Source: https://www.everycrsreport.com/changes/20150714_R42702_bdfb826dd6c79bc8d1786e0f832dc3195e9fee79__20161206_R42702_fc719e5ae25888b7b5b59380e37886f7695e4ea9.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 09:05:25+00:00

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The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act authorizes the President to issue declarations that provide states, tribes, and localities with a range of federal assistance in response to natural and man-made incidents. Since 1953 the numberfrequency of declarations issued each year has steadily has increased. For example, the average number of major disaster declarations issued from 1960 to 1969 was roughly 1918.6 per year. In contrast, the average number of major disaster declarations issued from 2000 to 2009 was 5657.1 per year. The highest number was declared in 2011, with 99 major disaster declarations.
Declarations are of congressional concern for at least two reasons: (1) congressional oversight of appropriations and the federal budget has led to an awareness of expenditures for disaster assistance, and (2) some are skeptical that declarations are solely made to provide disaster relief. They argue that declarations have become political tools—especially during election years—to gain political favor. Advocates of this position point to incidents which, in their view, could have been handled without federal assistance.
This report describes the declaration process and the types of declarations that can be declared under the Stafford Act: (1) Fire Management Assistance Grants, (2) emergencies, and (3) major disasters.
there is a slight increase in the total number of declarations issued in presidential election years from 1974 to 201397 major disaster declarations.
Declarations are of concern to Members of Congress and state delegations when incidents occur in their states and/or congressional districts. Declarations are also of broader congressional interest for at least two reasons: (1) the costs involved with the federal assistance provided by the declarations, and (2) concerns that declarations may be used as political tools—especially during election years.
the average number of declarations issued per year in presidential election years from 1974 to 2015 is slightly higher than the average number of declarations in other years from 1974 to 2015, but the number is not significant enough to draw a decisive conclusion regarding their use as a political tool.
The analysis is followed by a discussion concerning the possible causes for the increase in After providing an overview of each type of declaration, this report discusses factors that may be responsible for the increase in frequency of declarations, including federal policy changes, increases in severe weather incidents, population growth, and development.
adjusting the federal to state cost-share.
The analysis in this report suggests that such changes could reduce federal spending on disaster assistanceSuch changes could reduce declarations and shift a portion of the funding back to the states. On the other hand, limiting federal disaster assistancereducing declarations could hamper the ability of states and localities to adequately recover from an incident and could create long-term consequences.
The selected approach will likely be influenced by how policymakers view the role of the government when a disaster strikes. It is generally agreed that the government should help disaster victims in times of need, but it is debatable whether the fiscal responsibility resides primarily with the federal or the state government. Many of the policy options described in this report shift a greater share of disaster-related costs to states and localities. It remains to be seen if reducing declarations and/or limiting the amount of disaster assistance provided to requesting states would severely disrupt the state's ability to respond and recover from an incident.
This report concludes that the upward trend in declarations will likely continue if declaration policies remain unchanged and severe weather patterns, population growth, and development continue to increase. All of these variables appear to play a role in declaration activity. It could be argued that the policy mechanisms used to address the increase in declarations should be shaped in response to the given variable or variables. This may prove to be difficult because it is unclear which of the variables (or combination of variables) has had the greatest impact on the increase in disaster declarations over the years.
This report provides a historical overview of the three categories of declarations, including the average number of declarations declared and turned down, and the distribution of the declarations by incident type and state. This report discusses a wide range of factors that might be contributing to the increase in declarations, and provides policy options that might reduce the number of declarations and some of their associated costs.
Prior to 1950, state and local governments in need of federal assistance after a disaster had to wait until Congress met, debated, and then acted upon their request for disaster assistance. The Federal Disaster Relief Act of 1950 (P.L. 81-875, hereinafter the Disaster Relief Act) altered this arrangement and transferred the authority to provide federal disaster assistance from Congress to the President. Under the Disaster Relief Act, the President had the authority to decide whether to provide disaster assistance and which federal agencies would provide that assistance.
The Stafford Act authorizes three types of declarations: (1) Fire Management Assistance Grant Program declarations (FMAG) (FMAG) declarations, (2) emergency declarations, and (3) major disaster declarations. While emergency and major disaster declarations must be issued by the President, the FEMA Regional Director, in consultation with FEMA leadership, has the authority to issue FMAG declarations.9 A detailed description of each type of declaration is provided in the following sections of this report.
The denial of a gubernatorial request for federal assistance is referred to as a "turndown."
As with major disaster and emergencyemergency and major disaster declarations, FEMA has the authority to assess the situation, including the state's efforts, the current state of the fire, and its potential impact. However, before aan FMAG can be granted, the state or territory must meet a cost threshold, either for that particular fire or for a cumulative state-wide threshold number if the state is requesting help for numerous fires within the state.
the potential economic impacts of the fire.
In addition, FEMA uses two types of fire cost thresholds to help determine if a state or tribal nation is eligible for fire assistance: (1) individual thresholds for a single fire, and (2) cumulative thresholds for multiple fires. Cumulative thresholds are applied to multiple fires burning simultaneously, or the accumulation of multiple fires in a single fire season. Threshold amounts vary by state (see Table 1 for selected examples and the Appendix for a complete list of states).
The formula for the individual fire threshold is the state population multiplied by 5%, which is then multiplied by $1.39.1541.17 In general, if that amount exceeds the state's individual fire threshold, the state is eligible for federal assistance.
For example, the state of ColoradoWashington's population is 5,029,1966,724,540. The individual fire threshold formula for the state is: [5,029,1966,724,540 x 5% x $1.39 = $349,529]. The state of Colorado41 = $474,080]. Therefore, the state of Washington would meet or exceed the individual fire threshold if it had a wildfire costing $349,529474,080 or more in damages.
The formula for the cumulative fire threshold for a given state is one of two amounts—$500,000 or the amount of that state's individual fire threshold multiplied by three, whichever is greater. Returning to the ColoradoWashington example, the sum of three individual fire thresholds equals $1,048,587422,240. Since that amount is larger than $500,000, cumulative fire damages in ColoradoWashington must meet or exceed $1,048,587422,240 to be eligible for assistance. In contrast, the individual fire threshold for Alaska is $100,000, but the cumulative threshold is $500,000, not the sum of three individual fire thresholds ($300,000). For some states, such as Nebraska and West Virginia, the state population is high enough that the individual threshold exceeds $100,000. However, the cumulative threshold for these states is $500,000 because that number is still higher than the sum of three individual fire thresholds.
Source: FEMA, "FY2015 Fire Cost Threshold." Obtained through correspondence with FEMA Congressional Affairs.
