Source: https://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-supreme-court/304/92.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 23:21:29+00:00

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[304 U.S. 92, 94] Messrs. Ralph L. Carr and Jean S. Breitenstein, both of Denver, Colo., Byron G. Rogers, Atty. Gen. of Colo., and Shrader P. Howell, Asst. Atty. Gen. of Colo., for appellants.
The La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Company, a Colorado corporation, owns a ditch by which it diverts from that river in Colorado water for irrigation. On July 5, 1928, it brought in the district court for La Plata county a suit which charged that since June 24, 1928, the defendants, Hinderlider, State Engineer of Colorado, and his subordinates, have so administered the water of the river as to deprive the plaintiff of water which it claims the right to divert. A mandatory injunction was sought.
'1. At all times between the 1st day of December and the 15th day of the succeeding February each State shall have the unrestricted right to the use of all water which may flow within its boundaries.
'(a) Each State shall have the unrestricted right to use all the waters within its boundaries in each day when the mean daily flow at the interstate station is one hundred cubic feet per second, or more.
'(b) On all other days, the State of Colorado shall deliver at the interstate station a quantity of water equiv- [304 U.S. 92, 97] alent to one-half of the mean flow at the Hesperus station for the preceding day, but not to exceed one hundred cubic feet per second.
For the administration of water rights, Colorado and New Mexico each set up an administrative system with the State Engineers at its head. The State Engineers agreed that, in order to put the water to its most efficient use in the hot summer months of 1928, when the river was very low, the whole of the available supply should be rotated between the two States. In other words, that each State should be permitted to enjoy the entire flow of the river during alternating ten-day periods. During the ten days commencing June 24, 1928, all the water of the river (except small amounts diverted in Colorado for domestic and stock requirements) was thus allowed to pass to New Mexico; and during the succeeding ten-day period all the water in the stream was similarly allowed to be diverted in Colorado. The defendant water officials contend that in so rotating the water of the stream they administered it as required by the Compact and wisely.
The La Plata River rises in the mountains of Colorado, flows in a southerly direction until it reaches the boundary of New Mexico and in the latter State until it empties into the San Juan River. The stream is nonnavigable; has a narrow watershed; and a large run-off in the early spring. Then the quantity flowing begins to fall rapidly; [304 U.S. 92, 98] and during the summer months little water is available for irrigation. In each State the water of the stream has long been used for irrigation; and each adopted the so-called appropriation doctrine of water use. 2 Under that doctrine the first person who acts toward the diversion of water from a natural stream and the application of such water to a beneficial use has the first right, provided he diligently continues his enterprise to completion and beneficially applies the water. The rights of subsequent appropriations are subject to rights already held in the stream.
The relative rights of all claimants to divert in Colorado water from the La Plata River were adjudicated in a proceeding under the Colorado statutes. By decree therein of January 12, 1898 (and later amended), the Ditch Company was declared entitled to divert 39 1/4 cubic feet of water per second, subject to five senior priorities aggregating 19 second feet. On June 24, 1928, there was in the stream, at the recognized Colorado gauging station, 57 second feet of water. The Ditch Company claimed that by reason of the 1898 decree it was entitled to all the water in the stream except that required to satisfy the Colorado priorities. If it had been permitted to draw all that water, none would have been available to the New Mexico water claimants, who, under similar laws, had made appropriations. Some of them were earlier in date than the Ditch Company's. [304 U.S. 92, 99] The case was first heard in the District Court on evidence in 1930. The Ditch Company objected at the trial to the admission or consideration of the Compact. It insisted that the Compact attempted to surrender to New Mexico, and thus destroy. vested property rights of Colorado citizens; that this is a violation of the obligations of its contract; and that the Compact in so far as it 'applies or is intended to apply to private rights of the individuals or citizens of Colorado, or to be used as a defense of or justification for the acts of the State Engineer or his subordinates in interfering with or violating the private rights of citizens of Colorado, or in attempting to disregard, ignore or set aside the decrees of this ( District) Court for the distribution of water in accordance with the decrees, is unconstitutional and void,' in violation of the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Federal Constitution and of article 2, section 25 of the Constitution of Colorado.
