Source: http://municipalminute.ancelglink.com/2011/12/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 00:40:38+00:00

Document:
The American Bar Association (State and Local Government Section) has published its annual compilation of land use-related articles and reports released in 2011. At the Cutting Edge 2011, edited by Dwight Merriam, is an essential resource for land use lawyers, planning professionals, and others interested in keeping up with current trends and issues affecting land use law.
underutilization and the public use doctrine.
Three Ancel Glink attorneys contibuted to this year's publication. David Silverman authored an article on promoting green transportation. Brent Denzin and Julie Tappendorf co-authored an article on land banking of vacant property.
Visit ABA's website (publications page) to get yours today!
The OMA electronic training program for elected and appointed officials is now available on the Illinois Attorney General's website. As we reported previously, public officials currently in office have a year to complete their training (by January 1, 2013) and officials who take office after January 1, 2012, have 90 days after taking office to complete their training. (Practical tip 1: although the program appears to be available now, you might want to wait until after January 1st to complete the training -- see "glitch" discussion below).
You can access the OMA training program by clicking the "Electronic Training" link on the Attorney General's website. Then, you will need to register as an OMA Public Body Member, requiring you to create an account using the online registration form. This account will allow you to review your training records and print out your training certificate once you successfully complete the program (assuming you can get past screen 14 - more on that later). (Practical tip 2: When you choose your own password, make sure it is 8 characters in length (not 7, not 9, but exactly 8) and the password must contain a "special character." Not a number. Trust me, it doesn't work unless you follow the password instructions to the letter...I mean, special character).
After you create your account, you will be able to access the training program. There are 58 screens you have to progress through to complete the training. For obvious reasons, I won't share any of this information because if you are required by law to complete the training program, you need to find out for yourself!
One important tip about the training program - make sure you give yourself plenty of time to get through the training. The program froze up more than once, requiring me to log off and restart. Fortunately, you can choose to go back to where you left off when you logged off. Unfortunately, I never got past screen 14 because the program froze each time I answered the question. In all likelihood, these program glitches will be fixed by January 1, 2012, the effective date of the training requirement. Apparently, I was premature in trying to cross this one off the "to-do" list. I will, as my grandmother used to say, "hold my horses" and try again next week.
Today's story offers a lesson for municipalities and contractors: state agency approval may not shield activity from federal environmental laws.
The EPA and Department of Justice (DOJ) announced that Wright Brothers Construction Co. and the Georgia Department of Transportation (GDOT) have agreed to pay a $1.5 million penalty and spend more than $1.3 million to offset environmental damages to resolve alleged violations of the Clean Water Act (CWA). The civil penalty is one of the largest ever under the CWA provisions prohibiting the unauthorized discharge of dredged or fill material into waters of the United States.
The complaint alleges that between 2004 and 2007, Wright Brothers, with approval from GDOT, buried all or portions of seven primary trout streams in violation of the CWA. Wright Brothers was hired by GDOT to dispose of excess soil and rock generated during two GDOT highway expansion projects in northeast Georgia. The contracts between GDOT and Wright Brothers specifically required Wright Brothers to obtain written environmental clearance from GDOT prior to using any site as a fill site. GDOT approved sites that included streams considered to be waters of the United States. These actions resulted in the unauthorized disposal of more than one million cubic yards of excess rock and soil, impacting approximately 2,800 linear feet of stream.
Under the settlement, Wright Brothers and GDOT must perform injunctive relief measures, including purchasing 16,920 mitigation credits at an estimated cost of $1.35 million to offset the impacts to waters of the United States that cannot be restored. The credits must be purchased from mitigation banks servicing the area in which the violations occurred. A mitigation bank is a wetland, stream, or other aquatic resource area that has been set aside for the purpose of providing compensation for impacts to aquatic resources that occurred under a federal, state, or local permit.
Wright Brothers and GDOT will also remove piping and restore the bed and bank of a 150-foot stream channel that was impacted from the disposal activities. When complete, the restoration activities and injunctive relief measures will mitigate the 2,800 feet of stream impacted by the CWA violations.
The settlement is subject to a 30-day comment period and final court approval.
For more information on the settlement, visit the EPA's website.
Post authored by Brent Denzin.
The EPA announced a settlement with the Metropolitan Water Reclamation District (MWRD) to address the problem of raw sewage being released into Chicago area waterways during rain storms. MWRD has also agreed to pay a civil penalty of $675,000 and make an enormous investment in storm water/flood abatement projects.