Source: FEMA, "FY2014 Fire Cost Threshold." http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1389875349045-36f0ce0f02eed0357d4fd151f7056c17/FY14%20Fire%20Cost%20Threshold.pdf.
As shown in Figure 1, FMAG declarations began to increase steadily in the late 1990s, reaching a high of 114 in 2011. This surpassed the previous high of 86 FMAGs in 2006. As mentioned previously, FMAGS are designed to prevent fires from becoming major disasters. It could be argued that even though the cost for FMAG declarations may have increased, FMAGs may actually save federal dollars by reducing the need for a major disaster declaration which would decreaseand, in turn, decreasing spending on Stafford Act programs.
As shown in Figure 1, the first FMAG was declared in 1970, and theythough FMAGs were rarely issued until the 1990s. The average numbernumbers of FMAGs declared in the 1970s and the 1980s was about three per yearwere 3.8 and 3.5, respectively. During the 1990s, there were about 21an average of 21.6 FMAG declarations per year (see inset of Figure 1). This upward trend continued into the 2000s, with an average of 5355.2 FMAG declarations issued each year.
Unlike emergency and major disaster declarations, comprehensive data on turndowns are not available for FMAGs. However, from 2000 to 2015 the average annual number of FMAG requests that FEMA did not recommend the President to declare was 11.6.
Texas has received the most FMAGs declarations (236Texas has received the most FMAGs (235 declarations) followed by California (148153), Oklahoma (86), Washington (73) and Colorado (59) (see Figure 2). Data on FMAG request denials were not available87), and Washington (85) (see Figure 2).
Source: CRS analysis based on data provided by FEMAfrom U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Disaster Declarations, available at https://www.fema.gov/disasters.
Source: CRS analysis based on data provided by FEMAfrom U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Disaster Declarations, available at https://www.fema.gov/disasters. Note: One (1) FMAG was declared in Guam in 1998.
As shown in Figure 3, the number of emergency declarations declared each year has varied tremendously, from many years receiving no declarations, to 2005, which had 6865 declarations. 2005 received the highest number of emergency declarations because each state wasmany states were issued an emergency declaration to assist with Hurricane Katrina evacuees.
The average number of emergency declarations issued from 1974 to 20142015 was 8.9 per year; the average number of declarations from 2000 to 2014 was 152010 to 2015 was 11.2 (see inset of Figure 3).
Denials of gubernatorial requests for emergency declarations have remained fairly static each decade (see inset of Figure 3), averaging 2.87 per year. There is a slight decrease in denials during presidential election years, from an average of 2.89 per year during nonelection years, to an average of 2.0 during election years.1920 Some might argue this is an indication that Presidents are more reluctant to deny a declaration during an election year. In response to this argument, some might say that such conclusions are unwarranted because the number is statistically insignificant.21 For more discussion on the influence of politics on disaster declarations see section "Possible Presidential Election-Year Influence on Major Disaster and EmergencyPolitical Influences on Emergency and Major Disaster Declarations."
Source: CRS analysis based on data from U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Disaster Declarations, available at https://www.fema.gov/disasters and data provided by FEMA.
As shown in Figure 4, New York has received the most emergency declarations (22), followed by Massachusetts (17), Maine, (14), and New Hampshire and Texas (13 each).
Source: CRS analysis based on data provided by FEMA.
The majority of incidents declared as emergencies are issued for hurricanes, followed by snow incidents and droughts (see inset of Figure 4). As mentioned previously, FEMA does not use specific categories to classify disaster types.
from U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Disaster Declarations, available at https://www.fema.gov/disasters. Note: From 1974 to 2015, two (2) emergencies were declared in the Federated States of Micronesia, six (6) were declared in Puerto Rico, and four (4) were declared in the Virgin Islands.FEMA does not use specific categories to classify disasters. For this analysis, CRS searched the disaster titles from U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Disaster Declarations, available at https://www.fema.gov/disasters for keywords to determine categories of disasters. For all but "Winter Storm" and "Severe Storm," the category name is also the keyword that was used. For winter storms, keywords included "winter," "snow," and "blizzard." The severe storm category includes all declarations for which the disaster title included "storm," "rain," or "wind" that were not already categorized or that belonged to multiple categories. Some examples of events included in the "Other" category are water main breaks, a bridge collapse, chemical spills, terrorist attacks, viral outbreaks, and water shortages. The majority of incidents declared as emergencies are issued for winter storms, followed by hurricanes, droughts, and flooding (see inset of Figure 4). Since 1980, the U.S. Department of Agriculture has been the lead federal entity for drought assistance. While "drought" is listed in the definition of "major disaster," all drought-related declarations since 1980 have been for freely associated states where FEMA has a unique capacity to provide supplemental assistance.
The definition for a major disaster is more precise than an emergency declaration, and the range of assistance available to state and local governments; private, nonprofit organizations; and families and individuals is broader. Under a major disaster declaration, state and local governments and certain nonprofit organizations are eligible (if so designated) for assistance for the repair or restoration of public infrastructure, such as roads and buildings. A major disaster declaration may also include additional programs beyond temporary housing, such as disaster unemployment assistance and crisis counseling, and other recovery programs, such as community disaster loans.
The average number of major disasters declared per year from 1953 to 2014 is 362015 was 35.6. However, beginning in the 1990s there has been an uptick in the number of major disasters declared each yearfrequency with which major disasters are declared. During the 1990s the average number of declared major disasters is 46major disaster declarations per year was 45.8, the average number from 2000-2010 is 56 to 2009 was 57.1, and the average per yearnumber from 2010 to 2014 is 672015 was 60.8 (see inset of Figure 5).
The President can deny a gubernatorial request for federal disaster assistance (see inset of Figure 5). The average number of requests for a major disaster declaration denied by the President since 1953 has varied somewhat, from a low of 6.09.7 per year from 1953 to 19591960 to 1969 to a high of 18.7 during the 1970s. More recently, the number of presidential denials of requests for major disaster declarations has become more static, averaging 10.85 denials from 2000-20132010 to 2015 (see inset of Figure 5).
from U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Disaster Declarations, available at https://www.fema.gov/disasters and data provided by FEMA.
The majority of incidents declared as major disasters are issued as a result of a severe storm or flood. FEMA does not use specific categories to classify disaster types (see inset of Figure 6)flood, tornado, winter storm, or hurricane (see inset of Figure 6). Floods, which often co-occur with severe storms and hurricanes, represent at least 61.8% of all major disaster declarations. The states that have received the most major disaster declarations are Texas (8890), California (8081), Oklahoma (7577), New York (70), and Florida (67) (see Figure 6).
