Source: https://patentlyo.com/patent/academic-studies/page/3
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 18:28:16+00:00

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For better or worse, provisional patent applications have always been used as a way to delay patent prosecution. The procedure has become popular as a relatively cheap and informal mechanism for preserving priority of invention without losing patent term. Although a provisional application sets a priority date, the application does not even reach the examination queue until the full utility patent application is filed. Thus, on average, each day of delay in filing the utility patent application pushes the issue date back one day as well. However, provisional applications also serve as a mechanism for extending the tail end of the patent term because the twenty-year patent term does not begin to run until filing of the utility patent.
To see how provisional filings are being used, I compiled a set of 65,000 patents that issued sometime between Jan 2007 and Feb 2009 (inclusive). All the patents in the group share the common property of claiming priority only to one or more provisional applications. I additionally excluded patents that made other priority claims such as continuations, divisionals, and continuations-in-part. Once I formed the set of patents, I then looked at the filing date of the provisional application compared with the filing of the utility application to how applicants are using the extra year of deferred examination. For patents claiming priority to multiple provisional applications, I used the date of the earliest filed provisional application.
The graph below shows the result. The vast majority of applicants wait until the year is almost up before taking action and filing the non-provisional application. About two-thirds of the non-provisional applications were filed with less than ten days remaining in the one-year provisional pendency. In over ten percent of the cases, applicants properly filed the non-provisional more than 365 days after the original provisional filing because of weekends, holidays, and/or leap year.
Two weeks ago, I had a conversation with a patent litigator about the propensity of patent attorneys to barely meet deadlines. He was worried about the potential for malpractice claims against his firm. And, here, I found a surprising number of cases that appear to miss the deadline.
My lingering question for patent attorneys and applicants — why delay so long? Is it simply a matter of doing work according to deadline? Does it matter that delaying filing the application also delays the eventual issuance of the patent?
I compiled a list of the over five hundred thousand reference citations in the almost eighteen thousand utility patents issued in the past two months. (Jan 1, 2009 – Feb 18, 2009, excluding reissues and reexaminations). In this sample, the average patent issued with 31 cited references. This is a skewed average – the median patent only cites 15 references. The vast majority of references (77%) are introduced by the applicant during prosecution while less than a quarter (23%) are cited by the examiner.
Patent documents (including US & foreign issued patents and published applications) represent 82% of the cited documents while non-patent literature represents 18% of the total. As was noted in the comments regarding PTO search tools, PTO searches are overwhelmingly focused on patent documents. Thus, 95% of references cited by PTO examiners are patent documents. (See pie chart aside).
Although – on average – applicants submit most of the prior art, Applicants submitted absolutely no references (zero) 15% of the patents in my study, and the median number of references cited by the applicant is only 7. Applicants cite over 200 references in only 2% of cases. The PTO’s stalled IDS rules give the applicant 20 ‘free’ references that can be cited without payment of a fee or further description. About 23% of the issued patents in my sample include more than 20 references cited by the applicant. The chart below is a histogram of applicant submitted references. About 12% of patents are “off the chart.” In those cases the applicant cited more than 40 references.
The next graph shows the average number of applicant-cited references for various top-patenting companies. The size of the blue bar reflects the number of applicant cited reference on average, for that assignee’s Jan-Feb 2009 patents. (Scale at bottom). The graph is sorted so that companies with the greatest average number of cites are shown at the top. Although this is not strictly true, the difference between companies is largely a difference in areas of technology. Thus, companies patenting electronics generally cite less prior art than others. You may also notice in this list that US based companies tend to cite more prior art. The final chart in the series shows that – on average, US assignees submit over three times as many prior art references as do their foreign counterparts or patents without an assignee.
I looked again at patent term adjustments (PTA) for US patents. 3294 utility patents were granted on February 17, 2009. Of those, 2467 (75%) included some patent term adjustment based on PTO delays in prosecution under 35 U.S.C. § 154(b). For each of these patents, some additional quantum of exclusivity is added to the end of the patent term so long as maintenance fees are paid.
The median adjustment was just over one year (376 days) with the average adjustment of 430 days. The longest adjustment in the group was over five years (1958 days). That patent (No. 7,490,438) is directed to an automobile door and is based on an application filed in 2000. In that case, the applicant appealed twice. The examiner was reversed both times. The applicant lost 11 potential PTA days for filing an IDS after the first office action.
