Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/349/133/
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 02:22:16+00:00

Document:
A Michigan state judge served as a "one-man grand jury" under Michigan law in investigating crime. Later, the same judge, after a hearing in open court, adjudged two of the witnesses guilty of contempt and sentenced them to punishment for events which took place before him in the grand jury proceedings.
Held: their trial and conviction for contempt before the same judge violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Pp. 349 U. S. 133-139.
The power of a trial judge to punish for a contempt committed in his immediate presence in open court is not applicable to the contempt proceeding here. P. 349 U. S. 137.
340 Mich. 140, 65 N.W.2d 296, and 340 Mich. 151, 65 N.W.2d 301, reversed.
"Every procedure which would offer a possible temptation to the average man as a judge . . . not to hold the balance nice, clear, and true between the State and the accused denies the latter due process of law."
Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U. S. 510, 273 U. S. 532. Such a stringent rule may sometimes bar trial by judges who have no actual bias and who would do their very best to weigh the scales of justice equally between contending parties. But, to perform its high function in the best way, "justice must satisfy the appearance of justice." Offutt v. United States, 348 U. S. 11, 348 U. S. 14.
It would be very strange if our system of law permitted a judge to act as a grand jury and then try the very persons accused as a result of his investigations. Perhaps no State has ever forced a defendant to accept grand jurors as proper trial jurors to pass on charges growing out of their hearings. [Footnote 7] A single "judge-grand jury" is even more a part of the accusatory process than an ordinary lay grand juror. Having been a part of that process, a judge cannot be, in the very nature of things, wholly disinterested in the conviction or acquittal of those accused. While he would not likely have all the zeal of a prosecutor, it can certainly not be said that he would have none of that zeal. [Footnote 8] Fair trials are too important a part of our free society to let prosecuting judges be trial judges of the charges they prefer. [Footnote 9] It is true that contempt committed in a trial courtroom can under some circumstances be punished summarily by the trial judge. See Cooke v. United States, 267 U. S. 517, 267 U. S. 539. But adjudication by a trial judge of a contempt committed in his immediate presence in open court cannot be likened to the proceedings here. For we held in the Oliver case that a person charged with contempt before a "one-man grand jury" could not be summarily tried.
"there is one thing the record does not show, and that was Mr. White's attitude, and I must say that his attitude was almost insolent in the manner in which he answered questions and his attitude upon the witness stand. . . . Not only was the personal attitude insolent, but it was defiant, and I want to put that on the record."
In answer to defense counsel's motion to strike these statements because they were not part of the original record the judge said, "That is something . . . that wouldn't appear on the record, but it would be very evident to the court." Thus, the judge, whom due process requires to be impartial in weighing the evidence presented before him, called on his own personal knowledge and impression of what had occurred in the grand jury room, and his judgment was based in part on this impression, the accuracy of which could not be tested by adequate cross-examination.
that judge, the result would be either that the defendant must be deprived of examining or cross-examining him or else there would be the spectacle of the trial judge presenting testimony upon which he must finally pass in determining the guilt or innocence of the defendant. [Footnote 10] In either event, the State would have the benefit of the judge's personal knowledge, while the accused would be denied an effective opportunity to cross-examine. The right of a defendant to examine and cross-examine witnesses is too essential to a fair trial to have that right jeopardized in such way.
We hold that it was a violation of due process for the "judge-grand jury" to try these petitioners, and it was therefore error for the Supreme Court of Michigan to uphold the convictions. The judgments are reversed, and the causes are remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Sacher v. United States, 343 U. S. 1; Cooke v. United States, 267 U. S. 517, 267 U. S. 539; Ex parte Savin, 131 U. S. 267, 131 U. S. 277. See also In re Oliver, 333 U. S. 257, 333 U. S. 273-278.
