Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/453/280/
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 08:06:00+00:00

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"grant and issue passports, and cause passports to be granted, issued, and verified in foreign countries by diplomatic representatives of the United States . . . under such rules as the President shall designate and prescribe. . . ."
The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the Secretary was required to show that Congress had authorized the regulation either by an express delegation or by implied approval of a "substantial and consistent" administrative practice, and that no such authority had been shown.
policy being "sufficiently substantial and consistent" to compel the conclusion that Congress has approved it; and the regulation is constitutional as applied. Pp. 453 U. S. 289-310.
(a) Although the Act does not, in express terms, authorize the Secretary to revoke a passport or deny a passport application, neither does it expressly limit those powers. It is beyond dispute that he has the power to deny a passport for reasons not specified in the statutes, and, as respondent concedes, if the Secretary may deny a passport application for a certain reason, he may revoke a passport on the same ground. Pp. 453 U. S. 289-291.
(b) In light of the broad rulemaking authority granted in the Act, the consistent administrative construction of it must be followed by the courts, absent compelling indications that such construction is wrong. This is especially so in light of the fact that the statute deals with foreign policy and national security, where congressional silence is not to be equated with disapproval. Pp. 453 U. S. 291-292.
(c) Absent evidence of any legislative intent to repudiate the consistent administrative construction of the prior and similar 1856 Passport Act as preserving the nonstatutory authority of the President and Secretary to withhold passports on national security and foreign policy grounds, it must be concluded that Congress, in enacting the 1926 Act, adopted such construction. Moreover, the Executive has consistently construed the 1926 Act to work no change in prior practice. Pp. 453 U. S. 292-300.
(d) A 1978 statute making it unlawful to travel abroad without a passport even in peacetime and a 1978 amendment to the 1926 Act providing that "[u]nless authorized by law," in the absence of war, armed hostilities, or imminent danger to travelers, a passport may not be geographically restricted, are weighty evidence of congressional approval of the Secretary's interpretation of his authority to revoke passports, particularly as set forth in the challenged regulation. Pp. 453 U. S. 300-301.
(e) An administrative policy or practice may be consistent even though the occasions for invoking it are limited. Although a pattern of actual enforcement is one indicator of Executive policy, it suffices that the Executive has openly asserted the power at issue. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U. S. 116, distinguished. Pp. 453 U. S. 301-303.
(f) The protection accorded beliefs, standing alone, is very different from the protection accorded conduct. Here, beliefs and speech are only part of respondent's campaign, which presents a serious danger to American officials abroad and to the national security. Pp. 453 U. S. 304-306.
which permits revocation of a passport only in cases involving likelihood of "serious damage" to national security or foreign policy, respondent's constitutional claims are without merit. The right to hold a passport is subordinate to national security and foreign policy considerations, and is subject to reasonable governmental regulation. Assuming, arguendo, that First Amendment protections reach beyond our national boundaries, respondent's First Amendment claim is without foundation. See Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U. S. 697, 283 U. S. 716. To the extent the revocation of respondent's passport operates to inhibit him, it is an inhibition of action, rather than of speech. And, on the record of this case, the Government is not required to hold a pre-revocation hearing, since where there is a substantial likelihood of "serious damage" to national security or foreign policy as the result of a passport holder's activities abroad, the Government may take action to ensure that the holder may not exploit the United States' sponsorship of his travels. The Constitution's due process guarantees call for no more than what was accorded here: a statement of reasons and an opportunity for a prompt post-revocation hearing. Pp. 453 U. S. 306-310.
203 U.S.App.D.C. 46, 629 F.2d 80, reversed and remanded.
BURGER, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which STEWART, WHITE, BLACKMUN, POWELL, REHNQUIST, and STEVENS, JJ., joined. BLACKMUN, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 453 U. S. 310. BRENNAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which MARSHALL, J., joined, post, p. 453 U. S. 310.
The question presented is whether the President, acting through the Secretary of State, has authority to revoke a passport on the ground that the holder's activities in foreign countries are causing or are likely to cause serious damage to the national security or foreign policy of the United States.
Philip Agee, an American citizen, currently resides in West Germany. [Footnote 1] From 1957 to 1968, he was employed by the Central Intelligence Agency. He held key positions in the division of the Agency that is responsible for covert intelligence gathering in foreign countries. In the course of his duties at the Agency, Agee received training in clandestine operations, including the methods used to protect the identities of intelligence employees and sources of the United States overseas. He served in undercover assignments abroad and came to know many Government employees and other persons supplying information to the United States. The relationships of many of these people to our Government are highly confidential; many are still engaged in intelligence gathering.
"The Department's action is predicated upon a determination made by the Secretary under the provisions of [22 CFR] Section 51.70(b)(4) that your activities abroad are causing or are likely to cause serious damage to the national security or the foreign policy of the United States. The reasons for the Secretary's determination are, in summary, as follows: Since the early 1970's, it has been your stated intention to conduct a continuous campaign to disrupt the intelligence operations of the United States. In carrying out that campaign you have traveled in various countries (including, among others, Mexico, the United Kingdom, Denmark, Jamaica, Cuba, and Germany), and your activities in those countries have caused serious damage to the national security and foreign policy of the United States. Your stated intention to continue such activities threatens additional damage of the same kind. [Footnote 8] "
The notice also advised Agee of his right to an administrative hearing [Footnote 9] and offered to hold such a hearing in West Germany on 5 days' notice.
judgment for Agee, and ordered the Secretary to restore his passport. Agee v. Vance, 483 F.Supp. 729 (DC 1980).
or with respect to persons "engaged in criminal conduct." [Footnote 15] Id. at 52, 629 F.2d at 86.
