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Timestamp: 2019-04-26 03:39:33+00:00

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Constitution - Bin - Validity - Extra-territorial legislation - Criminal offences committed in Northern Ireland - Trial within the State - Evidence taken on commission - Fair procedures - Reference of bill to Supreme Court - Offences against the State Act, 1939 (No. 13). ss. 35, 36, 47, 48 - Criminal Law (Jurisdiction) Bill, 1975 - Constitution of Ireland, 1937, Articles 2, 3, 38, 40.
Section 2 of the bill of 1975 provided that where a person does in Northern Ireland an act that, if done in the State, would constitute an indictable offence specified in the schedule to the bill, he should be guilty of an offence and, on conviction on indictment, should be liable to the penalty to which he would have been liable if he had done the act in the State. The offences so specified included murder, manslaughter, arson, kidnapping, robbery and offences connected with the manufacture, the possession and the use of explosives. Section 3 of the bill provided that a person who is charged with or convicted of an offence under the law of Northern Ireland consisting of acts (whether done in the State or in Northern Ireland) which would constitute an offence in the State by virtue of s. 2, and who escapes from lawful custody in Northern Ireland should be guilty of an indictable offence.
Section 11 of the bill provided that, for the purposes of the trial by the Special Criminal Court of an offence under s. 2 or s. 3 of the bill, the court of trial, at the request of the prosecution or the accused, should by order provide (unless satisfied that it was not in the interests of justice to do so) for the issue of a letter of request to the Lord Chief Justice of Northern Ireland for the taking, in the presence of the members of the court making the order, of evidence in Northern Ireland by a judge from a witness specified in the order. Section 11 provided that the court making the order should inform the accused that he had a right to attend in the custody of the police of Northern Ireland at the taking of such evidence, that he had a right to be represented by solicitor and counsel on such occasion, and that he would be immune from legal process while in such custody in Northern Ireland. Section 11 provided that a statement of evidence of a witness taken in compliance with such letter of request and certified, by the judge who took it, to be a true and accurate statement of the evidence so taken should, if all the members of the court of trial were present throughout the taking of the evidence, be admissible at the trial as evidence of any fact stated therein.
Held by the Supreme Court, 1, that Ireland is a sovereign State (as was Saorstát Éireann éireann) and that its national parliament has full power to legislate with extraterritorial effect in accordance with the accepted principles of international law, notwithstanding the provisions of Article 3 of the Constitution which state that "the laws enacted by that parliament shall have the like area and extent of application as the laws of Saorstát Éireann éireann and the like extra-territorial effect."
not repugnant to the Constitution but that such presumption does not extend to the procedures and discretions provided and conferred by the bill where it is intended that they should be applied and exercised outside the State by persons having no obligation to uphold the Constitution.
In re Offences against the State (Amendment) Bill, 1940  I.R. 470; East Donegal Co-Operative v. The Attorney General  I.R. 317considered.
3. That the provisions of s. 11 of the bill did not prevent an accused from being furnished with a copy of the statement of evidence in accordance with the existing rights of a person charged with an indictable offence.
4. That, although the bill did not contain any provisions conferring jurisdiction on the Special Criminal Court, the provisions of s. 11 of the bill contemplated trials in that court and, therefore, the Supreme Court would examine whether such trials would be unconstitutional.
5. That the method of determining that the ordinary courts are inadequate to secure the effective administration of justice and the preservation of public peace and order adopted by the Offences against the State Act, 1939, was a constitutional method.
In re MacCurtain  I.R. 83 considered.
6. That no part of the bill of 1975 was repugnant to Article 38, Article 40 or any other provision of the Constitution.
Reference of bill passed by the Oireachtas.
The Criminal Law (Jurisdiction) Bill, 1975, was passed by both Houses of the Oireachtas on the 3rd March, 1976. On the 10th March, 1976, the President of Ireland referred the bill to the Supreme Court pursuant to the provisions of Article 26, s. 1, sub-s. 1, of the Constitution of Ireland, 1937, for a decision on the question as to whether the bill, or any provision or provisions of the bill, was or were repugnant to the Constitution or to any provision thereof. The Supreme Court assigned solicitor and counsel to oppose the constitutionality of the bill. The sections of the bill which were primarily impugned were ss. 2, 3 and 11.
"1. 1 The President may, after consultation with the Council of State, refer any Bill to which this Article applies to the Supreme Court for a decision on the question as to whether such Bill or any specified provision or provisions of such Bill is or are repugnant to this Constitution or to any provision thereof.
2 Every such reference shall be made not later than the seventh day after the date on which such Bill shall have been presented by the Taoiseach to the President for his signature.
3 The President shall not sign any Bill the subject of a reference to the Supreme Court under this Article pending the pronouncement of the decision of the Court.
2. 1 The Supreme Court consisting of not less than five judges shall consider every question referred to it by the President under this Article for a decision, and, having heard arguments by or on behalf of the Attorney General and by counsel assigned by the Court, shall pronounce its decision on such question in open court as soon as may be, and in any case not later than sixty days after the date of such reference.
2 The decision of the majority of the judges of the Supreme Court shall, for the purposes of this Article, be the decision of the Court and shall be pronounced by such one of those judges as the Court shall direct, and no other opinion, whether assenting or dissenting, shall be pronounced nor shall the existence of any such other opinion be disclosed.
