Source: http://supreme.nolo.com/us/397/358/case.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 15:45:17+00:00

Document:
Relying on a preponderance of the evidence, the standard of proof required by § 744(b) of the New York Family Court Act, a New York Family Court judge found that appellant, then a 12-year-old boy, had committed an act that "if done by an adult, would constitute the crime . . . of Larceny." The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, sustaining the constitutionality of § 744(b).
Held: Proof beyond a reasonable doubt, which is required by the Due Process Clause in criminal trials, is among the "essentials of due process and fair treatment" required during the adjudicatory stage when a juvenile is charged with an act that would constitute a crime if committed by an adult. Pp. 397 U. S. 361-368.
2 N.Y.2d 196, 247 N.E.2d 253, reversed.
whether a juvenile is a 'delinquent' as a result of alleged misconduct on his part, with the consequence that he may be committed to a state institution."
"[a]ny determination at the conclusion of [an adjudicatory] hearing that a [juvenile] did an act or acts must be based on a preponderance of the evidence. [Footnote 2]"
We noted probable jurisdiction, 396 U.S. 885 (1969). We reverse.
"demand for a higher degree of persuasion in criminal cases was recurrently expressed from ancient times, [though] its crystallization into the formula 'beyond a reasonable doubt' seems to have occurred as late as 1798. It is now accepted in common law jurisdictions as the measure of persuasion by which the prosecution must convince the trier of all the essential elements of guilt."
way in which law should be enforced and justice administered." Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145, 391 U. S. 155 (1968).
"[i]t is the duty of the Government to establish . . . guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. This notion -- basic in our law and rightly one of the boasts of a free society -- is a requirement and a safeguard of due process of law in the historic, procedural content of 'due process.'"
"[g]uilt in a criminal case must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt and by evidence confined to that which long experience in the common law tradition, to some extent embodied in the Constitution, has crystalized into rules of evidence consistent with that standard. These rules are historically grounded rights of our system, developed to safeguard men from dubious and unjust convictions, with resulting forfeitures of life, liberty and property."
"On the contrary, he is entitled to an acquittal of the specific crime charged if, upon all the evidence, there is reasonable doubt whether he was capable in law of committing crime. . . . No man should be deprived of his life under the forms of law unless the jurors who try him are able, upon their consciences, to say that the evidence before them . . . is sufficient to show beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of every fact necessary to constitute the crime charged."
Id. at 160 U. S. 484, 160 U. S. 493.
24 N.E.2d at 205, 247 N.E.2d at 259.
"There is always, in litigation, a margin of error, representing error in factfinding, which both parties must take into account. Where one party has at stake an interest of transcending value -- as a criminal defendant his liberty -- this margin of error is reduced as to him by the process of placing on the other party the burden of . . . persuading the factfinder at the conclusion of the trial of his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Due process commands that no man shall lose his liberty unless the Government has borne the burden of . . . convincing the factfinder of his guilt."
To this end, the reasonable doubt standard is indispensable, for it "impresses on the trier of fact the necessity of reaching a subjective state of certitude of the facts in issue." Dorsen & Rezneck, In Re Gault and the Future of Juvenile Law, 1 Family Law Quarterly, No. 4, pp. 1, 26 (1967).
Moreover, use of the reasonable doubt standard is indispensable to command the respect and confidence of the community in applications of the criminal law. It is critical that the moral force of the criminal law not be diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are being condemned. It is also important in our free society that every individual going about his ordinary affairs have confidence that his government cannot adjudge him guilty of a criminal offense without convincing a proper factfinder of his guilt with utmost certainty.
Lest there remain any doubt about the constitutional stature of the reasonable doubt standard, we explicitly hold that the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.
"is not a 'conviction' (§ 781); that it affects no right or privilege, including the right to hold public office or to obtain a license (§ 782), and a cloak of protective confidentiality is thrown around all the proceedings (§§ 783-784)."