First, the settlement requires MWRD to implement a $25 million to $50 million green infrastructure program that will reduce storm water runoff in communities. Among other green infrastructure projects, MWRD agreed to distribute rain barrels and develop projects to build green roofs, install rain gardens, or use pervious paving materials in urban neighborhoods.
Second, the settlement includes a requirement to complete the Deep Tunnel—an enormous public works project designed to detail floodwaters, in a series of stages in 2015, 2017, and 2029.
Third, the settlement requires MWRD to control trash and debris in overflows using skimmer boats to remove debris from the water so it can be collected and properly managed, making waterways cleaner and healthier.
For more information, check out the DOJ's website.
On February 8, 2012, the Metro West Council of Government will present a seminar titled "Eliminating Waste, Saving Money: Strategic Steps to Reduce Costs of Environmental Compliance and Mitigate Flood Impacts." The seminar will focus on quick and easy steps to protect communities from environmental liability and reduce impacts of flooding—while saving money in the process.
Ancel Glink Attorney Brent Denzin will address various ways communities can streamline their codes and ordinances. Brent will also provide tips for compliance practices. Eric Neagu of Weaver Boos Consultants will discuss ways communities can reduce costs by incorporating green infrastructure and reducing flooding and storm water pollution.
The seminar will be held at the Sugar Grove Fire Protection District building located at 25 Municipal Drive, Sugar Grove, Illinois, from 9:00 a.m. to 10:30 a.m.
With only two weeks left in 2011, and many lucky folks heading out of the office for the rest of the year, we thought it would be helpful to provide a brief summary of some of the new laws affecting municipalities that take effect on January 1, 2012.
Public Officials Must Complete Electronic Open Meetings Act Training.
As we reported on September 21, 2011, P.A. 97-0504 added a new training requirement for all elected and appointed public officials. Officials holding office on January 1, 2012, have one year to complete the training. Officials taking office after January 1, 2012 will have 90 days to complete the training. Officials who have already completed an OMA training program do not have to take it again.
The electronic training program is administered by the Public Access Counselor (PAC). Upon completion of the training, each official must submit a certificate of completion to the PAC. A certificate of completion covers the official for any committee or subcommittee of the public body and for every other public body of which the official may be a member.
Municipalities Must Post Employee Salary Information.
Under the new law, “total compensation package” is defined as salary, employer-paid health insurance premiums, housing allowance, vehicle allowance, clothing allowance, bonuses, loans, vacation days which will be earned in that year and sick days which will be earned in that year.
If an employer maintains a website, it can post the information on its website or post the information available at its main office. However, if an employer selects this option, it must also post directions on its website on how to access the information. If the employer does not have a website, it must post the information at its main office.
Contractors Subject to New Record-Keeping Obligations under Prevailing Wage Act.
P.A. 97-0571 amends the Prevailing Wage Act to require contractors and subcontractors to keep records for at least 3 years from the date of the last payment on a contract or subcontract. The new law also requires contractors to file a monthly certified payroll signed by the contractor or agent certifying that he or she has examined the payroll records. Contractors now have 3 days (instead of 7) to make records available for inspection by the public agency. For certain violations, contractors can be barred from public works projects for a four year period.
Municipalities Can Recover Overpayment of Wages and Benefits.
P.A. 97-0120 amends the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act to authorize municipalities to make deductions from employee wages or final compensation for overpayments that result from a typographical or mathematical error made by the municipality or to collect a debt owed to a municipality. The amount of the deduction cannot exceed 15% of the net amount of the payment. Prior to making the deduction, the municipality must certify that (i) the employee has received notice of a wage deduction and opportunity for a hearing. (ii) the employee has been afforded a hearing by the municipality to dispute the debt.
Back Seat Passengers Now Have to Buckle Up.
P.A. 97-0016 requires all back seat passengers to wear a seatbelt, but exempts passengers of emergency vehicles and taxi cabs.
The Chicago Bears are not going to the playoffs.
Can a Taxpayer Sue for Illegal Municipal Expenditures Without Showing Pecuniary Harm?
