Source: http://tn.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20180315_0000247.ETN.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 10:45:12+00:00

Document:
ERIC FARROW, MARK LUNDY, BRYAN SOMMERS, ROGER BAILEY, and NORTHEAST CORRECTIONAL COMPLEX, Defendants.
Before the Court is Plaintiff's pro se amended complaint for violation of civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 [Doc. 8]. On November 16, 2017, the Court entered an order screening Plaintiff's original complaint, and found that “[w]hile in its present form, his complaint does not state any claim for relief against the named Defendants, it is conceivable that Plaintiff could cure this defect in the complaint if given leave to amend his complaint . . . .” [Doc. 5 p. 8]. The Court then granted Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within twenty-one (21) days from the date of entry of the Court's order [Id. at 9]. Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on January 4, 2018 [Doc. 8].
Plaintiff's amended complaint must also be screened to determine whether it states a claim entitling Plaintiff to relief, or is frivolous or malicious, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A. For the reasons discussed below, Plaintiff's complaint will be DISMISSED sua sponte.
In his amended complaint, Plaintiff brings suit against Defendants Farrow, Lundy, Sommers, Bailey, and the Northeast Correctional Complex (“NECX”) [Doc. 8 p. 3]. Plaintiff alleges that during his transfer from the NECX County Annex to the NECX Main Annex, Defendant Farrow “willing[ly], unlawfully, and knowingly opened [Plaintiff's] mail, ” when Defendant Farrow opened a “sealed outgoing envelope” [Doc. 8 p. 4]. Plaintiff claims that this search of his mail was against Tennessee Department of Correction policy [Id.]. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Sommers “agreed with” Defendant Farrow in the unlawful opening of Plaintiff's “outgoing mail by preparing the write-up” [Id.]. Plaintiff additionally claims that Defendants Bailey and Lundy are responsible for their role in the grievance process and a disciplinary report related to Plaintiff's possession of a cellular telephone [Id.]. Plaintiff requests “[t]o have all officers involved relieved of their duties, ” as well as seeks monetary damages [Id. at 5].
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must establish that he was deprived of a federal right by a person acting under color of state law. Black v. Barberton Citizens Hospital, 134 F.3d 1265, 1267 (6th Cir. 1998); O'Brien v. City of Grand Rapids, 23 F.3d 990, 995 (6th Cir. 1994); Russo v. City of Cincinnati, 953 F.2d 1036, 1042 (6th Cir. 1992); see also Braley v. City of Pontiac, 906 F.2d 220, 223 (6th Cir. 1990) ("Section 1983 does not itself create any constitutional rights; it creates a right of action for the vindication of constitutional guarantees found elsewhere."). In other words, a plaintiff must plead facts sufficient to show: (1) the deprivation of a right, privilege, or immunity secured to him by the United States Constitution or other federal law; and (2) that the individual responsible for such deprivation was acting under color of state law. Gregory v. Shelby Cty., 220 F.3d 433, 441 (6th Cir. 2000).
At the outset, Plaintiff has brought suit against the NECX, a non-suable entity [Doc. 8 p. 3]. In order to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must establish that he or she was deprived of a federal right by a person acting under color of state law. Black v. Barberton Citizens Hosp., 134 F.3d 1265, 1267 (6th Cir. 1998); O'Brien v. City of Grand Rapids, 23 F.3d 990, 995 (6th Cir. 1994). NECX is a correctional facility and, as such, is not a suable entity under § 1983. See Anderson v. Morgan Cty. Corr. Complex, No. 15-6344, 2016 WL 9402910, at *1 (6th Cir. Sept. 21, 2016) (citing Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 68, 65-71) (“A state prison is not a ‘person' subject to suit under § 1983.”); see, e.g., Cage v. Kent County Corr. Facility, No. 96-1167, 1997 WL 25647, at *1 (6th Cir. May 1, 1997) (“The district court also properly found that the jail facility named as a defendant was not an entity subject to suit under § 1983.”); McIntosh v. Camp Brighton, No. 14-CV-11327, 2014 WL 1584173, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 21, 2014) (finding that a state prison facility is an institution operated by a state corrections department and “is not a ‘person' or legal entity subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983”). Thus, the Northeast Correctional Complex will be DISMISSED as a Defendant in this action.

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