Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/FSupp2/309/467/2311026/
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 07:59:21+00:00

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*468 *469 *470 *471 Marshall R. King, Terence P. Ross, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, L.L.P., New York, NY, for the Plaintiff.
*473 On January 7, 2003, the Court ordered, by memo-endorsement of a letter request from Defendant WhenU.com ("WhenU" or "WhenU.com"), an adjournment of the Preliminary Injunction Hearing in this case to March 18, 2003. (Memo-Endorsement of Def. Jan. 6, 2003.) On January 31, 2003, Defendant WhenU.com filed its Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for a Preliminary Injunction ("WhenU.com Jan. 31, 2003"), and Defendant Vision Direct filed its Memorandum in Opposition as well ("Vision Direct Jan. 31, 2003").
[E]ssentially, the program contains a directory of the Internet, and ... has over 40,000 elements in this directory. Elements such as URL's, but many other elements, such as search terms, something we call key-word algorithms. So an example of a key-word algorithm would be, the software processes the content of the page and if I'm reading an article where the word "diabetes" appears four times and the word "type I" or "type II" in conjunction with that, that would be an example of a key-word algorithm. All of those elements, the URL's, the search terms, the key-word algorithms, are processed and compared against this directory of 40,000, and growing, elements. And then a decision is made that says, OK, this user is engaged in activity in a particular category again, it may be hotel travel or air travel, in this case contact lenses or eye care and the ad units themselves are basically associated with categories, such that if the software detects, by looking at these elements, activity in a category, it may display an ad that's relevant to that category.
Pop-up advertisement windows generated by the SaveNow software are "branded" a green "$" mark and the text "SaveNow!" are affixed to the top of the pop-up window. On the upper right-hand corner of the SaveNow ad windows, next to the "X" symbol that typically closes windows, is a "?" symbol that, when clicked, opens a new window containing a notice explaining the SaveNow software and a link to a page with more detailed information for removing or "uninstalling" the software. (Tr. at 56-61; Naider Aff. ¶ 42.) As of the filing of this lawsuit, the pop-up advertisement windows contained text, at the bottom right of the pop-up window, stating: "A WhenU offer click? for info."Id.
WhenU.com's clients "buy categories" of goods or services, paying for delivery of their advertisements or coupons to SaveNow users' screens when the SaveNow users are working in relevant categories. (Tr. at 65-66, 152.) Under some of WhenU.com's contracts, advertisers pay WhenU.com to deliver pop-up advertisements to SaveNow users' screens; under other contracts, advertisers pay WhenU.com based on the number of people who click on the pop-up advertisements; still other advertisers pay WhenU.com based on the number of actual purchases made by SaveNow users from pop-up ads that have been delivered to their computers. (Tr. at 152.) Thus, WhenU.com has a fee relationship with the advertisers who pay it to deliver pop-up advertisements, and a free relationship with consumers who *479 install the SaveNow software on their computers, but no relationship with the companies on whose websites the pop-up advertisements appear.
It is well-settled in this Circuit that "a party seeking a preliminary injunction must demonstrate (1) the likelihood of irreparable injury in the absence of such an injunction, and (2) either (a) likelihood of success on the merits or (b) sufficiently serious questions going to the merits to make them a fair ground for litigation plus a balance of hardships tipping decidedly toward the party requesting the preliminary relief."Fed. Express Corp. v. Fed. Espresso, Inc., 201 F.3d 168, 173 (2d Cir. 2000); Procter & Gamble Co. v. Chesebrough-Pond's, Inc., 747 F.2d 114, 118 (2d Cir.1984); Coca-Cola Co. v. Tropicana Prods., Inc., 690 F.2d 312, 314-15 (2d Cir.1982); United States v. Siemens Corp., 621 F.2d 499, 505 (2d Cir.1980).
To establish a prima facie case of copyright infringement, a Plaintiff must show "1) Ownership of valid copyright, and 2) Copying of constituent elements of the work that are original." Feist Publications Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 361, 111 S. Ct. 1282, 113 L. Ed. 2d 358 (1991); On Davis v. The Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152, 158-59 (2d Cir.2001) (finding on the basis of this standard that "the owner of a copyright is thus entitled to prevail in a claim for declaratory judgment of infringement without showing entitlement to monetary relief").
Plaintiff has filed as an exhibit to its Complaint a certificate of registration with the United States Copyright Office of the "1800 Contacts Web site," (Memorandum in Support at 4; Complaint Exh. D); this serves as prima facie evidence of valid ownership of a copyright. 17 U.S.C. § 410(c). This protection extends to both the computer code for the website and the screen displays of the website. OP Solutions, Inc. v. Intellectual Property Network Ltd., 1999 WL 47191 at *10 (S.D.N.Y.1999), 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16639, at *10 (noting that the protection accorded "non-literal" elements of a computer program extends to screen displays); Harbor Software, Inc. v. Applied Systems, Inc., 925 F. Supp. 1042, 1045 (S.D.N.Y.1996) (finding sufficient expressive choices in the selection and arrangement of information compiled in screen reports and displays to satisfy the minimal requirement of originality to warrant protection).
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants have "copied" constituent elements of Plaintiff's website in the "broad sense of invasion of one of the exclusive rights secured to copyright owners under the Copyright Act." (Pl. Oct. 9, 2002 at 28) (quoting Dynamic Solutions, Inc. v. Planning & Control, Inc., 646 F. Supp. 1329, 1337 n. 12 (S.D.N.Y.1986)). Plaintiff argues that the 1-800 Contacts website, as perceived by a SaveNow user, appears differently than *485 the copyrighted website, and that the website's appearance has therefore been "modified and that Defendants' pop-up scheme caused this modification." (Pl. February 28, 2003 at 7). Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants have invaded Plaintiff's exclusive right to display the 1-800 Contacts website, in violation of 17 U.S.C. § 106(1), and its exclusive right to prepare derivative works based on the 1-800 Contacts website, secured to Plaintiff under 17 U.S.C. § 106(2).
Section 106 of the Copyright Act provides that "the owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive right to ... prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work." 17 U.S.C. § 106. However, Plaintiff has failed to show that *486 Defendants have created a "derivative work" that infringes Plaintiff's exclusive rights under § 106(2).
