Source: http://isme.tamu.edu/JSCOPE03/Lee03.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 14:04:59+00:00

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On September 11, 2001, America was attacked. 3000 civilians were killed in the space of a few hours, by an organized, militarized group of non-state actors. As a society that historically cherishes freedom and currently demands retribution, we want to identify a fair and expedient means of dealing with the responsible party -- the criminal who is also our enemy. Such a means must acknowledge and account for the now-intersecting objectives of war and justice. Military commissions are one option. But President Bush's November 13, 2001 Military Order authorizing military commission prosecution of Al Qaeda members and other international terrorists prompted a flurry of criticism, from legal scholars, political pundits, and even from moral philosophers.
I propose a broader application of existing court-martial jurisdiction as a means of addressing this new category of criminal-enemy and mooting the main criticisms of the proposed commissions. There are independent precedents and justifications for the commissions themselves. This paper and many others, in much greater detail, make it clear that military commission prosecutions remain a legitimate, viable option. The ideas forwarded here should not diminish the fact that we can convene commissions as the President’s Military Order intends. At most, I might suggest that convening courts-martial rather than commissions better closes the gap between what we can do and what we should do to achieve redress.
Recognizing that potential courts-martial jurisdiction over war criminals exists, some commentators have suggested that to achieve jurisdiction over all the potential defendants described in the Military Order, amendment of the Uniform Code of Military Justice would be necessary. Part I of this paper presents an argument, based in part on two very recent federal court decisions, as to why such amendment may not be necessary. In Part II, the paper reviews some of the standing precedent for prosecuting war crimes with military courts. And in Part III, it examines the jurisdictional objections that have been raised regarding the President's proposed military commissions, as a backdrop for finally assessing the aptness of the courts-martial option.
The events of September 11, 2001 have forced us to search for new definitions, possibly whole new judicial systems, that appropriately capture the intersection of war and justice. I argue here that no such search is necessary. The United States' Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) is already such a system.
Article 21 of the UCMJ establishes military tribunal jurisdiction over those who violate the laws of war. Article 18 of the UCMJ provides that general courts-martial also have jurisdiction to try "any person who by the law of war is subject to trial by a military tribunal." Though Article 18 in its current form is thus sufficient to provide jurisdiction over "foreign enemy war criminals," jurisdiction over international terrorists who cannot successfully be described as war criminals is not as clear. The Honorable Robinson O. Everett, Senior Judge, U.S. Court of Military Appeals and professor of law at Duke University School of Law, has suggested that Congress, to facilitate the use of courts-martial against international terrorists, could revise Article 18 to include reference to the law of nations as well as the law of war. He notes that "treating [terrorist offenses] as offenses against the law of nations is far easier to justify" than treating them as violations of the law of war.
Fully assessing whether the acts of September 11 violated the law of war as well as the law of nations is beyond the scope of this paper. I intend only to establish that if trial of "foreign enemy war criminals" is the objective, then courts-martial is an available means. It is worth note, though, that at least two federal courts have recently rejected the significance of the fact that our current "war against terrorism" is an "authorized use of force," rather than a "total, declared war" and have demonstrated a willingness to apply terms and rules from the law of war to defendants apprehended in the "war against terrorism."
...For the judicial branch to trespass upon the exercise of the warmaking powers would be an infringement of the right to self-determination and self-governance at a time when the care of the common defense is most critical. This right of the people is no less a right because it is possessed collectively.
These interests do not carry less weight because the conflict in which Hamdi was captured is waged less against nation-states than against scattered and unpatriated forces. We have emphasized that the "unconventional aspects of the present struggle do not make its stakes any less grave." Nor does the nature of the present conflict render respect for the judgments of the political branches any less appropriate. We have noted that the "political branches are best positioned to comprehend this global war in its full context," and neither the absence of set-piece battles nor the intervals of calm between terrorist assaults suffice to nullify the warmaking authority entrusted to the executive and legislative branches.
Like Yaser Hamdi, Jose Padilla is an American citizen detained in a Navy Brig as an enemy combatant without criminal charges pending against him or access to legal counsel. Unlike Hamdi, though, Padilla was captured on American soil and not by American soldiers on the field of battle. He was arrested on May 8, 2002, in Chicago, by Department of Justice personnel, and originally detained pursuant to a material witness warrant. He was later designated an enemy combatant and transferred to the Consolidated Brig in Charleston, South Carolina.