"The delinquency status is not made a crime, and the proceedings are not criminal. There is, hence, no deprivation of due process in the statutory provision [challenged by appellant]. . . ."
"[a] proceeding where the issue is whether the child will be found to be 'delinquent' and subjected to the loss of his liberty for years is comparable in seriousness to a felony prosecution."
Id. at 387 U. S. 36.
distinctive to juvenile proceedings that are employed prior to the adjudicatory hearing.
"a child's best interest is not necessarily, or even probably, promoted if he wins in the particular inquiry which may bring him to the juvenile court."
24 N.Y.2d at 199, 247 N.E.2d at 255. It is true, of course, that the juvenile may be engaging in a general course of conduct inimical to his welfare that calls for judicial intervention. But that intervention cannot take the form of subjecting the child to the stigma of a finding that he violated a criminal law [Footnote 5] and to the possibility of institutional confinement on proof insufficient to convict him were he an adult.
We conclude, as we concluded regarding the essential due process safeguards applied in Gault, that the observance of the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt "will not compel the States to abandon or displace any of the substantive benefits of the juvenile process." Gault, supra, at 387 U. S. 21.
that it calls on the trier of fact merely to perform an abstract weighing of the evidence in order to determine which side has produced the greater quantum, without regard to its effect in convincing his mind of the truth of the proposition asserted."
"that, where a 12-year-old child is charged with an act of stealing which renders him liable to confinement for as long as six years, then, as a matter of due process . . . the case against him must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt."
24 N.Y.2d at 207, 247 N.E.2d at 260.
"rests entirely on the assumption that all juvenile proceedings are 'criminal prosecutions,' hence subject to constitutional limitations."
"we are not here concerned with . . . the pre-judicial stages of the juvenile process, nor do we direct our attention to the post-adjudicative or dispositional process."
387 U.S. at 387 U. S. 13. In New York, the adjudicatory stage of a delinquency proceeding is clearly distinct from both the preliminary phase of the juvenile process and from its dispositional stage. See N.Y.Family Court Act §§ 731-749. Similarly, we intimate no view concerning the constitutionality of the New York procedures governing children "in need of supervision." See id. at §§ 711-712, 742-745. Nor do we consider whether there are other "essentials of due process and fair treatment" required during the adjudicatory hearing of a delinquency proceeding. Finally, we have no occasion to consider appellant's argument that § 744(b) is a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, as well as a denial of due process.
"Counsel: Your Honor is making a finding by the preponderance of the evidence."
"Court: Well, it convinces me."
"Counsel: It's not beyond a reasonable doubt, Your Honor."
"Court: That is true. . . . Our statute says a preponderance, and a preponderance it is."
Accord, e.g., In re Dennis M., 70 Cal.2d 444, 450 P.2d 298 (1969); In re Ellis, 253 A.2d 789 (D.C.Ct.App. 1969); State v. Arenas, 253 Ore. 215, 453 P.2d 915 (1969); State v. Santana, 444 S.W.2d 614 (Texas 1969). Contra, United States v. Costanzo, 395 F.2d 441 (C.A.4th Cir.1968); In re Urbasec, 38 Ill.2d 535, 232 N. F.2d 716 (1967); Jones v. Commonwealth, 185 Va. 335, 38 S.E.2d 444 (1946); N.D.Cent.Code § 27-202n(2) (Supp. 1969); Colo.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 22-3-6(1) (1967); Md.Ann.Code, Art. 26, § 70-18(a) (Supp. 1969); N.J.Ct.Rule 6:9(1)(f) (1967), Wash.Sup.Ct., Juv.Ct.Rule § 4.4(b) (1969); cf. In re Agler, 19 Ohio St.2d 70, 249 N.E.2d 808 (1969).
