Source: http://ca10.washburnlaw.edu/cases/2001/03/00-3268.htm
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 17:51:27+00:00

Document:
Before SEYMOUR, BALDOCK and EBEL, Circuit Judges.
My lawyer informed me that the plea of "GUILTY" could subject me to a mandatory minimum term of NO MANDATORY MINIMUM years imprisonment (if applicable) and to a maximum punishment which, as provided by law, is TEN (10) years, . . .
In this regard, my attorney has specifically informed me that pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §2251(d), as it existed prior to the September 30, 1996 amendment, I am subject to a maximum term of imprisonment of not more than 10 years. My attorney has informed me that because the present offense occurred prior to the September 30, 1996, amendment to 28 U.S.C. §2251(d), I am not subject to the enhanced sentences which now exist under the code section.
[Rule 60(b)] permits the court to grant relief from a final judgment for "any ... reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment [other than the first five reasons listed in the rule]." Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). There has been a recent trend, however, to treat motions by federal prisoners to set aside their convictions on constitutional grounds as § 2255 motions, regardless of the label affixed to the motion. According to this trend, even though [a defendant's] Rule 60(b) motion is styled merely as an attack on the judgment denying [his] § 2255 motion, we should treat the Rule 60(b) motion as a successive § 2255 motion because the motion actually attacks the validity of [a defendant's] conviction.
Id. at 551. Under AEDPA, a district court lacks jurisdiction to hear a petitioner's successive habeas petition unless the petitioner has previously applied for, and received, authorization from a circuit court of appeals to file the second petition. See 28 U.S.C. §2255 (referring to certification procedures contained in 28 U.S.C. §2244); 28 U.S.C. §2244(b)(3)(A); see also Lopez, 141 F.3d at 976. We thus construe Brown's request that we stay or dismiss his appeal so that he may file a Rule 60(b) motion with the district court "as an implied application under 28 U.S.C. §2244(b)(3)(A) for leave to file a second habeas petition in the district court." See Lopez, 141 F.3d at 976.
We reject Brown's implied application. We find that he has failed to make a prima facie showing either that his claim relies on a "new rule of constitutional law made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court," id., as required by 28 U.S.C. §2244(b)(2)(A), or that "the factual predicate for the claim could not have been discovered previously," as required by 28 U.S.C. §2244(B). Because Brown has not made a prima facie showing that his claim meets the criteria set forth in 28 U.S.C. §2244(b)(2)(A)-(B) for second or successive habeas petitions, we cannot grant leave for Brown to file a second habeas petition. See 28 U.S.C. §2244(b)(3)(c). For this reason, we must also reject Brown's motion to stay or dismiss his appeal and turn now to the resolution of his habeas claims.
Under the provisions of AEDPA, a state prisoner appealing a district court's denial of habeas relief under §2254 must obtain a COA before we may consider the merits of his claim. See 28 U.S.C. §2253(c)(1)(A), (B). A court may issue a COA "only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of a denial of a constitutional right." See 28 U.S.C. §2253(c)(3). Because the district court denied a COA, we must first decide whether to issue Brown's requested COA before we may address his claims on the merits. See United States v. Simmonds, 111 F.3d 737, 740-41 (10th Cir. 1997).
For substantially the same reasons as those relied upon by district court both to reject the initial petition on its merits and to deny COA, we find that COA should not be granted in this case. This appeal is therefore DISMISSED.
1. Brown also filed a direct appeal to this court, arguing that he was entitled to two three-level reductions in his base offense level under the USSG because his offense was never completed, but was instead merely an attempt to solicit. See United States v. Brown, No. 98-3164, 1999 WL 3369 (10th Cir. Jan. 6, 1999) (unpublished opinion). We affirmed Brown's conviction.

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