Source: https://rikiott.com/dispersants/peoples-petition-to-ban-dispersants/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 16:02:08+00:00

Document:
UPDATE: The US EPA responded to the People’s Petition to Ban Dispserants. To read the EPA response, download the pdf file by clicking HERE.
The Clean Water Act requires the President to prepare a National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP) that includes, among other things, a schedule identifying dispersants, chemicals, and other products that may be used under the NCP; the waters in which such dispersants, chemicals, and other products may be used; and the quantities of dispersants, chemicals, and other products that can be used safely in such waters.33 U.S.C. § 1321(d)(2)(G). Responsibility for the Product Schedule was delegated to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).
Require participation of Regional Citizens Advisory Councils as members of all Regional Response Teams (RRTs) and require concurrence of all RRT members in the authorization to use products on the Schedule without exception.
Require public disclosure of a product’s ingredients as a condition of placement, or retention, on the NCP Product Schedule.
Of foremost concern are the NCP regulations and test protocols that allowed the unprecedented and widespread application of at least 1.8 million gallons of two primary products––the dispersants Corexit 9500 and Corexit 9527A––during the 2010 BP Deepwater Horizon disaster. Massive releases of toxic products in the public commons, including the air people breathe and the oceans and coasts where people swim, recreate, and harvest seafood, must require definitive demonstration that all alternatives have more negative side effects. America’s oceans and coasts support multi-billion dollar recreational and commercial fishing industries and tourism, as well as diverse cultures. These concerns have been illustrated by data collected both before and after the BP disaster, validated by science done after the BP disaster, and include the emerging evidence of widespread, adverse environmental and human health impacts in the impacted Gulf states.
We address each of the first six issues separately while acknowledging that all nine points being raised by the public must be addressed to comprehensively update the NCP Product Schedule to fully address these important concerns.
In 1993, the industry Marine Spill Response Corporation, newly formed under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, addressed the chemical aspects of occupational health and marine oil-spill response but significantly limited the review to exposures to crude oil only, not oil spill response products.3 The authors of the 1993 review then independently completed a second review in 1999 to update their earlier report, eloquently stating, “Mists and aerosols containing polynuclear aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs) are, in principle, a cancer risk…” 4. The authors also noted, “Although there are frequent references to toxicity in connection with dispersants, these invariably seem to refer to ecotoxicity. Human hazard does not appear to be an issue.” The authors found few data on the latter subject and again limited their review to crude oil exposures.
Arguments for or against dispersant use remained unchanged for nearly forty years and are focused almost exclusively on potential harm to wildlife. Notably, the arguments are mostly subjective. The so-called “environmental trade-offs” of dispersant use have been the subject of spirited scientific debates for four decades––and still are for good reason.9 The use of dispersants does not represent a science-based, quantifiable “tradeoff” but can amount to convenient political expedience. Further, the main pro-dispersant argument––that is, to break up the oil, making it more accessible to microbial bacteria and hence speeding remediation–­–remains an untested assumption in the field for a range of oils. It was well established that bacterial degradation is the main natural pathway for removing crude oil from the environment, especially the less complex hydrocarbons (alkanes and “light ends” or smaller aromatic compounds).10 However, the toxicity of dispersants on these oil-eating bacteria populations largely was unknown before the BP disaster. The oil industry has a strong and expedient bias towards dispersant use instead of mechanical oil recovery equipment, despite known health risks from dispersants––and the fact that the stated priorities of the federal government are to use mechanical containment or recovery as the primary line of defense against oil spills in the United States and to minimize oil spill impacts on human health and the environment.
The state of scientific knowledge on adverse impacts of oil and dispersants pre-dating the BP Deepwater Horizon blowout is best summarized in two documents released shortly after the disaster. ScienceCorps.org released a comprehensive report on the health hazards of crude oil and the known ingredients of the Corexit 9500 and Corexit 9527A.11 The report stated that chemicals in these dispersants were known to be neurotoxins, mutagens, teratogens (able to disturb the growth and development of an embryo or fetus), and carcinogens. Further, Corexit 9527A contains 2-butoxyethanol, a toxic solvent and human health hazard that ruptures red blood cells, causing hemolysis (bleeding) and liver and kidney damage. The authors, a medical doctor and toxicologist, also warned that dispersants and crude oil contain many ingredients that target the same organs in the body and, further, that Corexit dispersants may act as an oil delivery system, facilitating the entry of oil into the body, into cells, which can damage every organ system in the body.
