Source: http://www.juricaf.org/arret/CONSEILDELEUROPE-COUREUROPEENNEDESDROITSDELHOMME-19850314-1046183
Timestamp: 2017-07-26 13:09:46+00:00

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Type d'affaire : DecisionType de recours : Partiellement recevable ; partiellement irrecevableNumérotation : Numéro d'arrêt : 10461/83Identifiant URN:LEX : urn:lex;coe;cour.europeenne.droits.homme;arret;1985-03-14;10461.83 Analyses : (Art. 13) DROIT A UN RECOURS EFFECTIF, (Art. 14) DISCRIMINATION, (Art. 3) PEINE DEGRADANTE, (Art. 3) PEINE INHUMAINEParties : Demandeurs : A.R.M. CHAPPELLDéfendeurs : ROYAUME-UNITexte : APPLICATION/REQUÃTE NÂ° 10461/83 A .R .M . CHAPPELL v/the UNITED KINGDOM A .R .M . CHAPPELL c/ROYAUME-UN I DECISION of 14 March 1985 on the admissibility of the application DÃCISION du 14 mars 1985 sur la recevabilitÃ© de la requ@t e
Article 6, parsgraph 1 of the Convention : A refusal of legal aid in a civil case can amount to a denial of a fair trial . Article 6, paragraphs I and 2 of the Convention : Have these provisions been violated where one party to civil proceedings is required under oath to reveal details of his business affairs which could expose him to criminai proceedings ? Question nat resolved.
Article 8 of the Convention : Search made at the home of one party to (civil) intellectual properyy proceedings by the other party by authority of the courl ("Anton Piller" order) . Eramination of the safeguards attending the search and its execution bearing in mind that the police effected a contemporaneous search at the same premises under a search warrant in proposed crimirwl proceedings (Complaint declared admissible) . Article 25 of the Convention : The Commission cannot examine a judicial procedure as such, but only to the extent that ilte applicant has been a"victirn" of irs application . Article 26 of the Convention : Search benefining a third party ("Anton Piller" order) . A person complaining of the seizure of documents beyong the scope of the litigation in question has the following remedies : application for contempt of court, application for damages from the part,v who obtained the order, application to the court for return of the documents . Where these have not been used, the applicant has not exhausted domestic remedies. 137
Article 6, paragraphe 1, de la Convention : Le refus de ('assistance judiciaire, en matiÃ¨re civile, peut Ã©quivaloir au refus d'un procÃ¨s Ã©quitable . Ar[icle 6, paragraphes 1 et 2, de la Convention : Y a-r-il violation de ces dispositions lorsqu'une panie Ã un procÃ¨s civil est obligÃ©e de rÃ©vÃ©ler sous la foi du serment des dÃ©tails de ses relations d'affaires qui pourraient l'exposer Ã des poursuites pÃ©nales ? Question non rÃ©solue . Ar ticle 8 de la Convention : Dans un procÃ¨s civil en matiÃ¨re de propriÃ©tÃ© intellectuelle . perquisition effectuÃ©e par une partie au domicile de l'autre sous l'autoritÃ© du juge (Â« Anton Piller order+) . Examen des garanties qui ont entourÃ© cette perquisition et des circonstances de son dÃ©roulemeut, compte tenu du fait que la police a perquisitionnÃ© simulranÃ©ment au mÃªme endroit en vertu d'un mandat de caranÃ¨re rÃ©pressif (Grief dÃ©clarÃ© rececable) .
Article 25 de la Convention :/n Commission n'e.rarnine pas une institution juridique en tant que telle mais seulemenr en ranr que le requÃ©rant a Ã©tÃ© Â« victime Â« de son application . Article 26 de la Convention : Perquisition au profit d'un tiers (Â«Anton Piller order .) . Celui qui se plaint de la saisie de documents Ã©trangers au lirige dispose des recours suivanrs : une plainte en Â«contempt of court ., une demande d'indemnitÃ© payable par la partie qui a obtenu l'ordonnance, une demande de restirution des documents adressÃ©e au juge du procÃ¨s . Faute de les avoir exercÃ©s, il n'a pas Ã©puisÃ© les voies de recours inrernes .
(franÃ§ais : voir p. 150)
The facts, as they have been submitted by the applicant, a British citizen born in 1948 and living in Frome, Somerset . may be summarised as follows : In late 1980 and the early pan of 1981 the applicant was operating a club for the exchange of video cassettes, under the name of the Video Exchange Club . through a company which he controlled . Video Exchange Limited . According to the applicant, Video Exchange Limited operated by "pirate" (i .e . unauthorised) recording of video cassettes which were subsequently made available through the Video Exchange Club . These pirate recordings were made in breach of copyright . On 26 February 1981, two film companies and an organisation formed to protect film companies from activities carried out in breach of copyright ('the plaintiffs') issued proceedings in the High Court against Video Exchange Limited and the applicant, and sought and were granted an "Anton Piller" order prohibiting the applicant and his company from in any way parting with possession of any illicit copy of any film the copyright of which was owned by the plaintiffs in the action, or paning wit h
possession of any documents relating to the supply of such films to other persons, or waming any person of the possibility of further proceedings being taken against such other persons . ln addition, the court ordered :"That the Defendants and each of them . . . do permit such persons as may be duly authorised by the Plaintiffs, not exceeding three in number, together with their solicitor and not more than one other solicitor or employee of the Plaintiffs' solicitors, to enter forthwith the said premises and any other premises under the control of the Defendants or any of them (which premises they are by this Order obliged to disclose) on any week day at any time between eight o'clock in the morning and nine o'cbck in the evening for the purpose of searching for and removing into the custody of the Plaintiffs' solicitors any of the following articles : (a) any unlicenced copies of any relevant film (as defined) or any copies of a substantial part thereof, whether such copies be on tape or celluloid or in any other medium (b) any documents which appear to relate to the acquisition, supply or disposal of such copies as aforesaid . " In addition the applicant was ordered to reveal to the plaintiffs' solicitor the whereabouts of all the documents specified in the order, and to supply the names and addresses of all presons to whom the applicant and his company had supplied or offered to supply pirated cassettes and, finally, that the applicant be ordered to swear an affidavit within four days of the service of the Anton Piller Order on him setting forth the information there required to be given pursuant to the terms of the order . The Anton Piller Order was supported by affidavits swom by the plaintiffs' solicitor and by an investigator employed by the plaintiffs . The plaintiffs gave undertakings to issue and serve the proceedings and further undertakings as follows : '(c) to abide by any Order this Court may make as to damages in case this Court shall hereafter be of opinion that the Intended Defendants (hereinafter called the Defendants) shall have sustained any by reason of this Order which the plaintiffs ought to pay . (d) that any articles or documents obtained as a result of this Order shall be retained by the plaintiffs' solicitors in safe custody until further Order . (e) not to use any documents or information obtained as a result of the execution of this Order save for the purpose of civil proceedings against these Defendants or third parties in connection with the subject matter of this dispute without leave of the Court an d (f) not to commence or instigate any criminal proceedings against any of the Defendants herein in respect of the acts forming the subject matter of this action" .
