Source: https://cbaclelegalconnection.com/tag/reasonable-suspicion/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 04:41:19+00:00

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The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in People v. Threlkel on Monday, March 11, 2019.
Investigatory Stop—Grounds for Stop or Investigation—Fellow-Officer Rule.
An extensive narcotics investigation culminated in arrest warrants for defendant and her significant other based on their alleged distribution of controlled substances. While attempting to execute the warrants, deputies observed a truck belonging to defendant’s significant other driving away from the residence shared by the couple. The deputies suspected that defendant was a passenger in the truck. As the deputies tried to stop the truck, it evaded them. At one point, the deputies observed a white bag fly out of the passenger window, which supported their belief that there was a passenger in the truck. The truck eventually stopped within a mile of the home. Inside, they located defendant’s significant other, but not defendant. Moments later, however, defendant was spotted a couple of hundred yards away, attempting to hitch a ride. It was a frigid and snowy night, the roads were slippery, and there was no easy access on foot between the home and the location of the stop. A deputy who recognized defendant detained her, and she was later arrested on her outstanding warrant.
The trial court suppressed all evidence and observations derived from defendant’s stop, finding that the deputies lacked reasonable, articulable suspicion to detain her. Later, the trial court explained that its suppression order included the deputies’ observations and investigation before they contacted defendant. The supreme court reversed. It concluded that the deputies had reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop defendant. It further concluded that the trial court lacked authority to suppress the deputies’ observations and investigation before they contacted defendant.
On Monday, January 14, 2019, the Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in People v. Burnett.
Searches and Seizures—Reasonable Suspicion— Mistake of Law.
In this interlocutory appeal, the supreme court considered whether a Colorado State Patrol trooper made a reasonable mistake of law when the trooper stopped a car for making what he believed to be an illegal lane change after witnessing the driver flash her turn signal twice over a distance of less than 200 feet and then change lanes. The court held that the trooper’s erroneous interpretation of the governing statute, C.R.S. § 42-4-903, did not constitute an objectively reasonable mistake of law. It is plain from the text of the statute that a driver is not required to signal continuously for any set distance before changing lanes on a highway; the statute only requires that a driver use a signal before changing lanes. Thus, because this was not a reasonable mistake of law, the trooper did not have reasonable suspicion to justify the investigatory stop. The court therefore affirmed the trial court’s suppression order.
The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People v. Johnston on Thursday, November 29, 2018.
Constitutional Law—Fourth Amendment—Search and Seizure—Motor Vehicles.
A sheriff’s deputy noticed defendant’s car continuously weaving within the right-hand lane while traveling on Interstate 70. The deputy followed defendant for five to six miles before stopping him for suspicion of driving under the influence of alcohol. During the stop, the officer noticed signs of intoxication, administered roadside tests, and arrested defendant. Defendant was charged with aggravated driving after revocation prohibited and driving under the influence (DUI). Defendant filed a motion to suppress, which the trial court denied. A jury found defendant guilty of aggravated driving after revocation prohibited and the lesser included offense of driving while ability impaired.
On appeal, defendant argued that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress. He argued that his weaving within a single lane, without more, did not create a reasonable suspicion of DUI. The Fourth Amendment does not require that a police officer see the defendant commit a traffic violation before stopping him, and repeated intra-lane weaving can create reasonable suspicion of impaired operation. Whether there exists reasonable suspicion of intoxicated driving is based on the totality of the circumstances. Here, under the totality of the circumstances, the police officer’s observation of defendant’s vehicle weaving continuously within its own lane for over five miles was sufficient to create a reasonable suspicion that the driver was intoxicated. Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress.
The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People v. Kessler on Thursday, May 3, 2018.
DUI—Evidence—Possession of a Controlled Substance—Search and Seizure—Search Incident to Arrest—Motor Vehicle—Reasonable Suspicion—Cross-Examination.
