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Timestamp: 2019-04-23 00:24:17+00:00

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the creditor only, and that the promise must be to answer out of the creditor's own estate. Like them it is but a limitation on the scope of a statute which is unlimited in its phraseology, but which is very definite in its underlying purpose.
8s This section of the Statute of Frauds is the subject of a series of articles by John Delatre Falconbridge, which is being presented in the current volume of the University of Pennsylvania Law Review. (See 68 U. of P. Law Rev. I and infra p. 137).
THE PENNSYLVANIA "STOP, LOOK AND LISTEN" RULE -To hold a man guilty of contributory negligence by reason of neglecting an act, the omission of which in no way contributed to his injury, would seem a decision apparently absurd on its face. And yet, by applying the "stop, look, and listen" rule as it ha; come to be understood by the courts of Pennsylvania, to the facts of a comparatively recent case' the Supreme Court of that state has arrived at just such a conclusion.
' Benner v. P. & R. R. R. Co., 262 Pa. 307 (1918).
to the jury by the lower court and verdict and judgment were given for the plaintiff, Benner's wife. On the defendant's assignments of error, the Supreme Court reversed the decision, and directed a judgment non obstante veredicto for the defendant, holding that Benner was guilty of contributory negligence in law, and that the case was wrongfully submitted to the jury.
Among other things, the court in this case pointed out, that, by reason of a long line of decisions, the "stop, look, and listen" rule in Pennsylvania has become so "inflexible"2 that if the injured person failed to stop, etc., before crossing any of the tracks of the defendant's right-of-way a nonsuit should be ordered regardless of all other circumstances in the case. Two members of the court dissented, Simpson and Stewart, J. J. In his very able opinion, Mr. Justice Simpson bases his dissent on three main objections.
Of these objections, in the order of their apparent strength, the first would seem to argue that the case was one for the jury, because of the well-established rule in "stop, look, and listen" cases that there is a presumption of proper conduct on the part of the injured party, which is rebuttable only by evidence of the defendant railroad to the contrary.3 In answer to this objection, it may be said that the defendant, by his witnesses, produced uncontroverted evidence that Benner did not do that which the majority of the court held, as a matter of law, he must have done in order to relieve himself of contributory negligence-namely, stop before crossing the siding.
A second objection, founded on reason and analogy, is ap- parently far more difficult to answer, unless the case of Peoples v. P. R. R., cited by the majority court, is authority to the contrary. Mr. Justice Simpson argues that the distinction between the duty of persons to stop before crossing railroad tracks on which trains must move at high speed, and their duty to merely look and listen before crossing trolley tracks, because the cars run at a less rate of speed, should be applied as between the sidings and main tracks of a railroad crossing. The comparability of a siding to a trollev track in respect to the quantum of danger involved in crossing it, is entirely logical as to the facts of the main case. It is conceiv- able, however, that the analogy might be more doubtful under a different set of facts.
2 Ihrig v. Erie R. R. Co., 210 Pa. 98 (1904). 3 Longnecker v. P. R. R. Co., 105 Pa. 328 (1884); Hanna v. P. & R. R. R. Co., 213 Pa. 157 (I9o6).
4 251 Pa. 275 (1916).
did her a most grievous wrong." According to the court's opinion, the negligence of the deceased consisted in failing to stop before crossing the siding, over which he passed in perfect safety. On the other hand, his injury occurred on one of the main tracks, and before attempting to cross any of these, Benner did everything required by law or reason to relieve him of negligence. Such a conclusion would seem to be in violation of one of the most ele- mentary principles of legal responsibility, for the so-called negli- gence of the deceased lacks the necessary element of being negli- gence dans locum injuriae.5 An analogous result would be reached, if a court were to hold an automobile owner negligent for running down a pedestrian who had jumped from the sidewalk directly in the path of the automobile, provided it were proved that at the time of the accident the car was likely to explode owing to the negligence of the owner in not having it inspected.
