Source: https://wcc.state.ct.us/crb/1998/3309crb.htm
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 16:27:30+00:00

Document:
Diaz v. Robert W. Baker Nursery, Inc.
ROBERT W. BAKER NURSERY, INC.
The claimant was represented by John Connor, Esq., Connor, Sandman & Weisser, 2 South Bridge Dr., Agawam, MA 01001.
The respondents were represented by Joseph E. Skelly, Jr., Esq., Edward M. Henfey & Associates, 55 Farmington Ave., Hartford, CT 06105.
This Petition for Review from the March 6, 1996 Finding and Award of the Commissioner acting for the First District was heard June 13, 1997 before a Compensation Review Board panel consisting of the Commission Chairman Jesse M. Frankl and Commissioners James J. Metro and John A. Mastropietro.
JESSE M. FRANKL, CHAIRMAN. The respondents have appealed from the March 6, 1996 Finding and Award of the Commissioner acting for the First District. In that decision the trier concluded that the claimant sustained a compensable injury to his back during his employment with the respondent employer. In support of their appeal, the respondents contend that the commissioner improperly admitted, and relied upon, a medical report written by Dr. James Rich. In addition, the respondents contend that the evidence does not support the trial commissioner’s determination that the claimant’s back condition was caused by his employment.
In the instant case, the June 27, 1995 medical report by Dr. Rich was the result of an IME which was conducted “at the request of the respondents.” (Respondents’ Brief at p. 3). At the formal hearing, when the claimant offered the IME report into evidence, the respondents’ attorney stated, “I’m not sure I was going to offer that, Commissioner, to be quite honest with you. He (the claimant) can always take the doctor’s deposition if he wants.” (12/4/95 TR. at p. 25). Subsequently, when the trial commissioner asked the respondents’ attorney if the case would be completed that day, he replied, “Well, except that I may take the deposition of my doctor now that it’s been admitted into evidence. I wasn’t planning on submitting it into evidence, I wasn’t planning to take his deposition, but now that it’s been admitted, I may have to do that.” (12/4/95 TR. at p. 45, emphasis added). However, the respondents’ attorney specifically decided to rest its case. (12/4/95 TR. at p. 67).
Accordingly, as the respondents in this case decided not to pursue a deposition or subpoena of Dr. Rich, we cannot now find that they were denied due process. See Giovino, supra, see also Straub v. Bolt Technology Corp., 9 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 212, 1130 CRD-3-90-11 (Sept. 12, 1991), Ruh v. Della Construction Co., 9 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 269, 1034 CRD-7-90-6 (Dec. 5, 1991), Diogostine v. Somers Thin Strip, 3 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 139, 282 CRD-5-83 (Jan. 22, 1987). Although we note that there may be difficulties in securing the testimony of an out-of-state physician, the respondents in the instant case do not allege that they made any attempt whatsoever in this regard. We certainly stress the importance of using physicians who are licensed in Connecticut. See § 31-294d; § 31-280-1. However, in the instant case, the choice of the IME physician was made by the respondents. After choosing a Massachusetts physician, the respondents should not now be able to object to said doctor merely because he is out-of-state, without having made any attempt to obtain a deposition.
In further support of their appeal, the respondents contend that the evidence does not support the trial commissioner’s determination that the claimant sustained a compensable injury. The respondents are essentially requesting that this board retry the evidence, which this board may not do. Rogers v. Laidlaw Transit, Inc., 45 Conn. App. 204, 206 (1997) per curiam. Whether an injury arose out of and in the course of the employment requires a factual determination. McDonough v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 204 Conn. 104, 117 (1987). The power and duty of determining the facts rests on the commissioner as the trier of fact. This fact-finding authority “entitles the commissioner to determine the weight of the evidence presented and the credibility of the testimony offered by lay and expert witnesses.” Webb v. Pfizer, Inc., 14 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 69, 70, 1859 CRB-5-93-9 (May 12, 1995) (citing Tovish v. Gerber Electronics, 32 Conn. App. 595, 599 (1993), appeal dismissed, 229 Conn. 587 (1994)). We will not disturb such determinations unless they are found without evidence, based on impermissible or unreasonable factual inferences or contrary to law. Fair v. People’s Savings Bank, 207 Conn. 535 (1988).
In the instant case, the trial commissioner determined that the claimant’s testimony was credible regarding his allegation that he sustained injuries to his back while lifting trees for the employer on July 23, 1993. The trial commissioner’s determination is supported by the medical opinion issued by Dr. Rich. (Finding No. 13). Where, as here, the commissioner’s determination is based upon the weight and credibility that he has accorded the evidence, we will not disturb such a determination. Dickey v. Harris Graphics, 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 218, 1481 CRB-2-92-8 (March 22, 1994).

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 31
 § 31
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.