Source: https://www.ascecuba.org/asce_proceedings/lifting-the-cuban-embargo-the-new-labors-of-hercules/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 15:10:04+00:00

Document:
Anyone familiar with the history of relations between the United States and Cuba in the last fifty years knows that the United States has in place a strict embargo on trade with, and on economic assistance to, Cuba. Pursuant to this embargo, it is virtually impossible for all but a very narrow category of persons or companies to engage in activities involving Cuba. Clearly, the embargo prohibitions will need to be lifted (or, at least, significantly modified) before the U.S. business community can again have access to the Cuban market. Travel to Cuba is also severely limited, although restrictions on some categories of travel have been recently reduced.
Many people are not aware of the full reach of the embargo and the way in which it excludes Cuba from programs that the United States has instituted or in which it participates, and which provide economic benefits to other Latin American and Caribbean nations. It is also not generally known that, because of the accumulation of increasingly prescriptive laws, lifting the embargo could require multiple actions by the Executive and Congress. Some of these actions are capable of relatively swift implementation, while others would involve a potentially drawn out process.
This paper describes the actions that the U.S. government would need to take to fully lift the Cuban trade embargo and erase its effects. As will be seen, the U.S. embargo against Cuba has two components: the direct embargo, which includes the measures that prohibit persons under the jurisdiction of the United States from engaging in economic transactions in Cuba; and the indirect embargo, which excludes Cuba from a number of economic assistance and development aid programs sponsored by the United States or in which this country participates. The information contained in the paper is important to individuals and companies that are U.S. nationals, because they are affected directly by the embargo’s prohibitions and should be aware of what must happen at a government level before they can lawfully do business in Cuba.1 The information is also of interest to individuals interested in traveling or otherwise engaging in non-commercial activities in Cuba.
Immediately following President Truman’s proclamation, the Secretary of the Treasury issued a set of regulations imposing a total embargo on unlicensed financial and commercial transactions between U.S. nationals and the People’s Republic of China and North Korea.7 These regulations, known as the Foreign Assets Control Regulations (“FACR”), were published on December 17, 1950 and codified at 31 C.F.R. Part 500.
The FACR were the first detailed regulations promulgated to impose a trade embargo on a foreign country under Section 5(b) of the TWEA. The FACR later served as the model for similar regulations issued in 1963 imposing a trade embargo on Cuba.
These broad presidential powers were limited in 1977 by Congress, which amended Section 5(b) of the TWEA to rescind the President’s authority to invoke the existence of a national emergency to impose a trade embargo against a foreign country.9 However, at the same time, Congress grandfathered existing exercises of the President’s “national emergency” authority and allowed embargoes then in place—including Cuba’s—to be maintained only as long as the President makes a determination that such authority remains necessary.10 Continued applicability of this “grandfathering” provision requires annual determinations by the President that the exercise of such authority with respect to each affected country is in the national interest of the United States. Since the imposition of this requirement, all U.S. Presidents have issued annual Determinations that have extended the state of emergency with respect to Cuba and kept the embargo in effect.11 The grandfathering provision has been allowed to lapse with respect to every country to which it had been applied, except Cuba.
(2) Except as may be deemed necessary by the President in the interest of the United States, no assistance shall be furnished under this chapter to any government of Cuba, nor shall Cuba be entitled to receive any quota authorizing the importation of Cuban sugar into the United States or to receive any other benefits under any law of the United States, until the President determines that such government has taken appropriate steps according to international law standards to return to United States citizens, and to entities not less than 50 per centum beneficially owned by United States citizens, or to provide equitable compensation to such citizens and entities for property taken from such citizens and entities on or after January 1, 1959, by the government of Cuba.
The provisions in Section 620(a) of the FAA evidenced a strong Congressional resolve to deny any form of U.S. assistance to Cuba as long as it remains under communist rule. There has been no indication of a change in this position by Congress; to the contrary, additional legislative action to date has been mainly in the direction of further tightening the embargo and imposing stricter, more specific conditions that a Cuban government must meet before the embargo is lifted and economic aid is made available to Cuba.
(1) To encourage the admission or reentry of such government to international organizations and international financial institutions.
(2) To provide emergency relief during Cuba’s transition to a viable economic system.
The conditions set in the CDA go beyond the requirements in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and impose further, specific requirements and timetables for the President’s lifting of all or portions of the Cuban trade embargo.
By virtue of this provision, the detailed regulations developed by the Department of the Treasury and in effect on March 12, 1996 have acquired the force of law and can only be rescinded by legislation.
Title II of the LIBERTAD Act delineates a program under which the United States will lift the trade embargo and provide economic assistance to Cuba at such a time as the President determines that a transition government or a democratically elected government is in power in Cuba.35 As will be further discussed below, the conditions imposed for those actions under the LIBERTAD Act are more numerous, and the definitions of qualifying “transition” and “democratic” governments in Cuba more restrictive, than those under the Cuban Democracy Act.
Suits under Title III of the LIBERTAD Act are currently being held in abeyance under authority granted to the President by 22 U.S.C. § 6085(b)(1), which allows the President to suspend the right to bring an action under Title III for six month periods by determining and reporting in writing to the appropriate congressional committees that such suspension is necessary to the national interests of the United States and will expedite a transition to democracy in Cuba. Such determinations have been made by the President every six months since the statute was enacted.
The CACR prohibit all unlicensed financial and commercial transactions by Americans with Cuba or its citizens.47 They serve the functions of isolating Cuba; protecting Cubans from having their assets in the United States confiscated by Cuban authorities; preserving Cuban assets for future disposition; and denying Cuba access to dollar earnings, and to dollar financial facilities.48 The regulations prohibit the export to Cuba—either directly or through third countries—of any U.S. products, technology or services except for certain goods licensed for export or re-export by the U.S. Department of Commerce (such as medicine and medical supplies, food, and agricultural commodities), publications and other informational materials, and telecommunications services and attendant equipment. 49 Likewise, goods or services of Cuban origin may not be imported directly or through third countries into the United States, except for publications or other informational materials.50 The CACR prohibit buying from or selling to Cuban nationals whether they are physically located in Cuba or doing business elsewhere on behalf of Cuba. The prohibition also extends to individuals or organizations anywhere in the world who act on behalf of Cuba.
These directives have been fully implemented via new OFAC regulations announced in September 2009.59 The new regulations establish a general license authorizing, in 31 C.F.R. § 515.561(a)(1), travel-related transactions and additional transactions that are directly incident to visiting a close relative who is a national of Cuba.60 The new regulations also amend 31 C.F.R. § 515.560(c)(2) by removing the $50 per day limit on living expenses in Cuba, as well as the $50 per trip limit on transportation-related expenses within Cuba, that formerly applied to licensed family visits. New section 515.560(c)(2) authorizes all transactions ordinarily incident to travel anywhere in Cuba, including payment of living expenses and the acquisition in Cuba of goods for personal consumption there, that do not exceed the “maximum per diem rate,” as established by the Department of State for Havana, Cuba, in effect at the time travel to Cuba takes place.
