Source: https://elawnora.blogspot.com/2018/04/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 08:53:26+00:00

Document:
Does the inclusion of a work [the photograph on the right hand side] — which is freely accessible to all internet users on a third-party website with the consent of the copyright holder — on a person’s own publicly accessible website constitute an act of communication to the public within Article 3(1) of the InfoSoc Directive if the work is first copied onto a server and is uploaded from there to that person’s own website?
This is the question that the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has been asked to address in Land Nordrhein-Westfalen v Renckhoff, C-161/17.
This morning Advocate General (AG) Campos Sánchez-Bordona delivered his Opinion [not yet available in English], and answered in the negative.
Well, the background is quite ... ridiculous (in the sense that it is ridiculous that litigation is brought in the first place in instances like the present one), and also the AG seemed to agree.
At the very outset, in fact, he observed that not long time ago, school research and work on posters used to be accompanied by photographs, prints and drawings published on books and journals/magazines and hanged on the walls of schools (so to allow parents to view them), “without the authors of those images seeking compensation for their use” [NOTE: all direct quotes are my own translations from the Italian version of the Opinion]. Things have changed and, nowadays, the images used are digital and the resulting school work/research is uploaded on freely accessible websites.
This is indeed what happened in this case to a schoolgirl, who found an image of the city of Cordoba online and used it for an assignment for her Spanish class, providing acknowledgment of the website from which she had downloaded the photograph (though not of the photographer, because the website where the photograph appeared did not provide any). Upon finishing her work, she and her teacher uploaded it online … but the photographer [in my view it might be even questionable that the work is protected by copyright in the first place; although the parties to the national litigation agreed that the photograph is protected, the AG also had his doubts: see further below] came forward claiming infringement of his copyright in the photograph, and that he had just granted a licence to use to the image to the website from which the pupil had downloaded it.
Litigation has ensued all the way up the German Federal Court of Justice [!!], which has decided to stay the proceedings and refer the question above to the CJEU.
Before even starting his own substantial analysis, the AG noted that the notion of communication to the public has been “already subject to several decisions of the Court”. Yet, “the current reference shows that the interpretative questions of national courts have not been fully solved yet” [this is indeed true … in terms of numbers, the CJEU is fast approaching its 20th decision on Article 3(1) of the InfoSoc Directive].
Then, the AG noted that the way the referring court has phrased the question requires the CJEU to only consider the construction of the right of communication to the public, not also the issue of reproduction [of course, by downloading the photograph and re-uploading it, the schoolgirl made acts of reproduction].
As mentioned, the AG did not find it straightforward to say that a photograph like the one at issue would be protected by copyright. Nonetheless, pursuant to the freedom left to Member Sates [but not all took advantage of this possibility, an example being the UK] by Article 6 of the Term Directive to protect ‘simple photographs’, it would appear that – at least under German law – such photograph would be protected.
The AG then turned to the construction of Article 3(1) of the InfoSoc Directive.
In relation to the need for an ‘act of communication’, the AG noted that one should consider “the indispensable role played by the user and the deliberate nature of its intervention” [here the AG directly referred to GS Media, on which see here]. Such criterion requires to consider both subjective elements relating to the behaviour of the user [the AG referred to GS Media to highlight how the Court has been taking into account also such elements] and objective circumstances, as the user’s act must give access to or facilitate access [this is a very important point relating to Article 3(1), which the CJEU has particularly elaborated in its judgments in Filmspeler – a case in which the AG was once again Campos; see my take here – and Ziggo, on which see here] to a work.
Whilst it is true that both the schoolgirl and her teacher were aware of the consequences of their behaviour when they posted the photo online, ie granting access to a work, it would be wrong not to consider: (1) the accessory character of the photograph as an element of a broader work; (2) the fact that the photograph was already freely accessible and had been published with the author’s consent; and (3) the educational context in which the act of communication occurred, ie without any customers or profit-making intention.
