Source: https://www.lipcon.com/work-in-progress/e-m-w-v-royalcaribbean-cruises-ltd-chukka-caribbean-adventures-ltd/
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 15:44:42+00:00

Document:
This is a case involving a cruise ship passenger who was injured while participating in a shore excursion. The shore excursion operators moved to dismiss the passenger’s lawsuit, and this is the response filed by the maritime attorneys at Lipcon, Margulies, Alsina & Winkleman, P.A.
The instant matter arises out of an incident that occurred while the Plaintiff was on a cruise with Defendant, ROYAL CARIBBEAN CRUISES LTD. (“Royal Caribbean”) and participating in a shore excursion. [D.E. 23, ¶23]. The shore excursion was owned and/or operated by the Chukka Defendants and offered, recommended, marketed, sold, co-operated and/or managed by Royal Caribbean. [Id. at ¶11].
On or about January 15, 2014, while the Plaintiff was riding in the back of the truck, the driver negligently operated the vehicle at a high rate of speed and drove the vehicle in a manner so that it struck nearby trees that lined the side of the road. [Id. at ¶23]. A tree limb that the vehicle struck entered the open-air truck where the passengers were seated and struck the Plaintiff at a high rate of speed, thereby causing the Plaintiff to suffer severe injuries. [Id.] As a result, the Plaintiff initiated this lawsuit against the Chukka Defendants alleging general Negligence (Count II), Negligence based on Apparent Agency or Agency by Estoppel (Count III), Negligence based on Joint Venture (Count IV), and Third-Party Beneficiary (Count V). [D.E. 23].
The Chukka Defendants filed an Answer directed at the Plaintiff’s general Negligence claim (Count II) on April 23, 2015 [D.E. 25]. Thereafter (but on the same day), the Chukka Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss directed at the remaining claims against them (Counts III-V). [D.E. 26]. At issue herein is such Motion to Dismiss [D.E. 26], wherein the Chukka Defendants seek to dismiss the Plaintiff’s claims for Negligence based on Apparent Agency or Agency by Estoppel (Count III), Negligence based on Joint Venture (Count IV), and Third-Party Beneficiary (Count V) under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
Specifically, the Chukka Defendants argue that 1) the Plaintiff’s Apparent Agency and Joint Venture claims (Counts III and IV) are theories of liability and not causes of action; and, 2) the Plaintiff’s Joint Venture and Third Party Beneficiary claims (Counts IV and V) are contradicted by the terms of the Tour Operator Agreement between Royal Caribbean and the Chukka Defendants.
As set forth in further detail below, however, all of their arguments fail because 1) the Plaintiff properly pled alternative theories of negligence under apparent agency and joint venture; and, 2) reviewing the Tour Operator Agreement would cause the Court to improperly consider documents beyond the four corners of the Complaint, and a resolution of the arguments raised involves issues of fact concerning the contracting parties’ intent.
Accordingly, the Chukka Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss should be denied its entirety.
In applying the aforementioned standards to the case at bar, it is clear that the Chukka Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim should be denied.
Count III of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint alleges Negligence against Defendants based on Apparent Agency or Agency by Estoppel (Count III). The Chukka Defendants only argue that it should be dismissed because there is no independent cause of action for agency. [D.E. 26, pp 2, 6].
This Court has consistently denied defendants’ motions to dismiss on the same grounds. Specifically, in Gayou v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc., 11-23359-CIV, 2012 WL 2049431 (S.D. Fla. June 5, 2012) and Ash v. Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd., No. 13-20619-CIV, 2014 WL 6682514 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 25, 2014), the plaintiff alleged a direct negligence count, followed by a separate negligence count based on apparent agency. The defendants in both cases moved to dismiss, arguing (like the Chukka Defendants argue herein) that apparent agency is not an independent cause of action. The Court in both cases, however, disagreed with the defendants and considered them proper negligence counts grounded on an agency theory of liability. See Gayou, 2012 WL 2049431 at *8 n.4 (“A fair reading of the substance of the claims… makes plain that [plaintiff] is really pleading negligence causes of action that are grounded on an agency theory of liability. The Court so construes them”); see also Ash, 2014 WL 6682514 at *7 (agreeing with Gayou).
Thus, whereas Count II is a direct negligence count against the Chukka Defendants, Count III is a negligence claim under the theory of apparent agency or agency by estoppel. The two counts are pled in the alternative and, thus, properly separated in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(2) (“A party may set out 2 or more statements of a claim or defense alternatively or hypothetically, either in a single count or defense or in separate ones. If a party makes alternative statements, the pleading is sufficient if any one of them is sufficient.”) (emphasis added).
Accordingly, this Honorable Court should deny the Chukka Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Count III of the Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint.
Count IV: Plaintiff’s claim of Negligence based on Joint Venture should not be dismissed based on the terms of the Tour Operator Agreement because the Court’s scope is limited to the four corners of the Complaint, and the Chukka Defendants’ argument involves questions of factual determinations that are improper at this juncture of the case.
