Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/467/138/
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 04:08:34+00:00

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Pub.L. 280 to require that all subsequent assertions of jurisdiction be preceded by tribal consent. The court also rejected petitioner's argument that to prohibit a suit such as petitioner's would violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and deny petitioner equal access to the courts in violation of the North Dakota Constitution.
1. No federal law or policy required the North Dakota courts to forgo in this case the jurisdiction recognized in Vermillion, supra. Pp. 467 U. S. 147-151.
(a) The exercise of state court jurisdiction in this case would not interfere with the right of tribal Indians to govern themselves under their own laws. As a general matter, tribal self-government is not impeded when a State allows an Indian to seek relief against a non-Indian concerning a claim arising in Indian country. The exercise of state jurisdiction is particularly compatible with tribal autonomy when, as here, the suit is brought by the tribe itself and the tribal court lacked jurisdiction over the claim at the time the suit was instituted. Pp. 467 U. S. 147-149.
(b) Nor would the exercise of state jurisdiction here be inconsistent with the federal and tribal interests reflected in North Dakota's Enabling Act or in Pub.L. 280. The legislative record suggests only that the Enabling Act's phrase "absolute [congressional] jurisdiction and control" was meant to foreclose state regulation and taxation of Indians and their lands, not that Indians were to be prohibited from entering state courts to pursue judicial remedies against non-Indians. Public Law 280 does not either require North Dakota to disclaim the basic jurisdiction recognized in Vermillion or authorize it to do so. Nothing in Pub.L. 280's language or legislative history indicates that it was meant to divest States of preexisting and otherwise lawfully assumed jurisdiction. Pp. 467 U. S. 149-151.
2. Where it is uncertain whether the North Dakota Supreme Court's interpretation of Chapter 27-19 rested on a misconception of federal law, its judgment will be vacated, and the case will be remanded to that court for reconsideration of the state law question. Pp. 467 U. S. 151-158.
(a) The court's incorrect assumption that Pub.L. 280 and the Civil Rights Act of 1968 either authorized North Dakota to disclaim jurisdiction or affirmatively forbade the exercise of jurisdiction absent tribal consent appears to have been the sole basis relied upon by the court to avoid holding the jurisdictional disclaimer unconstitutional as applied in this case. Pp. 467 U. S. 154-155.
bar to the exercise of jurisdiction here and interpreted state law to avoid a perceived conflict. Pp. 467 U. S. 155-157.
(c) The conclusion that the North Dakota Supreme Court's state law decision may have rested on federal law is buttressed by prudential considerations. If that court is not given an opportunity to reconsider its conclusions with the proper understanding of federal law, this Court, contrary to the fundamental rule that it will not reach constitutional questions in advance of the necessity of deciding them, will be required to decide whether North Dakota has denied petitioner equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. Pp. 467 U. S. 157-158.
321 N.W.2d 510, vacated and remanded.
BLACKMUN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, J. and BRENNAN, WHITE, MARSHALL, POWELL, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. REHNQUIST, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which STEVENS, J., joined, post, p. 467 U. S. 159.
This litigation presents issues of state court civil jurisdiction over a claim asserted by an Indian tribe. The case, as it comes to us, is somewhat unusual in a central respect: the Tribe seeks, rather than contests, state court jurisdiction, and the non-Indian party is in opposition. Cf. Williams v. Lee, 358 U. S. 217 (1959).
Code provides that the jurisdiction of North Dakota courts shall extend "over all civil causes of action which arise on an Indian reservation upon acceptance by Indian citizens." In this case, the Supreme Court of North Dakota interpreted Chapter 27-19 to disclaim state court jurisdiction over a claim (against a non-Indian) by an Indian Tribe that had not accepted jurisdiction under the statute. The court determined that the North Dakota Legislature had disclaimed jurisdiction pursuant to the principal federal statute governing state jurisdiction over Indian country, namely, the Act of Aug. 15, 1953, 67 Stat. 588, as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1360, commonly known as Pub.L. 280. The court further concluded that the jurisdictional disclaimer, inasmuch as it was authorized by Pub.L. 280, did not run afoul of the North Dakota or Federal Constitutions. Because the North Dakota Supreme Court's interpretation of Chapter 27-19 and its accompanying constitutional analysis appear to us to rest on a possible misunderstanding of Pub.L. 280, we vacate the court's judgment and remand the case to allow reconsideration of the jurisdictional questions in the light of what we feel is the proper meaning of the federal statute.
