Source: http://masscases.com/cases/sjc/207/207mass12.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 04:23:34+00:00

Document:
JOHN H. MENUT v. BOSTON AND MAINE RAILROAD.
Railroad. Fence. Negligence, Railroad. Statute, Construction. Words, "Suitable fences."
Review by Braley, J., of the statutes and of the decisions of this court with regard to the duty of railroad corporations to maintain fences upon both sides of the entire length of their railroads.
Section 120 of R. L. c. 111, now St. 1906, c. 463, Part II. § 103, which requires every railroad corporation to "erect and maintain suitable fences, with convenient bars, gates or openings therein, upon both sides of the entire length of its railroad," with certain exceptions, imposes no duty upon railroad corporations to prevent, by the maintenance of such fences, the owners of premises adjoining the railroads, or persons rightfully upon such premises, from falling down embankments along the railroads.
The history of St. 1906, c. 463, Part II. § 103, which provides that "every railroad corporation shall erect and maintain suitable fences, with convenient bars, gates or openings therein, upon both sides of the entire length of its railroad," with certain exceptions, requires that the words "suitable fences," therein shall be construed to mean fences suitable to protect the cattle of adjoining landowners and to prevent their intrusion upon the railroad locations; and, if the agricultural conditions which prevailed when the development of the railroad law of the Commonwealth began and for some time afterwards very largely have changed and the statutory regulations relating to the operation of railroads should be made more rigorous, as to places where the population has become increasingly urban and more dense, by the imposing of additional safeguards through the erection of barriers or the prescribing of what shall constitute a lawful fence for the personal safety of those who may live on estates adjoining or in proximity to the railroad location or may use the public ways contiguous and parallel to it, such change should come, not from an alteration in the judicial construction of the statute, but only from further legislation.
TORT for personal injuries. Writ dated June 3, 1909.
is specially exempted from the duty of so doing by the board'; yet said defendant, not being exempted from such duty as provided in said § 120, did on or about May 23, 1904, and a long time before that time, carelessly and negligently fail to erect and maintain a fence as provided in said chapter upon the side of its railroad adjoining the premises at or near 52 1-2 Silsbee street in said Lynn; and said premises not being on a crossing of a public way or a place where the convenient use of the road of the defendants would be obstructed by the erection of a fence as aforesaid, are, and were on or about May 23, 1904, wholly unprovided with any fence as aforesaid; that on or about May 23, 1904, the plaintiff was lawfully and rightfully upon the premises adjoining the railroad of said defendant situated at or near 52 1-2 Silsbee street in said Lynn, for, by leave of, under, and in the right of the adjoining land owner, and in the employ of and with the consent of said adjoining land owner, in the regular course of his employment by said land owner, and in the course of his business for said land owner; and that while he was so working on the said premises adjoining the road of the defendant, and while himself in the exercise of due care, he was thrown from a pile of lumber situated on the said premises, and in falling fell over the stone wall of said defendant and on to the ground of the road of said defendant, and was severely injured owing to the negligence of the defendant, its servants, or agents, in failing to erect and maintain a fence on said premises as provided in R. L. c. 111, § 120, which said fence, if erected and maintained, would have caught said plaintiff as he fell from the pile of lumber and prevented his falling over the stone wall to the ground below; that on or about May 23, 1904, owing to the negligence of the defendant, its servants or agents as aforesaid, and while himself in the exercise of due care, he was severely and permanently injured, and suffered greatly both in body and in mind, and was put to great expense for medicines and medical attendance, all to his damage as alleged."
The defendant demurred, the first ground of demurrer being that "no legal cause of action" was set forth in the declaration. The demurrer was heard by Dana, J., who made an order sustaining it. Judgment was entered for the defendant; and the plaintiff appealed.
E. M. Schwarzenberg & E. F. Schwarzenberg, for the plaintiff.
H. F. Hurlburt & D. E. Hall, for the defendant.
Braley, J. The plaintiff, having no cause of action at common law, seeks to hold the defendant in damages for personal injuries caused by a failure to comply with R. L. c. 111, § 120, that "every railroad corporation shall erect and maintain suitable fences, with convenient bars, gates or openings therein, upon both sides of the entire length of its railroad, except at the crossings of a public way or in places where the convenient use of the road would be thereby obstructed, and except at places where, and so long as, it is specially exempted from the duty of so doing by the board" of county commissioners. "The corporation shall also construct and maintain sufficient barriers, where it is necessary and practicable so to do, to prevent the entrance of cattle upon the road. A corporation which unreasonably neglects to comply with the provisions of this . . . section shall, for every such neglect, forfeit not more than two hundred dollars for every month during which the neglect continues; and the Supreme Judicial Court shall have jurisdiction in equity to compel the corporation to comply with such provisions, and, upon such neglect, to restrain and prohibit it from crossing a highway or town way, or from using any land, until such provisions shall have been complied with." Rust v. Low, 6 Mass. 90, 93. Thayer v. Arnold, 4 Met. 589. Eames v. Salem & Lowell Railroad, 98 Mass. 560. Baxter v. Boston & Worcester Railroad, 102 Mass. 383. Bronson v. Coffin, 108 Mass. 175. See St. 1906, c. 463, Part II. § 103.
