Source: http://bc-injury-law.com/blog/tag/mr-justice-mcewan/page/2
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 10:25:14+00:00

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Reasons for judgement were released last month by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, dismissing an ICBC application to transfer a Plaintiff’s lawsuit to Small Claims Court.
 I have commented on other occasions about these applications. They amount to the Supreme Court being asked to summarily determine that damages could not possibly exceed $25,000 and also to accept that a trial in Provincial Court is the most expeditious way to deal with the action. On the basis of the material before me, it is not possible to say that the case could not exceed $25,000. The plaintiff wishes to have the matter heard in Supreme Court, and it would only be on the clearest basis that the court would act to deprive a person who wished to be heard in the Supreme Court of the right to do so.
 I am not prepared, on the basis of the material, to summarily find that there is no possibility of the trial establishing damages in excess of $25,000, nor am I in a position to assess whether or not the liability aspect of the claim would foreclose the possibility of such damages. It seems to me that the defence must be seeking the limitation of $25,000 because there is very little else that would suggest a motivation for such claims. It is not, as it may once have been, obvious that the Provincial Court is equipped to hear these matters more expeditiously or more cheaply, particularly given the point at which this application is brought, post-discoveries, after most of the expenses that go into a Supreme Court trial have been incurred. My understanding of the current state of hearing day fees, as such, is that there are none for the first three days of trial. So that is not a factor. There was a suggestion before me that the informality of the Provincial Court is an advantage, but unless that informality is tied to reduced time in court, which is not at all clear, I fail to see how that, in itself, results in any particular economy.
 I think it should be clear that parties have a right to elect the court in which they bring their actions and that, in doing so, if they persist, they run certain risks. Those risks, in the case of a plaintiff’s action brought in Supreme Court that should have been brought in Small Claims Court, include the penalty of not receiving costs in the case of success, and also include the hazard, if an offer to settle is made, of double costs in accordance with the Rules setting out those penalties. It appears from the vantage of the bench that it is much more in the defence interest that the matter remain in Supreme Court than that this application succeed, unless, as I have said, what is really sought is a summary assessment of the case on the basis of very limited information, to bring the matter in under $25,000. Given the hazards (which the plaintiff is aware of), I am of the view that the plaintiff is entitled to bring the matter in this Court if that is what the plaintiff wishes to do.
 I have said as much on the previous occasion of Chang v. Wren in oral reasons given June 10, 2011. I see no reason to stray from the outcome in that case which was to the effect that unless the court were persuaded that damages could not possibly exceed $25,000 the plaintiff should not be deprived of the opportunity to convince a court that their damages exceed that amount. I considered it most unsafe to summarily decide a case on the basis of descriptions that do not include the actual evidence of the parties. Courts certainly have the experience of being persuaded that cases that did not appear to be worth a great deal turn out to be worth much more once they have been heard. I will also say, as I said in Chang v. Wren, that I am absolutely not persuaded by any efficiency or cost-saving argument, particularly where, as here, the application is brought at a point post-discovery. There is very little process to avoid at this point and, for the reasons I have already indicated, it is not at all clear that there are cost savings to be realized.
 Accordingly, I dismiss this application.
As previously discussed, Section 15 of the Supreme Court Act allows the Court to transfer a lawsuit to the Provincial Court (Small Claims) in certain circumstances. Reasons for judgement were released today making it clear that such applications will rarely succeed in personal injury lawsuits.
 I must say I find it unusual that a defendant brings such an application and had some difficulty appreciating the motivation for the application, given that the sanction in costs and in depriving the plaintiff of costs following a Supreme Court hearing would appear, in my view, to be more advantageous than the inevitable result of putting the matter down to Provincial Court, which would be a trial some eight months from when the trial is presently set in August of 2011 in Provincial Court, and a further proceeding by way of mandatory mediation in the Provincial Court.
 Whatever the merits of the respective parties’ positions as to the ultimate quantum of damages in this matter, it seems to me that the appropriate disposition is to see that it gets to trial before a competent tribunal as quickly as possible, and with as little procedural clutter as possible. That militates strongly in favour of the Supreme Court retaining this matter within its precincts, where there is a far greater likelihood, in the present circumstances, of a trial being held when it is scheduled, than there is in the Provincial Court.
