Source: https://www.povertylaw.org/clearinghouse/fpmd/chapter6/section7
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 04:04:57+00:00

Document:
Appellate practice raises some questions similar to those presented in the district court, but it also introduces new issues and procedures. Note that it contains argument both over whether the lower court’s order was appealable and substantive argument on the merits.
The basic rule is that “[t]he courts of appeals . . . shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts ....”3 The Supreme Court interprets this “to mean that an appeal ordinarily will not lie until after final judgment has been entered in a case.”4 This final judgment rule provides that “a decision is not final, ordinarily, unless it ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.”5 In practice, whether a judgment is indeed final is not always intuitive and should be researched. For example, the Supreme Court has ruled that a judgment is final even though a request for attorney fees is still pending.6 When a matter remains pending despite the entry of a judgment, research the finality issue carefully and quickly.
In the vast majority of cases, the appellant did not prevail below and has standing to challenge that adverse decision. However, the Supreme Court has concluded that prevailing parties may, under certain circumstances, possess the "personal stake" needed for Article III standing to appeal.7 In Camreta v. Greene, the Supreme Court recently held that a state social worker had standing to challenge a lower court decision that his interviewing a minor without a warrant, exigent circumstance or parental consent violated the Constitution, but they were immune because the law was insufficiently clear to put them on notice of the illegality of their conduct.8 The constitutional decision, if unchallenged, would require the social workers in the future either to modify their practice or to risk liability, thereby establishing a prospective stake in the outcome of the appeal.
In addition, the “collateral order doctrine,” a common-law doctrine, interprets “final decision” to include some orders that do not end the litigation. To be appealable, an order within this “small category” must be “conclusive, . . . resolve important questions separate from the merits, and . . . [be] effectively unreviewable on appeal from the final judgment in the underlying action.”19 The standard is extremely difficult to meet; a practitioner contemplating this approach should do considerable research on the intricacies of the doctrine.
Deciding whether to appeal an adverse decision involves balancing a host of potentially competing factors. Obviously, the clients’ needs and desires are at the top of the list.
At the same time, the possibility of success on the appeal has to be balanced against the impact of appealing or not appealing. For instance, if the district court rules adversely on the merits while certifying a class, certification may counsel in favor of an appeal as there may be little to lose. The more common concern, however, arises when the plaintiffs’ loss at the district court level affects only themselves, while an unsuccessful appeal would have a far broader impact as it would create binding precedent in the circuit. This is of particular importance when other public interest advocates in the circuit have filed or are about to file litigation on the same issue that may have a better chance of success in the district court.
Are there non-substantive aspects of the decision that favor or disfavor an appeal (e.g., a good ruling on standing or mootness that might be threatened by a cross-appeal if the adverse decision on the merits is appealed)?
Might an appeal result in a split of authority in the circuits, thereby increasing the risk of the issue going to the Supreme Court?
Is the decision to be appealed from likely to be published (and therefore more likely to have an impact in some way)?
With at least one significant difference, the decision to appeal is similar to the decision to bring the litigation in the first place. While a decision not to bring the litigation can be changed (subject to the statute of limitations), the decision not to appeal concludes that issue for those plaintiffs. Taking that step is sometimes difficult, but cutting losses to prevent a worse result is often the smartest move a practitioner may make.
The first step in an appeal is filing a notice of appeal. This is a one-sentence statement indicating who is appealing, from which order or judgment (including the date) the appeal is taken, and to which court.23 When you represent more than one party, you need not name all the plaintiffs who are appealing.24 Nevertheless, the safer approach is to specify all of them.25 The notice has the district court caption and is filed in the district court. The clerk then serves copies on the other parties’ counsel.26 If the appeal is from a final judgment, but the intention is to appeal orders issued during the course of the litigation, you need not specify each order to be appealed; the judgment encompasses all the orders entered.
Attorneys should review their circuit’s local rules to determine their obligations for this and other facets of the appeal.
