Source: https://case-law.vlex.com/vid/529-u-s-89-605549586
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 21:13:06+00:00

Document:
Party Name: UNITED STATES v. LOCKE, GOVERNOR OF WASHINGTON, et al.
After the supertanker Torrey Canyon spilled crude oil off the coast of England in 1967, both Congress, in the Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972 (PWSA), and the State of Washington enacted more stringent regulations for tankers and provided for more comprehensive remedies in the event of an oil spill. The ensuing question of federal pre-emption of the State's laws was addressed in Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151. In 1989, the supertanker Exxon Valdez ran aground in Alaska, causing the largest oil spill in United States history. Again, both Congress and Washington responded. Congress enacted the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA). The State created a new agency and directed it to establish standards to provide the "best achievable protection" (BAP) from oil spill damages. That agency promulgated tanker design, equipment, reporting, and operating requirements. Petitioner International Association of Independent Tanker Owners (Intertanko), a trade association of tanker operators, brought this suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against state and local officials responsible for enforcing the BAP regulations. Upholding the regulations, the District Court rejected Intertanko's arguments that the BAP standards invaded an area long pre-empted by the Federal Government. At the appeal stage, the United States intervened on Intertanko's behalf, contending that the District Court's ruling failed to give sufficient weight to the substantial foreign affairs interests of the Federal Government. The Ninth Circuit held that the State could enforce its laws, save one requiring vessels to install certain navigation and towing equipment, which was "virtually identical to" requirements declared pre-empted in Ray.
(a) The State has enacted legislation in an area where the federal interest has been manifest since the beginning of the Republic and is now well established. Congress has, beginning with the Tank Vessel Act of 1936, enacted a series of statutes pertaining to maritime tanker transports. These include the PWSA, Title I of which authorizes, but does not require, the Coast Guard to enact measures for controlling vessel traffic or for protecting navigation and the marine environment, 33 U.S.C. § 1223(a), and Title II of which, as amended, requires the Coast Guard to issue regulations addressing the design, construction, alteration, repair, maintenance, operation, equipping, personnel qualification, and manning of covered vessels, 46 U.S.C. § 3703(a). Congress later enacted OPA, Title I of which, among other things, imposes liability for both removal costs and damages on parties responsible for an oil spill, 33 U.S.C. §2702, and includes two saving clauses preserving the States' authority to impose additional liability, requirements, and penalties, §§ 2718(a) and (c). Congress has also ratified international agreements in this area, including the International Convention of Standards of Training Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW). Pp. 99-103.
in PWSA Title I, preserved state authority to regulate the peculiarities of local waters, such as depth and narrowness, if there is no conflict with federal regulatory determinations, see 435 U.S., at 171- 172, 178, but further held that Congress, in PWSA Title II, mandated uniform federal rules on the subjects or matters there specified, id., at 168. Thus, under Ray 's interpretation of the Title II provision now found at 46 U.S.C. § 3703(a), only the Federal Government may regulate the design, construction, alteration, repair, maintenance, operation, equipping, personnel qualification, and manning of tankers. The Court today reaffirms Ray 's holding on this point. Congress has left no room for state regulation of these matters. See Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141. Although the Ray Court acknowledged that the existence of some overlapping coverage between the two PWSA titles may make it difficult to determine whether a pre-emption question is controlled by conflict pre-emption principles, applicable generally to Title I, or by field pre-emption rules, applicable generally to Title II, the Court declined to resolve every question by the greater pre-emptive force of Title II. Thus, conflict pre-emption will be applicable in some, although not all, cases. Useful inquiries in determining which title governs include whether the regulation in question is justified by conditions unique to a particular port or waterway, see Ray, 435 U.S., at 175, or whether it is of limited extraterritorial effect, not requiring the tanker to modify its primary conduct outside the specific body of water purported to justify the local rule, see id., at 159-160, 171. Pp. 103-112.
licensed deck officer on the navigation bridge who is capable of clearly understanding English. Third, Washington's general requirement that the navigation watch consist of at least two licensed deck officers, a helmsman, and a lookout is pre-empted as an attempt to regulate a tanker's "operation" and "manning" under 46 U.S.C. § 3703(a). Fourth, the requirement that vessels in Washington waters report certain marine casualties regardless of where in the world they occurred cannot stand in light of Coast Guard regulations on the same subject that Congress intended be the sole source of a vessel's reporting obligations, see §§6101, 3717(a)(4). On remand, Washington may argue that certain of its regulations, such as its watch requirement in times of restricted visibility, are of limited extraterritorial effect, are necessary to address the peculiarities of Puget Sound, and therefore are not subject to Title II field pre-emption, but should instead be evaluated under Title I conflict pre-emption analysis. Pp. 112-116.

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