Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=82712:56529&catid=1580&Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 10:22:18+00:00

Document:
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. EMMANUEL C. CORTEZ, Respondent.
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to annul and set aside the Decision2 dated February 17, 2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA–G.R. CV No. 87505. The CA affirmed the Decision3 dated February 7, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 68, in LRC Case No. N–11496.
On February 28, 2003, respondent Emmanuel C. Cortez (Cortez) filed with the RTC an application4 for judicial confirmation of title over a parcel of land located at Barangay (Poblacion) Aguho, P. Herrera Street, Pateros, Metro Manila. The said parcel of land has an area of 110 square meters and more particularly described as Lot No. 2697–B of the Pateros Cadastre. In support of his application, Cortez submitted, inter alia, the following documents: (1) tax declarations for various years from 1966 until 2005; (2) survey plan of the property, with the annotation that the property is classified as alienable and disposable; (3) technical description of the property, with a certification issued by a geodetic engineer; (4) tax clearance certificate; (5) extrajudicial settlement of estate dated March 21, 1998, conveying the subject property to Cortez; and (6) escritura de particion extrajudicial dated July 19, 1946, allocating the subject property to Felicisima Cotas – Cortez’ mother.
As there was no opposition, the RTC issued an Order of General Default and Cortez was allowed to present his evidence ex–parte.
Cortez claimed that the subject parcel of land is a portion of Lot No. 2697, which was declared for taxation purposes in the name of his mother. He alleged that Lot No. 2697 was inherited by his mother from her parents in 1946; that, on March 21, 1998, after his parents died, he and his siblings executed an Extra–Judicial Settlement of Estate over the properties of their deceased parents and one of the properties allocated to him was the subject property. He alleged that the subject property had been in the possession of his family since time immemorial; that the subject parcel of land is not part of the reservation of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and is, in fact, classified as alienable and disposable by the Bureau of Forest Development (BFD).
Cortez likewise adduced in evidence the testimony of Ernesto Santos, who testified that he has known the family of Cortez for over sixty (60) years and that Cortez and his predecessors–in–interest have been in possession of the subject property since he came to know them.
WHEREFORE, finding the application meritorious, the Court DECLARES, CONFIRMS, and ORDERS the registration of the applicant’s title thereto.
As soon as this Decision shall have become final and after payment of the required fees, let the corresponding Decrees be issued in the name of the applicant, Emmanuel C. Cortez.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Solicitor General, Land Registration Authority, Land Management Bureau, and the Registry of Deeds of Rizal.
The Republic of the Philippines (petitioner), represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed to the CA, alleging that the RTC erred in granting the application for registration despite the failure of Cortez to comply with the requirements for original registration of title. The petitioner pointed out that, although Cortez declared that he and his predecessors–in–interest were in possession of the subject parcel of land since time immemorial, no document was ever presented that would establish his predecessors–in–interest’s possession of the same during the period required by law. That petitioner claimed that Cortez’ assertion that he and his predecessors–in–interest had been in open, adverse, and continuous possession of the subject property for more than thirty (30) years does not constitute well–neigh incontrovertible evidence required in land registration cases; that it is a mere claim, which should not have been given weight by the RTC.
Further, the petitioner alleged that there was no certification from any government agency that the subject property had already been declared alienable and disposable. As such, the petitioner claims, Cortez’ possession of the subject property, no matter how long, cannot confer ownership or possessory rights.
On February 17, 2009, the CA, by way of the assailed Decision,8 dismissed the petitioner’s appeal and affirmed the RTC Decision dated February 7, 2006. The CA ruled that Cortez was able to prove that the subject property was indeed alienable and disposable, as evidenced by the declaration/notation from the BFD.
The sole issue to be resolved by the Court is whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC Decision dated February 7, 2006, which granted the application for registration filed by Cortez.
