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CHEALL c. ROYAUME-UNI
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Type d'affaire : DecisionType de recours : Radiation du rôle (solution du litige)Numérotation : Numéro d'arrêt : 10550/83Identifiant URN:LEX : urn:lex;coe;cour.europeenne.droits.homme;arret;1985-05-13;10550.83 Analyses : (Art. 6-1) EGALITE DES ARMES, (Art. 6-1) PROCES EQUITABLE, (Art. 6-2) PRESOMPTION D'INNOCENCEParties : Demandeurs : CHEALLDéfendeurs : ROYAUME-UNITexte : APPLICATION/REQUÃTE NÂ° 10550/83
Ernest Dennis CHEALL v/the UNITED KINGDO M Emest Dennis CHEALL c/ROYAUME-UN I DECISION of 13 May 1985 on the admissibility of the application DÃCISION du 13 mai 1985 sur la recevabilitÃ© de la requÃªt e
Article 11 of the Conv ention : The rigltt to fonrn trade unions includes the right for trade unions to drac+up their own rules . 7he right to join trade unions for the protection of one's interests does not include the right to join the urtion of one's choice regardless of its rules. The State must protect the individua l against abuse bv unions of their dominant position . Erpulsion from a union in breach of tlie union's rules, decided pursuant m arbitrary rules or entailing erc'eptional hardship for the individual concerned, could constitute such an abuse . Article ll de la Convention : Le droit de fonder des svndicats comprend le droit pour les svndicats d'Ã©tnblir leurs rÃ¨glements . Le droit de s'affi(ier Ã¹ des syndicats pour la dÃ©fense de ses intÃ©rÃ©ts ne comprend pas le droit de s'affi[ier au svndicat de son choir au mÃ©pris de sa rÃ©glementation . L'Etat doit protÃ©ger l'indrvidu contre tout abus de la po.cition domittante d'un syndicat . Constituerait un tel abus une expulsion dÃ©cidÃ©e contrairement aur rÃ¨glements, dÃ©cidÃ©e en vertu de rÃ¨glements arbi traires ou avant des consÃ©quences particuliÃ¨rement rigoureuses pour l'iruÃ©ressÃ©.
(franÃ§ais : voir p . 186)
The applicant is a United Kingdom citizen bom in 1920 who is living at Houghton Regis, Bedfordshire . In the proceedings before the Commission he is represented by Messrs Boyle and Ormerod, a firm of solicitors, based in Aylesbury, Buckinghamshire . Since 1965 the applicant was employed as a security officer by Vauxhall Motors . He had been a trade union member since the age of fourteen, and held various union offices during the time of his above employment . Until May 1974 he was secretary of the local branch of the A .C .T .S .S . (Association of Clerical, Technical and Supervisory Staff), a subsidiary of the Transport and General Workers' Union (T .G .W .U .) . Disenchantment led the applicant (and some other persons) to resign from the A .C .T .S .S . on 6 May 1974 . The reasons stated were that he regarded the union's local full-time official as being wholly ineffective and uninterested, that he resented the T .G .W .U .'s increasing involvement in political activity and what he regarded as its increasing left-wing stance, and finally his demoralisation due to a series of defections from the branch . The branch apparently suffered a complete breakdown and was only reorganised in November 1974 . Despite his resignation from the union the applicant did everything to temÂ»nate his functions as branch secretary in good order . A few weeks later, on 29 May 1974, the applicant applied for the membership of another union, the Association of Professional Executive Clerical and Computer Staff (A .P .E .X .) . This was done on his own motion, without this union having previously approached him in any way either formally or inforrnally prior to his resignation from A .C .T .S .S . In the application fotm, the applicant did not reply to the question whether he had been a member of any other trade union, but it was well known to A .P .E .X . that he had formerly been a member of A .C .T .S .S . . No reproach was made to the applicant in the subsequent proceedings on account of this omission . In view of its knowledge of the applicant's earlier membership with the A .C .T .S .S . the new union, A .P .E .X ., would have been obliged to inquire of them whether they objected to his admission . A stipulation to this effect is contained in principle 2 of the "T .U .C . Disputes Principles and Procedures" (the "Bridlington principles") . These principles govern the relations between the various unions affiliated to the T .U .C . inter alia regarding membership disputes . According to their preface they "constitute a code of conduct accepted as morally binding by affiliated organisations . They xre not intended by such organisations or by the T .U .C . to be a legally enforceable contract" . 179
The above-mentioned principle 2 reads as follows : "No one who is or has recently been a member of any affiliated union should be accepted into membership in another without inquiry of his present or former union . The present or former union shall be under an obligation to reply within 21 days of the inquiry, stating : (a) Whether the applicant has tendered his resignation ; (b) Whether he is clear on the books ; (c) Whether he is under discipline or penalty : (d) Whether there are any other reasons why the applicant should not be accepted . If the present or former union objects to the transfer, and the inquiring union considers the objection to be unreasonable . the inquiring union shall not accept the applicant into membership but shall maintain the status quo witlt regard to membership . If the problem cannot be mutually resolved it should be referred to the T .U .C . for adjudication . A union should not accept an applicant into membership if no reply has been received 21 days after the inquiry but in such circumstances the union may write again to the present or former union . sending a copy of the letter to the head office of the union if the correspondence is with a branch, stating that if no reply is received within a further 14 days they intend to accept the applicant into membership . Where the union to which application is being made is dealing directly with the head office of the present or former union, a copy of this communication ntay be sent to the T .U .C .-A .P .E .X . clearly failed to comply with this procedure, and admitted the applicant without any inquiry of the former union . The applicant himself was not aware of the procedure to be followed and sincerely believed that he had been admitted in good order . Havingjoined A .P .E .X . the applicant was appointed to represent that union in dealings with his employers . The company appear not to have accepted him in this function in particular after September 1974 when it became clear that the applicant's transfer to A .P .E .X . was challenged by the A .C .T .S .S . On a later occasion in 1977 when the applicant was himself involved in a dispute with his employers, they refused to listen to any representations by A .P .E .X . on his behalf . A subsequent industrial tribunal action led to a finding that the employers were in breach of S .53 of the Employment Protection Act 1975 . as they had taken action against himpenalising him for being a member of A .P .E .X . The applicant was awarded E50 damages . On 2 FebrUary 1976 T .G .W .U . (A .C .T .S .S .) made a formal complaint to the T .U .C . regarding the applicant's admission to A .P .E .X . without observing the Bridlington principles . Under the applicable rules goveming the relations between the T .U .C . and its affiliated organisations, the matter was eventually brought before a disputes committee of the T .U .C . The only parties to these proceedings were the unions concerned, i .e . the T .G .W .U . (A .C .T .S .S .) and the A .P .E .X . The applicant himsel f 180
