Source: http://courts.mrsc.org/supreme/113wn2d/113wn2d0154.htm
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 00:42:58+00:00

Document:
Appeal - Findings of Fact - Review - Substantial Evidence - What Constitutes. Findings of fact will be upheld on review if they are supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is evidence sufficient to persuade a fair-minded person of the truth of the matter.
 New Trial - Review - Discretion of Court - Factual Issues. A grant of a new trial pursuant to CR 59 based upon issues of fact is reviewed only for an abuse of discretion.
 Jury - Selection - Examination - False Answer - Remedy - New Trial. A juror's false answer on a material matter during voir dire examination constitutes an irregularity affecting the parties' substantial rights and prevents the intelligent exercise of a party's right to challenge a juror. The grant of a new trial is an appropriate remedy in such a case.
 Jury - Selection - Examination - False Answer - Proof - Juror Affidavit. An affidavit of a juror is admissible to prove that a different juror provided false information during voir dire examination.
 Damages - Review - Increase - Range of Evidence. Under RCW 4.76.030, a court has no discretion to order additur if the amount of damages awarded by the jury is within the range of the credible evidence.
NATURE OF ACTION: A customer injured in a grocery store sought damages for negligence.
Superior Court: After the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, the Superior Court for King County, No. 84-2-14349 5, Anthony P. Wartnik, J., on May 14, 1987, ordered additur or, alternatively, a new trial limited to the issue of damages.
Court of Appeals: In an unpublished opinion noted at 52 Wn. App. 1051, the court REVERSED the trial court's order and REINSTATED the verdict.
Supreme Court: Holding that the verdict was within the range of the evidence but that juror misconduct and bias warranted a new trial, the court AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals insofar as it reversed the order of additur, REVERSES the decision of the Court of Appeals insofar as it reversed the order of a new trial, and REMANDS the case for a new trial on the issue of damages.
COUNSEL: LEVINSON, FRIEDMAN, VHUGEN, DUGGAN, BLAND & HOROWITZ, by DAVID W. SOUKUP and CHARLES R. JONES, for petitioner.
DAVID C. PEARSON (of MADDEN & CROCKETT), for respondent.
MAJORITY OPINION: Petitioner, Marie N. Robinson, brought this negligence action for injuries she sustained at a Safeway grocery store located in Seattle, Washington. The jury returned a verdict in her favor in the amount of $9,278.31. The trial court, finding juror misconduct, ordered additur or, in the alternative, a new trial on the issue of damages. The Court of Appeals reversed, remanding the case to the trial court with instructions to reinstate the jury's original verdict. This court granted review.
At issue is whether the trial court abused its discretion in ordering additur or, in the alternative, a new trial based on juror misconduct and bias. We hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering a new trial; thus, we reverse the Court of Appeals in part and remand, ordering the modified reinstatement of the trial court's order.
On May 28, 1983, Marie Robinson was a patron at a Seattle Safeway grocery store. While reaching into a refrigeration unit, she was struck in the head and back by a small, metal, product display rack that fell when she brushed against it.
prejudice for him. He responded that there was not.
jury questionnaire that he had been a party to a lawsuit.
can get money from," that "Californians are sue happy,"
from California, they sue all the time."
Well, the other person had the right-of-way and was speeding.
to the plaintiff on appropriate voir dire examination.
of damages in this case.
based on the evidence presented herein.
Thus, there are two grounds upon which the court based its order of new trial: the misconduct of a juror, as articulated in findings 1 through 5; and the inadequacy of the jury's verdict, as articulated in findings 6 through 9. Based on these findings, the trial court entered an order increasing the award of damages to $27,000 or, in the alternative, a new trial on the issue of damages.
The Court of Appeals reversed, holding the record does not establish the jury foreman dishonestly answered the questions posed during voir dire. On this issue we reverse.
of the truth of the declared premise. (Citations omitted.) HOLLAND v. BOEING CO., 90 Wn.2d 384, 390 91, 583 P.2d 621 (1978). We hold the trial court's finding that the foreman of the jury failed to disclose his prior involvement as a defendant in a suit brought by a California resident is supported by substantial evidence. The record further supports the court's finding that the foreman made numerous remarks regarding his perception of the "California litigation process", revealing the foreman's bias.
from having a fair trial.
(2) Misconduct of prevailing party or jury . . .
