Source: https://betterchancery.com/2017/07/
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 22:50:33+00:00

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That title up there is a quote from Samuel Goldwyn, he of Hollywood studio fame.
A lawyer recently introduced himself to me and, after telling me that he read this blog every day, said to the effect that he thought I was not always right, but he enjoyed reading it.
Well, I totally agree with him. You see, what you have here is my unvarnished opinion on whatever I choose to write about. My opinions may not always be right, but they might send you off on your own quest for something more solid.
As for what I do in court, the appellate courts may not agree with my opinion (if they care), other chancellors may not agree, and even lawyers may not agree. But in my court I’m never wrong until the COA or MSSC says I’m wrong, or until I change my mind. And I think my opinions, as do yours, and those of other lawyers and judges, have some value in themselves.
Seriously, you should regard this blog as a starting point. As one reader said, he searches here first on chancery issues and then uses what he finds to search on Westlaw. That’s in keeping with what I have said here many times: this is a starting point. Where you go from here with further research and analysis may take you in a different direction.
I am never offended when someone challenges my conclusions and judgments. That is what the law is all about. That is how the law grows and develops. That is what lawyers and judges do. Out of the controversy we hope that truth will emerge, and I think in most cases that is what happens.
Dorothy True died in 2014, at age 100. Her husband had predeceased her. She was survived by her four children: Ann Schmidt; Mary Hegwood; John True, who died after Dorothy’s death; and Jim True.
Jim filed to admit Dorothy’s eight-page holographic will to probate. Ann and Mary petitioned the chancery court to contest the will based on some formal irregularities. Following a hearing, the chancellor ruled that the will was a valid holographic will. It appears that Ann and Mary had proceeded against the executor and anyone else who had entered an appearance. But the estate of John, and some other devisees, as well as some heirs of the decedent, were not made parties. Ann and Mary appealed.
[T]he Legislature has provided that all interested persons must be made parties to the will contest. This requirement is jurisdictional. The Court has no power to proceed with a will contest, if any of the interested parties are not before the court. If the court does proceed the decree is invalid. It does not bind anyone, including those who participated in the contest. Moreover, the right to appeal on the basis of nonjoinder is not waived by the failure to plead it in the trial court.
The court cannot properly entertain a contest of the will without having before it all the parties interested in such contest. It was error to proceed without having them before the court. “There ought to be only one contest of the will, and, if the parties are not before the court when the will is being contested, of course their rights could not be affected by such contest.” This Court has consistently followed that interpretation in other cases.
[S]uch parties were necessary, indispensable parties to the contest of the will. The court was without power to proceed without them.
In Moore this Court held that a chancery court did not have the authority to hear a will contest until “all persons interested” were made parties.
Moore remains good law insofar as it holds trial proceedings must be held in abeyance until all necessary parties are joined in a suit contesting a will. Garrett v. Bohannon, 621 So. 2d 935, 937-38 (Miss. 1993) (internal citations omitted). The Court held that a judgment entered in a will contest “absent joinder of all necessary parties is void” and “must be set aside.” Id. at 938. In both Garrett and Moore, supra, the Supreme Court made it absolutely clear that although a failure to join a necessary party may be waived in some types of cases, it cannot be waived in a will contest; it may be raised for the first time on appeal, even by a party who participated below and failed to join the missing parties. See id. at 937-38; Moore, 247 Miss. at 787-88; 157 So. 2d at 861-63.
¶8. Returning to the present case, it is evident that we must reverse and set aside the judgment below because all necessary parties were not joined. John’s estate and Jamie are entitled to inherit under the contested will but were not joined. John’s estate and Frances’s two daughters were entitled to inherit under the law of intestate succession but were not joined. All were interested parties within the meaning of section 91-7-25 and Supreme Court precedent.
¶9. On appeal, Jim argues that his sisters waived this issue, that the missing parties’ interests were adequately represented, and that their joinder would not have made the slightest difference. [Fn omitted] We are sympathetic to these arguments. However, our Supreme Court has held specifically and repeatedly that the statutory requirement cannot be waived because it is both mandatory and jurisdictional. Its decisions do not reflect careless or imprecise use of the term “jurisdictional.” [Fn omitted] Rather, the point has been made and reaffirmed with deliberation and clarity over the course of many years. As such, any relaxation of or exception to this requirement must come from the Supreme Court or the Legislature.
