Source: https://www.mackscriminallaw.com/law-blog/tag/Section+12
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 08:39:32+00:00

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The placement of Prystay in administrative segregation amounted to a violation of s12. It was not the clearest of cases, however, and a stay was not warranted. As an alternative remedy, the court granted enhanced credit beyond 1.5:1 at a rate of 3.75:1.
It has long been recognized that time served in remand or pre-trial custody is more onerous than time served in a penitentiary after sentencing. Not only is the environment harsher, with limited access to programs, but pre-trial custody does not count toward parole eligibility or statutory release: R v Sooch, 2008 ABCA 186 at para 11, 433 AR 270; R v Summers, 2014 SCC 26 at para 26,  1 SCR 575; R v Adams, 2016 ABQB 648 at para 29,  4 WWR 741. [Para 19].
Inmates in either form of segregation are confined to their cell for 23 hours a day. Most are in single cells. They have two half-hour blocks outside of their cell during each 24 hour period. If an inmate is designated a cleaner for the unit, they may have an additional one to two hours outside their cell. Movement is strictly controlled. ERC staff are separated from the inmates by a steel and glass wall.
To reiterate, Prystay does not challenge his initial placement in AS. His conduct against a fellow inmate warranted this action. The legitimate penal aim in placing Prystay in AS was to ensure the safety and security of other inmates and staff. As outlined below, placement in AS for 13 ½ months went well beyond what was necessary to achieve this legitimate aim.
Of note, an inmate cannot be placed in DS for more than 14 days at a time: Correctional Institute Regulation, Alta Reg 205/2001, s 46. In contrast, neither the Corrections and Conditional Release Act, s 1992, c 20 (CCRA), nor its regulations, mandate any limit on placement in AS. [Paras 48-49].
I accept Prystay’s evidence that while in AS, he suffered from auditory hallucinations, paranoia, difficulties sleeping, anxiety and chest pain, feelings of hopelessness, increased antisocial feelings. Given his pre-existing mental health issues and the sheer length of time spent in AS, I conclude he was at increased risk of suffering some degree of permanent impact.
Despite Prystay not having demonstrated permanent psychological injury caused by his stay in AS, I have no hesitation in concluding that while in AS, he suffered mental injury and physical symptoms and his placement put him at significant risk of permanent psychological injury.
Finally, I conclude that Prystay’s placement was devoid of procedural fairness and appropriate oversight, and on the evidence, his ongoing placement was not justified. [Paras 82-84].
Similarly, while I find the evidence here to be shocking and deeply disturbing, these circumstances fall short of the “clearest of cases,” especially since a reduction in sentence can be fashioned so as to provide an appropriate remedy. [Para 162].
Joseph Lloyd was charged with trafficking contrary to section 5(3)(a)(i)(D) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act. He faced a mandatory minimum sentence of one year. He challenged that minimum and asserted that it violated section 12 of the Charter. Notwithstanding that the trial judge (and counsel) believed that Lloyd deserved a sentence of at least 12 months, the trial judge considered the constitutionality of the provision and held that it violated section 12. The trial judge “declared” the provision to be of no force and effect. The Crown appealed and succeeded. Lloyd appealed to the Supreme Court: 2016 SCC 13.
The Supreme Court’s ruling offers three significant points of interest: (i) constitutional jurisdiction; (ii) the standard for section 12; and (iii) the limits of section 7.
The law on this matter is clear. Provincial court judges are not empowered to make formal declarations that a law is of no force or effect under s. 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982; only superior court judges of inherent jurisdiction and courts with statutory authority possess this power. However, provincial court judges do have the power to determine the constitutionality of a law where it is properly before them. As this Court stated in R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., 1985 CanLII 69 (SCC),  1 S.C.R. 295, at p. 316, “it has always been open to provincial courts to declare legislation invalid in criminal cases. No one may be convicted of an offence under an invalid statute.” See also Cuddy Chicks Ltd. v. Ontario (Labour Relations Board), 1991 CanLII 57 (SCC),  2 S.C.R. 5, at pp. 14-17; Douglas/Kwantlen Faculty Assn. v. Douglas College, 1990 CanLII 63 (SCC),  3 S.C.R. 570, at p. 592; Re Shewchuk and Ricard (1986), 1986 CanLII 174 (BC CA), 28 D.L.R. (4th) 429 (B.C.C.A.), at pp. 439-40; K. Roach, Constitutional Remedies in Canada (2nd ed. (loose-leaf)), at p. 6-25.
This conclusion is indeed consistent with the Court’s prior jurisprudence on this point and, equally important, logical and principled. There is nothing in our constitutional history and nothing in our principles of law that would warrant otherwise.
