Source: https://case-law.vlex.com/vid/546-u-s-243-605949274
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 10:21:30+00:00

Document:
Party Name: Alberto R. GONZALES, Attorney General, et al., Petitioners, v. OREGON et al.
The Controlled Substances Act (CSA or Act), which was enacted in 1970 with the main objectives of combating drug abuse and controlling legitimate and illegitimate traffic in controlled substances, criminalizes, inter alia, the unauthorized distribution and dispensation of substances classified in any of its five schedules. The Attorney General may add, remove, or reschedule substances only after making particular findings, and on scientific and medical matters, he must accept the findings of the Secretary of Health and Human Services (Secretary). These proceedings must be on the record after an opportunity for comment. The dispute here involves controlled substances listed in Schedule II, which are generally available only by written prescription, 21 U.S.C. §829(a). A 1971 regulation promulgated by the Attorney General requires that such prescriptions be used "for a legitimate medical purpose by an individual practitioner acting in the usual course of his professional practice." 21 CFR §1306.04. To prevent diversion of controlled substances, the CSA regulates the activity of physicians, who must register in accordance with rules and regulations promulgated by the Attorney General. He may deny, suspend, or revoke a registration that, as relevant here, would be "inconsistent with the public interest." 21 U.S.C. §§824(a)(4), 822(a)(2). In determining consistency with the public interest, he must consider five factors, including the State's recommendation, compliance with state, federal, and local law regarding controlled substances, and "public health and safety." §823(f). The CSA explicitly contemplates a role for the States in regulating controlled substances. See §903.
some terminally ill state residents challenged the Rule. The District Court permanently enjoined its enforcement. The Ninth Circuit invalidated the Rule, reasoning that, by making a medical procedure authorized under Oregon law a federal offense, it altered the balance between the States and the Federal Government without the requisite clear statement that the CSA authorized the action; and in the alternative, that the Rule could not be squared with the CSA's plain language, [126 S.Ct. 908] which targets only conventional drug abuse and excludes the Attorney General from medical policy decisions.
The CSA does not allow the Attorney General to prohibit doctors from prescribing regulated drugs for use in physician-assisted suicide under state law permitting the procedure. Pp. 914-926.
(a) An administrative rule interpreting the issuing agency's own ambiguous regulation may receive substantial deference. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461-463, 117 S.Ct. 905, 137 L.Ed.2d 79. So may an interpretation of an ambiguous statute, Chevron U.S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-845, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694, but only "when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority," United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-227, 121 S.Ct. 2164, 150 L.Ed.2d 292. Otherwise, the interpretation is "entitled to respect" only to the extent it has the "power to persuade." Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140, 65 S.Ct. 161, 89 L.Ed. 124. Pp. 914-915.
interest" requirement, but 21 CFR §1306.04 was adopted in 1971. That the current interpretation runs counter to the intent at the time of the regulation's promulgation is an additional reason why Auer deference is unwarranted. Pp. 915-916.

References: v. 
 §829
 §1306
 §823
 §903
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 §1306