Source: https://litigation.consusgroup.com/2017/03/21/jury-verdict-sustained-communique-laboratory-inc-v-citrix-systems-inc-ctxs/
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 06:47:34+00:00

Document:
03-21-2017 – The court denied Communique’s motion for judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial. That means the jury verdict, which found Citrix did not infringe, will stand.
01 replied (Doc. No. 589 [“Reply”]).
For the reasons that follow, the motion is denied.
Court’s claims construction and summary judgment opinions. (See Doc. Nos. 343 [“Clm. Const. MOO”] and 471 [“SJ MOO”], respectively.) For purposes of context, a brief background summary is provided now, with greater detail provided later in this memorandum opinion as relevant to the Court’s analysis.
In this patent infringement action, plaintiff alleges that Citrix’s product, GoToMyPC, infringes independent claim 24, and dependent claim 45, of 01’s U.S. Patent No. 6,928,479 (the “‘479 patent”). The claimed invention allows individuals to remotely access a personal computer from any device with an internet connection. The primary infringement issue in this case revolves around the manner in which that remote access occurs.
Rule 59 motion. Verizon Servs. Corp. v. Cox Fibernet Va., Inc., 602 F.3d 1325, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (citation omitted); Sundance, Inc. v. DeMonte Fabricating Ltd., 485 F. Supp. 2d 805, 810 n.2 (E.D. Mich. 2007) (“Because Rule 50 and a motion for judgment as a matter of law raises a procedural issue that is not unique to patent law, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit applies the law of the ‘regional circuit in which the appeal from the district court would usually lie.’”) (quoting Summit Tech. Inc. v. Nidek Co., 363 F.3d 1219, 1223 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).
direct the entry of judgment as a matter of law.
“The inquiry for resolving a motion for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 50 is the same as the inquiry for resolving a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56.” White v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe R. Co., 364 F.3d 789, 794 (6th Cir. 2004), aff’d sub nom.
viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, giving that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences . . . reasonable minds could come to but one conclusion in favor of the moving party.’”) (quoting Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729, 736 (6th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1003, 126 S. Ct. 624, 163 L. Ed. 2d 506 (2005)).
It is only appropriate to grant a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law where the Court finds that there is no “legally sufficient evidentiary basis” for a reasonable jury to find for the prevailing party on that issue. White, 364 F.3d at 794; Static Control Components, 697 F.3d at 414. In making this determination, all reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of the prevailing party. White, 364 F.3d at 794 (citing Reeves, 530 U.S. at 133). The Court may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence, and “must disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to believe.” Id.; Static Control Components, 697 F.3d at 414 (“We will not substitute our interpretation of the evidence for the jury’s, even if we would have reached a different conclusion.”) (citing Barnes, 401 F.3d at 738).
155, 160 (6th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted); Carter v. Ricumstrict, 637 F. App’x 917, 919 (6th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 340, 196 L. Ed. 2d 267 (2016) (citing, among authority, Am.
& Foreign Ins. Co., 106 F.3d at 160).
And it’s also clear that the reason that [Citrix’s expert] has to take this position as we pointed out in our motion for summary judgment, which I incorporate by reference, is that Dr. Foster relied on a claim construction different from that offered by the Court to reach his invalidity conclusions. And I believe even the defendant realizes you can’t assert an invalidity ground based on claim construction language that the Court has rejected. So we would argue that the invalidity of the matter should not go to the jury.
evidence, 01 argued that it offered evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to find for 01 on that issue. (See Doc. No. 567 at 41148-49; id. at 41153 (“[J]udgment as a matter of law is only appropriate if there is no conflicting evidence, which is not the case here.”); 1/15/16 Tr. at 38072-83.) 01’s opposition to Citrix’s Rule 50(a) motion is inconsistent with its current postverdict argument that it sought judgment as a matter of law on infringement, as well as invalidity, at the close of evidence. See Medisim Ltd. v. BestMed, LLC, 758 F.3d 1352, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“The statement that BestMed now relies on as evidence of a motion for JMOL actually indicates the opposite—BestMed’s counsel stated that anticipation was ‘definitely something for the jury.’ … Further, BestMed’s counsel made this statement in opposition to Medisim’s motion for JMOL under Rule 50(a)[.]”) (internal record citation omitted).
Owens–Ford Co. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 9 F.3d 422, 425-27 (6th Cir. 1993)).
