Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/79370/boyle-vs-zacharie
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 04:45:55+00:00

Document:
"The sole effect of this agreement is to save to the party whatever rights he may claim from the legal operation of the insolvent laws of the State of Maryland. It neither admits their validity nor varies any rights of Z. and T., if they are entitled to them."
The agreement of B. to indemnify Z. and T. is not in contemplation of law a Maryland contract, but a Louisiana contract, by which B. undertook to pay the money, in the place where Z. and T. resided, and not in Maryland. The agreement of Z. and T. by which they procured the relief of the ship Fabius was within their authority as consignees of the ship.
Such a contract would be understood by all the parties to be a contract made in the place where the advance was to be made, and the payment, unless otherwise stipulated, would also be understood to be made there. The case would in this aspect fall directly within the authority of Lanusse v. Barker, 3 Wheat. 101, 16 U. S. 146 .
The effect of a discharge under an insolvent law of a state is at rest so far as it depends on the antecedent decisions made by this Court. The ultimate opinion delivered by MR. JUSTICE JOHNSON in the case of Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213, 25 U. S. 258 , was concurred in and adopted by the three judges who were in the minority on the general question of the constitutionality of state insolvent laws. So far, then, as decisions upon the subject of state insolvent laws have been made by this Court, they are to be deemed final and conclusive.
title could be lawfully taken in execution under the said judgment until a scire facias containing proper averments of the acquisition of property by him in someone of the above mentioned modes should be first issued and the facts found to be true either by confession or by verdict of a jury or otherwise according to law. And the bill prayed an injunction to be granted restraining and prohibiting the defendants from levying their execution, and the injunction to that effect was granted and served in due form.
The answer of the defendants, the appellees, stated that in the latter part of the year 1818, the complainant consigned to them at New Orleans a brig called the Fabius, and that they procured a freight for her to Liverpool; that after the cargo was actually laden on board of her, and she was about to sail, she was attached at the suit of Vincent, Nolte & Company, for a debt due to them by the complainant, and they, the defendants, and one Richard Relff, with a view to the benefit of the complainant, became security for the complainant and procured the release of the brig. The complainant approved of their acts, and undertook and promised to indemnify them for any loss they might sustain on his account. He afterwards gave the defendants a security for their liability on 1 May, 1819.
"I will see Messrs Zacharie & Turner paid whatever sum they have to pay Vincent, Nolte & Company on account of a bill drawn by them on Hugh Boyle for disbursements of the ship Mohawk, original bill amount, $5,451, of which the said Hugh Boyle paid $3,000; the balance, the said Hugh Boyle contends, is not due to Vincent, Nolte & Co. When decided ,it shall be paid."
Hugh Boyle, the complainant, and Lemuel Taylor, soon after this circumstance, became insolvent, and the defendants afterwards paid to Vincent, Nolte & Company the sum of $3,113.80, the amount of the judgment obtained by them against the complainant.
a suit in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Maryland against the complainant, and obtained judgment against him for the amount so paid by them on his account, and proceeded thereon as stated in the complainant's bill. They say that the discharge of the complainant by the insolvent laws of the State of Maryland does not prevent their having the full benefit of the execution issued against the complainant's property, which has been acquired to a large amount since the discharge, all of which is liable for the payment of his debts.
The court granted the injunction as prayed for.
The answer admits the issuing of the attachments in New Orleans against the supposed property of the complainant, but states that the defendants in the same denied having any funds, and the proceedings were dismissed.
On 19 May, 1829, the cause was set down for final hearing in the circuit court, and after argument it was decreed that the injunction should be dissolved, and the complainant's bill was dismissed. From this decree the complainant appealed to this Court.
on board and the brig was ready to sail, she was attached by process of law at the suit of Messrs Vincent, Nolte & Co. of New Orleans as the property of Boyle for a debt due by him to them. Zacharie & Turner, with one Richard Relff, with a view to benefit Boyle and enable the brig to perform her voyage, became security for Boyle upon the attachment, and thus procured the release of the brig. Upon information of the facts, Boyle approved of their conduct and promised to indemnify them for any loss they might sustain on that account. Messrs. Vincent, Nolte & Co. recovered judgment in their suit, and Zacharie & Turner were compelled to pay the debt and expenses, amounting to $2,113.30, and afterwards, on 23 December, 1819, they instituted a suit against Boyle for the recovery of the same in the Circuit Court of Maryland. On the 31st of the same month of December, 1819, Boyle made application for the benefit of the Insolvent Act of Maryland of 1816, ch. 228, and eventually received a discharge under the same. On 1 May, 1821, judgment by confession was rendered in the suit in favor of Zacharie & Turner for the sum of $3,113.80, with interest from 15 November, 1819, and costs of suit, and a memorandum was entered of record, by consent of the parties, as follows, "this judgment subject to the legal operation of the defendant's discharge under the insolvent laws of Maryland." The judgment having remained unexecuted for more than a year, it was revived by a scire facias, and writs of fieri facias were issued and renewed from time to time until 12 December, 1827, when a fieri facias was delivered to the marshal, who levied it on the ship General Smith, belonging to Boyle, on 31 March, 1828, and returned it to the May term of the Circuit Court of the same year.
commissions accruing to him for certain business done for Zacharie since the judgment and agreed to be deducted therefrom, and thirdly, for the amount of losses sustained by the plaintiff in consequence of Zacharie & Turner's having caused certain attachments for the same debt to be issued in Louisiana against the property of the plaintiff in the hands of certain debtors of the plaintiff in that state. An injunction issued on the bill on the 8th of the same April.
