Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/173/592/
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 02:03:22+00:00

Document:
This Court has jurisdiction to review the final judgment of the state court in this case for the purpose of ascertaining whether it deprived the defendants of any right, privilege or immunity set up by them under the Constitution of the United States.
The City of Henderson had authority to tax so much of the property of the Henderson Bridge Company as was permanently between low water mark on the Kentucky shore and low water mark on the Indiana shore of the Ohio River, it being settled that the boundary of Kentucky extends to low water mark on the Indiana shore.
The declaration of the state court that Kentucky intended by its legislation to confer upon the City of Henderson a power of taxation for local purposes coextensive with its statutory boundary is binding in this Court.
In order to bring taxation imposed by a state within the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment of the National Constitution, the case should be so clearly and palpably an illegal encroachment upon private rights as to leave no doubt that such taxation, by its necessary operation, is really spoliation under the guise of exerting the power to tax.
The taxation by the city, as property of the Bridge Company, of the bridge and its appurtenances within the fixed boundary of the city between low water mark on the two sides of the Ohio River was not a taking of private property for public use without just compensation in violation of the Constitution of the United States.
The Bridge Company did not acquire by contract an exemption from local taxation in respect of its bridge situated between low water mark on the two shores of the Ohio River.
"no land embraced within the city's limits, and outside of ten-acre lots as originally laid off shall be assessed and taxed by the city council unless the same is divided or laid out into lots of five acres or less and unless the same is actually used and devoted to farming purposes"
has no reference to bridges, their approaches, piers, etc.
The power of Kentucky to tax this bridge is not affected by the fact that it was erected under the authority or with the consent of Congress.
This case arises out of the taxation by the City of Henderson, a municipal corporation of Kentucky, of a railroad bridge (with its approaches, piers, etc.) extending from a point within that city on the Kentucky shore across the Ohio River to low water mark on the Indiana shore.
The property subjected to taxation belongs to the Henderson Bridge Company, a corporation of Kentucky, but is under the care, management, and control of the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company, also a corporation of that commonwealth.
Those corporations insist that the final judgment of the court of appeals of Kentucky here for review, affirming a judgment rendered in the Circuit Court of Henderson County, is in derogation of rights secured to them by the Constitution of the United States. The grounds upon which this contention rests will appear from the statement presently to be made of the history of the litigation between the City of Henderson and the corporations named in respect of taxes assessed upon the bridge property in question.
The city contends not only that the assessment of taxes upon this property was in all respects valid, but that the matters here in dispute, including the questions of constitutional law raised by the bridge and railroad companies, have been conclusively determined in prior litigation between the parties.
"a bridge across the Ohio River, extending from some convenient point within the corporate limits of the City of Henderson to some convenient point on the Indiana side of said river opposite the City of Henderson."
Acts Kentucky 1871-72, Vol. 1, 314.
The city's boundary, as defined by its charter granted February 11, 1867, extended "to low water mark on the Ohio River on the Indiana shore," and it had the power (with certain exceptions not material to be noticed here) to levy and collect taxes at a prescribed rate upon all property within its limits made taxable by law for state purposes.
"to construct on or over the center of Fourth Street in the City of Henderson, and of the line thereof extended to low water mark on the Indiana side of the Ohio River, such approaches, avenues, piers, trestles, abutments, toll houses, and other appurtenances necessary in the erection of, and for the business of, a bridge over the Ohio River from a point in the City of Henderson to some convenient point on the Indiana side of said river, and for such purposes, the use of said Fourth Street is hereby granted, subject to the terms and conditions hereinafter expressed;"
"to use the space between Water Street, in said city, and low water mark in the Ohio River, extending one hundred feet below the center of Fourth Street extended and three hundred feet above the center of said street extended to the Ohio River for the purpose required by said company."
wharfage, subject to the terms and conditions hereinafter expressed."
"as waiving the right of the City of Henderson to levy and collect taxes on the approaches to said bridge, or any building erected by said bridge company within the corporate limits of said city, the bridge itself, and all appurtenances thereto, within the limits of said city."
