Source: http://wa.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20180501_0002929.WWA.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 14:22:28+00:00

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FRED HUTCHINSON CANCER RESEARCH CENTER, Defendant.
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant's motion for partial summary judgment (Dkt. No. 33). Having thoroughly considered the parties' briefing and the relevant record, the Court finds oral argument unnecessary and hereby GRANTS the motion for the reasons explained herein.
“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). In making that determination, the Court must view the facts and justifiable inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). Once a summary judgment motion is properly made and supported, the opposing party “must come forward with ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (emphasis in original) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)).
To bring a Title VII discrimination claim, a plaintiff must first file a charge with a state EEOC agency within 300 days of experiencing an unlawful employment practice. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1); see also Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 113 (2002) (“Each discrete discriminatory act starts a new clock for filing charges alleging that act. The charge, therefore, must be filed within the . . . 300-day time period after the discrete discriminatory act occurred.”) Where a Title VII discrimination claim is based on discrete acts that occurred outside of the 300-day filing window, the claim is time-barred. See Morgan, 536 U.S. at 109; Siddiqui v. AG Commc'n Sys. Corp., 233 Fed.Appx. 610, 612 (9th Cir. 2007). The 300-day filing clock commences when a plaintiff becomes aware of the adverse employment action that supports his or her discrimination claim. See Lukovsky v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 535 F.3d 1044, 1051 (9th Cir. 2008) (“claim accrued when the plaintiffs received notice they would not be hired . . . .”).
In his complaint, Flowers alleges a single discriminatory act to support his Title VII discrimination claim. (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 5.) Flowers states that “[he] applied for a promotion to the Employment Manager position but was not promoted. Instead, a white, Caucasian employee was promoted to the position.” (Id.) It is undisputed that the discrete act supporting Flowers' discrimination claim is Fred Hutch's decision to promote Bartley rather than him. The undisputed evidence further demonstrates that Bartley officially began working as the Employment Manager in early August 2012, and Flowers was aware that Bartley had gotten the job. (Dkt. Nos. 34 at 15, 39 at 2.) Therefore, the 300-day clock began to run once Flowers knew Bartley had been hired in August 2012. Flowers did not file his EEOC claim regarding this allegedly discriminatory hiring decision until September 2013-well beyond the 300-day window required by Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). Based on this evidence, Fred Hutch has met its initial burden on summary judgment to demonstrate that Flowers' Title VII discrimination claim is time-barred.

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