¶10. Accordingly, the judgment rendered by the chancellor absent joinder of all interested parties is void and must be set aside. The case is remanded for joinder of all interested parties pursuant to the statutory mandate. Garrett, 621 So. 2d at 938.
So, who were the unjoined interested parties who were necessary to jurisdiction in this case? Note at ¶8 that the COA finds both the unjoined devisees and the unjoined heirs as necessary for jurisdiction. That’s because if the will is set aside, the heirs would stand to inherit.
This one is on the lawyers. It’s not the judge’s job to investigate and inquire about who should be made parties in a case such as this.
In 2007, Annie and Frederick Griffin got into a dispute with the mortgage carrier, ABN, over modified terms, and stopped paying. They then sued in federal court alleging fraud and violation of other federal laws on debt collection. ABN filed a motion to compel arbitration, but the matter returned to federal court in 2010 after the arbitrator no longer handled consumer cases. The Griffins filed a motion to declare the arbitration agreement unenforceable, and in response ABN withdrew the arbitration request, no doubt to move the case along. The court granted ABN’s motion.
In January, 2014, the Griffins filed another complaint in chancery court raising the same legal claims and issues as in the federal suit, and based on the same set of facts. There ensued a removal to and remand from federal court, a recusal, and finally a dismissal in chancery on the ground of res judicata. The Griffins appealed pro se.
¶7. “The appropriateness of application of the doctrine of res judicata is a question of law” and will therefore be reviewed de novo. Swaney v. Swaney, 962 So. 2d 105, 108 (¶11) (Miss. Ct. App. 2007).
¶8. We agree with the chancellor that Griffin II [the chancery matter filed after the federal court dismissal] is properly barred under the doctrine of res judicata. The doctrine of res judicata has four identities: (1) identity of the subject matter of the action; (2) identity of the cause of action; (3) identity of the parties to the cause of action; and (4) identity of the quality or character of a person against whom the claim is made. Harrison v. Chandler-Sampson Ins., 891 So. 2d 224, 232 (¶24) (Miss. 2005).
¶9. All four identities are met in the case at hand. The factual allegations in the complaint of Griffin II were copied almost verbatim from the complaint of Griffin I, and with the exception of dropping a couple of claims (the FDCPA and TILA claims), the complaint reasserts the same claims of fraud. All parties present in Griffin I were also present in Griffin II.
¶10. In addition to those four identities, to qualify as res judicata the prior judgment must have been a final judgment on the merits. Anderson v. LaVere, 895 So. 2d 828, 833 (¶10) (Miss. 2004). Under both Mississippi and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b), dismissal for failure to prosecute operates as a final judgment and dismissal is with prejudice. An exception is found in Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 41(d), which provides that where dismissal is made by the clerk following twelve months of docket inactivity, that dismissal is without prejudice. See Strickland v. Estate of Broome, 179 So. 3d 1088, 1094 (¶18) (Miss. 2015). But the case at hand does not fall under Rule 41(d), but rather falls under Rule 41(b). Prior to dismissal, the Griffins were put on notice by the district judge that the case would be dismissed for failure to prosecute if the litigation did not move forward in a meaningful way. The Griffins responded by shifting their legal position in order to avoid trying the merits of the case. The district court’s dismissal of the action was not only appropriate for failure to prosecute, but was also consistent with the Griffins’ new argument that the case should not be tried in court at all but rather arbitrated.
The court went on to address and reject some other issues raised by the Griffins.
Res judicata is all about identity of issues, facts, and parties. It matters not that the original, dismissed proceeding was in another state or federal court.
Res judicata requires a final judgment on the merits in the dismissed action, and the COA found here that the federal court’s dismissal order was a final judgment on the merits per R41(b), and not a dismissal per R41(d).
Shifting your legal position is a pretty effective way to frustrate your judge. My term for it is game-playing. Courts are for serious business, not for toying with others, delaying, pettifogging, and caviling. That’s the kind of conduct that will get your case thrown out of court. The Griffins’ lawyer was wise to withdraw before he became identified with their tactics and his own credibility with the court took a hit.
