Source: http://www.williamgoren.com/blog/tag/qualified-individual/
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 23:13:09+00:00

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The best weekend in sports is no doubt the first and second round of the NCAA basketball tournament. I hope your bracket survived. The UMBC VA game was amazing (even my 14-year-old daughter was into it), and there were plenty of other upsets along the way as well. I am in two pools (brother and brother-in-law), and Cincinnati’s loss did not help me. However, I do have Villanova and Gonzaga in the final game, and so I am okay that way (I have Gonzaga winning in one pool and Villanova winning in the other). Good luck to everyone with their brackets.
As everyone knows, I am not afraid to blog on cases blogged on by others. Today’s case is a first because I don’t think I have ever blogged on a case mentioned here by Eric Meyer of Fisher Broyles in his Employer Handbook blog, an ABA Hall of Fame blog that can be found in my blogroll. So, today is a first. My thanks to Eric for alerting me to the case. The case, Lindstrom v. Bingham County, Idaho, out of the Idaho District Court decided on March 15, 2018, is a combination of FMLA and ADA . As usual, the blog entry is divided into categories and they are: facts; court’s reasoning in denying summary judgment on the FMLA claim; court’s reasoning in denying summary judgment on the ADA and the equivalent Idaho Human Rights Act claim; and takeaways. Of course, the reader is free to focus on any or all of the categories.
Plaintiff was employed at the Rattlesnake Landfill located outside of Shelley, Idaho as the landfill manager from July 26, 2004, until March 10, 2015. It was a full-time position, and his duties generally included operating the scale house when customers arrived, operating heavy machinery throughout the landfill, and supervising other employees. On September 16, 2014, plaintiff was taken to the hospital because he was ill. Subsequent visit with doctors revealed multiple health issues including blurry vision and low blood sugar. As a result, one doctor told the plaintiff to refrain from operating heavy equipment for a time, and another doctor suggested taking time off work to address the health concerns.
On September 30, 2014, plaintiff signed a request for FMLA leave. That form noted that plaintiff’s FMLA leave started September 24, 2014 and would last for 12 weeks until December 16, 2014. During that time, plaintiff took medications and was able to improve his vision and level out his blood sugar. However, the condition with his feet, which was caused by diabetes, did not get better or worse.
During November and December 2014, plaintiff kept in contact with the County’s Human Resources Director and discussed various work option for him upon his return. Plaintiff indicated that he wanted to try to do some work at Rattlesnake to see how it went. However, that never took place. Plaintiff’s intent was to work mainly in the scale house, which he had done previously when his feet were causing him pain.
Plaintiff did not have a doctor’s note immediately available upon completion of his FMLA leave and did not show up for work on December 17, 2014. Even so, the County continued his time off as a paid leave of absence. On December 31, 2014, plaintiff received a note from a doctor and provided it to the County on January 2, 2015. The County asked the plaintiff to work with medical providers to determine the details of any work limitations and to fill out a fitness for duty form.
Plaintiff complied with that and furnished two fitness for duty forms. With some variations, both doctors recommended that plaintiff not stand or walk for long periods because of the condition with his feet along with other minor restrictions and suggestions.
As a result of the fitness for duty forms, the County determined that Rattlesnake was not a good fit for the plaintiff and instead offered him a position at the central transfer station located in Blackfoot, Idaho. The County gave him few details about that job, but did say that he would have a stool to sit on. While plaintiff initially agreed to attempt that position, when the day for him arrived to start that job, he left a message with the supervisor indicating that he would not be able to make it for medical reasons. He later indicated that he wasn’t comfortable driving the significantly greater distance to that job as opposed to his usual 3-4 mile commute to Rattlesnake. After meeting with his doctors, the doctors about the plaintiff that driving longer distances and a slower paced job close to home, essentially Rattlesnake, would be best for the plaintiff.
On March 5, 2015, the Board of Bingham County’s Commissioners passed a resolution reducing the hours of operation at Rattlesnake for financial reasons. They then implemented a reduction in force and terminated the plaintiff and another part-time employee. After exhausting administrative remedies, plaintiff brought suit and the County eventually moved for summary judgment.