Defendant was pulled over by the police for speeding. Upon approaching the car with a flashlight, an officer spotted a half-empty schnapps bottle on the floor behind the passenger’s seat. The officer asked defendant for his license, registration, and proof of insurance multiple times before defendant presented his registration and proof of insurance. Defendant admitted he did not have a valid driver’s license. Because defendant showed signs of intoxication, the officer asked him to step out of the vehicle. Defendant needed to use the car door for support to get out of the car, and he eventually admitted he had drunk from the schnapps bottle. Defendant performed roadside sobriety maneuvers unsatisfactorily, and his breath test registered .154g/210L. Defendant was arrested for DUI and placed in the back of the police car. Two other officers then searched the car for further evidence of alcohol consumption and found a bag of cocaine in the console, inches from where defendant sat. Among other things, defendant was convicted of possession of a controlled substance (cocaine).
On appeal, defendant contended that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of possessing a controlled substance (cocaine). He argued that he was not in exclusive possession of the car on the date in question and denied knowing the cocaine was on the car. The possibility that someone else was in the car earlier that day does not change the fact that defendant was in exclusive possession of the vehicle when it was stopped and searched, making him subject to the inference that he knowingly possessed the cocaine. Further, the location of the cocaine and defendant’s testimony that no one else had interacted with the console support the inference. There was sufficient evidence for the jury to convict him on this charge.
Defendant next contended that the trial court should have suppressed evidence related to the recovery of cocaine from his car because the police lacked sufficient grounds to search the car once they seized the half-empty bottle of schnapps. The police are permitted to search a vehicle incident to a lawful arrest. Here, the officer had probable cause to arrest defendant on a DUI charge, defendant initially denied consuming alcohol, and it was likely the officers would find evidence of alcohol while searching defendant’s vehicle. The officers’ reasonable suspicion that the car contained alcohol did not evaporate once the officers found some alcohol. Therefore, the search that uncovered the cocaine was proper.
Finally, at trial, the amount of alcohol in the schnapps bottle when the officer discovered it was contested: the officer said it was half full, while defendant testified it was two-thirds full. During cross-examination, the prosecution asked defendant if the officer “made up” the amount of schnapps in the bottle. Although the prosecution’s question was improper, it did not cast doubt on the reliability of the conviction. The error was not substantial and did not warrant reversal under the plain error rule.
The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People v. McKnight on Thursday, July 13, 2017.
Marijuana—Dog Sniff Search—Probable Cause—Reasonable Suspicion—Suppression of Evidence—Amendment 64.
At defendant’s suppression hearing, Officer Gonzales testified that he saw a truck parked in an alley that then left the alley and eventually parked outside a house for about 15 minutes. The house had been the subject of a search roughly seven weeks earlier that turned up illegal drugs. When the truck drove off, Officer Gonzales followed it, saw it turn without signaling, and pulled it over. Defendant was driving the truck. The officer recognized defendant’s passenger from previous contacts with her, “including drug contacts” involving the use of methamphetamine. At Officer Gonzales’s request, Sergeant Folks came to the scene with his certified drug-detection dog, Kilo. Kilo alerted, the truck was searched, and the officers found a “glass pipe commonly used to smoke methamphetamine” that contained white residue. Defendant was charged with possession of a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence found in his truck, arguing that the police violated his constitutional rights by conducting a dog sniff search without reasonable suspicion and by otherwise searching his truck without probable cause. The court denied the suppression motion, the case proceeded to trial, and defendant was convicted of both counts.
On appeal, defendant contended that under the Colorado Constitution, the deployment of the drug dog was a search requiring reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. The court of appeals first noted that Amendment 64 legalized possession for personal use of marijuana of one ounce or less by persons 21 or older. Therefore, under Colorado law, a drug dog’s alert can reveal, in addition to contraband, the presence of something in which a person has a legitimate expectation of privacy (i.e., the possession of one ounce or less of marijuana). Consequently, a dog sniff should be considered a “search” for purposed of article II, section 7 of the state constitution where the occupants of the vehicle are 21 years or older.
