Source: http://kirschenbaumesq.com/article/policastro-v-savarese-171-ad2d-849-567-nys2d-784-nyad-2-dept-mar-25-1991-no-3679e-3680e-3681e
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 21:12:14+00:00

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separate and distinct elements of damages.
Lawrence, J., concurred in part, dissented in part and filed opinion.
reached verdict on any fair interpretation of evidence.
intersection and that defect was proximate cause of accident.
danger to other users of highway and which was proximate cause of accident.
death and provided services and guidance to her two children, ages 12 and 14.
damages in wrongful death action.
$300,000 was approved. McKinney's CPLR 5501(c).
awarding damages for pain and suffering.
leg resulted in limp, and damages to eye muscle resulted in double vision.
motorist agreed to proportionate reduction of loss of future earnings award.
appellants Savarese in Action Nos. 2 and 4.
Martin M. McGlynn, Brooklyn, for appellants McMullen in Action No. 4.
appellant in Action No. 4.
counsel), for respondent-appellant in Action Nos. 1 and 3.
counsel), for respondents in Action No. 4.
Before BROWN, J.P., and KUNZEMAN, KOOPER and LAWRENCE, JJ.
against the defendants third party-plaintiffs in the principal sum of $408,298.
sum of $235,000 against the defendants Gerard A. Savarese and Michael J.
car, Susan Mary Lee, was killed. These four negligence actions ensued.
prejudiced by the court's charge is without merit.
instructed that the evidence must show that Scott McMullen and Gerard A.
that the court's charge was erroneous is without merit.
N.Y.S.2d 289, 536 N.E.2d 618), the award was not excessive.
(see, Rivera v. City of New York, 160 A.D.2d 985, 554 N.Y.S.2d 706; Juiditta v.
excessive to the extent indicated.
be considered in awarding damages for pain and suffering (see, McDougald v.
Garber, supra ). The award for loss of enjoyment of life must be vacated.
loss of $15,000 a year for a work life expectancy of 17 years.
BROWN, J.P., and KUNZEMAN and KOOPER, JJ., concur.
Incorporated Village of Lake Grove.
when it entered that road from Stony Brook Road.
a proximate cause of the accident.
misplacement or lack of markings or signs on the roadways.
the alleged misplacement or lack of markings or signs on the roadways.
on the apportionment of fault.
Robert POLICASTRO, Respondent-Appellant,v.Gerard A. SAVARESE, et al., Defendants and Third-Party Plaintiffs-Appellants-Respondents;Incorporated Village of Lake Grove, Third-Party Defendant-Appellant-Respondent. (Action No. 1)Wayne KEELTY, et al., Respondents,v.Gerard A. SAVARESE, et al., Appellants, et al., Defendants. (Action No. 2)Robert POLICASTRO, Respondent-Appellant,v.INCORPORATED VILLAGE OF LAKE GROVE, Appellant-Respondent. (Action No. 3)Gordon J. LEE, etc., et al., Respondents,v.Michael SAVARESE, et al., Defendants and Third-Party Plaintiffs-Appellants;Incorporated Village of Lake Grove, Third-Party Defendant-Appellant. (ActionNo. 4)March 25, 1991.
Four related negligence actions were brought for personal injuries or wrongful death sustained in automobile accident. Judgments were entered based on jury's apportionment of fault and assessment of damages following trial by the Supreme Court, Suffolk County, Orgera, J. Village appealed. The Supreme Court, Appellate Division, held that: (1) evidence supported apportionment of 5% of fault to village; (2) evidence supported apportionment of fault to defendant motorist based on theory of concerted action liability; (3) pecuniary damages of $471,000 for death of 36-year-old passenger was not excessive; (4) award of $110,000 for pain and suffering of another passenger was inadequate; (5) award of $1 million for pain and suffering of innocent motorist was appropriate; and (6) damages for pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life are not separate and distinct elements of damages.
Jury verdict will not be set aside absent showing that jurors could not have reached verdict on any fair interpretation of evidence.
Municipality has duty to construct and maintain its highways in reasonably safe condition.
Evidence supported jury apportionment of 5% fault for automobile accident to village where testimony of expert witness indicated that village either created or failed to correct defect in roadway when it constructed and resurfaced intersection and that defect was proximate cause of accident.
Evidence supported jury's apportionment of 20% of fault for automobile accident to motorist of vehicle not damaged in accident under theory of concerted action liability, even though no independent negligence by motorist was alleged to have caused accident, where jury could have concluded that motorist either expressly or impliedly agreed to engage in course of conduct which created unreasonable danger to other users of highway and which was proximate cause of accident.
Pecuniary damages award of $471,000 in wrongful death action arising from automobile accident was not excessive where deceased was 36 years old at time of death and provided services and guidance to her two children, ages 12 and 14.
