Source: http://www.college-chambers.co.uk/people/barristers/barrister/6/anthony-hand
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 09:10:51+00:00

Document:
Anthony was called to the Bar in July 1989 following the completion firstly of a law degree at the University of London (QMC) and then of the Bar Finals exams at the Inns of Court School of Law. As can be seen from his list of reported cases Anthony regularly undertakes extremely complex cases, and he appears in the High Court and the Court of Appeal on a fairly regularly basis. Currently he is Chairman of the Dorset Family Justice Board.
Adult social care/community care cases.
T (children)  EWCA Civ 453 – Court of Appeal decision concerning the applicable test when making an interim care order.
P (A Child)  EWFC B5 - a non-accidental injury case in which Anthony acted for the Local Authority and the child suffered a fractured arm and a fractured leg. The case is interesting for the number of intervenors, and the complex process of identification of the perpetrator of the injuries where there were so many family members in the pool.
A leading decision by the President on the scope of extensions to the 26 week rule in care proceedings and the proper test to be applied in applications for residential assessment.
Re W (Adoption Order: Leave to Oppose); Re H (Adoption Order: Application for Permission for Leave to Oppose)  EWCA Civ 1177  1 FLR 1266 -The decision in Re W (a child) EWCA Civ 1177 is another judgment from the President, Sir James Munby, in the Court of Appeal following on from the decision in Re B-S Children (2013) EWCA Civ 1146. Re W expands the thinking provided in Re B-S, and invites judges in particular to consider whether a parents' case has "solidity" as part of the overall discretionary exercise in this area.
Re S (Care and Placement Orders)  EWCA Civ 847  1 FLR 354 – Court of Appeal judgment considering the adequacy of psychological evidence needed to rule a parent out as a carer in care proceedings.
- Court of Appeal interpret the House of Lords decision in Re B (2008) with regard to findings of fact in a non-accidental injury case where both parents were left in the pool of possible perpetrators for the children's injuries.
A Charles J. case where the conflict between separated parents gave rise to significant emotional harm to the children, and grounds for public law orders.
A Court of Appeal decision concerning an application for residential assessment of the child and the parents, and the proper scope and interpretation of s.38(6) CA 1989.
Parents’ successful appeal against the making of orders refusing them permission to oppose the granting of adoption orders in relation to their children – Re BS (children) was revisited and confirmed.
I had the somewhat daunting task of representing a respondent local authority in the Court of Appeal on an adoption case the week after the judgment in Re BS was delivered by the President.
The judgment in Re W (a child) and Re H (a child) deals with two separate appeals (I was counsel for the Local Authority in Re W) made by parents against refusals to grant them permission to oppose adoption of their children pursuant to s.47(5) of the Adoption and Children Act 2002. So in both cases, care and placement orders had already been granted, and the respective children had been placed with prospective adopters. What the parents were trying to do was to oppose the making of adoption orders.
The President, Sir James Munby, delivered the lead judgment dealing with both the case of Re W and the case of Re H. In any application for leave to oppose the making of an adoption order under s. 47(5) Adoption and Children Act 2002, the law is now to be found in Re B-S, the President said. Earlier case law must be read in that light. “The Court of Appeal will expect, and be entitled to expect, that from now on judgments will reflect and give effect to the approach which Re B-S requires. Judgments that do not clearly do so are likely to be subject to anxious scrutiny and critical comment”(paragraph 15).
However, how was the Court to deal with appeals that arose from first instance decisions given in the weeks or perhaps months before the judgment in Re B-S in light of the new principles therein and the requirement for a B-S analysis? Well, the President said that appropriate allowance must be given for the fact that the first instance decision pre-dated Re B-S. In any appeal, “the focus must be on substance rather than form. Does the judge’s approach as it appears from the judgment engage with the essence? Can it be said, on a fair reading of the judgment taken as a whole – a fair and sensible reading, not a pedantic or nit-picking reading – that the judge has directed his mind to and provided answers to the key questions?” For example the mere fact that in dismissing the application for permission to oppose, the first instance judge used phrases such as permission is only granted “exceptionally rare” cases, or that the test is a “stringent” one, does not mean in itself that an appeal is likely to succeed (both phrases were disapproved of by the President in Re B-S).
The President also made it clear that in dealing with s.47(5) applications it is a two stage process. “There are two questions (Re B-S, para 73): Has there been a change in circumstances? If the answer to the first question is no, that is the end of the matter. If the answer is yes, then the second question is, should leave to oppose be given?” Para. 19 of Re W(a child); Re H (children).
