Source: https://www.yalelawjournal.org/comment/the-bostic-question
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 16:18:35+00:00

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This Comment aspires to persuade all federal courts of appeals to adopt the Bostic Question as a requirement for the district courts under their supervision. Part I explains why standards of appellate review have become important in the sentencing context and why, as a result, the Question is necessary. Part II first articulates reasons why courts have been reluctant to follow the Sixth Circuit’s lead and then proceeds to a two-part normative case for the Bostic Question: the Question is sound judicial policy that produces real benefits at a minimal cost, and it has the potential to advance demosprudential values.
In the sentencing context, it is increasingly critical to scrutinize these standards of review. After all, in the twenty-first century, American criminal justice is “a world of guilty pleas, not trials.”22 The vast majority of federal prosecutions end in guilty pleas, and therefore the vast majority of defendants appear in open court only for sentencing before a judge—never a jury of their peers.23 Judges are under no obligation to follow whatever sentencing recommendation the government and defendant may have agreed upon,24 and so even defendants who are pleading guilty in exchange for sentencing considerations are exposed to the possibility of judicial error.
When broad judicial discretion is combined with the requirement to lodge objections to preserve errors for appeal, odd situations can arise. Consider a normal federal sentencing hearing. The prosecution and the defense have assembled the Presentence Report; the attorneys have offered their final oral arguments; and the district court, after deliberation and with solemn gravitas, has announced the defendant’s sentence. Haggling with a judge after a ruling is rarely a wise lawyering choice, and yet in this context any competent defense attorney would promptly object.25 Thus, objecting to a freshly imposed sentence is both obligatory and awkward.26 Enter the Bostic Question.
The Tenth and D.C. Circuits have dismissed the Bostic Question as “gratuitous superintendence”—unnecessary procedural handholding for lawyers whom the legal system assumes to be “competent professionals.”27 But these courts’ opposition is misguided. As I argue in this Part, the Question has two principal virtues. First, it facilitates efficient, informed, and accurate appellate review, which improves the fairness and finality of criminal sentences. Second, it has the heretofore unrecognized potential to advance demosprudential values and help to create a sentencing regime that emerges from a dialogue involving not only legal elites but also the people and their elected representatives.
The Tenth Circuit’s concern appears to underlie the misgivings of the other courts that have rejected the Question.38 There is such a thing as too much handholding, the argument goes, and district courts should not have to bear an additional burden on top of the “numerous requirements” that already exist in the sentencing context.39 As I explain in the next Section, I find that concern puzzling and unpersuasive, because the Question, applied broadly, will improve efficiency and reduce the burden that resentencing imposes on district courts.
To be sure, most attorneys who represent criminal defendants at sentencing hearings are competent enough to lodge the objections that could be useful on appeal, so the Bostic Question may indeed be “gratuitous” in certain circumstances. But the annoyance—if any—caused by the Question is insignificant compared to the benefits it can confer.
The Eleventh Circuit was palpably frustrated with the consequences of the district court’s haste and had no choice but to vacate and remand. The district court, disregarding Gall,51 had failed to identify the correct Guidelines range,52 had evinced no meaningful consideration of the section 3553(a) factors,53 and had given minimal explanation for its decision to issue a sentence dramatically above that recommended by the Guidelines.54 Consequently, the court of appeals was “unable to determine with any certainty” the rationale behind the district court’s sentencing decision, because the record was “insufficient for meaningful review” of the “procedural errors and abnormalities” that appeared to have occurred.55 Although one cannot know how the Bostic Question would have affected Valera’s first sentencing hearing, there is a reasonable chance that the Question would have prompted a dialogue, or at least a more substantive explanation, for the Eleventh Circuit to review.
To be clear, when the Question is properly applied,63 defendants lucky enough to have attentive counsel should not be the only ones to benefit. The focus of the Bostic inquiry on appeal is simply whether the court afforded counsel an adequate opportunity to object—not whether counsel managed to articulate those objections with sufficient clarity to preserve them. If counsel misses or squanders the Bostic opportunity, his client will face plain-error review, but ought to be no worse off in that regard than if the Bostic Question had never been asked at all.