Plaintiff argues that, by delivering pop-up advertisements to a SaveNow user's computer while the user views Plaintiff's website, Defendants are adding a Vision Direct advertisement to Plaintiff's copyrighted screen display, thus creating a derivative of the Plaintiff's copyrighted screen display, and in the process violating "two fundamental tenets of copyright law exceeding the license granted and destroying the author's control over the manner in which its work is presented." (Pl. Oct. 9, 2002 at 30).
Plaintiff's second theory is that Defendants have created a derivative work by adding to or deleting from Plaintiff's copyrighted website, and therefore have transformed or recast the website, in derogation of Plaintiff's exclusive derivative work right. (Pl. Oct. 9, 2002 at 29.) Plaintiff argues that to infringe their derivative work right, Defendants need not have made a copy of the original work in order to create a derivative work, and that to violate its protected right to prepare derivative works, Defendants "need only transform or recast the copyrighted work in some way," as by "adding to or deleting from" Plaintiff's copyrighted website. (Pl. Oct. 9, 2002 at 29.) Plaintiff analogizes the pop-up ads in this case to advertisements added to and interspersed throughout the text of a copyrighted book in National Bank of Commerce v. Shaklee Corp., 503 F. Supp. 533 (W.D.Tex.1980), which were found to be "unauthorized additions" to the book text, in violation of the book author's copyright. (Pl. Oct. 9, 2002 at 30). Plaintiff's argument fails because Defendants have not created a "derivative work."
... original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either *487 directly or with the aid of a machine or device.
Applying the "fixation" requirement here, Plaintiff has failed to show that its website, and Defendants' pop-up advertisements are "sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration." 17 U.S.C. § 101. Indeed, Defendants' pop-up ad windows may be moved, obscured, or "closed" entirely thus completely disappearing from perception, with a single click of a mouse. (Tr. at 63-64.) Moreover, to the extent pop-up advertisements fit the description of "transmitted images," they are not "fixed" works, since there is no evidence that a fixation is made "simultaneously with" the pop-up advertisements' "transmission" to the viewer of the website. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
The first sentence of 17 U.S.C. § 101 also allows "non-original" works to qualify for "derivative" work status. Since the screen display of the 1-800 Contacts website with Defendant's pop-up ads is not a "translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation," for Plaintiff's to prevail, it must show that Defendants have "recast, transformed, or adapted" the 1-800 Contacts website. None of these three actions seems to describe what is done to Plaintiff's website by Defendants' pop-up ads, since Plaintiff's website remains "intact" on the computer screen. Defendants' pop-up ads may "obscure" or "cover" a portion of Plaintiff's website but they do not "change" the website, and accordingly do not "recast, transform or adapt" the website. Lee v. A.R.T. Company, 125 F.3d 580, 582 (7th Cir.1997) (mounting plaintiff's art works on ceramic tiles did not create "derivative work," and therefore did not infringe plaintiff's copyright). Moreover, if obscuring a browser window containing a copyrighted website with another computer window produces a "derivative work," then any action by a computer user that produced a computer window or visual graphic that altered the screen appearance of Plaintiff's website, however slight, would require Plaintiff's permission. A definition of "derivative work" that sweeps within the scope of the copyright law a multi-tasking Internet shopper whose word-processing program *488 obscures the screen display of Plaintiff's website is indeed "jarring," and not supported by the definition set forth at 17 U.S.C. § 101. See id.
Since Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that Defendants have invaded the exclusive rights secured to Plaintiff under the Copyright Act, there is little likelihood that Plaintiff will succeed on the merits of its copyright claims. Dynamic Solutions, Inc. v. Planning Control, Inc., 646 F. Supp. 1329, 1337 n. 12 (S.D.N.Y.1986). In view of this finding, there is no need to address the question of irreparable injury on these grounds.
*489 Defendants here use Plaintiff's mark in two ways. First, in causing pop-up advertisements for Defendant Vision Direct to appear when SaveNow users have specifically attempted to access Plaintiff's website on which Plaintiff's trademark appears Defendants are displaying Plaintiff's mark "in the ... advertising of" Defendant Vision Direct's services. Both Defendant Vision Direct and Plaintiff 1-800 Contacts are retail providers of replacement contact lenses, and therefore are unquestionably providing services "rendered in commerce." SaveNow users that type Plaintiff's website address into their browsers are clearly attempting to access Plaintiff's website because of prior knowledge of the website, knowledge that is dependent on Plaintiff's reputation and goodwill. SaveNow users that type Plaintiff's trademark "1-800 Contacts" into a search engine in an attempt to find the URL for Plaintiff's website are exhibiting a similar knowledge of Plaintiff's goods and services, and pop-up advertisements that capitalize on this are clearly using Plaintiff's mark. Thus, by causing pop-up advertisements to appear when SaveNow users have specifically attempted to find or access Plaintiff's website, Defendants are "using" Plaintiff's marks that appear on Plaintiff's website. 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendants have "used" Plaintiff's mark in commerce. OBH, Inc. v. Spotlight Magazine, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 2d 176, 185-86 (W.D.N.Y.2000) (finding defendants to have "used in commerce" plaintiffs' mark where defendants: 1. used plaintiffs' trademark as the domain name for defendants' web site which contained a link to defendants' other web site that was operated for commercial purposes; 2. used plaintiffs' trademark on the Internet, an international network; and 3. affected plaintiffs' ability to offer their services in commerce); Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am., Inc. v. Bucci, 1997 WL 133313, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.24, 1997), aff'd, 152 F.3d 920 (2d Cir.1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 834, 119 S. Ct. 90, 142 L. Ed. 2d 71 (1998).
