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Timestamp: 2019-04-21 22:37:17+00:00

Document:
A. Gautier and J. Jacqmin. "Une nouvelle tarification des réseaux pour favoriser la transition énergétique." Regards Economiques 145 (March 2019).
A. Gautier, B. Hoet, J. Jacqmin, and S. Van Driessche. "Self-consumption choice of residential PV owners under net-metering." Energy Policy 128 (2019): 648-653.
This paper studies the decision to synchronize household electricity consumption and production. While this behavior is beneficial for the energy system as a whole, it is not encouraged by a net-metering system. Relying on a large-scale survey conducted among households with solar PV in Wallonia, we investigate the factors impacting their decision to self-consume. As many as forty percent of our respondents declare to do so, notwithstanding the lack of incentives. The multivariate regression analysis shows that female and older residents, who tend to spend more time at home during daytime, are more likely to adapt their electricity usage by displacing their load. Prosumers with high environmental motives tend to synchronize more no matter the size of their installation. We conclude that prosumers will be further encouraged to self-consume by (1) setting monetary incentives to make consumption at the time of production more attractive, by (2) providing information to prosumers relative to their consumption/production profile and (3) by encouraging the adoption of smart devices that facilitate load shifting. These policies would lead to a higher degree of synchronization that would be beneficial for the energy system.
L. Van Neuss. "The Drivers of Structural Change." Journal of Economic Surveys 33, no. 1 (2019): 309-349.
The main goal of this paper is to provide an integrated survey of the literature devoted to identifying the drivers of structural change, broadly defined as the process of reallocation of economic activity across the three broad sectors agriculture, manufacturing and services. Using the GGDC 10-Sector Database, this paper first presents the empirical facts associated with structural change in different regions of the world – i.e. Europe and the USA, Asia, Latin America, and Africa – then reviews four determinants of structural change: (i) changes in income, (ii) changes in relative (sectoral) prices, (iii) changes in input-output linkages and (iv) changes in comparative advantage(s) via globalization and trade.
L. Van Neuss. "Globalization and Deindustrialization in Advanced Countries." Structural Change and Economic Dynamics 45 (June 2018): 49-63.
A strand of empirical research on deindustrialization seeks to quantify the relative importance of the economic forces behind deindustrialization, and especially of the internal and external factors, i.e. those linked to globalization and trade. The results of this literature are highly fragile, arguably because the commonly used indicators of trade are not well defined to capture the contribution of globalization to deindustrialization. While this empirical study does not necessarily contradict the widespread belief that the internal factors are quantitatively more important in accounting for deindustrialization in the OECD taken as a whole, our empirical results – based on panel data for 15 OECD advanced countries from 1970 to 2006 – nevertheless show that global exchanges have the potential to affect significantly and substantially a country’s sectoral patterns of employment. They also suggest that the contribution of globalization, and especially of growing North-South integration, to deindustrialization in advanced countries may be revised upwards when resorting to better-suited indicators of trade.
N. Petit. ""Innovation competition and merger policy: New? Not sure. Robust? Not quite!"." Concurrences 2018, no. 2 (May 2018).
In this short piece, I critically discuss the development of harm to innovation as a theory of anticompetitive harm in EU merger policy, following the conditional approval of the Dow/Dupont in 2017. © 2018 Institute of Competition Law.
A. Gautier, J. Jacqmin, and J.-C. Poudou. "The prosumers and the grid." Journal of Regulatory Economics 53 (2018): 100-126.
Prosumers are households that are both producers and consumers of electricity. A prosumer has a grid-connected decentralized production unit (DPU) and makes two types of exchanges with the grid: energy imports when the local production is insufficient to match the local consumption and energy exports when local production exceeds it. There exists two systems to measure the exchanges : a net metering system that uses a single meter to measure the balance between exports and imports and a net purchasing system that uses two meters to measure separately power exports and imports. Both systems are currently used for residential consumption. We build a model to compare the two metering systems. Under net metering, the price of exports paid to prosumers is implicitly set at the price of the electricity that they import. We show that net metering leads to (1) too many prosumers, (2) a decrease in the bills of prosumers, compensated via a higher bill for traditional consumers, and (3) a lack of incentives to synchronize local production and consumption.
A. Gautier and N. Petit. "Optimal enforcement of competition policy: the commitments procedure under uncertainty." European Journal of Law and Economics 45, no. 2 (2018): 195-224.
The introduction of a commitments procedure in EU antitrust policy (Article 9 of Council Regulation 1/2003) has entitled the the European Commission to extensively settle cases of alleged anticompetitive conduct. In this paper, we use a formal model of law enforcement to identify the optimal procedure to remedy cases in a context of partial legal uncertainty (Katsoulacos and Ulph in Eur J Law Econ 41(2):255–282, 2016). We discuss in particular the merits of a policy of selective commitments where firms either take strong commitments or are investigated under the standard infringement procedure.
A. Gautier. "Analyse économique des plateformes collaboratives." In Aspects juridiques de l'économie collaborative. Edited by G. Rue. Les dossiers du BJS. Belgique: Anthemis, 2017. 9-26.
On observe une multitude d’initiatives, qu’elles soient citoyennes ou commerciales, pour partager les ressources entre particuliers. Aujourd’hui il existe des sites pour partager ou échanger à peu près tout : voitures, trajets, appartements, outils, services, objets de seconde main, etc. Cette nouvelle tendance, que l’on range sous le vocable d’économie collaborative, fascine autant qu’elle inquiète. D’un coté, le partage de ressources sous-utilisées a de nombreux avantages, parmi ceux-ci une mutualisation des coûts pour les utilisateurs et une baisse de la pression sur l’environnement. D’un autre coté, les craintes sont nombreuses, notamment vis-à-vis des nouvelles formes de travail qui se développent, précaires, sous-payés et ultra-flexibles. Ce chapitre écrit par un économiste a pour objectif de présenter quelques concepts économiques qui permettent de mieux comprendre le phénomène d’économie collaborative.
A. Gautier. "La neutralité du net n'est pas neutre." In Les enjeux de l’innovation : quelles politiques ? Quelles gouvernances ? 22° Congrès des économistes. Université ouverte, 2017. 47-59.
L. Artige and A. Reginster. "Deux décennies d’augmentation des prix immobiliers résidentiels en Wallonie (1995-2015)." Dynamiques Régionales 5, no. 2 (September 2017): 9-22.
P. Agrell and A. Gautier. "A Theory of Soft Capture." Scandinavian Journal of Economics 119, no. 3 (July 2017): 571-596.
n this paper, wee propose a model for regulatory capture that is based on information transmission and asymmetric information. In a three-tier model, a regulator is charged by a political principal to provide a signal for the type of a regulated firm. Only the firm can observe his type and the production of a correlated signal with a given accuracy is costly for the regulator. The firm can costlessly provide an alternative signal of lower accuracy that is presented to the regulator. In a self-enforcing equilibrium, the regulator transmits the firm-produced signal, internalizes its own savings in information cost and the firm enjoys higher information rents. The main feature of soft capture is that it is not based on a reciprocity of favors but on a congruence of interests between the firm and the regulator.
S. Broos and J. Marcos Ramos. "Competing Business Models and Two-Sidedness: An Application to the Google Shopping Case." Antitrust Bulletin 62 (June 2017).
S. Broos and A. Gautier. "The exclusion of competing one-way essential complements: implications for net neutrality." International Journal of Industrial Organization 52 (May 2017): 358-392.
W. M. W. Lam. "Switching Costs in Two-sided Markets." Journal of Industrial Economics 65, no. 1 (March 2017): 136-182.
F. Bloch and A. Gautier. "Strategic bypass deterrence." Journal of Regulatory Economics 52 (2017): 189-210.
In liberalized network industries, competitors can either compete for service using the existing infrastructure (access) or deploy their own capacity (bypass). We revisit this make-or-buy problem making two contributions to the literature. First we analyze both the profit maximizing behavior of an incumbent and the welfare maximizing behavior when the entrant chooses between access and bypass. Second, we extend the baseline model studied in the literature by allowing for fixed costs of network installation. By analogy to the literature on strategic entry deterrence, we distinguish three regimes of blockaded bypass, deterred bypass and accommodated bypass depending on the entrant's unit cost. We show that the make-or-buy decision of the entrant is not necessarily technologically efficient: when bypass is chosen, it is always the cheapest option but access may be chosen when it is not cost effective.
T. K. Cheng, A. P. Grunes, L. Idot, L. Leblond, N. Petit, and M. E. Stucke. "I. Les moteurs de recherche." Concurrences 2017, no. 2 (2017).
N. Petit. "The Advocate General's opinion in Intel v. Commission: Eight points of common sense for consideration by the CJEU." Concurrences 1 (2017).
The Opinion delivered by Advocate General Wahl in Intel v Commission (“the Opinion”) invites the Court of Justice of the EU (“CJEU”) to “refine its case-law relating to the abuse of a dominant position” under Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (“TFEU”). In essence, the Opinion invites the CJEU to return to first principles and inject common sense into the law of Article 102 TFEU, in the wake of the evolution started by Post Danmark I and Post Danmark II. This can be understood through eight key points, the common thread of which is a concern to ensure legal coherence and economic reason in the application of Article 102 TFEU. This brief commentary highlights those eight points, and suggests that some should be taken even further than AG Wahl proposes.
N. Petit. "The Antitrust and Intellectual Property Intersection in European Union Law." In Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol. Cambridge, 2017.
In European legal scholarship, many articles discuss the equilibrium reached in the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”) when the EU antitrust prohibitions apply to, and restrain, the free and ordinary use of intellectual property rights (“IPRs”). We call this the antitrust-IP intersection. The most interesting feature of this literature is perhaps the common assumption that a unifying substantive perspective, vision or theory on IPR underpins the intersection point reached by the antitrust case-law. Whilst the theory of “absolutism” can be quickly disposed of, several other theories like inherency, exceptionalism or complementarity have been described as the lynchpin of the antitrust-IP intersection. Our paper offers a different reading of the case-law. It submits that the antitrust-IP intersection does not rest on any unitary theory which, in turn, bespeaks the Court’s vision of the social function of IPRs. Instead, the main feature of the CJEU case-law is that a specific methodology is applied to antitrust cases with IPR ramifications. The CJEU deals with most of such cases under a rule-based approach, instead of a standard-based approach. By rule-based approach, we refer to the ex ante setting of structured tests of liability, by opposition to ex post case-by-case resolution on grounds of a pre-determined, general standard (e.g., reasonableness, competition on the merits, efficiency, fairness, equity, etc.). As will be seen below, this approach has many virtues, not least in terms of legal certainty. But it also has a major qualification. Whilst the Court has consistently formulated rules of liability and justifiability at the antitrust and IP intersection, it has at the same time often embedded abstract standards within those rules. The implications of this mixed approach are unclear.
