Source: https://lonang.com/library/reference/tucker-blackstone-notes-reference/tuck-418/
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 08:21:16+00:00

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HAVING, under the head of redress by suit in courts, pointed out in the preceding pages, in the first place, the nature and several species of courts of justice, wherein remedies are administered for all sorts of private wrongs; and, in the second place, shown to which of these courts in particular application must be made for redress, according to the distinction of justice, or, in other words, what wrongs are cognizable by one court, and what by another; I proceeded, under the title of injuries cognizable by the courts of common law, to define and explain the specific remedies by action, provided for every possible degree of wrong or injury; as well such remedies as are dormant and out of use, as those which are in every day’s practice, apprehending that the reason of the one could never be clearly comprehended, without some acquaintance with the other: and, I am now, in the last place, to examine the manner in which these several remedies are pursued and applied, by action in the courts of common law; to which I shall afterwards subjoin a brief account of the proceedings in courts of equity.
IN treating of remedies by action at common law, I shall confine myself to the modern method of practice in our courts of judicature. For, though I thought it necessary to throw out a few observations on the nature of real actions, however at present disused, in order to demonstrate the coherence and uniformity of our legal constitution, and that there was no injury so obstinate and inveterate, but which might in the end be eradicated by some or other of those remedial writs; yet it would be too irksome a task to perplex both my readers and myself with explaining all the rules of proceeding in these obsolete actions; which are frequently mere positive establishments, the forma et figura judicii, and conduce very little to illustrate the reason and fundamental grounds of the law. Wherever I apprehend they may at all conduce to this end, I shall endeavor to hint at them incidentally.
WHAT therefore the student may expect in this and the succeeding chapters, is an account of the method of proceeding in and prosecuting a suit upon any of the personal writs we have before spoken of, in the court of common pleas at Westminster; that being the court originally constituted for the prosecution of all civil actions. It is true that the courts of king’s bench and exchequer, in order, without entrenching upon ancient forms, to extend their remedial influence to the necessities of modern times, have now obtained a concurrent jurisdiction and cognizance of civil suits: but, as causes are therein conducted by much the same advocates and attorneys, and the several courts and their judges have an entire communication with each other, the methods and forms of proceeding are in all material respects the same in al of them. So that, in giving an abstract or history1 of the progress of a suit through the court of common pleas, we shall at the same time give a general account of the proceedings of the other two courts; taking notice however of any considerable difference in the local practice of each. And the same abstract will moreover afford us some general idea of the conduct of a cause in the inferior courts of common law, those in cities and boroughs, or in the court-baron, or hundred, or county court: all which conform (as near as may be) to the example of the superior tribunals, to which their causes may probably be, in some stage or other, removed.
THE most natural and perspicuous way of considering the subject before us, will be (I apprehend) to pursue it is the order and method wherein the proceedings themselves follow each other; rather than to distract and subdivide it by any more logical analysis. The general therefore and orderly parts of a suit are these; 1. The original writ: 2. The process: 3. The pleadings: 4. The issue or demurrer: 5. The trial: 6. The judgment, and its incidents: 7. The proceedings in nature of appeals: 8. The execution.
ORIGINAL writs are either optional or peremptory; or, in the language of our law, they are either a praecipe, or a si te fecerit securum.5 The praecipe is in the alternative, commanding the defendant to do the thing required, or show the reason wherefore he has not done it.6 The use of this writ is where something certain is demanded by the plaintiff, which is in the power of the defendant himself to perform; as, to restore the possession of land, to pay a certain liquidated debt, to perform a specific covenant, to render an account, and the like: in all which cases the writ is drawn up in the form of a praecipe or command, to do thus or show cause to the contrary; giving the defendant his choice, to redress the injury or stand the suit. The other species of original writs is called a si fecerit te securum, from the words of the writ, which directs the sheriff to cause the defendant to appear in court, without any option given him, provided the plaintiff gives the sheriff security effectually to prosecute his claim.7 This writ is in use, where nothing is specifically demanded, but only a satisfaction in general; to obtain which and minister complete redress, the intervention of some judicature is necessary. Such are writ of trespass, or on the case, wherein no debt or other specific thing is sued for in certain, but only damages to be assessed by a jury. For this end the defendant is immediately called upon to appear in court, provided the plaintiff gives good security of prosecuting his claim. Both species of writs are teste‘d, or witnessed, in the king’s own name; “witness ourself at Westminster,” or wherever the chancery may be held.
