Source: https://recreation-law.com/category/state/georgia/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 10:03:33+00:00

Document:
The purpose of this article is to encourage owners of land to make land and water areas available to the public for recreational purposes by limiting the owners’ liability toward persons entering thereon for recreational purposes.
(1) “Charge” means the admission price or fee asked in return for invitation or permission to enter or go upon the land.
(2) “Land” means land, roads, water, watercourses, private ways and buildings, structures, and machinery or equipment when attached to the realty.
(3) “Owner” means the possessor of a fee interest, a tenant, a lessee, an occupant, or a person in control of the premises.
(4) “Recreational purpose” includes, but is not limited to, any of the following or any combination thereof: hunting, fishing, swimming, boating, camping, picnicking, hiking, pleasure driving, aviation activities, nature study, water skiing, winter sports, and viewing or enjoying historical, archeological, scenic, or scientific sites.
(3) Assume responsibility for or incur liability for any injury to person or property caused by an act of omission of such persons.
Unless otherwise agreed in writing, Code Sections 51-3-22 and 51-3-23 shall be deemed applicable to the duties and liability of an owner of land leased to the state or any subdivision thereof for recreational purposes.
(2) For injury suffered in any case when the owner of land charges the person or persons who enter or go on the land for the recreational use thereof, except that, in the case of land leased to the state or a subdivision thereof, any consideration received by the owner for the lease shall not be deemed a charge within the meaning of this Code section.
The General Assembly recognizes that persons who participate in the sport of fishing may incur injuries as a result of the risks involved in such activity. The General Assembly also finds that the state and its citizens derive numerous economic and personal benefits from such activity. The General Assembly finds, determines, and declares that this article is necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, and safety. It is, therefore, the intent of the General Assembly to encourage the sport of fishing by limiting the civil liability of those involved in such activity.
(1) “Fishing location” means a body of water, whether naturally occurring or manmade, containing fish and for the privilege of fishing there a fee is charged.
(2) “Participant” means any person who enters the fishing location, singly or with a group, either by paying a fee or having the fee waived, for the purpose of fishing, education, or enjoying the outdoor environment and any person who accompanies such person.
HISTORY: Code 1981, § 27-4-281, enacted by Ga. L. 1998, p. 1659, § 1.
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this Code section, the owner or operator of any fishing location, or any other person, corporation, group, partnership, or other entity, shall not be liable for an injury to or the death of a participant resulting from the inherent risks of fishing, including but not limited to drowning, and, except as provided in subsection (b) of this Code section, no participant or participant’s representative shall make any claim against, maintain an action against, or recover from an owner or operator, or any other person or entity for injury, loss, damage, or death of the participant resulting from any of the inherent risks of fishing.
(3) Intentionally injures the participant.
(c) Nothing in subsection (a) of this Code section shall prevent or limit the liability of an owner or operator under liability provisions as set forth in the products liability laws.
HISTORY: Code 1981, § 27-4-282, enacted by Ga. L. 1998, p. 1659, § 1.
(a) Every owner and operator of a fishing location shall post and maintain signs which contain the warning notice specified in subsection (b) of this Code section. Such signs shall be placed in a clearly visible location on or near the water and at the location where the fee is paid. The warning notice specified in subsection (b) of this Code section shall appear on the sign in black letters, with each letter to be a minimum of one inch in height. Every written contract entered into by an owner or operator shall contain in clearly readable print the warning notice specified in subsection (b) of this Code section.
Under Georgia law, an owner or operator of a fishing location is not liable for an injury to or the death of a participant from the inherent risks of fishing, including but not limited to drowning, pursuant to Article 7 of Chapter 4 of Title 27 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated.
(c) Failure to comply with the requirements concerning warning signs and notices provided in this Code section shall prevent an owner or operator from invoking the privileges of immunity provided by this article.
HISTORY: Code 1981, § 27-4-283, enacted by Ga. L. 1998, p. 1659, § 1.
Georgia court finds no requirement for an employee to intervene when higher trained first aid providers are present.