Note: From 1953 to 2015, 12 major disaster were declared in American Somoa; 14 were declared in Guam; 15 were declared in the Northern Mariana Islands; 26 were declared in Puerto Rico; 17 were declared in the Virgin Islands; and 32 were declared in what are now the freely associated states of the Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and the Republic of Palau. Eight (8) major disaster declarations were made for tribal lands, which are discussed further under "Tribal Declarations."
FEMA does not use specific categories to classify disasters. For this analysis, CRS searched the disaster titles from U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Disaster Declarations, available at https://www.fema.gov/disasters for keywords to determine categories of disasters. For all but "Winter Storm" and "Severe Storm," the category name is also the keyword that was used. For winter storms, keywords included "winter," "snow," and "blizzard." The severe storm category includes all declarations for which the disaster title included "storm," "rain," or "wind" that could not be categorized otherwise. Some examples of events in the "Other" category include drought, volcanic activity, tropical depressions, terrorist attacks, tsunamis, and water shortages. When incidents that could be classified in the "other" category could also be categorized in a major category (i.e. flood, tornado, winter storm, hurricane, severe storm, mudslide, typhoon, fire, or earthquake) they were classified in a major category. In the 535 instances when an event could be classified in more than one major category, only one was assigned. Consequently, one (1) hurricane event could be classified as a tornado, three (3) tornados could be classified as winter storms, and a combination of 32 fire, tornado, and winter storm events could be classified as mudslides. In 499 instances, an event that was categorized otherwise could have been categorized as a flood. If those instances had been categorized as floods, the total number of flood incidents that received a major disaster declaration would have been 1,388. None of these categorization decisions changes the relative position, in order of frequency, of disaster categories for major disaster declarations.
The Sandy Recovery and Improvement Act (SRIA, P.L. 113-2), among several significant changes to the Stafford Act, included the ability ofprovided the opportunity for Native American groups to be treated as states and to be eligible to request a major disaster declaration directly from the President. Previously, tribal groups were treated as local governments and any request had to be made by the governor(s) of the affected state(s) where the tribal land, infrastructure, and populations had been affected by an incident that could warrant consideration for an emergency or major disaster declaration.
Tribes had sought this authority for various reasons. While tribes and Native Americans have long received assistance under Stafford Act declarations, working through the state government for all assistance has been viewed as an issue of tribal sovereignty. States might at times beFor example, states might have been reluctant to request on behalf of a tribe when the damage was localized on tribal property. Other challenges to administering disaster relief involved language barriers and the physical isolation of some tribal lands. Also, the tribes wished to have the same ability as states to help manage the response and recovery from a disaster. All of these factors created challenges for emergency management following disaster events in tribal areas.
24 There has only been limited use of this authoritythe Savings Provision over the first several years. FEMA is continuing to develop polices on implementation of the tribal authority. As noted in Table 2, the initial declarations have been relatively small in terms of federal resources.
Source: CRS analysis of FEMA obligations data and declarations data, available at https://www.fema.gov/disasters/.
. Obligations data as of November 2015 provided by FEMA.
Notes: Obligations for major disasters often increase over a period of many years, so any costs reflected above are likely tomay increase in the future increase in the future.
a. Declaration was declared close to when data was provided to CRS. As a result, obligations are likely to ultimately result from this declaration, even though they were not reflected in that data.
There are a number of factors that might influence the increase in declarations in recent yearsover the past few decades, ranging from increases in weather incidents to changes in federal policies. This section reviews some of these factors.
Statistical data from 1955-201426 To assess that relationship, CRS compared severe weather data from 1974 to 2015 consisting of tornado, hail, and wind events, derivedavailable from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), were compared to emergency and major disaster declarations.2327 As illustrated in Figure 7, the reporting of weather incidents has also increased since the 1950s. In the 1970s and part of the 1980s, thehad an upward trajectory since 1974. In the latter half of the 1970s, there was a gap between the number of declarations and severe weather incidents widened, with more declarations than reported weather incidents. In the 1980s and the first part of the 1990s the two tracked fairly closely together, but then another gap occurred in the early part of the 2000s, this time with more reported weather incidents than declarations. The disparity in the data continued in the early part of the 2000s, with more parity in the latter half of the decadeSince 2010, however, there has been more parity.
To some, the increased number of reported severe weather incidents is evidence that there is a correspondence between the weather and the issuance of declarations.28 Others might be skeptical of the data. For example, it may be argued that the trend shown in Figure 7 could be explained by improvements in weather tracking technology. As this technology becomes more sophisticated, more weather incidents are reported. Furthermore, Figure 7 does not provide statistical information on flooding—one of the most frequent type of incidenttypes of incidents to receive declarations—or other incidents such as snowstorms, hurricanes, and droughtswinter storms. Some may, therefore, conclude that further studies are needed to establish a link between historical weather patterns and declarations.
Source: CRS analysis of declaration data provided by FEMA, and weather data derivedfrom U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Disaster Declarations, available at https://www.fema.gov/disasters, and weather data downloaded from National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Storm Prediction Center, SVRGIS, Norman, OK, April 28, 2015August 18, 2016, available at http://www.spc.noaa.gov/gis/svrgis/.
In addition, the costs of recovering from disasters may have also grown due not only to the growing population but also to increased standards of living and an increasing reliance on interdependent technical systems—both of which are expensive to repair and replace.
A number of federal policy changes have occurred since 1953 that may also help to explain why the number of declarations being issued each year has been increasing as well as the federal costs of those declarationsincreased. These include changes in (1) federal legislation and (2) various FEMA declaration policies. In addition, some have postulated that the declaration process has become politicized, attributing the increase to political motivations.
From that period a35 The federal/state framework that had been created that was, ironically, not really tested during the 1980s. That relatively quiet decade for natural disasters did not have large disaster events to present challenges to the disaster relief programs nor large supplemental expenditure requests for Congress. As a result, disaster policy changesto Congress. In spite of that, P.L. 100-707, which became law in 1988, contained a number of significant changes. In addition to naming the Disaster Relief Act in honor of former Vermont Senator Robert Stafford, it also established in law the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP) as well as the federal/state cost-share for the Public Assistance program.36 As a result of the quiescent period disaster policy changes then enacted that would later address an increasing number of unique and devastating disaster situations and result in presidential declarations were not challenged or employed until the 1990s.
, were not employed until the 1990s.
Source: CRS analysis of declaration data from U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Disaster Declarations, available at https://www.fema.gov/disasters.
In addition to the factors that might influence the President's decision to issue a declaration, there are agency-level policy changes at FEMA that may play a role in increasing declarations, including changes in how FEMA handles snowstorms, the use of pre-landfall declarations for hurricane response preparations, and the shift to a more transparent declaration process.
