Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/586/17-1104/
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 08:57:50+00:00

Document:
Manufacturers produced equipment for three Navy ships. The equipment required asbestos insulation or asbestos parts to function as intended, but the manufacturers did not always incorporate the asbestos into their products, so the Navy later added the asbestos. Two Navy veterans, exposed to asbestos on the ships, developed cancer. They sued the manufacturers. The manufacturers argued that they should not be liable for harms caused by later-added third-party parts.
The Supreme Court affirmed the Third Circuit in rejecting summary judgment for the manufacturers. The Court adopted a rule between the “foreseeability” approach and the “bare-metal defense,” that is "especially appropriate in the context of maritime law, which has always recognized a ‘special solicitude for the welfare’ of sailors." Requiring a warning in these circumstances will not impose a significant burden on manufacturers, who already have a duty to warn of the dangers of their own products. A manufacturer must provide a warning only when it knows or has reason to know that the integrated product is likely to be dangerous for its intended uses and has no reason to believe that the product’s users will realize that danger. The rule applies only if the manufacturer directs that the part be incorporated; the manufacturer makes the product with a part that the manufacturer knows will require replacement with a similar part; or a product would be useless without the part.
Where equipment manufactured for Navy ships required the subsequent installation of asbestos parts by the Navy, and the manufacturer had no reason to believe that the product’s users would realize the danger of exposure, the manufacturer had a duty to warn.
(a) Tort law imposes a duty to exercise reasonable care on those whose conduct presents a risk of harm to others. That includes a duty to warn when the manufacturer “knows or has reason to know” that its product “is or is likely to be dangerous for the use for which it is supplied” and “has no reason to believe” that the product’s users will realize that danger. 2 Restatement (Second) of Torts §388. Three approaches have emerged on how to apply that “duty to warn” principle when a manufacturer’s product requires later incorporation of a dangerous part in order for the integrated product to function as intended. The first—the foreseeability rule—provides that a manufacturer may be liable when it was foreseeable that its product would be used with another product or part, even if the manufacturer’s product did not require use or incorporation of that other product or part. The second—the bare-metal defense—provides that if a manufacturer did not itself make, sell, or distribute the part or incorporate the part into the product, the manufacturer is not liable for harm caused by the integrated product—even if the product required incorporation of the part and the manufacturer knew that the integrated product was likely to be dangerous for its intended uses. A third approach, falling between those two, imposes on the manufacturer a duty to warn when its product requires incorporation of a part and the manufacturer knows or has reason to know that the integrated product is likely to be dangerous for its intended uses.
The third approach is most appropriate for this maritime context. The foreseeability rule would sweep too broadly, imposing a difficult and costly burden on manufacturers, while simultaneously overwarning users. The bare-metal defense ultimately goes too far in the other direction. After all, a manufacturer that supplies a product that is dangerous in and of itself and a manufacturer that supplies a product that requires incorporation of a part that the manufacturer knows or has reason to know is likely to make the integrated product dangerous for its intended uses both “kno[w] or ha[ve] reason to know” that the product “is or is likely to be dangerous for the use for which it is supplied.” And in the latter case, the product manufacturer will often be in a better position than the parts manufacturer to warn of the danger, because the product manufacturer knows the nature of the ultimate integrated product. Requiring a warning in these circumstances will not impose a significant burden on manufacturers, who already have a duty to warn of the dangers of their own products. Nor will it result in substantial uncertainty about when product manufacturers must provide warnings, because the rule requires a manufacturer to warn only when its product requires a part in order for the integrated product to function as intended. And this Court is unaware of any substantial overwarning problems in those jurisdictions that have adopted the approach taken here. Requiring the product manufacturer to warn when its product requires incorporation of a part that makes the integrated product dangerous for its intended uses is especially appropriate in the context of maritime law, which has always recognized a “ ‘special solicitude for the welfare’ ” of sailors. American Export Lines, Inc. v. Alvez, 446 U.S. 274, 285. Pp. 4–10.
In maritime tort cases, we act as a common-law court, subject to any controlling statutes enacted by Congress. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 507–508 (2008). This maritime tort case raises a question about the scope of a manufacturer’s duty to warn. The manufacturers here produced equipment such as pumps, blowers, and turbines for three Navy ships. The equipment required asbestos insulation or asbestos parts in order to function as intended. When used on the ships, the equipment released asbestos fibers into the air. Two Navy veterans who were exposed to asbestos on the ships developed cancer and later died. The veterans’ families sued the equipment manufacturers, claiming that the manufacturers were negligent in failing to warn of the dangers of asbestos.
