Source: https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/364/454/
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 08:17:02+00:00

Document:
So far as relevant to our problem, the provisions of § 216(d) quoted are the same as those in § 3(1) of the Act, 49 U.S.C. 3(1), 49 U.S.C.A. § 3(1), except that the latter refers to railroads as defined in Part I of the Act instead of motor carriers as defined in Part II. Section 3(1) was the basis for this Court's holding in Henderson v. United States, supra, that it was an 'undue or unreasonable prejudice' under that section for a railroad to divide its dining car by curtains, partitions and signs in order to separate passengers according to race. The Court said that under § 3(1) '(w)here a dining car is available to passengers holding tickets entitling them to use it, each such passenger is equally entitled to its facilities in accordance with reasonable regulations.' Id., 339 U.S. at page 824, 70 S.Ct. at page 847. The Henderson case largely rested on Mitchell v. United States, supra, which pointed out that while the railroads might not be reguired by law to furnish dining car facilities, yet if they did, substantial equality of treatment of persons traveling under like conditions could not be refused consistently with § 3(1). It is also of relevance that both cases upset Interstate Commerce Commission holdings, the Court stating in Mitchell that since the 'discrimination shown was palpably unjust and forbidden by the Act' no room was left for administrative or expert judgment with reference to practical difficulties. Id., 313 U.S. at page 97, 61 S.Ct. at page 878.
Respondent correctly points out, however, that whatever may be the facts, the evidence in this record does not show that the bus company owns or actively operates or directly controls the bus terminal or the restaurant in it. But the fact that § 203(a)(19) says that the protections of the motor carrier provisions of the Act extend to 'include' facilities so operated or controlled by no means should be interpreted to exempt motor carriers from their statutory duty under § 216(d) not to discriminate should they choose to provide their interstate passengers with services that are an integral part of transportation through the use of facilities they neither own, control nor operate. The protections afforded by the Act against discriminatory transportation services are not so narrowly limited. We have held that a railroad cannot escape its statutory duty to treat its shippers alike either by use of facilities it does not own or by contractual arrangement with the owner of those facilities. United States v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., supra. And so here, without regard to contracts, if the bus carrier has volunteered to make terminal and restaurant facilities and services available to its interstate passengers as a regular part of their transportation, and the terminal and restaurant have acquiesced and cooperated in this undertaking, the terminal and restaurant must perform these services without discriminations prohibited by the Act. In the performance of these services under such conditions the terminal and restaurant stand in the place of the bus company in the performance of its transportation obligations. Cf. Derrington v. Plummer, 240 F.2d 922, 925926, certiorari denied, 353 U.S. 924, 77 S.Ct. 680, 1 L.Ed.2d 719. Although the courts below made no findings of fact, we think the evidence in this case shows such a relationship and situation here.
All of these things show that this terminal building, with its grounds, constituted one project for a single purpose, and that was to serve passengers of one or more bus companies certainly Trailways' passengers. The restaurant area was specifically designed and built into the structure from the beginning to fill the needs of bus passengers in this 'up-to-date, modern bus terminal.' Whoever may have had technical title or immediate control of the details of the various activities in the terminal, such as waiting-room seating, furnishing of schedule information, ticket sales, and restaurant service, they were all geared to the service of bus companies and their passengers, even though local people who might happen to come into the terminal or its restaurant might also be accommodated. Thus we have a well-coordinated and smoothly functioning plan for continuous cooperative transportation services between the terminal, the restaurant and buses like Trailways that made stopovers there. All of this evidence plus Trailways' use on this occasion shows that Trailways was not utilizing the terminal and restaurant services merely on a sporadic or occasional basis. This bus terminal plainly was just as essential and necessary, and as available for that matter, to passengers and carriers like Trailways that used it, as though such carriers had legal title and complete control over all of its activities. 3 Interstate passengers have to eat, and the very terms of the lease of the built-in restaurant space in this terminal constitute a recognition of the essential need of interstate passengers to be able to get food conveniently on their journey and an undertaking by the restaurant to fulfill that need. Such passengers in transit on a paid interstate Trailways journey had a right to expect that this essential 4 transportation food service voluntarily provided for them under such circumstances would be rendered without discrimination prohibited by the Interstate Commerce Act. Under the circumstances of this case, therefore, petitioner had a federal right to remain in the white portion of the restaurant. He was there under 'authority of law'the Interstate Commerce Actand it was error for the Supreme Court of Virginia to affirm his conviction.
Neither in the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia nor in his petition for certiorari or in his brief on the merits in this Court did petitioner challenge the judgment on the ground that it was obtained in violation of the Interstate Commerce Act. I therefore respectfully submit that, under our rules and decisions, no such question is presented or open for consideration here. 1 But even if the Court properly may proceed, as it has proceeded, to decide the case under that Act, and not at all on the constitutional grounds solely relied on by petitioner, 2 I must say, with all deference, that the facts in this record do not show that petitioner was convicted of trespass in violation of that Act.