In FY2010, the change in snow policy meant that 16 previously designatedresulted in 22 would-be "snow emergencies" were nowbeing declared "snow disasters" (this."43 This number included multiple declarations for states affected by the storms of December 2009, and the February 2010 storm in the National Capital Region). Without the snow policy change, the total number of major disasters for FY2010 most likely would have been 52.44would have been 65, placing that year in a tie for the fourth-busiest year with FY1998.38 While it was still a significant year for declarations, the change in snow policy increased the number of major disaster declarations by approximately one-third. Similarly, in 2011, there were 1614 major disaster declarations that referenced as their cause eitherissued for a severe winter storm or a snow storm. Absent those declarations, the record-setting total number of declarations for 2011 drops from 9997 to 83. In total, from 2010 to 2015 there were 78 major disasters declared for severe winter and snow storms.45 to 83.
Source: CRS analysis of FEMA DRF obligation data provided in January of 2015.
Notes: The categorization of major disaster declarations in the dataset does not specify incidents wherein a declaration was issued solely based upon a snowstorm. To identify the declarations that were used for this analysis, incidents were considered to be a "winter storm" if the description included any of the following keywords: winter, snow, blizzard, freeze, or ice. The descriptions provided by FEMA include all of the factors that contributed to the damage, so it is likely that the obligations below include funding for damage that was not caused by snow.
While traditionally FEMA had taken a "management of consequences" approach to most disasters and waited for a storm's impact before addressing a governor's request, in the late 1990s FEMA began to treat hurricanes differently. Due to the lead time provided by the tracking of hurricanes, FEMA began, in 1999, to issuerecommend emergency declarations in advance of hurricanes making landfall. The impetus for this policy was to supplement, and thus strengthen, state evacuation efforts and related work by state and local governments to reduce the impact of the hurricanes.
These pre-landfall declarations are made for states "immediately threatened with impact from a major hurricane or typhoon." The guidance suggests these declarations be made for storms projected to a category 3, 4, or 5 on the Saffir/Simpson scale. However, as with any declaration, the President retains discretion to make the decision on whether a declaration is made. This is an example of a change in FEMA policy that has increased the number of declarations over the last dozen yearstwo decades.
The disaster declaration process begins with a dynamic event and is generally considered to be open and relatively transparent as it proceeds. In addition, the disaster declaration process, though subject to inquiry, argument, hearings, studies, and recommendations, has changed very little over time. It remains a process that can be observed and evaluated as it occurs in the area affected by the disaster, and grows opaque as it moves up through layers of FEMA and DHS management to the White House.
That observation reflects the fact that damage assessments are done publicly with federal, state, and local officials working together to determine the amount of eligible damage. Similarly, the governor's letters requesting federal, supplemental help are usually available to the public. In that respect, FEMA provides a template to state emergency management offices so they can anticipate the types of information that should be provided (including legal language regarding state activities, state commitments toward program cost shares, and other necessary information).
The move toward greater transparency may have shifted the way in which FEMA makes recommendations to the President as to whether incidents are worthy of federal assistance. Prior to the move for greater transparency, FEMA officials could have private discussions to evaluate a range of factors when determining a state's financial capacity to respond to an incident without federal assistance. These factors could include the state's economic well-being, or whether the state had a budget surplus, among others. These factors are often subjective and difficult to quantify, which in turn makes the rationale for certain recommendations more difficult to justify. Some would contend that recommendations that are exclusively based on per capita thresholds make the recommendation process appear more equitable, but in reality, just using per capita thresholds to determine whether to provide disaster assistance eliminates important factors that establish state capacity. It could be argued that the move toward transparency eliminated private and frank discussions concerning state capacity that could potentially prevent a state from receiving federal assistance for an incident it could conceivably have handledhandle on its own.
Finally, as emergency managers have become more knowledgeable of the declaration process and the use of per capita indicators, they may dissuade the governor from making a request when they believe the per capita threshold for their particular incident is too low. Consequently, thisThis may explain, in part, why the number of declaration turndowns has decreased over the years (see inset of Figure 5), because it is possible that fewer incidentsrequests are being submitted that are likely to be denied.
Critics argue that in the past two decades, presidentsPolitical Influences on Emergency and Major Disaster Declarations Critics argue that Presidents are more likely to issue a declaration during a presidential election year, and the year prior to an election year.43.51 They would also argue that declaration turndowns are influenced by election cycles.
The data indicatesindicate that there is a slight increase in the number of emergency and major disaster declarations, and a slight decrease in the number of declaration turndowns, during presidential election years. However, there is also a slight decrease in the number of emergency declarations. From 1990 to 2013 the average numbers of major disaster declarations and emergency declarations during a nonelection year were 53 and 12, respectively. The average number of declared major disasters during a presidential election year increased to 59, while the average for emergency declarations fell to 9 per year. In total, there were a combined average of 65 emergency and major disaster declarations in nonelection years, and a combined average of 68 in election years (see Figure 9). The number of major disaster declaration turndowns during nonpresidential election years from 1990 to 2013 was 12, and decreased to 11 during election years (data not shown).44 Turndowns for emergency declarations, on the other hand, averaged 2.2 per year during nonelection years and remained steady at 2.0 during election years (data not shown).
On one hand, the increase in declarations and decrease in turndowns may lead some to conclude that political factors influence declaration decisions during presidential election years. On the other hand, it could be argued that while a President may be motivated to issue a declaration or be reluctant to deny a declaration for political reasons, it is at best a small factor. It is difficult to establish evidence to support that political reasons play a role in declaration determinations.
As demonstrated in Table 3, the differences in presidential and non-presidential election years are slight and prove to be statistically insignificant.53 Moreover, methodologically, there are more nonelection years in the sample than election years, which may skew the results since an increase in the sample will usually generate a figure that is more statistically normal. Additionally, there are not enough data points since to draw a conclusion on recent elections.45 Finally, the slight increase in declarations during presidential election years could be the result of other variables that have been described in this report.
Some may contend that the argument that declaration approvals and denials have increased solely due to political motivations may be making the unwarranted assumption that weather patterns, development, and increases in population have remained static or near static over the past six decades. For example, it could be argued that President Reagan's number of approvals of gubernatorial requests was low and his record of turndowns was high, representing a conservative ideological approach to governing in the disaster realm. However, very few natural disaster events occurred during President Reagan's presidency (see Figure 7). Had there been more disasters he may have approved more gubernatorial requests for assistance. In addition, to some the argument that declarations are politically motivated is weakened when one questions what an incumbent President not running for reelection would have to gain by issuing more declarations.