3. 1 In every case in which the Supreme Court decides that any provision of a Bill the subject of a reference to the Supreme Court under this Article is repugnant to this Constitution or to any provision thereof, the President shall decline to sign such Bill . . .
3 In every other case the President shall sign the Bill as soon as may be after the date on which the decision of the Supreme Court shall have been pronounced."
Article 38, s. 1, of the Constitution provides that "No person shall be tried on any criminal charge save in due course of law"; and s. 5 of that Article provides that "Save in the case of the trial of offences under section 2, section 3 or section 4 of this Article no person shall be tried on any criminal charge without a jury."
"1 Special courts may be established by law for the trial of offences in cases where it may be determined in accordance with such law that the ordinary courts are inadequate to secure the effective administration of justice, and the preservation of public peace and order.
2 The constitution, powers, jurisdiction and procedure of such special courts shall be prescribed by law."
"1 The State guarantees in its laws to respect, and, as far as practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate the personal rights of the citizen.
2 The State shall, in particular, by its laws protect as best it may from unjust attack and, in the case of injustice done, vindicate the life, person, good name, and property rights of every citizen."
"2.—(1) Where a person does in Northern Ireland an act that, if done in the State, would constitute an offence specified in the Schedule, he shall be guilty of an offence and he shall be liable on conviction on indictment to the penalty to which he would have been liable if he had done the act in the State.
he shall be guilty of, and may be indicted, tried and punished for, the relevant principal offence, and the following provisions of this Act relating to the commission of any such principal offence shall apply accordingly.
he shall be guilty of an offence and he shall be liable on conviction on indictment to a penalty not greater than the penalty to which he would have been liable if he had been convicted of the relevant principal offence.
(4) Where a person has committed an offence under subsection (1) orsection 3 or attempted to commit any such offence, any other person who, in the State or in Northern Ireland, knowing or believing him to be guilty of the offence or attempt or of some other such offence or attempt, does without reasonable excuse any act with intent to impede his apprehension or prosecution in the State or in Northern Ireland shall be guilty of an offence.
(5) If, upon the trial on indictment of an offence under subsection (1)or section 3 or an attempt to commit any such offence, it is proved that the offence charged (or some other offence of which the accused might on that charge be found guilty) was committed, but the accused is found not guilty of it, the accused may be found guilty of any offence under subsection (4)of which it is proved that he is guilty in relation to the offence charged (or that other offence).
or attempted to commit any such offence, any other person who, in Northern Ireland, knowing or believing him to be guilty of the offence or attempt or of some other such offence or attempt, does without reasonable excuse any act with intent to impede his apprehension or prosecution in the State or in Northern Ireland shall be guilty of an offence.
(7) If, upon the trial on indictment of an offence specified in the Schedule or an attempt to commit any such offence, it is proved that the offence charged (or some other offence of which the accused might on that charge be found guilty) was committed, but the accused is found not guilty of it, the accused may be found guilty of any offence under subsection (6)of which it is proved that he is guilty in relation to the offence charged (or that other offence).
(d) in any other case, he shall be liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years.
(9) The enactments and rules of law as to when a person charged with an offence committed in the State may be convicted of another offence shall apply so as to enable a person charged with an offence under subsection (1)to be convicted of another offence, being an offence under that subsection, or of attempting to commit the offence charged or that other offence, and so as to enable a person charged with an offence under section 3 to be convicted of attempting to commit that offence.
and who escapes from any lawful custody in which he is held in Northern Ireland shall be guilty of an offence.
(b) The reference in paragraph (a) to an offence specified in the Schedule includes aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring the commission of an offence there specified, attempting, conspiring or inciting another person to commit an offence there specified or an offence of doing without reasonable excuse any act with intent to impede the apprehension or prosecution of a person who has, and whom the person in question knows or believes to have, committed an offence there specified.
(c) The reference in paragraph (a) to lawful custody is a reference to any lawful custody in which the person concerned is held, for the purpose of the proceedings in relation to the offence under the law of Northern Ireland referred to in paragraph (a), at any time between the bringing of a charge in relation to that offence and the conclusion of his trial (including any appeal or retrial) for that offence or in which he is held while serving a sentence imposed on his conviction for that offence.
(2) A person who escapes from lawful custody while in Northern Ireland pursuant to an order under section 11 (2) shall be guilty of an offence.
(3) A person guilty of an offence under this section shall be liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for a term not exceeding seven years."
with the corresponding statutory provisions in force in Northern Ireland.
"11.—(1) For the purposes of the trial by a special court established under Article 38.3.1 of the Constitution of an offence under section 2 or 3 or of any appeal in relation to the trial, the court of trial shall, at the request of the prosecution or the accused unless it is satisfied that it is not in the interests of justice to do so, and may of its own motion, and any appellate court may at such a request or of its own motion, by order provide for the issue of a letter of request to the Lord Chief Justice of Northern Ireland for the taking, in the presence of the members of the court making the order, of evidence in Northern Ireland by a judge of the High Court of Justice in Northern Ireland from a witness specified in the order.
and, if the accused indicates to the court that he wishes to be present at the taking of the evidence, the court shall make an order directing that the accused be delivered when and so often as may be necessary into the custody of the police of Northern Ireland.
concerned as evidence of any fact stated therein of which evidence would be admissible at the trial or appeal.