The fifth section provided that before any of the rights or privileges so granted should inure to the benefit of or vest in the bridge company, the latter should, by proper authority, append to a certified copy of the ordinance their acceptance of, and agreement to abide by and faithfully keep, its terms and conditions, such acceptance and agreement to be acknowledged by the proper authority of the company, as provided in the case of a deed under the laws of Kentucky, and delivered to the clerk of the Henderson City Council.
The bridge company duly accepted the ordinance, with its terms and conditions, agreed to abide by and faithfully keep the same, and its acceptance was acknowledged and delivered to the city council.
ordinary wear and tear, and pay taxes imposed on said track and the bridge on compensation being made therefor by the bridge company. By that agreement, the bridge company undertook to pay the railroad company absolutely and in each year during the continuance of the agreement, in equal quarter-yearly payments, the sum of $10,000 per annum, which amount, or such parts thereof as were required, the railroad company agreed to apply to the maintenance of the track and roadbed of said railroad in good condition and repair, and towards the usual and ordinary repairs of the bridge, and also to pay all taxes imposed on said track or bridge structure and each of them.
Louisville & Nashville Railroad south of the river, and the said bridge company's property has become so valuable that its bonds, to the amount of about $2,000,000, are worth a premium of 8 1/2 percent"
The assessment against the bridge company on account of the bridge and its approaches was upon a valuation of $600,000 in 1885 and $1,000,000 in each of the years 1886 and 1887. In its petition, the city claimed a lien upon the bridge from the beginning of its approach at Main Street, in the City of Henderson, to low water mark on the Indiana side of the Ohio River, for said taxes and the penalties thereon.
"An act supplemental to an act approved December 17, 1872, entitled 'An act to authorize the construction of bridges across the Ohio River and to prescribe the dimensions of the same,'"
That, as the bridge derived no profit, protection, or advantage from the government of the city, to subject it to city taxation would be to take private property for public use without just compensation, in violation of the Constitution of the United States as well as of the Constitution and laws of Kentucky and of the defendant's rights in the premises.
That to grant to the plaintiff the relief prayed for or any part thereof would be a direct impairment of the contract between the bridge company and the railroad company.
The railroad company, having been made a party, adopted the answer of the bridge company.
and for the amounts claimed in the city's petition, and that the city had a lien upon the bridge structure, masonry piers, and the approach thereto, situated within its boundary extending to low water mark on the Indiana side of the Ohio River, for the taxes assessed for the years 1886 and 1887, with interest and costs expended. The bridge company was directed to pay said sums, with interest and costs, to the plaintiff on or before a named day.
"Several cases are relied on where the Court of Appeals have relieved parties from the payment of taxes on agricultural lands when the city limits had been extended without the owner's consent. The rule, if one has been established by those cases, should not be extended to cases where property has been voluntarily brought within such boundaries. The party thus bringing in his property should be treated as one who sanctioned the extension of a city so as to include his agricultural lands. All that can be deduced from these cases is that, in each extension of a town or city, the court will hear the complaints of any taxpayer, and grant or not grant him relief as the merits of his particular case may demand. In this case, the defendants voluntarily placed their property within the legally established limits of the city, and should pay the taxes assessed on other property holders of the city after 1885."
The bridge company and the railroad company prosecuted an appeal to the Court of Appeals of Kentucky, and the city was granted a cross-appeal from so much of the judgment as disallowed its claim of taxes for 1885.
agreed to, to claim that the bridge should be taxed in consideration of the privileges granted. This claim of right, it must be presumed, was asserted and agreed to and expressed in the contract by the term, 'not waiving the right.' If the contract does not mean this, then it means nothing. It is not supposed that the contracting parties only meant to reserve a right that they already had, and about which there was no possible ground of dispute, but when it is considered that the right to tax the bridge to the Indiana shore might be legitimately obtained by contract, and that the appellee granted to the appellant rights and privileges essential to its enterprise, designed to make money, and is making a large percent, it is entirely reasonable to suppose that the appellee would contract for the right to thus tax the appellant in consideration of granting these essential rights and privileges by which the appellant acquired the right to construct and operate so profitable a business enterprise. So it seems much more reasonable to suppose that the contracting parties intended to do this reasonable thing -- to-wit, to receive some consideration for the grant of privileges, rather than indulge in a mere nudum pactum. The appellant, at least, for the purpose of collecting taxes, should be considered as a part of a railroad -- consequently falls within the principle announced in Elizabethtown & Paducah Railroad v. Elizabethtown, 12 Bush, 239."
