Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/524/184/
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 15:47:14+00:00

Document:
JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court. Petitioner was convicted of "willfully" dealing in firearms without a federal license. The question presented is whether the term "willfully" in 18 U. S. C. § 924(a)(1)(D) requires proof that the defendant knew that his conduct was unlawful, or whether it also requires proof that he knew of the federal licensing requirement.
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Gun Owners Foundation by James H. Jeffries III and James H. Wentzel; and for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers by Barbara Bergman and Stephen P. Halbrook.
to include detailed provisions regulating the use and sale of firearms. As amended, 18 U. S. C. § 922 defined a number of "unlawful acts"; subsection (a)(l) made it unlawful for any person except a licensed dealer to engage in the business of dealing in firearms.2 Section 923 established the federal licensing program and repeated the prohibition against dealing in firearms without a license, and § 924 specified the penalties for violating "any provision of this chapter." Read literally, § 924 authorized the imposition of a fine of up to $5,000 or a prison sentence of not more than five years, "or both," on any person who dealt in firearms without a license even if that person believed that he or she was acting lawfully.3 As enacted in 1968, §§ 922(a)(1) and 924 omitted an express scienter requirement and therefore arguably imposed strict criminal liability on every unlicensed dealer in firearms. The 1968 Act also omitted any definition of the term "engaged in the business" even though that conduct was an element of the unlawful act prohibited by § 922(a)(1).
problem be properly dealt with, and effective State and local regulation of this traffic be made possible .... " 82 Stat. 225.
"(A) except a licensed importer, licensed manufacturer, or licensed dealer, to engage in the business of importing, manufacturing, or dealing in firearms, or in the course of such business to ship, transport, or receive any firearm in interstate or foreign commerce."
"(a) Whoever violates any provision of this chapter ... shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both." 82 Stat. 233.
"(b)(2) additional legislation is required to reaffirm the intent of the Congress, as expressed in section 101 of the Gun Control Act of 1968, that 'it is not the purpose of this title to place any undue or unnecessary Federal restrictions or burdens on law-abiding citizens with respect to the acquisition, possession, or use of firearms appropriate to the purpose of hunting, trapshooting, target shooting, personal protection, or any other lawful activity, and that this title is not intended to discourage or eliminate the private ownership or use of firearms by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes.''' 100 Stat. 449.
"(C) as applied to a dealer in firearms, as defined in section 921 (a)(ll)(A), a person who devotes time, attention, and labor to dealing in firearms as a regular course of trade or business with the principal objective of livelihood and profit through the repetitive purchase and resale of firearms, but such term shall not include a person who makes occasional sales, exchanges, or purchases of firearms for the enhancement of a personal collection or for a hobby, or who sells all or part of his personal collection of firearms ... ." 100 Stat. 449-450.
The § 922(a)(1)(A) 7 offense at issue in this case is an "other provision" in the "willfully" category.
The jury having found petitioner guilty, we accept the Government's version of the evidence. That evidence proved that petitioner did not have a federal license to deal in firearms; that he used so-called "straw purchasers" in Ohio to acquire pistols that he could not have purchased himself; that the straw purchasers made false statements when purchasing the guns; that petitioner assured the straw purchasers that he would file the serial numbers off the guns; and that he resold the guns on Brooklyn street corners known for drug dealing. The evidence was unquestionably adequate to prove that petitioner was dealing in firearms, and that he knew that his conduct was unlawful.8 There was, however, no evidence that he was aware of the federal law that prohibits dealing in firearms without a federal license.
"shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than five years, or both."
7 See n. 2, supra.
8 Why else would he make use of straw purchasers and assure them that he would shave the serial numbers off the guns? Moreover, the street corner sales are not consistent with a good-faith belief in the legality of the enterprise.
9 Although the prohibition against unlicensed dealing in firearms is set forth in § 922, see n. 2, supra, the criminal sanction is set forth in § 924(a)(1), see n. 6, supra.
