Source: https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/may-congress-abrogate-stare-decisis-by-statute
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 13:09:39+00:00

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The Yale Law Journal - Forum: May Congress Abrogate Stare Decisis by Statute?
May Congress Abrogate Stare Decisis by Statute?
Thinking about Congress’s power over the rules of precedent—and specifically, distinguishing its power in statutory cases from its power in constitutional ones—also gives us insight into other attempts to regulate judicial interpretation. For example, in early 2016, Republicans in Congress introduced the “Separation of Powers Restoration Act” (SPRA), a bill that would eliminate Chevron14 and Auer15 deference to agency interpretations of statutes and regulations.16 The SPRA passed the House in July 2016,17 and House Republicans quickly reintroduced and passed the bill in the most recent session of Congress.18 As Chevron and Auer deference do not implicate questions of constitutional interpretation, the SPRA, like some provisions of King’s bill, may prove more amenable to judicial review.19 And although the SPRA, as currently drafted, does not prohibit courts from citing Chevron and Auer for “purpose of precedent,” it is not difficult to imagine Congress taking that next step—especially if courts resist the clear purpose of the SPRA to eliminate judicial deference to administrative agencies.20 Past scholars have argued that the Supreme Court should overrule Chevron21 or have discussed Congress’s proposed legislation,22 but they have not considered whether Congress actually has the power to abrogate Chevron as a methodological precedent.
Despite the limited scholarly discussion, Congress’s power to abrogate substantive stare decisis—the narrow holding on the meaning of the statutory provision—and methodological stare decisis—the broader methodological approach to an interpretive question—could be quite important.23 Past studies have shown that courts often construe congressional overrides of judicial interpretations narrowly. As a result, courts frequently follow substantive or methodological stare decisis stemming from these “shadow precedents” in opposition to congressional intent.24 These articles have considered ways in which Congress might limit shadow precedents—by drafting override laws more precisely in order to abrogate a decision’s methodology25—and they have argued that courts should exercise restraint in following stare decisis in statutory cases when Congress has overridden the previous judicial decision.26 But none of these studies have asked the simple question of whether Congress can directly abrogate the precedential effect of statutory decisions.
Because Congress can overrule judicial interpretations of statutes and assuming that it can prescribe how courts should interpret statutes,30 why should Congress not be able to enact a law freeing courts from feeling bound by prior statutory decisions?31 Admittedly, distinguishing Congress’s power over stare decisis in statutory cases from its power in constitutional cases does not resolve the question entirely: we still do not know whether Congress can abrogate constitutional precedents. But by distinguishing these statutory and constitutional cases, we at least resolve the issue in the statutory context.
This Essay proceeds in two Parts. Part I describes the previous two scholarly theories of congressional power over the rules of precedent. Part II shows why we should distinguish Congress’s power over constitutional cases from its power over statutory cases and argues that Congress has a stronger claim to regulate stare decisis in the latter context. The Essay concludes by emphasizing the importance of congressional power over stare decisis in statutory cases matters.
In essence, past scholarship has taken one of two views regarding whether Congress may alter judicial rules of precedent. Some have embraced the possibility; others have rejected it. This Essay will briefly consider each position in turn.
Furthermore, both Paulsen and Harrison view Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution—the “Necessary and Proper Clause” or the “Sweeping Clause”—as authorizing Congress to regulate the rules and procedures of judicial decision making.36 For example, Paulsen finds additional “[p]recedents” for this power in such legislative enactments as the Rules of Decision Act, the Full Faith and Credit Act, the Anti-Injunction Act, the Federal Rules of Evidence, and the legislative abrogation of the Court’s judicial standing doctrine.37 Harrison and Paulsen also tie their conclusions to Congress’s apparently greater power to alter the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction under the Necessary and Proper Clause and Article 3, Section 2—the provision cited in King’s bill.38 As a subsidiary claim to their Necessary and Proper Clause arguments, they argue that Article III does not grant the courts autonomy to develop rules of stare decisis.39 Accordingly, congressional action limiting stare decisis would not violate the separation of powers.
As a final note, some might wonder whether the selective abrogation of stare decisis—as King’s bill would do with the ACA decisions—affects the constitutionality of his proposal. In Paulsen’s view, it would not.43 Abrogating stare decisis does not impede the ability of courts to decide cases on their merits. Indeed, one might argue that courts more faithfully follow their Article III duty “to say what the law is” when they are not bound by stare decisis.44 In addition, the Supreme Court already practices “selective stare decisis” as “[p]recedent is followed, except when it isn’t.”45 Selectively abrogating stare decisis by statute simply adopts this existing inconsistency in a more structured way.
