Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&amp;view=article&amp;id=49849:gr-169962-2007&amp;catid=1494&amp;Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 21:51:20+00:00

Document:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. RAUL CENAHONON, Appellant.
Before us is the Decision1 dated June 3, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) and the Decision2 dated October 20, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of ParaÃ±aque City, Branch 259, in Criminal Case No. 99-248, both finding accused Raul Cenahonon (Cenahonon) and Ranilo Erdaje (Erdaje) guilty of kidnapping for ransom and imposing upon them the death penalty.
That on or about November 25, 1999 in ParaÃ±aque City and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there, by force and intimidation, and with the use of a gun, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, carry away and deprive KENNETH MEDINA of his liberty against his will for the purpose of extorting money as in fact a demand for money was made as a condition for his release.
Upon arraignment, both accused pled "not guilty." Thereafter, Erdaje escaped from detention and, thus, was tried in absentia.
Around 1:00 p.m. that day, somebody called the Medina residence and talked to Fortunato. A speaker phone was used so everyone in the house heard the telephone conversation. The caller demanded P5,000,000.00 for Kenneth's release. A PAOCTF member instructed Fortunato to negotiate. The caller made several calls that same afternoon to negotiate for the ransom.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, finding Raul Cenahonon and Ranilo Erdaje GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom as defined and penalized under Art. 267 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by RA 7659 particularly the penultimate paragraph thereof, with reference to Kidnapping committed for the purpose of extorting money from the victim or any other person, both accused are hereby sentenced to the supreme penalty of death by lethal injection and to suffer the accessory penalties provided by law specifically Art. 40 of the Revised Penal Code.
The Clerk of Court is directed to prepare the Mittimus for the immediate transfer of Raul Cenahonon to the New Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa City from [the] ParaÃ±aque City Jail and to prepare an alias Warrant of Arrest for Ranilo Erdaje who is now considered a fugitive from justice. The Clerk of Court is also directed to forward all the records to the Supreme Court for automatic review in accordance with Section 9, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Court and Art. 47 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Section 22 of RA 7659.
In a Resolution27 dated October 12, 2004, this Court transferred the records of the case to the CA for appropriate action and disposition pursuant to People of the Philippines v. Efren Mateo28 which modified Sections 3 and 10 of Rule 122, Section 13 of Rule 124, and Section 3 of Rule 125, all of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, and allowed intermediate review by the Court of Appeals.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated October 20, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court of the City of ParaÃ±aque, Branch 259, in Criminal Case No. 99-248, finding accused-appellants Raul Cenahonon and Ranilo Erdaje guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping for ransom and imposing upon them the death penalty is AFFIRMED.
It must be remembered that Erdaje escaped from jail after his arraignment. The trial court tried him in absentia, found him guilty of the crime charged together with Cenahonon, and likewise sentenced him to death. While it appears that Cenahonon is the lone appellant in this case, this Court, in line with its ruling in People v. Esparas34 and in subsequent similar cases,35 is mandated by law to automatically review the conviction and the death sentence imposed on both Cenahonon and Erdaje, and promulgate the appropriate judgment. As the brief drafted by the PAO was initially filed for both accused, the Court will also consider the same with respect to Erdaje. Further, as the entire case is thrown open for scrutiny, it is the duty of this Court to correct any error, if any, that may be found in the judgment under review, whether or not an appeal brief is filed, and if there is, whether or not such error is assigned.
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE THEIR GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS CONSPIRACY IN THE CASE AT BAR.
Cenahonon assails the credibility of prosecution witnesses Jometh Magaway and Elizabeth Alamag. He points to certain inconsistencies which, according to him, discredit their testimony.
Firstly, Cenahonon claims that Magaway, on direct examination pointed to him as the person who approached him, poked a gun at him, demanded that he transfer to the front passenger seat, and drove the CRV away from the Medina residence; but, on cross-examination, testified that it was Erdaje, the person who collected the money from him, who poked the gun at him, demanded his transfer, and drove the vehicle with the boy.
