Source: http://municipalminute.ancelglink.com/2019/02/
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 18:37:40+00:00

Document:
In a recent Illinois Appellate Court decision, the court considered a challenge to a candidate's nomination papers where that candidate had withdrawn previously filed papers and submitted a second set prior to the filing deadline. McCaskill v. Harvey MOEB.
A candidate originally circulated, and then filed, nomination papers to run as a Democrat for the office of 6th ward alderman on the first day of filing for the February primary election. After filing, he learned that the City does not hold partisan primaries, so he filed a second set of papers designating himself as a nonpartisan candidate for the same office. At the same time, he filed a document withdrawing his first candidate filing.
An objection was filed to challenge the candidate's nomination papers on 2 grounds: (1) that he was prohibited from filing 2 petitions for the same office in the same election and (2) he violated the "dual circulation" prohibition because he circulated petitions for both a partisan and nonpartisan candidate in the same election.
A hearing was held before the City's electoral board, which overruled the objections and upheld his candidacy. That decision was appealed to the circuit court, which reversed, ordering that the candidate's name be removed from the ballot. That decision was also appealed, this time by the candidate, to the appellate court.
The appellate court rejected the objector's argument that the candidate filed multiple petitions for the same office, finding that section 10-6.2 of the Election Code states that if a candidate files multiple sets of nominating papers for the same office, he or she will be given the option to cancel the prior set of petitions, so long as that is done within the filing period. Since the objection did not challenge whether the candidate complied with this section, the court found that the electoral board properly denied the first objection.
The court also rejected the objector's "dual circulation" argument finding that it "makes absolutely no senses" in a non-partisan election. The purpose of this prohibition is to thwart political gamesmanship in partisan elections, which is not relevant in a non-partisan election.
In short, the appellate court denied the objection, and ordered that the candidate's name be placed on the ballot.
The annexation application was not filed to help a municipality involuntarily annex property in the future.
The bill also creates additional criteria that a municipality must satisfy before involuntarily annexing property, significantly upending municipal authority to annex property, control municipal boundaries, and promote economic development.
As drafted, the bill creates a host of problems. First, annexation commonly benefits more than just a property’s owners and residents. Annexation also benefits the annexing municipality, which receives increased regulatory control and tax revenue; parties that wish to develop the property, but may not yet own it; prospective residents that do not have an ownership interest in the property; and neighboring property owners that, as a result of the annexation, may be able to receive city services by annexing their properties. The bill would apparently invalidate annexations that benefit any of these parties.
Second, its unclear how an annexation applicant could confirm that its application would not help a municipality involuntarily annex property in the future. Annexation applicants generally aren’t aware of a community’s annexation plans (if any such plans exist). A law requiring an annexation applicant to attest to a municipality’s unknown future plans seems designed only to chill otherwise valid efforts to annex and develop property.
This bill comes on the heels of an annexation lawsuit we previously reported on involving Bolingbrook, a village located in Will County. The Bolingbrook case featured unusual facts that prompted the court to invalidate a voluntary annexation that facilitated a subsequent involuntary annexation. At first blush, this bill appears to respond to the Bolingbrook case, albeit in a way that may create serious unintended consequences.
We’ll update our readers as the bill progresses.
The APA Planning and Law Division is hosting an upcoming webinar that will be of interest to planners and land use professionals. Information about the webcast and registration are below.
Speakers include Erin Lapeyrolerie, PLD’s 2018-19 Curtin Fellow, Karla Chaffee, Esq., Counsel for Robinson & Cole LLP in Boston, Sunshine Lencho, Esq., Senior Associate at Hinman & Carmichael LLP in San Francisco, Joanna Hossack, Esq., Associate at Clark Neubert LLP in Sacramento and San Francisco, and Christina Sava, Managing Attorney at Anthony Law Group in Oakland.
While labor disputes often result in litigation, rarely, if ever before, has the ubiquitous rat itself become the subject of a lawsuit.
Employers are all aware of the rat. Unions often inflate a balloon type rat to stir emotion against an employer and to signify to the passing public that workers are embroiled in a labor dispute with a particular employer in hopes that the employer will feel pressured to capitulate to the union’s demands in order to avoid general association with the generally disliked rat. Simple concept. Some employers dread its appearance; some dig their heels in further when they see it.
