Source: https://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-supreme-court/264/95.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 11:21:18+00:00

Document:
[264 U.S. 95, 96] Mr. Allyn Smith, of Cotter, Ark., for plaintiffs in error.
[264 U.S. 95, 97] Messrs. Solicitor General Beck and George Ross Hull, both of Washington, D. C., for the United States.
Plaintiffs in error challenged the jurisdiction of the court below- United States District Court, Western Division of the Western District of Missouri-to try and punish them for disobeying its order, upon the ground that the contumacious acts occurred in another division of the district. Only the question of jurisdiction is here.
Counsel for plaintiffs in error maintain that ordinary contempts punishable by courts of equity without trial by jury differ radically from the 'statutory contempt' here disclosed, which, under the Clayton Act, must be dealt with as a criminal offense. And they insist that sections 51, 52, [264 U.S. 95, 102] and 53, Judicial Code (Comp. St. 1033-1035), control the venue when such 'statutory contempt' is alleged.
None of the cited Code sections makes specific reference to comtempt proceedings. These are sui generis-neither civil actions nor prosecutions for offenses, within the ordinary meaning of those terms-and exertions of the power inherent in all courts to enforce obedience, something they must possess in order properly to perform their functions. Bessette v. W. B. Conkey Co., 194 U.S. 324, 326 , 24 S. Sup. Ct. 665. [264 U.S. 95, 104] To disobey a judicial order is not declared criminal by the Clayton Act. It recognizes that such disobedience may be contempt and, having prescribed limitations, leaves the court to deal with the offender. While it gives the right to trial by jury and restricts the punishment, it also clearly recognizes the distinction between 'proceeding for contempt' and 'criminal prosecution.' 'No proceeding for contempt shall be instituted against any person unless begun within one year from the date of the act complained of; nor shall any such proceeding be a bar to any criminal prosecution for the same act or acts.' Section 25.
The following cases are in point: Eilenbecker v. District Court of Plymouth County, 134 U.S. 31 , 35, et seq., 10 Sup. Ct. 424; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447, 489 , 155 S. U. S. 3, 14 Sup. Ct. 1125, 15 Sup. Ct. 19; In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 594 , 596 S., 599, 15 Sup. Ct. 900; Bessette v. W. B. Conkey Co., supra, p. 326, 327 (24 Sup. Ct. 665); Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441 , 450 S., 31 Sup. Ct. 492, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 874; Binkley v. United States (C. C. A.) 282 Fed. 244; McGibbony v. Lancaster (C. C. A.) 286 Fed. 129; Dunham v. United States (C. C. A.) 289 Fed. 376; McCourtney v. United States (C. C. A.) 291 Fed. 497.
Gompers v. United States, 233 U.S. 604 , 34 Sup. Ct. 693, Ann. Cas. 1915D, 1044, does not support the claim that the challenged contempt proceedings amounted to prosecution for a criminal offense within the intendment of section 53, Judicial Code. While contempt may be an offense against the law and subject to appropriate punishment, certain it is that since the foundation of our government proceedings to punish such offenses have been- [264 U.S. 95, 105] regarded as sui generis and not 'criminal prosecutions' within the Sixth Amendment or common understanding.
[ Footnote 1 ] Sec. 21. That any person who shall willfully disobey any lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command of any District Court of the United States or any court of the District of Columbia by doing any act or thing therein, or thereby forbidden to be done by him, if the act or thing so done by him be of such character as to constitute also a creminal offense under any statute of the United States, or under the laws of any state in which the act was committed, shall be proceeded against for his said contempt as hereinafter provided.

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