A gradual tightening of the "stop, look, and listen" rule in Pennsylvania is apparent from an examination of other compara- tively recent decisions. In the case of Potter v. P. R. R.6 it was held to be contributory negligence in law for the driver of a horse and wagon to stop so near the defendant's tracks that his animal, frightened by the approach of a train, jumped forward, drawing its owner in the path of the locomotive. The same year the court made a similar decision in the case of a person who had stopped twenty feet from a siding and forty feet from the main track, holding that the distance was too great.7 And yet in a very much earlier case, the court ruled, that if the question of what was the proper place to stop was disputed it was a matter for the jury to decide.8 It would seem that this earlier decision would have justi- fied the court in the two more recent cases cited in relaxing the growing severity of the "rule." Again, in Neiman v. D. & H. Canal Co.,9 the court submitted the case to the jury where the evidence showed that the vision of the injured party was obscured by escaping steam; and in a later case the plaintiff was nonsuited for stopping at a point where his view was obstructed.'1 Another very recent decision" has refused to consider an implied invitation on the part of the defendant railroad to the injured party to cross, by reason of the fact that its safety gates were open at a time when they should have been closed.
Although Mr. Justice Simpson does not believe that the facts of the main case bring it within the "rule," the following comment upon the "rule" itself, quoted from his dissent, is indeed significant.
6 Metropolitan Street Ry. Co. v. Jackson, 3 App. Cases 193, 47 L. J. C. P. 303 (1877); Baughman v. Shenango & Allegheny R. R. Co., 92 Pa. 335 (188o).
6 221 Pa. 550 (1908). 7 Walsh v. P. R. R. Co., 222 Pa. 162 (1908). 8 Whitman v. P. R. R. Co., 156 Pa. 175 (1893). 9 149 Pa. 92 (1892). 10 Mankewicz v. Lehigh Valley R. R., 214 Pa. 386 (1906). "' Kipp v. Central R. R. Co. of N. J., 265 Pa. 20 (1919).
"Since that rule was first adopted and published," says the Jus- tice, "the members of thirty-one legislatures and one constitu- tional convention have been elected, met and adjourned, leaving it still in force, and because thereof, despite doubts as to the wis- dom of making it arbitrary, stare decisis compels our adherence to it now, however much plaintiff may suffer by reason thereof." At another place in his dissent Judge Simpson points out the fal- lacy of expecting the people to obey a rule which uselessly attempts to delay them in the ends they seek to accomplish. If these com- ments voice the sentiment of the judiciary of this state, then some legislative enactment would seem imperative to cure this growing injustice.
Assuming that the promulgators of the "rule" had a double reason in view, namely, the exaction of a higher degree of care from the public, and the economic necessity of the time, visualized or felt as public policy, since the railroads were recognized as public necessities, their first object has not been attained. The ever- increasing number of accidents at grade crossings bears witness to this. Nor does public policy require that the railroads should continue to be protected in this manner.
PHYSICAL INJURY DUE TO SPOKEN WORDs.-The courts in the administration of justice must deal with all sorts and condi- tions of men. Mankind is made up of individuals and most cases at law present two or more individuals in some particular rela- tionship. But the law is concerned with mankind as a whole, with the ordinary man, and its principles and rules are established for ordinary men of average mental and physical equipment.' Therefore the law refuses to listen to complaints based on injuries which were suffered only because of the supersensitive tempera- ment or the abnormal physical condition of the person harmed.2 In such cases it is said that the result is not to be reasonably an- ticipated, is unexpected and unusual; the chain of causation is beyond the control of the person at fault and the damage is too indirect and remote to create liability.
1 Bouvier, Law Dictionary; see "Negligence," "Skill," etc. 2 Nelson v. Crawford, 122 Mich. 466, 81 N. W. 335 (1899); Braun v. Cra- ven, 175 Ill. 4o01, 51 N. E. 657 (1898).
3 Nelson v. Crawford, supra; Braun v. Craven, supra. SKennedy, J., in Dulieu v. White, (1901) 2 K. B. 669, at page 675.

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