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KNUDSEN c. NORVEGE
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Type d'affaire : DecisionType de recours : Radiation du rôle (solution du litige)Numérotation : Numéro d'arrêt : 11045/84Identifiant URN:LEX : urn:lex;coe;cour.europeenne.droits.homme;arret;1985-03-08;11045.84 Analyses : (Art. 13) DROIT A UN RECOURS EFFECTIF, (Art. 14) DISCRIMINATION, (Art. 3) PEINE DEGRADANTE, (Art. 3) PEINE INHUMAINEParties : Demandeurs : KNUDSENDéfendeurs : NORVEGETexte : APPLICATION/REQUÃTE NÂ° 11045/84 Bbrre Arnold KNUDSEN v/NORWA Y B6rre Arnold KNUDSEN c/NORVEG E
DECISION of 8 March 1985 on the admissibility of the applicatio n DÃCISION du 8 mars 1985 sur la recevabilitÃ© de la requ@t e
A rt icles 2 and 25 of the Convention : A ntinister of religion within a State church, dismissed for refusing to perform certain of his functions in protest at a new law concerning the termination of pregnancy . cannot claim to be a victim of a violation of Article 2 of the Convention .
Article 9 of the Convention : Where the beliefs of a minister of religion within a State clturch conflict with his administrative duties, freedom of religion is protected by the possibility of resigning from the post . 7he dismissal of a minister of religion for refusal to perform administrative tasks within a State church is not in violation of the Convention where the refusal does nat directly form the expression of beliefs . A rticle 25 of the Convention : 77re Commissiort cannot examine the compatibility of a law with the Convention in abstract . A person who cannot show that he is personally affected by the law to a greater extent than other citizen may not claim to be a victim of a violation of the Convention . Articles 2 et 25 de la Convention : Ne peut se prÃ©tendre victime d'une violation de l'anicle 2 de la Convention un ministre de culte, exerÃ§ant ses fonctions au sein d'une Eglise d'Etat, qui se plaint d'avoir Ã©tÃ© licenciÃ© pour avoir refusÃ© d'esercer une partie de ses fonctions Ã titre de protestation contre une nouvelle lÃ©gislation concernant !'interruption de la grossesse . Article 9 de la Conventlon :[a libenÃ© de religion d'un ministre de culte, exerÃ§ant ses fonctions au sein d'une Eglise d'Eiat et dont les convictions sont en conflit ave c
les obligations administratives de sa charge, est sauvegardÃ©e par la garantie de pouvoir renoncer Ã ses fonctions . N'est pas contraire Ã cette disposition le licenciement d'un ministre de culte dÃ» au refus de s'acquitter de ses fonctions administratives au sein d'une Eglise d'Etat, lorsque ce refus n'esprime pas directement une conviction. Article 25 de la Convention : fn Commission ne peut examiner in abstrano la compatibilitÃ© d'une loi avec la Convention . Ne peut se prÃ©tendre victime d'une violation de la Convention celui qui est incapable de montrer qu'il est personnelletnent affectÃ©, autrement que tout autre citoyen, par la loi qu'il critique .
(franÃ§ais : voir p . 258)
The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows : The applicant is a Norwegian citizen, bom in 1937 . He is a vicar and resides at Balsfjord, Norway . Before the Commission he is represented by Mr Johan Hjon of the law firm Hjort, Eriksrud, Myhre and Bugge Fougner, Oslo, Norway . In Norway, an Act of 16 June 1978 (No . 66) made a number of amendments to the Act of 13 June 1975 (No . 50) concerning interruption of pregnancy - the socalled Abortion Act . The most important amendment was that whereas a pregnant woman could previously have her pregnancy terminated only by decision of a medical committee in accordance with conditions drawn up by the Act, the 1978 amendment authorised the woman herself to make the final decision whether to terminate the pregnancy provided the operation is performed before the end of the twelfth week of pregnancy . Already on 31 May 1978, the day after the amending Act had been dealt with in the lower house of the Norwegian Parliament, the applicant declared in a letter to the King that he regarded the Act as being "in manifest conflict with God's holy Commandment and the spirit and letter of the Constitution" . He declared that he had to regard himself as relieved from his Government appointment and his oath of office as sÃ´on as the Act came into force . On the day the Act came into force, I January 1979, the applicant announced in another letter to the King that he considered himself relieved from the oath he had given on taking the office of vicar . A few months later he informed the parish councils that he had withdrawn from his Government appointment in protest against the new Abortion Act .
