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Timestamp: 2019-04-22 20:26:47+00:00

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In re Marriage of SHERYL JONES DAVIS and KEITH XAVIER DAVIS.
In a marital dissolution proceeding, a court determines the division of property between the spouses by first characterizing the parties‘ property as community property or separate property. (In re Marriage of Valli (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1396, 1399.) Family Code section 760 provides that all property acquired by the spouses during the marriage is community property ―[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute.
One such statute is Family Code section 771, subdivision (a) (section 771(a)), which provides that ―[t]he earnings and accumulations of a spouse . . . , while living separate and apart from the other spouse, are the separate property of the spouse.
In this case we consider whether a couple may be ―living separate and apart,for purposes of section 771(a), when they live together in the same home. We conclude the answer is no. The statute requires the spouses to be living in separate residences in order for their earnings and accumulations to be their separate property. Because the Court of Appeal concluded otherwise, we reverse its judgment.
―living entirely separate lives. They spoke about divorce, but stayed together for the sake of the children.
The parties maintained a joint bank account from the beginning of their marriage, which wife managed. In 2001, however, husband started his own business and at some point opened a separate bank account. In 2003, wife reactivated a separate bank account of her own to manage her business funds and pay for her personal expenses. Husband contributed $3,200 a month to the parties‘ joint account from his separate account for the payment of household expenses. But both parties were unhappy with each other‘s contributions to the joint account. In January 2006, husband became employed by Clorox, substantially increasing his earnings. Wife was frustrated when he did not increase his financial support to the household.
contribute equally to running the home and funding the children‘s expenses, while being solely responsible for their own respective personal expenses. Wife removed husband from her American Express credit account and returned several of husband‘s credit cards to him. She believed at this point that they were acting simply as roommates. In July 2006, wife began working full-time, substantially increasing her earnings. Husband left his job with Clorox in September 2006.
The parties continued to live in the marital home after June 1, 2006. Wife continued to keep her personal belongings there. She continued to receive mail and telephone calls there. She continued to cook meals at the home when she was in town, although she often traveled for her work. She did not change the address on her driver‘s license. In August 2006, the parties took a family vacation to Hawaii with their children. However, they subsequently took no out-of-state vacations with one another. They continued to celebrate special occasions, such as birthdays and holidays, together as a family as they had previously done. They both continued to use their joint bank account.
When wife filed the petition for dissolution of the marriage on December 30, 2008, she listed the date of their separation as June 1, 2006. In his initial response to wife‘s petition, husband listed the date of separation as January 2, 2009 (a few days after wife‘s filing of the petition). Wife did not move out of the marital home until July 2011. Husband subsequently filed an amended response listing the date of separation as July 1, 2011.
After trial of the issue, the court found the date of separation to be June 1, 2006. The Court of Appeal affirmed. In relevant part, it disagreed with the majority decision in In re Marriage of Norviel (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 1152 (Norviel), which held that physically living apart is ―an indispensable threshold requirement‖ for separation under section 771(a). (Norviel, supra, at p. 1162.) We granted review to resolve the apparent conflict in interpretation of the statute.
Husband contends that spouses cannot be ―living separate and apart‖ for purposes of section 771(a) when they continue to share a residence. He urges such a bright-line rule in order to provide clear guidance to judges and a measure of predictability to attorneys and litigants. Wife contends that no particular fact, including place of residence, is determinative. Instead, wife argues that a court should consider the totality of the circumstances and decide the date of separation based on conduct by either or both of the spouses evidencing a complete and final intent to part ways with no plan of resuming the marital relationship, even if at that time they are still living in the same residence. According to wife, husband‘s proposed bright-line rule is unworkable and would lead to harsh results. Husband claims the same thing about wife‘s proposed rule.
―the phrase ‗living separate and apart‘ is a term of art.‖ (1 Kirkland et al., Cal. Family Law: Practice and Procedure (2d ed. 2014) Characterization — Division in General, § 20.06[a], p. 20-26.) As such, it has been defined in Black‘s Law Dictionary as spouses ―residing in different places and having no intention of resuming marital relations‖ (Black‘s Law Dict. (7th ed. 1999) p. 945, col. 2, italics added) and more recently as spouses ―living away from each other, along with at least one spouse‘s intent to dissolve the marriage.‖ (Black‘s Law Dict. (10th ed.
