Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/113/179/
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 02:40:00+00:00

Document:
The term "property" in the treaty by which the United States acquired Louisiana comprehends every species of title, inchoate or complete, legal or equitable, and embraces rights which lie in contract, executory as well as executed.
The incomplete title acquired from the Spanish government, prior to the Treaty of St. Ildefonso between Spain and France, to lands in the territory now embraced within the State of Missouri was such a property interest as could be transferred by mortgage or reached by judicial process.
Congress intended by the Act of February 14, 1874, 13 Stat. 16, entitled "An Act to confirm certain titles in the Missouri," to recognize the claim of Austin arising from the Spanish concession, survey, and grant recited in its preamble and to assure those who were in possession by contract or by operation of law, and therefore assignees of Austin, that they would not be disturbed by any assertion of claim upon the part of the United States.
Questions involved in the determination of a suit in equity are not open to reexamination in any collateral proceeding between the same parties or their privies if the court rendering the decree had jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties.
This action, in form ejectment, involves the title to an undivided half of a tract of land in the County of Washington, State of Missouri, containing 640 acres, part of a larger tract containing 7,153 arpents, or 6,085 acres, known as the Mine a Breton survey, or as United States survey numbered 430, made in the name of Moses Austin and dated August 14 and 15, 1817. In conformity with the instructions of the court, the jury returned a verdict for the defendants.
"the whole of that certain tract of land heretofore granted to the said Moses Austin by the Spanish government and confirmed to him by the government of the United States, containing 7,160 arpents, and being one league square, situated at and near the Mine a Breton, in the County of Washington, and territory aforesaid [Missouri], being the only concession from the Spanish government to the said Moses Austin,"
2,500 arpents, and which the grantor had previously conveyed to other persons.
The deed also provided that the grantor would not warrant and defend the premises against a judgment for about $14,000 which the Bank of St. Louis had obtained in the superior court of the territory against him, for which debt that bank held, in addition, a mortgage on part of the premises conveyed; nor against three judgments in favor of Gamble's estate for about $1,029; nor against a judgment in favor of Alexander McNair for about $450.
"CHAP. 29. An act to confirm certain land titles in the State of Missouri."
"Whereas the baron of Carondelet, Governor General of the Territory of Louisiana, did, on the fifteenth day of March, anno Domini seventeen hundred and ninety-seven, instruct Zenon Trudeau, lieutenant governor of said territory, to place Moses Austin in possession of a league square of land at Mine a Breton, in said territory; and"
"Whereas the said Moses Austin did, in the year anno Domini seventeen hundred and ninety-eight, take possession of the said land by moving upon it with his family, and did improve the same by building dwelling house, blacksmith shop, furnace, and other improvements, and"
"Whereas, the said lieutenant governor did, on the fourteenth day of January, seventeen hundred and ninety-nine, order Antone Lulard, surveyor in said territory, to survey the said land and put the said Austin legally in possession of the same, which survey, numbered fifty-two, containing seven thousand one hundred and fifty-three arpents, and three and two-thirds feet, was executed by said Antone Lulard, and a certificate of the same filed by him in November, anno Domini eighteen hundred; and"
and two, in the name of the King of Spain, grant to the said Moses Austin the land so surveyed and located, therefore,"
"Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled that the United States hereby release whatever title they have to said lands now numbered four hundred and thirty on the plat in the surveyor general's office, and in townships thirty-seven and thirty-eight, range two east, in the County of Washington and State of Missouri, containing seven thousand one hundred and fifty-three and thirty-two one-hundredths arpents (six thousand eighty-five and twenty-nine one-hundredths acres), to the heirs, legal representatives, or assigns of said Moses Austin, according to their respective interests therein, provided however that this act shall not affect nor impair the title which any settler or other person may have acquired adverse to the title of said Moses Austin to any portion of said land."