N. Petit. "EU Competition Law Analysis of FRAND Disputes." In The Cambridge Handbook of Technical Standardization Law. Cambridge University Press, 2017.
This paper describes the degree of obligation created by a FRAND commitment on the holders of a Standard Essential Patent (“SEP”) from an EU competition law perspective. It shows that the EU courts case-law does not seem supportive of the reading of FRAND as a distributional, pricing commitment. Instead, it views FRAND as a soft commitment device, designed to promote cooperation and exchange amongst independent firms. This is apparent in the Huawei v ZTE judgment, which conveys an invitation on both SEP holders and unlicensed implementers to follow basic procedural requirements in licensing talks. In addition, the paper contributes to the debate on the legal applicability of Article 102 TFEU to SEP holders other than practicing entities. Last, the paper discusses if Standard Setting Organizations (“SSOs”) ex ante specifications of FRAND terms can constrain the conduct of SEP holders under EU competition law.
A. Gautier and I. Salem. "La SNCB : prête pour la libéralisation totale du rail ?" Regards Economiques (December 22, 2016).
La SNCB n’a pas su s’adapter à la libéralisation du fret ferroviaire faute de rentabilité. Dans la perspective d’une libéralisation du transport de passagers annoncée pour 2023, nous évaluons les performances de l’entreprise. Notre étude met en avant un déficit de productivité et une contribution faible des passagers aux coûts par rapport à d’autres opérateurs européens.
W. M. W. Lam. "Attack-Prevention and Damage-Control Investments in Cybersecurity." Information Economics and Policy 37 (December 2016): 42-51.
N. Petit. "The IEEE-SA Revised Patent Policy and Its Definition of 'Reasonable' Rates: A Transatlantic Antitrust Divide?" Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law Journal (March 2016).
The IEEE-SA updated patent policy and the Business Review Letter issued by the US DoJ have caused much discussion in the US (Sidak, 2015). The purpose of this paper is to assess whether a similarly lenient antitrust approach to Standard Setting Organizations’ (“SSOs”) rate setting policies would prevail under the European Union (“EU”) competition rules. Recent EU competition case-law has promoted a very hard line in the area of coordinated conduct. Cases such as Dole Food Company, T-Mobile or Expedia have expanded the scope of the per se prohibition rule found in Article 101 TFEU to forms of horizontal coordination with less than obvious anticompetitive potential, such as “cheap-talk” pre-pricing communication (Dole Food Company), episodic collusion (T-Mobile) and horizontal agreements with limited market coverage (Expedia). Those judgments, and others, share a common rationale: that of deterring any coordinated interference with the price system. In the EU courts’ view, joint interference by competitors with the price system seems to be a sin in itself, regardless of actual or potential market effects. Horizontal coordination is thus increasingly prohibited on its face, and punished as a means to set an example. From an enforcement standpoint, this trend in the case-law trend has pros (lower enforcement costs) and cons (deters pro-competitive coordination). But perhaps more importantly, it has a major normative implication, which is that it raises the antitrust risk for all forms of coordination, including arrangements of the type found in the IEEE-SA updated patent policy. This paper explains that the antitrust risk generated by SSOs rate setting policies is presumably higher in the EU than in the US, where the case-law on horizontal coordination is less stringent. From a methodological standpoint, the paper choses to discuss this issue on the sole basis of the case-law of the EU courts, instead of focusing on Commission Guidelines and other soft law instruments, whose binding value on parties other than the Commission itself has been considerably degraded in recent judgments.
S. Broos, A. Gautier, J. Marcos Ramos, and N. Petit. "Analyse statistique des affaires d’ententes dans l’UE (2004-2014)." Revue Economique (2016).
P. Copée, A. Gautier, and M. Lefevre. "Promoting Competition at the Digital Age with an Application to Belgium." In The Future of the Postal Sector in a Digital World. Edited by M. Crew and T. Brennan. Topics in Regulatory Econ., Vol. 51. Springer, 2016. 137-151.
In this paper, we develop a fully-fledged postal market model to assess the extent of competition in the mail market in a context of declining mail volumes due to e-substitution. Our focus will be on the Belgian market situation that is interesting for at least two reasons. First, the homogenous nature of the country implies that the extent of the entrant's market coverage will be either limited to the few very densely populated areas or large covering the whole country at the exception of the few very sparely populated areas. Second, because strong licensing requirements -including coverage constraints- are imposed on competing postal operators and they may constitute barrier to entry. Our model allows us to estimate the extent of entry, the cost of meeting the licensing requirements for potential entrants and the impact of entry on the cost of the universal service.
D. Muheme, N. Neyrinck, and N. Petit. "Procedural Rights in EU Antitrust Proceedings." In Procedural Rights in Competition Law in the EU and China. Edited by C. Cauffman and Q. Hao. Springer, 2016. 129-160.
This contribution is an attempt to provide a comprehensive list of the rights of defendants in infringement procedures before the European Commission. We gat​her eparse prerogatives that have been defined by the case law and propose ten rights, of which we track back the origin, define the substance and undertline the sanction in case of violation.
N. Petit. Technology Giants, the Moligopoly Hypothezis and Holistic Competition: A Primer. 2016.
N. Petit and S. Bogojević. "Deterring the State Versus the Firm: Soft and Hard Deterrence Regimes in EU Law." Columbia Journal of European Law Vol. 23 (2016).
This paper sheds light on the existence of a differential deterrence regime in EU law, depending on whether the State or the firm is the addressee of a legal obligation. To that end, we review two areas of EU law – environmental law and competition law. Both disciplines employ fines to deter the State and the firm respectively from violating their specific duties under the Treaty: the ‘duty to transpose’ with regard to State obligation under environmental law, and the ‘duty to compete’ in relation to firms under competition law. We show how the deterrence regime is softer on the State in at least three ways: functionally (purpose ascribed to the penalties), operationally (method followed to set and liquidate the penalty), and procedurally (requiring prior judicial approval as opposed to having immediate applicability). These findings are significant for two reasons: they suggest a State versus firm discrepancy in the EU’s deterrence regime, and serve to initiate a debate on the desirability of such a divide.
N. Neyrinck. "Taxis bruxellois : Uber garde un pied dans la porte." Revue du Droit des Industries de Réseau 4 (December 2015).
French transaltion, analysis and comments of the firts Belgian translation issued against Uber.
L. Artige and P. Donnay. "Quels instruments pour quelle croissance ?" In La croissance : réalités et perspectives. Actes du 21e Congrès des économistes belges de langue française. Edited by E. De Keuleneer, B. Rentier, L. Artige, P.-M. Boulanger, T. Bréchet, I. Cassiers, D. de la Croix, P. Donnay, K. Maréchal, and A. Touzri. Charleroi, Belgique: Editions de l'Université Ouverte, 2015. 203-209.
P. Agrell and A. Gautier. "Marchés énergétiques en transition : le cas de la Belgique." Reflets et Perspectives de la Vie Economique LIV, no. 1-2 (October 2015): 5-6.
N. Boccard and A. Gautier. "Le coût de l'énergie verte en Wallonie 2003-2012." Reflets et Perspectives de la Vie Economique LIV, no. 1-2 (October 2015): 71-85.
In 2003, the Walloon region has installed a tradable green certificate mechanism to support the production of ‘green’ electricity. In this paper, we estimate that the total cost of the mechanism amounts to 1,871 billion € for the period 2003-2012, corresponding to a support of 107 €/MWh produced, with important differences between production technologies, the solar photovoltaic receiving up to 588 €/MWh. International comparisons indicate that the Walloon mechanism is particularly generous. We also show that the induced carbon savings are extremely costly with an implicit price of avoided CO2 of 425 € per ton.
A. Gautier. "Repenser la tarifaction de l'énergie." Reflets et Perspectives de la Vie Economique LIV, no. 1-2 (October 2015): 175-184.
The distribution tariff is for historical reasons connected to the consumption level. Maintaining a tariff per KWh is in our view problematic for two reasons. First, it induces inefficient consumption or production choices by consumers. Second, because of scale economies, a decrease in energy consumption leads to both a cost and a revenue decline with the latter being stronger than the former, thereby necessitating an increase in the tariff to compensate for the revenue losses and reinforcing the first effect. The distribution tariff should therefore be re-designed and de-connected, at least partially, from the consumption level.
N. Petit. "La rationalisation au long cours de la restriction de concurrence par "objet" dans la jurisprudence de la Cour de Justice de l'Union européenne." AJ Contrats d'Affaires (October 2015).
J. Marcos Ramos and D. Muheme. "The Brussels Court judgement in Commission v Elevators manufacturers, or the story of how the Commission lost an action for damages based on its own infringement decision." European Competition Law Review 36, no. 9 (August 2015).
With the proceedings before the Brussels Court, the Commission emphasized its growing need to promote claims for damages for infringements of EU Competition law. Ahead of the implementation of the Damages Directive, and with its own infringement decision in hand, this claim seemed to be an easy exercise for the Commission to recoup the allegedly surplus paid for the maintenance contracts.
N. Petit and J. Pilorge. "Avis 2/13 de la CJUE : l'obsession du contrôle ?" Revue des Affaires Européennes (June 2015).
N. Petit. "Le droit européen de l’abus de position dominante en 2014." Contrats Concurrence Consommation (May 2015).
J. Bouckaert and A. Gautier. "Current challenges in the regulation of utilities in Belgium." In Economic regulation in today’s Belgium. Edited by E. Cantillon. Re-Bel e-book 16. Belgium: Re-Bel initiative, 2015. 6-25.
This contribution to the Re-thinking of Belgium attempts to share our position on the current and future regulation of utilities in our country. We deliberately opt not to offer an exhaustive list of regulatory challenges based on thorough economic analysis. Our main goal is to participate in a welcomed open reform debate. The main messages are that we need (i) more stable and thought- through policy visions resulting from sound economics, clearer roles for all actors involved, more coordination between regulators and (ii) less dependent regulators, less regulatory creep and fewer unnecessary low-powered incentive schemes.