A. Petitioner Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation is a federally recognized Indian Tribe with its reservation in northwestern North Dakota. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 543, § 23, 26 Stat. 1032. See City of New Town v. United States, 454 F.2d 121 (CA8 1972). In 1974, petitioner employed respondent Wold Engineering, P. C. (hereafter respondent), a North Dakota corporation, to design and build the Four Bears Water System Project, a water supply system located wholly within the reservation. The project was completed in 1977, but it did not perform to petitioner's satisfaction.
jurisdiction over a claim by an Indian against a non-Indian in the absence of an agreement by the parties. Tribal Code, ch. II, § 1(a). [Footnote 1] The subject matter of petitioner's complaint, however, clearly fell within the scope of the state trial court's general jurisdiction. See N.D.Const., Art. VI, § 8; N.D.Cent.Code § 27-05-06 (1974 and Supp.1983). After counterclaiming for petitioner's alleged failure to complete its payments on the water supply system, respondent moved to dismiss petitioner's complaint on the ground that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over any claim arising in Indian country.
Ibid. North Dakota's original Constitution contained, in identical terms, the required jurisdictional disclaimers. See N.D. Const., Art. XVI, § 203, cl. 2 (1889).
Federal restrictions on North Dakota's jurisdiction over Indian country, however, were substantially eliminated in 1953 with the enactment of the aforementioned Pub.L. 280. See generally Washington v. Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U. S. 463, 439 U. S. 471-474 (1979). [Footnote 3] Sections 2 and 4 of Pub.L. 280 gave five States full jurisdiction, with a stated minor exception as to each of two States, over civil and criminal actions involving Indians and arising in Indian country. 67 Stat. 588-589, codified, as amended, at 18 U.S.C. § 1162 and 28 U.S.C. § 1360, respectively. Sections 6 and 7 gave all other States the option of assuming similar jurisdiction. Section 6 authorized States whose constitutions and statutes contained federally imposed jurisdictional restraints, like North Dakota's, to amend their laws to assume jurisdiction. 67 Stat. 590, codified, as amended, at 25 U.S.C. § 1324. Section 7 provided similar federal consent to any other State not having civil and criminal jurisdiction, but required such States to assume jurisdiction through "affirmative legislative action." 67 Stat. 590. As originally enacted, Pub.L. 280 did not require States to obtain the consent of affected Indian tribes before assuming jurisdiction over them. Title IV of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 amended Pub.L. 280, however, to require that all subsequent assertions of jurisdiction be preceded by tribal consent. Pub.L. 90-284, §§ 401, 402, 406, 82 Stat. 78-80, codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321, 1322, 1326.
"In accordance with the provisions of Public Law 280 . . . and [the amended] North Dakota constitution, jurisdiction of the state of North Dakota shall be extended over all civil causes of action which arise on an Indian reservation upon acceptance by Indian citizens in a manner provided by this chapter. Upon acceptance the jurisdiction of the state shall be to the same extent that the state has jurisdiction over other civil causes of action, and those civil laws of this state that are of general application to private property shall have the same force and effect within such Indian reservation or Indian country as they have elsewhere within this state."
C. Respondent's motion to dismiss rested on the restrictive jurisdictional principles of Whiteshield and its successors. Because the petitioner Tribe at no point has consented to state court jurisdiction under Chapter 27-19 over the Fort Berthold Reservation, respondent argued that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over petitioner's claim under Chapter 27-19 and the amended provisions of Pub.L. 280. Petitioner opposed respondent's motion to dismiss on the ground, inter alia, that the tribal consent requirements of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 were not meant to apply to a suit brought by a tribal government like petitioner. The trial court rejected petitioner's arguments and granted the motion to dismiss the suit for lack of jurisdiction, but did so without prejudice to a renewal of the action following compliance with the state and federal consent requirements. App. to Pet. for Cert. la.