was not a party to these proceedings although he took part in the hearing before the disputes committee on 17 May 1977 as part of the A .P .E .X . team . He did address the committee, but was not allowed to speak in his own name . On 20 June 1977 the T .U .C . disputes committee made its award in the above inter-union dispute . It considered tha t "A .P .E .X . should have made inquiries of the T .G .W .U ., and by not doing so .P .E .X . therefore acted in breach of principle 2 of the T .U .C . Disputes Prin,A ciples and Procedures . The disputes committee awarded that A .P .E .X . should exclude the I I named individuals [including the applicant] and advise them to rejoin the T .G .W .U . " A .P .E .X . did not comply immediately with the above award, and only after considerable pressure had been exercised against it by the T .U .C . did it eventually terminate the applicant's membership (and that of the other persons concemed) by a notice of 30 June 1978 . This was done under mle 14 of the A .P .E .X . Rule Book which reads as follows : "DECISIONS OF T .U .C . DISPUTES COMMITTEE Notwithstanding anything in these mles the executive council may, by giving six weeks' notice in writing, terminate the membership of any member, if necessary, in order to comply with a decision of a disputes committee of the Trades Union Congress . " Unlike other cases of expulsion (rvle 15) no hearing of the trade union member concemed is provided for in such cases . In October 1978 the T .G .W .U . invited the applicant to rejoin A .C .T .S .S . but he has not done so . Instead, the applicant challenged his expulsion by A .P .E .X . by a civil action . He claimed that the notice terminating his membership was invalid for the following reasons : (1) because it was not "necessary" within the meaning of mle 14 ; (2) because A .P .E .X . could not rely on this rule in view of the fact that it had caused the decision of the disputes committee by its own conduct, namely by a conscious breach of the Bridlington principles ; (3) because the procedure followed was contrary to the principles of natural justice as the applicant had no opportunity to be heard either in the disputes committee proceedings, or in A .P .E .X .'s own proceedings under rUle 14 : (4) because the exclusion under rule 14 and principle 2 of the Bridlington principles was contrary to public policy as defined inter alia in A rt icle I I of the European Convention on Human Rights . Justice Bingham of the Queen's Bench Divisio n .On24Novembr198,M rejected the action (1) . After dismissing the applicant's various other arguments the judge also dealt expressly with the public policy argument based on Article 11 of the (1) Cheall v . A .P.EX . 11982] 7 AII E.R . 858 .
Convention . He found that while the Convention was not justiciable in English courts it could nevertheless be taken into account as a guideline for an interpretation of legal principles found in the domestic law . English law in general, where possible and appropriate, leaned in favour of the liberty of the individual, but this was counterbalanced by the consideration that the law also, in general . leaned in favour of upholding contracts such as the A .P .E .X . rvles and rule 14 in particular which the applicant had accepted when becoming a member of that union . Despite much controversy and legislation conceming industrial relations in recent years . no attempt had been made to modify or restrict the Bridlington principles underlying this rule . The legislation since 1971 recognised the right of every worker to be a member of the trade union of his choice only as between himself and his employer, but not as between himself and the trade union . The Employment Act 1980 in section 4 gave an employee the right not to have an application for ntembership of a trade union unreasonably refused and not to be unreasonably expelled from a trade union, but the Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers' Associations 1965-1968 had regarded refusal of membership in compliance with the Bridlington principles as a good reason, a question which had never been decided by the courts . Neither did the European Convention give a clear answer to this question and therefore could not be relied upon . The facts of the Young, James and Webster case were essentially different from the present case and therefore did not assist the applicant . The applicant's appeal against this judgment was allowed by a majority decision of the Coun of Appeal, on 18 June 1982 (I) . Of the two judges constituting the majority, one considered the terrnination of the applicant's membership as invalid mainly because the union should not be allowed to invoke rule 14 in a case where it had itself breached the applicable principles (Slade L .1 .) . and one based his reasoning expressly on public policy and Article I 1 of the Convention, holding that the applicant was in principle entitled to resign from the union with which he was dissatisfied, and to join the union of his choice, and that he further had the right not to be excluded from that trade union without reasonable cause and without being heard : rule 14 did not accord with these fundamental principles (Lord Denning) . On the union's appeal, the House of Lords restored the judgment of the Divisional Court on 24 March 1983 (2) . It hel d -(I) That the only way that A .P .E .X . could comply with the decision of the disputes comminee of the T .U .C . was by terminating the plaintiffs membership of the union pursuant to mle 14 and that there was no principle of law which prevented the union from relying on that rule . - (2) That there was no principle of natural justice that the plaintiff was entitled to be heard before the disputes comntinee of the T .U .C . for the onl y ( I) Cheall v . A .P .E .X . 119831 I QB. 126 . (2) Chcall ~ . A .P .EX 119831 2 w .LR . 679 .
