Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/198/253/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 15:53:07+00:00

Document:
Even though the Fifth Amendment does apply to one seeking entrance to this country, and to deny him admission may deprive him of liberty, due process of law does not necessarily require a judicial trial, and Congress may entrust the decision of his right to enter to an executive officer.
Under the Chinese exclusion and the immigration laws, where a person of Chinese descent asks admission to the United States, claiming that he is a native born citizen thereof, and the lawfully designated officers finds that he is not, and upon appeal that finding is approved by the Secretary of Commerce and Labor, and it does not appear that there was any abuse of discretion, such finding and action of the executive officers should be treated by the courts as having been made by a competent tribunal, with due process of law, and as final and conclusive, and in habeas corpus proceedings, commenced thereafter and based solely on the ground of the applicant's alleged citizenship, the court should dismiss the writ and not direct new and further evidence as to the question of citizenship.
A person whose right to enter the United States is questioned under the immigration laws is to be regarded as if he had stopped at the limit of its jurisdiction, although physically he may be within its boundaries.
"First. Should a district court of the United States grant a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person of Chinese descent being held for return to China by the steamship company which brought him therefrom, who, having recently arrived at a port of the United States, made application to land as a native-born citizen thereof, and who, after examination by the duly authorized immigration officers, was found by them not to have been born in the United States, was denied admission, and ordered deported, which finding and action upon appeal was affirmed by the Secretary of Commerce and Labor, when the foregoing facts appear to the court, and the petition for the writ alleges unlawful detention on the sole ground that petitioner does not come within the restrictions of the Chinese exclusion acts, because born in and a citizen of the United States, and does not allege or show in any other way unlawful action or abuse of their discretion or powers by the immigration officers who excluded him?"
court of the United States dismiss the writ, or should it direct a new or further hearing upon evidence to be presented where the writ had been granted in behalf of a person of Chinese descent being held by the steamship company for return to China, from whence it brought him, who recently arrived from that country, and asked permission to land, upon the ground that he was born in and was a citizen of the United States, when the uncontradicted return and answer show that such person was granted a hearing by the proper immigration officers, who found he was not born in the United States, that his application for admission was considered and denied by such officers, and that the denial was affirmed upon appeal to the Secretary of Commerce and Labor, and where nothing more appears to show that such executive officers failed to grant a proper hearing, abused their discretion, or acted in any unlawful or improper way upon the case presented to them for determination?"
"Third. In a habeas corpus proceeding in a district court of the United States, instituted in behalf of a person of Chinese descent being held for return to China by the steamship company which recently brought him therefrom to a port of the United States, and who applied for admission therein upon the ground that he was a native-born citizen thereof, but who, after a hearing, the lawfully designated immigration officers found was not born therein, and to whom they denied admission, which finding and denial, upon appeal to the Secretary of Commerce and Labor, was affirmed, should the court treat the finding and action of such executive officers upon the question of citizenship and other questions of fact as having been made by a tribunal authorized to decide the same, and as final and conclusive unless it be made affirmatively to appear that such officers, in the case submitted to them, abused the discretion vested in them, or, in some other way, in hearing and determining the same, committed prejudicial error?"
that no abuse of authority of any kind is alleged. That being out of the case, the first of them is answered by the case of United States v. Sing Tuck, 194 U. S. 161, 194 U. S. 170: "A petition for habeas corpus ought not to be entertained unless the court is satisfied that the petitioner can make out at least a prima facie case." This petition should have been denied on this ground, irrespective of what more we have to say, because it alleged nothing except citizenship. It disclosed neither abuse of authority nor the existence of evidence not laid before the Secretary. It did not even set forth that evidence, or allege its effect. But, as it was entertained, and the district court found for the petitioner, it would be a severe measure to order the petition to be dismissed on that ground now, and we pass on to further considerations.