The import of this can be understood – to some extent – when one reviews the dissent which expresses notable concern and offers a note of caution about the impact of the majority’s finding on this standard and how the majority’s conclusion appears out of step with the Court’s prior position on mandatory minimum sentences. @paras105-107.
I am unable to accept the submission that the principle of proportionality in sentencing is a principle of fundamental justice under s. 7 of the Charter. My starting point is the observation that principles of fundamental justice in s. 7 must be defined in a way that promotes coherence within the Charter and conformity to the respective roles of Parliament and the courts.
Recognition of the principle of proportionality in sentencing as a principle of fundamental justice under s. 7 would also have implications for the respective roles of Parliament and the courts. The principle of proportionality is an admirable guide for judges seeking to impose fit sentences within the legal parameters established by Parliament. But it is not an overarching constitutional principle that allows judges to subvert the norms of punishment enacted by Parliament. Those norms are judged only by the standard of s. 12.
The victim surcharge codified in section 737 of the Criminal Code has survived yet another challenge to its constitutional validity: R c Boudreault, 2015 QCCQ September 23, 2015 (currently unreported). Alex Boudreault committed lots of criminal offences, some summary and some indictable. By the time sentence was to be imposed he had entered pleas of guilt to 19 charges including numerous breaches of conditions, residential break and enter and assault with a weapon.
Some of the offences Boudreault plead guilty to pre-dated the amendment to s737 of the Code, meaning that the judge retained a discretion to vary or waive the amount owed by the imposition of the surcharge. Some of the convictions post-dated the amendments to s737 of the Code. The amendments removed judicial discretion to vary or waive the surcharge and also increased the amount of the surcharge. Boudreault was to owe $1400 in mandatory surcharges and a maximum of $1200 in respect of the pre-amendment convictions.
Boudreault sought a declaration that the mandatory victim surcharge violated section 12 of the Charter and was therefore unconstitutional.
In light of these circumstances Boudreault argued that his limited earning capacity results in a grossly disproportionate effect of the surcharge provisions such that the provision is unconstitutional.
Boyer J of the Quebec provincial court rejected this argument. The Court held that notwithstanding the fact that the offender is both of limited means and with limited earning capacity an extension of the time to pay the surcharge would inure to the benefit of the offender. Moreover, non-payment of the surcharge does not result in consequences to the accused. It is only by application of the regulation that allows for the issuing of a warrant in default of payment that triggers the potential for consequences due to default.
Additionally, the province of Quebec offers a fine option program. Those with surcharge sums due may also avail themselves of the fine option program. In fact during his testimony the offender conceded that he was contemplating making use of a fine option program so that he could satisfy the outstanding debt.
In fact, in Quebec any offender in custody is notified by letter prior to their release of the amount of surcharges owing and the availability of a fine option program. Evidence lead at the hearing revealed that an 8hour work day at minimum wage results in 80$ paid to the outstanding surcharge debt. In order to pay off the mandatory $1400 the offender in this case would have to complete 17.5 consecutive days of work.
Having found no violation of s12 on the basis of the actual circumstances of the offender before the court, Boyer J then turned to a consideration of reasonable hypotheticals.
First, the court considered a scenario where an accused was charged with 56 counts of unlawfully at large. Although, not expressly mentioned in this particular decision the reference to a crime against the administration of justice such as unlawfully at large, as opposed to a crime perpetrated against a named victim harkens to arguments raised on other constitutional challenges to this provision based on a lack of connection between the purpose of the legislation and mechanism by which the purpose is achieved. In any event, Justice Boyer dismissed the example as an unreasonable hypothetical noting that much like the case of the offender before the court, the offender alone is responsible for the number of counts they are facing- not s737 of the Code.
Although not referenced by Justice Boyer this is entirely consistent with the Supreme Court of Canada’s determination in Wu where the majority of the Court held that the present inability of an offender to pay cannot be the basis to conclude that he will, for all time, be unable to pay.
As stated, the trial judge gave the respondent no time to pay. This was in accordance with a request from the defence, which sought to lay the basis for a conditional sentence. But it was an error. If it is clear that the offender does not have the means to pay immediately, he or she should be given time to pay: see R. v. Andrews (1973),  2 W.W.R. 481 (B.C. S.C.), and R. v. Brooks,  N.S.J. No. 94 (N.S. C.A.). The time should be what is reasonable in all the circumstances: R. v. Beaton (1984), 49 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 15 (P.E.I. C.A.), and R. v. Tessier (1957), 21 W.W.R. 331 (Man. Co. Ct.). In Canada (Attorney General) v. Radigan (1976), 33 C.R.N.S. 358 (Que. C.A.), the Quebec Court of Appeal allowed the offender to pay a fine of $5,000 through semi-annual instalments of $625. The courts have considerable flexibility to respond to the particular facts of an offender's situation. It is wrong to assume, as was done in this case, that the circumstances of the offender at the date of the sentencing will necessarily continue into the future.
