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Timestamp: 2019-04-25 18:07:38+00:00

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FindACase | Hall v. Life Care Centers of America, Inc.
Hall v. Life Care Centers of America, Inc.
LIFE CARE CENTERS OF AMERICA, INC., et al., Defendant.
KENNETH G. GALE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
Defendant Lifecare Centers of America (hereinafter “Defendant” or “Defendant LCCA”) has filed a motion seeking leave to amend its Answer to add the affirmative defenses of judicial estoppel and release/ ratification. (Doc. 91.) Having reviewed the parties' submissions, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendant's motion (Doc. 91).
Plaintiff's deposition was not scheduled until nine months later, on March 2, 2018. Defendant contends that it did not review the bankruptcy filings until it began preparation for Plaintiff's deposition. At that time, “Defendants discovered Plaintiff had failed - to date - to disclose the existence of this lawsuit as an asset in her pending bankruptcy. Nor had she (and still has not) moved to add this lawsuit as an asset in her bankruptcy schedules.” (Doc. 91, at 2.) Defendant contends that on March 7, 2018, “only eight days after discovering Plaintiff's failure to disclose, ” it notified Plaintiff of Defendants' “intent to assert a judicial estoppel defense.” (Id., at 2-3.) Defendant also contends that Plaintiff's March 2018 deposition testimony regarding her request for vacation pay as part of her severance provide the basis for Defendant's ratification defense.
Approximately two weeks later - and approximately a month after Plaintiff's deposition - Defendant LCCA filed the present motion seeking leave to amend its Answer to add the affirmative defenses of judicial estoppel and release and ratification. (Doc. 91.) Defendant contends the requested relief is “warranted because the factual basis for asserting the . . . defenses arose only recently and Plaintiff would not be unduly prejudiced by their inclusion at this stage of litigation.” (Doc. 91, at 1.) Defendant also argues that “standing is a non-waivable matter of subject-matter jurisdiction, not an affirmative defense.” (Id.) Finally, Defendant argues that the affirmative defense of after-acquired evidence was asserted in its initial Answer (Id., at 2.) Because the deadline for parties to amend their pleadings expired more than a year ago, Defendant brings the present motion as a motion to amend pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a) as well as a motion to modify the Scheduling Order pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 16(b)(4).
To establish ‘good cause' the moving party must show that the scheduling order's deadline could not have been met with diligence. Parker v. Central Kansas Medical Center, 178 F.Supp.2d 1205, 1210 (D.Kan.2001); Denmon v. Runyon, 151 F.R.D. 404, 407 (D.Kan.1993). ‘This rule gives trial courts ‘wide latitude in entering scheduling orders,' and modifications to such orders are reviewed for abuse of discretion.' In re Daviscourt, 353 B.R. 674, (B.A.P. 10th Cir.2006) (citing Burks v. Okla. Publ'g Co., 81 F.3d 975, 978-79 (10th Cir.1996)).
Grieg v. Botros, No. 08-1181-EFM-KGG, 2010 WL 3270102, at *3 (D.Kan. Aug. 12, 2010). It is well-established in this District that motions to modify a scheduling order focus “on the diligence of the party seeking to modify the scheduling order.” Id. (citing Leviton Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Nicor, Inc., 245 F.R.D. 524, 528 (D.N.M.2007) (internal citations omitted)).

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