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Timestamp: 2019-04-24 08:55:48+00:00

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Justia › US Law › US Case Law › US Supreme Court › Volume 314 › Toucey v. New York Life Insurance Co.
Section 265 of the Judicial Code forbids a federal court to enjoin a proceeding in personam in a state court on the ground that the claim in controversy has been previously adjudicated by the federal court. P. 314 U. S. 129.
112 F.2d 927 and 115 F.2d 1 reversed.
No. 16 came here on certiorari, 311 U.S. 643, to review the affirmance of a decree of injunction, 112 F.2d 927. The decision below was affirmed here by an equally divided Court, 313 U.S. 538; subsequently, a rehearing was granted, 313 U. S. 59.
No.19 is here on certiorari, 312 U.S. 670, to review the affirmance of a decree of injunction, 115 F.2d 1.
These cases were argued in succession, and are dealt with in a single opinion because the controlling question in both is the same: does a federal court have power to stay a proceeding in a state court simply because the claim in controversy has previously been adjudicated in the federal court?
No. 16. In 1935, Toucey brought suit against the New York Life Insurance Company in a Missouri state court. He alleged that, in 1924, the company issued him a life insurance policy providing for monthly disability benefits and for the waiver of premiums during disability; that he became disabled in April, 1933, and that the defendant fraudulently concealed the disability provisions from him; that the defendant unlawfully cancelled the policy for nonpayment of premiums; that, in September, 1935, he discovered the existence of the disability provisions; that he then applied to the company for reinstatement of the policy and for the payment of disability benefits, and that the company refused.
The suit was removed to the federal District Court for the Western District of Missouri, the plaintiff being a citizen of Missouri, the defendant a New York corporation, and the amount in controversy exceeding $3,000. All of the material allegations of the bill were denied. The district court dismissed the bill, finding that there was no fraud on the defendant's part and that the plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the policy. No appeal was taken.
In 1937, an action at law was brought against the insurance company in the Missouri state court by one Shay, a resident of the District of Columbia. He alleged that he was Toucey's assignee and that Toucey's disability entitled him to judgment. It does not appear that the insurance company filed an answer or any other pleading. Instead, a "supplemental bill" was filed in the Western District of Missouri, setting forth the history of the litigation between the parties, alleging that the assignment to Shay was made in order to avoid federal jurisdiction, and praying that Toucey be enjoined from bringing any suit for the purpose of readjudicating the issues settled by the federal decree and from further prosecuting the Shay suit.
appealed, and the Circuit Court of Appeals again affirmed, 112 F.2d 927. In view of the importance of the questions presented, we granted certiorari. 311 U.S. 643. The decision below was affirmed by an equally divided Court, 313 U.S. 538, and the case is now before us on rehearing, 313 U.S. 596.
No.19. The Iowa-Wisconsin Bridge Company, a Delaware corporation, in 1932 executed a deed of trust conveying all of its property, principally a bridge across the Mississippi River between Iowa and Wisconsin, to secure a $200,000 bond issue. In 1933, the trustees, an Iowa corporation and a Wisconsin citizen, filed a bill of foreclosure in the federal District Court for the Northern District of Iowa. One of the Bridge Company's stockholders intervened as a party defendant, alleging that the bonds and mortgage were fraudulent and without consideration. Upon his motion, the Phoenix Finance Corporation, a Delaware corporation which held almost 90% of the bonds, was joined as a plaintiff. The Bridge Company's answer challenged the validity of the indenture and alleged that the bonds were issued without consideration. Phoenix denied all allegations of fraud.
The case was tried before a master, whose modified conclusions were adopted by the court. Finding that the mortgage and bonds were fraudulently issued and that almost all the bonds were without consideration, the court denied foreclosure. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed, First Trust & Savings Bank v. Iowa-Wisconsin Bridge Co., 98 F.2d 416, and certiorari was denied, 305 U.S. 650.
judicata by the federal decree, and praying, inter alia, that Phoenix be enjoined from further prosecuting the state suits. (In one of the suits, the state court rejected the res judicata plea, Phoenix Finance Corp. v. Iowa-Wisconsin Bridge Co., 40 Del. 500, 14 A.2d 386, and an appeal is now pending in the Supreme Court of Delaware.) The district court found that Phoenix was bound by the former decree, and that the prohibition of § 265 was no bar to an injunction. The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, 115 F.2d 1, and, because of the relation of the questions presented to those in No. 16, we brought the case here. 312 U.S. 670.