Five businesses—Air and Liquid Systems, CBS, Foster Wheeler, Ingersoll Rand, and General Electric—produced some of the equipment that was used on the ships. Al-though the equipment required asbestos insulation or asbestos parts in order to function as intended, those businesses did not always incorporate the asbestos into their products. Instead, the businesses delivered much of the equipment to the Navy without asbestos. The equipment was delivered in a condition known as “bare-metal.” In those situations, the Navy later added the asbestos to the equipment.
McAfee and DeVries allege that their exposure to the asbestos caused them to develop cancer. They and their wives sued the equipment manufacturers in Pennsylvania state court. (McAfee and DeVries later died during the course of the ongoing litigation.) The plaintiffs did not sue the Navy because they apparently believed the Navy was immune. See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950). The plaintiffs also could not recover much from the manufacturers of the asbestos insulation and asbestos parts because those manufacturers had gone bankrupt. As to the manufacturers of the equipment—such as the pumps, blowers, and turbines—the plaintiffs claimed that those manufacturers negligently failed to warn them of the dangers of asbestos in the integrated products. If the manufacturers had provided warnings, the workers on the ships presumably could have worn respiratory masks and thereby avoided the danger.
The District Court granted the manufacturers’ motions for summary judgment. The U. S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit vacated and remanded. In re Asbestos Prods. Liability Litigation, 873 F.3d 232, 241 (2017). The Third Circuit held that “a manufacturer of a bare-metal product may be held liable for a plaintiff’s injuries suffered from later-added asbestos-containing materials” if the manufacturer could foresee that the product would be used with the later-added asbestos-containing materials. Id., at 240.
We granted certiorari to resolve a disagreement among the Courts of Appeals about the validity of the bare-metal defense under maritime law. 584 U. S. ___ (2018). Compare 873 F.3d 232 (case below), with Lindstrom v. A-C Prod. Liability Trust, 424 F.3d 488 (CA6 2005).
When a federal court decides a maritime case, it acts as a federal “common law court,” much as state courts do in state common-law cases. Exxon Shipping Co., 554 U. S., at 507. Subject to direction from Congress, the federal courts fashion federal maritime law. See id., at 508, n. 21; Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 27 (1990); United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 409 (1975); Detroit Trust Co. v. The Thomas Barlum, 293 U.S. 21, 42–44 (1934). In formulating federal maritime law, the federal courts may examine, among other sources, judicial opinions, legislation, treatises, and scholarly writings. See Exxon Co., U. S. A. v. Sofec, Inc., 517 U.S. 830, 839 (1996); East River S. S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 864 (1986).
This is a maritime tort case. The plaintiffs allege that the defendant equipment manufacturers were negligent in failing to warn about the dangers of asbestos. “The general maritime law has recognized the tort of negligence for more than a century . . . .” Norfolk Shipbuilding & Drydock Corp. v. Garris, 532 U.S. 811, 820 (2001); see also Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 631–632 (1959). Maritime law has likewise recognized common-law principles of products liability for decades. See East River S. S. Corp., 476 U. S., at 865.
We start with basic tort-law principles. Tort law im- poses “a duty to exercise reasonable care” on those whose conduct presents a risk of harm to others. 1 Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm §7, p. 77 (2005). For the manufacturer of a product, the general duty of care includes a duty to warn when the manufacturer “knows or has reason to know” that its product “is or is likely to be dangerous for the use for which it is supplied” and the manufacturer “has no reason to believe” that the product’s users will realize that danger. 2 Restatement (Second) of Torts §388, p. 301 (1963–1964).
The first approach is the more plaintiff-friendly foreseeability rule that the Third Circuit adopted in this case: A manufacturer may be liable when it was foreseeable that the manufacturer’s product would be used with another product or part, even if the manufacturer’s product did not require use or incorporation of that other product or part. See, e.g., 873 F. 3d, at 240; Kochera v. Foster Wheeler, LLC, 2015 WL 5584749, *4 (SD Ill., Sept. 23, 2015); Chicano v. General Elec. Co., 2004 WL 2250990, *9 (ED Pa., Oct. 5, 2004); McKenzie v. A. W. Chesterson Co., 277 Ore. App. 728, 749–750, 373 P.3d 150, 162 (2016).
