Source: http://circuit9.blogspot.com/2016/04/
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 00:06:47+00:00

Document:
US v. Adebimpe, No. 14-10303 (4-27-16)(Murguia with Hurwitz; Paez dissenting). We have a circuit split here: Can there be an abuse of trust enhancement under 3B1.3 appropriate for suppliers of durable Medicare equipment--mobile electric wheelchairs. The majority says "yes" because the supplier has to make sure the wheelchair is correct, independent of the physician prescribing and final approval. (The physician here was in on the fraudulent prescribing). The defendant thus had managerial discretion.
The dissent argues that the supplying was just ministerial. The prescription came in and the electric wheelchairs rolled out.
The 9th sides with the 5th against the 11th.
Here’s an efficient idea: why not involuntary medicate our clients with six times the recommended dose of psychotropic drugs? Easier for BOP staff, and a quicker hustle to restored competency.
(The Ninth, thankfully, doesn't buy it either).
United States v. Onuoha, 2015 WL 1579952(9th Cir. April 20, 2016), decision available here.
Players: Decision by Judge Gould, joined by Judge Berzon and District Judge Steeh. Important win for CD Cal AFPD Briana Fuller Mircheff.
Facts: Onuoha, a mentally ill man and former TSA screener, is charged under 18 USC §§ 844(e) and 1038(a)(1) for allegedly making threatening calls to LAX and telling them to clear the airport. Id. at *1. The defense noticed a diminished capacity defense before trial, and the district court then granted the government’s motion for a competency evaluation. Id. at *2.
After the BOP found Onuoha incompetent the government sought forced medication to restore competency under Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003). Id. at *2.
Over defense objection, the district court ordered involuntary medication. Id. at *2. Onuoha filed an interlocutory appeal. Id.
Issue(s): “On this appeal Onuoha challenges only the district court’s conclusions on the first and fourth [Sell] factors, and so we limit our discussion, first, to whether important government interests are at stake in prosecuting Onuoha and, second, to whether administration of the prescribed drugs is medically appropriate, i.e., in the patient's best medical interests in light of his medical condition.” Id. at *3.
Held: “We conclude that the first factor is met but that the fourth factor is not: there is an important governmental interest in prosecuting Onuoha, but the proposed treatment is not in his best medical interests.” Id.
Of Note: Onuoha’s Guideline range is only at 27-33 months. Id. at *4. When the Ninth upheld the “important governmental interest” in this case (the first Sell factor), Onuoha becomes the lowest guideline range to satisfy the “important governmental interest” test. Id. The Ninth adds many caveats, however, that make this a one-off case for this factor. Onuoha was a former TSA screener who allegedly made threatening calls to LAX on the eve of 9-11, who left notes leading law enforcement to believe he was an active shooter, and generally caused much havoc. Id. at *5. Moreover, the Ninth rejects the district court’s reliance on “future dangerousness” as a basis for the “governmental interest” inquiry. Id.
Don’t let an AUSA get away with a casual cite to this low range for this factor – this is a nuanced and fact-bound analysis of “governmental interest,” and is readily distinguishable in most low-guideline range cases.
How to Use: The BOP’s Dr. Lucking recommended forced injections of Haldol, at doses higher than the BOP’s own own recommendations. Id. at *7. Dr. Lucking recommended this high dose – up to six times higher than the BOP’s guidelines– “so that treatment moves on in a more rapid manner.” Id. at *8. The Ninth is appropriately unimpressed: “restoring competency quickly is not a controlling concern under the fourth Sell factor – only the best medical interests are considered.” Id.
Not that Judge Gould refuses to demure to the BOP’s doc’s “expertise:” “a physician's word is not absolute, not even the word of a reputable and experienced doctor. Although Dr. Lucking has administered involuntary medication hundreds of times, his recommendations are still subject to Sell’s rigorous analysis.” Id. at *9.
Onuoha illustrates why the defense really has to tear apart any BOP forced-med recommendation: it is a defendant-centered (actually, patient-centered, id. at *9) opinion that rightly puts our client’s health front and center.
A new leading opinion on Sell litigation, and a must-read for any forced-med case.
For Further Reading: Nna Alpha Onuoha is a former U.S. Army vet, and a former TSA worker, who allegedly made the threats to LAX the day after he resigned. For a news account of this sad and troubled man, see Former SoCal TSA Employee Arrested After Threats to LAX, available here.
