Source: https://es.scribd.com/document/320766446/United-States-v-Lamar-Staten-3rd-Cir-2014
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 13:16:16+00:00

Document:
conspiracy, robbery, and firearms offenses.1 For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
underlying facts and the same jury trial.
Smith was originally named in this criminal action, but pled guilty on October 6, 2010.
She later testified at the defendants trial as a cooperating co-defendant.
lawyer for Smith, who had been identified by the authorities by this point.
Miranda rights, at which point he told them that he wanted to speak with his lawyer.
another lawyer had advised him to wait for his attorneys arrival at the detective division.
every defendant was charged in each count.
We have jurisdiction over this matter under 28 U.S.C. 1291.
commerce, whether slight or potential, is sufficient to uphold a Hobbs Act prosecution.
for Hobbs Act purposes. Id. (quoting United States v. Walker, 657 F.3d 160, 182 (3d Cir.
established interference with interstate commerce.
because they were prejudicial to him.
defendant must pinpoint clear and substantial prejudice resulting in an unfair trial.
participants overlapped. United States v. Lee, 359 F.3d 194, 207 (3d Cir. 2004).
States v. Kelly, 892 F.2d 255, 258 (3d Cir. 1989).
counsel and the right to silence must be knowing and voluntary. United States v.
Velasquez, 885 F.2d 1076, 1084 (3d Cir. 1989) (citing Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S.
application of the law to those facts. United States v. Perez, 280 F.3d 318, 336 (3d Cir.
plan or a purpose, see 18 U.S.C. 1951(a).
former acquittal or conviction in the event of a subsequent prosecution. United States v.
Huet, 665 F.3d 588, 595 (3d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).
contains the necessary elements of the charged offenses. For example, 18 U.S.C.
reasons, the defendants challenge as to this statutory provision fails.

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