Petitioner was found guilty on both counts. On appeal he argued that the evidence was insufficient because there was no proof that he had knowledge of the federal licensing requirement, and that the trial judge had erred by failing to instruct the jury that such knowledge was an essential element of the offense. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 122 F.3d 90 (CA2 1997). It concluded that the instructions were proper and that the Government had elicited "ample proof" that petitioner had acted willfully. App. 22.
Because the Eleventh Circuit has held that it is necessary for the Government to prove that the defendant acted with knowledge of the licensing requirement, United States v. Sanchez-Corcino, 85 F.3d 549, 553-554 (1996), we granted certiorari to resolve the conflict. 522 U. S. 1024 (1997).
"The Federal Firearms Statute which the Defendant is charged with, conspiracy to violate and with allegedly violated [sic], is a specific intent statute. You must accordingly find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Defendant at all relevant times charged, acted with the knowledge that it was unlawful to engage in the business of firearms distribution lawfully purchased by a legally permissible transferee or gun purchaser.
"[Y]ou must be persuaded that with the actual knowledge of the federal firearms licensing laws Defendant acted in knowing and intentional violation of them." App. 17 (citing Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U. S. 135 (1994)).
12 "The word often denotes an act which is intentional, or knowing, or voluntary, as distinguished from accidental. But when used in a criminal statute it generally means an act done with a bad purpose (Felton v. United States, 96 U. S. 699; Potter v. United States, 155 U. S. 438; Spurr v. United States, 174 U. S. 728); without justifiable excuse (Felton v. United States, supra; Williams v. People, 26 Colo. 272; 57 Pac. 701; People v. Jewell, 138 Mich 620; 101 N. W. 835; St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Batesville & W Tel. Co., 80 Ark. 499; 97 S. W. 660; Clay v. State, 52 Tex. Cr. 555; 107 S. W. 1129); stubbornly, obstinately, perversely, Wales v. Miner, 89 Ind. 118, 127; Lynch v. Commonwealth, 131 Va. 762; 109 S. E. 427; Claus v. Chicago Gt. WRy. Co., 136 Iowa 7; 111 N. W. 15; State v. Harwell, 129 N. C. 550; 40 S. E. 48. The word is also employed to characterize a thing done without ground for believing it is lawful (Roby v. Newton, 121 Ga. 679; 49 S. E. 694), or conduct marked by careless disregard whether or not one has the right so to act, United States v. Philadelphia & R. Ry. Co., 223 Fed. 207, 210; State v. Savre, 129 Iowa 122; 105 N. W. 387; State v. Morgan, 136 N. C. 628; 48 S. E. 670." 290 U. S., at 394-395.
"willful" violation of a statute, "the Government must prove that the defendant acted with knowledge that his conduct was unlawful." Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U. S. 135, 137 (1994).
intent to do it or to omit doing it. 'The word "wilfully,'" says Chief Justice Shaw, 'in the ordinary sense in which it is used in statutes, means not merely "voluntarily," but with a bad purpose.' 20 Pick. (Mass.) 220. 'It is frequently understood,' says Bishop, 'as signifying an evil intent without justifiable excuse.' Crim. Law, vol. i. sect. 428"); 1 L. Sand, J. Siffert, W. Loughlin, & S. Reiss, Modern Federal Jury Instructions ~ 3A.01, p. 3A-18 (1997) ("'Willfully' means to act with knowledge that one's conduct is unlawful and with the intent to do something the law forbids, that is to say with the bad purpose to disobey or to disregard the law").
States v. Bailey, 444 U. S. 394 (1980), we held that the prosecution fulfills its burden of proving a knowing violation of the escape statute "if it demonstrates that an escapee knew his actions would result in his leaving physical confinement without permission." Id., at 408. And in Staples v. United States, 511 U. S. 600 (1994), we held that a charge that the defendant's possession of an unregistered machine gun was unlawful required proof "that he knew the weapon he possessed had the characteristics that brought it within the statutory definition of a machinegun." Id., at 602. It was not, however, necessary to prove that the defendant knew that his possession was unlawful. See Rogers v. United States, 522 U. S. 252, 254-255 (1998) (plurality opinion). Thus, unless the text of the statute dictates a different result,15 the term "knowingly" merely requires proof of knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.
