Source: https://cbaclelegalconnection.com/tag/search/
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 00:38:36+00:00

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The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People v. Camarigg on Thursday, September 7, 2017.
Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol—Impound—Vehicle—Inventory Search—Warrant—Prosecutorial Misconduct—Burden of Proof—Beyond a Reasonable Doubt—Evidence—Intent to Manufacture Methamphetamine.
After defendant was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI), officers impounded his vehicle because it was parked in front of a gas pump at a gas station. The officers conducted an inventory search of the vehicle and discovered a sealed box containing items commonly used in the manufacture of methamphetamine. Based on those items, they obtained a warrant to search the vehicle and found additional items used to manufacture methamphetamine. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the search and warrant. The trial court denied the motion. A jury convicted defendant of DUI, careless driving, and possession of chemicals, supplies, or equipment with intent to manufacture methamphetamine.
On appeal, defendant argued that the trial court should have excluded evidence discovered in the inventory search of his vehicle and under the subsequently issued warrant. A vehicle is lawfully taken into custody if the seizure is authorized by law and department regulations and is reasonable. Inventory searches are an exception to the warrant requirement and are reasonable if (1) the vehicle was lawfully taken into custody; (2) the search was conducted according to “an established, standardized policy”; and (3) there is no showing that police acted in bad faith or for the sole purpose of investigation. Here, the decision to impound the vehicle was reasonable, and the inventory search was conducted according to standard policy and was constitutional. Because the inventory search was constitutional, evidence obtained under the subsequently issued warrant could not have been tainted.
Defendant next argued that the prosecutor improperly quantified the concept of reasonable doubt and lowered the burden of proof by using a puzzle analogy during closing argument. The prosecutor used a puzzle analogy to convey the difference between proof beyond a reasonable doubt and proof beyond all doubt, which other courts have found permissible. Further, the prosecutor used the analogy to rebut the defense argument that evidence of defendant’s guilt was speculative. The Court of Appeals concluded there was no reasonable possibility that the prosecutor’s analogy contributed to defendant’s conviction. Additionally, the jury was properly instructed on the reasonable doubt standard. Therefore, any impropriety in the prosecutor’s analogy was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Lastly, defendant contended there was insufficient evidence that he intended to manufacture methamphetamine. There was sufficient circumstantial evidence from which a rational jury could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant intended to manufacture methamphetamine.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued its opinion in United States v. Russian on Tuesday, February 21, 2017.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals had to determine if the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule was properly applied in the case where police searched two cell phones belonging to the appellant after his arrest without first obtaining a valid search warrant. At trial, Mr. Russian moved to have evidence obtained from the phones suppressed for lack of particularity. The district court denied the motion, and sentenced Mr. Russian to 137 months’ incarceration. Mr. Russian appealed, claiming that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress the phone evidence, and claiming that the 137-month sentence was above the maximum permitted by statute.
The case stems from an incident beginning in Missouri, where police received a 911 call concerning a man matching Mr. Russian’s description threatening two women with a machete and handgun. When police arrived, Russian fled, beginning a high-speed chase into Kansas. Upon Russian’s arrest, Deputy Wilson searched Russian, and found a red and black phone in his possession. Deputy Wilson then found a second phone in Russian’s vehicle, both of which he entered into evidence. Deputy Wilson later applied for a warrant to search Russian’s residence, as well as both the contents of both phones already in police possession, The state district court warrant authorized the search of cell phones that could be used to commit the crimes, and described the locations to be searched, but did not authorize the search of the phones already in police possession.
The Fourth Amendment provides that no citizen will be subjected to unreasonable search and seizure. However, the court added, that even these protections are subject to the harmless error rule, where a search may be upheld if the error is so unimportant and insignificant that they may be deemed harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, not requiring the automatic reversal of the conviction. The court stated that a search warrant must, in addition to probable cause, describe with particularity the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. In this case, the court said that there is little doubt that the search warrant was invalid for lack of particularity, as it did not identify the phones or the data on those phones to be searched.
Although the warrant was invalid, the court still upheld the denial of Mr. Russian’s motion to suppress under the good faith exception. The good faith exception applies to an otherwise invalid search warrant where the officer’s reliance on the warrant was objectively reasonable under the circumstances, and asks if a reasonably well-trained officer would have known the search was illegal despite the warrant’s authorization. However, the court noted that the government is not entitled to the exception when the warrant is “so facially deficient—i.e., in failing to particularize the place to be searched or the things to be seized—that the executing officer cannot reasonably presume it to be valid.” In analyzing Deputy Wilson’s search, the court determined that because his affidavit specifically described the phones, the warrant referenced the affidavit, and the exclusion of the evidence would not serve the purpose of the exclusionary rule (to prevent police misconduct) the good faith exception applied.
As to Russian’s second claim, the court agreed that district court erred in relying on a guidelines range that improperly took into account a fifteen year old felony conviction that was too old to be included in the sentencing range. The court also agreed with Russian that the court erred in imposing a 76-month sentence, as it is above the 60-month maximum imposed by statute.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed Russian’s convictions, but remanded for resentencing for three of the counts based on the improperly calculated guidelines range.
The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in People v. Delacruz on Monday, December 5, 2o16.
Fourth Amendment—Traffic Stops—Protective Search of a Vehicle.