Secondly, Cenahonon points out that Alamag testified that she voluntarily accompanied him and the boy to her mother's house and was not threatened by her uncle, Erdaje, but she also affirmed the contents of her affidavit wherein she stated that her uncle threatened her.
The argument does not persuade.
A: Because Fiscal Macapagal mentioned the name, sir. I only knew them by their faces kaya nalilito po ako.
A: He handed it to his other companion, sir.
Your Honor please, matters that have to be taken by during re-direct examination are matters that have been taken up during the cross-examination. And these matters were not taken up during the cross-examination, your Honor.
It is material, your Honor, because there was a mistake committed by the witness on identifying who poked the gun and drove the car because I mentioned, this representation happened to mention the name of the accused which he did not know. Now, I'm clarifying the matter by making the witness point to that person who was then the companion of the one who is not present in court, for the clarification of the Honorable Court.
By the way, your Honor, I have vividly asked the witness a while ago that if that statement he made before was not true and he affirmed, your Honor. He affirmed that he was lying.
No. There was no affirmation that he was lying. It is just that he committed a mistake because this representation mentioned the name which he did not know.
A: Yes, ma'am. He is here.
A: Siya po. (Witness pointed to a person who, when asked his name, answered Raul Cenahonon).
A: He poked the gun at the left portion of my waist, sir.
On the other hand, Cenahonon interposed the defenses of alibi and denial, stating that he was merely coerced to take care of Kenneth and that he met Erdaje for the first time at Camp Crame. Ranged against this lame excuse is the positive identification of both accused by Magaway and by Kenneth himself.
During trial, however, only Cenahonon was positively identified by Magaway, as Erdaje had already escaped from prison.
The contention lacks merit. Following this line, if they were careful not to risk identification, then they should have worn masks in the first place. What occurred, and as was proven during trial, was not improbable or unnatural.
Cenahonon and Erdaje were shown to have clearly acted towards a common goal - to abduct Kenneth Medina and to extort ransom from his family. It was Erdaje who drove the CRV while Cenahonon poked a gun at Magaway from the back seat. They took Kenneth to Alamag in Molino, Bacoor, Cavite, where Cenahonon posed as the father of the boy, and then proceeded to the house Alamag's mother in Trece Martires, Cavite. Erdaje left Cenahonon and Kenneth to collect the ransom from the Medina spouses and later returned to that house in Trece Martires.
Based on the evidence proven during trial and as above discussed, the elements of the crime were present. Necessarily, the assailed decisions should be affirmed. However, with the advent of R.A. 9346,55 prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty, Cenahonon and Erdaje should be meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua with all its accessory penalties and without eligibility for parole under Act 4103,56 as amended.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated October 20, 2001 in Criminal Case No. 99-248 of the RTC, Branch 259, ParaÃ±aque City, finding Raul Cenahonon and Ranilo Erdaje guilty of kidnapping for ransom of Kenneth Medina, and the Decision dated June 3, 2005 of the CA, affirming in toto the Decision of the RTC, are AFFIRMED. On Cenahonon and Erdaje is imposed, in lieu of the death penalty by lethal injection, the penalty of reclusion perpetua with all its appurtenant accessory penalties and without eligibility for parole.
1 Penned by Associate Justice Aurora Santiago-Lagman, with Associate Justices Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. and Rebecca de Guia-Salvador, concurring; rollo, pp. 3-19.
