Source: https://harriscompanyrec.com/blog/2009/06/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 22:54:02+00:00

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Herbert L. Corn, the former superintendent of the city of Rochester Wastewater Treatment Plant in Rochester, Ind., pleaded guilty today in U.S. District Court in South Bend, Ind., to falsifying monthly discharge monitoring reports that concealed violations of the Clean Water Act at the Rochester plant.
copy can be ordered by calling 800-245-2691, option 1.
Both versions are available free of charge.
It's a tough time to be an expert witness. Courts are increasingly ordering such witnesses to disclose financial information or risk having their testimony struck from a case.
Also, in recent years, a growing number of courts have permitted parties to sue their own experts for negligent testimony, holding that expert witnesses should not be immune from liability from their own clients.
In California, a couple is suing a property-appraisal expert they hired for allegedly failing to adequately estimate the costs to rebuild their home, which was destroyed in a fire. The couple claimed the expert's estimate was $1.8 million off. The California Supreme Court in April refused to hear an appeal from the expert, who claimed immunity. Lambert v. Carneghi, No. 439931 (San Francisco Co., Calif., Super. Ct.).
In Utah, a couple is suing a medical expert they hired in a wrongful death suit for changing his testimony on the eve of trial, which led to the dismissal of the case. In March, the 10th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the lower court erred in dismissing the couple's suit against the expert. The case has been remanded. Pace v. Swerdlow, 519 F.3d 1067 (10th Cir. March 4, 2008).
"The trend in the country is to allow this sort of thing — and people are starting to do it," said Craig Moody, a San Francisco solo practitioner who represents the plaintiffs in the California fire case.
"You shouldn't be able to sue an expert just because you don't like his result . . . but you should be able to sue if he's negligent," he said.
An Oral Contract Worth More Than the Paper It's Not Written On?
An Oral Contract Worth More Than the Paper It's Not Written On? Lack of a Written Lease Not Fatal to a Tenant's Claim for Lost Business Goodwill.
The late Hollywood movie mogul, Samuel Goldwyn, once observed that “[a]n oral contract isn’t worth the paper it’s written on.” The California Court of Appeal for the Second District apparently disagrees - - at least in eminent domain. On Tuesday, the Court of Appeal issued its opinion in Los Angeles Unified School District v. Pulgarin (June 23, 2009, B206892, ____ Cal.App.4th ____).
Background: Can I Get That in Writing?
Mid Town Recycling (“Mid Town”) operated a small recycling business on some real property which the Los Angeles Unified School District (“LAUSD”) sought to condemn. Mid Town occupied the property under a month-to-month tenancy; it lacked a written lease. Nonetheless, after LAUSD’s condemnation, Mid Town would no longer be able to operate its business on the property.
Mid Town sought the value of its lost business goodwill in court. Before the compensation trial, LAUSD challenged Mid Town’s “entitlement” to any compensation. In other words, LAUSD sought a pretrial ruling from the court, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1260.040, that Mid Town possessed no legally enforceable interest in the property, since it lacked a written lease. LAUSD claimed Mid Town could not recover for lost business goodwill.
Mid Town, by contrast, asserted that a written lease is not necessary to recover lost business goodwill. The trial court agreed with LAUSD and dismissed Mid Town from the action.
Legal Background: Lost Business Goodwill Is Compensable in California.
Notably, the California business goodwill statute (section 1263.510) does not require that a business owner who seeks lost goodwill also prove that he or she owns the real estate on which the business happens to sit.
Written Lease Not Required to Recover Business Goodwill, as a Matter Of Law.
Mid Town argued on appeal that section 1263.510 does not require that a business owner own - - or even have a written lease on - - the property that is taken. The Court of Appeal agreed.
In Handlery Hotel, before the condemnation action, the fee owner refused to renew the lease that gave the business the right to operate on the property taken. Condemnation, therefore, did not terminate the owner’s right to operate its business on the property or cause any lost business goodwill; the fee owner’s decision not to renew the lease did.
Handlery Hotel should not be read to hold that section 1263.510 requires that a business owner have a written lease on the property that is taken to recover lost business goodwill.
Parting Thoughts: Semper Letteris Mandate, Perhaps.
The Court shared some parting thoughts on how lack of a written lease could affect the value of lost goodwill. The value of lost business goodwill “is affected by the probable remaining term of the tenancy,” and “[e]vidence of the remaining length of a lease and the existence of an option to renew a lease are, of course, relevant for determining the amount of compensation” for lost goodwill.
This online database presents data on the property tax in all 50 states. Because accurate data provide the critical foundation for sound governmental decision-making, the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy and the George Washington Institute of Public Policy joined in a partnership to provide information and support public policy concerning the property tax, probably the most controversial tax in the United States.
The term “Significant Features” pays tribute to the work of the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, which was established by Congress in 1959 to study the relationships among local, state, and national levels of government. Until its termination in 1996, ACIR provided a wealth of research on the functioning of the federal system, particularly through its flagship publication, Significant Features of Fiscal Federalism.
This new site provides data sets and links relating to the property tax and its role in state and local finance in all 50 states. The interface allows users to access property tax and data online in a variety of forms, including tables of the most frequently sought figures, a query system for creating new tables, and a downloadable database. This data will be of value to a wide variety of users, including journalists, public officials, and researchers.
For a user guide to this website, click here.
If you encounter any problems while viewing or downloading files, please email help@lincolninst.edu.
Opportunity Amidst the Commercial Real Estate Doom?
istorically, for a corporation, real estate assets have had one primary application: operational necessity. Companies have been regularly leasing, developing, buying and even selling facilities to meet their operational objectives. However, with the rise of an active industrial real estate investment market, another application emerged. Strategic, long-term real estate that remains critical to operations has become an alternate source of capital. It is the sale-leaseback structure that allows the owner-occupier to free up capital without any operational implications. As such, sale-leaseback transactions have become a more popular component of a company's financial management.
First Industrial Realty Trust estimates that 15 billion square feet, or more than 60 percent of all industrial space, is owned by corporate users, the highest among commercial property types.
HSBC in April confirmed that it was exploring buyer interest in its trophy properties in New York City, Paris and in London, where this building in Canary Wharf is located. Leaseback would probably be part of the sale agreement, reported The Sunday Times of London.
