Source: https://journals.lib.unb.ca/index.php/JCS/article/view/15229/20291
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 06:46:20+00:00

Document:
As a result of its engagement in combat operations in Afghanistan, the Canadian Forces have detained a number of individuals and subsequently transferred these detainees to a third party. This article will discuss the relevance of international humanitarian law and international human rights law in regards to the responsibility of the Canadian government for the treatment of these individuals. In order to provide an accurate examination of this issue, it is necessary to identify the classification of the armed conflict in Afghanistan during the initial invasion and consequently after the establishment of the Afghan Transitional Government. It will be noted that this shift in classification will have a significant effect on the pertinent rules of international humanitarian law governing the treatment of the detained. However, the consistent applicability of international human rights law will demonstrate its omnipresence, coupled with the prospect of Canadian domestic human rights protections.
1 Following the United States claim to individual and collective self-defence under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Charter1 and Article 51 under the United Nations Charter,2 Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) was launched in Afghanistan. From the operation’s beginning in 2001, the Canadian Forces (CF) have been actively engaged in combat — initially operating under OEF command and subsequently with the UN-sanctioned International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).3 As a result of its engagement in combat operations, the Canadian Forces have detained a number of individuals under both OEF and ISAF command, and subsequently transferred these detainees to a third party. This article will discuss the relevance of international humanitarian law and international human rights law in regards to the responsibility of the Canadian Forces and the Canadian government for the treatment of these individuals.
2 In order to provide an accurate examination of this issue, it is necessary to identify the classification of the armed conflict in Afghanistan during the initial invasion and, consequently, after the establishment of the Afghan Transitional Government. It will be noted that this shift in classification will have a significant effect on the pertinent rules of international humanitarian law governing the treatment of the detained. However, the consistent applicability of international human rights law will demonstrate its omnipresence, coupled with the prospect of Canadian domestic human rights protections. Through this analysis, it will be possible to measure Canada’s adherence to international humanitarian law and international human rights law regarding the treatment of those detained during combat missions in Afghanistan and its evolving policy which has yet to meet the required standards.
3 Although al-Qaeda’s leadership planned and trained for their 11 September 2001 attacks against the US from Afghanistan, their attacks should not be classified as the commencing of hostilities between the two states. The Taliban de facto government did allow al-Qaeda to act freely within its borders, but al-Qaeda’s actions were not of the Taliban state apparatus, as they had maintained a separate identity, ideology, membership, and command structure.7 Resulting from the Taliban’s reluctance to cooperate with the international community, they became an additional target of the US-led coalition. Therefore, the commencement of an international armed conflict began with the landing of the first American and British missiles on Afghan soil following the Taliban’s refusal to denounce and surrender al-Qaeda, and not the attacks of 11 September 2001.
6 Article 44 states that any combatant that meets this description is provided POW status. Additionally, Article 44 notes that, although combatants are obliged to adhere to international humanitarian law, violations will not result in the loss of POW status or recognition as a combatant.16 Therefore, with the provisions granted in Geneva Convention III and Additional Protocol I the Canadian government has no opportunity to refute the categorization of Taliban fighters as legitimate combatants entitled to POW status, despite the contentions of the United States.
9 As such, the Minister for the Department of National Defence, Art Eggleton, must have formulated a policy regarding JTF2 soldiers taking prisoners. In fact, it could be argued that the US Secretary of Defence, Donald Rumsfeld, set Canadian policy and Eggleton conceded to the arrangement with the commitment and role of Canadian troops. In December 2001, Rumsfeld stated that "Either a country will indicate that they will turn them [detainees] over to us . . . or they will be positioned in places where they're unlikely to come in contact with someone that we would like to have control over."28 Unfortunately, the Canadian government refused to confirm Canadian Forces’ operations in Afghanistan until a NATO meeting on 19 December 2001, three days before the Karzai government took office.29 Once the Canadian government admitted that the Canadian Forces were operating in Afghanistan, the policy regarding Canadian captured detainees became quite clear: hold them for the shortest period possible and then hand them over to the US.30 In fact, as one senior military official notes, a separate detention facility for prisoners taken by Canadian Forces personnel had not even been discussed.31 This in itself is clearly a policy issue that would have been formulated within the Canadian military in conjunction with its political leaders prior to deployment. Even if the negative effects of this decision are carried out by a foreign power, the Canadian government still holds the responsibility for providing the opportunity for such abuses to take place.