Police investigations and reports not infrequently play an evidentiary role in divorce and modification trials in chancery court.
A recent example is Heimert v. Heimert, handed down by the COA on November 13, 2012. In this case, Sheri and Walter Heimert had a history of physical altercations involving allegations of biting, strangling, hitting, and on and on, with the physical marks to show for it. The police were called multiple times to intervene, and two police reports, one from August, 2007, and the other from December, 2008, were offered into evidence. The December report showed that Sheri was charged with domestic violence. Her attorney objected that there was an inadequate foundation to admit it, but the chancellor let it in anyway, and Sheri complained on appeal that the report should not have been admitted.
Records, reports, statements, or data compilations, in any form, of public offices or agencies, setting forth . . . (C) in civil actions and proceedings and against the state in criminal cases, factual findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority granted by law, unless the sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness.
¶17. The police report was taken after an investigation of domestic violence reported by Sheri. No assertion has been made that the document lacks trustworthiness. Sheri argues the police report was inadmissible because it was not authenticated. However, a document may be authenticated by the testimony of a witness with knowledge “that a matter is what it is claimed to be.” M.R.E. 901(b)(1). Sheri was a knowledgeable witness, and she submitted the police report as part of discovery. Sheri testified she was familiar with the document; thus, Sheri’s testimony was sufficient to show that the document was “what it [was] claimed to be” – the police report from December 5, 2008. See Cassibry v. Schlautman, 816 So. 2d 398, 403-04 (¶¶20-23) (Miss. Ct. App. 2001) (finding medical records submitted by plaintiff in discovery were authenticated by plaintiff’s own testimony).
¶18. Further, Sheri testified consistently with the information in the police report, and Walter testified consistently with his version of events in the police report. Thus, even if the police report was admitted into evidence erroneously, the admission was harmless, as it was cumulative. Id. at 404 (¶24) (holding admission of hearsay may be held harmless where corroborating evidence exists). Sheri complains she was prejudiced by the report because it only contained information provided by Walter. However, this is not the case. The report clearly contains information gathered from both Walter and Sheri.
¶19. Sheri was familiar with the police report, and she submitted it as part of discovery. Further, the contents of the police report were corroborated by the testimony. We find the police report was properly admitted into evidence. This issue is without merit.
In other words, Sheri was hoist with her own petard. She herself corroborated the facts in the report in her testimony, and she herself had sifted the poison pill into the recipe by providing it in discovery, thus weakening her arguments against authenticity and trustworthiness.
The easier you make it for the judge to rule in your favor, the more likely it is that she will. That’s a thought I have expressed here many times.
When it comes to equitable distribution, think about how it’s usually done. On day one at 9:46, you ask your client about the living room furniture: its value, age, condition, whether it’s marital or not. Then, at 10:18, you return to the assets after a foray into some HCIT testimony. Ten minutes is devoted to an IRA and the couple’s vehicles. Then some custody testimony. At 11:38, you start questioning about a PERS account. Lunch break. After lunch, more PERS followed by a venture into more HCIT. At 2:09, more testimony about the furniture. Then back to HCIT. Day two is pretty much the same. After everyone has rested, the judge then has to dig through notes to ferret out the evidence on assets so as to make a ruling on equitable distribution. Don’t be surprised if the judge misses something. Oh, and if you happen to interrupt her while she is working on that opinion, don’t be surprised if she is in a foul humor.
Before you go to trial, why not make an asset table? It should have six columns: (1) a number assigned serially to each item to facilitate questioning; (2) a description of the asset (e.g., “Red couch – Living room” or “Apache Industries 401(k) account no. AFP0875-401-CX” or “2015 blue Ford F-150 pickup”; (3) Designation as marital or non-marital; (4) fair market value; (5) Debt associated with the item; (6) Whether Husband (H) or Wife should receive the item. Some people use a spreadsheet to do this; others use a table in a word processing program. When you come up with a template for it, you can use it time and again.
Once you have had the asset list properly identified and introduced, you can question your client from the table. It eases the work of the chancellor considerably, and will go a long way toward giving the judge the impression that you know what you’re doing.
