Source: https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_rul_rule8_sectioni
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 19:37:33+00:00

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The presence of noncombatants in or around a military objective does not change its nature as a military objective. Noncombatants in the vicinity of a military objective must share the danger to which the military objective is exposed.
Civilians working in a store on a military air base may not necessarily be taking … a direct part [in hostilities]. However, stores, depots, supply columns and military installations are clearly military objectives which may be attacked, regardless of the presence of civilian workers.
Civilians who are not directly involved in combat but are performing military tasks are not combatants. If they are killed or injured during an attack on a legitimate military objective there is no breach of LOAC provided the death or injury is not disproportionate to the direct and concrete military advantage anticipated from the attack. The presence of civilians on or near the proposed military objective (either in a voluntary capacity or as a shield) is merely one of the factors that must be considered when planning an attack.
Australia, Manual on Law of Armed Conflict, Australian Defence Force Publication, Operations Series, ADFP 37 – Interim Edition, 1994, §§ 526, 532 and 550.
5.36 … [C]ivilians working in a store on a military air base may not necessarily be taking … a direct part [in hostilities]. However, stores depots, supply columns and military installations are clearly military objectives which may be attacked, regardless of the presence of civilian workers.
5.55 Civilians who are not directly involved in combat but are performing military tasks are not combatants. If they are killed or injured during an attack on a legitimate military objective there is no breach of the LOAC provided the death or injury is not disproportionate to the direct and concrete military advantage anticipated from the attack. The presence of civilians on or near the proposed military objective (either in a voluntary capacity or as a shield) is one of the factors that must be considered when planning an attack.
Australia, The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 06.4, Australian Defence Headquarters, 11 May 2006, §§ 5.30, 5.36 and 5.55.
- objects which by virtue of their existence or destruction contribute in whatever way to military action. Civilians located within a military objective or in its surroundings immediately share the danger to which it is exposed.
For targeting purposes, the presence of civilians who are authorized to accompany the armed forces without actually being members thereof (such as crews of military aircraft, war correspondents, supply contractors or members of services responsible for the welfare of the armed forces) does not render a legitimate target immune from attack. Such persons run the risk of being attacked as part of a legitimate target.
Canada, The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Level, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 1999, p. 4-4, § 34.
Canada, The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Levels, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 13 August 2001, § 425.
Colombia, Derechos Humanos & Derecho Internacional Humanitario – Manual de Instrucción de la Guía de Conducta para el Soldado e Infante de Marina, Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, Oficina de Derechos Humanos, Fuerzas Militares de Colombia, Santafé de Bogotá, 1999, p. 18.
The presence of civilians who are authorized to accompany the armed forces without really being members of these forces (members of crews of military aircraft, war correspondents, suppliers, members of services responsible for the welfare of the armed forces) does not render a legitimate objective exempt from attacks. These persons run the risk of being attacked as elements of the legitimate objective.
Croatia’s LOAC Compendium (1991) considers that supply and maintenance bases are military objectives and that civilian personnel working there share the risk of attack.
Deliberate use of noncombatants to shield military objectives from enemy attack is prohibited. The presence of non-combatants within or near military objectives does not preclude an attack on such objectives … Unlike military personnel (other than those in a specially protected status such as medical personnel and the sick and wounded) who are always subject to attack, whether on duty or in a leave capacity, civilians are immune from attack unless they are engaged in direct support of the enemy’s armed forces or provide them with logistical support. Civilians who provide command, administrative or logistical support to military operations are exposed to attacks while performing such duties. Similarly, civilian employees of navy shipyards, the merchant navy personnel working on ships carrying military cargo, and the workers on military fortifications can be attacked while they carry out such activities.
Ecuador, Aspectos Importantes del Derecho Internacional Marítimo que Deben Tener Presente los Comandantes de los Buques, Academia de Guerra Naval, 1989, §§ 11.2 and 11.3.
Civilians present in military objectives are not protected against attacks directed at these objectives; the presence of civilian workers in an arms production plant, for instance, will not prevent opposing armed forces from attacking this military objective.
