Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/95393/mccaughn-vs-hershey-chocolate-co
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 08:41:30+00:00

Document:
1. "Sweet chocolate" and "sweet milk chocolate," which contain sugar in addition to chocolate or chocolate and milk solid, and which are widely known, distributed, and used as confectionery, are "candy" within the meaning of §§ 900(9), Revenue Act of 1918 and 900(6), Revenue Act of 1921, imposing excise on the sales price of candy and other luxuries. P. 283 U. S. 490 .
2. Administrative construction of a doubtful statute will not be lightly disturbed. P. 283 U. S. 492 .
Certiorari, 282 U. S. 827 , to review judgments which reversed judgments in favor of the above-named collectors in suits in the district court for recovery of money collected as taxes.
the sales price of enumerated articles, most of which may be characterized as luxuries. The enumeration of the ninth subdivision was, "Candy, 5 percentum." Section 900(6) of the Revenue Act of 1921, 42 Stat. 227, 292, reenacted this provision but reduced the tax to 3 percent. Respondents, manufacturers of "sweet chocolate" and "sweet milk chocolate," brought suits in the district court for Eastern Pennsylvania, to recover about $8,000,000 of taxes assessed under these sections for the years 1918 to 1924, on the ground that the articles sold are not "candy," sale of which was taxed. On written stipulation of the parties, the cases were tried by the court without a jury. Judgments for petitioners were reversed by the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. 42 F.2d 408. This Court granted certiorari, 282 U. S. 827 , to resolve the conflict of the decision below with that of the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in Malley v. Walter Baker & Co., 281 F. 41.
types of confectionery known as "candy," was not intended to be taxed. See DeGanay v. Lederer, 250 U. S. 376 , 250 U. S. 381 ; Van Camp & Sons v. American Can Co., 278 U. S. 245 , 278 U. S. 253 .
administrative construction, is at least persuasive of a legislative recognition and approval of the statute as construed. See National Lead Co. v. United States, 252 U. S. 140 , 252 U. S. 146 . We see no reason for rejecting that construction.
For reasons which need not be restated, such individual expressions are without weight in the interpretation of a statute. See Duplex Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443 , 254 U. S. 474 ; Lapina v. Williams, 232 U. S. 78 , 232 U. S. 90 ; United States v. Trans Missouri Freight Assn., 166 U. S. 290 , 166 U. S. 318 .

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