Source: https://openjurist.org/662/f2d/1148
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 06:03:49+00:00

Document:
Theodore Klein, Miami, Fla., pro se.
Sanford Svetcov, Chief, Asst. U.S. Atty., San Francisco, Cal., for plaintiff-appellee.
Before RIVES, KRAVITCH and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
This appeal arises out of a jury verdict finding the appellant, William Timothy Chaney, guilty on seven counts of mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1342 and one count of interstate transportation of stolen property in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2314.1 Appellant claims that he was denied a fair trial because the trial court (1) inquired into the appellant's waiver of counsel in the presence of the entire jury venire; (2) admitted hearsay evidence of an alleged co-conspirator although there was no independent evidence of the existence of such a conspiracy and gave a conspiracy instruction in support of the evidence at the close of the case although the appellant was never charged with conspiracy; (3) required the appellant to furnish handwriting exemplars subsequent to his indictment; and (4) excluded certain evidence offered by the appellant. Because we find these claims meritless, we affirm the conviction.
Appellant, his wife, and brother were officers of a company called Western Vending or Western Distributing, Inc. (hereafter Western Distributing), which was located in Foster City, California. The appellant was president of Western Distributing and used the name "James Kirk." The brother and wife also used aliases: Cathleen Chaney called herself "Lisa Kirk," and Michael Chaney assumed various names, including "Wayne Harrington."
The alleged purpose of Western Distributing was to merchandise consumer products; however, Western Distributing actually served as part of a plan to defraud companies of goods provided to Western Distributing on credit. Appellant's scheme began when he sent letters on Western Distributing stationery, signed in the name of "Kirk," to numerous manufacturers of consumer goods. The letter explained Western Distributing's merchandising plan and the company's desire to purchase goods for resale on credit. In soliciting this business, appellant not only used a false name, but also made misrepresentations concerning Western Distributing's financial and credit status. The appellant listed "Ira Goldberg" and "Goldberg Distributing Company" as credit references. In fact "Ira Goldberg" was a fictitious character created by the appellant to transmit false credit information.2 Many of the companies, relying on these misrepresentations, sold large quantities of merchandise and extended credit to Western Distributing. The merchandise included such items as C.B. radios, vacuum cleaners, calculators, stereo equipment, and typewriters.
In June 1977, Chaney vacated the Western Distributing office, as well as his home, and left town. Approximately $240,000 worth of goods, which had not been paid for, disappeared from the Western Distributing warehouse at that time. Companies that had sold merchandise to Western Distributing were not advised of the appellant's whereabouts; however, they were informed by a letter from Western Distributing, which was signed by "Kirk," that the company had suffered "a severe financial reversal" and that they would hear from Western Distributing within the next 45 days. The companies never heard from Western Distributing and never received payment for the goods.
Appellant's scheme was foiled a few months later in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. Acting under the alias "James Baron," the appellant advertised the sale of certain consumer products. Investigators found that one of the items sold by "Baron" was a typewriter that had initially been sold on credit by IBM to Western Distributing. Subsequently, a search warrant for "Baron's" Fort Lauderdale home was obtained. The execution of the warrant revealed a number of items that had been sold to Western Distributing. Police then conducted a consent search of a warehouse in Pompano Beach that had been leased by the appellant and found a large quantity of merchandise fraudulently obtained by the appellant in California.
The appellant was subsequently arrested and indicted on several counts of mail fraud and one count of interstate transportation of stolen property. He chose to proceed at trial pro se with the aid of an assistant public defender. The jury found the appellant guilty as charged.
Appellant first claims that he was denied a fair trial because the trial court inquired into the appellant's waiver of counsel in front of the entire jury venire. The appellant does not assert that the judge's comments would have been improper had they been made outside of the jury's presence; rather he argues that the colloquy unfairly prejudiced the jury against him and denied him effective assistance of counsel by destroying his credibility before the jury. At trial, the appellant did not timely object to the waiver hearing being conducted in the presence of the jury venire3 or ask for a curative instruction. Therefore, we can reverse the trial court only if we find that the trial judge's actions constituted plain error.4 Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b); United States v. Cormier, 639 F.2d 1177 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Fowler, 605 F.2d 181 (5th Cir. 1979). An error is plain if it is "so obvious that the failure to notice it would seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings." United States v. Fowler, supra, at 184 (quoting United States v. Musquiz, 445 F.2d 963, 966 (5th Cir. 1971)). And, such errors are recognized "only in exceptional circumstances to avoid a miscarriage of justice." Easton v. United States, 398 F.2d 485, 486 (5th Cir. 1968). Holding the waiver hearing in the presence of the jury venire did not in this case constitute a manifest miscarriage of justice.
