Source: http://ipbiz.blogspot.com/2017/07/
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 22:23:44+00:00

Document:
Hutchinson Technology Inc., 852 F.2d 552, 554 (Fed. Cir.
1988), we vacate and remand for reconsideration.
governing the PTAB’s obligation to explain itself).
Regeneron Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (“Regeneron”) appeals from a final judgment of the district court holding U.S. Patent No. 8,502,018 (“’018 patent”) unenforceable because of Regeneron’s inequitable conduct during prosecution. Regeneron also appeals the district court’s construction of several claim terms and determination of indefiniteness. Because we conclude that Regeneron engaged in inequitable conduct during prosecution of the ’018 patent, we affirm.
Antibodies are proteins that the body uses to counteract specific pathogens such as bacteria, viruses, and other foreign substances in the blood. Antibodies are typically represented by a “Y” shape consisting of four chains of amino acids: two longer “heavy” chains, and two shorter “light” chains. Each of the chains, in turn, consists of two regions: a “variable” region toward the top of the “Y,” and a “constant” region toward the bottom.
Mouse DNA coding for antibodies can be modified using human DNA in various different ways. For example, mouse DNA can be manipulated to create chimeric antibodies that have mouse variable region DNA and human constant region DNA. Similarly, mice can be used to create humanized antibodies that have some mouse variable region DNA, some human variable region DNA, and human constant region DNA.
Drs. Jones and Smeland together planned an in-person meeting with the Examiner during which they relied on the misleading presentation asserting that Regeneron had developed a commercial embodiment of the claimed mouse. That meeting occurred in March 2013. Following that meeting, in April 2013, the PTO issued a Notice of Allowance for the ’176 application.
Dr. Smeland knew of the third party submission as well as all four Withheld References during prosecution, yet withheld them from the ’018 patent’s examiner. Although Regeneron did not disclose the Withheld References during prosecution of the ’018 patent, once the ’018 patent had been allowed, Regeneron disclosed the Withheld References to the PTO in every related application having the same specification and similar claims. Merus contends that Regeneron’s failure to disclose the Withheld References constituted inequitable conduct. Regeneron responds that Dr. Smeland was under no obligation to disclose these references because they were not but-for material.
Direct evidence of intent is not, however, required. A court may infer intent from circumstantial evidence. Id. An inference of intent to deceive is appropriate where the applicant engages in “a pattern of lack of candor,” including where the applicant repeatedly makes factual representations “contrary to the true information he had in his possession.” Apotex Inc. v. UCB, Inc., 763 F.3d 1354, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
On appeal, Merus asserts that Drs. Smeland and Murphy violated their duty of candor and engaged in inequitable conduct. Regeneron does not contest that both of these individuals had a duty of candor to the PTO. Regeneron, however, argues that the duty was not violated because none of the Withheld References were but-for material and because the district court improperly concluded that the applicants possessed the necessary specific intent to deceive the PTO.
But Regeneron argues that under the broadest reasonable construction of claim 1, the non-variable (constant) region of the claimed mouse’s modified gene segments exclusively contains mouse genes. In other words, Regeneron argues that claim 1 is limited to a reverse chimeric mouse. Appellant’s Br. 32–35. Merus, on the other hand, argues that the constant region of the gene segments in the claimed mouse may contain mouse genes or human genes, and may, therefore, be reverse chimeric, humanized, or fully human. Appellee’s Br. 51.
But Regeneron points to no portion of the specification to support its argument. In context, it is clear that the endogenously produced antibodies may comprise a human constant region. The specification thus does not limit the claims to mice with human variable regions and mouse constant regions. Accordingly, we disagree with Regeneron and conclude that under the broadest reasonable construction, the district court correctly found that the claims are not limited to mice that solely comprise mouse constant region gene segments.
Under this broadest reasonable construction, the court next determines if the district court clearly erred in finding the Withheld References but-for material and not cumulative of prior art that the PTO considered during prosecution. We conclude that the district court properly found that the Withheld References were but-for material and were not cumulative.