As a consequence of his opinion he no longer performed the duties which he considered to belong to the State's part of the office of vicar . He performed no marriages, examination of marriage conditions or conciliation in matrimonial cases . He refused to keep the birth register. He refused to receive Government mail which was sent to him by the Ministry, and he refused to receive salary from the Government . However he still considered himself to be the true clergyman of the parish, holding that office by appointment from the Church, and he continued therefore to perform the functions which he regarded as pertaining to the Church's part of the office . The Ministry of Church and Education confined itself at first to declaring that the applicant, through his statements and his attitude, had revealed an interpretation of his office which was new and unacceptable to the Ministry . Apart from this, the Ministry decided to await developments, and accordingly no measures were taken against him . As the applicant's action continued and the situation gradually became more difficult, however, the Ministry requested by letter of 25 September 1980 the Bishop of Nord-He)ogaland to pass on an order to the applicant to resume promptly the duties of his office which he was not performing, as the Ministry would otherwise consider dismissing him in accordance with Article 10 of the Criminal Code Enforcement Act (Ikrafttraedelsesloven) . The applicant maintained his decision . By Royal Decree of 24 October 1980 it was then decided that the Ministry of Church and Education should on behalf of the Government bring legal actioh against the applicant to have him dismissed from office by court order . Following unsuccessful conciliation proceedings the Attorney General instituted proceedings before the Malangen District Coun on 21 November 1980, moving on behalf of the Goverruuent for the dismissal of the applicant from office, and requesting moreover a declaratory judgment to determine certain specific consequences of a dismissal . The District Court pronounced judgment on I Febmary 1982 concluding that the motion against the applicant should be rejected . The Government represented by the Ministry of Church and Education appealed against this judgment to the HMogaland Court of Appeal . During the main hearings in the Court of Appeal the Attomey General moved for dismissal of the applicant, in the alternative, a declaratory judgment obliging him to accept dismissal . The parties' arguments in the Court of Appeal as well as in Supreme Court were largely the same and may be summarised as follows . The applicant claimed that it was only formally and in its extemal aspects that the case concemed neglect of duty . Above all it concerned the innermost essence of the pastoral office . A clergyman had by vinue of his ordination received Ihe call of God and the Church and he was bound primarily by the Word of God and the Confession of the Church . In the applicant's opinion he was acting through his protest s 249
on behalf of the Church, and this was so whether or not everybody within the Church agreed with the method of action he had chosen . The reason for his action should be found in the Abortion Act of 1978 . The applicant insisted that the Act implied the abandonment of every legal protection of the budding human life and involved in principle a denial of the foetus's human worth . The Act was in conflict with basic Christian values and hence also with Articles 2 and 4 of the Norwegian Constitution which establishes the Evangelical Lutheran religion as the State's official faith . It was ntoreover in conllict with unwritten constitutional principles and with mles of intemational law for the protection of human rights . His acts of protest were intended to make the couns examine the legality of the Act . The legality of the Act should be examined in relation to the Constitution or to other superior sources of law . lf the applicant was right in claiming that the Act was void, this would influence the evaluation of his action and hence the question whether he could be dismissed . Furthermore the applicant maintained that his actions were justified under an emergency aspect . The Abortion Act created for the Church a state of affairs that could be called a confession situation, where the Church would lose its credibility if it failed actively to take up the struggle against a denial of vital christian and human values . He, as pastor, was committed by church doctrine, and it was not merely his right but also his duty to react on behalf of the Church . The action he chose went no further than was justified by the situation . Finally the applicant was of the opinion that even if his acts of protest should not be considered justified, there were in his view no grounds for dismissal . He did not contest that Article 10 of the Criminal Code Enforcement Act, under which a Government official may be dismissed when he persistently proves unable adequately to perform his duties- was in principle applicable also to an official who refused to perform his duties . But the official duties that were neglected in this case were so modest that they could not form reasonable grounds for a dismissal . The Govemment through the Ministry of Church and Education on the other hand argued that there were three independent grounds for dismissal . First, the applicant had for several years refused to perforro functions that were clearly duties of his office . Second, he had revoked his oath of loyalty which he had made under Article 21 of the Constitution on assuming office, and he could thus no longer be regarded as satisfying the validly required conditions for holding that office . Third, he had by written word and deed made it clear that he considered himself to have retired from office . It should thus be justifiable for the Govemment to take him at his word and to confirm the dismissal which he himself had in reality effected . The conditions for dismissal according to Article 10 of the Criminal Code Enforcement Act were therefore satisfied .
Furthermore, in the Govemment's view, the case did not justify any discussion of the position of the Abortion Act in relation to the Constitution, to other constitutional rules or to intemational law . The Government were of the opinion that the decisive point was that the Abortion Act did not interfere with the applicant's terms of employment ; the official duties he refused to perform bore no relation to the Abortion Act . The Govemment moreover contested that the provisions of Articles 2 and 4 of the Constitution regarding the Established Church imposed barriers to legislation which did not concem the Established Church's own affairs . If any such barriers should exist, it was doubtful how far the courts might be competent to undertake the constitutional review which the applicant had requested . The Govemment finally maintained that the applicant's acts could not be defended on grounds of emergency law . The applicant had every opportunity of battling for his view of the Abortion Act without resoning to unlawful discontinuance of his functions . The Court of Appeal pronounced judgment on 26 November 1982 in which the applicant was dismissed from his job according to Article 10 of the Criminal Code Enforcement Act . With regard to the applicant's allegations that the Abortion Act violated constitutional and international law the Court found no reason to express itself on these matters since the Abortion Act did not interfere with the terms of employment between the applicant and the State . The Coun found no link between the official duties which the applicant had refused to carry out and the Abortion Act . On 23 September 1983 the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Court of Appeal . Regarding the question whether the case provided an occasion for examining the validity of the Abortion Act with regard to constitutional and intemational law Justice Aasland wrote for the unanimous court : "Although there are strong indications that the case could have been decided on the grounds argued here by the Government with reference to the Appeal Court's judgment, I find it unsatisfactory under the circumstances to ignore the question of the legal validity of the Abortion Act .