"The Secretary of State may grant and issue passports, and cause passports to be granted, issued, and verified in foreign countries by diplomatic representatives of the United States . . . under such rules as the President shall designate and prescribe for and on behalf of the United States, and no other person shall grant, issue, or verify such passports."
"participating in illegal conduct, trying to escape the toils of the law, promoting passport frauds, or otherwise engaging in conduct which would violate the laws of the United States."
"In this vast external realm, with its important, complicated, delicate and manifold problems, the President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation. . . . As Marshall said in his great argument of March 7, 1800, in the House of Representatives, 'The President is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations."
Id. at 299 U. S. 319.
"[B]ecause of the changeable and explosive nature of contemporary international relations, and the fact that the Executive is immediately privy to information which cannot be swiftly presented to, evaluated by, and acted upon by the legislature, Congress -- in giving the Executive authority over matters of foreign affairs -- must of necessity paint with a brush broader than that it customarily wields in domestic areas."
"to the conduct of foreign relations . . . are so exclusively entrusted to the political branches of government as to be largely immune from judicial inquiry or interference."
Id. at 342 U. S. 589; accord, Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U. S. 103, 333 U. S. 111 (1948).
which, by usage and the law of nations, is received as evidence of the fact."
Urtetiqui v. D'Arcy, 9 Pet. 692, 34 U. S. 698 (1835).
With the enactment of travel control legislation making a passport generally a requirement for travel abroad, [Footnote 22] a passport took on certain added characteristics. Most important for present purposes, the only means by which an American can lawfully leave the country or return to it -- absent a Presidentially granted exception -- is with a passport. See 8 U.S.C. § 1185(b) (1976 ed., Supp. IV). As a travel control document, a passport is both proof of identity and proof of allegiance to the United States. Even under a travel control statute, however, a passport remains, in a sense, a document by which the Government vouches for the bearer and for his conduct.
"shall be authorized to grant and issue passports . . . under such rules as the President shall designate and prescribe for and on behalf of the United States. . . ."
exercised by the Secretary of State. This authority was ancillary to his broader authority to protect American citizens in foreign countries, and was necessarily incident to his general authority to conduct the foreign affairs of the United States under the Chief Executive."
Senate Committee on Government Operations, Reorganization of the Passport Functions of the Department of State, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 13 (Comm.Print 1960).
country to grant a passport to a citizen of the United States."
"[t]he Secretary of State has the right in his discretion to refuse to issue a passport, and will exercise this right towards anyone who, he has reason to believe, desires a passport to further an unlawful or improper purpose. [Footnote 30]"
Congress made clear its expectation that the Executive would curtail or prevent international travel by American citizens if it was contrary to the national security. The legislative history reveals that the principal reason for the 1918 statute was fear that "renegade Americans" would travel abroad and engage in "transference of important military information" to persons not entitled to it. [Footnote 35] The 1918 statute left the power to make exceptions exclusively in the hands of the Executive, without articulating specific standards. Unless the Secretary had power to apply national security criteria in passport decisions, the purpose of the Travel Control Act would plainly have been frustrated.
1926, adopted the longstanding administrative construction of the 1856 statute. See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U. S. 575, 434 U. S. 580-581 (1978).
"activities abroad would: (a) violate the laws of the United States;(b) be prejudicial to the orderly conduct of foreign relations; or (c) otherwise be prejudicial to the interests of the United States."
22 CFR § 51.136 (1958). This regulation remained in effect continuously until 1966.
"the authority to issue or withhold passports has, by precedent and law, been vested in the Secretary of State as a part of his responsibility to protect American citizens traveling abroad, and what he considered to be the best interests of the Nation. [Footnote 44]"
causing or are likely to cause serious damage to the national security or the foreign policy of the United States. [Footnote 46]"
"though it once again enacted legislation relating to passports, left completely untouched the broad rulemaking authority granted in the earlier Act."
A necessary premise for Agee's contention is that there were frequent occasions for revocation, and that the claimed Executive power was exercised in only a few of those cases. However, if there were no occasions -- or few -- to call the Secretary's authority into play, the absence of frequent instances of enforcement is wholly irrelevant. The exercise of a power emerges only in relation to a factual situation, and the continued validity of the power is not diluted simply because there is no need to use it.
The history is clear that there have been few situations involving substantial likelihood of serious damage to the national security or foreign policy of the United States as a result of a passport holder's activities abroad, and that, in the cases which have arisen, the Secretary has consistently exercised his power to withhold passports. Perhaps the most notable example of enforcement of the administrative policy, which surely could not have escaped the attention of Congress, was the 1948 denial of a passport to a Member of Congress who sought to go abroad to support a movement in Greece to overthrow the existing government. [Footnote 52] Another example was the 1954 revocation of a passport held by a man who was supplying arms to groups abroad whose interests were contrary to positions taken by the United States. [Footnote 53] In 1970, the Secretary revoked passports of two persons who sought to travel to the site of an international airplane hijacking. [Footnote 54] See also Note, 61 Yale L.J. 170, 174-176 (1952).
The Secretary has construed and applied his regulations consistently, and it would be anomalous to fault the Government because there were so few occasions to exercise the announced policy and practice. Although a pattern of actual enforcement is one indicator of Executive policy, it suffices that the Executive has "openly asserted" the power at issue. Zemel, 381 U.S. at 381 U. S. 9; see id. at 381 U. S. 10.
Relying on the statement of the Court in Kent that "illegal conduct" and problems of allegiance were, "so far as relevant here, . . . the only [grounds] which it could fairly be argued were adopted by Congress in light of prior administrative practice," id. at 357 U. S. 127-128, Agee argues that this enumeration was exclusive, and is controlling here. This is not correct.