10 Nevertheless, if it ever comes to light that Canadians captured Taliban fighters during this time (and they most likely did), they should be held accountable to the procedures of transference outlined above. As one MP correctly notes in reference to the policy, "we can’t outsource our moral obligations."32 This notion can be extended, in a more binding nature, to exclude the possibility of detaining powers outsourcing their legal obligations for the protection of POWs.33 What will become evident in the development of this analysis is the Canadian government’s reluctance to accept responsibility for the welfare of those it detains.
11 22 December 2001 was a day of significance for a multitude of reasons. Perhaps to the casual observer of world events it simply marked the instalment of a flimsy, Western-backed government in Afghanistan that few endowed with longevity.34 Official government quotes peppered news headlines with promises of Afghanistan as a democratic beacon of hope in the Middle East and an end to the tyrannical oppression of Afghan women inflicted by the Taliban regime. What these headlines neglected to capture was a subtle move in diplomatic matters that would change the characteristics of the conflict for its remaining years. One of the first orders of business for the Karzai government was to extend an invitation to the US-led coalition to continue its campaign against the Taliban and al-Qaeda on the new government’s behalf.35 As will be illustrated, this invitation changed the nature of the armed conflict from that of an international armed conflict to a non-international armed conflict.
12 Karzai’s invitation had little immediate effect on the US-led coalition. A national army (loyal to the state and not the Taliban) was nonexistent at this point, therefore Karzai could not offer troops and the US was already collaborating with the Northern Alliance.36 Presumably the purpose was twofold: to allow his government to gain intelligence on the status of foreign troop operations in Afghanistan and to exercise the sovereign will of the new interim government. Perhaps the unseen consequence of the invitation was that the US-led coalition ceased to be an invading force. What replaced this invading force was the Afghan Interim Government fighting an armed group within its borders alongside international military assistance forces. This assistance also came in the form of a UN-sanctioned force, referred to as ISAF, which began its initial six-month mandate by providing security for Karzai’s inauguration.37 Although the definition of a non-international armed conflict is somewhat elusive, the conditions outlined by the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols are quite characteristic of the situation in Afghanistan.
13 Again, it is important to keep in mind that neither Afghanistan nor the US are signatories of the Additional Protocols I or II, but Canada is and compliance with these treaties is not based on reciprocity of additional parties to the conflict. Therefore, those captured by the Canadian Forces would be entitled to the protections outlined above in both common Article 3 and Additional Protocol articles. In keeping with the spirit of the Geneva Conventions, the transference of detainees to a third party during a non-international armed conflict would not negate the detaining power’s responsibilities to monitor and ensure proper treatment is provided for detainees while in the custody of a third party.
14 On 29 January 2002, while K-Bar was still ongoing, the Canadian government was forced to confirm that JTF2 soldiers had, by this point, taken prisoners in Afghanistan and handed them over to their US counterparts.41 By early February 2002, Canada had added the 3rd Battalion of the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry to the US coalition forces operating in Afghanistan. With this increase of approximately 750 soldiers came greater likelihood of Canadians taking prisoners. Despite this increase in probability, and compounded by the Bush administration’s internal struggle on how to categorize the detainees being shipped to Guantanamo Bay under their vague tribunal procedures, the Canadian government maintained its policy of default handovers.42 Not long after, President Bush clarified his administration’s stance, stating that neither Taliban nor al-Qaeda fighters would receive POW status, although they would be treated humanely while detained in Guantanamo. It must be noted that the US made no distinction in their decision between those fighters captured before 22 December 2001 and those afterwards. The ICRC rejected Bush’s position stating that, "The ICRC stands by its position that people in a situation of international conflict are considered to be prisoners of war unless a competent tribunal decides otherwise," and was supported in their statements by the International Commission of Jurists, which noted, "Only a U.S. court and not the administration has the legal authority to make such a determination." Nevertheless, the Canadian government accepted Bush’s clarification as adhering to their Geneva Convention obligations.43 This article agrees with the ICRC’s response, so long as the categorization of an international armed conflict is restricted to the period between the dates of 7 October and 22 December 2001. With that said, it is in no way implied that subsequent to 22 December the US had carte blanche for its treatment of detainees and Canada was no longer responsible for the fate of those it captured. As outlined above, the Canadian government is still bound by the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols in conjunction with international human rights law.