Finally, if major disaster Finally, if declarations are tied to presidential elections, then one would expect the number of emergency and major disaster declarations to have been high for election year 2012. However, there were only 47 major disasters declared64 emergency and major disaster declarations in 2012, which was the lowest number for a single year, regardless of whether or not it was a presidential election year, since 2006 since 2001.
A related issue that may influence the President's decision to issue a declaration is the rise of 24-hour news networks in the last three decades. As previously mentioned, newsNews coverage and broadcasts of emergencies and major disasters have increased significantly since in the 1980s. The rise in news coverage is attributed, in part, to technological advances in electronics and satellite communications that began in the latter part of the 1980s. These advances eventually gave rise to 24-hour news networks that provide live coverage of emergencies and disasters. The striking images of emergencies and major disasters make the footage of these events highly desirable in media outlets. The miniaturization of cameras and the availability of video via cell phones and other devices have also increased the availability of footage of such events.
Scholars studying disasters have argued that the perceptions of the President's handling of a disaster hashave consequences. According to professor Richard T. Sylves, a notedan expert on emergency and disaster declarations, the perceived mishandling of Hurricane Andrew damaged President George H. W. Bush's image in Florida and may have contributed to his defeat in the 1992 presidential election.5160 It could be argued that if a President fails to issue a declaration he might be perceived as callous or indifferent to the disaster-stricken state. In the cases of "marginal" disasters—disasters that arguably could be handled by the state without federal aid—the greater the intensity of national news coverage of the event, the more the President is arguably compelled to provide federal aid.
In addition to the federal elements that may have played a role in the increases in major disaster declarations, there are a number of state-level factors that have made the states more likely to request a declaration than in years past. These may be the result of various factors including (1) budget shortfalls, (2) a "learning curve" in declarations, and (3) the professionalization of emergency management.
It could be argued that the budgetary stress caused by the economic contraction has encouraged states to seek federal funds to help offset state disaster costs. In prior years theypre-recession years states may have funded the recovery with their own funds, but now theygiven the tightening of those funds since that time states may be more likely to seek assistance from the federal government. Similarly, in years past, a state may have had sufficient funds for a rainy day fund to pay for unanticipated incidents. However, during periods of budgetary constraints, some states may not have any rainy day fundsrainy day funds may not be available to use for disaster assistance.
When a request for an emergency or major disaster is approved by the President for a certain type of incident, other states may take notice and request assistance for a similar incidentincidents. It is conceivable that thea state may not have thought to ask for the declaration had it not been previously approved for another state. In this way, "declaration creep" might occur over time as states learn what types of incidents might qualify for a declaration.
As a result of this changing environment, state emergency managers may have more confidence in advocating a request for a declaration. Conversely, the state emergency manager may dissuade the governor from requesting a declaration if the emergency manager believes the incident is likely to be turned down.
If the increase in the number of declarations is a concern perhaps for the federal costs that accompany them (or for other reasons which have been discussed in this report), Congress may choose to address the issue. Addressing the issue may be conceptualized as two approaches: (1) limiting the number of declarations and (2) limiting the amount of spending that can occur after thea declaration has been made.
The following section could be used to frame a potential debate on limiting the number of declarations being issued, limiting the assistance provided after a declaration has been declared, or both.
To many, providing relief to disaster victims is an essential role of the government. In their view, the concern over costs is understandable given concerns over the national budget. However, they may argue that the increase in the number of declarations being issued is justified because the declarations are tied to increased inclement weather, population growth, and development. Moreover, they say providing assistance to disaster-stricken areas is both acceptable and needed to help a state and region's economy to recover from a storm that it otherwise may not be able to recover from on its own.
A similar argument could be made that the number of declarations should be allowed to increase to meet the needs caused by population growth and development as well as inclement weather activity. However, there could be adjustments to limit the amount of federal assistance that is granted once the declaration has been issued.
Others may argue that the number of declarations being issued should be limited. The following sections review some policy mechanisms that could be employed to decrease the number of declarations that are being issued. The primary method consists of preventing what may be perceived to be marginal incidents from triggering federal assistance. These include changing the definitions of emergency and disaster in the Stafford Act, and changing the per capita formula for determining whether a disaster is sufficiently large to warrant federal assistance.
While it can be argued that FEMA should have been increasing the per capita amount to account for inflation in each succeeding year, it can also be argued that Congress's passage of Section 320 was also expressing its will that such measurements of need would not be the sole determinant for a disaster declaration.
In 2001, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued a report on disaster declaration criteria. This report was a comprehensive review of FEMA's declaration criteria factors. GAO recommended that FEMA "develop more objective and specific criteria to assess the capabilities of state and local governments to respond to a disaster" and "consider replacing the per capita measure of state capacity with a more sensitive measure, such as a state's total taxable resources."
It could be argued that the use of TTR would conflict with the prohibition against arithmetic formulas established by Congress. However, just as FEMA's per capita measurement is one of several factors considered and not the "sole" determinant of a declaration, GAO stated that TTR would not violate Section 320 because TTR could also be used with other criteria such as those identified in regulations. Thus, some could contend that TTR could fill a similar role with perhaps more accuracy. It may also help reduce federal costs for disaster assistance by denying assistance to marginal incidents that could be otherwise handled by the state.
Some might argue that the use of an expert panel would make decisions about whether to provide assistance more objective. Others might argue that the use of a panel may slow down the declaration process and impede the provision of important assets and resources. It may be further argued that the panel's recommendation would infringe on the President's authority to issue a declaration. On the other hand, it could also be argued that the President would retain the authority to issue a declaration despite the panel's recommendation.
Another potential method to reduce the number of declarations and the costs of federal disaster assistance would be to create incentives to dissuade states from requesting assistance. One method would be converting some, or all, federal assistance provided through emergency declarations into a loan programloan programs. For example, emergency declarations could be altered to provide up to a specified amount (for example, $5 billion dollars) in low -interest recovery loans.6472 Under this arrangement a state could elect to handle the incident without federal assistance rather than having to reimburse the federal government for recovery loans.
Another, similar, option would be to expand FEMA's Community Disaster Loan (CDL) program. The core purpose of the CDL program is to provide financial assistance to local governments that are having difficulty providing government services because of a loss in tax or other revenue following a disaster. The program assists local governments by offering federal loans to compensate for this temporary or permanent loss in local revenue. In addition to helping with lost revenue, the CDL program could be used to provide loans to help states and localities repair, rebuild, and recover after a major disaster.
Another loan program already in existence is the Small Business Administration (SBA) Disaster Loan Program.6573 SBA offers low-interest, long-term loans for physical and economic damages to businesses to help repair, rebuild, and recover from economic losses after a declared disaster. However, the majority of the agency's approved disaster loans (approximately 80%) are made to individuals and households (renters and property owners) to help repair and replace homes and personal property. Policymakers could consider expanding the SBA Disaster Loan Program by including recovery loans at low interest rates for states and local governments.
