Source: http://academy.lawofselfdefense.com/law_case/people-v-garcia-2016-cal-app-unpub-lexis-9326-ca-ct-app-2016/
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 04:33:43+00:00

Document:
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. LUIS ERASMO GARCIA, Defendant and Appellant.
Counsel: Alan Siraco, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Colleen M. Tiedemann and Michael C. Keller, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
HOFFSTADT, J.; ASHMANN-GERST, Acting P. J., GOODMAN, J. concurred.
A jury convicted Luis Erasmo Garcia (defendant) of three counts of first degree, premeditated murder and one count of attempted premeditated murder after he shot and killed three rival gang members and shot and injured a friend’s cousin at a streetside car show. On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court should have instructed the jury on the concepts of perfect and imperfect self-defense/defense of others, that the trial court should not have instructed the jury on a “kill zone” theory, and that there was insufficient evidence that the shootings were premeditated. We conclude there was no individual or cumulative error, and affirm.
On a night in August 2008, approximately 300 to 500 people gathered for an impromptu car show at the intersection of Western Avenue and Imperial Highway in South Los Angeles. Three members of the “South Los” street gang showed up, loudly proclaiming their gang affiliation and boisterously criticizing the multi-racial make-up of the crowd. Soon thereafter, someone fired a hail of four to eight bullets at the compact area where all three of the South Los gang members were standing next to one another. Some of the bullets struck and killed all three South Los gang members, and one bullet stuck Jose Garcia (Jose) in the chest but did not kill him.
The People charged defendant with the first degree, premeditated murders of the three South Los gang members (Penal Code, § 187, subd. (a)), and with the attempted premeditated murder of Jose (§§ 187, subd. (a) & 664). The People further alleged that defendant personally discharged a firearm (§ 12202.53, subd. (d)) and committed the crimes at the direction of, for the benefit of, or in association with a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C)).
The trial court instructed the jury on first and second degree murder, and, as to the attempted murder count, on “kill zone” liability. The jury convicted defendant of three counts of first degree, premeditated murder and of attempted premeditated murder; it also found true the firearm and gang allegations.
For each first degree murder, the trial court imposed a prison sentence of life without the possibility of parole to be followed by 25 years for the firearm enhancement. The court imposed each sentence consecutively. The court also imposed a further, consecutive life sentence plus 25 years for the attempted premeditated murder count.
Although Jose flatly denied—and another witness confirmed—that Jose never had any altercation with the three South Los gang members, and although Jose’s cousin had not mentioned being involved in a fistfight during his prior police interview or during his preliminary hearing testimony, Jose’s cousin testified at trial that (1) he saw one of the three South Los members push Jose, (2) he rushed over to “defend” Jose, (3) he swung at one of the three South Los members who had swung at him but missed, but ended up only “tapp[ing]” him on the chin. The cousin also testified that the guy he “tapped” had a bottle in his hand, but had set it on the ground to take off his shirt at the time the gunshots were fired. The medical examiner testified that one of the three South Los members had an abrasion on his chin (as well as other places) that could have been caused by his fall to the ground or by a fight. The cousin also stated he had been friends with defendant for two to 12 months prior to the shooting.
There is a further, independent reason why the trial court properly declined to instruct on perfect self-defense/defense of others. A defendant’s belief is reasonable—and perfect self-defense/defense of others is available—only if “lethal force is necessary to prevent death or great bodily injury.” (People v. Uriarte (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 192, 197.) A defendant cannot invoke perfect self-defense/defense of others if he is the one who escalates a confrontation from one involving non-lethal force to one involving lethal force. (People v. Clark (1982) 130 Cal.App.3d 371, 380 [“deadly force or force likely to cause great bodily injury may be used only to repel an attack which is in itself deadly or likely to cause great bodily injury”]; CALJIC No. 5.31 [“[a]n assault with the fists does not justify the person being assaulted in using a deadly weapon in self-defense unless that person believes and a reasonable person in the same or similar circumstances would believe that the assault is likely to inflict great bodily injury”].) Here, the South Los members and Jose’s cousin were engaged in a fistfight, and the South Los member who was “armed” with a bottle put it down to fight the cousin; defendant’s immediate resort to the lethal force of a gun therefore forecloses the availability of perfect self-defense/defense of others.
