Source: https://www.rslaw.com/category/articles-and-research/page/2/
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 20:36:46+00:00

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This article offers an overview of the 2018 Saskatchewan decision in Carlson v. Carlson Estate, 2018 SKQB 196.
Carlson reminds us of the importance of preserving evidence of just how “voluntary” a will is. If, in contrast, a particular beneficiary of the will is seen to be too involved in the will’s creation, such impression might lead a court might conclude that there is an issue of potential undue influence.
This involved a testator, Mabel Carlson, who had executed a will in 1975. This will named one of her children, Brian, as executor. It left her estate property to the testator’s children equally, if her husband predeceased her. Some later codicils were executed by testator over the years, but they did not otherwise affect the estate’s distribution of property.
In 2011, Mabel executed a radically different will, naming another child Warren as executor, and leaving bulk of her estate to Warren. $1,000.00 went to each of her grandchildren.. The testator also executed a power of attorney, making Warren and his wife the testator’s representatives. The testator also made Warren a beneficiary of her retirement income fund.
Whether there was undue influence exerted on Mabel in the execution of the 2011 will.
Brian’s application challenge the will was granted in part. It was found that a trial regarding undue influence should proceed.
The Court of Queen’s Bench began by noting the purpose of the court’s role, whenever a will is challenged. Brian had applied for an order that the 2011 will be proven in solemn form. Such an order would necessitate a long and expensive trial on the will’s validity. To justify this, an applicant like Brian must, at the first hearing, establish that there is a genuine issue to be tried.
In other words, the “first hearing” stage of a will challenge is to weed out those cases which do not raise a genuine issue. By weeding out these meritless challenges, such avoids unwarranted delays in the distribution of an estate.
Should be a trial on the issue of Mabel’s capacity?
Thus, the question was – did Brian’s evidence point to some fact which, if accepted at trial, would tend to negative testamentary capacity, or support a finding of undue influence.
34 Given the detail with which Mr. Peet attests to Mabel’s understanding of the extent of her estate and the beneficiaries, I find that Warren has provided the evidence required to overcome the suspicion with respect to testamentary capacity. I am persuaded through the uncontradicted evidence of Mr. Peet that Mabel understood the extent of her estate and who might benefit therefrom. Mr. Peet had taken instructions from Mabel a number of years earlier and on more than one occasion. In May of 2011 there was no confusion regarding who the members of her family were, what her property consisted of or how a distribution would operate.
As there was sufficient evidence that Mabel had testamentary capacity when she signed the disputed will on May 20, 2011, there was no genuine issue to be tried regarding capacity.
Should there be a trial of the issue of whether Mable was subject to undue influence?
The Court noted that undue influence can usually be discovered by examining the circumstances leading up to the preparation of the will, or by looking at the relationship that existed between the testator and beneficiaries.
The Court found that the attending solicitor who drew Mabel’s 2011 will, had not offered detailed evidence on the issue of how voluntary Mabel’s 2011 instructions had been.
To the contrary, Mabel’s sister-in-law, provided an affidavit. It referred to Mabel becoming more dependent on others as she aged, and becoming more easily influenced as a result. The sister-in-law had witnessed Warren demanding that Mabel sign a document without allowing her to read it, and Mabel reluctantly complying after what she described as “his constant demands.” There was also evidence that Warren became “very controlling of which family members could visit” Mabel.
26 I find that there are suspicious circumstances here. These include that Warren brought Mabel to Mr. Peet’s office where there was a change in course of a dramatic nature regarding Mabel’s testamentary dispositions completely in Warren’s favour. Mabel went from scrupulously including all of her living children in 1975 through to 2001 to removing all of them except Warren in 2011. The purported cause of this was a belief that the remaining children were “millionaires”, based on what Mabel reportedly told Mr. Peet, yet there is no evidence this is true.
48 …I therefore find that the suspicious circumstances and accompanying evidence, some of which postdates the May 2011 attendance at Mr. Peet’s office, have not been rebutted by the evidence provided by Warren. There is a genuine issue requiring a trial with respect to the issue of influence Warren had on Mabel and whether her choices were that of someone who exercised free and voluntary decision making in the circumstances of this matter.
