Source: http://supreme.nolo.com/us/446/578/case.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 15:46:57+00:00

Document:
and Conoco, Inc. (Conoco), the respondents here, challenged a decision of the Administrator concerning the applicability of EPA's "new source" performance standards to a power generating facility operated by PPG. More specifically, we must decide whether the Administrator's decision falls within the ambit of "any other final action" reviewable in a court of appeals under § 307(b)(1).
"any stationary source, the construction or modification of which is commenced after the publication of regulations (or, if earlier, proposed regulations) prescribing a standard of performance under this section which will be applicable to such source."
request, will determine whether any action taken or planned by the owner or operator of a facility constitutes or will constitute "construction" or "modification" of the facility for purposes of triggering the applicability of the performance standards. § 60.5.
Sometime in 1970, the respondent PPG, a chemical manufacturing corporation, began the planning and preliminary construction of a new power generating facility at its plant in Lake Charles, La. That facility, designed to take advantage of fuel-efficient "cogeneration" technology, was to consist of two gas turbine generators, two "waste-heat" boilers, and a turbogenerator. The dispute between EPA and PPG concerns the applicability of the "new source" performance standards to the waste-heat boilers of this facility. This controversy first arose in 1975, when the respondent Conoco, PPG's fuel supplier, informed EPA that Conoco was switching the supply of fuel to the Lake Charles facility from natural gas to fuel oil. An exchange of correspondence ensued, initiated by EPA's request that PPG submit additional information bearing on whether the waste-heat boilers were covered by the "new source" standards. PPG's submissions revealed that, although assembly of the waste-heat boilers had not begun until 1976, the new power facility itself, of which the boilers were an integral component, had been originally designed and partially ordered in 1970, a year before the proposed date of the "new source" performance standards.
On the basis of PPG's submissions, the Regional Director for Enforcement of the EPA notified PPG of his conclusion that the boilers were subject to the "new source" standards, since construction of the boilers themselves had not begun until long after January 14, 1971, the date on which the standards had been proposed. In response, PPG took the position that the boilers were part of an integrated unit, the construction of which had begun in 1970, before the proposed date of the standards. The Regional Director, nevertheless, reaffirmed his initial decision.
Pursuant to the procedure outlined in the "new source" regulations, 40 CFR § 60.5 (1979), PPG then submitted a formal request for an EPA determination that (1) the "new source" standards for "fossil fuel-fired steam generators" do not apply to the type of boilers in question, and (2) in any event, since construction of the facility of which the boilers were a part began before the date on which the standards were proposed, the boilers were not "new sources," and thus not subject to the performance standards. In the event that EPA determined that PPG's waste-heat boilers were subject to the standards, PPG also requested a clarification as to how those standards would apply.
PPG then filed a petition in the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, seeking review of EPA's decision concerning the applicability of the "new source" standards to its waste-heat boilers. Because of its uncertainty regarding the proper forum for judicial review, PPG also filed a complaint for injunctive relief against the Administrator in the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana. That suit has been stayed pending the disposition of the present case.
regionally applicable." (Emphasis added.) Later in 177, in enacting the Clean Air Act Technical and Conforming Amendments, Pub.L. 95-190, 91 Stat. 1404, Congress added several more provisions to those listed in § 307(b)(1) under which a locally or regionally applicable action of the Administrator is reviewable in the appropriate court of appeals.
It was under § 307(b)(1), as amended, that PPG filed a petition for review in the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Despite having filed its petition there, PPG, and Conoco as intervenor, argued that that court was without jurisdiction, since the Administrator's decision was not an action taken under one of the provisions specifically enumerated in § 307(b)(1), and could not be properly characterized as "any other final action of the Administrator." The latter phrase, they argued, referred only to other locally or regionally applicable final actions under the provisions of the Act specifically enumerated in § 307(b)(1). In response, EPA argued that the phrase "any other final action" should be read literally to mean any final action of the Administrator.
"[i]f Congress intended . . . to cast the entire responsibility for reviewing all EPA action under the Act into the courts of appeals, the numeration of specific sections would appear to be redundant."
