Source: https://openjurist.org/16/f1d/350
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 08:09:21+00:00

Document:
putcha:se. From that time the United States had no real in.terest in the land. It only held the dry legal title in trust for the purchaser, pending the usual necessary delay in issuing patents, and the patent only perfected the title, the right to which had already vested. Lands cease to be public lands when entered and paid for. People v. Shearer, 30 Cal. 648; Gwynne v. Niswanger, 15 Ohio, 368; AstroJn v. Hammond, 3 McLean, 108; Carroll v. Perry, 4 McLean, 26; Carroll v. Safford, 3 How. 441; Witherspoon v. Duncan, 4 Wall. 210, 219; Hughes v. U. S. ld. 232; Union M. x M. Co. v. Dangberg, 2 Sawy. 454. When the patent finally issues it attaches itself to the entry and relates to the date of the entry. it is regarded, for the purpose of protecting the rights of the patentee against parties seeking to acquire intervening rights, as if issued at the date of the entry. The entry and patent are regarded as one title. Bagnell v. Broderick, 13 Pet . . 450-1; Gibson v. Chouteau, 13 Wall. 93; Shepley v. Cowan, 91 U. S. 337; Smelting Co. v. Kemp, 104 U. S. 647; Hayner v. Stanly, 8 Sawy. 225; [So C.13 FED. REP. 217.] The title of the plaintiff dates from the date of the entry and payment, and not from the elate of the patent; and the reservation in the patent relates to that date, and therefore antedates the mining location of the defendants. The plaintiff in each case has the legal title to the mine, as well as the land, and is entitled to recover the lode from which it has been ousted, and it is so ordered.
M. & ST. P. Ry. Co.
RAILROAD-USE 011' STREET FOIt TRACKs-GRANT TO CITY 011' DUBUQUE--ACT8 OF CONGRESS 011' JULY 2, 1836, AND MARCH 3, 1837-S'I'ATUTE OF LUUTATION8 -ESTOPPEL-JUDGMENT AGAINST CITY.
When the town of Dubuque was laid out by the acts of congress of July 2, and March B, the United States caused a reservation to be made of a strIpof land fronting on the Mississippi, the same being reserved for and dedicated to public use forever" for the purposes of a highway and for other public uses." In 1853 the United States granted this land to the city of Dubuque, providing, however, that this grant should" in no manner affect the rights of third persons therein, or to the use thereof, but should be subject to the same." This strip, then known a,s Fron t street, was used as a highway and for levee purposes, and subsequently portions of it were occupied by the tracks of railroad companies, and in 1874 the track now owued bj' the Chi.
SIMPLOT V. CHICAGO, M. & ST. P.
cago, Milwaukee & 8t: Paul Railway Company was laid oVer a triangle forming part of Front street as originally laid out., At that time there was no building or fence or other erection on the land on which the track was laid. The plaintiffs had been in possession of this triangular tract for over 10 yeare, and during that time they had paid to the city certain sums assessed for tlle laying out, curbing, and paving of streets adjacent thereto, hl}t they had full knowledge of the fact that this triangle was part of the public reservation. They claimed title to the land under three claims: (1) Adverse possession un· der the statute of limitations; (2) an equitable estoppel agai'llst the publio; and (3) an adjudication by the district court of Dubuque county in their favor in Simplot v. OitlllJ/ DubfUJue; and as owners of the land demanded' damages from the railroad under the provisions of section 1244 of the Code of Iowa. Held '; (1) That, as the city of Dubuque was incorporated under a ,special charter, the provisions of section 464 of the Code were not applicable, 8lld the Qwner of land abutting on a highway or street along which a railroad track was laid, could not recover damages unless he owned the fee in the soil over which the tracks passed j and as the title to this land was held by the city as a trustee for the furtherance of the public uses and purposes to which the property, had been originally dedicated, title could not be acquired byadverlle possession" and plaintiffs were not entitled to recover. (2) That the act of the city in collecting the taxes w8sf6r its own benefit alone, and could not work an estoppel as against the general public, for whose use, the triangle was dedicated, and plaintiffs could derive no title by reason of an estoppel. (3) 'That as the railroad company did not acquire its sole right to use the street for its tracks from the city, but by virtue of the original act of congress, in dedicating this tract to public uses, it was not bound by the decree and judgment against the city in the case of Simptot v. Oity of Dubugue, to which it wall not a party·.
MUNICIPAL VoRPORATIONS-8TATUTE 01l' LIMITATIONS-ESTOPPEL IN PAIS.
