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Justia › US Law › US Case Law › US Supreme Court › Volume 388 › NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co.
Lawful economic strikes were called at two of respondent Allis Chalmers' plants in accordance with duly authorized union procedures by the locals of the union representing the employees. Some union members crossed picket lines and worked during the strikes. After the strikes were over, the locals brought proceedings against these members, imposed fines of $20 to $100, and sued in state courts to collect the fines. The collective bargaining agreement contained a union security clause which required each employee to become and remain "a member of the union to the extent of paying his monthly dues." Allis-Chalmers filed unfair labor practice charges against the locals alleging violation of § 8(b)(1)(A) of the National Labor Relations Act. The NLRB held that, even if the union action were restraint or coercion proscribed by that section, the conduct came within the proviso that the section "shall not impair the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership therein." The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the union conduct violated § 8(b) (1)(A).
1. The history of legislative action surrounding § 8(b)(1)(A)'s prohibition of union activity to "restrain or coerce" employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed by § 7 justifies the conclusion, in light of the imprecision of the words "restrain or coerce," and the repeated refrain throughout the debates that Congress did not propose limitations on the internal affairs of unions, that Congress did not intend § 8(b)(1)(A) to prohibit the imposition of reasonable fines on full union members who decline to honor an authorized strike or to prohibit attempts to collect such fines. Pp. 388 U. S. 178-195.
2. Since Allis-Chalmers offered no evidence that the fined employees enjoyed other than full union membership, the contrary will not be presumed. The question of the applicability of the statute to employees whose membership was limited to the obligation to pay monthly dues is not presented here. Pp. 388 U. S. 196-197.
Employees at the West Allis, and La Crosse, Wisconsin, plants of respondent Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Company were represented by locals of the United Automobile Workers. Lawful economic strikes were conducted at both plants in support of new contract demands. In compliance with the UAW constitution, the strikes were called with the approval of the International Union after at least two-thirds of the members of each local voted by secret ballot to strike. Some members of each local crossed the picket lines and worked during the strikes. After the strikes were over, the locals brought proceedings against these members charging them with violation of the International constitution and bylaws. The charges were heard by local trial committees in proceedings at which the charged members were represented by counsel. No claim of unfairness in the proceedings is made. The trials resulted in each charged member being found guilty of "conduct unbecoming a Union member" and being fined in a sum from $20 to $100. Some of the fined members did not pay the fines, and one of the locals obtained a judgment in the amount of the fine against one of its members, Benjamin Natzke, in a test suit brought in the Milwaukee County Court. An appeal from the judgment is pending in the Wisconsin Supreme Court.
A complaint issued and, after hearing, a trial examiner recommended its dismissal. The National Labor Relations Board sustained the examiner on the ground that, in the circumstances of this case, the actions of the locals, even if restraint or coercion prohibited by § 8(b)(1)(A), constituted conduct excepted from the section's prohibitions by the proviso that such prohibitions "shall not impair the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership therein." 149 N.L.R.B. 67. Upon Allis-Chalmers' petition for review to the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, a panel of that court upheld the Board's decision. Following a rehearing en banc, however, the court, three judges dissenting, withdrew the panel opinion, held that the locals' conduct violated § 8(b)(1)(A), and remanded to the Board for appropriate proceedings. 358 F.2d 656. We granted certiorari, 385 U.S. 810. We reverse.
"[t]he statutes in question present no ambiguities whatsoever, and therefore do not require recourse to legislative history for clarification."
the Congress to fashion a coherent national labor policy."
Labor Board v. Drivers Local Union, 362 U. S. 274, 362 U. S. 292.
National labor policy has been built on the premise that, by pooling their economic strength and acting through a labor organization freely chosen by the majority, the employees of an appropriate unit have the most effective means of bargaining for improvements in wages, hours, and working conditions. The policy therefore extinguishes the individual employee's power to order his own relations with his employer, and creates a power vested in the chosen representative to act in the interests of all employees.
"Congress has seen fit to clothe the bargaining representative with powers comparable to those possessed by a legislative body both to create and restrict the rights of those whom it represents. . . ."
"The complete satisfaction of all who are represented is hardly to be expected. A wide range of reasonableness must be allowed a statutory bargaining representative in serving the unit it represents, subject always to complete good faith and honesty of purpose in the exercise of its discretion."
Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U. S. 330, 345 U. S. 338.
"has stood as a bulwark to prevent arbitrary union conduct against individuals stripped of traditional forms of redress by the provisions of federal labor law."
Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U. S. 171, 386 U. S. 182. For the same reason, Congress, in the 1959 Landrum-Griffin amendments, 73 Stat. 519, enacted a code of fairness to assure democratic conduct of union affairs by provisions guaranteeing free speech and assembly, equal rights to vote in elections, to attend meetings, and to participate in the deliberations and voting upon the business conducted at the meetings.
Yet it is just such weak unions for which the power to execute union decisions taken for the benefit of all employees is most critical to effective discharge of its statutory function.
