Source: https://jacksonokeefe.com/personal-injury/connecticut-car-accident-statute-of-limitations-and-other-connecticut-statu/
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 00:01:31+00:00

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No action to recover damages for injury to the person, or to real or personal property, caused by negligence, or by reckless or wanton misconduct, or by malpractice of a physician, surgeon, dentist, podiatrist, chiropractor, hospital or sanatorium, shall be brought but within two years from the date when the injury is first sustained or discovered or in the exercise of reasonable care should have been discovered, and except that no such action may be brought more than three years from the date of the act or omission complained of, except that a counterclaim may be interposed in any such action any time before the pleadings in such action are finally closed.
There are complex issues raised by the possible statute of limitations defense to your claim, which may force you into a situation where you lose the right to any compensation. Therefore, it is imperative that claims be filed in a timely manner to avoid this issue. Contact us now to discuss your situation.
Statutes of limitation commonly provide for the time period in which a tort action may be brought. In some jurisdictions, there are specific statutes of limitation that apply to tort claims of professional negligence or malpractice. Only certain professions may be subject to such statutes of limitation, such as attorneys and physicians,and an action will not be governed by such a limitation period where the occupation is not one that is considered professional. Statutes of limitation for professional malpractice actions apply only if the alleged tortious conduct arose from the practice of a vocation that qualifies as a profession at the moment in time when that conduct caused the completed injury or loss under recognized tort-law principles.
See C.G.S.A. § 52-577 and Orticelli v. Powers, 197 Conn. 9, 495 A.2d 1023 (1985).
The Supreme Court held in Tarnowsky v. Socci, 271 Conn. 284, 856 A.2d 408 (2004) that "the two year statute of limitations set forth in § 52-584 does not begin to run until a plaintiff knows, or reasonably should have known, the identity of the tortfeasor." However, the three-year statute of repose contained in that same section continues to bar actions brought more than three years after the act or omission complained of.
C.G.S.A. § 52-584, the statute of limitations pertaining to medical malpractice, states that suit must be commenced within two years of the date when the injury was or should have been discovered. C.G.S.A. § 52-555, the statute of limitations in a wrongful death action, permits commencement of an action within two years of the date of death, but imposes an absolute limitation on commencement of a wrongful death action of within five years from the date of the act or omission complained of, whereas C.G.S.A. § 52-584 limits commencement of actions to within three years of the date or action complained of.
In McDonald v. Haynes Medical Laboratory, Inc., 192 Conn. 327, 471 A.2d 646 (1984), the defendant incorrectly diagnosed a woman's RH blood factor in 1960. In 1973, she gave birth to a baby boy who died shortly thereafter due to RH factor incompatibility. The administrator sued on behalf of the child. The issue was whether the court would exclude from the ambit of §§ 52-555 and 52-584 situations where injury was inherently undiscoverable. The supreme court adhered to a strict reading of the statutes and denied the plaintiff's claims. The constitutional problem posed in Chief Justice Speziale's dissent (with regard to a statute of limitations that begins to run before the occurrence of an injury) was disposed of in favor of the McDonald court majority in Stein v. Katz, 213 Conn. 282, 567 A.2d 1183 (1989).
In limited instances, it may be possible for a plaintiff to toll the statute of limitations under the doctrines of "continuous treatment" and "continuing course of conduct." See Blanchette v. Barrett, 229 Conn. 256, 640 A.2d 74 (1994); Starkweather v. Patel, 34 Conn.App. 395, 641 A.2d 809 (1994), cert. denied 230 Conn. 905, 644 A.2d 918 (1994); and Connell v. Colwell, 214 Conn. 242, 571 A.2d 116 (1990).

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