Source: http://californiaslapplaw.com/library-of-cases/kibler-v-northern-inyo-county-local-hospital-peer-review-is-official-proceeding-under-slapp-law/
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 20:57:09+00:00

Document:
NORTHERN INYO COUNTY LOCAL HOSPITAL DISTRICT et al., Defendants and Respondents.
No. E035085.24 Cal.Rptr.3d 220 (2005)Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division Two.January 11, 2005.As Modified February 4, 2005.Review Granted April 27, 2005.
Plaintiff George Kibler is a physician affiliated with Northern Inyo County Hospital. Throughout 2001, a troubled relationship existed between him, the hospital, and defendants. Kibler was critical of the hospital and its nursing staff. The hospital accused Kibler of acting violently and aggressively toward hospital employees, including making threats with a gun.
On December 20, 2001, the hospital’s Medical Staff Executive Committee, acting according to Business and Professions Code section 809 et seq. and the hospital’s medical staff by-laws, voted summarily to suspend Kibler’s medical staff privileges. The hospital also filed petitions in superior court seeking two “workplace violence” injunctions against Kibler.
The summary suspension and the injunctions were resolved in January 2002 by the execution of a release agreement between Kibler and the hospital. Kibler also agreed to stipulate to the entry of a permanent injunction.
In spite of the apparent resolution of the dispute, in December 2002, Kibler filed the instant lawsuit against defendants, claiming tortious interference with his right to practice medicine.
After some procedural delays, the trial court finally granted defendants’ special motion to strike, brought pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (hereafter section 425.16), the anti-SLAPP, Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation, statute. (City of Cotati v. Cashman (2002) 29 Cal.4th 69, 71-72, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 519, 52 P.3d 695.) The court also awarded 222*222 attorney’s fees to defendants. Kibler appeals.
The notice of suspension stated it “was based on written and oral reports reviewed at the meeting regarding Doctor Kibler’s continuing and recently escalating unprofessional conduct of extremely hostile and threatening verbal assaults, threats of physical violence, including assault with a gun, and related erratic actions of a hostile nature toward nursing and administrative personnel….” It cited various provisions of the medical staff by-laws and Business and Professions Code section 805.
Kibler has worked at the hospital since 1979. Kibler’s complaint alleges defendants suspended his medical staff privileges in retaliation for his purported misconduct. In particular, the hospital’s board of directors was antagonistic toward Kibler for raising issues of inadequate medical services and the hospital’s prospective insolvency. Additionally, Kibler had refused to participate in a joint effort to ostracize another doctor, Jon McLennan, and had complained about the obstetrics nursing staff, who allegedly violated his orders regarding infant care and gastric suctioning. Defendants falsely accused him of mishandling a crib containing a newborn baby. In addition to seeking injunctions, the hospital threatened to report Kibler to the Medical Board of California and to the National Practitioner Data Bank. Kibler contends that, due to his suspension, his permit to carry a firearm was revoked.
The seven causes of action asserted by Kibler included: intentional interference with right to practice profession; abuse of process; defamation; violation of constitutional rights; restraint of trade; extortion; and conspiracy.
In response, the hospital filed a motion to strike, contending that Kibler’s lawsuit constituted an effort to chill defendants’ exercise of free speech as related to an official proceeding authorized by law. Additionally, the hospital cited the release executed by Kibler on January 3, 2002, which fully resolved the dispute between Kibler and the hospital almost a year before he filed his lawsuit. Jan Almquist, general counsel for the hospital, stated in his declaration that he had consulted with Kibler about preparation of the release agreement.
In opposition, Kibler argued that section 425.16 did not apply when considered in conjunction with Evidence Code section 1157, providing confidentiality for the proceedings of hospital medical and peer review committees. On the merits of his claim, he further argued that his alleged misconduct did not involve medical treatment of a patient, the suspension violated Business and Professions Code sections 809, 809.05, 809.4, 809.5, and 2056, and the release was against public policy.
