Source: https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/trump-v-hawaii
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 13:10:12+00:00

Document:
abstract. Neal Katyal, who argued Trump v. Hawaii at each level of the federal court system, compares the Supreme Court’s decision to uphold President Trump’s travel ban to the Court’s decision nearly seventy-five years ago to affirm the internment of Japanese Americans in Korematsu. He concludes that while Hawaii overturned Korematsu, it essentially recreated the doctrine under another name. The phoenix of excessive deference to the executive unfortunately persists as an entrenched part of our jurisprudence.
In 1944, Justice Jackson delivered an ominous warning to his colleagues on the bench and to the nation. By sanctioning the internment of Japanese Americans and upholding an exclusion order based on a “mere declaration”1 of “reasonable military necessity,”2 the Supreme Court’s decision in Korematsu v. United States would “lie about like a loaded weapon ready for the hand of any authority that c[ould] bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent need.”3 For decades, Justice Jackson’s warning has been characterized as a fear of the past or an alternate history that never came to be.4 Indeed, the Court’s decision in Korematsu has joined the ranks of this country’s most notorious antiprecedents—textbook cases of judicial decision-making gone wrong that jurists of all stripes vow never to repeat.5 But on the eve of Korematsu’s seventy-fifth anniversary, a majority of the Court brought to fruition what Justice Jackson predicted so long ago. Despite overturning Korematsu, the Court’s decision in Trump v. Hawaii6 perpetuates the very-near-blind deference to the executive branch that led the Korematsu Court astray.
In the ensuing pages, I lay out these parallels. The parallels were not ones that Justice Sotomayor discovered at the conclusion of the litigation. Rather, at every step of the Hawaii case, I was aware of them; indeed, I had a unique perspective on how bad Korematsu was for our nation. Six years before Donald Trump was elected President, I confessed error on behalf of the Solicitor General’s Office for its conduct in litigating Korematsu. I knew firsthand the dangers of untrammeled executive power. Our amici and supporters knew this as well, so much so that my last physical contact before standing up to give the oral argument in Hawaii was the warm embraces in the Supreme Court chamber given to me by Senator Mazie Hirono and Karen Korematsu, the daughter of Fred Korematsu.
In the months since the Supreme Court’s five-four decision and in the wake of the criticism of Justice Sotomayor, I’ve wondered whether those of us who litigated the case were unduly sensitive to the commonalities between Hawaii and Korematsu. In the end, the answer is no.
This Essay explains why. In Part I, I explain many of the surface-level similarities between the cases, such as the way in which the history and purpose of both governmental actions were laundered. Readers of the Hawaii majority opinion would have little idea about the terrible history of Trump’s travel ban, including many of the anti-Muslim statements he had made over the years. As in Korematsu, it took the dissent to detail these buried facts at length. In Part II, the Essay details how the surface-level similarities are eclipsed by a much more fundamental commonality between the two decisions: they are, at their root, decisions that place their unbounded trust in the President when he asserts military necessity. One way of putting the point is this: it was not hard for Chief Justice Roberts in Hawaii to overrule Korematsu in name, since he merely recreated its reasoning under a different appellation. The Court still has the same tool in its toolkit—it’s just that the case now begins with a T.
Of course, Korematsu and Hawaii are not the same case. They involve orders of substantially different dimensions and scope. To put it briefly, in Korematsu, the Military Commander of the Western Defense Command, General John DeWitt, under the authority of the President, ordered the relocation of Japanese Americans—including United States citizens—to internment camps according to explicit race-based classifications.12 In Hawaii, the President of the United States, Donald Trump, ordered a ban on foreign nationals’ entry to the country using a facially neutral policy that predominantly impacts Muslim-majority nations.13 These cases are products of distinct time periods, and their facts are undisputedly different. But it’s the legal reasoning and the remarkable commonalities in the language and arguments—not the facts—that are telling.
There’s a bit of protesting too much in both of these passages. Despite the insistence that Korematsu is utterly distinct from Hawaii, the language, style, and arguments of the two majority opinions suggest otherwise.
