Source: http://pa.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20180216_0001119.MPA.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 16:16:27+00:00

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The instant appeal calls upon us to assess whether substantial evidence supported the ALJ's determination that Smith could perform a limited range of work in the national economy. Given the nature of Smith's emotional impairments, which included depressive disorder, anxiety, dysthymic disorder, bipolar disorder, panic disorder, schizophrenia, paranoid type, schizoaffective disorder, posttraumatic stress disorder, and a personality disorder, that finding by the ALJ rested upon an assessment of the medical and psychiatric evidence amassed in this case. In particular, the ALJ was called upon to consider some five years of treatment records compiled by multiple treating sources, all of whom documented that Smith suffered from a profound level of emotional and mental impairment on an on-going basis over an extended period of time. Notwithstanding this treating source evidence, the ALJ concluded that Smith could meet the mental demands of a limited range of light work, apparently reaching this conclusion based solely upon the rejection of five years of treating source documentation and opinions.
In our view, more is needed here to meet the Commissioner's burden of showing that this determination rested upon substantial evidence articulated in the record. Therefore, for the reasons set forth below, it is recommended that this case be remanded to the Commissioner for further proceedings.
A GAF score is a numerical summary of a clinician's judgment of an individual's psychological, social, and occupational functioning on a hypothetical continuum of mental health on a scale of one hundred. See Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 32-34(4th ed. text rev. 2000) (hereinafter ‘DSM-IV'). A score is placed in a particular decile if either symptom severity or the level of functioning falls with that range. Id.
GAF scores in the 51-60 range indicate moderate impairment in social or occupational functioning.” Cherry v. Barnhart, 29 Fed.Appx. 898, 900 (3d Cir. 2002). DaVinci v. Astrue, 1:11-CV-1470, 2012 WL 6137324 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 21, 2012) report and recommendation adopted, Davinci v. Astrue, 1:11-CV-1470, 2012 WL 6136846 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 11, 2012). “A GAF score of 41-50 indicates ‘serious symptoms (e.g., suicidal ideation, severe obsessional rituals, frequent shoplifting) [or] any serious impairment in social, occupational, or school functioning (e.g., no friends, unable to keep a job).' DSM-IV at 34. A score of 50 is on the borderline between serious and moderate symptoms.” Colon v. Barnhart, 424 F.Supp.2d 805, 809 (E.D. Pa. 2006). See Shufelt v. Colvin, No. 1:15-CV-1026, 2016 WL 8613936, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 15, 2016), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Shulfelt v. Colvin, No. 1:15-CV-1026, 2017 WL 1162767 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 2017).
Jones v. Colvin, No. 1:16-CV-1535, 2017 WL 4277289, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 25, 2017), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Jones v. Berryhill, No. 1:16-CV-1535, 2017 WL 4314572 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 27, 2017).
Further, in 2016, Smith started mental healthcare treatment with Julia L. Tilley (“Ms. Tilley”), MSW, LCSW. Ms. Tilley's treatment notes also documented paranoia, hallucinations, and severe depression on Smith's part. (Tr. 852-54.) Based upon this treatment history, Ms. Tilley reported in April of 2016 that Smith had marked restrictions in hosts of work-related spheres due to her mental health impairments. (Tr. 855.) Thus, between 2011 and 2016, while Smith's disability application was pending, no less than four separate treating sources have determined on multiple occasions that Smith suffers from severe impairments due to a cascading constellation of mental health conditions.

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