Source: https://www.calattorneysfees.com/cases_slapp_/
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 15:54:33+00:00

Document:
Appellate Court Did Note Split On Appealability Issue Which Was Unnecessary To Resolve.
A litigant only appealed a SLAPP ruling, never mentioning a fee award as also being challenged in the notice of appeal. That made it an easy call for the 2/8 DCA in Mostafavi v. Kingsley, Case No. B286081 (2d Dist., Div. 8 Dec. 17, 2018) (unpublished), which found it did not have jurisdiction to entertain the challenge given no appeal from the fee ruling. The appellate court, in a footnote, did note a split in opinion on an appealability issue: “Whether an order awarding attorney fees incurred in connection with a partially-successful anti-SLAPP motion is directly appealable is unsettled. (Compare Doe v. Luster (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 139, 145–146 [interlocutory order denying or awarding attorney fees is not immediately appealable] with Baharian-Mehr v. Smith (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 265, 275 [‘it would be absurd to defer the issue of attorney fees until a future date, resulting in the probable waste of judicial resources’] and City of Colton v. Singletary (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 751, 781 [reviewing pre-judgment attorney fees order under the collateral order doctrine].)” However, it was unnecessary to confront this split given the fee award was not mentioned in the notice of appeal.
Fee Request Claimed High Hourly Rates And Inflated Work Requests.
By now, readers will know that winning defendants in SLAPP motions are entitled to a fee recovery. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16(c)(1).) Despite this entitlement, however, the fee request must be reasonable under the lodestar analysis, allowing a trial judge to deny entirely or significantly reduce an inflated request. That is what happened in Dean v. Friends of Pine Meadow, Case No. A151256 (1st Dist., Div. 4 Sept. 27, 2018) (unpublished).
The trial judge was presented with a large fee request of $244,418.57 by winning SLAPP defendants, inclusive of a positive 1.5 multiplier request. That included lead work by a Los Angeles lead attorney and a request for hourly rates in the $750-775 range for a case venued in Contra Costa County (East Bay area). Plaintiffs challenged the fee motion as being untimely filed and unreasonable in amount, with lots of submissions by both sides in support of their respective positions. The trial judge found that defendants failed to show that a more local attorney learned in SLAPP issues could not be found, that $400-500 was the reasonable lodestar hourly rate for East Bay attorneys, that lead counsel was entitled to a $100 raise in his hourly rate (given that he carried work on a contingent basis for some time, which was the top $500 rate awarded by the lower court), and that some of the time charges were duplicative, unnecessary, or unreasonable.
The appellate court sustained the result on both the defense appeal and plaintiffs’ cross-appeal.
The lower court, based on the record, carefully followed the lodestar analysis, demonstrating that use of a non-local counsel was not required, that the claimed hourly rates were too high for the East Bay venue, and that an inflated request was presented—which means discretion was properly used to deny the fee request by the defense.
With respect to plaintiffs’ cross-appeal, plaintiff did appeal timely from a later judgment which was the appealable order rather than an earlier minute order not even involving the defense SLAPP fee entitlement. However, with that being said, the trial court did not err by awarding defendants a reduced amount of fees.
Both Sides Appealed, But Trial Court’s Fee Recovery Orders Were Affirmed.
In Geiser v. Kuhns, Case No. B279738 (2d Dist., Div. 5 Aug. 30, 2018) (unpublished), defendants were awarded $40,000 in attorney’s fees based on defeating plaintiff’s civil harassment action but were denied additional fees based on the defense SLAPP motions because the lower court indicated the SLAPP motion would have been denied. The defense sought $84,150 in fees (inclusive of a 1.5 multiplier) under SLAPP, but the lower court determined only a portion of fees were recoverable by the defense based the civil harassment “win.” The lower court found that the reduction in claimed fees was appropriate based on excessive hourly rates and unsuccessful negotiation/SLAPP work.
Both sides appealed, with no change in result.