This conclusion follows only if one sees the proper effect of the Bostic Question as imposing a formalistic procedural rule upon defendants. Instead, as the Vonner dissenters pointed out, the purpose of the Bostic Question is to add opportunities for objection and colloquy,67 not to wipe the slate clean of procedural objections already raised and thereby penalize defendants with inattentive or incompetent attorneys. To insist otherwise, as did the Vonner majority, is to “create a trap for unwary defendants.”68 It is regrettable that the Vonner majority misinterpreted the Question as a double-edged sword, rather than as a clarity-seeking device that benefits both defendants and courts.
Nor does the “additive” understanding of the Question undermine its ability to promote efficiency. Even if the Bostic Question does not force defendants to renew all their objections at a single spot in the sentencing transcript—thereby requiring appellate judges to search for valid objections in that transcript—the court of appeals is no worse off in that regard than it would be otherwise. And the Question’s purpose is not only to clarify and enumerate the defendant’s objections, but also, where appropriate, to clarify or correct the judge’s reasoning. A district judge’s concise response to a post-sentence objection can be helpful, as in Fout, to a reviewing court that might otherwise have to piece together the judge’s reasoning from statements scattered throughout the hearing transcript.
For reasons that the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits have articulated, I encourage the Sixth Circuit, as well as its sister circuits, to return to the original conception of the Bostic Question.
Had the district court used the Bostic Question to elicit objections from Thomas’s counsel, perhaps the story would have been the same. However, the Question could also have prompted Thomas’s counsel to challenge the court’s perfunctory treatment of the section 3553(a) factors, which in turn would have prompted the court to reconsider the sentence or, more likely, to provide a more robust explanation of the court’s decision making. At a minimum, the Bostic Question would have opened up space for Thomas (or the government, for that matter) to react to the sentence and elicit further clarification. Even if a district court has committed no reversible error—as is usually the case—this dialogue has intrinsic value.
Such dialogue does more than create a more robust transcript for appellate courts to parse. It also facilitates reaction to, and dialogue about, the manner in which the judge synthesized the facts and then applied the Guidelines or other relevant law. Members of the public—whether the defendant, those attending the hearing, or recipients of secondhand news—benefit in the aggregate when they gain access to more information about the law and legal institutions that bind them. At a time in American history when criminal sentencing reform is widely viewed as a necessary,85 but still politically fraught,86 topic, we ought to seize opportunities to tie public participation and mobilization more closely to the realities of sentencing procedure and judicial decision making.
The Bostic Question manages to promote both fairness and finality at once—no small feat in criminal procedure. District courts using the Question will be more likely to correct errors on the spot, more likely to record a more complete account of their reasoning for appellate courts to evaluate, and more likely to “enhance [courts’] democratic potential”87 and accountability for sentencing outcomes. I urge all courts to seize this opportunity to reap considerable benefits at a minimal cost.
371 F.3d 865 (6th Cir. 2004).
Bostic, 371 F.3d at 872-73 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
Guinier, supra note 8, at 16.
Id. at 657 (quoting Judge Tacha, of the Tenth Circuit, and Judge Wald, of the D.C. Circuit).
See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46 (2007).
See Raybin, supra note 19, at 236-37.
See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
See id. at 872 n.6.
Steele, 603 F.3d at 807.
See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
Flores-Mejia, 759 F.3d at 258.
Steele, 603 F.3d at 806.
See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
Valera, 622 F. App’x at 880.
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007); see supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
Valera, 622 F. App’x at 878-79.
614 F. App’x 335 (6th Cir. 2015).
516 F.3d 382 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
Id. at 399 (Clay, J., dissenting).
Id. at 398 (quoting United States v. Castro-Juarez, 425 F.3d 430, 433-34 (7th Cir. 2005)).
Id. at 390-92 (majority opinion).
United States v. Cortés-Medina, 819 F.3d 566, 571 (1st Cir. 2016).
Guinier & Torres, supra note 8, at 2749.
See Guinier, supra note 8, at 47-52.
See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
498 F.3d 336 (6th Cir. 2007).
Guinier & Torres, supra note 8, at 2756.
E.g., U.S. Const. amend. V (containing the Grand Jury Clause, the Double Jeopardy Clause, and the Self-Incrimination Clause); id. amend. VI (containing the rights to a speedy trial, a jury trial, the confrontation of witnesses, a compulsory process for obtaining witnesses, and the assistance of counsel); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363-64 (1970) (holding that proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is a constitutional requirement in criminal cases).