Congressional meaning is, of course, ordinarily to be discerned in the words Congress uses. But when the literal application of the imprecise words "restrain or coerce" Congress employed in § 8(b)(1)(A) produces the extraordinary results we have mentioned, we should determine whether this meaning is confirmed in the legislative history of the section.
"failure [of the employee] to tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership."
the employer to inquire into the internal affairs of the union."
"The pending measure does not propose any limitation with respect to the internal affairs of unions. They still will be able to fire any members they wish to fire, and they still will be able to try any of their members. All that they will not be able to do, after the enactment of this bill, is this: if they fire a member for some reason other than nonpayment of dues, they cannot make his employer discharge him from his job and throw him out of work. That is the only result of the provision under discussion. [Footnote 13]"
(Emphasis supplied.) Section 8(b)(1)(A) was under consideration when Senator Taft said this. Congressional emphasis that § 8(b)(2) insulated an employee's membership from his job, but left internal union affairs to union self-government, is therefore significant evidence against reading § 8(b)(1)(A) as contemplating regulation of internal discipline. This is borne out by the fact that provision was also made in the Taft-Hartley Act for a special committee to study, among other things, "the internal organization and administration of labor unions. . . ." § 402(3), 61 Stat. 160.
application of its prohibitions to traditional internal union discipline in general, or disciplinary fines in particular. On the contrary there are a number of assurances by its sponsors that the section was not meant to regulate the internal affairs of unions.
The provision was not contained in the Senate or House bills reported out of committee, but was introduced as an amendment on the Senate floor by Senator Ball. The amendment was adopted in the Conference Committee, without significant enlightenment from the report of that committee. The first suggestion that restraint or coercion of employees in the exercise of § 7 rights should be an unfair labor practice appears in the Statement of Supplemental Views to the Senate Report in which a minority of the Senate Committee, including Senators Ball, Taft, and Smith, concurred. The mischief against which the Statement inveighed was restraint and coercion by unions in organizational campaigns.
"The committee heard many instances of union coercion of employees, such as that brought about by threats of reprisal against employees and their families in the course of organizing campaigns; also direct interference by mass picketing and other violence."
"The purpose of the amendment is simply to provide that, where unions, in their organizational campaigns, indulge in practices which, if an employer indulged in them, would be unfair labor practices, such as making threats or false promises or false statements, the unions also shall be guilty of unfair labor practices."
"I merely wish to state to the Senate that the amendment offered by the Senator from Florida is perfectly agreeable to me. It was never the intention of the sponsors of the pending amendment to interfere with the internal affairs or organization of unions. [Footnote 17]"
"That modification is designed to make it clear that we are not trying to interfere with the internal affairs of a union which is already organized. All we are trying to cover is the coercive and restraining acts of the union in its effort to organize unorganized employees. [Footnote 18]"
to protect employees in their freedom to decide whether or not they desire to join labor organizations, to prevent them from being restrained or coerced. [Footnote 19]"
"If there is anything clear in the development of labor union history in the past 10 years, it is that more and more labor union employees have come to be subject to the orders of labor union leaders. The bill provides for the right to protest against arbitrary powers which have been exercised by some of the labor union leaders. [Footnote 21]"
"I think it is fair to say that, in the case of many of the unions, the employee has a good deal more of an opportunity to select his employer than he has to select his labor union leader. [Footnote 22]"
in this bill, we do not tell the unions how they shall vote or how they shall conduct their affairs. . . . [Footnote 23]"
that Senator Taft envisioned that 8(b)(1)(A) intruded into and regulated internal union affairs is negated by his categorical statements to the contrary in the contemporaneous debates on § 8(b)(2).
expulsion, and to impose fines which carry the explicit or implicit threat of expulsion for nonpayment. Therefore, under the proviso, the rule in the UAW constitution governing fines is valid, and the fines themselves and expulsion for nonpayment would not be an unfair labor practice. Assuming that the proviso cannot also be read to authorize court enforcement of fines, a question we need not reach, [Footnote 29] the fact remains that to interpret the body of § 8(b)(1) to apply to the imposition and collection of fines would be to impute to Congress a concern with the permissible means of enforcement of union fines and to attribute to Congress a narrow and discrete interest in banning court enforcement of such fines. Yet there is not one word in the legislative history evidencing any such congressional concern. And, as we have pointed out, a distinction between court enforcement and expulsion would have been anomalous for several reasons. First, Congress was operating within the context of the "contract theory" of the union-member relationship which widely prevailed at that time. The efficacy of a contract is precisely its legal enforceability. A lawsuit is, and has been, the ordinary way by which performance of private money obligations is compelled. Second, as we have noted, such a distinction would visit upon the member of a strong union a potentially more severe punishment than court enforcement of fines, while impairing the bargaining facility of the weak union by requiring it either to condone misconduct or deplete its ranks.
given § 8(b)(1)(A) by the majority en banc below.
