Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/452/576/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 16:09:01+00:00

Document:
"for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt."
"any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity."
An indictment charged respondent and others with, inter alia, a conspiracy to violate § 1962(c). The indictment described the enterprise in question as a group of individuals associated in fact for the purpose of engaging in certain specified criminal activities. Respondent was convicted in Federal District Court, but the Court of Appeals reversed on the ground that RICO was intended solely to protect legitimate business enterprises from infiltration by racketeers, and does not make it criminal to participate in an association which performs only illegal acts and has not infiltrated or attempted to infiltrate a legitimate enterprise.
Held: The term "enterprise," as used in RICO, encompasses both legitimate and illegitimate enterprises. Pp. 452 U. S. 580-593.
that the second category should be limited by the specific examples enumerated in the first. Pp. 452 U. S. 580-582.
(b) With respect to § 1962(c), an "enterprise" is not a "pattern of racketeering activity," but is an entity separate and apart from the pattern of activity in which it engages. In order to secure a conviction, the Government must prove both the existence of an "enterprise" and the connected "pattern of racketeering activity." Pp. 452 U. S. 582-583.
(c) Applying RICO to illegitimate as well as legitimate enterprises does not render any portion of the statute superfluous, nor does it create any structural incongruities within the statute's framework. On the contrary, insulating the wholly criminal enterprise from prosecution under RICO is the more incongruous position. Pp. 452 U. S. 583-587.
(d) Nothing in RICO's legislative history requires a conclusion that the statute is limited in its application to legitimate enterprises. In view of the purposes of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 to eradicate organized crime in the United States, it cannot be said that Congress nevertheless confined the reach of the law to only narrow aspects of organized crime, and, in particular, under RICO, to only the infiltration of legitimate business. Pp. 452 U. S. 588-593.
WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and BRENNAN, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, POWELL, REHNQUIST, and STEVENS, JJ., joined. STEWART, J., filed a dissenting statement, post, p. 452 U. S. 593.
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO), was added to Title 18 by Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub.L. 9152, 84 Stat. 991. The question in this case is whether the term "enterprise" as used in RICO encompasses both legitimate and illegitimate enterprises or is limited in application to the former. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that Congress did not intend to include within the definition of "enterprise" those organizations which are exclusively criminal. 632 F.2d 896 (1980). This position is contrary to that adopted by every other Circuit that has addressed the issue. [Footnote 1] We granted certiorari to resolve this conflict. 449 U.S. 1123 (1981).
"a group of individuals associated in fact for the purpose of illegally trafficking in narcotics and other dangerous drugs, committing arsons, utilizing the United States mails to defraud insurance companies, bribing and attempting to bribe local police officers, and corruptly influencing and attempting to corruptly influence the outcome of state court proceedings. . . . "
The other eight counts of the indictment charged the commission of various substantive criminal acts by those engaged in and associated with the criminal enterprise, including possession with intent to distribute and distribution of controlled substances, and several counts of insurance fraud by arson and other means. The common thread to all counts was respondent's alleged leadership of this criminal organization through which he orchestrated and participated in the commission of the various crimes delineated in the RICO count or charged in the eight preceding counts.
After a 6-week jury trial, in which the evidence focused upon both the professional nature of this organization and the execution of a number of distinct criminal acts, respondent was convicted on all nine counts. He was sentenced to a term of 20 years on the substantive counts, as well as a 2-year special parole term on the drug count. On the RICO conspiracy count, he was sentenced to a 20-year concurrent term and fined $20,000.
solely to protect legitimate business enterprises from infiltration by racketeers, and that RICO does not make criminal the participation in an association which performs only illegal acts and which has not infiltrated or attempted to infiltrate a legitimate enterprise. The Court of Appeals agreed. We reverse.
