Source: http://isthatlegal.ca/index.php?name=Habeas-Corpus
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 20:18:44+00:00

Document:
I begin with the decision in May v. Ferndale Institution, 2005 SCC 82 (CanLII),  3 S.C.R. 809. While May involved a challenge by federal inmates to the reclassification of their security level within the federal penitentiary system, and was thus factually distinct from the situation here, the importance of the decision for current purposes lies in its review of the history and principles surrounding habeas corpus.
 The majority in May reviewed the purpose behind the writ of habeas corpus. Fish and LeBel JJ., at para. 21, quoted from a decision of Black J. in the United States Supreme Court where he said that the purpose of habeas corpus was “the protection of individuals against erosion of their right to be free from wrongful restraints upon their liberty”. That protection was stated in broad terms. It was not restricted to imprisonment but to any restraint on a person’s liberty. Such restraints can take many different forms.
 The decision in May went on to consider other cases that had touched on the purpose of habeas corpus. It referred to the Supreme Court of Canada’s trilogy of decisions in R. v. Miller, 1985 CanLII 22 (SCC),  2 S.C.R. 613; Cardinal v. Director of Kent Institution, 1985 CanLII 23 (SCC),  2 S.C.R. 643; Morin v. National Special Handling Review Committee, 1985 CanLII 24 (SCC),  2 S.C.R. 662. The court pointed out, at para. 31, that in Miller, Le Dain J. had also described habeas corpus as “the traditional means of challenging deprivations of liberty”. Again, there was no suggestion that the remedy was restricted to incarceration. The court then went on to consider the exceptions to the general right of an individual to resort to habeas corpus to challenge their detention, a subject to which I will return shortly.
Given the historical importance of habeas corpus in the protection of various liberty interests, jurisprudential developments limiting habeas corpus jurisdiction should be carefully evaluated and should not be allowed to expand unchecked. The exceptions to habeas corpus jurisdiction and the circumstances under which a superior court may decline jurisdiction should be well defined and limited.
 This conclusion is also consistent with the proper approach to be taken to habeas corpus applications. As pointed out in Mission Institution v. Khela, 2014 SCC 24 (CanLII),  1 S.C.R. 502 at para. 30, habeas corpus applications proceed in two stages. First, the applicant must show that he or she has been deprived of liberty and that there is a legitimate ground upon which to question the legality of the detention. If the applicant succeeds in meeting that threshold, the onus shifts to the authorities to show that the deprivation of liberty is lawful.
 Declining to exercise habeas corpus jurisdiction is different from striking out an application on a summary basis. In Mission Institution v. Khela, 2014 SCC 24 (CanLII),  1 S.C.R. 502, at para. 78, the Court held that “[u]nlike the Federal Court in the context of an application for judicial review, a provincial superior court hearing a habeas corpus application has no inherent discretion to refuse to review the case.” Stated differently, “if the prisoner does raise an arguable issue there is no room for discretion: the matter should proceed to hearing so that a full and proper determination can be made. The non-discretionary nature of habeas corpus is an important difference between it and other prerogative writs:” Judith Farbey, Robert J. Sharpe and Simon Atrill, The Law of Habeas Corpus, 3rd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), at p. 53.
 As noted above, the respondent relied on the civil rules as the foundation for its pre-emptive motion to strike this habeas corpus application. However, this reliance was misplaced in a number of respects. First, the respondent relied on r. 21.01(3)(a) – “lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.” However, it would appear that the application judge did not apply this sub-rule. Instead, he found that it was “plain and obvious” that the appellant’s claim could not succeed. This language – “plain and obvious” – is more appropriate to r. 21.01(1)(b), which governs a “motion to strike out a pleading on the ground that it discloses no reasonable cause of action or defence”: see Paton Estate v. Ontario Lottery and Gaming Commission, 2016 ONCA 458 (CanLII), 131 O.R. (3d) 273, at para. 12; and R. v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd., 2011 SCC 42 (CanLII),  3 S.C.R. 45, at paras. 17-22.
 More profoundly, neither civil rule was applicable in the circumstances of this case. This habeas corpus application was criminal in nature; it arises directly from the imposition of a penal sanction under the Criminal Code: see Vukelich v. Mission Institution, 2005 BCCA 75 (CanLII), 252 D.L.R. (4th) 634, at para. 32. Accordingly, this application was governed by the Criminal Proceedings Rules for the Superior Court of Justice (Ontario), SI/2012-7 (“the criminal rules”). Rule 43 provides the foundation for prerogative relief applications, including habeas corpus.
