Source: http://massachusettslandlords.com/boston-housing-authority-v-hemingway-breach-of-warranty-of-habitability/
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 07:05:23+00:00

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BOSTON HOUSING AUTHORITY vs. RUTH HEMINGWAY (and a companion case).
Present: TAURO, C.J., REARDON, QUIRICO, BRAUCHER, HENNESSEY, KAPLAN & WILKINS, JJ.
Under a rental of premises for dwelling purposes, by a written or oral lease, for a specified time or at will, there is an implied warranty by the landlord that the premises are fit for human occupation and will remain so ; QUIRICO, REARDON and WILKINS, JJ., were of opinion that the warranty “fit for human occupation” was too broad and insufficiently defined, and that the landlord’s obligation should be related to the statutes and other provisions having the force of law which prescribe minimum standards for dwellings [213-220].
TWO ACTIONS OF SUMMARY PROCESS. Writs in the Municipal Court of the Roxbury District dated October 30, 1969.
Upon appeal to the Superior Court the actions were heard by Kalus, J.
Joseph S. Murphy, Jr., for the defendants.
George F. Mahoney for the plaintiff.
cases were originally entered and tried in the Municipal Court of the Roxbury District where the judge found for the landlord against the tenants. The tenants appealed to the Superior Court under G. L. c. 239, Section 5, as amended through St. 1969, c. 366, where the cases were retried. The trial judge found as to each tenant that the landlord was entitled to possession and rent of $1,200 up to and including June 30, 1970. [Note 3] The cases come before us on a consolidated bill of exceptions.
However, at the close of the evidence, the tenants presented requests for findings of fact and rulings of law. Among the requests were the following: “8. That the obligations of the Housing Authority to supply and maintain premises in compliance with the Housing Regulations and the obligations of the tenant to pay rent under a rental agreement are dependent.” “15. That any money owed by the Defendants to the Plaintiff ought to be determined by this Court according to the degree of inhabitability of each apartment of Defendants.” “21. That even if the Defendants had not complied with Chapter 239 (8) (A) of the Withholding Statute the defense of uninhabitability would still exist if the premises were as a matter of fact found to be in violation of the State Sanitary Code.” The Superior Court judge held that he need not reach these requests for rulings because of the tenants’ failure to comply with the notice requirement of c. 239, Section 8A. The denial of these requests presents the central issue in these cases, namely, whether the tenants’ remedies are limited to the pertinent statutory provisions.
is no implied agreement, apart from fraud, that the demised premises are or will continue to be fit for occupancy or safe and in good repair. The tenant takes the premises as he finds them and there is no obligation on the landlord to make repairs.” Fiorntino v. Mason, 233 Mass. 451 , 452. Although the Fiorntino case involved a tenancy at will, the language applied equally to a tenancy under a lease, absent any express provisions to the contrary. Since the leases between the landlord and the tenants in the present cases do not contain any express covenant to deliver or maintain the apartments in habitable condition, the tenants do not have any common law defence to the landlord’s action of summary process unless we change the old common law independent covenants rule as the tenants urge us to do. The tenants’ challenge to our common law rule of independent covenants has led us to reconsider whether the historical source and justifications for the rule are still valid in the modern context.
1. The Boston Housing Authority relies on a series of Massachusetts cases which established and followed the doctrine of caveat emptor and independent covenants between the landlord and the tenant. Mr. Justice Gray stated the old common law rule in Royce v. Guggenheim, 106 Mass. 201 , 202-203: “It is now well settled, both here and in England, that in a lease of a building for a dwelling-house or store no covenant is implied that it should be fit for occupation. [Citations omitted.] And the English authorities, ancient and modern, are conclusive, that even where the landlord is bound by custom or express covenant to repair, and by his failure to do so the premises become uninhabitable, or unfit for the purpose for which they were leased, the tenant has no right to quit the premises, or to refuse to pay rent according to his covenant, but his only remedy is by action for damages.” See, e.g., Kramer v. Cook, 7 Gray 550 ; Leavitt v. Fletcher, 10 Allen 119 ; Ware v. Hobbs, 222 Mass. 327 ; Stone v. Sullivan, 300 Mass. 450 .
assumption that a lease was in fact a conveyance of an estate in real property for a term. This characterization of the lease as a transfer of a property interest governed by property law reflected the parties’ expectations in a rural agrarian society where the right to possession of the land constituted the chief element of the exchange. “The common law focused on possession rather than service. The ideal landlord delivered possession, then did nothing more; the ideal tenant paid his rent and demanded nothing more than possession.” Notes, 56 Cornell L. Rev. 489, 490.
Thus, originally at common law, the tenant could not even escape his rental obligation when the demised premises were destroyed because of the law’s view that the land and not the premises was the essential part of the transaction. See Paradine v. Jane, 82 Eng. Rep. R. 897; Am. Law of Property, Section 3.103. Even if the landlord made express maintenance promises in the lease, courts often held that the landlord’s breach of these “secondary” obligations did not affect the tenant’s obligation to pay rent. See Stone v. Sullivan, 300 Mass. 450 . The tenant was released from his covenant to pay rent only when the landlord repossessed the property or interfered with the tenant’s quiet enjoyment of his leasehold. See Royce v. Guggenheim, 106 Mass. 201 (1870).
of the injustices stemming from strict application of the independent covenants rule without repudiating the rule’s basic premise that the lease was essentially a conveyance of a possessory interest in land for a term and not a contract for a dwelling suitable for human occupation. The constructive eviction doctrine created the legal fiction that the tenant had been “evicted” to show that the tenant’s possessory interest in the property itself was destroyed by the landlord’s failure to provide adequate maintenance services. It was the loss of the tenant’s possessory interest which excused him from paying rent.
