Source: https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/172/171
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 12:39:38+00:00

Document:
This case was begun by the filing in the district court for Bernalillo county, in the territory of New Mexico, by the district attorney for the territory, of an intervening petition on behalf of the territory, praying for an order against the receiver of the Atlantic & Pacific Railroad Company requiring him to pay the amount of taxes claimed to be due upon the improvements on the right of way of said railroad company in the county of Bernalillo, and upon station houses and other improvements at seven different stations in said county. The taxes claimed were for the years 1893, 1894, and 1895.
'That on and prior to January 1, 1892, the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Company, under the provisions of its charter, definitely located its line of road and right of way through Bernalillo county, which said right of way so located involved all necessary grounds for station buildings, workshops, depots, machine shops, switches, side tracks, turntables, and water stations. That upon said right of way so located through the city of Albuquerque, in said county, were definitely located necessary grounds for station buildings, workshops, depots, machine shops, side tracks, turntables, and water stations; and there were also located upon said right of way at the Atlantic and Pacific Junction, at Chaves or Mitchell, at Coolidge, at Wingate, at Gallup, and at Manuelito, necessary grounds for station buildings, work shops, depots, machine shops, switches, side tracks, turntables, and water stations.
'Commencing at the A. & P. Junction referred to, it runs thence, in a westerly direction, 4 miles 3,780 feet, to the division line between Bernalillo county and Valencia county, and then, after crossing a portion of Valencia county at a point known as 'Station 5,247,' it again runs through Bernalillo county 68 miles and 44 feet, to the west line of the county of Bernalillo, being the west line of the territory of New Mexico; which said right of way, outside of the reservation for station grounds, etc., was located and is of the width of 200 feet, being 100 feet on each side of the center of the railroad track located thereon.
'List of personal property belonging to, claimed by, or in the possession or under the control of, the receivers of the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Company (Western Division), a corporation created by act of congress, having its principal place of business at Albuquerque, New Mexico.
'The line of its road running through the counties of Bernalillo and Valencia, in said territory of New Mexico; thence through the counties of Apache, Navajo, Coconino, Yavapai, and Mohave, in the territory of Arizona, to the eastern boundary line of the state of California; thence through the counties of San Bernardino and Kern, in said state, to the western end of said line, and its terminus at Mojave, in said county of Kern,a total distance of 805.86 miles, the total mileage of said line owned by said company in said territory of New Mexico being 166.6, of which 73.142 are in Bernalillo county, and 93.458 miles are in Valencia county.
'That the above and foregoing was all the property returned for taxation in Bernalillo county by said receivers or by the railroad company itself, and that the same was made as the assignment of the property of said company subject to taxation in said county for the year A. D. 1895. That the county assessor of Bernalillo county in the year 1895, under the direction of the board of county commissioners of said county, placed on the assessment roll an assessment of property against the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Company for the year 1893. A true and correct copy of the assessment roll, showing such assessment so placed thereon, is filed with this as a part hereof, and as Exhibit 1, which said exhibit shows the taxes levied, together with the values and penalties. That at the time the said assessor, under the instructions of said board, placed upon said assessment roll certain property claimed to be taxable property belonging to said railroad company, which was omitted from taxation for the year 1894. A true and correct copy of the assessment so made is shown by Exhibit 2, herewith filed and made a part hereof.
'That the said assessor at the same time placed upon said assessment roll property claimed to have been omitted and belonging to said company for the year 1895, a true and correct copy of which said assessment roll, with said last-named assessment placed upon it, is shown by Exhibit 3, hereto attached and made a part hereof and filed herewith.
'That these exhibits show precisely the descriptions of property entered by the assessor, the penalties added, and the values, and also the taxes levied thereon. Exhibit 3 also shows the description of the property as returned by the receivers.