Legislative adoption of the reasonable doubt standard has been urged by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and by the Children's Bureau of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare's Social and Rehabilitation Service. See Uniform Juvenile Court Act § 29(b) (1968); Children's Bureau, Social and Rehabilitation Service, U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Legislative Guide for Drafting Family and Juvenile Court Acts § 32(c) (1969). Cf. the proposal of the National Council on Crime and Delinquency that a "clear and convincing" standard be adopted. Model Rules for Juvenile Courts, Rule 26, p. 57 (1969). See generally Cohen, The Standard of Proof in Juvenile Proceedings: Gault Beyond a Reasonable Doubt, 68 Mich.L.Rev. 567 (1970).
"A determination that the New York law unconstitutionally denies due process because it does not provide for use of the reasonable doubt standard probably would not have a serious impact if all that resulted would be a change in the quantum of proof."
"[T]he reasonable doubt test is superior to all others in protecting against an unjust adjudication of guilt, and that is as much a concern of the juvenile court as of the criminal court. It is difficult to see how the distinctive objectives of the juvenile court give rise to a legitimate institutional interest in finding a juvenile to have committed a violation of the criminal law on less evidence than if he were an adult."
The more comprehensive and effective the procedures used to prevent public disclosure of the finding, the less the danger of stigma. As we indicated in Gault, however, often, the "claim of secrecy . . . is more rhetoric than reality." 387 U.S. at 387 U. S. 24.
Compare this Court's rejection of the preponderance standard in deportation proceedings, where we ruled that the Government must support its allegations with "clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence." Woodby v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 385 U. S. 276, 385 U. S. 285 (1966). Although we ruled in Woodby that deportation is not tantamount to a criminal conviction, we found that, since it could lead to "drastic deprivations," it is impermissible for a person to be "banished from this country upon no higher degree of proof than applies in a negligence case." Ibid.
No one, I daresay, would contend that state juvenile court trials are subject to no federal constitutional limitations. Differences have existed, however, among the members of this Court as to what constitutional protections do apply. See In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1 (1967).
"The truth is that no one has yet invented or discovered a mode of measurement for the intensity of human belief. Hence, there can be yet no successful method of communicating intelligibly . . . a sound method of self-analysis for one's belief,"
To explain why I think this so, I begin by stating two propositions, neither of which I believe can be fairly disputed. First, in a judicial proceeding in which there is a dispute about the facts of some earlier event, the factfinder cannot acquire unassailably accurate knowledge of what happened. Instead, all the factfinder can acquire is a belief of what probably happened. The intensity of this belief -- the degree to which a factfinder is convinced that a given act actually occurred -- can, of course, vary. In this regard, a standard of proof represents an attempt to instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication. Although the phrases "preponderance of the evidence" and "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" are quantitatively imprecise, they do communicate to the finder of fact different notions concerning the degree of confidence he is expected to have in the correctness of his factual conclusions.
of an innocent man. On the other hand, an erroneous factual determination can result in a judgment for the defendant when the true facts justify a judgment in plaintiff's favor. The criminal analogue would be the acquittal of a guilty man.
The standard of proof influences the relative frequency of these two types of erroneous outcomes. If, for example, the standard of proof for a criminal trial were a preponderance of the evidence, rather than proof beyond a reasonable doubt, there would be a smaller risk of factual errors that result in freeing guilty persons, but a far greater risk of factual errors that result in convicting the innocent. Because the standard of proof affects the comparative frequency of these two types of erroneous outcomes, the choice of the standard to be applied in a particular kind of litigation should, in a rational world, reflect an assessment of the comparative social disutility of each.
who has the burden to persuade the [judge] of the fact's existence. [Footnote 2/4]"
"There is always in litigation a margin of error, representing error in factfinding, which both parties must take into account. Where one party has at stake an interest of transcending value -- as a criminal defendant his liberty -- this margin of error is reduced as to him by the process of placing on the other party the burden . . . of persuading the factfinder at the conclusion of the trial of his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."
