Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/100881/baggett-vs-bullitt
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 10:27:50+00:00

Document:
1. The provisions of the 1955 statute and the 1931 Act violate due process, since they, as well as the oaths based thereon, are unduly vague, uncertain and broad. Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction, 368 U. S. 278 , followed. Pp. 377 U. S. 361 -372.
2. A State cannot require an employee to take an unduly vague oath containing a promise of future conduct at the risk of prosecution for perjury or loss of employment, particularly where the exercise of First Amendment freedoms may thereby be deterred. Pp. 377 U. S. 373 -374.
3. Federal courts do not automatically abstain when faced with a doubtful issue of state law, since abstention involves a discretionary exercise of equity power. Pp. 377 U. S. 375 -379.
(a) There are no special circumstances warranting application of the doctrine here. P. 377 U. S. 375 .
(b) Construction of the 1931 oath cannot eliminate the vagueness from its terms, and would probably raise other constitutional issues. P. 377 U. S. 378 .
(c) Abstention leads to piecemeal adjudication and protracted delays, a costly result where First Amendment freedoms may be inhibited. Pp. 377 U. S. 378 -379.
"terms susceptible of objective measurement" and failed to inform as to what the State commanded or forbade. The statute therefore fell within the compass of those decisions of the Court holding that a law forbidding or requiring conduct in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates due process of law. Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U. S. 385 ; Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U. S. 451 ; Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U. S. 495 ; United States v. Cardiff, 344 U. S. 174 ; Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Comm'n of Oklahoma, 286 U. S. 210 .
We also conclude that the 1931 oath offends due process because of vagueness. The oath exacts a promise that the affiant will, by precept and example, promote respect for the flag and the institutions of the United States and and State of Washington. The range of activities which are or might be deemed inconsistent with the required promise is very wide indeed. The teacher who refused to salute the flag or advocated refusal because of religious beliefs might well be accused of breaching his promise. Cf. West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624 . Even criticism of the design or color scheme of the state flag or unfavorable comparison of it with that of a sister State or foreign country could be deemed disrespectful, and therefore violative of the oath. And what are "institutions" for the purposes of this oath? Is it every "practice, law, custom, etc., which is a material and persistent element in the life or culture of an organized social group," or every "established society or corporation," every "establishment, esp[ecially] one of a public character?" [ Footnote 9 ] The oath may prevent a professor from criticizing his state judicial system or the Supreme Court or the institution of judicial review. Or it might be deemed to proscribe advocating the abolition, for example, of the Civil Rights Commission, the House Committee on Un-American Activities, or foreign aid.
Smith v. California, 361 U. S. 147 ; Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359 , 283 U. S. 369 . See also Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U. S. 242 ; Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88 ; and Winters v. New York, 333 U. S. 507 .
It is further argued, however, that, notwithstanding the uncertainties of the 1931 oath and the statute on which it is based, the oath does not offend due process because the vagaries are contained in a promise of future conduct, the breach of which would not support a conviction for perjury. Without the criminal sanctions, it is said, one need not fear taking this oath, regardless of whether he understands it and can comply with its mandate, however understood. This contention ignores not only the effect of the oath on those who will not solemnly swear unless they can do so honestly and without prevarication and reservation, but also its effect on those who believe the written law means what it says. Oath Form A contains both oaths, and expressly requires that the signer "understand that this statement and oath are made subject to the penalties of perjury." Moreover, Wash.Rev.Code § 9.72.030 provides that "[e]very person who, whether orally or in writing . . . , shall knowingly swear falsely concerning any matter whatsoever" commits perjury in the second degree. Even if it can be said that a conviction for falsely taking this oath would not be sustained, the possibility of a prosecution cannot be gainsaid. The State may not require one to choose between subscribing to an unduly vague and broad oath, thereby incurring the likelihood of prosecution, and conscientiously refusing to take the oath with the consequent loss of employment, and perhaps profession, particularly where "the free dissemination of ideas may be the loser." Smith v. California, 361 U. S. 147 , 361 U. S. 151 .
Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Comm'n of Oklahoma, 286 U. S. 210 , 286 U. S. 243 ; cf. Small Co. v. American Sugar Refining Co., 267 U. S. 233 .
We are asked not to examine the 1931 oath statute because, although on the books for over three decades, it has never been interpreted by the Washington courts. The argument is that, ever since Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U. S. 496 , the Court on many occasions has ordered abstention where state tribunals were thought to be more appropriate for resolution of complex or unsettled questions of local law. AFL v. Watson, 327 U. S. 582 ; Spector Motor Service v. McLaughlin, 323 U. S. 101 ; Harrison v. NAACP, . Because this Court ordinarily accepts the construction given a state statute in the local courts and also presumes that the statute will be construed in such a way as to avoid the constitutional question presented, Fox v. Washington, 236 U. S. 273 ; Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U. S. 395 , an interpretation of the 1931 oath in the Washington courts in light of the vagueness attack may eliminate the necessity of deciding this issue.