The third approach falls between those two approaches. Under the third approach, foreseeability that the product may be used with another product or part that is likely to be dangerous is not enough to trigger a duty to warn. But a manufacturer does have a duty to warn when its product requires incorporation of a part and the manufacturer knows or has reason to know that the integrated product is likely to be dangerous for its intended uses. Under that approach, the manufacturer may be liable even when the manufacturer does not itself incorporate the required part into the product. See, e.g., Quirin v. Lorillard Tobacco Co., 17 F. Supp. 3d 760, 769–770 (ND Ill. 2014); In re New York City Asbestos Litigation, 27 N.Y.3d 765, 793–794, 59 N. E. 3d 458, 474 (2016); May v. Air & Liquid Systems Corp., 446 Md. 1, 29, 129 A.3d 984, 1000 (2015).
To begin, we agree with the manufacturers that a rule of mere foreseeability would sweep too broadly. See gener- ally 1 Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm §7, Comment j, at 82; 2 Restatement (Second) of Torts §395, Comment j, at 330. Many products can foreseeably be used in numerous ways with numerous other products and parts. Requiring a product manufacturer to imagine and warn about all of those possible uses—with massive liability looming for failure to correctly predict how its product might be used with other prod- ucts or parts—would impose a difficult and costly burden on manufacturers, while simultaneously overwarning users. In light of that uncertainty and unfairness, we reject the foreseeability approach for this maritime context.
That said, we agree with the plaintiffs that the bare-metal defense ultimately goes too far in the other direction. In urging the bare-metal defense, the manufacturers contend that a business generally has “no duty” to “control the conduct of a third person as to prevent him from causing physical harm to another.” Id., §315, at 122. That is true, but it is also beside the point here. After all, when a manufacturer’s product is dangerous in and of itself, the manufacturer “knows or has reason to know” that the product “is or is likely to be dangerous for the use for which it is supplied.” Id., §388, at 301. The same holds true, we conclude, when the manufacturer’s product requires incorporation of a part that the manufacturer knows or has reason to know is likely to make the integrated product dangerous for its intended uses. As a matter of maritime tort law, we find no persuasive reason to distinguish those two similar situations for purposes of a manufacturer’s duty to warn. See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability §2, Comment i, p. 30 (1997) (“[W]arnings also may be needed to inform users and consumers of nonobvious and not generally known risks that unavoidably inhere in using or consuming the product”).
Importantly, the product manufacturer will often be in a better position than the parts manufacturer to warn of the danger from the integrated product. See generally G. Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents 311–318 (1970). The product manufacturer knows the nature of the ultimate integrated product and is typically more aware of the risks associated with that integrated product. By contrast, a parts manufacturer may be aware only that its part could conceivably be used in any number of ways in any number of products. A parts manufacturer may not always be aware that its part will be used in a way that poses a risk of danger.
To be sure, as the manufacturers correctly point out, issuing a warning costs time and money. But the burden usually is not significant. Manufacturers already have a duty to warn of the dangers of their own products. That duty typically imposes a light burden on manufacturers. See, e.g., Davis v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 399 F.2d 121, 131 (CA9 1968); Butler v. L. Sonneborn Sons, Inc., 296 F.2d 623, 625–626 (CA2 1961); Ross Labs. v. Thies, 725 P.2d 1076, 1079 (Alaska 1986); Moran v. Faberge, Inc., 273 Md. 538, 543–544, 332 A.2d 11, 15 (1975). Requiring a manufacturer to also warn when the manufacturer knows or has reason to know that a required later-added part is likely to make the integrated product dangerous for its intended uses should not meaningfully add to that burden.
Requiring the product manufacturer to warn when its product requires incorporation of a part that makes the integrated product dangerous for its intended uses—and not just when the manufacturer itself incorporates the part into the product—is especially appropriate in the maritime context. Maritime law has always recognized a “special solicitude for the welfare” of those who undertake to “venture upon hazardous and unpredictable sea voy- ages.” American Export Lines, Inc. v. Alvez, 446 U.S. 274, 285 (1980) (internal quotation marks omitted). The plaintiffs in this case are the families of veterans who served in the U. S. Navy. Maritime law’s longstanding solicitude for sailors reinforces our decision to require a warning in these circumstances. See Yamaha Motor Corp., U. S. A. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199, 213 (1996); Miles, 498 U. S., at 36; Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 387 (1970).
