Source: http://masscases.com/cases/sjc/420/420mass739.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 00:19:29+00:00

Document:
Present: LIACOS, C.J., WILKINS, ABRAMS, & GREANY, JJ.
CIVIL ACTION commenced in the Superior Court Department on March 9, 1984.
The case was tried before Barbara J. Rouse, J., and a motion for a new trial was heard by her.
Paul M. Moretti (Richard L. Neumeier with him) for the defendant.
Kevin M. Truland for the plaintiff.
also conclude that Westwood cannot be vicariously liable for the police officer's conduct. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment against Westwood and direct entry of a judgment in its favor.
On March 11, 1982, the plaintiff and a friend went to the dog races at Wonderland Greyhound Park in Revere. They arrived shortly before the first race, which was scheduled for 8 P.M. The plaintiff parked his car in Wonderland's south parking lot, which is located across VFW Parkway, State Route 1A (Route 1A) from the track. The pair walked a short distance to the edge of the parking lot, where pedestrians would traverse a painted crosswalk in order to reach the track.
ond officer similarly directed the traffic in the southbound lanes.
The plaintiff based his case against Westwood on two theories. First, he alleged that the system used for patron crossing of Route 1A from the south parking lot was intrinsically inadequate and contributed to the accident. In particular, the plaintiff contended that Westwood should have erected a traffic light or constructed a pedestrian bridge in order to provide safe pedestrian passage across Route 1A. Second, the plaintiff alleged that Officer Falzarano acted negligently and that Westwood was responsible for the consequences of the officer's negligence.
At trial, the plaintiff called civil engineer James D'Angelo to testify as an expert on the subject of Westwood's allegedly negligent failure to erect a traffic light or to build a pedestrian bridge. [Note 7] In addressing whether the judge erred in allowing D'Angelo's testimony, the Appeals Court "put to one side the question whether [Westwood] was under a duty to make provision for safe passage of patrons over the highway, a public facility . . . [because Westwood] voluntarily undertook the task and was thus cast with a duty to exercise due care in carrying it out." Davis v. Allard, supra at 512.
It is well established that an owner or possessor of land owes a common law duty of reasonable care to all lawful visitors. Sullivan v. Brookline, 416 Mass. 825 , 827 (1994), citing Mounsey v. Ellard, 363 Mass. 693 , 707 (1973). This duty includes an obligation to maintain the premises in reasonably safe condition and to warn visitors of any unreasonable dangers of which the landowner is aware or reasonably should be aware. [Note 9] Thorson v. Mandell, 402 Mass. 744 , 747 (1988). Toubiana v. Priestly, 402 Mass. 84 88 (1988). Polak v. Whitney, 21 Mass. App. Ct. 349 , 351 (1985). Although a landowner or possessor typically is not held to any duty with respect to public highways adjacent to or crossing his land, he must exercise reasonable care in the use of his land so as not to injure a traveler on the highway. Pritchard v. Mabrey, 358 Mass. 137 , 140 (1970).
land, even where the person held to such a duty does not own the land in question. Underhill v. Shactman, 337 Mass. 730 , 733 (1958). See Anthony H. v. John G., 415 Mass. 196 , 200 (1993), citing Mounsey v. Ellard, supra at 707-708. Although Westwood arranged for municipal police details at the pedestrian crosswalk, we do not believe that this action amounts to such "control" over the road that we should impose on Westwood the broad duty to provide safe pedestrian passage across Route 1A by altering a State highway, or by applying for a permit to do so.
Indeed, it is clear that the Commonwealth controls Route 1A. Route 1A is a State highway owned and maintained by the Commonwealth. See G. L. c. 81, Section 13 (1992 ed.) ("State highways shall be maintained and kept in good repair and condition by the department [of highways] at the expense of the commonwealth"). For example, the Commonwealth, through the department of highways, designs and constructs State highways such as Route 1A. See G. L. c. 81, Section 5. The department, at the Commonwealth's expense, is responsible for snow and ice removal on State highways, for keeping State highways reasonably clear of brush, and for performing other maintenance duties. G. L. c. 81, Sections 13 & 19. The department constructs sidewalks along those sections of State highways as it determines public convenience and necessity require. G. L. c. 81, Section 20. It is authorized to install lighting to illuminate State highways. G. L. c. 81, Section 20A. In addition, the department oversees a permit process for approving and overseeing alterations to State highways. See G. L. c. 81, Section 21. As part of this process, the department has authority to require certain persons to install and pay for standard traffic control devices or other highway improvements to facilitate safe and efficient traffic flow, or to make these improvements itself at the expense of those persons. G. L. c. 81, Section 21.
The plaintiff also alleges that Westwood voluntarily assumed a duty to provide safe passage to its patrons from the south parking lot over the State highway and that "the precise scope of the duty gratuitously assumed was for the jury to determine." We disagree.
Westwood was cast with a duty to exercise due care in carrying out the particular task of hiring those officers.
Because we conclude that Westwood owed no duty to the plaintiff to provide safe passage across Route 1A by altering or seeking to alter the State highway, and because we conclude that Westwood cannot be held vicariously liable for Officer Falzarano's acts, we reverse the judgment against Westwood, and order entry of judgment for Westwood.
