Source: https://cbaclelegalconnection.com/2014/01/
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 15:10:34+00:00

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On Thursday, January 30, 2014, the Colorado Court of Appeals issued five published opinions and 29 unpublished opinions.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals published its opinion in Riddle v. Hickenlooper on Thursday, January 23, 2014.
In 2010, three individuals ran for the Colorado House of Representatives, House District 61: Kathleen Curry, Roger Wilson, and Luke Korkowski. Curry was a write-in candidate, Wilson was the Democratic nominee, and Korkowski was the Republican nominee. Under Colorado law, individual contributions to Curry were capped at $200, and individual contributions to each of her opponents were capped at $400. Contributors to Curry’s campaign (along with others) sued state officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming violation of the First Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. The district court rejected the claims and granted summary judgment to the state officials.
Amendment 27 of the state constitution limits campaign contributions to state office candidates from single contributors to $200 for the primary and $200 for the general election. In 2004, the legislature removed time limits as to when a candidate could accept and spend contributions when a primary is involved. Because Republican and Democratic candidates must run in a primary to get on the ballot even if unopposed, but minor party, unaffiliated, or write-in candidates are only required to run in a primary when multiple candidates seek the nomination, the Secretary of State interprets the amendment and statute to allow candidates with a primary to accept $400 and those without to accept only $200.
The plaintiffs made an as applied argument to the statute and challenged the disparity rather than the amount of the limit. The Tenth Circuit focused on the contributors, not the candidates, in finding that contributors to all three candidates were similarly situated. It then applied the intermediate level of scrutiny the U.S. Supreme Court applied in the First Amendment context of contribution limits — whether the limits are closely drawn to a sufficiently important governmental interest.
The court found that the defendant’s asserted interest of anticorruption was not advanced by the statute so it was not closely drawn. It held that the statutory classification violates the right to equal protection for individuals wishing to contribute to write-ins, unaffiliated candidates, and minor-party candidates when each candidate runs unopposed for the nomination. The court reversed and remanded for summary judgment to be awarded to the plaintiffs.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals published its opinion in In re C.W. Mining Co. on Wednesday, January 22, 2014.
These appeals arise from a Chapter 7 asset sale for the liquidating bankruptcy estate of C.W. Mining Co., a former coal mining operation in Emery County, Utah. The four appellants did business with C.W. Mining before its involuntary bankruptcy. They now claim various assets that the bankruptcy trustee, Kenneth A. Rushton, sold to an unrelated entity, Rhino Energy LLC. Under 11 U.S.C. § 363(m), the court cannot grant the appellants any relief that would affect the validity of Rushton’s sale to Rhino. The district court dismissed the appeals as moot because of this statute.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of all the appeals with the exception of Charles Reynolds’s appeal because he raised a statutory claim for relief that did not affect the validity of the sale. Reynolds and his family lived in the mine’s scale house. Reynolds opposed Rushton’s action to evict Reynolds and return the house to the bankruptcy estate by arguing he was the rightful owner of the house and counterclaiming under the Utah Occupying Claimant Statute (UOCS).
On appeal, Reynolds sought damages under UOCS of the value of improvements to the house, not undoing the sale to Rhino. Section 363(m) mootness does not apply to this claim, nor does equitable mootness because this is a purely statutory claim for money damages. The court reversed and remanded the dismissal of Reynolds’s claim.
On January 8, 2014, Rep. Libby Szabo and Sen. Lois Tochtrop introduced HB 14-1033 – Concerning State Agency Requirements for the Enforcement of New Regulatory Requirements on Small Businesses, and, in Connection Therewith, Enacting the “Regulatory Reform Act of 2014.” This summary is published here courtesy of the Colorado Bar Association’s e-Legislative Report.
