Source: https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/349/302
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 04:24:08+00:00

Document:
Petitioner, a native of Tunis, Africa, was ordered deported after a hearing pursuant to § 242(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 209, 8 U.S.C. 1252(b), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1252(b). It was found that he had been convicted in 1938 of violation of the Marihuana Tax Act, 26 U.S.C. 2591, 26 U.S.C.A. § 2591, and sentenced to imprisonment for one year. Section 241(a) (11) of the 1952 immigration law 1 makes such conviction at any time ground for deportation, and § 241(d) 2 provides that the deportation provisions of § 241(a) shall apply even though the facts giving rise to the alien's deportability occurred prior to the date of enactment of the 1952 Act.
At the hearing before a special inquiry officer of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, petitioner did not dispute the fact of his conviction. He did, however, object to the proceedings on the ground that they violated due process and the Administrative Procedure Act, 60 Stat. 237, 5 U.S.C. 1001 et seq., 5 U.S.C.A. § 1001, et seq. The hearing officer overruled these objections. Petitioner also contended that the ex post facto cause of the Constitution precluded the retroactive application of the 1952 law to his case. This contention too was rejected by the hearing officer. Petitioner and his counsel were advised of their right to apply to the Attorney General for the discretionary relief of suspension of deportation under § 244(a)(5) of the Act. 3 At first they declined to do so, but subsequently they moved to reopen the hearing to apply for such relief. The special inquiry officer denied the motion. On appeal, the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the order of deportation. Though no formal application for suspension of deportation under § 244(a)(5) had been filed, the Board considered whether such relief was merited but exercised its discretion against the remission.
Petitioner concedes that § 242(b) of the Immigration Act, authorizing the appointment of a 'special inquiry officer' to preside at the deportation proceedings, does not conflict with the Administrative Procedure Act, since § 7(a) of that Act excepts from its terms officers specially provided for or designated pursuant to other statutes. 4 He insists, however, that there are several significant discrepancies between the Acts, and claims that in cases of variance the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act must govern unless those of the Immigration Act 'shall * * * expressly' negate their application. Administrative Procedure Act, § 12. The discrepancies relied on stem from the 'separation of functions' provision of § 5(c), of the Administrative Procedure Act. To the extent her material, this section separates investigative and prosecuting functions from those of adjudication, expressly providing that hearing officers shall not be responsible to or under the supervision of those engaged in investigation and prosecution. The section also prohibits the hearing officer from participating or advising in the decision of a case, or one factually related thereto, in which he has performed investigative or prosecuting functions. Section 242(b) of the Immigration Act, on the other hand, permits the 'special inquiry officer' to take the dual role of prosecutor and hearing officerpresenting evidence and interrogating witnesses and prohibits him only from hearing cases which he has taken some part in investigating or prosecuting (other than in the permitted dual capacity). An alternative method is permitted by § 242(b), however, under which an additional immigration officer presents the evidence while the special inquiry officer presides. See 8 CFR § 242.53. Special inquiry officers are subject to such supervision as the Attorney General prescribes, 66 Stat. 171, 8 U.S.C. 1101(b)(4), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(b)(4), and at present they are subject to the supervision of district directors of the immigration districts to which they are assigned, as well as higher Service officials, all with enforcement responsibilities of the type proscribed by § 5(c) of the Administrative Procedure Act.
From the Immigration Act's detailed coverage of the same subject matter dealt with in the hearing provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, it is clear that Congress was setting up a specialized administrative procedure applicable to deportation hearings, drawing liberally on the analogous provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act and adapting them to the particular needs of the deportation process. The same legislators, Senator McCarran and Congressman Walter, sponsored both the Administrative Procedure Act and the Immigration Act, and the framework of the latter indicates clearly that the Administrative Procedure Act was being used as a model. But it was intended only as a model, and when in this very particularized adaptation there was a departure from the Administrative Procedure Actbased on novel features in the deportation processsurely it was the intention of the Congress to have the deviation apply and not the general model. Were the courts to ignore these provisions and look only to the Administrative Procedure Act, the painstaking efforts detailed above would be completely meaningless. Congress could have accomplished as much simply by stating that there should be a hearing to determine the question of deportability.