 On appeal, the respondent’s position has shifted. It now relies on a number of criminal rules (rr. 1.04(1), (2), 2.01, and 6.11). Moreover, the respondent attempts to fortify its position by invoking R. v. Jordan, 2016 SCC 27 (CanLII),  1 S.C.R. 631, stressing the need to prevent the criminal courts from becoming clogged by unmeritorious cases such as the appellant’s.
 This rule sets the bar quite high. The application must fail to show a “substantial ground for the order sought”; it must be “frivolous and vexatious”; and it must be capable of being determined “without a full hearing.” Even if these criteria are met, the power to dismiss remains discretionary. The test for dismissal under r. 6.11(2) differs substantially from, and is more onerous than, the tests under r. 21.01(1)(b) and r. 21.01(3)(a) of the civil rules. Moreover, unlike the r. 21.01 tests, the test under s. 6.11(2) contemplates summary dismissal without notice to the applicant – in other words, an application so devoid of merit it can be disposed of ex parte.
 In my view, it cannot be said that the appellant’s claim “does not show a substantial ground” or that it is “frivolous or vexatious”, for the following three reasons. First, when his previous habeas corpus application was terminated, it was “without prejudice” to commencing a new application. The appellant did just that by launching his new application. The new application is not, therefore, vexatious.
 Second, the appellant raises grounds that are arguably unique, operating outside of the Lyons/Gamble/Sarson/Gallichon framework. The appellant’s habeas corpus claims do not challenge the legality of his continued detention on the basis of legislative shifts; instead, he argues that the initial warrant of committal was invalid at the time it was issued.
 Third, whether the appellant could have raised these complaints at his 1995 appeal from sentence is not a foregone conclusion; it is a live issue, the resolution of which may well turn on the scope of this court’s dispositional powers under s. 759 of the Criminal Code that were in force at the time of the 1995 appeal.
 I return to the authorities (in para. 9, above) that were urged on the application judge by the respondent in support of its motion to strike. They have no application to this case. Those decisions involved prisoners seeking habeas corpus relief in response to lateral transfers between maximum security institutions. In each case, it was determined that there was no cognizable deprivation of liberty for habeas corpus purposes. This is very different from the situation faced by the appellant who, after 30 years, seeks to challenge the legality of his initial and continued detention as a dangerous offender.
 I acknowledge that the application judge provided detailed reasons for his decision. He grappled with the merits of the application. However, his judgment was rendered in response to a motion for summary dismissal, predicated on inapplicable civil rules. Given the unique nature of the appellant’s habeas corpus application, it was neither expedient nor in the interests of justice to short circuit his application through a procedure not contemplated by the criminal rules.
 The appellant argues that, if the application judge erred in striking his application, this court should consider the habeas corpus claim on the merits and grant him the relief that he seeks. The respondent resists this approach. It claims that the case cannot be decided on the merits because the record is incomplete. The respondent wishes to adduce evidence in support of its position.
 Even though the record is incomplete as a result of the respondent’s misplaced motion to strike, I would not be prepared to adjudicate on the merits of the appellant’s claim on the record that is presently before this court, and without the benefit of any further findings that a judge may make after a full hearing on the merits.
 As referenced in May, there are two exceptions to the availability of habeas corpus. One is where a statute confers jurisdiction on a court of appeal to correct the errors of a lower court and to release the affected person, if necessary. The other is where a legislator has put in place a complete, comprehensive and expert procedure for review of an administrative decision affecting a person’s liberty.
 Admittedly, the most common use of the writ of habeas corpus is where a person is being held in custody and they have not, for whatever reason, been granted a hearing respecting their qualification for release from custody. But there is nothing in the history of the remedy that would justify limiting its reach solely to situations where a person is being held in custody. The most common use should neither eclipse nor exclude other possible uses.
Habeas corpus issues as of right once a detainee proves a deprivation of liberty and raises a legitimate ground upon which to question the legality of that deprivation. (Emphasis added).
Bail and jail are different points on a continuum between complete freedom and total deprivation of liberty. Strict conditions amounting to house arrest significantly constrain liberty and push bail towards the total deprivation of liberty end of the continuum.
See also R. v. Downes (2006), 2006 CanLII 3957 (ON CA), 79 O.R. (3d) 321 (C.A.), at para. 29.
In Wang v. Canada (Ont CA, 2018) the court notes that the standard of judicial review is one of 'correctness'. In judicial review cases the law distinguishes 'correctness' from 'reasonableness', the latter being more forgiving of the tribunal below and the former requiring that the decision below be simply 'correct'.
 Before embarking on that review, however, I would point out that the scope of the writ of habeas corpus constitutes a question of law. The standard of review is, thus, one of correctness: Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33 (CanLII),  2 S.C.R. 235, at para. 8.

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