OFAC amended 31 C.F.R. § 515.570(a) to remove all limitations on the amount and frequency with which persons subject to the jurisdiction of the United States may make remittances to nationals of Cuba and to expand the category of permitted recipients to “close relatives,” as defined in new section 515.339. OFAC also amended 31 C.F.R. § 515.560 (c)(4)(i) to increase from $300 to $3,000 the total amount of family remittances an authorized traveler may carry to Cuba, and modified 31 C.F.R. § 515.560 to increase from $300 to $3,000 the amount of funds received as remittances that a national of Cuba departing the United States may carry. With respect to persons in Cuba seeking to emigrate to the United States, OFAC amended its regulations in 31 C.F.R. § 515.570(b) to authorize two separate one-time emigration-related remittances, and to increase the value limit of each of these remittances from $500 to $1,000.
Another change in the embargo regulations announced in September 2009 is in the area of telecommunications. While transactions with Cuba relating to telecommunications were first liberalized under the CDA in 1992, the new OFAC regulations provide that certain telecommunications services, contracts, related payments, and travel-related transactions are authorized by general licenses, that is, without requiring permission via license by OFAC. Thus, 31 C.F.R. § 515.542 (b) is being amended to authorize all transactions, including but not limited to payments, incident to the provision of telecommunications services between the United States and Cuba, the provision of satellite radio or satellite television services to Cuba, or the entry into and performance under roaming service agreements with telecommunications services providers in Cuba, by a telecommunications services provider that is a person subject to U.S. jurisdiction. Former 31 C.F.R. § 515.542 (c), which set forth a case-by-case licensing policy for payments to Cuba for authorized telecommunications services, is removed. Moreover, a new paragraph (c) of section 515.542 authorizes all persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction to enter into, and make payments under, contracts with non-Cuban telecommunications services providers, or particular individuals in Cuba, for services provided to particular individuals in Cuba, such as a contract for cellular telephone service for a phone owned and used by a particular individual in Cuba. The authorization in new paragraph (c) includes, but is not limited to, payment for activation, installation, usage (monthly, pre-paid, intermittent, or other), roaming, maintenance, and termination fees.
Newly added paragraph (d)(1) of section 515.542 contains a general license authorizing transactions incident to the establishment of facilities to provide telecommunications services linking the United States and Cuba, including but not limited to fiber-optic cable and satellite telecommunications facilities. Newly added paragraph (d)(2) provides a statement of specific licensing policy with respect to transactions incident to the establishment of facilities to provide telecommunications services linking third countries and Cuba, including but not limited to fiber-optic cable and satellite facilities, provided that such facilities are necessary to provide efficient and adequate telecommunications services between the United States and Cuba.
Travel-related transactions incident to these new authorizations in section 515.542 are addressed by amendments to 31 C.F.R. §§ 515.564 and 515.533. New paragraph (a)(3) of section 515.564 provides a general license authorizing, with certain conditions, the travel-related transactions set forth in section 515.560(c) and additional transactions that are directly incident to participation in professional meetings for the commercial marketing of, sales negotiation for, or performance under contracts for the provision of the telecommunications services, or the establishment of facilities to provide telecommunications services, authorized by the general licenses in section 515.542. With respect to those commercial telecommunications transactions that will require Commerce-authorized exports of telecommunications-related items, new paragraph (f) of section 515.533 provides a general license authorizing, with certain conditions, the travel-related transactions set forth in section 515.560(c) and additional transactions that are directly incident to the commercial marketing, sales negotiation, accompanied delivery, or servicing in Cuba of telecommunications-related items that have been authorized for commercial export or re-export to Cuba by the Department of Commerce.
The 2009 relaxations to the trade embargo against Cuba are relatively insignificant. Their importance, however, rests on two factors: (1) they mark the first time since the embargo was modified in 2000 to allow the sale of agricultural products to Cuba under restrictive conditions;62 and (2) despite their relative lack of significance, they were the subject of a fierce battle in Congress that required the White House to provide assurances to some members of Congress that the government would interpret the law with respect to travel to promote agricultural sales so that it “would be limited to only a narrow class of businesses,” and would be applied so strictly as to render them ineffective.63 The difficulties encountered in implementing even such a limited modification of the embargo raises the question of what will be necessary in order for a more significant lifting of the sanctions to take place.
As discussed above, the U.S. trade embargo against Cuba is based on four statutes (plus the CACR in place as of March 1996). The multiple statutory authority for the sanctions may require a diversity of procedures for lifting them. This section reviews the statutes to determine how the President and Congress might interact to remove the embargo’s prohibitions.
In the case of the Foreign Assistance Act, Section 620(a)(1) of the FAA, 22 U.S.C. § 2370(a)(1), authorizes the President to “establish and maintain a total embargo upon all trade between the United States and Cuba.” This section is clearly permissive and leaves the President free to determine whether to “maintain” the embargo, and consequently whether to lift it. The President could remove the embargo, to the extent it is imposed under this provision, by an executive order that rescinds President Kennedy’s Proclamation and revokes all subsequent executive orders and regulations thereunder implementing aspects of the embargo. The President could also take this action unilaterally, without reference to any external events.
The CDA, on the other hand, sets very specific conditions for the lifting of the U.S. trade embargo against Cuba. Section 1708(b)(3) of the CDA68 directs the President to “take steps to end the United States trade embargo of Cuba” when two conditions have been met. The first condition is that the President make a determination, and report it to Congress, that the Cuban government has carried out five actions identified in Section 1708(a), including holding free and fair elections conducted under international supervision, permitting opposition parties ample time to organize and campaign for such elections, showing respect for the basic civil liberties and human rights of Cubans, moving toward establishing a free-market economic system, and committing itself to constitutional change that would ensure regular free and fair elections. The second condition is that a new Cuban government be elected as a result of such elections.
The provisions of the LIBERTAD Act impose additional restrictions on the ability to modify or lift the embargo, for the President would need to make the determinations called for in the Act that a “transition government” and a “democratically elected government” are in place before he could proceed to suspend or lift the embargo, and such an action in the President’s part could be overridden by Congress.
Finally, the codification of the CACR provisions in effect as of March 1996 cannot be reversed by the President, but can only be rescinded by specific Congressional action.
In summary, the accumulated embargo legislation has created a situation where Cuba’s transition government must proceed in a very specific manner that meets the requirements of the CDA and the LIBERTAD Act in order for the embargo sanctions to be lifted. Assuming the conditions set forth in those statutes are met, once the President submits to Congress the reports required by these laws, he can issue an executive order to lift the embargo. The President will also be able at that time to order all affected executive departments and agencies, including Treasury, State and Commerce, to implement the termination of the sanctions now currently in effect against Cuba and against other countries providing assistance to the Cuban government.
If, however, the events in Cuba do not fit the pattern set out in the CDA and the LIBERTAD Act, the embargo will remain in place until the conditions in Cuba conform to the requirements in those laws, or until new legislation is enacted. Any effort by the President to expedite the process (e.g., by failing to renew the applicability of the TWEA) can be countermanded by Congress, particularly if it is unclear as to in what direction the Cuban government is going.
Also, as the example of the measures implemented in October 2000 and March 2009 shows, any new legislation that relaxes (instead of tightening) the embargo may be the subject of significant political debate and may falter unless there is an indisputable movement towards the re-establishment of democratic rule in the island.