Justice Boyer also rejected the offender’s hypothetical scenario involving an offender subject to an absolute discharge.
The Court found that the offender could not possibly be sentenced to an absolute discharge given the seriousness of the offences before the court. Boyer J held that it was incumbent on the accused to raise reasonable hypotheticals and not hypotheticals that are implausible or hard to imagine.
The Court concluded that s737 is constitutionally sound and imposed the mandatory surcharges. The Court then waived the imposition of the discretionary (pre-amendment) surcharges. Ironically, judges consistently waiving the surcharge was one of the leading factors in the decision to amend s737 of the Code and make the surcharge mandatory in all cases.
Guns are dangerous weapons. Crime perpetrated with a firearm “poses grave danger to Canadians. [@para 1] It might surprise you to learn, that despite this risk of grave harm identified by the Supreme Court of Canada, today, that very Court struck down the mandatory minimum sentences for the possession of a prohibited or restricted firearm: 2015 SCC 15.
Six Supreme Court judges struck down the mandatory minimum sentences which were imposed for possessing a prohibited or restricted firearm that is either loaded or kept wit readily accessible ammunition. For a first offence the offender would serve 3years; a second offence 5years. The dissenting three judges found that these mandatory minimums did not offend section 12 of the Charter.
In determining what is a reasonably foreseeable circumstance the court can look to reported cases. “Not only is the situation in a reported case reasonably foreseeable, it has happened.”[@para 72] However, the court is not prevented from looking to reasonably foreseeable scenarios not found in reported cases.
This type of example relates to the level or type of intent as opposed to what is traditionally understood as personal characteristics. In other words, the personal circumstances such as age, prior criminal record, socio-economic status, are not what the court is referring to. This distinction is important because it illustrates that only personal circumstances related to the offences are what may be considered.
The two offenders before the Court, Charles and Nur, did not argue that the mandatory minimum terms were grossly disproportionate as applied to them [@para 48]. Charles was arrested at his home with a loaded semi-automatic handgun and ammunition. The gun had an over-capacity magazine and the serial number had been removed. Charles had a serious and lengthy criminal record which included 5 other firearms offences. [@paras 28-29] Charles was thus subject to the 5year mandatory minimum.
Nur was arrested outside a community centre in a high crime area of Toronto. The centre had been locked down as a result of concerns about the presence of some threatening looking individuals outside. When police arrived Nur ran and threw something to the ground. Police caught Nur and retrieved the discarded item which turned out to be a loaded handgun with an oversized ammunition clip. [@para 18] Nur as a first offender was subject to the 3year mandatory minimum.
Having found a breach of section 12 the majority then conducted an analysis under section 1 of the Charter to determine whether the breach was justifiable in our free and democratic society. They concluded that it was not.
Edward Tinker was convicted of uttering threats and breach. He decided to challenge the constitutional validity of the victim surcharge, a mandatory order to be imposed under section 737 of the Code. Tinker challenged the surcharge under sections 7 and 12 of the Charter. At the first instance motion, Beninger J drew the following conclusions: 2014 ONCJ 208.
First, that the surcharge is a form of punishment [@para16]. In so concluding, Beninger J adopted the analysis by Schnall J in R v Flaro, 2014 ONCJ 2.
Second, that the surcharge impacts on security of the person. In coming to this conclusion, Beninger J rejected the Crown’s position that granting time to pay relieves against this impact [@paras20-21].
Third, that the surcharge infringes on security of the person in a manner that is not in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice; it is “arbitrary, overreaching, and grossly disproportionate” [@para34]. In coming to that conclusion, Beninger J reviewed the law on section 7, relying primarily on Canada (Attorney General) v Bedford, 2013 SCC 72. Notably, in relation to gross disproportionality, Beninger J set out the test from R v Nur, 2013 ONCA 677 (a test set out in that case under the section 12 analysis).
The Crown appealed: 2015 ONSC 2284.
On appeal, Glass J rejected the conclusions that the surcharge was punishment and held that it did not violate the principles of fundamental justice in section 7.
First, Glass J held that the surcharge is not punishment. Glass J held that the surcharge was not a sanction in its own right, “[r]ather, the surcharge is a sum of money that goes into a pool of resources to help victims of crime. Just as there are requirements for providing DNA samples upon conviction of offences and they are not sanctions, so do victim surcharges become requirements without being penalties” [@para29].