In short, there was a genuine issue for a trial. It was whether undue influence was exerted on Mabel.
Given this, the Court ordered a trial in relation to the issue of undue influence regarding Mabel’s will executed in May of 2011.
Carlson reminds us of the important role played by the solicitor who prepares a will. Such solicitor interacts with the testator, at the time most critical to assessing capacity. The observations that said solicitor does, or does not note down, can prove all the difference.
Whose idea was it, for you to prepare this (new) will?
Why are you deciding to make these specific gifts?
(If the new will contains dramatic changes from an older will) Why are these changes being made now?
Has anyone tried to influence or pressure you, on the issue of your will?
All these questions (and their answers) would be discussed between the lawyer and the testator, in total privacy. Things like how the testator answers, including body language, or hesitancy, may also be recorded.
The above is for general information only. Parties should seek specific legal advice prior to taking action in specific situations. For more information or for specific legal advice, please contact James Steele at 1 (306) 933- 1338 and j.steele@rslaw.com.
Robertson Stromberg LLP offers legal advice and representation in all areas of law, including significant experience in estate litigation.
Copyright 2018 by the author. All rights reserved. Reproduction of any material herein without permission of the author is prohibited.
 See Sample, Re (1955), 15 W.W.R. 193 (Sask. C.A.) (WL) at para 13.
 See Lamontagne v. Lamontagne (1996), 150 Sask. R. 85 (Sask. Q.B.) at para 30.
This article offers an overview of the 2018 Saskatchewan decision in Klassen v. Estate of John Arnold Wiers, 2018 SKQB 32, 288 A.C.W.S. (3d) 598.
Klassen was a decision which turned on a careful assembling of the evidence. While there was no single piece of magic evidence, Klassen reminds parties how methodical gathering of clues as to a testator’s intent, can ultimately successfully rebut a challenge.
Klassen involved a deceased who had a wife and two children (a daughter and son). By the time of the deceased’s death, both the wife and the son had predeceased him. The deceased was therefore survived by his daughter, who lived out of province, and by a daughter in law, with whom the deceased was close.
On August 12, 2015, the deceased executed a will. In it, the deceased named his former pastor as executor. The will gave certain farmland to the daughter in law, but no land to the daughter. After the deceased died, on December 14, 2016, the Executor obtained Letters Probate from the Court of Queen’s Bench.
The daughter sought a determination of the testamentary intentions of the deceased and, in the alternative, sought an order for proof in solemn form of the deceased’s will.
The daughter believed that her parents had always intended that she and her brother were to inherit the farmland. The daughter also claimed that the deceased lacked testamentary capacity at time that he executed the will, due to dementia or Alzheimer’s disease.
The daughter suggested that the provisions of the will showed confusion by the deceased. For instance, the daughter claimed that the deceased did not own a car at the time he executed the will, despite gifting it in the will.
After a full hearing, the daughter’s application was dismissed.
The terms of the will were consistent with the deceased’s wishes for the land, dating back twenty years, according to his financial adviser.
Apart from these instances of positive countervailing evidence provided by the defender of the will, the court also noted certain weaknesses in the daughter’s own evidence.
Finally, on the issue of undue influence, the daughter had adduced no firsthand or specific evidence of undue influence by daughter-in-law or by executor over the deceased. Moreover, there was no evidence to suggest that the daughter-in-law, or executor, was involved in preparing the will.
Klassen is a reminder of just how “fact-based” challenges to wills can be. Many estate disputes do not contain “magic bullets”, or single pieces of devastating evidence which alone suffice to prove a testator’s intentions.
The process of interview, and getting affidavits, from those who had spoken with the deceased regarding his estate intentions (e.g. for example, the evidence from the deceased’s financial adviser, etc).
The evidence compiled thus showed that the terms of the will were consistent with the deceased’s longstanding wishes to leave farmland to daughter-in-law and her family.
While no single piece of evidence in Klassen made the difference, together they showed a portrait of a testator, who had always intended to gift his farmland to his daughter in law. Parties involved in a will challenge, should make a global assessment of all available evidence, before starting off on their challenge, or, their defence.