Rule 50(a)(2) does not define how specific the grounds for judgment as a matter of law must be. Kusens v. Pascal Co., 448 F.3d 349, 361 (6th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). But the Sixth Circuit has cautioned against reviewing a post-verdict motion too narrowly, finding instead that the motion should be reviewed in light of Rule 50(a)’s purpose—“providing notice to the court an opposing counsel of any deficiencies in the opposing party’s case prior to sending it to the jury[.]” Id. (citation omitted); Chain v. Tropodyne Corp., 238 F.3d 421, at *3 (6th Cir. 2000) (Table decision) (“Th[e] purposes [of Rule 50(a)] are to provide the opposing party an opportunity to cure any defects in proof and to enable the trial court to re-examine the question of evidentiary insufficiency as a matter of law if the jury returns a verdict contrary to the movant.”) (citing Gutzwiller v. Fenik, 860 F.2d 1317, 1330 (6th Cir. 1988) (further citation omitted)). Where Rule 50(a)’s purpose is met, “courts usually take a liberal view of what constitutes a pre-verdict motion sufficient to support a post-verdict motion.” Kusens, 448 F.3d at 361 (citation omitted).
issues and arguments not specifically set forth in renewed Rule 50 motion where party incorporated by reference into renewed motion all arguments previously made in motions for summary judgment, in limine, etc.).
Second, 01’s detailed Rule 50(a) arguments on the issue of validity were insufficient to accomplish the purpose of Rule 50(a) as to infringement because the elements of proof for validity and infringement are entirely different. Duro-Last, Inc. v. Custom Seal, Inc., 321 F.3d 1098, 1107–08 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (pre-verdict motion for anticipation will not support post-verdict motion for obviousness because anticipation and obviousness are legally distinct challenges to a patent’s validity that require different elements of proof) (citation omitted); Laymon v. Lobby House, Inc., 613 F. Supp. 2d 504, 512 (D. Del. 2009) (a general pre-verdict motion for judgment as a matter of law is insufficient to provide notice when the issues involve different elements of proof) (citation omitted).
01’s Rule 50(b) motion must be denied. The denial of 01’s Rule 50(b) motion is somewhat academic, however, because 01 has alternatively moved for a new trial under Rule 59, as permitted by Rule 50(b). Moreover, even if 01 had not waived its Rule 50 motion as to infringement, the motion would be denied. The same evidence that supports the Court’s conclusion that 01’s Rule 59 motion for a new trial should be denied also supports the conclusion that, when the evidence is viewed in a light most favorable to Citrix, there is a “legally sufficient evidentiary basis” for a reasonable jury to find for Citrix on the issue of infringement.
“[A] new trial is appropriate when the jury reaches a ‘seriously erroneous result as evidenced by (1) the verdict being against the [clear] weight of the evidence; (2) the damages being excessive; or (3) the trial being unfair to the moving party in some fashion, i.e., the proceedings being influenced by prejudice or bias.’” Static Control Components, 697 F.3d at 414 (quoting Mike’s Train House, Inc. v. Lionel, L.L.C., 472 F.3d 398, 405 (6th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks, alterations, and citations omitted)). 01 contends that it is entitled to a new trial because the non-infringement verdict was against the weight of the evidence and certain aspects of the trial were prejudicial.
(6th Cir. 2000) (citing Holmes, 78 F.3d at 1048). “[C]ourts are not free to reweigh the evidence and set aside the jury verdict merely because the jury could have drawn different inferences or conclusions or because judges feel that other results are more reasonable.” Id. 201 F.3d at 821 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Duncan v. Duncan, 377 F.2d 49, 52 (6th Cir. 1967)); Decker v. GE Healthcare Inc., 770 F.3d 378, 395 (6th Cir. 2014) (same) (citing Owens-Corning and Holmes).
(Fed. Cir. 2012) (citations omitted.) To establish literal infringement at trial,3 01 must prove that each limitation of claims 24 and 45 “reads on” or is found in GoToMyPC. See Allen Eng’g Corp.
L.L.C. v. Google, Inc., 708 F.3d 1310, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).
