Source: https://www.scribd.com/document/156050938/De-Vera-v-De-Vera
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 21:09:00+00:00

Document:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse the February 28, 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) and its May 24, 2006 Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 91916.
Thus. did. the RTC promulgated Geren’s Sentence. accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of . Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. in the Municipality of San Juan. CONTRARY TO LAW. The motion was opposedby petitioner on the ground that not all the elements of the mitigating circumstance of “voluntary surrender” were present. 2005. the said accused Geren A. 2003. Finally. Upon arraignment. and the Indeterminate Sentence Law. de Vera (Geren) and Josephine F. De Vera’s previous marriage with Rosario T. who likewise has previous knowledge that accused Geren A. de Vera guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy as charged in the Information and there being two (2) mitigating circumstances (Plea of guilty and voluntary surrender).The facts. are as follows: Petitioner Rosario T. then and there willfully. Geren pleaded “Guilty. and without said marriage having been legally dissolved. They were thus indicted in an Information. said second marriage having all the essential requisites for its validity. in a Motion dated April 8. the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE. as amended. Article 64. 2005. Geren’s motion should no longer be entertained. Revised Penal Code. In an Order dated June 6. on even date. she posited that since the case was ready for promulgation. De Vera being previously united in lawful marriage with Rosario Carvajal Tobias-De Vera. She added that “voluntary surrender” was raised only as an afterthought. Juliano (Josephine) of Bigamy. Metro Manila. the court finds accused Geren A.” However. unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with accused Josephine Juliano y Francisco. as Geren had earlier invoked a “voluntary plea of guilty” without raising the former. as found by the CA. he prayed that he be allowed to withdraw his plea in the meantime in order to prove the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. and no aggravating circumstance and applying the provision of Article 349 in relation to paragraph 5. De Vera is still valid and subsisting. the Regional Trial Court (RTC) granted Geren’s motion and appreciated the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender in the determination of the penalty to be imposed. the accusatory portion of which reads: That on or about the 31st day of July. de Vera accused her spouse Geren A.
In sustaining the appreciation of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. For failure to obtain favorable action from the RTC. However.6 MONTHS of ARRESTO MAYOR. Metro Manila. petitioner moved for the partial reconsideration of the decision but the same was denied in an Order dated August 25. 2005. 2005 RENDERED BY THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT IN APPRECIATING THE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES OF PLEA OF GUILTY AND VOLUNTARY SURRENDER IN FAVOR OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. IT INCORRECTLY AFFIRMED THE ORDER AND SENTENCE BOTH DATED JUNE 6. In the meantime. as minimum to FOUR (4) YEARS. TWO (2) MONTHS ofPRISION CORRECCIONAL. Unsatisfied. 2005. AN ACT THAT WARRANTS THIS HONORABLE COURT TO EXERCISE ITS APPELLATE JUDICIAL DISCRETION. she failed to persuade the CA which rendered the assailed decision affirming the RTC Order and Sentence. CAGAS REGARDING THE REQUISITES OF VOLUNTARY SURRENDER TO BE APPRECIATED IN THE INSTANT CASE. IT ERRONEOUSLY FAILED TO APPLY THE RULING IN PEOPLE VS. 2005 AND THE ORDER DATED AUGUST 25. as maximum. . petitioner instituted a special civil action for certiorari before the CA. Geren applied for probation which was favorably acted upon by the RTC by referring it to the Probation Officer of San Juan. 130139. B. No pronouncement as to cost. and the assailed resolution denying her motion for reconsideration. on June 8. the CA maintained that all its requisites were present. Hence. SO ORDERED. the instant petition based on the following grounds: THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED QUESTIONS OF SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT PROBABLY IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND WITH APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT WHEN: A.