The above is for general information only. Parties should seek legal advice prior to taking action in specific situations. For more information or for specific legal advice, please contact James Steele at 1 (306) 933-1338 and j.steele@rslaw.com.
Robertson Stromberg LLP offers legal advice and representation in all areas of law, including experience in estate litigation.
This article offers an overview of the 2018 Saskatchewan Court of Appeal decision in Karpinski v. Zookewich Estate, 2018 SKCA 56.
Karpinski offers helpful reminders to parties who wish to challenge a Will based on a concern that the testator was subjected to undue influence. Namely, Karpinski reminds parties that while certain “general” concerns may be genuinely troubling to them as a family member of the deceased, such unease may not provide the actual “evidence” required to convince a court.
The deceased (Ernie) had died in his early eighties. Ernie had been a lifelong bachelor and had two siblings, a brother (Ed) and a sister (Mary). Ernie worked hard in his life, and at his death in 2016, he owned eleven quarters of farmland.
As I have not left anything to my brother [Ed], I wish to confirm that the reason for doing so is because I feel my brother is well off and has no need for further funds or assets. I also ask my sister Mary and her husband Al to give consideration to sharing my estate bequeathed to them herein, with their children and grandchildren.
The year before Ernie died, Ed discovered that Ernie was living in a nursing home. Ed later said that Ernie told him that this was Mary’s decision and not Ernie’s own. It was also at this time that Ed became aware that an auction of farm equipment was taking place at the family farm. It appears that this auction led to considerable friction in the family, as Ed believed Ernie still owed him $55,000 for co-owned equipment Ed had left behind on the farm.
According to Ed, when he spoke to Ernie about this, Ernie stated that he would pay Ed the money he owed and that all of his nieces and nephews were to have a share in his estate. Ed also stated that on multiple occasions, Mary was present when Ernie said that he was giving all of his assets to his nieces and nephews, including Ed’s daughter, Christine.
When Ernie died, his Will left all to Mary and her husband, Al. Ed brought an application to make Al and Mary prove the Will in solemn form (i.e. to incur the full delay and expense of a trial, which would prove the will was the voluntary and capacitated result of Ernie’s wishes). Ed argued that Mary and Al, had exerted pressure on the deceased, when Ernie made his will.
The matter went to a hearing before the Queen’s Bench judge in Chambers. In the resulting decision (reported at Karpinski v. Lozinski , 2017 SKQB 278 (Sask. Q.B.)), the Chambers judge denied Ed’s challenge.
The Chambers judge first set out the test for dealing with Will challenges. Namely, the challenger must “point to some evidence which, if accepted at trial, would tend to negative testamentary capacity or support a finding of undue influence” (see Bachman v. Scheidt, 2016 SKCA 150,  2 W.W.R. 301 (Sask. C.A.) at para 16).
The Chambers judge also noted that the court, in looking at the evidence, should focus on the evidence dating from the time of when the deceased actually executed the Will. Here, the Chambers judge stated that the best evidence came from his lawyer’s file and preparation documents (as these documents were obviously made at the same time as the Will).
 … There is nothing in the file to suggest any concern with respect to testamentary capacity, and indeed there was an execution by Mr. Kyba [the lawyer who drew Ernie’s Will] of a certificate that provided the testator had the capacity to understand the nature and effect of the Power of Attorney he was signing. That is not to say that the requirements of capacity for a Power of Attorney are the same as the requirements for capacity of a Will. It does, however, go a long way towards the question of capacity.
When it came to the issue of undue influence, the Chambers judge held that the actual direct and firsthand evidence before him did not support a finding that Mary or Al had exercised any undue influence at the time of the Will. Further, any contradictory evidence regarding certain events that occurred years after the signing of the Will was “peripheral” to the issues in this application.
Ed appealed this decision. However, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, on the same grounds as the Chambers judge.
Ed’s contention that Ernie did not like Mary’s husband was Ed’s subjective opinion only and does not support evidence of actual exertion of undue influence (para 48).
