Source: https://www.ptab.us/2011/05/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 09:45:23+00:00

Document:
Initially, we note that the standard for what constitutes proper enablement of a prior art reference for purposes of anticipation under section 102 differs from the enablement standard under section 112. In In re Hafner, 410 F.2d 1403, 1405 (CCPA 1969). A disclosure lacking a teaching of how to use a fully disclosed invention for a specific, substantial utility is, under the present state of the law, entirely adequate to anticipate a claim. See Rasmusson v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 413 F.3d 1318, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
Ex parte Obiaya, 227 USPQ 58, 60 (BPAI 1985) (“The fact that appellant has recognized another advantage which would flow naturally from following the suggestion of the prior art cannot be the basis for patentability when the differences would otherwise be obvious.”); In re Gershon, 372 F.2d 535, 539 (CCPA 1967) (“We think it is sufficient that the prior art clearly suggests doing what appellants have done, although an underlying explanation of exactly why this should be done, other than to obtain the expected superior beneficial results, is not taught or suggested in the cited references.”); In re Kubin, 561 F.3d 1351, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“Even if no prior art of record explicitly discusses the [limitation], [applicant’s] application itself instructs that [the limitation] is not an additional requirement imposed by the claims on the [claimed invention], but rather a property necessarily present in [the claimed invention]”).
The Examiner relies on In re Harza, 274 F.2d 669 (CCPA 1960) to provide reason why one of ordinary skill in the art would have modified Bortugno’s system to duplicate parts. (Id.). The Examiner does not analogize the facts in Harza to the facts in this appeal.
The Appellant contends the “reasoning for duplication of parts does not apply.” (App. Br. 7). In Harza, the court held that “[i]t is well settled that the mere duplication of parts has no patentable significance.” Harza , 274 F.2d at 671 (italics added). The Appellant points out that the three gutter sections recited in claims 7 and 8 “are different and not duplicates.” (Id.).
These modifications are far beyond the holding in Harza, which is limited to a mere duplication of parts.
Limitations appearing in the specification but not recited in the claim are not read into the claim. E-Pass Techs., Inc. v. 3Com Corp., 343 F.3d 1364, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (citation omitted) (claims must be interpreted “in view of the specification” without importing limitations from the specification into the claims unnecessarily) (“The problem is to interpret claims ‘in view of the specification’ without unnecessarily importing limitations from the specification into the claims.”). We decline to read the three criteria argued by the Appellant into the claims.
See Ex parte Curry, 84 USPQ2d 1272, 1275 (BPAI 2005) (informative) (“Common situations involving nonfunctional descriptive material are: - a computer-readable storage medium that differs from the prior art solely with respect to nonfunctional descriptive material, such as music or a literary work, encoded on the medium, - a computer that differs from the prior art solely with respect to nonfunctional descriptive material that cannot alter how the machine functions (i.e., the descriptive material does not reconfigure the computer), or - a process that differs from the prior art only with respect to nonfunctional descriptive material that cannot alter how the process steps are to be performed to achieve the utility of the invention. Thus, if the prior art suggests storing a song on a disk, merely choosing a particular song to store on the disk would be presumed to be well within the level of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made. The difference between the prior art and the claimed invention is simply a rearrangement of nonfunctional descriptive material.).” See also Ex parte Mathias, 84 USPQ2d 1276 (BPAI 2005) (informative).
The primary purpose of the definiteness requirement is to ensure that the claims are written in such a way that they give notice to the public of the extent of the legal protection afforded by the patent, so that interested members of the public, e.g., competitors of the patent owner, can determine whether or not they infringe. All Dental Prodx, LLC v. Advantage Dental Prods., Inc., 309 F.3d 774, 779-80 (Fed. Cir. 2002). If the language of a claim is such that a person of ordinary skill in the art could not interpret the metes and bounds of the claim so as to understand how to avoid infringement, a rejection of the claim under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, is appropriate. Orthokinetics, Inc. v. Safety Travel Chairs, Inc., 806 F.2d 1565, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Datamize, LLC v. Plumtree Software, Inc., 417 F.3d 1342, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“Some objective standard must be provided in order to allow the public to determine the scope of the claimed invention.”). In addition, if the claims are inherently inconsistent with the description, definitions, and examples appearing in the specification, a rejection of the claim under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, is likewise appropriate. In re Cohn, 438 F.2d 989, 993 (CCPA 1971).
