Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=82580:56457&catid=1577&Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 08:35:29+00:00

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G.R. No. 181986, December 04, 2013 - ELIZALDE S. CO, Petitioners, v. LUDOLFO P. MUÑOZ, JR., Respondent.
ELIZALDE S. CO, Petitioners, v. LUDOLFO P. MUÑOZ, JR., Respondent.
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari1 seeking to set aside the decision2 dated January 31, 2007 and resolution3 dated March 3, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 29355. The CA rulings reversed and set aside the decision4 dated February 24, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Legaspi City, Branch 5, in Criminal Case Nos. 9704, 9705 and 9737, and acquitted respondent Ludolfo P. Muñoz, Jr. (Muñoz) of three counts of libel.
In his defense,8 Muñoz countered that he revealed the anomalous government bidding as a call of public duty. In fact, he filed cases against Co before the Ombudsman involving the anomalous dredging project. Although the Ombudsman dismissed the cases, Muñoz claimed that the dismissal did not disprove the truth of his statements. He further argued that Co is a public figure considering his participation in government projects and his prominence in the business circles. He also emphasized that the imputations dealt with matters of public interest and are, thus, privileged. Applying the rules on privileged communication to libel suits, the prosecution has the burden of proving the existence of actual malice, which, Muñoz claimed, it failed to do.
In addition to imprisonment, Muñoz was ordered to pay P5,000,000.00 for each count of libel as moral damages, P1,200,000.00 for expenses paid for legal services, and P297,699.00 for litigation expense.11 Muñoz appealed his conviction with the CA.
The CA held that the subject matter of the interviews was impressed with public interest and Muñoz’ statements were protected as privileged communication under the first paragraph of Article 354 of the RPC.12 It also declared that Co was a public figure based on the RTC’s findings that he was a “well-known, highly-regarded and recognized in business circles.”13 As a public figure, Co is subject to criticisms on his acts that are imbued with public interest.14 Hence, the CA reversed the RTC decision and acquitted Muñoz of the libel charges due to the prosecution’s failure to establish the existence of actual malice.
whether the respondent is liable for damages arising from the libelous remarks despite his acquittal.
The private party may appeal the judgment of acquittal insofar as he seeks to enforce the accused’s civil liability.
Muñoz claims that the last paragraph of Section 2, Rule 111 of the ROC applies only if the civil liability ex delicto is separately instituted or when the right to file it separately was properly reserved. In contrast, Co claims that Muñoz’ acquittal of the crime of libel did not extinguish the civil aspect of the case because Muñoz’ utterance of the libelous remarks remains undisputed.
We reject Muñoz’ claim. The last paragraph of Section 2, Rule 111 of the ROC applies to civil actions to claim civil liability arising from the offense charged, regardless if the action is instituted with or filed separately from the criminal action. Undoubtedly, Section 2, Rule 111 of the ROC governs situations when the offended party opts to institute the civil action separately from the criminal action; hence, its title “When separate civil action is suspended.” Despite this wording, the last paragraph, by its terms, governs all claims for civil liability ex delicto. This is based on Article 100 of the RPC which states that that “[e]very person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.” Each criminal act gives rise to two liabilities: one criminal and one civil.
If, as Muñoz suggests, the extinction of the penal action carries with it the extinction of the civil action that was instituted with the criminal action, then Section 2, Rule 120 of the ROC becomes an irrelevant provision. There would be no need for the judgment of the acquittal to determine whether “the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist.” The Rules precisely require the judgment to declare if there remains a basis to hold the accused civilly liable despite acquittal so that the offended party may avail of the proper remedies to enforce his claim for civil liability ex delicto.
If the accused is acquitted on reasonable doubt but the court renders judgment on the civil aspect of the criminal case, the prosecution cannot appeal from the judgment of acquittal as it would place the accused in double jeopardy. However, the aggrieved party, the offended party or the accused or both may appeal from the judgment on the civil aspect of the case within the period therefor.
