Source: https://cbaclelegalconnection.com/tag/due-process/page/2/
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 18:20:48+00:00

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The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued its opinion in McDonald v. Wise on Tuesday, October 28, 2014.
Wayne McDonald was a Special Assistant to Denver Mayor Michael Hancock in 2011 and 2012. He was appointed by the mayor to serve “at the pleasure of the Special Assistant,” and in his official duties, he worked closely with Denver police officer Leslie Wise, who provided security to the mayor. He communicated with Ms. Wise on and off duty, discussing both work-related and personal matters. Between September 2011 and March 2012, Ms. Wise called Mr. McDonald at least 41 times on his personal phone, with calls as early as 6:26 a.m. and as late as 7:39 p.m. On November 3, 2011, unbeknownst to Mr. McDonald, Ms. Wise recorded two of these calls. At least 3/4 of the calls from Ms. Wise to Mr. McDonald occurred after November 3, 2011. She also gave him a Christmas gift, attended church with him, and met his family. They last spoke on March 14, 2012, when Ms. Wise telephoned Mr. McDonald.
On May 18, 2012, the mayor’s deputy chief of staff and the city attorney informed Mr. McDonald that Ms. Wise had accused him of sexual harassment and produced the two recorded phone calls from November 3, 2011. Mr. McDonald denied the allegations and agreed to participate fully in an investigation. He left the meeting with the understanding that he was suspended pending the outcome of an investigation and hearing. At a subsequent meeting on May 21, Mr. McDonald was told he could either resign or be fired due to the allegations. Mr. McDonald requested an investigation and opportunity to defend himself, but was fired on the spot. The mayor and his staff subsequently informed the news media that Mr. McDonald was fired for sexual harassment. Mr. McDonald applied for unemployment compensation benefits, but was denied based on his termination for sexual harassment. He appealed to the Colorado Department of Labor, and the hearing officer determined Mr. McDonald was not responsible for the separation from employment. Mr. McDonald has not been able to find subsequent employment, and has been told by potential employers that his termination for sexual harassment is the reason. He brought suit against the city, the mayor, and the mayor’s press secretary for due process violations, breach of contract, and unlawful disclosure of confidential information. He sued Ms. Wise for defamation. The district court rejected all of his claims, and this appeal followed.
The Tenth Circuit first addressed Mr. McDonald’s claims that he was deprived due process of the law for both property and liberty interests. The Tenth Circuit found that Mr. McDonald did not have a property interest in his continued employment, because he served at the pleasure of the mayor and as such was an at-will employee. He could not have had a property interest in continued employment because of his at-will status, and the district court correctly dismissed this claim. The Tenth Circuit reached a different outcome as to Mr. McDonald’s liberty interest in his good name and continued employment. The mayor said at a press conference that Mr. McDonald was terminated for sexual harassment, not because of allegations, thus effectively affirming the allegations in a public forum. The statements called Mr. McDonald’s good name into question, and Mr. McDonald has been unable to secure further employment due to the statements. The Tenth Circuit determined that Mr. McDonald’s liberty interest was infringed upon, and next turned to the question of whether he had a chance to clear his name at a proper name-clearing hearing. Because Mr. McDonald received no hearing at all on this issue, the Tenth Circuit found a serious deprivation of due process related to his protected liberty interest, and reversed the district court. However, the Tenth Circuit found that the mayor’s press secretary need not be named in her official capacity in the suit, since the mayor and the city were named. On remand, the proper parties for this issue are solely the mayor and the city.
Mr. McDonald also contended that his termination was a breach of his employment contract with the city. The Tenth Circuit disagreed, finding as above that his employment was at will, and his claim is not one for which relief can be granted. The Tenth Circuit likewise disposed of his claim regarding non-disclosure of personnel records under the Colorado Open Records Act, because there is no private right of action under CORA and he did not allege sufficient reason to amend his complaint.
Finally, the Tenth Circuit turned to Mr. McDonald’s defamation claim against Ms. Wise. The district court dismissed his defamation claim, finding qualified immunity for Ms. Wise, and that even if she were not immune, Mr. McDonald failed to allege a viable defamation claim. The Tenth Circuit disagreed with the trial court’s reasoning, finding instead that Ms. Wise was not entitled to qualified immunity since her actions were willful and wanton. Mr. McDonald’s complaint alleged sufficient facts to support an inference of willful and wanton conduct, including the numerous phone calls made to him by Ms. Wise after the date of the alleged sexual harassment, and he was entitled to a trial on the merits. As to the defamation claim, the Tenth Circuit found that Ms. Wise held no qualified privilege since she made the allegedly defamatory statements with actual malice, and the district court erred by concluding Ms. Wise was immune from liability.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Mr. McDonald’s property interest due process claim, breach of employment contract claim, and CORA violation claim. The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of Mr. McDonald’s liberty interest due process claim and defamation claim against Ms. Wise, and remanded for further proceedings.