'That all the property so placed upon the assessment roll by the assessor, outside of that returned by the receivers, was placed upon said assessment roll without the knowledge or consent of the receivers, or of said railroad company. That the entire property placed upon the assessment roll by said assessor, outside of the property returned by the receivers, constituted and constitutes an actual part and portion of the roadbed and railroad track thereon situated on the right of way of the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Company in Bernalillo county, in the territory of New Mexico, and constitutes the railroad used and occupied by the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Company under its charter and in accordance with the provisions thereof, and the machine shops, station buildings, water tanks, section houses, and other buildings of like character connected with, and a part of, the machinery used in the operation of said railroad. That each and every item of property described in the assessments so placed upon the said assessment roll, outside of the property returned by the receivers, is property that is actually and permanently attached to the right of way and station grounds of the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Company, and constitutes an actual part and portion of the superstructure placed upon said right of way by said railroad company for its railroad, and for its machine shops, turntables, side tracks, switches, water tanks, station buildings, and other buildings of the same class and character, actually used and needed in the operation of said railroad, and that no part of the same was, at the time of the placing of said assessment upon said assessment rolls by the assessors, detached from the actual right of way and station grounds of said railroad company, but, on the contrary, was firmly affixed thereto. That it was described as it was by the assessor in placing the same upon the assessment roll for the purpose of escaping the exemption from taxation contained in the second section of the act of congress approved July 27, 1866, known as the 'Charter of the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Company,' the assessor desiring to assess everything placed on the right of way separate from the right of way, no matter how permanently attached and affixed to the right of way.
'That during the year 1893 there were no receivers in possession of said property, and that said railroad was being operated by the railroad company itself, and, if any property was omitted to be returned for taxation which ought to have been returned to the assessor of Bernalillo county, it was the fault and neglect of the railroad company itself, and not the fault and neglect of the receivers afterwards appointed.
'That at Albuquerque, upon the reservations and station grounds, there were situated the largest machine shops of the said railroad company, the general office building, and such buildings as pertain to the headquarters of a railroad company. Said Buildings and reservation constitute the headquarters of the Western Division of the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Company, and, since the appointment of receivers, of the receivers operating the same.
'That the assessor, in placing each of these three assessments upon the assessment rolls as stated, added to the actual value of the property one-fourth of such value, as a penalty for the failure on the part of the receiver to return such property for taxation.
Subsequently the case came on to be heard, upon the intervening petition of the territory and the answer thereto of the United States Trust Company and of the receiver. C. W. Smith, and the agreed statement of facts. Upon the hearing the judge of the district court ordered the receiver to pay to the treasurer of the county of Bernalillo the sum of $43,254.70, the amount ascertained by a special master to be the aggregate of the taxes levied upon the additional assessments and penalties. An appeal was taken from this order by the United States Trust Company, and also by the receiver, C. W. Smith, who had obtained from the court permission to take such an appeal. The order appealed from was reversed upon hearing before the supreme court of the territory, the court determining that the additional assessments placed upon the rolls were illegal and void. 47 Pac. 725. An application was made for a rehearing, which the court denied, and an appeal was taken to this court.
Sec. 8. And be it further enacted, that each and every grant, right and privilege herein are so made and given to and accepted by said Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Company, upon and subject to the following conditions, namely: That the said company shall commence the work on said road within two years from the approval of this act by the president, and shall complete not less than fifty miles per year after the second year, and shall construct, equip, furnish and complete the main line of the whole road by the fourth day of July, Anno Domini eighteen hundred and seventy-eight.
Sec. 9. And be it further enacted, that the United States make the several conditional grants herein, and that the said Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Company accept the same, upon the further condition that if the said company make any breach of the conditions hereof, and allow the same to continue for upwards of one year, then, in such case, at any time hereafter, the United States may do any and all acts and things which may be needful and necessary to insure a speedy completion of said road.
Sec. 10. And be it further enacted, that all people of the United States shall have the right to subscribe to the stock of the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Company until the whole capital named in this act of incorporation is taken up by complying with the terms of subscription.
Sec. 11. And be it further enacted, that said Atlantic and Pacific Railroad, or any part thereof, shall be a post route and military road, subject to the use of the United States for postal, military, naval and all other government service, and also subject to such regulations as congress may impose restricting the charges for such government transportation.
Frank W. Clancey, for appellant.
