Source: https://openjurist.org/489/f2d/1195
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 11:46:05+00:00

Document:
Bernard Fensterwald, Jr., Washington, D.C., with whom James H. Lesar, Washington, D.C., was on the brief, for appellant.
Walter H. Fleischer, Atty., Dept. of Justice, with whom Asst. Atty. Gen. L. Patrick Gray, III, at the time the brief was filed, Thomas A. Flannery, U.S. Atty., at the time the brief was filed, Harold H. Titus, Jr., U.S. Atty., and Barbara L. Herwig, Atty., Dept. of Justice, were on the brief, for appellee. Alan S. Rosenthal, Atty., Dept. of Justice, also entered an appearance for appellee.
Before: BAZELON, Chief Judge, DANAHER, Senior Circuit Judge, WRIGHT, McGOWAN, TAMM, LEVENTHAL, ROBINSON, MacKINNON, ROBB and WILKEY, Circuit Judges, sitting en banc.
Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge DANAHER.
(7) investigatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes . . ..
President Kennedy was pronounced dead at 1:00 p.m. on Friday, November 22, 1963. That day, at 2:38 p.m., Lyndon B. Johnson was sworn in as the thirty- sixth President of the United States and immediately by plane left Texas for Washington.
When President Johnson returned to Washington he communicated with me within the first 24 hours and asked the Bureau to pick up the investigation of the assassination because as you are aware, there is no federal jurisdiction for such an investigation. It is not a Federal crime to kill or attack the President or Vice President or any of the continuity of officers who would succeed to the presidency.
Clearly, in the day and time of it all, the President contemplated collaboration with Texas authorities by agents of the Secret Service and of the Federal Bureau of Investigation looking to the early apprehension and ultimately the conviction of whoever murdered President Kennedy. It was speedily developed that the rifle from which the assassin's bullets had been fired had been shipped to one Lee Harvey Oswald. The latter was placed under arrest and charged with the perpetration of the crime. Two days later, as an investigation of massive proportions got under way, Oswald, then in the custody of Dallas Police, was fatally shot by one Jack Ruby.
The scope and detail of the investigative effort by the Federal and State agencies are suggested in part by statistics from the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Secret Service. Immediately after the assassination more than 80 additional FBI personnel were transferred to the Dallas office on a temporary basis to assist in the investigation. Beginning November 22, 1963, the Federal Bureau of Investigation conducted approximately 25,000 interviews and reinterviews of persons having information of possible relevance to the investigation and by September 11, 1964, submitted over 2,300 reports totaling approximately 25,400 pages to the Commission. During the same period the Secret Service conducted approximately 1,550 interviews and submitted 800 reports totaling some 4,600 pages.
We deem it demonstrated beyond peradventure that the Department's files: (1) were investigatory in nature; and (2) were compiled for law enforcement purposes.7 When that much shall have been established, as is so clearly the situation on this record, and the district judge shall so determine, such files are exempt from compelled disclosure.
There can be no question that 5 U.S.C. 552 had as its principal purpose that there was to be disclosure to the public of the manner in which the Government conducts its business. Congress additionally was concerned with the dilemma in which the public finds itself when forced to 'litigate with agencies on the basis of secret laws or incomplete information.'10 We have repeatedly made evident our appreciation of the principle that generally disclosure, and not withholding, of information is called for, especially where there is an adversarial posture presented as in Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 138 U.S.App.D.C. 22, 25, 424 F.2d 935, 938, cert. denied, 400 U.S. 824, 91 S.Ct. 46, 27 L.Ed.2d 52 (1970).11 But the remedy appropriately provided in 552(a)(3) is not available in every situation, and as we have previously noted, 552(b) is explicit that 552 does not apply to matters that are specifically exempted.
We are not here speaking of trade secrets, or personnel and medical files, or patent information or internal revenue returns, or yet other material which, by statute (see, e. g., 41 CFR 105-60.604, 1972), had been specifically exempted from disclosure. We are not treating of geological information or matter requred by Executive order to be kept secret. We are not discussing any problem except that of compelled disclosure of Federal Bureau of Investigation investigatory files11A compiled for law enforcement purposes. Certainly the answer does not depend upon what this appellant desires to accormplish if access be afforded. The Court has told us that the Act does not 'by its terms, permit inquiry into particularized needs of the individual seeking the information.' EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. at 86, 93 S.Ct. at 835. Against the background we have hereinbefore set out, we may appropriately turn, particularly as a frame of reference, to the correspondence between the appellant and the Department prior to the institution of this action.