parties in dispute before it were the trade unions concemed who alone were entitled to make representations written or oral to the committee . - (3) That although A .P .E .X . was permitted to give notice to an individual member and the opport unity to be heard before deciding whether or not to exercise its discretion to expel a member under rule 14, the union had been under no obligation to give the plaintiff any such notice in circumstances where there was an unassailable factual ftnding of the T .U .C . disputes commiuee and a willingness on the pan of his former union to readmit him to membership . - (4) That the Bridlington principles did not contravene any provision of the European Convention on Human Rights nor any existing rule of public policy . The relevant pa rt of the judgment in this latter respect reads as follows : "My Lords, freedom of association can only be mutual ; there can be no ri gh t of an individual to associate with other individuals who are not wllling to associate with him . The body of the membership of A .P .E .X ., represented by its executive council and whose best interest it was the duty of the executive council to promote, were not willing to continue to accept Cheall as a fellow-member . No doubt this was because if they continued to accept him, they ran the risk of attracting the sanction of suspension or expulsion of A .P .E .X . from the T .U .C . and all the attendant disadvantages to themselves as members of A .P .E .X . that such suspension or expulsion would entail . But I know of no existing rule of public policy that would prevent trade unions from entering into arrangements with one another which they consider to be in the interests of their members' bargaining power with their employers ; nor do I think it a permissible exercise of your Lordships' judicial power to create a new mle of public policy to that effect . If this is to be done at all it must be done by Parliament . Different considerations might apply if the effect of Cheall's expulsion from A .P .E .X . were to have put his job in jeopardy, either because of the existence of a closed shop or for some other reason . But this is not the case . All that has happened is that he left a union, A .C .T .S .S ., in order to join another union, A .P .E .X ., which he preferred . After four years of inembership he was compelled, against his will, to leave it and was given the opportunity, which he rejected, of rejoining A .C .T .S .S . if he so wished ." (per Lord Diplock at pp . 685-686) .
COMPLAINTS The applicant submits that at all times he wished to remain a member of A .P .E .X . and A .P .E .X . wished to retain him as a member, and excluded him only as a result of coercion and pressure from the T .U .C . He funher submits that the nature of industrial relations and the structure of union representation at the Vauxhall plant made his membership of a union which could adequately represent his interests a vital and necessary part of his working life .
In fact, however, he was lefl for 9 years (until his retirement in 1983) without union representation as a result of the maners complained of . He was severely affected by the lack of union representation in particular following the death of his wife in 1976 and his consequent need to change his shift pattem . A .P .E .X . was prevented from making representations on his behalf in this matter . The applicant considers that there has been a breach of his rights under Article I I of the Convention . He claims that he was denied his freedom to associate and his right to join a trade union for the protection of his own interests . This right necessarily includes choice as to its exercise (see Young, James and Webster case, Eur . Court H .R ., judgment of 13 .8 .81) and also a right to remain a member of the trade union of one's choice . This right is both an individual right to be exercised by a trade union member for the protection of his interests and a collective right of persons to associate together in trade unions . There will be an interference with and infringement of this right notwithstanding that the trade union of which the individual is a member has itself terminated the association if, as here, it can be shown that the trade union so acted at the behest of and/or compelled by the coercive threats of a party extemal to the association having a dominating influence on its behaviour . There can be no freedom of association where one party to the association is so influenced in its conduct by the dominance of another that it is unable to choose between its continuance and its termination . The Bridlington Principles and the T .U .C . Model Rule underlying rule 14 of the A .P .E .X . rules form a "coherent interlocking scheme" for regulating trade union conduct by (a) restricting the freedom of an individual to join and/or rentain a member of the union of his choice and (b) denying that individual the benefits of membership during the subsistence of that membership and (c) compelling his subsequent exclusion from that membership . The history of the Model Rule itself ntakes plain its restrictive intention . It is an inherent characteristic of this "scheme" that the T .U .C . Disputes Committee should determine the union to which an individual must belong without any regard to his choice or his freedom of choice . It is considered axiomatic that members obtained in breach of the Bridlington Principles should be excluded from membership following an award from the Disputes Committee and such award invariably requires that this be done . Hence it can be seen that the T .U .C . Rules are coercive in nature . The failure of the Government to enact legislation making unlawful the applicant's expulsion from membership constitutes an unjustified interference with his right to join a union .
THE LA W The applicant who was expelled from his trade union (A .P .E .X .) pursuant to a decision of the disputes committee of the T .U .C . complains of an unjustified interference with his right to join a trade union in breach of Article I I of the Convention . This provision provides that : "I . Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and join trade unions for the protection of his interests . 2 . No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others . This Article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights by members of the armed forces, of the police or of the administration of the State . " The Commission recalls that the right to form and join trade unions is a special aspect of freedom of association which protects, first and foremost, against State action . The State may not interfere with the forming and joining of trade unions except on the basis of the conditions set forth in Anicle I 1 para . 2 (see Young, James and Webster v . United Kingdom . Comm . Report 14 .12 .79, para . 162, Eur . Court H .R ., Series B no . 39, p .45) . The question that arises in the present case, however, concerns the extent t o which this provision obliges the State to protect the trade union member against measures taken against him by his union . In the Commission's view the right to form trade unions involves, for example, the right of trade unions to draw up their own rvles, to administer their own affairs and to establish and join trade union federations . Such trade union rights are explicitly recognised in Articles 3 and 5 of I .L .O . Convention No . 87 which must be taken into account in the present context . . . Accordingly trade union decisions in these domains must not be subject to restrictions and control by the State except on the basis of Article II para . 2 . As a corollary . such decisions must be regarded as private activity for which, in principle, the State cannot be responsible under the Convention . The right to join a union "for the protection of his interests" cannot be interpreted as conferring a general right to join the union of one's choice irrespective of the rules of the union . In the exercise of their rights under Article I I para . 1, unions must remain free to decide, in accordance with union rules, questions concerning admission to and expulsion from the union . The protection afforded by the provision is primarily against interference by the State .
Nonetheless for the right to join a union to be effective the State must protect the individual against any abuse of a dominant position by trade unions ( see Eur . Court H .R ., Young . lames and Webster judgment of 13 August 1981 . Series A no . 44 . p . 25, para . 63) . Such abuse might occur, for exantple, where exclusion or expulsion was not in accordance with union rules or where the rules were wholly unreasonable or arbitrary or where the consequences of exclusion or expulsion resulted in exceptional hardship such as job loss because of a closed shop . In the present case the applicant was expelled from his union (A .P .E .X .) pursuant to a decision of the T .U .C . disputes committee to the effect that A .P .E .X . had not complied with principle 2 of the Bridlington principles . These principles had been established by the T .U .C . to prevent inter-union disputes arising over con0icting membership rights . Principle 2 required A .P .E .X . to make an enquiry of T .G .W .U . when the applicant applied for mem be rship . It is clear that the applicant's expulsion was in accordance with the A .P .E .X . mies which provided in rule 14 for expulsion in order to comply with a decision of the T .U .C . disputes committee . The Commission does not consider that either rule 14 or principle 2 can be regarded as unreasonable . Moreover it notes that the applicant's expulsion from A .P .E .X . did not involve loss of his job because of a closed shop . In these circumstances the expulsion of the applicant from A .P .E .X . must be seen as the act of a private body in the exercise of its Convention rights under Article 11 . As such it cannot engage the responsibility of the respondent Government . It follows, therefore, that the application must be rejected as incompatible rarione personae with the provisions of the Convention within the nteaning of Article 27 para . 2 . For these reasons, the Commission DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE .
(TRADUCTION) EN FAI T Le requÃ©rant est un ressortissant du Royaume-Uni, nÃ© en 1920 et habitant Ã Houghton Regis . Bedfordshire . Dans la procÃ©dure devant la Commission . il est reprÃ©sentÃ© par MM . Boyle et Ormerod . solicitors Ã Aylesbury . Buckinghamshire . 186
Depuis 1965, le requÃ©rant Ã©tait employÃ© comme agent de la sÃ©curitÃ© par Vauxhall Motors . SyndiquÃ© depuis l'Ã¢ge de 14 ans, il a exercÃ© diverses fonctions syndicales pendant le temps de l'emploi prÃ©citÃ© . Jusqu'en mai 1974, il Ã©tait secrÃ©taire de la section locale de l'ACTSS (Association of Clerical, Technical and Supervisory Staft), filiale de la TGWU (Syndicat des travailleurs du transport) . DÃ©Ã§us, le requÃ©rant et quelques autres personnes en vinrent Ã dÃ©missionner de l'ACTSS le 6 mai 1974 . II expliqua qu'il considÃ©rait le travail Ã plein temps de fonctionnaire local du syndicat comme totalement inefficace et dÃ©nuÃ© d'intÃ©rÃªt, qu'il Ã©tait mÃ©content de la participation croissante de la TGWU Ã des activitÃ©s politiques et de ce qui Ã©tait Ã son avis une position de plus en plus gauchiste du syndicat et, enfin, qu'il Ã©tait dÃ©couragÃ© par une sÃ©rie de dÃ©fections au sein de la section . Cette section, en totale dÃ©bÃ¢cle semble-t-il, ne fut rÃ©organisÃ©e qu'en novembre 1974 . MalgrÃ© sa dÃ©mission du syndicat, le requÃ©rant fit de son mieux pour en terminer convenablement avec ses fonctions de secrÃ©taire de section . Quelques semaines plus tard, le 29 mai 1974, le requÃ©rant demanda Ã adhÃ©rer Ã un autre syndicat, l'APEX (Association of Professional Executive Clerical and Computer Staff) . Il le fit de sa propre initiative, sans que ce syndicat ait pris contact avec lui d'aucune maniÃ¨re, officielle ou informelle, avant sa dÃ©mission de la l'ACTSS . Dans sa formule de demande, le requÃ©rant ne rÃ©pondit pas Ã la question de savoir s'il avait Ã©tÃ© membre d'un autre syndicat, mais l'APEX savait fort bien qu'il avait Ã©tÃ© autrefois membre de l'ACTSS . Cette omission ne fut nullement reprochÃ©e au requÃ©rant par la suite . Connaissant l'appartenance antÃ©rieure du requÃ©rant Ã l'ACTSS, le nouveau syndicat, l'APEX, aurait dÃ» demander Ã ce dernier s'il avait des objections Ã cette adhÃ©sion . En effet, la rÃ¨gle No . 2 des â¢ Principes et procÃ©dures de rÃ©glement des conflits du TUC- (les .Principes de Bridlington-) contient une stipulation en ce sens . Ces Principes rÃ©gissent les relations entre les diffÃ©rents syndicats affiliÃ©s au TUC, notamment en ce qui concerne le contentieux des adhÃ©sions . Selon le prÃ©ambule qui les accompagne, ces Principes : Â«constituent un code de conduite acceptÃ© comme moralement contraignant par les organisations affiliÃ©es . Ni ces organisations ni le TUC n'envisagent de les considÃ©rer comme un contrat juridiquement exÃ©cutoireâ¢ . La rÃ¨gle No 2 susmentionnÃ©e est ainsi libellÃ©e : - Quinconque est ou a Ã©tÃ© rÃ©cemment membre d'un syndicat affiliÃ© ne doit pas Ãªtre acceptÃ© dans un autre sans qu'il soit procÃ©dÃ© Ã une enquÃªte dans le syndicat prÃ©sent ou passÃ© . L'un ou l'autre sera tenu de rÃ©pondre dans les 21 jours en prÃ©cisant : (a) si le requÃ©rant a remis sa dÃ©mission : (b) s'il est en rÃ¨gle sur les registres ; (c) s'il est sous le coup d'une sanction disciplinaire ou autre ; (d) s'il y a quelque autre raison militant contre l'acceptation de la demande . Si le syndicat prÃ©sent ou passÃ© objecte au transfen et que le syndicat auteur d e
l'enquÃ©te considÃ¨re l'objection comme dÃ©raisonnable, il ne devra cependant pas accepter l'adhÃ©sion mais laisser la situation en l'Ã©tat . Si le problÃ¨me ne peut pas Ãªtre rÃ©solu par les deux parties . il sera dÃ©fÃ©rÃ© Ã l'arbitrage du TUC . Si le syndicat n'a pas reÃ§u de rÃ©ponse 21 jours aprÃ¨s sa demande d'enqu@te, il ne doit pas encore accepter l'adhÃ©sion mais dans ce cas, il pourra rÃ©Ã©crire au syndicat prÃ©sent ou ancien, en adressant copie de la lettre au Bureau directeur du syndicat si le courrier est destinÃ© Ã une section Iocale et en prÃ©cisant que, faute de rÃ©ponse dans un nouveau dÃ©lai de 15 jours, il se propose d'admettre le demandeur comme adhÃ©rent . Lorsque le syndicat auquel est adressÃ©e la demande traite directement avec le Bureau directeur du syndicat actuel ou ancien, copie de ce courrier peut Ã©tre adressÃ©e au TUC .L'APEX n'a manifestement pas respectÃ© cette procÃ©dure et a acceptÃ© l'adhÃ©sion du requÃ©rant sans aucune enquÃªte auprÃ¨s du syndicat prÃ©cÃ©dent . Le requÃ©rant . quant Ã lui, n'avait pas connaissance de la procÃ©dure Ã suivre et a cru sincÃ¨rement avoir Ã©tÃ© admis dans les rÃ¨gles . AprÃ¨s avoir adhÃ©rÃ© Ã l'APEX, le requÃ©rant fut dÃ©signÃ© pour