Source: https://onlabor.org/further-thoughts-on-the-implications-of-the-mulhall-dismissal/
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 16:22:47+00:00

Document:
In my quick reaction to yesterday’s dismissal in Mulhall, I wrote that “as long as CA11’s decision stands, the specter of expensive and difficult litigation will hover over neutrality/bargaining agreements in many circuits, and will indeed chill the making of those agreements.” With more time and a day’s reflection, I now want to be more precise about the implications of the dismissal.
First, it is important to remember what the court below in the Eleventh Circuit held. It did not hold that bargaining agreements are per se illegal under §302 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. §186. More specifically, it did not hold that organizing assistance by an employer to a labor union in an organizing agreement was always (or even usually) a “thing of value” under §302. The court emphasized that it was “too broad to hold that all neutrality and cooperation agreements are exempt from the prohibitions in § 302,” and it added that “[e]mployers and unions may set ground rules for an organizing campaign, even if the employer and union benefit from the agreement.” However, the court went on to say that “innocuous ground rules can become illegal payments if used as valuable consideration in a scheme to corrupt a union or to extort a benefit from an employer,” and it remanded to the district court to “determine the reason why Unite and Mardi Gras agreed to cooperate with one another.” Unless and until the Eleventh Circuit reviews the district court’s decision on remand, therefore, neutrality/bargaining agreements can be challenged not on a per se basis, but rather on the somewhat diffuse ground that the agreement constitutes (as the Eleventh Circuit put it) an “improper payment” that is part of a scheme to corrupt a union or extort a benefit from an employer. In Alabama, Florida, and Georgia, therefore, neutrality/bargaining agreements can be challenged under Section 302 for corruption on the facts. To that extent, in these states, extant agreements are at risk and future agreements will be chilled by the litigation risk.
Third, in the remaining circuits, neutrality/bargaining agreements are open to challenge, either narrowly under the Eleventh’s Circuit’s “improper payment” standard, or more broadly on the ground that such agreements per se violate Section 302, as Respondent in Mulhall argued in the Supreme Court. I doubt any court will accept the latter argument, but the Eleventh Circuit’s holding, while unclear and not well explained, is not implausible (for reasons I have explained here.) I expect that we will see Section 302 litigation in these circuits by the National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation and similar groups, and to the extent that such litigation appears or is anticipated, neutrality/bargaining agreements will run litigation risk and to the extent of the perceived risk be unattractive.
I believe we should also ask for further briefing on a third question: the question whether §302 authorizes a private right of action. I recognize that the Court said, long ago and in passing, that §302(e) “permit[s] private litigants to obtain injunctions” for violations of §302. Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U. S. 195, 205 (1962), overruled in part on other grounds, Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks, 398 U. S. 235, 237–238 (1970). But, in light of the Court’s more restrictive views on private rights of action in recent decades, see, e.g., Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U. S. 275, 286–287 (2001), the legal status of Sinclair Refining’s dictum is uncertain. And if §302 in fact does not provide a right of action to private parties like Mulhall, then courts will not need to reach difficult questions about the scope of §302, as happened in this case, unless the Federal Government decides to prosecute such cases rather than limit its attention to cases that clearly fall within the statute’s core antibribery purpose.
It appears that the first court that will get a crack at this argument is the district court on remand in Mulhall.

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