Last month, a federal district court in New York also rejected Padilla's habeas corpus petition, ruling that: (1) the President has the authority to designate him an enemy combatant, despite the fact that he is an American citizen captured on American soil; and (2) the President, through the Secretary of Defense, has the authority to detain him as an enemy combatant for the duration of armed conflict with Al Qaeda.
Given the willingness of both these courts to accept "enemy combatant" designations applied to U.S. citizens based on fairly attentuated affiliations with the events of September 11, 2001, it is at least arguable that courts would accept designation of Al Qaeda members or other similar international terrorists, as “war criminals.” If so, then Article 18 jurisdiction already covers all the potential defendants described in the President's Military Order. In any case, without regard for the likely arguments of Al Qaeda-related prosecutions, and without fully assessing whether certain acts qualify as war crimes, it can still be said that an un-amended Article 18 grants courts-martial jurisdiction over the "foreign enemy war criminals" who are the actual targets of the Military Order.
Convening military courts to adjudicate offenses against the laws of war is by no means a new idea. Offenses against the law of war are regularly brought before military commissions. In fact, virtually every American armed conflict since the American Revolution has seen some form of military commission.
By his Order creating the present Commission [President Roosevelt] has undertaken to direct the performance of those functions which may constitutionally be performed by the military arm of the nation in time of war.
An important incident to the conduct of war is the adoption of measures by the military commander not only to repel and defeat the enemy, but to seize and subject to disciplinary measures those enemies who in their attempt to thwart or impede our military effort have violated the law of war.
was authorized by military command, and was in complete conformity to the Act of Congress sanctioning the creation of such tribunals for the trial of offenses against the law of war committed by enemy combatants.
It must also be noted that military trial of war criminals is not unique to the American military justice system. In the aftermath of World War II, over two thousand war crimes trials were conducted by ten different countries, most through a form of military commission. There is ample domestic and international precedent for the premise that persons committing war crimes are subject to trial by military tribunal. Article 18 of the UCMJ simply adds the option of a U.S. court-martial.
Having set forth the judicial support for military commissions, it is proper to also assess the recent criticisms of potential military commission prosecutions. This paper does not directly address or attempt to refute all of the published criticisms of potential military commissions. Many others have done so. A brief review of the general criticisms of the potential commissions, however, will provide a useful backdrop for assessing the viability of the courts-martial option.
Before discussing the general objections to military commission jurisdiction, it is helpful to review the possible bases for jurisdiction. Military jurisdiction generally fits into two groupings -- cases where jurisdiction is based upon military occupation, such as martial law jurisdiction or military government jurisdiction, and cases where jurisdiction based on prosecution of violations of the laws of war. The potential sources of jurisdiction for military commissions can therefore be categorized as follows: (1) martial law jurisdiction (applying generally when the President directs the military to exercise judicial authority in areas where, or at times when, the civilian court system is no longer functioning); (2) military government jurisdiction (applying generally when the United States occupies all or part of a foreign country at the end of a war, as it did, for example, in Germany after World War II); and (3) law of war jurisdiction (generally applying when the offense is a violation of the international law of war).
This criticism is drawn in part, from a rule first enunciated by the U.S. Supreme Court in a Civil War-era case, Ex Parte Milligan. Milligan's holding (often referred to as the “open-court” rule) has been quoted by some critics of the President’s Military Order, often without the context of the full opinion, as a broad statement that the laws of war "can never be applied to citizens in states which have upheld the authority of the government, and where the courts are open and their process unobstructed." For example, legal arguments filed on behalf of Jose Padilla, the American citizen arrested in Chicago last year and designated an "enemy combatant,” relied heavily on the Milligan case to argue that the U.S. Constitution forbids indefinite detention of a citizen captured on American soil.
Milligan's “open-court” rule, then, should properly be read only as a statement of the criteria for martial law jurisdiction, not as a limitation on military commission jurisdiction in general. The Quirin opinion, discussed at section IV, above, amply demonstrated that Milligan's "open-court" rule limits when martial law courts can be established in the United States. It does not broadly limit when all types military courts can properly be established and, significantly, does not apply to enemy combatants. Thus, the oft-cited “open-court” rule does not appear to pose any restrictions on convening courts-martial to try war criminals.
