Source: http://stopforeclosurefraud.com/tag/bbt/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 00:23:06+00:00

Document:
Since at least January 2006, BB&T has participated as a Direct Endorsement lender (DEL) in the FHA insurance program. A DEL has the authority to originate, underwrite, and endorse mortgages for FHA insurance. If a DEL approves a mortgage loan for FHA insurance and the loan later defaults, the holder of the loan may submit an insurance claim to HUD, FHA’s parent agency, for the losses resulting from the defaulted loan. Under the DEL program, the FHA does not review a loan before it is endorsed for FHA insurance for compliance with FHA’s credit and eligibility standards, but instead relies on the efforts of the DEL to verify compliance. DELs are therefore required to follow program rules designed to ensure that they are properly underwriting and certifying mortgages for FHA insurance.
The settlement announced today resolves allegations that BB&T failed to comply with certain FHA origination, underwriting and quality control requirements. As part of the settlement, BB&T admitted to the following facts: Between Jan. 1, 2006 and Sept. 30, 2014, it certified for FHA insurance mortgage loans that did not meet HUD underwriting requirements and did not adhere to FHA’s quality control requirements. BB&T significantly increased its loan volume between 2006 and 2009—more than doubling all loan originations, while increasing the number of FHA insured loans six fold. This increase in volume was accompanied by an increase in the number of loans internally rated “Serious-Marketability” by BB&T’s quality control department —the most significant quality control defect rating and a defect that rendered a loan ineligible for FHA insurance. Between 2007 and 2011, the percentage of loans underwritten by BB&T each year that were rated Serious-Marketability by its quality control department always exceeded 30 percent, and exceeded as much as 50 percent in 2010 and 2011. BB&T nevertheless endorsed many of these loans for FHA insurance and, if they defaulted, sought payment from HUD for the insured loans.
The monthly reviews and reports that BB&T’s quality control department shared with management alerted BB&T to deficiencies in many of its FHA loans. A 2010 internal memorandum at BB&T stated that “increased volume of FHA requests and changes to regulatory requirements have resulted in origination, processing and underwriting errors. Some employees are not applying current and accurate FHA guidelines.” A proposal to improve BB&T’s underwriting of FHA loans with additional training as well as a testing and certification process for underwriters was prepared in 2010, but neither recommendation was implemented until after 2014.
Additionally, between 2006 and 2014, BB&T’s quality control process did not satisfy certain FHA requirements. Although loan volume more than doubled from 2006 to 2009, the number of quality control employees remained the same. The quality control department requested additional employees in 2009, yet new employees were not added until 2013. Because BB&T’s quality control department did not have adequate staff, it instituted a cap on the number of loans it reviewed. As a result, between 2009 and 2014, the quality control department did not always review the number of loans necessary to comply with HUD’s loan review sampling requirements. Additionally, BB&T did not perform reviews of its lender branch offices, as required by HUD, before beginning the reviews again in late 2014.
Finally, since at least 2006, HUD has required self-reporting. However, despite internal ratings showing that 30 percent or more of the loans underwritten by BB&T between 2007 and 2011 had Serious-Marketability findings, and were thus ineligible for FHA insurance, BB&T did not self-report any loans containing material underwriting defects until 2013.
As a result of BB&T’s conduct and omissions, HUD insured loans endorsed by BB&T that were not eligible for FHA mortgage insurance under the DEL program, and that HUD would not otherwise have insured. HUD subsequently incurred substantial losses when it paid insurance claims on those loans.
The settlement was the result of a joint investigation conducted by HUD, the HUD Office of Inspector General, the Civil Division’s Commercial Litigation Branch and the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Northern District of Georgia. The claims asserted against BB&T are allegations only, and there has been no determination of liability.
BRANCH BANKING AND TRUST COMPANY, Appellee.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.Opinion filed November 30, 2011..Michael E. Rodriguez of Foreclosure Defense Law Firm, PL, Tampa, for Appellant.Miguel A. Gonzalez of Spear and Hoffman, P.A., Miami, for Appellee.VILLANTI, Judge.James D. Bryson appeals the final summary judgment of foreclosure entered in favor of Branch Banking and Trust Company (BB&T). Because BB&T did not meet its burden of conclusively showing that there was no genuine issue of material fact and that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, we reverse the summary judgment and remand for further proceedings.
On April 27, 2009, BB&T filed a copy of two default letters purportedly sent to Bryson on April 28, 2008, at two different addresses. However, the letters were not attached to an affidavit or authenticated in any way. BB&T then filed a revised summary judgment motion.
At a hearing held on the summary judgment motion, Bryson argued that BB&T had not refuted the affirmative defenses related to paragraph 22 of the mortgage and that the two default notice letters were not authenticated and could not be considered for summary judgment purposes. BB&T responded that the letters were “self-authenticating” because they were created by the bank. The court granted summary judgment. This appeal followed.
