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Justia › US Law › US Case Law › US Supreme Court › Volume 462 › Watt v. Western Nuclear, Inc.
Watt v. Western Nuclear, Inc.
The Stock-Raising Homestead Act of 1916 (SRHA) provided for the settlement of homesteads on lands the surface of which was "chiefly valuable for grazing and raising forage crops." Section 9 of the SRHA reserved to the United States title to "all the coal and minerals" in lands patented under the Act. When respondent mining company acquired a fee interest in land covered by a patent under the Act, it proceeded to remove gravel from a pit located on the land to use in paving streets and sidewalks in a company town where its workers lived. The Bureau of Land Management then notified respondent, and later determined, after a hearing, that the removal of the gravel constituted a trespass in violation of a Department of the Interior regulation for which respondent was liable in damages to the United States. The Interior Board of Land Appeals affirmed, holding that gravel is a mineral reserved to the United States in patents issued under the SRHA. Respondent then filed suit in Federal District Court, which affirmed, but the Court of Appeals reversed.
Held: Gravel found on lands patented under the SRHA is a mineral reserved to the United States within the meaning of § 9 of the Act. Pp. 462 U. S. 42-60.
(a) For a substance to be a mineral reserved under the SRHA, it must not only be a mineral within a familiar definition of that term, as is gravel, but must also be the type of mineral that Congress intended to reserve to the United States in lands patented under the Act. Pp. 462 U. S. 42-46.
commercial purposes, and that there is no reason to suppose were intended to be included in the surface estate. Pp. 462 U. S. 46-56.
(c) The conclusion that gravel is a mineral for purposes of the SRHA is also supported by the treatment of gravel under other federal statutes concerning minerals, and by federal administrative and judicial decisions over the last 50 years that have consistently recognized that gravel deposits could be located under the general mining laws. Pp. 462 U. S. 56-59.
(d) Finally, this conclusion is further buttressed by the rule that land grants are construed favorably to the Government. This rule applies here with particular force, because the legislative history of the SRHA reveals Congress' understanding that the mineral reservation would limit the operation of the Act strictly to the surface of the lands. Pp. 462 U. S. 59-60.
MARSHALL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and BRENNAN, WHITE, and BLACKMUN, JJ., joined. POWELL, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which REHNQUIST, STEVENS, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined, post, p. 462 U. S. 60. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 462 U. S. 72.
whether gravel found on lands patented under the Act is a mineral reserved to the United States.
"lands the surface of which is, in his opinion, chiefly valuable for grazing and raising forage crops, do not contain merchantable timber, are not susceptible of irrigation from any known source of water supply, and are of such character that six hundred and forty acres are reasonably required for the support of a family."
"to make permanent improvements upon the land . . . tending to increase the value of the [land] for stock-raising purposes of the value of not less than $1.25 per acre."
subject to and contain a reservation to the United States of all the coal and other minerals in the lands so entered and patented, together with the right to prospect for, mine, and remove the same."
"[t]he coal and other mineral deposits in such lands shall be subject to disposal by the United States in accordance with the provisions of the coal and mineral land laws in force at the time of such disposal."
On February 4, 1926, the United States conveyed a tract of land near Jeffrey City, Wyo., to respondent's predecessor in interest. The land was conveyed by Patent No. 974013 issued pursuant to the SRHA. As required by § 9 of the Act, 43 U.S.C. § 299, the patent reserved to the United States "all the coal and other minerals" in the land.
In March, 1975, respondent Western Nuclear, Inc., acquired a fee interest in a portion of the land covered by the 1926 patent. Western Nuclear is a mining company that has been involved in the mining and milling of uranium ore in and around Jeffrey City since the early 1950's. In its commercial operations, Western Nuclear uses gravel for such purposes as paving and surfacing roads and shoring the shaft of its uranium mine. In view of the expense of having gravel hauled in from other towns, the company decided that it would be economical to obtain a local source of the material, and it acquired the land in question so that it could extract gravel from an open pit on the premises.
After acquiring the land, respondent obtained from the Wyoming Department of Environmental Quality, a state agency, a permit authorizing it to extract gravel from the pit located on the land. Respondent proceeded to remove some 43,000 cubic yards of gravel. It used most of this gravel for paving streets and pouring sidewalks in nearby Jeffrey City, a company town where respondent's mill and mine workers lived.
"[t]he extraction, severance, injury, or removal of timber or mineral materials from public lands under the jurisdiction of the Department of the Interior, except when authorized by law and the regulations of the Department, is an act of trespass."
"The deposit located on the property is an alluvial gravel with 6.4 acres of the 14-acre parcel mined for gravel. . . . There are 6-12 inches of overburden on the site. . . . It is estimated that the deposit thickness will average 10 feet or more in thickness."
85 I.D. 129, 131 (1978). In a technical analysis accompanying the appraisal report, geologist William D. Holsheimer observed that "[t]he gravel is overlain by a soil cover of fairly well developed loamy sand, some 12-18 inches in thickness," and that "[t]here is a relatively good vegetative cover, consisting mainly of sagebrush, and an understory of various native grasses." Id. at 132. The appraisal report concluded that "the highest and best use of the property is for a mineral material (gravel) site." Id. at 131.
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. That court reversed, holding that the gravel extracted by Western Nuclear did not constitute a mineral reserved to the United States under the SRHA. Western Nuclear, Inc. v. Andrus, 664 F.2d 234 (1981). In reaching this conclusion, the Tenth Circuit relied heavily on a ruling made by the Secretary of the Interior prior to the enactment of the SRHA that land containing valuable deposits of gravel did not constitute "mineral land" beyond the reach of the homestead laws. Id. at 240. The court also relied on an analogy to "ordinary rocks and stones," id. at 242, which it said cannot be reserved minerals, lest patentees be left with "only the dirt, and little or nothing more." Ibid. The court reasoned that "if ordinary rocks are not reserved minerals, it follows that gravel, a form of fragmented rock, also is not a reserved mineral." Ibid.
In view of the importance of the case to the administration of the more than 33 million acres of land patented under the SRHA, [Footnote 4] we granted certiorari. 456 U.S. 988 (1982). We now reverse.
the dictionary throw but little light upon its signification in a given case."
"the scientific division of all matter into the animal, vegetable or mineral kingdom would be absurd as applied to a grant of lands, since all lands belong to the mineral kingdom."
Ibid. While it may be necessary that a substance be inorganic to qualify as a mineral under the SRHA, it cannot be sufficient. If all lands were considered "minerals" under the SRHA, the owner of the surface estate would be left with nothing.