"we have no jurisdiction over civil causes of action arising within the exterior boundaries of an Indian reservation, unless the Indian citizens of the reservation vote to accept jurisdiction."
was amended and Chapter 27-19 . . . was enacted."
321 N.W.2d at 513. As a result, any discrimination against Indian litigants did not violate the State or Federal Constitutions. Ibid.
Because of the complexity and importance of the issue posed by the North Dakota Supreme Court's decision, we granted certiorari. 461 U.S. 904 (1983).
Respondent does not dispute that petitioner's claim comes within the scope of the civil jurisdiction recognized by the North Dakota court in its Vermillion ruling in 1957. Respondent advances two arguments in support of the North Dakota Supreme Court's conclusion that state court jurisdiction no longer extends so far. The first is that federal law precludes the state courts from asserting jurisdiction over petitioner's claim. The second is that, regardless of federal law, the North Dakota Supreme Court has held that the trial court lacked jurisdiction as a matter of state law. We address these arguments in turn.
411 U. S. 164, 411 U. S. 179 (1973). We do not believe that either of these barriers precludes North Dakota courts from entertaining a civil action by an Indian tribe against a non-Indian for a claim arising on an Indian reservation.
on equal terms with other persons to seek relief against a non-Indian concerning a claim arising in Indian country. The exercise of state jurisdiction is particularly compatible with tribal autonomy when, as here, the suit is brought by the tribe itself and the tribal court lacked jurisdiction over the claim at the time the suit was instituted.
language of the Enabling Act in favor of a construction under which North Dakota could not provide a judicial forum for an Indian to obtain relief against a non-Indian.
In sum, then, no federal law or policy required the North Dakota courts to forgo the jurisdiction recognized in Vermillion in this case. If the North Dakota Supreme Court's jurisdictional ruling is to stand, it must be shown to rest on state, rather than federal, law.
"to the extent that a claimed bar to state jurisdiction . . . is premised on the respective State Constitutions, that is a question of state law over which the state courts have binding authority."
"when . . . a state court decision fairly appears . . . to be interwoven with the federal law, and when the adequacy and independence of any possible state law ground is not clear from the face of the opinion, we will accept as the most reasonable explanation that the state court decided the case the way it did because it believed that federal law required it to do so."
Supreme Court's interpretation of Chapter 27-19 was not influenced by its understanding of federal law.
"the people of North Dakota and the legislature were acting under explicit authority granted by Congress in the exercise of its federal power over Indians"
"The courts of the State of North Dakota are open to all persons. But . . . Federal law prohibits State courts from assuming jurisdiction of civil actions involving Indians which arise on an Indian reservation, until such time as the Indians of that reservation have consented to such jurisdiction. Thus the courts of the State of North Dakota are open to Indians, if they consent to the courts' jurisdiction as provided by law."
holding the jurisdictional disclaimer unconstitutional as applied in this case. Because the North Dakota Supreme Court has adhered consistently to the policy of construing state statutes to avoid potential state and federal constitutional problems, see, e.g., State v. Kottenbroch, 319 N.W.2d 465, 473 (1982); Paluck v. Board of County Comm'rs, 307 N.W.2d 852, 856 (1981); Grace Lutheran Church v. North Dakota Employment Security Bureau, 294 N.W.2d 767, 772 (1980); North American Coal Corp. v. Huber, 268 N.W.2d 593, 596 (1978); Tang v. Ping, 209 N.W.2d 624, 628 (1973), it is entirely possible that the court would have avoided any constitutional question by construing Chapter 27-19 not to disclaim jurisdiction here, and it is equally possible that the court will reconstrue Chapter 27-19 that way if it is given an opportunity to do so.
"In essence, [petitioner] argues that North Dakota retained residuary jurisdiction over actions brought by Indians against non-Indians for civil wrongs committed on Indian lands. . . . That argument would be more convincing had the legislature of North Dakota not, pursuant to Public Law 280, totally disclaimed jurisdiction over civil causes of action arising on an Indian reservation. In re Whiteshield, 124 N.W.2d 694 (N.D.1963). In Nelson v. Dubois, 232 N.W.2d 54 (N.D.1975), . . . we rejected the concept of 'residuary' jurisdiction. We adhere to that decision today."
