Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/84/253/
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 06:41:25+00:00

Document:
The Supreme Court of the State of Missouri, on appeal, dismissed a petition which sought to have the title to lands held by the defendant, under a patent from the United States, divested, and vested in the complainant. From this decree of dismissal a writ of error brought up the case under the twenty-fifth section of the Judiciary Act, the complainant claiming the land under a former patent from the United States.
This Court determined that the legal title to the premises was in the complainant under the second patent, reversed the decree, and remanded the cause "for further proceedings in conformity to the opinion of the court" ( 75 U. S. 8 Wall. 672). The opinion given declared also that on the merits (which were gone into, and in which utterance was given as to every point which it was necessary to decide in order to dispose of the case on them), the case was with the plaintiff or complainant.
On the presentation of the mandate to the supreme court of the state, they directed it to be filed, and entered up an order reversing their former decree, and the cause again coming up to be disposed of, the court decided that the legal title to the premises was vested by the second patent in the complainant, as declared by this Court, and that on such a title under the laws and practice of the state there was a plain and adequate remedy at law, and that equity bad no jurisdiction of the case made by the petition, and therefore decreed dismissing the petition.
That the legal sufficiency of the ground maintained by the supreme court of the state for its decree, to-wit that by the laws and practice of the state the complainant's remedy on a legal title was at law, and not in equity, is a question within the jurisdiction of this Court, and revisable under the twenty-fifth section on a second writ of error.
"perhaps before this Court on the first writ of error; but it is too late to raise such questions after the whole case had been decided, and the cause remanded for final judgment."
That under the Judiciary Act, as well as under that of the 5th February, 1867, amendatory of it, on a second writ of error to a state court, this Court "may proceed to a final judgment and award execution."
A decree was therefore entered up reversing the decree of the state court and declaring the title to the lands in controversy to be vested in the complainant and ordering a writ of possession to be issued by the clerk of this Court directed to the marshal thereof.
"That the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate."
the prevention of private wrongs, which shall be denominated a civil action. [Footnote 1]"
"Suits may be instituted in courts of record by filing in the office of the clerk of the proper court a petition setting forth the plaintiff's cause or causes of action, and remedy sought"
"The first pleading on the part of the plaintiff is the petition, which shall contain (1) The title of the cause, specifying the name of the court and county in which the action is brought, and names of parties to the action, plaintiffs and defendants; (2) a plain, concise statement of the facts constituting a cause of action, without unnecessary repetition; (3) A demand of the relief to which a plaintiff may suppose himself entitled. [Footnote 3]"
"The only pleading on the part of the defendant is either a demurrer or an answer. [Footnote 4]"
"SECTION 6. The defendant may demur to the petition when it shall appear upon the face thereof either (1) that the court has no jurisdiction of the person of the defendant or the subject of the action or (2) that the plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue, or"
"SECTION 10. When any of the matters enumerated in section six (the last quoted section) do not appear upon the face of the petition, the objection may be taken by answer. If no such objection be taken either by demurrer or answer, the defendant shall be deemed to have waived the same, excepting only the objection to the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the action, and excepting the objection that the petition does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. [Footnote 5]"
survey for Labaume's representatives, so procured by fraud, covin, and misrepresentation, conflicted with the patent and survey for Brazeau's representatives, and constituted a cloud upon the plaintiff's title.
1. That the court would divest out of the defendants all right, title, and interest acquired or claimed by them and each of them under Labaume.
2. And would vest the same in the plaintiff.
3. And would put the plaintiff in possession.
4. And would cause an account to be taken of the rents and profits of the land, and give to the plaintiff judgment therefor.
5. And would give to him "such other relief as might be proper in the case."
The patent to Labaume's representatives granted all the land in its exterior limits, "saving and reserving any valid adverse right that might exist to any part thereof."
The patent to Brazeau's representatives granted all the land included in its exterior limits, "saving and reserving any valid adverse right which might exist to any part thereof."
1. That the 4 x 4 arpents confirmed to Brazeau were not properly located by the United States survey thereof inside of Labaume's survey.