01’s argument that the jury’s verdict of non-infringement is against the weight of the evidence4 is two-pronged: (1) Citrix’s non-infringement argument at trial was premised upon a construction of the claim term “create” that was rejected by the Court;5 and (2) under the Court’s construction of “create,” reasonable minds could not disagree that GoToMyPC infringed claims 24 and 45 of ‘479 patent. (Mot. at 41249 and 41251-54.) Citrix opposes 01’s arguments on both the merits and on the grounds that 01 waived this basis for a new trial by failing to lodge appropriate objections during trial. (Opp’n at 41444.) For the purpose of this analysis, the Court assumes, without finding, that 01 did not waive this argument for a new trial.
01’s argument for a new trial focuses on the claim term “creating” in claim 24(b)(ii)6 of the ‘479 patent, which describes one function of the “location facility”—“creating a communication channel between the remote compute and personal computer.” During claim construction, the meaning of “creating” was not disputed by the parties. They agreed that “creating” means “making or bringing into existence,” and the Court adopted the parties agreed construction. (Clm. Const. MOO at 11485.) Contrary to 01’s contention, Citrix did not offer a construction of “creating” during claim construction that was rejected by the Court.
6 The text of claim 24 is set forth in its entirety, below. The disputed claim terms relevant to this analysis are shown in bold underlined typeface.
the server computer program includes a location facility and is responsive to a request from the remote computer to communicate with the personal computer to act as an intermediary between the personal computer and the remote computer by creating one or more communication sessions there between, said one or more communication sessions being created by the location facility, in response to receipt of the request for communication with the personal computer from the remote computer, by determining a then current location of the personal computer and creating a communication channel between the remote computer and the personal computer, the location facility being operable to create such communication channel whether the personal computer is linked to the Internet directly (with a publicly addressable) dynamic IP address or indirectly via an Internet gateway/proxy (with a publicly un-addressable dynamic LAN IP address).
Software on a locator server computer that: (1) receives a request for communication with the personal computer from a remote computer; (2) determines the then current location of the personal computer; (3) creates a communication channel between the remote computer and personal computer; and (4) creates one or more communication sessions between the remote computer and the personal computer. The locator server may comprise one or more computers, and the location facility may be distributed among one or more locator server computers.
Citrix’s proposed construction, the Court agreed with 01 that no construction was required. This means that the words are given their ordinary and customary meaning to a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312-13 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
Thus, the Court construed the phrase “‘creating a communication channel between the remote computer and personal computer’ to mean: ‘making or bringing into existence a communication channel between the remote computer and the personal computer.’” (Clm. Const.
As an example of Citrix’s purportedly improper use of “create” in its non-infringement case, 01 points to Citrix’s cross examination of Ganger regarding paragraph 810 of his second declaration to the patent office during reexamination. During this exchange, 01 argues that Citrix suggested the term “create” had “special meaning” rather than the Court’s construction of the term. (Mot. at 41256-57.) The relevant portion of the transcript follows.
[Mr. Cordell.] It’s paragraph 8. It’s page — I don’t know what page. Page 3. So just to make this clear to everybody, what you’re saying there is that in applying some references, what I mean by references, those were prior art references. Right?
[Dr. Ganger.] Well, at least potentially prior art, but yeah.
And you say in applying some references to the ‘479 patent claims, the ‘479 patent claims are the ones we are talking about in this case. Right? A. Yes.
“You know, the [Action Closing Prosecution (“ACP”)] essentially equates the word ‘creates’ with uses, enables, or facilitates.” Right?
ACP with respect to some references. One of ordinary skill in the art would also not view these “create” requirements to be satisfied if the location facility only “enables” or “facilitates” some other component that creates the communication channel, as asserted in the ACP with respect to some references. These words (“uses”, “enables”, “facilitates”) would have different meanings to one of ordinary skill in the art than “create”. Assisting some other component that creates the communication channel is not the same as creating the communication channel – the ‘479 Patent claims require the location facility to do the latter.
Well, you’re pointing out that the patent examiner in your view had equated the word “create” with these other verbs, uses, enables, or facilitates. Right?
And then you say, “You know, patent examiner, you’re wrong because one of ordinary skill in the art would not view the, quote, create requirements of the ‘479 patent claims to be satisfied if the location facility is only used by some other component that itself creates the communication channel as asserted in the ACP with respect to some references.” That’s what you wrote. Right? A. I believe you read that correctly.
. . . But the reality is, that one of ordinary skill in the art, you’re telling the patent office, “You got this wrong because one of ordinary skill in the art would not view the create requirements of the ‘479 patent claims.” You’re talking about the location facility here, correct? A. Yes.
