Source: https://www.ptab.us/2013/07/
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 08:19:52+00:00

Document:
Moreover, the Examiner’s reliance on In re Harza, 274 F.2d 669 (CCPA 1960) for the principle that mere duplication of parts is within the level of ordinary skill in the relevant art, is inapplicable as Appellants have persuasively proffered a new and unexpected result for the claimed pin cluster arrangement that is not taught by APA or Dickerson, either alone or in combination.
Although we recognize that “[o]bviousness does not require absolute predictability of success ... all that is required is a reasonable expectation of success.” In re Droge, 695 F.3d 1334, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting In re Kubin, 561 F.3d 1351, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (citing In re O'Farrell, 853 F.2d 894, 903-04 (Fed. Cir. 1988)). In the realm of cancer treatment, however, there is insufficient predictability in the art for there to be a reasonable expectation that administering a compound to an animal that is effective for one type of cancer would reasonably provide an expectation of success for the treatment of kidney cancer as claimed.
The scope of claim 10 encompasses any and all (present and future) processing instructions for directing a computer to perform the claimed steps. Yet, Appellants’ Specification discloses at most only those processing instructions known to the inventor. Our reviewing court has concluded that such all-encompassing claims do not comply with the enablement requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph.
Because the count at issue purports to cover all DNAs that code for <>–IF, it is also analogous to a single means claim, which has been held not to comply with the first paragraph of section 112. See In re Hyatt, 708 F. 2d 712,  (Fed. Cir. 1983) (“the enabling disclosure of the specification [must] be commensurate in scope with the claim under consideration.”) Claiming all DNA’s that achieve a result without defining what means will do so is not in compliance with the description requirement; it is an attempt to preempt the future before it has arrived.
Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1171 (Fed. Cir. 2004)(emphasis added).
The long-recognized problem with a single means claim is that it covers every conceivable means for achieving the stated result, while the specification discloses at most only those means known to the inventor. See O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 112, 14 L.Ed. 601 (1853).
In re Hyatt, 708 F.2d 712, 714 (Fed. Cir. 1983)(footnotes omitted).
We note that claims in the standard Beauregard-type computer program product means-plus-function format avoid this enablement problem.
The final paragraph of § 112 saves combination claims drafted using means-plus-function format from this problem by providing a construction of that format narrow enough to avoid the problem of undue breadth as forbidden by the first paragraph. But no provision saves a claim drafted in means-plus-function format which is not drawn to a combination, i.e., a single means claim.
Hyatt, 708 F.2d at 715.
Appellants’ first contention that the Board has erred is based on several points.
1) That the holding in CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., ___ F.3d ____, 2013 WL 1920941, No. 2011-1301 (Fed. Cir. May 10, 2013) requires the Board’s decision to “identify the fundamental concept (i.e., abstract idea) [ ] at risk of preemption.” (Rehearing Request 4).
2) That the Board’s rejection fails to “articulate the fundamental concept that allegedly is wrapped up in the claimed invention and at risk of preemption” as required by CLS. (Rehearing Request 1).
First, contrary to Appellants’ allegation, the holding in CLS v. Alice does not require the Board’s Decision to identify the fundamental concept or in fact to do anything else. Rather, as Chief Judge Rader points out “nothing said today beyond our judgment has the weight of precedent.” CLS, ___ F.3d at ____n.1, 2013 WL 1920941 at *20 n.1 (Rader, Chief Judge concurring-in-part dissenting-in-part).
Second, although Appellants are misguided in relying on CLS, we note that any rejection must begin “by determining what, precisely, the applicant has invented and is seeking to patent, and how the claims relate to and define that invention. (MPEP § 2103 I; 8th Ed., Rev. 9).” (Decision 16). The Board does precisely this at pages 22-25 of their Decision.
In reexaminations, the standard of proof is a preponderance of the evidence, not the conclusive burden of proof Appellant posits. In re Swanson, 540 F.3d 1368, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2008). See also 37 CFR § 1.555(b) referring to the preponderance of the evidence, burden of proof standard.
In a recent non-precedential decision, our reviewing court reminded us of the applicability of the precedential In re Gulack, 703 F.2d 1381 (Fed. Cir. 1983), In re Bernhart, 417 F.2d 1395 (CCPA 1969) and In re Lowry, 32 F.3d 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1994) decisions.
We have held that patent applicants cannot rely on printed matter to distinguish a claim unless “there exists [a] new and unobvious functional relationship between the printed matter and the substrate.” In re Gulack, 703 F.2d 1381, 1386 (Fed.Cir.1983). . . .
. . . [T]he Board did not create a new “mental distinctions” rule in denying patentable weight . . . . On the contrary, the Board simply expressed the above-described functional relationship standard in an alternative formulation—consistent with our precedents—when it concluded that any given position label’s function . . . is a distinction “discernable only to the human mind.” . . . ; see In re Lowry, 32 F.3d 1579, 1583 (Fed.Cir.1994) (describing printed matter as “useful and intelligible only to the human mind”) (quoting In re Bernhart, . . . 417 F.2d 1395, 1399 (CCPA 1969)).
In re Xiao, 2011-1195 WL 4821929, at *3-4 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Non precedential).
“Where there are several common meanings for a claim term, the patent disclosure serves to point away from the improper meanings and toward the proper meanings.” Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa’ per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1250 (Fed Cir. 1998).
In order to qualify as a printed publication within the meaning of § 102, a reference must have been sufficiently accessible to the public interested in the art. Because there are many ways in which a reference may be disseminated to the interested public, ‘public accessibility’ has been called the touchstone in determining whether a reference constitutes a ‘printed publication’ . . . . A reference is considered publicly accessible if it was disseminated or otherwise made available to the extent that persons interested and ordinarily skilled in the subject matter or art exercising reasonable diligence, can locate it.
In re Lister, 583 F. 3d 1307, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2009)(citations and internal quotations omitted).

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