See, e.g., Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 120-21 (1987) (discussing the importance of the “finality” of the criminal justice system and the impossibility of “perfect[ing]” it); United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 508-09 (1983) (discussing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), which established the standard for “harmless error”). But see Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309-10 (1991) (distinguishing quotidian “trial errors” from “structural defects in the constitution of the trial mechanism, which defy analysis by ‘harmless-error’ standards”).
The Supreme Court has explained that “[i]f an error is not properly preserved” by a timely objection in the trial court, then “appellate-court authority to remedy the error . . . is strictly circumscribed. . . . ‘[E]rrors are a constant in the trial process . . . [and] a reflexive inclination by appellate courts to reverse because of unpreserved error would be fatal.’” Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 134 (2009) (quoting United States v. Padilla, 415 F.3d 211, 224 (1st Cir. 2005) (en banc) (Boudin, C.J., concurring)); see Fed. R. Crim. P. 51(b).
On occasion, the Sixth Circuit also uses the terms “Bostic rule” or “Bostic requirement.” See, e.g., United States v. Daniels, 641 F. App’x 481, 487 (6th Cir. 2016) (using both); United States v. Vonner, 516 F.3d 382, 399 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (Clay, J., dissenting) (using “Bostic rule”). As discussed infra text accompanying notes 33-34, the Bostic Question was inspired by a nearly identical rule in the Eleventh Circuit.
Id. at 873 (quoting United States v. Jones, 899 F.2d 1097, 1102 (11th Cir. 1990), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Morrill, 984 F.2d 1136 (11th Cir. 1993)).
Lani Guinier, The Supreme Court 2007 Term—Foreword: Demosprudence Through Dissent, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 15-16 (2008); see Lani Guinier & Gerald Torres, Changing the Wind: Notes Toward a Demosprudence of Law and Social Movements, 123 Yale L.J. 2740 (2014).
See, e.g., Table B-5: U.S. Courts of Appeals—Appeals Terminated on the Merits, by Circuit, During the 12-Month Period Ending September 30, 2012, U.S. Cts. (2012), http://www‌.uscourts.gov‌/statistics‌/table/b-5/judicial-business/2012/09/30 [http://‌perma.cc‌/C7JD-YW3A] (reporting just a seven percent reversal rate of criminal proceedings across all courts of appeals).
See Jonathan S. Masur & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Deference Mistakes, 82 U. Chi. L. Rev. 643, 680 (2015) (“When a criminal defendant fails to object at trial, such that a district court judge has no warning of a potential problem, appellate judges may be exceedingly reluctant to undo their colleague’s hard work. This hesitance may well surpass whatever caution an appellate judge would exercise before overturning a lower court decision reviewed for abuse of discretion.”). Of course, not all courts of appeals “necessarily treat deference identically.” Id. at 661.
Id. at 658 (quoting Parts & Elec. Motors, Inc. v. Sterling Elec., Inc., 866 F.2d 228, 233 (7th Cir. 1988)).
543 U.S. 220 (2005) (rendering the Federal Sentencing Guidelines merely advisory for district judges and establishing a “reasonableness” standard for appellate review of sentences).
See Kate Stith, The Arc of the Pendulum: Judges, Prosecutors, and the Exercise of Discretion, 117 Yale L.J. 1420, 1472-94 (2008).
See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 351 (2007) (“[We] expla[ined] in Booker that appellate ‘reasonableness’ review merely asks whether the trial court abused its discretion . . . .”). Gall, too, suggests that “abuse of discretion” review and “reasonableness” review are essentially identical. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51; see also Stephanos Bibas & Susan Klein, The Sixth Amendment and Criminal Sentencing, 30 Cardozo L. Rev. 775, 775 (2008) (“[A]ppellate courts . . . must review all sentences individually and deferentially for abuse of discretion.”).
See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52 (“Any error, defect, irregularity, or variance that does not affect substantial rights must be disregarded . . . . A plain error that affects substantial rights may be considered even though it was not brought to the court’s attention.”).
As recently as 2010, the circuit split was more tangled. See Benjamin K. Raybin, Note, “Objection: Your Honor Is Being Unreasonable!”—Law and Policy Opposing the Federal Sentencing Order Objection Requirement, 63 Vand. L. Rev. 235, 244-50 (2010). Since Raybin’s survey, however, several circuits have decided to impose plain-error review for unpreserved procedural-unreasonableness claims. See, e.g., United States v. Flores-Mejia, 759 F.3d 253, 257 (3d Cir. 2014) (en banc) (“Our new rule is consistent with the holdings of most other circuit courts of appeals that have ruled on the issue.”).