Kibler submitted his declaration, stating he had no notice of his summary suspension; that he did not know of any complaints about his conduct, except for some use of profanity; that the only threats he had made were of legal action, never physical violence; that his only grievances concerned the nurses’ failure to follow procedure and their harassment of his fiancee, Diana. He was never accused of mistreating patients. He repeated his claim that the obstetrics nurses were untrustworthy and not following orders regarding “performing gastric suctioning and removal of a newborn from its mother….” He disputed any charge that he had roughly223*223 handled a crib containing a newborn. He complained that he was not able to disqualify biased persons, defendants Greene and Hathaway, from participating in the suspension proceedings.
Kibler also claimed that he signed the release under duress because he feared his medical license was threatened but that Almquist assured him the release would not impair his ability to file a lawsuit. He was concerned he might be forced to be a witness in a lawsuit by Dr. McLennan against defendants. He detailed his efforts to improve the hospital’s finances and administration. Because he could not return to the hospital until April 2002, he was financially damaged and he continues to be shunned by the hospital staff.
Kibler’s wife, Diana, submitted a declaration stating she is a nurse and was a hospital employee since January 2000. In May 2001, Kibler separated from his previous wife, Ingrid, also a nurse at the hospital, and became involved with Diana. The other nurses became critical and hostile. Diana was subjected to rude language and physical attacks. The hospital refused to consider Diana’s grievance. She left the hospital in November 2001.
Diana described Kibler as careful, quiet, consistent, and “respectful of the nurses.” The nurses, however, became hostile to him. Diana said defendant Greene, another doctor, was “belligerent,” “violent,” “verbally abusive and threw things while on duty but was never reprimanded.” He also swore and “said inappropriate things to nurses.” Diana’s car was vandalized several times and she suspected Ingrid.
Defendant Greene submitted a declaration, disputing Diana’s characterization of him and contradicting Kibler’s version of events, especially the details of the suspension proceedings. Other hospital declarants contradicted Kibler and Diana at every point, as well as accusing them of other kinds of misconduct. Almquist’s supplemental declaration asserted that the release was intended to cover all claims, including this lawsuit. Almquist had explained to Kibler that the release would not affect Diana’s independent grievance. Kibler had participated in negotiating the release and Kibler was repeatedly advised to obtain independent legal counsel and declined. Kibler promised Almquist he was obtaining counseling.
The court decided that section 425.16 applied because Kibler’s complaint concerned either an official proceeding authorized by law or other conduct involving free speech or the right of petition, and a public issue or issue of public interest. The court also found the release executed by Kibler precluded him from establishing the probability of prevailing. After granting defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion and hearing defendants’ motion for attorney’s fees and Kibler’s motion to strike costs, the court awarded defendants fees of $67,591.70.
Here all of plaintiff’s causes of action stem from his summary suspension and 225*225from the hospital seeking injunctions against him. (Martinez v. Metabolife, Internat., Inc. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 181, 187, 6 Cal.Rptr.3d 494.) His whole complaint is subject to section 425.16.
Kibler cannot easily dispute the foregoing although he attempts to argue that the confidentiality of the suspension proceeding, even if it was an official proceeding, renders it exempt from the reach of section 425.16. But the confidentiality accorded to medical and peer review proceedings is not irreconcilable with their status as official proceedings. Although Kibler’s conduct as a doctor in a public hospital certainly might be considered to be a public matter, an official proceeding need not involve a public issue to be considered subject to section 425.16. (Briggs, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 1118, 81 Cal. Rptr.2d 471, 969 P.2d 564.) Therefore, the confidentiality of this official proceeding did not exempt it from section 425.16.
We note that Division One of our Fourth Appellate District has recently rendered an opinion in which it reaches a result contrary to our opinion in this case. The facts in that case are similar to those in this case insofar as the plaintiff sued a medical peer review committee, alleging that the committee improperly investigated some of his actions and placed him on probation. Division One denied a medical committee’s SLAPP motion, finding that the proceedings by the hospital peer review committee did not constitute an “official proceeding” under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, subdivision (e)(1) and that the medical review committee 226*226 action was not conduct in furtherance of the constitutional right of free speech in connection with an issue of public interest under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, subdivision (e)(4).