"a limitation of the power of the federal courts dating almost from the beginning of our history and expressing an important Congressional policy -- to prevent needless friction between state and federal courts,"
granted by any court of the United States to stay proceedings in any court of a State, except in cases where such injunction may be authorized by any law relating to proceedings in bankruptcy. [Footnote 2]"
"will debar the district court from interfering with the judgments at law in the State courts; for if the plaintiff and defendant rely upon the State courts, as far as the judgment, they ought to continue there as they have begun. It is enough to split the same suit into one at law, and another in equity, without adding a further separation, by throwing the common law side of the question into the State courts, and the equity side into the federal courts."
duties were too burdensome. American State Papers, Misc. vol. 1, No. 32, p. 51. In response to this complaint, which was transmitted to Congress, the Act of March 2, 1793, was passed, containing in § 5, inter alia, the prohibition against staying state court proceedings.
Charles Warren, in his article Federal and State Court Interference, 43 Harv.L.Rev. 345, 347, suggests that this provision was the direct consequence of Randolph's report. This seems doubtful, in view of the very narrow purpose of Randolph's proposal -- namely, that federal courts of equity should not interfere with the enforcement of judgments at law rendered in the state courts. See Taylor and Willis, The Power of Federal Courts to Enjoin Proceedings in State Courts, 42 Yale L.J. 1169, 1171, n. 14.
see Proposed Draft of Revision of U.S. Statutes (1872), vol. 1, p. 418.
(2) Removal of actions. The Removal Acts, ever since the Act of September 24, 1789, 1 Stat. 73, 79, have provided that, whenever any party entitled to remove a suit shall file with the state court a proper petition for removal and a bond with good and sufficient surety, it shall then be the duty of the state court to accept such petition and bond "and proceed no further in the cause." Section 265 has always been deemed inapplicable to removal proceedings. Dietzsch v. Huidekoper, 103 U. S. 494; Madisonville Traction Co. v. St. Bernard Mining Co., 196 U. S. 239. The true rationale of these decisions is that the Removal Acts qualify pro tanto the Act of 1793. Subsequent decisions have clarified the loose ground advanced in French v. Hay, 22 Wall. 250, 89 U. S. 253, note. See Kline v. Burke Construction Co., 260 U. S. 226; Taylor and Willis, The Power of Federal Courts to Enjoin Proceedings in State Courts, 42 Yale L.J. 1169, 1174-75; compare Bryant v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 92 F.2d 569, 571.
(3) Limitation of shipowners' liability. The Act of 1851 limiting the liability of shipowners provides that, after a shipowner transfers his interest in the vessel to a trustee for the benefit of the claimants, "all claims and proceedings against the owner or owners shall cease." 9 Stat. 635, 636. Being a "subsequent statute" to the Act of 1793, this provision operates as an implied legislative amendment to it. Providence & N.Y. S.S. Co. v. Hill Mfg. Co., 109 U. S. 578, 109 U. S. 599; see Admiralty Rule 51, 254 U.S. appendix, p. 26.
any suit or proceeding in any State court or in any other Federal court. . . ."
See Dugas v. American Surety Co., 300 U. S. 414, 300 U. S. 428; Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U. S. 66, 308 U. S. 74.
(5) Frazier-Lemke Act. The filing of a petition for relief under this Act subjects the farmer and his property, wherever located, to the "exclusive jurisdiction" of the federal court. And, except with the consent of the court, specified proceedings against the farmer or his property "shall not be instituted, or if instituted at any time prior to the filing of a petition under this section, shall not be maintained, in any court. . . ." 47 Stat. 1473. See Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U. S. 433.
"The rank and authority of the [federal and state] courts are equal, but both courts cannot possess or control the same thing at the same time, and any attempt to do so would result in unseemly conflict. The rule, therefore, that the court first acquiring jurisdiction shall proceed without interference from a court of the other jurisdiction is a rule of right and of law based upon necessity, and where the necessity, actual or potential, does not exist, the rule does not apply. Since that necessity does exist in actions in rem and does not exist in actions in personam, involving a question of personal liability only, the rule applies in the former, but does not apply in the latter."