16 On 24 May 2002, the Canadian Forces participated in a raid that led to the capture of 55 Taliban and al-Qaeda suspects. Once again, JTF2 was suspected of being involved. When asked if any Canadian Forces personnel took prisoners, DND reaffirmed that anyone captured by Canadian troops would be handed over to US troops since it was a US-led mission.48 A week after the raid, testimony from villagers accused coalition troops of throwing stun grenades into houses, breaking walls, tying villagers up during interrogations, beatings, and humiliations.49 Of the 55 captives originally taken, 50 were released. As transfers continued and the international spotlight shone more brightly on the harsh conditions suffered by those in Guantanamo Bay, the Canadian government began to feel pressured to halt transfers to US authorities. Over the following years, organizations such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, the Organization of American States, and the United Nations took increasing interest in the methods used by the US in Guantanamo in regards to interrogation, detention, and due process.50 At the end of 2005, this pressure finally resulted in a slight change in Canadian policy.
19 For the next two years, with condemning reports of jail conditions and Afghanistan’s haphazard judicial system being published by the US State Department, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, and secretly by the Canadian Embassy in Afghanistan until forcefully disclosed, transfers continued under the impotent protections of the agreement.75 Increasingly negative attention was brought when Canada’s then- Defence Minister Gordon O’Connor responded to a question in the House of Commons by stating that the ICRC would report abuse allegations of detainees handed over to the Afghan authorities to Canada. The ICRC was quick to respond, clarifying that "The ICRC is under no obligation to share information with Canada on treatment of detainees handed over to the Afghan authorities. The ICRC provides this information to Afghanistan."76 On 23 April 2007, The Globe and Mail published an exclusive investigation that documented firsthand accounts of multiple Canadian captured detainees, 30 in all, who faced severe abuse and torture at the hands of Afghan authorities.77 O’Connor attempted to shift the blame and responsibility for the abuse by stating that "The [Afghan Independent] Human Rights Commission promised to advise us if any of our detainees are abused."78 Following The Globe and Mail report, two leading human rights academics (Michael Byers and William Schabas) sent a letter to the International Criminal Court’s chief prosecutor requesting an inquiry into the possibility of war crimes.79 The Canadian government was put under increasing pressure when Amnesty International and the British Columbia Civil Liberties Association filed for an injunction in Canada’s federal court system to stop future transfers to Afghan authorities on 3 May 2007. The hearing was suspended on that same day when the court was informed Canada and Afghanistan had signed an additional agreement regulating the transfer of detainees.80 The timing should be noted as peculiar.
22 Of course, this ruling was disheartening for those who wanted to see increased jurisdiction of the Charter in an effort to obtain accountability for Canadian Forces’ conduct abroad. Although an appeal was made to the Supreme Court of Canada, it refused to hear the argument in May 2009, marking the end of the domestic legal road.
24 Clearly, this issue has not been resolved, with the policy continuing and failure to locate or account for the treatment of previously transferred detainees. What this article has endeavored to demonstrate is that, although the classification of the conflict is important, Canada’s obligations under both non-international and international armed conflicts prevents it from deflecting responsibility for those that come under its effective control to a third party. This indifference to third-party treatment was maintained by the Liberal government while Canadian-captured detainees were being denied POW status during an international armed conflict and shipped to Guantanamo Bay to face torturous conditions. When the opposition questioned the policy, Liberal Prime Minister Jean Chrétien accused them of supporting terrorists and shrugged off the country’s Geneva Convention obligations. Once evidence of such conditions in US hands became overwhelming, the government simply changed the third-party recipient. This time Canada elected Afghanistan, with a notoriously dismal human rights record, to bear the responsibility. After signing two impotent agreements governing transfers within the context of a non-international armed conflict and the wide publication of abuses in Afghan hands, the Conservative government dismissed such claims as "Taliban propaganda," refusing to investigate or confirm allegations. Such blatant disregard (over the course of eight years and two governments) for Canada’s international human rights obligations under the ICCPR and CAT in addition to the continued obligations under humanitarian law has led to unimaginable suffering for torture victims and the undermining of Canada’s objectives in Afghanistan, and has done irreparable harm to Canada’s reputation as a human-rights vanguard.