321 N.W.2d at 511 (emphasis added).
"The solution to this most serious problem lies not with the State. Congress may amend its statutes; Indian tribes of this State may begin to assert their own jurisdiction. This State cannot exercise jurisdiction that it does not possess."
"avoid the risk of 'an affirmance of a decision which might have been decided differently if the court below had felt free, under our decisions, to do so.'"
United Air Lines, Inc. v. Mahin, 410 U.S. at 410 U. S. 632, quoting Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U. S. 437, 342 U. S. 443 (1952).
It is important to recognize what we have not decided in this case today. We have made no ruling that Chapter 27-19 has any meaning other than the one assigned to it by the North Dakota Supreme Court. Neither have we decided whether, assuming that the North Dakota Supreme Court adheres to its current interpretation of Chapter 27-19, application of the statute to petitioner will deny petitioner federal equal protection or violate any other federally protected right. Finally, we have intimated no view concerning the state trial court's jurisdiction over respondent's counterclaim should the North Dakota Supreme Court decide that the trial court does have jurisdiction over petitioner's claim. Instead, we merely vacate the North Dakota Supreme Court's judgment and remand the case for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Following the North Dakota Supreme Court's decision in this case, petitioner's Tribal Business Council amended the Tribal Code to grant the tribal court subject matter jurisdiction over all civil causes of action arising within the boundaries of the Fort Berthold Reservation.
See F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 268, and n. 72 (1982 ed.).
Before that, however, Congress had vested North Dakota with certain criminal jurisdiction over the Devils Lake Reservation. Act of May 31, 1946, ch. 279, 60 Stat. 229.
"no longer states the rule to be applied . . . in a case between Indians arising out of use of the public highways on an Indian reservation."
In United States ex rel. Hall v. Hansen, 303 N.W.2d 349, 350, and n. 3 (1981), however, the court did state in dictum that a state trial court lacked jurisdiction over a claim by an Indian against a non-Indian arising in Indian country.
"All courts shall be open, and every man for any injury done him in his lands, goods, person or reputation shall have remedy by due process of law, and right and justice administered without sale, denial or delay."
N.D. Const., Art. I, § 9. The State's Constitution further provides that no citizen or class of citizens "shall . . . be granted privileges or immunities which upon the same terms shall not be granted to all citizens." Art. I, § 21.
A number of state courts have recognized the right of Indians to bring suits in state courts against non-Indians for claims arising in Indian country. See, e.g., McCrea v. Busch, 164 Mont. 442, 524 P.2d 781 (1974); Paiz v. Hughes, 76 N.M. 562, 417 P.2d 51 (1966); Whiting v. Hoffine, 294 N.W.2d 921, 923-924 (S.D.1980).
In Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U. S. 60, 369 U. S. 71 (1962), this Court held that the phrase "absolute jurisdiction and control" was not intended to oust States completely from all authority concerning Indian lands. See, however, McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U. S. 164, 411 U. S. 176, n. 15 (1973).
Although Vermillion was decided after the enactment of Pub.L. 280, the North Dakota Supreme Court made clear that it was confirming preexisting jurisdiction, rather than establishing a previously unavailable jurisdictional category. See Vermillion v. Spotted Elk, 85 N.W.2d at 435-436.
See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321(a), 1322(a), 1326; S.Rep. No. 721, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 32 (1967) (additional views of Sen. Ervin); Goldberg, Public Law 280: The Limits of State Jurisdiction Over Reservation Indians, 22 UCLA L.Rev. 535, 551 (1975).
See 25 U.S.C. § 1323(a); 2 U.S. Dept. of Interior, Opinions of the Solicitor Relating to Indian Affairs, 1917-1974, pp.1951-1952 (1979); see also Goldberg, supra, at 558-562. Although any assumption of jurisdiction pursuant to Pub.L. 280 must comply with that statute's procedural requirements, see Kennerly v. District Court of Montana, 400 U. S. 423 (1971), Pub.L. 280's requirements simply have no bearing on jurisdiction lawfully assumed prior to its enactment.
