Source: http://az.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20180118_0000078.DAZ.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 08:58:42+00:00

Document:
Pending before the Court are Plaintiffs' Motion in Limine Regarding Collateral Sources (Doc. 57) and Motion to Exceed Administrative Claim Demand (Doc. 58). The motions are fully briefed (Docs. 61, 64, 71).
On February 19, 2016, Plaintiffs filed this medical malpractice action in Pima County Superior Court, naming Marana Health Center (“MHC”) and two medical doctors as defendants. (Doc. 1-3 at 7.) On July 29, 2016, the United States of America, on behalf of MHC and the two medical doctors, removed the action to this Court. (Doc. 1.) The Court substituted the United States of America as the sole defendant (Docs. 3, 4), because the individual defendants were acting within the scope of their employment at the time of the matters alleged in the Complaint, MHC is an entity that receives federal grant money from the United States Public Health Service, and the United States Department of Health and Human Services has deemed MHC and its physicians or other licensed or certified health care practitioners to be employees of the Public Health Service for purposes of coverage under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2671, et seq.
In their Motion in Limine Regarding Collateral Sources, Plaintiffs ask the Court to preclude the parties from introducing evidence of payments from collateral sources or reductions in the amount that Mrs. Salzwedel's health care providers accepted as full satisfaction for medical treatment provided. Plaintiffs argue that the collateral source rule is well-established under Arizona and federal law and that it prevents the introduction of evidence of third-party payments to reduce the amount of recoverable medical expenses. Plaintiffs further argue that A.R.S. § 12-565, which allows for the introduction of collateral source evidence in medical malpractice actions, is inapplicable to cases brought under the FTCA because (1) the United States is not a “licensed health care provider” as defined in A.R.S. § 12-561, and § 12-565 applies only to medical malpractice actions brought against “licensed health care providers, ” and (2) § 12-565 is exclusively procedural in nature because it does not affect the amount of damages that a plaintiff may recover, and federal procedural law supersedes state procedural law in federal court.
Defendant argues that A.R.S. § 12-565 applies to this action because it can be liable only to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b)(1), 2674. Defendant emphasizes that Plaintiffs' claims are predicated on the alleged negligence of two “licensed health care providers, ” both of whom would be allowed to introduce evidence of collateral benefits under § 12-565. Since Defendant's liability must be identical to those private individuals, Defendant contends it should be allowed to introduce evidence of collateral benefits as well.
Defendant disputes that A.R.S. § 12-565 is exclusively a procedural rule. Defendant argues that Plaintiffs misunderstand the holding of Eastin v. Broomfield, 570 P.2d 744 (Ariz. 1977), which Plaintiffs cite for the proposition that “§ 12-565 is not substantive because it does not affect the measure of damages.” Defendant argues that the Eastin court held only that A.R.S. § 12-565 does not place a cap on recoverable damages, and that this does not mean the statute has no effect on damages. Defendant argues that A.R.S. § 12-565 does affect the damages recoverable under the Arizona Medical Malpractice Act (“AMMA”), which makes it substantive and applicable to this FTCA action.

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