"To be sure, what Congress did in 1959 does not establish what it meant in 1947. However, as another major step in an evolving pattern of regulation of union conduct, the 1959 Act is a relevant consideration. Courts may properly take into account the later Act when asked to extend the reach of the earlier Act's vague language to the limits which, read literally, the words might permit."
"in establishing and enforcing statutory standards, great care should be taken not to undermine union self-government or weaken unions in their role as collective bargaining agents."
"to impair the right of a labor organization to adopt and enforce reasonable rules as to the responsibility of every member toward the organization as an institution. . . ."
union leadership. The 1959 amendments are addressed to that concern. The kind of regulation of internal union affairs which Senator Taft said protected stockholders of a corporation, and made necessary a "right of protest against arbitrary powers which have been exercised by some of the labor union leaders," [Footnote 34] is embodied in the 1959 Act. The requirements of adherence to democratic principles, fair procedures and freedom of speech apply to the election of union officials and extend into all aspects of union affairs. [Footnote 35] In the present case, the procedures followed for calling the strikes and disciplining the recalcitrant members fully comported with these requirements, and were in every way fair and democratic. Whether § 8(b)(1)(A) proscribes arbitrary imposition of fines, or punishment for disobedience of a fiat of a union leader, are matters not presented by this case, and upon which we express no view.
Thus, this history of congressional action does not support a conclusion that the Taft-Hartley prohibitions against restraint or coercion of an employee to refrain from concerted activities included a prohibition against the imposition of fines on members who decline to honor an authorized strike and attempts to collect such fines. Rather, the contrary inference is more justified in light of the repeated refrain throughout the debates on § 8(b)(1)(A) and other sections that Congress did not propose any limitations with respect to the internal affairs of unions, aside from barring enforcement of a union's internal regulations to affect a member's employment status.
"the result not of individual voluntary choice, but of the insertion of [this] union security provision in the contract under which a substantial minority of the employees may have been forced into membership."
"SEC. 7. Employees shall have the right to . . . engage in . . . concerted activities . . . and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities. . . ."
"SEC. 8(b). It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents -- "
"(1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7: Provided, That this paragraph shall not impair the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership therein. . . ."
Two locals were involved, Local 248 at the West Allis plant, and Local 401 at the La Crosse plant. Although Allis-Chalmers' charges of unfair labor practices mentioned threats of fines as well as imposition of fines, the only proof that fines were specifically threatened during a strike consisted of a letter to strike-breaking West Allis members of Local 248 in 1959. As to the 1962 strike at West Allis and both the 1959 and 1962 strikes at La Crosse, mention of fines first occurred after the strikes were over. The threat of court enforcement of the fines was first made in 1960 in letters sent to fined members of Local 248 who had not paid their fines; the letter informed them of the outcome of a Wisconsin Supreme Court opinion holding fines enforceable, UAW, Local 756 v. Woychik, 5 Wis.2d 528, 93 N.W.2d 336 (1958). Local 401's test suit was brought after the 1962 strike.
See J. I. Case Co. v. Labor Board, 321 U. S. 332, Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. Labor Board, 321 U. S. 678; ILGWU v. Labor Board, 366 U. S. 731, 366 U. S. 737.
See Mastro Plastics Corp. v. Labor Board, 350 U. S. 270, 350 U. S. 280.
See Labor Board v. Rockaway News Co., 345 U. S. 71.
Wellington, Union Democracy and Fair Representation: Federal Responsibility in Federal System, 67 Yale L.J. 1327, 1333 (1958).
See, e.g., Summers, Legal Limitations on Union Discipline, 64 Harv.L.Rev. 1049 (1951); Philip Taft, The Structure and Government of Labor Unions 117-180 (1954); Taylor, The Role of Unions in a Democratic Society, Selected Readings on Government Regulation of Internal Union Affairs Affecting the Rights of Members, prepared for the Subcommittee on Labor of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare 17 (Committee Print, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 1958) (hereafter Selected Readings); Kerr, Unions and Union Leaders of Their Own Choosing, Selected Readings, supra, at 106, 109.
Summers, supra, n 7, at 1049.
"Strikebreaking is uniformly considered sufficient reason for expulsion, whether or not there is an express prohibition, for it undercuts the union's principal weapon and defeats the economic objective for which the union exists."
Summers, Disciplinary Powers of Unions, 3 Ind. & Lab.Rel.Rev. 483, 495 (1950).
National Industrial Conference Board, The Union, The Leader, and The Members, Selected Readings, at 40, 69-71; Summers, Disciplinary Powers of Unions, 3 Ind.Lab.Rel.Rev. 483, 508-512 (1950); Disciplinary Powers and Procedures in Union Constitutions, U.S. Dept. of Labor Bulletin No. 1350, Bur.Lab.Statistics (1963).