It is not sufficient for the plaintiff to prove that the defendant failed to fence, and if this had been done he would not have been injured, but he must go further and show, that the requirement of the statute was enacted for his benefit. The inquiry, therefore, is, whether it was the defendant's duty to erect and maintain at the place of the accident a fence which would have been sufficient to have intercepted the plaintiff's fall, and prevented his injuries. If this is established the further averments of its negligence are admitted by the demurrer.
construed where the road was built prior to April 17, 1841, as requiring the owner to fence if his damages, or the price paid to him where the acquisition was by purchase, included the cost of fencing, and where the road was constructed after May 16, 1846, the corporation fenced the entire length of the railroad on both sides except in places where a fence would obstruct the convenient use of the railroad, or at crossings where the general public had a right of way. Morss v. Boston & Maine Railroad, 2 Cush. 536. Stearns v. Old Colony Railroad, 1 Allen 493. Boston & Albany Railroad v. Briggs, 132 Mass. 24. The exemption, however, was repealed by the St. of 1879, c. 205, which finally put upon the corporation the absolute and sole duty of maintaining the fence, and where by either law or contract this burden before had been placed on the adjoining landowner, the corporation was required thereafter to erect such fences, or to keep them in repair if they had been erected, and could recover the reasonable cost in an action of contract or by a lien upon the land for the labor and materials. The Pub. Sts. c. 112, § 115, and the R. L. c. 111, § 120, are re-enactments of these provisions, which from the first to the last enactment prescribe neither the dimensions, material or mode of construction, except as may be inferred from the words that it shall be a "suitable fence."
It is common observation, that a railroad often runs through extensive tracts of woodland and unimproved lands, and, as a fence which there might be sufficient to comply with the statute would be wholly insufficient between coterminous owners of lands under cultivation, Eames v. Salem & Lowell Railroad, 98 Mass. 560, 565, decided, that the fence defined in Gen. Sts. c. 25, § 1, now R. L. c. 33, § 1, was not the standard of requirement. The "security and benefit" of the landowner, and "of travellers on such railroad," having been the words of the statute of 1841, there would seem to be no reasonable ground to question, that, under the original act and subsequent statutes which indicate no change of purpose, a fence sufficient to turn the cattle of those whose lands adjoined the road, was all that the Legislature intended.
adopted the view, that, if a trespasser is a child of immature age or so young as to be incapable of caring for himself, the company is called upon to anticipate and discover his presence, although, when discovered, he cannot be injured wilfully, or treated with a reckless disregard for his safety. Anternoitz v. New York, New Haven, & Hartford Railroad, 193 Mass. 542. Compare Indianapolis, Peru & Chicago Railway v. Pitzer, 109 Ind. 179.
the company was not responsible for the death of the plaintiff's intestate. It also has been decided in other jurisdictions that statutes requiring the corporation to fence against live stock should not be construed as requiring it to fence for the protection of persons, whether infants or adults, and where fencing is held as designed for the benefit of the general public it would seem there is no obligation to provide for the safety of those capable of taking care of themselves, and of realizing the peril of being on a railroad track. Allen v. Boston & Maine Railroad, 87 Maine, 326. Russell v. Maine Central Railroad, 100 Maine, 406. Nolan v. New York, New Haven, & Hartford Railroad, 53 Conn. 461, 473. Cauley v. Pittsburgh, Cincinnati & St. Louis Railway, 95 Penn. St. 398. Baltimore & Ohio Southwestern Railway v, Bradford, 20 Ind. App. 348. Cornwall v. Sullivan Railroad, 28 N. H. 161, 165, 166. Delphia v. Rutland Railroad, 76 Vt. 84. Schreiner v. Great Northern Railway, 86 Minn. 245, 247. Cohoon v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railway, 90 Iowa, 169, 173. Ditchett v. Spuyten-Duyvil & Port Morris Railroad, 67 N. Y. 425. Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Railway v. Liidtke, 69 Ohio St . 384. Carper v. Norfolk & Western Railroad, 23 C. C. A. 669; Carper v. Kimball, 35 L. R. A. 135.
some time afterwards, have very largely changed, and the statutory regulations relating to the operation of railroads should be made more rigorous where the population has become increasingly urban and more dense, by imposing additional safeguards by the erection of barriers, or prescribing what shall constitute a lawful fence, for the personal safety of those who may live on estates adjoining, or in proximity to the line, or use the public ways contiguous and parallel to it, the change should come by further legislation.
The plaintiff having failed to allege any breach of duty by the defendant which it owed to his employer, or to him, the first ground of demurrer was well taken, and the second need not be considered.

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