Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/261/428/
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 12:11:52+00:00

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Justia › US Law › US Case Law › US Supreme Court › Volume 261 › Keller v. Potomac Elec. Power Co.
1. In a proceeding brought by a public utility against the Public Utilities Commission of the District of Columbia, in the Supreme Court of the District, under par. 64 of § 8 of the Act of March 4, 1913, c. 150, 37 Stat. 974, the court is empowered not merely to decide legal questions and questions of fact as incident thereto, but also to amend, and, if need be, enlarge valuations, rates, and regulations established by the Commission which the court finds upon the record and evidence to be inadequate, and to make such order as, in its judgment, the Commission should have made. P. 261 U. S. 440.
3. Under the power "to exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever" over the District of Columbia (Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 17), Congress may vest this jurisdiction in the courts of the District. P. 261 U. S. 442.
4. But such power cannot be conferred upon this Court, and the provision made by the above act (par. 64) for appeals here from the Court of Appeals of the District is therefore void. P. 261 U. S. 443.
the courts of the District, in new of the probable intent of Congress in this regard and the saving clause in par. 92. P. 261 U. S. 444.
6. If the provisions of the above act (pars. 65 and 69) seeking to limit the time within which recourse may be had to the courts against orders of the Commission and to put the burden of proof upon the party attacking them are unconstitutional, the remainder of the act would not be affected in new of the saving clause of par 92. P. 261 U. S. 445.
Act of October 22, 1913, 38 Stat. 219, this jurisdiction was conferred on the several district courts of the United States. This permits these courts to consider all relevant questions of constitutional power or right and all pertinent questions whether the administrative order is within the statutory authority, or is an attempted exercise or it so unreasonable as not to be within it, but these are questions of law only. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Illinois Central R. Co., 215 U. S. 452, 215 U. S. 470. Of course, the consideration and decision of questions of law may involve a consideration of controverted facts to determine what the question of law is, but it is settled that any finding of fact by the Commission, if supported by evidence, is final and conclusive on the courts. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Union Pacific R. Co., 222 U. S. 541, 222 U. S. 547. A similar distinction exists between the jurisdiction here conferred and that vested in circuit courts of appeals in reference to proceedings before the Trade Commission. Act Sept. 26, 1914, c. 311, § 5, 38 Stat. 719. The language of the act under discussion is much wider than that of the Interstate Commerce Act or of the Federal Trade Commission provisions. It brings the court much more intimately into the legislative machinery for fixing rates than does the Interstate Commerce Act. We cannot escape the conclusion that Congress intended that the court shall revise the legislative discretion of the Commission by considering the evidence and full record of the case and entering the order it deems the Commission ought to have made.
211 U.S. 211 U. S. 225; Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U. S. 71, 187 U. S. 83-84.
Such legislative or administrative jurisdiction, it is well settled, cannot be conferred on this Court either directly or by appeal. The latest and fullest authority upon this point is to be found in the opinion of MR. JUSTICE Day, speaking for the court in Muskrat v. United States, 219 U. S. 346. The principle there recognized and enforced on reason and authority is that the jurisdiction of this Court and of the inferior courts of the United States ordained and established by Congress under and by virtue of the third article of the Constitution is limited to cases and controversies in such form that the judicial power is capable of acting on them, and does not extend to an issue of constitutional law framed by Congress for the purpose of invoking the advice of this Court without real parties or a real case, or to administrative or legislative issues or controversies. Hayburn's Case, 2 Dall. 410, note; United States v. Ferreira, 13 How. 40, 54 U. S. 52; Ex parte Siebold, 100 U. S. 371, 100 U. S. 398; Gordon v. United States, 117 U.S. 697; Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 215 U. S. 216.
Some question has been made as to the validity of paragraph 65, which forbids all recourse to courts to set aside, vacate, and amend the orders of the Commission after 120 days, and of paragraph 69, which puts the burden upon the party adverse to the Commission to show by clear and satisfactory evidence the inadequacy, unreasonableness, or unlawfulness of the order complained of. It is suggested that this deprives the public utility of its constitutional right to have the independent judgment of a court on the question of the confiscatory character of an order, and so brings the whole law within the inhibition of the case of Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U. S. 287. It is enough to say that, even if paragraphs 65 and 69 were invalid, the whole act would not fail in view of paragraph 92 already referred to. It will be time enough to consider the validity of those sections, when it is sought to apply them to bar or limit an independent judicial proceeding raising the question whether a rate or other requirement of the Commission is confiscatory. Our conclusion that the provision for appeal to this Court in paragraph 64 is invalid makes it unnecessary to decide whether the appeal must be from a final decree, or whether the decree of the Court of Appeals was final.

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