[Note 1] Doing business as Wonderland Greyhound Park.
[Note 2] The plaintiff asserted negligence claims against Robert Allard, Edward Poulin (Allard's employer and owner of the van who also was a passenger in the van at the time of the accident), the city of Revere, and Trolley's Food and Spirits (a restaurant where Allard had spent time earlier that evening). Apparently the case against Trolley's was discontinued. Poulin, Revere, and Trolley's Food and Spirits are not parties to this appeal. Robert Allard did not seek further appellate review of the decision of the Appeals Court, Davis v. Allard, 37 Mass. App. Ct. 508 (1994). Hence, the issues pertaining to his appeal are not before us.
[Note 3] The Appeals Court affirmed the judgment against Allard.
[Note 4] The Appeals Court did not explicitly announce that Westwood owed a duty to the plaintiff to construct a pedestrian bridge or otherwise make alterations to Route 1A. However, the court's conclusion that an expert witness's testimony that Westwood should have erected a traffic light or constructed a pedestrian bridge was properly admitted, as well as its statement that this theory of liability was tenable, can be read as stating that Westwood had a duty to make alterations to the State highway. We note that in light of applicable statutes and procedures, the question more properly is whether Westwood had a duty to apply for a permit to make alterations to Route 1A in order to provide safe pedestrian passage across the State highway. See G. L. c. 81, Section 21 (1992 ed.) ("no . . . obstruction or structure [shall be placed on State highway] or removed therefrom or changed without the written permit of the department").
[Note 5] Wonderland's north parking lot is situated on the same side of Route 1A as the track.
[Note 6] The jury found Revere and Edward Poulin not responsible. The jury found total damages to be $247,200.
[Note 7] In light of our conclusion that Westwood had no duty to make alterations to the State highway or to apply for a permit to make alterations, we need not address the propriety of admitting D'Angelo's expert testimony.
[Note 8] Westwood filed motions for a directed verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. In our view, the latter motion should have been allowed.
[Note 9] If a risk is of such a nature that persons of ordinary intelligence would be aware of it, a landowner generally has no duty to warn of the risk. Toubiana v. Priestly, 402 Mass. 84 , 89 (1988). Young v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 400 Mass. 837 , 842 (1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1066 (1988).
[Note 10] Although we have not specifically addressed the duty owed by a landowner to pedestrians crossing a State highway, a number of jurisdictions have held that a landowner's duty does not extend to public streets over which the landowner has no control. See e.g., Chouinard v. New Hampshire Speedway, 829 F. Supp. 495, 503 (D.N.H. 1993) (defendant landowner owed no duty to plaintiff to guard against negligent acts of thirdparty tortfeasors on public way over which defendant had no control); Owens v. Kings Supermarket, 198 Cal. App. 3d 379, 388 (1988) (supermarket owed no duty to customer injured by negligence of third party in public street adjacent to supermarket premises); State v. Flanigan, 489 N.E.2d 1216, 1218-1219 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986) (owner of commercial premises adjacent to public highway generally owes no duty to patron injured when struck by automobile as patron was crossing or walking along highway); Swett v. Algonquin, 169 Ill. App. 3d 78, 90 (1988) (restaurant owed plaintiffs no duty to protect them from motorists traveling on public roadway located between restaurant and its parking lot); MacGrath v. Levin Properties, 256 N.J. Super. 247, 250-251 (App. Div. 1992) (property owner, who is otherwise without fault, owes no duty to pedestrians injured on abutting highway or sidewalk that is part of public domain); Laumann v. Plakakis, 84 N.C. App. 131, 133 (1987) (defendant had no duty to provide for crossing guard, warning lights or other traffic control devices on city street); Ferreira v. Strack, 636 A.2d 682, 686 (R.I. 1994) (owner of premises abutting public way has no duty to control traffic on a public way); Mahle v. Wilson, 283 S.C. 486, 488 (Ct. App. 1984) (defendant owed no duty to plaintiff to request that highway department post speed limit signs or furnish a pedestrian crosswalk in front of its place of business); Dixon v. Houston Raceway Park, Inc., 874 S.W.2d 760, 763 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994) (defendant owed no legal duty to person killed in motor vehicle accident that occurred on public road outside defendant's control).
[Note 11] We note that at trial it was undisputed that the Commonwealth had not recommended the construction of a traffic signal or pedestrian bridge at the crosswalk where the accident occurred.
"(b) the harm is suffered because of the other's reliance upon the undertaking."
[Note 13] In addition, to impose on Westwood this broad duty of altering a State highway would penalize Westwood for having arranged and paid for municipal police officers to monitor the pedestrian crossing. We conclude also that the jury verdict that the city of Revere was not negligent supports the conclusion that Westwood performed this duty with due care.
[Note 14] We note, however, that we are content with the Appeals Court's conclusion that Falzarano was an independent contractor rather than an employee of Westwood, and that therefore vicarious liability was not a tenable ground for a judgment against Westwood.

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