In this context, I view the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal case as bottomed on a fundamental value determination of our society that it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free. It is only because of the nearly complete and longstanding acceptance of the reasonable doubt standard by the States in criminal trials that the Court has not, before today, had to hold explicitly that due process, as an expression of fundamental procedural fairness, [Footnote 2/5] requires a more stringent standard for criminal trials than for ordinary civil litigation.
not identical to those in a criminal case, the differences will not support a distinction in the standard of proof. First, and of paramount importance, a factual error here, as in a criminal case, exposes the accused to a complete loss of his personal liberty through a state-imposed confinement away from his home, family, and friends. And second, a delinquency determination, to some extent at least, stigmatizes a youth in that it is, by definition, bottomed on a finding that the accused committed a crime. [Footnote 2/6] Although there are no doubt costs to society (and possibly even to the youth himself) in letting a guilty youth go free, I think here, as in a criminal case, it is far worse to declare an innocent youth a delinquent. I therefore agree that a juvenile court judge should be no less convinced of the factual conclusion that the accused committed the criminal act with which he is charged than would be required in a criminal trial.
between the procedural requirements imposed by due process in a criminal case and those imposed by due process in juvenile cases. [Footnote 2/7] It is of great importance, in my view, that procedural strictures not be constitutionally imposed that jeopardize "the essential elements of the State's purpose" in creating juvenile courts, id. at 387 U. S. 72. In this regard, I think it worth emphasizing that the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt that a juvenile committed a criminal act before he is found to be a delinquent does not (1) interfere with the worthy goal of rehabilitating the juvenile, (2) make any significant difference in the extent to which a youth is stigmatized as a "criminal" because he has been found to be a delinquent, or (3) burden the juvenile courts with a procedural requirement that will make juvenile adjudications significantly more time consuming, or rigid. Today's decision simply requires a juvenile court judge to be more confident in his belief that the youth did the act with which he has been charged.
See also Paulsen, Juvenile Courts and the Legacy of '67, 43 Ind.L.J. 527, 551-552 (1968).
For an interesting analysis of standards of proof see Kaplan, Decision Theory and the Factfinding Process, 20 Stan.L.Rev. 106, 1071-1077 (1968).
The preponderance test has been criticized, justifiably, in my view, when it is read as asking the trier of fact to weigh in some objective sense the quantity of evidence submitted by each side, rather than asking him to decide what he believes most probably happened. See J. Maguire, Evidence, Common Sense and Common Law 180 (147).
F. James, Civil Procedure 25251 (1965); see E. Morgan, Some Problems of Proof Under the Anglo-American System of Litigation 85 (1956).
"That the warrant now in question is legal process, is not denied. It was issued in conformity with an act of Congress. But is it 'due process of law?' The constitution contains no description of those processes which it was intended to allow or forbid. It does not even declare what principles are to be applied to ascertain whether it be due process. It is manifest that it was not left to the legislative power to enact any process which might be devised. The article is a restraint on the legislative, as well as on the executive and judicial, powers of the government, and cannot be so construed as to leave congress free to make any process 'due process of law' by its mere will."
"who is an habitual truant or who is incorrigible, ungovernable or habitually disobedient and beyond the lawful control of parent or other lawful authority."
"'Juvenile delinquent' is now a term of disapproval. The judges of the Children's Court and the Domestic Relations Court of course are aware of this, and also aware that government officials and private employers often learn of an adjudication of delinquency."
N.Y.Jt.Legislative Committee on Court Reorganization, The Family Court Act, pt. 2, p. 7 (1962). Moreover, the powers of the police and courts differ in these two categories of cases. See id. t 7-9. Thus, in a PINS-type case, the consequences of an erroneous factual determination are by no means identical to those involved here.
