Source: https://casebook.icrc.org/print/20744
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 22:47:59+00:00

Document:
The number of journalists killed in the world in 2003 – 42 – is the highest since 1995. This figure can be largely explained by the recent military campaign in Iraq, which inflicted a proportionally higher number of casualties on journalists than on members of the coalition’s armed forces: 14 journalists and media personnel lost their lives, two went missing and a dozen or so were wounded while covering the conflict and its aftermath. In recent years, one might also mention the deliberate targeting of journalists in the occupied Palestinian territories, the bombing of the Serbian State radio and television (Radio Televisija Srbije – RTS) building in Belgrade by NATO forces in 1999 and the bombing, by US forces, of the Kabul and Baghdad offices of the Qatar-based Al-Jazeera television network.
This particularly worrying situation prompted Reporters Without Borders to issue a “Declaration on the safety of journalists and media personnel in situations involving armed conflict,” which was opened for signing on 20 January 2003 and revised on 8 January 2004 in light of the events in Iraq. The purpose of the declaration is to remind belligerents of the principles and rules of international humanitarian law that protect journalists and media personnel in periods of armed conflict and to improve the law by adapting it to present needs. In this regard, it would seem necessary to reaffirm the illegality of attacks on journalists and news media and to remind the authorities of their obligation to take precautions when preparing attacks that might affect them.
The illegality of attacks on journalists and news media derives from the protection granted to civilians and civilian objects under international humanitarian law, and from the fact that the media, even when used for propaganda purposes, cannot be considered as military objectives except in special cases. In other words, while no specific status exists for journalists and the equipment they use, both journalists and their equipment benefit from the general protection enjoyed by civilians and civilian objects unless they make an effective contribution to military action.
War correspondents fall into the ill-defined category of “persons who accompany the armed forces without actually being members thereof .” Since they are not part of the armed forces, they enjoy civilian status and the protection derived from that status. Moreover, since they are, in a manner of speaking, associated with the war effort, they are entitled to prisoner-of-war status when they fall into the hands of the enemy, provided they have been duly authorized to accompany the armed forces.
Radio and television facilities are civilian objects and as such enjoy general protection. The prohibition on attacking civilian objects has been firmly established in international humanitarian law since the beginning of the twentieth century and was reaffirmed in 1977 Protocol I and in the Statute of the International Criminal Court.
Can media facilities constitute legitimate military objectives?
In today’s highly technological society, dual civilian and military use is often made of goods and resources and this is not without consequences in terms of protection. Civilian objects (roads, schools, railways, etc.) that are temporarily put to military use or used both for civilian and for military purposes constitute legitimate targets. On 27 March 2003 coalition forces twice bombed the Ministry of Information building in Baghdad although it was known to shelter offices of the international media. On 8 April 2003, after a US tank fired on the Palestine Hotel, a gathering spot for the foreign press in Baghdad, a spokesman for the American Defense Department claimed that the hotel was a legitimate target since Iraqi officials had held meetings there 48 hours earlier. During NATO’s air campaign in Yugoslavia, NATO representatives justified the bombing of the RTS building in terms of the dual use that had been made of it: in addition to their civilian use, RTS facilities were incorporated into the C3 (command, control and communications) network of the Serbian army. In its final report, the ICTY review committee stated that in so far as these facilities were used as transmitters by the armed forces, they constituted a military objective [See Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, NATO Intervention ]. This conclusion seems to reflect both the spirit and letter of Protocol I: it is lawful to attack objects that are being put to dual use when the conditions of Article 5 (2) of Protocol I are met. Likewise, if, as a US spokesman claimed to justify the bombing of 12 November 2002, the building of the Arab Al-Jazeera television network in Kabul really sheltered offices belonging to Taliban forces and Al Qaeda operatives, then it was a legitimate target. Whatever the case may be, the obligations that belligerents have to take precautions are greater when the object is used for dual purposes.
Does the use of media facilities for propaganda purposes make legitimate targets of them?
During the 2003 military campaign in Iraq, the British media were attacked by certain ministers and members of Parliament who accused them of playing into the hands of the Iraqi propaganda machine. Four years earlier, various NATO representatives publicly justified the bombing of the RTS building in Belgrade in terms of the wish to neutralize a propaganda tool. While there is no doubt that the RTS was used for propaganda purposes, Article 52 of Protocol I cannot reasonably be interpreted as meaning that this, in itself, could justify the military attack.
