Source: http://acoel.org/?tag=/Litigation
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 14:41:04+00:00

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A case working its way through the Rhode Island state court system, Power Test Realty Co. Ltd. Partnership v. Sullivan, No. PC 10-0404 (R.I. Super. Ct. Feb. 19, 2013), poses a dilemma regarding the obligation to remediate releases of virgin petroleum product.
Under the Rhode Island equivalent of CERCLA, virgin petroleum product is exempt from the definition of hazardous substances. R.I.G.L. 23-19.14-3(c), (i). Releases of virgin petroleum product are therefore not subject to the imposition of joint, several, strict and retroactive liability. One would accordingly expect that any obligation to remediate virgin petroleum product releases would be based on causation. Rhode Island oil pollution statutes and regulations appear to impose liability based on causation only.
Nevertheless, the Rhode Island Department of Environmental Management and the Rhode Island Superior Court have taken the position that (1) the obligation of a current landowner to remediate a release of virgin petroleum product that occurred before acquisition of title arises on the theory that the term “discharge” under the state oil pollution statute includes “leaching” and (2) leaching of pre-acquisition petroleum product into the groundwater constitutes a passive and continuing discharge for which the current landowner is liable to remediate.
The Superior Court held that causation is irrelevant under the state oil pollution control statute and regulations. This ruling clearly contradicts the intent of the legislature to carve out virgin petroleum product from a no-fault liability scheme.
This case of first impression is now before the Rhode Island Supreme Court on a writ of certiorari, Docket No. SU-13-0076. Practitioners await with interest how the Court will work its way through this issue. Stand by for some tortured reasoning if the Superior Court ruling is upheld.
Should the U.S.Have Specialized Environmental Courts?
The creation of specialized environmental courts and tribunals around the world has exploded in recent years as countries grapple with the increasingly complex challenges of environmental problems and laws. There are now over 360 environmental courts or tribunals in 42 countries (see George and Catherine Pring, “Greening Justice: Creating and Improving Environmental Courts and Tribunals”), and the Journal of Court Innovation, vol. 3, Winter 2010. Is it time for us to consider this option in the U.S.?
The U.S. Judicial Conference noted in its 1990 Report that specialized courts are considered “exotic in the American legal culture” and that “most American lawyers find the idea of specialized courts repugnant.” However, the U.S. uses specialized courts to deal with other complex and specialized fields of law (e.g., U.S. Tax Court, Bankruptcy Courts, U.S. Court of Federal Claims). A few specialized environmental courts and tribunals have operated successfully in the U.S. since the early 1990’s, including the Vermont Superior Court Environmental Division (1990), local courts such as the Shelby County, Tennessee Environmental Court (1991), and administrative tribunals such as the U.S. EPA’s Environmental Appeals Board (1992).
Specialized courts arguably offer several advantages for judges, parties and practitioners, including greater judicial expertise in complex legal, scientific and technical areas, more efficient adjudication, reduced litigation costs, and more predictable decision-making. Potential disadvantages and challenges include the costs to set up and maintain a separate system, organize and locate the court(s) to assure convenient access for parties, potentially inefficient caseloads due to inadequate or unevenly distributed cases, and the risk of court “capture” by either environmental activists or industry. See U.S. Judicial Conference 1990 Report at 18-20.
ACOEL members are uniquely qualified and situated to offer valuable insight into this important question for the future of environmental law and litigation in the U.S. Should we consider creating more specialized environmental courts or tribunals in the U.S.?
On Friday, in Texas v. EPA, the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals vacated EPA’s decision rejecting Texas’s SIP revisions that would have implemented (and did implement, for 16 years) a Flexible Permit Program for minor NSR sources. While genuflecting at the altar of deference to agency decisionmaking, the Court concluded that EPA’s rejection was not based on either EPA factual determinations or on its interpretation of federal, as opposed to state, law. The Court also concluded that EPA had not in fact relied on the reasons given in its briefs, and refused to defer to EPA’s “post hoc rationalizations.” The Court thus gave essentially no deference to EPA’s decision.
