Source: http://lawspace.stmarytx.edu/item/2011StMULawBestBriefOfSecFlores
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 14:43:42+00:00

Document:
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION The court of appeals entered judgment on March 15, 2010. (R. at 16). Petitioner filed his petition for writ of certiorari on May 15, 2010. (R. at 17). This Court granted the petition on October 7, 2010. (R. at 18). This Court’s jurisdiction rests on 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (1) (2000). A district court’s fact findings and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from them are reviewed for clear error. Its legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are the relevant provisions and are reproduced in the addendum to this brief. STATEMENT OF THE CASE On September 23, 2008, John Marlin (“Marlin”), a police officer employed by Respondent Fair County Police Department, pulled Beau Radley (“Radley”) over on the suspicion that Radley was driving drunk. (R. at 3). Marlin took Radley into custody and transported Radley to the Fair Police Station after Radley refused to take a breathalyzer test. (R. at 3). Upon arriving at the police station, Marlin escorted Radley into the booking room and handed Radley off to Respondent Officer Arthur Goode (“Goode”). (R. at 3). Marlin exited the booking room leaving Radley in the sole custody of Goode. (R. at 3). Goode removed Radley’s handcuffs for the booking process and re-cuffed Radley upon completion; however, Radley complained that the handcuffs were too tight. (R. at 3). When Marlin returned, Radley complained again, and Marlin loosened the handcuffs. (R. at 3). Goode then escorted Radley, without Marlin, to a holding cell where Radley alleges Goode pushed and hit Radley (R. at 3). Hours later Radley was examined at the Fair County Hospital. (R. at 3). Radley’s wrists were bruised and he had a cut lip and bruising along his jaw. (R. at 4).
excessive force by law enforcement officers’ “seizure” be analyzed under the “reasonableness” standard of the Fourth Amendment). According to Graham, seizure by government actors which restrains the liberty of a free citizen through a showing of authority or physical force triggers Fourth Amendment protections. Id. at 395 n.10 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.1 (1968)). However, Graham did not resolve whether Fourth Amendment protection against deliberate excessive physical force continues to apply beyond the ending point of arrest and the beginning of pretrial detention. Id. Graham also did not specify at what point arrest ends and pretrial detention begins. Id. (The Court referred to the ending point of arrest but did not actually define it when declining to answer whether the Fourth Amendment continues to apply after arrest). Graham’s open-endedness has led to a split amongst the circuit courts with regard to the application of the Fourth Amendment to excessive use of force claims by individuals who have been seized. See generally Riley, 115 F.3d 1159 (providing an overview of the split with reference to specific circuits). A critical and much disputed issue amongst the circuit courts is whether the Fourth Amendment continues to apply after initial seizure. See generally, id. Initial seizure is the idea that seizure is limited to the initial act of seizing. Riley, 115 F.3d at 1163 (citing Wilkins v. May, 872 F.2d 190 (7th Cir. 1989)). Courts holding that the Fourth Amendment applies after initial seizure espouse the idea of continuing seizure. Id. at 1162. Continuing seizure is the idea that seizure does not end at the point of arrest but continues while the person is in custody. Id. Respondents hold, with Riley, that the concept of continuing seizure is out-of-place given this Court’s definition of seizure. See id. at 1163. (Seizure is “a single act”) (quoting Thompson v. Whitman, 85 U.S. 457 (1873)). B. This Court’s definition of seizure does not support the idea of continuing seizure.
split-second judgments. Id. at 396-97. An obvious implication of the analysis provided by the Graham Court is that a Fourth Amendment seizure often begins with a law enforcement officer’s decision to initiate the seizure. It is also the officer who effectuates the seizure that determines how much physical coercion to apply. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97. The arresting officer controls the initial seizure and the immediate conditions of that seizure. See Fontana, 262 F.3d at 880-81. Once the arresting officer hands the arrestee over to another officer, the conditions of the arrestee’s seizure are no longer controlled by the arresting officer. See id. It makes sense to extend Fourth Amendment protection from the point that a law enforcement officer or officers takes a person into custody through the time the person remains in that officer’s or officers’ custody in light of the officer’s or officers’ continuing dominion over the person that has just been taken into custody. Marlin’s continuing dominion over Radley ceased when Marlin left Radley with Goode. (R. at 3). Furthermore, this Court has suggested in its dicta that after police officers effectuate a seizure under the Fourth Amendment, the Fourth Amendment may apply while the suspect is under the control of the police officers. Kathryn R. Urbonya, “Accidental" Shootings As Fourth Amendment Seizures, 20 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q., 337, 374 (1992) (citing California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991)). This Court briefly touched on the idea of a continuing arrest when this Court explained that if a suspect escaped after an officer stopped the suspect through the use of physical force, there may have been an arrest but not a continuing arrest. Id. In other words, the Court recognized there would have been a continuing seizure while the suspect remained with the arresting officer. Id. B. Some Circuits explicitly follow the arresting officer rule.
FOURTH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
Maria I. Flores, “Best Brief Contest Winner: Beau Radley v. Fair County Police Department and Arthur Goode 09-9100 Brief for Respondents,” St. Mary's Law Digital Repository, accessed April 24, 2019, http://lawspace.stmarytx.edu/item/2011StMULawBestBriefOfSecFlores.

References: § 1254
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