Germany, Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts – Manual, DSK VV207320067, edited by The Federal Ministry of Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany, VR II 3, August 1992, English translation of ZDv 15/2, Humanitäres Völkerrecht in bewaffneten Konflikten – Handbuch, August 1992, § 445.
Hungary’s Military Manual (1992) considers that supply and maintenance bases are military objectives and that civilian personnel working there share the risk of attack.
It is the duty of the attacker to distinguish between military targets and civilian targets, and the attacker should take into account the presence of civilian targets when planning the attack. No area in which military targets are combined with civilian targets may be considered as merely another target.
Civilians must not be used to screen the military movements and for the purpose of concealment amongst them. This is also the reason why soldiers are under an obligation to wear uniform or identification insignia so as to make it possible to distinguish clearly between them and civilians.
It is nevertheless unreasonable to expect a military force to completely hold its fire in every incident in which opening fire could endanger civilians; if this were the case, the best defence would be simply to surround military targets with civilians.
It is difficult to provide unequivocal answers to these questions. Each army and each commander needs to deal with this dilemma in ways that stem from the ethical outlook, the degree of risk that can be assumed in order to prevent the killing of innocent people and the nature of the enemy that is being contended with. The answer often depends on the circumstances. The situation can range from that of a large force pursuing a small company of enemy soldiers besieged from every angle, to a situation in which a unit in distress is under fire from a civilian target, for example from the rooftop of a museum. In the first incident the commander should display much more restraint, and in the second, the military needs [to] justify and permit an attack on the party that has misused the location, consequently weakening the protection afforded to the museum.
Acts such as the manufacturing and transport of military materiel in the hinterland certainly do not constitute a direct participation in hostilities. In addition, it has to be borne in mind that the fact that civilians are working in, for example, a weapons factory does not convert such an industrial object into a civilian object. Such a case has to be assessed in the light of the definition of a military objective.
New Zealand, Interim Law of Armed Conflict Manual, DM 112, New Zealand Defence Force, Headquarters, Directorate of Legal Services, Wellington, November 1992, § 802(2).
Spain’s Field Regulations (1882) deals with the question of whether protection should be granted to “individuals who, forming part of a field army, are nonetheless not combatants in the strict sense of the word, such as employees and operatives of administrative and technical bodies, drivers, cleaners”.
Spain, El Reglamento para el Servicio de Campaña, 4 January 1882, Article 853.
According to the Regulations, such individuals “who are not military personnel but follow armies to the battlefield are naturally exposed to the same dangers and cannot expect to be treated differently; but once their position and functions have been identified, they must be respected”.
Spain, El Reglamento para el Servicio de Campaña, 4 January 1882, Article 855.
–their carrying out activities supporting military operations (units of workers, workers in arms factories, etc.).
Spain, Orientaciones. El Derecho de los Conflictos Armados, Publicación OR7-004, 2 Tomos, aprobado por el Estado Mayor del Ejército, Division de Operaciones, 18 March 1996, Vol. I, § 4.4.e; see also § 2.3.b.(1).
The manual further provides that civilian personnel who accompany and render services to the armed forces “do not have the protected status of the civilian population but are entitled to the status of prisoner of war in case of capture”.
Indirect objectives are those that cannot be directly attacked, but may suffer the consequences of an attack on a military objective.
- activities that support military operations (labour units, workers in weapons factories, etc.).
Spain, Orientaciones. El Derecho de los Conflictos Armados, Tomo 1, Publicación OR7–004, (Edición Segunda), Mando de Adiestramiento y Doctrina, Dirección de Doctrina, Orgánica y Materiales, 2 November 2007, § 4.4.e.
The manual also states that civilian personnel accompanying and providing services to the armed forces “are not protected as civilians, but they are entitled to prisoner-of-war status if they are captured”.
Spain, Orientaciones. El Derecho de los Conflictos Armados, Tomo 1, Publicación OR7–004, (Edición Segunda), Mando de Adiestramiento y Doctrina, Dirección de Doctrina, Orgánica y Materiales, 2 November 2007, § 5.2.a.(2).(b); see also § 7.3.a.(3).