Based on science and driven by public concerns prior to the BP Deepwater Horizon disaster, the Regional Response Teams, authorized as part of the NCP under the Clean Water Act, adopted voluntary bans of dispersant use in shallow water equal to or less than ten meters deep and within three miles of the coast. However, the U.S. Coast Guard is given authority under the Clean Water Act §300.415(b) and §300.415(c) to “direct appropriate actions to mitigate or remove the release of hazardous substances”; in other words, to apply dispersants within these sensitive habitats and close to urban populations––without considerations for concerns for consequences to ecosystem or human health.
The widespread application of at least 1.8 million gallons of Corexit 9500 and Corexit 9527A in response to the BP disaster was an unprecedented experiment––with immediate unprecedented consequences. For example, instead of dispersing the oil, NOAA and other scientists confirmed in early June that undersea plumes of dispersed oil had formed.13 These plumes were relatively stable and moved with the currents, onshore and offshore: One concern is that subsea dispersant application may have played a role in the plume formation, yet the ecosystem damage from the deep plume remains largely unknown, as is much of the life of the deep sea.
People across the Gulf from Louisiana to Florida reported and documented that Corexit dispersants were sprayed in coastal seas and shallow bays, regardless of voluntary bans in regional and national contingency plans; that dispersant use continued long after the U.S. Coast Guard stated that dispersant spraying had stopped; and that dispersants were staged in neighborhoods and across from homes.29 The documentation triggered an investigation by the U.S. Justice Department.
Evidence is emerging of the potential for adverse long-term health impacts, consistent with long term health impacts in previous spills. For example, in March 2012, after denying all health claims related to the disaster (except bodily injury) for nearly two years,33 BP agreed to a Medical Benefits Class Action Settlement34 that was uncapped, but earmarked millions of dollars for medical treatment, medical monitoring, and compensation as well as $105 billion for five community health clinics, staffed with medical doctors trained in treating the chemical illnesses listed in the settlement.35 The illnesses and symptoms listed in Exhibit 8 of the settlement are consistent with exposure to crude oil and dispersants, as identified above by the scientific and medical community.
EPA clearly states, “Mechanical containment or recovery is the primary line of defense against oil spills in the United States.” Further, EPA also states, “Chemical and biological methods can be used in conjunction with mechanical means for containing and cleaning up oil spills” (emphasis added; http://www.epa.gov/osweroe1/content/learning/oiltech.htm).
We find this plan simply unacceptable and contrary to the purpose of the NCP of “controlling oil spills and minimizing their impact on human health and the environment.” This purpose and the strategy of mechanical containment or recovery as the primary line of defense against oil spills must be codified into regulations and law to prevent the oil industry, with its extreme bias towards dispersant use, from subverting the federal government’s authority and the public interest.
Pursuant to its responsibility under the Clean Water Act, EPA promulgated regulations in Subpart J of the NCP. The regulations establish a standard of effectiveness that each dispersant must attain in very specific laboratory conditions in order to be listed on the schedule, but require only minimal toxicity testing, permit claims of proprietary trade secrets or “confidential business information” (CBI) that limit public disclosure of a product’s ingredients, and set no criteria for worker or public safety or health.40 CFR §300.900-300.920 (2010).
The laboratory conditions represent quite unrealistic field scenarios: dispersant efficacy and toxicity tests are conducted with full-strength salinity (36 ppt), synthetic seawater prepared with distilled water. 40 CFR §300, App. C, 2.3.1 (2003). It is quite reasonable to expect that similar tests performed in the presence of particulate organic matter (POM) including bacteria, would yield different results.The micelles that form in the absence of POM, i.e., in the standard test conditions, are lipophilic, but readily bond to organic matter. When there is nothing to bond to, the micelles remain dispersed. However, in the presence of POM, micelles tend to clump together, which could explain the flocculent oily material that settled in near shore runnels and on the ocean bottom or that formed large subsurface plumes after dispersant application in the Gulf.