"[w]hatever addition to the jurisdiction of the courts of appeals Congress may have contemplated by adding the 'any other final action' language to § 307(b)(1), we assume that section was drafted with the mechanical limitations of the courts of appeals in mind."
587 F.2d at 245. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals dismissed PPG's petition for lack of jurisdiction under § 307(b)(1). We granted certiorari, 444 U.S. 823, because of the importance of determining the locus of judicial review of the actions of EPA.
It is undisputed that the Administrator's decision concerning the applicability of the "new source" performance standards to PPG's waste-heat boilers was locally applicable action under a provision of the Act not specifically enumerated in § 307(b)(1). The question at issue is whether the Administrator's decision falls within the scope of the phrase, "any other final action of the Administrator," so as to make that decision reviewable in a federal court of appeals under § 307(b)(1).
At the outset, we note that the parties are in agreement that the Administrator's decision was "final action" as that term is understood in the context of the Administrative Procedure Act and other provisions of federal law. It is undisputed that the Administrator's ruling represented EPA's final determination concerning the applicability of the "new source" standards to PPG's power facility. Short of an enforcement action, EPA has rendered its last word on the matter. The controversy thus is not about whether the Administrator's decision was "final," but rather about whether it was "any other final action" within the meaning of § 307(b)(1), as amended in 1977.
The respondents' reliance on the rule of ejusdem generis is, we think, misplaced in two respects. Under the rule of ejusdem generis, where general words follow an enumeration of specific items, the general words are read as applying only to other items akin to those specifically enumerated. Applying this rule to § 307(b)(1), the respondents argue that "any other final action" must refer only to final actions based on an administrative record reflecting at least notice and opportunity for a hearing. The flaw in this argument is that at least one of the specifically enumerated provisions in § 307(b)(1), namely, § 112(c) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(c) (1976 ed., Supp. II), does not require the Administrator to act only after notice and opportunity for a hearing. In fact, the respondents themselves recognize that an action by the Administrator under § 112(c) would be based on an administrative record not unlike that involved in this case. [Footnote 5] Thus, even if the rule of ejusdem generis were applied, it would not significantly narrow the ambit of "any other final action" under § 307(b)(1).
"'The rule of ejusdem generis, while firmly established, is only an instrumentality for ascertaining the correct meaning of words when there is uncertainty.'"
We have found nothing in the legislative history to support a conclusion that the phrase, "any other final action," in § 307(b)(1) means anything other than what it says.
"[The proposed addition to the first sentence of § 307(b)(1)] makes it clear that any nationally applicable regulations promulgated by the Administrator under the Clean Air Act could be reviewed only in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. . . ."
of appeals for the circuit in which such locality, State, or region is located. . . ."
Ibid. The Committee Report further stated that the proposed changes reflected the Committee's agreement with certain venue proposals of the Administrative Conference of the United States, but added the caveat that the adoption of these proposals was not to be taken as an endorsement of the remainder of the Administrative Conference's recommendations. Id. at 324.
The respondents infer from this scant legislative history that Congress never intended the addition of the phrase, "any other final action," to § 307(b)(1) to enlarge the jurisdiction of the courts of appeals to include the review of cases based on an administrative record reflecting less than notice and an opportunity for a hearing. But, insofar as the respondents rely on what the Committee said in its Report, we fail to see how the Committee's observations on venue have any bearing at all on the jurisdictional issue now before the Court. [Footnote 7] Moreover, since the Administrative Conference had not proposed that the jurisdiction of the courts of appeals be expanded to include "any other final action," the fact that the Committee expressly disclaimed an endorsement of the recommendations of the Administrative Conference on matters other than venue would appear wholly irrelevant.
view that, since agency action predicated on neither formal adjudication nor informal rulemaking is apt to be based on a record too scant to permit informed judicial review, the district court is the preferable forum, since the tools of discovery are there available to augment the record, whereas, in a court of appeals, a time-consuming remand to EPA might be required.
