Source: https://www.casemine.com/judgement/us/5965f02eadd7b0204c52d8dc
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 01:49:08+00:00

Document:
Janet Pichon Hixson and Richard Hixson brought this action, pro se, challenging various child custody determinations made by a state court judge. They've sued the judge in both his individual and official capacities. The judge in question, Judge Robert J. McCallen of the Wabash County, Indiana Superior Court, now seeks dismissal of the case. Because I do not have jurisdiction over these claims, Judge McCallen's motion will be granted and the case dismissed for a lack of jurisdiction.
Because Plaintiffs are pro se, I must construe their complaint liberally and hold it to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). However, the Hixsons remain responsible for proving that the jurisdictional requirements have been met. Ctr. for Dermatology & Skin Cancer, Ltd. v. Burwell, 770 F.3d 586, 588 (7th Cir. 2014). And, of course, I have the obligation to police my own jurisdiction. If it is determined that this Court lacks jurisdiction, I must dismiss the case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1); Baker v. Kingsley, 387 F.3d 649, 656 (7th Cir. 2004).
Due to the nature of this action, both the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and the domestic relations exception are independent jurisdictional bars. I will start with Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The doctrine derives its name from Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 236 U.S. 413 (1923) and Dist. of Columbia Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). At its basic level, the doctrine bars lower federal courts from having subject-matter jurisdiction over claims that seek review of state court judgments. Long v. Shorebank Dev. Corp., 182 F.3d 548, 554 (7th Cir. 1999); Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 463 (2006). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine "prevents lower federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over cases brought by 'state court losers' challenging 'state court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced.'" Lance, 546 U.S. 459, 460 (2006) (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005)).
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies in two circumstances, both of which are applicable here. The first involves a situation like in Lance where a plaintiff loses in state court and then asks a federal court to overturn that decision. The second application is where the federal claims are "inextricably intertwined" with the state court judgment. In this latter situation, the question is essentially whether the state court loser is requesting a federal court to review the state court judgment. Brown v. Bowman, 668 F.3d 437, 442 (7th Cir. 2012); Brokaw v. Weaver, 305 F.3d 660, 664 (7th Cir. 2002). The doctrine is not concerned with why the state court's decision might be wrong, but with which federal court has the authority to intervene. Iqbal v. Patel, 780 F.3d 728, 729 (7th Cir. 2015). It might be that the state judgment is clearly erroneous or unconstitutional, but I still would not be able to review the plaintiff's claims. See Holt v. Lake County Bd. Of Comm'rs, 408 F.3d 335, 336 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that plaintiff could not avoid Rooker-Feldman by styling the injury arising from the state court judgment as a due process violation). To bring a claim in federal court, a plaintiff must first exhaust her options in the state court appellate system and then appeal to the United States Supreme Court. Bergquist v. Mann Bracken, LLP, 592 F.3d 816, 818 (7th Cir. 2010).
The Hixsons allege that Judge McCallen's orders and custody decision caused them irreparable harm. [DE 1 at ¶¶79-82.] They are explicitly seeking relief from the state court judgment, but in doing they run headlong into the first application of Rooker-Feldman. Furthermore, at the very least, the Hixsons are asking me to review the state court judgment. In other words, their claims here are inextricably intertwined with the state court judgment. Because the Hixsons' injuries arise from a state court decision, Rooker-Feldman bars me from hearing these claims. The Hixsons must seek review of Judge McCallen's decisions through the Indiana state court system.
In addition, the domestic relations exception to federal jurisdiction also leaves this Court without jurisdiction to review the Hixsons' claims. Domestic relations matters, such as divorce and child custody, are within the state's traditional sphere of power. See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 12-13 (2004). The doctrine "precludes federal jurisdiction when a plaintiff seeks 'one or more of the distinctive forms of relief associated with the domestic relations jurisdiction: the granting of a divorce or an annulment, an award of child custody, a decree of alimony or child support.'" Dawaji v. Askar, 618 F. App'x 858, 860 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting Friedlander v. Friedlander, 149 F.3d 739, 740 (7th Cir. 1998)). The Supreme Court has long recognized this exception to federal jurisdiction. Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. 582 (1858); Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 694-95 (1992) (reaffirming the exception).
The Hixsons seek injunctive relief against child custody and visitation orders issued by Judge McCallen. What they essentially are asking me to do is to intervene in the custody case. I recognize that there are situations when the domestic relations exception does not apply, such as when one parent files a tort action against the other parent on behalf of the child, Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 690, but this case arises out of a custody dispute and falls squarely under the "core" category of domestic relations. Therefore, these issues must be raised in state court. Id. at 716. As such, I do not have jurisdiction to hear Plaintiffs' claims.
As a final point, while I may ordinarily grant leave to pro se plaintiffs to file an amended complaint to remedy errors that I have identified in their complaint, even if the Hixsons attempted to amend their complaint in this action to bring claims not barred by the two doctrines discussed above, Judge McCallen "is absolutely immune from liability for his judicial acts even if his exercise of authority is flawed by the commission of grave procedural errors." Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 359 (1978); see also Dawson v. Newman, 419 F.3d 656, 660 (7th Cir. 2005). Therefore, any amended complaint would be futile and is not allowed. See Hukic v. Aurora Loan Servs., 588 F.3d 420, 432 (7th Cir. 2009).
For the aforementioned reasons, Defendant Robert J. McCallen's Motion to Dismiss, DE 6, is GRANTED and this action is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE and CLOSED and the clerk is DIRECTED to treat this civil action as terminated.

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