"being denied their freedom of movement solely because of their refusal to be subjected to inquiry into their beliefs and associations. They do not seek to escape the law, nor to violate it. They may or may not be Communists. But assuming they are, the only law which Congress has passed expressly curtailing the movement of Communists across our borders has not yet become effective. It would therefore be strange to infer that, pending the effectiveness of that law, the Secretary has been silently granted by Congress the larger, the more pervasive, power to curtail in his discretion the free movement of citizens in order to satisfy himself about their beliefs or associations."
"establishes an irrebuttable presumption that individuals who are members of the specified organizations will, if given passports, engage in activities inimical to the security of the United States."
"The prohibition against travel is supported only by a tenuous relationship between the bare fact of organizational membership and the activity Congress sought to proscribe."
Id. at 378 U. S. 514.
We hold that the policy announced in the challenged regulations is "sufficiently substantial and consistent" to compel the conclusion that Congress has approved it. See Zemel, 381 U.S. at 381 U. S. 12.
Agee also attacks the Secretary's action on three constitutional grounds: first, that the revocation of his passport impermissibly burdens his freedom to travel; second, that the action was intended to penalize his exercise of free speech and deter his criticism of Government policies and practices; and third, that failure to accord him a pre-revocation hearing violated his Fifth Amendment right to procedural due process.
In light of the express language of the passport regulations, which permits their application only in cases involving likelihood of "serious damage" to national security or foreign policy, these claims are without merit.
U.S. 270, 179 U. S. 274; Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35, 73 U. S. 43-44; Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283, 48 U. S. 492 (Taney, C.J., dissenting). But this Court has often pointed out the crucial difference between the freedom to travel internationally and the right of interstate travel."
""The constitutional right of interstate travel is virtually unqualified, United States v. Guest, 383 U. S. 745, 383 U. S. 757-758 (1966); Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U. S. 88, 403 U. S. 105-106 (1971). By contrast, the right' of international travel has been considered to be no more than an aspect of the `liberty' protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. As such, this `right,' the Court has held, can be regulated within the bounds of due process." (Citations omitted.) Califano v. Torres, 435 U. S. 1, 435 U. S. 4 n. 6."
It is "obvious and unarguable" that no governmental interest is more compelling than the security of the Nation. Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. at 378 U. S. 509; accord, Cole v. Young, 351 U. S. 536, 351 U. S. 546 (1956); see Zemel, supra, at 381 U. S. 13-17. Protection of the foreign policy of the United States is a governmental interest of great importance, since foreign policy and national security considerations cannot neatly be compartmentalized.
"[t]he Government has a compelling interest in protecting both the secrecy of information important to our national security and the appearance of confidentiality so essential to the effective operation of our foreign intelligence service."
consular and other officials. Secrecy in respect of information gathered by them may be highly necessary, and the premature disclosure of it productive of harmful results."
299 U.S. at 299 U. S. 320. Accord, Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. at 333 U. S. 111; The Federalist No. 64, pp. 392-393 (Mentor ed.1961).
things, have the declared purpose of obstructing intelligence operations and the recruiting of intelligence personnel. They are clearly not protected by the Constitution. The mere fact that Agee is also engaged in criticism of the Government does not render his conduct beyond the reach of the law.
To the extent the revocation of his passport operates to inhibit Agee, "it is an inhibition of action," rather than of speech. Zemel, 381 U.S. at 381 U. S. 117 (emphasis supplied). Agee is as free to criticize the United States Government as he was when he held a passport -- always subject, of course, to express limits on certain rights by virtue of his contract with the Government. [Footnote 61] See Snepp v. United States, supra.
Agee has been deported from Great Britain, France, and the Netherlands. Dirty Work: The CIA in Western Europe 286-300 (P. Agee & L. Wolf eds.1978).
"Today, I announced a new campaign to fight the United States CIA wherever it is operating. This campaign will have two main functions: First, to expose CIA officers and agents and to take the measures necessary to drive them out of the countries where they are operating; secondly, to seek within the United States to have the CIA abolished."
"The effort to identify CIA people in foreign countries has been going on for some time. . . . (Today's) list was compiled by a small group of Mexican comrades whom I trained to follow the comings and goings of CIA people before I left Mexico City."
"Similar lists of CIA people in other countries are already being compiled and will be announced when appropriate. We invite participation in this campaign from all those who strive for social justice and national dignity."
App. to Pet. for Cert. 107a. See also P. Agee, Exposing the CIA, App. in No. 80-1125 (CADC), pp. 779 (hereinafter CA App.).
In a series of incidents between 1974 and 1978, and in two books published in the same period, Agee has identified hundreds of persons as CIA personnel. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 108a-111a; see generally P. Agee, Inside the Company: CIA Diary (1975); Dirty Work: The CIA in Western Europe 17-43 (P. Agee & L. Wolf eds. 1978), CA App. 66-79. See also P. Agee, Introduction, in Dirty Work 2: The CIA in Africa (E. Ray, W. Schapp, K. Van Meter, & L. Wolf eds. 1979). The latter two books contain "Who's Where" sections listing the names of alleged CIA employees on a country-by-country basis and "Who's Who" sections containing detailed biographical information on all such persons.
See Affidavits of CIA Deputy Director for Operations, App. to Pet. for Cert. 112a, 114a; see also n 5, infra.
"[i]n consideration of my employment by CIA, I undertake not to publish or to participate in the publication of any information or material relating to the Agency, its activities or intelligence activities generally, either during or after the term of my employment by the Agency without specific prior approval by the Agency."
This language is identical to the clause which we construed in Snepp v. United States, 444 U. S. 507, 444 U. S. 508 (1980).
"There is no dispute that Agee has openly flouted his refusal to submit writings and speeches to the CIA for prior approval, and has expressed a clear intention to reveal classified information and bring harm to the agency and its personnel."
