Source: http://www.loyno-lawreview.com/2018/03/15/thumbs-down-the-trouble-with-compelled-finger-print-access-to-smart-devices/
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 16:54:44+00:00

Document:
Smart devices have become an extension of ourselves. Take a walk, sit in the park, ride the subway, go to a restaurant, look around you while you sit in traffic; you will likely find that nearly everyone walks, sits, and drives with their phone in their hand. Your smartphone likely sits near you as you read this piece. Even our sleep is effected by our smart phone use. Today, hand injuries from excessive cell phone use have become commonplace. We are fixated on our phones, and we do not “unplug” when we get home. According to a 2014 Civic Science report, the average American spends over twelve hours a day engaged in smart phone use. We know what it means for our eyes, but what does it mean for our constitutional rights?
In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court held that cell phones were constitutionally protected from unreasonable search and seizure because they are a “pervasive and insistent part of daily life,” such that, as Chief Justice Roberts noted, “the proverbial visitor from Mars might conclude they were an important feature of human anatomy.” Despite this decisive holding, many lower courts have held that there are few, if any, constitutional barriers to law enforcement officials’ ability to compel access to the contents of an individual’s smart phone. Technological advancements, now readily available to the public in the form of biometric authentication on smart devices, have turned a convenience and novelty into what may be a degradation of fundamental constitutional rights. As it stands, in certain jurisdictions, numeric or alphabetical passcodes are protected by the Fifth Amendment, while biometric authentication in the form of fingerprint passcodes are not. Therefore, in these jurisdictions, law enforcement officers may compel an individual to unlock a device that is protected by a fingerprint or thumbprint passcode entry, but not a device that utilizes only a standard numeric or alphabetical passcode.
Additionally, courts have reached different conclusions on whether police officers may compel a suspect to unlock a device by forcibly entering the suspect’s fingerprint pursuant to a warrant that does not name a specific individual. Before his death, Justice Scalia predicted that the Supreme Court would soon have to decide whether digital data itself is an “effect” under the Fourth Amendment. This Comment argues that mobile devices and the information contained within are precisely the effects as pondered and articulated by the drafters of the Constitution, and any searches thereof should be based on probable cause and sufficiently particularized in a valid warrant, approved by a detached, neutral magistrate, absent exigent circumstances. Thus, in contemplation of fundamental Fourth Amendment rights, merely being present at a premise where there is suspected criminal activity should not thus subject an individual to search and possibly seizure of his mobile device. Further, biometric access should receive the same protections as a numeric or alphabetical passcode under the Fifth Amendment, and an individual should not be compelled to produce his fingerprint because doing so would violate rights guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment. This line of decisions misapplies Fourth and Fifth Amendment doctrine by improperly applying dated jurisprudence and law regarding the fingerprint, and further, that proper recognition of these important protections is needed to prevent unbridled and arbitrary government access to the smart devices with which we are intimately connected.
Part II provides an overview of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments and how these amendments have functioned in the context of mobile devices. Part III analyzes the doctrinal history of the fingerprint in light of Fourth and Fifth Amendment jurisprudence. Part IV proposes a standard for entry of biometric passwords consistent with Supreme Court precedent regarding mobile devices. Finally, Part V considers the risks created as a result of the Court failing to take action.
Modern cell phones are not just another technological convenience. With all they contain and all they may reveal, they hold for many Americans “the privacies of life.” The fact that technology now allows an individual to carry such information in his hand does not make the information any less worthy of the protection for which the Founders fought. Our answer to the question of what police must do before searching a cell phone seized incident to an arrest is accordingly simple—get a warrant.
In Riley v. California, the Court held that cell phones are subjected to a higher Fourth Amendment protection that requires a police officer to obtain a warrant before searching its digital contents. However, despite the Riley decision, divergent decisions have followed in response to novel issues prompted by the emergence of new smartphone technology, leaving insecure the reverence Riley delivered to our smartphones. After Riley, compelled access to smartphones has been challenged on Fourth and Fifth Amendment grounds, with mixed success.
The following section presents brief background of Fourth and Fifth Amendment doctrine, as well as recent law in the context of personal digital devices.
A search or seizure of a person must be supported by probable cause particularized with respect to that person. This requirement cannot be undercut or avoided by simply pointing to the fact that coincidentally there exists probable cause to search or seize another or to search the premises where the person may happen to be.