The dissent argues that Wood is not material because it only teaches a “DNA fragment construct” but does not describe “any targeted insertion method described elsewhere in the prior art . . . .” Dissent at 17. As an initial matter, neither party argues this position and the district court did not make this factual finding. See 3M Co. v. Avery Dennison Corp., 673 F.3d 1372, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“[I]t is improper for us to determine factual issues in the first instance on appeal . . . finding those facts in the first instance would overstep our bounds as a reviewing court and we cannot resolve the parties’ factual disputes on appeal.”). Regardless, the dissent’s argument is unavailing because the claim at issue does not recite a particular method of inserting DNA into a mouse. The claim simply recites a genetically modified mouse that comprises “human unrearranged variable region gene segments inserted at an endogenous mouse immunoglobulin locus.” Wood teaches that “[t]he animals of this invention are designed by the integration into their germlines of DNA carrying unrearranged or only partially rearranged exogenous Ig gene segments.” J.A. 2127. Wood thus teaches the elements of the claim at issue and is butfor material.
As noted earlier, the district court never held a second trial to determine if Regeneron acted with the specific intent to deceive the PTO during prosecution. Instead, the court sanctioned Regeneron for its litigation misconduct by drawing an adverse inference of specific intent. Contrary to Regeneron’s arguments, we determine that the district court did not abuse its discretion by sanctioning Regeneron in this manner.
Regeneron’s behavior in district court was beset with troubling misconduct. In its November 2015 opinion, the district court extensively detailed Regeneron’s litigation misconduct and exercised its discretion to sanction Regeneron. See Regeneron I, 144 F. Supp. 3d at 585–96. On appeal, Regeneron argues that the district court abused its discretion by sanctioning Regeneron, but does not meaningfully dispute any of the factual findings underlying the district court’s decision. Accordingly, we largely repeat, and adopt, the district court’s factual findings regarding Regeneron’s litigation misconduct below.
The only issue decided by the panel majority is the district court's ruling of inequitable conduct during patent prosecution.1 I respectfully dissent, for my colleagues apply incorrect law and add confusion to precedent.
"Inequitable conduct" arises when material references were intentionally withheld by the patent applicant in order to deceive or mislead the examiner into granting the patent. Both materiality and intent must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1287 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Intent to deceive cannot be inferred; yet here, the district court inferred intent to deceive during prosecution and invalidated the patent, as a sanction for purported attorney misconduct during this litigation.
The district court found that certain uncited references were "but-for material" to patentability—although the court did not find the '018 patent claims invalid on the substantive content of these references. The district court then declined to decide the question of specific intent to deceive the patent examiner. Instead, the court cancelled the scheduled trial on the question of intent, adopted an "inference" of intent, and held the '018 patent unenforceable on grounds of inequitable conduct as a sanction for Regeneron's "litigation misconduct" relating to discovery and the privilege log during this litigation.
The panel majority acknowledges that "the district court never held a second trial to determine if Regeneron acted with the specific intent to deceive the PTO during prosecution." Maj. Op. at 21. This absence of trial and trial findings on this critical issue cannot be substituted by inference.
Nor is the appellate role to scour the Appendix to fill the gap and make our own appellate finding of "intent to deceive." Here, no evidentiary record was developed on intent to deceive, with no testimony and no opportunity for examination and cross-examination of witnesses. The panel majority instead engages in innuendo based on its careful selections from documents not admitted into evidence. The panel majority thus convicts Regeneron, its counsel, and its scientists, with no trial, no evidence, and no opportunity to respond in their defense.
Materiality does not establish intent; deliberate withholding of but-for invalidating prior art, with the intent to deceive the examiner, must be established by clear and convincing evidence. The majority's mechanism whereby dispositive facts are found for the first time on appeal, with no right of traverse by the affected party, is contrary to fundamental fairness and judicial process. If the panel majority indeed believes that the four "uncited" references are but-for material to patentability, we should at least require trial of the question of intent.
[T]he remedies for litigation misconduct bar the malfeasant who committed the misconduct. The property right itself remains independent of the conduct of a litigant.
Leaving the patent right intact, the Supreme Court repeatedly stressed that litigation misconduct bars the litigant. Again in Hazel—Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford—Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 64 S. Ct. 997, 88 L. Ed. 1250, 1944 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 675 (1944), overruled on other grounds by Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 429 U.S. 17, 18, 97 S. Ct. 31, 50 L. Ed. 2d 21 (1976), another instance of extreme litigation misconduct, the Supreme Court "require[d] that Hartford be denied relief," but left the patent right intact. Id. at 251.
Litigation misconduct, while serving as a basis to dismiss the wrongful litigant, does not infect, or even affect, the original grant of the property right.
No case law from the Supreme Court or this court provides a basis for nullifying property rights granted by the United States when such property rights did not themselves accrue through inequitable conduct.