To reiterate, the extinction of the penal action does not necessarily carry with it the extinction of the civil action, whether the latter is instituted with or separately from the criminal action. The offended party may still claim civil liability ex delicto if there is a finding in the final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the liability may arise exists. Jurisprudence has enumerated three instances when, notwithstanding the accused’s acquittal, the offended party may still claim civil liability ex delicto: (a) if the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b) if the court declared that the liability of the accused is only civil; and (c) if the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused is acquitted. We thus now proceed to determine if Co’s claim falls under any of these three situations.
The respondent is not civilly liable because no libel was committed.
Jurisprudence supplements the enumeration in Article 354 of the RPC. In Borjal v. CA,35 we held that in view of the constitutional right on the freedoms of speech and of the press, fair commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged. In Guingguing v. CA,36 we ruled that the remarks directed against a public figure are likewise privileged. In order to justify a conviction in libel involving privileged communication, the prosecution must establish that the libelous statements were made or published with actual malice or malice in fact – the knowledge that the statement is false or with reckless disregard as to whether or not it was true.37 In other words, our rulings in Borjal and Guingguing show that privileged communication has the effect of destroying the presumption of malice or malice in law and consequently requiring the prosecution to prove the existence of malice in fact.
In the present case, the CA declared that the libelous remarks are privileged. The legal conclusion was arrived at from the fact that Co is a public figure, the subject matter of the libelous remarks was of public interest, and the context of Muñoz’ statements were fair comments. Consequently, malice is no longer presumed and the prosecution has the burden of proving that Muñoz acted with malice in fact. The CA found that the prosecution failed in this respect.
Co assails the CA’s ruling by raising arguments that essentially require a review of the CA’s factual and legal findings. However, the Court cannot, through the present petition, review these findings without going against the requirements of Rule 45 with respect to factual matters, and without violating Muñoz’ right against double jeopardy given that the acquittal is essentially anchored on a question of fact.
In light of the privileged nature of Muñoz’ statements and the failure of the prosecution to prove malice in fact, there was no libel that was committed by Muñoz. Without the crime, no civil liability ex delicto may be claimed by Co that can be pursued in the present petition. There is no act from which civil liability may arise that exists.
1 Under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court; rollo, pp. 50-93.
2 Penned by Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr., and concurred in by Associate Justices Vicente S.E. Veloso and Marlene Gonzales-Sison; id. at 97-110.
4 Penned by Judge Pedro R. Soriano; id. at 435-446.
5 Id. at 101, 106, 244, 374.
6 Criminal Case Nos. 9704, 9705 and 9737, which were consolidated in view of the identity of parties and issues; RTC decision; id. at 435-446.
9 Article 361. Proof of the truth. - In every criminal prosecution for libel, the truth may be given in evidence to the court and if it appears that the matter charged as libelous is true, and, moreover, that it was published with good motives and for justifiable ends, the defendants shall be acquitted.
Proof of the truth of an imputation of an act or omission not constituting a crime shall not be admitted, unless the imputation shall have been made against Government employees with respect to facts related to the discharge of their official duties.
16 Citing Bautista v. CA, G.R. No. 46025, September 2, 1992, 213 SCRA 231; id. at 593.
21 Id. at 560-561, citing People v. Pantig, 97 Phil. 748 (1955).
22 (CA) 50 O.G. 254.
23 Pages 10-12, Memorandum for the Respondent.
24 Page 14, Memorandum for the Respondent.
25 Rules of Court, Rule 111, Section 1.
28 G.R. No. 141181, April 27, 2007, 522 SCRA 316, 353.
29Padilla v. CA, 214 Phil. 492 (1984).
30 In Daez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 47971, October 31, 1990, 191 SCRA 61, 67, this Court held that there is libel only if the following elements exist: (a) imputation of a discreditable act or condition to another; (b) publication of the imputation; (c) identity of the person defamed; and, (d) existence of malice.
31 Article 354 of the RPC.
32 First paragraph, Art. 354, Revised Penal Code.
33 Art. 354(1), Revised Penal Code.
34 Art. 354(2), Revised Penal Code.
35 361 Phil. 1 (1999).
36 508 Phil. 193 (2005).
37Supra note 35 and 36.

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