Defendant errs in construing use "in connection with the services" to require "use as a trademark to identify or distinguish products or services." In support of its too narrow reading of the definition of "use," Defendant cites Lone Star Steakhouse v. Longhorn Steaks, 106 F.3d 355, 361 (11th Cir.1997). In Lone Star, the 11th Circuit upheld the district court's denial of the plaintiff restaurant owner's motion for a preliminary injunction, because plaintiffs had not "used" the service mark at issue prior to the defendant's registration of a similar mark. The court held that, as a matter of law, use of the mark "on a sign displayed on an interior wall of Plaintiff's ... [r]estaurant ... did not constitute a valid service mark use because it was not being used to identify or distinguish the services being offered." 106 F.3d at 361. The facts here are not controlled by the Lone Star court's reasoning. First, the question here is not whether Plaintiff adequately used its mark to establish a valid service mark; the question is whether Defendant is "using" Plaintiff's trademark. Second, even if this Court were to find that the standard for "use" required to establish a valid service mark is the same as the standard for "use" in the infringement context, in any case WhenU's use exceeds that of the plaintiff in Lone Star. Here, *490 WhenU.com is doing far more than merely "displaying" Plaintiff's mark. WhenU's advertisements are delivered to a SaveNow user when the user directly accesses Plaintiff's website thus allowing Defendant Vision Direct to profit from the goodwill and reputation in Plaintiff's website that led the user to access Plaintiff's website in the first place.
Defendant WhenU.com also cites Holiday Inns, Inc. v. 800 Reservation, Inc., 86 F.3d 619, 623-25 (6th Cir.1996), wherein the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court, which had found that the defendant who used a 1-800 telephone number that differed from plaintiff's 1-800 HOLIDAY telephone number in the use of a "zero" instead of the "o" had "used" plaintiff's mark because there was a "clear violation of the spirit, if not the letter, of the Lanham Act." The Sixth Circuit, noting that § 32 of the Lanham Act forbids the "use in commerce [of] any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a registered mark ... which ... is likely to cause confusion," reversed because the defendants did not actually "use" the plaintiff's mark, since plaintiff's number was 1-800 HOLIDAY, and defendants were using 1-800 409-4329, and also because the defendants "did not create any confusion," since the district court found that the defendants had "never advertised or publicized anything to do with Holiday Inns or its telephone number." Holiday Inns, Inc., 86 F.3d at 623-25 (emphasis in original). Again, this case does not support Defendant WhenU.com's claim that it has not "used" Plaintiff's website within the meaning of the Lanham Act.
Confusion for purposes of the Lanham Act is shown where there is a "likelihood that an appreciable number of ordinarily prudent purchasers are likely to be misled, or indeed simply confused, as to the source of the goods in question" or where "consumers are likely to believe that the challenged use of a trademark is somehow sponsored, endorsed, or authorized by its owner." New York Stock Exchange, Inc. v. New York, New York Hotel LLC, 293 F.3d 550 (2d Cir.2002) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Thus, "[c]onfusion" for purposes of the Lanham Act includes confusion "of any kind, including confusion as to source, sponsorship, affiliation, connection or identification." Guinness United Distillers & Vintners v. Anheuser-Bush, 2002 WL 1543817, *2 (S.D.N.Y.2002); Tommy Hilfiger Licensing, Inc. v. Nature Labs, LLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 410, 413-14 (S.D.N.Y.2002).
Under the Lanham Act, actionable "confusion" may take a number of forms. In some cases, there may be actual confusion among members of the consuming public, and the plaintiff may be able to demonstrate even at the preliminary injunction stage of the case such actual confusion. E.g., Register.Com, Inc. v. Domain Registry of America, Inc., 2002 WL 31894625, *11 (S.D.N.Y.2002); Les Ballets Trockadero de Monte Carlo, Inc. v. Trevino, 945 F. Supp. 563 (S.D.N.Y.1996) (confusion *491 among consumers, plaintiff's employees, and defendant's friends sufficient to show actual confusion).
However, a plaintiff may be unable to prove actual confusion in the market in some cases because the market for a particular mark or product has not yet developed, or because the plaintiff has acted early enough to prevent actual confusion from developing. Thus, although in order to support a claim of infringement a plaintiff must show a probability, not just a possibility, of confusion, Streetwise Maps, Inc. v. VanDam, Inc., 159 F.3d 739, 743 (2d Cir.1998), a likelihood of confusion is actionable even absent evidence of actual confusion. E.g., Hasbro, Inc. v. Lanard Toys, Ltd., 858 F.2d 70 (2d Cir.1988) (finding likelihood of confusion despite lack of evidence of actual confusion); Centaur Communications, Ltd. v. A/S/M Communications, Inc., 830 F.2d 1217, 1227 (2d Cir.1987) (finding lack of actual confusion did not undermine district court finding of likelihood of confusion), overruled on other grounds, 973 F.2d 1033, 1043-44 (2d Cir.1992); Lexington Management Corp. v. Lexington Capital Partners, 10 F. Supp. 2d 271, 286 (S.D.N.Y.1998) (lack of evidence of actual confusion neither supported nor detracted from plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction); Clinique Laboratories, Inc. v. Dep Corp., 945 F. Supp. 547, 555 (S.D.N.Y.1996).
Confusion need not be limited to the "point of sale" to be actionable under the Lanham Act. The Second Circuit has held that confusion among non-purchasers, arising from use of a mark outside of a retail environment after any sale or purchase of a product has concluded, is actionable under the Lanham Act.Clinique Laboratories, Inc., 945 F. Supp. at 558 (S.D.N.Y.1996) (use of disclaimers insufficient to address post-sale confusion among consumers).
found a likelihood of confusion not in the fact that a third party would do business with Pegasus Petroleum believing it related to Mobil, but rather in the likelihood that Pegasus Petroleum would gain crucial credibility during the initial phases of a deal. For example, an oil trader might listen to a cold phone call from Pegasus Petroleum an admittedly oft used procedure in the oil trading business when otherwise he might not, because of the possibility that Pegasus Petroleum is related to Mobil.
Application of this principle to the Internet context was recognized in Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment Corp., 174 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir.1999), in which the Ninth Circuit held that the Lanham Act bars a website owner from including in its HTML code any term that is confusingly similar to a competitor's mark. In Brookfield, the court found that the defendant's use of terms confusingly similar to plaintiff's trademarked term "MovieBuff" in metatags placed in defendant's website would result in initial interest confusion "in the sense that, by using `moviebuff.com' or `MovieBuff' to divert people looking for `MovieBuff' to its website, [defendant] improperly benefits from the goodwill that [plaintiff] developed in its mark." Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1062. The court held that the resulting likelihood of initial interest confusion was actionable under the Lanham Act.Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1063.
