Source: https://cbaclelegalconnection.com/2015/04/page/2/
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 14:30:38+00:00

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On Tuesday, April 28, 2015, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued two published opinions and five unpublished opinions.
Wichita Fireman’s Relief Association v. Kansas City Life Insurance Co.
Editor’s note: This is Part 20 of a series of posts in which Denver-area real estate attorney Frederick Skillern provides summaries of case law pertinent to real estate practitioners (click here for previous posts). These updates originally appeared as materials for the 32nd Annual Real Estate Symposium in July 2014.
It also reviews a claim that the insurer had a duty to initiate action to clear title to U.S. Bank’s lien prior to the date that U.S. Bank was served in the underlying litigation. The court surveys the cases on whether the insurer “may” or “must” take an affirmative action when it is notified that an insured may have a title issue. The court agrees that under these facts, no such duty was triggered until U.S. Bank – the real party in interest – was named in the suit. Although a title insurer may take action to clear an insured’s title, any duty is subject to the Conditions and Stipulations in the policy. “These policy provisions do not support U.S. Bank’s assertion that the policy creates a duty to defend the title independent of the insurer’s duty to defend the insured. If anything, these provisions reinforce the interpretation of the policy that Stewart Title’s duties are defined in relationship to the insured. The policy’s stated purpose is “a contract of indemnity against actual monetary loss or damage sustained or incurred by the insured” and Paragraph 7(c) states that Stewart Title will only pay “those costs, attorneys’ fees and expenses incurred in accordance with Section 4 of these Conditions and Stipulations.” (Emphasis added).
On Monday, April 27, 2015, the Colorado Supreme Court issued one published opinion.
The summary of this case is forthcoming, courtesy of The Colorado Lawyer.
The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People v. Campos on Thursday, April 23, 2015.
A police investigator discovered that defendant, an employee of ABM Janitorial Services, had been receiving paychecks under the name “S.A.” for approximately four years using S.A.’s social security number. Defendant was charged with identity theft, criminal impersonation, and two counts of forgery related to her hiring paperwork. The jury convicted defendant of identity theft and criminal impersonation but acquitted her of the two forgery counts.
On appeal, defendant contended that the evidence at trial was insufficient to convict her of identity theft. Because employment is a “thing of value” within the meaning of the identity theft statute, the evidence that defendant used S.A.’s personal identifying information to obtain employment at ABM was sufficient to sustain the conviction.
Defendant also contended that the trial court abused its discretion in restricting defense counsel’s recross-examination of Juan Martinez, an ABM manager, about whether he (1) had a valid social security number, and (2) was required to give ABM a social security number when he went to work there. The record shows that the trial court was well within its discretion to conclude that these two questions were repetitive of the areas already covered and were only marginally relevant. Further, precluding responses to the two questions did not excessively limit the defense’s ability to cross-examine Martinez, nor did the questions relate to Martinez’s bias, prejudice, or motive for testifying. Therefore, the court’s ruling was not an abuse of discretion and did not violate defendant’s rights under the Confrontation Clause. The judgment was affirmed.
The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in McShane v. Stirling Ranch Property Owners Association, Inc. on Thursday, April 27, 2015.
Real Property—Declaration of Covenants—Property Owners Association—Exculpatory Clause—Breach of Fiduciary Duty.
Plaintiffs purchased a lot in Stirling Ranch on which to construct a residential home. The lot was subject to the Second Amended and Restated Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, Restrictions and Easements for Stirling Ranch, P.U.D. (Declaration). Under the Declaration, each lot owner in the Stirling Ranch community is a member of the Stirling Ranch Property Owners Association, Inc. (POA). The POA is governed by an Executive Board, and the Board appoints and removes members of the POA’s Design Review Board (DRB). Although the DRB approved plaintiffs’ initial designs, it did so mistakenly based on representations by plaintiffs’ architect. After plaintiffs began construction on the initial designs, they were ordered to stop work and submit redesigned plans to conform to the Design Guidelines. Plaintiff later filed this action against the POA, claiming damages for the redesign of their home. The trial court found in favor of the POA.