Under the FMLA, if an employee can’t perform the essential functions of the position because of a physical or mental condition, he is not entitled to restoration of a job upon return. However, he may have rights under the ADA.
What were the essential duties of the job, how those essential duties were defined, and how fieldwork was allocated at Rattlesnake were all facts in hot dispute. Further, the County could not point anything in the record actually showing that plaintiff could not perform the duties as outlined.
In the past, plaintiff had worked internally with his coworkers to switch duties when he was having a difficult time, and the County provided no explanation as to why that type of scenario could not have continued upon his return.
No legal authority exists for the proposition that a person on FMLA leave must return to work at the specific time the FMLA leave ends or risk losing his right to reinstatement. In fact, FMLA regulations say that the timing is not so rigid. In particular, 29 C.F.R. §825.216 provides an employer can delay restoration to an employee who fails to provide a fitness for duty certificate to return to work. Importantly, that provision does not say the employer can fire an employee or that the employee’s right to reinstatement lapses or ends. Rather, it says that the employer can delay reinstatement. That is exactly what happened in this case. That is: plaintiff did not provide the form upon completion of the leave; the County requested it; plaintiff produced it; and then the parties work towards a solution. Further, 29 C.F.R. §825.312 says an employer may not terminate the employment of the employee while awaiting a certification of fitness to return to duty.
While an employee cannot wait around and return to work at his or her convenience, there is nothing indicating that the day after leave expires is the sole date upon which a person can return without forfeiting his or her rights, especially in this case where the County admittedly chose to work with the plaintiff regarding his return and even extended it with paid time off.
Nothing in the C.F.R. puts a timeframe on the required fitness for duty form.
While it is logical to assume that in order to avoid any downtime the employee should provide the form immediately after the 12 weeks, the regulations are silent with respect to timing.
Since federal regulations allow for delay for an employee to get paperwork, that suggest that there is not a strict timing requirement. Further, this case did not involve extreme behavior where the plaintiff put off returning to work: his leave ended on December 16, 2014; he got a note from a doctor on December 31, 2014; and submitted the same to the County on January 2, 2015. The County then asked for the official fitness for duty forms and the plaintiff provided two of those.
No indication exists that the County told the plaintiff he had to submit the form prior to December 16, nor was there any indication that plaintiff was not diligent in getting the requested forms to the County.
Once an employer becomes aware of the need for accommodation, the employer has a mandatory obligation to engage in an interactive process with the employee in order to identify and implement appropriate reasonable accommodations.
What is a reasonable accommodation is typically a jury question.
Just what were the essential duties of plaintiff’s job were not clear-cut.
There are several questions of fact in dispute that are critical to the case, including: whether plaintiff could do the work; what were the essential functions of the job; and why plaintiff could not trade the functions of the job off with other employees as he had done prior to his FMLA leave.
Whoever breaks down the interactive process bears the liability. In this case, who was responsible for that breakdown of the interactive process is in hot dispute. In particular, both sides interacted with each other but neither side liked the other side’s suggested options. So, whether those communications and ideas were adequate under the ADA is a question the trier of fact must determine, i.e. a jury question.
When trying to determine whether a person is a qualified individual under the ADA, it is absolutely critical to remember that the question is whether the individual can perform the essential functions of the job with or without reasonable accommodations. As mentioned in the above paragraphs, whether plaintiff could perform the essential functions of his job with or without reasonable accommodations is in hot dispute and material to the dispute as well.
With respect to causation, the County’s Human Resources Manager admitted that the plaintiff’s disability played a role in the decision to reduce plaintiff’s hours at Rattlesnake. Accordingly, if the reduction in plaintiff’s hours was the moving factor behind the reduction in force resulting in his losing employment, it is reasonable to infer that plaintiff’s health issues were a consideration in his termination. Since there appears to have been multiple factors with respect to the reduction in force, it all should be presented to the jury for resolution.
