Source: http://bc-injury-law.com/blog/tag/bc-court-of-appeal
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 18:16:06+00:00

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Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Court of Appeal addressing damages for chronic soft tissue injuries.
In today’s case (Taraviras v. Lovig) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2002 rear-end collision. The Plaintiff suffered “primarily neck and back injuries with referred pain down his left leg“. After a 10 day trial a Jury awarded the Plaintiff $691,000 in damages including $300,000 for non-pecuniary damages (pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life).
 In my review of the non-pecuniary jury verdict in this case, I must accept that the jury resolved all evidentiary conflicts in favour of Mr. Taraviras. I have described some of his evidence and I proceed on the assumption that the jury did accept this evidence. In other words, the question to be resolved is – taking Mr. Taraviras’ case at its most favourable, is the award nevertheless so exorbitant that it would shock this Court’s conscience and sense of justice? (Moskaleva at para. 116; Whiten v. Pilot Insurance Co., 2002 SCC 18)….
 Here, Mr. Taraviras testified that his life had, in almost all respects, been affected by this accident. He could no longer work in the same robust way he had worked previously. His renovation and property acquisition business was limited by his inability to do the heavy maintenance and renovation work. He could no longer participate in his previous active sporting life. His personal relationships were affected by his short temper and more sedentary lifestyle. He complained of constant pain in his leg and back. He could no longer enjoy his employment. Taking the plaintiff’s case at its most favourable, I would conclude that Mr. Taraviras’ injuries in this accident had a devastating effect on his previously active and energetic life. I must assume that the jury did not accept the proposition advanced by the defendants that his pre and post-accident injuries were causative.
 Even accepting Mr. Taraviras’ case as I have, I am of the view the award for non-pecuniary damages does require appellate intervention. This is one of those awards that is so out of all proportion to the circumstances of the case that it would shock the conscience of the court to leave it undisturbed. It is wholly out of proportion to the injuries suffered by Mr. Taraviras and must be set aside. In granting considerable deference to the jury and using the judge alone and appellate cases as some guidance, I would reduce the award from $300,000 to $200,000.
Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Court of Appeal addressing, amongst other things, a fair range of non-pecuniary damages (money for pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life) for chronic pain caused by the negligence of others.
 A review of those cases supports the respondent’s argument that the trial judge’s award of $125,000 was within the acceptable range. In Moses v. Kim, 2007 BCSC 1388, the plaintiff was struck while crossing the Trans-Canada highway, breaking his legs. While the breaks healed, the plaintiff was left with pain in his legs, back and hip. As he had been a very physical person prior to the accident, hunting, fishing, logging and playing sports, much of his life was affected. In addition to restricting the activities he could enjoy, this led him to become shorter tempered and angrier. He was awarded $165,000 in non-pecuniary damages.
 The plaintiff in Funk v. Carter, 2004 BCSC 866, was also struck by a vehicle and suffered broken legs, as well as some soft tissue injuries. While the plaintiff underwent surgery, the injuries did not heal well, and he was left with chronic pain and impaired mobility. As with the case at bar, and with Moses, the plaintiff had been “very fit” prior to the accident, and had “a great deal of difficulty adjusting psychologically”. As a result, he was awarded $140,000 in non-pecuniary damages.
 Moore v. Brown, 2009 BCSC 190, was a case similar to that at bar where the plaintiff was on a motorcycle when struck by the defendant. He suffered substantial injuries, including a shoulder injury, a leg ligament tear, knee problems and a foot injury. The accident also led to chronic neck pain, headaches and lumbar problems. Three years later, at trial, the plaintiff was still experiencing difficulties, including an altered gait and difficulty continuing in his work as a geo-scientist. The trial judge awarded non-pecuniary damages of $115,000.
 In Dufault v. Kathed Holdings Ltd., 2007 BCSC 186, the plaintiff fell while descending the stairs at the defendant’s business. The fall resulted in knee injuries that the trial judge accepted would likely require knee replacement surgery. This was exacerbated by chronic pain, hip problems, and some resultant mild depression. Taking these considerations into account, the trial judge awarded $110,000 in non-pecuniary damages.