The answer of the defendants (now appellees) having come in, the cause was set down for a hearing on the bill and answer (by which the facts stated in the answer must be taken to be true), and it was decreed by the court that the injunction be dissolved and the bill dismissed without costs. From that decree the present appeal has been taken to this Court.
The first point presented for argument, and indeed that which was the principal ground of the appeal, is as to the effect of the discharge under the insolvent act. This question is of course at rest so far as it is covered by the antecedent decisions made by this Court. The ultimate opinion delivered by MR. JUSTICE JOHNSON in the case of Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213, 25 U. S. 358 , was concurred in and adopted by the three judges, who were in the minority upon the general question of the constitutionality of state insolvent laws so largely discussed in that case. It is proper to make this remark in order to remove an erroneous impression of the bar that it was his single opinion, and not of the three other judges who concurred in the judgment. So far, then, as decisions upon the subject of state insolvent laws have been made by this Court, they are to be deemed final and conclusive.
It has been suggested that the memorandum of agreement accompanying the judgment that it should be "subject to the legal operation of the insolvent laws of Maryland," ought to be deemed an acquiescence on the part of Zacharie & Turner, in the validity of that discharge, or at least a waiver of any claim in repugnance to it. We do not think so. The sole effect of that agreement is to save to the party whatever rights he may claim from the legal operation of those laws. It neither admits their validity nor waives any rights of Zacharie & Turner, if they are unconstitutional.
"so far from disapproving of the acts of these defendants, as above stated, thanked them for their prompt and correct management of his business and undertook and promised to indemnify them from any loss which they might sustain on his account."
Now that could scarcely be deemed a prompt and correct management of the business of the principal, which was wholly beyond the scope of the authority delegated to the agents. In this view of the matter, the contract of indemnity would clearly refer for its execution to Louisiana, as much so as if Boyle had authorized Zacharie & Turner to advance money there on his account, for which he would repay them. Such a contract would be understood by all parties to be a contract made in the place where the advance was to be made, and the payment, unless otherwise stipulated, would also be understood to be made there. The case would in this aspect fall directly within the authority of Lanusse v. Barker, 3 Wheat. 101, 16 U. S. 146 ; see also Coolidge v. Poor, 15 Mass. 427; Consequa v. Fanning, 3 Johns.Ch. 587.
prior order, and when made, it has relation back to the time of the original transaction and gives it as full a sanction as if it had been done under an original authority. The ratification of this contract by Boyle was complete and perfect, and he treated it as a Louisiana contract of indemnity, for his benefit, by which he was bound, and which he ought to discharge in that state.
As to the credit for commissions, that is no longer relied on; for the defendant's answer asserts distinctly that the amount has been already credited.
"whereby your orator has been deprived of the benefit of any part of the debt, now due by the said Nelson [the garnishee], being somewhere about the sum of $1,500, besides interest thereon, from the said year, when the attachment aforesaid was laid, and which sum is as completely lost to your orator, as if it had been paid over to the said Zacharie & Turner, who, for aught your orator knows, may have actually recovered the whole of it in virtue of said attachment, and may have refused to give credit for the same."
"that they also attached property belonging to your orator, which was in the hands of Messrs Breedlove and Bradford [the garnishees], for which your orator has never received any credit, although it has been thus far completely lost to him, amounting, as he verily believes, to the sum of, &c.;"
effects of the attachment by the payment of the debt due to Zacharie & Turner, and where he has himself acquiesced in the delay, without in any manner attempting to speed the suits, and where no connivance or indulgence is pretended to have existed in concert with the garnishees, and where there is no allegation in the bill itself of any undue delay in prosecuting the attachments by the creditor, it is difficult to perceive any foundation on which to rest a claim for equitable relief. But the answer of the defendants shows still more forcible objections against the bill. This answer explicitly avers that in both of the attachments, the garnishees denied having any funds of Boyle in their possession, Nelson generally and Breedlove, Bradford & Co. with the qualification, any funds liable to the attachment, and the suits were dismissed accordingly. Copies of the proceedings are annexed to the answer, which demonstrate (if it had been necessary) the result of the averment; but it must be taken to be true, as the hearing was upon bill and answer.
"We do not consider ourselves in debt to Hugh Boyle or to Hugh Boyle & Co.; we received of Hugh Boyle & Co. some property, which has been sold, and the proceeds, say twelve or thirteen hundred dollars, placed to their credit on our books; but one of the house holds a claim against Hugh Boyle & Co. for upwards of twenty-five hundred dollars, which amount he refused to admit as a credit to our partner, but was willing to close Hugh Boyle & Co.'s account, by charging him and crediting the partner with the balance due said Boyle, and in this way said balance was held to pay the claim."
we know of any." Now it has not been shown at the argument that in a process of this sort, under the local laws of Louisiana, the debt due to one partner might not be a good defense for the garnishees, and certainly the court cannot presume it. And upon general principles there can be little doubt that in a court of equity in a suit by Boyle seeking relief, such a counterclaim would or might, under circumstances, furnish a good defense, if not to the firm, at least to the creditor partner, to rebut the claim of Boyle against him. Where there is an express denial by the garnishees setting up an equity of any property in their hands liable to the attachment, that allegation ought to be presumed to be supported by the local law applicable to the facts until the contrary is explicitly established. But the decisive answer is that as this suit was commenced at the request of Boyle, and as the garnishees did not admit that they had property liable to the attachment, the onus is on Boyle to show that nevertheless, by the local law, the attachment might have been enforced. He has failed to establish any such proposition.
This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Maryland and was argued by counsel, on consideration whereof it is ordered and decreed by this Court that the decree of the said circuit court in this cause be and the same is hereby affirmed with costs.

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