The Aptix holding has been applied in trial forums across the nation. E.g., Kimberly-Clark Worldwide, Inc. v. First Quality Baby Prods., LLC, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21474, 2011 WL 679337, at *6 (E.D. Wis. Feb. 16, 2011) ("[A]lleged litigation misconduct is not sufficient to support a counterclaim of unenforcea-blity of a patent."); MedPointe Healthcare Inc. v. Hi-Tech Pharmacal Co., 380 F. Supp. 2d 457, 467 (D.N.J. 2005) ("[B]ecause the alleged misconduct involved conduct before the court and not before the patent office during the procurement of the patent, it does not taint the property right ab initio to render the patent unenforceable."); Honeywell Int'l, Inc. v. Universal Avionics Sys. Corp., 398 F. Supp. 2d 305, 311 (D. Del. 2005) ("If the wrongdoing occurs during the prosecution of the patent, in the furtherance of obtaining a patent right, then it can render the patent unenforceable. Alternatively, if unclean hands occurs during litigation, it bars any recovery by the offending party.").
The parties debate several aspects of the broadest reasonable interpretation of claim terms, but neither the district court's nor my colleagues' analysis shows that any "withheld reference" is more material than the cited references. Under the district court's "broadest reasonable interpretation," the '018 claims require a genetically modified mouse, the genes of which have been modified using the particular large targeting vector method described in the specification, by the insertion of human variable region DNA in its germline configuration into or next to the endogenous mouse immunoglobulin locus. Dist. Ct. Op. at 564-67. The "withheld references" indeed relate to genetic modification, but they are not but-for material as compared with the references before the examiner.
The district court does not establish that the allegedly withheld references lead to unpatentability. Instead, the district court states that the references disclose motivations, benefits, and cumulative teachings. [*63] That is correct; but the references do not provide but-for materiality, whether taken alone, or with the cited references.
In a decision that took an inordinately long time to arrive (oral argument was held in mid-January), the Federal Circuit in Regeneron Pharmaceuticals v. Merus today affirmed the District Court's decision that the claims of Regeneron's patent-in-suit was unenforceable due to inequitable conduct in its procurement. However, the manner in which the District Court made its determination, and the Federal Circuit's affirmance in a divided opinion (by Chief Judge Prost joined by Judge Wallach, with a dissent by Judge Newman), raise questions regarding the proper implementation of the Court's en banc decision in Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson and Co., 649 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc) that remain unresolved.
What makes the case unusual was the party that sued: a computer science professor and three graduate students from the University of Wisconsin-Madison.
The university research team, headed by Guri Sohi, filed a patent in 1998 for microchip technology that Apple used in the most recent versions of the iPad and iPhone, a US federal jury ruled on Tuesday. On Friday, the court awarded $234 million in damages.
The ruling is a victory for university researchers, proclaimed the Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation (WARF), a non-profit that exists primarily to help University of Wisconsin professors with patents.
"This is a case where the hard work of our university researchers and the integrity of patenting and licensing discoveries has prevailed," Carl Gulbrandsen, managing director of WARF, said in a news release. "This decision is great news for the inventors, the University of Wisconsin-Madison, and for WARF."
Any probative value of the PTAB ruling is far outweighed by the potential for unfair prejudice and risk of jury confusion because the IPR proceeding is subject to different standards, purposes and outcomes than the original prosecution and the court proceeding. ST attempts to distinguish the court's similar ruling in WARF v. Apple based on ABS's assertion of an antitrust claim is unavailing. In particular, ST does not explain how PTAB's decision is somehow more relevant to its defense of ABS's antitrust claim, beyond the general proposition that its patent was not reviewed by PTAB, which is the same ambiguous ruling the court found confusing and unfairly prejudicial in WARF.
teaches that it is difficult to dissolve CoQ10 in lemon oil.
than essential oils such as lemon oil.
based upon the teachings of a combination of references”).
success.” Noelle v. Lederman, 355 F.3d 1343, 1352 (Fed.
one has every reason to expect success. As it happens, Dr.
CAFC explicates the meaning of the word "over" in Home Semiconductor. PTAB reversed.
In its patent owner response, Home argued that "forming an oxide layer over the diffusion region" in claims 2 and 9 should mean "forming an oxide layer covering the diffusion region" in light of the specification. J.A. 499 (emphasis added). Based on its proposed construction, Home argued that Doshi did not anticipate the challenged claims.
