Source: https://cbaclelegalconnection.com/tag/immunity/page/2/
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 00:00:10+00:00

Document:
The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in McLaughlin v. Oxley on July 5, 2012.
Defendants Christopher Oxley, Ricardo Sison, and Ability Specialists, Inc. (Ability) appealed the trial court’s holding that they were not immune from the suit brought by plaintiffs Brandon McLaughlin, Michael McLaughlin, and Selena McLaughlin. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s order and the case was remanded with directions.
Michael and Selena McLaughlin retained Ability to provide services to assist in the care of their developmentally disabled son, Brandon, who at the time was 21 years old. As part of the services, Oxley, an employee of Ability, was supervising Brandon at Oxley’s home, while Oxley’s own 7-year-old son, B.O., was present. Brandon and B.O. were left unattended together, during which time Brandon put B.O. in a “spanking position,” pulled down B.O.’s pants, and kissed him. Oxley informed his superiors, who called the police to investigate. The police charged Brandon with sexual assault on a child. The criminal case was dismissed after Brandon was found incompetent to proceed.
Plaintiffs later sued defendants, alleging negligence against Oxley and Ability. Defendants moved for summary judgment on all claims, arguing they were immune from liability under CRS §§ 13-21-117.5(4) and (6). The trial court denied the motion and defendants appealed.
CRS § 13-21-117.5 was enacted to “mitigate the risk of liability to providers to the developmentally disabled to the extent that such mitigation is reasonable and possible.” The Court agreed with defendants that the trial court erred in finding that § 13-21-117.5(6) did not apply. The trial court reasoned that the section applied only to immunize a provider against civil actions initiated by a victim of a developmentally disabled person’s assaultive behavior and not, as here, to a suit regarding harm to the developmentally disabled person. The Court found no support for such an interpretation of the statute. The order was reversed and the case was remanded for entry of summary judgment in favor of defendants.
It isn’t often that a case rooted in Colorado reaches the U.S. Supreme Court, but on June 4, 2012, the Supreme Court announced its decision in a case with deep Colorado connections, Reichle v. Howards. The facts of the case occurred in Beaver Creek, Colorado, and the respondent, Golden resident Steven Howards, was represented by Denver attorney David Lane of Kilmer Lane & Newman LLP, while the petitioner Secret Service agents were represented by Denver lawyer Sean Gallagher of Polsinelli Shughart, PC.
The case involved Howards, who confronted Vice President Cheney at a 2006 event at a mall in Beaver Creek. According to the Court’s opinion, Howards entered the line to meet Cheney, made critical remarks regarding the administration’s policies in Iraq, and touched Cheney on the shoulder before leaving (something Howards later denied to Secret Service agents). Howards was arrested by Secret Service agents Gus Reichle and Dan Doyle. He was charged with harassment, but the charges were later dropped. Howards then brought suit against the agents, claiming that he had been arrested without probable cause, a violation of the Fourth Amendment, and in retaliation for his comments to Vice President Cheney, a violation of the First Amendment.
The Court granted certiorari on the questions of (1) whether a First Amendment retaliatory arrest claim could be brought where the arrest was supported by probable cause and (2) whether there was clearly established law at the time of Howards’s arrest as to the first question. The Court only addressed the second question, and found that the law was not clearly established at the time of the arrest, entitling the agents to qualified immunity.