At this second stage, the judge has to evaluate the parent’s ultimate prospects of success if given leave to oppose. The key issue is whether the parent’s prospects of success are “more than just fanciful, whether they have solidity”. If the answer to this point is no, then once again the application goes no further. However, if the parent is able to establish that he or she does have “solid prospects of success, the focus of the second stage of the process narrows very significantly.” The court must ask whether the welfare of the child will be so adversely affected by an opposed, in contrast to an unopposed, application that leave to oppose should be refused” – para. 22. COMMENT - please note that one is considering here the potential detrimental effect on the child of a contested adoption hearing. In many cases where the child is a baby or very young they will be blissfully ignorant that his or her carers are going through a contested hearing, and therefore the child will arguably be unharmed by it.
Turning to a different issue, the President went on to indicate in his judgment that henceforth even if the application for permission under s.47(5) is refused then the judge should not proceed to make a formal adoption order that same day or proceed immediately to a celebration hearing. Rather, it would be prudent to wait until the time for permission to appeal has expired, before proceeding to make final orders.
In both appeals the parents were successful and each case was remitted to the respective first instance circuit judges for rehearing in the light of the Court of Appeal’s decision in this case and Re B-S.
When should an expert be instructed, if so of what discipline, and what should they examine?
Could mediation or ADR help?
Should the child be joined as a party?
Is a change of residence order realistic? Or is an order prohibiting face to face contact warranted?
What if intractable private law proceedings turn into public law proceedings?
Generally, how to achieve the best outcome for the client (and the child)?
The children may well become alienated from their non-resident parent creating a problem for the court in undertaking a reliable assessment of the child’s wishes and feelings.
2.1 What is the court to do in these circumstances?
“72. Weighing up matters, my conclusion is that it is unacceptable from the point of view of the boys welfare in the short, medium and long term for them to be deprived of family relationships that are essential for their development as balanced young people, and as adults. Although leaving the children to grow up in relative isolation of their mother’s home is the easier short term solution, it does not provide the foundations that they need for a healthy, rounded future.
73. It is also, as I have noted , bad for the children to be taught that the sort of manipulation that they have been caught up in succeeds. That would be a lesson in injustice. The courts have repeatedly concluded that it is in their interests to see their father and it is plainly wrong for them to learn that decisions of this kind can be ignored or defied, as is now happening.
74. Although the boys are of an age where their views have to be taken seriously. I am not deterred by what they say they want to happen. This is not to disrespect them, but to respect them by treating them as children who have no way of dealing with this sort of pressure. A true appreciation of their wishes and feelings points towards the restoration of their relationship with their father, not its abandonment.” P Jackson j. Re M (Contact) (2013) 1 FLR 1403.
(N.B. The boys in this case were aged 8 and 10 years).
2.2 But on the other hand is the desire to continue to struggle on in proceedings worth it? Doesn’t sometimes a pragmatic view have to be adopted? Can the Court actually achieve change?
2.3 In Re A (A child) (2013) EWCA Civ 1104 there were 82 orders made by the first instance judges, at least seven judges had been involved from time to time at first instance, there had been 10 Cafcass officers. The children had been represented by NYAS. Various social workers had been involved. The proceedings by the time of the appeal had lasted seven years! It is, in the circumstances, entirely understandable that the judge at first instance dealing with the “final” hearing felt that the statistics provided “the best evidence that there has been systematic failure in this case”.
2.4 On a similar theme, by the time of the final hearing in Re G (A child – intractable contact) (2013) EWHC B16 (Fam) there had been over forty court hearings. The first instance judge was left with a “feeling of failure on the part of the Family Justice System”.
2.5 Although it is wrong to make generalizations, at some point down the line in litigation, the Court will often conclude that the absent parent is “unimpeachable” (i.e the good one), also that the resident parent has no justification for withholding contact (the “bad” – but more usually sad or damaged), and then the remainder of the case is dealt with trying to unravel the unholy mess that exists on the ground surrounding the child (“the ugly” mess surrounding the child). As ever, some cases have a successful outcome but many do not.
“…the father may feel that he is suffering injustice. I am afraid to say that I think he is suffering an injustice, but this is yet another example where the welfare of the child requires the court to inflict injustice upon a parent with whom the child is not resident”.
