Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/138/146/
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 09:51:16+00:00

Document:
defendants claimed title to it and were in its possession, holding the same openly and adversely to him; that their claim of title was without foundation in law or equity, and that it was made in fraud of the rights of the plaintiff. To this bill the defendants demurred on the ground, among others, that it appeared from it that the plaintiff had a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law by ejectment to recover the real property described, and that it showed no ground for equitable relief. The demurrer was sustained. Held that the ruling of the court below was right.
When the right set up by the plaintiff is a title to real estate, and the remedy sought is its possession and enjoyment, that remedy should be sought at law, where both parties have a constitutional right to call for a jury.
"An action to determine and quiet the title to real property may be brought by anyone having or claiming an interest therein, whether in or out of possession of the same, against any person claiming title thereto, though not in possession,"
although construed by the courts of that state as authorizing a suit in equity to recover possession of real estate from the occupant in possession of it, does not enlarge the equity jurisdiction of federal courts in that state, so as to give them jurisdiction over a suit in equity in a case where a plain, adequate and complete remedy may be had at law.
Holland v. Challen, 110 U. S. 15, explained and distinguished from this case.
This was a suit in equity to quiet the title of the plaintiff, as trustee of the Des Moines and Fort Dodge Railroad Company, a corporation of Iowa, to certain real property in the County of Humboldt in that state of the value of five thousand dollars.
making a grant of land to Iowa to aid in the construction of certain railroads in that state, and a certificate of the proper officer of the Land Department of the United States setting apart the lands to that company as a portion of the grant.
The bill charged that the claim and pretended title of the defendants were without foundation in law or equity; that they were made in fraud of the rights of the plaintiff; that the preemption and homestead claim, and entry thereunder, and the certificate of entry of the land office, and the patent of the United States were fraudulently made, giving as a reason therefor that the land thus entered and patented was not at the time subject to entry and patent, and that the deed of the Iowa Homestead Company conveyed no title, for the reason alleged that the land was no part of the grant to the state, and that these evidences of title were procured without legal right and in violation of law, but were clouds upon the plaintiff's title, and interfered with and prevented the sale of his property. He therefore prayed that the certificate of entry, and the patent of the land, and the certificate of the Land Department that the land was a part of the grant to the Iowa, and the deed of the Homestead Company, might be annulled and cancelled, and the cloud upon his title caused thereby removed, and the title to the premises be established and quieted in him.
To the bill the defendants demurred on the ground, among others, that it appeared from it that the plaintiff had a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law by ejectment to recover the real property described, and that it showed no ground for equitable relief. The demurrer was sustained by the court below, and a decree entered dismissing the bill. From this decree the plaintiff appealed to this Court.
The facts set forth in the bill of the plaintiff clearly show that he has a plain, adequate, and complete remedy at law for the injuries of which he complains. He alleges that he is the owner in fee, as trustee, of certain described lands in Iowa, and his injuries consist in this, that the defendants are in the possession and enjoyment of the property, claiming title under certain documents purporting to transfer the same which are fraudulent and void. If the owner in fee of the premises, he can establish that fact in an action at law, and if the evidences of the defendants' asserted title are fraudulent and void, that fact he can also show. There is no occasion for resort to a court of equity either to establish his right to the land or to put him in possession thereof.
"that whenever a court of law is competent to take cognizance of a right, and has power to proceed to a judgment which affords a plain, adequate, and complete remedy, without the aid of a court of equity, the plaintiff must proceed at law, because the defendant has a constitutional right to a trial by jury."
Hipp v. Babin, 19 How. 271, 60 U. S. 278.
It would be difficult, and perhaps impossible, to state any general rule which would determine in all cases what should be deemed a suit in equity as distinguished from an action at law, for particular elements may enter into consideration which would take the matter from one court to the other; but this may be said, that where an action is simply for the recovery and possession of specific real or personal property or for the recovery of a money judgment, the action is one at law. An action for the recovery of real property, including damages for withholding it, has always been of that class. The right which in this case the plaintiff wishes to assert is his title to certain real property; the remedy which he wishes to obtain is its possession and enjoyment, and in a contest over the title, both parties have a constitutional right to call for a jury.
What we have thus said will be sufficient to dispose of this case, but some consideration is due to the arguments of counsel founded upon the statutes of Iowa and the principle supposed to have been established by this Court in the decision of the case of Holland v. Challen, 110 U. S. 15, upon which the plaintiff relies.
