Source: https://www.bruerlaw.com/read/archives/06-2018
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 06:35:35+00:00

Document:
The discovery of facts known and opinions held by an expert are, until the expert is designated for trial, the work product of the attorney retaining the expert. State ex rel. Tracy v. Dandurand, 30 S.W.3d 831, 834 (Mo. 2000). Once the retaining attorney decides to use the expert at trial and discloses him or her as a witness, the expert is subject to discovery. Tracy, 30 S.W.3d at 831.
In Missouri state court, the disclosure of experts is governed by Mo.R.Civ.P. 56.01(b). Under that rule, expert designations are divided into two categories: (1) retained(2) non-retained.
Importantly, the rule does not define what makes a witness an expert such that the witness should be disclosed as an expert; nor does it establish the difference between what makes an expert retained versus non-retained.
With respect to what makes a fact witness an expert, a fact witness only functions as an expert witness to the extent that one or both of the parties ask the witness to use the basic facts to draw conclusions and express opinionson relevant issues. Adams v. Squibb, 128 S.W.3d 149, 155 (Mo. App. 2004) (addressing a treating physician).
- Accordingly, if a physician is asked “what did the thermometer show as the patient’s temperature?” - that physician might not be considered an expert, but if the physician is asked “did the patient have a fever?” - the physician might be considered an expert.
With respect to the difference between what makes an expert retained versus non-retained, a retained expert “usually knows nothing about the facts in controversy until contacted by the attorney.” Dandurand, 30 S.W.3d at 834.
Retained experts are individuals engaged by a party in anticipation of litigation in order to testify about scientific or technical matters. Kehr v. Knapp, 136 S.W.3d 118, 123 (Mo. App. 2004). A retained expert typically has no knowledge about the case or the facts in controversy prior to being retained and instead gathers facts about the controversy through documents, materials, and other information provided to him by the attorney who contacted him. Kehr, 136 S.W.3d at 123.
3. Disclosure of Retained Experts.
(b) A party may discover through a deposition the facts and opinions to which the expert is expected to testify. Unless manifest injustice would result, the court shall require that the party seeking discovery from an expert pay the expert a reasonable hourly fee for the time such expert is deposed.
4. Disclosure of Non-Retained Experts.
(5) Trial Preparations: Non-retained Experts.A party, through interrogatories, may require any other party to identify each non-retained expert witness, including a party, whom the other party expects to call at trial who may provide expert witness opinion testimony by providing the expert’s name, address, and field of expertise. For the purpose of this Rule 56.01(b)(5), an expert witness is a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, experience, training, or education giving testimony relative to scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge that will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence. Discovery of the facts known and opinions held by such an expert shall be discoverable in the same manner as for lay witnesses.
5. Differences in Disclosure Between Retained Versus Non-Retained.
1. Extent of disclosure. For retained experts, the party must disclose: name, address, occupation, place of employment, qualifications to give an opinion or curriculum vitae, the general nature of the subject matter on which the expert is expected to testify, and the expert’s hourly deposition fee. For non-retained experts, the party must disclose: name, address, and field of expertise. In other words, nameand addressare the only overlapping designations for retained and non-retained experts.
2. Producing For Deposition. A party may depose a retained expert. On the other hand, discovery as to non-retained experts is the same as for lay witnesses. See also Dandurand, 30 S.W.3d at 831. The discovery rules do not impose a requirement upon the party to make a non-retained expert available for a deposition. Beaty, 298 S.W.3d at 559. For instance, a treating physician is not under a party’s control. Beaty, 298 S.W.3d at 559.
3. Hourly Deposition Fees. The section addressing experts under Rule 56.01(b)(4) contains a provision that mandates that the trial court “require that the party seeking discovery from an expert pay the expert a reasonable hourly fee for the time such expert is deposed.” Adams, 128 S.W.3d at 156. A paragraph concerning payment for the time of a non-retained expert was not added. Adams, 128 S.W.3d at 156 (“We can only assume that such an omission was intentional and not ambiguous.”) Accordingly, there is no provision requiring payment for a non-retained expert’s hourly deposition fee. See Adams, 128 S.W.3d at 156.
