Source: http://supreme.nolo.com/us/70/347/case.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 03:50:59+00:00

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Views of the defendants are, that the case, as stated, is not a case for contribution in general average, and that the court erred in instructing the jury that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover.
were incurred, the claim of the plaintiffs cannot be sustained.
Decision and judgment in the case must depend upon the question whether the several sums expended by the agent of the underwriters of the ship after he went on board and took charge of the vessel and the men and means employed to save her were properly carried into the adjustment, because it is plain that if those sums are not properly included in the expenses of general average, the judgment should be reversed.
I. Sacrifices, voluntarily made in the course of the voyage, of part of the ship or cargo to save the residue of the adventure from an impending peril or extraordinary expenses incurred for the joint benefit of both ship and cargo, and which became necessary in consequence of a common peril, are usually regarded as the proper subjects of general average.
1. Those which arise from sacrifices of part of the ship or part of the cargo, purposely made in order to save the whole adventure from perishing.
1. That it terminated when the cargo was separated from the ship, and was transported to the port of destination and delivered to the consignee.
2. That it terminated when the master, acting in good faith as the agent of all concerned, yielded to the necessities of his situation and abandoned the endeavors to save the ship, and left her where she was stranded, in charge of the agent of her underwriters.
3. That it did not terminate until the ship was got off from the bank where she was stranded, and arrived at the marine railway for repairs in her port of destination.
Theory of defendants is substantially expressed in the first proposition, but the plaintiffs insist that the community of peril did not terminate until the arrival of the vessel at the port of destination, and if not, then the charge of the court was correct, and the judgment of the court must be affirmed.
been regarded as a general regulation, applicable in all cases falling within the principle on which it is founded.
Principle of the rule is that "what is given for the general benefit of all, shall be made good by the contribution of all," and hence it is that losses, which arise out of extraordinary expenses incurred for the joint benefit of ship and cargo, are as clearly to be carried into the adjustment as those which arise from sacrifices of part of the ship or part of the cargo.
1. That if the ship is got off without discharging the cargo or by discharging only a part of it, then the whole expense is general average unless the vessel needs repairs, but if she needs repairs, those are particular average.
2. That if the vessel does not float when the whole cargo is discharged, the subsequent expenses do not concern the cargo, but are particular average on the vessel in the same manner as repairs.
3. That goods, when landed from a stranded ship and delivered to the consignee, cease to be liable to contribute for expenses subsequently incurred.
Unquestionably the rule enunciated in the first illustration is correct, but grave doubts are entertained whether the second and third can be admitted in all cases without important qualifications.
Although the stranded vessel may not float as a consequence of the unlading of the goods, still she may be so lightened by the operation that the usual appliances at hand may be amply sufficient to enable the master to rescue the vessel without much expense or delay and put her in a condition to receive back the cargo and transport it to the port of destination, and in the case supposed it cannot be doubted that the expense of saving the vessel, as well as the expense of preserving and reloading the cargo, would be the proper subject of general contribution.
Unless the rule is so, a new statement of the adjustment would be necessary upon each respective part of the cargo delivered as they successively reached a safe destination, which would be impracticable, and contrary to the usual course of adjusting such losses.
Conscious of the nature and extent of his obligations, the master accepted the services of the several steamers which went to the relief of the ship, and continued his endeavors to save both ship and cargo until the latter was safety delivered at the port of destination and until the consignees of the ship declined to authorize any further expense.
could not have been justified in doing less than he did; but the question is whether or not he was required to do more? Plainly his duty was not ended when the vessel was stranded, nor even when the cargo had been removed for the double purpose of saving it and of lightening the ship, as a part of the means adopted to get her off.
Means devised on the occasion were such as are usually employed for the purpose, and not a doubt is entertained that if the master had been successful in saving the ship as well as the cargo, the whole expense, inasmuch as it was the result of one continuous, unremitted operation, would have been properly regarded as a general average expenditure. Where the ship is stranded, much is necessarily confided to the discretion of the master, and if the ship had been saved through the means which he employed, it is clear that the expenditure would have fallen directly within the definition of general average as given by the best writers upon the subject.