This translates to a $700-billion to $900-billion investment in non-core assets owned by corporations. For most users, the primary reason for ownership of their industrial real estate is control. The importance of controlling the asset rises proportionately to the additional investment made by the user within the facility to make it operational.
sites contaminated by Petroleum Underground Storage Tanks.
Does not qualify for the UST Cleanup Fund.
Did not cause or contribute to release.
Has no affiliation with a person who caused or contributed to the release.
Principal source of contamination is from a petroleum UST.
No financially responsible party has been identified to pay for the cleanup costs.
The Center for Creative Land Recycling (CCLR or "see clear") is a nonprofit organization focused on creating sustainable communities by identifying and implementing responsible patterns of land use and development Our work is accomplished through training, technical assistance, and funding for communities who are attempting to recycle vacant or environmentally distressed properties, commonly known as brownfields.
Empress Casino Joliet Corp. v. Giannoulias, No. 08-945 (cert. petition filed Jan. 21, 2009) - the Illinois Supreme Court held (896 N.E.2d 277 (Ill. 2008) that a regulation which imposes a 3% "surcharge" on Illinois casinos with gross receipts over $200 million per year, and then gives the money to horse racing tracks is not a taking of property. Several casinos challenged the law asserting, among other arguments, that the redistribution of their money to tracks was a taking. The Illinois Supreme Court held that the regulation was a tax, and not subject to takings analysis. Cert denied June 8, 2009.
Fairbanks North Star Borough v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 543 F.3d 586 (9th Cir. 2008)- the Ninth Circuit held that since the Corps' jurisdictional determination is not a final agency action, the property owner cannot immediately challenge it under the Administrative Procedures Act. Cert denied June 22, 2009.
Joy Builders, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 11 N.Y.3d 863 (2008) - the New York Supreme Court Appellate Division upheld the imposition of a fee in lieu of a dedication of land. Cert denied April 20, 2009.
Navajo Nation v. United States Forest Service, 535 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2008) - the Ninth Circuit determined it was not a "substantial burden" on the religious exercises of Native American tribes under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act for the Forest Service to allow a ski resort to make artificial snow from recycled sewage water on a mountain considered by the tribes to be sacred. Cert denied June 8, 2009.
McClung v. City of Sumner, 548 F.3d 1219 (9th Cir. 2008) (cert petition filed Mar. 2, 2009) - the Ninth Circuit held that legislatively imposed exactions should be analyzed under the Penn Central ad hoc standards and not under Nollan/Dolan. Cert denied June 8, 2009.
AmeriSource Corp. v. United States, No. 08-497 (cert. petition filed Oct. 15, 2008) - the Federal Circuit held that the seizure as evidence was not a taking for public use because the seizure was an exercise of the government's "police power," and not an exercise of eminent domain. Cert denied March 23, 2009.
Resource page for the Florida beachfront takings case, Stop the Beachfront Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Dep't of Environmental Protection, No. 08-11 (cert. granted, June 15, 2009).
Scalia and O'Connor's dissent from the denial of cert in Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 510 U.S. 1207 (1994) ("As a general matter, the Constitution leaves the law of real property to the States. But just as a State may not deny rights protected under the Federal Constitution through pretextual procedural rulings, see NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 455-458 (1958), neither may it do so by invoking nonexistent rules of state substantive law. Our opinion in Lucas, for example, would be a nullity if anything that a State court chooses to denominate "background law" -- regardless of whether it is really such -- could eliminate property rights.").
McQueen v. South Carolina Coastal Comm'n, 530 S.E.2d 628 (S.C. 2000).
Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robbins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) (California Supreme Court's interpretation of California Constitution's free speech clause to require a shopping center to allow handbilling on its property was not a taking).
Another beachfront case - Severance v. Patterson, No. 07-20409 (5th Cir., Apr. 23, 2009).
Case to watch: Casitas Municipal Water District v. United States, 543 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2008). More here.
Property owners entitled to damages including reasonable attorneys fees and costs for failed condemnation attempt, even if government prevails in intermediate steps. More here.
Delegation of eminent domain power: redevelopment agency without power to take property until it enters into a development agreement when statute requires as a condition precedent. Eagan Economic Development Authority v. U-Haul Company of Minnesota, No. A08-0767 (Minn. Ct. App., May 19, 2009).
Delegation of eminent domain power: statutory delegations strictly construed. Spokane Airports v. RMA, Inc., No. 26538-2-III (Wash. Ct. App., Apr. 28, 2009).
Might Makes Blight In The New York Appellate Division - Develop Don't Destroy Brooklyn v. Urban Dev. Corp., 2009 NY Slip Op 01395 (Feb. 26, 2009).
Determining Eminent Domain Pretext In Serial Takings - County of Hawaii v. C&J Coupe Family Ltd. P’ship, 198 P.3d 615 (Haw., Dec. 24, 2008) (proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on remand).
Rose Acre Farms, Inc. v. United States, No. 2007-5169 (Fed. Cir., Mar. 12, 2009) - regulation restricting the sale of eggs was not a taking under Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), because the economic impact of the regulation "was not severe" and the character of the government action "strongly favored" the government.
* Forward-looking tables that show what happened to the rental stock that existed in 2005.
* Backward-looking tables that show the sources of the rental stock that existed in 2007.
* Combined analysis that account for the net changes in rental affordability over the period.
In addition to this report, we have also released the "Weighting Strategy for 2005-2007 CINCH Analysis," a technical report that explains the algorithms used to develop consistent longitudinal weights for the 2005-2007 Rental Dynamics and Components of Inventory Change (CINCH) reports. The CINCH report was released earlier and can be found via the same link.
All of these reports were prepared by Frederick J. Eggers and Fouad Moumen of Econometrica, Inc., under contract with HUD.
They don't want HUD Approved Appraisers to have direct contact with HUD Review Appraisers. We think they should. LOAN UNDERWRITERS AND MORTGAGE BROKERS HAVE THEIR NUMBERS WE FEEL YOU SHOULD TO, HERE ARE TWO DIRECT NUMBERS, CALL THEM IF YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS.
Tom Wilke @ HUD 714-796-1200 x 3401..I think I spoke to Susan in UW x 3466 regarding this, not sure but it was one of them..
The U.S. Supreme Court last week agreed to review the Florida Supreme Court's decision in Walton County v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So.2d 1102 (Fla. Sep. 29, 2008), which held that a state statute prohibiting "beach renourishment" without a permit did not effect a taking of littoral (beachfront) property, even though it altered the long-standing rights of the owners to accretion on their land and direct access to the ocean. See Stop the Beachfront Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Dep't of Environmental Protection, No. 08-11 (cert. granted. June 15, 2009). More background on the case at our resource page.
