Source: https://case-law.vlex.com/vid/776-F-3d-680-9th-Cir-2015-13-30273-United-States-v-Hertler-599220958
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 20:31:06+00:00

Document:
Judge Panel: Before: Harry Pregerson, Richard A. Paez, and Paul J. Watford, Circuit Judges.
Argued and Submitted, Portland, Oregon July 10, 2014.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Montana. D.C. No. 9:12-cr-00032-DWM-1. Donald W. Molloy, District Judge, Presiding.
Affirming a postrevocation term of supervised release, the panel held that the phrase " any term of imprisonment" in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(h), which authorizes a district court to impose a postrevocation term of supervised release up to the statutory maximum less " any term of imprisonment that was imposed upon revocation of supervised release," refers to terms of imprisonment imposed in connection with the offense of conviction for which an additional term of supervised release is imposed, not to terms of imprisonment imposed for all counts of conviction.
Andrew J. Nelson (argued), Assistant Federal Defender, Federal Defenders of Montana, Missoula, Montana, for Defendant-Appellant.
Lori Anne Harper Suek (argued) and Cyndee L. Peterson, Assistant United States Attorney, United States Attorneys' Office District of Montana, Missoula, Montana, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Before: Harry Pregerson, Richard A. Paez, and Paul J. Watford, Circuit Judges.
Defendant Mark William Hertler appeals a postrevocation term of supervised release. He argues that the new term of twenty months exceeds the maximum period that can be imposed under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(h). That subsection authorizes a district court to impose a postrevocation term of supervised release up to the statutory maximum, but requires the court to reduce the length of supervised release by " any term of imprisonment that was imposed upon revocation of supervised release." Hertler contends that the phrase " any term of imprisonment" in § 3583(h) refers to any term of imprisonment imposed for all offenses following the latest revocation of supervised release. He therefore argues that the district court erred when it construed this clause to refer only to all terms of imprisonment imposed for a single underlying offense. He further argues that, as a result of this error, the district court concluded that he was eligible for up to thirty-two months of additional supervised release when he should have been sentenced to no more than nine.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we review de novo the legality of Hertler's sentence. United States v. Xinidakis, 598 F.3d 1213, 1215 (9th Cir. 2010). For the reasons set forth below, we agree with the construction of " any term of imprisonment" adopted by the district court, the Eighth Circuit in United States v. Zoran, 682 F.3d 1060 (8th Cir. 2012), and the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Oswalt, 771 F.3d 849 (5th Cir. 2014). We therefore affirm.
probation officer filed a petition to revoke Hertler's supervised release. Among other allegations, the petition alleged that Hertler violated several conditions of his release by possessing sexually explicit materials, and by attending a Christmas dinner at which his nine-year-old niece was present. Hertler admitted the allegations. The district court revoked Hertler's supervised release and sentenced him to consecutive terms of nine months of imprisonment on Count 1 and three months on Count 2. The court also imposed concurrent terms of twenty-four months of supervised release on each of Counts 1 and 2.

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