Victor Morawetz and C. N. Sterry, for appellee.
Mr. Justice McKENNA, after stating the facts in the foregoing language, delivered the opinion of the court.
The right of way is granted to the extent of 100 feet on each side of the railroad, including necessary grounds for station buildings, workshops, etc. What, then, is meant by the phrase 'the right of way'? A mere right of passage, says appellant. Per contra, appellee contends that the fee was granted; or, if not granted, that such a tangible and corporeal property was granted that all that was attached to it became part of it and partook of its exemption from taxation.
To support its contention, appellant urges the technical meaning of the phrase 'right of way,' and claims that the primary presumption is that it was used in its technical sense. Undoubtedly that is the presumption, but such presumption must yield to an opposing context and the intention of the legislature otherwise indicated. Examining the statute, we find that whatever is granted is exactly measured as a physical thing, not as an abstract right. It is to be 200 feet wide, and to be carefully broadened so as to include grounds for the superstructures indispensable to the railroad.
The phrase 'right of way,' besides, does not necessarily mean the right of passage merely. Obviously, it may mean one thing in a grant to a natural person for private purposes, and another thing in a grant to a railroad for public purposes, as different as the purposes and uses and necessities, respectively, are.
Mr. Justice Blatchford said in Joy v. St. Louis, 138 U. S. 44, 11 Sup. Ct. 256: 'Now, the term 'right of way' has a twofold signification. It is sometimes used to describe a right belonging to a party,a right of passage over any tract; and it is also used to describe that strip of land which railroad companies take upon which to construct their roadbed.' That is, the land itself, not a right of passage over it. So, this court in Railway Co. v. Roberts, 152 U. S. 114, 14 Sup. Ct. 496, passing on a grant to one of the branches of the Union Pacific Railway Company of a right of way 200 feet wide, decided that it conveyed the fee. The effect of this decision is attempted to be avoided by saying that the distinction between an easement and the fee was not raised. The action was ejectment, and was brought in Kansas, and under the law of that state title could be tried in ejectment. Title was asserted by Roberts, who was plaintiff in the state court, and this court evidently considered it involved in the case. The language of Mr. Justice Field, who delivered the opinion of the court, would be unaccountable else. The difference between an easement and the fee would not have escaped his attention and that of the whole court, with the inevitable result of committing it to the consequences which might depend upon such difference.
Washburn in his work on Easements, on page 10, says: 'Whether the thing granted be an easement in land or the land itself may depend upon the nature and use of the thing granted.' To sustain this view the learned author cites Jamaica Pond Aqueduct Corp. v. Chandler, 9 Allen, 159. In that case the court said: 'Whenever a grant is made of a right or easement in lands which fall within the class sometimes described as 'noncontinuous,'that is, where the use of the premises by the grantee for the purpose designated in the deed will be only intermittent and occasional, and does not embrace the entire beneficial occupation and improvement of the land,the reasonable interpretation is that an easement in the soil, and not the fee, is intended to be conveyed. Among the most prominent of this class of easements is a way.' An ordinary way, of course, the court meant, one the use of which would be noncontinuous,only intermittent and occasional; but a way not of that character, whose use would be continuous, not occasional, and which would embrace the entire beneficial occupation and improvement of the land, might require the fee for its enjoyment,certainly would require more than a mere right of passage. 'Unlike the use of a private way,that is, discontinuous,the use of land condemned by a railroad company is perpetual and continuous.' Railroad Co. v. Trimmer, 53 N. J. Law, 3, 20 Atl. 761.
But if it may not be insisted that the fee was granted, surely more than an ordinary easement was granted,one having the attributes of the fee, perpetuity and exclusive use and possession; also the remedies of the fee, and, like it, corporeal, not incorporeal, property.
'The right acquired by the railroad company, though technically an easement, yet requires for its enjoyment a use of the land permanent in its nature and practically exclusive.' Hazen v. Railroad, 2 Gray, 580.
In Railroad Co. v. Burr, 86 Cal. 279, 24 Pac. 1032, the supreme court of California sustained an action of ejectment for land constituting a part of the right of way granted to the Central Pacific Railroad by the act of July 1, 1862, by language similar to the grant in the case at bar.
