Source: https://wcc.state.ct.us/crb/2012/5677crb.htm
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 02:29:34+00:00

Document:
The claimant was represented by Barry S. Moller, Esq., Cramer & Anderson, LLP, PO Box 278, Litchfield, CT 06759.
This Petition for Review from the July 29, 2011 Finding and Decision of the Commissioner acting for the Fifth District was heard January 20, 2012 before a Compensation Review Board panel consisting of the Commission Chairman John A. Mastropietro and Commissioners Jodi Murray Gregg and Daniel E. Dilzer.
JOHN A. MASTROPIETRO, CHAIRMAN. The respondents have appealed from a Finding and Decision granted to the claimant in this case. The trial commissioner in this matter determined that the claimant was entitled to incremental increases in his benefits pursuant to § 5-142(a) C.G.S., during the first five years after he was deemed totally disabled due to a compensable hazardous duty injury. The respondents argued that they should be excused from such adjustments as the claimant had entered the “inactive payroll” and had not presented a claim for such adjustments in a timely manner to the trial commissioner. The trial commissioner rejected this argument, and determined such adjustments were owed to the claimant. The commissioner further determined the respondents had engaged in undue delay and unreasonable contest, and determined further hearings were necessary to ascertain if sanctions should be levied against the respondents for their conduct.
The respondents have appealed from this Finding and Decision. We are not persuaded by the respondents’ argument that the statute herein does not require the payment of adjustments, finding the “plain meaning” of the statute makes such adjustments obligatory. We affirm the Finding and Decision.
The trial commissioner reached the following findings at the conclusion of the formal hearing in this case. The claimant was employed as a correction officer by the State of Connecticut on December 14, 1995. On that date, the claimant was responding to a Code Orange alarm, which indicates that a correction officer is being assaulted. The claimant suffered injuries to his left wrist, right ankle, and eye as a result of an altercation with an inmate at that time. The claimant resigned from the Department of Correction effective February 16, 1996. On September 12, 1997, the claimant was determined to be totally disabled.
A voluntary agreement was not reached in this matter until December 1, 2000. This voluntary agreement accepted the injury as compensable under § 5-142(a) C.G.S., and established a compensation rate for total incapacity of $536.23. The claimant was totally disabled, on and off, for a period of 260 weeks beginning September 12, 1997. From September 12, 1997, forward, at different times, the claimant received weekly temporary total disability benefits of $536.23. In May of 2008, the claimant’s weekly benefits were cut by 50 percent at the expiration of his 260th week of temporary total benefits to $268.00.
The trial commissioner found the claimant never received incremental increases for the five years he was totally incapacitated as directed by § 5-142(a) C.G.S. The commissioner also found the claimant was never advised that the respondents were not going to pay all benefits pursuant to C.G.S. § 5-142(a); nor had the respondents ever filed a Form 36 advising the claimant and the commission as to their position regarding the hazardous duty statute.
Based on these subordinate facts the trial commissioner concluded the claimant sustained compensable injuries to his right eye, left wrist, and left ankle in the course of employment on December 14, 1995, pursuant to § 5-142(a) C.G.S., and never waived any benefits in regard to § 5-142(a) C.G.S., when he resigned on February 16, 1996. The trial commissioner found the claimant a fully credible and persuasive witness. He found the claimant to be entitled to all benefits contained in § 5-142(a) C.G.S., including the incremental increases due, as well as all salary adjustments. The commissioner found it took the respondents almost 12 years from the date of injury to attempt to make the proper adjustments in this matter; and at no time had they ever filed a Form 36 reducing benefits in regard to this matter or advised the claimant as to their position in regard to § 5-142(a) C.G.S. The commissioner also found the respondents had not advised the claimant or commission of their position when the voluntary agreement was executed. The commissioner ordered all benefits pursuant to § 5-142(a) C.G.S., paid to the claimant, including all incremental increases due, as well as salary adjustments in regard to temporary total disability benefits to date. The commissioner set down the issue of sanctions for future hearings.