In Gault, for example, I agreed with the majority that due process required (1) adequate notice of the "nature and terms" of the proceedings; (2) notice of the right. to retain counsel, and an obligation on the State to provide counsel for indigents "in cases in which the child may be confined", and (3) a written record "adequate to permit effective review." 387 U.S. at 387 U. S. 72. Unlike the majority, however, I thought it unnecessary at the time of Gault to impose the additional requirements of the privilege against self-incrimination, confrontation, and cross-examination.
holding, were steps eroding the differences between juvenile courts and traditional criminal courts. The original concept of the juvenile court system was to provide a benevolent and less formal means than criminal courts could provide for dealing with the special, and often sensitive, problems of youthful offenders. Since I see no constitutional requirement of due process sufficient to overcome the legislative judgment of the States in this area, I dissent from further strait-jacketing of an already overly restricted system. What the juvenile court system needs is not more, but less, of the trappings of legal procedure and judicial formalism; the juvenile court system requires breathing room and flexibility in order to survive, if it can survive, the repeated assaults from this Court.
Much of the judicial attitude manifested by the Court's opinion today and earlier holdings in this field is really a protest against inadequate juvenile court staffs and facilities; we "burn down the stable to get rid of the mice." The lack of support and the distressing growth of juvenile crime have combined to make for a literal breakdown in many, if not most, juvenile courts. Constitutional problems were not seen while those courts functioned in an atmosphere where juvenile judges were not crushed with an avalanche of cases.
My hope is that today's decision will not spell the end of a generously conceived program of compassionate treatment intended to mitigate the rigors and trauma of exposing youthful offenders to a traditional criminal court; each step we take turns the clock back to the pre-juvenile court era. I cannot regard it as a manifestation of progress to transform juvenile courts into criminal courts, which is what we are well on the way to accomplishing. We can only hope the legislative response will not reflect our own by having these courts abolished.
"many opinions of this Court indicate that it has long been assumed that proof of a criminal charge beyond a reasonable doubt is constitutionally required."
is clearly enough revealed by the reference of the majority to "fair treatment" and to the statement by the dissenting judges in the New York Court of Appeals that failure to require proof beyond a reasonable doubt amounts to a "lack of fundamental fairness." Ante at 397 U. S. 359, 397 U. S. 363. As I have said time and time again, I prefer to put my faith in the words of the written Constitution itself, rather than to rely on the shifting, day-to-day standards of fairness of individual judges.
Our Constitution provides that no person shall be "deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." [Footnote 3/3] The four words -- due process of law -- have been the center of substantial legal debate over the years. See Chambers v. Florida, 309 U. S. 227, 309 U. S. 235-236, and n. 8 (1940). Some might think that the words themselves are vague. But any possible ambiguity disappears when the phrase is viewed in the light of history and the accepted meaning of those words prior to and at the time our Constitution was written.
destroyed; nor will we not pass upon him, nor condemn him, but by lawful Judgment of his Peers, or by the Law of the Land. [Footnote 3/4]"
"it is contained in the Great Charter of the Franchises of England that none shall be imprisoned nor put out of his Freehold, nor of his Franchises nor free Custom, unless it be by the Law of the Land. . . . [Footnote 3/5]"
"[t]hat no Man, of what Estate or Condition that he be, shall be put out of Land or Tenement, nor taken nor imprisoned, nor disinherited, nor put to Death without being brought in Answer by due Process of the Law. [Footnote 3/6]"
"[t]he words, 'due process of law,' were undoubtedly intended to convey the same meaning as the words 'by the law of the land' in Magna Charta."
Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improv. Co., 18 How. 272, 59 U. S. 276 (1856).
"The constitution contains no description of those processes which it was intended to allow or forbid. It does not even declare what principles are to be applied to ascertain whether it be due process. It is manifest that it was not left to the legislative power to enact any process which might be devised. The article is a restraint on the legislative, as well as on the executive and judicial, powers of the government, and cannot be so construed as to leave congress free to make any process 'due process of law' by its mere will. To what principles, then, are we to resort to ascertain whether this process, enacted by congress, is due process? To this, the answer must be two-fold. We must examine the constitution itself to see whether this process be in conflict with any of its provisions. If not found to be so, we must look to those settled usages and modes of proceeding existing in the common and statute law of England before the emigration of our ancestors, and which are shown not to have been unsuited to their civil and political condition by having been acted on by them after the settlement of this country."