*493 District courts in this circuit have noted that, on the Internet, initial interest confusion occurs when "potential consumers of one website will be diverted and distracted to a competing website." Bihari v. Gross 119 F. Supp. 2d 309, 319 (S.D.N.Y.2000) ("In the cyberspace context, the concern is that potential customers of one website will be diverted and distracted to a competing website. The harm is that the potential customer believes that the competing website is associated with the website the customer was originally searching for and will not resume searching for the original website."); BigStar Entertainment, Inc. v. Next Big Star, Inc., 105 F. Supp. 2d 185, 207 (S.D.N.Y.2000) ("The concern is that many of those initially interested potential customers of plaintiff's would be diverted and distracted by defendants' site and would either believe that defendants' site is associated with plaintiff's or would not return to plaintiff's domain."); Planned Parenthood, 1997 WL 133313, at *12 (Defendant's use of a domain name and home page address similar to plaintiff's mark "on their face, causes confusion among Internet users and may cause Internet users who seek plaintiff's web site to expend time and energy accessing defendant's web site."); New York State Soc. of Certified Public Accountants v. Eric Louis Assoc., Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d 331, 342 (S.D.N.Y.1999) (Use by defendant of a domain name and metatag similar to plaintiff's common law service mark "caused a likelihood of confusion because it created initial interest confusion.").
Even if the customer quickly becomes aware of the competing source's actual identity and can rectify the mistake, the damage to the first user that the courts have identified manifest in three ways: the original diversion of the prospective customers' interest; the potential consequent effect of that diversion on the customer's ultimate decision whether or not to purchase caused by an erroneous impression that two sources of a product may be associated; and the initial credibility which may be accorded by the interested buyer to the junior user's products customer consideration that otherwise may be unwarranted and that may be built on the strength of the senior user's mark, reputation and goodwill.
Because Plaintiff's mark, 1-800 Contacts, "is not a common description of goods," the Court finds Plaintiff's mark is not generic. Cline v. 1-888-PLUMBING Group, Inc., 146 F. Supp. 2d 351 (S.D.N.Y.2001) (finding the mark "1-888-PLUMBING" not generic, but instead descriptive).
Plaintiff's 1-800 CONTACTS mark is not descriptive, since it does not convey an immediate idea of the ingredients, qualities, or characteristics of the contact lens products sold by Plaintiff, and neither informs a consumer about qualities, ingredients or characteristics nor points to contact lens' intended purpose, *496 function or intended use, size, or merit. Gruner + Jahr USA Publishing v. Meredith Corp., 991 F.2d 1072, 1076 (2d Cir.1993); Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4 (2d Cir.1976).
The 1-800 CONTACTS mark is also distinctive in the marketplace. Plaintiff has invested significant sums in marketing its marks in 2001, Plaintiff spent $27,118,000 on marketing. (Mathison Dec. at ¶ 7.) Such efforts have generated significant sales some $169,000,000 worth in 2001. (Id.) Over 221,800 people visited Plaintiff's website in the month of September, 2002. (Mathison Dec. at ¶ 9.) These figures are persuasive evidence that Plaintiff has established distinctiveness in the marketplace. Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 631 F. Supp. 735, 741 (S.D.N.Y.1985) (evidence of widespread advertising and promotion of defendants' product that featured defendant's mark, continuous use of the mark for more than a century, and sales figures were all relevant to determination of the strength of the mark).
"In assessing the similarity of the marks, `courts look to the overall impression created by the logos and the context in which they are found and consider the totality of factors that could cause confusion among prospective purchasers.'" Lexington Management Corp. v. Lexington Capital Partners, 10 F. Supp. 2d 271, 279 n. 4 (S.D.N.Y.1998), (quoting Gruner + Jahr USA Publishing, 991 F.2d at 1078 (2d Cir.1993)). A court should look not just at "the typewritten and aural similarity of the marks, but [also at] how they are presented in the marketplace" to determine: *497 1.) whether the similarity between the two marks is likely to cause confusion and 2.) what effect the similarity has upon prospective purchasers." Sports Authority, Inc. v. Prime Hospitality Corp., 89 F.3d 955, 962 (2d Cir.1996).
Defendant WhenU.com has included the URL address of Plaintiff's website, , in its proprietary directory of terms, (Tr. at 134), so that pop-up advertisements for the website of Defendant Vision Direct and other competitors will appear when computer users enter Plaintiff's URL into the address bar on their Internet browsers. (Tr. at 144-45.) Defendants also use the address www.1800Contacts.com in the advertising of Defendant Vision Direct's products by causing pop-up advertisements to appear when a SaveNow user types the address into an Internet browser.
The website address , used by Defendants in the SaveNow proprietary directory of terms incorporates completely the Plaintiff's trademark 1-800 CONTACTS. As used in the WhenU.com directory, Plaintiff's address, , differs from Plaintiff's trademark only in the omission of spaces and grammatical marks, and in the addition of the "www" and ".com." These distinctions are not significant. TCPIP Holding Co., Inc. v. Haar Communications, Inc., 244 F.3d 88, 101-02 (2d Cir.2001) (omission of spaces and addition of domain identifier ".com" or ".net" "are of little or no significance," since "it is necessary in the registration of an internet address to eliminate spaces and possessive punctuation"); OBH, Inc. v. Spotlight Magazine, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 2d 176 (W.D.N.Y.2000) (finding "The Buffalo News" and "thebuffalonews.com," for all intents and purposes, identical); New York State Soc'y of Certified Pub. Accountants v. Eric Louis Assocs., Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d 331, 340 (S.D.N.Y.1999) (finding "nysscpa.com" nearly identical to "NYSSCPA"); Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am., Inc. v. Bucci, 1997 WL 133313, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.24, 1997) (finding "plannedparenthood.com" nearly identical to "Planned Parenthood"), aff'd, 152 F.3d 920 (2d Cir.1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 834, 119 S. Ct. 90, 142 L. Ed. 2d 71 (1998).
The similarity of the mark used by Defendants to Plaintiff's 1-800 Contacts mark is clearly relevant and increases the likelihood of confusion. If Defendants used a mark less similar to Plaintiff's mark for example, "www.contacts.com" then a SaveNow user who received Defendants' pop-up advertisements after typing into a browser "www.contacts.com" would be less likely to associate Plaintiff's mark with Defendants' pop-up advertisements. Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiff's mark and the mark used by Defendants to be extremely similar, and that this similarity weighs in favor of a finding of likelihood of confusion.