"All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory . . . to sue . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens."
Petitioner does not appear to have relied on § 1981 before the North Dakota Supreme Court, nor has it done so here. In light of our disposition of this case, we need not decide whether the § 1981 issue is properly before us or, if so, whether a violation of § 1981 has been made out. The Supreme Court of North Dakota is free, of course, to consider the applicability of § 1981 on remand if it deems the issue to be properly before it.
"to avoid the risk of 'an affirmance of a decision which might have been decided differently if the court below had felt free, under our decisions, to do so.'"
410 U.S. at 410 U. S. 632, quoting Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U. S. 437, 342 U. S. 443 (1952).
"[A]ny change from the present [jurisdictional] case law would require action by the United States Congress. The appellants are asking this court to assume the duties and responsibilities which are vested solely in the United States Congress. The arguments presented should be addressed to that body."
"The Congress has set out the mandatory procedure to be followed by the Indian Tribes and the State before the States may assume jurisdiction. . . . The Sioux Indians, not having accepted State jurisdiction as permitted and provided for by the congressional mandate and Chapter 27-19, we conclude that the State did not have, nor did it acquire, jurisdiction"
(Emphasis added.) See United States ex rel. Hall v. Hansen, 303 N.W.2d at 350; Nelson v. Dubois, 232 N.W.2d at 61 (dissenting opinion); Gourneau v. Smith, 207 N.W.2d at 259; see also Poitra v. Demarrias, 502 F.2d 23, 27 (CA8 1974), cert. denied, 421 U. S. 934 (1975); American Indian Agricultural Credit Consortium, Inc. v. Fredericks, 551 F.Supp. 1020, 1021-1022 (Colo.1982).
In at least one instance, the North Dakota Supreme Court took care not to extend its restrictive jurisdictional holdings to the situation in which an Indian plaintiff brought suit against a non-Indian defendant in state court. See Schantz v. White Lightning, 231 N.W.2d at 814, n. 1 (rejecting broad formulation of jurisdictional issue because it "would require the consideration of a question if an Indian could sue a non-Indian"). The court also once stated flatly that "Indians have the right to sue non-Indians in State courts." Rolette County v. Eltobgi, 221 N.W.2d 645, 648 (1974). But see n 5, supra.
In addition, the practical cost of mistakenly concluding that federal law influenced the North Dakota Supreme Court's treatment of Chapter 27-19 is far outweighed by the cost of mistakenly reaching the opposite conclusion. If the court's misunderstanding of Pub.L. 280 in fact did not contribute to its interpretation of state law, the court is free to reinstate its former judgment on remand. See, e.g., United Air Lines, Inc. v. Mahin, 54 Ill.2d 431, 298 N.E.2d 161 (1973). In contrast, if the court's understanding of federal law did play a role in its interpretation of Chapter 27-19 but we were to proceed on a contrary assumption, we would be depriving petitioner of a judicial forum that the North Dakota Supreme Court would make available if only it were given another opportunity to address the issue. When the cost of erring in one direction is so negligible and the cost of erring in the other is so great, we think that uncertainty about the federal basis for the state law decision properly is resolved in favor of the conclusion that federal law played a material role.
The highest state court in North Dakota has made a decision on the scope of state court jurisdiction, a decision based on a state statute passed following amendment of the State Constitution. The question is clearly one of state law, immune from our review except in so far as it might be preempted by federal law or in conflict with the United States Constitution. The Court today does not say that Chapter 27-19, as interpreted by the North Dakota Supreme Court, is preempted by federal law. Nor does the Court find that statute unconstitutional. Yet the Court vacates the judgment below because Pub.L. 280 neither "authorized" nor "required" any disclaimer of preexisting state jurisdiction.
because the only federal question actually before us -- the constitutionality of North Dakota's refusal to exercise jurisdiction over a lawsuit brought by an Indian tribe -- is insubstantial.