On appeal, plaintiffs asserted that the court erred in concluding that the exculpatory clauses barred their claims against the POA for declaratory judgment/equitable estoppel and negligence. The Court of Appeals disagreed. The Declaration and the Design Guidelines include provisions limiting the DRB’s liability, one of which states that the DRB and the Board are components of the POA and have no separate identity. Therefore, the exculpatory clauses are applicable even though plaintiffs only named the POA as a defendant. Additionally, the exculpatory clauses are valid because they do not implicate a public duty, do not involve an essential service, were fairly entered into, and plainly express the intent to release the DRB from liability.
The Court also rejected plaintiffs’ argument that the trial court erred in concluding that the POA did not breach its fiduciary duty. The record contains sufficient evidence as to why the POA and the DRB rejected plaintiffs’ redesign plans. The record also supports the court’s conclusion that these reasons for rejecting the redesign plans were consistent with the Design Guidelines’ goals. The judgment was affirmed.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued its revised opinion in Fulghum v. Embarq Corporation on Monday, April 27, 2015. The Tenth Circuit granted panel rehearing to a limited extent and issued a revised opinion. The opinion was circulated to all judges and none requested a poll, so en banc rehearing was denied. The Legal Connection summary of the original opinion is available here.
On Monday, April 27, 2015, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued one published opinion and no unpublished opinion.
The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Soicher v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. on Thursday, April 23, 2015.
Insurance—Non-Cooperation Defense—Jury Instructions—Unreasonable Denial—Unreasonable Delay.
In 2009, Manueke, who was uninsured, rear-ended another car, which in turn collided with Soicher’s vehicle. Soicher suffered a concussion in the accident, exacerbating a prior mild traumatic brain injury. At the time, Soicher had a motor vehicle insurance policy with State Farm that provided her $250,000 in uninsured motorist (UM) coverage. Seven months after Soicher filed a claim with State Farm, the insurer closed Soicher’s claim file due to Soicher’s noncooperation. Soicher later filed this action. At trial, State Farm failed to specifically plead the defense of noncooperation, but the court allowed State Farm to proceed on that defense. A jury found in State Farm’s favor.
On appeal, Soicher contended that the trial court erred in entering judgment based on State Farm’s noncooperation defense. State Farm did not plead the issue of noncooperation with the requisite specificity, and the parties did not try the issue by express or implied consent. Thus, State Farm waived the issue, and the trial court erred in entering judgment for State Farm based on that defense.
Soicher also contended that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that State Farm could be held liable, pursuant to CRS §§ 10-3-1115 to -1116, for its unreasonable denial, as opposed to its alleged unreasonable delay, in processing Soicher’s claim. State Farm did not reject Soicher’s application for benefits. To the contrary, it conceded coverage but disputed the amount that was to be paid. Accordingly, this case did not involve the unreasonable denial of Soicher’s claim.
The case was remanded for entry of judgment for Soicher and against State Farm on her breach of insurance contract claim in the amount of $125,000 plus pre-judgment interest, and entry of judgment for State Farm and against Soicher on its breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing and violations of CRS §§ 10-3-1115 and -1116 claims.
The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People v. Lopez on Thursday, April 23, 2015.
Assault—Menacing—Obstructing a Peace Officer—Jury Instruction—Attempt—Ineffective Assistance of Counsel—Crim.P. 33.
Defendant assaulted his wife and broke her clavicle. A uniformed officer found defendant outside the hospital. When the officer attempted to speak to him about his wife’s injuries, defendant became aggressive and threatening toward the officer. A jury convicted defendant of second-degree assault causing serious bodily injury, menacing by the use of a deadly weapon, and obstructing a peace officer.