(b) A document purporting to be a certificate of a judge of the High Court of Justice in Northern Ireland and to be signed by him shall be deemed, for the purposes of this section, to be such a certificate and to be so signed unless the contrary is shown.
(ii) if he is on bail, be thereupon released.
(5) An order under subsection (2) shall not operate to interrupt the currency of any sentence imposed in any other proceedings."
Sections 12 and 13 contained provisions analogous with those of s. 11 for the taking of evidence in the State for a criminal trial in Northern Ireland. Section 14 provided that a person charged with an offence under ss. 2 or 3 might elect to stand his trial in Northern Ireland, and s. 15 provided that a person acquitted or convicted of an offence under the law of Northern Ireland might plead his acquittal or conviction as a bar to any proceedings in the State for any offence consisting of the acts that constituted the offence of which he has been so acquitted or convicted.
Section 22, sub-s. 2—the final sub-section of the bill—provided for the coming into operation of the Act "on such day as the Minister for Justice may appoint by order."
Pursuant to Article 26, s. 2, sub-s. 1, of the Constitution the Supreme Court on the 26th-30th April, 1976, heard arguments by the Attorney General and by counsel assigned by the Court to oppose the constitutionality of the bill.
The words "the State" are used in two separate senses in the Constitution of Ireland, 1937. On some occasions they are used to describe a juristic person enjoying certain rights and bound by certain duties; on other occasions they are used to describe the geographical area governed by the law of this juristic person. [They referred to the judgment of Murnaghan J. in Byrne v. Ireland 1] The same ambiguity appears in the bill where these words are used in the former sense in s. 21 and in the latter sense in ss. 2-4, 10-15, 18 and 20. This bill extends the criminal law of the State, as a juristic person, outside its geographical boundaries by treating occurrences which have taken place outside those boundaries as if they had taken place within those boundaries.
While the precise extent of the legislative restrictions imposed by Article 3 of the Constitution on the parliament and government established thereby may not be easily determinable, they cannot be limited so as to permit legislation relating to an offence allegedly committed outside the geographical area of the State by a person resident outside that area. These restrictions were imposed deliberately because of the tensions existing (even at the time of the enactment of the Constitution) between the State and Northern Ireland; they were imposed pending either the re-integration of the national territory or the enactment of a new Constitution. Legislation giving effect to an international agreement as contemplated by Article 29, s. 6, of the Constitution would not be subject to the limitation imposed by Article 3 of the Constitution; but this bill is not legislation of that type.
The special courts envisaged by this bill could be set up even where the ordinary courts of the State were admittedly fully adequate to secure the administration of justice within the State and the preservation of public peace and order there.
The rights of an accused person under Articles 38 and 40 of the Constitution may be summarised as follows.
(a) He must be informed of the charges brought against him.
(d) He has a right to give evidence and to call witnesses and to make submissions, either personally or through his solicitor or counsel.
(e) He has a right to be tried with a degree of regularity sufficient to constitute the trial a trial in due course of law: The People (Attorney General) v. O'Brien 16; The Slate (O'Connor) v. Larkin. 17 Such regularity involves a substantial degree of continuity in the course of the trial: The People (Attorney General) v. McGlynn 18; The People (Attorney General) v.Jackson. 19 A trial in accordance with the provisions of the bill involves the taking of evidence in two jurisdictions and rules out the possibility of achieving substantial continuity in the process of trial.
The control of the taking of evidence in Northern Ireland is vested in the Northern Ireland judge and he must base his decision about the admissibility of a particular piece of evidence in accordance with the law in force in Northern Ireland at the relevant time; that law does not bind him to respect the rights guaranteed by the Constitution of Ireland. Police officers and soldiers, whose evidence would be privileged in Northern Ireland but not in the State, would elect to give evidence in Northern Ireland and that would create the likelihood of such evidence being given in the absence of the accused, thereby weakening the effect of any cross-examination.
The "national territory" mentioned in Articles 2 and 3 of the Constitution of Ireland, 1937, is the geographical unit for which it was the aspiration of the people that the Oireachtas would legislate eventually. The purpose and effect of Article 3 of the Constitution is to restrain the Oireachtas for the time being from legislating directly for that portion of the unit now known as Northern Ireland.
It is possible to envisage a situation in which a terrorist organisation carrying out its activities throughout Ireland could cause a breakdown in the judicial machinery of the State notwithstanding that many of the wrongful acts done by its members were done in Northern Ireland.
26  2 I.R. 165, 193.
the machinery for taking evidence outside the State, on the assumption that a special court of the State can have such jurisdiction.
34 (1934) 291 U.S. 97.
35 (1952) 342 U.S. 524.
36 (1895) 156 U.S. 237.
37 (1904) 194 U.S. 258.
38 (1912) 223 U.S. 442.
The decision of the Supreme Court (O'Higgins C.J., Finlay, Griffin, Kenny and Parke JJ.) was pronounced by one of the judges of that court in accordance with the provisions of s. 2, sub-s. 2, of Article 26 of the Constitution.
