Source: https://www.ulcc.ca/en/annual-meetings/430-1995-quebec-qc/civil-section-documents/1134-judicial-interpretation-of-the-uniform-arbitration-act-1995?tmpl=component&amp;print=1&amp;page=
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 18:56:17+00:00

Document:
1. Arbitration is intended to provide an alternate means of dispute resolution outside of the courts.
2. Once parties agree to pursue arbitration, judicial intervention in arbitration should be limited to very narrow circumstances.
Change the wording of s.6 to that used in the Alberta, Ontario and Saskatchewan legislation.
6. No Court shall intervene in matters governed by this Act, except as this Act provides.
Hopefully, this expanded wording of section 6 will serve to caution the courts about their role within disputes under private arbitration agreements.
1. Arbitration cannot be used to insulate a dispute from the courts, if the dispute is one which must be settled in court.
Change the wording of s.7(2)(c) to provide better clarity as to when a refusal to grant a stay is warranted based on the subject matter of the dispute.
i) The subject matter of the dispute is not capable of being the subject of arbitration under the law of [enacting jurisdiction] even if the parties expressly agree to submit the dispute to arbitration.
ii) The parties could not under the law of [enacting jurisdiction] enter into an agreement settling the dispute.
*Note: The same wording will need to be substituted in s.46(1)(e) as well.
Hopefully, this revision would avoid the use of discretion in granting stays as indicated by Justice Perras in his decision in McCulloch v. Peat Marwick Thorne.
1. Parties may agree to allow appeals from an arbitrator's decision (ie. on questions of law, fact or mixed law and fact).
3. Parties cannot completely bar an appeal on a question of law if the criteria are met.
Change the order of the wording of s.45(1),(2) and (3) to emphasize that parties can agree what may or may not be appealed.
(b) determination of the question of law at issue will significantly affect the rights of the parties.
(2) If the arbitration agreement so provides, a party may appeal an award to the court on a question of law.
(3) If the arbitration agreement so provides, a party may appeal an award to the court on a question of fact or on a question of mixed fact and law.
45(1) If the arbitration agreement so provides, a party may appeal an award to the court on a question of law, a question of fact or a question of mixed fact and law.
(3) Subsection (2) does not apply if the question of law on appeal is the question that was expressly referred to arbitration in the first place.
This revision would help to emphasize the fact that parties can agree on what can be appealed, but that it is possible to appeal questions of law with leave, if the criteria are met and providing the question of law is not the express question which was referred to arbitration.
No change is proposed to the Uniform Act concerning the ability of theparties to exclude appeals altogether. Jurisdictions enacting the Uniform Act will have to decide whether to follow Ontario and Saskatchewan in allowing a total ban on appeals, or Alberta and New Brunswick in requiring that some appeals be possible.
Remove the phrase "does not deal with" from s.45(1) of the Ontario legislation and rewrite it to conform with s.45(2) above.
The phrase "does not deal with" has led to the differing lines of authority as to what kind of provisions in an arbitration agreement or clause "deal with" the issue of appeal. It appears this phrase has given judges an opportunity to grant leaves to appeal on questions of law despite the fact that the parties agreed the arbitrator's decision would be "final and binding". The phrase is particularly problematic where the reference to arbitration is drafted before the new legislation is in place.
"...any dispute...relating to the construction, meaning or effect of anything in this agreement or the rights or liabilities of any party pursuant to this agreement...shall be referred to and settled by arbitration..."
4) is there any sufficient reason why the matter in dispute should not be referred to arbitration.
Perras, J. believes the criteria above are reflected in s.7 of the Arbitration Act (ie. criteria 3 is s.7(2)(b) and criteria 2 and 4 are in s.7(2)(c). Perras, J. concludes by finding that even if the criteria from Heyman v. Darwin do not apply, the application of s.7(2)(c) operates to deny the stay.
(2) it uses a summary of the stay rules from a decision long before the new legislation significantly revamped those rules (implying that the old discretion remains).
