Source: https://dc.fd.org/motions/appeals/improper%20argument/cooper.htm
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 06:45:47+00:00

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I. Whether the prosecutor's improper summation substantially prejudiced Mr. xxxxxx's right to a fair trial by suggesting that the government had predisposition evidence not presented to the jury and by appealing to the community passions and prejudices against drug dealers.
II. Whether the district court's acceptance of the verdict without disclosing that it was accompanied by a note recommending leniency, combined with defense counsel's failure to object or request any relief when the note was disclosed, deprived Mr. xxxxxx of an unqualified verdict and effective assistance of counsel.
Vernon xxxxxx's trial was fundamentally unfair. Desperate to secure a conviction after two previous juries were unable to reach verdicts, the prosecutor stepped outside of his proper role as a federal official duty-bound to see that justice is done. To overcome Mr. xxxxxx's entrapment defense by proving that he was predisposed to commit the charged drug offenses, the prosecutor referred in his summation to excluded and inadmissible evidence indicating the government had information not presented to the jury concerning Mr. xxxxxx's previous drug trafficking. The prosecutor's remarks flew in the face of the district court's admonishments and evidentiary rulings. By specifically referring to highly prejudicial evidence that the trial court had excluded, the prosecutor vouched for the claim that the government possessed certain intelligence about Mr. xxxxxx's criminal activities. This was more than a hard blow -- it was a foul one. The prosecutor's comments were highly improper and clearly worked to the detriment of Mr. xxxxxx's entrapment defense, denying him his right to a fair trial and to due process of law.
The prosecutor compounded the prejudice by repeatedly appealing to the passions of the jurors and to their fear of drug dealing in their community. He consistently characterized Mr. xxxxxx as a "kilo drug dealer" who would continue to distribute drugs on the streets of the District of Columbia if not convicted. Because such impassioned appeals distort the role of the jury, this Court has rightfully condemned them.
This is not a case of overwhelming evidence against the accused, as the issues relating to the entrapment defense were hotly contested. The government's predisposition case rested essentially upon the credibility of an admitted crack addict who received a $100,000 reward from the DEA, and a drug dealer who agreed to testify against Mr. xxxxxx to avoid a life sentence. Under these circumstances, the combined effect of the prosecutorial misconduct requires a reversal.
In addition to denying two mistrial motions relating to the prosecutor's improper summation, the district court committed another serious error in accepting a guilty verdict without disclosing that it was accompanied by a note -- signed by eight jurors -- recommending leniency for Mr. xxxxxx. The exceptional circumstances relating to the verdict and leniency request required the court to inform counsel of the note, reject the verdict, and send the jury back for further deliberations after appropriate re-instructions. The court plainly erred in accepting the verdict without disclosing the note or conducting any inquiry whatsoever.
The court's error was exacerbated by defense counsel's failure to object to the verdict or request any relief once the leniency note was disclosed. Counsel's deficient performance rendered the result of the trial unreliable.
Each point of error in this case warrants reversal. But the combination of prosecutorial misconduct, acceptance of a questionable verdict, and ineffective assistance of counsel demands it. Mr. xxxxxx did not receive a fair trial or an unqualified jury verdict. His conviction should be reversed.
An improper prosecutorial summation warrants reversal if it causes substantial prejudice to the defendant. United States v. Donato, 99 F.3d 426, 431 (D.C. Cir. 1997). In making this determination, this Court considers "the severity of the misconduct, the measures adopted to cure the misconduct, and the certainty of conviction absent the improper remarks." United States v. Monaghan, 741 F.2d 1434, 1443 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1085 (1985).
To satisfy its burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. xxxxxx was predisposed to commit the charged crimes, the government sought to prove that he was ready and willing to distribute drugs because he was, in fact, a drug dealer. However, the court precluded the prosecution from presenting evidence that the DEA had reason to suspect Mr. xxxxxx of drug activities before Brenda xxxxx agreed to xxxxxxate against him. In fact, the evidence established that the xxxxxx investigation did not begin until December 1993 -- about a year after xxxxx agreed to become an informant.
PROSECUTOR: Now, I want to go back to in December of 1993 there was a discussion, you refer to a meeting that occurred between you, Agent Shelley, and Ms. xxxxx, is that right?
PROSECUTOR: Okay. And at this meeting, was there the name of Vernon xxxxxx? Did that come up?
PROSECUTOR: And was it your intention in talking to Ms. xxxxx about Vernon xxxxxx to try to get her to force Vernon xxxxxx to sell drugs to the DEA?
PROSECUTOR: Was there a reason that name Vernon xxxxxx came up just out of thin air as a person who the DEA may be interested in? Or what happened?
