Source: http://faithandwar.org/index.php/national-security/44-strategic-leadership/126-the-religious-rights-of-those-in-uniform?showall=1
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 02:06:19+00:00

Document:
This Journal is sponsored by the Assn. for Christian Conferences, Teaching and Service.
by Jay Alan Sekulow, D.Jur. and Robert W. Ash, D.Jur.
We live in a very litigious society, where almost anyone can sue another for virtually any offense, real or imagined. DOD policy makers are not immune from such litigation. In fact, there are growing numbers of persons and advocacy groups in the United States actively seeking to remove from public life—including in the armed services—virtually all symbols and expression of religion and America’s religious heritage by advocating strict separation of church and state.1 Many of these groups are already actively engaged in filing lawsuits against DOD and its leaders over various concerns about religious expression in the armed services.2 Still others have threatened lawsuits.3 Persons and groups have every right to hold and zealously advocate such views, but many of their views on church-state separation go well beyond what the Constitution and US law require. In fact, they endanger the very freedoms the First Amendment was intended to protect. Indeed, protecting free exercise of religion is particularly important in the armed services because it is a key component in developing and strengthening the warrior ethos, an indispensible factor in fighting and winning our nation’s wars. This chapter will examine a number of issues of concern regarding free exercise of religion and religious expression in the armed services. It also will suggest ways of protecting service members’ free exercise and expressive rights while maintaining good order and discipline.
When discussing free exercise of religion and its limits in the US armed forces, one quickly encounters arguments citing the phrase “separation of church and state.” Those making such arguments often use that phrase when what they are really referring to is the establishment clause in the First Amendment.4 In truth, the phrase “separation of church and state” is found nowhere in the US Constitution. Instead, that phrase comes from a letter written in 1802 by Pres. Thomas Jefferson to members of a Baptist association in Danbury, Connecticut.5 Hence, rather than wasting time trying to determine the meaning of a phrase that does not exist in the Constitution, time would be better spent determining what the drafters of the First Amendment meant by “establishment of religion,” a phrase that does exist in the Constitution.
One of the methods used by the Supreme Court of the United States for interpreting the meaning and legal reach of the First Amendment is to examine how early Congresses acted in light of the amendment’s express terms. One can begin to understand what the establishment clause allows (and disallows) by examining what transpired in the earliest years of our nation during the period when Congress drafted the First Amendment and after the states ratified it.6 For example, “the First Congress, as one of its early items of business, adopted the policy of selecting a chaplain to open each session with prayer,”7 and a “statute providing for the payment of these chaplains was enacted into law on September 22, 1789.”8 Moreover, within days of legislating to pay congressional chaplains from the federal treasury, “final agreement was reached on the language of the Bill of Rights.”9 From these facts, the Supreme Court concluded that, whatever its ultimate meaning and reach, the establishment clause was not intended to forbid paid, legislative chaplains and their daily, public prayers.10 The Marsh Court concluded that chaplain-led prayer opening each day’s session in both houses of Congress “is not . . . an ‘establishment’ of religion,” but rather “a tolerable acknowledgment of beliefs widely held among the people of this country.”11 Additionally, the First Congress—the same Congress that drafted the First Amendment—established the tradition of clergy-led prayer at presidential inaugurations (which, in truth, constitute military change-of-command ceremonies, where the nation’s new commander in chief assumes office from his predecessor).12 These practices have continued to this very day.
would not be permitted to render police or fire protection to religious groups.
Rather than a bright-line rule, the so-called “wall” separating church and state “is a blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier depending on all the circumstances of a particular relationship,”25 and the location of the line separating church and state must be determined on a case-by-case basis.26 Hence, strict church-state separation has never been required in the United States and is not required now.
The remainder of this chapter will focus on the following areas: (1) the importance of the free exercise of religion to developing and strengthening the warrior ethos; (2) the role and responsibility of military commanders and other leaders in maintaining and protecting the moral and spiritual health of their units, including protecting the free exercise rights of the men and women they lead; (3) the general role of chaplains in assisting commanders in executing the commanders’ programs to protect and assist free exercise of religion and the role of the individual chaplain in meeting the unique needs of service members from the individual chaplain’s own faith group while assisting adherents of other faith groups, and of no faith, to obtain the specific help they may be seeking; (4) the rights enjoyed by all members of the armed forces to exercise their faith; (5) specific examples of permissible religious exercise in the military; (6) specific examples of impermissible religious conduct in uniform; and (7) recommendations to policy makers on how to protect the religious rights of men and women in uniform while maintaining good order and discipline.
What differentiates a murderer from a professional warrior? Both take the life of another human being. Why they kill differentiates the one from the other. The murderer may kill on a whim or after detailed planning but usually for his own purposes, while the warrior’s killings are constrained by purposes of state and are limited to certain defined instances on the battlefield. What defines the warrior’s constraints is moral discipline.66 Without such discipline, that which distinguishes the warrior from the murderer becomes negligible. Moral discipline (1) protects the general population from the warrior’s killing and (2) guards the warrior from the psychological damage inherent in being a murderer.67 Moral discipline is, in essence, the “glue” that holds the warrior ethos together and allows the individual warrior to commit otherwise objectionable acts with honor and integrity.
How then is moral discipline developed and maintained? While some may despise or belittle the thought, for many, there is an important underlying spiritual aspect to the moral discipline of the warrior ethos. This is not to say that a prerequisite for becoming a great warrior is to be religious; there have been, and undoubtedly still are, great professional military men and women who are nonreligious. Nevertheless, it is incontrovertible that many—indeed, most68—military service members derive their moral beliefs of right and wrong from personal religious beliefs and values.69 Hence, to successfully develop and maintain the moral discipline of the warrior ethos within its organizational structure, the military must provide religious care and encourage religious free exercise amongst its members. To do otherwise places at risk the development of those qualities that define and motivate the warrior ethos in the US armed forces.
As noted above, life in the military is markedly different from life as a civilian. Good order and discipline are required in the military to ensure that our armed forces will be able to carry out their vital duty to defend the United States whenever called upon to do so. Critical to ensuring the readiness of our armed forces are the various leaders assigned at all levels of command within each of the armed services. The US military has produced countless military commanders and other leaders who lead by example and model servant leadership for their subordinates. Such leaders take an active interest in their subordinates and their welfare. They demand high standards in training—both of themselves and of the men and women they lead. Further, such leaders give freely of themselves and of their time to mentor their subordinates so that they are properly prepared for the rigors of military life, including, when required, the rigors of combat when life and death decisions demand utmost courage and integrity. Given its level of responsibility, a commander’s life is not an easy life. In effect, commanders at every level are responsible for al that their commands do and fail to do; they are responsible for developing and honing the warrior ethos in their commands.
Among the many responsibilities that fall on commanders’ shoulders is the responsibility for the moral and spiritual welfare of their subordinates and their family members.74 Irrespective of the individual commander’s personal religious faith (or lack thereof), he75 is nonetheless responsible for ensuring that his subordinates’ moral and spiritual needs (as well as those of the subordinates’ families) are identified and met. Hence, it is the commander’s responsibility to develop the moral/religious program for his command. It is not (as is often thought) the military chaplain’s responsibility, although the chaplain, as a special staff officer, exists in part to advise and assist the commander in developing and carrying out the commander’s program. Moreover, as with every other command responsibility and command program, the commander is responsible to periodically—and personally—check to ensure that his religious program is being properly executed and is achieving the results intended. Failure to do so constitutes dereliction of duty and is a betrayal of the high trust we place in commanders.
