Source: http://pa.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20180119_0001235.MPA.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 11:47:29+00:00

Document:
The plaintiff, Judith Nagle, brought this action against her former employer, Comprehensive Women's Health Services, alleging that the medical services provider violated her rights under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 623 et seq. (ADEA) and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. (ADA) when it terminated her employment in June 2014. Ms. Nagle, who worked in a managerial capacity for the defendant for more than two decades before she was fired at age 53, also alleges that the defendant violated Pennsylvania's Wage Payment and Collection Law, 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 260.1 et seq. (WPCL) by refusing to pay her for hundreds of hours of annual and sick leave that she claims to have accrued and rolled over during the course of her many years of employment pursuant to practice custom and practice.
Following fact discovery, the defendant moved for summary judgment on the plaintiff's claims. The motion is fully briefed and ripe for disposition, and has been referred to the undersigned for purposes of preparing a report and recommendation. Following review of the briefs and the evidence the parties submitted, it will be recommended that the defendant's motion be denied because disputed issues of material facts are manifold in the record and make summary judgment unwarranted.
Prior to the reorganization, managerial administrative office functions were handled by two management employees, Ms. Nagle and Regina Tutko, the Assistant Office Manager and Operations Manager. (Doc. 28, Ex. 3, Certification of Regina Tutko, ¶ 7(B).) Ms. Nagle and Ms. Tutko worked together for approximately 13 years in this shared managerial role. Ms. Tutko left the practice in late 2013, thus making the need for a restructuring of office responsibilities more apparent. One of the principal physicians in the practice, Dr. Zimmerman, brought his wife, Lisa Zimmerman, in to assist with the restructuring.
Ms. Nagle's suspicions were further piqued by two age-related comments that were either directed at her personally or were otherwise made in her presence during the period following the restructuring. Thus, on January 20, 2014, while reviewing financial documents with Dr. Zimmerman, he told her directly “you're getting old.” (Nagle Dep. at 164:3-11; 165:13-15.) Just two months later, in March 2014, Dr. Krewson was overheard saying that he wanted a “young” staff, something that Ms. Nagle took to be a reference to her. Accordingly, whatever the meaning behind each of these statements, Ms. Nagle overheard them within a short period of time that overlapped with the restructuring of the medical practice, the transfer of many of Ms. Nagle's work to new, younger, and less experienced employees, and a growing sense that the restructuring had really become an effort to marginalize Ms. Nagle and push her out.
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, a court must determine “whether the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, and affidavits show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and whether the moving party is therefore entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Macfarlan v. Ivy Hill SNF, LLC., 675 F.3d 266, 271 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)). A disputed issue is only “genuine” if there is a sufficient evidentiary basis upon which a reasonable factfinder could find for the non-moving party. Kaucher v. Cnty. of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 423 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). A factual dispute is “material” only if it could affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Doe v. Luzerne Cnty., 660 F.3d 169, 175 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Gray v. York Papers, Inc., 957 F.2d 1070, 1078 (3d Cir. 1992)). The Court is not tasked with resolving disputed issues of fact, but only with determining whether there exist any factual issues that must be tried. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-49.
In considering a motion for summary judgment, a court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Macfarlan, 675 F.3d at 271; Bouriez v. Carnegie Mellon Univ., 585 F.3d 765, 770 (3d Cir. 2009). Where there exist factual issues that cannot be resolved without a credibility determination, the court must credit the non-moving party's evidence over that presented by the moving party. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 255. However, if there is no factual issue presented, and if only one reasonable conclusion could arise from the record with respect to the potential outcome under the governing law, the court must award summary judgment in favor of the moving party. Id. at 250.
The court must review the entire record, but in doing so must take care to “disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to believe.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, 530 U.S. 133, 150-51 (2000). The task for the court is to examine “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to the jury or whether it is so onesided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 251-52.
Furthermore, in cases involving allegations of employment discrimination, such as this one, the foregoing standard of review is applied with special care because the intent and credibility of parties are typically crucial. Conneen v. MBNA Am. Bank, N.A., 334 F.3d 318, 325 n.9 (3d Cir. 2003); see also Doe v C.A.R.S. Prot. Plus, 527 F.3d 358, 369 (3d Cir. 2008) (observing that “summary judgment is to be used sparingly in employment discrimination cases”). In undertaking this review, the Court avoids making credibility determinations and does not weigh the evidence, and instead must take care to accept as true the non- movant's evidence and draw all inferences in his favor. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 255; see also Marino v. Indus. Crating Co., 358 F.3d 241, 247 (3d Cir. 2004).
The ADEA prohibits employers from taking adverse employment action against an employee who is at least 40 years old, 29 U.S.C. § 631(a), “because of such individual's age.” 29 U.S.C. § 623(a). A plaintiff alleging that she was subjected to adverse employment action, such as a termination, in violation of the Act must show that her “age was the ‘but-for' cause of the employer's adverse action.” Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 177 (2009). It is not enough for a plaintiff to show that her age was a factor that motivated the employer's action, but instead must point to evidence that could support an inference that her age had a “determinative influence” on the decision. Id. at 176. This burden remains squarely with the plaintiff, who may prove her claims through direct or circumstantial evidence. Id. at 177.
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Gross, the Third Circuit had instructed that direct evidence of age discrimination meant “evidence sufficient to allow the jury to find that ‘the “decision makers placed substantial negative reliance on [the plaintiff's age] in reaching their decision to fire him.'” Fakete v. Aetna, Inc., 308 F.3d 335, 338 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Connors v. Chrysler Fin. Corp., 160 F.3d 971, 976 (3d Cir. 1998)). Gross fundamentally changed this and now it is clear that “ ‘substantial negative reliance' on age is not enough [to prove discrimination in violation of the ADEA]; the evidence must be a sufficient basis for a reasonable jury to conclude that age was the determinative, but-for cause of the employee's termination.” Palmer v. Britton Industries, Inc., 662 Fed.Appx. 147, 151 (3d Cir. Nov. 7, 2016).

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