One thrust of the criticism of President Bush's Military Order has been that it unconstitutionally established a new judicial forum without jurisdiction based on an appropriate legislative mandate to do so. Since last November, a number of legal scholars have argued that military trial of combatants, even of unlawful combatants, is unconstitutional without clear Congressional authorization in the form of a formal declaration of war or specific authorizing legislation. Neil Katyal and Lawrence Tribe have argued, for example, that "[t]he moment the President moves beyond detaining enemy combatants as war prisoners to actually adjudicating their guilt and meting out punishment...he has moved outside the perimeter of his role as Commander-in-Chief of our armed forces and entered a zone that involves judging and punishing alleged violations of the laws."
Katyal and Tribe note that Milligan found Congressional authority to be a prerequisite for military commission jurisdiction. They argue that this principle was “never repudiated in subsequent cases.” But that argument overlooks the fact that the legislative mandate for military commissions was far less clear in 1866 than it would be by 1916 and at all times subsequent.
The Milligan court prefaced its 1866 holding by noting that “it is not pretended that the commission was a court ordained and established by Congress.” By comparison, the Congressionally-enacted language of Article 21 of the UCMJ evidences clear legislative approval of military commission jurisdiction over enemy combatants. This statement of approval can be traced to at least 1916, when Article of War 15, the predecessor to UCMJ Article 21, was first enacted.
A legislative mandate for military court trial of war crimes is far easier to discern now than it was in 1866. Milligan’s reluctance to uphold a military commission based on the Court’s concerns regarding proper separation of powers therefore ought not carry through to form the grounds for jurisdictional criticisms of war crimes tribunals or courts-martial today.
There has also been quite a lot of criticism levied at the so-called procedural "short-cuts" authorized in the President's Military Order. The question of how much due process is due accused non-citizen terrorists has been the subject of numerous articles and speeches in the last year, most clamoring for "the kind of fundamentally fair trial process that America has held up to the world as the standard for criminal adjudications." Many of the articles critical of potential procedural shortcomings cited concerns such as: the absence of some form of grand-jury-like presentment; the possibility of closed rather than open trials; the absence of the opportunity for the accused to retain counsel of his choice; the possibility that the death penalty could be awarded by a non-unanimous verdict, and the absence of full appellate rights, including the opportunity to petition the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.
Following courts-martial procedures, rather than those authorized by the DOD regulations would certainly avert many, if not all, of the above criticisms, and many of those criticizing the commissions have conceded as much. It is certainly to imagine someone arguing that international terrorists and other unprivileged combatants are entitled to more due process that we routinely afford the men and women serving in the American armed forces.
The impediment to courts-martial jurisdiction over foreign enemy war criminals is one of dogma, not of law. For almost a century we have had a solid constitutional jurisdictional basis for convening courts-martial over this type of criminal and have not done so. For most of that time, though, we could safely assume that the greatest threats to our national security would come from state actors susceptible to diplomatic means and measures. Until recently, we could reasonably believe that war crimes death-tolling in the thousands would not take place on American soil. Those beliefs, and the dogmas that developed around them, are clearly inadequate now.
Both the jurisdictional and procedural objections raised by critics of the President's planned military commission are substantially resolved through a broader application of existing courts-martial jurisdiction. Convening legislatively authorized courts-martial is a solution that potentially appeases both legislative historians and constitutional scholars. We have options under our system of military justice. Convening military commissions is something we can do, convening full courts-martial might be something we should do.
 President Bush's November 13, 2001 Military Order sets forth three categories of individuals to be potentially tried by military commission: (1) anyone who there is reason to believe was a member of Al Qaeda; (2) anyone who there is reason to believe has engaged in, aided or abetted, or conspired to commit, acts of international terrorism, or acts in preparation therefor, that have caused, threatened to cause, or have as their aim to cause, injury to or adverse effects on the United States, its citizens, national security, foreign policy, or economy; or (3) anyone who there is reason to believe has knowingly harbored one or more individuals described in the first two categories. Military Order 222, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833, § 2(a)(1) (Nov. 13, 2001). According to the White House Counsel, the Order would be applied only to "foreign enemy war criminals." Alberto R. Gonzales, Editorial, Martial Justice, Full and Fair, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2001, at A27.