In determining the scope of a statute, we look first to its language. If the statutory language is unambiguous, in the absence of "a clearly expressed legislative intent to the contrary, that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive." Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U. S. 102, 447 U. S. 108 (1980). Of course, there is no errorless test for identifying or recognizing "plain" or "unambiguous" language. Also, authoritative administrative constructions should be given the deference to which they are entitled, absurd results are to be avoided, and internal inconsistencies in the statute must be dealt with. Trans Alaska Pipeline Rate Cases, 436 U. S. 631, 436 U. S. 643 (1978); Commissioner v. Brown, 380 U. S. 563, 380 U. S. 571 (1965). We nevertheless begin with the language of the statute.
criminal enterprises than it does legitimate ones. Had Congress not intended to reach criminal associations, it could easily have narrowed the sweep of the definition by inserting a single word, "legitimate." But it did nothing to indicate that an enterprise consisting of a group of individuals was not covered by RICO if the purpose of the enterprise was exclusively criminal.
The Court of Appeals, however, clearly departed from and limited the statutory language. It gave several reasons for doing so, none of which is adequate. First, it relied in part on the rule of ejusdem generis, an aid to statutory construction problems suggesting that, where general words follow a specific enumeration of persons or things, the general words should be limited to persons or things similar to those specifically enumerated. See 2A C. Sands, Sutherland on Statutory Construction § 47.17 (4th ed.1973). The Court of Appeals ruled that, because each of the specific enterprises enumerated in § 1961(4) is a "legitimate" one, the final catchall phrase -- "any union or group of individuals associated in fact" -- should also be limited to legitimate enterprises. There are at least two flaws in this reasoning. The rule of ejusdem generis is no more than an aid to construction, and comes into play only when there is some uncertainty as to the meaning of a particular clause in a statute. Harrison v. PPG Industries, Inc., 446 U. S. 578, 446 U. S. 588 (1980); United States v. Powell, 423 U. S. 87, 423 U. S. 91 (1975); Gooch v. United States, 297 U. S. 124, 297 U. S. 128 (1936). Considering the language and structure of § 1961(4), however, we not only perceive no uncertainty in the meaning to be attributed to the phrase, "any union or group of individuals associated in fact," but we are convinced for another reason that ejusdem generis is wholly inapplicable in this context.
"If 'a pattern of racketeering' can itself be an 'enterprise' for purposes of section 1962(c), then the two phrases 'employed by or associated with any enterprise' and 'the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through [a pattern of racketeering activity]' add nothing to the meaning of the section. The words of the statute are coherent and logical only if they are read as applying to legitimate enterprises."
operation. There is no inconsistency or anomaly in recognizing that § 1962 applies to both legitimate and illegitimate enterprises. Certainly the language of the statute does not warrant the Court of Appeals' conclusion to the contrary.
the State into the Federal realm." 116 Cong.Rec. 35217 (1970) (remarks of Rep. Eckhardt). See also id. at 35205 (remarks of Rep. Mikva); id. at 35213 (comments of the American Civil Liberties Union); Hearings on Organized Crime Control before Subcommittee No. 5 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 329, 370 (1970) (statement of Sheldon H. Eisen on behalf of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York). In the face of these objections, Congress nonetheless proceeded to enact the measure, knowing that it would alter somewhat the role of the Federal Government in the war against organized crime and that the alteration would entail prosecutions involving acts of racketeering that are also crimes under state law. There is no argument that Congress acted beyond its power in so doing. That being the case, the courts are without authority to restrict the application of the statute. See United States v. Culbert, 435 U. S. 371, 435 U. S. 379-380 (1978).
Contrary to the judgment below, neither the language nor structure of RICO limits its application to legitimate "enterprises." Applying it also to criminal organizations does not render any portion of the statute superfluous, nor does it create any structural incongruities within the framework of the Act. The result is neither absurd nor surprising. On the contrary, insulating the wholly criminal enterprise from prosecution under RICO is the more incongruous position.
to grow because of defects in the evidence-gathering process of the law inhibiting the development of the legally admissible evidence necessary to bring criminal and other sanctions or remedies to bear on the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime and because the sanctions and remedies available to the Government are unnecessarily limited in scope and impact."
