Source: https://eem.jacksonkelly.com/2014/05/index.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 12:23:05+00:00

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The EPA has finally presented its definition of “waters of the United States” in a proposed rule published on April 21 (79 FR 22188). For environmental lawyers generally and water law practitioners in particular, it has been highly anticipated. It will provide a common set of definitions for use by EPA and the Army Corps of Engineers in Clean Water Act (CWA) permitting for their §402 NPDES and §404 dredge and fill programs, as well as miscellaneous programs administered by both agencies.
Federal agencies, and particularly the EPA, have claimed an accretive authority over all water since the amendment of the CWA in 1977. For persons who have observed this federal encroachment over the course of 35 years, it is unsurprising that the agencies are now poised to assert federal authority over any moist patch of land in the United States. The enlargement of federal authority over water will be felt most acutely by landowners who seek to alter their land on which some water feature is found. As the Supreme Court has stated, “The burden of federal regulation on those who would deposit fill material in locations denominated “waters of the United States” is not trivial. . . The average applicant for an individual permit spends 788 days and $271,596 in completing the process, and the average applicant for a nationwide permit spends 313 days and $28,915—not counting costs of mitigation or design changes.” Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 721 (2006).
Nothing proposed by EPA was unexpected. The agency waited until an advisory panel issued a report last September which provided a fig-leaf for EPA to conclude that its interpretation of “significance” has a scientific foundation. In essence, EPA’s analysis is that water runs downhill, water can be assessed by its chemical, biological and physical parameters, and all water is connected through a hydrologic regime. Because each step of this process can be measured, all water has significance, and hence may be subjected to Congressional authority and jurisdiction under the CWA. In light of this assessment, it should come as little comfort that EPA has announced that it will eschew federal authority over “swimming pools,” “water-filled depressions created incidental to construction activity” and “gullies and rill and non-wetland swales.” 79 FR 22263.
What was unexpected, and is in fact highly interesting, is that EPA chose to include in the proposed rule its legal analysis in support of its rule. It is found at as Appendix B to the proposed rule and comprises nearly ten full pages of text (79 FR 22262-22272). EPA’s legal analysis is nothing short of a recitation of nearly 150 years of Supreme Court jurisprudence over navigable waters that purports to explain the growing Congressional authority over navigable waters under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution (Art. I, Sec. 8, cl. 3 - “The Congress shall have power . . . to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states.”). Make copies of the Federal Register because we are sure to see this history recited the next time the Supreme Court takes up this topic.
EPA would like us to believe that its judgment about the scope of its authority represents the ineluctable progression of Supreme Court decisions since 1870. Nevertheless, two things are curious about its historical recitation of the jurisprudence. First, EPA spends an inordinate number of pages analyzing its authority over interstate, but non-navigable waters. (I do not claim to understand why, but welcome any thoughts from readers who might be able to explain this to me). After all, the last time the Supreme Court considered whether a federal agency had jurisdiction to require a Federal Power Commission license to build dam on an interstate, but non-navigable, river was 1940. United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 311 U.S. 377.
The question was decisively answered, but authority over the New River at Glyn Lyn, Virginia (the site where the dam was constructed to generate electricity) is light years from asserting federal authority over unnamed ephemeral drainages across Central Appalachia. The federal Commerce Clause authority over the New River was predicated on its status as a channel of commerce. To the extent EPA tries to articulate its Commerce Clause power over ephemeral tributary streams, it is under a theory that any activity in such streams affect traditionally navigable waters.
Second, the real focus of EPA’s analysis is the 2006 decision of the Court in Rapanos. More precisely, EPA focuses on the concurring decision of Justice Kennedy in that case, an opinion which surely has become among the most analyzed concurrences in the history of the Court. Whether he intended to or not, Justice Kennedy has assured himself of a commanding position the next time a CWA case is accepted by the Court. To understand why, a quick recitation of Rapanos is necessary.
The case involved an enforcement action by the Corps regarding whether “four Michigan wetlands, which lie near ditches or man-made drains that eventually empty into traditional navigable waters, constitute “waters of the United States” within the meaning of the Act.” 547 U.S. at 729. A four member plurality of the Court concluded that the wetlands could not be regulated under the CWA. The test proposed by the plurality to confer CWA authority would require the lands in question to have some relatively permanent and continuous surface water connection with traditionally navigable waters which in Rapanos were miles distant. Four members of the Court in dissent determined that under existing criteria then relied upon by the Corps, the wetlands did fall within the jurisdiction of the CWA.
