Source: http://masscases.com/cases/sjc/401/401mass1201.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 15:43:34+00:00

Document:
OPINION OF THE JUSTICES TO THE SENATE.
Constitutional Law, "Anti-aid" amendment, Use of public money or property, Education. Education, "Anti-aid" amendment. Taxation, Income tax, Exemption.
On October 19, 1987, the Justices submitted the following answer to a question propounded to them by the Senate.
the General Court a bill, Senate No. 1893, entitled, "An Act providing a tax deduction for certain educational expenses." The order further recites that the bill, if enacted into law, would provide tax deductions for certain educational expenses incurred in attending public or nonprofit private primary and secondary schools, as well as for certain tutoring and related expenses, and that grave doubt exists as to the constitutionality of the bill if enacted into law. A copy of the bill was transmitted with the order.
"Would said section one of said Senate No. 1893, if enacted into law, violate the provisions of section two of Article XLVI of the Articles of Amendment to the Constitution of the Commonwealth?"
recognized that the tax subsidies or tax expenditures of this sort are the practical equivalent of direct government grants. See Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 544-545 (1983). Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 791 (1973) (money involved in a tax deduction is a charge made against the State treasury). See S. Surrey, Pathways to Tax Reform (1973); Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 705 (1970). [Note 5] Recognition of the practical equivalence of tax deductions and government payments is evidenced further by the fact that analysis of tax expenditures is mandated by statute as part of the Commonwealth's annual budget process. G. L. c. 29, Sections 1, 5B (1986 ed.). Thus, Senate No. 1893 must be tested under art. 46, Section 2.
Gen., 378 Mass. 550 , 558 (1979). The answer to the question necessarily involves some balancing of the considerations involved.
a. Purpose test. Article 46, Section 2, especially when viewed in light of its history, requires that we consider the purpose or purposes of the proposed legislation to ascertain whether the legislation has been proposed "for the purpose of founding, maintaining or aiding" private schools. Commonwealth v. School Comm. of Springfield, supra at 679. In this case, there is no statutory preamble, no proposed legislative findings, and no legislative history. [Note 6] Thus, the focus of the inquiry is on the bill itself. We look to the statutory scheme and to the anticipated functioning of the legislation to determine whether any implicit legislative purpose conflicts with art. 46, Section 2. Cf. Commonwealth v. School Comm. of Springfield, supra at 677-678 (setting forth this inquiry in the context of enacted legislation). We must examine the proposed legislation to discern whether the Legislature has attempted to circumvent the strictures of art. 46, Section 2, through the use of facially valid language. See Attorney Gen. v. School Comm. of Essex, 387 Mass. 326 , 330-331 (1982); Commonwealth v. School Comm. of Springfield, supra at 676-677.
and secondary school levels, and amounts expended for preparation for standardized tests usually taken for secondary school or college admission. The bill expressly excludes from the definition of "textbook" any "instructional books and materials used in the teaching of religious tenets, doctrines or worship, the purpose of which is to inculcate such tenets, doctrines or worship."
We do not consider this assistance to private schools to be only an incidental purpose of Senate No. 1893. In Commonwealth v. School Comm. of Springfield, supra, the court rejected an anti-aid amendment challenge to the statutory scheme presented by St. 1972, c. 766, whereby children with special educational needs were placed and educated in approved private schools at the Commonwealth's expense. In concluding that the purpose of c. 766 was primarily "to benefit public schools and individual children," id. at 678, and only incidentally to aid the private schools, the court focused on two limiting features of c. 766. First, private school placements were authorized only when the appropriate special education plan for a child was not available within the public school system. Id. at 677. Second, and more importantly, the statute did not permit the reimbursement of special education expenses for children whose parents unilaterally enrolled them in private school. The private placement provisions only applied to children who sought special education through the public school system, but who were identified as requiring special services which the school system either could not or would not provide. Id.
available for private school expenditures for all children, including those whose parents directly and unilaterally enroll them in the private schools and to whom a similar education is available in the public schools. We conclude that one of the primary purposes of Senate No. 1893, if not its only purpose, is to aid the private schools.
b. Substantial aid test. We further inquire whether the tax deduction authorized by the proposed legislation would provide "substantial assistance" to private schools. See Attorney Gen. v. School Comm. of Essex, supra at 332. While the aid must amount to substantial assistance, id., it need not comprise "a major portion of the total expense of such a school." Commonwealth v. School Comm. of Springfield, supra at 679. In applying this test, the court has examined the amount of aid furnished and the number of students affected by the aid, Commonwealth v. School Comm. of Springfield, supra at 680, as well as the degree to which the aid assists private schools in carrying out the essential function of teaching. Attorney Gen. v. School Comm. of Essex, supra at 333-334.
