Source: http://www.gerryarmstrong.org/50k/legal/a7/3916.php
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 20:25:46+00:00

Document:
Defendant Gerry Armstrong (“Armstrong”) respectfully submits that the opposition (“Opposition”) filed by Plaintiff Church of Scientology International (“Scientology”) provides no credible reason to deny Armstrong’s motion to set an evidentiary hearing pursuant to California Civil Code Section 1670.5(b) as to the commercial setting, purpose and effect of the contract Scientology seeks to enforce against Armstrong in this case to determine the unconscionability of certain of the contract’s clauses. This Court has already granted Scientology’s motion to reinstate jail sentences against Armstrong and to issue a warrant for his arrest; and he restates here his motion to this Court to stay the warrant and any other actions by Scientology against him until after such an evidentiary hearing has been held and this Court has made such a determination.
Armstrong identified in his motion the statute that provides the specific remedy in exactly this matter or kind of matter, C.C.C. § 1670.5 (b).
When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any clause thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose, and effect to aid the court in making the determination.
Although Scientology terribly misstates what Armstrong is saying or claiming in his motion, and although Scientology does not acknowledge that Armstrong is claiming to this Court that certain clauses in the contract are unconscionable, Scientology does not show that Armstrong did not make the claim, or even deny that he made it. (Opposition, 1:1-5:4) On this basis alone, this Court should grant Armstrong’s motion.
In its opposition, while not addressing Armstrong’s claim that certain of its contract’s clauses are unconscionable, and that consequently he is to be afforded the reasonable evidentiary opportunity C.C.C. § 1670.5 (b) provides, Scientology addresses this Court’s findings respecting unconscionability, which have the same consequence, only to the extent of denying that these findings were ever made. Scientology does not show or claim that, if this Court had made the findings it made as Armstrong states, the remedy C.C.C. § 1670.5 (b) provides is not the proper remedy. Since this Court did make the findings with respect to unconscionability that Armstrong identifies in his motion, the proper remedy is the one provided by C.C.C. § 1670.5 (b).
remedy but Scientology’s remedy as well.
Even if Armstrong retained the ability to address the merits, the central assertion of his Opposition (sic) is simply false. Armstrong claims that this Court found some aspect of the settlement agreement to be unconscionable, thus giving him, he asserts, the ability to re-argue the propriety of the settlement agreement. The Court made no such finding. (Opposition 4:13-16.
Armstrong is not asserting that this Court’s findings of unconscionability or the appearance of unconscionability give him “the ability to re-argue the propriety of the settlement agreement.” He is asserting that this Court’s findings, just as his own claims to this Court do, give him the right to be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to the contract’s commercial setting, purpose and effect to aid this Court in making the determination as to certain clauses’ unconscionability.
Armstrong asserts moreover that this reasonable opportunity should be in the form of an evidentiary hearing on those three evidentiary areas for the purpose of identifying procedural and substantive unconscionability. It very well may be that after such a hearing this Court determines certain clauses to be improper, but Armstrong is not now arguing or re-arguing their impropriety. Armstrong has simply moved for an evidentiary hearing to aid the court in making the determination as to those certain clauses’ unconscionability.
Scientology is engaging in a ridiculous straw man argument, completely misrepresenting Armstrong’s position. With respect to liquidated damages, what this Court found to be unconscionable was the clause that permitted Scientology to punish Armstrong limitlessly and forever. This Court acted, as directed by C.C.C. § 1670.5 (a) to limit the application of that unconscionable clause as to avoid the obvious unconscionable result. If the contractual clause that permits Scientology to punish Armstrong with liquidated damages without limit is not and was never an actual contractual clause, as Scientology is now implying, then Scientology is acknowledging, essentially, colossal malicious prosecution in filing this case and the earlier cases for millions of dollars in liquidated damages, and gargantuan abuse of process in pursuing those millions and threatening Armstrong with them up to the Court of Appeal.
now take the position that this clause does not exist. As Scientology itself observes, quoting from In re Marriage of Balcof (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1509,47 Cal.Rptr.3d 183, Joyce v. Simi Valley Unified School District (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 292,304,1 Cal.Rptr.3d 712, 721-722 ("Litigants are not free to continually reinvent their position on legal issues that have been resolved against them by an appellate court.") Scientology voluntarily dismissed its appeal from this Court’s 2004 judgment that found that the clause, which exists, and which permitted Scientology to punish Armstrong without end with limitless liquidated damages, is unconscionable.
