Source: https://www.ptab.us/2011/08/
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 08:45:04+00:00

Document:
Cf. In re Basell Poliolefine Italia S.P.A., 547 F.3d 1371, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (the disclosure of a copending application may be used to learn the meaning of claims and to interpret the coverage of a claim).
In Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals, 339 F. 3d 1373, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2003), the Court distinguished cases dealing with “accidental, unwitting, and unappreciated” anticipation, Eibel Process Co. v. Minn. & Ontario Paper Co., 261 U.S. 45 (1923) and Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707 (1880), where the record did not conclusively establish that the prior art produced the claimed subject matter, from cases in which the record established that the claimed subject matter necessarily and inevitably was a consequence of practicing a prior art process under the normal, as opposed to hypothetical or unusual, conditions disclosed.
See the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP) § 2111.04 citing Hoffer v. Microsoft Corp., 405 F.3d 1326, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (When a “‘whereby’ clause states a condition that is material to patentability, it cannot be ignored in order to change the substance of the invention.”).
The analysis required by § 103 has been characterized as “casting the mind back to the time of invention, to consider the thinking of one of ordinary skill in the art, guided only by the prior art references and the then-accepted wisdom in the field.” In re Dembiczak, 175 F.3d 994, 999 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (emphasis added). For this reason, obviousness has been likened to “the creature of an imagination projected upon the future out of materials of the past.” Schaefer, Inc. v. Mohawk Cabinet Co., 276 F.2d 204, 207 (2d Cir. 1960)(Learned Hand, J.). A determination of obviousness is based only on knowledge available at the time the claimed invention was made.
Such a recitation of an act that may occur in the future does not positively recite a structural relationship between the battery and the substrate. See In re Collier, 397 F.2d 1003, 1005 (CCPA 1968).
Callaway Golf Co. v. Acushnet Co., 576 F.3d 1331, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (holding jury verdict inconsistent for holding only the dependent claim to have been obvious); In re Muchmore, 433 F.2d 824, 824-25 (CCPA 1970) ("Since we agree with the board's conclusion of obviousness as to these narrow claims, the broader claims must likewise be obvious.").
Evidence of classification of prior art in different categories by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office “is inherently weak . . . because considerations in forming a classification system differ from those relating to a person of ordinary skill seeking solution for a particular problem.” In re Mlot-Fijalkowski, 676 F.2d 666, 670 n.5 (CCPA 1982).
“[O]ne cannot show non-obviousness by attacking references individually where . . . the rejections are based on combinations of references.” In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 426 (CCPA 1981). “The test for obviousness is not whether the features of a secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary reference . . . . Rather, the test is what the combined teachings of the references would have suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art.” Id. at 425.
See Specialty Composites v. Cabot Corp., 845 F.2d 981, 991 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“If the invention here would not have been obvious to one of extraordinary skill, it follows that in this case it would not be obvious to one with lesser skills.”).
A patent examiner evaluating the patentability of a claimed invention must take care when assessing the teachings of the prior art to refrain from impermissible reliance on hindsight using the inventor’s own disclosure in concluding obviousness. In re Fritch, 972 F.2d 1260, 1266 (Fed. Cir. 1992). The record must show that a skilled artisan confronted by the problems faced by the inventor and with no knowledge of the claimed invention would have selected the various elements of the prior art and combined them in the manner claimed. Princeton Biochemicals, Inc. v. Beckman Coulter, Inc., 411 F.3d 1332, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
As explained by the Gechter court (supra), vacatur is appropriate when the decision under review “lacks adequate fact findings [and] meaningful review is not possible.” Gechter, 116 F.3d at 1457. The federal circuit courts of appeal vacate trial court decisions “[w]hen an appellate court discerns that a district court has failed to make a finding because of an erroneous view of the law.” Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 291 (1982). See 9 Moore’s Federal Practice § 52.12 (3d ed., Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. 1997) (“When the trial court completely fails . . . to make findings on a material issue, the appellate court is entitled to vacate the judgment and remand the action to the district court . . . .” (footnotes omitted)).

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