U.S. 51, 177 U. S. 61; Kline v. Burke Construction Co., 260 U. S. 226, 260 U. S. 229, 260 U. S. 235; Lion Bonding & Surety Co. v. Karatz, 262 U. S. 77, 262 U. S. 88-89; see Warren, Federal and State Court Interference, 43 Harv.L.Rev. 345, 359-66. And where a state court first acquires control of the res, the federal courts are disabled from exercising any power over it, by injunction or otherwise. Palmer v. Texas, 212 U. S. 118.
"That term [proceedings] is comprehensive. It includes all steps taken or which may be taken in the state court or by its officers from the institution to the close of the final process. It applies to appellate as well as to original proceedings, and is independent of the doctrine of res judicata. It applies alike to action by the court and by its ministerial officers; applies not only to an execution issued on a judgment, but to any proceeding supplemental or ancillary taken with a view to making the suit or judgment effective."
Texas R. Co., supra, which, as we have seen, was not a relitigation case. [Footnote 9] 255 U.S. at 255 U. S. 367.
Fifth. We find, therefore, that, apart from Congressional authorization, only one "exception" has been imbedded in § 265 by judicial construction, to-wit, the res cases. The fact that one exception has found its way into § 265 is no justification for making another. Furthermore, the res exception, having its roots in the same policy from which sprang § 265, has had an uninterrupted and firmly established acceptance in the decisions. The rule of the res cases was unequivocally on the books when Congress reenacted the original § 5 of the Act of 1793, first by the Revised Statutes of 1874 and later by the Judicial Code in 1911.
We are not dealing here with a settled course of decisions, erroneous in origin but around which substantial interests have clustered. Only a few recent and episodic utterances furnish a tenuous basis for the exception which we are now asked explicitly to sanction. Whatever justification there may be for turning past error into law when reasonable expectations would thereby be defeated, no such justification can be urged on behalf of a procedural doctrine in the distribution of judicial power between federal and state courts. It denies reality to suggest that litigants have shaped their conduct in reliance upon some loose talk in past decisions in the application of § 265 or, more concretely, upon erroneous implications drawn from Looney v. Eastern Texas R. Co., supra, and Supreme Tribe of BenHur v. Cauble, supra. Compare Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U. S. 106, 309 U. S. 119-120.
and unmistakably spoken words. This is not a situation where Congress has failed to act after having been requested to act, or where the circumstances are such that Congress would ordinarily be expected to act. The provisions of § 265 have never been the subject of comprehensive legislative reexamination. Even the exceptions referable to legislation have been incidental features of other statutory schemes, such as the Removal and Interpleader Acts. The explicit and comprehensive policy of the Act of 1793 has been left intact. To find significance in Congressional nonaction under these circumstances is to find significance where there is none.
Section 265 is not an isolated instance of withholding from the federal courts equity powers possessed by Anglo-American courts. As part of the delicate adjustments required by our federalism, Congress has rigorously controlled the "inferior courts" in their relation to the courts of the states. The unitary system of the courts of England is saved these problems.
"The legislation of Congress, in organizing the judicial powers of the United States, exhibits much circumspection in avoiding occasions for placing the tribunals of the States and of the Union in any collision."
We must be scrupulous in our regard for the limits within which Congress has confined the authority of the courts of its own creation.
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS took no part in the consideration or decision of No.19.
* Together with No.19, Phoenix Finance Corp. v. Iowa-Wisconsin Bridge Co., also on writ of certiorari, 312 U.S. 670, to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit -- argued March 13, 1941, reargued October 17, 20, 1941.
Pleading a federal decree as res judicata in a state suit raises a federal question reviewable in this Court under § 237(b) of the Judicial Code, 43 Stat. 937, 28 U.S.C. § 344(b). Dupasseur v. Rochereau, 21 Wall. 130; Deposit Bank v. Frankfort, 191 U. S. 499; Virginia-Carolina Chemical Co. v. Kirven, 215 U. S. 252; Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U. S. 165, 305 U. S. 167.
"limits their general equity powers in respect to the granting of a particular form of equitable relief; that is, it prevents them from granting relief by way of injunction in the cases included within its inhibitions."
Smith v. Apple, 264 U. S. 274, 264 U. S. 279. See Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U. S. 66, 308 U. S. 74.
"nor shall such writ [of injunction] be granted in any case without reasonable previous notice to the adverse party, or his attorney, of the time and place of moving for the same."
