Source: http://fl.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20180404_0001176.MFL.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 11:10:05+00:00

Document:
Petitioner Donnie Lappale Hughes, in his Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody (Petition) (Doc. 1), challenges a 2010 Duval County conviction for dealing in stolen property (count one) and false verification of ownership on pawnbroker transaction form (count three). Petitioner raises four grounds in the Petition. Respondents filed an Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Response) (Doc. 14) and a Notice of Filing and Serving Exhibits (Doc. 15). Petitioner filed a Notice of Intent Not to File Reply (Doc. 18). See Order (Doc. 7).
The four claims raised in the Petition are: (1) the trial court erred in instructing the jury that proof of the sale of stolen property below the fair market value, where there was no evidence presented of fair market value, gives rise to an inference the seller knew or should have known the property was stolen, resulting in a due process violation; (2) the ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to call two exculpatory witnesses, (3) the ineffective assistance of counsel by misadvising Petitioner not to testify at trial, and (4) the ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to present a valid defense and misadvising Petitioner to reject the state's plea offer.
Petitioner seeks an evidentiary hearing. Petition at 1. It is Petitioner's burden to establish the need for a federal evidentiary hearing, and he has not met the burden. Chavez v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 647 F.3d 1057, 1060 (11th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 1120 (2012). In this regard, a district court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing if the record refutes the asserted factual allegations or otherwise precludes habeas relief. Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007). After a comprehensive review of the record before the Court, the Court finds that the pertinent facts are fully developed in this record or the record otherwise precludes habeas relief. Consequently, this Court is able to "adequately assess [Petitioner's] claim[s] without further factual development, " Turner v. Crosby, 339 F.3d 1247, 1275 (11th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1034 (2004).
The Court will address all four grounds, see Long v. United States, 626 F.3d 1167, 1169 (11th Cir. 2010) ("The district court must resolve all claims for relief raised on collateral review, regardless of whether relief is granted or denied.") (citing Clisby v. Jones, 960 F.2d 925, 936 (11th Cir. 1992) and Rhode v. United States, 583 F.3d 1289, 1291 (11th Cir. 2009)), but no evidentiary proceedings are required in this Court.
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) governs a state prisoner's federal petition for habeas corpus. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254; Ledford v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic & Classification Prison, 818 F.3d 600, 642 (11th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S.Ct. 1432 (2017). "AEDPA limits the scope of federal habeas review of state court judgments[.]" Pittman v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 871 F.3d 1231, 1243 (11th Cir. 2017). This narrow scope of review under AEDPA provides for habeas relief only if there are extreme malfunctions, certainly not to be used as a means to correct state court errors. Ledford, 818 F.3d at 642 (quoting Greene v. Fisher, 132 S.Ct. 38, 43 (2011)).
on "any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim" either "(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). "When deciding that issue, we review one decision: 'the last state-court adjudication on the merits.'" Wilson v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic Prison, 834 F.3d 1227, 1232 (11th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (emphasis added) (quoting Greene v. Fisher, 565 U.S. 34, 40, 132 S.Ct. 38, 181 L.Ed.2d 336 (2011)). This narrow evaluation is highly deferential, for "[a] state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as 'fairminded jurists could disagree' on the correctness of the state court's decision." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101, 131 S.Ct. 770, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011) (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664, 124 S.Ct. 2140, 158 L.Ed.2d 938 (2004)). We also must presume that "a determination of a factual issue made by a State court [is] correct, " and the petitioner "ha[s] the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
Morrow v. Warden, No. 17-10311, 2018 WL 1474837, at *5 (11th Cir. Mar. 27, 2018).
The standard of proof is demanding, requiring that a claim be highly probable. Bishop v. Warden, GDCP, 726 F.3d 1243, 1258 (11th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 135 S.Ct. 67 (2014). Also, the trial court's determination will not be superseded if reasonable minds might disagree about the factual finding. Brumfield v. Cain, 135 S.Ct. 2269, 2277 (2015). Also of note, "[t]his presumption of correctness applies equally to factual determinations made by the state trial and appellate courts." Pope v. Sec'y for Dep't of Corr., 680 F.3d 1271, 1284 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting Bui v. Haley, 321 F.3d 1304, 1312 (11th Cir. 2003)), cert. denied, 568 U.S. 1233 (2013).
As noted above in Morrow, in applying AEDPA deference, the first step is to identify the last state court decision that evaluated the claim on its merits. Marshall v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 828 F.3d 1277, 1285 (11th Cir. 2016). Once identified, the Court reviews the state court's decision, "not necessarily its rationale." Pittman, 871 F.3d at 1244 (quoting Parker v. Sec'y for Dep't of Corr., 331 F.3d 764, 785 (11th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted)).