The interesting part of the decision was the dissent by Judge Patrick Higginbotham, a Reagan appointee. Judge Higginbotham took the majority to task for “not faithfully applying the deferential arbitrary and capricious standard.” He then persuasively demonstrated why the Texas program, as written, did violate the Clean Air Act.
After dismantling the majority’s logic, he then addressed the practical heart of the case – EPA’s 16-year delay in rejecting the SIP revisions. While criticizing EPA for the delay, Judge Higginbotham pointed out that there is a statutory remedy for EPA’s failure to rule on the revisions – a suit under section 7604(a)(2) of the CAA – a remedy never pursued by Texas.
"As so often with political debate in search of a legal forum, its utility lies largely in pleasure of expression. Angst over perceived federal intrusion into state affairs ought be eased by the reality that laws enacted by Congress are laws of the States. Congress passed the Clean Air Act and made it enforceable by the EPA. The State was represented in that decision by two senators and its thirty-two other elected members of Congress. It also bears mentioning that its former governor was resident in the White House for eight of the years in passage here. The Clean Air Act is not foreign law. I dissent."
One of the more recent and interesting decisions in the world of CERCLA litigation practice was rendered just a few days ago by a federal district court in Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals Ltd. The judge in that case articulated the legal underpinnings of the often confused notions of CERCLA-based divisibility of harm and apportionment of liability determinations.
Against this legal backdrop, the facts in Pakootas brought into sharp focus a commonly encountered situation for CERCLA litigants where multiple parties find themselves attempting to apportion response cost liability for different contaminants, released from different facilities that have become commingled, and are encompassed within what the EPA or state regulatory agency has deemed to be a single “site”.
. . . [L]iability attaches when three conditions are satisfied: (1) the site at which there is an actual or threatened release of hazardous substances is a “facility” under 42 U.S.C. Section 9601(9); (2) a “release” or “threatened release” of a hazardous substance from the facility has occurred, 42 U.S.C. Section 9607(a)(4); and (3) the party is within one of the four classes of persons subject to liability under §9607(a). Pakootas I, 452 F.3d at 1073-74.
In Pakootas the party seeking apportionment (Teck) was clearly a liable person under CERCLA and was undeniably associated with the release of contaminants that could be traced only to the facility it operated. Teck argued as an affirmative defense to a liability claim that the “harm” at the site should be “apportioned” since the contaminants released by Teck could be discretely indentified even though they had become “commingled” with those released by many others. Teck reasoned that it could defend itself against a joint and several liability claim by way of such “apportionment”. In so many words, Teck sought to apportion liability based upon divisibility of the contaminants associated with its releases.
The fact for liability purposes the . . . Plaintiffs need to, and intend to, establish that Teck’s slag and/or liquid effluent released or threatens to release hazardous substances (certain metals) from the UCR Site does not, however, limit the scope of the releases or threatened releases from the Site for which Teck can be held liable and, in turn, does not limit the scope of the relevant harm for divisibility/apportionment purposes.
After a thorough examination of many of the more recent contribution/apportionment appellate decisions from around the country, Judge Suko ultimately determined that Teck failed to prove that contamination at the site involved was divisible and, as a result, would be subject to CERCLA 107 joint and several liability with other potentially responsible parties at the site.
If you find yourself representing a party in an apportionment dispute, this case seems to stand for the proposition that if you cannot determine everything that everyone may have done to create a contaminated site; you may be in trouble in pursuing an apportionment or contribution action. Additionally, and it is just my personal opinion, the decision represents one of the better anthologies of apportionment/divisibility jurisprudence I have seen in recent cases (and that includes some of the work of the Supreme Court).
Nevertheless, the high burden of technical or scientific proof Judge Suko would impose upon a party seeking apportionment/contribution could well hearken back to the days before post-BNSF days of “reason based” rules for apportioned liability. (See, e.g. J. Barkett, The Burlington Northern Decision, American College of Environmental Lawyers Blog (May 19, 2009).
