Source: https://openjurist.org/226/f3d/367/jeffrey-v-gary
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 09:04:44+00:00

Document:
* Jeffrey Henry Caldwell is scheduled to be executed on August 30, 2000, by the State of Texas for the crime of capital murder. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed his conviction and sentence in 1991. Caldwell v. State, 818 S.W.2d 790 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 1684 (1992). Caldwell first sought federal habeas relief, but his petition was dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust state remedies by the Northern District of Texas on September 9, 1993. Caldwell then filed a post-conviction application in the state trial court in November of 1993. That application was denied in 1994 by Judge Gerry Meier of the 291st District Court in Dallas County, Texas. A second post-conviction application was filed with Judge Meier on March 22, 1995. She denied relief on March 30, 1995. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed that denial of relief on March 31, 1995.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2000). Section 2254(d)(1) provides the standard of review for questions of law and mixed questions of law and fact. Williams v. Taylor, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 1523 (2000).
Under the "contrary to" clause of § 2254(d)(1), a federal court may grant the writ if the state court has arrived at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the Supreme Court on a question of law, or if the state court decides a case differently than the Supreme Court on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. See id. at 1523.
On review of a state prisoner's federal habeas petition, "a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct," and the petitioner "shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). A certificate of appealability may issue "only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(b)(2). "When the district court denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner's underlying constitutional claim, a COA should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states avalid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling." Slack v. McDaniel, 120 S. Ct. 1595, 1604 (2000).
His assertion that he is entitled here to Ake's assured access to medical assistance in evaluating and preparing a defense has more purchase, but ultimately is equally without merit. Ake v. Oklahoma held that an indigent criminal defendant who demonstrates "that his sanity at the time of the offense is to be a significant factor at trial," has a due process right to "a competent psychiatrist who will conduct an appropriate examination and assist in evaluation, preparation, and defense." Id. This right extends to the sentencing phase of trial. It did not by its terms or reasoning extend to a Ford type hearing. Safeguards rooted in the Constitution's protection of a fair and accurate trial are not necessarily implicated by Eighth Amendment prohibitions of cruel and unusual punishment. In Ford v. Wainwright, Justice Powell emphasized this distinction: "[T]he only question raised is not whether, but when, his execution may take place. This question is important, but it is not comparable to the antecedent question whether petitioner should be executed at all. It follows that this Court's decisions imposing heightened procedural requirements on capital trials and sentencing proceedings do not apply in this context." 477 U.S. at 425 (citations and footnote omitted).
All else aside, there are overarching flaws in Caldwell's request for stay of execution. Caldwell is in no position to claim that Texas has prejudiced his ability to trigger the appointment under Art. 46.04 of two medical experts to examine his competency.6 That was done. Nor does he point to any impediment imposed by the state to an adversarial test of the experts' reports. Ultimately, Caldwell's claimshrinks to claims that he was entitled to an expert of his choice or an expert to assist in any challenge of the opinion of the experts. This is no more and no less than a request that Ake be extended to Ford proceedings. In any event, such a new rule is not available in his federal habeas challenge to a state decision. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S. Ct. 1060 (1989); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).

References: v. 
 § 2254
 v. 
 § 2254
 § 2254
 § 2253
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 Art. 46
 v. 
 § 2254