Agee v. Central Intelligence Agency, 500 F.Supp. 506, 509 (DC 1980) (footnote omitted).
Affidavit of CIA Deputy Director for Operations, App. to Pet. for Cert. 112a.
In December, 1975, Richard Welch was murdered in Greece after the publication of an article in an English-language newspaper in Athens naming Welch as CIA Chief of Station. CA App. 92. In July, 1980, two days after a Jamaica press conference at which Agee's principal collaborator identified Richard Kinsman as CIA Chief of Station in Jamaica, Kinsman's house was strafed with automatic gunfire. Four days after the same press conference, three men approached the Jamaicia home of another man similarly identified as an Agency officer. Police challenged the men and gunfire was exchanged. Affidavit of United States Ambassador to Jamaica, App. to Pet. for Cert. 125a-127a. In January, 1981, two American officials of the American Institute for Free Labor Development, previously identified as a CIA front by Agee and discussed extensively in Agee's book Inside the Company: CIA Diary, were assassinated in El Salvador. N.Y. Times, Jan. 15, 1981, p. A10, cols. 4-5; i.d., Jan. 5, 1981, p. A1, col. 6, p. A10, cols. 3-6.
The Secretary does not assert that Agee has specifically incited anyone to commit murder. However, affidavits of the CIA's Deputy Director for Operations set out and support his judgment that Agee's purported identifications are "thinly-veiled invitations to violence," that "Agee's actions could, in today's circumstances, result in someone's death," and that Agee's conduct has "markedly increased the likelihood of individuals so identified being the victims of violence." App. to Pet. for Cert. 111a, 116a-118a. One of those affidavits also shows that the ultimate effectiveness of Agee's program depends on activities of hostile foreign groups, and that such groups can be expected to engage in physical surveillance, harassment, kidnaping, and, in extreme cases, murder of United States officials abroad. Id. at 116a-117a.
Id. at 120a. Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals suggested that the immediate impetus for the passport revocation may have been that Agee's activities took on special significance in light of the crisis following the seizure of the American Embassy in Iran on November 4, 1979. Agee v. Vance, 483 F.Supp. 729 (DC 1980); Agee v. Muskie, 203 U.S.App.D.C. 46, 47, 629 F.2d 80, 81 (1980). The captors held more than 50 United States citizens, many of whom were diplomats and some of whom the captors alleged to be CIA agents. Government affidavits show that Agee made contact with the captors, urged them to demand certain CIA documents, and offered to travel to Iran to analyze the documents. App. to Pet. for Cert. 117a; N.Y. Times, Dec. 24, 1979, p. 6, col. 5. A Government affidavit also mentions, but does not vouch for the accuracy of, an earlier report that Agee had been invited to travel to Iran in order to participate in a "Revolutionary Tribunal" to pass judgment on those hostages. App. to Pet. for Cert. 116a-117a.
See 22 CFR §§ 51.80-51.89 (1980).
Agee made no effort to exhaust administrative remedies. The Secretary initially defended on this ground. Tr. 5-6 (Jan. 3, 1980). However, after Agee conceded that his activities are causing or are likely to cause serious damage to the national security (see n 11, infra), the Secretary did not continue to rely on failure to exhaust available administrative remedies. Tr. 17 (Jan. 3, 1980).
"an effort to establish the kinds of things which would have been established through the administrative process if Mr. Agee had proceeded in that direction. . . ."
Tr. 8 (Jan. 29, 1980).
This statute is set out infra at 453 U. S. 290.
"that the situation in Iran constitutes an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy and economy of the United States."
The Secretary has never relied upon that Order to justify the passport revocation in the present case. General restrictions on travel to Iran under American passports apparently did not go into effect until several months after Agee's passport was revoked. See Exec.Order No. 12211, 3 CFR 253 (1980). Accordingly, our decision in this case does not depend on the declaration of national emergency.
The Court of Appeals stressed that Agee had not been indicted. In dicta, the court expressed approval of 22 CFR § 51.70(a)(1) (1980), which provides for withholding of a passport if the applicant is the subject of an outstanding federal felony warrant. 203 U.S.App.D.C. at 53, n. 10, 629 F.2d at 87, n. 10, citing Kent v. Dulles, 357 U. S. 116, 357 U. S. 127-128 (1958).
The Secretary represents that Agee's passport has been canceled, and that the Secretary has provided Agee with identification papers permitting him to return to the United States. Tr. of Oral Arg. 11. The regulations at issue contain an exception for "direct return to the United States." 22 CFR § 51.70(a) (1980).
"the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President, as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations -- a power which does not require as a basis for its exercise an act of Congress, but which, of course, like every other governmental power, must be exercised in subordination to the applicable provisions of the Constitution."
See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U. S. 304, 299 U. S. 319-320 (1936).
In fact, the pertinent language has not been changed since 1874. See n 26, infra. The sole amendment to the 1926 provision, enacted in 1978, limits the power of the Executive to impose geographic restrictions on the use of United States passports in the absence of war, armed hostilities, or imminent danger to travelers. See infra at 453 U. S. 300, and n 48.
However, by statute originally enacted in 1856, passports may not be issued to persons who do not owe allegiance to the United States. 22 U.S.C. § 212; Kent, supra, at 357 U. S. 127. This provision in no way diminishes the Secretary's discretion as to eligible persons.
Tr. of Oral Arg. 33. That has been the Secretary's consistent construction of the statute. See 22 CFR § 51.71(a) (1980), which provides, inter alia, that the grounds for denying passports set out in § 51.70 are also grounds for revoking, restricting, or limiting passports.
This case does not involve a criminal prosecution; accordingly, strict construction against the Government is not required.