The respondents filed a Motion to Correct seeking thirteen separate corrections. The trial commissioner granted three corrections which did not materially change the relief ordered in the Finding and Decision. The respondents have pursued this appeal with their argument being that since the claimant had entered the “inactive payroll” that this status somehow exempted the respondents from making annual increment adjustments so as to align the claimant’s compensation with the compensation paid to active personnel. We note that the respondents failed to cite a single reported appellate court or compensation review board decision for their position on appeal. Instead, the respondents rely on a single sentence attributed to an Assistant Attorney General who spoke in favor of a statutory revision in 1949.1 We note that since that time the General Assembly has enacted § 1-2z C.G.S., which requires us to apply the “plain meaning” of a statute’s provisions to the interpretation of a statute. We do not believe the “plain meaning” of § 5-142(a) C.G.S., supports the respondents’ theory.
a) If any member of the Division of State Police within the Department of Public Safety or of any correctional institution sustains any injury (1) while making an arrest or in the actual performance of such police duties or guard duties or fire duties or inspection duties, or prosecution or public defender or courthouse duties, or while attending or restraining an inmate of any such institution or as a result of being assaulted in the performance of such person’s duty, or while responding to an emergency or code at a correctional institution, and (2) that is a direct result of the special hazards inherent in such duties, the state shall pay all necessary medical and hospital expenses resulting from such injury. If total incapacity results from such injury, such person shall be removed from the active payroll the first day of incapacity, exclusive of the day of injury, and placed on an inactive payroll. Such person shall continue to receive the full salary that such person was receiving at the time of injury subject to all salary benefits of active employees, including annual increments, and all salary adjustments, including salary deductions, required in the case of active employees, for a period of two hundred sixty weeks from the date of the beginning of such incapacity. Thereafter, such person shall be removed from the payroll and shall receive compensation at the rate of fifty per cent of the salary that such person was receiving at the expiration of said two hundred sixty weeks as long as such person remains so disabled.
We also look to the “plain meaning” of the word “payroll.” The respondents argue that the term “active payroll” and “inactive payroll” mean very different things and a member of the inactive payroll is not entitled to future adjustments, notwithstanding what appears to be an unambiguous obligation on the part of the employer to provide such adjustments. The definition of “payroll” does not support this concept. It is defined as “[a] list of employees to be paid and the amount due to each of them.” Black’s Law Dictionary, 8th edition, p. 1186. It appears the difference between “active payroll” and “inactive payroll” constitutes whether the person in question is on a list of employees anticipated to be available for work; and nothing more. While we do not find C.G.S. § 5-142(a) ambiguous and believe the “plain meaning” supports the trial commissioner’s conclusions; the respondents ask that we examine the legislative history. We have done so and are not persuaded by the respondents’ strained statutory construction.
The principles of statutory construction argue in favor of the plain meaning of the statute. “[I]n determining the meaning of a statute . . . we look not only at the provision at issue, but also to the broader statutory scheme to ensure the coherency of our construction . . . . In applying these principles, we are mindful that the legislature is presumed to have intended a just and rational result.” Teresa T. v. Ragaglia, 272 Conn. 734, 748 (2005). The respondents focus on the definition of the word “payroll” does not advance their argument. We must look to § 1-1(a) C.G.S., which states “[i]n the construction of the statutes, words and phrases shall be construed according to the commonly approved usage of the language.” Weber v. U.S. Sterling Securities, 282 Conn. 722, 732 (2007). When one reviews the statement of Assistant Attorney General Thomas J. Conroy, relied on by the respondents in the context of the ordinary usage of the word “payroll,” and in the context of the rest of the legislation as it was actually adopted by the General Assembly, it is apparent the intent herein was not what the respondents claim.
Instead of creating a separate and distinct class of injured workers in an undefined “inactive payroll” which were to be dealt with in a different manner than those on the “active payroll”; the more logical conclusion herein is that this legislation was adopted simply for administrative imperatives to permit state agencies to replace injured workers who were not anticipated to return to active service. Public Act 352 simply allowed those state agencies that employed workers engaged in hazardous duty to place those on the payroll who were deemed totally disabled on an “inactive payroll.” Neither the plain meaning of the Act nor its legislative history support any other reasonable interpretation.3 “The test to determine ambiguity is whether the statute, when read in context, is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation.” Felician Sisters of St. Francis of Connecticut, Inc. v. Historic District Commission, 284 Conn. 838, 847 (2008); see also, Carmel Hollow Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Bethlehem, 269 Conn. 120 (2004). The trial commissioner applied the only reasonable interpretation of § 5-142(a) C.G.S.
We do wish to clarify one point where we believe the claimant and the trial commissioner may have misinterpreted the applicable law. The trial commissioner in the Finding and Decision noted in Conclusion, ¶ H, that the respondents never filed a Form 36 in this matter advising the claimant and commission of their intent to reduce or discontinue benefits. As the benefits due the claimant pursuant to statute, including the salary increments, were due to him by operation of law, we do not believe the issue of a Form 36 is particularly dispositive of the issues herein.7 This reasoning also applies to the required reduction of benefits to the claimant to 50 percent of full salary after 260 weeks of disability, since that also occurs by operation of law. This rationale also addresses the respondents’ argument that the claimant should not be barred by the doctrine of laches from seeking relief. If the claimant is due benefits by operation of law, it would appear inequitable to penalize him for belatedly realizing his employer failed to follow the law.
