Source: http://masscases.com/cases/sjc/242/242mass206.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 13:13:12+00:00

Document:
NASHUA RIVER PAPER COMPANY vs. EDWIN P. LINDSAY.
Present: RUGG, C. J., BRALEY, DE COURCY, CROSBY, & JENNEY, JJ.
Waiver by the plaintiff, in an action for breach of a warranty of the quality of goods sold to the plaintiff by the defendant, is an affirmative defence which should be alleged in the answer, and it is not open under an answer of general denial.
(2) The judge erroneously opened the defence of waiver.
It was stated that, while it was not necessary on the record in the action above described to decide whether a finding of a voluntary relinquishment of his known rights against the defendant for breach of warranty of quality would have been justifiable on the evidence on the record before the court if that defence properly had been pleaded, there was grave doubt whether such a finding would have been warranted.
(4) Upon the record, the exception above quoted presented no question of law for this court.
CONTRACT, with a declaration in three counts, only one of which, alleging a breach of warranty described in the opinion, now is material. Writ dated March 20, 1919.
The pleadings are described in the opinion. The action was heard by an auditor and, upon the auditor's report, by McLaughlin, J., without a jury, who found for the defendant. Material evidence, findings by the judge and exceptions by the plaintiff are described in the opinion.
R. G. Dodge, (R. S. Wilkins with him,) for the plaintiff.
T. W. Proctor, (R. W. Nason with him,) for the defendant.
breach, but apparently assumed their correctness. See Leonard v. Carleton & Hovey Co. 230 Mass. 262, 264. He found that the pulp shipped to the plaintiff by the defendant "was received and accepted by the plaintiff and manufactured into paper, which it put upon the market as No. 1 Kraft paper, and represented and sold as such through the agency of the defendant, its selling agent." The conclusion of the finding is that "In view of all the circumstances in the case, the relations of the parties and their written correspondence, and of all the evidence, I am satisfied that if there was any breach of warranty on the defendant's part the plaintiff waived it, and I find for the defendant."
The plaintiff excepted to the rulings (1) that the defendant was not liable, (2) that the fact that the plaintiff complained to the defendant of the quality of the pulp was not sufficient notice of the breach of warranty, and (3) that it was necessary for the plaintiff to give the defendant reason to understand thai it intended to hold him to damages.
the ground of waiver when his attention has not been called to that defence by the answer unless clearly the trial has been conducted as if it had been properly pleaded. A judge cannot open such a defence at the conclusion of the trial without the express consent of the parties. Plummer v. Boston Elevated Railway, 198 Mass. 499, 516. Elkins v. Boston & Albany Railroad, 115 Mass. 190, 201. Commonwealth v. Hassan, 235 Mass. 26, 32.
There is grave doubt whether on this record there is evidence sufficient to support a finding of waiver. The plaintiff, although an experienced paper maker, was ignorant as to the manufacture of that variety and quality known as Kraft, and appears to have depended in no small measure upon the advice of the expert defendant. Whether it knew, until the final break in its business relations with the defendant, that its difficulties in the manufacture of Kraft were due to the poor quality of the pulp sold to it by the defendant arising from a breach of his warranty of quality, was a question of fact requiring careful discrimination in the weighing of testimony and the inferences to be drawn therefrom. The mere acceptance of the pulp, manufacture of it into paper and the sale of the paper (as the judge rightly ruled) would not prevent the plaintiff from recovery for breach of warranty, provided it gave to the defendant notice of the breach within a reasonable time after it knew or ought to have known of such breach. Sales act, St. 1908, c. 237, s. 49, now G. L. c. 106, s. 38. It is not necessary to decide whether a finding of a voluntary relinquishment of its known rights against the defendant for breach of his warranty of quality would have been justifiable on this evidence. See Suburban Land Co. Inc. v. Brown, 237 Mass. 166, 168. It is enough to say that the question of waiver was not open on the pleadings and does not appear to have been fairly and fully tried.
time to time the plaintiff did complain to the defendant of the quality of the pulp, it was not until certain dissensions arose between the parties concerning the defendant's diligence as the plaintiff's selling agent, in disposing of its product, and concerning the question whether certain shipments of pulp made on or after December 16, 1918, were sales or merely consignments on memorandum, that the plaintiff gave the defendant reason to understand that it intended to hold him to damages." The first sentence of this paragraph is a correct ruling of law in accordance with the controlling provision of the sales act, St. 1908, c. 237, s. 49, now G. L. c. 106, s. 38. Trimount Lumber Co. v. Murdough, 229 Mass. 254. We interpret the balance of this paragraph to be a finding of fact and not a ruling of law. Complaints as to the quality of the pulp might have been found a sufficient notice of breach of warranty. Fisk Rubber Co. of New York v. New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad, 240 Mass. 40. We do not understand that there was a ruling of law to the contrary. There was no ruling of law that, in order to hold the defendant, the plaintiff must give him reason to understand that it intended to hold him in damages. That, too, as we understand it, is merely a statement of a finding of fact.

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