Source: https://www.jbwpc.com/Articles/Truck-Auto-Accidents/AVOIDANCE-OF-POTHOLES-ON-THE-ROAD-TO-UNINSURED-MOTORIST-INSURANCE-RECOVERY.shtml
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 02:11:39+00:00

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U. M. benefits to which he or she would otherwise be entitled. Not only that, any one of the potholes may subject you to a malpractice claim. As an attorney, you are deemed to know the location of each of these potholes; failure to negotiate the road and avoid the potholes may leave you accountable for the U. M. benefits not recovered at the end of the road.
This article attempts to help you avoid these potholes; it identifies and discusses those common lapses which occur to the unwary plaintiff's counsel. Some of the potholes are well-known; but some are more obscure. Let this serve as your check list of potholes to avoid in any U. M. case that presents itself to your office.
If a finding is made that written notice was not given as soon as practicable, that may void U. M. coverage.
To avoid the notice of occurrence pothole, you should immediately send a certified letter to all U. M. carriers upon acceptance of the case. This letter should be sent regardless of whether the tort-feasor has liability insurance or not. By doing that, you have avoided, at least as to your own representation, any claim that you failed to give the appropriate notice to the U. M. carrier.
You have satisfied your professional representation of your client if you give immediate notice upon your acceptance of the case as suggested in pothole #1 above. But the more difficult problem arises when the client first seeks your counsel more than thirty days after a hit-and-run wreck, and you are, thus, powerless to provide notice required under the policy. In such event, you might consider the excuse, based upon diligence of the insured, or other reasons, which would serve to excuse your client from having given the notice within the time required under the policy. As an example, a severely injured insured, hospitalized for a long period of time, may serve as a legally justifiable excuse for late notice.
Under the provisions of O.C.G.A. '33-7-11(c), an insured injured by an unknown "John Doe" driver must report the collision as required by O.C.G.A. '40-6-273 to recover U. M. benefits. Under this reporting statute, an insured is required to immediately report an accident to the local police department if it occurs within a municipality, or to the county sheriff or the nearest office of the state patrol if the accident occurs outside a municipality. Of course, so long as the accident is investigated by the local police and a report prepared, this reporting requirement is satisfied. But if the collision occurred, for example, on private property, rather than on a public highway, a report may not be completed by the local police. In that case, the report must be filed prior to filing a U. M. lawsuit.
Upon presentation to you of a "John Doe" U. M. claim, you should immediately determine whether a policy report has been prepared and, if not, immediately report the collision to the appropriate authorities as required by the statute prior to filing an action against the U. M. carrier.
In a claim arising out of an automobile collision where there is no liability coverage available to the injured insured, obviously service of summons upon the U. M. carrier is a necessary prerequisite to recover any insurance proceeds. But what about the claim where liability coverage exists in an amount at least equal to that of the U. M. coverage. Should service of process be made upon the U. M. carrier in this instance?
Just as was discussed in Paragraph 4 above, it behooves you as plaintiff's counsel to serve process upon the U. M. carrier in every suit arising out of an automobile collision regardless of whether liability coverage is available or is in an amount equal to or greater than the U. M. coverage. Just as important is the requirement that suit against the U. M. carrier be filed within the statute of limitation applicable to the underlying tort suit.
In a "John Doe" action against an unknown motorist, it is presumed that the offending motorist was operating an uninsured motor vehicle at the time of the collision.23 In such a case, no other proof as to the status of the liable motorist is necessary to assure the right of the injured insured to recover U. M. benefits. On the other hand, where the offending motorist is known, and subject to personal jurisdiction of the court, the court will not presume that the tort-feasor was an uninsured motorist.24 Thus, it is essential that the injured insured offer proof by way of competent evidence in a trial of the case that the alleged tort-feasor was either not covered under a policy of liability insurance or that the applicable liability insurance coverage is less than the U. M. coverage available to the injured insured. Absent that proof, the injured insured may suffer directed verdict barring the right to recover U. M. benefits.
In addition to proving the uninsured motorist status of the tort-feasor, the injured insured must also prove the existence of a policy of U. M. coverage where the U. M. carrier has answered the lawsuit in its own name. Where the U. M. carrier is a named defendant by its own election, the injured insured may recover a judgment in the action against the U. M. carrier for the amount the injured insured would be entitled to recover from the alleged tort-feasor.25 Obviously, such a judgment against the U. M. carrier would be subject to the policy limit of the U. M. coverage.
Where timely service of process upon the U. M. carrier is made, but the U. M. carrier either does not answer the suit or answers in the name of the alleged tort-feasor, the insured must first obtain a judgment against the uninsured motorist before being entitled to proceed directly against the U. M. carrier.30 Under these circumstances, the U. M. carrier would not be a party to the action and, thus, would not be bound by the judgment against the uninsured motorist, which may require a claim and suit against the U. M. carrier to recover the benefits. In most instances, however, the U. M. carrier, upon proof of U. M. coverage, is willing to pay based upon such a judgment.
