Source: http://vinculumjuris.net/2016/06/27/a-constitutional-solution-to-this-constitutional-crisis/
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 10:49:39+00:00

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Thanks for this very interesting and useful analysis.
One point occurs to me as a matter of practical politics. When you say “A requirement for the PM to submit his/her proposal for EU negotiation to the electorate before triggering Article 50”, you mean that the PM should, to use a metaphor, declare what cards s/he will play in that negotiation before it starts?
If so, I wonder how the EU would respond. It seems to me that it is going to limit (though not remove) the UK government’s room for manoeuvre in that negotiation. So it becomes less of a negotiation and more like an effort (quite possibly a futile one) by the UK to impose terms on an organisation from which it is seeking to withdraw.
If that is right, then it would seem plausible that the government would favour your alternative scenario to (a) above, because it seems to give it a little more wriggle room.
Keith, it would of course be preferable for the negotiated deal to be put to the UK electorate. I just don’t know that this would be allowed under the Article 50 mechanism, especially as the EU has pretty much declared that they won’t contemplate pre-negotiations–of course they could back down on this last point.
I don’t know how much it would compromise our bargaining position. Richard and Arvind may have different views, but what I contemplate is a clear statement of what we want (EEA membership, a free trade deal, or what) and whether certain things are on the table (free movement, for example). Would that amount to a showing of your hand? I am no expert on bargaining, but when I put an offer on a house, it was pretty clear which house I was wanted, and that I was willing to offer money for it (how much money, of course, I tried to keep to myself as far as possible). I do understand that it is a bit more complicated than that, but the alternative is that we are being sold a complete pig in a poke.
You speak of a broader interpretation that could emerge of the “constitutional requirements” part of Article 50 in regards to the consent of the Scottish Parliament.
We already find that the Sewel convention has a statutory footing under section 2 of the Scotland Act 2016. So any courts could directly (and narrowly) look to principles “as prescribed by law”, rather than to those “not merely” prescribed by law.
Interesting point, Luke. To elaborate a little, Section 2 of the Scotland Act states “But it is recognised that the Parliament of the United Kingdom will not normally legislate with regard to devolved matters without the consent of the Scottish Parliament.” What are we to make of the “not normally”? On the one hand, were it, counterfactually, instead to say “never”, it would be ineffective insofar as it would be subject to the doctrine of implied (or if necessary explicit) repeal. Similarly I suppose with “not normally”. The statutory footing adds nothing to–but nor, I think, does it take anything away from–the Sewel convention.
But this is all just a long-winded way of way of saying that it would certainly be lawful to abolish Section 29 of the Scotland Act 1998 without the consent of the Scottish Parliament. But to do so would be in defiance of normal constitutional process. Brexit would occur, but nor via an orderly constitutional process.
This also matters in the context of a possible Scottish Indie Referendum 2. If the United Kingdom Parliament did not legislate for such a referendum, it would have doubtful constitutional validity. But if the whole process of Brexit was seen to happen outside normal, accepted constitutional process, this might not matter. Any subsequent referendum and move towards independence would be an extra-constitutional secession but this could scarcely be an objection that could apply to one part of the whole constitutional unravelling but not to another.
Which it is why we should be clear about the rules, and stick scrupulously to them in the first place. Honestly, it would have been better if a little more thought had been given to the rules ahead of time, but hey-ho.
(i) I take a different position on whether referendums held under the EU Act have binding results – they may well be binding, in the sense that s.2 requires that the legislation authorising the treaty change must make its legal effectiveness conditional upon a successful referendum result. In that sense, the referendum is the final stage in the process (in a way which is not actually that dissimilar to the PCVS Act 2011) – the EU Act 2011 requires that effective implementing legislation makes the referendum result binding. This is potentially important when the parallel with the EU Act is being used (in a very interesting way) to leverage the normally less contentious requirement (compared to the holding of a referendum, anyway) of statutory approval for a decision to authorise the triggering of Art 50. It may be arguable that if triggering withdrawal did fall within s.2 EU Act, that provision would only be satisfied by implementing legislation which was conditional upon a further referendum. There are alternative readings of the 2011 Act’s requirements which might support the idea that the referendum already held could constitute satisfaction of a s.2 ‘referendum condition’, but this is a debatable and potentially strained reading of the natural wording of the provision.
(ii) In any event, I am not sure that a decision to notify intention to withdraw from the EU under Art 50 does fall within s.2. On my reading of the Act, it is silent on the question of whether a decision under Art 50 is covered, and to me that suggests exercise of this power lies outside the statutory scheme (we might, for example, have expected to see Art 50 in s.7 (decisions requiring approval by Act) or s.10 (decisions requiring non-legislative parliamentary control)) . The attempt to bring this within s.2 on the grounds that it would annihilate completely the treaty obligation is very innovative, but the fundamental difficulty is that the TEU / TFEU would not be amended or replaced by UK withdrawal from the EU – these treaties and their obligations would still exist, but the UK would no longer be subject to them, and even then only eventually, at the conclusion, not the commencement, of withdrawal negotiations. I think the best reading of the letter of the Act is that the Art 50 decision lies completely outside its scope (which also, incidentally, has implications for the alternative Barber, Hickman and King defence of the need for statutory authorisation of the Art 50 trigger, and indicates that this argument also ultimately fails – Parliament has established a very broad scheme of control, and opted not to subject a withdrawal decision to a standing requirement of legislative authorisation). I think this also fits with the spirit of the EU Act, which was ultimately intended to prevent further transfers of power or competence from the UK to the EU without additional steps being satisfied – on this rationale for the 2011 Act it makes sense that a decision to ‘reclaim’ power and competence from the EU would not be subject to additional conditions (even if we may find that statutory purpose an unsatisfactory one).
I agree with the authors that it is crucial to understand the power to trigger Art 50 in a context that takes account of the EU Act 2011, which is the key domestic provision governing decision-making concerning change to the UK – EU relationship. But once we do take account of the Act, the conclusions I would draw might differ from those reached here.
Michael (if I may), many thanks for your comment. We are working on a follow-up post which will explain our reasoning on section 2 in a bit more detail. You make very good points – we’ll try to make the reason why we take a different view clearer in our follow-up.

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