 Circumstances might be different if it could be reliably assumed that Provincial Court would get the matter on quickly and be done with it faster than a Supreme Court, but while I am not prepared to go so far as to say I take judicial notice of anything in particular, I certainly will observe that I do not think I can behave on the basis of that particular fiction.
 So on the basis that, first of all, it appears to be more efficient to continue in Supreme Court, and secondly, on the basis that it is, in any event, the plaintiff’s right to choose the forum, where there is any doubt about the appropriate jurisdiction, I think it better at this stage of this proceeding, post-discovery and a few months to trial, for the matter to remain in Supreme Court.
As previously discussed, where motorists have different versions of events following a collision the evidence of independent witnesses can be crucial in addressing the issue of fault. Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, demonstrating this.
In this week’s case (Chang v. Alcuaz) the Plaintiff was involved in a two vehicle collision in 2008. As she was travelling Eastbound on 33rd Avenue her vehicle was struck as she crossed Main Street. The Defendant was travelling Southbound on Main Street at the time the vehicles collided.
(2) was the operator of the vehicle with the benefit of the light, nonetheless responsible to some degree, in the circumstances.
 Respecting the first question, there is reason to doubt the plaintiff’s assertion that she had the benefit of a green light as she now asserts. She was unconscious following the accident and her original statement is at odds with what she presently says. It would be difficult to accept her version of the event without corroboration.
 The assistance offered by the witness, Ms. Currimbhoy, is highly debatable. She, alone, among the witnesses, suggests that the event happened in daylight. On a common sense basis, as I have indicated, she could not be right about her proximity to the plaintiff at the time of the collision. There is also the difficulty that none of the other witnesses saw any other vehicle proximate to the collision. There is a further difficulty posed by Mr. Humphrey’s flatly stated observation that he saw the woman who identified herself as a co-worker pull up after the collision. It is not conclusively established that that was the same person, but it is telling that neither Mr. Jantzen, nor Mr. Humphrey, who observed the entire incident, noted any other vehicle near the scene.
 The defendant, Mr. Jantzen and Mr. Humphrey all say firmly that the defendant had the benefit of the green light when he entered the intersection. Mr. Jantzen’s impression that the defendant may have been “timing” the light is borne out in the defendant’s description of what occurred, in that he says he slowed and then accelerated when he saw the light turn green.
 The evidence from the City of Vancouver respecting the timing of the lights that day at that intersection is also useful. If the light was turning, an eastbound driver had 3.5 seconds of an amber light before the change. For 1.5 seconds traffic in all directions is governed by a red light. This means that by the time the light turns to green, eastbound traffic, at any reasonable speed, has had a warning and ample time to stop.
 The scenario posted by the plaintiff that the light was green or green turning amber as she hit the intersection would imply a red light north and southbound that continued for five seconds after the defendant entered the intersection. This would preclude any impression of the defendant “timing” the light because he would have entered fully on red. That is not in accordance with the observation of Mr. Jantzen or of his passenger, Mr. Humphrey. Both were credible and balanced witnesses who were not caught up in the event themselves except to witness it. Mr. Jantzen, in particular, was paying specific attention to the light because he had been waiting for it to change. His view was unobstructed.
 I am satisfied, on the basis of a consideration of all the evidence, that at the time the collision occurred the defendant had the benefit of the green light and that the plaintiff should not have been in the intersection when the collision occurred.
This case is also worth reviewing for the Court’s discussion of fault for motorists who “time a green light“. The Plaintiff argued that if she did run a red light the Defendant was partially to blame because he timed his green light. Mr. Justice McEwan dismissed this argument but in doing so provided a useful overview of the law at paragraphs 36-46 of the reasons for judgement.
Earlier this year Mr. Justice McEwan provided reasons for judgement finding that an order to sever issues under Rule 12-5(67) is a prerequisite to having only part of a case tried by way of summary trial. Today, reasons for judgement were released confirming this point and finding that where credibility is an issue a case will likely not be suitable for severance or summary trial.
Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, dealing with an interesting question: is a Court order for severance of issues required prior to a Court adjudicating an issue (as opposed to the entirety of a claim) in a summary trial?