The requirement to use essentially full-strength seawater raises another problem. According to NOAA, the surface salinity at the blowout site was about half-brackish; i.e., far less saline than normal seawater.37 The Corexit dispersants only work in full-strength seawater––and apparently only in lab conditions of sterile, synthetic seawater. The lower salinity could have also been a factor in the observed altered behavior of the dispersed oil into flocculent material and plumes, and brackish waters are common close to shorelines, estuaries, and intertidal wetlands.
Realistic field scenarios are an important consideration when testing dispersants and other products for listing in the NCP Product Schedule. Sinking agents are expressly forbidden under Subpart J of the NCP: “Sinking agents shall not be authorized for application to oil discharges.” 40 CFR §300.910(e). Dispersants that create dispersed micelles under controlled laboratory conditions, but act as sinking agents under realistic field scenarios, should not be listed on the Schedule.
Finally with regards to the efficacy test protocol, dispersants are not tested on a specific crude to be dispersed, but rather on two standard reference oils, Prudhoe Bay Crude and South Louisiana Crude. 40 CFR §300, App. C, 2.3.2. The test results are averaged(§300, App. C, 2.5.19), and the minimum acceptable performance criterion is 45 percent (§300.915.7)––i.e., more than half the oil remains undispersed, allowing both significant oil and significant dispersants to impact the environment and human health.
We request that the minimum acceptable performance criterion be revised to at least 70 percent (70 percent + 5 percent), with dispersants of 90% efficacy directed to replace stocks of lesser performance dispersants. Further, we request that efficacy tests be conducted on a range of petroleum and refined products that might actually be spilled other than, and in addition to, the two standard test oils, and that they be conducted for a range of realistic field scenarios (i.e., brackish water, high algal load, etc.).
Despite the uncertainties involved with extrapolating test results from laboratory tests to field conditions, the regulations do not include a process to remove or delist products from the NCP Product Schedule that: (1) do not perform in the field as anticipated under controlled laboratory conditions; (2) prove to create, or are considered as likely to create given composition, unacceptable health risks for workers, the public, or the environment; or (3) were discontinued by the manufacturer but are still listed on the Schedule and stockpiled for disaster response.
Listing products that are no longer manufactured leaves the public and environment to bear the risk and liability should the manufacturers, or others, choose to rid their stockpiles of this hazardous product––conveniently during spill response. Clearly, this is an unacceptable scenario from the public’s perspective.
Currently, only EPA may remove a product from the NCP Product Schedule, but not for any of the aforementioned reasons. Instead, EPA may remove products only if EPA cannot verify test results [§300.920(a)(2)], or if the liability disclaimer statement or label is not “conspicuous” or “fully reproduced”, or if there is any “other improper attempt to demonstrate the approval of the product by any NRT or other U.S. Government agency” § 300.920(e).
Any person seeking to amend the NCP Product Schedule to delist (remove) currently listed products may petition for an amendment to the NCP Product Schedule.
The product contains chemicals that are known human health hazards [as defined in 29 CFR §19.1200(c)], or known to cause an adverse human health effect. The term “adverse human health effect” shall include, but not be limited to, any effect that causes a physical manifestation of harm to the human body.
Any of the ingredients in the product are proprietary or otherwise have not been released to the public for inspection and review.
The product, as a whole, is more harmful to natural wildlife, as demonstrated in toxicity tests with young life forms of ecologically and economically important species relevant to the area where the product will be used, than it is useful as a product. The absence of such testing, independently verified by the Administrator, is sufficient grounds to delist the product. Of specific relevance is the existence of comparable products that exhibit a less harmful effect on the natural wildlife.
