Source: https://elawnora.blogspot.com/2019/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 08:54:47+00:00

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As reported by The IPKat, earlier this week, like the European Parliament, also the Council adopted the latest version of the the Directive on copyright in the Digital Single Market (DSM Directive).
One of the seemingly most complex -if nothing else, due to its length - provisions is what is now Article 17 (formerly, Article 13) of the DSM Directive, on "Use of protected content by online content-sharing service providers".
1. Member States shall provide that an online content-sharing service provider [as defined in Article 2(6)] performs an act of communication to the public or an act of making available to the public for the purposes of this Directive when it gives the public access to copyright-protected works or other protected subject matter uploaded by its users.
6. Member States shall provide that, in respect of new online content-sharing service providers the services of which have been available to the public in the Union for less than three years and which have an annual turnover below EUR 10 million, calculated in accordance with Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC, the conditions under the liability regime set out in paragraph 4 are limited to compliance with point (a) of paragraph 4 and to acting expeditiously, upon receiving a sufficiently substantiated notice, to disable access to the notified works or other subject matter or to remove those works or other subject matter from their websites .
The chart can be also downloaded here.
Any feedback and comments welcome!
As IPKat readers know, a few days ago the European Parliament adopted the latest version of the draft Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market ('DSM Directive'). In a few days' time, the Council will cast the last vote on it and, after that, it will be published on the EU Official Journal. Individual Member States will then have 24 months to transpose this new piece of EU legislation into their own laws.
The IPKat is now running a DSM Directive Series [previous episodes, here and here], to address a number of points raised by the provisions contained in the directive.
... In the field of visual arts, the circulation of faithful reproductions of works in the public domain contributes to the access to and promotion of culture, and the access to cultural heritage. In the digital environment, the protection of such reproductions through copyright or related rights is inconsistent with the expiry of the copyright protection of works. In addition, differences between the national copyright laws governing the protection of such reproductions give rise to legal uncertainty and affect the cross-border dissemination of works of visual arts in the public domain. Certain reproductions of works of visual arts in the public domain should, therefore, not be protected by copyright or related rights. All of that should not prevent cultural heritage institutions from selling reproductions, such as postcards.
Three questions may arise - inter alia - in relation to Article 14. The first is whether, insofar as copyright is concerned, this provision represents a change in the law or, instead, a mere clarification thereof. The second is whether this provisions provides any broader teachings as regards copyright subsistence. The third is what relationship there is between Article 14 and Article 6 in the Term Directive.
Article 14: a change or a clarification?
This blog has discussed on a number of occasions, eg here, whether the concept of originality as mandated by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in Infopaq and its progeny allows Member States to protect - by means of copyright - verbatim reproductions of public domain artworks.
The answer appears to be in the negative: to satisfy the required originality it is necessary that a work be its 'author's own intellectual creation', as resulting from 'free and creative choices' so that the 'personal touch' of the author is visible in the creative result [see here for a recent application in the Netherlands].
In this sense, therefore, Article 14 is a clarification - rather than a change - in the law as it already exists or - rather, as it has been developed by the CJEU. A simple reproduction of a work in the public domain is not sufficient to create a new copyright.
The provision is also important because it somewhat codifies CJEU case law on originality. In fact , Article 14 relates the standard of originality required for copyright protection to the concept of 'author's own intellectual creation' in relation to 'any material resulting from an act of reproduction' (emphasis added).
So far, there has been a formal harmonization of the standard of originality only for computer programs, databases, and photographs. In its landmark Infopaq decision, the CJEU de facto harmonized this requirement for copyright protection and made the 'author's own intellectual creation' threshold applicable also to works falling within the scope of the InfoSoc Directive.
Article 14 of the DSM Directive - though within the (limited) remit of reproductions of works of visual art - appears to assume that, under EU copyright, protection only arises when a work - 'a material' - is sufficiently original in the sense clarified by the CJEU.
The Term Directive is a piece of EU legislation that the DSM Directive neither leaves unaffected (see Article 1 and Recital 4), nor does it amend explicitly (see Article 24).
This provision explicitly allows EU Member States to protect both original photographs (by means of copyright) and sub-original photographs (by means of related rights; recently this blog reported on the German Federal Court of Justice's decision concerning protection of digitzed images of works in the public domain: here and here).
With the introduction of Article 14 of the DSM Directive, the question that arises is whether and to what extent the possibility made available by the Term Directive of related rights in sub-original photographs has been affected by this new provision.
