Source: https://taxcontroversywatch.com/category/internal-revenue-code/page/2/
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 22:20:52+00:00

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Yesterday the Ninth Circuit addressed the question of whether an individual can be convicted of filing false tax returns pursuant to 26 U.S.C. 7206(1) where the tax returns in question were tendered to an IRS agent during an audit, and were not filed with an IRS Service Center in the normal course. See United States v. Boitano, No. 14-10139 (slip opinion available here). The defendant (who was also an accountant) had been convicted following a jury trial of making a false statement under penalty of perjury on personal income tax returns, and he appealed his conviction to the Ninth Circuit.
During the period relevant to this appeal, Boitano was a partner in Boitano, Sargent & Lilly, an accounting firm. His responsibilities included preparing tax returns and representing clients during IRS audits, but Boitano did not file his own income tax returns for the years 1991 to 2007.
The IRS undertook an examination in 1992/1993 and in 2004. Boitano still did not file any returns, and his case was referred to the IRS’s Special Enforcement Program.
In June 2009, Special Enforcement Program Agent Nick Connors requested a meeting with Boitano regarding his failure to file returns for 2001 through 2007. Connors and Boitano ultimately met three times. During the third meeting, Boitano handed Connors income tax returns for 2001, 2002, and 2003. The returns were signed under penalty of perjury by Boitano and his wife. Connors stamped the first page of the returns “Internal Revenue Service, SB/SE – Compliance Field, Sep 04, 2009, Area 7, San Francisco, CA,” and hand wrote “delinquent return secured by exam” on the first page of each. Per Boitano’s request, Connors copied the first page of the returns and gave the copies to Boitano as receipts.
The returns Boitano handed to Connors reported “estimated tax payments” that had not been made. The 2001 return reported a $26,000 payment, the 2002 return reported a $38,000 payment, and the 2003 return reported a $57,000 payment. In fact, the government calculated that Boitano owed the IRS $52,953.80 for 2001, $72,797.00 for 2002, and $104,545.94 for 2003.
Agent Connors quickly realized that the IRS did not have record of receiving the claimed estimated tax payments. Therefore, instead of sending the returns to the IRS service center for processing, he confronted Boitano with the discrepancy. According to Connors, Boitano “physically got a little pale and said that he was not sure why there [were] differences.” Soon thereafter, Connors sent Boitano a letter asking that he substantiate the estimated tax payments, or, if those estimates were not correct, that he identify the correct estimated amounts with “a written statement dated and signed explaining in detail why you believed the estimated payments to be the amounts reported on the delinquent returns filed on 9/4/09.” Boitano never responded.
Boitano was indicted and charged with three counts of making false statements under 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1). Section 7206(1) establishes that it is a felony for any person to “[w]illfully make and subscribe any return, statement, or other document, which contains or is verified by a written declaration that it is made under the penalties of perjury, and which he does not believe to be true and correct as to every material matter.” Boitano was also charged with three misdemeanor counts of failure to file taxes under 26 U.S.C. § 7203. He pleaded guilty to the three misdemeanors, but proceeded to trial on the felony charges.
The defendant argued at trial that filing is an essential element of § 7206(1) and that his act of handing the returns to Agent Connors did not constitute “filing” within the applicable IRS statute and regulations. The government agreed that filing is an element of the charged offense, but argued the filing element was satisfied by the uncontradicted evidence showing that the defendant handed fraudulent returns to Agent Connors. The district court agreed with the government. Over objection, Connors was permitted to testify that the defendant “filed 2001, 2002, and 2003 delinquent tax returns with me.” Connors provided additional foundational testimony that the IRS “treat[ed] the returns as having been filed” on September 4, 2009, the day the defendant handed them to Connors.
Reversing its prior position, the government now concedes that “there is a single definition of ‘filing’ that applies in both the civil and criminal context,” and that “the record does not support that the returns here were filed.” The government agrees with Boitano that Connors’s testimony that the returns were “filed” when Boitano handed them to him was incorrect. The government’s new argument is that filing is not an element of the charged offense because, “by its own terms, [§] 7206(1) does not require the government to prove ‘filing’ as defined by the IRS regulations to establish a violation of the statute.” The government reasons, “under a correct understanding of Section 7206(1), [Boitano’s] actions violated the statute by his completing a return, signing it, and taking actions by which he gave up any right of self-correction.” (Emphasis added.) Notably, the government concedes that if it had to prove the returns were filed within the meaning of the IRS regulations, then Boitano’s convictions must be reversed.
Our court has long held that “filing” is an element of a § 7206(1) violation. In United States v. Hanson, we affirmed a conviction for making false statements in violation of § 7206(1) where the defendant “fil[ed] false IRS forms that reported payments [defendant] had never made and claimed a tax refund [defendant] was not due.” 2 F.3d 942, 944 (9th Cir. 1993). In so ruling, we stated that “[t]o prove a violation of § 7206(1), making false statements, the government must prove that the defendant (1) filed a return, statement, or other document that was false as to a material matter . . . .” Id. at 945.
The government cites numerous reasons for its new contention that § 7206(1) does not require filing, but it offers no intervening authority for its argument that it should only be required to show that Boitano gave up the right of selfcorrection. It argues: (1) the statute, by its own terms, does not require proof of filing; (2) the Supreme Court has not identified filing as an element of the offense; (3) interpreting the statute not to require filing makes sense because the statute is not limited in its scope to tax returns; (4) the statute’s legislative history does not establish that filing is an element of the offense; and (5) filing a document is one way, but not the only way, to satisfy the statute. We are bound, however, by Hanson’s plain and explicit identification of “filing” as an element of a § 7206(1) offense. Id. (“To prove a violation of § 7206(1) . . . the government must prove that the defendant (1) filed a return. . . .”); see also United States v. Tucker, 133 F.3d 1208, 1218 (9th Cir. 1998).
