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(e") that, consequently, and on account of the material and non-material damage inflicted upon the Republic of Cameroon, reparation in an amount to be determined by the Court is due from the Federal Republic of Nigeria to the Republic of Cameroon, which reserves the introduction before the Court of [proceedings for] a precise assessment of the damage caused by the Federal Republic of Nigeria.
(e') that consequently, and on account of the material and non-material damage inflicted upon the Republic of Cameroon, reparation in an amount to be determined by the Court is due from the Federal Republic of Nigeria to the Republic of Cameroon, which reserves the introduction before the Court of [proceedings for] a precise assessment of the damage caused by the Federal Republic of Nigeria.
"On Saturday 3 February 1996, at 12 noon, Nigerian forces attacked the Cameroonian troops in the Bakassi Peninsula along the entire cease-fire line of February 1994. Following that attack, as a [p 18] result of which there was one death, one person missing and several wounded on the Cameroonian side, as well as substantial material damage, the Idabato Sub-Prefecture and the localities of Uzama, Kombo a Janea and Idabato fell into the hands of the Nigerian forces.
"The Nigerian Government hereby invites the International Court of Justice to note this protest and call the Government of Cameroon to order.
"The members of the Security Council call upon the parties to respect the cease-fire they agreed to on 17 February in Kara, Togo, and to refrain from further violence. They further call upon the parties to take necessary steps to return their forces to the positions they occupied before the dispute was referred to the International Court [of Justice]."
Both Parties should lend every assistance to the fact-finding mission which the Secretary-General of the United Nations has proposed to send to the Bakassi Peninsula.
AGAINST: Judge ad hoc Ajibola.
Done in French and in English, the French text being authoritative, at the Peace Palace, The Hague, this fifteenth day of March, one thousand nine hundred and ninety-six, in three copies, one of which will be placed in the archives of the Court and the others transmitted to the Government of the Republic of Cameroon and the Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, respectively.
Judges ODA, SHAHABUDDEEN, RANJEVA and KOROMA append declarations to the Order of the Court; Judges WEERAMANTRY, SHI and VERESHCHETIN append a joint declaration to the Order of the Court; Judge ad hoc MBAYE appends a declaration to the Order of the Court.
Judge ad hoc AJIBOLA appends a separate opinion to the Order of the Court.
In this declaration I would like to make clear two reservations that I have to the text of the Order.
"the presence of any armed forces in the Bakassi Peninsula does not extend beyond the position in which they were situated prior to 3 February 1996"
should have been 29 March 1994, that is, the date on which Cameroon filed the Application instituting proceedings in this case and the date which seems to be indicated in the mediation proposed by the President of Togo (see para. 45).
2. I am a little concerned by the passage in paragraph 42 in which the concept of "irreparable damage" is mentioned. The purpose of provisional measures is to preserve the rights of either party, and it is established in the jurisprudence that the rights in question are those which are to be considered at the merits stage of the case and which constitute, or are directly engaged by, the subject of the application. The urgency of the relevant action or inhibition is a prerequisite. The anticipated or actual breach of the rights to be preserved ought to be one which could not be erased by the payment of reparation or compensation to be ordered in a later judgment on the merits, and this irreparable prejudice must be imminent. These conditions have been regarded by the Court as the criteria according to which it has determined its position when indicating or refusing to indicate provisional measures as requested by the applicant in each case.
I believe, however, that loss of life in the disputed area, distressing as it undoubtedly is, does not constitute the real subject matter of the present case.
In addition, the Court admits that it has not been able to form any clear and precise idea of the events that took place on 3 February 1996 as well as those which recurred on 16 and 17 February 1996 in the Bakassi Peninsula, and has been unable to make a definitive findings of facts or of imputability (para. 43). In such an unclear situation the concept of irreparable damage cannot be used to justify the indication of provisional measures.
The Order made by the Court today should help to maintain friendly relations between two fraternal and neighbouring States. I have voted for paragraphs 1, 2, 4 and 5 of the dispositif. If I thought that there was a sound juridical basis for paragraph 3 of the dispositif, I should have voted for this also. However, I do not think there is such a basis.
A provisional measure should be framed in self-executing terms, in the sense that it should contain all the legal elements required for its interpretation and application. In the case of a provisional measure limiting the movement of armed forces, an essential element is the prescription of a clear physical benchmark, in the nature of a stipulation of positions or lines in relation to which it could be easily determined whether the required limitation has been observed. For the reasons alluded to in paragraph 38 of the Court's Order, the evidence has not permitted the Court to identify such a benchmark. A related problem confronted the Chamber in the Frontier Dispute case, but there an alternative solution was available (Provisional Measures, I.C.J. Reports 1986, pp. 10-11, para. 27, and p. 12, para. 32 (1) (D)). No similar alternative solution is available here.
