Source: http://www.isthatlegal.ca/index.php?name=213-case-law
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 16:13:15+00:00

Document:
Lord Cockburn’s language echoes through the English and Canadian case law: see, e.g., Clifford v. Hoare (1874), L.R. 9 C.P. 362; Pettey v. Parsons,  2 Ch. 653 (C.A.), at 662, 665-6, 667-8; Keefe v. Amor,  1 Q.B. 334 (C.A.), at 347; Celsteel Ltd. v. Alton House Holdings Ltd.,  1 W.L.R. 204 (Ch.), at 216-18, rev’d on other grounds,  1 W.L.R. 512 (C.A.); B & Q Plc. v. Liverpool and Lancashire Properties Limited,  E.W.H.C. 463, 81 P. & C.R. 20 (Ch.); Devaney v. McNab (1921), 69 D.L.R. 231 (Ont. C.A.); Voye v. Hartley, 2002 NBCA 14, 247 N.B.R. (2d) 128, at para. 25; Donohue v. Robins, 2012 ONSC 2851,  O.J. No. 2133, at para. 58; Lester v. Bond, 2013 ONSC 7888 (CanLII),  O.J. No. 6006, at paras. 30-33.
 The requirement that the dominant owner prove substantial interference to maintain a claim reflects the nature of the dominant owner’s right. He or she does not own the right-of-way or the land upon which the right-of-way runs, but only enjoys the reasonable use of that property for its granted purpose. The dominant owner may only sustain a claim predicated on substantial interference with that reasonable use. The distinction is between the rights of ownership and the right of reasonable use for an identified purpose.
 A court, when deciding whether an encroachment results in a substantial interference with the claimant’s use of the right-of-way, will have regard to the terms of the grant and the nature of the encroachment. The determination is a factual one and will turn on the specific circumstances of each case.
In short, the test, … is one of convenience and not necessity or reasonable necessity, Provided that what the grantee is insisting on is not unreasonable, the question is: can the right of way be substantially and practically exercised as conveniently as before?
 The facts of Celsteel Ltd. provide an excellent example of the proper application of the substantial interference test. In Celsteel Ltd., the defendant lessee of the property decided to build a car wash that encroached on a right-of-way the plaintiffs used to access their parking garages. The defendant argued that the encroachment was not substantial as it related to one of the plaintiffs because, although the plaintiff would have to drive into and reverse out of the garage, contrary to his habit of reversing into and driving out of the garage, the plaintiff could still access his garage.
In the present case the test is not, in my view, whether the means of access still possible is a reasonable means of access. The correct test is whether insistence by the third plaintiff [the holder of the right-of-way] on being able to continue to use the other means of access is reasonable. In my opinion, it is. I do not think it is open to the defendants to deprive the third plaintiff of his preferred means of entry to garage 52 and then to justify themselves by arguing that most other people would prefer some other still available means of entry. Such an argument might avail the defendants if the third plaintiff’s preference was unreasonable or perverse. But, in my view, it is neither of these things.

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