[The applicantj has also claimed that the Abortion Act should be regarded as invalid because it is incompatible with central legal principles of a constitutional nature and moreover with mles of international law which bind the legislator . Every Government operating under the rule of law must, he claims, be obliged to establish legal protection of human life, including the unbom life . The Human Rights declaration, adopted by the United Nations on 10 December 1948, affirms in Article 3 that everybody has the right to life, freedom an d 251
personal safety . And Article 2 of the European Human Rights Convention of 4 November 1950 provides : "Everyone's right to life shall be protected by law . No one shall be deprived of life intentionally, save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law . " In [the applicant's] view, this Convention overrides internal Norwegian legislation . And in addition he claims - as already mentioned - that the Govemment's obligation to protect the unbom life applies as a constitutional barrier for the legislator whether or not it follows from any written source of law, since every government operating under the rule of law is obliged not to undermine essential human rights . On that basis the Abortion Act, which deprives the foetus of legal protection in its first twelve weeks of life, should be declared void . I find it obvious that these arguments too fail to lead to the conclusion that the Abortion Act is invalid . I start with the question of intemational law, where the provision of Article 2 of the European Human Rights Convention is panicularly important . This Convention, to which Norway has acceded, is legally binding on the contracting States . A somewhat controversial question in the literature on international law is whether and to what extent the provision of Article 2 imposes requirements as to the contents of abortion laws . The Austrian Constitutional Court has in a decision of I I October 1974 considered that the provision according to its contents does not comprise the unborn . I for my pan do not find it necessary to decide whether it is justified to rely on such an absolute interpretation . In any case the provision must be regarded as not imposing any far-reaching restrictions on the legislator's right to set the conditions for abortion . The Norwegian Act, under which the woman herself makes the final decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy provided the operation can be made before the end of the twelfth week of pregnancy, is similar to the legislation of a number of other countries belonging to the same culture, countries which also have acceded to the European Human Rights Convention . This is hardly immaterial to the consideration of a matter of intemational law . I add for the sake of good order that the decision of 25 February 1975 by the Constitutional Court [of the Federal Republic of Germany] which was mentioned by the Court of Appeal, in which a law permining the woman herself to require an abortion in the first twelve weeks of pregnancy was declared invalid, concerned the application of internal constitutional rules . The question now remains whether the Abortion Act is incompatible with unwritten principles of law which bind the legislator . It is of course conceivable that such principles of law might impose more far-reaching requirements on the legislator than does the Human Rights Convention . Another matter is that both
the Convention and legislative practice in other countries belonging to our culture must be taken into consideration as expressing the margin it is natural for the legislator to have in this area . The Supreme Court has in cenain decisions, see especially Ri . 1961 p . 1350 and Rt . 1966 p . 476, left open the possibility that a law may have to be declared void if it conflicts with certain general principles of law of a constitutional nalure, even if it is not contrary to any positive rule of the Constitution . It was made clear in the 1961 decision, however, that this can only be done in extreme cases, and "that quite exceptional circumstances must be present in order for a law, issued by the Storting and sanctioned by the King, to be thus declared void as conflicting with the "spirit and principles" of the Constitution ." Clearly in my opinion, respect for human life, including the unborn life, is one of the legal principles that might be accepted as overriding positive law . In principle it is not difficult to conceive that an abortion law, based for example on nazi race ideology, might infringe human rights in such a way that it would have to be invalidated as contrary to unwritten standards of law of a constitutional nature . However, this example is remote from our reality . The Abortion Act which is being challenged by [the applicant] is not the reBection of a legislative ideology based on a lack of respect for human life . I refer to the passages I have quoted above from the opinions expressed in the drafting of the said Act . But abortion laws must necessarily be based on a compromise between the respect for the unborn life and other essential and worthy considerations . This compromise has led the legislator to permit selfdetermined abortion under the circumstances defined by the Act . Clearly, such a reconciliation of disparate considerations give rise to ethical problems, and clearly too, there will be some disagreement about the system embodied in the Act . The reactions to the Act show that many, like [the applicant], view it as an attack on central ethical principles . But it is equally relevant that others - also from an ethical point of view - regard the Act as having done away with an unacceptable legal situation . It is not a matter for the couns to decide whether the solution to a difficult legislative problem which the legislator chose when adopting the Abortion Act of 1978, is the best one . On this point, different opinions will be held among judges as among other members of our society . The reconciliation of opposing interests which abortion laws require is the legislator's task and the legislator's responsibility . The legislative power is exercised by Ihe People through the Storting . The Storting majority which adopted the Abortion Act in 1978 had its mandate from the People after an election campaign in which the abortion question had a prominent place . As already mentioned, the Stoning in 1983, after a new election in which the abortion question was again a central issue, decided moreover not to take the initiative towards any statutory amendment . Clearly, the courts must respect the solution chosen by the legislator .
I accordingly find that [the applicant[ has been unsuccessful in challenging the legal validity of the Abonion Act . " By virtue of this judgment the applicant was dismissed from his job . However, by letter of 6 September 1983 from the Ministry of Church and Education, to which a Royal Decree of 15 January 1982 had delegated the competence to grant a dispensation from the loss of pastoral rights following a possible judgment for dismissal, the Ministry decided that the applicant should not forfeit these rights which follow from his ordination . This meant that the applicant could continue to carry out religious functions, however, no longer as a State employee .
