Source: https://www.tdcaa.com/journal/you-cant-say-that/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 02:22:22+00:00

Document:
We prosecutors long for final argument. It is the reward for days, weeks, or even months of thanklessly slogging through trial. When the time for final argument arrives, prosecutors get to become the stars of the trial for a brief moment and release all of their pent-up angst from the trial in an explosion of impassioned oratorical brilliance.
However, there are limits to what we may say in final argument, and exceeding those limits can have dire consequences because Texas courts have specifically restricted what prosecutors may properly engage in during final argument. This article is designed to give a brief overview of permissible argument as well as those areas of argument courts have held improper so that prosecutors might sidestep these potential pitfalls.
While the Texas courts have generally defined the areas of permissible jury argument, it is impermissible jury argument that has been more specifically defined. Because it is impermissible jury argument that presents potential problems for prosecutors, an examination of some areas of impermissible jury argument is in order.
Impermissible jury argument is anything that does not fall within the four broadly defined categories of permissible argument. This definition provides little practical guidance for prosecutors in trial; however, one can glean from an examination of caselaw addressing impermissible jury argument the general categories of improper argument, as well as specific factual situations that can serve as a guide to permissible argument. The following is a non-exhaustive list of general areas of impermissible jury argument with case citations to specific factual scenarios.
While the Texas courts have made clear that any comment by the prosecution that could be interpreted as a comment on the defendant’s failure to testify is to be treated with suspicion, there are scenarios where comments by prosecutors along these lines may be proper. For example, “implied” or “indirect allusion” to the defendant’s failure to testify are not a violation of the defendant’s rights.10 However, in practice, defining what is a direct versus an indirect allusion to the defendant’s failure to testify is difficult to determine and will doubtless be even more difficult to a prosecutor in the heat of an emotional argument.11 In that light, the best policy is to avoid any potential reference to a defendant’s failure to testify.
Argument is improper where it states law contrary to that contained in the court’s charge.15 While the Court of Criminal Appeals has held that arguing law contrary to that contained in the court’s charge is improper, it has also held that “there is no error in correctly arguing the law, even if the law is not included in the court’s charge.”16 This rule insulates a prosecutor from a complaint that his argument went beyond the court’s charge, but it does not address the situation where the court’s charge contains a misstatement of the law.
Final argument is perhaps the most enjoyable part of trial practice. This is in part due to the latitude the prosecutor enjoys in making argument. However, it still is not without limitations, which should be taken seriously. Prosecutors should enjoy closing argument, but with moderation. There is no worse sensation than snatching appellate defeat from the jaws of trial victory because of an overreaching final argument.
1 United States v. McPhee, 731 F.2d 1150, 1152 (5th Cir. 1984).
2 Campbell v. State, 610 S.W.2d 754, 756 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) quoting Stearn v. State, 487 S.W.2d 734, 736 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
3 Campbell, 610 S.W.2d at 756.
4 Harris v. State, 996 S.W.2d 232, 237 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.).
5 Freeman v. State, 340 S.W.3d 717, 728 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); Berryhill v. State, 501 S.W.2d 86, 87 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
7 See id.; Watts v. State, 371 S.W.3d 448, 459-61 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.) (argument “inviting speculation into future events—including the fates of untried criminals” improper).
8 Cruz v. State, 225 S.W.3d 546, 548 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
9 Randolph v. State, 353 S.W.3d 887, 891 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); U.S. Const. amend. V; Tex. Const. art. I, §10; Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Art. 38.08.
10 Randolph, 353 S.W.3d at 891.
11 Id. at 892 (giving examples of scenarios where allusions to a defendant’s failure to testify would be proper or improper).
12 Jackson v. State, 17 S.W.3d 664, 674 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (prosecutor’s statement that defendant would have called his own DNA expert if he really believed State’s DNA evidence to be faulty was not an improper comment on defendant’s failure to testify).
13 Id.; Zavala v. State, 401 S.W.3d 171, 183 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, pet. ref’d).
14 See Garrett v. State, 632 S.W.2d 350, 353 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) (prosecutor’s final argument that defense could have called appointed expert was erroneous, though not reversibly so, where there was no mention of that expert in front of the jury).
15 Mauldin v. State, 628 S.W.2d 793, 795 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982).
16 State v. Renteria, 977 S.W.2d 606, 608 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).
17 Hawkins v. State, 135 S.W.3d 72, 84 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).
19 Taylor v. State, 233 S.W.3d 356, 359 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Art. 37.07 §4 (requiring the jury to be given certain parole eligibility instructions).
20 Mosley v. State, 983 S.W.2d 249, 258 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).
21 Fuentes v. State, 64 S.W.2d 333, 335 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984).
22 Mosley, 983 S.W.2d at 259; Williams v. State, 417 S.W.3d 162, 174 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, pet. ref’d).
23 Wilson v. State, 938 S.W.2d 57, 62 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) abrogation on other grounds recognized by Motilla v. State, 78 S.W.3d 352, 357 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
24 See, e.g., Duran v. State, 356 S.W.2d 937, 291 (Tex. Crim. App. 1962) (case reversed where prosecutor called defendant a “punk”); Ponce v. State (299 S.W.3d 167, 175 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2009, no pet.) (improper, though not reversible, for prosecutor to call defendant a “monster”).
25 Ponce, 299 S.W.3d at 175, citing Schumacher v. State, 72 S.W.3d 43, 49 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2009, pet. ref’d) (indirectly calling defendant a “scumbag” during voir dire).

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