In the half a century since the triumph of Cuba’s Revolution, the United States has instituted (and later scaled back or discontinued) a series of programs designed to assist in the economic development of the less affluent nations of the Western Hemisphere. Together with non-region-specific aid programs administered by various agencies of the Federal Government, these measures have offered varying degrees of support for the economic growth of Latin American and Caribbean countries.
The assistance programs have taken a variety of forms. They have included regional and non-regional programs and preferences; programs with a commercial purpose, as well as humanitarian assistance grants with significant commercial impact; programs run by the U.S. government, as well as those funded by the government but administered by outside organizations; and programs assisting Latin American and Caribbean countries directly, or having a positive effect on the economies of those countries through the actions of a U.S. program beneficiary. Cuba has been excluded from all these programs as a result of the U.S. trade embargo legislation, particularly the FAA, which deprives Cuba of access to trade assistance programs sponsored by the United States or involving significant U.S. participation. In addition, Cuba has been excluded from any form of direct aid from the United States, other than the humanitarian assistance provided by private charitable organizations and individual donors.
This section describes briefly the economic assistance programs or activities that are currently unavailable for Cuba, but could be applied upon the lifting of the embargo. Economic assistance programs can only be described in general terms because the scope of the assistance programs sponsored by the U.S. government, and the existence of the programs themselves, depends on policy and budgetary considerations that change with economic conditions and the vagaries of the political process. Therefore, some of the programs described in this section may not be in effect, or may exist in significantly modified form, when Cuba becomes eligible for U.S. assistance.
Thus, the level of aid would depend on what other competing priorities exist at the time Congress considers an aid package for Cuba.
By virtue of geography and history, the development needs of the Latin American and Caribbean nations have received varying degrees of U.S. attention in the last fifty years. Currently, the U.S. economic assistance programs focus largely on the Middle East, and little attention is being afforded to Latin America.87 Should that situation change, the general and region-specific tools of U.S. trade promotion and development policy towards the Third World could be utilized by Cuba if the U.S. trade embargo were to end.
The U.S. economic assistance programs and preferences have developed over a long period of time and are not under a unified command. The discussion here will group the most important of these programs under each agency charged with administering them.
U.S. Agency for International Development. As the mainstay of U.S. foreign assistance administration, the U.S. Agency for International Development (“USAID”) conducts an array of development projects and assistance programs from its field missions around the world.88 USAID, however, has drawn criticism for being wasteful and over-bureaucratic; Congressional funding for USAID development projects has been curtailed steadily over time.
financing assistance to U.S. companies wishing to export to developing countries.
Overseas Private Investment Corporation. The Overseas Private Investment Corporation (“OPIC”) is a self-financing federal corporation with the mission of assisting U.S. investors in developing countries and emerging economies.91 OPIC’s programs are available in over 140 countries throughout the world. OPIC’s assistance takes three principal forms: (i) project financing, in which OPIC makes available development funds for direct loans and loan guarantees to U.S. investors in commercial projects overseas;92 (ii) investment insurance issued by OPIC protects U.S. investments overseas against three types of political risks: currency inconvertibility, expropriation and political violence; and (iii) investor services, including advisory services and databases, investment missions, seminars and conferences.
U.S. Department of Commerce. The Commerce Department plays an active role in supporting development abroad through its numerous programs of general trade promotion. Commerce is the hub of an interagency task force, the Trade Promotion Coordinating Committee, which links most of the federal government’s export promotion programs.93 This task force has a hotline for businesses needing trade information and counseling, and publishes a directory of U.S. government resources for exporters.
Another Commerce Department office, the International Trade Administration, organizes trade missions to foreign countries focusing on particular U.S. industry or service sectors, and missions to introduce U.S. companies to foreign markets, and also arranges for U.S. participation in foreign trade fairs and exhibitions. The Commerce Department’s Foreign Commercial Service has officers in overseas posts scouting commercial opportunities for U.S. investors and traders.
In summary, a variety of government-sponsored investment and economic development programs could be utilized to stimulate economic recovery and development Cuba. Participation in these programs is currently foreclosed by the embargo.
Starting during the George H. Bush Administration, the United States has been conducting negotiations on trade and investment liberalization with many nations, including those in Latin American and the Caribbean. The United States is currently a party to many bilateral and multi-lateral trade agreements. Countries with which the United States has active bilateral trade agreements include: Australia, Bahrain, Chile, Israel, Jordan, Morocco, Peru, Oman, and Singapore. The active multi-lateral trade agreements that the United States has signed include the North American Free-Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”) (with Canada and Mexico) and the Central America-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement (“CAFTA-DR”) (with the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Costa Rica). U.S. trade agreements with Panama, Korea, and Colombia are pending congressional approval. The United States is also in negotiations on trade agreements with Malaysia, Thailand, the United Arab Emirates, and the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) which includes Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, and Swaziland.96 Agreements such as NAFTA and CAFTA-DR offer Latin American and Caribbean countries reductions in tariffs and elimination of non-tariff trade barriers to the export of their products to the United States, as well as increased investment, imports and technology transfers from the United States. An agreement of this nature between the United States and Cuba would pave the way towards re-establishing the special relationship that existed between the two countries before the Cuban Revolution.
Even after the trade embargo against Cuba is lifted, further steps will be needed to involve Cuba in the above-described U.S. assistance programs and preferences. This section summarizes the actions needed under present law to permit Cuban participation in some of these programs.
Were the embargo to be lifted, USAID would need to establish a field mission in Cuba and set in motion its project review procedures. Most importantly, Congress would need to appropriate the funds for USAID programs in Cuba. The Development Assistance and other aid programs run by the U.S. Agency for International Development would then become available.
The authorizing act for the Overseas Private Investment Corporation does not specifically restrict funding projects in Cuba.100 However, to be eligible for OPIC political risk insurance, an investment must be in a country that has signed a commercial agreement with the United States. Cuba and the United States would need to enter into such an agreement.
Food aid under the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, 7 U.S.C. § 1691 et seq., will become available to Cuba if the President determines that Cuba is a “friendly” country, and not one under the control of a foreign government running a world communist movement.101 Food aid under the International Development and Food Acts, codified in 22 U.S.C. Chapter 32, falls under the anti-Cuba restrictions of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and would be available if the FAA’s prohibitions were lifted.
Conceivably, a prolonged series of economic reverses such as those experienced in 2008 and 2009 could force Cuba to re-evaluate its relations with the United States, which until 1959 was by far Cuba’s main trading partner. However, it is unlikely that economic distress alone would be sufficient to cause a major policy change in Cuba. The country was able to weather a very severe economic crisis in 1990–95 (the aftermath of the dissolution of the Soviet Block) without making any political concessions. There is no reason to assume, therefore, that deteriorating economic conditions will bring about the transition to a free-market economy or the institution of democratic reforms.
A more probable scenario for change is one in which Raúl Castro dies, retires or is removed from power and is succeeded by new leaders who undertake to shift away from a rigorous Socialist style of government and set out to institute political and economic reforms. (However, there is no current indication that Raúl Castro will soon leave power or that if he did his successors would change the government’s current policies.) If the Cuban government started to institute significant economic and political reforms, the business community might urge the President and Congress to lift or scale down the sanctions and follow the same path with Cuba as it has done with other Socialist countries, such as Vietnam.