Sixteen-year-old collapsed at the defendant YMCA. A sheriff deputy and EMT provided CPR. Court held that the congenital heart disease had no causal connection to the Y’s negligence if there was any. Court also held the Y was not negligent because the employees did nothing, because higher trained medical personnel were already attending to the victim.
The plaintiffs are the parents of a sixteen-year-old who died walking on a treadmill at the defendant Family Y (YMCA). It was determined the deceased died from congenital heart disease.
An employee of the Y saw the deceased fall and immediately called 911. She did not go to the deceased because she said there was a sheriff’s deputy who was a first responder and had another first aid training attending to the deceased. Soon thereafter, an EMT also assisted the deceased.
…was under the “personal care” of a Y employee who had no CPR or first aid training, in spite of representations made by the fitness center. The Goins also claimed that the Y employees stood around and did nothing after Brant collapsed. The complaint alleged that the AED or defibrillator was locked away and not available in case of emergency. There was also a fraud count in which the Goins contended that the Y made misrepresentations to them that led them to believe that the Y was a “safe and positive” environment for their son.
The trial court dismissed their claims, and the plaintiff’s appealed.
The first issue was whether there was a duty to render first aid and whether the representations that the Y misled the parents. The court first outlined the requirements to prove negligence in Georgia.
The essential elements of a negligence claim are the existence of a legal duty; breach of that duty; a causal connection between the defendant’s conduct and the plaintiff’s injury; and damages. Thus, the threshold issue in a negligence action is whether and to what extent the defendant owes a legal duty to the plaintiff. This issue is a question of law.
The second issue on appeal was the negligence claim. As stated above to prove negligence, there must be a connection between the injury and the breach of the duty. Here the duty was alleged to be a lack of training, as advertised by the Y., However, the court could not find a connection. CPR would not have saved the deceased’s life and the people attempting to do so were better trained then the employees. “…the [plaintiff’s] cannot show a causal connection between Mason’s or any other employee’s lack of CPR training and Brant Goins’ death.” A casual connection is less than the proximate causation required to prove negligence.
It is undisputed that there was an emergency medical technician, and a deputy sheriff trained as a first-responder present at the time of Brant’s collapse. There would have been no reason for a Y employee to interfere with the care being given by the two qualified first responders.
The final issue was the fraud claim. The fraud claim was based on the allegations that the Y promised the plaintiff’s that the YMCA was a safe and positive environment and that there would be adequate and well-trained employees, and the employees would have access to life-saving equipment.
There was not argument that this did not occur. The plaintiff’s then tried to tie together the fact these things did not occur and that because their son had died, proving negligence. (The absence of facts does not prove a point in most cases and those facts that exist must link to each other in a legal way.) However, the court did not find this to be proved either.
Even assuming that the Goins could establish the other elements of their fraud claim, they can show no damage as the result of this claimed fraud. The EMT and the deputy were clearly the most highly trained people present in administering CPR. Neither called for a defibrillator and both testified that a defibrillator, would not be used on someone with a pulse who was still breathing.
Not brought up in the decision on this argument was proximate causation. There was no connection between the facts that if the Y had not done any of the issues pled in the fraud that the misrepresentation had anything to do with the death of their son.
First, it is great to have a court require a special relationship or acceptance of a duty that can be proved, not just argued and based on trying to tie loose facts together. The Y’s acceptance of the deceased minor to provide a trainer came with no other requirements, and the Y did nothing to create additional duties which it could be held too.
This is critical that in bringing in business, you don’t make promises that either you can’t complete or that may come back to haunt you.
Second, although specifically identified, the issue of higher medical care prevailed. I’ve never seen this issue argued in a case, that the person with the higher medical care, once they step in, are in charge and owes any duty. We are all taught this issue in first aid classes, but courts have never identified it. Here the court uses the argument and supports it.
Too often we start any defense of a lawsuit by lining up the defenses. All too often in the outdoor recreation community, we need to see if (1) we did anything wrong and (2) is there a connection with what was done incorrectly or not done and the injury. That is, was a duty breached and was there a proximate connection between the breach and the injury.
Amazing how a well-argued decision can be so short.

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