This is a reference to this Court by the President of Ireland made on the 10th March, 1976, under Article 26 of the Constitution of the entire of the Criminal Law (Jurisdiction) Bill, 1975. The bill, which contains 22 sections and a schedule, has the title:— "An Act to extend the Criminal Law of the State to certain acts done in Northern Ireland, to provide for the admission of evidence obtained by the examination of witnesses in Northern Ireland at trials for offences in respect of those acts, to enable evidence to be obtained by the examination of witnesses in the State for trials in Northern Ireland for corresponding offences under the law of Northern Ireland in respect of acts done in the State, to reform the criminal law in other respects and to provide for related matters." Counsel have been assigned to argue that the bill is repugnant to the Constitution and have contended that ss. 2, 3 and 11 of it are. These are the heart of the bill.
39 (1941) 75 I.L.T.R. 194.
40 (1952) 342 U.S. 524.
Section 2 of the bill provides42 that when a person does in Northern Ireland an act which, if done in the State, would constitute an offence specified in the schedule to the bill, he shall be guilty of an offence and shall be liable on conviction on indictment to the penalty to which he would have been liable if he had done the act in the State. The schedule to the bill includes murder, manslaughter, arson, kidnapping, false imprisonment, malicious damage, robbery, and offences in connection with explosives, firearms and the unlawful seizure of aircraft and vehicles. All the offences in the schedule are the type which subversive and terrorist organisations commit all over the world in the course of their campaigns. Section 2 goes on to provide that where a person in the State or Northern Ireland aids, abets, counsels or procures the commission of such an offence or in Northern Ireland aids, abets, counsels or procures the commission of an offence specified in the schedule, he shall be guilty of and may be indicted, tried and punished for the offence. It also provides that any person who in the State or Northern Ireland attempts, conspires or incites another person to commit such an offence shall be guilty of an offence and shall be liable on conviction on indictment to be punished as if he had committed the offence itself.
Section 3 of the bill provides that a person, who in Northern Ireland is charged with or convicted of an offence in Northern Ireland consisting of acts whether done in the State or in Northern Ireland which constitute an offence specified in the bill and who escapes from lawful custody in Northern Ireland, shall be guilty of an offence and liable to be punished on conviction on indictment.
42 See p. 132, ante.
In considering this bill, which has been passed by both Houses of the Oireachtas, the elected representatives of the people, the Court accepts the principles laid down by the former Supreme Court in In Re Article 26 of the Constitution and the Offences against the State (Amendment) Bill, 1940 44.that "where any particular law is not expressly prohibited and it is sought to establish that it is repugnant to the Constitution by reason of some implied prohibition or repugnancy, we are of opinion, as a matter of construction, that such repugnancy must be clearly established"—perSullivan C.J. at p. 478. This principle was accepted by the former Supreme Court in In Re Article 26 of the Constitution and the School Attendance Bill, 1942 45 (per Sullivan C.J. at p. 344) and in In Re Article 26 of the Constitution and the Electoral (Amendment) Bill, 1961 46 (per Maguire C.J. at p. 178). It was submitted by the opponents that the same considerations should not be applied to a bill referred by the President under Article 26 as are applied in the case of an Act which has been duly passed by both Houses of the Oireachtas and signed and promulgated by the President because the President has referred the bill after consultation with the Council of State and because a question has been raised in relation to the constitutionality of such a bill or some provision thereof. The Court does not accept that any distinction should be drawn in relation to the presumption of constitutionality between an Act of the Oireachtas and a bill referred by the President under Article 26.
43 See p. 135, ante.
Pending the re-integration of the national territory, and without prejudice to the right of the Parliament and Government established by this Constitution to exercise jurisdiction over the whole of that territory, the laws enacted by that Parliament shall have the like area and extent of application as the laws of Saorstát Éireann éireann and the like extra-territorial effect."
"1. All natural resources, including the air and all forms of potential energy, within the jurisdiction of the Parliament and Government established by this Constitution and all royalties and franchises within that jurisdiction belong to the State subject to all estates and interests therein for the time being lawfully vested in any person or body."
"11. Until the expiration of one month from the passing of the Act of Parliament for the ratification of this instrument, the powers of the Parliament and the government of the Irish Free State shall not be exercisable as respects Northern Ireland and the provisions of the Government of Ireland Act, 1920, shall, so far as they relate to Northern Ireland, remain of full force and effect . . ."
12. If before the expiration of the said month an address is presented to His Majesty by both Houses of the Parliament of Northern Ireland to that effect, the powers of the Parliament and Government of the Irish Free State shall no longer extend to Northern Ireland, and the provisions of the Government of Ireland Act, 1920, (including those relating to the Council of Ireland) shall, so far as they relate to Northern Ireland, continue to be of full force and effect, and this instrument shall have effect subject to the necessary modifications."
"83. The passing and adoption of this Constitution by the Constituent Assembly and the British Parliament shall be announced as soon as may be, and not later than the 6th day of December, Nineteen hundred and twenty-two, by Proclamation of His Majesty, and this Constitution shall come into operation on the issue of such Proclamation."
The Constitution of 1922 was ratified by an Act of the imperial parliament on the 5th December, 1922, and on the 6th December, 1922, the proclamation mentioned in Article 83 was issued. On the 7th December, 1922, the parliament of Northern Ireland presented an address under Article 12 of the Articles of Agreement of 1921. The result was that the powers of the parliament and government of the Irish Free State no longer extended to Northern Ireland and the provisions of the Government of Ireland Act, 1920, in so far as they related to Northern Ireland, continued to be of full force and effect.