They also proved that James Bryan, one of the grantees in the deed of February 15, 1820, intermarried in 1813 with Emily M. Austin, a daughter of Moses Austin. There were five children of that marriage, one of whom, Stephen, was born July 16, 1814, and died in the succeeding month. Three others, the present plaintiffs, were born respectively December 14, 1815, September 25, 1817, and January 12, 1821, while the remaining one, Elizabeth, was born in 1822 and died in 1833. Moses Austin died in 1821, and James Bryan in 1822. The widow of the latter intermarried in 1824 with James F. Perry, of which marriage there were five children, two of whom died in infancy during the lifetime of their parents, two others died without having been married, while the remaining one died in 1875, leaving several children. The surviving children of these two marriages and their descendants are the only living descendants of Moses Austin.
the court, could not be made a part of the bill of exceptions, but its import is shown by the preamble of the foregoing act of Congress.
"the plat of survey No. 52, containing 7,153 arps. 32 2/3 p's, in the right of Moses Austin, as the same appears of record in first part of registre d'arpentage, page 85, Soulard's surveys, together with field notes of the same,"
"Don John Bonaventure Morales, treasurer of armies, intendant interim of the royal finances of the provinces of Louisiana and western Florida, superintendent, subdelegate, judge of arrivals, of lands, and King's domain,"
"complete property, use, and domain of the aforesaid 7, 153 arpents 32 2/3 feet of land in superficie, according to the results of figures and measures contained in the plat of survey drawn by said Soulard,"
etc. This was accompanied by a copy of the testimony taken in 1808 in support of Austin's claim, from which it appears that he took possession of the land embraced in that grant as early as 1798, and made improvements thereon. 3 American State Papers 682.
2. The claim of Austin, as set out by him upon the United States record of land titles.
were had March 21, 1820; a deed by the sheriff making the sale to Charles R. Ross, who purchased as agent of the Bank of St. Louis, and to which no seal or scroll was affixed; duly recorded deeds from the bank to Charles R. Ross in trust; from Ross to Simpson, Price, Hammond, and Easton; from Simpson, Hammond, and Easton to Price; from Ross, agent, to Price; from Price to Smith and others in trust; from the latter, under date of June 29, 1822, to Louis Devotion; the death of Devotion, and the appointment and qualification of Savage and Walsh as his administrators; the resignation of Walsh, and the sale by Savage, as administrator, because of the insufficiency of personalty to meet debts of his intestate, and in conformity with the orders of the county court of St. Louis County, having jurisdiction in the premises, of Austin's interest in the land embraced in the Mine a Breton survey; its purchase by John Deane; the confirmation of such sale, and the subsequent conveyance to Deane by the administrator of Devotion on May 28, 1835.
"that the right, title, and interest of James Bryan at the time of his death, and of said James F. Perry and Emily, his wife, in her right, and of the said William Bryan, Moses Bryan, Guy Bryan Stephen Perry, Eliza Perry, and the child, whose name is unknown, of the child, whose name is unknown, of the said Emily Perry, in the said undivided moiety of the said tract of land conveyed by said Moses Austin, by his deed, executed the fifteenth of February, 1820, to said James Bryan as aforesaid, be vested in your orator, and for such other and further relief as to the court shall seem just,"
The bill was verified by the oath of the complainant, and he also made affidavit that the defendants (naming them) and the child, whose name was unknown, of the said Emily Perry, defendants in the bill, were nonresidents of the State of Missouri.
"by their guardian, Johh Brickey, and file their answer, and the said James F. Perry, and Emily, his wife, having been notified to appear at this term according to law, and answer the bill of the said complainant, or the same would be taken as confessed, and having failed to file any exceptions, plea, demurrer, or answer to the bill, it is ordered that the same be taken as confessed against the said James F. Perry and his wife."
"be vested in the said John Deane, the complainant, unless the said James F. Perry and wife appear at the next term of this Court and file their answer to said bill. "
"And now at this day comes the said John Deane, the complainant, by his solicitor, and the said William Bryan, Moses Bryan, Guy Bryan, Stephen Perry, Eliza Perry, and a child, whose name is unknown, of the said Emily Bryan, defendants, by their guardian, John Brickey, and by agreement of the parties aforesaid, it is consented that the bill be taken in lieu of allegations, and thereupon, neither party requiring a jury, all and singular the premises are submitted to the court, who doth find that the matters aforesaid, in form aforesaid in the bill alleged, are true, and the said James F. Perry, and Emily, his wife, having failed to appear at this term of the court, and file their answer to the bill of complaint, it is ordered and adjudged and decreed that the decree heretofore entered in this cause against them be, and the same is hereby, made final."
being the moiety conveyed as charged in the bill of complaint by Moses Austin to James Bryan, by his deed dated the fifteenth day of February, in the year one thousand eight hundred and twenty, be vested in the said John Deane, the complainant."