1. Facts and Opinions By Deposition Only.
Under Rule 56.01(b)(4), “[d]iscovery of facts and opinions held by experts . . . may be obtained onlyas follows: . . . . [a] party may discover by depositionthe facts and opinions to which the expert is expected to testify.” Under Rule 56.01(b)(4), the facts and opinions of an expert are only discoverable by deposition. Willis v. Brot, 652 S.W.2d 738, 740 (Mo. App. 1983).
2. The Permissible Scope of the Deposition.
The deposition of a retained expert, with no specific limitations, allows for opposing counsel to probe the expert on the expert’s qualifications, knowledge of the subject, information the expert has been provided, the expert’s opinions, and all other matters bearing on the expert’s opinions and the bases for the opinions. Dandurand, 30 S.W.3d at 834.
Missouri cases require an expert to produce at deposition the materials that the expert has reviewed in order that the opposing attorney be able to intelligently cross-examine the expert concerning what facts he used to formulate his opinion. Dandurand, 30 S.W.3d at 835. Rule 56.01(b)(4) should be read to require production of all of the materials provided to the expert. There is noexception to withhold from disclosure materials given to an expert if the expert did not rely on them. See Dandurand, 30 S.W.3d at 835. “All material given to a testifying expertmust, if requested, by disclosed. This is indeed a bright line rule, as our Rule 56.01(b)(4) requires. It is clear, understandable, and does not require the application of a multi-prong test.” Dandurand, 30 S.W.3d at 836.
3. The Method To Obtain Expert Opinion and Materials.
The methods used in Missouri cases to obtain expert materials include a subpoena duces tecumor notice duces tecum. See Dandurand, 30 S.W.3d at 831.
Rule 56.01(b)(4) authorizes the discovery of facts known and opinions held by a retained expert witness. That subsection does not expressly provide that such an expert witness may be compelled by subpoena duces tecumto produce material in his possession acquired and considered in anticipation of his testimony at trial. However, such materials come within the scope of facts known by such an expert witness. The purpose of the deposition is to discover and test the opinion of the expert. That cannot be done without reference to material relevant to the issue. When the deposition of a prospective expert witness is taken pursuant to Rule 56.01(b)(4), it is proper to require the attendance of that witness by a subpoena duces tecum. State ex rel. Mo. Hwy. and Transp. Com’n v. Anderson, 759 S.W.2d 102, 106 (Mo. App. 1988).
4. The Timing of Obtaining Expert Materials.
Requests for productionmay notbe served seeking expert witness discovery. State ex rel. Kawasaki Motors Corp. U.S.A. v. Ryan, 777 S.W.2d 247, 254 (Mo. App. 1989).
The waiver of work product as to an expert’s opinion and the grounds occurs if they are deposed; the waiver is thus limited to the time of the deposition. See, e.g., Brown v. Hamid, 856 S.W.2d 51, 54 (Mo. 1993). See also State ex rel. Washington University v. Gallagher, 797 S.W.2d 726, 728-29 (Mo. App. 1990).
1. Your current curriculum vitae or other documents describing your qualifications.
All materials or documents that you have reviewed or rely upon for the opinions you hold and intend to express in this case.
All materials or documents prepared by you which reflect or summarize any of the opinions you hold and intend to express in this case.
All materials or documents which reflect any charges made by you for the time spent or devoted to your review of this case as an expert witness.
All materials or documents provided to you by the attorneys representing defendants since you were first contacted concerning the subject matter of this lawsuit and materials and documents provided by you to the attorneys representing defendants since you were first contacted concerning the subject matter of this lawsuit.
Copies of any medical literature which you believe support the opinions you intend to express in this case.
Any and all standards, texts or published material reviewed, relied upon or utilized by you in the evaluation or formulation of any opinions you have formed in this action.
A bibliography of all books published and/or authored by you.
Copies of any unpublished articles written, in whole or in part, by you, including articles submitted for publication.
Any list or other document reflecting all occasions in which you have given sworn testimony.
Any medical records which were reviewed by you in preparation for the deposition.
Any medical records which are relied upon by you in forming any opinions in this action.
Any other document or item which was reviewed by you in preparation for the deposition.
Any other document or item relied upon or utilized by you in the evaluation or formulation of any opinions you have formed in this action.