Second, Ed argued that the Chambers judge erred when he only examined the issue of testamentary capacity, instead of also whether Ernie had the requisite knowledge and approval of the Will’s provisions.
… None of the circumstances alleged by the applicant create suspicion in the mind of the Court that Ernie knew and approved [sic] the contents of his Will. The cumulative effect of the arguments made in this regard do not advance the notion that a genuine issue to be tried exists with respect to testamentary capacity.
Even if the Chambers judge had only examined the issue of testamentary capacity as alleged by Ed, the presence proof of Ernie’s capacity, combined with execution, was enough to discharge the burden of validity. This was since the testator’s knowledge and approval will, in this case, be presumed by a court.
To this, Ed argued that, since Mr Kyba, the lawyer, had predeceased Ernie, there was no actual proof that the Will was read over by Ernie and that Ernie understood it.
Mr. Kyba had the opportunity to observe Ernie twice and signed the Independent Legal Advice and Witness Certificate for the Power of Attorney with respect to Ernie’s capacity to understand the nature and effect of the Power of Attorney.
There is one rule which has always been laid down by the Courts having to deal with wills, and that is, that a person who is instrumental in the framing of a will, and who obtains a bounty by that will, is placed in a different position from other ordinary legatees who are not called upon to substantiate the truth and honesty of the transaction as regards their legacies. But there is a farther onus upon those who take for their own benefit, after having been instrumental in preparing or obtaining a will. They have thrown upon them the onus of shewing the righteousness of the transaction.
In other words, if you are a beneficiary of a will, and are also instrumental in preparing or obtaining a will, you will bear the burden to show evidence of the validity of that Will.
However, the Court of Appeal dismissed this argument. First, the Court of Appeal noted certain academic commentary that the doctrine of righteousness “appears to be falling from judicial vogue.” Moreover, in any event, the Chambers judge had found that Mary had not given instructions for the preparation of the Will, nor was she involved in its execution.
Thus, as Mary was not instrumental in the generation of Ernie’s Will, and there were no suspicious circumstances, the doctrine of righteousness was not even triggered in this case.
Ed’s appeal was dismissed. The Will was permitted to proceed to probate, as Ed’s challenge had been dismissed.
What can we learn from Karpinski v. Zookewich Estate? One primary take-away, is a reminder of just how high a burden will rest on someone who is alleging “undue influence.” To recap, undue influence involves one person taking advantage of a position of power over another (often vulnerable or elderly) person. If a person has pressured a person in the making of their Will, so that the resulting terms are not the voluntary wishes of the testator (i.e. undue influence), the Will is invalid.
However, in the context of challenging a Will, courts will require first hand and compelling evidence of undue influence. This presents a practical problem – how often can you find direct evidence of acts of coercion? Such acts generally, if they occur, would take place in private.
This question of gathering actual evidence of undue influence, was central to Karpinski. Certain potential facts legitimately caused a family member concern. For instance, Ed was concerned by comments that Ernie allegedly made, suggesting that Mary had prepared his Will. Or, Ed was likely concerned by how much the actual Will, departed from Ernie’s apparent intention to gift part of his property to all his nieces and nephews.
However, from a legal perspective, these facts did not rise to the level of direct and clear evidence of actual instances of coercion exerted by Mary and her husband. Moreover, they were rebutted by the compelling evidence of the notes taken by Ernie’s independent solicitor, which showed that Ernie had authored his own Will, without Mary’s involvement, etc.
To summarize, parties considering challenging a Will, should therefore pause to reflect whether their “general” concerns of how a testator may have been coerced, will actually provide a court with affirmative evidence, of “specific” acts of improper pressure actually committed on specific dates, locations, etc.
The above is for general information only. Parties should seek legal advice prior to taking action in specific situations.
This articles offers an overview of the 2018 Court of Appeal decision in Olson v. Skarsgard Estate, 2018 SKCA 64.
Olson offers an important reminder to parties involved in estate litigation. Namely, one should always check to make sure you have the legal “standing” to formally challenge a Will.
