Source: https://www.helmlawoffice.com/police-misconduct/section-1983-unreasonable-searches-of-the-home/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 02:25:53+00:00

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the place where the search was conducted.
Ninth Cir. Civ. Jury Instr. 9.12.
With only three exceptions—consent, exigency, or emergency—an officer’s warrantless search of a person’s home is presumptively unconstitutional. Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 558 (2004) (citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586–88 (1980)).
As the United States Supreme Court has stated, “[t]he security of one’s privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police—which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment—is basic to a free society.” Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 453 (1971). To prevail at trial, however, a person must prove that none of the exceptions to the warrant requirement applied.
any other circumstances applicable to the case.
Ninth Cir. Civ. Jury Instr. No. 9.15.
Again, the home’s occupant must prove a negative–that, under the circumstances, the consent exception does not apply.
there was insufficient time for the officer to get a search warrant.
Ninth Cir. Civ. Jury Instr. No. 9.16.
In addition to exigent circumstances (1), an officer must still satisfy (2)-(3) for the exception to apply.
The emergency-aid exception recognizes that law-enforcement officers act in a “community caretaking function” which allows them without a warrant “to enter a home when an emergency which threatens physical harm is presented.” Espinosa v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 598 F.3d 528, 534 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted).
the search’s scope and manner were reasonable to meet that end.
Generally, a police officer’s search under an invalid warrant is as presumptively unreasonable a police officer’s warrantless search. A search warrant may be invalid because it lacks particularity, which means it fails to specify what the police are searching for. To be valid under the Fourth Amendment, a search warrant must specify what the police should be searching for with enough precision to prevent them from interpreting the warrant themselves: “[t]he requirement that warrants shall particularly describe the things to be seized makes general searches under them impossible and prevents the seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another. As to what is to be taken, nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant. Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927).
First, it prevents “a general, exploratory rummaging in a person’s belongings.” Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 (1971).
Second, it “assures the individual whose property is searched or seized of the lawful authority of the executing officer, his need to search, and the limits of his power to search.” Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 561 (2004) (quoting United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 9 (1977).
Third, “the absence of a sufficiently particular warrant increase[s] the likelihood and degree of confrontation” between the searching officers and the individuals whose property is subject to search.” Ramirez v. Butte-Silver Bow Cty., 298 F.3d 1022, 1027 (9th Cir. 2002) (as amended), aff’d, Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551 (2004).
Fourth, an invalid warrant deprives individuals “of the means to be on the lookout and to challenge officers who might have exceeded the limits imposed by the magistrate.” Ramirez, 298 F.3d at 1027.
Even a facially valid warrant may be invalid based on a theory of judicial deception if the officer lied to the judge to get it. Under certain circumstances, an occupant whose home was searched pursuant to a search warrant may sue the officer who submitted the affidavit in support of the search warrant to the judge for signing if the affidavit contained omissions or untruths.
Hervey v. Estes, 65 F.3d 784, 788-89 (9th Cir. 1995).
An officer may act with reckless disregard for the truth by leaving out of the affidavit important facts the officer knows. “By reporting less than the total story, an affiant can manipulate the inferences a magistrate will draw.” United States v. Stanert, 762 F.2d 775, 781 (9th Cir. 1985). To allow a magistrate “to be mislead in such a manner could denude the probable cause requirement of all real meaning.” Id. at 781. An officer may violate a person’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from an unreasonable search where (s)he “intentionally or recklessly omitted facts required to prevent technically true statements in the affidavit from being misleading.” Id.

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