Commercial agreement which fell under the jurisdiction of the International Commercial Arbitration Act, R.S.A. 1980, c.I-6.6 (ICAA) rather than the Alberta legislation. The Queen's Bench decision refused to grant a stay of proceedings on the basis that parties to the action who were not subject to the arbitration clause raised legitimate causes which all should be decided in the same proceedings. Kerans, J.A. in the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, stayed the proceedings and referred certain issues (ie. breach of contract and conspiracy) raised in the statement of claim to arbitration. Kerans, J.A. found that the ICAA included tort claims such as conspiracy as long as it was related to a commercial undertaking. Kerans, J.A. also found that while referring the additional issues to arbitration might be inconvenient, it would not be inoperative as contemplated by s.3 of the ICAA.
Murray, J. upholds s.7(2) and stays the plaintiff's claim for damages under a contract until the dispute for damages is dealt with in arbitration. Murray, J. discusses the underlying philosophy of the Arbitration Act and the concept of parties staying with the arbitration process if both agree to it.
Master Funduk grants a stay of proceedings based on s.7(1) of the Arbitration Act and determines that the issue of reasonable notice is one that flows from the contract relationship and therefore is arbitrable under the arbitration clause of the contract. He quotes Borowski (supra) with favour.
Gerein J. found that the former Arbitration Act applied to the dispute, but he offered his opinion on the new legislation, stating that s.8 (equivalent to s.7 in the Uniform Act) has restricted the court's discretion to refuse a stay and that it is now mandatory for a stay to be granted unless a party can come within one of the situations outlined in s.8(2). Gerein J. also noted that if he was wrong and the new Arbitration Act applied, that the stay would be denied because of s.8(2)(d), that is, that there was undue delay in bringing the motion.
This case concerned a dispute between shareholders in a small, family-owned company. The plaintiff filed a claim alleging a conspiracy by the other shareholders which was preventing him from receiving the full value of his shares. The defendants to the action applied for a stay pursuant to s.8 of the Arbitration Act. The plaintiff in the case argued that the stay should not be granted based on s.8(2)(c) of the Arbitration Act ie. "the subject-matter of the dispute is not capable of being the subject of arbitration under Saskatchewan law". MacLean, J. considered McCulloch v. Peat Marwick Thorne (supra) and determined that it had no application to the case. MacLean, J. said that although the plaintiff had characterized his claim as a conspiracy, in reality the issue to be resolved was whether the plaintiff should receive fair market value for his shares. That issue was one that fell under the arbitration clause therefore the stay was granted.
Scotia Realty Ltd. v. Olympia and York  O.J. No. 811 (QL) Ontario Court (General Division).
Commercial lease between two companies which allowed audits to determine the calculation of participation rent. The lease required any dispute about the audits to be arbitrated. The lease also included a "Scott v. Avery" clause which makes arbitration a condition precedent to any action. The plaintiffs brought a court action for a determination of its rights under the lease. The defendants then applied for a stay of the court proceedings under s.7 of the Arbitration Act. The plaintiff argued that the agreement it was seeking to resolve was separate and apart from the lease, therefore the arbitration clause would not apply. Lane, J. granted the stay on the basis that the agreement was an amendment to the lease, therefore it was subject to the arbitration.
(c) the broad language of the arbitration clause itself (ie. all disputes in connection with the agreement).
Blair acknowledged that the Arbitration Act created a statutory presumption in favour of granting stays with a narrow list of exceptions.
Deluce Holdings Inc. v. Air Canada  O.J. No. 2382 (QL) Ontario Court (General Division), 12 O.R. (3d) 131.
