Source: https://www.inversecondemnation.com/hawaiiappellate/supreme_court/page/2/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 15:35:57+00:00

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78 posts categorized "Hawaii Supreme Court opinions"
OPINION OF THE COURT BY DUFFY, J.
Defendant-Appellant The Rawlings Co., LLC [hereinafter, Rawlings], appeals from the August 1, 2006 interlocutory order of the circuit court of the first circuit, denying Rawlings's motion for summary judgment in this action initiated by Plaintiffs-Appellees Albert Flores and Donald Rapoza [hereinafter, collectively, Plaintiffs] against Rawlings. The case was subsequently transferred to this court pursuant to Hawai‘i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 602-58(b)(1) (Supp. 2006).
Although the heart of Plaintiffs' claim is that Rawlings violated the registration requirement for collection agencies under HRS § 443B-3(a) (1993), this appeal also concerns two threshold issues regarding whether Plaintiffs may bring this claim: (1) whether Plaintiffs have established injury within the meaning of HRS § 480-13 (Supp. 2004), and (2) whether Plaintiffs are "consumers" within the meaning of HRS § 480-13. The circuit court, in denying Rawlings's motion for summary judgment, found that these prerequisites for bringing suit had been met and that Rawlings was subject to the registration requirement of HRS § 443B-3(a).
On appeal, Rawlings argues that: (1) the circuit court erred in ruling that Plaintiffs' respective payments of what Rawlings terms "valid obligations" constituted "actual injury" sufficient to give them standing to bring suit; (2) the circuit court erred in ruling that Plaintiffs were "consumers" under HRS chapter 480, because the transaction involving Rawlings was a recovery of subrogation/reimbursement claims arising from tort rather than a consumer transaction concerning the delivery of medical services; and (3) the circuit court erred in ruling that Rawlings was recovering "debts" within the meaning of HRS chapter 443B, such that it was a "collection agency" subject to that chapter.
On August 29, 2007, this court accepted a timely application for a writ of certiorari, filed by petitioner/defendant-appellant Faa P. Fetelee on July 17, 2007, requesting that this court review the May 17, 2007 judgment of the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA), entered pursuant to its April 18, 2007 published opinion in State v. Fetelee, 114 Hawai'i 151, 157 P.3d 590 (App. 2007).
In light of our pronouncement today, we are compelled to vacate the ICA's May 17, 2007 judgment on appeal and the trial court's August 3, 2005 judgment of conviction and sentence, and remand the case to the trial court for a new trial consistent with this opinion.
Two sets of plaintiffs-appellants -- (1) the Office of Hawaiian Affairs (OHA) and its Board of Trustees [hereinafter, collectively, the OHA plaintiffs] and (2) Pia Thomas Aluli, Jonathan Kamakawiwo'ole Osorio, Charles Ka'ai'ai, and Keoki Maka Kamaka Ki'ili [hereinafter, collectively, the individual plaintiff and, together with the OHA plaintiffs, collectively, the plaintiffs] appeal from the Circuit Court of the First Circuit's January 31, 2003 final judgment, entered pursuant to Hawai'i Rules of Civil Procedure (HRCP) Rule 54(b) (2007). Following a jury-waived trial, the trial court found in favor of defendants-appellees State of Hawai'i (State), the Housing and Community Development Corporation of Hawai'i, and the executive director and members of the board of directors of the HCDCH, as well as Linda Lingle, in her capacity as Governor of the State [hereinafter, collectively, the defendants] and against the plaintiffs.
Following a jury trial, plaintiff-appellant/cross-appellee Kitty Kamaka appeals -- and defendant-appellee/cross appellant Goodsill Anderson Quinn & Stifel (Goodsill) cross appeals -- from the Circuit Court of the First Circuit's December 24, 2003 final judgment entered in favor of Goodsill against Kamaka in this wrongful termination case, as well as the December 24, 2003 order awarding attorneys' fees and costs in favor of Goodsill.
On December 20, 2007, this court accepted a timely application for a writ of certiorari, filed by petitioner/defendant-appellants Thomas E. Klie, on December 4, 2007, requesting that this court review the September 5, 2007 judgment of the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA), entered pursuant to its July 19, 2007 summary disposition order. Therein, the ICA affirmed the District Court of the First Circuit's May 19, 2006 judgment convicting Klie -- via his no contest plea -- of and sentencing him for the offense of street solicitation of prostitution, in violation of Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 712-1207 (Supp. 2006), quoted infra, [hereinafter, street solicitation].