Nothing in the FMLA requires that the process of going on FMLA leave and the certification process of coming back from FMLA leave factor in reasonable accommodations. However, since the FMLA applies to employers with 50 or more employees and title I of the ADA applies to employers of 15 or more employees, an employer would have to be out of their mind not to factor in the with or without reasonable accommodation part when it comes to the FMLA certification process. On the plaintiff’s side, the distinction is important for pleading purposes. A defendant would be perfectly justified in getting an FMLA claim dismissed if that claim focused on the reasonable accommodation piece, but that would not be the case if that claim was phrased as an ADA claim.
Make sure your essential duties of the job are current, accurate, and reflect what is actually happening on the ground.
If a reasonable accommodation is working, why mess with it?
Employers want to review their policies and figure out the timing for when paperwork must be in with respect to returning from FMLA leave. You do want to build a least a little bit of flexibility into the process.
What is a reasonable accommodation is typically a question for the jury.
As we have discussed before, whoever breaks down the interactive process bears the liability.
Figuring out who broke down the interactive process is a question for the jury, at least in close calls.
Whether a job can be performed with or without reasonable accommodations is a question of fact.
Interesting, that the court talks about the plaintiff’s health issues undoubtedly being a consideration in the termination. The court doesn’t address the issue of whether causation is sole cause analysis or causation is a motivating factor analysis. See this blog entry.
Not addressed in this case, but discussed here, is the important question of whether extending leave beyond FMLA leave is a reasonable accommodation under the ADA.
For another FMLA ADA interaction problem, check out this blog entry, which discusses forcing FMLA leave instead of engaging in the interactive process.
Don’t forget about reassignment as a reasonable accommodation.
This week when I was looking for a case to blog about I came across the case of Torres v. Junto De Gobierno De Servicio De Emergencia, where on April 28, 2015 United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico denied a motion to reconsider. In the original opinion and order, they held that a claim of employment discrimination filed under title II could survive a motion to dismiss. After reading that case, that caused me to review the issue myself. There are two views on this. The minority view is from the 11th circuit in the case of Bledsoe v. Palm Beach County Soil and Water Conservation District, 133 F.3d 816 (11th Cir. 1998), where they held that title II of the ADA does apply to employment. The majority view is represented by Brumfield v. City of Chicago, 735 F.3d 619 (7th Cir. 2013), and the cases collected therein, where they held that title II of the ADA most certainly does not apply to employment.
Reasons Why It Matters If Title II Applies to Employment?
1. With respect to title II cases, administrative remedies do not need to be exhausted before filing a claim. That said, I am of the view that it is always a good idea to exhaust internal remedies first. Also, if on the plaintiff side, I am also of the view that in addition to internal remedies, it is also a good idea to go through the Department of Justice first prior to filing suit because it they get involved, that involvement changes the dynamics of the case and also gives the plaintiff free discovery.
2. Since title II is tied into the Rehabilitation Act and Title I is tied into the civil rights of 1964, damages that can be obtained may be different and the standard for getting those damages may also be different. For example, to get any damages under title II, the general rule would be that you would have to show deliberate indifference, which is not the standard for non-punitive damages under title I.
1. Legislative history clearly shows that title II of the ADA was meant to apply to employment matters.
2. § 504 is so focused on employment discrimination that it led Congress to enact subsequent legislation clarifying that § 504 applies to other forms of discrimination in addition to employment discrimination.
3. Title II prohibits all discrimination by a public entity regardless of context.
4. DOJ regulation 28 C.F.R. § 35.140 says that title II applies to employment and the regulations are neither arbitrary, capricious, nor manifestly contrary to the statute. Therefore, they are entitled to Chevron deference.
5. Prior decisions in the 11th Circuit and in districts making up the 11th Circuit suggested that title II of the ADA applies to employment.
1. It is true that 28 C.F.R. § 35.140(a) says that a public entity cannot discriminate on the basis of disability in employment.
2. However, §35.140(b)(1) says that where a public entity is also subject to the jurisdiction of title I, then the requirements of title I of the ADA apply. This regulation as phrased could be read to say that title I of the ADA applies to public sector non-federal employment and not title II. The argument would be that the reference to also being subject to title II just means that nonfederal public entities have independent obligations under title II that they are subject to in addition to being subject to title I of the ADA.