If you live in Texas or have driven through the state, you know that our popular anti-litter campaign slogan is “Don’t Mess With Texas.” This slogan may have also been appropriate for the 5th Circuit’s recent decision in Luminant Generation Company, et al. v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, No. 10-60891, slip op. (5th Cir. Mar. 26, 2012), where the court came down hard on the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) for its very late disapproval of revisions to Texas’s State Implementation Plan (“SIP”) pertaining to standard permits for pollution control projects (“PCPs”).
In Luminant, the 5th Circuit noted that the federal Clean Air Act (“CAA”) “prescribes only the barest of requirements” for New Source Review (“NSR”) of minor new sources of air pollutant emissions. It found that EPA had not identified a single violation of the CAA or EPA’s regulations and thus had no legal basis for its disapproval of the PCP Standard Permit provisions, striking down as arbitrary and capricious the “three extra-statutory standards that the EPA created out of whole cloth.” Id. at 21. Two of those standards referenced Texas law and a third was based on too much agency discretion in permit issuance.
Noting that EPA failed to act until three years after the 18 month statutory deadline for EPA action had passed, the court ordered EPA to expeditiously reconsider the SIP revision submission made by the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (“TCEQ”), and compared the “sweeping discretion” given to the states in developing their SIPS to EPA’s “narrow task” of “ensuring” that the Texas regulations “meet the minimal CAA requirements that govern SIP revisions to minor NSR, as set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (a)(2)(C) and § 7310(l).” Id. The court then stated that this limited review “is the full extent of EPA’s authority in the SIP-approval process because that is all the authority that the CAA confers.” Id. at 21-22.
For the past several years, the TCEQ and EPA have butted heads over various aspects of Texas’s SIP. This was the third of three cases heard by the 5th Circuit on SIP reviews, albeit the first in which a decision has been rendered. Oral arguments were held in the other two pending cases last fall – the first relating to Texas’ Qualified Facilities program, Texas Oil & Gas Association, et al. v. U.S. EPA, No. 10-60459 (5th Cir. filed Jun. 11, 2010), and the second relating to Texas’s Flexible Permit Program, Texas v. U.S. EPA, No. 10-10614 (5th Cir. filed Jul. 26, 2010).
Of these three cases, the EPA’s disapproval of Texas’s Flexible Permit Program has caused the most tension between the agencies. That program provides facilities with flexibility to reduce emissions by the most cost-effective means through allocation of emissions on a facility-wide basis rather than by source point, and has been a basic tenet of permitting in Texas since 1994. The end result of the Flexible Permit Program—which Texas considers akin to the federal Plantwide Applicability Limit (“PAL”) under the New Source Review program—not only gave facilities greater flexibility and control, but actually reduced emissions and provided for compliance with all state health standards, as well as all applicable federal Clean Air Act requirements.
Given that EPA’s delay in disapproving these last two aspects of the Texas SIP was even more egregious (effectively up to sixteen years), it is likely that the 5th Circuit will view the EPA’s actions in those cases with a similarly critical eye. We in Texas hope that the court continues to call EPA to task for its past unpopular and unwarranted decisions with respect to Texas’s SIP.
On June 21, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held, in New Albany Tractor, Inc. v. Louisville Tractor, Inc. that the Supreme Court's rulings in Twombly and Iqbal must be strictly applied, mandating dismissal of a case in which the complaint failed to contain sufficient allegations of operative fact. What makes this decision significant is that the court recognized that the facts necessary to support the adequate allegations were probably only available from the files of the defendant; therefore, strict application of Twombly and Iqbal, denying the plaintiff access to the files in discovery, effectively denied the plaintiff any opportunity to bring the case. For this reason, the court also denied, as pointless, the plaintiff's alternative request for leave to amend its complaint.
For further information contact Jack Shumate or Sheldon Klein at 248.258.1616.
