Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=82481:56352&catid=1576&Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 16:30:30+00:00

Document:
G.R. No. 205180, November 11, 2013 - RYAN VIRAY, Petitioners, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
RYAN VIRAY, Petitioners, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 to reverse and set aside the August 31, 2012 Decision1 and January 7, 2013 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 33076, which affirmed with modification the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite City, Branch 16 (RTC), in Criminal Case No. 66-07.
That on or about 19 October 2006, in the City of Cavite, Republic of the Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, then being employed as a helper of ZENAIDA VEDUA y SOSA with intent to gain and with grave abuse of confidence, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously steal, take and carry away several pieces of jewelry, One (1) Gameboy, One (1) CD player, One (1) Nokia cellphone and a jacket with a total value of P297,800.00 belonging to the said Zenaida S. Vedua, without the latter’s consent and to her damage and prejudice in the aforestated amount of P297,800.00.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the Court finds the accused RYAN VIRAY GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of robbery and hereby sentences him to suffer the indeterminate imprisonment ranging from FOUR (4) years, TWO (2) months and ONE (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to EIGHT (8) years of prision mayor, as maximum.
Aggrieved, petitioner elevated the case to the CA.
Nonetheless, the CA held that a conviction of the accused for qualified theft is warranted considering that Viray enjoyed Vedua’s confidence, being the caretaker of the latter’s pets. Viray committed a grave abuse of this confidence when, having access to the outside premises of private complainant’s house, he forced open the doors of the same house and stole the latter’s personal belongings.21 In its assailed Decision, the appellate court, thus, modified the ruling of the trial court holding that the accused is liable for the crime of qualified theft.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is PARTLY GRANTED. The appealed Decision of the court a quo is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the accused-appellant be convicted for the crime of QUALIFIED THEFT and is hereby sentenced to suffer indeterminate imprisonment of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as maximum. The appellant is also ordered to return the pieces of jewelry and other personal belongings taken from private complainant. Should restitution be no longer possible, the accused appellant must pay the equivalent value of the unreturned items.
In the present controversy, while the CA modified the decision of the trial court by convicting petitioner of qualified theft rather than robbery, the facts as found by the court a quo were the same facts used by the CA in holding that all the elements of qualified theft through grave abuse of confidence were present. It is not, therefore, incumbent upon this Court to recalibrate the evidence presented by the parties during trial.
Be that as it may, We find it necessary to modify the conclusion derived by the appellate court from the given facts regarding the crime for which petitioner must be held accountable.
Art. 308. Who are liable for theft.– Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain but without violence against, or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take personal property of another without the latter’s consent.
As pointed out by both the RTC and the CA, the prosecution had proved the existence of the first four elements enumerated above beyond reasonable doubt.
First, it was proved that the subjects of the offense were all personal or movable properties, consisting as they were of jewelry, clothing, cellular phone, a media player and a gaming device. Second, these properties belong to private complainant Vedua. Third, circumstantial evidence places petitioner in the scene of the crime during the day of the incident, as numerous witnesses saw him in Vedua’s house and his clothes were found inside the house. He was thereafter seen carrying a heavy-looking sack as he was leaving private complainant’s house. All these circumstances portray a chain of events that leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion that petitioner took the personal properties with intent to gain, especially considering that, fourth, Vedua had not consented to the removal and/or taking of these properties.
With regard to the fifth and sixths elements, however, the RTC and the CA diverge in their respective Decisions.
The RTC found that the taking committed by petitioner was not qualified by grave abuse of confidence, rather it was qualified by the use of force upon things. The trial court held that there was no confidence reposed by the private complainant on Viray that the latter could have abused. In fact, Vedua made sure that she locked the door before leaving. Hence, Viray was compelled to use force to gain entry into Vedua’s house thereby committing the crime of robbery, not theft.
The CA, on the other hand, opined that the breaking of the screen and the door could not be appreciated to qualify petitioner’s crime to robbery as such use of force was not alleged in the Information. Rather, this breaking of the door, the CA added, is an indication of petitioner’s abuse of the confidence given by private complainant. The CA held that “[Viray] enjoyed the confidence of the private complainant, being the caretaker of the latter’s pets. He was given access to the outside premises of private complainant’s house which he gravely abused when he forced open the doors of the same house and stole the latter’s belongings.”35 Committing grave abuse of confidence in the taking of the properties, petitioner was found by the CA to be liable for qualified theft.
This Court is inclined to agree with the CA that the taking committed by petitioner cannot be qualified by the breaking of the door, as it was not alleged in the Information. However, we disagree from its finding that the same breaking of the door constitutes the qualifying element of grave abuse of confidence to sentence petitioner Viray to suffer the penalty for qualified theft. Instead, We are one with the RTC that private complainant did not repose on Viray “confidence” that the latter could have abused to commit qualified theft.