With respect to the three categories of conduct that are made punishable by § 924 if performed "knowingly," the background presumption that every citizen knows the law makes it unnecessary to adduce specific evidence to prove that "an evil-meaning mind" directed the "evil-doing hand." 16 More is required, however, with respect to the conduct in the fourth category that is only criminal when done "willfully." The jury must find that the defendant acted with an evil-meaning mind, that is to say, that he acted with knowledge that his conduct was unlawful.
of such a regulation its ignorance would constitute a defense." Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U. S. 337, 345 (1952).
15 Liparota v. United States, 471 U. S. 419 (1985), was such a case. We there concluded that both the term "knowing" in 7 U. S. C. § 2024(c) and the term "knowingly" in § 2024(b)(1) literally referred to knowledge of the law as well as knowledge of the relevant facts. See id., at 428-430.
16Justice Jackson's translation of the terms mens rea and actus reus is found in his opinion for the Court in Morissette v. United States, 342 U. S. 246, 251 (1952).
17 Even in tax cases, we have not always required this heightened mens rea. In United States v. Pomponio, 429 U. S. 10 (1976) (per curiam), for example, the jury was instructed that a willful act is one done "with [the] bad purpose either to disobey or to disregard the law." Id., at 11. We approved of this instruction, concluding that "[t]he trial judge ... adequately instructed the jury on willfulness." Id., at 13.
"The proliferation of statutes and regulations has sometimes made it difficult for the average citizen to know and comprehend the extent of the duties and obligations imposed by the tax laws. Congress has accordingly softened the impact of the common-law presumption by making specific intent to violate the law an element of certain federal criminal tax offenses. Thus, the Court almost 60 years ago interpreted the statutory term 'willfully' as used in the federal criminal tax statutes as carving out an exception to the traditional rule [that every person is presumed to know the law]. This special treatment of criminal tax offenses is largely due to the complexity of the tax laws."
19 See Bates v. United States, 522 U. S. 23, 31, n. 6 (1997) (noting that Ratzlaj's holding was based on the "particular statutory context of currency structuring"); Ratzlaj, 510 U. S., at 149 (Court's holding based on "particular contex[t]" of currency structuring statute).
often arises even among taxpayers who earnestly wish to follow the law,' and '''[i]t is not the purpose of the law to penalize frank difference of opinion or innocent errors made despite the exercise of reasonable care.'" United States v. Bishop, 412 U. S. 346, 360-361 (1973) (quoting Spies v. United States, 317 U. S. 492, 496 (1943))"); Murdock, 290 U. S., at 396 ("Congress did not intend that a person, by reason of a bona fide misunderstanding as to his liability for the tax, as to his duty to make a return, or as to the adequacy of the records he maintained, should become a criminal by his mere failure to measure up to the prescribed standard of conduct").
21 Cheek, 498 U. S., at 200; see also Ratzlaj, 510 U. S., at 149 (noting the "venerable principle that ignorance of the law generally is no defense to a criminal charge," but concluding that Congress intended otherwise in the "particular contex[t]" of the currency structuring statute).
"I believe that criminal prosecutions for 'currency law' violations, of the sort at issue here, very much resemble criminal prosecutions for tax law violations. Compare 26 U. S. C. §§ 60501, 7203 with 31 U. S. C. §§ 5322, 5324. Both sets of laws are technical; and both sets of laws sometimes criminalize conduct that would not strike an ordinary citizen as immoral or likely unlawful. Thus, both sets of laws may lead to the unfair result of criminally prosecuting individuals who subjectively and honestly believe they have not acted criminally. Cheek v. United States, 498 U. S. 192 ... (1991), sets forth a legal standard that, by requiring proof that the defendant was subjectively aware of the duty at issue, would avoid such unfair results." United States v. Aversa, 984 F.2d 493, 502 (CA1 1993) (concurring opinion).
He therefore concluded that the "same standards should apply in both" the tax cases and in cases such as Ratzlaf 984 F. 2d, at 503.
