Source: https://www.lawweb.in/2018/10/whether-maintenance-tribunal-can-grant.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 02:20:04+00:00

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Law Web: Whether maintenance tribunal can grant eviction of son from property of senior citizen even if no maintenance is claimed by him?
Whether maintenance tribunal can grant eviction of son from property of senior citizen even if no maintenance is claimed by him?
38. There is nothing in the language or purported intent of Section 23 of the Act 2007 to indicate that the Tribunal has the power to declare a transfer of property void if and only if the senior citizen is seeking maintenance under the Act from the opposite party.
39. In Justice Shanti Sarup Dewan (supra), the Punjab & Haryana High Court passed an eviction order under the Act, 2007 where not only no maintenance had been sought by the senior citizen, but in fact the senior citizen had volunteered to pay Rs.10,000/- as monthly maintenance to his son.
vacate H.No. 19A, Raj Niwas Marg, Civil Lines, Delhi-110054. Suffice it to state that only one of the petitioners (before the learned Single Judge) namely Sunny Paul has filed the present appeal.
2. The facts as noted from the record are that the appellant and his brother Victor Dass are the two sons of the respondent Nos.2 and 3 namely Leelawati and William Dass. Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 had filed a petition under the Act of 2007 alleging that both of them have been physically assaulted, maltreated and harassed by their sons. It is their case that the appellant is an alcoholic, whose services have been terminated by the Delhi Police on the ground of misconduct and who had been convicted in a fraud case and against whom number of police complaints are pending in different police stations. It is further averred that they have already disowned and disinherited the appellant and his brother by way of publication in newspaper. It is noted, the Tribunal had issued the following directions: - 1. That the respondents (a) Sunny Paul (b) Victor Dass along with their respective family members shall vacate the entire rooms, store, toilets, open space of House No.19A, Raj Niwas Marg, Civil Lines, Delhi-54 to the extent that is under their unauthorised and illegal occupation within 10 days of the receipt of the order.
2. That all household goods, LCD, Almirah, Clothes etc. belonging to petitioners shall be handed over back by the respondents to the petitioners. 3. That the S.H.O., P.S. Civil Lines is directed to ensure enforcement/compliance of the directions (1) & (2) mentioned above, and also ensure that life and property of the petitioners is secured and no harassment is caused to them by the respondents and their family. Beat Staff be deputed for regular visits to the Senior Citizen petitioners, in order to safeguard the life and property of the Senior Citizen petitioners. Compliance report be sent to the tribunal within 15 days of the order.
from 2002 till 2012, during which time respondents No. 2 and 3 were permitted by BCTA to reside in the property. It is a matter of record that BCTA filed a suit for taking over possession of the property, which is still pending. It is admitted by the appellant and his brother Victor Dass in their writ petition that the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 are the tenants in the property. It is noted by the learned Single Judge that the BCTA, which is the lessor paramount of the property, does not acknowledge any claim of the appellant and his brother to the property, and has stated that the appellant and his brother could claim only as children/legal representatives of respondent Nos. 2 and 3.
Civil Court for the purposes of taking evidence on oath and of enforcing the attendance of witnesses and for compelling the discovery and production of documents etc. It is his submission that specific provision is made for order of maintenance in section 9. According to him, various other provisions have been made for purposes connected with maintenance, in Chapter II of the Act. The respondents 2 and 3 had not invoked any of the statutory obligations of a child or relative; and they do not want maintenance from the appellant under Chapter II of the Act. He stated, any impression, observation, view concerning moral, pious or statutory obligation of a child or relative in relation to the respondents 2 and 3, would be irrelevant and ought to be set aside.
22, there is no provision prescribing any obligation or liability of child or relative; nor provision is made for any role of the Tribunal. Section 23 postulates transfer of property under certain circumstances shall be declared as void. He stated, in the present case, the provisions of section 23 are not applicable. None of the specified circumstances and conditions have been invoked or proved by the respondents 2 and 3 in the proceedings before the Tribunal. In the application/petition filed by them before the Tribunal, no such case was pleaded nor proved and no relief was sought in terms of section 23. The Tribunal has not made any such declaration postulated under section 23. The provisions made in section 23 are not attracted and are wholly irrelevant for the purpose of adjudication and decision of the present appeal.
