Source: http://supreme.nolo.com/us/210/281/case.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 05:50:41+00:00

Document:
Each state may, subject to restriction of the federal Constitution, determine the limit of the jurisdiction of its courts, and the decision of the highest court sustaining jurisdiction although the cause of action arose outside the border of the state is final, and does not present a federal question.
The provision in § 5 of the Safety Appliance Act of March 2, 1893, 27 Stat. 531, referring it to the American Railway Association and the Interstate Commerce Commission to designate and promulgate the standard height and maximum variation of drawbars for freight cars is not unconstitutional as a delegation of legislative power. Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U. S. 470.
Under the Safety Appliance Act of 1893, 27 Stat. 531, the center of the drawbars of freight cars used on standard gauges shall be, when the cars are empty, thirty-four and a half inches above the rails, and the statute permits, when a car is loaded or partly loaded, a maximum variation in the height downwards of three inches. The statute does not require that the variation shall be proportioned to the load, or that a fully loaded car shall exhaust the entire variation.
An instruction that, under the statute, the drawbars of fully loaded freight cars must be of a uniform height of thirty-one and a half inches and that a variation between two loaded cars' constitutes negligence under the statute is prejudicial error.
Although the constitutional grant of power to this Court to review judgements of the state courts may be wider than the statutory grant in 709, Rev.Stat., the jurisdiction of the court extends only to the cases enumerated in that section.
The denial by the state court to give to a federal statute the construction insisted upon by a party which would lead to a judgment in his favor is a denial of a right or immunity under the laws of the United States and presents a federal question reviewable by this Court under § 709, Rev.Stat.
It is only by reviewing in this Court the construction given by the state courts to federal statutes that a uniform construction of such statutes throughout all the states can be secured.
interstate carriers an absolute duty, and the common law rule of reasonable care is not a defense where, in point of fact, the cars used were not equipped with appliances complying with the standards established by the act.
The courts have no responsibility for the justice or wisdom of legislation. They must enforce the statute, unless clearly unconstitutional, as it is written, and when Congress has prescribed by statute a duty upon a carrier, the courts cannot avoid a true construction thereof simply because such construction is a harsh one.
pleadings, there was a verdict for the plaintiff, which was affirmed in a majority opinion by the supreme court of the state. The judgment of that court is brought here for reexamination by writ of error. The writ sets forth many assignments of error, but, of them, four only were relied upon in argument here, and they alone need be stated and considered. It is not and cannot be disputed that the questions raised by the errors assigned were seasonably and properly made in the court below, so as to give this Court jurisdiction to consider them; so no time need be spent on that. But the defendant in error insists that the questions themselves, though properly here in form, are not federal questions -- that is to say, not questions which we, by law, are authorized to consider on a writ of error to a state court. For that reason, it is contended that the writ should be dismissed. That contention we will consider with each question as it is discussed.
The accident by which the plaintiff's intestate lost his life occurred in the Indian territory, where, contrary to the doctrine of the common law, a right of action for death exists. The cause of action arose under the laws of the territory, and was enforced in the courts of Arkansas. The plaintiff in error contends that, of such a cause, triable as it was in the courts of the territory created by Congress, the courts of Arkansas have no jurisdiction. This contention does not present a federal question. Each state may, subject to the restrictions of the federal Constitution, determine the limits of the jurisdiction of its courts, the character of the controversies which shall be heard in them, and, specifically, how far it will, having jurisdiction of the parties, entertain in its courts transitory actions where the cause of action has arisen outside its borders. Chambers v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 207 U. S. 142. We have therefore no authority to review the decision of the state court so far as it holds that there was jurisdiction to hear and determine this case. On that question, the decision of that court is final.
"Within ninety days from the passage of this act, the American Railway Association is authorized hereby to designate to the Interstate Commerce Commission the standard height of drawbars for freight cars, measured perpendicular from the level of the tops of the rails to the centers of the drawbars, for each of the several gauges of railroads in use in the United States, and shall fix a maximum variation from such standard height to be allowed between the drawbars of empty and loaded cars. Upon their determination's being certified to the Interstate Commerce Commission, said Commission shall at once give notice of the standard fixed upon to all common carriers, owners, or lessees engaged in interstate commerce in the United States by such means as the Commission may deem proper. But, should such association fail to determine a standard as above provided, it shall be the duty of the Interstate Commerce Commission to do so before July first, eighteen hundred and ninety-four, and immediately to give notice thereof as aforesaid. And after July first, eighteen hundred and ninety-five, no cars, either loaded or unloaded, shall be used in interstate traffic which do not comply with the standard above provided for."
"Resolved, that the standard height of drawbars for freight cars, measured perpendicular from the level of the tops of the rails to the centers of the drawbars, for standard-gauge railroads in the United States, shall be thirty-four and one-half inches, and the maximum variation from such standard heights to be allowed between the drawbars of empty and loaded cars shall be three inches. "
"Resolved, that the standard height of drawbars for freight cars, measured perpendicular from the level of the tops of the rails to the centers of the drawbars, for the narrow-gauge railroads in the United States, shall be twenty-six inches, and the maximum variation from such standard height to be allowed between the drawbars of empty and loaded cars shall be three inches."