For the first time, EPA has chosen to define “tributary” as part of the proposed rule. It is difficult to conclude that the committee which wrote the Appendix B legal analysis read this part of the Kennedy concurrence as it has effectively adopted the very standard that Kennedy found overbroad. He did not invite EPA to promulgate a rule that was unlimited in scope. Nevertheless, by denying that it will assert jurisdiction over water filled depressions created by construction activities, EPA has claimed that it is trimming its authority. What the agency in fact has done is to take snippets of each opinion – the dissent’s conclusion that the CWA jurisdiction is unlimited, the plurality’s continuous surface water connection test, and Kennedy’s attempt to fashion a significant nexus - to reach a rule that is broader than the one Kennedy criticized in Rapanos.
The Court has sought to avoid having to analyze CWA using a Commerce Clause analysis. Such cases are invariably difficult conceptually, involve controversial issues, and rarely command unanimous decisions. The best current formulation of the ability of Congress to assert a federal authority under the Commerce Clause is United State v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
First, Congress may regulate the use of the channels of interstate commerce. . . Second, Congress is empowered to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, even though the threat may come only from intrastate activities. . . Finally, Congress’s commerce authority includes the power to regulate those activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce, i.e activities that substantially affect interstate commerce. 514 U.S. at 558, 559.
Justice Kennedy was part of the majority in Lopez, a case in which he also wrote separately to express his concerns about federal statutes which needlessly intrude in areas which traditionally are understood to be within the province of the states. 514 U.S. at 568-584. Commerce Clause authority over waters has always been analyzed using the first prong of the formulation expressed in Lopez: regulation of the use of channels of interstate commerce. Whether Kennedy will support a federal regulation of all waters based upon a Commerce Clause analysis heretofore not applied to waters (“activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.”) is unclear. He clearly attempted to draw some lines in his Rapanos concurrence, which EPA blows right past in its proposed rule while pretending it is doing otherwise.
The Court has almost begged the executive branch agencies to devise a rule that will recognize recent Supreme Court decisions to avoid such an analysis. As explained by Chief Justice Roberts in a concurring opinion in Rapanos, “Rather than refining its view of its authority in light of our decision in SWANCC [531 U.S. 179, 2001)], and providing guidance meriting deference under our generous standards, the Corps chose to adhere to its essentially boundless view of the scope of its power.” 547 U.S. 758.
The Chief Justice had no idea how prescient his observation was at the time he wrote his concurrence in 2006. We can only imagine what he will think when the Court reviews EPA’s new rule as it invariably will in the future.
A federal court has approved a resolution between EPA and several environmental groups relating to the Agency’s regulation of coal ash.
Under the resolution, EPA must take final action on its proposed revision of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) subtitle D regulations pertaining to coal combustion residuals (CCRs) by December 19, 2014.
On June 21, 2010, the EPA published proposed rules for regulating CCRs, also referred to as coal ash. EPA received over 400,000 comments on the proposed rule, but never took action.
Eleven environmental groups sued the EPA to finalize its CCR rule in April 2012. The Court subsequently granted plaintiffs’ motions for summary judgment, ruling in October 2013 that the EPA had failed to complete the RCRA subtitle D mandate that coal combustion residual regulations must be reviewed every three years and revised if necessary. Appalachian Voices v. McCarthy, No. 12-cv-00523 (D.D.C. Oct. 29, 2013).
The remaining question is this: what will EPA do on December 19, 2014? As described below, the Agency has previously proposed regulating CCRs as a solid waste, but it is possible for the Agency to change course.
The regulations EPA had previously proposed, but not acted on, were under RCRA Subtitle D. The proposed regulations imposed minimum standards for CCRs as solid waste and provided technical assistance to states for their solid waste management programs.
The direction and management of solid waste occurs at the local and state level. Subtitle D does not require permits, and enforcement is by states or citizen suits. The minimum standards cover location, composite liner requirements, groundwater monitoring, closure and post-closure care, and impoundment requirements. The focus of the proposed Subtitle D regulations is landfills and surface impoundments. See Hazardous and Solid Waste Management System; Identification and Listing of Special Waste; Disposal of Coal Combustion Residuals from Electric Utilities, 75 Fed. Reg. 35, 128 (June 21, 2010).