J. Pilorge. "La protection des droits fondamentaux des minorités nationales par les mécanismes régionaux de protection des droits de l’homme en Europe et en Afrique : étude comparative." Revue de la Faculté de Droit de l'Université de Liège 2015/1 (March 2015): 5-29.
L. Artige and R. Nicolini. "The Reputation Effect: A Case Study of Credit Contracts in Transition Countries." International Journal of Finance and Banking Studies 4, no. 1 (January 2015): 1-17.
P. Agrell and J. Teusch. "Making the Belgian distribution system fit for the energy transition. The case for yardstick competition." Reflets et Perspectives de la Vie Economique , no. 1 (2015).
M. Bougnouch. "Analyse comparée du caractère incitatif des modèles de régulation." Reflets et Perspectives de la Vie Economique LIV (2015).
S. Broos and A. Gautier. "Not on my network! App exclusion and the net neutrality debate." LCII Policy Brief , no. 2015/1 (2015).
The net neutrality debate is at its peak. On January 27, the Dutch Authority for Competition and Markets (DACM) fined KPN and Vodafone for the first violation of the Dutch net neutrality law ever.i On February 26, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) approved new regulations for broadband internet, preserving the net neutrality.ii In brief, the net neutrality proponents seem to be winning the debate. In a recent economic paper, Sébastien Broos and Axel Gautier analyze whether this toughened stance of regulatory authorities is the best way forward.
A. Gautier and J.-C. Poudou. "Reforming the Postal Universal Service." Review of Network Economics (2015).
The postal sector has undergone dramatic changes over the recent years under the double effect of ongoing liberalization and increased competition with alternative communication channels (e-substitution). As a result, the mail volume handled by the historical operator has declined sharply while the latter's ability to match the same standard of universal service may be under threat. Thus, a reform of the postal universal service is on the agenda. This paper examines possible reforming options ranging from keeping universal service within the postal sector to redefining universal service as spanning postal and electronic technologies.
P. González de Zárate Catón and J. Marcos Ramos. "La negativa de suministro por parte del fabricante en los sistemas de distribución selectiva ¿acuerdo entre empresas o conducta unilateral?" Revista de Derecho de la Competencia y la Distribucion 16 (2015).
The legal regime of selective distribution agreements consists basically of four conditions enshrined in Article 175 of the Guidelines of the European Commission on Vertical Restraints. As such, any selective distribution scheme must comply with these four conditions to be exempted from the application of Article 101 TFEU. In our opinion, the interpretation generally accepted of the second condition, which touches upon the selection of the distributors on the basis of objective criteria, refers to a unilateral conduct, and not to an agreement between undertakings. In practice, this means that the scope of application of Article 101 TFEU has been artificially broadened and encompasses conducts which in fact constitute unilateral decisions of the undertakings.
N. Petit. "Huaweï v. ZTE: Judicial Conservatism at the Patent-Antitrust Intersection." CPI Antitrust Chronicle 10, no. 2 (2015).
This paper argues that the judgment of the Court of Justice of the EU in Huaweï v ZTE is of conservative craft. Huaweï v ZTE only extends by a razor-thin margin the zone of antitrust liability for patent owners. The Court appears reluctant to relax its traditional case-law that affirms antitrust liability on patent owners only in “exceptional circumstances.” To be sure, the Court admits that SEPs covered by a FRAND pledge generate “particular circumstances,” which justify an extension of antitrust liability. But on careful read, the Court only expands antitrust liability in relation to a slice of cases of injunctions on FRAND-pledged SEPs that lead to exclusionary leveraging. This, in turn, relieves a number of upstream licensing entities from antitrust liability.
N. Petit. "Intel Leveraging Rebates and the Goals of Article 102 TFEU." European Competition Journal (2015).
N. Petit. "State Created Barriers to Exit - The Example of the Acquisition of Alstom by General Electric." Competition Policy International 11, no. 1 (2015).
L. Artige and L. Van Neuss. "A New Shift-Share Method." Growth and Change 45, no. 4 (December 2014): 667-683.
Shift-share analysis is a decomposition technique widely used in regional studies to quantify an industry-mix eﬀect and a competitive eﬀect on the growth of regional employment (or any other relevant variable) relative to the national average. This technique has always been subject to criticism for its lack of theoretical basis. This paper presents a critical assessment of the methods suggested by Dunn (1960) and by Esteban-Marquillas (1972) and proposes a new shift-share method, which separates out the two eﬀects unambiguously. By way of illustration, we provide an application to manufacturing employment in the Belgian provinces between 1995 and 2007.
A. Gautier and N. Petit. "“Settle ‘em all”: Generalized Commitments and the Under and Over Enforcement of Antitrust Law." LCII Policy Brief , no. 2014/2 (November 2014).
L. Artige, A. Dedry, and P. Pestieau. "Social Security and Economic Integration." Economics Letters 123, June (June 2014): 318-322.
N. Petit. ""Stealth Licensing" - Or antitrust law and trade regulation squeezing patent rights." Revue du Droit des Industries de Réseau (April 2014).
B. Candelon, A. Gautier, and N. Petit. "Market Power in the Credit Rating Industry: State of Play and Proposal for Reforms." CPI Antitrust Chronicle 2 (January 2014).
In recent years, the Credit Rating Agencies (“CRAs”) have been in the eye of the storm. Some argue that CRA rating errors—symptomatized by rating inflation or deflation—originate in excessive competition. This paper argues that the low level of competition in credit rating is a better explanation for rating this phenomenon.
J.-F. Bellis and N. Petit. "Le droit de la concurrence : précautions utiles lors de la rédaction d'un contrat de distribution." In UB3 - Actualités en matière de rédaction des contrats de distribution. Bruylant, 2014.
N. Petit. "Price Squeezes with Positive Margins - Economic and Legal Anatomy of a Zombie." Revue du Droit des Industries de Réseau (2014).
N. Petit. "Uber, Concurrent Déloyal ou Champion Libérateur de l’Économie du Partage ?" LCII Policy Briefs (2014).
N. Petit and S. Bostyn. "Patent=Monopoly: A Legal Fiction." 2014.
N. Petit. "Injunctions for FRAND Pledged SEPs : The question for an appropriate test of abuse under article 102 TFUE." European Competition Journal (December 2013).
A. Gautier and S. Reginster. "La collecte des déchets en Wallonie : organisation et performances." Regards Economiques , no. 106 (October 16, 2013).
En Wallonie, la collecte des déchets est fréquemment déléguée par les communes à une intercommunale ou à un collecteur privé. Par ailleurs, de plus en plus de communes utilisent des conteneurs à puce. Cet article compare les performances en termes de coûts de ces différentes alternatives.
L. Artige and R. Nicolini. "Institutions and Market Creation: Evidence from the Experience of Transition Countries." SSRN Working Paper (October 2013).
L. Artige and R. Nicolini. "The Reputation Effect: A Case Study of Credit Contracts in Transition Countries." SSRN Working Paper (October 2013).
N. Petit. "The Oligopoly Problem in EU Competition Law." In Research Handbook in European Competition Law. Edited by D. GERADIN and I. LIANNOS. Edward Elgar, 2013.
This paper offers a complete overview of the oligopoly problem in competition law and economics, with a specific focus on European Union (EU) law. A related purpose of the paper is to challenge the dominant view that merger control is the ultimate preventive remedy against tacit collusion. On close analysis, the merger-only enforcement paradigm against tacit collusion generates a systemic risk of type II errors. Part of this enforcement gap may, however, be alleviated through a more muscular enforcement of the rules on coordinated conduct (i.e. Article 101 TFEU) and on unilateral conduct (i.e. Article 102 TFEU). In this later respect, the paper formulates a possible theory of harm that would entitle agencies and courts to apply Article 102 TFEU to specific types of conduct by oligopolists. The concept of abuse of collective dominance may in particular be applied to the artificial tactics which oligopolists adopt to protect an observed collusive equilibrium from the natural, disruptive effect caused by an external shock (entry, natural disaster, change in tax rate, etc.). In this sense, the paper is different from other scholarly proposals that recommend applying rules on unilateral conduct to excessive oligopoly prices and/or facilitating practices.
W. Van Aken and L. Artige. "Reverse Majority Voting in Comparative Perspective: Implications for Fiscal Governance in the EU." In The Euro Crisis and the State of European Democracy. Edited by B. de Witte, A. Héritier, and A. H. Trechsel. Florence, Italy: European University Institute - EUDO, 2013. 129-161.
T. Coelli, A. Gautier, S. Perelman, and R. Saplacan-Pop. "Estimating The Cost of Improving Quality in Electricity Distribution: A Parametric Distance Function Approach." Energy Policy 53 (February 2013): 287-297.
The quality of electricity distribution is being more and more scrutinized by regulatory authorities, with explicit reward and penalty schemes based on quality targets having been introduced in many countries (France, Germany, Italy, UK,...). It is then of prime importance to know the cost of improving the quality for a distribution system operator. In this paper, we focus on one dimension of quality, the continuity of supply, and we estimated the cost of preventing power outages. For that, we make use of the parametric distance function approach, assuming that outages enter in the firm production set as an input, an imperfect substitute for maintenance activities and capital investment. This allows us to identify the sources of technical inefficiency and the underlying trade-­‐off faced by operators between quality and other inputs and costs. For this purpose, we use panel data on 92 electricity distribution units operated by ERDF (Electricité de France - Réseau Distribution) in the 2003–2005 financial years. Assuming a multi-output multi-input translog technology, we estimate that the cost of preventing one interruption varies substantily among the distribution units from 2.7 € to 15.7 €. Furthermore, as one would expect, marginal quality improvements tend to be more expensive as quality itself improves.
A. Gautier and G. d'Alcantara. "The postal sector as a vector of financial inclusion." Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics 84, no. 2 (2013): 119-137.
Access to finance has become a major policy issue under the term Financial Inclusion. In this paper, we focus on the role of postal operators in financial inclusion policies. In developing countries, postal firms typically manage a dense network of counters with a unique coverage of rural areas where the banking sector is totally absent. We use a formal location model for postal counters and bank agencies to show that in rural areas a post-bank partnership can be a vector of financial inclusion and that this can be done profitably.