It is contended that there is here an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the railway association and to the Interstate Commerce Commission. This is clearly a federal question. Briefly stated, the statute enacted that, after a date named, only cars with drawbars of uniform height should be used in interstate commerce, and that the standard should be fixed by the association and declared by the Commission . Nothing need be said upon this question except that it was settled adversely to the contention of the plaintiff in error in Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U. S. 470 -- a case which, in principle, is completely in point. And see Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U. S. 364, where the cases were reviewed.
that the two cars between which Taylor lost his life should be, when unloaded, of the equal and uniform height, from the level of the face of the rails to the center of the drawbars, of thirty-four and one-half inches, and when loaded to the full capacity, should be of the uniform height of thirty-one and one-half inches. Now if the plaintiff, by a preponderance of the evidence, shows a violation of this duty on part of defendant, then this is negligence and if the proof by a preponderance also shows that this caused or contributed to the death of Taylor, then you should find for the plaintiff, unless it appears by a preponderance of the evidence that Taylor was wanting in ordinary care for his own safety, and that this want of care on Taylor's part for his own safety caused or contributed to the injury and death sued for, in which latter case you should find for the defendant."
"2. If there was the difference between the height of the center of the drawbars in the two cars in question, as indicated in the first instruction, then the question arises whether this difference caused or contributed to the injury and death of Taylor sued for. On that point, if such difference existed, and, but for its existence, the injury and death of Taylor would not have happened, then such difference is said in law to be an efficient proximate cause of Taylor's injury and death, although it may be true that other causes may have cooperated with this one in producing the injury and death of Taylor, and but for these other cooperating causes the injury and death of Taylor would not have ensued. But if such difference in height of the center of the drawbars as aforesaid actually existed, yet if the injury and death of Taylor would have ensued just the same as it did without the existence of such difference in height of the center of the drawbars, then such difference in the height of the center of the drawbars is not in law an efficient proximate cause of the injury and death of Taylor."
"that, when one car is fully loaded and another car in the same train is only partially loaded, the law allows a variation of full three inches between the center of the drawbars of such cars, without regard to the amount of weight in the partially loaded car."
"The court charges you that the act of Congress allows a variation in height of three inches between the centers of the drawbars of all cars used in interstate commerce, regardless of whether they are loaded or empty, the measurement of such height to be made perpendicularly from the top of the rail to the center of the drawbar shank or draft line,"
contained an erroneous expression of the law, and was correctly refused. It is based upon the theory that the height of the drawbars of unloaded cars may vary three inches, while the act, as we have said, requires that the height of the drawbars of unloaded cars shall be uniform.
decision of those federal questions which are set forth in § 709 of the Revised Statutes, and it is strenuously urged that the error in this part of the case was not in the decision of any such federal question. That position we proceed to examine.
"They [the words of the Constitution] give to the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction in all cases arising under the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States. The words are broad enough to comprehend all cases of this description, in whatever court they may be decided;"
"A case in law or equity consists of the right of the one party, as well as of the other, and may truly be said to arise under the Constitution or a law of the United States, whenever its correct decision depends on the construction of either."
or immunity is claimed under . . . any . . . statute of . . . the United States, and the decision is against the title, right, privilege, or immunity specially set up or claimed . . . under such . . . statute."
There can be no doubt that the claim made here was specifically set up, claimed, and denied in the state courts. The question therefore, precisely stated, is whether it was a claim of a right or immunity under a statute of the United States. Recent decisions of this Court remove all doubt from the answer to this question. McCormick v. Market Bank, 165 U. S. 538; California Bank v. Kennedy, 167 U. S. 362; San Jose Land and Water Co. v. San Jose Ranch Co., 189 U. S. 177; Nutt v. Knut, 200 U. S. 12; Rector v. City Deposit Bank, 200 U. S. 405; Illinois Central Railroad v. McKendree, 203 U. S. 514; Eau Claire National Bank v. Jackman, 204 U. S. 522; Hammond v. Whittredge, 204 U. S. 538. The principles to be derived from the cases are these: where a party to litigation in a state court insists, by way of objection to or requests for instructions, upon a construction of a statute of the United States which will lead, or, on possible findings of fact from the evidence may lead, to a judgment in his favor, and his claim in this respect, being duly set up, is denied by the highest court of the state, then the question thus raised may be reviewed in this Court. The plain reason is that, in all such cases, he has claimed in the state court a right or immunity under a law of the United States and it has been denied to him. Jurisdiction so clearly warranted by the Constitution and so explicitly conferred by the act of Congress needs no justification. But it may not be out of place to say that in no other manner can a uniform construction of the statute laws of the United States be secured, so that they shall have the same meaning and effect in all the states of the Union.
construction of the act which warranted on the evidence a judgment in its favor. The denials of its claims were decisions of federal questions reviewable here.

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