Source: http://masscases.com/cases/sjc/362/362mass552.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 08:17:50+00:00

Document:
Present: TAURO, C.J., QUIRICO, BRAUCHER, & HENNESSEY, JJ.
COMPLAINT filed in the First District Court of Eastern Middlesex on January 24, 1968.
Upon appeal to the Superior Court and transfer of the case to the Third District Court of Eastern Middlesex, questions of law were reported by Feloney, J.
of G. L. c. 149, Section 129B, inserted by St. 1964, c. 233, and as appearing in St. 1967, c. 261. [Note 1] On February 6, 1968, the defendant was found guilty and fined on the complaint in the District Court and it appealed to the Superior Court under G. L. c. 278, Section 18.
On September 13, 1968, the case was transferred from the Superior Court to the Third District Court of Eastern Middlesex at Cambridge for trial by a jury of six persons. [Note 2] Thereafter the case was continued on ten different dates for varying consecutive periods of time ranging from a minimum of five days to a maximum of about twenty-three months, the last of which expired on December 10, 1971. On the latter date the case was reported to this court and trial of the case was continued indefinitely pending this court's decision thereon.
We assume, despite the form of the question reported, that the basic decision which the judge and the parties would like to obtain from this court is whether G. L. c. 149, Section 129B, is constitutional. Before reaching that important question, we feel compelled to consider whether this is an appropriate situation for the exercise of the power conferred by G. L. c. 278, Section 30A, to report interlocutory questions of law, in criminal cases for decision by this court. Resort to the history of this statute will shed light on this point.
interlocutory questions in criminal cases. It then said (in its Twenty-eighth Report, 34-35): "It would seem that they should have authority expressly recognized by statute, to deal with exceptional cases and prevent the possible injustice of a protracted trial (lasting perhaps weeks or months and delaying other trials) by a carefully prepared interlocutory report, where the judge considers that justice to the Commonwealth and the defendant calls for a decision whether his ruling on a decisive question of law is right or wrong before everyone involved is subjected to the ordeal of a long trial. Excessive use of such interlocutory reports by trial judges can be readily checked by the sound judicial discretion of the Supreme Court in criminal cases as it is in civil cases." The Council then quoted the following language from John Hetherington & Sons, Ltd. v. William Firth Co. 212 Mass. 257, 259: "Considerable discretion is conferred upon judges of the Superior Court in reporting cases before they are ripe for final judgment. If this discretion should be too generously exercised, and if moot, speculative or subsidiary questions are reported, they would not be considered." See Terry v. Brightman, 129 Mass. 535, 537-538.
further indefinite continuance. The record discloses no reason for any of the first ten continuances. There is nothing in the record to indicate that a trial de novo as requested by the defendant by its appeal, whether it be before a jury of six or before a judge of the District Court, will be either prolonged, expensive, involved or unduly burdensome on the parties or the court.
"Interlocutory matters should be reported only where it appears that they present serious questions likely to be material in the ultimate decision, and that subsequent proceedings in the trial court will be substantially facilitated by so doing." John Gilbert Jr. Co. v. C. M. Fauci Co. 309 Mass. 271, 273. Bendslev v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 328 Mass. 443, 445. This test is not met in the present case where an interlocutory decision by this court might avoid the necessity of holding what would appear to be a very short trial which the parties have already avoided for almost five years.
"Where conducive to justice, a court may set aside a stipulation made by the parties." Commonwealth v. Clarke, 350 Mass. 721, 722. See Loring v. Mercier, 318 Mass. 599. In our opinion, this is such a case. Accordingly, we set aside the stipulation, discharge the report, and remand the case to the Third District Court of Eastern Middlesex for further proceedings.
[Note 1] Section 129B as thus amended reads as follows: "Whoever, being engaged in construction work, requires or knowingly permits any person employed by him in such work to use certain devices, commonly called stilts, designed to be attached to the feet or legs of such employee for the purpose of elevating him to high placed or positioned work, shall be punished by a fine of not more than one hundred dollars for the first offense, by a fine of not more than five hundred dollars for the second offense, and by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars for any subsequent offense."
[Note 2] Presumably this transfer was made by authority of the following provision contained in St. 1964, c. 628, as amended by St. 1966, c. 360, Section 1; St. 1969, c. 253, Section 1; and St. 1971, c. 659, Section 1, authorizing trials by a jury of six in certain District Courts of Middlesex County: "Any defendant found guilty in any district court of Middlesex county of . . . [specified misdemeanors] who has appealed to the superior court may, at any time before trial on such appeal, claim a trial by a jury of six in the third district court of eastern Middlesex." These same statutes further provide that a defendant whose case is pending in a District Court for trial by a jury of six "may elect to waive a jury of six." See now G. L. c. 218, Section 27A, inserted by St. 1972, c. 620. The net effect of these statutes is that a defendant convicted of most misdemeanors has multiple options open to him for further trial. He may have a trial de novo in the Superior Court before a jury of twelve or before a judge, or he may have a trial de novo in the District Court before a jury of six or before another judge of that court. These broad options encourage "forum shopping" and often result in two independent trials before different District Court judges. This may even lead to the situation where the defendant is given separate trials before judges of the same District Court.
[Note 3] The introductory sentence of the stipulation states that the parties "agree that the following facts may be introduced into evidence pertaining to and as basis for defendant's motion to dismiss." The difficulty in determining whether such language is an agreement on facts or merely on evidence is discussed at length in Frati v. Jannini, 226 Mass. 430, and in Scaccia v. Boston Elev. Ry. 308 Mass. 310.
[Note 4] No question has been raised about the authority of a judge of a District Court presiding over a session of that court for trials of misdemeanors by a jury of six persons to report a question of law for decision by this court. Although Section 30A refers to trials "in the superior court," we note that the several statutes which relate to the trial of misdemeanors in District Courts by a jury of six and which are cited in footnote 2 above provide that the judge presiding over such a session "shall have and exercise all the powers and duties which a justice of the superior court has and may exercise in the trial and disposition of such cases." The same statutes further provide that review after such a trial by a jury of six "may be had directly by the supreme judicial court, by a bill of exceptions, appeal, report or otherwise in the same manner provided for trials by jury in the superior court."

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