any enactment other than this Act’. In the absence of such a provision regarding jurisdiction and powers of the Tribunal in respect of the subject matter under discussion, the question of "anything inconsistent therewith" in any other enactment, and the question of its overriding effect, do not arise for any further discussion. According to him, under section 27, jurisdiction of civil court is barred in respect of matters to which any provision of the Act applies. In the Act, there is no provision and the Tribunal has no jurisdiction or power for purposes of adjudication and deciding upon right, title, interest or status of the parties in respect of the property; to declare the appellant a trespasser; order him to vacate the property and / or direct police officers to evict him; and that too, not according to procedure established by law. The Tribunal was itself uncertain about its jurisdiction and powers to entertain and dispose of a matter of civil nature; but, this aspect of the case has been glossed over, not at all discussed, nor any finding has been recorded in the final order.
and relying upon inadmissible material, without giving opportunity to the appellant to challenge probity and veracity of such material, which is inconsistent with the provisions prescribed in the Act. Further, by relying upon inadmissible material; rather contrary to information furnished; recording extraneous and perverse findings on matters not even pleaded and beyond the prayer sought in the petition, the Tribunal has passed the eviction order.
(vii) Smt. Shrisht Dhawan v. Shaw Brothers AIR 1992 SC 1555; (viii) B.S. Nat v. Bachan Singh AIR 1971 P&H 144; (ix) State of West Bengal v. Atul Krishna Shaw AIR 1990 SC 2205; (x) M/s Lalchand Bhagat Ambica Ram v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Bihar & Orissa AIR 1959 SC 1295. (xi) Shadab Khairi & Anr. v. The State & Ors LPA 783/2017 decided on February 22, 2018.
property, the very purpose of the Act of 2007 will stand defeated.
transfer of the property in question on the condition that appellant would not harm them physically or mentally. She would rely upon the following judgments in support of her contention:- (i) Spring Meadows Hospital and another v. Harjolahluwalia through K.s. Ahluwalia and another Civil Appeals No. 7708/1997 and connected appeal decided on March 25, 1998; (ii) Nasir v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi & Ors. W.P.(C) No. 9717/2015 decided on October 13, 2015; (iii) Justice Shanti Sarup Dewan, Chief Justice (Retired) and another v. Union Territory, Chandigarh and others LPA No. 1007/2013 decided on September 26, 2013; (iv) Promil Tomar and others v. State of Haryana and others CWP 20072/2013 decided on December 06, 2013; (v) Jayantram Vallabhdas Meswania v. Vallabhdas Govindram Meswania, Special Civil Application No. 13954/2012 decided on October 18, 2012; (vi) Union of India and another v. Paras Laminates (P) Ltd. (1990) 4 SCC 453; (v) Gurpreet Singh v. State of Punjab & Ors.CWP No. 24508/2015 decided on December 01, 2015; (vi) Harpreet Kaur & Anr. v. State of Punjab & Ors. SLP© No. 10742/2016 decided on April 25, 2016.
(supra) the Punjab and Haryana High Court has held that peaceful living for the senior citizens in their property is the apparent objective of the Maintenance Act. 37. In the present case, though the allegation of the respondents No. 2 and 3 is of the trespass and forcible occupation of the property by the petitioners, yet even if it is presumed, as alleged by the petitioner No. 1, that he had been permitted to stay in the property, then also it would amount to transfer of the property in question. Needless to state, that even this permissive use amounts to transfer and that too on the condition that petitioner No.1-son would not harm them physically or mentally. In fact, in the Indian context, there would be a presumption that the transfer was subject to petitioner No.1-son providing all the basic necessities and looking after the physical needs of the senior citizens. Since the Maintenance Tribunal has found that the petitioner No.1-son has committed acts of physical assault and mental cruelty on the senior citizens, the pre-conditions mentioned in Section 23 stand satisfied.
40. Consequently, Section 4 and Section 23 are separate and distinct remedies and the claim for maintenance is not a condition precedent for passing an eviction order under Section 23 of the Act, 2007.” 15. Insofar as the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant that the Tribunal did not have the jurisdiction to direct the appellant to vacate the property is concerned, suffice to state, that as stated above, the Government of NCT of Delhi has framed Rules called Delhi Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Rules, 2009. The same were amended in December, 2016, whereby Sub Rule 3 was incorporated to Rule 22, which stipulates as under: - "(3)(1) Procedure for eviction from property/residential building of Senior Citizen/Parents - (i) A senior citizen may make an application before the Dy. Commissioner/District Magistrate(DM) of his district for eviction of his son and daughter or legal heir from his self acquired property on account of his non-maintenance and ill-treatment. (ii) The Deputy Commissioner/DM shall immediately forward such application to the concerned Sub Divisional Magistrates for verification of the title of the property and facts of the case within 15 days from the date of receipt of such application.