COMPLAINT S The applicant maintains that the Norwegian Abortion Act in its wording following the amendment of 16 June 1978, is in contravention of Anicle 2 of the Convention . He also maintains that the Norwegian Supreme Court has arrived at an incorrect result . It is further maintained in this context that the Convention on Human Rights as a rule of international law supersedes national legislation . If, therefore, the Commission finds that Norwegian legislation in this field is in conflict with the Convention, the consequence is that the Norwegian legislation must be amended . The applicant is of the opinion that he has a direct legal interest in a decision as to whether Norwegian law is in contravention of Article 2 . His case is allegedly different from the earlier so-called abortion cases brought before the Commission, in which the applicants approached the subject in their capacity of ordinary citizens with public interests, but without being personally affected by the national legislation which they attacked . The applicant finds that his case is different : he has risked and lost - his office on the issue of the acceptability of the Norwegian Abortion Act, i .e . in relation to the Convention on Human Rights . And therefore he has a direct and personal interest in the examination of the matter . It cannot be said in his casetherefore, that his interest is of an entirely abstract nature . He will resume his functions in the Norwegian State Church, provided his view on the Abortion Act is upheld . It is his belief that it must follow from a decision by the Commission or the Court, based on his conception of the law, that the Norwegian law must be amended . The applicant's second line of argument is that his dismissal from his office contravenes Article 9 of the Convention . He has been dismissed from his office although his views on the abortion issue are the same as those of the Church . He alleges that his dismissal was against the wishes of the members of his parish and against the advice of his bishop . In this connection it is argued that a minister in the Church has mixed duties- both towards the Church and towards the State, and that his duties towards the Church are of far greater importance than his relatively unimportant duties towards the State . It is therefore submined that a minister canno t 254
be dismissed against the wishes of the Church, and that a dismissal solely at the request of the State authorities and upheld by the court, constitutes a breach of the Convention
W.THELA I . The applicant has first complained that the Norwegian Abortion Act as it was formulated following the amendment of 16 June 1978 contravenes Anicle 2 of the Convention . He is funhermore of the opinion that he is personally affected by the above legislation in that he has risked - and lost - his office as vicar of Balsfjord within the Norwegian State Church on account of his views on this issue . Anicle 2 of the Convention provides that everyone's right to life shall be protected by law . Deprivation of life is not permitted under the Convention except in certain cases enumerated in the second sentence of Article 2 para . I, in Article 2 para . 2, and Article 15 para . 2 of the Convention . However, it is clear from Article 25 para . I of the Convention that the Commission can receive an application from a person, non- govemmental organisation or group of individuals only if such person, non-governmental organisation or group of individuals can claim to be a victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Panies of the rights set forth in the Convention . The Commission recalls in this respect its earlier case-law according to which the Commission is competent to examine the compatibility of domestic legislation with the Convention only with respect to its application in a concrete case, while it is not competent to exantine in abstracto its compatibility with the Convention . The Commission refers on this point in panicular to No . 867/60, Dec . 29 .5 .61, Collection 6 p . 34 conceming a similar case with respect to the introduction of new abortion legislation in Norway where the above principle was applied . The Commission also refers to No . 7045/75 . Dec . 10 .12 .76, D .R . 7 p . 87 in which the Commission found that the applicant could not claim to be affected by the new legislation in a way different to any other citizen . On the other hand the Commission has also in No . 6959/75, Dec . 19 .5 .76, D .R . 5 p . 103 developed the above principle in the sense that application of the law in a concrete case must not necessarily mean its application by a judicial or other authority . It is sufficient that the applicant is immediately concemed by it . Finally the Commission also recalls No . 8416/79, Dec . 13 .5 .80, D .R . 19 p . 244 in which the Commission accepted that the applicant, as a potential father, was so closely affected by the termination of his wife's pregnancy that he could claim to be a victim, within the meaning of Article 25 of the Convention, of the legislation complained of . 255
With regard to the question whether the applicant can be considered a victim of a violation of Article 2 of the Convention within the meaning of Article 25, the Commission has examined this case under the criteria laid down in the decisions mentioned above . The Commission recalls that the applicant is of the opinion that he has a direct legal interest in a decision as to whether Norwegian law contravenes Article 2 . His case is allegedly different from the earlier so-called abortion cases brought before the Commission, in which the applicants approached the subject in their capacity of ordinary citizens with public interests, but without being personally affected by the national legislation which they attacked . He has risked - and lost - his office on the issue of the acceptability of the Norwegian Abortion Act, i .e . in relation to the Convention on Human Rights . He maintains, therefore, that he has a direct and personalinterest in the examination of the matter and that it cannot be said in his case that his interest is of an entirely abstract nature . He will resume a position in the Norwegian State Church, provided his view of the Abortion Act is upheld . It is his belief that it must follow from a decision by the Commission or the Court, based on his