Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/486/249/
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 20:30:39+00:00

Document:
was subject to harmless error analysis, and that the error was harmless in this case.
1. The use, at the capital sentencing proceeding, of Dr. Grigson's testimony on the issue of future dangerousness violated the Sixth Amendment. The Court of Criminal Appeals properly determined that there had been no compliance with the Sixth Amendment requirement, set out in Estelle v. Smith, that defense counsel be given advance notice of a psychiatric examination encompassing the issue of future dangerousness. Petitioner's right to counsel had attached at the time Dr. Grigson examined him in jail, and the record does not support the State's contention that various ex parte motions and orders contained in the court file provided defense counsel with notice that an examination encompassing the issue of petitioner's future dangerousness would take place. Moreover, even if the ex parte orders and filings were timely and were applicable to Dr. Grigson's examination, they did not adequately notify defense counsel that Dr. Grigson would examine the petitioner to assess his future dangerousness. Constructive notice to defense counsel achieved by mere placement of the State's motions and the court's ex parte orders in the court file does not satisfy the Sixth Amendment. Pp. 486 U. S. 256-258.
2. The harmless error rule set forth in Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18 -- which held that, if the prosecution can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a constitutional error did not contribute to the verdict, the error is harmless and the verdict may stand -- applies to the admission of psychiatric testimony in violation of the Sixth Amendment right set out in Estelle v. Smith. Some constitutional violations -- including Sixth Amendment violations that pervade the entire criminal proceeding -- by their very nature cast so much doubt on the fairness on the trial process that, as a matter of law, they can never be considered harmless. However, the effect of the Sixth Amendment violation in this case is limited to the admission into evidence of Dr. Grigson's testimony. It is important to avoid error in capital sentencing proceedings. Moreover, the evaluation of the consequences of an error in the sentencing phase of a capital case may be more difficult because of the discretion that is given to the sentencer. Nevertheless, a reviewing court can make an intelligent judgment about whether the erroneous admission of psychiatric testimony might have affected a capital sentencing jury. Pp. 486 U. S. 256-258.
the jury's finding of future dangerousness. However, under the Chapman harmless error test, the controlling question is whether the State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained. Upon reviewing all the evidence at the sentencing hearing, this Court finds it impossible to say beyond a reasonable doubt that Dr. Grigson's expert testimony on the issue of petitioner's future dangerousness did not influence the sentencing jury. Pp. 486 U. S. 258-260.
O'CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., and WHITE, STEVENS, and SCALIA, JJ., joined. MARSHALL, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which BRENNAN, J., joined, and in Part II of which BLACKMUN, J., joined, post, p. 486 U. S. 260. BLACKMUN, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, post, p. 486 U. S. 267. KENNEDY, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
In Estelle v. Smith, 451 U. S. 454 (1981), we recognized that defendants formally charged with capital crimes have a Sixth Amendment right to consult with counsel before submitting to psychiatric examinations designed to determine their future dangerousness. The question in this case is whether it was harmless error to introduce psychiatric testimony obtained in violation of that safeguard in a capital sentencing proceeding.
"the conduct of the defendant that caused the death [was] committed deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that the death of [the victim] would result,"
and (2) that there is "a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society." App. 33. Texas law provides that, if a jury returns affirmative findings on both special verdict questions, "the court shall sentence the defendant to death." Tex.Code Crim.Proc.Ann., Art. 37.071(e) (Vernon Supp.1988). The jury answered both questions affirmatively, and the trial court sentenced Satterwhite to death.
that a Sixth Amendment violation tainting an entire criminal proceeding can never be considered harmless, Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U. S. 475 (1978), but reasoned that a per se rule of reversal is inappropriate where, as here, the error relates only to the admission of particular evidence. 726 S.W.2d at 93, n. 5. We granted certiorari to decide whether harmless error analysis applies to violations of the Sixth Amendment right set out in Estelle v. Smith. 482 U.S. 905 (1987).
