Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/195/223/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 15:45:23+00:00

Document:
While every intendment is to be made in favor of the lawfulness of the exercise of municipal power making regulations to promote the public health, municipal bylaws and ordinances, and even legislative enactments undertaking to regulate useful business enterprises, are subject to investigation in the courts with a view to determining whether the law or ordinance is a lawful exercise of the police power, or whether, under the guise of enforcing police regulations, there has been an unwarranted and arbitrary interference with constitutional rights to carry on a lawful business, make contracts, or use and enjoy property.
While the right to exercise the police power is a continuing one and a business lawful today may in the future become a menace to the public welfare and be required to yield to the public good, the exercise of the police power is subject to judicial review, and property rights cannot be wrongfully destroyed by arbitrary enactment.
Although an ordinance may be lawful on its face and apparently fair in its terms, yet if it is enforced in such a manner as to work a discrimination against a part of a community for no lawful reason, such exercise of power will be invalidated by the courts. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356.
no change in the neighborhood or conditions. Held to be void as against the holder of the permit as an arbitrary and discriminatory exercise of the police power which amounted to a taking of property without due process of law and an impairment of property rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Where property rights will be destroyed, unlawful interference by criminal proceedings under a void law or ordinance may be reached and controlled by a court of equity.
This is a writ of error to the Supreme Court of the State of California, seeking a reversal of the judgment of that court affirming the judgment of the superior court dismissing the complaint of the plaintiff in error against the City of Los Angeles.
Plaintiff in error filed a bill of complaint against the City of Los Angeles seeking an injunction to restrain the enforcement of certain ordinances prohibiting the erection or maintenance of gas works except within prescribed limits in said city.
1901, passed a second ordinance, amending the first ordinance and thereby so limiting the boundaries of the territory within which the erection of gas works was permitted in said city as to include the premises of the plaintiff in error within the prohibited territory. The work of constructing the works was continuously prosecuted until the latter part of February, 1902, when the plaintiff in error alleges that the City of Los Angeles, combining and confederating with one James R. C. Burton and other persons unknown, caused certain employees of the company engaged in the erection of said works to be arrested, charged with the violation of the said city ordinance. Other arrests were made on the first and third of March, 1902. On the third of March, 1902, the city council passed a third ordinance, amending the ordinance of November 25, 1901, in respect to the description of the district within which gas works could be erected. On March 6, 1902, the city caused the arrest of certain persons employed by the company in charge of the erection of the works, charged with the violation of the amended city ordinance.
will continue to be useless except for the erection of manufacturing establishments, within which were located at that time a soap factory, a wool-pulling factory, three wineries, numerous oil wells in operation, iron foundry, brass foundry, oil refinery; immediately east of said tract, railroads and an extensive tannery; immediately north, the oil tanks and refinery of the Standard Oil Company. That the works being constructed for the plaintiff in error are to be built upon concrete foundations with a superstructure of noncombustible material, so that there can be no danger from explosion, bursting, or leaking. The machinery is to be of the most approved pattern, and that there can be no leakage or escape of odors or any interference with the health, comfort, or safety of the inhabitants of the city.
The plaintiff in error, relying upon the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, prays that the permit granted by the board of fire commissioners be declared to be a valid and subsisting contract between the City of Los Angeles and herself, and that all ordinances passed by the city council in contravention thereof be declared void; that the defendant be enjoined from enforcing said ordinances against the plaintiff, from delaying or interfering with the action of the plaintiff in erecting the said works, from interfering with the maintenance and operation of the same, and for general relief.
As this case was decided upon demurrer to the complaint, the allegations thereof must be taken as true. The question presented involves the right of the plaintiff in error to invoke the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment against alleged infraction of her rights by the action of the city council in passing and enforcing the ordinances which prevent the carrying on of the business of making and selling gas to the people of the city.
"in any city where there are no public works owned and controlled by the municipality for supplying the same with water or artificial light, any individual, or any company duly incorporated for such purpose under and by authority of the laws of this state, shall, under the direction of the superintendent of streets or other officer in control thereof, and under such general regulations as the municipality may prescribe for damages and indemnity for damages, have the privilege of using the public streets and thoroughfares thereof, and of laying down pipes and conduits therein, and connections therewith, so far as may be necessary for introducing into and supplying such city and its inhabitants either with gas light or other illuminating light, or with fresh water for domestic and all other purposes, upon the condition that the municipal government shall have the right to regulate the charges thereof."