"The legislature, by authorizing the imposition and collection of the railroad and school taxes upon the real estate within the city limits, created a taxing district. The power to collect these taxes was therefore conferred upon the appellee as such a district, and the appellant's property, being within it, is liable for them. As to the municipal taxes proper, the appellant's property is within the corporate limits, and, in my opinion, receives such benefits from the municipal government as render it both legally and justly liable for them."
"The opinion of the state court is based wholly upon the ground that the proper interpretation of the ordinance of February, 1882, was that the bridge company voluntarily agreed that the bridge should be liable to taxation. This does not involve a federal question, and is broad enough to dispose of the case without reference to any federal question. This Court cannot review the construction which was given to the ordinance as a contract by the state court. There is nothing in the suggestion that the taxation of the bridge is a regulation of commerce among the states, or is the taxation of any agency of the federal government. The case of Louisville Bridge Co. v. City of Louisville, 81 Ky. 189, was not decided until May, 1883, more than a year after the ordinance of the City of Henderson was accepted by the bridge company, in February, 1882. The contract of February, 1884, between the bridge company and the railroad company, was made more than two years after the ordinance of February, 1882, came into existence. Neither the opinion of the Court of Appeals in the present case nor that of Chief Justice Holt nor that of the circuit court of the state, puts the decision upon any federal question, and, on this writ of error to the state court, we are bound by its interpretation of the contract contained in the ordinance, in view of the Constitution and laws of Kentucky, and cannot review that question."
Henderson Bridge Co. v. Henderson, 141 U. S. 679, 141 U. S. 689.
ten-acre lots Nos. 4 and 5; thence with the dividing line of said lots 71¡ west to low water mark on the Ohio River on the Indiana shore; thence down the river with the meanders thereof at low water margin to a point opposite the south line of Hancock Street; thence across said river south 59¡ east along the south line of said Hancock Street in a straight line to the beginning."
2 Acts Ky. 1887-88, p. 937. That act, as did the original charter of the city, gave the common council power, within the limits of the city, to levy and collect taxes at a prescribed rate upon all property in the city subject to taxation under the revenue laws of the state for state purposes, with certain exceptions which need not be stated.
"on all property within the limits of the City of Henderson subject to taxation under the present revenue laws of the State of Kentucky for state purposes, to be paid by the owners of said property, respectively, provided however, that no land embraced within the city limits, and outside of the ten-acre lots as originally laid off, shall be assessed and taxed by the council unless the same is divided and laid off into lots of five acres or less, and unless all of same is actually used and devoted to farming purposes."
Similar ordinances were passed providing the annual tax levies for the fiscal years 1889 and 1890. As appears from the ordinances, these taxes were laid for the purpose of raising money sufficient to pay interest on the city's bonded indebtedness, defray the ordinary expenses of the city government, and meet the annual expenses of the public schools of the city.
Under the above ordinances, the city caused the bridge in question to be assessed by the city assessor for taxation to low water mark on the Indiana side of the Ohio River, as other property in the city, for the years 1888, 1889, and 1890 at a valuation of $1,000,000 for each of those years.
Company to recover the amount of taxes for the years 1888, 1889, and 1890 alleged to be due under the above assessments. It is not disputed that those assessments embraced the bridge and its piers between low water mark on the Kentucky side of the Ohio River and low water mark on the Indiana shore.
During the progress of the cause, the plaintiff dismissed its suit so far as it related to taxes for the year 1890 without prejudice to any future action by it to recover those taxes.
That the taxable boundary of the plaintiff on the Ohio River is the low water mark on the Kentucky shore.
