Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/353/657/
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 08:48:02+00:00

Document:
Petitioner was convicted in a Federal District Court of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1001 by filing, under § 9(h) of the National Labor Relations Act, as president of a labor union, an affidavit stating falsely that he was not a member of the Communist Party or affiliated with such Party. Crucial testimony against him was given by two paid undercover agents for the FBI, who stated on cross-examination that they had made regular oral or written reports to the FBI on the matters about which they had testified. Petitioner moved for the production of these reports in court for inspection by the judge with a view to their possible use by petitioner in impeaching such testimony. His motions were denied.
Held: denial of the motions was erroneous, and the conviction is reversed. Pp. 353 U. S. 658-672.
(a) Petitioner was not required to lay a preliminary foundation for his motion, showing inconsistency between the contents of the reports and the testimony of the government agents, because a sufficient foundation was established by their testimony that their reports were of the events and activities related in their testimony. Gordon v. United States, 344 U. S. 414, distinguished. Pp. 353 U. S. 666-668.
(b) Petitioner was entitled to an order directing the Government to produce for inspection all written reports of the FBI agents in its possession, and, when orally made, as recorded by the FBI, touching the events and activities as to which they testified at the trial. P. 353 U. S. 668.
(c) Petitioner is entitled to inspect the reports to decide whether to use them in his defense. Pp. 353 U. S. 668-669.
(d) The practice of producing government documents to the trial judge for his determination of relevancy and materiality, without hearing the accused, is disapproved. P. 353 U. S. 669.
(e) Only after inspection of the reports by the accused must the trial judge determine admissibility of the contents and the method to be employed for the elimination of parts immaterial or irrelevant. P. 353 U. S. 669.
(f) Criminal action must be dismissed when the Government, on the ground of privilege, elects not to comply with an order to produce, for the accused's inspection and for admission in evidence, relevant statements or reports in its possession of government witnesses touching the subject matter of their testimony at the trial. Pp. 353 U. S. 669-672.
(g) The burden is the Government's, not to be shifted to the trial judge, to decide whether the public prejudice of allowing the crime to go unpunished is greater than that attendant upon the possible disclosure of state secrets and other confidential information in the Government's possession. P. 353 U. S. 672.
226 F.2d 540, 553, reversed.
"occupying strategic and important positions in labor unions and other organizations where public knowledge of their membership to non-Communists would jeopardize their position in the organization."
Accordingly, the Government did not attempt to prove the petitioner's alleged membership in the Communist Party on April 28, 1950, with any direct admissions by the petitioner of membership, by proof of his compliance with Party membership requirements, or that his name appeared upon a membership roster, or that he carried a membership card.
The evidence relied upon by the Government was entirely circumstantial. It consisted of testimony of conduct of the petitioner from early 1946 through October 15, 1949, and of Matusow's testimony concerning alleged conversations between him and the petitioner at a vacation ranch in July or August, 1950, and concerning a lecture delivered by the petitioner at the ranch. The Government also attached probative weight to the action of the petitioner in executing and filing an Affidavit of Non-Communist Union Officer on October 15, 1949, because of the events surrounding the filing of that affidavit. The Government bridged the gap between October 15, 1949, and July or August, 1950, with the testimony of Ford that, during that period, the Party took no disciplinary action against the petitioner for defection or deviation, and did not replace the petitioner in the Party office which Ford testified the petitioner held as a member of the Party State Board.
into several veterans' organizations and not all join the same one, the better to further Party work.
Later in 1946, the petitioner was employed by the International Union of Mine, Mill & Smelter Workers as business agent for several local unions in the Silver City-Bayard, New Mexico, area. It was testified that one of the petitioner's first acts was to meet with the International Union's then Regional Director for the Southwest, a Communist Party member, and with the Communist Party organizer for the area, to develop plans for organizing a Party group within each of those locals, which later merged to form Amalgamated Local 890 under the petitioner's presidency.