It is suggested that, while such provisions for fines and expulsion were a common element of union constitutions at the time of the enactment of § 8(b)(1), such background loses its cogency here, because such provisions did not explicitly call for court enforcement. However the potentiality of resort to courts for enforcement is implicit in any binding obligation. Surely it cannot be said that the absence of a "court enforceability" clause in a contract of sale implies that the parties do not foresee resort to the courts as a possible means of enforcement. It is also suggested that court enforcement of fines is "a rather recent innovation." Yet such enforcement was known as early as 1867. Master Stevedores' Assn. v. Walsh, 2 Daly 1 (N.Y.).
Summers, The Law of Union Discipline: What the Courts Do in Fact, 70 Yale L.J. 175, 180 (1960).
See generally Chafee, The Internal Affairs of Associations Not for Profit, 43 Harv.L.Rev. 993 (1930); Note, Judicial Control of Actions of Private Associations, 76 Harv.L.Rev. 983 (1963); Cox, Internal Affairs of Labor Unions Under the Labor Reform Act of 1959, 58 Mich.L.Rev. 819, 835-836 (1960).
"Since the union's effectiveness is based largely on the degree to which it controls the available labor, expulsions tend to weaken the union. If large numbers are expelled, they become a threat to union standards by undercutting union rates, and, in case of a strike, they may act as strikebreakers. . . . Therefore, expulsions must be limited to very small numbers unless the union is so strongly entrenched that it cannot be effectively challenged by the employer or another union."
Summers, Disciplinary Powers of Unions, 3 Ind. & Lab.Rel.Rev. 483, 487-488 (1950).
93 Cong.Rec. 4193, II Leg.Hist. 1097.
93 Cong.Rec. 4016-4017, II Leg.Hist. 1018-1021. Examples were given in debate of threats by unions to double the dues of employees who waited until later to join. It is suggested that this is no less within the ambit of internal union affairs than the fines imposed in the present case. But the significant distinction is that the cited examples necessarily concern threats against nonmembers designed to coerce them into joining, and are therefore further evidence of the primary concern of Congress with organizational tactics.
93 Cong.Rec. 4271, 4432, 4434, II Leg.Hist. 1139, 1199, 1203.
93 Cong.Rec. A-2252, II Leg.Hist. 1524-1525.
93 Cong.Rec. 4272, II Leg.Hist. 1141.
93 Cong.Rec. 4433, II Leg.Hist. 1200.
93 Cong.Rec. 4435, II Leg.Hist. 1204.
93 Cong.Rec. 4021-4022, II Leg.Hist. 1025-1027.
93 Cong.Rec. 4023, II Leg.Hist. 1028.
"It is significant that among the major changes made in the Wagner Act by the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 was the addition of sections purported to be aimed at protecting individual union members against undemocratic and corrupt leaders."
"[m]erely to require that unions be subject to the same rules that govern employers, and that they do not have the right to interfere with or coerce employees, either their own members or those outside their union, is such a clear matter, and seems to me so easy to determine, that I would hope we would all agree."
93 Cong.Rec. 4025, II Leg.Hist. 1032.
93 Cong.Rec. 4023, 4024, II Leg.Hist. 1029, 1030. It is this colloquy to which the dissent apparently refers in its statement that, in answer to Senator Pepper's charge that the amendment protected workers against their own leaders, "Senator Taft did not deny it." It may be more accurate to say that Senator Taft evaded the issue.
93 Cong.Rec. 4435-4436, II Leg.Hist. 1205-1206. The following statement of Senator Taft had no reference to the conduct of a union vis-a-vis a member who crossed the union's picket line, but referred to union conduct in preventing employees not in the bargaining unit from going to work -- "mass picketing, which absolutely prevents all the office force from going into the office of a plant."
"The effect of the pending amendment is that the Board may call the union before them, exactly as it has called the employer, and say,"
"Here are the rules of the game. You must cease and desist from coercing and restraining the employees who want to work from going to work and earning the money which they are entitled to earn."
"You can persuade them; you can put up signs; you can conduct any form of propaganda you want to in order to persuade them, but you cannot, by threat of force or threat of economic reprisal, prevent them from exercising their right to work."
"As I see it, that is the effect of the amendment."
93 Cong.Rec. 4436, II Leg.Hist. 1206.
"[i]ts application to labor organizations may have a slightly different implication, but it seems to me perfectly clear that, from the point of view of the employee, the two cases are parallel."
It is not true that "the sponsors of the section repeatedly announced that it would protect union members from their leaders." Only Senator Taft's statements provide limited support for the proposition.
S.Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 50, I Leg.Hist. 456; 93 Cong.Rec. 4025, 4436, II Leg.Hist. 1032, 1207.
"State regulations affecting interstate commerce, whose purpose or effect is to gain for those within the state an advantage at the expense of those without, or to burden those out of the state without any corresponding advantage to those within, have been thought to impinge upon the constitutional prohibition even though Congress has not acted."
"Underlying the stated rule has been the thought, often expressed in judicial opinion, that, when the regulation is of such a character that its burden falls principally upon those without the state, legislative action is not likely to be subjected to those political restraints which are normally exerted on legislation where it affects adversely some interests within the state."
