Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/183/53/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 10:48:57+00:00

Document:
Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway Company v.
When a state court refuses permission to remove to a federal court a case pending before the state court, and the federal court orders its removal, this Court has jurisdiction to determine whether there was error on the part of the state court in retaining the case.
The plaintiffs were citizens of the Missouri, in which this action was brought. The railway company was a citizen of the Kansas. On the face of record, there was therefore diverse citizenship, authorizing, on proper proceedings being taken to bring it about, the removal of the action from the state court to the federal court, and the State of Missouri is not shown to have such an interest in the result as would warrant the conclusion that the state was the real party in interest, and the consequent refusal of the motion for removal.
This case involves the question of removal from a state to a federal court.
"SEC. 1143. Commissioners to See to Enforcement of Article -- Investigate Complaints. -- It shall be the duty of the railroad commissioners of this state to see that the provisions of this article are enforced. When complaint is made in writing by any person having an interest in the matter about which complaint is made, that any rate or rates established by any common carrier are unreasonable, unjust, or extortionate, or that any of the provisions of this article have been or are being violated, it shall be the duty of said railroad commissioners to proceed at once to investigate such complaint and determine the truth of the same."
"SEC. 1144. Forfeitures, How Recovered and Disposed of. -- The forfeitures and penalties herein provided for shall go to the county school fund of the county where sued for, and may be recovered in a civil action in the name of the State of Missouri at the relation of the board of railroad commissioners to the use of said fund."
petitioner, be advanced upon the docket and take precedence of any other case upon the docket except criminal cases. The costs of such proceedings may be, with the approval of the attorney general and governor of the state, when such suit is brought by any private person, and when brought by said commissioners shall be ordered by the commissioners to be, paid, in the first instance, out of any money in the treasury not otherwise appropriated, and if upon final hearing the decision is against the said common carrier or other person against whom the proceeding is being prosecuted, such common carrier or person shall be liable for the costs, for which judgment may be rendered as in any other case."
to the supreme court of the state, and by that court on June 30, 1899, affirmed. 151 Mo. 644.
The single question presented for our consideration is whether the railway company was entitled to remove this suit from the state to the federal court. The state court refused the removal, and the federal court, on the other hand, denied a motion to remand. Under these circumstances, this Court has jurisdiction to determine whether there was error on the part of the state court in retaining the case. Removal Cases, 100 U. S. 457; Stone v. South Carolina, 117 U. S. 430; Missouri Pacific Railway Company v. Fitzgerald, 160 U. S. 556, 160 U. S. 582.
On the face of the record, the railway company was entitled to a removal. The plaintiffs were citizens of Missouri, the state in which the suit was brought. The railway company was a citizen of the State of Kansas. There was therefore diverse citizenship, the defendant a citizen of another state than that in which the suit was brought petitioning for removal, and the removal appears perfect in form.
But it was held by the Supreme Court of the State of Missouri that it was proper to go behind the face of the record and inquire who was the real party plaintiff, and, making such examination, that court decided that the real party plaintiff was the State of Missouri. If that conclusion be correct, then no removal in this case was justifiable, because a state is not a citizen within the meaning of the removal acts. Stone v. South Carolina, 117 U. S. 430; Germania Ins. Co. v. Wisconsin, 119 U. S. 473; Postal Telegraph Cable Co. v. United States, 155 U. S. 482.
day held by this Court, construing the Eleventh Amendment, that in all cases where jurisdiction depends on the party, it is the party named in the record. Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. 738. But that technical construction has yielded to one more in consonance with the spirit of the amendment, and in In re Ayers, 123 U. S. 443, it was ruled upon full consideration that the amendment covers not only suits against a state by name, but those also against its officers, agents, and representatives where the state, though not named as such, is nevertheless the only real party against which in fact the relief is asked, and against which the judgment or decree effectively operates. And that construction of the amendment has since been followed. That amendment refers only to suits brought against a state. But, applying the same principles of construction to the removal acts and to cases in which it is claimed that the state, though not the nominal, is in fact the real, party plaintiff, it may fairly be held that the state is such real party when the relief sought is that which inures to it alone, and in its favor the judgment or decree, if for the plaintiff, will effectively operate. Such a case was Ferguson v. Ross, 38 F. 161. There, an action was brought in the name of Ferguson, a shore inspector, against Ross and others, to recover a penalty. The statute of New York authorized the suit to be prosecuted in the name of the inspector, but all the moneys recovered were payable into the treasury of the state, and it was held by the Circuit Court for the Eastern District of New York that the action was one in which the real party plaintiff was the state. It was for its sole benefit that the action was brought, and it alone was to be benefited by the recovery.
parties in interest, and in respect to whom the decree will effectively operate.
It is true that the state has a governmental interest in the welfare of all its citizens, in compelling obedience to the legal orders of all its officials, and in securing compliance with all its laws. But such general governmental interest is not that which makes the state, as an organized political community, a party in interest in the litigation, for if that were so, the state would be a party in interest in all litigation, because the purpose of all litigation is to preserve and enforce rights and secure compliance with the law of the state, either statute or common. The interest must be one in the state as an artificial person. Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 154 U. S. 362, 154 U. S. 390.
of the public schools, to the establishment and maintenance of which its credit is pledged by the organic law. It seems to us, therefore, that the state, in addition to its governmental, has a real pecuniary interest in the subject matter of this controversy, and that the suit is being prosecuted for its benefit in every sense, and is not subject to removal to the United States court, and we so hold."
We are unable to concur in these views. Whatever may be the result of any subsequent or ancillary proceeding, the direct object of this suit is to obtain a decree of the court commanding the railway company to comply with the order of the commissioners. Such a decree is similar to the ordinary decrees of a court of equity, and it is familiar that a court of equity may enforce compliance with its orders and decrees by penalties upon the delinquents. So that, if this possible pecuniary result is sufficient to make the state the real party plaintiff it would follow that, in Missouri, the state is the real party plaintiff in every equity suit because in every equity suit such penalties may be imposed.
Neither can it be held that the state's voluntary assumption of the costs of the litigation when the decree is adverse to the railroad commissioners makes it the real party plaintiff. That is simply an incidental matter, and does not determine its relations to the suit any more than its payment of the salary of the judge, fees of jurors, or any other expenses of the litigation. We are of opinion, therefore, that the party named in the record as plaintiff is the real party plaintiff, and that the voluntary assumption by the state of the costs in some contingencies of the litigation, or the indirect and remote pecuniary results which may follow from a disobedience of the orders of the court, do not make it the party to whom alone the relief sought inures, and in whose favor a decree for the plaintiff will effectively operate.
The judgment of the Supreme Court of the Missouri is reversed, and the case remanded to that court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

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