Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/199/521/
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 00:24:09+00:00

Document:
There is a vital difference between an attempt of the government to review a verdict of acquittal in the court of first instance and the action of the accused in himself appealing from a judgment which convicts him of one offense while acquitting him from the higher one charged in the indictment. Kepner v. United States, 195 U. S. 100, distinguished.
Where, upon the indictment of a greater offense, the one accused is found not guilty thereof, but guilty of a lower offense included therein, and upon appeal from that judgment a new trial is granted by the appellate court, the accused can, on the new trial, be tried for the greater offense in the indictment, and such new trial does not amount to placing him in jeopardy a second time for the same offense within the meaning of the federal Constitution or of the provisions in that regard in the Philippine Act of July 1, 1902, 32 Stat. 691.
The appeal of the accused in such case amounts to a waiver to the plea of second jeopardy by asking that he be again tried for the offense for which he has once been convicted, and if that request be granted, he must take the burden with the benefit, and go back for the new trial upon the whole case.
Quaere whether the constitutional provision against second jeopardy was intended to apply to a judgment under these circumstances.
In reversing the lower court and itself convicting the accused on such appeal, the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands acted within its powers, and in ordinary procedure in the courts of that country under the Act of July 1, 1902.
of first instance of the Province of Bulacan, Philippine Islands, upon a complaint accusing them of causing the death of Benito Perez "with great cruelty and evident premeditation . . . by means of blows given with the butts of guns, they cooperating one with the other." In other words, the accused were complained of as guilty of murder in the first degree.
They were tried in the court above mentioned, and were acquitted of the crime of murder, and convicted of the crime of assault, which is included in the crime of murder charged in the complaint, and they were therefore sentenced by the court to suffer a penalty of six months' imprisonment, and to pay a certain sum to the heirs of Perez, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
All three of the accused appealed to the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands from the judgment and sentence of the trial court. The Supreme Court, having heard the case, reversed the judgment of the court of first instance and convicted the accused of the crime of homicide (in substance, murder in the second degree), which is included in, and is a lower degree of, the crime charged in the complaint, but is a higher degree of crime than that of which the accused were convicted in the court below. Two of them (Angeles and Trono) were sentenced to fourteen years, eight months, and one day, and Natividad to imprisonment for eight years and one day, and all three to the payment of an indemnity to the heirs of the deceased.
The accused have brought the case here by writ of error to the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands, for the purpose of reviewing the judgment of that court.
Messrs. Aldis B. Browne, Alexander Britton, and Maurice Kelly for plaintiffs in error.
The plaintiffs in error seek a reversal of the judgment in their case on the ground that the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands had no power to reverse the judgment of the court of first instance, and then find them guilty of a higher crime than that of which they had been convicted in that court, and of which higher crime that court had acquitted them, and they contend that such a conviction by the Supreme Court of the Islands was a violation of the act of Congress, passed July 1, 1902, 32 Stat. 691, a portion of the fifth section of that act providing that "no person for the same offense shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment."
This language is to be found in connection with other language in the same act providing for the rights of a person accused of crime in the Philippine Islands. The whole language is substantially taken from the Bill of Rights set forth in the amendments to the Constitution of the United States, omitting the provisions in regard to the right of trial by jury and the right of the people to bear arms, and containing the prohibition of the Thirteenth Amendment, and also prohibiting the passage of bills of attainder and ex post facto laws.
The important question to be determined is whether this action of the Supreme Court of the Islands did violate the act of Congress by placing the accused twice in jeopardy.
States, decided in May, 1904, 195 U. S. 100, where will be found a very full discussion of the subject. The plaintiff in error in that case had been acquitted of the crime charged against him in the court to first instance, but the government, not being satisfied with the decision, appealed to the Supreme Court, and that court reversed the judgment of acquittal and found Kepner guilty of the crime of which the court of first instance had acquitted him, and sentenced him to a term of imprisonment, and suspended him from any public office or public trust, and deprived him of the right of suffrage. This Court, upon writ of error, held that, in reversing, upon the appeal of the government, the judgment of the court of first instance, and itself convicting the accused and pronouncing judgment against him, the Supreme Court of the Islands violated the provision in question, and its judgment was therefore reversed and the prisoner discharged. It was also held that the government had no power to obtain a review of a judgment or decision of the trial court acquitting an accused party, and that the phrase in question was to be construed as the same phrase would be construed in the instrument from which it was originally taken -- viz., the Constitution of the United States -- and that the settled and well known meaning of the language, as used in the Constitution, must also be taken when the same language is used in the act of Congress, and not as it might possibly be construed with reference to Spanish law or Spanish procedure.
judgment and asking for its reversal, even though that judgment, while convicting him of the lower offense, acquits him of the higher one charged in the complaint.