"its ordinary and common meaning [as] a comprehensive term including every description of stone and rock deposit, whether containing metallic or non-metallic substances,"
Waugh v. Thompson Land & Coal Co., 103 W.Va. 567, 571, 137 S.E. 895, 897 (1927); see, e.g., Board of County Comm'rs v. Good, 44 N.M. 495, 498, 105 P.2d 470, 472 (1940); White v. Miller, 200 N.Y. 29, 38-39, 92 N.E. 1065, 1068 (1910), gravel would be included. If, however, the word "minerals" were understood to include only inorganic substances having a definite chemical composition, see, e.g., Ozark Chemical Co. v. Jones, 125 F.2d 1, 2 (CA10 1941), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 695 (1942); Lillington Stone Co. v. Maxwell, 203 N.C. 151, 152, 165 S.E. 351, 352 (1932); United States v. Aitken, 25 Philippine 7, 14 (1913), gravel would not be included.
""everything except the mere surface, which is used for agricultural purposes; anything beyond that which is useful for any purpose whatever, whether it is gravel, marble, fire clay, or the like, comes within the word mineral' when there is a reservation of the mines and minerals from a grant of land.""
188 U.S. at 188 U. S. 536 (emphasis added), quoting Midland R. Co. v. Checkley, L.R. 4 Eq.19, 25 (1867).
"mineral lands include not merely metalliferous lands, but all such as are chiefly valuable for their deposits of a mineral character, which are useful in the arts or valuable for purposes of manufacture."
On the other hand, in 1910, the Secretary of the Interior rejected an attempt to cancel a homestead entry made on land alleged to be chiefly valuable for the gravel and sand located thereon. Zimmerman v. Brunson, 39 L.D. 310, overruled, Layman v. Ellis, 52 L.D. 714 (1929). Zimmerman claimed that gravel and sand found on the property could be used for building purposes, and that the property therefore constituted mineral land, not homestead land. In refusing to cancel Brunson's homestead entry, the Secretary explained that "deposits of sand and gravel occur with considerable frequency in the public domain." 39 L.D. at 312. He concluded that land containing deposits of gravel and sand useful for building purposes was not mineral land beyond the reach of the homestead laws, except in cases in which the deposits "possess a peculiar property or characteristic giving them a special value." Ibid.
light on the question before us, the purposes of the SRHA strongly support the Government's contention that the mineral reservation in the Act includes gravel. As explained below, Congress' underlying purpose in severing the surface estate from the mineral estate was to facilitate the concurrent development of both surface and subsurface resources. While Congress expected that homesteaders would use the surface of SRHA lands for stockraising and raising crops, it sought to ensure that valuable subsurface resources would remain subject to disposition by the United States, under the general mining laws or otherwise, to persons interested in exploiting them. It did not wish to entrust the development of subsurface resources to ranchers and farmers. Since Congress could not have expected that stockraising and raising crops would entail the extraction of gravel deposits from the land, the congressional purpose of facilitating the concurrent development of both surface and subsurface resources is best served by construing the mineral reservation to encompass gravel.
nonmineral in character, the land grant statutes provided incentives for parties who wished to use the land for the purposes specified in those statutes, but the land was beyond the reach of the mining laws and the incentives for exploration and development that they provided.
"[s]uch a method permits the separation of the surface from the coal and the unhampered use of the surface for purposes to which it may be adapted."
"[r]ights to the surface of the public land . . . be separated from rights to forests upon it and to minerals beneath it, and these should be subject to separate disposal."
Special Message to Congress, Jan. 22, 1909, 15 Messages and Papers of the Presidents 7266.
the surface of which the Secretary of the Interior deemed to be "chiefly valuable for grazing and raising forage crops," 43 U.S.C. § 292, and reserved all the minerals in those lands to the United States.
"a method for the joint use of the surface of the land by the entryman of the surface thereof and the person who shall acquire from the United States the right to prospect, enter, extract and remove all minerals that may underlie such lands."
"unconditional patents for these comparatively large entries under the homestead laws might withdraw immense areas from prospecting and mineral development."
Letter from First Assistant Secretary of the Interior to Chairman of the House Committee on the Public Lands, Dec. 15, 1915, reprinted in H.R.Rep. No. 35, at 5.
"coal and other mineral deposits . . . shall be subject to disposal by the United States in accordance with the provisions of the coal and mineral land laws in force at the time of such disposal."
Since Congress intended to facilitate development of both surface and subsurface resources, the determination of whether a particular substance is included in the surface estate or the mineral estate should be made in light of the use of the surface estate that Congress contemplated. As the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit noted in United States v. Union Oil Co. of California, 549 F.2d 1271, 1274, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 930 (1977), "[t]he agricultural purpose indicates the nature of the grant Congress intended to provide homesteaders via the Act." [Footnote 13] See Pacific Power & Light Co., 45 I.B.L.A. 127, 134 (1980) ("When there is a dispute as to whether a particular mineral resource is included in the [SRHA] reservation, it is helpful to consider the manner in which the material is extracted and used"); 1 American Law of Mining § 3.26 (1982) ("The reservation of minerals to the United States [in the SRHA] should . . . be construed by considering the purposes both of the grant and of the reservation in terms of the use intended"). Cf. United States v. Isbell Construction Co., 78 I.D. 385, 390 (1971) (holding that gravel is a mineral reserved to the United States under statute authorizing the grant to States of "grazing district land") ("The reservation of minerals to the United States should be construed by considering the purpose of the grant . . . in terms of the use intended").
Congress plainly expected that the surface of SRHA lands would be used for stockraising and raising crops. This understanding is evident from the title of the Act, from the express provision limiting the Act to lands the surface of which was found by the Secretary of the Interior to be "chiefly valuable for grazing and raising forage crops" and "of such a character that six hundred and forty acres are reasonably required for the support of a family," 43 U.S.C. § 292, and from numerous other provisions in the Act. See, e.g., 43 U.S.C. § 293 (patent can be acquired only if the entryman makes "permanent improvements upon the land entered . . . tending to increase the value of the [land] for stock-raising purposes of the value of not less than $1.25 per acre"); 43 U.S.C. § 299 (prospector liable to entryman or patentee for damages to crops caused by prospecting).
"[w]hile the distinguishing special characteristics of gravel are purely physical, notably, small bulk, rounded surfaces, hardness, these characteristics render gravel readily distinguishable by any one from other rock and fragments of rock and are the very characteristics or properties that long have been recognized as imparting to it utility and value in its natural state."