With regard to the spectrographic analysis, if you are not aware of it, not then having been in your present position, I think you should know that if it does not agree in the most minute detail with the interpretation put upon it by the Warren Commission, their Report is a fiction.
Spectrographic Analyses: You have asked for access to the spectrographic analyses conducted on certain bullet evidence involved in the assassination.
I regret that I am unable to grant your request in that the work notes and raw analytical data on which the results of the spectrographic tests are based are part of the investigative files of the FBI and are specifically exempted from public disclosure as investigatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes. 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(7). The results of the spectrographic tests are adequately shown in the report of the Warren Commission where (Volume 5, pages 67, 69, 73 and 74) it is specifically set forth that the metal fragments were analyzed spectrographically and found to be similar in composition.
Our problem thus stems from what follows under the Freedom of Information Act after the Attorney General's exercise of the decisional process devolving upon him.
Further appreciation of the daily activity of the Bureau may be seen in its annual report for 1972. The FBI had developed more than 345,000 items of criminal intelligence which had been disseminated to other Federal, state and local agencies engaged in law enforcement. More than 495,000 examinations of evidence had been conducted by the FBI laboratory to be submitted to law enforcement agencies. Organized crime investigations had ranged throughout the nation. Discretion respecting disclosure of the records in such matters devolved upon the Attorney General by virture of 28 U.S.C. 534. Moreover, under subsection (b) thereof, the exchange of records so gathered may be 'subject to cancellation if dissemination is made outside the receiving departments or related agencies,' Congress provided. It may to some appear unthinkable that the criminal investigatory files of the Bureau of Investigation, compiled for law enforcement purposes, are to be thrown open to some 'person' as defined in 5 U.S.C. 551(2) who asserts entitlement in reliance upon 552(a)(3). Yet our appellant claims his 'right' as a matter of law since in November, 1963, it was not a federal crime to kill a President. We need only surmise the consequences to law enforcement if any 'person,' knowing full well that an investigation has been conducted, can ask some federal court to compel disclosure of the Bureau's files.
Obviously, the statutory scheme of organization, as above referred to, calls for the exercise of discretion by the Attorney General respecting execution of the duties devolving upon him, and through him, upon the Federal Bureau of Investigation. We have no doubt whatever that Congress was fully alive to the problem where investigatory files of the FBI were involved.
. . . an investigation as to the adequacy or the execution of these laws is not a matter within the jurisdiction of the judicial branch of this Government.
And see Newman v., United States, 127 U.S.App.D.C. 263, 265, 382 F.2d 479, 481 (opinion by present Chief Justice Burger, 1967). The Attorney General's prosecutorial discretion is broad, indeed, and ordinarily at least, is not subject to judicial review. Inmates of Attica Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375, 380 (2 Cir. 1973); Powell v. Katzenbach, 123 U.S.App.D.C. 250, 359 F.2d 234 (D.C.Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 906, 86 S.Ct. 1341, 16 L.Ed.2d 349 (1966); Touhy v. Ragen, 340 U.S. 462, 467-469, 71 S.Ct. 416, 95 L.Ed. 417 (1951); cf. Adams v. Richardson, 156 U.S.App.D.C. 267, 480 F.2d 1159 (en banc, June 12, 1973); but we suggested that immunity respecting the exercise of discretion may well be unavailable were the Department to be under investigation by a court or grand jury when fraud or corruption might be involved, Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v. Seaborg, 149 U.S.App.D.C. 385, 391, 463 F.2d 788, 794 (1971). But this much is certain, (5 U.S.C. 301 as part of Pub.L. 89-554, 80 Stat. 379), the Attorney General, like the heads of other Executive departments, was authorized to refuse disclosure under Exemption 7 if he could determine as here that the issue involved investigatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes.