We may regard the question as thus presented as the same as if it arose in one of the federal courts in this country, where, upon an indictment for a greater offense, the jury had found the accused not guilty of that offense, but guilty of a lower one which was included in it, and, upon an appeal from that judgment by the accused, a new trial had been granted by the appellate court, and the question was whether, upon the new trial accorded, the accused could be again tried for the greater offense set forth in the indictment, or must the trial be confined to that offense of which the accused had previously been convicted, and which conviction had, upon his own motion, been set aside and reversed by the higher court.
This question has given rise to much diversity of opinion in the various state courts. Many of them have held that the new trial must be confined to the lesser offense of which the accused had been convicted on the first trial, while other courts have held precisely the contrary, and that, upon a new trial, the whole case was open as if there had been no former trial. Most, if not all, of these two classes of cases have been cited by the respective counsel in this case, and will be found in their briefs herein. It would be unprofitable to cite and refer to each of them in detail here. They have been carefully examined.
trial, though it brings him twice in jeopardy. But that waiver, unless it be expressly of the benefit of the verdict of acquittal, goes no further than the accused himself extends it. His application for a correction of the verdict is not to be taken as more extensive than his needs. He asks a correction of so much of the judgment as convicted him of guilt. He is not to be supposed to ask correction or reversal of so much of it as acquitted him of offense. He therefore waives his privilege as to one, and keeps it as to the other. It is upon this principle that where, by a verdict of guilty on one count or for one offense and an acquittal on or for another, there has been a partial conviction on an indictment, and on writ of error there has been a reversal of the conviction, the acquittal still stands good, and is, as to that count or offense, a bar. As to that, the plea of autrefois acquit can be upheld, though the plea of autrefois convict cannot be upheld as to the offense of which the verdict was guilty. The waiver is construed to extend only to the precise thing concerning which the relief is sought."
"SEC. 464. The granting of a new trial places the parties in the same position as if no trial had been had."
"SEC. 544. When a new trial is ordered, it shall proceed in all respects as if no trial had been had."
The statute was held valid, and that it did not violate the constitutional provision against subjecting a person to be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense, as the jeopardy was incurred with the consent of, and as a privilege granted to, the defendant upon his application.
thing, and that, as he brings up the whole record for review, he thereby waives the benefit of the provision in question for the purpose of attempting to gain what he thinks is a greater benefit -- viz., a review and reversal by the higher court of the judgment of conviction. Although the accused was, as is said, placed in jeopardy upon the first trial in regard not only to the offense of which he was accused, but also in regard to the lesser grades of that offense, yet by his own act and consent, by appealing to the higher court to obtain a reversal of the judgment, he has thereby procured it to be set aside, and when so set aside and reversed, the judgment is held as though it had never been. This was in substance decided in United States v. Harding, tried in the United States circuit court in 1846, 26 Fed.Cas. 131, before Mr. Justice Grier, then a member of this Court, and this is the ground substantially upon which the decisions of the other courts are placed.
"no question of the right of the State of Missouri, either by her fundamental law or by an ordinary act of legislation, to abolish this rule, and that it is a valid law as to all offenses committed after its enactment. The question here is does it deprive the defendant of any right of defense which the law gave him when the act was committed, so that, as to that offense, it is ex post facto?"
"This Court answered that question in the affirmative. "
In our opinion the better doctrine is that which does not limit the court or jury, upon a new trial, to a consideration of the question of guilt of the lower offense of which the accused was convicted on the first trial, but that the reversal of the judgment of conviction opens up the whole controversy, and acts upon the original judgment as if it had never been. The accused, by his own action, has obtained a reversal of the whole judgment, and we see no reason why he should not, upon a new trial, be proceeded against as if no trial had previously taken place. We do not agree to the view that the accused has the right to limit his waiver as to jeopardy when he appeals from a judgment against him. As the judgment stands before he appeals, it is a complete bar to any further prosecution for the offense set forth in the indictment, or of any lesser degree thereof. No power can wrest from him the right to so use that judgment, but if he chooses to appeal from it, and to ask for its reversal, he thereby waives, if successful, his right to avail himself of the former acquittal of the greater offense contained in the judgment which he has himself procured to be reversed.