When a company saddled with potential environmental liabilities seeks bankruptcy protection, the goals of Chapter 11—giving the reorganized debtor a “fresh start” and fairly treating similarly situated creditors—can conflict with the goals of environmental laws, such as ensuring that the “polluter pays.” Courts have long struggled to reconcile this tension.
Environmental obligations arise in various forms and under numerous federal and state statutes. They include obligations to stop or contain ongoing pollution, to remediate contaminated sites, to reimburse other parties for remediation costs, and to pay fines and penalties. A number of factors, including the type of liability, the status of the contamination, and the statute under which the obligation arises, may have an impact on whether Chapter 11 provides protection to the post-petition entity, or whether the reorganized entity remains liable.
The only U.S. Supreme Court decision offering guidance on this issue is Ohio v. Kovacs decided in 1985. In Kovacs, the State of Ohio obtained an injunction requiring a polluter to clean up a site. When the polluter failed to comply, the state appointed a receiver who took possession of the site and the polluter’s assets in order to implement the remediation. Before the cleanup was complete, the polluter filed for bankruptcy. In holding that the cleanup obligation was a claim dischargeable in bankruptcy, the Court observed that by dispossessing the debtor and removing his control over the site, the State prevented the debtor from conducting the cleanup himself. As a result, it held that the State was effectively seeking a money judgment, which is a “claim” subject to discharge under the Bankruptcy Code.
Another leading case addressing this issue is United States v. LTV Corp. (In re Chateaugay Corp.). In this decision, the Second Circuit distinguished between orders to clean up accumulated waste and orders to stop ongoing pollution. It held that when an order requires cleanup of contamination and the applicable government agency has the option of conducting the cleanup itself and seeking reimbursement, the obligation is a “claim” subject to discharge under Chapter 11 because its breach gives rise to a right to payment. On the other hand, the Second Circuit observed that an order to stop polluting does not create a claim subject to discharge in bankruptcy, because the enforcing agency may not accept payment and allow the party to continue polluting. Hence, such an order remains enforceable against the reorganized entity.
The two leading cases discussed above have not provided sufficient guidance to resolve all potential issues that arise concerning whether environmental liabilities are dischargeable in bankruptcy. For example, one issue with which bankruptcy judges have grappled is how to determine whether pollution is ongoing. See e.g., In re Oldco M Corp. (finding that debtor’s obligation to operate groundwater remediation system was not dischargeable because plume would otherwise continue to migrate). Another is whether contribution claims arising in the environmental context are dischargeable. See e.g., In re Lyondell andIn re Chemtura.
Entities considering bankruptcy as a means of averting environmental liabilities should pay close attention to emerging case law decisions when seeking to determine whether their environmental liabilities are dischargeable claims under the Bankruptcy Code. Debtors facing the risk that such potential claims may be disallowed may want also to consider the potential alternative of pursuing a sale of assets under section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code.
 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(B) (emphasis added).
 944 F.2d 997 (2d Cir. 1991).
 438 B.R. 775 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010).
 In re Lyondell Chem. Co., No. 09-10023 (REG), 2011 WL 11413 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 2011).
 In re Chemtura Corp., No. 09-11233 (REG), 2011 WL 109081 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 2011).
People often ask me why I became an environmental lawyer in 1973 and why I am still practicing environmental law in 2011. I ask other environmental lawyers the same questions. Their answers provide useful information to resolve conflicts in our political and economic systems.
Environmental lawyers representing EPA, state agencies, NGOs and corporations have found ways to resolve environmental problems without the type of litigation and adversarial relationships that are present in other fields of law, such as labor law or personal injury. Environmental lawyers representing all sides regularly attend seminars together and are friends. Such camaraderie is not found in the U.S. Congress and in many state legislatures. How did this collegial atmosphere develop? What can we learn from it?
My discussions with other environmental lawyers resulted in the following conclusion. Environmental lawyers have an interest in the preservation of the planet. We may argue over how clean is clean and what is the best available technology for control of pollution. However, our shared belief that earth must be preserved creates a basis for reasoned debate, which results in reduction of pollution and a successful resolution of conflict.