25 Accountability seems elusive with the Harper government taking proactive measures to ensure the issue is marginalized. By proroguing Parliament from late December 2009 until 3 March 2010, the government shut down the joint House of Commons committee investigating the detainee matter. In addition, the unprecedented step of not extending Chairman Tinsley’s mandate until the conclusion of the MPCC’s investigation placed that oversight body on hold until the government announced a new appointment. This decision should be viewed as the equivalent of changing a judge midway through a trial. On the side of the Official Opposition, calls for a public inquiry were made but to limit that investigation to post-2006 when the Conservatives came into power, shielding the probe from the Liberal’s involvement in establishing the policy.
26 While a positive ruling by Justice MacTavish would have stopped the transfers, it is a comfort to know it is not the only avenue for a resolution. Once all domestic remedies have been exhausted, the UN Human Rights Committee and CAT could play a principled role in establishing state responsibility. Additionally, as mentioned above, the International Criminal Court has been notified of the potential violations of the Rome Statute, which could amount to war crimes, although indictments are not expected. Nevertheless, if nothing else, this case exemplifies civil society’s keen engagement and desire for Canada to adhere to its international and domestic obligations. Unfortunately, to date these efforts have not borne fruit, reinforcing the reality that government holds the ultimate power to decide policy as well as the ultimate responsibility for its actions.
27 Marc Gionet is the Director of the Atlantic Human Rights Centre at Saint Thomas University in Fredericton, New Brunswick.
1 The North Atlantic Treaty signed in Washington DC, 4 April 1949.
2 The United Nations Security Council issued Security Council Resolutions 1368 and 1373, which "recognized" and "reaffirmed" the inherent right of individual and collective self defense under article 51 of the UN Charter.
3 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1386.
4 Robert Cryer, "The Fine Art of Friendship: Jus in Bello in Afghanistan," Journal of Conflict and Security Law 7 (2002), pp. 37, and 40.
5 ICRC Press Release 01/47 "Afghanistan: ICRC Calls on all Parties to Respect International Humanitarian Law," 24 October 2001, found at: http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/57jrdn.htm.
6 Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, Volume 1: Rules (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
7 Mark Weisburd, "Al-Qaeda and the Law of War," Lewis & Clark Law Review 11 (2007), pp. 1072-73.
8 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 United Nations Treaty Series 135, Article 4 A(1), found at: http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/y3gctpw.htm.
9 Hencraerts and Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, p. 384.
10 Cryer, "The Fine Art of Friendship," p. 42.
11 Ray Murphy, "Prisoner of War Status and the Question of Guantanamo Bay Detainees," Human Rights Law Review 3, no. 2 (2003), pp. 257 and 266.
12 See Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v The United States) International Court of Justice, October 1984, found at: http://www.icjcij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=3&code=nus&case=70&k=66.
13 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Article 4 A (2). Conditions include: (a) that of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates; (b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance; (c) that of carrying arms openly; and (d) that of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.
14 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Article 5.
15 Protocol Additional I to the Geneva Conventions, 8 June 1977, found at: http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/full/470?opendocument.
16 Protocol Additional I, Article 44 (2).
17 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Article 12.
21 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Article 118.
22 "Bush’s PoW stance falls short ICRC," The Globe and Mail, 8 February 2002.
23 Dave LeBlanc and Jeff Sallot, "PM says critics are defending terrorist," The Globe and Mail, 7 February 2002.
24 UN Commission on Human Rights, "Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention and Others," (2006) UN Doc. E/CN.4/2006/120, found at: http://www.universalhumanrightsindex.org/documents/844/815/document/en/pdf/text.pdf.
25 "Interim government takes power," CBC News, 22 December 2001, found at: http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2001/12/21/afghanistan011221.html.
26 "JFT2: Canada’s Super Secret Commandos," CBC News, 15 July 2005, found at: http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/cdnmilitary/jtf2.html.
27 Ray Murphy, UN Peacekeeping in Lebanon, Somalia, and Kosovo (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 117.
28 Dave LeBlanc, "Canada Defies US over POWs," The Globe and Mail, 17 January 2002.
29 "Canada’s JTF2 in Afghanistan: Eggleton," CBC News, 19 December 2001, found at: http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2001/12/19/jtf2_kandahar011219.html.
