Source: https://govlawweb.typepad.com/government_liability_upda/attorney-fees/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 00:38:09+00:00

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In Hall v. DMV, published August 15, 2018, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, Division 1 affirmed a trial court order denying a petitioner's motion for attorney fees under the private attorney general fee statute, Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5. The petitioner was arrested for a suspected DUI. Because he refused to provide a blood test, his driver's license was seized. The petitioner challenged the seizure in a DMV hearing. At the hearing, he objected to a "officer's statement" that had a discrepancy as to the date of arrest and the date petitioner was admonished about the consequences of refusing a blood test. The hearing officer admitted the statement despite the discrepancy, ruled the discrepancy a clerical error, and sustained revocation of the license. The petitioner sought a writ of mandate in superior court, on the ground that the officer's statement was inadmissible. Before the hearing, the court allowed the petitioner to amend the petition based on a charge that the hearing officer had accepted bribes in other cases. After the hearing officer pleaded guilty, the petitioner contended that lack of an impartial hearing officer violated his due process rights. The trial court granted the petition on due process grounds, but did not grant the petitioner his requested relief of reinstating his license. Instead, it remanded the matter to the DMV for a new hearing before an impartial hearing officer. The DMV set the matter for a new de novo hearing. Before the hearing, the petitioner appealed the ruling. In a published decision, the Court of Appeal agreed that the petitioner had been deprived of due process, but rejected the requested relief and held that the trial court correctly ordered a new administrative hearing. The appellate court awarded the petitioner costs, but did not state the basis for doing so. The petitioner then sought over $145,000 in fees in the section 1021.5 motion. The trial court denied the motion on the ground that the petitioner was not successful.
The appellate court agreed. A section 1021.5 fee award requires that the petitioner be "successful." A petitioner is successful if he achieves his primary litigation goal. Here, the petitioner did not achieve his primary goal: license reinstatement. Instead, the result before the appeal was the same as the one afterward: He was offered a new administrative hearing, which he did not want. That the petitioner obtained a published decision that established an important right did not warrant fees if he was not successful. He was awarded costs in the previous appeal because of the interests of justice, not because he was successful. Further, he could not meet section 1021.5's test that the fee award is appropriate in light of the necessity and financial burden of private enforcement. He started the petition before the basis for the fee motion (the charge that the hearing officer took bribes) appeared, and his attorney incurred approximately as much in fees on the petition before the amendment as afterward. Further, once the trial court ruled that the petitioner was entitled to a new hearing, the litigation continued solely to vindicate the petitioner's personal goal of getting his license back.
In Doe v. Regents of University of California, published June 6, 2018, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed denial of a motion to dismiss a suit against the Regents of the University of California and the Assistant Dean of Students at one of the UC universities. The plaintiff, a university student, was suspended for alleged sexual assault of a fellow student. The university held an administrative hearing before suspending him. The plaintiff initially sued the Regents under Title IX, under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 (for denial of procedural due process), and under various state claims. The district court granted a motion to dismiss the state law claims, on the ground that the plaintiff had not yet exhausted his judicial remedies by filing a Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 petition for writ of administrative mandamus challenging the administrative decision. It dismissed the Title IX claim for failure to state a claim, and the section 1983 claim as barred by the Eleventh Amendment. The plaintiff filed a first amended complaint that dropped the state law claims, added a section 1094.5 claim, reasserted the Title IX claim with additional allegations, added the assistant dean and asserted the section 1983 claims only against the assistant dean. The district court dismissed the Title IX claim with prejudice and the section 1983 claim as barred by the Eleventh Amendment, and declined to exercise jurisdiction over the section 1094.5 claim. The plaintiff filed a second amended complaint stating that the assistant dean was sued under section 1983 only in her official capacity, and reasserting the section 1094.5 claim. The court denied a motion to dismiss. The defendants took an interlocutory appeal.
The 9th Circuit ruled that the Eleventh Amendment barred the section 1094.5 claim. Although there is an exception to the Eleventh Amendment for prospective injunctive relief, that exception does not apply when the state (or state instrumentalities, such as the Regents) is sued under state law. A section 1094.5 claim is not just a procedural vehicle; it raises substantive state law claims. Further, the complaint sought attorney fees under Government Code section 800(a), which applies when a complaint seeks relief under state law. Since the only claim under state law was the section 1094.5 claim, he was seeking substantive relief. The plaintiff therefore could not exhaust his judicial remedies in the federal lawsuit. His Title IX and section 1983 claims were therefore barred by failure to exhaust judicial remedies. Unless overturned by a writ of administrative mandamus under section 1094.5, the administrative decision had preclusive effect that barred his federal claims.
