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Timestamp: 2019-04-19 00:42:37+00:00

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132 Wn.2d 507, ROSS v. STATE FARM MUT. AUTO. INS. CO.
Argued May 21, 1997. Decided July 17, 1997.
CLYDE Ross, ET AL., Respondents, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Petitioner.
 Insurance - Scope of Coverage - Review - Standard of Review. An appellate court reviews a lower court decision regarding insurance coverage de novo if the material facts of the case are not in dispute.
 Insurance - Construction of Policy - Average Purchaser - In General. An insurance policy is given a fair, reasonable, and sensible construction as would be given by the average purchaser of insurance.
 Insurance - Construction of Policy - Question of Law or Fact - In General. The interpretation of insurance policy language is a question of law.
 Insurance - Construction of Policy - Policy as a Whole - Meaning to All Provisions - In General. An insurance policy is construed as a whole so as to give force and effect to each clause.
 Insurance - Construction of Policy - Unambiguous Language - In General. Clear and unambiguous insurance policy language is enforced as written and may not be judicially modified or construed to create an ambiguity where none exists.
 Insurance - Exclusions - Construction - Unambiguous Language. An exclusionary clause in an insurance contract is construed most strictly against the insurer only with respect to ambiguities in its language.
 Insurance - Construction of Policy - "Spouse". A legally married couple maintaining a full-time family residence in one state and a job-related temporary residence in another state, where one of them stays on weekdays, are "spouses" for purposes of an insurance policy that defines "spouse" as the insured's husband or wife "while living with the insured."
 Stipulations - Stipulated Facts - Effect - In General. Stipulated facts generally are binding on the parties and the court.
 Stipulations -- Stipulated Facts - Effect - Legal Conclusions. A factual stipulation does not control the legal determinations a court may make.
 Insurance - Underinsured Motorist - Exclusions - "Owned" Vehicle - Spouses - Separate Registration - Effect. For purposes of an underinsured motorist policy excluding coverage for a named insured while operating a vehicle owned or available for the regular use of the insured or the insured's spouse, a motor vehicle is "owned" by both spouses even though title to the vehicle is registered in the name of one spouse only.
 Insurance - Underinsured Motorist - Exclusions - "Regular Use" - What Constitutes - Factors - Purpose of Use. For purposes of an underinsured motorist policy excluding coverage for a named insured while operating a vehicle owned or available for the regular use of the insured or the insured's spouse, "regular use" does not depend upon the reason the vehicle is used.
 Insurance - Exclusions - Validity - Payment for Risk. An insurer has a legitimate interest in excluding from coverage events which would increase its risk without correspondingly increasing the policy premium.
ALEXANDER and MADSEN, JJ., concur in the result by separate opinion; DURHAM, C.J., did not participate in the disposition of this case.
her husband kept separate households in different states and visited each other on weekends. The plaintiff also sought damages for alleged violations of the insurer's duty of good faith and the Consumer Protection Act.
Superior Court: The Superior Court for Spokane County, No. 93-2-00255-1, Richard J. Schroeder, J., on November 18, 1994, entered a summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff on the coverage issue and a summary judgment in favor of the insurer on the bad faith and Consumer Protection Act claims.
Court of Appeals: The court affirmed both judgments at 82 Wn. App. 787 (1996), holding that the plaintiff and her husband were not "spouses," that she did not "own" her nonresident husband's automobile within the meaning of her policy, that the policy exclusion for "owned" vehicles did not apply, that the insurer's denial of coverage was not unreasonable and did not provide a basis for an award of bad faith or Consumer Protection Act damages, and that the plaintiff was entitled to attorney fees at trial and on appeal.
Supreme Court: Holding that the parties and the court were bound by the parties' stipulation to the facts of the case, that a policy exclusion for vehicles owned or available for the "regular use of the insured or the insured's spouse" was unambiguous, that the plaintiff and her husband were "spouses" for purposes of the policy exclusion, and that the husband's separately registered automobile was also "owned" by the plaintiff and available for her regular use, the court reverses in part the decision of the Court of Appeals and grants judgment in favor of the insurer on the coverage claim.