In this post, we will explore the background to the esoteric issue of "judicial takings" presented by the two Hawaii cases.
The Robinson litigation is one that holds a special place in our hearts, as it is a tale interwoven with the recent history of Hawaii, taking us from the time before jet travel when sugar and pineapple -- not tourism -- were the economic engines driving politics and the economy of the Territory of Hawaii, through the salad days of the openly activist Hawaii Supreme Court under the leadership of Chief Justice William S. Richardson, and finally sputtering out (sort of) after the U.S. Supreme Court's ripeness ruling in Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985).
Here's the short summary, repeated from memory (the litigation, which is still pending, has been going on for 50 years now, so please forgive us if a few of the details are off). The case started out in 1959 in a Kauai county trial court as a dispute between several sugar plantations over which of them possessed the rights to surplus water in a Kauai stream, among other things. Nine years later, the trial court issued a 65-page decision based on long-standing Kingdom, Territory, and State water law, and declared who owned what. So far, it was just another in a long line of water disputes between private parties. The losing parties took the case to the Hawaii Supreme Court (in those days, there was no Intermediate Court of Appeals and all appeals by right went directly to the Supreme Court), where no party, including the State, argued that the controlling water law was anything but as established by long-standing Hawaii cases.
The Hawaii Supreme Court, however, "sua sponte overruled all territorial cases to the contrary and adopted the English common law doctrine of riparian rights." Robinson, 753 F.2d at 1470 (citing McBryde Sugar Co. v. Robinson, 54 Haw. 174, 504 P.2d 1330 (1973)). The court "also held sua sponte that there was no such legal category as "normal daily surplus water" and declared that the state, as sovereign, owned and had the exclusive right to control the flow," and "that because the flow of the Hanapepe was the sovereign property of the State of Hawaii, McBryde's claim of a prescriptive right to divert water could not be sustained against the state." Robinson, 753 F.2d at 1470. In other words, in a dispute between "A" and "B" over which of them possessed water rights, the Supreme Court simply said "neither of you do, the State owns it all."
Although I voted with the majority of this court in McBryde Sugar Co. v. Robinson, 54 Haw. 174, 504 P.2d 1330 (1973) [hereinafter referred to as McBryde I], I am constrained to recant that position in view of my current understanding of the problems of this case. In light of the arguments adduced on rehearing, historical evidence discovered upon further research subsequent to the court's previous decision in this case, and a reappraisal of the reasoning supporting that decision, it is my opinion that the court committed error in holding that all surplus water belongs to the State and that private water rights, however acquired, may not be transferred to nonappurtenant land. Because of the importance of this case to the development of the law on the subject of Hawaii's water resources, I have undertaken to present a detailed analysis explaining why McBryde I is not in keeping with long established and unique principles of Hawaiian water law. Precisely because McBryde I is such a radical departure from these principles as they have been heretofore understood, moreover, I have concluded that McBryde I effectuates an unconstitutional taking of the appellant's and cross-appellants' property without just compensation and should be reversed on this ground as well.
McBryde, 55 Haw. at 262-63, 517 P.2d at 27 (Levinson, J., dissenting). The U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari meaning the Hawaii Supreme Court's McBryde decision was final.
But it was not the last word. The sugar companies sued the state (Governor Ariyoshi, actually, since under Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), a state official can be sued to enjoin unconstitutional conduct despite the 11th Amendment) in federal district court under the federal civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district judge -- the inimitable Martin Pence -- held that the Hawaii Supreme Court's McBryde decision took property without just compensation, and enjoined the state from enforcing the decision. See Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 441 F.Supp. 559 (D.Haw. 1977).
The leisurely pace of this litigation has produced three oral arguments in this court, two of which were followed by referral of certified questions to the Supreme Court of Hawaii. See Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 65 Hawaii 641, 658 P.2d 287 (1982) (Robinson II). Following the publication of the state court's answers to the certified questions, the parties briefed the remaining issues that had been narrowed by the earlier proceedings and reargued the case. A number of complex questions remain, but to expedite the matter we will discuss only those essential to a resolution of the main question: Can the state, by a judicial decision which creates a major change in property law, divest property interests?
The state conceded at oral argument that the Fourteenth Amendment would require it to pay just compensation if it attempted to take vested property rights. The substantive question, therefore, is whether the state can declare, by court decision, that the water rights in this case have not vested. The short answer is no.
Robinson, 753 F.2d at 1473.The court determined that the water rights claimed by the private parties were vested rights, and that the state legislature or the state supreme court cannot alter those rights without condemnation and payment of just compensation.
By the time Robinson IV rolled around, the U.S. Supreme Court had issued its ruling in Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985) that certain regulatory takings case were not ripe, and it granted cert and summarily vacated the Ninth Circuit's Robinson decision, ordering it to consider the decision again in light of Williamson County's new ripeness rules. See Ariyoshi v. Robinson, 477 U.S. 902 (1986) (Robinson IV). The Ninth Circuit vacated its earlier order (Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 796 F.2d 339 (9th Cir.1986) (Robinson V) and sent the case back to Judge Pence in the District Court.
Not to be deterred, Judge Pence found the case ripe under Williamson County. See Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 676 F.Supp. 1002, 1020-21 (D.Haw. 1987) (Robinson VI). Back up to the Ninth Circuit they went, and in Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 854 F.2d 1189 (9th Cir. 1988) (Robinson VII), the Ninth Circuit ordered further briefing on the issue. In Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 887 F.2d 215 (9th Cir. 1990) (Robinson VIII), the Ninth Circuit vacated the District Court's decision and sent it back with instructions to dismiss the case because it was not ripe under Williamson County.
A thirty-one year old case was not ripe, you say? How so?
As noted, we previously certified six questions to the Supreme Court of Hawaii. In response, the Hawaii court stated that the decision in McBryde II did not constitute the final disposition of the case. See Robinson II, 658 P.2d at 295-97. The court explained that the McBryde litigation began and was treated throughout by the trial court as an action to determine the rights of the parties to the waters of the Hanapepe. The trial court had attempted to identify the exact quantity of water to which each party was entitled. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Hawaii affirmed the award of appurtenant rights and reversed the award of prescriptive and surplus rights. No specific instruction was imparted to the trial court, and the Supreme Court did not utilize its power to render a final judgment. Further, no further proceedings are of record in the trial court. The court explained that the partial reversal without instruction merely rendered that portion of the judgment void. Id. at 296-97. Thus the only portion of the judgment which could be considered final after appeal was the partial quantification of the parties' water rights, namely the award of appurtenant rights.
