Source: http://wi.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20180327_0000471.EWI.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 11:54:58+00:00

Document:
NANCY JOSEPH, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
Deborah Napper seeks judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration denying her claim for a period of supplemental security income (“SSI”) under the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). For the reasons stated below, the Commissioner's decision is affirmed.
The Commissioner's final decision will be upheld if the ALJ applied the correct legal standards and supported his decision with substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Jelinek v. Astrue, 662 F.3d 805, 811 (7th Cir. 2011). Substantial evidence is not conclusive evidence; it is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Schaaf v. Astrue, 602 F.3d 869, 874 (7th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation and citation omitted). Although a decision denying benefits need not discuss every piece of evidence, remand is appropriate when an ALJ fails to provide adequate support for the conclusions drawn. Jelinek, 662 F.3d at 811. The ALJ must provide a “logical bridge” between the evidence and conclusions. Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 872 (7th Cir. 2000).
The ALJ is also expected to follow the SSA's rulings and regulations in making a determination. Failure to do so, unless the error is harmless, requires reversal. Prochaska v. Barnhart, 454 F.3d 731, 736-37 (7th Cir. 2006). In reviewing the entire record, the court does not substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner by reconsidering facts, reweighing evidence, resolving conflicts in evidence, or deciding questions of credibility. Estok v. Apfel, 152 F.3d 636, 638 (7th Cir. 1998). Finally, judicial review is limited to the rationales offered by the ALJ. Shauger v. Astrue, 675 F.3d 690, 697 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 93-95 (1943); Campbell v. Astrue, 627 F.3d 299, 307 (7th Cir. 2010)).
Napper alleges that the ALJ erred in four ways. First, she argues the ALJ improperly assessed her RFC by failing to account for her variable functioning, her intellectual deficits, and her deficiencies in concentration, persistence, or pace. Second, Napper argues the ALJ failed to consider whether she met Listing 12.05. Third, Napper argues the ALJ improperly weighed the opinions of her treating medical providers, specifically Dr. Eleasar San Agustin and Dr. Mariah Hewitt. Finally, she argues the ALJ erred in finding her allegations of disabling symptoms lacked credibility. I will address each argument in turn.
Napper argues the ALJ erred in determining her RFC in three ways. First, she argues the ALJ failed to account for variable functioning in the RFC assessment. Second, she argues the ALJ failed to account for her intellectual deficits. And third, she argues that although the ALJ found Napper had either mild or moderate difficulties in maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace, he did not properly account for that limitation in the RFC.

References: § 405
 § 405
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