3.1 The starting point remains the welfare principle – The legal context within which the decision to make any order under CA 1989, s.8 relating to the arrangements for residence and contact for the child is well established. At all times the child’s welfare must be the court’s paramount consideration (CA 1989 , s.1). When considering making, varying or discharging any such order the court must have particular regard to the matters listed in the “welfare checklist” at CA 1989 , s.1(3), which includes at s.1 (3) (a) the ascertainable wishes and feelings of the child concerned (considered in the light of his age and understanding). The court must have regard to the general principle that any delay in determining the question is likely to prejudice the welfare of the child (CA 1989, s1(2)) and the court must not make any order unless it considers that doing so would be better for the child than making no order (CA 1989, s.1(5)).
4.2 All of the above makes good sense. Like a care case, one should try and timetable a case through as far as possible. The same judge dealing with all hearings will have a better feel for the parents, and therefore the issues.
“60…In doing so I would stress the latter two elements in the judicial armory that I have listed. The need for the single judge who has charge of the case to establish a 'set strategy for the case' and to stick consistently to that strategy, so that all parties and the judge know what is happening and what the court plainly expects will happen, cannot be understated. If, as part of that strategy, the court makes an express order requiring the parent with care to comply with contact arrangements, and that order is breached then, as part of a consistent strategy, the judge must, in the absence of good reason for any failure, support the order that he or she has made by considering enforcement, either under the enforcement provisions in CA 1989, ss 11J-11N or by contempt proceedings. To do otherwise would be to abandon the strategy for the case with the risk that a situation similar to that which has occurred in the present case may develop; to do otherwise is also inconsistent with the rule of law.
61. The first time that a judge should give serious consideration to whether or not he or she will, if called upon, be prepared to enforce a contact order should be before the order is made and not only after a breach has occurred. Such forward thinking should be part of the judge's overall strategy for the case. If a directive contact order is called for, then, on making it, the judge should be clear, at least in his or her own mind, that, upon breach, enforcement may well follow. If, on the facts of the case, enforcement is not to be contemplated, then an alternative judicial strategy not involving a directive court order (and which might in an extreme case include a change of residence or, at the other extreme, dismissing the application for contact) must be developed. The error by HHJ Goldsack that I have already identified in deciding whether or not to 'attach a penal notice', when now, as a matter of law, all contact orders are to contain a warning notice as to enforcement (CA 1989, s 11N), is not a minor technical error. It is an error that, with respect, indicates a misunderstanding of the nature of the task of making a directive contact order in the first place. Under the modern law, the judicial discretion is not whether or not to attach a penal notice, it is whether or not to make the contact order itself.
4.4 N.B. In Re L-W Munby LJ encouraged practitioners not to try and seek transfer of intractable contact cases to the High Court. Firstly, transferring the case would probably fall foul of the rule that judicial continuity was best. Secondly, he made the point that the High Court had no better resources than what was then the County Court.
5.1 – If all else fails – desperation Plan A - applying for the child to live with the other parent. – In the right circumstances this can work, but the circumstances must be correct (it has worked for me on a few occasions). The non-resident parent is going to have to be able to prove that they are in a position to care – ie the father (usually) will need to show that he can alter his work commitments to cater for being a primary care giver. The child also probably needs to be at least open to this change taking place. Thirdly, the father will have to prove that if there was a change in where the child lived that he would be able to promote the mother in a positive light, to promote contact to her, and ensure in this way (unlike the status quo) that the child can grow to know both his/her parents of the child takes place. Probably, the father will also have to prove that there is no other viable alternative.
5.2 Such changes in where a child lives do take place in intractable contact cases, but usually only after a lot of litigation, time and money has flowed under the bridge.
5.3 But even if such applications are made they may not, of course, succeed.
5.4 Even if the Court orders a change in who the child is going to live with, enforcing that order may well be a completely different kettle of fish. In Re S (Transfer of Residence)  EWHC 192 (Fam);  1 FLR 1785, which was heard by HHJ Clifford Bellamy sitting as a deputy High Court Judge, a transfer of residence was granted. The first application for contact had been made when S was a year old and the proceedings had been ongoing for 10 years. The father had not had contact for over two years and S was aged 11. The mother was implacably hostile to contact and the court had held that S had suffered emotional harm as a result of the protracted contact dispute. At the time of the hearing, S was refusing to see his father. In the event the judge, contrary to the firm recommendation of the guardian, made an order transferring residence from the mother to the father. In doing so, and amongst a range of factors considered, Judge Bellamy noted S's strongly held views and held that those views were entitled to respect. However the judge accepted the expert evidence that, as a result of alienation, not only where the child's views irrational they were also unreliable; in doing so the judge relied, in part, on objective evidence that S seemed relaxed and happy when he had been having contact with his father. The mother's application for permission to appeal the residence order determination was refused by Wall LJ ( EWCA Civ 219), although, in the event, the practical attempts to achieve a change of residence failed (Re S (Transfer of Residence)  1 FLR 1789) – ie the child stayed with the mother in the end!.