Robinson VIII, 887 F.2d at 218 (footnote omitted). Unbelievably, a third cert petition was not sought, and the litigation (per the Hawaii Supreme Court's edict as noted above) went back to the Kauai trial court where it all began in 1959, where, as far as anyone in these parts is aware, the case remains on the docket. The state certainly has no interest in moving it forward and ripening the case, and the private parties who originated the litigation are long since out of the sugar business. Kauai is now a place of tax revolts, zoning fights, and quiet beaches, and the sugar industry is but a distant memory.
If you have managed to come along this far, congratulations -- there's more, but thankfully it's a shorter tale and one which follows the same general plot.
This Court fails to find any legal, historical, factual or other precedent or basis for the conclusions of the Hawaii Supreme Court that, following erosion, the monument by which the seaward boundary of seashore land in Hawaii is to be fixed is the upper reaches of the wash of the waves. To the contrary, the evidence introduced in this case firmly establishes that the common law, followed by both legal precedent and historical practice, fixes the high water mark and seaward boundaries with reference to the tides, as opposed to the run or reach of waves on the shore. For example, on the Island of Hawaii, the seaweed line was used to indicate the level of the high tides and high water mark. The decision in Sotomura was contrary to established practice, history and precedent and, apparently, was intended to implement the court's conclusion that public policy favors extension of public use and ownership of the shoreline. A desire to promote public policy, however, does not constitute justification for a state taking private property without compensation.
Id. at 480-81. The state's appeal to the Ninth Circuit was dismissed as untimely.
Just think of the possibilities if the deadline had not been missed -- this case might still be going on today.
Luce Forward's Eminent Domain practice leader obtains $8 million settlement.
Three years after Caltrans offered Altmans Winnebago nearly $1 million for its land, the agency ended up paying nearly $8 million.
The payment was part of settlement agreement, reached on June 8, between Altmans and Caltrans. Caltrans will use Altmans property at 12911 Garvey Ave. to widen the 10 Freeway.
"This is not a jury verdict," Murphy said. "This is Caltrans stepping up and realizing the value that the Altmans family had created at the site in Baldwin park."
The following report was recently posted to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s (FDIC) Office of Inspector General (OIG) Web site: www.fdicig.gov under Publications. In cases where an OIG report includes sensitive or confidential information, the OIG may redact certain information in the report, and the report will be marked as such. In some instances because of the highly sensitive nature of the entire report, the OIG may not make the report publicly available and instead, a brief summary of the report is posted to the Web site. Thank you for your interest in the work of the FDIC OIG. If you have questions or need additional information, please contact the OIG. The html version of this report will be posted as soon as possible.
It looks like the federal government will likely seek U.S. Supreme Court review of Casitas Municipal Water District v. United States, 543 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2008). As noted here, the SG's office has sought and received two extensions of time and the cert petition is now due by July 17, 2009.
In Casitas, the Federal Circuit held that contractual water rights were taken when the federal government required the landowner to construct a fish ladder and divert water in order to protect endangered steelhead trout. The court held that the requirement resulted in a physical diversion of water for public use, and that "Casitas will never, at the end of any period of time, be able to get the water back. The character of the government action was a physical diversion for public use -- the protection of an endangered species." The Federal Circuit's opinion is posted here, and the court's denial of rehearing and rehearing en banc -- which generated concurring and dissenting opinions, see 556 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2009) -- is available here.
The briefs in the court of appeals are not available via PACER, unfortunately, but the mp3 of the oral arguments is posted here. More background from the local paper.
Thanks to New Jersey Eminent Domain Law blog for reminding us of this case.
We predicted this was a case to watch, and we will be following any developments.
Washington, D.C.--The weakening economy and continued credit crunch led to increases in multifamily mortgage delinquencies during the first quarter of 2009, according to the Commercial/Multifamily Delinquency Report, released by the Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA).
Delinquency rates on commercial and multifamily mortgages held by banks and thrifts, by Fannie Mae and in commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) are all now at levels higher than at any time since the 2001 recession but lower than the downturn in the late 80s-early 90s.
I've been reading some noteworthy law journal articles on the subject of eminent domain -- two on the issue of pretext, and one on just compensation. Worth reviewing.
Daniel S. Hafetz, Ferreting Out Favoritism: Bringing Pretext Claims After Kelo, 77 Fordham L. Rev. 3095 (2009).
The plaintiffs in Goldstein based their pretext claims on both Justice John Paul Stevens's brief discussion of pretext in the majority opinion of Kelo and Justice Anthony Kennedy's more lengthy discussion in his concurrence. Acknowledging that "[t]here may be private transfers in which the risk of undetected impermissible favoritism of private parties is so acute that a presumption . . . of invalidity is warranted," Kennedy’s fifth-vote concurrence identified the possibility of "a more stringent standard of review than [rational basis review] for a more narrowly drawn category of takings." Although the Second Circuit rejected the application of this heightened pretext standard in Goldstein, it acknowledged that "Kelo opened up a separate avenue for a takings challenge" where the plaintiff alleges the asserted public purpose is a pretext for bestowing a private benefit.
Daniel B. Kelly, Pretextual Takings: Of Private Developers, Local Governments, and Impermissible Favoritism, 17 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. (forthcoming Summer 2009). inner).
often have mixed motives, particularly when confronted with a firm’s credible threat to relocate. Instead, the Article develops a framework that emphasizes informational differences between local governments and private developers. When the government lacks information regarding the optimal site for an assembly, the government may need to rely on a private party to identify, as well as develop, a particular site. However, when the government itself possesses information regarding the site, precondemnation private involvement, as well as post-condemnation involvement by a preferred developer, is generally unnecessary. Such involvement increases the likelihood of a pretextual transfer without any corresponding public benefit. The Article concludes that a burden-shifting framework, analogous to Title VII’s test for identifying pretext, can be adopted in the takings context. The new framework is then applied to several situations in which allegations of pretext are likely to arise.