When a municipal corporation seeks to enforce its private rights, asdistinguished from rights belonging to the public, it may be defeated by force of the statute of limitations; but in all cases wherein the corporation represents the pUblic at large or the state, or is seeking to enforce a right pertaining to sovereignty, the statute of limitations, as such, cannot be made applicable. In such cases, however, the courts may apply the doctrine of estopPll1 in pa1:s, and by means thereof, when justice and right demand it, prevent wrong and in· jury being done to private rights.
SIMPLOT V. OHICA.GO. M. & ST. P. BY. 00.
CHICAGO, M.& 'ST. P. BY. 00.
being covered by the phrase" other public uses," even if it di<l not come within the use" for a public highway."
SIMPLOT V. CHICAGO, M. & ST. P. BY. CO.
Could the legislature of Iowa, or the people thereof, in their sovereign capacity, in any manner authorize or em:power the city of Dubuque, or any citizen thereof; to divert said reservation to a pri.· vate use, or to a use inconsistent. with and destructive of the pur. poses contemplated in the original dedication of it to public use, as declared in the act of 1836? In the act of congress approved March 3, 1845, providing for the admission of Iowa into the Union, as a condition thereto it was required that the state should agree, by ordinance, that it would never "interfere with the primary disposal of the soil within the same by the United States, nor with any regulations congress may find necesBary for securing the title in such Boil to the bona fide purchasers thereof." By an act and ordinance of the general assembly of Iowa, under date of January 15, 1849, this proviso was accepted, and was made irrevocable and unalterable.
In the case of Kingv. Ware, 53 Iowa, 97-100, [So C. 4 N. W. Rep. 858,J the supreme court of Iowa held that under the terms of this ordinance "it was not within the power of the state to question his title by escheating the lands, or nullifying the sale made by the United States in any other manner." If, then, this reservation was dedicated to public use forever, by the act of 1836, when the title thereof was in the United States, and if the act of 1853, as is held by the supreme court of Iowa in Goal. v. City of Burlington, did not change or abrogate this dedication, but operated only to change the holding of the title from the United States to the city of Dubuque, then the property remained for public use by the express provisions of the act of congress, and this constitutes a primary disposal of the property by the United States, which it is beyond the power of the state of Iowa to abrogate or nullify in any manner. In other words, if the legislature of Iowa should enact that this reservation should no longer be used for public purposes and uses, but should be sold by the city for private use, such an act of the legislature would be wholly void uuder the ordinance above referred to. If, then, it be true that the state of Iowa cannot lawfully defeat or nullify the primary disposal of the lands within its borders by the United States, can it be done indirectly through the operation of its statutes of limitations, in cases like the one now before the court? If the United States grant land to A. in fee, and B. occupies same adversely for the requisite time, he will obtain a title against A., but this does not affect or defeat the title conveyed by the United States to A. The right and title acquired by possession take the place of an actual conveyance from A. to B., and as A. has the absolute right to convey the lands to B., the latter can acquire them byaclverse possession. If, however, the United States reserves lands in Iowa for a public use, and dedicates them to such use, so that the trust has attached to the naked title in the hands of the government, and then the government conveys the same to A. to be held by him for the public and for the public uses only, he having the right to convey the same for such uses, could B. in such case, by invoking the statute of limitations of the state, obtain the title and ownership of such land, when it is expressly provided in the organic law of the state that it shall not interfere with the disposition of the soil thereof, made by . the United States? That the United States did primarily dedicate and Bet apart their: land to the public use forever is admitted.
OHICAGO, ·M. & ST. P'. BY. 00.
" Municipal corporations, as we have seen, have,.ill some respects, a double character,-one public, the other (by way of distinction) private. As respects property not held for public use, or upon public trusts, and as respects contracts and rights of a private nature, there is no reason why these corporations should not fall within limitation statutes, and be affected by them. For example, in an action on contract or for tort, a municipal corporation may pleae1. or have pleaded against it, the statute of limitations. But such a corporation does not own and cannot alien public streets or places, and no laches on its part or on that of its officers can defeat the right of the public thereto; yet there may grow up, in consequence, pri vate rights of more persuasive force in the particular case than those of the public. It will, perhaps, be found that cases will arise of such a character that justice requires that an equitable estoppel shall be asserted, even against the public; but if so, such cases will form a law unto themselves, and do not fall within the legal operation of limitation enactments. 'fhe author cannot assent to the doctrine that, as respects pUblic rights, municipal corporations are within ordinary limitation statutes. But there is no danger in recognizing the principle of an estoppel in pais, as applicableto such cases, as this leaves tile courts to decide the question, not by the mere lapse of time, but by all the circumstances of the case to hold the public estopped or not, as right or justice may require."