Defendants/Appellees-Appellants, director of the Department of Planning and Permitting, State of Hawai'i, Michel's Inc., and D.G. Anderson (collectively referred to as "Appellants"), appeal from the first circuit court's July 23, 2003 judgment on appeal in favor of Plaintiff/Appellant-Appellee, Colony Surf, Ltd. ("CSL"). Appellants assert the following points of error on appeal: (1) the circuit court erred by ruling that the daytime operation of Michel's "constitute[d] an 'expanded' nonconforming use" under section 21-4.110(c)(1) of the Land Use Ordinance, codified as Revised Ordinances of Honolulu ("ROH") § 21-4.110(c)(1); (2) the circuit court erred by ruling that the daytime operation of Michel's following its temporary cessation constituted "action" within the meaning of ROH § 21-4.110(c)(5), inasmuch as it did not intend to reduce its hours; (3) the circuit court erred by construing ROH §§ 21-4.110(c)(2), (c)(3), and (c)(5) in pari materia and by ruling that the daytime operation of Michel's violated ROH § 21-4.110(c)(5); an (4) the circuit court erred by ruling that the daytime operation of Michel's increased its hours of operation within the meaning of ROH § 21-4.110(c)(1).
IN RE CONTESTED CASE HEARING ON THE WATER USE PERMIT APPLICATION FILED BY KUKUI (MOLOKAI), INC.
The present matter involves multiple appeals from the December 19, 2001 final decision and order of the Commission on Water Resource Management ("the Commission") approving Kukui (Moloka'i), Inc.'s ("KMI's") application for water use permits. On appeal, intervenor-appellants (collectively referred to as "Appellants") Department of Hawaiian Home Lands ("DHHL"), Office of Hawaiian Affairs ("OHA"), and Judge Caparida ("Caparida") and Georgina Kuhuia ("Kuahuia") generally allege multiple violations of the Commission's public trust duties under the Hawai'i Constitution, the State Water Code ("Code"), and the public trust doctrine. Specifically, the Appellants raise the following points of error.
For the following reasons, we hold that: (1) DHHL's reservation is a public trust "purpose" and not an "existing legal use"; (2) the Commission failed to adequately scrutinize KMI's request to divert water; (3) the Commission appeals to have placed the burden of proof on DHHL to demonstrate that pumpage at KMI's well would increase the chloride concentration at the DHHL well site; (4) the Commission's decision did not violate the precautionary principle; (5) the Commission erred by considering an untimely application; (6) KMI requested both existing and new uses; (7) pursuant to HRS § 174C-49(c), KMI may transport water from Well #17; (8) the Commission erred when it failed to consider the impact that the closing of the hotel and golf course would have on its allocation of water to KMI; and (9) the Commission impermissibly shifted the burden of proving harm to those claiming a right to exercise a traditional and customary native Hawaiian practice.
Accordingly, we vacate the Commission's December 19, 2001 final decision and order, and remand the matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Defendant-Appellant Fireman's Fund Insurance Company ("Fireman's Fund"), appeal from the order of the Circuit Court of the First Circuit ("circuit court") filed August 29, 2001, granting partial summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff-Appellee Del Monte Fresh Produce (Hawai'i), Inc. ("Del Monte Fresh"), and denying Fireman's Fund's motion for summary judgment. On appeal, Fireman's Fund presents the following points of error: (1) the circuit court erred when it chose to apply the law of Hawai'i rather than California; (2) even assuming, arguendo, that Hawai'i law applies, the circuit court misapplied this court's jurisprudence relating to insurance contracts; (3) the circuit court misinterpreted and misapplied the word "suits" in its insurance policies when it determined that Fireman's Fund owed a duty to indemnify on the basis that costs incurred in administrative proceedings are covered under the insurance policy as "damages."
