Source: https://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-5th-circuit/1682242.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 15:19:39+00:00

Document:
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Randy L. RANDALL, Defendant–Appellant.
Before DAVIS, DeMOSS, and ELROD, Circuit Judges. Carol Mignonne Griffing, Assistant U.S. Attorney, James G. Cowles, Jr., Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney's Office, Shreveport, LA, for Plaintiff–Appellee. Jennifer P. McKay, Esq., Colvin, Smith & McKay, Shreveport, LA, for Defendant–Appellant.
The PSR found that, although the overall drug amount involved in the conspiracy was five kilograms or more of cocaine, Randall's own “responsibility and knowledge in this case was limited to 148.8 net grams of powder cocaine, and 35.2 net grams of crack cocaine.”3 Based on that drug amount, the PSR calculated a Guidelines range of 70 to 87 months of imprisonment. However, the PSR concluded that the statutory mandatory minimum sentence of 120 months under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(ii) was required.
At sentencing, the district court “accept[ed] the findings of the probation office.” Although the district court noted the applicable Guidelines range of 70 to 87 months, it concluded that it was required to impose the statutory minimum sentence of 120 months for Count 1. Thus, Randall was sentenced above the calculated Guidelines range to the statutory mandatory minimum of 120 months of imprisonment on Count 1 and a consecutive mandatory sentence of 60 months of imprisonment on Count 24. He filed a timely notice of appeal. He now argues for the first time on appeal that the district court erred by imposing the statutory mandatory minimum sentence for Count 1.
For the reasons set out below, we VACATE the sentence and REMAND for resentencing consistent with this opinion.
In Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), the Supreme Court held that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt,”4 or, under Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004), admitted by the defendant. In Alleyne v. United States, ––– U.S. ––––, ––––, 133 S.Ct. 2151, 2158, 186 L.Ed.2d 314 (2013), the Supreme Court extended this holding to facts that increase the mandatory minimum sentence, as in this case. The issue in this appeal is whether or not Randall should be sentenced based on the amount of drugs attributable to the conspiracy as a whole or only on the amount attributable to him individually.
The jury returned a guilty verdict finding that the conspiracy involved five kilograms or more of cocaine, and each of the defendants was sentenced in accordance with § 841(b)(1)(A)(ii).
Prior to sentencing, the district court conducted a hearing on drug quantity in which all defendants participated. At the hearing, the district court noted that the jury had found all of the defendants guilty of conspiring to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine. Believing that not making a drug quantity finding as to each defendant could lead to problems on appeal, or could cause future complications depending on potential revisions to the sentencing guidelines, the defendants, led by Thomas, urged the court to make such findings. The defendants also acknowledged that the five kilogram amount was found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt, and was a floor for sentencing purposes. In response to the defendants' concern regarding drug quantity, the Government agreed to stipulate that the offenses involved five kilograms of cocaine. All defendants agreed to stipulate to this amount for the limited purpose of sentencing. Each defendant also reserved his or her right to argue sufficiency of the evidence on appeal with respect to the quantity of cocaine proved at trial.
To prove conspiracy under 21 U.S.C. § 846, the government must establish that: “(1) an agreement existed between two or more persons to violate federal narcotics law, (2) the defendant knew of the existence of the agreement, and (3) the defendant voluntarily participated in the conspiracy.” United States v. Ochoa, 667 F.3d 643, 648 (5th Cir.2012).
Thus, in both Daniels and the instant case, the defendants were charged under the same statutes for a conspiracy involving five or more kilograms of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 846. The main difference is that the issue in Daniels was whether the jury had sufficient evidence to find that the aggregate amount involved in the conspiracy as to all defendants was five kilograms or more, while the issue here is whether Randall actually pleaded guilty to facts requiring the statutory minimum sentence for five kilograms or more of cocaine under § 841(b)(1)(A)(ii).
The Government concedes that the drug quantity in a conspiracy case must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt or admitted by the defendant under Alleyne, but it argues that under United States v. Turner, 319 F.3d 716, 721 (5th Cir.2003), Randall must be sentenced based on the quantity attributable to the entire conspiracy, not just to him. Turner does not stand for that proposition. Rather, Turner stated that once the Government made a showing that the entire conspiracy involved a certain drug quantity for the conviction, “at sentencing, it need only prove the drug quantity attributable to Turner by a preponderance of the evidence (provided that his sentence falls within the statutory maximum made applicable by the fact finder's conspiracy-wide drug quantity determination).”17 Thus, even in Turner the Government had to demonstrate the amount attributable to a particular defendant for sentencing purposes.18 Moreover, under Alleyne, the imposition of a statutory mandatory minimum sentence requires that the drug quantity be proved beyond a reasonable doubt or admitted by the defendant.
With these cases in mind, this case is easily resolved. Randall's case is similar to both Guajardo and Gurrusquieta. As in those cases, Randall was found guilty on a conspiracy charge in which the overall conspiracy involved a sufficient amount of drugs to trigger an increased mandatory minimum penalty under §§ 841 and 846. However, as in those cases, the Factual Basis and PSR only attributed a lesser quantity of drugs to Randall (148.8 grams of powder cocaine and 35.2 grams of cocaine base), which would not be sufficient to trigger the statutory mandatory minimum sentence. The district court expressly adopted the facts set out in the PSR.
For the reasons set out above, we VACATE and REMAND for resentencing consistent with this opinion.
2. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(ii) (providing 10–year mandatory minimum sentence for offenses involving five kilograms or more of cocaine).
3. The PSR converted these drug amounts to a single marijuana equivalency of 155.46 kilograms.
4. 530 U.S. at 490.
5. See Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135, 129 S.Ct. 1423, 173 L.Ed.2d 266 (2009).
6. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 736, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993)).
7. 723 F.3d at 567–58.
12. Id. (citing United States v. Rolon–Ramos, 502 F.3d 750, 754–55 (8th Cir.2007), and United States v. Gomez–Rosario, 418 F.3d 90, 104 (1st Cir.2005)).
13. Id. at 572–73 (quoting United States v. Toliver, 351 F.3d 423, 430–31 (9th Cir.2003), abrogated on other grounds by Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004)); see also United States v. Collins, 415 F.3d 304 (4th Cir.2005) (discussed in Daniels ).
14. 723 F.3d at 573 (citing United States v. Hayes, 342 F.3d 385 (5th Cir.2003)).
17. 319 F.3d at 723 (footnote omitted, emphasis added).
18. The Government also cites United States v. Alvarez–Salinas, 292 F. App'x 368 (5th Cir.2008) for the proposition that a defendant “seal [s] his fate” by pleading guilty to a charge, but we specifically noted that “the drugs attributed to Alvarez were not based on relevant conduct, but on the offense to which Alvarez pleaded guilty: namely a violation of § 841(a) whereby he possessed or aided and abetted possession of greater than 100 kilograms of marijuana. The factual basis to which he stipulated showed that 132.5 kilograms were involved in his offense ․“ Id. at 371 (emphasis added). The sentence necessarily depends on the facts actually admitted by the defendant or found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
19. 391 F. App'x at 386.
21. 54 F. App'x 592, at *3.
22. Id. (citing United States v. Leonard, 157 F.3d 343, 346 (5th Cir.1998)).
23. See United States v. Cox, 565 F.3d 1013, 1017 (6th Cir.2009), and United States v. Colon–Solis, 354 F.3d 101, 103 (1st Cir.2004).
24. United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160, 56 S.Ct. 391, 392, 80 L.Ed. 555 (1936).

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