Source: http://news.lawreader.com/?p=384
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 14:36:03+00:00

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Ky. Supreme Court throws out contingent fee when attorney fired. Limits use of police ruses to gain entry to search residence.
This week the Ky. Supreme Court issued 35 rulings. LawReader subscribers may review our complete synopsis and the full text of the case.
Two cases are very important. First the court overruled prior Law and held that when an attorney who had a contingent fee contract is fired from the case, he cannot enforce the contract and is only entitled to quantum merit damages.
The second case limited the use of police ruses to gain entry to a residence to conduct a search. This decision did not outlaw police ruses, but does discuss the standard for their review. In this case the majority found the police violated the 4th. Amendment rights of the defendant. Justices Roach and Wintersheimer both dissented. This decision may be a telling prediction of Justice Roach’s view of the Bill of Rights in future cases and places his claim as Justice Wintersheimer’s philosopical replacement.
Justice Wintersheimer, who is retiring from the bench in January, follows his predictable pattern of overwhelming denial of defendant’s rights.
LawReader case #4 OVERRULING PRIOR LAW: when an attorney employed under a contingency fee contract is discharged without cause before completion of the contract, he or she is entitled to fee recovery on a quantum meruit basis only, and not on the terms of the contract.
Circuit Court. On discretionary review to this Court, we reverse the Court of Appeals and remand the case for further consideration.
This matter involves the enforcement of an attorney’s lien by Appellees, Richard Shapero and Carl Frederick.
LaBach v. Hampton, 585 S.W.2d 434 (Ky. App. 1979), the trial court determined that Shapero and Frederick were dismissed without cause, and thus, were entitled to a fee based on this employment contract.
remanded for a recalculation of the fee actually due to Shapero and Frederick.
Appellants petitioned for discretionary review to this Court, which we granted . We now overrule LaBach v. Hampton , supra, and therefore, must reverse both the Court of Appeals and the trial court.
on a former client’s final recovery, even though they never completed the contracted work, is an extreme minority position .
Most jurisdictions only allow these discharged attorneys to claim fees on a quantum meruit basis.
Discharged without Cause, 56 A.L.R. 5th 1, § 3(a) (1998) (same).
recovery on a quantum meruit basis only, and not on the terms of the contract.
As such, the Court of Appeals’ opinion is reversed, and this matter is remanded for proceedings in conformity with this opinion . Specifically, Shapero and Frederick shall be permitted to prove the quantum meruit value of the services they provided to Chiu prior to their final discharge on July 14, 1998 .
LawReader case #5 IMPORTANT 4THH. AMENDMENT RULING: “the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments require that a consent not be coerced, by explicit or implicit means . . .[fjor, no matter how subtly the coercion was applied, the resulting 'consent' would be no more than a pretext for the unjustified police intrusion against which the Fourth Amendment is directed ." JUSTICE ROACH AND JUSTICE WINTERSHEIMER DISSENT.
Cocaine ; Use/Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, Second Offense; and Possession of Marijuana. For these crimes, Appellant was sentenced to three days' imprisonment and two and one-half (2'/2) years of probation ....we reverse the Court of Appeals' opinion, vacate Appellant's convictions and sentence, and remand for further proceedings.
girl had just reported being raped by Yamada in the residence. He asked if he could look around in order to determine whether her description of the residence and its furnishings was accurate.
The trial court found that Trooper Manar "knew there would be no such evidence because he knew there was no assault. His intention was to gain consent to search for drugs."
On appeal to this Court, the sole issue for our consideration is whether the consent given by Appellant and his roommate was constitutionally valid. In Cook v.
Commonwealth, 826 S.W.2d 329 (Ky. 1992), this Court stated that “consent is one of the exceptions to the requirement for a warrant.” Id. at 331 (citing United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 96 S.Ct. 820, 46 L .Ed .2d 598 (1976)).
We further indicated that the “test for determining if consent is constitutional is set out in Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S .Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973).” Id .
In Schneckloth, supra, the Supreme Court held that “the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments require that a consent not be coerced, by explicit or implicit means . . .[fjor, no matter how subtly the coercion was applied, the resulting 'consent' would be no more than a pretext for the unjustified police intrusion against which the Fourth Amendment is directed ." Id. at 228, 93 S .Ct . at 2048. Whether consent is the result of express or implied coercion is a question of fact, id, at 227, 93 S.Ct. at 2048, and thus, we must defer to the trial court's finding if it is supported by substantial evidence. RCr 9.78 .
search of the residence. Thus, the underlying purpose and policies in this case differ from the purpose and policies in the Adcock case. The guiding factor here is to determine whether this particular ruse frustrated the purpose of the constitutional requirement that consent to make a warrantless entry into and search of a home must be voluntary, and thus, free of implied or express coercion .
Moreover, widespread use of this type of tactic could quickly undermine "the set of values reflecting society's deeply felt belief that the criminal law cannot be used as an instrument of unfairness." Id. at 225, 93 S.Ct. at 2046.
Lambert, C.J ., Graves, McAnulty, Minton, and Scott, J .J., concur.
I must respectfully dissent from the majority opinion because it misinterprets the clear statement of the circuit judge which found that the police were given consent to search . The order denying the motion to suppress evidence entered on July 25, 2003 clearly states that the defendants gave consent for the police to search for evidence of an assault.: Under all the circumstances, I believe that consent was given and that this judgment of conviction should be affirmed in all respects.
Roach, J ., joins this dissent.
I must respectfully dissent from the majority opinion because it misinterprets the clear statement of the circuit judge which found that the police were given consent to search . The order denying the motion to suppress evidence entered on July 25, 2003 clearly states that the defendants gave consent for the police to search for evidence of an assault.

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