See Flores-Mejia, 759 F.3d at 257-58 (collecting cases). But see United States v. Howard, No. 15-4533, 2016 WL 519119, at *1 (4th Cir. Feb. 10, 2016) (“Offering ‘§ 3553 arguments [before the sentence’s imposition] in the district court for a different sentence than the one he received’ is sufficient to ‘preserve [the defendant’s] claim of procedural sentencing error on appeal.’” (quoting United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 581 (4th Cir. 2010))); Flores-Mejia, 759 F.3d at 259-66 (Greenaway, J., dissenting) (assailing the majority for abandoning circuit precedent and adopting a procedural-unreasonableness objection requirement).
Only in the Fifth Circuit must defendants lodge a post-imposition substantive-reasonableness objection to avoid plain-error review. See United States v. Peltier, 505 F.3d 389, 391-92 (5th Cir. 2007). Six other circuits do not require objections to preserve a substantive-reasonableness claim. See United States v. Ruiz-Huertas, 792 F.3d 223, 228 (1st Cir. 2015) (collecting cases). In Ruiz-Huertas, the First Circuit took note of the circuit split but declined to pick a side. See id. at 228 & n.4 (“We need not resolve this apparent anomaly today.”).
Stephanos Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding and Sentence Enhancements in a World of Guilty Pleas, 110 Yale L.J. 1097, 1100 (2001).
See, e.g., Criminal Cases, U.S. Cts., http://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/types-cases/criminal-cases [http://perma.cc/QAE3-B7RG] (“More than 90 percent of defendants plead guilty rather than go to trial.”); Jed S. Rakoff, Why Innocent People Plead Guilty, N.Y. Rev. Books (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/11/20/why-innocent-people-plead-guilty [http://perma.cc/K89J-8RJ2] (“In 2013, while 8 percent of all federal criminal charges were dismissed . . . more than 97 percent of the remainder were resolved through plea bargains . . . . The plea bargains largely determined the sentences imposed.”).
See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 6B1.1(b) (U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 2016) (“To the extent the plea agreement is of the type specified in [Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure] 11(c)(1)(B), the court must advise the defendant that the defendant has no right to withdraw the plea if the court does not follow the recommendation or request.”).
See id. at 236 (remarking upon the nonsensical fact that “[t]his sentencing order objection requirement is mandatory even if the party had presented all appropriate arguments earlier during the sentencing hearing”).
See United States v. Hunter, 809 F.3d 677, 683 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. Steele, 603 F.3d 803, 807 (10th Cir. 2010)).
United States v. Bostic, 371 F.3d 865, 871 (6th Cir. 2004) (noting that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 51(b) “excuses the failure to object if that party had no opportunity to do so”).
Id. at 873 (internal quotation marks and other marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Jones, 899 F.2d 1097, 1102 (11th Cir. 1990), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Morrill, 984 F.2d 1136 (11th Cir. 1993)).
See, e.g., United States v. Louissant, 558 F. App’x 893, 894-95 (11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (unpublished opinion) (quoting Jones, 899 F.2d at 1102).
See United States v. Hunter, 809 F.3d 677, 682-83 (D.C. Cir. 2016); United States v. Flores-Mejia, 759 F.3d 253, 258 n.8 (3d Cir. 2014) (en banc) (“To ensure that timely objections are made, we encourage district courts at sentencing to inquire of counsel whether there are any objections to procedural matters. However, unlike the Sixth and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeals, we will not make this a requirement that district judges must follow. We believe that the burden of objecting to errors remains with the parties.” (citations omitted)).
See United States v. Steele, 603 F.3d 803, 807 (10th Cir. 2010); United States v. Vanderwerfhorst, 576 F.3d 929, 934 (9th Cir. 2009).
See United States v. Cortés-Medina, 819 F.3d 566, 574 n.10 (1st Cir. 2016) (Lipez, J., dissenting) (urging the First Circuit to implement the Bostic Question and opining that “such a rule . . . would have avoided, or at least minimized, the confusing jumble of standards deemed applicable by the majority”).