The AG observed that in a case like the one at issue, unlike GS Media, one should not consider whether the pupil and her teacher knew that the original photograph had been published or not with the consent of the author, but rather whether they should know that, to reproduce a third-party photograph, they needed the author’s consent. The AG answered in the negative, holding that one should bear in mind that: A) those who act without a profit-making intention do not usually act with full knowledge of the consequences of their behaviour; and B) the work communicated by the user was already lawfully and freely accessible on another website.
If the factors to which the arguments above refer to subsist, then “there is no communication to the public”. However, this is NOT the case when the the righholders notifies the user that the work to which it gives access is unlawfully available online or when the access granted by the suer circumvents protection measures.
These elements might have led the pupil and her teacher to believe that the photograph was free to use by the public.
The AG also held the view that lack of a profit-making intention is more relevant than what the referring court appears to think. Here the AG recalled the GS Media presumption as applied to for-profit link providers to hold that – in case there were any doubts – for users without a profit-making intention it is necessary to demonstrate their knowledge of the unlicensed character of the work linked to. And the lack of any warning should be read, according to the AG, as reinforcing the idea that neither the pupil nor her teacher had full knowledge of the protected character of the work and the need to seek the author’s authorization.
The AG then turned to consideration of whether in the present case the work has been made available to a ‘new public’, in that the technical means used for the original and the allegedly infringing communication was the same.
The AG ruled out that there would be a new public in this case: “As the photograph is easily and lawfully (ie with the consent of the rightholder) available to all internet users, it is unclear how the intervention of a pupil and her teacher may be decisive so that a greater number of persons access” the work [para 100].
The AG also rejected the idea – advanced by some commentators – that the ‘new public’ criterion would amount to an undue exhaustion of the right of communication to the public, which would be as such contrary to Article 3(3) of the InfoSoc Directive: “It is, instead, the logical consequence of the way in which the holder of the rights to the photograph has consented to its use, knowing or having to know that lack of any protection against the reproduction of the image could lead internet users to believe that it was freely available to the public” [para 104].
It is not too much to ask a professional, when he/she publishes a work online, personally or through third parties, to adopt the appropriate measures, also of a technical nature, in order to clarify his/her copyright and the will to control the circulation of his/her own work” [para 105]. This does not reduce the high level of protection that authors are entitled to.
In any case, one can always seek the removal of one’s own work if he/she believes that its use is prejudicial [para 107 - here the AG does not elaborate further, but it seems that this is an argument to strengthen the conclusion that the online publication of a work does not amount to a weakened copyright protection, or even the ‘exhaustion’ of one’s own rights].
The AG then recalled that, in any case, educational exceptions might be available. If Germany has transposed Article 5(3)(a) into its own law, then account should be given of the fact that the EU Charter recognizes the right to education as a fundamental right. This should guide the correct application of the relevant exception, including ensuring that this fundamental right is not unduly compressed. In any case, in the case at issue, also compliance with the three-step test appears ensured.
This looks like a reasonable Opinion in the context of a fairly unreasonable claim, as well as a good interpretation of CJEU case law on the right of communication to the public.
Two particular points are worth making.
The first one is that the AG Opinion is a helpful reminder that copyright protection should be balanced against other fundamental rights, including the right to education.
The second point relates to the construction of the right of communication to the public, and in particular the 'new public' criterion. It will be important to see if the Court, like the AG, addresses the criticism that the 'new public' criterion has resulted in an exhaustion of the right of communication to the public. The interpretation provided by AG Campos appears sensible, and suggests that - similarly to the case of other IP rights (eg trade marks and the steps to be taken against 'genericide') also copyright protection comes with certain 'responsibilities' on the side of rightholders.
A little over a year ago The IPKat reported that Italian-born sculptor Arturo Di Modica, ie the author of the well-known Charging Bull in Manhattan's Financial District, intended to file a formal complaint with the Office of the New York City Mayor over the decision of the latter to allow the positioning (and stay for a few months) of Kristen Visbal's Fearless Girl right just opposite the famous bull.
