operates are held under permit from USA Cycling and follow the USA Cycling rules, including the race at issue here. Leibold selects support drivers, but did not have a direct role in training or supervising the drivers to ensure that they comply with the USA Cycling rules. Liebold decided to have Ciccarelli drive the support vehicle about 20 to 30 minutes before the start of the event.
Excerpts from Ciccarelli’s declaration included his statements that when a support vehicle stops for a rider, the vehicle should be pulled as far off of the road as possible. However, Ciccarelli noted not to park in tall, dry grass to prevent starting a fire. While Ciccarelli was not aware of a rule stating the practice, in his experience, support vehicles stopped as close as reasonably feasible to the cyclist needing assistance. Ciccarelli was not aware of any rule from USA Cycling or Velo Promo to not provide supplies from a vehicle on dangerous bends or descents.
A participant in the race, Gale De Rosa, testified that the interval between different categories of riders at the event on May 13, 2012, was two minutes. There were roughly fifteen women competing in De Rosa and decedent’s heat. The section of the road where the incident occurred was a double yellow zone, where cars were not allowed to pass due to the lack of visibility from the blind turn. When De Rosa saw the support vehicle parked in the road, she shouted a warning, stopped pedaling and steered to the left to allow the riders around her to have as much room as possible to avoid the vehicle. She did not apply her brakes to prevent the cyclists behind her from losing control and crashing. She had about two to three seconds from the time she saw the support vehicle to the time she passed it. She admitted that she did not follow the rules of the road when she crossed the double yellow line into the other lane to avoid hitting the support vehicle. At the time that she passed the support vehicle, De Rosa’s speedometer on her bicycle indicated she was traveling at close to 40 miles per hour.
Had an oncoming car been in the other lane, De Rosa would not have had sufficient time to brake and she would have hit the support vehicle. She did not recall the driver of the support vehicle provide any warning or if the vehicle’s warning lights were operating. De Rosa observed that the road dropped off sharply where the support vehicle was stopped, but that there was more road surface, shoulder area and driveways within one-half to three-quarters of a mile further down the road.
Appellants also provided the declarations of two experts. Peter King, an expert in motor vehicle collision and reconstruction, opined that the support vehicle was stopped and was visible from less than 200 feet when traveling in the direction of the cyclists during the event. John Howard, a bicyclist safety consultant, provided a declaration. In his professional experience, it is custom and a USA Cycling rule that support vehicles should always pull off of the road to stop, and that a support vehicle stopped in the road becomes an unnecessary and extremely dangerous hazard to participants by blocking the lane of travel. It is custom and a USA Cycling rule that supplies should never be provided during a hill climb or descent because of the limited visibility in such locations. Custom and USA Cycling rules dictate the use of support vehicles of 1.6 meters or less tall as larger vehicles create a hazard by inhibiting the visibility of the participants. He opined that it is imperative for the support vehicle driver to know the interval time separating each category of riders so that they know when to expect the next category to approach. Rules and custom also provide that all competitors and support vehicles must keep to the right of the centerline in an open course due to the hazard of entering a lane where traffic may be traveling in the opposite direction. Finally, it is customary for support vehicles to operate with lights and flashers on during a race.
Based on his experience, Howard opined that it is not uncommon to hold a race without a support vehicle and the lack of support vehicles does not affect the nature of the sport or have any relation to the physical exertion, skill, endurance, and or strength required by the participant. Howard found there was evidence that respondents violated many of the 2012 USA Cycling Rules, including failing to train the driver of the support vehicle to pull off of the road to stop, failure to instruct the support vehicle driver not to stop and park on a descent, failure to instruct the support vehicle driver not to stop after a blind turn, failure to ensure that the support vehicle’s flashers were being used during the race, ignoring that the support vehicle driver was not familiar with the USA Cycling rulebook, failure to train the support vehicle driver on the course design, ignoring whether the support vehicle was of the recommended dimensions, failure to train the support vehicle driver where on the course repairs could be provided, failure to inspect whether the support vehicle driver had a clean driving record, failure to inform the support vehicle driver of the interval time between categories of riders, failure to train the support vehicle driver where supplies could be provided or sought from the support vehicle, and failure to train the support vehicle driver to follow the rules of the road. Howard believed that the conduct of Velo Promo was an extreme departure from the standard of conduct of race operators, which unnecessarily increased the risks of the participants of the race. In Howard’s opinion, if it is not feasible to pull a support vehicle entirely off of the road to stop, the support vehicle driver must continue to a location where the vehicle can completely pull off the road.
