Source: https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_cha_chapter4_rule14_sectionb
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 17:00:01+00:00

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Article 8(2)(b)(iv) of the 1998 ICC Statute provides that incidental loss of civilian life or injury to civilians must not be clearly excessive “in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated”.
Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted by the UN Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Rome, 17 July 1998, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/9, Article 8(2)(b)(iv).
The expression “concrete and direct overall military advantage” refers to a military advantage that is foreseeable by the perpetrator at the relevant time. Such advantage may or may not be temporally or geographically related to the object of the attack. The fact that this crime admits the possibility of lawful incidental injury and collateral damage does not in any way justify any violation of the law applicable in armed conflict. It does not address justifications for war or other rules related to jus ad bellum. It reflects the proportionality requirement inherent in determining the legality of any military activity undertaken in the context of an armed conflict.
Finalized draft text of the Elements of Crimes, adopted by the 23rd Meeting of the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court, New York, 30 June 2000, Report of the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court, UN Doc. PCNICC/2000/INF/3/Add.2, Addendum, 6 July 2000, as adopted by the Assembly of States Parties, First Session, 3–10 September 2002, Official Records of the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the ICC, UN Doc. ICC-ASP/1/3, 25 September 2002, and ICC-ASP/1/3/Corr.1, 31 October 2002, Footnote 36.
Australia’s Defence Force Manual (1994) refers to the declaration made by Australia upon ratification of the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the effect that references to military advantage in Articles 51(5)(b) and 57 of the Protocol mean “the advantage anticipated from the attack as a whole and not only from isolated or particular parts of the attack” and that “military advantage involves a number of considerations, including the security of the attacking forces”.
Australia, Manual on Law of Armed Conflict, Australian Defence Force Publication, Operations Series, ADFP 37 – Interim Edition, 1994, §§ 510 and 511.
the advantage anticipated from the attack as a whole and not only from isolated or particular parts of the attack.
Australia, The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 06.4, Australian Defence Headquarters, 11 May 2006, §§ 5.10–5.11.
Belgium’s Law of War Manual (1983) states that, when deciding whether or not to launch an attack, “the commander must consider the advantage of the attack as a whole (and not the advantages of specific or separate parts of the attack)”.
The military advantage at the time of the attack is that advantage anticipated from the military campaign or operation of which the attack is part, considered as a whole, and not only from isolated or particular parts of that campaign or operation. A concrete and direct military advantage exists if the commander has an honest and reasonable expectation that the attack will make a relevant contribution to the success of the overall operation. Military advantage may include a variety of considerations including the security of the attacking forces.
Canada, The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Level, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 1999, p. 4-3, §§ 20 and 21; see also p. 2-3, § 16.
1. The military advantage at the time of the attack is that advantage anticipated from the military campaign or operation of which the attack is part, considered as a whole, and not only from isolated or particular parts of that campaign or operation.
2. A concrete and direct military advantage exists if the commander has an honest and reasonable expectation that the attack will make a relevant contribution to the success of the overall operation. Military advantage may include a variety of considerations including the security of the attacking forces.
Canada, The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Levels, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 13 August 2001, § 415.1.
The military advantage at the moment of attack is the advantage anticipated from the operation or from the military campaign of which the attack is a part, considered as a whole, and not only from isolated or particular parts of that campaign or that operation.
There is a concrete and direct military advantage if the commander reasonably and honestly anticipates that the attack contributes to the success of the operation as a whole.
Côte d’Ivoire, Droit de la guerre, Manuel d’instruction, Livre IV: Instruction du chef de section et du commandant de compagnie, Manuel de l’élève, Ministère de la Défense, Forces Armées Nationales, November 2007, p. 27.
Germany, Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts – Manual, DSK VV207320067, edited by The Federal Ministry of Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany, VR II 3, August 1992, English translation of ZDv 15/2, Humanitäres Völkerrecht in bewaffneten Konflikten – Handbuch, August 1992, § 444.
Upon attacking a military target that is located at the heart of [a] civilian district, for example, a group of enemy soldiers who are holed up in the heart of a city and surrounded by civilians, they may be attacked, but only if the expected military benefit to one’s side from the offensive exceeds the expected damage that might be caused to civilians. There is no set formula according to which it is possible to weigh the civilian damage against the expected military benefit from the offensive; but it is a question of degree. An offensive would not be considered legitimate if it presented a significant risk to many civilian lives in return for gaining a subordinate military objective.