This factor is satisfied if Plaintiff shows that the parties' products are sufficiently related that customers are likely to confuse the source of origin. Lexington Management v. Lexington Capital Partners, 10 F. Supp. 2d 271, 284-85 (S.D.N.Y.1998) (Noting that the Second Circuit has suggested that "the `proximity of products' factor should be considered together with the `sophistication of buyers'") (citing Cadbury Beverages v. Cott, 73 F.3d 474, 480 (2d Cir.1996)); see also Beneficial Corp. v. Beneficial Capital Corp., 529 F. Supp. 445, 449 (S.D.N.Y.1982) (noting that "the closeness of two products is, at least in part, a function of the extent to which purchasers can and do examine and distinguish them").
Defendant WhenU.com does not provide a service similar to Plaintiff's, since WhenU.com is a provider of Internet marketing services, and Plaintiff is an Internet retailer of contact lenses. However, it is apparent that WhenU's SaveNow software relies on the close similarity between Plaintiff's services and those of Defendant Vision Direct. At the hearing, WhenU's CEO, Avi Naider, described how the SaveNow software operates to trigger pop-up advertisements by identifying the category of services provided by 1-800 Contacts, and then retrieving and displaying a pop-up advertisement of a competitor who fits into the same category of services. (Tr. at 65, 144-45.) Clearly, WhenU.com is intentionally benefitting from the fact that Defendant Vision Direct provides services that are substantially the same as Plaintiff's services.
"Actual confusion" is defined as the likelihood of consumer confusion that enables a seller to pass off his goods as the goods of another. W.W.W. Pharm. Co., Inc. v. Gillette Co., 984 F.2d 567, 574 (2d Cir.1993); Les Ballets Trockadero de Monte Carlo, Inc. v. Trevino, 945 F. Supp. 563, 571 (S.D.N.Y.1996).
However, "it is black letter law that actual confusion need not be shown to prevail under the Lanham Act, since actual confusion is very difficult to prove and the Act requires only a likelihood of confusion as to source." Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d 867, 875 (2d Cir.1986); see also Guinness United Distillers & Vintners v. Anheuser-Bush, 2002 WL 1543817, *4 (S.D.N.Y.2002) (finding plaintiff's survey, showing only 2% *499 actual confusion among consumers to weigh in favor of defendant, but nonetheless granting plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction on the strength of other factors); Lexington Management Corp. v. Lexington Capital Partners, 10 F. Supp. 2d 271, 286 (S.D.N.Y.1998) (where plaintiff provided no evidence of actual confusion in connection with its motion, this Polaroid factor neither supported nor detracted from plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction).
Proof of actual confusion, in the form of market research survey evidence, is highly probative of the likelihood of consumer confusion, "subject to the condition that `[t]he survey must ... have been fairly prepared and its results directed to the relevant issues.'" Schieffelin & Co. v. Jack Co. of Boca, Inc., 850 F. Supp. 232, 245 (S.D.N.Y.1994) (quoting Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Nintendo Co., 746 F.2d 112, 118 (2d Cir.1984)). However, survey evidence is not required to show actual confusion. The Sports Authority, Inc. v. Prime Hospitality Corp., 89 F.3d 955, 964 (2d Cir.1996).
Plaintiff's survey statistics rely on numerous leading questions that suggested their own answers, and that are therefore entitled to little weight in assessing consumer confusion. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Nintendo Co., Ltd., 746 F.2d 112 (2d Cir.1984) (Responses to survey question *500 that read, "To the best of your knowledge, was the Donkey Kong game made with the approval or under the authority of the people who produce the King Kong movies?" were not probative of confusion, because "[a] survey question which begs its answer cannot be a true indicator of the likelihood of consumer confusion.").
However, Mr. Neal's survey is at least suggestive of the likelihood of initial interest confusion. The survey results indicate that 68% of 490 surveyed SaveNow users did not know that they had the SaveNow software on their computers, that 76% of those who knew the SaveNow software was on their computers were unaware of what the SaveNow software does, that 59% of SaveNow users believed that "pop-up advertisements are placed on the website on which they appear by the owners of that website," and that 52% of all users believed "pop-up advertisements have been pre-screened and approved by the website on which they appear." (Neal Aff. ¶ 7.) The fact that a significant number of SaveNow users may believe that pop-up advertisements are associated with the *501 owner of the website on which it appears is relevant to the likelihood of initial interest confusion, since this means a consumer is likely to associate a Vision Direct pop-up advertisement generated by the SaveNow program with the 1800-Contacts websites on which it appeared.
found a likelihood of confusion not in the fact that a third party would do business with [defendant] believing it related to [plaintiff], but rather in the likelihood that [defendant] would gain crucial credibility during the initial phases of a deal. For example, an oil trader might listen to a cold phone call from [defendant] an admittedly oft used procedure in the oil trading business when otherwise he might not, because of the possibility that [defendant] is related to [plaintiff].
Plaintiff notes that "Defendants' services may or may not have the same quality as Plaintiff's services," but argues that the fact that Defendant's services are of comparable quality may confuse customers further, "precisely because the services are so similar." (Pl. Oct. 9, 2002 at 22.) However, here there is no evidence regarding the quality of Defendant's products. Without evidence, this factor could cut in favor of either Defendants or Plaintiff, Tommy Hilfiger Licensing, Inc. v. Nature Labs, LLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 410, 420 (S.D.N.Y.2002), and accordingly the Court finds it to be of assistance to neither Plaintiff nor Defendants.
Plaintiff argues that the level of care and attention paid by consumers on the Internet is diminished, and that therefore this factor cuts in Plaintiff's favor, as the likelihood of confusion will be high. (Pl. Oct. 9, 2002 at 23.) (citing Something Old, Something New, Inc. v. QVC, Inc., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d 1715, 1724 (S.D.N.Y.1999)). In Something Old, Something New, the court considered the sophistication of consumers purchasing goods from a cable television and website home shopping network and found that "[a]rguably, home shoppers are more subject to impulse buying than store shoppers; the product can be easily glorified and the consequence of the purchase can be masked." Id. By contrast, here there are no passive couch-potato consumers. Internet shoppers have a specific product in mind when they go online and have the ability to navigate the Internet to get what they want. Moreover, in the mixed publishing/retailing context of the Internet, (Tr. at 88-90), only a few clicks of a mouse by the consumer separates a pop-up advertisement from an actual purchase by that consumer. Thus, consumers who have typed Plaintiff's URL into the browser bar are clearly searching for contact lens products, and expect to be able to complete a transaction with Plaintiff in a short span of time, with little effort or transaction costs.
