Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/556/568/
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 15:58:12+00:00

Document:
An individual convicted for using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to any violent or drug trafficking crime, or possessing a firearm in furtherance of such a crime, receives a 5-year mandatory minimum sentence, in addition to the punishment for the underlying crime. 18 U. S. C. §924(c)(1)(A)(i). The mandatory minimum increases to 7 years “if the firearm is brandished” and to 10 years “if the firearm is discharged.” §§924(c)(1)(A)(ii), (iii).
Petitioner Dean was convicted of conspiring to commit a bank robbery and discharging a firearm during an armed robbery. Because the firearm was “discharged” during the robbery, Dean was sentenced to a 10-year mandatory minimum prison term on the firearm count. §924(c)(1)(A)(iii). On appeal, he contended that the discharge was accidental, and that §924(c)(1)(A)(iii) requires proof that the defendant intended to discharge the firearm. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding that no proof of intent is required.
Held: Section 924(c)(1)(A)(iii) requires no separate proof of intent. The 10-year mandatory minimum applies if a gun is discharged in the course of a violent or drug trafficking crime, whether on purpose or by accident. Pp. 2–9.
(a) Subsection (iii) provides a minimum 10-year sentence “if the firearm is discharged.” It does not require that the discharge be done knowingly or intentionally, or otherwise contain words of limitation. This Court “ordinarily resist[s] reading words or elements into a statute that do not appear on its face.” Bates v. United States, 522 U. S. 23, 29. Congress’s use of the passive voice further indicates that subsection (iii) does not require proof of intent. Cf. Watson v. United States, 552 U. S. ___, ___. The statute’s structure also suggests no such limitation. Congress expressly included an intent requirement for the 7-year mandatory minimum for brandishing a firearm by separately defining “brandish” to require that the firearm be displayed “in order to intimidate” another person. §924(c)(4). Congress did not, however, separately define “discharge” to include an intent requirement. It is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally when including particular language in one section of a statute but not in another. Russello v. United States, 464 U. S. 16, 23. Contrary to Dean’s contention, the phrase “during and in relation to” in the opening paragraph of §924(c)(1)(A) does not modify “is discharged,” which appears in a separate subsection and in a different voice than the principal paragraph. “[I]n relation to” is most naturally read to modify only the nearby verbs “uses” and “carries.” This reading will not lead to the absurd results posited by Dean. Pp. 3–6.
(b) Dean argues that subsection (iii) must be limited to intentional discharges in order to give effect to the statute’s progression of harsher penalties for increasingly culpable conduct. While it is unusual to impose criminal punishment for the consequences of purely accidental conduct, it is not unusual to punish individuals for the unintended consequences of their unlawful acts. The fact that the discharge may be accidental does not mean that the defendant is blameless. The sentencing enhancement accounts for the risk of harm resulting from the manner in which the crime is carried out, for which the defendant is responsible. See Harris v. United States, 536 U. S. 545, 553. An individual bringing a loaded weapon to commit a crime runs the risk that the gun will discharge accidentally. A gunshot—whether accidental or intended—increases the risk that others will be injured, that people will panic, or that violence will be used in response. It also traumatizes bystanders, as it did here. Pp. 6–9.
For many of the reasons that Justice Stevens sets forth, I believe the statutory provision before us applies to intentional, but not to accidental, discharges of firearms. As Justice Stevens points out, this Court in Bailey v. United States, 516 U. S. 137, 148 (1995), held that simple possession of a firearm, without some type of “active employment,” such as “brandishing, displaying, bartering, striking with, and, most obviously, firing or attempting to fire,” did not constitute “use” of a firearm. See ante, at 2 (dissenting opinion). It seems possible, if not likely, that Congress, in this statute, amended then-existing law by criminalizing the “simple possession” that Bailey found insufficient and then imposed a set of ever more severe mandatory sentences for the conduct that the Court listed in Bailey when it considered ways in which an offender might use a firearm. See ante, at 2–3. If so, the statutory words “is discharged,” 18 U. S. C. §924(c)(1)(A)(iii), refer to what Bailey called “firing,” and they do not encompass an accidental discharge.
I concede that the Court lists strong arguments to the contrary. But, in my view, the “rule of lenity” tips the balance against the majority’s position. The “rule of lenity” as ordinarily applied reflects the law’s insistence that a criminal statute provide “fair warning … of what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed.” United States v. Bass, 404 U. S. 336, 348 (1971) (internal quotation marks omitted). But here, where a mandatory minimum sentence is at issue, its application reflects an additional consideration, namely, that its application will likely produce an interpretation that hews more closely to Congress’ sentencing intent.
That is because, in the case of a mandatory minimum, an interpretation that errs on the side of exclusion (an interpretive error on the side of leniency) still permits the sentencing judge to impose a sentence similar to, perhaps close to, the statutory sentence even if that sentence (because of the court’s interpretation of the statute) is not legislatively required. See, e.g., United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual §2B3.1(b)(2) (Nov. 2008) (Specific Offense Characteristics) (possibly calling for a 7-to-9 year increase in the sentencing range in a case like this one). The sentencing judge is most likely to give a low non-Guidelines sentence in an unusual case—where the nature of the accident, for example, makes clear that the offender was not responsible and perhaps that the discharge put no one at risk. See, e.g., Koon v. United States, 518 U. S. 81, 92–94 (1996). And, of course, the unusual nature of such a case means it is the kind of case that Congress did not have in mind when it enacted the statute. Moreover, an error that excludes (erroneously) a set of instances Congress meant to include (such as accidental discharge) could lead the Sentencing Commission to focus on those cases and exercise its investigative and judgmental powers to decide how those cases should be handled. This investigation would, in turn, make available to Congress a body of evidence and analysis that will help it reconsider the statute if it wishes to do so.
On the other hand, an interpretation that errs on the side of inclusion requires imposing 10 years of additional imprisonment on individuals whom Congress would not have intended to punish so harshly. Such an interpretation would prevent a sentencing court from giving a lower sentence even in an unusual case, for example, where the accident is unintended, unforeseeable, and imposes no additional risk. And such an interpretation, by erroneously taking discretion away from the sentencing judge, would ensure results that depart dramatically from those Congress would have intended. Cf. Harris v. United States, 536 U. S. 545, 570 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (“statutory mandatory minimums generally deny the judge the legal power to depart downward, no matter how unusual the special circumstances that call for leniency”). Moreover, because such unusual cases are (by definition) rare, these errors would provide little incentive to the Sentencing Commission or Congress to reconsider the statute.

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