(Emphasis supplied.) A commentator has noted that "the ballot in a free election is the individual union member's weapon for inducing performance in accordance with his desire." Wellington, Union Democracy and Fair Representation: Federal Responsibility in a Federal System, 67 Yale L.J. 1327, 1329 (1958).
93 Cong.Rec. 4272, 4433, II Leg.Hist. 1141, 1200.
Our conclusion that § 8(b)(1)(A) does not prohibit the locals' actions makes it unnecessary to pass on the Board holding that the proviso protected such actions.
The notification by Local 248 to its strikebreaking employees that each day they continued to work might constitute a separate offense punishable by a fine of $100 was sent only to members of Local 248, not those of Local 401, and only during one of the two strikes called by Local 248. The notification was sent only to those employees who had already decided to work during the strike. Most important, no inference can be drawn from that notification that court enforcement would be the means of collection. Therefore, at least under the proviso, if not the body of § 8(b)(1), such notification would not be an unfair labor practice. It is not argued that the fines for which court enforcement was actually sought were unreasonably large.
Senator Wiley's reference in a speech after § 8(b)(1) was passed to $20,000 fines for crossing a picket line was not directed to the section. 93 Cong.Rec. 5000, II Leg.Hist. 1471.
It has been noted that the state courts, in reviewing the imposition of union discipline, find ways to strike down "discipline [which] involves a severe hardship." Summers, Legal Limitations on Union Discipline, 64 Harv.L.Rev. 1049, 1078 (1951).
It is suggested that reading § 8(b)(1) to allow court enforcement of fines adds a "new weapon to the union's economic arsenal," and is inconsistent with the mood of Congress to curtail the powers of unions. The question here, however, is not whether Congress gave to unions a new power, but whether it eliminated, without debate, a power which the unions already possessed.
"[T]he protection of union members in their rights as members from arbitrary conduct by unions and union officers has not been undertaken by federal law, and indeed the assertion of any such power has been expressly denied."
"The act is the first major step in the regulation of the internal affairs of labor unions. It expands the national labor policy into the area of relations between the employees and the labor union. Previously national policy was confined to relationships between management and union."
29 U.S.C. §§ 411-415, 431(c), 461-464, 481-482. Significantly, the Landrum-Griffin amendments expressly rendered it unlawful for any union "to fine, suspend, expel, or otherwise discipline any of its member for exercising any right to which he is entitled . . ." under that Act. 29 U.S.C. § 529.
"Any remedies, however, would properly be granted only to employees who have made known to the union officials that they do not desire their funds to be used for political causes to which they object. The safeguards of [the Act] . . . were added for the protection of dissenters' interest, but dissent is not to be presumed -- it must affirmatively be made known to the union by the dissenting employee. . . . Thus, we think that only those who have identified themselves, as opposed to political uses of their funds are entitled to relief in this action."
"expressly limited to the payment of initiation fees and monthly dues. . . . 'Membership' as a condition of employment is whittled down to its financial core."
Labor Board v. General Motors Corp., 373 U. S. 734, 373 U. S. 742.
Not before us is the question of the extent to which union action for enforcement of disciplinary penalties is preempted by federal labor law. Compare Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U. S. 617; Plumbers' Union v. Borden, 373 U. S. 690.
even though expulsion to enforce it would be a clear and serious brand of "coercion" imposed in derogation of those § 7 rights. Such restraint and coercion Congress permitted by adding the proviso to § 8(b)(1)(A). Thus, neither the majority nor the dissent in this case questions the validity of the union rule against its members' crossing picket lines during a properly called strike, or the propriety of expulsion to enforce the rule. Section 8(b)(1)(A), therefore, does not bar all restraint and coercion by a union to prevent the exercise by its members of their § 7 rights. "Coercive" union rules are enforceable at least by expulsion.
The dissenting opinion in this case, although not questioning the enforceability of coercive rules by expulsion from membership, questions whether fines for violating such rules are enforceable at all, by expulsion or otherwise. The dissent would at least hold court collection of fines to be an unfair labor practice, apparently for the reason that fines collectible in court may be more coercive than fines enforceable by expulsion. My Brother BRENNAN, for the Court, takes a different view, reasoning that, since expulsion would in many cases -- certainly in this one involving a strong union -- be a far more coercive technique for enforcing a union rule and for collecting a reasonable fine than the threat of court enforcement, there is no basis for thinking that Congress, having accepted expulsion as a permissible technique to enforce a rule in derogation of § 7 rights, nevertheless intended to bar enforcement by another method which may be far less coercive.
I do not mean to indicate, and I do not read the majority opinion otherwise, that every conceivable internal union rule which impinges upon the § 7 rights of union members is valid and enforceable by expulsion and court action. There may well be some internal union rules which, on their face, are wholly invalid and unenforceable.