It would appear that a related right (if any) recognized by a certain Member State is due to become unavailable insofar as the photograph at issue is of a work of visual art in the public domain, but it might not go beyond that.
would be outside the scope of the right (to be noted that, already now, the Galleria degli Uffizi - unlike, eg, the National Portrait Gallery or Musée d'Orsay - does not claim to hold any copyright over the digitized image of this masterpiece by Botticelli).
As reported by The IPKat, last week the European Parliament approved the latest version of the Directive on copyright in the Digital Single Market (DSM Directive) which, once approved one last time by EU Member States and published on the Official Journal, will officially come into effect and will then require transposition at the national level.
Still last week, The IPKat launched a 'DSM Directive Series' of posts to comment on certain key aspects of this forthcoming piece of EU legislation. The first post of the series, "Do Member States have to transpose the value gap provision and does the YouTube referral matter?" is available here.
Today, I shall be focusing on a different provision, that is what is now Article 15 of the DSM Directive (formerly, Article 11) and the new press publishers' right envisaged therein.
It will be enjoyed by press publishers established in an EU Member State: this means that press publishers established outside the EU would not be eligible for protection under Article 15. The UK withdrawal from the EU would likely mean that - by default - UK-based publishers would not be eligible for Article 15 protection, in a way similar to other situations that the EU Commission itself highlighted in a note sent to stakeholders last year [Katpost here], and that the UK IPO reiterated [Katpost here].
It will be enforceable against information society service providers in relation to online uses, not individual users in relation to private or non-commercial uses of press publications.
It will not encompass linking [but, of course, linking remains an activity that might fall within the scope of copyright protection - so it would be incorrect to think that linking to press content would be always allowed: see here].
It will not encompass use of individual words or very short extracts [again, copyright might be potentially relevant in relation to 'very short extracts', insofar as those extracts are sufficiently original as per Infopaq].
The right will last for 2 years (to be calculated from the date of publication) and will not have retroactive effect.
Authors of works incorporated in a press publication shall be entitled to an 'appropriate share' of the revenues as deriving from licensing online uses of press publications.
However, there is something that is potentially more interesting than the above and is something that the directive fails to tackle.
It is the issue of waivability of the right, ie one of the key issues arisen in respect of national initiatives in, respectively, Germany (sections 87f, 87g and 87h of the German Copyright Act) and Spain (Article 32 of the Spanish Intellectual Property Law).
mandatory fair compensation requirements (as is the case in Spain).
One of the actual reasons why the German initiative [currently under scrutiny of the Court of Justice of the European Union, due to lack of notification to the EU Commission; see here for the Opinion of Advocate General Hogan] has not been too successful is also due to the fact that a substantial number of German press publishers have opted to waive their right in order to be indexed by, eg, news aggregation services. In this sense, on the very day that the German right became enforceable, Google News became opt-in (rather than opt-out) in Germany: see IPKat post here.
Things are different in Spain, as the entitlement to compensation does not stem from a new right, but rather from the reformed language of quotation exception within Article 32 of the Ley de Propiedad Intelectual. Despite relying on a mechanism different from the one envisaged under German law, Article 32 as reformed has introduced a right to ‘equitable remuneration’ that, in its substance, is not dissimilar from the German press publishers’ right. There is however a significant difference, ie that – unlike the German right – the Spanish ‘right’ cannot be waived. The result of this is that, for instance, Google News is currently unavailable in Spain [Katpost here].
Considering its national predecessors, it is quite astonishing intriguing that the DSM Directive does not tackle the issue of waivability of the right in Article 15.
This silence raises a number of issues, two of which in particular stand out.
The first is whether beneficiaries of the right will be able to waive it, lacking a specific prohibition to the contrary. The answer appears to be in the affirmative.
The second, and possibly currently more pressing, is what effect all this will have on transposition debates. It appears likely that different Member States might opt for different ways to implement the directive into their own laws, and that lobbying at the national level might lead to diverging languages of the new press publishers' right. The result might be that the right ends up being waivable in certain countries but not others (eg because national law explicitly excluding waivability).
The CJEU has explicitly excluded the possibility for EU Member States to alter the scope of harmonized rights: it did so, eg, in relation to Article 3 of the InfoSoc Directive, in both Svensson and C More. However, while this is the truth and the CJEU was correct in its assessment, it is not excluded that in fact certain Member States would include language as regards the waivability of the right or - more likely - lack thereof.