Initially an advertisement for an index fund which comprises gender diverse companies that have a higher percentage of women among their senior leadership, Fearless Girl has become a popular sight in Manhattan.
The reason why Di Modica was unhappy about the positioning of Fearless Girl is explained in his complaint to the Mayor.
His sculpture was meant to symbolize, initially, the 'strength and power of the American people and, then (after it was moved to its current location), the 'hope of the American people for the future'.
The meaning has arguably changed since the arrival of Fearless Girl. According to Di Modica, contrasted with the soft, altruistic characteristics of the bronze girl, Charging Bull now appears menacing and aggressive.
Di Modica's lawyers have argued that Fearless Girl is a derivative work: 'The statue of the young girl become the "Fearless Girl" only because of the Charging Bull: the work is incomplete without Mr. Di Modica's Charging Bull'.
According to the complaint, also the features of Visbel's work have been deliberately chosen to create an association/contrast with the Charging Bull, including its material (bronze) and patina.
§106 of the US Copyright Act provides in fact that the copyright holder has the exclusive right "to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work".
It should be however noted that such exclusive right is: (1) subject to fair use within §107 and (2) the author of a derivative work owns the copyright to the material that he/she has contributed and this is independent of any copyright protection in the preexisting material, as per §103.
Besides issues of trade mark dilution, Di Modica's lawyers also argued that the altered meaning of Charging Bull would violate the work's integrity and cause prejudice to the author's honour and reputation, thus amounting to an infringement of §106A.
At the time of reporting on the complaint, I suggested that, although Di Modica's sculpture might potentially qualify for protection under §106A, the right of integrity envisaged therein is only actionable in relation to a "distortion, mutilation, or other modification of the work which would be prejudicial" to the honour or reputation of the author.
Arguably Fearless Girl and its positioning have not resulted in any direct intervention on Charging Bull.
Finally, it is worth noting that also §106A protection does not exclude availability of fair use within §107 of the Act.
Despite all this, on 19 April last Mayor Bill de Blasio announced that Fearless Girl will move to a new location in front of the New York Stock Exchange by the end of this year.
But what reasons have been given for this decision if the threat of litigation on copyright grounds from Di Modica is not mentioned in the press release?
Well, believe it or not the reason is ... health and safety and viability!
"The new, long-term home will also alleviate safety issues arising from the large numbers of pedestrians and visitors drawn to the statue, which has been located on a narrow median on Broadway", says the press release.
While the reasons given by the Mayor for his decision are indeed noble ones, it is a pity that Fearless Girl is being moved.
Two, brief, additional points can be made.
The first one is that Fearless Girl communicates a certain message irrespective of its location. In this sense, the claim that it is a derivative work that draws its meaning from the positioning in front of the Charging Bull may be debatable. Similarly questionable are, as explained above, the moral rights concerns.
The second point relates somewhat to the reasons given for its relocation and concerns indeed urban planning. Would it be a good idea for an author to be in a position to have a say over items or even buildings placed in the proximity of his/her publicly displayed work or ... would that be just too much (possibly with the exception of special circumstances)?
To what extent can an architectural project be modified without the express consent of the architect without such modifications being an infringement of their moral right of integrity?
This is the question that not long time ago the District Court of Milan (Tribunale di Milano) addressed in Boeri v Agnoletto, decision No 1568/2018.
In late 2000s well-known architect Stefano Boeri was commissioned to realize an architectural project - then become 'Casa Bosco' - for ‘residential standardized units – Low Cost housing units’ in Milan by virtue of a contract that foresaw that the architect and the commissioning party would have the co-ownership of any resulting rights, and also that any separate use of the project – including for marketing purposes – by either party should be authorized in writing by the other party.
Following the finalization of the project and the decision of Boeri to leave it due to his political commitment with the Municipality of Milan, a new contract was concluded to prepare the final version of the project and obtain the necessary administrative/building permits.