- Even if it is not possible to isolate civilians from the military target and there is no choice but to attack, the commanding officer is required to refrain from conducting an attack that could be expected to cause the civilian population damage that is disproportionate to the expected military gain.
Israel, Rules of Warfare on the Battlefield, Military Advocate-General’s Corps Command, IDF School of Military Law, Second Edition, 2006, pp. 27–28.
Netherlands, Humanitair Oorlogsrecht: Handleiding, Voorschift No. 27-412, Koninklijke Landmacht, Militair Juridische Dienst, 2005, p. 34.
In deciding whether the principle of proportionality is being respected, the standard of measurement is the contribution to the military purpose of an attack or operation considered as a whole, as compared with other consequences of the action, such as the effect upon civilians or civilian objects.
New Zealand, Interim Law of Armed Conflict Manual, DM 112, New Zealand Defence Force, Headquarters, Directorate of Legal Services, Wellington, November 1992, § 207.
According to Nigeria’s Military Manual (1994), the principle of proportionality requires that “incidental civilian casualties and damage which is excessive in relation to the value of the expected result of the whole operation” must be avoided.
Spain, Orientaciones. El Derecho de los Conflictos Armados, Publicación OR7-004, 2 Tomos, aprobado por el Estado Mayor del Ejército, Division de Operaciones, 18 March 1996, Vol. I, § 2.5.a; see also § 4.3.
It is prohibited to launch an attack on a military objective when, based on information available in the planning phase, it could be expected to lead to casualties among the civilian population or cause damage to civilian property which would be excessive in relation to the military advantage anticipated from the attack considered as a whole.
Spain, Orientaciones. El Derecho de los Conflictos Armados, Tomo 1, Publicación OR7–004, (Edición Segunda), Mando de Adiestramiento y Doctrina, Dirección de Doctrina, Orgánica y Materiales, 2 November 2007, § 2.5.a.
Spain, Orientaciones. El Derecho de los Conflictos Armados, Tomo 1, Publicación OR7–004, (Edición Segunda), Mando de Adiestramiento y Doctrina, Dirección de Doctrina, Orgánica y Materiales, 2 November 2007, § 4.3.
The military advantage anticipated from the attack refers to the advantage anticipated from the attack considered as a whole and not only from isolated or particular parts of the attack. The point of this is that an attack may involve a number of co-ordinated actions, some of which might cause more incidental damage than others. In assessing whether the proportionality rule has been violated, the effect of the whole attack must be considered.
United Kingdom, The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, Ministry of Defence, 1 July 2004, § 5.33.5.
The US Naval Handbook (1995) states that the term military advantage “refers to the advantage anticipated from the military operation of which the attack is a part, taken as a whole, and not from isolated or particular parts of that operation”.
United States, The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, NWP 1-14M/MCWP 5-2.1/COMDTPUB P5800.7, issued by the Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and Headquarters, US Marine Corps, and Department of Transportation, US Coast Guard, October 1995 (formerly NWP 9 (Rev. A)/FMFM 1-10, October 1989), § 8.1.2.1.
Pursuant to § 170 para. 2 StPO [Penal Procedure Code], the investigation proceedings which were initiated by the order of 12 March 2010 against Colonel (Oberst) Klein and Company Sergeant Major (Hauptfeldwebel) Wilhelm due to suspected offences under the VStGB [International Crimes Code] and other offences are to be terminated as a result of the investigations conducted and based on the sources of information set out hereafter and on the reasons given in detail hereafter.
Germany, Federal Court of Justice, Federal Prosecutor General, Fuel Tankers case, Decision, 16 April 2010, p. 1.
Even considering the fact that the bombing killed civilians to be protected under the international law of armed conflict, the order to attack was lawful under international law.
Even if the killing of several dozen civilians would have had to be anticipated (which is assumed here for the sake of the argument), from a tactical-military perspective this would not have been out of proportion to the anticipated military advantages. The literature consistently points out that general criteria are not available for the assessment of specific proportionality because unlike legal goods, values and interests are juxtaposed which cannot be “balanced” … Therefore, considering the particular pressure at the moment when the decision had to be taken, an infringement is only to be assumed in cases of obvious excess where the commander ignored any considerations of proportionality and refrained from acting “honestly”, “reasonably” and “competently” … This would apply to the destruction of an entire village with hundreds of civilian inhabitants in order to hit a single enemy fighter, but not if the objective was to destroy artillery positions in the village … There is no such obvious disproportionality in the present case. Both the destruction of the fuel tankers and the destruction of high-level Taliban had a military importance which is not to be underestimated, not least because of the thereby considerably reduced risk of attacks by the Taliban against own troops and civilians. There is thus no excess.
