Source: https://openjurist.org/235/us/610
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 22:51:40+00:00

Document:
Argued November 11 and 12, 1914.
Messrs. Osborne I. Yellott, Jackson H. Balston, Clement L. Bouv e, and William E. Richardson for plaintiff in error.
Mr. Edgar Allan Poe, Attorney General of Maryland, and Mr. Enos S. Stockbridge for defendant in error.
The cause was originally brought July 27, 1910, before a justice of the peace for Prince George's county by the state against John T. Hendrick for violating § 133 of the motor vehicle law effective July 1, 1910. He is and then was a citizen of the United States, resident and commorant in the District of Columbia. On that day he left his office in Washington in his own automobile and drove it into Prince George's county, and while temporarily there was arrested on the charge of operating it upon the highways without having procured the certificate of registration required by § 133 of the motor vehicle law. He was brought before a justice of the peace and fined $15 after having been found guilty of the charge set out in a warrant duly issued,—a motion to quash having been denied. Whereupon he filed his appeal. At the time and place aforesaid he had not procured the certificate of registration for his automobile required by § 133. Upon the foregoing the court shall determine the questions and differences between the parties and render judgment according as their rights in law may appear in the same manner as if the facts aforesaid were proven upon the trial. Either party may appeal.
Plaintiff in error maintains that the act is void because—it discriminates against residents of the District of Columbia; attempts to regulate interstate commerce; violates the rights of citizens of the United States to pass into and through the state; exacts a tax for revenue—not mere compensation for the use of facilities—according to arbitrary classifications, and thereby deprives citizens of the United States of the equal protection of the laws.
If the statute is otherwise valid, the alleged discrimination against residents of the District of Columbia is not adequate ground for us now to declare it altogether bad. At most they are entitled to equality of treatment, and in the absence of some definite and authoritative ruling by the courts of the state we will not assume that, upon a proper showing, this will be denied, The record fails to disclose that Hendrick had complied with the laws in force within the District of Columbia in respect of registering motor vehicles and licensing operators, or that he applied to the Maryland commissioner for an identifying tag or marker,—prerequisites to a limited use of the highways without cost by residents of other states under the plain terms of § 140a. He cannot therefore set up a claim of discrimination in this particular. Only those whose rights are directly affected can properly question the constitutionality of a state statute, and invoke our jurisdiction in respect thereto. New York ex rel. Hatch v. Reardon, 204 U. S. 152, 161, 51 L. ed. 415, 422, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 188, 9 Ann. Cas. 736; Williams v. Walsh, 222 U. S. 415, 423, 56 L. ed. 253, 256, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 137; Collins v. Texas, 223 U. S. 288, 295, 296, 56 L. ed. 439, 443, 444 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 286; Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Cade, 233 U. S. 642, 648, 58 L. ed. 1135, 1137, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 678, and cases cited.
In the absence of national legislation covering the subject, a state may rightfully prescribe uniform regulations necessary for public safety and order in respect to the operation upon its highways of all motor vehicles,—those moving in interstate commerce as well as others. And to this end it may require the registration of such vehicles and the licensing of their drivers, charging therefor reasonable fees graduated according to the horse-power of the engines,—a practical measure of size, speed, and difficulty of control. This is but an exercise of the police power uniformly recognized as belonging to the states and essential to the preservation of the health, safety, and comfort of their citizens; and it does not constitute a direct and material burden on interstate commerce. The reasonableness of the state's action is always subject to inquiry in so far as it affects interstate commerce, and in that regard it is likewise subordinate to the will of Congress. Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27, 30, 31, 28 L. ed. 923-925, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 357; Smith v. Alabama, 124 U. S. 465, 480, 31 L. ed. 508, 513, 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 804, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 564; Lawton v. Steele, 152 U. S. 133, 136, 38 L. ed. 385, 388, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 499; New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. v. New York, 165 U. S. 628, 631, 41 L. ed. 853, 854, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 418; Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366, 392, 42 L. ed. 780, 791, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 383; Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Ohio, 173 U. S. 285, 298, 43 L. ed. 702, 707, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 465; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. McGuire, 219 U. S. 549, 568, 55 L. ed. 328, 338, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 259; Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Georgia, 234 U. S. 280, 291, 58 L. ed. 1312, 1317, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 829.
In view of the many decisions of this court there can be no serious doubt that where a state at its own expense furnishes special facilities for the use of those engaged in commerce, interstate as well as domestic, it may exact compensation therefor. The amount of the charges and the method of collection are primarily for determination by the state itself; and so long as they are reasonable and are fixed according to some uniform, fair, and practical standard, they constitute no burden on interstate commerce. Parkersburg & O. River Transp. Co. v. Parkersburg, 107 U. S. 691, 699, 27 L. ed. 584, 587, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 732; Huse v. Glover, 119 U. S. 543, 548, 549, 30 L. ed. 487, 490, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 313; Monongahela Nav. Co. v. United States, 148 U. S. 312, 329, 330, 37 L. ed. 463, 469, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 622; Minnesota Rate Cases (Simpson v. Shepard) 230 U. S. 352, 405, 57 L. ed. 1511, 48 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1151, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 729, and authorities cited. The action of the state must be treated as correct unless the contrary is made to appear. In the instant case there is no evidence concerning the value of the facilities supplied by the state, the cost of maintaining them, or the fairness of the methods adopted for collecting the charges imposed; and we cannot say from a mere inspection of the statute that its provisions are arbitrary or unreasonable.
As the capacity of the machine owned by plaintiff in error does not appear, he cannot complain of discrimination because fees are imposed according to engine power. Distinctions amongst motor machines and between them and other vehicles may be proper, essential, indeed,—and those now challenged are not obviously arbitrary or oppressive. The statute is not a mere revenue measure, and a discussion of the classifications permissible under such an act would not be pertinent.

References: § 133
 § 133
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 § 140
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