But the Court seems unanimous in upholding the rule against crossing picket lines during a strike and its enforceability by expulsion from membership. On this premise, I think the opinion written for the Court is the more persuasive and sensible construction of the statute, and I therefore join it, although I am doubtful about the implications of some of its generalized statements.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK, whom MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, and MR. JUSTICE STEWART join, dissenting.
crossed its picket lines. I cannot agree, and therefore would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals which set aside the Labor Board's order.
"make the prohibition contained in section 8(b)(1) apply to coercive acts of unions against employees who did not wish to join or did not care to participate in a strike or picket line."
exercise of his right not to participate in the strike. In holding as it does, the Court interprets the words "restrain or coerce" in a way directly opposed to their literal meaning, for the Court admits that fines are as coercive as penalties imposed on citizens for the nonpayment of taxes. Though Senator Taft, in answer to charges that these words were ambiguous, said their meaning "is perfectly clear," 93 Cong.Rec. 4021, II Leg.Hist. 1025, and though any union official with sufficient intelligence and learning to be chosen as such could hardly fail to comprehend the meaning of these plain, simple English words, the Court insists on finding an "inherent imprecision" in these words. And that characterization then allows the Court to resort to "[w]hat legislative materials there are." In doing so, the Court finds three significant things: (1) there is "not a single word" to indicate that § 8(b)(1)(A) was intended to apply to "traditional internal union discipline in general, or disciplinary fines in particular"; (2) the "repeated refrain" running through the debates on the section was that Congress did not intend to impose any limitations on the "internal affairs of unions"; (3) the Senators who supported the section were primarily concerned with union coercion during organizational drives, and with union violence in general.
failure to participate; it is essential that weak unions have the choice between expulsion and court-enforced fines, simply because the latter are more effective, in the sense of being more punitive. Though the entire mood of Congress in 1947 was to curtail the power of unions, as it had previously curtailed the power of employers, in order to equalize the power of the two, the Court is unwilling to believe that Congress intended to impair "the usefulness of labor's cherished strike weapon." [Footnote 2/1] I cannot agree with this conclusion, or subscribe to the Court's unarticulated premise that the Court has power to add a new weapon to the union's economic arsenal whenever the Court believes that the union needs that weapon. That is a job for Congress, not this Court.
and to impose fines which carry the . . . threat of expulsion for nonpayment."
And finally, departing a third step further from the literal language of the proviso, the Court arrives at its holding that Congress could not have meant to preclude unions from the alternative of judicially enforcing fines.
Contrary to the Court, I am not at all certain that a union's right under the proviso to prescribe rules for the retention of membership includes the right to restrain a member from working by trying him on the vague charge of "conduct unbecoming a union member" and fining him for exercising his § 7 right of refusing to participate in a strike, even though the fine is only enforceable by expulsion from membership. It is one thing to say that Congress did not wish to interfere with the union's power, similar to that of any other kind of voluntary association, to prescribe specific conditions of membership. It is quite another thing to say that Congress intended to leave unions free to exercise a court-like power to try and punish members with a direct economic sanction for exercising their right to work. Just because a union might be free, under the proviso, to expel a member for crossing a picket line does not mean that Congress left unions free to threaten their members with fines. Even though a member may later discover that the threatened fine is only enforceable by expulsion, and in that sense a "lesser penalty," the direct threat of a fine, to a member normally unaware of the method the union might resort to for compelling its payment, would often be more coercive than a threat of expulsion.
intra-union means. [Footnote 2/2] As the Court recognizes, expulsion for nonpayment of a fine may, especially in the case of a strong union, be more severe than judicial collection of the fine. But, if the union membership has little value and if the fine is great, then court enforcement of the fine may be more effective punishment, and that is precisely why the Court desires to provide weak unions with this alternative to expulsion, an alternative which is similar to a criminal court's power to imprison defendants who fail to pay fines.
In this case, each strikebreaking employee was fined from $20 to $100, and the union initiated a "test case" in state court to collect the fines. In notifying the employees of the charges against them, however, the union warned them that each day they crossed the picket line and went to work might be considered a separate offense punishable by a fine of $100. In several of the cases, the strikes lasted for many months. Thus, although the union here imposed minimal fines for the purpose of its "test case," it is not too difficult to imagine a case where the fines will be so large that the threat of their imposition will absolutely restrain employees from going to work during a strike. Although an employee might be willing to work even if it meant the loss of union membership, he would have to be well paid indeed to work at the risk that he would have to pay his union $100 a day for each day worked. Of course, as the Court suggests, he might be able to defeat the union's attempt at judicial enforcement of the fine by showing it was "unreasonable" or that he was not a "full member" of the union, but few employees would have the courage or the financial means to be willing to take that risk. Cf. Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123.
I do not doubt that this too would be a violation of § 8(b)(1)(A).
product of a union shop. Although the Court of Appeals held that to be the case here, the Court takes the surprising position that "what motivated" the full union member to make the "contract" is immaterial. I doubt that even an ordinary commercial contract is enforceable against a party who entered into it involuntarily. But I am certain that Congress did not intend to insulate union coercion from the literal language of § 8(b)(1)(A) merely because the union has secured a "full" but involuntary contract from those it desires to coerce.