In the result, a provisional measure limiting the movement of armed forces will not serve the intended purpose of avoiding conflict in the area. On the contrary, it may provide a basis for a fresh dispute, in that, in the circumstances of this case, there could be argument between the Parties as to what position or positions each occupied prior to 3 February 1996.
In this situation, it seemed to me that the provisional measure prescribed in paragraph 2 of the dispositif, for which I voted, was as much as the Court could usefully indicate, that measure being directed to requiring both Parties to observe the agreement reached by their Ministers of Foreign Affairs on 17 February 1996 for the cessation of all hostilities in the Bakassi Peninsula. The observance of this requirement should yield much of the practical effect which would have been achieved by an adequately constructed provisional measure limiting the movement of the armed forces of the Parties.
The present Order confirms - if any confirmation was needed - the jurisprudence of the Chamber in the case concerning the Frontier Dispute (Provisional Measures, Order of 10 January 1986, I.C.J. Reports 1986, pp. 3 et seq.). The operative part does not confine itself to the indication of measures preserving rights in the traditional sense; it directly invites the Parties to take measures of a military nature: cessation of hostilities, refraining from any action by armed forces, freezing of the positions of the armed forces. A new "given" in international judicial relations is thus confirmed, that is, incidental proceedings consisting of a request for provisional measures owing to the occurrence of an armed conflict, grafted on to a legal dispute.
In that case, the indication of measures that may have a military character does not form part of a general regulatory function, which neither the Charter nor the Statute has conferred upon the Court. Such decisions represent, on the one hand, measures required by the circumstances of the case which are evaluated by the Court in the exercise of its discretionary power and, on the other hand, a contribution by the Court to ensuring the observance of one of the principal obligations of the United Nations and of all its organs in relation to the maintenance of international peace and security. The latter consideration explains more particularly the Court's position on a possible additional condition for the indication of provisional measures, that is, the prima facie admissibility of the principal Application (see paragraph 33 of the Order). By their nature, provisional measures fall within the Court's judicial functions and form part of the Court's responsibility for evaluating the circumstances: risks of irreparable damage to the rights of the Parties, urgency, etc., and the measures required.
I have voted in favour of the Order and it is my clear understanding that it does not prejudge the issues before the Court but rather - and in conformity with Article 41 of the Statute - is intended to preserve the respective rights of either Party, pending the decision of the Court. Article 41 empowers the Court to indicate, if it considers the circumstances so require, any provisional measures which ought to be taken to preserve the respective rights of either Party.
According to the material before the Court, including the oral arguments of the Parties, both sides have acknowledged that an incident involving the armed forces of the two States took place in the Bakassi Peninsula on 3 February 1996 and that it caused suffering and occasioned fatalities - of both military and civilian personnel - while causing others to be wounded or unaccounted for, as well as causing major material damage.
The Court, having found that it has prima facie jurisdiction, is not in a position to evaluate the conflicting versions of the incident that was said to have taken place on 3 February. However, based on the material before the Court, the possibility of a further military engagement resulting in irreparable damage to the rights of either Party, including further loss of human life, does, in my considered opinion, provide the Court with sufficient reason to grant the provisional order on its own accord.
It is hoped that this Order will discourage either Party from taking any measures which might cause irreparable damage to the millions of each of the Parties' nationals residing in the other's territory, help to reduce tensions between the two States and restore the fraternal relations which have always existed between the two countries, pending the decision of the Court.
Finally, I wish to stress once again that I have voted for the Order on the clear understanding that it does not prejudge the issues before the Court.
We have voted with the majority of the Court in regard to items 1, 2, 4, and 5 of the dispositif, but have been unable to support the majority in relation to item 3. The reasons for our unease with this clause are as follows.
The two Parties have given the Court two entirely different versions in regard to the incidents of 3 February 1996. These different versions involve entirely different positions in regard to the location of their respective armed forces on that date.
The Court has refrained from reaching any conclusion at this stage as between the contradictory versions presented by the two Parties, and advisedly so, for a decision on a matter of this nature would have required more detailed and specific evidence than was placed before the Court.
The Court Order, requiring the Parties to ensure that the presence of any armed forces in the Bakassi Peninsula should not extend beyond the positions in which they were situated prior to 3 February 1996, in effect leaves it to each Party to determine what that position was and to act upon that determination. These positions may well be contradictory, thus leaving open the possibility of confusion upon the ground. The Order may thus be interpreted as containing an internal contradiction.
Indeed, the Court itself would be unable to state what those respective positions are, if an enquiry were addressed to it.
Our view is that item 3 should not, for these reasons, have been included in the Order and we have therefore been unable to support that portion of the Order.
It rarely happens that two cases are exactly alike. However, the case concerning the Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Republic of Mali), Provisional Measures (I.C.J. Reports 1986, pp. 3 et seq.) and the present proceedings do display some striking similarities. In both cases, there is a dispute between two neighbouring African States. It relates to the delimitation of their boundary and has been referred to the Court. Further to certain armed actions, the Court has been asked to indicate provisional measures.
