Source: https://cbaclelegalconnection.com/tag/identity-theft/
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 20:54:06+00:00

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The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued its opinion in United States v. Worku on Tuesday, September 1, 2015.
Mr. Habteab Berhe Temanu’s children approached Kefelegne Alemu Worku, an Ethiopian man, and asked him to assume the identity of their father because they were afraid they would not be able to complete the admission requirements to enter the United States due to his dementia. Worku assumed Berhe’s identity and later became a U.S. citizen under Berhe’s name. Immigration authorities learned Worku was using a false identity and suspected he had tortured Ethiopian prisoners in the ’70s. After an investigation and trial, Worku was convicted of unlawful procurement of citizenship or naturalization, fraud and misuse of visas and other documents, and aggravated identity theft. He was sentenced to 22 years, partly because of a finding that he had committed the identity theft crimes to conceal the Ethiopian human rights violations.
On appeal, Worku contended (1) the immigration convictions violated the Double Jeopardy clause, (2) his aggravated identity theft conviction was improper because he had permission to use Berhe’s identity, (3) the sentence was procedurally improper because there was no evidence he had come to the United States to conceal human rights violations and the witnesses identifying him as the torturer did so due to impermissively suggestive photo arrays, and (4) the sentence was substantively unreasonable.
The Tenth Circuit first addressed Worku’s Double Jeopardy argument. Worku argued that his unlawful procurement of citizenship and aggravated identity theft convictions were predicated on the same conduct. Under a plain error review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed, finding that Count 1 was based on Worku’s form for naturalization and Count 3 was based on misrepresentations in his application for permanent residence. Worku contended the distinction was blurred in the jury instructions, but the Tenth Circuit disagreed. The Tenth Circuit found that the evidence of guilt was overwhelming and uncontroverted, and Double Jeopardy was not implicated.
Next, the Tenth Circuit addressed Worku’s contention that he could not be convicted of aggravated identity theft because he had permission to use Berhe’s identity. The Tenth Circuit found no error in this conviction, because the statute only allows an individual to permit use of his or her identity and in this case the individual’s children were the ones who allowed Worku to use the identity.
The Tenth Circuit then turned to Worku’s argument that he was denied due process because photo arrays in which he was identified as the notorious prison supervisor who had tortured inmates were unduly suggestive. The Tenth Circuit evaluated the photo arrays and found that although there were differences in the arrays, there was no error in the district court’s determination that they were not impermissively suggestive because appearances would be expected to have changed over the 30-plus-year time span. The Tenth Circuit also evaluated the witnesses’ testimony and found that because the witnesses were victims of Worku’s horrific acts of torture, the time span was inconsequential and their identification with “100% certainty” was reliable.
Finally, the Tenth Circuit addressed the substantive reasonableness of Worku’s sentence. The district court decided to stray from the Guidelines range because there were not enough cases involving human rights violators entering the United States to provide a reliable comparison. The district court imposed the maximum sentence for each count to fully compensate for the egregiousness of Worku’s human rights violations. The Tenth Circuit found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s conviction and sentence.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued its opinion in United States v. Camick on Friday, July 31, 2015.
Leslie Lyle Camick was a Canadian citizen who entered the United States in 2000 using the identity of his brother, Wayne Bradly Camick, who had died in infancy. Camick assumed his brother’s identity in order to avoid outstanding child support obligations and back taxes and to evade permanent driver’s license revocation due to numerous intoxicated driving offenses. Camick used his brother’s identity throughout his time in the United States.
In 2004, Camick began a professional and romantic relationship with Lyn Wattley. The couple eventually moved to Kansas and bought a home together under Camick’s assumed identity. In 2010, Camick and Wattley, together with machinist Mark Nelson, began developing an idea for a new way to cover manholes. In 2011, Camick’s and Wattley’s relationship deteriorated, and unbeknownst to Wattley, Camick filed a provisional patent application for the locking manhole cover. In the summer of 2011, Camick drove a 2006 GMC truck that he had paid for but that was titled in Wattley’s name to Arizona. Wattley became concerned about Camick driving since he had had prior intoxicated driving incidents, so she reported the vehicle stolen. Camick was arrested in New Mexico for theft of the truck but Wattley requested that the New Mexico charges be dropped. The Kansas warrant for the stolen vehicle remained outstanding.