Further, if the warrant gives the officer discretion over the person searched and what is seized, the warrant fails for overbreadth—although the Court has acknowledged that there are some exceptions to this rule.
As to smartphones, the Supreme Court held in Riley v. California that the Fourth Amendment requires a warrant in order to search the contents of a cellular phone. Chief Justice Roberts asserted in Riley that “a cell phone search would typically expose to the government far more than the most exhaustive search of a house.” In Riley, the Court expounded upon the intrusiveness on the search of an individual’s cellphone due to the gross amount of personal information contained therein. Therefore, the Constitution requires that searches of cell phones be executed pursuant to a valid warrant that is supported by probable cause and sufficiently particular as to the persons and items being searched.
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution states that “[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself[.]” Specifically, the privilege against self-incrimination protects a person only from communications that are deemed to be testimonial in nature. In Doe v. United States, the Supreme Court defined “testimonial communications” as any act or oral or written statement “that explicitly or implicitly, relate[s] a factual assertion or disclose[s] information” to the government. Specifically, the privilege is invoked when the information garnered from the act or statement is the product of the individual’s own thoughts, such that it can be considered the “contents of his own mind.” In addition to proving that the information produced was testimonial in nature, the party asserting the privilege must also prove that the information was coerced and incriminating. The privilege is not extended to acts or statements, whether oral or written, when the only information disclosed to the government is merely a physical fact. However, even where the compelled production is found to be testimonial in nature, it may still be outside the scope of the Fifth Amendment’s self-incrimination privilege if the Foregone Conclusion Doctrine applies.
The Foregone Conclusion Doctrine applies where the State has independently established the “existence, possession, and authenticity” of the information, such that the testimony of the individual adds “little or nothing to the sum total of the government’s information,” and as a result, the compelled testimony is nothing more than a foregone conclusion. Therefore, “in order for the foregone conclusion doctrine to apply, the State must show with reasonable particularity that, at the time it sought the act of production, it already knew the evidence sought existed, the evidence was in the possession of the accused, and the evidence was authentic. For example, where a defendant taxpayer attempted to invoke his Fifth Amendment self-incrimination privilege, the Supreme Court held that because the government independently knew of the existence of incriminating tax-returns and the defendant’s knowledge thereof, the defendant’s constitutional right to abstain from self-incrimination had not been infringed upon.
Thus, where any compelled statements or acts that may incriminate an individual or unveil incriminating evidence that has been independently verified by the government such that the evidence does not add to the government’s knowledge of criminal activity, the foregone conclusion doctrine applies and an individual is not shielded by Fifth Amendment immunity from self-incrimination.
the fingerprint like a key, however, does not require the witness to divulge anything through his mental processes. On the contrary, like physical characteristics that are non-testimonial, the fingerprint of Defendant if used to access his phone is likewise non-testimonial and does not require Defendant to “communicate any knowledge” at all. Unlike the production of physical characteristic evidence, such as a fingerprint, the production of a password forces the Defendant to “disclose the contents of his own mind.
Likewise, in State v. Stahl, the court granted a petition for a writ of certiorari and quashed an order following a trial court’s denial of the State’s motion to compel the production of the defendant’s passcode to unlock his iPhone. The court declared that it saw no distinction between a numeric or alphabetical passcode and a touch identification passcode. The court asserted that neither manual passcode nor fingerprint passcode should receive Fifth Amendment protection. Specifically, the court asserted that compelling an individual to provide access to a source that may contain incriminating information does not offend the privilege provided by the Fifth Amendment self-incrimination clause. Additionally, the court held that the government met its burden of proof and showed with reasonable particularity that the incriminating evidence was on the device, thereby sufficiently invoking the foregone conclusion doctrine.
Not all courts have followed this rationale, however. In response to a similar motion to compel a passcode, a Maine court denied the motion and held that compelling a defendant to unlock his smartphone by providing the passcode or opening it himself would require the defendant to divulge the contents of his mind and “would violate his privilege against self-incrimination protected by the Federal and Maine Constitutions.” Outside the context of cellular devices, other courts have also held that providing a password to an electronic device is indeed testimonial because an individual acknowledges control via his knowledge of the password and subsequently his control and knowledge of the underlying computer files. Clearly, the inconsistencies involving Fourth and Fifth Amendment protections and passcode-protected devices require guidance and resolution to provide courts with clarity.