This bill enacts the “Regulatory Reform Act of 2014”. The bill makes legislative declarations about the importance of businesses with 100 or fewer employees to the Colorado economy and the difficulty these types of businesses have in complying with new administrative rules that are not known or understood by these businesses. The bill defines “new rule” as any regulatory requirement in existence for less than one year prior to its enforcement by a state agency, and “minor violation” as any violation of a new rule by a business of 100 or fewer employees where the violation is minor in nature, involving record-keeping and issues that do not affect the life safety of the public or workers. The bill provides exceptions from the definition of “minor violation” for certain types of rules.
For the first minor violation of a new rule by a business of 100 or fewer employees, the bill requires a state agency to issue a written warning and engage the business in educational outreach as to the methods of complying with the new rule. The bill requires state agencies to make information on new rules available and allows this information to be made available in electronic form. The bill is assigned to the State, Veterans, & Military Affairs Committee.
On January 8, 2014, Rep. Bob Gardner and Sen. Mike Johnston introduced HB 14-1035 – Concerning Collection of Restitution Ordered Pursuant to a Deferred Judgment. This summary is published here courtesy of the Colorado Bar Association’s e-Legislative Report.
The bill clarifies that an order of restitution that is part of a deferred judgment can be collected by the court after the deferred judgment is dismissed until the judgment is satisfied. The bill has passed out of the Judiciary Committee—with amendments—and has been referred to the floor for consideration on 2nd Reading.
Since this summary, the bill passed 2nd Reading in the House with amendments and passed 3rd Reading.
On January 8, 2014, Rep. Daniel Kagan and Sen. Lucia Guzman introduced HB 14-1032 – Concerning the Provision of Defense Counsel to Juvenile Offenders. This summary is published here courtesy of the Colorado Bar Association’s e-Legislative Report.
The contact information for the local office of the state public defender (OSPD).
When a juvenile is placed in a detention facility, a temporary holding facility, or a shelter facility designated by the court, the screening team shall promptly so notify the court, the district attorney, and the local office of the OSPD.
The juvenile is charged with an offense for which the juvenile may waive counsel and the juvenile has made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his or her right to counsel.
The scheduled time for a detention hearing must allow a juvenile’s defense counsel sufficient time to consult with the juvenile before the detention hearing. This consultation may be performed by secure electronic means if the conditions under which the electronic consultation is held allow the consultation to be confidential. The law enforcement agency that arrested the juvenile shall promptly provide to the court and to defense counsel the affidavit supporting probable cause for the arrest and the arrest report, if the arrest report is available, and the screening team shall promptly provide to the court and to defense counsel any screening material prepared pursuant to the juvenile’s arrest.
A detention hearing shall not be combined with a preliminary hearing or a first advisement. Due to the limited scope of a detention hearing, the representation of a juvenile by appointed counsel at a detention hearing does not, by itself, create a conflict in the event that such counsel is subsequently appointed to represent another individual whose case is related to the juvenile’s case.
State the contact information for the OSPD that serves the jurisdiction of the court.
At a juvenile’s first appearance before the court, after the detention hearing or at the first appearance if the juvenile appears on a summons, the court shall advise the juvenile of his or her constitutional and legal rights, including the right to counsel. The court shall appoint the OSPD or, in the case of a conflict, the OADC for the juvenile unless the juvenile has retained his or her own counsel or the juvenile has made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his or her right to counsel.
The juvenile understands the possible consequences that may result from an adjudication or conviction of the offense with which the juvenile is charged.
An offense for which the juvenile is being charged as a repeat juvenile offender, as an aggravated juvenile offender, or as a mandatory sentence offender.
The court shall not accept a juvenile’s attempt to waive his or her right to counsel if the prosecuting attorney is seeking direct file proceedings or a transfer proceeding or if the juvenile is in the custody of the state department of human services or a county department of social services.
For purposes of applying for court-appointed counsel, the indigence of a juvenile is determined only by considering the juvenile’s assets and income.
The appointment of counsel for a juvenile offender shall continue until the court’s jurisdiction is terminated, the juvenile or the juvenile’s parent, guardian, or legal custodian retains counsel for the juvenile, or the juvenile makes a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his or her right to counsel.
A court shall not deem a guardian ad litem who is appointed by the court for a child in a delinquency proceeding to be a substitute for defense counsel for the juvenile.