In addition, beyond limiting the Court from citing the narrow interpretive holding of a case, Congress might also prevent it from citing its opinions as precedent for the use of interpretive canons, a phenomenon some have called “methodological stare decisis.”79 The most famous example of methodological stare decisis is Chevron, which is both a statutory precedent about the meaning of “stationary source” in the Clean Air Act80 and a methodological precedent regarding judicial deference toward agency interpretations of statutes.81If Congress banned the Court from citing Chevron, then it would eliminate both the narrow holding and the broader canon—at least as binding precedent.
Finally, it is important to note that such a law would eliminate both the horizontal precedential effect of the decision—the Supreme Court would not have to follow its prior decision—and also the vertical precedential effect—lower courts would not have to follow the Supreme Court’s decision.82 In contrast to other scholars,83 this Essay does not view the abrogation of vertical stare decisis as controversial. At least currently, federal courts do not appear to view vertical stare decisis as constitutionally compelled, as federal appellate courts often produce “unpublished” opinions which have no binding precedential effect on district courts or future appellate courts.84 Some commentators have questioned the constitutionality of issuing unpublished opinions,85 but they are still a firmly established aspect of judicial practice.86 Moreover, it is telling that when the Supreme Court issued Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 in 2006, it only prevented appellate courts from “prohibit[ing] or restrict[ing] the citation” of judicial opinions.87 The Rule does not prevent appellate courts from limiting the binding precedential effect of such opinions. In this way, Rule 32.1 tracks this Essay’s theory that the binding precedential effect of opinions can be limited, but their persuasive value cannot.
But even if the Constitution does not require a particular mode of constitutional interpretation—or if we cannot agree on whether or which methodology it requires—the question remains whether a congressionally-prescribed rule of constitutional interpretation would violate the separation of powers. It is difficult to predict how the Court might approach the constitutional issue,92 let alone to provide a normative theory for how the Court should resolve such a case. But the heated disagreement in the scholarly literature—drawing critiques from both liberals93 and conservatives94—suggests that Congress does not have a clear power over the judiciary’s interpretation of the Constitution.
At the very least, however, there is recent evidence to support this Essay’s view that Congress may permissibly interfere with the interpretation of statutes. Last term, in Bank Markazi v. Peterson,95 the Court upheld a statute that changed settled law in the midst of litigation by specific reference to the pending case.96 As the dissent noted, Congress was legislating a rule of decision for a particular case.97 Put another way, Congress was telling the Court how to interpret the statute by codifying its own interpretation of the law.
The Essay seeks to reframe a decade-old debate. We should revisit the question of whether Congress may abrogate stare decisis because Congress might attempt to do so in years to come. But more importantly, we need to reconsider Congress’s power by distinguishing its authority to regulate stare decisis in statutory cases from its power to regulate stare decisis in constitutional ones. There are reasons to think that King’s bill will never pass either chamber of Congress, let alone be signed into law.104 But other pending legislation, like the SPRA, may have better legislative prospects and may rest on constitutionally firmer ground because these bills only deal with statutory decisions. This Essay does not attempt to settle definitively whether abrogation of stare decisis for statutory decisions is constitutional. Rather, it merely offers strong reasons to believe that it is.
That Congress may regulate the interpretation of statutes of course does not mean that it should. Indeed, given the long-standing disagreements over statutory interpretation, it may be a very bad idea for Congress to force its way into the debate. Nevertheless, if we think that bills like the SPRA are misguided, then we should fight them politically in Congress rather than depend upon judges to rule them unconstitutional.
James Durling is a member of the Yale Law School J.D. Class of 2018. Thanks to Samir Doshi, Josh Revesz, Rich Medina and the editors of the Yale Law Journal Forum for their excellent suggestions. Special thanks to Megan McGlynn and Jenna Pavelec. All errors are my own.
Preferred Citation: James Durling, May Congress Abrogate Stare Decisis by Statute?, 127 Yale L.J. F. 27 (2017), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/may-congress-abrogate-stare-decisis-by-statute.
Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
See H.R. 177, 115th Cong. (2017).
132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).
134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997).
See H.R. 4768, 114th Cong. (2016); S. 2724, 114th Cong. (2016).
U.S. Const. art. V (describing the process for amending the Constitution).