This second judgment of the trial court was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the State; an additional opinion being delivered by the court, and a dissent by a different justice. 101 Colo. 73, 70 P.2d 849. An appeal to this Court was allowed by the Acting Chief Justice of the State. 3 Pursuant to the Act of Congress, August 24, 1937, c. 754, 50 Stat. 751, 28 U.S.C.A. 401, 349a, 380a and note 17 and note, the attention of the Attorney Gen- [304 U.S. 92, 101] eral of the United States was directed to the contention that the validity of a federal statute is involved, 302 U.S. 646 , 58 S.Ct. 123, 82 L.Ed. --. He filed memoranda in which he contended that: '(1) This Court is included in the courts to which section 1 of the Act of August 24, 1937 (28 U.S.C.A . 401) is applicable; (2) the constitutionality of the compact is drawn in question whether or not a decision on this point is necessary; (3) a compact is an Act of Congress; and (4) it is an Act 'affecting the public interest."
The Ditch Company moved to dismiss the appeal, contending among other things, that the mere fact that the Compact was approved by Congress does not make it a federal statute within the meaning of the jurisdictional act authorizing appeals. Decision on the motion to dismiss was postponed to the hearing on the merits. For reasons to be stated, we are of opinion that the case is not reviewable on appeal; that it presents a federal question reviewable on certiorari; that because of its importance certiorari should be granted; and that the judgment must be reversed.
First. As the La Plata River flows from Colorado into New Mexico and in each State the water is used beneficially, it must be equitably apportioned between the two. The decision below in effect ignores that rule. It holds immaterial the fact that the acts complained of were being done in compliance with the Compact, and does so on the ground that the Compact in authorizing diversion and rotation violated rights awarded by the January 12, 1898 decree in the Colorado water proceeding; holds that the decree awarded to the Ditch Company the right to divert from the river 39 1/4 cubic feet per second (subject [304 U.S. 92, 102] only to the senior Colorado priorities of 19 second feet), even if by so doing it exhausts the whole flow of the stream and leaves nothing for the New Mexico claimants; and holds that the right so awarded is a vested property right which the two States, although acting with the consent of the United States, lacked power to diminish or modify except by a condemnation proceeding and payment of compensation. No such proceeding was provided for in the Compact and none was had otherwise.
It may be assumed that the right adjudicated by the decree of January 12, 1898 to the Ditch Company is a property right, indefeasible so far as concerns the State of Colorado, its citizens, and any other person claiming water rights there. But the Colorado decree could not confer upon the Ditch Company rights in excess of Colorado's share of the water of the stream; and its share was only an equitable portion thereof.
See, also, Garcia v. Lee, 12 Pet. 511, 521; Coffee v. Groover, 123 U.S. 1, 29 , 30 S., 31, 8 S.Ct. 1; State of Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 525 , 13 S.Ct. 728.
Fourth. As the States had power to bind by compact their respective appropriators by division of the flow of the stream, they had power to reach that end either by providing for a continuous equal division of the water from time to time in the stream, or by providing for alternate periods of flow to the one State and to the other of all the water in the stream. To secure 'the greatest beneficial use of' the water in the stream, the Compact provided that the water may be 'rotated between the two States, in such manner for such periods, and to continue for such time as the State Engineers may jointly determine.' That such alternate rotating flow was then a more efficient use of the stream than if the flow had been steadily divided equally between the Colorado and the New Mexico appropriators was conclusively established by the evidence. That is, the rotating supply which the Compact authorized, and the two State Engineers agreed upon, was clearly more beneficial to the Ditch Company than to have given to it and other Colorado appropriators steadily one-half of the water in the river. The delegation to the State Engineers of the authority to determine when the waters should be so rotated was a matter of detail clearly within the constitutional power. There is no claim that the authority conferred was abused.
