Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&amp;view=article&amp;id=50621:gr-153567-2008&amp;catid=1502&amp;Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 13:06:19+00:00

Document:
LIBRADA M. AQUINO, Petitioner, v. ERNEST S. AURE1, Respondent.
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari2 under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court filed by petitioner Librada M. Aquino (Aquino), seeking the reversal and the setting aside of the Decision3 dated 17 October 2001 and the Resolution4 dated 8 May 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 63733. The appellate court, in its assailed Decision and Resolution, reversed the Decision5 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 88, affirming the Decision6 of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City, Branch 32, which dismissed respondent Ernesto Aure's (Aure) complaint for ejectment on the ground, inter alia, of failure to comply with barangay conciliation proceedings.
In her Answer,10 Aquino countered that the Complaint in Civil Case No. 17450 lacks cause of action for Aure and Aure Lending do not have any legal right over the subject property. Aquino admitted that there was a sale but such was governed by the Memorandum of Agreement11 (MOA) signed by Aure. As stated in the MOA, Aure shall secure a loan from a bank or financial institution in his own name using the subject property as collateral and turn over the proceeds thereof to the spouses Aquino. However, even after Aure successfully secured a loan, the spouses Aquino did not receive the proceeds thereon or benefited therefrom.
Aure's Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the RTC in an Order14 dated 27 February 2001.
In a Resolution dated 8 May 2002, the Court of Appeals denied the Motion for Reconsideration interposed by Aquino for it was merely a rehash of the arguments set forth in her previous pleadings which were already considered and passed upon by the appellate court in its assailed Decision.
WHETHER OR NOT NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE BARANGAY CONCILIATION PROCEEDINGS IS A JURISDICTIONAL DEFECT THAT WARRANTS THE DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT.
WHETHER OR NOT ALLEGATION OF OWNERSHIP OUSTS THE MeTC OF ITS JURISDICTION OVER AN EJECTMENT CASE.
Presidential Decree No. 1508 is now incorporated in Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as The Local Government Code, which took effect on 1 January 1992.
SEC. 412. Conciliation. - (a) Pre-condition to filing of complaint in court. - No complaint, petition, action, or proceeding involving any matter within the authority of the lupon shall be filed or instituted directly in court or any other government office for adjudication, unless there has been a confrontation between the parties before the lupon chairman or the pangkat, and that no conciliation or settlement has been reached as certified by the lupon secretary or pangkat secretary as attested to by the lupon chairman or pangkat chairman or unless the settlement has been repudiated by the parties thereto.
There is no dispute herein that the present case was never referred to the Barangay Lupon for conciliation before Aure and Aure Lending instituted Civil Case No. 17450. In fact, no allegation of such barangay conciliation proceedings was made in Aure and Aure Lending's Complaint before the MeTC. The only issue to be resolved is whether non-recourse to the barangay conciliation process is a jurisdictional flaw that warrants the dismissal of the ejectment suit filed with the MeTC.
Aquino posits that failure to resort to barangay conciliation makes the action for ejectment premature and, hence, dismissible. She likewise avers that this objection was timely raised during the pre-trial and even subsequently in her Position Paper submitted to the MeTC.
Ordinarily, non-compliance with the condition precedent prescribed by P.D. 1508 could affect the sufficiency of the plaintiff's cause of action and make his complaint vulnerable to dismissal on ground of lack of cause of action or prematurity; but the same would not prevent a court of competent jurisdiction from exercising its power of adjudication over the case before it, where the defendants, as in this case, failed to object to such exercise of jurisdiction in their answer and even during the entire proceedings a quo.
In the case at bar, we similarly find that Aquino cannot be allowed to attack the jurisdiction of the MeTC over Civil Case No. 17450 after having submitted herself voluntarily thereto. We have scrupulously examined Aquino's Answer before the MeTC in Civil Case No. 17450 and there is utter lack of any objection on her part to any deficiency in the complaint which could oust the MeTC of its jurisdcition.
By Aquino's failure to seasonably object to the deficiency in the Complaint, she is deemed to have already acquiesced or waived any defect attendant thereto. Consequently, Aquino cannot thereafter move for the dismissal of the ejectment suit for Aure and Aure Lending's failure to resort to the barangay conciliation process, since she is already precluded from doing so. The fact that Aquino raised such objection during the pre-trial and in her Position Paper is of no moment, for the issue of non-recourse to barangay mediation proceedings should be impleaded in her Answer.
Sec. 8. Omnibus Motion. - Subject to the provisions of Section 1 of Rule 9, a motion attacking a pleading, order, judgment, or proceeding shall include all objections then available, and all objections not so included shall be deemed waived.
