Source: http://www.worldcourts.com/hrc/eng/decisions/2005.03.29_Marques_de_Morais_v_Angola.htm
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 22:41:29+00:00

Document:
1. The author of the communication is Rafael Marques de Morais, an Angolan citizen, born on 31 August 1971. He claims to be a victim of violations by Angola [FN1] of articles 9, 12, 14 and 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (the Covenant). The author is represented by counsel.
[FN1] The Covenant and the Optional Protocol to the Covenant entered into force for the State party on 10 April 1992.
2.6 On 25 November 1999, the author was released from prison on bail and informed of the charges against him for the first time. Together with the director, A. S., and the chief editor, A. J. F., of Agora, he was charged with "materially and continuously committ[ing] the crimes characteristic of defamation and slander against His Excellency the President of the Republic and the Attorney General of the Republic...by arts. 44, 46 all of Law no 22/91 of June 15 (the Press Law) with aggravating circumstances 1, 2, 10, 20, 21 and 25, all of articles 34 of the Penal Code." The terms of bail obliged the author "not to leave the country" and "not to engage in certain activities that are punishable by the offence committed and that create the risk that new violations may be perpetrated - Art 270 of the Penal Code". Several requests by the author for clarification of these terms were unsuccessful.
2.8 By reference to article 46 [FN2] of Press Law No. 22/91 of June 15 1991, the Provincial Court ruled that evidence presented by the author to support his defence of the 'truth' of the allegations and the good faith basis upon which they were made, including the texts of speeches of the President, Government resolutions and statements of foreign State officials, was inadmissible. In protest, the author's lawyer left the courtroom, stating that he could not represent his client in such circumstances. When he returned to the courtroom on 25 March, the trial judge prevented him from resuming his representation of the author and ordered that he be disbarred from practising as a lawyer in Angola for a period of six months. The Court then appointed as ex officio defence counsel an official of the General Attorney's Office working at the Provincial Court's labour tribunal, who allegedly was not qualified to practise as a lawyer.
[FN2] Article 46 of the Press Law reads: "If the person defamed is the President of the Republic of Angola, or the head of a foreign State, or its representative in Angola, then proof of the veracity of the facts shall not be admitted."
2.10 On 31 March 2000, the Provincial Court convicted the author of abuse of the press [FN3] by defamation, [FN4] finding that his newspaper article of 3 July 1999, as well as the radio interview, contained "offensive words and expressions" against the Angolan President and, albeit not raised by the accusation and therefore not punishable, against the Attorney-General in their official and personal capacities. The Court found that the author had "acted with intention to injure" and based the conviction on the combined effect of articles 43, 44, 45 and 46 of Press Law No. 22/91, aggravated by item 1 of article 34 of the Penal Code (premeditation). It sentenced the author to six months' imprisonment and a fine of 1,000,000.00 Kwanzas (Nkz.) to "discourage" similar behaviour, at the same time ordering the payment of NKz. 100,000.00 compensatory damages to "the offended" and of a court tax of NKz. 20,000.00.
[FN3] The crime of abuse of the press is defined as follows in article 43 of the Press Law: "(1) For purposes of this law, an abuse of the press shall be deemed to be any act or behavio[u]r that injures the juridical values and interests protected by the criminal code, effected by publication of texts or images through the press, radio broadcasts or television. (2) The criminal code is applicable to the aforementioned crimes as follows: (a) The court shall apply the punishment set forth in the incriminating legislation, which punishment may be aggravated pursuant to general provisions. (b) If the agent of the crime has not previously been found guilty of any abuse of the press, then the punishment of imprisonment may be replaced by a fine of not less than NKz. 20,000.00."
[FN4] Article 407 of the Criminal Code describes the crime of defamation as follows: "If one person defames another publicly, de viva voce, in writing, in a published drawing, or in any public manner, imputing to him something offensive to his hono[u]r and dignity, or reproduces this, then he shall be condemned to a prison term of up to four months and a fine of up to one month."
[FN5] The translation of the Supreme Court's public notice reads, in pertinent parts: "It does not make sense, therefore, for a single courtroom incident, resulting from a decision handed down by the Judge in question in open court, a decision which may be cured by a higher court in the legal process, and which is subject to an inter-institutional decision, to have caused such an inflammatory and unnecessary public notice from the Bar Association, creating an unjustly suspicious climate and discrediting [the judiciary] both domestically and abroad, and causing distorted proclamations by individuals, institutions, and even governmental officials."
