Source: https://www.ndci.org/law-2-2/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 15:11:20+00:00

Document:
NDCI understands how important it is for treatment court professionals to remain informed about the latest statutes, case authority and how treatment courts are impacted. We maintain an up-to-date webliography of the relevant case law pertaining to treatment court operations to help guide court professionals as they navigate the ever-shifting legal landscape.
Click on each section to see relevant cases.
Thorne v. Hale, No. 1:08cv601 (JCC), 2009 WL 980136 (E.D. Va. 2009) (holding that a valid § 1983 civil rights claim was presented in the complaint, where the complaint stated that Hale and Killian were to some extent responsible for implementing the treatment regimen which included mandatory participation in AA/NA); Compl. at 15, Thorne v. Hale, No. 1:08cv601 (JCC), 2009 WL 980136 (E.D. Va. Mar. 26, 2009) (claiming that Killian "was responsible for all recommendations to Drug Court for treatment and clinical matters," including "substance abuse issues."); id. at 76 (claiming that Thorne was "subjected to the State religions of AA and NA by . . . [the] directors" of the Drug Court and the RACSB); id. at 89 (alleging due process deprivations by the "Directors" of the RACSB and the Drug Court). Members of the drug court ultimately prevailed in the Thorne v. Hale litigation, when the trial court granted summary judgment on the basis of absolute judicial immunity and dismissed the case. Id. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the granting of the summary judgment motion.
Thorne v. Hale, No. 09-2305, WL1018048 (4th Cir. Mar. 19, 2010) Thorne v. Hale is noteworthy, even in light of the dismissal, because the initial dismissal motion was denied and because, when coupled with Hanas v. Inner City Christian Outreach, the authority makes it patently clear that First Amendment violations can have consequences for drug court staff. Id. Hanas, 542 F. Supp. 2d at 683.
Americans United v. Prison Fellowship, 509 F.3d 406, 406 (8th Cir. 2007) (holding that a state supported non-coercive, non-rewarding faith based program violated the Establishment Clause of the U.S. Constitution because an alternative was not available).
Cox v. Miller, 296 F.3d 89, 89 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding that a confession to murder in an AA meeting was not protected by cleric-congregant privilege, despite 5th step requiring participant to admit to God, other human beings, and themselves the exact nature of their wrongs).
IV. Cases holding that place restrictions on the Drug Court participant are constitutional, when reasonably related to rehabilitative needs.
State v. Barth (Iowa Court of Appeals 2016) A majority of the courts across the nation that have considered the issue have concluded that "consent-search provisions in probation agreements constitute a waiver of search-and-seizure rights." Id. at 792-93 (citing cases); see also, e.g., United States v. Barnett, 415 F.3d 690, 691 (7th Cir.2005) ("Constitutional rights like other rights can be waived, provided that the waiver is knowing and intelligent, as it was here."); State v. Gawron, 112 Idaho 841, 736 P.2d 1295, 1297 (1987) (upholding warrantless search of probationer based on consent contained in probation agreement); People v. Absher, 242 Ill.2d 77, 351 Ill.Dec. 163, 950 N.E.2d 659, 668 (2011) (upholding suspicionless search based on consent to a warrantless search).
VII. Cases holding that terms of bond or terms of probation which include non consumption of alcohol or mandatory drug testing are proper, when related to defendant’s rehabilitation, protection of the public or assuring defendant appearance in court.
United States v. Jordan, 485 F.3d 982, 982 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding that alcohol use restrictions as part of supervised release should be based upon need).
VIII. Knowing and intelligent waivers of statutory and constitutional rights, including the right to appeal, to accede to a stipulated fact trial, provide search waivers or right to recuse the judge can be proper terms of Drug Court entry.
People v. Conway, 845 N.Y.S.2d 545, 545 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007) (addressing the waiver of appeal).
IX. Generally, termination from Drug Court requires notice, a hearing and a fair procedure.
Tsai, Evan C. (2017) "The Practitioner’s Guide to Due Process Issues in Veterans Treatment Courts," Mitchell Hamline Law Review: Vol.43 : Iss. 3 , Article 4.
Tate v. State, 2013 OK CR 18, 313 P.3d 274 (2013) (We find that this due process guarantee is also applicable to mental health court termination proceedings. Therefore, a mental health court participant must be sufficiently apprised as to the evidence and the grounds upon which his or her participation in the mental health court is terminated. See Hogar, 1999 OK CR 35, 990 P.2d at 899 (applying this same rule to drug court termination proceedings).