The constructive eviction defence gave the tenant the option of abandoning the demised premises in order to extinguish his rental obligation if the court shared the tenant’s view as to what acts or omissions on the landlord’s part constituted a breach of his duty to assure quiet possession. However, this defence offered little solace to the tenant who was more interested in securing a livable dwelling than a plot of land. Once again, this court responded by creating another exception to the independent covenants rule in those cases where the circumstances made it clear that the tenant’s purpose in signing the lease was to secure a dwelling fit for human occupation.
is a house suitable for occupation in its condition at the time.” Although the court’s holding in the Ingalls case has been limited to its special facts of a short term lease for a furnished room or dwelling, its rationale rested on the broader premise that we would not apply the independent covenants rule in those cases where the essential purpose of the lease was not the transfer of an interest in land but the use of the demised premises for immediate occupation. In effect, the Ingalls case reflected this court’s willingness to imply a warranty of habitability when it was clear that the lease was essentially a contract in which the landlord promised to deliver premises suitable to the tenant’s purpose in return for the tenant’s promise to pay rent.
This judicial willingness to expand the number of exceptions to the independent covenants rule in appropriate cases by treating the lease more as a contract than as a property conveyance was supported by our decision in Charles E. Burt, Inc. v. Seven Grand Corp. 340 Mass. 124 . We held in the Burt case that the tenant may get damages in a suit for equitable relief despite its failure to abandon the premises. We noted that damages without abandonment are possible in those cases where the breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment “goes to the essence” of the contract. P. 129. We decided that the tenant was entitled to damages in the Burt case because “[s]uch relief is more nearly adequate than the incomplete and hazardous remedy at law which requires that the lessee (a) determine at its peril that the circumstances amount to a constructive eviction, and (b) vacate the demised premises, possibly at some expense, while remaining subject to the risk that a court may decide that the lessor’s breaches do not go to the essence of the lessor’s obligation.” The Burt case, supra, 129-130.
The common purpose underlying these new statutes was to create a private remedy for these public violations by giving the tenant the power to initiate the Code enforcement process. (See 52 Mass. L. Q. 205.) General Laws c. 111, Sections 127C-127F and 127H, allow the tenant himself to initiate the process by a petition to either a District Court (Section 127C) or the Superior Court (Section 127H) requesting a finding that Code violations exist which “may endanger or materially impair the health or well-being of any tenant.” If the court makes this finding and concludes that “such rental payments are necessary to remedy the condition constituting the violation,” the court may by written order “authorize the petitioner . . . to make rental payments . . . to the clerk of the court” (Section 127F). The court can then order the clerk to “disburse all or any portion of the rental payments received by him to the respondent [lessor] for the purpose of effectuating the removal of the violation” (Section 127F).
Once the defects are corrected, the remaining balance of any rent paid to the court will be given back to the landlord (Section 127F).
of rent withholding “was to provide a tenant with yet another means of enforcing the state sanitary code or local health regulations, but without the necessity for a timid tenant to initiate court proceedings in what may appear to be a `frightening’ system.” 52 Mass. L. Q. 205, 228. This purpose is made clear by the fact that once repairs are made, the landlord receives the balance of any remaining rent held in escrow. Appelstein v. Quinn, 361 Mass. 861 . The statute’s clear purpose is to promote repairs by giving the landlord the incentive of getting his rent if he complies with the Code regulations.
At common law, the tenant could never justifiably withhold rent until the landlord made repairs because his rental obligation was not dependent on any services performed by the landlord besides delivery of the property to the tenant. However, both the courts in rendering decisions such as those in the Ingalls case, 156 Mass. 348 , and the Burt case, 340 Mass. 124 , supra, and the Legislature in enacting the rent withholding provisions, have retreated from the fundamental common law assumption on which the independent covenants rule is based, namely, that a lease is primarily a conveyance of an interest in real estate. By fixing a clear duty of repair on the landlord before the landlord can recover withheld rent in those cases where the demised premises are in violation of the standards of fitness for human habitation established under the State Sanitary Code, the Massachusetts Legislature has further weakened [Note 9] the old common law rule that the tenant’s obligation to pay rent is totally independent of any obligation the landlord may bear.