The controversy in Estelle v. Smith, supra, also centered on the expert testimony of Dr. James P. Grigson. In that case, as in this, Dr. Grigson appeared as a witness for the State in a capital sentencing proceeding and testified that the defendant was a severe sociopath who would continue to commit violent crimes in the future. He based his testimony upon a psychiatric examination of the defendant that he had conducted pursuant to court order. The problem in the case was that defense counsel were not given advance notice that Dr. Grigson's psychiatric examination, encompassing the issue of their client's future dangerousness, would take place. We recognized that, for a defendant charged with a capital crime, the decision whether to submit to a psychiatric examination designed to determine his future dangerousness is "literally a life or death matter'" which the defendant should not be required to face without "`the guiding hand of counsel.'" 451 U.S. at 451 U. S. 471, quoting Smith v. Estelle, 602 F.2d 694, 708 (CA5 1979), and Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45, 287 U. S. 69 (1932). We held that defense counsel must be given advance notice of such an examination.
testimony at the capital sentencing proceeding on the issue of future dangerousness violated the Sixth Amendment.
"'promotes public respect for the criminal process by focusing on the underlying fairness of the trial, rather than on the virtually inevitable presence of immaterial error.'"
Rose v. Clark, 478 U. S. 570, 478 U. S. 577 (1986) (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U. S. 673, 475 U. S. 681 (1986)).
joint representation of conflicting interests the evil -- it bears repeating -- is in what the advocate finds himself compelled to refrain from doing, not only at trial but also as to possible pretrial plea negotiations and in the sentencing process. . . . Thus, any inquiry into a claim of harmless error here would require, unlike most cases, unguided speculation."
435 U.S. at 435 U. S. 490-491 (citations omitted).
"when a defendant is deprived of the presence and assistance of his attorney, either throughout the prosecution or during a critical stage in, at least, the prosecution of a capital offense, reversal is automatic. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 (1963); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U. S. 52 (1961); White v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 59 (1963)."
error analysis applies to the admission of identification testimony obtained in violation of the right to counsel at a post-indictment lineup. Moore v. Illinois, 434 U. S. 220 (1977); Gilbert v. California, 388 U. S. 263 (1967) (capital case); United States v. Wade, 388 U. S. 218 (1967). Just last year we indicated that harmless error analysis would apply in a noncapital case to constitutional error in the use of a psychological evaluation at trial. Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U. S. 402, 483 U. S. 425, n. 21 (1987).
It is important to avoid error in capital sentencing proceedings. Moreover, the evaluation of the consequences of an error in the sentencing phase of a capital case may be more difficult because of the discretion that is given to the sentencer. Nevertheless, we believe that a reviewing court can make an intelligent judgment about whether the erroneous admission of psychiatric testimony might have affected a capital sentencing jury. Accordingly, we hold that the Chapman harmless error rule applies to the admission of psychiatric testimony in violation of the Sixth Amendment right set out in Estelle v. Smith.
"there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society."
"the properly admitted evidence was such that the minds of an average jury would have found the State's case [on future dangerousness] sufficient . . . even if Dr. Grigson's testimony had not been admitted."
not contribute to the verdict obtained." Chapman, 386 U.S. at 386 U. S. 24.
The evidence introduced at sentencing showed that, in addition to his conviction in this case, Satterwhite had four prior convictions of crimes ranging from aggravated assault to armed robbery. Eight police officers testified that Satterwhite's reputation for being a peaceful and law-abiding citizen was bad, and Satterwhite's mother's former husband testified that Satterwhite once shot him during an argument. The State also introduced the testimony of Bexar County psychologist Betty Lou Schroeder. [Footnote 3] Dr. Schroeder testified that she found Satterwhite to be a "cunning individual" and a "user of people," with an inability to feel empathy or guilt. She testified that, in her opinion, Satterwhite would be a continuing threat to society through acts of criminal violence. App. 55-56.
opinion of all: he told the jury that Satterwhite was beyond the reach of psychiatric rehabilitation. Id. at 72-73.
"Doctor James Grigson, Dallas psychiatrist and medical doctor. And he tells you that, on a range from 1 to 10, he's ten plus. Severe sociopath. Extremely dangerous. A continuing threat to our society. Can it be cured? Well, it's not a disease. It's not an illness. That's his personality. That's John T. Satterwhite."
The finding of future dangerousness was critical to the death sentence. Dr. Grigson was the only psychiatrist to testify on this issue, and the prosecution placed significant weight on his powerful and unequivocal testimony. Having reviewed the evidence in this case, we find it impossible to say beyond a reasonable doubt that Dr. Grigson's expert testimony on the issue of Satterwhite's future dangerousness did not influence the sentencing jury. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals insofar as it affirms the death sentence, and we remand the case for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
The Assistant Attorney General represented at oral argument that the trial court's order was stamped with the Clerk's stamp showing that it was filed on April 18. Tr. of Oral Arg. 22. The copy of the April 18 order contained in the record before us, however, contains no such stamp. 1 Record 23. Defense counsel informs us that, although he examined the court file twice, he did not discover the April 18 order until mid-May. Tr. of Oral Arg. 7.