Next, as to the Plaintiff’s claim of Negligence based on Joint Venture (Count IV), the Chukka Defendants argue that the Plaintiff’s allegations are contradicted by the terms of the Tour Operator Agreement between Royal Caribbean and the Chukka Defendants. This argument, however, fails for two reasons: 1) it would require this Court to improperly review documents beyond the four corners of the complaint; and, 2) it involves questions of fact as to the parties’ intent which are improper to determine at this stage.
The first requirement is not met because the Plaintiff never specifically referred to the “Tour Operator Agreement” in his Amended Complaint. In fact, the Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint never refers to any “written” agreement or contract whatsoever. The Chukka Defendants refer to paragraphs 27 and 66 of the Amended Complaint in an attempt to make their point. [D.E. 26, p. 2 at ¶2]. Those paragraphs, however, fall short for reasons tied into the second requirement.
Specifically, the alleged agreement is not central to the Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants, which is the second requirement. The Plaintiff is not relying on the agreement to prove his claims. Rather, the claims arise from the negligent conduct of the cruise line (Royal Caribbean) and the shore excursion providers (the Chukka Defendants). Addressing the same arguments as the Chukka Defendants raise herein, this Court refused to consider the cruise line’s agreement with the shore excursion operator, finding that: “[plaintiff] does not assert any breach of contract claims against [defendant]. Instead, she asserts claims based on tort theories. As such, the ticket contract is not essential or integral to [plaintiff’s] claims, rather, it is part of [defendant’s] defenses.” Gentry v. Carnival Corp., 11-21580-CIV, 2011 WL 4737062 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 5, 2011). Thus, as in Gentry, because Count IV is not asserting a breach of contract claims, the alleged agreement between Royal Caribbean and the Chukka Defendants is not essential or integral to the Plaintiff’s Joint Venture claim.
Finally, the fourth requirement is not met either because the Tour Operator Agreement was not even attached to the Chukka Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. [D.E. 26].
Furthermore, the Chukka Defendants’ reliance on Crenshaw v. Lister, 556 F. 3d 1283, 1292 (11th Cir. 2009) for the proposition that a district court may review exhibits, is misplaced. Pursuant to the explicit language of Crewshaw, the Court may review exhibits that contradict the allegations of the complaint only if such exhibits are attached to the complaint. See Crenshaw, 556 F. 3d at 1292 (“conflict between allegations in a pleading and exhibits thereto”; applied to officers’ police reports attached to the complaint) (emphasis added). Herein, the Plaintiff did not attach any documents to his Initial or Amended Complaint [D.E. 1, 23].
Accordingly, because the Chukka Defendants fail to demonstrate the applicability of the exception set forth in Stephens or the applicability of contradictory exhibits, this Honorable Court should not depart from the general rule that it does “not consider anything beyond the face of the complaint… when analyzing a motion to dismiss.” Stephens, 500 F.3d at 1284. Considering only the allegations in the Amended Complaint, which are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, the Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint sets out a claim for joint venture sufficient to state a plausible entitlement to relief. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The Chukka Defendants’ grounds for dismissal are therefore without merit and improper at this juncture of the case.
Even if this Honorable Court reviews the Tour Operator Agreement to decide whether it contradicts Plaintiff’s allegations (as the Chukka Defendants argue), it will still find that a determination as to the Chukka Defendants’ true role (i.e., independent contractors or joint venturers) is an issue of fact concerning the contractual parties’ intent.
In their motion, the Chukka Defendants point to the language in the contract which states that Chukka is considered an “Independent Contractor.” [D.E. 26, pp. 5-6]. However, the “ultimate determination” as to whether a joint venture exists between parties “turns upon evidence of intent of the parties.” Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Tien, 534 F. Supp. 2d 1267, 1287 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (emphasis added). And pursuant to the Eleventh Circuit, “[t]he court must look at the contract as a whole, the parties, and the purpose of the agreement to best determine the intent of the parties in interpreting the agreement.” Slater v. Energy Servs. Grp. Int’l, Inc., 634 F.3d 1326, 1330 (11th Cir. 2011) (emphasis added).
Therefore, the Plaintiff has presented sufficient facts – both in the contract as well as in his Amended Complaint – to infer an intent between the parties such that the issue should be one for the jury to decide. Accordingly, the Chukka Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Count IV of the Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint should be denied.
Count V: Plaintiff’s Third-Party Beneficiary claim should not be dismissed based on the terms of the Tour Operator Agreement because the Court’s scope is limited to the four corners of the Complaint, and the Chukka Defendants’ argument involves questions of factual determinations that improper at this juncture of the case.
Similar to the Joint Venture claim, the Chukka Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s Third-Party Beneficiary claim on grounds that Plaintiff’s allegations are contradicted by the terms of the Tour Operator Agreement. Again, however, this argument fails for the same reasons: 1) it would require this Court to improperly review documents beyond the four corners of the complaint; and, 2) it involves questions of fact as to the parties’ intent which are improper to determine at this stage.
