Source: https://en.m.wikisource.org/wiki/Younger_v._Harris/Dissent_Douglas
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 17:04:46+00:00

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The fact that we are in a period of history when enormous extrajudicial sanctions are imposed on those who assert their First Amendment rights in unpopular causes emphasizes the wisdom of Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479. There, we recognized that, in times of repression, when interests with powerful spokesmen generate symbolic pogroms against nonconformists, the federal judiciary, charged by Congress with special vigilance for protection of civil rights, has special responsibilities to prevent an erosion of the individual's constitutional rights.
Dombrowski represents an exception to the general rule that federal courts should not interfere with state criminal prosecutions. The exception does not arise merely because prosecutions are threatened to which the First Amendment will be the proffered defense. Dombrowski governs statutes which are a blunderbuss by [p59] themselves or when used en masse — those that have an "overbroad" sweep.
If the rule were otherwise, the contours of regulation would have to be hammered out case by case — and tested only by those hardy enough to risk criminal prosecution to determine the proper scope of regulation.
Id. at 487. It was in the context of overbroad state statutes that we spoke of the "chilling effect upon the exercise of First Amendment rights" caused by state prosecutions. Ibid.
As respects overbroad statutes, we said at least as early as 1940 that, when dealing with First Amendment rights, we would insist on statutes "narrowly drawn to prevent the supposed evil." Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 307.
Equity jurisdiction will be exercised to enjoin the threatened enforcement of a state law which contravenes the Federal Constitution wherever it is essential in order effectually to protect property rights and the rights of persons against injuries otherwise irremediable; and, in such a case, a person, who as an officer of the State is clothed with the duty of enforcing its laws, and who threatens and is about to commence proceedings, either civil or criminal, to enforce such a law against parties affected may be enjoined from such action by a federal court of equity.
In Younger, "criminal syndicalism" is defined so broadly as to jeopardize "teaching" that socialism is preferable to free enterprise.
If the "advocacy" which Harris used was an attempt at persuasion through the use of bullets, bombs, and arson, we would have a different case. But Harris is charged only with distributing leaflets advocating political action toward his objective. He tried unsuccessfully to have the state court dismiss the indictment on constitutional grounds. He resorted to the state appellate court for writs of prohibition to prevent the trial, but to no avail. He went to the federal court as a matter of last resort in an effort to keep this unconstitutional trial from being saddled on him.
Whatever the balance of the pressures of localism and nationalism prior to the Civil War, they were fundamentally altered by the war. The Civil War Amendments made civil rights a national concern. Those Amendments, especially § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, cemented the change in American federalism brought on by the war. Congress immediately commenced to use its new powers to pass legislation. Just as the first Judiciary Act, 1 Stat. 73, and the "anti-injunction" statute represented the early views of American federalism, the Reconstruction statutes, including the enlargement of federal jurisdiction,  represent a later view of American federalism.
This revolution, in turn, represents a historical judgment. It emphasizes the overwhelming concern of the Reconstruction Congresses for the protection of the newly won rights of freedmen. By interposing the federal government between the states and their inhabitants, these Congresses sought to avoid the risk of nullification of these rights by the states. With the subsequent passage of the Act of 1871, Congress sought to implement this plan by expanding the federal judicial power. Section 1983 is, therefore, not only an expression of the importance of protecting federal rights from infringement by the states, but also, where necessary, the desire to place the national government between the state and its citizens.
It . . makes criminal threats such as the following: (1) threats by dissentient groups to engage in disorderly conduct, threats by residents of a high-crime neighborhood to carry concealed weapons for their own protection, and threats by mothers to block a dangerous state highway to demonstrate the need for increased safety measures. Indeed, the phrase "commit any criminal offense" is so broad as to include threats to commit misdemeanors punishable by fine only. These evils are not so substantial that the state's interest in prohibiting the threat of them outweighs the public interest in giving legitimate political discussion a wide berth.