30 "Canadians Have Nowhere to Keep Captives," CBC News, 30 January 2002, found at: http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2002/01/30/canada_captives020130.html.
33 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Article 12.
34 "Karzai promises peace in post-Taliban Afghanistan," CBC News, 24 December 2001, found at: http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2001/12/22/afghan_inaug011222.html.
35 This agreement was later reflected in documents such as: Technical Arrangements between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan signed on 18 December 2005, found at: http://www.afghanistan.gc.ca/canada-afghanistan/assets/pdfs/Dec2005.pdf and The Afghan Compact signed 1 February 2006, found at: http://www.afghanembassy-brussels.org/uploads/3/0/2/3/3023882/afghanistan_compact.pdf. Canada has also signed a Status of Forces Agreement with Afghanistan.
36 Cryer, "The Fine Art of Friendship," p. 39.
37 "UN authorizes peacekeeping force for Afghanistan," CBC News, 20 December 2001, found at: http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2001/12/20/kabul_peace011220.html.
38 Protocol Additional II to the Geneva Conventions, 8 June 1977, Article 1.
39 Protocol Additional II, Article 4.
40 Protocol Additional I, Article 75(3).
41 "Eggleton Confirms that JTF2 is Taking Prisoners in Afghanistan," CBC News, 29 January 2002, found at: http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2002/01/29/jtf2020129.html.
42 Shawn McCarthy and Jeff Sallot, "Liberal fears fail to change orders on troops’ captives," The Globe and Mail, 6 February 2002.
43 "Bush’s POW stance falls short ICRC," The Globe and Mail, 8 February 2002.
44 Jeff Sallot, "Britain will give Afghans PoW status: Canada won’t," The Globe and Mail, 30 April 2002.
45 E. Olson, "UN to open rights review with US on sideline," The New York Times, 17 March 2002.
47 Katharine Seelye and Steven Erlanger, "US Suspends the transfer of terror suspects to Cuba," The New York Times, 24 January 2002.
48 Brian Laghi and Allison Dunfield, "Coalition captures 55 Al Qaeda suspects," The Globe and Mail, 25 May 2002.
49 "Afghani villagers say Canadians part of force that abused them," CBC News, 31 May 2002.
50 See "United States of America, Memorandum to the US Government on the Right of People under US Custody in Afghanistan and Guantanamo Bay," Amnesty International, 12 October 2003, found at: http://web.amnesty.org/library/print/ENGAMR510532002; "United States: Guantanamo Two Years On," Human Rights Watch, 9 January 2004, found at: http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/01/09/usdom6917.htm; UN Commission on Human Rights, "Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention and Others" (2006).
51 "Arrangement for the Transfer of Detainees between the Canadian Forces and the Ministry of Defence of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan," signed in Kabul, Afghanistan on 18 December 2005, found at: http://www.afghanistan.gc.ca/canada-afghanistan/assets/pdfs/Dec2005.pdf.
52 Stuart Hendin, "Do as We Say Not as We Do: A Critical Examination of the Agreement for the Transfer of Detainees between the Canadian Forces and the Ministry of Defense of Afghanistan," 7 (2007); New Zealand Armed Forces Law Review, p 32.
53 "Arrangement for the Transfer of Detainees," paragraph 3.
56 Hendin, "Do as We Say Not as We Do," p. 32.
57 Additional Protocol I, Article 80 (2) states: "The High Contracting Parties and the Parties to the conflict shall give orders and instructions to ensure the observance of the Conventions and this Protocol, and shall supervise their execution."
59 See International Court of Justice: "Request for an Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Use by a State of a Nuclear Weapon in Armed Conflicts 1993," found at: http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/93/7648.pdf.
60 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171, found at: http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/ccpr.htm.
61 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 6.
62 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 7.
63 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 9.
64 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 10.
65 United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, "General Comment No. 31: Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Pursuant to the Covenant," (2004) Article 10, found at: http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/58f5d4646e861359c1256ff600533f5f?Opendocument.