Matthew Cory Williams, Restitution, Eminent Domain, and Economic Development: Moving to a Gains-Based Conception of the Takings Clause, 41 Urban Lawyer 183 (Winter 2009) (25th Smith-Babcock-Williams Student Writing Competition Winner).
Post-Kelo, those recognizing the value of eminent domain to aggregate property for redevelopment have suggested that the real focus should not be on whether economic development is a public purpose, but on the amount of compensation given to the takees. Indeed, assuming takees were compensated at the takee’s subjective value, the problem of forcing takees to "sell" their property to the government would be a much less divisive issue. However, current measures of "just compensation" are based on the "fair market value" of the property. In response to this "under compensation," several suggestions have been made on how to raise the level of compensation, and some states have enacted measures aimed at increasing compensation levels. Proposed solutions seek to award some of the benefit of the reaggregation and development of the land, called "after value," to the takees. This article examines whether awarding after value to takees complies with the major purposes of the Takings Clause. While it examines a few of the many proposed ways to award takees a portion of this after value, this article focuses more on whether the general idea of after value complies with the philosophies underlying the Takings Clause.
Article available here for ABA members.
of Loan Modification BEWARED !!!!!
Adam Liptak reports Issue of Property Rights Is Likely to Arise in Sotomayor’s Confirmation Hearings in the June 14, 2009 edition of the New York Times, comparing SCOTUS nominee Sotomayor's decision in an infamous (at least in eminent domain circles) case with the positions of the two Justices most recently confirmed to the Court, Chief Justice Roberts and Associate Justice Alito on a similar issue.
Supreme Court nominees almost never comment on recent decisions from the court they hope to join. But both Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. and Justice Samuel A. Alito Jr. broke with protocol and perhaps prudence at their confirmation hearings when it came to a decision that had been issued just months before, Kelo v. City of New London.
Without quite saying Kelo had been incorrectly decided, both men, at the time federal appeals court judges, spoke at length about their doubts concerning its wisdom and consequences. The decision, a 5-to-4 ruling in 2005, allowed local governments to take private property for business development and provoked outrage across the political spectrum.
Mr. Didden had made arrangements to put a CVS drug store on his lot. At the meeting, the executive, Gregg Wasser, demanded $800,000 as the price for permission to proceed with that project, Mr. Didden said in court papers. The alternative, Mr. Wasser said, according to the papers, was to have the village condemn Mr. Didden’s property so that Mr. Wasser's company could put a Walgreen’s in the same place.
The Second Circuit's unsigned panel order disposed of the case in a mere 1 1/2 pages, agreeing with the district court's dismissal of Didden's challenge for being brought too late, and holding that even if not time-barred, that Kelo "obliges us to conclude that they have articulated no basis upon which relief can be granted." Order at 3.
These type of summary orders by an appellate court are especially frustrating for the parties and their attorneys, because they provide no clue as to the court's rationale, no guidance for future cases, and appear to blow off worthwhile arguments without explanation. The lack of an opinion setting forth the court's rationale also makes it difficult for the losing party to seek further review (the Supreme Court denied cert in this case).
We've summarized Judge Sotomayor's property rights-related decisions in this post, and if she is confirmed, we won't have long to wait to find out her views on regulatory takings since the Court recently accepted review of a case from Florida on takings of beachfront property. That case won't be heard until next term when the new Justice presumably will be on the Court.
The US Court of Appeals has reversed the Court of Federal Claims' dismissal of a takings case, holding the right to develop land is property protected by the Takings Clause. In Schooner Harbor Ventures, Inc. v. United States, No. 2008-5084 (June 16, 2009), the property owner claimed a designation of its property (Site 28) by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service as a critical habitat for the Mississippi Sandhill Crane -- which required it to purchase another parcel as a mitigation measure before it could sell Site 28 to the Navy -- was a taking.
The property owner sought just compensation in an inverse condemnation action in the CFC, which entered summary judgment for the government because the owner failed to assert a property right. The CFC characterized the interest claimed as "the right to sell its property to the government, without conditions imposed, in this instance to meet regulatory burdens imposed on the Navy, by obtaining the mitigation parcel." The CFC's decision is available here.
The Federal Circuit reversed, concluding the CFC misconstrued the property owner's claim, which was not a that it was deprived of its ability to sell to the Navy, but that the critical habitat designation affected its right to sell to any other party, the right to develop the land, and its fee simple title.
This alleged regulation of Schooner Harbor’s right to develop Site 28 would have an obvious impact on any subsequent sale, regardless of the purchaser’s identity—a development-restricted parcel commands a lower price. A lower sale price, of course, is not a restriction on the right of alienation, but rather one effect of a regulation on the right to develop. A detailed reading of Schooner Harbor’s position below and on appeal thus reveals that this alleged regulation of the right to develop Site 28 is also asserted as a taking.
Slip op. at 8-9. The court remanded the case to the CFC for a ripeness determination, and (if ripe), an application of the Penn Central factors to determine whether these property interests were taken.
An additional consideration may arise on remand. The trial court indicated that because the critical habitat designation occurred in 1977, subjecting the property to certain regulatory restrictions, and Schooner Harbor did not purchase the land until 2000, it "stretches the credulity of the court that plaintiff, as a real estate developer, did not do due diligence and was not aware of the protected status of the land at issue." Schooner Harbor, 81 Fed. Cl. at 414. Schooner Harbor’s knowledge of the regulation is not per se dispositive, although it is a factor that may be considered, depending on the circumstances. "A blanket rule that purchasers with notice have no compensation right when a claim becomes ripe is too blunt an instrument to accord with the duty to compensate for what is taken." Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 628 (2001) (rejecting the argument that one who acquires title after the relevant regulation was enacted could never bring a takings claim). Consequently, the trial court must consider if and when any claim ripened as well as all of the factors relevant to Schooner Harbor’s investment-backed expectations.
Slip op. at 12. The oral argument recording is available here (37mb mp3).
The Eminent Domain Law Blog, published by our colleagues at Owners' Counsel of America, has summarized Stop the Beachfront Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Dep't of Environmental Protection, No. 08-11, the takings and due process case which the U.S. Supreme Court agreed yesterday to review.
Beachfront property owners along Florida's Gulfcoast, have been trying to stop an effort by local and state officials to restore the beach through renourishment, a process by which sand is dredged from the ocean floor, transported through pipes and distributed along eroded beach areas, in essence adding sand to widen the beach. This proposed beach renourishment project would cover nearly seven miles of shoreline and widen the beach by approximately 210 feet in Destin, FL.