Loss of parental care and guidance may be considered element of pecuniary damages in wrongful death action.
Award of pain and suffering damages of $110,000 for injuries sustained in automobile accident was so inadequate as to shock conscience of court in view of nature of passenger's injuries, lengthy rehabilitation, and permanency of injuries to his leg and heart and, thus, stipulation increasing verdict to $300,000 was approved. McKinney's CPLR 5501(c).
Charging jury that damages for pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life were separate and distinct elements of damages was error since suffering attributable to limitation of life's activities is factor to be considered in awarding damages for pain and suffering.
Award of $1 million for pain and suffering caused by injuries received in automobile accident was appropriate where motorist was required to undergo extensive rehabilitation for brain injury, permanent paralysis resulted, broken leg resulted in limp, and damages to eye muscle resulted in double vision.
Jury instruction, on innocent motorist's claim for loss of future earnings resulting from injury sustained in automobile accident, was erroneous where instruction stated that motorist's work life expectancy was number of years remaining of motorist's life expectancy and, thus, new trial was required unless motorist agreed to proportionate reduction of loss of future earnings award. **785 Peter T. Affatato, Hicksville (Marshall D. Sweetbaum, of counsel), for defendants third-party plaintiffs appellants-respondents in Action No. 1 and appellants Savarese in Action Nos. 2 and 4.
Devitt & Spellman, Smithtown (Vincent A. Malito, of counsel), for appellant-respondent Incorporated Village of Lake Grove in Action No. 3, third- party defendant-appellant-respondent in Action No. 1, and third-party defendant-appellant in Action No. 4.
Kirschenbaum & Kirschenbaum, P.C., Garden City (Kenneth Kirschenbaum, of counsel), for respondent-appellant in Action Nos. 1 and 3.
Melvin Freidel, Garden City (Norman Bard, of counsel), for respondents in Action No. 2.
Lysaght, Lysaght & Kramer, P.C., Lake Success (Raymond E. McAlonan, of counsel), for respondents in Action No. 4.
In four related negligence actions to recover damages for personal injuries and/or wrongful death, etc., (1) the defendant Incorporated Village of Lake Grove appeals from so much of a judgment of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Orgera, J.), entered September 26, 1988, as, upon a jury verdict, is in favor of the plaintiff Robert Policastro in Action Nos. 1 and 3, and against it in the principal sum of $525,000 (of which $110,000 is for pain and suffering and $130,000 is for loss of earnings to the date of judgment), the defendants Gerard A. Savarese and Michael A. Savarese separately appeal from so much of the same judgment as is in favor of Robert Policastro and against them in the principal sum of $475,000 (of which $110,000 is for pain and suffering and $130,000 is for loss of earnings to the date of judgment), and Robert Policastro cross-appeals from the same judgment on the ground of inadequacy, (2) the defendant Incorporated Village of Lake Grove appeals from so much of a judgment of the same court, entered September 23, 1988, as, upon a jury verdict, is in favor of **786 the plaintiff J. Wayne Keelty in Action *850 No. 2 and against it in the principal sum of $2,489,561 (of which $1,000,000 is for pain and suffering, $1,000,000 is for loss of enjoyment of life, and $420,000 is for loss of future earning capacity), and is in favor of the plaintiff Alice I. Keelty in Action No. 2 and against it in the principal sum of $150,000, and the defendant Gerard A. Savarese and Michael A. Savarese separately appeal from so much of the same judgment as is in favor of the plaintiff J. Wayne Keelty and against them in the principal sum of $2,439,000 (of which $1,000,000 is for pain and suffering, $1,000,000 is for loss of enjoyment of life, and $420,000 is for loss of future earning capacity), and is in favor of the plaintiff Alice I. Keelty and against them in the principal sum of $150,000, and (3) the defendants third-party plaintiffs in Action No. 4 and the third-party defendant Incorporated Village of Lake Grove separately appeal from a judgment of the same court, entered September 26, 1988, which, upon a jury verdict, is in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants third party-plaintiffs in the principal sum of $408,298.
ORDERED that in the event the plaintiff J. Wayne Keelty so stipulates, then the judgment entered September 23, 1988, is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
Shortly after midnight on July 10, 1983, Gerard Savarese *852 drove his vehicle around a curve on Pond Path in the Incorporated Village of Lake Grove and crashed into a vehicle driven by J. Wayne Keelty. Savarese and his passenger were not seriously injured. However, Keelty, his wife and another passenger Robert Policastro suffered severe injuries. A fourth occupant of the Keelty car, Susan Mary Lee, was killed. These four negligence actions ensued.
