Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/498/39/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 04:24:32+00:00

Document:
In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358, 397 U. S. 364. Petitioner Cage was convicted in Louisiana of first-degree murder and was sentenced to death. In his trial's guilt phase, the jury was instructed that guilt must be found beyond a reasonable doubt, that reasonable doubt was "such doubt as would give rise to a grave uncertainty" and "an actual substantial doubt," and that what was required was a "moral certainty." In affirming Cage's conviction, the State Supreme Court rejected his argument that, inter alia, the instruction violated the Due Process Clause, and concluded that, "taking the charge as a whole," reasonable persons would understand the reasonable doubt definition.
Held: The instruction was contrary to the "beyond a reasonable doubt" requirement articulated in Winship. The words "substantial" and "grave" suggest a higher degree of doubt than is required for acquittal under the reasonable doubt standard. When those statements are then considered with the reference to "moral," rather than evidentiary, certainty, a reasonable juror, taking the charge as a whole, could have interpreted the instruction to allow a finding of guilt based on a degree of proof below that required by the Due Process Clause.
scheme of criminal procedure." Winship, 397 U.S. at 397 U. S. 363. Among other things, "[i]t is a prime instrument for reducing the risk of convictions resting on factual error." Ibid. The issue before us is whether the reasonable doubt instruction in this case complied with Winship.
"If you entertain a reasonable doubt as to any fact or element necessary to constitute the defendant's guilt, it is your duty to give him the benefit of that doubt and return a verdict of not guilty. Even where the evidence demonstrates a probability of guilt, if it does not establish such guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, you must acquit the accused. This doubt, however, must be a reasonable one; that is one that is founded upon a real tangible substantial basis and not upon mere caprice and conjecture. It must be such doubt as would give rise to a grave uncertainty, raised in your mind by reasons of the unsatisfactory character of the evidence or lack thereof. A reasonable doubt is not a mere possible doubt. It is an actual substantial doubt. It is a doubt that a reasonable man can seriously entertain. What is required is not an absolute or mathematical certainty, but a moral certainty."
State v. Cage, 554 So.2d 39, 41 (La.1989) (emphasis added).
the definition of reasonable doubt.'" Ibid. It is our view, however, that the instruction at issue was contrary to the "beyond a reasonable doubt" requirement articulated in Winship.
* Similar attempts to define reasonable doubt have been widely criticized by the Federal Courts of Appeals. See, e.g., Monk v. Zelez, 901 F.2d 885, 889-890 (CA10 1990); United States v. Moss, 756 F.2d 329, 333 (CA4 1985); United States v. Indorato, 628 F.2d 711, 720-721 (CA 1 1980); United States v. Byrd, 352 F.2d 570, 575 (CA2 1965); see also Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U. S. 478, 436 U. S. 488 (1978).

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.