"courts of the United States, shall have power to issue writs of scire facias, habeas corpus, and all other writs not specially provided for by statute, which may be necessary for the exercise of their respective jurisdictions, and agreeable to the principles and usages of law."
The general powers thus given to the federal courts were obviously limited by the subsequent enactment of the specific prohibitory provisions of the Act of 1793.
The first case arising under the provision was Diggs & Keith v. Wolcott, 4 Cranch 179, where the appellants brought an action at law on various promissory notes in a state court. While this action was still pending, the defendant filed a bill in the state chancery court for cancellation of the notes. The latter suit was removed to the federal circuit court, which cancelled the notes and enjoined the further prosecution of the state action at law. The report of the proceeding in this Court states merely that "the court, being of opinion that a circuit court of the United States had not jurisdiction to enjoin proceedings in a state court, reversed the decree." In his Commentaries on American Law (1826) vol. 1, p. 386, Chancellor Kent, stating that the decision in the case "is not to be contested," refers to it as illustrative of a situation "in which any control by the federal over the state courts, other than by means of the established appellate jurisdiction, has equally been prevented." Peck v. Jenness, 7 How. 612, 48 U. S. 625, holding that a federal court sitting in bankruptcy could not discharge the lien of a prior attachment made under state law, was the first case which expressly relied upon the Act of 1793. In Orton v. Smith, 18 How. 263, 59 U. S. 266, the Court held it error to enjoin a state action to establish title to certain land. "The courts of the United States have no such power over suitors in a state court."
The extent to which a federal court's exclusive control over the res may require use of the injunction to effectuate its decrees in rem is illustrated by Riverdale Mills v. Manufacturing Co., 198 U. S. 188; Julian v. Central Trust Co., 193 U. S. 93, and Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U. S. 234, 292 U. S. 241. Cf. Ex parte Baldwin, 291 U. S. 610, 291 U. S. 615.
For similar reasons, we need not here consider cases like Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123, and Gunter v. Atlantic Coast Line, 200 U. S. 273, with which compare Hale v. Bimco Trading, Inc., 306 U. S. 375, 306 U. S. 378.
The Court also held that, in a foreclosure proceeding, the complainant cannot join a third person who claims adversely to the mortgagor and mortgagee, and that consequently there was a misjoinder of parties. 96 U.S. at 96 U. S. 341. These grounds for decision were, of course, alternative, and either alone was sufficient to dispose of the case. However, they were entirely separate and distinct, and there is no basis for any inference that the Court might have upheld an injunction if Reynolds had been properly joined. Nor need we consider common law refinements in actions for ejectment, for the Court went explicitly on its duty to obey the Act of 1793.
"effectuate their own decrees by injunctions or writs of assistance, in order to avoid the relitigation of questions once settled between the same parties."
150 U.S. at 150 U. S. 411-412. The Court did not uphold a federal injunction against a state suit to relitigate a claim already settled by a previous federal decree -- no such state suit had been brought. Consequently, there was no occasion to consider the applicability of § 265. The "first come, first served" rationale of cases like Prout v. Starr, 188 U. S. 537, was discarded in Kline v. Burke Construction Co., 260 U. S. 226, 260 U. S. 235. Cf. Haines v. Carpenter, 91 U. S. 254, 91 U. S. 257.
There is no warrant for the assumption that, in the proposals for the Judicial Code of 1911, Congress had before it the "relitigation" exception as settled doctrine, and that, by § 265, gave it legislative confirmation. The Report of the Special Joint Committee on Revision and Codification of the Laws of the United States annotated the Act of 1793 with citations to twenty-six decisions of this Court. Sen.Rept. No. 388, 61st Cong., 2d Sess., p. 470. Yet no reference was made to four of the five decisions of this Court prior to the Judicial Code which are supposed to justify the "relitigation" doctrine: Root v. Woolworth, 150 U. S. 401; Prout v. Starr, 188 U. S. 537; Riverdale Mills v. Manufacturing Co., 198 U. S. 188; Gunter v. Atlantic Coast Line, 200 U. S. 273. (As we have already seen, "removal" cases like French v. Hay, 22 Wall. 250, and Dietzsch v. Huidekoper, 103 U. S. 494, rest upon an entirely different footing.) None of the reports submitted to Congress contained any discussion of § 5 of the Act of 1793 and the decisions construing it. See H.Rept. No. 818, 61st Cong., 2d Sess., referring to H.Doc. No. 783, 61st Cong., 2d Sess.; Sen. Rept. No. 388, 61st Cong., 2d Sess.; Final Report of the Commission to Revise and Codify the Laws of the United States (1906), pp. 29, 244. Nor do the debates disclose any consideration of the question. See 45 Cong.Rec. pt.s. III and IV, and 46 Cong.Rec. pt.s. I-V, passim.