"That Congress may exclude aliens of a particular race from the United States, prescribe the terms and conditions upon which certain classes of aliens may come to this country, establish regulations for sending out of the country such aliens as come here in violation of law, and commit the enforcement of such provisions, conditions, and regulations exclusively to executive officers, without judicial intervention are principles firmly established by the decisions of this Court."
across the territory of the United States was conclusive, and, still more to the point, in Lem Moon Sing v. United States, 158 U. S. 538, where the petitioner for habeas corpus alleged facts which, if true, gave him a right to enter and remain in the country, it was held that the decision of the collector was final as to whether or not he belonged to the privileged class.
It is true that it may be argued that these cases are not directly conclusive of the point now under decision. It may be said that the parties concerned were aliens, and that, although they alleged absolute rights, and facts which it was contended went to the jurisdiction of the officer making the decision, still their rights were only treaty or statutory rights, and therefore were subject to the implied qualification imposed by the later statute, which made the decision of the collector with regard to them final. The meaning of the cases, and the language which we have quoted, is not satisfied by so narrow an interpretation, but we do not delay upon them. They can be read.
It is established, as we have said, that the act purports to make the decision of the Department final, whatever the ground on which the right to enter the country is claimed -- as well when it is citizenship as when it is domicil -- and the belonging to a class excepted from the exclusion acts. United States v. Sing Tuck, 194 U. S. 161, 194 U. S. 167; Lem Moon Sing v. United States, 158 U. S. 538, 158 U. S. 546-547. It also is established by the former case and others which it cites that the relevant portion of the Act of August 18, 1894, c. 301, is not void as a whole. The statute has been upheld and enforced. But the relevant portion being a single section, accomplishing all its results by the same general words, must be valid as to all that it embraces, or altogether void. An exception of a class constitutionally exempted cannot be read into those general words merely for the purpose of saving what remains. That has been decided over and over again. United States v. Reese, 92 U. S. 214, 92 U. S. 221; Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U. S. 82, 100 U. S. 98-99; Allen v.
Louisiana, 103 U. S. 80, 103 U. S. 84; United States v. Harris, 106 U. S. 629, 106 U. S. 641-642; Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U. S. 269, 114 U. S. 305; Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U. S. 678, 120 U. S. 685-689; Smiley v. Kansas, 196 U. S. 447, 196 U. S. 455. It necessarily follows that, when such words are sustained, they are sustained to their full extent.
In view of the cases which we have cited it seems no longer open to discuss the question propounded as a new one. Therefore, we do not analyze the nature of the right of a person presenting himself at the frontier for admission. In re Ross, 140 U. S. 453, 140 U. S. 464. But it is not improper to add a few words. The petitioner, although physically within our boundaries, is to be regarded as if he had been stopped at the limit of our jurisdiction, and kept there while his right to enter was under debate. If, for the purpose of argument, we assume that the Fifth Amendment applies to him, and that to deny entrance to a citizen is to deprive him of liberty, we nevertheless are of opinion that with regard to him due process of law does not require judicial trial. That is the result of the cases which we have cited, and the almost necessary result of the power of Congress to pass exclusion laws. That the decision may be entrusted to an executive officer, and that his decision is due process of law, was affirmed and explained in Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U. S. 651, 142 U. S. 660, and in Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U. S. 698, 149 U. S. 713, before the authorities to which we already have referred. It is unnecessary to repeat the often-quoted remarks of Mr. Justice Curtis, speaking for the whole Court in Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 18 How. 272, 59 U. S. 280, to show that the requirement of a judicial trial does not prevail in every case. Lem Moon Sing v. United States, 158 U. S. 538, 158 U. S. 546-547; Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U. S. 86, 189 U. S. 100; Public Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U. S. 497, 194 U. S. 508-509.
that the writ should be dismissed, as it should have been dismissed in this case.
the Secretary of Commerce and Labor, and where nothing more appears to show that such executive officers failed to grant a proper hearing, abused their discretion, or acted in any unlawful or improper way upon the case presented to them for determination?"
