Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/277/274/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 10:26:28+00:00

Document:
1. The doubt of the plaintiff's right, arising only on the face of the leases by which it derived title, was not in legal contemplation a cloud, and a bill to remove it as such would not lie. P. 277 U. S. 288.
2. Relief by declaratory judgment is beyond the jurisdiction of the federal judiciary. P. 277 U. S. 289.
3. The proceeding was not a case or controversy within the meaning of Art. III of the Constitution, since no defendant had wronged or threatened to wrong the plaintiff and no cause of action arose from the thwarting of the plaintiff's plan by its own doubts or by the fears of others. Id.
4. A removed proceeding which is not a suit within the meaning of Jud.Code § 28 must be remanded by the federal court even though the remedy sought may be one conferred by state law or statute. P. 290.
Certiorari, 275 U.S. 519, to a decree of the circuit court of appeals, which reversed a decree of the district court, 8 F.2d 998, dismissing the bill of the Auditorium Association. The suit was said to be in the nature of a suit to remove a cloud from title, and was begun originally in the state court.
"for want of equity jurisdiction in the court to grant any relief upon the pleadings and the evidence, but without prejudice to whatever rights the plaintiff may have . . . when asserted in any appropriate proceeding or otherwise."
The circuit court of appeals held that the suit was cognizable in a court of equity as one to remove a cloud upon title, and it reversed the decree, with direction to the district court to hear the evidence and determine the issues involved. 20 F.2d 837. This Court granted a writ of certiorari. 275 U.S. 579. Motions by Willing and others to remand the cause to the state court had been made in the district court on the ground that the controversy involved was single and entire as to all the defendants. The motions, which that court denied, were renewed in the circuit court of appeals, and again denied. We have no occasion to consider whether the alleged controversy was separable, for we are of opinion that the proceeding does not present a case or controversy within the range of judicial decision, as defined in Article III of the federal Constitution.
for any and all purposes of profit. To this end, the association became, in 1887, the ground lessee of five adjacent parcels of land for the term of 99 years under five separate, substantially similar indentures. Three of the leases were later extended to the year 2085. On this land, the association built, before 1889, the single monumental structure now standing, known as the Auditorium Building, which contains, besides the auditorium, a recital hall, studios, a hotel, and many business offices. The cost of construction and maintenance was defrayed by stock issues aggregating $2,000,000, and by issues of bonds of which $1,375,000 are outstanding.
The building is now in fairly good condition, and continues to serve well the purposes for which it was constructed. The payments of rent and interest have been made regularly. Thus, neither the public, the landlords, nor the bondholders have cause for dissatisfaction. But, for the stockholders, the investment has never been financially remunerative. In 40 years, only one dividend has been paid, and that was 1 1/2 percent. Considered as a financial investment, the building is now obsolete in design, and it is incapable of alteration without unjustifiable expense. The highest and best use of the property for the financial gain of the tenant would now be the replacement of this structure by a modern one adapted for business. The association desires to erect a large modern commercial building of greatly increased height, the cost of which may be as much as $15,000,000. Appropriate changes in its charter powers have been made. Recently some of the stock has been acquired by the president of the corporation at a small fraction of its par value.
"keep the building situated upon said demised premises . . . in good repair, and in a safe and secure condition, . . . and all rooms in said building in a good, safe, clean and tenantable condition and repair during the entire term of this lease;"
that the tenant shall rebuild or repair the building, in event of damage or destruction by fire, upon the same plan as was followed in the original structure, or upon such other plans as are approved by the lessors, and that the landlords shall pay the tenant the appraised value of the improvements at the end of the term.
passed without further occurrence. Then the suit at bar was begun against all the lessors and the trustee for the bondholders.