See Rosenkranz, supra note 13, at 2140-41.
See infra notes 80-84 and accompanying text.
See Harrison, supra note 7; Paulsen, supra note 6.
See Harrison, supra note 7, at 505; Paulsen, supra note 6, at 1543-51.
See Paulsen, supra note 6, at 1551-67.
See Harrison, supra note 7, at 532-39; Paulsen, supra note 6, at 1567-70.
See Paulsen, supra note 6, at 1584-89.
See Harrison, supra note 7, at 539-43; Paulsen, supra note 6, at 1570-82.
See Paulsen, supra note 6, at 1596-98.
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
Paulsen, supra note 6, at 1598.
See Healy, supra note 7, at 1178-83; Lawson, supra note 7, at 194.
See Lawson, supra note 7, at 194.
See Lawson, supra note 7, at 201-214; Healy, supra note 7, at 1196-1207.
See Lawson, supra note 7, at 195.
See Healy, supra note 7, at 1199.
Fallon, supra note 7, at 577.
135 S. Ct. 2480, 2487 (2015).
134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759 (2014).
132 S. Ct. 2566, 2578-79 (2012).
See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
See Rosenkranz, supra note 13, at 2143.
See infra notes 88-94 and accompanying text.
See 1 U.S.C. §§ 1-8 (2012).
See id. at §§ 2-8.
See id. at § 1 (clarifying singular/plural distinction and gender).
See, e.g., Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
See, e.g., Rosenkranz, supra note 13, at 2125 n.167.
Fed. R. App. P. 32.1(a).
See Fallon, supra note 7.
See Lawson, supra note 7.
136 S. Ct. 1310 (2016); see also Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc., 503 U.S. 429 (1992).
See id. at 1329-1338 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
See John Harrison, Legislative Power and Judicial Power, 31 Const. Comment. 295, 298 (2016).
See H.R. 177, 115th Cong. (2017); see also Press Release, Steve King, King Introduces Bill to Prohibit Supreme Court from Citing Obamacare (Jan. 3, 2017), http://steveking.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/king-introduces-bill-to-prohibit-supreme-court-from-citing-obamacare [http://perma.cc/HQQ9-LL3F].
See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. Scholars have previously considered a closely related question of whether stripping the Supreme Court of its appellate jurisdiction over some cases would eliminate the binding precedential effect of its decisions in that area. Compare, e.g., Paul M. Bator, Withdrawing Jurisdiction from Federal Courts, 7 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 31, 33 (1984) (considering whether Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), would remain binding precedent if the Court’s ability to review state court decisions with respect to Roe were removed), with, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. Rev. 205, 258-59 n.170 (1985) (explaining why Supreme Court opinions can cease to be viewed as binding precedent).
See, e.g., Editorial, King Tells the Supreme Court How To Do Its Job, Des Moines Reg. (Jan. 9, 2017, 5:30 PM), http://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/opinion/editorials/2017/01/09/editorial-king-tells-supreme-court-how-do-its-job/96352340 [http://perma.cc/MMV8-8ALG]; Elie Mystal, Rep. Steve King Proposes Bill To Prevent Supreme Court from Citing Its Own Precedent, Above the Law (Jan. 4, 2017, 12:28 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/2017/01/rep-steve-king-proposes-bill-to-prevent-supreme-court-from-citing-its-own-precedent [http://perma.cc/79FQ-LWYP]; Eugene Volokh, Republican Congressman Trying To Undermine Hobby Lobby Decision — and it Just Gets Weirder, Wash. Post (Jan. 4, 2017), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/01/04/republican-congressman-trying-to-undermine-hobby-lobby-decision-and-it-just-gets-weirder [http://perma.cc/B6ZP-HPUC].
See Michael Stokes Paulsen, Abrogating Stare Decisis by Statute: May Congress Remove the Precedential Effect of Roe and Casey, 109 Yale L.J. 1535 (2000).
Compare, e.g., John Harrison, The Power of Congress Over the Rules of Precedent, 50 Duke L.J. 503, 504 n.7 (2000) (agreeing with Paulsen), with, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Stare Decisis and the Constitution: An Essay on Constitutional Methodology, 76 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 570 (2001) (disagreeing with Paulsen); Thomas Healy, Stare Decisis and the Constitution: Four Questions and Answers, 83 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1173, 1196-1207 (2008) (same); Gary Lawson, Controlling Precedent: Congressional Regulation of Judicial Decision-making, 18 Const. Comm. 191 (2001) (same).