Reed McClure, by William R. Hickman and Danielle A. Hess, for petitioner.
Lee, Michaud & Isserlis, P.S., by Kenneth L. Isserlis, for respondents.
Bryan P. Harnetiaux and Debra L. Stephens on behalf of Washington State Trial Lawyers Association, amicus curiae.
SMITH, J. - Petitioner State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company seeks review of a Court of Appeals decision which affirmed a summary judgment by the Spokane County Superior Court which granted underinsured motorist insurance coverage to Respondents Clyde and Betty L. Ross, husband and wife, under a policy on an automobile registered in the wife's name and insured in Washington for an accident the wife had in Washington while driving an automobile registered in the husband's name and insured in Montana. This Court granted review. We reverse.
The question presented in this case is whether a Washington resident, a married woman, injured in the State of Washington while driving an automobile insured in her name and the name of her husband by State Farm Insurance Company (State Farm) and registered only in the name of her husband in Montana, may recover Underinsured Motorist (UIM) benefits under another policy issued to them by State Farm covering an automobile registered and insured only in her own name in the State of Washington when that policy provides no UIM coverage for a "motor vehicle owned or available for the regular use of [the insured], [the insured's] spouse or any other relative, if it is not insured under the liability coverage of [the] policy."
«1» See Stipulation of Facts, Spokane County Superior Court Cause Number 93-2-00255-1 (Stipulation of Facts), Clerk's Papers at 14-17; Supplemental Stipulation of Facts, Spokane County Superior Court Cause Number 93-2-00255-1 (Supplemental Stipulation of Facts), Clerk's Papers at 98-102.
Respondents Ross at all times material were husband and wife, living in the State of Washington and maintaining their family residence in Spokane. Because of work opportunities Respondent Clyde Ross maintained a temporary residence in Libby, Montana. His wife maintained the family residence in Spokane.
The vehicles were insured under two separate State Farm policies because State Farm would not insure the two automobiles under the same policy.
«2» Respondent Betty L. Ross settled with Pizza Haven for the policy limit of $25,000.00. Her injuries from the accident exceeded the amount recovered. Neither Pizza Haven, its driver, nor its insurer is a party to this lawsuit.
«3» Supplemental Stipulation of Facts, Clerk's Papers at 98-102.
«5» See Stipulation of Facts, Clerk's Papers at 15. Supplemental Stipulation of Facts, Clerk's Papers at 98-99.
«6» State Farm of Montana policy number 1224-709-26.
«7» From July 1985 to October 1987, Clyde Ross did not have any vacation time. There were also weeks when he worked six days. While he had a key to the Spokane house and occasionally received mail there, he did not keep personal property there. He was registered to vote in Montana, paid Montana taxes, and had a Montana driver's license. See Clerk's Papers at 192-93, 208.
«8» See Stipulation of Facts, Clerk's Papers at 15.
«9» See id. at 17.
«10» See id. at 16.
«12» See Stipulation of Facts, Clerk's Papers at 15-16.
The weekend before the accident the Rosses exchanged automobiles because the Monte Carlo required repairs and Mr. Ross took it to Montana for that purpose.«14» Ms. Ross was driving the Eagle in Spokane when she was involved in the accident. Respondents stipulated the Eagle was available for Ms. Ross' regular use "either as a driver or passenger, when she and her husband were together either in Washington or Montana."«15» She stated that even though she could have driven the Eagle during her infrequent visits to Montana, she actually only drove it during the week the Monte Carlo was in Montana for repairs.
«13» State Farm of Washington policy number 2615-663-A20-47.
«14» See Clerk's Papers at 200, 220.
«15» Supplemental Stipulation of Facts, Clerk's Papers at 99.
