Source: http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/51922
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 16:42:00+00:00

Document:
NEPLUM, INC., PETITIONER, VS. EVELYN V. ORBESO, RESPONDENT.
Within what period may private offended parties appeal the civil aspect of a judgment acquitting the accused based on reasonable doubt? Is the 15-day period to be counted from the promulgation of the decision to the accused or from the time a copy thereof is served on the offended party? Our short answer is: from the time the offended party had actual or constructive knowledge of the judgment, whether it be during its promulgation or as a consequence of the service of the notice of the decision.
The foregoing Order effectively prevented petitioner from appealing the civil aspect of the criminal proceedings in which the accused was acquitted based on reasonable doubt.
“2.01 On 29 October 1999, the trial court promulgated its judgment (the ‘Judgment’) in Criminal Case No. 96-246 acquitting the accused of the crime of estafa on the ground that the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The accused and her counsel as well as the public and private prosecutors were present during such promulgation.
“2.02 On 12 November 1999, the petitioner, through the private prosecutor, received its copy of the Judgment.
“2.03 On 29 November 1999, petitioner filed its 25 November 1999 Motion for Reconsideration (Civil Aspect) of the Judgment.
“2.04 On 28 January 2000, a Friday, petitioner received its copy of the 24 January 2000 Order of the Trial Court denying for lack of merit petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.
“2.05 On 31 January 2000, a Monday, petitioner filed its 28 January 2000 Notice of Appeal from the Judgment. On the same day, petitioner filed by registered mail its 28 January 2000 Amended Notice of Appeal.
The RTC refused to give due course to petitioner’s Notice of Appeal and Amended Notice of Appeal. It accepted respondent’s arguments that the Judgment from which the appeal was being taken had become final, because the Notice of Appeal and the Amended Notice of Appeal were filed beyond the reglementary period. The 15-day period was counted by the trial court from the promulgation of the Decision sought to be reviewed.
Petitioner brought this case to this Court through a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The Petition seeks to set aside the February 17, 2000 Order of the RTC which, in effect, disallowed petitioner’s appeal of its Judgment.
An ordinary appeal from the RTC to the Court of Appeals (CA) is “taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party.” Consequently, the disallowance of the notice of appeal signifies the disallowance of the appeal itself.
The same Circular provides that petitioner’s counsel has the duty of using the proper mode of review.
This Court has often admonished litigants for unnecessarily burdening it with the task of determining under which rule a petition should fall. It has likewise warned lawyers to follow scrupulously the requisites for appeal prescribed by law, ever aware that any error or imprecision in compliance may well be fatal to the client’s cause.
On this score alone, the Petition could have been given short shrift and outrightly dismissed. Nevertheless, due to the novelty of the issue presented and its far-reaching effects, the Court will deal with the arguments raised by petitioner and lay down the rule on this matter. As an exception to Circular 2-90, it will treat the present proceedings as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
The italicized portion of the provision uses the conjunctive “or” in providing for the reckoning period within which an appeal must be taken. It shall be counted from the promulgation or the notice of the judgment or order.
The interpretation in that case was very clear. The period for appeal was to be counted from the date of promulgation of the decision. Text writers are in agreement with this interpretation.
Clear as those interpretations may have been, they cannot be applied to the case at bar, because in those instances it was the accused who appealed, while here we are confronted with the offended party’s appeal of the civil aspect only. Thus, the question arises whether the accused-appellant’s period for appeal, as construed in the cited cases, is the same as that for the private offended party. We answer in the negative.
1. The right to bring the foregoing actions based on the Civil Code need not be reserved in the criminal prosecution, since they are not deemed included therein.
2. The institution or waiver of the right to file a separate civil action arising from the crime charged does not extinguish the right to bring such action.
3. The only limitation is that the offended party cannot recover more than once for the same act or omission.
Thus, deemed instituted in every criminal prosecution is the civil liability arising from the crime or delict per se (civil liability ex delicto), but not those liabilities from quasi-delicts, contracts or quasi-contracts. In fact, even if a civil action is filed separately, the ex delicto civil liability in the criminal prosecution remains, and the offended party may -- subject to the control of the prosecutor -- still intervene in the criminal action in order to protect such remaining civil interest therein. By the same token, the offended party may appeal a judgment in a criminal case acquitting the accused on reasonable doubt, but only in regard to the civil liability ex delicto.
And this is precisely what herein petitioner wanted to do: to appeal the civil liability arising from the crime -- the civil liability ex delicto.
Taken on its face, the provision seems to suggest that the period for any appeal, whether by the accused or by the private offended party, must be counted from and understood in conjunction with the provision on the promulgation of the judgment. This provision mentions the presence of the accused, the judge or the clerk of court in certain instances, and/or the counsel or representative of the accused. Petitioner is correct in observing that the private offended party is not required to be present during the promulgation; in fact, the said party is not even mentioned in the provision.
“Section 6. Promulgation of judgment – The judgment is promulgated by reading it in the presence of the accused and any judge of the court in which it was rendered. However, if the conviction is for a light offense, the judgment may be pronounced in the presence of his counsel or representative. When the judge is absent or outside the province or city, the judgment may be promulgated by the clerk of court.
