Source: https://www.povertylaw.org/clearinghouse/fpmd/chapter5/section1a
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 04:46:07+00:00

Document:
The two principal statutes creating general causes of action for the enforcement of rights created by federal law are the Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts,1 particularly Section 1983, and the Administrative Procedure Act.2 Section 1983 authorizes a wide variety of suits against state and local governments and officials for deprivations of federal rights under color of state law, while other Reconstruction statutes authorize more limited claims against private parties who violate federal rights. The Administrative Procedure Act authorizes a narrower variety of suits against federal officials and agencies. Section 1983 litigation has vindicated constitutional and statutory rights in the context of health, welfare, education, housing, employment, and prison law in litigation against state, county, or municipal officials. The Administrative Procedure Act has vindicated similar rights by correcting federal agency action or by forcing specific federal agency action.
By its terms, Section 1983 can be used to remedy the deprivation of “rights” granted to the plaintiff under the Constitution, federal statutes, and regulations implementing these statutes. Constitutional provisions that are enforceable by a private party under Section 1983 consist of those which create personal rights and either explicitly apply to the states, or have been held to apply to the states by operation of the Fourteenth Amendment.11 In contrast to the relatively straightforward expression of individual “rights” protected by the Constitution, whether a statutorily created “right” exists has posed something of a challenge to plaintiffs.
Under the separation of powers doctrine, only the legislative branch has the power to create statutory causes of action.12 Hence, the ability of a private party to successfully sue to enforce a statute depends on whether Congress, in enacting the statute, has given the plaintiff a “private right of action.” As noted, these rights are sometimes expressly granted by statute. All other rights are “implied,” and a court’s task is to discern the intent of Congress.13 The two avenues for enforcing implied rights of action are either to sue directly under the statute or to litigate using the vehicle provided by 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Section 1983 generally provides a remedy so long as a right is shown to exist. The Supreme Court stated: “Once a plaintiff demonstrates that a statute confers an individual right, the right is presumptively enforceable by Section 1983.”19 However, not every federal law creates a “right” enforceable by a private plaintiff. As the Supreme Court became increasingly hostile to the use of Section 1983 to enforce federal statutes, it has continued to narrow its conception of the term. For this reason, one should understand the Court’s principal objections to the use of Section 1983 to enforce federal statutes.
5.1.A.1.a. Did Congress intend the law to so directly benefit the plaintiff, such that those in his or her place are the “unmistakable focus” of the statute?
The seesaw battle between shifting Supreme Court majorities over what constitutes an enforceable right led to a greater focus on the relationship between the aim of the statute and its effect on the plaintiff. As formulated by Wilder, even if a statute imposes binding obligations on the state which are capable of judicial enforcement, Section 1983 cannot be invoked unless Congress intended the law to directly benefit the plaintiff. However, this only begins the inquiry. The plaintiff must also point to evidence that Congress intended that he or she—and not just the federal government—could sue to enforce the statute.
In years past, some courts understood the Wilder test to allow private enforcement when the plaintiff was generally a beneficiary of the statute sought to be enforced. This made Section 1983 a friendlier avenue for enforcing a federal right than the implied right of action doctrine announced in Cort v. Ash. The erosion of this interpretation was first suggested in Blessing v. Freestone. Blessing involved a mandate requiring states receiving federal child-welfare funds to “substantially comply” with federal requirements aimed at ensuring timely payment of child support. The Court held that the mandate was not “an individual entitlement to services, … [but] simply a yardstick for the [federal government] to measure the systemwide performance of the State’s Title IV-D program.”24 Hence, parents who obviously benefited from the collection of child support were nevertheless unable to enforce the child support statute as a whole.25 This is because, the Court held, the syntax used by Congress in enacting certain state compliance and reporting provisions evidenced a focus on the government’s interest in recouping public assistance benefits, rather than ensuring a continued income stream to specific families.
In Gonzaga, the transformation of the “benefits” prong became manifest when the Court clarified that Section 1983 cannot be invoked simply because “the plaintiff falls within the general zone of interest that the statute is intended to protect.”29 Instead, the Court now requires a showing that “an unambiguously conferred right” exists that is “phrased in terms of the persons benefited.”30 “[I]t is rights, not the broader or vaguer ‘benefits’ or ‘interests,’ that may be enforced” under Section 1983.31 In Gonzaga, the Court considered whether the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act conferred a right to sue on a student whose privacy had been violated by the unauthorized release of educational records.32 There, the Court dismissed statutory language that seemingly granted individual students protection from institutional invasions of privacy. It held instead that the statute was addressed more to the entity regulated than to the students benefited.
With respect to a number of federal programs for low-income people, a strong argument can be made that Congress’ mandates are, in Gonzaga’s terms, “phrased in terms of the persons protected.”41 However, since many of these statutes were enacted under the Constitution’s Spending Clause, specific provisions of the statutes are written in a form which directs a federal agency to spend money so long as the state or other recipient complies with Congress’ rules (e.g., “the state’s plan shall provide ...”). Not surprisingly, government attorneys have argued with some success42 that such statutory provisions are “focus[ed] on the person regulated rather than the individuals protected” and hence, “create ‘no implication of an intention to confer rights on a particular class of persons.’”43 This sort of argument underscores the fact that advocates need to find language in the statutory provision sought to be enforced indicating that Congress “intended to confer individual rights upon a class of beneficiaries.”44 In addition, the advocate must research carefully how that provision has been interpreted both before and after Gonzaga.45 Given the Supreme Court’s tendency to restrict further the ability of private litigants to enforce federal laws, one should be very leery of the consequences of exploring new ground on this issue.
5.1.A.1.b. Is the alleged “right” so vague or amorphous as to make it unenforceable?
5.1.A.1.c. Does the statute create a binding obligation?
In Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, the first decision to limit the use of Section 1983 to enforce a federal statute, the Supreme Court considered the ostensibly “rights producing” language found in the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act.51 The Court ruled that congressional rhetoric about a disabled “bill of rights” found in the statute’s declaration of policy could not create enforceable rights since the law did not tie a state’s receipt of federal funding to the state’s compliance with the purported bill of rights. The statutory language was held to be “hortatory” rather than mandatory. Therefore, the third question a prospective plaintiff must consider is whether the statute sought to be enforced actually requires the state or local agency to do something.
5.1.A.1.d. Does the statute contain a comprehensive enforcement mechanism?
If the statute at issue passes muster under the prongs above, Section 1983 is presumed to provide a remedy unless the defendant shows that the enactment contains a “comprehensive enforcement mechanism” whose breadth or scope suggests that Congress viewed that mechanism as the sole means for statutory enforcement. In Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Association,52 environmentalists sought to use Section 1983 to enforce both the Federal Water Pollution Control Act and the Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act, by enjoining the dumping of waste in the Atlantic Ocean. In addition to providing a limited right to sue to private parties, these statutes provided an elaborate alternative mechanism to address the pollution problem. The Supreme Court pointed to those measures as indicating Congress’ intent to preclude enforcement of the legislation outside of the procedures set forth in these laws.
5.1.A.1.e. Does the enactment of a statute by Congress under its Spending Power undermine the enforceability of the statute under Section 1983?
5.1.A.1.f. To what degree can a federal regulation create rights enforceable under Section 1983?
In Wright, the Supreme Court implied that a regulation implementing a rights-creating statute (defining “rent” as including a reasonable amount to cover housing authorities’ tenants utility costs) was a “law” that could be enforced under Section 1983.65 Shortly thereafter, in Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Association,66 it relied on the definition of “reasonable” contained in Medicaid regulations, to flesh out the statutory requirement that the “reasonable cost” of services be paid to providers. This blunted the argument that the statute was too vague or ambiguous to be enforced. Drawing on these decisions and the somewhat analogous case of Golden State Transit Corporation v. City of Los Angeles (Golden State II), it was generally believed that binding regulations could themselves create enforceable rights.67 Recent appellate court rulings, however, question this view, suggesting that the private enforceability of a particular regulation depends on (1) the extent to which the regulation directly implements congressional intent, and (2) whether Congress also intended the governing statute to create a “right” enforceable under Section 1983.
Nevertheless, Justice O’Connor posed the issue in her dissent in Wright: “it is necessary to ask whether administrative regulations alone could create such a right.”70 Under the separation of powers doctrine, the creation of causes of action is within the purview of Congress,71 and the debate in the Supreme Court has involved the extent to which the enactment of Section 1983 evidenced the legislature’s intent to generally make actionable any deprivation resulting from the violation of “the constitution and laws.” The Supreme Court’s recent decision concerning the Title VI “disparate impact” regulations strongly suggests that private enforceability of federal regulations is directly dependent on Congressional intent.
In sum, after Gonzaga, a plaintiff seeking to enforce a federal statute using Section 1983 must be able to point to an “unambiguously conferred right” that is “phrased in terms of the persons benefited.” However, once this hurdle is overcome, Section 1983 is presumed to provide a remedy, absent a “comprehensive enforcement mechanism” or other evidence to suggest that Congress withdrew this avenue.
A Section 1983 action can be brought only against a person acting “under color of [state] law.”87 Liability lies against those “who carry a badge of authority of a State and represent it in some capacity, whether they act in accordance with their authority or misuse it."88 Although the term “person” was originally thought to refer only to human beings, the concept was broadened in Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services89 to include cities and local governments whose custom, policy or practice caused the deprivation.90 In any event, when the defendant is a government employee doing his or her job and acting under apparent government authority, she or he is very likely a “state actor.91 When a private actor is involved, as is increasingly the case with the trend towards “privatization” of government services, the waters are somewhat murkier.
Although misuse of power cases occasionally present difficult questions, the vast majority involve defendants who were able to inflict injury only because they were clothed with state authority. In such cases, defendants act under color of state law and can be sued under Section 1983. Moreover, defendants who enforce invalid state laws and regulations always act under color of state law.96 Thus, the color of state law requirement ordinarily poses no problem in litigation against state and local officials, or against local governmental entities.
A more difficult question is presented when a private party is considered to be acting under color of state law so as to be suable under Section 1983.97 Although closely related to the Fourteenth Amendment’s state action requirement, Section 1983’s color of state law requirement is conceptually distinct. Conduct that is state action under the Fourteenth Amendment is always action under color of state law for purposes of Section 1983.98 However, conduct under color of state law may not constitute state action under the Fourteenth Amendment.99 Because Section 1983 claims against private actors ordinarily involve a claimed deprivation of a constitutional right flowing from the Fourteenth Amendment, it is almost always necessary to establish state action under the amendment to prevail under Section 1983. Therefore, the focus of this section will be Fourteenth Amendment state action cases.
Since the early 1970s, the Supreme Court has substantially narrowed the range of private conduct that constitutes state action. In determining whether a private party has engaged in “state action,” a court must weigh “whether the claimed ... deprivation resulted from the exercise of a right or privilege having its source in state authority ” and “whether the private party charged with the deprivation could be described in all fairness as a state actor.”100 In doing so, a court looks at (1) the extent to which the actor relies on governmental assistance and benefits, (2) whether the actor is performing a traditional governmental function, and (3) whether the injury caused was aggravated in a unique way by the incidents of governmental authority.101 Because none of these factors is definitive, one can generalize that a deprivation of federal rights by a private party can constitute “state action” if the government has: (1) delegated its authority to the private actor, (2) participated in joint activity to a degree that the actions of one party can be attributed to the other, (3) created the legal framework necessary to carry out the private action, (4) compelled the private party to act in a certain way, (5) knowingly accepted the benefits of an unconstitutional practice, or (6) the private entity is carrying out a traditional “state function,” or (7) the government has created a “special relationship” with the plaintiff.