I upted the post to clarify that I am talking about Patent Term Adjustment here (PTA) available under 35 U.S.C. § 154(b). PTA applies to patents filed after May 2000.
A patent applicant has several options after receiving a final rejection from a patent examiner. “After final” practice is a matter of strategy, tactics, and art. The primary approaches are (1) abandon the application; (2) appeal to the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI); (3) file a request for continued examination (RCE) arguing against the rejection; or (4) concede scope and narrow the application (probably through an RCE). Each of these approaches differs in cost, timing, and likelihood of success. Of course, success may depend upon whether broad claims are important. And, in the background, applicants know that alternate claims can later be pursued in continuation applications (for a fee).
BPAI Appeals are generally thought to have a higher up-front cost – both in terms of PTO fees and attorney costs. However, if you win, appeals have the benefit of dramatically changing the course of the examination. Often, an applicant’s successful appeal results in an issued patent soon thereafter.
In this study, I looked at law firms involved in ex parte appeals to the BPAI that were decided in the calendar year 2008. Of the 4000+ decisions, only about 75% of the decisions mentioned the law firm name in the case caption. Using those names, I constructed the following table of the firms associated with the most decisions during 2008. It is interesting to compare Oblon Spivak and Sughrue Mion – both firms handle over 3000 patents each year – many of them involving electronics owned by non-US entities. Oblon, however, appears to have taken the strategy of appealing while Sughrue may be using alternate strategies. Foley & Lardner is regularly listed in the top-ten firms in terms of the number of patent grants – however, that firm does not make the list of having the most appeal decisions.
Some words of caution on the numbers game: (1) These are ordinarily dominated by lower cost electronics and software patents. (2) Some clients request that docketing go through their office – in those cases, the firm name would not show up here. (3) Focusing on appeals, it may be that some firms not on the list actually filed more appeal briefs. It turns out that in most cases, examiners withdraw their final rejections in the face of a high quality appeal brief.
The Federal Circuit had done a nice job summarizing their outcomes for the past year. Looking at cases decided on the merits, patent cases arising from district court were affirmed 55% of the time; affirmed-in-part 24% of the time; and reversed 19% of the time.
In two earlier posts, I discussed the BPAI reversal rate (link) and the reopening of prosecution after a reversal (link). In the reversal rate, I also looked at the historic jump in the absolute number of BPAI appeals filed. In FY2008 (ending Sept 30, 2008), the BPAI received over 6,000 ex parte appeals– concluding two consecutive years of over 35% annual growth rate in appeal filings.
Although dramatic, the reported filing increases pale in comparison to those seen in the past four months. The BPAI reports that in the period of Sept-Dec 2008, it received an average of 954 ex parte appeal cases per month. That value is well more than double the monthly average for the same span in 2007.
At this rate, the number of BPAI appeals would easily reach 10,000 in FY2009.
The planned BPAI rule changes may explain at least part of the sudden jump. In a recent presentation, William Smith of Woodcock Washburn stated that the new rules are “onerous and will significantly increase the cost of preparing an Appeal Brief.” [Link]. I have spoken with several patent attorneys who intentionally filed appeal briefs early in order to beat the December 10 deadline. That deadline has now been postponed. If the rules truly are onerous, then we may see a drop in appeals once they become effective.
In an earlier post, I examined what happens to patent applications after the BPAI reverses an examiner rejection. [LINK] This next post looks at the BPAI reversal rate itself. Here, I define the reversal rate as the percentage of cases where the Examiner rejections are completely reversed (as opposed to partial reversals).
Over the past several years, the BPAI reversal rate has dropped dramatically. From FY1999-FY2005, the reversal rate remained relatively steady between 35% and 40%. Then, in FY2006 we began to see a smaller proportion of reversals. By the first two months of FY2009, the reversal rate had dropped to 20%. Part of the drop is likely attributable to new filtering mechanisms that keep low-quality rejections from reaching the Board. The pre-appeal brief conference program started in 2005 and allows a patent applicant to request an internal review of the examiner’s final rejection at the Tech Center (TC) level before an appeal brief is filed. Even if no pre-appeal brief conference request is made, the examiner’s case for a rejection is usually reviewed at the TC level before the examiner is allowed to file a responsive brief.