Taken together, the opinions in Hawaii read like a modern-day adaptation of Korematsu. Normally, this would not be surprising—after all, the same institutional body decided both cases, and later decisions necessarily draw from the language and arguments of their earlier counterparts. But Korematsu is not just any case. It is one of the most widely rejected and disfavored decisions in the Court’s history. And it is altogether surprising that a decision that purported to overrule Korematsu in effect recreated its reasoning.
It is not simply the standard of review (strong deference) that creates the parallels in these cases, but also the way in which the majorities applied the standard to the facts at hand. In each case, the dissents condemn the Court’s unquestioning acceptance of the government’s “half-truths”49 and “self-serving” statements,50 “all in the name of a superficial claim of national security.”51 This shared criticism is much more than a surface-level similarity—it explains how, despite overturning Korematsu, the Court “merely replace[d] one ‘gravely wrong’ decision with another.”52 Both Courts adopted a posture of broad deference to the executive—even when individual constitutional rights are infringed—when the executive asserts that a policy is necessary to ensure the nation’s security.
Against this backdrop of the judiciary’s blind deference and the executive’s wanton dishonesty, Korematsu has taken its place in history as a warning message for judges, jurists, and government officials alike. Even apart from the Solicitor General’s suppression of valuable information, Korematsu’s legacy is inextricably linked to the majority’s failure to look past the government’s blanket assertions and evaluate the exclusion order for what it really was.69 In light of this infamous legacy, it is all the more surprising to see the current Court “redeploy the same dangerous logic”70 seventy-four years after the initial decision, and just seven years after the confession of error.
Arguing the Hawaii case, I was constantly aware of the ways in which military necessity claims had been abused by the White House in the past. I am not someone who generally believes courts should be in the business of second-guessing national security decisions. But when those decisions are the product of animus, and when they are not fully vetted by the interagency process and the national security professionals trained to make such decisions,71 some judicial scrutiny is not only appropriate—it is necessary.
According to the majority, President Trump’s statements were unnecessary to evaluate because the Proclamation contained sufficiently legitimate justifications to satisfy rational basis review.78 And so the Hawaii majority ultimately concluded that the Proclamation is “a facially neutral policy denying certain foreign nationals the privilege of admission.”79 But in focusing on the four corners of the Proclamation, the Court ignored the tainted influence of the President’s comments on the Proclamation itself. Though the majority recognized that President Trump had instructed his lawyers to craft a “legal” version of a Muslim ban,80 it assessed the Proclamation as if it had randomly dropped out of the sky.
Indeed, the Administration went to great lengths to suppress the worldwide review—the asserted basis for the ban—from being released to the public, both in the Hawaii litigation and elsewhere (such as FOIA litigation).87 The extent to which the Administration insisted that the report stay secret, and that not even portions of it be disclosed with redactions, is somewhat suspicious. Meanwhile, other documents that were released present greater cause for concern. In February 2017—following the President’s issuance of his first Executive Order—a draft report authored by the Department of Homeland Security was leaked, finding that “citizenship [is] likely an unreliable indicator of terrorist threat to the United States.”88 In other words, a mere six months before the Department helped produce the review that purportedly justified the third travel ban, it had drafted a report calling into question the entire rationale for the policy.
Hawaii could have been that “better ending.” With hundreds of pages in the Joint Appendix, the Court had more than sufficient evidence to affirm the injunction on religious animus grounds.96 Unlike the hidden intelligence report in Korematsu, President Trump’s anti-Muslim comments were littered across various media outlets, “plastered on the candidate’s website,” and “staring everyone in the face.”97 And yet when given the chance to memorialize Korematsu’s lessons, the Court instead made almost every mistake in Korematsu’s playbook—it accepted the government’s arguments at face value, deferred to the executive branch without ensuring that deference was warranted, and confined itself to a narrow review of the Proclamation, examining a “figmentary and artificial”98 case instead of the one actually before it. For these reasons, it will come as no surprise when, one day in the future, Trump v. Hawaii is eventually overturned. But let us hope that when that happens, the Court ends this line of cases for good, rather than resurrect it by another name.
Neal Katyal is the Saunders Professor of Law at Georgetown University, a partner at Hogan Lovells, LLP, and lead counsel for the State of Hawaii and other plaintiffs in Trump v. Hawaii. Thanks to Natalie Salmanowitz for fabulous assistance in preparing this Essay, and to the incredible appellate team at Hogan Lovells (and especially Mitch Reich, Tom Schmidt, Colleen Roh Sinzdak, and Sara Solow) for their brilliant work in litigating the Hawaii case.