Also this contract envisaged that Boeri would co-own any rights to the project as finalized, save for the right to modify the project if any such modifications would be necessary to obtain the necessary authorization.
In 2014 Boeri brought proceedings for infringement of – among other things – Article 20(1) of the Italian Copyright Act. This provision states that, irrespective of economic rights and even after their transfer, the author of a work has the right to object to any deformation, mutilation or any other modifications, as well as any other act to the detriment of the work, that may be prejudicial to their honour or reputation. The architect claimed in fact that both modifications made to his social housing project ‘Casa Bosco’ and the transformation of the project into a for-profit enterprise indeed infringed his moral right of integrity.
The judges noted that in Italian case law there have been two main interpretations of this provision. On the one hand, there is a restrictive view according to which the only possible modifications are those which in any case do not infringe the author’s moral right of integrity (hence, the provision would only apply with regard to economic rights). On the other hand, the prevalent view is that the derogation within Article 20(2) also applies to the right of integrity [this view appears preferable, also if one considers the fact that it is included within the provision devoted to moral rights]: the authorization of the author is not needed for any modifications that are detrimental to their honour or reputation should such modifications be indispensable to the realization of the work.
The modifications lamented by the architect concerned: (1) the removal of contractual clauses relating to the future sale of the units; (2) the modification of the ratio between free construction- and social construction-reserved areas.
The Court held that the former would be outside the scope of the author’s rights as it would relate not to the project as such but the economic exploitation of the resulting units, and the latter related to something that the author had consented to by entering the relevant contracts.
The judges thus dismissed Boeri’s action.
(b) the goals that the EU is trying to achieve with its copyright reform (if we take the case of the press publishers’ right, over the past few months so many different justifications have been advanced for its necessity – ranging from recouping revenue lost to the web, to preserving press freedom and cultural diversity in Europe, to – now with the latest from MEP Voss [see Recital 31] – contrasting fake news).
There is however an aspect of the discussion – that was explored yesterday during the session – that has remained a bit in the background over the past few months.
What I am referring to is the idea that EU legislature has been attempting to realize a ‘codification’ of the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), particularly with regard to the proposals for a press publishers’ right (for instance, in its latest compromise proposal the Bulgarian Council presidency refers to Infopaq and its progeny [Recital 34a], while in his proposal MEP Voss recalls GS Media [Recital 33 - Katposts here]) and the value gap proposal (here the reference is to the CJEU case law on the right of communication to the public, including the most recent decision in The Pirate Bay case [Katposts here]).
What has been a bit less at the centre of attention is those instances in which EU policy- and law-makers are not justifying their own choices by saying ‘it’s what the CJEU said’, but are rather departing from – and in doing so attempting to erase - CJEU case law.
I have two examples in mind, both of which likely contrast with the interests of those ‘authors and creators’ that the EU has been saying to want to protect further with its own initiatives, notably through Articles 15, 16 and 16a [see Bulgarian version].
First – and this is no surprise, since the Commission included it in its original 2016 proposal - is Article 12 of the directive, which substantially says that the CJEU decision in Reprobel [Katposts here] regarding the beneficiaries of the fair compensation for private copying was a bad move. The provision, that has not been really discussed with the same intensity as other proposals, basically says – unlike what the CJEU had decided by relying on the author principle as enshrined in the InfoSoc Directive – that it is OK that subjects other than reproduction rightholders are entitled ab initio to receive part of the fair compensation for private copying.
The second example, which may be found also in the latest Bulgarian compromise proposal, relates to what looks like a ‘weaponized’ extended collective licensing which substantially makes it clear that the CJEU decision in Soulier and Doke [Katposts here] should not be considered too relevant.
All this to say what? That sometimes references to CJEU case law are used to justify choices in certain areas (making them look like non-choices), while in other cases policy- and law-makers do not appear too reluctant to re-assess – and 'correct' – the legacy of certain decisions.

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