Plaintiff tried to argue that defendants were not the prevailing party because his civil harassment petition was a “catalyst” to certain responses by the defendants. However, the evidence showed that the lower court could conclude that defendants voluntarily did certain actions with no causal link to plaintiff’s lawsuit precipitating the responsive activities. Defendants were the prevailing parties, and the trial court’s fee calculations were not an abuse of discretion.
Defendants wanted more fees in their cross-appeal based on the theory they should have had their SLAPP motion granted. Nope, only a private matter was involved (over a dissenting justice’s opinion) such that the fee results remained unchanged.
However, Trial judge Was Right In Reducing $50,295 Fee Request Down To $33,759.28.
By now, our readers know that SLAPP defendants are entitled to mandatory attorney’s fee awards. However, there is an important “but.” That “but” is that the defense requested fees must be reasonable, with a large amount of discretion imbued to the trial court to reduce them on this basis. These principles were well illustrated in Nicosia Consulting International, LLC v. Rees, Case No. A149278 (1st Dist., Div. 2 July 23, 2018) (unpublished).
There, somewhat what late in the SLAPP motion proceeding, defendant did raise a winning argument in the form of the official proceeding privilege (OPP). The trial judge, although noting this turn of events, still granted the successful defendant $33,759.28 in SLAPP fees, reducing the fee request down from $50,295. Plaintiff appealed, but the appellate court affirmed. The trial judge did grant a decrease for plaintiff’s efforts in espousing unsuccessful theories and for other factors such that the award was justified as far as amount under the deferential abuse of discretion standard.
$14,000 Fee Award Against Plaintiff Affirmed, But Denial Of Fee Award Against Plaintiff’s Attorney Affirmed Also.
In Boodaie v. Vosoghi, Case No. B280032 (2d Dist., Div. 8 July 2, 2018) (unpublished), plaintiff did not oppose a defense SLAPP motion. Plaintiff appealed a subsequent fee award of $14,000 (out of a requested $20,475) on the ground that he brought his lawsuit in reliance on the advice of two attorneys. Defendants cross-appealed, arguing that they should have been awarded the full requested fees and challenging the trial judge’s failure to recover fees of $20,475 against one of plaintiff’s attorneys pursuant to CCP § 128.5.
All of the fee rulings were affirmed on appeal.
Plaintiff’s appeal did not gain traction because no reporter’s transcript of the fee motion was provided, so that an inadequate record was presented to review an abuse of discretion ruling.
The lack of an RT also barred review of the defense challenge that the $14,000 award was not enough.
That brought the appellate court to a review of the fee denial as to one of plaintiff’s attorneys under CCP § 128.5. The trial judge denied the motion for the failure to provide the 21-day safe harbor under § 128.7, but the appellate court said that the safe harbor provisions do not apply to § 128.5 sanctions requests, citing San Diegans for Open Government v. City of San Diego, 247 Cal.App.4th 1306, 1316-1317 (2016).) However, the appeal stalled out because the defense did not introduce any evidence that the attorney, rather than plaintiff, engaged in frivolous tactics.
BLOG COMMENT—The Court’s reliance on San Diegans for Open Government is interesting, given that the Second District, Division 7 in Nutrition Distribution, LLC v. Southern SARMS, 20 Cal.App.5th 117 (2018) came to an opposite conclusion in the § 128.5 context, with no indication from the docket in Southern SARMS that the case was accepted for review (it indicates a remittitur issued).
4/1 DCA Accepted Rationale In Sands Decision.
In Blackburn v. Herrick, Case No. D071043 (4th Dist., Div. 1 Mar. 29, 2018) (unpublished), the 4/1 DCA decided that the trial court correctly denied fees to successful SLAPP defendant attorneys when they were represented by “of counsel,” endorsing the Second District’s bright-line rule to this effect enunciated in Sands & Associates v. Juknavorian, 209 Cal.App.4th 1269, 1298 (2012),.
On another issue, the appellate court also agreed with the lower court’s decision to reduce a second-year attorney’s hourly rate for SLAPP recovery purposes from $300 to $200 per hour.
2/7 DCA Followed Its Earlier Conclusion in Doe v. Luster, Departing Opposite Conclusion By 4/3 And 2/3 DCA Panels.