6.1 – If all else fails – desperation Plan B – applying for the caregiver’s committal to prison – The father may well want to apply for the mother’s imprisonment at the earliest opportunity. However, this really is a remedy of last resort. One has also to consider, what will it actually achieve? (Unlike desperation Plan A above which has worked for me in the past, I have never been successful in sending a primary care giver to prison).
"To accede to the father's application for the committal order would not conceivably be in the best interests of the children. It would mean two things: first, if committed, that their mother would be taken away from them for a time and their father would be branded in their eyes as the man who had put their mother in prison. That is a brand from which no parent in my experience can ever hope to recover. It is the most deadly blow a parent can inflict on his children. There is no doubt and it should be clearly understood – I am speaking for myself now – throughout the legal profession that an application to commit for breach of orders relating to access (and I limit my comments to breaches of orders relating to access) are inevitably futile and should not be made. The damage which they cause is appalling. The damage in this case which they have caused is obvious. To apply for a legalistic but futile remedy, because it is the only thing left to do, is, in my judgment, the last hope of the destitute. The court is only concerned with the welfare of the children and ought not to trouble itself too much about its own dignity. These cases are exceedingly intractable. They can only be dealt with by tact not force. Force is bound to fail."
"the court has been placed by the mother in a situation in which it either has to yield to her obstinacy and back down from its own order or it has to enforce it. If the court were to yield to such persistent intransigence, respect for its orders and for the administration of justice would be at an end."
6.4 In B v S  EWCA Civ 548, a case where Wilson LJ, with whom Ward LJ agreed, said (para ): "The days are long gone when mothers can assume that their role as carers of children protects them from being sentenced to immediate terms of imprisonment for clear, repeated and deliberate breaches of contact orders."
(Of course, without resorting to changing where a child lives or applying for committal there are softer enforcement alternatives open – eg enforcement orders. Enforcement orders fall outside the scope of this document, but must not be forgotten – see Re L-W for further analysis).
Discipline of the expert – usually a psychologist to assess the intractable care giver who illogically refuses to provide contact, or a psychologist to carry out a wider family assessment, or may be a consultant psychiatrist to assess the emotional needs of the child and the respective parents abilities to meet those needs. Not all cases need an expert! For some an expert is essential!
Is the expert “necessary” for the purposes of Part 25?
How will the expert be funded?
What impact will the instruction of the expert have on the progress of the case – how long will the report take?
8.1 Does the child need to be separately represented? Once again it depends on the facts of any particular case, but this is an option that must be considered and kept under review. If the child is to be represented should they be represented through Cafcass, or would a body like NYAS be more appropriate?
9.1 Can intractable contact disputes turn into care proceedings? They certainly can is the answer. Eg Re Z and A (2000) (Contact: Supervision Order) 2 FLR 406. A Charles J. case where the conflict between separated parents gave rise to significant emotional harm to the children, and grounds for public law orders.
(a) Litigation in this area can be very long and very expensive.
(b) Don’t forget to tell them that exceptionally costs orders can be made.
(c) Is there a solution to the problem that whilst they may not be “happy” with, they could at least live with?
(d) They may have tried mediation in the past, but as the months (or years of litigation tick by) is it worth trying to talk things through again?
(e) At the end of the day, whilst you are there to help them to the best of your abilities, this is a very difficult area of law to predict an eventual outcome in. My legal crystal ball is generally somewhat misty, if not downright cloudy, in these cases.
(f) Keep good attendance notes!
As I write this article, I am about to go on my summer holiday. I am probably past my “sell by date” and I am generally hacked off. Over the last few weeks (or I should say months or weeks) the funding of Children Act proceedings (or I should say the lack of it) has been particularly irksome for me.