Thus, we are confronted with a situation where the legislation’s “establishment of policy carries significance beyond the particular scope of each of the statutes involved.” Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc. 398 U.S. 375, 390. As Professor James Landis noted in his essay, Statutes and the Sources of Law, Harvard Legal Essays (1934), pp. 222-223, “Doctrines of common law dealing with the relationship betwen individuals will often be seen to hinge upon a conception as to the position that one party is to occupy in our social structure. This becomes solidified into a concept of status. But obviously status has no meaning apart from its incidents. These incidents, often so numerous as to escape description, have a varying importance in shaping the nucleus of a status. The alteration of some of them possesses no importance beyond the change itself; the alteration of others, however, may call for a radical revision of the privileges or disabilities that have generally been attached to a particular status. The common-law incidents of status, that in their origin have themselves been of empiric growth, must then give way before the new aims deducible from such a basic alteration.
the independent covenants rule, it drastically altered most of the logical incidents flowing from the lease’s old status as property conveyance by allowing rent withholding, a remedy which reflects the Legislature’s judgment that the tenant should be paying rent only for habitable premises. This legislative alteration of the most important incident of the common law status of a lease as a property conveyance requires a judicial reappraisal [Note 10] of the common law status itself because the Legislature’s actions reflect a characterization of the landlord-tenant relationship that radically differs from the status accorded to it by the common law.
objective of the leasing transaction is to provide a dwelling suitable for habitation. The old common law treatment of the lease as a property conveyance and the independent covenants rule which stems from this treatment have outlived their usefulness. The urban tenant in a multiple dwelling unit cares little about the property interest he has acquired. Modern tenants, rightfully expect that the premises they rent, whether furnished or unfurnished, will be suitable for occupation. In Javins v. First Natl. Realty Corp. 428 F. 2d 1071 (D. C. Cir. 1970), the court justified in part its decision that all leases for dwellings imply a warranty of habitability [Note 11] by demonstrating how the factual assumptions underlying the Ingalls case exception to the independent covenants rule were in closer harmony to modern housing patterns than the old common law assumption that a property conveyance was the essential objective of the transaction.
on one piece of land for his entire life, urban tenants today are more mobile than ever before. A tenant’s tenure in a specific apartment will often not be sufficient to justify efforts at repairs. In addition, the increasing complexity of today’s dwellings renders them much more difficult to repair than the structures of earlier times. In a multiple dwelling repair may require access to equipment and areas in the control of the landlord. Low and middle income tenants, even if they were interested in making repairs, would be unable to obtain any financing for major repairs since they have no long-term interest in the property.” Javins v. First Natl. Realty Corp. at 1078-1079.
The opinion in the Javins case reflects the view expressed in recent cases and law review articles [Note 12] which rejects the old common law’s conception of the lease as a property transaction. The modern view favors a new approach which recognizes that a lease is essentially a contract between the landlord and the tenant wherein the landlord promises to deliver and maintain the demised premises in habitable condition and the tenant promises to pay rent for such habitable premises. These promises constitute interdependent and mutual considerations. Thus, the tenant’s obligation to pay rent is predicated on the landlord’s obligation to deliver and maintain the premises in habitable condition.
Therefore, we hold that in a rental of any premises for dwelling purposes, under a written or oral lease, for a specified time or at will, there is an implied warranty that the premises are fit for human occupation. “This means that at the inception of the rental there are no latent [or patent] defects in facilities vital to the use of the premises for residential purposes and that these essential facilities will remain during the entire term in a condition which makes the property livable.” Kline v. Burns, 111 N. H. 87, 92. This warranty (in so far as it is based on the State Sanitary Code and local health regulations) cannot be waived by any provision in the lease or rental agreement.
REMEDIES FOR THE LANDLORD’S BREACH OF THE IMPLIED WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY.
defence to justify the tenant’s decision to stop paying rent. “The doctrine of constructive eviction as an admitted judicial fiction, . . . no longer serves its purpose when the more flexible concept of implied warranty of habitability is legally available.” Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 434.
length of time the defects persist; (c) whether the landlord or his agent received written or oral notice of the defects; [Note 17] (d) the possibility that the residence could be made habitable within a reasonable time; [Note 18] and (e) whether the defects resulted from abnormal conduct or use by the tenant. If the court found a material breach of warranty, the tenant would be permitted to terminate the lease and recover any security deposits made; although he will be liable for the reasonable value, if any, of his use of the premises for the time he was in possession. See Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426; Pines v. Perssion 14 Wis. 2d 590, 597.
(2) If the tenant wishes to keep his lease and continue to occupy the premises, he can initiate proceedings under c. 111, Sections 127A-127H, or withhold rent pursuant to the procedures established by c. 239, Section 8A. If the landlord remedies the defects, he will recover the withheld rent. This result follows from the purpose of the statute. The tenant is allowed to withhold rent to induce the landlord to remedy the conditions rendering the premises uninhabitable. The landlord’s incentive to repair comes from the knowledge that such action taken before trial will guarantee his full recovery of the withheld rent.
the common law. Therefore, if the tenant’s Section 8A defence prevails, any withheld rent that had been paid into court must be returned to the tenant because the tenant’s rental obligation depended on the landlord’s warranty of habitability which has been broken. In these circumstances, the landlord’s breach, since it goes to the essence of the contract, renders the lease voidable at the tenant’s election. [Note 19] If the tenant elects to stay on for the rest of the term and the landlord promptly cures his breach by remedying the defective conditions, the tenant’s rental obligation for the remainder of the term will be revived when the dwelling becomes habitable. If the tenant elects to stay on until the end of the term and the landlord makes no repairs, the tenant will be liable for the reasonable value, if any, of his use of the premises for the time he remains in possession. See Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426; Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, 597.
