Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&amp;view=article&amp;id=40385:g-r-no-134436-august-16,-2000-metropolitan-bank-and-trust-company-v-joaquin-tonda,-et-al&amp;catid=1396&amp;Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 08:19:31+00:00

Document:
METROPOLITAN BANK and TRUST COMPANY, Petitioner, v. JOAQUIN TONDA and MA. CRISTINA TONDA, Respondents.
Spouses Joaquin G. Tonda and Ma. Cristina U. Tonda, hereinafter referred to as the TONDAS, applied for and were granted commercial letters of credit by petitioner Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, hereinafter referred to as METROBANK for a period of eight (8) months beginning June 14, 1990 to February 1, 1991 in connection with the importation of raw textile materials to be used in the manufacturing of garments. The TONDAS acting both in their capacity as officers of Honey Tree Apparel Corporation (HTAC) and in their personal capacities, executed eleven (11) trust receipts to secure the release of the raw materials to HTAC. The imported fabrics with a principal value of P2,803,000.00 were withdrawn by HTAC under the 11 trust receipts executed by the TONDAS. Due to their failure to settle their obligations under the trust receipts upon maturity, METROBANK through counsel, sent a letter dated August 10, 1992, making its final demand upon the TONDAS to settle their past due TR/LC accounts on or before August 15, 1992. They were informed that by said date, the obligations would amount to P4,870,499.13. Despite repeated demands therefor, the TONDAS failed to comply with their obligations stated in the trust receipts agreements, i.e. the TONDAS failed to account to METROBANK the goods and/or proceeds of sale of the merchandise, subject of the trust receipts.
Consequently, on November 9, 1992, Metrobank, through its account officer Eligio Labog, Jr., filed with the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal a complaint/affidavit against the TONDAS for violation of P.D. No. 115 (Trust Receipts Law) in relation to Article 315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code. On February 12, 1993, the assigned Assistant Prosecutor of Rizal submitted a Memorandum to the Provincial Prosecutor recommending that the complaint in I.S. No. 92-8703 be dismissed on the ground that the complainants had failed to establish "the existence of the essential elements of Estafa as charged." The recommendation was approved by Rizal Provincial Prosecutor Mauro Castro on May 18,1993.
METROBANK then appealed to the Department of Justice (DOJ). On June 1, 1994, Undersecretary Ramon S. Esguerra reversed the findings of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal and ordered the latter to file the appropriate information against the TONDAS as charged in the complaint.
The TONDAS immediately sought a reconsideration of the DOJ Resolution but their motion was denied by the then acting Justice Secretary Demetrio G. Demetria in a Letter-Resolution dated April 7, 1995. A second motion for reconsideration by the TONDAS was likewise denied by then Justice Secretary Teofisto Guingona on July 12, 1995.
It would appear that the aforestated amount of 1.8 Million was erroneously written since the intention of the petitioners was to open an account of P2.8 Million to pay the entire principal of the outstanding trust receipts account. In fact, also on 23 September 1991, petitioner Joaquin Tonda and Wang Tien En deposited four different checks with a total amount of P2,800,000.00 with Metrobank. The checks were received by a certain Flor C. Naanep. Notably, the petitioners had obtained a written acknowledgment of receipt of the checks totaling P2.8 Million from the Metrobank officer in order to show proof of compliance with the loan restructuring proposal. If the petitioners had intended it to be a simple deposit, then a deposit slip with a machine validation by the private respondent bank would have otherwise been sufficient.
However, the succeeding negotiations between petitioners and Metrobank, after the initial offer of 23 September 1991 was made, dealt with the other outstanding obligations while the matter regarding the trust receipts account remained unchanged; therefore, it was settled between the parties that the amount of P2.8 Million should be paid to cover all outstanding obligations under the trust receipts account. Despite the inability of both parties to reach a mutually agreeable loan restructured agreement, the amount of P2.8 Million which was deposited on 23 September 1991 by the petitioners appears to remain intact and untouched as Metrobank had failed to show evidence that the money has been withdrawn from the savings account of the petitioners.
The contention of Metrobank that the money had not been actually applied as payment for petitioners’ outstanding obligation under the trust receipts account is absolutely devoid of merit, considering that the petitioners were still in the process of negotiating for a reasonable loan restructuring arrangement with Metrobank when the latter abruptly abandoned all efforts to negotiate and instantly demanded from the petitioners the fulfillment of all their outstanding obligations.
Applying the above-mentioned ruling in this case, if the parties therefore fail to reach an agreement regarding the restructuring of HTAC’s loan, Metrobank can validly apply the amount deposited by the petitioners as payment of the principal obligation under the trust receipts account.
On the basis of all the evidence before Us, this Court is convinced that the amount of P2.8 Million representing the outstanding obligation of the petitioners under the trust receipts account had already been settled by the petitioners. The money remains deposited under the savings account of the petitioners awaiting a final agreement with Metrobank regarding the loan restructuring arrangement. Meanwhile, Metrobank has the right to use the deposited amount in connection with any of its banking business.
In response to the foregoing, the TONDAS maintain that METROBANK has no legal standing to file the present petition without the conformity or authority of the prosecutor as it deals solely with the criminal aspect of the case, a separate action to recover civil liability having already been instituted; that the issues raised in the present petition are purely factual; and that the subject trust receipts obligations have been extinguished by payment or legal compensation.
We find for petitioner bank.
Preliminarily, we shall resolve the issues raised by the TONDAS regarding the standing of METROBANK to file the instant petition and whether the same raises questions of law.
