Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/173/1/
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 04:48:26+00:00

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Justia › US Law › US Case Law › US Supreme Court › Volume 173 › Pierce v. Tennessee Coal, Iron & R. Co.
elect to treat the contract as absolutely and finally broken by the company and, in an action against it upon the contract, to introduce evidence of his age, health and expectancy of life, and, if his disability was permanent, to recover the full value of the contract to him at the time of the breach, including all that he would have received in the future as well as in the past if the contract had been kept, deducting, however, any sum that he might have earned already or might thereafter earn as well as the amount of any loss that the defendant sustained by the loss of his services without its fault.
house rent, a certain amount of supplies from the convict commissary at No. 2 prison which supplies were to amount to about the sum paid by me for house rent], and whereas said agreement has been faithfully kept by both parties, and whereas, on the 4th day of June, 1890, it is mutually agreed between myself and the said company that it will be better to give me the house rent than the supplies of about equal amount from the commissary, now therefore it is agreed, in view of the above propositions, which have been faithfully carried out, that my wages from this date are to be $65 a month, and in addition I am to have, free of charge, my coal and wood necessary for my household use at my dwelling, and the same benefit from the garden as is had by others who are allowed the garden privilege, and I, on my part, agree and bind myself to release the said company from any and all liability for said accident, or from the injuries resulting to me from it or from the effects of it, and agree that this is to be a full and satisfactory settlement of any and all claims which I might have against said company."
for the period of six months next before the commencement of the suit, and had entirely abandoned the contract and discharged the plaintiff from its service. The plaintiff claimed damages in the sum of $50,000 for the defendant's breach and abandonment of the contract.
The defendant demurred to the complaint upon the ground that the contract set out therein was one of hiring, terminable at the will of either party, and not one of hiring for life, as alleged in the complaint, and that it appeared from the allegations of the complaint that the defendant, in terminating the contract of hiring, had only exercised its legal right under the contract. The court sustained the demurrer, and, the plaintiff declining to amend his complaint, rendered judgment for the defendant, and the plaintiff, on February 21, 1894, appealed from that judgment to the Supreme Court of Alabama.
The record transmitted to this Court does not show any further proceedings in the Supreme Court of Alabama. But the official reports of its decisions show that, at November term, 1895, it reversed that judgment and remanded the case to the county court. Pierce v. Tennessee Coal Co., 110 Ala. 533. And the record before this Court necessarily implies that fact by setting forth that, in March, 1896, on motion of the defendant suggesting that from prejudice and local influence it would not be able to obtain justice in the state courts, the case was removed from the county court into the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern Division of the Northern District of Alabama, and a motion to remand the case to the state court was made by the plaintiff (on what ground did not appear in the record), and was overruled.
for further answer to the complaint, says that the plaintiff, under and by the terms of the contract set out in the complaint, contracted to perform for the defendant during the term thereof such service as he was able to perform, in consideration for the promises made by defendant therein, and the defendant avers that the plaintiff thereafter became able to perform service for the defendant, and did in fact perform such service for some time thereafter, and that, while engaged in the performance of such service, the plaintiff voluntarily, and without excuse therefor, refused to further perform such service as he was able to perform and was in fact performing for the defendant as required by said contract, and the defendant thereupon discharged the plaintiff from its service, and the defendant avers that the plaintiff failed to comply with the conditions imposed upon him by said contract."
The plaintiff joined issue on the first plea, and demurred to the second plea upon the ground that it did not go to the whole consideration of the contract, and was no answer to the entire action, and the court sustained his demurrer. The defendant, for further answer and by way of recoupment, pleaded that, on May 3, 1891, the plaintiff, voluntarily and without excuse, refused to perform such labor as he was able to perform and was in fact performing for the defendant as required by the contract, and since that time had continued to refuse to perform, and had not in fact performed, such service, or any part thereof, to the damage of the defendant in the sum of $50,000.
used by insurance companies, showing his expectancy of life at the time of his discharge and at the time of the trial.
"on the ground that it was immaterial and irrelevant, and because damages for the expectancy of life was a matter too vague and uncertain to be allowed."
