Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/120/327/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 01:46:10+00:00

Document:
The question whether either of the counts in an indictment charges an offense under the laws of the United states, is too vague and general to be certified in a Certificate of Division of Opinion.
An indictment claiming that the defendant, "as president and agent" of . . national bank, did the acts forbidden by Rev.Stat. § 5209 does not vitiate the counts in which he is so described.
In an indictment under Rev.Stat. § 5209 for willfully misapplying the funds of a national bank, it is not necessary to charge that the moneys and funds alleged to have been misapplied had been previously entrusted to the defendant, since a willful and criminal misapplication of the fund of the association may be made by its officer or agent without having previously received them into his manual possession.
In charging in an indictment the president of a back with aiding and abetting its cashier in the misapplication of the foods of the bank, it is not necessary to aver that he then and there knew that the person so aided and abetted was the cashier.
"willfully and unlawfully and with intent to injure the said national banking association, and without the knowledge and consent thereof, abstract and convert to his own use certain moneys and funds of the property of the said association of the amount and value,"
etc., sufficiently describes and identities the crime of abstracting the funds of the bank created by Rev.Stat. § 5209.
"was then and there president and agent of a certain national banking association, to-wit [naming tie association] theretofore duly organized and established, and then existing and doing business at [naming the place] under the laws of the United States"
sufficiently states that that bank was organized under tie National Banking Act or to carry on the business of banking under a law of the United States.
This was a certificate of division of opinion as to the sufficiency of the counts in an indictment for abstracting and misapplying the funds of a national bank. The case is stated in the opinion of the Court.
"1st. Whether either of said counts charges defendant with an offense under the laws of the United States."
"2d. Whether the charging of the defendant with committing the acts therein charged against him as 'president and agent' did not vitiate said counts of said indictment."
"3d. Whether, under § 5209 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, it was necessary in the indictment to charge that the moneys and funds alleged to have been embezzled and misapplied, or either, had been previously entrusted to the defendant."
"4th. Whether it is necessary, in charging said defendant with aiding and abetting Sylvester T. Fuller, cashier of said bank, as in counts sixteen, twenty-eight, and forty-six, with the misapplication of the funds of said bank, to charge that the defendant then and there knew that said Fuller was such cashier."
"5th. Whether said second count sufficiently describes and identifies the crime of abstracting the funds of the bank created by the act of Congress. "
"6th. Whether the indictment sufficiently states that the Second National Bank of Jefferson was organized under the National Banking Act, or to carry on the business of banking under a law of the United States."
"SEC. 5209. Every president, director, cashier, teller, clerk, or agent of any association, who embezzles, abstracts, or willfully misapplies any of the moneys, funds, or credits of the association, or who, without authority from the directors, issues or puts in circulation any of the notes of the association, or who, without such authority, issues or puts forth any certificate of deposit, draws any order or bill of exchange, makes any acceptance, assigns any note, bond, draft, bill of exchange, mortgage, judgment, or decree, or who makes any false entry in any book, report, or statement of the association, with intent, in either case, to injure or defraud the association or any other company, body politic or corporate, or any individual person, or to deceive any officer of the association, or any agent appointed to examine the affairs of any such association, and every person who, with like intent, aids or abets any officer, clerk, or agent in any violation of this section, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall be imprisoned not less than five years, nor more than ten."
We proceed to dispose of the several questions certified to us in their order.
1st. The question whether either of said counts charges said defendant with an offense under the laws of the United States, which is the first one certified, we decline to answer for the reason that it is too vague and general, within the act of Congress authorizing certificates of this character and the repeated decisions of this Court.
2nd. We are of opinion that charging the defendant with committing the acts therein charged against him as "president and agent" did not vitiate the counts of the indictment in which that description is contained. The only grounds on which the contrary conclusion could be predicated are that the allegation is either too uncertain or is contradictory.
The allegation is not uncertain, as it might have been if it had been "president or agent." In that case, it might have been urged that as the offense was charged to have been committed by the defendant either as president or agent, it was uncertain in which of these capacities he was charged, for although it might be said that a president is ex officio agent of the association, there may be many agents who are not president. Here, the description is that he was "president and agent," and committed the offense charged in some capacity described by both terms. Neither is the description contradictory, because he may be both president and agent. There is no repugnance in the two characters. Even on the supposition that the statute means to make a distinction between the two offices of president and agent, there is nothing in the nature of either to prevent them both being held at the same time by one person, and the acts charged may, in contemplation of law, have been committed by him in both capacities.
A fortiori, may this be the case if every president of such an association is to be held by virtue of his office to be also, within the meaning of the act, an agent of the association. In that case, the use of the words "and agent" would be mere surplusage in the indictment. Being already included within the meaning of the word "president," it does not add anything to the description to introduce the words "and agent." This question is therefore answered in the negative.
being the property of said banking association, . . . and then and there being in the possession of said Stephen A. Northway, as such president and agent aforesaid, he, the said Stephen A. Northway, then and there . . . wrongfully, unlawfully, and with intent to injure and defraud said banking association, did embezzle and convert to his, said Stephen A. Northway's, own use,"
etc. The fifteenth count is for wrongfully, unlawfully, and willfully misapplying certain described funds of the bank, with intent to injure the association and without the knowledge and consent thereof, by paying and causing to be paid to certain persons, out of the moneys, funds, and credits then and there belonging to the property of the association, a large sum of money, in the purchase by him, the said Northway, for the use, benefit, and advantage of himself, of a large number of shares of the capital stock of certain stock companies. It is not alleged in this count that the moneys and funds so alleged to have been misapplied had previously come into the possession of the defendant by virtue of his office and character of president and agent.