Civilians who are inside or in the immediate vicinity of military objectives run the risks to which the military objectives are exposed. For example, the presence of civilian workers inside a weapons factory does not prevent the enemy from attacking this military objective.
Switzerland, Lois et coutumes de la guerre (Extrait et commentaire), Règlement 51.7/II f, Armée Suisse, 1987, Article 28 and commentary.
Switzerland’s Regulation on Legal Bases for Conduct during an Engagement (2005) explains with respect to the example of a “[m]ortar site, two civilian women are supplying beverages” that, in application of the principles of distinction and proportionality, the “mortar site can be attacked as a military objective: collateral damage”.
Switzerland, Bases légales du comportement à l’engagement (BCE), Règlement 51.007/IVf, Swiss Army, issued based on Article 10 of the Ordinance for the Organization of the Federal Department for Defence, Civil Protection and Sports of 7 March 2003, entry into force on 1 July 2005, § 172.
With respect to the example of a “[c]onvoy of refugees intermingled with some combatants”, the Regulation explains that, in application of the principle of proportionality, “[t]he concrete military advantage is not in an acceptable proportion”.
With respect to the example of a “[b]attle tank accommodating wounded persons”, the Regulation further explains that, in application of the principle of military necessity, the tank is “not a protected object. Military objective, collateral damage”.
The Regulation also states that civilians “are especially protected by the law of armed conflict, insofar as they do not participate in combat and are not in the immediate proximity of military objectives”.
Switzerland, Bases légales du comportement à l’engagement (BCE), Règlement 51.007/IVf, Swiss Army, issued based on Article 10 of the Ordinance for the Organization of the Federal Department for Defence, Civil Protection and Sports of 7 March 2003, entry into force on 1 July 2005, § 197. The German language version of sentence 2 of § 197 notes: “… insofar as they do not participate in combat or [“oder”] are in the immediate proximity of military objectives”.
Deliberate use of noncombatants to shield military objectives from enemy attack is prohibited. Although the principle of proportionality underlying the concept of collateral damage and incidental injury continues to apply in such cases, the presence of non-combatants within or adjacent to a legitimate target does not preclude attack of it … Unlike military personnel (other than those in a specially protected status such as medical personnel and the sick and wounded) who are always subject to attack whether on duty or in a leave capacity, civilians, as a class, are not to be the object of attack. However, civilians that are engaged in direct support of the enemy’s war-fighting or war-sustaining effort are at risk of incidental injury from attack on such activities.
United States, The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, NWP 1-14M/MCWP 5-2.1/COMDTPUB P5800.7, issued by the Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and Headquarters, US Marine Corps, and Department of Transportation, US Coast Guard, October 1995 (formerly NWP 9 (Rev. A)/FMFM 1-10, October 1989), §§ 11.2 and 11.3.
Although the principle of proportionality underlying the concept of collateral damage continues to apply in such cases, the presence of civilians within or adjacent to a legitimate military objective does not preclude attack of it. Such military objectives may be lawfully targeted and destroyed as needed for mission accomplishment. In such cases, responsibility for the injury and/or death of such civilians, if any, falls on the belligerent so employing them.
The presence of civilian workers, such as technical representatives aboard a warship or employees in a munitions factory, in or on a military objective, does not alter the status of the military objective. These civilians may be excluded from the proportionality analysis.
Civilians who voluntarily place themselves in or on a military objective as “human shields” in order to deter a lawful attack do not alter the status of the military objective. While the law of armed conflict is not fully developed in such cases, such persons may also be considered to be taking a direct part in hostilities or contributing directly to the enemy’s warfighting/war-sustaining capability, and may be excluded from the proportionality analysis. Attacks under such circumstances likely raise political, strategic, and operational issues that commanders should identify and consider when making targeting decisions.
According to the Report on the Practice of Japan, the judgment of the Tokyo District Court in the Shimoda case in 1963, which concerned the dropping of the atomic bomb, can be interpreted as having denied the existence of the concept of so-called quasi-combatants, whereby civilians who do not directly partake in hostilities, but indirectly contribute to hostile acts by working in transportation, communication and industrial facilities would be regarded as military objectives.