2019 marks seventy-five years since the Supreme Court handed down its opinion in Korematsu v. United States. This Collection examines Korematsu's legacy for national security law, race, and equal protection, and explores what Korematsu means today in light of its formal overruling in Trump v. Hawaii.
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 245 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018).
See id. at 2447-48 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
See sources cited supra note 8.
Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2423.
Id. (quoting Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 248 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting)).
See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 226-29 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
See Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2404-07; see also id. at 2416-17.
Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2417 (quoting Joint Appendix at 120, 159).
See Geltzer, supra note 14.
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 219-20 (1944).
Id. at 2422 (quoting Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 33-34 (2010)).
Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 218 (quoting Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 99 (1943)).
Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 223.
Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 242 (citation omitted).
Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 232 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
See Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2429 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 232 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2433 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 234 (1944) (Murphy, J., dissenting).
Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 247 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2446 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2447 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 244-45 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2440 & n.5 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 239 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
Id. at 245 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2448 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Id. (quoting id. at 2423 (majority opinion)).
See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 218-19.
Id. at 3033 (quoting Kenneth Ringle, Ringle Report on Japanese Internment § I.h (1941)).
Id. at 3036 (quoting Hirabayashi, 828 F.2d at 603 n.13).
See Greene, supra note 5, at 423-25.
Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2448 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2420 (majority opinion).
See id. at 2436 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (quoting Joint Appendix at 123).
Id. (quoting Joint Appendix at 125).
See id. at 2436, 2438.
See id. at 2420-21 (majority opinion).
See Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2422-23; see also id. at 2430 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2421 (majority opinion).
See Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2443 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 239 (1944) (Murphy, J., dissenting).
See Joint Appendix at 158-241, Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018).
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 232 (1944) (Roberts, J., dissenting).
See David Cole, Judging the Next Emergency: Judicial Review and Individual Rights in Times of Crisis, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 2565, 2575 (2003); Adam Liptak, A Discredited Supreme Court Ruling that Still, Technically, Stands, N.Y. Times (Jan. 27, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com‌/2014‌/01‌/28‌/us‌/time-for-supreme-court-to-overrule-korematsu-verdict.html [https://perma‌.cc‌/ZP5B‌-TTXJ].
See Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 379, 380 (2011); see also Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 953 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“I am optimistic enough to believe that, one day, Stenberg v. Carhart will be assigned its rightful place in the history of this Court’s jurisprudence beside Korematsu and Dred Scott.”); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 236 (1995) (“Korematsu demonstrates vividly that even ‘the most rigid scrutiny’ can sometimes fail to detect an illegitimate racial classification.” (quoting Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 223)); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 501 (1989) (“The history of racial classifications in this country suggests that blind judicial deference to legislative or executive pronouncements of necessity has no place in equal protection analysis.” (citing Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 235-40 (Murphy, J., dissenting))).
See, e.g., id. at 2423 (majority opinion) (“[T]he dissent invokes Korematsu . . . . Whatever rhetorical advantage the dissent may see in doing so, Korematsu has nothing to do with this case.”); Marina Medvin, Korematsu Has Nothing to Do with Trump’s Travel Ban, Townhall (June 28, 2018, 12:01 AM), https://townhall.com/columnists/marinamedvin/2018/06‌/28‌/‌‌korematsu‌-has-nothing-to-do-with-trumps-travel-ban-n2495295 [https://perma.cc‌/HTD5‌-VFBY] (arguing that, by comparing President Trump’s travel ban to Korematsu, Justice Sotomayor “disgraced the abuse that the American-Japanese suffered during World War II”); Benjamin Wittes, Reflections on the Travel Ban Case and the Constitutional Status of Pretext, Lawfare (July 6, 2018, 8:18 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/reflections-travel-ban-case-and‌-constitutional-status-pretext [https://perma.cc/6LLM-3L6J] (“The discussion of the Japanese internment case by both the majority and dissenting opinions was degrading to the court as an institution and should embarrass both Sotomayor and Roberts. Citing Korematsu is one of the cheapest shots available to a litigant, much less a justice.”).
