Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/233/473/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 10:47:43+00:00

Document:
When a railroad is a highway for both interstate and intrastate commerce, and the two classes of traffic are interdependent in point of both movement and safety, Congress may, under the power committed to it by the commerce clause of the Constitution, regulate the liability of the carrier for injuries suffered by an employee engaged in general work pertaining to both classes of commerce, whether the particular service performed at the time, isolatedly considered, is in interstate or intrastate commerce. Employers' Liability Cases, 207 U. S. 463, distinguished.
Notwithstanding its wider powers, Congress, in enacting the Federal Employers' Liability Act of 1908, has confined the liability imposed by that act to injuries occurring to employees when the particular service in which they are employed at the time of injury is a part of interstate commerce. Pedersen v. Del., Lac. & West. R. Co., 229 U. S. 146.
An employee of a carrier in interstate commerce by railroad who is engaged on a switch engine in moving several cars all loaded with intrastate freight from one point in a city to another point in the same city is not engaged in interstate commerce, and an injury then sustained is not within the Employers' Liability Act of 1908.
The fact that an employee engaged in intrastate service expects, upon completion of that task, to engage in another which is a part of interstate commerce, is immaterial under the Employers' Liability Act of 1908, and will not bring the action under that act.
The facts, which involve the construction of the Federal Employers' Liability Act of 1908 and the determination of whether an injured employee was engaged in interstate commerce at the time of the injury, are stated in the opinion.
interstate commerce within the meaning of the Employers' Liability Act.
Considering the status of the railroad as a highway for both interstate and intrastate commerce, the interdependence of the two classes of traffic in point of movement and safety, the practical difficulty in separating or dividing the general work of the switching crew, and the nature and extent of the power confided to Congress by the commerce clause of the Constitution, we entertain no doubt that the liability of the carrier for injuries suffered by a member of the crew in the course of its general work was subject to regulation by Congress, whether the particular service being performed at the time of the injury, isolatedly considered, was in interstate or intrastate commerce. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 221 U. S. 612, 221 U. S. 618; Southern Railway Co. v. United States, 222 U. S. 20, 222 U. S. 26; Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U. S. 1; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Goodrich Transit Co., 224 U. S. 194, 224 U. S. 213; Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352, 230 U. S. 432. The decision in Employer's Liability Cases, 207 U. S. 463, is not to the contrary, for the Act of June 11, 1906, 34 Stat. 232, c. 3073, there pronounced invalid, attempted to regulate the liability of every carrier in interstate commerce, whether by railroad or otherwise, for any injury to any employee, even though his employment had no connection whatever with interstate commerce.
in whole or in part from the negligence of any of the officers, agents, or employees of such carrier, or by reason of any defect or insufficiency, due to its negligence, in its cars, engines, appliances, machinery, track, roadbed, works, boats, wharves, or other equipment."
"There can be no doubt that a right of recovery thereunder arises only where the injury is suffered while the carrier is engaged in interstate commerce and while the employee is employed by the carrier in such commerce."
Again (p. 229 U. S. 152): "The true test always is: is the work in question a part of the interstate commerce in which the carrier is engaged?" And a like view is shown in other cases. Mondou v. New York, New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Co., supra; Seaboard Air Line Railway v. Moore, 228 U. S. 433; St. Louis, San Francisco & Texas Railway Co. v. Seale, 229 U. S. 156, 229 U. S. 158; North Carolina Railroad Co. v. Zachary, 232 U. S. 248, 232 U. S. 256; Grand Trunk Western Railway Co. v. Lindsay, 233 U. S. 42.
Here, at the time of the fatal injury, the intestate was engaged in moving several cars, all loaded with intrastate freight, from one part of the city to another. That was not a service in interstate commerce, and so the injury and resulting death were not within the statute. That he was expected, upon the completion of that task, to engage in another which would have been a part of interstate commerce is immaterial under the statute, for, by its terms, the true test is the nature of the work being done at the time of the injury.

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