At the outset, the Court notes that the RTC did not cite any specific provision of law under which authority Cortez’ application for registration of title to the subject property was granted. In granting the application for registration, the RTC merely stated that “the possession of the land being applied for by [Cortez] and his predecessor–in–interest have been in open, actual, uninterrupted, and adverse possession, under claim of title and in the concept of owners, all within the time prescribed by law[.]”11 On the other hand, the CA assumed that Cortez’ application for registration was based on Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529. Nevertheless, Cortez, in the application for registration he filed with the RTC, proffered that should the subject property not be registrable under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529, it could still be registered under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141 (C.A. No. 141), or the Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. No. 107312 in relation to Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529. Thus, the Court deems it proper to discuss Cortez’ application for registration of title to the subject property vis–à–vis the provisions of Section 14(1) and (2) of P.D. No. 1529.
After a careful scrutiny of the records of this case, the Court finds that Cortez failed to comply with the legal requirements for the registration of the subject property under Section 14(1) and (2) of P.D. No. 1529.
This survey is inside L.C. Map No. 2623, Project No. 29, classified as alienable & disposable by the Bureau of Forest Development on Jan. 3, 1968.
The annotation in the survey plan presented by Cortez is not the kind of evidence required by law as proof that the subject property forms part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain. Cortez failed to present a certification from the proper government agency as to the classification of the subject property. Cortez likewise failed to present any evidence showing that the DENR Secretary had indeed classified the subject property as alienable and disposable. Having failed to present any incontrovertible evidence, Cortez’ claim that the subject property forms part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain must fail.
Anent the second and third requirements, the Court finds that Cortez likewise failed to establish the same. Cortez failed to present any evidence to prove that he and his predecessors–in–interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject property since June 12, 1945, or earlier. Cortez was only able to present oral and documentary evidence of his and his mother’s ownership and possession of the subject property since 1946, the year in which his mother supposedly inherited the same.
Further, the earliest tax declaration presented by Cortez was only in 1966. Cortez failed to explain why, despite his claim that he and his predecessors–in–interest have been in possession of the subject property since time immemorial, it was only in 1966 that his predecessors–in–interest started to declare the same for purposes of taxation.
That Cortez and his predecessors–in–interest have been in possession of the subject property for fifty–seven (57) years at the time he filed his application for registration in 2003 would likewise not entitle him to registration thereof under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529.
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated February 17, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA–G.R. CV No. 87505, which affirmed the Decision dated February 7, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 68, in LRC Case No. N–11496, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Application for Registration of Emmanuel C. Cortez in LRC Case No. N–11496 is DENIED for lack of merit.
2 Penned by Associate Justice Jose Catral Mendoza (now a member of this Court), with Associate Justices Portia Aliño–Hormachuelos and Ramon M. Bato, Jr., concurring; id. at 28–40.
3 Issued by Judge Santiago G. Estrella; id. at 55A–60.
13See Republic v. Rizalvo, Jr., G.R. No. 172011, March 7, 2011, 644 SCRA 516, 523.
15 534 Phil. 181 (2006).
17 G.R. No. 175846, July 6, 2010, 624 SCRA 116.
19Republic v. Dela Paz, G.R. No. 171631, November 15, 2010, 634 SCRA 610, 622–623, citing Mistica v. Republic, G.R. No. 165141, September 11, 2009, 599 SCRA 401, 410–411 and Lim v. Republic, G.R. Nos. 158630 and 162047, September 4, 2009, 598 SCRA 247, 262.
20Republic v. Espinosa, G.R. No. 171514, July 18, 2012, 677 SCRA 92, 106.
21 G.R. No. 179987, April 29, 2009, 587 SCRA 172.
24 G.R. No. 172011, March 7, 2011, 644 SCRA 516.
26See Republic v. Ching, G.R. No. 186166, October 20, 2010, 634 SCRA 415, 428.
27See Republic v. Metro Index Realty and Development Corporation, G.R. No. 198585, July 2, 2012, 675 SCRA 439, 446.

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