Source: http://masscases.com/cases/sjc/376/376mass557.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 23:56:40+00:00

Document:
COMMONWEALTH vs. ELMER L. HARMOND.
INDICTMENTS found and returned in the Superior Court on August 10, 1977.
A motion to suppress evidence was allowed by Nelson, J.
An application for an interlocutory appeal was allowed in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk by Kaplan, J., and the appeal was reported by him.
Mark T. Anastasi, Special Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.
search and that it was unlawful. We hold that there was no error.
questioning were going on, several uniformed officers, some with drawn guns, were in and about the defendant's one-room apartment looking for a gun which might be in plain view. Sometime later, Detectives Edward Caruso and John Reilly arrived in the room, and all the uniformed officers then present left.
After learning that the defendant had been apprised of his rights under Miranda, Caruso asked him where the gun was. The defendant replied, in substance, that he had no gun but that Caruso was free to look around. Caruso conducted a visual search of the room without result. Caruso then came upon a small footlocker (trunk) at the foot of the bed. He placed it on the bed, discovered that it was locked, and asked the defendant for a key. The defendant initially denied having a key. Caruso then stated he would obtain a search warrant and break the trunk open. At this point, the defendant admitted that he had a key for the trunk among several hanging on his belt. Caruso took the key and attempted to open the trunk but had difficulty in doing so. The defendant offered to help Caruso, but Caruso eventually opened the trunk without assistance. Caruso found a .32 caliber revolver and several rounds of live ammunition in the trunk.
At no time was the defendant told that he could refuse to consent to the search of his trunk. The defendant had been drinking but he was capable of understanding the questions and advice given him by the arresting officers. According to testimony by a court psychiatrist, the defendant "was lower than average but not considerably lower than average" in intelligence.
other basis for upholding the warrantless search, the judge granted the motion to suppress. The Commonwealth applied to single justice of this court for an interlocutory appeal under G. L. c. 278, Section 28E. The single justice allowed the application and reported the case to the full court without decision.
necessarily compels such a finding. See United States v. Johnson, 563 F.2d 936, 938-939 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1021 (1978); People v. Phiefer, 43 N.Y. 2d 719, 721 (1977). Finally, knowledge that a search will inevitably produce incriminating evidence does not automatically preclude a finding of voluntary consent. United States v. Ciovacco, 518 F.2d 29, 31 (1st Cir. 1975).
Tested by these principles, we are satisfied that in the circumstances of this case the issue of voluntariness was capable of rational resolution either way. The defendant's claim that his apparent consent was involuntary should be carefully scrutinized to avoid giving him an unfair advantage. See United States v. DiPrima, 472 F.2d 550, 551 (1st Cir. 1973). A number of factors pointing toward police coercion existed here, however. The defendant was in custody and had been guarded since his arrest by one or more police officers anxious to locate a weapon used in a homicide. He was arguably unaware of his right to refuse consent. By reason of drinking and limited intelligence he may have suffered from a reduced ability to evaluate correctly the consequences of his choice. We are unprepared to hold as matter of law that the consent given by the defendant was voluntary. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the trial judge in granting the motion to suppress, and we remand the case to the Superior Court Department for further proceedings.
[Note 1] There was much additional testimony relative to Ford's conversation with Stone and Keskula, but the judge made no findings on the basis thereof. In any event his failure to make such findings does not affect the ruling on the motion to suppress.
[Note 2] The defendant does not contend that the arrest was in any way illegal so as to taint the subsequent search. See Commonwealth v. Boswell, 374 Mass. 263 , 270-271 (1978).
[Note 3] Nothing we have said here is inconsistent with our decision in Commonwealth v. Ortiz, ante 349 (1978). In that case we reversed the finding by a trial judge that a warrantless search of an automobile was unreasonable. Id. at 358. We did so, however, because the judge applied too rigid a test for the existence of exigent circumstances. Id. at 356-357. Ortiz therefore exemplifies the situation referred to in the text where we disagree with the legal conclusion to be drawn from subsidiary findings.

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