Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/238/99/
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 12:20:36+00:00

Document:
General Order No. 58, of April 23, 1900, amended the Philippine Code of Criminal Procedure, and gave the person charged with crime a specified time within which to plead, but even if the trial court misconstrued the provisions of the Order in that respect, such error would not deprive the proceedings of lawful effect and enlarge the accused.
Mere error of law, even though serious, committed by the trial court in a criminal case in the exercise of jurisdiction over a case properly subject to its cognizance, cannot be reviewed by habeas corpus.
The writ of habeas corpus cannot be employed as a substitute for a writ of error.
The facts, which involve the validity of a conviction and sentence in the Philippine Islands and the extent to which the conviction can be reviewed on habeas corpus, are stated in the opinion.
and the Director of Prisons has appealed. The controversy fairly involves the application of § 5, Organic Act of the Islands (Act of Congress, July 1, 1902, c. 1369, 32 Stat. 691, 692, 695), and under § 10 of that statute, we have jurisdiction of the appeal. Fisher v. Baker, 203 U. S. 174; Paraiso v. United States, 207 U. S. 368.
"That said imprisonment and deprivation of his liberty are illegal, because said court of first instance denied him the due process of law guaranteed by the Philippine Bill of Rights. The said illegalities are as follows: That on December 21, 1910, the petitioner appealed from a judgment of the lower court sentencing him for the crime of theft. That on December 23, the petitioner, without having been asked to answer the complaint, was notified that the case would be heard at 10 A.M. on the 24th. When the case was called at 10 A.M. on December 24th, and while the petitioner was arraigned, he asked for time in which to answer the complaint, which request was denied by the court, who ordered the clerk to enter on the record that the petitioner pleaded 'Not guilty' to the complaint. Thereupon the petitioner's attorney also asked for time in which to prepare a defense, which petition was also denied by the same court, to which ruling the petitioner's attorney excepted and asked that the exceptions, together with the requests of the petitioner which had been denied, be entered on the record. Wherefore, the petitioner prays the Honorable Supreme Court to issue a writ of habeas corpus in his favor, reversing the judgment pronounced by the lower court as being contrary to law, and that the petitioner be set at liberty."
facts relates to the question of the alleged permission to take articles, and this, as we have seen, would not have excused the defendant, even had it been proved, though he admits that himself and Frandon are the only witnesses on that point."
"Sec.19. If, on the arraignment, the defendant requires it, he must be allowed a reasonable time, not less than one day, to answer the complaint or information. He may, in his answer to the arraignment, demur or plead to the complaint or information. . . ."
"Sec. 30. After his plea, the defendant shall be entitled, on demand, to at least two days in which to prepare for trial."
"If it appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in custody of an officer under process issued by a court or magistrate, or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or magistrate had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appear after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order."
the accusation against him, to have a speedy and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his behalf. . . ."
Kepner v. United States, supra, 195 U. S. 117-118.
occurred after the jurisdiction referred to had attached and after the trial had begun. It rested upon the proposition that, while the trial court had jurisdiction in the first place, it either lost that jurisdiction during the progress of the trial, or so transcended its powers as to render its judgment void."
We are unable to agree with the conclusion of the Supreme Court that the judgment pronounced by the Court of First Instance was void and without effect. Under the circumstances disclosed, denial of the request for time to answer and to prepare defense was, at most, matter of error which did not vitiate the entire proceedings. The cause -- admitted to be within the jurisdiction of the court -- stood for trial on appeal. The accused had known for weeks the nature of the charge against him. He had notice of the hearing, was present in person and represented by counsel, testified in his own behalf, introduced other evidence, and seems to have received an impartial hearing. There is nothing to show that he needed further time for any proper purpose, and there is no allegation that he desired to offer additional evidence or suffered substantial injury by being forced into trial. But for the sections in respect of procedure quoted from General Order No. 58, it could not plausibly be contended that the conviction was without due process of law. The Court of First Instance placed no purely fanciful or arbitrary construction upon these sections, and certainly they are not so peculiarly inviolable that a mere misunderstanding of their meaning or harmless departure from their exact terms would suffice to deprive the proceedings of lawful effect and enlarge the accused. Ex Parte Harding, 120 U. S. 782, 120 U. S. 784; In re Wilson, 140 U. S. 575, 140 U. S. 585; Felts v. Murphy, 201 U. S. 123, 201 U. S. 129; In re Moran, 203 U. S. 96, 203 U. S. 104-105; Frank v. Mangum, 237 U. S. 309.
over a case properly subject to its cognizance, cannot be reviewed by habeas corpus. That writ cannot be employed as a substitute for the writ of error."
Ex Parte Parks, 93 U. S. 18, 93 U. S. 21; Ex Parte Siebold, 100 U. S. 371, 100 U. S. 375; Ex Parte Royall, 117 U. S. 241, 117 U. S. 250; In re Frederich, 149 U. S. 70, 149 U. S. 75; Baker v. Grice, 169 U. S. 284, 169 U. S. 290; Tinsley v. Anderson, 171 U. S. 101, 171 U. S. 105; Markuson v. Boucher, 175 U. S. 184; Henry v. Henkel, 235 U. S. 219, 235 U. S. 229; Frank v. Mangum, supra.
The decree of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands, granting the writ of habeas corpus and discharging the prisoner, must be reversed and the cause remanded to that court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

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