Source: https://veteranclaims.net/2009/10/24/lay-evidence-continuity-of-symptomatology-3-303-savage-v-gober/
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 16:39:28+00:00

Document:
Continuing with our lay evidence series we came across this recent Veterans Court Memorandum decision by, Judge Schoelen. We are presenting this decision because of the way in which Judge Schoelen addressed the issues of lay evidence and continuity of symptomatology provision of § 3.303(b), citing to Savage v. Gober, 10 Vet.App. 488, 497 (1997).
We also recommend, as always, if at all possible seek out and retain an attorney to help with your claim[s].
this action may not be cited as precedent.
to service connection for peptic ulcer disease with duodenal ulcer. Record (R.) at 1-7. This appeal is timely, and the Court has jurisdiction to review the Board’s decision pursuant to 38 U.S.C. §§7252(a) and 7266(a).
Single-judge disposition is appropriate. Frankel v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App.
23, 25-26 (1990). For the following reasons, the Court will vacate the Board’s decision, and remand the matter for further proceedings consistent with this decision.
fromentitlementto VA benefits based on that period of service. R. at 172-73, 176.
SMR also indicated that the appellant had pain in his “lower abdomen.” Id.
lost health record[s],” did not reveal any abdominal complaints. R. at 29. Postservice medical records show that the appellant was seen in 1971 for epigastric pain (R. at 666); that he returned to work after being treated for a bleeding peptic ulcer in 1974 (R. at 492); and that he was treated for a duodenal ulcer with upper gastrointestinal bleeding in April 1984 (R. at 200). The Board denied service connection for peptic ulcer disease in March 1985. R. at 226-30. Since that time, the appellant’s attempts to reopen his claim have been unsuccessful. See R. at 324-28, 432, 590-95, 716-25, 741-51, 873-75.
His diagnosis was “[p]eptic ulcer disease, status post bleed in April.” Id.
causes gastritis and pyloric ulcers.” Id.
service connection for . . .
reference to “lower abdominal pain . . . is incorrect.” R. at 955.
duodenal ulcer.” R. at 7.
upper-lower abdominal distinction was the October 2001 VA medical examiner.
competent to render a medical diagnosis or an opinion concerning medical causation.” Id.
evidence had not been received to reopen his claim. Appellant’s Br. at 1. In response to the question as to whether the Board applied the wrong law or regulation in making its decision, the appellant cites Sagainza v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 575 (1991). Id. at 2. The appellant also asserts that the Board improperly based its decision on his “last period of service,” instead of on his “active period of service,” and that the Board should have “received another medical opinion.” Id.
statements were cumulative and that a remand “would [serve] no useful purpose.” Id. at 10-11. In response to the appellant’s remaining arguments, the Secretaryasserts that (1) the appellant’s reliance on Sagainza is misplaced because the Board in the present case “discussed the lay statements and determined that they were cumulative” (id. at 12); (2) “VA is not required to provide Appellant with another examination . . . unless new and material evidence has been presented to reopen Appellant’s claim” (id. at 12-14); and (3) the Board based its decision on the appellant’s active period of service (id. at 14-15).
Allday v. Brown, 7 Vet.App.
favorable to the claimant. Caluza v. Brown, 7 Vet.App. 498, 506 (1995).
Tucker v. West, 11 Vet.App. 369, 374 (1998).
record that were similar to the newly submitted evidence. Secretary’s Br.
at 10-11. The Board also rejected the appellant’s lay statements as “insufficient to establish a reasonable possibility of substantiating the claim because lay persons . . . are not competent to render a medical diagnosis or an opinion concerning medical causation.” R. at 7. The Court finds that the Board’s rejection of this lay evidence was in error.
symptomatology.” Barr v. Nicholson, 21 Vet.App. 303, 307 (2007) (emphasis added).
that lay evidence lacks credibility merely because it is unaccompanied by contemporaneous medical evidence.” Buchanan v. Nicholson, 451 F.3d 1331, 1336-37 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
diagnosis,” and stated that any categorical requirement of “a valid medical opinion” to establish nexus ” is in direct conflict with [the Federal Circuit’s] precedent.” Davidson v. Shinseki, ___ F.3d ___, ___, No. 2009-7075, 2009 WL 2914339, at *3-4 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 14, 2009). The Board’s categorical dismissal of this evidence as incompetent was in error.
constituted evidence of continuity of symptomatology. See Barr, supra; see also 38 C.F.
is one as to which a lay person’s observation is competent.
stomach problems from 1966 to 1979. R. at 949. The Board failed to acknowledge the appellant’s contention that his wife is a nurse, and failed to assess the impact, if any, that this would have on the competency of her statement. See Cox v. Nicholson, 20 Vet.App. 563, 569 (2007) (holding that a nurse practitioner is competent to provide “medical diagnoses, statements, or opinions”) (quoting 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(a)(1) (2006)); but cf. Black v. Brown, 10 Vet.App. 279, 284 (1997) (rejecting the medical opinion of the appellant’s wife – a nurse – because her duties were administrative and she did not have “special knowledge” relating to her husband’s condition). The appellant’s mother also stated that he had ongoing stomach problems both during and after service. R. at 911. The Board erred by failing to discuss whether these lay statements corroborate the appellant’s testimony regarding his continuous symptoms and by failing to assess their probative value instead of dismissing them as incompetent simply because of their lay nature.
and Savage, all supra; see also Robinson v. Shinseki, 312 Fed.Appx. 336, 339 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (nonprecedential) (requiring the Board to conduct a two-step analysis of lay evidence in which it must first determine whether the condition in question is the type of condition “for which lay evidence is competent evidence,” and, if so, “the Board must weigh that evidence against the other evidence of record”). Accordingly, the Court will vacate the Board’s finding that no new and material evidence has been submitted to reopen the appellant’s claim, and remand the matter to the Board for further development and adjudication. See Tucker, supra.
Given this disposition, the Court will not at this time address the appellant’s remaining arguments. See Best v. Principi, 15 Vet.App. 18, 20 (2001) (per curiam order) (holding that “[a] narrow decision preserves for the appellant an opportunity to argue those claimed errors before the Board at the readjudication, and, of course, before this Court in an appeal, should the Board rule against him”). On remand, the appellant is free to submit additional evidence and argument on the remanded matters, and the Board is required to consider any such relevant evidence and argument.
(1991). The Board must proceed expeditiously, in accordance with 38 U.S.C. § 7112 (requiring the Secretary to provide for “expeditious treatment” of claims remanded by the Court).
a review of the record, the December 21, 2007, Board decision is VACATED, and the matter is REMANDED to the Board for further proceedings consistent with this decision.

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