Distinguishing the case from Wood v. Turnpike Co., 24 Cal. 474, in which it was held that 'a road or right of way is an incorporeal hereditament, and ejectment is maintainable only for corporeal hereditaments,' the court said: 'We think that case plainly distinguishable from this. Here there was a special grant of a right of way two hundred feet in width on each side of the road. This grant is a conclusive determination of the reasonable and necessary quantity of land to be dedicated to the public use, and it necessarily involves a right of possession in the grantee, and is inconsistent with any adverse possession of any part of the land embraced within the grant. It is true the strip of land now actually occupied by the roadbed and telegraph line may be only a small part of the four hundred feet granted, but this fact is of no consequence. The company may at some time want to use more land for side tracks, or other purposes, and it is entitled to have the land clear and unobstructed whenever it shall have occasion to do so.' The court quoted and approved the views expressed in City of Winona v. Huff, 11 Minn. 119 (Gil. 75), that 'for a mere easement perhaps an action of ejectment would not lie; but wherever a right of entry exists, and the interest is tangible, so that possession can be delivered, an action of ejectment will lie.' The same distinction was made in Railroad Co. v. Trimmer, supra, and the court said that, if the interest of the railroad company was a naked right of way, it would constitute no such right of possession of the land itself as would sustain the action; for such a right would be an incorporeal one, upon which there could be no entry, nor could possession of it be given under an habere facias possessionem. In this case it was held that the interest taken by the railroad was not an easement.
The interest granted by the statute to the Atlantic & Pacific Railroad Company, therefore, is real estate of corporeal quality, and the principles of such apply. One of these, and an elemental one, is that whatever is erected upon it becomes part of it. There are exceptions to the principle, but, as we are not concerned with them, we need not state them. Applications of the principle to railroads are illustrated by the decisions of this court and by those of other courts: As to rails put down against him from whom purchased (Railroad Co. v. Cowdry, 11 Wall. 459; U. S. v. New Orleans R. Co., 12 Wall. 362; Thompson v. Railroad Co., 132 U. S. 68, 10 Sup. Ct. 29), even though the contract of purchase provided that the property should remain that of the vendor and he have a right to remove the same (Porter v. Steel Co., 122 U. S. 267, 7 Sup. Ct. 1206, and cases cited); in determining the relation of the rails to the right of way (Joy v. St. Louis, 138 U. S. 1, 11 Sup. Ct. 243). In this case Mr. Justice Blatchford said: 'The track cannot be separated from the right of way, the right of way being the principal thing and the track merely an incident. A right of way is of no particular use to a railroad without a superstructure and rails; the track is a necessary incident to the enjoyment of the right of way.' See, also, Palmer v. Forbes, 23 Ill. 300; Hunt v. Iron Co., 97 Mass. 279; City of New Haven v. Fair Haven & W. R. Co., 38 Conn. 422.
The principle has also illustrations in cases of taxation. People v. Cassity, 46 N. Y. 46; Appeal Tax Court of Baltimore City v. Baltimore Cemetery Co., 50 Md. 432; Osborne v. Humphrey, 7 Conn. 335; Parker v. Redfield, 10 Conn. 490; Lehigh Coal & Nav. Co. v. Northampton Co., 8 Watts & S. 334; Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Board of Sup'rs of Crawford Co., 48 Wis. 666, 5 N. W. 3; City of Richmond v. Richmond & D. R. Co., 21 Grat. 604; Mayor, etc., of Baltimore v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 6 Gill, 288; Osborn v. New York & N. H. R. Co., 40 Conn. 491; Richmond & D. R. Co. v. Commissioners of Alamance, 84 N. C. 504; Inhabitants of Worcester v. Western R. Corp., 4 Metc. (Mass.) 564.
