Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&amp;view=article&amp;id=45956:am-rtj-02-1691-2&amp;catid=1459&amp;Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 12:24:22+00:00

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The common thread in the above cases, which justifies the imposition of the supreme penalty of dismissal from the service upon the erring judges, is the fact that the acts committed by respondents therein involve malice, wrongful motives, corrupt intentions or moral depravity. Apparently, of the thirteen (13) cases cited, eight (8) were either for gross misconduct, serious misconduct or corruption. Five (5) cases were for gross ignorance of the law. In two (2) of these cases, only reprimand and fine were imposed upon respondents. In the remaining three (3), respondents were penalized with dismissal from the service because of facts peculiar to said cases, definitely not similar to the facts in the instant case. In CastaÃ±os v. EscaÃ±o,15 in addition to gross ignorance of the law, respondent was also found guilty of grave abuse of authority for using contempt as a retaliatory measure. In Lantaco, Sr. v. Judge Llamas,16 respondent judge repeatedly ignored our directive for him to file comment. And in State Prosecutors v. Muro,17 though respondent judge was initially dismissed, he was reinstated upon his filing of a motion for reconsideration. It bears reiterating that in all these cases, malice, fraud, dishonesty, corruption or wrongful intention are present. Here, respondent's questioned actuations are not tainted by any of these incidents. Hence, we can not consider the above cited cases as precedents applicable to his case.
Thirdly, it is not true that respondent has not shown remorse or repentance. In his motion for reconsideration, he manifested his immediate compliance with our Decision dated January 16, 2004 on the premise that the "Supreme Court has spoken." A truth, commonly accepted in civilized institutions, is that acceptance of punishment often mitigates the gravity of a violation of a duty. The ultimate commitment of one's fate to legal process means that under an obligation of consent or a duty to support just institutions, one's breach is also substantially lessened.18 Although respondent judge moved for the reduction of his penalty, the same was premised on his length of service in the judiciary. His motion merely appealed to our "compassion and understanding," thus, showing humility in his moral judgment.
'. This tale is farthest from the truth because the respondent had only inhibited in the cases of five (5) law offices, and one lawyer only, the Branch Clerk of Court's certificate is hereto attached as Annex "A." Thus, the rest of the complainants lawyer (sic) have continued to appear before the respondent's court, contrary to the allegation of the complainants.
'Competence is a mark of a good judge. When a judge displays an utter lack of familiarity with the rules, he erodes the public's confidence in the competence of our courts. Such is gross ignorance of the law. Having accepted the exalted position of a judge, he owes the public and the court the duty to be proficient in the law.
'Evidence on hand also reveals respondent's casual disregard of procedural rules, that is, when he promulgated a decision that has yet to be released as shown in the case of People v. Malapit, et al., docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 15320-R, 15323-R and 1532327-R, and in People v. Cas, docketed as Criminal Case No. 15306-R.
33 48 C.J.S. - 27 at 976-977, citing Saint v. Simon, 110 So. 826, 162 La. 596; Villani v. Duffy, 175 A. 373, 114 N.J. Law 60; Matter of Droege, 114 N.Y.S. 375, 129 App. Div. 866, appeal dismissed 90 N.E. 340, 197 N.Y. 44.
45 98 C.J.S. - 404, citing State v. Stone, 36 S.E. 2d 704, 226 N.C. 97.

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