For the reasons stated, we hold that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition for want of jurisdiction. Accordingly, the judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
"A petition for review of action of the Administrator in promulgating any national primary or secondary ambient air quality standard, any emission standard or requirement under section 112, any standard of performance or requirement under section 111, any standard under section 202 (other than a standard required to be prescribed under section 202(b)(1)), any determination under section 202(b)(5), any control or prohibition under section 211, any standard under section 231, any rule issued under section 113, 119, or under section 120, or any other nationally applicable regulations promulgated, or final action taken, by the Administrator under this Act may be filed only in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. A petition for review of the Administrator's action in approving or promulgating any implementation plan under section 110 or section 111(d), any order under section 111(j), under section 112(c), under section 113(d), under section 119, or under section 120, or his action under section 119(c)(2)(A), (b), or (C) (as in effect before the date of enactment of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977) or under regulations thereunder, or any other final action of the Administrator under this Act (including any denial or disapproval by the Administrator under title I) which is locally or regionally applicable may be filed only in the United States Court of Appeals for the appropriate circuit. Notwithstanding the preceding sentence a petition for review of any action referred to in such sentence may be filed only in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia if such action is based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect and if in taking such action the Administrator finds and publishes that such action is based on such a determination. Any petition for review under this subsection shall be filed within sixty days from the date notice of such promulgation, approval, or action appears in the Federal Register, except that, if such petition is based solely on grounds arising after such sixtieth day, then any petition for review under this subsection shall be filed within sixty days after such grounds arise."
(Emphasis added.) § 307(b)(1) of the Act, as added, 84 Stat. 1708, and amended by the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub.L. 95-95, 91 Stat. 776, and the Clean Air Act Technical and Conforming Amendments, § 14 of Pub.L. 95 190, 91 Stat. 1404, 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (1976 ed., Supp. II).
In a request for clarification, PPG expressed its understanding that the "new source" standards would not be applicable during the normal course of operation of the boilers, but only during performance tests or other periods when the boilers were operating on 100% fossil fuel. EPA, by letter, confirmed PPG's understanding. This position, however, was inconsistent with both the Regional Administrator's earlier ruling and with EPA's position in similar cases. Accordingly, an EPA representative notified PPG by telephone that the letter was incorrect. In a subsequent letter, the Director of the Division of Stationary Source Enforcement of EPA reiterated that the "new source" standards would be applicable during the normal operation of the waste-heat boilers, but only to the extent that the boilers were operating on fossil fuel, rather than waste heat. The Director also indicated that, pursuant to the standards, PPG would be required to operate the boilers at all times with fuel containing less than a certain specified content of sulfur. He further noted that PPG would be required to install and operate opacity monitors in the stacks of the boilers, and to perform alternative monitoring tests.
The respondents have abandoned the construction of the statute they advanced in the Court of Appeals, namely, that the phrase, "any other final action," refers only to other final actions under those provisions specifically enumerated in § 307(b)(1). That construction, as the Court of Appeals correctly noted, is inconsistent with the fact that the phrase, "any other final action," is modified not by "under these sections," but rather by "under this Act."
It would appear that the respondents' construction of the statute is that adopted by the Court of Appeals, although the matter is not free from doubt. The doubt arises from the fact that the Court of Appeals' opinion can also be read as establishing a jurisdictional test that turns on a case-by-case inquiry into the adequacy of the administrative record. But, as the respondents themselves acknowledge, that reading of the opinion would create excessive uncertainty as to the proper forum for judicial review.
The respondents argue that this exception should be ignored in applying the rule of ejusdem generis, since § 112(c) governs the regulation of "hazardous air pollutants" for which Congress may have wanted "special review" in the courts of appeals, even in the absence of procedures requiring notice and opportunity for a hearing. It is our view, however, that, if the rule of ejusdem generis is applicable, it must be applied to actions under all the specifically enumerated provisions in § 307(b)(1), not simply those that fit the respondents' theory.
