Source: http://www.garyrosenberg-law.com/blog/2012/july/jury-verdict-in-pedestrian-knockdown-against-wei/
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 16:36:01+00:00

Document:
Plaintiff MIGUEL AGUI (AGUI) moves, in this pedestrian knockdown action, pursuant to CPLR Rule 4404(a), to set aside the June 3, 2011jury verdict on liability in favor of defendants ADRIAN E. FERNANDEZ (FERNANDEZ) and MAURCIO MARTINEZ (MARTINEZ) as contrary to the weight of the evidence and seeks a new trial.
The Court finds that the June 3, 2011 jury verdict on liability in the instant action is contrary to the weight of the evidence for the reasons to be explained. Therefore, the June 3, 2011jury verdict on liability is set aside and a new trial is ordered.
Plaintiff AGUI, a pedestrian, was involved in an accident with the motor vehicle owned by defendant FERNANDEZ, who was not present at the accident, and operated by defendant MARTINEZ, on April 23, 2009, at about 8:45 A.M., at the intersection of 81st Street and 17th Avenue, Brooklyn, New York. Plaintiff AGUI testified at trial that he was crossing 17th Avenue westbound in a marked crosswalk when defendants' motor vehicle, traveling eastbound on 81th Street made a left turn onto 17th Avenue and struck him. Moreover, plaintiff AGUI testified that when he got to the corner the traffic light was green for traffic on 17th Avenue and that the "DON'T WALK" sign was flashing. After waiting for the light to change, the "WALK" sign appeared and plaintiff AGUI started to cross 17th Avenue. Defendant MARTINEZ testified that he made a left turn onto 17th Avenue and heard a bump on the right side of his car. Further, he testified several times at trial that he never saw plaintiff AGUI prior to hearing the bump on the right side of his car, as well as in testifying to this in portions of his February 10, 2010 examination before trial, which plaintiff's counsel read into the record as part of his direct case. However, the jury found for defendants on liability by answering "No" to the first question on the verdict sheet, "Were the defendants ADRIAN E. FERNANDEZ and MAURICIO MARTINEZ negligent."
Q. "Did you intend to go straight at that intersection or make a turn?
A. No, make a turn.
Q. "While you were stopped, did you look to see whether there were any pedestrians waiting to cross the street?
Q. Did you see any?
Q. "So after ten seconds the light changed to green?
Q. Did you start to make your left turn?
Q. When the light changed, did you see any pedestrians?
Q. How far through the turn did you get before an accident happened?
A. I crossed the white lines, passed the lines.
Q. Were there marked crosswalks at that intersection?
A. I think it's a white line."
Q. "When you started to turn left, where were you looking?
A. I looked to see if I saw any pedestrians or cars. I was looking from the left.
Q. Did you see any pedestrians or cars.
Q. Did you have an accident that day?
THE COURT: The question is, "Did you have an accident with a pedestrian?"
MR. RAPPAPORT [plaintiff's counsel]: No, I skipped that one because there was no response.
THE COURT: Okay, so you went to Line 11.
Q. "Did you have an accident that day?
Q. Was that with a pedestrian?
Q. Did you see him before the accident occurred?
Q. Did you ever see the plaintiff before the accident happened?
Q. Were you looking straight ahead?
THE COURT: You didn't see him? Yes or no, did you see him?
Q. You didn't see him?
A. I didn't see him.
Q. And you were looking in front?
Q. Did you see anybody there?
A. I don't see anybody. I didn't see anybody.
Q. Now, as you made the turn it's your testimony you didn't see anything?
Q. Now the bump you say that you heard was near your right front tire; is that right?
A. On the side of the car.
Q. On the side near the right front tire; is that right?
Q. So therefore, your right front tire would be where this "X" is; is that right?
A. No, that's where I heard the bump.
that the bump took place where the "X" is no?
Q. You also testified right after the bump you stopped, didn't you testify to that?
Q. Would you agree that when you stopped your van that part of your van was still in the crosswalk?
Q. Now, you got out of the van, right?
Q. The first knowledge you had of this accident was when you felt a bump; is that right?
Therefore, the jury's verdict on liability in the instant actions is clearly against the weight of the evidence and is vacated. The Court, in Barbieri v. Vokoun (72 AD3d 853, 856 [2d Dept 2010]), instructed: The defendant has a statutory duty to use due care to avoid colliding with pedestrians on the roadway (see Vehicle and Traffic Law Sec. 1146), as well as a common‑law duty to see that which he should have seen through the proper use of his senses (see Domanova v. State of New York, 41 AD3d 633, 634 [2d Dept 2006]; Larsen v. Spano, 35 AD3d 820 [2d Dept 2006]) ... Under these circumstances, the verdict could not have been reached on any fair interpretation of the evidence.
Motion after trial where jury required. After a trial of a cause of action or issue triable of right by a jury, upon the motion of any party or on its own initiative, the court may set aside a verdict or any judgment entered thereon and direct that judgment be entered in favor of a party entitled to judgment as a matter of law or it may order a new trial of a cause of action or separable issue where the verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence, in the interest of justice or where the jury cannot agree after being kept together for as long as is deemed reasonable by the court.
(See Acosta v. City of New York, 84 AD3d 706 [2d Dept 2011]; Jordan v. Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, 82 AD3d 936 [2d Dept 2011]; Carrara v. Kelly, 74 AD3d 719 [2d Dept 2010]; Hammond v. Diaz, 82 AD3d 839 [2d Dept 2011]; Alli v. Lucas, 72 AD3d 994 [2d Dept 2010]; Barbieri v. Voukon, supra).
