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Timestamp: 2019-04-23 07:02:12+00:00

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[ Footnote * ] Together with Nos. 72-35 and A-24, Keane et al. v. National Democratic Party et al., on petition for writ of certiorari and on application for stay to the same court.
On July 3, 1972, delegates from California and Illinois brought suits in District Court contesting their unseating, recommended by the Democratic Party's Credentials Committee, in the 1972 Democratic National Convention, scheduled to convene July 10. The District Court dismissed both actions. On July 5, the Court of Appeals reversed both decisions, granting relief to the California delegates, and denying relief to the Illinois delegates. Held: In view of the probability that the Court of Appeals erred in deciding the cases on the merits and in view of the traditional right of a political convention to review and act upon the recommendations of a Credentials Committee, the judgments of the Court of Appeals must be stayed. The important constitutional issues cannot be resolved within the limited time available, and no action is now taken on the petitions for certiorari.
In No. 72-35, the Credentials Committee recommended unseating 59 uncommitted delegates from Illinois on the ground, among others, that they had been elected in violation of the "slate-making" guideline adopted by the Democratic Party in 1971. A complaint challenging the Credentials Committee action was dismissed by the District Court. The Court of Appeals on review rejected the contentions of the unseated delegates that the action of the Committee violated their rights under the Constitution of the United States.
In No. 72-34, the Credentials Committee recommended unseating 151 of 271 delegates from California committed by California law to Senator George McGovern under that State's "winner-take-all" primary system. The Committee concluded that the winner-take-all system violated the mandate of the 1968 Democratic National Convention calling for reform in the party delegate selection process, even though such primaries had not been explicitly prohibited by the rules adopted by the party in 1971 to implement that mandate. A complaint challenging the Credentials Committee action was dismissed by the District Court. On review the Court of Appeals concluded that the action of the Credentials Committee in this case violated the Constitution of the United States.
We must also consider the absence of authority supporting the action of the Court of Appeals in intervening in the internal determinations of a national political party, on the eve of its convention, regarding the seating of delegates. 1 No case is cited to us in which any federal court has undertaken to interject itself into the deliberative processes of a national political convention; no holding of this Court up to now gives support for judicial intervention in the circumstances presented here, involving as they do relationships of great delicacy that are essentially political in nature. Cf. Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1 (1849). Judicial intervention in this area traditionally has been approached with great caution and restraint. See Irish v. Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party of Minnesota, 399 F.2d 119 (CA8 1968), affirming 287 F. Supp. 794 (Minn. 1968), and cases cited; Lynch v. Torquato, 343 F.2d 370 (CA3 1965); Smith v. State Exec. Comm. of Dem. Party of Ga., 288 F. Supp. 371 (ND Ga. 1968). Cf. Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214 (1952). It has been understood since our national political parties first came into being as voluntary associations of individuals that the convention itself is the proper forum for determining intra-party disputes as to which delegates shall be seated. Thus, these cases involve claims of the power of the federal judiciary to review actions heretofore thought to lie in the control of political parties. Highly important questions are presented concerning justiciability, whether the action of the Credentials Committee is state action and, if so, the reach of the Due Process Clause in this unique context. Vital rights of association guaranteed by the Constitution are also involved. While the Court is unwilling to undertake [409 U.S. 1, 5] final resolution of the important constitutional questions presented without full briefing and argument and adequate opportunity for deliberation, we entertain grave doubts as to the action taken by the Court of Appeals.
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN is of the view that in the limited time available the Court cannot give these difficult and important questions consideration adequate for [409 U.S. 1, 6] their proper resolution. He therefore concurs in the grant of the stays pending action by the Court on the petitions for certiorari.
[ Footnote 1 ] This is not a case in which claims are made that injury arises from invidious discrimination based on race in a primary contest within a single State. Cf. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
[ Footnote 2 ] Argument was had and the case decided in the District Court on July 3; the Court of Appeals entered its judgment July 5. Papers were filed here July 6.
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia denied both sets of plaintiffs relief on the ground that there was no justiciable question before it. 6 The United States Court of Appeals reversed the District Court and held that the questions presented in both suits were justiciable. It unanimously rejected the challenge made by the Illinois delegates, and by a 2-1 vote upheld the claim of the delegates from California that the belated change in the rules constituted a denial of due process of law.
The losing parties in the Court of Appeals seek review, and today this Court grants partial relief in the form of a stay of the judgments of the Court of Appeals. The Court holds, in effect, that even if the District [409 U.S. 1, 9] Court was incorrect in ruling that the issues before it were "political questions" not properly justiciable in a court of law, the posture and timing of these cases require that federal courts defer to the Democratic National Convention for resolution of the underlying disputes. I cannot agree.