Because the government commissions military chaplains due to their membership in specific faith groups (i.e., to meet the free exercise needs of the men and women in uniform), and because it is constitutionally inappropriate for the government to delve into the details of religious belief and clergy qualification within a specific faith group (i.e., to avoid violating the establishment clause by entangling the government in religious matters), DOD relies on civilian ecclesiastical endorsing agencies to ensure that chaplains seeking to serve in the armed forces meet the religious standards required by their respective faith groups.94 Were a chaplain to lose his denominational endorsement, he would be separated from the military.95 Hence, denominational affiliation is the irreducible essence of membership in the chaplaincy of the US armed forces, and as such, military chaplains are intentionally hired, and hence expected, to represent a specific denominational view within the military. Military chaplains are, in the final analysis, members of the clergy of their specific faith groups who conduct their ministries in uniform.
When discussing an individual service member’s right to free exercise of religion, it must be clearly understood that “free exercise of religion” means what it says—free exercise. Free exercise may not legitimately be limited to what some government official or civilian advocacy group or attorney may think it should mean—or is willing to tolerate.99 Further, the right to free exercise of religion applies to all members of the armed services—including general or flag officers, commanders, and chaplains—because the First Amendment guarantees the right to free exercise to every American, irrespective of that person’s station in life.
Subject to the demands of military service100 and the need to maintain good order and discipline,101 free exercise of religion for service members includes, but is not necessarily limited to, the following: the right to believe or not believe; the right to engage in corporate or individual worship; the right to study religious texts, both individually and with others; the right to fellowship with members of the same faith; the right to discuss and share basic truths of one’s faith, both with fellow adherents of that faith and with nonadherents as well; the right to teach one’s faith as truth; the right to observe religious holidays, feasts, ceremonies, and so forth; the right to attend religious retreats and conferences; the right to invite others to participate in a religious activity associated with one’s faith, such as a Bible study, a bar mitzvah, or a holiday celebration (like a Seder meal or a Christmas party or an Iftar celebration); the right to pass on one’s faith to one’s own children and other children placed for that purpose in one’s care (such as in Sabbath school, Sunday school, catechism classes, or youth groups like Young Life or Club Beyond); and the right to participate in activities sponsored by local religious groups or parachurch groups (like the Knights of Columbus, the B’nai B’rith, the Navigators, or the Officers’ Christian Fellowship).
For certain groups and individuals, sharing their faith with others is a religious command. To officially proscribe the sharing of a chaplain’s (or other service member’s) faith may itself run afoul of the establishment clause in that government officials sit in judgment of what constitutes acceptable religious belief and activities and what does not. This is not to say that a religious activity might not, under some circumstances, upset good order and discipline, just as a secular activity may do so. When that occurs in either case, of course, commanders may intervene, but commanders must be careful not to limit free exercise merely because some individual or group does not appreciate or want to be bothered by the message shared.102 Persons can be offended by both religious and secular sentiments.103 Tolerance must be a two-way street. Just as adherents of the majority religious faith must understand and respect the rights of those of minority faiths, or no faith, so too must those of minority faiths and of no faith understand and respect the rights of those professing the majority faith.
Given our long and unbroken history of permitting prayers to solemnize military ceremonies and other events, calling on chaplains to continue such historical practice today merely reflects long-held traditions and constitutes “tolerable acknowledgment[s] of beliefs widely held among the people of this country.”109 Hearing such prayers is also the price one pays for living in a pluralistic society that honors free exercise of religion and free expression of religious sentiments. It is, in fact, a testimony to the religious tolerance that we have been able to achieve in the United States and is something that should be recognized and applauded, not rejected and forbidden.
Some argue that to avoid giving offense chaplains must—at a minimum— offer only “nonsectarian” prayers when praying at events where adherents of other faiths, and persons of no faith, are present. There are numerous problems with such an argument. One problem is that it is not clear how or when an otherwise “sectarian” prayer becomes “nonsectarian”—or who is to judge. As the Tenth Circuit has aptly noted, “All prayers ‘advance’ a particular faith or belief in one way or another” if for no other reason than “the act of praying to a supreme power assumes the existence of that supreme power.”116 A second problem is that offense at what is being said has never been a valid reason to proscribe such speech. The same is true today. Were our government or the US armed forces ever to adopt the nonsectarian prayer standard, they would then be in violation of the establishment clause by preferring one form of prayer (the nonsectarian form) over alternative forms of prayer (the sectarian forms). Such a policy would not only violate the establishment clause but also the free exercise and free speech rights of every chaplain.
The Supreme Court has held that “the First Amendment’s Religion Clauses mean that religious beliefs and religious expression are too precious to be either proscribed or prescribed by the [Government]” (emphasis added).117 Lee involved the giving of a “nonsectarian” prayer at a high school graduation ceremony. Much of the criticism about the prayer in Lee centered not only on the fact that school officials selected which clergyman would deliver the prayer but also on the inappropriateness of the school principal’s telling the rabbi that he should render a “nonsectarian” prayer.118 The Lee Court concluded, “The question is not the good faith of the school in attempting to make the prayer acceptable to most persons, but the legitimacy of its undertaking that enterprise at all” (emphasis added).119 This comment applies with equal force to the oft-expressed desire that military chaplains deliver “nonsectarian” prayers in settings where adherents of other faith groups are present. No one questions the military’s good intentions, but as the Lee Court concluded, adopting such a policy is simply unconstitutional.
Further, any attempt to restrict religious speech (such as a prayer) to avoid causing offense to the hearer is sure to fail. First, the free speech clause of the First Amendment protects free expression from government interference. And there is no language in the First Amendment that protects a hearer from being offended. In truth, inoffensive speech needs no protection. If everyone were to agree with the sentiment expressed, no one would challenge it, and no protection would be needed. It is offensive speech that needs protection. Praying in Jesus’ name is offensive to some but not to others. Invoking the name of Allah also offends some people but not others. Still others—atheists and agnostics—may be offended by any and all prayer, no matter to what deity it may be directed. Hence, try as one might, one cannot avoid offending someone. Advocating a “cause no offense” strategy will surely fail. More importantly, it is unconstitutional.
reasonably might perceive a particular action as an endorsement of religion.
Likewise, service members are deemed to be “reasonable observers.” Consequently, they are deemed to know that chaplains represent different faith groups and traditions and that prayers offered at certain military ceremonies are part of military tradition meant to solemnize the event, not to endorse the faith or religious sentiments of the chaplain delivering the prayer. Thus, the establishment clause is not violated by an individual chaplain’s private choice of words for a prayer to solemnize a military ceremony.
Prayers at presidential inaugurations (which constitute, in fact, change of command ceremonies at the highest level of the armed forces) have been delivered by clergymen of many different faiths and have frequently included references to Jesus or the Trinity.123 Marsh refutes the contention that clergy-led, ceremonial prayer violates the establishment clause merely because a particular prayer might reference monotheistic terminology or beliefs. In Marsh, the Court rejected the argument that selection by the Nebraska legislature of a Presbyterian clergyman who chose to pray in the “Judeo-Christian” tradition violated the establishment clause. The Court declared: “We cannot, any more than Members of the Congresses of this century, perceive any suggestion that choosing a clergy man of one denomination advances the beliefs of a particular church.”124 The Court noted that “the content of the prayer is not of concern to judges where, as here, there is no indication that the prayer opportunity has been exploited to proselytize or advance any one, or disparage any other, faith or belief ” (emphasis added).125 The same holds true in the military. Moreover, were the government to outlaw prayer altogether at military ceremonies and other events, it would demonstrate hostility, not neutrality, towards religion in light of the long history of such prayers in the military and in light of the Supreme Court’s recognition that solemnizing, nonproselytizing prayers do not violate the establishment clause.
