Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=83946:58780&catid=1590&Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 01:46:19+00:00

Document:
G.R. No. 193707, December 10, 2014 - NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO, FOR AND IN BEHALF OF HER MINOR CHILD RODERIGO NORJO VAN WILSEM, Petitioner, v. ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM, Respondent.
NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO, FOR AND IN BEHALF OF HER MINOR CHILD RODERIGO NORJO VAN WILSEM, Petitioner, v. ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM, Respondent.
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the Orders1 dated February 19, 2010 and September 1, 2010, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City (RTC-Cebu), which dismissed the criminal case entitled People of the Philippines v. Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem, docketed as Criminal Case No. CBU-85503, for violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, otherwise known as the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004.
Because of the foregoing circumstances, petitioner filed a complaint-affidavit with the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City against respondent for violation of Section 5, paragraph E(2) of R.A. No. 9262 for the latter’s unjust refusal to support his minor child with petitioner.13 Respondent submitted his counter-affidavit thereto, to which petitioner also submitted her reply-affidavit.14 Thereafter, the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City issued a Resolution recommending the filing of an information for the crime charged against herein respondent.
That sometime in the year 1995 and up to the present, more or less, in the Municipality of Minglanilla, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and deliberately deprive, refuse and still continue to deprive his son RODERIGO NORJO VAN WILSEM, a fourteen (14) year old minor, of financial support legally due him, resulting in economic abuse to the victim.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds that the facts charged in the information do not constitute an offense with respect to the accused, he being an alien, and accordingly, orders this case DISMISSED.
The bail bond posted by accused Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem for his provisional liberty is hereby cancelled (sic) and ordered released.
x x x The arguments therein presented are basically a rehash of those advanced earlier in the memorandum of the prosecution. Thus, the court hereby reiterates its ruling that since the accused is a foreign national he is not subject to our national law (The Family Code) in regard to a parent’s duty and obligation to give support to his child. Consequently, he cannot be charged of violating R.A. 9262 for his alleged failure to support his child. Unless it is conclusively established that R.A. 9262 applies to a foreigner who fails to give support to his child, notwithstanding that he is not bound by our domestic law which mandates a parent to give such support, it is the considered opinion of the court that no prima facie case exists against the accused herein, hence, the case should be dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
x x x Nevertheless, the Rules do not prohibit any of the parties from filing a Rule 45 Petition with this Court, in case only questions of law are raised or involved. This latter situation was one that petitioners found themselves in when they filed the instant Petition to raise only questions of law.
Indeed, the issues submitted to us for resolution involve questions of law – the response thereto concerns the correct application of law and jurisprudence on a given set of facts, i.e., whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child under Philippine law; and whether or not he can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his unjustified failure to do so.
It cannot be negated, moreover, that the instant petition highlights a novel question of law concerning the liability of a foreign national who allegedly commits acts and omissions punishable under special criminal laws, specifically in relation to family rights and duties. The inimitability of the factual milieu of the present case, therefore, deserves a definitive ruling by this Court, which will eventually serve as a guidepost for future cases. Furthermore, dismissing the instant petition and remanding the same to the CA would only waste the time, effort and resources of the courts. Thus, in the present case, considerations of efficiency and economy in the administration of justice should prevail over the observance of the hierarchy of courts.
Now, on the matter of the substantive issues, We find the petition meritorious. Nonetheless, we do not fully agree with petitioner’s contentions.
To determine whether or not a person is criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262, it is imperative that the legal obligation to support exists.
Petitioner invokes Article 19530 of the Family Code, which provides the parent’s obligation to support his child. Petitioner contends that notwithstanding the existence of a divorce decree issued in relation to Article 26 of the Family Code,31 respondent is not excused from complying with his obligation to support his minor child with petitioner.
It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that the respondent is not obliged to support petitioner’s son under Article 195 of the Family Code as a consequence of the Divorce Covenant obtained in Holland. This does not, however, mean that respondent is not obliged to support petitioner’s son altogether.
In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the burden of proving the foreign law.40 In the present case, respondent hastily concludes that being a national of the Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the matter of provision of and capacity to support.41 While respondent pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing his position that he is not obliged to support his son, he never proved the same.