The EPA’s prior proposal sites new landfills away from the water table, wetlands, fault areas, seismic impact zones and unstable areas. Location standards already in place for floodplains, endangered species, and surface waters continue to apply. Existing landfills would be required to comply with floodplain and unstable areas. Lateral expansions of existing landfills would be treated as new sites. The proposed regulations require composite liners at new landfills and impoundments and the retrofit of existing surface impoundments within five years. Existing landfills are not required to have composite liners, but would have to groundwater monitoring, corrective action, and other requirements.
The EPA provided specific criteria to address the day-to-day operation of a landfill or surface impoundment, including controls relating to run-on and runoff from the surface of facilities, discharges to surface waters, pollution caused by windblown dust, and recordkeeping.
The proposed rules require a system of monitoring wells be installed at new and existing landfills and surface impoundments to evaluate groundwater. The closure plans require public notice of the closure and schedule for implementation of plans. Post-closure care is required for 30 years unless the owner meets certain criteria for a proposed reduced period.
The proposed regulations are designed, in part, to encourage the beneficial use of CCRs because the cost of disposing them is going to increase if the states adopt and implement increased regulation. Beneficial use is any use of coal combustion products that that provides a function benefit, such as inclusion for soil enhancing properties or fill projects, provided that all relevant specifications and regulations are met.
But What of Subtitle C Regulations?
The EPA’s proposed coal ash regulations were actually one of two alternative regulatory theories of CCR regulation, “driven in part by the failure of a surface impoundment retaining wall in Kingston, TN in December 2008.” 75 Fed. Reg. 35, 128. The first proposal was to reverse the Bevill determination that (CCRs) were not hazardous waste, and therefore, not regulated under subtitle C of RCRA. Id. CCRs were to be reclassified as “special waste” and “regulated from the point of their generation to the point of their final disposition.” Id. Subtitle C is generally considered to be more restrictive as it creates federal oversight and federal enforcement. Under the second proposal, the EPA would regulate CCRs under subtitle D of RCRA by issuing national minimum criteria. Id.
In its ruling on the motions for summary judgment, the Court carefully explained the difference between the regulatory scope and requirements under Subtitle C and Subtitle D. Appalachian Voices, et al. v. McCarthy, at *2-*3. The environmental plaintiffs sought relief under Subtitle C, as well as Subtitle D, claiming that Subtitle C applied to CCRs because a new testing procedure demonstrated toxicity. Id. at *10. Accordingly, one of the issues before the Court was whether or not Subtitle C applied to CCRs. Id. at *3.
Subtitle C of RCRA regulates hazardous waste from creation, treatment, storage, and disposal. Id. at *2. A waste is hazardous if it exhibits any of four characteristics: ignitability, corrosivity, reactivity, or toxicity. Id. Toxicity is characterized by leaking toxic residues into liquid determined using the EPA’s Toxicity Characteristic Leaching Procedure. Id. The Bevill Amendment required the EPA to complete and submit a study of mining wastes to Congress and then ultimately determine whether mining wastes were regulated by Subtitle C or not. Id. at *3. Ultimately, in 2000, the EPA concluded that CCRs were not hazardous waste subject to Subtitle C. Id.
The Court ruled that Subtitle C did not apply to CCRs, but the EPA did not concede in the federal litigation that Subtitle C could not apply to CCRs. The Court did not address whether or not the EPA has the ability to review a Belvill determination and regulate CCRs under Subtitle C as a “special waste” or otherwise. Id. at *12. While any regulation under Subtitle C, if possible, will not be final by December 19, 2014, the EPA clearly believes that it can re-evaluate CCRs and possibly regulate them under Subtitle C. Id. Indeed, it is entirely possible that EPA will elect to scrap its proposed rule regulating CCRs under Subtitle D when it takes action on December 19, 2014, leaving it free to pursue new rulemaking under Subtitle C.
This article was authored by M. Shane Harvey, Jackson Kelly PLLC. For more information on the author, see here.
Guilty, perhaps, of a poor choice of words, the Coal River Mountain Watch (“CRMW”) recently moved to dismiss one of two parallel complaints against the Office of Surface Mining (“OSM”), noting that its motion signaled a desire to avoid “duplicitous” litigation. See CRMW v. USDOI, C.A. 2:13-26251, Doc. 19 (5/15/14).
