Source: http://al.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20180330_0000333.NAL.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 03:00:04+00:00

Document:
Plaintiff Stanley Dale Harper brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking review of the final decision of the Acting Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying him supplemental security income (“SSI”) benefits. (Doc. 1). The case has been assigned to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to this court's general order of reference. The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of this court for disposition of the matter. (See Doc. 8). See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), Fed.R.Civ.P. 73(a). Upon review of the record and the relevant law, the undersigned finds that the Commissioner's decision is due to be affirmed.
Plaintiff filed his current SSI application in March 2012, alleging he became disabled beginning March 5, 2012. It was initially denied by an administrative law judge (“ALJ”). The Appeals Council (“AC”) remanded the case for a further hearing concerning Plaintiff's residual functional capacity (“RFC”) and the need for additional rationale concerning the assessed limitations. The AC also ordered the ALJ to obtain supplemental evidence from a vocational expert to clarify the effect of the assessed limitations on Plaintiff's occupational base. (R. 18, 35-36). A hearing was held on September 10, 2015 (id.) and the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision on October 28, 2015, finding Plaintiff was not entitled to SSI benefits. (R. 15, 18-27). The AC denied Plaintiff's request for review. (R. 1).
Plaintiff was 48 years old at the time of the ALJ's decision that is under review. (R. 36). He completed the second grade and last worked as a truck driver in 2000 or 2001. Since then he has been assisted by his family. Plaintiff alleges a disability onset date of March 5, 2012. (R. 18).
The court's review of the Commissioner's decision is narrowly circumscribed. The function of the court is to determine whether the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence and whether proper legal standards were applied. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 1422 (1971); Mitchell v. Comm'r Soc. Sec., 771 F.3d 780, 782 (11th Cir. 2015; Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1221 (11th Cir. 2002). The court must “scrutinize the record as a whole to determine if the decision reached is reasonable and supported by substantial evidence.” Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983). Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. It is “more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance.” Id.
The court must uphold factual findings that are supported by substantial evidence. However, it reviews the ALJ's legal conclusions de novo because no presumption of validity attaches to the ALJ's determination of the proper legal standards to be applied. Davis v. Shalala, 985 F.2d 528, 531 (11th Cir. 1993). If the court finds an error in the ALJ's application of the law, or if the ALJ fails to provide the court with sufficient reasoning for determining that the proper legal analysis has been conducted, it must reverse the ALJ's decision. See Cornelius v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1143, 1145-46 (11th Cir. 1991). The court must affirm the ALJ's decision if substantial evidence supports it, even if other evidence preponderates against the Commissioner's findings. See Crawford v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir.1990)).
To qualify for benefits a claimant must show the inability to engage in “any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). A physical or mental impairment is “an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(3).
Evans v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 551 F. App'x 521, 524 (11th Cir. 2014). The plaintiff bears the burden of proving that he was disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005); see also 20 C.F.R. § 416.912(a). The applicable “regulations place a very heavy burden on the claimant to demonstrate both a qualifying disability and an inability to perform past relevant work.” Id.
Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ erred in three ways: (1) she improperly evaluated the opinion evidence of Dr. June Nichols; (2) she improperly evaluated Plaintiff's subjective complaints of disabling symptoms; and (3) she failed to find Plaintiff to be illiterate. (Doc. 14 at 12-17). Each will be addressed below.
Plaintiff initially argues that the ALJ improperly found that Dr. Nichols's opinion that Plaintiff's anxiety and panic attacks would markedly interfere with his ability to concentrate is not supported by substantial evidence. (Doc. 14 at 12). The Commissioner responds that the ALJ correctly assessed Dr. Nichols's opinion in evaluating Plaintiff's RFC. (Doc. 17 at 5).
(R. 25-26 (record citations omitted and italics added)). The ALJ further stated, “As for the opinion evidence, as stated earlier, substantial weight is given to the opinions of Dr. Nichols as they are supported by the record and because they are the most limiting.” (R. 26).
20 C.F.R. § 416.927 provides the SSA with guidelines for evaluating opinion evidence. “The regulation provides that the SSA will consider ‘the following factors in deciding the weight [it] give[s] to any medical opinion': examining relationship, treatment relationship, supportability, consistency with the record as a whole, specialization, and other factors, including the medical professional's understanding of the SSA's disability programs.” Snow v. Colvin, 8 F.Supp.3d 1345, 1353 (N.D. Ala. 2014) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c)). Section 416.927(c) further provides that “an ‘ALJ may reject the opinion of any physician when the evidence supports a contrary conclusion' so long as the ALJ ‘state[s] with particularity the weight he gives to different medical opinions and the reasons why.' ” Snow, 8 F.Supp.3d at 1353 (quoting McCloud v. Barnhart, 166 F. App'x. 410, 418 (11th Cir. 2006) (citing Sharfarz v. Bowen, 825 F.2d 278, 279 (11th Cir. 1987); Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1240 (11th Cir. 1983)).

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