3. §35.140(b)(2) says that if a public entity has less than 15 employees, then § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act is the applicable law that applies to employment matters arising from public sector non-federal employment.
A. § 35.140(b)(2) seems to be operating on the assumption that a non-federal public entity is automatically going to take federal funds. That may not be the case. Therefore, I am having trouble understanding how the Rehabilitation Act regulations could apply if the Rehabilitation Act Itself doesn’t apply. Thus, this would create an argument, to my mind, that this particular regulation goes beyond the statutory authority of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act with respect to non-federal public sector employers of less than 15 people where that public-sector employer does not take federal funds. If the public-sector employer does take federal funds, which most probably do, then this provision seems to be saying that employment matters of non-federal public sector employers not subject to title II of the ADA are exclusively governed by § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.
The 11th Circuit is out there by itself, though the 1st Circuit, as mentioned in Torres, in prior case law seems to suggest it might go with the 11th.
1. It is absolutely true that title II of the ADA prohibits discrimination by public entities by reason of disability with respect to their services, programs or activities. However, both title I of the ADA and title II of the ADA are set up in such a way so that in addition to having a disability, you also have to be qualified. What it means to be qualified is different between title I of the ADA and title II of the ADA. Further, what it means to be qualified under title II of the ADA contains absolutely no hint that employment is involved. Instead, it talks about essential eligibility requirements and the receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities.
2. DOJ regulations are not entitled to deference because the title II of the ADA unambiguously does not apply to decisions of state and local governments in employment matters.
3. Employment cannot simply be described fairly as a service, program, or activity of a public entity nor is it ordinarily conceptualized as such.
4. If title II applies to employment, then the statute becomes redundant in the broader statutory scheme.
5. Title I of the ADA definition of what it means to be qualified specifically focuses on employment matters (i.e. perform the essential functions of the job with or without reasonable accommodations).
6. With respect to title I, the terms “reasonable accommodation” and “undue hardship,” both contain references to employment matters.
7. Title I of the ADA has its own comprehensive regulatory scheme.
For that matter, title II of the ADA has its own comprehensive regulatory scheme as well. With the exception of 28 C.F.R. § 35.140, you never see employment discussed in the title II regulations.
8. The 11th Circuit never considered the definition of qualified under title II of the ADA in its opinion.
9. With respect to the closely related issue of whether title III applies to employment, both the Third Circuit and the Sixth Circuit have said no and that title I is the exclusive arena for disability discrimination employment matters.
Brumfield does an excellent job of discussing the cases on both sides of the issue and the reader is referred to that opinion if desiring further analysis.
1. Bledsoe was the first Circuit Court decision to address the question of whether title II applies to employment. As such, it was on its own. One wonders if the question came before the 11th Circuit today whether the same decision would be reached.
2. The arguments laid out in Brumfield are compelling, and § III and § IV(7) of this blog entry make those arguments even more compelling (I mean I know those arguments are mine:-), but I do believe that those arguments buttress the Brumfield line of cases).
3. All of the cases since Bledsoe that have visited the question specifically of whether a different title of the ADA also applies to employment have held in the negative.
4. There is a Circuit Court split on this. Therefore, I would certainly expect an appeal to the First Circuit in Torres. It is true that the First Circuit has previously suggested that title II may encompass employment matters, but that was back in 2002, and also they did not specifically address that question. Therefore, it is uncertain as to what the First Circuit will do on appeal. Also, even assuming the First Circuit decides in favor of title II applying to employment, the Brumfield reasoning is so strong that to my mind it would likely prevail at the Supreme Court (since there is a Circuit split, there is a good chance that the Supreme Court would take the case).
5. So, unless you are in the 11th Circuit or are in the Second Circuit and dealing with a Title II entity with less than 15 employees that does not take federal funds, it is probably safe to say that title II of the ADA does not apply to employment matters. It would be interesting to see what would happen in the 11th Circuit if they were somehow asked to revisit the issue.
6. Preventive law dictates that the practitioner act as if title II does not apply to employment (the arguments are just too strong). Further, it would seem highly likely (though predicting the Supreme Court is always hazardous business), that the Supreme Court will eventually make the same decision.

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