Source: https://sfcriminallawspecialist.com/blog/sentencing-partners-august-part-ii/
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 03:00:14+00:00

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The defendant was found guilty of nine counts of wire fraud resulting from a large investment scheme in which she and her co-defendants defrauded more than 60 investors of almost $4.5 million. As part of the scheme, she sent false information to investors by electronic mail and facsimile. In calculating the sentence, the PSR recommended a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice pursuant to §3C1.1, based on her testimony to the grand jury where she “willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice when she testified falsely before the grand jury.” The PSR listed a number of her false statements made to the grand jury, which had been proven false by trial evidence, regarding statements made to investors about the companies they were investing in, personal use of the investment funds, and contracts she had advised investors that the companies were entering into with major businesses. The PSR calculated a sentencing range of 168 to 210 months. The defendant objected to the obstruction enhancement and argued that the evidence was insufficient to find that she intended to obstruct justice, and that she suffered from diminished capacity. The government argued that she had committed perjury in her testimony to the grand jury and detailed several of the statements that were perjury and attempts by the defendant to defend the lies she told investors in emails, until the district court stated that it had “enough examples.” The district court adopted the PSR in its entirety, including the obstruction enhancement, but imposed a below-guideline sentence of 48 months. The defendant appealed, arguing that the obstruction enhancement was error. The court of appeals found that the statements made by the defendant were material, because, while they did not keep her from being indicted by the grand jury, they could have had an effect on the grand jury’s decision to indict, or as to how many counts for which to indict. As set forth in the guidelines, a statement need only “tend to influence or affect the issue under determination” to be material, §3C1.1, cmt. n.6. Whether the statement actually had any influence or effect was not of consequence. The court further gave no weight to the defendant’s argument that any discrepancies in her grand jury testimony and the e-mails she sent investors were caused by diminished capacity. Prior to trial the district court had reviewed a psychological report regarding the defendant’s competency and after taking argument, found that she was fit to stand trial. The court found that this “clearly resolved the mental status issue against the defendant at trial.” As a result, the sentence was affirmed.
The defendant was sentenced, upon revocation of supervised release, to a term of 40 months imprisonment and 20 months of supervised release. He appealed, arguing that the district court committed plain error in failing to ask if he wanted to make allocution prior to imposition of the sentence. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1(b)(2)(E) provides that supervised releasees are to be given “an opportunity to make a statement and present any information in mitigation” at the revocation proceeding. The government argued that: (1) a district court did not have to affirmatively ask the defendant if he would like to allocute; (2) the statute requiring allocution only required that the releasee’s lawyer speak before sentencing; and (3) the district court’s obligations under Rule 32.1 were satisfied as it did not have to affirmatively advise him of his right to allocution. The Ninth Circuit rejected all of these arguments, finding that the rule required that a releasee be apprised of his right to allocution. “Allocution by a supervised releasee gives the court more information on which to base its sentence. It also encourages the supervised releasee to participate in post-revocation sentencing, enhancing his dignity.” The court held Rule 32.1(b)(2)(E) required a district court to address a supervised releasee personally and inquire as to whether he wants to speak before the court imposes a post-revocation sentence.
The defendant was an actor in a western-themed charity event, where he and other actors were to engage in a shoot-out, firing blanks. Unfortunately, the defendant’s gun had live ammunition and when he fired it, three spectators were injured and one vehicle was damaged. When he realized that he had fired live rounds, he hid the spent shell casings and remaining ammunition, and lied to investigators. He subsequently confessed and showed them where he had hidden the items. He was indicted for unlawful possession of a firearm as a previously convicted felon, and pled guilty to tampering with evidence. In the plea agreement, he agreed that he would pay restitution to the four victims “pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§3663 and 3663A.” He was sentenced to 90 months, which was an upward variance from the sentencing range of 24 to 30 months. He was also ordered to pay $45,382.88 to the three victims he shot. On appeal, he argued that restitution under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act was improper as the act did not apply to the offense of tampering. He also argued that restitution under the Victim and Witness Protection Act did not authorize restitution. As an alternative, he argued that the district court erred by failing to consider his ability to pay restitution. The Eighth Circuit agreed that restitution was not proper under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act, as tampering with evidence was not an enumerated offense for which restitution applied. However, restitution under the Victim and Witness Protection Act was proper, even though the victims of the shooting were not victims of the tampering offense, as the parties had agreed in the plea agreement that restitution would be ordered. However, under that statute, a defendant’s financial resources must be considered prior to restitution being ordered. As the district court did not address the defendant’s ability to pay, the restitution order was vacated and the case remanded.
United States v. Davila-Gonzalez, 595 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2010); United States v. Mondragon- Santiago, 564 F.3d 357 (5th Cir. 2009); United States v. Vonner, 516 F.3d 382 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc); United States v. Rice, 699 F.3d 1043 (8th Cir. 2012); United States v. Rangel, 697 F.3d 795 (9th Cir. 2012); United States v. Romero, 491 F.3d 1173 (10th Cir. 2007); United States v. Wilson, 605 F.3d 985 (D.C. Cir. 2010) with United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572 (4th Cir. 2010) (Rule 51 “does not require a litigant to complain about a judicial choice after it has been made.”).
After entering into a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement, the defendant pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to distribute more than 50 grams of crack cocaine and was sentenced to 151 months, the bottom end of his sentencing range as calculated in his PSR and agreed to by the parties. At sentencing, the district court found that the disparity between crack and powder cocaine should be one-to-one, resulting in a sentencing range of 41 to 51 months, but that the 120-month statutory minimum “trumped” that range, and then varied upward by 31 months to arrive at the 151-month sentence agreed to in the plea agreement. Later, the defendant filed for a reduction under 18 U.S.C. §3582(c)(2) because his original sentence was “based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission.” The district court denied the motion on the ground that it had “applied a guidelines range of 120 months,” which range had not been lowered by the amendment. On appeal, the question was whether Amendment 750 had the effect of lowering the defendant’s applicable guideline range. The defendant relied on Freeman v. United States, — U.S. —-, 131 S. Ct. 2685 (2011), a 4-1-4 decision with a controlling concurrence by Justice Sotomayor. The Sixth Circuit explained that “[t]he upshot of Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence appears to be that, in the Rule 11(c)(1)(C) context, what the sentencing judge said and did is largely irrelevant; instead, what matters is the agreement itself. As long as that sentencing range is evident from the agreement itself, for purposes of §3582(c)(2) the term of imprisonment imposed by the court in accordance with that agreement is based on that range.” Here, the defendant’s “sentence was based on a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement in which the parties agreed on a sentence between 120 and 188 months. That agreement ‘employ[ed] a particular Guidelines sentencing range’ – 151 to 188 months – ‘to establish the term of imprisonment’ by capping [his] sentence such that it could not exceed the upper end of that guideline range. The range was subsequently lowered by the Sentencing Commission. Therefore, [the defendant’s] sentence was based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission.” Further, a reduction in the sentence would be consistent with the Commission’s applicable policy statements. The case was reversed and remanded.
§3553(a) do not include the cost of incarceration, it appears that the Second Circuit ignored 18 U.S.C.
§3661, which provides that “[n]o limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a court of the United States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence.” If there is no limitation on what can be considered, then cost of incarceration could certainly be considered in determining a sufficient sentence.

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