J. W. Ford was a member of the Communist Party of New Mexico from 1946 to September 1950, and, from 1948, was a member of the State Board and a Party security officer. He said that, in 1948, he became a paid undercover agent for the FBI, [Footnote 7] and reported regularly upon Party activities and meetings. He testified that the petitioner was also a Party and a State Board member, and he related in detail occurrences at five closed Party meetings which he said the petitioner attended.
was completed, and the petitioner was appointed to the State Board and the Party leader in the southern half of the State. At the fourth meeting, in May, 1949, Ford said that the petitioner gave a progress report upon his success in recruiting Party members among labor groups, and offered to use Local 890's newspaper, "The Union Worker," which he edited, to support issues of Party interest. At the fifth meeting, in August, 1949, Ford said that preparations were made for another meeting later in that month of the Mexican-American Association in Albuquerque, and that the delegates, including the petitioner, were instructed to give vigorous support to the meeting, but to take care not to make themselves conspicuous in the proceedings.
"any particular defections from the Communist philosophy or any peculiar actions, statements or associations, which would endanger the security of the Communist Party of the state."
"would be called in and would be either severely reprimanded or criticized, or disciplined. If he refused to accept such discipline, he would either be suspended or expelled."
Ford testified that, between August, 1949, and September, 1950, when Ford ceased his activities with the New Mexico Party, there was no disciplinary action taken against the petitioner, and, to his knowledge, the petitioner was not replaced in his position on the State Board of the Communist Party.
months before, in May or June, 1948, a meeting of Party members holding offices in locals of the International Union of Mine, Mill & Smelter Workers was held in Denver to formulate plans for combatting a movement, led by non-Communists, to secede from the International Union. He said that the Party members, including the petitioner, were informed of Party policy not to sign affidavits required by § 9(h) of the then recently enacted Taft-Hartley Act. There was no testimony that that policy changed before October 15, 1949.
"right-wing unions . . . gobbling up chunks of militant unions. . . . Our International Union and its officers have swallowed a lot of guff, a lot of insults. But that is not the point. . . . Now that our Union has signed the phony affidavits, we can defend ourselves . . . in case of raids. We do not fear attack from that quarter any longer."
the petitioner applauded the idea and told him, "we can use you out here, we need more active Party members." On one of these occasions, Matusow said, the petitioner asked him for suggestions for a lecture the petitioner was preparing for delivery at the ranch, particularly as to what the New York Communists were doing about the Stockholm Peace Appeal. Matusow described to the petitioner a "do-day" program adopted in New York when the Party members were doers, not talkers, and performed some activity, such as painting signs around a baseball stadium urging support for the Peace Appeal. He testified that the petitioner showed great interest in the idea, and said he might bring it back to his fellow Party members in Silver City.
Matusow testified that the petitioner delivered his planned lecture, informed his audience of the "do-day" idea, praised the Soviet Union's disarmament plan, referred to the United States as the aggressor in Korea, and urged all to read the "Daily People's World," identified by Matusow as the "West Coast Communist Party newspaper." Another witness, an expelled member of Amalgamated Local 890, testified that petitioner, during 1950, 1951, and 1952, repeatedly urged at union meetings that the union members read that paper.
"sometimes once a week, sometimes once a month, and at various other times; maybe three or four times a week, depending on the number of meetings . . . [he] attended and the distance between the meetings."
He said that his reports were made immediately following each meeting, while the events were still fresh in his memory. He could not recall, however, which reports were oral and which in writing.
"for an order directing an inspection of reports of the witness Ford to the Federal Bureau of Investigation dealing with each of the meetings which he said that he attended with the defendant Jencks in the years 1948 and 1949."
The trial judge, without stating reasons, denied the motion.
heard at the . . . Ranch during the period that he was a guest there. . . . [Footnote 10]"
"[t]he demand was for production of . . . specific documents, and did not propose any broad or blind fishing expedition among documents possessed by the Government on the chance that something impeaching might turn up. Nor was this a demand for statements taken from persons or informants not offered as witnesses."
(Emphasis added.) 344 U.S. at 344 U. S. 419. We reaffirm and reemphasize these essentials. "For production purposes, it need only appear that the evidence is relevant, competent, and outside of any exclusionary rule. . . ." 344 U.S. at 344 U. S. 420.