Whatever the motivating factor, once the decision is made by at least one of the branches of government that the embargo should be lifted or modified, there are several actions that must be taken. First, the rest of the government has to support the proposed action. Second, all the statutory bases for the embargo must be removed or amended, including the Trading with the Enemy Act, the Foreign Assistance Act, the Cuban Democracy Act, and the LIBERTAD Act. Third, the CACR need to be modified or rescinded.
The President has a degree of legal authority to lift the embargo—at least to the extent that it is founded upon the TWEA and the FAA. Under those statutes, the President could lift the embargo unilaterally, at any time, and without any preconditions, and would not be required to consult Congress in order to do so. Political considerations would probably dictate that the President work with Congress and take public opinion into account before taking such an action.
The CDA and the LIBERTAD Act present a more difficult situation. The CDA has expanded the embargo in some respects (e.g., by prohibiting trade with Cuba by third-country subsidiaries of U.S. corporations). The statute has also defined a set of events in Cuba (specified in § 1708(a)) as preconditions to the President’s ability to take steps to lift the embargo. The President must make a determination that those conditions have been satisfied, and must report his determination to Congress, before he can act on the embargo. At that point, Congress can override the lifting of the embargo if it disagrees with the President. Presumably, the President’s determination could also be challenged in the courts. The LIBERTAD Act sets additional conditions for suspending, and eventually lifting, the embargo, most troublesome being the thorny issue of resolving the expropriation claims by U.S. nationals against Cuba.
One consequence of the imposition of an extensive, definite set of conditions before the President is able to modify or lift the embargo is the loss of U.S. government flexibility to deal with developments in Cuba. Unless Cuba’s transition to democracy proceeds in an orderly fashion that satisfies all requirements in the CDA and the LIBERTAD Act, the embargo may not be lifted for a significant period of time while events unfold in the island. Again, under such circumstances interested parties, including the business community could, and probably should, be prepared to press Congress for the quick enactment of legislation that would remove the existing legislative overkill and enable the President to lift or modify the embargo.
In addition to eliminating the embargo, the existing prohibitions against U.S. economic aid to Cuba would need to be dropped. Under the CDA and the LIBERTAD Act, no U.S. aid can be given to a future government in Cuba until the President deems that giving such aid is in the national interest of the United States, a “transition” government is in power, and Cuba has taken appropriate steps under international law standards to provide restitution or compensation to U.S. citizens whose property was confiscated by the Castro government. When appropriate, the need for such determinations would need to be rescinded or the determinations made.
Another action that must be accomplished, and which again the business community and other interested parties may need to press for, is the passage of legislation to incorporate a post-embargo Cuba into the various economic aid programs sponsored by the U.S. government or in which the U.S. participates. The LIBERTAD Act directs the President to take steps to bring a democratic Cuba within the coverage of some U.S. sponsored economic aid programs. The reach of that legislation, however, is incomplete and in some areas obsolete, and needs to be supplemented by specific legislation that covers the various aid programs in effect at the time the embargo is lifted, so that the U.S. government agencies will be prepared to take expeditious action to admit Cuba into the programs.
Finally, the Federal government should establish an advisory group to help identify the problems that will be posed by Cuba’s transition to a free-market democratic society, develop a unified strategy to assist Cuba in resolving those problems, and draft the necessary implementing laws and regulations. Those interested in a smooth transition process should be represented and heavily involved in these efforts.
1. Persons subject to the U.S. embargo are “persons under the jurisdiction of the United States.” 31 C.F.R. §515.201(b). This term includes U.S. citizens or permanent residents wherever located; any person actually within the United States; any corporation organized under the laws of the United States or any state, territory, possession or district of the United States; or any organization that is owned or controlled by any one of the above. 31 C.F.R. §§ 515.329, 515.330.
2. Embargo-related prohibitions against activities relating to Cuba are sprinkled throughout U.S. law. For example, Section 607 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008 (2007), provides: “None of the funds appropriated or otherwise made available pursuant to this Act shall be obligated or expended to finance directly any assistance or reparations to Cuba, North Korea, Iran, or Syria: Provided, That for purposes of this section, the prohibition on obligations or expenditures shall include direct loans, credits, insurance and guarantees of the Export-Import Bank or its agents.” Similar prohibitions are included in the appropriations bills every year. Provisions such as these will not be discussed here, since they can be removed in due course as the legislation is updated. Such revisions, however, will have to be undertaken, perhaps as part of a comprehensive Federal Government initiative to identify and rid the U.S. statutes of accumulated restrictions on transactions involving Cuba.
3. 40 Stat. 411 (1917), codified at 50 U.S.C. Appendix.
4. The legislative history is vague about the purposes behind the 1933 amendment to Section 5(b) of the TWEA. Interpretations of the intent of the legislation have been provided after the fact by courts and legal scholars. In 1971, for example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit noted: That policy [behind the TWEA] is to deny hard currency to blocked countries and their nationals. However, as the Secretary points out, the purpose behind the Act is not only that but also to preserve the assets of such countries and their nationals for possible vesting and use in the future settlement of American claims against those governments and their citizens. Cheng Yih-Chun v. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 442 F.2d 460, 465 (2d Cir. 1971). In a later case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit articulated the purpose behind Section 5(b) as follows: The governmental interests which arguably justify the blocking provisions of the TWEA and the Regulations are threefold: (1) to prevent designated countries from acquiring dollars; (2) to provide a fund from which United States citizens could be compensated for injury occasioned them by designated countries; (3) and to use the blocked funds as a negotiating tool with the designated country. Tran Qui Than v. Regan, 658 F.2d 1296, 1305 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1069 (1982). The statements by the courts in these two cases reflect the historical fact that the TWEA has been used as a political, as well as an economic, tool to further the U.S. government’s positions in its dealings with unfriendly nations.
5. As amended in 1933, Section 5(b) of the TWEA read: During time of war or any other period of national emergency declared by the President, the President may, through any agency that he may designate, or otherwise, investigate, regulate, or prohibit, under such rules and regulations as he may prescribe, by means of licenses or otherwise, any transactions in foreign exchange, transfers of credit between or payments by banking institutions as defined by the President, and export, hoarding, melting, or earmarking of gold or silver coin or bullion or currency, by any person within the United States or any place subject to the jurisdiction thereof; and the President may require any person engaged in any transaction referred to in this subdivision to furnish under oath, complete information relative thereto, including the production of any books of account, contracts, letters or other papers, in connection therewith in the custody or control of such person, either before or after such transaction is completed. Whoever willfully violates any of the provisions of this subdivision or of any license, order, rule or regulation issued thereunder, shall, upon conviction, be fined not more than $10,000, or, if a natural person, may be imprisoned for not more than ten years, or both; and any officer, director, or agent of any corporation who knowingly participates in such violation may be punished by a like fine, imprisonment, or both. As used in this subdivision the term “person” means an individual, partnership, association, or corporation. Section 2, Emergency Banking Relief Act of March 9, 1933, 48 Stat. 1.