However, whether or not consumers of replacement contact lenses on the Internet are "sophisticated" will not change the harm that flows from initial interest confusion, since that harm arises when consumers' interest is diverted from Plaintiff's products by association of Plaintiff's trademark with Defendants' products. Since *503 the harm from initial interest confusion does not depend on actual confusion, the sophistication of consumers does not mitigate the likelihood of initial interest confusion. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 818 F.2d 254, 260 (2d Cir.1987) (upholding a finding of trademark infringement where defendant's use of plaintiff's mark made probable "that potential purchasers would be misled into an initial interest" in defendant competitor's product, despite the sophistication of the consumers); Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d 867, 875 (2d Cir.1986) (sophistication of the buyers of expensive designer blue jeans contributed to, rather than prevented, initial interest confusion caused by infringer's use of trademark stitching patterns substantially similar to mark owner's, since sophisticated jeans consumers would be more likely to assume some sort of association between the mark-owner and the infringer); Grotrian, Helfferich, Schulz, Th. Steinweg Nachf v. Steinway and Sons, 523 F.2d 1331, 1342 (2d Cir.1975); New York State Soc. of Certified Public Accountants v. Eric Louis Associates, Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d 331, 341-42 (S.D.N.Y.1999) (sophistication of consumers does not mitigate initial interest confusion, since sophisticated consumers are as likely to be initially confused as unsophisticated consumers); Kompan A.S. v. Park Structures, Inc., 890 F. Supp. 1167 (N.D.N.Y.1995) (holding that the sophistication of purchasers of expensive playground equipment does not prevent initial confusion caused by defendants copying of plaintiff's trade dress).
The fact that Defendants' pop-up advertisement for competing Internet contact lenses retailers appears shortly after a consumer types into the browser bar Plaintiff's trademarked name and accesses Plaintiff's homepage increases the likelihood that a consumer might assume Defendants' pop-up advertisements are endorsed or licensed by Plaintiff, since the user will first see the 1-800 Contacts website, with logos and graphics, and then will see the pop-up advertisement. Planned Parenthood Fed'n. of Amer., Inc. v. Bucci, 1997 WL 133313, *8 (S.D.N.Y.1997) (plaintiff's mark appeared during a short delay while trademark infringer's homepage loaded, increasing the likelihood that Internet users would believe they had accessed plaintiff's website). Even if a consumer who clicked on Defendants' pop-up advertisements and accessed Defendant Vision Direct's website eventually realized prior to purchasing anything that Vision Direct's website was not related to Plaintiff, the consumer might then proceed to purchase replacement contacts on Vision Direct's website, instead of taking the steps necessary to return to Plaintiff's website. Bihari v. Gross 119 F. Supp. 2d 309, 319 (S.D.N.Y.2000); BigStar Entm't, Inc. v. Next Big Star, 105 F. Supp. 2d 185, 207 (S.D.N.Y.2000). Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of the Plaintiff.
Defendant WhenU.com argues that it has taken steps to ensure effectively there will be no confusion among consumers as to the source of the pop-up advertisements. Advertisement windows generated by Defendant WhenU's SaveNow software are "branded" a green "$" mark and the text "SaveNow!" are affixed to the top of the window. (Naider Aff. ¶ 42; Memo in Opposition at 11.) On the upper right-hand corner of the SaveNow ad windows, next to the "X" symbol that typically closes windows, is a "?" symbol that, when clicked, opens a new window containing an explanation of the SaveNow software and a direct link to a page with more detailed information for removing or "uninstalling" the software. (Memo in Opposition at 11.) At the bottom right of the advertisement window is text stating: "A WhenU offer click ? for info." (Memo in Opposition at *504 11 (citing Upjohn Co. v. AHPC, 598 F. Supp. 550, 561-62 (S.D.N.Y.1984))).
WhenU.com argues that its disclaimers are "the preferred way of alleviating consumer confusion." (WhenU.com Memorandum at 23). WhenU.com argues further that, "unlike the use of trademarks in metatags to "trick" consumers into believing that a website is in fact the website that they intended to visit, where ... consumers see both the website they accessed as well as WhenU's clearly labelled ad, they are not likely to be confused." (Memorandum in Opposition at 24, n. 14 (citing Bihari v. Gross, 119 F. Supp. 2d 309, 321-322 (S.D.N.Y.2000))).
Even if Defendants had offered evidence of the effect of its branding and disclaimers, such evidence would do little to counter Plaintiff's showing of the likelihood of initial interest confusion. OBH, Inc. v. Spotlight Magazine Inc., 86 F. Supp. 2d 176, 190 (W.D.N.Y.2000) (rejecting disclaimer defense because defendant's disclaimer could not remedy initial interest confusion caused by defendant's use of plaintiff's mark on its website); NYS Soc'y of CPAs v. Eric Louis Associates, 79 F. Supp. 2d 331 (S.D.N.Y.1999) (same); Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am., Inc. v. Bucci, 1997 WL 133313 (S.D.N.Y.1997) (same); cf. Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d 867 (2d Cir.1986) (finding a likelihood of confusion in the post-sale context, and finding that "[a]ppellants' labeling in no way dispels the likelihood that consumers will conclude that appellants' jeans are somehow connected to appellee by virtue of the nearly identical stitching patterns").
In sum, as discussed above, the Polaroid factors weigh heavily in favor of the Plaintiff's showing a likelihood of both source confusion and initial interest confusion. Having established a likelihood of confusion, Plaintiff has established both a likelihood *505 of success on the merits and irreparable harm on its trademark infringement claim. Hasbro, Inc. v. Lanard Toys. Ltd., 858 F.2d 70, 73 (2d Cir.1988).
15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (1) (A).
"[A] court may order the forfeiture or cancellation of the domain name or the transfer of the domain name to the owner of the mark." 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (1) (C).
(IX) the extent to which the mark incorporated in the person's domain name registration is or is not distinctive and famous within the meaning of subsection (c) (1) of this section.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (1) (B) (i).