Environmental lawyers meet and negotiate. They don’t hide data or take positions that avoid addressing the real issues in conflict. Environmental lawyers seek a win/win, knowing that the consequences of not achieving a solution may be a loss for both sides.
Environmental lawyers are also translators and problem solvers for clients. We are called upon to explain complex laws in lay terms and to seek solutions rather than stake out positions that lead to protracted litigation. We may fight vigorously over the provisions of a Consent Decree, but it is still a “consent” document in which both sides must give and take.
Environmental lawyers form groups of potentially responsible parties (“PRPs”) to address contamination caused by insolvent operators. In forming a PRP group, we are creating a vehicle for consensus despite individual differences among the parties.
Why is this status relevant for the current challenges America faces? I suggest environmental lawyers have found a way to get over partisanship and posturing. We have found a way to get beyond emotion to focus on what is relevant and how to solve a common problem. We recognized the concept of sustainability long before it became a trite phrase. If businesses could not comply with the environmental laws and still make money, the economy would fail. Saving the earth appeals to consumers who pay more for products that are made from recycled material or from sustainable practices. Coalitions of environmental interest groups, government and business can accomplish far more working together than fighting in courts or legislatures.
What actions would be appropriate for our current adversarial process? One would be meetings in which everyone has an opportunity to express their views and everyone is treated the same. Rather than having two sides, a group with all stakeholders would be a better way to solve many of our political and economic problems. Coming into a meeting with the idea that you have to negotiate a consent agreement with give and take would be a useful solution for many political and economic leaders. Seeking a win/win is a much better alternative than a filibuster. Focusing on solving the problem might avoid some of the needless expenditure of money to vilify the other side. Going to seminars together and drinking a beer at a reception would be a useful exercise for politicians from different parties. Having to produce all of the information to a governmental regulatory agency might prevent a trader from defrauding an investor in some “black box” investment.
Most stakeholders have assumed that Kennedy’s concurring opinion, requiring a “significant nexus” between wetlands and traditional navigable waters before those wetlands are subject to jurisdiction under the CWA, is the law of the land at this point. That is the approach adopted in the Rapanos Guidance issued by EPA and the Corps in 2007.
A recent decision by the 4th Circuit Court of Appeals, in Precon Development Corporation v. Army Corps of Engineers, illustrates just how muddled post-Rapanos interpretation has become. The decision in Precon – reversing the District Court – found that the Corps had not built a record sufficient to establish that the wetlands which Precon sought to develop were jurisdictional under the CWA.
There were two technical issues in Precon. Precon lost what one might have thought would be the more significant issue – the Corps’ finding that, although only 4.8 acres were really at issue in this case, and Precon’s entire development includes 166 acres of wetlands, 448 acres of “similarly situated” wetlands would be examined for a substantial nexus to navigable waters. Precon ultimately won, however, because the Court concluded that the Corps’ record did not contain enough physical evidence to support its determination that a significant nexus exists between the 448 wetland acres and the downstream navigable water.
Well, this is certainly a nice question of administrative law. The significant nexus issue may now be the ultimate legal question. Nonetheless, I would guess that most wetlands scientists and hydrologists would say that this is largely a factual question. Even if the agency is applying its judgment to answer that question, it’s the type of judgment that requires technical expertise – expertise to which courts have traditionally deferred.
The second of the Court’s important pronouncements was that it would not give the EPA/Corps Rapanos Guidance deference under Chevron. Why not?
Isn’t it timely, then, that EPA and the Corps sent a draft new Rapanos guidance to OMB in December, and GOP leadership in the House is proposing language in a continuing resolution that would preclude EPA from using any funds “to implement, administer, or enforce a change to a rule or guidance document pertaining to the definition of waters under the jurisdiction of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (33 U.S.C. 1251).” Perhaps EPA and the Corps should take half a loaf. Why not agree to shelve the guidance and instead proceed with notice-and-comment rulemaking to clarify Rapanos? At least then the Courts might grant EPA and the Corps more deference in implementation. It’s already been almost five years since Rapanos was issued. EPA and the Corps can hardly argue that it’s necessary to go the guidance route because they don’t have the time to proceed through the full regulatory process.