The crucial nature of the testimony of Ford and Matusow to the Government's case is conspicuously apparent. The impeachment of that testimony was singularly important to the petitioner. The value of the reports for impeachment purposes was highlighted by the admissions of both witnesses that they could not remember what reports were oral and what written, and by Matusow's admission: "I don't recall what I put in my reports two or three years ago, written or oral, I don't know what they were."
The practice of producing government documents to the trial judge for his determination of relevancy and materiality, without hearing the accused, is disapproved. [Footnote 15] Relevancy and materiality for the purposes of production and inspection, with a view to use on cross-examination, are established when the reports are shown to relate to the testimony of the witness. Only after inspection of the reports by the accused must the trial judge determine admissibility -- e.g., evidentiary questions of inconsistency, materiality, and relevancy -- of the contents and the method to be employed for the elimination of parts immaterial or irrelevant. See Gordon v. United States, 344 U.S. at 344 U. S. 418.
"[t]he rule urged by petitioner . . . disregards the legitimate interest that each party -- including the Government -- has in safeguarding the privacy of its files, particularly where the documents in question were obtained in confidence. Production of such documents, even to a court, should not be compelled in the absence of a preliminary showing by the party making the request."
The petitioner's counsel, believing that Court of Appeals' decisions imposed such a qualification, restricted his motions to a request for production of the reports to the trial judge for the judge's inspection and determination whether and to what extent the reports should be made available to the petitioner.
". . . the Government can invoke its evidentiary privileges only at the price of letting the defendant go free. The rationale of the criminal cases is that, since the Government which prosecutes an accused also has the duty to see that justice is done, it is unconscionable to allow it to undertake prosecution and then invoke its governmental privileges to deprive the accused of anything which might be material to his defense. . . ."
345 U.S. at 345 U. S. 12.
". . . While we must accept it as lawful for a department of the government to suppress documents, even when they will help determine controversies between third persons, we cannot agree that this should include their suppression in a criminal prosecution, founded upon those very dealings to which the documents relate, and whose criminality they will, or may, tend to exculpate. So far as they directly touch the criminal dealings, the prosecution necessarily ends any confidential character the documents may possess; it must be conducted in the open, and will lay bare their subject matter. The government must choose -- either it must leave the transactions in the obscurity from which a trial will draw them or it must expose them fully. Nor does it seem to us possible to draw any line between documents whose contents bears directly upon the criminal transactions and those which may be only indirectly relevant. Not only would such a distinction be extremely difficult to apply in practice, but the same reasons which forbid suppression in one case forbid it in the other, though not, perhaps, quite so imperatively. . . . "
We hold that the criminal action must be dismissed when the Government, on the ground of privilege, elects not to comply with an order to produce, for the accused's inspection and for admission in evidence, relevant statements or reports in its possession of government witnesses touching the subject matter of their testimony at the trial. Accord, Roviaro v. United States, 353 U. S. 53, 353 U. S. 60-61. The burden is the Government's, not to be shifted to the trial judge, to decide whether the public prejudice of allowing the crime to go unpunished is greater than that attendant upon the possible disclosure of state secrets and other confidential information in the Government's possession.
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER joins the opinion of the Court, but, deeming that the questions relating to the instructions to the jury should be dealt with since a new trial has been directed, he agrees with the respects in which, and the reasons for which, MR. JUSTICE BURTON finds them erroneous.
61 Stat. 143, 146, as amended, 65 Stat. 602, 29 U.S.C. § 159(h).
". . . unless there is on file with the Board an affidavit executed . . . by each officer of such labor organization . . . that he is not a member of the Communist Party or affiliated with such party, and that he does not believe in, and is not a member of or supports any organization that believes in or teaches, the overthrow of the United States Government by force or by any illegal or unconstitutional methods. . . ."
Other activities of Matusow are described in Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 351 U. S. 115, and United States v. Flynn, 130 F.Supp. 412.
Matusow recanted as deliberately false the testimony given by him at the trial. On the basis of this recantation, the petitioner moved for a new trial, while his appeal from the conviction was pending, on grounds of newly discovered evidence . After extended hearings, the District Court denied the motion.