A. Gautier and A. Yvrande-Billon. "Contract Renewal as an Incentive Device. An Application to the French Urban Public Transport Sector." Review of Economics and Institutions 4, Winter (2013): 2.
In the French urban public transport industry, operations are often delegated and periodically put out for tender. Thus, operators’ incentives to reduce costs come from both profit maximization during the current contract and from the perspective of contract renewal. We construct a dynamic incentive regulation model that captures these features and we show that both the level of cost-reducing effort and its repartition during the contracting period depend on the contract type (cost-plus, gross cost or net cost contract). We then estimate a cost frontier model for an eight-year panel of French bus companies (664 company-year observations) to test our predictions.
N. Petit. Droit européen de la concurrence. Paris, France: Montchrestien, 2013.
N. Petit. "Ethique et conflits d'intérêts en droit européen de la concurrence." Concurrences , no. 1 (2013).
The debate over the compatibility of EU competition enforcement with Article 6 ECHR is far from over. Whilst there has been a great - some would say excessive - deal of papers on due process issues, less, if none attention has been paid to the rules and remedies that govern conflicts of interests amongst lawyers, civil servants, legal secretaries and Members of the Court. This short paper seeks to open the discussion on this issue.
N. Petit. "The Future of the Court of Justice in EU Competition Law - New Role and Responsibilities." In in Court of Justice of the EU (Ed.), The Court of Justice and the Construction of Europe: Analyses and Perspectives on Sixty Years of Case-law. CJUE, 2013.
N. Petit. "The Future of the Court of Justice in EU Competition Law Copyright Year." In The Court of Justice and the Construction of Europe: Analyses and Perspectives on Sixty Years of Case-law. Asser Press, 2013.
N. Petit. "Of conflicts of interests in EU competition proceedings." European Competition Law Review 34, no. 6 (2013): 338-339.
The debate over the compatibility of EU competition enforcement with art.6 ECHR is far from over. Whilst there have been a great—some would say excessive—deal of papers on due process issues, less, or even no attention has been paid to the rules and remedies that govern conflicts of interests amongst lawyers, civil servants, legal secretaries and Members of the Court. This short paper seeks to open the discussion on this issue.
N. Petit and M. Rato. "Abuse of Dominance in Technology-Enabled Markets: Established Standards Reconsidered?" European Competition Journal (2013).
This paper seeks to examine whether the legal standards underpinning the application of Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) need to be revisited in light of the alleged specificities of “technology-enabled” markets. To this end, the paper is divided in seven parts. Following this short introduction (A), the paper offers first a definition of the very notion of “technology-enabled” markets (B). Then, it questions whether competition agencies should depart from conventional enforcement techniques when reviewing conduct in fast-moving, technology-enabled markets, and follow new, expedited enforcement procedures as proposed recently by several high-ranking officials (C). After this, the paper turns to substantive issues. It begins by reviewing the intricacies of market definition and dominance in technology-enabled markets (D). It then offers some general thoughts on whether a new, general legal standard for a determination of unlawful abuse is needed in technology enabled markets (E). Finally, the paper considers six categories of abusive conduct in the high-tech sector and shows that, faced with a variety of applicable legal standards for each of them, competition agencies, courts and plaintiffs have – understandably – almost always invoked and applied the loosest possible test in support of their allegations or findings. We suggest, in turn, that under existing case-law stricter standards could and should be applied, and that this is particularly important in the context of technology-enabled markets for the simple reason that it is in these markets that the most common pitfalls and shortcomings of the EU law on abuse of a dominant position are magnified (F).
N. Neyrinck. "Multinationales et droit de la propriété intellectuelle – Le cas des savoirs traditionnels." In Les Multinationales. Edited by C. Brüls. Droit des sociétés. Bruxelles, Belgium: Larcier, 2012. 225-258.
The present contribution provides an overview of various issues susceptible to arise in the international management of intellectual property right. Chapter I deals with patents and describes, on the one hand, a variety of legal options (novelty, exhaustivity, mandatory licensing, ...) that States can take to influence the management of patent portfolios abroad and, on the other hand, the forum shopping strategies that multinationals may implement to take advantage from the rules that favor them most. Chapter II deals with traditional knowledge issues and lists the various methods of protection – whether defensive or offensive – that States may implement to prevent free exploitation of traditional knowledge abroad. Sui generis regimes, trade secrecy, unjust enrichment and extra contractual liability are discussed. Various examples are given.
N. Neyrinck and L. Demuyter. "Une transaction en droit belge de la concurrence ? Approche critique des proprositions de la Direction Générale de la Concurrence et du Ministère de l'Economie." Tijdschrift voor Belgische Mededinging , no. 2-3 (June 2012): 106-118.
The settlement procedure – which can be defined as the offer made to an undertaking liable for infringement of competition law to acknowledge its wrongdoings in exchange of a reduction of the amount of the sanction – has flourished in numerous jurisdictions. In Belgium, the limited amount of resources of the Competition Authority and the length of the procedures are notorious. Hence, it is no surprise that the services of the Ministry for Economy offer to introduce a settlement procedure. The present contribution provides an overview of the settlement procedure and examines the settlement procedure proposal supported by the Ministry of Economy. We discuss the institutional and practical issues that this proposal raises and make several legal recommendations.
N. Petit and C. Lousberg. "Chronique - Cour de Justice et Tribunal de l'Union européenne - Concurrence." Journal du Droit International - Clunet , no. 2 (April 2012): 747-759.
P. Agrell and A. Gautier. "Rethinking Regulatory Capture." In Recent Advances in the Analysis of Competition Policy and Regulation. Edited by J. Harrington and Y. Katsoulacos. Cheltenham, United Kingdom: Edward Elgar, 2012.
Conventional capture models rely on the idea that regulator is induced to lenient behavior by the regulated firm through offers of monetary transfers, the bribery model, or future employment, the revolving doors model. To avoid socially costly capture, the political principal should then either implement collusion-proof mechanisms through the delegation of welfare gains, or severely restrict the career paths of regulatory staff. The paradox of capture is that neither the two modes of capture, nor the remedy are commonly found in practice. This paper proposes to rethink capture based on the widespread use of industry-commissioned consultants, experts and lobbyists that produce information for regulatory and policy use. A small model (Agrell and Gautier, 2010) introduces a 'soft capture' concept based on a self-enforced collusion between the firm and regulator, linked to the role of the regulator as information-processing intermediate for the political principal. The firm puts processed but biased information at the free disposal of the regulator, 'no strings attached', who can then either use the submitted information or produce a more accurate information by a costly process. Under a set of mild conditions, the equilibrium involves soft capture and the regulator uses the submitted information, leading to some distortions in welfare. A case study of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) in USA serves to motivate and illustrate the model. As shown by the case, the soft capture model may have a stronger positive potential than the conventional models, also implying that policy advice based on it may be valuable.
A. Gautier and X. Wauthy. "Competitively Neutral Universal Service Obligations." Information Economics and Policy 24 (2012): 254-261.
Universal service obligations impose specific costs on the universal service provider and the latter may call for an appropriate compensation. Most often, a two-step procedure is put forward to finance the universal service in a competitive environment. Firstly, the cost of the universal service is assessed; secondly, the provider must be compensated for this cost. We argue that this procedure is problematic because the implementation of a compensation scheme affects the behavior of market participants and leads to an overcompensation of the universal service provider. We put forward an alternative approach to this problem that fully acknowledges the distortions that result from the compensation mechanism.
N. Petit. "Conceptual Foundations and Practical Framework in Vertical Restraints And Distribution Agreements Under EU Competition Law." In Vertical Restraints and Distribution Agreements under EU Competition Law. Edited by N. Petit and C. Gheur. Bruxelles, Belgique: Bruylant, 2012.
N. Petit, D. Geradin, and A. Layne-Farrar. EU Competition Law and Economics. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2012.
N. Petit and D. Henry. Vertical Restraints under EU Competition Law: Conceptual Foundations and Practical Framework. Bruylant, 2011.
N. Petit. "Credit rating agencies, the Sovereign Debt Crisis and Competition Law." European Competition Journal 7, no. 3 (December 2011).
N. Petit. "Excessive Pricing: The Flaws of ‘Tea Party Competition’ Policy." Journal of European Competition Law and Practice 2, no. 6 (December 2011): 519-520.
N. Petit and C. Lousberg. "Arrêt Tele 2 Polska: une interprétation contestable de la compétence des autorités nationales de concurrence." Journal de Droit Européen , no. 182 (October 2011): 242-245.
En se fondant sur une lecture littéralement et téléologiquement discutable du Règlement 1/2003 pour conclure que seule la Commission, à l'exclusion des autorités nationales de concurrence, est compétente pour constater l'absence d'une pratique abusive, la Cour omet de tenir compte des implications pratiques de la limitation qu'elle impose aux compétences des ANC.
N. Petit and N. Neyrinck. "Collective dominance: An overview of national case law." e-Competitions N°39129 (October 2011).
This article aims at providing an overview of the national case law on collective dominance in Europe. We observe that overall, most domestic decisions have manifestly integrated the EU case law and followed the shift from a structural approach towards a more behavioral approach. We higlight several protruding cases on the definition of the notion of abuse and the most creative remedies devised by national competition authorities so far.
A. de Streel, A. Gautier, and X. Wauthy. "La régulation des industries de réseau en Belgique." Reflets et Perspectives de la Vie Economique L, no. 3 (September 2011): 73-92.
Le bilan que l’on peut dresser concernant la libéralisation et le nouveau mode de régulation des industries de réseau en Belgique est assez mitigé. En particulier, les bénéfices issus de la libéralisation tardent à être transférés vers les utilisateurs finaux et le financement des investissements nécessaires aux gains d’efficacité dynamiques n’est parfois pas assez facilité par l’action des régulateurs. Dans cet article, nous analysons tout d’abord d’un point de vue général, les enjeux et les difficultés auxquels les autorités de régulation sont confrontés et ensuite nous identifions quelques éléments critiques, spécifiques à trois industries : l’électricité, les télécommunications, et le transport de fret ferroviaire. En conclusion nous insistons sur la nécessité d’une indépendance accrue des régulateurs, un énoncé plus clair de leurs orientations stratégiques et une simplification institutionnelle. Ces trois conditions nous semblent indispensables pour assurer la sécurité juridique nécessaire à la réalisation optimale des investissements nécessaires dans les infrastructures. Par ailleurs, dans certains cas, une intégration européenne plus poussée est justifiée.