Germany, Federal Court of Justice, Federal Prosecutor General, Fuel Tankers case, Decision, 16 April 2010, pp. 63–66 .
“Basically, this subtest carries on its shoulders the constitutional view that the ends do not justify the means. It is a manifestation of the idea that there is a barrier of values which democracy cannot surpass, even if the purpose whose attainment is being attempted is worthy” (HCJ 8276/05 Adalah - The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel v. The Minister of Defense (unpublished, paragraph 30 of my judgment; see also ROBERT ALEXY, A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 66 (2002)).
As we have seen, this requirement of proportionality is employed in customary international law regarding protection of civilians (see CASSESE, at p. 418; Kretzmer, at p. 200; Ben-Naftali & Michaeli, at p. 278; see also Gardam; as well as §51(2)(III) of The First Protocol [1977 Additional Protocol I], which constitutes customary law). When the damage to innocent civilians is not proportionate to the benefit of the attacking army, the attack is disproportionate and forbidden.
“[R]egardless of the seriousness of certain actions and the culpability of the perpetrators of certain crimes, the power of the state is not unlimited, nor may the state resort to any means to attain its ends” (Velasquez Rodriguez v. Honduras, I/A Court H.R. (Ser. C.), No 4, 1, para. 154 (1988)).
However, when hostilities occur, losses are caused. The state’s duty to protect the lives of its soldiers and civilians must be balanced against its duty to protect the lives of innocent civilians harmed during attacks on terrorists. That balancing is difficult when it regards human life. It raises moral and ethical problems (see Asa Kasher & Amos Yadlin, Assassination and Preventative Killing, 25 SAIS REVIEW 41 (2005). Despite the difficulty of that balancing, there’s no choice but to perform it.
Israel, High Court of Justice, Public Committee against Torture in Israel case, Judgment, 14 December 2006, §§ 45–46.
Upon ratification of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, Australia stated that references to “military advantage” were intended to mean “the advantage anticipated from the attack considered as a whole and not only from isolated or particular parts of that attack” and maintained that the term “military advantage” involved a number of considerations, including the security of the attacking forces. Australia also stated that the expression “concrete and direct military advantage anticipated” meant “a bona fide expectation that the attack will make a relevant and proportional contribution to the objective of the military attack involved”.
Australia, Declarations made upon ratification of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, 21 June 1991, § 4.
Belgium, House of Representatives, Explanatory memorandum on a draft bill for the approval of the Additional Protocols, 1984–1985 Session, Doc. 1096-1, 9 January 1985, p. 11.
Upon ratification of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, Belgium stated that the term “military advantage” as used in the proportionality test of Articles 51 and 57 of the Protocol was understood to refer to the advantage anticipated from the attack considered as a whole and not only from isolated or particular parts of the attack.
Belgium, Interpretative declarations made upon ratification of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, 20 May 1986, § 5.
At the CDDH, Canada stated that in its view the expression “military advantage anticipated” was intended to refer to “the advantage anticipated from the attack considered as a whole, and not only from isolated or particular parts of that attack”.
Upon ratification of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, Canada stated that the term “military advantage” as used in the proportionality test of Articles 51 and 57 of the Protocol was understood to refer to the advantage anticipated from the attack considered as a whole and not only from isolated or particular parts of the attack.
Canada, Reservations and statements of understanding made upon ratification of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, 20 November 1990, § 10.
The term “the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated” used in article 8, paragraph 2 (b) (iv), must be interpreted in the light of the relevant provisions of [the 1977 Additional Protocol I]. The term must also be interpreted as referring to the advantage anticipated by the perpetrator at the time when the crime was committed. No justification may be adduced for the nature of any crime which may cause incidental damage in violation of the law applicable in armed conflicts. The overall military advantage must not be used as a basis on which to justify the ultimate goal of the war or any other strategic goals. The advantage anticipated must be proportionate to the damage inflicted.