Respondents assert that the appeal should be dismissed as it was taken from a nonappealable order granting summary judgment rather than from the entry of judgment. The trial court granted defendants’ summary judgment motion on March 5, 2015, and judgment was entered on March 16, 2015. Appellants filed the notice of appeal on the date judgment was entered, March 16, 2015. However, the notice of appeal refers to the summary judgment order entered on March 5, 2016, rather than the date of entry of judgment.
The California Rules of Court provide relief should a notice of appeal be filed prematurely. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104(d); Good v. Miller (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 472, 475.) “[W]e have discretion to entertain a premature appeal as long as a judgment was actually entered, there is no doubt concerning which ruling appellant seeks to have reviewed, and respondents were not misled to their prejudice.” (Boyer v. Jensen (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 62, 69.) Respondents present no evidence of confusion. Assuming the notice of appeal was filed prematurely, we shall construe it as filed immediately after entry of judgment. Further, we find it proper to overlook any defect regarding the date referred to in the notice of appeal and exercise our discretion to deem the appeal to be from the judgment and proceed to review its merits.
As the trial court did not address the objections, there is no ruling to review. However, when the trial court fails to rule expressly on evidentiary objections, it is presumed that the objections have been overruled and the trial court considered the evidence in ruling on the merits of the summary judgment motion. (Reid, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 534.) The weight of authority is that evidentiary objections, including on summary judgment, are reviewed for abuse of discretion. (See People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 717 (Waidla) [“Broadly speaking, an appellate court applies the abuse of discretion standard of review to any ruling by a trial court on the admissibility of evidence.”]; Carnes v. Superior Court (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 688, 694 [“Although it is often said that an appellate court reviews a summary judgment motion ‘de novo,’ the weight of authority holds that an appellate court reviews a court’s final rulings on evidentiary objections by applying an abuse of discretion standard.”]; see General Electric Co. v. Joiner (1997) 522 U.S. 136, 141–142 [applying abuse of discretion standard of review to trial court’s decision to exclude expert testimony at summary judgment stage].) Historically, this court reviews evidentiary rulings on summary judgment for abuse of discretion. (O’Neal v. Stanislaus County Employees’ Retirement Assn. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 1184, 1198–1199 (O’Neal); Powell v. Kleinman (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 112, 122.) Under an abuse of discretion standard, the party challenging the ruling (in this case, the presumed overruling of respondents’ objections) has the burden to establish an abuse (O’Neal, supra, at p. 1199), and we will interfere with the lower court’s judgment only if the party can show that no judge could reasonably have made the same judgment (ibid.).
As stated by our Supreme Court, “Judges deciding inherent risk questions … may consider not only their own or common experience with the recreational activity involved but may also consult case law, other published materials, and documentary evidence introduced by the parties on a motion for summary judgment.” (Nalwa v. Cedar Fair, L.P. (2012) 55 Cal.4th 1148, 1158 (Nalwa).) Thus, respondents’ argument that inherent risks of an activity always present purely legal questions is not accurate and overly broad. “Although the risks inherent in many activities are not subject to reasonable dispute (e.g., being hit with a baseball during a game), the risks inherent in some activities are not commonly known.” (Jimenez v. Roseville City School Dist. (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 594, 608.) In such cases, expert testimony may assist the court in determining whether inherent risks of the activity were increased. (Kahn, supra, 31 Cal.4th at pp. 1017–1018.) “Trial courts deciding these questions on summary judgment should not be faced with determining the inherent risks of an unfamiliar sport while bereft of the helpful factual input of experts.” (Staten, supra, 45 Cal.App.4th at p. 1636.) Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in taking the declaration of appellants’ expert into consideration in determining the inherent risks at issue here.
In addition to the fact that expert testimony may be used, respondents’ objections that the testimony is based on inadmissible hearsay or that Howard lacked personal knowledge are likewise without merit. First, an “‘expert may generally base his opinion on any “matter” known to him, including hearsay not otherwise admissible, which may “reasonably … be relied upon” for that purpose.’” (People v. Catlin (2001) 26 Cal.4th 81, 137; see Evid. Code, § 801, subd. (b).) Further, respondents’ objections that Howard lacked personal knowledge or failed to present adequate foundation for his expert testimony are likewise rejected. Review of the pertinent records along with the expert’s experience in the field of expertise can provide adequate foundation for expert opinions. (See People v. Edwards (2013) 57 Cal.4th 658, 708.) Howard states in his declaration that he reviewed pertinent documents and exhibits relating to the accident and relies upon over 30 years of experience as a cycling coach and bicyclist safety consultant. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling evidentiary objections to the declaration. Howard’s declaration is admissible and relevant to determine whether there are genuine issues of fact regarding whether inherent risks of the activity were increased.