With exceptions during the War of 1812 and the Civil War, see infra, at 453 U. S. 294, n. 25, and 453 U. S. 295, passports were not mandatory until 1918. See infra, at 453 U. S. 296-297. It was not until 1978 that passports were required by statute in nonemergency peacetime. See n 47, infra.
"There is no law of the United States, in any manner regulating the issuing of passports, or directing upon what evidence it may be done, or declaring their legal effect. It is understood, as matter of practice, that some evidence of citizenship is required, by the Secretary of State, before issuing a passport. This, however, is entirely discretionary with him."
See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. at 299 U. S. 320-321; The Federalist No. 64, pp. 392-396 (Mentor ed.1961).
"without a passport first obtained from the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, or other officer . . . authorized by the President of the United States, to grant the same."
An 1874 amendment replaced the phrase "shall be authorized to" with "may." Rev.Stat. § 4075. We are aware of no legislative history pertinent to that change. To the extent that amendment is relevant, it supports the Secretary's position in this case; "may" expressly recognizes substantial discretion. See 23 Op.Atty.Gen. 509, 511 (1901).
The main impetus for the 1856 statute was the confusion caused by state and local officials issuing passports, a relic of the colonial period. See U.S. Dept. of State, The American Passport 342 (1898).
"[I]t was the intention of the bill to leave, all that pertains to the diplomatic service of the country . . . exclusively to the Executive, where we consider the Constitution has placed it."
"Cong.Globe, 34th Cong., 1st Sess., 1798 (1856)."
Despite this widely publicized Executive policy restricting passport eligibility on national security grounds, the only congressional action arguably in response to it was a statute in 1866 which reenacted an 1856 prohibition against issuing passports to noncitizens. Act of May 30, 1866, ch. 102, 14 Stat. 54.
Rules Governing the Granting and Issuing of Passports in the United States, Sept. 12, 1903, § 16, quoted in 3 J. Moore, A Digest of International Law 902 (1906).
See Exec.Order No. 654 (1907); Exec.Order No. 2119-A (1915); Exec.Order No. 2362-A (1916); Exec.Order No. 2519-A (1917).
3 G. Hackworth, Digest of International Law § 268, pp. 498-499 (1942), discussing refusal of a passport to an American citizen residing in China whose promotion of "gambling and immoral houses" had developed into a scandal.
2 Papers Relating to Foreign Relations of the United States -- 1907, p. 1082, discussing refusal of a passport to an American citizen residing in Egypt who was slandering foreign diplomats.
"it shall, except as otherwise provided by the President and subject to such limitations and exceptions as the President may authorize and prescribe, be unlawful for any citizen of the United States to depart from or enter or attempt to depart from or enter the United States unless he bears a valid passport."
Unlike the 1815 statute, n 25, supra, which was limited in application to the then-current hostilities, the 1918 Act applied "when the United States is at war" and the President issued a proclamation. § 1, 40 Stat. 559.
"a United States citizen who recently returned from Europe after having, to the knowledge of our Government, done work in a neutral country for the German Government. There was strong suspicion that he came to the United States for no proper purpose. Nevertheless not only was it impossible to exclude him, but it would now be impossible to prevent him from leaving the country if he saw fit to do so. The known facts in his case are not sufficient to warrant the institution of a criminal prosecution, and, in any event, the difficulty of securing legal evidence from the place of his activities in Europe may easily be imagined."
See Validity of Passports: Hearings on H.R. 11947 before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., 5, 8, 111 (1926) (1926 Hearings).
Besides incorporating the 1856 provision, the 1926 Act added other provisions concerning fees and maximum terms for passports. See id. at 2. Assistant Secretary of State Carr, whom the House Committee regarded as "more familiar than anyone else with the entire subject," explained that the only change in existing law worked by the pertinent section of the 1926 Act was to recognize authority of the Secretary of State to empower consuls, in addition to diplomatic officers, to issue passports in foreign countries. Id. at 1, 11.
See Exec.Order No. 4800 (1928); Exec.Order No. 5860 (1932); Exec.Order No. 7856, 3 Fed.Reg. 681 (1938).
See 6 Fed.Reg. 5821, 6069-6070, 6349 (1941); 17 Fed.Reg. 8013 (1952); 22 CFR § 51.136 (1958).
See, e.g., U.S. Dept. of State, Abstract of Passport Laws and Precedents, Passport Office Instructions, Code No. 7.21 (Nov. 1, 1955), excluding "[p]ersons whose travel would . . . be inimical to the best interests of the United States," and "[p]ersons whose travel would endanger the security of the United States."
From 1948 to 1955, the Department notified all bearers of passports that "interfere[nce] in the political affairs of foreign countries" would be taken as a ground for refusing passports and for refusing protection. U.S. Dept. of State, Information for Bearers of Passports (Jan. 1, 1948, through Jan. 15, 1955, eds.).
See Hearing on Right to Travel before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, pp. 59-61 (1957); Proposed Travel Controls, Hearings on S. 3243 before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 72 (1966).
Pursuant to the general delegation statute, 3 U.S.C. § 301, the power of the President to prescribe passport regulations has been delegated to the Secretary. Exec.Order No. 11295, 3 CFR 570 (1966-1970 Comp.).
Section 51.70(b)(4) authorizes denial of a passport for this reason. Section 51.71(a), setting out grounds for revoking, restricting, or limiting passports, incorporates § 51.70 by reference. There have been no pertinent changes in these regulations since 1966.
"Except as otherwise provided by the President and subject to such limitations and exceptions as the President may authorize and prescribe, it shall be unlawful for any citizen of the United States to depart from or enter, or attempt to depart from or enter, the United States unless he bears a valid passport."
