Source: https://www.policelawblog.com/blog/2010/08/index.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 20:44:54+00:00

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Recently, a police sergeant in the City of Chicago filed a civil action against the City, claiming that he and others are due significant overtime compensation because they were required to use their Blackberry devices to continue working even though their official shifts were over.
In the civil action, filed on May 24, 2010, Chicago police Sergeant Jeffrey Allen contends that his connection to work means that the city of Chicago owes him a significant amount of overtime under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA). Sergeant Allen filed this suit on behalf of himself and all other similarly situated police officers employed by the Chicago Police Department “in any rank as non-exempt personnel who worked ‘off the clock’ using Police Department issued PDA’s or other electronic communications devices without receiving compensation for each hour worked, including overtime compensation” over the past 3 years. Allen’s Civil Complaint, at 3.
The lawsuit contends that the Blackberry devices or PDAs were issued by the Chicago Police Department and required such police officers to be on-call for 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. Essentially, the lawsuit claims that they were forced to access and review “work related e-mails, voicemails, and text message work orders regardless of their location.” Allen’s Civil Complaint, at 4. Sergeant Allen contends, in his lawsuit, that he received numerous telephone calls, emails, voicemails and text messages while not being compensated for his time off the clock.
Sergeant Allen contends that he was expected to respond to these work related messages during the night and early into the morning, while technically off duty.
It appears that police overtime FLSA lawsuits have finally reached current times. In our legal practice, we often see a lot of these types of issues as we represent law enforcement officers and police unions in FLSA cases. Initially, I think what the civil action filed in this case might mean for other police departments is a quick return to the policy drafting table and then consultation with police unions (where applicable). This particular case will ultimately be decided on a number of factors, to include (but not limited to) just how required the use of the Blackberry or PDA devices are while off duty.
Many police departments have general 24-hour on duty policies for law enforcement officers, but I would suspect that not many have comprehensive mobile device policies. The new department policies, to be effective, will have to also address the issue of exempt versus non-exempt law enforcement employees. Exempt employees, i.e. those that are employed on a strict salary basis will likely not benefit from these types of cases, while non-exempt employees, in theory, have to be paid for all hours of work.
Another issue that is sure to come up is the volume of electronic communications that takes place through these Blackberry or other PDA devices while they are off duty. If we are talking about a few minutes a day, off duty, the courts might consider this amount of time to be “de minimus” (i.e. too few minutes to be compensated), but as we reach 15 minutes a day, the arguments for FLSA overtime increase and will have to be dealt with either at the department level, or in court.
concealed firearms. The bill also would change the requirements that retired officers must meet to carry concealed firearms. CBO estimates that implementing the bill would result in no significant costs to the federal government. Enacting S. 1132 would not affect direct spending or revenues; therefore, pay-as-you-go procedures would not apply.
Reform Act (UMRA) because it would expand an existing mandate that preempts state or local laws prohibiting the carrying of concealed weapons. CBO estimates that the costs, if any, for state, local, or tribal governments to comply would be insignificant and well below the annual threshold established in UMRA ($70 million in 2010, adjusted annually for inflation).
S. 1132 contains no private-sector mandates as defined in UMRA. The CBO staff contacts for this estimate are Mark Grabowicz (for federal costs) and Melissa Merrell (for the state and local impact). The estimate was approved by Theresa Gullo, Deputy Assistant Director for Budget Analysis.
In other words, there is no reason not to move forward and pass these new changes into law, which still appears to be the likely outcome when the House votes on the already approved Senate Bill.
As one of the primary practice areas for the law firm of Berry & Berry, PLLC involves the legal representation of federal law enforcement officers (LEO or LEOs), we update the changes to the law and current qualification criteria for LEO status / federal LEO retirement coverage from time to time. After review some of the latest cases, we pass on the following update on these important issues.
As many federal law enforcement officers (LEOs) are aware, Federal civil service retirement laws extend special retirement benefits to them because they serve in rigorous law enforcement positions and risk their lives every day. Congress, in enacting this special program for federal law enforcement, however, intended to make it sometimes difficult to qualify for this special retirement coverage.