 This statement of approval can be traced to at least 1916. Article of War 15, (adopted in 1916) and the predecessor to the UCMJ's Article 21, contained substantially the same language as UCMJ Article 21. The American Bar Association Task Force on Terrorism and the Law Report and Recommendations on Military Commissions, issued January 2, 2002, notes that the language of UCMJ Article 21 and Article of War 15 was intended specifically to preserve the traditional jurisdiction of military commissions over enemy combatants. See American Bar Association Task Force on Terrorism and the Law Report and Recommendations on Military Commissions, January 2, 2002, reprinted in Army Law, March 2002, at 9 (emphasis added).
 Id. at note 61, citing Military Justice Act of 1968, art. 18, Pub. L. No. 90-632, 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. (82 Stat.) 1335 (emphasis added); UCMJ art. 18 (2000).
 See Robinson O. Everett, "The Law of War: Military Tribunals and the War on Terrorism," 48 FED. LAW. 20 (2001). See also Major Michael A. Newton, USA, Continuum Crimes: Military Jurisdiction Over Foreign Nationals Who Commit International Crimes, 153 MIL. L. REV. 1 (1996) (arguing that Congress should modify the UCMJ to give deployed commanders the authority to prosecute foreign nationals who commit international crimes during operations other than war); and Robinson O. Everett & Scott L. Silliman, Forums for Punishing Offenses Against the Law of Nations, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 509, 515-516 (1994) (noting that the UCMJ “confers upon the President and various military commanders the authority to try transgressors of the law of war”).
 On this topic, see Major Mark S. Martins, USA, "War Crimes" During Operations Other Than War: Military Doctrine and Law Fifty Years After Nuremberg--and Beyond, 149 MIL. L. REV. 145 (1995).
 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 198, *16, (4th Cir., January 8, 2003), quoting Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 66, (1981).
 Citing Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278, 283 (4th Cir. 2002).
 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 198, *16-*18, (4th Cir., January 8, 2003).
 Padilla was born in New York, convicted of murder in Illinois while a juvenile, and was sent to prison on a weapons conviction in Florida when he was 19. After being released from prison, he moved to Egypt. See Padilla v. Bush, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23086, *14, (ED NY, December 4, 2002). Padilla has been designated an enemy combatant based on the President's findings that he has had "extended contacts [in Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, and Pakistan] with senior Al Qaeda members and operatives," has acted "under the direction of senior Usama Bin Laden lieutenant Abu Zubaydeh and other senior Al Qaeda operatives, received training from Al Qaeda operatives in furtherance of terrorist activities, and was sent to the United States to conduct reconnaissance and/or conduct other attacks on their behalf." His alleged activities include approaching Zubaydeh and proposing stealing radioactive material within the United States so as to build and detonate a "radiological dispersal device" within the United States. Padilla v. Bush, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23086, *14, (ED NY, December 4, 2002), citing Declaration of Michael Mobbs, Special Advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.
 For a history of early American military commissions, see Major Timothy C. MacDonnell, USA, Military Commissions and Courts-Martial: A Brief Discussion of the Constitutional and Jurisdictional Distinctions Between the Two Courts, Army Law, March 2002, at 19, and Major Michael O. Lacey, USA, Military Commissions: A Historical Survey, Army Law, March 2002, at 41.
 Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942). Four of the Quirin defendants put ashore from a German submarine on June 13, 1942, at Amagansett Beach on Long Island, New York, wearing German Marine Infantry uniforms or parts of uniforms. They then buried the uniforms, along with “a supply of explosives, fuses, and incendiary timing devices,” and proceeded to New York City in civilian clothes. Id. at 21-22. On June 17, 1942, the other four defendants put ashore from a German submarine at Ponte Vedra Beach, Florida, wearing German Marine Infantry caps. They immediately buried the caps, again with explosives materials, and continued on to Jacksonville, Florida, then on to other cities, in civilian clothes. The men were all arrested in New York or Chicago, and were carrying “substantial sums” of U.S. currency which they had received from an officer of the German High Command. This same German officer had explicitly instructed the men to wear their German uniforms while landing in the United States. Id. They were each found guilty, at a military commission established by order of President Roosevelt, of violating the law of war, violating Article 81 of the Articles of War (relieving intelligence to the enemy), Violation of Article 82 of the Articles of War (spying), and conspiracy to commit those offenses. Id. at 23.