It is not necessary, or even rational that a trial court must find the complete subject contract in a case unconscionable before affording the parties the reasonable opportunity C.C.C. § 1670.5 (b) mandates. Scientology is riding a cart-before-the horse argument. All that C.C.C. § 1670.5 (b) requires is that it be claimed or appear to the court that any clause in the contract may be unconscionable, and the parties shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose, and effect.
It also appeared that this Court also found that the clauses that prohibit Armstrong from uttering his religious experiences, knowledge or beliefs about the Scientology religion and the Scientology religious class beneficiaries while permitting Scientology and the beneficiaries to say anything horrible they want about Armstrong, and the clauses that permit Scientology to have Armstrong jailed and fined for uttering such utterances while Scientology and the beneficiaries may attack and pursue Armstrong, his loved ones, associates, friends, religious class and fellow wogs or human beings in order to goad him to make such utterances, may also be unconscionable.
This Court already acted, both at trial on April 9, 2004, and in its order re sentences of May 20, 2004, to limit the application of those clauses as to avoid unconscionable results. That the Court of Appeal reinstated the sentences against Armstrong is, in his motion for an evidentiary hearing pursuant to C.C.C. § 1670.5 (b), and in his right to be afforded a reasonable opportunity for such a hearing, irrelevant, except as that reinstatement of sentences is another unconscionable result or effect of application of the contract’s unconscionable clauses.
One of the remedies that Armstrong has under law is the remedy provided by C.C.C. § 1670.5 (b), which he has moved this Court to afford him.
8. Para. 10, the clause prohibiting Armstrong from assisting or advising individuals, partnerships, associations, corporations, or governmental agencies contemplating any claim or engaged in litigation or involved in or contemplating any activity adverse to Scientology or the beneficiaries.
Scientology and the beneficiaries say about Armstrong, or his loved ones, friends, associates, class and fellows, and threaten and punish him if he responds to defend himself or Scientology’s other wog or human targets, the more unconscionable the clause that permits such sociopathic unfairness becomes. The unconscionable clauses in Scientology’s contract act, unconscionably, as an incentive to the people who run Scientology to do ever more unconscionableness.
you’ll be responsible – and legally unenforceable – “it’s not worth the paper it’s printed on.” Given this Court’s unconscionability finding, it may be possible now to understand why there was no negotiation, and why Armstrong yet signed Scientology’s contract. His own attorney Michael J. Flynn, who was also his employer and friend, told him what he already knew upon reading the contract: that the clauses Armstrong has identified above as unconscionable were exactly that, unconscionable. Mr. Flynn used the word “unenforceable” to describe these clauses, but Armstrong understood that it was their conscience-shocking impossibility, oppression, unreasonableness, unfairness, inhumanity and indeed obscenity, that made them unenforceable. Armstrong’s conscience was shocked when he read Scientology’s contract, which to add to the shock was sprung on him by surprise, and his conscience has continued to be shocked by the contract and Scientology’s unconscionable threats and efforts to enforce it every day since. For Armstrong there was no meaningful choice.
para. 1) The commercial setting includes the joint settlement of the cases or claims of some twenty clients of Mr. Flynn, who was, like Armstrong, a major Scientology target, and who had his own cases and claims against Scientology, and overarching conflicts of interest.
The matter of the unconscionability of Scientology’s contract has never been adjudicated. Scientology is asking this Court to censure Armstrong for Scientology’s own straw frivolousness. Scientology points to no such adjudication, and none exists. Scientology’s assertion that Armstrong is trying to re-litigate this matter is false. Whatever litigation or adjudication has occurred in this case over the years, it was not the opportunity for Armstrong to be heard that C.C.C. § 1670.5 affords him and the adjudication of unconscionability or not after such hearing.