Specifically, although the Chukka Defendants attempt to simply point to the language of the contract, the intent of the parties is the key to determining whether a third party is recognized as an intended beneficiary (with rights to enforce the contract) as opposed to only an incidental beneficiary (with no enforceable rights under the contract). Under Florida law, a third party is an intended beneficiary of a contract between two other parties only if a direct and primary object of the contracting parties was to confer a benefit on the third party. See Bochese v. Town of Ponce Inlet, 405 F.3d 964, 982 (11th Cir. 2005); see also Vencor Hosps. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of R.I., 169 F.3d 677, 680 (11th Cir. 1999) (“A party has a cause of action as a third-party beneficiary to a contract if the contracting parties express an intent primarily and directly to benefit that third party (or a class of persons to which that third party belongs).”). If the contracting parties had no such purpose in mind, then any benefit from the contract reaped by the third party is merely “incidental,” and the third party has no legally enforceable right in the subject matter of the contract. Bochese, 405 F. 3d at 982.
Accordingly, the Chukka Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Count V of the Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint should be denied.
Should this Honorable Court grant the Chukka Defendants’ motion or any portion thereof, Plaintiff respectfully requests leave to amend.
WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff respectfully requests this Honorable Court enter an Order denying the Chukka Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss in its entirety, and any other relief this Court deems just and proper.
 The Plaintiff also sued Royal Caribbean. [D.E. 28]. Royal Caribbean filed an Answer as to the general Negligence count (Count I) on April 24, 2015 [D.E. 27], and filed a Motion to Dismiss as to the remaining claims on May 1, 2015 [D.E. 28].
 Technically, a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) “must be made before pleading”. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (emphasis added). Once the answer is filed, the pleadings are closed, and a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, which does not go to the jurisdiction of the court, is inappropriate. Rodriguez v. Myrmidones LLC, No. 8:14-CV-618-T-24-TBM, 2014 WL 1779296, at *3 (M.D. Fla. May 5, 2014). Herein, because the Chukka Defendants filed its Answer first [D.E. 25], the Motion to Dismiss [D.E. 26] should instead be considered a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(2); see also Hallberg v. Pasco Cnty., Florida, No. 95-1354-CIV-T-17A, 1996 WL 153673, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 18, 1996). Nevertheless, the same standard applies. See Bryan Ashley Int’l, Inc. v. Shelby Williams Indus., Inc., 932 F. Supp. 290, 291-92 (S.D. Fla. 1996) (stating that when a motion filed pursuant to Rule 12(c) raises a Rule 12(b)(6) defense, “the court should apply the same standard used to evaluate a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion”).
 In introducing this argument in paragraph 3 of the motion, the Chukka Defendants include Plaintiff’s Joint Venture claim. [D.E. 26, p. 2] (“Plaintiff’s apparent agency and joint venture claims should be dismissed, as these are theories of liability and not causes of action.”). In their memorandum of law, however, the Chukka Defendants only direct the argument at Plaintiff’s apparent agency claim. In an abundance of caution, Plaintiff makes clear that this argument also applies to his Joint Venture claim (i.e., it is pled as a negligence claim under the alternative theory of joint venture). See Ash v. Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd., No. 13-20619-CIV, 2014 WL 6682514 at *8 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 25, 2014) (considering it a proper negligence claim under the alternative theory of joint venture). Further, like apparent agency, the elements to plead joint venture are different than those required to plead negligence. See Belik, 864 F. Supp. 2d at 1313 (“To properly allege a joint venture, a plaintiff must set forth the following five elements: ‘(1) a community of interest in the performance of a common purpose; (2) joint control or right of control; (3) a joint proprietary interest in the subject matter; (4) a right to share in the profits; and (5) a duty to share in any losses which may be sustained.’”) (citations omitted).
 The Chukka Defendants, in passing, make a reference to the “conclusory manner” in which Plaintiff alleged “the elements necessary to create a joint venture.” [D.E. 26, p. 5]. The motion, however, only focuses on the allegations being contradicted by the terms of the contract. Nevertheless, in an abundance of caution, Plaintiff refers to the following paragraphs of his Amended Complaint which alleges all elements to create a joint venture with sufficient factual allegations: ¶¶27, 54-65 [D.E. 23]. Furthermore, binding Eleventh Circuit precedent makes clear that the elements of a joint venture “cannot be applied mechanically” and that “[n]o one aspect of the relationship is decisive.” Fulcher’s Point Pride Seafood, Inc. v. M/V “Lady Mary,” 935 F.2d 208, 211 (11th Cir. 1991) (citing Sasportes v. M/V Sol de Copacabana, 581 F.2d 1204, 1208 (5th Cir. 1978)). Pursuant to this case, the factors are not a checklist, “[t]hey are only signposts, likely indicia, but not prerequisites.” Id. (emphasis added); see also Gentry v. Carnival Corp., 11-21580-CIV, 2011 WL 4737062 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 5, 2011) (“failure to specifically allege that the parties intended to create a joint venture is not fatal so long as the other allegations provide enough factual material to make it plausible that the parties intended to create one”).

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