In Highway J Citizens Group v. Village of Ritchfield, a citizens group challenged an annexation by the Village of Ritchfield, Wisconsin of certain property located in the Town of Polk. Plaintiffs claimed that the annexation did not meet the statutory contiguity requirement and resembled a "balloon on a string," contrary to state annexation laws. The complaint alleged that the annexation caused damages to members of the citizens group who resided in the Town of Polk due to lost property tax revenue and to members of the group who reside in the Village of Ritchfield (the annexing municipality) because the Village was required to make substantial annual payments to the Town as a result of the annexation.
The trial court dismissed the case, finding that plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the annexation. The appellate court affirmed on the same basis. The appellate court held that a taxpayer cannot "simply challenge an ordinance merely because he or she disagrees with the legislative body." Instead, a taxpayer must have "sustained, or will sustain, some pecuniary loss before he or she has standing." Because the members of the citizens' group were not owners of property within the annexed territory, they had no direct, legal interest in the annexation. According to the court, plaintiffs' allegations of pecuniary harm were no different than the harm suffered by any other taxpayer in the Town of Polk or Village of Ritchfield.
So, why do we care about an unpublished decision out of Wisconsin? Well, just last month, plaintiffs filed a petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. In their brief, plaintiffs argue that the Supreme Court and five of the Circuit Courts of Appeal (First, Second, Sixth, Ninth, and D.C.) do not require actual pecuniary harm to establish municipal taxpayer standing. According to plaintiffs, the Third, Fourth, and Seventh Circuits do require a showing of actual pecuniary harm. It is this alleged Circuit split that forms the basis for plaintiffs' writ of cert to the Supreme Court.
While this particular case focuses on the narrow issue of whether a municipal taxpayer has standing to challenge an annexation, the question presented to the Supreme Court could have broader application in taxpayer challenges to any municipal expenditure.
It remains to be seen whether the Supreme Court will grant cert and answer the plaintiffs' question: Does a taxpayer have standing to sue for illegal municipal expenditures without having to show pecuniary harm?
In January, the U.S. Supreme Court will hear oral argument in a case involving governmental enforcement of federal environmental laws against private property owners. In Sackett v. EPA, a property owner challenged the EPA’s use of so-called “administrative compliance orders.” The EPA uses these administrative orders to allege that a property owner is in violation of an environmental law provision and to demand that the owner bring the property into compliance. The Supreme Court will decide whether a property owner can immediately go to court to challenge the EPA's order or whether the owner must wait to challenge the order until after the EPA sues the property owner in a civil or criminal action.
The case involved a challenge to an EPA compliance order that asserted that the Sacketts had violated the Clean Water Act when they filled in a wetland on their property without a permit. The compliance order required the Sacketts to remove the fill material and restore the property to its original condition. The owners requested a hearing before the EPA, which was denied. The Sacketts then filed a lawsuit with the district court claiming that the compliance order was arbitrary and capricious, violated their due process rights, and was unconstitutionally vague. The district court dismissed the Sacketts' case. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed, concluding that the Sacketts were not entitled to pre-enforcement judicial review of the EPA compliance order.
The question presented to the Supreme Court is deceptively simple - Is a property owner entitled to judicial review of an EPA administrative compliance order? The issues surrounding that question, however, are far from simple and have kept quite a few environmental advocates and opponents (and their lawyers) busy. In fact, 14 amici briefs were filed in support of the Sacketts, including briefs filed by the National Association of Home Builders and the American Civil Rights Union, among others. A common theme among these briefs is the assertion of a conflict between these environmental laws and the Fifth Amendment right that no person be deprived of property without due process of law.
Those of us who work in the land use field are very interested in seeing how the Court will resolve the alleged conflict between environmental protection and property rights.
We will keep you posted on this case. For more information about this case, visit Scotusblog.
Never more than 140 characters.
Like most other municipalities throughout the state and across the country, the City of Chicago has in place an ordinance that regulates the height of weeds on private property. The City’s weed ordinance was recently the subject of a constitutional challenge by a property owner who was cited, and found to have violated, the ordinance. The appellate court upheld both the weed ordinance and the City’s administrative proceedings in Schacter v. City of Chicago.
In this case, the property owner had asserted a number of procedural and substantive challenges to the administrative proceedings, as well as constitutional challenges to the weed ordinance. Specifically, the owner alleged that the weed ordinance: (1) was vague and subjective; (2) invited arbitrary enforcement; (3) had been arbitrarily enforced; (4) failed the "strict scrutiny" test because it limited the right to property in an overly broad manner; and (5) bore no rational relationship to any legitimate or intended public purpose.