being heard, the Deputy Commissioner/DM is satisfied that the eviction order needs to be made, the Deputy Commissioner/DM may make an order of eviction, for LPA 783/2017 Page 8 reasons to be recorded therein, directing that the property/residential building shall be vacated; (3) Enforcement of Orders, (i) If any person refuses or fails to comply with the order of eviction within thirty days from the date of its issue, the Deputy Commissioner/DM or any other officer duly authorized by the Deputy Commissioner/DM in this behalf may evict that person from the premises in question and take possession; (ii) The Deputy Commissioner/DM shall have powers to enforce the eviction orders through Police and the Dy. Commissioner of Police concerned shall be bound to carry out execution of the eviction order. (iii) The Deputy Commissioner/DM will further handover the property/premises in question to the concerned Senior Citizen. (iv) The Deputy Commissioner/DM shall forward monthly report of such cases to the Social Welfare Department by 7th of the following month." 16. A further amendment has been carried out to Sub Rule 3 to Rule 22 of the Delhi Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Rules, 2009 in the year 2017, which amendment has already been reproduced above. The aforesaid Rules also deal with enforcement of orders passed by the Tribunal.
NCT clearly reflect that a senior citizen can file an application seeking eviction of his son and daughter or legal heir from his self acquired or ancestral property on the ground of ill-treatment or non maintenance. The vires of these Rules has not been challenged by the appellant. The limited challenge is to the jurisdiction of the Maintenance Tribunal to order an eviction under the Act of 2007. So noting the limited challenge to the order passed by the Tribunal and keeping in view the fact that the enactment being a social legislation and the same requires to be given liberal interpretation to achieve the mandate of the Act of 2007 i.e for the welfare of the parents and senior citizens and for the protection of their life and property, there is no doubt that the Tribunal does have the jurisdiction to direct vacation by the children of any property in which the senior citizen has a right of residence / possession. In this regard, we may refer to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Board of Muslim Wakfs, Rajasthan v. Radha Krishna and Ors (1979) 2 SCC 468 wherein it was held that the construction which tends to make any part of the Statute meaningless or ineffective must always be avoided and the construction which advances the remedy intended by the Statute should be accepted.
the same are beyond the scope and purview of Section 23. Emphasis is placed on the expression “transfer of property” in the said provision. It is claimed that the respondent has not transferred the property in his favour and therefore the provision would not be applicable and could not have been invoked. 14.1.However, the petitioner conveniently overlooks the provision under Section 4 of the Act. Sub Section (1) of Section 23 provides, inter alia, that where a senior citizen has transferred by way of gift or otherwise, his property, subject to the condition that the transferee shall provide basic amenities and physical needs to the transferor then the transfer may be declared void if the transferee refuses or fails to provide such amenities. Sub Section (2) of Section 23 provides, inter alia, that where a senior citizen has right to receive maintenance out of an estate which is transferred, the right to receive maintenance may be enforced against the transferee provided that the transfer is not made for “consideration”. 14.2. As mentioned above, it is not in dispute that the petitioner is in possession and occupation of part of the property/premises. 14.3.It is also not in dispute that the petitioner is “in possession of property” without consideration. 14.4.It also does not appear to be in dispute that as an elder son of the respondent the petitioner also would inherit right/interest in the property.
construed, having regard to the object of the Act and the provisions under Section 2(b), 2(d), 2(f), 2(h) and Section 4, so as to also include possession of the property as well. 15.1. It is noticed earlier that Sub Section (4) of Section 4 provides, inter alia, that any person who would inherit the property (which includes right or interest in such property) and is “in possession of property” shall maintain such senior citizen which includes the needs of such senior citizen to lead normal life. 15.2. Having regard to the object of the Act and the intention of the legislature, there is no reason or justification or indication to restrict the meaning and scope of the term “transfer” so as to mean only “actual transfer of title and ownership” and to exclude “possession of property” from the purview of Section 23 and/or from the term “transfer” employed in Section 23 of the Act. 15.3. There is no provision in the Act to suggest or to indicate that the said term carries very narrow, and literal meaning so as to mean only actual transfer of title and ownership and the concept of possession, which is recognized by the Act – particularly under Section 4 of the Act, has to be kept out. 15.4.On overall consideration and having regard to the provision under Sections 2(b), 2(d), 2(f), 4 and the object of the Act, the said term should receive wider meaning so as to include possession/occupation of property, as well. The said concept is already recognised, accepted and internalised by the Act vide Section 4 of the Act.