Most appeals are resolved after full briefing and oral argument, with each court having different policies and procedures for those activities. The content and form of the briefs and of the appendix to the briefs are set out in detail in Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 28, 30, and 32, and local rules of court. Because local practice often differs on these important aspects of appellate practice, they are not discussed here.49 Counsel must thoroughly familiarize themselves with these practices. In addition to entertaining plenary briefing and argument, the appellate courts also consider numerous motions, which can be either procedural or substantive and which, in some instances, are dispositive. A brief discussion of some of the more important motions follows.
Another motion to consider is one for summary disposition, that is, for affirmance or reversal without plenary review. This is especially useful if the court entertains it before full briefing and views the procedure positively.53 Although the standard is invariably strict and such a motion is rarely granted (especially summary reversal), summary disposition has the advantage of resolving the appeal quickly and with considerably less work and expense.54 Also, because the motion is based on a strict standard, which may not require a careful inquiry into the merits and usually does not result in more than a pro forma, unpublished disposition stating that the standard has not been met, there is little risk involved.55 Losing the motion should not have any impact on the ultimate outcome. If a reasonable chance of success is seen, a motion for summary disposition has the additional advantage of having two bites at the apple. Needless to say, however, practitioners should not abuse this approach but reserve it for the truly deserving case.
A losing party also has the right to petition for a writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court.65 This right may be exercised with or without a petition for rehearing and/or rehearing en banc having been filed. The petition for certiorari must be filed within 90 days after entry of the judgment in the court of appeals or denial of the petition for rehearing in that court.66 The brief in opposition, which is not mandatory, must be filed within 30 days after the case is put on the Supreme Court’s docket.67 Jurisdictional challenges to the petition must be included in the brief in opposition rather than filed as a separate motion to dismiss.68 Legal aid attorneys contemplating filing a petition for certiorari should discuss this matter with as many other seasoned practitioners as possible so that they, and their clients, are fully informed, from a variety of perspectives, as to whether filing such a petition is appropriate under the circumstances.
1. Further guidance on these issues is available in many texts, including Carole Berry, Effective Appellate Advocacy: Brief Writing and Oral Argument (West 4th ed. 2010); Bradley G. Clary et al., Advocacy on Appeal (West 3d ed. 2008); Michael R. Fontham et al., Persuasive Written and Oral Advocacy: In Trial and Appellate Courts (Aspen 2d ed. 2007).
2. See, e.g., In re O’Brien, 312 F.3d 1135, 1137 (9th Cir. 2002) (dismissal of appeal because brief and excerpts of record failed to comply with federal and circuit rules).
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 .
4. Cunningham v. Hamilton County, Ohio, 527 U.S. 198, 203 (1999) (citations omitted).
5. Id. at 204 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
6. Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 199-202 (1988).
7. Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2028-30 (2011).
9. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wetzel, 424 U.S. 737, 742-43 (1976).
10. In Gelboim v. Bank of America Corporation, 135 S. Ct. 897 (2015), the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff whose case has been consolidated for multidistrict litigation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407 may appeal the dismissal of the case under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 within 30 days rather than waiting until the completion of the multidistrict litigation consolidation.
11. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) .
12. See, e.g., Gardner v. Westinghouse Broad. Co., 437 U.S. 478, 480 (1978).
13. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) .
15. Swint v. Chambers County Comm’r, 514 U.S. 35, 47 (1995).
16. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f).
17. See In re Delta Air Lines, 310 F.3d 953, 959 (6th Cir. 2002) (reviewing and summarizing decisions from several other circuits on the appropriate standard), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 904 (2003); In re Lorazepam & Clorazepate Antitrust Litig., 289 F. 3d 98, 102-04 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (same).
18. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f).