In Grand Chute, Wisconsin, a town outside of Appleton, the rat itself became the subject of an ordinance violation. The union, feeling frustrated with the course of labor relations, inflated a 12-foot balloon rat in protest of the company, tethering the rate to the ground with stakes. It turns out that the rat was on the public way and violated the municipality’s sign ordinance which prohibited signs which are secured to the ground on the public way because they not only present a hazard but can create a disturbance to passersby. The police issued an ordinance violation to the rat (really to the union) and ordered its removal.
Nearly five years of litigation ensued over whether the union had the right to keep the rat in its location. While the municipality argued that the rat was being treated as any other sign and was subject to the sign ordinance, the union argued that the rat was an expression of free speech. Last week the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals sided with the municipality’s ordinance. Construction and General Laborers Union No. 300 v. Town of Grand Chute.
The court noted that “a municipality is entitled to implement a nondiscriminatory ban of all private signs from the public roads and rights-of-way” but that “even a neutral ordinance can violate the First Amendment if it is enforced selectively, permitting messages of which [the Town] approves while enforcing the ordinance against unions and other unpopular speakers.” The court concluded that there was no evidence before it to show that the sign ordinance was enforced selectively, and therefore ruled against the union.
Employers should note that if vexed with an appearance of the rat, do not ignore the simple solution of investigating whether its location violates local ordinances.
In 2009, the City of Chicago adopted an ordinance that prohibits any person from approaching within 8 feet of another person in the vicinity of an abortion clinic if their purpose is to engage in counseling, education, protest, or similar activities. Pro-life sidewalk counselors sued the City of Chicago to challenge the "bubble zone" ordinance, claiming that the ordinance violates their freedom of speech. The district court upheld the ordinance, citing a U.S. Supreme Court case from 2000 (Hill v. Colorado) that upheld a nearly identical law.
Plaintiffs appealed to the Seventh Circuit, relying on subsequent Supreme Court cases to argue that the Seventh Circuit should not rely on Hill v. Colorado. The Seventh Circuit disagreed, finding that the Hill case was still valid and had not been overruled in the subsequent cases. Price v. City of Chicago. Since the City of Chicago's "bubble zone" ordinance was narrower than the Colorado regulation (Colorado restricted contact within 100 feet of the clinic entrance, Chicago restricts contact within a 50 foot radius), the Court upheld the ruling in favor of the City that the ordinance was not unconstitutional.
It is important to note that the Seventh Circuit acknowledged that other cases have struck down contact restrictions at abortion clinics, including a state-wide restriction adopted by Massachusetts. However, the Court determined that the restriction at issue in this case (Chicago's bubble zone ordinance) was similar to, and more narrow, than the restriction upheld in the Hill v. Colorado case, which the Court noted had not been overruled.
A challenge to Chicago’s short-term rental regulations could continue after the Seventh Circuit held the plaintiffs may need new parties to establish standing.
In 2016, the City of Chicago passed a “Shared Housing Ordinance” in June 2016 to regulate short-term housing arrangements like those offered through sites such as Airbnb. The Ordinance requires interested hosts to register with the City and acquire a business license before listing units for rent online.
Six individuals and “Keep Chicago Livable,” an Illinois non-profit with the goal of educating Chicago hosts about local home-sharing laws, challenged the constitutionality of the ordinance. The case made its way to the Seventh Circuit, which vacated the rulings.
The Seventh Circuit sent the case back to the district court because there was no clear indication that any of the named plaintiffs have standing to challenge the Ordinance. In order to establish standing, a plaintiff must demonstrate (1) an injury in-fact; (2) that is fairly traceable to the defendant’s action; and (3) capable of being redressed by a favorable decision from the court.
The Seventh Circuit concluded that under this three-pronged test, it is unable to say with confidence that any of the named individual plaintiffs have standing due to changes in circumstances for each of the six individual plaintiffs. From the time of the filing of their most recent complaint to the case on appeal, each of the plaintiffs had either sold their property in Chicago or stopped using home sharing sites like Airbnb to rent out their properties. As a result, the Court found that since plaintiffs either no longer own property in the City, no longer use home-sharing sites, or allege how out-of-town renters are inhibited from visiting Chicago, none of the plaintiffs currently have standing to sue the City and challenge the Ordinance.