 In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946). The charges against General Yamashita specified that he had failed to control the members of his command, permitting them to commit “brutal atrocities and other high crimes.” Id. at 13-14. Those atrocities included: an estimated 25,000 civilians killed in the Batangas Province (a subordinate officer in that area apparently gave the following order: “all the civilians have now turned into guerrillas; therefore, kill all of them”); over 8,000 civilians killed, (and almost 500 women raped), in Manila during one two-week period; and almost 8,000 civilians killed in the Laguna Province. See Major Bruce D. Landrum, USMC, The Yamashita War Crimes Trial: Command Responsibility Then and Now, 149 MIL. L. REV. 293, 294-295 (1995) citing Richard L. Lael, The Yamashita Precedent: War Crimes and Command Responsibility 3 (1982).
Article 2 includes among those persons subject to the Articles of War the personnel of our own military establishment. But this, as Article 12 indicates, does not exclude from the class of persons subject to trial by military commissions “any other person who by the law of war is subject to trial by military tribunals,” and who, under Article 12, may be tried by court-martial, or under Article 15 by military commission.
… Congress, by sanctioning trial of enemy combatants for violations of the law of war by military commission, has not attempted to codify the law of war or to mark its precise boundaries. Instead, by Article 15, it had incorporated, by reference, as within the preexisting jurisdiction of military commissions … all offenses which are defined as such by the law of war, and which may constitutionally be included within that jurisdiction.
Id. at 7-8 (noting that this same explanation was offered in Ex Parte Quirin).
 See Jones, supra, at 168, citing "Progress Report of War Crimes Trials from Data Available on March 1st, 1948," in the United Nations War Crimes Commission, History of the United Nations War Crimes Commissions and the Development of the Laws of War (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1948), 518 (reporting 1,991 cases); and United Nations War Crimes Commission, Law Reports, vol. 15, Digest of Laws and Cases (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1949), xvi (reporting 2,003 cases).
 This paper limits review of the criticisms raised regarding military tribunals to the practical areas of jurisdiction and procedure. It should be noted, though, that some scholars in jurisprudence have also made objections to the administration's approach to the proposed commissions on philosophical grounds. George P. Fletcher, Professor of Jurisprudence at Columbia Law School, has argued that, though the rhetorical advantages of intermingling the lingo of war and justice are clear, the conceptual waffling is particularly dangerous because the targets and arguments are philosophically different depending on whether the agenda is justice or war. He argues that the goals of justice and war are fundamentally different. According to Fletcher, the former is about retrospectively "restoring moral order in the universe" and the latter is about prospectively "securing and achieving the partisan goals of a particular nation,” and the conceptual fusion of these aims runs the risk of great moral and legal error. He points to the Military Order establishing military tribunals to prosecute enemy terrorists in our custody as a sign of this error. See George P. Fletcher, On Justice and War: Contradictions in the Proposed Military Tribunals, 25 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 635 (2002). Other scholars have raised philosophical objections to the general approach of resolving issues of international armed conflict through military justice forums. See e.g., Erin Daly, Transformative Justice: Charting A Path to Reconciliation, 12 INT’L LEGAL PERSP. 73 (2002). But see also Colonel Frederick Bernays Wiener, USA, (ret.), The Years of MacArthur, Volume III: MacArthur Unjustifiably Accused of Meting Out "Victors' Justice" in War Crimes Cases, 113 Mil L. Rev. 203 (1986).
 See e.g., Major General Michael J. Nardotti, Jr., USA, (ret.), Military Commissions, Army Law, March 2002, at 1 (transcript of remarks delivered to the Senate Judiciary Committee SubCommittee on Administrative Oversight and the Courts on December 4, 2001).