1 Sometimes, the equipment manufacturers themselves added the asbestos to the equipment. Even in those situations, however, the Navy later replaced the asbestos parts with third-party asbestos parts.
2 We do not rule out the possibility that, in certain circumstances, the parts manufacturer may also have a duty to warn.
In the first place, neither of these standards enjoys meaningful roots in the common law. The common law has long taught that a manufacturer has no “duty to warn or instruct about another manufacturer’s products, though those products might be used in connection with the manufacturer’s own products.” Firestone Steel Prods. Co. v. Barajas, 927 S.W.2d 608, 616 (Tex. 1996). Instead, “the manufacturer’s duty is restricted to warnings based on the characteristics of the manufacturer’s own product.” Powell v. Standard Brands Paint Co., 166 Cal. App. 3d 357, 364, 212 Cal. Rptr. 395, 398 (1985). It doesn’t matter, either, whether a manufacturer’s product happens to be (or is designed to be) “integrated” with another’s. Instead, it is black-letter law that the supplier of a product generally must warn about only those risks associated with the product itself, not those associated with the “products and systems into which [it later may be] integrated.” Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability §5, Comment b, p. 132 (1997).
More than that, the traditional common law rule still makes the most sense today. The manufacturer of a product is in the best position to understand and warn users about its risks; in the language of law and economics, those who make products are generally the least-cost avoiders of their risks. By placing the duty to warn on a product’s manufacturer, we force it to internalize the full cost of any injuries caused by inadequate warnings—and in that way ensure it is fully incentivized to provide adequate warnings. By contrast, we dilute the incentive of a manufacturer to warn about the dangers of its products when we require other people to share the duty to warn and its corresponding costs. See S. Shavell, Economic Analysis of Accident Law 17 (1987); G. Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents 135, and n. 1 (1970); Italia Societa per Azioni di Navigazione v. Oregon Stevedoring Co., 376 U.S. 315, 324 (1964).
The traditional common law rule better accords, too, with consumer expectations. A home chef who buys a butcher’s knife may expect to read warnings about the dangers of knives but not about the dangers of undercooked meat. Likewise, a purchaser of gasoline may expect to see warnings at the pump about its flammability but not about the dangers of recklessly driving a car. As the Court today recognizes, encouraging manufacturers to offer warnings about other people’s products risks long, duplicative, fine print, and conflicting warnings that will leave consumers less sure about which to take seriously and more likely to disregard them all. In the words of the California Supreme Court, consumer welfare is not well “served by requiring manufacturers to warn about the dangerous propensities of products they do not design, make, or sell.” O’Neil v. Crane Co., 53 Cal. 4th 335, 343, 266 P.3d 987, 991 (2012); see also Cotton v. Buckeye Gas Prods. Co., 840 F.2d 935, 938 (CADC 1988) (“The inclusion of each extra item dilutes the punch of every other item. Given short attention spans, items crowd each other out; they get lost in fine print”).
(ii) What will qualify as an “integrated product”? In the past, we’ve suggested that a “product” is whatever assemblage of parts is “placed in the stream of commerce by the manufacturer,” and we’ve stressed the importance of maintaining the “distinction between the components added to a product by a manufacturer before the product’s sale . . . and those items added” later by someone else. Saratoga Fishing Co. v. J. M. Martinac & Co., 520 U.S. 875, 883–884 (1997). The Court’s new standard blurs that distinction, but it is unclear how far it goes. The Court suggests a turbine and separately installed insulation may now qualify as a single “integrated product.” But what about other parts connected to the turbine? Does even the pro- peller qualify as part of the final “integrated product” too, so that its manufacturer also bears a duty to warn about the dangers of asbestos hung around the turbine? For that matter, why isn’t the entire ship an “integrated product,” with a corresponding duty for all the manufacturers who contributed parts to warn about the dangers of all the other parts? And when exactly is a manufacturer supposed to “know or have reason to know” that some supplement to its product has now made a resulting “integrated product” dangerous? How much cost and effort must manufacturers expend to discover and understand the risks associated with third-party products others may be “incorporating” with their products?