 Finally, in Mosher v. Bitonti, 1998 CanLII 5186 (B.C.S.C.), the plaintiff sued two defendants for separate accidents. The trial judge found that the plaintiff had suffered fractured right leg bones as a result of the first accident, which caused muscular damage. He accepted that these were “very significant injuries” and that the plaintiff had suffered a painful recovery. While there was a small chance of future degenerative arthritis, the plaintiff was left with a normal gait, but with some difficulty squatting, kneeling or crouching. Those injuries resulted in the plaintiff being awarded $80,000 in non-pecuniary damages.
 As can be seen from those cases, trial judges have assessed non-pecuniary damages at well over $100,000 where there is an element of significant ongoing pain and, particularly, where the plaintiff had previously enjoyed an active lifestyle or a physical vocation….
 I agree with the respondent that the trial judge did not assess damages on the basis of a well-resolved fracture. Rather, the award for non-pecuniary damages was largely based on the trial judge’s conclusions that the respondent suffered and would continue to suffer from chronic debilitating pain that profoundly affected all aspects of his life. Viewed in this way, the award cannot be said to be inordinately high. The chronic pain cases cited by the trial judge support her assessment.
 I would not accede to this ground of appeal.
 An appellate court should decline to exercise its discretion to make an order to admit “new evidence”, unless that evidence would tend to falsify an assumption that the trial judge made about what was, at the time of judgment, the future: see Jens v. Jens, 2008 BCCA 392 at para. 29, citing North Vancouver (District) v. Fawcett (1998), 60 B.C.L.R. (3d) 201 (C.A.)(sub nomNorth Vancouver (District) v. Lunde).
 It is unnecessary for me to review in detail the nature of the evidence tendered on the application by the appellant and in reply by the respondent. Suffice it to say that the conclusions the appellant contended should be drawn from her proposed new evidence were clearly and persuasively refuted by the respondent in an affidavit and, in any event, did not rise to the necessary factual standard that would properly form the basis for a successful application for admission of new evidence.
The BC Public Healthcare System: Too Slow for Injured British Columbians?
British Columbia has a great public heath care system. If you are sick or injured you can see a doctor, if diagnostic tests are prescribed they are covered. If surgery is required the public health care system will take care of that as well.
As great as our system is, however, it is not without its flaws. One of the biggest shortcomings is delay. Many people involved in serious injury claims quickly come to this conclusion. If you need to see a specialist the wait can be long. Delays can be equally long for diagnostic tests and surgical intervention. Some people with means prefer not to wait and seek out private health care services instead. Where there is a need the market tends to fill it and some entrepreneurial companies have sought to fill this void and offer British Columbian’s services on a private basis.
There is a tension, however, between the Government of BC and these private health care facilities. These tensions were demonstrated in reasons for judgement released today by the BC Court of Appeal.
In today’s case (Cambie Surgeries Corporation v. British Columbia (Medical Services Commission), the Province of BC sought a Court order allowing a government inspector to access the premises of the Cambie Surgeries Corporation and to perform audits to see if violations of the Medicare Protection Act are taking place through the clinics private services.
At the trial level the BC Supreme Court ordered an injunction requiring these audits to take place. The Cambie Medical Clinic appealed arguing that provisions of the BC Medicare Protection Act are unconstitutional because they “have the effect of preventing patients from using their own resources to obtain desired medical care in a timely manner“.
 The Medicare Protection Act governs the administration of British Columbia’s Medical Services Plan (the “Plan”), the primary public health insurance scheme in the province. Most residents of B.C. are enrolled as beneficiaries and most physicians are enrolled as practitioners entitled to payment for their services under the Plan. A number of the provisions of the Act are relevant to the appeal. Rather than setting them out in the body of these reasons, I have appended the relevant portions of the statute.
 In the normal course, practitioners bill the Commission for services performed for beneficiaries, and the Commission pays the practitioners in accordance with its established payment schedules. Section 14 of the Act allows enrolled practitioners to opt out of the normal payment arrangements and to bill patients directly.