This interim relief was granted until 5 March 1981 or until further orde r Before proceeding to serve the Anton Piller order on the applicant, the plaintiffs notified the police that they suspected that the applicant was dealing in hard core pornography and obscene material . It was agreed between the plaintiffs and the police that a concerted visit would be carried out on the applicant's premises, the police acting under a search warrant granted for the purposes of seeking obscene material- and the plaintiffs proceeding under the Anton Piller Order . It was agreed that this visit would take place on 2 March 1981, and a prior meeting was held at 10 .45 at Bath Police Station, where it was agreed that the eleven policemen and five representatives of the plaintiffs, including two solicitors, would carry out the visit . When the visit took place, the police arrived first, with a search warrant, and notified the person who answered the door that ihey intended to enter whether or not permitted to do so, as authorised by the search warrant . The single policeman (the remainder having waited outside) was allowed admittance to the premises and was followed by the plaintiffs' representatives and their solicitors- who were taken for the police by the person who answered the door, and then by the remaining ten policemen . Once inside the police officer served the search warrant on the applicant and subsequently the plaintiffs' solicitor served the Anton Piller Order on the applicant as well . The applicant was advised by the plaintiffs' solicitor of the terms of the Anton Piller Order and of the advisability of obtaining legal advice . He arranged for a member of the rirm of solicitors whom he usually instructed to attend- who arrived shortly thereafter . During this interlude, the police proceeded to execute their search warrant . On the arrival of the applicant's solicitor, the applicant was advised of the implications of the Anton Piller Order and accepted service of it . Thereupon the plaintiffs and their solicitors started their search of the premises contemporaneously with the police search . The applicant contends that owing to the contemporaneous searching of his premises by the police and the plaintiffs he was unable to supervise the search and to take note of the documents which were seized . In particular he contends that a number of private and confidential documents of a personal nature were seized by the plaintiffs' solicitors which had no bearing on the action which they were bringing against him . These documents included bank statements, the mortage on the applicant's life assurance policy, details of the applicant's non-registration for value added tax (a criminal offence), a confidential bill from the applicant's previous panner and solicitor, details of adult films in respect of which the applicant was negotiating, and a privileged written barrister's opinion on the legality of the activities conducted by the applicant through his company . In addition, the applicant contends that correspondence between him and girlfriends and other personal correspondence was seized by the plaintiffs' solicitor . Funhermore- the applican t 140
contends that further highly confidential documents were seized, including a leaflet showing that he was using contact magazines to meet men and women for sexual relations, correspondence concerning the applicant's relationship with his former partner's wife and various other correspondence and documentation implementing the applicant more or less directly in various criminal activities concerning the use of drugs and the supply of "hard core" pornographic materials . Under the terms of the Anton Piller Order, the applicant was obliged to swear an affidavit of disclosure relating to his business activities including the operation of the Video Exchange Club, within four days . The case came before the High Court with both parties present on 5 March 1981 . When counsel for the applicant confirmed the undertakings required by the Anton Piller Order, the time for the filing of which was extended to 14 March 1981 . Subsequenlly arrangements were made between the applicant and the solicitors to the plaintiffs, to allow the applicant to inspect the documents seized from his premises in order to compile his affidavit . On 19 March 1981 the applicant applied for an extension of time for the filing of his affidavit, an application which was refused . In cortespondence between the applicant's solicitors and the plaintiffs' solicitors it was agreed that the time for filing the affidavit should be extended until 27 March 1981 . On 25 March 1981 the applicant filed an affidavit "in response to the proceedings issued by the plaintiffs" but which did not contain the information specified in the undertakings but contended that the activities of Video Exchange Limited were lawful and declining to give the names and addresses of the 4,000 members of the Video Exchange Club on the grounds that this would permit the plaintiffs to harass and prosecute them, although the applicant had guaranteed them strict confidence . The applicant also noted that he had just been granted legal aid and acknowledged that it might be necessary to prepare a further affidavit with the benefit of comprehensive legal advice . The applicant subsequently visited the plaintiffs' solicitor's offices on five occasions, in order to examine the information held by them . He was served with a notice of motion committing him for contempt of coun for failure to comply with the undertakings given to disclose the information demanded by the Anton Piller Order on 6 May 1981 . This motion came before the High Court on 13 May 1981 when it was adjourned for three weeks, i .e . until 3 June 1981 on an undertaking given by the applicant's counsel that the applicant would use his best endeavours to produce the affidavit of disclosure within seven days . On 26 May 1981 the applicant withdrew his instructions from the second firm of solicitors and counsel who had been advising him and from then on conducted his case in person . The applicant then issued a variety of cross motions against the plaintiffs . alleging that the Anton Piller Order had been obtained improperly, and improperly executed .in particular because the judge who granted the order had been inadequately informed of the plaintiffs' plans to execute the Anton Piller Order in concert with the police execution of their search warrant . He contended that this combined operation, of which the judge was not made aware, made both the searc h 141
warrant and in particular the Anton Piller Order far more onerous than intended and invalidated the Anton Piller Order and the evidence obtained under it . These proceedings came before the High Court on 27 July 1981 and were followed by the issue of committal proceedings by the plaintiffs to have the applicant committed to prison for contempt of court for failure to file the affidavit of disclosure required by the original Anton Piller Order . The High Court gave judgment on these respective motions after substantial argument on 10 November 1981 and held that, in the light of the inadequacies of one of the affidavits which had supported the original application for an Anton Piller Order, and of the need for alertness in controlling the scope of Anton Piller Ordersthe applicant and his company should be relieved of the undertaking to make an affidavit of disclosure conceming the operation of his business practices and the names and addressed of the members of the Video Exchange Club . In particular the Court considered that had the proposed co-operation between the police and the plaintiffs in the operation of the search warrant and the Anton Piller Order been brought to the attention of the High Court more clearly when the Anton Piller Order was granted, it was probable that the Court would have taken steps to ensure that further safeguards were provided for the applicant to ensure that he was better able to be advised as to the relevance of the Anton Piller Order and to protect his interest generally during its execution . At the same time the High Court found the applicant and his company Video Exchange Limited to have been in contempt of court in failing to make the affidavit of disclosure . but concluded that it would not be appropriate, in the light of the relief which had already been granted to the applicant in relation to the undertakings which he had given . to impose a penalty on him for this contempt . However the applicant did not obtain the return of the documents and materials seized from his premises under the Order . The applicant and the plaintiffs appealed from this decision to the Court of Appeal, which appeal was heard on 15 June 1982 . The Court of Appeal noted that an Anton Piller Order was a"draconian remedy" which : "infringes by the very necessity of the type of case in which it is appropriate what is normally a fundamental principle of our law, audi alteram partem . There is, in the eye of an English lawyer, something offensive in the concept of an order which, by its very nature, infringes the citizen's privacy as a result of proceedings in which he has never had an opportunity of being heard and of which he has not even previously been informed . That such a procedure is both necessary and salutary in the type of case in which it has become familiar is not in doubt, but its very nature as an ex parte measure underlines the overriding importance, first that the court to which application is made for an order should be put fully and accurately in possession of every fact material to th e 142
question of whether an order should be made ; and, secondly, that the stipulations which the court normally incorporates into such orders for the protection of the proposed defendants should be observed not only in the letter but in the spirit . . . .(These) are necessary and important safeguards of the interests of the person who ex hypothesi has not been before the court and has had no opportunity of being heard or even of suggesting that he may have some defence to the plaintiffs' claim . " The Court of Appeal held, however, that the inadequacies of the affidavit supporting the original application for the Anton Piller Order and the manner of the execution of the order were "very unfortunate", in that they deprived the applicant of the proper opportunity to raise any objection which he might have had to the entry of the plaintiffs' solicitors, an aspect which was described as "disturbing" . Nevertheless the Court of Appeal held that these defects did not justify releasing the applicant from the undertakings which he had given, which undenakings of disclosure were therefore re-imposed, although no penalty for the applicant's contempt of court by his failure until then to comply with the undertakings was imposed . In addition, the Coun of Appeal refused leave to appeal to the House of Lords and the applicant's petition to the House of Lords for leave to appeal was rejected on 7 October 1982 . Thereafter the applicant consented, allegedly under the duress of the risk of self-incrimination, to a consent order under which he was restrained from any dealinÂ¢s with pirated video tapes . was compelled to make an affidavit of disclosure . but omitting the names and addresses of anyone who was a bona fide member of the Video Exchange Club . In addition the plaintiffs and their solicitors were released from the undertakings as to the confidentialiry of the material received by them under the terms of the original Anton Piller Order, and both sides were released from any liability or claim a rising under the proceedings under any counter-claim, and that the documents and films seized under the order be returned to the applicant and the pr oceedings terminated . On 10 February 1983, following a request for further documentation from the Secretariat of the Commission, the applicant applied to the High Court for leave to use the documents which were before the High Court and the Court of Appeal in the proceedings before the Commission, which leave was granted on the same date, despite the opposition of the plaintiffs' solicitors
The applicant complains that the terms, content and manner of service of the Anton Piller Order against him were contrary to the Convention in a variety of ways . 143
He first contends that it was oppressive that in civil proceedings plaintiffs should be granted police powers of search and seizure which were executed in a humiliating and degrading manner . Furthermore, the applicant was threatened with the risk of loss of his liberty through a decision that he was in contempt of court should he fail to comply with the terms of the Anton Piller Order, in respect of which he had not been heard . He was further ordered to admit to criminal activities . contrary to his right to non-selfincrimination, which right has been specifically abolished with reference to civil proceedings relating to intellectual Propeny and breach of copyright by Section 72 of the Supreme Court Act 1981 . The applicant also complains that his right to respect for his home, correspondence and private life was interfered with in a grossly disproportionate manner by the execution of the Anton Piller Order, which permitted the plaintiffs' solicitors to inspect every single document on his premises, which were at the same time his home and his business premises, in order to see whether they referred to the subject of the action or not . In addition the applicant contends that by the mere fact of entering his home under the power of an order backed by the threat of contempt proceedings, the plaintiffs' solicitors were entitled to see his domestic circumstances and could conclude therefrom matters about himself which he had a right to keep confidential . In addition the applicant complains that he was denied legal aid in the Anton Piller Order proceedings, since he was unable to obtain access to the necessa ry documents ( held by the plaintiffs' solicitors) to support his application for legal aid . The applicant invokes Articles 3, 5, 6, and 8 and Article I of Protocol No . I .