6. Proclamation No. 2914, 15 Fed. Reg. 9029 (1950), reprinted in 1950 U.S. Code Cong. Service, Vol. 1 at 1557–58. At the time of the Proclamation, Section 5(b) of the TWEA read in relevant part as follows: (1) During the time of war or during any other period of national emergency declared by the President, the President may, through any agency that he may designate, or otherwise, and under such rules and regulations as he may prescribe, by means of instructions, licenses, or otherwise— (A) investigate, regulate, or prohibit, any transactions in foreign exchange, transfers of credit or payments between, by, through or to any banking institution and the importing, exporting, hoarding, melting, or earmarking of gold or silver coin or bullion, currency or securities, and (B) investigate, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any acquisition, holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation, importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising any right, power, or privilege with respect to, or transactions involving, any property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest, by any person, or with respect to any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. President Truman’s proclamation of a national emergency with regard to the worldwide threat of communist aggression was in effect until it was effectively rescinded by the National Emergencies Act, Pub. L. 94–412, September 14, 1976, 90 Stat. 1255, and the War Or National Emergency—Presidential Powers Act, Pub. L. No. 95–223, 91 Stat. 1625 (1977). The 1977 amendment to the TWEA required the President, within two years of enactment of the National Emergencies Act, to extend any national emergencies that he wanted to keep in effect. In order to extend a TWEA emergency further, the President was also required to issue an annual determination that the extension was in the national interest.
7. President Roosevelt had delegated to the Secretary of the Treasury the authority granted to him by the TWEA to the extent of empowering Treasury to issue implementing regulations. Executive Order 9193, 3 C.F.R. 1174, 1175 (1942). Treasury has since remained the Federal agency in charge of implementing trade embargoes.
8. Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 225–26, 104 S.Ct. 3026, 3029–30 (1984).
9. International Emergency Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”), Title II, Pub. L. 95–223, §§ 101(a) and 102, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701–07. The law, however, authorizes the President to exercise essentially the same powers as those granted by Section 5(b), but restricts the exercise of those powers only “to deal with any unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States, if the President declares a national emergency with respect to such threat.” 50 U.S.C. § 1701. The President is required, “in every possible instance,” to consult with Congress prior to exercising his IEEPA authority and, once such authorities have been exercised, to report to Congress every six months on the actions taken and any changes in underlying circumstances. 50 U.S.C. § 1703.
10. The IEEPA’s grandfathering clause provides: “Notwithstanding the termination of the authorities described in section 101(b) of this Act, any such authorities, which are exercised with respect to a country on the date of such termination to prohibit transactions involving any property in which such country or any national thereof has any interest, may continue to be exercised to prohibit transactions involving that property if the President determines that the continuation of such prohibition with respect to that property is necessary on account of claims involving such country or its nationals.” 50 U.S.C. § 1706(a)(2).
11. The most recent Presidential Determination, issued by President George W. Bush, extends the state of emergency with respect to Cuba until September 14, 2009. Presidential Determination No. 2008–27, September. 12, 2008, 73 Fed. Reg. 54055 (2008).
12. S.REP. No. 612, 87th Cong., 1st. Sess. (1961), reprinted in 1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2472, 2473.
15. Remarks about fighting the spread of Communism are scattered throughout the debate on the FAA. For example, Senator Kuchel, addressing the worldwide threat of Communism, stated: Thus the language of the report prevents any assistance under this act to the present government of Cuba. It provides, in the words which the Senate previously approved that, unless the President determines a country is not dominated or controlled by international communism, no assistance of any kind shall be furnished to the government of any such country. 107 Cong. Rec. S17705–06 (August 31, 1961).
16. Proclamation 3447, 27 Fed. Reg. 1085 (1962), 3 C.F.R., 1059–63 Comp. at 157. Previously, authorization had been suspended for most industrial export licenses to Cuba. 43 DEPT. STATE BULL. 715 (1960). President Eisenhower had also reduced the quota of Cuban sugar in the U.S. market to zero. Proclamation No. 3383, effective December 21, 1960, 25 Fed. Reg. 13131. Additional trade restrictions were imposed by other laws enacted in the 1960–1962 period. Therefore, by the time President Kennedy proclaimed a total trade embargo, trade between the United States and Cuba was already essentially cut off.
17. See, American Documentary Films, Inc. v. Secretary of the Treasury, 344 F.Supp. 703, 707–8 (1972); R.C.W., Supervisor, Inc. v. Cuban Tobacco Company, Inc., 220 F.Supp. 453, 463 (1963). Subsequent cases, however, have relied mainly on the TWEA to defend actions taken under the embargo regulations because of the greater enforcement powers the TWEA provides.
18. Pub. L. 102–484, 106 Stat. 2575, 22 U.S.C. §§ 6001–08.
19. Section 1703 of the CDA, 22 U.S.C. § 6002.
20. These limitations are contained in Sections 1704 through 1708 of the CDA, 22 U.S.C. §§ 6003–6007.
21. Section 1704 of the CDA, 22 U.S.C. § 6003.
22. Section 1706 of the CDA, 22 U.S.C. § 6005.
24. Id. Not all sections of the CDA imposed restrictions on trade with or assistance to Cuba. Section 1705 authorizes the donation of food, medicines and medical supplies to non-governmental organizations or individuals in Cuba, and the sale of medicines and medical supplies to Cuba. The sale of medicines to Cuba is also permitted, but is subject to limitations (no export is allowed where there is reasonable expectation that the items will be used for purposes of torture, for the production of biotechnology products, or for re-export); it is also subject to on-the-ground verification by the U.S. government that the exported items are to be used for the purposes for which they were intended and only for the use and benefit of the Cuban people. 22 U.S.C. § 6004(d). Section 1705 also permits telecommunications services between the United States and Cuba subject to certain limitations, and direct mail service to and from Cuba.
25. 22 U.S.C. § 6006.
26. 22 U.S.C. § 6007(a).
27. Section 1708(b) of the CDA, 22 U.S.C. § 6007(b).
28. As of early 1996, the then proposed Helms-Burton Law was stalled in Congress and had slim chances of passing and virtually no chances of overriding an announced presidential veto. However, on February 24, 1996 Cuban MIGs downed two unarmed planes piloted by Cuban Americans, causing the deaths of four of them. This incident changed the political climate in the United States overnight. The pending bill was passed within a matter of days, and was signed by the President into law despite the serious reservations he had previously expressed about it. It also signaled the end of the “two-track” policy that had been pursued by the U.S. government since 1992.
29. Cuba Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–114, 109 Stat. 785, 22 U.S.C. §§ 6021–91.
30. The Executive Branch has taken a variety of actions over the years, most notably in 2004, to further tighten the embargo.
31. 22 U.S.C. §§ 6021–46.
32. 22 U.S.C. § 6034(b). This provision is further discussed in Section III.E below.
33. Section 102(h) of the LIBERTAD Act, 22 U.S.C. § 6032(h).
34. 22 U.S.C. § 6033(a). The LIBERTAD Act also require the President to submit annual reports to Congress detailing the assistance received by Cuba from the governments of other countries, and a description of the joint ventures completed or in contemplation between Cuba and foreign investors. 22 U.S.C. § 6038.
35. 22 U.S.C. §§ 6061–67.
36. 22 U.S.C. §§ 6081–85.