This provision amended § 215 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. § 11185. Under the 1952 version, passports were required only in wartime or when the President had declared an emergency.
"Unless authorized by law, a passport may not be designated as restricted for travel to or for use in any country other than a country with which the United States is at war, where armed hostilities are in progress, or where there is imminent danger to the public health or the physical safety of United States travelers."
"achieving greater United States compliance with the provisions of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (signed at Helsinki on August 1, 1975)."
See also S.Rep. No. 94-1168, pp. 32-33 (1976).
Indeed, the inference of congressional approval is stronger here than in Zemel, where the Court relied on amendments to the Travel Control Act. 381 U.S. at 381 U. S. 11-12. Here, the amendment was to the Passport Act itself. Congress is therefore presumed to have adopted the administrative construction. Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U. S. 575, 434 U. S. 580 (1978).
The Court of Appeals accepted this argument. See 203 U.S.App.D.C. at 53, 629 F.2d at 87, quoted supra at 453 U. S. 288.
See N.Y. Times, Apr. 11, 1948, p. E9.
Brief for Petitioner 39; see Developments in the Law -- The National Security Interest and Civil Liberties, 85 Harv.L.Rev. 1130, 1150-1151, n. 76 (1972).
See Sirhan v. Rogers, No. 70 Civ. 3965 (SDNY, Sept. 11, 1970), appeal dism'd, No. 35364 (CA2, Sept. 11, 1970) (denying plaintiff's request for injunctive relief).
Congress considered, but did not enact, proposals to spell out passport standards in the 1926 Act. See 1926 Hearings at 4-5.
Congress itself has, from time to time, deemed it necessary to enact peace-time passport restrictions, and those measures recognize considerable discretion in the Executive. E.g., Act of Oct. 7, 1978 ( n 47, supra); Act of May 30, 1866 (nn. 19 29 supra).
"'association with persons suspected of being part of the Rosenberg espionage ring and his alleged presence at an apartment in New York which was allegedly used for microfilming material obtained for the use of a foreign government.'"
Id. at 357 U. S. 146. Although reserving the question of "[w]hether there are undisclosed grounds adequate to sustain the Secretary's action," this Court held that the Secretary's "Decision and Findings" showed "only a denial of a passport for reasons which we have today held to be impermissible," citing Kent. 357 U.S. at 357 U. S. 150. The "Decision and Findings," set out in the Appendix to the Court's opinion, id. at 357 U. S. 150-154, does not cite a single instance of Dayton's conduct, as distinguished from mere support for "the Communist movement" or association with known Communists.
See supra at 453 U. S. 283-287, and nn. 1-8.
Agee's deportation from Great Britain was expressly grounded, inter alia, on Agee's "disseminating information harmful to the security of the United Kingdom," and his "aid[ing] and counsel[ing] others in obtaining for publication information which could be harmful to the security of the United Kingdom." P. Agee & L. Wolf, supra, n 1, at 289.
Agee argues that the Government should be limited to an injunction ordering him to comply with his secrecy agreement. Tr. of Oral Arg. 339. This argument ignores the governmental interests at stake. As Agee concedes, such an injunction would not be enforceable outside of the United States. Id. at 39.
The District Court held that. since Agee's conduct falls within the core of the regulation, Agee lacks standing to contend that the regulation is vague and overbroad. Tr. 11-12 (Jan. 3, 1980). We agree. See Parker v. Levy, 417 U. S. 733, 417 U. S. 755-756 (1974).
In any event, there is no basis for a claim that the regulation is being used as a subterfuge to punish criticism of the Government. As evidenced in this case, the Government's interpretation of the terms "serious damage" and "national security" shows proper regard for constitutional rights, and is precisely in accord with our holdings on the subject. E.g., Cole v. Young, 351 U. S. 536 (1956). Nor is there any basis for a claim of discriminatory enforcement. The Government is entitled to concentrate its scarce legal resources on cases involving the most serious damage to national security and foreign policy.
We do not decide that these procedures are constitutionally required.
There is some force, I feel, in JUSTICE BRENNAN's observations, post at 453 U. S. 312-318, that today's decision cannot be reconciled fully with all the reasoning of Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U. S. 1 (1965), and, particularly, of Kent v. Dulles, 357 U. S. 116 (1958), and that the Court is cutting back somewhat upon the opinions in those cases sub silentio. I would have preferred to have the Court disavow forthrightly the aspects of Zemel and Kent that may suggest that evidence of a longstanding Executive policy or construction in this area is not probative of the issue of congressional authorization. Nonetheless, believing this is what the Court in effect has done, I join its opinion.
Today the Court purports to rely on prior decisions of this Court to support the revocation of a passport by the Secretary of State. Because I believe that such reliance is fundamentally misplaced, and that the Court instead has departed from the express holdings of those decisions, I dissent.
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Respondent writes and speaks out extensively on United States clandestine intelligence operations, with the stated goal of disrupting the CIA. Part of his activity apparently involves the identification of United States undercover personnel situated throughout the world.
"[t]he Secretary determines that the national's activities abroad are causing or are likely to cause serious damage to the national security or the foreign policy of the United States. [Footnote 2/2]"
and injunctive relief against the Secretary of State. For purposes of cross-motions for summary judgment on the facial validity of the regulations, respondent conceded that he was causing or was likely to cause serious damage to national security or foreign policy, and therefore, fell within the coverage of the regulations. Agee v. Muskie, 203 U.S.App.D.C. 46, 48, 629 F.2d 80, 82 (1980); App. 11. He argued, inter alia, that Congress had not given the Secretary of State authority to promulgate the regulations under which his passport was revoked. Both the District Court, Agee v. Vance, 483 F.Supp. 729 (1980), and the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit accepted this argument and granted respondent the relief requested.