A key issue in the litigation thus far, which has moved from Circuit Court to the First District Court of Appeal to the Florida Supreme Court, is that by adding sand to the waterfront and restoring the beach, the State of Florida will assume ownership of some of the beach. The property owners have argued that their littoral rights would be limited, amounting to a regulatory taking, without just compensation.
GUEST COLUMN: Do you have to be LEED to be Green?
GUEST COLUMN: Do you have to be LEED to be Green? The green building standard most commonly applied to today’s commercial and residential projects is USGBC’s LEED (Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design) certification, but do you really have to be LEED to be Green? The constraints of the LEED framework have created opportunities for new green building standards to be developed and have influenced LEED’s evolution. Builders and developers are no longer limited to LEED in the design and construction of their green projects.
GREEN Act Reintroduced to House, Praised by Many Washington, D.C.--The GREEN Act, which could potentially raise the bar for environmental performance in affordable housing, is getting a nod of approval from those involved in the multi-housing industry. Bill H.R. 2336 or the Green Resources for Energy Efficient Neighborhoods Act of 2009 (GREEN Act), which was recently reintroduced in the House by Representative Ed Perlmutter (D-Colo.), authorizes new federal resources for green affordable development while providing incentives to the private sector to invest in green affordable homes for low-income people.
An unusual lawsuit filed against a veteran New Jersey real estate attorney by a major title insurance company has caused fellow practitioners to sit up and take notice.
Although the suit was dismissed and it appears that the defendant attorney, Albert Birchwale, did nothing wrong, the Chicago Title Insurance Co. malpractice claim points to a possible pitfall for unwary practitioners in unrelated transactions, reports the New Jersey Law Journal.
Relying on a clean bill of health for a Cliffside Park six-unit apartment building from both a current and former title report, Birchwale helped a client close on the purchase of the building. However, unbeknownst to everyone involved in the transaction, a previous seller had failed to pay estate tax on the building, the legal publication recounts.
Chicago Title contended in the now-dismissed suit that Birchwale should have noted in the title report that a prior sale within the past 10 years was an estate and looked for definitive documentation from the Internal Revenue Service that estate tax had been paid by the previous seller.
Such IRS documentation reportedly did not exist in this case: The previous seller, who has been accused of fraud, allegedly certified himself that no estate tax was due on the property.
It may soon be harder to find experts to testify as witnesses in civil litigation if a trend toward allowing their own clients to sue them for negligence continues.
Courts in California and Utah recently recognized the validity of such suits in cases concerning, respectively, a real estate appraisal and medical testimony by an expert witness, reports the National Law Journal.
In the Utah case, the expert's lawyer, Michael Skolnick of Kipp and Christian in Salt Lake City, says the problem wasn't the way his client testified but the way the plaintiff's counsel handled the underlying medical malpractice case.
A federal appeals court ruling upholding the validity of the lawsuit against the expert, who is a physician, along with similar cases elsewhere, will discourage some experts from testifying—and may sway the testimony of those who do continue to serve as experts, Skolnick and other observers contend. They also predict that a trend toward requiring experts to disclose financial information in court will discourage some from offering their services as witnesses in litigation.
"It encourages the perception that experts are nothing more than hired guns," says Skolnick. "If you make the expert liable to his client, or if his opinion doesn't turn out like the client wants, that discourages experts from serving."
Commercial Appraiser Needed for large valuation project in San Bernardino, CA.
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This case presents an issue of first impression in this Circuit — whether a legislative, generally applicable development condition that does not require the owner to relinquish rights in the real property, as opposed to an adjudicative land-use exaction, should be reviewed pursuant to the ad hoc standards of Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), or the nexus and proportionality standards of Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987), and Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994). We affirm, holding that the Penn Central analysis applies to the 12-inch pipe requirement.
When Daniel and Andrea McClung applied for a permit to build a small business on their property, the City of Sumner, Washington, charged them nearly $50,000 to pay for improvements to the City's entire storm drainage system. The McClungs sued the City under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, whose Takings Clause prohibits the government from "taking" private property for public use without just compensation. They argue that the City cannot force them to pay fees for off-site pipes absent proof that their development would have a specific detrimental effect on the existing drainage system—and without any evidence that the impact was worth $50,000. The Ninth Circuit ruled in favor of the City, reasoning that money is not property (so there could be no unconstitutional taking) and that because the fees were imposed by ordinance (so the City's determination that the pipes needed upgrading was justification enough for the fees). The McClungs have now asked the Supreme Court to review their case. Cato, joined by the Pacific Legal Foundation and the Building Industry Association of Washington, argues that this case is a perfect vehicle for the Court to revisit the scope of Fifth Amendment protections. Our brief highlights the deep divisions among state and federal courts over several important issues, such as whether the Takings Clause applies to legislative (as opposed to bureaucratic) exactions and whether it applies to monetary exactions (not just burdens on land use). The Court should take this case to ensure that the standard for reviewing development conditions is uniform across the country and make clear that property right protections do not depend on ill-defined distinctions such as the form of property demanded by the government or the manner in which a condition is imposed.
The Supreme Court's denial of review does not establish any precedent, and McClung remains good law in the Ninth Circuit.
Appraisers of commercial real estate in the Reno-Sparks area have seen an increase in business as banks keep a close eye on assets backed by real estate loans.
In many cases, land and property owners have had to renegotiate loan terms because of the lower values that appraisers establish.
John Wright, a vice president at Nevada State Bank and a commercial real estate appraiser in the area for more than 25 years, said Nevada State Bank has seen a 20-percent increase in the number of commercial appraisers it hires as the bank closely monitors its assets.
“We are feeling out more appraisal work now than we ever have,” Wright said.
With bank regulators nervous about how current economic conditions might affect the value of commercial real estate secured by loans, commercial appraisers are busy looking at values that were established before rents started falling and occupancy sank.
The demand for commercial reappraisal stems from regulatory reforms established in 1989 in the wake of the savings and loan crisis, said Roger Kadz, senior vice president of Plumas Bank and manager of real estate lending.
“Lenders are bound by that regulation to engage appraisals in conjunction with our loans at any time we see market conditions that have changed,” Kadz said.
Julie Ott of Carter-Ott Appraisal Associates in Reno said her firm has received a growing amount of work as banks take a hard look at property values relative to the loan on a given property.