The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in Finney v. People on Tuesday, May 27, 2014.
Criminal Law—Sentencing and Punishment—Alternative Dispositions—Pre-Sentence Penalty Advisements at Revocation Hearings.
CRS § 16-11-206 requires a court to advise a probationer, at or before a hearing on a revocation complaint, of the possible penalties he or she may face. Here, the Supreme Court considered whether, to satisfy due process, Crim.P. 11(b) independently requires such an advisement. The record demonstrates that defendant waived his statutory right to a penalty advisement under CRS § 16-11-206. The Court concluded that, even if defendant had not waived his statutory right to an advisement, the requirement of CRS § 16-11-206 was met here because defendant was advised on several occasions of the potential penalties he faced. The Court further held that CRS § 16-11-206 does not incorporate Crim.P. 11(b) or otherwise embody a constitutional right to be advised of the possible penalties when a defendant admits to a violation of a deferred judgment agreement. Thus, where, as here, a defendant waives his or her statutory right under CRS § 16-11-206 to a penalty advisement at a revocation hearing, neither Crim.P. 11(b) nor constitutional due process independently requires such an advisement. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the court of appeals’ decision upholding the trial court’s denial of post-conviction relief.
The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People v. Desantiago on Thursday, May 22, 2014.
Speedy Trial—CRS 18-1-405(5)—Motion to Dismiss—Timeliness.
At his arraignment in this case on November 4, 2010, defendant entered a not-guilty plea, and the court set a trial date of April 6, 2011. Because defendant was in federal custody and his presence could not be secured by the prosecution through a writ to federal authorities, defendant did not appear in court for a hearing in this case until July 14, 2011. A new trial date was set for September 7, 2011. Though a motions hearing was held on August 5, 2011, defendant did not then move to dismiss based on the speedy trial statute. However, on August 26, 2011, before the September 7 trial setting, defendant moved to dismiss the charges against him, asserting violation of his statutory speedy trial right, which was denied by the court as untimely filed.
On appeal, defendant contended that the trial court should have granted his motion to dismiss for violation of his statutory right to speedy trial. Under Colorado’s speedy trial statute, if a defendant has not been brought to trial within six months from the date of entry of a plea of not guilty, charges against him or her must be dismissed with prejudice. Under the plain meaning of CRS § 18-1-405(5), a defendant timely files a motion to dismiss even if it is filed on the day of trial, as long as it is filed before any hearing on any pretrial motion that is set for hearing on that date. Therefore, defendant’s motion to dismiss was timely filed. However, the trial court’s findings were insufficient to determine whether dismissal of the case was warranted on speedy trial grounds with regard to whether the prosecution made diligent efforts to secure defendant’s presence. Accordingly, the case was remanded to the trial court for the limited purpose of having the court make findings of fact and conclusions of law on that issue.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals published its opinion in Cole v. Trammell on Monday, November 18, 2013.
On the evening of December 20, 2002, Benjamin Cole caused fatal injuries to his nine-month-old daughter Brianna. An autopsy revealed that Brianna’s spine had been snapped in half, and her aorta had been completely torn through due to non-accidental stretching.
Cole was charged in the District Court of Rogers County, Oklahoma, with one count of first degree murder of a child. The State also filed a bill of particulars alleging the existence of three aggravating circumstances: (1) Cole was previously convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person; (2) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel; and (3) the existence of a probability that Cole would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society.
The case proceeded to trial. At the conclusion of the first stage evidence, the jury found Cole guilty of first degree murder. At the conclusion of the second-stage evidence, the jury found the existence of two of the three aggravating factors alleged in the bill of particulars — the murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel, and that Cole had been previously convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person — and fixed Cole’s punishment at death.
Cole initiated these federal habeas proceedings. The district court issued an opinion and order denying Cole’s petition, but granting him a certificate of appealability (COA) with respect to five issues: an alleged breakdown in communications between Cole and his defense counsel; defense counsel’s failure to investigate and present additional mitigating evidence; improper admission of photographs of the victim; sufficiency of the evidence to support the heinous, atrocious or cruel aggravator; and prosecutorial misconduct. The court subsequently expanded the COA to include the issue of cumulative error.