Well, you say to one of ordinary skill in the art. Right[?] That’s what that means?
Yeah, but I don’t think it’s because it has special meaning. I’m pretty sure somewhere else I actually note what it doesn’t have special meaning.
Oh, okay. I didn’t mean to suggest that it was something different. But you’re making the point to the patent examiner that in your view, your expert view, one of ordinary skill in the art, when they see the word “create” they don’t think facilitate or enable or help. Right?
Again, yeah, but you have to put this all into context, right, of what the specific references were doing and what he was saying about those references.
CORDELL: I shouldn’t have said special meaning, but my intention is to characterize the role of the location facility. He said 17 times that – when I asked him whether these entities created the channel, he would say well, the broker directs it. And he kept hedging back to trying to pull something out of what his definition of location facility is would be involved in some way. THE COURT: First of all, I think the point that Mr. Shunk makes is well-taken in that it could be a little confusing to say special meaning.
CORDELL: Yeah, I shouldn’t have said special meaning.
THE COURT: So just rephrase. From that perspective, I agree.
Secondly, I think this was an issue that we used extensively prior to trial. And Citrix will be permitted to cross-examine Dr. Ganger regarding his clarification of what one of ordinary skill in the art understands the word “create” to mean, and more importantly, if you recall, not to mean. So with that, you may continue.
So engineers that work in this field would not view the create requirements — the create requirements you’re talking about here is the create requirement that the location facility creates the channel. Right?
Okay. Now, in the next sentence you give some words that are similar to use. Let’s look at some of those. What about enable? How does your argument change, if at all, with regard to enable?
[Dr. Ganger.] Well, enable, like facilitate, is a broad word. If it only — if — you can say that it enables, but it only enables by doing something that’s not creating. You wouldn’t say is making or bringing into existence. Then it would not be sufficient.
[“1/12/16 Tr.”]) at 35757-78) and on cross examination by Citrix (1/13/16 Tr. at 36481-82).
The Court concludes that no “special meaning” of the claim term “creating” was argued or used by Citrix in connection with Citrix’s cross examination of Ganger, and that Ganger used the Court’s construction of that term in arriving at his opinion that GoToMyPC infringed the asserted claims of the ‘479 patent.
[Mr. Cordell]. Okay. Now, let’s go back to the location facility. Remember we — this is what we were looking for in the claims, right? [Dr. Foster]. Yes.
And in order to satisfy the claims, we have to meet the Court’s definition.
Okay. And did you look to see whether or not the Citrix accused GoToMyPC system has anything called the location facility — well, let’s just start with this.
The location facility we know is part of the server computer program, right? A. That is correct.
Did you look to see whether anything in the servers creates a communication channel between the remote computer and the personal computer? A. I did.
There is nothing there that creates a channel.
And what is it that creates the channels in the GoToMyPC system?
It’s the, — as we have seen from looking at the code it’s the host and the client. Q. And just to make sure, we put an absolute fine point on it, did you use the definition of creating that the court gave us, makes or bringing into existence? A. I did.
Now, I guess in summary here — well, just tell us what your opinion is about what system element creates the channels in the GoToMyPC system?
Yeah, so, you know, really the key point here is it’s — as we’ve seen by looking at the appropriate code, it’s the host and the client that create a channel.
It’s indisputable, I think, from themselves out to this comm server.
And does that meet the Court’s definition of the location facility?
Now, Dr. Ganger gave the patent office some of his views about some of these claims, right? At least he gave the patent office his view of what a location facility is, right?
And did you review Dr. Ganger’s declarations?
And do you think that what he told the patent office was unclear in any way?
Okay. And do you agree with his statement one of ordinary skill in the art would also not view these create requirements to be satisfied if the location facility only enables or facilitates some other component that creates the communication channel?
So the question was, do I — Q. Do you agree with his statement?
And in your view, therefore, is the claim limitation, the server computer creating including a location facility that creates a communication channel between the remote computer and the personal computer satisfied in [GoToMyPC]?
“create” function of the location facility in the ‘479 patent, Foster’s testimony does not redefine “create,” but addresses how the location facility does, or does not, create the communication channel.
