Source: http://bc-injury-law.com/blog/2011/12
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 15:51:20+00:00

Document:
With New Year’s celebrations around the corner now is an opportune time to discuss the perils of impaired driving. Below is a compelling first hand account of some of the real world consequences of this un-necessary act.
And remember, impaired walking is just as dangerous, if not more so, than impaired driving. More pedestrians are killed on New Years than any other time. Statistics bear out that “For every mile walked drunk, turns out to be eight times more dangerous than the mile driven drunk“. Celebrate safely folks and Happy New Year!
I’d like to thank DriveSmat BC for bringing this clip to my attention.
Plaintiff Stripped of Costs for Failing to "Justify His Choice of Forum"
As previously discussed, the default position when a Plaintiff is awarded less than $25,000 following a Supreme Court trial is that they are not entitled to costs unless they show “sufficient reason” for suing in that forum. Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, addressing this and stripping a Plaintiff of costs who failed to justify his choice of forum.
In this week’s case (Quartey-Harrison v. Klusiewich) the Plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle collision and following trial was awarded just over $18,000 in damages plus costs “if no submissions (respecting costs) have been received“.
 The burden is on the plaintiff to justify his choice of forum. The court is to consider the circumstances at the time the action was commenced.
 In this case, Mr. Quartey-Harrison has made no submissions on costs and has offered no evidence on the issue of “sufficient reason” for bringing the proceeding in the Supreme Court. In the circumstances, I do not think that I should speculate.
 In my view, the evidence at trial made it plain and obvious that no award for past or future loss of income or the capacity to earn income, was warranted, and that the mild whiplash type injury suffered by Mr. Quartey-Harrison was unlikely to result in an award in excess of the $25,000 monetary limit in Small Claims Court.
 I have carefully considered the submissions made by the defendants in respect of the defendants’ settlement offer but have concluded that Mr. Quartey-Harrison’s right to recover disbursements should not be nullified by the offer.
 In summary, each party shall bear its own costs, but the plaintiff is entitled to recover his disbursements from the defendants.
Reasons for judgement were released yesterday by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, punishing a Defendant in a personal injury lawsuit with a special costs order for bringing an “ill-conceived” motion to dismiss the Plaintiff’s lawsuit.
In yesterday’s case (Wood Atkinson v. Murphy) the Plaintiff suffered a bilateral wrist injury in a 2006 collision. She sued for damages and the Defendant admitted fault for the crash. In the course of the lawsuit the Defendant requested employment records relating to the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff made reasonable efforts to obtain these but the Plaintiff’s employer “mistakenly failed to provide counsel with the Plaintiff’s complete employment file“. The Court found that this failure was due “to repeated errors or internal miscommunication on the part of (the employer)“.
The Defendant obtained two Court Orders addressing the production of the sought records. The Defendant then brought an application seeking the dismissal of the Plaintiff’s lawsuit for “material non-disclosure”. In support of the application to dismiss the Defendant’s lawyer “swore an affidavit erroneously describing the orders“.
 I have concluded in the circumstances that it is appropriate to award special costs to the plaintiff for the dismissal application. It is the mechanism by which the Court expresses its disapproval of two aspects of defendants’ counsel’s conduct. The first aspect is his carelessness in erroneously deposing to the contents of the two orders in question and relying on them to make a very serious application to punish the plaintiff. This error was a self-serving lack of attention to detail.
 Court orders are important. They give effect to the Rule of Law. Counsel cannot simply rely on their notes or fail to be accurate, especially after becoming aware of the disagreement or reservation of the other counsel. Although an application to the court is required to obtain a transcript of submissions at a CPC or TMC, the clerk’s notes are readily available. Indeed, plaintiff’s counsel obtained them to clarify the nature of the orders in question and provided them to defendants’ counsel.
 Secondly, it is clear that defendants’ counsel knew well before the hearing that the dismissal application was ill-conceived and was on notice that his version of the court orders was in question. Nonetheless, he persisted with the application.