2. That the confirmation to Brazeau was void.
3. That the survey for Brazeau's representatives was void for want of legal authority in the officers to make it.
4. That the patent to them was void for the same reason.
5. That the plaintiff, claiming under the confirmation and survey for Brazeau's representatives, was estopped to locate the land inside the Labaume patent, by matter in pais, long before their date.
6. That the survey and patent for Labaume's representatives vested a title in them in fee simple.
7. That the defendants had no notice of Brazeau's claim, and were innocent purchasers of the Labaume title.
8. That the plaintiff, claiming under Brazeau, was barred by the statute of limitations.
The defendants denied that any part of the 4 x 4 of Brazeau was inside the Labaume patent; that the patent or survey for Labaume's representatives was procured by fraud, covin, or misrepresentation; that the plaintiff had the Brazeau title to the 4 x 4.
They set forth a former suit and judgment against the plaintiff prior in date to the plaintiff's survey and patent, in bar of this suit.
And finally denied every averment in the plaintiff's petition in conflict with any part of their answer.
And "so having fully answered, the defendants asked for judgment and their costs."
"having been submitted to the court for a decision on the plaintiff's petition, and the answers of all the defendants and the exhibits and other evidence in the cause,"
the court found "all the issues in the cause for the plaintiff;" that the survey for Labaume in 1799 was made to include the Brazeau's land by mistake or design; that the land was situated inside of the Labaume survey and patent; and that the Labaume survey and patent were issued and procured by fraud and misrepresentation, and in combination and confederacy by the defendants to keep the plaintiff out of possession of his property, and its rents and profits.
"The 4 x 4 arpents is hereby decreed to the plaintiff, and all the right, title, and interest of each and everyone of said defendants in and to said tract of land is hereby divested out of said defendants, and each of them, and is vested in and passed to plaintiff, to have and to hold to said plaintiff, his heirs, and assigns,"
and profits accrued during the respective possessions, and for as much as the court is not advised what is the amount and other particulars thereof, Alexander Martin is appointed commissioner to take an account,"
"that the legal title to the tract of 4 x 4 arpents remained in the United States till June 10, 1862, and that on that day, by virtue of a survey referred to and a patent of that date, Brazeau 'acquired the legal title to the tract.'"
The opinion went, however, largely besides into the merits of the case, any gave utterance upon every question at issue between the parties which it was necessary to decide to dispose of the case on their merits. These it declared were entirely with the plaintiff or complainant, who, it said, was justly and honestly owner of the land, and ended with an order of reversal of the decree of the Supreme Court of Missouri, "with directions to affirm the decree of the St. Louis court of common pleas."
of the Supreme Court of Missouri had been silent as to the grounds on which it dismissed the plaintiff's petition; that while if that court passed merely on the title derived from the United States (as in view of this Court's taking jurisdiction of the case was now to be assumed), this Court, under the twenty-fifth section, had authority to review and reverse it, yet that under no circumstances had this Court authority to pass on those defenses set forth in the record which were of a local nature only, and that no opinion of the judges of this Court, separately or collectively, bound by authority the state court of Missouri on those points, or could deprive the defendants in error of the right to have that court pass upon them. Any mandate, therefore (the learned counsel argued), directing the Supreme Court of Missouri "to affirm the decree of the St. Louis court of common pleas" would be a judgment by this Court upon questions upon which it had no authority to pass.
MR. JUSTICE CLIFFORD, delivering the opinion of the Court on this new matter of the propriety of the form of order, as he had delivered that on the principal case, stated that the Court, in the opinion delivered in that principal case, had "decided the following propositions," reciting numerous propositions pertinent to the merits, and reciting also, specifically, the decision as to the legal title's being in Brazeau. "Based upon these conclusions of law," the learned judge said, "the Court gave the directions recited in the order" objected to; but now, after the argument upon the question of its propriety had "come to the conclusion that a different direction would be more in accordance with the usual practice of the court."
here recited and refers to the opinion of the Court delivered at the time the decree was entered as to the ground on which these conclusions rest."
The matter accordingly went back to the Supreme Court of Missouri on this mandate, upon which, as well as on the pleadings and proofs of record in the cause, it came on to be heard. Counsel for the defendant insisted that the Supreme Court of the United States having decided that the legal title was in the plaintiff, his only remedy was at law; that the whole scope and very prayer of the petition filed in the case was for equitable relief, and that the petition should therefore be dismissed.