In filing her motion for reconsideration before the RTC and her petition for certiorari before the CA.” The eventual relief prayed for is the increase in the penalty imposed on Geren. because of the allegedly mistaken application of the mitigating circumstance of “voluntary surrender. petitioner sought the modification of the court’s judgment of conviction against Geren. we cannot ignore the procedural issues which the trial and appellate courts failed to appreciate. While we are called upon to resolve the sole issue of whether the CA correctly denied the issuance of the writ of certiorari . Is this action of petitioner procedurally tenable? .The petition lacks merit.
or has applied for probation. or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served. Modification of judgment. be modified or set aside before it becomes final or before appeal is perfected.” Obviously. for to do so would place the accused in double jeopardy.” effectively resurrecting our earlier ruling prohibiting the prosecution from seeking a modification of a judgment of conviction. In 1985. upon motion of the accused. or he. Although the trial court correctly denied the motion for lack of merit. we held in various cases that the prosecution (or private complainant) cannot move to increase the penalty imposed in a promulgated judgment. himself. Records show that after the promulgation of the judgment convicting Geren of bigamy. it was petitioner (as private complainant) who moved for the reconsideration of the RTC decision. This was timely opposed by Geren. The 1964 amendment. the Rules was amended to include the phrase “upon motion of the accused. Prior to the 1964 Rules of Court.Section 7. moves for reconsideration of. Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides: Sec. in judgments of conviction. errors in the decision cannot be corrected unless the accused consents thereto. a judgment becomes final after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal. the present Rules retained the phrase “upon motion of the accused. Except where the death penalty is imposed. . invoking his right against double jeopardy. or appeals from. As explained in People v. we would like to add that the same should have been likewise denied pursuant to the above-quoted provision of the Rules. Simply stated. – A judgment of conviction may. 7. Viernes. the requisite consent of the accused is intended to protect him from having to defend himself anew from more serious offenses or penalties which the prosecution or the court may have overlooked. the rule on the modification of judgments of conviction had undergone significant changes before and after the 1964 and 1985 amendments to the Rules. allowed the prosecutor to move for the modification or the setting aside of the judgment before it became final or an appeal was perfected. Significantly. the decision. or when the accused has waived in writing his right to appeal. however.
But it was an exceptional case. we allowed a modification of the judgment not on motion of the accused but through a petition initiated by the prosecution. The Court declared that the petition constituted a violation of the accused’s right against double jeopardy. The accused thereafter appealed his conviction to the CA which affirmed the judgment of the trial court but increased the award of civil indemnity. on behalf of the prosecution. Certainly.Equally important is this Court’s pronouncement in People v. but it generally refers to “capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. and imposed instead reclusion perpetua. we reiterate the rule that review is allowed only in apparently void judgments where there is a patent showing of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. or to act at all in contemplation of law. Veneracion. In that case. the trial judge. we are not inclined to rule differently. hence. the trial court convicted the accused of homicide. as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary . The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). we entertained the petition for certiorari initiated by the prosecution to resolve the issue of whether the RTC gravely abused its discretion in imposing a lower penalty. then filed before this Court a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. alleging grave abuse of discretion.” The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. Here and now. and remanded the case to the trial court for the imposition of the proper penalty. In that case. in such cases. the OSG wanted a higher penalty to be imposed. dismissible. Indeed. fully aware of the appropriate provisions of the law. In resolving the case in favor of the prosecution. must clearly show that the public respondent acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. a petition for certiorari may be resorted to on jurisdictional grounds. In People v. The OSG prayed that the appellate court’s judgment be modified by convicting the accused of homicide without appreciating in his favor any mitigating circumstance. By so doing. Court of Appeals on the propriety of a special civil action for certiorari assailing a judgment of conviction. In effect. refused to impose the penalty of death because of his strong personal aversion to the death penalty law. the Court concluded that the RTC gravely abused its discretion. The aggrieved parties. Grave abuse of discretion defies exact definition.