In the recent decision of the President in Q v Q and others (2014) EWFC 31, three private law cases were heard together. They all concerned the situation where the mother had the benefit of public funding but the father did not. As we are all aware by virtue of s.9 of Sch. 1 of LAPSO public funding is generally not available for private law proceedings, but there is provision where the one party is able to show that they have been subject to domestic abuse. So typically mothers, who can show that they were subject to abuse, may still be able to obtain legal aid.
At the time of the bill being debated, this produced calls saying this was unfair to fathers. A mother could allege DV, obtain funding, but the father would be left unrepresented. In order to even things up s.10 of Sch. 1 allowed for there to be a grant of public funding in private law cases in “exceptional circumstances”. The Lord Chancellor gave guidance that the discretion to allow funding should be “used in rare cases” (note the absence of the would “very” before rare). But what does this mean on the ground?
A freedom of information request was made to find out how many exceptional cases were actually being funded. The answer was that the LAA had granted funding to 8 or 9 cases a year! A government spokesman said “ we are satisfied that the system is working in accordance with the section”. But if public funding is only granted under s.10 in 8 or 9 cases a year how can this be fair? How can this said to be a working system? Further, where is the logic? One hopes that after the President’s decision in Q v Q the discretion to permit funding under the “exceptional” category will henceforth be used more liberally, but I will not hold my breath.
On a similar theme, also highlighting the lack of logic in LAA funding, experts instructed in care proceedings at the end of last year had a marked and somewhat arbitrary reduction in their fees. For example a consultant paediatric expert based outside London is allowed £108 per hour, whereas one based in London is permitted only £72 ph. The reason for the distinction is that apparently this can be justified on the basis of the market economy. London is awash with doctors willing to work for £38ph less than a doctor is Reading or Slough, it is said.
Is it me, or in reality are there no paediatricians willing to accept instructions at the inside London LAA rates? It is hard enough to find an expert willing to work for the outside London rates. But why should I worry? Either way the expert’s hourly rate is greater than my own! However, without adequate funding the system breaks down. Reports are not written. Issues are not fairly disposed of. Ultimately, children would go unprotected and unserved by the system if local authorities were unwilling to step in and just sometimes agree to make up the shortfall in fees. This willingness to help, of course, cannot be the solution to the problem.
So, just on the verge of going on holiday, the temptation just to stay in Norfolk, become a deck chair ticket seller and never come back is a great one. However, the thing that keeps the heart of the child care / family law system going is that by and large it is staffed by good people. Be they social workers, guardians, lawyers or judges. These are people who are dedicated to the system. We get out of bed to see if me might make a small difference each day. On that basis, being a deck chair attendant may have to wait for another summer, but I do not think that we should stop complaining.
The facts of this care case are important, and not that uncommon any more. D was aged two years old. He had been born to a Czech parents. In the care proceedings in this country, the Local Authority and the Guardian were at one in that they were suggesting that care and placement orders should be granted.
However, on the other hand the parents argued that D should be returned to their care and it was their plan to go home to the Czech Republic. They had the support of Czech social services, and of a psychotherapist who said she could work with the family in the Czech Republic. If D was with his parents he would have the additional advantage of being brought up to know and participate in his cultural background as a Czech Roma boy. The Local Authority, for obvious reasons, accepted that in this country they would not be able to place D in a family where his ethnical background could be matched.
In addition there were two middle courses available. The first was leaving D with his current foster carers under a Special Guardianship Order. (COMMENT – I really liked the Judge’s description of a SGO – “Special guardianship of course endows the guardian with super-parental responsibility but does not formally extinguish the parental responsibility of the parents which lies fallow in a sort of symbolic state.”). The second middle option was a long term foster care placement in the Czech republic.
On the evidence the court discounted a placement of D in Poland with the parents. The risks would be too great. However, what followed next was in my view slightly unexpected (but a sign of things to come?) Mr Justice Moor quite rightly reminded himself of the case of Re B-S – placement for adoption should only occur if nothing else will do. So the question then became will a SGO placement in England or a long-term fostering placement in the Czech Republic “do”? The judge in fact decided that a SGO placement with the current foster carers or a long term fostering placement in the Czech Republic would in fact “do” very nicely for this two year old boy.
At the end of the day I think it was D losing touch with his Czech/Roma background that swayed the judge, as well as (and intricately connected with) considerations of never seeing his birth family again. The court directed that SGO with the current foster carers was the best way forward with exploration of long term foster care in the Czech Republic a close second.
As I write this article, it is my last afternoon at work before my summer holiday. I am probably past my “sell by date” and I am generally hacked off. Over the last few weeks (or I should say months or weeks) the funding of Children Act proceedings (or I should say the lack of it) has been particularly irksome for me.
