Source: https://www.juridicainternational.eu/index.php?id=14577
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 12:59:45+00:00

Document:
1. When did we start to think about judicial independence? Why should we care?
We are today so used to the rhetoric of judicial independence that we rarely think about the origins of the concept of judicial independence and whether and how we benefit from it. Although the idea of separation of powers has been discussed already from Aristotle and Polybius to Marsilius of Padua, John Fortescue, and Gasparo Contarini *1 , judicial independence is a comparatively modern invention.
Later, judicial independence has been considered in a much broader context, including that of undue influences from all possible agents in society.
Although there is tension between independence and accountability, independence will be weak if corrupt behaviour is prevalent. *10 The threat to judicial independence is not always governmental. The judiciary needs to be concerned about independence not only from the other branches of government but also from illegitimate sources of power. Judicial independence from other branches of government is crucial, but it is meaningless if judges are instead subjected to other improper influences. Consequently, governments seeking to establish an independent, autonomous judiciary having the respect and trust of the people must take steps to secure the independence of the judiciary from the influence of powerful non-government groups that have an incentive to influence the outcome of adjudications. *11 In this sense, judicial independence has utilitarian reasons. Judges conceivably influenced by agents of undue pressure would render judgements not based exclusively on the law and facts of the case but may take into account the interests of the above-mentioned agents. Therefore, judgements rendered under undue influence would lead the society away from the models of behaviour upon which that society has decided through legislation *12 to be those best serving the interests of the society.
Judicial independence signifies much more than a judge’s freedom from political influence. Independence has a number of definitions and dimensions, including structural, organisational, and administrative aspects of a judicial system, which all play a role in judicial independence.
The International Association of Judges has declared that “[j]udicial independence is independence from any external influence on a judge’s decisions in judicial matters, ensuring [for] the citizens impartial trial according to law. This means that the judge must be protected against the possibility of pressure and other influence by the executive and legislative powers of [the] state as well as by the media, business enterprises, passing popular opinion etc. But it also implies guarantees against influence from within the judiciary itself” *13 .
In the discussion on the influence of the hunt for efficient court management, all of these types of independence should be kept in mind.
Although the concept of judicial independence is at least in part based on the Aristotelian desire to keep away from the threat of tyranny, unlimited judicial independence, if not counterpoised by accountability as well as checks and balances between powers, could lead to tyranny itself: judicial tyranny.
2. Courts need administration, don’t they?
In conclusion, it can be asserted that the more involvement of executive and legislative powers in judicial administration the more potential threats exist to judicial independence.
Since regaining independence in 1991, Estonia has tried out two different systems of judicial administration and is currently debating introduction of a third.
For a decade, the Supreme Court and the Ministry of Justice were engaged in discussion as to whether the model of judicial administration guaranteed enough independence for the judiciary.
12) the conscription of judges into active service in the defence forces.
Still the executive remained heavily involved in the administration of the first- and second-instance courts. And the judicial power continued to be unsatisfied with the situation.
The next momentous factor to be considered in the development of Estonia’s courts is that the judges worked out the principles for development of the court system. The discussion about the development of the court system’s self-organisation, its financing, and administration culminated in February 2007, when the en banc meeting comprising all Estonian judges approved certain principles for development of the court system. The document concerning these principles according to which the court system would be developed as an independent branch of power, for the first time in the history of the Republic of Estonia, set out the directions and objectives for that development.
1. Estonia’s court system is a Constitutional institution that, on the basis of the principle of separate and balanced powers, is independent in its activities.
3. To ensure development of the court system in observation of fundamental values and its functioning pursuant to established requirements, it is important to regulate the duties and structure of the court system, to develop the financing and administration of the court system, to deepen the self-managerial elements thereof, and to promote the personnel policy of the court system and training.
7. For further development in line with the principle of separation of powers, the administration of courts should be separated from the executive power. To guarantee the appropriate administration and development of courts, an independent administrative authority was to be established, to be part of the single court system in legal and organisational senses and subject to the management model of the court system as a whole.
8. The court system shall be managed on the basis of the principle of self‑management, with that management exercised through the activities of the Court en banc, the Council for Administration of Courts, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, chairmen of courts, the full court, and the director general of the administrative authority of courts and directors of courts.
