Source: http://masscases.com/cases/sjc/266/266mass315.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 00:28:13+00:00

Document:
EDWIN C. BARRINGER vs. GEORGE A. NORTHRIDGE & another.
Law of the Case. Equity Pleading and Practice, Appeal, Decree. Trustee Process.
(3) The decree entered on the second motion therefore was erroneous and must be reversed.
It was stated that the Superior Court has power to correct clerical errors in its records and decrees.
It was stated that, in the suit in equity above described, there was nothing inherently wrong or contrary to law in specifying in the interlocutory decree the sum for which the trustee was to be charged.
BILL IN EQUITY, commenced by a common law writ in trustee process dated May 4, 1925, for an accounting.
the opinion. The interlocutory and final decrees, and the final decree after rescript were entered by order of Cox, J. The trustee's first, motion was heard by Broadhurst, J., and his second motion by Lummus, J.
E. C. Barringer, pro se.
F. P. McKeon, for W. H. Northridge.
trustee.'" The plaintiff's appeal from that decree brings the case here.
The trustee raises the point that the case is not rightly before us on appeal from an interlocutory decree. Hutchins v. Nickerson, 212 Mass. 118, 120. Siciliano v. Barbuto, 265 Mass. 390, 393. The decree of June 26, 1926, charging the trustee for specific amounts, was in form final. The alleged correction made by the decree here under review affected the rights of the plaintiff. If it stand, the trustee could not be charged except upon scire facias. MacAusland v. Fuller, 229 Mass. 316. While the proceeding by trustee process and the scire facias to determine the amount due "are part of one continued and connected course of proceedings," Universal Optical Corp. v. Globe Optical Co. 228 Mass. 84, 85, yet we think that the decree appealed from in the circumstances here disclosed was sufficiently final, so far as the trustee was a party to the equity suit, to warrant present consideration of it. Reynolds v. Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway, 224 Mass. 253, 254. Hanson v. Hanson, 258 Mass. 45, 47. The rights of the plaintiff against the trustee in trustee process, and his rights against the main defendant, are so far distinct and severable that a decision respecting each may be treated as final for the purpose of bringing proceedings to this court without violation of the rule of Hutchins v. Nickerson, supra. Reynolds v. Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway, 224 Mass. 253, 254; S. C. 224 Mass. 379.
The question presented by the appeal is not whether the Superior Court has power to correct clerical errors in its records and decrees. Of that there can be no doubt. Karrick v. Wetmore, 210 Mass. 578, 579, and cases there collected. Randall v. Peerless Motor Car Co. 212 Mass. 352, 387. Everett-Morgan Co. v. Boyajian Pharmacy, 244 Mass. 460, 462. The question presented is whether on this record the decree here under review rightly could have been entered. There is nothing inherently wrong or contrary to law in specifying in the original proceeding and without resort to scire facias the amount for which a trustee shall be charged. Jarvis v. Mitchell, 99 Mass. 530. Cheshire National Bank v. Jaynes, 225 Mass. 432, 435.
The question whether there was mistake or clerical error in the decree charging the trustee for a specific amount was raised clearly and unequivocally by the first motion seeking that relief, filed by the trustee on June 16, 1927. Notice issued on that motion. It was denied absolutely and without reservation. It must be assumed to have been denied as the result of deliberate decision of the judge. There is nothing on which to found the inference that it was not denied on its merits. Bigelow v. Winsor, 1 Gray 299, 301. Foote v. Gibbs, 1 Gray 412. Borrowscale v. Tuttle, 5 Allen 377. See Newburyport Institution for Savings v. Puffer, 201 Mass. 41, 49. No finding was made by the third judge that this action of the second judge in denying the earlier motion of the same tenor was not based on a consideration of the merits of all matters of fact and of law thereby raised. Mistake in the decree entered by the first judge was explicitly asserted in that motion. Whether there was such mistake was directly involved in the decision made by the second judge. There was no appeal or exception taken by the trustee to that denial of the motion. No relief from the effect of that denial was sought. If the trustee thought it was tainted by error in any essential particular, he took no steps to correct it.
If that action by the second judge be treated as a finding of fact, it is entitled to the same weight as any finding of fact made by a tribunal having jurisdiction of the cause and the parties. Until reversed or set aside in some recognized form of procedure, it must be accepted as true. It is conclusive upon the rights of the parties. If it be treated as a ruling of law, there was no exception or appeal taken to the end that it might be reversed. It must stand as the law of the case. Boyd v. Taylor, 207 Mass. 335. Beach & Clarridge Co. v. American Steam Gauge & Valve Manuf. Co. 208 Mass. 121, 132. Murphy v. Hanright, 238 Mass. 200, 203, 204. United Drug Co. v. Cordley & Hayes, 239 Mass. 334, 337. Daniels v. Cohen, 249 Mass. 362, 364. Phillips v. Director General of Railroads, 251 Mass. 263, 268. Pizer v. Hunt, 253 Mass. 321, 333. If it be treated as the decision of a mixed question of law and fact, the same principles apply.
The third judge, at the hearing upon the second motion of the trustee, was bound to accept that decision of the second judge upon precisely the same motion as binding upon him. There would be no end of litigation if a party, defeated before one judge, were privileged to go before another judge of the same court and in the same case seek a different decision upon the same point. Such procedure would be most unseemly. It would tend to bring the administration of justice into contempt. The policy of the law requires that litigation be ended within a reasonable time and not be protracted at the will of either party; it condemns successive hearings of the same point once decided after a hearing not vitiated by any error ascertained according to settled practice. Boston Bar Association v. Casey, 227 Mass. 46, 48, 49. Commonwealth v. Dascalakis, 246 Mass. 12, 25. Thorndike, petitioner, 254 Mass. 256, 260. United States v. Mayer, 235 U. S. 55, 70. Exporters of Manufacturers' Products, Inc. v. Butterworth-Judson Co. 258 U. S. 365, 369.
Other points argued need not be considered.

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