Source: https://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-supreme-court/412/427.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 01:01:03+00:00

Document:
Since the Court of Appeals' denial of costs and attorneys' fees under 718 of the Emergency School Aid Act of 1972 to petitioners, who were successful in litigation aimed at desegregating the public schools of Memphis, Tenn., was without stated reasons, this Court cannot determine whether the proper standard, Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400 , was correctly applied.
Section 718 tracks the wording of 204 (b) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 244, 42 U.S.C. 2000a-3 (b), which provides that, in an action seeking to enforce Title II of that Act, "the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs . . . ." In Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400 (1968), we held that, under 204 (b), "one who succeeds in obtaining an injunction under that Title should ordinarily recover an attorney's fee unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust." Id., at 402. The similarity of language in 718 and 204 (b) is, of course, a strong indication that the two statutes should be interpreted pari passu. Moreover, "the two provisions share a common raison d'etre. The plaintiffs in school cases are `private attorneys general' vindicating national policy in the same sense as are plaintiffs in Title II actions. The enactment of both provisions was for the same purpose - `to encourage individuals injured by racial discrimination to seek judicial relief . . . .'" Johnson v. Combs, 471 F.2d 84, 86 (CA5 1972), quoting Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., supra, at 402. We therefore conclude that, as with 204 (b), if other requirements of 718 are satisfied, the successful plaintiff "should ordinarily recover an attorney's fee unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust." 390 U.S., at 402 . Since it is impossible for us [412 U.S. 427, 429] to determine whether the Court of Appeals applied this standard and, if so, whether it did so correctly, we grant the petition for certiorari, vacate the judgment below insofar as it relates to the denial of attorneys' fees, and remand to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 2 See Taylor v. McKeithen, 407 U.S. 191 (1972); cf. California v. Krivda, 409 U.S. 33 (1972).
[ Footnote 1 ] Respondents suggest that petitioners' motion for costs and attorneys' fees might have been denied due to untimeliness. Although it is clear that the petitions for rehearing en banc were denied as untimely, there is no indication that the bill of costs was filed out of time, or that costs and attorneys' fees were denied for that reason.

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