Source: http://www.courtswv.gov/supreme-court/docs/spring2001/28243.htm
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 22:26:26+00:00

Document:
Opinion, Case No.28243 Chester Nutter & Alma Nutter v. Owens-Illinois, Inc.
Kenneth P. Hicks, Esq. David K. Hendrickson, Esq.
Huntington, West Virginia Robert A. Flaugher, Esq.
Donald R. Capper, Esq. Barbara A. Allen, Esq.
Proctorville, Ohio Hendrickson & Long, P.L.L.C.
1. A plaintiff may establish 'deliberate intention' in a civil action against an employer for a work-related injury by offering evidence to prove the five specific requirements provided in W.Va. Code § 23-4-2(c)(2)(ii) (1983). Syllabus Point 2, Mayles v. Shoney's, Inc., 185 W.Va. 88, 405 S.E.2d 15 (1990).
2. To establish that an employer has acted with deliberate intention, no higher burden of proof exists beyond those five requirements set forth in W.Va. Code, 23-4- 2(c)(2)(ii) . Under the statute, whether an employer has a subjective realization and appreciation of an unsafe working condition and its attendant risks, and whether the employer intentionally exposed an employee to the hazards created by the working condition, requires an interpretation of the employer's state of mind, and must ordinarily be shown by circumstantial evidence, from which conflicting inferences may often reasonably be drawn. Accordingly, while a plaintiff may choose to introduce evidence of prior similar incidents or complaints to circumstantially establish that an employer has acted with deliberate intention, evidence of prior similar incidents or complaints is not mandated by W.Va. Code, 23-4-2(c)(2)(ii) .
In this appeal from the Circuit Court of Cabell County, we are asked to consider whether the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment to an employer in a deliberate intention action brought pursuant to W.Va. Code, 23-4-2(c)(2)(ii) See footnote 1 1 . After careful examination of the record, the briefs of the parties, and all other matters of record, we find that genuine questions of material fact exist regarding whether the plaintiff- employee's damages are a result of the defendant-employer's violation of the aforementioned statute. As set forth below, we reverse the circuit court's summary judgment order and remand the case for further proceedings.
Owens-Illinois, Inc., the defendant below and appellee, operated a glass- making plant in Huntington, West Virginia. Owens-Illinois would often perform safety inspections of its plant. Some of these inspections would include testing for levels of carbon monoxide around equipment with combustion engines, such as forklifts operating on the loading docks.
The plaintiff asserts that regulations imposed by the U. S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration establish a maximum safe limit of 35 parts per million (ppm) of carbon monoxide. In April 1992, a safety inspection of the Owens-Illinois plant by an outside inspector found that carbon monoxide levels were reaching 17 to 19 parts per million in a conference room that was adjacent to a loading dock. The safety inspector wrote a report indicating that the source of the carbon monoxide is the tractors and lifts used on the nearby loading dock, and that the carbon monoxide was being drawn into the room through a fresh air duct on the dock.
To correct the carbon monoxide problem, the safety inspector recommended that the plant conduct exhaust gas tests on the forklifts and tractors to insure that minimum carbon monoxide levels are produced. The safety inspector further recommended that an analyzer be purchased so that the plant could conduct routine checks of levels of carbon monoxide, and ensure that its equipment was calibrated to produce a minimum level of carbon monoxide.
For a second time, the safety inspector recommended that the plant acquire a carbon monoxide analyzer for proper adjusting of the powered equipment. The record indicates that Owens-Illinois never purchased the carbon monoxide analyzer, and never adjusted the equipment to reduce carbon monoxide output.
The plaintiff below and appellee, Chester Nutter, was employed by Owens- Illinois as a maintenance carpenter. On April 27, 1993, the plaintiff, along with several other Owens-Illinois employees, was performing renovations to an interior area of the plant known as the old cafeteria. Doors to the area were removed, and in their place plastic sheets were hung from the ceiling to seal off the area and prevent dust from entering other areas of the plant. To perform work, three machines with combustion engines were used in the renovations. A forklift was used to assist with knocking down walls; a bobcat was used to pick up and move bricks and debris; and a tractor with a cullet wagon was used to haul debris to another location.
During the morning of April 27, the plaintiff was removing the suspended ceiling of the old cafeteria. A basket was secured to the forklift, and the plaintiff was lifted in the basket to a height where he could remove an area of ceiling tile. The forklift would then be driven to different areas in the room to remove other areas of ceiling tile. Throughout the morning, the engine of the forklift was turned on and off intermittently.