"The territory on both sides of the Ohio River was, prior to the year 1784, a part of the State of Virginia, in which year she ceded to the United States the territory north and west of said river. On the 18th of December, 1789, the Congress of the United States passed the 'compact with Virginia,' which authorized the establishment of the State of Kentucky, and which compact defined the rights of the said state in and to the Ohio River. By the eleventh section of that compact, it is provided"
"that the use and navigation of the river Ohio, so far as the Territory of the proposed state (Kentucky) or the territory which shall remain within the limits of this commonwealth (Virginia) lies thereon, shall be free and common to the citizens of the United States, and the respective jurisdiction of this commonwealth and the proposed state on the river aforesaid shall be concurrent only with the states which may possess the opposite shores of said river."
"An act supplemental to an act approved December 17th, 1872, entitled 'An act to authorize the construction of bridges across the Ohio River and prescribe the dimensions of same, approved February 14th, 1883,' and the defendant submits that the plaintiff has no jurisdiction over said stream to tax any property placed therein by authority of Congress, and for plaintiff to assume to tax said bridge thus situated would be violative of the Constitution of the United States, the laws of Congress, and of the defendant's rights in the premises."
The bridge company defended the action upon the further ground that the relief asked by the city could not be granted without directly impairing the obligation of the contract between it and the railroad company, which contract, it was insisted, was to be interpreted in the light of the law of Kentucky as it was when such contract was made, and without reference to subsequent legislative acts and ordinances inconsistent with its provisions.
The railroad company adopted the answer of the bridge company, averring, among other things, that to grant the plaintiff the relief prayed for, or any part thereof, would be a direct impairment of the obligation of the contract between the railroad company and the bridge company, and a violation of the tenth section of the first article of the Constitution of the United States.
"The plaintiff says that the right of plaintiff to assess and collect the taxes sued for, against the defendant the Henderson Bridge Company, its jurisdiction thereon, and all questions raised by the pleadings in this case, except as to the passage of the ordinances alleged, are now res judicata, and plaintiff pleads and relies upon same as a bar to defendants' pleas herein, and prays as in its petition."
"has a lien upon the bridge structure, masonry and piers [mentioned in the petition], and the approach thereto, situated within the boundary of the State of Kentucky, an extending to low water mark on the Indiana side of the Ohio River."
That judgment having been affirmed by the Court of Appeals of Kentucky, the present writ of error was sued out.
bridge property between low water mark on the Kentucky shore and low water mark on the Indiana shore of the Ohio River. This Court therefore has jurisdiction to review the final judgment of the state court for the purpose of ascertaining whether it deprived the defendants of any right, privilege, or immunity specially set up by them under that instrument.
"the navigable waters leading into the Mississippi and St.Lawrence, and the carrying places between the same, shall be common highways and forever free, as well to the inhabitants of the said territory as to the citizens of the United States, and those of any other states that may be admitted into the confederacy, without any tax, impost or duty therefor."
"the afore-recited article of compact between the original states and the people and states in the territory northwest of the Ohio River be and the same is hereby ratified and confirmed, anything to the contrary in the deed of cession of the said territory by this commonwealth to the United States notwithstanding."
"§ 11. That the use and navigation of the River Ohio, so far as the territory of the proposed state, or the territory which shall remain within the limits of this commonwealth, lies thereon, shall be free and common to the citizens of the United States, and the respective jurisdictions of this commonwealth and of the proposed state on the river as aforesaid shall be concurrent only with the states which may possess the opposite shores of the said river."
commonwealth, and of its laws, under the exceptions aforesaid, shall cease and determine forever over the proposed state, and the said articles become a solemn compact, mutually binding on the parties, and unalterable by either without the consent of the other."
"§ 15. Provided, however, that prior to the first day of November, one thousand seven hundred and ninety-one, the general government of the United States shall assent to the erection of the said district into an independent state, shall release this commonwealth from all its federal obligations arising from the said district as being part thereof, and shall agree that the proposed state shall immediately after the day to be fixed as aforesaid, posterior to the first day of November, one thousand seven hundred and ninety-one, or at some convenient time future thereto, be admitted into the federal Union."
"§ 18. This act shall be transmitted by the executive to the representatives of this commonwealth in Congress, who are hereby instructed to use their endeavors to obtain from Congress a speedy act to the effect above specified."