Municipalities have traditionally justified and supported their “weed ordinances” with recitals that emphasize the health and safety benefits to the regulation (control of rodents, prevention of disease, etc). Based on this decision, aesthetics alone may provide sufficient justification and support for a municipality’s property maintenance regulations.
Check out the winter issue of Ancel Glink's e-newsletter, In the Zone: Current Trends in Land Use Law, for updates on land use and economic development topics. This edition focuses on "controversial land uses" including municipal regulation of landfills, billboards, cellular facilities, and agricultural uses.
This article compares three recent Illinois cases that considered challenges to municipal regulation of various controversial land uses, including billboards, landfills, and agricultural uses.
In our first case, the court upheld a municipal zoning decision resulting in the removal of a billboard - a common eyesore that many local governments desire to eliminate.
An even more onerous land use - a landfill - is the subject of our second case. The court in this case considers what constitutes a fundamentally fair landfill siting hearing, a procedural due process concept that can also be applied to traditional zoning hearings.
Our third case reminds municipalities of the importance of carefully defining controversial land uses in local zoning ordinances - here, agricultural uses and the boarding of horses.
We also discuss another controversial land use that might create the biggest paradox in a community - the erection of cellular towers; no one wants one nearby, but no one is willing to put down their phone. This article summarizes how courts have reviewed cellular zoning decisions in light of the FCC's latest administrative order adopting "shot clock regulations" to place time limits on a municipality's review and consideration of a cellular tower application.
Perhaps, the biggest thing to happen during the recent veto session of the Illinois General Assembly is what did not happen, as a tax package designed to keep several high-profile firms in Illinois earned only eight votes in the Illinois House, after passing out of the Senate with a veto-proof majority. CME, CBOE and Sears are each seeking millions of dollars in tax relief before a tax increase kicks in next July. Observers expect that this will not be the end of the tax relief effort, and the legislature may take action on a new plan as early as Monday, December 12th.
Yesterday, I reported on the six binding opinions issued by the Illinois Attorney General (PAC) in 2011. Today, I have summarized the four binding opinions issued in 2010.
Spoiler alert - just as in 2011, the PAC ruled against the public body in each of the 2010 opinions summarized below.
An individual filed a FOIA request seeking a copy of a public body's water meter card showing reading for a six month period. The public body responded that the requestor could inspect a copy of the records, but the public body was not obligated to provide a copy of the records. On appeal, the PAC determined that the public body violated FOIA by not furnishing copies of the records as required by Section 3(b) of FOIA.
An individual filed a FOIA request for certified payroll records and contracts with various contractors. The public body charged a fee for the copies that were provided to the requestor as well as a fee for duplicate copies that were retained by the public body. The individual appealed the duplicate fee charges to the PAC. The PAC determined that although FOIA requires a public body to retain a copy of the original request and response, the public body is not entitled to pass on duplicate copy costs to the requestor. In short, the PAC determined that the public body violated FOIA.
Reporters filed a FOIA request for autopsy records of Christopher Kelly (fundraiser for former Governor Blagojevich) and Michael Scott (President of the Chicago Board of Education), both suicide victims. The requested documents included photographs, toxicology reports, police reports, and various other records. The public body requested pre-authorization from the PAC to deny the request based on the "personal privacy" exemption, arguing that the privacy interests of the victims' families outweighed the public's interest in the release of these records. The PAC denied the pre-authorization request except as it related to post-mortem photographs, ordered the public body to release the records, and determined that the public body violated FOIA by not releasing the records.
A reporter filed a FOIA request for a copy of a settlement agreement in an employment discrimination case. The public body denied the request, stating that it did not have a copy of the settlement agreement because the lawsuit was defended by the public body's insurance carrier. The PAC determined that Section 2.02 of FOIA expressly states that settlement agreements are public records subject to release to the public and that the public body violated FOIA by not providing a copy of the settlement agreement.
UPDATED 4/9/2012: Under state law, the Public Access Counselor of the Office of the Illinois Attorney General, is authorized to issue binding opinions in response to requests for review submitted by members of the public. The PAC was granted this authority in 2010 when the General Assembly amended both the OMA and FOIA. A request for review can be filed when a Freedom of Information Act request has been denied by a public body or when a public body has allegedly violated the Open Meetings Act. According to a story published by the Chicago Tribune today, most of the complaints filed with the PAC involve FOIA requests rather than open meetings. For example, last year, the PAC handled more than 5,200 new matters regarding public access, but only about 200 were for allegations of open meetings violations.
