Source: https://dc.fd.org/motions/appeals/arrest/royster.htm
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 06:54:31+00:00

Document:
The parties below and on this appeal are the Defendant-Appellant, xxxxxxx xxxxxxx, and the Plaintiff-Appellee, the United States of America. There are no amici.
This is an appeal from the judgment of the district court (The Honorable Stanley Sporkin), dated April 16, 1993, adjudging appellant guilty upon a conditional guilty plea to the charge of possession with intent to distribute five grams or more of cocaine base. (App. 071) In this appeal, appellant seeks review of the district court's ruling, dated January 27, 1993, denying Mr. xxxxxxx's motion to suppress evidence (App. 067). That ruling is not reported.
There are no related cases and this case has not previously been before this court.
* Authorities principally relied upon are marked with an asterisk.
Pursuant to Rule 28(f) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and Circuit Rule 28(a)(5), pertinent statutes and rules are set forth in the addendum to this brief.
1.WHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE, WHERE THE POLICE ARRESTED THE APPELLANT AFTER WITNESSING THE TRANSFER OF AN UNKNOWN WHITE OBJECT FOR AN UNKNOWN AMOUNT OF CURRENCY?
Appellant, xxxxxxx B. xxxxxxx, was charged in a two- count indictment with unlawful possession with intent to distribute five grams or more of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(B)(iii), and, unlawful possession with intent to distribute cocaine base within 1000 feet of a school, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §860(a). (App. 006) On January 25, 1993, the Honorable Stanley Sporkin, United States District Court Judge, denied Mr. xxxxxxx's motion to suppress physical evidence and statements. Upon the denial of his motion to suppress, Mr. xxxxxxx entered a conditional guilty plea to count one of the indictment, pursuant to Rule 11(a)(2), of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, reserving his right to appeal the district court's denial of his motion. On April 14, 1993, Judge Sporkin sentenced Mr. xxxxxxx to 71 months' imprisonment, four years of supervised release, and a $50.00 special assessment. xxxxxxx xxxxxxx appeals the denial of his motion to suppress.
The Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and seizures precludes the arrest and search of a citizen without warrant. One of the exceptions to this constitutional protection is where the officer's actions are based upon probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed. In this case, the district court erred in concluding that an otherwise casual contact between two citizens involving the exchange of an unknown item for currency, without more, amounted to probable cause to arrest and search the participants.
The district court's decision that the arrest and search did not violate the Fourth Amendment is reviewed de novo, however, its findings to support its decision are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. United States v. Patrick, 959 F.2d 991 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
[t]he point of the Fourth Amendment . . . is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.
Thus, the warrant requirement acts as a "checkpoint between the Government and the citizen," Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 212 (1981), to correctly weigh the strength of the information offered in support of the police action against the person's liberty interest. Id. at 212.
In the present case, the police arrested and searched Mr. xxxxxxx without a warrant. Without that neutral, detached determination that he had committed an offense, the police action against Mr. xxxxxxx was per se unreasonable and the government bears the burden of establishing that one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement applies. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455 (1971); United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951).
One of the exceptions to the warrant requirement permits the police to make warrantless arrests where there is probable cause to believe that the person is involved in the commission of a crime. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976); Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1958). As has been stated many times in many ways, "[p]robable cause exists where `the facts and circumstances within their [the officers'] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that' an offense has been or is being committed." Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-176 (1949) (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)). "Mere suspicion however is not sufficient; the standard the government must satisfy is that of probable cause." United States v. Jenkins, 530 F. Supp. 8, 10 (D.D.C. 1981).
While "a sequence of events which is typical of a common form of narcotics transaction may create a suspicion in a police officer's mind," United States v. Green, 670 F.2d 1148, 1151 (D.C. Cir. 1981), it does not always rise above the level of suspicion and permit the officer to arrest without a warrant. Id. at 1151. Although, [t]his Court has never held that the observance of a suspicious transaction, without more, provides probable cause for arrest," id. at 1151, it has on several occasions permitted the warrantless arrests of individuals when the officers reasonably concluded that they had observed drug transactions. In United States v. Harley, 990 F.2d 1340 (D.C. Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 236 (1993), this Court upheld the warrantless arrest of the defendant after the officers had observed the passenger in his car, on three separate occasions in a high drug area, hand an object to an individual in exchange for money prior to getting into the defendant's car. In United States v. Lucas, 778 F.2d 885 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (per curiam), the Court upheld the warrantless arrest of the defendant which was based upon three separate transactions under circumstances which corroborated the anonymous tip that had been received by the officer. In United States v. White, 655 F.2d 1302 (D.C. Cir. 1981), the Court upheld the warrantless arrest of the defendant after he had been observed, in a high drug area, having contact with a car that had been previously visited by numerous known drug addicts. See also United States v. Green, 670 F.2d 1148 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (probable cause for arrest existed based upon combination of factors involving sequence of events typical of sophisticated two-party narcotics transaction in a neighborhood "notorious" for trafficking, concealment of object of transaction and appearance of evasion by defendant); United States v. Davis, 561 F.2d 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (probable cause existed where officers observed three transactions involving pink tablets in five minute period of time); United States v. Davis, 458 F.2d 819 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (per curiam) (probable cause for arrest where the defendant involved in a transaction and in company of individuals obviously under the influence of drugs).
more, albeit suspicious in character, did not amount to probable cause.
As all of the evidence against Mr. xxxxxxx was obtained as a result of the illegal police conduct, it is respectfully requested that his conviction be reversed.
xxxxxxx xxxxxxx, does not exceed the number of words permitted Rule 28(d) of the General Rules of this Court.
I hereby certify that two copies of the foregoing Brief of the Appellant and one copy of the accompanying Appendix was served by first class mail, postage prepaid, upon the Office of the United States Attorney, Appellate Division, 555 Fourth Street, N.W., Washington, DC 20001, this 15th day of July, 1994.
DOCKET ENTRIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
INDICTMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
TRANSCRIPT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
DISTRICT COURT'S OPINION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
JUDGMENT AND COMMITMENT ORDER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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