In 467 U. S. the Court argues that state court jurisdiction over this case would have been proper, as a matter of both federal and North Dakota law, prior to the passage of Pub.L. 280, and that nothing in Pub.L. 280 should have changed that situation. In Part 467 U. S. the Court parlays the eclipse of this "residual jurisdiction" into a reason for concluding that the North Dakota Supreme Court may have misunderstood Pub.L. 280 when it interpreted Chapter 27-19. The linchpin of the entire argument is the 1957 case of Vermillion v. Spotted Elk, 85 N.W.2d 432, in which the North Dakota court took an expansive view of the scope of state court jurisdiction over suits by and against Indians in Indian country. The Court today correctly states that the jurisdiction claimed in Vermillion -- over all civil actions arising in Indian country, except those involving interests in Indian lands -- would embrace this case. Ante at 467 U. S. 147. B ut the argument for residual jurisdiction which the Court constructs around Vermillion is wholly untenable for the simple reason that the expansive jurisdiction of Vermillion was discredited, two years after it was claimed, by our decision in Williams v. Lee, 358 U. S. 217 (1959).
such an intrusion into strictly tribal affairs without affirmative legislative action pursuant to Pub.L. 280. See Fisher v. District Court, 424 U. S. 382 (1976). And the expansive claim made in Vermillion to jurisdiction over all civil actions arising in Indian country, except those involving interests in Indian lands, cannot be squared with the requirement that such jurisdiction be assumed by legislative action pursuant to Pub.L. 280.
The Court glosses over this obvious difficulty in its argument by simply recasting Vermillion to fit its needs.
over claims between Indians, it intruded impermissibly on tribal self-governance. . . . This Court, however, repeatedly has approved the exercise of jurisdiction by state courts over claims by Indians against non-Indians, even when those claims arose in Indian country."
Ante at 467 U. S. 148.
In accordance with its view of what the North Dakota courts could have done compatibly with federal law, the Court proceeds to treat Vermillion as if it had, in fact, only claimed jurisdiction over suits by Indians against non-Indians. Thus, the Court says that nothing in Pub.L. 280 "required North Dakota to disclaim the basic jurisdiction recognized in Vermillion or authorized it to do so," ante at 467 U. S. 150, and that "no federal law or policy required the North Dakota courts to forgo the jurisdiction recognized in Vermillion in this case," ante at 467 U. S. 151. The Court even refers to the jurisdiction of Vermillion as "otherwise lawfully assumed jurisdiction." Ante at 467 U. S. 150.
I must confess to being nonplussed by the Court's treatment of Vermillion. It seems strange, indeed, to suppose that Vermillion is in some sense good law -- when neither its holding nor its reasoning is acceptable under federal law -- merely because the opinion would be acceptable if it had been written altogether differently and reached an opposite result. The fact remains that it was not written differently, and did not reach the opposite result.
"[T]he requirement of affirmative legislative action [was not] an idle choice of words; the legislative history of the 1953 statute shows that the requirement was intended to assure that state jurisdiction would not be extended until the jurisdictions to be responsible for the portion of Indian country concerned manifested by political action their willingness and ability to discharge their new responsibilities. "
I might finally add that, even if one did posit a truncated Vermillion as somehow providing the residual jurisdiction necessary to the Court's argument until eclipsed by the North Dakota Legislature, there is still no indication and the Court offers no good reason to believe that the North Dakota Supreme Court interpreted Chapter 27-19 under any misapprehensions about Pub.L. 280. The North Dakota court, in fact, shows a perfectly clear appreciation of both the purpose and effect of Pub.L. 280.
"The purpose of Public Law 280 was to facilitate the transfer of jurisdictional responsibility to the states. Washington v. Confederated Bands and Tribes, 439 U. S. 463, 439 U. S. 505 (1979). It permitted states to amend their constitutions or existing statutes to remove any legal impediments to the assumption of civil and criminal jurisdiction, and thereby to unilaterally assume jurisdiction over criminal and civil matters within the exterior boundaries of Indian reservations within the states taking such action."