According to the AG's website, the PAC has issued just 11 binding opinions in the two years since the PAC was created -- four in 2010 and seven in 2011 and all involving FOIA appeals. I have summarized the 2011 opinions in this post and will provide a summary of the 2010 opinions in a future blog.
Spoiler alert - the PAC ruled against the public body in each of the seven opinions from 2011 that are summarized below and, in all but two of the opinions, the requestor appealing the FOIA denial was a reporter.
An individual filed a FOIA request seeking arrest records and gunshot residue test report. The request was denied based on the criminal history record exemption under Section 2.15 and because the public body did not possess the gunshot residue report. On appeal, the PAC first determined that since the gunshot residue report was not in the public body 's possession, the denial was permissible. However, the PAC also determined that the arrest records were not exempt under FOIA and, therefore, the public body violated FOIA by improperly denying the records.
A reporter filed a FOIA request seeking records containing the number of sworn officers assigned to each district. The public body denied the request under Section 7(1)(v), claiming that the information related to the mobilization and deployment of police personnel. The PAC determined that the records were not exempt because the public body failed to demonstrate how the number of officers assigned to a district could reasonably be expected to jeopardize the effectiveness of security measures or safety of the officers or public. In short, the PAC found that the public body violated FOIA.
A reporter filed a FOIA request seeking various records relating to a university’s presidential search. The university sought pre-authorizations to withhold certain information under Section 7(1)(c) as personal privacy information, which was partially denied by the PAC. The university then partially denied the FOIA request. A subsequent request was filed, seeking the documents previously denied and the university denied the subsequent request, asserting that providing the requested documents would be unduly burdensome and that the request was a “repeated request” from the same person for the same records. The PAC found that the university violated FOIA because the public body did not either (1) previously disclose the requested records or (2) property deny the previous request.
A reporter filed a FOIA request seeking a copy of a settlement agreement between a public body and a former employee. The public body denied the request under Section 7(1)(s) which permits a public body to withhold records relating to insurance or self-insurance claims and loss or risk management information because the settlement amount was paid by the public body’s insurance carrier. The PAC determined that the settlement agreement was not exempt under FOIA because (1) FOIA was recently amended to expressly provide that settlement agreements are public records subject to release and (2) Section 7(1)(s) only protects proprietary information regarding policies, procedures, and practices of the self insurance or risk management pool or association, and not information relating to individual claims or losses, including the amount to settle a claim. In short, the PAC found that the public body violated FOIA.
A reporter filed a FOIA request seeking 50 individual reports containing “nerve conduction velocity” results conducted as part of workers compensation claims involving employees at a particular correctional center. The requestor subsequently clarified his request to the public body that personal identifying information could be redacted. The public body denied the request, claiming that the tests were risk management records protected by Section 7(1)(s). Based on similar analysis as contained in PAC Opinion 11-004, the PAC found that the records were not "proprietary" insurance or risk management documents and that the public body violated FOIA.
As I discussed in more detail in a separate blog post on November 17, 2011, the PAC issued a binding opinion regarding the denial of reporter's FOIA request for text messages, emails, and other electronic records on public officials’ personal cell phones and other devices. The public body had argued that the records were not “public records” subject to release, but the PAC disagreed and determined that the public body violated FOIA.
An individual filed a FOIA request for electronic and paper copies of mining plans with the Department of Natural Resources. The Department responded that the records were available on microfiche and invited the requester to schedule an appointment for inspection. The requester filed a request for review with the PAC, arguing that the Department's response was a denial of his request for a printed copy of the reclamation plan. The PAC agreed, finding that the Department violated FOIA by refusing to provide copies of the records.
On December 1, 2011, the Illinois Supreme Court decided Forest Preserve of DuPage County v. First National Bank of Franklin Park, 2011 IL 110759 (2011). The case involved a challenge to a condemnation action filed by the District to take 204 acres of land consisting of an existing public golf course and undeveloped land. The landowners challenged the condemnation on a number of grounds, including the jury’s determination of value as of the date of the filing of the action. In this decision, the Supreme Court determined that the taking occurs when the government (1) deposits the amount of compensation that has been ascertained and awarded and (2) acquires title and the right to possess the property and not at the time of filing of the action.