Defendant also argued that the dog’s alert, in combination with other relevant circumstances, did not give police reasonable suspicion to search his truck and thus the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress. A warrantless search effected by a dog sniff of the exterior of a vehicle must be supported by reasonable suspicion. Under the circumstances of this case, the police lacked the requisite reasonable suspicion, the dog sniff was invalid, and the methamphetamine recovered as a result should have been suppressed.
The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in People v. Reyes-Valenzuela on Monday, April 24, 2017.
This interlocutory appeal required the Colorado Supreme Court to answer whether an officer with a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal behavior is afoot must consider the possible innocent explanations for otherwise suspicious behavior before conducting an investigatory stop. The court held that, because case law from this court and the U.S. Supreme Court does not require an officer to consider every possible innocent explanation for criminal behavior, the officers in this case justifiably performed an investigatory stop on defendant based on a reasonable, articulable suspicion of ongoing criminal activity. The court therefore reversed the trial court’s suppression order and remanded the case for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued its opinion in United States v. Hernandez on Thursday, February 9, 2017.
Phillip Hernandez was charged with one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C § 922(g)(1). The district court granted his motion to suppress the evidence, as it was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unlawful seizure during his encounter with two police officers. The government appealed, claiming that the court should apply the subsequent decision in Utah v. Streiff, and arguing that the district court failed to properly apply the Spence factors to the seizure.
On October 20, 2014, two police officers observed Phillip Hernandez walking near a construction site in a known high crime area. The uniformed officers asked Hernandez if they could speak to him, and began asking him questions while driving along side him in their marked police car as Hernandez continued walking. The officers eventually asked Hernandez to stop so they could ask him additional questions. While questioning Hernandez, the officers discovered an active warrant against him and that Hernandez was in possession of a firearm. Hernandez filed a motion to suppress the firearm evidence, which the district court granted.
On appeal, the government asserted that the Supreme Court’s decision in Utah v. Streiff should apply to this case. In Streiff, the Supreme Court ruled that courts may admit illegally obtained evidence as long as the link between the evidence and the illegal method is sufficiently remote, in a case where the evidence in question was obtained by police officers who illegally stop someone and later discover an existing warrant against that person. The Tenth Circuit, however, rejected the application of the decision in Streiff, agreeing with Hernandez that the government had waived the right to present this argument as they had failed to assert it at the district court level.
The court next turned to the government’s argument that the lower court improperly applied the Spence factors to Hernandez’s encounter with the two officers because officers are free to approach individuals and question them. The court stated that the crucial test to determine if an unlawful seizure has occurred is if the officer’s conduct would lead a reasonable person under similar circumstances to believe they were not free to ignore the police presence and leave the situation. The court agreed with the district court’s application of the factors enumerated in United States v. Spence, stating that once the police officers asked Hernandez to stop, because there were two uniformed police officers in a police car at night without other witnesses present, a reasonable person would not have felt he could walk away.
Finally, the court addressed if the officers had reasonable suspicion to justify an investigative detention. In considering the reasonableness of the detention, the court looked at if there were “specific and articulable facts and rational inferences drawn from those facts” that gave the officers reasonable suspicion that Hernandez was involved in criminal activity. The court looked at the officer’s stated reasons for suspicion, including that Hernandez was walking near a construction site where there had been prior thefts, Hernandez was in a high crime area, Hernandez chose not to walk on the side of the street with a sidewalk, and Hernandez was dressed in all black clothing and carrying two backpacks. The court ultimately determined that, although the level of suspicion required for a Terry stop is less than that required for an arrest, the circumstances in this case did not rise to the requisite level for the officers to stop Hernandez.
Justice Briscoe dissented, stating that he believed the encounter between Hernandez and the officers was more along the lines of a consensual encounter and did not constitute an unlawful seizure considering the circumstances.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of a motion to suppress the evidence.
The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in People v. Cox on Monday, February 6, 2017.
Fourth Amendment—Probable Cause—Totality of the Circumstances—Canine Alerts.
