Source: http://www.joeldufresnecase.com/supreme-court-opinions-federal/aliens-opinions/ins-v-chadha
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 18:50:02+00:00

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1. This Court has jurisdiction to entertain the INS's appeal in No. 80-1832 under 28 U.S.C. § 1252 which provides that "[a]ny party" may appeal to the Supreme Court from a judgment of "any court of the United States" holding an Act of Congress unconstitutional in "any civil action, suit, or proceeding" to which the United States or any of its agencies is a party. A court of appeals is "a court of the United States" for purposes of § 1252, the proceeding below was a "civil action, suit, or proceeding," the INS is an agency of the United States and was a party to the proceeding below, and the judgment below held an Act of Congress unconstitutional. Moreover, for purposes of deciding whether the INS was "any party" within the grant of appellate jurisdiction in § 1252, the INS was sufficiently aggrieved by the Court of Appeals' decision prohibiting it from taking action it would otherwise take. An agency's status as an aggrieved party under § 1252 is not altered by the fact that the Executive may agree with the holding that the statute in question is unconstitutional. Pp. 929-931.
2. Section 244(c)(2) is severable from the remainder of § 244. Section 406 of the Act provides that, if any particular provision of the Act is held invalid, the remainder of the Act shall not be affected. This gives rise to a presumption that Congress did not intend the validity of the Act as a whole, or any part thereof, to depend upon whether the veto clause of § 244(c)(2) was invalid. This presumption is supported by § 244's legislative history. Moreover, a provision is further presumed severable if what remains after severance is fully operative as a law. Here, § 244 can survive as a "fully operative" and workable administrative mechanism without the one-House veto. Pp. 931-935.
3. Chadha has standing to challenge the constitutionality of § 244(c)(2), since he has demonstrated "injury in fact and a substantial likelihood that the judicial relief requested will prevent or redress the claimed injury." Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 79. Pp. 935-936.
4. The fact that Chadha may have other statutory relief available to him does not preclude him from challenging the constitutionality of § 244(c)(2), especially where the other avenues of relief are at most speculative. Pp. 936-937.
5. The Court of Appeals had jurisdiction under § 106(a) of the Act, which provides that a petition for review in a court of appeals "shall be the sole and exclusive procedure for the judicial review of all final orders of deportation . . . made against aliens within the United States pursuant to administrative proceedings" under § 242(b) of the Act. Section 106(a) includes all matters on which the final deportation order is contingent, rather than only those determinations made at the deportation [p921] hearing. Here, Chadha's deportation stands or falls on the validity of the challenged veto, the final deportation order having been entered only to implement that veto. Pp. 937-939.
6. A case or controversy is presented by these cases. From the time of the House's formal intervention, there was concrete adverseness, and prior to such intervention, there was adequate Art. III adverseness even though the only parties were the INS and Chadha. The INS's agreement with Chadha's position does not alter the fact that the INS would have deported him absent the Court of Appeals' judgment. Moreover, Congress is the proper party to defend the validity of a statute when a Government agency, as a defendant charged with enforcing the statute, agrees with plaintiffs that the statute is unconstitutional. Pp. 939-940.
7. These cases do not present a nonjusticiable political question on the asserted ground that Chadha is merely challenging Congress' authority under the Naturalization and Necessary and Proper Clauses of the Constitution. The presence of constitutional issues with significant political overtones does not automatically invoke the political question doctrine. Resolution of litigation challenging the constitutional authority of one of the three branches cannot be evaded by the courts simply because the issues have political implications. Pp. 940-943.
8. The congressional veto provision in § 244(c)(2) is unconstitutional. Pp. 944-959.
(a) The prescription for legislative action in Art. I, § 1 -- requiring all legislative powers to be vested in a Congress consisting of a Senate and a House of Representatives -- and § 7 -- requiring every bill passed by the House and Senate, before becoming law, to be presented to the President, and, if he disapproves, to be repassed by two-thirds of the Senate and House -- represents the Framers' decision that the legislative power of the Federal Government be exercised in accord with a single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered procedure. This procedure is an integral part of the constitutional design for the separation of powers. Pp. 944-951.