Many of the complaints about prayers in the military revolve around the issue of praying “in Jesus’ name.”126 Not every Christian chaplain feels compelled to pray explicitly in Jesus’ name, but some do. Such differences reflect the religious pluralism not only within American society but also within Western Christianity. Ending a prayer in Jesus’ name (or a similar phrase)—without more—is not proselytizing. To proselytize is defined as “to make or try to make converts.”127 To assert that merely adding the words “in Jesus’ name” to a prayer said in the presence of adherents of different faiths, or persons of no faith, constitutes proselytizing is absurd. Orthodox Christian theology teaches that Jesus is God128—hence, praying in Jesus’ name is another form of praying in God’s name. There is no principled reason why invoking Jesus by name is any different than invoking the name of Adonai or Allah or Vishnu, something few are suggesting should be forbidden.
Saying a prayer that ends in Jesus’ name clearly identifies the religious faith of the person praying, just as beginning a prayer with the words “in the name of Allah the compassionate, the merciful” identifies the person praying as a Muslim, or invoking the “God of Abraham” before reciting the Shema identifies the person praying as Jewish. None of these prayers—without more—can be remotely construed as constituting proselytizing. Yet were any of these chaplains to pray in such a manner that the prayer was meant to convince the hearer to adopt the chaplain’s specific faith, such a prayer would constitute proselytizing, whether Jesus, the God of Abraham, or Allah were specifically mentioned or not. Hence, fixating on praying explicitly in Jesus’ name, without more, is without merit.
The Constitution prohibits any federal official—including senior civilian leaders, military commanders, and senior chaplains—from directing that a chaplain either pray or refrain from praying in a certain manner, except when required to maintain good order and discipline in the respective service. This position comports fully with the Constitution—it avoids government entanglement with religion, religious beliefs, and religious practices, while upholding the free speech and free exercise rights of military chaplains.
The same is true when a chaplain is teaching the truths of the chaplain’s specific faith group to interested service members or their family members. Chaplains are selected by faith group to meet the religious needs of adherents of that faith group. Hence, the chaplain need not be inclusive of nonadherents during such times and may be exclusive, without violating the Constitution.
Opponents of such interaction simply ignore the fact that it is the commander who bears full responsibility for the moral and spiritual welfare of his subordinates and their family members.134 Such persons also fail to take into account that frequent, intimate interaction with one’s subordinates is what helps to solidify one’s command and create a healthy, effective unit.135 Hence, speaking on topics of morality and spirituality with subordinates is a necessary part of the commander’s job,136 irrespective of the commander’s personal belief system. Further, some of those who complain about such interaction are hypersensitive or hostile to religious matters and may see proselytizing or religious endorsement where there is none.137 Individual hypersensitivity to religious discussions and sentiments must not be permitted to interfere with the commander’s responsibility to develop and implement an effective program to meet the moral and spiritual needs of the men and women under his command.
Finally, an obvious example where commanders must speak to their subordinates about religious beliefs often occurs aboard ship. On board US Navy ships at sea, “divine services shall be conducted on Sunday[s] if possible.”153 Because so many Navy ships deploy without a “chaplain attached to the command[,] . . . [s]ervices led by laypersons are encouraged.”154 Regardless of whether a chaplain is embarked, the commanding officer is still responsible for ensuring “the religious preferences and the varying religious needs of individuals [are] recognized, respected, encouraged and ministered to.”155 Therefore, a commander must ensure that a religious lay leader is capable of adequately fulfilling a role like that of a chaplain so that the free exercise rights of his subordinates are protected. That commander must be free to communicate—in depth—with potential lay leaders to ensure the best quality spiritual care for those under his command.
Despite the herculean efforts made by commanders and military chaplains to provide for the free exercise needs of all service members and their families, there are times when their efforts fall short of the service members’ religious needs and desires. As such, when possible, service members often avail themselves of religious opportunities in nearby civilian communities and/or participate in parachurch groups to meet their spiritual needs. Many religious groups in communities located near military installations offer outreach programs to service members and their families, most of whom are far away from their families and friends. Such efforts are to be lauded and encouraged. There are a limited number of chaplains available at any military installation, and it is virtually impossible for them to meet the needs of each denomination or faith group represented by service members on that installation. Local and parachurch groups help to fill that gap. Such groups may also fill the gap by providing a greater array of religious opportunities throughout the week than can normally be provided by chaplains, thus accommodating the often chaotic schedules that define service members’ lives. In some instances, without external help, chaplains would simply be unable to meet the spiritual needs of the men and women in uniform that constitute their respective flocks. For example, the Pentagon chaplain’s office comprises three persons whose mission it is to serve the men and women assigned to and working in the Pentagon. Thus, three persons are expected to provide spiritual support to over 24,000 persons,156 an impossible task. As such, the Pentagon chaplain must rely on volunteers—often from local religious and parachurch groups—to carry out his ministry. DOD and the armed services should applaud and encourage the efforts of such groups to minister to the spiritual needs of the men and women in uniform and their families. Working together, they help to ensure that the First Amendment’s guarantee of free exercise of religion can be realized by those serving all of us in uniform.
Teaching the strictures and beliefs of one’s own faith, even when they contradict beliefs of another faith group, does not constitute disparaging the other faith, provided that such teaching occurs in a place where people freely gather on their own accord to receive such teaching. For example, a Christian chaplain’s affirmative teaching to Christians and/or other interested persons that Jesus is the only way to heaven, a core Christian teaching, does not disparage Islam, despite Islamic teachings about Jesus to the contrary, just as a Muslim chaplain’s affirmative teaching to Muslims and/or other interested persons that Mohammed is the last and greatest prophet of God, a core Islamic teaching not shared by Christians, does not disparage Christianity. Such faith-specific teaching is inappropriate, however, in settings where service members and their families are otherwise required to be present (i.e., where they are a captive audience).
No official in the US government or armed forces—regardless of rank or station—has the right to compel or pressure any other person (1) to assent to any specific philosophy or religious belief or creed,159 (2) to participate in a religious worship service (such as forcing someone to attend a chapel worship service—unless that person is on duty, for example, serving as a member of an honor guard or a color guard at a funeral or other ceremony), or (3) to engage in a religious act (even so simple an act as being asked to join hands with others when a short prayer of blessing is said over a Thanksgiving or Christmas meal in the military dining facility).
No commander or leader may require a subordinate to attend or remain in a meeting or other gathering (i.e., create a captive audience) when the commander or leader intends to use the opportunity to convince those in attendance to adopt or assent to his religious faith or secular philosophy.
This should not be understood to preclude a commander or leader from being able to mention his religious faith or upbringing when introducing himself to subordinates for the first time.162 Such information informs the commander’s/ leader’s subordinates about himself and his standards and is permissible, pro- vided that the commander or leader makes clear that he will not judge his subordinates on anything other than that person’s duty performance, character, and integrity.
All of the armed services are in the team-building business. Each service must take men and women from all walks of life and all types of backgrounds and meld them into an effective team. Part and parcel of such a process is educating service members about their differences and building understanding, tolerance, and respect for each other despite those differences. Such differences manifest themselves, inter alia, through race, ethnicity, creed, gender, and culture. They mirror the American motto: E pluribus unum. Each service member must learn to tolerate and respect the differences exhibited by his fellows in uniform.
The same is true with respect to religion and chaplains. Religiously, we are a heterogeneous nation, and the military and its chaplains reflect that heterogeneity. Adherents of different faiths approach God differently. That is reflected in many ways, including how they pray. Rather than try to restrict how an individual chaplain prays at certain public events, the chaplain should pray consistent with his conscience and religious tradition. This presents a great opportunity to demonstrate, recognize, and celebrate diversity within the military.