The product or its ingredients have mutagenic capabilities or have not been tested for mutagenicity using current methods that evaluate all standard measures including, but not limited to DNA adduct formation, sister chromatid exchanges (SCE), and epigenetic genotoxicity.
The product contains any ingredients, breakdown, or interaction products that are biologically active at concentrations or for exposure levels that may occur under ALL reasonable scenarios, including multimedia contamination, anticipated misuse or accidents, or concurrent exposures to other chemicals with the same target organs.
The product and/or all of its ingredients have not been tested for biological impacts resulting from lifetime or near lifetime exposure periods, with comprehensive evaluation of impacts on all systems using clinical chemistry, hematology, and other standard measures of function and toxicity at the cellular, organ, organism, and population levels.
The study results are not made available to the public in their entirety, including animal-specific results, laboratory notes, Quality Assurance/Quality Control reports and other standard scientific study data.
A statement of the need and justification for the amendment, including any supporting tests, studies, or other information.
The Administrator will make a tentative decision to grant, deny, or review for no more than 14 days a petition and will publish notice of such tentative decision in the Federal Register for written public comment within 10 days of receiving the petition. The public comment period will be open for 30 days.
Upon written request by any interested person, the Administrator may, at his discretion, hold an informal public hearing to consider oral comments on the tentative decision within 30 days of receiving the petition. A person requesting a hearing must state the issues to be raised and explain why written comments would not suffice to communicate the person’s views.
After evaluating all public comments the Administrator will make a final decision publishing in the Federal Register a regulatory amendment or a denial of the petition within 60 days of receiving the initial petition.
was discontinued by the manufacturer but is still listed on the Schedule and stockpiled for disaster response.
Quite bluntly, we do not believe that human health should be considered a “tradeoff” for dispersant use––ever, but especially in light of the long history of cavalier and superficial treatment of ecological “tradeoffs.” The oil industry and federal government have used “tradeoffs” to continue using dangerous products without any scientific justification. In the case of human health “tradeoffs,” justification is impossible.
Yet the two main dispersants stockpiled in the United States for use on future spills are Corexit 9500 and Corexit 9527A––the very dispersants that were known to be harmful to ecosystems and humans before the BP disaster, and that proved to do so after the disaster. These two dispersants are stockpiled in coastal communities around the contiguous United States and in Alaska and Hawaii.44 Most are owned either by the U.S. Coast Guard regional strike teams or the major national Oil Spill Response Organizations. But, ironically, the federal government shields itself from any liability for use of these, and other, dangerous oil spill response products.
We request that EPA immediately removes Corexit 9500 and Corexit 9527A from the NCP Product Schedule under the newly established Removal Section §300.925 (g)(1-4).
Such action is broadly supported and demanded by the public and, increasingly, Tribes, as demonstrated in Appendix 1: Petition to EPA to Amend the NCP and Delist Products of Concern (signed by over 1,500 people), and Appendix 2: Village of Bill Moore’s Slough Resolution 2012-22 Banning Use and Opposition to the Use of Chemical Dispersants in Oil Spill Response and Planning.
As part of preauthorization planning authorized under the Clean Water Act [40 CFR §300.910 (a)], Regional Response Teams (RRT) have adopted voluntary restrictions on dispersant use in shallow water equal to or less than ten meters deep and within three miles of the coast (near shore environment), following recommendations by the National Research Council45 and driven by public concern before the BP disaster.
Voluntary restrictions and even outright voluntary bans do not work because the U.S. Coast Guard, as On Scene Commander (OSC) during spill response, is given ultimate authority to preempt the EPA Administrator and all other federal agencies under the Clean Water Act to “direct appropriate actions to mitigate or remove the release of hazardous substances.” CFR 40 §300.415(b) and §300.415(c). Under the NCP, the OSC can use any product, listed or not, “when, in the judgment of the OSC, the use of the product is necessary to prevent or substantially reduce a hazard to human life” (emphasis added). §300.910 (e).
Such cart blanche authority during a disaster is a disincentive for industry to develop non-toxic products before disasters, as well as a disincentive for the public participation in the pre-planning public process, and it ignores established science. It also undermines the entire national contingency planning process, which is best done before, not during, disaster response.