III. General average denotes that contribution which is made by all who are parties to the same adventure towards a loss arising out of extraordinary sacrifices made or extraordinary expenses incurred by some by them for the common benefit of ship and cargo.
its character as an act performed for the joint benefit of the ship and cargo.
Except when the disaster occurs in the port of destination or so near it that the voyage may be regarded as ended, the master, if the goods are not perishable, has the right, and if practicable, it is his duty, to get off the ship, reload the cargo, and prosecute the voyage to its termination.
Where the whole adventure is saved by the master, as the agent of all concerned, the consignments of the cargo first unladed and stored in safety are not relieved from contributing towards the expenses of saving the residue, nor is the cargo in that state of the case relieved from contributing to the expenses of saving the ship, provided the ship and cargo were exposed to a common peril and the whole adventure was saved by the master in his capacity as agent of all the interests and by one continuous series of measures.
Ship and cargo were in imminent danger from a common peril, and under those circumstances it was the duty of the master, as the agent of all concerned, to use his best endeavors and employ his best exertions to save the whole adventure.
Viewing the matter in that light, his first efforts were directed to the object of relieving the vessel by means of the steamers which came alongside; but, finding that the ship was too fast in the sand to be got off by those means, he commenced to discharge the cargo, to save the goods and lighten the ship as apparently the best possible measure which could be adopted to save the whole adventure.
IV. None of these propositions is controverted by the plaintiffs, but they insist that the subsequent expenses incurred by the agent of the underwriters of the ship should also be carried into the adjustment, and that the cargo saved by the master should be adjudged liable to contribute towards the expenses incurred by the agent of the underwriters of the ship in accomplishing, at the end of six weeks, what the master abandoned as hopeless and as a total loss.
any further expenditure, had dismissed the steamers that went to the aid of the ship and had sent back to the port all the steam pumps and wrecking apparatus he had employed in his endeavors to save the ship as well as the cargo, and had, in fact, decided to abandon the ship as a total loss, and left her in charge of the agent of her underwriters.
Prior to that decision, the cargo, except a few remnants of small value, subsequently found in the lower hold, had been discharged into lighters and transported to the place of destination and had been delivered into the possession of the consignees.
Having saved the cargo, and finding that further efforts to save the ship with the means at his command were fruitless, he relinquished his endeavors and abandoned the undertaking.
Such are the undisputed facts of the case, and under the circumstances it is not possible to hold that the ship, as subsequently got off, was, as matter of fact, saved by a continuation of the same series of measures as those by which the cargo was saved.
Complete separation had taken place between the cargo and the ship, and the ship was no longer bound to the cargo nor the cargo to the ship.
from New Orleans to Philadelphia, and the vessel was stranded in Delaware Bay in a situation of imminent peril. Statement of the case shows that the specie was among the first articles landed, and it was immediately sent overland to the port of destination, and on the following day was delivered to the defendants. Eight weeks afterwards the vessel reached the same port in safety with the remainder of the cargo, which had been discharged into lighters and was afterwards reshipped. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that the defendants were liable to contribute in general average to the charges and expenses incurred subsequently to the landing of the specie.
