Source: http://ny.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20180328_0011570.NY.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 18:11:31+00:00

Document:
Stewart Lee Karlin Law Group, P.C., New York, NY (Daniel Dugan of counsel), for appellant.
Zachary W. Carter, Corporation Counsel, New York, NY (Devin Slack and Jeremy W. Shweder of counsel), for respondents.
WILLIAM F. MASTRO, J.P. RUTH C. BALKIN FRANCESCA E. CONNOLLY LINDA CHRISTOPHER, JJ.
Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Johnny L. Baynes, J.), entered June 30, 2015. The order granted the defendants' motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the complaint and denied the plaintiffs cross motion pursuant to CPLR 3025(b) for leave to amend the complaint.
ORDERED that the order is modified, on the law and in the exercise of discretion, (1) by deleting the provision thereof granting that branch of the defendants' motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss the cause of action alleging discrimination on the basis of age in violation of the New York City Human Rights Law, and substituting therefor a provision denying that branch of the motion, and (2) by deleting the provision thereof denying the plaintiffs cross motion pursuant to CPLR 3025(b) for leave to amend the complaint, and substituting therefor a provision granting the cross motion; as so modified, the order is affirmed, with costs to the plaintiff.
The plaintiff was employed as an Administrative Law Judge (hereinafter ALJ) with the New York City Department of Consumer Affairs (hereinafter DCA). She commenced this action against the City of New York, the DCA, and four DCA employees, alleging causes of action to recover damages for violation of her rights to free speech and to petition under the New York State Constitution, article I, §§ 8-9, and discrimination on the basis of age in violation of the New York City Human Rights Law (see Administrative Code of City of NY § 8-107; hereinafter NYCHRL). The complaint alleged that the plaintiff and other ALJs spoke out internally within the agency and externally to public officials and the press about an alleged DCA practice of improperly pressuring the ALJs to issue recommended decisions in favor of the agency and imposing maximum fines. The plaintiff allegedly received negative performance evaluations and disciplinary charges due to this speech. The complaint also alleged the existence of a pattern of age discrimination within the agency. The defendants moved pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the complaint. The plaintiff cross-moved for leave to amend the complaint to assert an alternative First Amendment retaliation cause of action pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 in the event her state constitutional cause of action was dismissed. The Supreme Court granted the defendants' motion and denied the plaintiffs cross motion. The plaintiff appeals.
On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the complaint is to be afforded a liberal construction, the facts alleged are presumed to be true, the plaintiff is afforded the benefit of every favorable inference, and the court is to determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (see CPLR 3026; Thompson Bros. Pile Corp. v Rosenblum, 121 A.D.3d 672, 673). Moreover, the court may consider affidavits submitted by a plaintiff to remedy any defects in the complaint (see Rushaid v Pictet & Cie, 28 N.Y.3d 316, 327; Chanko v American Broadcasting Cos. Inc., 27 N.Y.3d 46, 52). ''Whether the complaint will later survive a motion for summary judgment, or whether the plaintiff will ultimately be able to prove its claims, of course, plays no part in the determination of a prediscovery CPLR 3211 motion to dismiss" (Shaya B. Pac., LLC v Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker, LLP, 38 A.D.3d 34, 38; see EBC I, Inc. v Goldman, Sachs &Co., 5 N.Y.3d 11, 19).
Here, the Supreme Court erred in granting that branch of the defendants' motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss the cause of action alleging age discrimination pursuant to the NYCHRL (see Administrative Code § 8-107). The allegations that there was disparate treatment of older employees, including the plaintiff, and that the plaintiffs disciplinary charges were based, in part, on age discrimination, sufficiently stated a cause of action to recover for age discrimination pursuant to the NYCHRL (see Administrative Code § 8-107[a]; Kassapian v City of New York, 155 A.D.3d 851; Bennett v Health Mgt. Sys., Inc., 92 A.D.3d 29, 40; cf. Askin v Department of Educ. of the City of N.Y., 110 A.D.3d 621, 621-622). The fact that the individual defendants were approximately the same age as the plaintiff does not render the cause of action insufficient (see Rollins v Fencers Club, Inc., 128 A.D.3d 401, 402).
The plaintiffs failure to serve a notice of claim requires dismissal of the cause of action alleging violations of the State Constitution (see General Municipal Law §§ 50-e, 50-i; 423 S. Salina St. v City of Syracuse, 68 N.Y.2d 474, 482; East End Resources, LLC v Town of Sout hold Planning Bd., 135 A.D.3d 899, 902; Bidnick v. Johnson, 253 A.D.2d 779, 780; Gorman v. Sachem Cent. School Dist., 232 A.D.2d 452, 453). Contrary to the plaintiffs contention, the action does not fall within the public interest exception to the notice of claim requirement, since the complaint seeks to vindicate the private rights of the plaintiff, and the disposition of the claim will not directly affect or vindicate the rights of others (see 423 S. Salina St. v Syracuse, 68 N.Y.2d at 493; Mills v County of Monroe, 59 N.Y.2d 307, 312; Sager v County of Sullivan, 145 A.D.3d 1175, 1177). Further, although the complaint named the individual defendants in their individual capacities, it alleged retaliation by them as part of their employment, and, thus, the notice of claim requirement applied (see Miller v City of New York, 89 A.D.3d 612; Hale v Scopac, 74 A.D.3d 1906, 1907; Tesciuba v Koch, 215 A.D.2d 222; Matter of Rattner v Planning Commn. of Vil. of Pleasantville, 156 A.D.2d 521, 526).

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