Olson involved the estate of a deceased, who had been a successful farmer. The deceased had been diagnosed with terminal esophageal cancer in October 2015. The deceased married his long time partner a few months later in March 2016. The deceased had already had a child with his partner previously, and they had been co-habiting together as a couple for a lengthy period of time.
The deceased then made his last will and testament appointing his wife as the executor and as the sole beneficiary of the estate. The deceased died mere months after his marriage, in May 2016. His wife applied for letters probate of the will, which would leave her the estate.
The deceased’s sister opposed the probate application and disputed the nature of the relationship between the deceased and his wife. The sister also claimed that her brother was not the father of the wife’s daughter. The sister applied for an order for proof in solemn form, which would require that the wife formally prove the validity of the 2016 will in a trial. This type of application requires a challenger – the sister – to present evidence showing a “genuine issue” with the will’s validity.
In response to these allegations, the wife responded by presenting clear evidence of her long relationship with the deceased, which went back some 16 years. As well, the lawyer who prepared the will swore an affidavit as to his involvement in that process, and his observations of the deceased at that time. The lawyer stated that he had had no concerns about the deceased’s capacity to instruct him or to execute the will.
Other evidence also indicated the deceased had publicly acknowledged his common law relationship with his wife, and had acknowledged the daughter as his own daughter as early as 2005. The evidence adduced by the wife also included an earlier holographic will executed on November 21, 2015, under which the deceased would also have left his entire estate to his wife and her three children.
Decision of Court of Queen’s Bench.
In the Court of Queen’s Bench, the Chambers’ judge rejected the sister’s challenge to the will. Put simply, no “genuine issue” regarding the will had been demonstrated. The Court found that the deceased and his wife had cohabited for two years or more before marriage. There was compelling evidence showing the validity of this marriage, and showing the spousal relationship, and the paternity of the child.
Given this evidence, the Chambers judge found there was “absolutely no evidence” showing that the deceased’s marriage was invalid. As such, there was no triable issue with respect to testamentary capacity, or any other ground that might impugn the validity of the will.
Secondly, however, the Chambers’ judge made another important procedural ruling. Namely, the Chambers’ judge found that the sister did not have the “standing” to challenge the will. Namely, even if the challenged will was found to be not valid, the deceased still had a valid wife, and a daughter who would have inherited his estate. Thus, the sister was not in a position to be affected by the question of whether the 2016 will was found valid, or not. She consequently had no standing to bring the challenge.
Having made these determinations, the Chambers’ judge then turned of the issue of what costs the court should award. As the wife had been successful, the Chambers’ judge ordered the sister to pay the solicitor-client costs of the wife. Orders for “solicitor-client costs” require a losing litigant to pay the full amount that a winning party has paid to their lawyer. Orders for “solicitor-client costs” are relatively rare, as most lawsuits in Saskatchewan see a winner receive only a partial percentage of their fees from the losing party.
In justifying this exceptional award, the Chambers’ judge relied on the fact that the sister “had neither standing nor valid justification for causing delay and expense to her brother’s widow and her children”.
Who has “standing” to challenge Wills?
The sister appealed. That brings us to the Court of Appeal decision in Olson v. Skarsgard Estate.
The Court of Appeal agreed with the Chambers’ judge, and found that that the sister lacked standing to seek proof of will in solemn form.
16-46 A person who is or may be interested in the estate of a deceased person may give notice for the will to be proven in solemn form.
Any person who would be entitled under a resulting intestacy, if the challenged will were held invalid.
21 In each case, the court must determine whether a person “is or may be interested in the estate of a deceased person” on the basis of the evidence adduced. This means a person who seeks to have a will proven in solemn form bears the evidentiary and persuasive burden of establishing that he or she has standing to do so. That is, the person must present enough evidence to satisfy the court that he or she is or may be interested in the estate. For example, a person claiming to have an interest in an estate if it were administered in intestacy would have to adduce evidence sufficient to establish a relationship to the testator that satisfies the foremost applicable rule under the hierarchy of rules of succession set out in The Intestate Succession Act, 1996, SS 1996, c I-13.2. Regardless of the context, a person seeking to have a will proven in solemn form must do more than merely assert that they have or may have an interest in the estate. They must adduce evidence sufficient to support that inference.