When the low quality rejections are eliminated from consideration, we should expect that the BPAI reversal rate would drop – as it has. The BPAI is no longer seeing many of the easy reversal cases where the examiner made a clear legal error. Rather, today’s cases before the board tend to be more focused on arguable issues involving obviousness, enablement, and patentable subject matter.
The filters only tell part of the story, and the reversal rate masks the fact that – in absolute numbers – the Board is reversing more cases than ever. Over this same period, the number of appeals filed has increased dramatically. And, although the BPAI has increased its throughput, the backlog has grown five-fold since 2005. These pendency pressures give the Board an incentive to make appeals less hospitable – as we saw with the new (not-yet-final) BPAI appeal rules.
In a recent working paper, two European economists studied the price elasticity of demand for patents based on data from past twenty-five years. Their empirical result – the demand for patents is responsive to price, but relatively inelastic. I have created the following table showing where their result fits in the overall elasticity schema of goods and services.
Historical data is only available for a limited range of pricing schemes. In his paper on Patent Demand Tim Wilson proposes raising the patent filing fee to $50,000 with the assumption that the demand for patents becomes more elastic as the price becomes dramatically higher.
Even after the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI) reverses an examiner’s rejection, the case is returned to the same examiner to ensure that the application is in condition for allowance. 37 CFR 41.54. At that point, the examiner is not allowed to make another search for prior art. However, the examiner may reopen prosecution and enter a new grounds for rejection “[i]f the examiner has specific knowledge of the existence of a particular reference or references which indicate nonpatentability of any of the appealed claims.” MPEP §1214.04. According to the MPEP, reopening prosecution requires written approval of the Technology Center Director.
To get a sense of how this post-reversal process operates in practice, I looked at a set of 149 decisions from 2006 where the BPAI had reversed examiner rejections. In 80% of cases, the examiner accepted the BPAI decision and did not re-open prosecution. In these cases, a patent generally issued within nine-months of the BPAI decision (median of six months) unless the applicant caused some delay. A typical delay is seen in IBM’s Application No. 10/047,116. After winning an appeal on nonobviousness grounds and receiving a notice of allowance, IBM failed to pay the issue fee in a timely fashion. The patent finally issued after the PTO granted a petition to revive.
In the remaining 20% of the reversals, the PTO re-opened prosecution by offering new grounds for rejection. Occasionally the new grounds are suggested by the BPAI but more often they come from the examiner and fall under §101, §103, or §112. The current status of those re-opened cases from my 2006 sample can roughly be broken into thirds: a third of the cases were eventually patented despite the new rejection; a third of the cases are still pending; and a third of the cases were abandoned after the PTO continued to press its case. A handful of the pending cases are on their way to the BPAI for a second go-round.
One PTO insider takes issue with my statement that after being reversed “the examiner is not allowed to make another search for prior art.” The MPEP §1214.04 states that “[t]he examiner should never regard such a reversal as a challenge to make a new search to uncover other and better references.” According to the insider, that statement is not a prohibition on making a new search, but only a “discouragement.” In practice, new searches are conducted and, if new art is found the PTO will reopen prosecution.
In its recently issued en banc majority opinion in In re Bilski, the Federal Circuit articulates a “machine-or-transformation” test for patent-eligible subject matter under § 101 of the Patent Act. Although they are both legitimate questions, this short comment addresses neither whether there is a legitimate statutory basis for this test nor whether Supreme Court precedent should be interpreted so as to mandate (or even support) this test. Rather, it focuses solely on the criteria that the court offers to draw the line between patentable and unpatentable transformations. The Federal Circuit has added a new twist to the tangibility test that has for many years played a role in determining patent-eligibility: the tangibility test has gone “meta.” The tangibility of the formal data that is actually transformed by a method of processing information is not relevant to patent-eligibility, but the tangibility of the things that the data is about—the tangibility of the informational content of the data or the things to which the data refers—now appears to be dispositive.
