Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=83155:57118&catid=1584&Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 10:15:24+00:00

Document:
G.R. No. 207176, June 18, 2014 - SPOUSES VICTOR AND EDNA BINUA, Petitioners, v. LUCIA P. ONG, Respondent.
SPOUSES VICTOR AND EDNA BINUA, Petitioners, v. LUCIA P. ONG, Respondent.
Spouses Victor and Edna Binua (petitioners) seek the declaration of the nullity of the real estate mortgages executed by petitioner Victor in favor of Lucia P. Ong (respondent), on the ground that these were executed under fear, duress and threat.
During the hearing of the motion [for new trial], [petitioner Edna’s] counsel presented [petitioner Edna]. In the course of her testimony, she narrated that a promissory note (Exhibit “1”) dated March 4, 1997 was executed by her in favor of Lucia P. Ong, the herein private complainant.
With the surfacing and finally the introduction of Exhibit “1”, the nature of the liability of [petitioner Edna] changed from both criminal and civil in nature to purely civil in character.
The Promissory Note novated the complexity of the nature of the course of action the [respondent] had from the beginning against [petitioner Edna].
However, after the Promissory Note (Exh. “1”) was executed by the parties, the whole scenario was novated into purely civil in nature. It was the intention of both [the respondent] and [petitioner Edna] to turn the debt into a mere loan, hence, this agreement of theirs being the law that binds them must be respected.
Petitioner Edna, however, failed to settle her obligation, forcing the respondent to foreclose the mortgage on the properties, with the latter as the highest bidder during the public sale.
In this case, the Court notes that the petitioners’ arguments are exact repetitions of the issues raised in the CA, and the petitioners failed to advance any convincing reason that would alter the resolution in this case. Not only that, the petitioners’ arguments are also downright inaccurate, if not maliciously misleading.
Finally, the petitioners assail the ten percent (10%) imposed by the RTC-Branch 2 in the criminal cases for estafa. As previously stated, however, the decision in said case is already final and executory.32 The Court will not even consider the petitioners’ arguments on such issue for to do so would sanction the petitioners’ act of subverting the immutability of a final judgment.
1 Issued by Presiding Judge Vilma T. Pauig; records, pp. 9-23.
8 Issued by Presiding Judge Jezarene C. Aquino; id. at 133-136.
11 Penned by Associate Justice Danton Q. Bueser, with Associate Justices Amelita G. Tolentino and Ramon R. Garcia, concurring; CA rollo, pp. 68-75.
18Aquiles Riosa v. Tabaco La Suerte Corporation, G.R. No. 203786, October 23, 2013.
21 Buaya v. Stronghold Insurance Co., Inc., 396 Phil. 738, 748 (2000).
22 See Pahila-Garrido v. Tortogo, G.R. No. 156358, August 17, 2011, 655 SCRA 553, 573-574.
24 CA rollo, p. 46.
26 264 Phil. 711 (1990).
28Ramos v. Obispo, G.R. No. 193804, February 27, 2013, 692 SCRA 240, 254.
29 G.R. No. 105083, August 20, 1993, 225 SCRA 526.
31 CA rollo, pp. 73-74.

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