Egypt, Declarations made upon signature of the 1998 ICC Statute, 26 December 2000, § 4(c).
Upon ratification of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, France stated that the term “military advantage” as used in the proportionality test of Articles 51 and 57 of the Protocol was understood to refer to the advantage anticipated from the attack considered as a whole and not only from isolated or particular parts of the attack.
France, Reservations and declarations made upon ratification of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, 11 April 2001, § 10.
Upon ratification of the 1998 ICC Statute, France declared that “the term ‘military advantage’ in article 8, paragraph 2 (b) (iv), refers to the advantage anticipated from the attack as a whole and not from isolated or specific elements thereof”.
France, Interpretative declarations made upon ratification of the 1998 ICC Statute, 9 June 2000, § 5.
At the CDDH, the Federal Republic of Germany stated that in its view the expression “military advantage anticipated” was intended to refer to “the advantage anticipated from the attack considered as a whole and not only from isolated or particular parts of that attack”.
Germany, Federal Republic of, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. VI, CDDH/SR.41, 26 May 1977, p. 188; Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. VI, CDDH/SR.42, 27 May 1977, p. 226.
Upon ratification of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, Germany stated that the term “military advantage” as used in the proportionality test of Articles 51 and 57 of the Protocol was understood to refer to the advantage anticipated from the attack considered as a whole and not only from isolated or particular parts of the attack.
Germany, Declarations made upon ratification of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, 14 February 1992, § 5.
The term “military advantage” refers to the advantage which can be expected of an attack as a whole and not only of isolated or specific parts of the attack.
It should also be recalled that, as noted above, the relevant consideration to gauge the legitimacy of a response to an act of aggression is not the attacks which have already been committed, but the “overall objective of ending the aggression”. In Israel’s case this means that its response has to be measured not only in respect of the initial Hizbullah cross-border attack, or even the missiles which have already been fired at Israel’s northern towns and villages (some 2,500 at time of writing), but also against the threat of the estimated 13,000 missiles which Hezbollah still has and threatens to use against Israel.
Israel, Israel’s War with Hizbullah. Preserving Humanitarian Principles While Combating Terrorism, Diplomatic Notes No. 1, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Israel, April 2007, pp. 13–14.
123. … [I]nternational law confirms the need to assess proportionality from the standpoint of a “reasonable military commander,” possessed of such information as was available at the time of the targeting decision and considering the military advantage of the attack as a whole. Moreover, the balancing may not be second-guessed in hindsight, based on new information that has come to light; it is a forward-looking test based on expectations and information at the time the decision was made. This perspective is confirmed by the use of the word “anticipated” within the text of the rule itself, as well as in the explanations provided by numerous States in ratifying [the 1977] Additional Protocol I.
126. The same criteria for assessing “military advantage” apply in the proportionality context, namely that the “military advantage anticipated” from a particular targeting decision must be considered from the standpoint of the overall objective of the mission. In addition, it may legitimately include not only the need to neutralise the adversary’s weapons and ammunition and dismantle military or terrorist infrastructure, but also – as a relevant but not overriding consideration – protecting the security of the commander’s own forces.
Israel, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Operation in Gaza 27 December 2008–18 January 2009: Factual and Legal Aspects, 29 July 2009, §§ 123 and 126–127.
Italy, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. VI, CDDH/SR.42, 27 May 1977, p. 231.
Upon ratification of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, Italy stated that the term “military advantage” as used in the proportionality test of Articles 51 and 57 of the Protocol was understood to refer to the advantage anticipated from the attack considered as a whole and not only from isolated or particular parts of the attack.
Italy, Declarations made upon ratification of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, 27 February 1986, § 6.
At the CDDH, the Netherlands stated that in its view the expression “military advantage anticipated” was intended to refer to “the advantage anticipated from the attack considered as a whole and not only from isolated or particular phases of that attack”.
Netherlands, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. VI, CDDH/SR.41, 26 May 1977, p. 168, § 141 and p. 195.
Upon ratification of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, Netherlands stated that the term “military advantage” as used in the proportionality test of Articles 51 and 57 of the Protocol was understood to refer to the advantage anticipated from the attack considered as a whole and not only from isolated or particular parts of the attack.
Netherlands, Declarations made upon ratification of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, 26 June 1987, § 5.
