Source: https://openjurist.org/391/us/930
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 18:19:49+00:00

Document:
SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NO. 5. ZIGMOND v. SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NO. 5.
For memorandum decisions of the court see 391 U.S. 930, 88 S.Ct. 1831.
Applicant Shiffman's Local Board declared him delinquent, canceled his II-A occupational deferment and reclassified him I-A after Shiffman had 'turned in' his draft classification card to the Government in an antiwar protest. He was then ordered to report for induction. Applicant Zigmond was classified I-A, but, having reached the age of 26, should ordinarily not have been called for induction until younger eligible registrants in the draft pool had been taken (see 32 CFR § 1631.7). Nevertheless, he received a delinquency notice followed by his induction notice soon after 'turning in' to the Government both his draft registration and classification certificates as a sign of protest.
I would grant the stays3 as I am unable to see any place in our constitutional system for Selective Service delinquency regulations employed to penalize or deter exercise of First Amendment rights.
Oestereich v. Selective Service Local Board No. 11, No. 1246, this Term, 391 U.S. 912, 88 S.Ct. 1804, 20 L.Ed.2d 651, cert. granted, May 20, 1968, raises the same issue presented in these cases, viz., whether § 10(b)(3) may, consistent with the First Amendment, preclude judicial review of petitioner's punitive reclassification and order to report for induction made by his local board after petitioner had returned his Selective Service registration certificate to the Government as a protest against the war in Vietnam. Although the Solicitor General supported that petition on the ground that § 10(b)(3) should not be construed to preclude judicial review of local board action terminating an express statutory exemption granted by Congress, the writ we issued was unrestricted. The question of the validity of § 10(b)(3) in cases raising First Amendment defenses to reclassification and induction is now pending before this Court and these cases clearly come within the rule of Yasa v. Esperdy, 80 S.Ct. 1366, 4 L.Ed.2d 1717, and Keith v. People of State of New York, 79 S.Ct. 938, 3 L.Ed.2d 974, in which stays were granted because similar or identical issues were before the Court in other cases.
Although the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 made no explicit provision for judicial review of the action of local boards, and in fact made their decisions 'final,' we found that Congress had not intended to deny all judicial review of a local board's action. Rather we concluded, judicial review was available to the extent of determining in the criminal action whether there was any basis in fact for the classification given the registrant by his local board. Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 66 S.Ct. 423, 90 L.Ed. 567. We noted that we could 'assume that where only one judicial remedy is provided, it normally would be deemed exclusive,' 327 U.S., at 125, 66 S.Ct., at 429. (Emphasis added.) We were not, however, then dealing with the question whether a restrictive review provision might itself offend the Constitution in circumstances where it operates to chill the effective exercise of First Amendment rights. See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 85 S.Ct. 1116, 14 L.Ed.2d 22. That is the question which is presented here with respect to § 10(b)(3).

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