"Third. In a habeas corpus proceeding in a district court of the United States instituted in behalf of a person of Chinese descent being held for return to China by the steamship company which recently brought him therefrom to a port of the United States, and who applied for admission therein upon the ground that he was a native-born citizen thereof, but who, after a hearing, the lawfully designated immigration officers found was not born therein, and to whom they denied admission, which finding and denial, upon appeal to the Secretary of Commerce and Labor, was affirmed -- should the court treat the finding and action of such executive officers upon the question of citizenship and other questions of fact as having been made by a tribunal authorized to decide the same, and as final and conclusive unless it be made affirmatively to appear that such officers, in the case submitted to them, abused the discretion vested in them, or, in some other way, in hearing and determining the same, committed prejudicial error?"
"immediately upon the arrival of Chinese persons . . . , it shall be the duty of the officer . . . to adopt suitable means to prevent communication with them by any persons other than the officials under his control, to have said Chinese persons examined promptly, as by law provided, touching their right to admission, and to permit those proving such right to land."
"RULE 7. The examination prescribed in Rule 6 should be separate and apart from the public, in the presence of government officials and such witness or witnesses only as the examining officer shall designate, and if, upon the conclusion thereof, the Chinese applicant for admission is adjudged to be inadmissible, he should be advised of his right of appeal, and his counsel should be permitted, after duly filing notice of appeal, to examine, but not make copies of, the evidence upon which the excluding decision is based."
"RULE 8. Every Chinese person refused admission under the provisions of the exclusion laws by the decision of the officer in charge at the port of entry must, if he shall elect to take an appeal to the Secretary, give written notice thereof to said officer within two days after such decision is rendered."
"RULE 9. Notice of appeal provided for in Rule 8 shall act as a stay upon the disposal of the Chinese person whose case is thereby affected until a final decision is rendered by the Secretary; and, within three days after the filing of such notice, unless further delay is required to investigate and report upon new evidence, the complete record of the case, together with such briefs, affidavits, and statements as are to be considered in connection therewith, shall be forwarded to the Commissioner General of Immigration by the officer in charge at the port of arrival, accompanied by his views thereon in writing; but on such appeal no evidence will be considered that has not been made the subject of investigation and report by the said officer in charge."
"RULE 10. Additional time for the preparation of cases after the expiration of three days next succeeding the filing of notice of appeal will be allowed only in those instances in which, in the judgment of said office in charge, a literal compliance with Rule 9 would occasion injustice to the appellant, or the risk of defeat of the purposes of the law, and the reasons for delay beyond the time prescribed shall, in every instance, be stated in writing in the papers forwarded to the Commissioner General of Immigration. "
"RULE 21. The burden of proof in all cases rests upon Chinese persons claiming the right of admission to or residence within the United States to establish such right affirmatively and satisfactorily to the appropriate government officers, and in no case in which the law prescribes the nature of the evidence to establish such right shall other evidence be accepted in lieu thereof, and in every doubtful case the benefit of the doubt shall be given by administrative officers to the United States government."
It will be seen that, under these rules, it is the duty of the immigration officer to prevent communication with the Chinese seeking to land by any one except his own officers. He is to conduct a private examination, with only the witnesses present whom he may designate. His counsel, if, under the circumstances, the Chinaman has been able to procure one, is permitted to look at the testimony, but not to make a copy of it. He must give notice of appeal, if he wishes one, within two days, and within three days thereafter the record is to be sent to the Secretary at Washington, and every doubtful question is to be settled in favor of the government. No provision is made for summoning witnesses from a distance or for taking depositions, and, if, for instance, the person landing at San Francisco was born and brought up in Ohio, it may well be that he would be powerless to find any testimony in San Francisco to prove his citizenship. If he does not happen to have money, he must go without the testimony, and when the papers are sent to Washington (3,000 miles away from the port, which, in this case, was the place of landing), he may no have the means of employing counsel to present his case to the Secretary. If this be not a star-chamber proceeding of the most stringent sort, what more is necessary to make it one?
by a state, and an obnoxious class may be put beyond the protection of the Constitution by ministerial officers of a state, proceeding in strict accord with exactly similar rules.
It will be borne in mind that the petitioner has been judicially determined to be a free-born American citizen, and the contention of the government, sustained by the judgment of this Court, is that a citizen, guilty of no crime -- for it is no crime for a citizen to come back to his native land -- must, by the action of a ministerial officer, be punished by deportation and banishment, without trial by jury and without judicial examination.
