Source: https://portal.ct.gov/DOB/Enforcement/Securities-Orders-2/Marshall-QuintinArgyleFINE
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 03:07:09+00:00

Document:
1. The facts as set forth in paragraphs 6 through 11, inclusive, of the Notice shall constitute findings of fact within the meaning of Section 4-180(c) of the Connecticut General Statutes, and the conclusions, set forth in paragraphs 12 through 15, inclusive, of the Notice, shall constitute conclusions of law within the meaning of Section 4-180(c) of the Connecticut General Statutes and Section 36a-1-52 of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies.
2. The Commissioner complied with the provisions of Section 36b-27(d) of the Act.
Section 36b-31(b) of the Act requires that the Commissioner find that an order is necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors and consistent with the purposes fairly intended by the policy and provisions of sections 36b-2 to 33b-33, inclusive. Although the Commissioner is not required to make all these findings to make an order, since Section 36b-31(b) is clearly in the disjunctive, all of these elements are present in this case. While the term “public interest” is not defined in the Act, courts have determined that words of wide generality, like “public interest”, must take their meaning from the substantive provisions and purposes of the legislation and the words must be interpreted in the context of the regulatory scheme, see NAACP v. Federal Power Comm’n, 425 U.S. 662 (1975); N.Y. Central Sec. Corp. v. United States, 287 U.S. 12 (1932); and “it is for the legislature to determine what is in the public interest . . .”. Brosnan v. Sacred Heart Univ., 1997 Conn. Super. Lexis 2815, *47 (1997) (Internal quotation marks omitted.) (Quoting West v. Egan, 18 Conn. Supp. 447, 450 (1953)). “‘[T]he primary purpose behind . . . [the ACT] was to institute comprehensive registration requirements and thereby improve surveillance of securities trading.’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Andresen, 256 Conn. 313, 329, 773 A.2d 328 (2001). ‘[S]tate securities laws, or “blue sky laws,” are remedial statutes . . . see also Securities & Exchange Commission v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 353, 64 S.Ct. 120, 88 L.Ed. 88 (1943) (noting that state securities laws have “dominating purpose to prevent and punish fraudulent floating of securities”); Connecticut National Bank v. Giacomi, 233 Conn. 304, 320, 659 A.2d 1166 (1995) (noting that state securities laws contain antifraud provisions, require registration of brokers and sellers of securities and registration of securities themselves); People v. Landes, 84 N.Y.2d 655, 660, 645 N.E.2d 716, 621 N.Y.S.2d 283 (1994) (“purpose of [New York securities] statute is remedial: to protect the public from fraudulent exploitation in the offering and sale of securities”). In 1977, the Connecticut legislature formally adopted the Uniform Securities Act (Uniform Act).” (Citation omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Andresen, supra, 256 Conn. 322-23.” Papic v. Burke, 2007 Conn. Super. LEXIS 820 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2007) Thus, the “public interest” as it relates to the purposes of the Act includes requiring registration of securities and protecting the public from fraudulent exploitation in the offering and sale of securities, which are both key elements in the network of safeguards the legislature has enacted to protect the public investor. In this case, Respondents’ actions in violation of the Act involved disregarding a regulatory prohibition on offering and selling unregistered securities, and in connection with the offer and sale of unregistered securities, directly or indirectly, making an untrue statement of material fact or omitting to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statement made, in light of the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading by guaranteeing a return of the monies invested and failing to disclose investment risks. In addition, an investor was harmed in connection with such offer and sale by Respondents’ failure to provide the investor the stated return on investment. Consequently, the Commissioner finds that based upon the nature of Respondents’ actions in violation of the Act, the facts require the imposition of a fine against Respondents for Respondents’ violations of Section 36b-16 of the Act and 36b-4(a) of the Act in an amount equal to the maximum permitted by Section 36a-27(d) of the Act as in effect prior to October 1, 2003 and that this order imposing fine against Respondents is necessary and appropriate in the public interest and for the protection of investors and consistent with the purposes fairly intended by the policy and provisions of Sections 36b-2 to 36b-33, inclusive, of the Act.
3. This Order shall become effective when mailed.
this 24th day of October 2007.

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