Source: https://dbfamilylaw.wordpress.com/category/vulnerable-witnesses/
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 20:01:22+00:00

Document:
The BBC reported on Wednesday that there is a shortage of intermediaries for help of vulnerable witnesses ‘to give evidence to police and court’; and that some intermediaries are refusing to help because of late payment by the police.
In criminal proceedings – not yet in family or other civil proceedings – the court can order ‘special measures’ for a child or vulnerable witness (eg someone suffering from mental incapacity, or scared of facing their alleged abuser). This can include having their evidence pre-recorded or having someone with them in court to help with deafness or other communication difficulties (‘an intermediary’). These have been in place – or intended to be in place – for criminal proceedings since 1999.
Even this assistance for children, parties and witnesses has not been available in family proceedings – domestic violence, child abuse, or communication difficulties (eg deafness), unless a witness brings their own help. Any payment for help will come from the child or vulnerable person (unless they have legal aid).
Since November 2017, a scheme for ‘intermediaries’ has been introduced by court rule. It applies to adults only. The new rule says in terms it will not be paid for by Ministry of Justice; though help is paid for in criminal proceedings. That is the case even if they are suffering from incapacity or have been abused by a former partner.
A review of my top twelve family law cases for 2017 must mention – no more – R (Miller & anor) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union  UKSC 5,  2 WLR 583. It drew attention Brussels IIA (Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 Concerning Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Matrimonial Matters and in Matters of Parental Responsibility) as being an example of legislation which any ‘Great Reform Bill’ (such a silly name, now European Union (Withdrawal) Bill)) could not replace. It requires co-operation from other EU legislatures and judiciary which may – or may not: we do not know yet – be forthcoming.
Lady Black must be congratulated for her promotion to the Supreme Court; but for clarity of law-making her brother McFarlane LJ remains the star. In the High Court it is hard to choose only a handful of cases when we have lawyers of the calibre of Peter Jackson (now LJ), Cobb, Keehan, MacDonald, Hayden and Baker JJ pushing out the judgments (I don’t mention Mostyn J, who is too self-indulgent; and he is too wobbly as a lawyer to be a good judge).
It is odd that it is the male judges who send in their judgments to BAILII. The common law (for it is reported, not unreported decisions which frame the law) – like other things in life, perhaps? – tends to be made by boys, even in family law. I have limited each Family Division judge to only one case. No women reach this cut, which may be very unfair: where are Parker or Theis, Russell or Roberts JJ, for example? Not even Lady Hale, whose judgements in her thirteen years in the Supreme Court have done so much to reform and define family law, makes it in Supreme Court judgments this year.
Nor have I found it possible to include in my dozen one judgement from the President, Sir James Munby. Perhaps in part this is because amongst his duties is work on obscure subjects like HRH Princess Margaret’s will and cases brought by the Queen’s Proctor such as Grasso v Naik (twenty-one irregular divorces)  EWHC 2789 (Fam). Twenty-one divorce petitions issued from the same address by a struck-off barrister were revoked or set aside. After the initial explanation of the law and a scan of the evidence you could tell that Sir James was thoroughly bored by the whole thing. Neither case – the will and the QP application – add much to the use or ornament of the principles of family law.
2017 began with all eleven Supreme Court Justices delivering their split (8:3) judgements in Miller. Birch v Birch  UKSC 53,  2 FLR 1031 explained that an undertaking, pre-curial to a court order could be varied in narrow and appropriate circumstances (Birch by the way was ignored by Mostyn J in his administrative exercise of CH v WH (Power to order indemnity)  EWHC 2379 (Fam) as explained here https://dbfamilylaw.wordpress.com/2017/12/18/when-is-a-financial-provision-order-not-an-order/). R (UNISON) v Lord Chancellor (Equality and Human Rights Commission and another intervening)  UKSC 51,  3 WLR 409 makes the cut as a family law case. It is pervasive to all litigation. It elegantly and authoritatively defines rights to justice and the rule of law.
The star for me of Court of Appeal cases is Re T (A Child)  EWCA Civ 1889 in which McFarlane LJ explains the breadth and utility to parties and children in family proceedings of the non-molestation order under Family Law Act 1996 s 42; in this case to protect a child who was in foster care. In so doing he refuses to define ‘molestation’ or ‘domestic abuse’ (see, by contrast, the effort to do so in the revised FPR 2010 PD12J para 3: for a pre-Re T discussion of PD12J see https://dbfamilylaw.wordpress.com/2017/11/18/lord-scarman-and-a-definition-of-domestic-abuse/). It depends on the circumstances and whether they come within the broad meaning of molestation in Family Law Act 1996 s 42.
