Source: https://www.jbwpc.com/Articles/Zoning-and-Land-Use-General/KEY-ISSUES-IN-MAKING-ZONING-LAND-USE-DECISIONS.shtml
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 02:05:45+00:00

Document:
Zoning is a quasi-legislative matter but it is subject to constitutional prohibition against taking private property without just compensation. U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 14; Const. art. 1, § 1, par. 3.
Zoning classification may only be justified if it bears a substantial relation to public health, safety, morality or general welfare; lacking such justification, the zoning may be set aside as arbitrary or unreasonable. U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 14; Const. art. 1, § 1, par. 3.
If zoning regulation results in relatively little gain or benefit to public while inflicting serious injury or loss on owner, such regulation is confiscatory and void; for such unlawful confiscation to occur it is not necessary that the property be totally useless for the purposes classified, it suffices if the damage to the owner is significant and not justified by the benefit to the public. U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 14; Const. art. 1, § 1, par. 3.
The gathering of a quorum of the members of a governing body of an agency at social, ceremonial, civic, or religious events so long as no official business, policy, or public matter is formulated, presented, discussed, or voted upon by the quorum.
This subparagraph's exclusions from the definition of the term meeting shall not apply if it is shown that the primary purpose of the gathering or gatherings is to evade or avoid the requirements for conducting a meeting while discussing or conducting official business.
Set for a time, place, and date of the regular meeting of the agency pursuant to notice posted at least one week in advance and maintained in a conspicuous place available to the public at the regular meeting place of the agency, as well as the agency's website, if any.
Minutes shall be promptly recorded not later than immediately following the next regular meeting of the agency.
Minutes shall include names of the members present, a description of each motion or proposal, identity of the person making and seconding the motion or other proposal, and a record of all votes.
Every county, municipality, commission, agency, board, department or authority of each county or municipality.
What meetings are required to be opened?
A gathering of a quorum of the members of the governing body or any committee at which official business, policy, or public matter of the governing body or agency is formulated, presented, discussed, or voted upon.
Pursuant to written notice at least 24 hours at the place of regular meetings and notice at least 24 hours to the legal newspaper if the meeting is not held at a time or place for regular meetings of the agency.
Within two business days of the adjournment of an open meeting, a summary of the subjects acted on and the members present at the meeting is required to be available for public inspection.
The county commissioner, a sole commissioner in Pickens County, sent a letter to a developer notifying him that a proposed subdivision had to comply with new zoning ordinances requiring minimum lot sizes of one acre for subdivisions among other provisions. That letter constituted a zoning decision by the sole commissioner, and the developer's failure to file an appeal within 30 days of that letter was not timely and was thus dismissed.
A county building inspector is entitled to official immunity from suit in its individual capacity if his inspection of a residence is a discretionary act rather than a ministerial act. Qualified immunity affords protection to inspectors for discretionary actions taken within the scope of their official authority. A ministerial act is commonly one that is simple, absolute, definite, and arising under conditions admitted or proved to exist and requiring the execution of a specific duty. A discretionary act, on the other hand, calls for the exercise of personal deliberation and judgment. Evidence showed that the building inspector was granted discretion in determining how he went about conducting the inspection, the methodology he employed, and the number of inspections that he made as well as requirements he placed on contractors afterwards. Therefore, the inspection of the residence was a discretionary act, and the building inspector was entitled to qualified immunity from suit by the building owner.
gutter work was sufficient to find fraud and corruption in commissioners' vote to approve zoning for the applicant.
The issue before the court is whether a commissioner ". . .had a direct or indirect financial interest in the outcome of the zoning vote—an interest which was not shared by the public generally, and which was more than remote or speculative." A judicial inquiry into the circumstances of the conflict of interest of the commissioner is proper even thought the bias of the commissioner was not raised in the zoning hearing before the board of commissioners.
A county commissioner had a conflict of interest when he voted to purchase a tract of land for use by the county as a landfill. Three tracts were under consideration by the county for the landfill. The two tracts rejected by the county were in close proximity to a tract of land co-owned by the commissioner which he intended to develop as a subdivision. The commissioner admitted in testimony that the proximity of the two rejected tracts would affect the value of his land and his ability to sell lots in the subdivision. The Supreme Court found that the effect on the commissioner's pecuniary interest was direct and immediate. Because of this conflict of interest, the court voided the vote by the county to purchase the third tract under consideration for its landfill.
The chair of the city planning commission who was also an officer of the corporation applying for rezoning may have tainted the proceedings although he only presided at the planning commission hearing on the application, but did not vote.
The ordinance provisions which restrict signs in residential zoning districts to on-premise signs and certain temporary or special signs, such as political signs, are likewise unconstitutional. The court reasoned that the ordinance prohibits vital expression through the unique medium of residential signs without providing a viable alternative.