"And it is further ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the said defendants recover of the said complainant, John Deane, the costs and charges in this behalf expended."
"And it is further ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the said William Bryan, Moses Bryan, Guy Bryan, Stephen Perry, Eliza Perry, and a child, whose name is unknown, of the said Emily Bryan, respectively, be allowed each the time of six months after he or she respectively comes of age to appear and show cause against this decree entered as aforesaid against them."
1. That the defendants and those under whom they claim, had been in the open, continuous adverse possession of the premises in controversy for more than thirty years prior to the commencement of the action. 2. That the equitable title to the premises emanated from the government of the United States on the tenth of April, 1803; that the premises have not been in possession of the plaintiffs, or of anyone under whom they claim, for a period of time exceeding thirty years prior to February 27, 1874, nor have plaintiffs, during that period, paid taxes thereon, but they have been paid by defendants and those under whom they claim; that on the 10th day of June, 1814, all title, both legal and equitable, to said premises passed from the United States, and that no action to recover the same has been instituted, as provided by law, prior to the institution of the present suit. 3. That the decree in the equity suit, instituted on the 1st day of April, 1836, by John Deane, who then had actual possession of the premises, and under whom the defendants claim, estops the plaintiffs from maintaining their action and from claiming under the deed from Moses Austin to James Bryan, Levi Pettibone, and Rufus Pettibone any interest or estate in the premises adverse to said defendants.
possession, the jury were instructed to find and did find a verdict for the defendants. A general exception was taken by the plaintiffs to the "instructions" given by the court. Judgment was rendered on the verdict. The plaintiffs sued out this writ of error.
The objection that the record does not show a sufficient exception upon the part of plaintiffs to the instructions given to the jury cannot be sustained. The series of propositions announced by the court, although styled instructions, embodies nothing more than the reasons that induced it to direct a verdict for the defendants. These propositions submitted no fact for the determination of the jury, for they were accompanied by a peremptory instruction to return a verdict for the defendants. As the bill of exceptions contains all the evidence, and in addition sets forth the exceptions reserved by the plaintiffs in the progress of the trial to the admission of testimony, it is competent for this Court to determine whether the exceptions were well taken and also whether there was error in directing a verdict for the defendants. If, upon all the evidence, excluding such as was incompetent, plaintiffs were entitled to go to the jury -- and such is the contention here -- there was error of law in instructing them to find for the defendants. We proceed, therefore, to consider such of the questions argued by counsel as are deemed necessary to the determination of the case.
granted for lands lying within the Territory of Missouri before the 10th day of March, 1804. In behalf of the plaintiffs, it is contended that the Spanish grant of 1802, recited in the preamble of the Act of February 14, 1874, was void because made subsequent to the Treaty of St. Ildefonso, concluded October 1, 1800, between Spain and France, Act March 26, 1804, c. 38, § 14, 2 Stat. 287; Foster v. Neilson, 2 Pet. 253, 27 U. S. 304; that if the grant to Austin was an incomplete grant, and therefore embraced by the act of 1814, that act operated only to confirm to him the equitable title to the land, the legal title remaining in the United States until the passage of the Act of February 14, 1874; that the equitable title passed only under the restrictions and in the manner prescribed by the act of 1814; that, so far from Austin acquiring the legal title, the board of commissioners organized under the act of Congress found that his title was not a grant made and completed prior to the Treaty of St. Ildefonso, 2 American State Papers, 678; 3 American State Papers, 671; Burgess v. Gray, 16 How. 48; that for these reasons, Austin did not at the date of the before-mentioned judgments, have any title which could be mortgaged or which was subject to levy and sale under execution; and consequently that all the proceedings which had for their object to acquire or reach his interest in the Mine a Breton survey are inoperative to defeat their rights under the Act of February 14, 1874, by which, for the first time, the United States parted with the legal title.