Should this Court, or a lower federal court, be compelled to wait until the national convention makes a final decision on whether it will seat the delegates excluded by the Credentials Committee, it may never again be practicable to consider the important constitutional issues presented. Once the convention rules, we will [409 U.S. 1, 10] be faced with the Hobson's choice between refusing to hear the federal questions at all, or hearing them and possibly stopping the Democratic convention in mid-stream. This would be a far more serious intrusion into the democratic process than any we are asked to make at this time.
If we wait even longer - until the national convention is over - and ultimately sustain the delegates' claims on the merits, we would have no choice but to declare the convention null and void and to require that it be repeated. The dispute in these cases concerns the right to participate in the machinery to elect the President of the United States. If participation is denied, there is no possible way for the underlying disputes to become moot. The drastic remedy that delay might require should be avoided at all costs.
It is, therefore, obvious to me that now is the time for us to act. It is significant in this regard that the delegates request declaratory, as well as injunctive, relief. A declaratory judgment is a milder remedy than an injunction, cf. Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 111 (1971) (BRENNAN, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). It is a particularly appropriate remedy under these circumstances, because it can protect any constitutional rights that may be threatened at the same time that the premature issuance of an injunction is avoided. Hence, I believe that we should consider the prayer for declaratory relief and that we should do so now.
"The objection that the subject matter of the suit is political is little more than a play upon words. Of course the petition concerns political action but it alleges and seeks to recover for private damage. That private damage may be caused by such political action and may be recovered for in a suit at law hardly has been doubted for over two hundred years, since Ashby v. White, 2 Ld. Raym. 938, 3 id. 320, and has been recognized by this Court. Wiley v. Sinkler, 179 U.S. 58, 64 , 65. Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475, 485 . See also Judicial Code, 24 (11), (12), (14). Act of March 3, 1911, c. 231; 36 Stat. 1087, 1092. If the defendants' conduct was a wrong to the plaintiff the same reasons that allow a recovery for denying the plaintiff a vote at a final election allow it for denying a vote at the primary election that may determine the final result." Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 540 (1927).
The doctrine of "political questions" was fashioned to deal with a very different problem, which has nothing to do with this case. As the Court said in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), the basic characteristic of a political question is that its resolution would lead a court into conflict with one or more of the coordinate branches of government; courts decline to decide political questions out of deference to the separation of powers. 369 U.S., at 217 ; see Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 518 -549 (1969). Neither the Executive nor the [409 U.S. 1, 12] Legislative Branch of Government purports to have jurisdiction over the claims asserted in these cases. Apart from the judicial forum, only one other forum has been suggested - the full convention of the National Democratic Party - and that is most assuredly not a coordinate branch of government to which the federal courts owe deference within the meaning of the separation of powers or the political-question doctrine.
Moreover, it cannot be said that "judicially manageable standards" are lacking for the determinations required by these cases, 369 U.S., at 217 . The Illinois challenge requires the Court to determine whether certain rules adopted by the National Party for the selection of delegates violate the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of Illinois voters and, if the rules are valid, whether they were correctly applied to the facts of the case. The California challenge requires the Court to determine whether the votes of party members were counted in accordance with the rules announced prior to the election and, if not, whether a change in the rules after the election violates the constitutional rights of the voters or the candidates. Both these determinations are well within the range of questions regularly presented to courts for decision, and capable of judicial resolution.
A second threshold objection, however, has been raised as an obstacle to judicial determination of these claims. Even if the actions of a political party are not inherently nonjusticiable, it is suggested that the Constitution places few, if any, restrictions on the actions of a political party, and none of those restrictions are even arguably implicated by any of the allegations here. On this view, then, the plaintiffs below failed to state a claim on which relief can be granted. I disagree.
1. First, I agree with the Court of Appeals that the action of the Party in these cases was governmental [409 U.S. 1, 13] action, and therefore subject to the requirements of due process. The primary election was, by state law, the first step in a process designed to select a Democratic candidate for President; the State will include electors pledged to that candidate on the ballot in the general election. The State is intertwined in the process at every step, not only authorizing the primary but conducting it, and adopting its result for use in the general election. In these circumstances, the primary must be regarded as an integral part of the general election, see United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941), quoted infra, at 15-16, and the rules that regulate the primary must be held to the standards of elementary due process.
It is suggested that California, at least, cannot be charged with responsibility for the rules that are challenged here, because California by law sought (albeit unsuccessfully) to prohibit the Party from adopting those rules. That argument is somewhat disingenuous, however, unless it can seriously be contended that California will decline to recognize on its ballot in the general election the nominee of the Democratic convention. For so long as the State recognizes and adopts the fruits of the primary as it was actually conducted, then the State has made that primary an integral part of the election process, and infused the primary with state action, no matter how vociferously it may protest. A State cannot render the action of officials "private" and strip it of its character as state action, merely by disapproving that action. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172 -187 (1961).