it was because he was left with no choice. For voluntary surrender to be appreciated. Cagas and in People v. no grave abuse of discretion may be attributed to a court simply because of its alleged misappreciation of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. Without these elements. the “surrender” was not spontaneous. the accused ran to the upper portion of the cemetery where a police officer caught up with him. the Court added a fourth requisite before “voluntary surrender” may be appreciated in favor of the accused – that there is no pending warrant of arrest or information filed. the following requisites should be present: 1) the offender has not been actually arrested. petitioner insists that arrest was imminent and the “surrender” could not be considered “voluntary. The Court held that if the accused did then and there surrender. Consequently. cannot be characterized as “voluntary surrender” to serve as a mitigating circumstance. and therefore non-reviewable by. Petitioner is correct in saying that in People v. 2) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority or the latter’s agent. Since the warrant of arrest had been issued. after the stabbing incident. and 3) the surrender was voluntary. Obviously. Taraya. the surrender is not spontaneous and. he voluntarily gave himself up.” In Cagas. and where the clear reasons for the supposed surrender are the inevitability of arrest and the need to ensure his safety.and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. The essence of voluntary surrender is spontaneity and the intent of the accused to give himself up and submit himself to the authorities either because he acknowledges his guilt or he wishes to save the authorities the trouble and expense that may be incurred for his search and capture. Thereupon. which had already been done by the appellate court. Even if we dwell on the merit of the case. the trial court’s action cannot come within the ambit of the writ’s limiting requirement of excess or lack of jurisdiction. we find no cogent reason to grant the instant petition. the trial court’s action becomes an improper object of. Thus. . Thus. therefore. certiorari.
acknowledging his culpability. Lastly. Notwithstanding such surrender and confession to the police. the trial court was correct in appreciating the mitigating circumstance of “voluntary surrender. 2005. In Barcino. In the afternoon of the same day. we cannot apply the same conclusion to the instant case. Geren already gave himself up. This was bolstered by his eventual plea of guilt during the arraignment. the court issued an Order finding probable cause for the accused to stand trial for the crime of bigamy and for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. he immediately went to the police station where he confessed that he killed the victim. when the accused learned that the police authorities were looking for him (because of a warrant for his arrest). On March 1. there was no more need for the court to issue the warrant of arrest. nor to save the government the expense and trouble of looking for and catching him. the accused surrendered to the authorities after more than one year from the incident in order to disclaim responsibility for the killing of the victim. Certainly. the Court refused to appreciate the mitigating circumstance in his favor. Thus. the warrant of arrest had. it appears that the Information was filed with the RTC on February 24. As distinguished from the earlier cases..In Taraya. The foregoing circumstances clearly show the voluntariness of the surrender. After the accused posted bail. upon learning that the court had finally determined the presence of probable cause and even before the issuance and implementation of the warrant of arrest. but actually to deny his culpability. not for purposes of acknowledging his culpability. 2005. been issued and was forwarded to the proper authorities for implementation. In Taraya. Barcino. in People v. Geren surrendered to the court and filed a motion for reduction of bail. The Court refused to mitigate the accused’s liability because there was no acknowledgment of the commission of the crime or the intention to save the government the trouble and expense in his search and capture. Cagas is not applicable because the accused therein did not surrender but was caught by the police. in fact. it was a year after the commission of the crime when the accused went to the police station. and there was a pending warrant for his arrest. Jr. In this case.” .
2006 Decision and its May 24. the Court appreciated the mitigating circumstance because immediately upon learning that a warrant for his arrest was issued.” In People v. and without the same having been served on him. Thus. it is clear that notwithstanding the pendency of a warrant for his arrest. the accused may still be entitled to the mitigating circumstance in case he surrenders. Oco. SO ORDERED. PERALTA .We would like to point out that the mere filing of an information and/or the issuance of a warrant of arrest will not automatically make the surrender “involuntary. NACHURA Associate Justice WE CONCUR: CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice Chairperson CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice MINITA V. premises considered. the petition is DENIED. depending on the actual facts surrounding the very act of giving himself up. WHEREFORE. 2006 Resolution in CAG. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice DIOSDADO M. The Court of Appeals February 28. SP No. the accused surrendered to the police.R. 91916 are AFFIRMED. ANTONIO EDUARDO B.
PUNO Chief Justice * Additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Ma.  Penned by Associate Justice Remedios A.  Penned by Associate Justice Remedios A. pp.Associate Justice ATTESTATION I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division. 2009. Villon. REYNATO S. I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division. Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation. rollo. rollo. CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice Chairperson. 602 dated March 20. concurring. concurring. Salazar-Fernando. Salazar-Fernando. Abdulwahid and Estela M. 43-51. Abdulwahid and Sesinando E. 52- . Alicia Austria-Martinez per Special Order No. Perlas-Bernabe. with Associate Justices Hakim S. Third Division CERTIFICATION Pursuant to Section 13. pp. with Associate Justices Hakim S.

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 V.