A. Gautier and D. Paolini. "Universal Service Financing in Competitive Postal Markets: One Size Does Not Fit All." Review of Network Economics 10, no. 3 (September 2011): 6.
N. Petit and N. Neyrinck. "Credit Rating Agencies and Competition Law." CPI Antitrust Journal 8, Summer (August 2011).
Interestingly, while all the evidence points to the existence of a competition problem in the rating industry, almost nothing has been written on whether the CRAs could be amenable to antitrust scrutiny. This paper aims at identifying competition law tools that could be used to redress the functioning of the market for credit rating services.
A. Gautier and K. Mizuno. "Gradual Network Expansion and Universal Service Obligations." Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics 82, no. 2 (June 2011): 97-113.
Universal service obligations are usually not competitively neutral as they modify the way firms compete in the market. In this paper, we consider a continuum of local markets in a dynamic setting with a stochastically growing demand. The incumbent must serve all markets (ubiquity) possibly at a uniform price and an entrant decides on its market coverage before firms compete in prices. Connecting a market involves a sunk cost. We show that the imposition of a uniform price constraint modifies the timing of entry: for low connection cost markets, entry occurs earlier while for high connection cost markets, entry occurs later.
N. Neyrinck and L. Hermida. "The Belgian Competition Council dismisses a claim from the Prosecutor concerning a coordinated price increase due to the non-respect of the rights of the defence (Ferrero)." e-Competitions 45895 (April 2011).
N. Neyrinck and Q. Metz. "The Belgian Competition Council returns the case to the College of Prosecutors for having failed to consider the repeated nature of the abuse in its assessment of termination rules (Omega Pharma)." e-Competitions 45892 (April 2011).
N. Petit and N. Neyrinck. "Back to Microsoft I and II: Tying and the Art of Secret Magic." Journal of European Competition Law and Practice 2, no. 2 (April 2011): 117-121.
This paper seeks to uncover an inconvenient truth. The Microsoft decisions are not tying cases. Rather, the two decisions taken by the EU Commission against Microsoft – i.e. the Windows Media Player (“WMP”) case of 2004 and the Internet Explorer (“IE”) case of 2009 – mark departures from conventional tying analysis (I). First, they deviate from standard tying law in that in the Microsoft cases, a key component of abusive tying, namely coercion, is missing (II). Second, the Microsoft decisions share many analogies with “essential facility” cases. One may thus question to what extent the Commission has not pursued disguised refusal to supply cases (III).
N. Neyrinck and O. Beddeleem. "Utilisation stratégique du droit de la concurrence: Le cas de la ‘‘TVA Bouygues Telecom’’." Concurrences , no. 3 (2011).
Competition law aims at securing the existence of an efficient competition on the market. However, if adequately used, that competition law can also offer a relevant advantage to companies facing a powerful competitor. In France, Bouygues Telecom’s behavior when the value added tax raised in 2011 for cell phone activities is a good example of this tendency towards the strategic use of competition law by weak parties.
N. Petit. "The Economics of Parallel Trade – Econ-oclast Views on a Dogma of EU Competition Law." In Trade and Competition Law in The EU and Beyond, Edward Elgar Publishing. Edited by I. Govaere, R. Quick, and M. Bronckers. edward elgar publishing, 2011.
N. Petit. "The Judgement of the European Court of Justice in VEBIC:Filling a Gap in Regulation 1/2003." Journal of European Competition Law and Practice (2011).
N. Petit. "The Judgment of the European Court of Justice in VEBIC: Filling a Gap in Regulation 1/2003." Journal of European Competition Law and Practice 2, no. 4 (2011): 340-344.
N. Petit and N. Neyrinck. "Droit de la concurrence et instrumentalisation parisitaire." In La contribution des juristes et du droit à la performance de l'entreprise. Edited by C. Roquilly. Pratique des affaires. Paris, France: Joly éditions, 2011. 74-86.
This paper explore whether, and to what extent, firms can instrumentalize the competition rules to free ride on others’ efforts. We come to the conclusion that attempts to free ride through Article 101 TFEU allegations are likely to fail. In contrast, Article 102 TFEU offers a more promising legal avenue to wanna-be free riders.
N. Neyrinck. "Rambus déclare forfait. La Commission dans un fauteuil." Revue du Droit des Technologies de l'Information 41 (December 2010): 90-113.
The present contribution comments the undertaking decision of the European Commission in the Rambus case. We put the case into context and introduce the economic notions needed to understand patent ambush issues. We then explain how such strategies may harm the economy. Second, we present the various legal tools which may be invoked to fight patent ambushes, with a specific emphasis on competition law tools. Third, we discuss whether such tools provide an efficient answer to the patent ambush issue. If the intervention of the Commission seems legally possible, by offering commitments, Rambus gets the Commission out of a difficult situation.
L. Artige. "Envisager la décroissance ?" 15e Jour du Mois (October 2010).
A. Gautier and X. Wauthy. "Price competition under universal service obligations." International Journal of Economic Theory 6, no. 3 (September 2010): 311-326.
In industries like telecom, postal services or energy provision, universal service obligations (uniform price and universal coverage) are often imposed on one market participant. Universal service obligations are likely to alter firms' strategic behavior in such competitive markets. In this paper we show that, depending on the entrant's market coverage and the degree of product differentiation, the Nash equilibrium in prices involves either pure or mixed strategies. We show that the pure strategy market sharing equilibrium, as identified by Valletti et al. (2002) defines a lower bound on the level of equilibrium prices.
N. Petit. "Remedies for Coordinated Effects under the EU Merger Regulation." Competition Law International 6, no. 2 (September 2010): 29-37.
N. Neyrinck and D. Smessaert. "The Belgian Competition Council issues an infringement decision for the imposition of minimum prices by the Belgian professional association of real estate agents and orders the publication of its decision (Beroepsinstituut van Vastgoedmakelaars)." e-Competitions 47336 (August 2010).
N. Neyrinck and Q. Metz. "The Belgium Competition Council dismisses a complaint against the incumbent telecoms operator regarding the access to its broadband network (Mobistar / Belgacom)." e-Competitions 36453 (July 2010).
L. Artige and R. Nicolini. "Market potential, productivity and foreign direct investment: some evidence from three case studies." European Planning Studies 18, no. 2 (February 2010): 147-168.
This paper aims at analysing the importance of local determinants to foreign direct investment (FDI) in three European regional case studies. The originality of the approach lies in the use of disaggregated data by sector and by region. The results are threefold. First, regional demand and productivity are fundamental FDI determinants, confirming most studies with national data. Second, regional FDI inflows are more dependent on regional than national determinants. Finally, the effect of market potential measured with absolute GDP on regional FDI diminishes linearly with distance and does not when measured with GDP per capita.
N. Petit. "Editorial - Antitrust in the Energy Sector." Oil, Gas and Energy law Intelligence 8 (February 2010): 1-2.
This Special OGEL issue on "Antitrust in the energy sector" is devoted to the challenges arising from the implementation of the antitrust laws across various energy sectors. While this Special spans a range of countries, its primary focus is on the European Union ("EU") and the United States ("US").
N. Petit and N. Neyrinck. "A Review of the Competition Law Implications of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union." CPI Antitrust Journal 1 (February 2010).
A review of the modifications brought to competition law by the Lisbon Treaty.
N. Petit. "Le droit européen de la concurrence au banc des accusés." Revue de la Faculté de Droit de l'Université de Liège , no. 2 (2010).
N. Petit. "How Much Discretion do, and should, Competition Authorities enjoy in the Course of their Enforcement Activities? A Multi-Jurisdictional Assessment." Concurrences , no. 1 (2010): 44-62.
The purpose of this study is to assess whether competition agencies (“CAs”) do, and in turn should, enjoy an unfettered discretionary power in the context of the investigation of competition law infringements or whether their margin of discretion should be subject to certain limits. To this end, it focuses on four successive areas where CAs may be entitled to make choices, i.e. detection of infringements, selection of enforcement targets, initiation of infringement proceedings and outcome of the case. Thanks to reports received from 21 national experts in response to a questionnaire covering 18 jurisdictions, the present study formulates a number of public policy proposals.
N. Petit and D. Henry. "Why the EU Merger Regulation should not enjoy a Monopoly over Tacit Collusion." In Changes in Competition policy over the last two Decades. Edited by Krasnodebska-Tomkiel. Varsovie, Pologne: UOKIK, 2010. 181-197.
Over the past two decades, the European Commission (“the Commission”) has adopted a stance whereby the implementation of ex ante, structural merger rules is deemed more appropriate when seeking to challenge tacit collusion than ex post, behavioural instruments (e.g. on the basis of Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (“TFEU”). As a result, the EU merger regulation (“EUMR”) is the preferred, if not sole, legal instrument deployed by the Commission in order to avert any potential risk of tacit collusion. Since the entry into force of the EUMR, the number of Commission decisions in which the future emergence of risks of collective dominance was examined lies in the region of 130. In stark contrast, and despite pronouncements of the General Court (“GC”, or the Court) that Article 102 TFEU may apply to tacit collusion, the Commission has not yet taken a single decision enforcing Article 102 TFEU against tacitly collusive oligopolies. Similarly, the stillness of the 2009 Guidance Communication on Enforcement Priorities in applying Article 102 TFEU in this context implicitly confirms the Commission’s reluctance to use the abuse of dominance rules in order to address the phenomenon of tacit collusion. Overall, within the realm of EU competition law, the provisions of the EUMR de facto enjoy a jurisdictional monopoly over issues pertaining to collective dominance. The present article challenges the conventional view that tacit collusion should be exclusively addressed through the use of the EUMR. To this end, it examines and seeks to set straight five widespread misconceptions on which such view is based.
N. Petit and N. Neyrinck. "Behavioral Economics and Abuse of Dominance: A Proposed Alternative Reading of the Article 102 TFEU Case-Law." Global Competition Law Centre Working Papers Series , no. 02/2010 (2010).
Behavioral economics has become a popular field of study. With the reconsideration of the homo economicus paradigm, psychology and sociology have infiltrated economic theory. More recently, several commentators have argued in favor of an incorporation of behavioral economics within antitrust law. This paper argues, however, that EU competition law already integrates the findings of behavioral economics. A review of the Article 102 TFUE case-law reveals that contrary to the more conservative approach adopted by US agencies and courts, EU competition authorities already acknowledge the boundaries and biases of economic agents, and take into account the limits of the rationality assumption whilst drafting their decisions.
