Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/100324/salem-vs-united-states-lines-co
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 04:29:09+00:00

Document:
Respondent United States Lines Co.
Held: it was error for the Court of Appeals to order a new trial on the ground that a jury could not determine, in the absence of supporting testimony by an expert in naval architecture, a claim that the shipowner had failed to equip the ship with necessary and feasible safety devices to prevent such a mishap. Pp. 370 U. S. 31 -37.
2. The evidence in this record provides no support for the trial court's award to the seaman of future maintenance for three years. Pp. 370 U. S. 37 -38.
The first question to be decided the seaman's personal injury suit for damages on the grounds of unseaworthiness and negligence under the Jones Act [ Footnote 1 ] is whether the jury should have been allowed to determine, in the absence of supporting testimony by an expert in naval architecture, a claim that the shipowner failed to equip his ship with necessary and feasible safety devices to prevent the mishap which befell the seaman.
"[t]here was no expert testimony that proper marine architecture required the additional provision of railings or other safety devices on such a ladder or platform enclosed within a tower leading to a crow's nest. Should the jury, under these conditions, have been permitted to decide whether proper marine architecture required railings or other safety devices? In two recent cases, this court has held that a jury should not be permitted to speculate on such matters in the absence of expert evidence. [ Footnote 2 ]"
crow's nest level which we have described. If the holding of the Court of Appeals is only that, in this case, there are peculiar fact circumstances which made it impossible for a jury to decide intelligently, we are not told what those circumstances are, and our examination of the record discloses none. [ Footnote 3 ] If the holding is that claims which might be said to touch upon naval architecture can never succeed without expert evidence, neither the Court of Appeals nor the respondent refers us to authority or reason for any such broad proposition.
United States Smelting Co. v. Parry, 166 F. 407, 411, 415. Furthermore, the trial judge has broad discretion in the matter of the admission or exclusion of expert evidence, and his action is to be sustained unless manifestly erroneous. Spring Co. v. Edgar, 99 U. S. 645 , 99 U. S. 658 .
Compare Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. Watson, 190 U. S. 287 , 190 U. S. 290 , in which there may have been peculiar difficulties impeding installation of any truly effective safety device.
Although it was later held that the Safety Appliance Act has no room for the doctrine of equivalent, substitute devices, St. Joseph & Grand Island R. Co. v. Moore, 243 U. S. 311 , the authority of Spokane on jury competence is unimpaired.
The value of an expert's testimony to explain what the best safety device might be is clear, but the question here is simply whether some such device should have been provided. Zinnel v. United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp., 10 F.2d 47, 48. Nor would expert testimony about customary equippage be essential, Pure Oil Co. v. Snipes, 293 F.2d 60, 71; nor, even if offered, would it have concluded the questions of unseaworthiness or negligence. Wabash R. Co. v. McDaniels, 107 U. S. 454 , 107 U. S. 460 -461; Grand Trunk R. Co. v. Richardson, 91 U. S. 454 , 91 U. S. 469 -470; The T. J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737; Kennair v. Mississippi Shipping Co., 197 F.2d 605; June T., Inc. v. King, 290 F.2d 404.
Although the law favors the aid of experts if the problem is not one "upon which the lay or uneducated mind is capable of forming a judgment," Milwaukee & St. P. R. Co. v. Kellogg, 94 U. S. 469 , 94 U. S. 472 , if the matter is only arguably beyond common experience, expert testimony will be admitted with care. The rule reflects the consideration of avoidance of unnecessarily prolonged trials and attendant expense and confusion. Winans v. New York & Erie R. Co., 21 How. 88, 62 U. S. 100 -101; and see Thorn v. Worthing Skating Rink Co. (1876), reported in Plimpton v. Spiller, 6 Ch.D. 412, footnote at 415-418 (1877).
I do not read the Court of Appeals' opinion either as holding that, because of "peculiar fact circumstances," petitioner's claims respecting the alleged faulty construction of the radar tower required " supporting expert testimony" ( ante, pp. 370 U. S. 35 , 370 U. S. 32 ) (emphasis added), or as establishing a general proposition that such testimony is needed in every instance where a seaman claims to have been injured because of his employer's failure to equip a ship with safety devices.
293 F.2d at 123. (Emphasis added.) To me, it seems clear that the court referred to expert testimony simply as an example of the kind of evidence that the petitioner might have offered on this score. Consequently, the District Court's charge that the jury could find the respondent negligent "in failing to provide railings or other safety devices" had injected into the case a theory of liability which had not been presented to the jury by the evidence introduced at the trial. This has uniformly been held to constitute reversible error. E.g., Mandel v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 291 F.2d 433; Smith v. Ellerman Lines, Ltd., 247 F.2d 761, 766; see Wilmington Star Mining Co. v. , 205 U. S. 60 , 205 U. S. 78 -79.

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