Defendant lost a SLAPP motion, but the trial court refused to award plaintiff attorney’s fees because it did not believe the motion to be frivolous. Both sides appealed in Hirschfield v. Cohen, Case No. B267706 (2d Dist., Div. 7 Mar. 27, 2018) (unpublished). Defendant’s appeal of the SLAPP denial was affirmed, while plaintiff’s cross-appeal of the fee denial following the SLAPP denial was dismissed.
The dismissal occurred because the 2/7 DCA, based on its earlier conclusion in Doe v. Luster, 145 Cal.App.4th 139, 147 (2006), found that the fee denial order was not immediately appealable. In doing so, it departed company with an opposite conclusion reached by the 4/3 DCA in Baharian-Mehr v. Smith, 189 Cal.App.4th 265, 275 (2010) and the 2/3 DCA in Chitsazzadeh v. Kramer & Kaslow, 199 Cal.App.4th 676, 680 n. 2 (2011). “We conclude, as we did in Doe, that an order denying a plaintiff’s request for attorneys’ fees is not immediately appealable regardless of whether it is made concurrently with the order denying the special motion to strike, as here, or after the filing of a motion for attorneys’ fees.” With respect to the argument that it was inefficient for the appellate court to not hear the fee denial with the SLAPP denial, the 2/7 DCA panel dropped a footnote suggesting the litigant could file a petition for writ of mandate if it felt firmly convinced of the inefficiency in not hearing both matters together.
However, Fees Might Have To Be Allocated.
In Area 51 Production, Inc. v. City of Alameda, Case No. A144645 (1st Dist., Div. 4 Jan. 16, 2018) (unpublished), SLAPP defendants had their motions denied at the trial level but either won across the board or had partial victories in the appellate court, which decided the SLAPPs should be granted. Based on these results, the appellate court remanded to have the trial court allocate fees attributable to the victories by the various defendants, given that SLAPP fees do have a causal relationship requirement.
Winning Defendant Requested $242,585, But Only Awarded $61,250.
A big theme of our blog is that fee recovery is with rare exceptions limited to reasonable fees, even where there is mandatory fee entitlement under statutes like SLAPP (in favor of victorious defendants). D and S Homes, Inc. v. Ludlow, Case No. B276116 (2d Dist., Div. 5 Jan. 9, 2018) (unpublished) forcefully illustrates this principle in a recent decision.
Defendant won a SLAPP motion on a procedural issue in a run-of-the-mill case. He then sought $242,585 in attorney’s fees. The defense opposed, saying only $52,650.50 was appropriate. The trial judge decided that a 75% reduction in the SLAPP fee request was justified, awarding $61,250 in fees. That prompted an appeal by defendant.
Defendant was disappointed because nothing more was awarded on appeal.
Defendant argued that California state courts must specifically justify a substantial “hair cut” in fees, relying on the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Moreno v. City of Sacramento, 534 F.3d 1106, 1112 (9th Cir. 2008). The appellate court noted that Moreno does not provide guidance for California courts. However, the trial judge did justify why he felt the fee request was excessive, bolstered by findings that the case was not that complex, there was no evidence of “scorched earth” practices, and the opposition should not have to pay for “hand holding” between the defense and his counsel. Fee award, substantially reduced from the original request, affirmed.
Defense Smartly Stipulated To Reduce Fee Request By $10,000 During The Course Of Events.
Shalant v. Mackston, Case No. B271189 (2d Dist., Div. 8 Oct. 10, 2017) (unpublished) is a case where a trial judge granted the defense appellate fees of $96,420 for defending a SLAPP victory. The decision is worth posting on because of two things: (1) the defense smartly agreed to reduce the request by $10,000, and (2) the opposing party could not help itself in running up resources, given that the reporter’s transcript on this hearing alone was 58 pages in length, such that the record on appeal gave the reviewing court a good bead on what was occurring.
$42,500 In Fees And $2,842 In Costs Was The Total Award.