In Morales v. Fry, published October 16, 2017, a divided panel of the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed in part and affirmed in part a judgment after jury trial in a 42 U.S.C. section 1983 suit against two police officers. During a protest, Officer Rees put his hand on the plaintiff's shoulder to get her attention. The plaintiff pulled her arm away abruptly and told the officer not to touch her. Officer Rees lost sight of the plaintiff. Later, the plaintiff turned Officer Fry's bicycle handlebar so that she could pass through a tight spot. Officer Fry testified that she felt what she perceived to be a punch to her chest. She believed the plaintiff had punched her. She yanked the plaintiff headlong over the bike, causing the plaintiff to fall on her back on top of other bikes. Multiple officers converged on the plaintiff while she was down. When the plaintiff started to stand up, Officer Rees, who had not been involved in the altercation, sprayed pepper spray into the plaintiff's eyes. The plaintiff was arrested and charged with the blow that Officer Fry perceived. The charges were later dismissed. The plaintiff sued both officers. The district court denied summary judgment, based on factual disputes about what happened in the plaintiff's encounters with the officers. At the close of evidence, the district court denied the officers' motion for a directed verdict. The court's instructions to the jury included asking them whether the officers reasonably believed that their actions (Fry's arrest of the plaintiff and the officers' use of force) was lawful. The jury found for the plaintiff on her excessive force claim against Officer Rees, but not on her excessive force and unlawful arrest claims against Officer Fry. The plaintiff obtained nominal damages and attorney fees against Officer Rees. Both sides appealed the judgment.
The majority decision reversed the judgment against the plaintiff concerning Officer Fry. Rejecting previous 9th Circuit decisions as contrary to U.S. Supreme Court law, and following the majority of circuits, the majority concluded that the prong of qualified immunity that asks whether an officer violated clearly-established law is an issue for the court, not the jury, to decide. By asking whether the officers reasonably believed they were violating the law, the court was asking the jury to decide whether the officers violated clearly-established law. The error was not prejudicial, because the special verdict asked the jury whether the officer violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights regarding arrest and excessive force, and the jury answered, "no." The verdict did not reveal whether the jury based its decision on the clearly-established prong of qualified immunity. The district court should have the jury resolve the factual issues, and then decide as a matter of law whether the officers violated clearly established law. The district court may either submit interrogatories to the jury, to ask them to resolve the factual issues, or use a general verdict and then resolve all factual disputes in favor of the prevailing party. The error was harmless as to Officer Rees, and the district court properly denied his motion for JNOV. The jury could have determined that he used pepper spray in retaliation, rather than as a reasonable use of force, and such a use would violate clearly-established law.
The dissenting judge opined that the jury instructions were proper, and that the plaintiff failed to preserve her claim that they were erroneous.
In Ponte v. County of Calaveras, ordered published August 15, 2017, the Third District Court of Appeal affirmed both a summary judgment granted to the defendant county and an award of attorney fees to the County under Code of Civil Procedure section 1038. The plaintiff contractor alleged that he performed work on a land failure on county property under an oral agreement with a county employee. County ordinances required public contracts to be put out for bid and to contain a fixed payment. The alleged oral contract met neither criterion. The plaintiff contended he had a cause of action against the county for promissory estoppel, and that there is an emergency exception to the county's contractual requirements. He further alleged that he should not be subjected to a fee award under section 1038 because under the circumstances he believed in good faith in his claims.
The appellate court rejected these arguments. Promissory estoppel cannot be asserted against a public entity to bypass rules that require contracts to be in writing or be put out for bids, rules that reflect a public policy to preclude oral contracts or other exposures to liability, including claims of promissory estoppel. The plaintiff was unable to identify any authority supporting his argument that emergencies provide an exception to this rule, or that private parties may declare a public emergency. Nor was this an exceptional case that would warrant applying estoppel against a public entity in the interests of justice, since applying estoppel would undermine the public contract rules set forth by ordinance, designed to prevent oral contract claims. The award of fees under section 1038 was proper, because to avoid paying fees under section 1038 when a public entity wins summary judgment and moves for fees, a plaintiff must show that the action was brought or continued with both subjective good faith and objective reasonable cause. The plaintiff argued that he believed in good faith that he should be paid for his work. But he failed to show that any reasonable attorney would have thought his claim tenable. He therefore failed to show objective reasonable cause.
