Source: https://pacificviewcenter.com/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 22:32:13+00:00

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An ocean, mountain, city or other view can add a lot to a property’s value. However, as “a general rule, a landowner has no natural right to air, light or an unobstructed view and the law is reluctant to imply such a right.” The plaintiffs in the recent case of Boxer v. City of Beverly Hills (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1212 tried to use an inverse condemnation claim to sue the City of Beverly Hills for condemnation for planting thirty (30) Sequoia (Coastal) redwood trees in Roxbury Park. The trees obstructed the homeowners long enjoyed view of the Hollywood Hills, , downtown Los Angeles, “and—on a clear day—Mounty Baldy 50 miles away.” The court held that a view rights claim cannot be the basis of inverse condemnation claim.
In a nutshell, “inverse condemnation” is based on the Constitutional right that provides that a property owner is entitled to compensation if the government takes its property. The California Constitution specifically provides: “Private property may be taken or damaged for public use only when just compensation has first been paid to the owner.” (Cal. Const. art. I, § 19; emphasis added.) This constitutional principal provides for two types of claims:  eminent domain (or condemnation), which is when the government sues a property owner to acquire property; and  inverse condemnation, which is when a property owner sues the government for taking or damaging its property In either case the property owner is entitled to recover just compensation, which is often measured by the fair market value of the property taken.
The trial court sustained the plaintiffs’ demurrer, without leave to amend, which the court of appeal affirmed in the reported case.
The bottom line: The court held that the plaintiffs could not sue the City for the view obstruction because “’[U]nder California law, a landowner has no right to an unobstructed view over adjoining property.’” Boxer v. City of Beverly Hills (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1212, 1219 (citing Posey v. Leavitt (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 1236, 1250). The general exceptions are view rights provided by local ordinances; CC&Rs or other deed obstructions; and in certain nuisance cases. Id.
The plaintiffs in Boxer “vigorously” tried to save their claims by arguing that a property owner’s loss of view can be an element of compensable damages in eminent domain cases where there was a physical taking of the claimant’s property. However, the court rejected that argument because there was no “physical invasion in a tangible manner,” which is the prerequisite for an inverse condemnation claim. The trees were planted on a neighboring property, not on any part of the plaintiffs’ property, nor did the plaintiffs complain “that the trees or debris from the trees physically intrude[d] upon the plaintiffs’ properties. (Id. at 1219). Plaintiffs are merely complaining of their obstructed view rights, which do not constitute physical damage to their properties. Thus, plaintiffs have not set any tangible physical intrusion on their properties.
Presumably, the plaintiffs-homeowners in Boxer have suffered a material loss in their value of their home from the loss of the views. The general common law rule of no view rights and the Boxer case is another reminder to home buyers (and their real estate brokers) to thoroughly research the property’s view rights if the view is an important part of the property’s value, before the sale closes.
The Turner Law Firm is one of the leading view rights law firms in California and has handled hundreds of view right cases.
Colyear v. Rolling Hills Community Association of Rancho Palos Verdes (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 119 is a recent example of an anti-SLAPP motion being a very powerful defense weapon in HOA litigation.
Colyear and other cases provide chilling examples of how the anti-SLAPP motion procedure has been used to squash homeowners seeking judicial relief from allegedly out of control HOA boards of directors or disputes with other homeowners (members).
Colyear arises from homeowner defendant Yu Ping Liu’s “Application for Assistance to Restore View” that he with the HOA, because the view from his residence was obstructed by several trees and hedges. The CC&Rs provided that the HOA had “the right at any time to enter on or upon any part” of a property subject to that declaration “for the purpose of cutting back trees or other plantings which, in the opinion of the [HOA], is warranted to maintain and improve the view of, and protect, adjoining property.” Liu believed that the trees in question were on the property immediately north of Liu’s property, which was owned by Richard and Kathleen Krauthamer. However, plaintiff Richard Colyear alleged that the trees were in fact on his property, which was directly east of the Krauthamer’s property, and kitty-corner to Liu’s property. Liu, Colyear, and the Krauthamers are all members of the HOA.