Tinsley Media, LLC v. Pickens County, Georgia, United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit, decided October 12, 2006.
The First Amendment and the Free Speech Amendment permit a local government to prohibit sign messages promoting unlawful activity or messages that are misleading. But any other restriction of otherwise protected speech is valid only if it "…seeks to implement a substantial government interest, …directly advances that interest, [and] reaches no further than necessary to accomplish the given objective."
a decision is a denial of free speech. Fifteen to thirty days is usually adequate for a decision to be made, and your ordinance should state a specific time within which an applicant may expect a decision.
In 2010 the Georgia General Assembly amended the Official Code of Georgia to add § 8-2-170 and § 8-2-171. The amendment is effective on and after September 1, 2010 and applies to the right to install and occupy a pre-owned manufactured home. It prohibits any county or city from imposing health and safety standards or conditions based on the age of the manufactured home. It does provide for the establishment of health and safety standards and authorizes an inspection program for pre-owned manufactured homes when relocated from their current locations. It also absolves any inspector of pre-owned manufactured homes from any liability resulting from defects or conditions in the pre-owned manufactured homes.
The Following Chapter was Adopted by the 2010 Georgia General Assembly, O.C.G.A. § 36-66b-1 et seq., and is Known as the "Advanced Broadband Collocation Act."
The intent of this legislation is to limit a local government's review and evaluation of an application to either modify or collocate wireless support structures located within its jurisdiction. Modification of a wireless support structure means improvement, upgrade, expansion, or replacement of an existing wireless facility that does not increase the height of the structure or the dimensions of the equipment compound. Collocation, as used in the act, means the placement or installation of new wireless facilities on previously approved wireless support structures that negates the need to construct a new freestanding wireless support structure.
If an applicant applies to a local government for modification or collocation of a preexisting wireless support structure, the act limits the review and evaluation of the local government to conformance with an applicable site plan, building permit requirements, zoning, and land use conformity. But an application may not be subject to additional zoning, land use, or special use permit approvals beyond the initial zoning, land use, or special permit approval issued for the existing wireless support structure. Its intent is to require that previously approved wireless support structures may be modified or accept collocations without additional zoning or land use review beyond that required by the local government for issuance of building or electrical permits.
This streamlined process required by this act applies when the proposed collocation does not increase the height or width of the wireless support structure, or dimensions of the equipment, or exceed the weight limits for the wireless support structure. Any proposed collocation must comply with applicable conditions of approval applied to the initial approval of the wireless support structure.
The act also requires a local government to make its final decision to approve or disapprove the application within 90 days of the filing of the application for modification or collocation. If the application in incomplete, an applicant must be notified within 30 days of filing the incomplete application. The 90 days within which the local government must make its decision is tolled until the application is complete.
In 2010, the Georgia General Assembly adopted amendments to the Industrialized Building Code in which it identified a "residential industrialized building" as any dwelling unit designed and constructed in compliance with the minimum one- and two-family dwelling code made, fabricated or assembled in a manufacturing assembly which cannot be inspected at the installation site without disassembly or damage to the structure. It does not include a manufactured home. The act provides that all industrialized buildings and residential industrialized buildings bearing the insignia of approval issued by the commissioner of community affairs are deemed to comply with minimum standard codes and all ordinances and regulations enacted by any local government. It specifically prohibits any local government from excluding residential industrialized buildings from any residential district solely because the building is a residential industrialized building. But it reserves to the local government the right to restrict by land use and zoning laws such things as building setback, yard requirements, subdivision regulations, and architectural and aesthetic requirements.
Local governments may draw a distinction in their zoning ordinances between manufactured homes (HUD homes) and modular homes (DCA homes). As was the case in City of Bainbridge, a zoning ordinance may exclude manufactured homes in a zoning district, but permit modular homes in the same district.
The City of Bainbridge's zoning ordinance excluded manufactured homes from all zoning districts, except manufactured home parks and subdivisions. Since this zoning ordinance was approved by the court, local governments may also adopt the same restrictions or similar variations with reasonable assurance that they will be upheld if challenged in court.
In King v. City of Bainbridge, 276 Ga. 484, 577 S.E.2d 772 (2003), King, a resident of the city, was sued for placing her manufactured home in the R-2 zoning district from which such homes were excluded under the zoning ordinance. In her defense of the action against her, she challenged the zoning ordinance in a two-pronged attack. One was under the National Manufactured Housing and Safety Standards Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5401-5426. King contended that the fact that manufactured homes were excluded from the R-2 district, while modular homes (Department of Community Affairs homes) were permitted, evinced a regulatory scheme in violation of the national act. In her second attack, King asserted that the exclusion of manufactured homes from the R-2 district exceeded the police power of the city; thus the ordinance according to her challenge was unconstitutional.