2 Rollo (G.R. No. 157022), pp. 15-19.
4 TSN, June 8, 2000, pp. 4-7, 8-13; TSN, August 23, 2000, pp. 7-16.
5 TSN, July 11, 2000, p. 7; TSN, August 23, 2000, pp. 31-37.
6 TSN, June 8, 2000, pp. 14-17.
8 TSN, July 11, 2000, p. 3.
9 Id. at 4-11; TSN, August 23, 2000, pp. 21-23, 37-42.
10 TSN, October 12, 2000, pp. 15-21.
11 Id. at 20-21; TSN, December 6, 2000, p. 20.
12 TSN, July 11, 2000, pp. 13, 17; id. at 21-25.
13 Id. at 16; TSN, October 12, 2000, pp. 23-25.
14 TSN, April 18, 2000, p. 16; id. at 26-29.
15 TSN, October 12, 2000, p. 30.
16 TSN, April 18, 2001, pp. 6-14.
17 TSN, October 12, 2000, pp. 21-32.
18 TSN, April 18, 2001, p. 21.
19 TSN, October 12, 2000, pp. 33-40.
20 TSN, August 23, 2000, pp. 47-49.
21 TSN, July 12, 2001, pp. 4-15.
22 Rollo (G.R. No. 157022), pp. 15-19.
27 Rollo (G.R. No. 169962), p. 2.
28 G.R. NOS. 147678-87, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 640.
29 Rollo (G.R. No. 169962), pp. 3-19.
31 Order dated December 6, 2005, id. at 20.
32 OSG's Manifestation and Motion for Leave to Adopt Brief as Supplemental Brief, id. at 21-23.
33 Manifestation (In Lieu of Supplemental Brief), id. at 25-27.
34 329 Phil. 339, 347 (1996) (Resolution); 354 Phil. 342 (1998) (Decision). Citing U.S. v. Laguna, et al. (17 Phil. 533 ), the Court held that the power to review a decision imposing the death penalty remains automatic and mandatory and cannot be waived either by the accused or by the courts. In this case, the accused has absconded.
35 Please see People v. Latayada, 467 Phil. 682 (2004); People v. Abes, 465 Phil. 165, 180 (2004); People v. Ferrer, 454 Phil. 431, 451 (2003); People v. Oranza, 434 Phil. 417, 424 (2002); People v. Palabrica, 409 Phil. 618, 627 (2001); People v. Aquino, 385 Phil. 887, 899 (2000); People v. RaquiÃ±o, 374 Phil. 283, 292 (1999); and People v. Prades, 355 Phil. 150, 160 (1998).
36 TSN, August 23, 2000, pp. 24-30.
37 Yuchengco v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. NOS. 149802, 150320, 150367, 153207 & 153459, January 20, 2006, 479 SCRA 1, 39; People v. Castillano, Sr., 448 Phil. 482, 506-507 (2003).
38 People v. Salimbago, 373 Phil. 56, 65 (1999).
39 People v. Mamarion, 459 Phil. 51, 87 (2003).
40 TSN, August 23, 2000, pp. 47-49.
41 319 Phil. 128, 180 (1995). See also People v. Arellano, 397 Phil. 307, 322 (2000). "In resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-of-court identification of suspects, courts have adopted the totality of circumstances test where they consider the following factors, viz.: (1) the witness' opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness' degree of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length of time between the crime and the identification; and (6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure."
42 People v. Bacungay, 428 Phil. 798, 811 (2002).
43 People v. Suarez, G.R. NOS. 153573-76, April 15, 2005, 456 SCRA 333, 349.
44 People v. Garin, G.R. No. 139069, June 17, 2004, 432 SCRA 394, 407; People v. Giganto, Sr., 391 Phil. 169, 183 (2000).
45 People v. Bacungay, supra note 42, at 814-815.
46 Rollo (G.R. No. 157022), pp. 116-117.
47 People v. Otayde, 462 Phil. 309, 323 (2003); People v. Cueto, 443 Phil. 425, 436 (2003); People v. Prades, supra note 35, at 164-165.
48 People v. RaquiÃ±o, supra note 35, at 298.
49 People v. Andales, 466 Phil. 873, 887 (2004).
50 Revised Penal Code, Article 8, 2nd paragraph.
51 Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 159556, May 26, 2005, 459 SCRA 236, 258; People v. Felipe, 463 Phil. 518, 553-554 (2003); People v. Pangilinan, 443 Phil. 198, 238 (2003).
4. If the person detained or kidnapped shall be a minor, except when the accused is any of the parents, female, or public officer.
53 People v. Bisda, 454 Phil. 194, 234 (2003).
54 People v. Salimbago, supra note 38, at 75.
55 An Act Prohibiting Death Penalty in the Philippines.

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