Source: https://www.floridabar.org/the-florida-bar-journal/make-it-an-even-10-courts-rely-on-more-than-the-seven-carpenter-factors-to-analyze-a-claim-for-undue-influence-of-a-will-or-trust/
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 06:19:00+00:00

Document:
733.107 Burden of proof in contests; presumption of undue influence. — 1) In all proceedings contesting the validity of a will, the burden shall be upon the proponent of the will to establish prima facie its formal execution and attestation. Thereafter, the contestant shall have the burden of establishing the grounds on which the probate of the will is opposed or revocation is sought.
(2) The presumption of undue influence implements public policy against abuse of fiduciary or confidential relationships and is therefore a presumption shifting the burden of proof under ss. 90.301-90.304.
The court observed that the new statute superseded Carpenter as to the legal effect of the presumption of undue influence, but not as to the circumstances giving rise to the presumption.
In addition to the seven Carpenter factors, however, Florida law recognizes at least three other indicators of active procurement: a) isolating the testator and disparaging family members; b) mental inequality between the decedent and the beneficiary; and c) the reasonableness of the will or trust provisions. This article analyzes the case law surrounding these additional factors to assist practitioners in fully developing a case for or against undue influence.
Florida courts have considered the inequality of mental acuity between the decedent and beneficiary to determine whether a will was procured by undue influence. Although this factor is similar to the issue of voiding a will for lack of testamentary capacity, it differs in that it assumes the decedent does have testamentary capacity, but is weak-minded and, therefore, easily influenced. Essentially, the factor compares the decedent and the influencer rather than merely evaluating the testamentary capacity of the decedent.
Whereas the Carpenter decision provides seven criteria for courts to consider in analyzing active procurement in undue influence cases, Florida courts also consider at least three other factors not listed in Carpenter. Lawyers should be aware of these additional factors in order to fully develop a case for or against undue influence in the making of a will or trust.
1 Peacock v. Du Bois, 105 So. 2d 321, 323 (Fla. 1925).
2 In re Estate of Carpenter, 253 So. 2d 697, 702 (Fla. 1971).
6 See id. at 698.
7 See id. at 705.
8 See Hack v. Janes, 878 So. 2d 440, 443 n.4 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 2004).
9 See Newman v. Smith, 82 So. 2d 236, 252 (Fla. 1919).
13 In re Auerbacher’s Estate, 41 So. 2d 659, 661 (Fla. 1949).
17 In re Ates’ Estate, 60 So. 2d 275, 279 (Fla. 1952).
21 In re Baldridge’s Estate, 74 So. 2d at 661 (Fla. 1954) (Barns, J., dissenting).
23 Id. at 662 (Barns, J., dissenting).
24 Id. at 663 (Barns, J., dissenting).
25 About two years subsequent to Baldridge, the Florida Supreme Court again faced the isolation issue and found that a will was procured by undue influence in the matter in In re Estate of Krieger, 88 So. 2d 497, 498 (Fla. 1956). Krieger involved a beneficiary who moved into the decedent’s home after having only known her less than eight months. The beneficiary then took complete charge of the decedent, telling her what to eat, when to stand, how to dress and otherwise “directing all her activities.” See id.
26 In re Estate of Winslow, 147 So. 2d at 616 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1962).
28 Id. at 618. In Davidson v. Feuerherd, 391 So. 2d 799 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1980), the Second District again held that a defendant tortiously interfered with an expected bequest by exerting undue influence upon the decedent. Although couched in a tort context rather than a will contest, the issue of undue influence was the same, and the same factors and elements were considered. See id. at 802.
29 In re Estate of Lamberson, 407 So. 2d 358, 363 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1981).
30 Id. In addition to isolating the decedent, the beneficiary had recommended the attorney who drew up the will, instructed the attorney in preparing the will, secured witnesses, attended the execution of the will, and maintained possession of the will during and after its execution. See id. at 360.
31 Peacock v. Du Bois, 105 So. 2d at 322-23 (Fla. 1925).
35 In re Estate of Reid, 138 So. 2d 342, 347-49 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1962), overruled in part by In re Estate of Carpenter, 253 So. 2d 697, 702 (Fla. 1971).
38 Id. at 350. In Estate of Brock, 692 So. 2d 907, 912 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1996) (“[w]here there is inequality of mental strength, active procurement can be shown by evidence of a request or suggestion by the dominant party”).
39 In re Estate of Duke, 219 So. 2d 124, 125 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1969).
41 In re Estate of Dalton, 246 So. 2d at 614 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1971).
43 Elson v. Vargas, 520 So. 2d 76, 77 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1988).
44 Id. In In re Siddons, 297 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1974), the Third District found that the “[t]estator was a strong-willed, self-determined individual” and held there was no undue influence by the beneficiaries even though they had received the most valuable property, helped the decedent type the will, lived with the decedent, and secured the witnesses to the will. See id. at 57.
45 Cripe v. Atlantic First Nat’l Bank of Daytona Beach, 422 So. 2d at 824 (Fla. 1988).
46 See id.; see also Estate of Brock, 692 So. 2d 907, 912 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1996) (citing, Cripe and finding undue influence in part due to inequality of mental strength). The Fifth District relied upon the Brock decision in Hack v. Estate, 811 So. 2d 822 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 2002), where the court listed the seven Carpenter factors for active procurement and then stated, “[i]n addition, although not part of the Carpenter criteria, the inequality of mental capacity and strength between the testatrix and the party with the confidential relationship is a factor in determining active procurement.” See Hack, 811 So. 2d at 826 (internal citations omitted).
47 Newman v. Smith, 82 So. 236, 251-52 (Fla. 1919).
52 Peacock v. DuBois, 105 So. 2d at 322-23.
55 In re Donnelly’s Estate, 188 So. 108, 114 (Fla. 1939).
58 In re Ates’ Estate, 60 So. 2d 275, 280 (Fla. 1952).
61 See id. at 279-80.
62 In re Estate of Witt, 139 So. 2d 904, 909 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1952) (quoting, Newman v. Smith, 82 So. at 251).
65 In re Estate of Tobias, 192 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1966).
66 See id. at 84-86.
67 See id. at 86.
David P. Hathaway is a shareholder in Dean, Mead, Egerton, Bloodworth, Capouano & Bozarth, P.A., in Orlando. He concentrates in the areas of arbitration, complex commerical litigation, creditors’ rights, real estate litigation, business torts, and will contests. He is a graduate of the University of North Carolina School of Law, Chapel Hill.
This column is submitted on behalf of the Real Property, Probate and Trust Law Section, Sandra F. Diamond, chair, and William P. Sklar and Richard R. Gans, editors.

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