 Many other aspects of the Military Order are well beyond the scope of this paper. For example, discussion of whether all acts described in the order would qualify as war crimes under international law, or whether those who merely harbor members of Al Qaeda have violated any international law, would require entirely separate papers. For purposes of this analysis, I accept and assume that our objective is to bring "foreign enemy war criminals" to trial in a manner that is legal, reasonably expedient, and just.
There are under the Constitution three kinds of military jurisdiction: one to be exercised both in peace and war; another to be exercised in time of foreign war without the boundaries of the United States, or in time of rebellion and civil war within states or districts occupied by rebels treated as belligerents; and a third to be exercised in time of invasion or insurrection within the limits of the United States, or during rebellion within the limits of states maintaining adhesion to the National Government, when the public danger requires its exercise. The first of these may be called jurisdiction under MILITARY LAW, and is found in acts of Congress prescribing rules and articles of war, or otherwise providing for the government of the national forces; the second may be distinguished as MILITARY GOVERNMENT, superseding, as far as may be deemed expedient, the local law, and exercised by the military commander under the direction of the President, with the express or implied sanction of Congress; while the third may be denominated MARTIAL LAW PROPER, and is called into action by Congress, or temporarily, when the action of Congress cannot be invited, and in the case of justifying or excusing peril, by the President, in times of insurrection or invasion, or of civil or foreign war, within districts or localities where ordinary law no longer adequately secures public safety and private rights. Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 141-142 , 1866 U.S. LEXIS 861, ***246-247 (1866).
 Duncan v. Kahanamok, 327 U.S. 304 (1945) provides a thorough review of martial law jurisdiction. In that case, the U.S. Supreme Court reviewed the cases of two civilians, Duncan and White, who were convicted by military commissions in Hawaii in March of 1944 and August of 1942, respectively. Duncan was a shipfitter employed in the Honolulu Navy Yard convicted of assaulting two Marine sentries; White was a stockbroker convicted of embezzling stock from another civilian in Honolulu. Relying on "the so-called 'open court' rule of the Milligan case" (discussed below at V. A. 1), the Court reversed both convictions, noting that civilian courts had been open at the time, and finding that Congress had not intended to replace civilian courts with military jurisdiction under those circumstances. Duncan, 327 U.S at 324.
Shortly after Pearl Harbor was attacked in 1941, Hawaii's governor declared martial law, and authorized the Commanding General of the Military Department of Hawaii "to exercise all of the powers normally exercised by judicial officers." The district court judge who first heard the Duncan case made the following finding of fact regarding President Roosevelt's involvement in Governor Poindexter's declaration of martial law: "By radio the Governor of Hawaii on December 7, 1941, notified the President of the United States simply that he had placed the Territory under martial law and suspended the writ [of habeas corpus]. The President's approval was requested and it was granted by radio on December 8, 1941. Not until 1943 was the text of the Governor's December 7 proclamation furnished Washington officials, and it is still doubtful if it has yet been seen by the President." Duncan 327 U.S. at note 2. Pursuant to the governor’s declaration, military authorities essentially took over the government of Hawaii until martial law was revoked by President Roosevelt three years later.
 Tribunals conducted under this type of jurisdiction are fairly rare, but have been affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court. In 1952, the Court recognized that the United States Court of the Allied High Commission, established in the American Zone in Occupied Germany, had the constitutional authority to try civilian Yvette J. Madsen for the murder of her active duty husband. While denying Madsen’s habeas petition, the Court held that “as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, [the President] may, in time of war, establish and prescribe the jurisdiction and procedure of military commissions, and of tribunals in the nature of such commissions, in territory occupied by Armed Forces of the United States. His authority to do this sometimes survives cessation of hostilities.” Madsen was charged under the German Criminal Code and served her sentence at the Federal Reformatory for Women in Alderson, West Germany. Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341, 343-344, 348 (1952). Though doing so is beyond the scope of this paper, a thorough review of the full parameters of military government jurisdiction, its limitations, and the concomitant policy and cultural considerations, would be particularly timely. John W. Dower's EMBRACING DEFEAT, JAPAN IN THE WAKE OF WORLD WAR II (Norton 1999), is illustrative of the potential transformative and restorative power of military government jurisdiction. Dower himself, however, has recently cautioned against using the success of military government jurisdiction in Japan after World War II as a blueprint for achieving justice and societal change in post-Saddam Hussein Iraq. See John W. Dower, Lessons From Japan About War's Aftermath, N.Y. TIMES, October 27, 2002, at 4-13.