That the deceased might not be the biological father of his daughter.
Only if all three of these findings had been shown to the Chambers judge, would it be possible to conclude that the sister might be the deceased’s sole surviving next-of-kin, and thus possessed of “standing”. Moreover, even then, the sister would still have had to show evidence of a genuine issue surrounding the will’s validity (which the sister did not).
In the result, therefore, the sister had no direct relationship to the deceased’s estate, as to confer standing on her.
Should solicitor-client costs be ordered, without proof of scandalous litigation conduct?
The Court of Appeal did offer a partial victory to the sister. As a reminder, the sister had been ordered in Chambers to pay the wife’s entire costs. On appeal, however, the Court of Appeal declared that this award of solicitor-client costs had not been appropriate.
Notwithstanding point 3, solicitor and client costs may be awarded in exceptional cases to provide the other party complete indemnification for costs reasonably incurred.
 Solicitor-client costs must not be awarded casually and, in my view, never without reasons as to why they are being awarded and an identification of the conduct which is said to warrant them. The Chambers judge should have offered a clear explanation as to his perceived basis for awarding solicitor-client costs. He did not do so.
As such, the award of solicitor and client costs was set aside, and in its place was substituted an award of party and party costs (meaning, the sister only had to pay the tariff (partial) costs of the wife).
Olson offers an reminder of the importance of “standing.” Standing is the ability of a party to show a sufficient connection regarding a given legal dispute, as to justify that party’s participation in that lawsuit.
As such, “standing” is a key threshold inquiry for any party to make. Emotions can run high in estate matters, and a party might be immediately driven by a sense to proceed to court, in order to “right the wrongs” perceived in a given will, etc. However, any party should take a moment to first ask, whether they are indeed within that category of people who can legitimately make such a legal challenge. A basic first question might be put as follows – ask what will happen if you successfully overturn a given will. If you then stand to inherit, you likely have standing. If you do not, you may be best advised not to commence a formal legal challenge.
 Hope v. Pylypow, 2015 SKCA 26, 457 Sask. R. 55.
One of the key ways in which risk is allocated on a construction project is through insurance, typically in the form of builder’s risk, course of construction, or “all-risk” property policies. In most cases, the responsibility for obtaining insurance coverage is set out in a parties’ construction contract. It is common for these contracts to require a policy holder to add others, such as the owner or a subcontractor, as named insureds, which then affords this party the benefit of coverage. By ensuring all parties can be indemnified by a common insurer, there should be, in theory, less disputes over who is responsible for a loss on a construction project when such a loss occurs, which should allow construction projects, even in the event of loss, to proceed in a timely manner.
In Jacobs v. Leboeuf Properties Inc., an Ontario court had an opportunity to consider who should be responsible for a loss, on a construction project, when the owner fails to obtain the insurance coverage stipulated in the prime contract.
1. The Owner executed a contract with a General Contractor to demolish and replace a residential property located in the City of Toronto.
The Owner shall purchase and maintain property . . . insurance in a form acceptable to the Construction Manager upon the entire Project for the full cost of replacement as of the time of any loss. This insurance shall include, as named insureds, the Owner, the Construction Manager, Trade Contractors, and their Trade Subcontractors and shall insure against loss from the perils of Fire, Extended Coverage, and shall include builder’s risk insurance for physical loss or damage including, without duplication of coverage, at least theft, vandalism, malicious mischief, transit, collapse, and where applicable, flood, earthquake testing, and damage resulting from defective design, workmanship or material. . .
3. The Owner did not include the General Contractor as a named insured.
4. Although it appears the demolition work scope was completed without issue, the Owner alleged that there were numerous issues with the workmanship of the General Contractor, which caused the Owner to suffer property damage.
5. Ultimately the Owner sued the General Contractor, alleging that the General Contractor was responsible for paying the Owner the costs incurred to correct this property damage.
6. The General Contractor then brought a court application to dismiss the lawsuit on the basis that the costs the Owner was claiming should have been covered by the Owner’s property insurance policy and, more particularly, on the basis that the General Contractor was supposed to be included as a named insured under that policy.