"under the proper construction and interpretation of the terms, covenants, and conditions of said several leases, your orator is fully empowered and has the right to tear down and remove the present improvement as a part of and incidental to the erection of a new improvement of equal or greater value, not impairing in any way the security and property right of the said lessors or their successors and assigns, upon furnishing proper and adequate security during the removal of the present improvement and until the completion of the new improvement; but the defendants hereinafter named, or some of them, nevertheless claim and assert, and by reason of such claim and assertion certain persons with whom your orator is obliged to deal in the financing of its aforesaid plans are fearful, that the present building cannot be removed without a violation of the terms, covenants, and conditions of said leases. . . . The aforesaid claims, fears, and uncertainties respecting the rights of the parties to said leases, based upon the terms, covenants, and conditions of the leases of said property, have greatly impaired the value of the leasehold interests of your orator, and have made them unmarketable, and have prevented your orator from exercising its rights with respect to said leasehold interests so as to secure therefrom the highest and best use of its interest in the land, and the terms, covenants, and conditions of the said leases, insofar as they give color to said claims, fears, and uncertainties, are clouds upon the title of your orator, for the removal of and relief against which your orator has no adequate remedy in a court of law."
effect of the terms, covenants, and conditions of the aforesaid leases, and will fully quiet and establish the title of your orator to the said leasehold properties with full right on the part of your orator to tear down and remove any and all buildings which for the time being may be upon said premises, upon giving proper security, . . . and that said defendants may also be restrained and enjoined from taking any steps to prevent your orators from tearing down or removing the present building. . . ."
There is not in the bill, or in the evidence, even a suggestion that any of the defendants had ever done anything which hampered the full enjoyment of the present use and occupancy of the demises premises authorized by the leases. There was neither hostile act nor a threat. There is no evidence of a claim of any kind made by any defendant, except the expression by Willing, in an amicable, private conversation, of an opinion on a question of law. Then, he merely declined orally to concur in the opinion of the association that it has the right asserted. For that or for some other reason, several of the defendants had refused to further the association's project. Other defendants had neither done nor said anything about the matter to anyone, so far as appears. Indeed, several refrained, even in their answers, from expressing any opinion as to the legal rights of the parties.
which the association complains cannot be remedied by an action at law. But it does not follow that the association may have relief in equity in a federal court. What the plaintiff seeks is simply a declaratory judgment. To grant that relief is beyond the power conferred upon the federal judiciary. Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Grannis, 273 U. S. 70, 273 U. S. 74. Compare Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Burely Tobacco Growers' Assn., 276 U. S. 71. The statement made at the bar that Blair v. Chicago, 201 U. S. 400, 201 U. S. 450, supports the jurisdiction is unfounded.
fears of others, does not confer a cause of action. No defendant has wronged the plaintiff or has threatened to do so. Resort to equity to remove such doubts is a proceeding which was unknown to either English or American courts at the time of the adoption of the Constitution and for more than half a century thereafter. Cross v. De Valle, 1 Wall. 5, 68 U. S. 14-16. Compare Jackson v. Turnley, 1 Drew. 617, 627; Rooke v. Lord Kensington, 2 K. & J. 753, 760; Lady Langdale v. Briggs, 8 De G., M. & G. 391, 427.
As the proceeding is not a suit within the meaning of § 28 of the Judicial Code, the motions to remand the cause to the state court should have been granted. Stewart v. Virginia, 117 U. S. 612; Upshur County v. Rich, 135 U. S. 467; Pacific Live Stock Co. v. Oregon Water Board, 241 U. S. 440, 241 U. S. 447. Whether, as the respondent contends, it has a remedy under the law of Illinois we have no occasion to consider. Fulwiler v. McClun, 285 Ill. 174. Compare McCarty v. McCarty, 275 Ill. 573; Greenough v. Greenough, 284 Ill. 416; Devine v. Los Angeles, 202 U. S. 313, 202 U. S. 334-335. Even a statute of the state could not confer a remedial right to proceed in equity in a federal court in a suit of this character. Pusey & Jones Co. v. Hanessen, 261 U. S. 491.
Court is without constitutional power to review such judgments of state courts when they involve a federal question. Compare Fidelity National Bank & Trust Co. v. Swope, 274 U. S. 123, 274 U. S. 130-134. "It is not the habit of the Court to decide questions of a constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the case." Burton v. United States, 196 U. S. 283, 196 U. S. 295. See Blair v. United States, 250 U. S. 273, 250 U. S. 279; Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U. S. 107, 220 U. S. 177; Light v. United States, 220 U. S. 523, 220 U. S. 538. There is certainly no "case or controversy" before us requiring an opinion on the power of Congress to incorporate the declaratory judgment into out federal jurisprudence. And the determination now made seems to me very similar itself to a declaratory judgment to the effect that we could not constitutionally be authorized to give such judgments -- but is, in addition, prospective, unasked, and unauthorized under any statute.

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