Layman v. Ellis, 52 L.D. at 720. Insofar as the purposes of the SRHA are concerned, it is irrelevant that gravel is not metalliferous and does not have a definite chemical composition. What is significant is that gravel can be taken from the soil and used for commercial purposes.
gravel from SRHA lands that others might have. It had been informed that "[t]he farmer-stockman is not seeking and does not desire the minerals," ibid., and it would have had no more reason to think that he would be interested in extracting gravel than that he would be interested in extracting coal. Stockraising and raising crops do not ordinarily involve the extraction of gravel from a gravel pit.
If we were to interpret the SRHA to convey gravel deposits to the farmers and stockmen who made entries under the Act, we would in effect be saying that Congress intended to make the exploitation of such deposits dependent solely upon the initiative of persons whose interests were known to lie elsewhere. In resolving the ambiguity in the language of the SRHA, we decline to construe that language so as to produce a result at odds with the purposes underlying the statute. Instead, we interpret the language of the statute in a way that will further Congress' overriding objective of facilitating the concurrent development of surface and subsurface resources. See, e.g., Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U. S. 270, 350 U. S. 285 (1956); SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U. S. 344, 320 U. S. 350-351 (1943); Griffiths v. Commissioner, 308 U. S. 355, 308 U. S. 358 (1939).
statute authorizing grants to States of "grazing district land." United States v. Isbell Construction Co., 78 I.D., at 394-396.
The treatment of gravel as a mineral under the general mining laws suggests that gravel should be similarly treated under the SRHA, for Congress clearly contemplated that mineral deposits in SRHA lands would be subject to location under the mining laws, and the applicable regulations have consistently permitted such location. Supra at 462 U. S. 51. Simply as a matter of consistent interpretation of statutes concerning the same subject matter, if gravel deposits constituted "mineral deposits" that could be located under the mining laws, then presumptively gravel should constitute a "mineral" reserved to the United States under the SRHA. If gravel were deemed to be part of the surface estate of lands patented under the SRHA, gravel deposits on SRHA lands obviously would not have been locatable, whereas gravel deposits on other lands would have been locatable. There is no indication that Congress intended the mineral reservation in the SRHA to be narrower in scope than the mining laws.
"the established rule that land grants are construed favorably to the Government, that nothing passes except what is conveyed in clear language, and that, if there are doubts they are resolved for the Government, not against it."
force, because the legislative history of the SRHA reveals Congress' understanding that the mineral reservation would "limit the operation of this bill strictly to the surface of the lands." H.R.Rep. No. 35, at 18 (emphasis added). See also 53 Cong.Rec. 1171 (1916) (the mineral reservation "would cover every kind of mineral"; "[a]ll kinds of minerals are reserved") (Rep. Ferris). In view of the purposes of the SRHA and the treatment of gravel under other federal statutes concerning minerals, we would have to turn the principle of construction in favor of the sovereign on its head to conclude that gravel is not a mineral within the meaning of the Act.
The SRHA was effectively suspended by executive action taken pursuant to the Taylor Grazing Act, 48 Stat. 1269, ch. 865, 43 U.S.C. § 315 et seq. Both the SRHA and the general homestead laws were repealed by the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 2743, 43 U.S.C. § 1701 et seq. Existing patents were unaffected by the repeal.
The IBLA also affirmed the BLM's calculation of damages on the basis of a royalty rate of 30¢ per cubic yard, rejecting Western Nuclear's claim that the use of this rate was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable. 85 I.D. at 139. The Board adjusted the damages from the appraiser's rounded-off figure of $13,000 to $12,802.50. Id. at 140.
"What the United States is concerned about are commercial gravel operations. The United States [does] not see how a commercial gravel operation in any way, shape or form lends itself to helping the rancher. All it does is len[d] itself to helping the mineral company or whoever happens to . . . have a commercial operation. In fact, we would think it would take the land out of the ranch production."
"The United States also has no intention of claiming trespass for [the use of] and and gravel on [the rancher's] own land for purposes related to ranching. That is not the intent of the United States."
The Government, the WSGA, and two other intervenors entered into a stipulation providing that the District Court's judgment would not bar the intervenors "from raising, in the future, issues of fact and law concerning their property rights in sand and gravel." App. to Pet. for Cert. 44a. The stipulation was approved by the District Court and incorporated in its judgment.
See Dept. of Interior, Report of Director of Bureau of Land Management, 1948, Statistical Appendix, Table 17, p. 22.
Whether gravel is a mineral for purposes of the SRHA is an issue of first impression in the federal courts. In a state condemnation proceeding the New Mexico Supreme Court held, with little explanation, that gravel does not constitute a mineral reserved to the United States under the Act. State ex rel. Highway Comm'n v. Trujillo, 82 N.M. 694, 487 P.2d 122 (1971).
The specific listing of coal in the reservation clause of the SRHA sheds no light on what Congress meant by the term "minerals." See Skeen v. Lynch, 48 F.2d 1044, 1046-1047 (CA10), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 633 (1931). There were special reasons for expressly addressing coal that negate any inference that the phrase "and other minerals" was meant to reserve only substances ejusdem generis. The legal context in which the SRHA was enacted suggests that Congress specifically listed coal to make clear that coal was reserved even though existing law treated it differently from other minerals. Coal had been exempted from the application of the general mining laws. See Coal Lands Act of 1873, 17 Stat. 607, current version at 30 U.S.C. § 71 et seq. In addition, the Coal Lands Acts of 1909 and 1910 permitted the acquisition of lands containing coal under patents reserving the coal to the United States. 35 Stat. 844, current version at 30 U.S.C. § 81; 36 Stat. 583, ch. 318, current version at 30 U.S.C. § 83 et seq. See also Act of Apr. 30, 1912, 37 Stat. 105, ch. 99, 30 U.S.C. § 90. That the express listing of coal was not intended to limit the phrase "other minerals" is confirmed by the alternate use of the phrases "coal and other minerals" and "all minerals" in the House Report on the bill that became the SRHA. See H.R.Rep. No. 35, 64th Cong., 1st Sess., 18 (1916).
Relying on Soderberg, the Supreme Court of Oregon subsequently held that "land more valuable for the building sand it contains than for agriculture . . . is mineral within the meaning of the United States mining statutes." Loney v. Scott, 57 Ore. 378, 385, 112 P. 172, 175 (1910). See also State ex rel. Atkinson v. Evans, 46 Wash. 219, 223-224, 89 P. 565, 567-568 (1907) (relying on Soderberg in holding that land containing valuable deposits of limestone, silica, silicated rock, and clay constituted mineral land under a state statute).
