Source: https://openjurist.org/59/f1d/756
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 15:52:40+00:00

Document:
was attached"as mortgagees, and moved theconrt. to dischargE. · the order of attachment, arid the levy made thereunder. The issues arising on this interplea and the issues in the 'attachment suit were tried together before the court, which found generally in favor of the plaintiffs in the attachment suit,and rendered judgment accordingly. In this court there is but one record in both cases, and, as they have been argued as one cause, they will be decided together. The only error assigned on behalf of the interpleader is · that, "upon and under the evidence heard upon the hearing of said motion," the court ought to have discharged the attachment. It appears that the interveners executed to the marshal a redelivery bond for the property attached. Under the statutes of Kansas this bond had the effect ,to estop them from denying that the property belonged to the defendant in the attachment, or that it was not subject to the attachment. Code, Ran.§ 199; Sponenbarger v. Lemert, 23 Kan. 55, 62; Haxtun v. Sizer, Id.310; Wolf v. Hahn, 28 Kan. 588; Case, Bishop & Co; v. & Hosea, 31 Ran. 96,99, 1 Pac. 269; Peterson v. Woollen, 48 Kan. 770, 30 Pac. 128. To avoid the legal effect of the execution of the redelivery bond, · the interveners claimed they were induced to execute it by the false and fraUdulent representations of the plaintiffs' agent or attorneyas to its legal effect, and there is a good deal of testimony in the recor-d relating to this issue. But the finding of the lower court upon this, as upon all other. issues of fact in the case, was general; and, as we have seen, where a case is tried by the court without a jury, and its finding upon the facts is general, such finding cannot be reviewed in this court. The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
CITY OF LINCOLN v. SUN VAPOR STREET-LIGHT CO. OF CANTON.
(Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
The provisions of the twenty-fourth rule of court. (47 Fed. xl.,) prescribing the contents and manner of statement of briefs for plaIntiff in error. particularly In respect to assignments and specifications of error, and the presentation of the questions to be dIscussed, will be enforced by the court, to the end that the vital issues in the case may be clearly presented. and immaterial and frivolous matters excluded from consideration.
A contract for lighting streets by gasoline lamps. requiring no plant but the posts and lamps, which are to'remain the property of the contractors. ,may be made by simple resolution of cOuncil, under the general charter power to make contracts necessary to the exercise of the corporate powers, and further provisions recognizing the power to contract by resolution or order concurred in by a majority of the members elected; and provisions requiring formal ordinances in making contracts for "gas works, electric or other light works.... etc., do not apply.
CITY OF LINCOLN V, SUN VAPOR STREET-LIGHT CO.
Contracts formally executed by the proper officers of the city by an· thority of its counCil, and not necessarily beyond the scope of its powers, will, in the absence of, proof to the contrary, be presumed to have been made by lawful authority.
REVIEW ON ERROR-SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE.
On a writ of error the court cannot consider a proposition that the jury Violated tneir instructions, in that, being instructed that there could be no recovery unless the claim sued on was presented to the city clerk within three months of its accrual, they awarded a recovery, although the uIlcontradicted evidence was that the claim was not so presented; for this is simply a contention that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict, which question cannot be considered in a federal appellate court, in the. absence of a request for a peremptory instruction to the jury.
SAME-MOTION FOR NEW TlUAL-NoT REVIEWABLE.
"(4) When there Is no assignment of errors, .as reqUired by section 997 of tbe Rev!sedStatutes, counsel w111 not be heard, excePt at the request of the court;. and errors not specified according to this rule will be disregarded; .but the court, at,lts option, may notice a plain error not assigned or specified." 47 Fed. xl.
The eIl,tire rule is a copy of the twenty-first rule of the supreme court. 13 Sup. Ct. xii. Only the pprt;ion of it material in this case is quoted h.ere. In our opinion, the strict and careful observance of this rule directs the attention of counsel and the court to the merits of the ..case presented, to'the vital questions at issue, and excludes from their consideration frivolous and immaterial questions. If the rule is observed, the arguments of counsel and the consideration of the court are concentrated upon the important questions in c()lltroversy, instead of being scattered and dissipated by the argument and consideration of numerous side issues, that, if at all material,' are generally governed by the decision of the main questions,apd. in this way a just result is more speedily and certainly attained. It often occurs that, through abundance of cauerrors, when they obtain their writ of tion, counsel assign error, which they find it entirely unnecessary to refer to, and themselves abandon upon reflection, and after an examination of the authorities upon which they intend to rely in the presentation of their case to this court. Every of the bar understands and appreciates the necessity of concmtrating and confining his own attention and investigation, as well as the attention and consideration of the court, to the crucial questions in his case. This rule enables him to accomplish. this result after he has carefully examined the 'authorities and considered the reasons which support his positions, Ilnd when: he is best prepared to select the errors he deems of importance. The rule should be carefully observed. The brief of counsel for the plaintiff in error contains 23 printed pages. The record: contains pleading-s, evidence, instructions given and instructions refused,the verdict, judgment, assignment of errOrs, and writ of' error, and covers 62 printed pages. No specification of the errors :relied on which sets out separately or particularly each error asserted and intended to be urged in a separate subdivision of the brief is found. After the statement of the case, and before the argument, the following statement appears, which is the nearest apprQach to such a specification found in this brief: ..