 Ex Parte Milligan concerned the trial of a citizen of Indiana by military commission during the Civil War. Lamdin P. Milligan was found guilty of crimes including conspiracy against the Government of the United States, affording aid and comfort to rebels against the authority of the United States, and violations of the laws of war. Specifically, Milligan, and his cohorts in a secret society known alternately as the Order of American Knights or the Sons of Liberty, were convicted of planning to seize weapons, free Confederate prisoners, and kidnap the governor of Indiana. Milligan appealed his conviction, and the Supreme Court found that the military commission lacked jurisdiction over him. Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866), 1866 U.S. LEXIS 861, at ***4 -5.
 Milligan, 71 U.S. at 121.
 Padilla v. Bush, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23086 , *79 (December 4, 2002).
 Quirin, 317 U.S. at 45, citing Milligan at 118, 121-122, and 131.
 Padilla, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23086 at *81-82.
The so-called "open court" rule of the Milligan case, to be sure, has been the subject of severe criticism, especially by military commentators. That criticism is repeated by the Government in these cases. It is said that the fact that courts are open is but one of many factors relevant to determining the necessity and hence the constitutionality of military trials of civilians. The argument is made that however adequate the "open court" rule may have been in 1628 or 1864 it is distinctly unsuited to modern warfare conditions where all of the territories of a warring nation may be in combat zones or imminently threatened with long-range attack even while civil courts are operating. Hence if a military commander, on the basis of his conception of military necessity, requires all civilians accused of crime to be tried summarily before martial law tribunals, the Bill of Rights must bow humbly to his judgment despite the unquestioned ability of the civil courts to exercise their criminal jurisdiction.
The argument thus advanced is as untenable today as it was when cast in the language of the Plantagenets, the Tudors and the Stuarts. It is a rank appeal to abandon the fate of all our liberties to the reasonableness of the judgment of those who are trained primarily for war. It seeks to justify military usurpation of civilian authority to punish crime without regard to the potency of the Bill of Rights. It deserves repudiation.
Duncan v. Kahanamok, 327 U.S. 304, 327-328 (1945).
 See e.g Orentlicher, supra, at 655-666 (arguing that the contemporary threat of international terrorism does not satisfy the stringent test for invoking martial law jurisdiction set forth in Milligan).
 Neil N. Katyal, and Lawrence H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military Tribunals, 111 YALE L.J. 1259, 1270 (2002).
 The American Bar Association Task Force on Terrorism and the Law Report and Recommendations on Military Commissions notes that the language of UCMJ Article 21 and Article of War 15 were substantially the same, and reports that Congress repeated the language specifically intending to preserve the traditional jurisdiction of military commissions over enemy combatants. See American Bar Association Task Force on Terrorism and the Law Report and Recommendations on Military Commissions, January 2, 2002, reprinted in Army Law, March 2002, at 9.
 A few commentators have also argued that in “the middle of a grave conflict with an efficient and undeterrable adversary,” the streamlined procedures of military commissions may actually be the most “practicable” course. Ruth Wedgwood, Military Commissions: Al Qaeda, Terrorism, and Military Commissions, 96 A. J. I. L. 328 (2002) (pointing out that federal court Al Qaeda trials would present problems related to national security and classified information as well as problems related to the personal security of judges and juries).
 J. Gordon Forester, Jr., and Kevin J. Barry, Military Commissions: Meeting American Standards of Justice, 49 FEDR. LAW. 28 (2002).
 See DOD Military Commission Order No. 1, Procedures for Trials by Military Commission of Certain Non-United States Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, http://www.defenselink.mil/ news/Mar2002/d20020321ord.pdf (March 21, 2002).
 “One important thing to remember [as the rules for detaining non-citizen terrorists and trying them] are set in motion is that history will judge how the United States reacts to the September 11 tragedy… The outcomes of these trials do not depend very much on what few protections we afford the accused. Our place in history does.” Morrow, supra, at 20.
 The current language of Article 18 of the UCMJ was first enacted in the 1916 Articles of War.

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