The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 established two Regional Citizens’ Advisory Councils (RCACs) demonstration programs in Alaska after the Exxon Valdez oil spill with the understanding that, if successful, these councils could be expanded into other regions. 33 USC §2732. The councils, especially the Prince William Sound RCAC, have been highly successful in combating industry and government complacency and in increasing oil spill prevention and response measures. Such councils are already authorized under OPA90; they need to be established in practice in every region. 33 USC §2732(a)(1)(2)(J). One way of establishing such councils is to require their presence within the RRTs and to give them authority under the NCP.
There is overwhelming evidence from the BP disaster that dispersant use significantly enhanced the harm to people and the environment than the oil release alone; that the harm to the environment occurred in shallow near shore environments and open ocean environments from the littoral to the pelagic to the benthic zones; and that the harm to human populations occurred near the coast and some distance inland––i.e., significant distances from where dispersant use was officially reported, indicating transportation via interaction with hydrologic cycles, physical oceanography, and geomorphology.
Given this evidence, it is now abundantly clear to us that: 1) voluntary bans do not work; 2) restricting dispersant use in shallow waters is not sufficient to protect human health or the environment; and 3) citizen input in the planning process and during disaster response is necessary to ensure protection of people as well as the environment.
(a) RRTs, including Regional Citizens Advisory Councils (RCACs), and Area Committees shall address, as part of their planning activities, the desirability of using appropriate dispersants, surface washing agents, surface collecting agents, bioremediation agents, or miscellaneous oil spill control agents listed on the NCP Product Schedule, and the desirability of using appropriate burning agents. RCPs and ACPs shall, as appropriate, include applicable preauthorization plans and address the specific contexts in which such products should and should not be used. In meeting the provisions of this paragraph, preauthorization plans may address factors such as: the potential sources and types of oil that might be spilled; the existence and location of environmentally sensitive resources that might be impacted by spilled oil and intentional (and unintentional) release of products; the existence and location of human populations and culturally sensitive resources that might be impacted by spilled oil and intentional (and unintentional) release of products; whether public notification requirements for intentional release of products allow ample evacuation time, especially in densely populated urban areas or remote areas; available product and storage locations; available Personal Protective Equipment, including HAZWOPER gear and respirators, for anticipated numbers of responders and storage locations; available equipment and adequately trained operators; and the available means to monitor product application and effectiveness. The RRT representatives from EPA and the states with jurisdiction over the waters of the area to which a pre-authorization plan applies and the RCACs and the DOC and DOI natural resource trustees shall review and either approve, disapprove, or approve with modification the pre-authorization plans developed by Area Committees, as appropriate. Approved preauthorization plans shall be included in the appropriate RCPs and ACPs. Only if the RRT representatives from EPA and the states with jurisdiction over the waters of the area to which a preauthorization plan applies and the RCACs and the DOC and DOI natural resource trustees approve in advance the use of certain products under specified circumstances as described in the preauthorization plan, the OSC may authorize the use of the products without obtaining the specific concurrences described in paragraphs (b) and (c) of this section.
(b) For spill situations that are not addressed by the preauthorization plans developed pursuant to paragraph (a) of this section, the OSC, with the concurrence of the EPA representative to the RRT and the concurrence of the RRT representatives from the states with jurisdiction over the navigable waters threatened by the release or discharge and the RCACs, and in consultation with the DOC and DOI natural resource trustees may authorize the use of dispersants, surface washing agents, surface collecting agents, bioremediation agents, or miscellaneous oil spill control agents on the oil discharge, provided that the products are listed on the NCP Product Schedule.
(c) The OSC, with the concurrence of the EPA representative to the RRT and the concurrence of the RRT representatives from the states with jurisdiction over the navigable waters threatened by the release or discharge and the RCACs, and in consultation with the DOC and DOI natural resource trustees may authorize the use of burning agents on a case-by-case basis.