Éireann éireann sitting as a constituent assembly passed on the 25th October, 1922—see the decision of the former Supreme Court in The State (Ryan) v.Lennon 47 and, in particular, the judgment of Kennedy C.J. at p. 203 and the judgment of FitzGibbon J. at p. 225 of the report.
The Articles of Agreement of 1921 were amended by an agreement made on the 3rd December, 1925, between the British Government and the Governments of the Irish Free State and of Northern Ireland which was confirmed by the Treaty (Confirmation of Amending Agreement) Act, 1925. The effect of this was that the Irish Free State recognised and confirmed that "the extent of Northern Ireland for the purposes of the Government of Ireland Act, 1920, and of the said Articles of Agreement shall be such as was fixed by sub-section (2) of section one of that Act."
It was contended by the opponents that the Constitution is a legal document and must be read and construed having regard to this. If this means that the Court cannot have regard to the legislation in force at the date of the Constitution or to the historical background against which it was enacted in order to determine its meaning, the proposition is incorrect. The correct meaning of any constitutional document may be ascertained by construing it with regard to the historical circumstances in which it came into existence. It is true that the Constitution is a legal document, but it is a fundamental one which establishes the State and it expresses not only legal norms but basic doctrines of political and social theory. "Ireland is a sovereign, independent, democratic State" (Article 5) is a statement of political belief and of law. The directive principles of social policy in Article 45 are to be followed by the Oireachtas and their application is not cognisable by any court. These Articles show that the Constitution contains more than legal rules: it reflects, in part, aspirations and aims and expresses the political theories on which the people acted when they enacted the Constitution.
One of the theories held in 1937 by a substantial number of citizens was that a nation, as distinct from a State, had rights; that the Irish people living in what is now called the Republic of Ireland and in Northern Ireland together formed the Irish Nation; that a nation has a right to unity of territory in some form, be it as a unitary or federal state; and that the Government of Ireland Act, 1920, though legally binding, was a violation of that national right to unity which was superior to positive law.
This national claim to unity exists not in the legal but in the political order and is one of the rights which are envisaged in Article 2; it is expressly saved by Article 3 which states the area to which the laws enacted by the parliament established by the Constitution apply.
The effect of Article 3 is that, until the division of the island of Ireland is ended, the laws enacted by the parliament established by the Constitution are to apply to the same area and have the same extent of application as the laws of Saorstát Éireann éireann had. The area to which the laws of Saorstát Éireann éireann applied was, having regard to the Articles of Agreement of 1921 and the Act of 1925, unquestionably the area now known as the Republic of Ireland. The laws enacted by the parliament established by the Constitution were to have the same extra-territorial effect as the laws of Saorstát Éireann éireann. This analysis of Article 3 gets considerable support from Article 10 for it states that all natural resources "within the jurisdiction of the Parliament and Government established by this Constitution" belong to the State and there is a clear distinction drawn by the Constitution itself between the Nation and the State. If the saver contained in Article 3 were to be interpreted as entitling the parliament established by the Constitution to legislate at any time it so decided for the parliamentary counties and boroughs set out in sub-s. 2 of s. 1 of the Government of Ireland Act, 1920, then the effect of Article 10 would be that it would apply to the natural resources of the national territory and would have been so expressed.
Article 3 of the Constitution does not prohibit the Oireachtas legislating with extra-territorial effect in relation to Northern Ireland for so long as the division of the island of Ireland continues, if the parliament of Saorstát Éireann éireann had power to legislate with extra-territorial effect.
The Court has no doubt that in 1937 Saorstát Éireann éireann had power to legislate with extra-territorial effect. This view was not contested by the opponents. The 1929 report of the conference on the operation of Dominion legislation noted that the question whether the Dominions had power to legislate with extra-territorial effect was "full of obscurity." However, there was the all important distinction that the Constitution of Saorstát Éireann éireannderived its authority, not from any Act of the imperial parliament but from an Act of the Dáil, while the constitutions of the other Dominions derived their authority from Acts of the imperial parliament. If there was any doubt about the position of the other Dominions it was dispelled by s. 3 of the Statute of Westminster, 1931, which declared and enacted that, the parliament of a dominion had full powers to make laws having extra-territorial operation.
The Court is satisfied that Saorstát Éireann éireann had full power to legislate with extra-territorial effect from 1922. This was the view of FitzGibbon J. in R. (Alexander) v. Circuit Judge for Cork 48 and, therefore, the Statute of Westminster, 1931, should be regarded as declaratory of the law and not as making any change in it.
48  2 I.R. 165, 193.
It is established in international law by the decision of the Permanent Court of International Justice in the Lotus Case 49 that every sovereign State has power to legislate with extra-territorial effect in the sense that it may enact that acts or omissions done outside its borders are criminal offences which may be successfully prosecuted within its borders—this is sometimes called the jurisdiction to prescribe—provided that the events, acts or persons to which its enactment applies bear upon the peace, order and good government of the legislating State: see O'Connell on International Law (2nd ed., vol. 2, p. 602). The Court has no doubt that the offences described in the schedule to the bill bear upon the peace, order and good government of the State, particularly as they are committed within the national territory.