Part II of this Essay discusses other evidence that emerged after oral argument. This Part discusses only statements that were articulated in the opinions themselves, not statements that came out after the decision or oral argument. See Joshua A. Geltzer, The White House Refuses to Disavow Trump’s Muslim-Ban Promise, Slate (Apr. 26, 2018, 6:15 PM), https://slate.com‌/news‌-and‌-politics/2018/04/did-noel-francisco-mislead-the-supreme-court-about-trumps -current‌-muslim-ban-position.html [https://perma.cc/2PPG-LGUR] (discussing information that the Solicitor General mischaracterized during oral argument in Hawaii). See generally Neal Kumar Katyal, The Solicitor General and Confession of Error, 81 Fordham L. Rev. 3027, 3034-36 (2013) (discussing critical evidence in Korematsu that the Solicitor General did not bring to the attention of the Court). These statements—and their implications—are discussed below. See infra Part II.
Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 236-37 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (quoting J.L. Dewitt, Final Report: Japanese Evacuation from the West Coast, 1942 (1943)).
See Jenna Johnson, Trump Calls for ‘Total and Complete Shutdown of Muslims Entering the United States,’ Wash. Post (Dec. 7, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post -politics‌/wp‌/2015/12/07/donald-trump-calls-for-total-and-complete-shutdown-of-muslims‌-entering‌-the-united-states [https://perma.cc/3ZKH-UQU6].
Id. at 2437 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (quoting Joint Appendix at 131-32) (paraphrasing the President’s words in an interview with Fox News); see also Chris Cillizza, Donald Trump’s Explanation of His Wiretapping Tweets Will Shock and Amaze You, Wash. Post (Mar. 16, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/03/16/donald-trump-explained -twitter-the-universe-and-everything-to-tucker-carlson [https://perma.cc/E3VN-CCDY].
Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2435 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (quoting Joint Appendix at 120). These remarks were made while Trump was a presidential candidate in 2015. See Jenna Johnson, Donald Trump Says He Is Not Bothered by Comparisons to Hitler, Wash. Post (Dec. 8, 2015), https://‌www‌.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2015/12/08/donald-trump-says -he‌-is-not‌-bothered-by-comparisons-to-hitler [https://perma.cc/K6YF-9UU8].
Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2417 (majority opinion) (quoting Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982)).
Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2421 (quoting Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Water­man S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948)).
Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2432-33 (quoting Declaration of Christopher Richardson at 3-4, Alharbi v. Miller, No. 1:18-cv-2435 (E.D.N.Y. June 1, 2018)).
Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2446 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1862 (2017)).
See id. at 241 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (noting that “nearly four months elapsed after Pearl Harbor before the first exclusion order was issued; nearly eight months went by until the last order was issued; and the last of these ‘subversive’ persons was not actually removed until almost eleven months had elapsed,” suggesting that “[l]eisure and deliberation seem to have been more of the essence than speed”).
See id. at 219 n.2 (majority opinion). The Court provided a more thorough summary of General DeWitt’s report in Hirabayashi. See Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 102-04 (1943). But even there, the Court failed to mention the report’s troubling aspects, including each of the damaging facts noted above. See Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 102-04In any event, the Court’s scant mention of the report in Korematsu cannot be excused by its prior analysis in Hirabayashi, as the two cases involve orders of entirely different magnitudes. As Justice Roberts explained in his dissent, curfew orders are simply not the same as forcible relocation, and the Court’s acceptance of the former cannot singlehandedly provide the basis for upholding the latter. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 231-32 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 219 n.2 (first citing National War Agencies Appropriation Bill for 1945: Hearings Before the Subcomm of the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 78th Cong. 608-76 (1944) (noting that many people who had been interned were “pro-American” and likely “not dangerous” but rather feared they would not properly adjust to the United States); and then citing Expatriation of Certain Nationals of the United States: Hearings on H.R. 2701, H.R. 3012, H.R. 3489, H.R. 3446, and H.R. 4103 Before the H. Comm. on Immigration and Naturalization, 78th Cong. 37-45, 49-58 (1944) (noting that (a) over 10,000 previously-interned Japanese-Americans had voluntarily moved to the Midwest and the intermountain region, after which there had been no reports of “any trouble” among this group that reached the military’s attention, and (b) that it may be possible to identify and segregate disloyal individuals of Japanese ancestry from loyal ones)).
