Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=83041:57036&catid=1584&Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 02:42:55+00:00

Document:
G.R. No. 171286, June 02, 2014 - DOLORES CAMPOS, Petitioner, v. DOMINADOR ORTEGA, SR. AND JAMES SILOS, Respondents.
DOLORES CAMPOS, Petitioner, v. DOMINADOR ORTEGA, SR.1 AND JAMES SILOS, Respondents.
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure (Rules) seeks the reversal of the August 12, 2005 Decision2 and January 17, 2006 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 76994, which set aside the November 12, 2002 Decision4 of the Mandaluyong City Regional Trial Court, Branch 213 (RTC) and, in effect, dismissed petitioner’s complaint for specific performance and damages.
19. As a result of the bypassing of plaintiff’s right[,] she was dislocated, [has] suffered sleepless nights, mental anguish, wounded feelings, and undue embarrassment, among others, the assessment of which in pecuniary terms is left to the sound discretion of this Honorable Court.
Respondents countered that the complaint stated no cause of action, and that, if any, such cause of action is already barred by prior judgment. They noted petitioner’s admission in the Verification that an action for recovery of possession was commenced against her by respondents before the Pasig City RTC, Branch 153, involving the same property; that it was resolved in respondents’ favor on October 12, 1992; and that such decision was affirmed by the CA on May 30, 1996 and became final and executory on September 14, 1996. Respondents also contended that the case was prematurely filed since there was no prior recourse to the barangay conciliation as required by Section 412 of the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law. Lastly, respondents argued that they are registered owners of the land in question as well as the house built thereon by virtue of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 13342 and tax declarations, and that the Torrens title cannot be altered, modified or cancelled except through a direct proceeding.
Trial ensued. Presented as witnesses for the plaintiff were petitioner herself, Pagunsan, and Dolores Abad Juan, who claimed to be a bookkeeper of the NHA and a member of its census team in 1977.8 Only Ortega, Sr. testified for and in behalf of the defendants.
WHEREFORE, accordingly the acquisition of [DOMINADOR] V. ORTEGA and JAMES SILOS of Lot 18 Block 7 of the Hulo estate is hereby declared VOID for being violative of the right of the plaintiff. Herein defendants are hereby ordered to surrender their title to the National Housing Authority (NHA). Finally, the [NHA] is hereby ordered to recognize plaintiff’s right to purchase the structure and give her reasonable time within which to exercise said right.
x x x The case being referred to by defendants is for the recovery of possession filed in Pasig City Court, which judgment was confirmed by the Honorable Court of Appeals. In that case, the appellate [court] ruled that the defendants in this case [have] better rights over the said property, it being titled under their names. Therefore, the cause of action in the previous case involves the right of possession over the disputed property. In the instant case, the cause of action is the violation of the plaintiff’s right to exercise their right to buy the property in dispute within the period given by the Arbitration and Awards Committee of the National Housing Authority in [coordination] with the Local Government of Mandaluyong City. Thus, this court was never swayed by the [defendants’] argument that res judicata is present. There is no identity of the cause of action between the Pasig case and the instant case.
To our mind, [respondents] correctly underscore the fact that, even from the testimonial evidence proffered by [petitioner], there is no gainsaying [of] their lease of the first floor of the residential structure owned by Dominga Boloy. Although the commencement of their contract with the latter had, admittedly, not been exactly established, the record ineluctably shows that both [respondents] had attended the meetings conducted by the NHA Arbitration Committee for the purpose of awarding the lots covered by the ZIP. Even more significantly, [respondent] [Ortega, Sr.] was also included in the NHA’s 1977 survey of the Hulo Estate and was, in fact, issued a separate identifying house tag alongside [petitioner’s] husband.
In contrast, [petitioner’s] lease of the second floor since 1966 clearly qualified her as a “beneficiary” under the ZIP Guideline Circular No. 1 which employs the term to refer to those who permanently reside in the project site either as owners of residential structures or renters/sharers thereof before August 15, 1975 up to the time that the area has been adopted as a slum-upgrading site. Unlike [respondents] who immediately availed of the opportunity they were afforded to purchase their own residential lot, however, it appears that [petitioner] demurred when the NHA offered her the chance of buying Lot 17, Block 7 of the Hulo Estate until December 19, 1987. On this score alone, we find that [petitioner] cannot be presently heard to complain that she had been unjustifiably deprived of her right as a qualified beneficiary under the aforesaid program.
[Petitioner] had, of course, impressed upon the trial court that the reason for her refusal was the fact that, as occupant of the residential structure on Lot 18, Block 7, she had been offered the wrong lot by the NHA. It bears emphasizing, however, that ZIP Guideline Circular No. 1 does not give renters or sharers a preferential right to purchase a particular lot within the ZIP project site. While actual owners of structures are thereunder given priority to stay in the project site, house renters or [sharers] like [petitioner] are only entitled to accommodation in a relocation site, if one is available, or “allowed to continue within the project area, together with the owner of the structures they are renting.” In this particular regard, even [petitioner] conceded that she could have acquired the subject lot had she purchased the residential structure owned by Dominga Boloy or, at least, her allotted 1/3 portion thereof.