In the instant cases, the defendants failed to comply with the notice requirement of c. 239, Section 8A. Therefore, we sustain the Superior Court judge’s ruling that the tenants cannot raise the statute as a defence to the landlord’s action of summary process.
However, the landlord’s breach of its implied warranty of habitability constitutes a total or partial defence to the landlord’s claim for rent being withheld, depending on the extent of the breach. The tenants’ claim for damages based on this breach by the landlord should be limited to the period of time that each apartment remained uninhabitable after the landlord had notice of the defects. The measure of damages would be the difference between the value of each apartment as warranted and the rental value of each apartment in its defective condition.
The cases are remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
The answer of each tenant also “claims the protection of . . . [G. L. c. 239, Section 8A, inserted by St. 1965, c. 888, as amended] which states that a defendant may not be evicted for non-payment of rent where the plaintiff is in violation of the State Sanitary Code and a proper inspection of said premises has been made and the tenant has been paid up in her rent prior to said inspection; [and] [t]hat the defendant has complied with . . . [c. 239, Section 8A] and that therefore the plaintiff cannot recover.” As to each tenant the trial judge found that she had failed to give the written notice required by Section 8A, that she “would, because of such [Code] violations, withhold all rent thereafter becoming due until the conditions constituting such violations were remedied.” He then properly ruled that Section 8A “is not available to the defendant as a defense to this proceeding.” See Rubin v. Prescott, 362 Mass. 281 , 287-289.
or maintain for them apartments which exceeded, or included more than, that which is required by the minimum standards of the Code.
The situation before us is that tenants who have admittedly withheld payment of rent for apartments which they continued to occupy despite alleged violations of the Code now take the position that by reason of the violations the landlord may neither evict them nor recover any rent from them. The opinion of the court holds that the tenants are subject to eviction because of their failure to pay rent, but that their liability for unpaid rent is limited to the reasonable value, if any, of their apartments, considering the alleged violations of the Code. That holding is sufficient to dispose of the only issues raised in these cases, and to that extent I concur with the opinion.
However, the opinion of the court purports to declare a set of rules which go beyond the facts, issues and necessities of these cases. While I recognize that it is proper to discuss some of the far reaching implications and probable consequences of the holding, a clear line should be drawn betwen the holding and the additional discussion lest the latter be assumed, under the doctrine of stare decisis, to be a present commitment on questions not now being decided. Swan v. Superior Court, 222 Mass. 542 , 545. Erickson v. Ames, 264 Mass. 436 , 444. Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner of Corps. & Taxn. 346 Mass. 667 , 674-676. Additionally, I am unable to agree with some statements in the opinion which I think go beyond the holding necessary for the decision of these cases. Those statements from which I dissent will be discussed in a later portion of this opinion.
no obligation on the landlord to make repairs.” Fiorntino v. Mason, 233 Mass. 451 , 452. Foster v. Peyser, 9 Cush. 242 , 246-247. Cowen v. Sunderland, 145 Mass. 363 , 364. Kearines v. Cullen, 183 Mass. 298 , 300. Walsh v. Schmidt, 206 Mass. 405 , 406. Mills v. Swanton, 222 Mass. 557 , 559. Conahan v. Fisher, 233 Mass. 234 , 237-238. Bergeron v. Forest, 233 Mass. 392 , 398. Borden v. Hirsh, 249 Mass. 205 , 210. Bolieau v. Traiser, 253 Mass. 346 , 348. Shepard v. Worcester County Inst. for Sav. 304 Mass. 220 , 221. Hart v. Windsor, 12 M. & W. 68.
The record of the past century reveals a striking contrast between the judiciary and the Legislature in their respective attitudes toward the need to insure to occupants of dwelling units a reasonable opportunity to obtain at least the minimum measure of shelter, safety (including protection from exposure to health hazards), facilities and services basic to the changing exigencies of a developing society. As early as 1871 the Legislature enacted a comprehensive set of regulations (St. 1871, c. 280) governing all types of buildings, particularly dwelling houses, tenements and lodging houses, in the city of Boston. In 1872 it enacted a statute (St. 1872, c. 243) which authorized other cities and towns to “prescribe rules and regulations for the inspection, materials, construction, alteration and safe use of buildings and structures.” These were but the forerunners of a continuing series of statutes prescribing, or permitting municipalities to prescribe, detailed minimum physical standards and requirements for dwelling units and other buildings and providing criminal penalties for violations. Many of these statutes, in their amended form, ultimately became part of G. L. cc. 143, 144 and 145.
standards of fitness of structures for human habitation. It does so in great detail and to an extent never before incorporated in any statute. It expressly provides that “[n]o person shall . . . let to another for occupancy any dwelling, dwelling unit, or rooming unit, for the purpose of living, sleeping, cooking, or eating therein, which does not comply” with its provisions, and further provides a criminal penalty for violation of its provisions. It expressly places the burden on the owner to comply with the prescribed minimum physical standards for rented dwelling units. The Code is not solely penal in nature. By G. L. c. 111, Section 127C, as amended by St. 1969, c. 242, and Section 127H, as amended by St. 1972, c. 201, a tenant may file a petition in the District or Superior Court to enforce compliance with the Code by the landlord; and by Section 127K, inserted by St. 1968, c. 404, Section 2, any agreement by the tenant to waive that right is declared to be against public policy and void. Both the enabling statute (G. L. c. 111, Section 127A) and the Code (Art. I, Reg. 2.1) recognize the authority of municipalities to adopt local regulations containing requirements stricter than those contained in the Code. No such local regulations are involved in the cases before us.