The OSPD, before determining indigency, may provide limited representation to juveniles in detention hearings or adult defendants in custody who cannot post or are not allowed bond.
The OSPD, the OADC, and the judicial branch shall annually report certain data concerning juvenile delinquency proceedings.
The bill is assigned to the Judiciary Committee. The summary above relates to the bill as introduced; the sponsor is seeking input from various stakeholders to develop amendments.
On January 13, 2014, the Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in In re Marriage of Cardona and Castro. The supreme court granted certiorari review in this case to consider whether accrued vacation and sick leave may be considered marital property subject to division under C.R.S. § 14-10-113 of the Uniform Dissolution of Marriage Act (UDMA). The court considered this issue a matter of first impression in Colorado, noting, as did the court of appeals, that courts in other jurisdictions are split on this issue.
In Marriage of Cardona and Castro, wife raised the issue of husband’s accrued leave. The husband’s accrued leave had been reflected in his most recent pay stub, which indicated the total number of hours of vacation time and sick time that had accrued up until the date of dissolution. The pay stub did not indicate the cash value of the accrued leave or whether husband was entitled to cash payment for any portion of the leave. At the permanent orders hearing, the wife did not establish, nor did the husband render an opinion as to, whether husband was entitled to cash payment for any portion of the leave. In fact, the husband’s statements at the permanent orders hearing were somewhat vague and ambiguous as to his expectations—other than that he would be entitled to some form of pay for his accrued leave at the time of his termination.
The supreme court, in considering case law from other jurisdictions and relevant Colorado precedent, concluded that where a spouse has an enforceable right to be paid for accrued vacation or sick leave, as established by an employment agreement or policy, such accrued leave earned during the marriage is marital property for purposes of the UDMA. The court clarified that the value of such accrued leave at the time of dissolution must be equitably divided as part of the marital estate as long as such value can be reasonably ascertained at the time of dissolution. Alternatively, when a court cannot reasonably ascertain the value of such leave at the time of dissolution, the court should consider a spouse’s right to such leave as an economic circumstance of the parties when equitably dividing the marital estate. The supreme court found that there was not any competent evidence presented in the Cardona and Castro matter to establish that husband had an enforceable right to payment for his accrued leave and, accordingly, determined the trial court erred in considering the purported cash value of such leave as part of the marital estate. The court of appeals judgment was affirmed on narrower grounds.
The importance of this case to practitioners is clear in terms of trial preparation. As with other marital assets such as real estate, businesses, and retirement plans, it is essential for the practitioner to obtain accurate documentation and/or testimony from reliable sources such as the employer (as witness) and employer policies and procedures (as exhibits) relative to valuation of accrued sick time and leave. Based upon the detailed analysis in the supreme court decision, it will be critical for the trial court to assess whether the “value” of accrued vacation or sick leave, at the time of dissolution, may be so difficult to ascertain as to be speculative. Under many employment policies, different types of leave may be combined in one comprehensive paid time off plan, whereas other policies split vacation leave, sick leave, and personal leave into separate plans. Some employers allow leave to accrue and “roll over” from year to year, while others adopt a “use it or lose it” approach, under which accrued leave is forfeited if the employee does not take time off. Therefore, under this ruling, it is clear that accurate, demonstrative, and probative evidence must be presented to the trial court as to whether the value of accrued leave can be determined through a reasonable dollar estimate. If such an estimate cannot be demonstrated, it is clear that the accrued leave has speculative value that could lead a trial court to treat such leave as an “economic circumstance” under C.R.S. § 14-10-113(1)(c).
Lesleigh W. Monahan, Esq. is a partner in the Lakewood firm of Polidori, Franklin & Monahan, LLC. Ms. Monahan has been practicing law exclusively in domestic relations since 1988. She received her Juris Doctor degree from the University of Colorado School of Law in 1987. Ms. Monahan has repeatedly been recognized for her accomplishments, and is a frequent speaker at continuing legal education programs. She was admitted as a Fellow in the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers in 2004 and was president of the Colorado chapter in 2011/2012. Ms. Monahan is also a member of the CBA Family Law Section, and was chair of that section’s executive council in 2002-2003.