Relying on these factors, it is apparent that Vision Direct has acted with bad faith. Vision Direct has no trademark rights in the domain name, is not identified by the domain name, has not demonstrated any prior bona fide use of the domain name or any site accessible using the domain name accordingly, these factors weigh in favor of the Plaintiff. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (1) (B) (i) (I-IV). Defendant Vision Direct and Plaintiff are competitors, offering virtually identical services over the Internet this alone tends to show that Vision Direct has registered the www.www1800Contacts.com domain name with the "intent to divert consumers from the mark owner's online location to a site accessible under the domain name that could harm the goodwill represented by the mark, either for commercial gain or with the intent to tarnish or disparage the mark, by creating a likelihood of confusion as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of the site." 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (1) (B) (i) (V).
Some district courts have found the trademark infringment principle applies in cybersquatting actions under the ACPA that irreparable harm may be caused by the improper registration, trafficking or use of a confusingly similar domain name. E.g. Advance Magazine Publishers Inc. v. Vogue Int'l, 123 F. Supp. 2d 790, 801 (D.N.J.2000) (citing Shields v. Zuccarini, 89 F. Supp. 2d 634, 641 (E.D.Pa.2000)). However, other courts have not applied this principle, and have required a showing of irreparable harm to the plaintiff. E.g., BroadBridge Media, L.L.C. v. Hypercd.com, 106 F. Supp. 2d 505, 509-10 (S.D.N.Y.2000). The Second Circuit has not weighed in on the distinction between irreparable harm for purposes of trademark infringement claims and cybersquatting claims. This Court joins the courts that find irreparable harm may be presumed on a motion for a preliminary injunction in a cybersquatting case where a *507 plaintiff has shown a likelihood of success on the merits. Accordingly, issuance of a preliminary injunction against Defendant Vision Direct's use of the domain name www.www1800Contacts.com is appropriate.
Although Vision Direct may have ceased its use of the complained-of pop-up advertisements, the Court nonetheless has authority to issue a preliminary injunction. See Blisscraft of Hollywood v. United Plastics Co., 294 F.2d 694, 701 (2d Cir.1961) (Injunction issued against future infringement although the defendant discontinued the use of offending labels, since the defendant continued to dispute the validity of the trademark); United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633, 73 S. Ct. 894, 97 L. Ed. 1303 (1953) ("[t]he court's power to grant injunctive relief survives discontinuance of the illegal conduct" since the "purpose of an injunction is to prevent future conduct"). Moreover, since here there is little to support a conclusion that use by Defendant Vision Direct of pop-up advertisements will not reoccur, the Court rejects Defendant's claim that a preliminary injunction should not issue merely because Defendant has ceased the offending conduct. E.g., United Farm Workers v. Sloan's Supermarkets, Inc., 352 F. Supp. 1025, 1028-29 (S.D.N.Y.1972); Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Theodore Hamm Brewing Co., 314 F. Supp. 697, 701 (D.Conn.1970); Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Admiral Corp., 186 F. Supp. 800, 801 (S.D.N.Y.1960).
Vision Direct's claim that "no likelihood exists that Vision Direct will resume causing pop-up advertisements to appear on 1-800's web pages" is supported by nothing more than the affidavit of Ian Mummery stating that "Vision Direct has no intention of again participating in pop-up advertising." (Mummery Dec. at ¶ 8.) This avowed lack of "intention" to participate is a far cry from a guarantee by Vision Direct that it will not participate in pop-up advertising in the future. Here, Vision Direct has not convinced the Court that it has voluntarily done "everything within its power" to ensure that "there is not even a slight danger that it would now turn around and embark upon another course of deceptive conduct." Twentieth Century *508 Fox v. Suarez Corp., 1998 WL 126065, *3-5 (S.D.N.Y.1998) (denying preliminary injunction where defendant voluntarily changed website and attempted to cancel 42 advertisements, and "[p]laintiff ... specifically conceded that the defendant [did] everything within its power to cancel all advertisements").
Vision Direct argues that the balance of the hardships weighs in favor of denying the injunction, because of the harm to its reputation that will result from the imposition of a preliminary injunction against it. In support of its argument, Vision Direct cites United Farm Workers v. Sloan's Supermarkets, Inc., 352 F. Supp. at 1028-29. In Sloan's, the court acknowledged that "a preliminary injunction is not precluded merely because the action complained of has ceased, or because it was inadvertent, or because the defendant has sworn it will not happen again, or because the defendant might suffer some harm from the injunction," but held that the balance of harms tipped in favor of denying a preliminary injunction where "[t]he mere announcement to the public that [defendant] had been preliminarily enjoined ... would convey an incorrect impression of the defendant's position with regard to the plaintiff union; would misrepresent its good faith efforts; and would likely do considerable injury to its general business reputation which is not presently justified by the record".
Plaintiff advances several other related theories under the Lanham Act and state law, in support of its Motion for Preliminary Injunction. As none of those theories, if established, would entitle plaintiff to greater relief" than that appropriate under its infringement and cybersquatting claims, "there is no need to consider them." E.G.L. Gem Lab Ltd. v. Gem Quality Institute, Inc., 90 F. Supp. 2d 277, 298 (S.D.N.Y.2000).
As Professor Deighton noted, the distinction between marketing and publishing *509 may be diminishing in the context of the unique environment of the Internet. (Tr. at 88-90.) On the other hand, technological advances should not trample on the traditionally-protected rights established by the trademark infringement laws. On the Internet, online shoppers have a myriad of competing retailers literally at their fingertips, are easily able to research preferences, and with very little time and effort are able to enact their preferences with purchases. In this context, the good will and reputation that Plaintiff and other online retailers have established is of extreme importance. Plaintiff has spent considerable sums to establish and maintain its marks' notoriety with online consumers, and is entitled to protect this investment from conduct that infringes those marks. An online shopper who has knowledge of Plaintiff's mark and an interest sufficient to choose to visit or find Plaintiff's website is a potential buyer that Plaintiff is entitled to protect from confusion.
*510 Defendants are preliminarily enjoined from: 1) including the 1-800 Contacts mark, and confusingly similar terms, as elements in the SaveNow software directory, and 2) displaying Plaintiff's mark "in the ... advertising of" Defendant Vision Direct's services, by causing Defendant Vision Direct's pop-up advertisements to appear when a computer user has made a specific choice to access or find Plaintiff's website by typing Plaintiff's mark into the URL bar of a web browser or into an Internet search engine. Within 30 days of the date of this Order, Defendants SHALL effect this injunction.