"It therefore appearing . . . that the said Patrolman Lee Roy Murchinson [sic] has been guilty of willful and corrupt perjury, which perjury has an obstructive effect upon the judicial inquiry being conducted by this court, and the said Patrolman Lee Roy Murchinson [sic] obstructed the judicial function of the court by wilfully giving false answers as aforesaid, and did also tend to impair the respect for the authority of the court, all of which perjury and false answers given by the said witness aforesaid was committed during the sitting of, in the presence and view of this court and constitutes criminal contempt;"
"It is therefore ordered that the said Patrolman Lee Roy Murchinson [sic] appear before this court on the tenth day of May, 1954, at 10:00 o'clock in the forenoon and show cause why he should not be punished for criminal contempt of this court because of his aforesaid acts."
See, e.g., Note, 50 L.R.A. (N.S.) 933, 953-954, 970-971.
"There are two points that suggest themselves to me."
"One is that, if the respondent is going to claim that he was in Shrewsberry, Ontario, Canada, on March 9, 1954, that we ought to be furnished with information so that we could, between now and two days from now, which I am going to give you, we could do some checking and investigating ourselves."
Because of the judge's dual position, the view he took of his function is not at all surprising.
See, e.g., Queen v. London County Council,  1 Q.B. 190; State ex rel. Getchel v. Bradish, 95 Wis. 205, 70 N.W. 172, 37 L.R.A. 289.
See Hale v. Wyatt, 78 N.H. 214, 98 A. 379. See also Witnesses -- Competency -- Competency of a Presiding Judge as Witness, 28 Harv.L.Rev. 115.
grand jury investigation not in secret, but with other public officials to aid him, and a transcript is made of the testimony. There is certainly nothing unconstitutional about this. A State may reduce the customary number of grand jurors to one, and impart the investigatory duty to a member of its judiciary if it so desires. Further, the accused is afforded a full hearing in open court, with a statement of charges, benefit of counsel, and a full opportunity to explain his conduct before the grand jury, before being held in contempt. Thus, all the requirements set down in In re Oliver, 333 U. S. 257, are met.
The Court's determination is rested on the sole fact that the same judge first cited petitioners for contempt committed in his presence and then presided over the proceedings leading to the final adjudication. It is neither shown nor alleged that the state judge was in any way biased. Nor is this required by the Court, for it holds, as a matter of law, that the judge's "interest" in a conviction makes the proceedings inherently prejudicial, and thus constitutionally invalid. The fact that the "interest" of the state judge in this procedure is no different from that of other judges who have traditionally punished for contempt leads us to dissent.
to assume the role of accuser or complaining witness before another judge. In Offutt v. United States, 348 U. S. 11, the Court simply stated an exception: when the trial judge becomes personally embroiled with the contemnor, he must step aside in favor of another judge. That decision was rested upon our supervisory authority over the administration of criminal justice in the federal courts. The Court now holds, even though there is no showing or contention that the state judge became embroiled or personally exercised, or was in any way biased, that, as a matter of constitutional law -- of procedural due process -- a state judge may not punish a contempt previously committed in his presence. This seems inconsistent with all that has gone before.
Oliver, 333 U. S. 257. Petitioners had all this. They are not entitled to more.
We do not see how it can be held that it violates fundamental concepts of fair play and justice for a state judge after a full court trial to punish a contempt previously observed when acting as a grand jury when it has been held that it is perfectly proper for a federal judge to summarily punish a contempt previously observed in open court. It seems to us that the Court has imposed a more stringent requirement on state judges as a matter of due process than we have imposed on federal judges over whom we exercise supervisory power.
"subject his liberty or property to the judgment of a court, the judge of which has a direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary interest in reaching a conclusion against him in his case."
Id. at 273 U. S. 523. It is one thing to hold that a judge has too great an interest in a case to permit the rendition of a fair verdict when his compensation is determined by the result he reaches. It is quite another thing to disqualify a state judge as having too great an interest to render a due process judgment when his sole interest, as shown by this record, is the maintenance of order and decorum in the investigation of crime -- an interest which he shares in common with all judges who punish for contempt.
The State of Michigan has decided that, in the administration of its criminal law, it is wise to have the investigating power in the hands of a judge. It has also decided that the judge who observes the contempt is to preside at the trial of the contemnor. It does not seem that there is here such a violation of accepted judicial standards as to justify this Court's determination of unconstitutionality.

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