In review of the aforementioned inconsistencies surrounding a smart phone and the constitutional protections afforded to the device and its user, the fingerprint is a common subject. Fingerprint doctrine, while historically uncontroversial in either the Fourth or Fifth Amendment context, is in unchartered territory in the face of readily available biometric security features. Upon review of the seminal cases, it is difficult to reconcile the historical context of fingerprinting with the technological features currently available to, and used by, society at large.
Unlike smartphones and mobile devices, fingerprints are associated with nearly a century of constitutional history. Courts have long held that fingerprinting is permissible under the Fourth Amendment. By the middle of the Twentieth Century, fingerprinting had become part of routine booking procedure practiced by law enforcement agents. Fingerprinting as a practice is completely uncontroversial under the Fourth Amendment; however, in order for fingerprinting to remain non-violative of the Fourth Amendment, it must adhere to the quality that made it such—namely, that it be part of a routine procedure. The routine practice of fingerprinting began in the early twentieth century when it became apparent that the Bertillon measurement method (the Nineteenth Century practice of indexing and cataloging criminal suspects’ biometric dimensions, such as the circumference of the head or the length of the middle finger, for purposes of identification) was an insufficient and unreliable way to document and trace the identifications of criminals. In United States v. Kelly, Judge Augustus Hand explained that fingerprinting did not violate the Fourth Amendment because it had become the most prevalent form of identifying a person due to its certainty and reliability.
Detention for fingerprinting may constitute a much less serious intrusion upon personal security than other types of police searches and detentions. Fingerprinting involves none of the probing into an individual’s private life and thoughts that marks an interrogation or search.
Despite the Supreme Court’s acknowledgement of technological advances such as touch identification and biometric security that have effectually made the fingerprint a tool to access all of the intricacies of a citizen’s private life, fingerprinting still remains a constitutionally approved tool. Furthermore, even though technology has given rise to methods more reliable and preferable than fingerprinting for identification and criminal investigation, courts today still employ the same analysis used for over a century. Without a doubt, those very courts that first articulated the constitutional permissibility and value of fingerprinting could not have imagined a day where it could be possible that every personal detail of an individual’s life—his communications, contacts, fancies, medical history, financial information, most frequently visited locations, etc.—could be accessed by a fingerprint. Technological advancements demand legislative and doctrinal attention.
Likewise, fingerprints have not received Fifth Amendment protection because they are considered purely physical. Courts have held that the compelled production of the fingerprint discloses only a physical characteristic, and such a compelled production of physical evidence does not equate to testimony for Fifth Amendment purposes. The rationale follows a 1910 opinion by Justice Holmes regarding a case wherein the petitioner asserted that his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination had been violated when he was compelled to model a blouse during his trial for murder. In Holt v. United States, Justice Holmes famously called this an “extravagant extension of the 5th Amendment,” and rejected the petitioner’s complaint. Justice Holmes held that the privilege only pertained to extorted “communications,” and did not extend to the government’s compelled use of the petitioner’s body as evidence where it was material. Despite the enormous technological and societal changes since the decision over a century ago, Justice Holmes’s Holt communicative versus physical testimony distinction still dominates self-incrimination analysis in the century following the holding. As a result, this legal standard has recently been called into question.
While the government does not know ahead of time the identity of every digital device or fingerprint (or indeed, every other piece of evidence) that it will find in the search, it has demonstrated probable cause that evidence may exist at the search location, and needs the ability to gain access to search them.
In support of this request, the government asserted that such a search did not violate either the Fourth or Fifth Amendment. Specifically, the memorandum stated that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the taking of fingerprints where the taking is supported by reasonable suspicion, and compelling a person to provide his fingerprint does not violate the Fifth Amendment because a fingerprint supplies no testimonial information. According to the Central District of California, an individual can arm himself with all of the heightened encryption and security available on his device, but at the end of the day, biometric security features may actually make it easier for law enforcement agents to obtain access—whether the individual is directly suspected of a crime or merely present at a location to be searched pursuant to a warrant.