The net result of this court’s interpretation of these statutes was (a) that the owner of a dwelling unit which did not comply with the prescribed minimum standards could be prosecuted criminally, (b) that if he rented the unit without correcting the violations the statutes did not per se impose an obligation on him for the benefit of the tenant to correct the violations, and (c) that unless there was an express agreement to the contrary, the tenant took the unit subject to all existing violations and if he wanted them corrected the burden of doing so was on him. That result, when coupled with the operation of the further rule that even if the landlord expressly agreed to make repairs such an agreement was independent from the tenant’s obligation to pay the rent, constitutes a formidable judicial roadblock preventing the tenant from having any practical means of obtaining the benefits which the statutes were designed and intended to give him.
The opinion of the court in the present cases does not discuss or otherwise deal with the rule quoted above from Palmigiani v. D’Argenio, 234 Mass. 434 , 436. As the first step in the removal of the roadblock discussed above I would reverse that rule and hold instead (a) that the various statutes, ordinances, by-laws, rules, regulations and codes prescribing minimum standards for dwelling units impose on the landlord, for the benefit of his tenants, an obligation to comply with those minimum standards, and (b) that by renting such a unit the landlord impliedly agrees with his tentant (i) that at the time of the renting the unit complies with those standards and (ii) that during the term of the renting he will do whatever such legal provisions require him to do for compliance with such standards. Such a holding is necessary to insure that tenants shall enjoy the rights which these various legal provisions have created for their benefit. Other courts have made similar holdings.
“Tenement House Law,” which provided in part: “Every tenement house and all the parts thereof shall be kept in good repair.” The plaintiff was injured by the falling of a ceiling in her apartment. The landlord argued that the statute had not changed the common law under which no duty rested on him to repair the rooms demised. In rejecting that argument, Judge Cardozo said at pp. 18-19: “The command of the statute, directed, as it plainly is, against the owner . . . has thus changed the ancient rule. . . . We may be sure that the framers of this statute, when regulating tenement life, had uppermost in thought the care of those who are unable to care for themselves. The legislature must have known that unless repairs in the rooms of the poor were made by the landlord, they would not be made by any one. The duty imposed became commensurate with the need. The right to seek redress is not limited to the city or its officers” (emphasis supplied). The same language was quoted with approval in Javins v. First Natl. Realty Corp. 428 F. 2d 1071, 1080-1081 (D. C. Cir.), where the court said further that the comprehensive set of housing regulations then in effect “creates privately enforceable duties,” and that “by signing the lease the landlord has undertaken a continuing obligation to the tenant to maintain the premises in accordance with all applicable law.” To the same effect see also Whetzel v. Jess Fisher Management Co. 282 F. 2d 943, 950 (D. C. Cir.), and Kanelos v. Kettler, 406 F. 2d 951, 953 (D. C. Cir.).
The above statement was quoted with approval in Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 Ill. 2d 351, 361-362, where the court held that in the rental of certain dwellings the landlord impliedly warrants that the premises comply with the city’s building code. A dissenting opinion in the Jack Spring case contains the following observations, at pp. 374-375: “The housing code of the city of Chicago . . . imposes certain obligations upon an owner of dwelling units to repair and maintain the same. In keeping with this expression of legislative intent I would imply in every lease covering residential property within the purview of the housing code . . . an implied covenant by the lessor to repair the premises in keeping with the requirements of the housing code. . . . Possibly my preference for the use of the term `implied covenant’ instead of `implied warranty of habitability’ as used by the majority is only a matter of semantics. However, I prefer the covenant designation because it definitely indicates an obligation or an undertaking by the lessor as part of the lease itself. The term `warranty,’ however, generally carries with it the idea of a holding out or a representation thereby inducing another to act.
The second step required for the removal of the roadblock is the reversal of the present common law rule that the obligation of the tenant to pay rent and the obligation, if any, of the landlord to repair or maintain the rented premises are independent, and the substitution therefor of a new rule that such obligations are substantially mutually interdependent. The opinion of the court accomplishes this. However, the second step without the first will apply only to those very few cases in which the landlord has expressly agreed to repair or maintain the rented premises, and it will not benefit the present tenants, and the many others similarly situated, whose landlords have not expressly agreed to do so and against whom the present law implies no obligation to do so. The present tenants and others similarly situated can benefit only if this court also takes the first step described above, thereby reversing the present common law rule that “[t]here is no implied agreement, apart from fraud, that the demised premises are or will continue to be fit for occupancy or safe and in good repair [and] the tenant takes the premises as he finds them and there is no obligation on the landlord to make repairs.” Fiorntino v. Mason, 233 Mass. 451 , 452.
unit impliedly warrants to the tenant “that the premises are fit for human occupation . . . [which] `. . . means that at the inception of the rental there are no latent [or patent] defects in facilities vital to the use of the premises for residential purposes and that these essential facilities will remain during the entire term in a condition which makes the property livable.'” The court makes no attempt to define what is required to make a dwelling unit “fit for human occupation,” or to make “the property livable,” or to define what may constitute a material breach of the new implied warranty. It suggests that broad discretion be left to trial courts to decide these questions on a continuing case by case basis.