 An order dismissing a plaintiff’s claim for material non-disclosure is a very serious matter; the consequences for the plaintiff and her counsel would have been severe. This type of application requires a solid foundation of misconduct on the part of the plaintiff, especially considering that the defendants had already admitted liability for her injuries.
 The fact the defendants may have become aware of the file and the correct nature of the orders after defendants’ counsel had sworn his September 14, 2011 affidavit (for his application to dismiss filed the next day) is of no moment because he became aware of these matters well before the start of the hearing on September 26, 2011. He pursued the application in any event.
 It is no answer to say that outside counsel was required nonetheless in order to address inconsistencies in counsels’ version of Ms. Tsang’s statements as to whether she had provided the complete file. Those hearsay issues are quite minor in the circumstances of all CBSA’s errors or miscommunications. Plaintiff’s counsel was put to a clearly unnecessary expense in the requirement to retain outside counsel to speak to plaintiff’s counsel’s affidavit. The application to dismiss the claim was misconceived and heavy handed.
 I have concluded it is appropriate to award the plaintiff special costs for the defendants’ application to dismiss her claim. The Court heard that application on the afternoon of September 26, 2011, the first of the three-day hearing. It is that day for which plaintiff’s counsel was obliged to retain outside counsel to speak to the affidavit that, amongst other things, corrected the errors in the defendants’ counsel’s version of the two orders.
Relationship Breakup Following Collision "Too Remote To Create Liability"
Reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Supreme Court, New Westminster Registry, finding that a claim for damages for a break-up of a relationship following a collision is too remote for liability.
In last week’s case (Shinkaruk v. Crouch) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2006 collision. He was found 20% at fault for the crash with the Defendant shouldering 80% of the blame. The Plaintiff had “a significant history of low back pain” and this pre-existing injury was aggravated by the collision. He was awarded damages for this aggravation.
Is the "Low Velocity Impact" Defence Unethical?
The Law Society of BC’s Winter Benchers’ Bulletin is now out and available here. As always there are many good tips and reminders to help keep out of ethical hot water.
Chapter 8, Rule 1(a) of the Handbook prohibits lawyers from instituting or prosecuting proceedings that, although legal in themselves, are clearly motivated by malice on the client’s part and are brought solely for the purpose of injuring another party. Rule 4.01(2)(a) is the counterpart to Rule 1(a) in the new BC Code. In addition, BC Code Rule 2.02(4) requires lawyers to encourage clients to compromise or settle a dispute on a reasonable basis.
2.02(4) A lawyer must advise and encourage a client to compromise or settle a dispute whenever it is possible to do so on a reasonable basis and must discourage the client from commencing or continuing useless legal proceedings.
This led me to think about the Low Velocity Impact defence used in response to personal injury lawsuits. I’ve discussed this many times. In short the LVI Defence is an argument that a Plaintiff suffered no injury due to the minor nature of vehicle damage following collision.
This defence has been rejected numerous times in British Columbia with Courts stating that it has “no scientific justification“, a defence that does not follow “logic or legal principle” and is a “myth“. Given these findings is it fair to conclude the LVI Defence leads to a “useless legal proceeding“? Is it unethical for counsel to run a trial based solely on the LVI defence? As always, feedback and comments are welcome.
In one of the more in-depth judicial discussions of examinations for discovery in the context of a personal injury claims, reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, addressing the scope of proper objections at a Plaintiff’s examination.
In today’s case (Nwachukwu v. Ferreira) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2006 collision. In the course of the lawsuit the Plaintiff attended three examinations for discovery. The Plaintiff’s lawyer raised numerous objections during these and the discoveries were ultimately cut short. The Defendant brought an application directing the Plaintiff to answer the questions which were objected to and further for permission to conduct a lengthier examination for discovery pursuant to Rule 7-2(2).
 The scope of examination for discovery has recently been canvassed by this court in Kendall v. Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada, 2010 BCSC 1556; More Marine Ltd. v. Shearwater Marine Ltd., 2011 BCSC 166; and Day v. Hume, 2009 BCSC 587. In those cases, the court reiterated the following principles: the language of Rule 7-2(18) is identical to the former Rule 27(22) and the scope of examination for discovery has remained unchanged and is very broad. Rigid limitations rigidly applied can destroy the right to a proper examination for discovery. Useful or effective cross-examination would be impossible if counsel could only ask such questions as plainly revealed their purpose. An examination for discovery is in the nature of cross-examination. Counsel for the party being examined should not interfere except where it is clearly necessary to resolve ambiguity in a question or to prevent injustice.