Defendant raises three sets of arguments in response. First, he asserts that a defendant is not required to take the stand at trial in order to establish the existence of his actual, subjective belief in the need to use deadly force to defend others. Defendant is right. (E.g., People v. De Leon (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 815, 824.) But with or without a defendant’s testimony, there still “must be evidence from which the jury could find that [defendant] actually had such a belief.” (People v. Viramontes (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 1256, 1262.) Here, for the reasons explained above, there is no evidence that defendant knew Jose and his cousin were in a fistfight and thus no evidence that defendant subjectively believed he needed to defend them.
Second, defendant contends that the timing of the shooting (that is, not immediately upon the arrival of the three South Los members at the car show) as well as defendant’s decision to be parsimonious with his bullets (that is, shooting only four to eight) shows that he was only trying to stop a fight; further, he argues, his gang rivalry with South Los does not preclude a finding that he acted to defend Jose and Jose’s cousin. Significantly, these arguments do not cure the evidentiary deficiency outlined above. Moreover, there was no evidence as to when defendant first became aware of the three South Los members vis-à-vis when he opened fire. Additionally, the fact that defendant shot one of the South Los members in the back and shot another in the head at point-blank range refutes defendant’s contention that he was merely aiming to stop the fight rather than to kill.
Lastly, defendant argues any inconsistency between his “it wasn’t me” defense at trial and “it was me, but I acted to defend others” on appeal is not a reason to deny him these instructions. We need not address this argument because, as explained above, he did not adduce substantial evidence to support an instruction on perfect or imperfect self-defense/defense of others.
Defendant responds with two arguments. First, he argues that a “kill zone” can only exist in an enclosed area (such as a structure or a car), and not in an open area such as a crowd. Falaniko refutes this argument.
Defendant is a member of the Gardena 13 street gang. One of Gardena 13’s rivals is the South Los gang. Defendant “usually” carries a nine-millimeter handgun on his person. On the night of the shootings, Jose’s cousin saw defendant with a nine-millimeter handgun, and casings from a nine-millimeter handgun were recovered from the scene of the shooting. Defendant may have walked back to his car to retrieve the gun prior to the shooting. One of the South Los members died from a gunshot wound to the chest; another had two gunshot wounds, including one in his back; and the third died from a gunshot wound to the head from point-blank range.
Defendant makes four arguments to the contrary. First, he argues that there was no evidence that he was looking for trouble. But a long-gestating plan to kill is not required. (See People v. Memro (1995) 11 Cal.4th 786, 863 [“‘”[t]houghts may follow each other with great rapidity and cold, calculated judgment may be arrived at quickly”‘”].) Second, defendant contends that Jose and his cousin dispute that defendant went to his car to retrieve his gun. This is of no concern because we disregard conflicting evidence when evaluating its substantiality (People v. Hernandez (2000) 22 Cal.4th 512, 526), and because, as noted above, defendant’s act in carrying a loaded firearm with him on his person is also evidence of planning. Third, defendant asserts that firing a gun at close range is not evidence of prior planning and cites People v. Ratliff (1986) 41 Cal.3d 675, 695. The issue in Ratliff, however, was whether firing a gun at close range established a defendant’s intent to kill, not whether the killing in that case was premeditated (id. at pp. 695-696); Ratliff ‘s analysis is accordingly unhelpful. Lastly, defendant suggests that the fact he shot Jose indicates that the killing was unplanned. But it just as likely suggests that he was a bad shot or that he did not care whom he shot or killed in the course of killing the three South Los members. Because we draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the verdict (People v. Wong (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1433, 1444), we need not—and, indeed, cannot—draw the inference defendant requests.
*. Retired judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
1. Because defendant and Jose Garcia share the same last name, we use Jose’s first name for clarity. We mean no disrespect. We also note that the two men are unrelated.
2. All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
3. Retired judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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