7. In response, the Owner argued that even if it had obtained a builder’s risk policy, the type of property damage that occurred would have been excluded from coverage.
Ultimately the Court agreed with the General Contractor and dismissed the Owner’s action. According to the judge, the Owner had clearly agreed to obtain a builder’s risk policy indemnifying the parties, including the General Contractor, from “damage resulting from defective design, workmanship or material”. The fact a “hypothetical” insurance policy may not have covered the loss was not important. Rather, by failing to obtain insurance, the Owner had voluntarily assumed the risk of loss. As such, even if the General Contractor was negligent, it could not be held liable. Jacobs is a timely reminder for both owners, as well as general contractors, who in many cases are responsible for obtaining builder’s risk policies, of the importance of ensuring that contract provisions, relating to who must obtain insurance as well as who must be added as an insured under an insurance policy, are followed.
This article provides a Saskatchewan estate litigation update, offering a brief synopsis of the 2018 Saskatchewan decision in Figley v. Figley, 2018 SKQB 102, 21 C.P.C. (8th) 149.
Figley v. Figley reminds estate litigators of the important “wills exception” to solicitor-client privilege, which can ensure key solicitor records are producible, as long as they relate to the intention of a testator.
This case arose out of the estate of Ray Kenneth Figley, who died on October 4, 2007. Eugene Figley, as plaintiff, was attempting to probate what purported to be the Last Will and Testament of Ray Figley (the “Will”). Ronald Figley and Stanley Figley opposed probate, disputing the testamentary nature of the alleged Will.
Ronald Figley requested a court order, allowing Ronald to question a local lawyer (not a party to this action) who had been a witness to the Will now being probated. Ronald Figley requested a court order, first, to examine the lawyer, and second, to obtain certain documents from the lawyer, relating to the preparation and execution of the Will.
5-20(1) The Court may grant leave to question any person who may have information relevant to any matter in issue in the action, other than an expert engaged by or on behalf of a party in preparation for contemplated or pending litigation.
(iii) result in unfairness to the person the applicant seeks to question.
Here, the Court found that the applicant, Ronald, had apparently not made such efforts. Ronald had previously had the chance to question Eugene Figley, in Eugene’s capacity as the purported executor of the estate. Eugene Figley would have been obliged in such questioning, to inform himself of the discussions that the deceased had with his lawyer surrounding the Will, including documents prepared by the lawyer.
However, in that previous questioning opportunity, Ronald Figley did not ask any questions of Eugene Figley to attempt to obtain this information. Thus, Ronald had not satisfied this precondition. Ronald’s application to question the third party lawyer, failed on this basis.
This then left the second part of Ronald’s application. It was a request for an order requiring the local lawyer, as a non-party, to produce certain documents relating to the Will’s execution.
(c) the person who has possession, custody or control of the document might be required to produce it at trial.
The third-party lawyer had resisted the application, noting the sanctity of the solicitor-client relationship, and the privilege that attaches to documents surrounding the making of the Will.
However, the Court rejected any defence of privilege. The Court noted the decision in Geffen v. Goodman Estate,  2 S.C.R. 353 (SCC), and other Canadian case law. In such previous decisions, Canadian courts had established a so-called “wills exception” to privilege. The principled basis for such an exception, was that if privilege were automatically upheld, such would prevent a court from seeing documents which could shed light on the true intention of a testator’s intention over their estate. As such, the lawyer’s documents were ordered disclosed.
Figley emphasizes a useful tool available to parties involved in disputes over a Will’s validity. Namely, a key source of evidence of a deceased testator’s intentions, or voluntariness, can sometimes be found in the lawyer’s documents which were created when a Will was made.
Such documents would ordinarily be privileged, but are subject to a “wills exception.” This means that if the documents are capable of showing a deceased’s intentions for their estate, they may be produced to shed light for a court. As such, parties should consider if such documents exist in their Will dispute, and may wish to take steps to determine their contents. As shown in Figley, it may be that a formal court application is required, however.

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