In Hart v Hart  EWCA Civ 1306 Moylan LJ produced a master-class on the back-ground to the modern – ie post White v White  1 AC 596,  2 FLR 981,  UKHL 54 – law on ancillary relief; and in particular in relation to ‘non-matrimonial assets’ (eg inherited, after acquired or earned by exceptional effort assets). Mrs Hart, much to the unbridled disgust of her own lawyers, Irwin Mitchell (who should have restrained their comments on the judgment) failed in her appeal. A judge has a wide discretion in these things. All lawyers, Irwin M included, must learn that discretion does not always fall the way you expect – or in the way you have advised your client to expect.
In AM (Afghanistan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department  EWCA Civ 1123 Sir Ernest Ryder (as President of Appeals Tribunals) emphasised that care is needed by courts in how they treat the evidence of vulnerable witnesses (here in an immigration appeals tribunal). It is an important case for anyone acting for a vulnerable party or witness in any form of court proceedings: criminal, family, civil or administrative tribunal (as here). Two particular issues arose which are relevant also eg to children proceedings: the way in which the credibility of a child or other vulnerable witness should be assessed against other objective evidence in the particular case; and the importance of flexibility of procedure for the hearing of vulnerable and child witnesses (including taking account of recommendations of expert witnesses as to how this could be done) (please note authors of the recent FPR 2010 Pt 3A on vulnerable witnesses: and see David Burrows on ‘Evidence of children and vulnerable witnesses: Part 1’).
Maybe I’ve been a little biased in singling out EU regulation cases; but the hole being bored in our family justice system is still only present, for now, in its ignoral by most family lawyers. In B v B (Maintenance Regulation – Stay)  EWHC 1029 (Fam) MacDonald J explained the background to the stay jurisdiction and why in this case the former wife and the English courts must await a decision from the Milan court. In FE v MR & Ors  EWHC 2298 (Fam) Baker J considered whether Brussels IIA Art 15 enables the court of a member state (a requesting court, R) to request another to transfer a case from that member state’s court to R’s court. Were the children’s circumstances exceptional and would the requesting court ‘be better placed to hear the case’ (Art 15.1). Baker J considers the factors which should influence him in requesting a Spanish court to transfer a case to the English courts, where two children aged 14 and 11 of Spanish parents, were living in England, but had been subject to proceedings in Spain for four years.
One money, one ‘private law’ children case; and finally a ‘public law’ case, all under Brussels IIA. In Redbridge LBC v D, E, F and G (Children: Art 15 – transfer of the proceedings)  EWFC B82, HHJ Carol Atkinson as High Court judge dealt with an application under Art 15 in respect of 4 Roma heritage children from Romania. An application for a transfer of the proceedings to Romania, pursuant to Art 15 was issued by the mother in April 2017. The English court had jurisdiction based on habitual residence. Judge Atkinson provides a text-book analysis of the law to determine this application, by reference to leading case law and concluded that it would not be in the ‘best interests’ of the children to transfer the children; at least not at this stage.
In the tragic case of Re Gard (A Child)  EWHC 1909 (Fam) (and see ‘Lessons from Gard’), Francis J did what a Family Division judge sometimes has to do, and he did so with great dignity and care. Charlie suffered severe brain damage and could not see or hear or breathe because of a mitochondrial condition. Your heart bleeds for his parents, who – or on whose behalf – every legal and medical stone was turned. Spare a thought too for the Family Division judge who has to say a child must die.
In Wolverhampton City Council v JA & Ors  EWFC 62, Keehan J – with enormous care, and attention to detail of the evidence – explained why children should go into care and why the ABE evidence adduced before him was admissible and credible. An oddity of the case remains that information which should have been covered by legal professional privilege – as I read the report (see eg here) – was compelled to be produced by a lawyer who took part in the early stages of the case.
Peter Jackson J (as he then was) would be the first to accept that Re A (Letter to a Young Person) (Rev 1)  EWFC 48 broke no new ground, in law. It has to be included here as a very real attempt to open up to a ‘young person’ (a young boy who had, originally, made his own application to go to live with his father in a ‘Scandinavian’ country). When courts are being reminded daily that the views of those children mature enough to be consulted – if they want to be consulted – must be taken into consideration (see Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union Art 24: also proposed to go with EU withdrawal), for a judge to ensure that the traffic flows in both directions is surely a very good thing?
My favourite case of 2017 is Re S (Child as Parent: Adoption: Consent)  EWHC 2729 (Fam). In it Cobb J combines, with the typical sensitivity of a fine children lawyer, an understanding of how one of my favourite cases of all time – Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech AHA  UKHL 7,  1 AC 112,  1 FLR 224 – with a subject which is essential to all family lawyers Mental Capacity Act 2005. He shows how these two subjects complement one another in relation to a child’s or other person’s understanding and ability to consent (see eg ‘Capacity to consent’).