Gross v. State of Maine, Superior Court case # CR-11-4805 (2/26/13)(drug court procedures relating to termination violative of due process and, therefore, unconstitutional. Drug Court participant entitled to: notice of the termination allegations and the evidence against him, right to call and x-examine witnesses, a hearing at which he is present, a neutral magistrate, written factual findings and the right to counsel. Here, the drug court team discussed the termination decision during the termination hearing, without defendant’s presence or that of his counsel. That procedure coupled by the fact the Superior Court felt that the drug court judge should have recused, resulted in a finding of constitutional infirmity. Moreover, the appellate court ruled the defendant did not, arguably could not prospectively waive his rights, citing LaPlaca and Staley.
People v. Kimmel, 24 Misc.3d 1052, 882 N.Y.S.2d 895 (2009) (not selected for official publication) (holding that defendant not entitled to a hearing per se, but was entitled to make a statement and have counsel present-- relying upon Torres v. Berbary, 340 F. 3d 63, 63 (2d Cir. 2003)).
State v. Perkins, 661 S.E. 2d 366, 366 (S.C. Ct. App. 2008) (holding that termination decision not reviewable, but defendant entitled to notice and hearing on whether defendant violated conditions of his suspended sentence by being terminated from drug court).
X. Full constitutional rights do not apply to probation revocation hearing and, therefore, would not apply at a termination from Drug Court hearing.
Tyler T., 279 Neb. 806, 806 (2010) (“Given the therapeutic component of problem-solving-court programs, we are not prepared to say that each and every action taken in such a proceeding must be a matter of record. But we have no difficulty in concluding that when a judge of a problem-solving court conducts a hearing and enters an order affecting the terms of the juvenile's probation, the proceeding must be on the record. We agree with other courts which have held that where a liberty interest is implicated in problem-solving-court proceedings, an individual's due process rights must be respected.”).
drug-addicted offenders into the program.
without continuing the prosecutor's right to veto.
State v. Guise, Iowa: Court of Appeals 2018 (Use of the Iowa Risk Revised assessment tool at sentencing was improper, where court rejected plea agreement solely based on the IRR results. The court observed: “On this record, we only know that the IRR authorized intensive supervision. We do not know what the IRR is, what factors led to the recommendation of intensive supervision, or whether the factors were appropriate for consideration in the sentencing context. It is impossible to determine whether the IRR was relevant to the question of sentencing within the meaning of section 901.2(1). …… To reiterate, our record contains no information on what the IRR was intended to measure, how it was scored, what factors were considered in arriving at a score, or how the PSI evaluator applied the test to Guise. See Klingele, 91 Notre Dame L. Rev. at 576 ("As an initial matter, risk is a squishy concept and its variations (low, medium, and high) are subject to all manner of manipulation."). The IRR as described in Guise's PSI report was a black box, devoid of transparency.
Beisel v. Espinosa, Dist. Court, (MD Florida 2017) (While Beisel would have preferred a program integrating the use of narcotic medications, Espinosa's threatening to sanction Beisel if Beisel took narcotics obtained outside of the program does not qualify as deliberate indifference to Beisel's medical needs. Cf. Fredericks v. Huggins, 711 F.2d 31, 33-34 (4th Cir. 1983)(holding that requiring pre-trial detainees to stop methadone "cold turkey," causing them to suffer withdrawal, is not an unconstitutional violation of their civil rights).
Reed-Kaliher v. Hoggatt, ___ Ariz. ___, ___ P.3d ___ (2015), (holding that § 36-2811(B)(1) prohibits a trial court from conditioning probation on refraining from possessing or using medical marijuana in compliance with Arizona Medical Marijuana Act).
Polk v. Hancock, ___ Ariz. ___, ___ P.3d ___ (2015) (holding that § 36-2811(B)(1) prohibits a trial court from conditioning probation on refraining from possessing or using medical marijuana in compliance with Arizona Medical Marijuana Act).
State v. Plouffe, 2014 MT 183, 329 P.3d 1255 (Mont. 2014) (Under statewide drug court protocols, defendant had to be honest and treatment providers could not use drug court disclosed information, such as drug testing with individuals not part of the drug court team. When non-team members obtained statements from the drug court participant under circumstances where he was in a penalty position, the statements were not admissible. Plouffe was impermissibly required to "choose between making incriminating statements and jeopardizing his conditional liberty by remaining silent,"
LAVITE v. Dunstan, Dist. Court, (SD Illinois 2018) (Denying summary judgment motion, in large part, in suit against county and sheriff, brought by decorated vet, who formed Veterans Treatment Court, when he had a PTSD incident and was then barred from county buildings).
Sturkin v. Patrick, ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, (Dist. Court, SD Mississippi 2017)(Claimant’s assertion that her drug court parole officer harassed her stated §1983 claim and not barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994)).
SM v. Lincoln County, ___ F. 3d ___, (8th Circuit Court of Appeals, 2017) (affirming substantial verdict against County for failure to supervise drug court tracker who was sexually assaulting drug court participants and whose job involved monitoring drug court participants by home visits and other supervision tools.

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