«16» See Pls.' Mot. for Summ. J., Spokane County Superior Court Cause Number 93-2-00255-1, Clerk's Papers at 88-89; Mem. of Authorities in Supp. of Pls.' Mot. for Summ. J., Spokane County Superior Court Cause Number 93-2-00255-1, Clerk's Papers at 69-86; Defendant State Farm's Mem. of Authorities in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. and Opp. to Pls.' Mot. for Summ. J., Spokane County Superior Court Cause Number 93-2-00255-1, Clerk's Papers at 90-97.
«17» See Order on Cross Mots. for Summ. J., Spokane County Superior Court Cause Number 93-2-00255-1, Clerk's Papers at 362-64.
Washington Insurance Act and Washington Consumer Protection Act. Those claims are not before this court.
On August 16, 1996, State Farm filed a "Motion to Reconsider or, in the Alternative, to Depublish [sic] Opinion." On August 29, 1996, Chief Judge Dennis J. Sweeney denied the motion. This Court granted review on January 7, 1997.
«19» See Defendant's Notice of Appeal to Division III of the Washington State Court of Appeals Cause Number 93-2-00255-1, Clerk's Papers at 360-61.
«20» See Ross v. State Farm, 82 Wn. App. 787, 919 P.2d 1268 (1996).
«21» See id. at 795.
«22» See id. at 796-97.
«23» See id. at 797-98.
«24» Stipulation of Facts, Clerk's Papers at 14-17. Supplemental Stipulation of Facts, Clerk's Papers at 98-100.
«25» Roller v. Stonewall Ins. Co., 115 Wn.2d 679, 682, 801 P.2d 207 (1990) (citations omitted).
«26» McDonald v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 119 Wn.2d 724, 730-31, 837 P.2d 1000 (1992) (citing Stonewall Ins. Co., 115 Wn.2d at 682).
«27» Mid-Century Ins. v. Henault, 128 Wn.2d 207, 213, 905 P.2d 379 (1995).
«28» Stonewall Ins. Co., 115 Wn.2d at 682 (citing State Farm Gen. Ins. Co. v. Emerson, 102 Wn.2d 477, 480, 687 P.2d 1139 (1984)).
«29» Transcontinental Ins. Co. v. Washington Pub. Utils. Dists.' Util. Sys., 111 Wn.2d 452, 456-57, 760 P.2d 337 (1988) (citations omitted).
Petitioner State Farm argues the Montana policy on the AMC Eagle does not provide underinsured motorist coverage; and because the Pizza Haven driver did have insurance, the uninsured motorist provision in the Eagle policy is not applicable. Petitioner asserts that in order to have underinsured motorist coverage on the Eagle, Respondents were required to specifically request and purchase it under the Montana policy; but they did not. We address only the Washington policy on the Chevrolet Monte Carlo in this opinion because the parties do not otherwise address the Montana policy on the AMC Eagle.
«30» See Riley v. Viking Ins. Co., 46 Wn. App. 828, 829, 733 P.2d 556 (1987).
«31» Phil Schroeder, Inc. v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 99 Wn.2d 65, 68, 659 P.2d 509 (1983) (citation omitted), modified on reconsideration, 101 Wn.2d 830, 683 P.2d 186 (1984). In the modification opinion, the Court specifically reaffirmed the portion of the original opinion containing the quoted passage. See 101 Wn.2d at 831.
«32» See Tissell v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 115 Wn.2d 107, 111, 795 P.2d 126 (1990).
«33» Jain v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 130 Wn.2d 688, 692, 926 P.2d 923 (1996) (emphasis added) (citing RCW 48.22.030(1) and Britton v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 104 Wn.2d 518, 531, 707 P.2d 125 (1985)).
«34» See Britton, 104 Wn.2d at 526.
«35» See id. at 522 (citing Touchette v. Northwestern Mut. Ins. Co., 80 Wn.2d 327, 494 P.2d 479 (1972)).
«36» The liability coverage extends to the use, by an insured, of a newly acquired car, a temporary substitute car or a non-owned car." (emphasis omitted) State Farm Automobile Insurance Company policy. Clerk's Papers at 48.
«37» Id. at 44 (emphasis omitted).
«38» Id. at 58 (emphasis omitted).