In the world of environmental claims, there are numerous ways that a duty to preserve documents and particularly e-documents can arise before litigation is filed.
E-discovery sanctions have reached an all-time high after three decades of litigation over alleged discovery wrongdoing. “Sanctions motions and sanction awards for e-discovery violations have been trending every-upward for the last 10 years and have now reached historic highs,” according to a King & Spalding study published at 60 Duke Law Journal 789 (2010).
King & Spalding lawyers analyzed 401 cases before 2010 in which sanctions were sought and found 230 sanctions awarded, including often severe sanctions of case dismissal, adverse jury instructions and significant money awards. Sanctions of more than $5 million were ordered in five cases, and sanctions of $1 million or more were awarded in four others. Before 2009, the highest number of sanctions awarded against lawyers in a single year was five. However, 46 sanctions were awarded in 2009, the last year covered by the study.
Defendants and their lawyers were sanctioned for e-discovery violations nearly three times more often than plaintiffs. When sanctions were awarded, the most common misconduct was failure to preserve electronic evidence.
That is why prospective environmental litigants and their counsel must be aware of the issue. Even if the client does not realize that the duty to preserve has attached, and electronic information disappears, the client and its lawyers are subject to spoliation claims, and increasingly sanctions.
A duty to preserve represents a legal requirement to maintain relevant records for litigation. Hence, identifying the trigger of the duty to preserve is essential. The duty to preserve arises before a complaint is filed when a party reasonably should know that the evidence may be relevant to anticipated litigation. When that time occurs is anything but certain.
Unlike the paper world where documents are often maintained in central storage, in the electronic world, every employee is a file keeper. E-mails can disappear with the stroke of a key. A company’s records management system may provide for relatively short timeframes for e-mails in mailboxes to eliminate data clutter. Be aware that storage systems used for disaster recovery are periodically recycled.
Can a prospective plaintiff or defendant have a duty to preserve if counsel has not been retained to explain the duty?
Must a client’s lawyer have knowledge of a claim before a duty to preserve can be triggered?
If an environmental agency is pursuing other entities in an industry but not your client, does that trigger a duty to preserve?
Does a notice of violation sent by a regulatory agency represent “anticipation” of litigation.
I repeat -- In the world of environmental claims, there are numerous ways that a client’s duty to preserve documents, and particularly e-documents, can arise before litigation is actually filed.
Recent Supreme Court opinions interpreting Rule 12(b)(6) have been applied in an environmental context. A state agency cost recovery action was dismissed for failure to plead facts sufficient to show a plausible claim for relief, resulting in unnecessary additional litigation costs.
WhenBell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554 (2007) was decided, many lawyers lamented the loss of Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957) (in effect, if there is a claim somewhere within the four corners of a complaint, a motion to dismiss will be denied) as the governing case in Rule 12(b)(6) jurisprudence. Then Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (May 18, 2009) came down. The laments became cries for action to restore Conley legislatively, and, indeed, such legislation was introduced in the Congress by Senator Specter who was not returned to office. For now, Iqbal and Twombly remain the law.
For those few lawyers who may not be familiar with Twombly or Iqbal, both cases dealt with the sufficiency of allegations in a complaint to state a cause of action. Twombly dealt with parallel conduct in an antitrust setting that was consistent with lawful behavior but was alleged conclusorily to represent a conspiracy in restraint of trade. Without fact allegations to show why lawful parallel conduct was in fact unlawful anticompetitive behavior, the complaint did not survive. Iqbal dealt with claims against the Attorney General and the Director of the FBI for post-9/11 activities that restrained the liberty of the plaintiffs for a period of time. Other defendants remained in the case. The Supreme Court held that the complaint’s allegations against these two executives were not “plausible.” Hence, they were dismissed.