Wright said appraisal values depend on the type of property, its location and niche in the market. In some cases flat rents and lower occupancies have had minimal impact on the appraised value — maybe a 5-percent or 10-percent decrease. In other cases, though, the decline has been as much as 25 percent to 30 percent.
Wright cautiously points out that appraised value is not the actual value of a property but rather a representation of what the property might sell for on the market.
As reported here, the American Civil Liberties Union of Florida has joined forces with the American Center for Law and Justice to help protect a property owner. It's good to see that these two organizations -- usually on opposite sides in the courtroom -- have put aside their differences and agree that property rights are fundamental and an integral part of the Bill of Rights. Is this a sign of the end times?
In Stone v. Holmes County, No. 09-27ICA (May 21, 2009), the property owner alleges the County widened an easement across his property in retaliation for the owner complaining to the County about his neighbor's use of an easement across his property. The complaint alleges the widening of the easement was done as a favor to the neighbor. The complaint for inverse condemnation is available here.
Joining forces isn't unprecedented: the ACLU Fund of Michigan and the Pacific Legal Foundation jointly filed an amicus brief supporting property owners in County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004), the case in which the Michigan Supreme Court overruled the infamous Poletown case and held that economic development was not a public use under the Michigan Constitution's takings clause. That brief is posted here, courtesy of one of its authors, PLF attorney Tim Sandefur. These two examples highlight what is often forgotten: the right to make reasonable use of property is a fundamental right. See Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972) ("[T]he dichotomy between personal lberties and property rights is a false one.").
Production projects aim to transform old shells with entertainment magic.
hen disaster strikes, the film industry may not be far behind.
Such has been the result in Louisiana, where events, incentives and star-powered endorsements have combined to bring a raft of new film and television production work to the state since Hurricane Katrina. Now the same may hold true for the Detroit metro, with two new studios occupying the former digs of previous economic saviors in the process – thanks to the sponsorship of two Detroit natives, among others.
In early February, Michigan Gov. Jennifer Granholm announced that Motown Motion Pictures, a new venture to be operated by Hollywood-based Raleigh Studios, would invest US$70 million and create 3,600 direct jobs in a 600,000-sq.-ft. (55,740-sq.-m.), nine-sound-stage development in a former General Motors manufacturing facility in Pontiac. The project is being backed by Pontiac native and prominent developer Alfred Taubman, Detroit-based developer Nelson Ventures and Grand Sakwa Properties LLC.
Separately, Wonderstruck Studios, operating in partnership with Los Angeles-based real estate developer SHM Partners as Detroit Center Studios, will produce computer-generated visual effects and animated content at a new 413-employee operation in the former MGM Grand Casino temporary property in downtown Detroit. The company plans to invest $85.9 million in the facility, a former IRS building that MGM occupied temporarily until its new building was complete in late 2007.
The two projects attracted $142.5 million in state incentives from the Michigan Economic Growth Authority, including a 12-year, $101-million state tax credit for the Motown Motion Pictures project.
Like Louisiana, Michigan's film industry is benefiting from new incentives, which, also like the Bayou State, were spurred on in part by celebrity endorsements, from the likes of actor Jeff Daniels and bestselling author Mitch Albom, who in 2008 testimony to state legislators likened California's "it'll never leave" attitude toward its film industry to Detroit's old attitude about its auto industry.
The Detroit metro area has shown impressive project resilience in the face of the automotive industry meltdown, garnering fifth place among Site Selection's Top Metros for corporate facility projects in 2008, even as its unemployment rate reached 13 percent in January 2009, the highest rate among cities with populations of 1 million or more. According to Gov. Granholm, the new film incentives have spurred 70 different film and TV production projects and approximately $430 million in economic activity since being signed into law in April 2008.
Minutes from meetings of the Michigan Film Advisory Commission show that Michelle Richards, the film and video-game entrepreneur behind the Wonderstruck project, has been working on establishing the studio in Detroit for more than a year. In an interview with Crain's Detroit Business, she said the MGM site was chosen from a baker's dozen of sites. She likened the new venture to another SHM project, the Los Angeles Center Studios, which found a home in a former Unocal headquarters.
The state press release said the project considered other sites in China and Korea. In her testimony to state legislators, Richards, a Michigan State University graduate, said she envisioned creating an animation automation pipeline in Michigan to do work currently outsourced to India.
Michael Newport, director of marketing and client development for Raleigh Studios, confirms that incentives drive projects in his business.
"There are great incentives in Louisiana and now Michigan," he says, "so it's natural that studio locations would be the next step in these areas."
Newport says Raleigh Studios was approached by the development groups in the Detroit area to do a studio feasibility study for the area. He says Raleigh is the only independent studio that conducts this type of study for locations, with the intent of being able to manage such studios once they're up and running. He says Raleigh's studios in Baton Rouge and Pontiac will be the only "built-for-production" studios in both states.
Raleigh Studios is growing in Louisiana too. The company in November 2008 teamed with FBT Film & Entertainment, an affiliate of First Bank and Trust, and Blueroom Post to commit to further expansion of production services in Baton Rouge and a new location in New Orleans. Raleigh also operates studios in Manhattan Beach, Calif.; Playa Vista, Calif.; and, soon, in Budapest, Hungary. The Playa Vista campus includes the facility once used to assemble Howard Hughes' famous "Spruce Goose" aircraft, and was the site of a planned $250-million studio project by Dreamworks SKG that fell by the wayside a decade ago.
Newport says Raleigh hears from a lot of economic developers. The company is currently doing a study for an area just outside Park City, Utah, as well as two other North American cities, and has been approached by several foreign countries as well.
I just finished reading a recently-published law review article by Missouri Court of Appeals Judge Harold L. Lowenstein, Redevelopment Condemnations: A Blight or a Blessing upon the Land?, 74 Mo. L. Rev. 30 (2009) (available here).
Despite the efforts of legislatures to reform eminent domain, the exercise of eminent domain for private redevelopment still confers a concentrated benefit on a few while imposing the costs of such redevelopment on a discrete set of property owners. To remedy this imbalance, and to prevent developers and development agencies from abusing this power, this article proposes that property owners be accorded remedies at the beginning as well as at the end of the eminent domain process.
The article recommends redefining blight in "concrete and measurable terms," and allowing courts to undertake "meaningful judicial review" of blight determinations. The article also suggests that precondemnation blight cover damage to property for the "pall cast" by the establishment of a redevelopment district.