"To justify the state in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear first that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference, and second that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. The legislature may not, under the guise of protecting the public interests, arbitrarily interfere with private business or impose unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations. In other words, its determination as to what is a proper exercise of its police powers is not final or conclusive, but is subject to the supervision of the courts."
"The question of constitutional law to which we have referred [the equal protection of the laws] cannot be disposed of by saying that the statute in question may be referred to what are called the police powers of the state, which, as often stated by this Court, were not included in the grants of power to the general government, and therefore were reserved to the states when the Constitution was ordained. But, as the Constitution of the United States is the supreme law of the land, anything in the Constitution or statutes of the states to the contrary notwithstanding, a statute of a state, even when avowedly enacted in the exercise of its police powers, must yield to that law. No right granted or secured by the Constitution of the United States can be impaired or destroyed by a state enactment, whatever may be the source from which the power to pass such enactment may have been derived. 'The nullity of any act inconsistent with the Constitution is produced by the declaration that the Constitution is the supreme law.' The state has undoubtedly the power, by appropriate legislation, to protect the public morals, the public health, and the public safety; but if, by their necessary operation, its regulations looking to either of those ends amount to a denial to persons within its jurisdiction of the equal protection of the laws, they must be deemed unconstitutional and void. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 22 U. S. 210; Sinnot v. Davenport, 22 How. 227, 63 U. S. 243; Missouri, Kansas & Texas Ry. v. Haber, 169 U. S. 613, 169 U. S. 626."
police power is exerted to regulate a useful business or occupation, the legislature is not the exclusive judge as to what is a reasonable and just restraint upon the constitutional right of the citizen to pursue any trade, business, or vocation which in itself is recognized as innocent and useful to the community. It is always a judicial question if any particular regulation of such right is a valid exercise of police power, though the authority of the courts to declare such regulation invalid will be exercised with the utmost caution, and only when it is clear that the ordinance or law declared void passes the limits of the police power and infringes upon rights guaranteed by the Constitution."
nothing in the situation which rendered it necessary, in order to protect the city from a noisome and unhealthy business, to decrease the area within which gas works could lawfully be erected.
It is urged that, where the exercise of legislative or municipal power is clearly within constitutional limits, the courts will not inquire into the motives which may have actuated the legislative body in passing the law or ordinance in question. Whether, when it appears that the facts would authorize the exercise of the power, the courts will restrain its exercise because of alleged wrongful motives inducing the passage of an ordinance is not a question necessary to be determined in this case, but where the facts as to the situation and conditions are such as to establish the exercise of the police power in such manner as to oppress or discriminate against a class or an individual, the courts may consider and give weight to such purpose in considering the validity of the ordinance. This Court, in the case of Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, held that, although an ordinance might be lawful upon its face, and apparently fair in its terms, yet if it was enforced in such a manner as to work a discrimination against a part of the community for no lawful reason, such exercise of power would be invalidated by the courts.
held to be the legislative intention, in empowering city councils to regulate the price of gas, to limit such companies to fair and reasonable prices, and if, in the colorable exercise of this power, a majority of the members of the council, for a fraudulent purpose, combine to pass an ordinance fixing the price of gas at a rate at which they well know it cannot be manufactured and sold without loss, such an ordinance would impose no obligation on the company. This case was cited with apparent approval by Mr. Justice Matthews in delivering the opinion of this Court in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, supra, and see Dillon Mun.Corp., 4th ed. § 311.
In this case, we think the allegations of the bill disclose such character of territory, such sudden and unexplained change of its limits after the plaintiff in error had purchased the property and gone forward with the erection of the works, as to bring it within that class of cases wherein the court may restrain the arbitrary and discriminatory exercise of the police power which amounts to a taking of property without due process of law and an impairment of property rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution.
It is also urged by the defendants in error that a court of equity will not enjoin prosecution of a criminal case; but, as we have seen, the plaintiff in error in this case had acquired property rights which, by the enforcement of the ordinances in question, would be destroyed and rendered worthless. If the allegations of the bill be taken as true, she had the right to proceed with the prosecution of the work without interference by the city authorities in the form of arrest and prosecution of those in her employ.
It is well settled that, where property rights will be destroyed, unlawful interference by criminal proceedings under a void law or ordinance may be reached and controlled by a decree of a court of equity. Davis & Farnum Mfg. Co. v. Los Angeles, 189 U. S. 207, 189 U. S. 218, and cases therein cited.
should have been overruled and the City of Los Angeles put upon its answer.
For the reasons herein stated, the judgment of the Supreme Court of California is reversed, and the cause remanded to that court for further proceedings not in conflict with this opinion.

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