At summary judgment, the trial court granted respondents’ motion, finding that appellants’ claim for negligence was foreclosed based on the release signed by decedent and the primary assumption of risk doctrine. Appellants do not challenge the fact that decedent signed the release, nor whether the release relinquishes liability for claims of negligence. Instead, appellants contend that there are triable issues of material fact whether respondents’ conduct constituted gross negligence, and that the signed waiver and the primary assumption of risk doctrine do not bar such claims.
Ordinary negligence “consists of a failure to exercise the degree of care in a given situation that a reasonable person under similar circumstances would employ to protect others from harm.” (City of Santa Barbara v. Superior Court (2007) 41 Cal.4th 747, 753–754 (Santa Barbara).) “‘[M]ere nonfeasance, such as the failure to discover a dangerous condition or to perform a duty,’” amounts to ordinary negligence. (Frittelli, Inc. v. 350 North Canon Drive, LP (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 35, 48.) However, to support a theory of “‘[g]ross negligence,’” a plaintiff must allege facts showing “either a ‘“‘want of even scant care’”’ or ‘“‘an extreme departure from the ordinary standard of conduct.’”’” (Santa Barbara, supra, at p. 754.) “‘“[G]ross negligence” falls short of a reckless disregard of consequences, and differs from ordinary negligence only in degree, and not in kind.’” (Gore v. Board of Medical Quality Assurance (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 184, 197; see Anderson v. Fitness Internat., LLC (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 867, 881 (Anderson).) As explained below, appellants contend on appeal that there are genuine issues of fact as to whether respondents’ conduct constituted gross negligence.
In the recreation and sports context, primary assumption of risk is a defense that relieves a defendant of any duty to the plaintiff when the injury is due to a risk that is inherent in an activity in which the plaintiff chose to participate. (Knight v. Jewett (1992) 3 Cal.4th 296, 308 (Knight); Nalwa, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 1154.) In Knight, the Supreme Court considered the application of the assumption of risk doctrine in light of the court’s adoption of comparative fault principles in Li v. Yellow Cab Co. (1975) 13 Cal.3d 804. The Court distinguished between primary assumption of risk—i.e., “those instances in which the assumption of risk doctrine embodies a legal conclusion that there is ‘no duty’ on the part of the defendant to protect the plaintiff from a particular risk”—and secondary assumption of risk—i.e., “those instances in which the defendant does owe a duty of care to the plaintiff but the plaintiff knowingly encounters a risk of injury caused by the defendant’s breach of that duty.” (Knight, supra, at p. 308.) When applicable, primary assumption of risk “operate[s] as a complete bar to the plaintiff’s recovery.” (Id. at pp. 314–315.) In contrast, when applicable, secondary assumption of risk “is merged into the comparative fault scheme, and the trier of fact, in apportioning the loss resulting from the injury, may consider the relative responsibility of the parties.” (Id. at p. 315.) Here, respondents assert that primary assumption of risk serves to bar appellants’ claim.
As the race organizers, respondents had a duty to use care not to increase the risks to decedent above those inherent in the activity. Appellants presented issues of fact regarding whether the supervision and actions of the support driver increased the risks to the participants. For example, an inherent risk on an open course cycling event would be potential collisions with motor vehicles. In the instant race, the other lane of the road remained open to vehicle traffic and potential collisions with vehicles traveling in the other lane or entering or exiting the roadway was an inherent risk of the activity. However, the negligent operation and supervision of a support vehicle is not necessarily inherent in the activity. Appellants provided evidence that the use of a support vehicle is not required nor does the lack of a support vehicle change the nature of the sport. Examining the evidence in the light most favorable to appellants, there are triable issues of fact whether the use of a support vehicle is necessary and, therefore, the added risk was inherent to the sport of road cycling. The nature of the sport involves racing against other bicyclists. While certain risks are therefore inherent, including contact with other riders or encountering imperfections in the road surface, assistance from a support vehicle is not necessary to the competition, and the lack of such a vehicle would not work a basic alteration to the nature of the sport. Finding the alleged improper operation of the support vehicle not an inherent risk in the context of a cycling race, respondents had a duty not to increase the risk to participants by providing a support vehicle.