On appeal, defendant contended that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he committed the crime of menacing against the police officer. Evidence showed that defendant made a threat and that he placed or attempted to place the first officer in fear of imminent serious bodily injury by telling her he had a knife and approaching her in an aggressive manner. This was sufficient to support a conviction for misdemeanor and felony menacing.
Defendant contended that the record did not contain sufficient evidence to support the conviction for obstructing a peace officer because the officer had not arrested nor intended to arrest defendant at the time. The obstructing statute is not limited to officers making arrests, and there was sufficient evidence that defendant’s conduct violated the obstructing statute even though the first officer did not arrest him.
Defendant also argued that the trial court erred when it instructed the jury on criminal attempt, even though the prosecution had not charged defendant with attempt. Because defendant was charged with menacing, and menacing includes the element of attempt, the court did not err in instructing the jury on the definition of attempt.
Defendant argued that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for a new trial because his trial counsel had been ineffective. Because defendant raised this as a Crim.P. 33 motion instead of a Crim.P. 35(c) motion, the trial court’s decision to deny defendant’s Crim.P. 33 motion without a hearing was reviewed for an abuse of discretion. The Court of Appeals found that the trial court’s rulings were not manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair because defendant failed to prove prejudice based on any alleged errors. The judgment was affirmed.
The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People v. Clark on Thursday, April 23, 2015.
Murder—Evidence—Gang Membership—Collateral—Fifth Amendment Privilege—Prior Consistent Statement—Jury Instruction—Complicity—Juror Misconduct.
After getting into an altercation at a club on New Year’s Eve, defendant and Daniel Harris fired gunshots aimed at an oversized limousine, which left Darrent Williams, a member of the Denver Broncos football team, dead; two additional people wounded; and fourteen others uninjured but shaken. A jury found defendant guilty of one count of murder (extreme indifference), one count of murder (after deliberation), sixteen counts of attempted first-degree murder, two counts of second-degree assault, sixteen counts of violent crime, and one count of possession of a weapon by a previous offender.
On appeal, defendant argued that the court erred by admitting evidence and testimony regarding his gang membership, as well as expert testimony about gang origin, structure, psychology, hierarchy, and presence in Denver. Because defendant’s gang affiliation had motivated him to participate in the shooting, this evidence was admissible to show motive.
Defendant asserted that the trial court abused its discretion by precluding certain lines of inquiry during his cross-examination of three witnesses. It was not an abuse of discretion to prohibit cross-examination of the factual details underlying other incidents because this information was collateral and inadmissible. Further, defense counsel had already established that the witnesses had been dishonest in the past.
Defendant asserted that the trial court erred in its handling of two witnesses who refused to answer questions based on the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination. It was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to grant Bragg’s (Harris’s brother) motion to quash the subpoena to testify before subjecting him to questioning in front of the jury. Additionally, it was not error for the court to sustain Harris’s invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege because it was at least possible that his response could have incriminated him.
Defendant contended that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the entire videotaped interview of Harris as a prior consistent statement. Because the court gave defense counsel extensive leeway to attack Harris’s credibility with respect to his testimony in this case and his prior interactions with police officers, admission of the entire video was necessary to give the jury the full picture of what he had said to the police.
Defendant additionally argued that the prosecution violated his due process rights because it knowingly used Harris’s false evidence to obtain his conviction, and the prosecution improperly argued inconsistent factual theories. However, there is no evidence of perjury in the record, and the trial court did not err by allowing the prosecution to present alternative legal theories in this single trial involving this single defendant.
Defendant asserted that certain jurors’ actions occurring during trial constituted juror misconduct. The affidavit tendered by defendant contained hearsay evidence that two jurors had conducted experiments on their own to weigh some of the evidence, and that an alternate juror who was removed from the case had communications with a deliberating juror about the case. Although the affidavit was based on hearsay, the trial court erred by not considering the allegations set forth in the affidavit when it denied defendant’s motion for a new trial without a hearing. Therefore, the case was remanded for an evidentiary hearing on the issue of juror misconduct.

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