321 N.W.2d 510, 511 (1982). This statement of the law is unexceptionable. Indeed, the Court's own statement of the purpose and effect of Pub.L. 280, see ante at 467 U. S. 150, reads like a paraphrase of the above passage.
the majority does not imply that it was, then there is no additional requirement that it be affirmatively sanctioned. A State is not obliged to play "Mother, may I" with the Federal Government before retroceding jurisdiction that, under our cases, could have been retained.
In my view, therefore, the only federal question presented in this case is whether North Dakota's failure to permit Indians to sue non-Indians in circumstances under which non-Indians could not sue Indians violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. After our decision in Washington v. Yakima Indian Nation, supra, that question is not a substantial one. See n. 5, supra. Access to the North Dakota courts is within the power of petitioner. The Tribe need merely consent to the full civil jurisdiction which North Dakota, pursuant to Pub.L. 280, stands ready to offer them. Petitioner wants to enjoy the full benefits of the state courts as plaintiff without ever running the risk of appearing as defendant. The Equal Protection Clause mandates no such result.
In Williams, a non-Indian who operated a store on an Indian reservation in Arizona sued an Indian couple to collect goods sold to them on credit. We held that principles of tribal autonomy precluded the Arizona courts from entertaining the suit in the absence of an affirmative assumption of jurisdiction by the state legislature. 358 U.S. at 358 U. S. 222.
In Washington v. Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U. S. 463, 439 U. S. 495 (1979), we held that "any option State can condition the assumption of full jurisdiction on the consent of an affected tribe," even though not required to do so by Pub.L. 280.
The North Dakota court's subsequent treatment of Vermillion provides a strong indication that the court would never, as a matter of state law, have recognized the one-sided jurisdiction sought by petitioner and permitted by federal law. As noted, the jurisdiction claimed in Vermillion under state law was invalid under Williams v. Lee as preempted by federal law. That same jurisdiction was also disclaimed as a matter of state law by the passage of Chapter 27-19. See 321 N.W.2d 510, 511 (N.D.1982).
"jurisdiction of the state of North Dakota shall be extended over all civil causes of action which arise on an Indian reservation upon acceptance by Indian citizens in a manner provided by this chapter."
N.D.Cent.Code § 27-19-01 (1974). A later provision excepts from this jurisdiction suits involving interests in Indian lands. § 27-19-08. Thus, the jurisdiction which North Dakota stands ready to accept under Chapter 27-19 is exactly coterminous with that claimed in Vermillion.
If Vermillion had been good law, Chapter 27-19 would have been entirely superfluous. Following the passage of Chapter 27-19, therefore, the North Dakota court could reasonably conclude that the legislature had disclaimed (i.e., renounced any claim to) the jurisdiction wrongfully usurped in Vermillion except on consent of the affected tribes. And the fact that the court concluded that all the jurisdiction of Vermillion had been disclaimed indicates that, as a matter of state law, the court views the jurisdiction of Vermillion as an all-or-nothing, reciprocal proposition. Again, it is irrelevant that our cases would have permitted the State to assert one-sided, residual jurisdiction. The State was not obliged to accept the invitation.
For this reason, the Court's reliance on Nelson v. Dubois, 232 N.W.2d 54 (N.D.1975), and Schantz v. White Lightning, 231 N.W.2d 812 (N.D.1975), see ante at 467 U. S. 155-156, and n. 14, for the proposition that the North Dakota Supreme Court may have misread federal law is misplaced. Insofar as North Dakota has not already assumed lawful jurisdiction over suits arising in Indian country, either prior to Pub.L. 280 or pursuant to the terms of that statute, federal law does act "as an affirmative bar to the exercise of jurisdiction here," ante at 467 U. S. 155.
Obviously, if Pub.L. 280 would preclude a judicial assumption of jurisdiction in this case, then the North Dakota Supreme Court properly disposed of petitioner's equal protection argument with a simple citation to Washington v. Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. at 439 U. S. 500-501, in which we rejected a similar challenge to a Washington statute which conditioned state jurisdiction over Indian lands in some subject matter areas on Indian consent. It would also follow that the lower court's handling of the equal protection claim does not, as the Court would have it, ante at 467 U. S. 154, reflect any misunderstanding of federal law.

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