Source: http://www.paulksicinskilaw.com/blog/archives/09-2015
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 12:25:44+00:00

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Is there a relationship between education and abusive relationships?
A 2013 study published in the Journal of Marriage and Family, “Women’s Education, Marital Violence, and Divorce: A Social Exchange Perspective,” analyzes a nationally representative sample of more than 900 young U.S. women to look at factors that make females more likely to leave abusive relationships.
The researchers note that, across the U.S. population, more women are attaining college degrees, and given the study’s findings, this suggests “increases in women’s education should reduce rates of domestic violence. In a population with many educated women, violent marriages are likely to break up.” They caution that it is also possible “that our observed patterns reflect husbands’ perceptions and decisions. Perhaps abusive men feel threatened by successful wives, which then increases divorce risk. Nonabusive men may not feel threatened and thus stay with successful women.” On this point, more research is required.
Recently, I litigated whether a client was constitutionally stopped for a missing right mirror on his vehicle despite having a left and center mirror on his vehicle. The evidence submitted by way of stipulation was that my client was completely innocent while he was driving of any legal violation, criminal or traffic, since he did have mirrors. The officer, it was admitted, had made a mistake not of fact, but of law, in pulling him over. Nevertheless, given recent Wisconsin and U.S. Supreme Court decisions, the trial court found innocent people can lawfully stopped by police when the police make a mistake of law.
So what has become of America now? In our lives we have seen that various authoritarian regimes systematize oppression by passing more laws. This practice has long been criticized. The Roman historian Tacitus observed, "The more corrupt the state, the more numerous the laws." It continues today. When journalists like Al Husseini Abu Deif were killed during Egypt's clashes in 2012, it was all done legally. The law was followed. When Fred Korematsu, a Japanese-American man, was interned into America’s Gulag, it was done lawfully and endorsed by the courts. Today, when Black Americans were (and are) told they are not entitled to all the legal protections, it is done legally by various criminal laws which had their origins in Jim Crow.
It makes me wonder if authoritarian regimes rule by lawlessness or by law?
Solzhenitsyn described the history, the methods, and the structure of Soviet forced labor camps in great detail in his long, multi-volume work, The Gulag Archipelago. Article 58 (which was repealed in 1958 in the course of a complete revision of the Penal Code) Solzhenitsyn maintains that the gulag system still existed and was, with the addition of the sentences to psychiatric clinics, even more vicious. There were fourteen sub-sections to Article 58, all of them formulated so broadly (even more broadly than a disorderly conduct statute) that practically any action (or even nonaction) could be, and was, interpreted as "a crime against the state." In fact, virtually all the inmates of the "special" camp described in Solzhenitsyn’s other book, One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich had been sent there because of a violation of some provision of Article 58. Clearly, recent history demonstrates that a citizen’s oppression is not done by lawlessness but by the law.
So we now live in an America where the most innocent word or action is a crime. Or, as Solzhenitsyn once put it, "Wherever the law is, crime can be found.
Middle-class kids don’t get locked up for smoking pot, and poor kids do . . . . African-American kids and Latino kids are more likely to be poor and less likely to have the resources and support to avoid unduly harsh penalties. President Obama, David Remnick, Going the Distance, NEW YORKER, Jan. 27, 2014, at 52.
Judge Posner, United States v. Jesse A. Smith, No. 14-2223 (7th Cir. Decided Oct. 27, 2014) slip at 5.
Should laws that were created to discriminate against a group of people be enforced?
Harry Anslinger, a former railroad cop and Prohibition agent who was the first commissioner of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics (an early predecessor of the DEA), was one of the driving forces behind pot prohibition. The devil weed and Harry Anslinger, Common Sense for Drug Policy, http://www.csdp.org/publicservice/anslinger.htm He pushed it for explicitly racist reasons, saying, “Reefer makes darkies think they're as good as white men.” Kyle Schmidlin, 'War On Drugs' Merely Fights The Symptoms Of A Faulty System, CBS News (Sept. 13, 2008) http://www.cbsnews.com/news/column-war-on-drugs-merely-fights-the-symptoms-of-a-faulty-system/.