 Unless a physician has opted out or is not enrolled in the Plan, s. 17 prohibits him or her from charging a beneficiary for the provision of a service covered by the Plan. Where a physician has opted out or is not enrolled, s. 18 prohibits him or her from charging a patient more than the amount that the Plan would pay for a medical service.
 Together, ss. 17 and 18 greatly restrict the scope for medical practitioners to bill patients directly for their services. Section 18 also prohibits “extra billing” – i.e., billing a patient for an amount beyond that which the Plan pays for a service.
 The clinics admit that they have engaged in practices that would violate the statutory prohibitions against direct and extra billing if those prohibitions are constitutional. Some patients have signed “acknowledgement forms” confirming their understanding that they are being billed for amounts in excess of those provided for under the Plan.
 The clinics contend, however, that ss. 14, 17 and 18 of the Act are unconstitutional. They allege that those provisions have the effect of preventing patients from using their own resources to obtain desired medical care in a timely manner. Relying primarily on Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General),  1 S.C.R. 791, the clinics argue that the impugned provisions of the Medicare Protection Act violate the rights of patients to life, liberty, and security of the person in a manner that is not in accordance with principles of fundamental justice, contrary to s. 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. They have commenced an action seeking a declaration that the impugned provisions are unconstitutional.
It appears that this battle will continue to play out before the Courts. It will be welcome, for both patients and health care practitioners alike, to have certainty in this area of law so that British Columbians can better know what healthcare care options are available to them when they are in need of care.
If you’re injured through the fault of another and successfully sue you are entitled to be compensated for your losses and damages. However, if you ignore medical advice or otherwise fail to take reasonable steps to minimize your losses your damages may be reduced. This principle in personal injury law is called “failure to mitigate“.
The Defendant has the burden to prove that a Plaintiff failed to mitigate their damages. If the evidence does not establish that absent the alleged ‘failure‘ the injuries would have appreciably improved then no reduction in damages will be made. Today the BC Court of Appeal released reasons for judgement upholding a trial verdict addressing this.
In today’s case (Mattu v. Fust) the Plaintiff suffered reasonably serious injuries in a 2004 BC motor vehicle collision. These included symptomatic disc herniations in his back. At trial the Plaintiff succeeded and was awarded just over $170,000 for his damages. (You can click here to read my summary of the trial verdict).
 I am not prepared to assume the judge ignored the evidence, nor can I say that the evidence was so important that it required specific mention. The judge concluded the respondent was well motivated in seeking recovery from his accident injuries and that conclusion is reasonably based on the record. The judge was not, in my opinion, looking for absolute proof of a failure to mitigate. The fact of the matter is that on the civil standard the appellant failed to establish that the respondent’s less than full compliance with medical recommendations would have made any difference to his continuing disability. The respondent never took the case on mitigation beyond generalities, such as: it is always preferable to follow your doctor’s advice. The judge drew an inference from the evidence that the respondent did not fail to mitigate. On the palpable and overriding error standard, I can see no basis for interfering with her finding in this regard.
When faced with an argument from ICBC or another defendant that you ‘failed to mitigate‘ your injuries keep in mind that they need to prove this allegation with evidence. If you’re looking for more information about the law of mitigation in injury claims you can click here to access my archived posts.
After dozens of trial judgements which have applied Rule 37B (the current rule dealing with formal settlement offers which will be replaced with the almost identical Rule 9 on July 1, 2010), the BC Court of Appeal has agreed to hear what I believe will be their first case dealing with the application of this rule.
Reasons for judgement were published today on the BC Court’s Website where the BC High Court agreed to hear such an appeal. In today’s case (Gehlen v. Rana) the Plaintiff was injured in a BC motor vehicle collision. The Plaintiff sued. Prior to trial ICBC made a formal settlement offer of $22,000. The Plaintiff rejected this and proceeded to trial. At trial a jury awarded just over $13,000 in damages.
In these circumstances the trial judge had the discretion to order that the Plaintiff pay the Defendant’s trial costs. Mr. Justice Leask refused to do so and instead ordered that the Defendant pay the Plaintiff’s costs. (You can click here to read my article discussing the trial decision).
