Source: https://connecticut.lexroll.com/a-dubreuil-sons-inc-v-lisbon-215-conn-604-1990/
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 06:24:29+00:00

Document:
PETERS, C.J., SHEA, CALLAHAN, CLASS and HULL, Js.
concluded that the consent of both parties was required for arbitration; it was not unreasonable for the trial court to have concluded that the parties intended to modify the standard form to provide for consensual rather than mandatory arbitration.
Application for an order to compel the defendant to proceed with arbitration pursuant to an agreement executed by the parties, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of New London and tried to the court, Hendel, J.; judgment for the defendant denying the application, from which the plaintiff appealed. Affirmed.
Richard S. Cody, for the appellant (plaintiff).
David S. Williams, for the appellee (defendant).
of either party. Subsequently, the plaintiff filed a “Motion for Arbitration” that was heard on the short calendar and denied by the trial court. See General Statutes 52-410 (c). Later, a motion to reconsider and reargue the same motion was also denied. From those decisions of the trial court denying its application for an order to compel arbitration, the plaintiff appealed to the Appellate Court. We transferred the appeal to ourselves, pursuant to Practice Book 4023.
After the plaintiffs appeal was transferred to this court, the trial court, in response to the plaintiff’s motion for articulation, filed a written memorandum of decision articulating its reason for denying the plaintiff’s application for an order to compel arbitration. In its memorandum the trial court declared: “If one party could unilaterally compel the other party to resolve any disputes by arbitration, as the plaintiff contends, then the change in section 7.9.1 of the terms from `shall’ to `may’ would be meaningless.” The trial court could reasonably have reached such a conclusion.
Peck, Inc. v. Harbor Marine Contracting Corporation, 203 Conn. 123, 130, 523 A.2d 1266 (1987); Finley v. Aetna Life Casualty Co., 202 Conn. 190, 199, 520 A.2d 208 (1987); Bead Chain Mfg. Co. v. Saxton Products, Inc., 183 Conn. 266, 274-75, 439 A.2d 314 (1981); First Hartford Realty Corporation v. Ellis, supra; Albert Mendel Son, Inc. v. Krogh, 4 Conn. App. 117, 123, 492 A.2d 536 (1985); Novelly Oil Co. v. Mathy Construction Co., 147 Wis.2d 613, 617, 433 N.W.2d 628 (1988); Peninsular Carpets, Inc. v. Bradley Homes, 58 Wis.2d 405, 416, 206 N.W.2d 408 (1973).
(1980); Albrecht v. Albrecht, 19 Conn. App. 146, 152, 562 A.2d 528, cert. denied, 212 Conn. 813, 565 A.2d 534 (1989); Friedlander v. Friedlander, 5 Conn. App. 1, 5, 496 A.2d 964 (1985).
The cardinal rule in construing contracts is to ascertain the intention of the parties. Finlay v. Swirsky, 103 Conn. 624, 634, 131 A. 420 (1925); McVay v. Anderson, 221 Ga. 381, 385, 144 S.E.2d 741 (1965). “[I]nterpretation of an agreement [by a court] is a search for the intent of the parties.” Lavigne v. Lavigne, supra, 428; Lar-Rob Bus Corporation v. Fairfield, supra. “A contract is to be construed [by the trier of fact] according to what is fairly to be assumed to be the understanding and intent of the parties.” Bridge-Mile Shoe Corporation v. Liggett Drug Co., 142 Conn. 313, 318, 113 A.2d 863 (1955); Bronx Derrick Tool Co. v. Porcupine Co., 117 Conn. 314, 318, 167 A. 829 (1933). “Such a determination of what the parties intended is normally a question of fact, reversible only if the trier of fact could not reasonably have arrived at the conclusion that it had reached.” Thompson Peck, Inc. v. Harbor Marine Contracting Corporation, supra, 130. “`The intent developed is alone material, and when that is ascertained it is conclusive.’ Whitney v. Wyman, 101 U.S. 392, 395 [25 L.Ed. 1050 (1880)]; Adams v. Whittlesey, 3 Conn. 560 ; Ogden v. Raymond, 22 Conn. 379, 385 .” Massaro v. Savoy Estates Realty Co., 110 Conn. 452, 458, 148 A. 342 (1930).
Because the command word “shall” was deliberately removed from the contract by the parties and replaced by the word “may,” it was not unreasonable for the trial court to have determined that the parties intended to modify their contract to provide for consensual rather than mandatory arbitration. See Shulman v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 154 Conn. 426, 429, 226 A.2d 380 (1967); Miller v. Phoenix State Bank Trust Co., 138 Conn. 12, 16, 81 A.2d 444 (1951). We certainly cannot say that it was clearly erroneous for the court to have attributed such a meaning to the amended arbitration provision. See Rowe v. Cormier, supra, 373.
Mercantile Co. v. Farm Builders, Inc., supra; see 17 Am.Jur.2d, Contracts 271, p. 680.
(1973). To the extent that such an ambiguity exists, “the rule should be applied which says typed matter controls the printed instead of the rule which says that a contract will be construed against the author. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corporation v. Daniel, 150 Tex. 513, 243 S.W.2d 154 (1951); Leslie Lowvy Co. v. KTRM, Inc., [239 S.W.2d 98, 900 (Tex.Civ.App. 1951)]; 17A C.J.S. Contracts 324, p. 217.” Innes v. Webb, 538 S.W.2d 237, 239 Tex. Civ. App. 1976).
We cannot say that the trial court erred by concluding that arbitration, under the amended contract, required the consent of both parties.
(1986); East Hartford v. East Hartford Municipal Employees Union, Inc., 10 Conn. App. 611, 525 A.2d 112 (1987), rev’d on other grounds, 206 Conn. 643, 539 A.2d 125 (1988).

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