The first prong of 01’s argument that the jury’s verdict is against the weight of the evidence because Citrix did not use the Court’s definition of “create” fails for the reasons discussed above. Experts from both sides, using the Court’s definition of “create,” presented extensive testimony, including whether GoToMyPC reads on claim 24’s limitations in the ‘479 patent, whether GoToMyPC contains a location facility, whether a location facility in GoToMyPC creates the communication channel between the remote and personal computers, and whether the remote and personal computers in GoToMyPC create the communication channel between them.
Infringement is a question of fact for the jury. To establish literal infringement at trial, 01 was required to prove that each limitation of claims 24 and 45 in the ‘479 patent “reads on” or is found in GoToMyPC. Among other evidence, the parties’ experts expressed different opinions regarding how GoToMyPC creates a communication channel between the remote and personal computers, and whether the manner the communication channel is created “reads on” claims 24 and 45. If the evidence presented at trial by Citrix was believed by the jury, there was more than sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude, among other things, that GoToMyPC does not contain a location facility, and/or that the remote and personal computers, not the location facility, creates the communication channel in GoToMyPC. If the jury concluded that GoToMyPC does not read on even one limitation in claim 24, then 01 failed to establish that GoToMyPC infringes the ‘479 patent. Function Media, 708 F.3d at 1330 (“To prove infringement, the patentee must show that the accused device contains each limitation of the asserted claim[.]”) (quoting Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317, 1334 (Fed. Cir.
F.3d at 821. The jury was persuaded by Citrix’s evidence and not persuaded by 01’s evidence. Because there was sufficient evidence upon which a reasonable jury could find that GoToMyPC does not infringe claims 24 and 45 of the ‘479 patent, the Court will not grant a new trial on the basis that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence.
Cordance Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 658 F.3d 1330, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citation omitted).
1365 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“[T]here is no ‘practicing the prior art defense’ to literal infringement.”) (citing Baxter Healthcare Corp. v. Spectramed, Inc., 49 F.3d 1575, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). “[L]iteral infringement is determined by construing the claims and comparing them to the accused device, not by comparing the accused device to the prior art.” Id. at 1366 (citing Baxter, 49 F.3d at 1583.
[Mr. Cordell.] Because it turns out that there was a lot of prior art put in front of the patent office. And Mr. Shunk made a point of this in his opening statement. He said, you know, a lot of those systems were already put in front of the patent office so don’t sit still for too much of this invalidity business.
Well, it turns out one of [the] systems that was put in front of the patent office was BuddyHelp. They put the BuddyHelp system in front of the patent office. It was put in front of the patent office. And the patent office didn’t [have all] the information about BuddyHelp, but it had some of the documentation.
And what did the patent office say? The patent office said BuddyHelp is different. And, in particular, the patent office said that one or more communication sessions being created by the location facility in response to receipt of the request for communication with the personal computer from the remote computer is not taught by BuddyHelp. That’s patent speak for it is different from BuddyHelp.
We agree with that. We agree with that. We’re not here to try to take Mr.
and they’ve got to remain true to their word. They told the patent office that systems that create those channels using the end points rather than a central location facility are different. Are different. And that’s what we expect them to live up to here today.
CORDELL: The fact that [Dr. Ganger] says that a particular set of code and processes within GoToMyPC is covered by the patent, and if I can prove those same processes existed not prior art BuddyHelp system, then the patent is invalid. I don’t … understand this practicing of the prior art argument. Our expert did this analysis. He is the one that said, “Look, all the technology they’re accusing in GoToMyPC, that existed back in the BuddyHelp system.” So they have a problem. They have a fundamental problem.
And this is not — I don’t know what this practicing of the prior art thing is all about. This is pure fact and law. They say that a particular set of technology is covered by this patent, invalidity and infringement are two sides of the same coin.
THE COURT: And so you can use it, you’re saying, to demonstrate invalidity on the basis of what?
CORDELL: So, you know, what I said in opening, I meant. I took the jury through the claim and distinguished the claim from what GoToMyPC is doing. If we are wrong on that, and it turns out that this claim covers that technology.
CORDELL: That technology existed before 1999. And they’ve got an invalidity problem. But I’ll prove it up that way.
THE COURT: I understand what you’re saying, but you’re saying that it’s based upon prior art.
THE COURT: So you’re saying that Mr. Shunk’s argument that you can’t have that defense is not true.
THE COURT: That’s exactly the defense you’re trying to make.
CORDELL: I am arguing that this system does not infringe. And that’s what I told the jury.
CORDELL: Then the patent is invalid.