All of the armed services have both entry-level schooling for enlisted service members and for officers as well as follow-on schooling as officers and enlisted service members increase in rank and assume greater responsibilities. Part of the team-building process is noting our differences and encouraging service members of all ranks to respect and tolerate those differences. Each member of the military takes an oath to defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic. It should be a relatively simple task to teach enlisted service members and officers about the First Amendment’s religion clauses and how they play themselves out in the individual service member’s daily life. Service members can be taught that commanders are responsible to develop and implement moral and religious programs to meet their free exercise needs; that military chaplains traditionally offer prayers at various military ceremonies (such as at change of command ceremonies) to solemnize such events; that, due to the heterogeneous nature of religious beliefs in the United States, they are apt to hear prayers said from various religious perspectives; and that such prayers are evidence of the religious tolerance that our country has been able to achieve over time, not an indication that our government, DOD, or the armed services favor a certain faith group or belief.
Reminding the men and women in uniform that chaplains come from differing religious traditions and that their prayers reflect those traditions should be embraced and celebrated, since what we have achieved in the United States differs markedly from many cultures where certain religious groups are often denigrated and marginalized, if not outright persecuted. Because commanders set the tone within their commands, they too should receive training at command and staff schools concerning the roles of the chaplains within their commands as well as their responsibilities to ensure that their subordinates and their families may freely exercise their religious faiths. Commanders play the key role in ensuring that a chaplain’s free speech and free exercise rights are not violated as well as ensuring that those under their commands understand that allowing a chaplain to pray as he deems appropriate does not constitute governmental sanction of any particular faith group or religious belief. If this is done evenhandedly by commanders, there should be no reason—real or perceived—to direct how a chaplain should pray. Likewise, there should be no reason for any service member to misinterpret or misunderstand why a prayer is being offered or how the respective armed service views such prayer. After all, it is not a difficult concept to understand that the government “does not endorse or support . . . speech that it merely permits on a nondiscriminatory basis.”163 Similarly, reminding the men and women in uniform that their colleagues in uniform also reflect differing religious faiths, including no faith, and that such differences reflect our tolerant society should also be embraced and appreciated.
Tolerance is a two-way street, and military commanders must act as vigorously to protect the majority’s free exercise rights as they do to protect the rights of those in the minority. It is a given that the majority religious faith in the United States (and, hence, in the armed forces) is the Christian faith, in all its myriad forms. As such, it is the Christian message that will—simply by virtue of the sheer numbers of its adherents—be foremost among the religious sentiments publicly expressed in the military. That does not mean that the military is “favoring” the Christian faith merely because it is so visible, and commanders must always remember that their support of a service member’s free exercise rights does not mean that the military is establishing religion. Facilitating the free exercise rights of Christians (and of adherents of other faith groups) is a command responsibility and, without more, does not implicate the establishment clause.
In sum, a well-planned and executed program for educating service members—at all phases of their careers—about our religious heritage, chaplains and their roles, commanders’ responsibilities for the moral and spiritual welfare of those they command, and the First Amendment will reduce confusion about religious expression in the military and increase appreciation for what we as a nation, unlike too many others, have been able to achieve in the area of religious tolerance. This relatively easy fix should resolve problems of perceived religious discrimination. Regarding those isolated times when actual religious discrimination occurs, DOD and the uniformed services have ample tools to remedy such violations, and those tools should be used as required.
The defense of the nation is the highest priority of government,167 and the Supreme Court has correctly recognized “the limits of its own competence in advancing this core national interest.”168 Many of the complaints raised against DOD in US courts involve service members dissatisfied with, and complaining about, something they experienced as part of their training.169 In such circumstances, the trainee is, in effect, criticizing the training being conducted. This in itself constitutes a challenge to the military chain of command, suggests a potential breakdown in good order and discipline within the affected unit, and counsels caution before jumping in to remedy the alleged “violation” of the complaining service member’s rights. It is wrong (as a matter of policy and common sense) for civilian advocacy groups and civilian attorneys to sue in court seeking to apply civilian standards to military units. Life in the military and life in the civilian world are different, and they need to remain different.
The armed forces of the United States have a proven record of success honed over time. Training methods are entrusted to persons in each service who have proven themselves capable of assuming such heavy responsibilities. Courts and civilian society should defer to their experience and training and should not second-guess their judgment merely because it does not mirror what might be acceptable in civilian society.
In sum, military commanders are entrusted with training our sons and daughters to defend the nation as required. Senior military commanders are masters of the profession of arms. They are competent, smart, and dedicated. They are committed to defending the nation and the Constitution, to the point of laying down their lives on behalf of us all. They deserve our trust in developing and implementing the training regimens that they—in their professional opinions—believe will protect us. When commanders determine that a solemnizing prayer at certain ceremonies is appropriate as a team-building tool, for example, they are acting in accordance with military traditions that predate the founding of the republic, traditions that have been considered important to team-building throughout our history and are consistent with long-held values of the majority of our population—both in civilian society and in uniform. Given the unique nature of the military, such reasoned judgments should be supported, not challenged in court. Nothing in the Constitution requires that Americans shed their religious beliefs and heritage once they don a military uniform, and military commanders have recognized the positive role of religious faith on morale and service consistently over the course of our history.170 Commanders and leaders at all levels of our armed forces are responsible for the moral and spiritual health of their commands, and they deserve our support and our deferring to their professional judgment when it comes to planning and implementing those training regimens that they believe are necessary to defend the nation.
In conclusion, the foregoing examples and recommendations are consistent with our history and fully in accord with the Constitution and laws of the United States. An aggressive education program performed at every level of the service member’s career should remove any misunderstanding about religious observance and expression in the military and should help each service member to understand and appreciate the degree of religious liberty and tolerance that our nation, unlike many others, has been able to achieve.
This treatise was originally published as "Religious Rights and Military Service," in Attitudes Aren't Free: Thinking Deeply about Attitudes in the US Armed Forces, eds. James E. Parco and David A. Levy, published by Air University Press: Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, 2010. The AU Press website is at: aupress.maxwell.af.mil.
A condensed version of this paper was published as a series, under the title used in this journal, in Command magazine, a publication of the Officers' Christian Fellowship of the USA, in 2010 and 2011. This version is published in the Journal of Faith & War with the permission of the authors.
Dr. Jay Alan Sekulow is chief counsel of the American Center for Law and Justice, a national public interest law firm specializing in constitutional litigation, including protecting religious freedom. Dr. Sekulow has argued a number of important First Amendment cases before the Supreme Court of the United States, including, most recently, Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125 (2009). He is also chief counsel of the European Centre for Law and Justice (ECLJ), a public interest law firm located in Strasbourg, France, which specializes in defending religious freedom. The ECLJ is also accredited to the United Nations as a non-governmental organization (NGO) and has been active in promoting freedom of religion worldwide. The National Law Journal has twice named Dr. Sekulow one of the “100 Most Influential Lawyers” in the United States. Dr. Sekulow earned his bachelor’s and juris doctor degrees from Mercer University and his doctor of philosophy degree from the Regent School of Leadership Studies.