Policastro and the Keeltys, in addition to the claims made against Savarese, alleged that the village was negligent in that it failed to maintain the roadway at the intersection of Stony Brook Road and Pond Path, where the accident occurred, in a safe condition. The Keeltys and the administrator of Lee's estate also sued Scott McMullen, Savarese's friend who was driving behind the Savarese vehicle at the time of the accident, and Robert McMullen the owner of the car Scott McMullen was driving. The complaint alleged that Savarese and McMullen had engaged in a speed contest or other reckless conduct which was a proximate cause of the accident. Following a joint trial, the jury apportioned 75% of the fault in the happening of the accident to Savarese, 20% to McMullen, and 5% to the village. No issue is raised on appeal with respect to Savarese's liability.
 A jury verdict will not be set aside absent a showing that the jurors could not have reached their verdict on any fair interpretation of the evidence (see, Nelson v. City of New Rochelle, 154 A.D.2d 661, 546 N.Y.S.2d 661; Nicastro v. Park, 113 A.D.2d 129, 495 N.Y.S.2d 184). We decline to disturb the jury's apportionment of fault with respect to the village. A municipality has a duty to construct and maintain its highways in a reasonably safe condition (see, Gutelle v. City of New York, 55 N.Y.2d 794, 447 N.Y.S.2d 422, 432 N.E.2d 124; Demesmin v. Town of Islip, 147 A.D.2d 519, 537 N.Y.S.2d 605). Based on the testimony of expert witnesses, the jury could fairly conclude that the village either created or failed to correct a defect in the roadway when it reconstructed and resurfaced the subject intersection and that this defect was a proximate cause of the accident. The contention of the village that it was prejudiced by the court's charge is without merit.
 Similarly, we find that the jury's apportionment of fault with respect to the McMullens was based on a fair interpretation of the evidence and should not be disturbed. As there was no contact between the McMullen vehicle and either the Savarese or Keelty vehicles, and no independent act of negligence by Scott McMullen was alleged to have caused the accident, the court properly instructed the jury that the claim against the McMullens was based on a theory of concerted *853 action liability. In order to find the McMullens liable, the jury was instructed that the evidence must show that Scott McMullen and Gerard A. Savarese agreed, either expressly or impliedly, to engage in a particular course of conduct which created an unreasonable danger to other users of the highway and which was a proximate cause of the accident (see, Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 55 N.Y.2d 571, 450 N.Y.S.2d 776, 436 N.E.2d 182; Finn v. Morgan, 46 A.D.2d 229, 362 N.Y.S.2d 292). There was ample evidence, in particular the testimony of the occupants of a vehicle following behind the Savarese **788 and McMullen vehicles that night, from which the jury could infer such an agreement (cf., Shea v. Kelly, 121 A.D.2d 620, 503 N.Y.S.2d 649). The McMullens' contention that the court's charge was erroneous is without merit.
 Certain elements of the jury's verdict on damages are challenged on appeal. The finding that the estate of Susan Mary Lee sustained pecuniary damages in the amount of $471,000 is based on a fair interpretation of the evidence. Lee was 36 years old at the time of her death and had two children, ages 12 and 14, who testified at the trial with respect to the services and guidance she had provided. Although an award in a wrongful death action is limited to pecuniary damages, the loss of parental care and guidance may be considered an element of such damages (see, DeLong v. County of Erie, 89 A.D.2d 376, 455 N.Y.S.2d 887, affd. 60 N.Y.2d 296, 469 N.Y.S.2d 611, 457 N.E.2d 717; Kenavan v. City of New York, 120 A.D.2d 24, 507 N.Y.S.2d 193, affd. 70 N.Y.2d 558, 523 N.Y.S.2d 60, 517 N.E.2d 872). In view of the variety of factors which can be considered in determining pecuniary damages (see, Nussbaum v. Gibstein, 138 A.D.2d 193, 531 N.Y.S.2d 276, revd. on other grounds 73 N.Y.2d 912, 539 N.Y.S.2d 289, 536 N.E.2d 618), the award was not excessive.
 Policastro contends that the award of damages of $110,000 for pain and suffering was inadequate. As his actions were commenced prior to the effective date of CPLR 5501(c) and the trial was commenced prior to August 1, 1988, the jury's assessment of damages must be reviewed under the standard of whether the verdict is so excessive or inadequate that it shocks the conscience of the court (see, Rivera v. City of New York, 160 A.D.2d 985, 554 N.Y.S.2d 706; Juiditta v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 75 A.D.2d 126, 428 N.Y.S.2d 535). In view of the nature of Policastro's injuries, his lengthy rehabilitation and the permanency of the injuries to his leg and heart, we find that the verdict was inadequate to the extent indicated. We find that the verdict for loss of past earnings is excessive to the extent indicated.