conception of the law, that the Norwegian law must be amended . The Commission finds in accordance with its above case-law that a person cannot claim to be a victim of a violation of the Convention unless he can show that he is personally affected by the circumstances of the case . In regard to legislation goveming abortion in connection with Article 2 of the Convention this question obviously raises certain questions as to who may claim to be personally affected by the situation . The Commission has accepted that a potential father may claim to be a victim of an alleged violation of Article 2 but has on the other hand rejected applications where, however respectable his motives may be . the applicant cannot show that he has been affected by the new legislation in a way different to any other citizen . The Commission cannot find that the applicant in the present case was affected differently by the new legislation than other citizens . The amendment to the Abortion Act did not directly affect the applicant in his family life nor did it affect him in his obligations as vicar . It is true that he lost the said office, but this was not due to the Abortion Act as such but to the fact that the applicant, because of his views on the Act, refused to perform functions that were duties of his office . The functions in question were considered by the applicant to belong to the State's part of the office of vicar . He performed no marriages, examination of marriage conditions or conciliation in matrimonial cases . He refused to keep the birth register, refused to receive Government ntail and refused to receive salary from the Government . The Commission finds that even though the applicant's attitude was motivated by his opposition to the Abortion Act, the sanctions imposed upon him cannot lead to the conclusion that he can claim to be a victim within the meaning of Article 25 of the Convention with regard to that Act . 256
The Commission therefore concludes that the matters raised by the applicant are abstract questions within the meaning of the Commission's constant case-law . It follows that the applicant cannot, with regard to this complaint, claim to be a victim of a violation of the Convention . This part of the application is therefore incompatible ratione personae with the provisions of the Convention and must consequently be rejected under Article 27 para . 2 of the Convention . 2 . The applicant has also complained that the Norwegian Abortion Act as amended on 16 June 1978 violates his rights under Article 9 of the Convention in that he was dismissed from his office although his views on the abortion issue are the same as those of the Church . Article 9 of the Convention provides : 1 . Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion ; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance . 2 . Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protetion of the rights and freedoms of others . The Commission first points out that a right to hold office within the Norwegian State Church or in general is not as such guaranteed by the Convention . Nevenheless the Commission considers it conceivable that a dismissal of a State official for disobedience could in certain circumstances raise an issue under the above Article . However, in the circumstances of the present case no such issue arises for the following reason . The Commission finds that a clergyman within a State Church system, has not only religious duties, but has also accepted certain obligations towards the State . If the requirements imposed upon him by the State should be in conflict with his convictions . he is free to relinquish his office as clergyman within the State Church, and the Commission regards this as an ultimate guarantee of his right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion . In the present case the Commission recalls that the applicant refused to carry out functions that were duties of his office and that he lost the said office . The Commission also recalls that the applicant has retained the pastoral rights which follow from his ordination and which allow him to carry out religious functions . Finally, it is recalled that the applicant's religious views, including his views on the abortion issue, were consistent with the views held by the Norwegian State Church . However, these views expressed by the applicant did not lead to his dismissal which the Commission finds was due to his refusal to perform functions that wer e
administrative duties of his office . The Commmission finds that this refusal did not actually express the applicant's belief or religious views and it cannot, therefore, be considered as such to be protected by Article 9 para . I, even when it was motivated by such views or belief (cf . Arrowsmith v . the United Kingdom, Comm . Report 12 .10 .78, para . 71, D .R . 19 p . 19) . The applicant has not shown that he has been under any pressure to change his views or that he has been prevented from manifesting his religion or belief. It follows, that the applicant's dismissal did not in any way interfere with the exercise of his rights under Article 9 of the Convention and this part of the application is therefore manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para . 2 of the Convention . For these reasons, the Commission DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE .
(I'RADUCT/ON)
EN FAI T Les faits de la cause, tels que le requÃ©rant les a exposÃ©s, peuvent se rÃ©sumer comme suit . Le requÃ©rant est un ressonissant norvÃ©gien, nÃ© en 1937 . II est curÃ© de paroisse et habite Balsfjord, en NorvÃ¨ge . Devant la Commission, il est reprÃ©sentÃ© par Me Johan Hjort du cabinet Hjon, Eriksrud . Myhre et Bugge Fougner, Oslo, NorvÃ¨ge . En NorvÃ©ge, une loi du 16 juin 1978 (No 66) apporta un certain nombre d'amendements Ã la loi du 13 juin 1975 (No 50) concemant l'intermption volontaire de grossesse - ce qu'on appelle la loi sur l'avonement . Alors qu'auparavant une femme enceinte ne pouvait interrompre sa grossesse que par dÃ©cision d'une commission mÃ©dicale conformÃ©ment aux conditions stipulÃ©es par la loi, l'amendement de 1978 autorise Ã prÃ©sent la femme Ã dÃ©cider en dernier ressort de mettre fin ou non Ã sa grossesse, Ã condition que l'intervention ait lieu avant la fin de la douziÃ¨me semaine . Le 31 mai 1978 dÃ©jÃ , soit le lendemain de l'examen de la loi modificative par la deuxiÃ¨me chambre du Parlement norvÃ©gien, le requÃ©rant Ã©crivit au Roi qu'il considÃ©rait la loi comme â¢en conflit manifeste avec le commandement sacrÃ© de Dieu e t 258