Other employees used the basket affixed to the forklift to remove duct work from the ceiling. It appears that the engines of the bobcat and tractor were also turned on and off throughout the morning as they were used in the old cafeteria.
During his lunch break on April 27, the plaintiff became ill, complaining of a severe headache and nausea. The plaintiff was taken to a local hospital where a blood test revealed he had been exposed to high levels of carbon monoxide. While a normal carboxyhemoglobin test will show levels near zero, a test of the plaintiff's blood showed a carboxyhemoglobin level of 21%. The plaintiff now contends that as a result of his exposure to carbon monoxide, he has permanent injuries including continuous and uncontrollable shaking.
In an order dated November 22, 1999, the circuit court granted summary judgment to Owens-Illinois and dismissed the plaintiff's claims. The circuit court found that the plaintiff was the only employee who reported feeling ill on the day of the accident, and that no other employees working in the old cafeteria had complained about carbon monoxide or other fumes to Owens-Illinois. The circuit court also found no other employees of Owens- Illinois had ever reported suffering illness after being exposed to carbon monoxide.See footnote 5 5 The circuit court therefore ruled that Owens-Illinois did not realize or appreciate the existence of dangerous levels of carbon monoxide in the old cafeteria, as required by W.Va. Code, 23-4-2(c)(2)(ii)(B), and further could not have intentionally and knowingly exposed the plaintiff to the carbon monoxide, as required by W.Va. Code, 23-4-2(c)(2)(ii)(D).
The plaintiff now appeals the circuit court's summary judgment order.
A motion for summary judgment should be granted only when it is clear that there is no genuine issue of fact to be tried and inquiry concerning the facts is not desirable to clarify the application of the law.
In the instant case, the parties appear to agree that genuine issues of fact exist concerning whether a specific unsafe working condition existed at the Owens-Illinois plant when the plaintiff was allegedly injured. See W.Va. Code, 23-4-2(c)(2)(ii)(A). The working condition at issue is whether the engines of the powered equipment used by Owens-Illinois -- such as the forklifts -- were improperly adjusted and produced excessive levels of carbon monoxide, particularly when used in an enclosed area. The existence of a specific unsafe working condition alone, however, is insufficient to support a deliberate intention cause of action.
To be held liable under the deliberate intention statute, W.Va. Code, 23-4- 2(c)(2)(ii)(B) requires that an employer have both a subjective realization and an appreciation of the existence of such specific unsafe working condition and of the high degree of risk and the strong possibility of serious injury or death presented by such specific unsafe working condition. This requirement is not satisfied merely by evidence that the employer reasonably should have known of the specific unsafe working condition and of the strong probability of serious injury or death presented by that condition. Instead, it must be shown that the employer actually possessed such knowledge. Syllabus Point 3, in part, Blevins v. Beckley Magnetite, Inc., 185 W.Va. 633, 408 S.E.2d 385 (1991).
The plaintiff argues that the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment because genuine issues of fact exist regarding whether defendant Owens-Illinois injured the plaintiff with deliberate intention as set forth in W.Va. Code, 23-4-2(c)(2)(ii). The plaintiff contends that a reasonable fact-finder could conclude from the evidence that Owens-Illinois had actual, subjective knowledge that the forklifts and other equipment used at the Owens- Illinois plant produced elevated levels of carbon monoxide -- levels in excess of federal safety regulations. Second, the plaintiff contends that the evidence indicates that Owens- Illinois, notwithstanding its knowledge that the equipment created a specific, unsafe condition, intentionally placed the plaintiff in a closed room where he would be exposed to elevated levels of carbon monoxide.
Owens-Illinois, however, argues that the plaintiff did not establish the existence of prior injuries or complaints related to carbon monoxide exposure at the plant. Owens- Illinois therefore contends that the plaintiff failed to establish a question of fact regarding whether Owens-Illinois realized that its powered equipment was improperly adjusted so as to be unsafe, and whether it appreciated the high degree of risk and a strong possibility of serious injury presented by operating the equipment in an enclosed room. We disagree.
A plaintiff may establish deliberate intention in a civil action against an employer for a work-related injury by offering evidence to prove the five specific requirements provided in W.Va. Code § 23-4-2(c)(2)(ii) (1983).
However, we went on in Mayles to approve a jury instruction stating that a plaintiff need only prove the five statutory elements of W.Va. Code, 23-4-2(c)(2)(ii), because such words were used to explain that no higher burden [of proof] existed. 185 W.Va. at 97, 405 S.E.2d at 24.