Nevertheless, as correctly pointed out by Appellant on page 16 of the Appeal Brief, merely that a claim is broad does not mean that it is necessarily indefinite. See In re Johnson, 558 F.2d 1008, 1016 n.17 (CCPA 1977); In re Miller, 441 F.2d 689, 693 (CCPA 1971); In re Gardner, 427 F.2d 786, 788 (CCPA 1970).
To establish an actual reduction of practice, the patent owner has the burden of demonstrating that the method reduced to practice includes all the elements of the claimed method (Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP) §§ 715.07 & 2185.05, Eighth Edition (August 2001), revised July 2010). See also In re Borkowski, 505 F.2d 713, 718-19 (CCPA 1974).
Whether the inventor has provided adequate written description, either explicitly or inherently, must be determined from the disclosure considered as a whole. Reiffin v. Microsoft Corp., 214 F.3d 1342, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2000). When the original written description describes something within the scope of the claim, the Examiner must do more than point out the difference in scope. This is so because “that a claim may be broader than the specific embodiment disclosed in a specification is in itself of no moment.” In re Rasmussen, 650 F.2d 1212, 1215 (CCPA 1981). There are instances in which a narrower disclosure can support broader claims. Id.
2175 Ex Parte McKeon et al 10/868,248 LUCAS 103(a) SHOOK, HARDY & BACON L.L.P.
If the words of limitation can connote with equal force a structural characteristic of the product or a process used to obtain it, then the limitation is commonly interpreted in its structural sense. See, e.g., 3M Innovative Props. Co. v. Avery Dennison Corp., 350 F.3d 1365, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“[E]ven words of limitation that can connote with equal force a structural characteristic of the product or a process of manufacture are commonly and by default interpreted in their structural sense….”); Hazani v. U.S. Int’l. Trade Com’n., 126 F.3d 1473, 1479 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (holding that claims to a plate having a “chemically engraved” surface are best characterized as pure product claims, since the “chemically engraved” limitation, read in context, describes the product more by its structure than by the process used to obtain it); see also In re Garnero, 412 F.2d 276, 278-79 (CCPA 1969) (noting that past-tense verbs such as “ ‘intermixed,’ ‘ground in place,’ ‘press fitted,’ ‘etched,’ and ‘welded,’ all … at one time or another have been separately held capable of construction as structural, rather than process, limitations.”).
“Abstract software code is an idea without physical embodiment.” Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 449 (2007).
We are also not persuaded that common ownership is a requirement for an obviousness-type double patenting rejection. As stated in MPEP § 804 ¶ I.A., “[d]ouble patenting may exist between an issued patent and an application filed by the same inventive entity, or by a different inventive entity having a common inventor, and/or by a common assignee/owner” (emphasis added).
This policy is supported by the decision in In re Van Ornum, 686 F.2d 937 (CCPA 1982), in which the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals affirmed an obviousness-type double patenting rejection over a patent with a common inventor, despite a lack of common ownership. The court reasoned there that the concern over potential harassment of an infringer by multiple assignees asserting essentially the same patented invention outweighed the applicant‟s inability to proffer a terminal disclaimer tying together ownership of the application and conflicting patent. Id. at 944-48.
The harassment justification for obviousness-type double patenting is particularly pertinent here because the Fallaux application and the Vogels patents are not commonly owned. If the Fallaux application and the Vogels patents were commonly owned, the terminal disclaimer filed in this case would have been effective to overcome the double patenting rejection. We note that this defect was of the applicant‟s creation as through assignment it allowed ownership of the applications to be divided among different entities.
Id. at 1319 (footnote omitted).

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