Quite apart from Soderberg, even if Congress had been aware of Zimmerman, there would be little basis for inferring that it intended to follow the specific ruling in that case, rather than the Interior Department's general approach in classifying land as mineral land or nonmineral land. As a leading contemporary treatise pointed out, 2 C. Lindley, American Law Relating to Mining and Mineral Lands § 424, p. 996, and n. 78 (3d ed.1914), Zimmerman was inconsistent with the Department's traditional treatment of the problem. Whereas the Secretary emphasized in Zimmerman that gravel is a common substance, other Department rulings recognized that land containing deposits of other common substances constituted "mineral land" if the deposits were found "in quantity and quality sufficient to render the land more valuable on account thereof than for agricultural purposes." Pacific Coat Marble Co. v. Northern Pacific R. Co., 25 L.D. 233, 245 (1897). See Bennett v. Moll, 41 L.D. 584 (1912) (pumice); McGlenn v. Wienbroeer, 15 L.D. 370 (1892) (building stone); H. P. Bennett, Jr., 3 L.D. 116 (1884) (building stone); W. H. Hooper, 1 L.D. 560 (1881) (gypsum).
In 1913, the Interior Department itself listed gravel as a mineral in a comprehensive study of the public lands. Dept. of Interior, United States Geological Survey, Bulletin 537, The Classification of the Public Lands 138-139 (1913).
For example, mineral land was exempted from the homestead laws, Act of June 21, 1866, § 1, 14 Stat. 66, ch. 127, 43 U.S.C. § 201, from statutes granting lands to railroads, Act of July 1, 1862, § 3, 12 Stat. 492; Act of July 2, 1864, § 3, 13 Stat. 367, and from a statute granting land to States for agricultural colleges, Act of July 2, 1862, § 1, ch. 130, 12 Stat. 503. See generally United States v. Sweet, 245 U. S. 563, 245 U. S. 567-572 (1918); Deffeback v. Hawke, 115 U. S. 392, 115 U. S. 400-401 (1885). If land was classified as mineral land, it could not be conveyed under these statutes.
Land was frequently misclassified as nonmineral. Misclassification resulted both from fraud and from the practical difficulties in telling at the time of classification whether land was more valuable for the minerals it contained than for agricultural purposes. See Deffeback v. Hawke, supra, at 115 U. S. 405. Classification depended largely upon affidavits of entrymen, reports by surveyors, information available from field offices of the Land Department, and information provided by persons with an interest in contesting the classification of particular land as nonmineral. Frequent errors were inevitable. See 1 American Law of Mining § 3.1 (1982); West v. Edward Rutledge Timber Co., 244 U. S. 90, 244 U. S. 98 (1917). If land was erroneously classified as nonmineral and conveyed under a land grant statute, the patentee received title to the entire land, including any subsequently discovered minerals. See Diamond Coal & Coke Co. v. United States, 233 U. S. 236, 233 U. S. 239-240 (1914); Shaw v. Kellogg, 170 U. S. 312, 170 U. S. 342-343 (1898). Absent proof of fraud, see Diamond Coal & Coke Co. v. United States, supra, at 233 U. S. 239-240, the Government had no recourse once title passed.
Even with respect to land properly classified as more valuable for agricultural or other purposes than for the minerals it contained, the system of land classification provided incentives only for the use of surface resources. After land was classified as nonmineral and conveyed under a land grant statute, only the grantee had an incentive to discover and exploit minerals lying beneath the land. If he did not do so, they would remain undeveloped.
The Coal Lands Act of 1909 permitted settlers on lands which President Roosevelt had subsequently withdrawn from entry under the homestead laws to obtain patents which reserved the coal to the United States. 35 Stat. 844, current version at 30 U.S.C. § 81. The Coal Lands Act of 1910 made withdrawn lands available for settlement, and permitted settlers to obtain patents which reserved the coal to the United States. 36 Stat. 583, ch. 318, current version at 30 U.S.C. § 83 et seq. See also Act of Apr. 30, 1912, 37 Stat. 105, ch. 99, 30 U.S.C. § 90. The Agricultural Entry Act of 1914 permitted the acquisition of lands withdrawn from entry, or classified as valuable, because of the phosphate, nitrate, potash, oil, gas, or asphaltic minerals they contained, but provided that patents would reserve to the United States all such minerals. 38 Stat. 509, as amended, 30 U.S.C. § 121 et seq.
"[a]ny person qualified to locate and enter the coal and other mineral deposits, or having the right to mine and remove the same under the laws of the United States, . . . the right at all times to enter upon the lands entered or patented [under the SRHA] for the purpose of prospecting for coal or other mineral therein."
To protect the homesteader, Congress made it a condition of the prospector's entry on the land that he "not injure, damage, or destroy the [homesteader's] permanent improvements," and also provided that the prospector "shall be liable . . . for all damages to the crops on such lands by reason of such prospecting." Any person who, after discovering minerals, acquires from the United States "the right to mine and remove the same" can "reenter and occupy so much of the surface thereof as may be required for all purposes reasonably incident to the mining or removal," if he (1) obtains the written consent or waiver of the homesteader, (2) compensates the homesteader for any damages to the "crops or other tangible improvements" on the land, or (3) executes a bond to secure the payment of such damages. In 1949, Congress increased the patentee's protection by expanding the liability of the prospector or miner to encompass "any damage that may be caused to the value of the land for grazing." 63 Stat. 215, § 5, 30 U.S.C. § 54.
See Department of the Interior, Circular No. 1278, Mining Claims on the Public Domain, 55 I.D. 235, 236 (1935); 43 CFR § 185.1 (1939), current version at 43 CFR § 3811.1 (1982). By their own terms, the mining laws apply to "all valuable mineral deposits in lands belonging to the United States." 30 U.S.C. § 22. Like other interests in land owned by the Government (e.g., leaseholds, easements), mineral estates reserved under the SRHA constitute "lands belonging to the United States." Cf. Devearl W. Dimond, 62 I.D. 260, 262 (1955) (minerals reserved under the SRHA constitute "vacant, unreserved, and undisposed of public lands" under statute adding lands to the Navajo Indian Reservation in Utah). See also Act of Sept. 19, 1964, 78 Stat. 985, § 10, 43 U.S.C. § 1400 (1970 ed.) (for purposes of statute creating Public Land Law Review Commission, "the term public lands' includes . . . outstanding interests of the United States in lands patented, conveyed in fee or otherwise, under the public land laws").
