Source: http://gkemploymentlaw.com/appellate.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 01:59:13+00:00

Document:
The Appellate Practice Group is chaired by Chris Kleppin. The Practice Group is involved in all sorts of appeals, relating to most aspects of labor and employment law, wage and hour law, and civil rights litigation. We have successfully handled appeals to the district courts of appeal in Florida (Florida's mid-level appellate court), the Supreme Court of Florida, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, and the Supreme Court of the United States.
List of Representative Clients: The Town of Davie, Florida, Broney Automotive Repairs, Inc., Irmadan, Inc., Playmaker Services, LLC, Wall to Wall Residence Repairs, Inc., Lt. Kenneth Swan, and Meghan Bussell.
List of Representative Cases: Our firm enjoys the pleasure of having many appellate victories. A sampling of those cases is set forth below.
The firm represented the Defendant (a manufacturer's representative for playground equipment) in an action alleging four counts of Fair Labor Standards Act violations and two counts under Florida wage statutes. The Defendant defended the case on the ground that the Plaintiff was an independent contractor who (by virtue of that status) had no cause of action under the FLSA or under Florida unpaid wage statutes. Florida Statutes § 448.08. The Defendant's motion for summary judgment was granted. Murray v. Playmaker Servs., LLC, 512 F. Supp. 2d 1273 (S.D. Fla. 2007). Following the court's decision, the Defendant moved for attorney fees on the ground that the case was frivolous or, in the alternative, the continued litigation of the case past the discovery stage was litigated after Plaintiff's counsel knew or should have known the case was frivolous. The motion for attorney fees was granted in part by the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida in the amount of $23,375.00. Murray v. Playmaker Servs., LLC, 548 F. Supp. 2d 1378 (S.D. Fla. 2008). The plaintiff appealed, but the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the sanctions against the plaintiff's attorney for vexatious multiplication of the proceedings.
The firm represented the Defendant, which is a local automotive repair business. The plaintiff was an employee who brought suit under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq., alleging unpaid overtime compensation. The Defendant moved for summary judgment because Defendant was not subject to the FLSA and because the Plaintiff could not prove that he was entitled to invoke individual coverage under the FLSA, meaning that he could not prove that he participated in the actual movement of people or things across state lines, and thus the motion was granted. Navarro v. Broney Automotive Repairs, Inc., 533 F. Supp. 2d 1223 (S.D. Fla. 2008). The Plaintiff appealed claiming that he was engaged in commerce because the automotive parts he used to repair the vehicles flowed in interstate commerce until the parts reached the customer. The court rejected this argument and found that the parts interstate activity ended when the parts reached the retailer's shop from which the Defendant purchased the parts. The Plaintiff's purchase of those parts and the taking and placing them in and on customers' cars was purely intrastate activity and thus not subject to FLSA coverage. The Plaintiff filed a writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court of the United States which was summarily denied after the firm's Brief in Opposition was filed. See Navarro v. Broney Automotive Repairs, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 507 (2008).
The firm represented a small, family owned carpentry business in a suit alleging unpaid overtime wages against the company and owner pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq. The plaintiff was a cabinet installer and assembler for the company. The plaintiff claimed he was an employee directly involved in interstate commerce due to the fact that he was sometimes sent to local hardware and retail stores to pick up items that had previously traveled in interstate commerce. The court granted the Defendant's motion for summary judgment finding that purchasing goods in Florida that had previously traveled in interstate commerce did not qualify as participating in interstate commerce. Guzman v. Irmadan, Inc., 551 F. Supp. 2d 1368 (S.D. Fla. 2008). The court had previously limited discovery to the issue of coverage under the FLSA and limited the plaintiff to approximately 34 days of discovery which greatly reduced the attorneys fees and costs in the case that were expended. Guzman v. Irmadan, Inc., 2008 WL 926375 (S.D. Fla. 2008). The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed the grant of summary judgment.
Lt. Swan moved for dismissal on the ground that he was entitled to absolute immunity from suit under Florida Statutes § 768.28(9)(a)--this firm had previously obtained an order from a court holding that employees of governmental entities (such as cities and counties) are absolutely immune from such suits. Brooks v. Jenne, 2005 WL 5488060 (S.D. Fla. 2005). The circuit court granted the dismissal. The Plaintiffs appealed, and the Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed, holding that § 768.28(9)(a) does not render employees of governmental entities absolutely immune from suit. Brown v. Jenne, 941 So. 2d 447 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006). Lt. Swan sought review in the Supreme Court of Florida, which denied review.
The case went back down to the trial court, and after further discovery, the circuit court granted Lt. Swan's motion for summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity. Brown v. Jenne, 2009 WL 3253820 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2009). The Plaintiffs appealed, but the Plaintiffs lost that appeal, because the Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the grant of summary judgment originally issuing the opinion as, Brown v. Jenne, 2011 WL 5375045 (Fla. 4th DCA, Nov. 9, 2011). The court held that there was no Fourth Amendment search or seizure, because the decedent was not restrained for a law enforcement purpose, but rather was restrained for fire rescue personnel to administer first aid. On rehearing, the court issued the opinion cited in the title of this section, leaving intact the grant of summary judgment that the trial court awarded to the firm's client Lt. Swan, and the other Broward County Fire Rescue workers.
The court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant for all of the reasons listed and others. See Portales v. Another Beautiful Corporation, 2011 WL 1043663 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2011) (Miami-Dade). The defendant is deciding whether to seek attorney fees from plaintiff's counsel for the filing of a frivolous lawsuit. In any event, the Plaintiff appealed, and the Third District Court of Appeal on May 16, 2012, affirmed in the opinion cited above.
The firm represented the Defendant (a municipality in Florida) in an action brought by two plaintiffs (former police officers) alleging discrimination, harassment, and retaliation in violation of Florida's Civil Rights Act, Florida Statutes § 760.01 et seq. Plaintiff testified that he was referred to as a "f------ Jewish pig", and that his co-plaintiff was retaliated and discriminated against for maintaining a friendship with Plaintiff. The Defendant's motion for summary judgment was granted. Malin v. Town of Davie, 2008 WL 2752707 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2008). Following the court's decision, the Plaintiff appealed to the Fourth District Court of Appeal which affirmed the decision below.
The case went back down to the trial court, and after further discovery, the circuit court granted Lt. Swan's motion for summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity. Brown v. Jenne, 2009 WL 3253820 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2009). The Plaintiffs appealed, but the Plaintiffs lost that appeal, because the Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the grant of summary judgment. Brown v. Jenne, -- So. 3d --, 2011 WL 5375045 (Fla. 4th DCA, Nov. 9, 2011).
The firm represented the Broward County Sheriff's Office in a discrimination and civil rights proceeding brought by a former employee Kenneth Arugu, who had filed a charge of discrimination alleging various violations of the Florida Civil Rights Act, Florida Statutes §§ 760.01 et seq. After review of BSO's position statement contesting the allegations in the plaintiff's charge of discrimination, which set forth the percentage of minorities employed by BSO, the administrative agency issued a "no-cause" determination, meaning it found that plaintiff Arugu was not discriminated against. Because of this finding, Arugu could not file suit in court, but was limited to administrative remedies (a hearing before DOAH), which he pursued. At the DOAH, DOAH found in favor of BSO. Arugu appealed, and the Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the decision for BSO.

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