Wisconsin courts are now consistently facing the dilemma of having to sentence persons addicted to drugs for non-drug crimes. Such as when an addict commits a burglary to sell property to supply his/her habit. The prosecution may then try to argue that the defendant’s addiction does not matter since it is a burglary case, not a drug case.
The sentencing court must understand what drug addiction means. Some people betray a terrible misunderstanding of addiction when they suggest that if an addict is involved in the criminal justice system they can be simply ordered to stop using a drug. That thinking demonstrates ignorance about drug addiction. Drug addiction is a brain disease that affects behavior due to “brain changes, which accompany the transition from voluntary to compulsive drug use, affect the brain’s natural inhibition and reward centers, causing the addicted person to use drugs in spite of the adverse health, social, and legal consequence.” Principles of Drug Abuse Treatment for Criminal Justice Populations - A Research- Based Guide, (U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, revised April 2014) p.15. http://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/principles-drug-abuse-treatment-criminal-justice-populations-research-based-guide/are-all-drug-abusers-in-criminal-justice-system-good. That is why those in the criminal system interested in really solving addiction issues do not seek punishment immediately for the addict who uses while in the criminal system. Instead, honesty is seen as the key to rehabilitation. Heroin addicts, for instance, should not punished for using heroin as long as they don't lie about it. But if they challenge a positive drug test, they should face a jail sanction. Gilman Halsted, Drug courts give heroin users an alternative to prison, Wisconsin Public Radio, Monday, July 22, 2013, http://www.wpr.org/drug-courts-give-heroin-users-alternative-prison. Finally, many in the legal system confuse forced abstinence with treatment. “Forced abstinence (when it occurs) is not treatment, and it does not cure addiction. Abstinent individuals must still learn how to avoid relapse, including those who may have been abstinent for a long period of time while incarcerated.” Principles of Drug Abuse Treatment for Criminal Justice Populations - A Research- Based Guide, id.
The defense should remind the court that the label which the court sees fit to attach to a case (“Counsel, this is a burglary case not a drug case!”) does not matter as much to the defense as solving the problem of defendant’s addiction which lead the person to commit crimes. As Dane County Judge John Markson once explained, criminality is fueled by drug addiction. If a court can treat their addiction and remove the root cause of the problem, we're being smarter about how we deal with criminality. Gilman Halsted, Drug courts give heroin users an alternative to prison, Wisconsin Public Radio, Monday, July 22, 2013, http://www.wpr.org/drug-courts-give-heroin-users-alternative-prison.
Determining the appropriate sentence in this straight forward manner causes one to ask the obvious question: can treatment for heroin addiction still benefit society and defendant after s/he committed robberies? The National Institute on Drug Abuse has explained that “drug abuse treatment is effective for offenders who have a history of serious and violent crime, particularly if they receive intensive, targeted services. The economic benefits in avoided crime costs and those of crime victims (e.g., medical costs, lost earnings, and loss in quality of life) may be substantial for these high-risk offenders. Treating them requires a high degree of coordination between drug abuse treatment providers and criminal justice personnel to ensure that the prisoners receive needed treatment and other services that will help prevent criminal recidivism.” Principles of Drug Abuse Treatment for Criminal Justice Populations - A Research-Based Guide, (U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services revised April 2014) p.18. http://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/principles-drug-abuse-treatment-criminal-justice-populations-research-based-guide/are-all-drug-abusers-in-criminal-justice-system-good. Emphasis added.
