Source: https://recreation-law.com/tag/san-diego-unified-school-district/
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 14:55:18+00:00

Document:
Sara Hohe, a Minor, etc., Plaintiff and Appellant, v. San Diego Unified School District, Defendant and Respondent; Mission Bay High School Parent, Teacher and Student Association, Defendant and Appellant.
Court of Appeal of California, Fourth District, Division One.
Robert P. Irwin for Plaintiff and Appellant.
A. Book for Defendant and Appellant.
McInnis, Fitzgerald, Rees, Sharkey & McIntyre and Steven J.
Cologne for Defendant and Respondent.
[fn*] Assigned by the Chairperson of the Judicial Council.
Plaintiff Sara Hohe (Hohe), a minor, by her guardian ad litem, Steven Hohe, appeals after the court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants San Diego Unified School District (School District) and Mission Bay High School Parent, Teacher and Student Association (PTSA). The court found the releases signed by Hohe and Steven Hohe on his daughter’s behalf barred her personal injury lawsuit. Hohe contends the court erred because the releases are contrary to public policy, unenforceable because of her minority and unenforceable because of fraud in the inducement. She also argues the written release did not clearly notify her or her parent of its effect. We conclude a triable issue of fact exists regarding the releases’ scope and effect. We therefore reverse the judgment. Accordingly, PTSA is not entitled to attorney fees or costs.
for the senior class. Hypnotism shows had been held annually since 1980.
Hohe saw the prior year’s hypnotism show. She explained to her father that it would be fun, the show was popular and discussed at least one previous stunt where a subject was suspended between two objects while another person stood on the subject’s stomach.
She also said people sang.
During the course of the show, Hohe slid from her chair and also fell to the floor about six times.
The circumstances here present an entirely different situation.
Hohe volunteered to be part of a PTSA activity because it would be “fun.” There was no essential service or good being withheld by PTSA. Hohe, like thousands of children participating in recreational activities sponsored by groups of volunteers and parents, was asked to give up her right to sue. The public as a whole receives the benefit of such waivers so that groups such as Boy and Girl Scouts, Little League, and parent-teacher associations are able to continue without the risks and sometimes overwhelming costs of litigation. Thousands of children benefit from the availability of recreational and sports activities.
Those options are steadily decreasing — victims of decreasing financial and tax support for other than the bare essentials of an education. Every learning experience involves risk. In this instance Hohe agreed to shoulder the risk. No public policy forbids the shifting of that burden.
(2) Hohe also argues the release from liability cannot be enforced against her because she is a minor. The permission and waiver forms were signed on her behalf by her parent. Hohe also signed one of the release documents.
The court in Celli v. Sports Car Club of America, Inc. (1972) 29 Cal.App.3d 511, 517 [105 Cal.Rptr. 904], found a release signed by a nine-year-old invalid because, among other reasons, the minor’s signature was the only signature on the release. We therefore hold Hohe cannot disaffirm the release based on her minority.
(3a) Hohe also attacks the release based on fraud because the permission form bore the heading “Mission Bay High School PTSA Presents Dr. Karl Santo.” It was undisputed the hypnotist was not a medical doctor. Hohe and her father signed a second release form which was simply captioned “KARL SANTO HYPNOTIST.” The question facing the court was whether a material and triable factual issue existed based on the alleged fraudulent content of the release. We think not.
(3b) The record before us does not disclose evidence which creates a triable and material issue of fact. Use of the title “Dr.” did not falsely represent the hypnotist as a medical doctor or show PTSA intended such a representation. There is also no evidence PTSA intended to induce reliance or Hohe justifiably relied in any way. Hohe has not presented a triable issue of fact on the question of fraud to defeat the summary judgment.
(5a) The more troublesome issue before us is the scope and effect of the release forms. (6a) Hohe contends the executed forms do not clearly and unequivocally release School District and PTSA from liability for negligence.
(5b) The permission form signed by Steven Hohe “waive[d] all liability against PTSA, its members, Mission Bay High School, and the San Diego Unified School District.” The form began with precautionary language stating children with mental disorders or of a nervous disposition were not allowed to participate. The parent was advised to exercise parental discretion because the anticipated program might contain an adult theme. The additional form signed by both Hohe and her father stated “I agree to indemnify and hold you and any third parties harmless from any and all liability, loss or damage (including reasonable attorney fees) caused by or arising in any manner from my participation in the Magic of the Mind Show. . . .” This second document signed at the same time as the permission form granted Karl Santo the authority to broadcast and record Hohe’s performance and to use her name and likeness for promotional purposes. It also specifically indemnified Santo from any liability due to Hohe’s utterances while participating in the show.