The case before me is a far cry from being grossly disproportionate for the persons involved and further when applied to reasonable hypotheticals. With each Defendant, the conviction is made on summary conviction leading to a consideration of a surcharge of $100 each. The persons involved are not well-to-do persons. They have an economic life style that is very humble. However, there is a means of granting them significant time to pay the surcharges. The Crown has indicated a willingness to allow 2 years for payment. I might add that if there were some of the surcharges still outstanding at the end of 2 years, the person could apply for another extension. The same reasoning for the individual Defendants would apply to others in general in our society. [@para33].
Third, Glass J held that the surcharge was not “too broad a sweep against persons” or an inherently “bad law” as defined in Bedford.
Tinker is the first appellate decision on the constitutional validity of the surcharge. Its impact is significant. It has resolved, for now, much debate in the provincial court over this issue: see for example the discussion in R v Frail, 2014 ONCJ 744. It is difficult to conceive of any sustainable argument that would distinguish its binding authority: see generally R v Malmo-Levine, 2003 SCC 74. Some arguments may be conceived. Those arguments are likely to fail.
Joseph Lloyd was convicted of three counts of possession of drugs for the purpose, contrary to section 5(2) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act [CDSA]. Lloyd had a prior conviction under the same section; as a result, he faced a mandatory minimum of one year.
Lloyd argued that the one-year mandatory minimum violated section 12. The sentencing judge held that the minimum did not violate section 12 as it related to Lloyd but went on to consider whether the provision would violate section 12 in a reasonable hypothetical. The court found that it did. As a result, the court “declared” that the provision was invalid.
The Crown appealed: 2014 BCCA 224.
Two aspects of the appeal are quite interesting.
First, the court considered the jurisdiction of the provincial court to consider the constitutionality of provisions.
In this context, the court noted that while a provincial court has the jurisdiction to consider any constitutional impact of a provision on the offender before it, any ruling is limited in its application to the present case. The court has no jurisdiction to make a general declaration of invalidity: “the judge in this case did, indeed, intended to make a formal declaration that the impugned provision was of no force and effect. He had no jurisdiction to make such a declaration, and, assuming that he was right to have found the impugned provision to be unconstitutional, ought to have confined himself to refusing to apply it in the case before him. I would set aside the declaration” [para 38].
Second, the court considered the proper scope of constitutional consideration by a provincial court.
In this context the court noted two points. One, in light of the fact that a provincial court ruling on the constitutionality of a provision is limited to the case before it, any consideration of the constitutionality in the context of a reasonable hypothetical might be unnecessary and inappropriate. Two, based on the more general principle that courts should restrict their rulings to the case before them it was, in the present case, inappropriate for the court to strike down the provision on the basis of a reasonable hypothetical.
A case that is properly before a court may be capable of decision on a non-constitutional ground or a constitutional ground or both. The course of judicial restraint is to decide the case on the non-constitutional ground. That way, the dispute between the litigants is resolved, but the impact of a constitutional decision on the powers of the legislative or executive branches of government is avoided. For the same reason, if a case can be decided on a narrow constitutional ground or a wide ground, the narrow ground is to be preferred. If a case can be decided on a rule of federalism or under the Charter, the federalism ground is the narrower one, because it leaves the other level of government free to act, whereas a Charter decision striking down a law does not. The general idea is that a proper deference to the other branches of government makes it wise for the courts, as far as possible, to frame their decisions in ways that do not intrude gratuitously on the powers of the other branches.
In short, while Mr. Lloyd clearly had standing to challenge the validity of s. 5(3)(a)(i)(D) of the CDSA, the court was not obliged to determine that issue unless that section would have an impact on the appropriate sentence for Mr. Lloyd.
Mr. Lloyd contends that the court is required to determine the constitutionality of s. 5(3)(a)(i)(D), because "no one may be sentenced under an unconstitutional law". While there is some merit in that contention, I do not think that it can be said that Mr. Lloyd would be "sentenced under an unconstitutional law" unless that law in some way affects his sentence. Before embarking on the constitutional inquiry, therefore, the court should consider whether the impugned provision would have any effect on the sentence to be imposed. [Paras 42-44].
Lloyd is an interesting and helpful decision. Interesting in its consideration of reliance upon a reasonable hypothetical in the context of section 12. As per Lloyd, where a provision would have no possible impact on the present offender reliance on a reasonable hypothetical may be unnecessary. Helpful in that it reminds that provincial courts are limited in their constitutional powers to making a finding about the force and effect of a provision to the case before them; there is no power to make general declarations of constitutional invalidity.

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