Two months after the Application was filed, Colyear filed a lawsuit against Liu and the HOA Board. Colyear alleged that two of the offending trees were actually on his property, that the relevant tree-trimming CC&R provision covenant did not encumber his property, and therefore that Liu and the HOA were wrongfully clouding his title.
One month after being sued, Liu withdrew his Application. As a result, the HOA never issued any decision on the Application. Following the withdrawal, the HOA had no pending applications involving either Liu or Colyear’s property.
Colyear’s operative verified complaint “for Declaratory Relief, Injunctive Relief, To Quiet Title, and for Damages” sought a declaration, among other things, that Colyear’s lot was not subject to the tree-trimming CC&R provision; and that a specific HOA Board’s Resolution was void to the extent it purported to enforce such tree-trimming covenant. The complaint sought to quiet title to Colyear’s lot that it was not covered by the trees tree-trimming CC&R provision. Finally, the complaint sought injunctive relief barring defendants from seeking to enforce the relevant covenant against Colyear’s lot. The plaintiff also claimed compensatory and punitive damages from the HOA and the board for alleged fraud and breaches of fiduciary duties.
Liu filed an anti-SLAPP motion to strike Colyear’s complaint, which the trial court granted and court of appeal affirmed.
California caselaw holds that “‘public interest’ within the meaning of the anti-SLAPP statute has been broadly defined to include, in addition to government matters, ‘“private conduct that impacts a broad segment of society and/or that affects a community in a manner similar to that of a governmental entity.” ’ Thus, “several courts have found protected conduct in the context of disputes within a homeowners association.” Colyear, suppra, at 131; see e.g., Ruiz v. Harbor View Community Assn. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1456, 1468, Country Side Villas Homeowners Assn. v. Ivie (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1113; Damon v. Ocean Hills Journalism Club (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 468, 479; Lee v. Silveira (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 527, 540; Talega Maintenance Corporation v. Standard Pacific Corporation (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 722, 729.
The court rejected Colyear argument that Liu’s application was just a private tree-trimming dispute between two neighbors and therefore does not qualify as a matter of “public interest.” The court rejected that the argument because Liu’ application evidenced that there was an ongoing controversy, dispute, or discussion regarding the applicability of tree-trimming C&R provision and the HOA’s authority to enforce it. Furthermore, the issue was an ongoing topic of debate between the board and homeowners, resulting in multiple hearings, letters, and several changes to the board’s policy on the matter starting as early as 2002 and continuing up to the current dispute. In this context, Liu’s application sought to invoke the HOA process at the center of that dispute.
On the one hand, the case seems to be chilling use of the anti-SLAPP procedure to preclude the right to resolve a CC&R/HOA related disputed by litigation. We can appreciate plaintiff Colyear’s desire to obtain judicial relief for the ongoing dispute regarding the CC&R’s tree trimming provision and the HOA’s right or power to enforce it. But obviously the case would have had a different outcome if Colyear would have pursued the HOA’s “dispute resolution process.” California’s HOA laws (the Davis-Stirling Act) contain several sections that sometimes require the use of the dispute resolution process before litigation can be filed. Civil Code section 5905 requires that associations provide a “fair, reasonable, and expeditious procedure for resolving a dispute” with members.
Palm Spings Villas II v. Parth is a another example of what can happen when an HOA board member “goes rogue” and tests the limits of the so-called “business judgment rule,” which HOA board members sometimes naively believe immunizes their conduct from personal liability. The court held that an HOA director can be held personally liable for failing to act with reasonable diligence in the performance of director duties.
This case is important reminder that HOA board members’ authority is also limited by the governing documents, the CC&Rs and by-laws.
Parth hired a roofing company to perform roofing repairs, without notice or approval by the Board, after the Board had already approved and hired a different roofing company for the same repairs. She did not confirm whether the company held a roofing license.
Parth hired landscaping company to a 5-year contract; however, under the Bylaws, a majority vote of the members was required to enter into a services contract for longer than a year. She also hired a new management company, even though the existing company had not yet been terminated by the Board, and the Board agreed not to terminate the company until they received bids from other management companies.