PROSECUTOR: Did you broach the name of Vernon xxxxxx first or Agent Shelley?
PROSECUTOR: Now, was the DEA, were you as investigative agents, interested in pursuing Vernon xxxxxx in this investigation?
PROSECUTOR: And was your decision to initiate an investigation based upon intelligence information you had as investigative agents?
THE COURT: All right, come up to the bench.
THE COURT: Why do you have to get into all this now?
THE COURT: We don't want this -- I don't want this jury to infer from the evidence at this stage of the game that xxxxxx is a known drug dealer, and you're getting dangerously close to that.
PROSECUTOR: I'm not going to bring out that information. That's why I phrased it like that, was it based, was there an intelligence information that caused you to initiate an investigation against xxxxxx.
COUNSEL: What proof of there is that?
THE COURT: Well, that certainly infers [sic] that he is a known drug dealer, and I don't think that you want to get into that now.
PROSECUTOR: I'm not going to bring out he's a known drug dealer.
THE COURT: Well, implicitly or impliedly, when you state it in that fashion, the jury comes to the conclusion that this man is a known drug dealer. Otherwise why would they investigate him?
THE COURT: I think as this case develops, it's going to become quite clear that he's not an innocent person being induced the first time.
PROSECUTOR: Well, I wish you were on the jury, Your Honor, because we've had two hung juries on this case.
THE COURT: I know, but I don't think you should go into that at this time. All right.
Although an error in a prosecutor's summation only rarely warrants reversal, United States v. Donato, 99 F.3d at 432, this Court "has long made clear that the government must take care to ensure that statements made in . . . closing arguments to the jury are supported by evidence introduced at trial." United States v. Small, 74 F.3d 1276, 1280 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1867 (1996) (citing Gaither v. United States, 413 F.2d 1061, 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1969)). The Court also has emphasized the prosecutor's duty to comply with the district court's rulings. See Small, 74 F.3d at 1283 (prosecutor's references in opening and closing statements to inadmissible evidence relating to law enforcement investigative techniques conflicted with trial court's instructions). This Court has reversed convictions where prosecutors referred to evidence not admitted at trial, particularly when the evidence was inadmissible or excluded.
In United States v. Foster, 982 F.2d 551, 555 (D.C. Cir. 1993), the prosecutor made two remarks in rebuttal argument referring, without any basis in the record, to evidence of prior drug dealing by the defendant. In holding that the improper summation constituted reversible error, the court noted, " . . . we can detect no purpose for the comments other than an impermissible one -- to convey to the jury that the prosecution knew of crimes, other than the one charged, committed by Foster before [the date of the charged offense] and even on that very day or morning." Id. at 555. Similarly, in the instant case, the prosecutor's purpose in referring to DEA information about Mr. xxxxxx's suspected drug activities was to persuade the jury that the government knew of prior drug offenses committed by xxxxxx and that, therefore, he was predisposed to commit the charged offenses.
Moreover, in Garris v. United States, 390 F.2d 862, 865-66 (D.C. Cir. 1968), the court held that the prosecutor's reference in his summation to facts that he had been unable to get into evidence over defense objection constituted plain error authorizing reversal, despite the defense's failure to object timely. See also United States v. Hilliard, 569 F.2d 143, 146 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (conviction reversed where prosecution bolstered case by repeated suggestions to jury that information existing outside record proved defendant's guilt); King v. United States, 372 F.2d 383, 394-97 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (murder conviction reversed where prosecutor's assertions in cross-examination and summation regarding defendant's psychiatric evaluation were without evidentiary foundation).
Other federal appellate courts have reached similar results. In United States v. Frederick, 78 F.3d 1370, 1378-79 (9th Cir. 1996), the trial court sustained objections to and struck testimony concerning a government witness's out-of-court prior consistent statements. Notwithstanding the court's ruling, the prosecutor argued in summation that the law enforcement witnesses had testified that the complainant's testimony was consistent with her earlier out-of-court statements. Id. at 1378. Concluding that this argument constituted improper prosecutorial vouching, the court of appeals reversed the conviction. Id. at 1378-79. See also United States v. Gonzalez, 488 F.2d 833, 836 (2d Cir. 1973) (drug conviction reversed where prosecutor's summation included remarks unsupported by the record).
