Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/99-5280/99-5280a-2011-03-24.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 04:15:31+00:00

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Randolph, Circuit Judge: Steven D.C. Bigelow, while a major in the United States Air Force, worked in the Informa- tion Warfare and Special Technical Operations Center, a part of the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Pentagon. The chief of that section and Major Bigelow's immediate supervisor, United States Army Colonel Nathan W. Noyes, learned of allegations of misconduct concerning Bigelow, per- haps the most serious of which was that he sometimes disappeared in foreign countries near sensitive international borders. Major Bigelow's position demanded that he hold the highest security classification, above "Top Secret" (the name of the classification is itself classified). Colonel Noyes's position, so it is claimed, demanded that he continually assess the trustworthiness of those under his command. To this end, and because he thought Bigelow might be lying about his past, Noyes went to the Joint Staff Security Office and requested Bigelow's personnel security file. Convinced that his suspicions had been confirmed, Colonel Noyes referred the matter to the Air Force for disciplinary action, as a result of which Major Bigelow was relieved of his duties at the Pentagon (he is now a Lieutenant Colonel at Bolling Air Force Base).
Bigelow brought this action under the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. s 552a, seeking damages and other relief against the Depart- ment of Defense on the ground that Colonel Noyes unlawfully reviewed his personnel security file in violation of the Act. The district court, Judge Thomas P. Jackson, granted the government's motion for summary judgment and declared moot Bigelow's motion for discovery pursuant to Rule 56(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Privacy Act generally prohibits government agencies from disclosing personnel files. To this general prohibition there are several exceptions, one of which is the "need-to-know" provision of s 552a(b)(1). The Defense Department assures us, through a brief filed on its behalf by the United States Attorney, and through a sworn declaration of Colonel Noyes, that Noyes's duties entailed examining Bigelow's personnel security file because Bigelow was under his supervision. We believe the Department's regulations support this position.
At the Pentagon, "personnel security investigative reports" may be revealed only to "those designated DoD officials who require access in connection with specifically assigned person- nel duties, or other activities specifically identified under the provisions of s 154.65." 32 C.F.R. s 154.67. The activities mentioned in s 154.65 include "determining eligibility of DoD military and civilian personnel ... [for] assignment or reten- tion in sensitive duties." 32 C.F.R. s 154.65. Major Bigelow had "access to the Nation's most sensitive secrets." Amend- ed Complaint p 45. Did Colonel Noyes have a continuing duty to determine whether Major Bigelow should be retained in his sensitive duties on the Joint Chiefs of Staff? According to s 154.60(a) of the regulations, the answer is yes. An "individual's trustworthiness is a matter of continuing assess- ment," and the "responsibility for such assessment must be shared by the organizational commander or manager, [and] the individual's supervisor...." 32 C.F.R. s 154.60(a).
derogatory information is not listed. We think his line of reasoning misses the point of the need-to-know exemption in the Privacy Act. Section 552a(b)(1) does not require an agency to list those of its officers eligible to look at protected records, nor does it demand that an agency official be specifi- cally assigned to examining records. What must be deter- mined--and what Judge Tatel does not confront--is whether the official examined the record in connection with the perfor- mance of duties assigned to him and whether he had to do so in order to perform those duties properly. See Pippinger v. Rubin, 129 F.3d 519, 529-30 (10th Cir. 1997); Hernandez v. Alexander, 671 F.2d 402, 410 (10th Cir. 1982). Colonel Noyes reviewed Major Bigelow's file in connection with his continu- ing duty to make sure that the major was worthy of trust; and he had a need to examine the file in view of the doubts that had been raised in his mind about Bigelow and Bigelow's access to the country's top secrets. See Britt v. Naval Investigative Service, 886 F.2d 544, 549 n.2 (3d Cir. 1989) (dictum). Given these circumstances it is an overstatement to suppose, as our dissenting colleague does, that our decision "has dramatically expanded the number of people" within the military who may examine personnel files. Dissenting op. at 6. There may be many people in the military who have access to the nation's most important secrets, but we doubt that their supervisors regularly receive information casting doubt on their trustworthiness.
that is the subject of s 154.65 and s 154.67, which we have already cited. It does not relieve supervisors of their duty, spelled out in s 154.60(a), to assess continually the reliability and loyalty of those working under them. While s 154.55(b) does require the reporting of "derogatory information" to the commander forthwith, it contemplates that such information will first be "developed" or will become "available." 32 C.F.R. s 154.55(b). Here Colonel Noyes developed such information and when he reported it to the Air Force, as he attests in his affidavit, he presumably acted in accordance with s 154.55(b).