The following section discusses some potential changes to the Stafford Act that might limit the number of declarations being issued each year or the amount of assistance provided to the state by the federal government.
As mentioned previously, Section 320 of the Stafford Act restricts the use of an arithmetic or sliding scale to provide federal assistance. Repealing Section 320 would allow formulas that establish certain thresholds that states would have to meet to qualify for assistance.
Section 404 of the Stafford Act6674 authorizes the President to contribute up to 75% of the cost of an incident toward mitigation measures that reduce the risk of future damage, loss of life, and suffering. One example of a change that could reduce federal cost is thatto amend Section 404 could be amended to make mitigation assistance contingent on state codes being in place prior to an event. For example, states that have met certain mitigation standards could remain eligible for the 75% federal cost share. States that do not meet the standards would be eligible for a smaller share, such as 50% federal cost share. The amendment could incentivize mitigation work on the behalf of the state and possibly help reduce damages to the extent that a request for assistance is not needed, or the cost of the federal share may be lessened. The amendment could be set to take effect in the future (for example, in three years), giving states time to act, or not.
Other amendments to the Stafford Act could either limit the number of declarations being issued, or the amount of assistance provided to the state by the federal government.
The Stafford Act could be amended so that there could be no administrative adjustment of the cost-share. The cost-share could only be adjusted through congressional action. The amendment could be designed to apply immediately.
The Stafford Act could be amended so that federal assistance would only be available for states with corollary programs (such as Public Assistance, Individual Assistance, and housing assistanceHousing Assistance). Establishing these programs at the state level may increase state capacity to handle some incidents without federal assistance. The amendment could be designed to take effect in the future (for example, three years), giving states time to act, or not.
The Stafford Act could be amended to discontinue all assistance for snow removal unless directed by Congress. The amendment could be designed to take effect in the future (for example, three years) to give states and localities an opportunity to increase snow removal budgets, or not.
There is no statutory limit on the number of people that can be helped following a disaster.6977 Similarly, when assessing damage to state and local infrastructure there is no cap on the amount of federal funds that can be expended to make the repairs or accomplish a replacement. The only limitation is that the damage must be to eligible facilities and that it is disaster-related damage.
Given that open-ended commitment by the federal government, some may argue that increasing the state share of 25% to a higher percentage would be warranted given the federal government's fiscal condition. Another option would be to make the cost-share arrangement not subject to administrative adjustment.
As mentioned previously, the assistance provided for emergency declarations could be provided through the form of loans. Similarly, some or all of the assistance provided to the state after a major disaster could be converted to low-interest or no-interest loans. For example, a state may receive the traditional 75% cost share for an incident but be required to reimburse 25% of that funding to the federal government. Loans for disaster recovery could also be incentivized. For instance, states that undertook certain pre-established preparedness mitigation measures could qualify for a larger federal share or a lower interest rate.
Given the variables described in this report that can lead to increasedan increase in the number of declarations, including trends in severe weather patterns, population growth, and development, the upward trend of declarations will likely continue if declarations policies remain unchanged. Some may contend that the policy mechanisms used to address the increase in declarations should be shaped by its causesin response to the causes of the increase. Others may argue that if the causes are due to an increase in severe weather incidents, population growth, or development, then the declaration process should remain unchanged. Alternatively, thresholds for federal assistance could be adjusted to eliminate what aremay be perceived to be marginal incidents and focus federal assistance on large-scale disasters. Another method would be shifting a greater share of the responsibility for providing assistance from the federal government to states and localities.
The approach to reduce declarations might shift somewhat if the increase in declarations and their costs is due primarily to federal policies. If that is the case, it could be argued that methods that constrain the President's discretion to issue declarations, or reforming or reform FEMA policies may be more suitable. If the increase is tied to state policies, then mechanisms such as the use of loans or other incentives could be implemented to help decrease the number of state requests for assistance. Finally, as mentioned throughout this report, a combination of all of the above could be implemented.
At the heart of the declaration phenomenon is the role of the government when a disaster strikes. While it is generally agreed that the government should help disaster victims in time of need, it is uncleardebatable whether the fiscal responsibility resides primarily with the federal or the state government. Finding the balance has thus far has been elusive, and altering the declaration process could have important implications for both federal and state officials, as well as disaster victims. Many of the policy options described in this report would shift a greater share of disaster-related costs to states and localities. It remains to be seen if reducing declarations and/or limiting the amount of disaster assistance provided to requesting states would severely disrupt the state's ability to adequately recover from an incident, or if states would be able to adjust to the changes by reallocating available state resources.
[author name scrubbed], Research Assistant, Government and Finance Division, compiled the data for this report. Richard T. Sylves, Ph.D. University of Delaware, and the staff of GAO provided input and insight on presidential declarations. Robert Dilger, Senior Specialist, Government and Finance Division, assisted with editorial comments and suggestions; Amber Wilhelm, Graphics Specialist, Publishing and Editorial Resources Section, assisted with figures in this report; James Uzel, GIS Analyst, Resources, Science and Industry Consulting Section, assisted with NOAA data; [author name scrubbed], Analyst in Immigration Policy, Domestic Security and Immigration Section, assisted with demographic information and census data.
Daniel Richardson, former Research Assistant, Government and Finance Division, assisted with compiling data for previous versions of this report.
Fire Management Assistance Grants—discussed later in this report—do not need presidential approval to be declared.
U.S. Department of Homeland Security/, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Declared Disasters by Year of StateDisaster Declarations, available at httphttps://www.fema.gov/news/disaster_totals_annual.fema.
The calculus of how declarations translate into costs, however, is not as simple as it may seem. On one hand, each declaration adds to the amount of disaster relief costs obligated by the federal government. On the other hand, some declarations, as discussed below, are intended to avoid major disaster declarations thereby potentially avoiding expenditures associated with programs only available under a major disaster declaration. Furthermore, increasing costs of disasters tend to be attributable to the largest disasters and not the large number of typical incidents. Analysis of disaster declarations and obligations data from 1989 to 2014 provided by FEMA has shown that half of all disasters account for 97% of the costs, and the top quartile of disasters is responsible for 93% of all disaster spending. To avoid these complications, this report will focus solely on the number of disaster declarations. For more information about the costs of disaster declarations see CRS Report R43537, FEMA's Disaster Relief Fund: Overview and Selected Issues; CRS Report R44619, FEMA Disaster Housing: The Individuals and Households Program—Implementation and Potential Issues for Congress; and CRS Report R43990, FEMA's Public Assistance Grant Program: Background and Considerations for Congress.