Thus, the willfulness requirement of § 924(a)(1)(D) does not carve out an exception to the traditional rule that ignorance of the law is no excuse; knowledge that the conduct is unlawful is all that is required.
n. 4, supra; see also United States v. Andrade, 135 F.3d 104, 108-109 (CAl1998).
24 For example, Representative Hughes, a staunch opponent of the bill, stated that the willfulness requirement would "make it next to impossible to convict dealers, particularly those who engage in business without acquiring a license, because the prosecution would have to show that the dealer was personally aware of every detail of the law, and that he made a conscious decision to violate the law." 132 Congo Rec. 6875 (1986). Even petitioner's amicus acknowledges that this statement was "undoubtedly an exaggeration." Brief for National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae 14.
25 See also Andrade, 135 F. 3d, at 108-109.
26 See, e. g., Perri v. Department of the Treasury, 637 F.2d 1332, 1336 (CA9 1981); Stein's Inc. v. Blumenthal, 649 F.2d 463, 467-468 (CA7 1980). 27 Rich v. United States, 383 F. Supp. 797, 800 (SD Ohio 1974).
28 Lewin v. Blumenthal, 590 F.2d 268, 269 (CA8 1979); Fin & Feather Sport Shop v. United States Treasury Department, 481 F. Supp. 800, 807 (Neb. 1979).
29 Prino v. Simon, 606 F.2d 449, 451 (CA4 1979) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Stein's, 649 F. 2d, at 467 ("[I]f a person 1) intentionally does an act which is prohibited, irrespective of evil motive or reliance on erroneous advice, or 2) acts with careless disregard of statutory requirements, the violation is willful" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
the owner of the pawnshop, as well as his employees, had knowledge of the law).
"The uncontroverted evidence shows clearly that plaintiff was aware of the above holding period requirements. Mr. Mayesh had been previously advised on the requirements under Illinois law, and he clearly acknowledged that he was aware of them .... Since the material facts are undisputed, as a matter of law the plaintiff clearly and knowingly violated the Illinois holding provisions ... , and hence, 18 U. S. C. § 922(b)(2). This court can only consider such action to have been 'wilful' as a matter of law. There is no basis for trial of any disputed facts in this connection. This is sufficient to justify refusal of license renewal." 58 F. R. D., at 540. See also, e. g., Perri, 637 F. 2d, at 1336 (stating that when a dealer understands the requirements of the law, but knowingly fails to follow them or is indifferent to them, willfulness "is established," i. e., is satisfied); Stein's, 649 F. 2d, at 468 ("Evidence of repeated violations with knowledge of the law's requirements has been held sufficient to establish willfulness" (emphasis added)); McLemore, 317 F. Supp., at 1078-1079.
3218 U. S. C. § 922(b)(3).
"In this case, the government is not required to prove that the defendant knew that a license was required, nor is the government required to prove that he had knowledge that he was breaking the law." App. 19 (emphasis added). If the judge had added the words "that required a license," the sentence would have been accurate, but as given it was not.
"We ... see no reason why the word 'regulations' [or the phrase 'any other provision of this chapter'] should not be construed as a shorthand designation for specific acts or omissions which violate the Act. The Act, so viewed, does not signal an exception to the rule that ignorance of the law is no excuse .... " Id., at 562.
the narrow legal question whether knowledge of the licensing requirement is an essential element of the offense.
I join in the Court's opinion with the caveat that if petitioner had raised and preserved a specific objection to the erroneous statement in the jury instructions, see Part V, ante, at 199 and this page, I would vote to vacate the conviction.
JUSTICE SCALIA, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and JUSTICE GINSBURG join, dissenting.
ambiguity in a criminal statute, doubts are resolved in favor of the defendant.'" Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U. S. 275, 284-285 (1978), quoting United States v. Bass, 404 U. S. 336, 348 (1971).