THE LA W The applicant complains first that various private and confidential documents 1. and papers were seized from his premises during the conduct of the search pursuant to the Anton Piller Order . He submits that these documents, unrelated to the copyright action, were seized by the solicitors for the plaintiffs and that some of the private information which they contained was misused . He invokes Article 8 of the Convention and Article I of Protocol No . I . which guarantee the right to respect for inter a(ia one's correspondence . and the peaceful enjoyment of one's possessions . The respondent Government have contended that the applicant has failed to exhaust his domestic remedies in relation to this complaint . They therefore invoke Anicle 26 of the Convention which provides that : "The Commission may ordy deal with the maner after all domestic remedies have been exhausted, according to the generally recognised rules o f 144
international law, and within a period of six months from the date on which the final decision was taken . " The respondent Governmem contend that the tertns of the Anton Piller Order were clear and explicit, and did not permit the plaintiffs' solicitors to take documents beyond those which were directly relevant to the copyright action . Accordingly they submit that the applicant could have sought an order from the trial judge that any extraneous papers should be retumed to him, together with all copies taken of them, and indeed for contempt of court against any person who had taken such documents improperly or used them outside the terms of the order . The applicant contends that he attempted to pursue such remedies, but that they proved ineffective . The Commission notes that the applicant did prepare and swear an affidavit making various allegations of contempt by the plaintiffs' solicitors in October 1981 . However the allegations contained in this affidavit were of a general nature, and did not include the specific allegations which the applicant now makes that certain highly private and personal documents were seized and misused by the plaintiffs' solicitors . In addition, although this affidavit was apparentaly sworn, it appears that the applicant did not effectively pursue an application for contempt on the grounds which he now raises before the Commission against the solicitors for the plaintiffs . Nor did the applicant make any other application to the trial judge for the retum of any documents which were unrelated to the copyright proceedings . Furthermore, it would have been open to the applicant to make an application to the trial judge to implement the undertaking in damages given by the plaintiffs when the Anton Piller Order was granted . This undertaking was expressly contained in paragraph (c) of the Anton Piller Order of 26 February 1981, and the Commission finds that it would have provided the applicant with an immediate and appropriate means of redress in respect of the complaints which he now brings before the Commission . It follows that the applicant has failed to comply with the requirements of Article 26 of the Convention in that he has not exhausted the domestic remedies which would have been sufficient and effective for his complaints before introducing his application to the Commission . Accordingly, this part of his application must be declared inadmissible pursuant to Article 27 para . 3 of the Convention . 2 . The applicant further complains that the Anton Piller Order imposed an obligation on him to swear an affidavit of disclosure setting out details of his business transactions with all the members of the club which he operated, although he contends that this amounted to an obligation on him to incriminate himself, since some of these transactions involved dealings in pornographic material and pirated tapes, both of which were criminal offences . The applicant refers in this respect to the terms of Section 72 of the Supreme Coun 1981, which, he submits, has specifically restricted the right of non-self-incrimination in civil proceedings relating to intellectual property and breach of copyright .
In this respect the applicant has invoked Article 6 para . I of the Convention, which guarantees the right to a fair hearing and a fair trial, and to Article 6 para . 2 which provides : "2 . Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law . " The Commission notes that the Anton Piller Order contained various obligations . One of these was the requirement that the applicant swear an affidavit of disclosure relating to his business affairs, which was to be filed in evidence before the judge in the civil proceedings in order that the question of the alleged breach of copyright could be examined by the court . It appears however that no such affidavit was ever sworn . The applicant's refusal to swear the affidavit was the grounds for a motion of contempt before Mr . Justice Wamer in November 1981 . when the applicant's cross motions to set aside the Anton Piller Order were also considered . Since the applicant's motions were successful, the plaintiffs' motion for contempt for failure to swear the affidavit failed . The obligation to swear the affidavit was technically reimposed by the Court of Appeal, but rentoved by the consent order approved by the High Court in December 1983 . Funhermore, the Commission notes that under the tenns of the Anton Piller Order itself, the plaintiffs were expressly prohibited from using the information contained in any affidavit of disclosure for any purpose outside the scope of the civil action for breach of copyright which they had brought . This is clear from the terms of paragraph (f) of the Anton Piller Order, where the plaintiffs undertook "not to comntence or instigate any criminal proceedings against (the applicant)" . The Commission recalls that, in accordance with the provisions of Article 25 para . I of the Convention, it may only receive petitions " . . . from any person . . . claiming to be the victim of a violation . . . of the rights set forth in (the) Convention . . . " . It appears from the facts of the present case . however, that the applicant cannot claim to be a victim of a violation of any of the rights guaranteed by the Convention in respect of this complaint conceming his alleged self-incrimination, since he was not in fact obliged to swear an affidavit of disclosure revealing any criminal or other activities, and, specifically was not subject to criminal proceedings in relation to the subject matter of the copyright proceedings . It follows that this aspect of the applicant's complaint is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Anicle 27 para . 2 of the Convention . 3 . The applicant has further complained that he was denied legal aid in the proceedings relating to the Anton Piller Order and that he was unable to obtain access to the necessary documents held by the plaintiffs' solicitors to support his application for legal aid . In this respect he invokes Article 6 of the Convention . The Commission recalls that Article 6 of the Convention does not expressly guarantee legal aid in civil proceedings, and that the proceedings relating to the 146
Anton Piller Order were civil in character . Nevertheless, the Commission has held that, the right to a fair hearing protected by Article 6 para . I of the Convention may, in certain circumstances, oblige a State to provide legal aid if the complexity of the proceedings are such that an applicant cannot be expected to plead in person . Nevertheless, in the present case, it is clear that this issue does not arise . Although the applicant has complained that his application for legal aid was delayed by the requirement to examine documents held by the plaintiffs' solicitors, it appears that legal aid was nevertheless granted, and that the applicant was able to examine the documents at the plaintiffs' solicitors' office for this purpose, and that it was the applicant himself who decided to proceed without legal aid, and ultimately proceeded in person . In these circumstances his complaint that he was denied legal and that thereby he was denied a fair hearing is unsubstantiated and manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para . 2 of the Convention . 4 . The applicant has also invoked Article 5 of the Convention in respect of the events of 2 March 1981 . Although Article 5 of the Convention guarantees liberty and security of person the applicant has wholly failed to substantiate how this provision might be at issue in his case and it follows that this aspect of his complaint is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para . 2 of the Convention . 5 . The applicant complained in his written submissions submitted on 2 July 1984 that the Court of Appeal was biased in hearing his appeal on 15 June 1982 . The applicant has failed to submit any substantiation of this complaint which is accordingly manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para . 2 of the Convention . 6 . The applicant has finally complained that Anton Piller orders are a "plague", which give police powers to private individuals and companies . He also complains of the way in which the Anton Piller Order was served and the subsequent search was carried out on his premises . The Commission recalls that, in accordance with Article 19 of the Convention, its task is to ensure the observance by the High Contracting Parties of their obligations undertaken under the Convention . As it has frequently held, this requires the Commission to examine whether the applicant's rights guaranteed by the Convention have been interfered with, in a way which permits him to claim to be a victim within the meaning of Article 25 para . I of the Convention . The Commission is not therefore called upon to examine, in the abstract, whether a particular aspect of domestic law is or is not in conformity with the Convention . In the present case therefore, the Commission is not called upon the examine the applicant's first compaint of the existence of Anton Piller Orders and that they grant police powers to private individuals and companies . The Commission must however examine the applicant's complaint arising from the specific facts of his case . 147
In this respect, the applicant contends that the search of his premises on 2 March 1981 under the Anton Piller Order which was granted in the proceedings against him was an unjustified interference with his right to respect for his home, private life and correspondence, contrary to Article 8 of the Convention . Article 8 provides : "I . Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence .
2 . There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic wellbeing of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others ." The applicant contends that the execution of the Anton Piller Order in the circumstances of this case, including the simultaneous visit by the police and the plaintiffs' solicitors, the numbers of persons involved and the fact that the search of the applicant's premises, which were both his home and his business, involved an investigation of aspects of his private life, constituted a disproportionate and unjustified interference of his rights guaranteed by this Article . The respondent Government contended that the search pursuant to the Anton Piller Order was conducted properly, after service of the order on the applicam, and after the applicant had been advised to seek the assistance of his solicitor, and after the solicitor had advised the applicant to accept service of the Anton Piller Order and to permit the search . The applicant was at all times present in the building while the search was carried out, as was his solicitor . They iherefore submit that it was open to the applicant to ensure that the search was conducted in an orderly manner, and in accordance with the terms of the Anton Piller Order itself, which contained an automatic undertaking of damages given by the plaintiffs if the terms of the order were overstepped . In addition the respondent Government have indicated the vital nature of an ex pane order to seize evidence in proceedings relating to copyright and intellectual property law, in order that the evidence which will be central to the subsequent trial is not destroyed by the defendant before the matter comes to court . They submit that it has been shown that a remedy such as an Anton Piller Order is the only effective way to control the pirating of video tapes, and that the execution of this order in the particular facts of this case did not constitute a disproportionate interference with the applicant's private life, since it was regulated by the terms of the order itself and hence in accordance with law, and was necessary in the interests of the protection of the rights of others, namely the rights of the copyright holders . The Commission notes that the applicant was, under the terms of the order, obliged to permit the search to be undertaken, subject to the subsequent control an d 148
supervision exercised by the High Court in the event that the terms of the order permitting the search were overstepped . It appears that the search under the terms of the Anton Piller Order involved the examination of large quantities of papers held by the applicant in his premises, which premises included both his home and business premises, and that in these circumstances the supervision of the search may have been rendered difficult . Nevertheless, the Commission notes that the Anton Piller Order made against the applicant in civil proceedings, was executed immediately following the service of a search warrant by the police in proposed crintinal proceedings and that it appears that some confusion arose at the time of the service of the order and of the search warrant as to whether the plaintiffs' solicitors were in fact part of the police party, or involved in a separate matter . Significant numbers of police were involved in the execution of a search warrant, for reasons which are not wholly clear . In this respect the Commission notes that the Anton Piller Order itself was restricted to be executed by not more than five persons, while it appears that I1 or 12 policemen took part in the execution of the search warrant . The scale of the powers afforded by the Anton Piller Order were described a s "draconian" by the Court of Appeal in its judgment of 15 June 1982 in this case and the question arises whether the safeguards contained in the terms of the Anton Piller Order served in this case and the circumstances of its execution were in conformity with the requirements of Article 8 of the Convention . However the Commission finds that this issue raises difficult questions of fact and law which are of such complexity that their determination should depend upon a full examination of the merits of the application . It follows that this complaint cannot be declared manifestly illfounded, and is therefore admissible, no other ground for inadmissibility having been established . For these reasons, the Commissio n DECLARES ADMISSIBLE, without prejudging the merits, the applicant's complaints concerning the execution of the search pursuant to the Anton Piller order (para . 6 of the law) ; DECLARES INADMISSIBLE the remainder of the application .
(TRADUCTION ) EN FAI T Les faits, tels qu'exposÃ©s par le requÃ©rant, ressortissant britannique nÃ© en 1948 et habitant Ã Frome, Somerset, peuvent se rÃ©sumer comme suit : A la fin de 1980 et au tout dÃ©but de 1981 . le requÃ©rant exploitait par le truchement d'une sociÃ©tÃ© qu'il dirigeait, Video Exchange Limited, un club d'Ã©change de vidÃ©o-cassettes, intitulÃ© Video Exchange Club . Selon ses propres dires, Video Exchange Limited travaillait par enregistrement -pirate- (c'est-Ã -dire non autorisÃ©) de vidÃ©o-cassettes ultÃ©rieurement offertes par le Video Exchange Club . Ces enregistrements pirates Ã©taient faits en violation du copyright . Le 26 fÃ©vrier 1981, deux entreprises cinÃ©matographiques et un organisme constituÃ© pour protÃ©ger le copyright des sociÃ©tÃ©s cinÃ©matographiques (Â«les plaignantsÂ») intentÃ©rent devant la High Court une action contre Video Exchange Limited et contre le requÃ©rant . Elles demandÃ¨rent et obtinrent une ordonnance dite "Anton Piller" qui interdisait au requÃ©rant et Ã sa sociÃ©tÃ© tout acte de disposition de copie de film illÃ©galement obtenue et dont les plaignants possÃ©daient le copyright, ou d'un quelconque document concernant la distribution de ces films Ã d'autres personnes, et mettait en garde contre la possibilitÃ© de voir ces tiers faire l'objet de poursuites . Le tribunal ordonna en outre : -Que les dÃ©fendeurs ensemble et sÃ©parÃ©ment . . . permettent aux personnes dÃ»ment autorisÃ©es par les plaignants, trois au maximum, accompagnÃ©es de leur homme de loi et au maximum d'un autre homme de loi ou agent du cabinet des solicitors des plaignants, de pÃ©nÃ©trer dans lesdits locaux et dans tout autre local placÃ© sous le contrÃ´le des dÃ©fendeurs ou de l'un d'eux (locaux que cette ordonnance les oblige Ã indiquer) les jours ouvrables, Ã tout moment entre 8 heures du matin et 9 heures du soir, aux fins d'y rechercher et de remettre Ã la garde des hommes de loi des plaignants l'un des anicles suivants : (a) toute copie non autorisÃ©e de tout film visÃ© (voir dÃ©finition) ou d'une partie importante de ce film, qu'il s'agisse d'une copie faite sur bande magnÃ©tique, sur pellicule ou sur tout autre support ; (b) tout document qui semble Ãªtre liÃ© Ã l'acquisition, la distribution ou la destmction des copies susdites . â¢ Le requÃ©rant fut en outre sommÃ© de rÃ©vÃ©ler au solicitor des plaignants les caractÃ©ristiques de tous les documents Ã©noncÃ©s dans l'ordonnance, de foumir les noms et adresses de toutes les personnes Ã qui sa sociÃ©tÃ© et lui avaient foumi ou proposÃ© des cassettes piratÃ©es . Enfin, le requÃ©rant devait exposer sous sertnent les inforrnations ainsi requises conformÃ©ment aux tertnes de l'ordonnance et ce, dans les quatre jours suivant la signification de l'ordonnance Anton Piller . 150
L'ordonnance fut assonie d'anestations sous serment foumies par le solicitor des plaignants et par un enquÃªteur employÃ© par eux . Ceux-ci fournirent pour intenter et poursuivre l'action les engagements suivants : -c . se conformer Ã toute ordonnance du tribunal concemant des dommagesintÃ©rÃªts pour le cas oÃ¹ le tribunal estimerait par la suite que les dÃ©fendeurs visÃ©s (ci-aprÃ¨s appelÃ©s les dÃ©fendeurs) auraient exposÃ© des frais en raison de l'ordonnance et qu'ils devraient les acquitter ;d . conserver jusqu'Ã nouvel ordre Ã la garde, des solicitors des plaignants tou t article ou document recueilli suite Ã cette ordonnance : e . ne se servir des documents ou informations recueillis suite Ã l'exÃ©cution de cette ordonnance que pour engager des poursuites civiles contre les dÃ©fendeurs ou des tiers en liaison avec l'objet du prÃ©sent litige et sans l'autorisation du tribunal e t f . ne pas entamer ou inciter Ã entamer des poursuites pÃ©nales contre l'un des dÃ©fendeurs pour les actes visÃ©s par la prÃ©sente action .Cetie mesure conse rvatoire Ã©tait valable jusqu'au 5 mars 1981 ou jusqu'Ã nouvel ordre . Avant de faire signifier l'ordonnance Anton Piller au requÃ©rant, les plaignants indiquÃ¨rent Ã la police que le requÃ©rant faisait peut-Ã¨tre commerce de pornographie dure et de documents de caractÃ¨re obscÃ¨ne . Les plaignants et la police convinrent d'effectuer ensemble la visite des locaux pour l'exÃ©cution, d'une part d'un mandat de perquisition par la police pour rechercher les documents de caractÃ¨re obscÃ¨ne et, d'autre pan, de l'ordonnance Anton Piller par les plaignants . II fut dÃ©cidÃ© que cette visite aurait lieu le 2 mars 1981 . Une rÃ©union prÃ©alable se tint Ã 10 h 45 au commissariat de police de Bath, oÃ¹ il fut convenu que la visite serait effectuÃ©e par onze policiers et cinq reprÃ©sentants des plaignants, dont deux solicitors . Lorsque la visite eut lieu, la police arriva la premiÃ¨re, munie d'un mandat de perquisition, et indiqua Ã la personne qui ouvrit la porte qu'elle entrerait, qu'on le lui permette ou non, comme l'y autorisait le mandat de perquisition . L'officier de police (les autres attendant Ã l'extÃ©rieur) se vit auto ri sÃ© Ã pÃ©nÃ©trer dans les locaux . Il fut suivi par les reprÃ©sentants des plaignants et leurs solicitors, que la personne qui avait ouvert la porte prit pour des policiers, puis par les dix autres policiers . Une fois Ã l'intÃ©rieur, l'officier de police signifia le mandat de perquisition au requÃ©rant, aprÃ¨s quoi le solicitor des plaignants signifia l'ordonnance Anton Piller . Le solicitor des plaignants indiqua au requÃ©rant quels Ã© taient les tertoes de l'ordonnance et lui conseilla de consulter un homme de loi . Il p rit les dispositions pour appeler un membre du cabinet des solicitors qu'il avait l'habitude de consulter et qui arriva peu aprÃ©s . Dans l'interv alle, la police commenÃ§a Ã perquisitionner. 151
A l'arrivÃ©e du solicitor du requÃ©rant, celui-ci fut informÃ© des effets de l'ordonnance Anton Piller et en accepta la signification . Sur quoi les plaignants et leurs solicitors commencÃ¨rent la fouille des locaux en mÃªme temps que la police perquisitionnait . Le requÃ©rant soutient qu'en raison de cette perquisition simultanÃ©e de ses locaux par la police et par les plaignants, il n'a pas pu surveiller les opÃ©rations et prendre note des documents qui Ã©taient saisis . Il soutient notamment que les solicitors des plaignants ont saisi un certain nombre de documents personnels et confidentiels qui n'avaient rien Ã voir avec l'action engagÃ©e contre lui . Parmi ces documents figuraient des relevÃ©s bancaires, l'hypothÃ¨que sur sa police d'assurance-vie, des dÃ©tails sur le non-enregistrement du requÃ©rant pour la taxe Ã la valeur ajoutÃ©e (infraction pÃ©nale), une note confidentielle adressÃ©e par un ancien associÃ© du requÃ©rant et son avouÃ©, des dÃ©tails sur des films pour adultes qui faisaient l'objet de nÃ©gociations de la part du requÃ©rant et l'avis d'un avocat, donnÃ© par Ã©crit et bÃ©nÃ©ficiant du secret professionnel, sur la lÃ©galitÃ© des activitÃ©es menÃ©es par le requÃ©rant et sa sociÃ©tÃ© . De plus, selon le requÃ©rant, le solicitor des plaignants emporta une correspondance Ã©changÃ©e avec des amis et d'autres lettres personnelles . Il prÃ©tend en outre que d'autres documents hautement confidentiels ont Ã©tÃ© saisis, notamment une brochure montrant qu'il utilisait des revues spÃ©cialisÃ©es dans les rencontres pour rapports sexuels masculins et fÃ©minins, une correspondance concernant ses relations avec l'Ã©pouse de son ancien associÃ©, et diverses autres correspondances et documents impliquant plus ou moins directement le requÃ©rant dans diverses activitÃ©s dÃ©lictuelles touchant Ã l'usage de drogues et au commerce de documents de pornographie dure .