*3 (finding deference unwarranted given "the flip-flops [in] the Secretary's position.... [and] litigation counsel's simulta- neous advocacy of several different positions"). The Depart- ment's interpretation of the regulations is therefore entitled to weight.
Tatel, Circuit Judge, dissenting: To maintain national security, Department of Defense employees whose official duties require access to classified information undergo exten- sive, very personal background investigations. The regulato- ry scheme at issue in this case protects the sensitive informa- tion collected during those investigations and maintained in personnel security files--information about political associa- tions, criminal or dishonest conduct, mental illness, family relationships, financial circumstances, drug and alcohol use, sexual behavior, etc. See 32 C.F.R. s 154.7 & Pt. 154, App. H. Relying on the government's appellate brief in this case, which in turn relies solely on a declaration of the non-policy- making employee whose behavior is the target of this suit, this court interprets the regulations to give access to person- nel files not just to officials specified in the regulation, but to any supervisor anywhere in the Department who doubts an employee's loyalty. Because there is more than ample "rea- son to suspect" that this counterintuitive interpretation of the regulation represents a convenient litigating position rather than the "fair and considered judgment" of the Secretary of Defense or any other official with policy-making responsibili- ty, Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462 (1997), Supreme Court and circuit precedent preclude us from deferring to it. See, e.g., Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hospital, 488 U.S. 204, 213 (1988); Akzo Nobel Salt v. FMSHRC, 212 F.3d 1301, No. 99-1370, 2000 WL 639933 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
In recognition of the sensitivity of personnel security reports and records, particularly with regard to individu- al privacy, it is Department of Defense policy that such personal information be handled with the highest degree of discretion. Access to such information shall be afford- ed only for the purposes cited herein and only to persons whose official duties require such information. 32 C.F.R. s 154.65. To protect the privacy of personnel security files, the regulation requires them to be stored only in approved locked cabinets, vaults, or safes; transmitted only in sealed double envelopes bearing a special restricted access notation; and reproduced only to the minimum extent necessary. See id. s 154.68. Information contained in these files may not be made available without the consent of the subject except to those personnel who have an official need for the information, and then only for specified limited pur- poses: "determining eligibility ... for access to classified information, assignment or retention in sensitive duties, ... or for law enforcement and counterintelligence investiga- tions." Id. s 154.65. Commanders and security officers who have "specifically assigned personnel security duties" may access the files. Id. s 154.67(b). But "[r]ank, position, or title alone do not authorize access to personal information about others. An official need for the information must exist before disclosure." Id. s 310.41(a)(2).
Citing section 154.60 of the regulations, my colleagues conclude that Noyes had an "official need" for access to Bigelow's file because "[a]n 'individual's trustworthiness is a matter of continuing assessment,' and the 'responsibility for such assessment must be shared by the organizational com- mander or manager, [and] the individual's supervisor' "--in this case, Noyes. Maj. Op. at 3 (quoting 32 C.F.R. s 154.60(a)). Although I agree with my colleagues that the regulations impose on supervisors a "shared" duty to assess the trustworthiness of those they supervise, I do not agree that this duty gives supervisors a per se "official need"-- indeed duty--to go through security files. The regulations protect the privacy of personnel security files by providing access only to certain specified officials (commanders and security officers) and by requiring that supervisors like Noyes report their concerns to the Defense Investigative Service for further investigation. 32 C.F.R. s 154.60(c)(3). Of course, had the Secretary of Defense, exercising his au- thority to interpret Department regulations, interpreted "shared" responsibility to mean that supervisors are "desig- nated DoD officials who require access in connection with specifically assigned personnel duties" within the meaning of section 154.67, I would defer to that interpretation. See Buffalo Crushed Stone v. Surface Transp. Bd., 194 F.3d 125, 128 (D.C. Cir. 1999) ("Where the meaning of regulatory language is not free from doubt, we will defer to the agency's interpretation so long as it sensibly conforms to the purpose and wording of the regulations.") (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). But neither the Secretary nor any other policy-making official has so interpreted the regulation.