During the hearings on the motion for a new trial, the petitioner made several requests for the production of documents in the possession of the Government relating to the testimony given. These motions were denied. Because of our disposition of this case, it is unnecessary to consider these rulings.
". . . Upon a proper showing that the Government has possession of such inconsistent statements and the presence of the other requisite conditions, a person charged with crime would be permitted to examine and use them. But no such showing was made here. . . ."
"Now, if a paper be in possession of the opposite party, what statement of its contents or applicability can be expected from the person who claims its production, he not precisely knowing its contents? . . ."
". . . It is objected that the particular passages of the letter which are required are not pointed out. But how can this be done while the letter itself is withheld? . . ."
United States v. Schneiderman, 106 F.Supp. 731; People v. Dallabonda, 265 Mich. 486, 251 N.W. 594; see Canon 5, American Bar Association, Canons of Professional Ethics (1947).
"Let it be supposed that the letter may not contain anything respecting the person now before the court. Still it may respect a witness material in the case, and become important by bearing on his testimony. Different representations may have been made by that witness, or his conduct may have been such as to affect his testimony. In various modes, a paper may bear upon the case, although, before the case be opened, its particular application cannot be perceived by the judge. . . ."
See, e.g., United States v. Grayson, 166 F.2d 863, 869; United States v. Beekman, 155 F.2d 580, 584; United States v. Ebeling, 146 F.2d 254, 256; United States v. Cohen, 145 F.2d 82, 92; United States v. Krulewitch, 145 F.2d 76, 78.
R.S. § 161, 5 U.S.C. § 22; United States v. Reynolds, 345 U. S. 1; cf. Totten v. United States, 92 U. S. 105.
the fact that each had made oral or written reports to the Federal Bureau of Investigation relating to the respective events about which each had testified on direct examination. Having established that fact, petitioner sought an order requiring the Government to produce, for inspection by the court, the reports relating to those matters about which each witness had testified. The procedure to be followed was carefully specified: the court was to determine whether the reports had evidentiary value for impeachment of the credibility of Ford or Matusow; if the court found that they had value for that purpose, it was then to make them available to petitioner for his use in cross-examination. The Government opposed each motion on the ground that no showing of contradiction between the witness' testimony and his reports had been made as required by a controlling Fifth Circuit decision, Shelton v. United States, 205 F.2d 806. Apparently on that ground, the trial court denied the motions.
I agree that, under such circumstances, it was unnecessary for petitioner to show that Ford's and Matusow's trial testimony was contradicted in some respect by their contemporaneous reports. Although some federal courts have required a showing of contradiction, [Footnote 2/2] this Court never has done so. [Footnote 2/3] A rule requiring a showing of contradiction in every case would not serve the ends of justice. I concur, therefore, in that portion of the Court's opinion holding that petitioner laid a sufficient foundation for the production of the reports.
and upon the potential use of the requested document in proving those facts. Since that determination depends on "numerous and subtle considerations difficult to detect or appraise from a cold record . . . ," the trial court's discretion should be upheld in the absence of a "clear showing of prejudicial abuse of discretion. . . ." Cf. Michelson v. United States, 335 U. S. 469, 335 U. S. 480. We have so held even when the documents sought to be produced have been used at the trial for the purpose of refreshing a witness' recollection. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U. S. 150, 310 U. S. 232-234. When the documents have not been so used and are sought only to impeach the credibility of adverse witnesses, and not to prove the facts stated therein, the same conclusion is even more compelling.
necessary for the trial court, before disclosing the privileged material to the defendant, to pass on the question by examining in camera the portions claimed to be privileged. Cf. Bowman Dairy Co. v. United States, 341 U. S. 214, 341 U. S. 221. There is nothing novel or unfair about such a procedure. According to Wigmore, it is customary.
". . . it is obviously not for the witness to withhold the documents upon his mere assertion that they are not relevant or that they are privileged. The question of relevancy is never one for the witness to concern himself with; nor is the applicability of a privilege to be left to his decision. It is his duty to bring what the Court requires, and the Court can then, to its own satisfaction, determine by inspection whether the documents produced are irrelevant or privileged. This does not deprive the witness of any rights of privacy, since the Court's determination is made by its own inspection, without submitting the documents to the opponent's view. . . ."