In the very recent decision of the President in Q v Q and others (2014) EWFC 31, three private law cases were heard together. They all concerned the situation where the mother had the benefit of public funding but the father did not. As we are all aware by virtue of s.9 of Sch. 1 of LAPSO public funding is generally not available for private law proceedings, but there is provision where the one party is able to show that they have been subject to domestic abuse. So typically mothers, who can show that they were subject to abuse, may still be able to obtain legal aid.
A freedom of information request was made to find out how many exceptional cases were actually being funded. The answer was that the LAA had granted funding to 8 or 9 cases a year! A government spokesman said “ we are satisfied that the system is working in accordance with the section”.
If public funding is only granted under s.10 in 8 or 9 cases a year how can this be fair? How can this said to be a working system? Further, where is the logic? One hopes that after the President’s decision in Q v Q the discretion to permit funding under the “exceptional” category will henceforth be used more liberally, but I will not hold my breath.
Is it me, or in reality are there no paediatricians willing to accept instructions at the inside London LAA rates? It is hard enough to find an expert willing to work for the outside London rates.
But why should I worry? Either way the expert’s hourly rate is greater than my own! However, without adequate funding the system breaks down. Reports are not written. Issues are not fairly disposed of. Ultimately, children would go unprotected and unserved by the system if local authorities were unwilling to step in and just sometimes agree to make up the shortfall in fees. This willingness to help, of course, cannot be the solution to the problem.
Good bye County Court, farewell Family Proceedings Court. Its not a long, long way to 22nd April and the single Family Court is here!
Without a fanfare to announce it, the new single Family Court is here as of 22nd April. With no salute, tear or goodbye party the Family Proceedings Court is now a matter of history. But what will it mean in reality?
Firstly, we have to get used to the name. Should it be the Single Family Court, or single (small "s") Family Court or just the Family Court? It is the latter. But not the Bournemouth Family Court or the Southampton Family Court, for pedants like me the proper title is "The Family Court sitting in..." whichever town or city. That’s the way orders and documents should be titled.
Upon issue there will be an allocation exercise, and cases will be allocated according to complexity to a level of tribunal. Ie this case will be heard by a lay bench, this case will be heard at District Judge level, this case will be heard at Circuit judge level. As for High Court, it will be "this case will be heard by a High Court judge sitting in the Family Court". For existing cases, when you next have a hearing, you need to add into the order the new proper allocation level (and don’t forget to change your headings).
We will also have some new judges hearing our cases. Some Employment Tribunal judges are being ticketed to hear family cases at District Judge level. I think this is a response to the downturn in employment work, and the increase in time it is taking to hear family cases due to the rise in litigants in person.
The aim of the process is to ease administration. So apart from changing names I wonder how much change there will actually be? One thing is for sure, the back office staff will be rushed off their feet for the next few weeks whilst the changes bed in. Further, whilst I am not a betting man I wonder if I could convince Ladbrokes to give me the odds on whether the ushers will have a Family Court stamp on Tuesday 22nd April to put on my FAS form?
The facts - This was a case where I acted on behalf of the Local Authority before The President.
S was the mother’s fourth child. The mother’s elder three siblings had been removed from her care a number of years ago. The mother is a vulnerable woman who struggles to care for herself, she has mental health problems, an anxiety disorder and low IQ.
S was born in October 2013. By the time of the final hearing care proceedings had been running for approximately five months. The Court had the benefit of a Local Authority parenting assessment in respect of the mother and also a psychiatric assessment from an independently instructed expert. The Local Authority plan, supported by the Guardian, was to place the child with an extended family member with a view to a Special Guardianship Order being made following a trial placement.
The mother was opposed to such a placement and she made an application for residential assessment under s.38(6) CA 1989.
Residential assessment application- The President, Sir James Munby reviewed the case law with regards to section 38(6), and went on to consider the amendments made by the Children and Families Act 2014.
"(7A) A direction under subsection (6) to the effect that there is to be a medical or psychiatric examination or other assessment of the child may be given only if the court is of the opinion that the examination or other assessment is necessary to assist the court to resolve the proceedings justly.
(g) any matters prescribed by Family Procedure Rules."
20. The language of section 38(7A) replicates, in all material respects verbatim, the more general provision in section 13(6) of the 2014 Act which applies to the calling of expert evidence (and which in turn replicates, with the addition of the word "justly", the language of FPR 25.1). Likewise, the language of section 38(7B) is very similar to that of section 13(7) of the 2014 Act.