Landry and others brought a class action challenging the constitutional validity of five sections of the Illinois statutes. They alleged arrests under all but two of the challenged sections. Just before trial, they abandoned their challenge of two of the five sections. The District Court held one of the remaining sections constitutional, and the "mob action" and "intimidation" sections unconstitutional. Appellants have not appealed the determination that the "mob action" section of the Illinois statutes is unconstitutional.
There is nothing contained in the allegations of the complaint from which one could infer that any one or more of the citizens who brought this suit is in any jeopardy of suffering irreparable injury if the State is left free to prosecute under the intimidation statute in the normal manner.
As the standards of certainty in statutes containing criminal sanctions are higher than those in statutes containing civil sanctions, so are the standards of certainty touching on freedom of expression higher than those in other areas. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 515-516.
There must be ascertainable standards of guilt. Men of common intelligence cannot be required to guess at the meaning of the enactment. The vagueness may be from uncertainty in regard to persons within the scope of the act . . . or in regard to the applicable tests to ascertain guilt.
Where freedom of expression is at stake, these requirements must be more sedulously enforced.
In Younger, there is a prosecution under an unconstitutional statute, and relief is denied. In Boyle, there is harassment, but, as yet, no prosecution. Allegations of a prosecution or harassment under facially unconstitutional statutes should be sufficient for the exercise of federal equity powers.
Dombrowski and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 indicate why, in Boyle, federal intervention against enforcement of the state laws is appropriate. The case of Younger is even stronger. There, the state statute challenged is the prototype of the one we held unconstitutional in Brandenburg v. Ohio, supra.
The eternal temptation, of course, has been to arrest the speaker, rather than to correct the conditions about which he complains. I see no reason why these appellees should be made to walk the treacherous ground of these statutes. They, like other citizens, need the umbrella of the First Amendment as they study, analyze, discuss, and debate the troubles of these days. When criminal prosecutions can be leveled against them because they express unpopular views, the society of the dialogue is in danger.
^ . See Linde, "Clear and Present Danger" Reexamined: Dissonance in the Brandenburg Concerto, 22 Stan.L.Rev. 1163 (1970).
A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.
The writ of injunction shall not be granted by any court of the United States to stay proceedings in any court of a State, except in cases where such injunction may be authorized by any law relating to proceedings in bankruptcy.
In Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118, 133-134, in discussing the statutory exceptions to the "anti-injunction" Act, we noted that, while only bankruptcy was the explicit exception, there were others. (1) The "Removal Acts qualify pro tanto the Act of 1793." (2) The Act of 1851 limiting shipowners' liability "[b]eing a "subsequent statute" to the Act of 1793 . . . , operates as an implied legislative amendment to it." We also added (3) the Interpleader Act of 1926 and (4) the Frazier-Lemke Act, 47 Stat. 1473. Toucey limited a line of cases dealing with nonstatutory exceptions to the "anti-injunction" Act. Shortly thereafter, the current language of § 2283 was written into the Judicial Code. The Reviser's Note states: "[T]he revised section restores the basic law as generally understood and interpreted prior to the Toucey decision." Both pre-Toucey and post-Toucey decisions recognize implied legislative exceptions to the "anti-injunction" Act. See Porter v. Dicken, 328 U.S. 252; Leiter Minerals v. United States, 352 U.S. 220.
^ . What is now 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) was added in 1871, 17 Stat. 13, and the federal question jurisdiction of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 was added in 1875. 18 Stat. 470.
^ . We have already held that § 1983 requires no exhaustion of state remedies. McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U.S. 668.
^ . In accord with the view are Honey v. Goodman, 432 F.2d 333 (CA6), and Cooper v. Hutchinson, 184 F.2d 119 (CA3). Opposed are Goss v. Illinois, 312 F.2d 257 (CA7), and Baines v. City of Danville, 337 F.2d 579 (CA4).
And see Maraist, Federal Injunctive Relief Against State Court Proceedings: The Significance of Dombrowski, 48 Tex.L.Rev. 535, 591 et seq. (1970).

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