The reason why this is an issue is due to two competing Rules of Court. Rule 9-7(2) permits a party to “apply to the court for judgement…either on an issue or generally“. On the face of it this rule seems to permit a party to apply for only part of a case to be dealt with summarily. However, Rule 12-5(67) requires a Court Order to sever issues in a lawsuit stating that “the court may order that one or more questions of fact or law arising in an action be tried and determined before the others“:.
 The question is really whether Rule 9-7 merely describes a mode of trial, while the claim or cause of action remains otherwise subject to the rules that govern trial, or whether the trial of an “issue” under Rule 9-7, where that issue is the severance of liability from quantum, somehow bypasses Rule 12-5 (67) and falls to be decided on a lower standard.
 In the brief passage excerpted from Bramwell (above), three different approaches are apparent. It seems to me, however, that whether the test for severance, or of a trial of an “issue” is rationalized as within or outside Rule 9-7, it must meet the standard set out in Bramwell. Rule 9-7 is, in itself, a departure from the ordinary mode of hearing a trial, and proceedings within it are contingent upon the court accepting that the compromises inherent in that process will not impair the courts’ ability to do justice. That being so, it would be illogical that collateral to the compromises inherent in proceeding by summary trial, other aspect of the process were similarly downgraded. If a trial of an issue is found to be an appropriate way to proceed, it may be tried under Rule 9-7, if Rule 9-7 itself is properly applicable. Where a party seeks to proceed on only part of a case under Rule 9-7, the first question is whether there should be severance at all, and the second is whether Rule 9-7 is appropriate. The correct approach is set out in Bramwell, which would bind me in any case (see Hansard Spruce Mills Ltd. (Re),  4 D.L.R. 590 (B.C.S.C.)).
Can a Verbal Deal Create a Binding ICBC Claim Settlement?
When ICBC Tort and Part7 Claims are settled ICBC usually requires a ‘full and final release‘ to be signed as part of the deal. There is a common misconception that individuals can simply refuse to sign the release if they get cold feet after negotiating a settlement.
ICBC apparently responded that they accepted this offer and required the Plaintiff to submit receipts documenting her out of pocket expenses. The Plaintiff had a different recollection stating that ICBC agreed to pay for her out of pocket expenses on top of the $10,000. ICBC refused to do so arguing that they had a binding settlement.
 Where an oral contract is asserted and denied the case will generally come down to a contest of credibility. An example in the contest of an automobile insurance claim is Barclay v. Insurance Corp. of British Columbia, 2002 BCPC 15.
 This is not a case of duress or unconscionability or undue influence. Depending on the evidence there may be an element of mistake. As the motion for summary judgment has been defended, the issue is whether there was a “meeting of the minds.” The material is not at all decisive on that point, specifically as to the inclusion of the Part 7 benefits in the settlement. Mr. Boswell and the plaintiff differ on what was discussed, and such, if it remains an issue in the action when it is tried will have to be resolved on an assessment of credibility. Such an issue cannot be safely undertaken on the affidavit and documentary material before the court.
 The defendants’ application for summary judgment on the alleged settlement contact is, therefore, dismissed, with leave to bring the issue on at trial, on a better evidentiary foundation, if the defendants consider it in their interests to do so.
While this case did not result in a dismissal based on the settlement discussions it demonstrates that a claimant can enter into a binding settlement even without signing a full and final release. Settlements are based on ‘offers and acceptance’ and it is vital that a claim be valued properly prior to selling your right to sue. You can access my archived posts discussing other legal issues involved in ICBC Settlements by clicking here.
Can A Litigation Guardian Be Ordered to Attend an Independent Medical Exam?
When a mentally incompetent person brings a lawsuit in BC they must do so through a litigation guardian or a committee. Generally, when personal injuries are the subject of a lawsuit, the Defendant is entitled to have the Plaintiff attend an ‘independent’ medical exam. What about the litigation guardian? Can they be ordered to attend an independent medical exam? The BC Supreme Court Civil Rules are silent on this point however, reasons for judgement were released today considering this question using the Court’s ‘inherent jurisdiction’.
