Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/405/127/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 00:45:09+00:00

Document:
224 Tenn. 712, 462 S.W.2d 491, certiorari dismissed as improvidently granted.
We granted certiorari in this case, 404 U.S. 821, to consider questions seemingly presented under the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy. After briefing and oral argument, it now appears that those questions are so interrelated with rules of criminal pleading peculiar to the State of Tennessee, the constitutionality of which is not at issue, as not to warrant the exercise of the certiorari jurisdiction of this Court. See, e.g., Wilson v. State, 200 Tenn. 309, 292 S.W.2d 188 (1956); Young v. State, 185 Tenn. 596, 206 S.W.2d 805 (1947). See U.S.Sup.Ct.Rule 19(1)(a). The writ is, therefore, dismissed as having been improvidently granted.
fundamental right is so plain on the record before us that I am compelled to dissent.
Petitioner and a codefendant, Brooks, were brought to trial in the Criminal Court of Montgomery County, Tennessee, on an indictment charging armed robbery "by the use of a deadly weapon, to-wit: A Gun to-wit: a pistol. . . ." [Footnote 1] The jury was selected and sworn, the indictment read, and a plea of not guilty entered on the defendants' behalf. The State's first witness, the officer investigating the robbery, testified that he had been looking for a "22 rifle" used in the commission of the crime. Defense counsel immediately objected to this evidence as immaterial to a charge of armed robbery with a pistol, and, after some discussion out of the jury's presence, his objection was sustained. The prosecutor then informed the court that he had used the word "pistol" in the indictment by mistake, and that, in view of the court's refusal to admit evidence of the rifle, the State could proceed no further with its case, and would move for a directed verdict of acquittal on the ground of erroneous indictment. The trial court granted this motion over defendants' objection, and instructed the jury "to find, or to acquit the Defendants of the charge in view of that error in the indictment."
"'an allegation in an indictment which is not impertinent or foreign to the cause [such as specifying the weapon as a pistol] must be proved, though a prosecution for the same offense might be supported without such allegation.' . . ."
224 Tenn. at 717, 462 S.W.2d at 494 (italics omitted), quoting Hite v. State, 17 Tenn. 357, 377 (1836) (theft of note payable at Mechanics' and Traders' Bank inadmissible on indictment specifying note payable at Merchants' and Traders' Bank). See also Wilson v. State, 200 Tenn. 309, 292 S.W.2d 188 (1956) (proof of theft of bronze rollers material variance from indictment charging theft of brass rollers). The court went on to hold, however, that, since the variance between "pistol" and "rifle" was sufficient to render the initial indictment defective, it was likewise sufficient to distinguish the second indictment from the first for double jeopardy purposes.
"when consistently applied as a test for both variance and double jeopardy, will affect equally both the state and the defendant, and, in our opinion, not offend the Fourteenth Amendment."
224 Tenn. at 719, 462 S.W.2d at 494. A petition for rehearing based on this Court's decision in Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U. S. 436 (1970), was denied on the ground that Ashe "has no application to the question whether there has been double jeopardy where the first indictment is void for variance." 224 Tenn. at 720, 462 S.W.2d at 495.
"the State, with all its resources and power, should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that, even though innocent he may be found guilty."
consent he cannot be tried again."
Id. at 355 U. S. 188. There are exceptions to this rule, of course, as in the case of a hung jury, United States v. Perez, 9 Wheat. 579 (1824), or military emergency requiring withdrawal of charges, Wade v. Hunter, 336 U. S. 684 (1949), but they do not apply here.
"former jeopardy includes one who has been acquitted by a verdict duly rendered, although no judgment be entered on the verdict, and it was found upon a defective indictment. The protection is not . . . against the peril of second punishment, but against being again tried for the same offense."
Clause was designed to avoid. The State very properly conceded at oral argument that petitioner "was placed in jeopardy in the first trial." Tr. of Oral Arg. 23.
"the Double Jeopardy Clause requires the prosecution, except in most limited circumstances, to join at one trial all the charges against a defendant that grow out of a single criminal act, occurrence, episode, or transaction."
second prosecution based on this "single criminal act." [Footnote 2] The majority's refusal to address these issues is inexplicable. It may be that the prosecution in this case did not have available to it a ready means, under state law, of amending the first indictment, and thus had no choice but to end the trial and begin again. If so, its remedy lies in changing Tennessee's criminal procedure, not in denying petitioner the constitutional protection to which he is entitled. Petitioner was tried twice for the same offense, and his conviction should be reversed. United States v. Jorn, 400 U. S. 470, 400 U. S. 488 (1971) (Black and BRENNAN, JJ., concurring). I would grant him that relief.
"Robbery is the felonious and forcible taking from the person of another, goods or money of any value, by violence or putting the person in fear. Every person convicted of the crime of robbery shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary not less than five (5) nor more than fifteen(15) years; provided, that, if the robbery be accomplished by the use of a deadly weapon the punishment shall be death by electrocution, or the jury may commute the punishment to imprisonment for life or for any period of time not less than ten (10) years."
"When the Legislature determined in 1955 to amend the penalty statute for the crime of robbery, it was obvious that robbery by the use of a deadly weapon was dangerous to life for many reasons, and thus it was that the act was amended to make the penalty for the crime of robbery with a deadly weapon as stated above, to try to prevent the use of a deadly weapon in the perpetration of a robbery. [But] so adding this increased punishment for the increased gravity of the crime does not create a separate or distinct offense, but merely provides for increased punishment of such offender because of the presence of aggravating circumstances."
Id. at 567-568, 399 S.W.2d at 743. Relying on Winsett and the robbery statute itself, petitioner contends, with some force, in my view, that the only crime charged in either prosecution was "robbery," with the use of the weapon and its specification in the indictment adding only to the punishment that might be imposed.

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