Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/washington/supreme-court/1963/36491-1.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 11:57:06+00:00

Document:
*438 Hughes & Jeffers, for relator.
Whitmore, Graham & Whitmore, for respondent.
"IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED That, conditioned upon defendants' acceptance of the following terms, the Judgment heretofore entered on the 5th day of December, 1961, be vacated and set aside, the terms being that the issue remaining be limited to the question of damages; that said issue be submitted to the Court sitting without a jury; and if said terms be not accepted by the defendant, the Petition to Set Aside and Vacate Judgment shall be denied."
The defendant not accepting the conditions in the order, the petition to vacate the default judgment is denied.
Plaintiff, Richard E. Johanson, commenced this action in Chelan County for personal injuries sustained by reason of the alleged negligence of the defendant, United Truck Lines. The home office of the defendant is in Spokane, but the summons and complaint were served on Don Trotter, dock foreman at the defendant's East Wenatchee freight terminal. This was on October 17, 1961; and no appearance having been made by defendant by November 15, 1961, the plaintiff moved for, and secured, an order of default. December 5, 1961, the trial court, after hearing testimony, entered a judgment for $21,384.73 and costs. The plaintiff's attorneys then wrote a letter to the defendant, addressed to its Spokane office, asking payment of the judgment; and the defendant, claiming that this letter (received December 7, 1961) was the first notice it had of the pendency of the *439 action, petitioned (January 3, 1962) for an order vacating the order of default and the judgment.
The defendant relied in the trial court (and is relying here) on subsections 3 and 7 of RCW 4.72.010.
In attacking the validity of the service, under subsection 3, the defendant admits that the summons and complaint were served on Trotter; but contends that this was not service on the corporation because he was not the "managing agent" or "office assistant ... of the managing agent" within the meaning of our statute relative to service on corporations (RCW 4.28.080 (9)) and relies on D.M. Osborne & Co. v. Columbia Cy. Farmers' Alliance Corp. (1894), 9 Wash. 666, 38 Pac. 160, to support that contention.
 The evidence established that the manager of the defendant's East Wenatchee terminal was out of town on business at the time of the service on Trotter, and that the latter was in charge during his absence. Of the 12 to 15 *440 employees at the branch terminal, Trotter had authority to hire and fire 9 of them. There was also evidence that both before and after the service in question, he had been served with legal process directed to the defendant, including garnishment process; and it had not, theretofore or thereafter, denied his authority to accept such process.
The trial court made an excellent analysis of the evidence and the applicable case law on this phase of the case; and its conclusion that under a statute such as ours the general rule is that the managing agent of a corporation upon whom process could be served is one who "must have some substantial part in the management of its affairs generally or in a particular district or locality" is abundantly supported by the authorities set out in a 1960 A.L.R. annotation on "Who is `managing agent' of domestic corporation within statute providing for service of summons or process thereon." See 71 A.L.R. (2d) 178 et seq.
"... Trotter had been served with legal processes both before and after the service here in question, including garnishee process as against the defendant corporation, and that the corporation had accepted such service of process and had reason to know that sheriffs or other legal process servers would continue to serve process on Don Trotter."
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has held that such circumstances can be considered in determining whether a particular individual is a managing agent upon whom service of process can be made. Neitzke v. Kraft-Phenix Dairies, Inc. (1934), 214 Wis. 441, 253 N.W. 579.
We agree with the trial court's holding that Trotter was a managing agent of the defendant at the time and place of the service of the summons in this case.
 The defendant insists that such a holding is contrary to the Osborne case, supra, which does squarely hold that service on a branch manager of a domestic corporation is ineffectual and that a "managing agent ... was one who managed the affairs of the corporation, and not some particular part or branch thereof only."
*442 We, too, decline to follow it; and to the extent that it is inconsistent with the general rule to which we have made reference, it is overruled.
As we agree with the trial court that there was adequate service on the defendant corporation, we must consider the defendant's further claim: that the order of default and the default judgment should be vacated because of "unavoidable casualty or misfortune" preventing the defendant from answering and defending (RCW 4.72.010(7)).
"... that affiant believes and states that if said transmittals were made by the said Ahnemiller as above stated, the same must have been lost in the United States mails; that affiant believes and states that United Truck Lines, Inc. has a meritorious defense to the within action."
This leaves the mailing of the summons and complaint to the Spokane office resting on a hearsay affidavit (Agostino's statement that Ahnemiller told him they had been mailed). Plaintiff's counsel in oral argument stated that Ahnemiller was present at the hearing on whether the order of default and judgment should be vacated, but did not testify.