«39» Supplemental Br. of Pet'r State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (Supplemental Br. of Pet'r) at 12.
generally binding on the parties and on the court.«40» However, they do not agree on the question whether the court applied the stipulated facts to the insurance policy or whether the court ignored the stipulated facts. Petitioner argues the court ignored the stipulated facts when it concluded that under the policy Mr. Ross was not the spouse of Ms. Ross, that Ms. Ross did not own the Eagle, and that the Eagle was not available for her regular use.
«40» See Cook v. Vennigerholz, 44 Wn.2d 612, 615, 269 P.2d 824 (1954).
«41» Supplemental Br. of Resp'ts Clyde Ross and Betty L. Ross, at 19.
«42» State v. Wehinger, 182 Wash. 360, 367, 47 P.2d 35 (1935) ("Nor can a court be controlled as to the legal construction from a given state of facts.").
«43» See Oregon Mut. Ins. Co. v. Fomo, 2 Wn. App. 304, 306-07, 469 P.2d 989 (1970) (The court found that the phrase "then and there under the control of Stephen D. Cottrell" was not a finding of fact but a conclusion of law.); Wehinger 182 Wash. at 367 ("the court cannot be controlled by an agreement of counsel on a subsidiary question of law. . . . Nor can a court be controlled as to the legal construction from a given state of facts.").
«44» Supplemental Factual Stipulation, Clerk's Papers at 99.
«45» WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2438 (2d ed. 1949).
«46» State Farm Automobile Insurance Company Policy, Clerk's Papers at 44 (emphasis added).
policy. Thus, although the court applied the stipulated facts to the policy, it nevertheless determined Mr. Ross was not Ms. Ross' spouse under the language of the policy, even though they have been legally married and have been husband and wife for more than thirty years.
The court then considered ownership of the AMC Eagle. The stipulated facts state that "[a]t the time of the incident, Betty L. Ross and her husband, Clyde Ross, owned two vehicles."«47» It was also stipulated the Eagle "was purchased with funds which Mr. Ross had earned while he and [Ms.] Ross were married . . . ."«48» The court also considered other stipulated facts showing indicia of ownership. "Mr. Ross was the title owner and registered owner, and he had possession, care, control and management of the Eagle."«49» The court stated the word "owner" can be ambiguous and the court has found it ambiguous in other contexts.«50» The court concluded that while Ms. Ross may legally own the Eagle under Washington community property law, that did not mean she owns it under the language of the State Farm of Washington policy.
«47» Stipulation of Facts, Clerk's Papers at 15.
«48» Supplemental Stipulation of Facts, Clerk's Papers at 99.
«49» Ross v. State Farm, 82 Wn. App. 787, 797, 919 P.2d 1268 (1996). See also Stipulation of Facts, Clerk's Papers at 15; Supplemental Stipulation of Facts, Clerk's Papers at 98-99.
«50» See Farmers Ins. Co. v. USF&G Co., 13 Wn. App. 836, 841, 537 P.2d 839 (1975) (the court states the term "owner" may include both the title owner, legal or equitable, as well as the possessor of the automobile).
«51» Ross, 82 Wn. App. at 798.
Respondents stipulated the AMC Eagle "was available for the regular use of Betty L. Ross, either as a driver or passenger, when she and her husband were together either in Washington or Montana. . . . Although she could have driven the Eagle during these visits to Montana, she never did so. Betty L. Ross drove the car in Washington only during February 1987 while the Monte Carlo she ordinarily drove was being repaired in Montana."«55» The vehicles were individually garaged in different states and each automobile was driven almost exclusively by one spouse or the other,«56» but the Rosses under the stipulation acknowledged that the only time Ms. Ross had ever driven the AMC Eagle was the week of the accident.
«52» Grange Ins. v. MacKenzie, 103 Wn.2d 708, 712, 694 P.2d 1087 (1985) (citation omitted).
«53» Palmer v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 58 Wn.2d 88, 90. 360 P.2d 742 (1961).