THE day, on which the defendant is ordered to appear in court, and on which the sheriff is to bring in the writ and report how far he has obeyed it, is called the return of the writ; it being then returned by him to the kings justices at Westminster. And it is always made returnable at the distance of at least fifteen days from the date or teste, that the defendant may have time to come up to Westminster, even from the most remote parts of the kingdom; and upon some day in one of the four terms, in which the court sits for the dispatch of business.
Easter, of the holy Trinity, and of St. Michael: which terms have been since regulated and abbreviated by several acts of parliament; particularly trinity term by statute 32 Hen. VIII. c. 2. and Michaelmas term b statute 16 Car. I. c. 6. and again by statute 24 Geo. II. c. 48.
THE first return in every term is, properly speaking, the first day in that term; as, for instance, the octave of St. Hilary, or the eighth day inclusive after the feast of that saint; which falling on the thirteenth of January, the octave therefore or first day of Hilary term is the twentieth of January. And thereon the court sits to take essoigns, or excuses for such as do not appear according to the summons of the writ: wherefore this is usually called the essoign day of the term. But the person summoned has three days of grace, beyond the return of the writ, in which to make his appearance; and if he appears on the fourth day inclusive, the quarto die post, it is sufficient. For our sturdy ancestors held it beneath the condition of a freeman to be obliged to appear, or to do any other act, at the precise time appointed or required. The feudal law therefore always allowed three distinct days of citation, before the defendant was adjudged contumacious for not appearing:20 preserving in this respect the German custom, of which Tacitus thus speaks,21 “illud ex libertate vitium, quod non simul nec jussi conveniunt; sed et alter et tertius dies cunctatione co ntium absumitur.” And a similar indulgence prevailed in the Gothic constitution: “illud enim nimiae libertatis indicium, concessa toties impunitas non parendi; nec enim trinis judicii consessibus peonam perditae causae contumax meruit.”22 Therefore at the beginning of each term, the court does not sit for dispatch of business till the fourth day, as in Hilary term on the twenty third of January; and in Trinity term, by statute 32 Hen. VIII. c. 21. not till the sixth day; which is therefore usually called and set down in the almanacs as the first day of the term.
1. In deducing this history the student must not expect authorities to be constantly cited; as practical knowledge is not so much to be learned from any books of law, as from experience and attendance on the courts. The compiler must therefore be frequently obliged to rely upon his own observations; which in general he has been studious to avoid, where those of any other might be had. To accompany and illustrate these remarks, such gentlemen as are designed for the possession will find it necessary to peruse the books of entries, ancient and modern; which are transcripts of proceedings that have been had in some particular actions. A book or two of technical learning will also be found very convenient; from which a man of a liberal education and tolerable understanding may glean pro re nata as much as is sufficient for his purpose. These books of practice, as they are called, are all pretty much on a level, in point of composition and solid instruction; so that that which bears the latest edition is usually the best. But Gilbert’s history and practice of the court of common pleas is a book of a very different stamp: and though (like the rest of his posthumous works) it has suffered most grossly by ignorant or careless transcribers, yet it has traced out the reason of many parts of our modern practice, from the feudal institutions and the primitive construction of our courts, in a most clear and ingenious manner.
3. Flet. l. 2. c. 34.
4. Mirr. c. 2. § 5.
6. Append. No. III. § 1.
7. Append. No. II. § 1.
8. Finch. L. 189. 252.
9. Stiernh. de jure Gothor. l. 3. c. 7.
10. Mod. Un. Hist. xxii. 45.
11. Jan. Angl. l. 2. § 9.
12. Spelman of the terms.
13. c. 3. de temporibus et diebus pacis.
14. c. 3. § 8.
17. c. 5. § 108.
18. Registr. 19. Salk. 627. 6 Mod. 250.
19. 1 Jon. 156. Swann & Broome. B. R. Mich. 5. Geo. III. et in Dom. Proc. 1766.
20. Feud. l. 2. t. 22.
21. de mor. Germ. c. 11.
22. Stiernh. de jure Goth. l. 1. c. 6.

References: § 5
 § 1
 § 1
 § 9
 § 8
 § 108