Source: https://www.piercemandell.com/insurance-defense-and-litigation?TagID=138441
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 06:24:11+00:00

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Bob Pierce and Lena Finnerty obtained a defense verdict on behalf of their client in a jury trial in Middlesex Superior Court that concluded on September 19, 2016.
The plaintiff in the case claimed that he suffered serious head injuries when he fell on black ice in the parking lot of the office park owned by Pierce & Mandell’s clients. Plaintiff claimed in excess of $1 Million in lost earning capacity, and asked the jury for an award of over $4 Million. The firm defended the case on the basis that the property owner client was not negligent, and that if the plaintiff did fall on black ice, the fall was caused by his own negligence.
The case was tried over 7 days, and the jury deliberated for approximately 2 ½ hours. The jury determined that Pierce & Mandell’s client was not negligent, and the plaintiff was awarded nothing.
Bob Pierce has now achieved complete victory for his clients in well over 80% of the cases he has tried.
by Paul Hourihan, Pierce & Mandell, P.C.
The Massachusetts Appeals Court recently extended the bar on liability provided in the Massachusetts Workers’ Compensation Act, G.L. c. 152, § 1, et seq., to protect employers whose employees are provided by a separate staffing entity. The Massachusetts Workers’ Compensation statute requires employers to obtain workers’ compensation insurance for all employees to ensure that employees injured during the course of their employment will be adequately and expeditiously compensated. The statute also provides that, on the other hand, workers injured on the job cannot sue their employer for negligently causing the accident.
This statute has created a bit of an ambiguity in the context of the temporary workers provided by staffing companies. When a company needs extra manpower (or womanpower), and contracts with a staffing company for temporary employees, nothing in the Workers’ Compensation Act prevents an injured temporary employee from suing the temporary employer, regardless of coverage under an insurance policy.
The Massachusetts Appeals Court, in Molina v. State Garden, Inc., 88 Mass. App. Ct. 173 (Sept. 3, 2015) recently ruled that the Workers’ Compensation Act will serve to bar the claims of an injured employee against a temporary employer when (1) the temporary employer works at the direction of the temporary employer and (2) the temporary employer is afforded workers’ compensation insurance coverage under an “alternate employer endorsement” of the staffing company’s insurance policy. The “alternative employer endorsement” of the policy will serve to cover a temporary employee’s accident and will provide the temporary employer the protections of the Workers’ Compensation Act.
This ruling serves as an exhortation to any employers who contract for employees from staffing companies: insist that any staffing company provide an “alternate employer endorsement” naming your company as an alternate employer. Doing so will protect your temporary employees and will protect your company from lawsuits.
Paul Hourihan is an associate at Pierce & Mandell who handles claims for workplace accidents and injuries.
Pursuant to G.L. c. 221, §46A, out of state counsel may seek permission to practice law temporarily in Massachusetts pro hac vice. While the provisions of that particular statute clearly allow the Court wide discretion in deciding a pro hac vice motions (see e.g. Diluzio v. United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America, Local 274, et al., 391 Mass. 211 (1984), in practice, opposing counsel rarely oppose, and the Courts routinely grant, pro hac vice motions to out of state counsel who satisfy the requirements of the statute. The operative question then is not whether out of state counsel can represent their clients in Massachusetts Courts, but whether the best interests of the client are advanced by doing so.
To even the most experienced out of state lawyer, the legal landscape in Massachusetts can be confusing, if not somewhat intimidating. From the unique procedural requirements of Superior Court Rule 9A, to the considerable remedies (in theory) allowed pursuant to the Massachusetts Consumer Protection statute, G.L. c. 93A, developing a basic understanding of Massachusetts law in any given practice area is no small task. In addition, there are very important cultural, economic and geographic considerations unique to Massachusetts to be taken into account in formulating litigation and trial strategy that the uninitiated lawyer may likely overlook to their client’s detriment. In short and not surprisingly, there is a considerable home field advantage for the client who is represented by a Massachusetts attorney in a Massachusetts action.
Nevertheless and for a variety of reasons, it often makes sense (or the client simply prefers) that their out of state counsel seek to be admitted pro hac vice. In such instances, the first and most critical step is to identify and retain experienced, local trial counsel. Not only are local counsel required to enter an appearance in the matter and sponsor the pro hac vice motion, but much more importantly, when allowed, they act as procedural guides and local legal experts, invariably saving the client time and money in the prosecution or defense of their action. At Pierce & Mandell, P.C., we are experienced trial lawyers who try cases. We have broad experience trying the most sophisticated civil litigation matters. We have worked with a variety of small, medium and large out of state firms, both as co-counsel and local counsel, in the prosecution and defense of civil actions here in the Commonwealth. If your client is in need of Massachusetts counsel, or you are in need of local counsel to sponsor your pro hac vice motion, please contact Dennis Lindgren at (617) 720-2444.
Seasoned Pierce & Mandell litigator and founding partner Bob Pierce may not get his NCAA Final Four Championship bracket exactly right, but he was pretty confident when reached by The Boston Business Journal this week about the effect of this biblical winter on future litigation. Unlike some past winters that were relatively mild with minimal snow and ice events, Pierce said that this year’s historic winter will inevitably lead to more litigation, predicting a 50 percent increase in winter related claims.