Similarly, the Seventh Circuit found that Keep Chicago Livable had not alleged a sufficient injury to the organization itself that could be addressed by the Court. The Court further concluded that even if Keep Chicago Livable brought suit on behalf of its members in a representative capacity, the organization had not identified an individual plaintiff with standing to bring any claim.
The Seventh Circuit indicated that the lower court has substantial discretion to move forward with the proceedings, including allowing new parties to sue that might have standing and by allowing those plaintiffs to file an amended complaint. Finally, the Seventh Circuit observed that if the district court determines a plaintiff does have standing, the court should allow the plaintiff the opportunity to move forward with the case and a request that the Court issue a preliminary injunction against the City's enforcement of the Ordinance. As a result, this challenge to Chicago’s short-term rental regulations might continue with the addition of new parties.
The Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Keep Chicago Livable v. City of Chicago is available here.
A recent Illinois Appellate Court decision provides some insight on how electoral boards can address objections to candidate nominating petitions that exceed the maximum number of signatures under state law. Ghiles v. MOEB, 2019 IL App (1st) 190117.
Section 10-3 of the Illinois Election Code sets out the signature requirements for certain types of candidates for local office. That section requires a candidate to file nomination papers signed by not less than 5%, nor more than 8% (or 50 more than the minimum, whichever is greater) of voters in the last election who voted for local elected officers.
A candidate for mayor filed nomination papers containing 736 signatures. The minimum number of signatures required for that office was 139, and the maximum number was 221, based on the above-statute. An objection was filed to challenge the candidate's nomination papers on various grounds, which was heard by the local electoral board. In reviewing the nomination papers to determine whether the objection was valid, the electoral board only reviewed challenges to 221 signatures (the statutory maximum), and disregarded all of the remaining signatures. In deciding which of the 221 signatures to review, the electoral board started at the bottom of the 81 pages of nomination petition, counting from the last signature on the last page and working backwards. After the electoral board struck invalid signatures from the 221 it reviewed, the board concluded that the candidate did not have enough signatures to remain on the ballot. As a result, the electoral board ordered the candidate's name to be struck from the ballot.
The candidate sued, challenging the electoral board's decision. Specifically, the candidate argued that the electoral board should have started its review of the first 221 signatures filed, and not the last signatures.
The case made its way to the Illinois Appellate Court, which upheld the electoral board's decision, finding no error in the board disregarding the excess signatures and drawing from the bottom of the stack of petitions. The Court did note that an electoral board should not strike all of the nomination papers solely because the petitions exceed the statutory maximum number of signatures, but that it was fair and reasonable for the electoral board to disregard the excess signatures.
The Illinois Supreme Court recently found that grand jury documents were exempt from disclosure under FOIA and once again stated that protective orders take precedence over disclosure under FOIA.
In In Re Appointment of Special Prosecutor, the Better Government Association (BGA) sent a FOIA request to the City of Chicago and the Office of Special Prosecutor, asking for grand jury documents regarding a 2004 death and allegations of whether employees of the City suppressed and concealed evidence. The FOIA request asked for: 1) documents to show the names of everyone interviewed by the special prosecutor, 2) statements and communications between Mayor Daley’s family members, their attorney, and the City’s corporate counsel at the time, and 3) invoices and billing records. The City and the OSP denied the FOIA request under Section 7(1)(a) of FOIA, stating that disclosure was prohibited by state law. Specifically, they argued that disclosure was prohibited by Section 112-6 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which prohibits release of grand jury matters. The City further argued they could not release the grand jury records as they were placed under seal by a protective order.
The Illinois Supreme Court reviewed the denial and noted that the rule of secrecy around grand jury proceedings is a fundamental part of criminal procedural law. The Court reviewed the policy reasons for maintaining grand jury secrecy, including preventing the flight of persons under investigation, protecting grand jurors from undue influence or intimidation, preventing subornation of perjury, encouraging witnesses to testify, and protecting the innocent from exposure.
In short, the Illinois Supreme Court concluded that the requested information was prohibited from disclosure under the Code of Criminal Procedure and FOIA because release of the documents would disclose matters occurring before the grand jury. In ruling in favor of the City, the Court rejected the BGA’s argument that protective orders from the criminal court were not a basis to withhold documents under FOIA. The BGA had argued that withholding the documents was improper as it did not fall within the narrow list of exemptions in FOIA. But, the Court disagreed, ruling that a court order must be obeyed and that protective orders take precedence over the disclosure requirements of FOIA.

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