the act of allowing possession of property / allowing stay in the property or in part of property from which the Senior Citizen / Parents can earn income to maintain themselves and (ii) similarly the term “transferee” shall mean the children / legal heir in whose favour the property, is transferred or is in possession of or are staying in the property or part of the property (but without consideration). 24. In fact, we find a Coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Shadab Khairi & Anr. (supra), has, by referring to the judgment, which is under challenge i.e Sunny Paul & Anr. v. State of NCT of Delhi & Ors in paras 18 to 20 held as under;- “18. A plain reading of the above extracted Rules clearly reflect that a senior citizen is entitled to institute an application seeking eviction of his son, daughter or other legal heir from his self-acquired property on the ground of ill-treatment and non-maintenance.
maintenance within the meaning of the provisions of the Act. 20. We do not agree. At the outset, we had elaborated on how beneficial legislation in a welfare State demands a liberal interpretation wide enough to achieve the legislative purpose and be responsive to some urgent social demand in a welfare State. The object for which the Act as well as the subject Rules, extracted hereinabove, were brought into force, namely, for the welfare of parents and senior citizens and for protection of their life and property, leave no manner of doubt that the Maintenance Tribunal constituted under the Act has the power and jurisdiction to render the order of eviction. (emphasis supplied)” 25. In the case in hand, it is an admitted case of the appellant that the property was allotted by the BCTA to the respondent No.3-the late father of the appellant being an employee of the said Trust. It clearly imply that the appellant herein has no right to reside in the property contrary to the wishes of the respondents 2, more particularly when there are serious allegations against the appellant of ill-treatment, misbehavior with respondent Nos.2 and 3, (who is no more). They had rightly filed a petition before the Tribunal.
2007, whereby SDM directed the petitioners before the High Court to handover the possession of the house property described as B/1, Santosh Nagar Society, Camp Road, Shahibaug, Ahmedabad to the second respondent. From the order, it is noted the only reasoning given by the Tribunal is that since the petitioners were harassing the applicant, i.e., respondent No.2, possession of the house in question was liable to be handed over to the said respondent. The High Court was of the view that the reason, tantamount to no reason, much less a valid reason. It held that the order is cryptic and illegal and on that ground, has set aside the order and remanded the matter back to the Maintenance Tribunal to take up the case afresh and pass an order after keeping in view inter-alia the object of the Act of 2007 for grant of maintenance. The judgment is distinguishable being in peculiar facts of that case.
state, in view of our finding in para 26 above, this judgment has no applicability to the issue in hand.
29. The judgment in the case of Shri Krishna Chandraji (supra) is on similar lines as the case of Motiben Jadavbhai Malani Education & Charitable Trust (supra). This judgment will also have no relevance to the issue in question. 30. Insofar as the case of Harvinder Kaur Bawa (supra) is concerned, we note that the said judgment has been referred to and dealt with by the learned Single Judge. In the said case, the prayer of the petitioner was rejected by the learned Single Judge of the Punjab & Haryana High Court by holding that the petitioner was required to file an application under Section 22 (2) of the Act of 2007, and not much less under the Action Plan, which is altogether different procedure to be followed. The judgment is distinguishable on facts.
April 23, 2014 of the Revenue Authorities. In effect, the direction of the High Court to the State was to attest the mutation by treating the respondent as an agriculturist. The appeal before the Supreme Court was primarily to the extent of challenging the direction to amend the legislation. The Supreme Court has allowed the appeal holding that such a direction is manifestly unsustainable. According to us, the said judgment has no relevance to the issue, which falls for consideration in this case.
32. In Lalappa Lingappa & ors v. Laxmi Vishnu Textiles Mills Ltd (supra), the reliance placed by the learned counsel on paras 13 and 14 of the judgment wherein it was held that in construing a social welfare legislation, the Court should adopt a beneficent rule of construction. If a section is capable of two constructions, that construction should be preferred which fulfills the policy of the Act and is more beneficial to the persons in whose interest, the Act has been passed. The said proposition of law is squarely applicable to the issue in hand, as noted by us in the aforesaid paragraphs. This judgment would not help the case of the appellant.
Shaw (supra) and M/s Lalchand Bhagat Ambica Ram v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Bihar & Orissa (supra) have no relevance to the issue in question, more so in view of our conclusion above. 34. In view of the discussion above, we do not see any merit in the appeal. The same is dismissed. No costs. CM No. 11669/2017 Dismissed as infructuous.

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