In March 2008, the Minister of Justice established a working group to prepare the amendments to the legislation regulating judicial administration and organisation. Then, in 2009, a new draft Courts Act was submitted by the working group headed by Märt Rask, who was Minister of Justice at the time the Courts Act was adopted in 2002 and is now Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. *47 The new draft suggests a complete change in the judicial administration; the administration of the first- and second-instance courts will be in the same system as the Supreme Court. The Ministry of Justice will have almost no functions in judicial administration. Judicial administration will be the mandate of the Council for Courts’ Administration of Courts and the Centre for Courts’ Administration.
The opposition to the draft has several, very different sets of roots. *49 Nonetheless, almost all who oppose the 2009 draft are unsatisfied with the fact that it proposes to introduce to judicial administration many features that have long been employed exclusively in the sphere of administration of civil service.
The 2009 draft introduces an opportunity for a judge to be transferred from one courthouse of a court to another by the chairman of the court without the consent of that judge. *56 This would make it easier for judicial administration to equalise caseloads across the various courts, but it would create an additional opportunity for a higher‑ranking judge to exert pressure on judges as well.
The draft introduces a novelty for the Estonian judicial system, substitute judges. According to the draft, the substitute judges should have the qualifications necessary for a person becoming a judge and would be appointed through the same procedure as the other judges. However, they would receive a salary only for the time for which they are appointed to serve as a substitute judge.
For the Estonian judicial system, there is a further argument against introduction of substitute judges. The Estonian Constitution’s § 147 states rigidly that ‘judges shall be appointed for life’ *63 . And it is extremely questionable whether the substitute judge receiving a salary only for the brief period(s) for which she serves as a substitute judge can be regarded as a judge appointed for life. In any sense, the guarantees of independence would be substantially less for substitute judges than for ‘full’ judges appointed for life.
In conclusion, one may assert that the history of the development of the schemes for administration of the Estonian judicial system indicates that judicial administration may hinder judicial independence no matter what concrete model of judicial administration is employed.
*1 S. D. Gerber. The Court, the Constitution, and the History of Ideas. – Vanderbilt Law Review 2008 (61), pp. 1088 –1105.
*2 R. J. McWhirter. Going Courting. Where We Got Courts and the Rule of Law. – Arizona Attorney, October 2008 (45), pp. 12–22.
*3 English Bill of Rights. Available at http://www.statutelaw.gov.uk/content.aspx? LegType=All+Legislation &Year=1688 &searchEnacted=0 &extentMatchOnly =0 &confersPower=0 &blanketAmendment=0 &sortAlpha=0 &TYPE=QS &PageNumber=1 &NavFrom=0parentActiveTextDocId=1518621ActiveTextDocId =1518621 &filesize=29720 (20.12.2009).
*4 R. J. Reinstein. The Limits of Executive Power. – American University Law Review, December, 2009 (59), p. 282.
*5 Act of Settlement. Available at http://www.statutelaw.gov.uk/content.aspx? LegType=All+Legislation &searchEnacted=0 &extentMatchOnly=0 &confersPower =0 &blanketAmendment=0 &sortAlpha=0 &PageNumber=0 &NavFrom=0 &activeTextDocId =1565208 &parentActiveTextDocId=0 &showAllAttributes=0 &showProsp =0 &suppressWarning=0 &hideCommentary=0 (20.12.2009).
*6 No judge in England has been removed from a high court since 1830. See M. Dakolias, K. Thachuk. Attacking Corruption in the Judiciary: a Critical Process in Judicial Reform. – Wisconsin International Law Journal, Spring, 2000 (18), p. 402. Nevertheless there have been very few lapses in propriety. One judge died in Nottingham, on 17 July 1884, in a house which was neither so sedate, nor so orderly, as the judge’s lodgings. But so far as independence is concerned any examples of subservience to either executive or to the legislature in the last century in England are difficult, if not possible, to find. See Lord Lane. Judicial Independence and the Increasing Executive Role in Judicial Administration. – Judicial independence: the contemporary debate. S. Shetreet, J. Deschênes (eds.). Dordrecht: Kluwer Law International 1985, p. 525.
*7 S. Jay. Servants of Monarchs and Lords: the Advisory Role of Early English Judges. – American Journal of Legal History 1994 (38), p. 151.
*8 S. D. Gerber (Note 1), p. 1090.