We disagree with those conclusions. Business and Professions Code section 809, subdivision (a)(3) observes that “Peer review, fairly conducted, is essential to preserv[e] the highest standards of medical practice.” Subdivision (a)(6) observes that it is the policy of the State of California to protect the health and welfare of the people of California, through the peer review mechanism. Business and Professions Code section 805, subdivision (1)(A) defines a peer review body to include the medical or professional staff of any properly licensed health care facility.
We conclude, contrary to the O’Meara court, that the defendant peer review committee in this case is protected under the anti-SLAPP statute both because its action was an official proceeding clearly authorized by the California Business and Professions Code and because its decision involved a public issue, namely the protection of the health and welfare of the people of California. A contrary conclusion would ignore California’s stated purpose to create a mechanism to insure the health of its residents and would dissuade medical and professional staffs of health care facilities or clinics from participating in the peer review process.
The proper standard of review to evaluate the probability of success under section 425.16 is not to “weigh the evidence or make credibility determinations; doing either would violate plaintiff’s right to a jury trial. [Citation.] … [T]he court may … consider the opposing evidence `to determine if it defeats the plaintiff’s showing as a matter of law. [Citation.]’ (Kashian v. Harriman (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 892, 906, 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 576.)” (Colt v. Freedom Communications, Inc., supra, 109 Cal.App.4th at p. 1557, 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 245.) Here defendants’ evidence positively prohibits any probability of success by Kibler.
Kibler’s primary response to this point is to mischaracterize Westlake’s reference toWillis v. Santa Ana etc. Hospital Assn. (1962) 58 Cal.2d 806, 810, 26 Cal.Rptr. 640, 376 P.2d 568, overruled in Cianci v. Superior Court (1985) 40 Cal.3d 903, 221 Cal. Rptr. 575, 710 P.2d 375. Neither Westlake nor Willis affords the right of an immediate tort suit for damages unless there is no other procedure available. That is not the situation here in which Kibler should have sought administrative and judicial redress before attempting a civil suit.
Nor do we find any evidence the hospital violated the Business and Professions Code or its own by-laws by suspending Kibler summarily. The by-laws and Business and Professions Code section 809.5 both allow a summary suspension to be imposed. The hospital followed the correct procedure in doing so. If the suspension was improper, Kibler should have asserted that contention according to proper procedures.
The second roadblock thrown up to Kibler showing probability of success is the release agreement. Kibler admitted he agreed to the release because he wanted to resolve the suspension in the 15 days before the hospital had to report it to the state medical board and national data bank. But, in doing so, he agreed to withdraw his request for a hearing. He expressly waived all claims relating to the suspension and agreed not to sue. He also consented in court to a stipulated injunction.
Kibler’s reliance on Civil Code section 1668 is not appropriate. Section 1668 states: “All contracts which have for their object, directly or indirectly, to exempt anyone from responsibility for his own fraud, or willful injury to the person or property of another, or violation of law, whether willful or negligent, are against the policy of the law.” The code section applies to clauses that are exculpatory of future conduct. (Tunkl v. Regents of University of California (1963) 60 Cal.2d 92, 94, 104, 32 Cal.Rptr. 33, 383 P.2d 441.) Civil Code section 1668 does not govern a settlement agreement concerning a present liability. As common sense indicates, following Kibler’s proposed interpretation means there could never be an effective settlement agreement.
We conclude that because Kibler did not exhaust his remedies and because he agreed to a release, he cannot show the probability of success of his claims.
Kibler protests the award of attorney’s fees to defendants of about 72 percent of what they requested. Kibler contends defendants should be limited to the fees incurred only for the motion to strike, not the whole action, citing Lafayette Morehouse, Inc. v. Chronicle Publishing Co. (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1379, 1383, 46 Cal. Rptr.2d 542. As we review the record, however, we conclude the trial court correctly estimated the fees broadly attributable to the special motion to strike and limited the award accordingly. (Metabolife International, Inc. v. Wornick (S.D.Cal.2002) 213 F.Supp.2d 1220, 1223-1225.) Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s exercise of its discretion.
We affirm the judgment and order defendants to recover their costs on appeal.
We concur: HOLLENHORST, Acting P.J., and WARD, J.
 O’Meara v. Palomar-Pomerado Health System (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 1324, 23 Cal. Rptr.3d 406.

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