Litigation will then likely ensue in a few years' time, the CJEU might be given the possibility to assess the appropriateness of resulting national transpositions, deem them compatible or incompatible with EU law, concerned Member States will need to change their own laws, etc.
A change or just a clarification?
As reported by The IPKat, earlier this week the European Parliament adopted the latest version of the new Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market (DSM Directive).
The IPKat will now run a series of posts discussing some of the key aspects of this new instrument which, following publication in the Official Journal of the EU, will need to be transposed by EU Member States within 2 years.
Today I begin with a provision or, rather, a recital that, at least in certain respects, makes national transpositions somewhat redundant. It relates to the 'value gap' provision in what is now Article 17 of the Directive (formerly Article 13).
When an online content-sharing service provider performs an act of communication to the public or an act of making available to the public under the conditions laid down in this Directive, the limitation of liability established in Article 14(1) of Directive 2000/31/EC [that is the E-commerce Directive] shall not apply to the situations covered by this Article.
Is the idea that an online content-sharing service provider (OCSSP) communicates to the public and is ineligible for safe harbour protection a change in the law, which will require EU Member States to change their approach to platform liability and the construction of the right of communication to the public under Article 3 of the InfoSoc Directive?
This question of of no little importance, at least on two levels.
First of all, as reported by The IPKat, last September the German Federal Court of Justice made a referral to the CJEU (YouTube, C-682/18) asking, among other things, whether "the operator of an internet video platform on which videos containing content protected by copyright are made publicly accessible by users without the consent of the rightholders carry out an act of communication within the meaning of Article 3(1)" of the InfoSoc Directive, insofar as certain conditions are satisfied.
The YouTube referral was made amidst the uncertainties arisen in the aftermath of the CJEU decision in Ziggo (The Pirate Bay case; Katposts here and see also here), which held that the operators of a platform could be directly responsible for users' infringing activities.
if the operator is not specifically aware of the availability of copyright-infringing content or, after having become aware, expeditiously deletes that content or expeditiously disables access thereto?
The German court also asked the CJEU to say (Question 2) whether, in the event that Question 1 is answered in the affirmative (ie YouTube communicates to the public), the doing of an act of communication to the public rules out the availability of the safe harbour within Article 14 of the E-commerce Directive.
Dreaming of a blue passport?
The second reason why the question asked is relevant relates to Brexit: if the UK leaves the EU after the DSM Directive enters into force but before the deadline for national transpositions has passed, will it have to transpose the DSM Directive into its own law?
This is a matter of discussion and, lacking precedent, might become quite contentious.
This said, the DSM Directive - at least insofar as Article 17(1) and (3) is concerned - might not require Member States to do much.
It is appropriate to clarify in this Directive that online content-sharing service providers perform an act of communication to the public or of making available to the public when they give the public access to copyright-protected works or other protected subject matter uploaded by their users. Consequently, online content-sharing service providers should obtain an authorisation, including via a licensing agreement, from the relevant rightholders. This does not affect the concept of communication to the public or of making available to the public elsewhere under Union law, nor does it affect the possible application of Article 3(1) and (2) of Directive 2001/29/EC to other service providers using copyright-protected content.
So, Article 17 would not change the law as it already exists under the InfoSoc Directive and as transposed at the national level: it would merely clarify it.
This recital likely has the effect of rendering the YouTube referral irrelevant or diminish substantially its relevance. As the answer to Question 1 would be 'Yes', the other questions - which depend on a negative answer to that question - would not need to be considered.
The additional implication of the recital is making Brexit and the issue of transposition less of a pressing matter: if Article 17(1) and (3) is a clarification of the law as it already exists, then there is no need to change one's own law: only the interpretation should change and be in accordance with what the DSM Directive 'clarifies'.
In addition, the economic damage suffered for the violation of one's own image rights is not limited to the loss of licensing revenues, but also the actual or potential harm to one's own professional reputation which, in turn, might have an effect on the licensing market for one's own image.
Yesterday, the Italian Supreme Court issued two key decisions concerning the liability of intermediaries for third-party IPR infringements.
The judgments are: Decision 7708/19 Reti Televisive Italiane SpA v Yahoo! Inc and Decision 7709/19 Reti Televisive Italiane SpA v Yahoo! Inc. The former relates to Yahoo!’s videosharing service, while the latter concerns Yahoo!’s search engine.
finds that a notice-and-takedown request imposes on the provider at which it is addressed a stay-down obligation (also this is a major point, both under Italian law and the law of other EU Member States).