Title 18 U. S. C. § 922(a)(1)(A) makes it unlawful for any person to engage in the business of dealing in firearms without a federal license. That provision is enforced criminally through § 924(a)(1)(D), which imposes criminal penalties on whoever "willfully violates any other provision of this chapter." The word "willfully" has a wide range of meanings, and "'its construction [is] often ... influenced by its context.'" Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U. S. 135, 141 (1994), quoting Spies v. United States, 317 U. S. 492, 497 (1943). In some contexts it connotes nothing more than "an act which is intentional, or knowing, or voluntary, as distinguished from accidental." United States v. Murdock, 290 U. S. 389, 394 (1933). In the present context, however, inasmuch as the preceding three subparagraphs of § 924 specify a mens rea of "knowingly" for other firearms offenses, see §§ 924(a)(1)(A)-(C), a "willful" violation under § 924(a)(1)(D) must require some mental state more culpable than mere intent to perform the forbidden act. The United States concedes (and the Court apparently agrees) that the violation is not "willful" unless the defendant knows in a general way that his conduct is unlawful. Brief for United States 7-9; ante, at 193 ("The jury must find that the defendant acted with an evil-meaning mind, that is to say, that he acted with knowledge that his conduct was unlawful").
textual basis for that conclusion other than the notoriously malleable word "willfully" itself. Instead, it seems to fall back on a presumption (apparently derived from the rule that ignorance of the law is no excuse) that even where ignorance of the law is an excuse, that excuse should be construed as narrowly as the statutory language permits.
a license), I see no principled way to determine what law the defendant must be conscious of violating. See, e. g., Lewis v. United States, 523 U. S. 155, 174-175 (1998) (SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment) (pointing out a similar interpretive problem potentially raised by the Assimilative Crimes Act).
Congress is free, of course, to make criminal liability under one statute turn on knowledge of another, to use its firearms dealer statutes to encourage compliance with New York City's tax collection efforts, and to put judges and juries through the kind of mental gymnastics described above. But these are strange results, and I would not lightly assume that Congress intended to make liability under a federal criminal statute depend so heavily upon the vagaries of local law-particularly local law dealing with completely unrelated subjects. If we must have a presumption in cases like this one, I think it would be more reasonable to presume that, when Congress makes ignorance of the law a defense to a criminal prohibition, it ordinarily means ignorance of the unlawfulness of the specific conduct punished by that criminal prohibition.
"willful" to require some awareness of illegality, as opposed to merely "an act which is intentional, or knowing, or voluntary, as distinguished from accidental." Murdock, 290 U. S., at 394. But it in no way justifies the distinction the Court seeks to draw today between knowledge of the law the defendant is actually charged with violating and knowledge of any law the defendant could conceivably be charged with violating. To protect the pure of heart, it is not necessary to forgive someone whose surreptitious laundering of drug money violates, unbeknownst to him, a technical currency statute. There, as here, regardless of how "complex" the violated statute may be, the defendant would have acted "with an evil-meaning mind."
presumption that willful violation requires knowledge of the law violated.
If one had to choose, therefore, I think a presumption of statutory intent that is the opposite of the one the Court applies would be more reasonable. I would not, however, decide this case on the basis of any presumption at all. It is common ground that the statutory context here requires some awareness of the law for a § 924(a)(1)(D) conviction, but the statute is simply ambiguous, or silent, as to the precise contours of that mens rea requirement. In the face of that ambiguity, I would invoke the rule that" 'ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity,'" United States v. Bass, 404 U. S., at 347, quoting Rewis v. United States, 401 U. S. 808, 812 (1971).
"The rule that penal laws are to be construed strictly, is, perhaps, not much less old than construction itself. It is founded on the tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals; and on the plain principle that the power of punishment is vested in the legislative, not in the judicial department." United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76, 95 (1820).
In our era of multiplying new federal crimes, there is more reason than ever to give this ancient canon of construction consistent application: by fostering uniformity in the interpretation of criminal statutes, it will reduce the occasions on which this Court will have to produce judicial havoc by resolving in defendants' favor a Circuit conflict regarding the substantive elements of a federal crime, see, e. g., Bousley v. United States, 523 U. S. 614 (1998).

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