Robert Weston Ash is an associate professor of law at the Regent University School of Law in Virginia Beach, Virginia, where he teaches courses in international law, national security law, comparative law, business associations, and First Amendment law. Mr. Ash also serves as senior litigation counsel for national security law at the American Center for Law and Justice. Mr. Ash received his bachelor of science degree from the United States Military Academy, his master of international public policy degree from the School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) of the Johns Hopkins University, and his juris doctor degree from the Regent University School of Law. Mr. Ash served 22 years on active duty in the United States Army. His assignments included command of both armored cavalry and armor units, a tour on the history faculty at West Point, a tour as a Congressional Fellow in the office of Senator John McCain (R-AZ), a tour as the NATO desk officer in the War Plans Division of the Army staff in the Pentagon, and a tour as a strategist in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
1. Representative among individuals advocating strict church-state separation are the following: Rev. Barry W. Lynn—see his Piety & Politics: The Right-Wing Assault on Religious Freedom (New York: Random House, 2007), advocating the importance of the strict-separationist viewpoint and decrying challenges to that philosophy by the “religious right”; Michael “Mikey” Weinstein, see Michael L. Weinstein and Davin Seay, With God on Our Side: One Man’s War Against an Evangelical Coup in America’s Military (New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2006), detailing Weinstein’s legal fight against a perceived Evangelical Christian takeover of the military, generally, and the US Air Force Academy, specifically; Christopher Hitchens, “GI Jesus: The Real Problem with Military Chaplains,” Slate, 2 October 2006, http://www.slate.com/id/2150801/?nav=ais, criticizing the National Defense Authorization Act of 2007 due to “lawmakers arguing seriously over how much religious instruction and rhetoric should be permitted in the [military] ranks and how explicitly monotheistic that instruction and rhetoric ought to be.” Representative among groups advocating strict separation of church and state are the following: Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Freedom from Religion Foundation, American Civil Liberties Union, and Military Religious Freedom Foundation.
2. See, for example, Chalker v. Gates, No. 08-CV-2467-KHV-JPO (D. Kan. filed 25 September 2008).
3. See, for example, letter demanding the cessation of the Naval Academy’s traditional noonmeal prayer from Deborah A. Jeon, legal director, ACLU of Maryland, to Vice Adm Jeffrey Fowler, superintendent, US Naval Academy, 2 May 2008, on file with author.
4. US Constitution, Amendment I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion”). 5. Thomas Jefferson, president of the United States, to Danbury Baptist Association of Connecticut, letter, 1 January 1802, in The American Republic: Primary Sources, ed. Bruce Frohnen, 2002, 72, 75.
6. Most agree that, at a minimum, the establishment clause was intended to prohibit the creation of a national church for the United States, such as existed in England. Nevertheless, one must keep in mind that the First Amendment did not preclude individual states from adopting a state church or a state religion. See Carl Zollman, American Church Law (St. Paul, MN: West Publishing Co., 1933) (first edition in 1917), 2–4. In fact, Massachusetts was the last state to disestablish its state church, and it did so of its own accord in 1833, more than 40 years after the ratification of the First Amendment. Kelly Olds, “Privatizing the Church: Disestablishment in Connecticut and Massachusetts,” Journal of Political Economy 102, no. 2 (1994): 277, 281–82.
7. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 787-88 (1983).
9. Ibid. (citation omitted). The First Amendment is part of the Bill of Rights.
10. Ibid. See also ibid., 790 (“It can hardly be thought that in the same week Members of the First Congress voted to appoint and to pay a chaplain for each House and also voted to approve the draft of the First Amendment for submission to the States, they intended the Establishment Clause to forbid what they had just declared acceptable.”).
12. See Newdow v. Bush, 355 F. Supp. 2d 265, 270 n.5, 286–87 (D.D.C. 2005).
13. For example, Catherine Millard, The Rewriting of America’s History (Camp Hill, PA: Horizon Books, 1991): 61–62.
14. Proclamation of President John Adams (6 March 1799), in A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents 1789–1897, vol. 1, James D. Richardson, ed., 1899, 284–86.
15. See Daniel L. Dreisbach, Real Threat and Mere Shadow: Religious Liberty and the First Amendment (Westchester, IL: Crossway Books, 1987): 127, noting that the 1803 treaty with the Kaskaskia Indians included federal funds to pay a Catholic missionary priest; noting further treaties made with the Wyandotte and Cherokee tribes involving state-supported missionary activity.
16. John W. Whitehead, The Second American Revolution (Charlottesville, VA: The Rutherford Institute, 1982), 100, citing J. O. Wilson, Public School of Washington, vol. 1 (Washington, DC: Columbia Historical Society, 1897): 5.
17. Charles E. Rice, The Supreme Court and Public Prayer: The Need for Restraint (New York: Fordham University Press, 1964): 63–64.
19. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. at 790 (citation omitted); see also United States v. Curtiss- Wright Export Corporation, 299 U.S. 304, 328 (1936), noting that understanding “placed upon the Constitution . . . by the men who were contemporary with its formation” is “almost conclusive” (citation omitted).
20. Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
21. Ibid., 335, quoting Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Commission of Florida, 480 U.S. 136, 144–45 (1987).
23. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
25. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971).
27. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. at 313.
29. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 589 (1992).
30. Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004).
32. Ibid., quoting Walz v. Tax Commission of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970).
34. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
36. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Board v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 767 (1995).
37. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of University of Virginia 515 U.S. at 828, citing Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641–43 (1994).
38. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Board v. Pinette, 515 U.S. at 760 (citations omitted).
39. Good News Club v. Milford Central School, 533 U.S. 98, 106–07 (2001) (internal citations omitted).
40. Board of Education v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250 (1990).
42. Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 778 (1996) (Justice Thomas, concurring), quoting United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles 350 U.S. 11, 17 (1955).
43. Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 360 (1980).
44. 10 U.S.C. § 654 (a)(8)(A) & (B) (2006).
46. DOD Instruction 1300.17, Accommodation of Religious Practices Within the Military Services, 2009, para. 4.
47. Air Force Policy Directive (AFPD) 52-1, Chaplain Service, 2006, introduction.
49. Secretary of the Navy Instruction (SONI) 1730.8B, Accommodation of Religious Practices, 2008, paras. 1 & 5.
50. Army Regulation (AR) 600-20, Army Command Policy, 2009, para. 3-3.b.(4).
52. Commandant of the Coast Guard Instruction M1730.4B, Religious Ministries within the Coast Guard, 1994, para. 5.a.
53. Carlo D’Este, Patton: A Genius for War (New York: HarperCollins, 1996); 221 (citation omitted); see also John Paul Jones, personal journal entry (1787), in Augustus C. Buell, Paul Jones: Founder of the American Navy, vol. 1 (London: K. Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., 1900): 286–87 (“Men mean more than guns in the rating of a ship.”).
54. See Mats Alvesson, Understanding Organizational Culture (London: Sage Publications, 2002): 1–2; see also Army Field Manual (FM) 6-22, Army Leadership, 2006, § 4-46.
55. Don Snider, “U.S. Civil-Military Relations and Operations Other Than War,” in Civil- Military Relations and the Not-Quite Wars of the Present and Future, ed. Vincent Davis (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, Army War College, 1996): 1, 3.
56. Christopher Coker, The Warrior Ethos: Military Culture and the War on Terror (New York: Routledge, 2007): 141, comparing the warrior cultures of the ancient Chinese, Greek, Roman, and Japanese societies; and Army FM 6 - 22, Army Leadership, § 4-47, § 4-51.
57. Jamison Yi, “MCMAP and the Marine Warrior Ethos,” Military Review, November–December 2004, 17, illustrating a “synergy of disciplines” via Venn diagram; see also Air Force Recruiting Service, Air Force Warrior Facts: Expand Your Training 2 (n.d.) (“It takes a strong mind, body, and spirit to become an Air Force warrior” [emphasis added]); Army FM 6-22, Army Leadership, § 4-47 to § 4-52; and H. Michael Gelfand, Sea Change at Annapolis: The United States Naval Academy, 1949–2000 (Chapel Hil : The University of North Carolina Press, 2006): 9, listing part of the US Naval Academy’s mission as “develop[ing] [midshipmen] moral y, mentally, and physically” (citation omitted).