"First. What is due process of law may be ascertained by an examination of those settled usages and modes of proceedings existing in the common and statute law of England before the emigration of our ancestors, and shown not to have been unsuited to their civil and political condition by having been acted on by them after the settlement of this country. . . ."
"Second. It does not follow, however, that a procedure settled in English law at the time of the emigration, and brought to this country and practiced by our ancestors, is an essential element of due process of law. If that were so, the procedure of the first half of the seventeenth century would be fastened upon the American jurisprudence like a straight-jacket, only to be unloosed by constitutional amendment. . . ."
"Third. But, consistently with the requirements of due process, no change in ancient procedure can be made which disregards those fundamental principles, to be ascertained from time to time by judicial action, which have relation to process of law and protect the citizen in his private right, and guard him against the arbitrary action of government."
ordered liberty." See Rochin v. California, 342 U. S. 165, 342 U. S. 172 (1952); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 302 U. S. 325 (1937). While this approach has been frequently used in deciding so-called "procedural" questions, it has evolved into a device as easily invoked to declare invalid "substantive" laws that sufficiently shock the consciences of at least five members of this Court. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45 (1905); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U. S. 1 (1915); Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U. S. 504 (1924); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479 (1965). I have set forth at length in prior opinions my own views that this concept is completely at odds with the basic principle that our Government is one of limited powers, and that such an arrogation of unlimited authority by the judiciary cannot be supported by the language or the history of any provision of the Constitution. See, e.g., Adamson v. California, 332 U. S. 46, 332 U. S. 68 (1947) (dissenting opinion); Griswold v. Connecticut, supra, at 381 U. S. 507 (1965) (dissenting opinion).
In my view, both Mr. Justice Curtis and Mr. Justice Moody gave "due process of law" an unjustifiably broad interpretation. For me, the only correct meaning of that phrase is that our Government must proceed according to the "law of the land" -- that is, according to written constitutional and statutory provisions as interpreted by court decisions. The Due Process Clause, in both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, in and of itself, does not add to those provisions, but, in effect, states that our governments are governments of law, and constitutionally bound to act only according to law. [Footnote 3/11] To some, that view may seem a degrading and niggardly view of what is undoubtedly a fundamental part of our basic freedoms.
also made it abundantly clear that all governmental actions affecting life, liberty, and property were to be according to law.
For years, our ancestors had struggled in an attempt to bring England under one written constitution, consolidating in one place all the threads of the fundamental law of that nation. They almost succeeded in that attempt, [Footnote 3/12] but it was not until after the American Revolution that men were able to achieve that long-sought goal. But the struggle had not been simply to put all the constitutional law in one document, it was also to make certain that men would be governed by law, not the arbitrary fiat of the man or men in power. Our ancestors' ancestors had known the tyranny of the kings and the rule of man and it was, in my view, in order to insure against such actions that the Founders wrote into our own Magna Carta the fundamental principle of the rule of law, as expressed in the historically meaningful phrase "due process of law." The many decisions of this Court that have found in that phrase a blanket authority to govern the country according to the views of at least five members of this institution have ignored the essential meaning of the very words they invoke. When this Court assumes for itself the power to declare any law -- state or federal -- unconstitutional because it offends the majority's own views of what is fundamental and decent in our society, our Nation ceases to be governed according to the "law of the land," and instead becomes one governed ultimately by the "law of the judges."
It can be, and has been, argued that, when this Court strikes down a legislative act because it offends the idea of "fundamental fairness," it furthers the basic thrust of our Bill of Rights by protecting individual freedom.