The Ninth Circuit concluded that because binding circuit precedent establishes that “filing” is an element of a conviction under § 7206(1), and the government conceded on appeal that the record does not support that the returns here were filed, the defendant’s felony convictions must be reversed.
Late yesterday, the Justice Department announced that it had reached resolutions with four more Swiss banks under the terms of the DOJ Swiss Bank Program. The latest banks to resolve their U.S. tax issues are the following: Société Générale Private Banking (Lugano-Svizzera); MediBank AG; LBBW (Schweiz) AG; and Scobag Privatbank AG.
Yesterday’s announcement brings the total Swiss bank resolutions to seven to date. The Justice Department previously announced resolutions with BSI SA, Vadian Bank AG, and Finter Bank Zurich AG. More than 100 Swiss banks previously notified the Tax Division that they wished to enroll in the program.
Today’s agreements reflect the Tax Division’s continued progress towards reaching appropriate resolutions with the banks that self-reported and voluntarily entered the Swiss Bank Program. The department is currently investigating accountholders, bank employees, and other facilitators and institutions based on information supplied by various sources, including the banks participating in this Program. Our message is clear – there is no safe haven.
These four additional bank agreements signal a change in terrain for offshore banking. No longer is it safe to hide money offshore and expect that it will not be discovered. ‎ IRS CI Special Agents will continue to follow the money to find those who circumvent the offshore disclosure laws and hold them accountable.
According to the terms of the non-prosecution agreements signed today, each bank agrees to cooperate in any related criminal or civil proceedings, demonstrate its implementation of controls to stop misconduct involving undeclared U.S. accounts and pay the penalties in return for the department’s agreement not to prosecute these banks for tax-related criminal offenses.
The DOJ noted that in accordance with the terms of the Swiss Bank Program, each bank mitigated its penalty by encouraging U.S. accountholders to come into compliance with their U.S. tax and disclosure obligations. While U.S. accountholders at these banks who have not yet declared their accounts to the IRS may still be eligible to participate in the IRS Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program, the price of such disclosure has increased.
On February 26, 2015, the Treasury Department’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”) issued an assessment of a civil money penalty totaling $1,500,000 against First National Community Bank (“FNCB”), which is located in Dunsmore, Pennsylvania. The penalty was issued in conjunction with the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, which is FNCB’s primary regulator. The penalty was premised on FNCB’s failure to file suspicious activity reports (“SARs”) stemming from the “Kids for Cash” scandal.
The “Kids for Cash” scandal involved payoffs that two state court judges received. The payoffs were made by an operator of a juvenile detention facility. The two judges, Mark Ciavarella and Senior Judge Michael Conahan, sentenced thousands of juveniles to excessive terms of incarceration for petty crimes. In exchange, they received payments from the facility operator. Conahan pleaded guilty and Ciavarella was convicted after a jury trial. Conahan had received $2,600,000 in bribes. He was sentenced to a term of 17.5 years.
FinCEN’s assessment of a civil money penalty against FNCB was premised on the bank’s anti-money laundering violations. Conahan had banked at FNCB. The notice focused on three “red flags” missed by the bank: (1) a law enforcement subpoena submitted in 2007 for information related to Conahan and other individuals and entities; (2) activity occurring as early as 2005, involving many large, round-dollar transactions often occurring on a single day; and (3) an abnormal volume of activity compared to account balances.
According the assessment, Conahan deposited the bribe proceeds into a business bank account for company named Pinnacle. The agency took FNCB to task for not taking note that in 2005, Conahan purchased a condominium as an investment and then refinanced the unit three months later. According the assessment, Conahan reported a substantial increase in the condominium and was able to perform a “cash out” refinancing. Further, FinCEN’s assessment stated: “From 2004 to 2005, Conahan’s and Ciavarella’s incomes nearly quadrupled, purportedly as a result of rental income from the condominium purchased through Pinnacle.” FinCEN also noted that the size, frequency, and type of deposits into the Pinnacle account should have also alerted regulators.
According to Bloomberg, Conahan sat on the FNCB’s board. Attorneys for the bank told Bloomberg that bank officials were unaware of Conahan’s role in the “Kids for Cash” scandal. “The way his account was viewed is the way any judge’s account would be viewed and it is unfair to imply that his account would be handled differently with regard to whether he was on the board,” the bank’s attorney told the wire service.
Given the isolated nature of the account, one has to wonder whether FinCEN’s decision to take an enforcement action stemmed from the fact that Conahan was a member of FNCB’s board. The penalty appears disproportionate to the financial side of the transaction. Given Conahan’s abuse of trust, it is hard to quantify the true harm that he caused.
Frequently asked questions for taxpayers residing outside the United States here.
The Delinquent International Information Return Submission Procedures clarify how taxpayers may file delinquent international information returns in cases where there was reasonable cause for the delinquency. Taxpayers who have unreported income or unpaid tax are not precluded from filing delinquent international information returns. Unlike the procedures described in OVDP FAQ 18, penalties may be imposed under the Delinquent International Information Return Submission Procedures if the Service does not accept the explanation of reasonable cause. The longstanding authorities regarding what constitutes reasonable cause continue to apply, and existing procedures concerning establishing reasonable cause, including requirements to provide a statement of facts made under the penalties of perjury, continue to apply. See, for example, Treas. Reg. § 1.6038-2(k)(3), Treas. Reg. § 1.6038A-4(b), and Treas. Reg. § 301.6679-1(a)(3).
We will analyze this guidance and provide further analysis in future posts.

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