(iii) If a defendant reasonably expects that the manufacturer of a third-party product will comply with its own duty to warn, is that sufficient “reason to believe” that users will “realize” the danger to absolve the defendant of responsibility? Or does a defendant have to assume that the third-party manufacturer will behave negligently in rendering its own warnings? Or that users won’t bother to read the warnings others offer? And what if the defendants here understood that the Navy itself would warn sailors about the need for proper handling of asbestos—did they still have to provide their own warnings?
Still, there’s a silver lining here. In announcing its new standard, the Court expressly states that it does “not purport to define the proper tort rule outside of the maritime context.” Ante, at 10. Indeed, the Court acknowledges that it has created its new standard in part because of the “solicitude for sailors” that is a unique feature of our maritime jurisdiction. Ante, at 9. All of this means, of course, that nothing in today’s opinion compels courts operating outside the maritime context to apply the test announced today. In other tort cases, courts remain free to use the more sensible and historically proven common law rule. And given that, “unlike state courts, we have little . . . experience in the development of new common-law rules of tort,” Saratoga, 520 U. S., at 886 (Scalia, J., dissenting), that is a liberty they may be wise to exercise.
1 See also, e.g., Dreyer v. Exel Industries, S. A., 326 Fed. Appx. 353, 357–358 (CA6 2009); Barnes v. Kerr Corp., 418 F.3d 583, 590 (CA6 2005); Reynolds v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 989 F.2d 465, 472 (CA11 1993); Baughman v. General Motors Corp., 780 F.2d 1131, 1133 (CA4 1986); In re Deep Vein Thrombosis, 356 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1068 (ND Cal. 2005); Acoba v. General Tire, Inc., 92 Haw. 1, 18, 986 P.2d 288, 305 (1999); Brown v. Drake-Willock Int’l, Ltd., 209 Mich. App. 136, 144–146, 530 N.W.2d 510, 514–515 (1995); Rastelli v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 79 N.Y.2d 289, 297–298, 591 N.E.2d 222, 225–226 (1992); Walton v. Harnischfeger, 796 S.W.2d 225, 226 (Tex. App. 1990); Toth v. Economy Forms Corp., 391 Pa. Super. 383, 388–389, 571 A.2d 420, 423 (1990); Mitchell v. Sky Climber, Inc., 396 Mass. 629, 631–632, 487 N.E.2d 1374, 1376 (1986); Johnson v. Jones-Blair Paint Co., 607 S.W.2d 305, 306 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980); 63A Am. Jur. 2d, Products Liability §1027, p. 247 (2010); Behrens & Horn, Liability for Asbestos-Containing Connected or Replacement Parts Made by Third-Parties: Courts Are Properly Rejecting This Form of Guilt by Association, 37 Am. J. Trial Advocacy 489, 494–497 (2014).
2 See, e.g., Cipollone v. Yale Indus. Prods., Inc., 202 F.3d 376, 379 (CA1 2000); Crossfield v. Quality Control Equip. Co., 1 F.3d 701, 703–704 (CA8 1993); Childress v. Gresen Mfg. Co., 888 F.2d 45, 48–49 (CA6 1989); Koonce v. Quaker Safety Prods. & Mfg. Co., 798 F.2d 700, 715 (CA5 1986).
3 See also Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability §5, Comment a, p. 131 (1997) (“If the component is not itself defective, it would be unjust and inefficient to impose liability solely on the ground” that others “utiliz[e] the component in a manner that renders the integrated product defective”); Edwards v. Honeywell, Inc., 50 F.3d 484, 490 (CA7 1995) (placing liability on a defendant who is not “in the best position to prevent a particular class of accidents” may “dilute the incentives of other potential defendants” who should be the first “line of defense”); National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. Riggs Nat. Bank of Washington, D. C., 5 F.3d 554, 557 (CADC 1993) (Silberman, J., concurring) (“Placing liability with the least-cost avoider increases the incentive for that party to adopt preventive measures” that will “have the greatest marginal effect on preventing the loss”).
4 See App. 40 (affidavit of retired Rear Admiral Roger B. Horne stating that “the Navy chose to control and make personnel aware of the hazards of asbestos exposures through . . . military specifications and personnel training”).
