Source: http://www.torttalk.com/2016/02/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 14:30:29+00:00

Document:
Judge Matthew W. Brann of the Pennsylvania Middle District Court recently granted a Defendant's Motion to Dismiss in the slip and fall negligence case of Holt v. Lowe’s Home Centers, LLC, No. 4:15-CV-01728 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 10, 2016).
In this case, Judge Brann ruled that a Defendant landowner could not be held liable for injuries sustained by an independent contractor’s employee when that employee slipped and fell through a snow covered greenhouse roof that the contractor was hired to clear.
At the outset of his Opinion, Judge Brann outlined the stricter "plausibility" standard of review for federal court motions to dismiss enunciated by decisions in recent years by the Chief Justice Roberts-led U.S. Supreme Court.
The court noted that the records confirmed that the contractors retained by Lowe's, one of which designed, manufactured and manufactured greenhouses of the type at issue, obviously knew of the existence of the snow, and also know of the possible structural damage to the area where the Plaintiff fell through the greenhouse roof.
The court found that there was no peculiar risk or special danger presented by the facts of this matter. Judge Brann stated that a snowy roof in winter in Pennsylvania did not amount to a peculiar risk as that term is identified under the law.
Judge Brann also held that it could not be a peculiar risk in that the premises owner did not have any duty to inspect as that duty had been contractually assumed by the contractor.
Judge Brann also supported his decision to dismiss the matter by asserting that the record did not prove causation attributable to Lowe's as the possessor of land. In this regard, the court noted that the Plaintiff’s injury was caused, in part, by the failure to use safety equipment and that that failure was under the contractor’s responsibility and not the landowners.
In his recent decision in the case of Oscarson v. Moses Taylor Hospital, No. 2013-CV-1523 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Feb. 3, 2016 Nealon, J.), Judge Terrence R. Nealon of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas denied a Defendant hospital’s Motion for Summary Judgment on the Plaintiff’s ostensible agency theory of liability for an independent contractor physician.
In this medical malpractice action, the Plaintiff alleged a negligent performance and interpretation of a needle biopsy at the Defendant-hospital by the Defendant-pathologist. The Plaintiff asserted a claim of a vicarious liability on the hospital. This claim was based upon the assertion that the independent contractor pathologist was an ostensible agent of the hospital at the time of the biopsy.
The matter came before the court on the hospital Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment.
Judge Nealon noted that, under 40 P.S. §1303.516, a hospital may be vicariously liable for the negligence of an independent contractor physician based upon ostensible agency if the evidence shows that either (1) a reasonably prudent person in the patient’s position would be justified in believing that the care in question was being rendered by the hospital or its agent, or (2) the care at issue was advertised or otherwise represented to the patient as being rendered by the hospital or its agent.
Reviewing the records before him, Judge Nealon noted that there was evidence that the Plaintiff was advised by his treating surgeon that he was being referred to the hospital, not any particular pathologist, for the needle biopsy. Moreover, the Plaintiff was contacted by the hospital’s outpatient department, as opposed to the pathologist’s office, for the scheduling of the biopsy procedure at the hospital.
The record also established that, prior to the date of the biopsy, the Plaintiff had never met or been treated by the pathologist. The only care that the Plaintiff received from the pathologist took place at the Defendant-hospital. Judge Nealon also noted that the pathologist never informed the Plaintiff of his independent contractor status. The Plaintiff additionally testified during his deposition that he thought that the pathologist was indeed a hospital employee.
As such, viewing the records in a light most favorable to the Plaintiff as the non-moving party as required by the standard of review for motions for summary judgment, Judge Nealon ruled that it could not be declared, as a matter of law, that a reasonably prudent person in the position of the Plaintiff would not have been justified in believing that the needle biopsy was being performed by the hospital’s agent. As such, the hospital’s Motion for Summary Judgment was denied.