Selon l'ordonnance Anton Piller, le requÃ©rant Ã©tait tenu d'exposer sous serment, dans un dÃ©lai de quatre jours, la nature de ses activitÃ©s commerciales, y compris l'exploitation du club d'Ã©change-vidÃ©o . La High Court fut saisie et les deux parties comparurent le 5 mars 1981 . Lorsque l'avocat du requÃ©rant confirma les engagements requis par l'ordonnance Anton Piller, le juge prorogea au 14 mars 1981 le dÃ©lai prescrit pour les dÃ©poser . UltÃ©rieurement, des dispositions furent prises entre le requÃ©rant et le solicitor des plaignants pour permettre au premier de voir quels documents avaient Ã©tÃ© saisis dans ses locaux afin d'Ã©tablir son attestation sous serrnent . Le 19 mars 1981, le requÃ©rant sollicita la prorogation du dÃ©lai de dÃ©pÃ´t de son attestation, ce qui lui fut refusÃ© . Par un Ã©change de leltres entre le solicitor du requÃ©rant et celui des plaignants, il fut convenu que le dÃ©lai de dÃ©pÃ´t de l'attestation serait prorogÃ© jusqu'au 27 mars 1981 . Le 25, le requÃ©rant dÃ©posa une attestation sous serment â¢ en rÃ©ponse Ã la procÃ©dure engagÃ©e par les plaignantsÂ», mais le document ne contenait pas les informations requises dans l'engagement souscrit ; au contraire, il soutenait que les activitÃ©s de Video Exchange Limited Ã©taient licites et refusait de donner les noms et adresses des 4 .000 membres du club au motif que cela permettrait aux plaignants d'engager des poursuites contre des clients Ã qui le requÃ©rant avait garanti la plu s 152
grande discrÃ©tion . Le requÃ©rant relevait Ã©galement qu'il venait juste de se voir accorder l'aide judiciaire et admettait qu'il pourrait Ãªtre nÃ©cessaire d'Ã©tablir une nouvelle attestation sous serment, avec l'aide Ã©clairÃ©e d'un avocat . Le requÃ©rant se rendit Ã cinq reprises au cabinet du solicitor des plaignants, afin d'y examiner les informations qu'il dÃ©tenait . II se vit signifier le 6 mai 1981 une accusation d'outrage Ã magistrat pour n'avoir pas respectÃ© l'obligation de soumettre les informations requises dans l'ordonnance Anton Piller . L'accusation fut examinÃ©e le 13 mai 1981 par la High Court qui ajouma l'affaire Ã trois semaines, soit au 3 juin 1981, l'avocat du requÃ©rant ayant pris pour son client l'engagement de tout faire pour produire dans les sept jours l'attestation rÃ©clamÃ©e . Le 26 mai 1981, le requÃ©rant retira son mandat au deuxiÃ¨me cabinet d'avouÃ©s et Ã l'avocat conseil et dÃ©cida alors de mener personnellement son affaire . 0 dÃ©posa ensuite quantitÃ© de contre-plaintes allÃ©guant que l'obtention et l'exÃ©cution de l'ordonnance Anton Piller n'avaient pas Ã©tÃ© rÃ©guliÃ¨res, puisque le juge qui en Ã©tait l'auteur n'avait pas Ã©tÃ© informÃ© du projet de l'exÃ©cuter de concert avec le mandat de perquisition de la police . Il soutenait que cette opÃ©ration combinÃ©e, menÃ©e Ã l'insu du juge, avait fait du mandat de perquisition et surtout de l'ordonnance Anton Piller une charge beaucoup plus lourde que ce qui Ã©tait prÃ©vu, ce qui entachait de nullitÃ© autant l'ordonnance Anton Piller que les preuves saisies Ã cette occasion . L'affaire fut examinÃ©e par la High Court le 27 juillet 1981 et suivie de l'ouverture d'une procÃ©dure de demande de mise en accusation du requÃ©rant rÃ©clamÃ©e par les plaignants pour outrage Ã magistrat puisque l'intÃ©ressÃ© n'avait pas soumis l'attestation sous serrnent requise par l'ordonnance initiale Anton Piller . La High Court statua sur ces demandes respectives aprÃ¨s un examen approfondi le 10 novembre 1981 et dÃ©clara que, compte tenu des insuffisances des dÃ©clarations sous serrnent prÃ©sentÃ©es Ã l'appui de la demande d'ordonnance Anton Piller et de la nÃ©cessitÃ© d'Ãªtre vigilant pour maitriser le domaine d'application de ces ordonnances ; le requÃ©rant et sa sociÃ©tÃ© devaient Ãªtre relevÃ©s de l'obligation d'exposer sous serment la nature des activitÃ©s commerciales ainsi que les noms et adresses des membres du club d'Ã©change-vidÃ©os . Le tribunal estima notamment que si la coopÃ©ration envisagÃ©e entre la police et les plaignants pour exÃ©cuter de concert le mandat de perquisition et l'ordonnance Anton Piller lui avait Ã©tÃ© signalÃ© au moment de la dÃ©livrance de l'ordonnance, il est probable qu'il aurait pris des mesures pour s'assurer que le requÃ©rant soit mieux conseillÃ© sur la peninence de l'ordonnance et puisse protÃ©ger ses intÃ©rÃ¨ts pendant l'exÃ©cution de l'ordonnance . SimultanÃ©ment, la High Court dÃ©clara le requÃ©rant et sa sociÃ©tÃ© Video Exchange Limited coupables d'outrage Ã magistrat pour n'avoir pas foumi l'attestation rÃ©clamÃ©e, mais estima qu'il serait inopportun de leur infliger une sanction de ce chef, vu les mesures d'allÃ¨gement accordÃ©es Ã l'intÃ©ressÃ© en ce qui concerne les engagements souscrits par lui . Le requÃ©rant n'obtint cependant pas la restitution des documents saisis dans ses locaux en vertu de l'ordonnance . 153
Le requÃ©rant et les plaignants ftrent appel de cette dÃ©cision devant la Court of Appeal, qui examina l'affaire le 15 juin 1982 . La Cour fit remarquer qu'une ordonnance Anton Piller est un .remÃ¨de draconienÂ» qui : Â« du fait mÃªme du type d'affaires pour lequel elle est indiquÃ©e, porte atteinte Ã ce qui est habituellement un principe fondamental de notre droit : audi alteram partem . Pour un juriste anglais, il y a quelque chose de choquant Ã l'idÃ©e d'une ordonnance qui, par sa nature mÃªme, porte atteinte Ã la vie privÃ©e du citoyen par suite d'une procÃ©dure au cours de laquelle l'intÃ©ressÃ© n'ajamais eu la possibilitÃ© de se faire entendre et dont il n'a mÃªme jamais Ã©tÃ© informÃ© . Il ne fait aucun doute que cette procÃ©dure est Ã la fois nÃ©cessaire et salutaire dans le type d'affaires oÃ¹ elle est frÃ©quemment utilisÃ©e . Cependant, en raison de son caractÃ¨re unilatÃ©ral, il est important 1) que le tribunal saisi de cette demande d'ordonnance dispose de maniÃ¨re complÃ¨te et prÃ©cise de tous les Ã©lÃ©ments utiles pour dÃ©cider s'il faut ou non dÃ©livrer l'ordonnance ; et 2) que les conditions dont le tribunal assortit gÃ©nÃ©ralement ces ordonnances pour protÃ©ger les dÃ©fendeurs soient respectÃ©es non seulement dans la lettre mais dans l'esprit .