Nicholas Rosenkranz has briefly argued that Congress “could . . . do away with . . . stare decisis in statutory cases” by prescribing an interpretive rule: “The United States Code shall be interpreted de novo in each case.” See Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 2085, 2125 (2002). But Rosenkranz’s rule neither addresses whether Congress can target specific statutory precedents nor considers whether such a rule would abrogate both the statutory and the methodological stare decisis effect of the decision. See infra notes 79-81 and accompanying text (distinguishing statutory from methodological stare decisis). Similarly, although Rosenkranz argues that Congress “probably” cannot eliminate “[v]ertical stare decisis,” see Rosenkranz, supra, at 212 n.167, this Essay argues that Congress does have such a power. When a statute directly abrogates the precedential effect of a Supreme Court decision, lower courts need no longer follow it. See infra notes 81-86 and accompanying text. Likewise, Thomas Healy has conceded that “it is conceivable that a statute abrogating stare decisis in statutory cases could be seen simply as a redefinition of the substantive law” and thus be constitutionally permissible. Healy, supra note 7, at 1198 n.138. But he does not elaborate on whether Congress has power over judicial interpretation.
See Brent Owens, US Congress Considers Law That Would Overturn Chevron Deference, Fresh Law Blog (Aug. 11, 2016), http://www.freshlawblog.com/2016/08/11/us-congress-considers-law-that-would-overturn-chevron-deference [http://perma.cc/6NGX-SYBX].
See H.R. 5, 115th Cong. (2017); see also Michael Macagnone, House Passes Bill Ending Chevron Deference, Law360 (Jan. 11, 2017, 8:55 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/879235/house-passes-bill-ending-chevron-deference [http://perma.cc/3DBJ-UDG2].
See infra notes 88-91 (discussing Congress’s less defined power over constitutional interpretation).
Whether repealing Chevron and Auer deference even matters is a separate question. See Connor N. Raso & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Chevron as a Canon, Not a Precedent: An Empirical Study of What Motivates Justices in Agency Deference Cases, 110 Colum. L. Rev. 1727, 1799 (2010) (arguing that Chevron is only one “canon” driving judicial deference to agency interpretations).
See, e.g., Jack M. Beermann, End the Failed Chevron Experiment Now: How Chevron Has Failed and Why It Can and Should Be Overruled, 42 Conn. L. Rev. 779, 841-43 (2010); Philip Hamburger, Chevron Bias, 84 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1187, 1205-13 (2016).
See Andrew Hessick, Legislative Efforts to Overturn Chevron, Yale J. on Reg.: Notice & Comment (Mar. 19, 2016), http://yalejreg.com/nc/legislative-efforts-to-overturn-chevron-by-andy-hessick [http://perma.cc/B9C4-G39W].
Admittedly, it is unclear how often courts follow methodological stare decisis. See, e.g., Abbe R Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation, 119 Yale L.J. 1750, 1823 (2010) [hereinafter Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation] (noting that the Supreme Court does not appear to follow methodological stare decisis). But at a minimum, the Supreme Court appears to do so in some cases. See Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation: Methodology as “Law” and the Erie Doctrine, 120 Yale L.J. 1898, 1990 n.320 (2011) [hereinafter Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation] (describing Chevron as an example of methodological stare decisis).
See, e.g., Deborah A. Widiss, Undermining Congressional Overrides: The Hydra Problem in Statutory Interpretation, 90 Tex L. Rev. 859, 887-81 (2012) [hereinafter Widiss, Undermining Congressional Overrides]; Deborah A. Widiss, Shadow Precedents and the Separation of Powers: Statutory Interpretation of Congressional Overrides, 84 Notre Dame L. Rev. 511, 531-34 (2009) [hereinafter Widiss, Shadow Precedents]. A recent article has shown that citations to decisions decline more when they are judicially overruled than when they are legislatively overridden, which might suggest that courts respond better to clear directives. See Brian J. Broughman & Deborah A. Widiss, After the Override: An Empirical Analysis of Shadow Precedent (Ind. Legal Stud. Research Paper No. 312, Sept. 1, 2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2584048 [http://perma.cc/Z8CX-QFMD].
See James J. Brudney, Distrust and Clarify: Appreciating Congressional Overrides, 90 Tex. L. Rev. See Also 205 (2012); Lawrence M. Solan, Precedent in Statutory Interpretation, 94 N.C. L. Rev. 1165, 1228-33 (2016); Widiss, Shadow Precedents, supra note 24, at 566-80.