To be sure, in the case concerning the Frontier Dispute, the two Parties, who had both signed a special agreement to refer their case to the Court, had both ultimately requested the indication of provisional measures on the basis of Articles 41 of the Statute and 73 of the Rules of Court, whereas in the present proceedings, Nigeria - which asserts that the Court does not have even "prima facie jurisdiction over the substantive issues", has argued and submitted that the Court should refrain from indicating the measures requested by Cameroon, further contending that those measures were neither admissible nor appropriate. One should moreover bear in mind that Nigeria, with regard to the merits of the case, has raised eight preliminary objections with a view to having the Court find that it lacks jurisdiction or, having it, dismiss the Application as inadmissible. However, that in no way detracts from the similarity between the two cases.
Among the provisional measures requested by Cameroon, it will be noted that the Court is asked "without prejudice to the merits of the dispute", to indicate that: "(1) the armed forces of the Parties shall withdraw to the position they were occupying before the Nigerian armed attack of 3 February 1996".
"the selection of these positions would require a knowledge of the geographical and strategic context of the conflict which the Chamber does not possess, and which in all probability it could not obtain without undertaking an expert survey" (I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 11, para. 27).
However it had previously declared, and quite rightly, that the measures whose indication it was contemplating "for the purpose of eliminating the risk of any future action likely to aggravate or extend the dispute, must necessarily include the withdrawal of . . . troops" (ibid., pp. 10-11, para. 27). That had quite naturally led the Chamber to adopt the solution I have mentioned.
The Court was under the same obligation in the present proceedings. Just like the Chamber in 1986 it had to find, in the light of the circumstances, a way of applying the principle that had been highlighted by the Chamber and according to which, when a case is pending before the Court and an armed conflict breaks out between the parties, the measures that the Court is required to indicate must necessarily include the withdrawal of troops.
The Court, concerned to contribute "to the attainment of one of the principal obligations of the United Nations . . . in relation to the maintenance of . . . peace" (see the declaration of Judge Ranjeva) has indicated that "both Parties should ensure that the presence of any armed forces in the Bakassi Peninsula does not extend beyond the positions in which they were situated prior to 3 February 1996" (an appropriate form of words, under the circumstances, to indicate the withdrawal of troops), taking due account of the circumstances of the case.
I am delighted by this, as I consider that three of the measures indicated by the Chamber in the case concerning the Frontier Dispute (see paragraph 32 (1) (A), (B) and (D) of the operative part of its Order), namely the halting of any action which might aggravate or extend the dispute, abstention from any act likely to impede the gathering of evidence and the withdrawal of troops, form an aggregate that is indispensable in each instance of a conflict of the kind that has occurred between Cameroon and Nigeria, at a time when their dispute is pending before the Court. These three measures should, in such a case, be indicated so as to [p 34] maintain the peace that is necessary to such negotiations as the Parties have contemplated or might be contemplating, and the execution of the judgment that the Court might hand down in the case. The Court has consolidated its jurisprudence.
After careful consideration of the present situation in the Bakassi Peninsula which forms part of the area in dispute between Cameroon and Nigeria, I agree to vote in favour of the first operative part of the Court's Order indicating provisional measures in this case. I am convinced that it is the proper thing to do in the circumstances, in accordance with the relevant Articles of the Statute and Rules of Court, as well as its jurisprudence. This Order is made irrespective of the request of Cameroon, the Court, in its judicial wisdom, having based the indication on Article 75 (2) of its Rules.
"should ensure that no action of any kind, and particularly no action by their armed forces, is taken which might . . . aggravate or extend the dispute before it".
1.These other four operative parts, to my mind, one way or the other, touch on some of the facts about which the Court cannot pronounce at the moment, and the verification of which is in doubt because of insufficient and conflicting evidence from each Party.
2.Some of these other operative parts have been adequately dealt with in the preceding paragraphs of the Order, and therefore need no further repetition in the operative.
3.While it is clear that Article 33 of the United Nations Charter provides for various machinery to effect peaceful resolution of disputes, it is my humble belief that the Court should concern itself solely with a purely "legal" order and refrain from orders with diplomatic or political content or matters concerning mediation or negotiation, since strictly speaking these issues are apparently outside the legal assignment of the Court. While it is true that the Court is one of the main organs of the United [p 37] Nations and is, in fact, its principal judicial organ, matters involving political and diplomatic decisions are better left with the Security Council, the General Assembly, and the Secretary-General of the United Nations. The Court should singularly concern itself with legal and judicial matters. This statement is not without my understanding and recognition that in matters of peace and security all these organs are not uncomplementary and that the role of the Court is not mutually exclusive. I still hold, however, that in the present case before it, the Court should restrict itself to the application of the law under Article 41 of the Statute of the Court and Articles 73, 74 and 75 of its Rules.