«54» Grange Ins., 103 Wn.2d at 712 (emphasis omitted).
«55» Supplemental Stipulation of Facts, Clerk's Papers at 99.
«56» See Grange Ins., 103 Wn.2d at 712-13 (citation omitted) (The court stated the purpose of the "use of other automobiles" clauses was "(I) to prevent an insured from receiving coverage on all household cars or another uninsured car of the insured by merely purchasing a single policy, and (2) to provide coverage to the insured when engaged in the infrequent use ofnonowned vehicles." The court found the purpose of the provision was not met because the plaintiff was the only driver in the household and he drove the car at least four to six times per month. The court stated "Such use by [plaintiff] is not the type of sporadic, isolated incidence of driving of an noncovered car that was contemplated in the clause.").
and that no modification is valid unless it is in writing and made a part of the policy.«57» Petitioner correctly states the interpretation of insurance policy language is a question of law.«58» Clear policy language must be enforced as written and the policy should be given the fair, reasonable and sensible construction that would be given by the average person purchasing insurance.«59» Petitioner also states "the court is directed to avoid strained or forced construction which might lead to absurd or nonsensical results."«60» Petitioner suggests the policy construction given by the Court of Appeals led to an absurd result when it concluded that under the language of the policy Ms. Ross did not own the Eagle and it was not available for her regular use.
«57» RCW 48.18.520: "Every insurance contract shall be construed according to the entirety of its terms and conditions as set forth in the policy, and as amplified, extended, or modified by any rider, endorsement, or application attached to and made a part of the policy."
RCW 48.18.190: "No agreement in conflict with, modifying, or extending any contract of insurance shall be valid unless in writing and made a part of the policy."
«58» Supplemental Br. of Pet'r at 8 (citing Mid-Century Ins. Co. v. Henault, 128 Wn.2d 207, 212, 905 P.2d 379 (1995)).
«59» See Mid-Century Ins. Co., 128 Wn.2d at 212; Smith v. Continental Cas. Co., 128 Wn.2d 73, 80-81^ 904 P.2d 749 (1995); Stonewall Ins. Co., 115 Wn.2d at 682.
«60» Supplemental Br. of Pet'r at 13 (citing see Morgan v. Prudential Ins. Co., 86 Wn.2d 432, 434-35, 545 P.2d 1193 (1976); Smith v. Continental Cas. Co., 128 Wn.2d at 82; Mid-Century Ins. Co., 128 Wn.2d at 213).
«61» See Compl. for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Damages and Att'ys Fees and Costs. Spokane County Superior Court cause number 93-2-00255-1, Clerk's Papers at 5; see also Answer to Compl., Spokane County Superior Court cause number 93-2-00255-1, Clerk's Papers at 12.
policy on the 1977 Chevrolet Monte Carlo automobile provided UIM coverage for Respondent Betty L. Ross when she was driving the 1980 AMC Eagle automobile while the Monte Carlo was being repaired.
 Under the stipulation of the parties, it is not logical to conclude that Respondents Clyde and Betty L. Ross were not spouses and that the two of them did not own both the 1977 Chevrolet Monte Carlo and the 1980 AMC Eagle. Nor is it logical to conclude that the Rosses were not living with each other. The exclusionary provisions of the State Farm of Washington policy on to the 1977 Chevrolet Monte Carlo are clear and unambiguous. The Rosses are bound by the terms of that policy. They are not entitled to UIM coverage under the stipulated facts in this case.
Respondents Ross seek an award of attorney fees under Rule of Appellate Procedure (RAP) 18.1.«62» Petitioner does not address this issue in its brief to this Court.«63» An insured who is compelled to assume the burden of legal action to obtain the benefit of its insurance contract is entitled to attorney fees.«64» But under our decision in this case Respondents are not entitled to attorney fees on appeal.
"(a) Generally. If applicable law grants to a party the right to recover reasonable attorney fees or expenses on review, the party must request the fees or expenses as provided in this rule . . . .
"(b) Argument in Brief. The party must devote a section of the brief to the request for the fees or expenses. . . ."