 The time limit established by Rule 7-2(2) creates a greater obligation on counsel for the party being examined to avoid unduly objecting or interfering in a way that wastes the time available. A largely hands-off approach to examinations for discovery, except in the clearest of circumstances, is in accord with the object of the Rules of Court, particularly the newly stated object of proportionality. Allowing wide-ranging cross-examination on examination for discovery is far more cost effective than a practice that encourages objections which will undoubtedly result in subsequent chambers applications to require judges or masters to rule on the objections. It is far more efficient for counsel for the examinee to raise objections to the admissibility of evidence at trial rather than on examination for discovery. Where intervention is appropriate, the proper conduct of counsel is to state the objection to the form of a question and the reasons for the objection, but it is not appropriate to make comments, suggestions or criticism.
 Many of the specific objections in issue are addressed in an article by John Shields and Howard Shapray published in The Advocate, Vol. 68, pt. 5 (September 2010) at page 671, referred to by Mr. Markham-Zantvoort in argument.
 Counsel objects to many questions on the grounds that they are not relevant. In addressing these objections, I proceed from the proposition that counsel should have broad discretion to frame appropriate questions for the examination of the plaintiff, respecting the principles described in the cases to which I have referred.
If a question is difficult to answer, the witness can say so and can be cross-examined about the difficulty. It is for the witness, not counsel, to deal with that. Difficulty in answering does not exclude a whole area. It excludes specific questions. No area of fact is closed on the ground that to enter it would “open the floodgates”.
It is trite law that an examination for discovery is in the nature of a cross-examination. While there will be situations in which repeating the same allowable question over and over on cross-examination may amount to intimidation, the Court must be slow to interfere where that tactic is used relatively sparingly and particularly in circumstances in which there are good grounds for the cross-examiner’s belief the witness may be falsifying his evidence.
The objection is that no foundation was laid for the questions. That suggestion does not appear to have been made at the time and I think that, if one objects, one should say why. Presuming that this objection can now be made, I merely say that I know of no requirement that a foundation be laid. None was cited to us. Those questions should have been answered by the witness without interruption by counsel.
 Counsel routinely objected to questions that he considered to be compounded questions. Shields and Shapray say, properly in my view, that objection to the form of question should be used sparingly.
 Counsel objected, at the most recent examination, when the plaintiff was asked what he alleges or says in relation to the claim. The plaintiff cannot be asked what counsel told him about his claim or how the case will be framed at trial. He may not be asked how much he will say he has lost, if the answer requires disclosure of an opinion obtained by the solicitor. Question 1152 on the examination for discovery seems to seek such information.
 The witness cannot be asked to disclose how the facts having assembled, weighed or analysed by counsel. That is what was offensive in the general requests considered by the court inTriathlon Ltd. v. Kirkpatrick, 2006 BCSC 890. The questions asked in that case were held to offend the description of the privilege afforded to the solicitor’s brief in Hodgkinson v. Simms(1988), 33 B.C.L.R. (2d) 129 (C.A.). It was the manner of getting at the work product by asking what facts had been assembled by counsel or what facts would be relied upon, rather than by asking about specific facts, that was objectionable. The manner in which facts have been marshalled is a question going to trial strategy. It is for that reason that I expect that counsel have included in the book of authorities Blue Line Hockey Acquisition Co., Inc. v. Orca Bay Hockey Limited Partnership, 2007 BCSC 143, although no express reference was made to it in oral submissions. In that case, questions were held to be objectionable because of what was being sought: conclusions reached by counsel, rather than the evidence of the witness.
 Questions that intrude upon privilege are generally objectionable. That is expressly reflected in Rule 7-2(18). Care should be taken to protect the solicitor/client relationship.

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