avec l'esprit et la lettre de la Constitution- . Il indiqua que, dÃ©s l'entrÃ©e en vigueur de la loi, il serait obligÃ© de se considÃ©rer comme relevÃ© de sa charge et dÃ©liÃ© de son serment de fonctionnaire . Le jour de l'entrÃ©e en vigueur de la loi, le 1â¢ 1 janvier 1979, le requÃ©rant annonÃ§a dans une autre lettre au Roi qu'il se considÃ©rait comme dÃ©liÃ© du serment qu'il avait pr@tÃ© en prenant sa charge de curÃ© . Quelques mois plus tard, il informa les conseils paroissiaux qu'il s'Ã©tait dÃ©gagÃ© de ses fonctions pour protester contre la nouvelle loi sur l'avonement . ConsÃ©quent avec ses opinions, il ne s'acquitta plus des devoirs qu'il estimait relever de la partie Ã©tatique de sa charge de curÃ© : il ne cÃ©lÃ©bra plus les mariages, n'examina plus si les futurs Ã©poux remplissaient les conditions requises ni ne s'occupait de conciliation matrimoniales . Il refusa de tenir le registre des naissances, de recevoir le courrier administratif que lui adressait le ministre et de percevoir le salaire versÃ© par le Gouvemement . Il se considÃ©rait cependant toujours comme le vÃ©ritable pasteur de la paroisse, tenant cette charge de I'Eglise et il continua dÃ¨s lors Ã s'acquitter des fonctions qu'il considÃ©rait comme relevant de la partie ecclÃ©siale de sa charge . Dans un premier temps, le MinistÃ¨re du Culte et de l'Education se borna Ã dÃ©clarer que, par ses dÃ©clarations et son attitude, le requÃ©rant donnait Ã ses fonctions une interprÃ©tation totalement nouvelle et inacceptable pour le MinistÃ©re . Cela mis Ã part, il dÃ©cida d'attendre les Ã©vÃ©nements et ne prit dÃ¨s lors aucune sanction contre le curÃ© . Comme le requÃ©rant persistait dans son comportement et que la situation devenait progressivement plus difficile, le Minist8re demanda par lettre du 25 septembre 1980 Ã l'Ã©v@que du Nord-H$logaland de sommer le requÃ©rant de reprendre rapidement les devoirs de sa charge qu'il n'accomplissait plus, faute de quoi le MinistÃ©re envisagerait un licenciement conformÃ©ment Ã l'article 10 de la loi d'application du Code pÃ©nal (Ikrafttraedelsesloven) . Le requÃ©rant persista dans sa dÃ©cision . Par dÃ©cret royal du 24 octobre 1980, il fut alors dÃ©cidÃ© que, au nom du Gouvernement, le MinistÃ©re du Culte et de l'Education engagerait une action en justice contre le requÃ©rant pour le faire dÃ©mettre de ses fonctions par dÃ©cision judiciaire . Une procÃ©dure de conciliation ayant Ã©chouÃ©, le Procureur gÃ©nÃ©ral engagea le 21 novembre 1980 une action devant le tribunal de district de Malangen, demandant au nom du Gouvemement une dÃ©cision judiciaire licenciant le requÃ©rant de ses fonctions, assortie d'un jugement dÃ©claratoire prÃ©cisant les consÃ©quences du licenciement . Le tribunal de district rendit sonjugement le IÂ° fÃ©vrier 1982, concluant au rejet de l'action engagÃ©e contre le requÃ©rant . Le Gouvernement, reprÃ©sentÃ© par le MinistÃ¨re du Culte et de l'Education fit appel de ce jugement devant la cour d'appel de l'H&logaland . En appel, le Procureu r
gÃ©nÃ©ral demanda le licenciement du requÃ©rant et Ã titre subsidiaire, un jugement dÃ©claratoire obligeant le requÃ©rant Ã accepter le licenciement . L'argumentation dÃ©veloppÃ©e par les parties, en gros identique devant la cour d'appel et la Cour suprÃ¨me, peut se rÃ©sumer comme suit . Selon le requÃ©rant, c'est seulement formellement et dans ses aspects extÃ©rieurs que l'affaire conceme un abandon de fonctions . Il s'agit avant tout de la nature profonde de la fonction pastorale . En effet, un pasteur a reÃ§u, par son ordination, l'appel de Dieu et de l'Eglise et est avant tout liÃ© par le Verbe de Dieu et la Confession de l'Eglise Ã laquelle il appartient . Le requÃ©rant estime que- par ses protestations, il a agi au nom de l'Eglise et ce, que les membres de l'Eglise soient ou non tous d'accord avec le mode d'action qu'il a choisi . La raison de son comportement se trouve dans la loi de 1978 . Le requÃ©rant rÃ©itÃ¨re que la loi suppose l'abandon de toute protection juridique de la vie humaine embryonnaire et pose le principe du refus au foetus de toute valeur humaine . La loi est en conflit avec les valeurs chrÃ©tiennes fondamentales et donc aussi avec les articles 2 et 4 de la Constitution norvÃ©gienne qui instaurent la religion Ã©vangÃ©lique luthÃ©rienne comme religion officielle de l'Etat . Elle est en outre en conflit avec des principes constitutionnels non Ã©crits et avec les rÃ¨gles du droit international pour la protection des droits de l'homme . Ses protestations personnelles ont pour but d'obliger les tribunaux Ã examiner la lÃ©galitÃ© de la loi, qui doit en effet Ã¨tre apprÃ©ciÃ©e par rapport Ã la Constitution et Ã d'autres sources supÃ©rieures du droit . Si le requÃ©rant a raison d'affirmer que la loi est nulle, cela influencera l'apprÃ©ciation faite sur son comportement et donc sur le point de savoir s'il peut ou non Ãªtre licenciÃ© . Le requÃ©rant soutient en outre que son comportement se justifiait dans une optique d'urgence . La loi sur l'avortement crÃ©e pour l'Eglise un Ã©tat de choses que l'on peut qualifier de situation confessionnelle critique oÃ¹ l'Eglise va perdre sa crÃ©dibilitÃ© si elle ne mÃ¨ne pas le combat contre le refus des valeurs chrÃ©tiennes et humaines de la vie . Lui-mÃªme, en sa qualitÃ© de pasteur, s'est engagÃ© au service de la doctrine de l'Eglise et c'est non seulement son droit mais aussi son devoir de rÃ©agir au nom de l'Eglise . Le mode d'action qu'il a choisi ne va pas au-delÃ de ce que rÃ©clamait la situation . Enfin, le requÃ©rant estime que mÃªme si ses actes de protestation ne doivent pas @tre considÃ©rÃ©s comme justifiÃ©s, il n'existe Ã son avis aucun motif de le licencier . Il ne conteste pas que l'article 10 de la loi d'application du Code pÃ©nal, en vertu duquel un fonctionnaire peut Ãªtre licenciÃ© s'il se rÃ©vÃ¨le de maniÃ¨re constante incapable de s'acquitter convenablement de ses fonctions, soit en principe applicable aussi au fonctionnaire qui refuse d'exercer ses fonctions . Mais les fonctions officielles qu'il a nÃ©gligÃ©es en l'espÃ©ce sont tellement modestes qu'elles ne peuvent pas constituer un motif valable de licenciement .