The Denver Bar Association seeks nominations for its annual awards – the DBA Award of Merit, Judicial Excellence Award, Young Lawyer of the Year, Volunteer Lawyer of the Year, and Education in the Legal Community awards. The deadline for nominations has been extended to Monday, February 3, 2014.
Nominate an attorney by submitting a statement of why the nominee deserves the honor. The statement need not be a complete essay; just provide a few salient points and the committee will follow up with the nominator and nominee for complete details. You can complete and submit a nomination form online or send your nomination by email to Heather Clark. The committee will consider involvement with the DBA, community contributions outside the bar associations, career history and accomplishments.
Click here for more information on the DBA awards and for links to nomination forms.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals published its opinion in United States v. Harmon on Tuesday, January 21, 2014.
Mr. Harmon, the appellant in this case, was driving a car across New Mexico with drugs in his spare tire. After weaving within his lane and crossing the fog line, Officer Lucero decided to stop the car on suspicion of violating a New Mexico statute that requires a driver to stay in his or her lane. During the traffic stop, the officer discovered the drugs, and Mr. Harmon was arrested and charged with possession with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine and possession with intent to distribute 50 kilograms of marijuana.
He moved to suppress the evidence before trial, but the district court denied that motion. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit was asked to decide, among other things, whether the stop was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
On appeal, Mr. Harmon made the following arguments: (1) that Officer Lucero lacked sufficient reasonable suspicion to make the initial traffic stop; (2) that the scope of the search exceeded the initial justification for the stop; (3) that his motion to reopen ought to have been granted in light of Officer Lucero’s behavior in another case the Officer was involved in; and (4) that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in entering into his plea agreement.
First, the Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court that Officer Lucero had reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle on suspicion of impairment under New Mexico law. A traffic stop is a seizure for purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis, and the “reasonable suspicion” standard from Terry v. Ohio applies. An investigatory stop is justified at its inception if the specific and articulable facts and rational inferences drawn from those facts give rise to a reasonable suspicion a person has or is committing a crime. The court looks to the totality of circumstances to determine whether reasonable suspicion exists.
The Tenth Circuit held that Officer Lucero had reasonable suspicion that Mr. Harmon violated the New Mexico statute of driving while impaired when the tires of Mr. Harmon’s car crossed the white fog line that separates the right lane of the interstate from the shoulder. The statute states in part that “a vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane and shall not be moved from such lane until the driver has first ascertained that such movement can be made with safety.” Under these facts, Officer Lucero could have had a reasonable suspicion of impairment.
Mr. Harmon also argued that Officer Lucero’s investigatory stop exceeded the scope of the initial justification, thereby violating the Fourth Amendment and entitling him to suppression of the drugs discovered in the car. Not only must the initial stop be justified, but the scope of the resulting detention must remain reasonably related to the initial justification. Once the officer has satisfied his initial reasonable suspicions, unless the officer obtains a new and independent basis for suspecting the detained individual of criminal activity, his investigation must end. However, counsel conceded during oral argument that the search was consensual.
Mr. Harmon also contended that the district court improperly denied his motion to reopen and reconsider the previous denial of the motion to suppress. In that motion, he also claimed that evidence regarding Officer Lucero’s omission in a report in an unrelated case constituted impeachment material that should have been disclosed prior to the suppression hearing. The Tenth Circuit found this argument unavailing for several reasons. First, Officer Lucero did not violate the Fourth Amendment in the other case. Second, there was no obligation that the report be exhaustive. Third, law enforcement may at times have legitimate reasons to keep certain information confidential. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in deciding that the evidence from the other case did not possess impeachment value and was unlikely to change the outcome of the suppression hearing.
The court rejected Mr. Harmon’s argument that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.
On Tuesday, January 28, 2014, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued three published opinions and three unpublished opinions.

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