Next respondents present extensive argument as to why it was reasonable for Ciccarelli to stop the support van where he did to provide assistance to the rider from the prior heat. Ciccarelli was aware that a rider needed assistance after a downhill curve and considered various factors before stopping, including the USA Cycling Rules regarding stopping a support vehicle on a curved or downhill section and pulling the vehicle completely off of the road, that there was no suitable shoulder on which to pull off of the road near the disabled rider, that there was a fire risk from pulling over onto an area with tall grass and that he was expected to stop close to a racer in order to provide prompt assistance. Respondents also contend that Ciccarelli was knowledgeable as to how to operate a support vehicle and had done so for Velo Promo over 100 times before and, therefore, he was not a last-minute volunteer. Regardless whether the support vehicle had its flashers on or was larger than the size specified by the USA Cycling Rules, respondents allege that there is no proof that those issues caused an increased risk to decedent.
The evidence presented by respondents only underscore that there are disputed issues of fact. Appellants presented contrary evidence that the actions of Ciccarelli in stopping the support vehicle in the racing lane on a curved downhill section of the course was in violation of custom and USA Cycling Rules and resulted in increased risk to the participants of the race. According to Howard, USA Cycling Rules dictate that support should not have been provided in such a place and, even if it was, it was imperative that the support vehicle pulled completely off of the road. Alternatively, if there was not a safe place to stop, Howard opined that it was proper to proceed to a location where the support vehicle could pull completely off of the road before stopping. In response, respondent contends that there were legitimate reasons why Ciccarelli stopped in the manner that he did: he wanted to stop close to the rider that needed aid, there was no available turnout or shoulder at that location and parking on dry grass on the side of the road could have started a fire.
Additional factual issues exist with regard to whether Velo Promo properly informed Ciccarelli regarding the details of the race, including the design of the course and interval times of the different heats. Ciccarelli declares that he made a decision to stop his support vehicle in the racing lane to render immediate aid to the cyclist rather than continue to look for a turnout that might not exist for miles. His testimony creates a question of fact whether he was improperly informed of the course and, in turn, whether his lack of knowledge of the location of appropriate areas to stop the support vehicle and the location of blind curves or descents increased the risk to the participants of the race. Likewise, questions of fact regarding whether Ciccarelli was informed as to the interval times may have increased the risk to the riders. It was Ciccarelli’s understanding that the interval times between racing heats was five minutes, but he admits that he may have been mistaken and that the interval times was only three minutes. The interval times were actually only two minutes, and Ciccarelli’s lack of knowledge of the times is probative of whether he increased the risk to the riders as he was unaware of when the next heat of riders was approaching.
Ciccarelli testified in his declaration that he knew the USA Cycling Rules regarding operating a support vehicle. He declares that it was standard operating procedure for support vehicles to pull as close as reasonably feasible to the cyclist needing assistance. In his experience, it would be a violation of safety protocol and very unusual to have the support vehicle meet the rider in a location other than where the rider is stopped because it would run contrary to the needs of the rider who wants immediate assistance. He also stated it was very common that at least part of the support vehicle would remain in the racing lane while providing assistance. His recollection was that the relevant USA Cycling Rule states to pull as far to the right when pulling over and was unaware of any USA Cycling Rule regarding not providing supplies on dangerous bends or descents.
Respondents moved for summary judgment based on the defenses of waiver and primary assumption of risk. Appellants presented triable issues of material fact whether the risk was one that was inherent to the sporting activity and whether respondents increased that inherent risk. Appellants have shown that factual disputes exist whether respondents committed gross negligence that is not foreclosed by the assumption of risk defense. Here, appellants presented evidence that could support a determination that respondents failed to use due care not to increase the risks to decedent in its supervision and operation of the support vehicle. The stopped vehicle created a dangerous obstacle that caused all of the riders in decedent’s heat to take evasive actions while racing at high speed to avoid. Triable issues of material fact exist with respect to the applicability of the release and the preclusion of liability by the doctrine of primary assumption of risk. The trial court’s weight of the evidence was improper and the entry of summary judgment was error.
Description Suzanne Rivera (decedent) competed in the Mariposa Women’s Stage Race, a bicycling race coordinated and organized by respondents Velo Promo, LLC and USA Cycling, Inc. (USA Cycling). During the race, a support van operated by Velo Promo stopped to assist a rider and parked the vehicle in the lane of the road designated for the cyclists on a downhill, curved section of the course. As the support vehicle was stopped, a pack of riders from the next heat, including decedent, rounded the blind turn with only a few seconds to avoid the parked vehicle. Other riders in the pack avoided the vehicle by swerving into the opposite lane of the road, which was open to motor vehicle traffic traveling in the opposite direction. Decedent was not able to avoid the support vehicle, crashed and succumbed to her injuries. The heirs of decedent sued defendants Velo Promo, USA Cycling and Richard alleging a single cause of action for negligence.
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