N. Petit and E. Provost. "L'émancipation du Conseil de la Concurrence? Note sous la décision du Conseil de la concurrence du 26 mai 2009 dans l'affaire Base/BMB." Tijdschrift voor Belgische Mededinging , no. 2 (2010): 89-101.
Enième avatar de la bataille juridique opposant les opérateurs alternatifs de communications électroniques à l’ancien monopole public Belgacom1, la décision commentée constitue une première pour Conseil de la concurrence (« le Conseil ») à plus d’un titre : première condamnation de l’opérateur historique, première caractérisation d’un ciseau tarifaire abusif, première décision infligeant une amende aussi élevée en Belgique. Après des années de carence dans l’application des règles de concurrence au secteur des communications électroniques le Conseil parait vouloir renverser la vapeur. Sonne peut-être – comme nous l’avons écrit précédemment – la « fin de la récréation pour l’opérateur historique ». Il faut sans doute s’en féliciter, la Belgique figurant depuis longtemps parmi les mauvais élèves de l’ouverture à la concurrence des industries de réseaux.
A. Gautier and F. Heider. "The benefit and cost of winner-picking: Redistribution vs. Incentives." Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 165, no. 4 (December 2009): 622-649.
This paper examines the agency cost of winner-picking in multidivision firms and uses explicit incentive contracts to analyze the interaction between corporate headquarters' investment and incentive policies. Winner-picking, i.e. the efficient reallocation of scarce resources in an internal capital market, adds an extra layer of noise to the moral hazard problem of incentivizing division managers to produce the resources that can then be redistributed. In particular, division managers with strong future investment opportunities anticipate that headquarters will bail them out should they fail to produce enough resources themselves. This reduces incentives to create the resources in the first place with possible consequences for the optimal investment policy.
N. Neyrinck and P. Sabbadini. "The Belgian competition Council’s College of Prosecutors dismiss multiple complaints against the incumbent telecom operator for abuse of a dominant position on the international transit services for call termination in Belgium (Base / Belgacom." e-Competitions Art. N° 35146 (December 2009).
N. Petit. "From formalism to effects? The Commission's Communication on enforcement priorities in applying article 82 EC." World Competition: Law and Economics Review 32 (December 2009): 485-504.
N. Petit and E. Provost. "Abusive margin squeeze: an overview of European national case laws." e-Competitions (November 11, 2009): 11.
The purpose of this brief article is to introduce the reader to the national case-law on abusive margin squeezes that was commented in the e-competitions bulletin over the period 2003-2009.To this end, it seeks, to the extent possible, to analyze the 23 e-competitions case notes in relation to six items which are generally reviewed in margin squeeze cases, i.e., existence of an upstream input and a downstream product/service (1); indispensability of the upstream input (2); dominance in the upstream market and vertical integration (3); particularly aggressive downstream pricing policy (4); anticompetitive effects (5); absence of objective justifications (6). In addition, the present article reviews a seventh issue, namely sanctions and remedies (7), where national enforcement practices may again diverge/converge.
A. Gautier and D. Paolini. "Delegation, externalities and organizational design." Economics Bulletin 29, no. 4 (October 28, 2009).
In a repeated interaction between a principal and two agents with inter-agents externalities and asymmetric information, we show that optimal decentralization within the organization is limited to the first period and across agents.
N. Neyrinck and M. Coquelet. "The Belgian Competition Prosecutor dismisses a claim from the Union of Belgian French-speaking Booksellers against their main distributors concerning alleged illicit agreement and abuse of dominant position (Interforum)." Concurrences (October 22, 2009).
N. Neyrinck and A.-S. Come. "The Belgian Competition Prosecutor dismisses a complaint from the Union of Belgian French-speaking Booksellers alleging an abuse of dominance and the existence of a cartel between two book distributors (Dilibel)." Concurrences (October 20, 2009).
N. Petit and L. RABEUX. "Judicial Review in French Competition Law and Economic Regulation: A Post Commission v. Tetra laval Assessment." In National Courts and the Standard of Review in Competition Law and Economic Regulation. Groningen: europa law Publishing, 2009. 103-126.
N. Petit and A. Defossez. "La loi belge sur la protection de la concurrence économique - Rapport d'étape après deux années d'application." Concurrences 2 (June 2009).
N. Petit. "L'application du droit communautaire des restrictions verticales aux accords de distribution commerciale." Le Droit de la Distribution (May 2009).
N. Neyrinck and L. Caucheteux. "The Court of Appeal of Brussels upholds the NCA’s ruling holding that the opening days/hours and advertising provisions for pharmacy outlets, as set by the Belgian Pharmacists Association, were contrary to competition law (Ordre des pharmaciens)." Concurrences (April 7, 2009).
N. Neyrinck and W. De Vos. "The Belgian Competition Council assesses the implementation of a merger remedy imposed in the cinemas complexes sector and finds that no prior approval is needed to create a new cinema complex, but refers the case back to the Competition Council’s Prosecutor for further investigation due to changed market conditions (Kinepolis)." Concurrences (April 7, 2009).
N. Petit. "The outcome of the EC pharmaceutical sector inquiry." Concurrences , no. 3 (March 2009).
N. Petit. "Les strategies juridiques en droit des coordinations entre entreprises Une approche scenarisee." In Les stratégies juridiques des entreprises. Bruxelles, Belgique: Larcier, 2009.
E. Fegatilli and N. Petit. "Économétrie du droit de la concurrence, un essai de conceptualisation." Revue Internationale de Droit Economique I (January 2009): 67-122.
The present paper reviews in a plain language and with only limited statistical formalization, the virtues of econometrics in the field of competition law. Following a brief introduction to the origins of econometrics, we explain first that econometrics provides assistance to decision-making in a variety of fields (merger control, abuse of dominance, etc.). Second, we show that econometrics also constitute a decision-reading instrument, which may assist competition agencies, courts, firms and their counsels in understanding the content of the law. The econometric models discussed in the paper are illustrated by examples coming from well-known legal cases. Our conclusion is that in light of the novel sophisticated issues arising in antitrust enforcement (damages estimation, etc.), the nascent "econometrics of competition law" exhibit promising features.
N. Petit. "Aperçu de la procédure communautaire de transaction." Concurrences (January 2009).
The new settlement procedure introduced by the Commission in July 2008 brings about significant changes in conventional antitrust procedure. To cast light on theses changes and their practical implications, the present article and table provide a snapshot of the settlement procedure.
N. Petit. "Accords d’échange d’informations et fédérations d’entreprises – Grands principes d’analyse en droit de la concurrence." In Les fédérations d'entreprises et les règles de concurrence. Bruxelles, Belgique: Larcier, 2009. 52-68.
A l'heure de l'alourdissement des risques générés par le non-respect du droit de la concurrence, il est crucial que les fédérations sachent distinguer l'échange d'informations licite de l'échange illicite et puissent remédier en temps utile à tout risque de violation du droit. Pour les y aider, la présente étude tente de définir une méthode permettant de trier les bons et mauvais accords d'échange d'informations.
N. Petit. "L'application du droit de la concurrence par les juridictions belges: une analyse tendancielle de la jurisprudence récente." In Concurrence en droit, belge et européen. Larcier, 2009.
N. Petit and M. Abenhaim. "L’exemption des engagements d’exclusivité au “seuil” de la réforme du droit des accords verticaux : Quelle(s) part(s) de marché ?" Concurrences (2009).
The present paper discusses whether the market share threshold enshrined in Regulation 2790/1999 allows to draw correct inferences on the foreclosure risks arising from single branding and exclusive purchasing obligations in the context of vertical relationships. As far as the customer foreclosure risks arising from single branding are concerned, it comes to the conclusion that Regulation 2790/1999 wrongly focuses on the market share of the seller and should concentrate on the market share of the acquirer. Symetrically, in so far as the input foreclosure risks arising from exclusive purchasing are concerned, Regulation 2790/1999 should focus on the market share of the seller. In the context of the upcoming review of the rules applicable to vertical agreements, the European Commission should seek to address this problem.
N. Petit and I. Daems. "La fin de la récréation pour l'opérateur historique? Annotation de la décision du Conseil de la concurrence dans l'affaire Belgacom/Scarlet, 7 novembre 2008." Tijdschrift voor Belgische Mededinging , no. 3 (2009).
Le Conseil belge de la concurrence a décidé de subordonner l'autorisation de la concentration entre Belgacom et Scarlet à la mise en oeuvre de diverses mesures correctives structurelles et comportementales.
N. Petit and L. RABEUX. "Judicial Review in French Competition Law and Economic Regulation: A Post Commission v. Tetra laval Assessment." In National courts and the Standard of Review in Competition Law and Economic Regulation. Groningen: europa law Publishing, 2009. 105-124.
N. Petit and M. Rato. From hard to soft enforcement of EC Competition Law. L.G.D.J. Bruxelles, Belgique: Bruylant, 2009.
A. Gautier and M. Mitra. "Regulation of an Open Access Essential Facility." Economica 75 (November 2008): 662-682.
A vertically integrated ﬁrm owns an essential input and operates on the downstream market. There is a potential entrant in the downstream market. Both ﬁrms use the same essential input. The regulator’s objectives are (i) to ensure ﬁnancing of the essential input and (ii) to generate competition in the downstream market. The regulatory mechanism grants non-discriminatory access of the essential facility to the entrant provided it pays a two-part tariff to the incumbent. The optimal mechanism generates inefﬁcient entry. The inefﬁcient entry captures the trade-off between market efﬁciency and infrastructure ﬁnancing resulting from incomplete information and non-discriminatory access.
N. Petit. "Jacques Steenbergen: A Counsel at the head of the Belgian NCA." Concurrences 3-2008 (September 2008).
N. Petit. "Non-competition concerns under the ECMR - An overview." Concurrences 4-2008 (September 2008): 182-187.
This article lists the EC merger cases where noncompetition concerns were raised (industrial policy, social concerns, personal data protection etc.). It summarizes the issues raised by non-competition concerns in the ECMR.
