Source: https://mdappblog.com/2014/03/
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 21:05:25+00:00

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We were lucky enough to convince Karen Federman Henry, a Division Chief in the Office of the County Attorney for Montgomery County, to join the Maryland Appellate Blog’s editorial board.
If you want an idea of Karen’s impressive appellate credentials, we invite you to type her name into Google Scholar case search. Along with former blog editor Kevin Arthur and current editor Brad McCullough, Karen was among the 18 candidates whom the Judicial Nominating Commission forwarded for the three recently filled vacancies on the Court of Special Appeals. Kevin was one of those three appointees, and Karen fills the resulting vacancy on the blog’s editorial board.
Karen’s first post will appear on Monday morning. We’re thrilled to welcome her aboard!
Did the iPad kill the acronym?
Issues – Zoning and Planning – 1) Whether the prima facie aggrievement standard established in Bryniarski v. Montgomery County Bd. of Appeals, 247 Md. 137 (1967), should be expanded beyond challenges to administrative land use decisions to include challenges to legislative comprehensive zoning enactments? 2) Whether the “almost prima facie” standard as established in Ray v. Mayor of Baltimore, 430 Md. 74 (2013), should be expanded beyond challenges to administrative land use decisions to include challenges to legislative comprehensive zoning enactments? 3) Whether noise from a predicted increase in traffic constitutes “special damages”?
Issues – Civil Procedure – 1) Whether it was error to enforce the Letter of Intent given the parties never intended to be bound by the Letter of Intent and the Letter of Intent does not contain all material terms? 2) Did the lower court err in failing to hold a full plenary hearing on the Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement since the existence of a binding and enforceable agreement was contested and there were contradicting proffers regarding a material issue, i.e. whether the parties intended to be bound by the Letter of Intent?
Issues – Election Law – 1) Was the Board of Elections’ determination that the referendum summary was not “fair and accurate” is arbitrary, capricious and illegal as a matter of law? 2) Is the referendum summary as presented “fair and accurate” as required by EL § 6-201(c)(2)(i)?
Issues – Civil Procedure – 1) Did CSA err in its decision that the lower court’s remand order was not a “final judgment” as defined by CJP § 12-301? 2) Did the lower court act arbitrarily and capriciously in remanding a final administrative decision to the processes of an administrative agency without conducting any record review and without any finding of fraud, mistake, inadvertence, cognizable defect, intervening factors or subsequent events? 3) Did CSA properly decide Anne Arundel County v. Rode, 214 Md.App. 702 (2013), and properly apply that ruling to the procedural circumstances in this case?
Issue – Election Law – Within the context of the decision-making required by EL § 6-208(a)(2), was the Board of Elections’ determination that the referendum summary was not “fair and accurate” arbitrary, capricious and illegal as a matter of law?
Issues – Criminal Law – 1) Did CSA err in concluding that the lower court violated the doctrine of the separation of powers in finding respondent in violation of his probation based upon his failure to comply with a lawful order of his probation agent where the order was a requirement of his mandatory parole release conditions? 2) Did CSA correctly hold that the lower court erred in revoking Callahan’s probation?
Across the political spectrum of legal blogs, the Supreme Court’s decision in Kaley v. United States has drawn strong criticism, and Chief Justice Roberts’ dissent has drawn strong praise. A sampling of the commentaries appear at the end of this post.
A federal statute, 21 U. S. C. §853(e), authorizes a court to freeze an indicted defendant’s assets prior to trial if they would be subject to forfeiture upon conviction. In United States v. Monsanto, 491 U. S. 600, 615 (1989), we approved the constitutionality of such an order so long as it is “based on a finding of probable cause to believe that the property will ultimately be proved forfeitable.” And we held that standard to apply even when a defendant seeks to use the disputed property to pay for a lawyer.
In this case, two indicted defendants wishing to hire an attorney challenged a pre-trial restraint on their property. The trial court convened a hearing to consider the seizure’s legality under Monsanto. The question presented is whether criminal defendants are constitutionally entitled at such a hearing to contest a grand jury’s prior determination of probable cause to believe they committed the crimes charged. We hold that they have no right to relitigate that finding.

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