Source: https://www.jbwpc.com/Articles/Zoning-and-Land-Use-The-Basics/SURVEY-OF-LEGAL-ISSUES-IN-ZONING.shtml
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 02:06:24+00:00

Document:
City of Atlanta et al. v. Tap Associates, L.P., 273 Ga. 681, 544 S.E.2d 433 (2001).
A. Amendment to the Zoning Procedures Law to Require Special Investigation Respecting Rezoning of Property within 3,000 Feet of a Military Base or Military Installation, O.C.G.A. § 36-66-6.
This amendment to the Zoning Procedures Law, O.C.G.A. § 36-66-1 et seq. provides that where a local government has established a planning department or similar agency, charged with reviewing zoning proposals, certain procedures are required where a rezoning is requested within 3,000 feet of any military base, military installation, or certain military airport. It requires the planning department to notify the commander of the military base or installation and request a written recommendation relating to the land being considered for a zoning decision. It also lists standards or criteria which the planning department shall respond to and which shall become part of the public record.
B. City of Roswell et al., v. Outdoor Systems, Inc., 274 Ga. 130, 549 S.E.2d 90 (2001).
C. Fairfax MK, Inc. et al. v. City of Clarkston et al., 274 Ga. 520, 555 S.E.2d 722 (2001).
D. City of Walnut Grove v. Questco, Ltd., 275 Ga. 266, 564 S.E.2d 445 (2002).
A. Outdoor Systems, Inc. v. Cobb County et al., 274 Ga. 606, 555 S.E.2d 689 (2001).
B. Union City Board of Zoning Appeals et al. v. Justice Outdoor Displays, Inc., 266 Ga. 393, 467 S.E.2d 875 (1996).
1. The city's sign ordinance which distinguishes between "off-premise signs" and "on-premise signs" violates the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Free Speech Clause of the Georgia Constitution. Since the city restricts the content of a sign based upon its location, it will not survive strict scrutiny. The city effectively prohibits signs bearing non-commercial messages in zoning districts where a sign of the same size and structure may display commercial messages.
2. The city's sign ordinance is also unconstitutional to the extent that it limits the messages on specific categories of signs, which are principal identification signs, marketing signs, construction signs, instructional signs, real estate directional signs, real estate signs, and special event signs. The effect of the ordinance was to limit the message of certain signs to those identifying the type of sign that may be used.
3. The ordinance provisions which restrict signs in residential zoning districts to on-premise signs and certain temporary or special signs, such as political signs, is likewise unconstitutional. The court reasoned that the ordinance prohibits vital expression through the unique medium of residential signs without providing a viable alternative.
4. The city's time limitation on political signs during a period of six weeks prior to and one week after an election is likewise unconstitutional. Since the ordinance does not place time limits that a resident may post a sign selling his house, for example, restrictions on political signs are necessarily content based and unconstitutionally restricted.
A. Wise Enterprises, Inc. v. Unified Government of Athens-Clarke County, Georgia, 217 F.3d 1360 (2000).
B. Gold Rush II v. City of Marietta, 267 Ga. 683, 482 S.E.2d 347 (1997).
A. Dover v. City of Jackson, 246 Ga.App. 524, 541 S.E.2d 92 (2000).
B. City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes At Monterey, Ltd., 119 S.Ct. 1624 (1999).
Town of Tyrone v. Tyrone LLC, 275 Ga. 383, 565 S.E.2d 806 (2002).
Homebuilders Association of Savannah, Inc. v. Chatham County, 276 Ga. 243, 577 S.E.2d 564 (2003).
This is a challenge by the Homebuilders Association against Chatham County and its building department alleging that the regulatory fees charged for inspections and other services were excessive and thus in violation of the law. By January 2000, the reserve account in which fees collected were deposited showed a surplus of almost two million dollars. Nevertheless, in that same month the permit fee was increased and the valuation rate was increased. In June 2002 the permit fee was reduced to pre-2000 level, but the valuation rate remained unchanged. The evidence also showed that there were various distributions from the reserve account to other county departments, including the engineering department, the Savannah area GIS program, and other distributions from the fund.
The Homebuilders Association alleged that the county violated O.C.G.A. § 48-13-9(a). This statute provides that a local government is authorized to collect a regulatory fee for services it customarily performs for investigation or inspections, but the local government is not authorized to use the regulatory fee for raising revenue for general purposes as the regulatory fee shall only approximate the reasonable cost of the regulatory activity performed by the local government.
For procedural or technical reasons, the Court of Appeals reversed summary judgment entered for the county and returned the case to the trial court for trial. It did conclude that the two million dollars accumulated in the reserve account is some evidence that the fees may have exceeded the reasonable cost of the activity performed by the building department.
King v. City of Bainbridge, 276 Ga. 484, 577 S.E.2d 772 (2003).