Counsel of the plaintiff answered that the code of practice adopted by the State of Missouri would not countenance such an objection; that under it, there was no "bill in equity or other formal pleading;" that "justice was now administered without forms;" that the defendants having denied the plaintiff's right and submitted themselves to the judgment of the court, waived the plea of "remedy at law," even supposing the forms of equity pleading still to prevail in Missouri; that as the twenty-fifth section of the Judiciary Act gave the Supreme Court at Washington jurisdiction to pass on the questions involved in the construction of acts of Congress, that court had implied authority to pass also upon all incidental questions which were necessary to be determined in order to render a judgment in the case; that the said Supreme Court had done so, as would be seen by the report of the case in 8th Wallace, and that this concluded the Supreme Court of Missouri.
"The only question which it was competent for the Supreme Court of the United States to notice when the cause was removed there was the question of title arising out of the respective confirmations under which the parties claimed. Everything else set up in the bill was peculiarly and exclusively of local state jurisdiction, over which the national tribunal had no control and concerning which an adjudication here is final."
"In conformity with the decision of the national court, the legal title is vested in the plaintiff, and his remedy is the next question to be considered."
"That ejectment is the proper and appropriate remedy, where a party has the title, to recover possession of real estate is a principle too well established to require argument or the citation of authorities. A bill in equity is not the proper remedy to recover the possession of lands, and where there is an adequate and complete remedy at law, a court of equity will not interpose unless upon some matters coming under some peculiar head of concurrent equity jurisdiction. [Footnote 11]"
count must be tried by itself, according to the prescribed mode in such actions and suits. In an action at law, there is a constitutional right of trial by jury, which has no existence in equity. The courts in New York have held that an equitable cause of action to remove -- as a cloud upon the plaintiff's title -- a deed given by mistake by a third party to the defendants, under which, having fraudulently obtained possession by connivance with the plaintiff's tenant, he claims to hold as owner, and a claim to recover the possession of the premises, may be united in the same action and asserted in the same complaint. But it is also clearly held that where legal and equitable causes of action are united under the code, as to the former, on the trial of the causes, the issues must be submitted to a jury. [Footnote 12]"
"It has often been held in this court that in a bill to set aside a deed as fraudulent, the plaintiff cannot sue for the recovery of the possession of the land, and that proceedings instituted for the purpose of vacating title, vesting it in the plaintiff, and to eject a defendant and obtain possession, are fatally erroneous on writ of error or appeal, and cannot be sustained. When the decree is entered establishing the plaintiff's title, he must then pursue his remedy in ejectment for the possession. The defendant has a right to demand this. He has a right to have a jury pass upon the question of rents and profits, and upon other questions which may arise in that form of action."
"In like manner it has been held that a cause of action in ejectment cannot be united with a cause of action for partition of the premises sued for. [Footnote 13]"
"It is a grave error -- an entirely mistaken notion -- to suppose that all distinction between law and equity is abolished by our code of procedure. The line of demarcation -- the great and essential principles which underlie the respective systems -- is inherent, and exists in the very nature of things. Although legal and equitable cases are to a certain degree blended as to form, the principles remain the same, and the court will not interfere and exert its equity powers in a strictly legal action."
has been the uniform course of practice ever since the adoption of our new system. In all the states where the code has been instituted, the ruling has been harmonious in the same way. The statute enacts that"
"There shall be in this state but one form of action for the enforcement or protection of private rights, and the redress or prevention of private wrongs, which shall be denominated a 'civil action.'"
"In providing that there shall be but one form of civil action, the legislature cannot be supposed to have intended, at one stroke or sweeping enactment, to abolish the well recognized and long established distinction between law and equity. Such a construction would lead to perplexities and difficulties infinite and endless in their character. The innovation extends only to the form of action in the pleadings. While the difference in form and the technicalities in pleadings have been dispensed with, and the party need only state his cause of action in ordinary and concise language, whether it be under assumpsit, trover, trespass, or ejectment, without regard to the ancient forms, still the distinction between these actions has not been destroyed, but remains the same. So cases legal and equitable have not been consolidated, although there is no difference between the form of the bill in chancery and the common law declaration under our system, where all relief is sought in the same way from the same tribunal. The distinction between law and equity is as naked and as broad as ever. To entitle the plaintiff to an equitable interposition of the court, he must show a proper case for the interference of a court of chancery, and one in which he has no adequate or complete relief at law. The judgment vesting him with the legal title shows that he has a complete, appropriate, and ample remedy at law by ejectment. These plain principles were entirely overlooked at the trial in the court of common pleas, but, as before remarked, according to the decision of the majority of the court, the case was instituted and tried upon a misapprehension."