Because the Court has never struck down one of Congress’s interpretive rules as violating separation of powers, this is not an unrealistic assumption. See infra notes 69-74.
Like Paulsen, I assume that such a bill would only prohibit courts from feeling “bound” by prior precedent, meaning that courts could still cite the decisions for their persuasive value. See Paulsen, supra note 6, at 1593. Although King’s bill does not clearly adopt this narrow view of abrogating precedent, this Essay will adopt such a construction under principles of constitutional avoidance. Admittedly, the notion of feeling “bound” by precedent is itself ambiguous, but it is a description accepted by others. See, e.g., Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 723, 755 (1988). In addition, whether the Court ever feels bound by its past precedent is itself an unresolved empirical question. See Frederick Schauer, Stare Decisis and the Selection Effect, in Precedent in the United States Supreme Court 121-33 (Christopher J. Peters ed., 2013). But at the very least, we might think that King’s bill would free lower courts to disregard the ACA decisions as binding precedent.
See Harrison, supra note 7, at 513-25; Paulsen, supra note 6, at 1543-51; see also Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Irrepressible Myth of Marbury, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 2706, 2731-34 (2003) (discussing the unconstitutionality of precedent).
See Harrison, supra note 7, at 514; Paulsen, supra note 6, at 1593; see also supra note 3 (noting disagreement about whether appellate jurisdiction stripping also strips the Court’s past decisions of their binding precedential effect).
Paulsen, supra note 6, at 1590 (noting that such an inquiry “lies beyond the scope of this article”).
See Fallon, supra note 7, at 591-96; Healy, supra note 7, at 1196-1207; Lawson, supra note 7, at 194-95, 219-29.
Id. at 578. Fallon suggests that selective abrogation may be even more constitutionally problematic, but does not elaborate on this claim. See id. at 595-96. Neither Healy nor Lawson directly address selective abrogation as distinct from total abrogation.
Healy concedes that “it is conceivable that a statute abrogating stare decisis in statutory cases could be seen simply as a redefinition of the substantive law.” Healy, supra note 7, at 1198 n.138. Interestingly, however, he qualifies his concession by noting that “the extent to which Congress can use the substantive law to direct specific judicial outcomes is unclear.” Id. As discussed below, the Court has recently recognized a broad understanding of Congress’s power to direct specific judicial outcomes. See infra notes 95-99 and accompanying text. Likewise, Rosenkranz simply notes that “if [Paulsen] is right,” Congress’s power over statutory stare decisis “follows a fortiori.” Rosenkranz, supra note 13, at 2126 n.169.
Admittedly, the Court’s Commerce Clause analysis might already be non-binding dicta. See David Post, Dicta on the Commerce Clause, Volokh Conspiracy (July 1, 2012), http://volokh.com/2012/07/01/dicta-on-the-commerce-clause/ [http://perma.cc/TR9Y-TTFG].
To be precise, the Court construed the individual mandate as a “penalty for statutory purposes” under the Anti-Injunction Act of 1867 (AIA) and as a “tax for constitutional purposes.” Erin Morrow Hawley, The Jurisdictional Question in Hobby Lobby, 124 Yale L.J. F. 63, 63 (2014). Although Morrow describes one holding as “statutory” and the other as “constitutional,” both are ultimately about the statutory meaning of the individual mandate.
Because “federal common law is not qualitatively different from textual interpretation,” Congress presumably has similar powers over rules of stare decisis for federal common law as it does for statutory cases. Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 5 (1985); see Peter Westen & Jeffrey S. Lehman, Is There Life for Erie After the Death of Diversity, 78 Mich. L. Rev. 311, 332-333 (1980).
Indeed, the Supreme Court appears to justify the greater weight it affords to statutory stare decisis based on Congress’s power to correct its decisions. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 Geo. L.J. 1361, 1366-67 (1988).
See, e.g., 21 U.S.C.A. § 853(o) (2012) (prescribing that criminal forfeiture provision “shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes”); see also Lawrence Solan, The Language of Statutes: Laws and Their Interpretation 6-34, 6-42 (2010) (providing additional examples).
See, e.g., Danieli Evans, What Would Congress Want? If We Want To Know, Why Not Ask?, 81 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1191, 1213-16 (2013); Rosenkranz, supra note 13, at 2143.
This is even more true at the state level. See Jacob Scott, Codified Canons and the Common Law of Interpretation, 98 Geo L.J. 341 (2010).