N. Petit and M. Rato. "From Hard to Soft Enforcement of EC Competition Law - A Bestiary of Sunshine Enforcement Instruments." Alternative Enforcement Techniques in EC Competition Law (September 2008).
N. Petit and K. Digneffe. "The Belgian Competition Council finds a non-profit association guilty of price fixing but does not impose any fine (AIAB)." e-Competitions , no. 22333 (July 25, 2008).
F. Bloch and A. Gautier. "Access Pricing and Entry in the Postal Sector." Review of Network Economics 7, no. 2 (June 2008): 207-230.
In a fully liberalized postal market, two business models will be possible for a new postal operator: (1) access: where the firm performs the upstream operations and uses the incumbent's network for final delivery and (2) bypass where the competing firm controls the entire supply chain and delivers mails with its own network. The choice between access and bypass depends on the entrant's delivery cost relative to the access price. In this paper, we derive welfare maximizing prices for the incumbent operator and we show how these prices should be re-balanced when the entry method is considered as endogenous.
A. Gautier. "La libéralisation du secteur postal." Regards économiques 60 (June 2008).
En 2011, le marché postal sera entièrement libéralisé. Le service universel sera-t-il maintenu ? Comment sera-t-il financé ? Dans cet article, nous abordons la question du financement du service universel postal dans un environnement concurrentiel. La Commission européenne propose plusieurs pistes, les Etats Membres doivent maintenant choisir la solution la plus appropriée à leur marché.
N. Petit and A. Defossez. "L’effet des arrêts de la Cour de Justice et du Tribunal de première instance des Communautés européennes." In L'effet de la décision de justice. Contentieux européens, constitutionnel, civil et pénal. CUP vol. 102. Anthemis, 2008.
N. Petit. Oligopoles, collusion tacite et droit communautaire de la concurrence. Bruylant, 2008.
N. Petit. "TPICE British Aggregates Association contre Commission." Revue d'Etudes Juridiques Aménagement, Environnement, Urbanisme et Droit Foncier (February 2008).
N. Petit and R. Verbeke. "The Belgian Competition Council bans a price-coordination mechanism in the retail bakery markets (VEBIC)." e-Competitions , no. 21559 (January 25, 2008).
N. Petit. "L'arrêt Microsoft. Abus de position dominante, refus de licence et vente liée... L'article 82 sans code source." Journal de Droit Européen (January 2008).
L. Artige and R. Nicolini. Investigación y Desarrollo más Innovación. Madrid, Espagne: Consejo Económico y Social de España, 2008.
F. Bloch and A. Gautier. "Access, Bypass and Productivity Gains in Competitive Postal Markets." In Competition and Regulation in the Postal and Delivery Sector. Cheltenham, United Kingdom: Edward Elgar, 2008. 125-135.
G. d'Alcantara and A. Gautier. "National Postal Strategies after a Full Postal Market Opening." In Competition and Regulation in the Postal and Delivery Sector. Cheltenham, United Kingdom: Edward Elgar, 2008. 167-186.
A. Defossez and N. Petit. "L'effet des arrêts et jugements de la CJCE et du TPICE." 2008.
A. Gautier and X. Wauthy. "Teaching versus Research: The Role of Internal Financing Rules in Multi-Department Universities." In Higher education in a globalized world: Governance, competition and performance. Bruxelles, Belgium: Editions de l’Université Libre de Bruxelles, 2008.
N. Petit. "L'actualité du droit des ententes en 2007." Les Petites Affiches (2008).
N. Petit. "Annotation sous TPICE, T-210/02, 23 décembre 2006, affaire des granulats." Aménagement - Environnement , no. 2 (2008): 119.
Les éxonérations de l'écotaxe sur l'extraction des granulats instaurée en 2001 constituaient-elles des aides d'état incompatibles avec le Traité CE?
N. Petit. "Traité de Lisbonne et politique de concurrence – Rupture ?" Revue de la Faculté de Droit de l'Université de Liège , no. 1 (2008): 265-279.
N. Petit and C. Lousberg. "TPI, 9 septembre 2008, MyTravel Group plc/Commission." Revue des Affaires Européennes , no. 4 (2008): 785-792.
N. Petit. "L'ordonnance Actua TV contre Belgacom TV, ou l'art de la définition stratégique du marché pertinent." Revue du Droit des Technologies de l'Information (September 2007).
N. Petit and L. Biesemans. "The Belgian Competition Council orders an ICT company to disclose proprietary information over its electronic network (CRM/FneyrinckPortima)." e-Competitions , no. 14978 (February 14, 2007).
A. Gautier and X. Wauthy. "Teaching versus research: A multi-tasking approach to multi-department universities." European Economic Review 51, no. 2 (February 2007): 273-295.
We study the possible implications of incentive schemes as a tool to promote efﬁciency in the management of universities. In this paper, we show that by designing internal ﬁnancial rules which create yardstick competition for research funds, a multi-department university may induce better teaching quality and research, as compared to the performance of independent departments.
A. Defossez and N. Petit. "The Belgian Competition Council assesses the validity of opening days/hours and advertising provisions for pharmacy outlets as set by the pharmacists professional associations (Belgian Pharmacists Associations)." e-competitions bulletin (2007).
A. Gautier. "Network ﬁnancing with two-part and single tariffs." In Access Pricing: Theory and Practice. Amsterdam, Netherlands: Elsevier, 2007.
In this paper, we compare two types of access pricing: a two-part tariff where the ﬁxed part aims to cover (part of) the network’s ﬁxed cost while the variable part covers the network’s usage costs and a single tariff where both the usage and (part of ) the infrastructure costs are covered by a per-unit access charge. We compare how the regulator trades-off the degree of competition induced by the access charges and the network ﬁnancing. (JEL: L11, L51).
A. Gautier and D. Paolini. "Delegation and Information Revelation." Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 163 (2007): 574-597.
N. Petit and M. Rato. "The Commission's Non Contractual Liability in the Field of Merger Control - Don't Use a Hammer When You Need a Screwdriver." Global Competition Policy (2007).
It has become conventional wisdom to view the rulings handed down by the CFI in Airtours, Schneider, Tetra Laval and Impala as unprecedented setbacks for the European Commission ("the Commission") that would usher in a new era of administrative accountability in the field of merger control. However, several commentators still consider that the Commission regretfully enjoys a de facto power of "life or death" over notified mergers, and that judgments striking down its decisions are unlikely to change much in practice. Parties to a blocked merger generally abandon their projects following the Commission's decision, irrespective of the outcome of the actions they may subsequently bring before the EC Courts (e.g. the Airtours/First Choice or Schneider/Legrand mergers). Third parties - competitors or consumers - to an illegally approved merger have little prospect of inducing the Commission to unscramble a consummated transaction (e.g. the Sony/BMG merger). This unsatisfactory state of affairs has led practitioners to explore other legal avenues to hold the Commission accountable for its mistakes. One such possible means of redress is to resort to Article 288 EC which provides that the EC shall "make good any damage caused by its institutions". Where an EC institution such as the Commission is found liable for such damage, Article 235 EC grants the Community Courts jurisdiction to award compensation In light of the virulence of some of criticism directed at the Commission by the CFI in the Airtours and Schneider/Legrand judgments, the parties to those mergers initiated proceedings against the Commission, seeking compensation for the unlawful prohibition of their proposed mergers. These actions drew enthusiastic reactions from certain EC competition law experts which, upon close examination, appear unjustified. The legal avenue provided for by Article 288 EC is most likely a procedural dead-end. First, from the applicants' perspective, the conditions under which the Commission's liability can give rise to a right to compensation in the field of merger control are set so high by existing case-law that most Article 288 EC claims are likely to be dismissed as unfounded. Second, from a public policy standpoint, Article 288 EC does not constitute an adequate instrument to improve the Commission's accountability for its unlawful decisions.
L. Artige and R. Nicolini. "Inversions Estrangeres Directes i Innovació a Catalunya." In La situació de la innovació a Catalunya. Edited by I. Busom. Barcelone, Espagne: CIDEM edition, 2006. 179-206.
L. Artige and R. Nicolini. "Agrupació geogràfica d'empreses multinacionals a Catalunya." Revista Econòmica de Catalunya 54 (2006): 23-46.
A. Gautier. "Dynamics of Dowstream Entry in Postal Markets." In Liberalization of the Postal and Delivery Sector. Edited by M. Crew and P. Kleindorfer. Advances in Regulatory Economics series. Northampton (MA), USA: Edward Elgar, 2006. 71-88.
A. Gautier and M. Mitra. "Regulating a monopolist with limited funds." Economic Theory 27 (2006): 705-718.
We consider the problem of regulating a monopolist with unknown costs when the regulator has limited funds. The optimal regulatory mechanism sat- isﬁes four properties. The ﬁrst property is bunching at the top, that is the more efﬁcient types produce the same quantity irrespective of their costs. The second property is separability of less efﬁcient types. The third property is full bunching of types when the available fund is small enough. The fourth property of the mecha- nism is that it is a third best one, that is, the output under this regulatory mechanism is strictly lower than the second best output for any given type.
N. Petit. "La politique industrielle sous les tirs croisés de la mondialisation et du droit communautaire de la concurrence." Mondialisation politique industrielle et droit comm de la concurrence (2006).
N. Petit and D. Geradin. "Price Discrimination Under Ec Competition Law: Another Antitrust Theory in Search of Limiting Principles." GCLC (July 2005).