The respondents raise several objections to so literal a reading of § 307(b)(1), none of which we find persuasive. First, the respondents assert that such a construction of § 307(b)(1) is both internally inconsistent and inconsistent with another provision of the Act. The internal inconsistency is said to arise from the fact that, if the phrase, "any other final action," were construed to include any final action of the Administrator, it would nullify the express exception from review in § 307(b)(1) of any "standard required to be prescribed under section 202(b)(1)." The inconsistency with another provision in the Act is said to arise from the fact that a literal reading of "any other final action" would effectively repeal another judicial review provision in the Act, § 206(b)(2)(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7525(b)(2)(b) (1976 ed., Supp. II). These objections fall far short of the mark, however, for the general language of the catchall phrase, "any other final action," must obviously give way to specific express provisions in the Act.
The respondents also argue that, if Congress had intended the phrase, "any other final action," to refer to all final actions of the Administrator, it would have been unnecessary, in 1977, to add to the list in § 307(b)(1) of specifically enumerated provisions under which actions of the Administrator are reviewable in the courts of appeals. This may be true, but the fact remains that even if Congress had intended the phrase, "any other final action," to be read, as the respondents urge, in accordance with the rule of ejusdem generis, there still would have been no necessity to add to the list of specifically enumerated provisions.
That the Committee intended the phrase, "any other final action," to result in at least some expansion of the jurisdiction of the courts of appeals is evident in the fact that the Committee Report expressly indicated that several types of nationwide actions under provisions not specifically enumerated in § 307(b)(1) would be reviewable in the District of Columbia Circuit. See H.R.Rep. No. 9294, pp. 323-324 (1977) (e.g., regulations to carry out the nonattainment policy set out in § 117 of the Act). Thus, as even the respondents concede, the issue here is not whether Congress intended any expansion of the jurisdiction of the courts of appeals, but rather the extent to which Congress intended to expand that jurisdiction. As to that issue, the legislative history is silent.
Arthur Conan Doyle, The Silver Blaze, in The Complete Sherlock Holmes (1938).
"[a]ction of the Administrator with respect to which review could have been obtained under [§ 307(b)(1)] shall not be subject to judicial review in civil or criminal proceedings for enforcement."
42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(2) (1976 ed., Supp. II). To preclude a defendant in a civil or criminal enforcement proceeding from attacking the validity of informal action on the part of the Administrator would, in the respondents' view, violate the defendant's due process right to a "reasonable opportunity to be heard and present evidence." Yakus v. United States, 321 U. S. 414, 321 U. S. 433. The short answer to the respondents' argument is that the validity of § 307(b)(2) is not at issue here. The constitutional question raised by the respondents must, therefore, await another day.
The dissenting opinions would modify the language of § 307(b)(1) so as to read either (1) any other final action similar to that under the specifically enumerated provisions other than those added in the Clean Air Act Technical and Conforming Amendments, post at 446 U. S. 600-602, or (2) any other final action expressly, but not impliedly, authorized under the sections of the Act not specifically enumerated in § 307(b)(1), post at 446 U. S. 607. But neither the language of the statute nor its legislative history supports either of these proposed readings of § 307(b)(1).
Whether the present administrative record in this case is adequate to permit informed judicial review is a question that the Court of Appeals must determine.
possible in this case. As the Court demonstrates, the intention of Congress is clear. Accordingly, I join the opinion of the Court.
For the reasons stated in my Brother STEVENS' dissent, I accept the Court's conclusion that the Agency's determination in this case constituted "final" action. The opaque language of § 307(b)(1) and the scant attention it received by Congress, however, leave me in doubt concerning Congress' true intention with respect to the scope of direct appellate review. Like my dissenting Brethren, I find it difficult to believe that Congress would undertake such a massive expansion in the number of Agency actions directly reviewable by the courts of appeals without some palpable indication that it had given thought to the consequences. Nonetheless, I agree with the Court that the dearth of evidence to the contrary makes its broad interpretation of the statute inescapable. On this legislative record, we must leave to Congress, should it be so inclined, the task of introducing some clear limitation on appellate jurisdiction over review of informal Agency determinations like the one now before us.
we know of the matter makes Congress' additions to § 307(b)(1) in the Clean Air Act Technical and Conforming Amendments of 1977 no less curious than was the incident in the Silver Blaze of the dog that did nothing in the night time. If I am correct in this, we must look beyond the language of the phrase "any other final action" in ascertaining congressional intention. The Court did just that in Chemehuevi Tribe of Indians v. FPC, 420 U. S. 395 (1975).