37. All these terms are defined in 22 U.S.C. § 6023. In particular, “trafficking” in confiscated property is said to occur when a person or entity “knowingly and intentionally” does one of the following: (i) sells, transfers, distributes, dispenses, brokers, manages, or otherwise disposes of confiscated property, or purchases, leases, receives, possesses, obtains control of, manages, uses or otherwise acquires or holds an interest in confiscated property, (ii) engages in a commercial activity using or otherwise benefiting from a confiscated property, or (iii) causes, directs, influences, approves, participates in or profits from trafficking as described in clauses (i) and (ii) by another person, or otherwise engages in trafficking (as described in clauses (i) and (ii) through another without the authorization of the United States national who holds a claim to the property. 22 U.S.C. § 6023 (13).
38. In 1964, Congress amended the Foreign Claims Settlement Act to establish a Cuban Claims Program, under which the FCSC was given the authority to determine and certify the validity and amount of claims by U.S. nationals against the Cuban government for the uncompensated taking of their property in the early 1960s. 22 U.S.C. § 1643. The issues involved in the resolution of confiscation claims against Cuba have been discussed in many publications. See, e.g., Matias F. Travieso-Diaz, Alternative Remedies In A Negotiated Settlement Of The U.S. Nationals’ Expropriation Claims Against Cuba, 17 U. Pa. J. Int’l. Bus. L.659 (1996); Laws and Legal System, Chapter 4.
39. 22 U.S.C. § 6082(a)(1). Recovery under either option includes also “reasonable costs and attorneys fees.” Id.
40. 22 U.S.C. § 6082 (a)(3). In addition to making third country investors in Cuba potentially subject to civil liability to U.S. property owners, the LIBERTAD Act imposes a broadly worded immigration exclusion against foreigners involved in transactions concerning properties confiscated by Cuba from U.S. nationals. Title IV of the legislation directs that the U.S. Departments of State and Justice shall exclude from the United States any alien who (1) has confiscated, or has directed or overseen the confiscation of, property the claim to which is owned by a United States person, or converts or has converted for personal gain confiscated property, the claim to which is owned by a United States national; (2) traffics in confiscated property, the claim to which is owned by a United States national; (3) is a corporate officer, principal or shareholder with a controlling interest of an entity which has been involved in the confiscation of property or trafficking in confiscated property, the claim to which is owned by a United States person, or (4) is a spouse, minor child or agent of a person excludable under paragraph (1), (2) or (3). 22 U.S.C. § 6091. The Title IV exclusion has only been applied a handful of times to officials of Canadian, Mexican and Israeli companies.
41. Treasury Department Order No. 128 (Rev. 1, Oct. 15, 1962).
42. The CDA also identifies the Department of the Treasury (and consequently OFAC) as the chief agency given authority to enforce the legislation, and amends the TWEA by empowering Treasury to impose civil penalties of up to $50,000 and forfeitures of property for violating the CDA’s prohibitions. Section 1710 of the CDA, 50 USC Appendix § 16.
43. 28 Fed. Reg. 6974, July 9, 1963. The regulations, known as the Cuban Assets Control Regulations (“CACR”), are codified in 31 C.F.R. Part 515. Pursuant to the CDA’s authority, on June 29, 1993, OFAC published regulations amending the CACR to incorporate several of the CDA provisions. 58 Fed. Reg. 34709 (1993). The amendments reflected the CDA’s prohibition on the issuance of licenses for most trade between third country subsidiaries of U.S. companies, imposed a prohibition on the entry into the United States of vessels touching Cuban ports, and added civil penalty authority.
45. See, e.g., Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 104 S.Ct. 3026 (1984); Miranda v. Secretary of Treasury, 766 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1985); Sardino v. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 361 F.2d 106 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 898 (1966). In recent cases, Treasury’s authority to issue additions or modifications to the CACR have been upheld on the strength of the statutory authority of the TWEA. See, Regan v. Wald, 104 S.Ct. at 3029; American Airways Charters, Inc. v. Regan, 746 F.2d 865, 867 (D.C. Cir. 1984); De Cuellar v. Brady, 881 F.2d 1561, 1562 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 895 (1990). See also, Walsh v. Brady, 927 F.2d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. v. Brady, 740 F.Supp. 1007, 1008 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Cernuda v. Heavy, 720 F.Supp. 1544, 1546–47 (S.D.Fla. 1989).
46. The CACR were amended in July 1996 to incorporate certain provisions of the LIBERTAD Act dealing with new prohibitions on bank financing and imposing new civil penalties on infractors. 61 F.R. 37385 (July 18, 1996). Presumably, these CACR also have the force of law since they implement the statute.
48. S.L. Sommerfield, Treasury Regulations Affecting Trade with the Sino-Soviet Bloc and Cuba, 79 BUS. LAW. 861, 868 (1964). The CACR do not ban altogether commercial transactions with Cuba, but require the issuance of “specific licenses” by OFAC approving such transactions. Applications for such specific license are granted only in rare cases.
49. Under the Trade Sanctions and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (Title IX of P.L. 106–387, 114 Stat. 1549A-67), the Commerce Department authorizes the sale and export or re-export of medicine and medical supplies, food and agricultural commodities to Cuba. Those interested in engaging in such exports or reexports must first obtain authorization from the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Export Administration. All licensed sales may be financed by cash-in-advance or by third-country banks. 15 C.F.R. § 740.18.
50. 31 C.F.R. §§ 515.204, 515.560, 515.570. The regulations used to allow travelers to Cuba to bring into the United States up to $100 worth of Cuban goods for their personal use. That allowance was rescinded in 2004 when the CACR were amended to implement a tightening of the embargo restrictions by the Bush administration. 69 Fed. Reg. 33768, 33771 (June 16, 2004); 31 C.F.R. § 515.560(a)(3).
51. 31 C.F.R. § 515.205.
52. 31 C.F.R. § 515.415(a).
53. 31 C.F.R. § 515.564(a)(1). Also authorized is travel by full-time professionals to attend professional meetings or conferences in Cuba organized by an international professional organization, institution, or association that is not headquartered in the United States unless that organization, institution, or association has been specifically licensed to sponsor the meeting in Cuba, and the purpose of the meeting or conference is not the promotion of tourism in Cuba or other commercial activities involving Cuba or fostering production of any biotechnological products. 31 C.F.R. § 515.564(a)(2). Other types of travel incident to research or professional meetings in Cuba require a specific license. 31 C.F.R. § 515.564(b).
54. 31 C.F.R. §§ 515.562 and 515.563.
55. Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009, H.R. 1105, Pub. L. 111–8.
59. See Update to Cuban Assets Control Regulations, http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/actions/.
60. The term “close relative” is defined in new section 31 C.F.R. § 515.339 as any individual related to a person by blood, marriage, or adoption who is no more than three generations removed from that person or from a common ancestor with that person. The new regulations also authorize persons who share a common dwelling as a family with a licensed family traveler to accompany the licensed traveler on a family visit.
61. 31 C.F.R § 515.570(d)(3). Specific licenses may also be issued on a case-by-case basis authorizing remittances to “to nongovernmental organizations and individuals, to independent non-governmental entities in Cuba, including but not limited to pro-democracy groups, civil society groups, and religious organizations, and to members of such groups or organizations.” 31 C.F.R § 515.570(d)(1).