4.In fact, it appears to me that some of the operative parts are not only unnecessary, having been adequately covered by the first one, but that they may, contrary to the intentions of the Court, do more harm or damage than good. For example, the third operative part is negative in nature and even in effect. My fear is that it may create more problems than it intends to resolve. There were no "positions in which they were situated prior to 3 February 1996" agreed to by the armed forces and Governments of both Parties at the moment.
5.Above all, I strongly believe that the Court should not issue an order in vain, that is, an order that is difficult or impossible to implement.
I shall now proceed to express my views on the request of Cameroon, and some of my observations on the important issues raised in this request coupled with some of the reasoning behind my decision to support the Court regarding the first operative part of the Order indicated in this matter.
Based on its original Application filed in the Registry of the Court on 29 March 1994 and supplemented by an additional Application of 6 June 1994, the Republic of Cameroon next filed a request for the indication of provisional measures under Article 41 of the Statute of the Court. The request is dated 10 February 1996, seven days after the alleged incidents in the Bakassi Peninsula of 3 February 1996, described by Cameroon as "the grave incidents which have taken place between the Cameroonian forces and the Nigerian forces of aggression in the Bakassi Peninsula".
(3) the Parties shall abstain from any act or action which might hamper the gathering of evidence in the present case" (emphasis added).
(a) Diplomatic initiatives of Cameroon and the mediation efforts of President Eyadema of Togo which involved the Foreign Ministers of both Parties and the final communique of the Foreign Ministers of Nigeria and Cameroon.
Documents concerning the intervention of the United Nations which include the appeals made by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, for withdrawal of troops and recourse to peaceful settlement of disputes; statements of the United Nations Secretary-General with regard to the message of President Biya of Cameroon and made after the visit of Ambassador Gambari of Nigeria to the United Nations Secretary-General; letter by the Foreign Minister of Nigeria stating the Nigerian position.
(b) Appeal by Salim Ahmed Salim, the Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), to both Parties to seek a peaceful settlement of their conflict and statements from ambassadors of the European Union calling on both Parties to abstain from any military activities and to withdraw troops to their respective positions prior to the time when this matter was filed in this Court.
(c) Documentary evidence on local elections in the Bakassi Peninsula by Cameroon in 1996.
(d) Documents indicating new military activities in the Bakassi Peninsula after the Piya communique, that is, 17 February 1996.
Similarly, Nigeria also submitted a bundle of documents in support of its defence to Cameroon's request. In effect many of the documents contained therein negate the documentary assertions and averments contained in the documents of Cameroon. But some facts, like those relating to the presentation of the dispute before many international organizations like the OAU, the Security Council and the European Union, seem not to be in dispute. Subsequently Cameroon submitted, though belatedly, another bundle of documents much of the contents of which was not referred to in the hearings but which contained more detailed maps of the area in dispute. Nigeria also submitted on 7 March 1996 an addendum to its original document of telegrams pertaining to the incident of 3 February 1996.
The relevant question now is whether these facts, documentary and oral, placed before the Court and as responded to by Nigeria are sufficient for the Court to indicate the requests for the three provisional measures at the instance of Cameroon. My answer to this question unfortunately is in the negative. From the evidence placed before the Court, there is no doubt that there were certain incidents recently in the Bakassi Peninsula - the area of dispute between Cameroon and Nigeria. Cameroon, from all the available documents placed before the Court in its Memorial and all the documents presented in support of this request for an indication of provisional measures, claims unequivocally the Bakassi Peninsula as forming part of its territory. Nigeria, as can be observed from all of its documents in defence of this request coupled with its oral presentation, also claims that the Bakassi Peninsula forms part of Nigeria's territory. The question now is who is to be believed? This question, as I have said earlier, cannot be treated fully at this stage of the proceedings. This question, provided the case proceeds eventually to be heard on the merits (in view of the fact that Nigeria on 18 December 1995 filed its preliminary objection challenging the Court's jurisdiction and admissibility of Cameroon's Application) may then be settled one way or the other. No conclusive or convincing evidence was, to my mind, placed before the Court to determine the issue of who was where and when. There is no doubt that this is difficult to decide at this stage of the proceedings. What has been presented before the Court are claims and counter-claims, allegations and counter-allegations, by both Parties. The picture painted of Nigeria by Cameroon was that of a belligerent neighbour bent on expanding its territory by sheer force and who therefore attacked Cameroon in its territory many times in the recent past. Cameroon also tried to persuade the Court to "view Nigeria as the party unwilling to honour bilateral agreements and treaties with regard to the dispute concerning the boundary between them". On the other hand Nigeria equally accused Cameroon as the warmonger who had in the recent past tried to drive away Nigeria from its land in the Bakassi Peninsula and it claimed that 90 per cent of all the people in the Bakassi Peninsula are Nigerians. [p 40] It also claimed that most of the civilians killed during the recent incidents are Nigerians and not Cameroonians. Nigeria even went to the extent (CR 96/4, pp. 82-90) of giving a graphic description of how Nigeria was tactically attacked on 3 February 1996 and on 16 and 17 February 1996 through the creeks of the Bakassi Peninsula. Cameroon claimed that Nigeria now occupies some part of the Bakassi Peninsula by force of arms while it drove the Cameroonian forces out of the area before it was occupied mostly between 1994 and 1996 and that it has never laid any claim to the Bakassi Peninsula before 1993.
