Source: http://masslegalresources.com/hugenberger-et-al-v-alpha-management-corp-lawyers-weekly-no-11-087-13
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 16:14:59+00:00

Document:
CHRIS HUGENBERGER & another vs. ALPHA MANAGEMENT CORP.
No. 12‑P‑1788. June 28, 2013.
Consumer Protection Act, Demand letter.
The plaintiffs appeal from a decision of the Appellate Division of the Boston Municipal Court Department (BMC) affirming the trial judge’s allowing the defendant’s motion for reconsideration and ordering the entry of judgment for the defendant. The trial judge concluded that “the failure to offer the [G. L. c.] 93A demand letter, proof of a required element in the plaintiffs’ case, was a fatal mistake.” The plaintiffs claim error in this ruling on the ground that they were not required, in the circumstances, to offer the demand letter in evidence and that the failure to do so was not manifestly wrong so as to allow the judge to reconsider his earlier denial of the defendant’s motion for a directed finding. As we disagree, we affirm.
“A demand letter is a condition precedent to commencing an action under G. L. c. 93A, § 9.” Spilios v. Cohen, 38 Mass. App. Ct. 338, 342 (1995). As most recently stated in Lingis v. Waisbren, 75 Mass. App. Ct. 464, 468 (2009), “Chapter 93A, § 9(3), inserted by St. 1969, c. 690, provides that ‘[a]t least thirty days prior to the filing of any [action under G. L. c. 93A, § 9], a written demand for relief, identifying the claimant and reasonably describing the unfair or deceptive act or practice relied upon and the injury suffered, shall be mailed or delivered to any prospective respondent.’” Of particular import here, the plaintiffs bear the burden of proving “the timely sending of a letter complying with the statutory specifications.” Ibid., quoting from Spilios, supra. See Entrialgo v. Twin City Dodge, Inc., 368 Mass. 812, 813 (1975) (“A demand letter listing the specific deceptive practices claimed is a prerequisite to suit and as a special element must be alleged and proved”). It also bears stating that the demand letter itself (and any written tender of settlement in response thereto) would be the best evidence of their contents. See Mass. G. Evid. § 1002 (2013).
The plaintiffs do not dispute that they did not offer the demand letter in evidence. They attempt to excuse that omission on the ground that the defendant not only acknowledged receiving the letter, but also sought a ruling that its response thereto was reasonable. To this end, the plaintiffs suggest that the defendant’s own requested findings of fact and rulings of law demonstrate the plaintiffs’ satisfaction of the purposes served by the demand letter, i.e., to give notice to the defendant of the plaintiffs’ claim, and therefore, in these circumstances, to require the demand letter be offered in evidence is a needless hypertechnicality. This argument, however, overlooks the second of the two purposes served by the demand letter: “to operate as a control on the amount of damages which the complainant can ultimately recover if he proves his case. If the addressee makes a reasonable tender of settlement which is rejected by the complainant, the damages recoverable are limited to the amount of the tender. If the addressee either fails to make a tender of settlement, or makes an unreasonable tender in relation to the injury suffered, a finding for the plaintiff will lead to a recovery in the amount of actual damages or of $ 25, whichever is greater. This amount is to be doubled or trebled if the court finds that the addressee’s failure to grant relief on demand was made in bad faith with knowledge or reason to know that the act or practice complained of violated § 2. These are matters to be left to allegations and proof at trial.” Slaney v. Westwood Auto, Inc., 366 Mass. 688, 704-705 (1975). See Casavant v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., 460 Mass. 500, 505 (2011).
Jeremy T. Robin for the plaintiffs.
Daniel Briansky for the defendant.
 The defendant’s answer to the plaintiffs’ complaint is not in the record appendix, nor has the trial transcript been reproduced. See Mass.R.A.P. 8, as amended, 430 Mass. 1601 (1999).
 We do not intend to discourage stipulations or agreed-upon redactions.
 We deny the defendant’s request for appellate attorney’s fees.

References: § 9
 v. 
 v. 
 § 9
 § 9
 v. 
 § 1002
 § 2
 v. 
 v.