2.12 On 26 October 2000, the Supreme Court quashed the trial court's judgment on the defamation count, but upheld the conviction for abuse of the press on the basis of injury [FN6] to the President, punishable by item No. 3 of article 45, [FN7] of Press Law No. 22/91. The Court considered that the author's acts were not covered by his constitutional right to freedom of speech, since the exercise of that right was limited by other constitutionally recognized rights, such as one's honour and reputation, or by "the respect that is due to the organs of sovereignty and to the symbols of the state, in this case the President of the Republic." It affirmed the prison term of six-month, but suspended its application for a period of five years, and ordered the author to pay a court tax of NKz. 20,000.00 and NKz. 30,000.00 damages to the victim. The judgment did not refer to the pre-existing bail conditions imposed on the author.
[FN6] The crime of injury is defined in article 410 of the Criminal Code: "The crime of injury, without imputation of any determined fact, if committed against any person publicly, by gestures, de viva voce, by published drawing or text, or by any other means of publication, shall be punished with a prison term of up to two months and a fine [...]. In an accusation for injury, no proof whatsoever of the veracity of the facts to which the injury may refer shall be admissible."
[FN7] Article 45 No. 3 reads: "Providing the veracity of the facts of the offense, once admitted by the author, shall render it exempt from punishment. Otherwise, the violator would be punished as a slanderer and sentenced to a prison term of up to 2 years and the corresponding finde, in addition to damages to be determined by a court, but in no case less than NKz. 50,000.00."
2.14 On 12 December 2000, the author was prevented from leaving Angola for South Africa to participate in an Open Society Institute conference; his passport was confiscated. Despite repeated requests, his passport was not returned to him until 8 February 2001, following a court order of 2 February 2001 based on Amnesty Law 7/00 of 15 December 2000, [FN8] which was declared applicable to the author's case. Regardless of this amnesty, on 19 January 2002, the author was summoned to the Provincial Court and ordered to pay compensation of Nkz. 30,000 to the President, which he refused to pay, and legal costs, for which he paid.
[FN8] Amnesty Law 7/00 applies to "crimes against security which were committed [...] within the sphere of the Angolan conflict, as long as its agents have presented themselves or may come to present themselves to the Angolan authorities [...]."
[FN9] The author refers to Communication No. 305/1988, van Alphen v. The Netherlands, Views adopted on 23 July 1990, at para. 5.8.
3.2 The author claims a violation of article 9, paragraph 2, as he was arrested without being informed of the reasons for his arrest or the charges against him. His 10-day incommunicado detention, [FN10] without access to his lawyer or family, the denial of his constitutional [FN11] right to be brought before a judge during the entire 40 days of his detention, and the authorities' failure to release him promptly pending trial, despite the absence of a risk of flight (as reflected by his cooperative attitude, e.g. when he reported to the DNIC on 13 October 1999), violated his rights under article 9, paragraph 3. The fact that he was prevented from challenging the lawfulness of his detention while detained incommunicado also violated article 9, paragraph 4, as did the Angolan courts' failure to address his habeas corpus application. Under article 9, paragraph 5, the author claims compensation for his unlawful arrest and detention.
[FN10] By reference to Communication No. 277/1988, Terán Jijón v. Ecuador, Views adopted on 26 March 1992, at para. 3, the author submits that incommunicado detention as such gives rise to a violation of article 9, paragraph 3, of the Covenant, since it negatively impacts on the exercise of the right to be brought before a judge.
[FN11] Article 38 of the Constitution of Angola provides: "Any citizen subjected to preventive detention shall be taken before a competent judge to legalise the detention and be tried within the period provided for by law or released."
[FN12] It appears that this issue was not however raised in the Supreme Court.