"that unlike Nigeria, which has a number of military installations in Bakassi, Cameroon has no fixed military position there. It launched its attack outside the Peninsula" (CR 96/3, p. 13).
It again emphasized the same fact: "I repeat, Mr. President, that prior to 3 February 1996 Cameroon had no military position in Bakassi" (CR 96/3, p. 66). But this point was not specifically replied to by Cameroon, even though it claimed to have an administration set up in many places in Bakassi, including Idabato I and Idabato II. Even many of the maps submitted by Cameroon only indicate the military positions of Nigeria since 3 February 1996 and 16 and 17 February 1996, with nothing shown about the military positions of Cameroon (Map A, Cameroon dossier). On the issue of elections, Nigeria accused Cameroon of recently holding elections within its territory. To counter this claim Cameroon put in documents to show that the election was held within its territory (unfortunately the date of the election was not indicated on this document) (Exhibit H of Cameroon dossier).
The first question that comes to mind, in my opinion, concerning such a request of this nature is the issue of facts and evidence that the Court could rely upon in order to exercise its discretion regarding this incidental jurisdiction under Article 41 of the Statute. But before this issue is examined reference should be made to the question of what is legally required of the Applicant regarding this kind of request. Article 73 (2) of the Rules of Court provides that the requesting party must "specify the reasons therefor, the possible consequences if it is not granted, and the measures requested". In addition to the request filed, the Applicant has also presented a dossier of documents in support of the request. The question is whether all of the documents presented by the Applicant is sufficient for the Court to exercise its discretion based on those facts. It should be added here that Nigeria also presented its own bundle of documents in [p 41] reply to that of the Applicant and in support of its own argument that the Court should not grant the request for an indication of provisional measures at the instance of Cameroon.
(i) A sketch-map of the incidents showing the alleged territory of Cameroon which had been occupied by Nigeria since 3 February 1996 and the area which had been occupied by Nigeria since 18 February 1996.
(ii) Reports by the Cameroon authorities on the alleged clash of 3 February 1996 which include, inter alia, radio messages, telegram and telex messages; they catalogued alleged attacks by the Nigerian forces, places captured by them, as well as the intensity of the alleged attacks.
(iii) Press reports by Agence France Presse on 5 and 6 February 1996.
However, judging from the material placed by both Parties before the Court certain facts appear to be undisputed which constitute, in effect, the common ground in these proceedings. These facts are of a purely provisional nature and do not involve any definitive finding of full facts in this case and neither do they affect the ultimate decision on the merits in the future. There are two categories of facts: first, those of the two major incidents and, second, the international mediation and negotiation efforts concerning the dispute.
With reference to the first category, both Parties, as can be gleaned from the material presented in this case and the oral evidence in support, agreed that there was an incident on 3 February 1996 involving loss of lives on both the military and civilian side. Similarly, there were incidents on 16 and 17 February 1996 involving loss of lives on both sides. Both of these incidents occurred in the Bakassi Peninsula. Both incidents were referred to as "skirmishes" in the communique of 17 February 1996.
The communique also referred to the earlier efforts to maintain peace between both Parties by recalling the Tunis Communique of 13 June 1994 and the Kara Meeting of 4 to 6 July 1994.
On 5 February 1996, the United Nations Secretary-General issued a press release in which he expressed deep concern about the "border clash" between the Parties which resulted in several casualties; he urged that both Parties should "show restraint and to withdraw their troops from the border area to create the necessary conditions for the peaceful settlement of their dispute", but most importantly the Secretary-General called on both Parties to: "await the deliberation of the International Court of Justice which is presently seized with the case" (Cameroon dossier); (emphasis added).
"The members of the Council have taken note of the communique issued by the Central Organ of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) (S/1994/351, annex). The members of the Council also welcome the fact that the dispute has been referred to the International Court of Justice.
Council members encourage the parties to continue to pursue their efforts for a peaceful resolution of the dispute in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the Charter of the Organization of African Unity.
Other diplomatic appeals were made by the Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity, Mr. Salim Ahmed Salim, urging the peaceful resolution of the dispute and the ambassadors of the European Union also called on both Parties to abstain from armed conflict and to withdraw to positions occupied before the Court was seised of the matter.