Lane summarized his thoughts on the ruling in a statement to the Associated Press, “‘They broke absolutely no legal ground while managing to duck every significant issue in the case.’” However, Gallagher saw the decision differently: “‘This ruling confirms that the federal courts will not subject law enforcement officials to personal liability except when it is absolutely clear that they have no basis to make the arrest.’” While it remains an open question whether a First Amendment retaliatory arrest claim can be brought where the arrest is supported by probable cause, this case was certainly fascinating for the facts and issues involved, as well as its connections to Colorado and two of Denver’s prominent attorneys.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals published its opinion in Newton v. Lee on Tuesday, April 24, 2012.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed in part and declined to exercise jurisdiction in an interlocutory appeal. Petitioner alleges that two officers of the Utah Air National Guard violated his due process rights when they suspended and subsequently withdrew his Air Traffic Control Specialist (ATCS) certificate, and when they suspended his employment as an Air Traffic Control Supervisor at Hill Air Force Base in Utah. The district court granted summary judgment to Respondents on Petitioner’s due process claim regarding the suspension of his employment. However, it denied summary judgment on his due process claim regarding the withdrawal of his ATCS certificate, holding this claim is not barred by qualified immunity or by intramilitary immunity under the Feres doctrine.
In this interlocutory appeal, Respondents challenge the denial of qualified immunity and intramilitary immunity on Petitioner’s ATCS certificate claim. Petitioner cross-appeals the grant of summary judgment on his employment claim. The Court held that Petitioner’s ATCS certificate is not barred by the Feres doctrine, and that it had no jurisdiction over the interlocutory appeal from the denial of qualified immunity to Respondents. The Court also declined to exercise pendent jurisdiction over Petitioner’s cross-appeal.
On February 7, 2012, Rep. Ray Scott and Sen. Joyce Foster introduced HB 12-1244 – Concerning an Inventory of Local Governmental Entities Maintained by the Department of Local Affairs and, in Connection Therewith, Requiring the Inclusion of Certain Information in the Inventory. This summary is published here courtesy of the Colorado Bar Association’s e-Legislative Report.
Filing a notice of a claim arising under the act with a person listed as an agent in the inventory is deemed to satisfy requirements for filing such notice. Service to the most recently listed registered agent is deemed valid if the local governmental entity failed to timely update its registered agent information. The bill passed out of the House on February 28 and is assigned to the Local Government Committee. Committee review is scheduled for Tuesday, March 20 at 2 p.m.
The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in Air Wisconsin Airlines Corp. v. Hoeper on March 19, 2012.
The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals’ judgment and held that a trial court must decide before trial if a party is immune from suit pursuant to the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA), 49 U.S.C. § 44941. The Court held that (1) Air Wisconsin Airlines Corporation was not immune from suit for defamation under the ATSA; (2) the record showed clear and convincing evidence to support a finding of actual malice; (3) Air Wisconsin’s statements were not protected as opinion; and (4) the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s determination that the statements were false.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals published its opinion in Morris v. Noe on Monday, February 27, 2012.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. Respondent brought a § 1983 action for unlawful arrest and excessive force on behalf of her deceased husband against Petitioner police officer. She alleges Petitioner violated her husband’s clearly established rights when the officer forceably arrested decedent and caused him injury. Petitioner moved for summary judgment based on qualified immunity, and the district court denied his motion. Petitioner now appeals.
The Court found that the officer “had reason to believe that [decedent] was, at most, a misdemeanant. But [the decedent] posed no threat to [the officer] or others, nor did he resist or flee. Thus, based on the facts assumed by the district court, [the decedent]’s right to be free from a forceful takedown was clearly established,” and Petitioner is not entitled to qualified immunity.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals published its opinion in Romero v. Story on Thursday, February 23, 2012.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s decision. Respondent brought suit against Petitioner law enforcement officers, alleging unlawful arrest and excessive force. The district court denied Petitioners’ claim to qualified immunity in the context of summary judgment, and they appealed.
The Court concluded that Petitioners lacked reasonable suspicion to detain Respondent for the vandalism and lacked probable cause to arrest Respondent for flight or evasion, “thereby violating [Respondent]’s constitutional right to be free from unlawful arrest. The district court, therefore, properly denied Petitioners’ motion for qualified immunity. However, the district court did not evaluate whether the force was excessive, and so the Court vacated the denial of qualified immunity as to Respondent’s excessive force claim and remanded to the district court to evaluate the excessive force claim separate and independent from the unlawful arrest claim.