It is clear that the prosecutor's reference to DEA intelligence about Mr. xxxxxx was more than an attempt to simply provide the jury with "background" information. Cf. United States v. Clarke, 24 F.3d 257, 267-68 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (finding "questionable" admission of police "background testimony" but permitting it where testimony could "be said to show the state of mind of the officers.") In this case, the DEA agents' state of mind was irrelevant to the entrapment issue. Instead, the prosecutor's purpose was to convey to the jury that contrary to the defense theory that the informant entrapped Mr. xxxxxx, the government had independent evidence that xxxxxx was predisposed to commit the charged offenses. (See 11/14/95 p.m. Tr. 94-96) Given that two previous juries had hung when presented with Mr. xxxxxx's entrapment defense, the prosecutor was acutely aware of the government's burden to prove predisposition beyond a reasonable doubt. (Id. at 96) Under these circumstances, the prosecutor's improper remarks must be viewed as a desperate attempt to nail down a conviction on his third -- and perhaps final -- try.
Here, the prosecutor's repeated references to Mr. xxxxxx as a large-scale drug dealer who, if acquitted, would continue to distribute drugs on the streets of the District of Columbia, was calculated to excite the prejudices and passions of the jury. Moreover, the prosecutor's suggestion of future drug dealing by Mr. xxxxxx is unsupported by the record as the government presented no evidence of illegal activities by xxxxxx subsequent to his arrest in this case. By "substitut[ing] emotion for evidence," the prosecutor implied that a guilty verdict would constitute "a blow against the drug problem." United States v. Hawkins, 595 F.2d 751, 754 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 910 (1979) (footnote and additional citations omitted). By playing on the jurors' fear of violent drug dealers and their concern for ridding the streets of such criminals, the prosecutor unfairly sought to persuade the jury to convict Mr. xxxxxx for improper reasons wholly apart from the evidence in the case.
Given the severity of the prosecutorial misconduct, the limited corrective steps taken by the district court, and the uncertainty of a conviction in the absence of the improper remarks, it follows that the prosecutor's summation caused substantial prejudice to Mr. xxxxxx's defense. See United States v. Monaghan, 741 F.2d at 1443 (enunciating test for determining whether a prosecutor's summation warrants reversal of conviction).
First, the consequences of the prosecutor's improper arguments were severe. His reference to DEA intelligence about Mr. xxxxxx's prior drug activities provided the jury with inadmissible evidence on the crucial question of xxxxxx's predisposition. The government's other predisposition evidence was not strong. It was presented almost exclusively through the rebuttal testimony of Norman Smith, whose credibility was questionable, at best, because of his interest in testifying to avoid a potential life sentence. (11/28/95 a.m. Tr. 9-13, 94) Although the government introduced some pen register records in an effort to corroborate Smith's testimony, his claim that he had sold cocaine to xxxxxx on numerous occasions was largely uncorroborated. This lack of corroboration apparently gave the jury pause as it took two and a half days to reach a verdict despite audio and videotaped evidence of the two drug transactions.
In this context, the prosecutor's insinuation that the government knew of other drug offenses committed by Mr. xxxxxx -- a remark which the jury had no reason to discredit -- may have "tipped the scales for the jury" on the crucial predisposition question. United States v. Teffera, 985 F.2d 1082, 1089 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (even if appellate court had not found evidence insufficient to support verdict, it would have had to reverse conviction because of prosecutor's improper remarks where government's other evidence was weak). Combined with this error, the prosecutor's appeal to the fears and passions of the jury exacerbated the prejudice to the defense.
Second, given the severity of the prosecutor's improper argument, the district court's standard instruction that the arguments of counsel are not evidence was insufficient to cure the prejudice. See United States v. Foster, 982 F.2d at 555 n.7 (standard reminder in jury charge that arguments of counsel are not evidence insufficient to offset prosecutor's improper remarks relying on facts not in evidence concerning other drug crimes committed by defendant); King v. United States, 372 F.2d at 396 (instruction that jury is to rely on testimony rather than arguments of counsel cannot avoid reversal where case is close and reversal necessary to guard against continued prosecutorial misconduct).
Finally, as noted above, the predisposition question was close and conviction was by no means certain in the absence of the prosecutor's improper remarks. Two previous juries had been unable to reach a verdict in this case. It is likely that the combination of extrarecord references and inflammatory comments at this trial induced one or more jurors who otherwise would have been reluctant to convict in the absence of the improper summation. Because this case is sufficiently close that the Court cannot say with confidence that the prosecutor's improper argument did not affect the integrity of the jury's verdict, reversal of Mr. xxxxxx's conviction is required.
As to Mr. xxxxxx's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, he must show (1) that his attorney's performance was, under all the circumstances, unreasonable under prevailing professional norms, and (2) that there is a "reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result . . . would have been different." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-94 (1984). On a scale of evidentiary burdens, a reasonable probability is shown by less than a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 693-94.
