Source: http://masscases.com/cases/sjc/286/286mass50.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 21:48:30+00:00

Document:
Present: RUGG, C.J., CROSBY, PIERCE, WAIT, & LUMMUS, JJ.
It is not within the power of the General Court to reopen a decision once made as final according to existing law by a judicial tribunal or a quasi judicial board exercising judicial functions, so far as such decision affects private rights of property.
The provisions of the paragraph added to § 12 of G. L. c. 152 by St. 1929, c. 246, and amended by St. 1932, c. 117, § 1, 2, so far as they purported to affect a final decision by the Industrial Accident Board, made before their effective dates in proceedings under the workmen's compensation act, that the employee's incapacity from an injury had ceased, were unconstitutional because in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and of arts. 10, 30, of the Declaration of Rights of the Constitution of this Commonwealth.
(3) The decree. was ordered reversed.
CERTIFICATION to the Superior Court under the provisions of the workmen's compensation act of a decision by the Industrial Accident Board, made on May 26, 1933, affirming findings and a decision by a single member after a rehearing held on January 10, 1933, on the question of disability of the employee subsequent to March 1, 1928, and ordering compensation to be paid.
"1. That the reviewing board is without jurisdiction in the matter of this rehearing.
"2. That the matter of rehearing in the above case was not properly before the single member, and is not properly before the reviewing board.
"3. That no further compensation can now be ordered or made to the employee upon his petition for rehearing.
"4. That by the decision of the reviewing board filed November 10, 1928, that all incapacity terminated on December 28, 1927, from which no appeal was taken, the matter of further payments to the employee became res judicata, and no further payments can now be ordered or made.
"5. That upon the record in this case the employee is entitled to no further payments, and no further payments can be ordered by this board.
"6. That the provisions of St. 1932, c. 117, and of St. 1929, c. 246, authorizing rehearing, are unconstitutional and void both under the Constitution of the United States and under the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts."
Material facts appearing in the record certified to the Superior Court are stated in the opinion.
In the Superior Court, the case was heard by Weed, J., by whose order a decree was entered directing the payment of compensation in accordance with the decision by the board. The insurer appealed.
J. P. Sullivan, (A. F. Bickford with him,) for the insurer.
W. J. McDonald, (E. Nutter with him,) for the claimant.
and that there was causal relationship between the accident of June 23, 1927, and this condition. He found that total disability began August 26, 1929, and continues. Compensation was ordered at $12.80 per week from August 26, 1929, to continue in accordance with the terms of the act. The insurer filed claim for review. The reviewing board, after hearing, denied requests, affirmed and adopted the findings and decision of the single member and ordered payments to be continued subject to provisions of the act. January 2, 1934, the Superior Court entered a decree in accord. The insurer appeals.
This case differs in an essential respect from MacKinnon's Case, ante, 37, in which we affirmed a decree granting compensation for a partial incapacity arising after a cessation of payment upon an agreement for compensation, and held that the Industrial Accident Board under G. L. c. 152, § 12, had authority to order payment for incapacity not provided for in the compensation agreement. Here, more than four years after a decision of the board that no incapacity existed - a decision from which no appeal was taken - the statute of 1932 grants further hearing on the issue of incapacity. In the case before us there had been a definite adjudication that no incapacity longer existed. In the earlier case there was no such adjudication. A statute has been enacted, after an adjudication apparently final at the time it was had, providing that such adjudication shall not be considered as final in factor as res judicata at law. The question is the right of the Legislature so to provide under the Constitution of the United States and of this Commonwealth.
subsequent petition may be referred, and that, in the event of the death of the employee, such a petition for a rehearing shall be filed within three months from the time of his decease and within one year from the date of the finding terminating his compensation." By St. 1932, c. 117, § 1, the section was further amended by making the provisions of St. 1929, c. 246, applicable where compensation has been paid under an agreement of the parties; and by § 2 where compensation had been paid or agreement made subsequent to January 1, 1925. Brode's Case was decided in 1925. The intent of the Legislature is to permit reexamination of the question of existing disability due to the original injury, and modification of payment to meet the situation found to exist on the reexamination, both uncontrolled by earlier determination that incapacity had wholly ceased.
review or rehearing of the judgment or decree of a court where none is provided at the time of the decision.
In speaking of a statute which declared to be superseded a decree of this court confirming a report in a grade crossing proceeding, the justices said: "The final decree . . . was a judgment of a court. The Legislature cannot exercise judicial powers. That is prohibited by the clear words of art. 30 of the Declaration of Rights of our Constitution. Any legislative attempt to that end would be a nullity. Manifestly it is the exercise of judicial power to grant a new trial or a rehearing in a cause in the courts, or to declare ineffective or to reverse, annul, change, modify or affect the judgment of a court." Opinion of the Justices, 234 Mass. 612, 621. See also Bigelow v. Bemis, 2 Allen 496; Arnold & Murdock Co. v. Industrial Commission, 314 Ill. 251. We need not multiply citations.
We find nothing in Ahmed's Case, 278 Mass. 180, cited by the employee, which controls what is here said. The statutes questioned pass beyond the line of legislation with regard to procedure, and, so far as retroactive, must be held to be inoperative. See Hanscom v. Malden & Melrose Gas Light Co. 220 Mass. 1.
The requests denied need not be discussed in detail. In substance they should have been given. It follows that the decree must be reversed. It is in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and of arts. 10 and 30 of the Declaration of Rights of the Constitution of this Commonwealth.
Decree must enter for the insurer.

References: § 12
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 art. 30
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