While the Court may be correct in saying that resort to legislative history is proper here, it is certainly not justified in ignoring the plain meaning of § 8(b)(1)(A) on the basis of the inconclusive legislative history it points to. In the first place, "[w]hat legislative materials there are dealing with § 8(b)(1)(A)" are only the remarks of a few Senators during the debate on the floor. The section was added on the floor after the bill had cleared the Senate Committee. There were no debates on the section in the House, there were no committee reports on the section, and debate in the Senate was brief. In the second place, though the Court deems the words "restrain or coerce" to be "imprecise," it somehow is willing to attribute a magical quality of clarity to the refrain "internal affairs of unions." The Court is thus willing to attribute more certainty and careful consideration to a refrain used by several Senators in a heated debate in response to certain criticism than it is to the words repeatedly used in the Act itself.
"The Board has been defining those words for 12 years, ever since it [the Act] came into existence. Its application to labor organizations may have a slightly different implication, but it seems to me perfectly clear that, from the point of view of the employee, the two cases are parallel. . . . If there is anything clear in the development of labor union history in the past 10 years, it is that more and more labor union employees have come to be subject to the orders of labor union leaders. The bill provides for the right of protest against arbitrary powers which have been exercised by some of the labor union leaders. Certainly it seems to me that, if we are willing to accept the principle that employees are entitled to the same protection against labor union leaders as against employers, then I can see no reasonable objection to the amendment. . . ."
"I think it is fair to say that, in the case of many of the unions, the employee has a good deal more of an opportunity to select his employer than he has to select his labor union leader, and even if he has that opportunity . . . , the man who is elected may have been voted against by various of the employees who did not desire to have that particular man elected as the union leader. In such cases, the very fact that they did vote against that man is often used later by the union as a means of coercing such employees, and, in some cases, the union expels them from the union or subjects them to treatment which interferes with their rights as American citizens."
"instances in which unions . . . have imposed fines upon their members up to $20,000 because they crossed picket lines -- dared to go to the place of employment. [Footnote 2/15]"
"Apparently it is not intended by the sponsors of the amendment to affect at least that part of the internal administration which has to do with the admission or the expulsion of members, [Footnote 2/19]"
"None of these provisions interferes unduly with union affairs, except to the extent necessary to protect the individual rights of employees. [Footnote 2/21]"
"this paragraph shall not impair the right of a labor organization nonarbitrarily to restrain or coerce its members in their exercise of § 7 rights."
Nothing in the legislative history supports the creation of this new proviso.
"is to say that Congress preceded the Landrum-Griffin amendments with an even more pervasive regulation of the internal affairs of unions. [Footnote 2/23]"
But again the Court fails to distinguish between court-enforced fines and fines enforced by the traditional method of expulsion. Although both kinds of fines are coercive, I have already indicated that the proviso to § 8(b)(1)(A) may preserve the union's right to impose fines which are enforceable only by expulsion, and that expulsion was the common mode of enforcing fines at the time the section was adopted. If one assumes that the only fines prohibited by the section are court-enforced fines, then the section was not a pervasive regulation of union internal affairs. If court enforcement of fines is within the ambit of internal union affairs, which I doubt, then those affairs were only incidentally regulated by a flat prohibition of this seldom-used method of union discipline. If the common forms of union discipline -- expulsion and fines enforceable by expulsion -- were not prohibited or regulated by Taft-Hartley, then Landrum-Griffin was indeed the first comprehensive regulation of them.
for all employees, including the ones involved here, to pay dues and fees to the union. But § 8(a)(3) and § 8(b)(2) make it clear that "Congress intended to prevent utilization of union security agreements for any purpose other than to compel payment of union dues and fees." Radio Officers' Union v. Labor Board, 347 U. S. 17, 347 U. S. 41. If the union uses the union security clause to compel employees to pay dues, characterizes such employees as members, and then uses such membership as a basis for imposing court-enforced fines upon those employees unwilling to participate in a union strike, then the union security clause is being used for a purpose other than "to compel payment of union dues and fees." It is being used to coerce employees to join in union activity in violation of § 8(b)(2).
the state court that they were not full members of the union? By refusing to decide whether § 8(b)(1)(A) prohibits the union from fining an employee who does nothing more than pay union dues as a condition to retaining his job in a union shop, the Court adds coercive impetus to the union's threat of fines. Today's decision makes it highly dangerous for an employee in a union shop to exercise his § 7 right to refrain from participating in a strike called by a union in which he is a member in name only.
from being used for purposes other than to compel payment of dues. In such a situation, it cannot be justified on any theory that the employee has contracted away or waived his § 7 rights.
Where there is clear legislative history to justify it, courts often decline to follow the literal meaning of a statute. But this practice is fraught with dangers when the legislative history is, at best, brief, inconclusive, and ambiguous. This is precisely such a case, and I dissent because I am convinced that the Court has ignored the literal language of § 8(b)(1)(A) in order to give unions a power which the Court, but not Congress, thinks they need.
