Source: http://co.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20180322_0000370.DCO.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 18:50:00+00:00

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, Defendant.
This matter comes before the court on “Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum Brief in Support Thereof” (Doc. No. 49 [Mot.], filed August 8, 2017). Plaintiff filed his Response on October 3, 2017 (Doc. No. 55 [Resp.]), and Defendant filed its Reply on October 27, 2017 (Doc. No. 63 [Reply]).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). A party also “may object that the material cited to support or dispute a fact cannot be presented in a form that would be admissible in evidence.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(2).
Moreover, “[i]f a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party's assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c), the court may . . . consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion” or “grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials-including the facts considered undisputed-show that the movant is entitled to it . . . .” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(2)-(3).
Finally, the court should accept as true all material facts asserted and properly supported in the summary judgment motion. Reed v. Bennett, 312 F.3d 1190, 1195 (10th Cir. 2002). “[O]n a motion for summary judgment, it is the responding party's burden to ensure that the factual dispute is portrayed with particularity, without depending on the trial court to conduct its own search of the record.” Cross v. The Home Depot, 390 F.3d 1283, 1290 (10th Cir. 2004) (quotations and citation omitted). The court is “not obligated to comb the record in order to make [Plaintiff's] arguments for him.” Mitchell v. City of Moore, Okla., 218 F.3d 1190, 1199 (10th Cir. 2000).
Accordingly, to the extent Plaintiff “denies” facts presented or requests that they be stricken as immaterial and yet fails to provide any evidence in support of the denial or request to strike which contradicts Defendants' evidence, the court considers the facts identified by Defendant as unopposed.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2). Nevertheless, although certain facts are deemed admitted, the court still must decide whether the defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law based upon the material facts asserted and properly supported in the Motion and applicable legal principles. See Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(a), (c), (e)(3); Reed, 312 F.3d at 1195-96.
need not be submitted in a form that would be admissible at trial. Parties may, for example, submit affidavits in support of summary judgment, despite the fact that affidavits are often inadmissible at trial as hearsay, on the theory that the evidence may ultimately be presented at trial in an admissible form. Nonetheless, the content or substance of the evidence must be admissible. Thus, for example, at summary judgment courts should disregard inadmissible hearsay statements contained in affidavits, as those statements could not be presented at trial in any form.
Agro v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kan., Inc., 452 F.3d 1193, 1199 (10th Cir. 2006) (emphasis in original, internal citations and quotations omitted). It is only necessary for the party submitting the evidence to show “that it will be possible to put the information, the substance or content of the evidence, into an admissible form.” Brown v. Perez, 835 F.3d 1223, 1232 (10th Cir. 2016) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Because the written reports of Plaintiff's experts set out opinions that are anticipated to be offered in testimony at trial, there is no bar to considering those opinions here. The court will, however, disregard any statements recorded in the expert reports that would not be otherwise admissible at trial. See Agro, 452 F.3d at 1199.
This court's practice standards require “[a] party objecting to the admissibility of opinion testimony by an expert witness [to] file a written motion seeking its exclusion.” See Practice Standards (Civil Cases), § III.J. “The deadline for filing all such motions shall be the same date as set for the filing of dispositive motions.” (Id.) Mr. Cox's report is dated February 1, 2017, and was provided to Defendant on February 3, 2017. (See Doc. No. 44.) Thus, at this time, Defendant's objection to the inclusion of Mr. Cox as an expert witness or to the inclusion of his report is overruled.
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 “imposes on the district court a gatekeeper function to ‘ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable.' ” United States v. Gabaldon, 389 F.3d 1090, 1098 (10th Cir. 2004) (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993)). To execute that function, the court must “assess the reasoning and methodology underlying the expert's opinion, and determine whether it is both scientifically valid and applicable to a particular set of facts.” Dodge v. Cotter Corp., 328 F.3d 1212, 1221 (10th Cir. 2003) (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-93). Defendant has not seriously called into question the “reasoning and methodology underlying [Dr. Busse's] opinion, ” Dodge v. Cotter Corp., 328 F.3d 1212, 1221 (10th Cir. 2003). Rather, Plaintiff questions the validity of the opinion in the guise of attacking its admissibility.
“While expert opinions ‘must be based on facts which enable [the expert] to express a reasonably accurate conclusion as opposed to conjecture or speculation, . . . absolute certainty is not required.' ” Goebel v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R. Co., 346 F.3d 987, 991 (10th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). See also Warren v. Tastove, 240 F. App'x 771, 773 (10th Cir. 2007) (requiring that “an opining physician . . . offer an opinion with a reasonable degree of medical certainty” and noting that “a hunch, even an educated hunch, is not enough”). Nevertheless, the fact that a physician may not be able to testify to a reasonable degree of medical certainty goes to the weight a testimony, not to its admissibility. In re Swine Flu Immunization Prod. Liab. Litig., 533 F.Supp. 567, 578 (D. Colo. 1980) (citing United States v. Cyphers, 553 F.2d 1064 (7th Cir. 1977).
To the extent Defendant seeks to undermine the correctness of Dr. Busse's opinion, it may do so through normal means at trial. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596 (“Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.”). Defendant's objection to Dr. Busse's opinion at this stage, however, is overruled.

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