Source: http://masscases.com/cases/sjc/454/454mass306.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 08:35:48+00:00

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JANICE KELLY, individually and as executrix, [Note 1] vs. FOXBORO REALTY ASSOCIATES, LLC, & another [Note 2] (and a companion case [Note 3]).
Jury and Jurors. Practice, Civil, Instructions to jury. Agency, Independent contractor. Negligence, Employer, Independent contractor.
CIVIL ACTION commenced in the Superior Court Department on May 5, 2004.
CIVIL ACTION commenced in the Stoughton Division of the District Court Department on August 25, 2006.
After transfer and consolidation, the cases were tried before Raymond J. Brassard, J.
Myles W. McDonough for Foxboro Realty Associates, LLC.
John A.K. Grunert for Apollo Security, Inc.
Andrew C. Meyer, Jr. (Adam R. Satin with him) for Janice Kelly.
CORDY, J. In this personal injury case we must decide whether it was permissible for a judge to instruct jurors that they could discuss evidence among themselves during the course of the trial, without the agreement of all parties. We do not indorse the practice except in civil trials where all parties agree, but conclude that the defendants suffered no prejudice in this case from the judge's decision to allow the jury to do so. We also must decide whether the judge correctly instructed the jury on the "control" an employer must exercise over an independent contractor to be liable for the contractor's negligence. We conclude that the judge's instruction on "control" was proper. We affirm judgment for the plaintiffs.
1. Facts. This case arises from tragic events on August 29, 2003. Based on the evidence, the jury could have found the following.
Early in the afternoon, a bus carried passengers from a golf tournament in Norton to Gillette Stadium in Foxborough, where the passengers previously had parked their vehicles. As the bus traveled down an access road owned by the defendant Foxboro Realty Associates, LLC (Foxboro), a large security gate arm swung into the road, piercing the side of the bus. A number of passengers suffered serious injuries; one passenger, Thomas Kelly, later died from his injuries. [Note 4] Foxboro owned the property on which the accident occurred, Apollo Security, Inc. (Apollo), provided security guards for the stadium parking lots and surrounding areas, and Standard Parking Corporation (Standard) managed stadium parking operations.
the course of the trial. [Note 5] The instruction directed, however, that they could exercise this option only when they were together as a group, [Note 6] and cautioned that they could not "judge" the evidence midtrial. [Note 7] The defendants' objection was overruled.
During the trial, the parties first focused on the condition of the security gate at the time of the accident. The defendants conceded that the gate arm was normally secured in the "open" position by dropping a three-pound pin through a hole in the gate pole and a sleeve in a post on the side of the road. If the pin was twisted, a flange would lock into place, preventing the pin from being lifted out of the sleeve. At the time of the accident, the pin was found in an unsecured, raised position; witnesses were unsure when it had been placed in that position or who had placed it there. There was evidence of strong wind gusts on the day of the accident, and the plaintiffs' expert opined that the wind blew the unsecured gate arm into the bus.
The jury found Foxboro, Apollo, and Standard liable for Thomas Kelly's pain and suffering prior to his death and for the Kelly family's loss of consortium, and awarded $4,400,000 in damages. [Note 9] Foxboro and Apollo appealed, and we granted Foxboro's application for direct appellate review, which Apollo had joined.
only if it exercised a "degree of control" over the contractors' work.
a. Instruction allowing a jury to discuss evidence during the trial. When reviewing jury instructions to which there has been an objection, we conduct a two-part test: "whether the instructions were legally erroneous, and (if so) whether that error was prejudicial." Masingill v. EMC Corp., 449 Mass. 532 , 540 n.20 (2007), citing Blackstone v. Cashman, 448 Mass. 255 , 270 (2007). This is also the standard for reviewing the use of an "innovative" jury technique over a party's contemporaneous objection. See United States v. Lewis, 716 F.2d 16, 19 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Motlagh v. United States, 464 U.S. 996 (1983) (standard on appeal from conviction by "dual jury" is "whether there exists evidence indicating that the dual jury caused specific prejudice to someone's defense at trial"). Cf. Commonwealth v. Britto, 433 Mass. 596 , 611 (2001) ("defendant has the burden of showing actual prejudice from juror questions").
Massachusetts judges enjoy discretion in using the innovations included in the project, except where the court has specifically disapproved of the proposed innovation. While the judge's instructions to the jury in this case differed from the judge's instructions in Benjamin, and were less objectionable, they still violated our directive in Benjamin not to permit jurors to discuss the case with each other before they commenced deliberations.
We proceed then to the second part of the test: whether the judge's instruction prejudiced the defendants. Under the well-established standard, the court must determine whether the "result might have differed absent the error." Blackstone v. Cashman, 448 Mass. 255 , 270 (2007). We are convinced that it would not.
the defendants' primary concern that the jurors would "prematurely deliberate critical issues, even before the defense had begun its case." Additionally, at the close of the evidence the judge instructed jurors to end any predeliberation discussions; this helped confine the jury's discussions to evidentiary issues only. "We presume that the jury followed the judge's instruction." Commonwealth v. Pillai, 445 Mass. 175 , 190 (2005).