In County of Los Angeles Board of Supervisors v. Superior Court (ACLU), ordered published June 22, 2017, the Second District Court of Appeal, Division 3, addressed this case on remand from the California Supreme Court. The Supreme Court's opinion ruled that billing invoices from outside counsel to public entities in pending cases are exempt from the California Public Records Act, because every portion--including fee totals--communicate attorney-client information. But it left open the possibility that fee totals from long-concluded matters may not be exempt from the CPRA.
On remand, the appellate court interpreted the Supreme Court's decision as holding that the only portion of an invoice from a long-concluded proceeding that may be subject to the CPRA is the fee total. Whether the fee total communicates attorney-client information is a factual inquiry for the trial court. The appellate court also rejected the document-seeker's argument that the trial court should examine the redactions of attorney-client information in camera to determine whether too much was cut out. Absent party permission, courts cannot examine in camera information claimed to be protected by attorney-client information to determine if the privilege applies.
In Irvine Unified School Dist. v. K.G., published April 13, 2017, a divided panel of the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed an attorney fee award to a student under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, but reversed the order setting the amount of the award and remanded the matter back to the district court for recalculation. Three agencies agreed that K.G. was entitled to a Free and Appropriate Public Education under the IDEA, but each agency contended it was not responsible for paying for K.G.'s special education. K.G. initiated an action in the California Office of Administrative Hearings asking that an administrative law judge deem one of the three agencies responsible for paying for his education. The ALJ deemed the school district responsible. The school district brought an IDEA action in federal court challenging that ruling, and arguing that the state was the responsible agency. It named the other agencies and K.G. as defendants. Before the district court ruled on the case, K.G. graduated from high school. There was no threat to take his diploma away. During the district court proceedings, K.G. argued that the state was responsible for his education Seven months after K.G. graduated, the district court ruled that the state was responsible. The state appealed to the 9th Circuit. The 9th Circuit ruled that the district was responsible. On remand, the district court awarded K.G. his attorney fees. The school district appealed the fee award.
The 9th Circuit ruled that K.G. was entitled to attorney fees. He brought the administrative action because the dispute over funding threatened his FAPE. He obtained an enforceable decision in that action that one of the agencies was responsible for his education. The district "kept the meter running" by bringing the district court suit while K.G. was still a student. The majority held, however, that K.G.'s fees should be reduced if it was unreasonable for his attorneys to continue litigating (rather than seeking K.G.'s dismissal from the suit as a defendant) after K.G. graduated and could no longer benefit from the litigation. A dissenting judge opined that the fee award should not be reduced.
In M.C. v. Antelope Valley Union High School Dist., published March 27, 2017, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a district court order affirming an administrative law judge's decision in a due process hearing brought by the parent of a blind child under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. The parent alleged that the child's Individualized Education Plan was procedurally inadequate because the IEP the parent signed included an offer of 240 minutes of services by a teacher of the visually impaired a month, which the district unilaterally amended more than a month later to 240 minutes per week without notifying the parent. At the hearing, District witnesses testified that the district offered the child 300 minutes of TVI services per week. The parent also alleged that the IEP failed to specify the assistive technology devices offered; and that the district failed to file a response to the parent's due process complaint.
The 9th Circuit emphasized that federal courts review decisions in IDEA due process decisions de novo. It criticized the district court for deferring to the ALJ's decision because it was lengthy and the due process hearing was three days long. The 9th Circuit concluded that the district violated the IDEA's procedural requirements by amending the IEP without notifying the parent or obtaining her consent to the modification, and because the amount of TVI even in the amended IEP did not match the amount the district witnesses testified to in the hearing. Further, had the district brought the error to the parent's attention before the due process hearing, the parent might have agreed to the number of hours provided, avoiding the hearing and the attorney fees the parent incurred. The IEP was also procedurally inadequate because it did not specify the AT devices provided. Parents must be able to use the IEP as a monitor and enforce the services their child is to receive. If the parent is unaware of the services offered to the child, and cannot monitor how they are provided, a Free and Appropriate Education is denied.
The 9th Circuit also concluded that the IDEA was procedurally violated because the district did not file a response to the parent's due process complaint. A response gives notice of the issues in dispute and binds the answering party to a position. When a school district fails to file a timely answer, an ALJ must not go forward with the hearing. The ALJ must order a response, and shift the cost of the delay to the district regardless of who is ultimately the prevailing party.
Normally, the party alleging a violation of the IDEA bears the burden of showing the services provided amount to a denial of FAPE. But where procedural violations as to the IEP deprive the parent of knowledge of what services are offered, the burden shifts to the school district to show that the services provided are adequate. The 9th Circuit emphasized that on remand, the ALJ must determine whether the services were adequate under the standard the U.S. Supreme Court articulated in Endrew F. v. Douglas County School Dist., decided March 22, 2017.

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