Par l'intermÃ©diaire du MinistÃ¨re du Culte et de l'Education, le Gouvernement fit valoir, quant Ã lui, qu'il y avait en l'espÃ¨ce trois motifs indÃ©pendants de licenciement . Tout d'abord, plusieurs annÃ©es durant, le requÃ©rant a refusÃ© de s'acquitter de fonctions qui relevaient manifestement des devoirs de sa charge . DeuxiÃ¨mement, il s'est dÃ©liÃ© du serment de fidÃ©litÃ©, qu'il avait prÃ©tÃ© conformÃ©ment Ã l'article 21 de la Constitution en prenant sa charge de curÃ©, et il ne peut dÃ©s lors plus Ãªtre considÃ©rÃ© comme remplissant les conditions valablement requises pour dÃ©tenir ladite charge . TroisiÃ¨mement, il a verbalement et par Ã©crit indiquÃ© clairement qu'il se considÃ¨re comme retirÃ© de sa charge . Il serait dÃ¨s lors justifiÃ© que le Gouvernement le prenne au mot et confirrne le licenciement qu'il a en rÃ©alitÃ© lui-mÃªme pratiquÃ© . Les conditions de licenciement prÃ©vues par l'article 10 de la loi d'application du Code pÃ©nal Ã©taient dÃ¨s lors remplies . En outre, selon le Gouvemement, l'affaire n'appelle aucune discussion de la position de la loi sur l'avortement par rapport Ã la Constitution, Ã d'autres rÃ¨gles constitutionnelles ou au droit international . Le Gouvernement estime que le point dÃ©cisif est que la loi sur l'avortement ne portait pas atteinte aux conditions d'emploi du requÃ©rant ; les fonctions officielles qu'il a refusÃ© d'exercer n'ont aucun lien avec cette loi . Le Gouvernement conteste en outre que les dispositions des articles 2 et 4 de la Constitution sur la religion officielle de l'Etat empÃ¨chent d'adopter une lÃ©gislation qui ne concerne pas les affaires propres Ã l'Eglise Ã©tablie . A supposer mÃªme que ce soit le cas, on voit mal comment les tribunaux pourraient Ã¨tre compÃ©tents pour entreprendre la rÃ©vision constitutionnelle que rÃ©clame le requÃ©rant . Le Gouvernement soutient enfin que les actes du requÃ©rant ne peuvent pas se justifier par des raisons d'urgence de la loi . I .e requÃ©rant a eu toute latitude de batailler pour faire connaitre son opinion sur cette loi sans recourir Ã la suspension illicite de ses fonctions . la cour d'appel a rendu le 26 novembre 1982 un arrÃªt licenciant le requÃ©rant de son emploi conformÃ©ment Ã l'anicle 10 de la loi d'application du Code pÃ©nal . La cour n'a pas jugÃ© nÃ©cessaire de se prononcer sur les allÃ©gations du requÃ©rant selon lesquelles la loi sur l'avortement serait contraire Ã la Constitution et au droit international, puisque la loi en question ne portait pas atteinte aux conditions d'emploi entre le requÃ©rant et l'Etat . La cour n'a vu aucun lien entre les fonctions officielles que le requÃ©rant refusait d'exercer et la loi sur l'avortement . Le 23 septembre 1983, la Cour suprÃªme a confirmÃ© l'arrÃªt de la cour d'appel . Sur la question de savoir si l'affaire fournissait l'occasion d'examiner la validitÃ© de la loi sur l'avortement au regard de la Constitution et du droit intemational, le juge Aasland a exposÃ© pour la cour unanime le point de vue suivant : . Bien que de puissants indices montrent que l'affaire pourrait Ãªtre tranchÃ©e Ã panir des motifs invoquÃ©s par le Gouvemement par rÃ©fÃ©rence Ã l'arrÃ¨t rend u
parla cour d'appel, je trouve peu satisfaisant dans les circonstances de l'espÃ¨ce d'ignorer la question de la validitÃ© juridique de la loi sur l'avortement .
[Le requÃ©rant] a Ã©galement soutenu que la loi sur l'avortement devrait Ãªtre considÃ©rÃ©e comme entachÃ©e de nullitÃ© pour incompatibilitÃ© avec des principes fondamentaux d'ordre constitutionnel et des rÃ©gles de droit international qui lient le lÃ©gislateur . A son avis, tout gouvemement fonctionnant dans un Etat de droit est tenu d'instaurer une protection juridique de la vie humaine, y compris la vie foetale . La DÃ©claration des Droits de l'Homme, adoptÃ©e par les Nations Unies le 10 dÃ©cembre 1948 . affume en son article 3 que tout individu a droit Ã la vie, Ã la libertÃ© et Ã la sÃ¹retÃ© de la personne . Et l'article 2 de la Convention europÃ©enne des Droits de l'Homme du 4 novembre 1950 stipule que : - Le droit de toute personne Ã la vie est protÃ©gÃ© par la loi . ta mort ne peut Ãªtre infligÃ©e Ã quiconque intentionnellement, sauf en exÃ©cution d'une sentence capitale prononcÃ©e par un tribunal au cas oÃ¹ le dÃ©lit est puni de cette peine par la loi . Selon le requÃ©rant, cette Convention a prioritÃ© sur la lÃ©gislation inteme norvÃ©gienne . Il prÃ©tend en outre - comme dÃ©jÃ mentionnÃ© - que l'obligation pour le Gouvernement de protÃ©ger la vie foetale est un obstacle constitutionnel Ã l'action du lÃ©gislateur, indÃ©pendamment du point de savoir si cela dÃ©coule ou non d'une source de droit Ã©crit puisque tout gouvernement fonctionnant dans un Etat de droit est tenu de ne pas saper les droits fondamentaux