Source: http://masscases.com/cases/sjc/373/373mass401.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 09:53:01+00:00

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CIVIL ACTION commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk on May 6, 1976.
Walter H. Mayo, III, for the plaintiff.
Alan K. Posner, Assistant Attorney General, for the Civil Service Commission.
Augustus J. Camelio for the employees.
in point of fact) that the director had failed to comply with G. L. c. 31, Section 43 (a), in that he had not given the employees a hearing with respect to the basis for the termination. [Note 3] In the proceedings before the Commission which followed, the director defended on the dual grounds that the positions had not been brought under the civil service system so that Section 43 (a) was inapplicable; but if the positions were covered, then that the employees' complaints failed because they had not been filed within the time limit set by Section 46A or for other reasons. The proceedings were divided into two corresponding parts, and the Commission, accepting the recommendations of the respective hearing officers who heard the parties, ruled first that the positions were covered, and then that the complaints should be allowed, and entered an order, dated November 19, 1975, restoring the employees to their positions without loss of compensation or other rights.
of Agency positions, including the thirty in question, thereby -- so the director contends -- rendering "moot" the proceedings before the Commission and invalidating its order. The case is here on reservation and report, without decision, of a single justice of this court. We shall draw on the record, consisting of the pleadings and a statement of agreed facts with numerous annexes, as becomes appropriate to the issues discussed below.
1. Were the positions under the civil service? The situation is exceptional, and the question is a close one, but we think the answer is yes.
Statute 1950, c. 639, "An Act to provide for the safety of the commonwealth during the existence of an emergency resulting from disaster or from hostile action," created the Agency as one of the instruments to be used by the Governor in preparing for and meeting such exigencies. We note three important features of the act. First, evidently the act was conceived originally as a response to a temporary or passing situation, as indicated by the fact that it was to run only to July 1, 1952, and might be terminated sooner by resolution of the House and Senate acting concurrently (Section 22). (The specific date was changed to July 1, 1953, by St. 1952, c. 269; and by St. 1953, c. 491, that date was removed and the act given indefinite extension subject to joint resolution.) Second, as befitted its volatile and perilous mission, the act delegated to the Governor, as head of the executive branch, very extensive and highly flexible powers both in preparing for and meeting an emergency. Third, the act anticipated and made possible a close relationship between the State and Federal governments in the field of civil defense.
Court. [Note 5] The question is whether all that has occurred since the enactment, including not only a realization of the more durable character of the Agency and the civil defense program generally, but also action by the Governor under other provisions of the statute and the adoption of adjacent legislation by the General Court, has effected a supersession in substance.
Although asserting and buttressing its own legality, the Order indicated frankly and understandably a preference for the adoption of legislation fully to achieve the purpose.
As the reason for issuing an Order, the preamble mentioned the virtual impossibility of securing legislative action by January 1, 1961; and the Order, which ran to the end of the fiscal year, stated that it was to terminate at any earlier date on which legislation should be adopted confirming the Order or otherwise establishing the civil service status. In fact there was activity in the Legislature on the subject during 1960-1962, but it petered out for no particular reason that can be derived with any assurance from the legislative record. [Note 11] Therefore, in order to continue to qualify the Commonwealth for matching Federal funds (see note 7 supra), further executive orders were issued declaring the civil service status. [Note 12] The last effective order speaking on July 11, 1962, [Note 13] was without limit of time. It has not been rescinded.
even more strongly, by the fact that the Legislature was repeatedly making appropriations for civil defense knowing that receipt of the counterpart funds was contingent on compliance with Federal requirements (see note 4 supra). The vital importance of Federal funding need not be underlined.