5 As the Court notes, some of the defendants sold the Navy products that were not “bare metal” but contained asbestos at the time of sale. Ante, at 3, n. 1. We can all agree that those defendants had a duty to warn users about the known dangers of asbestos. And there’s a color-able argument that their responsibility didn’t end when the Navy, as part of routine upkeep, swapped out the original asbestos parts for replacements supplied by others. Under traditional tort principles, the seller of a defective, “unreasonably dangerous” product may be liable to an injured user if the product “is expected to and does reach the user . . . without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.” 2 Restatement (Second) of Torts §402A(1)(b), pp. 347–348 (1963–1964). And replacing worn-out parts every now and then with equivalently dangerous third-party parts may not qualify as a “substantial change” if the replacement part does “no more than perpetuate” problems latent in the original. Sage v. Fairchild-Swearingen Corp., 70 N.Y.2d 579, 584–587, 517 N.E.2d 1304, 1306–1308 (1987); see, e.g., Whelan v. Armstrong Int’l Inc., 455 N. J. Super. 569, 597–598, 190 A.3d 1090, 1106–1107 (App. Div. 2018). Of course, the defendants’ original failure to warn might not be the legal cause of any harm if the use of the replacement part was unforeseeable, or if an intervening action severed the connection between the original sale and the injurious use. For example, if the replacement part itself posed the danger—or if, by the time the original part wore out, safer alternatives had become avail-able. The Court’s new standard, however, does not address these de-fendants separately, but focuses on the bare metal defendants.
December 8, 2017 Application (17A625) to extend the time to file a petition for a writ of certiorari from January 1, 2018 to February 1, 2018, submitted to Justice Alito.
December 11, 2017 Application (17A625) granted by Justice Alito extending the time to file until January 31, 2018.
March 5, 2018 Blanket Consent filed by Petitioners, Air and Liquid Systems Corp., et al..
March 5, 2018 Motion to extend the time to file a response from March 9, 2018 to March 23, 2018, submitted to The Clerk.
March 8, 2018 Motion to extend the time to file a response is granted and the time is extended to and including March 23, 2018.
March 9, 2018 Brief amicus curiae of The Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America filed.
March 23, 2018 Brief of respondents Roberta G. DeVries, Executrix of the Estate of John B. Devries, Deceased, et al. in opposition filed.
April 5, 2018 Reply of petitioners Air and Liquid Systems Corp., et al. filed.
April 11, 2018 DISTRIBUTED for Conference of 4/27/2018.
May 7, 2018 DISTRIBUTED for Conference of 5/10/2018.
May 14, 2018 Petition GRANTED.
May 23, 2018 Motion for an extension of time to file joint appendix and the opening briefs on the merits filed.
June 7, 2018 Motion to extend the time to file the joint appendix and the opening briefs on the merits granted. The time to file the joint appendix and petitioners' brief on the merits is extended to and including July 9, 2018. The time to file respondents' brief on the merits is extended to and including August 20, 2018.
July 9, 2018 Brief of petitioners Air and Liquid Systems Corp., et al. filed.
July 9, 2018 Brief of respondent General Electric Co. in support of petitioners filed.
July 13, 2018 Brief amicus curiae of Richard A. Epstein filed.
July 16, 2018 Brief amicus curiae of Coalition for Litigation Justice, Inc., et al. filed.
July 16, 2018 Brief amici curiae of Product Liability Advisory Counsel, Inc. filed.
July 16, 2018 Brief amici curiae of The Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, et al. filed.
August 7, 2018 Record requested from the U.S.C.A. 3rd Circuit.
August 20, 2018 Brief of Roberta G. DeVries, Individually and as Administratrix of the Estate of John B. DeVries, Deceased, et al. submitted.
August 20, 2018 Record received from the U.S.C.A. 3rd Circuit. The record is electronic.
August 24, 2018 Amicus brief of Multiple Veterans Organizations submitted.
August 27, 2018 Amicus brief of American Association for Justice submitted.
August 27, 2018 Amicus brief of Port Ministries International submitted.
August 27, 2018 Amicus brief of Evelyn Hutchins, Flora Everett, James T. McAllister submitted.
Air and Liquid Systems Corp., et al.
Roberta G. Devries, Administratrix of the Estate of John B. DeVries, Deceased, et. al.

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