(b) Here, the action taken by the House pursuant to § 244(c)(2) was essentially legislative in purpose and effect, and thus was subject to the procedural requirements of Art. I, § 7, for legislative action: passage by a majority of both Houses and presentation to the President. The one-House veto operated to overrule the Attorney General and mandate Chadha's deportation. The veto's legislative character is confirmed by the character of the congressional action it supplants; i.e., absent the veto provision of § 244(c)(2), neither the House nor the Senate, or both acting together, could effectively require the Attorney General to deport an alien once the Attorney General, in the exercise of legislatively [p922] delegated authority, had determined that the alien should remain in the United States. Without the veto provision, this could have been achieved only by legislation requiring deportation. A veto by one House under § 244(c)(2) cannot be justified as an attempt at amending the standards set out in § 244(a)(1), or as a repeal of § 244 as applied to Chadha. The nature of the decision implemented by the one-House veto further manifests its legislative character. Congress must abide by its delegation of authority to the Attorney General until that delegation is legislatively altered or revoked. Finally, the veto's legislative character is confirmed by the fact that, when the Framers intended to authorize either House of Congress to act alone and outside of its prescribed bicameral legislative role, they narrowly and precisely defined the procedure for such action in the Constitution. Pp. 951-959.
Ibid. [p927] The resolution was passed without debate or recorded vote. [n3] Since the House action was pursuant to § 244(c)(2), the resolution was not treated as an Art. I legislative act; it was not [p928] submitted to the Senate or presented to the President for his action.
In motions to dismiss the INS appeal, the congressional parties [n5] direct attention, however, to our statement that "[a] party who receives all that he has sought generally is not aggrieved by the judgment affording the relief and cannot appeal from it." Deposit Guaranty National Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 333 (1980). Here, the INS sought the invalidation of § 244(c)(2), and the Court of Appeals granted that relief. Both Houses contend that the INS has already received what it sought from the Court of Appeals, is not an aggrieved party, and therefore cannot appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals. We cannot agree.
A provision is further presumed severable if what remains after severance "is fully operative as a law." Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, supra, at 234. There can be no doubt that § 244 is "fully operative" and workable administrative machinery without the veto provision in § 244(c)(2). Entirely independent of the one-House veto, the [p935] administrative process enacted by Congress authorizes the Attorney General to suspend an alien's deportation under § 244(a). Congress' oversight of the exercise of this delegated authority is preserved, since all such suspensions will continue to be reported to it under § 244(c)(1). Absent the passage of a bill to the contrary, [n8] deportation proceedings will be canceled when the period specified in § 244(c)(2) has expired. [n9] Clearly, § 244 survives as a workable administrative mechanism without the one-House veto.
It is urged that these two intervening factors constitute a prudential bar to our consideration of the constitutional question presented in these cases. See Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). If we could perceive merit in this contention, we might well seek to avoid deciding the constitutional claim advanced. But, at most, [p937] these other avenues of relief are speculative. It is by means certain, for example, that Chadha's classification an immediate relative would result in the adjustment Chadha's status from nonimmigrant to permanent resident. See Menezes v. INS, 601 F.2d 1028 (CA9 1979). If Chadha is successful in his present challenge, he will not be deported, and will automatically become eligible to apply for citizenship. [n10] A person threatened with deportation cannot be denied the right to challenge the constitutional validity of the process which led to his status merely on the basis of speculation over the availability of other forms of relief.
It is true that one court has read Cheng Fan Kwok to preclude appeals similar to Chadha's. See Dastmalchi v. INS, 660 F.2d 880 (CA3 1981). [n11] However, we agree with the Court of Appeals in these cases that the term "final orders" in § 106(a) "includes all matters on which the validity of the final order is contingent, rather than only those determinations actually made at the hearing." 634 F.2d at 412. Here, Chadha's deportation stands or falls on the validity of the challenged veto; the final order of deportation was entered against Chadha only to implement the action of the House of Representatives. Although the Attorney General was satisfied that the House action was invalid and that it should not have any effect on his decision to suspend deportation, he appropriately let the controversy take its course through the courts.
This Court's decision in Cheng Fan Kwok, supra, does not bar Chadha's appeal. There, after an order of deportation had been entered, the affected alien requested the INS to stay the execution of that order. When that request was denied, the alien sought review in the Court of Appeals under § 106(a). This Court's holding that the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction was based on the fact that the alien "did not ‘attack the deportation order itself, but instead [sought] relief not inconsistent with it.'" 392 U.S. at 213, quoting [p939] Mui v. Esperdy, 371 F.2d 772, 777 (CA2 1966). Here, in contrast, Chadha directly attacks the deportation order itself, and the relief he seeks -- cancellation of deportation -- is plainly inconsistent with the deportation order. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction under § 106(a) to decide these cases.
The records of the Constitutional Convention reveal that the requirement that all legislation be presented to the President before becoming law was uniformly accepted by the Framers. [n14] Presentment to the President and the Presidential [p947] veto were considered so imperative that the draftsmen took special pains to assure that these requirements could not be circumvented. During the final debate on Art. I, § 7, cl. 2, James Madison expressed concern that it might easily be evaded by the simple expedient of calling a proposed law a "resolution" or "vote," rather than a "bill." 2 Farrand 301-302. As a consequence, Art. I, § 7, cl. 3, supra at 945-946, was added. 2 Farrand 304-305.