Secretary's interpretation in Auer because, unlike in Bowen, it was "in no sense a post hoc rationalization advanced by an agency seeking to defend past agency action against attack," but instead "reflect[ed] the agency's fair and considered judgment on the question." Auer, 519 U.S. at 462 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). See also Martin v. OSHRC, 499 U.S. 144, 156 (1991) ("Our decisions indicate that agency litigating positions are not entitled to deference when they are merely appellate counsel's post hoc rationalizations for agency action, advanced for the first time in the reviewing court.") (internal quotation marks omitted); Akzo Nobel Salt, 212 F.3d at ----, 2000 WL 639933 at *3 ("[C]ourts ... defer to agency interpretations of ambiguous regulations first put forward in the course of litigation, but only where they 'reflect the agency's fair and considered judgment on the matter in question.' ") (quoting Auer, 519 U.S. at 462). This insistence that an agency exercise its "fair and considered judgment" stems from two concerns: "First, appellate coun- sel's interpretation may not reflect the views of the agency itself. Second, it is likely that 'a position established only in litigation may have been developed hastily, or under special pressure,' and is not the result of the agency's deliberative processes." National Wildlife Fed'n v. Browner, 127 F.3d 1126, 1129 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (quoting FLRA v. United States Dept. of Treasury, 884 F.2d 1446, 1455 (D.C. Cir. 1989)). Thus, we may defer to an agency's litigating position if, for instance, it merely "articulate[s] an explanation of longstand- ing agency practice," Akzo Nobel Salt, 212 F.3d at ----, 2000 WL 639933 at *3 (citing Association of Bituminous Contrac- tors, Inc. v. Apfel, 156 F.3d 1246, 1252 (D.C. Cir. 1998)), or if the Secretary explicitly adopts the position expressed in the brief, see FLRA, 884 F.2d at 1455, but not where the record "strongly suggests to us that the Secretary has in fact never grappled with--and thus never exercised her judgment over--the conundrum posed by the regulation's clear ambigu- ity." Akzo Nobel Salt, 212 F.3d at ----, 2000 WL 639933 at *3.
[this] regulation's clear ambiguity": whether all supervisors have a per se duty to review the personnel security files of employees they supervise. Id. The government's brief cites only one source in support of its interpretation of the regula- tion: a declaration prepared for this litigation by Noyes. Nothing in the record, however, demonstrates that Noyes has authority to make policy for the Department. See Paralyzed Veterans of America v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579, 587 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ("A speech of a mid-level official of an agency ... is not the sort of 'fair and considered judgment' that can be thought of as an authoritative departmental position.") (quoting Auer, 519 U.S. at 462). Indeed, the statement in Noyes's declaration cited in the brief--"I had an official need to know the information in the personnel security file of any employee under my supervision in order to protect the inter- ests of national security"--does not purport to set agency policy. It represents only Noyes's view about why he thought he had authority to search Bigelow's file. Noyes, moreover, is the alleged wrongdoer in this case, the person with the greatest incentive to defend his past "action[s] against attack." Auer, 519 U.S. at 462.
1129. Defense Department lawyers, moreover, neither signed the brief nor appear of counsel, as agency lawyers often do in our cases. See FLRA, 884 F.2d at 1455 (deferring to agency interpretation in brief because "Ms. Horner, the agency head, has explicitly adopted the view of the amicus brief. There is no risk that counsel may have acted as mavericks disembodied from the agency that they repre- sent.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
It misses the point to say that "we have been pointed to no past practices or pronouncements that are inconsistent with the Defense Department's current interpretation." Maj. Op. at 5. The point is that we have good "reason to suspect that this interpretation does not reflect the agency's fair and considered judgment" (Auer's words) and is nothing more than the position of the U.S. Attorney and the two AUSAs who signed the brief. As the Supreme Court observed in a similar situation where counsel "rationalized the basis of [a regulation] with great professional competence.... this is hardly tantamount to an administrative interpretation of [the relevant statutory provisions].... Congress has delegated to the administrative official and not to appellate counsel the responsibility for elaborating and enforcing statutory com- mands." Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 628 (1971). And as we said in City of Kansas City, Missouri v. HUD, 923 F.2d 188, 192 (D.C. Cir. 1991), "[i]n whatever context we defer to agencies, we do so with the understanding that the object of our deference is the result of agency decisionmaking, and not some post hoc rationale developed as part of a litigation strategy."
tion an interpretation, it can only change that interpretation as it would formally modify the regulation itself: through the process of notice and comment rulemaking."). I respectfully dissent.

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