Second, we reject the defendants' claim that questions (for witnesses) proposed by some of the jurors during the trial demonstrate that the jurors "prematurely deliberated critical issues." Questions highlighted by the defendants are requests only for additional facts, [Note 20] an expert opinion, [Note 21] or a response to a particular piece of evidence. [Note 22] The questions do not demonstrate that the jury had engaged in any preliminary deliberation, and they certainly do not show the preliminary group deliberation that the defendants posit. See Commonwealth v. Urena, 417 Mass. 692 , 700 (1994) (even if one juror's suggested question showed improper midtrial deliberation, it did not "support the assertion that other jurors were influenced improperly and prematurely").
contested instruction, we are persuaded that the jury's verdict would not have been different. Blackstone v. Cashman, supra at 270.
Finally, the jury never actually requested time to discuss the evidence in the manner permitted by the judge. [Note 23] The jury may not have exercised their power to discuss evidence at all; at the very least, they spent little time doing so.
judge erroneously instructed the jury that the issue was only " 'control' versus 'no control,' " and that the judge should have stated that Foxboro must have had a sufficient "degree of control necessary for liability."
"A trial judge has wide latitude in framing the language to be used in jury instructions" as long as the instructions adequately explain the applicable law. Jacobs v. Pine Manor College, 399 Mass. 411 , 414 (1987). "The judge [is] not bound to instruct in the exact language of the requests"; "[t]he test of the charge is the impression created by it as a whole." Commonwealth v. Kelley, 359 Mass. 77 , 92 (1971). In this case, the charge as a whole constituted a proper instruction on the applicable law. The judge correctly stated that an employer can be held liable for an independent contractor's negligence only if the employer "gives direction for the work, furnishes equipment for the work, or retains control over any part of the work" (emphasis added). He also stated that "one who entrusts work to an independent contractor, but who retains control over any part of the work, is subject to liability" (emphasis added). These instructions were almost identical to our rule: "One who entrusts work to an independent contractor, but who retains the control of any part of the work, is subject to liability for physical harm to others for whose safety the employer owes a duty to exercise reasonable care, which is caused by his failure to exercise his control with reasonable care" (emphasis added). Restatement (Second) Torts, supra at § 414. See Corsetti v. Stone Co., supra; Dilaveris v. W.T. Rich Co., 424 Mass. 9 , 11-12 (1996).
The judgments in favor of the plaintiffs are affirmed on all counts.
[Note 1] Of the estate of Thomas Kelly.
[Note 2] Apollo Security, Inc. (Apollo).
[Note 3] Robert Dixon vs. Foxboro Realty Associates, LLC (Foxboro), & another. A third consolidated case is not part of this appeal.
[Note 4] Thomas Kelly's wife, Janice Kelly, filed this lawsuit individually and as executrix of his estate against Foxboro; Apollo; Standard Parking Corporation (Standard); Rebecca Valentin, the bus driver; and Arrow Line Acquisition, LLC (Arrow), the bus owner and operator. Another passenger who was injured, Robert Dixon, also filed suit. The jury eventually returned verdicts in favor of Valentin and Arrow.
[Note 5] "From this point forward in the trial, you may, if you wish, as a jury, talk about the case in a certain way amongst each other, only amongst each other as a jury. . . . [E]xperience has shown that, in a long case and in a case with many witnesses and of some complexity, that it may be useful in some respects for the jurors to talk about the evidence in a limited way with one another during the trial. For example, if you misunderstood something, it may be better to get it corrected at the beginning of the trial rather than to wait two weeks or so and have been thinking, under the mistaken impression, that something was so when it was not. It may also help you to better remember and understand the testimony. But that's up to you. This is not obligatory; it's an option that you, as a jury, have."
[Note 6] "However, there are some important ground rules. Number [one], when you talk about the case, you may only do so when all of you are together and, of course, when no one else is present. We don't have any subcommittees on the jury. It's only when all of you are together. You may do it as you are waiting to get started in the morning if we are detained here in the court room. You may do it at the break if you wish. You may stay over a bit at lunch or what have you and do it then, or at the end of the day. Or you may not do so at all. It's up to you. But everyone has to be together."
[Note 7] "[I]t would be very unfair, and indeed it's not allowed, for you to begin judging the evidence. You cannot even judge, ladies and gentlemen, the believability of one witness fairly until you've heard all of the witnesses. . . . In other words, you can talk about the evidence with a view to better understanding the evidence, not with a view to judging it, evaluating it. Judgment and evaluation must come at the very end of the case. You can talk about it with a view to understanding it better."
[Note 8] The plaintiffs also argued that Foxboro was liable because it should have provided additional padlocks to lock the pins into a secure position in the sleeve, and because Foxboro provided inadequate training to Standard and Apollo on gate safety.