Fifth. As Colorado possessed the right only to an equitable share of the water in the stream, the decree of January 12, 1898, in the Colorado water proceeding did not award to the Ditch Company any right greater than the equitable share. Hence the apportionment made by the Compact can not have taken from the Ditch Company any vested right, unless there was in the proceedings leading up to the Compact or in its application, some vitiating infirmity. No such infirmity or illegality [304 U.S. 92, 109] has been shown. There is no allegation in the pleadings, no evidence in the record, no suggestion in brief or argument, that the apportionment agreed upon by the commissioners was entered into without due enquiry; or that it was not an honest exercise of judgment; or even that it was, or is, inequitable. The fact that the appointment of the Joint Commissioners was authorized in 1921, that their agreement was not adopted by the States until 1923, and that it was not approved by Congress until 1925 shows that there was ample time for consideration by all concerned. There is no suggestion that the Ditch Company, or indeed anyone else, was denied by the commissioners opportunity to be heard; or even that any water claimant objected to the terms of the Compact. It appears that although the State of Colorado was not permitted to intervene in this litigation, State of Colorado v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 101 Colo. 368, 73 P. 2d 997, its Attorney General represented the State's water officials. Moreover, the Compact provides in Article VI that it 'may be modified or terminated at any time by mutual consent'; and there is not even a suggestion that either State, or the Ditch Company, has expressed a desire to modify or terminate it.
[ Footnote 1 ] The Compact had its inception in 1921 when the legislature of each state authorized the appointment of a commissioner who shall represent the State 'upon a Joint Commission ... to be constituted by said states for the purpose of negotiating and entering into a compact or agreement between said states, with consent of Congress, respecting the future utilization and disposition of the waters of the La Plata River, and all streams tributary thereto, and fixing and determining the rights of each of said states to the use, benefit and disposition of the waters of said stream, provided, however, that any compact or agreement so entered into on behalf of said states shall not be binding or obligatory upon either of said states or the citizens thereof, unless and until the same shall have been ratified and approved by the Legislatures of both states, and by the Congress of the United States.' Colo.Session Laws, 1921, p. 803, 1; Session Laws of New Mexico, 1921, c. 147, p. 323, 1.
[ Footnote 2 ] Colorado Constitution, art. 16, 5, provides: 'The water of every natural stream, not heretofore appropriated, within the state of Colorado, is hereby declared to be the property of the public, and the same is dedicated to the use of the people of the state, subject to appropriation as hereinafter provided.' Article 16, 6, provides in part: 'The right to divert the unappropriated waters of any natural stream to beneficial uses shall never be denied. Priority of appropriation shall give the better right as between those using the water for the same purpose.' For the law of New Mexico, see its Constitution, art. 16, 2 and 3.
[ Footnote 3 ] The first judgment in the trial court was entered June 16, 1930; the first judgment of the Supreme Court of Colorado on July 3, 1933; the dismissal by this Court of the first appeal on March 12, 1943; the second judgment in the trial court on May 12, 1936; the second judgment of the Supreme Court of Colorado on July 6, 1937.
[ Footnote 4 ] Washington v. Oregon, 297 U.S. 517, 528 , 56 S.Ct. 540, 545. Compare Fowler v. Lindsey, 3 Dall. 411, 412; Arkansas v. Tennessee, 246 U.S. 158, 176 , 38 S.Ct. 301, L.R.A.1918D, 258.
[ Footnote 5 ] Nine colonial boundary agreements are listed by Frankfurter and Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitution-A Study in Interstate Adjustments (1925) 34 Yale L.J. 685, 730-732.
[ Footnote 6 ] Five agreements made under the Articles of Confederation have been found. See Frankfurter and Landis, supra note 5, at 732-734.
[ Footnote 7 ] Nine compacts were apparently executed in this period (although five of these were without express Congressional consent). See Frankfurter and Landis, supra note 5, at 735-737, 749-752. See also Ely, Oil Conservation through Interstate Agreement (1933) 371, 372, 389-391; (June 1936) 9 State Government 118; Dodd, Interstate Compacts (1936) 70 U.S.L. Rev. 557, 574. The agreement between New Jersey and New York in 1833 put an end to the boundary suit begun in 1829. New Jersey v. New York, 3 Pet. 461; Id., 5 Pet. 284; Id., 6 Pet. 323.