In Union Oil,the Ninth Circuit held that geothermal steam constitutes a mineral reserved to the United States under the SRHA.
It is important to remember that, in contrast to the situation in Zimmerman v. Brunson, 39 L.D. 310 (1910), where treating gravel as a mineral would have required cancellation of a homestead entry, treating a substance as a mineral under the SRHA in no way calls into question any homestead entries, for the SRHA was not limited to nonmineral land. The only consequence is that title to the substance rests with the United States, rather than with the owner of the surface estate, and that, if the latter wishes to extract the substance and sell it or use it for commercial purposes, he must first acquire the right to do so from the United States.
We note that this case does not raise the question whether the owner of the surface estate may use a reserved mineral to the extent necessary to carry out ranching and farming activities successfully. Although a literal reading of the SRHA would suggest that any use of a reserved mineral is a trespass against the United States, one of the overriding purposes of the Act was to permit settlers to establish and maintain successful homesteads. There is force to the argument that this purpose would be defeated if the owner of the surface estate were unable to use reserved minerals even where such use was essential for stockraising and raising crops.
"the privilege of residing on the land for five years [the period then necessary to perfect a homestead entry and thus obtain a patent] would be ineffectual if [the homesteader] had not also the right to build himself a house, outbuildings, and fences, and to clear the land for cultivation,"
and concluding that "to that extent, the [homestead] act limits and modifies" the statute making it a crime to cut timber on public lands. Ibid. Cf. 86 U. S. Cook, 19 Wall. 591, 86 U. S. 593 (1874) (although treaty gave Indians only the right to use and occupy certain land, and although "timber while standing is part of the realty, and . . . can only be sold as the land could be," the Indians' right of use and occupancy encompassed the right to cut timber "for use upon the premises" or "for the improvement of the land"); Alabama Coal Lands -- Act of Apr. 2, 1912, 41 L.D. 32, 33 (1912) ("There is at this time no law which provides for the disposition of the coal in these lands. Persons having homestead entries . . . obtain no right to obtain coal therefrom, except for their own domestic use . . .") (emphasis added).
In this case, however, respondent cannot rely on any right it may have to use reserved minerals to the extent necessary for ranching and farming purposes, since it plainly did not use the gravel it extracted for any such purpose. The gravel was used for commercial operations that were in no way connected with any ranching or farming activity.
"[n]o deposit of common varieties of sand, stone, gravel, pumice, pumicite, or cinders and no deposit of petrified wood shall be deemed a valuable mineral deposit within the meaning of the mining laws of the United States so as to give effective validity to any mining claim hereafter located under such mining laws."
"[t]he Secretary [of the Interior], under such rules and regulations as he may prescribe, may dispose of mineral materials (including but not limited to common varieties of the following: sand, stone, gravel, pumice, pumicite, cinders, and clay). . . ."
The Surface Resources Act is, by its terms, limited to the locatability of claims under the mining laws, and does not limit the scope of the mineral reservation in the SRHA. See Dept. of Interior, Division of Public Lands, Solicitor's Opinion, M-36417 (Feb. 15, 1957).
Charlestone Stone Products Co. involved several different mining claims. In the part of its decision that is pertinent for present purposes, the Ninth Circuit upheld the validity of claims to commercially exploitable deposits of sand and gravel. The Secretary of the Interior did not seek certiorari with respect to this portion of the Ninth Circuit's decision, limiting his petition for certiorari to that part of the Ninth Circuit's decision which upheld the validity of a claim to subsurface water. See 436 U.S. at 436 U. S. 610 ("The single question presented in the petition is [w]hether water is a locatable mineral under the mining law of 1872'").
The only decision to the contrary, Anchorage Sand & Gravel Co. v. Schubert, 114 F.Supp. 436, 438 (Alaska 1953), aff'd on other grounds, 224 F.2d 623 (CA9 1955), was never followed in either the District in which it was decided or elsewhere in the Ninth Circuit.
"of such a character that a person of ordinary prudence would be justified in the further expenditure of his labor and means, with a reasonable prospect of success, in developing a valuable mine."
by reason of accessibility, bona fides in development, proximity to market, existence of present demand, and other factors, the deposit is of such value that it can be mined, removed and disposed of at a profit.
Taking of Sand and Gravel from Public Lands for Federal Aid Highways, 54 I.D. 294, 296 (1933). See Foster v. Seaton, 106 U.S.App.D.C. 253, 255, 271 F.2d 836, 838 (1959).
JUSTICE POWELL, with whom JUSTICE REHNQUIST, JUSTICE STEVENS, and JUSTICE O'CONNOR join, dissenting.
"[T]he Act [includes] substances that are mineral in character (i.e., that are inorganic), that can be removed from the soil, that can be used for commercial purposes, and that there is no reason to suppose were intended to be included in the surface estate."
Ante at 462 U. S. 53.
As I read the Court's opinion, it could leave Western homesteaders with the dubious assurance that only the dirt itself could not be claimed by the Government. It is not easy to believe that Congress intended this result.
In construing a congressional Act, the relevant intent of Congress is that existing at the time the statute was enacted. See Andrus v. Charlestone Stone Products Co., 436 U. S. 604, 436 U. S. 611, and n. 8 (1978); Winona & St. Peter R. Co. v. Barney, 113 U. S. 618, 113 U. S. 625 (1885). The Court avoids this rule of construction by largely ignoring the stated position of the Department of the Interior before 1916 that gravel -- like sand and clay -- was not a mineral.
land more valuable on account thereof than for agricultural purposes, should be treated as coming within the purview of the mining laws."
Under the Department of the Interior's earliest decisions, certain commonplace substances were classified as minerals. See W. H. Hooper, 1 L.D. 560, 561 (1881) (gypsum); H. P. Bennet, Jr., 3 L.D. 116, 117 (1884) (permitting placer claims for building stone). But the Department soon began to recognize a small group of substances, that were valuable for certain purposes, as not being "minerals" "under all authorities." In Dunluce Placer Mine, 6 L.D. 761, 762 (1888), the Secretary held that a deposit of "brick clay" would not warrant classification as a valuable mineral deposit. The Secretary so held despite a finding that the land on which the deposit was found was "undoubtedly more valuable as a clay placer' than for any other purpose." Id. at 761.
"A search of the standard American authorities has failed to disclose a single one which classifies a deposit such as claimed in this case as mineral, nor is the Department aware of any application to purchase such a deposit under the mining laws. This, taken into consideration with the further fact that deposits of sand and gravel occur with considerable frequency in the public domain, points rather to a general understanding that such deposits, unless they possess a peculiar property or characteristic giving them a special value, were not to be regarded as mineral."