Section 242(b) expressly states: 'The procedure (herein prescribed) shall be the sole and exclusive procedure for determining the deportability of an alien under this section.' That this clear and categorical direction was meant to exclude the application of the Administrative Procedure Act is amply demonstrated by the legislative history of the Immigration Act. The original bills included statements to the effect that the § 242(b) procedures were to be exclusive, '(n)otwithstanding any other law, including the (Administrative Procedure Act).' S. 3455, 81st Cong., 2d Sess.; S. 716, 82d Cong., 1st Sess.; H.R. 2379, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. The 'notwithstanding' clause was dropped in later versions of the Act and did not appear in the bills reported out of committee or in the statute as finally enacted. S. 2055, 82d Cong.; H.R. 5678, 82d Cong.; S. 2550, 82d Cong. The deletion is nowhere explained, but it is possible that the phrase was considered unnecessaryand perhaps inappropriate as a description as § 242(b) became more detailed, encompassing in its particularization the greater part of the Administrative Procedure Act's hearing provisions. In the Senate Report accompanying the revised bill, it is stated that § 242(b) sets up special procedures for deportation proceedings, that these are made exclusive, and that the exemption from the Administrative Procedure Act in the Supplemental Appropriation Act of 1951 is repealed because it is 'no longer necessary.' S.Rep. No. 1137, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 28. The House Report is to the same effect, stating that the prescribed deportation proceedings shall be the sole and exclusive procedure, 'notwithstanding the provisions of any other law.' H.R.Rep. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 58. Throughout the debates it is made clear that the Administrative Procedure Act does not apply directly, but that its provisions have been specially adapted to meet the needs of the deportation process. See particularly the detailed statement of Senator McCarran, 98 Cong.Rec. 56255626, wherein he recognizes a departure from the 'dual-examiner provisions' of the Administrative Procedure Act, the very section here in issue.
Considering first the alleged list, it is clear that petitioner has not made out a case of prejudgment. He did not allege that either the inquiry officer or the Board of Immigration Appeals had seen the list, had known of its existence, or had been influenced in their decisions by the inclusion of petitioner's name thereon. In argument before the Board, petitioner stated through counsel that he had 'the feelingand it's a feeling that's based upon evidence which we will supplythat the real basis for the denial of suspension here was the fact that Marcello was one of these hundred whom the Attorney General had named * * *.' No evidence of this was forthcoming. As to petitioner's charges concerning the Attorney General's 'list,' the record is completely barren.
Finally, we note that, even as to his claim relating to adverse publicity, petitioner introduced no evidence other than the newspaper clippings. Surely on this meager showing the district judge was warranted in findingas he didthat the special inquiry officer, the only official mentioned in petitioner's pleadings, was not controlled in his decision by superiors in the Department of Justice. The decision of the district judge cannot be set aside as clearly erroneous. Accordingly, we hold that under our Accardi decisions petitioner has failed to make out a case for a new hearing. Ex Post Facto.
Section 5(c) of the Administrative Procedure Act forbids hearing officers covered by the Act to conduct hearings if they are 'responsible to or subject to the supervision or direction of any officer, employee, or agent engaged in the performance of investigative or prosecuting functions for any agency.' In 1950 we held in Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 70 S.Ct. 445, 94 L.Ed. 616, that deportation proceedings must be conducted as required by § 5. Congress, however, later in 1950, put a rider on an appropriation bill providing that 'Proceedings under law relating to the exclusion or expulsion of aliens shall hereafter be without regard to the provisions of sections 5, 7, and 8 of the Administrative Procedure Act.' 3 Were this express modification of the Procedure Act still in effect, we would have to reach the constitutional question raised by petitioner. But this appropriation rider was repealed in the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act. 4 The result of this repeal was to leave § 5(c) of the Administrative Procedure Act applicable to immigration cases unless, as the Government contends, other provisions of the 1952 Immigration Act made the Procedure Act inapplicable. I think this contention of the Government should not be sustained.