The CRMW had previously sued OSM in federal court both in West Virginia and the District of Columbia, charging that a letter issued by OSM originally to address a surface mining permit administration issue in West Virginia was actually a rulemaking. The federal Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (“SMCRA”) requires that challenges to OSM’s nationwide rules be filed in D.C., while challenges to federal rules issued for an individual state program may be filed only in the state to which the rule is applicable. When it filed its original complaints, the CRMW sued OSM in the alternative—claiming that it believed OSM’s letter was a nationwide rule, but that if it was not, then it was a statewide rule applicable to and challengeable only in West Virginia. Now, however, the CRMW claims to have obtained additional evidence that OSM’s letter is a “nationwide” rule that must be challenged in D.C. Accordingly, it has moved to dismiss its West Virginia Complaint.
In October 2013, the CRMW filed two complaints in federal court against OSM: one in West Virginia and one in the District of Columbia. The complaints concern a determination issued by OSM in August 2013 that the West Virginia Department of Environmental Protection (“WVDEP”) had responded appropriately to a federal Ten Day Notice (“TDN”) issued in West Virginia. The TDN related to state-issued permits where mining activity has not commenced within three years of permit issuance. The CRMW claimed originally that OSM’s determination constitutes either a national rulemaking (challengeable only in Washington under SMCRA) or a federal rulemaking for the West Virginia program (challengeable only in West Virginia). See 30 U.S.C. § 1276(a)(1).
In its August 2013 final determination, OSM confirmed WVDEP’s position that mining permits DO NOT automatically terminate if mining has not commenced within the initial three year term of the permit. OSM agreed with WVDEP that termination of a permit beyond its three year term requires some affirmative administrative action at the discretion of WVDEP. Additionally, OSM affirmed WVDEP’s actions to administratively extend the term of the permit at issue in accordance with an internal policy issued by the state in 1993.
While the original citizen complaint, the TDN and the final OSM determination relate to a specific permit, similar issues exist for other mining permits in West Virginia. The complaint identifies 143 permits where mining did not start within the three-year timeframe. Additionally, the CRMW identified in earlier correspondence other mining permits where mining activity commenced after the initial three-year permit term had expired.
A permit terminates if the permittee has not commenced the surface mining operations covered by such permit within three years of the date the permit was issued; Provided, that the Secretary may grant reasonable extensions of time upon a timely showing that such extensions are necessary by reason of litigation precluding such commencement, or threatening substantial economic loss to the permittee, or by reason of conditions beyond the control and without the fault or negligence of the permittee.
W.Va. Code § 22-3-8(a)(3). West Virginia’s Surface Mining and Reclamation rules at CSR § 38-2-3.27.e require requests for extensions to “be specifically set forth in a written approval and made part of the permit. Such extensions shall be made public by the Secretary.” The corresponding federal statute and regulations are virtually the same. See 30 U.S.C. § 126; 30 C.F.R. § 773.19.
A citizen group complained to WVDEP about a permit that was more than three years old, but at which mining activities had not commenced. WVDEP declined to terminate the permit, finding that its own policies called for prior notice to permittees that their permits were set to expire absent the start of mining activities or an extension on the three-year limit. Here, WVDEP conceded that it had failed to follow its own policy for notifying the operator of the approaching three-year permit term.
Shortly thereafter, OSM’s Charleston Field Office (“CFO”) received a citizen complaint and it issued a TDN to WVDEP. That notice required WVDEP to explain why its failure to terminate the permit was not a violation of the federally-approved state mining program. In two rounds of communication, the state agency relied on its own policy as justification for issuing a permit extension after the expiration of the original three year permit term. Subsequently, it allowed the operator to obtain an extension of the obligation to start mining.
The CRMW’s complaints allege that OSM’s determination constitutes fundamental “reinterpretation” of SMCRA that amounts to unlawful rulemaking. To support its contention that OSM’s decision was a rulemaking rather than an informal “adjudication,” the CRMW alleged that OSM has cited and relied on its August 2013 decision to find that other states have acted appropriately by not automatically terminating permits in similar circumstances.
In response to the Complaints, OSM and the CRMW have sparred in both courts. The parties initially agreed that the D.C. District Court should decide which of the two courts should hear the case. OSM moved in the D.C. Court to have the case heard in West Virginia. Subsequently, the CRMW argued that OSM had conceded it was using its August 2013 determination as a national rule. The CRMW then moved to dismiss its West Virginia complaint. OSM has responded by contending that: 1) it has not engaged in any rulemaking; 2) the CRMW’s “real” claim is a challenge to an informal adjudication; and 3) venue for the “real” challenge belongs in West Virginia. Accordingly, it has asked the West Virginia court to stay proceedings there while it pursues a motion to dismiss the rulemaking claim in D.C.