"It results that so much of the motion as asks for an affirmance of the judgment of the court of common pleas will be overruled and, in accordance with the mandate, the judgment of this court will be reversed and the petition dismissed."
"1. In conformity to the said mandate the judgment and decree of this Court therein mentioned is hereby reversed, and thereupon this cause remains to be proceeded with in conformity to the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States and the laws of the State of Missouri."
"2. This court doth find, and adjudge, and decree, that under and in conformity with the laws of the State of Missouri, the said petition of the said Magwire is a proceeding to obtain equitable relief only in respect to the lands in said petition mentioned, and that no right or title to any equitable relief touching the said lands, or any part thereof, is shown by the said petition and the proofs adduced in support thereof."
"3. The court doth find, adjudge, and decree, that in conformity with the laws of the State of Missouri the legal title to said land cannot be tried and adjudged or determined under said petition, and the proceedings thereunder, there being a plain, adequate, and complete remedy by an action of ejectment in conformity with the laws of the State of Missouri in that behalf, and no relief in the proceedings in equity pending before this Court."
"4. The court doth find, adjudge, and decree, that in conformity with the laws of the State of Missouri, the petition of said Magwire is a proceeding for equitable relief only for the purpose of vesting the legal title by decree in said Magwire to the lands therein mentioned. The legal title to which was admitted by plaintiff in his petition to be held by defendants, and the only judgment that, under the laws of the State of Missouri, can be entered therein, if supported by the proofs in the cause, would be a decree vesting the title to said lands in said Magwire, and under said laws the right to recover in that suit the possession of the lands therein described could not be tried, adjudged, or determined under the said petition and the proceedings thereunder."
to be then in defendant), in said plaintiff, Magwire, and in conformity with said laws the right to recover in said suit the rents, issues, and profits of said lands, cannot be tried, adjudged, or determined, under the said petition and the proceedings thereunder."
"6. It is therefore considered by the court, and the court doth order, adjudge, and decree that the said"
"PETITION BE DISMISSED WITH COSTS."
From this decree Tyler now in turn appealed, and the case was here for the third time, having been already twice before the common pleas of Missouri and twice before the supreme court of that state.
"was drawn in question the validity of a treaty or statute of, or an authority exercised under the United States, and the decision was against their validity; or was drawn in question, the validity of a statute of, or an authority exercised under any state, on the ground of their being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States, and the decision was in favor of such their validity; or was drawn in question, the construction of a clause of the Constitution, or of a treaty, or statute of, or commission held under the United States, and the decision was against the title, right, privilege, or exemption, especially set up or claimed under said clause of the Constitution, treaty, statute, or commission. "
state, and to reverse or affirm the same upon a writ of error, was conferred upon the Supreme Court by the twenty-fifth section of the Judiciary Act, and the same section provides that the writ of error shall have the same effect as if the judgment or decree had been rendered or passed in the circuit court, and that the proceeding upon the reversal shall also be the same, except that the Supreme Court, instead of remanding the cause for a final decision, may, at their discretion, if the cause shall have been once before remanded, proceed to a final decision of the same and award execution. [Footnote 14] Where the reversal is in favor of the original plaintiff, and the damages to be assessed or matters to be decreed are uncertain, the Supreme Court will remand the cause for a final decision unless the same shall have been once before remanded, in which case the Court may, at their discretion, proceed to a final decision of the cause. Execution in that event may be awarded here, but the Court, in all other appellate cases, will send a special mandate to the subordinate court for all further necessary proceedings.