equity powers of judges of this Court by authorizing them to issue writs of ne exeat and injunction, and, on the other, restricted the use of restraining orders without notice. Left to the four corners of the act, for lack of legislative materials, for deductions as to the purpose and intention of the enacting Congress, and faced with the absolute prohibition of its words, it might well be concluded that the intention was to bar an injunction running against the court itself, as distinguished from the parties. [Footnote 2/4] The fact that courts of equity had long exercised the power to entertain bills to carry their decrees into execution by injunction against the parties adds strength to such a supposition. [Footnote 2/5] Such needed powers would not be lightly withdrawn.
The courts properly are hesitant to depart from literalism in interpreting a statute. [Footnote 2/11] Strong equities do induce departure from the ordinary course where the purpose of the Congress appears plain. [Footnote 2/12] It is hard to conceive of a statute, new or old, which has a meaning totally disassociated from supporting legislation or the body of adjudications within its ambit. This statute is in a posture much more favorable for the interpretation that it authorizes injunctions against relitigation in state courts than were the statutes construed in any of the cases cited in the preceding note for the interpretation given them. In fact, we conclude that its restatement in the Code of 1911, with the decisions now to be examined in existence, necessitates the interpretation here advocated. Additional decisions since 1911 and the failure of Congress to repudiate this interpretation add something of substance to this argument.
of a court. Inasmuch, however, as the cases hereafter cited concern rights arising from claims already adjudicated, and since, in the cases where a res was at one time involved, the property was no longer in the possession of the court issuing the injunction, the theory of preventing an unseemly clash over physical possession has no basis. The principle for which the following authorities stand is that a court has the right to execute its decrees to avoid relitigation and forced reliance on res judicata. The proceedings, as will be made to appear later, which were supplemented by the orders prohibiting state suits here under review, fall well within the limits of this hitherto well recognized conception.
"jurisdiction of courts of equity to interfere and effectuate their own decrees by injunctions or writs of assistance, in order to avoid the relitigation of questions once settled between the same parties, is well settled."
Root, the party enjoined by the original decree, asserted rights which would require relitigation of settled issues. Accordingly, he was enjoined on supplemental bill, inter alia, "from bringing any action or actions touching the title to or possession of the said premises. . . ." Until dissolved, that injunction forbade proceedings in state and federal courts alike. Although § 265 was not discussed, the case is cited as a convenient summary of the then law, and because it promptly became a precedent for enforcement of decrees even when the problem of § 265 was raised. The authority of this case has not been doubted until now.
defeated or impaired by the institution, by one of the parties, of subsequent proceedings, whether civil or criminal, involving the same legal questions, in the state court."
"In such case, we are of opinion that a supplemental bill may be filed in the original suit with a view to protecting the prior jurisdiction of the Federal court and to render effectual its decree. . . . In such cases, where the Federal court acts in aid of its own jurisdiction and to render its decree effectual, it may, notwithstanding § 720, Rev.Stat. [§ 265, J.C.], restrain all proceedings in a state court which would have the effect of defeating or impairing its jurisdiction. . . . It is conceded that the Federal right could be set up in the state court from which the execution issued, and, if denied, the ultimate rights of the parties can be determined upon writ of error to this Court. In the view we have taken of this case, the federal court had not lost its jurisdiction to protect the purchaser at its sale upon direct proceedings such as are now before us. [Footnote 2/14] "
"protect the title which it has decreed as against every one a party to the original suit, and prevent that party from relitigating the questions of right which have already been determined."
198 U.S. at 198 U. S. 195.
"A court of the United States is not prevented from enforcing its own judgments by the statute which forbids it to grant a writ of injunction to stay proceedings in a State court. "
"Indeed, the proposition that the 11th Amendment, or § 720 of the Revised Statutes, control a court of the United States in administering relief, although the court was acting in a matter ancillary to a decree rendered in a cause over which it had jurisdiction, is not open for discussion. Dietzsch v. Huidekoper, 103 U. S. 494; Prout v. Starr, 188 U. S. 537; Julian v. Central Trust Co., 193 U. S. 93, 193 U. S. 112."