If the facts in this record could fairly be said to show that the restaurant was a facility 'operated or controlled by any (motor) carrier or carriers, and used in the transportation of passengers or property in interstate or foreign commerce,' § 203(a)(19) of Part II of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. 303(a)(19), 49 U.S.C.A. § 303(a)(19); I would agree that petitioner had a legal right to remain in and to insist on service by that restaurant and, hence, was not guilty of trespass in so remaining and insisting though in defiance of the manager's order to leave, for § 216(d) of the Act, 49 U.S.C. 316(d), 49 U.S.C.A. § 316(d), makes it unlawful for a motor carrier while engaged in interstate commerce 'to subject any particular person * * * to any unjust discrimination,' and this Court has held that any discrimination by a carrier against its interstate passenger on account of his color in the use of its dining facilities is an unjust discrimination. Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816, 70 S.Ct. 843, 94 L.Ed. 1302. Cf. Mitchell v. United States, 313 U.S. 80, 61 S.Ct. 873, 85 L.Ed. 1201.
There is not a word of evidence that any carrier had any interest in or control over the lessee or its restaurant. Nor is there any suggestion in the record that the lease or the lessee's restaurant operations under it were anything other than bona fide and for a legitimate and private business purpose. Indeed, there is not a word of evidence in the record tending to show that any carrier even had any interest in or control over the lessor corporation that owned the building. In truth, the record does not even show the name of the carrier on which petitioner was traveling or identify it other than as 'Trailways.' 5 On the other hand, the assistant manager of the restaurant testified, without suggestion of contradiction, that '(t)he company that operates the restaurant is not affiliated in any way with the bus company,' and that '(t)he bus company has no control over the operation of the restaurant.' There was simply no evidence to the contrary.
For these reasons, I cannot agree on this record that petitioner's conviction of trespass under § 18225 of the Code of Virginia was had in violation of the Interstate Commerce Act. Since the Court's opinion does not explore the constitutional grounds relied on by petitioner, I refrain from intimating any views on those subjects.
See National Association for the Advancement of Colored People v. St. Louis-S.F.R. Co., 297 I.C.C. 335, 347348, in which the Interstate Commerce Commission held that a railroad terminal discriminates in violation of § 3(1) if it maintains waiting rooms for the exclusive use of Negroes. The Commission regarded assignment to accommodations or facilities in a railroad terminal solely on the basis of race as an implication of inherent inferiority and found it to be unreasonable.
Because the evidence shows that this terminal restaurant was utilized as an integral part of the transportation of interstate passengers, we need not decide whether discrimination on the basis of color by a bus terminal lessee restaurant would violate § 216(d) in the absence of such circumstances. Cf. National Association for the Advancement of Colored People v. St. Louis-S.F.R. Co., supra, at 343344.
Obviously recognizing these glaring deficiencies in the evidence, counsel for petitioner and for the Government, as amicus curiae, have submitted with their briefs in this Court copies of certain Annual Reports of Virginia Stage Lines, Inc. (which probably was the carrier on which petitioner was traveling), Carolina Coach Company, and of Trailways Bus Terminal, Inc. (the owner of the building and lessor of the space occupied by the lessee's restaurant), to the State Corporation Commission of Virginia, purporting to show that those companies were doing business in Virginia in 1958 and 1959, and a copy of certain pages of the Annual Report filed by Virginia Stage Lines, Inc., with the Interstate Commerce Commission for the year 1959, purporting to show that the capital stock of Trailways Bus Terminal, Inc., was owned in equal parts by Virginia Stage Lines, Inc., and Carolina Coach Company. But none of those documents was put in evidence nor brought to the attention of the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, and it appears, as contended by Virginia, that the Virginia court could not take judicial notice of those documents. See §§ 8264 and 8266 of the Code of Virginia; Commonwealth v. Castner, 138 Va. 81, 121 S.E. 894; Sisk v. Town of Shenandoah, 200 Va. 277, 105 S.E.2d 169; Bell v. Hagmann, 200 Va. 626, 107 S.E.2d 426. In the light of these facts the proffered documents cannot be considered here. Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S. 339, 354, 78 S.Ct. 311, 320, 2 L.Ed.2d 321; Wolfe v. North Carolina, 364 U.S. 177, 80 S.Ct. 1482, 4 L.Ed.2d 1650. But even if those documents could be considered here, they would not aid petitioner, for they do not purport to show that any carrier had any interest in or control over the restaurant involved or in or over Bus Terminal Restaurant of Richmond, the company that owned and operated the restaurant.
The Richmond Terminal Railway Company was controlled jointly by two railroadsthe Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac Railway Co. and the Atlantic Coast Line.

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