(6b) A valid release must be simple enough for a layperson to understand and additionally give notice of its import. A drafter of such a release faces two difficult choices. His Scylla is the sin of oversimplification and his Charybdis a whirlpool of convoluted language which purports to give notice of everything but as a practical matter buries its message in minutiae.
29 Cal.App.3d at page 525, appendix, a release printed on the back of a race car pit pass in six point type attempted to “[release, remise and forever discharge] from any and every claim, demand, action or right of action whatsoever kind or nature, in law or in equity, arising from or by reason of any injury to or death of any person, . . . resulting or alleged to result from or arise out of any accident or other occurrence during or in connection with the foregoing event and/or any practice session in connection therewith, and/or any use of the course and/or facilities provided for such event.” The Celli court found the release invalid.
sentence contained no releasing words such as “‘release,’ ‘remise,’ ‘discharge,’ ‘waive’ or the like.” The Ferrell court found the release invalid.
(5c) The question here is whether the release and waiver language in the documents signed by Hohe and her father exculpates PTSA and School District from the consequences of its own breach of duty.
the release forms before the court. In this instance, the intention as expressed in the releases signed by the parent for his child is not clear. Although the parent waived all liability it was in the context of two documents which focused on mental and nervous disorders, defamation and broadcast rights. The scope of the waiver is ambiguous. Where the intention of the parties on the face of the releases is ambiguous, a triable factual issue is presented. (8) Any doubts as to the propriety of granting the motion for summary judgment should be resolved in favor of the party opposing the motion. (Stationers Corp. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. (1965) 62 Cal.2d 412, 417 [42 Cal.Rptr. 449, 398 P.2d 785]; Slivinsky v. Watkins-Johnson Co., supra, 221 Cal.App.3d at p. 804.) We are mindful of the salutary purposes sometimes served by releases in diminishing the risk of litigation to groups and entities sponsoring student and recreational activities. However we cannot say the release documents signed by Hohe and her parent bar recovery for her personal injuries as a matter of law. Accordingly, we must reverse the summary judgment.
Finally, Hohe contends hypnotism is an ultrahazardous activity.
It is unnecessary to reach this issue in deciding whether or not the court properly granted summary judgment. We decline Hohe’s invitation to direct the court on how it should receive evidence on that issue.
We similarly need not decide whether or not the attorney fees provision found in the release forms would entitle PTSA to attorney fees. The court denied PTSA its attorney fees and costs on its motion for summary judgment. Since we have decided the court erred in granting judgment to PTSA, it follows PTSA is not entitled to attorney fees or costs.
The judgment is reversed. The order denying attorney fees and costs is affirmed. All parties to bear their own costs on appeal.
[fn1] The release form read as follows: “CAUTION [¶] Children with any mental disorder or of a nervous disposition are not allowed to participate. A portion of the program occasionally contains adult theme; parental discretion is advised.
“SUBJECTS ARE REQUIRED TO ARRIVE AT 6:30 p.m.
(Italics added.) In all fairness, it is difficult to imagine what more any drafter could do to advise a layperson the release covers all types of liability than to say so.
However, as the majority correctly notes, the validity of a release should not turn on “magic” words. Instead, the issue is whether a layperson such as Hohe understood, from whatever language used, that she was releasing persons from negligence liability.
I am unable to discern, as does the majority, the existence of any ambiguity in the phrase “any and all liability.”[fn2] Sara had seen the show, was aware that participants would fall down, and elected to be among them. She now seeks compensation for injuries allegedly incurred when she fell down. The alleged harm is precisely that for which she released all others from liability. (Cf. Madison v. Superior Court (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 589 [250 Cal.Rptr. 299]; Kurashige v. Indian Dunes, Inc. (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 606 [246 Cal.Rptr. 310]; Coates v. Newhall Land & Farming, Inc. (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 1 [236 Cal.Rptr. 181]; Hulsey v. Elsinore Parachute Center (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 333 [214 Cal.Rptr. 194] .) Based upon the foregoing, I would hold the release effective and affirm the judgment.
[fn1] I agree with the majority’s statements in section IV regarding the social value of releases and the difficulties which face the successful drafter of a release.
[fn2] The release, quoted in footnote 2 of the majority opinion, ante, page 1563, is not written in legalese or insurance company double-talk.

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