The spirit that surrounds the foregoing statutory norm is to require the party filing a pleading or motion to raise all available exceptions for relief during the single opportunity so that single or multiple objections may be avoided.26 It is clear and categorical in Section 1, Rule 9 of the Revised Rules of Court that failure to raise defenses and objections in a motion to dismiss or in an answer is deemed a waiver thereof; and basic is the rule in statutory construction that when the law is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for construction or interpretation.27 As has been our consistent ruling, where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no occasion for interpretation; there is only room for application.28 Thus, although Aquino's defense of non-compliance with Presidential Decree No. 1508 is meritorious, procedurally, such defense is no longer available for failure to plead the same in the Answer as required by the omnibus motion rule.
Neither could the MeTC dismiss Civil Case No. 17450 motu proprio. The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provide only three instances when the court may motu proprio dismiss the claim, and that is when the pleadings or evidence on the record show that (1) the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter; (2) there is another cause of action pending between the same parties for the same cause; or (3) where the action is barred by a prior judgment or by a statute of limitations. Thus, it is clear that a court may not motu proprio dismiss a case on the ground of failure to comply with the requirement for barangay conciliation, this ground not being among those mentioned for the dismissal by the trial court of a case on its own initiative.
Aquino further argues that the issue of possession in the instant case cannot be resolved by the MeTC without first adjudicating the question of ownership, since the Deed of Sale vesting Aure with the legal right over the subject property is simulated.
Again, we do not agree. Jurisdiction in ejectment cases is determined by the allegations pleaded in the complaint. As long as these allegations demonstrate a cause of action either for forcible entry or for unlawful detainer, the court acquires jurisdiction over the subject matter. This principle holds, even if the facts proved during the trial do not support the cause of action thus alleged, in which instance the court - - after acquiring jurisdiction - - may resolve to dismiss the action for insufficiency of evidence.
SECTION 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. - Subject to the provisions of the next succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person may at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession, together with damages and costs.
As the law on forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases now stands, even where the defendant raises the question of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts nevertheless have the undoubted competence to resolve the issue of ownership albeit only to determine the issue of possession.
x x x. The law, as revised, now provides instead that when the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession. On its face, the new Rule on Summary Procedure was extended to include within the jurisdiction of the inferior courts ejectment cases which likewise involve the issue of ownership. This does not mean, however, that blanket authority to adjudicate the issue of ownership in ejectment suits has been thus conferred on the inferior courts.
Thus, an adjudication made therein regarding the issue of ownership should be regarded as merely provisional and, therefore, would not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the land. The foregoing doctrine is a necessary consequence of the nature of forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases where the only issue to be settled is the physical or material possession over the real property, that is, possession de facto and not possession de jure."
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated 17 October 2001 and its Resolution dated 8 May 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 63733 are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
1 Substituted by his heirs: Agnes J. Aure, Ma. Cecilia Aure-Quinsay, Ma. Concepcion Criselda Aure-Barrion, Ma. Erna J. Aure, Ernest Michael J. Aure and Ma. Melissa J. Aure; rollo, p. 159.
3 Penned by Associate Justice Ramon Mabutas, Jr. with Associate Justices Roberto A. Barrios and Edgardo P. Cruz, concurring. Rollo, pp. 21-26.
17 People v. Caruncho, Jr., 212 Phil. 16, 27 (1984).
18 Galuba v. Laureta, G.R. No. 71091, 29 January 1988, 157 SCRA 627, 634.
4] Where the action may otherwise be barred by the Statute of Limitations.
20 Paragraph 2, Section 6, PD No. 1508.
21 Morata v. Go, 210 Phil. 367, 372 (1983).
22 Uy v. Contreras, G.R. No. 111416-17, 26 September 1994, 237 SCRA 167, 170.
23 Presco v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 82215, 10 December 1990, 192 SCRA 232, 240-241.
24 212 Phil. 432, 435-436 (1984).
26 Manacop v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104875, 13 November 1992, 215 SCRA 773, 778.
27 Twin Ace Holdings Corporation v. Rufina and Company, G.R. No. 160191, 8 June 2006, 490 SCRA 368, 376.
30 Tecson v. Gutierez, G.R. No. 152928, 4 March 2005, 452 SCRA 781, 786.
31 327 Phil. 982, 1001-1002 (1996).
32 329 Phil. 202, 208 (1996), as cited in Oronce v. Court of Appeals, 358 Phil. 616 (1998).

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