In this interlocutory appeal, the Supreme Court reviewed the trial court’s order suppressing a firearm that police seized from a vehicle in which defendant was a passenger. The Court concluded that the firearm was discovered during a valid protective search of the vehicle under Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983), given the circumstances confronting the officer at the time of the search. The officer had an articulable and objectively reasonable basis to conduct a protective search of the passenger compartment of the vehicle because (1) the investigatory stop occurred in an area the officer testified was known for frequent criminal activity; (2) defendant appeared to have given the officer a false name; and (3) the officer observed a large knife on the front floorboard near defendant’s feet when the officer asked him to step out of the vehicle for questioning. The Court further concluded that the officer did not exceed the lawful scope of a protective search by looking behind the driver’s seat because the rear floorboard is an area of sufficient size to conceal a weapon and would have been within the reaching distance of a vehicle occupant.
The trial court’s suppression order was reversed.
The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People v. Verigan on Thursday, September 25, 2015.
Warrantless Search of a Vehicle—Probable Cause—Motion to Suppress Evidence—Miranda Warning—Voluntary Statements.
After Verigan’s vehicle was pulled over for a routine traffic stop, in which Verigan was a passenger in the front seat, officers found methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia in the vehicle. She was found guilty of possession of two grams or less of a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia.
On appeal, Verigan argued that the evidence obtained from the search of her vehicle should have been suppressed because Officer Mitchell’s observation of a used marijuana pipe and an unlabeled pill bottle, without more, did not give the officers probable cause to search the vehicle. The officer’s observation of a used marijuana pipe containing a burned substance that the officer could reasonably infer to be marijuana supported a reasonable belief that the vehicle could have contained marijuana, an illegal drug at the time of the search in 2011. Therefore, there was probable cause for the search of Verigan’s car, and the trial court properly denied her motion to suppress the evidence discovered during that search.
Verigan further argued that the trial court erred by denying her motion to suppress the statements she made to police at the scene and later at the station. Based on the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person in Verigan’s situation would have had reason to believe that her freedom of action had been curtailed to the degree associated with a formal arrest and that she was in custody for Miranda purposes even though she had not been given a Miranda warning. Accordingly, the trial court erred by failing to suppress the statements she made to the officers before the Miranda advisement was given. However, because all of the improperly admitted statements that Verigan made in the pre-advisement interrogation were voluntary, and she repeated those statements in her properly admitted post-advisement statement, the improper admission of the pre-advisement statements was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The judgment was affirmed.
The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in People v. Webb on Monday, May 19, 2014.
In this case, the Supreme Court considered whether the search of a purse is within the scope of a search warrant. The police searched Webb’s purse when they executed a search warrant for her house, which they had obtained after identifying indicia that Webb’s adult son, A.W., was using methamphetamine in the house.
The Court held that because the purse was found in a room to which A.W. had access, and because the purse was a container in which A.W. reasonably could have hidden contraband, the search of Webb’s purse was within the scope of the search warrant. The Court therefore reversed the trial court’s order suppressing the evidence that the police found in Webb’s purse and remanded the case to that court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued its opinion in United States v. Romero on Tuesday, April 15, 2014.
Defendant Romero was convicted by a jury of assaulting and killing Naayaitch Friday. He appealed the district court’s refusal to suppress evidence found after searches of the car he drove and his bedroom, claiming that the warrant to search the car was based on an affidavit lacking a substantial basis for probable cause, and that his stepfather did not have authority to consent to the search of his bedroom.
The Tenth Circuit noted that the supporting affidavit for the search of the car contained ample reason to believe a search would uncover evidence, stating “[t]he Fourth Amendment does not require the abandonment of common sense. The officers would have been derelict in their duties had they not sought to search the [car].” The Tenth Circuit also affirmed the trial court’s allowance of evidence recovered from the search of Defendant’s bedroom, finding that under Tenth Circuit precedent, when a child lives with his or her parent, there is a presumption that the parent retains control for most purposes over the property. Since Defendant lived with his parents and there was nothing to rebut the presumption of parental control of the property, his stepfather’s consent to the search of his bedroom was sufficient.
The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in People v. Crum on Tuesday, November 12, 2013.
Vehicular Search Incident to Arrest—Reasonable Articulable Suspicion—Reasonable Searches and Seizures—Suppression of Evidence.
The Supreme Court held that where a defendant is seen retrieving controlled substances packaged in a manner consistent with the intent to distribute from a vehicle parked late at night in an area known for high volumes of drug activity, and where the defendant attempts to conceal the substances, the facts and circumstances give rise to a reasonable articulable suspicion that the vehicle might contain more evidence of possession of a controlled substance. Under such circumstances, police officers may search the vehicle incident to the defendant’s arrest for possession of a controlled substance. The Court therefore reversed the order of the trial court suppressing evidence discovered during the search.
The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in People v. Fuerst on Monday, May 20, 2013.
Suppression of Evidence—Consent to Search.
The Supreme Court held that respondent Kim Maurice Fuerst’s decision to silently remain behind a locked door inside his home did not constitute an express refusal of consent to a police search. Therefore, Fuerst’s wife’s free and voluntary consent to the search of the couple’s home was valid as to Fuerst. The trial court’s order granting Fuerst’s motion to suppress evidence obtained during the search was reversed.

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