This is not a complicated case. The Court has twice articulated the proper mode of analysis for determining whether Congress has delegated to the Executive Branch the authority to deny a passport under the Passport Act of 1926. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U. S. 1 (1965); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U. S. 116 (1958). The analysis is hardly confusing, and I expect that, had the Court faithfully applied it, today's judgment would affirm the decision below.
authorize the denial of passports to alleged Communists, the Court examined cases of actual passport refusals by the Secretary to determine whether "it could be fairly argued" that this category of passport refusals was "adopted by Congress in light of prior administrative practice." Id. at 357 U. S. 128. The Court was unable to find such prior administrative practice, and therefore held that the regulation was unauthorized.
"We have held, Kent v. Dulles, supra, and reaffirm today, that the 1926 Act must take its content from history: it authorizes only those passport refusals and restrictions 'which it could fairly be argued were adopted by Congress in light of prior administrative practice.' Kent v. Dulles, supra, at 357 U. S. 128. So limited, the Act does not constitute an invalid delegation."
381 U.S. at 381 U. S. 17-18. In reaching its decision, the Court in Zemel relied upon numerous occasions when the State Department had restricted travel to certain international areas: Belgium in 1915; Ethiopia in 1935; Spain in 1936; China in 1937; Yugoslavia in the late 1940's; Hungary in 1949; Czechoslovakia in 1951; Albania, Bulgaria, Communist China, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, and the Soviet Union in 1952; Albania, Bulgaria, and portions of China, Korea, and Vietnam in 1955; and Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and Syria in 1956.
"with regard to the sort of passport [revocation] involve [here], an administrative practice sufficiently substantial and consistent to warrant the conclusion that Congress had implicitly approved it."
"We hold that the policy announced in the challenged regulations is 'sufficiently substantial and consistent'' to compel the conclusion that Congress has approved it. See Zemel, 381 U.S. at 381 U. S. 12."
"a consistent administrative construction of [the Passport Act] must be followed by the courts "unless there are compelling indications that it is wrong.'""
Ante at 453 U. S. 291 (emphasis added).
the Chief Executive, and the Attorneys General, all so said. This long-continued executive construction should be enough, it is said, to warrant the inference that Congress adopted it. See Allen v. Grand Central Aircraft Co., 347 U. S. 535, 347 U. S. 544-545; United States v. Allen-Bradley Co., 352 U. S. 306, 352 U. S. 310. But the key to that problem, as we shall see, is in the manner in which the Secretary's discretion was exercised, not in the bare fact that he had discretion."
might register general approval of the Executive's overall policy, it still might disapprove of the Executive's pattern of applying that broad rule in specific categories of cases.
"[t]he President and the Secretary of State consistently construed the 1856 [Passport] Act to preserve their authority to withhold passports on national security and foreign policy grounds,"
a revocation pursuant to the regulations challenged in this case. Yet, in 1979 alone, there were 7,835,000 Americans traveling abroad. U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States 253 (101st ed., 1980).
"The Secretary has construed and applied his regulations consistently, and it would be anomalous to fault the Government because there were so few occasions to exercise the announced policy and practice. . . . It would turn Kent on its head to say that, simply because we have had only a few situations involving conduct such as that in this record, the Executive lacks the authority to deal with the problem when it is encountered."
Ante at 453 U. S. 303. Of course, no one is "faulting" the Government because there are only few occasions when it has seen fit to deny or revoke passports for foreign policy or national security reasons. The point that Kent and Zemel make, and that today's opinion should make, is that the Executive's authority to revoke passports touches an area fraught with important constitutional rights, and that the Court should therefore "construe narrowly all delegated powers that curtail or dilute them." Kent v. Dulles, supra, at 357 U. S. 129. The presumption is that Congress must expressly delegate authority to the Secretary to deny or revoke passports for foreign policy or national security reasons before he may exercise such authority. To overcome the presumption against an implied delegation, the Government must show "an administrative practice sufficiently substantial and consistent." Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. at 381 U. S. 12. Only in this way can the Court satisfy itself that Congress has implicitly approved such exercise of authority by the Secretary.
"The Department's action is predicated upon a determination made by the Secretary under the provisions of Section 51.70(b)(4) that your activities abroad are causing or are likely to cause serious damage to the national security or the foreign policy of the United States. The reasons for the Secretary's determination are, in summary, as follows: Since the early 1970's, it has been your stated intention to conduct a continuous campaign to disrupt the intelligence operations of the United States. In carrying out that campaign, you have traveled in various countries (including, among others, Mexico, the United Kingdom, Denmark, Jamaica, Cuba and Germany), and your activities in those countries have caused serious damage to the national security and the foreign policy of the United States. Your stated intention to continue such activities threatens additional damage of the same kind."
Quoted in Agee v. Muskie, 203 U.S.App.D.C. 46, 48, 629 F.2d 80, 82 (1980).
Title 22 CFR § 51.71 (a) (1980) allows revocation, restriction, or limitation of a passport where the national would not be entitled to issuance of a new passport pursuant to 22 CFR § 51.70 (1980). For purposes of this case, denial and revocation of a passport are treated identically.
The lower courts have had no trouble understanding and following the holdings of Kent and Zemel. See, e.g., Lynd v. Rusk, 128 U.S.App.D.C. 399, 404-405, 389 F.2d 940, 945-946 (1967); Woodward v. Rogers, 344 F.Supp. 974, 985 (DC 1972), summarily aff'd, 159 U.S.App.D.C. 57, 486 F.2d 1317 (1973).
"[t]he Secretary of State has the right, in his discretion, to refuse to issue a passport, and will exercise this right towards anyone who, he has reason to believe, desires a passport to further an unlawful or improper purpose."
