Source: https://www.ruaneattorneys.com/connecticut-criminal-defense/connecticut-drug-defense/connecticut-drug-laws/
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 06:39:16+00:00

Document:
As used in these criminal statutes “possession” means an intentional control of the controlled substance accompanied by a knowledge of its character. Thus, in order for the state to convict of possession of any controlled substance, it must prove three separate things: (1) that the defendant knew the character of the substance, (2) knew of its presence, and (3) exercised dominion and control over it.
The essence of exercising control over a controlled substance is not the act of control but the act of being in a position of control coupled with the requisite mental state. The control must be exercised intentionally and with the knowledge of the character of the controlled substance. Depending on the circumstances the jury may infer, from the fact that the defendant was in possession of the substance, that he knew of its character and presence.
Possession of a controlled substance may be actual, or it may be constructive. Although both actual and constructive possession require the elements of knowledge and control described above, the concept of constructive possession involves the situation in which the defendant, although not in actual possession of the substance—e.g., it is not on his person or so close to him as to be functionally on his person—knowingly has the power and the intention at a given time of exercising dominion and control over the substance.
Where the defendant is in exclusive possession of the premises where the illegal substance is found, it may be inferred from that possession that he knew of its presence and character, and that he had control of it. State v. Alfonso, 195 Conn. 624, 490 A.2d 75 (1985). One who owns or exercises dominion over an automobile in which an illegal substance is concealed may be deemed to possess the substance. State v. Delossantos, 211 Conn. 258, 559 A.2d 164 (1989). Thus, where the defendant was in exclusive possession of an automobile and had exclusive access to its locked glove compartment in which the substance was found, the jury could infer that he had control over the substance and knew of its character. State v. Lee, 32 Conn.App. 84, 628 A.2d 1318 (1993).
Where, however, the defendant is not in exclusive possession of the premises where the illegal substance is found, it may not be inferred that he knew of its presence and character, and had control of the substance, unless there are other incriminating statements or circumstances tending to support such an inference. State v. Alfonso, 195 Conn. 624, 490 A.2d 75. Thus, where the substance was found in a common area of the defendant’s room that he shared with roommates, it was not found among his personal belongings, and there was no evidence that he had used the substance in the past, there was insufficient evidence of constructive possession by the defendant. Id. Similarly, it cannot be reasonably inferred solely from the fact that the defendant was one of several occupants of a vehicle that he knew of the presence of contraband in the vehicle. State v. Delossantos, 211 Conn. 258, 559 A.2d 164. Where, however, there are such additional incriminating statements or circumstances indicating the defendant’s knowledge of the presence of the contraband and of its character, the fact that the defendant was not the sole occupant of the vehicle will not preclude a finding of constructive possession. State v. Pena, 16 Conn. App. 518 (1988).
On the same principle, the mere presence of the defendant in the vicinity of an illegal substance is insufficient to support an inference of possession without some additional fact connecting him to the contraband. Thus, where the drugs were found under the siding of a house adjacent to a public street on which there was a history of heavy drug activity, the fact that the defendant was observed in front of the house, bending over as if to tie his shoe when approached by the police, was insufficient to support an inference that he had constructive possession of the contraband under the house siding. Although there was evidence that several cars had approached the defendant over a short period of time as he stood in front of the house, there was no evidence that the defendant had given anything to their occupants, that there was any connection between the defendant and the drugs found under the house siding, or that the defendant had said anything incriminating. In re Benjamin C., 22 Conn. App. 458 (1990). Furthermore, there is no minimum amount of illegal substance that is required to constitute illegal possession. A trace amount or residue will suffice. State v. Johnson, 26 Conn. App. 779 (1992).
“Possess” means to have physical possession or otherwise to exercise dominion or control over tangible property. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-3(2).
Where the state charges the defendant with possession with intent to sell, the defendant’s intent, as in other cases in the criminal law, may be inferred from circumstantial evidence. Thus, such intent may be inferred from evidence such as a large amount of drugs found in the defendant’s possession inconsistent with an amount held for personal use, the evidence that the defendant was not a personal user, and the evidence that a gun was found with the drugs. State v. Avila, 166 Conn. 569 (1974). Other circumstantial evidence bearing on the question of an intent to sell is the absence of any drug paraphernalia indicating personal use, the packaging of the drugs consistent with sales, and the defendant’s interaction with other persons at the time of the possession. State v. Conley, 31 Conn. App. 548 (1993). It has been recognized as common knowledge that cocaine is often packaged as a white powder in small plastic bags. State v. Delossantos, 211 Conn. 258 (1989). The fact alone that the amount found was small will not, however, preclude a finding of an intent to sell, if there is other evidence indicating such an intent, such as the manner of packaging consistent with selling, and the fact that the defendant maintained three addresses, a behavior characteristic of drug dealers. State v. Whittingham, 18 Conn. App. 406 (1989). Under C.G.S.A. § 21a-278(a), it is a specific offense to sell or possess with the intent to sell a compound or substance “containing an aggregate weight of one ounce or more” of certain controlled substances. It has not yet been decided whether this means whether (1) the state must prove that the compound or substance contains one ounce or more of the controlled substance in its pure form, or (2) the compound or substance containing the controlled substance must weigh one ounce or more. The Supreme Court found it unnecessary to decide the question in the case in which it was raised, because the unchallenged evidence indicated that the compound or substance contained more than one ounce of pure cocaine. State v. Delossantos, 211 Conn. 258 (1989).