I dissent from the statement of such a broad and sweeping new rule for the reason, in part, that it would be sufficient for the decision of these cases to hold that the landlord, in renting the apartments to the tenants, impliedly agreed that the apartments would comply with the several requirements of the Code which the tenants allege were violated, and that if the tenants sustain their burden of proof of such violations their liability for the unpaid rent may be reduced to the fair value of their use and occupancy of the apartments in their deficient condition.
I dissent from the stated new rule for the further reason that the basis and scope of the landlord’s obligation thereunder are related to the court’s implication of a new and otherwise undefined warranty of fitness of the rented premises for human habitation. The present situation in this Commonwealth is not one of a void in the law with reference to what is required of dwelling units to constitute “fitness for human habitation” (G. L. c. 111, Section 127A). As already noted in this opinion, we have had considerable legislative and administrative attention and action on this subject. We have the numerous statutes passed by the Legislature. Municipalities have been authorized to enact ordinances or by-laws and to adopt rules and regulations thereon.
The Department of Public Health, by authority expressly delegated to it by the Legislature, has adopted the State Sanitary Code having the force and effect of law throughout the State. In short, the field has been occupied, and the void, if any, has been filled. It remains for the courts only to accommodate their rules of common law to enable tenants to enforce against landlords these mandatory, detailed, precise and easily understandable minimum standards of fitness of dwelling units for human occupation, rather than to create a new implied and undefined obligation which will require years of litigation to develop and define.
Since it is clear that mandatory minimum standards for housing units as prescribed by statutes, ordinances, rules, regulations or codes having the force and effect of law cannot be waived or otherwise undercut by agreement of the parties to a tenancy, it appears that the opinion contemplates that the new implied warranty may require even higher standards to satisfy its requirement of fitness “for human occupation.” Thus these identical words would have one meaning under applicable statutes, ordinances, rules, regulations or codes, and they might have a different meaning under the proposed implied warranty. The court’s opinion itself says, in footnote 16, that “the protection afforded by the implied warranty of habitability does not necessarily coincide with the Code’s requirements.” This deliberate creation of a presently undefined, indeterminable and uncharted area of potential rights and liabilities of landlords and tenants can serve only to vex them and to produce litigation otherwise avoidable.
make frequent use of the words “implied warranty of habitability” and in most instances they make no attempt to explain or define what is included in such a warranty. In its present opinion the court seems to rely considerably on these decisions and writings, and the opinion quotes from some of them at length. Although some of the decisions on which the court seems to place its greatest reliance include in their discussions general language about the implication of a warranty of habitability, it is clear from the express language of their holdings that they imply a warranty of habitability which is limited to the minimum standards prescribed by applicable statutes, ordinances, by-laws, codes, rules and regulations.
The opinion of the court appears to rely principally on the decision in Javins v. First Natl. Realty Corp. 428 F. 2d 1071 (D. C. Cir.), and it quotes at length from what I believe to be dictum in that case. The facts of that case were very much like those of the present cases. The holding of that case is stated near the beginning of the opinion at pp. 1072-1073 to be that “We . . . hold that a warranty of habitability, measured by the standards set out in the Housing Regulations for the District of Columbia, is implied by operation of law into leases of urban dwelling units covered by those Regulations and that breach of this warranty gives rise to the usual remedies for breach of contract” (emphasis supplied), and the holding is repeated near the end of the opinion at p. 1082 in the following language: “We therefore hold that the Housing Regulations imply a warranty of habitability, measured by the standards which they set out, into leases of all housing that they cover” (emphasis supplied).
both oral and written, governing the tenancies of the defendants in the multiple unit dwellings occupied by them, is an implied warranty of habitability which is fulfilled by substantial compliance with the pertinent provisions of the Chicago building code” (emphasis supplied). In the later case of Gillette v. Anderson, 4 Ill. App. 3d 838, 841-842, the court in applying the rule of the Jack Spring case said: “[T]he oral lease . . . included an implied warranty of habitability and the standards of that warranty would be those standards set forth in those sections of the ordinances of Waukegan related to housing” (emphasis supplied).
minimum standards, [Note Quirico-3] and (d) that if the landlord fails in any material respect to comply with the prescribed minimum standards the tenant may (i) elect to remain in possession, paying the full amount of the agreed rent under protest based on such violation, and then bring an action to recover the excess of the amount paid over and above the fair value of the occupancy of the deficient premises, or (ii) vacate the premises, thereby terminating the tenancy, and as to rent unpaid for any period of occupancy the landlord may recover the fair value of such occupancy of the deficient premises. If such a rule were adopted, it would, of course, require further attention to such matters as notice to the landlord of Code violations arising after the letting, the time permitted the landlord to correct the violations, and the nature, extent or duration of a violation necessary to entitle the tenant to vacate or exercise other remedies available to him by reason of the violation.
actually in controversy, with due consideration for the consequences of the decision, but without trying to anticipate and simultaneously decide all possible related questions which might arise later.