The issue of determining facts also goes to the issue of whether sanctions are warranted in this matter. A party may not be sanctioned unless there is a factual predicate that supports the imposition of sanctions. McFarland v. Dept. of Developmental Services, 115 Conn. App. 306, 323 (2009). The trial commissioner in the present matter determined that the claimant was entitled to all benefits pursuant to § 5-142(a) C.G.S., Conclusion, ¶ C, and the respondents took almost twelve years to attempt to make proper adjustments in this matter, Conclusion, ¶ I. The commissioner could have found that in the absence of justification that this constituted “undue delay” under § 31-288 C.G.S. The commissioner further found the respondents had never brought this dispute previously to the Commission for adjudication. Conclusions, ¶¶ G and H. We believe this provides proper foundation to find the present contest unreasonable pursuant to § 31-300 C.G.S.
We believe the case of Wikander v. Asbury Automotive Group, 5586 CRB-4-10-9 (September 8, 2011), is on point. In Wikander, the respondents failed to file a timely disclaimer to a claim, and then advanced legal arguments they subsequently abandoned prior to the hearing. The trial commissioner sanctioned the respondents, and they appealed. We upheld the sanctions for the following reasons. “Failure to adhere to an unambiguous statutory obligation is not a complex issue which excuses a respondent’s delay. While the imposition of an award for attorneys’ fees following preclusion is indeed a “harsh remedy”, West, supra.; we find the Supreme Court has specifically encouraged this Commission to impose harsh remedies when respondents fail to file disclaimers or commence payment as mandated by statute. Harpaz, supra, 120-121, footnote, ¶ 13, pp. 130-131.” Id. The respondents in this matter similarly failed to adhere to a statutory obligation. We find no abuse of discretion should sanctions be levied following a violation of statute. As noted, such sanctions will be the subject of additional hearings and may be addressed at such time before the trial commissioner.
The claimant has asked us to review Courtright v. State/Connecticut Valley Hospital, 3573 CRB-6-97-4 (June 5, 1998), asserting the reasoning in that case is relevant to the present case. We have done so, as well as review the lodestar Supreme Court cases on § 5-142(a) C.G.S., Jones v. Mansfield Training School, 220 Conn. 721 (1992) and Trinkley v. Ella Grasso Regional Center, 220 Conn. 739 (1992). In the present case the voluntary agreement clearly delineates the claimant made an election of benefits for § 5-142(a) C.G.S. benefits. The other side of this transaction is clearly the respondents were obligated to perform its obligations pursuant to the statute. That it failed to do.
In Courtright, this tribunal denied the claimant’s bid to reopen a voluntary agreement so that she could obtain cost-of-living increases by means of § 31-307a C.G.S., from the point after she was reduced pursuant to § 5-142(a) C.G.S. to 50 percent of her full salary. In reliance on Trinkley, we determined such COLA’s were inconsistent with the definition of “full salary” in that case. We held the claimant to the terms of the statute and the voluntary agreement. Our analysis in the concurring opinion in Courtright, however, is also relevant to the issues at hand as the rationale for the statute was discussed.
It is self-evident that the legislature intended to reward individuals engaged in the high-risk state service jobs listed in § 5-142(a) by entitling them to full pay if they became incapacitated during the performance of their duties. Rather than giving such employees carte blanche to collect full salary indefinitely, however, the lawmakers limited the availability of full pay under § 5-142(a) to a 260-week period. Anyone choosing to receive benefits under § 5-142(a) rather than the Workers’ Compensation Act thus ran the risk that her disability would last longer than five years, and that she would only be entitled to compensation equaling half her regular salary for the remainder of her incapacity. That is the trade-off that a state employee makes by electing benefits under § 5-142(a).
During the first 260 weeks of benefits under § 5-142(a), a claimant is entitled to receive “the full salary which he was receiving at the time of injury subject to all salary benefits of active employees, including annual increments, and all salary adjustments, including salary deductions, required in the case of active employees.” Afterward, the claimant is removed from the payroll and “shall receive compensation at the rate of fifty per cent of the salary which he was receiving at the expiration of said two hundred sixty weeks.” Given that the legislature’s goal was clearly to reward state employees for accepting the risky duties of the jobs listed in § 5-142(a), it would be illogical to presume that lawmakers sought to penalize the most severely injured workers using the same statute.
The trial commissioner’s Finding and Decision properly applied the law and is consistent with the precedent in Courtright, supra.9 10 We therefore affirm the Finding and Decision.

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