“If the accused is confined or detained in another province or city, the judgment may be promulgated by the executive judge of the Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction over the place of confinement or detention upon request of the court which rendered the judgment. The court promulgating the judgment shall have authority to accept the notice of appeal and to approve the bail bond pending appeal; provided, that if the decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense from non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail can only be filed and resolved by the appellate court.
“The proper clerk of court shall give notice to the accused personally or through his bondsman or warden and counsel, requiring him to be present at the promulgation of the decision. If the accused was tried in absentia because he jumped bail or escaped from prison, the notice to him shall be served at his last known address.
“In case the accused fails to appear at the scheduled date of promulgation of judgment despite notice, the promulgation shall be made by recording the judgment in the criminal docket and serving him a copy thereof at his last known address or thru his counsel.
Clearly, the Rule on the promulgation of judgment refers to the accused, not to the private offended party, who is not even required to be present during the proceedings. Since the judgment may be promulgated in the absence of the latter, it will be inequitable to count from that date the period of appeal for the said party. It is but logical to begin tolling such period only upon service of the notice of judgment upon the offended party, and not from its promulgation to the accused. It is only through notice to the former that an appeal can reasonably be made, for it is only from that date that the complainant will have knowledge of the need to elevate the case. Till then, the remedy of appeal would not be an option in the event of an adverse judgment.
We clarify also that the situations covered by this Rule (Section 6, Rule 122) are limited to appeals of judgments rendered by regional trial and inferior courts. In higher courts, there is no promulgation in the concept of Section 6 Rule 122 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure. In the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, a decision is promulgated when the signed copy thereof is filed with the clerk of court, who then causes copies to be served upon the parties or their counsels. Hence, the presence of either party during promulgation is not required.
The above-quoted portion provides for the procedure for suspending and resuming the reglementary period of appeal specifically mentioned in the preceding sentence. However, it is clear that the procedure operates only in relation to the accused. This conclusion can be deduced from the fact that after being interrupted, the period to appeal begins to run again only after the accused or the counsel of the accused is given notice of the order overruling the motion for reconsideration or for new trial. Verily, the assumption behind this provision is that the appeal was taken by the accused, not by the private offended party.
Indeed, the rules governing the period of appeal in a purely civil action should be the same as those covering the civil aspects of criminal judgments. If these rules are not completely identical, the former may be suppletory to the latter. As correctly pointed out by petitioner, “[t]he appeal from the civil aspect of a judgment in a criminal action is, for all intents and purposes, an appeal from a judgment in a civil action as such appeal cannot affect the criminal aspect thereof.” Being akin to a civil action, the present appeal may be guided by the Rules on Civil Procedure.
In People v. Santiago, the Court has definitively ruled that in a criminal case in which the offended party is the State, the interest of the private complainant or the private offended party is limited to the civil liability arising therefrom. If a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, an appeal of the criminal aspect may be undertaken, whenever legally feasible, only by the State through the solicitor general. As a rule, only the solicitor general may represent the People of the Philippines on appeal. The private offended party or complainant may not undertake such appeal.
However, the offended party or complainant may appeal the civil aspect despite the acquittal of the accused. As such, the present appeal undertaken by the private offended party relating to the civil aspect of the criminal judgment can no longer be considered a criminal action per se, wherein the State prosecutes a person for an act or omission punishable by law. Instead, it becomes a suit analogous to a civil action.
Being in the nature of a civil case, the present intended appeal involves proceedings brought to the Court of Appeals from a decision of the RTC in the exercise of the latter’s original jurisdiction. Thus, it should be properly done by filing a notice of appeal. An appeal by virtue of such notice shall be filed within 15 days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. For the private offended party, this rule then forecloses the counting of the period to appeal from the “promulgation” of the judgment to the accused.
In sum, we hold that an offended party’s appeal of the civil liability ex delicto of a judgment of acquittal should be filed within 15 days from notice of the judgment or the final order appealed from. To implement this holding, trial courts are hereby directed to cause, in criminal cases, the service of their judgments upon the private offended parties or their duly appointed counsels -- the private prosecutors. This step will enable them to appeal the civil aspects under the appropriate circumstances.
Having laid down the general rule on the appeal of civil liabilities ex delicto, we now determine its application to the present controversy. In short, was petitioner’s appeal timely filed?
If we were to follow the reasoning of petitioner, the Notice of Appeal filed on January 31, 2000 was on time, considering that (1) the Judgment had been received by its counsel only on November 12, 1999; and (2) the Motion for Reconsideration filed on November 29, 2000 interrupted the running of the reglementary period.
Further, private prosecutor even signed a copy of the Judgment dated October 29, 1999, a signature which in unequivocal terms signifies notification of the party he represents -- herein petitioner.
Petitioner stresses the need for service of the Judgment on the offended party. It harps on the fact that -- based on constitutional, statutory and even jurisprudential edicts -- judgments must be in writing and with the factual and legal bases thereof clearly expressed.