13 Hening's Stat. 17. This was followed by an act of Congress approved February 4, 1791, which referred to the above Virginia Act of December 18, 1789, and expressed the consent of Congress that the said district of Kentucky, "within the jurisdiction of the commonwealth of Virginia, and according to its actual boundaries on the 18th day of December, 1789," should on the 1st day of June, 1792, be formed into a new state, separate from, and independent of, the Commonwealth of Virginia. 1 Stat. 189, c. 4.
for the River Ohio as the boundary line shall be considered as bounded in that particular by the state line on the northwest side of said river, and the bed of the river and the islands therefore shall be within he respective counties holding the main land opposite thereto, within this state, and the several county tribunals shall hold jurisdiction accordingly."
Kentucky Sess.Laws 1810, p. 100.
"is the boundary between two nations or states, if the original property is in neither, and there be no convention respecting it, each holds to the middle of the stream. But when, as in this case, one state [Virginia] is the original proprietor, and grants the territory on one side only, it retains the river within its own domain, and the newly created state extends to the river only. The river, however, is its boundary. . . . Whenever the river is a boundary between states, it is the main, the permanent river, which constitutes that boundary, and the mind will find itself embarrassed with insurmountable difficulty in attempting to draw any other line than the low water mark."
"As thus seen, the territory ceded by the State of Virginia to the United States, out of which the State of Indiana was formed, lay northwest of the Ohio River. The first inquiry, therefore, is as to what line on the river must be deemed the southern boundary of the territory ceded -- or, in other words, how far did the jurisdiction of Kentucky extend on the other side of the river."
Referring to the channel of the Ohio River as it was when Kentucky was admitted into the Union, this Court stated its conclusion to be that "the jurisdiction of Kentucky at that time extended, and ever since has extended, to what was then low water mark on the north side of that channel."
The same view of the question of boundary was taken by the Court of Appeals of Kentucky in Fleming v. Kenney, 4 J. J. Marsh. 155, 158; Church v. Chambers, 3 Dana 274, 278; McFarland v. McKnight, 6 B. Mon. 500, 510, and McFall v. Commonwealth, 2 Metc. 394, 396, and by the General Court of Virginia in Commonwealth v. Garner, 3 Grat. 655, 677.
Upon this question of boundary nothing can be added to what was said in the cases cited, and it must be assumed as indisputable that the boundary of Kentucky extends to low water mark on the western and northwestern banks of the Ohio River.
Such being the case, it necessarily follows that the Jurisdiction of that commonwealth, for all the purposes for which any state possesses jurisdiction within its territorial limits, is coextensive with its established boundaries -- subject, of course, to the fundamental condition that its jurisdiction must not be exerted so as to entrench upon the authority of the national government or to impair rights secured or protected by the national Constitution.
and low water mark on the Indiana shore without violating the Constitution of the United States in particulars to be adverted to presently.
In considering this objection so far as it is rested on federal grounds, we shall assume that the action of the City of Henderson was authorized by the terms of its charter, and was in no respect forbidden by any principle of local law. Upon these points we accept the decision of the highest court of Kentucky as conclusive. We accept, also, as binding upon this Court, the declaration of the state court that Kentucky intended by its legislation to confer upon the City of Henderson a power of taxation for local purposes coextensive with its statutory boundary. But we may add, as pertinent in the consideration of the federal questions presented, that if the Commonwealth of Kentucky could tax for state purposes the bridge property so far as it was between low water mark on the Kentucky shore and low water mark on the Indiana shore, it could confer upon one of its municipal corporations the power to tax the same property for local purposes. So that a judgment declaring the taxation of such property by the City of Henderson for local purposes, under the authority of the state, to be forbidden by the Constitution of the United States, would, in effect, declare that like taxation by the state for state purposes would be forbidden by that instrument.