But that argument ignores the effect of such decisions on perhaps the most fundamental individual liberty of our people -- the right of each man to participate in the self-government of his society. Our Federal Government was set up as one of limited powers, but it was also given broad power to do all that was "necessary and proper" to carry out its basic purpose of governing the Nation, so long as those powers were not exercised contrary to the limitations set forth in the Constitution. And the States, to the extent they are not restrained by the provisions in that document, were to be left free to govern themselves in accordance with their own views of fairness and decency. Any legislature presumably passes a law because it thinks the end result will help more than hinder, and will thus further the liberty of the society as a whole. The people, through their elected representatives, may, of course, be wrong in making those determinations, but the right of self-government that our Constitution preserves is just as important as any of the specific individual freedoms preserved in the Bill of Rights. The liberty of government by the people, in my opinion, should never be denied by this Court except when the decision of the people, as stated in laws passed by their chosen representatives, conflicts with the express or necessarily implied commands of our Constitution.
this requirement is almost universally found in the governing laws of the States. And as long as a particular jurisdiction requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt, then the Due Process Clause commands that every trial in that jurisdiction must adhere to that standard. See Turner v. United States, 396 U. S. 398, 396 U. S. 430 (1970) (BLACK, J., dissenting). But when, as here, a State, through its duly constituted legislative branch, decides to apply a different standard, then that standard, unless it is otherwise unconstitutional, must be applied to insure that persons are treated according to the "law of the land." The State of New York has made such a decision, and, in my view, nothing in the Due Process Clause invalidates it.
The Fifth Amendment applies this limitation to the Federal Government, and the Fourteenth Amendment imposes the same restriction on the States.
25 Edw.3, Stat. 5, c. IV.
Coke's Institutes, Second Part., 50 (1st ed. 1642).
Cf. 11 U. S. Hudson, 7 Cranch 32 (1812), in which the Court held that there was no jurisdiction in federal courts to try criminal charges based on the common law, and that all federal crimes must be based on a statute of Congress.
Cf. the views of Mr. Justice Iredell in Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 3 U. S. 398 (1798).
It is not the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, standing alone, that requires my conclusion that that Amendment was intended to apply fully the protection of the Bill of Rights to actions by the States. That conclusion follows from the language of the entire first section of the Fourteenth Amendment, as illuminated by the legislative history surrounding its adoption. See Adamson v. California, supra, at 332 U. S. 71-75, 332 U. S. 92-123.
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN continues to insist that uncontroverted scholarly research shows that the Fourteenth Amendment did not incorporate the Bill of Rights as limitations on the States. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U. S. 497, 367 U. S. 540 (1961) (dissenting opinion); Griswold v. Connecticut, supra, at 381 U. S. 500 (concurring in judgment); ante at 397 U. S. 372-373, n. 5. I cannot understand that conclusion. Mr. Fairman, in the article repeatedly cited by MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, surveys the legislative history and concludes that it is his opinion that the amendment did not incorporate the Bill of Rights. Mr. Flack, in at lest an equally "scholarly" writing, surveys substantially the same documents relied upon by Mr. Fairman and concludes that a prime objective of Congress in proposing the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment was "[t]o make the Bill of Rights (the first eight Amendments) binding upon, or applicable to, the States." Compare H. Flack, The Adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment 94 (1908), with Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The Original Understanding, 2 Stan.L.Rev. 5 (1949). It is, of course, significant that, since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, this Court has held almost all the provisions of the Bill of Rights applicable to the States: the First Amendment, e.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652 (1925), Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 (1940), Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U. S. 229 (1963); the Fourth Amendment, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961); the Fifth Amendment, Chicago B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226 (1897), Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U. S. 1 (1964), Benton v. Maryland, 395 U. S. 784 (1969); the Sixth Amendment, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 (1963), Pointer v. Texas, 380 U. S. 400 (1965), Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U. S. 213 (1967), Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145 (1968), and the Eighth Amendment, Robinson v. California, 370 U. S. 660 (1962). To me, this history indicates that, in the end, Mr. Flack's thesis has fared much better than Mr. Fairman's "uncontroverted" scholarship.

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