reprÃ©senter ce syndicat dans des nÃ©gociations avec son employeur . La sociÃ©tÃ© sembla ne pas lui reconnaitre cette fonction, en particulier aprÃ¨s septembre 1974, lorsqu'il apparut clairement que le transfe rt du requÃ©rant Ã l'APEX Ã©tait contestÃ© par l'ACTSS . UltÃ©rieurement, en 1977, alors que le requÃ©rant Ã©tait lui-ntÃ©me impliquÃ© dans un litige avec ses employeurs, ceux-ci refusÃ©rent d'Ã©couter les protestations faites par l'APEX en son nom . Une action ultÃ©rieure devant un tribunal du travail conduisit Ã constater que les employeurs avaient mÃ©connu l'anicle 53 de la loi de 1975 sur la protection de l'emploi, puisqu'ils avaient engagÃ© une action contre lui, en le pÃ©nalisant pour son adhÃ©sion Ã l'APEX . Le requÃ©rant obtint 50 Â£ de dommages-intÃ©rÃ©ts . Le 2 fÃ©vrier 1976, le TGWU (ACTSS) dÃ©posa une plainte offi cielle auprÃ¨s du TUC concernant l'acceptation de l'adhÃ©sion du requÃ©rant Ã l'APEX au mÃ©pris des Principes de Bridlington . ConformÃ©ment Ã la rÃ©glementation rÃ©gissant les relations entre le TUC et ses organisations affiliÃ©es, l'affaire fut fi nalement portÃ©e devant la commission des conflits du TUC . Les seules pa rt ies Ã cette procÃ©dure Ã©taient les syndicats concernÃ©s, TGWU (ACTSS) et APEX . Le requÃ©rant n'Ã©tait pas lui-mÃªme partie Ã la procÃ©dure bien qu'il ait pris pa rt Ã l'audience devant la commission des conflits le 17 mai 1977 . en tant que membre de l'Ã©quipe APEX . Il s'adressa effectivement Ã la commission niais ne fut pas autorisÃ© Ã parler en son nom personnel . Le 20 juin 1977, la commission des conflits du TUC rendit sa sentence sur le litige intersyndical . Elle considÃ©ra qu e Â«L'APEX aurait dÃ» enquÃªter auprÃ¨s du TGWU et en ne le faisant pas, l'APEX a dÃ¨s lors agi en violation de la rÃ¨gle No 2 des principes et procÃ©dures d e 188
rÃ¨glement des conflits du TUC . La commission des conflits dÃ©cide que l'APEX doit exclure les 11 personnes visÃ©es (dont le requÃ©rant) et leur conseiller de revenir au TGWU . . L'APEX ne s'est pas immÃ©diatement conformÃ©e Ã cette dÃ©cision et ce n'est qu'aprÃ¨s des pressions considÃ©rables exercÃ©es sur elle par le TUC qu'elle a finalement mis un terme Ã l'adhÃ©sion du requÃ©rant (et Ã celle des autres personnes concernÃ©es) en les en informant le 30 juin 1978 . Cela a Ã©tÃ© fait conformÃ©ment Ã l'article 14 du RÃ¨glement de l'APEX, ainsi libellÃ© : â¢ DÃCISIONS DE LA COMMISSION DES CONFLITS DU TUC Sous rÃ©serve d'autres dispositions du prÃ©sent RÃ¨glement, le conseil exÃ©cutif peut, moyennant un prÃ©avis Ã©crit de 6 semaines, mettre fin Ã l'appartenance d'un membre du syndicat si cela est nÃ©cessaire pour se conformer Ã une dÃ©cision de la commission des conflits du Trades Union Congress . . Contrairement aux autres cas d'expulsion (article 15), il n'est pas prÃ©vu en pareil cas d'entendre le syndiquÃ© en question . En octobre 1978, le TGWU invita le requÃ©rant Ã revenir Ã l'ACTSS mais celuici n'en fit rien . Au lieu de cela, le requÃ©rant contesta son expulsion par l'APEX en engageant une procÃ©dure civile . Il soutint que la lettre mettant Bn Ã son adhÃ©sion n'Ã©tait pas valable pour les raisons suivantes :( I) elle n'Ã©tait pas â¢ nÃ©cessaire Â» au sens de l'article 14 ;(2) l'APEX ne pouvait pas invoquer cette rÃ©gle puisque c'est elle qui, ayant sciemment mÃ©connu les Principes de Bridlington, Ã©tait par son propre comportement Ã l'origine de la dÃ©cision de la commission des conflits ; (3) la procÃ©dure suivie avait mÃ©connu les principes de justice naturelle, le requÃ©rant n'ayant pas eu la possibilitÃ© de se faire entendre, ni dans la procÃ©dure devant la commission des conflits, ni dans celle suivie Ã l'APEX conforrnÃ©ment Ã l'article 14 ;(4) l'exclusion prÃ©vue par l'Article 14 et la RÃ¨gle No 2 des Principes de Bridlington Ã©tait contraire Ã l'ordre public tel que dÃ©fini notamment Ã l'article 11 de la Convention europÃ©enne des Droits de l'Homme . Le 24 novembre 1981, le juge Bingham dÃ©bouta le requÃ©rant (1) . AprÃ©s avoir Ã©cartÃ© les divers autres arguments du requÃ©rant, le juge examina expressÃ©ment l'argument d'ordre public fondÃ© sur l'article 11 de la Convention . Il estima que si la Convention ne pouvait Ãªtre invoquÃ©e devant les tribunaux anglais, elle pouvait nÃ©anmoins Ã©tre prise en compte comme principe d'interprÃ©tation des rÃ¨gles juridiques consacrÃ©es par le droit inteme . La lÃ©gislation anglaise en gÃ©nÃ©ral, chaque fois que cela est possible et opportun, incline Ã favoriser la libertÃ© de l'individu mais cette considÃ©ration est contrebalancÃ©e par l'idÃ©e que la loi est en gÃ©nÃ©ral aussi, en faveu r ( 1) Cheall c/APEX 1198213 AII E .R . 858 .