Cf. Leah Litman, Unchecked Power Is Still Dangerous No Matter What the Court Says, N.Y. Times (June 26, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/26/opinion/travel-ban-hawaii -supreme‌‌-court.html [https://perma.cc/4TPS-TJNG] (noting that “immigration has become a ‘Constitution-lite zone’”).
See Katyal, supra note 14, at 3037 (quoting Hirabayashi v. United States, 828 F.2d 591, 602 (9th Cir. 1987)).
See Neal Katyal, Confession of Error: The Solicitor General’s Mistakes During the Japanese-American Internment Cases, U.S. Dep’t Just. (May 20, 2011), https://www.justice.gov/archives‌/opa‌/blog‌/confession-error-solicitor-generals-mistakes-during-japanese-american-internment -cases [https://perma.cc/M7FA-W7S4].
See Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 Yale L.J. 2314 (2006).
E.g., Brief for Amici Curiae Scholars of Immigration Law in Support of Respondents on the History of the Immigration and Nationality Act at 23-24, Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (No. 17-965), 2018 WL 1586764; Brief of Amici Curiae Former National Security Officials in Support of Respondents at 23, Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (No. 17-965), 2018 WL 1733146; Brief of Amici Curiae Immigration, Family, and Constitutional Law Professors in Support of Respondents at 34, Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (No. 17-965), 2018 WL 1585891; Brief of Amici Curiae Muslim Justice League et al. in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees and Affirmance at 16-17, Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (No. 17-965), 2017 WL 5640359; Brief of Amici Curiae Pars Equality Center et al. in Support of Respondents at 11-12, Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (No. 17-965), 2017 WL 4176191; Brief of Amici Curiae The Association of Art Museum Directors et al. in Support of Respondents at 14, Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (No. 17-965), 2018 WL 1605671; Brief of the States of New York et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 9 n.22, Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (No. 17-965), 2018 WL 1586440.
See id. at 2421 (majority opinion) (noting—just as the majority did in Korematsu—that the Court cannot “substitute” its own policy judgments for those of the executive branch); see also id. at 2443-45 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 218 (1944) (“Here . . . we cannot reject as unfounded the judgment of the military authorities and of Congress that there were disloyal members of that population, whose number and strength could not be precisely and quickly ascertained.”).
See id. (noting that the government “refuse[d] to disclose [the review] to the public”); Notice of In Camera Ex Parte Lodging of Report Containing Classified Information and Objection to Review or Consideration of Report at 4, Hawaii v. Trump, No. 17-cv-00050-DKW-KSC (D. Haw. Oct. 13, 2017) (resisting a request to provide the report to the U.S. District Court for the District of Hawaii for in camera inspection and urging the court not to “consider [its] contents” if it did review the report); see also State Letter Resisting FOIA Request, Brennan Ctr. for Justice v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 300 F. Supp. 3d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 17 Civ. 7520 (PGG)) (resisting the release of the report to the public in FOIA litigation).
Citizenship Likely an Unreliable Indicator of Terrorist Threat to the United States, U.S. Dep’t Homeland Sec. (2017), https://fas.org/irp/eprint/dhs-7countries.pdf [https://perma.cc‌/P7AB‌-32AJ].
Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2439 n.4 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument at 81).
See Richard Primus, How Trump Gave the Supreme Court a Second Chance on Japanese Internment, Politico (May 30, 2017), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/05/30 /donald‌-trump-korematsu-japanese-internment-supreme-court-215208 [https://perma‌.cc‌/9GJE‌-UT8W].
See Noah Feldman, Opinion, Why Korematsu Is Not a Precedent, N.Y. Times (Nov. 18, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/21/opinion/why-korematsu-is-not-a-precedent.html [https://perma.cc/5TS8-7WT9].
Ian Samuel & Leah Litman, No Peeking? Korematsu and Judicial Credulity, Take Care (Mar. 22, 2017), https://takecareblog.com/blog/no-peeking-korematsu-and-judicial-credulity [https://‌perma.cc/LTW7-5F47].

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