The defendant's argument that a plaintiff must introduce additional evidence -- such as evidence of prior injuries or complaints about a working condition -- to establish their case runs counter to our holding in Mayles. As we indicated in Mayles, to establish that an employer has acted with deliberate intention, no higher burden of proof exists beyond those five requirements set forth in W.Va. Code, 23-4-2(c)(2)(ii). Under the statute, whether an employer has a subjective realization and appreciation of an unsafe working condition and its attendant risks, and whether the employer intentionally exposed an employee to the hazards created by the working condition, requires an interpretation of the employer's state of mind, and must ordinarily be shown by circumstantial evidence, from which conflicting inferences may often reasonably be drawn. See, e.g., Sias v. W-P Coal Co., 185 W.Va. 569, 575, 408 S.E.2d 321, 327 (1991). Accordingly, while a plaintiff may choose to introduce evidence of prior similar incidents or complaints to circumstantially establish that an employer has acted with deliberate intention, evidence of prior similar incidents or complaints is not mandated by W.Va. Code, 23-4-2(c)(2)(ii).
After carefully examining the record in the instant case, we find circumstantial evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer that Owens-Illinois had a subjective realization of a specific unsafe working condition -- that its forklifts and other machines were producing high levels of carbon monoxide. The evidence suggests that the defendant knew, through inspections, that its equipment was producing levels of carbon monoxide apparently in excess of federal safety requirements. It also suggests that safety inspectors employed by Owens-Illinois recommended that a carbon monoxide sampler be purchased by the plant, and that the equipment be adjusted to reduce the output of carbon monoxide. We therefore believe that questions of material fact exist regarding whether Owens-Illinois had a subjective realization and appreciation of the existence of a specific unsafe working condition and of the high degree of risk and the strong possibility of serious injury or death presented by such specific unsafe working condition.
As for the statutory requirement that the plaintiff prove he was intentionally exposed to a specific unsafe working condition, the plaintiff argues that Owens-Illinois knew that the use of forklift motors would cause carbon monoxide levels to exceed federally mandated safety requirements. The safety inspections performed by Owens-Illinois found elevated levels of carbon monoxide in enclosed offices which merely adjoined areas where forklifts were being used. The plaintiff asserts that, with this knowledge, the defendant still required the plaintiff to work in the enclosed old cafeteria with the motors of its powered equipment running. Accordingly, the plaintiff contends that a genuine issue of material fact exists with regard to whether the plaintiff can meet the standard of proof contained in W.Va. Code, 23-4-2(c)(2)(ii)(D). We agree.
Accordingly, it appears that genuine issues of material fact exist regarding whether the plaintiff's damages are the result of the defendant's violation of our deliberate intention statute. We therefore hold that the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment to defendant Owens-Illinois.
The circuit court's November 22, 1999 order is reversed, and the case is remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.
Footnote: 1 1The Legislature amended W.Va. Code, 23-4-2 in 1994, subsequent to the plaintiff's injury. However, no changes were made that would affect the instant appeal.
. . . so I left and went up to my office. And I opened up the windows to the outside and stuck my head out and took four or five big breaths of air, and my headache got better. I sat back down at my desk and I thought, What in the world is going on. Then it hit me, and I called the plant engineer and told him, I said, You get down there and get them people out of that room, I said, there is carbon monoxide in that room, and I am on my way down there too.
(E) That such employee so exposed suffered serious injury or death as a direct and proximate result of such specific unsafe working condition.
Footnote: 4 4Before the circuit court, Owens-Illinois also challenged whether the plaintiff had presented evidence that Owens-Illinois had violated any state or federal safety statute or regulation, or any commonly accepted and well-known safety standard, as required by W.Va. Code, 23-4-2(c)(2)(ii)(C).
The circuit court concluded that genuine questions of material fact exist regarding whether the defendant violated a safety statute or regulation. Owens-Illinois does not challenge this conclusion in the instant appeal.
It is unclear why this deposition testimony was not considered by the circuit court in its summary judgment order.
Footnote: 6 6The plaintiff must also establish, pursuant to W.Va. Code, 23-4-2(c)(2)(ii)(C), that the unsafe working condition violated a state or federal safety requirement or some well- known safety standard within the industry. The parties do not dispute before this Court that questions of fact exist regarding this point. See supra, footnote 4.

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