Id. at 923. [Footnote 11] The various Titles of the Act provide the tools through which this goal is to be accomplished. Only three of those Titles create substantive offenses, Title VIII, which is directed at illegal gambling operations, Title IX, at issue here, and Title XI, which addresses the importation, distribution, and storage of explosive materials. The other Titles provide various procedural and remedial devices to aid in the prosecution and incarceration of persons involved in organized crime.
"Organized criminals, too, have flooded the market with cheap reproductions of hit records and affixed counterfeit popular labels. They are heavily engaged in the illicit prescription drug industry."
116 Cong.Rec. 592 (1970). In view of the purposes and goals of the Act, as well as the language of the statute, we are unpersuaded that Congress nevertheless confined the reach of the law to only narrow aspects of organized crime, and, in particular, under RICO, only the infiltration of legitimate business.
This is not to gainsay that the legislative history forcefully supports the view that the major purpose of Title IX is to address the infiltration of legitimate business by organized crime. The point is made time and again during the debates and in the hearings before the House and Senate. [Footnote 13] But none of these statements requires the negative inference that Title IX did not reach the activities of enterprises organized and existing for criminal purposes. See United States v. Naftalin, 441 U. S. 768, 441 U. S. 775 (1979); United States v. Culbert, 435 U.S. at 435 U. S. 377.
constitute such a serious threat to the economic wellbeing of the Nation. In short, an attack must be made on their source of economic power itself, and the attack must take place on all available fronts."
"the combination of criminal and civil penalties in this title offers an extraordinary potential for striking a mortal blow against the property interests of organized crime."
"[T]itle IX . . . will deal not only with individuals, but also with the economic base through which those individuals constitute such a serious threat to the economic wellbeing of the Nation. In short, an attack must be made on their source of economic power itself. . . ."
As a measure to deal with the infiltration of legitimate businesses by organized crime, RICO was both preventive and remedial. Respondent's view would ignore the preventive function of the statute. If Congress had intended the more circumscribed approach espoused by the Court of Appeals, there would have been some positive sign that the law was not to reach organized criminal activities that give rise to the concerns about infiltration. The language of the statute, however -- the most reliable evidence of its intent -- reveals that Congress opted for a far broader definition of the word "enterprise," and we are unconvinced by anything in the legislative history that this definition should be given less than its full effect.
JUSTICE STEWART agrees with the reasoning and conclusion of the Court of Appeals as to the meaning of the term "enterprise" in this statute. See 632 F.2d 896. Accordingly, he respectfully dissents.
See United States v. Sutton, 642 F.2d 1001, 1006-1009 (CA6 1980) (en banc), cert. pending, Nos. 80-6058, 80-6137, 80-6141, 80-6147, 80-6253, 80-6254, 80-6272; United States v. Errico, 635 F.2d 152, 155 (CA2 1980); United States v. Provenzano, 620 F.2d 985, 992-993 (CA3), cert. denied, 449 U. S. 99 (1980); United States v. Whitehead, 618 F.2d 523, 525, n. 1 (CA4 1980); United States v. Aleman, 609 F.2d 298, 304-305 (CA7 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980); United States v. Rone, 598 F.2d 564, 568-569 (CA9 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980); United States v. Swiderski, 193 U.S. App.D.C. 92, 94-95, 593 F.2d 1246, 1248-1249 (1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 933 (1979); United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880, 896-898 (CA5), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978). See also United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358, 1372 (CA8 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 912 (1981). But see United States v. Sutton, 605 F.2d 260, 264-270 (CA6 1979), vacated, 642 F.2d 1001 (1980); United States v. Rone, supra, at 573 (Ely, J., dissenting); United States v. Altese, 542 F.2d 104, 107 (CA2 1976) (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977).