In March 2013, Camick was indicted on charges of mail fraud, wire fraud, material false statement to the U.S. Patent Office, and three counts of aggravated identity theft relating to the fraud and false statement charges. In July 2013, Camick filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 lawsuit against Wattley and others, alleging constitutional and tort violations arising from the 2011 stolen vehicle report. This lawsuit became the source of Camick’s obstruction of justice charge as contained in the government’s second superseding indictment. After a three-day trial, Camick was convicted of all seven charges and was sentenced to 48 months’ imprisonment followed by one year of supervised release. Camick was also ordered to pay $15,186 in restitution to Wattley. He timely appealed.
The Tenth Circuit analyzed the mail fraud charge, which was premised on the letter Camick mailed to the Kansas court regarding his failure to respond to the quiet title action. Camick argued the evidence was insufficient to show he made materially false statements with the intent to defraud. The Tenth Circuit agreed. The Kansas court and Wattley were aware of Camick’s true identity at the time he sent the letter, and he had been known as Wayne throughout his time in the United States. The Tenth Circuit held that Camick’s identity could have had no bearing on the Kansas court’s decision to uphold its default judgment. Camick’s statement that he had been “wrongfully detained” was likewise immaterial since it was incapable of influencing the Kansas court’s decision. The Tenth Circuit reversed Camick’s conviction for mail fraud and the related aggravated identity theft charge.
The Tenth Circuit next evaluated Camick’s challenges to the wire fraud and material false statement convictions, both of which pertained to the provisional patent application. Camick argued that because he was the actual inventor of the locking manhole cover and everyone knew him as Wayne Camick, his use of that name on the provisional patent application was insufficient to show a false statement with intent to defraud. The Tenth Circuit again agreed, holding that the false statements were immaterial to the provisional patent application. Because the provisional patent application did not require an oath or declaration by the applicant, the Tenth Circuit found Camick’s fraud in using his brother’s name immaterial to the provisional patent application. The Tenth Circuit reversed the convictions for wire fraud and material false statement. The Tenth Circuit also reversed the accompanying aggravated identity theft charges.
Camick challenged his obstruction of justice charge, arguing the evidence was insufficient to show that he filed the civil rights suit against Wattley with retaliatory intent. The Tenth Circuit, drawing inferences of retaliation from the timing of his filing, disagreed. The Tenth Circuit upheld this conviction. Judge Kelly dissented from this part of the opinion; he would have reversed the obstruction of justice conviction as well.
Finally, Camick argued that the restitution award improperly failed to tie Camick’s harms of conduct to the restitution requested by Wattley. The Tenth Circuit evaluated the restitution award and reversed the parts of the award requested for Wattley’s quiet title action and review of the provisional patent application. The Tenth Circuit also reversed the award of costs incurred in a separate civil lawsuit.
Camick’s convictions for mail fraud, wire fraud, material false statement, and aggravated identity theft were reversed. Camick’s conviction for obstruction of justice was affirmed. The case was remanded for a hearing on the remaining restitution award.
The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People v. Perez on Thursday, May 9, 2013.
Defendant appealed the judgment of conviction entered on jury verdicts finding him guilty of identity theft and criminal impersonation. The convictions were vacated.
Defendant was charged with identity theft and criminal impersonation for using another person’s Social Security number to obtain employment. On appeal, defendant asserted that the prosecution presented insufficient evidence to sustain his identity theft convictions. The identity theft statute, CRS § 18-5-902, requires that the prosecution prove that the defendant knew the Social Security number at issue belonged to someone. The prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence of this element.
Defendant also contended that the evidence was insufficient to support his criminal impersonation conviction, because the prosecution failed to prove that he assumed a false or fictitious identity or capacity. Although there might have been evidence that the employers would not have hired defendant unless he had a Social Security number, there was no evidence that a Social Security number was legally required for employment. Thus, the evidence was not sufficient to prove defendant assumed a false capacity.