The statute sets up three elements, all of which must be established beyond a reasonable doubt in order to justify a finding of guilty: (1) the defendant had possession of a substance; (2) the substance was a narcotic substance; and (3) he possessed it with the intent to sell it.The first element is that the defendant had possession of a substance. This element of possession means that the defendant knew of the narcotic character of the substance, that he knew of its presence, and that he exercised dominion and control over it. It is not necessary, however, that the defendant actually had the substance on his person, although that is one form of possession. It means having dominion and control over the substance, even though it is not on the defendant’s person. As long as the substance is in a place where it is subject to the defendant’s dominion and control, where the defendant can, if he wishes, go and get it, it is in his possession; and that possession is illegal if the defendant knew of the narcotic character of the substance, and knew of its presence.
The second element is that the substance of which the defendant had possession was a narcotic substance. The amount of the narcotic substance which the defendant possessed is immaterial. Any amount, however slight, is sufficient.
The third element of this offense is that the defendant possessed the narcotic substance with the intent to sell it. The word “sell” here has a much broader meaning than it does in ordinary usage. It is not confined to a delivery of narcotics which is paid for by someone else. Under our statute (§ 21a-240(50)), a sale is any form of delivery, and it includes a barter, which is a trade of one thing for another. It also includes any exchange of narcotics for something else. It also includes a gift of the narcotic substance, which does not require that the defendant received or expected to receive anything in payment or exchange for it.
A “delivery” of a narcotic substance, insofar as that word applies here, means an actual or an attempted transfer from one person to another. It may be that the defendant intended to make the delivery personally, but that is not necessary. It is also sufficient if the defendant intended that the delivery be done by the defendant’s agent, that is, by someone else who is acting for him and under his control. It is not necessary that any sale actually occurred. It is only necessary that the defendant intended that a sale, as defined here, occur.
Furthermore, it is not necessary that the defendant intended to make the sale in person. The statutory definition of “sale”, insofar as it applies here, includes “each such transaction made by any person whether as principal, agent, servant or employee.” Therefore, if the defendant intended that the sale was to be carried out by someone else who was in fact his agent, servant or employee, the defendant would be legally responsible for the sale.
The statute defining this offense imposes punishment on any person who (sells / possesses with the intent to sell) to another person any controlled substance in or on, or within one thousand five hundred feet of the real property comprising (a public or private elementary or secondary school / a public housing project / a licensed child day care center that is identified as a child day care center by a sign posted in a conspicuous place).
The state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 1) the defendant (sold / possessed with the intent to sell) a controlled substance and 2) that this occurred in or on, or within 1500 feet of the real property of a specific prohibited place.
The first element is that the defendant (sold / possessed with the intent to sell) to another person a controlled substance. “Sale” is any form of delivery, which includes barter, exchange or gift, or offer therefore, and each such transaction made by any person whether as principal, proprietor, agent, servant or employee.”Possession” means either actual possession or constructive possession. Actual possession means actual physical possession, such as having the object on one’s person. Constructive possession means having the object in a place under one’s dominion and control. Possession also requires that the defendant knew that (he/she) was in possession of the controlled substance. That is, that (he/she) was aware that (he/she) was in possession of it and was aware of its nature. The state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew that (he/she) was in possession of the controlled substance.
Conviction for possession of a controlled substance with the intent to sell requires proof of the specific intent to sell the controlled substance. A person acts “intentionally” with respect to a result when (his/her) conscious objective is to cause such result. A jury should consider all of the surrounding circumstances in determining whether the defendant had the intent to sell.
Drug dependency, or being a “drug dependant person”, is an affirmative defense to the sale and possession of controlled substance. As an affirmative defense to these charges a defendant claiming drug dependence will be required to prove such dependence by a preponderance of the evidence. Conversely, the fact that a person is not drug dependant is not an element or aggravating factor of the underlying drug offense that the prosecution will be required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Ray, 290 Conn. 602 (2009).
If you are a drug dependant person, you are not exempt from the typical penalties. However, this defense allows the court to consider alternative sentencing supervision options that will allow and encourage the defendant’s rehabilitation.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 21a-269. Burden of proof of exception, excuse, proviso or exemption.
In any complaint, information or indictment, and in any action or proceeding brought for the enforcement of any provision of this part, it shall not be necessary to negative any exception, excuse, proviso or exemption contained in said section, and the burden of proof of any such exception, excuse, proviso or exemption shall be upon the defendant.
To establish the crime of conspiracy under § 53a-48 of the General Statutes, the state must show that there was an agreement between two or more persons to engage in conduct constituting a crime and that the agreement was followed by an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy by any one of the conspirators. The state must also show intent on the part of the accused that conduct constituting a crime be performed. The existence of a formal agreement between the parties need not be proved; it is sufficient to show that they are “knowingly engaged in a mutual plan to do a forbidden act.” State v. Holmes, 160 Conn. 140, 149, 274 A.2d 153. A conviction of the crime of conspiracy can be based on circumstantial evidence, for conspiracies, by their very nature, are formed in secret and only rarely can be proved otherwise than circumstantial evidence.
There are, therefore, three elements to this crime: (1) an intent that criminal conduct be performed; (2) an agreement with one or more persons to engage in or cause the performance of that conduct; and (3) the commission of an overt act in pursuance of the agreement, by any one or more of the persons who made the agreement.
The first element is that the defendant had the intent that conduct constituting a crime be performed. The defendant must be proven to have been actuated by criminal intent. It is not necessary, however, that the defendant intended to commit a crime. It is only necessary that he intended that certain conduct, which if performed would constitute a crime, be performed or take place.
Attempt and conspiracy are crimes of the same grade and degree as the most serious offense which is attempted or is an object of the conspiracy, except that an attempt or conspiracy to commit a class A felony is a class B felony.

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 53
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 21
 v. 
 v. 
 § 21
 § 53
 v.