Source: https://www.animallaw.info/case/us-v-martinelli
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 16:39:29+00:00

Document:
Country of Origin: United States Court Name: United States District Court for the Northern District of California Primary Citation: 240 F. Supp. 365 (N.D. Cal. 1965) Date of Decision: Monday, April 12, 1965 Judge Name: Carter Jurisdiction Level: Federal Judges: OLIVER J. CARTER Attorneys: Cecil Poole, U.S. Atty., Jerrold M. Ladar, Asst. U.S. Atty., San Francisco, Cal., for plaintiff. Bagshaw, Martinelli, Weissich & Jordan, A. E. Bagshaw, San Rafael, Cal., for defendant.
Court held the 1962 version of the BGEPA mandates a jury trial where defendant requests one, despite the fact it constitutes a "petty offense." For further discussion of criminal prosecutions under the BGEPA, see Detailed Discussion of Eagle Act.
The defendant in an information filed by the United States Attorney has been charged with the violation of Title 16 U.S.C. § 668 [FN1] for unlawfully taking a bald eagle and a golden eagle. He has entered a plea of not guilty, and has demanded a jury trial. The government moves to quash his motion for a jury trial.
Both parties further agree that even though a jury trial is not required as a matter of constitutional right Congress has the power to grant or deny the right of jury trial in cases involving petty offenses. The question therefore is not whether a jury trial upon demand of the defendant is constitutionally required, but whether a jury trial is required upon the demand of the defendant under relevant congressional statutes and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. It is in this area of statutory and rule construction that the parties have their disagreement. It is the government's contention that the statutory and rule scheme of procedure in the trial of petty offenses precludes a jury trial, whereas the defendant contends that the scheme of procedure requires a jury trial upon demand of the defendant.
While the defendant contends that the offense charged is not a petty offense, the Court is of the view that this is the type of offense which would fall squarely within the definition of a petty offense, and, if necessary to the decision, the Court would so hold. [FN5] Therefore the Court will treat with this issue as though the offense charged was a petty offense without deciding that issue.
'Persons charged with petty offenses in the national parks may now be tried by a U.S. commissioner specifically designated for that purpose. Persons charged with a similar offense in a national forest or national grassland area must, however, be tried by a U.S. district court because of the provision of section 3401(a) of the Criminal Code limiting the jurisdiction of U.S. commissioners in petty offense cases to areas over which the United States has exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction. Generally, the jurisdiction of the United States over national forests and national grasslands is proprietary rather than exclusive or concurrent.
'Because of the distance and time involved, and the crowded dockets of most U.S. courts, the appearance of a person charged with a petty offense in the national forests or grasslands entails substantial expense and inconvenience both to the person accused and to Forest Service officials. This has very naturally resulted in a reluctance on the part of Forest Service officers to enforce rules and regulations by means stronger than persuasion.' (Emphasis added).
Congress has also provided for a system of summary trial of petty offenses in the District of Columbia. Several of the cited cases in this memorandum discuss that system (United States v. Clawans, supra, and District of Columbia v. Colts, supra), so no further discussion of that system will be made here except to note that when Congress desired to provide for the prosecuting of petty offenses without a jury trial in that district it did so by legislative act.
It appears to the Court that the only conclusion to be drawn from this legislative pattern is that Congress intended that petty offenses should be tried like all other criminal offenses (jury trial) unless it otherwise provided. This conclusion is also indicated by Smith v. United States, 128 F.2d 990, 991 (Cir. 5, 1942), and United States v. Great Eastern Lines, Inc., 89 F.Supp. 839 (D.C., E.D.Va., 1950). In Smith the court determined that a jury trial was required on an offense charged under a statute closely related to the statute under consideration here. There the offense was charged under 16 U.S.C. § 703 et seq., the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, whereas, here the offense is charged under 16 U.S.C. § 668, for the protection of bald and golden eagles. Both sections are a part of Title 16 which generally codifies the law in the area of conservation, but these sections are even more closely related by reason of 16 U.S.C. § 668b, which by reference adopts the enforcement provision of 16 U.S.C. § 706 of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act as the method of enforcing section 668. Absent some special distinction, it would seem that the mode of trial for an offense charged under section 668 should be the same as for an offense charged under section 703. In Smith, supra, the district court had denied a jury trial in a case involving the unlawful sale of wild ducks upon the ground that the offense charged was a petty offense and a jury trial was not permitted. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the district court was in error, 'for the reason that Congress has not conferred upon the district courts jurisdiction to try petty criminal offenses without a jury.' In another case involving the interpretation of a statute creating a federal offense for acts committed off a federal reservation the same test was applied. In United States v. Great Eastern Lines Inc., supra, the court was interpreting regulations under the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C.A. § 301 et seq., which the court indicated '* * * might be classified as petty offenses, as distinguished from crimes, and their trial not necessitate a jury.' The court refrained from making any classification of the offense but held, 'Unless the Congress expressly directs that there shall be none, the Court will conclude that Congress intended a jury trial of a statutory offense,' (citing Smith, supra).
Since Congress has not indicated otherwise and since the alleged offenses charged in the information were not committed on a government reservation, or within the exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction of the United States, the defendant may have a jury trial upon demand. There is nothing in Schick v. United States, supra, or United States v. Au Young, 142 F.Supp. (D.C., D.Hawaii, 1956), which require a contrary holding because both cases involve defense waivers of a jury trial in petty offense cases rather than a demand for jury trial.
It is ordered that plaintiff's motion to quash and deny defendant's demand for a jury trial be, and the same is hereby denied.
FN4. See also: Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540, 8 S.Ct. 1301, 32 L.Ed. 223; District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 57 S.Ct. 660, 81 L.Ed. 843; Smith v. United States, 5 Cir., 128 F.2d 990.
FN5. District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 57 S.Ct. 660 (1937); District of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U.S. 63, 51 S.Ct. 52, 75 L.Ed. 177 (1930); Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65, 24 S.Ct. 826 (1904); Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540, 8 S.Ct. 1301 (1888); Smith v. United States, 128 F.2d 990 (5th Cir., 1942). The killing of an eagle is not malum in se, such violations would not be triable to a jury at common law, and the penalties imposed by Congress for violation of this section are within the definition of petty offenses as set out in 18 U.S.C. § 1(3).
'(a) Any United States commissioner specially designated for that purpose by the court by which he was appointed has jurisdiction to try and sentence persons committing petty offenses in any place over which the Congress has exclusive power to legislate or over which the United States has concurrent jurisdiction, and within the judicial district for which such commissioner was appointed.
'(b) Any person charged with a petty offense may elect, however, to be tried in the district court of the United States. The commissioner shall apprise the defendant of his right to make such election and shall not proceed to try the case unless the defendant after being so apprised, signs a written consent to be tried before the commissioner.
'(c) The probation laws shall be applicable to persons so tried and the commissioner shall have power to grant probation.
'(d) For his services in such cases the commissioner shall receive the fees, and none other, provided by law for life or similar services.
'In all cases of conviction by United States commissioners an appeal shall lie from the judgment of the commissioner to the district court of the United States for the district in which the offense was committed.

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