21. For present purposes the key point is the use in common in section 38(7A) of the 1989 Act, section 13(6) of the 2014 Act and FPR 25.1 of the qualifying requirement that the court may direct the assessment or expert evidence only if it is "necessary" to assist the court to resolve the proceedings. This phrase must have the same meaning in both contexts. The addition of the word "justly" only makes explicit what was necessarily implicit, for it goes without saying that any court must always act justly rather than unjustly. So "necessary" in section 38(7A) has the same meaning as the same word in section 13(6), as to which see Re TG (Care Proceedings: Case Management: Expert Evidence)  EWCA Civ 5,  1 FLR 1250, para 30, and In re H-L (A Child) (Care Proceedings: Expert Evidence)  EWCA Civ 655,  1 WLR 1160,  2 FLR 1434, para 3."
So practitioners must be aware that s.38 (7A) and (7B) are now imported into the test for residential assessment. A key component in deciding the application is whether the proposed assessment is necessary to assist the court in resolving the issues ultimately to be determined at the disposal hearing? In this context "necessary" means the same as in the decision in Re TG - "what is "necessary" sets a hurdle which is on any view significantly higher that the old test of what is "reasonably required", Sir James Munby in Re TG.
The outcome was that the President agreed with my submission that residential assessment was not necessary, and the application was dismissed.
Scope to extend beyond 26 weeks - The President in Re S also considered the wider context of the case. The timescale of proceedings had already taken five months.
"(1) A court hearing an application for an order under this Part shall "
(b) give such directions as it considers appropriate for the purpose of ensuring, so far as is reasonably practicable, that that timetable is adhered to."
(5) A court in which an application under this Part is proceeding may extend the period that is for the time being allowed under subsection (1)(a)(ii) in the case of the application, but may do so only if the court considers that the extension is necessary to enable the court to resolve the proceedings justly.
and here "ensuing timetable revision" means any revision, of the timetable under subsection (1)(a) for the proceedings, which the court considers may ensue from the extension.
(7) When deciding whether to grant an extension under subsection (5), a court is to take account of the following guidance: extensions are not to be granted routinely and are to be seen as requiring specific justification.
must, or may or may not, have regard to matters specified in the rules, or must take account of any guidance set out in the rules."
No rules have been made pursuant to section 32(10) and none are proposed to be made for the time being.
The 26 week time limit is a mandatory limit which must be complied with, subject to the statutory exception set out in s.32(5). He reiterated his message that deadlines can and must be met.
However, he approved of Pauffley J’s judgment in Re NL (A child) that "justice must never be sacrificed upon the altar of speed".
The President in Re BS had dealt with the possibility of extension beyond 26 weeks in a potential adoption case if the court was not properly equipped to make decisions. In Re S he said at paragraph 27 "That approach, which is entirely compatible with the requirements of section 32, applies not just in the particular context under consideration in Re BS but more generally".
Whether a case would warrant a s.32(5) extension must be determined on a case by case basis. But by way of illustration, it may be appropriate in drug abuse/alcohol abuse cases or cases involving parental mental ill-health to consider an extension beyond 26 weeks to see if a parent can make changes within the child’s timescales. However, extensions should not be granted in the hope that something may turn up. But rather: "Typically three questions will have to be addressed. First, is there some solid, evidence based, reason to believe that the parent is committed to making the necessary changes? If so, secondly, is there some solid, evidence based, reason to believe that the parent will be able to maintain that commitment? If so, thirdly, is there some solid, evidence based, reason to believe that the parent will be able to make the necessary changes within the child’s timescale?" Para.38 Re S.
Re J - The Relevance Of The Uncertain Perpetrator Finding In Care Proceedings.
Care Proceedings Broken Baby Or Broken Science?
A few months ago I received a brief on a High Court finding of fact hearing in care proceedings. The very small baby had received approximately twenty fractures. The police in interview suggested that someone must have stamped on the baby. In this unhappy case, I acted for the mother. The usual medical evidence came in from the experts, all pointing to non-accidental injury. Then came a chink of light - one of the very early fractures was said to be due to "osteopenia".
Osteopenia is separate and distinct from osteogenesis imperfecta ("brittle bone"). Osteopenia is very rare, but can affect premature babies. A chemical reaction takes place within their bodies that means that for a time calcium is drawn out from their bones leaving their bones demineralised or "hollow". Over time their bones re-mineralise or "fill in".