Although the U. M. carrier may waive the necessity of judgment against the uninsured motorist, plaintiff's counsel in all cases should remember that judgment against the uninsured motorist is necessary and, therefore, suit must be filed against the uninsured motorist and the U. M. carrier within the applicable statute of limitation. It is too risky to rely upon waiver of this statutory requirement and, thus, suit in all instances should be filed in a timely manner.
Especially true where liability coverage exists but is less than the U. M. coverage available, there is often incentive to attempt settlement with the liability carrier without settling the claim against the U. M. carrier. But the temptation to settle with the liability carrier must be resisted, unless it is known and recognized by counsel and client alike that a claim against the U. M. carrier will be barred.
Avoid the many potholes along the road to U. M. coverage by giving immediate notice of the occurrence to the U. M. carrier, being sure that any hit-and-run collision is reported to the local police, filing suit against the tort-feasor and the U. M. carrier within the applicable statute of limitations, serving the U. M. carrier as if it were a party defendant to the action, proving that the tort-feasor is an uninsured motorist and the existence of the U. M. policy, obtaining a judgment against the uninsured motorist and avoiding settlement and release of the uninsured motorist except where no claim will be made against the U. M. carrier.
Keep these rules in mind, and you will maintain the highest professional representation for your client.
1. Gibson v. Dempsey, 167 Ga. App. 23, 25, 306 E.E.2d 32 (1983).
2. Gibson v. Dempsey, 167 Ga. App. at 25; Gregory v. Allstate Insurance Company, 134 Ga. App. 461, 214 S.E.2d 696 (1975).
3. Gibson v. Dempsey, 167 Ga. App. at 25; Gregory v. Allstate Insurance Company, 134 Ga. App. at 464.
4. Gibson v. Dempsey, 167 Ga. App. at 25; Gregory v. Allstate Insurance Company, 134 Ga. App. at 464.
5. Woods v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 234 Ga. 782, 218 S.E.2d 65 (1975).
6. Flamm v. Doe, 167 Ga. App. 587, 307 S.E.2d 105 (1983).
8. Johnson v. Atlanta Casualty Company, 187 Ga. App. 306, 370 S.E.2d 157 (1988). See also Flamm v. Doe, 167 Ga. App. 587, 307 S.E.2d 105 (1983), where the 30-day notice provision was held to bar recovery by a plaintiff who was operating an automobile owned and insured by his employer.
9. Jones v. Doe, 143 Ga. App. 451, 238 S.E.2d 555 (1977).
11. Id.; See also Corbin v. Gulf Insurance Company, 125 Ga. App. 281, 187 S.E.2d 312 (1972).
13. Yarbrough v. Dickinson, 183 Ga. App. 489, 359 S.E.2d 235 (1987).
14. Bohannon v. Futrell, 189 Ga. App. 340, 375 S.E.2d 637 (1988), aff'd, Bohannon v. J. C. Penney Casualty Insurance Company, 259 Ga. 162, 377 S.E.2d 853 (1989).
15. Bohannon v. J. C. Penney Casualty Insurance Company, 259 Ga. 152, 377 S.E.2d 853 (1989).
16. Bohannon v. J. C. Penney Casualty Insurance Company, 259 Ga. 162, 377 S.E.2d 853 (1989)(Weltner, J., dissenting). In United States Fidelity & Guaranty Insurance Company v. Meyers, 214 Ga. App. 851, 449 S.E.2d 359 (1994), the plaintiffs first became aware of the existence of a phantom driver's involvement in the accident during the deposition of a witness in the personal injury action filed against certain known defendants. This deposition was taken two and one-half years after the accident. The trial court allowed the plaintiff to add "John Doe" as a party defendant, and the plaintiffs' U. M. carrier was subsequently served with the complaint. The U. M. carrier filed a motion to dismiss. The trial court denied that motion, finding that the statute of limitation was tolled from the date the original complaint was filed until the date of the witness' deposition. On interlocutory appeal, the Georgia Court of Appeals reversed, holding that "the trial court erred in finding that the statute of limitation was tolled until the plaintiffs discovered the possible existence of a phantom driver.
17. Vaughn v. Collum, 236 Ga. 582, 224 S.E.2d 416 (1976).
18. One possible escape from the harsh statute of limitation rule is found in Reid v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company, ___Ga. App.___, ___S.E.2d___(Case Nos. A96A1629, A96A1630, decided October 15, 1996). There the U. M. carrier was not served in a personal injury suit because liability coverage was in place. But after the two-year statute had run, the liability carrier was declared insolvent. The court reversed summary judgment for the U. M. carrier where the injured insured dismissed the tort suit and refiled within six months under the savings statute and then served the U. M. carrier with process. The court reasoned that the underlying action was voidable, but not void, and therefore its status was not a basis for granting summary judgment to the U. M. carrier on the ground that the two-year statute of limitation had expired. Note that a petition for writ of certiorari was file with the Georgia Supreme Court, so don't rely on it as the final word on this subject.