The amount of aid at issue here, although it would not amount to a major portion of the cost of operating a private school, would be neither minimal nor insignificant. At the five per cent rate of taxation prescribed in G. L. c. 62, Section 4 (b) (1986 ed.) (which specifies the tax rate on taxable earned income for Massachusetts residents), the proposed tax deduction would yield a maximum possible saving on taxes of $50 a dependent in grades K1 to 6, and of $75 in grades 7 to 12. The most recently published figures indicate that, as of October 1, 1986, 146,567 students had enrolled in private elementary and secondary schools in Massachusetts. Individual School Report, Massachusetts Department of Education, Bureau of Data Collection, Public Summary 4 (1987). Thus, in the aggregate, the tax deduction proposed by Senate No. 1893 would result in a sizable subsidy to private schools and in an equally large reduction in the Commonwealth's tax revenues. This amount of aid is not insubstantial.
for, among other things, private school tuition and textbooks. The aid is not limited to benefits that are remote from the essential function of the schools, benefits such as transportation, [Note 9] police and fire protection, and the provision of sewers and public ways. Attorney Gen. v. School Comm. of Essex, supra at 333. Rather, the aid provided by Senate No. 1893 would underwrite the teaching function, "the school's essential enterprise." Id. See Bloom v. School Comm. of Springfield, supra at 42. We conclude that the deduction authorized by the proposed legislation would constitute "substantial assistance" to private elementary and secondary schools.
the Supreme Judicial Court has termed "critically important." Attorney Gen. v. School Comm. of Essex, supra at 335.
d. Conclusion. After considering the three criteria discussed above, the undersigned Justices conclude that Senate No. 1893, if enacted, would violate art. 46, Section 2, of the Amendments to the Constitution of the Commonwealth, at least in so far as it authorizes a tax deduction for amounts expended on tuition and textbooks for students of private elementary and secondary schools.
The undersigned Justices answer the question, "Yes."
The foregoing answer and opinion are submitted by the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices subscribing hereto on the 19th day of October, 1987.
[Note 1] The Justices invited interested persons to file briefs on or before June 26, 1987, and they acknowledge the assistance of briefs submitted on behalf of Massachusetts Association of School Committees, Inc.; Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts; Massachusetts Teachers Association; Catholic League for Religious and Civil Rights; and Citizens for Public Schools, American Jewish Congress, Boston Teachers Union, League of Women Voters, Massachusetts Advocacy Center and Massachusetts Federation of Teachers.
[Note 2] General Laws c. 62, Section 2(a), has been further amended by St. 1986, c. 488, Sections 24 and 74.
[Note 3] The remaining sections of the bill provide that Section 1 of the bill shall apply to tax years commencing on or after January 1, 1988, and that the act shall take effect on its passage.
[Note 4] The Supreme Court's decision in Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983), in which a Minnesota statute providing tax deductions for educational expenditures was held not to violate the establishment clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, need not enter our analysis. The language of our anti-aid amendment is "much more specific" than the First Amendment, Opinion of the Justices, 357 Mass. 836 , 841 (1970), and its restrictions are "more stringent." Attorney Gen. v. School Comm. of Essex, 387 Mass. 326 , 332 (1982). Its prohibition is "emphatic and comprehensive," Opinion of the Justices, supra at 842, and it "marks no difference between `aids,' whether religious or secular." Bloom v. School Comm. of Springfield, 376 Mass. 35 , 45 (1978). Attorney Gen. v. School Comm. of Essex, supra at 332 n.3.
[Note 5] By contrast, the Supreme Judicial Court has recognized that "[e]xemptions from property taxation accorded to schools (G. L. c. 59, Section 5) entail no `grant, appropriation or use' of public money within the meaning of the anti-aid amendment, as was made clear at the 1917 convention," by which art. 46 was submitted. Bloom v. School Comm. of Springfield, supra at 48, citing 1 Debates in the Massachusetts Constitutional Convention, 1917-1918 at 361 (1919); R.L. Bridgman, The Massachusetts Constitutional Convention of 1917, at 34 (1923). The reason for the distinction is the long tradition of acceptance of property tax exemptions which predated the 1917-1918 convention. See 1 Debates, supra at 360-361. See also Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, supra at 792-794 (paying deference to tax exemption for church property which predated the First Amendment, and contrasting the wide-ranging "benevolent neutrality" of this exemption with the "recent innovation" of benefits specifically designed to aid nonpublic institutions).
[Note 6] Unenacted legislation, when considered by the Justices in an advisory opinion, does not benefit from the presumption of constitutionality that applies when the Supreme Judicial Court considers a postenactment constitutional challenge to legislation. See Blue Hills Cemetery, Inc. v. Board of Registration in Embalming & Funeral Directing, 379 Mass. 368 , 371 & n.7 (1979).
[Note 7] The Commonwealth already authorizes municipalities to provide transportation for public school and private school students alike in a comprehensive program pursuant to G. L. c. 76, Section 1. This program was held constitutional under the anti-aid amendment in Attorney Gen. v. School Comm. of Essex, 387 Mass. 326 (1982), at least in part because "the purpose of school transportation [is to promote] the health and safety of school children." Id. at 331, quoting Murphy v. School Comm. of Brimfield, 378 Mass. 31 , 41 (1979). Thus, a deduction limited to amounts expended on transportation would not clearly offend against the anti-aid amendment.
[Note 8] Four years after the issuance of this opinion, art. 46, Section 2, was amended by art. 103 of the Amendments to the Constitution. Article 103 recast the core prohibitory language of art. 46, Section 2, with certain modifications not here material. See Bloom v. School Comm. of Springfield, supra at 40-41.
[Note 9] The Supreme Judicial Court has held that providing transportation to public and private school students under G. L. c. 76, Section 1, provides only remote, not substantial, aid to private schools, noting that "[t]ransportation to and from these schools . . . does `no more than provide a general program to help parents get their children . . . safely and expeditiously to and from accredited schools.'" Attorney Gen. v. School Comm. of Essex, 387 Mass. 326 , 333-334 (1982), quoting Everson v. Board of Educ. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947).

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