Source: https://www.tdcaa.com/case-summaries/april-19-2013/
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 20:09:51+00:00

Document:
Does the inevitable dissipation of alcohol in blood alone constitute an automatic exigency to support a non-consensual, warrantless blood test during a DWI investigation?
No, but—depending on the “totality of the circumstances” in a particular case—an exigency may develop. Otherwise, a warrant is required.
The totality of the circumstances test is fine in general, but drunk-driving cases are a discrete class, and the court should provide more guidance.
This decision profoundly affects statutory blood draws in Texas. Expect motions to suppress in pending intoxication manslaughter and intoxication assault cases if you have blood draws performed pursuant to the statute rather than a warrant.
Is the applicant entitled to mandamus relief because the district clerk unilaterally assessed $7,945 in reimbursement fees for court-appointed counsel nine years after judgment was entered in the applicant’s forgery of a check case?
Yes. Although the petition was submitted under CCP art. 11.07, the court looked to the substance of the application and found mandamus relief appropriate. There is no other remedy available because time for direct appeal has passed, the clerk’s bill of costs is not an appealable order, and the claim is not a cognizable issue for habeas purposes. The applicant was clearly entitled to relief because the trial court made no finding under CCP art. 26.05(g) that the applicant must reimburse the State for the cost of his appointed attorney.
I expect to see more opinions like this as more counties try to cure their budgetary woes by increased cost collections from criminal defendants.
Did the defendant forfeit appellate review of his restitution claims because he failed to object in the trial court?
No. The defendant had no opportunity to object because the oral pronouncement of the court did not include restitution, but the written judgment entered one day later did. He could not have known at the sentencing hearing that the written judgment would differ, and his motion for new trial filed on the same day as the oral pronouncement was denied.
The defendant could have asked the trial court to rescind the order denying the motion for new trial and filed an amended motion for new trial.
The best practice is for the court to determine sentence, fine, restitution, and stacking and assess everything in one proceeding. Anything else opens up a number of issues best avoided.
Did the defendant’s conviction for fraudulent use or possession of identifying information under Penal Code §32.51 violate the doctrine of in pari materia because it conflicts with the statute defining the offense of failure to identify, Penal Code §38.02?
No. PC §32.51 is meant to prevent ID theft and is a property-centered offense. PC §38.02 is meant to ensure officers receive accurate information and prevent the obstruction of governmental operations. Each offense contains elements the other does not, and the Legislature explicitly stated its intent to allow prosecution under either statute when both apply.
This case is particularly useful because the court blessed the Legislature’s language designed to kill in pari materia claims—“[i]f conduct that constitutes an offense under this section also constitutes an offense under any other law, the actor may be prosecuted under this section, the other law, or both.” This phrase has been used in a number of different places in the Penal Code.
Does CCP art. 38.072’s hearsay exception for outcry witness testimony also allow for the admission of the child-complainant’s videotaped statement to the outcry witness?
No. Extra-statutory factors, including the legislative history of CCP art. 38.072 and the existence of a specific statute governing the admissibility of recorded pre-trial statements in CCP art. 38.071, indicate that the outcry statute contemplates a witness’s live testimony subject to confrontation and cross-examination.
The statute does not clearly contemplate that a sponsoring outcry witness must offer the outcry statement through testimony, and it makes no sense to say that a less reliable method of relating the statement (oral testimony) is admissible while a more reliable method (video recording) is not.
The Legislature could solve this problem by making the videotaped statement admissible, which has been done in other states.
Did the trial court properly grant the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence based on the fact that officers, who observed the defendant’s malnourished dogs from the street, entered the curtilage of the home where the dogs were kept without a warrant and without consent?
Yes. The defendant had standing to challenge the search and seizure of the dogs because he at one time lived in the home where his dogs were kept, and he had been given permission from the owner, his aunt, to enter the property daily to care for the dogs. The seizure was not justified under the plain view doctrine because the officers were not lawfully in the yard at the time of the seizure; no exigent circumstance or other exceptions to the warrant requirement allowed for warrantless entry into the yard.
The search, rather than the seizure, is at issue in this case. The defendant had standing because the property seized was his. Whether he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the curtilage of the home is not dispositive.
Another search case turning on something that happened within the curtilage. This case is also useful to point out the limits of the plain view doctrine.
Did the appellate court have jurisdiction to review the trial court’s order granting the defendant’s motion to quash when the portions of the indictment quashed pertained only to an enhancement allegation, rather than the elements of the offense?
Yes. The plain language of CCP art. 44.01(a)(1) allows the State to appeal any order dismissing a portion of an indictment, even when that portion is the punishment-enhancement paragraph.
Did the defendant show that the bigamy enhancement elevating punishment for sexual assault in Penal Code §22.011(f) is facially unconstitutional?
No. Although his motion to quash properly presented a facial challenge because it alleged PC §22.011(f) creates a class of individuals—those who are married—who would potentially receive a punishment greater than the statute contemplates, he did not prove the statute operates unconstitutionally in all its applications.
Be careful with this opinion—it does not give prosecutors carte blanche to use the particular enhancement in question.
In reviewing the trial court’s granting of the defendant’s motion to suppress, did the court of appeals improperly substitute its own findings of fact for those of the trial court?
Interesting. The officer did not see what would otherwise be a lawful basis for a stop, but it was captured by his in-car video. The officer (or officers working with him) must know the basis for a stop when he makes the stop.
Did the trial court adequately admonish the defendant before accepting his waiver of the right to counsel?
Yes, the trial court’s 12 admonishments adequately covered the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so the defendant’s waiver was knowing and voluntary.
Nothing new about the law, but the admonishments should be helpful to practitioners because they are quite comprehensive.

References: art. 11
 art. 26
 §32
 §38
 §32
 §38
 art. 38
 art. 38
 art. 38
 art. 44
 §22
 §22