"From the above resume, it follows that the Department, in the absence of specific legislation by Congress, will refuse to classify as mineral land containing a deposit of material not recognized by standard authorities as such, whose sole use is for general building purposes, and whose chief value is its proximity to a town or city, in contradistinction to numerous other like deposits of the same character in the public domain."
Id. at 313. The Secretary concluded that gravel was such a material, and this clearly remained the Department's position until 1929.
"it [did] not appear that the [claimant's] removal of the sand or gravel had any connection with the cultivation of the land and it was removed solely for the purpose of sale."
"The Department does not concur with the contention that this deposit [of shell rock] is a mineral within the meaning of the general mining laws. It presents features greatly similar to the deposits of sand and gravel considered in the case of Zimmerman v. Brunson. . . ."
implement the SRHA, its contemporaneous construction should be persuasive as to congressional intention. This Court previously had accorded this respect to the Department of the Interior. See, e.g., Burke v. Southern Pacific R. Co., 234 U. S. 669, 234 U. S. 677-678 (1914); Northern Pacific R. Co. v. Soderberg, 188 U. S. 526, 188 U. S. 534 (1903).
"the Nation as a unit needs more States like, for instance, Kansas and Iowa, where each citizen is the sovereign of a portion of the soil, the owner of his home and not tenant of some (perhaps) distant landlord, a builder of schools and churches, a voluntary payer of taxes for the support of his local government."
The first attempt by the Department of the Interior to acquire ownership of gravel on SRHA lands did not occur until this case began in 1975. One would think it is now too late, after a half-century of inaction, for the Department to take action that raises serious questions as to the nature and extent of titles to lands granted under the SRHA. [Footnote 2/20] Owners of patented land are entitled to expect fairer treatment from their Government. In my view, the Department should be required to adhere to the clear intent of Congress at the time this legislation was adopted. I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
"to include substances that are mineral in character . . . and that there is no reason to suppose were intended to be included in the surface estate"
is tautological, and to include all substances "that can be used for commercial purposes" is to ignore the prerequisites to commercial value of quantity and quality. The only factor that can be said to provide any guidance is that the substance must be one "that can be removed from the soil." Moreover, the Department of the Interior has operated under a common definition of the statutory term "mineral" in the general mining laws for quite some time, and I therefore am puzzled why the Court creates a new one today. See 43 CFR § 3812.1 (1982) ("Whatever is recognized as a mineral by the standard authorities, whether metallic or other substance, when found in public lands in quantity and quality sufficient to render the lands valuable on account thereof, is treated as coming within the purview of the mining laws"); see n. 4, infra.
The Government's claim is less inclusive, because all parties agree that to hold that the homesteader has no right to use sand, gravel, and other common substances for his own purposes would pose a considerable impediment to the task of establishing a home and raising stock, undoubtedly the most important policies underlying the SRHA and the other Homestead Acts. See infra at 462 U. S. 71. The Court's solution to the rancher's problem is to allow the owner of the surface estate to use reserved minerals where such use is essential for stockraising and raising crops. See ante at 462 U. S. 54-55, n. 14. Thus, the Court apparently would give ranchers this free use of all reserved minerals, including "coal," which is specifically mentioned in 43 U.S.C. § 299. I am not sure this Court should so lightly suggest such a broad exception to the mineral rights reserved by Congress. Moreover, such a free use exception only invites litigation over what is a domestic use, who is a rancher, what is a ranch, what rights successors in interest have, and what rights a developer may have to halt such free use of "its" minerals.
My list is not exclusive.
"Landowners have sold 'moss rock,' common rock on which moss has grown, to contractors to decorate fireplaces and homes. The rock has become 'valuable,' but it is absurd to think that this common rock should now be included in a mineral reservation to the government."
Case Note, 18 Land & Water L.Rev. 201, 216 (1983).
By the phrase "general mining laws," I refer primarily to the Mining Act of 1872, as amended, 30 U.S.C. § 21 et seq., which declares that "all valuable mineral deposits in lands belonging to the United States . . . shall be free and open to exploration and purchase. . . ." § 22. See generally ante at 462 U. S. 50-51. As the Court notes, ante at 462 U. S. 39, mineral exploitation of SRHA lands was made subject to the same restrictions that characterize development of lands under the general mining laws, and thus the interpretation of those laws is directly pertinent to determining congressional intent in 1916. It should be noted, however, that, since 1955, it has been clear that a gravel deposit could not be "a valuable mineral deposit" under the general mining laws. See 30 U.S.C. § 611. The issue in this case is thus limited to the right of the Government to claim gravel found on SRHA lands, patented to private owners, even though the general mining laws still apply as to most minerals, but not to gravel.
Cf. 1 C. Lindley, American Law Relating to Mines and Mineral Lands § 98, pp. 174-175 (3d ed.1914). The test whether a claimant has located a "valuable mineral deposit" under the general mining laws remains, for the most part, the same. See ante at 462 U. S. 44. As JUSTICE MARSHALL concluded for a unanimous Court in Andrus v. Charlestone Stone Products Co., 436 U. S. 604, 436 U. S. 610 (1978), mineral land must contain a deposit that both is a "mineral" and is "valuable."
See, e.g., King v. Bradford, 31 L.D. 108, 109-111 (1901) (brick clay); Bettancourt v. Fitzgerald, 40 L.D. 620, 621-622 (1912) (clay useful for cement manufacturing); Holman v. Utah, 41 L.D. 314, 315 (1912) (clay and limestone); Victor Portland Cement Co. v. Southern Pacific R. Co., 43 L.D. 325, 326 (1914) (limestone shale); Mrs. A. T. Van Dolah, Solicitor's Opinion A-26443 (Oct. 14, 1952) (clay). See also Gray Trust Co., 47 L.D. 18, 20 (1919) (limestone useful in cement and road surfacing found not to qualify land as mineral land); Union Oil Co., 23 L.D. 222, 229 (1896) (petroleum) (overruled by Congress in Act of Feb. 11, 1897, ch. 216, 29 Stat. 526); Jordan v. Idaho Aluminum Min. & Mfg. Co., 20 L.D. 500, 501 (1895) (alumina) (but see Downey v. Rogers, 2 L.D. 707, 709 (1883) (permitting entry for alum)); Tucker v. Florida R. & Navigation Co., 19 L.D. 414 (1894) (phosphate) (overruled in Pacific Coast Marble Co. v. Northern Pacific R. Co., 25 L.D. 233, 246-247 (1897)). Cf. Southwestern Mining Co., 14 L.D. 597, 602 (1892) (salt) (relying on consistent legislative policy to reserve saline lands from all land Acts).