The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Colorado Special Districts Property and Liability Pool v. Lyons III on February 2, 2012.
Defendants William S. Lyons, Jr. and William S. Lyons III (collectively, Lyonses) appealed the district court’s order, pursuant to C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1), dismissing their claim for bad-faith breach of insurance contract against plaintiff Colorado Special Districts Property and Liability Pool (Pool) and third-party defendant County Technical Services, Inc. (CTSI), on the ground that the Pool and CTSI are immune from liability under the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (CGIA). The order was affirmed and the case was remanded with directions.
In early 2006, several banks purchased bonds issued by Lincoln Creek Metropolitan District (District), a quasi-municipal corporation in Douglas County. The District issued the bonds to finance construction of a proposed master-planned residential community called Lincoln Creek Village. The Lyonses were members of the District’s board of directors and LCV, LLC, the developer’s board of directors. The banks brought an action (the underlying lawsuit) against LCV and the Lyonses, alleging claims for damages arising from the offering and sale of the bonds issued by the District. The Pool claimed it had no duty to defend or indemnify the Lyonses in the underlying lawsuit because the Lyonses were not covered under the insurance policy and the banks in the underlying lawsuit did not name the District as a defendant or sue the Lyonses in their capacity as members of the District’s board of directors. The trial court found that the Pool and CTSI were both “public entities” and, therefore, immune under the CGIA. It dismissed the Lyonses’ bad-faith claim against these entities.
The Lyonses contended that the district court erred in dismissing their claim for bad-faith breach of insurance contract under the CGIA. The CGIA provides a public entity the defense of sovereign immunity against actions for tort injuries and does not apply to actions grounded in contract. Here, the Lyonses’ bad faith breach of contract claim against the Pool and CTSI was a tort claim that existed independently of the Lyonses’ underlying contract claim against the Pool. Accordingly, the district court did not err in concluding that the CGIA applied to that claim.
The Lyonses next contended that the district court erred in determining that CTSI was a “public entity” within the meaning of the CGIA and, therefore, not immune under the CGIA. The definition of “public entity” includes any “separate entity created by intergovernmental contract or cooperation” composed only of entities that are themselves public entities under the statutory definition. Here, the Pool is a “separate entity created by intergovernmental contract or cooperation” among special districts. Because CTSI is a public corporation, is governmental in nature, and serves as an intermediary to the Pool, CTSI is an “instrumentality” of the Pool and, thus, a “public entity” under the CGIA. CTSI also is a public entity under CRS § 24-10-103(5) because, like the Pool, it is a separate entity created by intergovernmental cooperation between or among other public entities.
The Lyonses next contended that the district court abused its discretion by implicitly rejecting their request to conduct discovery on whether the Pool and CTSI waived their immunity. However, by their own admission, the Lyonses chose not to conduct discovery on the immunity issue because of a perceived need to maintain consistency between their positions in this case and the underlying lawsuit.
Finally, the Pool and CTSI requested an award of attorney fees for defending against the Lyonses’ bad faith claim on appeal. CTSI was entitled to its attorney fees on appeal because the only claim asserted against it was dismissed before trial under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1). The Pool, however, was not entitled to attorney fees on appeal because the Lyonses’ breach of contract claim was stayed in the district court and had not been dismissed.
This summary is published here courtesy of The Colorado Lawyer. Other summaries for the Colorado Court of Appeals on February 2, 2012, can be found here.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals published its opinion in Guttman v. Khalsa on Wednesday, January 11, 2012.
Petitioner challenged the Board’s findings in state court, asserting for the first time that the Board’s actions violated Title II of the ADA. Because Petitioner had not raised an ADA claim before the Board, the state court refused to consider it and affirmed the revocation of his license. Petitioner also filed a pro se complaint in federal district court against New Mexico and two individuals: the Board’s administrative prosecutor and the Board’s hearing officer. The district court granted the Respondents’ motion for summary judgment after finding that the individual defendants were entitled to absolute immunity.