According to a recent Associated Press article, a California state court judge earlier this year ordered U.S. Rep. Darrell Issa to pay $42,500 in attorney’s fees and $2,842 in costs for obtaining dismissal through a SLAPP motion of Rep. Issa’s defamation action against Colonel Doug Applegate arising from allegations that Colonel Applegate’s television commercials hurt his reputation. The trial court found Colonel Applegate was exercising his free speech rights with the ads and Rep. Issa did not prove his defamation case at an early juncture for SLAPP motion purposes. Rep. Issa’s attorney has indicated his client will be appealing the decision.
Defendant SLAPP Winner Awarded Full Amount Of Request, Waiving Supplemental Request Based On Actions Below.
In Jaguar Land Rover North America, LLC v. Kasparian, Case No. B260613 (2d Dist., Div. 3 Aug. 31, 2017) (unpublished), a defendant successfully won a SLAPP action and was awarded $4,027.50 in fees, the exact amount requested. However, even though knowing at the time of the fee hearing that defendant expended more than this in supplemental time from the request contained in the papers, its counsel did not ask for more fees at the hearing or file a supplemental fee motion. Defendant cross-appealed for a fee enhancement, but the appellate court refused that request based on not taking further actions below and based on the lower awarding exactly what defendant requested at the start.
Hourly Rates Were Reasonable, And 28% Reduction Cemented The Conclusion.
In Ellis v. Mercury Ins. Co., Case No. E064749 (4th Dist., Div. 2 April 14, 2017) (unpublished), plaintiff lost a SLAPP motion and then lost an appeal of the SLAPP merits loss. The lower court then awarded the defendant insurance company $8,797.50 in attorney’s fees and costs on appeal, 72% of the requested amount. Plaintiff’s appeal was unsuccessful. The appellate court found the $210 per hour billing rate was reasonable as well as the trial court’s elimination of certain billed items not relating to the appeal. It specifically found that 16 hours to prepare for an appellate argument and respond to petitions for rehearing/California Supreme Court review was “entirely reasonable.” The affirmance also means that the defense can seek more fees for winning the SLAPP “fees on fees” issue before the 4/2 DCA.
California Supreme Court Decides Any Other Interpretation Would Gut SLAPP Policies.
The California Supreme Court, in Barry v. State Bar of California, Case No. S214058 (Cal. Supreme Court Jan. 5, 2017), confronted the issue of whether a prevailing defendant (the State Bar) was entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs when the primary winning ground under the SLAPP motion was lack of subject matter jurisdiction, namely, the trial court had no jurisdiction but jurisdiction rested with the California Supreme Court because it was a State Bar issue.
The answer was "yes," affirming the trial court conclusion on the issue but reversing the appellate court's contrary perspective on the issue.
Our state supreme court decided that any other result would gut SLAPP early-on determinations and attendant fee recoveries, especially given that analogous sanctions decisions had expressed the view that lack of subject matter jurisdiction was a collateral, non-merits determination of importance which would allow for imposition of fees/costs.
This 7-0 decision was authored by Justice Kruger.
Word To The Wise—Both Losing Plaintiff And Plaintiff’s Counsel Should Appeal The Sanctions Award.
The Inland Oversight Comm. v. Yates, Case No. E064787 (4th Dist., Div. 2 Dec. 8, 2016) (unpublished) is a decision having a good cautionary lesson for a nonprevailing plaintiff and its counsel when plaintiff’s attorney is hit with CCP § 128.7 after involuntary dismissal of the lawsuit. It teaches both should file a notice of appeal if they want to challenge the sanctions ruling against the attorney.
Here, defendant won a demurrer without leave, later filing a section 128.7 motions for sanctions. The lower court granted $15,000 in sanctions against plaintiff’s counsel, prompting an appeal by plaintiff (but not plaintiff’s sanctioned counsel).
That was a mistake. The appellate court dismissed the appeal after finding that plaintiff had no standing to appeal because it was not aggrieved. Plaintiff tried to rely on Eichenbaum v. Alan, 106 Cal.App.4th 967, 974 (2003) and Kane v. Hurley, 30 Cal.App.4th 859, 861 fn. 4 (1994) to drive a contrary result, but the 4/2 DCA panel found them distinguishable—involving sanctions jointly imposed (such that the notice of appeal by plaintiff sufficed) and/or resting on shaky analytical ground with respect to Eichenbaum. Appeal dismissed.
