Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&amp;view=article&amp;id=33818:g-r-no-79732-november-8,-1993-republic-of-the-phil-v-court-of-appeals,-et-al&amp;catid=1308&amp;Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 21:47:07+00:00

Document:
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS, HENRICO UVERO, ET AL., Respondents.
Raymundo T. Nagrampa for Private Respondents.
1.	CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; EMINENT DOMAIN; EXPROPRIATION; JUST COMPENSATION; DETERMINATION THEREOF, A JUDICIAL FUNCTION. — In Export Processing Zone Authority ("EPZA") v. Dulay, etc., Et Al., this Court held the determination of just compensation in eminent domain to be a judicial function, and it thereby declared Presidential Decree No. 76, as well as related decrees, including Presidential Decree No. 1533, to the contrary extent, as unconstitutional and as an impermissible encroachment of judicial prerogatives. The ruling, now conceded by the Republic, was reiterated in subsequent cases.
2.	POLITICAL LAW; LEGISLATIONS; LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENT DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL; EFFECT THEREOF. — Whether the declaration of nullity of the law in question should only have prospective, not retroactive, application, The strict view considers a legislative enactment which is declared unconstitutional as being, for all legal intents and purposes, a total nullity, and it is deemed as if it had never existed. Here, of course, we refer to the law itself being per se repugnant to the Constitution. It is not always the case, however, that a law is constitutionally faulty per se. Thus, it may well be valid in its general import but invalid in its application to certain factual situations. To exemplify, an otherwise valid law may be held unconstitutional only insofar as it is allowed to operate retrospectively such as, in pertinent cases, when it vitiates contractually vested rights. To that extent, its retroactive application may be so declared invalid as impairing the obligations of contracts. A judicial declaration of invalidity, it is also true, may not necessarily obliterate all the effects and consequences of a void act occurring prior to such a declaration. Thus, in our decisions on the moratorium laws, we have been constrained to recognize the interim effects of said laws prior to their declaration of unconstitutionality, but there we have likewise been unable to simply ignore strong considerations of equity and fair play. So also, even as a practical matter, a situation that may aptly be described as fait accompli may no longer be open for further inquiry, let alone to be unsettled by a subsequent declaration of nullity of a governing statute.
Hence, the instant petition by the Republic.
EFFECT OF JUDICIAL DECLARATION OF PD 1533 AS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND VOID; UP TO WHEN RETROACTIVELY; EFFECT ON A PENDING APPEALED CASE WHERE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PD 1533 NOT ASSAILED BEFORE COURT A QUO.
WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION OF THIS HONORABLE COURT IN EPZA VS. HON. DULAY, ETC., ET AL. (G.R. NO. 59603, APRIL 29, 1987) DECLARING PD 1533 UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND VOID, BE APPLIED IN THIS CASE.
WHETHER OR NOT VALUATION OF LAND SOUGHT FOR EXPROPRIATION AS APPEARING ON THE TAX DECLARATION BE USED AS PRELIMINARY BASIS FOR THE TEN PER CENT (10%) DEPOSIT REQUIRED UNDER RULE 67 OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT, AS AMENDED BEFORE PLAINTIFF IS PERMITTED ENTRY THEREON.
The last item is not in issue; being merely provisional in character, the matter has not been questioned by the private respondents. 3 We will thus limit ourselves to the first two issues which, in turn, really boil down to whether the declaration of nullity of the law in question should only have prospective, not retroactive, application. The petitioner proposes the affirmative.
"There are two views on the effects of a declaration of the unconstitutionality of a statute.
The first is the orthodox view. Under this rule, as announced in Norton v. Shelby, an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no right; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, inoperative, as if it had not been passed. It is therefore stricken from the statute books and considered never to have existed at all. Not only the parties but all persons are bound by the declaration of unconstitutionality, which means that no one may thereafter invoke it nor may the courts be permitted to apply it in subsequent cases. It is, in other words, a total nullity.
A judicial declaration of invalidity, it is also true, may not necessarily obliterate all the effects and consequences of a void act occurring prior to such a declaration. Thus, in our decisions on the moratorium laws, 6 we have been constrained to recognize the interim effects of said laws prior to their declaration of unconstitutionality, but there we have likewise been unable to simply ignore strong considerations of equity and fair play. So also, even as a practical matter, a situation that may aptly be described as fait accompli may no longer be open for further inquiry, let alone to be unsettled by a subsequent declaration of nullity of a governing statute.
In fine, we hold that the appellate court in this particular case committed no error in its appealed decision.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED. No costs.
1.	G.R. No. 59603, 29 April 1987, 149 SCRA 305.
2.	Toledo v. Fernando, 160 SCRA 285; Belen v. Court of Appeals, 160 SCRA 291.
4.	Constitutional Law, 1991, 32-33, citing Norton v. Shelby, 118 U.S. 425 and Shepard v. Barren, 194 U.S. 553.
5.	A similar rule has been applied to new doctrines enunciated by this Court (reversing prior ones) in the interpretation and construction of laws [Sps. Benzonan v. Court of Appeals, 205 SCRA 515].
6.	Republic v. Herida, 119 SCRA 411; Republic v. CFI, Negros Occidental, 120 SCRA 154; see also Tan v. Barrios, 190 SCRA 686.

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