Source: https://caselaw.lexroll.com/2019/03/31/sweetwater-union-high-school-district-v-gilbane-building-company-no-s233526-cal-2-28-2019/
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 06:22:58+00:00

Document:
Justice Corrigan authored the opinion of the court, in which Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Chin, Liu, Cuéllar, Kruger, and Manella concurred.
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.
The narrow question here is what kind of evidence a court may consider in ruling on a pretrial anti-SLAPP motion in determining a plaintiff’s probability of success. The inquiry has two aspects. One addresses the form in which the evidence is produced in connection with the motion. The other evaluates whether that evidence will be admissible at an eventual trial. We conclude the evidence produced by plaintiff Sweetwater Union High School District (the District) was properly considered and affirm the Court of Appeal’s judgment.
In November 2006, voters approved Proposition O, a bond measure to fund capital improvements in the District. The District solicited bids to manage various construction projects funded by the measure. It received seven proposals, including a joint submission from defendants Gilbane Building Company (Gilbane), The Seville Group, Inc. (SGI), and Gilbane/SGI, a joint venture (the Joint Venture). A screening committee selected three finalists. The final review committee, consisting of School Superintendent Jesus Gandara and three others, selected defendants’ proposal as the winning bid. Gandara was authorized to negotiate a contract. The District board ultimately approved several contracts with defendants to manage projects arising from Proposition O and a previous measure.
The District sued to void the contracts and secure disgorgement of funds already paid. It alleged that Amigable, Flores, and others gave meals, vacations, and event tickets to Gandara, board members and their families and friends. (See Gov. Code, §§ 1090, 1092, subd. (a).) It also alleged contributions were made to various campaigns, charities, and events on the officials’ behalf. The conduct allegedly occurred both before the passage of Proposition O and during the bidding and approval process.
Gilbane and the Joint Venture brought a special motion to strike under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (the SLAPP Act). Defendants urged the complaint stemmed from constitutionally protected political expression. The District’s response relied on evidence of the various guilty and no contest pleas. Each plea form incorporated a written factual narrative attested to under penalty of perjury. Amigable’s narrative stated: “I provided gifts, meals and tickets to entertainment events directly to [Superintendent Gandara and board members Sandoval, Ricasa, and Quinones]. I provided the meals, tickets and gifts upon my initiative as sanctioned and encouraged by my employers. I also provided meals, tickets and gifts at the request of the elected board members and the Superintend[e]nt. The meals, tickets and gifts were made on behalf of my employers with the intent to influence the board’s decisions in granting construction contracts from the Sweetwater Union High School District to the firms for which I was working. My expenses were generated with the endorsement of my employers and they were reimbursed to me by my employers. At no time did the elected board members or Superintend[e]nt reimburse me or my employers for the meals, tickets or gifts I gave them on behalf of my employers.” Flores’s narrative included a similar statement. Ricasa’s statement read in part: “In 2009, I was an elected School Board Member for the Sweetwater Union High School District. I accepted gifts from Rene Flores (SGI) in 2009 with a value of $2,099 and I did not report them. . . . Rene Flores provided these gifts with the intent to influence my vote on business awarded to Seville Group, Inc.” Quinones’s statement said that she “accepted gifts from Henry Amigable in 2007 with a total value in excess of $500.00 and I did not report them” and that “Henry Amigable provided these gifts with the intent to influence my vote on business awarded to Gilbane, his employer.” Both Sandoval’s and Gandara’s statements indicated that they received gifts from Amigable and Flores “with a total value of more than” $2,770 (Sandoval) and $4,500 (Gandara) and failed to report them. They acknowledged these gifts were provided “to influence my vote on business awarded to” defendants.
The District also relied on excerpts from the grand jury testimony of several witnesses, including Amigable and Flores, who described their conduct in providing meals and tickets to plaintiff’s officers. The court overruled defendants’ evidentiary objections and denied their special motion to strike. The Court of Appeal affirmed.
However, statutes allowing consideration of some statements in resolving pretrial motions provide an exception to the hearsay rule for purposes of the motion. (See Elkins v. Superior Court (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1337, 1355; § 2009.) Elkins emphasized that “[a]lthough affidavits or declarations are authorized in certain motion matters under Code of Civil Procedure section 2009, this statute does not authorize their admission at a contested trial leading to judgment.” (Elkins, at p. 1355.) Although affidavits and declarations constitute hearsay when offered for the truth of their content, section 425.16, subdivision (b)(2) permits their consideration in ruling on a pretrial anti-SLAPP motion. In connection with the form of the declaration, then, defendants’ hearsay objection fails. These declarations may be considered, not because they satisfy some other hearsay exception, but because they qualify as declarations or their equivalent under section 2015.5, and can be considered under section 425.16.
The change of plea forms may constitute declarations under section 2015.5 if signed under penalty of perjury. (See Kulshrestha, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 606.) “[C]ourts have made clear that a declaration is defective under section 2015.5 absent an express facial link to California or its perjury laws.” (Id. at p. 612; see People v. Bryant (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 1457, 1470.) The Court of Appeal below concluded that “[e]ach plea form submitted by Sweetwater with respect to the anti-SLAPP motion meets the requirements set forth in section 2015.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Specifically, each individual who signed and dated a plea form attested to the truth of the contents . . . under penalty of perjury under the laws of California.” Accordingly, the change of plea forms and the incorporated factual narratives qualify as declarations the court may consider in determining plaintiffs’ likelihood of success.
The excerpts of the grand jury testimony, however, require a different analysis. Although testimony before the grand jury is given under oath, a transcript of that testimony is not a “written declaration under oath.” (§ 2003.) Rather, a transcript is a written memorialization of an oral examination under oath. (See § 2005 [defining “oral examination”].) Likewise, a transcript of testimony is not a declaration under section 2015.5 because it is not “subscribed by” the testifying witness.