All photographs, films, video, or other recordings, which were made of plaintiff, which depict any of the injuries or damages which plaintiff is claiming in this action or which documents any of the facts alleged in the pleadings.
All notes, journal, written documents, memoranda, and recordings made by you memorializing facts relating to any of the allegations set forth in the pleadings.
A list of any other litigation cases (including style with jurisdictions) in which you have testified as an expert at trial or by deposition or otherwise participated as an expert reviewer within the preceding five years.
Copies of Schedule C and Form 1099 of the witness’ tax records for the preceding tax years.
Any and all copies, texts, documents or other materials which in any way evidence your advertisement as a medical malpractice expert.
- The Rules and applicable cases present some practical difficulties. If a party must depose an expert to obtain the facts and opinions, must the party actually subpoena the expert, including delivery of the subpoena by process server with a witness fee? How extensive must the duces tecum be in order to obtain the expert materials? If it is anticipated that the materials produced at the deposition are voluminous, can a party look at the materials in advance?
Expert witness, opinion testimony admissible--hypothetical question not required, when.
4. If a reasonable foundation is laid, an expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and give the reasons therefor without the use of hypothetical questions, unless the court believes the use of a hypothetical question will make the expert's opinion more understandable or of greater assistance to the jury due to the particular facts of the case.
The standard for the admission of expert testimony is civil cases is that set forth in section 490.065. State Bd. of Reg. Healing Arts v. McDonagh, 123 S.W.3d 146, 149 (Mo. 2003). To the extent that civil cases apply Fryeor some other standard, they are incorrect and should no longer by followed. See McDonagh, 123 S.W.3d at 139.
- Section 2 allows an expert to testify on the ultimate issue.
- Section 3 allows an expert to rely upon testimony from trial or hearsay.
- Section 4 addresses the use of hypothetical questions.
1. “Generic” non-retained expert designations.
“Plaintiff may call [the patient’s] treating physicians as non-retained experts.” Khoury v. Conagra Foods, Inc., 368 S.W.3d 189 n. 7 (Mo. App. 2012); “Plaintiff may also call as expert witnesses on damages any and all of Plaintiff’s treating physicians.” Wilkerson v. Prelutsky, 943 S.W.2d 643, 649-50 (Mo. 1997).
These are not likely to be sufficient interrogatory answers.
2. Transforming a non-retained expert into a retained expert.
What if a non-retained expert, such as a treating physician, is paid for preparation and/or reads deposition transcripts?
If a treating physician’s testimony is limited to a discussion of plaintiff’s case and treatment and opinions regarding causation and prognosis that are developed based upon information obtained during such care and treatment, compensationalone does not transform the treating physician into a retained expert. Kehr, 136 S.W.3d at 124. Where the expert does not rely on material other than records he generated while caring for the patient and medical knowledge generally known in his specialty area, the expert’s review of deposition transcriptsdoes not alter his status as a non-retained expert.
If a non-retained expert is transformed into a retained expert, the above differences in designation and other discovery procedures are then triggered, such as the extent of the disclosure, the payment of hourly deposition fees, and arguably the requirement to produce for deposition.
3. Discovery Requests Essentially Seeking Expert Opinion.
In certain cases, such as a medical negligence case in which experts will testify as to negligence and the standard of care, or in cases in which an economist will need to calculate damages, these types of interrogatories essentially seek expert opinion. The parties and/or the Court may need to address the extent to which a party should answer these types of interrogatories, with the principle in mind that expert opinions are discoverable onlyby deposition (and not by interrogatories). One of the purposes of this rule is to avoid subjecting the parties to paper discovery, directed to a party, but in fact answerable only by the expert. Willis, 652 S.W.2d at 749.
Where a party has made a response to interrogatories and subsequently learns that the response is no longer true, although correct when made, he is under a duty to seasonably amend the response. Rule 56.01(e)(2). Gassen v. Woy, 785 S.W.2d 601, 603 (Mo. App. 1990).
The rules make no express provision, in the case of pre-trial discovery by deposition, for an obligation to supplement responses under similar circumstances where a truthful answer when given later ceases to be correct. Considered as a whole, however, the rules and the cause authority suggest that such duty is impliedas a component of the discovery process. Gassen, 785 S.W.2d at 603.