 Mr. Mathison's Declaration states that "Approximately 221,864 people visited the website in the past month" his declaration was dated October 4, 2002.
SaveNow shows users relevant contextual information and offers as they surf the Web. There are a vast number of offers and services available to Internet users that SaveNow may display. In addition, WhenU.com negotiates exclusive offers to maximize value for users. The software's goal is to show users information about these offers and services right at the moment when they need it. Offers and information are provided to users by showing a limited number of relevant ads in the form of interstitials ("pop-up ads") and other ad formats. These offers and ads are shown when users visit various sites across the Internet, based on URLs visited by the user and/or search terms typed into search engines and/or the HTML content of the page viewed by the user. SaveNow ads/offers are delivered independently from the site the user happens to be visiting when they see a SaveNow ad/offer and are not endorsed or affiliated with anyone other than WhenU.com.
 In December 2002, subsequent to the filing of this lawsuit, WhenU.com replaced this text with a new disclaimer, stating: "This is a WhenU offer and is not sponsored or displayed by the websites you are visiting. More ..." If a user clicks on the "More," a new window displays the same statement that was generated when the user clicked on the "?" character. (Tr. at 58.) However, since "there is no guarantee that Defendants will not simply return to the same conduct if the case is dismissed without issuance of an injunction," the Court considers the disclaimers as they appeared at the time the action was filed. OBH, Inc. v. Spotlight Magazine, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 2d 176, 186 n. 8 (W.D.N.Y.2000).
 Citing Abdul Wali v. Coughlin, 754 F.2d 1015, 1025 (2d Cir.1985), Plaintiff argues that, to show a likelihood of success on the merits, a party moving for a preliminary injunction "need not show that success is an absolute certainty," but that instead a movant need only show that the probability of success is "better than 50%" despite the fact that "considerable room for doubt" may remain about the ultimate case outcome. (Memorandum in Support at 12). Plaintiff misstates the relevant standard, since the Second Circuit specifically noted in Abdul Wali that where, as here, a grant of preliminary injunctive relief would do more than merely maintain the status quo, the movant "must show a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, i.e., that their cause is considerably more likely to succeed than fail." 754 F.2d 1015, 1026 overruled on other grounds, 482 U.S. 342, 107 S. Ct. 2400, 96 L. Ed. 2d 282 (1987).
 Plaintiff argues that, under New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 121 S. Ct. 2381, 150 L. Ed. 2d 500 (2001), "this Court must view Plaintiff's website as would a PC user surfing the web in order to determine whether Defendant modified Plaintiff's copyrighted works." Plaintiff appears to read Tasini too broadly. (Pl. Feb. 28, 2003 at 7). In Tasini, the Supreme Court held that the privilege accorded a newspaper, as a collective work copyright owner under § 201(c) of the Copyright Act, to reproduce and distribute parts of a collective work did not shield the newspaper from liability for permitting electronic publishers to include the work of individual authors in electronic online Databases. Tasini, 533 U.S. at 500, 121 S. Ct. 2381. The Court explained that "[i]n determining whether the Articles have been reproduced and distributed `as part of' a `revision' of the collective works in issue, we focus on the Articles as presented to, and perceptible by, the user of the Databases." Tasini, 533 U.S. at 499-500, 121 S. Ct. 2381. Although the Tasini Court turned to the perceptions of the computer user to determine whether articles had been reproduced and distributed "as part of" a "revision" of collective works for purposes of § 201(c), Tasini does not require this Court to "view Plaintiff's website as would a PC user surfing the web in order to determine whether Defendant modified Plaintiff's copyrighted works" in preparing a derivative work in violation of 17 U.S.C. § 106(2).
 The lack of any "fixation" here explains why Plaintiff errs in its assertion that this case is analogous to National Bank of Commerce v. Shaklee Corp., 503 F. Supp. 533 (W.D.Tex.1980). While in this case any "derivative" work created when a computer user views Plaintiff's copyrighted website as modified by Defendants' pop-up advertisements is not fixed in any tangible medium of expression, the books published with unauthorized interspersed advertisements in National Bank of Commerce v. Shaklee Corp., were clearly "fixed" in print.
 While this case was sub judice, Defendants called to the Court's attention two decisions denying a preliminary injunction, by finding that "use" did not occur. In Wells Fargo & Co. v. WhenU.com, 293 F. Supp. 2d 734, 763 (E.D.Mich.2003), the court determined that inclusion in SaveNow's proprietary directory of the Plaintiff's trademark was not "use," based on its reading of Sixth Circuit case law. In U-Haul Intern., Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d 723, 728 (E.D.Va.2003), the court made a similar ruling based on a factual finding that WhenU.com uses the marks for a "pure machine-linking function." This Court disagrees with, and is not bound by these findings.
 In Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 631 F. Supp. 735 (S.D.N.Y.1985), the plaintiff sought a declaration that the pattern of stitching on the back pockets of its jeans, which was virtually identical to the trademarked stitch pattern on the back pocket of the declaratory defendant's jeans "two curved arches intercepting at midpoint" did not infringe defendant's trademark. Id. at 737-39.
On appeal, the Second Circuit reaffirmed that harm to a trademark owner resulting from the likelihood that misuse of a mark might attract potential consumers to the junior user's product "based on the reputation built up by [the trademark owner]" was actionable under the Lanham Act, and that "the Lanham Act was designed to prevent a competitor from such a bootstrapping of a trademark owner's goodwill ..." Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d 867, 872 (2d Cir.1986).
 See Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 820, 82 S. Ct. 36, 7 L. Ed. 2d 25 (1961).
 As noted above, in December 2002, subsequent to the filing of this lawsuit, WhenU.com replaced this text with a new disclaimer, stating: "This is a WhenU offer and is not sponsored or displayed by the websites you are visiting. More ...," (Memo in Opposition at 10). However, since "there is no guarantee that Defendants will not simply return to the same conduct if the case is dismissed without issuance of an injunction," the Court considers the disclaimers as they appeared at the time the action was filed. OBH, Inc. v. Spotlight Magazine, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 2d 176, 186 n. 8 (W.D.N.Y.2000).

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