In all cases in which the Court is called upon to exercise its power to indicate provisional measures, it must satisfy itself, as one of the "circumstances" referred to in its Statute, that it has prima facie jurisdiction. However, a clear distinction has always been drawn between the jurisdiction of the Court to determine the case on its merits (which is not to be considered at this stage of the proceedings) and its jurisdiction to indicate provisional measures. However the two issues are not unconnected, since both are based on the consent of the Respondent State. A clear distinction has been drawn between "consent to statute" and "consent to case".
"if we assume . . . that by virtue of its declaration Cameroon thereby acquired a right to institute proceedings against Nigeria, then the surreptitious way in which Cameroon set about making its declaration and subsequently acting on it against Nigeria amounted to an abusive exercise of that right" (CR 96/3, p. 45).
Nigeria's objection on this ground also includes an assertion that the request of Cameroon is inadmissible.
It was argued by Cameroon that on the basis of the decision in the case concerning Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Preliminary Objections, I.C.J. Reports 1957, p. 125), the contention of Nigeria cannot be a valid one in law. However, while I do not wish to go into the details of that decision, I would point out that that case dealt with the issue of substantive jurisdiction on the merits and not prima facie jurisdiction for the purpose of an indication of provisional measures, and that most of the objections raised in that case with regard to the declarations of both India and Portugal under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute, dealt with the issue of ratione temporis and were not based on the issue of lack of good faith and admissibility.
"The Court, if it is not sitting when the request is made, shall be convened forthwith for the purpose of proceeding to a decision on the request as a matter of urgency."
"Whereas provisional measures under Article 41 of the Statute are indicated 'pending the final decision' of the Court on the merits of the case, and are therefore only justified if there is urgency in the sense that action prejudicial to the rights of either party is likely to be taken before such final decision is given" (I.C.J. Reports 1991, p. 17, para. 23).
In its request, Cameroon argues that there is urgency in this case. Nigeria denies it. In support of its argument, Cameroon refers to all the incidents that occurred in the recent past, especially before and after the filing of its Application in the Court on 29 March 1994. It refers in par-[p 47]ticular to the incidents of 3 February 1996, and 16 and 17 February 1996, apart from all the diplomatic attempts to settle the dispute which proved futile. Nigeria, for its part, considers the entire request of Cameroon to have become "moot" because there was no need for it, as hostilities have ceased while moves to settle the dispute are at the moment progressing and will ultimately involve the Heads of State of both countries on a bilateral basis.
Considering all the intermittent incidents in the recent past involving sporadic clashes that have degenerated into serious skirmishes and which could possibly explode into a full-scale war, can it be denied that this request is urgent? I take the view that this is a serious and very urgent situation which urgently requires attention of the Court. The Court took such speedy action recently in the case concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, when an Order was promptly made on 8 April 1993 (I.C.J. Reports 1993, p. 3). It is therefore difficult for me to accept Nigeria's view that there is nothing urgent in this matter. In my view, it is extremely urgent.
"Whereas the Court, in the context of the present proceedings on a request for provisional measures, has in accordance with Article 41 of the Statute to consider the circumstances drawn to its attention [as requiring the indication of provisional measures, but] cannot make definitive findings of fact or of imputability, and the right of each Party to dispute the facts alleged against it, to challenge the attribution to it of responsibility for those facts, and to submit arguments in respect of the merits, must remain unaffected by the Court's decision" (I.C.J. Reports 1993, p. 347, para. 48; emphasis added).
The indication of provisional measures by the Court is a matter for the exclusive discretion of the Court which it may or may not exercise, depending on the circumstances of any particular case. Some schools of thought in international law consider this discretionary power to be a part of the inherent power of international tribunals. However, since the Court is by Article 30 of the Statute empowered to make its own rules, provision is made for this unfettered discretion to take action proprio motu under Article 75 of the Rules. I shall return again to this important discretionary power later on.
but ultimately decided that it had no jurisdiction.
At this stage of the proceedings, I would find it difficult, therefore, to support the decision of the Court that Nigeria should withdraw "from its territory". Apart from the controversial aspect of the binding or non-binding nature of the indication of provisional measures, it is my humble view that the Court should be cautious and refrain from making an Order which is impossible to comply with. The Court does not do anything in vain, judicium non debet esse illusorium; suum effectum habere debet.
"apart from the general object of preserving the parties' rights as finally determined by the Court, the object is to do so in the interests of both parties equally; and further that the main purpose of the power to act proprio motu is to ensure that the Court can always do this, and is not confined to doing so only if one of the parties so requests" (Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice, Vol. II, p. 544; second emphasis added).
(a) The request of Cameroon as presented to the Court virtually deals with the area of the Bakassi Peninsula and any material with regard to other parts of the boundary is either absent, or very scanty and not such as to be relied upon.