CITY OF LINCOLN V. SUN VAPOR .STREET-LIGHT CO.
city, the plaintiff must have first filed with the city clerk a statement of his claim, giving his full naine, the time, place, nature, circumstance, and cause of injury or damage complained of, and that such statement must have been filed within threE:' months of the time when his cause of action accrued. "(4) That the verdict is contrary to, and in direct violation of, the instructions of the court as given to the jury."
works, -electric or other light works, in said city, and give such persons, compan,. or' association the privilege of furnishing light 'for the streets, lanes and alleys ofsatd city, for any length of time not exceeding five years." Id. § 67.
12 Wheat. 64, 70; The Omaha Bridge Cases, 10 U. S. App. 98, 189, 2 C. C. A. 174, 240, 51 Fed. 309, and cases cited; Union Water Co. v. Murphy's Flat Fluming Co., 22 Cal. 620, 629. 3. The third point urged is that the company must have filed a statement of its claim with the city clerk within three months after it accrued, in order to maintain its action. The court so instructed the jurY, and a careful perusal of the 21 supposed errors assis-ned when the writ was issued discloses none which challenges any ruling .ofthe court upon this question. 4. The fourth point urged is that the verdict was in direct violation of the instructions given by the court to the jury. The contention of the counsel for the city here rests upon the proposition that the court instructed the jury that the company could not reo cover unless it proved that it had filed the statement of its claim with the city clerk within three months of its accrual, and that the uncontradicted evidence was that it had not done so; in other words, the point is that the evidence was not sufficient to sustain the verdict. If the city wished to test, by writ of error in this court, the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a verdict for the company, it should. have requested the court below, at the close of the evi· dence, to peremptorily instruct the jury to return a verdict in de· fendant's favor. Village of Alexandria v. Stabler, 4 U. S. App. 324, 1 C. C. A. 616, 50 Fed. 689; :Railroad Co. v. Hawthorne, 144 U. S. 202, 12 Sup. Ct. 591. It did not do this, and the sufficiency of the evidence cannot be considered here. In an action at law brought here by writ of error for review, this is a court for the correction of the errors of the court below solely ; it is not a court for the correction of the mistakes of the jury,or for the retrial of issues of fa.ct which they have determined with the consent of the litigants. In order to obtain a review of any question by writ of error in this court it must appear that the court below decided that very question, for there cltn be no. review of that which has never beenpassed upon. In this case the city consented to the submission of the eyi· dence to the jury, and requested· the general instruction on this subject which was given by the court. The court below was not requested to decide, and did not determine, whether or not there was sufficient evidence to warrant a verdict before it was rendered, and hence it could not have committed any error in this regard, and there is nothing here for us to consider. It is true that the question of the sufficiency of the evidence was subsequently submitted to the court below on a motion for a new trial; but the action of the court upon that motion was discretionary, and is not reviewable in this court. McClellan v. Pyeatt, 4 U. S. App. 319, 323, 1 O. O. A. 613, 50 Fed. 686; Village of Alexan· dria v. Stabler, supra; Railroad Co. v. Howard, 4 U. S. App. 202, 1 C. O. A. 229, 49 Fed. 206; Mining Co. v. Fullerton, 58 Fed. 521. The result is that there was no substantial error in the/trial of this case, and no error whatever has been specified according to the rules of this court. The judgment of the circuit court is accord· mgly affirmed, with costs.
Wh8fe, ,wlqdow, glaBsls brokeuin transit, so tbat partot ,It Is useless for remanufacture, the broken part Is not admissible, un4er paragraph '590 of the tree list, as broken 'glass, but the whole is dutiable as window glass, unless there is an abandonment to the government, under section 23 of theaot otJune 10, 1890. MFed. 371,reversed.
"-<1) Tbe merchandise consists of window, .cyllnder,and other kinds of glass, of the particular des'cription named in the severalinvoices and entries, contained In cases or packages, marked and numbered as shown· by the accompanying papers in the appended list of clises. "(2)· A part ot said merchandise was ill\ported under the new tariff act, and since October 6, 1890, and a part of it under the tariff act of March 3, 1883, prior to the time when the present tariff law went into effect. But all of the merchlW'lise was imported after AUgust I, 1890, when the act of June 10, 1890. kr wn as the 'Customs Administrative Act,' went Into effect.

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