3.8 The author contends that his critical statements about President dos Santos were covered by his right to freedom of expression under article 19, which requires that citizens be allowed to criticize or openly and publicly evaluate their Governments, as well as the ability of the press to express political opinion, including criticism of those who wield political power. His unlawful arrest and detention on the basis of his statements, the restrictions on his rights to free speech and movement pending trial, his conviction and sentence, and the threat that any expression of opinion may be punished by similar sanctions in the future constituted restrictions on his freedom of speech. He argues that these restrictions were not "provided by law" within the meaning of article 19, paragraph 3, given (a) that his unlawful detention and subsequent travel restrictions had no basis in Angolan law; (b) that his conviction was based on provisions such as article 43 of the Press Law ("abuse of the press") and article 410 of the Criminal Code ("injury"), which lacked the necessary clarity to qualify as "adequately accessible" and "sufficiently precise" norms, enabling an individual to foresee the consequences that his statements may entail; and (c) that the terms of his bail prohibiting him to "engage in certain activities that [...] create the risk that new violations may be perpetrated" were equally unclear and that he had unsuccessfully requested clarification of the meaning of this restrictions.
5.4 Insofar as the author claims that he was not apprised of the formal charges against him until 40 days after his arrest, the Committee recalls that article 14, paragraph 3 (a), of the Covenant does not apply to the period of remand in custody pending the result of police investigations, [FN13] but requires that an individual be informed promptly and in detail of the charge against him, as soon as the charge is first made by a competent authority. Although the author was formally charged on 25 November 1999, that is, one week after the indictment had been "approved" by the prosecution, he did not raise this delay on appeal. The Committee therefore concludes that this part of the communication is inadmissible under article 5, paragraph 2 (b), of the Optional Protocol.
[FN13] See Communication No. 253/1987, Kelly v. Jamaica, Views adopted on 8 April 1991, para. 5.8.
5.6 As regards the author's claim that article 14, paragraph 3 (b), was also violated because the trial judge did not adjourn the trial after having replaced his lawyer by an ex officio counsel, thereby denying him adequate time to consult with his new counsel to prepare his defence, the Committee notes that the material before it does not reveal that the author, or his new counsel, requested an adjournment on grounds of insufficient time to prepare the defence. If counsel felt that they were not properly prepared, it was incumbent on him to request the adjournment of the trial. [FN14] In this respect, the Committee refers to its jurisprudence that a State party cannot be held responsible for the conduct of a defence lawyer, unless it was, or should have been, manifest to the judge that the lawyer's behaviour was incompatible with the interests of justice. [FN15] It considers that the author has not substantiated, for purposes of admissibility, that failure to adjourn the trial was manifestly incompatible with the interests of justice. Accordingly, this part of the communication is inadmissible under article 2 of the Optional Protocol.
[FN14] See Communication No. 349/1989, Wright v. Jamaica, Views adopted on 27 July 1992, at para. 8.4.
[FN15] See Communications No. 980/2001, Hussain v. Mauritius, decision on admissibility adopted on 18 March 2002, at para. 6.3, and No. 618/1995, Campbell v. Jamaica, Views adopted on 20 October 1998, at para. 7.3.
5.7 As to the author's claim that his right to defend himself through legal assistance of his own choosing (article 14, paragraph 3 (d)) was breached, the Committee notes that the Supreme Court, while annulling the temporary suspension of the author's lawyer, did not pronounce itself on the legality of the lawyer's removal from the trial. On the contrary, it held that the abandonment of a client by a lawyer, outside situations specifically allowed by law, was subject to disciplinary sanctions under applicable regulations. In its public notice, the Supreme Court, instead of defending the judge's decision to debar the author's lawyer, expressed its concern about the effects of the Bar Associations criticism (causing "an unjustly suspicious climate [...] discrediting [the judiciary] both domestically and abroad"), while emphasizing that the trial judge's decision "may be cured by a higher court in the legal process." The Supreme Court subsequently declared the author's lawyer's six-month suspension null and void. Similarly, it does not transpire from the trial transcript that counsel was appointed against the author's will or that he limited his interventions during the remainder of the trial to redundant pleadings. According to the transcript, the author, when asked whether he intended to designate a new legal representative, declared that he would leave such decision to the Court. The Committee concludes that the author has not substantiated, for purposes of admissibility, that the removal of his lawyer from the trial was unlawful or arbitrary, that counsel was appointed against the author's will, or that he was unqualified to provide effective legal representation. Accordingly, this part of the communication is inadmissible under article 2 of the Optional Protocol.