19. Swint, 514 U.S. at 42. See also Mohawk Industries v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100 (2009) (orders to disclose documents asserted to be protected by the attorney-client privilege do not qualify for immediate appeal under the collateral order doctrine); Osborn v. Haley, 549 U.S. 225 (2007) (order denying Westfall Act certification and substitution); Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345 (2006) (Federal Tort Claims Act’s judgment bar); Cunningham v. Hamilton Co., 527 U.S. 198 (1999) (sanctions against attorney for failing to comply with discovery order); Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 878-79 (1994) (refusal to enforce settlement agreement); Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 143-44 (1993) (Eleventh Amendment immunity); Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517, 530-31 (1988) (forum non conveniens dismissal); Richardson-Merrill Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424 (1985) (attorney disqualification).
20. Fed. R. App. P. 38. See, e.g., Ingle v. Circuit City, 408 F.3d 592, 595-96 (9th Cir. 2005).
21. While most appellate courts regularly invite judges from other appellate courts and from the district courts to sit by designation on their panels, the D.C. Circuit currently uses only its own appeals court judges. This kind of information can be useful in gauging the odds of a sympathetic panel.
22. A good source of information about federal appellate judges is the Almanac of the Federal Judiciary (published by Aspen), a two-volume looseleaf volume updated at least twice a year; it has basic biographical information and anonymous evaluations by lawyers of judges’ perceived strengths, weaknesses, and political predispositions. Volume 2 describes the appellate judges.
23. Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)(1). Form 1 attached to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure is a “Notice of Appeal to a Court of Appeals from a Judgment or Order of a District Court.” See Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)(5).
25. Under the prior version of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(c)(1), the Supreme Court held that naming one plaintiff as an appellant, followed by “et al.,” was not sufficient to designate the unspecified plaintiffs as appellants. Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312, 317-18 (1988). The rule was then liberalized to eliminate this trap for the unwary. See, e.g., Garcia v. Walsh, 20 F.3d 608, 609 (5th Cir. 1994).
26. Fed. R. App. P. 3(a)(1), (d)(1), (e). As a matter of courtesy, however, appellants’ counsel also should serve the notice of appeal on the other parties. See, e.g., Handbook of Practice and Internal Procedures § III.B.I. at 13 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 1, 2009) [hereinafter D.C. Circuit Handbook].
27. See, e.g., Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 214 (2007) (courts cannot make equitable exceptions); Griggs v. Provident Consumer Disc. Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58-59 (1982); see also Fed. R. App. P. 3(a)(2) .
28. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A) .
29. Ray Haluch Gravel Company v. Central Pension Fund of the International Union of Operating Engineers, 134 S. Ct. 773 (2014); Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Company, 486 U.S. 196 (1988).
30. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(B) . The rules regarding judgments are almost metaphysical. According to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(7), a judgment is considered to be “entered” when there has been compliance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 58, which requires the judgment to be “set forth on a separate document.” Only then is the judgment “effective.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 58; see Shalala v. Schaeffer, 509 U.S. 292, 302-03 (1993). Adding to the complexity is that the real date on which the judgment is considered entered is “the date of entry of a civil judgment on the clerk’s docket,” which may not be shown on the docket sheet. Houston v. Greiner, 174 F.3d 287, 289 (2d Cir. 1999). Using the date file-stamped on the judgment as beginning the time to appeal is the safest approach.
31. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(2) .
35. See, e.g., Allied Steel v. City of Abilene, 909 F.2d 139, 142 (5th Cir. 1990).
36. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5)(A)(ii).
38. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1913 (note), 1917; U.S. Courts, Court of Appeals Miscellaneous Fee Schedule (Dec. 1, 2013).
39. Id. 24(a)(1). The necessary information for the accompanying declaration appears in Form 4 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. See id. 24(a)(1)(A).
44. Second Circuit Local Rule 31.2(a)(1).
45. See RLI Insurance Company v. JDJ Marine, Incorporated, 716 F.3d 41, 43-44 (2d Cir. 2013).
46. The panel of three judges must unanimously agree that the appeal is frivolous, that the dispositive issues “have been authoritatively decided,” or that the facts and arguments have been presented such that “the decisional process would not be significantly aided by oral argument.” Id. 34(a)(2).