"The requirements that interested persons have an opportunity at least for written comment and that the agency provide a general statement of reasons virtually assure that an appellate court will have a meaningful record to review. While it is true that, in many instances, informal adjudication also produces an administrative record, the nature and scope of the records vary widely from one type of action to another, and cannot provide the same assurance that appellate review will be feasible."
"[t]his may be true, but the fact remains that, even if Congress had intended the phrase 'any other final action' to be read . . . in accordance with the rule of ejusdem generis, there still would have been no necessity to add to the list of specifically enumerated provisions."
Ante at 446 U. S. 589, n. 6.
than the jurisdictional shift that, according to the Court, Congress adopted sub silentio. And the remarks made at the time the technical amendments were adopted, coupled with the nature of the actions reviewable under § 307(b)(1) prior to that time, are sufficiently perplexing that, in my view, the technical amendments do not shed any meaningful light on Congress' intention in adding the phrase "any other final action" to § 307(b)(1). Accordingly, even though they be labeled "technical amendments," I think they are most accurately viewed as subsequent legislative history that is not controlling in interpreting a prior enactment. See United Air Lines, Inc. v. McMann, 434 U. S. 192, 434 U. S. 200, n. 7 (1977). Indeed, to one not acquainted with the significance of the expansion of jurisdiction of courts of appeals urged by the EPA and adopted by the Court, the technical amendments most likely looked like minor additions to § 307(b)(1). Thus, I think the most sensible way to interpret the phrase "any other final action" is to do so by reference to § 307(b)(1) at the time that phrase was enacted, rather than at the subsequent time at which the technical amendments were added.
of actions. This interpretation offers the most satisfactory explanation for Congress' curious failure to provide any indication that it intended to effect a major jurisdictional change in the manner of reviewing EPA actions such as the one before us, a change that is inconsistent with the traditional role of appellate courts. In a case where the construction of legislative language such as this makes so sweeping and so relatively unorthodox a change as that made here, I think judges, as well as detectives, may take into consideration the fact that a watchdog did not bark in the night.
"A petition for review of action of the Administrator in promulgating any national primary or secondary ambient air quality standard, any emission standard under section 112, any standard of performance under section 111, any standard under section 202 (other than a standard required t.o be prescribed under section 202(b)(1)), any determination under section 202(b)(5), any control or prohibition under section 211, or any standard under section 231 may be filed only in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. A petition for review of the Administrator's action in approving or promulgating any implementation plan under section 110 or section 111(d) may be filed only in the United States Court of Appeals for the appropriate circuit. Any such petition shall be filed within 30 days from the date of such promulgation or approval. . . ."
Pub.L. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1708. It was inserted by the Senate, S. 4358, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., § 308 (1970), to "specify forums for judicial review of certain actions of the [EPA] Secretary. . . ." H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 91-1783, p. 57 (1970). The House bill did not contain a comparable provision. Ibid. In 1974, §§ 119(c)(2)(A),(b), and(C) and the phrase "regulations thereunder" were added to the list of actions reviewable under § 307(b)(1). Pub.L. 93-319, 88 Stat. 259.
"technical and other relevant information necessary to achieve a sound judgment . . . should be reviewable in the court of appeals so that the interests of all parties can be fully protected. With the record developed by the [EPA] Secretary, the court, as an unbiased, independent institution, is the appropriate forum for reviewing such decision and making a judgment as to its quality."
"Direct appellate review of formal administrative adjudications . . . has long been standard practice: because the agency's action is to be judged by the administrative record, there is no need for a trial, and thus no need for prior resort to a district court."
Currie, Judicial Review Under Federal Pollution Laws, 62 Iowa L.Rev. 1221, 1232 (1977) (emphasis added). See also Currie & Goodman, Judicial Review of Federal Administrative Action: Quest for the Optimum Forum, 75 Colum.L.Rev. 1, 5-6 (1975).
"in adopting this subsection, the committee was in large measure approving the portion of the Administrative Conference of the United States recommendation Section 305.76-4(A) [41 Fed.Reg. 56768 (1976)], that deals with venue,"
"incorporates recommendation D2 of the Administrative Conference on extending the period for petitioning for judicial review in the court of appeals."