"'enterprise' includes any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity."
"It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprises affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt."
The Court of Appeals' application of ejusdem generis is further flawed by the assumption that "any individual, partnership, corporation, association or other legal entity" could not act totally beyond the pale of the law. The mere fact that a given enterprise is favored with a legal existence does not prevent that enterprise from proceeding along a wholly illegal course of conduct. Therefore, since legitimacy of purpose is not a universal characteristic of the specifically listed enterprises, it would be improper to engraft this characteristic upon the second category of enterprises.
"We do not suggest that any two sporadic and isolated offenses by the same actor or actors ipso facto constitute an 'illegitimate' enterprise; rather, the existence of the enterprise as an independent entity must also be shown."
Reply Brief for United States 4. But even if that were not the case, the Court of Appeals' position on this point is of little force. Language in a statute is not rendered superfluous merely because, in some contexts, that language may not be pertinent.
"(a) It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful debt in which such person has participated as a principal within the meaning of section 2, title 18, United States Code, to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such income, or the proceeds of such income, in acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce. A purchase of securities on the open market for purposes of investment, and without the intention of controlling or participating in the control of the issuer, or of assisting another to do so, shall not be unlawful under this subsection if the securities of the issuer held by the purchaser, the members of his immediate family, and his or their accomplices in any pattern or racketeering activity or the collection of an unlawful debt after such purchase do not amount in the aggregate to one percent of the outstanding securities of any one class, and do not confer, either in law or in fact, the power to elect one or more directors of the issuer."
"(b) It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce."
"(a) The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction to prevent and restrain violations of section 1962 of this chapter by issuing appropriate orders, including, but not limited to: ordering any person to divest himself of any interest, direct or indirect, in any enterprise; imposing reasonable restrictions on the future activities or investments of any person, including, but not limited to, prohibiting any person from engaging in the same type of endeavor as the enterprise engaged in, the activities of which affect interstate or foreign commerce; or ordering dissolution or reorganization of any enterprise, making due provision for the rights of innocent persons."
"(c) Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United States district court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee."
In discussing these civil remedies, the Senate Report on the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 specifically referred to two state cases in which equitable relief had been granted against illegitimate enterprises. S.Rep. No. 91-617, p. 79, n. 9, p. 81, n. 11 (1969). These references were in the context of a discussion on the need to expand the remedies available to combat organized crime.
RICO imposes no restrictions upon the criminal justice systems of the States. See 84 Stat. 947 ("Nothing in this title shall supersede any provision of Federal, State, or other law imposing criminal penalties or affording civil remedies in addition to those provided for in this title"). Thus, under RICO, the States remain free to exercise their police powers to the fullest constitutional extent in defining and prosecuting crimes within their respective jurisdictions. That some of those crimes may also constitute predicate acts of racketeering under RICO is no restriction on the separate administration of criminal justice by the States.
We find no occasion to apply the rule of lenity to this statute.
"[T]hat 'rule,' as is true of any guide to statutory construction, only serves as an aid for resolving an ambiguity; it is not to be used to beget one. . . . The rule comes into operation at the end of the process of construing what Congress has expressed, not at the beginning as an overriding consideration of being lenient to wrongdoers."
Callanan v. United States, 364 U. S. 587, 364 U. S. 596 (1961) (footnote omitted). There being no ambiguity in the RICO provisions at issue here, the rule of lenity does not come into play. See United States v. Moore, 423 U. S. 122, 423 U. S. 145 (1975), quoting United States v. Brown, 333 U. S. 18, 333 U. S. 25-26 (1948) ("The canon in favor of strict construction [of criminal statutes] is not an inexorable command to override common sense and evident statutory purpose. . . . Nor does it demand that a statute be given the "narrowest meaning"; it is satisfied if the words are given their fair meaning in accord with the manifest intent of the lawmakers'"); see also Lewis v. United States, 445 U. S. 55, 445 U. S. 60-61 (1980).