In reply, as it had done in its IPR petition, Samsung argued that the broadest reasonable interpretation of "forming an oxide layer over the diffusion region" should be "forming an oxide layer above the diffusion region." J.A. 695-96. Samsung argued that construing "over" as "covering" was too narrow a reading for a person of ordinary skill in the art and that its argument was supported by Becker, which describes gate electrode structures that do not cover the substrate as being "over" the substrate.
regardless, we conclude that the Board erred in its antici-pation finding because its claim construction was flawed.
Doshi's "oxide layer" is only "above" the diffusion re-gion in the sense that it is higher in position, but is mere-ly insignificantly overlapping with the diffusion region, and therefore is not "over the diffusion region." "[O]xidizing the sides" of the gate electrode in Doshi is not "forming an oxide layer over the diffusion region"; it is the "layer of silicon nitride" that is "deposited overall" in Doshi. Doshi col. 7 ll. 59-60. Substantial evidence thus does not support the Board's finding [*18] of anticipation be-cause Doshi fails to teach forming an oxide layer over the diffusion region in addition to on the sidewalls of the gate electrode. Because independent claim 9 is not anticipated by Doshi, dependent claims 10-14 are also not anticipated by Doshi.
There was another argument by Samsung, which "fell by the wayside."
issue is not properly before us.
Did Heartland open the floodgates to the ITC? Not really.
and procedures. As lawyers looking to monetize patents, they will seek the venue that maximizes their leverage post-TC Heartland.
The ITC today is no doubt a more attractive venue than before.
district courts, Patent Owners Can More Easily Enjoin Infringers by Using the ITC Rather Than Federal District Courts.
The ITC permits a patent owner to enforce its rights against an entity that imports allegedly infringing products in the United States.
And like a U.S. District Court, the ITC also has the power to issue injunctions, called "exclusion orders," to stop infringing products from being imported into the U.S.
There was a question as to whether the standard for injunctive relief at the ITC is the same as that for a U.S. District Court.
to consider certain "public interest" factors, those factors are not the same as those considered by a U.S. District Court.
import infringing components to use in products should consider the benefits of filing a complaint in the ITC.
This is especially important for non-practicing entities that do not make or sell products covered by the patents.
to obtain injunctive relief in the ITC, giving them more leverage for license negotiations with potential licensees and infringers.
The advantages, and disadvantages, of the ITC venue existed before Heartland, and were not changed by Heartland.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 50. Because the only reasonable conclusion as to the defenses of 1) patent eligible subject matter and 2) indefiniteness is that they are inapplicable, with respect to those two defenses, the motion will be allowed.
The two-step framework for patentable subject matter is described in Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293, 182 L. Ed. 2d 321 (2012). First, the Court must determine whether the patent claims are "directed" to a patent-ineligible concept, such as a natural law, natural phenomenon or abstract idea. Rapid Litig. Mgmt. Ltd. v. CellzDirect, Inc., 827 F.3d 1042, 1047 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1296-97). If the claims are not so directed, they are patentable. Id. If the claims are directed to an ineligible concept, then the Court determines whether the elements of the invention "transform" the claims into an application eligible for a patent. Id. Patent eligibility is a question of law. Id.
Amphastar contends that all of the claims are indefinite because they are limited to "the non naturally occurring sugar associated with peak 9 of FIG. 1" and there is no specific "FIG. 1" in the '886 patent. Based on the intrinsic evidence, however, the "Figure 1" in the patent is composed of Fig. 1A and Fig. 1B. The only figure in the patent with peak 9 is FIG. 1A. Moreover, the claims of the patent involve enoxaparin and the Fig. 1A is titled "Lovenox" which is the brand name for enoxaparin. Furthermore, the "Brief Description of the Drawings" in the patent clarifies that FIG. 1A is a "[c]apillary electrophoresis (CE) profile of enoxaparin (Lovenox™)". Therefore, this Court concludes that the patent "afford[s] clear notice of what is claimed." Trusted Knight Corp., 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 3979, 2017 WL 899890, at *3 (quoting Nautilus, 134 S. Ct. at 2128-29) and, with respect to the infiniteness defense, the motion for judgment as a matter of law with be allowed.
Who owns copyright in student papers?
VeriCite integrates seamlessly with all of the popular learning management systems (LMS) like Moodle, Blackboard and of course Canvas. The students and you, retain ownership of the work turned into VeriCite even if you change LMS providers.