In today’s case (Bishop v. Minichiello) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2005 motor vehicle collision. He was an infant at the time and brought the lawsuit by way of litigation guardian. The Plaintiff became an adult prior to the lawsuit resolving. Normally, when this occurs, the Plaintiff files an affidavit and overtakes the lawsuit without the litigation guardian. In today’s case the Plaintiff did not do this apparently because his injuries may have rendered him “unable to appreciate the extent of his own injuries and unable to effectively conduct the litigation on his own behalf.”.
(b) be invoked against the party by invoking the same against the party’s litigation guardian.
The inherent jurisdiction of the court may be exercised in any given case, notwithstanding that there are Rules of Court governing the circumstances of such case. The powers conferred by the Rules of Court are, generally speaking, additional to, and not in substitution of, powers arising out of the inherent jurisdiction of the court. The two heads of powers are generally cumulative, and not mutually exclusive, so that in any given case, the court is able to proceed under either or both heads of jurisdiction.
 The Rules do not, properly speaking, confer jurisdiction. To the extent that they reflect a consensus of the Judiciary (and the Bar) as to the presumptions, or expectations, or shifts in onus that will contribute to the just and expedient conduct of litigation, they are useful in bringing predictability and stability to civil procedure. To the extent that they do not reflect such a consensus, they cannot be regarded as mandatory impediments to doing the right thing in any particular case.
 The silence of Rule 7-6 on the question of ordering the litigation guardian to attend an independent medical examination, does not, in and of itself, preclude the making of such an order, if it otherwise makes sense to do so in order to advance the speedy, just and inexpensive determination of the proceeding on its merits.
 The plaintiff’s objection to the attendance of the litigation guardian is primarily that a conversation between the litigation guardian and the examining physician creates a form of statement that is not controlled within the process and that might well lead to conflict or confusion later, if the guardian and the Doctor do not agree as to what was said.
 The defendant’s point is, primarily, that in a case where the defence is guessing as to the mental status of the plaintiff, it would be prudent to have the person who knows him best, and who is also the litigation guardian, available to answer questions about his condition, especially where it is suggested that, among the effects of the injuries suffered in the accident, is a lack of insight or appreciation on Brandon Bishop’s part of the harm that has occurred.
 I think that as long as the case continues to be conducted by Charlotte Bishop as litigation guardian, the implication that, for reasons related to his injuries Brandon Bishop is unable to conduct the litigation will remain, along with the implication that talking to him will not yield the whole story. The plaintiff’s concerns about possible confusion do not outweigh the defendant’s interest in the appointed examiners getting accurate and complete information. Accordingly, Charlotte Bishop, as litigation guardian, must attend and answer the questions posed by the examiners as they require.
As I’ve previously posted, when Plaintiff’s sue for damages from soft tissue injuries sustained in so-called “Low Velocity Impacts” their credibility often plays a crucial role at trial. The simple reason for this is that without objectively verified injuries a Court must make a favourable finding to accept the Plaintiff’s evidence that they experienced pain following the collision. Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, New Westminster Registry, discussing the relationship between soft tissue injuries and plaintiff credibility.
In today’s case (Chandra v. Chen) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2007 BC motor vehicle collision. The claim was defended with the argument that “the Plaintiff did not suffer an injury in the accident which was so slight that the other driver involved in the accident could not even recall an impact to the front of his vehicle“.
 It is often difficult to assess injuries where the mechanism of injury is not obvious – as is often the case in low damage accidents – and there is little other than the plaintiff’s own evidence to support a claim of ongoing pain. Because “credibility” is crucial, much is often made of inconsistencies in medical records that ostensibly record the impressions of physicians of the plaintiff’s remarks under circumstances that are themselves difficult to assess. The court is often left with making what it can of the impression given by the plaintiff in the witness box.
 The plaintiff did not appear to be exaggerating. She gave her evidence in a straightforward manner. I accept that she suffered some pain associated with the accident and I accept that she is sincere in her effort to recall the pain she has suffered since that time. To the extent that she has been unspecific, and at times somewhat inconsistent, I do not think she has been motivated to mislead. I think her attempt to recall all of the pain she attributes to the accident somewhat at odds with her actual experience, which appears to have been of some aches and pains that would come and go over time. I also think that the stresses of a physical occupation have at times been assigned to the accident when they have actually arisen independently.

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