In his recent decision in the dog bite case of Wagner v. Teneyck, No. 15-01783 (C.P. Lycoming Co. Jan. 5, 2016 Gray, J.), Judge Richard A. Gray of the Lycoming County Court of Common Pleas denied in part and sustained in part a Defendant’s various demurrers to a Plaintiff’s Complaint in a dog bite personal injury matter.
The court found that Complaint contained sufficient allegations for a cause of action for negligence per se for harboring a dangerous dog and failing to keep a dangerous dog under control in violation of Pennsylvania’s Dangerous Dog Law as well as the Borough of Jersey Shore Codes pertaining to dog leash laws.
The court rejected the Defendant’s objections to the Complaint for failing to specify the provisions of the Pennsylvania Dog Law and/or the Borough of Jersey Shore Codes pertaining to dog leash laws in the content of the Complaint.
In this regard, Judge Gray noted that Pennsylvania is a fact-pleading jurisdiction under which the courts are presumed to know the law such that Plaintiffs need only plead facts supporting a cause of action and that the courts will take judicial notice of any statutes involved or implicated by such allegations. Here, the court found that the Complaint sufficiently pled that the Defendants’ harbored a dangerous dog and failed to either keep the dog within a dwelling or an enclosure or to keep the dog muzzled. As such, the Defendants’ objections based upon a lack of form or improper form in the Complaint was overruled.
Judge Gray did sustain the Defendants’ objection asserting that the Complaint failed to specify the alleged special damages at issue. Judge Gray noted that Pa. R.C.P. 1019(f) required that items of special damages be specifically stated in a Complaint.
Here, the court noted that the Complaint failed to specify the amount of past medical bills to the extent known as well as the future medical bills anticipated. Accordingly, the Complaint was found to lack sufficient specificity under Rule 1019(f). The Defendants’ Preliminary Objection based upon lack of specificity was therefore sustained.
Judge Gray's Opinion in Wagner can be viewed HERE.
In its recent decision in the case of Chaudhuri v. Capital Area Transit, No. 1467 C.D. 2015 (Pa. Cmwlth. Jan. 7, 2016 McCullough, J.), the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court affirmed the entry of a defense verdict in a motor vehicle versus pedestrian accident and, in doing so, found that the trial court did not err in its jury instructions, particularly with respect to the requirement of law that a pedestrian cross streets at crosswalks.
This matter arose out of an accident during which the Plaintiff, who was crossing the street as a pedestrian outside of a designated crosswalk, waled behind a public bus and was struck by a second bus. At trial, the jury returned a verdict finding the Plaintiff to be 75% negligent and the Defendant bus driver 25% negligent.
In post-trial motions and on appeal, the Plaintiff argued that the trial court erred on its instructions to the jury on the legal duty of pedestrians crossing outside of a crosswalk. The Plaintiff alleged that the trial court’s instruction effectively directed to the jury to find the Plaintiff negligent and that the Plaintiff failed to exercise due care simply because he crossed the street outside of the crosswalk. The Plaintiff made this argument based upon the trial court’s instruction noting that there was a preference under the law for pedestrians to cross streets at crosswalks.
The appellate court rejected this argument and found that, viewing the trial court’s instructions to the jury as a whole, the Plaintiff was not prejudiced because the trial court was found to have accurately instructed the jury. The Commonwealth Court reaffirmed the legal duty of pedestrians crossing outside of a crosswalk to yield to oncoming traffic. The appellate court noted that the trial court properly read from the applicable statutes,and additionally reminded the jury that they were solely responsible for determining whether or not the Plaintiff was negligent based upon the applicable standard of care.
The appellate court also specifically found that the trial court’s instructions never informed or instructed the jury that the Plaintiff had violated any statute or that the Plaintiff was contributorily negligent simply because the Plaintiff had decided to cross the street outside of a crosswalk.
Accordingly, the Commonwealth Court found no error in the trial court’s jury instruction in this regard and chose not to disturb the jury’s verdict on appeal.
Anyone wishing to read this Opinion, may click HERE.