convicted. And this is generally put upon the ground that, by appeal, he waives his right to the plea and asks the court to award him a new trial, although its effect will be, if granted, that he will be again tried for the offense of which he has been once convicted. This holding shows that there can be a waiver of the defense by reason of the action of the accused. As there is therefore a waiver in any event, and the question is as to its extent (that is, how far the accused by his own action may be deemed to have waived his right), it seems much more rational and in better accord with the proper administration of the criminal law to hold that, by appealing, the accused waives the right to thereafter plead once in jeopardy, when he has obtained a reversal of the judgment, even as to that part of it which acquitted him of the higher while convicting him of the lower offense. When, at his own request, he has obtained a new trial, he must take the burden with the benefit, and go back for a new trial of the whole case. It does not appear to us to be a practice founded on solid reason to permit such a limited waiver by an accused party while himself asking for a reversal of the judgment.
There is also the view to be taken that the constitutional provision was really never intended to, and, properly construed, does not, cover the case of a judgment under these circumstances, which has been annulled by the court at the request of the accused, and there is therefore no necessity of relying upon a waiver, because the correct construction of the provision does not make it applicable.
A further question is made as to the power of the Supreme Court of the islands to reverse the judgment appealed from and itself convict the accused on appeal. The Supreme Court, in so doing, acted within its power and jurisdiction. It is a result of the ordinary procedure in the courts of that country, proceeding under the act of Congress already referred to. See statement of the procedure in the case heretofore cited, Kepner v. United States, 195 U. S. 100.
The plaintiffs in error were tried by one of the courts of first instance in the Philippine Islands for the crime of murder. The trial was before a single judge, without a jury, and simply upon a written complaint filed by an individual with a justice of the peace. The judge who tried the accused found them not guilty of murder and guilty only of assault. For the latter offense they were each sentenced to six months' imprisonment. Upon appeal by the accused to the Supreme Court of the Islands, the judgment of the trial court was reversed, and two of the accused were condemned to the penalty, each one, of fourteen years, eight months, and one day of reclusion temporal, the other one to the penalty of eight years and one day of prision mayor, and all three to the indemnification of five hundred Philippine pesos to the heirs of the deceased.
I did not so state in a separate opinion in Kepner v. United States, 195 U. S. 101, but my concurrence in the judgment in that case was upon the ground that, from the moment of the complete acquisition of the Philippine Islands by the United States, and without any act of Congress or a proclamation of the President upon the subject, the people of those islands became entitled, of right, to the benefit of all the fundamental guaranties of life, liberty, and property to be found in that instrument. Hence my approval of the review announced in Kepner's case that the accused was entitled to the benefit of the jeopardy clause of the Constitution.
holds that the accused in the present case were entitled to the benefit of the jeopardy clause of the Constitution, and that, after their acquittal in the tribunal assuming jurisdiction to try them for the crime of murder, they could not thereafter, in any appellate tribunal deriving its authority from the United States, be again tried for that crime or for any crime more serious than the one of which they were convicted in the court of first instance.
authority from the United States can disregard the mandatory injunctions of the Constitution by which the government of the United States is created, and under the sanction of which alone that government exists and performs its functions. It may be that the application of these principles to the Philippine Islands and to the people who inhabit them may, particularly in criminal prosecutions, prove sometimes to be inconvenient. But no authority exists anywhere to set aside plain provisions of the supreme law of the land and substitute the law of convenience for the written fundamental law.
I am unable to concur in the judgment of the Court.
When the United States acquired the Philippine Islands, the system of jurisprudence which prevailed there was different from our Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence. Trial by jury was unknown. The trial court, called the court of first instance, had full authority to find the facts and adjudge the law, subject, however, to a review by a higher court of both the facts and law.