A similar warrant application was presented to the Northern District of Illinois Eastern Division court, wherein the government sought “the authority to compel any individual who is present at the subject premises at the time of the search to provide his fingerprints and/or thumbprints ‘onto the Touch ID sensor of any Apple iPhone, iPad, or other Apple brand device in order to gain access to the contents of any such device.’” However, unlike the constitutional interpretation employed by the Virginia Circuit in Baust and the warrant application in the Central District of California Courts, Northern District of Illinois Magistrate Judge M. David Weisman denied the warrant application for the compelled fingerprint access request. Judge Weisman found that the warrant application failed because it did not establish probable cause for such an overly broad and insufficiently particularized request under the narrowly construed Fourth Amendment, and because the compelled fingerprint unlocking of a biometrically protected smart device violates the Fifth Amendment guarantee to be free from self-incrimination.
In light of these diametric points of view, there must be some resolution to guide citizens, law enforcement, and the lower courts.
It is generally known, and begrudgingly accepted, that the law lags behind the times, especially with regards to technology. While patience is usually appropriate, here, action is required. The special and unique challenges presented by smart devices are pressing and require a swift update.
Riley held that cell phones deserved more constitutional protection because of their pervasiveness and association with the intimacies of citizens’ private lives and that the searches thereof must be pursuant to a warrant which is sufficiently particularized. Courts must consider Riley when they reconcile modern day technological advances with traditional doctrinal theory. As noted by Judge Weisman in his order denying the warrant application, “the context in which fingerprints are taken, and not the fingerprints themselves, can raise concerns under the Fourth Amendment.” Because we live and interact in a digital and virtual realm, the law must evolve and address these changes, especially where great amounts of information are portable and accessible by the touch of a finger.
Current law is unclear on whether compelled smartphone access is testimonial and what exactly constitutes a foregone conclusion sufficient to override the testimonial privilege. The 2014 Baust decision held that a numeric or alphabetical passcode is sufficiently communicative and therefore testimonial under the Fifth Amendment. However, applying the physical characteristic distinction delineated in Holt and United States v. Wade, the Court held that compelled biometric fingerprint (touch identification) access does not force the individual to disclose or divulge the contents of his mind and is thus non-testimonial and beyond the reach of the Fifth Amendment. Like Holt, the Wade decision was made many decades before the advent of biometric security and should not guide modern court decisions. Neither Court could have comprehended the enormous technological advances that would occur by leaps and bounds in the years to come. Therefore, applying Wade in the wake of great technological advances is improper. It is a common scholarly complaint that the law lags behind technology. Despite this, courts should take note that scholars are not merely complaining but are expressing important concerns regarding advanced technology and the erosion of constitutional protections.
The Stahl court was correct in asserting that numeric and alphabetic passcodes should indeed be considered exactly the same as fingerprint biometric access. However, in declaring that neither variety of authentication is testimonial in nature, the court veered off course. Similarly, the Baust court considered self-authentication in the context of early and mid-twentieth century jurisprudence. This line of analysis sets forth a troubling precedent and opens the door to an erosion of fundamental Fourth and Fifth Amendment protections. It is clear that the fingerprint can no longer be viewed merely as a physical characteristic as articulated in Holt and Wade. The fingerprint is unlike a voice exemplar or a writing sample. It does not merely identify an individual but provides access to all of the details of an individual’s personal life—precisely the opposite of why the Supreme Court has held that fingerprinting is a reasonable and permissible practice under the Fourth Amendment. Therefore, it must first be established that providing a passcode in any form to unlock a digital or electronic personal device may be testimonial in nature. Second, fingerprints must be viewed as having the capability of providing testimonial information such as knowledge and control. For these reasons, courts and legislators can no longer consider touch identification in the context of dated cases that regard fingerprinting as part of routine booking procedures. Legislators and courts must recognize that self-authentication in the form of biometric access to mobile devices may be self-incriminating and is therefore protected by the Fifth Amendment. In sum, biometric authentication of smart phones should be considered standing alone and outside of the context of traditional fingerprint doctrine.
How are Americans to know how to secure their smart phones? And should law-abiding citizens need to worry? A California warrant’s approval would suggest they should. Although a Chicago court rejected a similar warrant application, the opinion provided the government with a work-around: namely more specific warrants. The law must address technological and societal changes to prevent an erosion of our constitutional protections.
Without precise guidance from the Supreme Court, legislators will be left to enact arbitrary laws applying to the search of cellphones and mobile devices. The United Kingdom and Singapore have enacted legislation to punish those who refuse to unlock their smartphones pursuant to law enforcement order. Could similar legislation could be on the horizon in the United States? Especially problematic is that legislators will be left guided by outdated jurisprudence. As mentioned in Part IV, frequently cited jurisprudence is either pre-smart phone or prior to the existence of biometric accessibility features. Clearly, it is of no question whether a cell phone is itself an “effect,” however, because technology allows individuals to transport large amounts of data and information in pocket-sized devices, the courts must create a legal framework that addresses personal technology and constitutional protections.