Although the § 2254(d) standard is difficult to meet, the standard is meant to be difficult. Rimmer v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 876 F.3d 1039, 1053 (11th Cir. 2017) (opining that to reach the level of an unreasonable application of federal law, the ruling must be objectively unreasonable, not merely wrong or even clear error), petition for cert. docketed by (U.S. Mar. 9, 2018) (No. 17-8046). This Court recognizes, applying the AEDPA standard, state court decisions must be given the benefit of the doubt. Trepal v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 684 F.3d 1088, 1107 (11th Cir. 2012) (quotation and citation omitted), cert. denied, 568 U.S. 1237 (2013). Thus, in order to obtain habeas relief, "a state prisoner must show that the state court's ruling on the claim being presented . . . was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement." Richter, 562 U.S. at 103.
A brief procedural history will provide context for the claims. In an information, Petitioner was charged with dealing in stolen property, burglary of a structure, and false verification of ownership on pawnbroker transaction form. Ex. A at 14-15. The state filed a Notice of Intent to Classify Defendant as an Habitual Felony Offender. Id. at 16. On July 7, 2010, the trial court conducted a jury trial. Ex. B. The jury returned a verdict of guilty as two counts one and three, and not guilty as to count two. Id. at 166-67; Ex. A at 38-40. Petitioner moved for a new trial, Ex. A at 77-78, and the trial court denied it. Id. at 80.
On October 6, 2010, the trial court held a sentencing proceeding. Id. at 116-37. The court sentenced Petitioner as a habitual felony offender to thirty years in prison on count one, concurrent with a ten-year sentence on count three. Id. at 134-35. The court entered judgment and sentence on October 6, 2010. Id. at 83-89.
Petitioner appealed his conviction. Id. at 106. Through counsel, Petitioner filed an appeal brief. Ex. C. The state filed an answer brief. Ex. D. On March 6, 2012, the First District Court of Appeal (1st DCA) affirmed with a written opinion. Ex. E. The mandate issued on March 22, 2012. Ex. F. Petitioner sought discretionary review, Ex. G, but the Supreme Court of Florida declined to accept jurisdiction and denied the petition for review. Ex. H.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Postconviction Relief (Rule 3.850 motion), pursuant to the mailbox rule, on October 12, 2012. Ex. I. He filed an Amended Motion for Post-Conviction Relief (amended Rule 3.850 motion) on November 20, 2013. Ex. J. After being directed to do so by the trial court, the state filed a Response to Defendant's Amended Motion for Post Conviction Relief addressing ground four of the amended motion (ground eight, as designated by the trial court). Ex. K. See Ex. M at 80. Petitioner replied. Ex. L.
The trial court denied the Rule 3.850 motion and amended Rule 3.850 motion in its Order Denying Defendant's Motion for Postconviction Relief and Amended Motion for Postconviction Relief. Ex. M. Petitioner moved for rehearing. Ex. N. The trial court denied rehearing. Ex. O. Petitioner appealed. Ex. P. The state filed a notice that it would not file a brief. Ex. Q. The 1st DCA, on February 18, 2016, per curiam affirmed. Ex. R. The mandate issued on March 15, 2016. Ex. S.
In order to prevail on these Sixth Amendment claims, Petitioner must satisfy the two-pronged test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984), requiring that he show both deficient performance (counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness) and prejudice (there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different). Recently, the Eleventh Circuit, in Reaves v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 872 F.3d 1137, 1148 (11th Cir. 2017) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687), instructed: a counsel's performance is deficient only if counsel's errors are "so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment." And importantly, with regard to the establishment of prejudice requirement, the Eleventh Circuit provided that the reasonable probability of a different result must be "a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).
Finally, in order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, both parts of the Strickland test must be satisfied. Bester v. Warden, Att'y Gen. of the State of Ala., 836 F.3d 1331, 1337 (11th Cir. 2016) (citing Holladay v. Haley, 209 F.3d 1243, 1248 (11th Cir. 2000)), cert. denied, 137 S.Ct. 819 (2017). However, a court need only address one prong, and if it is found unsatisfied, the court need not address the other prong. Id.
In his first ground, Petitioner claims the trial court erred in instructing the jury that proof of the sale of stolen property below the fair market value, where there was no evidence presented of fair market value, gives rise to an inference the seller knew or should have known the property was stolen, resulting in a due process violation. Petition at 15. Petitioner contends this issue boils down to a due process violation as the state was allowed to infer guilt but not present evidence to support the inference on essential elements of the crime of dealing in stolen property. Id. In the Response, Respondents assert that the due process claim is unexhausted and procedurally barred. Response at 11, 24-27.