This system was continued substantially by the orders of the President and the Act of July 1, 1902, providing for the government of the islands.
not to call for much attention. I think otherwise. What was the Kepner case, and what is this?
appeal from an acquittal of a grave crime and cast from himself the immunity that such an acquittal gives him. Should such consent be imputed? Let it be remembered that we are dealing with a great right -- I may even say a constitutional right -- for the opinion of the Court discusses the case as though it were from a circuit court of the United States. Should such a right be narrowly or grudgingly considered? Should it be put in balance with other rights, and lost by their exercise? I think that the guaranties of constitutions and laws should not be so construed. The life and liberty of the citizen are precious things -- precious to the state as to the citizen -- and concern for them is entirely consistent with a firm administration of criminal justice. I submit that the state seeks no convictions except in legal ways, and because it does not, it affords means of review of erroneous rulings and judgments, and freely affords such means. It does not clog them with conditions or forfeit by their exercise great and constitutional rights. Yet, in my judgment, such is the effect of the decision just rendered.
"he thereby waives the benefit of the provision in question [once in jeopardy] for the purpose of attempting to gain what he thinks is a greater benefit -- viz., a review and reversal by the higher court of the judgment of conviction."
I repeat again that constitutional guaranties and statutory remedies should not be put in such barter; that a defendant should not be required to give up the protection of a just (it must be so regarded for the sake of the argument) acquittal of one crime as the price of obtaining a review of an unjust conviction of another crime.
"It is not necessary to determine in this case whether the jeopardy provision in the Bill of Rights would have become part of the law of the islands without congressional legislation."
adjudication in the courts of this country, and the maintenance of which has been ever deemed essential to our government, could be used by Congress in any other sense than that which has been placed upon them in construing the instrument from which they were taken? It is a well settled rule of construction that language used in a statute which has a settled and well known meaning, sanctioned by judicial decision, is presumed to be used in that sense by the legislative body. The Abbotsford, 98 U. S. 440."
THE CHIEF JUSTICE also dissented.
* Alabama -- Bell v. State, 48 Ala. 684; Berry v. State, 65 Ala. 117; Sylvester v. State, 72 Ala. 201.
California -- People v. Gilmore, 4 Cal. 376; People v. Apgar, 35 Cal. 389; People v. Gordon, 99 Cal. 227.
Florida -- Johnson v. State, 27 Fla. 245; Golding v. State, 31 Fla. 262.
Illinois -- Brennan v. People, 15 Ill. 511; Barnett v. People, 54 Ill. 325.
Iowa -- State v. Tweedy, 11 Ia. 350; State v. Helm, 92 Ia. 540.
Louisiana -- State v. Dennison, 31 La.Ann. 847; State v. Victor, 36 La.Ann. 978.
Michigan -- People v. Knapp, 26 Mich. 112, 114; People v. Comstock, 55 Mich. 405, 407.
Minnesota -- State v. Lessing, 16 Minn. 75.
Mississippi -- Morris v. State, 8 S. & M. 762; Hurt v. State, 25 Miss. 378.
Missouri -- Prior to alteration effected by constitutional amendment of 1875, as to which see State v. Simms, 71 Mo. 538, in State v. Ross, 29 Mo. 32; State v. Kattlemann, 35 Mo. 105; State v. Brannon, 55 Mo. 63.
New York -- Prior to alteration effected by the Code of Procedure, as to which see People v. Palmer, 109 N.Y. 413, in Guenther v. People, 24 N.Y. 100; People v. Dowling, 84 N.Y. 478, and see People v. Cignarale, 110 N.Y. 23.
Oregon -- State v. Steeves, 29 Or. 85.
Tennessee -- Campbell v. State, 9 Yerg. 333; Slaughter v. State, 6 Humph. 410, 415.
Texas -- Jones v. State, 13 Tex. 168.
Virginia -- Before alteration by statute, as to which see Briggs v. Commonwealth, 82 Va. 554, doctrine enforced in Stuart v. Commonwealth, 28 Gratt. 950. Reinstated by later statute, as to which see Forbes v. Commonwealth, 90 Va. 550, and Benton v. Commonwealth, 91 Va. 782.
Washington -- State v. Murphy, 13 Wash. 229.
Wisconsin -- State v. Martin, 30 Wis. 216; State v. Hill, 30 Wis. 416; State v. Belden, 33 Wis. 120. But not in cases of misdemeanors -- Rasmussen v. State, 63 Wis. 1.
Georgia, owing to constitutional provisions, and by statute in the States of Indiana, Kansas, and Kentucky, when a new trial is granted on motion of an accused, he may be tried again for the greater offense of which he was acquitted on the first trial. Morris v. State, 1 Blackf. 37; Veatch v. State, 60 Ind. 291; State v. McCord, 8 Kan. 232; Commonwealth v. Arnold, 83 Ky. 1.

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