*9 J. C. Wallace. An Essay on Independence of the Judiciary: Independence from what and why. – New York University Annual Survey of American Law 2001 (58), p. 242.
*10 M. Dakolias, K. Thachuk (Note 6), p. 354.
*11 J. C. Wallace (Note 9), pp. 245–246.
*12 Here we do not enter the discussion whether any society is able to find the best models of behaviour through legislation and just assume that we have not been able to find out any better sources.
*13 International Association of Judges. Meeting in Recife, 17–21 September 2000, Final Report. The Independence of the Individual Judge within his Own Organization. Available at: http://www.iaj-uim.org/site/modules/mastop_publish/?tac=41 (17.06.2010).
*14 See S. Shetreet. The Normative Cycle of Shaping Judicial Independence in Domestic and International Law: the Mutual Impact of National and International Jurisprudence and Contemporary Practical and Conceptual Challenges. – Chicago Journal of International Law, Summer, 2009 (10), p. 281; M. Dakolias, K. Thachuk (Note 6), pp. 361–362.
*15 Eesti Vabariigi Põhiseadus. Kommenteeritud väljaanne (The Constitution of the Republic of Estonia. Commented edition). Tallinn: Juura 2002, p. 611 (in Estonian).
*16 Eesti Vabariigi Põhiseadus. Kommenteeritud väljaanne. 2., täiendatud trükk (The Constitution of the Republic of Estonia. Commented edition. Second, amended edition). Tallinn: Juura 2008, pp. 678 and 683 (in Estonian).
*17 D. Pimentel. Reframing the Independence v. Accountability Debate: Defining Judicial Structure in Light of Judges’ Courage and Integrity. – Cleveland State Law Review 2009 (57), p. 5.
*18 F. B. Cross. Thoughts on Goldilocks and Judicial Independence. – Ohio State Law Journal 2003 (64), p. 195.
*19 P. F. Drucker. Management: Tasks, Responsibilities, Practices. New York: Harper & Row 1973, p. 6.
*20 A. B. Aikman. The Art and Practice of Court Administration. Boca Raton, Florida: CRC Press 2007, p. 5.
*22 S. Henley, J. H. Suhr. The Role of Court Administration in the Management, Independence, and Accountability of the Courts. – Florida Bar Journal, March, 2004 (8), p. 29.
*23 S. Shetreet. Judicial Independence: New Conceptual Dimensions and Contemporary Challenges. – Judicial independence: the contemporary debate. S. Shetreet, J. Deschênes (eds.). Dordrecht: Kluwer Law International 1985, p. 644.
*25 Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) has in Germany the benefit of a much wider administrative independence than other courts. The budget estimates of the Constitutional Court are prepared by the court and are presented to the Ministry of Finance directly as a separate plan, like the budget plan of a Federal Ministry.
*26 S. Shetreet (Note 23), p. 644.
*28 Eesti Vabariigi kohtuniku staatuse seadus, 1991. – RT 1991, 38, 473 (in Estonian).
*29 Kohtute seadus, 1991. – RT 1991, 38, 472 (in Estonian).
*30 The pros and contras regarding judicial independence guaranteed by the 1991 Acts were discussed in a paper: J. Ginter. Guarantees of Judicial Independence. – Juridica International 1996 (I), pp. 75–84.
*31 Eesti Vabariigi põhiseadus, § 150. – RT 1992, 26, 349; RT I 2007, 43, 311 (in Estonian). Translation into English available at http://www.president.ee/en/estonia/constitution.php (23.03.2010).
*32 The Estonian Constitution, § 150.
*33 R. Maruste. Eesti kohtusüsteemi juhtimise korrastamise kava (Project for Regulating the Management of the Court System). – Juridica 1995/5, pp. 199–203 (in Estonian).
*34 H. Schneider. Kohus lahusvõimude süsteemis (Courts in the System of Separation of Powers). – Juridica 1999/9, p. 419 (in Estonian).
*35 U. Lõhmus. Kohtuvõimu sõltumatus ja kohtuhaldus (Independence of Judiciary and Judicial Administration). – Riigikogu Toimetised 2001 (3). Available at http://www.riigikogu.ee/rito/index.php?id=11686 &op=archive2 (17.01.2010) (in Estonian).