Stone useful for building purposes was not classified as a mineral -- at least for a time. See Conlin v. Kelly, 12 L.D. 1, 2-3 (1891) (declining to follow H. P. Bennet, Jr., 3 L.D. 116, 117 (1884)); Clark v. Ervin, 16 L.D. 122, 124 (1893); Hayden v. Jamison, 16 L.D. 537, 539 (1893); Florence D. Delaney, 17 L.D. 120, 121 (1893) (glass sand and building stone); Act of Aug. 4, 1892, 27 Stat. 348, 30 U.S.C. § 161 (making building stone a locatable mineral). Cf. Stanislaus Electric Power Co., 41 L.D. 655, 658-661 (1912) (§ 161 does not apply to common, low-grade rock having no special value for building purposes). The Department, however, later recognized claims founded on stone deposits that could be used for special purposes, such as monuments and ornamentation. See McGlenn v. Wienbroeer, 15 L.D. 370, 374 (1892).
"an examination be made of the individual adjudicated cases and the decisions of the United States Land Department, upon which these general definitions of the term 'mineral' are based, it will be found that commercial gravel was not a factor in forming them, and that it has never been considered as a mineral."
Id. at 16. See D. Barringer & J. Adams, Law of Mines and Mining cxxv (1900) (list of 46 nonmetallic minerals that possess commercial value, but not listing gravel); D. Barringer, Minerals of Commercial Value (1897) (listing over 350 substances, including clay, petroleum, phosphate, salt, but not listing sand or gravel); 2 C. Lindley, supra, n. 5, § 424, at 996-997 (recognizing Department's policy for "commonplace substances such as ordinary clay, sand and gravel"); 1 W. Snyder, Mines and Mining § 144, p. 117 (1902) (discussing Department's policy not to treat clay as a mineral).
In 1914, a bill to permit homesteading on unappropriated public lands in the West was referred by the House Committee on Public Lands to the Department of the Interior for comment. First Assistant Secretary Jones, six months after deciding Hughes v. Florida, 42 L.D. 401 (1913), submitted the Department's report on the bill and at the same time submitted the Department's draft of a substitute Stock-Raising Homestead Bill. After Committee hearings on the bills, Jones issued a second report to the Committee. See H.R.Rep. No. 626, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. , 1-9 (1914). The House passed the Department's bill, but the full Senate failed to act on it. In the next Congress, the Department's bill was reintroduced in the House. Again the Public Lands Committee sought the advice of the Department. See H.R.Rep. No. 35, 64th Cong., 1st Sess., 4-8, 13 (1916). In the floor debates, Members made frequent reference to the fact that the Department had drafted the bill. See, e.g., 53 Cong.Rec. 1127 (1916) (statement of Congressman Taylor) (describing Department's report as "one of the best reports we have ever had on any bill since I have been in Congress"); id. at 1130-1131.
"[i]t is most unlikely that many Members of Congress were aware of the ruling in Zimmerman, which was never tested in the courts and was not mentioned in the Reports or debates on the SRHA."
Ante at 462 U. S. 46. The Court generally does not attribute such ignorance of the law to Congress. See, e.g., Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U. S. 575, 434 U. S. 581 (1978); National Lead Co. v. United States, 252 U. S. 140, 252 U. S. 147 (1920). And assuming ignorance seems especially inappropriate in this case, where during floor debates Congressmen referred to the Department's administrative decisions and its interpretations of prior Homestead Acts. See 53 Cong.Rec. 1174 (1916). See also n. 9, supra.
"[e]ven if Congress had been aware of Zimmerman, there would be no reason to conclude that it approved of the Secretary's ruling in that case, rather than this Court's opinion in [Northern Pacific R. Co. v.\] Soderberg, [188 U.S. 526, 188 U. S. 530 (1903)], which . . . quoted with approval a statement that gravel is a mineral."
Ante at 462 U. S. 46. I do not believe that the Soderberg Court's one quotation from an English case is of greater relevance than the established views of the Department that is entrusted with the administration of the Federal Government's public lands and that drafted the very Act before us now. Certainly the Soderberg Court did not think so, for in searching for a definition of the word "mineral," it first examined "[t]he rulings of the Land Department, to which we are to look for the contemporaneous construction of these statutes." 188 U.S. at 188 U. S. 534. And the holding of Soderberg as to the classification of granite was not at all inconsistent with Department policy. See n. 7, supra.
"[D]eposits of sand and gravel in lands . . . patented under the act which can be shown as of the date of . . . patent to have a definite economic value by reason of the existence and nearness of a market in which they can be sold at a profit are reserved. . . ."
Solicitor's Opinion M-36379, supra, at 4 (emphasis added).
"sand and gravel have been declared to be nonmineral substances, and should therefore no longer be considered as being reserved to the United States under the mineral reservation in the [SRHA]."
Dept. of Interior, Division of Public Lands, Solicitor's Opinion, M-36417, p. 1 (Feb. 15, 1957). Assuming, however, that the Department eventually may have concluded properly that the Act did not quitclaim common materials to SRHA patentees, see id. at 2, it is nevertheless difficult for the Department to contend that the Act is irrelevant to the inquiry whether the Government had title to the gravel in the first instance. Interestingly, the Act specifically permits continued location on public lands of gravel with "distinct and special value," § 611, the same test set forth in Zimmerman for determining when a deposit of gravel would be considered a "valuable mineral deposit." See United States v. Kaycee Bentonite Corp., 89 I.D. 262, 274 (1982) (1955 congressional test "echoes" Zimmerman test).
While the Department's authority to dispose of gravel on "public lands" is clear, see n. 4, supra, it is not at all clear with respect to gravel on SRHA lands. The Court assumes without discussion agency jurisdiction to bring a trespass action on SRHA lands under regulations that authorize such actions for trespass on "public lands." Yet there at least is doubt that SRHA lands are "public lands" as that term has been interpreted by this Court. See, e.g., Bardon v. Northern Pacific R. Co., 145 U. S. 535, 145 U. S. 538 (1892); Mall, Federal Mineral Reservations, 20 Rocky Mt.Min.L.Inst. 399, 443-449 (1975). Furthermore, even if SRHA lands are public lands and gravel is reserved, the Department's regulations apparently fail to permit disposal of minerals for these lands. See 30 U.S.C. § 601; 43 CFR § 3601.1 (1982) (stating that "mineral material disposals" may not be made from "public lands" on which there are "valid, existing claims to the land by reason of settlement, entry, or similar rights obtained under the public land laws"). Thus, the Court's extended discussion of the policy of encouraging mineral development on SRHA lands has little relevance with respect to gravel and other commonplace substances. Indeed, if this case is any indication, it rather appears that the Government wants to prevent development of such materials.