Bilski sets out a disjunctive two-prong “machine-or-transformation” test for patent-eligible subject matter: “A claimed process is surely patent-eligible subject matter under § 101 if: (1) it is tied to a particular machine or apparatus, or (2) it transforms a particular article into a different state or thing.” Slip op. at 10. The opinion declines to elaborate on the implications of the particular-machine prong of the test because the applicants conceded that their claim did not satisfy this prong. Id. at 24. It addresses only the transformation prong. It puts forward a conjunctive, two-prong test that must be satisfied for a method to “transform a particular article into a different state or thing” and thus to qualify as patent-eligible subject matter. First, the transformation implicated “must be central to the purpose of the claimed process.” Id. In other words, it must also “impose meaningful limits on the claim’s scope” and not “be insignificant extra-solution activity.” Id. Second, the transformation only qualifies as patent-eligible if it transforms a certain type of “article.” “[T]he main aspect of the transformation test that requires clarification here is what sorts of things constitute ‘articles’ such that their transformation is sufficient to impart patent-eligibility under § 101.” Id. at 24–25. This is the distinction—the distinction between the “articles” that, if transformed, constitute patent-eligible subject matter and the other “articles” that, if transformed, do not constitute patent-eligible subject matter—on which the opinion elaborates at length, id. at 25–32, and on which this comment focuses.
Most importantly for the point addressed here, the Federal Circuit implies in Bilski that there are two different categories of “electronically-manipulated data,” id. at 25, and that the data in each category is a different type of “article” insofar as patent-eligibility is concerned. The data in the first category is an “article” that, if transformed by a method claim, constitutes patent-eligible subject matter, but a method that transforms the data in the second category is not a patent-eligible method.
The first category is comprised of data that represents a “physical object or substance.” Id. at 28. For example, citing In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902 (C.C.P.A. 1982), the Federal Circuit stated that a method that transforms data that “clearly represent[s] the physical and tangible objects, namely the structure of bones, organs, and other body tissues” is a patent-eligible method. Slip. op. at 26.
The second category of data seems to have two distinct subsets. The first subset is data that, as claimed, does not represent anything (or, alternatively, that can represent anything). This data is semantically empty; it is a variable without any specified informational content. Bilski again uses Abele—but this time the claims that the court rejected under § 101—as an example. Id. The fact that methods reciting the transformation of this meaningless (or infinitely meaningful) data are not patent-eligible should come as no surprise to those familiar with the history of patent-eligibility in the last several decades: methods that recite the manipulation of variables without semantic meaning are nothing more than methods that recite mathematical algorithms in the abstract.
The second subset of the second category, however, is likely to raise some eyebrows: it contains data that represents something specific or something in particular, but that something represented is itself intangible. Here, the informational content of the data—the thing in the world to which the data refers—is intangible. The Federal Circuit holds that the method at issue in Bilski is not patent-eligible because it “transform[s]” or “manipulat[es]” data representing “public or private legal obligations or relationships, business risks, or other such abstractions,” which critically is not data “representative of physical objects or substances.” Id. at 28.
The idea that the meaning that the user attributes to the data transformed or manipulated by an information processing method is relevant to patent-eligibility is not a novel feature of the “machine-or-transformation” test announced in Bilski. For example, the “concrete, useful and tangible result” test of State Street Bank required the courts to examine the meaning of the data, variables or “numbers” in the course of determining patent-eligibility. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, 149 F.3d 1368, 1373–75 (Fed. Cir. 1998). However, what is new in Bilski is the importance now placed on the physicality of the thing to which the data refers. Thus, the tangibility test has gone “meta”: it is no longer the tangibility of jostling electrons that is of concern (as it was in the early days of patents on computer-executed information processing methods), but the tangibility of the stuff represented by those electrons-as-symbols. In the language of semiotics, the tangibility analysis has shifted from a concern about the tangibility of the signifier—the physical configuration of matter that forms a symbol—to a concern about the tangibility of the signified—the informational content of or the thing represented by the symbol.
There is in my opinion much that needs to be said about this move in Bilski that takes the long-standing concern about tangibility in the patent-eligibility analysis “meta,” transforming it from a concern about a signifier to a concern about a signified. Here, however, I limit myself to raising two initial, narrow questions.
First, the move raises a normative question: Why should we treat information about tangible things in a manner that is categorically different from the manner in which we treat information about intangible things? Having taken its cue from the Supreme Court, the Federal Circuit clearly wants to prevent patent-eligible method claims from pre-empting mathematical “fundamental principles.” Slip op. at 26. However, the most appropriate means to achieve this end would seem to be a focus on the specificity, not the intangibility, of what is meant. Why should the manipulation of data that represents my height (a presumptively physical property of my body) be patentable, yet the manipulation of data that represents my expected longevity (a property that is difficult to classify as a physical one) be unpatentable?