However, in the absence of a conspiracy or governmental control, the applicability of the joint activity test to find state action is problematic, as illustrated by National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Tarkanian.106 The case involved a private membership body of public and private colleges that regulated intercollegiate athletics. The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) determined that a member state university had violated NCAA rules and required that the school suspend coach Tarkanian. When the school complied, the coach sued under Section 1983, claiming that his firing violated due process. The Court held that the school, a state actor, and the NCAA, a private party, were not joint participants in the suspension of the coach. The Court reasoned that the school was free to cancel its agreement with the NCAA, the disciplinary function had not been delegated to the NCAA by the state, and the NCAA was actually acting on behalf of all other NCAA members against the efforts of the state to forestall the suspension of its most successful coach.
A private party may be engaged in “state action” if the act which deprived federal rights could not have occurred but for the existence of a governmental framework requiring government approval or action. In North Georgia Finishing, Incorporated v. Di-Chem, Incorporated109 the Court found state action in a private party’s invocation of a court-ordered attachment that failed to afford due process to the debtor. Similarly, in Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Company, the Court held that a creditor who invokes prejudgment attachment remedies requiring the participation of a court clerk and a sheriff, acts under color of state law.110 In contrast, in Flagg Brothers v. Brooks, involving a prejudgment attachment authorized by state law but not requiring the intervention of a court, no state action was found.111 Finally, in Edmondson v. Leesville Concrete Company, the Court found that a private attorney using peremptory challenges in a jury trial in a racially biased manner was a “state actor” because his act—use of peremptory challenges—could exist only in the judicial context and with the approval of a state judge.112 The rule of these cases is that a private party becomes a state actor if he or she uses a state procedure requiring some state intervention.
However, in American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Company v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court found that a private workers’ compensation insurer was not a state actor when it withheld payments without prior notice to a worker as part of a state “utilization review” of certain medical costs.113 The purpose of a utilization review is to assess the necessity for a particular procedure to determine whether the costs should be borne by the workers’ compensation carrier. In Sullivan, even if it could be assumed that the state, by providing a utilization review procedure, had “subtly encouraged” insurers to withhold payments pending the review, invocation of the procedure was not seen as required or coerced by the state.
In the context of state-mandated procedures or programs carried out by private parties, the distinction between state and private actions depends on (1) whether the state plays an active role in furthering the act which allegedly caused the deprivation of federal rights, and (2) the degree to which the procedure invoked is a core governmental function or institution. In short, the inquiry turns on whether the state affirmatively furthers the action or merely authorizes it, and, if the latter, how important the procedure is to the functioning of the state.
One of the most important Section 1983 issues for legal aid advocates is the degree to which one can imply “state action” from the fact that the defendant has received government funding or is extensively regulated by the state. Generally, government funding or regulation does not make a state actor of the recipient or the regulated party unless one can show such a close connection between the government and the act complained of that the action taken “may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.”117 A private landlord participating in the Section 8 program is a “state actor” while taking actions required by federal regulations, but is only a private actor if she unilaterally locks out her tenant in violation of those regulations. The act of forcible eviction is analytically an expression of her private will and not compelled by government fiat.
Most recently, as discussed above, the Court held in American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Company v. Sullivan, that a private workers’ compensation insurer who used a state “utilization review” of certain medical costs resulting in the withholding of payments without prior notice to the worker, did not thereby become a state actor.123 The Court concluded that because its actions were not imposed or sanctioned by the state, it could not be a state actor.
Nor does governmental funding give rise to “state action” absent state coercion or significant encouragement of the act causing the deprivation. Thus, in Blum v. Yaretsky, the Court rejected the contention that extensive public funding converted the nursing home’s decision to lower the level of care into state action in violation of the Medicaid Act.124 In essence, there was no cause and effect relationship between the fact of public funding and the nursing home’s allegedly unlawful act.
The Supreme Court began narrowing Burton in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, holding that the grant of a state liquor license did not convert the discriminatory conduct of the licensee into state action.129 The Court specifically rejected the plaintiff’s claim of a Burton symbiotic relationship, even though the license was of great value to the licensee and generated revenue for the state.130 According to the Court, the benefit to the state of liquor license revenues was only remotely attributable, if at all, to the private party’s discriminatory conduct.
A plaintiff claiming state action on the basis of a “symbiotic relationship” between a private party and state or local government must show that the government derives a financial benefit that can be specifically attributed to the challenged conduct. In Burton, the benefit to the government was the additional revenue resulting from the increased patronage given to a whites-only restaurant. In contrast, the government received no specific benefit from the club’s discriminatory conduct in Moose Lodge or the school’s decision to fire a schoolteacher in Rendell-Baker. Only the combination of a symbiotic relationship and a specific financial benefit to the government from the conduct at issue will create state action out of private conduct. For these reasons, Burton is rarely applicable.
Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Company provided the doctrinal foundation for further narrowing the public function doctrine. Rejecting the claim that the provision of electricity was a public function, the Court held that a public function must be one that traditionally was “the exclusive prerogative of the state.”140 Thus, the Court has since found that the following are not public functions: enforcement of a warehouseman’s lien,141 education of children with special needs,142 the operation of a nursing home,143 control of the word “Olympic,”144 and establishment of disciplinary standards for intercollegiate athletics.145 The atrophied “public function” doctrine now can probably be collapsed within the “delegation of traditional state function” test discussed above.
An arrest, incarceration, involuntary commitment, or a foster care placement resulting from a dependency proceeding would create a “special relationship” necessary to establish liability.