The very fact that petitioner “forced open” the main door and screen because he was denied access to private complainant’s house negates the presence of such confidence in him by private complainant. Without ready access to the interior of the house and the properties that were the subject of the taking, it cannot be said that private complaint had a “firm trust” on petitioner or that she “relied on his discretion”36 and that the same trust reposed on him facilitated Viray’s taking of the personal properties justifying his conviction of qualified theft.
Although appellant had taken advantage of his position in committing the crime aforementioned, We do not believe he had acted with grave abuse of confidence and can be convicted of qualified theft, because his employer had never given him the possession of the machines involved in the present case or allowed him to take hold of them, and it does not appear that the former had any special confidence in him. Indeed, the delivery of the machines to the prospective customers was entrusted, not to appellant, but to another employee.
Without the circumstance of a grave abuse of confidence and considering that the use of force in breaking the door was not alleged in the Information, petitioner can only be held accountable for the crime of simple theft under Art. 308 in relation to Art. 309 of the RPC.
As for the penalty, We note with approval the observation made by the appellate court that the amount of the property taken was not established by an independent and reliable estimate. Thus, the Court may fix the value of the property taken based on the attendant circumstances of the case or impose the minimum penalty under Art. 309 of the RPC.44 In this case, We agree with the observation made by the appellate court in accordance with the rule that “if there is no available evidence to prove the value of the stolen property or that the prosecution failed to prove it, the corresponding penalty to be imposed on the accused-appellant should be the minimum penalty corresponding to theft involving the value of P5.00.”45 Accordingly, We impose the prescribed penalty under Art. 309(6) of the RPC, which is arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods. The circumstance of the breaking of the door, even if proven during trial, cannot be considered as a generic aggravating circumstance as it was not alleged in the Information.46 Thus, the Court finds that the penalty prescribed should be imposed in its medium period, that is to say, from two (2) months and one (1) day to three (3) months of arresto mayor.
WHEREFORE, the CA Decision of August 31, 2012 in CA-G.R. CR No. 33076 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner Ryan Viray is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of SIMPLE THEFT and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for two (2) months and one (1) day to three (3) months of arresto mayor. Further, for want of convincing proof as to the value of the property stolen, the order for reparation is hereby DELETED.
Abad, Perez,* Mendoza, and Leonen, JJ., concur.
Please take notice that on November 11, 2013 a Decision, copy attached herewith, was rendered by the Supreme Court in the above-entitled case, the original of which was received by this Office on November 18, 2013 at 2:00 p.m.
* Additional member per raffle dated March 18, 2013.
1Rollo, pp. 83-98. Penned by Associate Justice Angelita A. Gacutan and concurred in by Associate Justices Fernanda Lampas Peralta and Francisco P. Acosta.
2 Id. at 39-40; 108-109.
3 Id. at 10, 26-27, 39-41, 61, 84.
4 Id. at 11, 27.
6 Id. at 27, 41, 62-63. 84.
7 Id. at 11, 27-28, 41, 63, 84.
8 Id. at 11, 28, 42, 63, 84.
9 Id. at 11, 64, 85.
10 Id. at 11, 64, 85.
11 Id. at 11-12, 29, 43, 65, 85.
12 Id. at 12, 29, 44, 64, 85.
14 Id. at 12-13, 30, 46-49, 65, 85-86.
19 Id. at 13, 27, 56, 62, 86-87.
22 Arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if such value does not exceed 5 pesos.
23 Art. 310. Qualified theft.—The crime of theft shall be punished by the penalties next higher by two degrees than those respectively specified in the next preceding article x x x.
25 Id. at 14, 96-97.
33People v. Domingo, G.R. No. 184958, September 17, 2009, 600 SCRA 280, 288; Gerasta v. People, G.R. No. 176981, December 24, 2008, 575 SCRA 503, 512; People v. Lantano, G.R. No. 176734, January 28, 2008, 542 SCRA 640, 651-652.
34People v. Puig, G.R. Nos. 173654-765, August 28, 2008, 563 SCRA 564.
36 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, 9th ed., for the iPhone/iPad/iPod touch. Version 2.1.1 (B12136), p. 339.
37People v. Koc Song, 63 Phil. 369 (1936).
38People v. Maglaya, No. L-29243, November 28, 1969, 30 SCRA 606.
39 See People v. Anabe, G.R. No. 179033, September 6, 2010, 630 SCRA 10.
41 Reyes, Luis B., The Revised Penal Code: Criminal Law 710 (15th ed., 2001).
44 See People v. Dator, G.R. No. 136142, October 24, 2000, 344 SCRA 222; see also Lozano v. People, G.R. No. 165582, July 9, 2010.
45 People v. Dator, id. at 236.
46People v. Perreras, G.R. No. 139622, July 31, 2001, 362 SCRA 202; People v. Legaspi, G.R. Nos. 136164-65, April 20, 2001.
47 Francisco v. People, 478 Phil. 167 (2004).

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