On July 20, 277, the defendant-appellant-petitioner Michael Spillner filed an application for a writ of certiorari urging this court to review the summary disposition order (SDO) of the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) in State v. Spillner, No 27722 (Haw. App. Apr. 13, 2007) [hereinafter, "the ICA's SDO"], which affirmed the 'Ewa district court's January 4, 2006 judgments, the Honorable Valerie W.H. Chang presiding, convicting him of and sentencing him for one count each of driving while unlicensed, in violation of Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 286-102 (1993 & Supp. 2002) (offense one), and driving without motor vehicle insurance, in violation of HRS § 431:10C-104 (Supp. 1997) (offense two). In his application, Spillner asserts that the district court erred: (1) in denying his motion to suppress the fruits of the March 1, 2005 traffic stop, during which Honolulu Police Department Officer Arthur Takamiya cited Spillner for offenses one and two; and (2) in convicting him on the basis of illegally obtained evidence. On August 21, 2007, this court granted Spillner's application and, on October 31, 2007, we heard oral argument.
For the reasons discussed herein, we conclude that Spillner's points of error are ultimately meritless and, therefore, affirm the ICA's April 24, 2007 judgment on appeal.
Defendants-Appellants the Hawai'i Office of Information Practices and Les Kondo, Director of Office of Information Practices, in his official capacity [hereinafter, collectively OIP], appeal from the June 30, 2005 final judgment of the circuit court of the first circuit entered pursuant to its May 23, 2005 order that (1) granted summary judgment to Plaintiff-Appellee, Olelo: the Corporation for Community Television (Olelo), and (2) denied OIP's cross-motion for summary judgment.
On September 6, 2002, OIP issued OIP opinion letter number 02-08 (Olelo letter). OIP Op. Ltr. No. 02-08 (2002), 2002 WL 31126635. The Olelo letter concluded that Olelo met the definition of "agency" contained in Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 92F-3 (1993) and, therefore, was subject to the provisions of Hawai'i Uniform Information Practices Act (UIPA), HRS chapter 92. As an agency subject to UIPA, OIP concluded that Olelo was required to disclose "government records."
The current controversy began in 2004 when Olelo received a request from three individuals for a master list with contact information (names, addresses, telephone number, and email addresses) for Olelo's current clients, presented, producers, volunteers, and "all persons eligible to vote in Olelo's election." When OIP subsequently demanded that Olelo disclose the requested information, Olelo filed a complaint for declaratory relief in circuit court requesting that the court declare that it is not an agency under UIPA. After a de novo review of the legal arguments and evidence submitted by both parties, the circuit court granted Olelo summary judgment and denied OIP's corresponding motion for summary judgment.
OIP appealed to this court on July 26, 2005. OIP alleges that the circuit court erred because (1) it did not apply the correct standard of review to and/or grant deference to OIP's conclusion that Olelo was an agency subject to UIPA, and (2) it concluded that Olelo was not an agency as defined in UIPA.
Petitioners-Appellants, the grandparents ("Grandparents") of a minor child ("Child"), appeal from the third circuit family court's February 27, 2004 order and February 27, 2004 judgment dismissing their petition for visitation rights filed pursuant to Hawai'i Revised Statutes ("HRS") § 571-46.3. The solitary issue presented by Grandparents on appeal is whether the family court correctly concluded that HRS § 571-46.3, Hawaii's grandparent visitation statute, which allows the court to award reasonable visitation to a minor child's grandparent if it is "in the best interests of the child," is unconstitutional on its face in light of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (200).
Petitioners Semin Oh and Myung Hui Oh seek review of the Intermediate Court of Appeals' (ICA) November 16, 2006 judgment affirming the November 2, 2005 judgment of the circuit court of the first circuit. We accepted the Oh's application for a writ of certiorari and oral argument was held on August 15, 2007.
The Ohs assert that the ICA gravely erred in vacating in part and affirming in part the circuit court's judgment in favor of Respondent/Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant-Appellee Connie Fong and Respondent/Third-Party Defendant-Appellee Keith Kiuchi. With respect to Fong, the Ohs assert that the ICA mistakenly held that the anti-fraud provisions of Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) chapter 485, known as the Uniform Securities Act, do not apply to transactions in which "a party sells all, as opposed to only a portion, of the stock of a corporation." With respect to Kiuchi, the Ohs assert the ICA was mistaken in its ruling that an escrow agent's duty of disclosure is limited to agreements or instructions imposing such a duty, and that there was no evidence of any such agreement or instructions in this case.. Because we do not believe the ICA's conclusion with respect to Kiuchi was in error, we focus on the Ohs' HRS § 485-25 claim.