If the sentencing court believes prison is necessary, the court needs to understand Wisconsin’s prison population. In September 2012, the Wisconsin Department of Corrections reported that 21,713 people were in Wisconsin state prisons; that is, the Wisconsin Prison System is operating at 129% or 4,600 more than the facilities’ permitted capacity. Healthier Lives, Stronger Families, Safer Communities: how increasing funding for alternatives to prison will save lives and money in Wisconsin (Human Impact Partners and WISDOM November 2012) p. 6, http://prayforjusticeinwi.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/11x15_Health_Impact_Assessment_Full_Report.pdf; Christina D. Carmichael, Adult Corrections Program (Wisconsin Legislative Fiscal Bureau Jan. 2013) p.4. Additional inmates were housed by: (a) exceeding the defined number of double occupancy cells; (b) housing more than two inmates in some cells; and (c) utilizing some non-housing space for housing purposes. Adult Corrections Program, id. Out of this general prison population, 12.6% are males in prison for robbery. Id., at 40. The cost of this prison population to a Wisconsin taxpayer was staggering. In 2011-12, daily per capita cost at all correctional facilities was approximately $33,400 annually. Adult Corrections Program, p.3.
So Wisconsin has set aside approximately 600 beds in a prison system of 21,713 inmates. While the Wisconsin Department of Corrections offers a variety of health, substance abuse treatment, and life skills programs to incarcerated offenders in other facilities, merely offering programs does not guarantee that prisoners can get in. Healthier Lives, Stronger Families, Safer Communities: how increasing funding for alternatives to prison will save lives and money in Wisconsin, p.7. Former Wisconsin prisoners mentioned long waiting lists and restrictive criteria that kept them out of the programs they wanted to enroll in. Said one former prisoner: “The waiting list is so long – hundreds and hundreds of people – so many people don’t get in.” Id. In fact, “[u]p to 85% of prisoners who could benefit from substance abuse treatment in prisons do not receive it.” Id. at 10. The defense would suggest that untreated or inadequately treated inmates are more likely to resume using drugs when released from prison, and commit crimes at a higher rate than non-abusers.
In Scott v. Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769 (2007) the United States Supreme Court was of the opinion that “no reasonable juror” could find that a fleeing driver did not pose a deadly risk to the public. Due to this belief, the Court held that a police officer did not violate the Fourth Amendment when the officer deliberately rammed his car into that of the fleeing motorist and flipped it over an embankment. The fleeing driver had refused to be pulled over for speeding and instead sought to evade the police in a high-speed chase. “He created the scariest chase I ever saw since ‘The French Connection,’” said Justice Scalia. The crash rendered the fleeing motorist a quadriplegic. To support the Court’s opinion, the Court uploaded to its website a video of the chase, filmed from inside the pursuing police cruisers, and invited members of the public to make up their own minds after viewing it.
This same video was shown to a sample of 1350 Americans. Overall, a majority agreed with the Court’s resolution of the key issues, but within the sample there were sharp differences of opinion along cultural, ideological, and other lines.
A fairly substantial majority did interpret the facts the way the Court did. But members of various subcommunities did not. African Americans, low-income workers, and residents of the Northeast, for example, tended to form more pro-plaintiff views of the facts than did the Court. So did individuals who characterized themselves as liberals and Democrats. Individuals with these characteristics tend to share a cultural orientation that prizes egalitarianism and social solidarity. Various highly salient, “symbolic” political issues — from gun control to affirmative action, from the death penalty to environmental protection — feature conflict between persons who share this recognizable cultural profile and those who hold an opposing one that features hierarchical and individualistic values. Persons who subscribed to the former style tended to perceive less danger in driver’s flight, to attribute more responsibility to the police for creating the risk for the public, and to find less justification in the use of deadly force to end the chase. Indeed, these individuals were much more likely to see the police, rather than driver, as the source of the danger posed by the flight and to find the deliberate ramming of the driver’s vehicle unnecessary to avert risk to the public.
The question, therefore, posed by the data is not, as Justice Breyer asked, whether to believe one’s eyes, but rather whose eyes the law should believe when identifiable groups of citizens form competing factual perceptions. So what see becomes a question of what you believe is the correct way of doing something.
So Justice Scalia’s insistence that there was only one “reasonable” view of the facts itself reflected a form of bias — cognitive illiberalism — that consists in the failure to recognize the connection between perceptions of societal risk and contested visions of the ideal society. When courts fail to take steps to counteract that bias, they needlessly invest the law with culturally partisan overtones that detract from the law’s legitimacy.