Both parties in this case claim under the same concession, which was issued by the governor to Joseph Brazeau. On the 1st of June, 1794, he presented his petition to the governor, asking for a tract of land situate in the western part of the Town of St. Louis, beyond the foot of the mound called La Grange de Terre, of four arpents in width, to extend from the bank of the Mississippi in the west quarter, southwest, by about twenty arpents in depth, beginning at the foot of the hill on which stands the mound and ascending in a northwest course to the environs of Rocky Branch, so that the tract shall be bounded on the east side by the bank of the river and on the other sides in part by the public domain, and in part by the lands reunited to that domain.
and that he should put the interested party in possession of the described premises. Pursuant to those directions, the surveyor made the requisite survey, but he included the whole of the former concession in the certificate, overlooking the undisputed fact that the grantor of the deed reserved to himself 4 x 4 arpents of the same, "to be taken at the foot of the hillock in the southern part of said land," which shows the origin of this long-protracted controversy. Special consideration was given to that survey in the first opinion delivered in this case, in which the court decided that such a survey, however the error may have arisen, cannot have the effect to enlarge the rights of the purchaser or to diminish or impair the rights of the donee of the concession, to the 4 x 4 arpents reserved in the said deed, and which were never conveyed to the grantee of the residue of the tract.
Mississippi River; thence down and along the right bank of said river, to the beginning corner."
the case. Service was made and the defendants appeared and filed an answer, denying pretty nearly every material allegation of the petition. They admitted, however, that the governor made the concession of the 4 x 20 arpents to Joseph Brazeau, and they set up as the source of their title the deed of the 4 x 16 arpents, deducting the reservation from the original donee to the other claimant.
or his legal representatives, under which the plaintiff now claims. None of the proceedings is referred to with any other view than to enable the parties to understand the propositions of law and fact which were decided by the Court in the former opinion, as it is not proposed to reexamine any of those questions.
Having overruled all of those special defenses, the Court proceeded to say in the first opinion that the incomplete title to the tract remained unextinguished in the original donee or his assigns throughout the whole period of the litigation; that he never sold the 4 x 4 arpents to the other claimant, nor did he ever request that it should be surveyed or located in any other place than the one where it was, by the first survey, ascertained to be; that the other claimant never had any concession of the tract, that he never purchased it and never had any title of any kind to any part of the concession, except the sixteen arpents as described in his deed from the rightful owner of the residue of the tract.
bounded justly and honestly belongs to the plaintiff," as alleged in the petition.
Removed here, as the cause then was, by writ of error to the supreme court of the state, it becomes necessary to advert briefly to the proceedings in the state courts.
"The court finds that, out of the claim presented to the board of commissioners by Labeaume, the tract of 4 x 4 arpents claimed by the plaintiffs was confirmed to Joseph Brazeau, or his legal representatives, and that the court also found the issues in this cause in favor of the plaintiff, and therefore it was ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the tract of land, meted and bounded as follows,"
survey No. 3343, approved May 8, 1862, and patented to Joseph Brazeau or his legal representative, the 10th of June in the same year."
Rents and profits were also decreed to the plaintiff, and the cause was sent to a master to report the amount. Two motions for new trial were filed by the defendants, but they were both denied and the court, having amended and confirmed the report of the master, entered a final decree for the plaintiff, and the defendants having filed a bill of exceptions, as before explained, appealed to the supreme court of the state. Hearing was had in the supreme court upon the exhibits, proofs, evidence, and testimony set forth in the bills of exceptions, and the supreme court reversed the decree of the court of common pleas and dismissed the petition. Whereupon the plaintiff sued out a writ of error and removed the cause into this Court, and this Court reversed the decree of the supreme court of the state, and by the order, as amended, remanded the cause for further proceedings in conformity to the opinion of the Court. [Footnote 22] Pursuant to the mandate of this Court remanding the cause, the supreme court of the state reversed their former decree reversing the judgment and decree of the court of common pleas and dismissing the petition, but they did not proceed and dispose of the case in conformity to the opinion of this Court, as directed in the mandate.
as a repeal of the Constitution and the laws of Congress passed to carry the judicial power conferred by the Constitution into effect.
of error, and removed the cause a second time into this Court.