Other considerations also militate against abstention here. Construction of this oath in the state court, abstractly and without reference to concrete, particularized situations so necessary to bring into focus the impact of the terms on constitutionally protected rights of speech and association, Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U. S. 288 , 297 U. S. 341 (Brandeis, J., concurring), would not only hold little hope of eliminating the issue of vagueness, but also would very likely pose other constitutional issues for decision, a result not serving the abstention-justifying end of avoiding constitutional adjudication.
for an undue length of time. England, supra; Spector, supra; Government & Civic Employees Organizing Committee v. Windsor, 353 U. S. 364 , [ Footnote 14 ] a result quite costly where the vagueness of a state statute may inhibit the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. Indeed, the 1955 subversive person oath has been under continuous constitutional attack since at least 1957, Nostrand v. Balmer, 53 Wash.2d 460, 463, 335 P.2d 10, 12, and is now before this Court for the third time. Remitting these litigants to the state courts for a construction of the 1931 oath would further protract these proceedings, already pending for almost two years, with only the likelihood that the case, perhaps years later, will return to the three-judge District Court and perhaps this Court for a decision on the identical issue herein decided. See Chicago v. Atchison, T. & S.F. R. Co., 357 U. S. 77 , 357 U. S. 84 ; Public Utilities Comm'n of Ohio v. United Fuel Co., 317 U. S. 456 . [ Footnote 15 ] Meanwhile, where the vagueness of the statute deters constitutionally protected conduct, "the free dissemination of ideas may be the loser." Smith v. California, 361 U. S. 147 , 361 U. S. 151 .
Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U. S. 488 , 367 U. S. 495 -496.
Although the 1931 Act has not been the subject of previous challenge, an attack upon the 1955 loyalty statute was instituted by two of the appellants in the present case, Professors Howard Nostrand and Max Savelle, who brought a declaratory judgment action in the Superior Court of the State of Washington asking that Chapter 377, Laws of 1955, be declared unconstitutional and that its enforcement be enjoined. The Washington Supreme Court held that one section was unconstitutional but severable from the rest of the Act, whose validity was upheld. Nostrand v. Balmer, 53 Wash.2d 460, 335 P.2d 10. On appeal to this Court, the decision of the Washington court was vacated and the case remanded for a determination of whether employees who refused to sign the oath would be afforded a hearing at which they could explain or defend the reasons for their refusal. Nostrand v. Little, 362 U. S. 474 . The Washington Supreme Court held upon remand that, since Professors Nostrand and Savelle were tenured professors, the terms of their contracts and rules promulgated by the Board of Regents entitled them to a hearing. Nostrand v. Little, 58 Wash.2d 111, 361 P.2d 551. This Court dismissed a further appeal, Nostrand v. Little, 368 U. S. 436 . The issue we find dispositive of the case at bar was not presented to this Court in the above proceedings.
" Statement and Oath for Teaching Faculty "
" of the University of Washington "
" Statement and Oath for Staff of the University of Washington "
" Other Than Teaching Faculty "
Id. at 341 U. S. 57 .
It is also argued that § 2 of the Smith Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2385, upheld over a vagueness challenge in Dennis v. United States, 341 U. S. 494 , proscribes the same activity in the same language as the Washington statute. This argument is founded on a misreading of § 2 and Dennis v. United States, supra.
Id. at 341 U. S. 502 .
In reversing convictions under this section in Yates v. United States, 354 U. S. 298 , the Court made quite clear exactly what al the above terms do and do not proscribe: "[T]he Smith Act reaches only advocacy of action for the overthrow of government by force and violence." Id. at 354 U. S. 324 .
Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359 , 283 U. S. 369 .
United States v. Congress of Industrial Organizations, 335 U. S. 106 , 335 U. S. 141 -142 (Rutledge, J., concurring).
See, e.g., Railroad Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U. S. 496 ; Chicago v. Fieldcrest Dairies, Inc., 316 U. S. 168 ; Spector Motor Service, Inc., v. McLaughlin, 323 U. S. 101 ; Alabama State Federation of Labor v. McAdory, 325 U. S. 450 ; American Federation of Labor v. Watson, 327 U. S. 582 ; Stainback v. Mo Hock Ke Lok Po, 336 U. S. 368 ; Shipman v. DuPre, 339 U. S. 321 ; Albertson v. Millard, 345 U. S. 242 ; Leiter Minerals, Inc., v. United States, 352 U. S. 220 ; Government & Civic Employees Organizing Committee, CIO v. Windsor, 353 U. S. 364 ; City of Meridian v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 358 U. S. 639 .
In Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U. S. 167 , the NAACP and the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund sought a declaratory judgment and injunction on several constitutional grounds in respect to numerous recently enacted state statutes. The lower court enjoined the implementation of three statutes, including one provision on vagueness grounds, and ordered abstention as to two others, finding them ambiguous. This Court ordered abstention as to all the statutes, finding that they were all susceptible of constructions that would limit or eliminate their effect on the litigative and legal activities of the NAACP and construction might thereby eliminate the necessity for passing on the many constitutional questions raised. The vagueness issue, for example, would not require adjudication if the state courts found that the challenged provisions did not restrict the activities of the NAACP or require the NAACP to register. Unlike the instant case, the necessity for deciding the federal constitutional issues in the above and other abstention cases turned on whether the restrictions or requirements of an uncertain or unclear state statute were imposed on the persons bringing the action or on their activities as defined in the complaint.
317 U. S. 317 U.S. 456 at 317 U. S. 463 .
At 368 U. S. 286 .
At 341 U. S. 515 -516.

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