It is urged, however, that the rule of construction declared in Railroad Co. v. Dennis, 116 U. S. 665, 6 Sup. Ct. 625, and the cases there cited and approved, and repeated in Railroad Co. v. Thomas, 132 U. S. 184, 10 Sup. Ct. 68; Railroad Co. v. Alsbrook, 146 U. S. 294, 13 Sup. Ct. 72; Keokuk & W. R. Co. v. Missouri, 152 U. S. 306, 14 Sup. Ct. 592; Railroad Co. v. Pendleton, 156 U. S. 667, 15 Sup. Ct. 413; and Road Co. v. Sandford, 164, U. S. 578, 17 Sup. Ct. 198,determines in favor of appellant's contention. That we do not think so is probably sufficiently indicated, but we cite the cases to preclude the thought that they have been overlooked, or that the rule announced by them is questioned. Indeed, we regard it as salutary, and not impaired by our decision, which simply rests on the terms of the statute.
Section 1. * * * And said corporation is hereby authorized and empowered to lay out, locate and construct, furnish, maintain and enjoy a continuous railroad and telegraph line, with the appurtenances, namely, beginning at or near the town of Springfield, in the state of Missouri, thence to the western boundary line of said state, and thence by the most eligible railroad route as shall be determined by said company to a point on the Canadian river; thence to the town of Albuquerque, on the river Del Norte, and thence, by way of the Agua Frio or other suitable pass, to the head waters of the Colorado Chiquito, and thence along the thirty-fifth parallel of latitude as near as may be found most suitable for a railway route to the Colorado river, at such point as may be selected by said company for crossing; thence by the most practicable and eligible route to the Pacific. The said company shall have the right to construct a branch from the point at which the road strikes the Canadian river eastwardly, along the most suitable route as selected, to a point in the western boundary line of Arkansas at or near the town of Van Buren. And the said company is hereby vested with all the powers, privileges and immunities necessary to carry into effect the purposes of this act as herein set forth.
First. The term 'real estate' includes all lands within the territory to which title or right to title has been acquired; all mines, minerals and quarries, in and under the land, and all rights and privileges appertaining thereto and improvements.
Second. The term 'improvements' includes all buildings, structures, fixtures and fences erected upon or fixed to land, whether title has been acquired to said land or not.
Fourth. The term 'credit' includes every claim and demand for money, or other valuable thing, and every annuity or sums of money receivable at stated periods; but pensions from the United States and salaries, or payments expected, for services to be rendered are not included in the above term.
First. All property belonging to, claimed by or in the possession or under the control or man agement of such person, or any firm of which such person is a member, or any corporation of which such person is president, secretary, cashier or managing agent.
Second. The county in which such property is situated, or in which it is liable to taxation.
Third. A description by legal subdivisions, or otherwise, sufficient to identify it, of all real estate of such person and a detailed statement of his personal property, including average value of merchandise for the year ending March 1st; amount of capital employed in manufacture; number of horses, mules, cattle, sheep, swine and other animals; of carriages and vehicles of every description; jewelry, gold and silver plate; musical instruments; household furniture; moneys and credits; shares of stock of any corporation or company; and all other property not herein enumerated, with the value of the different classes of property in detail.
Sec. 2834. On or before the first Monday in March, annually, the assessor shall make out an assessment book or roll, with appropriate headlines, alphabetically arranged, in which must be listed all the property in the county subject to taxation. Such book shall contain the names of the persons to whom the property is assessed, with the several species of property and the value as hereinbefore indicated, with the columns of numbers and values as given by the person making the return, as fixed by the assessor, and as decided by the county commissioners. At the end of such book or roll all property assessed to 'unknown owners' shall be entered.
Sec. 2835. Each tract of land shall be valued and assessed separately except when one or more adjoining tracts are returned by the same person, in which case they may be valued and assessed together.
WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH COMPANY, v. PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD COMPANY and United New Jersey Railroad & Canal Company.
ST. LOUIS, KANSAS CITY, & COLORADO RAILROAD COMPANY, Appt., v. WABASH RAILROAD COMPANY and City of St. Louis. NO 57. ST. LOUIS, KANSAS CITY, & COLORADO RAILROAD COMPANY, Petitioner, v. WABASH RAILROAD COMPANY and the City of St. Louis. NO 301.

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