Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/198/508/
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 17:01:42+00:00

Document:
The general rule is that all matters respecting the remedy and the admissibility of evidence depend upon the law of the state where the suit is brought.
Under the circumstances of this case, the contract was a New York contract, and not an llinois contract.
As §§ 834, 836, of the N.Y.Code of Civil Procedure were enacted prior to the execution of the contract involved, they could not impair its obligation.
In cases of this nature, this Court accepts the construction given by the courts of the state to its statutes, and even if, under § 709, Rev.Stat., this Court could review all questions presented by the record, the judgment should be affirmed.
The plaintiff in error is a corporation organized under an Act of Congress approved June 29, 1894. This action was brought against it by defendant in error as payee in a certain benefit certificate issued by it to Emanuel Meyer, husband of Henrietta Meyer, dated September 20, 1894, whereby it insured his life in the sum of $2,000. The defendant in error obtained judgment, which was successively affirmed by the appellate division and by the court of appeals of New York. The judgment of affirmance was entered in the supreme court, to which the case was remitted, and this writ of error was then sued out.
"And I hereby, for myself, my heirs, assigns, representatives, and beneficiaries, expressly waive any and all provisions of law, now or hereafter in force, prohibiting or excusing any physician heretofore or hereafter attending me professionally or otherwise, from disclosing or testifying to any information acquired thereby, or making such physician incompetent as a witness, and hereby consent that any such physician may testify to and disclose any information so derived or received in any suit or proceeding wherein the same may be material."
This provision takes pertinence from another whereby "it is agreed that, if death shall result by self-destruction, whether sane or insane," the certificate "shall be null and void, and all claims on account of such membership shall be forfeited."
The case was submitted for a special verdict on the question "Did Emanuel Meyer, the husband of the plaintiff, commit suicide?" The jury answered "No."
"to disclose any information which he acquired in attending a patient, in a professional capacity, and which was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity,"
when the provisions of § 834 have been expressly waived on such trial or examination by the personal representatives of the deceased patient."
"The attempted application of sections 834 and 836 of the Civil Code of Procedure of the State of New York to the contract in the case at bar is a violation of the federal Constitution."
These contentions may be said to have the same ultimate foundation, but regarding them as separate and independent, the first is based on the ground that plaintiff in error derived the right, from its contract with Meyer, to the testimony of the physicians, which right attended the contract in whatever forum suit upon the contract might be brought. This is certainly debatable. The general rule is that all matters respecting the remedy and admissibility of evidence depend upon the law of the state where the suit is brought. Northern Pacific R. Co. v. Babcock, 154 U. S. 190; Wilcox v. Hunt, 13 Pet. 378; Pritchard v. Norton, 106 U. S. 124; Bank of the United States v. Donnally, 8 Pet. 361.
it was binding upon either party to it, until it was delivered in New York, after the execution by the member of the further agreement expressing his unqualified acceptance of its conditions. As a matter of fact, the promise of the defendant was to pay the insurance moneys to the plaintiff, who resided in New York -- a feature giving additional local coloring to the contract. But the sufficient and controlling fact is that, by its terms, it was first to take effect as a binding obligation when the required agreement on the part of the member was executed by him."
2. The ground of this contention is not made clear. The language of counsel points to the contract clause of the Constitution as that relied on, and to render it available, makes the law of Illinois the obligation of the contract of insurance. But this can only be upon the supposition, which we have seen is erroneous, that the certificate of insurance was an Illinois contract, not a New York contract. Being a New York contract, the code sections did not impair its obligation. They were enacted before the contract was executed, and if they were a valid exercise of legislative power, and we have no doubt they were, it was competent for the state to enact the rule of evidence expressed in them. The case is in this narrow compass, and we need not further follow the details of the argument of counsel that the obligation of the contract of insurance was impaired. But we may observe that there is no question in the case of the validity or the enforcement of the provision in the certificate of insurance against suicide. It is only of the testimony offered to prove suicide. Plaintiff in error sought to prove it by the testimony of a physician, and the attempt encountered the New York Code and the questions we have discussed.
"The writ [to the final judgment or decree of a state court] shall have the same effect as if the judgment or decree complained of had been rendered or passed in a court of the United States."
"no one, except the personal representatives of the deceased patient, can waive the provisions of § 834, and it can be waived by them only upon the trial or examination where the evidence is offered or received."
Foley v. Royal Arcanum was referred to, and limited to the construction of the statute as it stood before amendment. The opinion of the court of appeals in the case at bar follows the Holden case and distinguishes prior cases.

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