Source: http://wcc.dli.mt.gov/B/Burgan%20Findings.htm
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 14:43:53+00:00

Document:
Summary: Factory maintenance worker with preexisting history of post-traumatic stress disorder was exposed to gas at work, which caused an immediate though temporary headache and bad taste in his mouth. He was also immediately angry and distraught. His reaction was exacerbated by a meeting at work which claimant interpreted as suggesting a cover-up by the employer. Six days after the incident, he was ordered into psychiatric hospitalization based on one of his treating psychiatrist's concern for the safety of claimant and others. Claimant never returned to work due to his treating doctors' opinions that his mental state would deteriorate on returning to work. The parties sought adjudication of whether claimant's condition is an injury compensable by the Workers' Compensation Act.
Held: Claimant presented no objective medical findings of an injury as required by section 39-71-119(1)(a), MCA (2001). The Court is persuaded that claimant's disabling mental condition resulted from his psychological reaction to the incident and was not a consequence of a physical injury. Under section 39-71-119, MCA (2001), and Yarborough v. MMIA, 282 Mont. 475, 938 P.2d 679 (1997), claimant's condition is a mental-mental condition not compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act.
Constitutions, Statutes, Regulations, and Rules: section 39-71-119, MCA (2001). Although claimant had a headache and bad taste in his mouth following exposure to gas, he presented no objective medical findings of a physical injury as required under section 39-71-119(1)(a), MCA (2001). The Court is persuaded that claimant's disabling mental condition resulted from his psychological reaction to the work incident. Under section 39-71-119, MCA (2001), and Yarborough v. MMIA, 282 Mont. 475, 938 P.2d 679 (1997), claimant's condition is a mental-mental condition not compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act.
Injury and Accident: Mental or Psychological Stress. Although claimant had a headache and bad taste in his mouth following exposure to gas, he presented no objective medical findings of a physical injury as required under section 39-71-119(1)(a), MCA (2001). The Court is persuaded that claimant's disabling mental condition resulted from his psychological reaction to the work incident. Under section 39-71-119, MCA (2001), and Yarborough v. MMIA, 282 Mont. 475, 938 P.2d 679 (1997), claimant's condition is a mental-mental condition not compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act.
¶1 Petitioner, Bill Burgan (claimant), and respondent, Liberty Northwest Insurance Company (Liberty), agreed to submit this matter on depositions, exhibits, and written arguments. Claimant is represented by Mr. Patrick R. Sheehy. Liberty is represented by Mr. Michael P. Heringer.
¶2 Exhibits: Exhibits 1 through 16 were admitted by stipulation. Exhibit 17, referenced in the Exhibit Grid prepared by the parties as "Hartford disability policy documents," was not included in the exhibits delivered to the Court.
¶3 Depositions: The Court received and considered the depositions of claimant, Scott K. Ross, M.D., Simon Wall, M.D., and Joseph McElhinny, Psy.D. The Court also received and considered the exhibits to depositions.
Was Petitioner's pre-existing post-traumatic stress syndrome [PTSD] aggravated by the hydrogen sulfide exposure he experienced at work on May 16, 2002?
If his PTSD was aggravated, was the aggravation an injury as defined by § 39-71-119(3), MCA?
(Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment at 1-2.) The second issue is the critical issue.
¶6 Claimant is a Vietnam war veteran. He served in the Navy in 1969 and 1970. Following his military service he was diagnosed as suffering from PTSD related to his service.
¶9 Dr. Andre saw claimant on July 18, 2000, and recorded "Dr. Grewell's office sent him to our clinic today because of the extreme difficulty he is having adjusting to an altercation with a co-worker last week." (Id.) While claimant had not previously been treated for PTSD, Dr. Andre found evidence indicating probable PTSD due to claimant's Vietnam experience. He made the diagnosis based on the history related to him by claimant.
. . . Since this altercation, Mr. Burgan claimed he has had a replaying of "the old tapes" from his post Vietnam drinking and drugging days. He claimed that he has not had any significant aggressive incidents in the last 15 years since he became sober from drugs and alcohol, but added that he fears that this event may push him back into that frame of mind. So far, he has not acted out in response to his angry impulses . . . [and] it was quite clear to this clinician that Mr. Burgan wants to avoid a violent altercation at all costs, but nonetheless, he is worried about what may happen . . . .
While time did not allow for a comprehensive assessment of symptoms of posttraumatic stress disorder, it is probable that Mr. Burgan's current difficulties are related to his exposure to trauma while serving in Vietnam in the late 1960's. He does exhibit an extraordinary amount of anger that has been dormant for the last several years. . . . In general, he appears to avoid circumstances that put him in risk of losing his temper due to his belief that his Vietnam experience has left him capable of extreme violence toward others. . . .
(Ex. 3 at 34.) Notably absent in Dr. Andre's notes is any report of physical complaints or symptoms by claimant.