[Note 1] The defendant tenants are Ruth Hemingway and Ruth Briggs.
[Note 2] The tenants claimed that their apartments had, among other defects, leaking ceilings, wet walls, improper heating, and broken doors and windows, and were infested with rodents and vermin.
[Note 3] Since Ruth Briggs vacated her apartment on September 30, 1970, her exceptions in essence are based on the finding by the trial judge for the landlord for $1,200.
[Note 5] In 1969, the Legislature amended Section 8A to allow written notification of Code violations to the landlord from the appropriate local agency (such as the Boston housing inspection department) to satisfy the tenant’s obligation to notify the landlord. Since they began withholding rent after the landlord had received notice of the Code violations, the tenants in the instant cases could have properly raised c. 239, Section 8A, as a defence if the amendment applied to them. However, the amendment was enacted after the tenants had started to withhold rent and therefore did not apply to them. See St. 1969, c. 355, approved May 27, 1969, effective ninety days thereafter.
[Note 6] Article II of the State Sanitary Code was originally adopted by the Department of Public Health on September 13, 1960, in the exercise of authority granted by G. L. c. 111, Section 5. By St. 1965, c. 898, Sections 1, 3, that authority was eliminated from Section 5 and placed instead in a new Section 127A inserted in c. 111. Section 127A was amended by St. 1971, c. 261.
[Note 7] Both G. L. c. 111, Sections 127C-127F and 127H, and G. L. c. 239, Section 8A, were approved on the same day, January 7, 1966.
[Note 9] However, c. 239, Section 8A, and c. 111, Sections 127A-127H, have not abrogated the independent covenants rule. See Rubin v. Prescott, 362 Mass. 281 , 286, fn. 4, where we noted that the State Sanitary Code did not abrogate the lessor’s common law rights to recover possession when the premises did not comply with the minimum standards of the Code for dwelling purposes. If the Sanitary Code did not abrogate the common law rule of independent covenants, it seems logical to conclude that remedial legislation designed to aid enforcement of the Code has not repealed the common law rule. For similar treatment of a New York rent withholding statute’s impact on landlord-tenant common law, see Davar Holdings, Inc. v. Cohen, 255 App. Div. (N. Y.) 445, affd. 280 N. Y. 828; Matter of Himmel v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 47 Misc. 2d (N. Y.) 93, 96; Matter of De Koven v. 780 West End Realty Co. 48 Misc. 2d (N. Y.) 951; 176 East 123rd St. Corp. v. Flores, 65 Misc. 2d (N. Y.) 130.
[Note 10] The Boston Housing Authority argues that even if there is an implied warranty of habitability, c. 239, Section 8A, offers tenants the exclusive remedy for its breach. However, there is no evidence to indicate that the Legislature intended the limited remedy afforded by c. 239, Section 8A, to exclude appropriate additional remedies created by changes in the common law.
This conclusion is supported by recent judicial decisions to reform the landlord-tenant common law rules in States which have rent withholding statutes. All of these decisions are predicated on the implied assumption that remedial legislation designed to promote safe and sanitary housing does not preclude the courts from fashioning new common law rights and remedies to facilitate the policy of safe and sanitary housing embodied in the withholding statutes. See Hinson v. Delis, 26 Cal. App. 3d 62; Amanuensis Ltd. v. Brown, 65 Misc. 2d (N. Y.) 15; Jackson v. Rivera, 65 Misc. 2d (N. Y.) 468; Morbeth Realty Corp. v. Rosenshine, 67 Misc. 2d (N. Y.) 325. In Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 Ill. 2d 351, the Illinois Supreme Court expressly rejected the landlord’s claim that the tenant’s request for far reaching changes in landlord-tenant law “is appropriate for legislative rather than judicial consideration.” P. 357. Despite the Legislature’s passage of a rent withholding statute, Ill. Rev. Sts. c. 23, Section 11-23, that court noted that there was no need to defer to future legislative reforms of old common law rules in the landlord-tenant area. “A rule which in its origin was the creation of the courts themselves, and was supposed in the making to express the mores of the day, may be abrogated by courts when the mores have so changed that perpetuation of the rule would do violence to the social conscience. . . . This is not usurpation. It is not even innovation. It is the reservation for ourselves of the same power of creation that built up the common law through its exercise by the judges of the past.” Justice Cardozo, The Growth of the Law, c. IV, p. 136, cited at p. 367 of the Jack Spring case.
[Note 11] We face a slightly different situation from that which confronted the court in the Javins case, supra. At the time of the Javins decision, the Washington, D. C., Code did not contain any rent withholding provisions which the tenants could implement when their apartments were in uninhabitable condition. The Code merely provided for criminal sanctions by public agencies when landlords maintained their apartments in violation of the Code. Thus, the Javins case holding, which granted tenants private rent withholding powers and contractual remedies which could abate or extinguish their rental obligations, constituted a judicial reform of landlord-tenant common law which radically expanded the scope of remedies previously available to the tenant under the housing codes. Since the Massachusetts Legislature has already passed a rent withholding statute, a decision to grant alternative rent abatement or suspension remedies would constitute a far less radical alteration of existing tenant remedies than that accomplished by the Javins decision.