(d) Sinking agents shall not be authorized for application to oil discharges; this includes products that perform as sinking agents in laboratory tests using realistic field scenarios.
(e) Products containing industrial solvents for oil and grease, human health hazards, proprietary ingredients, and/or surfactants are expressly prohibited within all special maritime and territorial waters of the United States, including and extending from the upper intertidal (littoral) zone (18 USC §7). No exemptions are allowed.
(f) When developing preauthorization plans, RRTs and RCACs may require the performance of supplementary toxicity and effectiveness testing of products, in addition to the test methods specified in §300.915 and described in appendix C to part 300, due to existing site-specific or area-specific concerns.
During the BP disaster, coastal residents documented spraying of dispersants in near shore and inland waters from Florida to Louisiana, despite contrary claims by USCG and BP.47 The civilian documentation became the basis for a Department of Justice investigation––and a lingering distrust of the accuracy of public reporting of intentional releases of products during oil spill response.
Using the same rationale for the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA), the general public has a right-to-know when, where, and what chemicals are intentionally released during oil spill response. People need time to act to prevent harm to themselves and their families.
We request EPA to notify the public at the national, state, and local levels 72 hours in advance of intentional releases of products on the Schedule, similar to the reporting requirements for Federal, state and local governments, Indian Tribes, and industry, regarding accidental releases of hazardous and toxic chemicals under the EPCRA.
As mentioned in the introduction, we extend our support to the Petition for Rulemaking filed by Earthjustice on October 25, 2010.
We reiterate the points that the limited toxicity tests required by EPA to list products on the NCP Product Schedule do not address: toxicity to ecologically or economically important species (“species of concern”); toxicity to young life forms of species of concern; food web interactions involving species of concern; short- or long-term ecological effects of dispersed oil and dispersant mixtures, including effects on beneficial, naturally-occurring, oil-eating bacteria; or effects on human health, including response workers and the public. Further, the 96-hour LC50 toxicity tests are outdated and must be supplemented with, at a minimum, tests for mutagenicity using current methods that evaluate all standard measures including, but not limited to DNA adduct formation, sister chromatid exchanges (SCE), and epigenetic genotoxicity.
We also support and reiterate the point that the industry argument for preserving trade secrets is specious: food products and nutritional supplements list ingredients without jeopardizing competition.
We support the Earthjustice petitioners’ request that EPA revise and update the toxicity testing protocol by including the tests mentioned above and require full public disclosure of product ingredients as a condition of listing, or retention, on the Product Schedule.
The emerging science from the BP Gulf oil disaster demonstrates the gross inadequacy of current regulations. These inadequacies resulted in unexpected and unprecedented subsurface oily flocculent and plumes of dispersed oil and dispersant. Emerging science is confirming that products were used in the BP disaster response, especially unprecedented amounts of dispersants, created more harm to humans and the environment than the oil release alone––yet these same dispersant products are stockpiled for future oil spill response. The EPA has both the authority and the duty to ensure a greater level of preparedness.
Christine J. Breault, J.D. Esq.
1 I. R. Politzer, I. R. DeLeon, J. L. Laseter, Impact on Human Health of Petroleum in the Marine Environment, American Petroleum Institute, Washington, DC, 1985.
2 Robert Rigg, MD, Letter to Cordova District Fishermen United, May 13, 1989, Cordova, AK. Also in City of Cordova, AK, Cordova Fact Sheet:1989 1.
3 M. G. Holliday, J. M. Park, Occupational Health Implications of Crude Oil Exposure: Literature Review and Research Needs, Technical Report 93-007, Marine Spill Response Corporation, Washington, DC, 1993.
4 Park, J. M. and M. G. Holliday, Occupational-health aspects of marine oil spill response, Pure Applied Chemistry, 1999, 71(1):113–133.
5 Barry Levy and William Nassetta, “The Adverse Health Effects of Oil Spills: A Review of the Literature and a Framework for Medically Evaluating Exposed Individuals,” Int J Occup Environ Health 2011; 17:121–167.