6.1 The first issue before the Committee is whether the author's arrest on 16 October 1999 and his subsequent detention until 25 November 1999 were arbitrary or otherwise in violation of article 9 of the Covenant. In accordance with the Committee's constant jurisprudence, [FN16] the notion of "arbitrariness" is not to be equated with "against the law", but must be interpreted more broadly to include elements of inappropriateness, injustice, lack of predictability and due process of law. This means that remand in custody must not only be lawful but reasonable and necessary in all the circumstances, for example to prevent flight, interference with evidence or the recurrence of crime. No such element has been invoked in the instant case. Irrespective of the applicable rules of criminal procedure, the Committee observes that the author was arrested on, albeit undisclosed, charges of defamation which, although qualifying as a crime under Angolan law, does not justify his arrest at gunpoint by 20 armed policemen, nor the length of his detention of 40 days, including 10 days of incommunicado detention. The Committee concludes that in the circumstances, the author's arrest and detention were neither reasonable nor necessary but, at least in part, of a punitive character and thus arbitrary, in violation of article 9, paragraph 1.
[FN16] See Communication No. 305/1988, Van Alphen v. The Netherlands, Views adopted on 23 July 1990, at para. 5.8; Communication No. 458/1991, Mukong v. Cameroon, Views adopted on 21 July 1994, at para. 9.8; Communication No. 560/1993, A. v. Australia, Views adopted on 3 April 1997, at para. 9.2.
6.3 As regards the author's claim that he was not brought before a judge during the 40 days of detention, the Committee recalls that the right to be brought "promptly" before a judicial authority implies that delays must not exceed a few days, and that incommunicado detention as such may violate article 9, paragraph 3. [FN17] It takes note of the author's argument that his 10-day incommunicado detention, without access to a lawyer, adversely affected his right to be brought before a judge, and concludes that the facts before it disclose a violation of article 9, paragraph 3. In view of this finding, the Committee need not pronounce itself on the alleged violation of article 14, paragraph 3(b).
[FN17] Communication No. 277/1988, Terán Jijón v. Ecuador, Views adopted on 26 March 1992, at para. 5.3.
6.6 With respect to the author's claim under article 9, paragraph 5, the Committee recalls that this provision governs the granting of compensation for arrest or detention that is "unlawful" either under domestic law or within the meaning of the Covenant. [FN18] It recalls that the circumstances of the author's arrest and detention gave rise to violations of article 9, paragraphs 1 to 4, of the Covenant, and notes the author's uncontested argument that the State party's failure to bring him before a judge during his 40-day detention also violated article 38 of the Angolan Constitution. Against this background, the Committee deems it appropriate to deal with the issue of compensation in the remedial paragraph.
[FN18] See Communication No. 560/1993, A. v. Australia, Views adopted on 3 April 1997, at para. 9.5.
[FN19] See Communications Nos. 422/1990, 423/1990 and 424/1990, Aduayom et al. v. Togo, Views adopted on 12 July 1996, at para. 7.4.
6.8 The Committee refers to its jurisprudence that any restriction on the right to freedom of expression must cumulatively meet the following conditions set out in paragraph 3 of article 19: it must be provided for by law, it must serve one of the aims enumerated in article 19, paragraph 3 (a) and (b), and it must be necessary to achieve one of these purposes. The Committee notes that the author's final conviction was based on Article 43 of the Press Law, in conjunction with Section 410 of the Criminal Code. Even if it were assumed that his arrest and detention, or the restrictions on his travel, had a basis in Angolan law, and that these measures, as well as his conviction, pursued a legitimate aim, such as protecting the President's rights and reputation or public order, it cannot be said that the restrictions were necessary to achieve one of these aims. The Committee observes that the requirement of necessity implies an element of proportionality, in the sense that the scope of the restriction imposed on freedom of expression must be proportional to the value which the restriction serves to protect. Given the paramount importance, in a democratic society, of the right to freedom of expression and of a free and uncensored press or other media, [FN20] the severity of the sanctions imposed on the author cannot be considered as a proportionate measure to protect public order or the honour and the reputation of the President, a public figure who, as such, is subject to criticism and opposition. In addition, the Committee considers it an aggravating factor that the author's proposed truth defence against the libel charge was ruled out by the courts. In the circumstances, the Committee concludes that there has been a violation of article 19.
[FN20] See Human Rights Committee, General Comment 25 , 12 July 1996, at para. 25.

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