Source: https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/justice-scalia-s-enduring-ceqa-and-land-80620/
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 15:35:52+00:00

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Perhaps foremost among Justice Scalia’s contributions to CEQA is his creation of the constitutional lens through which all land use lawyers view mitigation measures and exactions. CEQA Guidelines § 15126.4(a)(4)(A) and (B) now enshrine the applicable constitutional requirements that mitigation measures must have an “essential nexus” to a legitimate governmental interest and be “roughly proportional” to the impacts of the project. (Id., citing Nollan v. California Coastal Commission (1987) 483 U.S. 825 and Dolan v. City of Tigard (1994) 512 U.S. 374.) Over the years, these “Nollan/Dolan” requirements have been refined (see Ehrlich v. City of Culver City (1996) 12 Cal.4th 854) and expanded to extend beyond the compelled transfer of title to land and to ad hoc imposition of monetary exactions (Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management Dist. (2013) 570 U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 2586). The underlying “doctrine of unconstitutional conditions” has stood the test of time, firmly rooted in Justice Scalia’s deep concern for property rights and his brilliant, groundbreaking Fifth Amendment jurisprudence.
The genesis, of course, was Justice Scalia’s rejection of the California Coastal Commission’s attempted unconstitutional property grab in Nollan. The Commission tried to extract a lateral public access easement across a homeowner’s beachfront lot as a condition of approving a coastal development permit to demolish a small bungalow on the lot and replace it with a larger house. The Commission’s attempted justification was that the larger home would block public views of the ocean from the street, creating a “psychological barrier” to beach access which the easement condition would alleviate. With withering logic, Justice Scalia’s opinion obliterated that justification by pointing out that an easement benefiting only those already present on the beach by allowing them to traverse the Nollans’ property had nothing to do with mitigating any blocked ocean views caused by the new house. Because the “essential nexus” between the project impact and permit condition was missing, rather than being a legitimate land use regulation rationally designed to alleviate the project’s adverse impact, the condition amounted to nothing more than “an out-and-out plan of extortion” — the attempted governmental taking of a private property right for which the Constitution demands payment of just compensation.
Justice Scalia’s opinions have also shaped the law of standing – both for environmental group and affected property owner plaintiffs – to challenge actions taken under Federal environmental statutes. (See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife (1992) 504 U.S. 555 [holding environmental groups lacked standing to challenge federal regulations because they failed to show they would be affected by the rules]; Bennett v. Spear (1997) 520 U.S. 154 [holding standing to bring Federal Endangered Species Act claims extends to those seeking to redress economic injury from government overregulation in violation of ESA].) Significantly, the last-cited decision also held that a U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service Biological Opinion constituted “final agency action” subject to immediate judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act.
As it probably has with most land use lawyers, Justice Scalia’s work has significantly influenced my own thinking, career and practice. I was fortunate enough to personally witness him in action on the bench at the December 10, 2002 oral argument in Borden Ranch Partnership, and Tsakopoulos v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, et al, U.S. Supreme Ct., Case No. 01-1243; 261 F.3d 810 (9th Cir. 2001). That Clean Water Act (“CWA”) case (which I tried in the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of California and argued in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals with Ed Regalia) presented issues concerning whether our rancher clients’ plowing of semi-arid rangelands in areas of seasonal wetlands to plant orchards and vineyards required a federal CWA § 404 permit, i.e., whether it constituted the “discharge” from a “point source” (a deep plow or ripper) of a “pollutant” (the native soil turned in place) into “waters of the United States” (the seasonally wet areas of the ranch delineated as “wetlands”).
After losses in both lower courts, which held my clients’ traditional farming activities met the foregoing elements and thus required a section 404 permit, the U.S. Supreme Court granted my petition for certiorari filed on behalf the Borden Ranch Partnership and Mr. Tsakopoulos. The high court ultimately (and disappointingly) deadlocked 4-4 (with Justice Kennedy recusing himself ) and was thus unable to reach a decision, which left the adverse 2-1 Ninth Circuit decision in place. Nonetheless, I will not forget the experience, including Justice Scalia’s encouraging interjection during oral argument that “I never thought a plow was a “point source either!” That comment perfectly encapsulated his preferences for adhering to the plain text of federal legislation (as well as the Constitution), and for avoiding interpretations that would upset the appropriate balance of state and federal powers dictated by federalism principles.
Thank you, and rest in peace, Justice Scalia.

References: § 15126
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