See also 116 Cong.Rec. 602 (1970) (remarks of Sen. Yarborough) ("a full scale attack on organized crime"); id. at 819 (remarks of Sen. Scott) ("purpose is to eradicate organized crime in the United States"); id. at 35199 (remarks of Rep. Rodino) ("a truly full-scale commitment to destroy the insidious power of organized crime groups"); id. at 35300 (remarks of Rep. Mayne) (organized crime "must be sternly and irrevocably eradicated").
See also id. at 601 (remarks of Sen. Hruska); id. at 60607 (remarks of Sen. Byrd); id. at 819 (remarks of Sen. Scott); id. at 962 (remarks of Sen. Murphy); id. at 970 (remarks of Sen. Bible); id. at 18913, 18937 (remarks of Sen. McClellan); id. at 35199 (remarks of Rep. Rodino); id. at 35216 (remarks of Rep. McDade); id. at 35300 (remarks of Rep. Mayne); id. at 35312 (remarks of Rep. Brock); id. at 35319 (remarks of Rep. Anderson of California); id. at 35326 (remarks of Rep. Vanik); id. at 35328 (remarks of Rep. Meskill); Hearings on S. 30 et al. before the Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 108 (1969) (statement of Attorney General Mitchell); H.R.Rep. No. 1574, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 5 (1968).
116 Cong.Rec. 591 (1970) (remarks of Sen. McClellan) ("title IX is aimed at removing organized crime from our legitimate organizations"); id. at 602 (remarks of Sen. Hruska) ("Title IX of this act is designed to remove the influence of organized crime from legitimate business by attacking its property interests and by removing its members from control of legitimate businesses which have been acquired or operated by unlawful racketeering methods"); id. at 607 (remarks of Sen. Byrd) ("alarming expansion into the field of legitimate business"); id. at 953 (remarks of Sen. Thurmond) ("racketeers . . . gaining inroads into legitimate business"); id. at 845 (remarks of Sen. Kennedy) ("title IX . . . may provide us with new tools to prevent organized crime from taking over legitimate businesses and activities"); S.Rep. No. 91-617, p. 76 (1969).
See also, e.g. 115 Cong.Rec. 827 (1969) (remarks of Sen. McClellan) ("Organized crime . . . uses its ill-gotten gains . . . to infiltrate and secure control of legitimate business and labor union activities"); 116 Cong.Rec. 591 (1970) (remarks of Sen. McClellan) ("illegally gained revenue also makes it possible for organized crime to infiltrate and pollute legitimate business"); id. at 603 (remarks of Sen. Yarborough) ("[RICO] is designed to root out the influence of organized crime in legitimate business, into which billions of dollars of illegally obtained money is channeled"); id. at 606 (remarks of Sen. Byrd) ("loan sharking paves the way for organized criminals to gain access to and eventually take over the control of thousands of legitimate businesses"); id. at 35193 (remarks of Rep. Poff) ("[Title IX . . . will deal not only with individuals, but also with the economic base through which those individuals constitute such a serious threat to the economic wellbeing of the Nation. In short, an attack must be made on their source of economic power itself . . ."); S.Rep. No. 91-617, supra, at 78-80; H.R.Rep. No. 1574, supra, at 5 ("The President's Crime Commission found that the greatest menace that organized crime presents is its ability through the accumulation of illegal gains to infiltrate into legitimate business and labor unions"); Hearings on Organized Crime Control before Subcommittee No. 5 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 170 (1970) (Department of Justice Comments) ("Title IX is designed to inhibit the infiltration of legitimate business by organized crime, and, like the previous title, to reach the criminal syndicates' major sources of revenue") (emphasis supplied).

References: § 1962
 § 1962
 v. 
 v. 
 § 47
 § 1961
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 1961
 § 1962
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.