In particular, because these LEO retirement programs are more costly to the government than traditional retirement plans (in addition to often resulting in the retirement of important employees at a time when they would otherwise have continued to work for a number of years) eligibility for federal LEO retirement is strictly construed. Watson v. Dep’t of Navy, 262 F.3d 1292, 1298 (Fed.Cir.2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1083 (2002). Additionally, in order to qualify for LEO retirement, LEOs bear the burden of proving entitlement thereto by a preponderance of the evidence. Fagergren v. Dep’t of the Interior, 98 M.S.P.R. 649 (2005), aff'd, 166 Fed.Appx. 483 (Fed.Cir.2006).
Typically, when an officer who is not already presumed to be covered under federal LEO retirement coverage wants to obtain this status, he or she will eventually contact the human resources staff for the individual federal agency. The goal in doing so is to obtain approval for this coverage from your agency.
The head of the federal agency in question (or their designee) then makes the initial decision as to whether a particular individual or position should be approved for LEO retirement coverage. If the federal agency determines the need for new positions that meet the statutory and regulatory definitions relating to a LEO (and therefore could receive enhanced retirement benefits and be subject to a mandatory retirement age), the agency sends a notice to OPM. 5 C.F.R. §§ 831.911(a) and 842.808(a).
Each federal agency, in first reviewing LEO entitlement looks to the laws and regulations which govern LEO retirements. The Federal Employees Retirement System (FERS), enacted by Congress defines a primary LEO to be one who holds a position, the “primary duties” of which involve the “investigation, apprehension, or detention” of those suspected or convicted of federal offenses. 5 U.S.C. § 8401(17)(A). Per regulation, OPM has defined “primary duties” in a three-part test.
(c) Are assigned on a regular and recurring basis.
Under this evaluation, if an employee spends at least 50 percent of his time performing certain duties, those duties are usually considered to be his or her primary duties. Furthermore, duties that are of an emergency, incidental, or temporary nature cannot be considered ‘primary’ even if they meet the substantial portion of time criterion.
When evaluating entitled to federal LEO retirement coverage for federal LEOs, I often look at the day-to-day duties of the particular LEO, along with a review of the individual LEO’s position description, their job description and any other materials which document a LEO’s duties within the context of the FERS statute.
If a federal LEO feels that they have been wrongly excluded from LEO retirement coverage, the LEO may appeal the final decision of the federal agency denying an the LEO’s request for the approval of a position as rigorous, to the Merit Systems Protection Board. If an MSPB Administrative Judge does not grant the relief sought, the federal LEO can then appeal the AJ’s opinion to the full MSPB, and from there to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
A recent review in August of 2010 revealed that the caselaw in this area has remained fairly consistent over the last few years, but with the number of changes through restructuring of LEO positions, along with a number of new laws on the books over the past few years I fully expect that LEO issues at the MSPB will again start to appear in larger numbers as new legislative issues impact the OPM and Federal Circuit definitions of what it means to be a Federal LEO. The issues can be complex and a federal LEO is definitely advised to navigate the attempt to gain coverage with the help of an attorney.
In an effort to review the different aspects of the Law Enforcement Officers’ Safety Act of 2004 (LEOSA) / HR 218, I see a case that I have not looked at before. The case itself is not new, but it is unique and it is hard to tell whether or not it will yield similar results in other states.
The case, In re Carry Permit of Andros, 958 A.2d 78 (N.J. 2008), involved an attempt by the State of New Jersey to revoke a retired police officer’s permit to carry a firearm. The honorably retired police officer had challenged the efforts of New Jersey in this case by invoking LEOSA, contending that the revocation application process was preempted by the LEOSA legislation. The court held that held that LEOSA did not preempt a state statute allowing revocation for good cause of a retired officer's privilege to carry a handgun.
The court, in it’s opinion seriously evaluated the federal preemption argument regarding the firearms permit revocation, but ultimately concurred in the ability of the state to take such action, even it light of LEOSA.
