Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&amp;view=article&amp;id=26517:g-r-no-52064-december-26,-1984-juliana-caragay-layno-v-court-of-appeals,-et-al&amp;catid=1192&amp;Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 15:03:23+00:00

Document:
JULIANA CARAGAY-LAYNO, Assisted by Her Husband, BENITO LAYNO, Petitioner, v. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and SALVADOR ESTRADA as Administrator of the Estate of the Deceased, MARIANO DE VERA, Respondents.
Pedro G. Peralta for Petitioner.
Andres T. Gutierrez for Private Respondent.
1.	CIVIL LAW; LAND REGISTRATION; TORRENS TITLE; MERE POSSESSION THEREOF NOT CONCLUSIVE AS TO HOLDER’S TRUE OWNERSHIP OF ALL PROPERTY DESCRIBED THEREIN. — The foregoing conclusion does not necessarily wreak havoc on the indefensibility of a Torrens title. For, mere possession of a certificate of title under the Torrens System is not conclusive as to the holder s true ownership of all the property described therein for he does not by virtue of said certificate alone become the owner of the land illegally included. A Land Registration Court has no jurisdiction to decree a lot to persons who have never asserted any right of ownership over lt.
2.	ID.; PRESCRIPTION; AN ACTION TO QUIET TITLE TO PROPERTY IN ONE’S POSSESSION IS IMPRESCRIPTIBLE. — Prescription cannot be invoked against JULIANA for the reason that as lawful possessor and owner of the Disputed Portion, her cause of action for reconveyance which, in effect seeks to quiet title to the property, falls within settled jurisprudence that an action to quiet title to property in one’s possession is imprescriptible (Sapto, Et. Al. v. Fabiana, 103 Phil. 683, 687 ). Her undisturbed possession over a period of fifty-two (52) years gave her a continuing right to seek the aid of a Court of equity to determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and the effect on her own title.
Respondent Appellate Court, then the Court of Appeals, affirmed in toto the judgment of the former Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch III, at Dagupan adjudging private respondent entitled to recover possession of a parcel of land and ordering petitioners, as defendants below, to vacate the premises. Petitioners, as paupers, now seek a reversal of that judgment.
It was established by a relocation survey that the Disputed Portion is a 3,732 square-meter-area of a bigger parcel of sugar and coconut land (Lot No. 1, Psu-24206 [Case No. 44, GLRO Rec. No. 117]), with a total area of 8,752 square meters, situated at Calasiao, Pangasinan. The entire parcel is covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 63, and includes the adjoining Lots 2 and 3, issued on 11 September 1947 in the name of Mariano M. DE VERA, who died in 1951 without issue. His intestate estate was administered first by his widow as later by her nephew, respondent Salvador Estrada.
Because of the discrepancy in area mentioned in the Inventory as 5,147 square meters (as filed by the widow), and that in the title as 8,752 square meters, ESTRADA repaired to the Disputed Property and found that the northwestern portion, subsequently surveyed to be 3,732 square meters, was occupied by petitioner-spouses Juliana Caragay Layno and Benito Layno. ESTRADA demanded that they vacate the Disputed Portion since it was titled in the name of the deceased DE VERA, but petitioners refused claiming that the land belonged to them and, before them, to JULIANA’s father Juan Caragay.
After hearing, the Trial Court rendered judgment ordering JULIANA to vacate the Disputed Portion.
On appeal, respondent Appellate Court affirmed the Decision in toto.
We are constrained to reverse.
The evidence discloses that the Disputed Portion was originally possessed openly, continuously and uninterruptedly in the concept of an owner by Juan Caragay, the deceased rather of JULIANA, and had been declared in his name under Tax Declaration No. 28694 beginning with the year 1921 (Exhibit "2-C"), later revised by Tax Declaration No. 2298 in 1951 (Exhibit "2-B"). Upon the demise of her father in 1914, JULIANA adjudicated the property to herself as his sole heir in 1968 (Exhibit "4") and declared it in her name under Tax Declaration No. 22522 beginning with the year 1959 (Exhibit "2-A"), later cancelled by TD No. 3539 in 1966 (Exhibit "2"). Realty taxes were also religiously paid from 1938 to 1972 (Exhibits "3-A" to "3-H"). Tacking the previous possession of her father to her own, they had been in actual, open, continuous and uninterrupted possession in the concept of owner for about forty five (45) years, until said possession was disturbed in 1966 when ESTRADA informed JULIANA that the Disputed Portion was registered in Mariano DE VERA’s name.
To substantiate her claim of fraud in the inclusion of the Disputed Portion in OCT No. 68, JULIANA, an unlettered woman, declared that during his lifetime, DE VERA, her first cousin, and whom she regarded as a father as he was much older, borrowed from her the Tax Declaration of her land purportedly to be used as collateral for his loan and sugar quota application; that relying on her cousin’s assurances, she acceded to his request and was made to sign some documents the contents of which she did not ever know because of her ignorance; that she discovered the fraudulent inclusion of the Disputed Portion in OCT No. 63 only in 1966 when ESTRADA so informed her and sought to eject them.
Of significance is the fact, as disclosed by the evidence, that for twenty (20) years from the date of registration of title in 1947 up to 1967 when this suit for recovery of possession was instituted, neither the deceased DE VERA up to the time of his death in 1951, nor his successors-in-interest, had taken steps to possess or lay adverse claim to the Disputed Portion. They may, therefore be said to be guilty of laches as would effectively derail their cause of action. Administrator ESTRADA tools interest in recovering the said portion only when he noticed the discrepancy in areas in the Inventory of Property and in the title.
Inasmuch as DE VERA had failed to assert any rights over the Disputed Portion during his lifetime, nor did he nor his successors-in-interest possess it for a single moment; but that, JULIANA had been in actual, continuous and open possession thereof to the exclusion of all and sundry, the inescapable inference is, fraud having been unsubstantiated, that it had been erroneously included in OCT No. 63. The mistake is confirmed by the fact that deducting 3,732 sq. ms., the area of the Disputed Portion from 8,752 sq. ms., the area of Lot 1 in OCT No. 63, the difference is 5,020 sq. ms., which closely approximates the area of 5,147 sq. ms., indicated in the Inventory of Property of DE VERA. In fact, the widow by limiting the area in said Inventory to only 5,147 sq. ms., in effect, recognized and admitted that the Disputed Portion of 3,132 sq. ms. did not form part of the decedent’s estate.
JULIANA, whose property had been wrongfully registered in the name of another, but which had not yet passed into the hands of third parties, can properly seek its reconveyance.
Besides, under the circumstances, JULIANA’s right to quiet title, to seek reconveyance, and to annul OCT. No. 63 accused only in 1966 when she was made aware of a claim adverse to her own. It was only then that the statutory period of prescription may be said to have commenced to run against her, following the pronouncement in Faja v. Court of Appeals, supra, a case almost identical to this one.
Teehankee, Plana, De la Fuente and Cuevas, *, JJ., concur.
Relova and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., took no part.
2.	Ledesma v. Municipality of Iloilo, 49 Phil. 769 (1926), cited in Vda. de Recinto v. Inciong, 77 SCRA 201 (1977).
3.	Vda. de Recinto v. Inciong, supra.
5.	Sapto, Et. Al. v. Fabiana, 103 Phil. 683, 687 (1958).
6.	Faja v. Court of Appeals, 75 SCRA 441 (1977).
*	Justice Serafin R. Cuevas was designated to sit in the First Division per Special Order No. 307, dated November 26, 1984.

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