"If the defendant, after making the contract sued on and before the suit, refused further to pay the plaintiff and to furnish the articles stipulated to be furnished, and refused to employ the plaintiff, and discharged him, the plaintiff is entitled to the full benefit of his contract, which is the present value of the money agreed to be paid and the articles to be furnished under the contract for the period of his life, if his disability is permanent, less such sum as the jury may find the plaintiff may be able to earn in the future, and may have been able heretofore to earn, and less such loss as the defendant may have sustained from the loss of the plaintiff's service without the defendant's fault."
The defendant also tendered and was allowed a bill of exceptions, presenting substantially, though in different form, the questions involved in the plaintiff's case, and the contents of which therefore need not be particularly stated.
The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff in the sum of $5,893, upon which judgment was rendered. Each party sued out a writ of error from the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
"an employment by the month, and therefore, like every other such employment, subject to be discontinued at the will of either party at the expiration of any month or at any time for adequate cause,"
in overruling the demurrer to the complaint, and upon that ground, without passing upon any other question in the case, reversed the judgment of the circuit court of the United States and remanded the case to that court for further proceedings, Judge Pardee dissenting. 81 F. 814. The plaintiff thereupon applied for and obtained a writ of certiorari from this Court. 168 U.S. 709.
In the circuit court of the United States, a verdict and judgment were rendered for the plaintiff for a less amount of damages than he claimed, and each party alleged exceptions to rulings and instructions of the judge, and sued out a writ of error from the circuit court of appeals. That court held that the defendant's demurrer to the complaint should have been sustained, and therefore reversed the judgment of the circuit court and remanded the case for further proceedings. A writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the circuit court of appeals was thereupon applied for by the plaintiff, and was granted by this Court.
The fundamental question in this case is whether the contract in suit, made by the parties on June 4, 1890, is a contract intended to last during the plaintiff's life, or is a mere contract of hiring from month to month, terminable at the pleasure of either party at the end of any month.
compromising the plaintiff's claim for damages for the injuries, and had repeated negotiations with that object. In November, 1888, they made an agreement (which does not appear to have been reduced to writing) by which the defendant was to pay the plaintiff regular wages while he was disabled, and also to furnish him with such supplies as he might choose to get from a commissary and to give him coal and wood for fuel at his dwelling house and the benefit of a garden belonging to the defendant. That agreement was carried out by the defendant until May, 1889, and was then, after the plaintiff had resumed work, modified by stipulating that the defendant should give the plaintiff such work as he could do, should pay him therefor wages of $60 a month, as before the accident, and should give him the rent of his house, or, in lieu of house rent, an equivalent amount of supplies from the commissary, and the agreement, as so modified, was faithfully kept by both parties until June 4, 1890. Finally, on that day, the parties entered into the written contract sued on, by which, after reciting the plaintiff's claim for damages and the earlier agreements, it was agreed "in view [evidently a misprint for "in lieu"] of the above propositions, which have been faithfully carried out," that the plaintiff's "wages from this date are to be $65 a month" (the increase of wages being apparently intended as an equivalent for the provision, now omitted, for house rent, or supplies from the commissary), and that he was to have, free of charge, his fuel and the benefit of the garden, and the plaintiff, on his part, agreed to release the defendant from any and all liability for the accident, or for the injuries resulting to him from it or from the effects of it, and that this should be a full and satisfactory settlement of all claims which he might have against the defendant.
to pay him certain wages and to furnish him with certain supplies. The supplies to be furnished were evidently a minor consideration, and require no particular discussion. The more important matter is the wages. The defendant at first agreed to pay the plaintiff "regular wages while he was disabled." The agreement in that form would clearly last so long as he continued to be disabled, and could not have been put an end to by the defendant without the plaintiff's consent. By the next succeeding agreement, made after the plaintiff had resumed work, the defendant was "to give him work, such as he could do, paying him therefor the wages paid before said accident -- that is, $60 a month." That agreement must be considered as a mere modification of the first, requiring the plaintiff to do such work as he could do, but showing that he was still much disabled by his injuries. By the final agreement in writing of June 4, 1890, after reciting the plaintiff's claim for damages for these injuries, as well as the earlier agreements, his wages were increased by a stipulation that his "wages from this date are to be $65 a month," and he expressly released the defendant from all liability for the injuries resulting to him from the accident or from the effects thereof, and agreed that this should be a full and satisfactory settlement of all his claims against the defendant.
