Source: https://www.mkblawfirm.com/blog/
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 05:57:14+00:00

Document:
Have You Got the Time Right?
By Ken Barre of McMickle, Kurey and Branch, LLP on Monday, April 1, 2019.
Recently, the Supreme Court of Georgia came down with another important ruling in the long line of "bad faith" cases in Georgia. In this most recent case, First Acceptance Insurance Company of Georgia, Inc. v. Hughes, S180517, the Court asked the parties to address whether an insurer's duty to settle only arises when an injured party presents a valid offer to settle within the insured's policy limits or whether, even absent such an offer, a duty arises when the insurer knows, or reasonably should know that settlement within the insured's policy limits is possible. The Court concluded that an insurer's duty to settle only arises when the injured party presents a valid offer to settle within the insured's policy limits.
In this particular case, the injured parties presented the insurer with a valid offer to settle within the insured's policy limits, but they did not include a deadline for response. It was concluded as a matter of law that the insurer could not have acted unreasonably in failing to accept the offer before it was withdrawn. The reasoning being that prior rulings on this issue express that "[a]n insurance company may be liable for the excess judgment entered against its insured based on the insurer's bad faith or negligent refusal to settle a personal injury claim within its policy limits." Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co. v. Brightman, 276 Ga. 683, 684(1), 580 S.E. 2d 519 (2003). The Court in Brightman further stated that an "insurer is negligent in failing to settle if the ordinarily prudent insurer would consider choosing to try the case created an unreasonable risk. The rationale is that the interests of the insurer and insured diverge when a plaintiff offers to settle a claim for the limits of the insurance policy." Id. at 685(1). The Court in Hughes further applied that an insurance company's bad faith refusal to settle a claim depends on whether the insurer "acted reasonably in responding to a settlement offer," and whether the insurer accorded its own interests and the interests of its insured equally. See Fortner v. Grange Mut. Ins. 286 Ga. 189, 190, 686 S.E. 2d 93 (2009).
By Jon M. Hughes of McMickle, Kurey and Branch, LLP on Monday, April 30, 2018.
The general understanding among attorneys and insurance professionals is that a general liability (or CGL) policy's "auto" exclusion does just what it says, excludes coverage when an auto is involved. As litigation becomes more complex and more parties are brought into a case, even parties only tangentially related to the actual accident, closer analysis of the exclusion's language is necessary. The auto exclusion in many policies actually contains limiting language that can result in coverage under a CGL policy, even where an auto is involved.
By Zach M. Matthews of McMickle, Kurey and Branch, LLP on Monday, April 30, 2018.
Georgia's primary premises liability statute is O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1, which requires the "owner or occupier" of land to keep his premises and approaches safe for those he "induces or leads" to come onto the property. These people are termed "invitees" and they are entitled to certain protections. In Georgia, our seminal case controlling the duties of a landlord is Robinson v. Kroger, 222 Ga. App. 711, 476 S.E.2d 29 (1996).
Most lawyers are very familiar with owner/occupier liability and the so-called "premises liability statute." O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1 is typically the first statute cited in any Complaint involving an individual who is injured on a premises. However, not all premises owners are created alike.
By Ray J. Kurey of McMickle, Kurey and Branch, LLP on Monday, April 30, 2018.
Can a Corporation or LLC Suffer Emotional Distress under Georgia Law?
By Casey D. Baker of McMickle, Kurey and Branch, LLP on Monday, April 30, 2018.
The answer, perhaps unsurprisingly, is "no." What is surprising is that the law in Georgia was unsettled until October 2017. In Osprey Cove Real Estate, LLC v. Towerview Construction, LLC, 2017 WL 4856319, *3, ___ S.E.2d ___ (Ga. Ct. App., October 27, 2017), as a matter of first impression, the Georgia Court of Appeals adopted what appears to be the majority view that "business entities [...] cannot recover on claims of intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress as a matter of law because [they] lack the cognizant ability to experience emotions."
By V. Morgan Carroll of McMickle, Kurey and Branch, LLP on Monday, April 30, 2018.
It's 4:45 on Friday afternoon. You're going to finish up one last claim note and sprint out of the office toward your weekend with no further thoughts of claims until the 10:00 p.m. Sunday-evening-dread sets in. You are seconds away from hitting "Enter" on your claim note when it happens - ANOTHER email. You recognize the file number from the subject line right away. (That can't be good) It's the one with all of the insureds (three of them) and all of the plaintiffs (four of them). Yikes.
By Andrew E. Feske of McMickle, Kurey and Branch, LLP on Monday, April 30, 2018.
By Chandler L. Smith of McMickle, Kurey and Branch, LLP on Monday, April 30, 2018.
The Florida Supreme Court recently adopted a new standard for determining whether a state or common law claim against an interstate cargo carrier is preempted by the Carmack Amendment, 49 U.S.C. § 11706, et seq. In Mlinar v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 186 So. 3d 997 (Fla. 2016), the court was tasked with determining whether Ivana Mlinar, a well-known oil painter, could bring claims against UPS for conversion, profiting by criminal activity, unauthorized publication of name or likeness, and violations of Florida's Deceptive and unfair Trade Practices Act.
By Michael P. Johnson of McMickle, Kurey and Branch, LLP on Monday, April 30, 2018.
Contrary to popular belief, the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations do not require post-accident drug and alcohol testing of commercial motor vehicle drivers in all instances. If the driver does not receive a citation, no testing is required unless a fatality results from the accident. Even if the driver is cited, no testing is required unless a vehicle must be towed from the scene or someone requires immediate medical treatment away from the scene.

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