Upon ratification of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, New Zealand stated that references to the “military advantage” were intended to mean “the advantage anticipated from the attack considered as a whole and not only from isolated or particular parts of that attack” and maintained that the term “military advantage” involved a number of considerations, including the security of the attacking forces. New Zealand further stated that the expression “concrete and direct military advantage anticipated” meant “a bona fide expectation that the attack will make a relevant and proportional contribution to the objective of the military attack involved”.
New Zealand, Declarations made upon ratification of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, 8 February 1988, § 3.
Upon ratification of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, Spain stated that the term “military advantage” as used in the proportionality test of Articles 51 and 57 of the Protocol was understood to refer to the advantage anticipated from the attack considered as a whole and not only from isolated or particular parts of the attack.
Spain, Interpretative declarations made upon ratification of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, 21 April 1989, § 6.
At the CDDH, the United Kingdom stated that in its view the expression “military advantage anticipated” was intended to refer to “the advantage anticipated from the attack considered as a whole and not only from isolated or particular parts of the attack”.
United Kingdom, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. VI, CDDH/SR.41, 26 May 1977, p. 164, § 120.
Upon ratification of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, the United Kingdom stated that the term “military advantage” as used in the proportionality test of Articles 51 and 57 of the Protocol was understood to refer to the advantage anticipated from the attack considered as a whole and not only from isolated or particular parts of the attack.
United Kingdom, Reservations and declarations made upon ratification of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, 28 January 1998, § i; see also United Kingdom, Declarations made upon signature of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, 12 December 1977, § e and Declarations made upon ratification of the 1996 Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, 13 February 1995.
At the CDDH, the United States stated that in its view the expression “military advantage anticipated” was intended to refer to “the advantage anticipated from the attack considered as a whole and not only from isolated or particular parts of the attack”.
United States, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. VI, CDDH/SR.42, 27 May 1977, p. 241.
The concept of “incidental loss of life excessive in relation to the military advantage anticipated” generally is measured against an overall campaign. While it is difficult to weigh the possibility of collateral civilian casualties on a target-by-target basis, minimization of collateral civilian casualties is a continuing responsibility at all levels of the targeting process.
United States, Letter from the Department of the Army to the legal adviser of the US Army forces deployed in the Gulf region, 11 January 1991, § 8(F).
In 1992, in its final report to Congress on the conduct of the Gulf War, the US Department of Defense stated that the balancing of collateral damage against military gain “may be done on a target-by-target basis, as frequently was the case during Operation Desert Storm, but also may be weighed in overall terms against campaign objectives”.
United States practice recognizes the principle of proportionality as part of the customary law of non-nuclear war. In applying this principle, it is necessary to consider military advantage not only on an immediate or target-by-target basis, but also in light of the military objectives of an entire campaign or operation.
Report on US Practice, 1997, Chapter 1.5.
The expression “concrete and direct” was intended to show that the advantage concerned should be substantial and relatively close, and that advantages which are hardly perceptible and those which would only appear in the long term should be disregarded.
Yves Sandoz et al. (eds.), Commentary on the Additional Protocols, ICRC, Geneva, 1987, § 2209.
The addition of the words “clearly” and “overall” in the definition of collateral damage [in Article 8(2)(b)(iv) of the 1998 ICC Statute] is not reflected in any existing legal source. Therefore, the addition must be understood as not changing existing law.
ICRC, Paper relating to the crimes listed in article 8, paragraph 2 (b) (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (ix), (xi) and (xii) of the Statute of the ICC, annexed to UN Doc. PCNICC/1999/WGEC/INF.2/Add.1, 30 July 1999, p. 29.
The addition of the words “clearly” and “overall” in [the] provision relating to proportionality in attacks must be understood as not changing existing law. The word “overall” could give the impression that an extra unspecified element has been added to a formulation that was carefully negociated during the 1974–1977 Diplomatic Conference that led to [Additional Protocol I] and this formulation is generally recognized as reflecting customary law. The intention of this additional word appears to be to indicate that a particular target can have an important military advantage that can be felt over a lengthy period of time and affect military action in areas other than the vicinity of the target itself. As this meaning is included in the existing wording of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, the inclusion of the word “overall” is redundant.
ICRC, Statement at the UN Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, 8 July 1998, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/INF/10, 13 July 1998, p. 1, § 2.

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