Clearly, when the Draftsmen sought to confer special powers on one House, independent of the other House, or of the President, they did so in explicit, unambiguous terms. [n21] [p956] These carefully defined exceptions from presentment and bicameralism underscore the difference between the legislative functions of Congress and other unilateral but important and binding one-House acts provided for in the Constitution. These exceptions are narrow, explicit, and separately justified; none of them authorize the action challenged here. On the contrary, they provide further support for the conclusion that congressional authority is not to be implied, and for the conclusion that the veto provided for in § 244(c)(2) is not authorized by the constitutional design of the powers of the Legislative Branch.
* Together with No. 80-2170, United States House of Representatives v. Immigration and Naturalization Service et al., and No. 80-2171, United States Senate v. Immigration and Naturalization Service et al., on certiorari to the same court.
1. Congress delegated the major responsibilities for enforcement of the Immigration and Nationality Act to the Attorney General. 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a). The Attorney General discharges his responsibilities through the Immigration and Naturalization Service, a division of the Department of Justice. Ibid.
2. In constitutional terms, "veto" is used to describe the President's power under Art. I, 7, of the Constitution. See Black's Law Dictionary 1403 (5th ed.1979). It appears, however, that congressional devices of the type authorized by § 244(c)(2) have come to be commonly referred to as a "veto." See, e.g., Martin, The Legislative Veto and the Responsible Exercise of Congressional Power, 68 Va.L.Rev. 253 (1982); Miller & Knapp, The Congressional Veto: Preserving the Constitutional Framework, 52 Ind.L.J. 367 (1977). We refer to the congressional "resolution" authorized by § 244(c)(2) as a "one-House veto" of the Attorney General's decision to allow a particular deportable alien to remain in the United States.
4. Nine Members of the House of Representatives disagree with the position taken in the briefs filed by the Senate and the House of Representatives, and have filed a brief amici curiae urging that the decision of the Court of Appeals be affirmed in this case.
5. The Senate and House authorized intervention in this case, S.Res. 40 and H.R.Res. 49, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981), and, on February 3, 1981, filed motions to intervene and petitioned for rehearing. The Court of Appeals granted the motions to intervene. Both Houses are therefore proper "parties" within the meaning of that ter, in 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1). See Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 424, n. 7 (1977).
6. In addition to meeting the statutory requisites of § 1252, of course, an appeal must present a justiciable case or controversy under Art. III. Such a controversy clearly exists in No. 80-1832, as in the other two cases, because of the presence of the two Houses of Congress as adverse parties. See infra at 939; see also Director, OWCP v. Perini North River Associates, 459 U.S. 297, 302-305 (1982).
7. In this case, we deem it appropriate to address questions of severability first. But see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1"]424 U.S. 1, 108-109 (1976); 424 U.S. 1, 108-109 (1976); United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 585 (1968).
10. Depending on how the INS interprets its statutory duty under § 244 apart from the challenged portion of § 244(c)(2), Chadha's status may be retroactively adjusted to that of a permanent resident as of December 19, 1975 -- the last session in which Congress could have attempted to stop the suspension of Chadha's deportation from ripening into cancellation of deportation. See 8 U.S.C. § 1254(d). In that event, Chadha's 5-year waiting period to become a citizen under § 316(a) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a), would have elapsed.
11. Under the Third Circuit's reasoning, judicial review under § 106(a) would not extend to the constitutionality of § 244(c)(2) because that issue could not have been tested during the administrative deportation proceedings conducted under § 242(b). The facts in Dastmalchi are distinguishable, however. In Dastmalchi, Iranian aliens who had entered the United States on nonimmigrant student visas challenged a regulation that required them to report to the District Director of the INS during the Iranian hostage crisis. The aliens reported and were ordered deported after a § 242(b) proceeding. The aliens in Dastmalchi could have been deported irrespective of the challenged regulation. Here, in contrast, Chadha's deportation would have been canceled but for § 244(c)(2).
12. A relevant parallel can be found in our recent decision in Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983). There, the United States agreed with Bob Jones University and Goldsboro Christian Schools that certain Revenue Rulings denying tax-exempt status to schools that discriminated on the basis of race were invalid. Despite its agreement with the schools, however, the United States was complying with a court order enjoining it from granting tax-exempt status to any school that discriminated on the basis of race. Even though the Government largely agreed with the opposing party on the merits of the controversy, we found an adequate basis for jurisdiction in the fact that the Government intended to enforce the challenged law against that party. See id. at 585, n. 9.