The purpose for excluding manufactured homes is still important, however. Without a purpose, a restriction in a zoning ordinance is arbitrary and unreasonable, and thus unconstitutional. In City of Bainbridge, the court found the zoning ordinance valid and constitutional because the restrictions were designed to regulate the quality of housing and advance general safety concerns. Other reasons may also be used and many of those are enumerated in this decision. The Supreme Court specifically noted Courts routinely uphold zoning ordinances broadly restricting mobile home placement. A wide variety of rationales have been found sufficient to justify these ordinances: preserving land for low density, single-family dwellings, protection of property values, guarding against increased crime, guarding against traffic congestion, maintaining aesthetics, regulating population density, preventing waste and sewage problems, regulating quality of housing stock, and concerns about wind vulnerability. Hence, those reasons all appear to be legitimate. The reasons don't have to be stated in the zoning ordinance, but it is a better practice to develop acceptable reasons when preparing the record prior to adopting a zoning ordinance. The best place to put the basis for manufactured home restrictions is in the comprehensive land use plan.
Placement of manufactured homes is now largely up to the discretion of the local government. A careful and reasoned approach to restrictions on manufactured homes best serves the community, as manufactured homes should be permitted in every community.
The plaintiff property owners placed a mobile home on their property where the parents of one of the property owners resided until their deaths in 1994 and 1995. In 2006, one of the property owners decided to replace the mobile home, which was a 660-square foot mobile home, with a 1980-square foot manufactured home. The property was located in an R-1 single-family residential zoning district which did not permit mobile homes or manufactured homes. The city clerk nonetheless issued a permit for a "manufactured/modular/home" which the property owner purchased and placed on the property in 2006.
The property owners contended they had a right to replace the former mobile home with the new manufactured home. The court, however, disagreed as the ordinance permits all residences that have been determined to be nonconforming to "make needed routine improvements to include replacement." The ordinance further provided that a nonconforming use may not be expanded or extended. The court found that the mobile home was a nonconforming use and the placement of the new 1,980-square foot home was not a replacement authorized by the ordinance.
The property owner also alleged that the city was estopped from requiring the removal of the manufactured home since the city clerk had issued a permit. But the court found that the clerk's act of issuing the permit was unauthorized as she did not have the authority to waive any of the conditions of zoning, and therefore, the city was not estopped from enforcing the zoning ordinance despite the issuance of the permit.
ZONING means the power of local governments to provide within their respective territorial boundaries for the zoning or districting of property for various uses and the prohibition of other or different uses within such zones or districts and for the regulation of development and the improvement of real estate within such zones or districts in accordance with the uses of property for which such zones or districts were established.
ZONING ORDINANCE means an ordinance or resolution of a local government establishing procedures and zones or districts within its respective territorial boundaries which regulate the uses and development standards of property within such zones or districts. The term also includes the zoning map adopted in conjunction with a zoning ordinance which shows the zones and districts and zoning classifications of property therein.
The grant of a permit relating to a special use of property.
Notice published in a newspaper of general circulation within the territorial limits of the jurisdiction at least 15 days, but not more than 45 days prior to the hearings.
Local governments shall adopt policies and procedures which govern calling and conducting hearings required by Code Section 36-66-4, and printed copies of such policies and procedures shall be available for distribution to the general public.
A local government is required to give equal time to both proponents and opponents of the zoning application. In addition, the written procedures must state that each side shall have no less than 10 minutes.
PUBLIC HEARING ON PUBLIC HEARING PROCEDURES: The policies and procedures which govern calling and conducting a public hearing may be included in and adopted as part of the zoning ordinance. But prior to adoption of any zoning ordinance, a local government is required to conduct a public hearing on the policies and procedures for conducting public hearings.
Notices of a public hearing for adopting policies and procedures shall be the same as for adoption of a zoning ordinance.
In addition to policies and procedures required by subsection (a) of this Code section, each local government shall adopt standards governing the exercise of the zoning power, and such standards may include any factors which the local government finds relevant in balancing the interest in promoting the public health, safety, morality, or general welfare against the right to the unrestricted use of property. Such standards shall be printed and copies thereof shall be available for distribution to the general public.
Standards to be adopted by a local government may be included in and adopted as part of the zoning ordinance. But before its adoption, a local government is required to conduct a public hearing on the proposed standards. Notices relating to public hearings for adoption of zoning standards shall be advertised and conducted in the same manner as public hearings for adoption of a zoning ordinance.
be considered by the hearing board. A copy should be available for all attendees.
On appeal to the Superior Court, new evidence may be presented to the Superior Court, even though not presented to the local government.
Provide the same file to the applicant as is provided to each board member. Make sure each board member has a copy of the file prior to the hearing. Make the file available to the parties interested upon request.