[w]hile great deference must be accorded to fact‑finding function of the jury, a trial court's discretion to set aside the verdict "is at its broadest when it appears that the unsuccessful litigant's evidentiary position was particularly strong compared to that of the victor" (Pire v. Otero, 123 A.D.2d 611 [2d Dept 1986], quoting Nicastro v. Park, 113 A.D.2d at 136; see Panariello v. Ballinger, 248 A.D.2d 452 [2d Dept 1998]).
(See Jordan v. Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, supra ).
Recent Appellate Division, Second Department, decisions in Barbieri v. Voukon, supra and Martinez v. Kreychmar, 84 AD3d 1037 [2d Dept 2011] are both determinate of the issues in the instant action. In Barbieri v. Voukon, plaintiff pedestrian was pushing a shopping cart across a street when she was struck by the left‑turning defendant's vehicle.
Here, no fair interpretation of the evidence supports a finding that the defendant was entirely free of negligence in the happening of this accident. Although a driver facing a steady green light is entitled to proceed, he or she has a duty to yield the right‑of‑way to pedestrians lawfully within a crosswalk (see Vehicle and Traffic Law Sec. 1111[a] ) ... While the defendant claimed that the impact occurred right before his vehicle entered the crosswalk, this claim was inconsistent with his admission that upon arriving at the intersection he observed the plaintiff standing at the corner next to the pedestrian signal button. From this location, the plaintiff would have been within the crosswalk when she stepped off the sidewalk into the street. The defendant's claim that the impact occurred just before his vehicle entered the crosswalk is also inconsistent with the fact that he was already in the process of executing a left turn onto Prospect Avenue when his vehicle came into contact with the plaintiff and her shopping cart ... Since a violation of a standard of care imposed by the Vehicle and Traffic Law constitutes negligence per se [citations omitted], the jury verdict completely absolving the defendant of any responsibility for the accident was contrary to the weight of the evidence [citations omitted].
(See Buchinger v. Jazz Leasing Corp., 95 AD3d 1053 [2d Dept 2012]; Cuevas v. Chavez, 94 AD3d 803 [2d Dept 2012]; Arazashvilli v. Executive Fleet Management Corp. 90 AD3d 682 [2d Dept 2011]; Benedikt v. Certified Lumber Corp., 60 AD3d 798 [2d Dept 2009]).
In the instant case, it is clear that defendant MARTINEZ is negligent, as a matter of law, because "an accident occurs because he or she failed to see that which through the proper use of his or her senses he or she should have seen." (Katanov v. County of Nassau, 91 AD3d 723, 725 [2d Dept 2012]). (See Weigand v. United Traction Co., 221 N.Y. 39, 42 ; Heath v. Liberato, 82 AD3d 841 [2d Dept 2011]; Kucar v. Town of Huntington, 81 AD3d 784, 785 [2d Dept 2011]). Defendant MARTINEZ's failure to see what there was to be seen, including pedestrian plaintiff AGUI in a marked crosswalk, mandates setting aside the jury verdict in favor of defendant MARTINEZ.
Sulamain v. Thomas, 54 AD3d 751 [2d Dept 2008] has a fact pattern similar to that of the instant action. Plaintiff stated in his affidavit, in support of his motion for partial summary judgment on liability, that he was crossing the street in the crosswalk with the light in his favor when defendant's vehicle struck him while turning through the crosswalk. As in the instant action, the police report about the accident contained defendant's admission that he didn't see the injured plaintiff. The Appellate Division, Second Department, in affirming the granting of partial summary judgment on liability, held at 752, that "plaintiffs made a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter law."
The plaintiff Rochelle Zabusky was crossing a street when she was struck by a vehicle driven by the defendant Dana Cochran. There is no dispute that Zabusky was walking within the crosswalk and that the light was in her favor. The defendant driver admitted at her deposition that she struck the plaintiff while attempting to make a left hand turn and that her view of the crosswalk was unobstructed. The evidence submitted by the plaintiffs was sufficient to establish their entitlement to summary judgment on the issue of liability.
(See Ricci v. Lo, 95 AD3d 859, 2012 N.Y. Slip Op 03429 [2d Dept May 1, 2012]; Kusz v. New York City Transit Authority, 88 AD3d 768 [2d Dept 2011]; Benedikt v. Certified Lumber Corp, supra; Rosenblatt v. Venizelos, 49 AD3d 519 [2d Dept 2008]).
[e]very person shall obey the instructions of any official traffic‑control device applicable to him placed in accordance with the provisions of this chapter, unless otherwise directed by a traffic or police officer, subject to the exceptions granted the driver of an authorized emergency vehicle in this title.
VTL Sec. 1111(a)(1), dealing with green traffic‑control signal indications, provides: [t]raffic, except pedestrians, facing a steady circular green signal may proceed straight through or turn right or left unless a sign at such place prohibits either such turn. Such traffic, including when turning right or left, shall yield the right of way to other traffic lawfully within the intersection or an adjacent crosswalk at the time such signal is exhibited.
[n]otwithstanding the provisions of any other law to the contrary, every driver of a vehicle shall exercise due care to avoid colliding with any ... pedestrian ... upon any roadway and shall give warning by sounding the horn when necessary.
[n]o person shall move a vehicle which is stopped, standing, or parked unless and until such movement can be made with reasonable safety.
_[n]o person shall turn a vehicle at an intersection unless the vehicle is in proper position upon the roadway ... or otherwise turn a vehicle from a direct course or move right or left upon a roadway unless and until such movement can be made with reasonable safety.
Clearly, in the instant action, the jury verdict on liability is against the weight of the evidence.
The verdict is vacated and a new trial is ordered.
ORDERED, that the parties shall appear in Part 27, Room 479, on July 31, 2012, at 10:00 A.M., for jury selection.

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.