Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/37/657/
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 04:31:03+00:00

Document:
"That the stake set up by Woodword and Saffrey, approved artists, in 1642, and since that often renewed, in lat. 41°55' N., being three English miles south of Charles River, in its southernmost part, agreeably to the letters patent to Massachusetts, be accounted and allowed as the commencement of the line between the colonies, and continued between them as deciphered in the plan of Woodword and Saffrey, on record in the Massachusetts government."
The plea then sets forth the subsequent agreement of the two colonies, in 1717 and 1718, touching their boundaries and a running and marking thereof by their respective commissioners, appointed for the purpose of finally settling the controversy, who in 1718 agreed that the stake of Woodword and Saffrey, should be the point from which the dividing line should be run and be forever the boundary between the two governments, notwithstanding any former controversy or claim. That this agreement was recorded, ratified, and confirmed by the General Assembly of Rhode Island; that no false representation was made to their commissioners; that the agreement was concluded fairly, in good faith, with full and equal knowledge by the respective parties, has never been annulled, rescinded or abandoned, and was in pursuance and completion of the agreement of 1709. The report of the commissioners is then set out, stating that in 1719 they run and marked a line west, 2° south from the stake of Woodword and Saffrey, at which they met, as the boundary, which report was approved by Rhode Island in the same year. The plea then makes the same averment as to these proceedings of 1717, 1718, and 1719 as it did in relation to those of 1709, 1710, and 1711; pleads both agreements and unmolested possession by the defendant, from their respective dates to the present time, as a bar to the whole bill and against any other or further relief therein; prays the judgment of the Court whether the defendant shall make any further answer to the bill, and to be dismissed.
This Court, in construing the Constitution as to the grants of powers to the United States and the restrictions upon the states, has ever held that an exception of any particular case presupposes that those which are not excepted are embraced within the grant or prohibition, and have laid it down as a general rule that where no exception is made in terms, none will be made by mere implication or construction. 19 U. S. 6 Wheat. 378; 21 U. S. 8 Wheat. 489-490; 25 U. S. 12 Wheat. 438; 22 U. S. 9 Wheat. 206-207, 22 U. S. 216.
according to the principles of construction adopted and acted on by this Court in cases involving the exposition of the Constitution and laws of the United States, which are construed as other instruments granting power or property. 25 U. S. 12 Wheat. 437; 31 U. S. 6 Pet. 738, 31 U. S. 740. That some degree of implication must be given to words is a proposition of universal adoption; implication is but another term for meaning and intention apparent in the writing on judicial inspection; "the evident consequence," 1 Bl.Com. 250, "or some necessary consequence resulting from the law," 2 Ves.Sr. 351, or the words of an instrument in the construction of which the words, the subject, the context, the intention of the person using them are all to be taken into view. 17 U. S. 4 Wheat. 415; 31 U. S. 6 Pet. 739, 31 U. S. 741. Such is the sense in which the common expression is used in the books, "express words or necessary implication," such as arise on the words, taken in connection with other sources of construction, but not by conjecture, supposition, or mere reasoning on the meaning or intention of the writing. All rules would be subverted if mere extraneous matter should have the effect of interpreting a supreme law differently from its obvious or necessarily to be implied sense; vide 22 U. S. 9 Wheat. 188, so apparent as to overrule the words used, 19 U. S. 6 Wheat. 380. "Controversies between two or more states," "all controversies of a civil nature, where a state is a party," are broad comprehensive terms, by no obvious meaning or necessary implication excluding those which relate to the title, boundary, jurisdiction, or sovereignty of a state. 19 U. S. 6 Wheat. 378.