58. Humfrey Michell, Sparta (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1964): 165.
59. Yi, “MCMAP and the Marine Warrior Ethos,” 21 (“Physical discipline consists of armed and unarmed combat techniques combined as part of the USMC Physical Fitness Program . . . [which] develops a Marine’s ability . . . [to] overcom[e] physical hardship and obstacles under any climatic condition.”).
61. Army FM 6-22, Army Leadership, § 4-49.
65. For example, ibid., § 4-53 (“The Warrior Ethos is crucial but also perishable. Consequently, the Army must continually affirm, develop, and sustain it.”).
66. Shannon E. French, The Code of the Warrior: Exploring Warrior Values Past and Present (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005): 1–3.
69. Army FM 6-22, Army Leadership, § 4-57 (“Beliefs matter because they help people understand their experiences. Those experiences provide a start point for what to do in everyday situations. Beliefs are convictions people hold as true. Values are deep-seated personal beliefs that shape a person’s behavior. Values and beliefs are central to character.”); see also ibid., § 4-59 (“Beliefs derive from upbringing, culture, religious backgrounds, and traditions. As a result, different moral beliefs have, and will, continue to be shaped by diverse religious and philosophical traditions” [emphasis added].); and French, The Code of the Warrior, 3.
70. See ibid., § 4–59; see also note 68, noting that over two-thirds of US service members claim religious affiliation.
71. Army FM 6-22, Army Leadership, § 4–58 (“Army leaders should recognize the role beliefs play in preparing Soldiers for battle.”).
72. Coker, The Warrior Ethos, 132–33; and Yi, “MCMAP and the Marine Warrior Ethos,” 17.
Members of the military live with the fact that they could be asked to surrender their lives at any moment. Those who see combat face life-and-death issues on a regular basis and are forced to grapple with fundamental questions of existence in a way those they protect likely will never face. This means that for many, if not most, in the military, religion is part and parcel of their original decision to serve, their loyalty to country and family, and their source of strength in times of great stress. . . . [I]t’s unrealistic to expect the spiritual beliefs of soldiers to vanish once they put on a uniform.
In Fagin and Parco, “A Question of Faith,” 42.
74. For example, Operational Naval Instruction 1730.1, Chaplains’ Manual, 1973, § 1301(1); US Air Force, “Revised Interim Guidelines Concerning Free Exercise of Religion in the Air Force,” 2006, § 3.D.1; Army FM 1-05, Religious Support, 2003, § 1-16.
75. The use of “he” and “his” throughout this chapter is simply for convenience and is not intended to demean or denigrate women in uniform or their military service. Women serve with distinction throughout the US armed services in virtually every job category, including as commanders and chaplains.
76. For example, Combined Arms Center, Center for Army Leadership, Army Leader Transitions Handbook, 2008, 20. (“You are the role model. . . . Your example speaks for what is acceptable and what is not.”) The handbook “contains best practices and proven techniques from military and civilian sources” (emphasis added), 1.
77. Ibid., 14 (“Leave plenty of time for visits to see Soldiers at their duty stations or in training”), 15, 18, 20 (“Meet your troops at ranges, on guard duty and during squad and crew training. Do physical training with different groups regularly.”).
79. Ibid., 14, 20 (“Never pass up an opportunity to talk with your Soldiers.”), 25.
81. See Order No. 50 of George Washington to the Continental Army at Valley Forge, 2 May 1778, in Revolutionary Orders of General Washington, ed. Henry Whiting (New York: Wiley and Putnam, 1844), 74–75 (“While we are duly performing the duty of good soldiers, we certainly ought not to be inattentive to the higher duties of religion. To the distinguished character of a Patriot, it should be our highest glory to add the more distinguished character of a Christian.”); see also “The Christmas Message and Prayer Sent the Third Army, 1944,” in Brenton Greene Wallace, Patton & His Third Army, (1946; repr., Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2000): app. 7, 231, detailing the prayer sent by Gen George Patton to the Third Army.
82. Don M. Snider, “Intrepidity. . . . and Character Development within the Army Profession,” Strategic Studies Institute, January 2008, 2, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/ PUB847.pdf (“The soldier’s heart, the soldier’s spirit, the soldier’s soul are everything. Unless the soldier’s soul sustains him, he cannot be relied on and he will fail himself, his commander, and his country in the end. It is not enough to fight. It is the spirit that wins the victory,” quoting Gen George Marshall); see also Army Leader Transitions Handbook, 20, noting that the commander/ leader is “the role model for the ethical and moral climate of the unit” and that the commander’s/ leader’s “example speaks for what is acceptable and what is not” in the unit.
83. See 10 U.S.C. § 3581 (2006).
84. Army FM 1-05, Religious Support, § 3-106.
85. See, for example, Department of the Navy (DON), United States Navy Regulations: 1990, ch. 8, § 1, art. 0817(2) (“Chaplains shall be permitted to conduct public worship according to the manner and forms of the church of which they are members” [emphasis added].). Legislative chaplains are not so. Legislative chaplains exist, first and foremost, to seek divine blessings on, and to solemnize the proceedings of, legislators in enacting the statutes that govern us all, not to ensure free exercise of religion by legislators. In the legislative milieu, the chaplain is not hired to represent a specific denomination and, in fact, is not expected to do so. See Andy G. Olree, “James Madison and Legislative Chaplains,” Northwestern University Law Review 102 (2008): 151.
86. For information concerning the prevalence of Christianity in the United States as a whole, see US Census Bureau, Religious Composition of U.S. Population: 2007, 2008, table 74, http://www .census.gov/compendia/statab/tables/09s0074.pdf, reporting the combined percentage of Protestants and Catholics in the United States at 75.2 percent as of 2007. For information about the military, see Segal and Segal, “America’s Military Population, ” note 68.
87. See Religion Facts, Comparison Chart of Christian Denominations’ Beliefs, http://www.religionfacts.com/christianity/charts/denominations_beliefs.htm (accessed 5 May 2009). 88. Whatever else it was understood to mean when drafted and adopted, the establishment clause meant that none of the religious groups present at the founding of our nation would be elevated to become the established, national church of the United States. It is also important to recognize that military commanders have a responsibility to support the free exercise needs of the men and women in uniform. Merely because most of those serving in uniform happen to practice some variant of the Christian faith does not mean that DOD is favoring Christianity over other religious faith groups. As noted above, sheer numbers dictate most chaplains and resources are used to meet the needs of Christian service members and their families.
89. Katcoff v. Marsh, 755 F.2d 223, 234 (2d Cir. 1985).
90. See, for example, Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977), recognizing that freedom of expression includes the right to refrain from such expression; and Air Force Instruction (AFI) 52-101, Chaplain Planning and Organizing, 13 August 2005, § 2.1 (“Chaplains do not perform duties that are incompatible with their faith group tenets.”).
91. For example, Secretary of the Navy Instruction 1730.7D, Religious Ministry within the Department of the Navy, 8 August 2008, para. 5(e)(3) (“Chaplains care for all Service members, including those who claim no religious faith, [and] facilitate the religious requirements of personnel of all faiths.”).
92. DOD Directive 1304.19, Appointment of Chaplains for the Military Departments, 11 June 2004, para. 4.1.
93. Israel Drazin and Cecil B. Currey, For God and Country: The History of a Constitutional Challenge to the Army Chaplaincy (Hoboken, NJ: KTAV Publishing House, 1995): 35, 41.