The trial court did not discuss the issue of "unavoidable casualty or misfortune," but devoted its attention solely to *443 the sufficiency of service. However, it could not have found that "unavoidable casualty or misfortune" had been established and, at the same review, refuse to set aside the order of default and give the defendant an opportunity to plead and defend on the issues of liability and damage. We, therefore, proceed on the theory that the court found adversely to the defendant on the issue of "unavoidable casualty or misfortune" and sustain it in that position because the defendant clearly did not sustain its burden of proof.
 Having determined that there was adequate service of process upon the defendant and that no "unavoidable casualty or misfortune" was established, there were no statutory grounds for the vacation of either the order of default or the default judgment, and it is unnecessary to consider whether defendant has shown that it had a meritorious defense. Skidmore v. Pacific Creditors (1943), 18 Wn. (2d) 157, 138 P. (2d) 664; Harter v. King Cy. (1941), 11 Wn. (2d) 583, 119 P. (2d) 919; Haynes v. B.F. Schwartz Co. (1892), 5 Wash. 433, 32 Pac. 220; see RCW 4.72.060.
The trial court's refusal to set aside the order of default (entered November 15, 1961) is affirmed.
The trial court also refused to vacate the default judgment (entered December 5, 1961). As we have indicated, the defendant has failed to show either failure of service or "unavoidable casualty or misfortune" preventing it from defending the action. There has been no suggestion that there was not proper proof on the issue of damages, and there is a recital in the judgment that "evidence both oral and documentary" was received. We find nothing in the record which would require the trial court to vacate the default judgment.
*444 What the trial court did was to say that if the defendant was willing to accept its terms, i.e., conditionally opening the judgment for the consideration of the issue of damages, and this issue to be submitted to the court sitting without a jury, the default judgment (not the order of default) would be vacated.
The conditions were not accepted because the defendant believed that it was entitled to have the order of default and the default judgment set aside and to have a trial on all issues. Our conclusion that the trial court was correct in refusing to vacate the order of default and in refusing to vacate the default judgment does not preclude the defendant from now accepting the conditions should it elect so to do.
There remains for consideration the defendant's contention that, by the conditions imposed, it is being denied a constitutional right of a trial by jury on the issue of damages.
See also Dyson v. Rhode Island Co. (1904), 25 R.I. 600, 57 Atl. 771.
There is a suggestion that, not having availed itself of the conditional vacation of the default judgment, the defendant has no further rights. We are satisfied that a trial court cannot impose conditions designed to deprive a litigant of his right to appellate review of orders entered, and we are sure that the trial court had no such thought in mind.
We hold that the status of this case on remand is exactly what it was at the time the writ of certiorari was sought and obtained, and the defendant has its election to accept or reject the conditional vacation.
The plaintiff, Richard E. Johanson, is entitled to recover his costs herein to be taxed.
OTT, C.J., ROSELLINI, HUNTER, and HALE, JJ., concur.
[*] Reported in 383 P. (2d) 512.
 Plaintiff's suggestion that the review should have been by appeal and not by certiorari is good, but not timely. The record is before us and we will determine the issues presented.
"(3) For mistakes, neglect or omission of the clerk, or irregularity in obtaining a judgment or order.
"(7) For unavoidable casualty, or misfortune preventing the party from prosecuting or defending."
"(9) If the suit be against a company or corporation other than those designated in the preceding subdivisions of this section, to the president or other head of the company or corporation, secretary, cashier or managing agent thereof or to the secretary, stenographer or office assistant of the president or other head of the company or corporation, secretary, cashier or managing agent."
"(8) If the suit be against a company or corporation other than those designated in the preceding subdivisions of this section, to the president or other head of the company or corporation, secretary, cashier or managing agent thereof."
 The Osborne case also held that the fact that a defendant corporation has knowledge of the pendency of a suit against it will not dispense with the necessity of proper service; and it has been cited many times as authority for that proposition.
 A default admits the plaintiff's right to recover, but it does not admit the amount claimed where the damages are unliquidated; and the amount of the recovery, in such cases, must be established by proof. RCW 4.56.160(2). State ex rel. Allied Bldg. Credits v. Superior Court (1953), 44 Wn. (2d) 39, 265 P. (2d) 261; Hawk v. Mayer (1950), 36 Wn. (2d) 858, 220 P. (2d) 885; Paine-Gallucci, Inc. v. Anderson (1949), 35 Wn. (2d) 312, 212 P. (2d) 805; Skidmore v. Pacific Creditors (1943), 18 Wn. (2d) 157, 138 P. (2d) 664; Ferguson v. Hoshi (1901), 25 Wash. 664, 66 Pac. 105.
 "The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate, but the legislature may provide for a jury of any number less than twelve in courts not of record, and for a verdict by nine or more jurors in civil cases in any court of record, and for waiving of the jury in civil cases where the consent of the parties interested is given thereto." Const. Art. 1, § 21.

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