(Emphasis deleted and supplied.) VIII Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed. 1940), 117-118.
"[N]o fixed rule with respect to disclosure is justifiable. The problem is one that calls for balancing the public interest in protecting the flow of information against the individual's right to prepare his defense. Whether a proper balance renders nondisclosure erroneous must depend on the particular circumstances of each case, taking into consideration the crime charged, the possible defenses, the possible significance of the informer's testimony, and other relevant factors."
"In considering whether or not the defendant was a member of the Communist Party, you may consider circumstantial evidence, as well as direct. You may consider whether or not he attended Communist Party meetings, whether or not he held an office in the Communist Party, whether or not he engaged in other conduct consistent only with membership in the Communist Party and all other evidence, either direct or circumstantial, which bears or may bear upon the question of whether or not he was a member of the Communist Party on April 28, 1950."
"Affiliation . . . means something less than membership but more than sympathy. Affiliation with the Communist Party may be proved by either circumstantial or direct evidence, or both."
"Petitioner asked only that the reports be produced to the trial judge so that he could examine them and determine whether they had evidentiary value for impeachment purposes. Petitioner sought access only to those portions of the reports having this value. The motion therefore proposed no broad foray into the government's files, and afforded the judge every opportunity to protect the government's legitimate privilege as to the matters not connected with this case."
Scanlon v. United States, 223 F.2d 382, 385-386; Shelton v. United States, 205 F.2d 806, 814-815; Christoffel v. United States, 91 U.S.App.D.C. 241, 244-247, 200 F.2d 734, 737-739, reversed on other grounds, 345 U.S. 947; D'Aquino v. United States, 192 F.2d 338, 375; United States v. De Normand, 149 F.2d 622, 625-626; United States v. Ebeling, 146 F.2d 254, 257; Little v. United States, 93 F.2d 401; Arnstein v. United States, 54 App.D.C. 199, 203, 296 F. 946, 950.
In Gordon v. United States, 344 U. S. 414, the petitioners had shown that written statements given to government agents by a key government witness contradicted the witness' trial testimony. In holding the the trial court erred in denying petitioners' motion for the production and inspection of these statements, the Court was deciding that case on its facts. I do not regard it as establishing a rule that a showing of contradiction is an essential element of the foundation precedent to production.
See, e.g., United States v. Coplon, 185 F.2d 629, 638; United States v. Beekman, 155 F.2d 580, 584; United States v. Cohen, 145 F.2d 82, 92; United States v. Krulewitch, 145 F.2d 76, 79; United States v. Flynn, 130 F.Supp. 412; United States v. Mesarosh, 116 F.Supp. 345, 350; United States v. Schneiderman, 106 F.Supp. 731, 735-738.
Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides: "Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded." See Lutwak v. United States, 344 U. S. 604, 344 U. S. 619; Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U. S. 750, 328 U. S. 756-777. There are many cases in which nonproduction of documents has been held to be harmless error. Three comparatively recent cases, dealing with reports of law enforcement officers, are United States v. Sansone, 231 F.2d 887; Montgomery v. United States, 203 F.2d 887, 893-894; and Bundy v. United States, 90 U.S.App.D.C. 12, 193 F.2d 694.
The trial court is the appropriate forum to consider the possible prejudicial effect of the error. See, e.g., Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 351 U. S. 115; Remmer v. United States, 347 U. S. 227.
Fisher v. United States, 231 F.2d 99, 106-107. See also Ocon v. Guercio, 237 F.2d 177; Baghdasarian v. United States, 220 F.2d 677; Sigurdson v. Landon, 215 F.2d 791; Dickhoff v. Shaughnessy, 142 F.Supp. 535.
United States ex rel. Kettunen v. Reimer, 79 F.2d 315, 317. See also Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U. S. 135; Fisher v. United States, 231 F.2d 99, 107-108.
