Source: https://www.criminallegalnews.org/cln-litigation/pln-us-supreme-court-amicus-brief-in-support-of-certiorari-in-jones-v-bock-michigan-plra-administrative-exhaustion-case-2005/
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 22:21:38+00:00

Document:
remedies; or instead, whether non-exhaustion is an affirmative defense.
---F.3d---, 2005 WL 285015 (9th Cir.
the federal courts to redress civil rights violations.
for redress of violations of their constitutional rights.
(2d Cir. 2004); Johnson v. Testman, 380 F.3d 691 (2d Cir.
in Support of Petitioner, 2000 WL 1868111 (Dec. 14, 2000).
construction of statutes that affect its clients’ access to courts.
regional and national expert on various criminal justice issues, prison issues, and prisoners’ rights.
of fundamental human and civil rights.
legal service center serving the poor and indigent of Chicago.
resulting in the dismissal of Petitioner’s civil rights claims.
the vindication of prisoners’ rights of access to the courts.
to the courts.” Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821 (1977).
Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 750 (2004).
Congress has historically prescribed limits on the ability of a prisoner to pursue a civil rights claim in federal court.
McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 153 (1992).
that no action shall be brought by a prisoner under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 with respect to prison conditions “until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C.
(1995) (statement of Sen. Thurmond).
of whether the relief sought was injunctive or monetary. Id.
quality of prisoner suits.” Id. at 524.
PLRA’s exhaustion requirement with prisoners’ right of access to the courts.
plead exhaustion with respect to any one or more claims.
4. Petitioner filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
(“MDOC”). Pet. App. 1a. Petitioner suffered serious injuries, including spinal cord injuries requiring fusion surgery.
him for complaining about his injuries. Id. at 8a-9a.
Prisons, 355 F.3d 1204 (10th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 125 S.
3 See Pet. at 18-19, citing, inter alia, Vazquez v. Ragonese, No.
05-1203, 2005 WL 1842273 (3d Cir. Aug. 4, 2005); Bey v.
Johnson, 407 F.3d 801 (6th Cir. 2005); Ross v. County of Bernalillo, 365 F.3d 1181 (10th Cir. 2004).
which it is based, cannot be reconciled with this Court’s decisions prohibiting judicially created pleading requirements.
against judicially-created pleading standards. Swierkiewicz v.
ion issued after the Petition was filed. Lira v. Herrera, --F.3d---, 2005 WL 285015 (9th Cir. Nov. 1, 2005).
falls equally on meritorious cases as on frivolous ones.
furthered the purposes underlying the exhaustion requirement—federal-state comity, and the development of a complete factual record to aid the federal courts. Id. at 515, 51819. Neither rationale supports the adoption of a total exhaustion rule for PLRA cases. See Wilkinson v. Dotson, 125 S.
(noting non-judicial nature of prison administrative proceedings).
claims, rather than mandating dismissal of the entire petition.
Rhines Court are equally applicable to such actions.
prior decisions of this Court.
less the heightened pleading standard of the court below.
the Sixth Circuit disregarded this Court’s clear precedent.
in actions alleging municipal liability under 42 U.S.C.
8(a)’s notice pleading standard alone governs such complaints, and vacated the Fifth Circuit’s decision. Ibid.
the simple requirements of Rule 8(a).
515 (citing Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 168).
they have exhausted all available state administrative remedies. See Baxter v. Rose, 305 F.3d 486, 489-90 (6th Cir.
2002); Knuckles El v. Toombs, 215 F.3d 640, 642 (6th Cir.
2000); Brown v. Toombs, 139 F.3d 1102, 1104 (6th Cir.
the exhaustion requirement.” Pet. App. 3a.
The Sixth and Tenth Circuits’ attempts at distinguishing this Court’s decision in Swierkiewicz are unpersuasive.
court, [that] has required a prisoner to plead specific exhaustion information.” Steele, 355 F.3d at 1211.
does not necessarily follow from the mandatory language.
Swierkiewicz. Both the Third and Ninth Circuits have recognized as much. See Ray v. Kertes, 285 F.3d 287, 297 (3d Cir.
2002); Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1118 (9th Cir.
to in Swierkiewicz and exemplified by Rule 9(b).
315 F.3d at 1118 (citations omitted).
likely to eliminate frivolous suits than to eliminate meritorious ones.
that have been administratively exhausted.
---F.3d---, 2005 WL 285015, *9-10 (9th Cir. Nov. 1, 2005).
in the habeas corpus context, see Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S.
the habeas corpus total exhaustion rule into PLRA litigation.
depth that has occasioned absolute immunity.
context applies in the PLRA context.
a new federal petition containing only the exhausted claims).
In contrast, § 1983 claims are subject to statutes of limitations. See City of Rancho Palos Verdes, California v.
bar a meritorious civil rights claim forever.
mixed petition. Id. at 1535.
not the kind of dismissal contemplated by § 1915(g)).
Court should grant the petition.
their properly exhausted claims are dismissed under a total exhaustion rule.

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