*36 A. Sammelselg. Kohtukorralduse korraldamatus pärsib kohtusüsteemi arengut (Problems in Judicial Administration Hampers Development of the Judicial System). – Riigikogu Toimetised 2001 (3). Available at http://www.riigikogu.ee/rito/index.php?id=11686 &op=archive2 (17.01.2010) (in Estonian).
*37 R. Maruste. Kuidas korraldada kohtukorraldus? (How to Organise the Administration of Courts?) – Juridica 1997/10, pp. 501 (in Estonian).
*38 M. Rask. Võimude tasakaalustatus kui põhiseadulik väärtus (Balance of Government Powers as a Constitutional Value). – Riigikogu Toimetised 2001 (3). Available at http://www.riigikogu.ee/rito/index.php?id=11686 &op=archive2 (17.01.2010) (in Estonian).
*39 The Estonian Constitution, § 146.
*40 Kohtute seaduse eelnõu seletuskiri (Explanatory Memorandum to the Draft Courts Act), 2000. Available at http://web.riigikogu.ee/ems/saros-bin/mgetdoc ?itemid=003674649 &login=proov &password= &system=ems &server=ragne11 (24.01.2010) (in Estonian).
*41 The speech of then Minister of Justice, Märt Rask, at the first reading of the Courts Act in Riigikogu on 14 February 2001. Available at http://web.riigikogu.ee/ems/stenograms/2001/02/t01021405-15.html (25.01.2010) (in Estonian).
*43 Kohtute seadus (The Courts Act), § 41. – RT I 2002, 64, 390; 2009, 68, 463 (in Estonian).
*44 This principle involved other elements also.
*45 This principle involved other elements also.
*46 The principles of development of the court system. Resolution of the Court en banc of 9 February 2007. Available at http://www.nc.ee/?id=188 (26.03.2010).
*47 Text of the Draft Courts Act (2009). Available at http://www.riigikogu.ee/?page=pub_file &op=emsplain &content_type=application/msword &file_id=868762 & file_name=Kohtute%20seadus%20(652).doc &file_size=384000 &mnsent=649+SE &fd=26.03.2010 (26.03.2010) (in Estonian); Explanatory memorandum to the Draft Courts Act (2009) (Note 40).
*48 J. Filippov. Reformierakond valmistub kohtuid politiseerima (Reform Party Prepares to Politicise the Courts). – Eesti Ekspress, 10.12.2009. Available at http://www.ekspress.ee/news/paevauudised/eestiuudised/ reformierakond-valmistub-kohtuid-politiseerima.d?id=27693755 (12.01.2010) (in Estonian).
*49 U. Lõhmus. Kohtuhaldus kohtute seaduse eelnõu järgi (Administration of the Judiciary under the Courts Act Bill). – Juridica 2010/2, pp. 75–85 (in Estonian); P. Simson. Debatt: Kas kohtuid kummitab politiseerumisoht? (Debate: Is there a Threat of Politicisation of the Courts?). – Eesti Päevaleht, 3.02.2010. Available at http://www.epl.ee/artikkel/487310 (23.03.2010) (in Estonian).
*50 Section 27 of the Draft Courts Act (2009).
*51 S. Shetreet (Note 14), p. 296.
*52 The Draft (2009), § 26.
*53 The Draft (2009), § 19.
*54 See, e.g., S. Shetreet (Note 14).
*55 S. Shetreet (Note 23), p. 637.
*56 The Draft (2009), § 52.
*57 S. Shetreet (Note 23), p. 630.
*59 The Draft (2009), § 92.
*60 The First Study Commission of the International Association of Judges has concluded in their (2003) study on “The Role and Function of the High Council of Justice or Analogous Bodies in the Organisation and Management of the National Judicial System” that “[t]he independence of the judiciary is also dependent on adequate budgetary allocations for the administration of justice and the proper use of those resources. This can be best achieved by an independent body which has responsibility for the allocation of those resources”. Available at http://www.iaj-uim.org/site/modules/mastop_publish/?tac=43 (21.06.2010).
*61 Universal Declaration on the Independence of Justice. – Judicial Independence. S. Shetreet, J. Deschênes (eds.). Dodrecht, Boston, Lancaster: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1985, p. 447.
*62 S. Shetreet (Note 23), p. 626.
*63 The Estonian Constitution, § 147.

References: § 147
 v. 
 § 150
 § 150
 § 146
 § 41
 § 26
 § 19
 § 52
 § 92
 § 147