Source: https://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/01-408.ZS.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 06:08:42+00:00

Document:
Petitioner filed a federal-court action, seeking, inter alia, a declaratory judgment that its products did not infringe respondents trade dress and an injunction restraining respondent from accusing it of such infringement. Respondents answer asserted a compulsory patent-infringement counterclaim. The District Court ruled in petitioners favor. Respondent appealed to the Federal Circuit, which, notwithstanding petitioners challenge to its jurisdiction, vacated the District Courts judgment and remanded the case.
Held: The Federal Circuit cannot assert jurisdiction over a case in which the complaint does not allege a patent-law claim, but the answer contains a patent-law counterclaim. Pp. 38.
(a) The Federal Circuits jurisdiction is fixed with reference to that of the district court, 28 U.S. C. §1295(a)(1), and turns on whether the action is one arising under federal patent law, §1338(a). Because §1338(a) uses the same operative language as §1331, which confers general federal-question jurisdiction, the well-pleaded-complaint rule governing whether a case arises under §1331 also governs whether a case arises under §1338(a). As adapted to §1338(a), the rule provides that whether a case arises under patent law is determined by what appears in the plaintiffs well pleaded complaint. Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 809. Because petitioners well pleaded complaint asserted no claim arising under patent law, the Federal Circuit erred in asserting jurisdiction over this appeal. Pp. 34.
(b) The well-pleaded-complaint rule does not allow a counterclaim to serve as the basis for a district courts arising under jurisdiction. To rule otherwise would contravene the face-of-the-complaint principle set forth in this Courts prior cases, see, e.g., Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392, and the longstanding policies furthered by that principle: It would leave acceptance or rejection of a state forum to the master of the counterclaim rather than to the plaintiff; it would radically expand the class of removable cases; and it would undermine the clarity and ease of administration of the well-pleaded-complaint doctrine. Pp. 46.
(c) As for respondents alternative argument, that reading §§1295(a)(1) and 1338(a) to confer appellate jurisdiction on the Federal Circuit whenever a patent-law counterclaim is raised is necessary to effectuate Congresss goal of promoting patent-law uniformity: This Courts task is not to determine what would further Congresss goal, but to determine what the statutes words must fairly be understood to mean. It would be impossible to say that §1338(a)s arising under language means the well-pleaded-complaint rule when read on its own, but respondents complaint-or-counterclaim rule when referred to by §1295(a)(1). Pp. 67.
Scalia, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, and Breyer, JJ., joined, and in which Stevens, J., joined as to Parts I and IIA. Stevens, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Ginsburg, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which OConnor, J., joined.

References: §1295
 §1338
 §1338
 §1331
 §1331
 §1338
 §1338
 v. 
 v. 
 §1338
 §1295