Source: http://ca10.washburnlaw.edu/cases/2001/07/00-3086.htm
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 16:31:19+00:00

Document:
We review de novo a grant of judgment as a matter of law. Phillips v. Hillcrest Med. Ctr., 244 F.3d 790, 796 (10th Cir. 2001). Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes a trial judge to grant judgment as a matter of law "if, after a party has been fully heard on an issue, there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for the party . . . ." Id. Because a court does not lightly presume the decision of a reasonable juror, judgment "may be granted only if the evidence points but one way and is susceptible to no reasonable inference which may support the opposing party's position." Id. (internal quotations omitted). Thus, when a defendant seeks judgment as a matter of law, the controlling question is whether the plaintiff has arguably proven a legally sufficient claim.
In making that determination, "[w]e do not weigh the evidence, pass on the credibility of the witnesses, or substitute our conclusions for that of the jury." Pizza Hut v. Lockard, 162 F.3d 1062, 1068 (10th Cir. 1998) (quotations and citations omitted). Instead, we view "the facts and all reasonable inferences from them . . . in the light most favorable to the appellant." Phillips, 244 F.3d at 796. Accordingly, although the parties set forth varying versions of the underlying facts, we consider those facts in the light most favorable to Dr. Turnbull.
Topeka State Hospital was a state-run inpatient mental health center(1) which treated patients with severe mental illnesses for whom outpatient treatment options had failed. TSH was not a jail. Patients were treated in the least restrictive environment possible, although all patients had been admitted because they posed some danger to themselves or others. While the hospital had an obligation to admit anyone referred there, unusually violent offenders could be transferred to more secure facilities.
Here, the jury found Dr. Turnbull was subjected to a sexually hostile work environment. See R. at 1458. We easily conclude that determination was not unreasonable. While there was only one incident,(2) it was objectively abusive, dangerous, and humiliating, and Dr. Turnbull was so traumatized she was unable to return to work thereafter. TSH argues any dangers inherent in the hospital environment could not constitute sexual harassment because the male staff members were also subject to sexual comments or physical attack by patients. However, conduct that affects both sexes may constitute sexual harassment if it disproportionately affects female staff. See Crist v. Focus Homes, Inc., 122 F.3d 1107, 1111 (8th Cir. 1997) (assaults on female staff sexual harassment even though patient also assaulted male staff member). The male staff of TSH were not subject to the fear or the reality of sexual assault in the same manner as the female staff. We turn, therefore, to the more difficult question of whether TSH should be legally liable for the harassment.
We have held that an employer may be responsible for sexual harassment based upon the acts of nonemployees. Lockard, 162 F.3d at 1073 (restaurant responsible for acts of customers); see also Crist, 122 F.3d at 1108 (group home liable for acts of mentally incapacitated resident); 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(e) (employer may be responsible for acts of non-employee where employer "knows or should have known of the conduct and fails to take immediate and appropriate corrective action"). To protect against imposing strict liability upon employers, we apply a negligence analysis, asking whether the organization "fail[ed] to remedy or prevent a hostile or offensive work environment of which management- level employees knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known." Lockard, 162 F.3d at 1074, citing Hirschfeld v New Mexico Corrections Dept., 916 F.2d 572, 577 (10th Cir. 1990); 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(e) (employer liable if "fails to take immediate and appropriate corrective action"). The focus is not on the conduct itself but on the employer's behavior in response; a hospital cannot control every act of its patients, but it does control the environment at large. Crist, 122 F.3d at 1110-12.
. . . a danger to themselves or others, employees like plaintiff inherently assume the risk of facing sexually hostile, aggressive patients." Aplee. Br. at 50. In support of this theory, it cites cases which held prisons were not liable for sexual harassment or sexual assaults by an inmate. See, e.g., Powell v. Morris, 37 F.Supp.2d 1011 (S.D. Ohio 1999); Hicks v. Alabama, 45 F.Supp.2d 921 (S.D. Ala. 1998). This argument overlooks the continued emphasis on the employer's preventive measures, however. As explained in one case, "Courts have repeatedly declined to impose sexual harassment liability upon correctional institutions for the sexually offensive conduct of inmates, as long as the defendant institution took proper preventative and remedial steps with regard to inmate behavior." Powell, 37 F.Supp.2d at 1017 (emphasis added); see also Hicks, 45 F.Supp.2d at 933 (prison not liable where plaintiffs could identify no extra measures that could have prevented incident). Even in an inherently dangerous working environment, the focus remains on whether the employer took reasonable measures to make the workplace as safe as possible.
1. The hospital closed in 1997.
2. Title VII provides that an employee must file a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission within three hundred days of the acts about which she complains. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). Counting back three hundred days from the date Dr. Turnbull filed her complaint yields a date of July 19, 1996, approximately five weeks before her attack. Accordingly, TSH argues any events that took place before that date are time barred and must not be considered. In response, Dr. Turnbull argues the environment that existed throughout her employment constituted continuing sexual harassment and should be considered as a whole. See Martin v. Nannie & the Newborns, Inc., 3 F.3d 1410, 1414-16 (10th Cir. 1993) (discussing continuing course of conduct for sexual harassment under Title VII).

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