Congress surely realized that disclosure was not to be required in certain prescribed classifications. For example, section 552(b) provided that the section as a whole was not to apply to matters that are (3) 'specifically exempted from disclosure by statute.' See, as illustrative, the statutes identified in 41 CFR 105-60.604 (1972).
Rather than some vague standard, the test was to be simply whether the President has determined by executive order that particular documents are to be kept secret. The language of the Act itself is sufficiently clear in this respect, but the legislative history disposes of any possible argument that Congress intended the Freedom of Information Act to subject executive security classifications to judicial review at the insistence of anyone who might seek to question them.
, what has been said thus far makes wholly untenable any claim that the Act intended to subject the soundness of executive security classifications to judicial review at the insistence of any objecting citizen.
There was to be no room for challenge, no 'balancing' function, no in camera inspection. Rather, upon the basis of the 'showing and in such circumstances, petitioners had met their burden of demonstrating that the documents were entitled to protection under Exemption 1, and the duty of the District Court under 552(a)(3) was therefore at an end.' EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. at 84, 93 S.Ct. at 835.
In that very case, strickingly different treatment was prescribed even as to executive materials claimed to be immune from disclosure under Exemption 5. EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. at 85 et seq., 93 S.Ct. 827. The applicability of Exemption 7 no less will turn ultimately upon a determination by the district court14 that disclosure is not required-- as in the instant case.
Thus he ruled that there was no claim upon which relief could be granted, that there was no issue as to any material fact, and that he Department was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.16 The action was thereupon dismissed.
Spectrographic analysis of bullet, fragments of bullet and other objects, including garments and part of vehicle and curbstone said to have been struck by bullet and/or fragments during assassination of President Kennedy and wounding of Governor Connally.
. . . that the work notes and raw analytical data on which the results of the spectrographic tests are based are part of the investigative files of the FBI and are specifically exempted from public disclosures as investigatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes. 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(7). The results of the spectrographic tests are adequately shown in the report of the Warren Commission where (Volume 5, pages 67, 69, 73 and 74) it is specifically set forth that the metal fragments were analyzed spectrographically and found to be similar in composition.
Thus, we deal in this case, not with Section 552(b)(1), but with Section 552(b)(7). The latter provision exempts from disclosure 'matters that are . . . investigatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes except to the extent available by law to a party other than an agency.' I have no doubt that, as Judge Danaher's majority opinion concludes, the information sought in this case is lodged in a file originally compiled for law enforcement purposes. I cannot, however, agree with the majority that this fact automatically brings the information within the ambit of Section 552(b)(7). There remains the question whether such information is to be considered as resting solely within an 'investigative file' when the results of the spectrographic tests have been made public in the Warren Commission report and when there is no indication that the Government contemplates use of the information for law enforcement purposes.
In Bristol-Myers Company v. F.T.C. (138 U.S.App.D.C. 22), 424 F.2d 935, 939-40 (D.C.Cir), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 824 (91 S.Ct. 46, 27 L.Ed.2d 52) (1970), Chief Judge Bazelon, in reversing the grant of a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's Freedom of Information Act complaint, and in commenting upon the 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(7) exemption, wrote: * * * The agency cannot, consistent with the broad disclosure mandate of the Act, protect all its files with the label 'investigatory' and a suggestion that enforcement proceedings may be launched at some unspecified future date. Thus the District Court must determine whether the prospect of enforcement proceedings is concrete enough to bring into operation the exemption for investigatory files, and if so whether the particular documents sought by the company are nevertheless discoverable.