Finally, Parth secretly renewed a 1-year contract with their existing security company, even though the Board was actively obtaining bids from other security companies. She did not disclose the 1-year renewal with the new company. When the HOA Board hired a different security company, the existing company sued for breach of contract, which led to the HOA’s cross-complaint against Parth.
At deposition, Perth repeatedly admitted that she had no understanding of what her actual scope of authority was as the HOA President and a board member, and that she never reviewed the governing documents to find out.
Parth’s main defense from personal liability was the business judgment rule. Although the business judgment rule applies generally to all corporations, the California Corporations Code has special sections for volunteer directors of nonprofit organizations. At issue in Palm Springs Villas II, was the section governing volunteer directors and officers of mutual benefit corporations, Corp. Code § 7231.5. Under the business judgment rule, an HOA director will not be held personally liable in the performance of their duties. Even if a director breaks HOA rules, or otherwise makes unsound business decisions, that director will not be personally liable as long as they acted in good faith, in the best interests of the HOA, and based on reasonable inquiry. The business judgment rule is intended to allow board members to make important decisions, including those that may pose some risk to the HOA; without it, directors would be paralyzed by the fear of being held personally liable for acting on behalf of the HOA.
However, the business judgment rule has its limits. It will not protect a director who fails to exercise reasonable diligence, fails to conduct a reasonable investigation, or otherwise acts in bad faith in the performance of director duties.
Palm Springs Villas II is a good reminder to HOA directors that they have a duty to act exercise diligence when attending to the property’s needs. HOA directors cannot simply hide behind the business judgment rule. The case is good example for disgruntled unit owners to challenge the ineptitude and incompetence of HOA directors, and to remind them to do their duty.
Is property subject to CCRs or other recorded property specific restrictions?
The Los Angeles Municipal Code defines the terms “fence” and “wall” to include: latticework, ornamental fences, screen walls, hedges or thick growths of shrubs or trees.
FRONT YARD FENCES: in most residential areas, fences, hedges, trees are limited to 3.5′ in height in the front yard.
8 ft. maximum height – R zoned property, if lot width is 40 ft. or greater and not in hillside area.
6 ft. maximum height – R zone, hillside area.
See LAMC §12.22.C.20.(f)(3) for full text of law and height limits in other property zones (which is below).
What is a spite fence?
California spite fence law starts with Civil Code section 841.4. It states, “any fence or other structure in the nature of a fence unnecessarily exceeding 10 feet in height maliciously erected or maintained for the purpose of annoying the owner or occupant of adjoining property is a private nuisance.” The statute is not limited to traditional fences. In Wilson v. Handley (2002) 97 Cal.App.3d 1301, the Court of Appeals held that trees and hedges planted in a row to form a barrier may be deemed a spite fence. The court agreed in Vanderpol v. Star (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 385, finding that at row of pine trees planted along a neighbor’s boundary line could be considered a spite fence for the purposes of the statute.
The court in Wilson v. Handley expanded the definition of a “structure in the nature of a fence.” Defendants argued that a row of trees was a not a “structure”, and thus could not come under Section 841.4. The court, however, defined a fence as a “structure … erected … to separate two contiguous estates,” and “a barrier intended … to mark a boundary.” Ultimately, the court concluded that, in light of the purpose of the spite fence statute, the term “fence” should be liberally construed. By this reasoning, other non-traditional fence-like structures may come under the California spite fence statute.
Both the California and Los Angeles spite fence statutes require a showing that the fence was “maliciously” constructed or maintained. Courts generally use the “dominant purpose” test to determine malice. Under that test, if the dominant purpose in constructing or maintaining the fence was to annoy a neighbor, then malice may be found. However, if there is another dominant purpose for the fence, such as to maintain the aesthetic qualities of one’s property or to protect one’s own privacy, then there is no malice. Since every dispute is different, the question of malice must be answered on a case-by-case basis.
