Source: http://ar.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20180320_0000795.EAR.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 10:27:39+00:00

Document:
The parents of children taken into temporary protective custody by the State of Arkansas bring this class action against state officials of the Division of Children and Family Services of the Department of Human Services (“DHS”) in their individual and official capacities alleging violations of the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The state officials have filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and (6). For the following reasons, the motion is granted in part and denied in part.
The plaintiffs allege three categories of federal claims: (1) Webb and the Lays claim separately from the class that the seizures of their children were unconstitutional; (2) Webb and the Lays claim separately from the class that they were deprived of an opportunity to be heard in a timely manner after the seizures; and (3) Webb and the Lays claim on behalf of themselves and the proposed class that the Arkansas statutes governing the provision of post-deprivation hearings to parents of seized children are constitutionally deficient. The statutes at issue are Ark. Code Ann. § 12-18-1001, which authorizes taking children into protective custody for up to 72 hours without a hearing, and Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-314, which governs the pertinent court procedures.
The amended class action complaint alleges the following facts. Katelyn Webb is a mother of two. On June 28, 2017, a juvenile court jailed her for contempt and DHS seized her children. Webb was released from jail on July 3. Document #1-2 at 61. Chelsea Smith, a Family Services Worker, petitioned the court on July 5 for an ex parte order for emergency custody. Smith alleged that Webb was incarcerated and that no relative or friend was willing or able to take temporary custody of the children. The court entered the order on July 5 and set a probable cause hearing for July 12. Smith sent a text message to Webb on July 11 informing her that the court cancelled the hearing. The court reset the hearing for July 20. Webb appeared and informed that court that she did not want appointed counsel. The court continued the hearing until July 26, when the court found that probable cause existed for removal of the children from Webb's custody at the time they were seized. The court did not find that the children were neglected and restored custody to Webb.
Jerimey and Tabitha Lay have three children. On May 1, 2017, DHS seized the children based on a suspicion of abuse or neglect. Stacy Houck, a Family Services Worker, petitioned the court on May 3 for an ex parte order for emergency custody. The court entered the order on May 5 and set a probable cause hearing for May 8. The hearing did not conclude on May 8 and the court ordered that the children be returned to Tabitha on May 10 unless the attorney ad litem objected. The attorney ad litem objected and the court set the conclusion of the hearing for May 12. After the hearing, the children were returned to Tabitha pursuant to a safety plan by which the Lays were to keep DHS apprised of the children's whereabouts. Jerimey was not permitted to have any contact with the children and was not allowed to stay at the home.
Cindy Gillespie is the Director of DHS. Mischa Martin is the Director of the Division of Children and Family Services. The amended class action complaint alleges that Gillespie and Martin approved and ratified the actions of Smith and Houck, and failed to properly train and supervise DHS employees.
The defendants maintain that the plaintiffs do not have Article III standing. The “irreducible constitutional minimum” of standing consists of three elements. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 2136, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). “The plaintiffs must have (1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S.Ct. 1540, 1547, 194 L.Ed.2d 635 (2016). The plaintiff has the burden of establishing these elements, which at the pleading stage may be met by clearly alleging facts demonstrating each element. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-99, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975). It is established that parents have a fundamental right to the custody of their children and the deprivation of that right is an injury in fact. The issue concerns the second element. The defendants argue that they did not cause the injuries the plaintiffs allege.
The amended complaint alleges that DHS seized the plaintiffs' children prior to the juvenile courts' ex parte orders. Then, post-deprivation hearings were not held in a timely manner. The defendants note that they were not present at any hearings, nor do they have the authority to cancel or schedule hearings. Document #17 at 3. However, the seizure of the children did lead to the court proceedings, the amended complaint alleges that the seizure of the Lays' children was unlawful, and the amended complaint alleges that Smith did not petition the court for emergency custody within the time required under Arkansas law. “At the pleading stage, general factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant's conduct may suffice.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561, 112 S.Ct. at 2137. The alleged injuries can fairly be traced to the defendants. Based on the allegations in the amended complaint, the plaintiffs have Article III standing to seek damages for the seizures of their children and the alleged lack of due process following those seizures.
Although the plaintiffs have standing to seek damages for the seizures of their children and the lack of due process, it is not clear that they have standing to challenge the constitutionality of the statutes at issue. The third element of the standing test-redressability-presents a hurdle to them because “[t]he alleged injury-[Arkansas's] temporary removal of their children-has already occurred and will not necessarily occur again.” Doe v. Kearney, 329 F.3d 1286, 1292 (11th Cir. 2003). In Kearney, the court found that the redressability element was met because the record indicated the likelihood that the plaintiffs would encounter similar state action under the statute in the future. Id. at 1293. Nothing of the sort is alleged here.

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