94. Ibid., 32. DOD can, and does, set neutral criteria that all chaplains—irrespective of faith group—must meet, such as education, health, age, and experience requirements. DOD Instruction 1304.28, Guidance for the Appointment of Chaplains for the Military Departments, 11 June 2004, paras. 6.1–6.4. However, aside from such neutral criteria, DOD relies on the endorsement by the respective faith group that a chaplain nominee fully meets the religious requirements of his respective faith group.
95. Drazin & Currey, For God and Country, 32; and DOD Instruction 1304.28, Guidance for the Appointment of Chaplains for the Military Departments, para. 6.5.
96. Rigdon v. Perry, 962 F. Supp. 150 (D.D.C. 1997).
100. The US armed forces operate 24 hours per day, every day of the year. As such, men and women will be assigned to duties at odd hours and times throughout the year. When those times conflict with regularly scheduled chapel worship times or other religious activities, those on duty will be required to forgo attending such religious activities in order to carry out their military duties. Affected service members may, of course, request an accommodation, but the granting of such an accommodation will ultimately depend on mission requirements. See, for example, AFPD 52-1, Chaplain Service, attachment 1; AR 600-20, Army Command Policy, para. 5-6.a; and SECNAV Instruction 1730.8B, Accommodation of Religious Practices, para. 5.
104. See for example, Chalker v. Gates, Case No. 08-2467-KHV-JPO (D. Kan. filed 25 Sep 2008), where plaintiff complains, inter alia, about hearing “sectarian Christian prayers” being delivered at mandatory events. As an aside, one wonders what a “nonsectarian” Christian prayer would sound like and whether the plaintiff would have been satisfied had that kind of prayer been offered at the mandatory events. See also Ezra W. Reese, counsel to the Military Religious Freedom Foundation, to Thomas F. Kimble, acting inspector general, DOD, letter, 11 December 2006, http://www.militaryreligiousfreedom.org/MRFF%20Letters.pdf, complaining about the promulgation of a Christian video that featured several Pentagon officials extolling, inter alia, the virtues of prayer.
105. Technically, George Washington’s inauguration as president under our current Constitution, being the first, was an assumption of command ceremony, not a change of command ceremony, but the principle is exactly the same.
106. Military Establishment Act of 1791, ch. XXVIII, § 5, 1 Stat. 222.
108. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. at 790 (citation omitted); see also United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation, 299 U.S. 304, 328 (1936), noting that understanding “placed upon the Constitution . . . by the men who were contemporary with its formation” is “almost conclusive” (citation omitted).
109. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. at 792.
110. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. at 597.
111. See Rosenberger v. Rector, 515 U.S. at 828 (“Discrimination against speech because of its message is presumed to be unconstitutional.” Citing Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. at 641–43.).
112. See “Chaplain John Maurice Delivers Meaningful Shipboard Prayer on the Eve of the War in Iraq,” Military Christian, Summer 2003, http://members.iquest.net/~c_m_f/cmfnew56 .htm (accessed 6 May 2009); Navy Recruiting Command, Delayed Entry Program, “Daily Routine,” http://www.cnrc.navy.mil/DEP/daily.htm (accessed 6 May 2009), including the traditional evening prayer in Navy recruits’ daily schedules; and Robert S. Lanham, ENCM (SW/AW), USN, “I Love the Navy,” Goat Locker, http://www.goatlocker.org/retire/lovenavy.htm (accessed 6 May 2009), noting, through poetry, a myriad of naval traditions, including the evening prayer.
113. See note 107 and accompanying text.
114. Jacqueline L. Salmon, “ACLU Might File Suit to End Lunch Prayer,” The Washington Post, 26 June 2008, B04; see also Charles J. Gibowicz, Mess Night Traditions, 115 (2007).
115. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. at 792.
116. Snyder v. Murray City Corporation, 159 F.3d 1227, 1234 n.10 (10th Cir. 1998).
117. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. at 589.
120. 542 U.S. 1 (2004).
121. Ibid., 34–35 (Justice O’Connor concurring). Capitol Square Review & Advisory Board v. Pinette, 515 U.S. at 780; see also Rosenberger v. Rector, 515 U.S. at 828 (“It is axiomatic that the government may not regulate speech based on its substantive content or the message it conveys. . . . Discrimination against speech because of its message is presumed to be unconstitutional.”).
122.Capitol Square Review & Advisory Board v. Pinette, 515 U.S. at 780: see also Rothenberg v. Rector, 515 U.S. at 828 ("It is axiomatic that the government may not regulate speech based on its substantive content or the message it conveys....Discrimination against speech because of its message is presumed to be unconstitutional.").
123. See Newdow v. Bush, 355 F. Supp. 2d at 286–87.
124. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. at 793.
128. See John 1:1, 14 (“In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. . . . The Word became flesh and made His dwelling among us.”); and John 10:30 (“I and the Father are one.”).
129. For example, AFPD 52-1, Chaplain Service, para. 3.4.
131. Rosenberger v. Rector, 515 U.S. at 839, recognizing that government neutrality is respected, not offended, when evenhanded policies are applied to diverse viewpoints, including religious viewpoints.
132. See ibid., 828 (“Discrimination against speech because of its message is presumed to be unconstitutional.” Citing Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. at 641–43); Capitol Square Review & Advisory Board v. Pinette, 515 U.S. at 767, noting that “private religious expression receives preferential treatment under the Free Exercise Clause”; and Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. at 313 (“We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being. . . . [The Government] sponsor[s] an attitude . . . that shows no partiality to any one group and that lets each flourish according to the zeal of its adherents and the appeal of its dogma.”).
134. Operational Naval Instruction 1730.1, Chaplains’ Manual, 1973, § 1301(1); US Air Force, “Revised Interim Guidelines Concerning Free Exercise of Religion in the Air Force,” 2006, § 3. D.1; and Army FM 1-05, Religious Support, 2003, § 1-16.
135. See Center for Army Leadership, Army Leader Transitions Handbook, 14 (“Open communications early.”), 18 (“Spend time . . . talking to Soldiers. . . . Never be too busy to stop and share thoughts and ideas with your subordinates.”), 20 (“Never pass up an opportunity to talk with your Soldiers.”), 25 (“Spend more time listening and talking to subordinates.”), 26 (“As their leader, provide . . . an ear for listening. Listening to your subordinates gives individuals a share in the organization’s future.”).
136. See ibid., 11, identifying topics to be addressed with subordinates, including values, ethics, and integrity; and 20 (“You are the role model for the ethical and moral climate of the unit. Your example speaks of what is acceptable and what is not.”).
138. For example, Josh White, “4-Star General Relieved of Duty: Rare Move Follows Allegations of an Extramarital Affair,” The Washington Post, 10 August 2005, A01; William Fisher, “Jesus Is Not Our Co-Pilot, Academy Insists,” AntiWar.com, 20 June 2005, http://www.antiwar.com/ips/ fisher.php?articleid=6484 (accessed 6 May 2009); and Dave Moniz and Blake Morrison, “General Who Led Abu Ghraib Prison Guard Unit Has Been Suspended,” USA Today, 25 May 2004, http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2004-05-24-abuse-karpinski_x.htm.
139. Center for Army Leadership, Army Leader Transitions Handbook, 1.
153. DON, United States Navy Regulations: 1990, ch 8, § 1, art 0817(2).
156. “The Pentagon,” GlobalSecurity.org, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/ pentagon.htm (accessed 6 May 2009).
157. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. at 792.
I am a [Fill in your belief system (e.g., Christian, Muslim, Jew, atheist, Buddhist, Hindu, Wiccan, nontheist, etc.)]. I will not use my position to influence individuals or the chain of command to adopt [Fill in your belief system (e.g., Christianity, Islam, Judaism, atheism, etc.)], because I believe that soldiers who are not [Fill in your belief system (e.g., Christians, Muslims, Jews, atheists, etc.)] are just as trustworthy, honorable and good as those who are. Their standards are as high as mine. Their integrity is beyond reproach. They will not lie, cheat or steal, and they will not fail when called upon to serve. I trust them completely and without reservation. They can trust me in the same way.