"The proceeding before a United States judge, as provided for in section 6 of the act of 1892, is in no proper sense a trial and sentence for a crime or offense. It is simply the ascertainment, by appropriate and lawful means, of the fact whether the conditions exist upon which Congress has enacted that an alien of this class may remain within the country. The order of deportation is not a punishment for crime. It is not a banishment in the sense in which that word is often applied to the expulsion of a citizen from his country by way of punishment."
or for life. It is inflicted principally upon political offenders, 'transportation' being the word used to express a similar punishment of ordinary criminals."
"a species of punishment consisting in removing the criminal from his own country to another (usually a penal colony), there to remain in exile for a prescribed period."
"A punishment by forced exile, either for years or for life; inflicted principally upon political offenders, 'transportation' being the word used to express a similar punishment of ordinary criminals."
"As a man may be deprived of any right whatsoever by way of punishment; exile, which deprives him of the right of dwelling in a certain place, may be inflicted as a punishment; banishment is always one, for a mark of infamy cannot be set on any one but with a view of punishing him for a fault, either real or pretended."
"if a banishment of this sort be not a punishment, and among the severest of punishments, it will be difficult to imagine a doom to which the name can be applied."
and that every such imprisonment is hereby enacted and adjudged to be illegal, . . . and the person or persons who shall knowingly frame, contrive, write, seal, or countersign any warrant for such commitment, detainer, or transportation, or shall so commit, detain, imprison, or transport any person or persons, contrary to this act, or be any ways advising, aiding, or assisting therein, being lawfully convicted thereof shall be disabled from thenceforth to bear any office of trust or profit within the said realm of England, dominion of Wales, or Town of Berwick-upon-Tweed, or any of the islands, territories, or dominions thereunto belonging, and shall incur and sustain the pains, penalties, and forfeitures limited, ordained, and provided in and by statute of provision and praemunire, made in the sixteenth year of King Richard II., and be incapable of any pardon from the king, his heirs or successors, of the said forfeitures, losses, or disabilities, or any of them."
"If she was not an alien immigrant within the intent and meaning of the act of Congress entitled 'An Act in Amendment of the Various Acts Relative to Immigration and the Importation of Aliens under Contract or Agreement to Perform Labor,' approved March 3, 1891, 26 Stat. 1084, c. 551, the commissioner had no power to detain or deport her, and the final order of the circuit court must be reversed."
"That any person alleging himself to be a citizen of the United States, and desiring to return to his country from a foreign land, and that he is prevented from doing so without due process of law, and who, on that ground, applies to any United States court for a writ of habeas corpus, is entitled to have a hearing and a judicial determination of the facts so alleged, and that no act of Congress can be understood or construed as a bar to such hearing and judicial determination."
"Being a citizen, the law could not intend that he should ever look to the government of a foreign country for permission to return to the United States, and no citizen can be excluded from this country except in punishment for crime. Exclusion for any other cause is unknown to our laws, and beyond the power of Congress."
In Ex Parte Tom Tong, 108 U. S. 556, 108 U. S. 559, Mr. Chief Justice Waite said: "The writ of habeas corpus is the remedy which the law gives for the enforcement of the civil right of personal liberty."
"The jurisdiction of the court was not affected by the fact that the collector had passed on the question of allowing the person to land, or by the fact that the treaty provides for diplomatic action in case of a hardship."
"To avoid misconstruction upon so grave a subject, we think it proper to state that we do not consider Congress can either withdraw from judicial cognizance any matter which, from its nature, is the subject of a suit at the common law, or in equity or admiralty; nor, on the other hand, can it bring under the judicial power a matter which, from its nature, is not a subject for judicial determination."
"undoubtedly where life and liberty are involved, due process requires that there be a regular course of judicial proceedings. which imply that the party to be affected shall have notice and an opportunity to be heard."