du maintien de contrats . par exemole les rÃ¨eles de l'APEX fl'article 14 notamment) que le requÃ©rant avait acceptÃ©es en s'affiliant Ã ce syndicat . MalerÃ© les nombreuses controverses et la lÃ©eislation votÃ©e ces demiÃ¨res annÃ©es en matiÃ¨re de relations du travail, le lÃ©gislateur n'a jamais tentÃ© de modifier ou de restreindre les Principes de Bridlington qui sous-tendent cette rÃ¨gle . Depuis 1971, la lÃ©gislation a reconnu le droit pour tout travailleur de devenir membre du syndicat de son choix, rÃ¨gle qui vaut entre lui-mÃªme et son employeur, mais non pas entre lui-mÃ©me et le syndicat . La loi de 1980 sur l'emploi reconnait au salariÃ© en son article 4,un le droit de ne pas voir dÃ©raisonnablement dÃ©cider par un syndicat soit le refus de sa demande d'adhÃ©sion soit son expulsion . La Commission royale des syndicats et associations patronales a certes considÃ©rÃ© en 1965-1968 que le refus de la demande d'adhÃ©sion conformÃ©ment aux Principes de Bridlington Ã©tait un motif valable, niais la question n'a jamais Ã©tÃ© tranchÃ©e par les tribunaux . La Convention europÃ©enne ne fournit pas non plus une rÃ©ponse claire Ã cette question et ne peut dÃ¨s lors pas Ã¨tre invoquÃ©e . Les faits de l'affaire Young, James et Webster Ã©taient fondamentalemenl diffÃ©rents de ceux de la prÃ©sente affaire, qu'ils n'aident dÃ¨s lors pas Ã rÃ©soudre . Par une dÃ©cision prise Ã la majoritÃ© le 18 juin 1982, la Court of Appeal fit droit Ã l'appel formÃ© par le requÃ©rant ( I) . Sur les deux juges qui constituaient la majoritÃ©, l'un (le juge Slade) estima que la rÃ©siliation de l'adhÃ©sion du requÃ©rant Ã©tait entachÃ©e de nullitÃ© essentiellement parce que le syndicat n'Ã©tait pas autorisÃ© Ã invoquer l'article 14 dans une affaire oÃ¹ il avait lui-mÃªme mÃ©connu la rÃ©glementation en vigueur, le deuxiÃ¨me juge (Lord Denning) fonda expressÃ©ment son raisonnetnent sur l'imÃ©rÃ©t gÃ©nÃ©ral et sur l'article 11 de la Convention, dÃ©clarant que le requÃ©rant avait en principe le droit de dÃ©missionner du syndicat dont il n'Ã©tait pas content et d'adhÃ©rer au syndicat de son choix, et qu'en outre, il avait le droit de ne pas Ãªtre exclu de ce syndicat sans motif raisonnable et sans Ã©tre entendu : l'article 14 n'est pas en accord avec ces principes fondamentaux . Sur recours forrnÃ© par le syndicat, la Chantbre des Lords rÃ©tablit le jugement de la Divisional Court le 24 mars 1983 (2) . Elle dÃ©clara : - ( I) que la seule faÃ§on pour l'APEX de se conformer Ã la dÃ©cision de la commission des conflits du TUC Ã©tait de mettre fin Ã l'adhÃ©sion du plaignant en application de l'article 14 et qu'aucun principe de droit n'empÃ©chait le syndicat d'invoquer cet article . - (2) qu'il n'existait par ailleurs aucun principe de justice naturelle autorisant le demandeur Ã Ã©tre entendu devant la commission des conflits du TUC puisque les seules part ies au litige Ã©taient les syndicats concemÃ©s, seuls habilitÃ©s Ã prÃ©senter des obse rv ations Ã©crites ou orales devant la commission . (1) Cheell c/APEX 119831 1 Q .B . 126 . 121 Cheall c/APEX 119831 2 WLR 679 .
- (3) que si l'APEX Ã© tait auto ri sÃ©e Ã informer un adhÃ©rent de la dÃ©marche et Ã lui donner l'occasion d'Ãªtre entendu avant de dÃ©cider d'exercer ou non son pouvoir discrÃ©tionnaire d'expulsion conformÃ©ment Ã l'article 14, le syndicat n'avait absolument pas l'obligation de le faire puisque la commission des conflits du TUC avait constatÃ© les faits de maniÃ¨re inattaquable et que le prÃ©cÃ©dent syndicat Ã©tait disposÃ© Ã reprendre le requÃ©rant comme adhÃ©rent . - (4) que les Principes de Bridlington ne heurtent aucune disposition de la Convention europÃ©enne des Droits de l'Homme ni aucune rÃ¨gle d'ordre public . La partie de I'arrÃ©t touchant ce dernier aspect est ainsi libellÃ© : . Messieurs, la libert Ã© d'association ne peut Ãªtre que rÃ©ciproque ; un individu ne saurait avoir le droit de s'associer avec d'autres qui ne le dÃ©sirent pas . Les adhÃ©rents de l'APEX, reprÃ©sentÃ©s par le conseil exÃ©cutif, qui avait l'obligation de promouvoir au mieux leurs intÃ©rÃªts, ne dÃ©siraient pas continuer Ã avoir Cheall pour compagnon . Incontestablement, la raison en Ã© tait que s'ils le conse rv aient chez eux, ils courraient le risque de voir l'APEX suspendue ou expulser du TUC, avec tous les inconvÃ©nients que cette sanction ou suspension emrainerait pour eux-mÃªmes en tant qu'adhÃ©rents de l'APEX . Or, je ne connais aucune rÃ¨gle d'ordre public qui empÃªcherait des syndicats de passer l'un avec