The Constitution contemplated privacies as being contained in personal papers and effects, such as diaries, journals, accounts, and the like. Our Founding Fathers likely never imagined ordinary citizens carrying their effects in their pockets or purses every day, everywhere. Imagine leaving home every day with your journal, diary, medical history, bank statements, fancies, fantasies, business dealings, and financial stature along for the ride. It seems absurd, but in fact, that is what nearly every individual who has upgraded from a flip phone is actually doing. The fact that technology has turned a physical characteristic into a tool to quickly access what would normally be required by the manual entry of a passcode should spurn legislative update. But, just like the much-maligned iOS updates, legislators are hesitant to update their own operating systems. The current constitutional questions pertaining to personal mobile devices in the context of Fourth and Fifth Amendment law require a mandated security update for the American operating system. No longer can American courts hold that fingerprints are merely physical characteristics outside the scope of the Fifth Amendment privilege whereby an individual cannot be a witness against himself. Courts must properly recognize that the act of self-authentication may be self-incrimination, and authorization by the use of a fingerprint may as a result be testimonial in nature. By utilizing the biometric fingerprint access, an individual admits control, and may thereby incriminate himself by making an admission of a connection to or knowledge of any incriminating evidence on the device.
In closing, this Comment suggests that the Court look to traditional notions of Fourth Amendment protection in regard to search warrant applications in the mobile device context, and also asserts that the Court must re-evaluate the physical distinction in determining whether an act is a testimonial communication in this digital age.
. See Smartphone Overuse May ‘Damage Eyes’ Say Opticians, BBC (March 28, 2014), http://www.bbc.co.uk/newsbeat/article/26780069/smartphone-overuse-may-damage-eyes-say-opticians.
. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014).
biometrics (last visited Mar. 7, 2018).
. See Commonwealth v. Baust, 89 Va. Cir. 267, 271 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2014).
. Commonwealth v. Baust, 89 Va. Cir. 267, 271 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2014).
. Maureen E. Brady, The Lost “Effects” of the Fourth Amendment: Giving Personal Property Due Protection, 125 Yale L. J. 946, 956 (2016).
. See Kara Goldman, Note: Biometric Passwords and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 33 Cardozo Arts & Entm’t L. J. 211 (2015).
. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2495 (2014) (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 625 (1886)).
. See Boyd, 116 U.S. at 637 (“But where the owner of the property has been admitted as a claimant, we cannot see the force of this distinction; nor can we assent to the proposition that the proceeding is not, in effect, a proceeding against the owner of the property, as well as against the goods; for it is his breach of the laws which has to be proved to establish the forfeiture, and it is his property which is sought to be forfeited; and to require such an owner to produce his private books and papers, in order to prove his breach of the laws, and thus to establish the forfeiture of his property, is surely compelling him to furnish evidence against himself.”).
. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2495 (quoting Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630).
. “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. Const. amend. IV.
. Coolidge v. N.H., 403 U.S. 443, 467 (1979).
. Ybarra v. Illinois, 100 S. Ct. 238, 342–43 n. 4 (1979) (holding that it was impermissible to search a patron of a tavern pursuant to a warrant authorizing the search of the tavern and its owner).
. See United States v. Leary, 846 F.2d 592, 600 (10th Cir. 1988).
. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2493 (2014).
. Id. at 2495; United States v. Leary, 846 F.2d 592, 600 (10th Cir. 1988).
. U.S. Const. amend. IV.
. Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 210 (1988).
. Id. at 211 (quoting Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118, 128 (1957)).
. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 410 (1976); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated March 25, 2011, 670 F.3d 1335, 1341 (11th Cir. 2012).
. Examples of compelled acts that fall outside of the Fifth Amendment self-incrimination privilege include: providing a blood sample, handwriting sample, or voice sample; standing in a police line-up; and trying on an item of clothing. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated March 25, 2011, 670 F.3d 1335, 1345, 1345 n. 24 (11th Cir. 2012).
. State v. Stahl, 206 So. 3d 124 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016).
. Id. (citing In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 670 F.3d at 1344).