The only reasonable interpretation of this contract is that the defendant promised to pay the plaintiff wages at the rate of $65 a month, and to allow him his fuel and the benefit of the garden so long as his disability to do full work continued, and that in consideration of these promises of the defendant the plaintiff agreed to do such work as he could, and to release the defendant from all liability upon his claim for damages for his personal injuries. An intention of the parties that, while the plaintiff absolutely released the defendant from that claim, the defendant might at its own will and pleasure cease to perform all the obligations which were the consideration of that release finds no support in the terms of the contract, and is too unlikely to be presumed. Carnig v. Carr, 167 Mass. 544, 547.
"the contract is sufficiently definite as to time, and bound the defendant to its performance so long as the plaintiff should be disabled by reason of the injuries he received, which, under the averment that he was permanently disabled, will be for life,"
and upon that ground reversed the judgment of the county court sustaining the demurrer to the complaint and remanded the case to that court. 110 Ala. 533, 536. As we concur in that opinion, it is unnecessary to consider how far it should be considered as binding upon us in this case. See Williams v. Conger, 125 U. S. 397, 125 U. S. 418; Gardner v. Michigan Central Railroad, 150 U. S. 349; Great Western Tel. Co. v. Burnham, 162 U. S. 339, 162 U. S. 344, and cases cited; Moulton v. Reid, 54 Ala. 320.
It follows that the judgment of the United States circuit court of appeals in this case was erroneous, and must be reversed.
It appears to us to be equally clear that the circuit court of the United States erred in excluding the evidence offered by the plaintiff, in restricting his damages to the wages due and unpaid at the time of the trial, and in declining to instruct the jury as he requested.
"in an action for a personal injury, the plaintiff is entitled to recover compensation, so far as it is susceptible of an estimate in money, for the loss and damage caused to him by the defendant's negligence, including not only expenses incurred for medical attendance and a reasonable sum for his pain and suffering, but also a fair recompense for the loss of what he would otherwise have earned in his trade or profession, and has been deprived of the capacity of earning by the wrongful act of the defendant,"
probable duration of life and the present value of a life annuity are competent evidence,"
Vicksburg &c. Railroad v. Putnam, 118 U. S. 545, 118 U. S. 554, and that, in an action for breach of contract, "the amount which would have been received, if the contract had been kept, is the measure of damages if the contract is broken." Benjamin v. Hilliard, 23 How. 149, 64 U. S. 167.
But the recent tendency of judicial decisions in this country, in actions of contract as well as in actions of tort, has been towards allowing entire damages to be recovered, once for all, in a single action, and thus avoiding the embarrassment and annoyance of repeated litigation. This especially appears by well considered opinions in cases of agreements to furnish support or to pay wages, a few only of which need be referred to.
"if the defendant for a period of about two years neglected to furnish aid or support to the plaintiff, without any fault of the plaintiff, the plaintiff might treat the contract as at an end, and recover damages for the breach of the contract as a whole, and that the plaintiff would be entitled to recover compensation for the past failure of the defendant to furnish him aid and support, and full indemnity for his future support."
date of the writ, and not up to the time when the verdict is rendered. But if the breach has been such that the plaintiff has the right to treat the contract as absolutely and finally broken by the defendant, and he so elects to treat it, the damages are assessed as of a total breach of an entire contract. Such damages are not special or prospective damages, but are the damages naturally resulting from a total breach of the contract, and are suffered when the contract is broken, and are assessed as of that time. From the nature of the contract, they include damages for not performing the contract in the future, as well as in the past. The value of the contract to the plaintiff at the time it is broken may be somewhat indefinite because the duration of the life of the plaintiff is uncertain, but uncertainty in the duration of a life has not, since the adoption of life tables, been regarded as a reason why full relief in damages should not be afforded for a failure to perform a contract which, by its terms, was to continue during life. When the defendant, for example, absolutely refuses to perform such a contract after the time for entering upon the performance has begun, it would be a great hardship to compel the plaintiff to be ready at all times during his life to be supported by the defendant if the defendant should at any time change his mind, and to hold that he must resort to successive actions from time to time to obtain his damages piecemeal, or else leave them to be recovered as an entirety by his personal representatives after his death. Daniels v. Newton, 114 Mass. 530, decides that an absolute refusal to perform a contract before the performance is due by the terms of the contract is not a present breach of the contract for which any action can be maintained, but it does not decide that an absolute refusal to perform a contract after the time and under the conditions in which the plaintiff is entitled to require performance is not a breach of the contract, even although the contract is, by its terms, to continue in the future."