As the report (with draft regulations attached) of Vulnerable Witnesses and Children Working Group (‘VWCWG’) continues to rot in the Lord Chancellor’s in-tray – or its resources implications to be embroiled with some Treasury austerity sub-committee – three cases concerning vulnerable witnesses and child law have been reported recently.
The first is an immigration case, but one which concerns a 15 year old Afghan asylum seeker and the assessment of his credibility in the administrative appeals tribunals. The Court of Appeal was unimpressed as to how he had been dealt with. In AM (Afghanistan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department  EWCA Civ 1123 (27 July 2017) the court commented on the treatment of evidence of child and vulnerable witnesses and held that a First-tier Tribunal (‘FtT’) ‘did not properly consider the impact of the appellant’s age, vulnerability and the evidence of [his] significant learning disability’ (). They sent the case back for reconsideration. The Lord Chancellor was given permission to intervene. The main judgment (with which Gross and Underhill LJJ agreed) was given by President of the Tribunals (‘Ryder LJ’). All parties and the court agreed that the appeal should be allowed.
AM’s father was a member of the Taliban. After the father’s death AM travelled across Europe to UK and had claimed asylum. He was beaten up by Afghan police before leaving, and was threatened by them and by the Taliban in Afghanistan. He had a real fear of persecution. It was said that he has mental health and psychological difficulties. The Secretary of State refused him asylum but granted leave to remain till 17½. Reasons for this included that his evidence was not credible.
The tribunal paper included a psychologist’s report which the FtT judge said had only been ‘drawn to his attention’ after the hearing. That said Ryder LJ was not true and was, in any event, ‘a wholly inadequate response to the content of the report’ which included ‘opinions about the appellant that were relevant to procedural fairness’ (). AM’s appeal was rejected as was his appeal to the Upper Tribunal (‘UT’).
 In like manner to my conclusion at  I have come to the firm view that the UT judge took no sufficient steps to ensure that the appellant had obtained effective access to justice and in particular that his voice could be heard in proceedings that concerned him. Procedurally, the proceedings were neither fair nor just. That was a material error of law. The appellant was a vulnerable party with needs that were not addressed…. The parties agree.
Central to the court’s view of the tribunal’s assessment of evidence was that the FtT judge looked at what he regarded as the ‘credibility’ of AM, rather than considering his vulnerability and looking at to other available ‘objective evidence’ first. He had an ‘obligation’ to ‘give precedence and greater weight to objective evidence and indicators of risk’ to AM, rather than to his personal credibility. These evidential factors must be reviewed ‘in light of [AM]’s age, vulnerability and learning disability’ (). Had the tribunal properly considered its own practice direction and rules this error and the importance of AM’s age would have been clear to it.
The FtT and the parties are required to ensure that an appellant is able to participate fully in the proceedings. There is a flexibility and a wide range of specialist expertise which the tribunal can use to deal with a case fairly and justly. Within the Rules themselves this flexibility and ability to override formality is made clear, said Ryder LJ. If this is not done there is a risk that any decision made by a tribunal will be ‘unlawful’; and this is especially so where – as here – the welfare of a child is in issue.
Ryder LJ reviewed the available tribunal practice directions on dealing with ‘vulnerable adults and sensitive witnesses’ ( and ): ‘failure to follow them will most likely be a material error of law’ ().
 … The facts in dispute are whether, or not, A repeatedly raped his daughter, Y, more than 20 years ago when she was under 16. It is said that the abuse continued after she turned 16. A strongly denies the accusation. His wife B says that the allegation is impossible to believe, as does Y’s sister C. Y herself suffers from mental illness and has not participated in the trial. Her counsel take a neutral stance in relation to the allegations, as does the [children’s guardian]. The local authority submits that the accusation is true.
But to what application do these facts relate (the heading of the case refers to a child Z)? Z is introduced half way through the judgement at . It becomes clear at  and  that she was born on 25 October 2011 and that she is the daughter of Y and therefore the grand-daughter of A. By the end of the judgement the implication that there are care issues in relation to Z becomes clear.
 For an exhaustively full account of the background reference should be made to the chronology prepared by junior counsel for the local authority, which has left no stone unturned. I am grateful for the preparation of that very useful document.
But this judge has already made clear that he does not consider that documents in family proceedings should be released (DL v SL  EWHC 2621 (Fam) sub nom L v L (Ancillary Relief Proceedings: Anonymity)  WLR 1259, Mostyn J at ). In law, there are real question on this (see eg ‘Release of court hearing documents’: ). As matters now stand ‘reference’ cannot now be made to the ‘useful document’. Both problems remain.
 The decision of the House of Lords in Re B (Children)  UKHL 35 confirms what we all already knew, namely that if an allegation in relation to a past (as opposed to future) fact or event is not proved to a probability of 51% then it is treated as not having happened: see Lord Hoffmann at paragraph 2. The court may feel that there is a not fanciful (im)probability, say 25%, of the event having happened, but that mere suspicion, for that is all it is, entirely falls by the wayside….