[Note 9] The jury also awarded $45,000 to Robert Dixon in compensation for his injuries. With prejudgment interest, the court entered final judgments of $6,119,727.35 to Janice Kelly and $52,352.88 to Dixon.
[Note 10] The trial judge in Commonwealth v. Benjamin, 369 Mass. 770 , 772 (1976) (Benjamin), also instructed the jurors that in those discussions the jurors were not to "express any opinions."
"We recognize that it is hard for a juror to obey such instructions, particularly in talking to a spouse, and it can be argued that they are largely unenforceable. But they are sound; if followed, they avoid a variety of troubles. In particular, we do not think it is useful to ask lay jurors to distinguish in conversation between opinion and fact."
[Note 12] There are a number of important differences between the Benjamin case and this case, not the least of which is that Benjamin was a criminal case and this is a civil case. In addition, the instructions were different in several respects. For example, in Benjamin, supra at 772, the jurors were instructed that they were allowed to discuss the case with their spouses, and were not specifically instructed that they needed to be all together to have any discussions among themselves.
[Note 13] Scholarly responses to these studies vary widely. Contrast Diamond, Jury Room Ruminations on Forbidden Topics, 87 Va. L. Rev. 1857, 1874 (2001) (except for brief detours into impermissible areas, jury discussions are largely proper), with Hannaford-Agor, "Speaking Rights": Evaluating Juror Discussions During Civil Trials, 85 Judicature 1, 2-3 (2002) (allowing midtrial jury to discuss evidence as group increases occurrence of impermissible discussions in small groups and with nonjurors). While we decline to evaluate the statistical methodology or conclusions reached in these studies, it is clear that they have not established decisively that these jury techniques are beneficial or detrimental to the outcomes.
[Note 14] The Massachusetts Project on Innovative Jury Trial Practices Final Report, National Center for Citizen Participation in the Admin. of Justice at 55-56 (2001) (Massachusetts Report), was undertaken with the assent of the Supreme Judicial Court, and data with respect to the trials at which the various techniques were used was collected by the Supreme Judicial Court.
[Note 15] For example, a majority of States (including Massachusetts) and the District of Columbia permit jurors to ask questions, subject to the discretion of the judge. See Commonwealth v. Britto, 433 Mass. 596 , 610-611 & n.6 (2001).
[Note 16] See Lakamp, Deliberating Juror Predeliberation Discussions: Should California Follow the Arizona Model?, 45 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 845, 855-857 (1998) (jurors frequently engage in intratrial discussions against instructions, and so judges should "creat[e] specific guidelines regarding predeliberation discussions"); Diamond, Juror Discussions During Civil Trials: Studying an Arizona Innovation, 45 Ariz. L. Rev. 1, 51 (2003) (when jurors are given permission to discuss case midtrial, they are much more likely improperly to discuss what verdict should be prior to deliberation).
[Note 17] While the parties in a civil case may consent to juror discussions during the trial, we would not approve of that practice in a criminal case.
[Note 18] Our ruling in this case is not intended to discourage other innovative trial approaches that may improve jurors' understanding of the evidence and reduce confusion.
[Note 19] "Now, make sure . . . that you're all together and that you don't cross the line of evaluating or judging the evidence. It's well for me to appoint a foreperson for the jury now so that someone is responsible to be sure you don't cross over this boundary . . . ." "If you are discussing the case as a jury, please, following carefully the two primary rules, only when you are together and only when you're being careful not to judge or evaluate, but only better to understand the evidence." "I want to remind you that if you are talking about the evidence, remember only when you're all together and only being careful not to judge, not to evaluate, but only to understand." "If you are talking about the evidence, remember only with a view to understanding it, not judging it or evaluating it please."
[Note 20] "Where was the padlock that was supposed to be used to hold the gate open? Should there not be two locks used to secure both sides?" "Who was responsible to meet w/ Apollo about how to open gates and park cars from Standard Parking?"
[Note 21] "In [the plaintiffs' expert's] opinion, are the contract between [Foxboro], Apollo Security, and Standard Parking proper to secure traffic safety?"
[Note 22] "Can the witness explain why he is not alarmed that operational practices that impact public safety are not written down?"
[Note 23] "You may stay over a bit at lunch or what have you and do it then, or at the end of the day. Or you may not do so at all."
[Note 26] Although we need not reach the issue, we also note that Foxboro was not prejudiced by the instruction. Masingill v. EMC Corp., 449 Mass. 532 , 540 n.20 (2007). There was ample evidence supporting the jury's conclusion that Foxboro retained sufficient control over its independent contractors for liability to be imposed. See Corsetti v. Stone Co., 396 Mass. 1 , 11 (1985) (whether control over contractor sufficient to impose liability is question of fact for jury). At trial, Foxboro conceded by stipulation that it owned the gate; that it "had control over the gate and the padlocks used to secure the gate"; that it "had the power and the authority to direct the manner in which the gate would be secured in the open position"; and that it "established the protocol for how the gate was to be opened and how the gate was to be secured in the open position."

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