Source: http://the9thcircuitwatch.com/wp/?m=201102
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 00:43:09+00:00

Document:
The trial in Peo. v. Valdovinos was extremely difficult for the prosecution. Witnesses were uncertain and in some cases contradictory in identifying the defendant. Despite the conflicting evidence, the jury convicted Valdovinos, and the state court ssummarily denied his appeal. The U. S. District Court denied the petition for habeas corpus. Valdovious appealed to the 9th Circuit.
The Supreme Court reversed the 9th Circuit and remanded for “further consideration in light of Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S._(2011).” See, Blog.
Valdovinos is the sixth case the Supreme Court has reversed the Ninth Circuit during the current term of the Court.
On the same day the Supreme Court wrote Harrington v. Richter, 2011 WL 148587 (C.A. 9) Justice Kennedy authored another opinion severely criticizing the 9th Circuit for disregard of the federal statute regulating federal habeas corpus (AEDPA; 28 U.S.C. 2254) and Supreme Court precedent. The unanimous decision of the Supreme Court suggests a wilful disregard of the statute and Supreme Court case law by the Ninth Circuit.
In Premo, defense counsel entered into negotiations with the prosecutor to plead his client to an offense not requiring the death penalty. The prosecution had a strong case including a confession by the defendant and two other civilian witnesses.
After the state court imposed Moore’s sentence (for an extremely violent and brutal crime) he appealed on grounds of “ineffective counsel” citing the Supreme Court 1986 case of Strickland v. Washington 466 U.S. 669 (1986). Moore alleged his counsel should have moved to suppress the confession to police. The state court denied his appeal; denied a post trial evidentiary hearing in state court; was denied a petition for habeas corpus in U.S. District Court; state court decision reversed in the Ninth Circuit.
Comment: The Ninth Circuit has a long history of reversing state court decisions by employing the Strickland case. Harrington v. Richter and Premo v. Moore may end a litany of wrong decisions written by the Ninth Circuit, most recently in Knowles v. Mirzayance, and Wong v. Belmontes.
The dissenting judge in the Ninth Circuit decision skewers this principle. No one doubts the importance of a confession, but under Ninth Circuit reasoning defense counsel must file every motion, frivolous or not, prior to any plea. The prosecution is unlikely to engage in any plea bargaining under those circumstances. Oregon sought review of the Ninth Circuit decision in the Supreme Court.
And the most important factor for defense counsel: the death penalty. Moore had attacked the victim, bound him with tape, threw him in the trunk of a car and eventually killed him. These facts are sufficient to warrant the death penalty after a trial. Defense counsel received a reasonable offer from the prosecution for reasons unknown on the record. But if the defendant refused the offer, the prosecution would continue investigation in an attempt to strengthen the case, and the potential of seeking the death penalty loomed.
Again the Supreme Court explains the role of the Anti-Terrorism statute (AEDPA; 28. U.S.C. 2254) and reproaches the Ninth Circuit for mis interpreting the statute and Supreme Court case law.
Supreme Court case law. See, discussion of AEDPA in Harrington v. Richter.
The most important part of the case is the Supreme Court explanation of the role of federal courts in reviewing allegations of its leading cases on ineffective counsel; Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Federal appellate courts reviewing state court decisions on habeas corpus cannot undertake its own interpretation of Strickland and the effectiveness of counsel. The court must concede to a state court ruling. and issue the writ only if the state court interpretation is unreasonable, and not interpret Stickland de novo.
In an emphatic and harsh review of the case in Harrington v. Richter, the Supreme Court again reprimanded the Ninth Circuit for its failure to abide by Congressional rules enacted in the Anti Terrorism & Effective Death Penalty Act restricting federal collateral review of state court decisions in criminal cases (AEDPA; 28 U.S.C. 2254). In a unanimous decision written by Justice Kennedy, he criticized the Ninth Circuit’s refusal to apply the Act and the appellate court’s failure to apply Supreme Court precedent.
Justice Kennedy intially dismisses the Ninth Circuit decision holding that on habeas corpus review of state court decisions the federal court applies a de novo standard in the absence of any written opinion issued by the state court. AEDPA neither requires written opinions nor does Supreme Court precedent, and every other Circuit Court has rejected the Ninth Circuit interpretation. AEDPA permits a federal court to reverse a state court decision on habeas corpus only if it finds an unreasonable application of Supreme Court law or an unreasonable interpretation of facts whether the state court writes a decision or not.
At its core, Harrington is an “ineffective counsel” case. The Ninth Circuit had criticized the defense lawyer who had not submitted evidence of a blood sample found at the scene of the crime but otherwise effectively cross examined witnesses and presented a reasonable defense to the crime of murder. Justice Kennedy administers another lesson to the Ninth Circuit on trial advocacy.

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