Can a police officer check every driver they pull over for warrants?
The following analysis of Rodriguez v. United States, __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 1609 (2015) was presented by Prof. Welty of UNC School of Government Blog.
The United States Supreme Court decided Rodriguez v. United States, __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 1609 (2015) and ruled that once the purpose of a traffic stop has been addressed – or reasonably should have been addressed – an officer can’t extend the stop, even briefly, for unrelated investigative activities such as drug dog sniffs, unless the officer has reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to support the continued detention.
The facts of the case are that just after midnight, a Nebraska law enforcement officer saw a vehicle veer onto the shoulder of a state highway, then pull back onto the road. Nebraska law prohibits driving on the shoulder, so the officer stopped the vehicle. The driver provided the officer with his license, registration, and proof of insurance. The passenger provided his license as well. License and warrant checks on both men apparently came back clean, and the officer issued a warning ticket to the driver. The officer suspected that the driver might be involved in drug activity, so he asked the driver for permission to run the officer’s drug dog around the vehicle. The driver said no. The officer then called for backup and detained the driver for a few minutes until another officer arrived. At that point, the officer walked his dog around the vehicle twice and the dog alerted. The alert led to a search and the discovery of methamphetamine. The total delay to allow the drug dog to sniff the car was seven or eight minutes.
Justice Ginsburg wrote for herself and five other Justices. She concluded that a stop may not be extended beyond the time necessary to complete the “mission” of the stop, which is “to address the traffic violation that warranted the stop . . . and attend to related safety concerns.” That is, “[a]uthority for the seizure ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are – or reasonably should have been – completed.” A dog sniff is not such a task “tied to the traffic infraction,” as it is “aimed at detecting ordinary criminal wrongdoing.” Therefore, if such a sniff prologs a stop at all, it violates the Fourth Amendment. There is no exception for “de minimis” delays.
The majority stated that an officer may check for outstanding arrest warrants for the driver during a traffic stop. That is apparently a common law enforcement practice. But, as noted by the dissent, it does not align very well with the majority’s reasoning that a stop should stay focused on its “mission” rather than general crime detection. The majority’s justification for permitting warrant checks is that they add to roadway safety by allowing an officer to determine whether a driver is wanted for other traffic offenses. That strikes me as a pretty weak argument – how many outstanding warrants are there for speeding? Furthermore, the principal authority the majority cites for that idea is Professor LaFave’s treatise, but Professor LaFave himself doubts whether warrant checks should be permitted. Wayne R. LaFave, The “Routine Traffic Stop” from Start to Finish: Too Much “Routine,” Not Enough Fourth Amendment, 102 Mich. L. Rev. 1843 (2004) (stating that “a rather compelling argument” can be made for abolishing warrant checks as insufficiently directed at the purpose of the stop, though noting that “there are at least some rational arguments” to the contrary).
Although Rodriguez concerned a stop that was extended to allow a drug dog to sniff a car, rather than a stop that was extended to allow the officer to ask unrelated questions of an occupant of the vehicle, the Court’s opinion indicates that a stop may not be extended for any kind of unrelated investigation without reasonable suspicion. See, e.g., Rodriguez, 135 S.Ct. at 1614 (“Authority for the seizure thus ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are—or reasonably should have been—completed.”). Lower courts have applied the case outside the dog sniff context. See, e.g., United States v. Archuleta, __ Fed. Appx. __, 2015 WL 4296639 (10th Cir. July 16, 2015) (citing Rodriguez while ruling that a bicycle stop was improperly prolonged “in order to ask a few additional questions” unrelated to the bicycle law violations that prompted the stop); Amanuel v. Soares, 2015 WL 3523173 (N.D. Cal. June 3, 2015) (unpublished) (extending a traffic stop by 10 minutes to discuss a passenger’s criminal history, ask whether the passenger had been subpoenaed to an upcoming criminal trial, and caution the passenger against perjuring himself, would amount to an improper extension of the stop in violation of Rodriguez); United States v. Kendrick, 2015 WL 2356890 (W.D.N.Y. May 15, 2015) (unpublished) (agreeing that “absent a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, extending the stop . . . in order to conduct further questioning of the driver and the occupants about matters unrelated to the purpose of the traffic stop would appear to violate the . . . rule announced in Rodriguez,” though finding that reasonable suspicion was present in the case under consideration).
