Source: http://masscases.com/cases/app/17/17massappct255.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 00:35:46+00:00

Document:
Present: HALE, C.J., CUTTER, GREANEY, SMITH, & WARNER, JJ.
CIVIL ACTION commenced in the Fourth Plymouth Division of the District Court Department on February 23, 1981.
On appeal to the Superior Court, the case was ordered dismissed by Carey, J.
Robert W. MacDonald for the plaintiff.
Alan M. Spiro for the defendant.
we held that the deletion of the exclusionary sentence in G. L. c. 231, Section 103, as amended through St. 1931, c. 426, Section 112 ("This and the seven following sections shall not apply to actions under chapter two hundred and thirty nine"), by St. 1975, c. 377, Section 103, "manifested an intent by the Legislature that the provisions of G. L. c. 231, Sections 97, 103 et seq., were to apply to summary process cases just as they apply to all civil actions." Id. at 125.
In this case the plaintiff, on February 23, 1981, brought a summary process action in a District Court, pursuant to G. L. c. 239, in which it sought possession and rent in the amount of $14,850, and the defendant filed an answer. If the holding in Shea governs, the plaintiff thus waived its right to an appeal to the Superior Court for a trial de novo. G. L. c. 231, Section 103. Likewise, the defendant, not having removed to the Superior Court a case in which the amount claimed was $7,500 or more, lost is right to appeal for a trial de novo. G. L. c. 231, Section 104. See G. L. c. 231, Section 97. Judgment entered in the District Court for the plaintiff for possession and rent in the amount of $6,825. Both parties filed appeals in the Superior Court in April of 1981. Citing Shea as controlling, a Superior Court judge, on October 8, 1982, ruled that the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeals (see Shea at 129), and a judgment of dismissal was entered on October 12, 1982.
Approved on July 9, 1982, four days before our decision in Shea, St. 1982, c. 304, Section 1, effective August 8, 1982 (see art. 48 of the Amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution, The Referendum, III, Section 2; G. L. c. 4, Section 1), restored the exclusionary sentence in G. L. c. 231, Section 103. ("This section and sections one hundred and four to one hundred and ten, inclusive, shall not apply to actions or counterclaims under the provisions of chapter two hundred and thirty-nine.") Rights of appeal to the Superior Court in summary process actions begun in the District Court were thus, once again, governed by G. L. c. 231, Section 97. See Shea at 124-126. Under that statute, since the waiver and removal provisions of G. L. c. 231, Sections 103 and 104, do not apply, any party may appeal to the Superior Court for a trial de novo.
matter inadvertently omitted in the 1975 amendment. There is nothing in the 1982 amendment which manifests an intent to do so.
granting the right; and (2) Rule 1 (A) of the Interim Supplemental Rules of Appellate Procedure in Care and Protection Proceedings (1982) provided that, if there had been a timely claim of appeal, the right to a trial de novo was preserved.
In summary, we conclude that St. 1982, c. 304, Section 1, applies to the plaintiff's claim of appeal from the summary process judgment of the District Court to the Superior Court; and that, therefore, the plaintiff has the right to a trial de novo in the Superior Court. The judgment of dismissal of the plaintiff's appeal to the Superior Court is reversed, and the case is remanded to that court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
[Note 1] This case was initially heard by a panel comprised of Justices Cutter, Greaney and Warner, and was thereafter submitted on the record and briefs to Chief Justice Hale and Justice Smith (who, with Justice Greaney, comprised the panel in Shea v. Neponset River Marine & Sportfishing, Inc., 14 Mass. App. Ct. 121 ), all of whom took part in the decision of this case in accordance with Mass.R.A.P. 24(a), 365 Mass. 872 (1974).
[Note 2] We are aware of some concern resulting from our holding in Shea. See Connors & Perlin, Summary Process Case May Have Serious Consequences, 10 Mass. Law. Weekly 1315, 1348 (1982). In their briefs the parties point out alleged pitfalls encountered by parties in summary process cases who assumed the long standing procedure remained the same after the 1975 amendment, and before Shea. The most serious issues affecting those cases do not arise on this appeal, and they are, possibly, for another day.
[Note 3] See for examples of cases where statutes have been found to be remedial and have been applied retroactively: Bemis v. Clark, 11 Pick. 452 (1831) (adding remedy of abatement in nuisance cases); Mulvey v. Boston, 197 Mass. 178, 180-181 (1908) (statute of limitations); Smith v. Freedman, 268 Mass. 38, 40-42 (1929) (statute dealing with burden of proof in tort actions); Welch v. Mayor of Taunton, 343 Mass. 485, 488 (1962) (statute providing for removal of certain public officials for wrong-doing in office); Kagan v. United Vacuum Appliance Corp., 357 Mass. 680, 684 (1970) (the long-arm statute, G. L. c. 223A); Massachusetts Bd. of Regional Community Colleges v. Labor Relations Commn., 377 Mass. 847, 850 (1979) (statute permitting Labor Relations Commission to order employee reinstatement with back pay); Zildjian v. Zildjian, 8 Mass. App. Ct. 1, 8-12 (1979) (statute eliminating defense of recrimination in divorce actions). Compare for examples of cases where statutes have been found to affect substantive rights and have been applied prospectively: Paraboschi v. Shaw, 258 Mass. 531, 533-534 (1927) (statute making the Registrar of Motor Vehicles agent for service of proccess on nonresident drivers); Cudlassi v. MacFarland, 304 Mass. 612, 613 (1939) (statute changing recovery from double damages to damages); Hay v. Cloutier, 389 Mass. 248, 252-254 (1983) (statute establishing new substantive right of the parties to a division of property in a divorce proceeding); Smith v. Caggiano, 12 Mass. App. Ct. 41, 43 (1981) (statute changing certain elements of a G. L. c. 93A action).
[Note 4] Thus, in this case the doctrine is not applicable to the appeal of the defendant to the Superior Court, since the defendant did not appeal from the judgment of dismissal. This result has no practical effect, since the defendant did not counterclaim.
[Note 5] Despite the statement of the broad "workable rule" in Porter, the substantive-procedural analysis appears to have considerable vitality. See, e.g., Massachusetts Bd. of Regional Community Colleges v. Labor Relations Commn., 377 Mass. 847, 850 (1979); Hay v. Cloutier, 389 Mass. 248, 252-254 (1983); Kennedy v. Kennedy, 10 Mass. App. Ct. 113, 115-116 (1980); Smith v. Caggiano, 12 Mass. App. Ct. 41, 43 (1981).

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