Legal aid advocates regularly face the problem of individually vindictive or incompetent government workers whose actions deprive clients of the level of public assistance or other benefit to which they are entitled. These actions are often taken by agency employees in violation of that agency’s own stated policies. In such cases, as more fully discussed in Chapter 8 of this MANUAL, only the employee is liable in a Section 1983 claim. Even if the employee’s acts result in a violation of federal constitutional, statutory, or regulatory rights, they cannot give rise to agency liability under Section 1983. Agency liability must be founded on a deprivation caused by the institution’s “custom, policy or practice,” and not as the result of aberrant behavior by a rogue employee.
This rule was established by Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services, which held that a municipality could be a “person” for purposes of Section 1983, but limited the scope of the agency’s liability to only those instances where the deprivation resulted from that agency’s custom, policy or practice.150 Monell establishes the principle that the government should be liable only for actions for which it is directly responsible. This holding gives a plaintiff several options. She can sue the defendant employee in her personal or official capacity, or both. Assuming the defendant is not a State and immune under the Eleventh Amendment from suit in federal court, the plaintiff can name as an additional defendant – or even the sole defendant – either the agency itself, or its titular head, who is sued in his or her official capacity.151 Naming the entity or its head is particularly important when injunctive relief binding the entire agency is sought. An order entered against the agency head in her or his official capacity will bind any successor officer.
1. Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1988.
2. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551 et seq. and 701 et seq.
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-88.
4. Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organization, 441 U.S. 600, 617 (1979). Although this MANUAL is directed at cases filed in federal court, Section 1983 suits can also be heard in state court. Indeed, the Supreme Court recently struck down, on Supremacy Clause grounds, a New York state statute which divested its state courts of entertaining Section 1983 actions against state correctional employees, holding that there is strong presumption of concurrent jurisdiction that can be overcome only when the state adopts a neutral rule needed for judicial administration of its court system. Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. 28 (2009); Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 375 (1990); Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 283 n.7 (1980).
5. The Supreme Court has ruled that in passing § 1983, Congress did not intend to strip states of sovereign immunity. Hence, while a state is not a “person” for purposes of § 1983 (Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 345 (1979),) local governments – which cannot claim immunity – are. Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). In Inyo County v. Paiute-Shoshone Indians, 538 U.S. 701 (2003), the Court held that a sovereign Indian Tribe is not a “person within the jurisdiction” of the United States, and cannot sue under § 1983.
6. Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 285-85 (2002) (citing Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 609, n.13 (1979)). The ability to use § 1983 to enforce a statute was first established in Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980). See also King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968) (in which the Court, by basing its decision on statutory rather than equal protection grounds, implied that § 1983 was a proper vehicle for raising a state’s violation of a federal statute enacted under the Constitution’s Spending Clause).
7. Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131 (1988) (state claims statute); Patsy v. Florida Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496 (1982) (state administrative proceeding); McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U.S. 668 (1963) (state procedure for challenging school segregation); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1971) (no need to resort to state causes of action). A recent example of a court rejecting an abstention argument raised in a federal trial court action seeking review of a Medicaid administrative hearing decision (invoking Section 1983 to address an erroneous interpretation of federal law) is Romano v. Greenstein, 721 F.3d 373 (5th Cir. 2013). Although the law seems fairly clear in this area, one consequence of the federal judiciary’s heightened concern for state’s rights has been greater reliance on abstention doctrines to keep from hearing these cases. See, e.g., 31 Foster Children v. Bush, 329 F.3d 1255, 1274-81 (11th Cir. 2003). See Chapter 2.7 of this MANUAL for a detailed discussion of abstention.
8. Chapter 8.2 of this MANUAL discusses the limitations imposed by the Eleventh Amendment on suits against a state.
9. See, e.g., Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976) (allegation that police wrongfully circulated damaging information about plaintiff did not state Fourteenth Amendment violation and hence did not state § 1983 cause of action; plaintiff limited to state law remedies).
10. Chapter 8.3 of this MANUAL explores defendants and defenses in § 1983 litigation.
11. Constitutional provisions explicitly creating state obligations include the Reconstruction Amendments (Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments as well as those expanding the franchise to women and eliminating the poll tax. Portions of the Bill of Rights, which originally applied only to the federal government, now apply to the states by operation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. For a list of these amendments, see generally, Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148-49 (1968).
12. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 730 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting).
13. In alleging a “right,” plaintiffs’ attorneys should be very specific, taking to heart the Supreme Court’s dictum that “[o]nly when the complaint is broken down into manageable analytic bites can a court ascertain whether each separate claim satisfies the various criteria we have set forth for determining whether a federal statute creates rights.” Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 342 (1997). For examples of how courts have applied this guideline, see infra note 25.
14. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78-79 (1975). Since Cort, the Supreme Court has become more restrictive in finding rights of action implied directly under a statute. See, e.g., Touche Ross v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979) and Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
15. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 286. Sandoval and the implied statutory causes of action will be discussed further at Section 5.2 of this MANUAL.
16. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980).
18. In hindsight, however, the Wright decision seems to have turned more on the absence of a “comprehensive enforcement mechanism” which would have precluded the applicability of § 1983 than the ability of a regulation to create “rights.” While earlier decisions held that regulations can create rights enforceable under § 1983, see, e.g., Loschiavo v. City of Dearborn, 33 F.3d 548 (6th Cir. 1994), and Samuels v. District of Columbia, 770 F.2d 184 (D.C. Cir. 1985), the more recent trend is to reject this view. See Caswell v. City of Detroit, 418 F.3d 615, 618-20 (6th Cir. 2005); Save Our Valley v. Sound Transit, 335 F.3d 932, 935-36 (9th Cir. 2003); South Camden Citizens v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, 274 F.3d 771, 778 (3rd Cir. 2001); Harris v. James, 127 F.3d 993, 1007-08, 1009 (11th Cir. 1997).
19. Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284 (2002). Prior to Gonzaga, a plaintiff invoking § 1983 to enforce a statute could presume that a private right of action existed, with defendants having the burden to disprove the existence of the right. After Gonzaga, the burden appears to have shifted to the plaintiff. However, once a right is shown to exist, § 1983 is presumed to provide a remedy, while defendants have the burden to prove otherwise. Id. at 284 n.4.
20. Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Association, 496 U.S. 498 (1990).
21. Id. at 509-512 (1990). Wilder actually lists these factors in reverse order. However, since Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340-41 (1997), the factor which asks whether the statute benefits the plaintiff has generally been listed first. This is appropriate because it has become the main battleground for the use of § 1983 to enforce federal statutes. While some courts seem to think that Gonzaga has entirely displaced the Wilder/Blessing inquiry, Gonzaga cites the latter decisions without reservation.
22. Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Association, 453 U.S. 1 (1981).
23. Much of the debate over private enforceability involves federal statutes enacted under the Constitution's Spending Clause, where the issue is whether the right to sue can be inferred from a mandate to spend money in a particular way. See Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 28 (1981); Houston v. Williams, 547 F.3d 1357, 1361 (11th Cir. 2008) (Spending Clause legislation rarely confers a private right of action on funding beneficiaries); but see Grammer v. John J. Kane Regional Centers, 570 F.3d 520 (3rd Cir. 2009); cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1524 (2010). In contrast, civil rights statutes, targeting individual discrimination against individuals, are more likely to be interpreted as privately enforceable under § 1983. See, e.g., Wallace v. Chicago Housing Authority, 298 F. Supp. 2d. 710, 718 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (allowing use of § 1983 to sue for breach of Fair Housing Act, (citing Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979)).
24. Blessing, 520 U.S. at 343.
26. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
28. Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002).
30. Id. at 283, 284 (the latter quoting in part Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 692 (1979)).
31. Id. at 283 (emphasis in original).
32. Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g.
33. Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 287 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1)).
34. Id. at 289 (quoting Cannon, 441 U.S. at 691 (emphasis added)).
36. Id. at 288 (quoting Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 343 (1997)).
37. Id. at 285 (citation omitted).
38. Enforceable rights may also be created by statutes that mandate governmental duties owed to a class of beneficiaries. “Where a statute does not include this sort of explicit ‘right-or duty-creating language’ we rarely impute to Congress an intent to create a private right of action.” Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 284, n.3. (emphasis added, citing Cannon, 441 U.S. at 690, n.13.) Cannon, in that footnote, stated that “the right- or duty-creating language of the statute has generally been the most accurate indicator of the propriety of implication of a cause of action. With the exception of one case, in which the relevant statute reflected a special policy against judicial interference, this Court has never refused to imply a cause of action where the language of the statute explicitly conferred a right directly on a class of persons that included the plaintiff in the case. ” Because Spending Clause legislation is often written in a form that requires state recipients to do something for members of a class, such “duty-creating” language suggests a right enforceable under § 1983.
39. Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 280.
40. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 691. The tendency of some courts to highlight the first Blessing prong at the expense of the second and third prongs is illustrated by the Eleventh Circuit’s adoption – with no mention of the other Blessing criteria – of its own three-part test for determining if Congress intended to benefit plaintiffs: (1) Does the statute contain individually focused, rights creating language? (2) Does it address the needs of individual persons instead of having a systemwide or aggregate focus? (3) Does it lack an enforcement mechanism available to the aggrieved individual? Arrington v. Helms, 438 F.3d 1336 (11th Cir. 2006) (citing 31 Foster Children v. Bush, 329 F.3d 1255, 1272-73 (11th Cir. 2003)).
41. The Food Stamp Act, for example, provides that “... households [receiving] benefits under a ... program that complies with standards established by the Secretary ... shall be eligible to participate in the food stamp program. Assistance ... shall be furnished to all eligible households ...” 7 U.S.C. § 2014(a). Hence, specific statutory provisions spelling out eligibility standards presumably create enforceable rights for those who apply and meet the standards. An example of similar language in the Medicaid Act, but one focusing on a state plan, is the requirement that “[a] State plan for medical assistance must ...(10) provide ... for making medical assistance available ... to ... all individuals [meeting the following five pages of eligibility criteria].” 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a). The latter language was cited in Sabree v. Richman, 367 F. 3d 180, 189 (3rd Cir. 2004) to find an enforceable right to certain services. Judge Alito concurred, cryptically noting that the lower court’s reversed decision “may reflect the direction that future Supreme Court cases in this area will take.” Id. at 194. See also Watson v. Weeks, 436 F.3d 1152, 1159 n.8 (9th Cir.), ("section 1396a(a)(10) creates an individual right enforceable under section 1983")., cert denied sub nom, Goldberg v. Watson, 549 U.S. 1032 (2006). See Indiana Protection and Advocacy Services v. Indiana Family and Social Services Administration, 603 F.3d 365, 374-82 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (Protection and Advocacy for Individuals with Mental Illness program reflects Congress' intent to give state protection and advocacy programs right to sue for records).
42. See, e.g., Johnson v. City of Detroit, 446 F.3d 614, 624, 627 (6th Cir. 2006) (Lead Based Paint Protection Act is aimed at entities and does not confer right to sue); Banks v. Dallas Housing Authority, 271 F. 3d 605, 609-10 (5th Cir. 2001) (requirement that privately owned Section 8 units be kept in “decent, safe and sanitary” condition is principally aimed at property owners); Hill v. San Francisco Housing Authority, 207 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1028-29 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (requirement that units be maintained in accord with Department of Housing and Urban Development housing quality standards was directed to public housing authorities and did not create enforceable rights); Almendares v. Palmer, No. 3:00-CV-7524, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23258, 2002 WL 31730963 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 3, 2002) (requirement that state Food Stamp agencies provide access for limited English proficient (LEP) applicants and recipients was directed to state, and did not create right to LEP services).
43. Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 287 (quoting Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 289 (2001).
44. For example, in Bryson v. Shumway, 308 F.3d 79, 88 (1st Cir. 2002), Sabree v. Richman, 367 F.3d 180, 189 (3rd Cir. 2004), South Dakota ex rel. Dickson v. Hood, 391 F.3d 581, 603-05 (5th Cir. 2004), and Watson v. Weeks, 436 F.3d 1152 (9th Cir. 2006), the courts focused on a Medicaid provision’s reference to “all eligible individuals.” Dickson and Watson also cited the “Suter fix,” 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-2, in which Congress indicated that certain statutory provisions could not be held to be privately unenforceable simply because they were requirements of a state plan. Similarly, in Johnson v. Housing Authority of Jefferson Parish, 442 F.3d 356 (5th Cir. 2006), finding that Section 8 voucher holders had an enforceable right to an adequate utility allowance, the court focused on the reference in 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o)(2)(A) to “the monthly assistance payment for the family....” The Johnson court also buttressed its holding by “tak[ing] the entirety of the legislative enactment into account,” 442 F.3d at 362, something not often seen when parsing statutes into “manageable analytic bites” is the order of the day.
45. An excellent reference is Jane Perkins, Using Section 1983 to Enforce Federal Laws, 38 Clearinghouse Review 720 (March-April 2005), containing an extensive table of court decisions addressing the enforceability of particular statutory provisions intended to benefit low-income clients. See also Rochelle Bobroff & Jane Perkins, Recent Developments in Court Access for Medicaid and Medicare Cases, 42 Clearinghouse Review 246 (Sept.-Oct. 2008).
46. Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 359-64 (1992).
47. Wary of Suter’s potential for undermining private enforcement of similar statutes requiring “state plans” to carry out the various subchapters of the Social Security Act, Congress has legislatively affirmed that a private right of action can exist to enforce such statutes to the extent that the right to sue existed before Suter, limiting the latter’s effect to only the specific provision of the Adoption Assistance Act addressed by the court. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-2 (1994). See Suter, supra note 46 .
48. Wright v. Roanoke Redevelopment and Housing Authority, 479 U.S. 418, 431 (1987).
49. Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Association, 496 U.S. 498, 499 (1990).
50. See Rolland v. Romney, 318 F.3d 42, 53 (1st Cir. 2003) (relying on Department of Health and Human Services regulations to find enforceable mandate to provide certain “specialized services" under Medicaid Act). In contrast, in Banks v. Dallas Housing Authority, 271 F.3d 605, 610 (5th Cir. 2001), the court found too vague to be judicially enforceable the “decent, safe, and sanitary” public housing ostensible entitlement set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 1437f. See also Watson v. Weeks, 436 F.3d 1152, 1162, (9th Cir. 2006); Lankford v. Sherman, 451 F.3d 496 (4th Cir. 2006) (both cases holding that Medicaid Act’s requirement that state plans include “reasonable standards ... which shall be comparable for all groups” and “consistent with the objectives of this subchapter” was vague and amorphous because it did not provide more definite guidance linking “reasonable standards” to medical need).
51. Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
52. Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Association, 453 U.S. 1 (1981).
53. Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (1984).
56. Fitzgerald v. Barnstable School Committee, 555 U.S. 246, 254(2009).
57. Id. at 255. The Court noted that the statutory remedies of withdrawing federal funding and an implied right of action under Title IX "stand in stark contrast to the 'unusually elaborate,' 'carefully tailored,' and 'restrictive' enforcement schemes of the statutes at issue in Sea Clammers, Smith, and Rancho Palos Verdos . . ." Id.
58. Id. 129 S. Ct. at 797 (noting that Title IX was modeled after Title VI, which has been interpreted as permitting concurrent claims as well).
59. Wright, 479 U.S. at 424-25.
60. Id. at 426. See also Wilder, 496 U.S. at 521-23 (existence of administrative appeal procedures did not foreclose private enforcement) and Golden Gate Transit Corporation v. City of Los Angeles (Golden State II), 493 U.S. 103, 109 (1989) (existence of NLRB procedures). Although the National Sea Clammers test was not an articulated basis for its decision, the Gonzaga Court also pointed to Congress’ mandate to the Secretary of Education to “deal with violations” of Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act through the establishment of a review board, and the Secretary’s subsequent adoption of complaint and investigation procedures, as evidence of a “federal review mechanism” which distinguished Gonzaga from Wright. Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 289-90 (2002).
61. This contention is based on Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion in Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 349 (1997), analogizing the class of persons benefited by such federal-state cooperative programs to a third-party beneficiary under a contract. The preclusion of a § 1983 remedy is said to flow from Justice Rehnquist’s opinion in Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 28 (1981), that “[i]n legislation enacted pursuant to the spending power, the typical remedy for state noncompliance with federally imposed conditions is not a private cause of action for noncompliance but rather action by the Federal Government to terminate funds to the State.” See also Pharmaceutical Research Manufacturers of America v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 683 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring).
62. Antrican v. Odom, 290 F.3d 178 (4th Cir. 2002) and Westside Mothers v. Haveman, 289 F.3d 852 (6th Cir. 2002) (construing enforceability, by private parties, of dental care and early and periodic screening, diagnosis and treatment provisions of Medicaid Act, respectively).
63. Westside Mothers, 289 F.3d at 858 (quoting Bennett v. Kentucky Department of Education, 470 U.S. 656, 669 (1985)).
64. Westside Mothers, 289 F.3d at 863. In Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181 (2002), addressing whether the violation of two Spending Clause statutes – the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act – could give rise to punitive damages, Justice Scalia’s majority opinion denied such relief on the ground the Spending Clause statutes were analogous to contracts between the federal government and the state, and that punitive damages were not traditionally available in contract actions. Nevertheless, responding to the critique of the minority, Justice Scalia wrote that the Court “d[id] no[t] imply ... that suits under Spending Clause legislation are suits in contract, or that contract-law principles apply to all issues that they raise.” 536 U.S. at 188, n.2.
66. Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Association, 496 U.S. 498 (1990). For a recent example of a court relying on regulations to find that a statute confers an enforceable right, see Rolland v. Romney, 318 F.3d 42, 50-51 (1st Cir. 2003) (Medicaid specialized services to mentally disabled nursing home residents).
67. Golden State Transit Corporation v. City of Los Angeles (Golden State II), 493 U.S. 103 (1989) (“[a] rule of law that is the product of judicial interpretation of a vague, ambiguous, or incomplete statutory provision” could give rise to “right” enforceable under § 1983).
68. Chevron U.S.A. Incorporated v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Incorporated, 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984).
69. United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2002).
70. Wright, 479 U.S. at 437.
71. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286 (2001).
73. Guardians Association v. Civil Service Commission, 463 U.S. 582, 590 (1983). Id. at 623-24 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Id. at 645 (Stevens, J., joined by Brennan, J. and Blackmun, J., dissenting).
74. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 291. Hence, while 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (“No person in the United States shall ... be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance [on the basis of race, color, or national origin]” clearly confers a personal right to sue for intentional discrimination, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (federal agencies authorized “to effectuate [2000d] ... by issuing rules, regulations, or orders ...”) speaks only of the powers of agencies. According to Sandoval, “[i]t is clear now that the disparate- impact regulations do not simply apply § 601 – since they indeed forbid conduct that § 601 permits – and therefore clear that the private right of action to enforce § 601 does not include a private right to enforce these regulations.” Id. at 285. This is because “[l]ike substantive federal law itself, private rights of action to enforce federal law must be created by Congress. The judicial task is to interpret the statute Congress has passed to determine whether it displays an intent to create not just a private right but also a private remedy. Statutory intent on this latter point is determinative. Without it, a cause of action does not exist and courts may not create one, no matter how desirable that might be as a policy matter, or how compatible with the statute.” Id. at 286-87 (citations omitted).
75. E.g., is plaintiff a member of the class benefited by the statute? See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
76. Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 285 (2002) (citation omitted).
77. Loschiavo v. City of Dearborn, 33 F.3d 548 (6th Cir. 1994). See also Robinson v. Kansas, 295 F.3d 1183 (10th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 926 (2003), upholding the invocation of § 1983 to enforce the disparate impact regulations against an Eleventh Amendment objection, but without addressing the issue of the enforceability of federal regulations under § 1983.
78. Samuels v. District of Columbia, 770 F.2d 184, 188 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
79. Loschiavo, 33 F.3d at 551.
80. Harris v. James, 127 F.3d 993, 1007-1009 (11th Cir. 1997). See also American Association of People with Disabilities v. Harris, 605 F.3d 1124, 1131-37 (11th Cir. 2010) (American with Disabilities Act regulations are not enforceable).
81. South Camden Citizens v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, 274 F.3d 771, 778 (3rd Cir. 2001).
82. Rolland v. Romney, 318 F.3d 42, 52 (1st Cir. 2003).
83. Save Our Valley v. Sound Transit, 335 F.3d 932, 939 (9th Cir. 2003).
84. The partial dissent in Save Our Valley contains an extensive analysis of how regulations can create “rights,” opining that such rights are enforceable under § 1983 if the regulation meets the Gonzaga standard of being written in “‘individually-focused,’ ‘rights-creating language[.]’” 335 F.3d at 963. However, because the Title VI regulations at issue were focused on the person or agency regulated rather than the class benefited, Judge Berzon believed that no enforceable right had been created.
85. Caswell v. City of Detroit, 418 F.3d 615, 618-20 (6th Cir. 2005).
86. See Three Rivers Center for Independent Living v. Housing Authority, 382 F.3d 412, 430 (3rd Cir. 2004). The case holds that Department of Housing and Urban Development regulations implementing the Rehabilitation Act to require the creation of accessible housing could not create an enforceable right to compel compliance. Although the statute conferred an enforceable right on plaintiffs to a “reasonable accommodation,” the accessible housing regulation mandate was said to have only an aggregate focus and “not concerned with ‘whether the needs of any particular person have been satisfied.’” Id. at 430 (quoting Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 288 (2002).
87. “Like the state-action requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment, the under-color-of-state-law element of § 1983 excludes from its reach ‘merely private conduct, no matter how discriminatory or wrongful.’” American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Company v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50 (1999).
88. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172 (1971) (police misconduct). Federal officials acting under color of federal law are not subject to § 1983. Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647 (1963).
89. Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). See Los Angeles County v. Humphries, 131 S. Ct. 447 (2010) (Monell's requirement that municipality's policy or custom cause deprivation in order to impose liability on municipality applies in cases seeking prospective injunctive relief as well as damages).
90. The issue of what constitutes a “custom, policy or practice” actionable under § 1983 is discussed later in this chapter.
91. However, a government employee or subcontractor such as a public defender, whose fundamental loyalties are owed to the criminal defendant and accordingly are adverse to the government, is not a “state actor” whose alleged malpractice is actionable under § 1983. Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981); cf. Vermont v. Brillon, 556 U.S. 81, 129 S. Ct. 1283, 1291 (2009) (court assigned counsel are not state actors for purposes of speedy trial claim). Compare Miranda v. Clark County, 319 F.3d 465 (9th Cir.) (chief public defender is state actor in devising administrative procedures governing allocation of lawyer resources to defendants based on results of lie detector tests), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 814 (2003) This exception is very narrowly construed. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988), in which a private doctor under contract to a prison, who owed a professional obligation to his patient, did not as a result have interests which were necessarily so adverse to the government as to preclude a § 1983 claim.