The question of "who owns" copyright in student papers was addressed in 26 Touro L. Rev. 207, titled Do Students Turn Over Their Rights When They Turn in Their Papers? A Case Study of Turnitin.com , which discussed the "iParadigms" case, 544 F. Supp. 2d 473; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19715.
There seems to have been no dispute that the students were authors, with standing to bring suit.
iParadigms' only reasonable conclusion is found in its analysis of the third factor. Relying heavily on Sony and Perfect 10, n153 iParadigms found that copying an entire work, when necessary to do so, does not preclude a finding of fair use. n154 It is conceded that to effectively locate a plagiarized portion of a paper, one must have access to as much data as possible and it must be in its original context. n155 This only comprises half of the answer though. Using the entire document does not preclude a finding of fair use, but it certainly does not favor one either. iParadigms acknowledged that the entire paper must be used for Turnitin's system to operate, but the statute does not ask the court to consider whether using the entire work is necessary, rather it questions "the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole." n156 Taking into account the first two factors, which should not have favored Turnitin, this factor should be an additional strike against Turnitin, rather than an additional factor on its side.
The application includes discussion of functional modules.
to transform cancer research and care by substantially accelerating efforts to combat cancer over the next five years.
from filing a petition under the program.
that 80 petitions have been requested, to date, and nine eligible patents have been granted under the Pilot Program.
infringed U.S. Patent Nos. 8,135,122 and 8,565,399.
determined by the judge, not the jury.
meaning as used in the patent. See Summit 6, LLC v.
changed the result at trial.
scope of the ‘positional accuracy’ limitation.”).
such factual aspects into legal issues of claim construction.
to make certain arguments to the jury.”).
were improper . . . .”).
The district court held that the claims were obvious because they were the inherent result of an allegedly obvious process, viz., lyophilizing bortezomib in the presence of the bulking agent mannitol. Millennium argued that a person of ordinary skill would avoid lyophilization in developing a formulation involving bortezomib because "bortezomib was known to be unstable even in the dry state as a freestanding solid compound." Dist. Ct. Op. *6. The court was not persuaded by this argument and instead relied on the testimony of Sandoz's witness, Dr. Repta, to find that, as of the '446 Patent's priority date, lyophilization "was well-known in the field of formulation" and that it was considered an obvious alternative "when a liquid formulation provided limited success." Id.
the district court held the claims invalid on the ground of obviousness, agreeing with Sandoz that "Millennium conceded as a matter of law that the ester is the 'natural result' of freeze-drying bortezomib with mannitol." Id. at *8. The court reasoned that the "natural result" of a chemical procedure is inherent in the procedure, and thus the product thereof "would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill," in the words of § 103.
The district court also clearly erred in its consideration of inherency in the case."A party must . . . meet a high standard in order to rely on inherency to establish the existence of a claim limitation in the prior art in an obviousness analysis." Par Pharm., 773 F.3d at 1195-96. "The mere fact that a certain thing may result from a given set of circumstances is not sufficient" to render the result inherent. In re Oelrich, 666 F.2d at 581 (quoting Hansgirg v. Kemmer, 102 F.2d 212, 214, 26 C.C.P.A. 937, 1939 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 327 (CCPA 1939)).
Sandoz argues that although lyophilization in the presence of mannitol produced an unexpected result, the result was "inevitable" and thus "inherent," and thus not "inventive." Sandoz Br. at 1, 12-17. However, in the case.invention is not a matter of what the inventor intended when the experiment was performed; obviousness is measured objectively in light of the prior art, as viewed by a person of ordinary skill in the field of the invention. "Those charged with determining compliance with 35 U.S.C. § 103 are required to place themselves in the minds of those of ordinary skill in the relevant art at the time the invention was made, to determine whether that which is now plainly at hand would have been obvious at such earlier time." Interconnect Planning Corp. v. Feil, 774 F.2d 1132, 1138 (Fed. Cir. 1985). No expert testified that they foresaw, or expected, or would have intended, the reaction between bortezomib and mannitol, or that the resulting ester would have the long-sought properties and advantages.
The opinion suggests that obviousness requires the art to provide a reason for taking the particular experimental route leading to the claimed success, as well as a reasonable expectation of achieving that success. Instances, as here, where the result is unforeseen and serendipitous cannot satisfy these criteria.
