Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/413/472/
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 04:36:20+00:00

Document:
Justia › US Law › US Case Law › US Supreme Court › Volume 413 › Levitt v. Committee for Public Ed.
"for expenses of services for examination and inspection in connection with administration, grading and the compiling and reporting of the results of tests and examinations, maintenance of records of pupil enrollment and reporting thereon, maintenance of pupil health records, recording of personnel qualifications and characteristics and the preparation and submission to the state of various other reports. . . ."
1. The statute constitutes an impermissible aid to religion contravening the Establishment Clause, since no attempt is made and no means are available to assure that internally prepared tests, which are "an integral part of the teaching process," are free of religious instruction and avoid inculcating students in the religious precepts of the sponsoring church. Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, post, p. 413 U. S. 756. Pp. 413 U. S. 479-481.
2. The inquiry is not whether the State should be permitted to pay for any "mandated" activity, but whether the challenged state aid has the primary purpose or effect of advancing religion or religious education or whether it leads to excessive entanglement by the State in the affairs of the religious institution. Pp. 413 U. S. 481-482.
3. The Act provides only for a single per-pupil allotment for a variety of services, some secular and some potentially religious, and the courts cannot properly reduce that allotment to correspond to the actual costs of performing reimbursable secular services, as that is a legislative and not a judicial function. P. 413 U. S. 482.
BURGER, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which STEWART, BLACKMUN, POWELL, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. DOUGLAS, BRENNAN, and MARSHALL, JJ., filed a separate statement, post, p. 413 U. S. 482. WHITE, J., dissented.
"for expenses of services for examination and inspection in connection with administration, grading and the compiling and reporting of the results of tests and examinations, maintenance of records of pupil enrollment and reporting thereon, maintenance of pupil health records, recording of personnel qualifications and characteristics and the preparation and submission to the state of various other reports as provided for or required by law or regulation. [Footnote 1]"
of testing in nonpublic, as well as public, schools is of the latter variety.
"to include as permissible beneficiaries schools which (a) impose religious restrictions on admissions; (b) require attendance of pupils at religious activities; (c) require obedience by students to the doctrines and dogmas of a particular faith; (d) require pupils to attend instruction in the theology or doctrine of a particular faith; (e) are an integral part of the religious mission of the church sponsoring it; (f) have as a substantial purpose the inculcation of religious values; (g) impose religious restrictions on faculty appointments; and (h) impose religious restrictions on what or how the faculty may teach."
two installments: between January 15 and March 15 of the school year, one-half of the "estimated total apportionment" is paid directly to the school; the balance is paid between April 15 and June 15. The Commissioner is empowered to make "later payments for the purpose of adjusting and correcting apportionments." Id. § 5.
required to submit reports accounting for the moneys received and how they are expended."
A three-judge District Court was convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281, 2284. After a hearing on the merits, a majority of the District Court permanently enjoined appellants from enforcement of the Act. The District Court concluded that this case was controlled by our decision in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1971), and held the Act unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause.
"By far the greatest portion of the funds appropriated under Chapter 138 is paid for the services of teachers in testing students, and testing is an integral part of the teaching process."
342 F.Supp. at 444. Likewise, the court dismissed as "fanciful" the contention that a State may reimburse church-related schools for costs incurred in performing any service "mandated" by state law.
"direct money grants from the State to 'qualifying' nonpublic schools to be used for the 'maintenance and repair of . . . school facilities and equipment to ensure the health, welfare and safety of enrolled pupils.'"
Id. at 413 U. S. 762 (footnote omitted). [Footnote 6] The infirmity of the statute in Nyquist lay in its undifferentiated treatment of the maintenance and repair of facilities devoted to religious and secular functions of recipient, sectarian schools. Since "[n]o attempt is made to restrict payments to those expenditures related to the upkeep of facilities used exclusively for secular purposes," the Court held that the statute has the primary effect of advancing religion and is, therefore, violative of the Establishment Clause. Id. at 413 U. S. 774.
provides for a direct money grant to sectarian schools for performance of. various "services." Among those services is the maintenance of a regular program of traditional internal testing designed to measure pupil achievement. Yet, despite the obviously integral role of such testing in the total teaching process, no attempt is made under the statute, and no means are available, to assure that internally prepared tests are free of religious instruction.