When an expert witness has been deposed and later: (1) changes that opinion before trial or (2) bases that opinion on new or different facts from those disclosed in the deposition, it is the duty of the party intending to use the expert witness to disclose that new information to his adversary, thereby updating the responses made in the deposition. Green v. Fleishman, 882 S.W.2d 219, 221 (Mo. App. 1994).
The trial court is vested with broad discretion in determining how to remedy a situation when an expert provides different testimony from that disclosed in discovery. That can occur if: (1) the expert changes the nature of his or her opinion, or (2) relies upon new or different facts not previously disclosed. See Beaty, 298 S.W.3d at 560. The court can reject the evidence or fashion some other appropriate remedy. Beaty, 298 S.W.3d at 560. Options include: (1) limiting testimony to the information that was produced during discovery, or continuing the matter and allowing an opportunity to question or re-depose the expert. See Beaty, 298 S.W.3d at 560.
What if, after you retain your expert but before the expert testifies in a deposition, you learn something indicating you would prefer not to have that expert testify at his deposition? What if, after the deposition, but before trial, you learn something indicating you would prefer not to have that expert testify at trial? What are you allowed to do if the other side withdraws an expert prior to trial, but you would like the factfinder to know how the expert testified? How far can you go?
- An attorney “presumably” has the option of withdrawing the expert’s designation prior to deposition. Dandurand, 30 S.W.3d at 835. The attorney can claim work-product protection as to that retained expert, since the expert will not be called for trial. Dandurand, 30 S.W.3d at 835. A withdrawal may take place (at any time) by supplementing the expert interrogatory answer, as noted above.
- Once the expert’s testimony is taken, however, the expert’s deposition is available for use by any party, subject to Rule 57.07. See Dandurand, 30 S.W.3d at 836. Our Rule 57 does not distinguish between a deposition for discovery and a deposition for trial. Dandurand, 30 S.W.3d at 836 n. 5.
- There is no prohibition to calling an opposing party’s expert witness at trial. Stone v. Duffy Distributors, Inc., 785 S.W.2d 671, 675 (Mo. App. 1990). There is also no general prohibition against one party calling as its own witness an expert formerlyemployed by the opposing party. State ex rel. Mo. Hwy. and Transp. Com’n v. Sturmfels Farm Ltd. Partnership, 795 S.W.2d 581, 588 (Mo. App. 1990).
- However, if a party calls the opposing party’s expert in the party’s case, the party could notelicit from the expert the fact that he had been employed by the opposing party. See Smith v. Homestead Distributing Co., 629 S.W.2d 454 (Mo. App. 1981); see also State ex rel. State Hwy. Com’n v. Klivas, 484 S.W.2d 292, 294 (Mo. 1972). This rule likely applies equally if the withdrawn expert’s deposition testimony is read to the factfinder.
- If an opposing party’s expert is withdrawn, but the other party chooses to show or read only the favorable portions of the expert’s testimony at trial, the “rule of completeness” might allow the opposing party to then read the unfavorable portions as well.
- To be safe, a party should consider whether interrogatory answershave been sufficiently crafted such that the opposing party is on notice when the party intends to offer testimony at trial of the opposing party’s withdrawn expert witness.
- As to whether a negative inference can be argued from counsel’s decision not to call an expert to testify in a case, see Kelly by Kelly v. Jackson, 798 S.W.2d 699, 703 (Mo. 1990) and State ex rel. State Hwy. Com’n v. Moulder, 547 S.W.2d 882, 885 (Mo. App. 1977).
The standard for medical opinion concerning causation is usually said to be one of “reasonable medical certainty.” Pfeffer v. Kerr, 693 S.W.2d 296, 300 (Mo. App. 1985). But “the precise words used by an expert witness do not necessarily ‘render his testimony inadmissible if he intended to express his opinion or judgment.’” Bynote v. National Super Markets, Inc., 891 S.W.2d 117, 125 (Mo. 1995). The ultimate importance of the expert testimony is to be determined from the testimony as a wholeand less than direct statements of reasonable medical certainty will be sufficient. McGrath v. Satellite Sprinkler Systems, Inc., 877 S.W.2d 704, 708 (Mo. App. 1994) (emphasis added). When the talismanic phrase is employed, it is noteworthy that it may be raised at the beginning or end of the questioning. One may start the questioning by asking the expert at the beginning of his testimony to limit his opinions to those within a reasonable degree of medical certainty is permissible. See e.g., Hickman v. Branson Ear, 256 S.W.3d 120, 122, n.1 (Mo. 2008). The question has also been approvingly posed at the endof the testimony. SeeNadolski v. Ahmed, 142 S.W.3d 755, 763-64 (Mo. App. 2004).