Let’s see more in detail how the Court reasoned.
RTI appealed to the Supreme Court (it should be noted that an appeal to this court is only possible insofar as the lower court has erred in its application of legal provisions: in this sense, the Italian Supreme Court is not a court on the merits), claiming - among other things - that Yahoo! could not qualify for protection under the safe harbour, it being an ‘active host’.
The Italian court also recalled the fairly recent Communication from the Commission on Illegal Content Online, in which the Commission noted that - as per Recital 42 in the preamble to the E-commerce Directive, as well as the CJEU decision in Google France and L'Oréal - the safe harbour only applies to hosting providers that do not play an ‘active role’ of such a kind as to give them knowledge of, or control over, unlawful information.
Interestingly, the Supreme Court also mentioned the initial proposal for a Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market [Katposts here], notably the attempted ‘codification’ [the language actually employed omitted to mention that the CJEU held that the active role must be such as to give the provider knowledge of or control over the infringing content] made by the Commission concerning safe harbour eligibility in the original version of Recital 38.
Having somewhat criticized EU law for lacking sufficient theoretical strength (“tendenziale sottoteorizzazione”), the Supreme Court said that there is a need to ensure the certainty of the law and bring also EU-derived norms within an “effective conceptual system”.
When does a provider lose the safe harbour?
of content as performed through an entrepreneurial management of the service and the adoption of tools aimed at evaluating user behaviour to enhance the ‘retention’ thereof.
As such, any refusal in abstracto to consider Yahoo! as a hosting provider would be incorrect. The Milan Court of Appeal performed a well-reasoned assessment of why Yahoo! would qualify as a ‘passive’ host. The provider would become liable only when, upon becoming aware of the users' infringing activity, it would fail to act expeditiously to bring the infringing activity to an end.
How should the notice and take-down request be made and what should it contain?
The Supreme Court held that, for a provider to become aware, it is not required that the rightholder send a formal cease-and-desist letter: a simple communication suffices.
The Court also tackled an issue that in Italy has been contentious for a long time: what should the notice include?
While some courts have required the indication of the relevant URLs [see, eg, here and here], other courts – notably those in Rome – have considered the indication of the mere title of the work sufficient [see, eg, here].
The Supreme Court found that this is something for a judge on the merits to determine (and this was something that, according to the Court, the lower court had failed to do). However, it did not exclude that simple indication of the title of the work could be enough, especially for those works whose title consists of “words combined in an original way, so that they can be distinguished from common language”. A URL is required only when "indispensable" to identify the infringing content.
Is a notice-and-takedown enough to trigger a notice-and-stay-down obligation?
The Court also tackled the issue whether a notice-and-takedown request imposes on the relevant provider an obligation of ‘stay-down’, ie an obligation to prevent the re-uploading of the same infringing content.
The Supreme Court answered: YES.
An obligation to prevent the re-uploading of the same infringing content has nothing to do with imposing a general monitoring obligation (which would be contrary to Article 15 of the E-commerce Directive). The Supreme Court found that this conclusion would be also in line with CJEU case law, notably the decisions in UPC Telekabel and L’Oréal.
In conclusion, the Supreme Court sent the case back to the Milan Court of Appeal for it to re-assess whether, at the time when the infringing activity occurred, it was possible for Yahoo! to identify the infringing videos through mere indications of the titles of the works.
In 2014, the Milan Court of First Instance considered RTI’s claim that Yahoo! would have failed to comply with the injunction granted in the 2011 decision mentioned above, for allowing the re-posting of infringing content. Also, by providing hyperlinks and embedded links to said infringing content, also made discoverable through suggest search, Yahoo! would have directly infringed RTI’s copyrights.
The Milan court dismissed the action, and found that Yahoo! would qualify as a caching provider and would be eligible for the safe harbour as available under Article 13 of the E-commerce Directive and the corresponding provision under Italian law.
RTI appealed, but with no success. So, it lodged a further appeal to the Supreme Court, claiming wrongful application of law provisions by the Milan Court of Appeal.
The Supreme Court found that the Milan court had correctly applied the legal principles on caching providers to Yahoo! Italia Search. As regards the linking activities performed by Yahoo!, the Supreme Court held that these would not remove Yahoo! from its condition of neutrality and would be also in line with the content of Recitals 42 to 44 in the preamble to the E-commerce Directive.

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