As for the purported "inherency" of the outcome relied upon by the District Court in its reasoning, the panel found that the District Court had erred in agreeing with Sandoz that, because the result (the claimed bortezomib-mannitol ester) was "inevitable" it was also inherent, and therefore could not be inventive (in the archaic meaning of that term, i.e. non-obvious). The error stems from the principle that the inventor's intention is not the relevant consideration; it is whether the invention would have been objectively obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art. Here, there was no evidence that anyone "foresaw, or expected, or would have intended, the reaction between bortezomib and mannitol, or that the resulting ester would have the long-sought properties and advantages" and hence the invention was non-obvious.
IPBiz notes that obviousness relates to that which is known or reasonably foreseeable. Inherency (in an anticipation context) does NOT require this. In Millennium, the formation of, and the inherent properties of, the bortezomib-mannitol ester were not known or reasonably foreseeable. On these facts, the mere invocation of inherency was legal error.
Appellants are correct insofar as that a retrospective (retroactive or backwards) employment of inherency by the Solicitor is incorrect in a § 103 analysis. Appellants are also correct that employment of inherency is incorrect in a § 103 analysis when it is not known in the art that the inherent part is in fact inherent. Newell, 891 F.2d at 899 quoting In re Spormann, 363 F.2d 444 (C.C.P.A. 1966), (“That which may be inherent is not necessarily known. Obviousness cannot be predicated on what is unknown.”).
Although one can discuss "objectively obvious," the key analytical point is whether the compound and its properties were known (or reasonably foreseeable).
There is discussion of the HBO show Confederate, an alternate history, which places slavery as a present-day institution in America.
when the PTAB explicitly said there were no claim construction issues.
How does one appeal what does not exist?
Board’s ruling in this regard is a ruling on claim construction.
drew using the standard tools of claim construction. Id.
the subject matter that is patented.” Netword, LLC v.
929, 939–40 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
789 F.3d 1292, 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
claim 24. See In re Varma, 816 F.3d 1352, 1363 (Fed. Cir.
Trademarks in music. Flashback to New Jersey stating: its previous position "was inadvertently put into the brief."
IPBiz notes another interesting bit of music intellectual property. It is "like" the issue in "He's a Rebel," because it involves a "confusion of source" issue. The State of New Jersey was trying to enforce its "Truth in Music" Act (to avoid confusion related to later day bands performing music of earlier groups) against an entity who had in fact secured common law trademark rights. The State lost.
On September 7, 2007, the parties returned to the District Court [D. N.J.]for a hearing on the preliminary injunction. In its written submission prior to the hearing, the State argued that an unregistered trademark satisfied the Truth in Music Act only if the performing group obtained express authorization from an original group member, included an original member, or denominated itself as a tribute or salute to the original group. The State contended that its interpretation of the Act was consistent with the Lanham Act, the First Amendment, and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It also objected to Live Gold's suit on jurisdictional grounds.
Judge Debevoise began the preliminary injunction hearing by asking the State why it insisted on distinguishing between registered and unregistered trademarks: "Why shouldn't they proceed on an equal basis, two valid trademarks?" In response, the State contended that because the Lanham Act accorded a rebuttable presumption of validity to registered trademarks, its action here against unregistered trademarks was consistent with federal law. Judge Debevoise repeatedly rejected this argument, explaining that the differences under federal law between registered and unregistered trademarks for purposes of validity did not authorize the State to discriminate against an unregistered trademark, once proven valid. "There's no reason for it," he declared. Nevertheless, the State continued to press its interpretation of the Truth in Music Act. Judge Debevoise again rejected the State's position, stating, "Well, I fail to see it."
After rejecting the State's arguments, Judge Debevoise suggested that the State reconcile the Truth in Music Act with the Lanham Act by interpreting subsection (e) of the former to permit unregistered trademark holders to perform under their group names without any additional requirements. The State suddenly capitulated, effectively adopting Live Gold's interpretation of the Act. Incredulous, Live Gold objected that the State had made "a 180 degree shift in position." Judge Debevoise agreed, telling the State that the position in its brief was "contrary to what I [just] understood you to say." In response, the State explained that its previous position "was inadvertently put into the brief." The Judge then declared that the State would be "bound" by its new interpretation of the Act.
We have a statement by the State of New Jersey as to what the meaning of this statute is insofar as it relates to common law trademarks, and I think we've stated it. If there's a valid common law trademark under the Lanham Act, and if whoever has possession of it can establish a right to that possession, he is to be treated — or she is to be treated in the same way as the holder of a registered trademark. Now, no necessity of — to say or give any tribute to anybody. So we have an agreement on that.