66 See Al-Skeini and Others v Secretary of State for Defence UKHL 26 (June 2007), found at: http://www.unhcr.org/cgibin/texis/vtx/refworld/rwmain?docid=4672880a2; The inter-American Commission for Human Rights Case no. 11.589, 29 September 1999, Alejandro and Others v Cuba; Loizidou v Turkey (Preliminary Objections); European Court of Human Rights 40/1993/435/514; Rasul v. Bush, 542 US 466 (2004); Omar et al. v. Secretary of the United States Army et al.; 479 F. 3d 1 (DC Cir. 2007); Banković v. Belgium, (2001) 11 BHRC 435, 2001–XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 333 (GC); and Issa v. Turkey (2004) 41 EHRR 567.
67 Kindler v Canada (Comm No 470/1991), UN Doc CCPR/C48/D/470/1991 (1993), found at: http://www.worldcourts.com/hrc/eng/decisions/1993.07.30_Kindler_v_Canada.htm.
69 "Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment," adopted 10 December 1984, entered into force 26 June 1987, 1465 UNTS 85, found at: http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/cat.htm.
70 Convention against Torture, Article 3.
71 UN General Assembly, "Interim report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on the question of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment," UN Doc A/59/324, (2004), found at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4267be1b4.html.
72 Convention against Torture, Article 16.
73 Convention against Torture, Article 11.
74 Convention against Torture, Article 15.
75 Paul Koring, "What Ottawa doesn’t want you to know," The Globe and Mail, 25 April 2007.
76 "O’Connor sorry for misinforming house on Afghan detainees," CBC News, 17 March 2007, found at: http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2007/03/19/afghanaplogy.html.
77 G. Smith, "From Canadian Custody to Cruel Hands," The Globe and Mail, 23 April 2007, found at: http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20070423.wdetainee23/BNStory/Afghanistan/?pageRequested=1 .
78 "Latest Afghan abuse claims spark cries for O’Connor to resign," CBC News, 23 April 2007.
79 "World Court asked to look into Afghan detainee controversy," CBC News, 26 April 2007.
80 "Canada has new Afghan deal Court told," CBC News, 3 May 2007, found at: http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2007/05/03/detainees-court.html.
81 "Arrangement for the Transfer of Detainees between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan," signed May 3, 2007, paragraph 2, found at: http://www.afghanistan.gc.ca/canada-afghanistan/documents/arrangement_detainee.aspx?lang=eng.
82 Ibid., paragraphs 3 and 5.
84 Ibid., paragraphs 7 and 8.
86 "Ottawa dismisses report that Afghan prisoners are still beaten," CBC News, 29 October 2007, found at: http://www.cbc.ca/canada/montreal/story/2007/10/29/qc-afghanreport1029.html.
87 "Causes of Torture in Law Enforcement Institutions," Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission Report (April 2009), found at: http://www.aihrc.org.af/english/Eng_pages/Researches_eng/Research_cause_of_Torture_2009_April.pdf.
88 "Challenge on handling of Afghan prisoners can continue: court," CBC News, 5 November 2007), found at: http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2007/11/05/detainee-challenge.html.
89 Paul Koring, "Detainee torture remains a reality, report shows," The Globe and Mail, 22 January 2008.
90 "Acting Commander ended Afghanistan detainee transfers, court hears," CBC News, 25 January 2008, found at: http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2008/01/24/afghan-detainees.html.
91 "Judge rejects injunction to ban transfers of Afghan prisoners," CBC News, 7 February 2008, found at: http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2008/02/07/detainees-judge.html.
92 Amnesty International Canada v Canada (Minister of National Defense) (2008 FC 162), 7 February 2008, paragraph 5.
94 "Canadian military resumes transfer of detainees," CBC News, 29 February 2008, found at: http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2008/02/29/detainees-afghanistan.html.
96 R. v. Hape, (2007), SCC 26, found at: http://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/2007/2007scc26/2007scc26.pdf.
97 Amnesty International Canada v Chief of the Defense Staff [2008 FC 336] 12 March 2008, paragraph 194, found at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,CAN_FC,,AFG,4562d8cf2,49cb8cff2,0.html.
101 "Commission Forced to Hold Public Interest Hearing into Allegations Concerning Detainee Transfers in Afghanistan," 12 March 2008, found at: http://www.mpcc-cppm.gc.ca/300/Afghan2/index_e.aspx.
102 House of Commons Committee AFGH (40-02) Edited Evidence Number 015 (official version), found at: http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=4236267&Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=40&Ses=2#I nt-2955390.

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