Not all forms of propaganda are authorized, however. Propaganda that incites war crimes, acts of genocide or acts of violence is forbidden, and news media that disseminate such propaganda can become legitimate targets. “Whether the media constitutes a legitimate target group is a debatable issue. If the media is used to incite crimes, as in Rwanda, then it is a legitimate target...” It is not clearly established whether or not media that incite genocide, as Radio-Télévision Libre des Mille Collines and the newspaper Kangura did in Rwanda in 1994, constitute a legitimate target. A positive reply to this question may no doubt be found in an interpretation of Article 52 (2) of Protocol I or of the principle whereby protection is lost in the event of participation in the hostilities. The ICTY commission itself replies as follows: “If the media is used to incite crimes, as in Rwanda, it can become a legitimate military objective. It may also be argued that “hate media” constitute legitimate targets by virtue of the obligation to repress breaches of the Geneva Conventions (Articles 49 /50 /129 /146  respectively of the four Geneva Conventions) and Protocol I (Article 85 ). Indeed, under common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions and Protocol I, States Parties undertake to respect and “ensure respect” for these instruments.
The lawfulness of an attack depends not only on the nature of the target – which must be a military objective – but also on whether the required precautions have been taken, in particular as regards respect for the principle of proportionality and the obligation to give warning. In this regard, journalists and news media do not enjoy a particular status but benefit from the general protection against the effects of hostilities that Protocol I grants to civilians and civilian objects.
In a message to Amnesty International dated 17 May, NATO contended that it had made “every possible effort to avoid civilian casualties and collateral damage... “during the attack on RTS, in accordance with the prescriptions of Article 57 (“Precautions in attack”) of Protocol I. Beyond the specific cases of RTS in Yugoslavia, Al-Jazeera in Afghanistan or Baghdad and the Palestinian radio-television offices in Ramallah, it may more generally be asked whether the bombing of radio-television facilities is the most adequate means to the sought end. According to Article 52.2 of Protocol I, the destruction of a military objective is not the only possible solution: it may be enough to capture or neutralize the objective. These other solutions may be justified from a military point of view in terms of economy and concentration of means, since the destruction of a military objective implies the destruction of materials and ammunition. But these solutions are justified above all from a humanitarian point of view, by making it possible to “minimize loss of civilian life” (Article 57.2 (a) (ii) of Protocol I ).
Would you consider that journalists on dangerous mission were adequately protected before the special provision, Art. 79 of Protocol I, was adopted?
What is the difference under IHL between war correspondents accompanying the armed forces and other journalists? Does IHL give them the same rights under IHL, whether they belong to the one category or the other? Do only “freelance journalists” come into the second category? Or also permanent media correspondents?
What are the rights under IHL of war correspondents accompanying the armed forces? What are the criteria they have to fulfil to be qualified as a war correspondent? What would happen if they do not fulfil those criteria? Is the ID card a prerequisite for a journalist to be entitled to POW status? Is that card still relevant under Art. 79 of Protocol I? Do you think that by making an explicit distinction between journalists engaged in dangerous missions and war correspondents, IHL broadens the protection of journalists? Or does it undermine their protection?
During the “travaux préparatoires” of Art. 79, the idea of special protection for journalists was put forward. Why was this idea rejected? Do you think that considering journalists as a special category of protected persons or providing them with a distinctive sign would give them better protection? Does Art. 79 of Protocol I clarify Art. 4(A)(4) of Convention III? What are the main rights of a journalist, other than a war correspondent covered by Convention III, who is detained during an international armed conflict? Do these rights differ from those of war correspondents covered by Convention III? Do you think that one category is more likely to be subjected to ill-treatment on being captured than the other?
If a journalist accompanies an army unit and is shot at by the enemy forces, would you consider this as a breach of IHL? Do the enemy forces have to take special care in a conflict to distinguish between combatants and journalists? Can military necessity justify the killing of a journalist?
Are journalists adequately protected in non-international armed conflicts? Are they civilians? Does the rule in Protocol I’s Art. 79, stating that journalists in dangerous missions are considered at all times as civilians and therefore enjoy the same protection, also apply in non-international armed conflicts?
Has the 2003 war in Iraq and the unclear status of the “embedded” journalists made a clarification of the protection of journalists necessary? What consequences could the use of armed guards have for the status of journalists?
Should propaganda media be considered a legitimate target? Is the deliberate targeting of these facilities a violation of IHL? Where should the line be drawn between “hate media” and “normal” war propaganda? Is it possible to make such a distinction and target media in accordance with it? Is a journalist who encourages war crimes a legitimate target for an attack? Does everyone who commits war crimes lose protection against attacks?

References: Art. 79
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