―apart‖ from someone else do not include persons living together in the same home. Ordinary usage of the language itself contemplates the parties‘ occupation of separate residences. Therefore, the statute on its face appears to have a commonly understood, plain meaning.
court‘s attention on the spouses‘ independence or autonomy from each other in their daily living. Under this understanding of the statutory phrase, physical separation would, as wife contends, be simply one of many factors to consider in determining the date of a couple‘s separation.
husband‖ strongly suggests that the 1870 Act was directed at a situation where the spouses had physically separated and the wife in fact had ―her own‖ residence. It is some indication that the 1870 Legislature had in mind what we have described as the common meaning of the language when it first adopted it.
When read as a whole and in this context, it seems evident that the 1870 Act was intended to afford married women some additional protection from the rigors of the law generally denying them control over their earnings and separate property. Under the authority of the 1870 Act, a wife whose husband was not physically living with her could undertake to support herself in her ―own‖ residence. Unlike other married women, she could retain her earnings and accumulations as her separate property to maintain her separate residence. She was given the right to control and dispose of her separate property. She could sue and be sued without the joinder of her husband. Nothing in the 1870 Act indicates a different intent — to characterize a wife‘s earnings and accumulations as her separate property while she was still physically living with her husband in the marital home so long as she and her husband were sufficiently leading ―separate lives.‖ To the contrary, the 1870 Act should be understood as a limited exception to the general rule of that time that the husband had full management and control over the marital and separate assets for the duration of the marriage. It appears the Legislature was concerned only with the special and limited circumstance of a wife who was living physically separate from her husband. Such a wife was likely to be incurring separate expenses associated with her separate residence and could be anticipated to need the authority to separately maintain, control and manage such property. In such a situation, the 1870 Legislature determined an exception to the normal community property characterization of earnings and accumulations acquired during marriage and husband‘s control was appropriate.
nothing suggests that the 1872 Legislature contemplated that anything other than separate residences would qualify as ―living separate,‖ i.e., that it intended the language to be construed differently from its common and ordinary meaning. In fact, the Legislature enacted at the same time section 5 of the Civil Code, which states that ―[t]he provisions of this Code, so far as they are substantially the same as existing statutes or the common law, must be construed as continuations thereof, and not as new enactments.‖ Because former section 169 was substantially the same as section 2 of the 1870 Act, Civil Code section 5 directs that it be interpreted as continuing in effect the former law.
And indeed, with respect to the language now found in section 771(a), from the earliest cases on, the issue presented regarding the interpretation of the statute was not whether separate places of residence were a prerequisite for application of the law, but rather whether separate residences sufficed. That question was answered in the negative.
marital relations with his wife, while his wife and children continued to live in the marital home, where the wife kept boarders and did other work to support herself and the children. (Loring v. Stuart (1889) 79 Cal. 200, 201-202; see Tagus Ranch Co. v. First Nat. Bk. (1935) 7 Cal.App.2d 457 [money borrowed by wife who had been deserted by her husband constituted her separate property under former section 169].) These facts illustrate the apparent purpose of the statute: to provide for an estranged wife, whose husband was not physically living with her, a means of maintaining herself in her separate place of residence by allowing her earnings and accumulations to be her separate property.
Without questioning whether separate residences was a necessary predicate, courts struggled to articulate a uniform standard for determining the date of separation in circumstances where the parties had moved into separate homes.
Subsequent legislative developments suggest no intent to change the meaning of the phrase ―living separate and apart.‖ In 1969, the Legislature repealed the family law portions of the Civil Code and replaced them with the Family Law Act. (Stats. 1969, ch. 1608, §§ 3, 6, 8, pp. 3313-3314.) Relevant to our discussion, former section 169 was repealed and Civil Code section 5118 (former section 5118) was adopted. (Stats. 1969, ch. 1608, § 8, p. 3340.) Like its predecessor, former section 5118 provided that ―[t]he earnings and accumulations of the wife . . . , while she is living separate from her husband, are the separate property of the wife.‖ (Stats. 1969, ch. 1608, § 8, p. 3340.) As before, no specialized definition of the language was provided, and by enacting language identical to former section 169, the 1969 Legislature once again expressed its intent to continue in effect the former law. (Civ. Code, § 5.) Therefore, as it did originally, the statute continued to address the situation in which a wife was living estranged in a separate residence from her husband.
mean the minor occupies a separate residence. (Fam. Code, § 6922, subd. (a)(2); see Family Code, 22 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep. (1992) foll. § 6922, p. 545 [―Section 6922 restates former Civil Code § 34.6 without substantive change.‖].) This statute further supports our view that the Legislature likely intends the common meaning of the language when it uses this statutory phrase.
p. 927.) The Manfer court stated that ―[t]he date-of-separation test does not ask what the public thinks, but whether at least one of the parties intended to end the marriage and whether there was objective conduct ‗bespeak[ing] the finality of the marital relationship.‘ ‖ (Id., at p. 928.) Once again, as in all the other cases discussed previously, the facts in Manfer involved the separation of residences.