l'autre des accords qu'ils estiment Ãªtre dans l'intÃ©rÃ©t du pouvoir de nÃ©gociation de leurs adhÃ©rents avec leurs employeurs ; etje ne pense pas non plus qu'il vous soit loisible d'exercer votre pouvoirjudiciaire pour instaurer une nouvelle rÃ¨gle d'ordre public en ce sens . A supposer qu'il faille le faire, ce devrait Ãªtre l'o_uvre du Parlement . D'autres considÃ©rations auraient pu entrer en ligne de compte si l'expulsion de Cheall de l'APEX avait eu pour effet de compromettre son emploi, soit Ã cause de l'existence d'un monopole syndical de l'emploi, soit pour toute autre raison . Mais ce n'est pas le cas . Ce qui s'est passÃ© en fait, c'est que Cheall a quittÃ© un syndicat, l'ACTSS, pour adhÃ©rer Ã un autre, l'APEX, qui avait ses prÃ©fÃ©rences . AprÃ¨s quatre ans d'appartenance Ã ce dernier syndicat, il fut obligÃ© de le quitter contre son grÃ© et s'est vu offrir la possibilitÃ©, qu'il a repoussÃ©e, de revenir Ã I'ACTSS s'il le dÃ©sirait . Â» (per Lord Diplock pp . 685-686) . GRIEFS Le requÃ©rant soutient qu'il a toujours dÃ©sirÃ© rester membre de l'APEX, qu e celle-ci dÃ©sirait le conserver comme adhÃ©rent, qu'elle ne l'a exclu qu'en raison de la coercition et des pressions exercÃ©es par le TUC . Il soutient en outre que la nature des relations patronat/salariÃ©s et la structure de la reprÃ©sentation syndicale Ã l'usine de Vauxhall faisaient de son appartenance Ã un syndicat susceptible de reprÃ©senter convenablement ses intÃ©rÃ©ts un Ã©lÃ©ment vital et nÃ©cessaire de son existence de salariÃ© . Or, pendant neuf ans (soit jusqu'Ã sa retraite en 1983), il est restÃ© dÃ©pourvu de reprÃ©sentation syndicale en raison de la situatio n 191
litigieuse . Cette absence de reprÃ©sentation syndicale l'a gravement affectÃ© notamment aprÃ¨s la mort de son Ã©pouse en 1976 et vu la nÃ©cessitÃ© oÃ¹ il s'est trouvÃ© de modifier ses horaires de travail . Sur ce point, l'APEX n'a pas pu Ã©lever de protestations en son nom . Le requÃ©rant estime qu'il y a eu violation des droits que lui garantit l'article 11 de la Convention . Il prÃ©tend s'Ã¨tre vu refuser la libertÃ© d'association et le droit de s'affilier Ã un syndicat pour dÃ©fendre ses intÃ©rÃªts . Ce droit inclut nÃ©cessairement le choix quant Ã son exercice (voir affaire Young, James et Webster, Cour Eur . D .H ., arrÃªt du 13 .8 .81) ainsi que le droit de demeurer mentbre du syndicat de son choix . Ce droit comporte deux facettes : un droit individuel qu'exerce le syndicaliste pour dÃ©fendre ses intÃ©rÃªts et un droit collectif des personnes associÃ©es au sein du syndicat . Il y aura atteinte Ã ce droit et mÃ©connaissance de celui-ci, bien que le syndicat dont l'individu est membre ait mis fin lui-m@me Ã l'association . si comme en l'espÃ¨ce, il peut Ãªtre Ã©tabli que le syndicat a agi ainsi sur l'ordre et/ou sous la ntenace et la contrainte d'un groupe extÃ©rieur Ã l'association et ayant sur sa conduite une influence prÃ©dominante . Il ne saurait y avoir libenÃ© de s'associer lorsque l'une des panies Ã l'association subit dans son componement l'influence prÃ©dominante d'une autre, au point de n'Ã¨tre pas en mesure de choisir entre la poursuite ou la fin de ses activitÃ©s . Les Principes de Bridlingion et la rÃ¨gle type du TUC qui sous-tend l'article 14 du RÃ¨glement de l'APEX constituent un -systÃ¨me cohÃ©rent de blocageâ¢ propre Ã rÃ¨glementer le comportement syndical en (a) restreignant la libenÃ© d'un individu de s'affllier et/ou de continuer Ã adhÃ©rer au syndicat de son choix et (b) refusant Ã cet individu les avantages de l'appartenance syndicale pendant le maintien de cette affiliation et (c) en obligeant Ã prononcer par la suite son exclusion . La genÃ¨se de la rÃ¨gle type elle-mÃ¨me montre l'intention manifestement restrictive . C'est une caractÃ©ristique intrinsÃ©que de ce - systÃ¨me â¢ que la commission des conflits du TUC doive dÃ©terminer le syndicat auquel doit adhÃ©rer l'individu sans tenir compte du choix ou de la libertÃ© de choix de I-intÃ©ressÃ© . On considÃ¨re comme un axiome que les adhÃ©rents entrÃ©s en violation des Principes de Bridlington doivent Ã©tre exclus du syndicat sur dÃ©cision prise par la commission des conflits, dÃ©cision qui exige invariablement l'exclusion . On voit dÃ¨s lors que les rÃ¨gles du TUC sont coercitives par nature . Le fait pour le Gouvernement de n'avoir pas adoptÃ© une lÃ©gislation frappant d'illÃ©galitÃ© l'exclusion syndicale du requÃ©rant constitue une ingÃ©rence injustifiÃ©e dans le droit du requÃ©rant de s'affilier Ã un syndicat .