The terms “think,” “guess” or “suggest” do not render an expert witness’s testimony inadmissible if the expert intended to express his opinion or judgment. Lineberry,695 S.W.2d at136. Thus, for example, when a doctor was asked whether he thought his patient’s injury was permanent and he answered “I think so,” the opinion was appropriately admitted as an expression of the expert’s opinion. Lineberry, 695 S.W.2d at 135-36.
It is also not improper to ask an expert witness if something “might, could or would” produce a certain result. An expert's view of possibility or probability is often helpful and proper. Emery v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 976 S.W.2d 439, 447 (Mo. 1998). Along these lines, for example, the Western District Court of Appeals held it was entirely appropriate in a vehicular negligence case for a plaintiff to ask her testifying expert whether brain concussions “sometimes” cause epilepsy, because the expert’s view of what is possible is proper and helpful to the jury in understanding the medical evidence. Lineberry, 695 S.W.2d at 135.
Most importantly, the court should review the experts’ testimony as a whole in determining whether the appropriate legal standard of reasonable degree of medical certainty has been satisfied. SeeWilliams v. Daus, 114 S.W.3d 351 (Mo. App. 2003).
Significantly, the testimony of a physician concerning a diagnosis of a patient is admissible even when it is notbased on a reasonable degree of medical certainty. Johnson v. Creative Restaurant Mgmt.,904 S.W.2d 455, 459 (Mo. App. 1995); Kilmer v. browning, 806 S.W.2d 75, 81-82 (Mo. App. 1991). Again, the courts reason that the ultimate test of the admissibility of expert testimony is whether it will help the jury. Hendricks v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. Co., 709 S.W.2d 483, 493 (Mo. App. 1986). Where the physician’s testimony is intended to express his opinion or judgment with respect to what caused his patient’s ailments, or where his notes help explain the examination and diagnosis of the patient’s complaints, and thereby aid the jury in its determination of the defendants’ liability, the opinions and testimony should be allowed. See Stevens v. Craft, 956 S.W.2d 351, 354 (Mo. App. 1997); Johnson, 904 S.W.2d at 459.
b. Publishing to jury. Wilson v. ANR Freight Systems, Inc., 892 S.W.2d 658, 664 (Mo. App. 1994) (medical journal articles may be used on director cross-examination to test the knowledge of the expert and the reliability of his opinion - this is usually accomplished by reading from the publicationand asking the expert if he agrees with the statement). In Wilson, the court noted that the medical literature does not become substantive evidence in the case even when used on direct examination, but it may still be referred to, discussed, and published to the juryas data upon which the expert relies. Id. at 665, butcf.Kelly v. St. Luke’s Hosp., 826 S.W.2d 391, 396 (Mo. App. 1992); Callahan v. Cardinal Glennon Hosp., 863 S.W.2d 852 (Mo. banc 1993); Peterson v. National Carriers, Inc., 972 S.W.2d 349, 352 (Mo. App. 1998) (the witness’s use of an enlargedcopy of the accident report with certain redactions for display to the jury); Wilkerson v. Prelutsky, 943 S.W.2d 643 (Mo. 1997) (though no inteligible objection, no error in permitting the use of certain medical journals during direct examination of expert witnesses without the “required foundational showing of authoritativeness”).
Cross examination– Missouri courts have long permitted medical literature to be used on cross-examination over the objection that it is hearsay. See Gridley v. Johnson, 476 S.W.2d 475 (Mo. 1972); Kansas City v. Dugan, 524 S.W.2d 194 (Mo. App. 1975). Learned treatises may be used during cross-examination to test or challenge an expert’s testimony. Kelly, 826 S.W.2d at 396. They are used to test the knowledge of the expert and reliability of the expert’s opinion. State v. Love, 963 S.W.2d 236, 245 (Mo. App. 1997). They are proper for the jury to consider in passing on the credibility of an expert witness, and thus they are evidence which may be relevant to the jury’s task. Herrera v. DiMayuga, 904 S.W.2d at 490, 494 (Mo. App. 1995).