Therefore, the Court rejects the contention that Articles 2 and 3 of the Constitution constitute a prohibition on the Oireachtas legislating with extra-territorial effect in relation to matters occurring in Northern Ireland so long as the island is divided. The bill is not repugnant to the Constitution on this ground.
It is submitted that the bill is repugnant to Article 38 of the Constitution. This submission is based on two connected but independent contentions.
It is asserted that the bill confers jurisdiction upon the Special Criminal Court to try offences created by the bill and that this is repugnant to the Constitution either on the basis that no offence, the constituent acts of which are committed outside the State, could affect the administration of justice or the preservation of public peace and order within the State, or on the basis that, even if this is not universally correct, it is possible to envisage circumstances surrounding the commission of particular offences under the bill which would render them incapable of affecting the administration of justice or the preservation of public peace and order within the State.
"Special courts may be established by law for the trial of offences in cases where it may be determined in accordance with such law that the ordinary courts are inadequate to secure the effective administration of justice, and the preservation of public peace and order."
49 (1927) P.C.I.J. Ser. A, No. 10.
that sub-section is the Offences against the State Act, 1939, which provides for the establishment of a Special Criminal Court or Courts by virtue of Part V of that Act. The method, by which it may be determined if and when the ordinary courts are inadequate to secure the effective administration of justice and the preservation of public peace and order, is provided by s. 35 of the Act of 1939, and is a proclamation by the Government which can be annulled by a resolution of Dáil Éireann éireann. The offences triable by such a special court when established are determined by ss. 36, 37, 45-48 of the same Act.
In short, by virtue of these sections, the offences which may be tried by the Special Criminal Court at any time when it is established fall into two categories. The first is an offence of a particular class or kind or under a particular enactment declared by the Government to be a scheduled offence under s. 36 of the Act of 1939; and the second is an offence which is not scheduled but is one in respect of which the Director of Public Prosecutions (or, formerly, the Attorney General) has certified in the individual case that, in his opinion, the ordinary courts are inadequate to secure the effective administration of justice and the preservation of public peace and order in relation to the trial of the person charged with such offence. By virtue of s. 37 of the Act of 1939 each of the acts of attempting, conspiring or inciting to commit, or aiding or abetting the commission of, a scheduled offence is itself a scheduled offence. No other offence can, under the law, come within the jurisdiction of and be triable by the Special Criminal Court.
Therefore, it is clear that, even if this bill were enacted, it does not and cannot confer on the Special Criminal Court any jurisdiction to try any offence. Before any offence created by this bill could come within the jurisdiction of the Special Criminal Court it would be necessary either for the Government to declare under s. 36 of the Act of 1939 such offence to be a scheduled offence or for the Director of Public Prosecutions, in the case of the trial of a particular person charged with such offence, to have issued the certificate already referred to.
However, s. 11 of the bill clearly refers and, indeed, is solely referable to the trial of offences against the bill by a special court. This Court has an obligation to be alert in upholding constitutional rights and in discharge of that duty feels obliged to decide whether such trial would be unconstitutional if, upon the enactment of this bill, by action either of the Government or the Director of Public Prosecutions an offence created by the bill were tried by a special court.
Prosecutions that for the offence, or for the particular trial, the ordinary courts are inadequate. It is clear that many factors could go to the formation of such an opinion, such as a general state of unrest within the State, the identity and associates of the accused, the nature of the crime alleged or the apparent motive for it. There does not appear to be any justification for singling out any one of these factors and so asserting that, because the acts which constitute an offence were committed outside the State, no such declaration or certificate could be issued.
Therefore, the Court must reject the contention that an offence against the criminal law of the State which consists of acts committed outside the State could not—by reason of that fact alone—be properly and constitutionally committed for trial by a special court.
If it is possible to envisage a hypothetical case of a particular charge against a particular person in respect of an offence created by the bill of which it could not reasonably be said that the trial was one for which the ordinary courts are inadequate, then it is necessary to consider whether that fact alone and that single hypothetical case render the bill repugnant to Article 38 of the Constitution.
The former Supreme Court in In re MacCurtain 50 and Mr. Justice Kenny in the High Court in The Attorney General v. Bollard , subsequently confirmed by this Court without a written judgment, decided that it was constitutional for the Oireachtas to have provided by the Act of 1939 that the question of the inadequacy of the ordinary courts should be decided by a proclamation and declaration of the Government or by a certificate of the Attorney General, whose function is now discharged by the Director of Public Prosecutions.
It is not necessary in this case for the Court to express an opinion on the circumstances, if any, in which the Courts would be entitled to review any such proclamation, declaration or certificate and it does not do so.
As has already been pointed out, the bill does not confer any jurisdiction upon a special court in relation to all or any of the offences created by the bill.
of acts committed either within or outside the State, such an opinion could properly be formed. Therefore, the Court must reject the submission that the bill is repugnant to Article 38 of the Constitution.
It has been submitted that s. 11 of the bill conflicts with the Constitution either because in certain respects it permits the operation of unfair trial procedures or fails to provide for trial in due course of law, or in other respects fails to defend or to vindicate the personal rights of the citizen in accordance with Article 40, s. 3, sub-s. 1, of the Constitution.
