Source: https://fatherhoodcoalition.org/newsite/content/greater-boston-legal-services-opposes-shared-parenting-and-due-process-rights
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 09:03:56+00:00

Document:
The main points of the Legal Services' letter in opposition, below, are at the end - following the cut and paste 'Legal Background'. Their absurd argument is that a presumption of shared parenting and ensuring due process would curtail the power of the courts. They also misstate the intent of the petitions. Regarding due process, for example, they claim jury trials are mandated. Instead, as is routine under civil law, the option for a trial by jury would be available. Simlarly, the statement that a presumption of shared parenting will 'hobble' the courts is baseless hyperbole.
If you support shared parenting and due process rights your help is needed. Though the Legal Services' arguments are flawed the organization's close working relationship with many state government agencies likely means its position on the issues may be given undeserved weight.
Please comment in support of the petitions. It should be submitted to 'William Cowin of the Mass. Attorney General's office at william.cowin@state.ma.us'. Letting Greater Boston Legal Services know that their opposition is destructive to stable families is also appreciated.
Office of the Attorney General to interested parties to comment on whether the above-referenced initiative petitions meet the requirements of Amendment Article 48 of the Massachusetts Constitution. As explained below, we believe that the petitions relate to the powers of courts under Amend. Art. 48, Init., Pt. 2, 5 2, and are therefore matters excluded from the Initiative.
provides, in relevant part, that the legislative power "shall continue to be vested in the general court; but, the people reserve to themselves the popular initiative, which is the power of the specified number of voters to submit constitutional amendments and laws to the people for approval or rejection." Art. 48, pt. 1, Definition.
(1970); (3) a statute granting the Chief Administrative Justice of the Trial Court the authority to consolidate related custody and adoption actions brought initially in different trial courts, Custody of a Minor (No. 11,391 Mass. 572,578-79 (1984); and (4) a statute broadening the procedural circumstances under which witnesses may be granted immunity, Commonwealth v. Dalrymple, 428 Mass. 1014, 1015 & n.3 (1998).
160 (petitions proposing to change the substantive law that the courts enforce are not excluded matters but petitions dealing with the court's power to decide its cases or enforce its decisions are excluded matters).
exercise of discretion in civil matters. Since this petition aims to restrict the powers of the courts and has no other purpose, certification should be denied.
presumption of joint physical and legal custody in "all court cases concerning child custody." Such a law relates expressly and directly to the powers of courts since it aims to lessen the court's power and discretion and alters court proceedings as to such matters. It is nearly black letter law that the governing principle in custody matters, is the welfare of the child and is a subject that is within the sound discretion of the trial judge. Ardizoni v. Raymond, 40 Mass.App.Ct. 734 (1996). This petition hobbles the authority of the courts to make custody decisions. As such, certification should be denied.
More generally, each of these petitions includes declaratory language, to wit: "The citizens of Massachusetts intend under state law that.. . .". Assuming that this language is intended to be binding and not merely precatory, the petitions do not propose "a law" and should not be certified for that reason. Paisner v. Attorney General, 390 Mass. 593,600-01 (1983).
Finally, unlike the petition at issue in Albano, no governmental agency other than the court has any powers of enforcement under these petitions. These proposals are therefore subsidiary to and merely support the main purpose of both petitions, which is to limit the court's powers to enter abuse prevention orders and to curtail the courts' discretion to make custody decisions.
Since both initiative petitions exclusively and explicitly relate to the powers of the court, the Attorney General should reject them as excluded under Amend. Art. 48, Init., Pt. 2, 5 2.

References: Art. 48
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