Source: http://masscases.com/cases/sjc/331/331mass694.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 18:17:25+00:00

Document:
SYDNEY S. MORGAN & others vs. JOHN BANAS & others.
BILL IN EQUITY, filed in the Superior Court on March 27, 1952.
Charles V. Ryan, Jr., (James F. Egan with him,) for the plaintiffs.
Joseph P. Zajac, for the defendant Banas.
Donald A. Clancy, Associate City Solicitor, for the defendants city council and mayor of Springfield.
QUA, C.J. This is a bill for a declaratory decree as to the validity of an amendment to the zoning ordinance of Springfield whereby certain land of the defendant Banas on the north side of Boston Road was changed from "Residence B" to "Business A." The trial judge found the amendment valid. Beyond this he made no express findings. He dismissed the bill. The evidence is reported.
The plaintiffs insist that the amendment is invalid for several reasons with which we shall deal in turn.
city council did not act reasonably with "Due regard . . . to the characteristics of the different parts of the city" for the purposes laid down in G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 40, Section 25, as appearing in St. 1933, c. 269, Section 1. [Note Page696-1] Lamarre v. Commissioner of Public Works of Fall River, 324 Mass. 542, 544-546, and cases cited. Shannon v. Building Inspector of Woburn, 328 Mass. 633, 635-638. Marblehead v. Rosenthal, 316 Mass. 124, 126. Compare Caputo v. Board of Appeals of Somerville, ante, 547.
2. It is contended that the formal requirements of G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 40, Section 27, as appearing in St. 1941, c. 320, were not observed because the hearing before the city council was held on December 27, 1951, and the amendment was voted on February 25, 1952, and in the meantime there had been an election which had resulted in a change of eleven members in the city council of twenty-six members, including a change in the majority in the board of aldermen.
313 Mass. 393, and Perkins v. School Committee of Quincy, 315 Mass. 47, are distinguishable both as to their subject matter and as to the wording of the statutes involved. One distinction is that the action of the board in those cases was quasi judicial rather than legislative in character. See Coleman v. Board of Appeal of Boston, 281 Mass. 112, 115.
3. It is contended that the previous hearing before the planning board and the recommendations of that board were insufficient because they related to a petition by Banas for rezoning his entire tract alleged in the bill to contain twenty-eight acres, [Note Page697-1] whereas in fact the city council ultimately rezoned only about seventeen acres out of that tract. It is argued that the amendment adopted was not the same as that proposed and that a further reference to and hearing by the planning board were necessary to comply with c. 40, Section 27.
One answer to this contention is that paragraphs 8 and 9 of the plaintiffs' bill, the truth of which (with an exception not here material) is admitted in the defendants' answers, can only be construed as alleging that the entire tract included in the petition, whatever its area, was rezoned. The amended ordinance itself does not appear in the record. But even if it be the fact that only seventeen acres were rezoned out of twenty-eight petitioned for, and if that fact could be shown in spite of the pleadings, there would be nothing in the point. Section 27 provides that after the required hearings and the report by the planning board the city council "may adopt, reject, or amend and adopt any such proposed ordinance or by-law." An amendment as the result of which only part of the tract originally described is rezoned is within the wording above quoted. No further reference to the planning board was necessary. See Burlington v. Dunn, 318 Mass. 216, 218-219; Lundy v. Wayland, 328 Mass. 581, 582-583. Compare Fish v. Canton, 322 Mass. 219, 222-224.
the judge in his finding refers to the amendment as "purporting to change the zone of the twenty-eight acres." At most this was nothing but an inaccuracy in describing the amendment which the judge plainly intended to hold valid. Moreover, the language of the judge was warranted by the state of the pleadings.
4. It is contended that the amendment is invalid because Banas deceived the city council as to the use he intended to make of his land if it should be rezoned. It is settled, however, that courts cannot, for the purpose of determining the validity of legislation, receive evidence of the inducements and motives of the legislators in enacting it. Paine v. Boston, 124 Mass. 486, 490. Attorney General v. Williams, 178 Mass. 330, 335. Donovan v. Suffolk County Apportionment Commissioners, 225 Mass. 55, 58. Attorney General v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 306 Mass. 25, 48. Simon v. Needham, 311 Mass. 560, 566. Rosenberg v. Whitefish Bay, 199 Wis. 214, 218. Angle v. Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis & Omaha Railway, 151 U.S. 1, 18-19. Calder v. Michigan, 218 U.S. 591, 598. Daniel v. Family Security Life Ins. Co. 336 U.S. 220, 224.
5. A bill for a declaratory decree is not usually dismissed because the court refuses the interpretation sought by the plaintiff. Ordinarily a declaratory decree will be entered in any event. Merchants Mutual Casualty Co. v. Leone, 298 Mass. 96, 99. Zaltman v. Daris, ante, 458, 459, 462. But this case "involves the validity of a municipal ordinance" of the city of Springfield, and the city has not been made a party. We think that by the language of G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 231A, Section 8, inserted by St. 1945, c. 582, Section 1, the city is made an indispensable party, and that the case cannot go on to a declaratory decree in its absence. The decree dismissing the bill was therefore technically correct. Doubtless we could have disposed of the case upon this ground alone, but as our decision is in favor of the validity of the ordinance, we have thought it better to deal with the questions presented and argued.
[Note Page696-1] The amendment by St. 1950, c. 325, Section 1, has no bearing on this case.
[Note Page697-1] Dimensions of the tract also stated in the bill seem difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile with the allegation that it contained as many as twenty-eight acres.

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