This article was authored by Robert G. McLusky, Jackson Kelly PLLC. For more information on the author, see here.
 Disagreements between primacy states and OSM over the appropriate use of the TDN process began shortly after the federal agency reinstated an internal policy document referred to as INE-35 that governs OSM’s review of individual state permitting actions. In 2008, as a result of another West Virginia permitting dispute where the CFO used a TDN to address a perceived permitting defect, then OSM Director Brent Wahlquist reversed the CFO and suspended INE-35. In 2009, as part of the multi-agency MOU issued by the Obama Administration to better regulate Appalachian surface mining activities, OSM announced it would reinstate INE-35. The use of that guidance and the TDN process to influence state permitting actions is the subject of ongoing federal litigation.
As a result of concerns that hydraulic fracturing could contribute to movement near geologic faults, the Ohio Department of Natural Resources (ODNR) is setting new permitting conditions in earthquake-sensitive areas. Ohio’s new permitting conditions require all new drilling sites within 3 miles of a known fault or seismic activity of 2.0 magnitude or higher to install seismic-monitoring equipment. If the monitors detect a seismic event in excess of 1.0 magnitude, activities would pause while the cause is investigated. If the investigation reveals a probable connection to the hydraulic fracturing process, all well completion operations will be suspended. ODNR will develop new criteria and permit conditions for new applications along with reviewing previously issued permits that have not been drilled. ODNR’s press release and map of sensitive areas may be seen here: http://www2.ohiodnr.gov/news/post/ohio-announces-tougher-permit-conditions-for-drilling-activities-near-faults-and-areas-of-seismic-activity.
This article was authored by Matthew S. Tyree, Jackson Kelly PLLC. For more information on the author, see here.
Dual-Method Selenium Testing: More Fair, or Two Ways to Violate?
The Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) is set to unveil a dual approach to selenium testing next month—one that would overhaul the antiquated testing requirements that are currently in place. According to published reports of remarks made by Elizabeth Southerland, the Office of Water’s Director of Science and Technology, EPA’s new selenium plan will require dischargers to measure both a water column concentration value and a fish-tissue value. While this hybrid approach has been contemplated by EPA for several years, the issue made headlines in 2013 when EPA approved a similar plan in Kentucky that incorporated both water column and fish tissue testing. Environmentalists are wary that a new hybrid testing method will not provide adequate protection to wildlife and will be difficult to enforce. Dischargers and regulators are likewise fearful that this new method will prove difficult to implement, thereby complicating the compliance requirements for dischargers. Despite these concerns, some scientists believe that incorporating fish tissue testing will provide a better indication of any actual harm caused by selenium.
Selenium is a metal-like element—a “metalloid”—discovered in 1818. Selenium occurs naturally in the environment and is nutritionally necessary for humans and a variety of plants and animals. Selenium can be found naturally in some rocks and soils, whereupon weathering and leaching of these substances cause the selenium to enter the groundwater. Selenium is also released during the mining and smelting of certain ores. Given its prevalence in nature, selenium is also released as a result of industrial activities such as coal mining and power generation.
Scientists now know that selenium is what is called a “bioaccumulative” pollutant, meaning that it collects in the tissues of the aquatic organisms that consume materials contaminated with selenium. When the selenium concentration in an organism is too high, the organism cannot dispel the selenium as fast as it accumulates, which leads to toxic buildup. The alleged harm to aquatic life includes causing skeletal deformities and affecting the growth and survival of juvenile fish and the health of their offspring.
In 1987, EPA first regulated selenium due to concerns that excessive selenium could cause harm to certain fish, invertebrates, and the animals that feed off of them. EPA has not updated its selenium criteria since promulgating this initial regulation in 1987, however, despite a wealth of new research over the past 25 years documenting the effects of selenium. Recognizing that time rendered the 1987 data unreliable, EPA attempted to release new selenium guidelines in 2000 and 2004, but those updates never made it past the draft stage and were not implemented.
Historically, EPA has recommended water quality parameters for selenium that limit chronic selenium exposure to 5µg/l (micrograms per liter) and acute exposure to 20µg/l. These water column tests are designed to measure the concentration of selenium in water samples. Under § 303(c) of the Clean Water Act, states have the option to adopt these national recommended standards, or to develop their own water quality standards. While some states have based their standards on EPA’s national criteria, other states have developed their own testing parameters that better address state-specific biological issues. States use their water quality standards to establish permitting criteria under the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (“NPDES”), and issue industrial permits based on compliance with the recommended limits.