It cannot fairly be said, we think, that this was not a holding that a federal court has the duty to protect its parties against relitigation. This seems quite certain when we examine the cases cited which are discussed heretofore in this opinion.
renewal of the injunction over the specific objection that R.S. § 720 (§ 265, J.C.) barred the order. 36 F. 337, 365.
The opinion was by Justice Field of this Court, on circuit, and stated: "The decree of the federal court, when revived, may be used to stay any attempted enforcement of the judgment of the state court." P. 364. It is true that the opinion shows that the circuit court was of the view that prior jurisdiction of an in personam cause gave the federal court authority to issue an injunction against state proceedings. P. 366. But the decision was directly on the point of enforcement of a decree. When the case came to this Court, it was affirmed without consideration of § 265 on the ground that the propriety of the revivor was the only matter for decision, 131 U. S. 40.
c. 22, 1 Stat.L. 334, has repeatedly been held not applicable to such an injunction."
The last case in this Court, Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U. S. 234, upheld by a unanimous court an injunction upon an ancillary bill in a bankruptcy proceeding forbidding the prosecution in a state court of a claim discharged in bankruptcy. This Court placed its decision squarely on the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court to execute its decrees "notwithstanding the provisions of section 265 of the Judicial Code." Quite properly, no mention is made of the exception in § 265 "except in cases where such injunction may be authorized by any law relating to proceedings in bankruptcy." The only authorization for injunctions is in Bankruptcy Act § 11, 11 U.S.C. § 29, which provides for a stay of pending suits during adjudication in bankruptcy. This is substantially the language of § 21 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1867, 14 Stat. 526, which caused the insertion of the exception in the Revised Statutes, as is shown by the cross-reference under R.S. § 720. The specific exception of § 265 was inapplicable to the Local Loan Company situation. Furthermore, this case involved a res only in the sense that every bankruptcy proceeding involves a res, i.e., the estate.
the power of federal courts to prevent relitigation. There are adequate precedents directly in point, and others which recognize that the rule exists and is sound. Some at one time involved a res. A number applied the same rule when a res was never in the hands of the court. Not a case nor a text book is cited to support the Court's present position. No articles in periodicals suggest the propriety or desirability of so positive a change, except a single query as to the logic of the relitigation development. [Footnote 2/19] Though the Judicial Code received careful analysis before adoption, [Footnote 2/20] no language was inserted to disavow the settled construction of the reenacted section. Dial v. Reynolds, 96 U. S. 340, said by the Court to be a "relitigation" case, did not involve a decree. In a federal suit to quiet title, an injunction was sought to forbid a state action in ejectment. It is in line with Kline v. Burke Construction Co., 260 U. S. 226, but not even persuasive on the question of relitigation or execution of decrees.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE and MR. JUSTICE ROBERTS concur in this dissent.
R.S. § 905, 28 U.S.C. § 687; Hancock National Bank v. Farnum, 176 U. S. 640.
Embry v. Palmer, 107 U. S. 3, 107 U. S. 9; Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. Sowers, 213 U. S. 55, 213 U. S. 64.
"The Supreme Court and the district courts shall have power to issue writs of scire facias. The Supreme Court, the circuit courts of appeals, and the district courts shall have power to issue all writs not specifically provided for by statute, which may be necessary for the exercise of their respective jurisdictions, and agreeable to the usages and principles of law."
(R.S. § 716, Mar. 3, 1911, c. 231, § 262, 36 Stat. 1162).
Cf. Steelman v. All Continent Corp., 301 U. S. 278, 301 U. S. 290; Warren, Federal and State Court Interference, (1930) 43 Harv.L.Rev. 345, 372.
Story, Equity Pleadings, (10th Ed.) § 429; Mitford, Pleadings in Chancery, (1780) p. 38; Cooper, Equity Pleading, (1809) pp. 98, 99; Booth v. Leycester, 1 Keen 579; Kershaw v. Thompson, 4 Johns.Ch. 609.
Cf. United States v. American Trucking Assns., 310 U. S. 534, 310 U. S. 543.