Different theories are put forth as to the ground assumed by the supreme court of the state in refusing to proceed with the case as directed in the mandate, and in entering the decree dismissing the petition, but the explanations given in the order of the court show that the court decided that the petition was a proceeding to obtain equitable relief in respect to the lands therein described, and that the legal title to the premises cannot be tried and adjudged under such a petition, and that inasmuch as the plaintiff had a plain, adequate, and complete remedy at law, the suit could not be maintained.
Presented as the proposition was as a reason for not executing the mandate of this Court, the question as to its sufficiency is one which must necessarily be determined by this Court, else the jurisdiction of the court will always be dependent upon the decision of the state court, which cannot be admitted in any case.
"there shall be in this state but one form of action for the enforcement or protection of private rights and the redress or prevention of private wrongs, which shall be denominated a civil action. [Footnote 28]"
(1) The title of the cause, specifying the name of the court and county in which the action is brought, and the names of the parties to the action.
(2) A plain and concise statement of the facts constituting a cause of action, without unnecessary repetition.
(1) That the court has no jurisdiction of the person of the defendant or the subject matter of the action.
(2) That the plaintiff has not legal capacity to sue.
(3) That there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause of action in the state.
(4) That there is a defect of parties plaintiff or defendant.
(5) That several causes of action have been improperly united.
(6) That the petition does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
No other grounds of demurrer are allowed by the statutory rules of pleading. Those rules demand only a cause of action, but it need not be designated as legal or equitable, as a demurrer for want of form is not allowed; nor is the jurisdiction of the court in any way affected by forms.
Such objections as those enumerated in the sixth section, if they do not appear on the face of the petition, may be taken by answer, and the tenth section expressly enacts that "if no such objection be taken, either by demurrer or answer, the defendant shall be deemed to have waived the same," excepting only the objection to the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the action, and excepting the objection that the petition does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
objection is not a valid one under the statutory rules of pleading prescribed in that state.
Suppose the general rule, however, to be otherwise, still the Court is of the opinion that the objection, even if it had been made earlier, could not avail the defendants, as they did not make it by demurrer or in the answer, as the express provision of the statute is that unless it is made by demurrer or answer, "the defendant shall be deemed to have waived the same."
Justice requires that that rule shall be applied in this case, as the case has been pending more than ten years, having been twice heard in the common pleas, once in the supreme court of the state, twice before the present hearing, including the hearing on the motion, in this Court, and a second time in the supreme court of the state, and is now here on a second writ of error after this Court has decided that the plaintiff has a complete, perfect, and unqualified right under the patent granted to the original donee or his legal representatives.
the saving clause in the patent reserved any valid adverse right which may exist to any part of the tract; that the patent granted to Joseph Brazeau at the same time never became operative, as he refused to accept the same, and returned it to the land department; that the subsequent action of the Secretary of the Interior in cancelling the same, and in ordering a new survey, was authorized by law; that Joseph Brazeau, by virtue of that survey, and the patent granted to him June 10, 1862 acquired the legal title to the tract of 4 x 4 arpents, notwithstanding the saving clause in the patent, as he was the rightful owner of the incomplete title to the same, as acquired by the concession granted under the former sovereign. Directed, as the court below was, to proceed in conformity to the opinion of the court, it is quite clear that it was their duty to reverse their judgment and to grant to the plaintiff the relief prayed in his petition -- that is, to enter a decree divesting out of the defendants all the right, title, and interest acquired or claimed by them and each of them form the other claimant or anyone claiming under him, and invest the same in the plaintiff, and to put him in possession of the premises.
as the decree in Gibbons v. Ogden, [Footnote 43] was also entered in this Court.
It follows that that part of the decree of the supreme court of the state dismissing the petition must be reversed, with costs, and that a decree be entered in this Court for the plaintiff, that the tract of 4 x 4 arpents claimed by the plaintiff was confirmed by the commissioners to Joseph Brazeau, and that the final survey, and the patent of June 10, 1862, issued to him or his legal representatives, gave him a complete title to the tract, and that the same tract, as meted and bounded in the petition, be decreed to the plaintiff, and that all the right, title, and interest of each and everyone of said defendants in and to said tract of land be divested out of said defendants and be vested in and passed to the plaintiff, to have and to hold to the said plaintiff, his heirs and assigns, forever.
