Source: https://es.scribd.com/document/391414517/391406988-Republic-of-Moldova-Opinion-on-the-Law-on-Preventing-and-Combating-Terrorism-Adopted-by-the-Venice-Commission-at-Its-116th-Plenary-Session-V
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 11:48:56+00:00

Document:
Opinion No. 936 / 2018 Or. Engl.
Combatting Terrorism (CDL-REF(2018)046), hereinafter referred to as Law no. 120 or the Law.
Moldovan authorities for the preparation of the visit.
Moldova. Inaccuracies may occur in this opinion as a result of incorrect translation.
adopted by the Venice Commission at its 116th Plenary Session (Venice, 19 - 20 October 2018).
at least as yet to the best of its knowledge, given rise to major issues.
the practical importance of such infrastructure should not be underestimated.
This is the name of the Service contained in the current English translation of the Law.
authorities playing a subordinate role in their respective fields.
(an attack, a hostage taking, etc.), where there is an “imminent threat” to the vital public interests.
are overly broad and all-encompassing.
in nature. One may conclude that this is a sui generis activity, governed by different rules.
International Human Rights Law, 2014, OHCHR, p. 24.
to the property interests, or a large and boisterous demonstration. These acts may not be polite.
possible, within the framework parameters and jurisprudence of the criminal law.
Moldovan authorities to consider this question.
overlapping and unhelpfully lacks clarity regarding its chain of command and operational process.
precisions”.8 A similar remark is called for in the context of Law no. 120.
the intelligence and security service of the Republic of Moldova.
 the law on personal data protection (Law no. 133), etc.
by the CPC and Law no. 59.
gathering work, and in particular to the tasks performed under Law no. 120?
out in Law no. 59.
ordinary legislation, and which are governed by the special rules, and what those rules are.
reference to all applicable legislation pertinent to the SIS.
explain why the Speaker is designated as a “coordinating authority” under Law no. 120.
the representatives of the opposition on this body.
of that becoming a norm.
no. 37138/14, 12 January 2016, § 82.
surveillance the possibility of obtaining redress (as stressed by the ECtHR in Szabó and Vissy v. Hungary, no.
individual complaints by the victims of surveillance and other persons affected by the activities of the SIS.
verification visits, which may be unannounced and repeated.
prevention of terrorism” (Article 13 (2)).
provisions of the Law may be construed as giving the SIS coercive powers of a similar nature.
need to verify whether the building of the station is “terrorist-proof”?
reasons by a court (or other external body), to obtain an order validating the request?
the conditions on which public authorities are empowered to resort to any such measures”.
special investigative measure is capable of infringing human rights, the tighter should be the controls on its use”.
least, Article 21 is quite precise as to what information the SIS may collect from the air companies.
the CPC and Law no. 59), but references to such other laws are not specific and clear enough.
Thus, there is a risk that these provisions may be abused.
Chisinau the rapporteurs did not hear about any serious allegations of abuses by the SIS.
terrorist crisis, which is defined by the head of the CTC (see Article 25 of Law no. 120).
gatherings, the prohibition of sale of certain dangerous goods and alcohol, etc.
private persons, to intercept telephone calls and other electronic communications, etc.
procedures cannot be employed. Several questions, however, remain.
require a court warrant is also open to criticism – but this law is not in the focus of the present opinion.
possible to contact the Minister and obtain, if need be, oral permission to initiate the operation.
ECtHR, even if a large margin of appreciation is granted to the State in such context.
sort of parliamentary commission or sub-commission.
regards the decision to initiate at least some forms of more far-reaching anti-terrorist operations.
sense of a parliamentary mechanism for approval, or post hoc veto, or annulment.
an urgent sitting of the plenary Parliament.
terrorist intervention”, when the “defensive” methods of solving the crisis did not work.
sort of means they may use and which precautions they should take.
on the Democratic Oversight of the Security Services (updated), section VIII.
CDL-AD(2015)010, Report on the Democratic Oversight of the Security Services (updated), section V.A.
deadlock in hostage situations and facilitate regaining control.
reduce the risk of such errors, the law may be amended as follows.
weapons not adapted to the situation may be usefully added to the Law.
terrorists”, and “for the damages caused during the course” of the counter-terrorist operation.
The Law should be amended in these respects.
speech in the context of fight against terrorism.39 However, this margin is not all-embracing.
and means used) and situations of a major terrorist crisis, as the one described in Finogenov.
ECtHR, Tagayeva and Others v. Russia, nos. 26562/07 et al., 13 April 2017, § 598.
United Kingdom, no. 5878/08, ECHR 2016.
interviews with terrorists – see Brind and Others v. the United Kingdom, no. 18714/91, decision of 9 May 1994.
should not be tempted nor allowed to use secrecy rules to keep their actions from public scrutiny.
and it is a right of the public to be informed about them.
interest defence” is available to the journalists (in this Law or elsewhere).
definition of “terrorist activities” given by the Law itself in Article 3).
existence”.43 This is obviously even more true in respect of the closing down of the outlet.
See ECtHR, Stoll v. Switzerland [GC], no. 69698/01, 10 December 2007, §§ 108 et seq.
may be sufficient to deter media outlets from expressing “support” to terrorists.
terrorists – a general one (under Article 8) and one for the border controls (under Article 10).
on the list. Three observations are called for in respect of Article 10.
persons put on the list.
coup of 15 July 2016, §§ 128 et seq.
citizens, and in this case Article 2.2 of Protocol No. 4 to the ECHR must be respected.
the list) are compatible with the Moldova’s other international obligations.
cases where the inclusion in the database led to an interference with somebody’s rights.
other institutions are legal persons, so it should suffice to have one article for both purposes.
person empowered with leading roles within the legal entity thereof”.
for delimiting the mandate of the SIS, which may be broader.
account the individual circumstances of each of the deceased and those of their family members.
innocent bystanders or even hostages, killed by accident during the counter-terrorist operation.
the participation of all interested parties (like the next of kin of the “supposed terrorist”).
the prosecution, etc.) and specify the measures and the relevant procedures in detail.
Moldova for further assistance in this matter.
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References: sui generis
 § 82
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 § 598
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