 I am satisfied that the defendant has met the test for leave to appeal on both grounds, as that test is set out in Power Consolidated (China) Pulp Inc. v. British Columbia Resources Investment Corp. (1988), 19 C.P.C. 3d 396 (B.C.C.A.) (Chambers). With respect to the merits of the appeal, I appreciate that an order for costs is a discretionary order to which an appellate court will give considerable deference. I am nevertheless satisfied that the first ground of appeal may be characterized as a question of law, and the second as an error in principle. In fact, counsel advises that leave has been granted in another appeal on the question of whether it is appropriate to adjust costs on the basis that one party chose a jury trial.
 The issue is of significance to the parties as the order under appeal entitles the plaintiff to costs in the range of $47,000, while if the defendant is successful he will recover costs in the range of $8,000.
 It is more difficult to see significance to the practice in this appeal, but I do not find that militates against granting leave. The defendant does say that this court has not had the opportunity to hear many cases that provide guidance on R. 37B and its interaction with R. 57(10).
 Finally, being an order for costs at the end of the action there is no need to consider possible delay due to the appeal.
As I recently wrote, ICBC has asked the Court of Appeal to also consider the issue of ‘costs’ awards when Plaintiff’s receive a judgement below $25,000 at a BC Supreme Court trial and these appeals may be heard together.
Clarity from the BC High Court will be welcome on numerous issues regarding the effects of formal settlement offers and costs awards after trial and I will be sure to report the highlights of the decisions when they are pronounced.
BC Court of Appeal Finds Cyclist 50% at Fault for "Cycling Between Lanes"
Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Court of Appeal addressing the issue of fault for a cyclist involved in an intersection crash.
In today’s case (MacLaren v. Kucharek) the Plaintiff cyclist was injured when he was travelling through an intersection in Surrey BC when he was struck by a left hand turning vehicle approaching from the opposite direction. At trial the driver of the vehicle was found 100% at fault. The vehicle operator appealed and the BC High Court overturned the trial judgement and found the cyclist 50% at fault.
The roadway the cyclist was travelling on had one marked lane but as it approached the intersection it “widens…(and) although unmarked as two lanes, there is sufficient room for two vehicles to travel abreast within the one marked lane.” Critical to the Court’s judgement was a finding that although unmarked, the roadway had “two de facto lanes” just prior to the intersection.
It was accepted that vehicles that drove in the right of these two defacto lanes were right turning vehicles. Vehicles that intended to drive straight through the intersection stayed in the left hand portion of the wide lane. As the cyclist approached the intersection a vehicle in front of him in his direction fo travel stopped and left a “gap in the traffic lined up behind the intersection“. The Plaintiff passed this traffic on the right and entered the intersection (basically travelling down the centre of these two defacto lanes). At the same time the Defendant made a left hand turn into the intersection resulting in collision. The Defendant testified that he never saw the cyclist prior to the crash.
…In my view it is not so much that Mr. MacLaren was passing on the right when he was struck by the appellant, but that he was riding between what were effectively two lanes of travel before entering the Laurel Drive intersection. In my view, s. 183(2)(c) (which required him to ride as near as practicable to the right side of the highway), did not authorize him to ride between two lanes of travel. For Mr. MacLaren to ride between two unmarked but commonly travelled lanes immediately prior to reaching the Laurel Drive intersection was dangerous because a northbound left-turning driver would have little opportunity to see him as he cycled alongside vehicles to his left. In my view, given the configuration of the roadway and the pattern of traffic in this case, for Mr. MacLaren to cycle alongside vehicles to his left created a danger both to himself and to the appellant.
I am of the view that the trial judge erred in failing to conclude that Mr. MacLaren, in choosing to ride in between the two travel lanes and beside the stopped pick-up rather than in the lane of travel behind it, did not take reasonable care for his own safety. His failure to take reasonable care for his own safety was one of the causes of the accident. Mr. MacLaren was therefore contributorily negligent.

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