CORDELL: So it’s not a practicing the prior art defense. It’s we think it’s different, but if we’re wrong, then they’ve got a date problem.
[Mr. Cordell.] Now, Dr. Foster, I just went through the infringement, and I think you said it was your opinion that the Citrix GoToMyPC system does not infringe.
[Dr. Foster.] I don’t thing think you asked me — oh, yes. That is my opinion. Yes. Q. Now I’m going to ask you a different question.
Dr. Foster, in your expert opinion, is the ‘479 patent, if faithfully applied according to its claims and the Court’s definition, is the ‘479 valid? A. So I’m not a lawyer, but my opinion is yes, it is valid.
And yet, you’re here to talk about invalidity, right?
So let me ask you a different question. If instead — well, Dr. Ganger says the GoToMyPC system infringes, right? A. He does.
And you say it doesn’t infringe?
If Dr. Ganger is right and the ‘479 patent claims cover systems where the end points create the channel, is the ‘479 patent valid?
Again, I’m not a lawyer, but my view it is invalid under those constraints, yes.
So let’s see if we can look at some of this. We’ve heard a lot about BuddyHelp in this case. But can you remind the jury about what BuddyHelp is? A. Yes, so it’s a particular sort of remote access system.
Did you consider documents about BuddyHelp as part of your analysis?
I looked at some documents. As many documents as I could. I also spent a lot of time looking at the source code. This here shows one of the documents I looked at. I think we’ve seen this earlier.
Okay. And just take us briefly through the way the BuddyHelp system worked.
So the BuddyHelp system, essentially it’s doing the same thing as GoToMyPC, but with some variance because it’s trying to do something slightly different.
Now, in your expert opinion, have you compared the BuddyHelp system to the ‘479 patent claims using the Court’s claim construction to determine whether or not it is covered by the claims? A. I have, yes.
And what was your conclusion if you used the Court’s claim construction and faithfully apply it?
It is not covered by the claims.
But if instead for some reason your analysis is wrong and Dr. Ganger’s analysis that a system that operates using the end points to create the channel is covered by the claims, is BuddyHelp covered? A. I believe it is. Yes.
In arriving at their respective opinions regarding the asserted claims and whether GoToMyPC read on the limitations of those claims, both experts state that they applied the Court’s construction of the relevant claim terms.
“[Mr. Cordell.] Okay. And just take us briefly through the way the BuddyHelp system worked.
“Q. And so, Dr. Foster — well, this is a comparison of ExpertLive and GoToMyPC. Does the same analysis that you gave us with respect to BuddyHelp apply to this comparison as well? A. It does, yes.
Pretty much everything from the next down is architecturally the same?
Thank you. And then again did you do an analysis of the features of ExpertLive and compare them to GoToMyPC?
20 “Q. And did you do an analysis of the PC Anywhere system? A. I did, yes.
Did you actually look at the software and operate it?
So let’s go through it just quickly. I believe you said the system was usable to connect a personal computer to a remote computer. Can you take us through how that happened?
Yeah, so, you know, at a high level, it’s quite similar to GoToMyPC. We have a directory service which computers that are going to participate in the remote access system register with so that when their IP address changes we can keep track of their current IP address.
Someone who wants to access the remote computer first contacts this thing called the directory service which keeps track of IP addresses, retrieves the address.
It then has what it needs to establish the connection to the personal computer.
So in the PC Anywhere, would you say the directory server facilitates the channel between the remote and personal computers?
Well, that’s a word you could use, yes.
prior art with respect to Citrix’s invalidity defense, that defense failed—the jury determined that the ‘479 patent was valid.
prejudicial as to warrant a new trial).Thus, to the extent that any prejudice resulted from comparisons between GoToMyPC and prior art by Citrix in connection with invalidity, there is no reasonable probability that the jury’s infringement verdict was influenced by prejudice, or that the infringement verdict was seriously erroneous. Strickland, 142 F.3d at 358; Holmes, 78 F.3d at 1045–46.
[i]t is of very minimal, if any, probative value as to who brought the prior art to the attention of the examiner. It fact, given the role of the jury in this case, it would be unfairly prejudicial to Citrix to attribute the reexamination request to Citrix or to indicate that it was Citrix that advanced certain arguments in the reexamination process. This is especially true since Citrix is only permitted to rely on a very limited type of evidence (patents and printed articles) when taking a position with the PTO during reexamination. The jurors may put undue weight on the fact that it was Citrix who advanced the arguments which, in the end, were rejected by the PTO, even though the PTO does not make its decision based upon the same standard as used in an infringement/invalidity lawsuit, nor does it have the benefit of the full array of evidence that will be presented to a jury for its consideration.
