Source: https://mdafny.com/index.aspx?TypeContent=CUSTOMPAGEARTICLE&custom_pages_articlesID=14726
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 12:58:22+00:00

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Witnesses are essential to the success or failure of a case. A good witness is every trial lawyer’s dream. A poor witness can lay waste to even the best case. Attorneys, obviously, will try to call to the stand those witnesses who are most favorable to their case, however, sometimes attorneys are stuck with a “bad” witness.
As we also know, the calling of expert witnesses is routine and, at trial, experts are necessary to help establish the elements of a case, to explain the issues to the jury and to provide a reasoned and thoughtful narrative. Attorneys will pay high fees for those experts who can positively affect the outcome of the litigation. However, occasionally, an attorney is faced with a situation where the expert’s testimony will not further his client’s case and the expert may, in fact, be a better witness for his adversary than for him. An attorney may decide not to call the witness at trial and, thus, avoid detrimental testimony. But this may create another problem.
In accordance with CPLR § 3101(d), an attorney discloses to opposing counsel the names of expert witnesses and examining physicians he or she plans to call at trial and the nature of the witnesses’ testimony. Likewise, the names and addresses of lay witnesses are also exchanged. In preparing for trial, opposing counsel may realize that these witnesses will actually support his case, but his adversary, perhaps coming to the same conclusion, decides not to call the witness.1 How can the opposing party make use of this incriminating evidence if an attorney fails to call the witness? The answer: New York’s missing witness charge.
Pursuant to New York’s Pattern Jury Instructions 1:75, a party’s failure to call a particular witness could lead to a jury charge allowing an adverse inference to be drawn. If the jury finds the party’s explanation for not calling the witness to be reasonable, the jury is instructed not to consider the failure of the party to call the witness in evaluating the evidence.
This article will initially discuss the definition of what is “noncumulative testimony” in light of a recent 2013 New York Court of Appeals’ decision and will then address the three other preconditions to the missing witness charge.
In DeVito v. Feliciano, the Court of Appeals clarified the noncumulative testimony requirement of the missing witness charge: testimony will be considered cumulative only if it is cumulative of testimony presented by the non-calling party.5 Even if the uncalled witness’s testimony would be cumulative of testimony presented by the party requesting the charge, the judge can still instruct the jury as to the charge. To determine if the testimony would be cumulative, one needs to cross-check the testimony presented by the non-calling party.
In DeVito, the plaintiff alleged injuries to her nose and back as a result of an automobile accident. Plaintiff’s medical records revealed that four months before the accident, plaintiff fell and sustained a minor concussion and an injury to her wrist. At the trial, two doctors testified on plaintiff’s behalf that the motor vehicle accident was “the competent producing cause” of plaintiff’s neck and nose injuries.
Although the jury was capable of making an inference based on such a statement, the jury was not instructed that they could draw the “strongest inference.” Furthermore, the Court stated that the testimony elicited during defense counsel’s cross-examinations was not so conclusive as to cast doubt upon plaintiff’s claims. For these reasons, the Court held that plaintiff was prejudiced by the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury as to the missing witness charge.
Demonstrating that the uncalled witness testimony would be noncumulative in nature is only one piece to the puzzle. The other elements, however, are clearer and simpler than the noncumulative testimony requirement.
4. Noncumulative – the uncalled witness’s testimony would be noncumulative of testimony presented on behalf of the non-calling party.
Failure to call a witness is clearly intentional. The failure is usually an attempt to prevent damaging evidence being provided by a “friendly” witness. This testimony can be devastating to one’s case as opposing counsel will no doubt point out to the jury that the harmful testimony was supplied by someone friendly to that party and therefore it must be true.
The Court of Appeals’ clarified definition of noncumulative testimony should encourage more parties to request the charge and inevitably hold opposing parties accountable for the absence of a vital witness.
1 N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3101(d)(1) (McKinney 2013) (“Upon request, each party shall identify each person whom the party expects to call as an expert witness at trial and shall disclose in reasonable detail the subject matter on which each expert is expected to testify….”).