For further analysis on the sequestration and disaster assistance see CRS Report R42352, An Examination of Federal Disaster Relief Under the Budget Control Act, by [author name scrubbed], [author name scrubbed], and [author name scrubbed]; and CRS Report R44415, Five Years of the Budget Control Act's Disaster Relief Adjustment, coordinated by [author name scrubbed].
44 C.F.R. §206.48. The publication of factors considered (1999) was made at the request of Congress. While providing greater transparency in the declaration process it also created expectations among state and local governments onconcerning when a declaration would occur based on selected factors.
For more information on emergency and disaster declarations see CRS Report R43784, FEMA's Disaster Declaration Process: A Primer, by [author name scrubbed].
42 U.S.C. §5121 et seq. For further analysis on the Stafford Act see CRS Report RL33053, Federal Stafford Act Disaster Assistance: Presidential Declarations, Eligible Activities, and Funding, by [author name scrubbed].
FEMA was incorporated into DHS by the Homeland Security Act (P.L. 107-296). DHS Secretary has re-delegated Stafford Act authority to the Administrator of FEMA.
For more information on FMAGs see CRS Report R43738, Fire Management Assistance Grants: Frequently Asked Questions, coordinated by [author name scrubbed].
P.L. 93-288, 42 U.S.C. §5191(b). Examples of these declarations include the April 19, 1995, bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Building in Oklahoma City, and the September 11, 2001, attack on the Pentagon.
The first FMAG declaration was issued in 1970, and the first emergency declaration was issued in 1974. Therefore, while data for major disaster declarations are available beginning in 1953, FMAG declaration data are reported from 1970, and emergency declaration data are reported from 1974.
Note that the number of Stafford Act declarations is not equivalent to the number of natural or manmade incidents requiring federal assistance. To illustrate, Hurricane Katrina received 52 declarations—48 emergency declarations and 4 major disaster declarations. Most incidents that received multiple declarations did so because the incident affected multiple states, each of which was issued a distinct declaration. Other incidents, however, received more than one declaration because the incident was initially granted one type of declaration and then progressed such that it warranted another type of declaration. For example, the 2014 Washington Wildfires received an FMAG, then received an emergency declaration, and ultimately were upgraded to a major disaster declaration between July and August of 2014.
P.L. 93-288, 42 U.S.C. §5187(a).
The formula is [(population) x .05 x $1.3941]. The dollar amount is periodically adjusted for inflation by FEMA.
For additional information on the differences between major disaster and emergency declarations, see CRS Report RL33053, Federal Stafford Act Disaster Assistance: Presidential Declarations, Eligible Activities, and Funding, by [author name scrubbed].
Recent examples of pre-event declarations include emergency declarations prior to Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, Gustav, Sandy, and Matthewand Sandy.
P.L. 93-288, 42 U.S.C. §5122(1).
Data not shown. Based on CRS analysis of turndown data provided by FEMA.
P.L. 93-288, 42 U.S.C. §5122(2).
For additional information on the SRIA provisions for tribal governments, see CRS Report R42991, Analysis of the Sandy Recovery Improvement Act of 2013, by [author name scrubbed], [author name scrubbed], and [author name scrubbed].
For a two-tailed t-test, p = 0.34.
For more information on the professional development of emergency managers see "The Professionalization of Emergency Management," below.
Changes to the automated forms used for populating the FEMA declarations dataset, available for download at https://www.fema.gov/data-feeds, have lagged behind changes in legislation. Consequently, the tribal declarations listed in Table 2 are not listed as tribal declarations in the FEMA declarations dataset. Instead, they are associated with the states in which the area of tribal land affected by each disaster is located. More specifically, the declaration numbers are associated with the following states: 4103-NC, 4104-AZ, 4123-ND, 4142-CA, 4147-NM, 4151-NM, 4206-CA, and 4237-SD.
Global Climate Change Impacts in the United States, ed. Karl, Thomas R., Jerry M. Melillo and Thomas C. Peterson, 9, 12, 24, 32-40. ed. (Cambridge University Press, 2009), available at http://library.globalchange.gov/products/assessments/2009-national-climate-assessment/2009-global-climate-change-impacts-in-the-united-stateshttps://downloads.globalchange.gov/usimpacts/pdfs/climate-impacts-report.pdf.
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Storm Prediction Center, SVRGIS, Norman, OK, April 28, 2015, available at http://www.spc.noaa.gov/gis/svrgis/.
From 1974 to 2015, the correlation coefficient between severe weather events and emergency and major disaster declarations is 0.76.
Population estimates can be found at American FactFinder managed by the U.S. Census Bureau, Annual Estimates of Resident Population, May 2015July 2016, at http://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=PEP_2014_PEPANNRESPEP_2015_PEPANNRES&src=pt.
This can include upgrading building codes, planning development with an adherence to National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) mapping, and other steps to decrease the impact of disaster events.
Ronald J. Daniels, Donald F. Kettl, and Howard Kunreuther, On Risk and Disaster (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006), p. 3.
The H. John Heinz III Center for Science, Economics and the Environment, Human Links to Coastal Disasters, Washington DC, 19942002, pp 23-24,https://adapt.nd.edu/resources/462/download/Human_Links_to_Coastal_Disasters, pp 23-24, http://www.heinzctr.org/Major_Reports_files/Human%20Links%20to%20Coastal%20Disasters.pdf.
P.L. 93-288, Disaster Relief Act Amendments of 1974. Later named in honor of former Vermont Senator Robert Stafford.
Executive Order 12127, "Federal Emergency Management Agency," 19367, March 31, 1979.
[author name scrubbed], "The Formative Years: 1950-1978," in Emergency Management: The American Experience 1900-2010, ed. Claire B. Rubin, 2nd ed. (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2012), p. 111.
P.L. 93-288, 42 U.S.C. §5170(c) and §5172.
42 U.S.C. §5174 (c)(2)(C), later removed by P.L. 109-295.
For further analysis on PKEMRA, see CRS Report RL33729, Federal Emergency Management Policy Changes After Hurricane Katrina: A Summary of Statutory Provisions, coordinated by [author name scrubbed], p. 36.
For additional analysis of the SRIA provisions see CRS Report R42991, Analysis of the Sandy Recovery Improvement Act of 2013, by [author name scrubbed], [author name scrubbed], and [author name scrubbed]. Also, for a detailed analysis of the changes to the Public Assistance program see CRS Report R43990, FEMA's Public Assistance Grant Program: Background and Considerations for Congress, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed].
One recent exception was the emergency declaration on October 31, 2011, for the snow event in Connecticut. This snow emergency was reclassified as a major disaster declaration on November 17, 2011.