19. Vaughn v. Collum, 236 Ga. 582, 224 S.E.2d 416 (1976); Kemp v. Cotton States Mutual Insurance Company, 177 Ga. App. 460, 340 S.E.2d 26 (1986); Commercial Union Insurance Company v. Wraggs, 159 Ga. App. 596, 284 S.E.2d 19 (1981); accord White v. Wright, 566 F. 2d 99 (5th Cir. 1978).
20. O.C.G.A. '9-3-33; Vaughn v. Collum, 236 Ga. 582, S.E.2d 416 (1976).
21. Yarbrough v. Dickinson, 183 Ga. App. 489, 359 S.E.2d 235 (1987).
22. Bohannon v. Futrell, 189 Ga. App. 340, 375 S.E.2d 637 (1988), aff'd, Bohannon v. J. C. Penney Casualty Insurance Company, 259 Ga. 162, 377 S.E.2d 853 (1989); Continental Insurance Company v. Echols, 145 Ga. App. 112, 243 S.E.2d 88 (1978); see Judge Beasley's special concurring opinion in Smith v. Allstate Insurance Company, 199 Ga. App. 264, 265-266, 404 S.E.2d 593 (1991); Clark v. Safeway Insurance Company, 198 Ga. App. 282, 401 S.E.2d 72 (1991).
23. O.C.G.A. '33-7-11(b)(2); Smith v. Commercial Union Insurance Company, 246 Ga. 50, 268 S.E.2d 632 (1980); General Accident Insurance Company v. Straws, 220 Ga. App. 496, ---S.E.2d---(1996).
24. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company v. Studebaker, 139 Ga. App. 386, 228 S.E.2d 322 (1976); accord Dewberry v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 197 Ga. App. 248, 398 S.E.2d 266 (1990).
25. Moss v. Cincinnati Insurance Company, 154 Ga. App. 165, 268 S.E.2d 676 (1980).
26. Cf. Carolina Casualty Insurance Company v. Davalos, 246 Ga. 746, 272 S.E.2d 702 (1980).
28. O.C.G.A. '33-7-11(a)(1) In the direct action against the U. M. carrier, the judgment against the uninsured owner or operator is the highest and best evidence of its contents. Generally, the contents of the judgment cannot be proved by parol evidence. Peagler and Manley Insurance Agency v. Studebaker, 156 Ga. App. 786, 275 S.E.2d 385 (1980).
29. Continental Insurance Company v. Echols, 145 Ga. App. 112, 243 S.E.2d 88 (1978).
30. O.C.G.A. '33-7-11(j); Lewis v. Cherokee Insurance Company, 258 Ga. 839, 375 S.E.2d 850 (1989); State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Lorenz, 202 Ga. App. 123, 413 S.E.2d 782 (1991); McCrary v. Preferred Risk Mutual Insurance Company, 198 Ga. App. 727, 402, S.E.2d 519 (1987); Peagler and Manley Insurance Agency, Inc. v. Studebaker, 156 Ga. App. 786, 275 S.E.2d 385 (1980).
31. Moss v. Cincinnati Insurance Company, 154 Ga. App. 165, 268 S.E.2d 676 (1980).
32. Boles v. Hamrick, 194 Ga. App. 595, 391 S.E.2d 418 (1990); Jones v. Cotton States Mutual Insurance Company, 185 Ga. App. 66, 363 S.E.2d 303 (1987). See Cotton States Insurance Company v. Bogan, 194 Ga. App. 824, 392 S.E.2d 33 (1990).
33. Jones v. Cotton States Mutual Insurance Company, 185 Ga. App. 66, 363 S.E.2d 303 (1987); Rosenberg v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, 163 Ga. App. 82, 293 S.E.2d 737 (1982); see and compare Beasley v. Parks, 204 Ga. App. 482, 420 S.E.2d 3 (1992).
34. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Noble, 208 Ga. App. 518, 430 S.E.2d 804 (1993); see Cotton States Mutual Insurance Company v. Bogan, 194 Ga. App. 824, 392 S.E.2d 33 (1990); Chitwood v. Southern General Insurance Company, 189 Ga. App. 697, 377 S.E.2d 210 (1988); Norman v. Daniels, 142 Ga. App. 456, 236 S.E.2d 121 (1977).
35. Chitwood v. Southern General Insurance Company, 189 Ga. App. 697, 377 S.E.2d 210 (1988).
37. Williams v. Thomas, 187 Ga. App. 527, 370 S.E.2d 773 (1988), quoting Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company v. Studebaker, 139 Ga. App. 386, 228 S.E.2d 322 (1976).
38. Darby v. Mathis, 212 Ga. App. 444, 441 S.E.2d 905 (1994).
39. Id.; O.C.G.A. '33-24-41.1 provides for a limited release by which an injured insured may, under specified circumstances, settle a claim with a tort-feasor's liability carrier and yet preserve the claim against the U. M. carrier.
40. Darby v. Mathis, 212 Ga. App. 444, 441 S.E.2d 905 (1994).
41. See Jenkins & Miller, Georgia Automobile Insurance Law, Including Tort Law, 1996 Edition, The Harrison Company, Section 13-5.

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