On December 5, 2014 the Massachusetts Superior Court issued a standing order outlining interim procedures governing attorney-conducted voir dire in Superior Court civil and criminal trials. The standing order was issued in anticipation of the implementation of G. L. c. 254, § 2, which will go into effect on February 2, 2015. Although trial judges will still have discretion as to how attorneys conduct voir dire, this Standing Order represents a significant change in Massachusetts trial practice. Massachusetts, unlike most states, has never before permitted attorneys to directly question jurors. Attorneys will now have an opportunity to pose questions directly to jurors in an effort to uncover biases and to learn more about the background of potential jurors.
The Standing Order dictates the specific procedures attorneys must follow to conduct voir dire. For example, attorneys will be required to seek approval from the court as to the topics of questions posed to potential jurors and, in some cases, will be required to seek court approval regarding the wording of questions. Attorneys will be required to comply with Superior Court Rule 9A when serving and filing motions to conduct voir dire. Thus, attorneys will need to consider voir dire questions well before trial begins.
The Standing Order provides the trial judge with wide discretion in determining which questions attorneys will be permitted to ask and the manner in which the questions will be asked. The Standing Order also outlines topics which will generally be allowed (background, experience, bias, ability to listen to judge’s instructions) and those topics which will be disfavored (political views, religious beliefs, hobbies, participation as a juror in other cases) unless a specific showing is made that the topics are germane to the case.
The Standing Order, which goes into effect on February 2, 2015, will likely be superseded by rules established by the Supreme Judicial Court. However, at this point it is unclear when the Supreme Judicial Court will issue final rules implementing G. L. c. 254, § 2. Thus, trial attorneys must familiarize themselves with the new Standing Order and must be prepared to seek court approval for voir dire questions in advance of trial.
Plaintiff’s attorneys, who strongly supported the passage of G. L. c. 254, § 2, may not be content with the amount of discretion that trial judges have to control the types of questions attorneys may ask jurors. The plaintiff’s bar will likely urge the Superior Court to modify the Standing Order to provide more latitude to trial attorneys in conducting voir dire.
Do you believe that there are too many big verdicts and/or jury awards to injured persons in the Courts? How have you come to that belief?
Some people believe that you should not receive money damages for injuries or pain and suffering. Other people feel it is appropriate. Which one of those groups are you closer to?
Based on the Standing Order, a judge has discretion not to permit these types of questions to be asked by plaintiff’s attorneys because they delve too far into a juror’s political beliefs. Whereas the plaintiff’s bar views these biases as an impediment to a fair and impartial jury.
Pierce & Mandell, P.C. has secured an important appellate victory for a subcontractor and buyer of industrial scaffolding equipment in the appeal of a dismissal of the indemnity claims the equipment’s manufacturer.
In Fraco Products, Ltd., et al. v. Bostonian Masonry Corp., the Massachusetts Appeals Court addressed whether or not the trial court erred in dismissing the indemnity claims of the manufacturer of industrial mast-climbing scaffolding equipment that collapsed on Boylston Street in Boston in April 2006. In its appeal, the manufacturer sought indemnity for the amount it paid to settle to the claims filed by the estate of an employee of the purchaser who was killed in the accident.
Robert Pierce, a shareholder at Pierce & Mandell, argued successfully for the defense.
Among the issues addressed by the Appeals Court was the so-called “disparate fault” theory of common law indemnity. In general, a party who is at fault for an injury is not entitled to common law indemnity from another negligent party. However, under the “disparate fault” theory, a party whose negligence in connection with a particular injury is relatively small as compared to that of another party may seek indemnification from the party who is disproportionately at fault for the same injury.
The opinion of Justice Katzmann, who wrote for the panel of three justices, stated “[a]lthough the Supreme Judicial Court has adverted to the differing degree of fault theory in two modern decisions, see Rahthbun, Western Mass. Elec. Co., 395 Mass. 361 (1985), and Economy Engr. Co. v. Commonwealth, 413 Mass. 791 (1992), in neither case was indemnification allowed. Moreover, a review of the cases cited in Rathbun reveals only one case, more than a century ago — before the existence of statutory contribution and workers’ compensation — in which the court allowed indemnification to one of two joint tortfeasors based on differing degrees of fault.” The Appeals Court, instead, applied the general rule that a party who is at fault for an injury is not entitled to common law indemnity and upheld the dismissal of the claims of the manufacturer.
In so ruling, the Appeals Court determined that the plaintiff manufacturer was not entitled to a new trial to ascertain whether or not its negligence was of the small amount contemplated by the “differing fault” theory of common law indemnity. The Appeals Court also ruled that no common law indemnity obligation could be inferred from the buyer-manufacturer relationship of the parties, and that the contractual indemnity claims of the manufacturer also failed as a matter of law.
Pierce & Mandell has broad experience in the most sophisticated insurance defense, catastrophic injury and construction related litigation, and we routinely handle high value trials and appeals where cutting edge legal issues in these fields are determined.

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