"the arguments advanced by the Department for overruling Zimmerman are difficult to distinguish from rationales that would support making common clay locatable."
Kaycee Bentonite, supra, at 274, n. 9.
See n. 12, supra. The Court relies on a dozen federal administrative and judicial cases since Layman but involving pre-1955 locations for the proposition that gravel deposits could be located under the general mining laws. See ante at 462 U. S. 57-58. But none of these cases involves SRHA land, they were concerned primarily with the application of the marketability test, and none questioned whether gravel was a mineral. The issue here, however, is whether gravel should ever be considered a "mineral" under the SRHA, and the cases are at the most evidence of how gravel should be treated on "public lands" under the mining laws after Layman and before Congress in 1955 removed all gravel from the purview of the mining laws. See n. 13, supra. The only prior case addressing the precise issue before the Court held that ordinary sand and gravel were not reserved to the United States within the meaning of the mineral reservation contained in SRHA patents. See State ex rel. Highway Comm'n v. Trujillo, 82 N.M. 694, 487 P.2d 122 (1971). Similar cases also suggest that gravel is not a reserved mineral. Cf. United States v. Union Oil Co. of California, 549 F.2d 1271, 1279 (CA9) (SRHA reserved "unrelated subsurface resources"), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 930 (1977); Bumpus v. United States, 325 F.2d 264 (CA10 1963) (finding a mineral reservation following condemnation not to include gravel).
Not even the Department has gone as far as the Court apparently would. Although Layman made common varieties of gravel locatable, gravel that "is principally valuable for use as fill, sub-base, ballast, riprap or barrow was never [a valuable mineral deposit]," despite the fact that it "might be marketable at a profit." United States v. Verdugo & Miller, Inc., 37 I.B.L.A. 277, 279 (1978) (emphasis in original). See Tr. of Oral Arg. 50.
"'not to be so construed as to defeat the intent of the legislature, or to withhold what is given either expressly or by necessary or fair implication.'"
Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 440 U. S. 668, 440 U. S. 682-683 (1979) (quoting United States v. Denver & Rio Grande R. Co., 150 U. S. 1, 150 U. S. 14 (1893)). See Burke v. Southern Pacific R. Co., 234 U. S. 669, 234 U. S. 679 (1914) (Congress intended "mineral lands" to be applied "in their ordinary and popular sense"); id. at 234 U. S. 676 ("doubtless the ordinary or popular signification of that term was intended"); Marvel v. Merritt, 116 U. S. 11, 116 U. S. 12 (1885) (statutory terms "mineral . . . substances" have no "scientific meaning different from their popular meaning"). A good indicator of the "ordinary and popular sense" of a word is the common law's use of it. The Court ignores this. See Reeves, The Meaning of the Word "Minerals," 54 N.D.L.Rev. 419, 472 (1978) ("As a general rule . . . sand and gravel are usually held not to be a mineral in private grants or reservations of minerals"); id. at 431; Brief for United States in Bumpus v. United States, 325 F.2d 264 (CA10 1973), pp. 7-14 (construing declaration of taking's mineral reservation as not reserving gravel to former landowners).
Quite apart from the clear evidence of congressional intent at the time the SRHA was enacted in 1916, see 462 U. S. supra, it is unreasonable to suppose that Congress ever intended -- when it was enacting legislation to encourage settlement of the West -- to reserve to the Federal Government the commonplace inorganic substances that actually constituted the soil of the patented land. The incentive to move to the West and settle on its semiarid land would have been diminished significantly if it had been understood that only limited rights in what most persons consider a part of the soil itself were being granted. Indeed, the legislative history is clear that, rather than intending to provide rights analogous to grazing leases upon the unappropriated public domain, Congress intended to promote permanent settlement. See 53 Cong.Rec. 1233-1234 (1916) (statement of Congressman Mondell) ("I wish [the Congressman] would not call the laws he refers to surface entry laws, for they are not. They convey fee titles. They give the owner much more than the surface; they give him all except the body of the reserved mineral").
Cf. H.R.Rep. No. 626, supra, n. 9, at 3 (surface owners' activities "can be carried on without being materially interfered with by the reservation of minerals and the prospecting for a removal of same from the land"). Based on similar concerns, the Department on occasion has limited the breadth of mineral reservations because of the obvious congressional intent. See Solicitor's Opinion M-36379, supra, n. 11, at 4.
"Generations of land patents have issued without any express reservation of the right now claimed by the Government. Nor has a similar right been asserted before. . . . This Court has traditionally recognized the special need for certainty and predictability where land titles are concerned, and we are unwilling to upset settled expectations. . . ."
440 U.S. at 440 U. S. 687 (footnotes omitted).
considerable importance in the semiarid lands of the West, but it is of much less importance to the rest of the Nation. For that reason, as well as those set forth at some length in my concurring opinion in Watt v. Alaska, 451 U. S. 259, 451 U. S. 273 (1981), I believe the Court of Appeals should have been permitted to make the final decision upon the unique question of statutory construction presented by this case. * Accordingly, while I join JUSTICE POWELL's opinion explaining why the judgment of the Court of Appeals should be affirmed, I believe an even better disposition would have been simply to deny certiorari.
"The federal judicial system is undergoing profound changes. Among the most significant is the increase in the importance of our courts of appeals. Today they are in truth the courts of last resort for almost all federal litigation. Like other courts of last resort -- including this one -- they occasionally render decisions that will not withstand the test of time. No judicial system is perfect, and no appellate structure can entirely eliminate judicial error. Most certainly, this Court does not sit primarily to correct what we perceive to be mistakes committed by other tribunals. Although our work is often accorded special respect because of its finality, we possess no judicial monopoly on either finality or respect. The quality of the work done by the courts of appeals merits the esteem of the entire Nation, but, unfortunately, is not nearly as well or as widely recognized as it should be. Indeed, I believe that, if we accorded those dedicated appellate judges the deference that their work merits, we would be better able to resist the temptation to grant certiorari for no reason other than a tentative prediction that our review of a case may produce an answer different from theirs. In my opinion, that is not a sufficient reason for granting certiorari."
151 U.S. at 151 U. S. 275 (footnote omitted).

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