They are consistent with a view that both separate residences and demonstrated intent are necessary.
5	The Norviel majority noted In re Marriage of Johnson (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 148, was the only case husband proffered as authority for his position that parties may live together and still be considered separated. (Norviel, supra, 102 Cal.App.4th at p. 1162.) In Johnson, supra, at page 155, husband contested the trial court‘s finding of the date of separation, but the reviewing court concluded, in a single paragraph with little discussion, that the trial court‘s determination was based upon substantial evidence. The Norviel majority was not convinced that Johnson was contrary to the conclusion that it reached, given Johnson‘s sparse recitation of the relevant facts. (Norviel, supra, at p. 1162.) We agree. But to the extent that it can be argued that the Johnson court determined that living separate lives was sufficient for purposes of former section 5118 (Johnson, supra, at p. 155), it is contrary to the evidence of legislative intent that we have discussed.
There appears to have been no reaction from the bench or bar subsequent to the Norviel decision contending that the Norviel majority had introduced a sudden new rule that was legislatively unintended and unworkable. No movement to promote the position of the Norviel dissent seems to have materialized. And, although we recognize that legislative inaction after a judicial decision does not necessarily imply legislative approval (County of Los Angeles v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1981) 30 Cal.3d 391, 404), it is also interesting to observe that the Legislature has had more than a decade to amend section 771(a) in response to the Norviel majority‘s recognition of a threshold requirement of physically separate places of residence and has failed to do so.
Wife contends that a bright-line rule, such as we articulate, will be overly simplistic, will lead to unjust, harsh results, and is, essentially, against current public policy considerations. She suggests that ―[a] typical spouse in California, for example, may face further financial difficulties simply by being required to move out of the marital residence as a prerequisite to establishing the date of separation rather than intentionally and meaningfully living as roommates at the same residence, while taking the necessary steps to untangle any outstanding financial, legal and social ties incident to that spouse‘s decision to terminate the marriage.‖ She points out that there may be spouses who need to reside in the same residence as ―roommates‖ because of foreclosure, job loss, or other economic factors. She suggests that others may wish to share the same residence in order to coparent their children. Finally, she speculates concerning the difficulty a spouse may encounter in obtaining a move-away order.
7	Under the facts presented by this case, we have no occasion to consider, and expressly reserve the question, whether there could be circumstances that would support a finding that the spouses were ―living separate and apart,‖ i.e., that they had established separate residences with the requisite objectively evidenced intent, even though they continued to literally share one roof.
ordinary sense as requiring separate places of residence before the earnings and accumulations of a wife during marriage could be characterized as the wife‘s separate property. We understand the original legislative purpose of the statute to be the protection of and provision for a wife who was estranged and living physically separate from her husband. Thus, the statutory phrase ―living separate and apart‖ required that the spouses be living in separate residences. We find no evidence of any subsequent change in the legislative intent to apply the commonly understood meaning of that language or change of legislative purpose in protecting a vulnerable spouse, which alter the meaning of this statutory phrase. Admittedly, the statute, as so construed, may work hardship in some specific situations, but we cannot say it is absurd. (People v. Leiva (2013) 56 Cal.4th 498, 506 [a literal construction may be rejected where it would result in absurd consequences the Legislature could not have intended].) Very much to the contrary; a bright-line rule, as husband points out, promotes fairness by providing a measure of predictability to the parties and their attorneys, as well as clear guidance to judges. It reduces the potential for manipulation of a more elastic standard by the higher earner in situations of significant disparity of spousal income. It provides separate property classification of earnings and accumulations where the need is greatest because each spouse is maintaining his or her own separate place of residence. It retains the presumption of community property for earnings and accumulations acquired during marriage during a period of time likely to be prior to the institution of court proceedings and any court order of support, thereby protecting the lower earning spouse.
We conclude that living in separate residences ―is an indispensable threshold requirement‖ (Norviel, supra, 102 Cal.App.4th at p. 1162) for a finding that spouses are ―living separate and apart‖ for purposes of section 771(a). This interpretation of the statutory language aligns with the common understanding of the words, the statutory history of the provision, and legitimate public policy concerns. Because the Court of Appeal rejected such a requirement as a matter of statutory construction, it erred as a matter of law.