In respect to the counts for embezzlement, it is quite clear that the allegation is sufficient, as it distinctly alleges that the moneys and funds charged to have been embezzled were at the time in the possession of the defendant as president and agent. This necessarily means that they had come into his possession in his official character, so that he held them in trust for the use and benefit of the association. In respect to those funds, the charge against him is that he embezzled them by converting them to his own use. This we think fully and exactly describes the offense of embezzlement under the act by an officer or agent of the association.
that he did willfully misapply certain funds belonging to the association by causing them to be paid out to his own use and benefit in unauthorized and unlawful purchases, without the knowledge and consent of the association and with the intent to injure it, it necessarily implies that the acts charged were done by him in his official capacity, and by virtue of power, control, and management which he was enabled to exert by virtue of his official relation. This, we think, completes the offense intended by the statute of a willful misapplication of the moneys and funds of a national banking association. We therefore answer the third question in the negative.
"did aid, abet, incite, counsel, and procure the said Sylvester T. Fuller, he, the said Fuller, then and there being cashier and agent as aforesaid, so as aforesaid to wrongfully, unlawfully, and willfully misapply,"
etc. We do not think it is necessary, in an indictment for this offense, to charge any scienter more distinctly. The acts charged against Fuller could only be committed by him by virtue of his official relation to the bank. The acts charged against the defendant likewise could only be committed by him in his official capacity. Both are alleged to be officers of the same corporation. The knowledge that each had of the official relation of the other is necessarily implied in the coexistence of this official relation on the part of both toward the same corporation. It is as cashier that Fuller was aided and abetted by the defendant in the commission of his offense. This allegation necessarily imputes knowledge of his official character.
"willfully and unlawfully, and with intent to injure the said national banking association and without the knowledge and consent thereof, abstract and convert to his, the said Stephen A. Northway's, own use certain moneys and funds of the property of said association, of the amount and value,"
etc. We see no reason to doubt the sufficiency of this description of the offense. It is true that the word "abstract," as used in this statute, is not a word of settled technical meaning like the word "embezzle," as used in statutes defining the offense of embezzlement, and the words "steal, take, and carry away," as used to define the offense of larceny at common law. It is a word, however, of simple popular meaning, without ambiguity. It means to take or withdraw from, so that to abstract the funds of the bank, or a portion of them, is to take and withdraw from the possession and control of the bank the moneys and funds alleged to be so abstracted. This, of course, does not embrace every element of that which, under this section of the statute, is made the offense of criminally abstracting the funds of the bank. To constitute that offense within the meaning of the act it is necessary that the moneys and funds should be abstracted from the bank without its knowledge and consent, with the intent to injure or defraud it, or some other company or person, or to deceive some officer of the association, or an agent appointed to examine its affairs. All these elements are contained in the description of the offense in the count in question. The count is therefore sufficient within the decisions of this Court upon similar statutes. United States v. Mills, 7 Pet. 138; United States v. Simmons, 96 U. S. 360; United States v. Carll, 105 U. S. 611; United States v. Britton, 107 U. S. 655.
the word "abstract" is not ambiguous, because it does not appear from other parts of the statute that there are two or more kinds of abstracting, both unlawful, but only one described as a criminal offense. The word "abstract," as used in the statute, therefore has but one meaning, being that which is attached to it in its ordinary and popular use. It is to be accepted with that meaning in framing an indictment under the section, which is not required, in order to be sufficient, to contain more than those allegations which are necessary, when added to the allegation of abstracting, to complete the description of the offense intended by the statute. This the count in question sufficiently does.
company, body politic or corporate, or individual person, than the banking association whose property is abstracted, or merely to deceive some other officer of the association, or an agent appointed to examine its affairs. This intent may exist in a case of abstracting without that intent which is necessary to constitute the offense of stealing. We answer the fifth question therefore in the affirmative.
"was them and there president and agent of a certain national banking association, to-wit, 'The Second National Bank of Jefferson,' theretofore duly organized and established, and then existing and doing business at the Village of Jefferson and County of Ashtabula, in the division and district aforesaid, under the laws of the United States."
We do not understand the necessity of this question. The allegation seems to be perfectly explicit. The defendant is charged by virtue of his office as president and agent of a national banking association, to-wit, the Second National Bank of Jefferson, which, it is further alleged, had been theretofore duly organized and established, and was then existing and doing business under the laws of the United States. This can mean only that it was organized and established as a banking association under the act of Congress authorizing the organization and establishment of national banks, and that it was in existence and doing business at the time of the alleged offense as such national banking association, because it could not be organized and established and existing and doing business under the laws of the United States in any other capacity. This question is accordingly answered in the affirmative.
These answers will be accordingly certified to the circuit court.

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