The general rule is that it is only the Solicitor General who is authorized to bring or defend actions on behalf of the People or the Republic of the Philippines once the case is brought before this Court or the Court of Appeals. However, an exception has been made that "if there appears to be grave error committed by the judge or lack of due process, the petition will be deemed filed by the private complainants therein as if it were filed by the Solicitor General." 10 In that case, the Court gave due course to the petition and allowed the petitioners to argue their case in lieu of the Solicitor General. We accord the same treatment to the instant petition on account of the grave errors committed by the Court of Appeals. We add that no information having been filed yet in court, there is, strictly speaking, no case yet for the People or the Republic of the Philippines. In answer to the second issue raised by the TONDAS, while the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court is limited to reviewing only errors of law, not of fact, one exception to the rule is when the factual findings complained of are devoid of support by the evidence on record or the assailed judgment is based on misappreciation of fact 11 , as will be shown to have happened in the instant case.
In the main, the issue is whether or not the dismissal by the Court of Appeals of the charge for violation of the Trust Receipts Law in relation to Art. 315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code against the TONDAS is warranted by the evidence at hand and by law.
The Court of Appeals gravely erred in reversing the Department of Justice on the finding of probable cause to hold the TONDAS for trial. The documentary evidence presented during the preliminary investigation clearly show that there was probable cause to warrant a criminal prosecution for violation of the Trust Receipts Law.
SECTION 13.	Penalty Clause. — The failure of an entrustee to turn over the proceeds of the sale of the goods, documents or instruments covered by a trust receipt to the extent of the amount owing to the entruster or as appears in the trust receipt or to return said goods, documents or instruments if they were not sold or disposed of in accordance with the terms of the trust receipt shall constitute the crime of estafa, punishable under the provisions of Article Three Hundred and Fifteen, Paragraph One (b), of Act Numbered Three Thousand Eight Hundred and Fifteen, as amended, otherwise known as the Revised Penal Code. If the violation or offense is committed by a corporation, partnership, association or other juridical entities, the penalty provided for in this Decree shall be imposed upon the directors, officers, employees or other officials or persons therein responsible for the offense, without prejudice to the civil liabilities arising from the criminal offense.
Based on the foregoing, it is plain to see that the Trust Receipts Law declares the failure to turn over the goods or the proceeds realized from the sale thereof, as a criminal offense punishable under Article 315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code. The law is violated whenever the entrustee or the person to whom the trust receipts were issued in favor of fails to: (1) return the good covered by the trust receipts; or (2) return the proceeds of the sale of the said goods. The foregoing acts constitute estafa punishable under Article 315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code. Given that various trust receipts were executed by the TONDAS and that as entrustees, they did not return the proceeds from the goods sold nor the goods themselves to METROBANK, there is no dispute that that the TONDAS failed to comply with the obligations under the trust receipts despite several demands from METROBANK.
Finding favorably for the TONDAS, however, and ordering the dismissal of the complaint against them, the Court of Appeals held that: (1) the TONDAS opened a savings account of P2.8 Million to pay the entire principal of the outstanding trust receipts account; (2) the TONDAS obtained from a METROBANK officer 12 a written acknowledgment of receipt of checks totaling P2.8 Million in order to show proof of compliance with the loan restructuring proposal; (3) it was settled between the parties that the amount of 2.8 Million should be paid to cover all outstanding obligations under the trust receipts account; (4) the money remains deposited under the savings account of petitioners awaiting a final agreement with METROBANK regarding the loan restructuring arrangement; and that (5) there is no evidence suggesting that METROBANK has been damaged by the proposal and the deposit or that the TONDAS employed fraud and deceit in their dealings with the bank.
The foregoing findings and conclusions are palpably erroneous.
Verily, there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Secretary of Justice in directing the filing of the Information against the TONDAS, and the Court of Appeals overstepped its boundaries in reversing the same without basis in law and in evidence. We emphasize that for purposes of preliminary investigation, it is enough that there is evidence showing that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof. 27 By reason of the abbreviated nature of preliminary investigations, a dismissal of the charges as a result thereof is not equivalent to a judicial pronouncement of acquittal, 28 a converso, the finding of a prima facie case to hold the accused for trial is not equivalent to a finding of guilt.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
2.	Third Division, composed of J. Eubolo G. Verzola (member and ponente); and JJ. Jorge S. Imperial (chairman) and Artemio G. Tuquero (member), concurring.
4.	Per Undersecretary Ramon S. Esguerra as acting Secretary of the Department of Justice.
5.	Per Acting Secretary Demetrio G. Demetria; rollo, pp. 66-67.
6.	Per Secretary Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr.; rollo, p. 65.
7.	Rollo, CA-G.R. SP No. 38113, pp. 2-21.
10.	Columbia Pictures Entertainment, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 262 SCRA 219 (1996).
11.	Congregation of the Religious of the Virgin Mary v. Court of Appeals, 291 SCRA 385 (1998).
13.	Annex "D" ; OR, p. 141.
14.	First Philippine International Bank v. Court of Appeals, 252 SCRA 259 (1996); Limketkai Sons Milling, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 255 SCRA 626 (1996).
16.	Arturo M. Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines (Quezon City: Central Lawbook Publishing Co., Inc., 1997).
17	Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, 299 SCRA 744 (1998).
18.	136 SCRA 461 (1 985).
19.	150 SCRA 578 (1987).
20.	207 SCRA 726 (1992).
22.	Ho v. People, 280 SCRA 365 (1997).
23.	People v. Navarro, 270 SCRA 393 (1997).
24.	Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, 278 SCRA 656 (1997).
25.	Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 254 SCRA 307 (1996).
27.	Flores v. Sumaljag, 290 SCRA 568 (1998).

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