 J. Wayne Keelty was awarded separate damages of $1,000,000 for pain and suffering and $1,000,000 for loss of enjoyment of life. The court erred in charging the jury that these are *854 separate and distinct elements of damages (see, McDougald v. Garber, 73 N.Y.2d 246, 538 N.Y.S.2d 937, 536 N.E.2d 372; Nussbaum v. Gibstein, 73 N.Y.2d 912, 539 N.Y.S.2d 289, 536 N.E.2d 618,supra; Venable v. New York City Transit Authority, 165 A.D.2d 871, 560 N.Y.S.2d 341, as the suffering attributable to the limitation of life's activities is a factor to be considered in awarding damages for pain and suffering (see, McDougald v. Garber, supra ). The award for loss of enjoyment of life must be vacated. With respect to the issue of Keelty's pain and suffering, his injuries included a brain injury, which required him to undergo extensive rehabilitation and which resulted in some permanent paralysis, a broken leg which resulted in a limp, and a damaged eye muscle which resulted in double vision. In view of the nature of his injuries and their permanency, we find that an award of $1,000,000 for pain and suffering is appropriate.
 Finally, in instructing the jury on Keelty's claim for loss of future earnings, the court stated that his work life expectancy was 28 years, which was his life expectancy, not his work life expectancy. At another point during the trial, the trial court found that Keelty's work life expectancy was only 17 years, based upon the fact that Keelty was past his forty-seventh birthday at the time of the trial, but, during its instructions to the jury, apparently confused work life expectancy and life expectancy. It appears that the jury calculated Keelty's loss of future earnings as $15,000 a year. Thus, a new trial is granted unless the plaintiff stipulates to a reduction of the award for loss of future earnings to the principal amount of $255,000, which represents a loss of $15,000 a year for a work life expectancy of 17 years.
I concur with my colleagues with regard to all the issues raised on these appeals, except the claims with regard to the liability of the defendant Incorporated Village of Lake Grove.
As noted by the majority, the general claim against the Village was that it had failed to maintain in a safe condition Stony Brook Road and Pond Path. There was extensive testimony presented by both lay and expert witnesses with regard to three theories of liability against the Village: (a) the alleged improper markings and lack of markings on the roadways, (b) the alleged improper signs and lack of signs on the roadways, and (3) an alleged defect in the roadways, which purportedly might cause a vehicle to slide to the wrong side of Pond Path, when it entered that road from Stony Brook Road.
*855 At the conclusion of all of the testimony, the trial court, in effect, dismissed two theories of liability as against the Village. Specifically it indicated that in its final charge to the jury, it would instruct them that the alleged misplacement or lack of markings or signs on the roadways were not proximate causes of the accident as a matter of law and the jury was not to consider those claims, relying on Atkinson v. County of Oneida, 59 N.Y.2d 840, 464 N.Y.S.2d 747, 451 N.E.2d 494. In addition, the trial court indicated that it would sustain an objection to any summation comments that those factors were a proximate cause of the accident.
In compliance with the trial court's ruling, none of the attorneys made any reference in their summations to the alleged misplacement or lack of markings or signs on the roadways during their comments concerning the proximate causes of the accident. After summations, the counsel for the Village formally requested the trial court to instruct the jury in its final charge not to consider the alleged misplacement or lack of markings or signs on the roadways. Despite its earlier ruling, the trial court denied the request, noting that it would simply not mention the subject. During its charge to the jury, the trial court did not limit the jury to a consideration of the alleged defect in the roadways which might cause a vehicle to slide. Rather, the jury was specifically instructed that they could consider all of the testimony they had heard, and that certain expert witnesses had given their opinions "with respect to how the accident occurred and what various factors contributed to it". Thus, the trial court's instructions clearly permitted the jury to consider the alleged misplacement or lack of markings or signs on the roadways.
While there may have been sufficient evidence upon which the jury could find the Village liable based on the alleged defect in the roadways, the jury did not indicate the basis for its liability verdict. Therefore, I cannot conclude that the Village, which was found 5% at fault in the happening of the accident, was not prejudiced by the trial court's rulings (see, Wirth v. De Vito, 74 A.D.2d 827, 425 N.Y.S.2d 179; see also, Cumbo v. Valente, 118 A.D.2d 679, 500 N.Y.S.2d 30). Specifically, in light of the trial court's initial ruling concerning its charge to the jury, the counsel for the Village reasonably refrained from commenting in his summation on the extensive testimony concerning the alleged misplacement or lack of markings or signs on the roadways. Further, the trial court's subsequent refusal to specifically instruct the jury as requested by counsel for the Village *856 resulted in a confusing charge which failed to fully inform the jurors how they were to apply the facts to the law.
Accordingly, under these circumstances, I find that the Village is entitled to a new trial on the issue of its liability and if necessary, a new determination on the apportionment of fault.

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