Source: http://www.touchngo.com/ap/html/ap-2332.htm
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 12:30:17+00:00

Document:
the attention of the Clerk of the Appellate Courts.
J. Burns, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
verdict of guilt, so it is not known which theory or theories formed the basis of its verdict.
both of these jury instructions were error.
State failed to satisfy the corpus delicti rule with respect to those predicate felonies.
murder conviction under alternative theories, or on his sentence.
conclude that Lawson has not shown plain error, and we affirm Lawson's convictions.
into her disappearance soon focused on the manager of those apartments, Michael Lawson.
Lawson had arranged to train her to show apartments to prospective tenants.
Lawson's trial, but a redacted version of these phone conversations was played to the jury.
without determining which of these possible felonies Lawson committed.
- the only dispute was his state of mind at the time.
for purposes of judgment and sentencing.
felony murder deprived him of his right to a unanimous verdict.
(possession of cocaine with intent to sell).
doubt that Lawson committed at least one of the predicate felonies.
conviction and of his conviction of second-degree murder under alternative theories.
decision, the court adopted the majority rule in the landmark New York case People v.
5    U.S. Const. amends. VI, XIV; Alaska Const. art. I, §§ 7, 11.
7    698 P.2d at 1165.
8   Id. at 1164-65 (citing People v. Sullivan, 65 N.E. 989 (N.Y. 1903)).
returned by the jury to the judge in open court."
11  James, 698 P.2d at 1165.
enumerated in the felony murder statute proscribe "distinctly different kinds of conduct"
offered a witness a bribe or threatened her during a series of phone conversations); Baker v.
the illegal taking of deer).
14  See United States v. Gipson, 553 F.2d 453 (5th Cir. 1977), disavowed in Schad v.
at 458-59)); State v. Lomagro, 335 N.W.2d 583, 591-92 (Wis. 1983).
F.3d 810 (3d Cir. 1996).
780 P.2d 725, 731 (Or. 1989), as limited in State v. King, 852 P.2d 190, 192-93 (Or. 1993).
17  397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
Steve v. State, 875 P.2d 110, 118 (Alaska App. 1994).
19  People v. Santamaria, 884 P.2d 81, 89      (Cal. 1994) (in bank).
than one hundred years ago).
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was one or the other or both.
in support of the predicate felonies was, as the trial judge recognized, "painfully skinny."
of each element of a particular felony offense.
second-degree murder on alternative theories.
Juvenile Law , 1 Family Law Quarterly, No. 4, pp. 1, 26 (1967)).
respect to subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2).
admissions to his brother to establish the corpus delicti of the offenses.
23  Todd v. State, 884 P.2d 668, 683 (Alaska App. 1994).
the State failed to establish the corpus delicti of those offenses.
24  Whiteaker v. State, 808 P.2d 270, 277 (Alaska App. 1991).
25  Roth v. State, 626 P.2d 583, 585 (Alaska App. 1981).
26  See Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263, 266-67 (1989).
their determination of this question.
that Lawson had the required mens rea when he shot Correira.
the chest of Bethany Correira.
Lawson shot Correira, he had the requisite mens rea to commit the offense.
context of this case, one of the four."
counts, the court could have given a corrective instruction.
27   781 P.2d 1000 (Alaska App. 1989).
of one of the essential elements of the charged offense.28 This case is distinguishable.
impermissibly directed a verdict on the homicide counts.
that the shooting was accidental and that the jury should return a verdict of  manslaughter.
28  Id. at 1003, 1004-05.
person may have had that resulted in a death.
resolves Lawson's claim that the court directed a verdict on the felon-in-possession charge.
because he has not shown that he was prejudiced by the court's instructions to the jury.
error by commenting on the evidence.
impermissibly commented on the evidence when he explained                       "extreme indifference"
the value of human life.
that the fatal shot was fired at a distance "greater than contact and less than one foot."
positions on extreme indifference murder.
judge's statement did not suggest that one theory was more persuasive than the other.
Lawson also argues that the court's reference to "what went on in the room"
not require the jury to find that any of the offenses occurred in a particular place.
statement of the law distinguishing extreme indifference murder from felony murder.
instruction on extreme indifference murder was plain error.
that any error was not so plain that it would be obvious to any competent judge or attorney.
be that the court's instructions encouraged the jury to revisit counts it had already decided.
30  See State v. Savage, 799 A.2d 477, 490 (N.J. 2002).

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