Source: http://ky.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20180405_0000299.WKY.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 23:57:25+00:00

Document:
This matter is before the Court on Defendants David Voegele, Scott Harris, Alan Bond, the Oldham County Engineer's Office, and the Oldham County Fiscal Court's motion for partial judgment on the pleadings, [DN 13.] Plaintiff Longwood, LLC (“Longwood” or “Plaintiff”) responded, [DN 14], and Defendants replied, [DN 15.] Fully briefed, this matter is ripe for adjudication. For the reasons discussed below, Defendants' motion is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.
“For purposes of a motion for judgment on the pleadings [under Rule 12(c)], all well-pleaded material allegations of the pleadings of the opposing party must be taken as true, and the motion may be granted only if the moving party is nevertheless clearly entitled to judgment.” JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Winget, 510 F.3d 577, 581 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Southern Ohio Bank v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 479 F.2d 478, 480 (6th Cir. 1973)). However, the Court “need not accept as true legal conclusions or unwarranted factual inferences.” Id. at 581-82 (quoting Mixon v. Ohio, 193 F.3d 389, 400 (6th Cir. 1999)). “A Rule 12(c) motion ‘is granted when no material issue of fact exists and the party making the motion is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.' ” Id. at 582 (quoting Paskvan v. City of Cleveland Civil Serv. Comm'n, 946 F.2d 1233, 1235 (6th Cir. 1991)).
In its motion for partial judgment on the pleadings, Defendants contend that “[t]he proper party to Plaintiff's Complaint is Oldham County. Defendants, David Voegele, Scott Harris, Alan Bond, and the Oldham County Engineer's Office are not proper parties and Plaintiff's claims against them should be dismissed with prejudice.” [DN 13-1 at 2 (Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion).] The Court will address each of Defendants' arguments in turn.
Defendants first argue that any claims brought against Voegele, Harris, and Bond in their official capacities as Oldham County employees “are simply another way of stating a cause of action against the Oldham County Fiscal Court, ” which is duplicative since Plaintiffs also assert a claim against the Oldham County Fiscal Court. [Id. at 3.] Indeed, there is an abundance of case law confirming the principle that official capacity claims against employees of an entity, when that entity itself is also named as a defendant, are duplicative. See Colson v. City of Alcoa, Tennessee, No. 3:16-CV-377, 2017 WL 4019596, at *5 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 11, 2017) (“In allowing the municipal liability claims against the City of Alcoa to remain intact, however, the Court will dismiss the official-capacity claims against Chief Potter, Lieutenant Fletcher, Officer Cook, and Officer Wilson because they are duplicative.”); Thorpe ex rel. D.T. v. Breathitt Cty. Bd. of Educ., 932 F.Supp.2d 799, 802 (E.D. Ky. 2013) (“[W]hen a § 1983 complaint asserts a claim against a municipal entity and a municipal official in his or her official capacity, federal courts will dismiss the official-capacity claim.”).
In its response, Plaintiff concedes that the official capacity claims against Voegele, Harris, and Bond are properly dismissed. Accordingly, to the extent Plaintiff does sue those Defendants in their official capacities, those claims will be dismissed. However, Plaintiff contends that it also brings its claims against those Defendants in their individual capacities, and that those claims are proper and not subject to dismissal. [DN 14 at 1 (Plaintiff's Response).] Plaintiff is correct that, even when official capacity claims are dismissed as duplicative of claims against the entity itself, individual capacity claims against the same defendants can proceed. See Thorpe, 932 F.Supp.2d 799, 802 (E.D. Ky. 2013) (“Because Thorpe has also asserted a claim against the Board of Education, these official-capacity claims are duplicative . . . Therefore, the Court will dismiss the official-capacity claims. Thorpe may still pursue the § 1983 claim against the Board of Education and the claims against Defendants in their individual capacities.”); Fultz v. Whittaker, 187 F.Supp.2d 695, 708 (W.D. Ky. 2001) (“Plaintiffs' actions against the individual defendants in their official capacities do duplicate the action against the Fiscal Court and for the sake of accuracy Defendants John Black and Gene Hicks should be dismissed to the extent they are sued only in their official capacity.”) (emphasis added).

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