By this surrender of the power, which before the adoption of the Constitution was vested in every state, of settling these contested boundaries as in the plenitude of their sovereignty they might, they could settle them neither by war, or in peace, by treaty, compact or agreement without the permission of the new legislative power which the states brought into existence by their respective and several grants in conventions of the people. If Congress consented, then the states were in this respect restored to their original inherent sovereignty, such consent being the sole limitation imposed by the Constitution, when given, left the states as they were before, as held by this Court in Poole v. Fleeger, 11 Pet. 209, whereby their compacts became of binding force and finally settled the boundary between them, operating with the same effect as a treaty between sovereign powers. That is that the boundaries so established and fixed by compact between nations become conclusive upon all the subjects and citizens thereof and bind their rights, and are to be treated to all intents and purposes as the true real boundaries. 36 U. S. 11 Pet. 209; S.P. 1 Ves.Sr. 448-449; 25 U. S. 12 Wheat. 534. The construction of such compact is a judicial question, and was so considered by this Court in Lessee of Sims v. Irvine, 3 Dall. 425-454, and in Marlatt v. Silk & McDonald, 11 Pet. 2, 36 U. S. 18; Barton v. Williams, 3 Wheat. 529-533.
In the front of the Constitution is a declaration by the sovereign power from which it emanated; that it was ordained, "in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility," &c. Whether it was best calculated to effect these objects by making the judicial power utterly incompetent to exercise a jurisdiction expressly delegated to the old Congress and its constituted court, over states and their boundaries, in the plenitude of absolute power, yet granted only by the legislative power of the several states, or whether the powers granted to this Court by the people of all the states, ought, by mere construction and implication, to be held inefficient for the objects of its creation, and not capable of "establishing justice" between two or more states, are the direct questions before us for consideration. Without going further into any general consideration on the subject, there is one which cannot be overlooked and is imperious in its results.
"What then is the extent of jurisdiction which a state possesses? . . . We answer without hesitation the jurisdiction of a state is coextensive with its territory, coextensive with its legislative power. The place described, is unquestionably within the original territory of Massachusetts. It is, then, within the jurisdiction of Massachusetts, unless that jurisdiction has been ceded to [by] the United States [id., 16 U. S. 387]. . . . A cession of territory is essentially a cession of jurisdiction [id., 16 U. S. 388]. Still the general jurisdiction over the place, subject to this grant of power [to the United States] adheres to the territory as a portion of sovereignty not yet given away [id., 16 U. S. 389]."
count appointed the judges of courts of law and equity; the King's writs did not run into his county; writs were in his name, and indictments against his peace, Co.Inst. 204-218. Yet his jurisdiction, his royalties, and jura regalia, &c., existed or disappeared, according as a chancellor should decree as to boundary. Penn v. Baltimore, 1 Ves.Sr. 448-449, &c. The King had no jurisdiction over boundary within the realm, without he had it in all his dominions, as the absolute owner of the territory, from whom all title and power must flow, 1 Bl.Com. 241; Co.Litt. 1; Hob. 322; 7 D.C.D. 76; Cowp. 205-211; 7 Co. 17, b., as the supreme legislator; save a limited power in Parliament. He could make and unmake boundaries in any part of his dominions, except in proprietary provinces. He exercised this power by treaty, as in 1763, by limiting the colonies to the Mississippi, whose charters extended to the South Sea; by proclamation, which was a supreme law, as in Florida and Georgia, 25 U. S. 12 Wheat. 524; 1 Laws U.S. 443-51; by order in council, as between Massachusetts and New Hampshire, cited in the argument.
19 U. S. 6 Wheat. 378, 19 U. S. 384, 19 U. S. 392-393.
Adopting the construction given by Congress, and the boundary being disputed in 1804, when the grant was made, the Court considered both to be political questions and held them not to be cognizable by judicial power. 27 U. S. 2 Pet. 253, 27 U. S. 299, 27 U. S. 306, 27 U. S. 309, 27 U. S. 314-315. All the principles laid down in this case were fully considered and affirmed in the United States v. Arredondo, which arose under an act of Congress submitting to this Court the final decision of controversies between the United States and all persons claiming lands in Florida under grants, &c., by Spain, and prescribing the rules for its decision, among which was the "stipulations of any treaty," &c. Thus acting under the authority delegated by Congress, the court held that the construction of the eighth article of the treaty of 1819, by its submission to judicial power, became a judicial question, and on the fullest consideration, held that it operated as a perfect, present, and absolute confirmation of all the grants which come within its provision. That no act of the political department remained to be done; that it was an executed treaty, the law of the land, and a rule for the Court. 31 U. S. 6 Pet. 710, 31 U. S. 735, 31 U. S. 741-743.