We accepted the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner James George Plichta's application for a writ of certiorari in order to review the summary disposition order (SDO) of the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) in State v. Plichta, No. 27294 (Haw. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2006). The ICA affirmed the judgment of the first circuit court, the Honorable Karl K. Sakamoto presiding, convicting Plichta of first degree unauthorized entry into a motor vehicle, in violation of Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 708-836.5 (Supp. 1996) (Counts I & III), robbery in the first degree, in violation of HRS § 708-840(1)(b)(ii) (Supp. 1998) (Count II), robbery in the second degree, in violation of HRS § 708-841(1)(a) (1993) (Count IV), unauthorized control of a propelled vehicle, in violation of HRS § 708-836 (1993 & Supp. 2001) (Count V), and first degree assault against a law enforcement officer, in violation of HRS § 707-712.5(a)(a) (2003 Supp.) (Counts VII & VIII), all arising out of incidents occurring on August 1, 2003.
HAWAII VENTURES, LLC v. OTAKA, INC.
AMENDED OPINION OF THE COURT BY MOON, C.J.
The instant action arises from product liability cases initiated by the plaintiffs-appellants/cross-appellees Albert Isa dba Albert Isa Nursery (Isa), Samuel H. Taka and Sylvia A. Taka dba S. Taka (the Takas), Mark Willman dba Hawai'i Orchids (Willman), and James McCulley [hereinafter, collectively, the plaintiffs] in 1992 and 1993 against, inter alia, the defedant-appellee/cross-appellant E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Company (DuPont), alleging that contaminated Benlate, an agricultural fungicide manufactured by DuPont, had killed or damaged their plants and nurseries. Between 1994 and 1995, the plaintiffs settled their product liability cases. In 2000, the plaintiffs commenced the instant action against, inter alia, DuPont, alleging that only after settling their claims did they discover that DuPont had improperly failed to reveal certain vital scientific data and information indicating that Benlate was contaminated. As such, the plaintiffs believed that DuPont was guilty of fraudulently withholding such evidence in order to induce them to settle for less than the fair value of their claims.
In three summary judgment orders, the Circuit Court of the Third Circuit, the Honorable Ronald J. Ibarra presiding, found in favor of DuPont on all of the plaintiffs' claims. Significantly, the circuit court, without determining whether DuPont indeed committed fraud, found as a matter of law that the plaintiffs could not meet their burden of proving damages. According to the circuit court, the damages available to the plaintiffs was "the fair compromise value of the claim at the time of settlement." A judgment, pursuant to Hawai'i Rules of Civil Procedure (HRCP) Rule 54(b) (2007), in favor of DuPont was entered on August 10, 2005.
The plaintiffs appeal -- and DuPont cross appeals -- from the HRCP Rule 54(b) judgment. The plaintiffs challenge, inter alia, the circuit court's order granting summary judgment on the basis that they were unable to prove damages. Although DuPont's position is that the HRCP Rule 54(b) judgment should be upheld, it cross appeals in apparent recognition of the possibility that this court may not agree with its position, challenging another order granting in part and denying in part DuPont's motion for summary judgment, discussed infra.
Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant Charlie Owens, Jr. (Petitioner) filed an application for writ of certiorari on July 12, 2007, requesting that this court review the April 13, 2007 judgment of the Intermediate Court of Appeals (the ICA), issued pursuant to its February 5, 2007 opinion that affirmed the December 20, 2005 Revocation of Probation; Order of Resentencing of the Family Court of the First Circuit (the court), and its January 10 2006 Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Violation of Hawai'i Rules of Penal Procedure (HRPP) Rule 9, except that Conclusions of Law Nos. 1, 2, 4, and 5 were vacated because they were wrong. State v. Owens, 113 Hawai'i 472, 477, 155 P.2d 655, 660 (App. 2007). Petitioner's application was accepted on August 10, 2007, and oral argument was heard on October 31, 2007.