3 J. Moore, A Digest of International Law 902 (1906); Brief for Petitioner 28. This statement can hardly be thought to communicate to Congress the contours of the Executive's discretion; indeed, it is little more than embellishment on the passport legislation itself.
In contrast with the Kent Court, today's Court relies on Executive Orders promulgated after passage of the Passport Act of 1926. Compare ante at 453 U. S. 298, n. 39, with Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. at 357 U. S. 124, n. 10.
Even if the Court were correct to use administrative constructions of passport legislation, it is by no means certain that the Executive did construe the Acts to give it the discretion alleged here, since it sometimes referred to the unqualified rights of citizens to passports. See, e.g., 15 Op. Atty. Gem 114, 117 (1876); 13 Op.Atty.Gen. 397, 398 (1871). Indeed the State Department has sought legislation from Congress to provide the sort of authority exercised in this case. See S. 4110, § 103(6), 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958); Hearings on S. 2770, S. 3998, S. 4110, and S. 4137 before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 1, 4 (1958); see also H.R. 14895, § 205(e), 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966). This hardly suggests that the Executive thought it had such authority.
"Because passport files are maintained by name, rather than by category of applicant or reason for disposition, it is virtually impossible to compile comprehensive statistical data regarding passport denials on national security or foreign policy grounds."
Brief for Petitioner 29, n. 22. One wonders, then, how the petitioner can argue that Congress was aware of any administrative practice, when the data is unavailable even to the Executive. In any event, the slim practice that Judge MacKinnon and the petitioner cite could hardly be termed a sufficiently consistent and substantial administrative practice to pass the Kent-Zemel test.
"QUESTION: General McCree, supposing a person right now were to apply for a passport to go to Salvador, and when asked the purpose of his journey, to say, to denounce the United States policy in Salvador in supporting the junta. And the Secretary of State says, I just will not issue a passport for that purpose. Do you think that he can consistently do that in the light of our previous cases?"
"MR. McCREE: I would say, yes, he can. Because we have to vest these -- The President of the United States and the Secretary of State working under him are charged with conducting the foreign policy of the Nation, and the freedom of speech that we enjoy domestically may be different from that that we can exercise in this context."
Tr. of Oral Arg. 20. The reach of the Secretary's discretion is potentially staggering.
Because I conclude that the regulation is invalid as an unlawful exercise of authority by the Secretary under the Passport Act of 1926, I need not decide the important constitutional issues presented in this case. However, several parts of the Court's whirlwind treatment of Agee's constitutional claims merit comment, either because they are extreme oversimplifications of constitutional doctrine or mistaken views of the law and facts of this case.
"To the extent the revocation of his passport operates to inhibit Agee, 'it is an inhibition of action,' rather than of speech. . . . Agee is as free to criticize the United States Government as he was when he held a passport -- always subject, of course, to express limits on certain rights by virtue of his contract with the Government."
Ante at 453 U. S. 309 (footnote omitted). Under the Court's rationale, I would suppose that a 40-year prison sentence imposed upon a person who criticized the Government's food stamp policy would represent only an "inhibition of action." After all, the individual would remain free to criticize the United States Government, albeit from a jail cell.
"Agee's disclosures, among other things, have the declared purpose of obstructing intelligence operations and the recruiting of intelligence personnel. They are clearly not protected by the Constitution."
Ante at 453 U. S. 308-309. The Court seems to misunderstand the prior precedents of this Court, for Agee's speech is undoubtedly protected by the Constitution. However, it may be that respondent's First Amendment right to speak is outweighed by the Government's interest in national security. The point respondent makes, and one that is worthy of plenary consideration, is that revocation of his passport obviously does implicate First Amendment rights by chilling his right to speak, and therefore the Court's responsibility must be to balance that infringement against the asserted governmental interests to determine whether the revocation contravenes the First Amendment. I add that Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U. S. 697 (1931), is hardly a relevant or convincing precedent to sustain the Secretary's action here. Only when there is proof that the activity "must inevitably, directly, and immediately cause the occurrence of an event kindred to imperiling the safety of a transport already at sea" does the Near exception apply. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U. S. 713, 403 U. S. 726-727 (1971) (BRENNAN, J., concurring). Agee's concession in the trial court below was only for the purpose of challenging the facial validity of the regulation, not its application to his case. Therefore, until the facts are known, the majority no less than I can have no idea whether Agee's conduct actually would fall within the extreme factual category presented by Near.
"Your client, you would be conceding, falls within the core of the objective of the regulation, and the fact that it may be over-broad as to somebody else isn't very persuasive to me."
Tr. 11 (Jan. 3, 1980). Not only is this obviously not a holding, and not only did Judge Gesell never mention vagueness, but further portions of the transcript clearly establish that Judge Gesell expressly declined to reach Agee's overbreadth claim for purposes of this summary judgment motion, and that this claim was reserved for future consideration. Id. at 16. In any event, it is strange indeed to suggest that an individual whose activities admittedly fall within the core of the challenged regulation does not have standing to argue overbreadth. After all, the purpose of the overbreadth doctrine in First Amendment cases is precisely to permit a person who falls within the legislation nevertheless to challenge the wide sweep of the legislation as it affects another's protected activity. See, e.g., Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U. S. 518, 405 U. S. 520-521 (1972). And nothing in Parker v. Levy, 417 U. S. 733 (1974), the case cited by the Court, detracts from that doctrine.
Because the Court concludes that Agee has no standing to raise vagueness and overbreadth claims, it does not decide the question whether the challenged regulation is constitutionally infirm under those doctrines. I can only say that, for me, these are substantial issues highlighted particularly by the Solicitor General's comments at oral argument as to the reach of the regulations. See n. 9, supra.

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