"I can see nothing in the pending measure which . . . would in some way outlaw strikes. It would outlaw threats against employees. It would not outlaw anybody striking who wanted to strike. It would not prevent anyone using the strike in a legitimate way. . . . All it would do would be to outlaw such restraint and coercion as would prevent people from going to work if they wished to go to work."
93 Cong.Rec. 4436, II Leg.Hist. 1207.
See generally Comment, 115 U.Pa.L.Rev. 47 (1966); 80 Harv.L.Rev. 683 (1967).
These authorities are cited at n 9 of the Court's opinion. One of them notes that the union's "discipline power has its own practical limitations" simply because the union's ultimate sanction at that time was limited to expulsion. Summers, Disciplinary Powers of Unions, 3 Ind.Lab.Rel.Rev. 483, 487 (1950). That practical limitation is today removed by the Court's holding.
See, e.g., NLRB v. Bell Aircraft Corp., 206 F.2d 235 (collective bargaining agreement between employer and union provided that employer could not promote employee who had disciplinary charges pending against him by union).
See, e.g., Associated Home Builders of Greater Green Bay, 145 N.L.R.B. 1775, remanded on other grounds, 352 F.2d 745.
"The contract of membership is . . . a legal fabrication. . . . What are the terms of the contract? The constitutional provisions, particularly those governing discipline, are so notoriously vague that they fall far short of the certainty ordinarily required of a contract. The member has no choice as to terms, but is compelled to adhere to the inflexible ones presented. Even then, the union is not bound, for it retains the unlimited power to amend any term at any time. . . . In short, membership is a special relationship. It is as far removed from the main channel of contract law as the relationships created by marriage. . . ."
Summers, Legal Limitations on Union Discipline, 64 Harv.L.Rev. 1049, 1055-1056 (1951).
Although the Court states that Congress was operating within the context of the "contract theory," I have been unable to find any reference to this theory in the legislative history, even by the opponents to curtailing union power. When Senator Pepper suggested that the section should not apply to union members because they elect their own leaders, Senator Taft rejected that premise as a frequent fiction. See p. 388 U. S. 210, infra.
Congress was, indeed, primarily concerned with the kind of coercion state courts were unable to cope with. 93 Cong.Rec. 4016, 4024, II Leg.Hist. 1018, 1031.
93 Cong.Rec. 4021, II Leg.Hist. 1025. See generally 93 Cong.Rec. 4432-4436, II Leg.Hist. 1199-1207.
93 Cong.Rec. 4016, II Leg.Hist. 1018; 93 Cong.Rec. 4021, II Leg.Hist. 1025; 93 Cong.Rec. 4023, II Leg.Hist. 1028.
93 Cong.Rec. 4023, II Leg.Hist. 1029. Senator Taft merely responded that the section protects nonunion employees as well as union members.
93 Cong.Rec. 4017, II Leg.Hist. 1020.
93 Cong.Rec. 4024, II Leg.Hist. 1031.
93 Cong.Rec. 4017, II Leg.Hist. 1020; 93 Cong.Rec. 4433, II Leg.Hist. 1200.
93 Cong.Rec. 5000, II Leg.Hist. 1471.
See n. 1, supra; statement by Senator Taft quoted in n 25 of the Court's opinion.
See n 25 of the Court's opinion.
93 Cong.Rec. 4271, II Leg.Hist. 1139 (emphasis added).
93 Cong.Rec. 5001, II Leg.Hist. 1472 (emphasis added).
"the imposition of a fine by a labor organization upon a member who files charges with the Board does restrain and coerce that member in the exercise of his right to file charges. The union's conduct is no less coercive where the filing of the charge is alleged to be in conflict with an internal union rule or policy and the fine is imposed allegedly to enforce that internal policy."
Local 138, 148 N.L.R.B. at 682. In the present case, the Board distinguished Local 138 and Roberts on the ground that the union rules involved there were "beyond the competence of the union to enforce," and were "not the legitimate concern of a union." 149 N.L.R.B. 67, 69. My Brother WHITE seems to take a similar position in resting his concurrence on the Court's holding that the union rule against crossing a picket line is "valid." But neither Congress' aim in § 8(b)(1)(A) of proscribing certain means used to accomplish legitimate ends nor the Court's view that Congress intended no interference with internal union affairs would allow the application of the section to depend on the Board's or this Court's views of whether a particular internal union rule is "valid" or not.
Although the Landrum-Griffin Act might be resorted to for the purpose of determining the limits of "vague language" in the Taft-Hartley Act, it should not be used, as the Court here uses it, to deprive employees of rights unequivocally granted them by the earlier Act. Section 103 of the Landrum-Griffin Act, 73 State, 523 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 413, expressly provides: "Nothing contained in this title shall limit the rights and remedies of any member of a labor organization under any . . . Federal law. . . ."

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