Judge Debevoise then turned to Pryor Cashman's application for attorney's fees. After hearing from Live Gold, he asked, "State, why shouldn't you be responsible for attorney's fees[?]" In response, the State replied that a fee award was inappropriate because "there was no past enforcement action" and because it had never taken any position on the Truth in Music Act. Judge Debevoise disagreed with the latter contention, reminding the State that it made a "180 degree change in position because [it] came in negating everything that [Live Gold] [was] urging, and in effect conceded [Live Gold] [was] right, and permitted everything to go forward." The State again distanced itself from its initial arguments, explaining that they were "not . . . as clear as they could have been" because the State was rushed in responding to the TRO application. The Court took the matter under advisement.
One month later, Judge Debevoise entered an order affirming the Magistrate Judge's order denying reimbursement of Live Gold's attorney's fees and granting [page 228] the State's motion to dismiss. In his order, Judge Debevoise held that Live Gold was not a prevailing party because he "did not enter a preliminary injunction or any other order on the merits of the case." He also concluded that the State voluntarily changed its position, stating that "[w]hile it may be true that this court's involvement aided in the resolution of the constitutional issues between the parties, the fact remains that the issues were not resolved as the result of a court order." In granting the State's motion to dismiss, Judge Debevoise concluded that Live Gold's claims were moot in light of the parties' agreement that the preliminary injunction hearing had resolved all of Live Gold's constitutional claims. In this appeal, Live Gold challenges only the denial of attorney's fees.
CA3 affirmed and thus no award of attorney's fees: "Because no enforceable judgment on the merits issued in this case and the State's actions that mooted the case were voluntary, Buckhannon tells us that Live Gold was not a prevailing party. Given that precedent, we affirm."
"When does a party 'prevail' within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1988?" That is the basic question that both parties here are asking. The Majority qualifies the question by referring to certain facts of record: "Does a party 'prevail' if it obtains a temporary restraining order the day after it files suit . . . but 22 days later is denied a preliminary injunction because the opposing party's voluntary change of position moots the case?" The Majority answers "No" to the question.
I would add different facts to the basic question — and, by doing so, I arrive at a different answer. My "different" qualifying facts are clearly found in the record of this case. Moreover, my facts support a finding of "prevailing party."
(App. 388.) There was no dissent.
This conclusion by the court, that a valid common law trademark was to be recognized in the same way as a registered trademark, was the merits question put to the court by Live Gold — and the State of New Jersey was now bound in this action by this legal conclusion. I cannot imagine that the State would dare come again before the District Court and take any position contrary to the ruling of the court: "So we have an agreement on that." Nor, as I discuss later, would the State be in the position to contend in any future action before the New Jersey District Court that a valid common law trademark was not to be accorded the same recognition as a registered one. If it did so, the State would be barred by judicial estoppel.
With these facts in mind, I state my question as follows: "Does a party 'prevail' under the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1988 when it has obtained a TRO, granting an important part of the relief sought, and further when its opponent has been bound by the District Court to the position of law that grants complete relief on the merits of the complaint." I answer "Yes." I conclude from this factual setting, supported by the record, that Live Gold is clearly a prevailing party and, thus, deserves an award of its reasonable attorney's fees.
The Majority contends, however, that Live Gold did not receive a judgment on the merits. The Majority does agree that the TRO Live Gold obtained constituted a judgment [page 1188] and that injunctive relief "can, under appropriate circumstances, render a party 'prevailing.'" See ante, 13 (quoting People Against Police Violence v. City of Pittsburgh (PAPV), 520 F.3d 226, 233 (3d Cir. 2008)). But, I part ways with the Majority on its conclusion that the TRO here was not a resolution on the merits.
I find it clear that the TRO obtained by Live Gold was a "judicially sanctioned change in the legal relationship" between Live Gold and the State of New Jersey. The TRO allowed Live Gold to achieve much of the benefit it sought in bringing suit and provided some relief on the merits of its claims. Before the TRO hearing, New Jersey indicated that Live Gold could be penalized if the Platters and the Coasters were not billed as "tribute" bands. After the District Court issued the TRO, the bands were permitted to perform under the names "Platters" and "Coasters" without modifiers like "tribute" or "salute to," and the State was prohibited from penalizing Live Gold for doing so.