6 The Exxon Valdez oil spill (EVOS) was referenced but only for psychological disorders, which were not included as acute health effects. The Corexit dispersants 9500 and 9527A, and other products, were used during the EVOS disaster response; for a list of acute and chronic adverse health impacts among response workers, see: Annie O’Neill, Self-Reported Exposures And Health Status Among Workers From The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Cleanup, MS Thesis, Yale University Dept. of Epidemiology and Public Health, 2003, available at https://secureservercdn.net/104.238.71.97/cko.8b7.myftpupload.com/pdf/oneill_thesis.pdf.
7 Charles Peterson, Stanley Rice,Jeffrey Short,Daniel Esler,James Bodkin,Brenda Ballachey, and David Irons, “Long-term Ecosystem Responses to the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill,” 2003; 302:2082–2086. See alsoand in Riki Ott, Sound Truth and Corporate Myths: The Legacy of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill (Dragonfly Sisters Press, Cordova, AK: 2004), available at: www.rikiott.com.
8 J. Boyd, D. Scholz, and A. Walker, “Effects of oil and chemically dispersed oil in the environment.” In Proceedings of the International Oil Spill Conference, American Petroleum Institute, Washington, DC, 2001:1213–1216.
10 R. Wilcock, G. Corban, G. Northcott, A. Wilkins and A. Langdon, “Persistence of polycyclic aromatic compounds of different molecular size and water solubility in surficial sediment of an intertidal sandflat,” Environmental Toxicology and Chemistry, 1996; 15:670-676.
15 Ibid., Kirby, Persistent PAHs.
16 NIOSH Pocket Guide To Chemical Hazards; DHHS (NIOSH) Publication No. 2005-149; Sept 2007.
17 Ibid. Kirby, Persistent PAHs.
18 See Kirby, Persistent PAHs.
20 Ibid, Kirby, Persistent PAHs, see esp. Figures 6 and 7, p. 16.
21 Leila Hamdan and Preston Fulmer, “Effects of COREXIT® EC9500A on bacteria from a beach oiled by the Deepwater Horizon spill,” Aquatic Microbial Ecology, 2011; 63:101-109.
24 Jamail, Gulf seafood deformitites.
28 News 5 investigates: Testing the water, July 23, 2012.
30 Shawn Griffith, executive producer, Beyond Pollution, 2012; Bryon Hopkins, producer, Dirty Energy, 2012; Dahr Jamail, BP blamed for ongoing health problems,” Aljazeera English, April 20, 2012, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2012/04/2012420725163795.html; Riki Ott, “Bio-remediation or bio-hazard? Dispersants, bacteria, and illness in the Gulf,” Sept. 17, 2010, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/riki-ott/oil-spill-illness_b_873582.html; Antonia Juhasz, Black Tide: the Devastating Impact of the Gulf Oil Spill (Wiley, April 2011); Josh and Rebecca Tickell, producers, The Big Fix, 2011. List is not exhaustive.
32 Louisiana Bucket Brigade, Self-Reported Health and Economic Impact Survey: An Analysis of the Deepwater Horizon Oil Disaster in Seven Coastal Louisiana Communities, March 3, 2011.
36 Coastal Response Research Center, Research Planning Incorporated, and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, The Future of Dispersant Use in Oil Spill Response Initiative, March 2012.
38 The history of Inipol use during the EVOS disaster response was documented by Riki Ott in Sound Truth and Corporate Myth, especially chapters 6 and 7.
39 A. J. Mearns, Exxon Valdez shoreline treatment and operations: Implications for response, assessment, monitoring, and research, American Fisheries Society Symposium 18:309–328.
40 Exxon Company, USA, MSDS for Inipol EAP22, July 28, 1989, Houston, TX. Listed and reported symptoms included dizziness, headaches, central nervous system depression, liver and kidney damage, and red discoloration of the urine.
41 Annie O’Neill, Self-reported exposures and health status among workers from the EVOS cleanup, Master’s thesis M. P. H. Yale University, Department of Epidemiology and Public Health, 2003.
45 National Research Council, Using Oil Spill Dispersants on the Sea, Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 1989.

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