French v. Hay, 22 Wall. 250; Dietzsch v. Huidekoper, 103 U. S. 494; Julian v. Central Trust Co., 193 U. S. 112; Sharon v. Terry, 36 F. 337; Garner v. Second Nat. Bank, 67 F. 833; Central Trust Co. v. Western N.C. R. Co., 89 F. 24; James v. Central Trust Co., 98 F. 489; Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. Co. v. St. Joseph Union Depot Co., 92 F. 22; State Trust Co. v. Kansas City, P. & G. R. Co., 110 F. 10.
Dietzsch v. Huidekoper, 103 U. S. 494, 103 U. S. 498.
Cf. Princess Lida v. Thompson, 305 U. S. 456, 305 U. S. 466.
E.g., 89 U. S. 22 Wall. 157, 89 U. S. 166; Sharon v. Terry, 36 F. 337, 345.
Cf. Southern Railway Co. v. Painter, post, p. 314 U. S. 155.
United States v. American Trucking Assns., 310 U. S. 534, 310 U. S. 543; United States v. Guaranty Trust Co., 280 U. S. 478; Miller v. Standard Nut Margarine Co., 284 U. S. 498; Allen v. Regents, 304 U. S. 439.
Kline v. Burke Construction Co., 260 U. S. 226, 260 U. S. 229.
The doctrine of the Julian case finds illustrations in the lower federal courts. While it is true that those courts were enforcing foreclosure, that purpose had been accomplished, and the enjoined state suits sought relitigation of closed issues. James v. Central Trust Co., 98 F. 489, modifying Central Trust Co. v. Western N.C. R. Co., 89 F. 24; State Trust Co. v. Kansas City, P. & G. R. Co., 110 F. 10; Central Trust Co. v. Western North Carolina R. Co., 112 F. 471; Alton Water Co. v. Brown, 166 F. 840.
Cf. Garner v. Second National Bank, 67 F. 833.
There are instances of the recognition of the power to prevent relitigation despite R.S. § 720, though the power was not actually exercised. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. Co. v. St. Joseph Union Depot Co., 92 F. 22, 25; Guardian Trust Co. v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co., 146 F. 337, 340. Craft v. Lathrop, Fed.Cas. No. 3,318, presents the converse situation of the exercise of this power without consideration of the contemporary equivalent of § 265.
II Pomeroy's Equitable Remedies (1905) § 640, p. 1079. After discussing § 265 -- "Accordingly, a federal court may grant an injunction against a proceeding in a state court when necessary to render effective its own decree."
St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co. v. McElvain, 253 F. 123 (validity of mortgage foreclosure); Wilson v. Alexander, 276 F. 875 (defeasibility of title to land); Hickey v. Johnson, 9 F.2d 498 (validity of deeds to Indian land); American Surety Co. of New York v. Baldwin, 2 F.Supp. 679 (liability of surety on appeal bond); Sterling v. Gredig, 5 F.Supp. 329 (validity of provisions in a will); Hesselberg v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 102 F.2d 23 (validity of insurance policy).
See Taylor and Willis, The Power of Federal Courts to Enjoin Proceedings in State Courts, (1933) 42 Yale L.J. 1169, 1176. Cf. Warren, Federal and State Court Interference, (1930) 43 Harv.L.Rev. 345, 378.
Senate Report No. 388, 61st Cong., 2d Sess., (1910), p. 2.
Cf. Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 102 F.2d 16, 20; Equitable Life Assur. Soc. v. Wert, 102 F.2d 10.
First Trust & Savings Bank v. Iowa-Wisconsin Bridge Co., 98 F.2d 416, cert. denied, Phoenix Finance Corp. v. Iowa-Wisconsin Bridge Co., 305 U.S. 650.
See, for an understanding of the complexities of the issues already settled: Bechtel Trust Co. v. Iowa-Wisconsin Bridge Co., 19 F.Supp. 127; First Trust & Savings Bank v. Iowa-Wisconsin Bridge Co., 98 F.2d 416; Phoenix Finance Corp. v. Iowa-Wisconsin Bridge Co., 115 F.2d 1.
It might be noted that § 265 is recognized as merely a limitation on general equity powers, Smith v. Apple, 264 U. S. 274, while the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 70, is a denial of jurisdiction to enjoin.
"No court of the United States . . . shall have jurisdiction to issue any . . . injunction in a case involving or growing out of a labor dispute, except . . ."

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