Several factors led the trooper, who had stopped defendant’s vehicle for a traffic infraction, to suspect that there might be evidence of illegal activity in the vehicle’s trunk, including defendant’s unusual nervousness, an inconsistency in his account of his travels, the fact that he had two cell phones on the passenger seat of his vehicle, and the fact that the trooper’s canine alerted to the trunk for the presence of drugs. The trooper searched the trunk over defendant’s objection and found multiple sealed packages of marijuana. Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence found in the trunk, which the trial court granted. The trial court concluded that the canine alert could not be considered under the totality of the circumstances because the canine would alert to both legal and illegal amounts of marijuana. The trial court ultimately held that the trooper did not have probable cause to search the trunk.
The Colorado Supreme Court reversed. Under People v. Zuniga, 2016 CO 52, issued before the trial court issued its order in this case, the canine alert should be considered as a part of the totality of the circumstances. Considering the totality of the circumstances, including the canine alert, defendant’s unusual nervousness, an inconsistency in his account of his travels, and the fact that he had two cell phones on the passenger seat of his vehicle, there was probable cause to search the vehicle’s trunk.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Vasquez v. Lewis on Tuesday, August 23, 2016.
Peter Vasquez was driving eastbound on I-70 through Kansas at 2 a.m., traveling from Colorado to Maryland. Officer Lewis and Officer Jimerson could not read Vasquez’s temporary tag through his car’s tinted windows so they initiated a traffic stop. Jimerson observed blankets and a pillow in the front passenger seat and back seat of the car as he approached, and assumed something was obscured by the blankets in the back seat. Vasquez responded that there was no one else in the car. Jimerson took Vasquez’s license and proof of insurance and returned to the patrol car, where he told Lewis that Vasquez appeared nervous. Jimerson sent Lewis to gauge Vasquez’s nervousness and “get a feel for him.” Upon his return, Lewis responded that Vasquez looked “scared to death.” Jimerson checked the insurance and discovered that Vasquez had insurance for two newer vehicles. Suspecting that Vasquez was transporting illegal drugs, Jimerson called for a drug sniffing dog.
Lewis returned to Vasquez’s vehicle and asked where he worked, why he wasn’t driving the newer car, and why he didn’t have more belongings in his vehicle if he was moving. Eventually, Lewis issued a warning and started to walk away, then walked back and asked Vasquez if he could ask a few more questions. Lewis asked Vasquez if there were any illegal drugs in the vehicle, which Vasquez denied. Lewis then asked to search the vehicle but Vasquez refused. After he refused, Lewis detained Vasquez and searched the vehicle, aided by the drug dog. The search revealed nothing illegal.
Vasquez brought suit against the officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, arguing they violated his Fourth Amendment rights by detaining him and searching his car without reasonable suspicion. The district court initially denied the officers’ motion to dismiss, but after discovery, it granted the officers’ motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity, holding that Vasquez could not show the officers violated a clearly established right. Vasquez timely appealed.
The Tenth Circuit remarked that it has repeatedly admonished that once an officer establishes a temporary tag is valid, the officer should explain the reason for the initial stop and let the motorist continue on his or her way. The officers argue their extended seizure was justified by reasons other than the temporary tag. The Tenth Circuit considered only whether the search and dog sniff were valid based on Vasquez’s challenge.
It is wholly improper to assume that an individual is more likely to be engaged in criminal conduct because of his state of residence, and thus any fact that would inculpate every resident of a state cannot support reasonable suspicion. Accordingly, it is time to abandon the pretense that state citizenship is a permissible basis upon which to justify the detention and search of out-of-state motorists, and time to stop the practice of detention of motorists for nothing more than an out-of-state license plate.
The Tenth Circuit continued that the continued use of state of residence as justification is impermissible.
The Tenth Circuit also found that nervousness could not be used as justification, and found that the officers’ reasoning was contradictory at points. The Tenth Circuit similarly disregarded the argument that because Vasquez was driving on I-70 there should be suspicion, noting it would be suspicious if he were driving from Colorado to Maryland and not using I-70. The Tenth Circuit concluded the officers violated Vasquez’s constitutional rights by searching his car.