The CA also gave credit to respondents for causing the titling of the subject lot in their names, declaring it for taxation purposes, and paying the realty taxes due thereon. While petitioner’s tax declarations are considered as good indicia of possession in the concept of the owner, the appellate court ruled that respondents’ certificate of title is indefeasible and cannot be subject of a collateral attack like petitioner’s present complaint for specific performance and damages. Even if a transfer of title that is replete with badges of fraud and irregularities renders nugatory and inoperative the existing doctrines on land registration and land titles, the CA opined that petitioner lost sight of the fact that the trial court discounted the existence of fraud which she imputed against respondents’ acquisition of the subject parcel and the fact that she did not appeal such finding. In the end, for petitioner’s failure to present clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, the appellate court upheld the presumption of regularity of official acts and resolved not to disturb the NHA’s award in favor of respondents.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, PARTICULARLY, IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THAT PETITIONER HAS ALREADY ACQUIRED A VESTED AND COGNIZABLE RIGHT RESPECTING THE PROPERTY.
Plaintiff's structure was one of those found existing during the census/survey of the area, and her structure was assigned TAG No. 77-0063. While it is true that NHA recognizes plaintiff as the censused owner of the structure built on the lot, the issuance of the tag number is not a guarantee for lot allocation. Plaintiff had petitioned the NHA for the award to her of the lot she is occupying. However, the census, tagging, and plaintiff's petition, did not vest upon her a legal title to the lot she was occupying, but a mere expectancy that the lot will be awarded to her. The expectancy did not ripen into a legal title when the NHA, through Ms. Ines Gonzales, sent a letter dated March 8, 1994 informing her that her petition for the award of the lot was denied. Moreover, the NHA, after the conduct of studies and consultation with residents, had designated Area 1, where the lot petitioned by plaintiff is located, as an Area Center.
A vested right is one that is absolute, complete and unconditional and no obstacle exists to its exercise. It is immediate and perfect in itself and not dependent upon any contingency. To be vested, a right must have become a title – legal or equitable – to the present or future enjoyment of property.
Petitioner argues that what prompted her refusal to purchase was not a matter of whimsical preference, not really insisting on any preferential right, but on imminent apprehension that the house that was being sold by Boloy is situated at Lot 17 while they were occupying Lot 18; that the particular lot number is different from what she is applying; and that said lot is actually occupied by another person who too may have already qualified as a ZIP beneficiary, resulting in conflict of award. She contends that she could not be compelled to suddenly become particularly interested in a lot that is completely different from the one where the house structure she occupies is situated and that the structure owner in Lot 17 may not be willing to sell the same.
The argument is untenable. Petitioner is certainly confused. There should be no doubt that the object of the sale is a determinate thing, a semi-apartment house owned by Boloy and not the specific lot on which it was built. Thus, it is totally immaterial if the land on which the structure stood was indicated as Lot 17 or Lot 18. It should not have been a source of needless concern on the part of petitioner mainly because the lots in the Hulo estate were at the time owned by the government prior to the actual award to qualified beneficiaries. Likewise, petitioner has not shown that Boloy, or another specific person, actually owned a housing structure in Lot 17 aside from the one they were leasing in Lot 18.
Petitioner next alleges that the entire process was pock-marked with irregularities too nagging to be ignored, and collectively outweighed the presumption of regularity; that the meetings only proved to be farcical, even embarrassing; and that the repetitive absence of the persons necessary for those meetings could not have been trifling or insignificant since, as what later proved to have transpired, the execution of a deed of conveyance for the property was already taking place while petitioner was still unsuspectingly relying on the prospects of the scheduled meetings. Particularly, she maintains that the brazen irregularity took place just four days after the initial meeting on November 19, 1987 with the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale on November 23, 1987 in favor of respondents who surreptitiously and effectively pre-empted the option given her to purchase the residential structure, easing her out from the race, so to speak. These fail to convince.
In this case, petitioner, as the party alleging fraud in the transaction and the one who bears the burden of proof,18 miserably failed to demonstrate that respondents committed fraud or that they connived with government officials and employees to cause undue damage or prejudice to petitioner. Petitioner did not present even a single evidence to support the view that the repetitive absences of the persons necessary for the meetings before the Arbitration and Awards Committee were intentional or done with malicious intent. Also, as the CA found, records would show that respondent Ortega, Sr. initially purchased 1/3 of the residential structure on November 23, 1987, per Deed of Absolute Sale, which, recognizing his co-occupancy with others, also gave respondent Silos and petitioner the similar option to buy their respective 1/3 portion. Petitioner did not exercise the option given. Hence, upon such failure, the entire structure was eventually sold to both respondents through the Deed of Sale dated February 19, 1988.
