Source: http://ca10.washburnlaw.edu/cases/2001/11/00-1510.htm
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 14:26:10+00:00

Document:
Arthur James Moore, a prisoner in the Colorado State Prison (CSP), filed this suit pro se under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against CSP officials alleging various constitutional violations and seeking money damages and injunctive relief. The district court dismissed all his claims as legally frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 1915A(b)(1). Mr. Moore appeals and we affirm.
This court construes pro se complaints liberally. See Hunt v. Uphoff, 199 F.3d 1220, 1223 (10th Cir. 1999); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972) (per curiam). We extend this liberal construction principle to pro se appellate filing as well. See Cummings v. Evans, 161 F.3d 610, 613 (10th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1052 (1999). While this court has not yet determined whether a dismissal pursuant to § 1915A on the ground that the complaint is legally frivolous is reviewed de novo or for an abuse of discretion, Plunk v. Givens, 234 F.3d 1128, 1130 (10th Cir. 2000), our result would be the same under either standard. We present the facts of the case only as they are relevant to individual claims, discussed below.
According to the Fifth Amendment, no person shall be "subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." U.S. Const. amend. V. The double jeopardy clause has been interpreted to prohibit prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, prosecution for the same offense after a conviction, and multiple punishments for the same offense. See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969), overruled on other grounds, Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794 (1989). Mr. Moore's complaint appears to make the argument that placing him on restricted privileges for refusing to discuss his crime in the life skills class constitutes a multiple punishment as discussed in Pearce. However, subsequent decisions have clarified that jeopardy attaches only to proceedings which are "essentially criminal" in nature. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 528 (1975). "Prison disciplinary hearings are not part of a criminal prosecution, and therefore do not implicate double jeopardy concerns." Lucero v. Gunter, 17 F.3d 1347, 1350 (10th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). The disciplinary process instituted here falls into the same category. Mr. Moore's claims on this question are therefore without merit.
Mr. Moore also vaguely asserts that requiring him to answer questions about the crimes he committed violated his Fifth Amendment right not to incriminate himself. Even assuming Mr. Moore could somehow be incriminated by discussing his past crimes, see Lile v. McCune, 224 F.3d 1175, 1179 (10th Cir. 2000), cert. granted, 121 S. Ct. 1955 (2001), we are not persuaded the loss of a personal television set amounts to the degree of punishment required to establish compulsion under the Fifth Amendment, see id. at 1180-82, 1185-87.
Second, Mr. Moore complains that his rights have been violated because the prison chaplain prays with inmates at their cell doors instead of in a private room. Because he is trying to become a Muslim and does not wish to hear these prayers, he argues that being forced to hear them infringes on his rights. Construed liberally, his complaint appears to raise a free exercise claim under the First Amendment.(2) In analyzing a free exercise claim we first determine whether government action creates a burden on the exercise of a person's religion. "(I)t is necessary in a free exercise case to show the coercive effect of the enactment as it operates against . . . the practice of (their) religion." Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172, 176 (10th Cir. 1980) (quoting School Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963)), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 954 (1981). In this case, Mr. Moore has not made any argument as to how hearing Christian prayers burdens his own exercise of his religious beliefs. As to this issue, his complaint fails to state a cognizable claim.
Finally, Mr. Moore alleges that his rights were violated because prison officials did not notify prisoners of a change in standard drug testing procedure when they switched from a urine-sample based test to a drug "patch" test. When he refused to comply with the new test, Mr. Moore was sanctioned. Even liberally construed, it is not clear from Mr. Moore's complaint what constitutional right he alleges was violated. This claim, too, was properly dismissed.
1.Mr. Moore subsequently participated in the life skills program and successfully completed it.
2. Even liberally construed, Mr. Moore does not make a cognizable establishment clause First Amendment claim.
3. We agree with the district court in its further holding that the claim fails because it does not assert a connection between the named defendants and the alleged violation of rights, an essential allegation in a civil rights case. See Bennett v. Passic, 545 F.2d 1260, 1262-63 (10th Cir. 1976).

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