Within the Agency, administrative conduct conformed to civil service procedures. It was shown in the Commission proceedings that job seekers were first made aware of openings in the Agency by civil service announcements; that applicants were required to take civil service examinations in order to qualify; that names to fill the positions were requisitioned from the appropriate civil service lists; that jobs were upgraded by reference to civil service standards -- in short, the positions, including the thirty in question, were treated as blanketed by civil service. [Note 14] And vis-a-vis the Federal government, the Commonwealth was representing repeatedly that personnel standards in the civil defense organization were on a merit basis.
of the statute, or rendering inoperative an otherwise active provision; under the civil defense statute, indeed, emergency powers are contingent on the Governor's proclamation.
The case of Nichols v. Commissioner of Pub. Welfare, 311 Mass. 125 (1942), does not, we think, stand in the way of our conclusion. There the Commissioner of Public Welfare promulgated rules of his own which, as the record shows, were similar to, but not the same as the civil service laws and rules, in order to create a merit system that could meet the requirements for obtaining Federal funds for old age assistance and aid to dependent children. This court indicated in dictum that the Commissioner's rules would not have been valid, but the distinguishing fact is that, whereas the State legislation there involved contained no such negative as Section 2 of our civil defense statute, the Commissioner was not able to point to provisions either expressing or implying an adequate delegation of power to him to accomplish his purpose. This distinguishes Nichols from the present case, even without reference to the differences of background and the commanding position of the Governor under the civil defense statute.
appropriations that attracted Federal contributions dependent upon a merit system being in effect, can well be taken as a practical confirmation or ratification of the executive orders even if the latter were in themselves inadequate. Such confirmation or ratification can be raised from a course of legislative behavior and need not be set out in a statute in haec verba. See Fleming v. Mohawk Wrecking & Lumber Co., 331 U.S. 111, 116 (1947); Brooks v. Dewar, 313 U.S. 354, 360-361 (1941); Swayne & Hoyt, Ltd. v. United States, 300 U.S. 297, 301-303 (1937); Isbrandtsen-Moller Co. v. United States, 300 U.S. 139, 146-148 (1937).
3. The director argues that the proceedings before the Commission must be nullified because of the abolition of the positions involved. On the date of that abolition -- November 8, 1975, the effective date of the relevant legislation -- the Commission hearings had been completed and decision was to be rendered in a week's time. We should not embrace easily the result that all must be thrown away and the employees remitted to a fresh law suit, if any can be now maintained.
wooden way the closing words of the second paragraph of Section 46A that the Commission "may order the said appointing authority to restore immediately said person to his employment without loss of compensation or other rights." [Note 18] Such a statement of the remedy appropriate in the usual case should not oust the Commission in the unusual case. Indeed, if correspondence not only with the intent but the words of the statute is wanted, one can say fairly that abolition of the position does not prevent reinstatement but simply limits the period for which it can be ordered. See an analogous situation in Letteney v. Commissioner of Commerce & Dev., 358 Mass. 10 , 12-13 (1970). It may be noted that, besides entitlement to back pay, employees in such cases may have continuing rights to certain kinds of preferment within the system. See G. L. c. 31, Section 46G.
The case is returned to the single justice for the entry of an appropriate judgment for the defendants.
[Note 1] Also joined as defendants were the thirty employees mentioned in the text.
The defendant Civil Service Commission is represented herein by the Attorney General; the plaintiff director by separate counsel.
[Note 2] For the relevant text of Section 46A, see note 16 infra.
[Note 4] Item 0432-0001 under "Civil Defense Agency" cut down permanent positions to not more than fifty-two, as follows: "For the service of the civil defense agency; provided, that expenditures from this item shall be contingent upon the prior approval of the proper federal authorities and shall be expended with at least an equivalent amount of federal funds for the purposes of this item, including not more than fifty-two permanent positions $305,361."
[Note 5] It may be noted here that Section 2 was amended in 1970 (St. 1970, c. 112) but that was merely to make a formal change in the name of the Agency and without attention, we think, to the civil service question.
[Note 6] The President was acting pursuant to the Act of Aug. 8, 1958, Pub. L. 85-606, Section 4, 72 Stat. 533 (later amended by Pub. L. 88-335, 78 Stat. 231 ; see 50 U.S.C. app. Section 2286 [1970 & Supp. III 1973]); and see Presidential Exec. Order No. 10,773, 23 Fed. Reg. 5061, as amended by Exec. Order No. 10,782, 23 Fed. Reg. 6971 (1958).