Report on the Practice of Japan, 1998, Chapter 1.2, referring to Tokyo District Court, Shimoda case, Judgment, 7 December 1963.
In practice Israel does not adopt the position reflected here that civilians in the vicinity of a military objective must “share the danger”, but rather takes significant efforts to avoid or minimize civilian casualties.
Israel, Israel’s War with Hizbullah. Preserving Humanitarian Principles While Combating Terrorism, Diplomatic Notes No. 1, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Israel, April 2007, p. 14.
Clearly, the deliberate placing of military targets in the heart of civilian areas is a serious violation of humanitarian law, and those who chose to locate such targets in these areas must bear responsibility for the injury to civilians which this decision engenders. … The defender has the primary duty of protecting the civilian population and removing civilians from military targets, if necessary. And … [s]hould civilian casualties ensue from an attempt to shield combatants or a military objective, the ultimate responsibility lies with the belligerent placing innocent civilians at risk.
Nonetheless the callous disregard of those who hide behind civilians does not absolve the state seeking to respond to such attacks from the responsibility to avoid or at least minimize injury to civilians and their property in the course of its operations. In particular this raises the complex issue of proportionality.
100. The expected presence of civilians, though, does impact the analysis of the proportionality of an attack.
Israel, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Operation in Gaza 27 December 2008–18 January 2009: Factual and Legal Aspects, 29 July 2009, §§ 99–100.
Civilians who work within a military objective are at risk from attack during the times in which they are present within that objective, whether their injury or death is incidental to the attack of that military objective or results from their direct attack … The substitution of a civilian in a position or billet that normally would be occupied by a member of the military will not make that position immune from attack.
United States, Department of the Army, Office of the Judge Advocate General, Memorandum of Law: Executive Order 12333 and Assassination, 2 November 1989, The Army Lawyer, Pamphlet 27-50-204, December 1989.
Civilians using those bridges or near other targets at the time of their attack were at risk of injury incidental to the legitimate attack of those targets … The presence of civilians will not render a target immune from attack; legitimate targets may be attacked wherever located (outside neutral territory and waters).
United States, Department of Defense, Final Report to Congress on the Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, 10 April 1992, Appendix O, The Role of the Law of War, ILM, Vol. 31, 1992, pp. 624 and 625.
Frédéric de Mulinen, Handbook on the Law of War for Armed Forces, ICRC, Geneva, 1987, § 56.
Sections of the civilian population, like munition workers, which are closely identified with military objectives proper, may, while so identified, be legitimately exposed to air attack and to other belligerent measures aiming at the destruction of the objectives in question.
Lassa Oppenheim, International Law. A Treatise, Vol. II, Disputes, War and Neutrality, Sixth edition, revised, Hersch Lauterpacht (ed.), Longmans, Green and Co., London/New York/Toronto, 1944, p. 416, § 214ea.
Persons providing only indirect support to the Nicaraguan army by, inter alia, working in defense plants, distributing or storing military supplies in rear areas, supplying labor and food, or serving as messengers or disseminating propaganda … may not be subject to direct individualized attack or execution since they pose no immediate threat to the adversary. However, they assume the risk of incidental death or injury arising from attacks against legitimate military targets.
Americas Watch, Violations of the Laws of War by Both Sides in Nicaragua: 1981–1985, New York, March 1985, p. 32.
Americas Watch, Land Mines in El Salvador and Nicaragua: The Civilian Victims, New York, December 1986, p. 98.
Persons providing only indirect support to the Angolan, Cuban, or South African armed forces or UNITA [União Nacional para Independência Total de Angola] by, inter alia, working in defense plants, distributing or storing military supplies behind conflict areas, supplying labor and food, serving as messengers, or disseminating propaganda … may not be subject to direct individualized attack because they pose no immediate threat to the adversary. They assume, however, the risk of incidental death or injury arising from attacks and the use of weapons against legitimate military targets.
Africa Watch, Angola: Violations of the Laws of War by Both Sides, New York, April 1989, p. 138.

References: § 34
 § 425
 § 445
 § 802
 § 4
 § 2
 § 4
 § 5
 § 7
 § 172
 § 197
 § 197
 § 56
 § 214