Two mental health examinations and a jury trial were held to determine Mr. Cole’s competency. The Tenth Circuit held that that Cole’s arguments were insufficient to warrant federal habeas relief under the standards of review outlined in § 2254(d). Although the record on appeal indicated, and the Oklahoma Court of Appeals (OCCA) conceded, that Cole and his defense team had difficulties communicating with each other during the course of the pretrial proceedings, the OCCA found that Cole was partly responsible for these communication difficulties and that, in the end, there was not a complete breakdown in communication such that Cole was denied his right to effective assistance of counsel. And, though Cole disagreed with the OCCA’s finding that he was partly responsible for the communication difficulties, he failed to establish that it was “an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding” as required by § 2254(d)(2).
Cole contended that his trial counsel failed to investigate and present mitigation evidence from Cole’s family members that would have “personalized” him to the jury. Consequently, Cole argued, he was deprived of his right to effective assistance of counsel in violation of the United States Constitution. The Tenth Circuit held Cole’s claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel was procedurally barred for purposes of federal habeas review. Even after an analysis on the merits, the court concluded that Cole was not prejudiced by his trial counsel’s failure to investigate and present the various items of mitigating evidence.
Cole argued that he was denied his constitutional rights to due process, a fundamentally fair trial, and a reliable sentencing hearing as a result of the state trial court’s erroneous admission of “gruesome autopsy photographs” during the first-stage proceedings.
Cole pointed to Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1 (1994), as providing the clearly established federal law applicable to this claim. In Romano, the Supreme Court held that “the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . applies to the sentencing phase of capital trials.” 512 U.S. at 12. When a defendant claims that the introduction of evidence during the penalty phase of a capital trial violates the Due Process Clause, the relevant question is whether the admission of the challenged evidence so infected the sentencing proceeding with unfairness as to render the jury’s imposition of the death penalty a denial of due process. The court agreed with OCCA that the admission of certain autopsy photographs of the child did not deprive Cole of a fair sentencing proceeding.
Cole argued that his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments were violated because the evidence presented during the second-stage proceedings was insufficient to allow the jury to reasonably find that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel.
Cole argued that the medical examiner’s findings, at most, indicated the possibility that some pain might have been felt by Brianna as the result of the fracture of the spine, but there was no evidence that Brianna was conscious during the time the injury was inflicted; and even if she was, the medical examiner testified that such consciousness would not have lasted any more than thirty seconds. The OCCA rejected Cole’s arguments and agreed with the State’s description that Brianna’s injuries would have been absolutely painful to a nine-month-old child. The Tenth Circuit fully agreed with the OCCA that the medical examiner’s testimony was sufficient to allow a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel.
Cole asserted that prosecutorial misconduct in seeking sympathy for the decedent, by way of repeated references to God and religion in both stages of the trial, resulted in violations of his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Cole further asserted that his rights under the First Amendment were also violated by the prosecutorial misconduct. Additionally, Cole asserted that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the alleged instances of prosecutorial misconduct. According to Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974), prosecutorial misconduct can result in constitutional error if it so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process. The Tenth Circuit held that the prosecutor’s comments, when considered in light of the trial as a whole, did not result in a deprivation of Cole’s due process right to a fair trial and sentencing proceeding.
Having reviewed all of the state court records in the case, the court concluded that Cole received a fundamentally fair trial. In other words, even aggregating the constitutional errors alleged by Cole, those errors did not have a substantial and injurious effect or influence on either the jury’s determination of Cole’s guilt or its decision to sentence Cole to death.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals published its opinion in West v. Dobrev on Wednesday, October 30, 2013.
Petitioner Livia West and Respondent Stanislav Dobrev were married in the United States and their two children were born here. The family moved to France and after about a year, West filed for divorce. The French court ordered the children to remain in the usual home of West. Dobrev moved back to the United States. The French court gave West permission to move with the children to Belgium for employment and the divorce was finalized.
Two years later, Dobrev took the children to the United States for a vacation but then filed suit in Utah state court for “Emergency Jurisdiction and Custody.” West filed a petition in Utah federal district court for the return of the children under Article 3 of the Hague Convention.
The Utah federal district court, after holding a preliminary hearing, granted Petitioner West’s petition for return of her two minor children to their residence in Belgium, pursuant to the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction and its implementing legislation, The International Child Abduction Remedies Act (ICARA). The district court also awarded Petitioner fees, costs, and expenses.
Respondent Dobrev appealed, claiming a denial of due process based on the district court’s refusal to provide him an evidentiary hearing to challenge its finding that Belgium was the habitual residence of the children under the convention. The Tenth Circuit found that Dobrev never contested whether Belgium was the children’s habitual residence.
The court held that Dobrev failed to meet his burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence an exception to West’s prima facie case for return of the children under the Convention. Dobrev received a meaningful opportunity to be heard at the preliminary hearing; he was not entitled to a fishing expedition.
The court also found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s award of fees and costs and affirmed the district court in all respects.

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