The California spite fence statute includes a right of enforcement for private citizens. It states that any person may enforce the statute by filing a civil action, pursuant to Civil Code section 3501.
Unlike the California statute, the LAMC spite fence statute does not explicitly include a right of enforcement by private citizens. However, under California Government Code section 36900, a private citizen may still be able to sue for violations of the LAMC.
Section 36900 states that violation of a city ordinance may, “be prosecuted by city authorities in the name of the people of the State of California, or redressed by civil action” (Emphasis added). In Riley v. Hilton Hotels Corp. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 599, 607, the court held that Section 36900 allowed a private individual to sue for an alleged violation of the Beverly Hills Municipal Code. Thus, a homeowner may still be able to sue for violation of the spite fence statute in the Los Angeles Municipal Code, or other local codes and ordinances.
Sometimes the development and use of property goes beyond the property line, such as driveways and landscaping improvements, which are called “encroachments.” (An “encroachment” is the extension of a building or other structure beyond the boundaries of the land on which it was rightfully constructed onto adjoining land, or into its airspace, without the permission or consent of the adjoining landowner.) Encroachments are often discovered when a land survey is done by a property owner when submitting a new property improvement, such as when a property owner wants to add a swimming pool or home addition. The law provides that such use and development can sometimes ripen into property rights; and, sometimes it does not. Some recent cases highlight that the analysis can be complex and it is important for property owners to timely assert their rights, or they risk essentially losing a piece of the land.
In Shoen v. Zacarias (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 16, the dispute was over 481 square foot flat patch of land between two hillside properties. When the defendant purchased her property in 2003, she thought the patch was on her property and populated it with outdoor furniture—a cabana, a chaise chair, tables, and stools; none of it is set in concrete. But in 2005, the plaintiff’s predecessor land surveyed the boundaries and discovered that the patch belonged to him, but told the defendant she could continue to use it for as long as he owned the property. However, in 2006, the plaintiff purchased the property and in 2011, she demanded demand that the defendant remove the furniture, even though the plaintiff could not reach the flat patch of land without a building a staircase that would cost $100,000 to build.
The trial court granted the defendant an equitable easement but the court of appeal reversed, holding that a trial court has the power to issue an equitable easement authorizing a trespasser to continue her trespass in exchange for paying damages, but only if, among other things, the hardship on the trespasser in ceasing the trespass is “greatly disproportionate” to the hardship on the land’s owner in losing use of the trespassed upon portion of her land. Because removing the furniture would only cost $275, the court held that the defendant was not entitled to an equitable easement because hardship was not “greatly disproportionate” on the defendant.
An “easement” is generally defined as the right to use someone else’s property for a specific purposes, such as access, and an easement is considered to be interest in real estate, giving the holder a right to bring a suit for trespass or ejectment. Because it is an interest in the property itself, it is subject to the statute of frauds, so it must be granted in writing. In contrast a “license” allows its holder to perform some act on property of another, or use the property in some way. It gives the holder a personal privilege, but not an interest in the land itself. Licenses are usually revocable.
In Richardson v. Franc (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 744, the dispute was whether a neighbor exceeded the scope of an express easement for access and utility purposes over a shared driveway, buy installing and maintaining landscaping, irrigation, and lighting. The trial court ruled—irrespective of the terms of the easement—it would be inequitable to deny respondents an irrevocable license given their substantial investment of time and money on the landscaping and other improvements and the burdened property owner’s years of acquiescence.
Richardson is a major case because licenses are usually revocable, but the court held it was irrevocable and it held that it ran not only in favor of the present owners, but also to their successor-in-interest. Hence, the court granted essentially a permanent right that runs with the land, the way an easement does.
This case also makes the analysis more difficult and harder to predict outcomes in these neighbor vs. neighbor encroachment related disputes. The court in Richardson discussed in great detail all of the landscaping and other improvements that were made over the years and how the burdened property benefitted from letting the easement holder do all the work and pay for all the decades of landscaping and water bills. So having good evidence such as photos and receipts to build a case fairness and balancing the equities can be the key fact.

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