Much stress is laid in the opinion of the court upon the fact that the vessel and the residue of the cargo left on board, were subsequently brought into port by the extraordinary exertions of the master, and if the conclusion can be sustained at all, it must be upon the ground that the whole adventure was saved by a continuous series of measures prosecuted by the master as the agent of all concerned which commenced with the saving of the specie and ended with the saving of the vessel and the residue of the cargo. Stranding in that case was outside of the harbor of the port of destination, and there was no abandonment of the vessel nor any suspension in the endeavors of the master to save the entire adventure. But the statement of the case shows that the master and mariners remained on board and that they saved the ship, and having returned the residue of the cargo to the ship, the same was duly transported to the place of destination. [Footnote 14] Standard text writers have doubted the correctness of that decision, [Footnote 15] but it is unnecessary to determine the question at the present time, as it is clearly distinguishable from the case before the Court.
case. Insurers of the ship were the plaintiffs, and the defendants were the owners of the cargo. She was stranded nine miles from the port of destination. Part of the cargo was saved by men employed by the owners of the same, at their own expense. Other parts of the same were subsequently saved by the underwriters of the ship, and it appears that at one time the latter had a hundred men employed in efforts to save the cargo and the sails and rigging of the vessel. They afterwards entered into a contract with a third party, and agreed to pay a certain sum if he would save the ship and the residue of the cargo.
and as the goods of the respondents were silks, they were first carried on shore. Night came, and the armed vessel left, and as the danger no longer continued, the master forbore to land any more of the goods. Six days afterwards the armed vessel returned, and captured the ship and the goods on board, belonging to the appellants.
general average, for the amount paid for the services of the other vessel, and for the expenses incurred at the port of distress.
Precise doctrine advanced was that the liability to general average continues until the property has been completely separated from the rest of the cargo, and from the whole adventure, so as to leave no community of interest remaining. Majority of the court went farther and held that if the voyage is not abandoned, and the property, although separated from the rest, is still under the control of the master, and liable to be taken again on board for the purpose of prosecuting the voyage, the common interest remains, and whatever is done for its protection, is done at the common expense. Correctness of that decision cannot be doubted, and yet the question may often arise in practice, whether in a given case the separation is, or is not so complete as to justify the conclusion that no community of interest remains. Close cases may doubtless arise, but it is believed that in general there will not be much difficulty in ascertaining the true line of distinction.
Statement of facts shows that it became necessary to cut a channel for the vessel, and employ a steam tug in order to get the vessel off; and the view of the court was that the goods had been previously saved by a distinct and completed operation, and that afterwards a new operation began for the benefit of the shipowner.
Applying those principles to the present case, we are of opinion that there was no community of interest remaining between the ship and the cargo when the master, as declared in the statement of the case, abandoned the ship and left her in charge of the agent of the underwriters after the consignees of the ship had declined to authorize the master to incur any further expense.
Judgment of the circuit court is therefore reversed and the cause remanded with directions to issue a new venire.
One box had been lost overboard in discharging the cargo.
2 Arnould on Insurance 881.
Benecke & Stevens on Average 96; Baily on Average 45, 71; Birkley v. Presgrave, 1 East 220; Addison on Contracts 490.
2 Phillips on Insurance 65; Holt on Shipping 482.
Bedford Commercial Insurance Company v. Parker, 2 Pickering 7; Benecke & Stevens on Average, 139.
Benecke & Stevens on Average 141 and note.
2 Phillips on Insurance § 1407; 2 Arnould on Insurance § 338.
The Propeller Niagara, 21 How. 27; King v. Shepherd, 3 Story 358; Elliot v. Russel, 10 Johnson 7.
M. & P. on Shipping 320; Maclachlan on Shipping 556; Smith's Mercantile Law, 6th ed. 336; Barnard v. Adams, 19 How. 270.
Slater v. Rubber Co., 26 Conn. 129; Nemick v. Holmes, 25 Pa.St. 371.
Lewis v. Williams, 1 Hall S.C. 436; Gray v. Waln, 2 Sergeant & Rawle 239.
Parsons' Mercantile Law 326; 2 Phillips on Insurance § 1407.
Columbia Insurance Co. v. Ashby, 13 Pet. 331.
Benecke & Stevens on Average 61.
Job v. Langton, 6 Ellis & Blackburne 779: M. & P. on Shipping (3d ed) 322.
Moran v. Jones, 7 Ellis & Blackburne 532.
Maclachlan on Shipping 573, 576.

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