Id. at 324. It further stated that it did not endorse the remainder of the Administrative Conference's recommendations, ibid., which include a recommendation that proposed expanding the jurisdiction of the courts of appeals by eliminating the exception to review in those courts for regulations adopted under § 202(b)(1) , 42 U.S.C. § 7521(b)(1) (1976 ed., Supp. II).
"[o]nly those amendments that are necessary to correct technical errors or unclear phrases have been retained in the package of amendments that is now before the Senate."
Section 112(c) does not make any provision for notice and comment or hearing. And, while §§ 111(j) and 119(a) generally provide for notice and hearing, they do not do so in every case. Under § 111(j), an order denying a waiver apparently may be made by the Administrator without formal proceedings, and under § 119(a), the Administrator apparently may deny an application for a primary nonferrous smelter order without providing for notice and hearing.
in her June,1977, response, unequivocally stating that PPG's boilers were subject to the standards in question.
After a few more "clarifying" letters were exchanged, PPG brought two separate petitions for review of EPA's determination, filing in both the District Court for the Western District of Louisiana and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The Fifth Circuit dismissed the petition on the ground that review was properly had, if at all, in the District Court.
There are two issues before us today: first, whether EPA's determination constitutes "final" agency action such that any review is appropriate, and second, if so, whether that review must be had in the Court of Appeals because the determination constituted "any other final action" within the meaning of § 307(b)(1) of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (1976 ed., Supp. II). While I accept the Court's holding that the Agency's determination constituted "final" action as that term is ordinarily used under the Administrative Procedure Act, I am not persuaded that Congress intended exclusive review of this type of action in the courts of appeals.
In Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U. S. 136, 387 U. S. 149-156, this Court set out three tests that informal agency action must meet in order to be considered final agency action that is ripe for judicial review. First, the action must involve an issue that is appropriate for judicial review, such as a purely legal question. Second, it must be a definitive statement of the agency's position, and not merely a tentative view or the opinion of a subordinate official. Finally, the party seeking review of the action must be faced with serious hardship if he is not allowed to obtain preenforcement review. In Abbott Laboratories itself, the third requirement was satisfied by the fact that the affected companies either had to expend substantial amounts of money to comply with the regulation or not comply, and risk serious criminal and civil penalties.
review that action. As MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST points out in his dissent, such a construction of the statute will greatly increase the burdens currently borne by the courts of appeals, both in terms of numbers of cases and difficulty of issues presented. [Footnote 3/5] Ante at 446 U. S. 596-597, 446 U. S. 600-601. In my view, it will also distort the concept of final agency action by giving EPA virtually unlimited discretion to transform its informal advice into final agency action subject to court of appeals review.
publication may give the Agency the benefit of the preclusive effect of § 307(b)(2), it has every incentive to notice a wide range of actions in the Federal Register.
I find it difficult to believe that Congress intended this highly undesirable result. Although I do not share MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST's interpretation of the statute, I would construe it as drawing a line short of allowing EPA complete discretion to turn anything it chooses into final action reviewable only in the courts of appeals.
and 7419 (1976 ed., Supp. II), empower the Administrator to grant (and, by necessary implication, to deny) waivers to companies that are unable to comply with the applicable standards; and § 120, 42 U.S.C. § 7420 (1976 ed., Supp. II), sets up a procedure through which the Administrator is to assess noncompliance penalties, after notice and hearing on the record. Each of these types of agency action has an immediate impact on the legal rights of the affected party.
By contrast, agency advice as to whether or not particular sources are subject to previously promulgated regulations does not, in itself, change any party's legal status; nor is there anything in the statute that specifically requires or permits the Administrator to give such advice. This does not mean that it is beyond the Administrator's power to do so, or to set up his own procedures, as he has done in 40 CFR § 60.5(a) (1979), for giving advice in a formalized manner. But I do not believe Congress intended the review provisions of the statute to cover this type of "agency action" as well as those types specifically contemplated by the statute. In making reviewable "any other final action of the Administrator under this chapter," Congress must have been thinking of actions it had specifically directed or authorized the Administrator to take under sections of the Act not specifically enumerated in § 307(b)(1). This interpretation is consistent with both an ejusdem generis construction of the statute and its plain language. It is also supported by Congress' apparent belief that it was extending court of appeals review only to the types of actions that EPA had been accustomed to publishing in the Federal Register. See n. 7, supra.
