Source: http://nh.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20170505_0000118.DNH.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 06:39:20+00:00

Document:
Steven J. McAuliffe United States District Judge.
Katherine Frederick was employed by the State of New Hampshire, Department of Health and Human Services (“DHHS” or the “Department”) as a child support officer in its Conway, New Hampshire, office. Her employment was terminated on September 21, 2012. On September 21, 2014, Frederick filed this suit, advancing state and federal claims, including claims asserting Title VII (Pregnancy Discrimination Act) violations, retaliation, FMLA interference, and wrongful discharge. DHHS moved to dismiss all of Frederick's claims, and, on September 30, 2015, the court granted DHHS's motion, without prejudice to Frederick's filing an amended complaint.
On November 13, 2015, Frederick filed an amended complaint, asserting federal claims under Title VII (for gender discrimination) and the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), as well as a claim for wrongful discharge under state law. DHHS again moved to dismiss. On August 16, 2016, the court granted DHHS's motion in part, dismissing Frederick's Title VII claim, but denied the motion with respect to Frederick's ADA and wrongful discharge claims.
On September 13, 2016, DHHS timely filed its answer, raising as an affirmative defense “all applicable immunities.” Document No. 28. Shortly thereafter, on October 26, 2016, DHHS filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, asserting its immunity from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. Frederick objects.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) provides that, “[a]fter the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” “The standard of review of a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) is the same as that for a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).” Marrero-Gutierrez v. Molina, 491 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). Accordingly, “[t]he court accepts the plaintiff's well-pleaded facts as true and draws all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor.” Holder v. Town of Newton, No. 09-CV-341-JD, 2010 WL 3211068, at *1 (D.N.H. Aug. 11, 2010) (citing Citibank Global Mkts., Inc. v. Santana, 573 F.3d 17, 23 (1st Cir. 2009)). Judgment on the pleadings should be entered “only if the uncontested and properly considered facts conclusively establish the movant's entitlement to a favorable judgment.” Aponte-Torres v. Univ. of P.R., 445 F.3d 50, 54 (1st Cir. 2006).
In support of its motion, DHHS notes that the State has not consented to be sued in federal court with regard to claims under Title I of the ADA or for wrongful termination, nor has Congress validly abrogated the Eleventh Amendment with regard to the ADA. Therefore, DHHS says, it is immune from this suit.
Frederick does not dispute DHHS's contention that the State is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity with respect to her ADA and wrongful termination claims. Instead, she argues that the State waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity by voluntarily litigating the case on the merits. Frederick points out that the case has been pending for over two years, during which time the court has ruled on two motions to dismiss filed by DHHS. That course of conduct, says Frederick, establishes the State's intent to waive its immunity and litigate the case on the merits. Frederick argues that DHHS “kept its immunity chip in its back pocket” until the court declined to dismiss two of her claims in its order on DHHS's second motion to dismiss. Only then, Frederick says, did DHHS invoke its “immunity chip” to “get a do-over” in state court. Pl.'s Br. at 5. Therefore, she argues, DHHS should not be permitted to invoke the Eleventh Amendment because inconsistency and unfairness will result.
”The Eleventh Amendment provides that the ‘Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit . . . commenced or prosecuted against one of the States” by citizens of another State, U.S. Const., Amdt. 11, and (as interpreted) by its own citizens.'” Lapides v. Bd. of Regents, 535 U.S. 613, 618 (2002) (quoting Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 (1890)). “As a general matter, ‘states are immune under the Eleventh Amendment from private suit in the federal courts.'” Wojcik v. Mass. State Lottery Comm., 300 F.3d 92, 99 (1st Cir. 2002) (quoting Greenless v. Almond, 277 F.3d 601, 606 (1st Cir. 2002)).
However, “[a] State remains free to waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in a federal court.” Lapides, 535 U.S. at 618. A state can waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity to suit in three ways: (1) by “clear declaration that it intends to submit itself to the jurisdiction of a federal court;” (2) “by consent to or participation in a federal program for which waiver of immunity is an express condition;” or (3) “by affirmative conduct in litigation.” Taylor v. U.S. Dept. of Labor, 440 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2005) (quotations omitted). But, “[b]ecause the sovereign's decision to waive such immunity to suit must be ‘altogether voluntary, ' the ‘test for determining whether a State has waived its immunity from federal-court jurisdiction is a stringent one.'” Maysonet-Robles v. Cabrero, 323 F.3d 43, 50 (1st Cir. 2003) (quoting College Savs. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 675 (1999) (further quotations omitted)).
Frederick argues that the state has waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity through affirmative conduct in this litigation. “As a general proposition, waiver by litigation conduct requires a showing that a state has voluntarily invoked the jurisdiction of the federal courts.” Bergemann v. Rhode Island Dep't of Envtl. Mgmt., 665 F.3d 336, 340 (1st Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks, citation and alteration omitted). “If litigation conduct is to constitute a waiver of immunity, that conduct must be ‘unambiguous' and ‘must evince a clear choice to submit [the state's] rights for adjudication by the federal courts.'” Ramos-Pinero v. Puerto Rico, 453 F.3d 48, 52 (1st Cir. 2006) (quoting Maysonet-Robles, 323 F.3d at 52). In Lapides, 535 U.S. 613, for example, the Supreme Court determined that a state waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity by voluntarily invoking federal jurisdiction by removing a case to the federal courts. The Court explained that, when determining whether a state has indicated intent to waive immunity, the focus is on “the litigation act the State takes that creates the waiver.” Lapides, 535 U.S. at 620.

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