If a baby suffers from osteopenia, then in the right circumstances normal day to day handling can cause fractures.
Following the onset of osteopenia the baby is at an increased risk of fracture for up to six months, or up to a year, or up to two years depending on which study you read.
X-rays are not very useful in telling you the strength of babies’ bones. If the child’s bones have re-mineralised or filled in to 60% of normal, they will still appear as normal bones on the x-ray. Therefore bones that have filled in to the extent of 60%, 80% or even 100% capacity all look the same on x-rays.
However, if the bones have filled in partially but not fully, there is no scientific evidence about the forces required to cause fractures in these circumstances.
Lastly, osteopenia can also affect the timing given by experts for when an injury occurred. Radiologists normally depend on the reactions observed at fracture sites for estimating how recent the fracture was. However, studies of animals with osteopenia indicate that new bone growth is slower in animals that have the condition.
I am left with the abiding feeling that science still has a long way to go in this area. If you are acting for parents you can rejoice in the fact that the burden of proof is on the Local Authority. If you are acting for the Local Authority, and it is established that the baby was suffering from osteopenia and within a reasonable timescale the baby suffers seemingly non-accidental fractures, then you may have your work cut out. Either way, there is a need for very careful consideration of the type of expert evidence required at the outset of the case.
In May of this year I was before the Court of Appeal to argue a point of law in care proceedings, Re D*. I was not looking forward to the situation, or the forthcoming ordeal as I saw it to be, as I was seeking to overturn on appeal, findings of fact made in care proceedings concerning the identification of which parent was said to have inflicted serious injuries on their two children.
The other two parties to the appeal were represented by silks. The application for permission to appeal had been refused on paper, but permission had been granted at an oral hearing by the slimmest of margins. To make matters worse, Wall LJ who had refused the paper application, was going to be the lead judge considering the full appeal hearing. The odds were stacked against me.
The point of law to be argued was a novel one. The House of Lords in Re B (2008) UKHL 35, had confirmed that in family proceedings the test for proving an allegation was simply the balance of probabilities. The Court at first instance is just concerned with finding the most likely outcome from the various alternatives placed before it. We have a binary system of justice. If something is proved that counts as a ‘1', but if an allegation cannot be proved that counts as ‘0'. It is only the ‘1's that go into the balance at the end of the day when a judge makes his or her decision.
In Re D, it was argued by one of my opponents, that the impact of Re B in finding of fact hearings where injuries to a child could have been caused by one or either of the parents was that a court must now be able to specifically determine which parent caused the injuries, i.e. on a balance of probabilities test a court must be able to find, it was argued, that an injury was caused by either the mother or the father, but a finding that either of them could have done it was no longer open. Taking this argument to its logical extreme a court must be able to examine the evidence and conclude that if a mother had say a 49% likelihood of causing injuries, and a father had 51% chance of causing injuries; on that basis the father would have a ‘1' added against his name, and the mother would escape with a ‘0'. For what it was worth, I felt that this new approach made no sense, and could not have been the House of Lords' intentions in Re B.
"Nothing in Re B, in our judgment, requires the court to identify an individual as the perpetrator of non-accidental injuries to a child, simply because the standard of proof for such an identification is the balance of probabilities. If such an identification is not possible - because, for example, a judge remains genuinely uncertain at the end of a fact finding hearing, and cannot find on the balance of probabilities that A rather than B caused the injuries to the child, but that neither A nor B can be excluded as a perpetrator - it is the duty of the judge to state that as his or her conclusion. To put the matter another way, judges should not, as a result of the decision in Re B, and the fact that it supersedes Re H, strain to identify the perpetrator of non-accidental injuries to children. If an individual perpetrator can be properly identified on the balance of probabilities, then for the reasons given in Re K it is the judge's duty to identify him or her. But the judge should not start from the premise that it will only be in an exceptional case that it will not be possible to make such an identification. There will inevitably be cases - of which this, in our judgement, is one - where the only conclusion which the court can properly reach is that one of two parents - or both - must have inflicted the injuries, and that neither can be excluded."
Re D is also useful on the issue of the desirability of continuity in the judge hearing a case. *Re D has now been reported in The Times (25 August 2009) or a full transcript can be found at EWCA (2009) Civ 472; or simply request a copy via my email address below.
Anthony is married, with four children and one dog.

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