. Specifically, the Court stated, “The existence and location of the papers are a foregone conclusion and the taxpayer adds little or nothing to the sum total of the Government’s information by conceding that he in fact has the papers. Under these circumstances by enforcement of the summons ‘no constitutional rights are touched.’ The question is not of testimony but of surrender.” Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 410–11 (1976).
. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 411 (1976).
. Adam M. Gershowitz, Password Protected? Can a Password Save Your Cell Phone from a Search Incident to Arrest?, 96 Iowa L. Rev. 1125, 1171 (2011) (“Courts have repeatedly held that producing tangible evidence . . . can be testimonial even in the absence of any verbal language. This is because producing such tangible evidence demonstrates the existence, control, and location of those items, which amounts to testimony. In the cell-phone context, this is significant because clever police officers could attempt to avoid a Fifth Amendment problem by demanding that an arrestee either provide a written copy of his password or simply enter the password himself without the officer seeing it. Indeed, in one of only two cases addressing the compulsion of computer passwords, prosecutors offered to have the individual enter his password without any onlookers, so that he would not have to make a testimonial statement in violation of the Fifth Amendment. The magistrate assigned to the case refused to accept this option, explaining that even entering the password privately would be testimonial because it would demonstrate knowledge of the password and access to the underlying computer files.”).
. Id.; State v. Trant, No. 15-2389, 2015 LEXIS 272, at *11 (Me. 2015) (“The court finds that the foregone conclusion exception does not apply in these circumstances, and accordingly finds that compelling Defendant to divulge the contents of his mind—either by compelling him to surrender the passcodes or compelling him to himself open the phones—would violate his privilege against self-incrimination protected by the Federal and Maine Constitutions.”).
. Commonwealth v. Baust, 89 Va. Cir. 267, 271 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2014) (“[C]ompelling Defendant to provide access through his passcode is both compelled and testimonial and therefore protected. Contrary to the Commonwealth’s assertion, the password is not a foregone conclusion because it is not known outside of Defendant’s mind. Unlike a document or tangible thing, such as an unencrypted copy of the footage itself, if the password was a foregone conclusion, the Commonwealth would not need to compel Defendant to produce it because they would already know it.”).
. Commonwealth v. Baust, 89 Va. Cir. 267, 270 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2014).
. State v. Stahl, 206 So. 3d 124, 136–37 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016).
. State v. Trant, No. 15-2389, 2015 LEXIS 272, at *11 (Me. 2015).
. In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Boucher), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13006, at *9 (D. Vt. 2009).
. See United States v. Kelly, 55 F.2d 67, 68 (2d Cir. 1932) (“We find no ground in reason or authority for interfering with a method of identifying persons charged with crime which has now become widely known and frequently practiced.”).
. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1976 (2013).
. United States v. Guevara-Martinez, 262 F.3d 751, 756 (8th Cir. 2001).
. Alexander T. Nguyen, Article: Here’s Looking at You, Kid: Has Face-Recognition Technology Completely Outflanked the Fourth Amendment?, 7 Va. J.L. & Tech. 2 (2002).
. Cory Preston, Note, Faulty Foundations: How the False Analogy to Routine Fingerprinting Undermines the Argument for Arrestee DNA Sampling, 19 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 475, 486 (2010) (“The only serious alternative to fingerprinting for criminal identification was the Bertillon method, which had proven both administratively and scientifically suspect.”).
. United States v. Kelly, 55 F.2d 67, 69 (C.A.2 1932) (“Fingerprinting seems to be no more than an extension of methods of identification long used in dealing with persons under arrest for real or supposed violations of the criminal laws. It is known to be a very certain means devised by modern science to reach the desired end, and has become especially important in a time when increased population and vast aggregations of people in urban centers have rendered the notoriety of the individual in the community no longer a ready means of identification.”).
. Preston, supra note 55.
. Id. (“Admittedly, the value of routine fingerprinting as a tool for seeking “cold hits” with unsolved cases has expanded with law enforcement’s ability to cross-reference and search enormous databases.”).
. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1971 (2013) (“A suspect’s criminal history is a critical part of his identity that officers should know when processing him for detention. It is a common occurrence that ‘people detained for minor offenses can turn out to be the most devious and dangerous criminals.’”).
. See Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. at 1976; Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727 (1969) (stating that detentions for fingerprinting are less intrusive because the fingerprinting does not involve probing into an individual’s private life or thoughts.).