It is conceded that appellant satisfied the requirements of the federal act. But a retired officer's conduct permits the licensing state to revoke the permit, as evidenced by the requirements for qualification and testing every year. . . . In other words, the federal act expressly permits states to set "standards for training and qualification" consistent with those of "active law enforcement officers." Otherwise, a retired officer who suffers from a disability or inability to satisfy those standards would be able to continue to carry firearms.
We thus agree with the opinion of Judge Neustadter that the federal act merely preempts a state's ability to preclude, or change the requirements for, carrying the firearm interstate, if the state of former employment permits licensing of the retired officer. Thus, as the judge said, New Jersey "retains jurisdiction to hear the State's contention that it can establish 'good cause' justifying the revocation." In fact, prior to adoption of the 2004 Act, a federal court in a removal action noted that the Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C.A. § 922, et seq., was designed to have preemptive effect only where there is "a direct and positive conflict" when state law and the federal statute "cannot be reconciled." City of Gary v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 94 F.Supp.2d 947, 951 (D.Ind.2000) (quoting 18 U.S.C.A. § 927). This is not such a case.
Federal preemption recognizes the "assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress." City of Columbus v. Ours Garage & Wrecker Service, Inc., 536 U.S. 424, 432, 122 S.Ct. 2226, 2232, 153 L.Ed.2d 430, 440 (2002).
With these principles in mind, we find no Congressional intent to preclude the action taken by the State in this case, and no basis for concluding that a state cannot revoke a handgun permit because Congress authorizes a carrier when licensed in one state to possess it in another state. Andros has submitted references to the Congressional Record in which speakers opposed the legislation and addressed adverse effects on the states. However, when seeking to determine legislative intent, the United States Supreme Court has stated that "[t]he fears and doubts of the opposition are no authoritative guide to the construction of legislation." Shell Oil Co. v. Iowa Dept. of Revenue, 488 U.S. 19, 29, 109 S.Ct. 278, 284, 102 L.Ed.2d 186, 198 (1988) (quoting cases). Andros has submitted no legislative history which warrants a conclusion that section 926C was designed to preempt the action taken by the State in this case.The order revoking the permit to carry a handgun is affirmed.
While we must keep in mind that this is the decision of a single state court in this area of law, it is a quite interesting decision. I believe that this issue will no doubt be litigated again, probably in a number of states given the issues of preemption.
In a potentially problematic move (liability-wise), the City of San Francisco has developed a new program which will attempt to put into place a new civilian policing pilot program. According to news reports, the civilians will be trained to handle “low-level offenses,” with the theory being that it will leave police officers free to respond to more violent crimes. The Chief of Police for the San Francisco Police Department is launching this pilot program to employ civilians as investigators. The Department apparently is aiming to have civilian investigators trained and working by Summer, 2011.
According to the 2011 budget, the City plans to hire 15 civilian investigators. Each one of these civilians will apparently be trained to interview victims, take photos, and hunt for prints and DNA traces. The theory behind the system is that residents will receive better service for lower level crimes from civilian investigators. The City even suggested that victims of lower level crimes may be able to make appointments with civilian investigators.
A number of concerns arise whenever a department hires civilians or contractors to perform what are essentially police functions. Depending on whether or not the new civilians are employees of the City or considered to be contractors, we are bound to see a new round of legal issues arise when an individual files suit for improper actions (or police action) alleged to have been taken by civilian investigators.
While the idea of hiring civilian investigators may be tempting for police departments, it may be a better long term plan (and less expensive as well) for them to hire and train more police officers. Given that many areas of the country can be litigation zones, municipalities must think clearly before committing to these types of civilian positions. I have defended a number of police officers in civil actions and there is no limit to the creativity of plaintiffs lawyers in police cases.
Some of the legal issues for civilian investigators could potentially involve whether or not they were acting under the color of law, in which case they may be potentially sued personally (like police officers, without the benefit of police training) and whether there will be adequate background checks on civilian investigators so that Giglio type issues in their background enable them to testify. There are also numerous potential issues with how municipalities will be (or will not be held) liable for the police-type actions of civilian investigators. In the end, much like the failed attempt of some federal agencies between 2000 and 2006 to contract out some police officer positions, I believe that the concept of civilian investigators will end much the same way.

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