62. The authorization to sell agricultural products to Cuba was hotly debated and only approved after a compromise was reached that prohibited sales on credit, and barred financing by U.S. banks. The law also tightened travel restrictions to the island. Eric Pianin and Dan Morgan, Deal Reached to Allow Food Sales to Cuba, WASHINGTON POST, October 6, 2000 at A1.
64. This was the process followed by the Carter Administration to remove the sanctions imposed by President Truman against the People’s Republic of China in 1950, which were based on TWEA authority. The Office of Foreign Assets Control of the Department of the Treasury, which administered the embargo on trade with China through the FACR, lifted the trade sanctions against China in accordance with a treaty signed between the United States and China. 45 Fed. Reg. 7224, January 31, 1980.
65. The total ban on assistance to Cuba contained in Section 620(a)(2) of the FAA has been modified in part by several provisions in the CDA. Section 1705 of the CDA, 22 U.S.C. § 6004, specifically states, “[t]he provisions of this section apply notwithstanding any other provision of law, including section 620(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961….” This assertion overrides Sub-section (a), as well Sub-sections (e), (f) and (h) of Section 620 of the FAA, with respect to food donations and the provision of telecommunication services. Also, Section 1707 of the CDA, 22 U.S.C. § 6006, effectively overrides all the provisions of Section 620 of the FAA with regard to providing food, medicine, and medical supplies for humanitarian purposes to Cuba once there is a government in the island that meets the requirements of Section 1707 of the CDA. Section 1707 does not mention the payment of compensation for nationalized or expropriated property as a prerequisite for providing such aid to Cuba, but the LIBERTAD Act does. 66. Because the definition of “appropriate steps” is tied to “international law standards,” the determination whether the steps are appropriate is an objective one, and would be amenable to review by a court, assuming it finds the Executive determination reviewable.
67. The Rhodesian sanctions present an example of a non-TWEA embargo based upon a specific Congressional grant of authority to the President. Section 5 of The United Nations Participation Act of 1945, 22 U.S.C. § 287c, gives the President the authority to impose economic sanctions against a foreign country if necessary to give effect to resolutions of the United Nations (“U.N.”) Security Council. This general grant of authority to the President is similar to that in the TWEA, in that both statutes allow the President to impose sanctions without further enabling legislation. Citing the U.N. Participation Act of 1945 as authority, President Johnson imposed a limited embargo against Rhodesia in 1967 to implement measures adopted by the U.N. Security Council. Executive Order No. 11322, 32 Fed. Reg. 33 (1967), reprinted in 1967 U.S.C.A.A.N. 3453–54. Years later, Congress enacted legislation empowering the President to impose a comprehensive trade embargo against that country. Pub. L. 95–12, 91 Stat. 22 (1977). The President did so. President Carter ultimately lifted the Rhodesian embargo by another executive order, in which he revoked all previous executive orders imposing the embargo and directed the relevant executive agencies to take the steps necessary to rescind the trade sanctions. Executive Order No. 12183, 44 Fed. Reg. 74787 (1979), reprinted in 1979 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3375–6. The Rhodesian example indicates that Congressional action is not needed to end an embargo where the President has been given express authority to impose the embargo in the first place and Congress has neither set conditions for the lifting of the embargo nor reserved any review power over the President’s decision. Thus, if the Cuban trade embargo were to be acted upon in accordance with the Rhodesian example, the President would simply need to issue an executive order revoking all previous executive orders and regulations that instituted the embargo against Cuba. However, other laws (the CDA and the LIBERTAD Act) preclude such a simple solution.
68. 22 U.S.C. § 6007(b)(3).
69. In this regard, the CDA is in some ways analogous to the legislation that established the South African Trade Embargo, the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 (“the CAAA”), Pub. L. 99–440, 100 Stat. 1087, as amended by Pub. L. 99–631, 100 Stat. 3515, 22 U.S.C. § 5001 et seq., repealed by Pub.L. 103–149, 107 Stat. 1503 (November 23, 1993). In the CAAA, Congress imposed—among other sanctions—explicit prohibitions on the importation from and export to South Africa of certain items. 22 U.S.C. §§ 5011(a), 5051 through 5073. The sanctions would terminate if the government of South Africa implemented five measures specified in the law. 22 U.S.C. § 5061(b). Alternatively, the President could suspend or modify the sanctions under specified conditions. Id. Thus, in the CAAA Congress set two different procedures under which the sanctions against South Africa could be lifted: automatically, if South Africa took all the measures specified by the law; or through a determination by the President that the enumerated conditions were met. The President’s determination was subject to nullification if Congress disagreed with it. President George H. Bush lifted the South African embargo through an Executive Order issued in 1991. Executive Order 12769 of July 10, 1991, 56 Fed. Reg. 31855, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. B50. The Executive Order cited as basis for lifting the sanctions the President’s conclusion that the government of South Africa had taken the steps specified by Congress. Thus, the President followed the course made available to him by the CAAA and proclaimed that the embargo had ended without referring his decision to Congress. Congress took no action to countermand the President’s action. The CDA is analogous to the CAAA in that it requires a degree of interaction between the President and Congress. Section 1708 of the CDA directs that the President officially report to Congress that the five conditions for waiver of the sanctions against Cuba have been met before the sanctions can be lifted. This report is analogous to that required by the CAAA. The reporting requirement did not need to be satisfied in the case of South Africa, however, because the President exercised the option of declaring that the South African government had satisfied each of the five conditions listed in §5061(a). Since the CDA does not give the President this option, the President would need to represent to Congress that the CDA’s requirements have been satisfied.
70. Section 1707 of the CDA, 22 U.S.C. § 6006, allows partial lifting of the trade embargo to allow shipment of food, medicines and medical supplies to Cuba if the President determines and certifies to Congress that the government in power in Cuba has made public commitments to holding free and fair elections within six months and to respecting human rights and basic democratic freedoms, and is implementing those commitments, and is not providing weapons or funds to any group in another country that seeks the violent overthrow of the government of that country. However, Section 1705 of the CDA, 22 U.S.C. § 6004, imposes certain limitations on the donations of food, exports of medicines and medical supplies, and provision of telecommunications services to Cuba. Section 1705(a) declares that the provisions of the section apply “notwithstanding any other provision of law,” including the TWEA and the FAA. Moreover Congress, perhaps inadvertently, never applied Section 1708 to the provisions of Section 1705. Therefore, even a President who made the findings set forth in Section 1708 would be unable to change the stipulations of Section 1705 on his own, and would have to rely on Congressional action to repeal the restrictions.