Air Canada terminated employment of two members of Deluce Holdings in order to gain 100% control of the shares. Arbitration clause existed in agreement to determine the valuation of shares. Deluce Holdings argues that Air Canada did this to avoid the constraints of the minority shareholders under the unanimous shareholder agreement. Action brought by minority shareholder (Deluce) for oppression remedy under s. 241 of the Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44 as well as an action to stay the arbitration for valuation of the shares. Air Canada countered with a request for a stay under s.7 of the Arbitration Act. Blair, J. denied the request for a stay and allowed the oppression action to commence. Blair, J. denied Air Canada's request for a stay as he felt the triggering of the arbitration mechanism was done solely to effect the wrongful objective of the majority over the minority. This action, in Blair's opinion, destroys the "very underpinning of the arbitration structure, thus taking the subject of the dispute out of the 'matters to be submitted to arbitration under the agreement'." (QL decision, p.15) Blair reasons that the oppression remedy under s.241 of the CBCA gives broad discretion to find a remedy appropriate to the situation at hand. In this situation, he finds that the purpose for which the arbitration mechanism is being used brings it outside the subject matter which the parties agreed to submit to arbitration. In short, Blair is applying an equitable remedy to the situation. Blair also notes that the arbitration clause is not a broad, blanket clause (ie. all matters arising from this agreement) but rather a very narrow one (valuation of shares only). This, Blair contends, means that the parties never intended to send such an issue to arbitration.
Plaintiff (Condor) commenced an action against the City and an engineering consultant (RC Ltd.) involved on a sewer line project. Both the City and RC requested a stay of proceedings under s.7 of the Arbitration Act. Deschenes, J. granted the stay requested by the City as the City and Condor had agreed to submit all disputes arising from the agreement to arbitration. Deschenes refused to grant a stay for RC however as they were not a party to that agreement.
The Court ignores the presumption in legislation for granting stays. Essentially, this case comes down to a conflict between two pieces of legislation and the CBCA wins out. The judge wants equity to prevail and refuses to grant the stay. This is done to prevent the majority from bringing about an injustice to the minority shareholders through the Arbitration Act.
(g) section 50 (enforcement of award).
7. (1) If a party to an arbitration agreement commences a proceeding in respect of a matter to be submitted to arbitration under the agreement, the court in which the proceeding is commenced shall, on the motion of another party to the arbitration agreement, stay the proceeding.
(e) the matter is a proper one for default or summary judgement.
(3) An arbitration of the dispute may be commenced and continued while the motion is before the court.
(b) an arbitration that has been commenced shall not be continued, and anything done in connection with the arbitration before the court made its decision is without effect.
(b) it is reasonable to separate the matters dealt with in the agreement from the other matters.
(6) There is no appeal from the court's decision.
(4) The court may require the arbitral tribunal to explain any matter.
(5) The court may confirm, vary or set aside the award or may remit the award to the arbitral tribunal, with the court's opinion on the question of law, in the case of an appeal on a question of law, and give directions about the conduct of the arbitration.
(i) the award was obtained by fraud.
(2) If clause (1)(c) applies and it is reasonable to separate the decisions on matters covered by the arbitration agreement from the impugned ones, the court shall set aside the impugned decisions and allow the others to stand.
(3) The court shall not set aside an award on grounds referred to in clause (1)(c) if the party has agreed to the inclusion of the dispute or matter, waived the right to object to its inclusion or agreed that the arbitral tribunal has power to decide what disputes have been referred to it.
(4) The court shall not set aside an award on grounds referred to in clause (1)(h) if the party had an opportunity to challenge the arbitrator on those grounds under section 13 before the award was made and did not do so, or if those grounds were the subject of an unsuccessful challenge.
(5) The court shall not set aside an award on a ground to which the applicant is deemed under section 4 to have waived the right to object.
(6) If the ground alleged for setting aside the award could have been raised as an objection to the arbitral tribunal's jurisdiction to conduct the arbitration or as an objection that the arbitral tribunal was exceeding its authority, the court may set the award aside on that ground if it considers the applicant's failure to make an objection in accordance with section 17 justified.
(7) When the court sets aside an award, it may remove the arbitral tribunal or an arbitrator and may give directions about the conduct of the arbitration.
(8) Instead of setting aside an award, the court may remit it to the arbitral tribunal and give directions about the conduct of the arbitration.
1. This memorandum was prepared with the able assistance of Donna Clark, a Research Student with the Alberta Law Reform Institute.
2. Uniform Law Conference of Canada. Proceedings of the Seventy-Second Annual Meeting. (Saint John, New Brunswick, August, 1990) at 88.
3. W.H. Hurlburt. "Escape from Arbitration Clauses: Effect of the New Arbitration Act." (1992) Vol. 30, No. 4, Alta. L. Review 1361 at 1366.

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