. . . (ce sont lÃ ) des garanties nÃ©cessaires et importantes pour protÃ©ger les intÃ©rÃªts d'une personne qui, par hypothÃ¨se, n'a pas comparv devant le tribunal ni eu l'occasion de se faire entendre, voire mÃªme de donner Ã penser qu'elle pourrait avoir quelque moyen de dÃ©fense Ã opposer aux accusations des plaignants . Â» La Court of Appeal dÃ©clara cependant que les insuffisances des dÃ©clarations sous serment prÃ©sentÃ©es Ã l'appui de la demande d'ordonnance Anton Piller et le mode d'exÃ©cution de cette ordonnance Ã©taient Â« trÃ¨s fÃ cheuses- en ce qu'elles privaient le requÃ©rant de la possibilitÃ© de formuler une quelconque objection Ã la pÃ©nÃ©tration dans les locaux des solicitors des plaignants, Ã©vÃ©nement qu'elle qualifia de â¢ prÃ©occupant â¢ . La cour dÃ©clara nÃ©anntoins que ces insuffisances ne justifiaient pas de relever le requÃ©rant des engagements souscrits et qu'il Ã©tait donc sommÃ© une nouvelle fois d'exposer sous serment la nature de ses activitÃ©s . Cependant, elle ne lui infligea aucune sanction pour outrage Ã magistrat pour n'avoir pas jusqu'alors respectÃ© ses engagements . De plus, la Court of Appeal refusa l'autorisation d'en appeler Ã la Chambre des Lords, laquelle rejeta le 7 octobre 1982 la demande que le requÃ©rant lui avait adressÃ©e en ce sens . Par la suite, le requÃ©rant accepta, au risque de s'incriminer lui-mÃ©me, de se soumettre Ã une ordonnance lui interdisant de faire commerce de vidÃ©o-cassettes piratÃ©es et l'obligeant Ã rÃ©vÃ©ler sous serment ses activitÃ©s, sans toutefois mentionner les noms et adresses des membres de bonne foi du club d'Ã©change-vidÃ©os . De plus, les plaignants et leurs solicitors furent relevÃ©s de leur engagement de garder confidentiels les documents qu'ils avaient recueillis conformÃ©ment Ã l'ordonnance initiale Anton Piller . Les deux panies furent dÃ©gagÃ©es de toute responsabilitÃ© ou prÃ©tention Ã des dommages-intÃ©rÃ¨ts suite Ã la procÃ©dure engagÃ©e en vertu d'une Ã©ventuelle demande reconventionnelle . Les intÃ©ressÃ©s devaient restituer au requÃ©rant les documents et films saisis en venu de l'ordonnance et mettre fin aux poursuites . 154
Le 10 fÃ©vrier 1983, le SecrÃ©tariat de la Commission ayant demandÃ© un surcroit d'information, le requÃ©rant sollicita de la High Court l'autorisation d'utiliser devant la Commission le dossier qui Ã©tait en possession de la High Court et de la Coun of Appeal - autorisation qui fut accordÃ©e le mÃ©me jour, malgrÃ© l'opposition des solicitors des plaignants .
GRIEFS Ix requÃ©rant se plaint de ce que les conditions, la teneur et le mode d'exÃ©cution . de l'ordonnance Anton Piller dÃ©livrÃ©e contre lui ont Ã©tÃ© contraires Ã la Convention Ã plusieurs Ã©gards . Il soutient tout d'abord qu'il est abusif d'accorder aux demandeurs dans un e procÃ©dure civile des pouvoirs de police leur permettant de perquisitionner et de sai-, sir, et d'user de ces pouvoirs de maniÃ¨re humiliante et dÃ©gradante . Le requÃ©rant fut en outre menacÃ© de privation de libertÃ© par une dÃ©cision le dÃ©clarant coupable d'outrage Ã magistrat s'il ne se soumettait pas aux conditions de l'ordonnance Anton Piller, alors qu'il n'avait pas pu faire entendre sa cause . Il fut en outre sommÃ© de se reconnaÃ®tre coupable d'activitÃ©s criminelles, ce qui est contraire au droit de ne pas s'incriminer soi-mÃªme, droit qu'a expressÃ©ment aboli par l'article 72 de la loi de 1981 sur la Cour SuprÃ©me, pour les procÃ©dures civiles touchant Ã la propriÃ©tÃ© intellectuelle et Ã la violation du copyright . Le requÃ©rant se plaint Ã©galement de ce que l'exÃ©cution de l'ordonnance Anton Piller a portÃ© une atteinte grossiÃ¨re et disproportionnÃ©e au droit au respect de son domicile, de sa correspondance et de sa vie privÃ©e, puisque le texte permettait au solicitor des plaignants d'inspecter un par un les documents dans ses propres locaux, qui lui servaient Ã la fois de domicile et de bureaux, pour vÃ©rifier si lesdits documents concemaient ou non l'objet de leur action . Le requÃ©rant soutient aussi que du simple fait de pÃ©nÃ©trer chez lui en venu d'une ordonnance assortie d'une menace de procÃ©dure pour outrage Ã magistrat, les solicitors des plaignants ont pu voir son cadre de vie domestique et en tirer des conclusions sur des questions personnelles qu'il avait le droit de tenir confidentielles . En outre, le requÃ©rant se plaint de s'Ãªtre vu refuser le bÃ©nÃ©fice de l'aide judiciaire dans la procÃ©dure concemant l'ordonnance Anton Piller car il n'a pas pu obtenir l'acc8s aux documents que dÃ©tenaient les solicitors des plaignants et qui lui Ã©taient nÃ©cessaires pour Ã©tayer sa demande d'aide judiciaire . Le requÃ©rant invoque les articles 3 . 5 . 6 . et 8 de la Convention et l'article I du Protocole additionnel .
EN DROIT I . Le requÃ©rant se plaint en premier lieu de ce que diffÃ©rents documents privÃ©s et confidentiels ont Ã©tÃ© saisis dans ses locaux pendant le dÃ©roulement de la perquisition conformÃ©ment Ã l'ordonnance Anton Piller . Selon lui, ces documents n'avaient rien Ã voir avec l'action sur le copyright et ont Ã©tÃ© saisis par les solicitors pour leurs clients qui ont fait un usage abusif des renseignements privÃ©s qui y figuraient . I-e requÃ©rant invoque l'article 8 de la Convention et l'anicle I du Protocole additionnel, qui garantissent notamment le droit au respect de la correspondance et des biens .