In this district, we require counsel for both parties to come up with a consolidated asset table. You can’t get a trial date in my court until you do, when equitable distribution or alimony is an issue. This requires the parties to agree to what the assets are, but they can disagree as to values, whether the asset is marital or not, and who should receive the item. The obvious virtue of this approach is that the judge does not have to figure out whether the wife’s testimony about the “green chair” was referring to the “chair in the living room” testified to by husband.
We have had few problems getting counsel to cooperate to come up with the list. When a client drag his feet, the judge’s suggestion that he will simply use the more diligent party’s list usually gets cooperation.
Don’t forget to provide your asset list in discovery if that information is requested. You don’t want to be stopped at trial by failure to provide it in discovery.
Remember, too, that although a client may give his or her opinion as to values, some values are best proven otherwise. A residence, for example, should have an appraisal, unless the parties agree to the value. The value of financial assets should reflect the most recent statements. If you want the judge’s ruling to be as accurate as possible, you should provide as accurate as possible information.
The asset table may be appended to an 8.05, or it may be referenced in the appropriate place in the financial statement.
This may seem like extra work, but you will be gratified at how much easier it makes your trial work, and how much clearer and effective your case for equitable distribution will be.
In 2015, Ronnie and Amy Ali were divorced in an acrimonious proceeding that featured over 200 docket entries. Amy was granted the divorce on HCIT, and was awarded custody, child support, equitable distribution, alimony, and attorney’s fees. To secure the financial award, the chancellor ordered Ronnie to maintain a $2 million life insurance policy. Ronnie appealed on several issues, including the life insurance.
¶22. The chancellor ordered Ronnie to maintain a life insurance policy valued at $2 million, with Amy to receive $1.5 million and the minor daughter to receive $500,000 in the event of Ronnie’s death. On appeal, Ronnie argues that the policy amounts required for Amy are excessive in light of the permissible purposes of such awards. We agree.
Periodic alimony is an obligation that “terminates automatically” upon the payor’s death and cannot be imposed upon the payor’s estate, absent an express agreement. Armstrong [v. Armstrong, 618 So. 2d 1278, 1281 (Miss. 1993)]; see In re Hodges, 807 So. 2d at 443 (¶19). While lump-sum alimony fully vests at the time of the divorce judgment, periodic alimony only vests on the date each payment becomes due. In re Hodges, 807 So. 2d at 442 (¶17). So when the payor dies, the only alimony obligations that survive—and the only obligations that may be insured—are unpaid lump-sum alimony and unpaid periodic-alimony payments that have already vested.
Recognizing the possibility that an alimony payor may fall behind in periodic-alimony payments and then die leaving those vested payments unsatisfied, this court has acknowledged the chancellor’s authority to require the alimony payor to maintain a life-insurance policy to protect the recipient spouse against such a contingency. [Johnson v. Pogue, 716 So. 2d 1123, 1134 (¶41) (Miss. Ct. App. 1998)]; see also Beezley v. Beezley, 917 So. 2d 803, 808 (¶17) (Miss. Ct. App. 2005). But in Pogue, this court found that requiring the payor to maintain a $75,000 life-insurance policy to protect against the potential failure to make $500-per-month alimony payments was “excessive.” Pogue, 716 So. 2d at 1134 (¶41).
¶24. Given the standard we have just recited, it is impossible to say that a life insurance policy of $1.5 million is necessary to guard against the potential failure to make $5,500 monthly alimony payments and to repay approximately $376,500 in marital debt. On remand, the chancery court should determine an appropriate award in light of the authorities we have just discussed.
I posted about Coggins at this link.
I think most attorneys have thought about life insurance as a replacement for future years of alimony that will not be paid in the event of the payer’s untimely death. Coggins, however, makes it clear that what is insured is any unpaid arrearage existing at the time of death, since periodic alimony payments cease at the death of the payer.
Does the same rule apply to child support? In the absence of an agreement to the contrary, the child support obligation ceases at the death of the payer, and the estate of the decedent is not liable for future support. It would appear, then, that child support would be subject to the same considerations as alimony.
One failing of most attorneys is to offer any proof of the cost of life insurance. I refuse to award it without some testimony of the projected cost.
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