Texts and journals on technical subjects are not, of themselves, direct and independent evidence. Wilson, 892 S.W.2d at 664, Kelly, 826 S.W.2d at 396 (Mo. App. 1992); Langley, 710 S.W.2d at 377. The use of an article does not change the character of the evidence. Wilson, 892 S.W.2d at 665. The medical articles do not become transformed into substantive evidence. Id; see also Herrera, 904 S.W.2d at 493.
In order to use medical literature in cross-examination, it must be shown to be standard or authoritative. SeeGridley, 476 S.W.2d at 481; Shop-n-Save Warehouse Foods, Inc., v. Soffer, 918 S.W.2d 851, 868 (Mo. App. 1996). “Authoritative” has been defined by the Eastern District, using Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of the English Language, unabridged, 1981, as “possessing recognized or evident authority that elicits acquiescence and acceptance: having qualities that mark as definitive.” Grippe v. Momtazee, 705 S.W.2d 551, 556 (Mo. App. 1986). Mere familiarity of a witness with a publication or periodical does notrender it authoritative. Grippe, 705 S.W.2d at 556; see also Love, 963 S.W.2d at 245.
In order to use text in the examination of an expert, counsel must first adduce evidence that the text is authoritative, that is, that it is generally accepted and accredited within the profession. Foster v. Barnes-Jewish Hosp., 44 S.W.3d 432, 438 (Mo. App. 2001); seealsoGrippe, 705 S.W.2d at 556; Crain v. Newt Wakeman, M.D., Inc., 800 S.W.2d 105, 107 (Mo. App. 1990). This foundational requirement that the literature is authoritative can be established either: (1) by concession of the witness being cross-examined; (2) by proper voir direexamination of the party’s own expert outside the hearing of the jury, thereby laying the foundation for their use in cross-examination at the proper time, Gridley, 476 S.W.2d at 481; (3) by other experts in the field, Grippe, 705 S.W.2d at 556; or (4) by judicial notice. Crain, 800 S.W.2d at 107.
Once the foundation is established, authoritative literature may be used in cross-examination of an expert by reading passages from the literature and asking the witness whether he agrees with those statements. Hemminghaus v. Ferguson, 215 S.W.2d 481, 489 (Mo. 1948). It is proper to cross-examine a medical expert by framing a proposition in the exact language of the author and asking the witness whether he agrees to it. Gridley, 476 S.W.2d at 481; Foster, 44 S.W.2d at 438; Wilson, 892 S.W.2d at 664-65; Langley v. Michael, 710 S.W.2d 373, 377 (Mo. App. 1986); Crain, 800 S.W.2d at 107. Before propounding such a question, it is notnecessary to ascertain whether the witness agrees with the author. Gridley, 476 S.W.2d at 481. The Supreme Court of Missouri has rejected the proposition that the expert witness being cross-examined must first agree that the text is standard or authoritative. The practical effect of such cross-examination would be to give the witness complete control of the cross-examination. Gridley, 476 S.W.2d at 481. A trial court should notdisallow such cross-examination because the witness says he is not familiar with the book or did not recognize it as authoritative. Crain, 800 S.W.2d at 107.
Query whether, based on the discovery rules above regarding discovery of the expert’s opinions file during deposition, as well as the supplementation rules, a party is entitled to discover during a deposition whether an opposing party’s expert believes any literature is authoritative, and if so, which literature. If the opposing party’s expert does not believe any literature is authoritative (which is sometimes the case), can the party fairly assume that the opposing party may not be able to lay the appropriate foundation to cross-examination the party’s experts with literature?
8. “The Rule” As To Expert Witnesses.
Does the old English rule prohibiting a witness from listening to the testimony of other witnesses (“The Rule”) apply to experts?
A trial court does not abuse its broad discretion in allowing an expert to be present in the courtroom for others’ testimony, as section 490.065.3 allows an expert to base his opinion on facts or data made known to him at trial. Grab ex rel. Grab v. Dillon, 103 S.W.3d 228, 237 (Mo. App. 2003).

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