The remedy is eminently fair. Scientology also gets to present evidence as to the contract’s commercial setting, purpose and effect to aid this Court in making the determination, which Scientology suggests it already possesses but does not, that the clauses Armstrong claims are unconscionable are not unconscionable. There has been no such determination as the result of the kind of judicial testing and analysis that the cases on unconscionability cited above show is expected in California courts.
Armstrong has not only not repeatedly lost on the merits of the issue he raises, to wit, the unconscionability of the eight clauses identified above, Armstrong has never lost on the merits of the issue. The only way he can lose on the merits of the issue is if he is afforded the opportunity to be heard that C.C.C. § 1670.5 affords him and this Court determines after such a [fair] hearing that those clauses are not unconscionable. The law of the case now includes the judgment that Scientology’s limitless liquidated damages clause is unconscionable. That judgment merits a full and fair hearing on the contract’s commercial setting, purpose and effect to determine any other clauses’ unconscionability. That hearing has never occurred; and res judicata cannot lawfully be employed to stop it from occurring.
Scientology points to Armstrong’s effort over many years to put before one court or another the evidence of substantive and procedural unconscionability that would shock their consciences. He achieved that, essentially, in 1991 in Los Angeles Superior Court with Judge Geernaert.
I'll say one of the most ambiguous, one-sided agreements that I have ever read. And I would have not ordered the enforcement of hardly any of the terms if I had been asked to, even on the threat that okay, the case is not settled. [¶] I know we like to settle cases. But we don't like to settle cases and, in effect, prostrate the court system into making an order which is not fair or in the public interest.GA Dec, Ex. L.
Scientology simply commenced a new action to enforce its unconscionable clauses in Marin County, where Judge Thomas’ conscience was for whatever reason not shocked. Armstrong contends that, tragically, Judge Thomas, moreover, acted improperly to facilitate the unconscionable results Scientology sought.1 Scientology quotes from Armstrong’s Answer dated July 21, 1992 (Opposition Ex. A.), in which Armstrong pled unconscionability as an affirmative defense, to support the assertion that all the central issues regarding enforceability of the contract had been litigated and adjudicated. (Opposition 2:18-22) It is true that unconscionability was in issue, but it was not in fact or truth decided. Therefore, res judicata effect must not be given to this matter to prevent Armstrong from being afforded the reasonable [and fair] opportunity C.C.C. § 1670.5 (b) mandates so that he can have it decided.
Opposition Ex. E, p.6) The Court of Appeal did not say that this Court, unique among all the other Courts of California, is barred from policing its cases for unconscionable contracts, or, contracts’ unconscionable clauses, or barred from having its conscience shocked.
This Court has now done what the Court of Appeal directed in its October 19, 2005 order. Additionally, this Court has granted Scientology’s motion to issue a new bench warrant for Armstrong's arrest. This Court can now, in the interest of justice, stay the warrant and be in full compliance with the Court of Appeal’s order. At trial in April 2004, this Court stayed the warrants, which issued from the same sentences that have now been reinstated, until a hearing on their validity occurred, and Scientology’s attorney agreed. It is now no less proper and just to stay the new warrant.
hearing at the end of this case.
hearing date on the validity of them and the sentencing on the third contempt.
The Court of Appeal did not say that this Court is barred from staying any proceedings or actions before it if not staying them would yield a potentially unconscionable result, as it would here, or for any other reason. The evidentiary hearing that Armstrong seeks is not specifically a hearing on the validity of the contempt orders, although potentially these orders could be invalidated if the clauses from which they result are found to be unconscionable, and unenforceable, after such evidentiary hearing.
There has been no ruling on the issues of procedural unconscionability, substantive unconscionability, the commercial setting between the parties in December 1986, what really was the contract’s purpose, and what has been its effect. Because this never happened, because there has been no fair trial or hearing, there are twenty years of effect, much of it, Armstrong contends, unconscionable, on which evidence can be presented. If Scientology were really not trying to achieve the unconscionable it would welcome an evidentiary hearing that would get to the truth in what Armstrong is claiming.
Scientology has not shown any lawful reason to deny Armstrong’s motion to set an evidentiary hearing pursuant to C.C.C. § 1670.5(b) and to stay the warrant for his arrest until after such an evidentiary hearing, and his motion should be granted.
Executed on September 27, 2007 at Chilliwack, B.C., Canada.

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