United States v. Valera, 622 F. App’x 876, 876 (11th Cir. 2015) (unpublished opinion). Recall that the Eleventh Circuit has its own counterpart to the Bostic Question. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
Brief of the United States at 2-4, Valera, 622 F. App’x 876 (No. 15-10084-BB), 2015 WL 1950947, at *2-3.
Id. at 877 (“As the deputy began calling the next case, defense counsel attempted to object to the reasonableness of Valera’s sentence, but was interrupted mid-statement by the court’s terse comment, ‘They’re noted.’”).
To interpret the Bostic Question as requiring attorneys to reiterate previously raised objections is to undercut its effectiveness significantly. See infra notes 64-70 and accompanying text.
See id. at 2752 (“Demosprudence is in the nature of an acid bath to remove the corrosion that has isolated the realm of the state from the legitimizing power of the people, except as it is expressed through conventional partisan politics and the act of representation by elites.”).
See id. at 2742 (borrowing a metaphor from Rev. Jim Wallis: “I say here’s how you recognize a member of Congress. They’re the ones walking around with their fingers up in the air. And then they lick their finger and they put it back up and they see which way the wind is blowing. You can’t change a nation by replacing one wet-fingered politician with another. You change a nation when you change the wind”).
Id. at 49. Guinier argues that this sort of dissent, if executed thoughtfully and effectively, is not “[m]ere public grandstanding” but rather “a powerful pedagogical opportunity to open up space for public deliberation and engagement.” Id. at 51.
Guinier & Torres, supra note 8, at 2752; see also supra note 74 and accompanying text (describing the importance of changing the underlying political climate instead of one’s political representatives). Social movements during the Civil Rights Movement—for example, the Montgomery Bus Boycotters and California’s United Farm Workers—played an integral role in “forg[ing] new understandings of the status quo,” “chang[ing] norms,” and “creating an alternative narrative of constitutional meaning.” Guinier & Torres, supra note 8, at 2756-57.
Juries serve not only a fact-finding function but also a demosprudential one: the institution of the jury both engages nonlawyer citizens in criminal justice and educates them about the law and its consequences. See John H. Langbein, On the Myth of Written Constitutions: The Disappearance of Criminal Jury Trial, 15 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 119, 124 (1992). The ever-increasing scarcity of the jury trial makes it all the more desirable to favor demosprudential procedures at a defendant’s sentencing—in open court.
[W]hen decisionmakers expect voluntary compliance, or when they expect respect for decisions because the decisions are right rather than because they emanate from an authoritative source, then giving reasons becomes a way to bring the subject of the decision into the enterprise. Even if compliance is not the issue, giving reasons is still a way of showing respect for the subject, and a way of opening a conversation rather than forestalling one.
Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 633, 658 (1995); see also Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007) (“Judicial decisions are reasoned decisions. Confidence in a judge’s use of reason underlies the public’s trust in the judicial institution. A public statement of those reasons helps provide the public with the assurance that creates that trust.”).
Id. at 340 (“In this case, the district court asked Thomas’s counsel, ‘Do you have anything further for the record, Mr. Canady?’ We have previously determined that a similar question by the district court is not clear enough to satisfy the requirements of the Bostic rule.” (citation omitted)).
See, e.g., Inimai Chettiar, Don’t Lock Up Prison Reform: Congress’ Fight over the Supreme Court Shouldn’t Doom Desperately Needed Sentencing Reform, U.S. News (Mar. 7, 2016, 12:15 PM), http://www‌.usnews‌.com‌/opinion/articles/2016-03-07/supreme-court-battle-shouldnt-kill-criminal-justice-sentencing-reform [http://perma.cc/JQ4K-W7BH].
See, e.g., Lydia Wheeler, Trump Marks Change for Criminal Justice Reform, Hill (Nov. 27, 2016) http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/307377-trump-marks-change-for-criminal-justice-reform [http://perma.cc/23AL-WX4B] (speculating as to whether the “bipartisan agreement that many aspects of our criminal justice system need reform” will result in new legislation under the Trump Administration).
Yale Law School, J.D. Class of 2016. I thank the editors of the Yale Law Journal—especially Hilary Ledwell, Aaron Levine, Diana Li, Alina Lindblom, and Anna Mohan—for their assistance in developing and polishing this Comment. The piece has improved a great deal as a result of their insight and careful editing.

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