That this evidence was from a vulnerable witness (though she was no longer a child) and that therefore whether it should have been seen in the light of other objective evidence of her credibility (if there was any: her mental state might be part of such a question), in accordance with AM (above) was not considered by Mostyn J. In fairness that decision was only handed down a couple of days before Mostyn J’s judgment. However, in AM at  Ryder LJ referred to older Court of Appeal authority (which would have been available to Mostyn J) namely Mibanga v Secretary of State for the Home Department  EWCA Civ 367.
 It seems to me to be axiomatic that a fact-finder must not reach his or her conclusion before surveying all the evidence relevant thereto. Just as, if I may take a banal if alliterative example, one cannot make a cake with only one ingredient, so also frequently one cannot make a case, in the sense of establishing its truth, otherwise than by combination of a number of pieces of evidence. Mr Tam, on behalf of the Secretary of State, argues that decisions as to the credibility of an account are to be taken by the judicial fact-finder and that, in their reports, experts, whether in relation to medical matters or in relation to in-country circumstances, cannot usurp the fact-finder’s function in assessing credibility. I agree. What, however, they can offer, is a factual context in which it may be necessary for the fact-finder to survey the allegations placed before him; and such context may prove a crucial aid to the decision whether or not to accept the truth of them. What the fact-finder does at his peril is to reach a conclusion by reference only to the appellant’s evidence and then, if it be negative, to ask whether the conclusion should be shifted by the expert evidence….
 As stated, Y has not given oral evidence. She is presently detained in a psychiatric hospital under the Mental Health Act. There is compelling, unchallenged, medical evidence that it would be very harmful for her to give oral evidence in court. A therefore has not had the opportunity of confronting his principal accuser, nor has the court had the opportunity of assessing under cross-examination the reliability of the evidence deriving from her.
 In February 2016 Y was sectioned. She has been in a psychiatric unit ever since and is under close supervision. Her condition is truly pitiful in that she seems to wish to engage in self-harm at almost every opportunity. As I have stated above, the medical evidence is very clear – for her to give evidence or to participate in the proceedings could aggravate her condition considerably.
No more detail of the evidence or its assessment of Y’s credibility is attempted by the judge; nor, for example, does he ask why her mental capacity may be affected as it now is. He did not review how a witness in Y’s position might have been dealt with in the analogous position dictated for criminal trials under Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 Pt 2 (though it is likely he was not referred to that Act).
The title of H v D (Appeal – Failure of Case Management)  EWHC 1907 (Fam), Peter Jackson J gives a clue as to what is coming. In a convoluted series of hearings concerning a contact dispute, the first instance judge had attempted to protect the mother from direct cross-examination by the father of their child.
 Where questioning by the court is for some reason not possible, the situation of the alleged victim may be entirely unsatisfactory: see for example the recent observations of Hayden J in Re A (a minor) (fact finding; unrepresented party)  EWHC 1195 (Fam) at 57-63.
Neither he nor Hayden J (in Re A) seems to have been referred to the Court of Appeal case of Re K & H (Children)  EWCA Civ 543 sub nom K and H (Private Law: Public Funding)  1 FLR 754, where Lord Dyson MR said in terms that if a judge considers that parent B should not cross-examine the other (A), then the judge must make do and conduct the questioning of A for B (Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984 s 31G(6)) (and see per Lord Bingham CJ in R v Brown (Milton)  2 Cr App Rep 364 cited by Lord Dyson at ).
Peter Jackson J explains that in August 2015 – yes, 2015 – the matter was allocated to HHJ Kushner QC. Her first task, said the judge, was to conduct a hearing of the mother’s allegations which were likely to have a strong effect on the welfare decision, whether proved or not. He went on: ‘ A broad survey of the events over the past two years makes very concerning reading. It would be no exaggeration to say that practically no progress has yet been made;’ and he then lists 10 examples of why he was concerned at the lack of progress.
At the conclusion of all this, the circuit judge ordered that the father be permitted to cross-examine the mother. She then appealled against this decision; and, in the course of the appeal, advance an ‘additional ground of appeal, based upon the general failure of case management’.
Peter Jackson J allowed the mothers appeal, and sent the case back to another judge in the court appealled from. Perhaps his most controversial finding was that the father had no right to ‘cross-examine’ or ask questions of the mother (, first bullet-point). Directions had already been given to which the father did not object. The court had made ‘repeated orders (five in all) requiring [him] to put his questions in writing’. The father did not comply, ‘no sanctions were applied, and it was not until 7 March 2017 (Day 2 of the hearing), that he eventually produced a list of questions’ ((ii)). In fairness to Peter Jackson J, he perhaps treated that direction as sufficient to deal with F’s ‘right to cross-examine’.

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