Both the Procedure Act and the 1952 Immigration Act were sponsored by Senator McCarran and Representative Walter. Their original proposals which finally evolved into the 1952 Act did expressly provide that the Procedure Act should not control proceedings under the Immigration Act. The provision was that 'Notwithstanding any other law, including the Act of June 11, 1946 (the Administrative Procedure Act), the proceedings so prescribed shall be the sole and exclusive procedure for determining the deportability of an alien who is in the United States'. 5 Hearings on these proposals brought strong protests from some organizations, including the American Bar Association, against the provision making the Administrative Procedure Act inapplicable to deportation proceedings. 6 Afterwards the sponsors of the immigration measures introduced new bills which significantly omitted from that provision the words 'Notwithstanding any other law, including the Act of June 11, 1946 (the Administrative Procedure Act).' Consequently when the bill finally passed there was no language which 'expressly' superseded or modified the binding requirement of § 5(c) of the Administrative Procedure Act.
Other statements in the discussions of the 1952 Act may look in a different direction from the statements just quoted. But whatever was said, no language in the 1952 Immigration Act expressly authorizes deportation cases to be heard, contrary to the Administrative Procedure Act, by hearing officers who are the dependent subordinates of the immigration agency's prosecutorial staff. The idea of letting a prosecutor judge the very case he prosecutes or supervise and control the job of the judge before whom his case is presented is wholly inconsistent with our concepts of justice. It was this principle on which Congress presumably acted in passing the Procedure Act. Only the other day we had pointed out to us an instance in which the immigration authorities had relieved an immigration hearing officer from his duties because they believed that the hearing officer had failed adequately to present available derogatory information against an alien. 10 It is hard to defend the fairness of a practice that subjects judges to the power and control of prosecutors. Human nature has not put an impassable barrier between subjection and subserviency, particularly when job security is at stake. That Congress was aware of this is shown by the Procedure Act, and we should not construe the Immigration Act on a contrary assumption.
The Constitution places a ban on all ex post facto laws. There are no qualifications or exceptions. Article I, § 9, applicable to the Federal Government, speaks in absolute terms: 'No * * * ex post facto Law shall be passed.' 1 The prohibition is the same whether a citizen or an alien is the victim. So far as ex post facto laws are concerned, the prohibition is all-inclusive and complete.
At the same time, there was a parallel development in the field of ex post facto legislation. Chief Justice Marshall in Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87, 138139, 3 L.Ed. 162, refused to construe the Ex Post Facto Clause narrowly and restrict it to criminal prosecutions. The Fletcher case held that property rights that had vested could not be displaced by legislative fiat. That liberal view persisted. It was given dramatic application in post-Civil War days. The leading cases are Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277, 18 L.Ed. 356, and Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 18 L.Ed. 366, where the right to practice a person's profession was sought to be taken away, in the first case by a State, in the second by the Federal Government, for acts which carried no such penalty when they were committed. The essence of those proceedings was the revocation of a license. Yet the Court held them to be violative of the Ex Post Facto Clauses because they were 'punishment' for acts carrying no such sanctions when done.
66 Stat. 204, 8 U.S.C. 1251(a)(11), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1251(a)(11).
66 Stat. 208, 8 U.S.C. 1251(d), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1251(d).
66 Stat. 214, 8 U.S.C. 1254(a)(5), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1254(a)(5).
Japanese Immigrant Case, Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 100101, 23 S.Ct. 611, 614, 47 L.Ed. 721; Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 4951, 70 S.Ct. 445, 453454, 94 L.Ed. 616.
60 Stat. 237, 5 U.S.C. 10011011, 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 1001 1011.
66 Stat. 166, 8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq., 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101 et seq.
Joint hearings before the Subcommittees of the Committees on the Judiciary S. 716, H.R. 2379, H.R. 2816, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 526537, 591, 691692, 739.
Johannessen v. United States, 225 U.S. 227, 32 S.Ct. 613, 56 L.Ed. 1066, involved an attempt to cancel a certificate of citizenship on the ground it had been fraudulently and illegally procured. The Court pointed out that the Act did not impose a new penalty on the wrongdoer but merely provided a method for depriving him of a privilege 'that was never rightfully his.' Id., 225 U.S. at pages 242243, 32 S.Ct. at page 617.
Rafeh-Rafie ARDESTANI, Petitioner v. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE.
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, Petitioner v. Joseph Patrick DOHERTY.
Herbert BROWNELL, Jr., Attorney General of the United States, Petitioner, v. Tom WE SHUNG.
John M. LEHMANN, Officer in Charge, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES of America ex rel. Bruno CARSON or Bruno Carasaniti.
John F. MULCAHEY, District Director of Immigration and Naturalization Service, Detroit District, Petitioner, v. Guiseppe CATALANOTTE.

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