Thus, when the Party deprived the candidates of their status as delegates, it was obliged to do so in a manner consistent with the demands of due process. Because the Court does not reach the question, I likewise refrain from expressing my views on the merits of the due process challenge in either case. It is sufficient to say that beyond all [409 U.S. 1, 14] doubt, these claimants are entitled to a judicial resolution of their claim.
It is, of course, well established that the Constitution protects the right to vote in federal or state elections without impairment on the basis of race or color, Const. Amdt. XV, or on the basis of any other invidious classification, e. g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972). With respect to federal elections, however, the right to vote enjoys a broader constitutional protection. In Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970), Mr. Justice Black cited a long line of precedents for the proposition that Congress has ultimate supervisory power over all congressional elections, based on Art. I, 4, of the Constitution. E. g., Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1880); Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884); United States v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383 (1915); United States v. Classic, supra. On the basis of these precedents, it is beyond [409 U.S. 1, 15] dispute that the right to vote in congressional elections is a federally secured right.
Mr. Justice Black went on to argue that presidential elections have the same constitutional status: "It cannot be seriously contended that Congress has less power over the conduct of presidential elections than it has over congressional elections." 400 U.S., at 124 . To support this conclusion, he relied on Art. II, 1, and its judicial interpretation in Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534 (1934), and also on "the very concept of a supreme national government with national officers." 400 U.S., at 124 n. 7. On the basis of Oregon v. Mitchell, then, in which Mr. Justice Black's analysis was decisive, the right to vote in national elections, both congressional and presidential, is secured by the Federal Constitution.
Moreover, federal protection of the right to vote in federal elections extends not only to the general election, but to the primary election as well. In United States v. Classic, supra, this Court sustained an indictment charging a conspiracy "to injure and oppress citizens in the free exercise and enjoyment of rights and privileges secured to them by the Constitution and Laws of the United States, namely, (1) the right of qualified voters who cast their ballots in the primary election to have their ballots counted as cast for the candidate of their choice, and (2) the right of the candidates to run for the office of Congressman and to have the votes in favor of their nomination counted as cast." Id., at 308. It was critical to the decision to hold, first, that the Constitution protects the right to vote in federal congressional elections, and, second, that the right to vote in the general election includes the right to vote in the primary.
"Where the state law has made the primary an integral part of the procedure of choice, or where in fact the primary effectively controls the choice, the [409 U.S. 1, 16] right of the elector to have his ballot counted at the primary is likewise included in the right protected by Article I, 2. And this right of participation is protected just as is the right to vote at the election, where the primary is by law made an integral part of the election machinery, whether the voter exercises his right in a party primary which invariably, sometimes or never determines the ultimate choice of the representative." Id., at 318.
That reasoning has equal force in the case of a presidential election. Where the primary is by law made an integral part of the election machinery, then the right to vote at that primary is protected just as is the right to vote at the election. In the cases before this Court, it is claimed that the presidential primary is an integral part of the election machinery, and that the right to vote in the presidential primary has been impaired. That claim should be heard and decided on its merits, certainly not by the use of the stay mechanism in lieu of granting certiorari and plenary consideration.
It is unfortunate that cases like these must be decided quickly or not at all, but sometimes that cannot be avoided. Where there are no substantial facts in dispute, and where the allegation is made that a right as fundamental as the right to participate in the process leading to the election of the President of the United States is threatened, I believe that our duty lies in making decisions, not avoiding them.
[ Footnote 1 ] While the delegates couch their arguments in various ways, all of the arguments boil down to these two: i. e., they have been denied due process and the voters who elected them have been denied an opportunity to vote for the candidate or delegate of their choice.
[ Footnote 2 ] This approval was given in the form of a written communication from the Commission on Party Structure and Delegate Selection to the Democratic National Committeeman from California.
[ Footnote 3 ] A hearing officer found merit in the delegates' claims, but he was reversed by the Credentials Committee.
[ Footnote 4 ] Report of Hearing Officer 2, adopted by Credentials Committee, June 30, 1972.
[ Footnote 5 ] See Report of Hearing Officer 3-4.
[ Footnote 6 ] The District Court Judge indicated that, in his view, a quota system would raise serious constitutional questions. Two judges of the Court of Appeals found that the rules did not require any quotas. Judge MacKinnon disagreed, believing that the rules did establish a quota and that they were, therefore, unconstitutional.

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