This analysis is sound. The statutory scheme already permits consideration of affidavit equivalents. (§ 2015.5.) As Kulshrestha noted, the important aspect of such evidence is that it be made under penalty of California’s perjury laws. (See Kulshrestha, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 610-618.) Sworn testimony made before a grand jury obviously is made under penalty of perjury. (Cf. People v. Snyder (1958) 50 Cal.2d 190, 192.) As Williams and the Court of Appeal reasoned, a transcript of this testimony is the equivalent of a testifying witness’s declaration under penalty of perjury, assuming the authenticity of the transcript can be established. Defendants here do not contest authenticity.
It would not serve the purposes of the SLAPP Act to preclude consideration of testimony made under oath. This sworn testimony is at least as reliable as an affidavit or declaration. An anti-SLAPP motion is filed early in the case, usually within 60 days of service of the complaint. (§ 425.16, subd. (f).) Discovery is stayed once the motion is filed. (§ 425.16, subd. (g).) Under these circumstances, it may not be practicable for a plaintiff to obtain declarations from various witnesses, particularly those associated with the defense. Further, under the present circumstances, even if declarations were obtained, they would have added little to the evidence already in plaintiff’s possession. It seems doubtful that the Legislature contemplated dismissal of a potentially meritorious suit for want of declarations largely duplicating available evidence.
Relying on Gatton, defendants argue that a witness testifying in a different case may not have been cross-examined with the same motive as the parties here. Their reliance is misplaced. The former testimony exception is not the correct lens through which to examine this question. When satisfied, the former testimony exception permits admissibility at trial because the earlier opportunity for cross-examination ensures sufficient reliability. (See People v. Gonzales (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1234, 1262.) In the anti-SLAPP motion context, however, reliability stems from the oath-taking procedures required for affidavits, or the execution under penalty of California perjury laws required by declarations. (Cf. Kulshrestha, supra, 33 Cal.4th 601, 606.) Indeed, even affidavits or declarations produced specifically for this case would not be subject to cross-examination. Yet, the statutory scheme clearly contemplates that courts may consider them.
Defendants further suggest that use of statements from a different case should not be allowed because “[n]o showing need be made that the declarant is available or unavailable, alive or dead, competent or demented.” Defendants misunderstand the role of these statements in a second step anti-SLAPP procedure. As we explain in detail below (see post, at pp. 15-21), the affidavit or declaration is offered to demonstrate that admissible evidence exists to prove plaintiff’s claims. The statements must reflect that they were made by competent witnesses with personal knowledge of the facts they swear to be true. A transcript of a witness’s testimony under oath before a grand jury would serve to establish personal knowledge and competence in the same manner that an affidavit or declaration could.
There are important differences between the two schemes. Chief among them is that an anti-SLAPP motion is filed much earlier and before discovery. However, to the extent both schemes are designed to determine whether a suit should be allowed to move forward, both schemes should require a showing based on evidence potentially admissible at trial presented in the proper form. The grand jury transcripts at issue here satisfy this requirement.
Thus, in determining a plaintiff’s probability of success, the court may consider statements that are the equivalent of affidavits and declarations because they were made under oath or penalty of perjury in California. Here, the change of plea forms, factual narratives, and the excerpts from the grand jury testimony satisfy this requirement. That conclusion does not end the inquiry.
Defendants return to their reliance on the former testimony hearsay exception. (Evid. Code, § 1292.) That exception requires the declarant be unavailable as a witness, and “[t]he issue is such that the party to the action or proceeding in which the former testimony was given had the right and opportunity to cross–examine the declarant with an interest and motive similar to that which the party against whom the testimony is offered has at the hearing.” (Evid. Code, § 1292, subd. (a)(3).) Defendants contend, unless this showing is definitively made at the hearing, a court may not consider the statements in determining the probability of success. The argument runs ahead of itself and accordingly fails. As explained below, evidence may be considered at the anti-SLAPP motion stage if it is reasonably possible the evidence set out in supporting affidavits, declarations or their equivalent will be admissible at trial.
This case, like Fashion 21, describes evidence that is potentially admissible at trial. Here, unlike the facts in Perry, there is no categorical bar to statements contained in the grand jury transcript and plea forms. Indeed, the statements themselves appear to be statements against interest. (Evid. Code, § 1230.) Further, there are no undisputed factual circumstances suggesting the evidence would be inadmissible at trial. In Fashion 21, the videotape at issue could be admitted at trial if properly authenticated. In the videotaped demonstration, “employees and representatives of Fashion 21 . . . along with” others were present (Fashion 21, supra, 117 Cal.App.4th at p. 1145), suggesting there were identifiable witnesses who had personal knowledge of the events. The signers of those documents or other competent witnesses could testify at trial to support the District’s claims. That live testimony would supplant any improper reliance on hearsay. Finally, plaintiff would have the opportunity to satisfy the requirements of any other applicable hearsay exceptions before admission at trial.
In sum, at the second stage of an anti-SLAPP hearing, the court may consider affidavits, declarations, and their equivalents if it is reasonably possible the proffered evidence set out in those statements will be admissible at trial. Conversely, if the evidence relied upon cannot be admitted at trial, because it is categorically barred or undisputed factual circumstances show inadmissibility, the court may not consider it in the face of an objection. If an evidentiary objection is made, the plaintiff may attempt to cure the asserted defect or demonstrate the defect is curable.
The Court of Appeal’s judgment is affirmed.
Dentons US, Charles A. Bird, Christian D. Humphreys and Gary K. Brucker, Jr., for Defendants and Appellants.

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