Source: https://www.warnkenlaw.com/law/workers-compensation/interpretation-of-the-act/
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 00:03:48+00:00

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How Maryland Courts Interpret Ambiguous Provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act.
The Maryland’s Workers’ Compensation Act (“the Act”) will be 100 years old this April. Prior to its enactment in 1914, Maryland merely maintained an insurance fund that covered only a select few. Initially the Act covered “accidental injuries that arose out of and in the course of employment,” but has subsequently been amended to include occupational diseases as well.
We recognize that the Act is a remedial statute. The purpose of the Act is to protect workers and their families from hardships inflicted by work-related injuries by providing workers with compensation for loss of earning capacity resulting from accidental injury arising out of and in the course of employment. Therefore, we have been consistent in holding that the Act must be construed as liberally in favor of injured employees as its provisions will permit in order to effectuate its benevolent purposes.
Maryland courts draw upon classic principles of statutory construction when interpreting the Workers’ Compensation Act. The goal is to ascertain legislative intent. The first step is to consider the text of the Act, “giving it its natural and ordinary meaning.” Where the plain language interpretation is clear and unambiguous, a court’s inquiry is at its end.
The 2011 decision in Montgomery County v. Deibler is a recent example of how the Court of Appeals construes ambiguous provisions of the Act. In Deibler, the court was tasked with determining whether the term “wage earning capacity” included overtime work and its associated compensation.
Similarly, the court in Deibler turned to the dictionary for insight into the meaning of “wage earning capacity,” specifically focusing on the definition of “wage.” According to Black’s Law Dictionary, “wages include every form of remuneration,” which the court believed clearly encompassed overtime compensation.
Finally, Deibler ensured that its holding conformed with the Act’s statutory purpose of shielding the injured worker from related hardships. The particular claimant’s inability to work overtime equated to over $30,000 in lost wages, which the court viewed as a notable “hardship.” The court further opined that the particular claim was by no means an “isolated” case, as more than half of America’s workforce receives overtime pay.
In sum, Montgomery County v. Deibler reflects the various avenues available to Maryland courts when tasked with interpreting ambiguous provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act. Dictionaries are a logical and useful starting point, but further inquiry is generally warranted. As a general rule, moreover, the Act is to be “construed as liberally in favor of injured employees as its provisions will permit in order to effectuate its benevolent purposes.” Therefore, in instances of ambiguity, a tie goes to the runner – i.e. the injured employee – as evidenced by the outcomes in Deibler and Stachowski.
 Wal Mart Stores, Inc. v. Holmes, 416 Md. 346, 363 (2010).
 Johnson v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 430 Md. 368, n. 8 (2013) (citing Richard P. Gilbert & Robert L. Humphreys, Jr., Maryland Workers’ Compensation Handbook § 1.03 (3d ed.2007)).
 Johnson, 430 Md. at 378 (internal citations omitted).
 Johnson v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 430 Md. 368, 377 (2013) (quoting Montgomery County v. Deibler, 423 Md. 54, 61 (2011)) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
 Deibler, supra note 4, at 61 (citing Wal Mart Stores, Inc. v. Holmes, 416 Md. 346 (2010)).
 Johnson, 430 Md. at 377-78 (quoting Breitenbach v. N.B. Handy Co., 366 Md. 467 (2001)); see also Wal Mart, supra note one.
 Wal Mart Stores, 416 Md. at 362.
 423 Md. 54, 31 A.3d 191.
 Deibler, 423 Md. at 56 (§ 9-615 provides the procedure “for compensating temporary partial disabilities that result from work accidents or occupational diseases”).
 Id. at 62 (internal citations redacted) (quoting Reier v. State Dep’t of Assessments & Taxation, 397 Md. 2, 26-27, 915 A.2d 970, 9845-85 (2007)).
 Id. at 63 (“[t]he phrase ‘wage earning capacity’ appears nowhere in the Maryland Code, other than in L&E § 9-615. Furthermore, neither ‘wage,’ nor ‘earning,’ nor ‘capacity’ is defined in Subtitle 1, the Act’s Definition and General Provisions subtitle. Moreover, the Act does not mention the word ‘overtime,’ in any context”).
 Deibler, 423 Md. at 65-66 (discussing Stachowski, 423 Md. 54, 31 A.3d 191 (2007)).
 See Deibler, 423 Md. at 68, n. 5 (courts must consult the dictionary definition from the time the legislature enacted the particular provision; because the 1914 and 1991 definitions were “strikingly similar to the contemporary definition,” the court utilized the modern definition of “wage”).

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