"Suits in equity shall not be sustained in either of the courts of the United States in any case where a plain, adequate, and complete remedy may be had at law,"
or the constitutional right of parties in actions at law to a trial by a jury. The state, it is true, may create new rights and prescribe the remedies for enforcing them, and if those remedies are substantially consistent with the ordinary modes of proceeding in equity, there is no reason why they should not be enforced in the courts of the United States, and such we understand to be the effect of the decision in Clark v. Smith, 13 Pet. 195, and In re Broderick's Will, 21 Wall. 503.
other disposition of the property impossible, and disturbed him in his right of possession. He therefore prayed that the defendant might be required to show the nature of her adverse estate or interest; that the title of the plaintiff might be adjudged valid, and quieted as against her and parties claiming under her, and his right of possession assured, and that the defendant might be decreed to have no estate in the premises, and be enjoined from in any manner injuring or hindering the plaintiff in his title and possession. The defendant demurred to the bill on the ground that the plaintiff had not made or stated such a case as entitled him to the discovery or relief prayed. The court below sustained the demurrer, dismissed the bill, and, the case was brought to this Court, where the decree was reversed and the bill sustained.
"the statute of Nebraska enlarges the class of cases in which relief was formerly afforded by a court of equity in quieting the title to real property. It authorizes the institution of legal proceedings not merely in cases where a bill of peace would lie -- that is, to establish the title of the plaintiff against numerous parties insisting upon the same right, or to obtain repose against repeated litigation of an unsuccessful claim by the same party -- but also to prevent future litigation respecting the property by removing existing causes of controversy as to its title, and so embraces cases where a bill quia timet to remove a cloud upon the title would lie."
law permitted, and that, to entitle the plaintiff to relief in such cases, there must be a concurrence of three particulars -- the possession of the property by the plaintiff, the disturbance of his possession by repeated actions at law, and the establishment of his right by successive judgments in his favor. Upon these facts' appearing, the court would interpose and grant a perpetual injunction to quiet the possession of the plaintiff against any further litigation from the same source. It was also observed that a change in the form of the action for the recovery of real property had taken place from that which formerly existed, and that the judgment rendered in such cases in some states became a bar to future litigation upon the subjects determined, and that in such cases, there could be no necessity of repeated adjudications at law upon the right of the plaintiff as a preliminary to his invoking the jurisdiction of a court of equity to quiet his possession against an asserted claim to the property. The Court also explained when a bill quia timet would lie, and in what respect such a bill differed from a bill of peace. It was brought, it said, not so much to put an end to vexatious litigation respecting the property as to prevent future litigation, by removing existing causes of controversy as to its title. It was designed to meet anticipated wrongs or mischiefs, the jurisdiction of the court being invoked because the party feared future injury to his rights and interests. To maintain a suit of this character, it was said, it was also generally necessary that the plaintiff should be in possession of the property, and, except where the defendants were numerous, that his title should have been established at law or be founded on undisputed evidence or long continued possession.
controversy at law respecting the title to or right of possession of real property when neither of the parties is in possession. An action at law, whether in the ancient form of ejectment or in the form now commonly used, will lie only against a party in possession. Should suit be brought in the federal court under the Nebraska statute against a party in possession, there would be force in the objection that a legal controversy was withdrawn from a court of law, but that is not this case, nor is it of such cases we are speaking."
It is thus seen that the very case that is now before us is excepted from the operation of the ruling in Holland v. Challen, or at least was designedly left open for consideration whenever similar relief was sought where the defendant was in possession of the property.
Nor can the case of Reynolds v. National Bank, 112 U. S. 405, be deemed to sustain the plaintiff's contention. It was there only held that the legislation of the state may be looked to in order to ascertain what constitutes a cloud upon a title, and that such cloud could be removed by a court of the United States sitting in equity in a suit between proper parities. The question did not arise as to whether the plaintiff had a plain, adequate, and complete remedy at law, but whether a suit to remove the cloud mentioned would lie in a federal court. Nothing was intended at variance with the law of Congress excluding the jurisdiction of a court of equity where there is such a full remedy at law, or in conflict with the constitutional guaranty of the right of either party to a trial by jury in such cases. In Frost v. Spitley, 121 U. S. 552, 121 U. S. 557, subsequently decided, the Court referred to Holland v. Challen as authorizing a bill in equity to quiet title in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Nebraska by a person not in possession "if the controversy is one in which a court of equity alone can afford the relief prayed for," recognizing that the decision in that case went only to that extent.

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