This is the long awaited decision in response to the Cannon v. Coweta County, 260 Ga. 56, 389 S.E.2d 329 (1990) case which established an ambiguous ruling at best on the right of local governments to exclude manufactured homes from zoning districts. In this well-reasoned case, the Supreme Court looked to various federal court decisions as well as decisions from other states to make clear the rule in Georgia. In affirming the right of the city to exclude manufactured homes from single-family residential districts, the court found the city's zoning ordinance constitutional and at the same time expressly overruled the Cannon case. So long as the ordinance is not arbitrary and unreasonable, according to the court, it is within the police power of the local government to exclude manufactured homes from zoning districts. The court listed a wide variety of reasons and various other cases for excluding manufactured homes, including preserving land for low density, protection of property values, guarding against increased crime, guarding against traffic congestion, maintaining ascetics, regulating population density, preventing waste and sewage problems, regulation of the quality of the housing stock, and concerns about wind vulnerability. In the case of Bainbridge, the city's purpose in restricting manufactured home placement was to regulate the quality of housing stock and promote general safety concerns. As these reasons were not arbitrary or unreasonable, the ban on placement of manufactured homes in single-family districts was not unconstitutional and thus upheld by the court.
Note in this case that the city's zoning ordinance excluded manufactured homes from all single-family districts and allowed them only in manufactured home parks.
RCG Properties, LLC v. City of Atlanta Board of Zoning Adjustment, 260 Ga.App. 355, 579 S.E.2d 782 (2003).
In January 2001, Holder Properties submitted an application to Atlanta for a special administrative permit (SAP) to allow construction of an eleven-story concrete parking structure on Peachtree Center Avenue. RCG Properties filed an appeal of the city's administrative action approving the application to the Board of Zoning Adjustment. The BZA denied RCG's appeal and upheld the decision of the planning bureau granting the application for the parking facility. RCG then appealed that decision to the superior court which dismissed the appeal on the ground that RCG lacked standing to challenge the decision of the planning bureau.
RCG appealed to the Court of Appeals which in its decision reversed the superior court. In an informative discussion of the difference between administrative decisions and legislative decisions by local governments, the court found that the decision of the planning bureau and the review by the BZA was an administrative (quasi-judicial) decision. Under Georgia law, all issues have to be raised before the local government which is making an administrative decision. Since the issue of standing was not raised before the BZA, then the city, according to the Court of Appeals, could not raise that issue for the first time in the superior court. For this reason, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case to the superior court with direction to reconsider the decision by the BZA.
Buckhorn Ventures, LLC v. Forsyth County, Georgia, 262 Ga.App. 299, 585 S.E.2d 229 (2003).
Buckhorn Ventures sued Forsyth County in an effort to hold the county commissioners in contempt for failing to comply with a court order that included a 1992 settlement agreement. The county responded that the 1992 agreement was ultra vires(not lawful). If, according to the county's argument, the agreement is ultra vires, then the county could reject the agreement and would thus not be bound by its terms.
The agreement in question provided that later amendments of the Forsyth County zoning ordinance may not further impede the activities allowed on the property in question. Under its terms the agreement bound forever future Forsyth County commissioners from changing the zoning ordinance on the subject property to prohibit or restrict the use that was otherwise authorized in the agreement. The court ruled for the county and concluded that the 1992 agreement was ultra vires. Thus the county was not subject to its terms. O.C.G.A. § 36-30-3(a) provides that "[o]ne counsel may not, by an ordinance, bind itself or its successors so as to prevent legislation in matters of municipal government [or county government]." Since the agreement restricted the legislative actions of future counsels, it was void as a matter of law and the county was not subject to its terms nor in contempt for failing to comply with the agreement.
Legislative Amendments to the Transfer of Development Right's Laws,O.C.G.A. § 36-66a-1.
In this amendment, the key provision eliminates the requirement that separate approval is required by the local governing authority where the property owners agree to both sending and receiving property development rights. Although the local government still must establish ordinances authorizing transfer of development rights, it may not thereafter interfere with the rights of the transferring and receiving property owners who agree to transfer development rights.
Local Government Code Enforcement Boards, O.C.G.A. § 36-74-1 et seq.
In this act, the General Assembly overhauled the prior local government code enforcement board laws. The new law provides detailed procedures for establishment of enforcement boards, jurisdiction of enforcement boards, procedures of enforcement boards, enforcement of local ordinances by enforcement boards, and other matters for enforcement boards created by a local government on or after January 1, 2003, and also separate provisions which apply to enforcement boards created prior to January 1, 2003.
Codes and ordinances which may be enforced by the board include zoning ordinances, subdivision regulations, environmental ordinances, state minimum standard codes, ordinances relating to the development of real property, ordinances providing for control of litter and debris, control of junked or abandoned vehicles, and control of overgrown vegetation.
A local government may create an enforcement board consisting of three, five, or seven members.
The code inspector is required to notify a violator and allow a reasonable time to correct the violation. If the violation is not corrected, the inspector may proceed by calling a hearing before the enforcement board.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the board shall issue findings of fact and conclusions of law and shall issue an order with proper relief as provided under the act.

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