Turning to whether the right to be free of unconstitutional searches was clearly established at the time of the incident, the Tenth Circuit found precedent to support that it was. In fact, the Tenth Circuit found that the same officer, Officer Jimerson, was the subject of a strikingly similar case in which the Tenth Circuit found no reasonable suspicion for the driver’s detention.
The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings. Judge McHugh dissented; he would not have found a constitutional violation and would have distinguished the other case involving Officer Jimerson.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued its opinion in United States v. Padilla-Esparza on Friday, August 14, 2015.
Daniel Enrique Padilla-Esparza is a citizen of Mexico and a lawful permanent resident of the United States. On February 25, 2013, he was entering the United States from Mexico when a drug-sniffing dog alerted to his truck. Officers searched his truck and found an empty non-factory compartment above the gas tank. The officers released Padilla-Esparza but entered an alert on their communications system regarding Padilla-Esparza and his truck. On September 7, 2013, agents stopped Padilla-Esparza as he was traveling through a border checkpoint on his way to Mexico. CBP Officer Aguilera and his partner interviewed Padilla-Esparza. Their suspicions were raised because Padilla-Esparza had money hidden in a camera case that he had not originally declared, he could not name the last three clients of his landscaping business, he had been through border checkpoints every month for the past six months, and he had receipts for $1,300 in recent clothing purchases. Because of these inconsistencies, Officer Aguilera created a second alert for Padilla-Esparza and updated his license plate information. Officer Aguilera also set up an alert to be sent to his cell phone when Padilla-Esparza returned to the United States.
On September 10, 2013, Officer Aguilera received an alert that Padilla-Esparza had re-entered the United States. He issued a “be on the lookout” alert (BOLO) for Padilla-Esparza and his truck. Three days later, Padilla-Esparza entered the Las Cruces Border Patrol checkpoint, but an officer waved him through the checkpoint due to heavy rain. Another officer monitoring license plates recognized Padilla-Esparza’s and stopped traffic, but soon realized that Padilla-Esparza had already been waved through. Border Patrol agents with a drug-sniffing dog pursued Padilla-Esparza and pulled him over about 15 miles from the border. However, one of the agents mistakenly believed they had the wrong truck and let Padilla-Esparza go. When the agents realized their error, they again pursued Padilla-Esparza and pulled him over again. A drug-sniffing dog alerted to Padilla-Esparza’s truck. Due to the heavy rain, the agents asked him to return to the border patrol checkpoint, and he agreed. At the checkpoint, the agents found 16 kilograms of cocaine in the hidden non-factory compartment.
Padilla-Esparza was indicted on one count of possession with intent to distribute 5 kilograms or more of cocaine. He moved to suppress the evidence seized from his truck. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied his motion. He eventually pleaded guilty but reserved the right to appeal the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress. He was sentenced to 78 months in prison followed by two years of supervised release. He appealed.
On appeal, Padilla-Esparza argued the evidence seized from his vehicle should be suppressed because (1) the first stop was unlawful because Officer Aguilera lacked reasonable suspicion to issue the BOLO alert, and (2) the second stop was unlawful because any reasonable suspicion was dissipated after he was released from the first stop. The Tenth Circuit rejected both arguments. Although Padilla-Esparza argued there were innocent reasons for all the reasons Officer Aguilera found suspicious, the Tenth Circuit found that the mere possibility of innocence does not negate reasonable suspicion. As to Padilla-Esparza’s argument that the second stop was unlawful, the Tenth Circuit again disagreed, noting that the officers’ suspicions were not dissipated after the first stop. Rather, they erroneously released the vehicle based on a mistaken belief that it was not the correct vehicle. They did not investigate Padilla-Esparza at all at the first stop, so there was no basis on which their suspicions could have dissipated.
The district court’s order allowing introduction of the evidence from Padilla-Esparza’s vehicle was affirmed.

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