“The question presented in this appeal is whether the Eleventh Amendment protects New Mexico from a suit for money damages under Title II of the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA).” The Court concluded that it does. “New Mexico has state sovereign immunity from a claim that it violated the ADA when it revoked the medical license of a physician whose practice the state claimed constituted an imminent danger to the public. As a result, [the Court] found the district court did not err by dismissing the ADA claim of [Petitioner] against the State of New Mexico for revoking his medical license. [The Court also concluded that] the state’s actions did not violate the United States Constitution.” However, Petitioner may still have extant claims for prospective injunctive relief.
The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Shirk v. Forsmark on January 5, 2012.
Adoption—Department of Social Services—42 U.S.C. § 1983—Abuse—Injuries—Foster Care—Qualified Immunity.
Defendants Joan Forsmark, Cathy O’Donnell, and Angela Lytle, who are all employees of the Adams County Department of Social Services (Department), sought review of the trial court’s orders denying their motions for summary judgment, which asserted qualified immunity for their discretionary decisions as government officials regarding claims arising from the placement and adoption of foster children. The orders were affirmed.
Plaintiffs Michael and Joanna Shirk filed this action individually and on behalf of their adopted children, B.N.S., R.T.S., and B.K.S., who were in the Department’s custody from approximately August 2000 through their adoption in August 2003. The case from which this interlocutory appeal arises involves 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims on behalf of children for injuries suffered in connection with their foster care placement and adoption.
Defendants contended that because their conduct did not constitute a violation of a clearly established constitutional right, the trial court erred in denying them qualified immunity. Children in the state’s legal custody have a clearly established “constitutional right to be reasonably safe from harm; and that if the persons responsible place children in a foster home or institution that they know or suspect to be dangerous to the children they incur liability if the harm occurs.” Here, plaintiffs alleged that Forsmark placed the children in an obviously dangerous foster home because (1) there were previous reports of abuse at that home; (2) the previous foster mother, Penny Staley, had been placed on the central registry for child abuse; (3) two of Staley’s adoptive children were reported for sexually abusing other children; (4) Forsmark and O’Donnell ignored many signs of ongoing sexual abuse while the children were at the Staley home; and (5) defendants failed to disclose to the Shirks the abuse, including incestuous behavior between the children. Because plaintiffs alleged conduct violated the constitutional rights of B.N.S., R.T.S. and B.K.S, defendants were not entitled to summary judgment based on qualified immunity.
This summary is published here courtesy of The Colorado Lawyer. Other summaries for the Colorado Court of Appeals on January 5, 2012, can be found here.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Kerns v. Bader on Tuesday, December 20, 2011.
The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision. Petitioner was an initial suspect in the downing of a police helicopter by a sniper. During their investigation, suspicious activity and evidence was present at Petitioner’s home, leading officers to enter the premises and later arrest Petitioner. After the charges against Petitioner were dismissed, he sued the officers, alleging they had violated his Fourth Amendment rights by briefly entering his house on the night of the crash. Second, he sued the sheriff, arguing his efforts to obtain Petitioner’s psychiatric records violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment privacy rights. Finally, he accused several deputies of false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution. All the defendants moved for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity, but the district court denied relief, and the defendants now appeal.
Lastly, the Court reasoned that each suspicious fact known to the officers does not require any speculation on their behalf. “Probable cause to arrest often arises from circumstantial evidence when the weapon responsible for the crime cannot be found or identified.” The totality of the circumstances and information available to the officers at the time created the existence of probable cause, and disposes of all of Petitioner’s claims against all the deputies.

References: v. 
 § 13
 § 13
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 44941
 v. 
 § 1983
 v. 
 v. 
 § 24
 v. 
 v. 
 § 1983
 § 1983
 v.