A jury's leniency recommendation generally does not invalidate its verdict and may be disregarded as surplusage. Rogers v. United States, 422 U.S. 35, 38 (1975) (citing Cook v. United States, 379 F.2d 966, 970 (5th Cir. 1967)). However, where the circumstances surrounding the recommendation cast suspicion on whether the verdict is unqualified or unanimous, the trial court must conduct an inquiry. Cook, 379 F.2d at 970-71. See also Rogers, 422 U.S. at 38 (noting Cook "exception" with approval). Given the exceptional facts and circumstances regarding the jury's leniency recommendation in the instant case, the district court committed plain error by accepting the verdict without informing the defense of, or conducting any inquiry into, the recommendation.
Although based on different facts, the decisions in Rogers and Cook are instructive. In Rogers, the deliberating jury inquired in a note whether the court would accept a guilty verdict "with extreme mercy of the Court." 422 U.S. at 36. Without notifying the defendant or his counsel, the court affirmatively responded to the note. Id. Five minutes later, the court accepted the jury's verdict as indicated in its note. Id. at 37. When the jury was polled, all jurors confirmed their verdict. Id.
In reversing the defendant's conviction even though the issue had not been raised either in the court of appeals or in the Supreme Court, the Court held that the district court had violated FED. R. CRIM. P. 43 by answering the jury's inquiry without informing the defense and providing it with an opportunity to be heard. Id. at 39-41. The Court concluded that the Rule 43 violation was not harmless because the circumstances concerning the jury's leniency inquiry and subsequent guilty verdict "strongly suggest[ed] that the trial judge's response may have induced unanimity by giving members of the jury who had previously hesitated about reaching a guilty verdict the impression that the recommendation might be an acceptable compromise." Id. at 40. In reaching this conclusion, the Court noted that "[a]t the very least," the trial judge should have responded to the inquiry by advising the jury that its recommendation would not be binding in any way. Id.
In Cook, the district court accepted a verdict that included on the bottom of the form a request that the defendant be given "every degree of leniency possible." 379 F.2d at 968. When the verdict was published, the court referred to the leniency request and explained the sentencing procedures to the jury. Id. at 968-69. The jury was then polled and almost all of the jurors made some reference to the leniency recommendation. Id. at 969 & n.1. The trial court denied the defendant's request for a further inquiry into the verdict. Id. at 969. The Fifth Circuit reversed the conviction and found that the combination of circumstances required the district court to conduct an inquiry to decide whether the verdict was conditioned in any way on the leniency request. Id. at 970-71.
As in Rogers and Cook, the circumstances in this case indicate that the jury's verdict was not unqualified and unambiguous. First, the leniency recommendation indicates that a compromise was reached. This is particularly true here, where if all of the jurors had accepted the prosecution's theory of the case that Mr. xxxxxx was a notorious drug dealer, a request to show him mercy makes little sense. The leniency recommendation strongly suggests a compromise whereby some jurors who had doubts about the credibility of the government's evidence qualifiedly voted guilty in conjunction with their leniency recommendation. Second, the fact that the leniency note was not signed by all of the jurors casts further doubt on the unanimity of the verdict. Third, the jury here deliberated for more than two days even though ultimately only the very narrow issues relating to Mr. xxxxxx's entrapment defense were significant. Finally, two previous juries were unable to reach verdicts and this was the third jury convened by the government.
Under these circumstances, the trial judge plainly erred by not rejecting the verdict, instructing the jury that its verdict could not be conditioned on its leniency request, and sending the jury back for further deliberations in light of those instructions. The only action the district court took in response to the leniency note was improper -- informing the jurors that, contrary to the court's standard instruction that the question of possible punishment should not influence their deliberations (11/29/95 Tr. 116), the court would consider their recommendation. (12/1/95 Tr. 9) The trial court also independently had a duty to inform counsel of the leniency note before accepting the verdict and polling the jury. Rogers, 422 U.S. at 39-41.
Furthermore, in denying Mr. xxxxxx's new trial motion, the district court's reliance on the decision in United States v. Lee, 532 F.2d 911, 914-15 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 838 (1976), was misplaced. In that case, the jury returned a guilty verdict stating in pertinent part, "although we have voted guilty we implore the Court to exercise extreme leniency." Id. at 914. The note was signed by each juror. Id. After publishing the verdict and polling the jury, the trial judge read the note into the record. Id. The district court denied the defendant's request to ask the jurors whether their leniency request affected their verdict. Id. at 913.