The stop in Rodriguez was extended as it was coming to a close, and there are a few phrases in the Court’s opinion that could be read to limit the reach of the opinion to such cases. See, e.g., Rodriguez, 135 S.Ct. at 1612 (discussing “whether the Fourth Amendment tolerates a dog sniff conducted after completion of a traffic stop” (emphasis added)). But overall, the opinion is pretty clear that delays unrelated to the purpose of the stop are forbidden whenever they take place. See, e.g., id. at 1616 (“The critical question, then, is not whether the dog sniff occurs before or after the officer issues a ticket . . . but whether conducting the sniff ‘prolongs’—i.e., adds time to—[the stop].”). At least, so concluded the court in People v. Pulling, __ N.E.3d __, 2015 WL 3764791 (Ill. Ct. App. June 17, 2015) (applying Rodriguez and finding that an officer violated by “interrupt[ing] his traffic citation preparation to conduct a free-air sniff based on an unparticularized suspicion of criminal activity”; although the sniff took place during the stop, while the sniff in Rodriguez took place at the end of the stop, “this positional difference of the point at which the sniff occurs has no impact on our ruling,” as “the dog sniff added time to the total duration of the stop at issue”).
The Rodriguez Court stated that an officer may conduct the ordinary inquiries incident to a traffic stop, including “checking the driver’s license, determining whether there are outstanding warrants against the driver, and inspecting the automobile’s registration and proof of insurance.” Rodriguez, 135 S.Ct. at 1615. A few cases have addressed what counts as an ordinary traffic-related inquiry.
Asking about travel plans. In United States v. Iturbe-Gonzalez, __ F.Supp.3d __, 2015 WL 1843046 (D. Mont. April 23, 2015), the court indicated that an officer may make “traffic safety-related inquiries of a general nature [including about the driver’s] travel plans and travel objectives,” and said that “any suggestion to the contrary would ask that officers issuing traffic violations temporarily become traffic ticket automatons while processing a traffic violation, as opposed to human beings.” While a question or two about travel plans may be sufficiently related to the purpose of a traffic stop, a court might take a different view of an officer’s extended discussion of itineraries with multiple vehicle occupants.
“Ex-felon registration check[s].” In United States v. Evans, 786 F.3d 779 (9th Cir. 2015), the court ruled that an officer improperly extended a traffic stop to conduct an “ex-felon registration check,” a procedure that inquired into a subject’s criminal history and determined whether he had registered his address with the sheriff as required for certain offenders in the state in which the stop took place. The court reasoned that the check appeared to be directed at finding evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing, i.e., a failure to register, not enhancing traffic safety.
Seeking consent to search. The Rodriguez Court did not directly address requests for consent to search, but such requests are not ordinary incidents of routine traffic stops. Thus, in United States v. Hight, 2105 WL 4239003 (D. Colo. June 29, 2015), an officer stopped a truck for a traffic violation. After running standard checks on the driver and talking briefly with him, the officer decided that he wanted to ask for consent to search. He called for backup and spent at least nine minutes waiting for another officer and working on a consent form. When backup arrived, the officer terminated the stop, then asked for and obtained consent. The court ruled that the nine-minute extension of the stop was improper and that it required suppression even if consent to search was obtained voluntarily after the stop ended. Hight does not address significant questions like (1) whether an officer who takes two seconds, instead of nine minutes, to ask “may I search your car?” has measurably extended the stop, and (2) whether an officer who seeks and obtains consent without extending a stop – for example, while waiting for a warrant check to be completed – may extend the stop to conduct the search without running afoul of Rodriguez.

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