Scientists have found evidence that chronic selenium toxicity is primarily a result of the accumulation of selenium inside an organism’s body from its diet, not because of the concentration of selenium in the water itself. This has led to a desire for fish tissue testing, where the selenium levels are measured in the fish tissue, and not in the water itself. For fish tissue testing, fish are collected and tested for the amount of selenium contained either in their whole body or in their eggs and ovaries. “Studies show diet is the principle route of exposure that causes chronic toxicity effects to fish, the group of organisms considered most sensitive to chronic selenium exposure. Tests studying chronic toxicity effects only through water exposure have had questionably low selenium tissue residue.” See Payne, Randall G., Div. of Water, Dep’t for Envtl. Protection, Kentucky Cabinet for Energy and Environment, Update to Kentucky Water Quality Standards for Protection of Aquatic Life: Acute Selenium Criterion and Tissue-Based Selenium Chronic Criteria (“Kentucky Selenium Update”), at *18 (April 3, 2013).
In states that still follow the outdated EPA standards based solely on acute and chronic selenium concentration levels, industrial dischargers have been targeted by suits from environmental groups for selenium discharges in excess of these standards. In light of the bioaccumulative data now available on selenium, states and industrial dischargers think that fish tissue testing is a more accurate and reliable method to measure the potential harm to aquatic life and have pushed for this change. This sentiment was echoed by EPA itself, as EPA’s 2004 draft guidelines were based on whole-body fish tissue concentrations. Given this, the announcement that EPA’s upcoming revision includes fish tissue sampling is unsurprising.
Based on the current science the Cabinet concludes taking a tiered approach for the chronic standard is advisable. Kentucky is utilizing a 5.0 μg/L water column value as threshold for screening purposes as a first step to determining potential selenium toxicity concerns in the waterbody . If the threshold (screening value) of 5.0 μg/L total selenium in the water column is not exceeded, then the water body is considered in attainment of the selenium criterion. If 5.0 μg/L total selenium in the water column is exceeded, this would trigger sampling of fish tissue. If the results of the selenium tissue concentrations do not exceed the criterion associated with the tissue type sampled (whole body or egg/ovary) then the designated use of aquatic life is protected for selenium.
See Kentucky Selenium Update, at *28. The Cabinet acknowledged this process might be difficult to implement, but felt that this two-step process was workable.
Now, it appears that EPA will be adopting a national hybrid program similar to that implemented in Kentucky. This will undoubtedly lead to controversy during the public comment period, as environmentalists have already sued EPA over its approval of the Kentucky plan. Several environmental groups filed suit on December 13, 2013 in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Kentucky, taking issue with: the two-step process of the testing; the proposed selenium standards, which they alleged were too low; and the impact of these new standards on streams without testable fish.
Furthermore, the Frankfurt, Kentucky field office of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Services (“the Service”) also indicated that its approval of the Kentucky plan was misrepresented to the Kentucky legislature. In a December 2013 letter to EPA, the supervisor of the Frankfurt field office wrote that, despite EPA’s assertions that the Service had approved of the science behind the plan, it was his understanding that the Service had requested—and never received—additional information to review and analyze prior to approval.
While the states await the release of EPA’s new federal selenium recommendations, the concerns voiced during the notice and comment period for Kentucky’s plan may shed light on the forthcoming concerns. Environmental groups have voiced countless objections over the fish tissue testing methods, stating that by the time the fish tissue results register as problematic, the harm to the waterway will already have been committed.
While industrial representatives were generally in favor of incorporating fish tissue testing methods, some commentators expressed concern over the implementation of the fish tissue testing plan, and how it would work in conjunction with permitting.
Southerland’s comments indicated that both testing methods would be required for compliance, however, and did not discuss limiting the fish tissue testing to those samples which exceeded a “trigger” concentration level. If both types of testing were to become standard, this would essentially double the amount of testing that needed to be conducted on each body of water and potentially double permit violations if both effluent limitations and fish tissue standards are incorporated into a discharger’s NPDES permit. Whether the benefits of the new testing process will outweigh any extra testing standards or regulatory burdens remains to be seen.
This article was authored by Jennelle D. Arthur, Jackson Kelly PLLC. For more information on the author, see here.

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