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, "Snow Assistance and Severe Winter Storm Policy," 74 Federal Register 57509, November 6, 2009.
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, FEMA, "Declared Disasters by Year or State," As noted previously, FEMA does not use specific categories to classify disasters. Snow declarations were identified by using a keyword search of disaster titles from U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Disaster Declarations, available at https://www.fema.gov/disasters for "blizzard," "freeze," "ice," "snow," and "winter." 44. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Disaster Declarations, available at https http://www.fema.gov/news.disaster_totals_annual.femadisasters. 45. During this time period there were also eight (8) emergencies declared for severe winter storms or snow storms.
FEMA Policy FP-010-4, "Pre-Disaster Emergency Declarations Requests," May 18, 2012 (supersedes policy guidance, July 18, 2007).
SpendingEmergency declarations were issued for North Carolina on August 25th and for New York, Virginia, and Massachusetts on August 26th. 48. Although the number of declarations is doubled, spending is likely not increased since, under previous policy, much of the emergency spending may have been captured as eligible within a longer incident period. The benefit of the separate emergency declaration is that it makes federal; assistance available more rapidly and likely contributes to the confidence of state and local governments in carrying out emergency services with an assurance of partial reimbursement.
Federal Emergency Management Agency, "Disaster Assistance; Factors Considered When Evaluating a Governor's Request for a Major Disaster Declaration," 64 Federal Register 47698, September 1, 1999.
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Preliminary Damage Assessment Reports, available at http://www.fema.gov/rebuild/recover/pda_reports.shtmpreliminary-damage-assessment-reports.
For example, see Jessica Zuckerman, An Election-Year Trend: Disaster Declarations on the Rise, The Heritage Foundation, January 4, 2012, available at http://blog.heritage.org/2012/01/04/an-election-year-trend-disaster-declarations-on-the-rise/.
Data on turndowns were only available through the end of FY2013. The publicly-available Disaster Declarations page maintained by FEMA only includes those that were ultimately declared, not all that were requested.
Thirty data points are needed to establish statistical significance.
46In previous versions of this report, this section separately analyzed emergency and major disaster declarations since 1990. This report analyzes both emergency and major disaster declarations since 1974 for data reliability purposes. The results from both analyses yield statistically insignificant differences between presidential and non-presidential election years, using a two-tailed t-test assuming heterogeneity at the p=0.10 level. 53. Using a two-tailed t-test assuming heterogeneity, the p-value for declarations is 0.81 and for turndowns is 0.44. Furthermore, when comparing all four years of the election cycle (see Table 4) simultaneously using an ANOVA, the p-value for declarations is 0.97 and for turndowns is 0.76.
Using a two-tailed t-test assuming heterogeneity, the p-value for percentage of turndowns is 0.79. When comparing all four years of the election cycle simultaneously using an ANOVA, the p-value for percentage of turndowns is 0.89.
Thomas A. Garrett and Russell S. Sobel, "The Political Economy of FEMA Disaster Payments," Economic Inquiry, Vol. 41, No. 3, July, 2003, p. 496, available at http://www.be.wvu.edu/divecon/econ/sobel/All%20Pubs%PDF/The%20Political%20Economy%20FEMA%20Disaster%20Payments.pdf.
Richard S. Salkowe and Jayajit Chakraborty, "Federal Disaster Relief in the U.S.: The Role of Political Partisanship and Preference in Presidential Disaster Declarations and Turndowns," Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management, Vol. 6. 2009. p. 13.
Richard T. Sylves, Disaster Policy and Politics: Emergency Management and Homeland Security (Washington DC: CQ Press, 2008), p. 219.
Claire Rubin, Ed. Emergency Management: The American Experience 1900-2010, 2nd Edition, (CRC Press: Boca Raton, 2012), p. 131. Excerpt: Gary L. Wamsley, et al. Coping with Catastrophe: Building an Emergency Management System to Meet People's Needs in Natural and Manmade Disasters (Washington DC: National Academy of Public Administration, 1993).
Richard T. Sylves, Disaster Policy and Politics: Emergency Management and Homeland Security (Washington DC: CQ Press, 2008), p. 85.
National Governors Association and the National Association of State Budget Officers, The Fiscal Survey of States, Washington, DC, 20122016, p. vii, available at http://www.nasbo.org/sites/default/files/Spring%202012202016%20Fiscal%20Survey_120Survey%20of%20States-S.pdf.
Federal Emergency Management Agency, Status Report: Emergency Management Higher Education Project, Emmitsburg, MD, June 8, 2004.
Lucien G. Canton, Emergency Management: Concepts and Strategies for Effective Programs (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2007), p. 79.
Based on a count of associates, bachelors, masters, and PhD.doctoral degree programs in the United States, as well as concentrations and specializations in emergency management, drawn from Federal Emergency Management Agency, The College List: Colleges, Universities and Institutions Offering Emergency Management Courses, Emmitsburg, MD, May 5, 2015March 18, 2016, available at http://www.training.fema.gov/emiweb/edu/collegelist/.
Claire Rubin, Ed. Emergency Management: The American Experience 1900-2010, 2nd Edition, (CRC Press: Boca Raton, 2012), p.158.
P.L. 93-288, 42 U.S.C. §5122.
Richard T. Sylves, Disaster Policy and Politics: Emergency Management and Homeland Security (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2008), p. 79.
Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General, Opportunities to Improve FEMA's Public Assistance Preliminary Damage Assessment Process, pp. 5-7.
For further information on this process, see CRS Report R43784, FEMA's Disaster Declaration Process: A Primer, by [author name scrubbed].
U.S. General Accounting Office, Disaster Assistance: Improvement Needed in Disaster Declaration Criteria and Eligibility Assurance Procedures, GAO-01-837, August 31, 2001, pp. 11-12, available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/240/232622.pdf.
For example, in the 112th Congress, Section 109 of S. 1630 proposed the use of an expert panel to designate a new category of declaration known as a "catastrophic" declaration. In this case, the panel would have determined whether the incident met the threshold of being catastrophic. For further analysis on catastrophic declarations see CRS Report R41884, Considerations for a Catastrophic Declaration: Issues and Analysis, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed].
Assistance for emergency declarations is capped at $5 billion per incident.
For more information on SBA disaster loans see CRS Report R41309, The SBA Disaster Loan Program: Overview and Possible Issues for Congress, by [author name scrubbed].
For additional discussion on this topic see CRS Report R41101, FEMA Disaster Cost-Shares: Evolution and Analysis, by [author name scrubbed].
There is however, a limit on how much any one household can receive ($31,40033,000 at the time of this report).

References: §206
 §5121
 §5191
 §5187
 §5122
 §5122
 §5170
 §5172
 §5174
 §5122