"that the criminal action must be dismissed when the Government, on the grounds of privilege, elects not to comply with an order to produce, for the accused's inspection and for admission in evidence, relevant statements or reports in its possession of government witnesses touching the subject matter of their testimony at the trial."
Every federal judge and every lawyer of federal experience knows that it is not the present rule. Even the defense attorneys did not have the temerity to ask for such a sweeping decision. They only asked that the documents be delivered to the judge for his determination of whether the defendant should be permitted to examine them. This is the procedure followed in some of our circuits. My Brother BURTON has clearly stated in his concurring opinion the manner in which this procedure works. Perhaps here, with a recanting witness, the trial judge should have examined the specific documents called for, as the defense requested, and if he thought justice required their delivery to the defense, order such delivery to be made. I would have no objection to this being done. But, as Brother BURTON points out, this would not require a reversal, but merely a vacation of the judgment and a remand to the trial court for that purpose.
through confidential information as well as vital national secrets. This may well be a reasonable rule in state prosecutions where none of the problems of foreign relations, espionage, sabotage, subversive activities, counterfeiting, internal security, national defense, and the like exist, but any person conversant with federal government activities and problems will quickly recognize that it opens up a veritable Pandora's box of troubles. And all in the name of justice. For over eight score years now, our federal judicial administration has gotten along without it, and today that administration enjoys the highest rank in the world.
"I have always maintained the view that, if we were to fully discharge the serious responsibilities imposed upon us, the confidential character of our files must be inviolate. . . . [U]nless we drastically change or circumscribe our procedures, they should not be disclosed."
"FBI reports set forth all details secured from a witness. If those details were disclosed, they could become subject to misinterpretation, they could be quoted out of context, or they could be used to thwart truth, distort half-truths, and misrepresent facts. The raw material, the allegations, the details of associations, and compilation of information . . . are of value to an investigator in the discharge of his duty. These files were never intended to be used in any other manner, and the public interest would not be served by the disclosure of their contents."
in security cases, they contain not only background data on the individual, but details of his private life . . . , the identities of our confidential sources of information, and full details of investigative techniques. In short, they consist of a running account of all that transpires."
". . . For want of a more apt comparison, our files can be compared to the notes of a newspaper reporter before he has culled through the printable material from the unprintable. The files do not consist of proven information alone. . . . One report may allege crimes of a most despicable type, and the truth or falsity of these charges may not emerge until several reports are studied, further investigation made, and the what separated from the chaff."
"If spread upon the record, criminals, foreign agents, subversives, and others would be forewarned, and would seek methods to carry out their activities by avoiding detection, and thus defeat the very purposes for which the FBI was created."
Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on S. Res. 231, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 327-329. I can add nothing to this graphic expression of the necessity for the existence of the rule which, until today, kept inviolate investigative reports.
the instructions on the whole were sufficient. It is unfortunate that the majority does not announce its position. This is only one of some 10 Communist affidavit cases now pending in the trial and appellate courts. Unless this case goes as did Gold's, [Footnote 3/3] the question of the sufficiency of instructions will come up in this as well as in each of the other cases. The Court is sorely divided on this important issue and proper judicial administration requires that charges as to what constitutes membership and affiliation in the Communist Party be announced.
"showing that the documents were in existence, were in possession of the Government, were made by the Government's witness under examination, were contradictory of his present testimony, and that the contradiction was as to relevant, important and material matters which directly bore on the main issue being tried: the participation of the accused in the crime."
Id. at 344 U. S. 418-419. Likewise, United States v. Reynolds, 345 U. S. 1 (1953), by my late Brother Chief Justice Vinson, approved the refusal of the Government to produce documents in a tort claims suit. The opinion gave no approval whatever to the conclusion announced by the majority here. I purposely omitted the reference in the opinion after the penultimate sentence, "Accord, Roviaro v. United States, 353 U. S. 53, 353 U. S. 60-61." That case had to do with the disclosure of a dead informant's name and did not touch on the problem of the disclosure of government documents.
In Gold v. United States, 352 U. S. 985 (1957), this Court reversed and remanded the case for a new trial because of official intrusion into the privacy of the jury. The case was dismissed on oral motion of the Government on May 9, 1957.

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