In the first place it is submitted that fair trial procedures, and the specific requirement of Article 38, s. 1, of the Constitution which states that no person shall be tried on a criminal charge save in due course of law, are violated by the fact that the person accused can only be present at the taking of evidence on commission in Northern Ireland by submitting to conditions which, it is said, are unduly harsh and unreasonable. In this respect the section provides that, if the accused indicates that he wishes to be present, the court shall make an order directing that he be delivered into the custody of the police of Northern Ireland (sub-s. 2) and, for this purpose, he shall be brought to a convenient point of departure by the Garda Síochána and, if on bail, shall be taken into custody not more than 24 hours before such delivery (sub-s. 4). These provisions, it is said, impose conditions on the exercise of a right which are so unreasonable as to frustrate such exercise because they involve the accused having to leave the security of the State for Northern Ireland, and to do so in the custody first of the Garda Síochána and then of the police of Northern Ireland.
The provisions of Article 38, s. 1, of the Constitution, stating that no person shall be tried on a criminal charge save in due course of law, require fair and just treatment for the person so charged, having due regard to the rights of the State to prosecute for the offence charged and to ensure that the person so charged will stand his trial. The phrase "due course of law"requires a fair and just balance between the exercise of individual freedoms and the requirements of an ordered society.
accused. Under Article 40, s. 3, sub-s. 1, of the Constitution, the State has the added duty by its laws, as far as practicable, to defend and vindicate the personal rights of the person so charged. The question this Court has to decide is whether, in the circumstances in which the bill was deemed necessary, these requirements of the Constitution have been fairly met in the provisions under examination.
No question arises with regard to the accused's right to be present at and throughout his trial. This trial will take place within the State before a special court established under Article 38, s. 3, of the Constitution. What is in issue is his right to be present at the taking "for the purposes of the trial" of the evidence of a witness or witnesses in Northern Ireland. This involves the travelling to Northern Ireland of all the members of the court of trial, and the taking there of the evidence in their presence before a member of the High Court of Justice of Northern Ireland. In these circumstances, how are the rights of the accused observed? Obviously, if he is to be present he must leave the jurisdiction; it is equally obvious that this involves the danger that he may not return to stand his trial if he is not in custody while in Northern Ireland. The section expressly recognises his right to be present but stipulates that such right should be exercised in custody. In addition, under the provisions of sub-s. 2 he is, while in Northern Ireland for the purpose of the taking of such evidence, accorded an immunity from detention or any kind of suit or legal process in respect of any cause or matter, civil or criminal, arising before his arrival in Northern Ireland. The section also recognises his right not to be present, and in such circumstances ensures that he can nevertheless be represented by counsel and solicitor (or by solicitor alone).
Does the fact that he can be present only whilst in custody frustrate the exercise of that right? If all the evidence for his trial were to be given at the trial, his freedom of movement would be restricted in any event because he would be in the custody of the court. That he should also be in custody when it is necessary for part of the evidence to be taken outside the State in his presence seems to be a reasonable compromise. Does the fact that, in order to exercise his right, he is obliged to go to Northern Ireland and put himself beyond the protection of the State constitute in itself too high a price to pay for the exercise of that right? It cannot be overlooked that he is to be in the custody and, therefore, under the protection of the police of Northern Ireland, and that he is guaranteed immunity from detention or legal process while so there. The Court is of the opinion that in this respect the provisions of this section do not offend the provisions of the Constitution and are not repugnant thereto in the manner submitted.
"From the earliest times it was appreciated that detention in custody pending trial could be a cause of great hardship and it is as true now as it was in ancient times that it is desirable to release on bail as large a number of accused persons as possible who may safely be released pending trial. From time to time necessity demands that some unconvicted persons should be held in custody pending trial to secure their attendance at the trial but in such cases 'necessity' is the operative test."
Here what is done is done pursuant to an order of the court. If such order is made on a wrong basis, it can be set aside by the High Court. In addition, the order can only be made at the request of the accused. Further, the requirements as to custody are obviously necessary, and no more than necessary, to secure that the accused while in Northern Ireland will receive proper protection and will be returned at the conclusion of the evidence to the jurisdiction of the State, there to be returned into such custody as had existed or to be released on bail, as the court may decide.
In the opinion of the Court these provisions do not constitute either a denial of access to or an interference with the jurisdiction of the Courts.
and solicitor (or solicitor alone) is provided for. The Court is of the opinion that this right of representation undoubtedly includes the right to cross-examine. For this reason the Court holds that this objection also fails.
It was also submitted that the section does not provide that a statement of the evidence intended to be given by the witness shall be given to the accused before such evidence is taken. It was urged that this involved an unfair trial procedure or was contrary to a trial in "due course of law"because the accused could be left in ignorance of the nature of evidence sought to be adduced against him.
By virtue of s. 6 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1967, an accused person charged in the District Court with an indictable offence and not being tried summarily is entitled, as part of the preliminary examination, to a statement of the evidence to be given by each witness whom it is proposed to call at the trial. By virtue of the Special Criminal Court Rules, 1975, a person brought before the Special Criminal Court under s. 47 of the Offences against the State Act, 1939, and charged with an indictable offence is entitled to receive a list of the witnesses to be called and a statement of the evidence that is to be given by each of them.