47. First Circuit Local Rule 34(a).
48. Second Circuit Local Rule 34(d)(1).
49. Note, however, that the rules now generally require briefs to be in at least 14-point type. Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(5)(A). Also, since the limit for a principal brief is only 30 pages, it will invariably be preferable to employ the alternative method of counting the words (up to 14,000 for a principal brief) and certifying compliance with that limit. Id. 32(a)(7)(B)(i),(C). Practitioners should also check the local rules.
50. Id. 8(a)(1), (2). The rule is somewhat illogical in requiring the appellant first to seek emergency relief pending appeal in the district court. If the district court grants a stay, it is effectively contradicting the rationale of its own previous decision to issue an injunction. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. DeBuono, 175 F.3d 227, 235 (2d Cir. 1999) (in reversing preliminary injunction which had been stayed by the district court, court of appeals states that “grant of a stay of a preliminary injunction pending appeal will almost always be logically inconsistent with a prior finding of irreparable harm”). The request for an injunction pending appeal from the district court is also almost certainly an exercise in futility because of that court’s denial of the request for an injunction on the merits. Nevertheless the effort should be made in order to satisfy the terms of the rule.
51. Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009). The Court also made it clear that satisfaction of these first two factors, the likelihood of success and irreparable harm, requires more than just a better than negligible chance of success and more than just the possibility of irreparable harm. Id.; see also, e.g., Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776 (1987) (listing the four factors for a stay pending appeal). Rule 8(a)(1), Circuit Rules of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (standard for both a stay and an injunction pending appeal).
52. In some instances the statute under which a case is brought specifies the circumstances in which the appeal may be expedited. See, e.g., D.C. Circuit Rule 47.2(a). Otherwise, the standard often is the traditional “good cause”; see, e.g., Rule 27-12, Circuit Rules of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Rule 27.5, Circuit Rules of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, may be more demanding, such as in requiring “irreparable injury” and in that the decision under review be “subject to substantial challenge.” D.C. Circuit Handbook, supra note 423, § VIII.B, at 33.
53. The Fourth Circuit, for instance, discourages motions for summary disposition and considers them only after briefing is completed. Rule 27(f), Circuit Rules of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. But see, e.g., D.C. Circuit Rule 27(g)(1) (requiring the motion to be filed within forty-five days of docketing); D.C. Circuit Handbook, supra note 423, § VIII.I at 36 (“Parties are encouraged to file such motions where a sound basis exists for summary disposition.”); see also, e.g., Rule 27.4, Third Circuit Local Appellate Rules (must “alleg[e] that no substantial question is presented”).
54. See, e.g., Taxpayers Watchdog Inc. v. Stanley, 819 F.2d 294, 297 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
55. See, e.g., Indianapolis Power & Light Co. v. Surface Transp. Bd., No. 02-1056, 2002 WL 1349542 (D.C. Cir. June 19, 2002).
56. Fed. R. App. P. 40(a)(2).
57. See, e.g., Second Circuit Local Rule 40.1(d).
58. Fed. R. App. P. 40(a)(4).
59. Id. 35(a). Although extremely rare, a hearing en banc may also be requested before the appeal to the panel is heard. Id. 35(c).
61. Indeed, a vote will not even be taken unless at least one judge calls for it. Id. 35(f). If rehearing en banc is granted, the appeal will be heard by the entire circuit court, except in the Ninth Circuit, which employs a limited en banc court of eleven judges (with a full en banc at least theoretically possible). Ninth Circuit Rule 35-3.
62. Fed. R. App. P. 40(a)(1), 35(c).
63. Id. 35(b)(2), (3), 40(b).
65. 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).
66. Sup. Ct. R. 13.1, 13.3.
67. Id., Rule 15.1, 15.3.

References: v. 
 § 1291
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 1407
 § 1291
 § 1292
 v. 
 § 1292
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 1254