when it becomes absolutely necessary to prevent injustice. Evidently such a claim must depend very largely upon the statutory provisions of the state, and to those the court has not been referred. Unless the statutes present some insuperable difficulties in the way of such a recovery, no doubt is entertained that the plaintiff will be entitled to enforce that claim in such form of remedy as is allowed by the local law. Whoever takes and holds possession of land to which another has a better title is in general liable to the true owner for all the rents and profits which he has received, whether the owner recover the possession of the premises in an action at law or in a suit in equity. [Footnote 44] Depending, as such a claim necessarily must, very much upon the statutes of the state, the Court, on the authority of the case of Miles v. Caldwell [Footnote 45] as well as for the other reasons suggested, deems it proper to leave the party to prosecute the claim as he may be advised in the tribunals of original jurisdiction as better suited to investigate and adjudicate such a claim than a court of errors. Besides the relief already described, the decree will also direct that the plaintiff be put in possession of the premises, and for that purpose he will be entitled to a writ of possession to be issued by the clerk of this Court.
of the supreme court of the state as dismissed the petition of the plaintiff be, and the same is hereby, reversed with costs. And it is further ordered, adjudged, and decreed, that the tract of 4 x 4 arpents claimed by the plaintiff was confirmed by the board of commissioners to Joseph Brazeau or his legal representatives, and that the said tract of land as meted and bounded, justly and equitably belongs to the plaintiff, as alleged in his petition, and as shown by the survey of the 8th of May, 1862, and by the patent of the 10th of June following, duly executed and signed by the President.
Wherefore this Court proceeding to render such decree in the case as the supreme court of the state should have rendered, it is ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the said tract of land, being the said 4 x 4 arpents claimed by the plaintiff, and meted and bounded as follows, viz.: beginning at a point on the right bank of the Mississippi River, the northeast corner of survey No. 3342, in the name of Esther, a free mulatress, or her legal representatives, and the southeast, corner of Louis Labeaume's survey, No. 3333; thence south 74 degrees 30 minutes west, with the southern boundary of said Labeaume's survey, and the northern boundary of the said Esther survey, to the northwest corner of the said Esther survey; thence north 23 degrees west, 776 feet 8 inches, to a stone; thence north 74 degrees 30 minutes east, 776 feet 8 inches, to a point on the right bank of the Mississippi River; thence down and along the right bank of said river to the beginning; be and the same is hereby decreed to the plaintiff, and all the right, title, and interest of each and everyone of said defendants, in and to said tract of land, is hereby divested out of said defendants, and each of them, and that the same is vested in and by virtue of the patent passed to the plaintiff; to have and to hold to the said plaintiff, his heirs and assigns, the said tract of land so passed to him and his heirs and assigns forever, being the same which is covered by the survey No. 3343, approved May 8, 1862, and patented to Joseph Brazeau 10 June in the same year, as appears by the record.
AND IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the plaintiff recover the possession of the said tract of land as herein meted and bounded, and that a writ of possession issued for that purpose in the usual form, directed to the marshal of this Court, duly executed by the clerk, and under the seal of this Court.
MR. JUSTICE SWAYNE, MR. JUSTICE STRONG, and MR. JUSTICE BRADLEY, dissented.
MR. JUSTICE HUNT did not hear the argument, and took no part in the judgment.
1. Revised Statutes of Missouri 1216.
"in the nature of a bill of equity, seeking to divest out of the defendants the title held by them, and to vest the same in the plaintiff, and to put him in possession"
"The answer denies the equities . . . pleads in bar a final decree in chancery, in a former suit, between the same parties, and insists that the suit is barred by the great lapse of time."
The court then enters into a comparison of title under the patents to the respective parties, and considers the equities lying behind the patents.
"Courts of equity in this state exercise jurisdiction according to the principles of equity jurisprudence, excepting only as the same may have been modified by some special statute. . . . There is really no case made on the record which can entitle the plaintiff to relief under any head of equity jurisprudence."
The court then sustains the plea of res judicata, saying that "the former decree in chancery between these parties proceeded upon the same substantial facts and grounds of equity that are here alleged again."