See, e.g., Vincy Fon & Francesco Parisi, Judicial Precedents in Civil Law Systems: A Dynamic Analysis, 26 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 519, 522 (2006).
Sydney Foster, Should Courts Give Stare Decisis Effect to Statutory Interpretation Methodology?, 96 Geo L.J. 1863, 1872 (2008); see also Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation, supra note 23, at 1994.
467 U.S. 837 (1984); see also Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation, supra note 23, 1990 n.320.
See Connor N. Raso & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Chevron as a Canon, Not a Precedent: An Empirical Study of What Motivates Justices in Agency Deference Cases, 110 Colum L. Rev. 1727, 1799 (2010).
See, e.g., Joseph W. Mead, Stare Decisis in the Inferior Courts of the United States, 12 Nev. L.J. 787, 790 (2012) (distinguishing vertical and horizontal stare decisis).
See Erica S. Weisgerber, Note, Unpublished Opinions: A Convenient Means to an Unconstitutional End, 97 Geo. L.J. 621, 622 (2009).
See, e.g., Bradley Scott Shannon, May Stare Decisis Be Abrogated by Rule?, 67 Ohio St. L.J. 645, 650 n.23 (2006); Weisgerber, supra note 84.
Courts not only limit the precedential effect of decisions before releasing them, but also change precedent after the fact by amending portions of opinions or withdrawing them entirely. In this way, courts can retroactively eliminate the stare decisis effect of opinions, either in part or whole. See, e.g., Peter W. Martin, Judges Revising Opinions After Their Release, Citing Legally (Apr. 29, 2014, 5:56 PM), http://citeblog.access-to-law.com/?p=157 [http://perma.cc/F3W9-KZFZ]; Shaun Martin, Jackson v. Ryan (9th Cir. – Sept. 27, 2011), Cal. App. Rep. (Sept. 27, 2011, 1:11 PM), http://calapp.blogspot.com/2011/09/jackson-v-ryan-9th-cir-sept-27-2011.html [http://perma.cc/5EYX-2FK5].
Admittedly, some rules of statutory interpretation may blur the line between statutory law and constitutional law. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 Vand. L. Rev. 593, 600-01, 619-29 (1992) (noting the “quasi-constitutional” status of some rules of statutory interpretation). There are a few rules of constitutional interpretation that Congress clearly cannot change. See U.S. Const. amend. IX (“The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”).
See, e.g., Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution’s Secret Drafting History, 91 Geo L.J. 1113, 1129 (2003) (arguing that the Constitution requires originalism).
Admittedly, an originalist might think that Congress can prescribe a rule of constitutional interpretation that requires judges to use originalism. Although it may seem strange for Congress to codify something that the Constitution already requires, the Court has recognized Congress’s power to codify constitutionally required rules in other areas. See, e.g., Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (finding that the Rules of Decision Act prescribes what the Constitution already requires).
One data point is City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), where the Court held that Congress could not use its powers under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment to define constitutional rights more or less broadly than the Court. This suggests judicial preeminence and independence in constitutional interpretation. See Laurence H. Tribe, Transcending the Youngstown Triptych: A Multidimensional Reappraisal of Separation of Powers Doctrine, 126 Yale L.J. F. 86, 90 (2016).
22 U.S.C. § 8772(b) (2012) (defining “financial assets” as “the financial assets . . . in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York in Peterson et al. v. Islamic Republic of Iran et al., Case No. 10 Civ. 4518 (BSJ) (GWG)”).
See 136 S. Ct. at 1332 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (noting that the statute “decides a particular pending case . . . changing the law—for these proceedings alone—simply to guarantee that respondents win.”).
See Evan C. Zoldan, Bank Markazi and the Undervaluation of Legislative Generality, 35 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. Inter Alia 1 (2016) (noting the importance of “legislative generality”).
The Court has also allowed Congress to override its statutory decisions and apply the override retroactively so long as the statute does not require courts to reopen final judgments. See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 226-27 (1995).
See Tierney Sneed, GOP Bill Would Ban Supreme Court from Citing Its Own Obamacare Cases, Talking Points Memo (Jan. 3, 2017), http://talkingpointsmemo.com/dc/steve-king-obamacare-supreme-court [http://perma.cc/G75W-P232] (quoting Timothy Jost as noting that Sebelius “contained very strong statements about state rights,” King “included language in which the court basically limited deference to administrative agencies,” and Hobby Lobby “was all about religious liberty”).

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