In the within case, no criminal or civil action relating to the death of President Keenedy is pending nor is it indicated by the Government that any such future action is contemplated by anyone. Nor is Weisberg the subject of any investigation. He simply asks for information which he alleges he is entitled to have made available to him under 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(3). The language of Section 552, supported abundantly by the legislative history of the Freedom of Information Act,6 places the burden on the Government to show why non-revelation should be permitted, and requires that exemptions from disclosure be narrowly construed and that ambiguities be resolved in favor of disclosure. See generally Getman v. N.L.R.B. (146 U.S.App.D.C. 209), 450 F.2d 670, 672 (D.C.Cir. 1971); Soucie v. David (151 U.S.App.D.C. 144), 448 F.2d 1067, 1080 (D.C.Cir. 1971); Wellford v. Hardin, 444 F.2d 21, 25 (4th Cir. 1971); Bristol-Myers Company v. F.T.C., supra at 938-40; M. A. Shapiro & Co. v. Securities & Exchange Comm'n, 339 F.Supp. 467, 469, 470 (D.D.C.1972); cf. LaMorte v. Mansfield, 438 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1971) (Friendly, J.). In Wellford v. Hardin, supra at 25, Judge Butzer commented that 5 U.S.C. 552(c) provides that the Act "does not authorize withholding of information or limit the availability of records to the public, except as specifically stated" and noted Professor Davis' emphasis upon "the pull of the word 'specifically' . . .." K. Davis, The Information Act: A Preliminary Analysis, 34 U.Chi.L.Rev. 761, 783 (1967).
The above was, of course, written in the context of the facts of this case. In most cases perhaps, the Government may satisfy its burden of proof simply by establishing that the information sought was compiled for investigatory purposes and rests in an investigatory file, none of the contents of which have ever been made public. But that is not the case here.
I continue to agree with Judge Kaufman that the purpose of the Act should not be defeated if there is available a judicial technique for advancing it and at the same time ensuring that no harm comes to the interests Congress intended to protect. In camera inspection, as required by the remand order of the withdrawn opinion, is such a technique. The fact that, in Mink, the Supreme Court determined that the language and legislative history of the Section (b) (1) exemption did not permit the use of in camera inspection does not mean that the technique is unsuitable in every case involving the Section (b)(7) exemption.11 Indeed, its use seems most suitable in this case. Without it, the public will have to rely entirely upon the Justice Department's opinion that 'the results of the spectrographic tests are adequately shown in the report of the Warren Commission . . ..'12 I suggest that Congress, in enacting the Freedom of Information Act did not intend that the public would so have to rely.
Accordingly, I dissent, and continue to adhere to the views on this issue expressed by Judge Kaufman in his majority opinion for the panel.
h) metal scrapings from curb in Dealey Plaza which was struck by bullet or fragment.
Nothing in the foregoing cases runs counter to the supreme Court's treatment in EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 93 S.Ct. 827, 35 L.Ed.2d 119 (1973).
11A Attorney General Richardson, acting pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. Section 509, by Order No. 528-73, July 11, 1973, 38 Fed.Reg. No. 136, 19029, (and see 5 U.S.C. 301) has amended earlier regulations relating to materials exempted from compulsory disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act. 'Possible releases that may be considered under this section are at the sole discretion of the Attorney General and of those persons to whom authority hereunder may be delegated.' The Order provides for access to material within the Department's investigatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes 'that are more than fifteen years old' subject to certain deletions which include '(4) Investigatory techniques and procedures.' Compare text quoted supra, and identified in Frankel v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 460 F.2d at 817-818, n. 9, supra.
Our appellant had sought to test the spectrographic analyses of materials (listed in our n. 3, supra) not unlike certain items listed in note 1 of Nichols, supra. There Nichols had sought to make his own scientific analysis of the described material, which the court found to be specifically exempted from disclosure by statute, pointing to 552(b)(3). The opinion cited Pub.L. 89-318, 79 Stat. 1185, November 2, 1965, where the Attorney General acting in 'the national interest' designated evidence considered by the Warren Commission to 'be preserved.' Such evidence pursuant to 4 of that Act was to be placed under the jurisdiction of the Administrator of General Services for preservation under such rules and regulations as the Administrator might prescribe. (See generally, 41 CFR 105-60.101, 105-60.601, 60.602 and 60.604; and Vol. 11, Part 17, 23,002 Congressional Record, 89th Cong. 1st Sess., Sept. 7, 1965).
The court found-- without more-- that the rules and regulations are clearly within the grant of authority of Pub.L. 89-318, and that the materials sought by Nichols came within the exemption of 552(b)(3).
In this case no Executive order, and no matter of national defense or foreign policy, is asserted to be involved. Further, it is to be noted that in remanding in connection with the application of 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(5) exempting 'inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency', Mr. Justice White in the Environmental Protection Agency case placed the burden of showing entitlement to the (b)(5) exemption upon the Government.

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