Do you have any contacts in or near Sacramento that could do an appraisal for me? I have 11.78 acres of land (parcel number 201-0270-047-0000) in Sacramento, 6.6 acres of which needs to be acquired by SAFCA (Sacramento Area Flood Control Agency). They are offering peanuts for it, quite upsetting actually. They are using appraisals from locations 40 miles away which are valued much lower than my area. This is an unfair practice. That's like me getting an appraisal for my house valued at downtown San Francisco prices... it doesn't make sense. Anyway, I paid about $40,000 per acre a few years ago and they are offering $23,000 per acre. I wouldn't sell in this market, but they are forcing me to sell at a dirt cheap price. I don't want to lose my money on this. Can you assist? Do you have any appraisers or attorneys I can speak with in Sacramento?
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AmiLynne Carroll has invited you to the event 'CREPIG Site Traiing' on Commercial Real Estate Professional Investors Group!
Come share with us in a quick overview of the CREPIG site - it's features, forums and best practice use for all.
Looking to connect with other Real Estate professionals? CREPIG brings to you a common meeting place - now come and learn a little about how to get the most out of the site - and how to do it efficiently at the same time.
Plase click on the link below to register. We look forward to seeing you on Monday at 5pm PST.
In the current economic climate, there is a major scarcity of new primary issuance in the mortgage securitization market. In addition, government strategies to revive mortgage securitization are still under development. Yet, there has been a surge in RE-REMIC (Re-securitization of Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduit Securities) transactions.
What are the federal income tax consequences of sponsoring a RE-REMIC?
How is a RE-REMIC accounted for under U.S. GAAP (Generally Accepted Accounting Principles)?
Read the complete article to equip yourself in navigating the complex terrain, as the industry looks forward to the day when primary issuance of new issue whole loan securitizations will overtake the pace of RE-REMIC activity.
or call 858-736-7788 for event details.
State mandated real estate appraiser training (2,000/3,500 hours) available at $5.00 per hour (payed by trainee), for a total fee of $10,000.00/17,500.00. Training provided by The Harris Company, REA/C, http://www.harriscompanyrec.com a leading Southern California Real Estate Appraiser and Consultant. Trainees should contact the Office of Real Estate Appraisers for other Requirements, We are only offering the Training at this point.
Compensation: This is a Trainee Payed Internship.
DEPARTMENT OF ARMY RANKED ONE OF THE TOP TEN FEDERAL WORKPLACES FOR 2007!
About the Position: Work is performed in an office or similar setting involving everyday risks or discomforts requiring normal safety precautions. The work area contains adequate light, heat and ventilation. It may involve walking, standing, bending or carrying light items. It may involve occasional travel.
Who May Apply: Click here for more information.
Department of Defense employees serving on a Career or Career Conditional Appointment.
NSPS Position: This position is covered by the National Security Personnel System. For more information on NSPS, please visit the website at http://www.cpms.osd.mil/nsps/index.html.
Provide staff planning, management, direction, coordination and devaluation of the South Atlantic Division's operating programs involving the appraisal of real property pertinent to the interests of the U.S. Army, U.S. Air Force, and other customers. Accomplishes staff review of appraisal actions involving real estate aspects of varies single and multi-purpose flood and navigation projects, major integral public recreation sites, navigation projects, fish and wildlife habitats, commercial concession developments and support space and facilities for armed forces installations. Furnish staff approval/disapproval of District appraisal, Real Estate Planning reports, real estate implications of Design Memoranda and related studies. Advise and coordinate with District counterparts regarding the application of appropriate methodology, procedures, principles and practices of sound appraisal management.
NOTE: To be found best qualified, you must describe in detail your specialized experiences associated with this recruitment effort./////SPECIALIZED EXPERIENCES: Expert knowledge of appraisal concepts, principles and methodologies sufficient to appraise and review a broad range of properties with extremely complex characteristics similar to those of a Military base, a variety of diverse recreational, commercial industrial or residential use. Knowledge in appraising and/or reviewing the appraisals of properties that may involve controversial condemnations or whose values have significant impact on the economy of a community and typically involve intense, public or Congressional scrutiny. Mastery skill in providing program and policy guidance to all associated Districts on application of new theories and standards to appraisal problems or assignments where conflicts exist between policy and program objectives.
Resumes will be evaluated to ensure your experience, knowledge, skills, training and/or education meet the qualifications requirements stated in this vacancy announcement.
Your pay will be set within the range specified in this vacancy announcement and will be based on your qualification, education, experience, training, and availability of funds.
Time-in-grade restrictions do not apply to NSPS positions.
PB 2/3 Positions- Applicants must have one year of specialized experience at the next lower pay band or equivalent under the General Schedule (GS) or other pay systems.
Quality of experience relates to how closely or to what extent an applicant's background and recency of experience, education, and training are relevant to the duties and responsibilities of the announced position. Candidates must have the knowledge, skills, abilities and competencies to successfully perform the work of the position at the appropriate level.
Must file annual financial statement.
Resumes will be evaluated for basic qualifications requirements and for the skills needed to perform the duties of the position, as described in this vacancy announcement and identified by the Selecting Official for the position.
Temporary Duty (TDY) travel is 25 percent.
Defense National Relocation Program will be authorized.
Other Advantages: Metro Atlanta is home to more than four million people and more than 120,000 businesses. In fact, metro Atlanta has drawn more in-migration to the area than any area in the nation. The area's low cost of living, high employment and strong, diverse industry base will ensure its continued record-setting growth.
Self-nomination must be submitted by the closing date.
Resume must be on file in our centralized database.
Announcements close at 12:00am (midnight) Eastern Time.
You must have an ACTIVE resume with the Army Centralized Resumix database before you submit your Self-nomination. If you do not have an ACTIVE resume on file, please click here to use the Army Resume Builder to create or update your resume.
Once this announcement closes, candidates will be evaluated using an automated system, (Resumix) which compares your skills and experience as described in your resume with the requirements of the position. If you are found to be a highly qualified candidate, you will be referred to the selecting official for further consideration. (In some cases, individuals with priority for special consideration must be considered and selected before other candidates.) Whether or not you are contacted for an interview depends upon the location of the position and the judgment of the selecting official. You can view the status of announcements that you applied for through our automated response system, ANSWER, accessed through our Civilian Personnel On-Line web page.
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