92. Where state officials act in violation of federal law, the official is said to have been stripped of official authority for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment by acting illegally, but, nevertheless, considered to be engaged in “state action” for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment if the action was taken “under color” of the apparent authority conferred by official position. Home Telephone and Telegraph v. Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278 (1913).
93. Delcambre v. Delcambre, 635 F.2d 407, 408 (5th Cir. 1981) (per curiam).
95. Morgan v. Tice, 862 F.2d 1495, 1499 (11th Cir. 1989).
98. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 930-32, 935.
99. Id. at 935, n.8.
102. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988). Another example of delegation is the privatization of the prison system. In Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399 (1997), the Court assumed state action in ruling that private prison guards were not entitled to qualified immunity from liability for their unconstitutional practices.
103. Addickes v. S. H. Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970) (involving conspiracy between “dime store” and local deputy sheriffs to prevent integration of southern lunch counter during Civil Rights Movement).
104. Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 28-29 (1980).
105. Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors, 353 U.S. 230, 231 (1957) (Private college administered by city board “state actor” in refusing to admit African Americans).
106. National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179 (1988).
107. Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association, 531 U.S. 288 (2001).
109. North Georgia Finishing, Incorporated v. Di-Chem, Incorporated, 419 U.S. 601 (1975).
110. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Company, 467 U.S. 922, 934, 940-42 (1980). The creditor's action is not state action if it is contrary to state law. Id. at 940.
111. Flagg Brothers v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
112. Edmondson v. Leesville Concrete Company, 500 U.S. 614 (1991).
113. American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Company v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40 (1999).
114. Id. at 51-52 (quoting Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982)).
116. Id. at 54 (quoting Tulsa Professional Collection Services v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 486 (1988)).
117. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Company, 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974).
118. Id. at 351; compare Memphis Light, Gas and Water Division v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1 (1978) (a municipally owned utility was required to afford customers due process before terminating utilities under a statute requiring utility shut-offs to be only for “cause”).
119. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982).
121. San Francisco Arts and Athletics, Incorporated v. U.S. Olympic Committee, 483 U.S. 522, 542-47 (1987).
122. Id. at 546-47. See also Carlin Communications v. Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company, 827 F.2d 1291, 1295, 1297 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1029 (1988) (finding that a telephone company’s decision to terminate an adults-only message service was state action because it was the product of state coercion; holding, however, that the company’s later decision to bar all adult entertainment services was not state action, since it was not coerced).
123. American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 53-54 (1999).
124. Blum, 457 U.S. at 1003.
125. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982).
126. Id. at 840-41. To be sure of finding state action in these types of circumstances, advocates should ask whether the private actor is standing in for the government, or involved in what amounts to “joint action,” either because it could not take place without government involvement, or is compelled by government policy.
127. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
129. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 171-78 (1972).
131. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982).
134. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (state could not enforce trespass laws to bar Jehovah’s Witness from distributing literature in company town).
135. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932) (collectively, the White Primary Cases).
136. Marsh, 326 U.S. at 505-10.
137. The White Primary Cases may be better understood as finding circumstantial evidence of state-sponsored intentional racial discrimination from state regulation of every aspect of primary elections but voter eligibility.
138. Hudgens v. National Labor Relations Board, 424 U.S. 507, 512-21 (1976) (overruling Amalgamated Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308 (1968)).
139. U.S. CONST. amends. XV, XIX, XXIV and XXVI; and art. IV, § 4. See also Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104-105 (2000).
140. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Company, 419 U.S. 345, 353 (1974).
141. Flagg Brothers v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978), 155-66 (1978).
142. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 , 837-43 (982).
143. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1002-12 (1982).
144. San Francisco Arts and Athletics, Incorporated v. U.S. Olympic Committee, 483 U.S. 522, 542-47 (1987).
145. National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 194(1988).
146. See, e.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994), alluding to government’s affirmative duty to protect those in custody from injury caused by a third party.
147. An example of a decision finding such a “special relationship” or "state created danger" outside of the typical custodial situation is Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583, 589-90 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 938 (1990). In this case, a woman formerly held in custody by a highway patrolman was raped after being released in a high crime area without a car at 2:30 a.m. On the other hand, city liability was not found for the murder of a domestic violence victim despite a state law requiring police to enforce restraining orders, Gonzales v. City of Castle Rock, 307 F.3d 1258 (10th Cir. 2002), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005), or where police officers allowed a drag race to go forward, resulting in the death of a spectator. Jones v. Reynolds, 438 F.3d 685 (6th Cir. 2005). The key distinction is whether the government took affirmative action that created the danger.
148. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
150. Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690-91, 692 (1978). See Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1359 (2011) (policies, acts, and practices of government must be so widespread as to "practically have the force of law"); Los Angeles County v. Humphries, 131 S. Ct. 447 (2010). Chapter 8.3 of this MANUAL discusses municipal or agency liability and the parameters of a “custom, policy or practice” for purposes of § 1983.

References: § 1983
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 1983
 § 1983
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 1983
 v. 
 v. 
 § 1983
 v. 
 v. 
 § 1983
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 1983
 § 1983
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 1983
 § 1983
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 1983
 § 1983
 v. 
 v. 
 § 1983
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 1983
 v. 
 § 1983
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 1232
 § 1232
 v. 
 § 1983
 v. 
 v. 
 § 2014
 § 1396
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 1320
 v. 
 § 1437
 v. 
 § 1320
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 1437
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 1983
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 1983
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 2000
 § 2000
 § 601
 § 601
 § 601
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 1983
 § 1983
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 1983
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 1983
 v. 
 v. 
 § 1983
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 1983
 § 1983
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 1983
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 4
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 1983