Source: http://www.wisconsinappeals.net/on-point-by-the-wisconsin-state-public-defender/state-v-corey-kleser-2010-wi-88/
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 02:20:27+00:00

Document:
¶69 Nothing in § 970.032(2) places a limitation on the evidence at a reverse waiver hearing so long as the evidence is admissible under the rules of evidence and is relevant to one or more of the three elements set out in the subsection. Having said that, it appears to us that the legislature did not intend the reverse waiver hearing to be a minitrial. Accordingly, the court has authority to control the admission of evidence to assure that a juvenile adheres to the statutory scheme——such as recognition of “the violation” already established——and to prevent the hearing from consuming unnecessary time and resources.
¶84 We conclude that the juvenile must be given reasonable latitude to offer admissible evidence for the purpose of meeting his burden to prove the three elements for reverse waiver under Wis. Stat. § 970.032(2). This includes evidence of “the violation” or the offense charged that supplements the facts used to establish probable cause. Stated differently, the defendant may offer additional factual evidence to put “the offense” in context so that the court can make an informed judgment on whether transferring the matter to juvenile court would “depreciate the seriousness of the offense.” However, the juvenile may not offer evidence for the purpose of contradicting the offense charged because that offense has already been established in the preliminary examination.
¶88 The admissibility of evidence at a reverse waiver hearing is subject to the rules of evidence. “Chapters 901 to 911 [the rules of evidence] govern proceedings in the courts of the state of Wisconsin except as provided in ss. 911.01 and 972.11.” Wis. Stat. § 901.01. Wisconsin Stat. § 911.01(2) provides that the rules of evidence “apply generally to proceedings in civil and criminal actions.” Wisconsin Stat. § 911.01(4) then enumerates a list of situations in which the rules of evidence do not apply. Because a reverse waiver hearing is not listed as one of the specific circumstances in which the rules of evidence do not apply, we see no reason why the rules do not apply at a reverse waiver hearing.
¶91 We note that Dr. Beyer used Kleser’s description of the offense to formulate her opinion that Kleser acted out of rage and fear. An expert may rely on inadmissible evidence in formulating an opinion, if the evidence is “of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject.” Wis. Stat. § 907.03. Even assuming that Kleser’s hearsay was reasonably relied upon by an expert in Dr. Beyer’s field, Wis. Stat. § 907.03 is not a hearsay exception, State v. Weber, 174 Wis. 2d 98, 107, 496 N.W.2d 762 (Ct. App. 1993), and it does not render the underlying inadmissible testimony admissible, see State v. Watson, 227 Wis. 2d 167, 199, 595 N.W.2d 403 (1999). By allowing Dr. Beyer to present Kleser’s description of the offense, the court permitted Dr. Beyer to act as a conduit for inadmissible hearsay. This type of testimony is prohibited by the rules of evidence. See State v. Coogan, 154 Wis. 2d 387, 399, 453 N.W.2d 186 (Ct. App. 1990) (holding that an expert may not “act as a conduit for inadmissible evidence”).
Footnote 9 elaborates on this point, and should be read in full. Beyer’s testimony was hearsay-based — admitted for the truth of the matter asserted — because she addressed “what happened that night,” based on Kleser’s version of the incident, ¶90. The legal principles recited by the majority are settled, it is their application to the particular facts that might be doubtful (a point made by the dissent, ¶133). The court is a bit less than clear, but apparently Beyer relied on Kleser’s statements to her, during a pre-hearing interview as opposed to his statements to the police, ¶96 and id. nn. 11, 12. Perhaps (again: the court simply does not say), had the opinion been based on an against-interest (i.e., substantively admissible) statement to the police, then the “conduit for inadmissible hearsay” problem would have been absent. On the other hand, the dissent persuasively argues that the facts testified to by Beyer “are nearly identical” to those related by the subsequently-testifying detective, ¶143. The majority doesn’t really address this point, but instead obliquely implies that had the detective testified first, then Beyer’s testimony would have been admissible; same, if Kleser had himself testified, fn. 11. The court leaves to inference the significance of either possibility. Apparently — the court doesn’t say –, in either such event Beyer’s opinion would have been based on admissible evidence.
Ultimately, there is a bit of a puzzle: just how is an expert supposed to derive an opinion about the best placement for an adolescent without having an understanding of “what happened”? And if that understanding must be based entirely on “admissible evidence,” then this is a novel approach to expert testimony. Not necessarily a bad thing, unless limited to the unusual context such as this one where the defendant bears the burden of proof. Put it like this. As to the settled principle that inadmissible hearsay may not be admitted as substantive evidence under guise of expert opinion: application of that principle with the same assiduity as reverse waiver to, for example, ch. 980 proceedings may be something else; we shall see.
In any event, a juvenile must prove all of the elements of reverse waiver, else jurisdiction remains in adult court. With the loss of admissibility of Beyer’s opinion testimony (as to reverse waiver not depreciating seriousness of the offense), Kleser’s claim necessarily fails, ¶97, but the court nonetheless takes up other errors in the hearing.
¶102 We are not persuaded that the vouching rule becomes inapplicable simply because a witness does not use specific words such as “I believe X is telling the truth,” or is inapplicable because X never testified as a witness. There is no requirement that an expert explicitly testify that she believes a person is telling the truth for the expert’s opinion to constitute improper vouching testimony. In Haseltine, for example, the expert testified only implicitly that the victim was telling the truth. Haseltine, 120 Wis. 2d at 96. A requirement that specific words be used would permit the rule to be circumvented easily.
This “anti-vouching” rule applies to hearsay, i.e., the supposed truthfulness of a non-testifying declarant (such as Kleser), ¶103-04.
¶115 Kleser argues that this reasoning from Davis is not applicable because Davis specifically pertained to Richard A.P. evidence as it implicated the defendant’s guilt or innocence. We disagree. Although the issue at a reverse waiver hearing is not guilt or innocence, we see no reason why a different rule should apply when the defendant is seeking reverse waiver under Wis. Stat. § 970.032(2). The reasoning from Davis is not limited to cases where the defendant was presenting Richard A.P. evidence to prove his innocence. Rather, the relevant inquiry from Davis is whether “the defendant uses the expert as a surrogate to assert his or her own statements about facts on the crime and thereby waives the right against self-incrimination.” Davis, 254 Wis. 2d 1, ¶3. In Davis, because the expert evidence was “circumstantial evidence of [the defendant’s] innocence,” the state could adequately rebut the testimony without a reciprocal examination. Id., ¶38. Here, on other hand, Kleser waived his right against self-incrimination by using Dr. Beyer as a surrogate to assert his own statements about the crime, and the State was put at an unfair disadvantage when the court prohibited Dr. Collins from interviewing Kleser regarding the offense.
¶127 In this case, Kleser did not dispute that the deceased suffered at least 20 blows to the head, 30 stab wounds to the neck, and various other wounds. He admitted to a police officer that he stabbed the deceased in the neck multiple times with a pair of scissors after he realized that the man was still alive. He is charged with two additional felonies involving violence to a fellow prisoner. We conclude that transferring this 19-year-old defendant to juvenile court would depreciate the seriousness of the offenses and undermine deterrence.

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