2d. Massachusetts surrendered the right to judge of her own boundary, and submitted the power of deciding a controversy concerning it to this Court. 19 U. S. 6 Wheat. 378, 19 U. S. 380, 19 U. S. 393.
2d. That when a territory is acquired by treaty, cession, or even conquest, the rights of the inhabitants to property are respected and sacred. 21 U. S. 8 Wheat. 589; 25 U. S. 12 Wheat. 535; 31 U. S. 6 Pet. 712; 33 U. S. 8 Pet. 445; 34 U. S. 9 Pet. 133; 35 U. S. 10 Pet. 330, 35 U. S. 718.
anything more to be done, they must resort to another jurisdiction, which is appropriate to the cause of complaint, as the King's Bench, or the King in council. Vide 9 U. S. Peters, 5 Cranch 115, 9 U. S. 135; make the decree without prejudice to the (United States) or any persons whom the parties could not bind. And in case any person should obstruct the execution of the agreement, the party to be at liberty, from time to time, to apply to the court. 1 Ves.Jr. 454; 3 Ves.Sr. 195, 196. Or, as the only question is one of jurisdiction, which the court will not divide, they will retain the bill, and direct the parties to a forum proper to decide collateral questions. 1 Ves.Sr. 204, 205; 2 Ves.Sr. 356, 357; 1 Ves.Sr. 454; 9 U. S. 5 Cranch 115, 9 U. S. 136. On the other hand, should the agreement not be held binding, the Court will decree the boundary to be ascertained agreeably to the charters according to the altered circumstances of the case, by which, the boundary being established, the rights of the parties will be adjudicated and the party in whom it is adjudged may enforce it by the process appropriate to the case, civilly or criminally, according to the laws of the state, in which the act which violates the right is committed. In ordinary cases of boundary, the functions of a court of equity consist in settling it by a final decree, defining and confirming it when run. Exceptions, as they arise, must be acted on according to the circumstances.
The same principle was adopted by the eminent jurists of the Revolution, in the ninth Article of the Confederation, declaring that the sentence of the court in the cases provided for should be final and conclusive, and with the other proceedings in the case, be transmitted to Congress, and lodged among their acts, for the security of the parties concerned, nothing further being deemed necessary. The adoption of this principle was indeed a necessary effect of the Revolution, which devolved on each state the prerogative of the King as he had held it in the colonies; 17 U. S. 4 Wheat. 651; 21 U. S. 8 Wheat. 584, 21 U. S. 588, and now holds it within the realm of England, subject to the presumptions attached to it by the common law, which gave, and by which it must be exercised. This Court cannot presume that any state which holds prerogative rights for the good of its citizens, and by the Constitution has agreed that those of any other state shall enjoy rights, privileges, and immunities in each, as its own do, would either do wrong, or deny right to a sister state or its citizens, or refuse to submit to those decrees of this Court, rendered pursuant to its own delegated authority, when in a monarchy its fundamental law declares that such decree executes itself. When, too, the highest courts of a kingdom have most solemnly declared that when the King is a trustee, a court of chancery will enforce the execution of a trust by a royal trustee; 1 Ves.Sr. 453, and that when a foreign king is a plaintiff in a court of equity, it can do complete justice, impose any terms it thinks proper, has him in its power and completely under its control and jurisdiction, 2 Bligh.P.C. 57, we ought not to doubt as to the course of a state of this Union, as a contrary one would endanger its peace, if not its existence.
In the Case of Olmstead, this Court expressed its opinion that if state legislatures may annul the judgments of the courts of the United States and the rights thereby acquired, the Constitution becomes a solemn mockery, and the nation is deprived of the means of enforcing its laws, by its own tribunal. So fatal a result must be deprecated by all, and the people of every state must feel a deep interest in resisting principles so destructive of the Union, and in averting consequences so fatal to themselves. 30 U. S. 5 Pet. 115, 30 U. S. 135.

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