(b) Secondly, evidence was only given about some rather vague military activities in the Bakassi Peninsula area, not in the region of Lake Chad.
(c) How could the Court possibly stop either Cameroon or Nigeria from carrying on military activities within their respective boundaries?
(d) Where is the evidence clearly indicating the boundary between the [p 50] two disputants along which the Court could order abstention from military activities? Is there any cease-fire line?
Consequently, it is very doubtful whether the Court can indicate provisional measures along the lines suggested by Cameroon in its second request, and this should also be rejected.
"Whereas, having regard to the character of the alleged rights in question, considered in relation to the natural characteristics of the territory in issue, even 'measures calculated to change the legal status of the territory' could not, according to the information now at the Court's disposal, affect the value of such alleged rights, once the Court in its judgment on the merits had recognized them as appertaining to one or other of the Parties . . ." (P.C.I.J., Series A/B, No. 48, p. 288).
Thus, in the past, Article 41 of the Statute was very strictly interpreted and some positivists are still of the view that this should be so. For example, of the six applications that came before the Permanent Court, only two led to the indication of interim measures. In the case concerning the Denunciation of the Treaty of 2 November 1865 between China and Belgium of 1926, President Huber issued an Order indicating provisional measures pending the decision of the Court which eventually decided that it had no jurisdiction to deal with the merits of the case. Subsequently the Parties agreed on a provisional measure of their own. In the Factory at Chorzow case of 1927, the Legal Status of the South-Eastern Territory of Greenland case of 1932, and the Polish Agrarian Reform and German Minority case of 1933, the Court declined all the requests for the indication for provisional measures of protection. In the case concerning the Prince von Pless Administration it was President Adatci who urged the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs to exercise some measure of restraint [p 51] until the Court could meet. Subsequently the Government of Poland rectified what it deemed to be an error, to the satisfaction of the German Government, and the Court made an Order taking note of the declarations made by the two Governments.
The present Court has dealt with 18 requests for the indication of provisional measuresFN1.Of these requests, one was discontinued (Trial of Pakistani Prisoners of War case), one was withdrawn (Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicaragua v. Honduras case), the Court indicated provisional measures in nine instances and declined to do so in seven. Again in the recent past the Court has been more inclined to indicate provisional measures in matters involving armed conflicts or violent incidents. The examples are the case concerning the Application of the Convention of the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the Frontier Dispute case and the case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua.
FN1 Such provisional measures have been requested in the following 17 cases: Anglo - Iranian Oil Co. (United Kingdom v. Iran); Interhandel (Switzerland v. United States of America); Fisheries Jurisdiction (United Kingdom v. Iceland) (Federal Republic of Germany v. Iceland); Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France) (New Zealand v. France); Trial of Pakistani Prisoners of War (Pakistan v. India); Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turkey); United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States of America v. Iran); Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America); Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Republic of Mali) (case referred to a Chamber); Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicaragua v. Honduras) (in this case the request was withdrawn); Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989 (Guinea - Bissau v. Senegal); Passage through the Great Belt (Finland v. Denmark); Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United Kingdom) (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United States of America); Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)) (in this case two requests were made by Bosnia and Herzegovina and one by Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)..
"Bulgaria should ensure that no step of any kind is taken capable of prejudicing the rights claimed by the Belgian Government or of aggravating or extending the dispute submitted to the Court" (P.C.I.J., Series A/B, No. 79, p. 199; emphasis added).
This was an early indication of extending the concept of the rights of the Parties to include the avoidance of incidents, which was apparently rejected in the South-Eastern Territory of Greenland case (although this [p 52] decision was explained in other terms, that is, by saying that the Parties could no longer be affected by the legal positions one way or the other).
"Whereas, accordingly, it is not necessary for the Court to decide the question whether Article 41 of the Statute confers upon it the power to indicate interim measures of protection for the sole purpose of preventing the aggravation or extension of dispute" (I.C.J. Reports 1976, p. 13, para. 42).
"[t]he Governments of the United States of America and the Republic of Nicaragua should each of them ensure that no action of any kind is taken which might aggravate or extend the dispute submitted to the Court" (I.C.J. Reports 1984, p. 187 para. 41 B (3)).
One may therefore reasonably assume that international law and the jurisprudence of the Court have been further developed along this line. In all cases involving questions of armed conflicts involving the loss of lives and properties, the protection of the respective rights of the parties includes the need for the avoidance, by the parties, of any aggravation or extension of the dispute or hostile incidents.
"Considering that, independently of the requests submitted by the Parties for the indication of provisional measures, the Court or, accordingly, the chamber possesses by virtue of Article 41 of the Statute the power to indicate provisional measures with a view to preventing the aggravation or extension of the dispute whenever it considers that circumstances so require" (I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 9, para. 18; emphasis added).