This case began with the filing of the condemnation action by the District in 1999. The next seven years were spent sorting out the legal rights and responsibilities between the landowners. No final action could be taken on the condemnation action until the landowners’ legal issues were resolved. Finally, in 2007, a jury trial on the condemnation action was held where it was determined that the fair market value of the property was approximately $11 million, a valuation only slightly above what the District offered the landowners in 1999. The jury based the property valuation on the value as of the filing date in 1999. The landowners challenged that valuation, contending that the property had increased in value from 1999 to 2007 to be more than twice that amount or $25.5 million. The appellate court vacated the jury verdict on the issue of fair market value, and sent the case back to the trial court to determine whether the jury verdict awarded just compensation to the landowners as required under the state and federal constitutions. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court.
The dispute as to fair market valuation arose because provisions of Illinois’ Eminent Domain Act suggest that the date of valuation is the date on which the condemnation action is filed. In vacating the jury’s valuation, the Illinois Supreme Court relied on the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Kirby Forest Industries, Inc. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1 (1984), which held that the constitutional fifth amendment right to just compensation entitles a landowner to fair market value on the date of taking, which it defined as payment and the passing of title. The Illinois Supreme Court explained that establishing a taking at this point in time would (1) enable Illinois trial courts to hold post-trial Kirby hearings to ensure that just compensation is properly awarded to landowners and (2) align Illinois eminent domain law with federal eminent domain law, ensuring its constitutionality.
Post authored by David Silverman.
On December 1, 2011, the Illinois Supreme Court held that benefits under the Public Safety Employees Benefits Act (PSEBA) begin on the date of termination of employment, reversing an appellate court’s decision that PSEBA benefits attach on the date of the injury.
The case, Nowak v. City of Country Club Hills, involved a police officer who was injured in the line-of-duty. Three years after his injury, he was awarded a line-of-duty disability. The officer claimed that he was entitled to reimbursement of the portion of his health insurance premiums that he paid while still employed during the three year period from his injury to the disability determination. The trial court held that PSEBA attaches on the date of the determination of the disability. The appellate court reversed, holding that benefits kick in on the date of the injury.
The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the appellate court’s decision, agreeing with the trial court that PSEBA benefits do not begin until the officer’s employment was terminated. The Court first examined the language of the statute, finding that it was silent on the issue of when the employer’s obligation attaches. Because the statute could be reasonably interpreted in one of two ways (as the trial court and appellate court established in their differing opinions) the Supreme Court found the language ambiguous and turned to the legislative history for guidance. Relying on statements made by legislators in debating the bill, as well as a public policy analysis, the Court determined that the legislature intended PSEBA to be a post-employment benefit, meaning that PSEBA benefits will attach on the date that it is determined that an officer’s injury is “catastrophic” and therefore eligible for a line-of-duty disability pension, not on the date of injury.
An employer who employs a full-time law enforcement…officer…who…suffers a catastrophic injury or is killed in the line of duty shall pay the entire premium of the employer’s health insurance plan for the injured employee, the injured employee’s spouse, and for each dependent child of the injured employee until the child reaches the age of majority…820 ILCS 320/10(a).
On November 28, 2011, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that it would rehear en banc its May 2, 2011 decision in Nordyke v. King. That case involved a challenge to a municipal gun show ordinance. The plaintiffs had promoted gun shows at the Alameda County fairgrounds from 1991 until the county enacted the ordinance in 1999 after a shooting. Plaintiffs initially challenged the ordinance based on First Amendment and Equal Protection grounds, which were rejected by the U.S. District Court. The plaintiffs appealed to the Ninth Circuit after the District Court refused to allow them to add a Second Amendment claim in an amended complaint.
In the May decision, a three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed dismissal of the plaintiffs’ First Amendment claim, holding that it was not convinced that Alameda had adopted the law to limit free expression among "gun culture" members or that the sale of guns at shows was a form of advocacy or commercial speech protected by the First Amendment. The panel had also ruled in favor of the County on plaintiffs’ Equal Protection Clause argument.
However, the panel ruled in favor of the plaintiffs on their Second Amendment argument, holding that they should be allowed to amend their complaint to add a Second Amendment claim because of recent decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court in the six years since they had initially raised their claim. Specifically, the panel stated that: “Since then, all of the Supreme Court’s modern Second Amendment case law has been created. See McDonald v. Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010); District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).” The panel then remanded the case to the District Court.
Based on this ruling, the full Ninth Circuit will have a chance to review Alameda County’s ordinance based on the analysis contained in McDonald and Heller.

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.