In holding that the district court did not err in refusing to question the jurors or ordering further deliberations sua sponte, the Fifth Circuit distinguished Cook on the grounds, inter alia, that, unlike the leniency recommendation in Cook, the language of the Lee jury's note indicated that the vote for a guilty finding was unconditional. Id. at 915. The court of appeals noted that the jury's use of the word "implore" in its leniency request "sounds like nothing more than a plea containing no element of contingency." Id. The tone and language of the leniency recommendation in the instant case are significantly different from that used in Lee but almost identical to that used in Cook. For that reason, Cook rather than Lee is controlling. Moreover, the court of appeals's analysis in Lee -- which the district court in this case followed -- is flawed insofar as it relied on the results of the jury poll to support its decision. Because the district courts here and in Lee failed to advise the respective juries before polling them that their leniency recommendations were ineffectual and could not be considered in reaching their verdicts, the jurors' apparently unequivocal responses during their polling were functionally irrelevant. This is particularly true in the instant case where the court specifically instructed the jurors before polling them to answer either "yes" or "no." (12/1/95 Tr. 8) Under these circumstances, the jurors' assent to the guilty verdict is not legally meaningful.
The district court's error in accepting the verdict without informing counsel of the leniency recommendation, re-instructing the jury, or ordering further deliberations violated settled law under Rogers, Cook, and United States v. Patrick, 494 F.2d 1150, 1153 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (trial judge erred by telling jury it could recommend psychiatric treatment if it returned guilty verdict since "[i]t is well established in this jurisdiction that the jury's only function is to assess guilt or innocence on the basis of their independent views of the evidence.") Moreover, the error was clearly prejudicial in that the effect of the leniency recommendation in light of the exceptional circumstances involved in this case, was to nullify the verdict. See Cook, 379 F.2d at 970. Therefore, the district court committed plain error requiring reversal of Mr. xxxxxx's conviction. See Patrick, 494 F.2d at 1151, 1153-55 (finding plain error); United States v. Davidson, 367 F.2d 60, 63-64 (6th Cir. 1966) (trial court plainly erred by instructing deliberating jury it could recommend leniency and guilty verdict reached one-half hour later).
Defense counsel did not become aware of the jury note recommending leniency until after the district court had accepted the verdict and polled the jury. At that time, given the two previous hung juries, the length of deliberations in this case, and the less than unanimous leniency recommendation, counsel's failure to object or to request any relief whatsoever deprived Mr. xxxxxx of his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-90 (1984) (requiring performance below objective standard of reasonableness and prejudice).
The relevant case law clearly recognizes that inquiry is required where the circumstances surrounding a leniency recommendation cast doubt on the unconditional nature of a guilty verdict. Therefore, defense counsel's performance was deficient in failing to object to the acceptance of the verdict and in failing to request additional instructions, further deliberations, or, at a minimum, re-polling of the jury with specific reference to the effect, if any, of the leniency request. Counsel's failure to take any action fell below an objective standard of reasonable competence required of criminal defense attorneys practicing in federal court. Id. at 687-88.
Mr. xxxxxx was prejudiced by his counsel's failure to challenge the verdict in that there is a reasonable probability that had counsel objected and an appropriate inquiry been made, the district court would have discovered that at least one juror's guilty vote was conditioned on the leniency recommendation. Counsel's inaction undermined confidence in the jury's verdict. Therefore, counsel's deficient performance rendered the result of the trial unreliable and fundamentally unfair. Id. at 693-94. Because Mr. xxxxxx did not receive the unqualified and unambiguous verdict to which he is entitled under the law, a new trial is required.
The two points of error in this case -- the prosecutor's improper summation and the district court's acceptance of a questionable verdict -- cast doubt on the fairness of Mr. xxxxxx's conviction. Taken together, the errors leave the impression of hollow justice. Under these circumstances, Mr. xxxxxx respectfully asks the Court to reverse his conviction and remand the case for a new trial in which prosecutorial zeal is properly harnessed and the integrity of the jury's verdict is certain.
I hereby certify that the foregoing brief for appellant, Vernon xxxxxx, does not exceed the number of words permitted pursuant to D. C. Circuit Rule 28(d).
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on April 30, 1997, I have served by hand two copies of the foregoing Brief for Appellant Vernon xxxxxx and one copy of the accompanying Appendix on John R. Fisher, Chief, Appellate Section, Criminal Division, United States Attorney's Office, 555 4th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20001.
1. "A." refers to the appendix filed with this brief. References to the transcript of the district court proceedings are cited by date and page number (e.g., "12/1/95 Tr. ") and trial exhibits are cited by their exhibit numbers (e.g., "Gov. Ex. "). Pertinent portions of the transcript are contained in the appendix behind tabs A-G.
3. Smith's testimony during the afternoon session of the 11/28/95 proceedings was typed in a separate volume, pages 1-54.

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