C,IMPLOT V. CHICAGO, M. & ST. P. BY. CO.
of a municipal corporation and those of the state or the general public. We believe the weight of authority is that the statute does not run against the general public because of the adverse possession of a highway established in the maimer prescribed by law. Whether this rule should prevail in this state we do notdeterllline; and yet we believe there are cases where the non-user has continued for such a length of time, and private rights of such a character have been acquired by adverse possession. and the conse-. quent of lands by purchase a'nd sale, that justice demands the public should @e estopped from asserting the right to open the highway." ..
over a part of Front street, in strict accordance with the 11ses and purposes for which the reservation was dedicated to the public. The plaintiffs seek to show that they have become the owners of a part of Front street, and have defeated the right of the public thereto, by reason of the statute of limitations. ' To tmch a case, arising under the circumstances shown herein, in my judgment the statute ij'l inapplicable, and plaintiffs cannot make out their title to the triangle in dispute by force of the statute. 2. The next question for d'ecision is whether, under the facts of the, case, plaintiffs are entitled to estop the defendant corporation from questioning their title to the portions of the triangle occupied by the railroad company. In most of the cases wherein this doctrine of estoppel has been recognized, it har.been applied to protect a defendant from being disturbed in the possession of rights which have been acquired by long-continued adverse possession. It has been used as a shield for protection, not as a weapon of attack. In the case at bar, the defendant corporation has been occupying and using the railroad track over the triangleevel' since it purchased the right of the Chicago, Clinton, Dubuque & .Minnesota. Railroad Company, in 1881. And that company and its predegessors had been using the track since 1874. The object of this proceedingis to compel the defendant to pay .damages to plaintiffs for using this track, on the ground that the track is located upon the property of plaintiffa, and th.erefore,plaintiffs are entitled to damages. When the defendant denies the ownership of plaintiffs, and challenges the plaintiffs to produce the evidence of such ownership, the reply is that the defendant and the . public are estopped from questioning plaintiffs' title. What are the facts relied on as the basis of an estoppel? They are: (1) Adverse possession for ten years or more; (2) payment by plaintiffs to the city of Dubuque of certain assessments levied for the curhing and paving the streets of the city adjoining the triangle and lots 529 and 530; (3) the judgment obtained by plaintiffs in the case against the city of Dubuque. The jury found that plaintiffs had been in adverse possession of the triangle for more than 10 years; that when the railroad track was laid down and operated, there were no buildings, fences, or erec-. tiona thereon which had to ,be removed to mn.ke way for the track; that pillJintiffs had neyer put that portion of the triangle on which the track wajil placed to any use inconsistent with its use for railroad purposes.
CHICAGO, M. & ST. P. BY. CO.
Cl'lICAGO, M. & ST. P. BY. 00.
"Thus an assignee is not estopped by judgment against his assignor in a, suit by or against, the assignor alone, instituted after the assignment was made, though if the jndgment ,l1ad preceded the assignment the case would have been different. Hence privity in estoppel arises by virtue of succession. Nor is a grantee of land affected by jndgment concerning the property against his grantor, in the suit of a tfiird person begun after the grant. JUdgment bars those only Whose interest is aC(luired after the suit, excepting, of course· 'the parties."
H, then, it be the rule that a. judgment ba.rs only those whose interest is acquired after the institution of the suit, it is clear that in this. case the defendant cannot b6 barred by the decree in the case against the city, e'Ven if the defenda.nt be treated as a grantee of the city. in Ingram 'V. G., D. It M. R. Go. supra, Under the doctrine the defendant gets its right to occupy the premises in question for its. railroad track under the provisions of the act of congress of 1836, and the right-of-way act of the atate of Iowa; and under the rule· recognized in this case, as it does, the earlier cases of Gity of Clinton v. G. R. It M. R. R. Co. 24 Iowa, 455; C., N. eX S. W. R.
SIMPLOT V. OHICAGO, M.· & ST. P. BY. 00.
that their right to the premises might be disputed, and that the plain. , tiffs would not guaranty his possession. In my judgment the original dedicatiun by act of congress of Front street to public use cannot be defeated by reason of the facts shown ill this case. They fall far short of showing an estoppel upon the public, and hence the plaintiffs fail to show a title or ownership in the premises which would entitle them to claim damages for the use thereof for railroad purposes, under the law as it was in force in 1874. Consequently the proceedings !3hould be dismissed at costs of plaintiffs.
Where, in an action for damages for a personal injury caused by the negligence of defendant, the instruction to the jury was as favorable as the plaintiff was entitled to, and there is nothing to indicate that the jury were actuated by passion or prejudice, the verdict will be sustained.

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