¶17 On Wednesday, May 22nd, claimant reported to work and participated in a meeting with union representatives and "management guys." (Burgan Dep. at 60-61.) Claimant believed a coverup was taking place. (Id. at 40.) He testified: "I got the impression that they -- I mean, they obviously didn't care whether they gassed me or not." (Id. at 36.) Claimant became upset and angry. (Id. at 68.) He left the meeting and made an emergency appointment with Dr. Wall. (Id. at 65.) Claimant did not return to work thereafter.
Affect was angry and tearful. Thought processes were somewhat tangential, meaning that he didn't sort of take a line of thought and follow it in a logical fashion. He would sort of leap from one thing to another. No insight. Suicidality, see note. Homicidality, see note. Cognition, was confused. He wasn't thinking terribly clearly. And at that time I had him go to the emergency room with Michelle, who was a nurse who was working for us at that time, because I felt that he needed to be admitted to the hospital.
(Wall Dep. at 36.) Dr. Wall had claimant admitted to the psychiatric unit of the hospital because claimant had "pretty significant suicidal ideation," and "a lot of difficulty coping with the stress of the exposure, and he just wasn't thinking clearly." (Id. at 37.) Dr. Wall did not physically examine claimant.
extremely angry, hostile, had high levels of anxiety. His speech was rapid. He was disoriented cognitively. His thoughts were racing. He seemed to be paranoid. His ability to engage in abstract thinking was poor. And he kept referring to himself as a dangerous and violent person. Not a person that I wanted to spend any extra time with.
¶32 Liberty has denied liability for claimant's disability on the basis that any injury was due to mental stress and is non-compensable.
¶33 The evidence submitted to the Court demonstrates that claimant was exposed to H2S or some other gas and that he suffered minor physical symptoms not requiring medical care. His physical symptoms included a bad taste in his mouth, headaches, an upset stomach, and a feeling of fullness in his lungs. Claimant conceded none of these physical symptoms was disabling; they have subsided in any event. It is therefore apparent, and I find, that claimant did not suffer any disabling physical condition.
¶34 On the other hand, claimant's May 16, 2002 work exposure to H2S or some other gas caused him severe mental stress and led to other events which contributed to that stress, culminating in a disabling mental condition. The disabling condition is not a consequence of any physical injury the claimant suffered, rather it is a consequence of his psychological reaction to the exposure and claimant's subsequent interaction with the management of Cenex.
¶35 This case is governed by the 2001 version of the Montana Workers' Compensation Act since that was the law in effect on the date of the May 16, 2002 incident. Buckman v. Montana Deaconess Hospital, 224 Mont. 318, 321, 730 P.2d 380, 382 (1986).
¶36 Claimant bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he is entitled to benefits. Ricks v. Teslow Consolidated, 162 Mont. 469, 512 P.2d 1304 (1973); Dumont v. Wicken Bros. Construction Co., 183 Mont. 190, 598 P.2d 1099 (1979).
(5) (a) A cardiovascular, pulmonary, respiratory, or other disease, cerebrovascular accident, or myocardial infarction suffered by a worker is an injury only if the accident is the primary cause of the physical condition in relation to other factors contributing to the physical condition.
¶38 Initially, the claim in this case fails because there is no evidence of any objective medical findings of internal or external physical harm. § 39-71-119(1)(a), MCA (2001). Claimant never sought medical care for any physical harm. His physical complaints were minor and subjective.
Yarborough's PTSD arose from emotional or mental stress, and, therefore, that Yarborough's PTSD was not a compensable injury as defined by § 39-71-119, MCA (1987). Although Yarborough did suffer burns to his face and hands, no medical expert testified that Yarborough's PTSD directly resulted from those physical injuries. Rather, the medical testimony linked Yarborough's PTSD only to the house-fire explosion itself. Consequently, just as in Stratemeyer II(1) and Kleinhesselink(2), Yarborough's PTSD resulted from emotional or mental stress, and, therefore is a "mental-mental" injury, excluded from the definition of injury as set forth under § 39-71-119, MCA (1987).
Yarborough, 282 Mont. at 482-83.
¶40 Here, as noted above, I am persuaded that claimant's condition following the May 16th incident was not attributable to any physical injury but rather was triggered by the emotional stress caused by the incident and subsequent interaction with his employer. His condition thus falls within the "mental-mental" category articulated by the Montana Supreme Court. It is not compensable.
¶41 In his petition, claimant requests costs and attorney's fees. Both requests are denied.
(c) in the case of attorneys' fees, the workers' compensation court determines that the insurer's actions in denying liability or terminating benefits were unreasonable.
(2) A finding of unreasonableness against an insurer made under this section does not constitute a finding that the insurer acted in bad faith or violated the unfair trade practices provisions of Title 33, chapter 18.
¶43 Here, the claim was not judged compensable, thus there is no authority for either costs or attorney's fees.
¶44 Claimant is not entitled to benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act. His petition is dismissed with prejudice.
¶45 Claimant is not entitled to costs or attorney's fees.
DATED in Helena, Montana, this 27th day of August, 2003.

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