Source: https://nevada.lexroll.com/abbott-interfast-v-district-court-107-nev-871-1991/
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 22:44:45+00:00

Document:
ABBOTT-INTERFAST CORPORATION, PETITIONER, v. EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLARK, AND THE HONORABLE STEPHEN L. HUFFAKER, DISTRICT JUDGE, RESPONDENTS, AND GASSER CHAIR CO., INC., REAL PARTY IN INTEREST.
No. 22239Supreme Court of Nevada.
Appeal from Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Stephen L. Huffaker, J.
Edwards, Hunt, Hale Hansen, Las Vegas, for Petitioner.
Rex Bell, District Attorney, Clark County, for Respondents.
Vargas Bartlett, Las Vegas, for Real Party in Interest.
326 U.S. 310 (1945). The district court denied the motion, and this petition followed.
Judas Priest v. District Court, 104 Nev. 424, 425, 760 P.2d 137, 138 (1988). When a challenge to personal jurisdiction is made, the plaintiff has the burden of introducing competent evidence of essential facts which establish a prima facie showing that personal jurisdiction exists. See Davis v. District Court, 97 Nev. 332, 337, 629 P.2d 1209, 1213 (1981).
Abbott is an Illinois corporation with its principal place of business in Illinois. Gasser is an Ohio corporation engaged in the design, manufacture and sale of chairs for hotels, restaurants and casinos. Approximately thirty percent of Gasser’s production is sold to gaming clients, a large portion of which are in Nevada. Gasser has presented evidence that Abbott knew the nature of Gasser’s business and actively marketed its bolts and fasteners to Gasser, knowing many of them would be incorporated into chairs destined for Nevada customers. Therefore, Abbott has sufficient contacts with Nevada to be required to defend in Nevada claims that bolts made by it failed and caused injury in this state. See World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297-98 (1979); Myers v. Johns Manville Sales Corp., 600 F. Supp. 977, 986 (D. Nev. 1984); Judas Priest v. District Court, 104 Nev. 424, 760 P.2d 137 (1988); Metal-Matic v. District Court, 82 Nev. 263, 415 P.2d 617 (1966). Consequently, we conclude that the district court did not err by denying the motion to quash, and we deny this petition.

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