71. LIBERTAD Act, § 204(a), 22 U.S.C. § 6064(a).
72. Id., § 204(c), 22 U.S.C. § 6064(c).
73. Id., § 204(e), 22 U.S.C. § 6064(e).
74. LIBERTAD Act § 202(a)(1), 22 U.S.C. § 6062(a)(1).
76. LIBERTAD Act § 205(a), 22 U.S.C. § 6065(a).
77. Id., § 205(b), 22 U.S.C. § 6065(b).
78. LIBERTAD Act. § 206, 22 U.S.C. § 6066.
79. Id., § 202(b)(2)(A)(i), 22 U.S.C. § 6062(b)(2)(A)(i).
80. Id., § 202(b)(2)(A)(ii), 22 U.S.C. § 6062(b)(2)(A)(ii).
81. Id., § 202(b)(2)(B), 22 U.S.C. § 6062(b)(2)(B).
82. Id., § 202(a)(1), 22 U.S.C. § 6062(a)(1).
83. Id., § 202(e), 22 U.S.C. § 6062(e).
84. The Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) is a U.S. program that came into effect in 1984. It was aimed to provide tariff and trade benefits to many Caribbean Basin countries. The “Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Expansion Act” of 1990, known as “CBI II”, made the CBI permanent. However, once the United States entered into the NAFTA trade pact in 1994 with Mexico it became easier for Mexico to export its products to the United States, and the CBI countries lost their trade advantage relative Mexico. The CBI remains in place but its effectiveness is debatable. See http://www.ustr.gov/trade-topics/trade-development/preference-programs/caribbean-basin-initiative-cbi.
85. Id., § 202(h)(1), 22 U.S.C. § 6062(h)(1).
86. While the LIBERTAD Act was being considered by Congress, the Clinton Administration was in the process of developing an action plan for giving assistance to Cuba with few requirements when a transition to democracy started to occur. The United States would assist Cuba in the areas of humanitarian aid, political reform, economic reform, and infrastructure rebuilding. Help would generally come on a multilateral basis with the involvement of international institutions, such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the Inter- American Development Bank, and the United Nations, as well as foreign countries interested in aiding Cuba. The United States would provide insurance protection for U.S. investors via the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, and project lending through the Export- Import Bank. Richard Nuccio, U.S. Assistance to the Economic Reconstruction of a Transitional and Democratic Cuba, Address to the Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge Workshop on “Foreign Investment in Cuba: Past, Present, and Future” (January 26, 1996) (On file with author). The Administration’s plan never materialized and the LIBERTAD Act was passed in the form then pending before the House of Representatives following the February 24, 1996 downing of civilian planes by Cuba.
87. Venezuela’s President Hugo Chávez has frequently boasted that Venezuela’s aid to Latin American countries exceeds that provided by the United States. See, e.g., Natalie Obiko Pearson, Chávez: Venezuela Aiding Latin America, ASSOCIATED PRESS, available online at http://www.mylot.com/w/newsarticle/103520.aspx.
88. Authority for USAID programs is codified throughout Chapter 32 (“Foreign Assistance”) of Title 22 of the United States Code.
90. The vast majority of that aid ($562 million) went to Colombia. See http://www.globalissues.org/article/35/us-and-foreign-aid-assistance.
91. 22 U.S.C. § 2191. See http://www.opic.gov/about/index.asp.
94. 12 U.S.C. § 635; 12 C.F.R. § 411.
95. Other agencies providing programs that could benefit U.S. investors going into Cuba include the Department of Agriculture, which provides assistance to the developing world is the Agricultural Trade Development Act of 1954. The Food Aid Program established by this statute and administered by the Department of Agriculture in coordination with USAID provides concessional loans to purchase U.S. agricultural products to meet the needs of developing countries. (The Agricultural Trade Development Act of 1954 is codified at 7 U.S.C. § 1691 et seq., and the International Development and Food Acts are codified throughout 22 U.S.C. Chapter 32.) Also, the Agriculture Department’s Trade Assistance and Promotion Office, and the Office of International Cooperation and Development, offer information, databases, services and trade missions to U.S. and foreign agricultural producers. The U.S. Foreign Agricultural Service maintains 16 missions abroad, which scout agricultural export opportunities for U.S. farmers. The Small Business Administration (“SBA”) is an independent federal agency charged with counseling, aiding and protecting U.S. businesses that meet its size requirements. 15 U.S.C. § 636. The SBA’s Office of International Trade provides information and services to small businesses on exports and investments abroad. Among the services provided is access to the Export Legal Assistance Network, a nationwide group of international trade attorneys who provide initial consultations to small businesses. The SBA also has its own International Trade Loan program, guaranteeing 85% of loans up to $1 million. Another independent federal agency, the U.S. Trade and Development Agency (“TDA”), is also charged with some of the functions assigned to the SBA. 22 U.S.C. § 2421. The TDA hosts foreign officials and businessmen to the United States on reverse trade missions and provides grants for feasibility studies, consulting and project planning for major projects in developing countries. The projects involve highpriority sectors such as agribusiness, energy, telecommunication and transportation. TDA’s grants for these projects range between $150,000 and $750,000. TDA also offers Technical Assistance Grants to involve U.S. technical experts in development projects underway. The Bureau of International Labor Affairs of the U.S. Department of Labor offers a variety of labor force development and training programs upon the request of foreign governments. Labor Department personnel, funded by USAID or the World Bank, conduct these training programs in the host country to develop small business entrepreneurial skills, increase labor and management productivity, and improve labor-management relations in the workplace.
97. Pub. L. 99–83, Section 403, 99 Stat. 219 (August 8, 1985), 22 U.S.C. § 2227(a).
98. LIBERTAD Act, Sections 104(a) and (c), 22 U.S.C. §§ 6034(a), (c).
100. 22 U.S.C. § 2191 et seq.
101. 7 U.S.C. § 1703(d).
102. 12 U.S.C. § 635(b).
104. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2434 and 2435(b).
105. For example, Cuba has a massive foreign debt problem, which would have to be addressed as part of any effort to gain admittance into multi-lateral lending institutions such as the IMF. See, e.g., Cuba, in Liquidity Crunch, Rolls over Euro Bonds, REUTERS, June 9, 2009.
106. Matthew Borghese, Obama Promises To Maintain Cuban Embargo (May 23, 2008), available online at http://www.allheadlinenews. com/articles/7011045005; Biden says U.S. does not plan to lift Cuba Embargo, REUTERS, Mar. 26, 2009; Shailagh Murray and Karen DeYoung, Momentum Grows for Relaxing Cuba Policy, WASHINGTON POST (Mar. 30, 2009) at A1; Matthew Lee, Obama to Ease Cuban Travel Ban, not Ease Embargo, ASSOCIATED PRESS (April 5, 2009).
107. Frances Robles and Wilfredo Cancio Isla, Purge Aims to halt Cuba’s Economic Free Fall, MIAMI HERALD, March 8, 2009.
109. Cuba Tourism Reached Record Levels in 2008, ASSOCIATED PRESS, January 13, 2009.
110. See, e.g., Cuba Foreign Income Could be Slashed by $1 billion, REUTERS, May 26, 2009.

References: § 6085
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 § 5001
 § 5061
 §5061
 § 6006
 § 6004
 § 204
 § 6064
 § 204
 § 6064
 § 204
 § 6064
 § 202
 § 6062
 § 205
 § 6065
 § 205
 § 6065
 § 206
 § 6066
 § 202
 § 6062
 § 202
 § 6062
 § 202
 § 6062
 § 202
 § 6062
 § 202
 § 6062
 § 202
 § 6062
 § 2191
 § 635
 § 411
 § 1691
 § 636
 § 2421
 § 2227
 § 2191
 § 1703
 § 635