No person can be brought before the Special Criminal Court and tried on an indictable offence except after an order returning him for trial by a District Justice subsequent to a preliminary examination carried out under the Criminal Procedure Act, 1967, or pursuant to a direction of the Director of Public Prosecutions under s. 47 of the Act of 1939. Section 11 of the bill applies to the trial of an offence under s. 2 or s. 3 of the bill only. Every offence under either s. 2 or s. 3 of the bill is punishable only on conviction on indictment. Therefore, every trial to which s. 11 could have application must be the trial (as the law now is) of an indictable offence by the Special Criminal Court. In every such trial either by virtue of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1967, or the Special Criminal Court Rules, 1975, the accused is entitled to a statement of the evidence of each witness whom it is proposed or intended to call.
commissioner in the presence of the members of the court and not before the members of the court themselves he is not a witness within the meaning of the Act and Rules mentioned.
It is also to be noted that under the provisions of sub-s. 1 of s. 11 the court has to consider, in relation to the making of an order for the taking of evidence of a witness, the interests of justice, and it is precluded from doing so if it is not in the interests of justice to do so. It seems impossible to imagine the operation of the section without a full and adequate disclosure of the nature of the evidence being made beforehand to the accused. Without such, the court could scarcely consider the interests of justice and, without such, the accused could not properly decide whether he ought to be present or not. Therefore, without deciding whether there is a constitutional right to have prior notice of the evidence to be given, the Court is of opinion that the operation of the section requires the disclosure in an ample manner to the accused of the evidence sought to be taken and that, accordingly, this submission also fails.
It was also submitted that the provisions of s. 11, sub-s. 3(a), of the bill are defective in that the sub-section only provides that "a statement of evidence of a witness" so taken shall be admissible and that this could fall far short of a full transcript of the questions asked, the answers given and of rulings on the admissibility of evidence and, therefore, could be inadequate. The Court notes, however, that such statement is to be certified as "a true and accurate statement of the evidence so taken" by the judge of the High Court in Northern Ireland who took it and that its admissibility as evidence at the trial of the accused depends on such certificate being given. It is also to be borne in mind that the members of the court by whom the evidence, if admitted, is to be accepted or rejected must have been present for the entire of the proceedings before the Commissioner. The Court is satisfied that a statement of evidence, correctly certified to be a true and accurate statement of the evidence so taken in the presence of the court, satisfies the requirements of justice.
Objection was also taken to the section on the grounds that it did not extend to evidence of opinion from experts and that, accordingly, an accused person on trial here who wished to have the evidence of an expert taken in Northern Ireland as part of his defence would be hampered in his defence. This objection was based on the provisions of sub-s. 3(a) of s. 11 to the effect that the statement of the evidence so taken shall be admissible"as evidence of any fact stated therein." The Court is of the opinion that these words extend to the sworn testimony of an expert as to what his opinion is.
A further objection was taken that the section provided only for the transmission of a statement of evidence and did not expressly extend to exhibits. This objection may be a relevant one for the consideration of the special court when deciding on the admissibility of such evidence or any part thereof, or the proof necessary of any exhibit. The Court does not regard this question as relevant to the constitutionality of the section.
It is further contended that sub-s. 3(a) of s. 11, so far as it provides that a statement of evidence certified in accordance with the sub-section shall "be admissible," was mandatory and excluded the jurisdiction of the court to reject or not to accept such evidence. The Court is of opinion that this submission is not well-founded. The section merely provides that such a statement of evidence shall be capable of being admitted. It is for the court to decide whether in fact it will be admitted and, if admitted, whether to accept or reject such evidence.
"The witness shall be entitled to the same immunities and privileges as if he were a witness in a trial on indictment for an offence under the law of Northern Ireland, and questions as to the exclusion of any evidence, or the withholding of any document or thing on the ground of public interest, shall be determined in accordance with the law of Northern Ireland."
be applied to proceedings, procedures, discretions and adjudications required by the legislation to be performed outside the State by persons having no obligation to uphold the Constitution. However, this does not mean that the rights of the accused are thereby endangered. It remains a question for the court of trial or, on review, for the Court of Criminal Appeal to decide whether in the circumstances of a determination made under paragraph 2(4) of the fourth schedule to the British Act the statement of the evidence ought to be, or to have been, admitted. The question whether such evidence is to be admitted and, if admitted, acted upon remains completely within the jurisdiction of our Courts. For these reasons this submission fails.
One final submission deserves particular attention. Sub-section 2 of s. 11 of the bill provides that, where a court makes an order for the taking of such evidence, it shall inform the accused that he has certain rights. These rights are specified in paragraphs (a) to (d) of the sub-section. It has been pointed out by counsel opposing the bill that the sub-section does not accord these rights but merely provides that the accused shall be informed that he has them. This is undoubtedly true, and probably arises from the fact that the sub-section contemplates rights to be enjoyed outside the jurisdiction and in accordance with the laws there in force. The Court does not consider this to be a sustainable objection to the bill. The Court thinks it proper to say, however, that if all these rights are not accorded in full to the accused it is the opinion of the Court that a statement of evidence taken in such circumstances would not be taken in compliance with the section and would on that ground not be admissible at his trial.
The Court has examined the whole of the bill and is satisfied that neither the bill nor any provision or provisions thereof is or are repugnant to the Constitution, or to any provision thereof, and will advise the President accordingly.
Solicitor instructing counsel assigned by the court: Ernest Keegan.
Solicitor for the Attorney General: Chief State Solicitor.

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