. Preston, supra note 55, at 490-91 (“The genius of fingerprinting for identification purposes, according to forensic expert Simon Cole, is that fingerprints have proven over time to offer no valuable or personal information beyond the mere identity of the individual they belong to. Despite substantial research seeking to prove a hereditary or racial link to fingerprints, no such link has been found. This lack of depth in fingerprint evidence, Cole argues, has been essential to its staying power as strong evidence of identification, in that fingerprint experts asked to testify at criminal trial are not influenced by traits that may indicate a particular type of suspect.”).
. Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727 (1969).
. See generally Commonwealth v. Baust, 89 Va. Cir. 267, 271 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2014).
. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763–64 (1966) (“It is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused’s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one’s papers. On the other hand, both federal and state courts have usually held that it offers no protection against compulsion to submit to fingerprinting . . . The distinction which has emerged, often expressed in different ways, is that the privilege is a bar against compelling ‘communications’ or ‘testimony,’ but that compulsion which makes a suspect or accused the source of ‘real or physical evidence’ does not violate it.”).
. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763–64 (1966).
. Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 252 (1910).
. Goldman, supra note 15, at 218.
. In re Application for a Search Warrant, 236 F. Supp. 3d 1066, 1073 (N.D. Ill. 2017) (“By using a finger to unlock a phone’s contents, a suspect is producing the contents on the phone. With a touch of a finger, a suspect is testifying that he or she has accessed the phone before, at a minimum, to set up the fingerprint password capabilities, and that he or she currently has some level of control over or relatively significant connection to the phone and its contents.”); Goldman, supra note 14, at 235-36 (“Applying the law to issues of first impression involving modern technology requires flexibility and reinterpretation of precedential case law. Seminal Fifth Amendment case law, including Doe and Hubbell, are illustrative of the Court’s struggle to account for the testimonial qualities of compelled physical actions. However, under the proper circumstances, it is evident that a physical compulsion, such as a signature or even a fingerprint, could maintain the requisite level of testimonial quality deserving of Fifth Amendment protection.”).
brewster/2016/10/16/doj-demands-mass-fingerprint-seizure-to-open-iphones/#63b21e 9b1288 (last visited Mar. 11, 2017).
. Notice of Filing Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Search Warrant Application, Central District of California 1 (2016), https://assets.
. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).
. Order and Opinion, supra note 76, at 7.
. Report on Smartphone Encryption and Public Safety: An Update, Manhattan District Attorney’s Office 17 (Nov. 2016), https://assets.documentcloud.
org/documents/3222483/White-Paper-2-0.pdf (“The constitutionality of ordering a person to unlock his device, or to provide a plaintext copy of its contents, is the subject of much debate. Even though the users are not required to give ‘testimony’ in these scenarios, which would be prohibited by the Fifth Amendment, users may still enjoy a Fifth Amendment privilege to refuse to unlock their phones. That is because by complying with the order, a user effectively confirms the existence and authenticity of the records sought.”).
. Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 253 (1910).
. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 222–23 (1967) (“It is no different from compelling Schmerber to provide a blood sample or Holt to wear the blouse, and, as in those instances, is not within the cover of the privilege. Similarly, compelling Wade to speak within hearing distance of the witnesses, even to utter words purportedly uttered by the robber, was not compulsion to utter statements of a ‘testimonial’ nature; he was required to use his voice as an identifying physical characteristic, not to speak his guilt.”).
. Baust, 89 Va. Cir. at 271.
. Wade, 388 U.S. at 222-23.
. Lyria Bennett Moses, Recurring Dilemmas: The Law’s Race to Keep Up With Technological Change, 7 U. Ill. J.L. Tech. & Pol’y 239, 241 (2007) (“The tension between law and technology has been observed by multiple authors and is often reflected in metaphors involving competitors in a race with law the inevitable loser. Those using these metaphors are generally concerned about the law’s failure – whether or not they regard it as inevitable – to cope with technological change, especially rapid or accelerating change. Scholars have used metaphors of the law falling behind technology in contexts as diverse as railroads, in vitro fertilization, computers, and the Internet.”).
. Goldman, supra note 15.
. State v. Stahl, 206 So. 3d 124, 124 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016).
. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2490 (2014).
. Order and Opinion, supra note 76.
. Report on Smartphone Encryption, supra note 82, at p. 27.
. Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 721 (1969).

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