EN DROI T Le requÃ©rant, expulsÃ© de son syndicat (APEX) suite Ã une dÃ©cision de la commission des conflits du TUC, se plaint d'une ingÃ©rence injustifiÃ©e dans l'exercice de son droit de s'affilier Ã un syndicat, contrairement Ã l'article 11 de la Convention . Cette disposition est ainsi libellÃ©e : .1 . Toute personne a droit Ã la libe rt Ã© de rÃ©union pacifique et Ã la libertÃ© d'association, y compris le droit de fonder avec d'autres des syndicats et de s'affilier Ã des syndicats pour la dÃ©fense de ses intÃ©r@ts . 2 . L'exercice de ces droits peut faire l'objet d'autres restrictions que celles qui, prÃ©vues par la loi, constituent des mesures nÃ©cessaires, dans une sociÃ©tÃ© dÃ©mocratique, Ã la sÃ©curitÃ© nationale, Ã la sÃ»retÃ© publique, Ã la dÃ©fense de l'ordre et Ã la prÃ©vention du crime, Ã la protection de la santÃ© ou de la morale, ouâ¢Ã la protection des droits et libertÃ©s d'autrui . Le prÃ©sent article n'interdit pas que des restrictions lÃ©gitimes soient imposÃ©es Ã l'exercice de ces droits par les membres des forces armÃ©es, de la police ou de l'administration de l'Etat . La Commission rappelle que le droit de fonder des syndicats et de s'affilier Ã des syndicats esl un aspect particulier de la libertÃ© d'association, qui protÃ¨ge d'abord et avant tout contre les agissements de l'Etat . Celui-ci ne peut pas s'immiscer dans la fondation des syndicats ni dans l'affiliation Ã ceux-ci . sauf sur la base des conditions Ã©noncÃ©es Ã l'a rticle II par . 2 (voir affaire Young, James et Webster, c/Royaume-Uni, rapport Comm . 14 .12 .79, Cour Eur. D .H ., sÃ©rie B nÂ° 39, par . 162) . La question qui se pose en l'espÃ¨ce concerne cependant la mesure dans laquelle cette disposition oblige l'Etat Ã protÃ©ger le syndicaliste contre des dÃ©cisions prises Ã son encontre par son syndicat . De l'avis de la Conimission, le droit de fonder des syndicats comporte par exemple le droit pour les syndicats d'Ã©tablir leurs propres rÃ¨glements, d'adminisirer leurs propres affaires . d'instaurer des fÃ©dÃ©rations de syndicats et d'y adhÃ©rer . Ces droits syndicaux sont expressÃ©mcnt reconnus par les articles 3 et 5 de la Convention n" 87 du BIT Ã prendre en contpte dans le prÃ©sent contexte . . . En consÃ©quence, les dÃ©cisions prises par les syndicats dans ces domaines ne doivent pas Ãªtre soumises Ã des restrictions ni au contrdle de l'Etat sauf sur la base de l'anicle 11 par . 2 . A titre de corollaire, ces dÃ©cisions doivent Ãªtre considÃ©rÃ©es comme une activitÃ© privÃ©e dont, en principe, l'Etat ne saurait @tre tenu pour responsable au regard de la Convention . Le droit de s'affilier Ã un syndicat Â«pour la dÃ©fense de ses intÃ©rÃªts â¢ ne saurait s'interprÃ©ter comme confÃ©rant un droit gÃ©nÃ©ral de s'affilier au syndicat de son choix indÃ©pendamment de la rÃ©glementation du syndicat . Dans l'exercice du droit que leur reconnait l'article 11 par . I, les syndicats doivent conserver la libertÃ© de dÃ©cider ,
confomtÃ©nient Ã la rÃ©glementation syndicale, des questions concernant l'admission ou l'expulsion de membres . La protection offerte par cene disposition est avant tout dirigÃ©e contre les ingÃ©rences de l'Etat . NÃ©anmoins, pour que le droit d'adhÃ©rer Ã un syndicat soit effectif, l'Etat doit protÃ©ger l'individu contre tout abus d'une position dominante de la part des syndicats (voir Cour Eur . D .H ., arrÃ©t Young, James et Webster du 13 aoÃ»t 1981, sÃ©rie A nÂ° 44, par . 63) . Cet abus pourrait se produire par exemple lorsque l'exclusion ou l'expulsion n'a pas Ã©tÃ© conforme au rÃ¨glement du syndicat ou lorsque les rÃ¨gles en Ã©taient totalement dÃ©raisonnables ou arbitraires ou encore que les consÃ©quences de l'exclusion ou de l'expulsion ont Ã©tÃ© particuliÃ¨rement rigoureuses pour l'intÃ©ressÃ©, par exemple lui ont fait perdre son emploi en raison d'un monopole de l'emploi exercÃ© par ce syndicat .
En l'espÃ¨ce, le requÃ©rant fut expulsÃ© de son syndicat (APEX) suite Ã une dÃ©cision de la contmission des conflits du TUC parce que l'APEX n'avait pas respectÃ© la RÃ¨gle No 2 des Principes de Bridlington . Ces Principes ont Ã©tÃ© instaurÃ©s par le TUC pour empÃ©cher les conflits intersyndicaux nÃ©s dc droits d'adhÃ©sion contradictoires . La RÃ¨gle No 2 obligeait l'APEX Ã procÃ©der Ã une enquÃ©te auprÃ¨s du TGWU lorsque le requÃ©rant a sollicitÃ© son adhÃ©sion . Il est clair que l'expulsion du requÃ©rant Ã©tait conforme au RÃ¨glement de l'APEX qui prÃ©voyait l'expulsion en son article 14 pour se conforrner Ã une dÃ©cision de la commission des conflits du TUC . La Commission n'estime pas que l'article 14 ou la RÃ¨gle No 2 puissent Ãªtre considÃ©rÃ©s comme dÃ©raisonnables . Elle relÃ¨ve en outre que l'expulsion du requÃ©rant de l'APEX n'a pas entrainÃ© la perte de son emploi suite Ã l'existence d'un monopole syndical de l'emploi . Dans ces conditions, l'expulsion du requÃ©rant de l'APEX doit Ã¨tre considÃ©rÃ©e comme la dÃ©cision d'un organe privÃ© agissant dans l'exercice des droits que la Convention lui garantit en son article 11 . Comme telle, elle ne saurait engager la responsabilitÃ© du Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur . Il s'ensuit dÃ¨s lors que la requÃ©te doit Ãªtre rejetÃ©e comme incompatible ratione personae avec les dispositions de la Convention au sens de l'article 27 par . 2 . Par ces motifs, la Commissio n DÃCLARE LA REQUÃTEIRRECEVABLE .
194Origine de la décision Pays : Conseil de l'EuropeJuridiction : Cour européenne des droits de l'hommeFormation : Cour (chambre)Date de la décision : 13/05/1985Fonds documentaire : HUDOC Haut de page

References: l'article 14
 l'article 14
 l'article 14
 l'Article 14
 l'article 11
 l'article 11
 l'article 14
 l'article 11
 l'article 14
 l'article 14
 l'article 14
 l'article 11
 l'article 14
 l'article 11
 l'article 11
 l'article 14
 l'article 27