It is said that the bridge property outside of low water mark on the Kentucky shore is so far beyond the reach of municipal protection by the authorities of the City of Henderson that it cannot be said to receive any benefits whatever from the municipal government, and that to impose taxes for the benefit of the city upon such property is a taking of private property for public use without just compensation, and therefore inconsistent with the due process of law ordained by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. Chicago, Burlington &c. Railroad v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226, 166 U. S. 241. It is conceivable that taxation may be of such a nature and so burdensome as properly to be characterized a taking of private property for public use without just compensation.
its authority within the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment of the national Constitution, the case should be so clearly and palpably an illegal encroachment upon private rights as to leave no doubt that such taxation, by its necessary operation, is really spoliation under the guise of exerting the power to tax. As an act of Congress should not be declared unconstitutional unless its repugnancy to the supreme law of the land is too clear to admit of dispute, so a local regulation under which taxes are imposed should not be held by the courts of the Union to be inconsistent with the national Constitution unless that conclusion be unavoidable. All doubt as to the validity of legislative enactments must be resolved, if possible, in favor of the binding force of such enactments. In the case before us, the state court rejected the idea that the bridge property in question was entirely beyond municipal protection and could not receive any of the benefits derived from the municipal government of the City of Henderson. We cannot adjudge that view to be so clearly untenable as to entitle the defendants to invoke the principle that private property cannot be taken for public use without just compensation.
are lessened, nor its corresponding duty to bear its full share of the burden is impaired or affected, by the fact that a portion of the bridge is over water."
We are unwilling to hold that the state court, in so adjudging, has prescribed any rule of taxation inconsistent with the supreme law of the land.
"There must be a palpable and flagrant departure from equality in the burden, as imposed upon the persons or property bound to contribute, or it must be palpable that persons or their property are subjected to a local burden for the benefit of others, or for purposes in which they have no interest, and to which they are therefore not justly bound to contribute. The case must be one in which the operation of the power will be at first blush pronounced to be the taking of private property without compensation, and in which it is apparent that the burden is imposed without any view to the interest of the individual in the objects to be accomplished by it."
within the fixed boundary of the city between low water mark on the two sides of the Ohio River was not a taking of private property for public use without just compensation in violation of the Constitution of the United States.
4. Another contention of the defendants is that the acceptance by the bridge company of its charter and the construction of the bridge under it created a contract between that company and the state whereby the bridge structure north of low water mark on the Kentucky shore of the river was exempted from taxation for any local purpose, and that the tax ordinances of the City of Henderson on which the taxation in question is based, impair the obligation of that contract, and for that reason are repugnant to the Constitution of the United States.
"as waiving the right of the City of Henderson to levy and collect taxes on the approaches to said bridge, or any building erected by said bridge company within the corporate limits of said city, the bridge itself, and all appurtenances thereto within the limits of said city."
from taxation cannot arise from mere implication, but only from words clearly and unmistakably granting such an immunity.
benefit, actual or presumed, from the government of that corporation.
In those cases, the court wisely refrained from laying down any general rule that would control every controversy that might arise touching the application of the constitutional provision prohibiting -- as did the Constitution of Kentucky as well as that of the United States -- the taking of private property for public use without just compensation. So far as those adjudications are concerned, it is competent for the court to inquire in every case, as it arises, whether particular property taxed for local purposes is so situated that it cannot receive any benefit, actual or presumed, from the government of the municipal corporation imposing such taxation. The argument of the learned counsel assumes it to be incontrovertible that the bridge property here taxed cannot receive any such benefit from the government of the City of Henderson. As already indicated, this Court does not accept that view, and is of opinion that the bridge property within the statutory limits of that city, and looked at in its entirety, may be regarded as so situated with reference to the city that it enjoys, and must continue to enjoy as long as the bridge exists, such benefits from the government of the city that, consistently with the Constitution of the United States and consistently with the rule heretofore adverted to for determining the validity of legislative enactments, it may be subjected to municipal taxes under any system established by the state for the assessment of property for taxation. In this view, there is no ground upon which to base the contention that the ordinance of the city imposing the taxation in question impairs the obligation of any contract between the bridge company and the state arising from the acceptance by that company of its charter, and the construction of the bridge under it.
contract between the bridge company and the railroad company could stand in the way of the city's exerting, as between it and the bridge company, any power of taxation it legally possessed. If the taxation in question did not impair the obligation of any contract between the city and the bridge company -- and we have held that it did not -- it results that the railroad company cannot complain of such taxation. The agreement between the bridge company and the railroad company was necessarily subject to the exercise by the City of any authority it had or might have touching the taxation of the bridge for local purposes.