"assume that teachers in parochial schools will be guilty of bad faith or any conscious design to evade the limitations imposed by the statute and the First Amendment."
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 403 U. S. 618. But the potential for conflict "inheres in the situation," and, because of that, the State is constitutionally compelled to assure that the state supported activity is not being used for religious indoctrination. See id. at 403 U. S. 617, 403 U. S. 619. Since the State has failed to do so here, we are left with no choice under Nyquist but to hold that Chapter 138 constitutes an impermissible aid to religion; this is so because the aid that will be devoted to secular functions is not identifiable and separable from aid to sectarian activities.
"to all children residing in such district who are enrolled in grades seven to twelve of a public or private school which complies with the compulsory education law."
Id. at 392 U. S. 239.
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 403 U. S. 617.
Liberty v. Nyquist, supra, at 413 U. S. 772-773; Kurtzman, supra, at 403 U. S. 612-613. That inquiry would be irreversibly frustrated if the Establishment Clause were read as permitting a State to pay for whatever it requires a private school to do.
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, and MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL are of the view that affirmance is compelled by our decision today in Committee for Public Education Religious liberty v. Nyquist, post, p. 413 U. S. 756, and Sloan v. Lemon, post, p. 413 U. S. 825.
* Together with No. 72-270, Anderson v. Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty et al., and No. 72-271, Cathedral Academy et al. v. Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty et al., also on appeal from the same court.
N.Y.Educ.Law § 305 charges the Commissioner of Education with the duty of maintaining general supervision over all schools throughout the State and with making sure that each school is "examined and inspected."
The Regents' examinations are described by appellants Levitt and Nyquist as "state-wide tests of subject matter achievement." The pupil evaluation program tests, the so-called "PEP Tests," are also administered throughout the State in grades three, six, and nine.
"While our decision as to the constitutionality of the statute does not turn on the factual question so presented, we mention it to illustrate the lack of certainty as to the purposes for which the moneys received are actually used, or, indeed, whether they can be regarded as specifically 'mandated.'"
"shall conduct in all grades in which instruction is offered a continuing program of individual pupil testing designed to provide an adequate basis for evaluating pupil achievement, and in addition shall administer, rate and report the results of all specific tests or examinations which may be prescribed by the commissioner."
Appellees do not contest the validity of appellants' construction of the Act, and we accept it for the purposes of this litigation.
"That prior to the enactment of Chapter 138 of the Laws of 1970, a conference was held in which representatives of the Office of the Counsel to the Governor, of the Division of the Budget in the Executive Department and of the State Education Department participated; that, at said conference the representatives of the State Education Department were asked whether the dollar amount in question was reasonable and that the answer was that to the best of their judgment the amount was reasonable; that no record of the said conference was made."
"If such items as 'teacher examinations' and 'entrance examinations' are included in the list of 'mandated services,' it appears that the schools' expenses are at least as great as the amounts they receive from the state. But if those items are excluded, the amounts received from the state are substantially greater than the schools' expenses."
342 F.Supp. at 441. As noted above, the court did not resolve the question whether payments under the Act were intended to compensate schools for internal testing. See n 3, supra.
The Court's holding as to grants of public funds for "maintenance and repair of . . . school facilities and equipment . . ." is sufficient authority to support affirmance of the District Court holding in this case. The author of this opinion joined that part of the Court's holding in Nyquist, supra, while dissenting from the holding that tuition grants and tax credits to parents are unconstitutional, and is, of course, bound by all parts of the judgment.
We do not doubt that the New York Legislature had a "secular legislative purpose" in enacting Chapter 138. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U. S. 97 (1968). The first section of the Act provides that the State has a "primary responsibility" to assure that its youth receive an adequate education; that the State has the "duty and authority" to examine and inspect all schools within its borders to make sure that adequate educational opportunities are being provided, and that the State has a legitimate interest in assisting those schools insofar as they aid the State in fulfilling its responsibility.

References: v. 
 v. 
 § 5
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 305
 v.