By Article III, sec. 2 of the Constitution, "the trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury;" and by the Fifth Amendment, "no person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury."
the ministerial officer. Can one who judicially establishes his innocence of any offense be punished for crime by the action of a ministerial officer? Can he be punished because he has failed to show to the satisfaction of that officer that he is innocent of an offense? The Constitution declares that "the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when, in cases of invasion or rebellion, the public safety may require it." There is no rebellion or invasion. Can a citizen be deprived of the benefit of that so much vaunted writ of protection by the action of a ministerial officer?
"if the Chinese person has been born in the United States, neither the immigration acts nor the Chinese exclusion acts prohibiting persons of the Chinese race, and especially Chinese laborers, from coming into the United States, apply to such person."
"The provisions of the laws regulating immigration, excluding those which prescribe payment of the head tax, apply to the residents and natives of Porto Rico and Philippine Islands, and, moreover, the provisions of the laws relating to the exclusion of Chinese apply to all such persons as are of the Chinese race, except those who are born in the United States."
laborers, from coming into the United States, do not and cannot apply to him."
"in every case where an alien is excluded from admission into the United States under any law or treaty now existing or hereafter made, the decision of the appropriate immigration or customs officers, if adverse to the admission of such alien, shall be final, unless reversed on appeal to the Secretary of the Treasury."
The same limitation of finality to the case of aliens is repeated in the Act of March 3, 1903, 32 Stat. 1213. So it appears that this Court discharged from the custody of the immigration officers a person of Chinese descent on the ground that he was a citizen of the United States, doing this upon the concession of the government that, if he was a citizen, the exclusion acts had no application to him; that Congress in terms makes the decision of the immigration officer final only when the party is an alien, and that the rules prescribed by the proper department exclude from the operation of the law citizens of the United States of Chinese descent. Yet, in spite of all this, it is held that this citizen of the United States must, by virtue of the ruling of a ministerial officer, be banished from the country of which he is a citizen. And this upon the ground that such officer has a right to decide whether he is or is not a citizen, and his decision on the question excludes all judicial examination.
"it would seem that the operation of every judgment must depend on the power of the court to render that judgment -- or, in other words, on its jurisdiction over the subject matter, which it has determined. In some cases, that jurisdiction unquestionably depends as well on the state of the thing as on the constitution of the court. If, by any means whatever, a prize court should be induced to condemn, as prize of war, a vessel which was never captured, it could not be contended that this condemnation operated a change of property. Upon principle, then, it would seem that, to a certain extent, the capacity of the court to act upon the thing condemned, arising from its being within or without their jurisdiction as well as the constitution of the court, may be considered by that tribunal which is to decide on the effect of the sentence."
"No valid divorce from the bond of matrimony can be decreed on constructive service by the courts of a state in which neither party is domiciled. And by the law of Pennsylvania, every petitioner for a divorce must have had a bona fide residence within the state for one year next before the filing of the petition. . . . The recital in the proceedings in Pennsylvania of the facts necessary to show jurisdiction may be contradicted. Thompson v. Whitman, 18 Wall. 457."
"Of course, when we speak of the conclusive presumptions attending a patent for lands, we assume that it was issued in a case where the Department had jurisdiction to act and execute it; that is to say, in a case where the lands belonged to the United States, and provision had been made by law for their sale. If they never were public property, or had previously been disposed of, or if Congress had made no provision for their sale, or had reserved them, the Department would have no jurisdiction to transfer them, and its attempted conveyance of them would be inoperative and void, no matter with what seeming regularity the forms of law may have been observed. The action of the Department would in that event be like that of any other special tribunal not having jurisdiction of a case which it had assumed to decide."
It would be an affectation to attempt to cite all the authorities in which this doctrine is announced. In Doolan v. Carr, 125 U. S. 618, decided in 1887, Mr. Justice Miller cites more than a dozen cases as directly in point. Since then, the doctrine has been again and again restated.
as to that fact? Certainly this Court has wasted a great deal of time determining whether a given article was subject to duty or not if the decision of the custom house officers, approved by the Secretary of the Treasury, was a final decision of the question.
guarantees, and if it did so intend, I do not believe that it has the power to do so.

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