"not [to] take any action and [to] ensure that no action is taken which may aggravate or extend the existing dispute over the preven-[p 53]tion or punishment of the crime of genocide, or render it more difficult of solution" (I.C.J. Reports 1993, p. 24, para. 52 B).
In view of what I have said above, the purpose and content of Article 41 of the Statute is not and cannot be restricted only to the preservation of the prospective rights of the parties in a matter like the one before the Court. The situation calls for an order proprio motu under Article 75 of the Rules of Court, hence my reason for voting with the majority of the Court on the first operative part of the Order. Inherently, the issue of non-aggravation and non-extension is not only linked with the protection of the prospective rights of litigants, but it is an integral part of that protection, and provides a basis upon which an indication can be given.
"the rights of its nationals to life, liberty, protection and security; the rights of inviolability, immunity and protection for its diplomatic and consular officials; and the rights of inviolability and protection for its diplomatic and consular premises" (I.C.J. Reports 1979, p. 19, para. 37).
"continuance of the situation the subject of the present request exposes the human beings concerned to privation, hardship, anguish and even danger to life and health and thus to a serious possibility of irreparable harm" (I.C.J. Reports 1979, p. 20, para. 42; emphasis added).
Similarly, in the matter before this Court, indisputable facts have been adduced to show that there has been human suffering, death, injury and even some people missing on both sides. It is also clear that the majority of the inhabitants of this area of the Bakassi Peninsula are fishermen who ought not to be deprived of their livelihood. On its own the indication proprio motu by the Court that the Parties should cease from acts of aggression and from any extension of the dispute should definitely alleviate the sufferings and loss of life and property caused to the people living in the Bakassi Peninsula.
The Court has seldom indicated provisional measures for the preservation of evidence. Although this aspect was mentioned in the case concerning the Denunciation of the Treaty of 2 November 1865 between China and Belgium, the Court declined to indicate provisional measures to this effect in the Aegean Sea Continental Shelf case in its Order of 11 September 1976. In one case where such a request was granted there was agreement between the Parties, that is, in the case concerning the Frontier Dispute between Burkina Faso and the Republic of Mali where a clear cease-fire line had previously been defined by agreement.
(a) As mentioned earlier, it has not been shown clearly where the armed forces of Cameroon and Nigeria are stationed at the moment. The evidence put in by the two Parties is conflicting and there is no agreement between them. The maps are not of much help either.
(c) There was no agreement between Nigeria and Cameroon about the cease-fire line which might have made it easier to indicate a provisional measure in this regard, unlike the case concerning the Frontier Dispute where such an agreement was reached.
(d) Part of Nigeria's case is that since Cameroon has already filed its Memorial, all the required evidence (which, I think, mostly consists of treaties, agreements and conventions) has already been filed in the Court.
(e) Nigeria is not making any request of this kind and the position of the law is that both Parties should be treated equally. In other words, though the content of the request is that "the parties" should abstain from acts which might hamper the gathering of evidence in this case, this can only refer to Cameroon.
It is for all these reasons that I have come to the conclusion that this request made by Cameroon cannot be granted by the Court. It follows that the three requests made in the request of Cameroon on 10 February 1996 cannot be indicated.
There are many reasons why the Court should indicate only the provisional measure which I have voted for in paragraph 1 of the dispositif.
1. Admittedly, the Court is not in a position to verify and therefore rely upon all the conflicting facts placed before it, although there are some that are uncontroverted as I have stated above. They provide compelling reasons why the Court cannot ignore this apparently explosive situation in the Bakassi Peninsula and fail to indicate provisional measures.
2. The judicial intervention of the Court in this matter is not exclusive of but rather complementary to the other efforts of the Security Council, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, President Eyadema of Togo, and the Organization of African Unity through its Secretary-General, Mr. Salim A. Salim, but the Court should concern itself only with its legal and judicial assignment and nothing more.
"Nigeria has no intention of using military force to, and I quote from the Cameroonian request, 'continue the conquest of the Bakassi Peninsula'. Nigeria's position is, as it has always been, to resolve the Bakassi issue by peaceful means" (CR 96/3, p. 16; emphasis added).
4. Both Parties have been involved in various attempts to resolve the dispute peacefully and amicably. These are reflected in the communiques issued in Tunis and in Togo.
5. In the recent past, the Court has indicated provisional measures in matters of this nature. It did so in the case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America) (I.C.J. Reports 1984, p. 167), the Chamber's case concerning the Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Republic of Mali) (I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 3) and the case concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)) (I.C.J. Reports 1993, p. 3) and there is therefore no reason why it should not indicate provisional measures in similar circumstances, when incidents of armed hostilities are being alleged and recognized.
It is for all the aforementioned reasons that I have been prompted to vote in favour of the first operative part of the Order but to decline to vote for the indication of the remaining four provisional measures by the Court.

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