Source: https://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-supreme-court/198/508.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 17:14:16+00:00

Document:
[198 U.S. 508, 509] Messrs. Carlos S. Hardy and Laurence G. Goodhart for plaintiff in error.
[198 U.S. 508, 513] Messrs. Otto H. Droege and J. Lawrence Friedmann for defendant in error.
These contentions may be said to have the same ultimate foundation, but regarding them as separate and independent, the first is based on the ground that plaintiff in error derived the right, from its contract with Meyer, to the testimony of the physicians, which right attended the contract in whatever forum suit upon the contract might be brought. This is certainly debatable. The general rule is that all matters respecting the remedy and admissibility of evidence depend upon the law of the state where the suit is brought.
Northern P. R. Co. v. Babcock, 154 U.S. 190 , 38 L. ed. 958, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 978; Wilcox v. Hunt, 13 Pet. 378, 10 L. ed. 209; Pritchard v. Norton, 106 U.S. 124 , 27 L. ed 104, 1 Sup. Ct. Rep. 102; Bank of the United States v. Donnally, 8 Pet. 361, 8 L. ed. 974.
2. The ground of this contention is not made clear. The language of counsel points to the contract clause of the Constitution as that relied on, and to render it available makes the law of Illinois the obligation of the contract of insurance. But this can only be upon the supposition, which we have seen is erroneous, that the certificate of insurance was an Illinois contract, not a New York contract. Being a New York contract, the Code sections did not impair its obligation. They were enacted before the contract was executed, and if they were a valid exercise of legislative power, and we have no doubt they were, it was competent for the state to enact the rule of evidence expressed in them. The case is in this narrow compass, and we need not further follow the details of the argument of counsel that the obligation of the contract of insurance was impaired. But we may observe that there is no question in the case of the validity or the enforcement of the provision in the certificate of insurance against suicide. It is only of the testimony offered to prove suicide. Plaintiff in error sought to prove it by the testimony of a physician, and the attempt encountered the New York Code and the questions we have discussed.
However this may be, in cases like that at bar, we accept the construction the state courts give to state statutes. It is manifest that the question submitted involves the construction of the state statute. Plaintiff in error is not helped by the decision in Foley v. Royal Arcanum, 151 N. Y. 196, 56 Am. St. Rep. 621, 45 N. E. 456. It was there decided that a waiver in a policy of insurance was valid under 834 and 836, as they then stood, and their subsequent amendment did not affect the waiver. But the certificate of insurance in the case at bar was made after the amendment to 836. In Holden v. Metropolitan L. Ins. Co. 165 N. Y. 13, 58 N. E. 771, it was held that the statute, by virtue of the amendment, 'in positive and express terms, requires the waiver to be made upon or at the time of the trial or examination,' and 'no one, except the personal representatives of the deceased patient, can waive the provisions of 834, and it can be waived by them only upon the trial or examination where the evidence is offered or received.' Foley v. Royal Arcanum was referred to, and limited to the construction of the statute as it stood before amendment. The opinion of the Court of Appeals in the case at bar follows the Holden Case and distinguishes prior cases.

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.