Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/97414/board-trade-vs-united-states
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 14:26:07+00:00

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Held, that, considering the whole history of grain rate regulation, the differentiation between primary markets and interior points thus made by the Commission was not an undue or unreasonable discrimination forbidden by the Interstate Commerce Act. P. 314 U. S. 544 .
2. The contention that the orders of the Commission are invalid because they deprive the primary markets of natural competitive advantages is rejected. P. 314 U. S. 548 .
disturbed by the courts except upon a showing that they are unsupported by evidence, were made without a hearing, exceed constitutional limits, or for some other reason amount to a, abuse of power. P. 314 U. S. 546 .
13, 1931. Grain and Grain Products Within the Western Dist. and for Export, 173 I.C.C. 511. Because the Commission did not take evidence relating to the drastic changes in economic conditions due to the depression occurring between the close of its hearings and the date of its orders, this Court set aside the orders. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. United States, 284 U. S. 248 . New and extensive hearings were thereupon held, and on October 22, 1934, the Commission in an elaborate report affirmed some of its earlier findings and modified others. 205 I.C.C. 301. Upon further consideration of the record, the Commission issued a supplemental order to remove discriminations between interior points. 215 I.C.C. 83. Dealers at the primary markets thereupon filed formal complaints seeking modification of that part of the Commission's orders which differentiated between transit privileges at primary markets and those at interior points. Hearings upon these complaints produced more than 7,000 pages of new testimony and over 250 exhibits. On July 27, 1937, the Commission authorized but did not require the carriers to meet the requests of the primary markets. 223 I.C.C. 235. The carriers having declined to act on this authorization, the Commission was petitioned to enter a mandatory order. Proceedings were reopened, new arguments were heard, and on July 12, 1938, the Commission found that the prescribed rates did not subject the primary markets to any "undue prejudice and disadvantage." 229 I.C.C. 9, 16. Upon reconsideration this conclusion was affirmed on March 13, 1939. 231 I.C.C. 793. To upset these findings and to strike down the orders based upon them the present suit was filed.
reshipped to point C at a rate less than the combination of the separate rates from A to B and B to C. See Transit Case, 24 I.C.C. 340; Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. United States, 279 U. S. 768 , 279 U. S. 777 -779; Locklin, Economics of Transportation (1935) 122, 123, 629-631. The shipper pays the local rate on the inbound shipment to the transit point, B in our illustration. A receipted freight bill specifying the point of origin, the rate paid, and other pertinent data, is recorded with the transit bureau as evidence of intention of further transportation of the inbound grain or its equivalent. When the outbound shipment is tendered to the carrier, the freight bill is surrendered in order that the shipper may obtain an outbound rate lower than that which he would otherwise be compelled to pay. The privilege belongs, as it were, to both the grain and its shipper.
Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. United States, 279 U. S. 768 , 279 U. S. 778 .
"164 I.C.C. 619, 644, 645. [ Footnote 2 ]"
markets and at interior points on routes passing through such markets. [ Footnote 4 ] The exclusive rate-break combinations were not made applicable to interior points not on routes passing through rate-break markets because the rate-break combinations had no relevance to these points. 164 I.C.C. 619, 645; 173 I.C.C. 511, 516, 517.
229 I.C.C. 9, 16. [ Footnote 5 ] Accordingly, the Commission dismissed the complaints and withdrew its previous permission to the carriers voluntarily to establish the rates requested by the primary markets. After a second reargument, the Commission adhered to this conclusion. 231 I.C.C. 793.
Manufacturers' Ry. Co. v. United States, 246 U. S. 457 , 246 U. S. 481 ; see Nashville, C. & St.L. Ry. v. Tennessee, 262 U. S. 318 , 262 U. S. 322 ; United States v. Chicago Heights Trucking Co., 310 U. S. 344 , 310 U. S. 352 -353.
The process of ratemaking is essentially empiric. The stuff of the process is fluid and changing -- the resultant of factors that must be valued, as well as weighed. Congress has therefore delegated the enforcement of transportation policy to a permanent expert body, and has charged it with the duty of being responsive to the dynamic character of transportation problems. Cf. Railroad Commission v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 310 U. S. 573 , 310 U. S. 581 -582.

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