Price discrimination is one of the most complex areas of EC competition law. There are several reasons for this. First, the concept of price discrimination covers many different practices (discounts and rebates, tying, selective price cuts, discriminatory input prices set by vertically-integrated operators, etc.) whose objectives and effects on competition significantly differ. From the point of view of competition law analysis, it is thus not easy to classify these practices under a coherent analytical framework. Second, there is a consensus among economists that the welfare effects of the (various categories of) price discrimination are ambiguous. It is hard to say a priori whether a given form of price discrimination increases or decreases welfare. The response to this question may indeed depend on which type of welfare standard (total or consumer) is actually pursued. Moreover, even if one agrees on a given standard, the welfare effects of discriminatory prices generally depend on factual issues, such as whether it increases or decreases total output. Third, the exact scope of Article 82(c), the only Treaty provision dealing with discrimination, is not entirely clear. While the European Commission (hereafter, the Commission) and the Community courts have applied Article 82(c) to many different practices, there are good reasons to believe that this provision should be applied to a limited set of circumstances, most forms of discrimination being adequately covered by Article 82(b) or other provisions of the Treaty. Against this background, the main objective of this paper is to throw some light on the compatibility of price discrimination with EC competition law. In order to do so, this paper does not seek to propose a grand unifying theory that would provide a single test offering a way to distinguish between practices compatible and incompatible with the EC Treaty. Instead, we offer an analytical framework which distinguishes between different categories of price discrimination depending on their effects on competition. Different tests may thus be needed to assess the compatibility of the practices belonging to these categories with EC competition law. Another objective of the paper is to show that Article 82(c) should only be applied to the limited circumstances where a non-vertically integrated dominant firm price discriminates between customers with the effect of placing one or several of them at a competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis other customers (secondary line price discrimination). In contrast, Article 82(c) should not be applied to pricing measures designed to harm the dominant firm's competitors (first line price discrimination) or to fragment the single market across national lines. As will be seen, relying on Article 82(c) to condemn such practices goes against the letter and the spirit of this provision and may also apply a wrong test to such practices. It is also not necessary since other Treaty provisions can be used to achieve this objective.
N. Petit, D. Geradin, P. Hofer, F. Louis, and M. Walker. "The Concept of Dominance in EC Competition Law." GCLC (July 2005).
N. Petit, D. Geradin, P. Hofer, M. Walker, and F. Louis. "GCLC Research Papers on Article 82 EC: The concept of dominance." GCLC College d'Europe (July 2005).
A. Gautier and M. Hamadi. "Internal Capital Market Efficiency of Belgian Holding Companies." Finance 26, no. 2 (2005): 11-34.
In this paper, we raise the following two questions. (1) Do Belgian holding companies operate an internal capital market to transfer ﬁnancial resources amongst their subsidiaries? And if yes, (2) is the internal capital market efficient? To answer the ﬁrst question, we check if group cash ﬂow is a determinant of the group members investment spending. The answer is positive if the holding company’s subsidiary is affiliated to a coordination center and negative otherwise. To answer the second question, we evaluate if internal transfers are driven by efficiency. From our estimations, we cannot conclude that Belgian Holding companies have an efficient internal capital market.
A. Gautier and D. Paolini. "Information Acquisition in Repeated Relationships." In New Developments in Macroeconomics Research. Edited by L. Pelzer. Nova Science, 2005. 117-132.
This paper presents a new rationale for delegation. In a repeated relationship, when the principal gives up at time t the control over an action to the better informed agent, the decision taken by the agent signals his private information to the principal. The revelation of information is valuable to the principal only in a context of repeated relation where the principal can use the information at time t + 1 to take another decision. In this paper, we present an example where delegation occurs only if the relation lasts for more than one period. In a single period context, if the agent has a bias in favor of one project, he does not have incentives to select a project that is not his preferred one; hence he does not disclose his private information and delegation is not valuable. While in a repeated relationship, it becomes costly for the agent to keep the principal non-informed and this counterbalances the agent’s bias for one project. Shared-control (partial delegation) is then the preferred organizational structure when the interaction is repeated. Moreover, shared-control dominates an alternative mechanism where the principal centralizes all the decisions and the information is transferred through a message game.
N. Petit. "Droit de la concurrence et recours en annulation à l'ere post-modernisation." Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Européen (2005).
N. Petit and D. Geradin. "Judicial Remedies Under EC Competition Law: Complex Issues Arising from the Modernization Process." Fordham Corporate Law (2005).
Article 230 EC allows any natural or legal person to institute proceedings against a decision addressed to that person or against a decision which, although in the form of a regulation or a decision addressed to another person, is of direct and individual concern to the former . Private parties thus frequently rely on this provision to challenge acts adopted by the European Commission (hereafter the Commission ) in accordance with the powers granted to it in the field of competition law. While this particular subject has generated extensive scholarly analysis, the last decade of reforms of EC competition law often cited as the modernisation process makes it particularly necessary to re-examine this topic. Two major developments in the field of competition law give rise to novel and complex questions with regard to judicial review pursuant to Article 230 EC. First, the reforms introduced by virtue of the modernisation of the implementation of EC competition rules have generated a proliferation of new acts whose legal character (and therefore by implication the possibility to challenge these new acts before the European Court of Justice hereafter, the ECJ and the Court of First Instance hereafter, the CFI ) is not necessarily clear. This is the case, for example, of the multitude of soft law instruments (notices, guidelines, etc.) which the Commission adopted with a view to clarifying its decisional practice, as well as new binding acts envisaged by Regulation 1/2003 such as findings of inapplicability and decisions to remove a case from a National Competition Authority. Second, the increased emphasis on the use of economic analysis following the successive reforms of the rules pertaining to horizontal and vertical agreements and merger control has transformed competition law into a technically complex subject matter whereby economists are stealing a lead over lawyers. The corollary of this development could be to limit the scope of judicial review exercised by generalist EC and national courts. Indeed, faced with having to make complex evaluations involving the weighing up of anti-competitive restrictions and efficiency gains, the generalist judge could quickly find himself lost. Therefore, the more opaque and complex a particular case is, the wider the Commission s discretion in its decision making becomes. Certain recent judgments of the CFI concerning the annulment of Commission prohibition decisions in merger control, however, put this danger into perspective. Apart from the above-mentioned developments, it is equally worth highlighting the proliferation of litigation running in parallel to annulment actions. Such litigation calls for, first and foremost, a re-examination and revision of the fines imposed by the Commission under Articles 81 and 82 EC. Subsequent to successful annulment actions, such litigation also encompasses actions for compensation of the losses incurred by the firm(s) subjected to unlawful Commission decisions. The recent case Holcim v. Commission or the request lodged by Mytravel after the Airtours judgment illustrate the development of such litigation in the field of competition law. Against this background, the developments that follow intend to provide a critical analysis of annulment actions against Commission decisions in the field of competition law in the aftermath of the modernisation process. This study is made up of seven parts. Part II identifies those acts that can be the subject of an annulment action within the meaning of Article 230 EC. Part III reviews and analyses the rules laying down who is entitled to initiate an annulment action. Part IV recalls the modalities for an annulment action. Part V evokes the parallel actions (revision of fines) and subsequent actions for indemnity following an annulment action. Part VI evaluates the effectiveness of the Community annulment action procedure in the light of the principles laid down by the CFI and ECJ as regards judicial review. Part VII provides a brief conclusion.
L. Artige, C. Camacho, and D. de la Croix. "Wealth Breeds Decline: Reversals of Leadership and Consumption Habits." Journal of Economic Growth 9, no. 4 (December 2004): 423-449.
In a two-region model, we formalize Kindlebergerrsquos idea that wealth breeds first more wealth, and then decline: when one region leads, its inhabitants develop consumption habits incompatible with the necessary investment in knowledge to remain the leader. This gives the other region a window of opportunity to gain economic primacy. The theory suggests that differences across regions that have similar characteristics may persist even if physical capital flows from rich to poor regions. We study patterns of overtaking, alternating primacy, irreversible decline, and monotonic convergence, according to the initial dispersion of knowledge and the strength of consumption habits. Even though exogenous factors may matter on some occasions, we show that they are not necessary to reverse economic leadership.
A. Gautier. "Le rail belge s'ouvre à la concurrence. Peut-on tirer parti de l'expérience étrangère ?" Regards économiques (June 2004).
La Commission européenne vient de décider d’ouvrir d’ici 2010 l’ensemble du marché ferroviaire à la concurrence. À l’avenir, la SNCB ne sera plus la seule compagnie à transporter des passagers dans notre pays. Dans ce numéro de Regards économiques, nous analysons au travers de l’expé- rience de deux pays, l’Allemagne et l’Angleterre, les conséquences de la libéralisation du secteur sur le rail belge.
N. Petit. "note sous arrêt du 4 mars 2003 "FENIN c/ Commission"." Revue du Droit de l'Union Européenne (March 4, 2004).
L. Artige. "Les investissements directs et les échanges commerciaux entre la Belgique et les pays arabes." In Belges et Arabes. Voisins distants, partenaires nécessaires. Edited by B. Khader and C. Roosens. Louvain-La-neuve, Belgique: Presses universitaires de Louvain, 2004. 163-222.
A. Coppe and A. Gautier. "Régulation et concurrence dans le transport collectif urbain." Reflets et Perspectives de la Vie Economique 43, no. 4 (2004): 65-76.
A. Gautier. "Regulation under Financial Constraints." Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics 75, no. 4 (2004): 645-656.
This article studies a simple procurement problem (Laffont and Tirole, 1993) where the regulator faces a cash-in-advance constraint. The introduction of such a constraint not only reduces the amount of public good provided but also limits the instruments available to the regulator. The wealth constraint could change the optimal regulatory contract from a two-part tariff, where the quantities produced depend on the firm's cost, to a less efficient fixed fee where the firm produces the same quantity whatever its cost.
N. Petit and D. Geradin. The Development of Agencies at EU and National Levels: Conceptual Analysis and Proposals for Reform. 2004.
N. Petit. "note sous arrêt du 18 septembre 2003, Volkswagen AG c/ Commission." Revue du Droit de l'Union Européenne (September 18, 2003).
L. Artige and R. Nicolini. "Book Review: Theories of Endogenous Regional Growth: Lessons for Regional Policies." Journal of Regional Science 43, no. 2 (2003): 403-406.
N. Petit. "Circumscribing the Scope of EC Competition Law in Network Industries_A Comparative Approach to the US Supreme Court Ruling in the Trinko Case." Journal of Network Industries (2003).
N. Petit. "note sous arrêt du 23 octobre 2003, Van den Bergh Foods contre Commission." Revue du Droit de l'Union Européenne (2003).
N. Petit and D. Geradin. "Competition Policy and the Euromed Partnership." European Foreign Affairs Review (2003).
This paper seeks to provide a critical assessment of the efforts made by the EC to stimulate the development of competition laws in the Mediterranean countries with which it is engaged in partnership agreements. It reviews the content of the competition provisions of the association agreements, as well as their effectiveness. In then examines the regular calls for convergence on the EC competition law model to which Mediterranean countries are object. There is indeed room for debate regarding the opportunity, as well as the nature of such convergence. The paper concludes that a deep convergence approach, whereby the non-candidate Partner countries would transpose EC competition rules in their domestic legal order, would provide many benefits for both the EC and these countries.

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