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Timestamp: 2019-04-21 13:14:10+00:00

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FindACase | Coleman v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.
Coleman v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.
FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, as Receiver for Silverton Bank, N.A., Defendant.
Pending before the Court is Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and Supporting Memorandum of Law. (Doc. Nos. 7, 8). Plaintiff filed a response in opposition (Doc. No. 13), and Defendant has replied. (Doc. No. 15). For the reasons discussed below, Defendant's motion to dismiss is GRANTED.
Plaintiff Greta Coleman filed this action in Williamson County Chancery Court, seeking to recover funds that Plaintiff alleges were obtained by Defendant Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation as Receiver for Silverton Bank, N.A., as the result of a wrongful levy on a joint bank account Plaintiff kept with her husband Scott Coleman. (Doc. No. 1-1). Defendant properly removed the action to this Court under 12 U.S.C. § 1819(b)(2)(B) and 28 U.S.C. § 1442. (Doc. No. 1).
The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency closed Silverton Bank on May 1, 2009, and Defendant was appointed as the receiver for the bank soon thereafter. (Doc. No. 8 at 4). In its capacity as receiver of Silverton, Defendant obtained a judgment against Plaintiff's husband Scott Coleman, and sought to garnish a Bank of America account held jointly by the Plaintiff and her husband. (Id.). Bank of America answered the garnishment on June 24, 2014, and deposited $28, 380.00 with the Williamson County Clerk and Master on July 7, 2014. (Id.).
Plaintiff alleges in her Complaint that Defendant did not have the authority to levy funds out of the couple's joint bank account because Defendant was only a judgment creditor of Plaintiff's husband, not Plaintiff. (Doc. No. 1-2). Defendant filed its motion to dismiss on October 20, 2017, arguing the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims against the FDIC-R and that the Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. (Doc. No. 7).
While Defendant's filings do not cite specifically Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), a motion to dismiss that challenges a court's subject matter jurisdiction is governed by that rule. A Rule 12(b)(1) challenge can attack the sufficiency of the pleading itself (facial attack), in which case all factual allegations of the Plaintiff must be considered as true, or attack the factual basis for jurisdiction (factual attack). Cartwright v. Garner, 751 F.3d 752, 759-60 (6th Cir. 2014). If the factual basis for jurisdiction is challenged, as is the case here, a court has broad discretion to consider and weigh evidence, including evidence outside of the pleadings, and the plaintiff bears the burden of proving jurisdiction. (Id.).
Defendant argues that the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the claims against Defendant because Plaintiff did not comply with the administrative claims process set out in the Federal Institution Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act (“FIRREA”), 12 U.S.C. § 1811 et seq. (Doc. No. 8 at 7). Specifically, Defendant alleges that Plaintiff did not follow the administrative claims process of FIRREA for her claim that is the subject of this lawsuit, and therefore deprived Defendant of the opportunity to consider her claim before she filed suit. (Id.). Plaintiff does not dispute this, or even address FIRREA, in her response to Defendant's motion. (Doc. No. 13).
“FIRREA was enacted during the savings and loan insolvency crisis to enable the FDIC . . . to efficiently and expeditiously wind up the affairs of hundreds of failed financial institutions.” In re Lewis, 398735, 739 (6th Cir. 2005). Under FIRREA, the FDIC is given broad discretion to adopt and enforce policies that promote efficiency in winding up the affairs of failed institutions. 12 U.S.C. § 1821. To do so, FIRREA “establishes an administrative process for handling claims made against the assets of a failed bank that has been placed under receivership.” In re Lewis, 398 F.3d at 739.
The process for handling administrative claims against institutions for which the FDIC has been appointed receiver is set forth in 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(3)-(13). The FDIC is required to mail or publish notice to the institution's creditors instructing them to present their claims to the receiver by a date specified in the notice. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(3). Claims filed after this date are generally barred unless the claimant did not receive notice of the appointment of the receiver in time to file the claim before the stated date, and the claim is filed in time to permit payment of the claim. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(5)(C). According to one circuit court, “the only statutorily-specified exemption from the strict requirements of the administrative claims process is provided ‘if the claimant did not receive notice of the appointment of the receiver in time to file . . . [a] claim.'” Secrest v. Indymac F.S.B., 2009 WL 302321, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 9, 2009) (quoting Freeman v. FDIC, 56 F.3d 1394, 1402 (D.C. Cir. 1995)). But even then, “the only consequence is that the FDIC ‘may' consider a late-filed claim, provided the claim is filed ‘in time to permit payment.'” Id.

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