The State points to the following documents in the record: (1) the State's March 16 motion for a psychological examination, App. 3-4; (2) the court's March 16 order granting that motion and appointing Dr. Betty Lou Schroeder to examine Satterwhite, id. at 5; (3) the State's April 17 motion for a psychiatric examination to be conducted by Drs. Holbrook and Schroeder, id. at 12-13; and (4) the court's April 18 order granting that motion, id. at 14.
Satterwhite now contends that Dr. Schroeder's testimony was also admitted in violation of Estelle v. Smith, 451 U. S. 454 (1981). The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals explicitly noted that this claim was not raised at trial or on appeal, and we decline to consider it.
JUSTICE MARSHALL, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN joins and with whom JUSTICE BLACKMUN joins as to Part II, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
(1981), and that petitioner's death sentence should be vacated. I write separately because I believe the Court errs in applying harmless error analysis to this Sixth Amendment violation. It is my view that the unique nature of a capital sentencing determination should cause this Court to be especially hesitant ever to sanction harmless error review of constitutional errors that taint capital sentencing proceedings, and even if certain constitutional errors might properly be subject to such harmless error analysis, a violation of Estelle v. Smith is not such an error.
Until today's ruling, this Court never had applied harmless error analysis to constitutional violations that taint the sentencing phase of a capital trial. In deciding to apply harmless error analysis to the Sixth Amendment violation in this case, I believe the Court fails to adequately consider the unique nature of a capital sentencing proceeding and a sentencer's decision whether a defendant should live or die. The Court's analysis is also flawed in that it fails to accord any noticeable weight to the qualitative difference of death from all other punishments.
Unlike the determination of guilt or innocence, which turns largely on an evaluation of objective facts, the question whether death is the appropriate sentence requires a profoundly moral evaluation of the defendant's character and crime. See California v. Brown, 479 U. S. 538, 479 U. S. 545 (1987) (O'CONNOR, J., concurring) (a death sentence should "reflect a reasoned moral response to the defendant's background, character, and crime"); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U. S. 782, 458 U. S. 801 (1982) (capital defendant's "punishment must be tailored to his personal responsibility and moral guilt"). Moreover, although much of the Court's capital jurisprudence since Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238 (1972), has been focused on guiding and channeling the decision whether death is the appropriate sentence in a specific case, the sentencer nonetheless is afforded substantial discretion. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U. S. 279, 481 U. S. 304-306 (1987); Woodson v.
North Carolina, 428 U. S. 280 (1976). Even in the face of overwhelming aggravating evidence, the sentencer has discretion to act with leniency and refuse to impose the death sentence. See McCleskey, supra, at 481 U. S. 311 ("[D]iscretionary exercises of leniency [by the sentencer] are final and unreviewable").
"[i]ndividual jurors bring to their deliberations 'qualities of human nature and varieties of human experience, the range of which is unknown and perhaps unknowable,'"
and their collective judgment of the appropriate sentence is marked by an "inherent lack of predictability." Id. at 481 U. S. 311, quoting Peters v. Kiff, 407 U. S. 493, 407 U. S. 503 (1972) (opinion of MARSHALL, J.). The threat of an erroneous harmless error determination thus looms much larger in the capital sentencing context than elsewhere.
"capital proceedings be policed at all stages by an especially vigilant concern for procedural fairness and for the accuracy of factfinding."
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 466 U. S. 704 (1984) (BRENNAN, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see California v. Ramos, 463 U. S. 992, 463 U. S. 998-999 (1983) ("[T]he qualitative difference of death from all other punishments requires a correspondingly greater degree of scrutiny of the capital sentencing determination"). Because of this heightened concern for reliability, "[t]ime and again the Court has condemned procedures in capital cases that might be completely acceptable in an ordinary case." Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U. S. 880, 463 U. S. 913 (1983) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). Harmless error analysis impinges directly on the reliability of the capital sentencing decision by allowing a court to substitute its judgment of what the sentencer would have done in the absence of constitutional error for an actual judgment of the sentencer untainted by constitutional error.