The trial judge in this case erred by holding the waiver hearing in front of the jury venire. However, close scrutiny of the record reveals that the colloquy was not conducted in a manner that seriously threatened the fairness or integrity of the judicial proceeding. First, the judge explained to the entire jury venire that the appellant had decided to represent himself with the assistance of the public defender. Even if the waiver hearing had been conducted outside the presence of the jury, the jury would have been informed of the defendant's decision to proceed pro se. Second, the judge told the jury venire that before selecting the jury, he must discuss with the appellant his choice to represent himself. The judge explained to the appellant that the case was complicated, that a trained lawyer would aid with respect to the substance and procedure of the case and would better understand the proclivities of a jury, and that the defendant's inexperience might confuse the jury. He further informed the defendant that if the defendant failed to make objections during the course of the trial, those objections were waived, and that if the defendant chose to represent himself, he could not later appeal his conviction on the grounds of inadequate assistance of counsel. Finally, the judge asked the appellant to state for the record whether he knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel; the appellant answered affirmatively. At no time during the colloquy did the judge discuss the merits of the case, criticize the defendant, or in any other way act in a manner that evidenced a bias against the defendant. Although the judge should have conducted the waiver hearing outside of the presence of the jury venire, we cannot say that his failure to do so in this case prejudiced the jury in such a way as to constitute plain error.
Appellant's second claim is two-fold: first, that the trial court erred by admitting hearsay statements of an alleged co-conspirator without sufficient independent evidence of the existence of a conspiracy; and second, that the trial court erred by giving the jury a conspiracy charge in support of the admission of such evidence even though the appellant was not indicted for conspiracy. In the court below, the appellant objected to the admission of the co-conspirator's statements on the grounds that the statements were prejudicial and that the appellant had not been charged with conspiracy. On appeal, the appellant abandons these contentions and instead argues that there was insufficient independent evidence of a conspiracy to admit the co-conspirator's statements. Because the appellant did not raise this claim below, we also review this claim under the plain error standard.
on appropriate motion at the conclusion of all the evidence, the court must determine as a factual matter whether the prosecution has shown by a preponderance of the evidence independent of the statement itself (1) that a conspiracy existed (2) that the co-conspirator and the defendant against whom the co-conspirator's statement is offered were members of the conspiracy, and (3) that the statement was made during the course and in the furtherance of the conspiracy.
Appellant's third claim is that the court erred by requiring the appellant to furnish handwriting exemplars subsequent to the indictment in violation of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The appellant does not specify the rule that was violated, and we are unable to find one. Nor did appellant have a constitutional right to refuse to provide the handwriting exemplar. It is well settled that the taking of handwriting exemplars does not violate a defendant's fifth amendment right against self-incrimination. United States v. Euge, 444 U.S. 707, 100 S.Ct. 874, 63 L.Ed.2d 141 (1980); Gilbert v. State of California, 388 U.S. 263, 266, 87 S.Ct. 1951, 1953, 18 L.Ed.2d 1178 (1967); United States v. McGann, 431 F.2d 1104, 1108 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 919, 91 S.Ct. 904, 27 L.Ed.2d 821 (1970); Higgins v. Wainwright, 424 F.2d 177 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 905, 91 S.Ct. 145, 27 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). This is so whether the handwriting exemplar is taken before or after indictment. Appellant's claim is therefore meritless.
At trial, the appellant urged the court to admit the resolution for the truth of its contents under the general hearsay exception contained in Fed.R.Evid. 803(24).11 The appellant does not renew this contention on appeal but instead argues that the evidence was not hearsay and should have been admitted because it was introduced to show only that the appellant relied on the resolution and not to establish the truth of its contents. Since this argument was not raised below, we will consider it only if a refusal to do so would result in a miscarriage of justice. Martinez v. Mathews, 544 F.2d 1233, 1237 (5th Cir. 1976). Such is not the case here as the trial judge properly exercised his discretion in excluding the resolution as hearsay.
if the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into evidence. However, a statement may not be admitted under this exception unless the proponent of it makes known to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, his intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it, including the name and address of the declarant.

References: § 1342
 § 2314
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