"the state in which the premises are situated was formerly a part of the territory first of France, next of Spain, then of France, who ceded it to the United States by the treaty of 1803, in full propriety, sovereignty, and dominion, as she had acquired and held it, 2 Pet. 301, by which this government put itself in place of the former sovereigns and became invested with all their rights, subject to their concomitant obligations to the inhabitants;"
"This Court has defined property to be any right, legal or equitable, inceptive, inchoate, or perfect which, before the treaty with France in 1803, or with Spain in 1819, had so attached to any piece or tract of land, great or small, as to affect the conscience of the former sovereign 'with a trust,' and make him a trustee for an individual, according to the law of nations, of the sovereign himself, the local usage or custom of the colony or district, according to the principles of justice and rules of equity"
"the term 'grant,' in a treaty, comprehends not only those which are made in form, but also any concession, warrant, order, or permission to survey, possess, or settle, whether evidenced by writing or parol, or presumed from possession."
So, in Hornsby v. United States, 10 Wall. 242, it was said that by the term "property," as applied to lands, all titles are embraced, legal or equitable, perfect or imperfect. See also Carpenter v. Rannels, 19 Wall. 141; Morton v. Nebraska, 21 Wall. 660.
"It is a matter of history of which this court will take judicial notice that at the time of the cession of Louisiana to the United States, in that portion of the territory of which this state is composed, nineteen-twentieths of the titles to lands were like that involved in this case prior to its confirmation. There were very few complete grants. Most of the inhabitants were too poor to defray the expenses attending the completion of their titles, but they had faith in their government, and rested as quietly under their inchoate titles as though they had been perfect. As early as October, 1804, we find the legislature speaking of freeholders and authorizing executions against lands and tenements. There being so few complete titles, the legislatures, in subjecting lands and tenements generally to execution, must have contemplated a seizure and sale of those incomplete titles which existed under the Spanish government. At the date of the act above referred to, no titles had been confirmed by the United States. An instance is not recollected in which a question has been made as to the liability of such titles as Clamorgan's, under the Spanish government, to sale under execution. It is believed that such titles have been made the subject of judicial sales without question ever since the change of government."
"The imperfect title, as then filed, was subject to seizure and sale by execution; the ultimate perfect title demanded and granted was a confirmation and sanction by the political power of the imperfect title, and gave it complete legal validity."
right which at least as between private parties, could be transferred by mortgage or be reached by judicial process.
But it is contended that the defendants cannot claim title under the before-mentioned proceedings in the courts of the territory and State of Missouri, and thereby defeat the rights of the plaintiffs under Austin's deed of 1820, because: 1, it was not competent for the bank to have Austin's interest sold under execution on a judgment while it held a mortgage on part of the premises sold, and thus cut off his right of redemption; 2, the sheriff's deed to Ross was void for want of a seal or scroll affixed thereto, 1 Terr.Stats.Missouri 120, § 45; Moreau v. Detchemendy, 18 Mo. 522; Moreau v. Branham, 27 Mo. 351; Moreau v. Detchemendy, 41 Mo. 431; Grimsley v. Riley, 5 Mo. 280; Harley v. Ramsey, 49 Mo. 309; 3, the deed from the bank was not under its corporate seal, and these matters all appearing upon the face of the record in the suit of Deane v. Bryan, instituted in 1836, no title passed by the decree therein, even if the court rendering it had jurisdiction. These propositions were necessarily involved in the determination of that suit, and, so far as they impeach the correctness of that adjudication, are not open to reexamination in any collateral proceeding between the same parties or their privies, provided the court which rendered the decree had jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties.
Its jurisdiction to pass any final decree affecting the rights of nonresident minors is assailed only upon grounds to be now stated.
"suits in equity concerning real estate or whereby the same may be affected shall be brought in the county within which such real estate, or a greater part thereof, is situate,"
"in all cases where the court may decree the conveyance of real estate or the delivery of personal property, they may by decree pass the title of such property without any act to be done on the part of the defendants when in their judgment it shall be proper, and may issue a writ of possession if necessary to put the party entitled into possession of such real or personal property, or may proceed by attachment or sequestration."