I therefore have serious doubts whether a constitutional error that infects the sentencing phase of a capital case ever may be considered harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. But even if I could agree that harmless error analysis is appropriate for certain constitutional errors at the sentencing phase, such a situation is not presented when the error is a violation of the Sixth Amendment under Estelle v. Smith.
in Smith is understandable, because the factors on which this Court traditionally has focused to determine whether harmless error review is appropriate make clear that an Estelle v. Smith violation that taints a capital sentencing proceeding should lead to automatic reversal. First, the potential for actual prejudice resulting from such a violation of Smith is so high that a "case-by-case inquiry into prejudice is not worth the cost." Strickland v. Washington, supra, at 466 U. S. 692. As evidenced in this case, psychiatric testimony is generally of critical importance to the sentencing determination, covering issues of rehabilitative potential, future dangerousness, and individual culpability. [Footnote 2/1] Moreover, psychiatric testimony on these issues is clothed with a scientific authority that often carries great weight with lay juries. Cf. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U. S. 68, 470 U. S. 79 (1985) (recognizing "pivotal role" psychiatry has come to play in criminal proceedings).
"'The right to have the assistance of counsel is too fundamental and absolute to allow courts to indulge in nice calculations as to the amount of prejudice arising from its denial.' . . . Accordingly, when a defendant is deprived of the presence and assistance of his attorney, either throughout the prosecution or during a critical stage in, at least, the prosecution of a capital offense, reversal is automatic."
"the decision to be made regarding the proposed psychiatric evaluation is 'literally a life or death matter' and is 'difficult . . . even for an attorney' because it requires 'a knowledge of what other evidence is available, of the particular psychiatrist's biases and predilections, [and] of possible alternative strategies at the sentencing hearing.'"
Id. at 451 U. S. 471, quoting Smith v. Estelle, 602 F.2d 694, 708 (CA5 1979).
"that a reviewing court can make an intelligent judgment about whether the erroneous admission of psychiatric testimony might have affected a capital sentencing jury."
Ante at 486 U. S. 258. I do not possess the same confidence in an appellate court's ability to divine the prejudice arising from such a significant error in a capital sentencing proceeding. In my view, the speculation engendered by harmless error review of a violation of Estelle v. Smith in the context of a capital sentencing proceeding presents an intolerable danger that the death sentence will be administered erroneously. Accordingly, I do not join in that aspect of the Court's opinion sanctioning harmless error analysis for violations of Estelle v. Smith.
The likelihood of actual prejudice arising from the illegal admission of psychiatric testimony is even greater in the context of this case. The Texas capital sentencing statute provides that, in the absence of evidence of provocation by the victim, the court "shall sentence the defendant to death" if the jury finds that the murder was "committed deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that the death of the deceased . . . would result," and that "there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society." Tex.Code Crim.Proc.Ann., Art. 37.071 (Vernon Supp.1988). The psychiatrist's evaluation of future dangerousness thus purports to answer one of two questions posed by the statute.
It is also important to note that a violation of petitioner's Sixth Amendment right to counsel under Estelle v. Smith is easy to identify and, "for that reason and because the prosecution is directly responsible, easy for the government to prevent." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 466 U. S. 692 (1984). Because the error is in the control of the State and is easy to prevent, holding that such a violation will result in automatic reversal does not pose a significant burden on the State.
Moreover, in the present case, the Court is unable to cite a single capital case since our decision in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238 (1972), in which we have ignored Holloway's reasoning and have applied harmless error analysis to a Sixth Amendment violation occurring during a critical stage of the proceedings. The Court cites dicta in Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U. S. 402, 483 U. S. 425, n. 21 (1987), as an indication of the Court's willingness to apply harmless error analysis to the admission of psychological testimony in violation of Estelle v. Smith, 451 U. S. 454 (1981). But the petitioner in Buchanan was not prosecuted for a capital offense, and thus the Court's indication in that case that harmless error analysis might apply to the illegal admission of psychological testimony has little relevance in the present context.
answer. I am fortified in this conclusion by my continuing concern -- wholly apart from the testimony of the ubiquitous Doctor Grigson in Texas capital cases -- about the reliability of psychiatric testimony as to a defendant's future dangerousness (wrong two times out of three). See Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U. S. 880, 463 U. S. 916 (1983) (dissenting opinion).

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 Art. 37
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.

 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 Art. 37
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.