Source: https://www.animallaw.info/case/volosen-v-state-0
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 06:27:45+00:00

Document:
The State prosecuted appellant for cruelty to animals on the ground that he killed the dog without legal authority.FN1 The case was tried to the bench. At trial, appellant contended that Health and Safety Code § 822.033 provided him with legal authority because the dog was attacking his chickens. FN2 The State responded that § 822.033 applied only to civil lawsuits, FN3 but that, even if the statute did apply to criminal prosecutions, the dog did not engage in an “attack.” The trial judge found appellant guilty and placed him on probation.
Because the State prevailed at trial, it was not required to raise any allegations before the court of appeals. The Rules of Appellate Procedure require an appellant to file a brief but impose no such requirement on an appellee.FN5 Regardless of whether an appellee files a brief, a first-level appellate court has the obligation to conduct a thorough review of an appellant's claims, including any subsidiary issues that might result in upholding the trial court's judgment. An appellee's failure to make a particular argument is a factor that may be considered when this Court decides whether to exercise its discretion to grant review, but it does not bar this Court from granting review to address the issue if the Court, in its discretion, decides that review is warranted. We turn, then, to the merits.
Appellant contends that § 822.033 applied statewide, despite its presence in a subchapter of limited applicability. In support of this proposition, he cites the fact that the provision was renumbered in 2003 as § 822.013, taking the provision out of subchapter C and making it a law of general applicability.FN8 But in interpreting a prior law, we generally accord little weight to subsequent legislative enactments.FN9 The Legislature's amendment cannot negate the import of the unambiguous language of the applicability statute, § 822.021.
The next question, then, is whether Chapter 822C applied to Tarrant County or to the City of Colleyville. The trial record, of course, contains no information in this regard.FN10 Where a matter is appropriately subject to judicial notice, an appellate court can take judicial notice for the first time on appeal.FN11 A matter of law would seem to be an especially appropriate subject of judicial notice by an appellate court, but county and municipal laws pose some unique challenges.
As of 1995, then, Tarrant County had not adopted Chapter 822C. But we have no information (aside from the State's proffered affidavit) that definitively shows whether it was ever adopted in a subsequent election. We cannot determine the content of local law with sufficient certainty to take judicial notice of whether or not former § 822.033 applied to the location in which the incident occurred.
The final question presented is which party bears the burden to demonstrate the content of local law and thus suffers if the content of local law cannot be ascertained. The answer in this instance is that the defendant bears this burden. Although “without legal authority” constitutes an element of the offense of cruelty to animals,FN18 the State provided prima facie support for that element when it proved that the dog was owned by someone other than appellant. Appellant wishes to rely upon an entirely different statute to supply legal authority for his conduct. In doing so, he has essentially invoked a defense, upon which he has the burden of production.FN19 Indeed a very similar, but more restrictive, provision is codified as a “defense” in the same Penal Code section as the cruelty to animals offense.FN20 Because § 822.033 was contained within a subchapter of limited applicability, a defense based upon that provision necessarily includes as one of its elements the statute's applicability.
FN1. “A person commits an offense if the person intentionally or knowingly ... kills, seriously injures, or administers poison to an animal, other than cattle, horses, sheep, swine, or goats, belonging to another without legal authority or the owner's effective consent.” TEX. PEN.CODE § 42.09(a)(5).
FN2. “A dog that is attacking, is about to attack, or has recently attacked sheep, goats, calves, or other domestic animals or fowls may be killed by any person witnessing or having knowledge of the attack.” TEX. HEALTH & SAF.CODE § 822.033(a).
FN3. See TEX. HEALTH & SAF.CODE § 822.033(b)(“A person who kills a dog as provided by this section is not liable for damages to the owner of the dog.”).
FN4. Volosen v. State, 192 S.W.3d 597, 602-604 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2006).
FN5. See TEX.R.APP. P. 38.8.
FN6. Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782, 785 (Tex.Crim.App.1991).
FN8. Acts 2003, 78th Leg., ch. 1002, § 1.
FN9. Ex parte Schroeter, 958 S.W.2d 811, 813 (Tex.Crim.App.1997).
FN10. With its petition, the State submitted an affidavit from a county official stating that the subchapter was never adopted in Tarrant County. Because of our disposition, below, we need not address the propriety of considering an affidavit submitted at this stage of the proceedings.
FN11. Emerson v. State, 880 S.W.2d 759, 765 (Tex.Crim.App.1994); Robinson v. State, 783 S.W.2d 648, 653 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1989), aff'd and opinion adopted, 841 S.W.2d 392 (Tex.Crim.App.1992).
FN12. Lange v. State, 639 S.W.2d 304, 306 (Tex.Crim.App.1982).
FN13. Id. (quoting Karchmer v. State, 61 Tex.Crim. 221, 221, 134 S.W. 700, 700 (1911)).
FN16. Acts 1995, 74th Leg., Ch. 489.
FN17. Senate/House Committee Reports, S.B. 1437 (April 6 and May 9, 1995).
FN18. TEX. PEN.CODE § 42.09(a)(5)(“A person commits an offense if the person intentionally or knowingly ... kills, seriously injures, or administers poison to an animal, other than cattle, horses, sheep, swine, or goats, belonging to another without legal authority or the owner's effective consent.”).
FN19. See Zuliani v. State, 97 S.W.3d 589, 594 (Tex.Crim.App.2003)(explaining that the defendant bears the burden of production with respect to a defense while the State bears the burden of persuasion).
FN20. It is a defense to prosecution under Subsection (a)(5) that the animal was discovered on the person's property in the act of or immediately after injuring or killing the person's goats, sheep, cattle, horses, swine, or poultry and that the person killed or injured the animal at the time of this discovery. TEX. PEN.CODE § 42.09(e).
FN21. Indeed, appellant has provided no such information on discretionary review, after the State brought the issue to this Court's (and appellant's) attention.
FN22. We also keep in mind that appellant lost in the trial court, so he does not gain the benefit of any implied findings that might support the trial court's judgment. See State v. Kelly, 204 S.W.3d 808, 818-819 (Tex.Crim.App.2006). We need not decide today whether an appellate court could imply, from a silent record, findings with respect to local law in the prevailing party's favor.

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