"The great lapse of time and the statute of limitations have been urged on our consideration. On this it will be enough to say that the defense resting upon a Spanish possession, under a concession and recorded survey, and continued to the present time under an absolute title from the United States, dated from the year 1806, needs no help, and could derive no additional strength from any statutes of limitations."
The judgment for these reasons was reversed and the petition dismissed.
See Magwire v. Tyler, 8 Wall. 650.
See Appendix, where the section is set forth.
Davis v. Packard, 8 Pet. 323; Mitchel v. United States, 15 Pet. 84.
47 Mo. 125, October Term 1870.
Janney v. Spedden, 38 Mo. 395.
Bradley v. Aldrich, 40 N.Y. 510; Lattin v. McCarty, 41 id. 107.
See Peyton v. Rose, 41 Mo. 257; Curd v. Lackland, 43 id. 139; Young v. Coleman, ib., 179; Gray v. Payne, ib., 203; Wynn v. Cory, ib., 301; Jones v. Moore, 42 id. 413; Lambert v. Blumenthal, 26 id. 471; Gott v. Powell, 41 id. 416.
1 Stat. at Large 86.
8 Stat. at Large 202; United States v. Wiggins, 14 Pet. 350.
2 Stat. at Large 326.
Ib., 283, 327, 353, 391, 440.
Magwire v. Tyler, 8 Wall. 658-661.
United States v. King, 3 How. 786; Same v. Forbes, 15 Pet. 173; Landes v. Brant, 10 How. 370; West v. Cochran, 17 How. 414; Stanford v. Taylor, 18 How. 412; Bissell v. Penrose, 8 How. 334.
Neilson v. Lagow, 12 How. 110; Magwire v. Tyler, 40 Mo. 433; Magwire v. Tyler, 1 Black 199.
Magwire v. Tyler, 8 Wall. 650, 75 U. S. 672.
Washington Bridge Co. v. Stewart, 3 How. 424; Ex Parte Sibbald, 12 Pet. 492; Peck v. Sanderson, 18 How. 42; Leese v. Clark, 20 Cal. 417; Hudson v. Guestier, 7 Cranch 1; Browder v. McArthur, 7 Wheat. 58.
Skillern's Executors v. May's Executors, 6 Cranch 267; Livingston v. Story, 12 Pet. 339; Chaires v. United States, 3 How. 618; Whyto v. Gibbes, 20 How. 542; Sibbald v. United States, 2 How. 455.
Roberts v. Cooper, 20 How. 467.
Sizer v. Many, 16 How. 98; Corning v. Iron Co., 15 How. 466; Himely v. Rose, 5 Cranch 313; Martin v. Hunter, 1 Wheat. 355.
Hipp v. Babin, 19 How. 278; Parker v. Woollen Co., 2 Black 551. Noonan v. Bradley, 12 Wall. 129.
Scott v. Pilkington, 15 Abbott's Practice Reports 285.
Robinson v. Rice, 20 Mo. 236; Butterworth v. O'Brien, 24 Howard's Practice Reports 438.
Rankin v. Charless, 19 Mo. 493; Winterson v. Railroad Co., 2 Hilton 392; Patrick v. Abeles, 27 Mo. 185.
Marquat v. Marquat, 12 N.Y. 341.
Miltenberger v. Morrison, 39 Mo. 78; Meyers v. Field, 37 id. 434.
Underhill v. Van Courtlandt, 2 Johnson's Chancery 369; Livingston v. Livingston, 4 id. 290.
Grandin v. Le Roy, 2 Paige 509; Hawley v. Cramer, 4 Cowen 727; Ludlow v. Simond, 2 Caines' Cases 56; Le Roy v. Platt, 4 Paige 81; Davis v. Roberts, 1 Smedes & Marshall's Chancery 550; Osgood v. Brown, 1 Freeman's Chancery 400; May v. Goodwin, 27 Ga. 353; Burroughs v. McNeill, 2 Devereux & Battle's Equity 300; Rathbone v. Warren, 10 Johnson 595.
Martin v. Hunter, 1 Wheat. 354.
22 U. S. 9 Wheat. 239.
Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheat. 70; Chirac v. Reinicker, 11 Wheat. 296; Same Case, 2 Pet. 617.
69 U. S. 2 Wall. 44.

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