Rev.Stat.Mo. 1835 (2d ed. 1840), Title "Courts," 155; ib., Title "Practice in Chancery," art. 1, §§ 1 and 2; art. 6, § 7.
for publication) and answer the same, or the bill will be taken as confessed. Rev.Stat.Mo. 1835, Title "Practice in Chancery," art. 1, § 7. Similar proceedings were prescribed as to persons interested in the subject matter of the bill, whose names appeared from the verified allegations of the bill to be unknown to the complainant. Ib., §§ 10, 11. While our attention has not been called to any statute of Missouri in force when Deane's suit was instituted which in terms authorized publication against nonresident minors, there was no exception in their favor from the provision which permits that mode of bringing nonresident defendants before the court. They could be proceeded against by publication whenever the statute permitted such process against adults. 1 Daniell Ch.Prac. 164, 659, c. § 2. The provision authorizing courts of equity to proceed according to the rules, usage, and practice of courts of chancery had reference to the rules and practice which obtained in the English courts of chancery. Ruby v. Strother, 11 Mo. 417; Hendricks v. McLean, 18 Mo. 32; Creath v. Smith, 20 Mo. 113. In conformity with that practice, the court, in the case of Deane v. Bryan, appointed a guardian ad litem to defend the suit for the nonresident infant defendants. 1 Daniell, Ch.Prac. 160-163. And the record shows that he made defense.
shall set down distinctly the allegations made by him and denied by the other party or which by the course of proceedings in chancery he is required to support by his testimony, and issues shall be made thereon accordingly,"
"The trial of all issues and matters of fact shall be by jury, or, if neither party require a jury, by the court, and the allegations shall be disposed of by a general or special verdict before a final decree shall be made, except such as shall be expressly decided by the court to be immaterial or irrelevant to the merits of the cause."
Ib., § 5. The consent given was not that the court might take the allegations of the bill to be true, but only that the "bill be taken in lieu of allegations," thereby dispensing with the requirement of the statute that the complainant should formally "set down" the material allegations of his bill. The effect of the consent was to place the complainant under the necessity, imposed by statute as well as by the established rules in equity practice, of proving every allegation of fact necessary to authorize a decree against the nonresident infants. Nothing was confessed by the guardian ad litem, but, a jury being waived, the court found the matters alleged in the bill to true, and decreed accordingly. That the evidence upon which the court acted does not appear in the record is perhaps because the suit was heard upon oral testimony, in connection with the official documents and records referred to in the bill. Ib., § 7.
We have, then, a final decree of a court of superior general jurisdiction, rendered in a suit that involved the title to a tract of land embracing the premises in controversy, and situate in the county in which the court was held; in which suit the present plaintiffs, as nonresident minors, were parties defendant, having been brought, in the mode prescribed by the local law, before the court, by publication, and having made defense by guardian ad litem duly appointed, and by which decree it was adjudged that the right, title, and interest of the present plaintiffs and others in the said tract be vested in the complainant Deane, under whom the present defendants hold possession.
The decree, as we have seen, passed the title without any conveyance from the nonresident defendants, for, by its terms, whatever title they held was vested in the complainant Deane. According to the settled principles of law, the plaintiffs are thereby estopped from asserting in this collateral proceeding any interest in the premises in controversy adverse to that of the defendants. It is not subject to collateral attack, because there is nothing on the face of the record which shows any want of jurisdiction in the court that rendered it. It was and is conclusive as to all the parties to that suit and their privies until reversed or modified on appeal, or unless, in proper time, it had been impeached, in some direct proceeding and set aside or annulled.
concession, survey, and grant recited in its preamble and to release to the assignee of such claim the remaining title (if any such there was) of the United States. And those who purchased under the proceedings referred to were assignees within the meaning of the act. There was no purpose to disturb their title or possession. On the contrary, the sole object of this legislation, so far as it may be ascertained from the debates in Congress, was to assure those who thus acquired possession, whether by contract or by operation of law, that they would not be disturbed by any assertion of claim upon the part of the United States. It originated with the representatives in Congress from Missouri, whose avowed purpose was to protect the interests of their immediate constituents. The necessity of this act arose from a then recent opinion of the Commissioner of the General Land Office that the legal title to the land within the Austin claim was still in the United States. In order to quiet the fears of those "who have been in possession for half a century, claiming the land adversely against everybody, as well as the United States," the act of 1874 was passed. It had no other object. Cong.Rec., Vol. 2, Pt. 1, 43d Cong., 1st Sess. 1874, pp. 716, 910.

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