Petitioner posits that it can make an appeal only after receiving a written copy of the Judgment, for “the parties would always need a written reference or a copy [thereof which] they can review or refer to from time to time.” To rule otherwise would supposedly deny them due process.
We clarify. If petitioner or its counsel had never been notified of the Judgment, then the period for appeal would never have run. True, no law requires the offended party to attend the promulgation, much less to secure a copy of the decision on that date. But fiction must yield to reality. By mere presence, the offended party was already actually notified of the Decision of acquittal and should have taken the necessary steps to ensure that a timely appeal be filed.
Besides, all that petitioner had to do was to file a simple notice of appeal -- a brief statement of its intention to elevate the trial court’s Decision to the CA. There was no reason why it could not have done so within 15 days after actually knowing the adverse Judgment during the promulgation. Parties and their counsels are presumed to be vigilant in protecting their interests and must take the necessary remedies without delay and without resort to technicalities.
It should be stressed that the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process. It is merely a procedural remedy of statutory origin and may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by the provisions of law authorizing its exercise. Hence, its requirements must be strictly complied with. The failure of petitioner to file a timely notice of appeal from the Judgment, thus rendering the Judgment final and executory, is not a denial of due process. It might have lost its right to appeal, but it was not denied its day in court.
Neither has petitioner justified a deviation from an otherwise stringent rule. Anyone seeking exemption from the application of the reglementary period for filing an appeal has the burden of proving the existence of exceptionally meritorious instances warranting such deviation.
A fundamental precept is that the reglementary periods under the Rules are to be strictly observed, for they are indispensable interdictions against needless delay and for an orderly discharge of judicial business. After judgment has become final, vested rights are acquired by the winning party. Just as the losing party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period, so does the winning party also have the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of the case. This principle becomes even more essential in view of the fact that the criminal aspect has already been adjudicated.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Order AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
 Rollo, p. 73; issued by Judge Napoleon E. Inoturan.
 Assailed RTC Order, Annex “A” of the Petition; rollo, p. 73.
 Petitioner’s Memorandum, pp. 2-3; rollo, pp. 132-133; italics supplied.
 Annex “F” of the Petition; ibid., pp. 88-89.
 Annex “G” of the Petition; id., pp. 91-92.
 The Court deemed the case submitted for resolution on May 16, 2001, upon receipt of petitioner’s Memorandum signed by Atty. Riche L. Tiblani of Picazo Buyco Tan Fider & Santos. The Memorandum for respondent, signed by Atty. Horacio R. Makalintal Jr., was filed on April 6, 2001.
 Petitioner’s Memorandum, p. 3; rollo, p. 133. Original in upper case.
 §2(a), Rule 41, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. However, an appeal in cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall be by a petition for review, not by a simple notice of appeal.
 §1(d), Rule 41, 1997 Rules of Court.
 §1, Rule 65, 1997 Rules of Court.
 Sea Power Shipping Enterprises, Inc v. CA, GR No. 138270, June 28, 2001.
 Circular No. 2-90 dated March 9, 1990, signed by the then Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan.
 Sea Power Shipping Enterprises, Inc. v. CA, supra.; Ybañez v. CA, 253 SCRA 540, February 9, 1996.
 Petitioner’s Memorandum, p. 7; rollo, p. 137.
 55 SCRA 153, January 21, 1974.
 Ibid., p. 157, per Aquino, J. (later CJ).
 Pamaran, The 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure Annotated, 1998 ed., pp. 497-498; Herrera, Remedial Law, Vol. IV, 1999, p. 595.
 Landicho v. Tan, 87 Phil 601, November 16, 1950.
 Ibid., p. 605, per Bautista Angelo, J.
 “ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages.
 Panganiban, Transparency, Unanimity & Diversity, 2000 ed., pp. 214-215.
 §6, Rule 120, 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure.
 §9, Rule 51, 1997 Rules of Court; §4, Rule 56, 1997 Rules of Court.
 §6, Rule 122, 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure.
 Petitioner’s Memorandum, p. 9; rollo, p. 139. Italics supplied.
 174 SCRA 143, June 20, 1989.
 §2, Rule 41, 1997 Rules of Court.
 §3, Rule 41, 1997 Rules of Court.
 Petitioner’s Memorandum, p. 2; rollo, p. 132.
 Atty. Froilan Rocas; records, p. 245-A.
 Respondent’s Memorandum, p. 3; rollo, p. 124.
 Republic v. CA, 322 SCRA 81, January 18, 2000.
 Oro v. Judge Diaz, GR No. 140974, July 11, 2001; Mercury Drug Corp. v. CA, 335 SCRA 567, July 13, 2000; Ortiz v. CA, 299 SCRA 708, December 4, 1998.
 Casim v. Flordeliza, GR No. 139511, January 23, 2002.
 Del Rosario v. CA, supra, at p. 557, per Bidin, J.

References: V. 
 v. 
 §2
 §1
 §1
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 §6
 §9
 §4
 §6
 §2
 §3
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.