$152,529.95 Fee Request Slashed Down To $30,752.86 Through Actual Fee Order.
On May 20, 2016 and June 20, 2016, we posted on a case which was later accepted for rehearing by the same appellate panel. The opinion upon rehearing is now out in 569 East County Blvd. LLC v. Backcountry Against The Drop, Inc., Case No. D068538 (4th Dist., Div. 1 Dec. 5, 2016) (published; rehearing opinion).
The result did not change upon rehearing.
Basically, a SLAPP winner decided to request $152,529.95 in mandatory fees, subject only to the fees being “reasonable”—which was the rub in this matter. This was based on a $750 hourly rate for a senior attorney not experienced on SLAPP matters and on a $350 hourly rate for a fifth year associate. The lower court found that $275 per hour was more like it for a San Diego-venued case, especially where a seasoned attorney for another party in the case had charged this very same rate. The trial judge also determined the work was excessive, awarding only $30,752.86 in fees and prompting an appeal by the losing party.
The appellate court affirmed. Because this was governed under a deferential abuse of discretion review standard, the lower court had to resolve conflicting testimony about hourly rates and had discretion to pick the appropriate one, not having to accept hourly rates listed in the Laffey Matrix. (Syers Properties III, Inc. v. Rankin, 226 Cal.App.4th 691, 702 (2014).) The reviewing court also endorsed these common sense principles in the fee petition area: (1) lower rates should be utilized by seasoned attorneys doing tasks normally delegated to younger attorneys; and (2) blended hourly rates are acceptable in the right context. The trial judge did not err in concluding that the fee request was inflated, reducing for that factor also.
Probate—Corman v. Corman, Case No. B251513 (2d Dist., Div. 7 Aug. 29, 2016) (Unpublished)—Partial Beneficiary Success Did Not Justify Fee Award.
In this first one, there was a nasty probate fight (I guess one could conjecture whether any are other than nasty) over trust accountings, which pitted the trustees against beneficiaries in most situations. The lower court found that the beneficiaries had contested the accountings without reasonable cause and in bad faith, ordering them to pay from their trust shares almost $3 million in attorney’s fees and costs the trustees had incurred to defend against the losing beneficiaries’ objections. This one was reversed. The problem was that under Probate Code section 17211(a), beneficiaries did achieve some success in the contests, such that successful contests are not ones that every reasonable attorney would agree are totally and completely without merit. This fee award was reversed in entirety.
SLAPP—Woodward v. Church of Scientology, Case No. B261813 (2d Dist., Div. 3 Aug. 29, 2016) (Unpublished)—Mandatory SLAPP Fee Award Of $90,567.50 Affirmed On Appeal.
L. Ron Hubbard. December 31, 1949. Wikipedia.
The second case involves the Church’s recovery of mandatory defense fees for a SLAPP grant, with the lower court awarding $90,567.50. The appellate court affirmed under the deferential abuse of discretion standard. The lower court only awarded 70% of requested fees, with a $463 hourly rate for Los Angeles litigators. No problem on appeal.
Costs—Garibaldi v. City of Long Beach, Case No. B257300 (2d Dist., Div. 7 Aug. 29, 2016) (Unpublished)—Party Obtaining Dismissal, Without Stipulation Otherwise, Entitled To Routine Fees.
Last, this one shows how parties through stipulations can govern their fate in many disputes. A party was dismissed from the suit, but there was no stipulation to waive costs. So, the prevailing party filed a costs memorandum which was stricken by the lower court. The appellate court determined this was error; after all, a party dismissed from a suit is entitled to routine costs under most normal situations. The other side could have asked for a costs waiver, but this was not done. The appellate court also rejected the unity in interest exception under the circumstances. Reversed so that the dismissed party could obtain an award of routine costs.
$17,124.79 Fee Award Upheld On Appeal.

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