Source: https://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-9th-circuit/1690299.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 11:30:07+00:00

Document:
Terry Ezell was convicted in 2008 of being a felon in possession of a firearm, see 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and for possession with intent to distribute cocaine, see 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B)(iii). Am. Mem. & Decision 11–12, Case No. CR05–273RSM, ECF No. 113 (W.D.Wash. Mar. 26, 2008). For the felon in possession charge, the district court sentenced Ezell to 262 months' imprisonment under the ACCA.1 See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (“In the case of a person who violates section 922(g) of this title and has three previous convictions ․ for a violent felony ․, such person shall be fined under this title and imprisoned not less than fifteen years․”). It based this enhancement, in part, on Ezell's two prior Washington state burglary convictions. Because Washington's burglary statute is broader than the generic federal definition, the district court—in keeping with then—Ninth Circuit precedent—applied the modified categorical approach. After considering underlying charging documents, the district court determined that both burglaries qualified as violent felonies and could therefore serve as predicates to impose § 924(e)'s mandatory minimum.
Ezell exhausted his direct appeal in 2010. See United States v. Ezell, 337 F. App'x 623, 624 (9th Cir.2009) (affirming district court). He filed an unsuccessful § 2255 petition later that year. See Ezell v. United States, Nos. C10–467RSM, CR05–273RSM, 2011 WL 1900155 (W.D.Wash. May 18, 2011). Two years later, he asked us for authorization to file a second or successive § 2255 petition. Finding that Ezell's motion did not satisfy § 2255(h), we summarily denied it. Ezell v. United States, No. 12–73464 (9th Cir. Jan. 25, 2013) (order denying motion).
The majority of our sister circuits to have considered § 2244(b)(3)(D)'s time limit have held that it is hortatory, not mandatory. See Word v. Lord, 648 F.3d 129, 129 n. 1 (2d Cir.2011) (per curiam); Ochoa v. Sirmons, 485 F.3d 538, 539 n. 1 (10th Cir.2007) (per curiam); Gray–Bey v. United States, 201 F.3d 866, 867–70 (7th Cir.2000); Rodriguez v. Superintendent, Bay State Corr. Ctr., 139 F.3d 270, 272–73 (1st Cir.1998), abrogated on other grounds as recognized in Simpson v. Matesanz, 175 F.3d 200 (1st Cir.1999); In re Siggers, 132 F.3d 333, 336 (6th Cir.1997); In re Vial, 115 F.3d 1192, 1194 n. 3 (4th Cir.1997) (en banc); cf. Gray–Bey, 201 F.3d at 871 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (arguing that the thirty-day limit is mandatory and faulting the majority for ignoring the limit).
But some of our sister circuits have cited this provision as mandatory. See, e.g., In re Henry, 757 F.3d 1151, 1157 n. 9 (11th Cir.2014) (“[T]his Court necessarily must apply § 2244(b)(2) under a tight time limit in all cases, since the statute expressly requires us to resolve this application within 30 days, no matter the case.”).

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