2 N.Y. Pattern Jury Instr. 1:75 (2013) (emphasis added).
3 People v. Savinon, 100 N.Y.2d 192, 196, 761 N.Y.S.2d 144, 146-47 (2003) (internal quotation marks omitted).
4 See id. at 197; People v. Gonzalez, 68 N.Y.2d 424, 427, 502 N.E.2d 583 (1986).
5 DeVito v. Feliciano, 22 N.Y.3d 159, 1 N.Y.3d 791 (2013).
9 DeVito v. Feliciano, 2010 WL 6971895 (Sup. Ct. Bronx Cnty, 2010).
10 DeVito v. Feliciano, 84 A.D.3d 645, 924 N.Y.S.2d 330 (1st Dep’t 2011).
11 DeVito, 22 N.Y.3d at 166.
13 Leahy v. Allen, 221 A.D.2d 88, 92, 664 N.Y.S.2d 88 (3d Dep’t 1996).
15 DeVito, 22 N.Y.3d at 165, 167.
16 Feneeck v. First Union Real Estate Equity & Mortg. Invs., 266 A.D.2d 916, 916, 697 N.Y.S.2d 442 (4th Dep’t 1999).
18 People v. Hall, 18 N.Y.3d 122, 936 N.Y.S.2d 630 (2011).
19 Crowder v. Wells & Wells Equip., Inc., 11 A.D.3d 360, 361, 783 N.Y.S.2d 552, 554 (1st Dep’t 2004).
20 See Cohen v. Lukacs, 272 A.D.2d 501, 708 N.Y.S.2d 133 (2d Dep’t 2000) (uncalled witness was unavailable as a matter of law where, at the time of trial, she resided in another state and was “beyond the jurisdiction of the court”); see also Zeeck v. Melina Taxi Co., 177 A.D.2d 692, 576 N.Y.S.2d 878 (2d Dep’t 1991).
21 See N.Y. Pattern Jury Instr. 1:75 cmt. II.C (2013).
22 People v. Gonazalez, 68 N.Y.2d 424, 509 N.Y.S.2d 796.
23 Dukes v. Rotem, 191 A.D.2d 35, 40, 599 N.Y.S.2d 915, 918 (1st Dep’t 1993).
25 See People v. Hall, 18 N.Y.3d at 131, 936 N.Y.S.2d at 630 (holding that the uncalled witness was in a party’s control where the uncalled witness “could have been expected to support his version of events”).
26 Chandler v. Flynn, 111 A.D.2d 300, 301, 489 N.Y.S.2d 289, 291 (2d Dep’t 1985).
27 See In Re Judicial Settlement of Second Intermediate Account of Chase Manhattan Bank, 2 Misc. 3d 1002(A), 784 N.Y.S.2d 921 (Sur. Monroe Cnty. 2004) (holding that the element of control was missing where witness was a former employee of the petitioner); see also People v. Gonzalez, 68 N.Y.2d 424, 502 N.E.2d 583 (1986) (defense counsel entitled to missing witness charge where the people failed to call complainant’s husband as a witness); Buttice v. Dyer, 1 A.D.3d 552, 767 N.Y.S.2d 784 (2d Dep’t 2003) (ex-girlfriend was not under party’s control).
29 People v. Smith, 71 A.D.3d 1174, 1175-76, 898 N.Y.S.2d 599 (2d Dep’t 2010), citing Savinon, 100 N.Y.2d at 196.
30 Diorio v. Scala, 183 A.D.2d 1065, 583 N.Y.S.2d 654 (3d Dep’t1992).
31 Follett v. Thompson, 171 A.D.2d 777, 778, 567 N.Y.S.2d 497, 498 (2d Dep’t 1991).
33 People v. Morris, 140 A.D.2d 551, 552, 528 N.Y.S.2d 630 (2d Dep’t 1988).
34 Early notification “allow[s] the court to appropriately exercise its discretion and the parties to adjust trial strategy.” N.Y. Pattern Jury Instr. 1:75, cmt. (citing People v. Gonzalez, 68 N.Y.2d 424, 509 N.Y.S.2d 796 (1986)).

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