Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&amp;view=article&amp;id=84229:59844&amp;catid=1594&amp;Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 02:24:47+00:00

Document:
G.R. No. 196750, March 11, 2015 - MA. ELENA R. DIVINAGRACIA, AS ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE OF THE LATE SANTIAGO C. DIVINAGRACIA, Petitioner, v. CORONACION PARILLA, CELESTIAL NOBLEZA, CECILIA LELINA, CELEDONIO NOBLEZA, AND MAUDE NOBLEZA, Respondent.
MA. ELENA R. DIVINAGRACIA, AS ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE OF THE LATE SANTIAGO C. DIVINAGRACIA, Petitioner, v. CORONACION PARILLA, CELESTIAL NOBLEZA, CECILIA LELINA, CELEDONIO NOBLEZA, AND MAUDE NOBLEZA, Respondent.
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated March 26, 2009 and the Resolution3 dated April 6, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV. No. 80167, which set aside the Decision4 dated November 29, 2002 and the Order5 dated April 4, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 31 (RTC) in Civil Case No. 19003 and, consequently, dismissed Santiago C. Divinagracia’s (Santiago) complaint for judicial partition.
On reconsideration21 of Ceruleo and herein respondents Celedonio, Maude, Celestial, Coronacion, and Cecilia (respondents), the RTC issued an Order22 dated April 4, 2003 further ordering Santiago to comply with the provisions of the Supplemental Contract dated December 22, 1989 by paying the amount of P337,887.73 upon the partition of the subject land.
Dissatisfied, respondents appealed23 to the CA. Records are bereft of any showing that the other heirs made similar appeals thereto.
Aggrieved, the heirs of Santiago27 moved for reconsideration28 which was, however, denied in a Resolution29 dated April 6, 2011, hence, this petition instituted by herein petitioner, Ma. Elena R. Divinagracia, as administratrix of Santiago’s estate.
The issues for the Court’s resolution are whether or not the CA correctly: (a) ruled that Felcon’s siblings and Cebeleo, Sr. and Maude’s children are indispensable parties to Santiago’s complaint for judicial partition; and (b) dismissed Santiago’s complaint for his failure to implead said omitted heirs.
The aforementioned heirs – whether in their own capacity or in representation of their direct ascendant – have vested rights over the subject land and, as such, should be impleaded as indispensable parties in an action for partition thereof. However, a reading of Santiago’s complaint shows that as regards Mateo, Sr.’s interest, only Felcon was impleaded, excluding therefrom his siblings and co-representatives. Similarly, with regard to Cebeleo, Sr.’s interest over the subject land, the complaint impleaded his wife, Maude, when pursuant to Article 97235 of the Civil Code, the proper representatives to his interest should have been his children, Cebeleo, Jr. and Neobel. Verily, Santiago’s omission of the aforesaid heirs renders his complaint for partition defective.
In this case, while it is conceded that Santiago bought the interests of majority of the heirs of Conrado, Sr. as evidenced by the subject document, as a vendee, he merely steps into the shoes of the vendors-heirs. Since his interest over the subject land is merely derived from that of the vendors-heirs, the latter should first be determined as co-owners thereof, thus necessitating the joinder of all those who have vested interests in such land, i.e., the aforesaid heirs of Conrado, Sr., in Santiago’s complaint.
In fine, the absence of the aforementioned indispensable parties in the instant complaint for judicial partition renders all subsequent actions of the RTC null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties, but even as to those present.38 Therefore, the CA correctly set aside the November 29, 2002 Decision and the April 4, 2003 Order of the RTC.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. Accordingly, the Decision dated March 26, 2009 and the Resolution dated April 6, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV. No. 80167, setting aside the Decision dated November 29, 2002 and the Order dated April 4, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 31 in Civil Case No. 19003, are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION REMANDING the instant case to the court a quo, which is hereby DIRECTED to implead all indispensable parties and, thereafter, PROCEED with the resolution of the case on the merits WITH DISPATCH.
2 Id. at 27-45. Penned by Associate Justice Florito S. Macalino with Executive Justice Antonio L. Villamor and Associate Justice Stephen C. Cruz concurring.
3 Id. at 47-48. Penned by Associate Justice Edgardo L. Delos Santos with Associate Justices Eduardo B. Peralta, Jr. and Gabriel T. Ingles concurring.
4 Id. at 167-182. Penned by Judge Rene S. Hortillo.
6 See id. at 30-31.
7 “Cerulio” in some parts of the record.
9 See id. at 11.
13 Id. at 138-139. Referred to as “Supplemental Contract dated December 12, 1989” in some parts of the records.
20 See id. at 180-181.
21 See Motion for Reconsideration dated December 30, 2002 filed by Ceruleo, Celedonio, and Maude; id. at 183-185. See also Motion to Declare Nullity of Judgment and/or Motion for Reconsideration dated December 30, 2002 filed by Coronacion, Celestial, and Cecilia; id. at 186-189.
23 See Notice of Appeal dated April 15, 2003; id. at 204-205.
26 See id. at 40-44.
27 In view of the death of Santiago on April 14, 2004, he was substituted by his widow, Ma. Elena R. Divinagracia, and children, namely: Elsa, Ruth Mari, Liane Grace, Ricardo, and Ma. Fe Emily, all surnamed Divinagracia, per Notice of Death and Substitution of Parties filed before the CA on April 28, 2004. See id. at 27.
28 See Motion for Reconsideration dated May 4, 2009; id. at 266-273.
30Gabatin v. Land Bank of the Philippines, 486 Phil. 366, 379-380 (2004), citing Bank of the Philippine Islands v. CA, 450 Phil. 532, 541 (2003); further citation omitted.
31Domingo v. Scheer, 466 Phil. 235, 265 (2004).
32Sepulveda, Sr. v. Atty. Pelaez, 490 Phil. 710, 721 (2005).
33 See Civil Code, Articles 970 to 977.
34 See Rollo, pp. 10-11 and 31-33.
In the collateral line, it takes place only in favor of the children of brothers or sisters, whether they be of the full or half blood.
36 See Samson v. Spouses Gabor, G.R. No. 182970, July 23, 2014, citing Reyes-de Leon v. Del Rosario, 479 Phil. 98, 107 (2004).
37Lacbayan v. Samoy, Jr., G.R. No. 165427, March 21, 2011, 645 SCRA 677, 688-689.
38Quilatan v. Heirs of Quilatan Lorenzo, 614 Phil. 162, 168 (2009).
39 G.R. No. 201816, April 8, 2013, 695 SCRA 345.
40 Id. at 353, citing Pamplona Plantation Co., Inc. v. Tinghil, 491 Phil. 15, 29 (2005).
41 In Quilatan v. Heirs of Quilatan (supra note 37), the Court similarly ordered the remand of the partition case therein to the RTC for the failure of petitioners therein to implead all the indispensable parties in their complaint for partition.

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