[Note 12] See Javins v. First Natl. Realty Corp. 428 F. 2d 1071 (D. C. Cir.); Hinson v. Delis, 26 Cal. App. 3d 62; Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426; Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 Ill. 2d 351; Kline v. Burns, 111 N. H. 87; Marini v. Ireland, 56 N. J. 130; Morbeth Realty Corp. v. Rosenshine, 67 Misc. 2d (N. Y.) 325; Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590; Notes, 40 Fordham L. Rev. 123; Notes, 56 Cornell L. Rev. 489; Recent Developments, (1970) Duke L.J. 1040; Notes, 21 Drake L, Rev. 300; 52 Mass. L. Q. 205. See also American Bar Foundation Tent. Draft-Model Residential Landlord-Tenant Code (1969); Uniform Residential Landlord-Tenant Act, Sections 2.103, 2.104 (1972).
[Note 13] Since these cases did not raise any question of tort liability, we need not consider the effect this continuing warranty of habitability may have on the landlord’s liability for injuries to the tenant or his guests which result from conditions rendering the apartment uninhabitable.
[Note 14] By discussing the outline of remedies now available to a tenant, we do not purport to forecast all the changes that will arise from our new common law rule.
[Note 15] A housing inspection report which certifies that Code violations exist which “may endanger or materially impair the health or safety, and the well-being of any tenant therein or persons occupying said property” would constitute evidence of a material breach and the landlord’s notice of that breach.
[Note 16] The State Sanitary Code’s minimum standards of fitness for human habitation and any relevant local health regulations provide the trial court with the threshold requirements that all housing must meet. Proof of any violation of these regulations would usually constitute compelling evidence that the apartment was not in habitable condition, regardless of whether the evidence was sufficient proof of a constructive eviction under our old case law. However, the protection afforded by the implied warranty of habitability does not necessarily coincide with the Code’s requirements. There may be instances where conditions not covered by the Code regulations render the apartment uninhabitable. Although we have eliminated the defence of constructive eviction in favor of a warranty of habitability defence, a fact situation, which could have demonstrated a constructive eviction, would now be sufficient proof of a material breach of the warranty of habitability, regardless of whether a sanitary code violation existed or not. On the other hand, there may be instances of isolated Code violations which may not warrant a decision that the premises are uninhabitable. The trial court must have the same broad discretion to determine whether there is a material breach given the special circumstances of each case as that accorded the board of health under Reg. 39 of the Code which allows the board to vary the application of any provision with respect to a particular case.
[Note 17] Where one tenant gives the landlord notice of a defect which affects the habitability of other tenant’s apartments, the other tenants may rely on the first tenant’s notice.
[Note 18] If the premises are uninhabitable at the beginning of the lease’s term and the tenant decides to rescind the lease immediately, factors (c) and (d) should not be considered because the landlord is obligated to deliver the premises in a condition fit for immediate occupation.
[Note 19] It is doubtful that a tenant at will, with a brief term between rent days, would utilize this remedy.
[Note 20] The tenant may avoid the risk of eviction by paying his rent when due under protest and then sue the landlord to recover some or all of it because of the landlord’s breach of his warranty.
[Note 21] This remedy is quite similar to the one we afforded the tenant in Charles E. Burt, Inc. v. Seven Grand Corp. 340 Mass. 124 , 130. “The appropriate measure of damage thus is the difference between the value of what Burt should have received and the fair value of what it has in fact received.” See Grennan v. Murray-Miller Co. 244 Mass. 336 , 339; Daniels v. Cohen, 249 Mass. 362 , 364; Parker v. Levin, 285 Mass. 125 , 128; Corbin, Contracts, Sections 1105, 1108, 1114, 1115; McCormick, Damages, Section 142, p. 586; Williston, Contracts (3d ed.) Sections 1404, 1455, et seq. See also Am. Law of Property, Sections 3.51-3.52.
[Note Quirico-1] Ruth Briggs, the tenant in the companion case, vacated her apartment after trial of her case in the Superior Court. Thus the only issue in her case is her liability for the unpaid rent.
[Note Quirico-2] Despite these repeated statements that such statutes are penal in nature and that they do not “modify or affect in any way the relations between landlord and tenant as they exist at common law,” this court has nevertheless said in many cases, including most of those cited above, that in actions against the landlord for injuries sustained on the rented premises the violation of such a statute may, in certain circumstances, be evidence of the landlord’s negligence.
[Note Quirico-3] This obvious limitation on the total interdependence of the landlord’s obligation to repair and maintain the rented premises and the tenant’s obligation to pay rent also appears in the opinion of the court. It is a reasonable limitation in view of the fact that a tenant, if he wishes to remain in possession and either withhold payment of rent or pay rent into court, may do so to the extent permitted by G. L. c. 111, Section 127F, inserted by St. 1965, c. 898, Section 3, Section 127H, as amended by St. 1972, c. 201, and Section 127L, inserted by St. 1972, c. 799; or by G. L. c. 239, Section 8A, as amended by St. 1969, c. 355. As a matter of policy it is not desirable that a tenant who does not avail himself of these statutory remedies be permitted to continue to occupy the landlord’s premises indefinitely, without paying the rent to the landlord or depositing it in court when due, while prolonged legal proceedings to establish the rights and liabilities of the parties await final disposition by the courts.

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