3 The Majority attempts to evade this common-sense conclusion by mistakenly arguing that "'likelihood' does not mean more likely that than not." Ante at 13 (citing Hackett v. Price, 381 F.3d 281, 290-91 (3d Cir. 2004).) But Hackett was not a preliminary injunction case — it was a habeas case concerning the constitutionality of jury instructions at the penalty phase of a capital case, where the question was "whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way that prevents the consideration of constitutionally relevant evidence." Id. at 290. Hackett acknowledged that "[a]s one definition of 'likely' is 'having a better chance of existing or occurring than not,' Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1310 (1971), someone could plausibly argue that 'reasonable likelihood' is not a lesser standard than 'more likely than not.'" Indeed, "courts use a bewildering variety of formulations of the need for showing some likelihood of success." 11A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2948.3 (2d. ed. 2010).
In addition to the judicial order here, the District Court permanently altered the legal relationship between the parties. The court's statement that the State would be "bound" by its new interpretation of the Act should bar the State from taking any inconsistent positions in future litigation because of the doctrine of judicial estoppel. Judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine that entails "'the intrinsic ability of courts [page 239] to dismiss an offending litigant's complaint without considering the merits of the underlying claims when such dismissal is necessary to prevent a litigant from playing fast and loose with the courts.'" In re Kane, 628 F.3d 631, 638 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Krystal Cadillac-Oldsmobile GMC Truck, Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 337 F.3d 314, 319-20 (3d Cir. 2003)). "[T]he basic principle of judicial estoppel . . . is that absent any good explanation, a party should not be allowed to gain an advantage by litigation on one theory, and then seek an inconsistent advantage by pursuing an incompatible theory." Krystal Cadillac, 337 F.3d at 319 (quoting Ryan Operations G.P. v. Santiam-Midwest Lumber Co., 81 F.3d 355, 358 (3d Cir. 1996)). "Though there is no rigid test for judicial estoppel, three factors inform a federal court's decision whether to apply it: there must be (1) 'irreconcilably inconsistent positions;' (2) 'adopted . . . in bad faith;' and (3) 'a showing that . . . estoppel . . . address[es] the harm and . . . no lesser sanction [is] sufficient.'" G-I Holdings, Inc. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 586 F.3d 247, 262 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Chao v. Roy's Constr., Inc., 517 F.3d 180, 186 n.5 (3d Cir. 2008)).
Here, once the State had reversed course and accepted that a valid common law trademark must be treated in the same way as a registered trademark, the State would be judicially estopped from adopting a contrary interpretation of the Act in any subsequent judicial proceeding and certainly in any proceeding against Live Gold. This is the significance of the District Court's statement that the State was "bound" to its new interpretation. Moreover, it showed that the District Court must have relied on this commitment by the State when the court did not enter a permanent injunction [page 1192] [**46] against the State. If the State were to assert again that the Truth in Music Act does not recognize valid common law trademarks, it would be asserting an inconsistent position in presumptive bad faith after already having conceded the wrongfulness of such an assertion. Judicial estoppel, therefore, would apply to prevent the State from perpetuating a fraud on the court. See New Hampshire, 532 U.S. at 751 (noting that a court addressing judicial estoppel should consider "whether the party seeking to assert an inconsistent position would derive an unfair advantage or impose an unfair detriment on the opposing party if not estopped").
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described and claimed in the ’446 Patent.
state as a freestanding solid compound.” Dist. Ct. Op. *6.
relied on the testimony of Sandoz’s witness, Dr.
liquid formulation provided limited success.” Id.
such an esterification reaction might occur during lyophilization.
the prior art.” Id. at *10 (quoting Hitachi Koki Co. v.
Doll, 620 F. Supp. 2d 4, 30 (D.D.C. 2009)).
obviousness. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S.
this new compound, or that it would form during lyophilization.
solving the problems that accompanied bortezomib.
reason to make the mannitol ester of bortezomib.
581 (CCPA 1981); then quoting Alcon Research, Ltd. v.
solve the problems experienced with bortezomib.
circumstances is not sufficient” to render the result inherent.
In re Oelrich, 666 F.2d at 581 (quoting Hansgirg v.
Kemmer, 102 F.2d 212, 214 (CCPA 1939)).
freeze-drying bortezomib with mannitol.” Dist. Ct. Op. *8.
used in finding the invention is beside the point.
charged with determining compliance with 35 U.S.C.
Trade Comm’n, 598 F.3d 1294, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2010)).
These indicia cannot be set aside in the analysis of obviousness.
entered in favor of Millennium as to the Sandoz defendants.

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