We hold, respectfully, that the ICA's April 13, 2007 judgment issued pursuant to its February 5, 2007 opinion is reversed, because (1) HRPP Rule 9 requires Respondent to serve warrants in both pre-conviction and post-conviction contexts without unnecessary delay, (2) Respondent's delay of nearly five years in serving Petitioner with a bench warrant for his arrest amounted to an unnecessary delay under HRPP Rule 9 where Petitioner was available for service in the jurisdiction of this state over the period of non-service, there was no evidence that Petitioner intentionally avoided service, and there was no evidence that attempts had been made by Respondent to serve Petitioner over the nearly five-year period, and (3) Respondent's duty to comply with HRPP Rule 9 in the service of the bench warrant is not excused by Petitioner's failure to obey a court order that resulted from the issuance of the bench warrant. [footnotes omitted].
Plaintiff-Appellant, Emerson M.F. Jou, M.D. ("Jou"), appeals from the first circuit court's December 17, 2003 judgment in favor of Defendant-Appellant, Dai-Tokyo Royal State Insurance Company, Limited ("DTRIC") and Lawrence E. Reifurth in his capacity as the director of the Department of Commerce and Consumer Affairs ("DCCA"), State of Hawai'i ("the director"). On appeal, Jou presents the following points of error: (1) the circuit court reversibly erred by denying his motion for recusal; (2) the circuit court reversibly erred by denying his oral motion for an interlocutory appeal from the denial of his motion for recusal; (3) the circuit court reversibly erred by denying his request to amend the complaint; (4) the circuit court erroneously granted summary judgment in favor of the director inasmuch as his declaration in support of summary judgment was insufficient; (5) the circuit court erred by granting DTRIC's motion to dismiss, or for summary judgment, inasmuch as "[t]he court was violating state law [sic] of equitable tolling, the right to sue insurers in tort notwithstanding administrative proceedings, and settled law of third party beneficiaries"; (6) the foregoing errors violated his constitutional rights to equal protection and due process of law under the state and federal constitutions; and (7) "[t]he first circuit, by repeatedly assigning [J]udge Hifo to Appellant's case is creating a 'conduit court' bent on damaging Dr. Jou as much as possible on his way to the appellate court." Also before this court is a motion for damages and costs filed by the director, pursuant to Hawai'i Rules of Appellate Procedure ("HRAP") Rule 38, asserting that Jou filed a frivolous appeal.
Acoba, J., concurs in the result only.
This appeal arises from a quiet title action filed in the the circuit court of the third circuit (the court) involving numerous parties and several dispositions. To summarize, Appellants claim an undivided one-half interest in the ahupua'a of Hilea Nui under the theory that Prince Lot Kamehameha (Lot) and Chief Leleiohoku (Leleiohoku) were granted a cotenancy in a single ahupua'a known as "Hilea" at the time of the Great Mahele, as opposed to receiving grants in fee simply of two separate ahupua'as, Hilea Iki and Hilea Nui. They contend that Hilea Iki and Hilea Nui actually represent 'ilis, or administrative divisions, of the single ahupua'a of Hilea. Appellants further maintain that the cotenancy created between Lot and Leleiohoku continues to the present, between Appellants (Lot's successors in interest) and Appellees (Leleiohoku's successors in interest).
On the other hand, the essence of Appellees' argument is that the Boundary Commission of the Kingdom of Hawai'i determined the relative boundaries of Hilea Iki and Hilea Nui in 1877, defining them as two adjacent ahupua'as owned in fee simple, and that the Boundary Commission's judgment cannot be collaterally attacked by Appellants.
Levinson, J., concurs in the result only.
This case is before us by virtue of our acceptance of a transfer from the Intermediate Court of Appeals (the ICA), Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 602-58 (Supp. 2006), filed by Complainant-Appellant-Appellant the Hawai'i Government Employees Association, AFSCME, Local 152, AFL-CIO (HGEA or Appellant).
Appellant appeals from the February 21, 2006 judgment of the first circuit court (the court) affirming the June 30, 2005 decision and order rendered by the HLRB dismissing a prohibited practice complaint (Complaint) filed by HGEA pursuant to HRS §§ 89-13 (Supp. 2006) and 89-14 (1993) against Respondents-Appellees-Appellees, employer and supervisors of affected HGEA members (Respondents or State) and Agency-Appellees-Appellees HLRB, Brian K. Nakamura, Emory J. Springer, and Kathleen Racuya-Markrich, then-members of the HLRB [collectively, HLRB or Board], for removal of election campaign materials from a State bulletin board assigned for "Union Notices."