The Tenth Circuit published its opinion in United States v. Loughrin on Friday, March 8, 2013.
Kevin Loughrin was convicted of bank fraud and other charges arising from a check and identity theft scheme.
He appealed his conviction on two grounds: (1) the district court’s jury instructions on the bank fraud counts, 18 U.S.C. § 1344(2), were erroneous because they did not contain a requirement that Loughrin intended to defraud a bank; and (2) the delay between his indictment and trial violated his rights under the Speedy Trial Act.
Loughrin first argued that the district court’s jury instructions on the bank fraud counts, 18 U.S.C. § 1344(2), were erroneous because they did not contain a requirement that Loughrin intended to defraud a bank.
The case law requires the government to prove: “(1) that the defendant knowingly executed or attempted to execute a scheme (i) to defraud [§ 1344(1)] or (ii) to obtain property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations or promises [§ 1344(2)]; (2) that defendant did so with the intent to defraud; and (3) that the financial institution was then insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.” United States v. Rackley, 986 F.2d 1357, 1360–61 (10th Cir. 1993).
There is no requirement in either Rackley or the text of § 1344(2) that the fraud must be intentionally directed at a bank. Unlike clause (1), clause (2) does not explicitly state who must be the object of the scheme. Rackley indicates that only an intent to defraud someone is required. 986 F.2d at 1360–61. Thus, under Tenth Circuit precedent, an individual can violate § 1344(2) by obtaining money from a bank while intending to defraud someone else. The fact that Loughrin fraudulently obtained funds using bank checks, even though the bank was not at risk of loss, was sufficient to support his conviction for bank fraud.
The Tenth Circuit concluded the district court did not err in applying the requisite elements for bank fraud under § 1344(2) and that the subsection does not require proof that the defendant intended to defraud a bank.
Loughrin next argued that the district court violated his rights under the Speedy Trial Act (STA).
The Speedy Trial Act requires that a criminal trial begin no more than seventy days after the filing of an indictment or the defendant’s first appearance in court. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1). But not every day counts towards the seventy-day limit because of a multitude of statutory exclusions, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(g). If a delay does not fit within an explicit exclusion, the court may still exclude days from the seventy-day tally as long as it makes “findings that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.” Id. § 3161(h)(7)(A).
Loughrin made his first appearance in federal court on June 8, 2010. After a series of continuances for various reasons, Loughrin went to trial in April 2011.
However, after reviewing each continuance in turn, the Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court that Loughrin was tried within seventy days as required by the Speedy Trial Act.
Practically every company in our modern economy has information security and privacy risk. There is no way to completely eliminate it. Whether it is your firm or your client, most companies of all shapes, sizes, and wealth profiles use information technology and handle sensitive information including personal information and credit card numbers. That means organizations face potential direct losses, lawsuits, and liability due to data, security, and privacy breaches.
The frequency and magnitude of data breaches by hackers has only been increasing. We read about security and privacy breaches practically every day in the newspaper. As the world continues to change at seemingly light-speed and cyber risks increase, the need for risk transfer with cyber insurance is also growing. Relying on a general liability or property policy to provide the coverage is no longer a wise choice (if it ever was), and companies could be well-served to get peace of mind and relative predictability by learning more about cyber policies that are actually designed to address the risk.
CBA-CLE will be hold a program on Thursday, March 29 to address the impact of data breaches and the trend toward cyber insurance. The program presenter, David Navetta, Esq., has written several articles about data security and cyber insurance. Read some of his insights below, and then join us to learn more about protecting sensitive information with cyber insurance, an option that may be of great importance to your clients or law firm.
The early cyber policies included liability and property components. The liability coverages addressed claim expenses and liability arising out of a security breach of the insured’s computer systems (some early policies only covered “technical” security breaches, as opposed to policy violation-based security breaches). The property-related components covered business interruption and data asset loss/damage arising out of a data breach (during the holiday season many online retailers suddenly developed a tasted for business interruption coverage after realizing just how negatively their business would be impacted by a denial of service attack). Additional first party coverages included cyber-extortion coverage and crisis management/PR coverage.