«63» See Pet. for Review of State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company; Supplemental Br. of Pet'r.
«64» See Findlay v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 129 Wn.2d 368, 380, 917 P.2d 116 (1996); see also McGreevy v. Oregon Mut. Ins. Co., 128 Wn.2d 26, 28, 904 P.2d 731 (1995).
of law.«65» Courts should interpret the policy with a fair, reasonable and sensible construction.«66» Where there is an ambiguity, an inclusionary clause in an insurance policy should be construed liberally, while an exclusionary clause should be construed strictly against the insurer.«67» There is no ambiguity in the relevant provisions of the policy in this case.
[8, 9] Stipulated facts are generally binding on the parties and the court. However, a factual stipulation does not control the legal determination to be made by the court.«68» This is a mixed question of fact and law.«69» Under the stipulated facts and the law in this case, Petitioner State Farm is entitled to favorable judgment on review by this Court.
The Court of Appeals and the trial court erred in determining Respondent Clyde Ross was not Respondent Betty L. Ross' spouse under language of the State Farm of Washington policy. That policy specially defines "spouse" as "your husband or wife while living with you." Respondents Ross at all times relevant to this case have been husband and wife since their marriage on November 4, 1963. Ms. Ross maintained the family residence in Spokane, Washington while Mr. Ross maintained a temporary residence in Libby, Montana because of his employment. It cannot be concluded they were not "living with" each other as husband and wife.
 Notwithstanding title registration of the 1977 Chevrolet Monte Carlo in Ms. Ross' name only and title registration of the 1980 AMC Eagle in Mr. Ross' name only, the Court of Appeals and the trial court were not correct in concluding Ms. Ross was not an owner of the AMC Eagle.
«65» See Stonewall Ins. Co., 115 Wn.2d at 682.
«66» See Mid-Century Ins. Co., 128 Wn.2d at 213.
«67» See Viking Ins. Co., 46 Wn.App. at 829; see also Phil Schroeder. Inc., 99 Wn.2d at 68.
«68» See Wehinger, 182 Wash. at 367.
«69» See Oregon Mut. Ins. Co., 2 Wn. App. at 306-07.
State Farm Insurance Company is entitled to insist upon the terms of its Washington policy issued to Respondents for the 1977 Chevrolet Monte Carlo registered in the name of Betty L. Ross in denying her underinsured motorist coverage while driving the 1980 AMC Eagle registered in Montana in the name of her husband, Respondent Clyde Ross.
We reverse the Court of Appeals, Division III, which affirmed the Spokane County Superior Court in granting summary judgment in favor of Respondents extending UIM coverage under a State Farm insurance policy to Respondent Betty L. Ross for the accident she had in Spokane, Washington on February 19, 1987 while driving an automobile registered in Montana in the name of her husband, Respondent Clyde Ross, and insured under another policy with State Farm.
DOLLIVER, GUY, JOHNSON, TALMADGE, and SANDERS, JJ., concur.
«70» Grange Ins., 103 Wn.2d at 712.
Eagle, it was not a temporary substitute car under the liability portion of the policy and no Underinsured Motorist coverage would be available to Mrs. Ross under the policy.
Resolution of that issue is controlled by the stipulation of the parties to the effect that Mrs. Ross owned the Eagle. Stipulation of Facts, Clerk's Papers at 15. In the light of that stipulation, the Court of Appeals' conclusion that Mrs. Ross did not own the Eagle is inexplicable. It is also error because, absent a reason to not hold the parties to their stipulation, it should be binding on them and the court. See Reilly v. State, 18 Wn. App. 245, 253, 566 P.2d 1283 (1977).
Even if a conclusion that Mrs. Ross did not own the car was justified, notwithstanding the stipulation, coverage would still be excluded if the Eagle were available for her regular use. Again, Mrs. Ross stipulated that the vehicle was available for her regular use. The exclusion, therefore, applies. In short, there is no coverage and the Court of Appeals should be reversed.
MADSEN, J., concurs with ALEXANDER, J.

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