In the recent decision of Denzel v. Fed. Cleaning Contractors, Inc., PICS Case No. 16-0056 (C.P. Lehigh Co. Oct. 22, 2015 Varricchio, J.), the Lehigh County Court of Common Pleas ruled that, while Defendant-mall owners and managers owed the Plaintiff a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect the Plaintiff from conditions that were known or discoverable to the Plaintiff, the Plaintiff was found to have assumed the risk of her injury by knowingly and voluntarily walking over the patches of snow and ice. As such, the court found that Defendants’ duty to the Plaintiff was discharged and that the Plaintiff could not establish negligence. Accordingly, the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment was granted.
Tort Talkers may recall that the Pennsylvania Superior Court previously issued a decision on October 9, 2015 in the same case confirming that the trial court may enter summary judgment in favor of a Defendant in a slip and fall case based upon the assumption of risk defense. To view that Tort Talk entry, click HERE.
To review the more recent trial court Opinion from October 22, 2015 in the Denzel case, please call the Pennsylvania Instant Case Service of the Pennsylvania Law Weekly at 1-800-276-7427 and provide the above-referenced PICS Case No. and pay a small fee.
In his recent January 19, 2016 Opinion in the case of Lapinski v. Schiowitz, No. 2009-CV-4287 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Jan. 19, 2016 Nealon, J.), Judge Terrence R. Nealon of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas addressed the issue of a Defendant seeking to be dismissed from a lawsuit by way of a Discontinuance when the entire lawsuit has not yet concluded.
In Lapinski, the Defendant-hospitals in a malpractice action filed Motions for Discontinuance seeking their dismissal as named defendants pursuant to Pa. R.C.P. 229(b)(1).
Judge Nealon confirmed that no cross-claims were asserted against the Defendant-hospitals by any Co-Defendant under Pa. R.C.P. 1031.1. Moreover, no expert report had been produced in the case by any party alleging any liability on the part of the Defendant-hospitals who were seeking dismissal by way of a Discontinuance.
The court noted that the only claim against the Defendant-hospitals was the Plaintiffs’ original allegation that the Defendant-surgeons were ostensible agents of the Defendant-hospitals such that the hospitals were vicariously liable for the surgeons’ negligence. When the Plaintiffs chose to abandon that only claim asserted against the Defendant-hospitals, the hospitals sought the dismissal. The court also noted that the Plaintiff had stipulated in writing their agreement to the dismissal of the Defendant-hospitals.
The Co-Defendant-surgeons opposed the requested Discontinuances. As such, the Defendant-hospitals filed the motion at issue.
Judge Nealon ruled that the Defendant-surgeons had no basis to oppose the Discontinuance of this action against the Defendant-hospitals since the surgeons did not assert any cross-claims against the Defendant-hospitals. The court also ruled that the Defendant-surgeons could not compel the Plaintiff to litigate an ostensible agency claim that the Plaintiffs had elected to withdraw.
The court also ruled that another judge’s denial of the Defendant-hospitals’ previous Motion for Summary Judgment did not serve to preclude the granting of the Motion to Discontinue at issue.
Accordingly, the court granted the Defendant-hospitals’ Motion for Leave of Court to Discontinue under Rule 229(b)(1) and the Defendant-hospitals were removed as parties from the case.
Anyone wishing to read this Opinion by Judge Nealon in the Lapinski case may click this LINK.
Commentary: It would appear that the ruling and reasoning of Judge Nealon in this medical malpractice case could be applied in other types of civil litigation matters where a party Defendant requests a Discontinuance in a multi-Defendant matter where the Plaintiff agrees to forego any claims against that Defendant and where there are no cross-claims asserted by any other Defendant.
A copy of the Supreme Court's Order can be viewed HERE.
See also Amato v. Bell & Gosset, Clark-Reliance Corp., No. 448 EAL 2015, 2016 WL 381069 (Pa. Feb. 1, 2016) HERE.
I send thanks to Attorney James Beck of the Philadelphia office of Reed Smith for bringing this Order to my attention. Check out Attorney Beck's excellent Drug and Device Law Blog HERE.

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