"in that its property has been subjected to taxation from which all other land not divided into lots has been exempted, although the only reasons for exemption apply with much greater force to the property of the plaintiff in error than to the property which enjoys the exemption."
"no land embraced within the city limits, and outside of ten-acre lots as originally laid off, shall be assessed and taxed by the city council unless the same is divided or laid out into lots of five acres or less, and unless all of same is actually used and devoted to farming purposes."
Kentucky Acts 1887-88, Vol. 2, p. 991.
suggestion of a denial of the equal protection of the laws, particularly as it is not contended that the city applies to the assessment of the bridge and its approaches for taxation any rule that is not applied to all property within its limits. As in the case of the property of others, the bridge and its approaches are required to be taxed upon their value.
6. Another contention of the plaintiffs in error is that the assertion of the right of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, or of any municipal corporation acting under its authority, to tax bridge structures permanently located, with the consent of Congress, in or over the bed of the Ohio River is the assertion of authority over that stream inconsistent with the Congressional and legislative compact concerning its use, and inconsistent with the concurrent jurisdiction over the river of the states on either side of it. Indeed, the defendants insist that if the power to tax the bridge structure north of low water mark on the Kentucky side and south of low water mark on the Indiana side of the Ohio River exists at all, it rests in Congress, and could not be exercised even by the concurrent action of two states, much less by the independent action of one.
The present case does not require any decision by this Court as to the extent and character of the jurisdiction which may be exercised over the Ohio River by the states whose boundaries come to low water mark on its shore opposite to Kentucky. The only question for determination is whether the taxation, under the authority of Kentucky, of this bridge within its jurisdiction involves any encroachment upon federal authority or any infringement of rights secured to the defendants by the Constitution of the United States.
limited or restrained, except as its exercise was expressly or impliedly limited or restrained by that instrument. But what clause of that instrument declares that a state may not tax for state purposes any property within its territorial limits which is owned and operated by one of its own private corporations? In McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 17 U. S. 429, it was said by the Chief Justice to be obvious that the power of taxation was an incident of sovereignty, was coextensive with that to which it was an incident, and that "all subjects over which the sovereign power of a state extends are objects of taxation." The subject of taxation in this case is a bridge structure within the territorial limits of Kentucky. It is therefore property over which the state may exert its authority, provided it does not encroach upon federal power, or entrench upon rights secured by the Constitution of the United States. It is nonetheless property, although the state does not own the soil in the bed of the river upon which the piers of the bridge rest. Whatever jurisdiction the State of Indiana may properly exercise over the Ohio River, it cannot tax this bridge structure south of low water mark on that river, for the obvious reason that it is beyond the limits of that state, and permanently within the limits of Kentucky.
Nor do we perceive that the power of Kentucky to tax this bridge structure as property is any the less by reason of the fact that it was erected in and over the Ohio River under the authority or with the consent of Congress. The taxation of the bridge by Kentucky is in no proper sense inconsistent with the power of Congress to regulate the use of the river as one of the navigable waters of the United States. This taxation does not interfere in any degree with the free use of the river by the people of all the states, nor with any jurisdiction that the State of Indiana may properly exercise over that stream.
"As matter of fact, the building of bridges over waters dividing two states is now usually done by Congressional sanction. Under this power, the states may also tax the instruments of interstate commerce as it taxes other similar property, provided such tax is not laid upon the commerce itself."
"We are not aware of any case in which the real estate or other property of a corporation not organized under an act of Congress has been held to be exempt, in the absence of express legislation to that effect, from just contribution, in common with other property, to the general expenditure for the common benefit because of the employment of the corporation in the service of the government. . . . There is a clear distinction between the means employed by the government and the property of agents employed by the government. Taxation of the agency is taxation of the means. Taxation of the property of the agent is not always or generally taxation of the means."
"no one questions that the power to tax all property, business, and persons within their respective limits is original in the states, and has never been surrendered,"
same principles have been maintained in other cases in this Court. If a state may tax the property of one of its corporations engaged in the service of the United States, such property being within its limits, there is no sound reason why the bridge property in question, although erected, with the consent of Congress, over one of the navigable waters of the United States, should be withdrawn from the taxing power of the state which created the corporation owning it, and within whose limits it is permanently located.

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