Second, the move raises concerns about administrability. Is data about my expected longevity about something physical, namely my body? If it is, then why isn’t the data at issue in Bilski also about something tangible? The data is after all about a property of lumps of coal, namely their expected future rate of consumption or the legal rights that individuals have with respect to them. Or, to formulate the administrability problem in a recursive manner, what about data that is about the structural qualities of electronic signals? To determine whether a method that manipulates such data is patent-eligible, it would seem again to be necessary to confront the tangibility of an electronic signal—the very question that patent doctrine has been trying to render irrelevant for several decades—but this time with the signal as a signified rather than as a signifier.
The patent laws promote an early filing doctrine. Most directly, by filing patent application documents early, an applicant can avoid problems created by pre-filing disclosures that can negate patentability. Inter alia, early filing also provides a presumptive date of invention and reduction to practice that may have important evidentiary benefits for the applicant. Some doctrines push against early filing. Notably, earlier filed applications may be more likely to have inadequate disclosure. A rushed disclosure could result in the patent application being rejected under the utility, written description, or enablement requirements of the Patent Act. Alternatively, if the application is filed prior to gaining an understanding of the eventual market, an applicant may have insufficient disclosure to support the most valuable claims potential.
At the time of filing, the applicant must provide a complete description including the best mode contemplated by the inventor. However, many if not most patent applications are filed well before the associated product or method is ready for public consumption – before the inventor knows the best commercially viable mode. Post-application developments could take any number of forms, such as particularly operative formulations; ideal antibiotic manufacturing parameters; software code that implements a novel algorithm; a more durable circuit arrangement; etc. Commonly, these tweaks and advances may take the form of a specific species of a disclosed and claimed genus. Of course, this later-stage developments could be incredibly important to anyone wanting to practice the invention or develop some follow-on technology.
Even though product development typically continues after the patent application is filed, the law allows the patent applicant to legitimately keep any later developed information as trade secret. Patent applications are not allowed to add ‘new matter’ to a patent application during prosecution. Likewise, the applicant has no duty to otherwise inform the patent office or the public of ongoing development. Rather, the application is set at filing and ex post developments are generally irrelevant to patentability.
In a later post, I’ll explore whether this potential overlap of patent and trade secret rights is good from a policy perspective.
 35 U.S.C. §102(b). This is especially critical if filing foreign applications.
 See, for example, 35 U.S.C. §102(g) and §102(a).
 See 35 U.S.C. §101 and §112¶1.
 There may be some exception here when arguing secondary factors of nonobviousness.
On Friday, I will be speaking at the Seton Hall Law Review’s Health Law Symposium. This year’s topic is focused: Preparing for a Pharmaceutical Response to Pandemic Influenza. [LINK] A portion of my talk will focus on how patent law may react during a public health crisis.
The reality is that in a pandemic situation, the patent rights covering important treatments will be ignored. Under TRIPS, during a national emergency would-be patent infringement becomes a legitimate unauthorized use. At some later point, the patent holder should receive payment based on “the economic value of the authorization.” In all likelihood, however, that ex-post payment will be a small fraction of the potential monopoly profits that could have been earned.
There are several legal avenues to allow “unauthorized use” in the US. One avenue is by denying injunctive relief. Even before eBay, no court would order an injunction in the face of a public health crisis that could be mitigated by allowing infringement. The test for injunctive relief specifically looks to the public interest. And here, easy access to treatments would weigh heavily in the public interest. Further, a patentee has no right to injunctive relief if the infringer is the US Government. 28 U.S.C. §1498. Thus, another avenue for unauthorized use is through direct government intervention. In 2001, Congress and the Administration were reported to have seriously considered “breaking” Bayer’s patent on Cipro in order to stockpile the drug against a potential anthrax attack. In the Cipro case, the Government apparently used the threat of breaking the patent to negotiate a long-term contract with Bayer at an unusually low price. This approach might be termed ‘bending’ the patent. Individual states within the US may also apply pressure and threat of unauthorized use while retaining immunity from suit under the 11th Amendment of the Constitution.