Notice of the hearing must be published in a newspaper of general circulation within the territorial limits of the jurisdiction at least 15 days, but not more than 45 days prior to the hearings. (O.C.G.A. §§ 36-66-4(a); 1-3-1(d)(3)).
While the statute only requires publication in a newspaper of general circulation, it is suggested that the ad should appear in the newspaper in which the county's legal advertisements customarily appear.
Policies and procedures which will govern the calling and conducting of zoning hearings. (O.C.G.A. § 36-66-5).
Following the hearing, the governing authority should officially adopt the policies and procedures.
If the final adoption (read "official adoption") of the policies and procedures takes place at a subsequent meeting of the governing authority, it is recommended that the date, place and time of the final adoption be included in the published notice.
At a minimum, the policies and procedures must provide equal time for proponents and opponents to make presentations, with a minimum of ten minutes per side. (O.C.G.A. § 36-66- 5(a)).
Standards governing the exercise of the zoning power. (O.C.G.A. § 36-66-5(b)).
The standards must be in writing and copies available to the public.
The proposed zoning ordinance and official zoning map or maps.
The official zoning map or maps to be adopted must be physically present at each hearing. The same is true for the text of the ordinance, the standards, and the policies and procedures.
The map should have a title that is referenced in the text of the zoning ordinance.
Subsequent to the hearing, an original of the map should be maintained in a location specified in the text of the ordinance.
Written copies of the policies and procedures and the standards governing zoning decisions must be copied, and made available to the public. (O.C.G.A. § 36-66-5).
Until recently, adoption of the zoning ordinance required a three step process: First, the policies and procedures had to be adopted; Second, the standards had to be adopted; and Third, the ordinance itself was adopted. Now they can all be adopted at the same time and can all be incorporated as part of the ordinance.
While the statute does not specify the number of times a matter must be considered before final action is taken, it is recommended that if local legislation provides for a specified manner official action must be conducted, that those requirements also be followed.
While the statute does not explicitly refer to the Comprehensive Long Range Planning Map, it is recommended that the same procedure be followed prior to the official adoption of the future land use map. This is particularly pertinent if a rezoning request under the ordinance must comply with the future land use map.
Attached as exhibits are samples of advertisements, policies and procedures and standards governing zoning decisions.
All persons who wish to address the Commission at a hearing concerning a proposed zoning decision under consideration by the Commission shall first sign up on a form to be provided by the [local government] prior to the commencement of the Hearing.
The Zoning Administrator will read the proposed zoning decision under consideration and the departmental reviews pertaining thereto prior to receiving public input on said proposed zoning decision. Proposed zoning decisions shall be called in the order in which they were filed.
The Zoning Administrator shall then call each person who has signed up to speak on the zoning decision in the order in which the persons have signed up to speak, except the applicant who will always speak first. Prior to speaking, the speaker will identify himself or herself and state his or her current address. Only those persons who signed up to speak prior to the commencement of the hearing shall be entitled to speak, unless the Commission, in its discretion, allows the persons to speak to the zoning decision, notwithstanding the failure of the person to sign up prior to the hearing.
Each speaker shall be allowed ten (10) minutes to address the Commission concerning the zoning decision then under consideration, unless the Commission, prior to or at the time of the reading of the proposed zoning decision, allows additional time in which to address the Commission on said proposed zoning decision. The speaker may initially use all of the time allotted to him to speak or he may speak and reserve a portion of his allotted time for rebuttal. A member of the Commission's staff shall be designated as the time keeper to record the time expended by each speaker.
Each speaker shall speak only to the merits of the proposed zoning decision under consideration and shall address his remarks only to the Commission. Each speaker shall refrain from personal attacks on any other speaker or the discussion of facts or opinions irrelevant to the proposed zoning decision under consideration. The Commission may limit or refuse a speaker the right to continue, if the speaker, after first being cautioned, continues to violate this subsection.
Nothing contained herein shall be construed as prohibiting the Commission from conducting the hearing in an orderly and decorous manner to assure that the public hearing on a proposed zoning decision is conducted in a fair and orderly manner.
Café Risqué/We Bare All Exit 10, Inc. v. Camden County, 273 Ga.451, 542 S.E.2d 108 (2001).
"The rule in Georgia is that where a landowner makes a substantial change in position by expenditures in reliance upon the probability of the issuance of a building permit, based upon an existing zoning ordinance and the assurances of zoning officials, he acquires rights and is entitled to have the permit issued despite a change in the zoning ordinance which would otherwise preclude the issuance of a permit." The expenditure of $600.00 was not substantial and thus did not accord the developer of a proposed multi-family building a vested right.

References: art. 1
 § 1
 art. 1
 § 1
 art. 1
 § 1
 v. 
 § 8
 § 8
 § 36
 v. 
 § 36
 § 36
 § 36
 § 36
 v.