In view of respondent’s failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands in his favor, the doctrine of processual presumption shall govern. Under this doctrine, if the foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that the foreign law is the same as our local or domestic or internal law.44 Thus, since the law of the Netherlands as regards the obligation to support has not been properly pleaded and proved in the instant case, it is presumed to be the same with Philippine law, which enforces the obligation of parents to support their children and penalizing the non-compliance therewith.
Moreover, while in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera',45 the Court held that a divorce obtained in a foreign land as well as its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines in view of the nationality principle on the matter of status of persons, the Divorce Covenant presented by respondent does not completely show that he is not liable to give support to his son after the divorce decree was issued. Emphasis is placed on petitioner’s allegation that under the second page of the aforesaid covenant, respondent’s obligation to support his child is specifically stated,46 which was not disputed by respondent.
In the instant case, assuming arguendo that the English Law on the matter were properly pleaded and proved in accordance with Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court and the jurisprudence laid down in Yao Kee, et al. vs. Sy-Gonzales, said foreign law would still not find applicability.
Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and established public policy of the forum, the said foreign law, judgment or order shall not be applied.
Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
The public policy sought to be protected in the instant case is the principle imbedded in our jurisdiction proscribing the splitting up of a single cause of action.
If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the others.
Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the Netherlands neither enforce a parent’s obligation to support his child nor penalize the non-compliance therewith, such obligation is still duly enforceable in the Philippines because it would be of great injustice to the child to be denied of financial support when the latter is entitled thereto.
Under the aforesaid special law, the deprivation or denial of financial support to the child is considered an act of violence against women and children.
In addition, considering that respondent is currently living in the Philippines, we find strength in petitioner’s claim that the Territoriality Principle in criminal law, in relation to Article 14 of the New Civil Code, applies to the instant case, which provides that:“[p]enal laws and those of public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live and sojourn in Philippine territory, subject to the principle of public international law and to treaty stipulations.” On this score, it is indisputable that the alleged continuing acts of respondent in refusing to support his child with petitioner is committed here in the Philippines as all of the parties herein are residents of the Province of Cebu City. As such, our courts have territorial jurisdiction over the offense charged against respondent. It is likewise irrefutable that jurisdiction over the respondent was acquired upon his arrest.
SECTION 24. Prescriptive Period. – Acts falling under Sections 5(a) to 5(f) shall prescribe in twenty (20) years. Acts falling under Sections 5(g) to 5(I) shall prescribe in ten (10) years.
The act of denying support to a child under Section 5(e)(2) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 is a continuing offense,53 which started in 1995 but is still ongoing at present. Accordingly, the crime charged in the instant case has clearly not prescribed.
Given, however, that the issue on whether respondent has provided support to petitioner’s child calls for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, and the truth and falsehood of facts being admitted, we hereby remand the determination of this issue to the RTC-Cebu which has jurisdiction over the case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders dated February 19, 2010 and September 1, 2010, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of the City of Cebu are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the same court to conduct further proceedings based on the merits of the case.
Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Villarama, Jr., Mendoza,*and Reyes, JJ., concur.
1 Penned by Judge Bienvenido R. Saniel, Jr.; Annexes "A" and “B” to Petition, respectively, rollo, pp. 22-26.
5 Annex “F” to Petition, rollo, p. 31.
7 Annex “A” to Petition, rollo, pp. 23-24.
11 Supra note 7, at 23-24.
12 Supra note 5, at 32.
(5) Legitimate brothers and sisters, whether of full or half-blood.
24 Annex “R” to Petition, rollo, p. 102.
25 Annex “B” to Petition, id. at 25.
28 G.R. No. 194880, June 20, 2012, 674 SCRA 320.
31 Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 3637 and 38.
32 Comment on the Petition for Review on Certiorari, rollo, p. 123.
35 Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
36Supra note 7, at 24.
38 G.R. No. L-25441, October 26, 1968, 25 SCRA 616.
40EDI-Staffbuilders International, Inc. v. NLRC, 563 Phil. 1, 22 (2007).
41 Annex “N” to Petition, rollo, p. 84.
42 399 Phil. 342 (2000).
44Bank of America, NT and SA v. American Realty Corporation, 378 Phil. 1279, 1296 (1999).
45 G.R. No. 80116, June 30, 1989, 174 SCRA 653.
49 543 Phil. 275 (2007).
A continued (continuous or continuing) crime is defined as a single crime, consisting of a series of acts but all arising from one criminal resolution. Although there is a series of acts, there is only one crime committed; hence, only one penalty shall be imposed.

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