PPG also had questions about compliance in the event that the standards were found to apply.
"When requested to do so by an owner or operator, the Administrator will make a determination of whether action taken or intended to be taken by such owner or operator constitutes construction (including reconstruction) or modification or the commencement thereof within the meaning of this part."
The Court relies exclusively on this factor, along with the fact that the parties agree that the action is "final." I would not place much reliance on the parties' agreement, however, since they share a common interest in having the threshold jurisdictional question resolved in the affirmative. Thus, it serves PPG's interests to treat EPA's letter as a final action, because PPG wants judicial review as soon as possible. It also serves EPA's interests because broadening the category of agency actions that are final and reviewable only in the courts of appeals increases the number of agency actions that cannot be challenged in enforcement proceedings under the Act. See infra at 446 U. S. 605.
See National Automatic Laundry & Cleaning Council v. Shultz, 143 U.S.App.D.C. 274, 281, 443 F.2d 689, 696 (1971), in which the court held a letter signed by the Wage-Hour Administrator concerning a particular application of the Fair Labor Standards Act to be "final action" in light of the fact that noncompliance with the agency's policy could have led to criminal liability and actions for double damages by affected employees. But see West Penn Power Co. v. Train, 522 F.2d 302, 31311 (CA3 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 947; 522 F.2d at 317-319 (Adams, J., dissenting), where the court refused to consider a notice of violation issued pursuant to the Clean Air Act to be final agency action despite the severe penalties that could have attached to future noncompliance.
Whether or not the record in this case was sufficiently developed for purposes of court of appeals' review (an issue on which the parties differ), it is clear that there will be many cases involving informal EPA action in which the "record" on which the Agency relied in making its determination will be minimal.
"Action of the Administrator with respect to which review could have been obtained under paragraph (1) shall not be subject to judicial review in civil or criminal proceedings for enforcement."
In EPA's brief in the Court of Appeals, it took the position that, by adding "any other final action" to § 307(b)(1), Congress intended to require the Agency to give notice in the Federal Register of each and every "final action" it takes, contrary to its prior practice. Although the Agency noted that it had not yet begun complying with this obligation, it stated that it intended to begin publication in the near future of all final agency actions taken since the 1977 amendments. Brief for Respondents in No. 77-2989 (CA5), pp. 27-29. EPA's interpretation of the Federal Register clause as a requirement that notice of final determinations be given seems backwards to me. I think a more plausible interpretation of the statute is that Congress intended the term "final agency action" to refer only to the types of actions that EPA was accustomed to publishing in the Federal Register prior to the 1977 amendments.
The hardship determination, of course, becomes circular, since there is no preclusion unless there is "final" agency action and no finality unless there is some hardship in not according preenforcement review. Under these circumstances, the courts are likely to emulate the Court's approach in this case, ignoring the hardship component entirely and making reviewable any action that constitutes a definitive statement of the Agency's position.

References: § 307
 § 60
 § 60
 § 307
 § 307
 § 307
 § 307
 § 307
 § 307
 § 307
 § 307
 § 307
 § 307
 § 307
 § 112
 § 7412
 § 112
 § 307
 § 307
 § 307
 § 307
 § 307
 § 14
 § 7607
 § 307
 § 112
 § 307
 § 307
 § 307
 § 307
 § 206
 § 7525
 § 307
 § 307
 § 117
 § 7607
 v. 
 § 307
 § 307
 § 307
 § 307
 § 307
 § 307
 v. 
 § 307
 § 307
 v. 
 § 307
 § 307
 § 308
 § 307
 § 202
 § 7521
 § 111
 § 119
 § 307
 § 7607
 v. 
 § 307
 § 120
 § 7420
 § 60
 § 307
 v. 
 v. 
 § 307