Le Gouvemement dÃ©fendeur a soutenu que le requÃ©rant n'avait pas Ã©puisÃ© les recours internes en ce qui conceme ce grief. Il invoque dÃ¨s lors l'article 26 de la Convention . ainsi libellÃ© : - La Commission ne peut Ãªtre saisie qu'aprÃ¨s Ã©puisement des voies de recours internes, tel qu'il est entendu selon les principes de droit international gÃ©nÃ©ralement reconnus et dans le dÃ©lai de six mois, Ã partir de la date de la dÃ©cision interne dÃ©finitive . Le Gouvemement dÃ©fendeur plaide que les termes de l'ordonnance Anton Piller Ã©taient clairs et explicites et ne permettaient pas aux solicitors des plaignants de s'emparer de documents autres que ceux qui concemaient directement l'action en matiÃ¨re de copyright . Le requÃ©rant aurait dÃ¨s lors pu demander au juge une ordonnance en restitution des documents Ã©trangers Ã l'affaire ainsi que de toute copie qui en avait Ã©tÃ© prise . et bien sÃ»r engager aussi une action pour outrage Ã magistrat contre toute personne ayant saisi de tels documents de maniÃ©re impropre ou en ayant fait usage en transgressant les conditions prÃ©vues par l'ordonnance . Le requÃ©rant dit qu'il a essayÃ© d'utiliser ces recours mais que ceux-ci se sont rÃ©vÃ©lÃ©s inefficaces . La Commission relÃ¨ve que le requÃ©rant a effectivement Ã©tabli en octobre 1981 une attestation sous serroent contenant diverses allÃ©gations d'outrage Ã magistrat de la pan des solicitors des plaignants . Cependant- ces allÃ©gations Ã©taient de caractÃ©re gÃ©nÃ©ral et ne contenaient pas les accusations prÃ©cises que formule Ã prÃ©sent le requÃ©rant, selon lesquelles certains documents tout Ã fait privÃ©s et personnels auraient Ã©tÃ© saisis et abusivement utilisÃ©s par les solicitors des plaignants . De plus, il semble qu'une fois faite cette attestation sous serment, le requÃ©rant n'ait pas engagÃ© d'action pour outrage Ã magistrat contre les solicitors des plaignants Ã partir des motifs qu'il invoque Ã prÃ©sent devant la Commission . Le requÃ©rant n'a pas non plus formulÃ© d'autres demandes auprÃ¨s du juge d'instance pour la restitution des documents qui n'auraient pas Ã©tÃ© liÃ©s Ã la protection du copyright . En outre, l'intÃ©ressÃ© avait la possibilitÃ© de demander au juge d'instance l'exÃ©cution de l'engagement de rÃ©paration pris par les plaignants au moment de l'octroi de l'ordonnance Anton Piller . Cet engagement figure expressÃ©ment au paragraphe (c) de l'ordonnance du 26 fÃ©vrier 1981 et la Commission estime que le requÃ©rant avait lÃ un moyen immÃ©diat et appropriÃ© de remÃ©dier aux griefs qu'il formule Ã prÃ©sent devant elle . 156
Il s'ensuit que le requÃ©rant n'a pas satisfait aux exigences de l'article 26 de la Convention puisqu'avant d'introduire sa requÃªte Ã la Commission, fl n'a pas Ã©puisÃ© les recours internes qui auraient Ã©tÃ© suffisants et efficaces pour remÃ©dier Ã ses griefs . En consÃ©quence, la requÃªte doit, sur ce point, Ã©tre dÃ©clarÃ©e irrecevable conformÃ©ment Ã l'article 27 par .3 de la Convention . 2 . Le requÃ©rant se plaint en outre de ce que l'ordonnance Anton Piller l'obligeait Ã exposer sous serment le dÃ©tail de ses activitÃ©s commerciales avec tous les membres du club qu'il gÃ©rait, ce qui, soutient-il, Ã©quivalait Ã l'obliger Ã s'accuser lui-mÃ©me puisque certaines de ces transactions emportaient commerce de cassettes pornographiques et piratÃ©es, l'un et l'autre nÃ©goces constituant des infractions pÃ©nales . Le requÃ©rant renvoie Ã cet Ã©gard au libellÃ© de l'article 72 de la loi de 1981 sur la Cour suprÃªme qui, soutient-il, a prÃ©cisÃ©ment restreint le droit de ne pas s'auto-incriminer dans les procÃ©dures civiles concemant la propriÃ©tÃ© intellectuelle et la violation du copyright . Le requÃ©rant a invoquÃ© Ã cet Ã©gard l'articte 6 par .1 de la Convention, qui garantit le droit Ã un procÃ©s Ã©quitable et l'article 6 par . 2 ainsi libellÃ© : .2 . Toute personne accusÃ©e d'une infraction est prÃ©sumÃ©e innocente jusqu'Ã ce que sa culpabilitÃ© ait Ã©tÃ© lÃ©galement Ã©tablie . â¢ La Commission relÃ¨ve que l'ordonnance Anton Piller renfermait diverses obligations . L'une d'elles obligeait le requÃ©rant Ã exposer sous sertnent ses activitÃ©s commerciales, information qui devait Ã©tre produite comme preuve dans la procÃ©dure civile afin que le tribunal puisse examiner la question de violation allÃ©guÃ©e du copyright . Il semble cependant qu'aucune attestation de ce genre n'ait jamais Ã©tÃ© faite . Le refus du requÃ©rant de la prÃªter fut Ã l'origine d'une action pour outrage Ã magistrat prÃ©sentÃ©e devant le juge Wamer en novembre 1981, date Ã laquelle furent Ã©galement examinÃ©es les actions en annulation de l'ordonnance Anton Piller formÃ©es Ã titre reconventionnel par le requÃ©rant . Les demandes du requÃ©rant ayant abouti, l'action des plaignants pour outrage Ã magistrat Ã raison du dÃ©faut d'attestation sous serment Ã©choua . L'obligation de prÃ¨ter l'attestation sous sertnent fut rÃ©instituÃ©e par la Court of appeal, mais derechef supprimÃ©e par l'ordonnance de consentement approuvÃ©e par la High Court en dÃ©cembre 1983 . La Commission relÃ¨ve en outre que, selon le libellÃ© mÃªme de l'ordonnance Anton Piller, interdiction expresse Ã©tait faite aux plaignants d'utiliser les renseignements figurant sur une quelconque attestation sous serrnent pour un but autre que celui de l'action civile engagÃ©e pour violation du copyright . Cela ressort clairement des termes du paragraphe (f) de l'ordonnance, oÃ¹ les plaignants s'engageaient Â« Ã n'entamer ni inciter Ã entamer aucune procÃ©dure pÃ©nale contre (le requÃ©rant) . . La Commission rappelle que selon les dispositions de l'article 25 par . 1 de la Convention, elle ne peut Ã©tre saisie d'une requÃªte qu'adressÃ©e . . . . par toute personne physique . . . qui se prÃ©tend victime d'une violation . . . des droits reconnus dans l a 157
(prÃ©sente) Convention . . . . . Il ressort cependant des faits de la cause que le requÃ©rant ne saurait se prÃ©tendre victime d'une violation de l'un quelconque des droits que lui garantit la Convention au titre de ce grief d'auto-incrimination puisqu'en fait il n'a pas Ã©tÃ© obligÃ© de rÃ©vÃ©ler sous serrnent des activitÃ©s dÃ©lictuelles ou autres et n'a en particulier pas fait l'objet d'une procÃ©dure pÃ©nale liÃ©e Ã l'objet de l'action en protection du copyright . 11 s'ensuit que le grief du requÃ©rant est, sur ce point, manifestement mal fondÃ© au sens de l'article 27 par . 2 de la Convention . 3 . Le requÃ©rant s'est plaint en outre de s'Ã©tre vu refuser l'aide judiciaire dans la procÃ©dure affÃ©rente Ã l'ordonnance Anton Piller et de n'avoir pas eu accÃ¨s aux documents nÃ©cessaires dÃ©tenus par les solicitors des plaignants pour Ã©tayer sa demande d'aide judiciaire . Il invoque Ã cet Ã©gard l'anicle 6 de la Convention . La Commission rappelle que l'article 6 de la Convention ne garantit pas expressÃ©ment le bÃ©nÃ©fice de l'aidejudiciaire dans une procÃ©dure civile et que, prÃ©cisÃ©ment, la procÃ©dure concernant l'ordonnance Anton Piller Ã©tait de caractÃ¨re civil . NÃ©anmoins, la Commission a dÃ©clarÃ© que le droit Ã un procÃ©s Ã©quitable protÃ©gÃ© par l'article 6 par . I de la Convention peut, dans certains cas, obliger l'Etat Ã foumir une aide judiciaire si la complexitÃ© de la procÃ©dure est telle que l'on ne saurait anendre d'un requÃ©rant qu'il plaide personnellement sa cause . En l'espÃ¨ce, nÃ©anmoins, il est clair que cette question ne se posait pas . Le requÃ©rant s'est plaint, certes, de ce que sa demande d'aide judiciaire ait Ã©tÃ© retardÃ©e par la nÃ©cessitÃ© d'examiner les documents que dÃ©tenaient les solicitors des plaignants, mais il semble que l'aide judiciaire lui ait nÃ©anmoins Ã©tÃ© accordÃ©e et qu'il ait Ã©tÃ© en mesure de consulter les documents dans le bureau des solicitors des plaignants . C'est finalement le requÃ©rant qui a dÃ©cidÃ© de poursuivre la procÃ©dure sans aide judiciaire pour se dÃ©fendre lui-mÃ©me . Dans ces conditions, le grief selon lequel il se serait vu refuser l'aidejudiciaire et, par lÃ mÃ¨me, le bÃ©nÃ©fice d'un procÃ¨s Ã©quitable, n'est pas Ã©tayÃ© et se rÃ©vÃ¨le manifestement mal fondÃ© au sens de l'article 27 par . 2 de la Convention . 4 . Le requÃ©rant a Ã©galement invoquÃ© l'articte 5 de la Convention pour ce qui touche aux Ã©vÃ©nements du 2 mars 1981 . L'article 5 de la Convention garantit la libertÃ© et la sfiretÃ© de la personne mais le requÃ©rant n'a absolument pas Ã©tabli comment cette disposition pouvait Ã¨tre en jeu en l'espÃ©ce . Il s'ensuit dÃ©s lors que son grief est, sur ce point aussi, manifestement mal fondÃ© au sens de l'anicle 27 par . 2 de la Convention . 5 . Dans ses observations Ã©crites produites le 2 juillet 1984, le requÃ©rant s'est plaint de ce que la Court of appeal se serait montrÃ©e partiale lorsqu'elle a examinÃ© son appel le 15 juin 1982 . Le requÃ©rant n'a pas non plus dÃ©veloppÃ© les arguments Ã l'appui de ce grief qui est dÃ¨s lors manifestement mal fondÃ© au sens de l'article 27 par . 2 de la Convention . 158
6 . Le requÃ©rant s'est plaint enfin que les ordonnances Anton Piller sont un â¢ flÃ©au Â» qui confÃ©re des pouvoirs de police Ã des particuliers et Ã des sociÃ©tÃ©s privÃ©es . Il se plaint Ã©galement de la maniÃ¨re dont l'ordonnance lui a Ã©tÃ© signifiÃ©e et des modalitÃ©s de perquisition dans ses locaux ensuite . La Commission rappelle que, selon l'article 19 de la Convention, elle a pour tÃ¢che d'assurer le respect des engagements rÃ©sultant pour les Hautes Parties Contractantes des obligations souscrites en vertu de la Convention . Comme elle l'a souvent dÃ©clarÃ©, cela l'oblige Ã examiner s'il y a eu atteinte aux droits garantis au requÃ©rant par la Convention de telle maniÃ¨re qu'il peut se prÃ©tendre victime au sens de l'article 25 par . 1 de la Convention . La Commission n'est dÃ¨s lors pas appelÃ©e Ã examiner dans l'abstrait si un un aspect particulier du droit inteme est ou non confortne Ã la Convention . En l'espÃ¨ce donc, elle n'est pas appelÃ©e Ã examiner le premier grief formulÃ© par le requÃ©mnt quant Ã l'existence des ordonnances Anton Piller et au fait qu'elles donnent des pouvoirs de police aux particuliers et aux sociÃ©tÃ©s privÃ©es . La Commission peut cependant examiner les griefs du requÃ©rant nÃ©s des faits prÃ©cis de la cause . A cet Ã©gard, le requÃ©rant soutient que la perquisition menÃ©e dans ses locaux le 2 mars 1981 en vertu de l'ordonnance Anton Piller dÃ©livrÃ©e dans la procÃ©dure le concemant Ã©tait une atteinte injustifiÃ©e au droit au respect de son domicile, de sa vie privÃ©e et de sa correspondance, atteinte contraire Ã l'article 8 de la Convention .