What Incentive?: We all understand that governments will not be able to avoid the temptation of breaking (or bending) patents covering important treatments that may be useful in some future crisis. Unfortunately, this prediction of the likely future greatly diminishes today’s incentives to innovate crisis-specific treatments. Many empirical questions remain: Will the ex post compensation be a sufficient incentive to innovate? Will the most valuable treatments have non-crisis uses where patent rights will operate more normally? Are the potential crises so well defined that a grant or prize system could work better?
The tables below show patenting and patent application data for patents relating to influenza (search influenz$). For applications filed in 2001, almost 2,500 have been published. Less than 50% of those published applications have issued as patents in the seven year interim. Although we will never be sure, it looks like a little under 20% of the “influenza” applications filed in 2001 kept secret rather than publishing.
The next chart shows the average number of non-patent references cited in the influenza patents as compared to patents in general.
Does the Piracy Paradox apply for Patents?
A 2006 paper by Kal Raustiala (UCLA) and Chris Sprigman (UVA) titled the Piracy Paradox discusses intellectual property and the fashion industry. The authors conclude that the legal ability of manufacturers to create knock-off versions of fashion designs actually promotes innovation and investment in that industry. Similar phenomena have been explained in other industries. In music, for instance, some studies have shown that peer-to-peer file sharing of copyrighted work actually increases sales because of the increased popularity of the artist. Since the dawn of radio, record companies have paid stations to broadcast their music – even though the broadcast would be considered infringement.
My question is whether there are patent specific examples of this process going on? Are there times when ‘piracy’ of a technology actually encourages further R&D?
The graph below shows the average number of claims filed with each patent application. I used as my sample 400,000+ original published patent applications. “Original” means that these applications do not claim priority back to an earlier filing. The trend leading up to late 2004 was a very slight (but statistically significant) rise in the total number of claims being filed. Then, in late 2004, we see a sudden drop. Over a one-month time period, the average number of claims dropped from about twenty six claims per application to about twenty two claims per application.
The simple explanation for that change is that the Patent Office dramatically increased its prosecution fees. Instead of charging $18 for each additional claim (over 20), applicants who filed on or after December 8, 2004 were required to pay $50 per additional claim. At the same time, independent claim fees were also more than doubled from $86 per additional independent claim to $200. The PTO also began charging a hefty fee for patent applications that were exceedingly long. All these forces came together to give applicants a clear incentive to forgo potential claim scope in favor of reducing the up-front fees. Since January 2004, the number of claims has continued to fall slightly (but significantly).
This change is good. Applicants will tend to drop red-herring and worthless claims. That in-turn will hopefully lead to tighter prosecution times and more clarity of claim scope.
Distance Collaboration: Patent No 7,343,719 is interesting to me because it list 30 different US inventors coming from nine different US states: Illinois, California, Tennessee, Connecticut, Texas, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Wisconsin, and Florida. Have the tools of modern communication changed the nature of invention? The patent covers a machine that cooks and packages French fries.
Information Disclosure: Less is More for PTO?
The PTO hopes to change the disclosure requirement of Rule 56. The PTO does not want more references – it already has millions stored in its electronic databases. Rather, the PTO wants practitioners to perform a preliminary search and distinctly point out the closest features of the prior art. In tension with the PTO’s desires are the multiple cases finding patents unenforceable due to applicants failure to submit relevant prior art to the PTO. Based on those cases and on the increased potential value of patent rights, patent applicants have dramatically increased the number of references cited in each application. (See first chart on right showing rise of references over time). In my sample of 500,000+ patents issued 1971-2008, the average number of references cited on the face of patents rose five-fold – from fewer than five in 1971 to more than twenty-five in 2008. On the other hand, it seems that the increase of prior art is largely due to patent applicant activity. In particular, on their own, examiners only discover [cite] around six or seven references – even when the applicant submits no prior art at all.
This result is shown in the second chart which compares the number of references cited in issued patents from 2006-2007 where the applicant filed an information disclosure statement (IDS) versus those where no IDS was filed.
I don’t have the answer, but I do know that virtually no one reads all the references when more than thirty are submitted (except in litigation down the line).

References: § 154
 § 154
 §1214
 Application No. 10
 §101
 §103
 §112
 §1214
 § 101
 § 101
 § 101
 § 101
 v. 
 §102
 §102
 §102
 §101
 §112
 §1498