Concurring Opinion by J. Levinson, with whom C.J. Moon, joins [pdf].
Petitioner/Petitioner-Appellant Freedus W. Wilton, II (Petitioner) filed a petition for writ of certiorari on June 29, 2007. Certiorari was accepted on August 7, 2007, and oral argument was held on October 17, 2007.
Petitioner seeks review of the judgment of the Intermediate Court of Appeals (the ICA) filed on April 12, 2007, pursuant to its March 21, 2007 Summary Disposition Order (SDO), affirming the December 1, 2004 "Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order Denying Petition to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Judgment or to Release Petitioner from Custody," filed by the Circuit Court of the Second Circuit (the court). Respondent did not file a memorandum in opposition.
We respectfully vacate the April 12, 2007 ICA judgment and the court's December 1, 2004 findings and conclusions and order, and remand for an evidentiary hearing under Hawai'i Rules of Penal Procedure (HRPP) Rule 40 (2007) for the reasons stated herein.
Per Curiam. In this original proceeding, petitioner State of Hawai'i (the prosecution) petitions this court for a writ of mandamus directing respondent the Honorable David W. Lo, judge of the District Court of the First Circuit (the respondent judge), to vacate a pretrial order granting respondent Jack Miller's [hereinafter, defendant Miller] motion to compel discovery in State v. Miller, Case No. 1DTC-07-017133. The prosecution contends that the respondent judge exceeded his lawful authority under Hawai'i Rules of Penal Procedure (HRPP) Rule 16(d) (200&), quoted infra, by compelling the prosecution to disclose to defendant Miller the calibration distances and calibration locations for the laser unit used to cite defendant Miller for excessive speeding, in violation of Hawai'i revised Statutes (HRS) § 291C-105(a)(1) (Supp. 2006), quoted infra.
Based on the following, we hold that, because the calibration information falls within the ambit of HRPP rule 16(d), the respondent judge did not exceed his lawful authority and that, therefore, the prosecution is not entitled to mandamus relief.
Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant James Murray (Petitioner) filed an application for writ of certiorari on April 27, 2007, requesting that this court review the February 6, 2007 judgment of the Intermediate Court of Appeal (the ICA), issued pursuant to its January 19, 2007 memorandum opinion, affirming the September 13, 2005 judgment of the family court of the second circuit (the court), convicting Petitioner of Abuse of A Family Member or Household Member as a class C felony, HRS §§ 709-906(1) and (7) (Supp. 2006).
Respondent/Plaintiff-Appellee State of Hawai'i (Respondent) did not file a memorandum in opposition.
AMENDED OPINION OF THE COURT BY NAKAYAMA, J.
On June 30, 2005, defendant-appellant-petitioner Reginald Fields ("Fields") filed an application for writ of certiorari to review the published decision of the Intermediate Court of Appeals ("ICA") in State v. Fields, No. 25455 ("the ICA's opinion"), affirming the October 11, 2002 judgment of the family court of the fifth circuit, convicting Fields of, and sentencing him for, the offense of abuse of a family or household member, in violation of Hawaii Revised Statutes ("HRS") § 709-906(1).
Amended dissenting opinion by Acoba, J. [pdf].
On February 20, 2007, on petition for a writ of certiorari, the United States Supreme Court vacated the judgment of this court in State v. Maugaotega, 107 Hawai‘i 399, 114 P.3d 905 (2005) (Maugaotega I), in which this court affirmed the defendant-appellant Miti Maugaotega, Jr.'s extended terms of imprisonment, and ordered that we reconsider Maugaotega's appeal in light of Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. ___, 127 S. Ct. 856 (2007). Maugaotega v. Hawai‘i, 549 U.S. ___, 127 S. Ct. 1210 (2007).
For the reasons discussed infra, we vacate Maugaotega's original extended term sentences and remand to the circuit court for non-extended term sentencing. . . .
Concurring and dissenting Opinion by J. Acoba, with whom J. Duffy joins [pdf].

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