The magistrate judge was persuaded by the administrative record that “repeatedly and consistently” characterized the DEP’s response action as “interim.” The DEP was not helped by its 2002 “Analysis of Alternatives” under Pennsylvania’s Hazardous Sites Cleanup Act which stated that the interim response was warranted but that the response as then proposed “is not a final remedial response.” The magistrate judge rejected the DEP’s argument that a “prompt interim response” would be a removal action in CERCLA terms but that a “limited interim response” in fact was the same as a remedial action under CERCLA.
The Deck is Still Stacked in the Government's Favor -- Is This A Good Thing?
Last week, in City of Pittsfield v. EPA, the First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed denial of a petition by the City of Pittsfield seeking review of an NPDES permit issued by EPA. The case makes no new law and, by itself, is not particularly remarkable. Cases on NPDES permit appeals have held for some time that a permittee appealing an NPDES permit must set forth in detail in its petition basically every conceivable claim or argument that they might want to assert. Pretty much no detail is too small. The City of Pittsfield failed to do this, instead relying on their prior comments on the draft permit. Not good enough, said the Court.
For some reason, reading the decision brought to mind another recent appellate decision, General Electric v. Jackson, in which the D.C. Circuit laid to rest arguments that EPA’s unilateral order authority under § 106 of CERCLA is unconstitutional. As I noted in commenting on that decision, it too was unremarkable by itself and fully consistent with prior case law on the subject.
What do these two cases have in common? To me, they are evidence that, while the government can over-reach and does lose some cases, the deck remains stacked overwhelmingly in the government’s favor. The power of the government as regulator is awesome to behold. Looking at the GE case first, does anyone really deny that EPA’s § 106 order authority is extremely coercive? Looking at the Pittsfield case, doesn’t it seem odd that a party appealing a permit has to identify with particularity every single nit that they might want to pick with the permit? Even after the Supreme Court’s recent decisions tightening pleading standards, the pleading burden on a permit appellant remains much more substantial than on any other type of litigant.
Why should this be so? Why is it that the government doesn’t lose when it’s wrong, but only when it’s crazy wrong?
The batting average of the Bush administration EPA in appeals of its regulatory proposals may now have dropped below the proverbial Mendoza line. This week, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia remanded a substantial part of EPA’s particulate rule. That the Bush administration could achieve results where the Mendoza line is even a close metaphor is a testament to just how low its stock has fallen in the courts.
· First, the basic holding: the court remanded EPA’s primary annual standard for PM2.5, because EPA did not justify that the 15 ug/m3 standard was sufficient to protect public health with an adequate margin of safety. Second, the court also remanded EPA’s determination of the secondary, public welfare, standard for PM2.5.
· The court gave great weight to the role of the Clean Air Science Advisory Committee (CASAC) and staff recommendations in the regulatory process. After this decision, EPA is going to think twice about choosing a regulatory course difference than that recommended by CASAC and staff. On balance, I think that this is a bad thing and more evidence of the collateral damage from the extreme positions taken by the Bush administration. After all, while the Clean Air Act sets some boundaries, these are ultimately policy decisions that should be made by the President and his or her chosen staff, not by a committee no one’s heard of or low-level staff.
· Unlike the chaos created when the court vacated the CAIR regulations, the court appears to have learned its lesson. This time around, the court remanded the rule, but left the standard in place for now.
· The court’s decision to remand the public welfare standard will have implications for current efforts to implement the its Regional Haze Rule. The extent to which this decision throws Haze Rule implementation back to the drawing board may not be known for some time.
How many more cases can the Bush administration lose after it’s already out of office? At least one. Greenwire reports today about speculation that this decision means that the EPA rules regarding the nitrogen oxide NAAQS may also be in trouble.
The interesting question in all this is the extent to which the abysmal record of the Bush EPA in defending its decisions in the courts will damage EPA’s credibility and thus result in a long-term weakening of the deference given EPA by the courts. At this point, my assumption is that, in the long run, these cases will be seen as an aberration and courts will resume their prior practice of granting EPA substantial deference. Of course, whether that is a good thing or not is a separate question.

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