[ Footnote 8 ] See, also, Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660 , 51 S.Ct. 286; Id., 283 U.S. 789 , 51 S.Ct. 356 (Connecticut River); New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336 , 51 S.Ct. 478; Id., 283 U.S. 805 , 51 S.Ct. 562 (Delaware River); Wyoming v. Colorado, 286 U.S. 494 , 52 S.Ct. 621; Id., 298 U.S. 573 , 56 S.Ct. 912 (Laramie River); Washington v. Oregon, 297 U.S. 517 , 56 S.Ct. 540 (Walla Walla River). Three other water approtionment suits are pending in this Court. Colorado v. Kansas, Original No. 6 (Arkansas River); Nebraska v. Wyoming, 295 U.S. 40 , 55 S.Ct. 568, Original No. 9 (North Platte River); Texas v. New Mexico, Original No. 11 (Rio Grande River).
[ Footnote 9 ] The long drawn out irritating boundary litigation, Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 7 Pet. 651; Id., 11 Pet. 226; Id., 12 Pet. 657; Massachusetts v. Rhode Island, 12 Pet. 755; Rhode Island v. Mass., 13 Pet. 23; Id., 14 Pet. 210; Id., 15 Pet. 233; Id., 4 How. 591; was finally settled by a Compact. See Frankfurter and Landis, supra note 5, at 696, 737, 738.
[ Footnote 10 ] 'We cannot withhold the suggestion, inspired by the consideration of this case, that the grave problem of sewage disposal presented by the large and growing populations living on the shores of New York Bay is one more likely to be wisely solved by co-operative study and by conference and mutual concession on the part of representatives of the states so vitally interested in it than by proceedings in any court however constituted.' At page 313 at 256 U.S., 41 S.Ct. 492, 498.
[ Footnote 11 ] Congress has consented to 15 such compacts, of which 5 have been ratified by two or more of the contracting States. See State Government, supra note 7, at 120-21. See, also, Ely, supra note 7, at 381-88; Dodd, supra note 7, at 574-78.
[ Footnote 12 ] Cissna v. Tennessee, 246 U.S. 289, 295 , 38 S.Ct. 306; Compare Rust Land & Lumber Co. v. Jackson, 250 U.S. 71, 76 , 39 S.Ct. 424. In Howard v. Ingersoll, 13 How. 381, this Court reversed the Supreme Court of Alabama's decision, 17 Ala. 780, locating the Alabama-Georgia boundary, which depended upon the construction of a cession of territory by Georgia to the United States in 1802. Compare Coffee v. Groover, 123 U.S. 1 , 8, S.Ct. 1. The decisions are not uniform as to whether the interpretation of an interstate compact presents a federal question. Compare People of N.Y. v. Central R.R., 12 Wall. 455; with Wedding v. Meyler, 192 U.S. 573 , 24 S.Ct. 322, 66 A.L.R. 833, and Wharton v. Wise, 153 U.S. 155 , 14 S.Ct. 783.
[ Footnote 13 ] Compare Handly's Lessee v. Anthony, 5 Wheat. 374; Howard v. Ingersoll, 13 How. 381; Poole v. Fleeger, 11 Pet. 185; Coffee v. Groover, 123 U.S. 1 , 8 S.Ct. 1; St. Louis v. Rutz, 138 U.S. 226 , 11 S.Ct. 337; Moore v. Maguire, 205 U.S. 214 , 27 S.Ct. 483; Cissna v. Tennessee, 246 U.S. 289 , 38 S.Ct. 306; Marine Ry. & Coal Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 47 , 42 S.Ct. 32; Smoot Sand & Gravel Corp. v. Washington Airport, 283 U.S. 348 , 51 S.Ct. 474.

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