“A movant is entitled to summary judgment `if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, affidavits, and other materials as would be admissible in evidence on file show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.'” Estate of Githens ex rel. Seaman v. Bon Secours-Maria Manor Nursing Care Ctr., Inc., 928 So. 2d 1272, 1274 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (quoting Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510(c)). The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of establishing irrefutably that the nonmoving party cannot prevail. See Hervey v. Alfonso, 650 So. 2d 644, 645-46 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). “[I]t is only after the moving party has met this heavy burden that the nonmoving party is called upon to show the existence of genuine issues of material fact.” Id. at 646; see also Holl v. Talcott, 191 So. 2d 40, 43 (Fla. 1966) (“Until it is determined that the movant has successfully met this burden, the opposing party is under no obligation to show that issues do remain to be tried.”); Deutsch v. Global Fin. Servs., LLC, 976 So. 2d 680, 682 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (“The burden of proving the existence of genuine issues of material fact does not shift to the opposing party until the moving party has met its burden of proof.”); Berenson v. S. Baptist Hosp. of Fla., Inc., 646 So. 2d 809, 810 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) (noting that “the nonmoving party need make no showing in support of his claim until the moving party has, by affidavit or otherwise, completely negated all allegations and inferences raised by the nonmoving party”).
On summary judgment, the trial court’s function “is solely to determine whether the record conclusively shows that the moving party proved a negative, that is, `the nonexistence of a genuine issue of a material fact.'” Winston Park, Ltd. v. City of Coconut Creek, 872 So. 2d 415, 418 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (quoting Besco USA Int’l Corp. v. Home Sav. of Am. FSB, 675 So. 2d 687, 688 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996)). Where a defendant pleads affirmative defenses, the plaintiff moving for summary judgment must either factually refute the affirmative defenses by affidavit or establish their legal insufficiency. See Frost v. Regions Bank, 15 So. 3d 905, 906 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009); Newton v. Overseas Private Inv. Corp., 544 So. 2d 224, 225 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989).
In numerous foreclosure cases summary judgment has been reversed because the defendant has pleaded lack of notice and opportunity to cure as an affirmative defense and nothing in the bank’s complaint, motion for summary judgment, or affidavits established that the bank gave the homeowners the notice and opportunity to cure required by the mortgage. See, e.g., Laurencio v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., 65 So. 3d 1190, 1192 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011); Konsulian v. Busey Bank, N.A., 61 So. 3d 1283, 1285 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (“[N]othing in Busey’s complaint, motion for summary judgment, or affidavits indicates that Busey gave Konsulian the notice which the mortgage required. . . . Further, Busey did not refute Konsulian’s defenses nor did it establish that [they] were legally insufficient.”); Frost, 15 So. 3d at 906. We reach the same conclusion in this case.
The unauthenticated copies of default letters purportedly sent to Bryson by BB&T were insufficient for summary judgment purposes because only competent evidence may be considered in ruling on a motion for summary judgment. Daeda v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 698 So. 2d 617, 618 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997); Tunnell v. Hicks, 574 So. 2d 264, 266 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (explaining that court could not consider certain documents in its summary judgment decision because “Tunnell failed to attach either document to affidavits that presumably would have ensured their admissibility”).
At the summary judgment hearing, BB&T took the position that the letters were self-authenticating because they were the bank’s own letters. Self-authentication is a concept that, due to a document’s very nature of being notarized or certified in some fashion, eliminates hearsay and other extrinsic objections to admissibility. However, a document bereft of genuineness, such as a purported copy, cannot be said to be self-authenticating because extrinsic evidence to establish its truthfulness is still required. With this in mind, BB&T’s letters are clearly not self-authenticated. Hence, we reject BB&T’s argument in this regard. See, e.g., Bifulco v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 693 So. 2d 707, 709 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (“Merely attaching documents which are not `sworn to or certified’ to a motion for summary judgment does not, without more, satisfy the procedural strictures inherent in Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510(e).”); Morrison v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 66 So. 3d 387, 387 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011) (reversing summary judgment of foreclosure where defendant asserted she had not received a notice of default as required by the mortgage and the bank had simply filed an unauthenticated notice letter). In this case, the letters at issue were not admitted by the pleadings, nor were they accompanied by an affidavit of a record custodian or other proper person attesting to their authenticity or correctness. See id.
Finally, BB&T argues that it was entitled to summary judgment because “Bryson did not file any affidavits in opposition or tender sufficient evidence to demonstrate to the court that a genuine issue of material fact existed.” BB&T has misunderstood the summary judgment standard. If the defendant pleads affirmative defenses, the plaintiff moving for summary judgment must either factually refute the affirmative defenses by affidavit or establish their legal insufficiency. Frost, 15 So. 3d at 906; Newton, 544 So. 2d at 225. “The burden of proving the existence of genuine issues of material fact does not shift to the opposing party until the moving party has met its burden of proof.” Deutsch, 976 So. 2d at 682. Because BB&T did not tender any competent evidence on the issue of Bryson’s notice of the default, it did not meet its burden of proof on summary judgment.
ALTENBERND and KHOUZAM, JJ., Concur.

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