L'article 8 est ainsi libellÃ© : -1 . Toute personne a droit au respect de sa vie privÃ©e et familiale, de son domicile et de sa correspondance . 2 . 11 ne peut y avoir ingÃ©rence d'une autoritÃ© publique dans l'exercice de ce droit que pour autant que cette ingÃ©rence est prÃ©vue par la loi et qu'elle constitue une mesure qui, dans une sociÃ©tÃ© dÃ©mocratique, est nÃ©cessaire Ã la sÃ©curitÃ© nationale, Ã la sÃ»retÃ© publique, au bien-Ã¨tre Ã©conomique du pays, Ã la dÃ©fense de l'ordre et Ã la prÃ©vention des infractions pÃ©nales, Ã la protection de la santÃ© ou de la morale, ou Ã la protection des droits et libertÃ©s d'autmi . â¢ Le requÃ©rant soutient que l'exÃ©cution de l'ordonnance Anton Piller dans son cas - notamment la visite simultanÃ©e de la police et des solicitors des plaignants, le nombre important de personnes impliquÃ©es et le fait que la perquisition des locaux du requÃ©rant (qui Ã©taient Ã la fois son domicile et ses bureaux) - entrainait une enquÃ¨te sur des aspects de sa vie privÃ©e et constituait une ingÃ©rence disproportionnÃ©e et injustifiÃ©e dans l'exercice des droits que lui garantit cet article . Le Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur a soutenu que la perquisition conforme Ã l'ordonnance Anton Piller a Ã©tÃ© menÃ©e convenablement, c'est-Ã -dire aprÃ¨s signification de l'ordonnance au requÃ©rant, aprÃ¨s que celui-ci eut reÃ§u le conseil de recherche r
l'assistance de son homme de loi, enfin aprÃ¨s que le solicitor eut conseillÃ© au requÃ©rant d'accepter la signification de l'ordonnance Anton Piller et d'autoriser la perquisition . Le requÃ©rant Ã©tait Ã tout moment prÃ©sent dans le bÃ timent lors de la perquisition, de mÃ©me que son solicitor . Le Gouvernement soutient que le requÃ©rant pouvait alors s'assurer que la perquisition Ã©tait menÃ©e convenablement et confortnÃ©ment aux tertnes de l'ordonnance oÃ¹ figurait un engagement automatique de rÃ©paration par les plaignants si ceux-ci outrepassaient les termes de l'ordonnance . De plus, le Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur a indiquÃ© combien, dans une procÃ©dure concemant le droit de la propriÃ©tÃ© intellectuelle et du copyright, une ordonnance rendue sur requÃªte unilatÃ©rale Ã©tait imponante pour saisir des preuves capitales pour le procÃ¨s Ã venir et Ã©viter leur destruction par le dÃ©fendeur avant que l'affaire n'arrive devant le tribunal . Le Gouvemement soutient qu'il a Ã©tÃ© prouvÃ© qu'un recours tel que l'ordonnance Anton Piller est le seul moyen de lutter efficacement contre le piratage des vidÃ©ocassettes et que l'exÃ©cution de cette ordonnance dans les circonstances propres Ã l'affaire ne constituait pas une atteinte disproportionnÃ©e Ã la vie privÃ©e du requÃ©rant puisqu'elle Ã©tait rÃ©gie par les termes de l'ordonnance elle-mÃ©me et Ã©tait donc prÃ©vue par la loi et nÃ©cessaire Ã la protection des droits d'autrui, Ã savoir les droits des titulaires du copyright . La Commission relÃ¨ve que, selon l'ordonnance, le requÃ©rant Ã©tait tenu d'autoriser la perquisition, sous rÃ©serve de contrÃ´les ultÃ©rieurs par la High Court au cas oÃ¹ les termes de l'ordonnance autorisant la perquisition seraient outrepassÃ©s . Il apparait que, selon les termes de l'ordonnance, la perquisition comportait l'examen d'une foule de documents dÃ©tenus par le requÃ©rant dans ses locaux, locaux qui servaient Ã la fois de domicile et de bureaux, et que, dans ces conditions, le contrÃ´le de la perquisition a pu s'en trouver plus difficile . NÃ©anmoins, la Commission relÃ¨ve que l'ordonnance Anton Piller rendue contre le requÃ©rant dans la procÃ©dure civile a Ã©tÃ© exÃ©cutÃ©e immÃ©diatement aprÃ¨s signification du mandat de perquisition par la police dans la procÃ©dure pÃ©nale envisagÃ©e . II apparaÃ®t dÃ¨s lors qu'il y a eu une certaine confusion au moment de la signification de l'ordonnance et du mandat de perquisition quant au point de savoir si les solicitors des plaignants faisaient en rÃ©alitÃ© partie du groupe de la police ou d'un groupe distinct . Un nombre important de policiers ont pris part Ã l'exÃ©cution du mandat de perquisition, pour des raisons qui n'ont pas Ã©tÃ© entiÃ¨rement Ã©claircies . La Commission relÃ¨ve Ã cet Ã©gard que l'ordonnance elle-mÃªme se limitait Ã une exÃ©cution par cinq personnes maximum, alors que 11 ou 12 policiers ont semble-t-il, pris part Ã l'exÃ©cution du mandat de perquisition . L'importance des pouvoirs confÃ©rÃ©s par l'ordonnance Anton Piller a Ã©tÃ© qualifiÃ©e de . draconienne - par la Court of appeal dans l'arrÃ¨t qu'elle a rendu en l'espÃ¨ce le 15 juin 1982 et la question se pose de savoir si d'une part les garanties liguran t 160
dans l'ordonnance signifiÃ©e en l'espÃ¨ce et, d'autre part, les circonstances de l'exÃ©cution de l'ordonnance, ont Ã©tÃ© conformes aux exigences de l'article 8 de la Convention . La Commission constate que ce point litigieux pose des questions de fait et de droit dont la complexitÃ© est telle qu'elles appellent pour en dÃ©cider un examen complet du biee-fondÃ© de la requÃªte . 11 s'ensuit que ce grief ne saurait Ãªtre dÃ©clarÃ© manifestement mal fondÃ© et qu'il est dÃ¨s lors recevable, aucun autre motif d'irrecevabilitÃ© n'ayant Ã©tÃ© Ã©tabli .
Par ces motifs, la Commissio n DÃCLARE RECEVABLES . tous moyens de fond rÃ©servÃ©s, les griefs du requÃ©rant concernani l'exÃ©cution de la perquisition conformÃ©ment Ã l'ordonnance Anton Piller (par . 6 de la partie En Droit) ; DÃCLARE LA REQUÃ.TE IRRECEVABLE pour le surplus .
161Origine de la décision Pays : Conseil de l'EuropeJuridiction : Cour européenne des droits de l'hommeFormation : Commission (plénière)Date de la décision : 14/03/1985Fonds documentaire : HUDOC Haut de page

References: l'article 72
 l'article 8
 l'article 26
 l'article 26
 l'article 27
 l'article 72
 l'article 6
 l'article 25
 l'article 27
 l'article 6
 l'article 6
 l'article 27
 L'article 5
 l'article 27
 l'article 19
 l'article 25
 l'article 8

L'article 8
 l'article 8