1. US v. Onuoha, No. 15-50300 (4-20-16)(Gould with Berzon and Steeh, D.J.) This is a Sell involuntary medication issue. The 9th reverses the district court's order for involuntary medication to treat defendant's schizophrenia and to restore him to competency. The 9th found that the government had an important interest in prosecuting the defendant, who had made a threat that shut down LAX. However, under Sell, the defendant has a self-interest in the best medical course of action. The district court clearly erred in finding that involuntary medication was in the defendant's best interests given the effect of anti-psychotic medication under the circumstances, the course of treatment, and the amount proposed to be given. The 9th remands to the court for a full consideration of the best medical interest of the defendant and the contradictory medical evidence.
Congrats to Brianna Mircheff, Deputy FPD, Cal Central (L.A.).
2. US v. Cruz, No. 10-50115 (4-20-16)(Bybee with Farris and N. Smith). The 9th affirms a life sentence for a mid-level drug dealer because he had two prior drug felonies and such a sentence is mandated by 21 U.S.C. § 841. The sentence is mandated even though, under California's Prop 47, one of the state priors was reclassified as a misdemeanor. The 9th holds that a subsequent change and reclassification of a state conviction would not impact a federal sentence properly imposed at the time. The 9th has previously found that a prior conviction, even subsequently expunged or dismissed, would not alter a sentence. If a dismissal didn't cause a resentencing on the recidivist statute, a reclassification also would not. The 9th also stated that Congress could have allowed for such reconsideration, or have changed 841, but it hasn't. The recidivist statute also serves a purpose to "send a message."
What happens when state legislatures and appellate courts cram too much conduct into common law crimes, and salvage lousy convictions on appeal?
United States v. Parnell, No. 14-30208 (9th Cir. Apr. 12, 2016), decision available here.
Players: Decision by Judge Fisher, joined by Judge Berzon. Concurrence by Judge Watford. Big win for AFDs Robert Schwarz and Melissa Winberg, Federal Defender Services of Idaho.
Facts: Parnell was convicted of armed robbery in Massachusetts. Slip Op. at 3. He was later convicted of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), felon in possession of a firearm. The government sought a fifteen-year mand-min sentence, arguing that the Mass. prior was a “crime of violence” that – along with other priors -- triggered the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). Id. The district court agreed. Id. at 4.
Issue(s): “The district court concluded Parnell qualifies as an armed career criminal based in part on his [Mass.] conviction for armed robbery . . . . Parnell argues this offense does not have ‘as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.’” Id.
Held: “We agree with Parnell that the force required by the actual force prong of robbery under Massachusetts law does not satisfy the requirement of physical force under § 924(e)(2)(B)(i) – ‘force capable of causing physical pain or injury to another person.’ Johnson, 559 U.S. at 140. Because the ‘degree of force is immaterial’ [under Massachusetts’ law], any force, however slight, will satisfy this prong so long as the victim is aware of it. Such force is insufficient under Johnson.” Id. at *6.
“[B]ecause the degree of force required to commit armed robbery in Massachusetts is immaterial so long as the victim is aware of it, Massachusetts’ armed robbery statute does not have ‘as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.’ 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i). Under the categorical approach, therefore, a conviction under the Massachusetts statute does not qualify as a violent felony under ACCA’s force clause. The government does not argue Parnell’s conviction falls under § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) or that the modified categorical approach applies. Accordingly, we hold Parnell’s 1990 armed robbery conviction does not qualify as a predicate conviction for purposes of a sentencing enhancement under ACCA.” Id. at *11.
This frank concurrence illustrates two points. First, take nothing for granted when thinking about Johnson crimes of violence: even armed robbery can be vulnerable.
Second, think back on all of those aggravating decisions we've suffered over the years, where courts stretched criminal statutes to the breaking point and beyond to uphold a conviction. Johnson is our spin of the karmic wheel – it is those selfsame crazy decisions that now make whole swaths of prior convictions subject to Johnson attack.
How to Use: This is a very good opinion. We like the outcome, of course, but Judge Fisher’s decision also clearly works through the steps of a (successful!) Johnson challenge. He explains the modified categorical approach, and its limitation to divisible statutes. Id. at *4. He works through the force prong of the Crime of Violence analysis, and rejects the argument that being armed – alone – satisfies that prong. Id. at *5. Judge Fisher also discusses the “realistic probability” requirement, and applies it to the Mass. statute. Id. at *7 & n.4. Plus, look for a bonus holding: reckless assault and battery by dangerous weapon doesn’t count, either! Id. at 12 & n.5.
If you’re mounting a Johnson challenge, you'll find Parnell an accessible and helpful starting point and guide.
For Further Reading: Is Johnson retroactivity for guideline sentences a substantive inquiry, or procedural? And why is the government arguing that at all in a non-guideline case?
For some troubling dicta-baiting by DOJ, see the transcript of the Welch Supreme Court argument, available here.

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