SEC. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. - A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.
The appropriate legal remedy that petitioner should have availed is an action for reconveyance. Proof of actual fraud is not required as it may be filed even when no fraud intervened such as when there is mistake in including the land for registration.
The Court agrees with the CA’s disquisition that an action for reconveyance can indeed be barred by prescription. In a long line of cases decided by this Court, we ruled that an action for reconveyance based on implied or constructive trust must perforce prescribe in ten (10) years from the issuance of the Torrens title over the property.
However, there is an exception to this rule. In the case of Heirs of Pomposa Saludares v. Court of Appeals, the Court, reiterating the ruling in Millena v. Court of Appeals, held that there is but one instance when prescription cannot be invoked in an action for reconveyance, that is, when the plaintiff is in possession of the land to be reconveyed. In Heirs of Pomposa Saludares, this Court explained that the Court, in a series of cases, has permitted the filing of an action for reconveyance despite the lapse of more than ten (10) years from the issuance of title to the land and declared that said action, when based on fraud, is imprescriptible as long as the land has not passed to an innocent buyer for value. But in all those cases, the common factual backdrop was that the registered owners were never in possession of the disputed property. The exception was based on the theory that registration proceedings could not be used as a shield for fraud or for enriching a person at the expense of another.
In Alfredo v. Borras, the Court ruled that prescription does not run against the plaintiff in actual possession of the disputed land because such plaintiff has a right to wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is questioned before initiating an action to vindicate his right. His undisturbed possession gives him the continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its effect on his title. The Court held that where the plaintiff in an action for reconveyance remains in possession of the subject land, the action for reconveyance becomes in effect an action to quiet title to property, which is not subject to prescription.
The Court reiterated such rule in the case of Vda. de Cabrera v. Court of Appeals, wherein we ruled that the imprescriptibility of an action for reconveyance based on implied or constructive trust applies only when the plaintiff or the person enforcing the trust is not in possession of the property. In effect, the action for reconveyance is an action to quiet the property title, which does not prescribe.
In this case, petitioner, taking into account Article 1155 of the Civil Code27 and jurisprudence28 on the matter, should be guided by the following facts in enforcing her legal remedy/ies, if still any: (1) her judicial admission that they no longer possess the subject lot, claiming that they stayed therein from 1966 until 1997 when they were ejected by the sheriff of Pasig RTC;29 (2) TCT No. 13342 was issued on December 9, 1997; and (3) the instant case for specific performance with damages was filed on August 17, 1999.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED. The August 12, 2005 Decision and January 17, 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 76994, which dismissed petitioner’s complaint for specific performance and damages docketed as Civil Case No. MC99-826 before the Mandaluyong City Regional Trial Court, Branch 213, are hereby AFFIRMED.
Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Del Castillo,* Villarama, Jr.,** and Leonen, JJ., concur.
* Designated additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Jose Catral Mendoza, per Raffle dated June 2, 2014.
2 Penned by Associate Justice Rebecca De Guia-Salvador, with Associate Justices Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. and Jose C. Mendoza (now a member of the Court) concurring; rollo, pp. 27-40.
4 CA rollo, pp. 31-35.
8 Exhibit “L,” Evidence Folder p. 12; TSN, September 3, 2001, p. 5.
9 CA rollo, pp. 34-35.
13 587 Phil. 152 (2008).
14Magkalas v. National Housing Authority, supra, at 161-162 (2008).
15 TSN, July 23, 2001, pp. 31-32.
16Republic of the Philippines v. Guerrero, 520 Phil. 296, 306 (2006).
19Urieta Vda. de Aguilar v. Alfaro, G.R. No. 164402, July 5, 2010, 623 SCRA 130, 143-144.
21Pasiño. v. Dr. Monterroyo, 582 Phil. 703, 715-716. (2008).
22Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA) v. Fernandez, 411 Phil. 107, 119 (2001).
25 G.R. No. 161360, October 19, 2011, 659 SCRA 545.
26Yared v. Tiongco, supra, at 552-554.
27 ART. 1155. The prescription of actions in interrupted when they are filed before the court, when there is a written extrajudicial demand by the creditors, and when there is any written acknowledgement of the debt by the debtor.
28 See Ampeloquio, Sr. v. Napiza, 536 Phil. 1102 (2006); Permanent Savings and Loan Bank v. Velarde, G.R. No. 140608, September 23, 2004, 439 SCRA 1; Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106646, June 30, 1993, 224 SCRA 175; Philippine National Railways v. National Labor Relations Commission, 258 Phil. 552 (1989); and The Overseas Bank of Manila v. Geraldez, 183 Phil. 493 (1979).
29 TSN, July 23, 2001, pp. 7, 33-34, 36-37.

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