Unfortunately for the carriers, it was not easy to get people to understand the need for this coverage (and that is still a challenge today, but certainly a lesser challenge with all of the security and privacy news constantly streaming). Early on there were very few lawsuits and regulators were just beginning to consider enforcement of relatively new statutes like GLB and HIPAA.
Two things changed that made cyber insurance much more relevant. One was a rather sudden event, and the other more gradual.
First, in 2003, California passed SB1386, the world’s first breach notification law. The reality then (as now) is that companies suffer security breaches each and every day. Prior to SB1386, however, breaches of personal information simply went unreported. With SB1386 and the subsequent passage of breach notice laws in 45 other states (and now coming internationally), the risk profile changed for data breaches. Instead of burying the breaches, companies were required to incur significant direct expenses to investigate security breaches and comply with applicable breach notice laws, including the offering of credit monitoring to affected individuals (which is not legally required by existing breach notice laws, but is optionally provided by many companies or “suggested” by state regulators). As a result, the plaintiffs’ bar now had notice of security breaches and began filing class action lawsuits after big breaches (usually involving high-profile brand name organizations). As such, cyber insurance coverage went from coverage addressing a hypothetical risk of future lawsuits, to a coverage addressing real-life risk (and now we have lawsuits getting deeper into litigation and public settlements of these types of cases). Moreover, shortly after the passage of SB 1386 many cyber insurance policies began covering the direct costs associated with complying with breach notification laws, including attorney fees, forensic investigation expenses, printing and mailing costs, credit monitoring expenses and call center expenses. Breach notification costs are direct and almost unavoidable after a personal information breach. Regardless of lawsuit activity, a direct financial rationale for cyber insurance coverage now existed.
The other change that occurred more gradually over time, but which has had a significant impact concerning the frequency and magnitude of data breaches, was organized crime. In the early 2000s, hacking was more of an exercise in annoyance or a used for bragging purposes. Hackers at that time wanted their exploits talked about and know. They wanted credit for hacking into or bringing down a sophisticated company (or better yet a division of the Federal Government or military). As such, when an attack happened it was discovered and remediated, and that would be the end of it.
True criminals, of course, are less interested in such notoriety. In fact, when trying to steal thousands/millions of records to commit identity theft or credit card fraud it is much better to NOT be detected. Lingering on a company’s network taking information for months or years is a much more profitable endeavor. Recognizing that this type of crime is low risk (it can be performed from thousands of miles away in Eastern Europe with almost no chance of getting caught) and high reward, organized crime flooded into the space. And in this context the word “organized” is truly appropriate – these enterprises retain very smart IT-oriented people that use every tool possible to scale and automate their crimes. They leverage the communication tools on the Internet to fence their “goods” creating, for example, wholesale and retail markets for credit cards, or “eBay”-like auction sites to hawk their illicit wares (e.g. valuable information). The change in orientation described above has essentially resulted in a 24/7/365 relentless crime machine constantly attacking and looking for new ways to attack, and always seeming to be one step ahead of those seeking to stop them. That is why we read about security and privacy breaches practically every day in the newspaper.
Fast-forward to present time. Cyber insurance is a much more established market with more carriers entering on a regular basis. There are primary and excess markets available for big risks, and companies of all sizes are looking at cyber more as a mandatory purchase rather than discretionary. As the world continues to change at seemingly light-speed and cyber risks increase (with the advent of hacktivism, social media and the consumerization of IT/BYOD ) the need for cyber is also growing. With competition pushing cyber insurance prices down, and significant security and privacy risk being retained by organizations, risk transfer is becoming very attractive (and from an overall big picture systemic point of view, spreading risk is also attractive). The price may be right, and the peace of mind priceless.
Click here to read the full article. Program registration information below.
This CLE presentation will take place on Thursday, March 29. Participants may attend live in our classroom or watch the live webcast.

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