13. The suggestion is made that 244(c)(2) is somehow immunized from constitutional scrutiny because the Act containing § 244(c)(2) was passed by Congress and approved by the President. Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803), resolved that question. The assent of the Executive to a bill which contains a provision contrary to the Constitution does not shield it from judicial review. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740, n. 5 (1979); National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 841, n. 12 (1976); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926). See also n. 22, infra. In any event, 11 Presidents, from Mr. Wilson through Mr. Reagan, who have been presented with this issue have gone on record at some point to challenge congressional vetoes as unconstitutional. See Henry, The Legislative Veto: In Search of Constitutional Limits, 16 Harv.J.Legis. 735, 737-738, n. 7 (1979) (collecting citations to Presidential statements). Perhaps the earliest Executive expression on the constitutionality of the congressional veto is found in Attorney General William D. Mitchell's opinion of January 24, 1933, to President Hoover. 37 Op.Atty.Gen. 56. Furthermore, it is not uncommon for Presidents to approve legislation containing parts which are objectionable on constitutional grounds. For example, after President Roosevelt signed the Lend-Lease Act of 1941, Attorney General Jackson released a memorandum explaining the President's view that the provision allowing the Act's authorization to be terminated by concurrent resolution was unconstitutional. Jackson, A Presidential Legal Opinion, 66 Harv.L.Rev. 1353 (1953).
15. The Great Compromise was considered so important by the Framers that they inserted a special provision to ensure that it could not be altered, even by constitutional amendment, except with the consent of the states affected. See U.S.Const., Art V.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952). See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 123. When the Attorney General performs his duties pursuant to § 244, he does not exercise "legislative" power. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 213-214 (1976). The bicameral process is not necessary as a check on the Executive's administration of the laws, because his administrative activity cannot reach beyond the limits of the statute that created it -- a statute duly enacted pursuant to Art. I, §§ 1, 7. The constitutionality of the Attorney General's execution of the authority delegated to him by § 244 involves only a question of delegation doctrine. The courts, when a case or controversy arises, can always "ascertain whether the will of Congress has been obeyed," Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 425 (1944), and can enforce adherence to statutory standards. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, supra, at 585; Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 176 U.S.App.D.C. 373, 440, 541 F.2d 1, 68 (en banc) (separate statement of Leventhal, J.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976); L. Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action 320 (1965). It is clear, therefore, that the Attorney General acts in his presumptively Art. II capacity when he administers the Immigration and Nationality Act. Executive action under legislatively delegated authority that might resemble "legislative" action in some respects is not subject to the approval of both Houses of Congress and the President for the reason that the Constitution does not so require. That kind of Executive action is always subject to check by the terms of the legislation that authorized it; and if that authority is exceeded, it is open to judicial review, as well as the power of Congress to modify or revoke the authority entirely. A one-House veto is clearly legislative in both character and effect, and is not so checked; the need for the check provided by Art. I, §§ 1, 7, is therefore clear. Congress' authority to delegate portions of its power to administrative agencies provides no support for the argument that Congress can constitutionally control administration of the laws by way of a congressional veto.
17. We express no opinion as to whether such legislation would violate any constitutional provision. See n. 8, supra.
19. This does not mean that Congress is required to capitulate to "the accretion of policy control by forces outside its chambers." Javits & Klein, Congressional Oversight and the Legislative Veto: A Constitutional Analysis, 52 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 455, 462 (1977). The Constitution provides Congress with abundant means to oversee and control its administrative creatures. Beyond the obvious fact that Congress ultimately controls administrative agencies in the legislation that creates them, other means of control, such as durational limits on authorizations and formal reporting requirements, lie well within Congress' constitutional power. See id. at 460-461; Kaiser, Congressional Action to Overturn Agency Rules: Alternatives to the "Legislative Veto," 32 Ad.L.Rev. 667 (1980). See also n. 9, supra.
20. See also U.S.Const., Art. 11; § 1, and Amdt. 12.
21. An exception from the Presentment Clauses was ratified in Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 Dall. 378 (1798). There the Court held Presidential approval was unnecessary for a proposed constitutional amendment which had passed both Houses of Congress by the requisite two-thirds majority. See U.S.Const., Art. V.
23. Neither can we accept the suggestion that the one-House veto provision in § 244(c)(2) either removes or modifies the bicameralism and presentation requirements for the enactment of future legislation affecting aliens. See Atkins v. United States, 214 Ct.Cl. 186, 250-251, 556 F.2d 1028, 1063-1064 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1009 (1978); Brief for Petitioner in No. 80-2170, p. 40. The explicit prescription for legislative action contained in Art. I cannot be amended by legislation. See n. 13, supra.

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