COLEMAN v. GEORGE, 62 Wn.2d 840, 841, 384 P.2d 871 (1963).
NELSON v. PLACANICA, 33 Wn.2d 523, 528-29, 206 P.2d 296 (1949).
Robinson contends she was deprived of her right to a trial by an impartial jury when the foreman failed to disclose his bias toward California residents, particularly his perception of their role in the legal process. Robinson's argument is well taken. "The right to trial by jury includes the right to an unbiased and unprejudiced jury. A trial by a jury, one or more of whose members are biased or prejudiced, is not a constitutional trial." ALLISON v. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR & INDUS., 66 Wn.2d 263, 265, 401 P.2d 982 (1965).
A juror's misrepresentation or failure to speak when called upon during voir dire regarding a material fact constitutes an irregularity affecting substantial rights of the parties. When the failure to respond in voir dire relates to a material question, the appropriate remedy is to grant a new trial. GORDON v. DEER PARK SCH. DIST. 414, 71 Wn.2d 119, 122, 426 P.2d 824 (1967).
a litigant's constitutional right of trial by jury.
a juror for cause or to exercise a peremptory challenge.
voir dire examination. . . .
and adequate opportunity to challenge the juror . . .
trial by jury is to grant a new trial.
SMITH v. KENT, 11 Wn. App. at 441, 443-45.
 Nevertheless, Safeway contends it is an invasion of the deliberative process to rely upon the affidavits of the jurors to subsequently challenge the verdict. However, such an argument fails to distinguish between relying upon a juror's affidavit for the purpose of establishing juror misconduct and relying upon a juror's affidavit to subsequently contest the thought processes involved in reaching a verdict. Only the former is permissible. HENDRICKSON v. KONOPASKI, 14 Wn. App. 390, 393, 541 P.2d 1001 (1975).
In ALLISON v. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR & INDUS., SUPRA, this court held it was proper to rely upon the affidavit of a juror to establish that another juror had provided false information on voir dire. Reliance upon the juror's affidavit is not violative of the deliberative process, as the information does not inhere in the jury's verdict. ACCORD, GARDNER v. MALONE, 60 Wn.2d 836, 841, 376 P.2d 651, 379 P.2d 918 (1962); BYERLY v. MADSEN, 41 Wn. App. 495, 499-500, 704 P.2d 1236, REVIEW DENIED, 104 Wn.2d 1021 (1985).
Thus, we reverse the Court of Appeals on this issue and affirm the trial court's ruling that Robinson was denied a fair trial as to damages as the result of juror bias and misconduct.
In a de novo review of the record, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's order granting additur, holding the jury verdict was not so inadequate as to indicate passion or prejudice.
 It is apparent from this provision the determinative factor in awarding additur is not merely the existence of jury passion or prejudice. For, if that were the case, the existence of juror misconduct and bias, as discussed above, would leave the trial court free to fashion its remedy according to its own sense of justice regardless of whether that misconduct affected the verdict. Such a practice would ignore our reverence for the verdict of the jury. Under the statutory scheme, to justify an award of additur, as distinguished from an award of a new trial under CR 59, the verdict ON ITS FACE must be so inadequate as to unmistakably indicate the amount was the result of passion or prejudice.
In an instance where the jury verdict is within the range of credible evidence, the trial court has no discretion to find passion or prejudice affected the verdict FOR THE PURPOSE OF ORDERING ADDITUR. JAMES v. ROBECK, 79 Wn.2d 864, 490 P.2d 878 (1971); HENDRICKSON v. KONOPASKI, SUPRA.
In considering the extent of Robinson's injuries, the jury's award is within the range of credible evidence. The expert medical testimony of Dr. McDermott, if believed, established that Robinson's current symptoms and many of her medical bills were not related to the accident at issue. Thus, it cannot be said the jury's verdict is "so inadequate as unmistakably to indicate that the amount of the verdict must have been the result of . . . prejudice." Therefore, the Court of Appeals did not err in reversing the trial court's order of additur.
Accordingly, the unpublished opinion of the Court of Appeals is reversed in part, and affirmed in part, and this case is remanded for a new trial as to damages.
CONCURRING JUDGES: Callow, C.J., and Utter, Brachtenbach, Dolliver, Dore, Andersen, Durham, and Smith, JJ., concur.
POST-OPINION INFORMATION: Reconsideration denied October 4, 1989.

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.