133 Mass. 75, 76. It is proper to remark that the point decided in Daniels v. Newton was left open in Dingley v. Oler, 117 U. S. 490, 117 U. S. 503, and has never been brought into judgment in this Court.
"Your verdict is all she can ever recover, no matter how long she may live. That ends the contract between these parties, and you will decide, considering her age, her health, her condition in life, and the circumstances under which she is placed, how long she will probably live, and how much services she can probably perform in the future, and say how much more it will cost her to support herself than she will be able to earn, and allow her to recover for such sum."
further remarked that, in actions for personal injuries, the constant practice is to allow a recovery for such prospective damages as the jury are satisfied the party will sustain notwithstanding the uncertainty of the duration of his life and other contingencies which may possibly affect the amount."
55 N.Y. 597, 598. See also Remelee v. Hall, 31 Vt. 582; Sutherland v. Wyer, 67 Me. 64.
brought. The right to recover damages accrues upon the breach of the contract. But the rule of damages in such cases is what would have come to the plaintiff under the contract had it continued, less whatever the plaintiff might earn by the exercise of reasonable and proper diligence on his part, and, of course, in ascertaining this, we must look to a time subsequent to the breach, and in some cases to a time subsequent to the bringing of the suit. Nor is it any objection to the recovery that, in this case, the damages are difficult to ascertain, depending upon contingent and uncertain events. There are many cases in which the damages are uncertain and difficult to ascertain, and in fact cannot be ascertained with certainty, but this has never been regarded as a sufficient reason for denying all relief."
These cases appear to this Court to rest upon sound principles, and to afford correct rules for the assessment of the plaintiff's damages in the case at bar.
The legal effect of the contract sued on, as has been seen, was that the defendant promised to pay the plaintiff certain wages and to furnish him with certain supplies so long, at least, as his disability to work should continue, and the consideration of these promises of the defendant was the plaintiff's agreement to do for the defendant such work as he was able to do, and his release of the defendant from all liability in damages for the personal injuries which had caused his disability.
The complaint alleged, and the plaintiff at the trial introduced evidence tending to prove, that by those injuries he was permanently disabled; that he was always ready and offered to do for the defendant such work as he was able to do, and labored at that work for such reasonable time as he was able to work and bound to work under the contract, and that the defendant, without any reasonable ground therefor, denied its obligation to pay the plaintiff the stipulated wages longer than suited its pleasure, and, for six months before the commencement of the action, disregarded the contract and refused to abide by it, and entirely abandoned the contract, and dismissed the plaintiff from its service.
If these facts were proved to the satisfaction of the jury, the case would stand thus: the defendant committed an absolute breach of the contract at a time when the plaintiff was entitled to require performance. The plaintiff was not bound to wait to see if the defendant would change its decision and take him back into its service, or to resort to successive actions for damages from time to time, or to leave the whole of his damages to be recovered by his personal representative after his death. But he had the right to elect to treat the contract as absolutely and finally broken by the defendant, to maintain this action, once for all, as for a total breach of the entire contract, and to recover all that he would have received in the future, as well as in the past, if the contract had been kept. In so doing, he would simply recover the value of the contract to him at the time of the breach, including all the damages, past or future, resulting from the total breach of the contract. The difficulty and uncertainty of estimating damages that the plaintiff may suffer in the future is no greater in this action of contract than they would have been if he had sued the defendant, in an action of tort, to recover damages for the personal injuries sustained in its service, instead of settling and releasing those damages by the contract now sued on.
In assessing the plaintiff's damages, deduction should, of course, be made of any sum that the plaintiff might have earned in the past or might earn in the future, as well as the amount of any loss that the defendant had sustained by the lose of the plaintiff's services without the defendant's fault. And such deduction was provided for in the instruction asked by the plaintiff and refused by the judge.
The questions of law presented by the defendant's bill of exceptions, allowed by the circuit court of the United States, are substantially like those above considered, and require no further notice.
United States must also be reversed because of the rulings excepted to by the plaintiff, and that the case must be remanded to that court, with directions to set aside the verdict and to order a new trial.
Judgments of the circuit court of appeals and of the circuit court of the United States reversed, and case remanded to said circuit court for further proceedings in conformity with the opinion of this Court.

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