Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&amp;view=article&amp;id=50178:gr-175720-2007&amp;catid=1496&amp;Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 21:48:53+00:00

Document:
G.R. No. 175720 - Cresenciana Tubo Rodriguez etc. v. Evangeline Rodriguez, et al.
CRESENCIANA TUBO RODRIGUEZ (now deceased), substituted by SUSANA A. LLAGAS, Petitioner, v. EVANGELINE RODRIGUEZ, BELEN RODRIGUEZ and BUENAVENTURA RODRIGUEZ, Respondents.
This Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91442 dated June 27, 2006, which set aside the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 134, in Civil Case No. 03-517, and reinstated the Decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of Makati City, Branch 63, in Civil Case No. 75717, dismissing the complaint for ejectment; as well as the Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration.
WHEREFORE, the Complaint is DISMISSED. Plaintiff is ordered to pay attorney's fees of P10,000.00 and the costs of suit in favor of defendants.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision rendered by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 63, Makati City, is hereby ordered REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. Consequently, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendants and all persons claiming rights under them to vacate the premises and surrender the possession thereof to the plaintiff. Defendants are likewise ordered to pay jointly and severally the plaintiff an amount of P5,000.00 a month per unit beginning 13 August 2001 until they finally vacate the premises and the costs of this suit.
WHEREFORE, this Court resolves to REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Decision of the Regional Trial Court. The decision dated February 26, 2002 of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 63, Makati City in Civil Case No. 75717 dismissing the complaint for ejectment is hereby REINSTATED.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW AND GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN REVERSING AND SETTING ASIDE THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT AND REINSTATING THE DECISION OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT DISMISSING PETITIONER'S COMPLAINT FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER.
Petitioner alleges that as the registered owner of the subject property, she enjoys the right of possession thereof and that question of ownership cannot be raised in an ejectment case unless it is intertwined with the issue of possession. While the court may look into the evidence of title or ownership and possession de jure to determine the nature of possession, it cannot resolve the issue of ownership because the resolution of said issue would effect an adjudication on ownership which is not proper in the summary action for unlawful detainer. Petitioner insists that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the Huling Habilin at Testamento transmitted ownership of the specific apartments disregarding the fact that the same is not probated yet and that the testator changed or revoked his will by selling the property to petitioner prior to his death.
Contrarily, respondents pray that the instant Petition for Review be dismissed since the resolution of the question of ownership by the MTC and the Court of Appeals was provisional only to resolve the issue of possession. Petitioner can always avail of legal remedies to have the issue of ownership passed upon by the proper court. Aware of the provisional nature of the resolution on ownership in ejectment cases, respondents filed Civil Case No. 01-1641 to assail the validity of the deed of sale of the property and the registration thereof in petitioner's name.
SEC 16. Resolving defense of ownership. - When the defendant raises the defense of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession.
In the case at bar, petitioner's cause of action for unlawful detainer was based on her alleged ownership of land covered by TCT No. 150431 and that she merely tolerated respondents' stay thereat. However, when respondents leased the apartments to other persons without her consent, their possession as well as those persons claiming right under them became unlawful upon their refusal to vacate the premises and to pay the rent. On the other hand, respondents assailed petitioner's title by claiming that the deed of sale upon which it was based was simulated and void. They insisted that they were co-owners thus, they have the right to possess the said property. To prove their claim, they presented the Huling Habilin at Testamento of Juanito Rodriguez and the Partition Agreement.
The lower courts considered the following documentary evidence in arriving at their respective decisions, albeit the RTC decision contradicts that of the MTC and Court of Appeals: 1) Huling Habilin at Testamento executed by Juanito Rodriguez on October 27, 1983; 2) Deed of Sale of the property executed by Juanito Rodriguez and the petitioner on June 14, 1984; 3) TCT No. 150431 in the name of the petitioner; and 4) the August 23, 1990 Partition Agreement executed by both the respondents and the petitioner.
Based on the foregoing documentary evidence, we find that there is preponderance of evidence in favor of the petitioner's claim. Respondents failed to prove their right of possession, as the Huling Habilin at Testamento and the Partition Agreement have no legal effect since the will has not been probated. Before any will can have force or validity it must be probated. This cannot be dispensed with and is a matter of public policy.18 Article 838 of the Civil Code mandates that "[n]o will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court." As the will was not probated, the Partition Agreement which was executed pursuant thereto can not be given effect. Thus, the fact that petitioner was a party to said agreement becomes immaterial in the determination of the issue of possession.
Moreover, at the time the deed of sale was executed in favor of the petitioner, Juanito Rodriguez remained the owner thereof since ownership would only pass to his heirs at the time of his death. Thus, as owner of the property, he had the absolute right to dispose of it during his lifetime. Now, whether or not the disposition was valid is an issue that can be resolved only in Civil Case No. 01-1641, an action instituted by the respondents for that purpose.
We are, thus, left with the deed of sale and the certificate of title over the property to consider.
We agree with the RTC that a certificate of title is a conclusive evidence of ownership of the land described therein; the validity of which shall not be subject to a collateral attack, especially in an ejectment case which is summary in nature.
The long settled rule is that the issue of ownership cannot be subject of a collateral attack.
. . . Under Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, a certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified or cancelled, except in a direct proceeding for that purpose in accordance with law. The issue of the validity of the title of the respondents can only be assailed in an action expressly instituted for that purpose. Whether or not the petitioners have the right to claim ownership over the property is beyond the power of the court a quo to determine in an action for unlawful detainer.
[T]he Torrens System was adopted in this country because it was believed to be the most effective measure to guarantee the integrity of land titles and to protect their indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is established and recognized.
We emphasize, however, that our ruling on the issue of ownership is only provisional to determine who between the parties has the better right of possession. It is, therefore, not conclusive as to the issue of ownership, which is the subject matter of Civil Case No. 01-1641. Our ruling that petitioner has a better right of possession was arrived at on the basis of evidence without prejudice to the eventual outcome of the annulment case, where the issue as to who has title to the property in question is fully threshed out. As the law now stands, in an ejectment suit, the question of ownership may be provisionally ruled upon for the sole purpose of determining who is entitled to possession de facto.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91442 dated June 27, 2006 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 134, in Civil Case No. 03-517, reversing the Decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of Makati City, Branch 63, in Civil Case No. 75717, is REINSTATED.
1 Rollo, pp. 39-49. Penned by Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr. and concurred in by Associate Justices Rosalinda Asuncion-Vicente and Sesinando E. Villon.
8 Id. at 177. Penned by Judge Evelyn S. Arcaya-Chua.
9 Id. at 217. Penned by Judge Perpetua Atal-PaÃ±o.
12 Racaza v. Gozum, G.R. No. 148759, June 8, 2006, 490 SCRA 302, 312.
13 Domalsin v. Valenciano, G.R. No. 158687, January 25, 2006, 480 SCRA 114, 131.
15 Ocampo v. Tirona, G.R. No. 147812, April 6, 2005, 455 SCRA 62, 74.
16 Arambulo v. Gungab, G.R. No. 156581, September 30, 2005, 471 SCRA 640, 649.
17 Ross Rica Sales Center, Inc. v. Ong, G.R. No. 132197, August 16, 2005, 467 SCRA 35, 50.
18 Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. III (1979), pp. 151-152.
19 Supra note 17 at 51.
20 G.R. No. 149912, January 29, 2004, 421 SCRA 455, 459-460.

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