The underlying assumptions of the oath appear to suggest that all religious/philosophical belief systems are essentially equivalent and that the adherents of one religious/philosophical system essentially exhibit the same characteristics as adherents of every other religious/philosophical system. Aside from the fact that it is impossible to prove the truthfulness of the underlying assumptions contained in the oath—to wit, about the trustworthiness, dependability, integrity, and the like, of adherents of belief systems other than the oath taker’s—and the fact that many could convincingly argue that readily available evidence indicates that such assertions are, in fact, demonstrably untrue, requiring the taking of such an oath would violate a whole host of constitutional provisions. First, it seeks to compel belief in the equivalence of different religions and between religion and nonreligion. No government official may require that. Simply put, things are rarely equivalent, and some things are definitely not equivalent to others. For example, one could legitimately argue that a philosophy or religion that demeaned women would be inferior (and so not equivalent) to one that did not do so. Likewise, a philosophy or religion that preferred one race over another would be inferior (and so not equivalent) to a philosophy or religion that did not do so. Second, the undertaking seeks to compel speech with which one may disagree, and freedom of speech includes the right to refrain from expressing ideas with which one disagrees. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. at 714 (recognizing that freedom of expression includes the right to refrain from such expression). Third, the undertaking seeks to replace the religious/philosophical views held by various commanders—as of right—with a view of religion and its adherents acceptable to the oath’s proponents (and, they hope, ultimately the US government).
Yet, once government officials put their stamp of approval on a religious belief, they have violated the very establishment clause that they were sworn to uphold. The above oath, if required, would violate the free exercise, the free speech, and the establishment clauses of the First Amendment, irrespective of the good intentions of those proffering the suggestion. The Supreme Court stated in Lee v. Weisman that “the First Amendment’s Clauses mean that religious beliefs and religious expression are too precious to be either proscribed or prescribed by the [Government]” (emphasis added), 505 U.S. at 589. Further, there seems to be a basic non sequitur in the argument. The authors correctly recognize that “beliefs remain a right, ” and “freedom of conscience is among the oldest and most precious freedoms enshrined in the history of America’s founding” (emphasis added) (Fagin and Parco, 43). In the very next sentence, they acknowledge, correctly, that members of the armed forces take an oath to uphold the Constitution of the United States (including, one presumes, the First Amendment). But then they argue that military leaders who believe that adherents of other faiths are less likely to have good character than adherents of the leader’s own faith/philosophy should leave the military and seek another career. What happened to the constitutional “right” of that leader to believe as he does? What happened to that leader’s constitutionally protected “freedom of conscience”? On what legal basis do the authors conclude that those who do not share their views on how to resolve potential religious misunderstandings in the military have any less right to remain in the military than those who agree with them? The authors refer to the First Amendment, but that amendment protects the leader’s right to believe as he wishes, not as the government or the authors may prefer. The First Amendment does not stand for what the authors contend. It protects the individual’s right to believe against government coercion or government-supported orthodoxy, even when the individual’s beliefs are strange or offensive.
160. Merely being present when a prayer is being said does not mean that one is assenting to the sentiments being expressed, that one is actively participating in religious worship, or that one is actively engaging in a religious act. Instead, the service member is an observer. People encounter and observe religious ceremonies all the time without their mere presence converting them into participants in the ceremonies. The same is true when present at military ceremonies or formations where a short, solemnizing prayer is said. Solemnizing prayers constitute only a minute part of such ceremonies and, thus, do not convert such gatherings into religious gatherings.
161. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. at 588–89, noting that it is inappropriate for a government official to tell a member of the clergy how to pray.
162. See Center for Army Leadership, Army Leader Transitions Handbook, 11, 15, and 19.
163. Board of Education v. Mergens, 496 U.S. at 250.
164. At its most obvious level in the West, one easily notes that Roman Catholics and Protestants share different theological views and practices. There continue to be theological differences separating Roman Catholics from Eastern Orthodox as well. Likewise, there are significant differences in theological beliefs and practices within Protestantism, such as between liturgical denominations (e.g., Episcopalians, Lutherans) and nonliturgical denominations (e.g., Baptists, Assemblies of God). Then, there are differences between denominations that believe that spiritual gifts (i.e., charismata) are still in use today (e.g., Church of God in Christ) and denominations that believe that such gifts are no longer in use (e.g., Independent Fundamental Churches of America). Further, there are religious groups that do not fall neatly into any category (e.g., Latter-Day Saints [Mormons], Christian Scientists). Even within groups with a common heritage, there can be significant theological differences (e.g., the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America versus the Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod or the Presbyterian Church [USA] versus the Presbyterian Church in America). To accommodate free exercise of religion as much as possible in the military, military chaplains represent many different Christian denominations, based in large part on the relative numbers of adherents of the respective denominations in uniform (i.e., denominations with greater numbers of adherents in uniform are allotted more chaplains than denominations with fewer numbers). See also, http:// www.religionfacts.com/christianity/charts/denominations_beliefs.htm (accessed 5 May 2009).
165. For example, complaint at 3-4, Chalker v. Gates, No. 08-CV-2467-KHV-JPO (D. Kan filed 25 Sep 2008), describing the “requirement for [P]laintiff . . . to attend military functions and formations where sectarian Christian prayers are delivered” (emphasis added).
167. See Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981), noting as “obvious and unarguable” that there is no governmental interest more compelling than security of the nation (citing Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 509 (1964).
168. Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. at 778.
169. See, for example, Chalker v. Gates, No. 08-CV-2467-KHV-JPO (D. Kan. filed 25 Sep 2008), complaining about “sectarian prayers” given at three required formations.
170. Order No. 50 of George Washington, in Revolutionary Orders of General Washington, 74–75 (“The Commander-in-Chief directs that Divine service be performed every Sunday at 11 o’clock, in each Brigade which has a Chaplain. Those Brigades that have none will attend the places of worship nearest them.”); “The Prayer at Sumter,” Harper’s Weekly: A Journal of Civilization, 26 January 1861, http://www.sonofthesouth.net/leefoundation/major-anderson-ft-sumter_Dir/civil-war-prayer -fort-sumter.htm, describing the dramatic prayer offered by the command chaplain following Maj Robert Anderson’s raising of the American flag over Fort Sumter just days before the post fell, signaling the start of the Civil War; “Proud to Pay Debt, says Gen. Pershing,” New York Times, 1 December 1918 (“[General Pershing] paid tribute to the dead and wounded, urged the soldiers to thank God for the victory, and declared that a new vision of duty to God and country had come to all.”); James H. O’Neill, “The True Story of the Patton Prayer: The Author of General Patton’s Famous Third Army Prayer Reveals the Story of its Origin, Paying Tribute Both to the General’s Trust in God and to the Power of Faith-filled Prayer,” The Review of the News, 6 October 1971, reprinted in The New American, 12 January 2004, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/ mi_m0JZS/is_1_20/ai _n25081623?tag=untagged, describing General Patton as a self-proclaimed “firm believer in prayer” as he issued his famous Third Army Prayer to his subordinates; and Don M. Snider, “Intrepidity . . . and Character Development,” 2 (“The soldier’s heart, the soldier’s spirit, the soldier’s soul are everything. Unless the soldier’s soul sustains him, he cannot be relied on and he will fail himself, his commander, and his country in the end. It is not enough to fight. It is the spirit that wins the victory,” quoting Gen George Marshall).
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