WERDEGAR, J. CHIN, J. CORRIGAN, J. LIU, J. CUÉLLAR, J. KRUGER, J.
I agree with today‘s opinion that the phrase ―living separate and apart in Family Code section 771, subdivision (a) (hereafter section 771(a)) ―refers to a situation in which spouses are living in separate residences and at least one of them has the subjective intent to end the marital relationship, which intent is objectively evidenced by words or conduct reflecting that there is a complete and final break in the marriage relationship.‖ (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 23–24.) I also agree that it remains open ―whether there could be circumstances that would support a finding that the spouses were ‗living separate and apart,‘ i.e., that they had established separate residences with the requisite objectively evidenced intent, even though they continued to literally share one roof.‖ (Id. at p. 24, fn. 7.) I write separately to note that in addressing that question, courts should understand the purpose of section 771(a) in light of relevant changes in historical context that have occurred since 1870 when the Legislature enacted the original version of the statute.
The 1870 Act may be understood as a legislative response to cases like Lawrence v. Spear (1861) 17 Cal. 421. There a wife deserted by her husband engaged in a furniture business and sold furniture to the defendant. The husband sued the defendant to void the sale on the ground that he never consented to it.
The court upheld the sale based on the legal fiction that the husband, having abandoned the wife, impliedly consented to her disposition of property for her own support. (Id. at pp. 423–424.) This fiction was necessary because the wife had no control over community property and no way to accumulate or control her own separate property, even though she was living separate and apart from her husband. Moreover, divorce did not appear to be a widely accessible option. (See Stevenson & Wolfers, Marriage and Divorce: Changes and their Driving Forces (Spring 2007) 21 J. Econ. Persp. 27, 29, fig. 1 (Stevenson & Wolfers) [showing very low rate of divorce in the United States between 1860 and 1900].) The 1870 Act provided a narrow exception to the male-dominated property regime in order to protect a wife in such circumstances.
Thus, by 1971, an estranged wife living separate and apart from her husband had no need for a special statutory dispensation to earn and control separate property in order to provide for her own sustenance. She already controlled the portion of the community comprised of her own earnings, and she was soon to have equal control of all community property. Thus, the gender- neutral version of the statute enacted in 1971 no longer served the same protective purpose of the gender-specific 1870 Act. The modern statute is best understood to have a different purpose: Instead of addressing a nonexistent need to free one spouse from the other‘s exclusive control of community property, the statute — consistent with contemporary norms of gender equality — evenhandedly recognizes the separateness of each spouse‘s earnings and accumulations in situations where the spouses have effectively though not formally ended their marriage. In short, the statute recognizes a separation before divorce that effectively ends the community.
p. 25.) But whereas a narrow construction of the phrase now ―protect[s] the lower earning spouse by ―reduc[ing] the potential for manipulation of a more elastic standard by the higher earner (ibid.), a narrow construction served no similar protective purpose in 1870. To the contrary, the Legislature in 1870 understood ― living separate and apart narrowly to mean separate addresses because it sought to create ―a limited exception to the general rule of that time that the husband had full management and control over the marital and separate assets for the duration of the marriage. (Id. at p. 11, italics added.) A broader understanding of ―living separate and apart — one that enabled an estranged wife to earn and control separate property without living at a separate address from her husband — would have been more protective of the vulnerable spouse in 1870. Yet it also would have meant greater property rights for married women at the expense of the male- controlled property regime, and there is no indication that the Legislature in 1870 had any interest in fundamentally changing that regime. The 1870 statute was protective because it created an exception to the male-dominated property regime, not because the exception it created was a narrow one.
administrability (id. at p. 25) suggest that whether spouses are ―living separate and apart‖ turns not solely on the subjective intent of at least one spouse, but also on an objective manifestation of that intent by some form of physical separation.
p. 24) suggest that the physical separation need not assume the precise form that the Legislature in 1870 envisioned, namely, separate addresses.
purpose of section 771(a), the question is whether the spouses, in addition to their intent to separate, have demonstrated ―unambiguous, objectively ascertainable conduct amounting to a physical separation under the same roof.‖ (In re Marriage of Norviel (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 1152, 1164.) In order to qualify as ―living separate and apart,‖ the spouses must have a living arrangement that clearly and objectively signals a complete and final termination of the marital relationship.
Neither the Legislature nor this court has foreclosed the possibility that such a living arrangement may occur within a single dwelling.

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