Neither party cites any case law that addresses the issue of excluding the identity of the party requesting reexamination from evidence in a patent infringement trial. Some courts have limited the use of reexamination evidence by not permitting use of the word “reexamination” or evidence of the number of times prior art references were considered by the patent office, and requiring appropriate redactions. See Fairchild Semiconductor Corp. v. Power Integrations, Inc., No. CV 12-540-LPS, 2015 WL 10457176, at *1 (D. Del. Apr. 23, 2015) (“While there shall be no reference to ‘reexamination,’ evidence (including prior art) used during a reexamination is not inadmissible solely due to its use or even creation during a reexamination, provided that general terminology (e.g., ‘prosecution history’) is used and necessary redactions are made.”) Such evidence of reexamination history may be excluded under the balancing test of Fed. R. Evid.
Whatever probative value there is to evidence that the PTO considered a particular piece of prior art on multiple occasions (i.e., during initial prosecution and again during reexamination) is substantially outweighed by the risk of jury confusion and the waste of the jury’s time that would be necessitated to put in full context the details of the reexamination. Therefore, the balance under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 favors exclusion of the evidence of reexaminations at this jury trial. The parties may present evidence and argument that a prior art reference was considered by the PTO and the patent was granted, but may not present evidence or argument as to whether a prior art reference was repeatedly considered by the PTO and whether the patent was repeatedly allowed by the PTO.
Masimo Corp. v. Philips Elec. N. Am. Corp., No. CV 09-80-LPS, 2014 WL 4246579, at *2 (D. Del. Aug. 27, 2014) (footnote omitted, emphasis in original).
arrive at different conclusions regarding the proper Rule 403 balance between prejudice and the probative value of evidence depending upon the particular facts of a case.
Communique from a full-on attack of the illegitimate ‘practicing the prior art’ defense to infringement.” (Mot. at 41267.) The Court has concluded, however, the Citrix did not assert such an illegal defense theory to plaintiff’s infringement claim that was prejudicial to plaintiff. Therefore, there is nothing that occurred at trial that changes the Court’s conclusion that the probative value of identifying the party requesting reexamination is outweighed by the danger of jury confusion and prejudice to Citrix.
Accordingly, 01’s motion for a new trial on this basis must be denied.
For all of the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ordered that 01’s motion for judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial (Doc. No. 580) is denied.
 All references to page numbers are to the page identification numbers generated by the Court’s electronic filing system.
 Citrix’s expert, Dr. Ian Foster (“Foster”).
 Similarly, with respect to proving invalidity, the prior art must be compared against the claims of the asserted patent, not the accused product. Zenith Elecs. Corp. v. PDI Commc’n Sys., Inc., 522 F.3d 1348, 1363–64 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“In [Tate], … we explained that the defense of noninfringement cannot be proved by comparing an accused product to the prior art[.] … Likewise, mere proof that the prior art is identical, in all material respects, to an allegedly infringing product cannot constitute clear and convincing evidence of invalidity. Anticipation requires a showing that each element of the claim at issue, properly construed, is found in a single prior art reference. ‘[I]t is the presence of the prior art and its relationship to the claim language that matters for invalidity.’”) (quoting Tate at 1367); Cordance, 658 F.3d at 1337 (“In Tate, this court explained that accused infringers are not free to flout the requirement of proving invalidity by clear and convincing evidence by asserting a ‘practicing the prior art’ defense to literal infringement under the less stringent preponderance of evidence standard. It is the presence of the prior art and its relationship to the claim language [of the patent in suit] that matters for invalidity.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (quoting Zenith Electrs. Corp., 522 F.3d at 1363 (quoting Tate, 279 F.3d at 1367)).
This aspect of the “practicing the prior art” defense, however, is not relevant because the jury found the patent valid and Citrix has not filed a post-trial motion taking issue with that verdict. 01 does not take issue with the jury’s verdict that the ‘479 patent is invalid because Citrix cannot be liable for infringement of an invalid patent. See Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 737 F.3d 699, 702 (Fed. Cir. 2013).

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