[Note 7] As required by 50 U.S.C. app. Section 2286(a) (4) ("establishment and maintenance of personnel standards on the merit basis"). Section 2286 states further "[t]hat the financial contributions to the States for the purposes of this section shall not exceed one-half of the total cost of such necessary and essential State and local civil defense personnel and administrative expenses."
[Note 8] Most of the text of the Order was given over to the details of procedure for effecting the change within civil defense organizations of the political subdivisions of the Commonwealth. See St. 1950, c. 639, Section 13. Section 15, quoted in part in the text above, spoke of acceptance by the political subdivisions of offers of Federal funds, also "subject to the terms of the offer and the rules and regulations, if any, of the agency making the offer."
[Note 9] Sections 4 and 6 develop further the authority of the Governor to work cooperatively with the Federal government.
[Note 10] Section 4 stated that "[t]he governor shall have general direction and control of the . . . [Agency], and shall be responsible for carrying out the provisions of this act and may assume direct operational control over any or all parts of the civil defense functions within the commonwealth." Section 8 (as clarified by St. 1968, c. 579, Section 4) stated that the Governor may exercise any power or discretion conferred on him by the act in an emergency or in preparation therefor through the issuance of executive orders (or through instructions or general regulations). By Section 8A an order issued under the act superseded any provision of a general or special law to the extent the latter was inconsistent. Section 20 authorized the Governor to make, amend, and rescind orders, rules and regulations pertaining to civil defense, and prohibited inconsistent rules or regulations of other governmental agencies of the Commonwealth. For the Governor's comprehensive emergency powers, see Sections 5, 7.
[Note 11] Without tracing the legislative moves and retreats in detail, we may mention Governor Furcolo's message to the General Court, 1960 House Doc. No. 3265; Governor Volpe's two requests, 1961 House Doc. No. 2937, 1961 Senate Doc. No. 684; and the last bill introduced, 1962 House Doc. No. 901.
[Note 12] See Executive Orders Nos. 38 (March 12, 1961), 39 (May 1, 1961), 41 (August 30, 1961), 42 (September 15, 1961), and 42A (July 11, 1962).
[Note 13] Executive Order No. 42, as amended by Executive Order No. 42A.
[Note 14] The director of Civil Service expressed the view in writing in 1971 that employees of the Agency (other than its director) were under civil service, a view that was reexamined and upheld in the Commission proceedings in the present case.
We reach our conclusion in this opinion without attaching particular weight to the Commission's decision on a question of law related to its jurisdiction.
[Note 15] The employees have not pressed a possible contention (under the supremacy clause) that they have civil service rights based upon the Federal statute conditioning Federal aid on the State's maintenance of a merit system. Cf. Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282 (1971); California Dep't of Human Resources Dev. v. Java, 402 U.S. 121 (1971); Tomlinson & Mashaw, The Enforcement of Federal Standards in Grant-in-Aid Programs: Suggestions for Beneficiary Involvement, 58 Va. L. Rev. 600, 630-637 (1972).
[Note 17] This interpretation seems to us also supported by (i) the third sentence of the second paragraph of Section 46A which assumes an actual termination, as it speaks of "restoring" the complainant to employment; (ii) the third sentence of Section 43 (a), where the phrase "action affecting employment or compensation" also appears to refer to actual termination.
See also cases interpreting the first paragraph of Section 46A: Coyne v. City Manager of Cambridge, 331 Mass. 270 , 273 (1954); Branche v. Fitchburg, 306 Mass. 613 , 615 (1940).
Reliance for a contrary interpretation on Chartrand v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 345 Mass. 321 , 327-328 (1963), seems misplaced.
[Note 18] We find unconvincing an argument by the director based on the evolution of Section 46A.

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