Before seeking § 2254 habeas relief in federal court, a petitioner must exhaust all state court remedies available for challenging his conviction. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c). For a federal claim to be exhausted, the petitioner must have "fairly presented [it] to the state courts." McNair v. Campbell, 416 F.3d 1291, 1302 (11th Cir. 2005). The Supreme Court has suggested that a litigant could do so by including in his claim before the state appellate court "the federal source of law on which he relies or a case deciding such a claim on federal grounds, or by simply labeling the claim 'federal.'" Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 32, 124 S.Ct. 1347, 158 L.Ed.2d 64 (2004). The Court's guidance in Baldwin "must be applied with common sense and in light of the purpose underlying the exhaustion requirement"-namely, giving the state courts "a meaningful opportunity" to address the federal claim. McNair, 416 F.3d at 1302. Thus, a petitioner could not satisfy the exhaustion requirement merely by presenting the state court with "all the facts necessary to support the claim, " or by making a "somewhat similar state-law claim." Kelley, 377 F.3d at 1343-44. Rather, he must make his claims in a manner that provides the state courts with "the opportunity to apply controlling legal principles to the facts bearing upon (his) [federal] constitutional claim." Id. at 1344 (quotation omitted).
Lucas v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., 682 F.3d 1342, 1351-52 (11th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 568 U.S. 1104 (2013).
Federal habeas courts reviewing the constitutionality of a state prisoner's conviction and sentence are guided by rules designed to ensure that state-court judgments are accorded the finality and respect necessary to preserve the integrity of legal proceedings within our system of federalism. These rules include the doctrine of procedural default, under which a federal court will not review the merits of claims, including constitutional claims, that a state court declined to hear because the prisoner failed to abide by a state procedural rule. See, e.g., Coleman, supra, at 747-748, 111 S.Ct. 2546; Sykes, supra, at 84-85, 97 S.Ct. 2497. A state court's invocation of a procedural rule to deny a prisoner's claims precludes federal review of the claims if, among other requisites, the state procedural rule is a nonfederal ground adequate to support the judgment and the rule is firmly established and consistently followed. See, e.g., Walker v. Martin, 562 U.S. __, __, 131 S.Ct. 1120, 1127-1128, 179 L.Ed.2d 62 (2011); Beard v. Kindler, 558 U.S. __, __, 130 S.Ct. 612, 617-618, 175 L.Ed.2d 417 (2009). The doctrine barring procedurally defaulted claims from being heard is not without exceptions. A prisoner may obtain federal review of a defaulted claim by showing cause for the default and prejudice from a violation of federal law. See Coleman, 501 U.S., at 750, 111 S.Ct. 2546.
Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1, 9-10 (2012).
The Supreme Court has imparted that a petition for writ of habeas corpus should not be entertained unless the petitioner has first exhausted his state court remedies. Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 349 (1989); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982). A procedural default arises "when 'the petitioner fails to raise the [federal] claim in state court and it is clear from state law that any future attempts at exhaustion would be futile.'" Owen v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., 568 F.3d 894, 908 n.9 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting Zeigler v. Crosby, 345 F.3d 1300, 1304 (11th Cir. 2003)), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 1151 (2010).
Upon review, the record shows Petitioner did not raise the federal due process claim in his appeal brief. Ex. C. Thus, he did not fairly present a federal constitutional claim to the state courts. In this case, it is clear that any future attempts at exhaustion would be futile.
There are, however, allowable exceptions to the procedural default doctrine; "[a] prisoner may obtain federal review of a defaulted claim by showing cause for the default and prejudice from a violation of federal law." Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. at 10 (citing Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991)). If cause is established, a petitioner is required to demonstrate prejudice. In order to demonstrate prejudice, a petitioner must show "that there is at least a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different had the constitutional violation not occurred." Owen, 568 F.3d at 908.
More particularly, to demonstrate cause, a petitioner must show that some objective factor external to the defense impeded his effort to properly raise the claim in state court. Wright v. Hopper, 169 F.3d 695, 703 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 934 (1999). Here, Petitioner fails to point to some factor external to the defense.
Petitioner has failed to show cause, and he does not meet the prejudice or manifest injustice exceptions. Although a petitioner may obtain review of the merits of a procedurally barred claim if he satisfies the actual innocence "gateway" established in Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995), Petitioner has not done so. The gateway is meant to prevent a constitutional error at trial from causing a miscarriage of justice and "'the conviction of one who is actually innocent of the crime.'" Kuenzel v. Comm'r, Ala. Dep't of Corr., 690 F.3d 1311, 1314 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324), cert. denied, 569 U.S. 1004 (2013). The fundamental miscarriage of justice exception is only available in extraordinary cases upon a showing of "'actual' innocence" rather than mere "'legal' innocence." Johnson v. Ala., 256 F.3d 1156, 1171 (11th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 926 (2002). With respect to this unexhausted ground, Petitioner has failed to identify any fact warranting the application of the fundamental miscarriage of justice exception.
In conclusion, the Court finds ground one is unexhausted and procedurally defaulted. As Petitioner has failed to establish cause and prejudice or any factors warranting the application of the fundamental miscarriage of justice exception to overcome the default, this ground is due to be denied as procedurally barred.

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