de l'homme . C'est sur cette base que la loi sur l'avonement, qui prive le foetus d'une protection juridique dans les douze premiÃ¨res semaines de sa vie, doit Ã¨tre dÃ©clarÃ©e frappÃ©e de nullitÃ© . Il est Ã mon sens Ã©vident que ces arguments non plus ne conduisent pas Ã conclure que la loi sur l'avortement est entachÃ©e de nullitÃ© . Je commencerai par la question du droit intemational, oÃ¹ la disposition figurant Ã l'article 2 de la Convention europÃ©enne des Droits de ]'Homme est particuliÃ¨rement importante . Cette Convention, Ã laquelle la NorvÃ¨ge a adhÃ©rÃ©, est juridiquement contraignante pour les Etats parties . Les ouvrages de droit international sont partagÃ©s sur le point de savoir si et dans quelle mesure l'article 2 Ã©nonce des exigences quant aux lois sur l'avortement . Dans une dÃ©cision du 11 octobre 1974, la Cour constitutionnelle autrichienne a estimÃ©, que, d'aprÃ¨s le libellÃ© de cette disposition, l'article ne concerne pas les foetus . Je n'estime pas nÃ©cessaire pour ma part de dÃ©cider du point de savoir s'il faut ou non se fonder sur une interprÃ©tation aussi absolue . Quoi qu'il en soit, l'article doit Ãªtre considÃ©rÃ© comme n'imposant aucune limitation importante au droit du lÃ©gislateur de dÃ©cider des conditions pour avorter . La loi norvÃ©gienne, selon laquelle c'est la femme elle-mÃ¨me qui dÃ©cide en dernier resson du point de savoir si elle doit ou non mettre fin Ã sa grossesse - la condition Ã©tant qu e
l'intervention doit avoir lieu avant la fin de la douziÃ¨me semaine - est analogue Ã la lÃ©gislation de bon nombre d'autres pays appa rt enant Ã la mÃ©me culture, pays qui ont eux-mÃ©mes adhÃ©rÃ© Ã la Convention europÃ©enne des Droits de l'Homme . Cette considÃ©ration n'est pas sans importance quand il s'agit d'examiner une question de droit intemational . J'ajoute par souci de prÃ©cision que l'arrÃ©t rendu le 25 fÃ©vrier 1975 par la Cour constitutionnelle [de la RÃ©publique FÃ©dÃ©rale d'Allemagne], mentionnÃ© par la cour d'appel - qui a dÃ©clarÃ© entachÃ©e de nullitÃ© une loi autorisant la femme Ã exiger un avo rt ement dans les douze premiÃ¨res semaines de la grossesse concemait l'application de rÃ¨gles constitutionnelles internes . La question demeure de savoir si la loi sur l'avo rt ement est incompatible avec des principes de droit non Ã©crits qui s'imposent au lÃ©gislateur . On peut bien sÃ»r imaginer que de tels principes de droit pourraient imposer au lÃ©gislateur des exigences beaucoup plus grandes que celles de la Convention europÃ©enne des Droits de l'Homme . Il n'en demeure pas moins que la Convenlion aussi bien que la pratique lÃ©gislative d'autres pays appartenant Ã notre culture doivent Ãªtre prises en considÃ©ration puisqu'elles expriment la marge de manmuvre qu'il est naturel de laisser au lÃ©gislateur dans ce domaine . Dans ce rtaines de ses dÃ©cisions, la Cour suprÃªme a dÃ©clarÃ© ( notamment Rt . 1961 p . 1350 et Rt . 1966 p . 476) qu'il Ã©tait possible de dÃ©clarer nulle une loi qui heu rte ce rt ains principes gÃ©nÃ©raux de droit de caractÃ¨re constitutionnel, mÃªme si elle n'est pas contraire Ã une rÃ¨gle prescrite par la Constitution . Cependant, elle a indiquÃ© clairement dans la dÃ©cision de 1961 que cela ne peut dtre fail que dans des cas extrÃªmes et 'qu'il faut des circonstances tout Ã fait exceptionnelles pour qu'une loi, votÃ©e par le Parlement et entÃ©rinÃ©e par le Roi, soit dÃ©clarÃ©e entachÃ©e de nullitÃ© comme contraire Ã 'l'esprit et aux principes' de la Constitution' . A mon sens, il est clair que le respect de la vie humaine, y compris la vie fÂ¢tale, est l'un des principes de droit susceptibles d'Ã©tre reconnu comme l'empo rtant sur le droit positif. ThÃ©oriquement, il n'est pas diffi cile d'imaginer qu'une loi sur l'avortement, fondÃ©e par exemple sur l'idÃ©ologie raciale nazie, po rt e atteinte aux droits de l'homme de telle maniÃ¨re qu'il faudra la dÃ©clarer nulle parce que contraire Ã des norrnes de droit non Ã©crites Ã caractÃ¨re constitutionnel . C'est lÃ cependant un exemple bien Ã©loignÃ© de notre rÃ©alitÃ© . En effet, la loi sur l'avortement, que conteste le requÃ©rant, n'est pas le reflet d'une idÃ©ologie du lÃ©gislateur fondÃ©e sur l'absence de respect de la vie humaine . Les passages citÃ©s plus haut sont tirÃ©s des avis exprimÃ©s lors de l'Ã©laboration de la loi . Naturellement, les lois sur l'avo rtement se fondent nÃ©cessairement sur un compromis entre le respect de la vie foetale et d'autre s
considÃ©rations fondamentales et valables . Ce compromis a conduit le lÃ©gislateur Ã autoriser l'avortement par autodÃ©termination de la femme dans les conditions dÃ©finies par la loi . Manifestement, concilier des questions aussi disparates pose des problÃ¨mes Ã©thiques et manifestement aussi, il y aura quelque dÃ©saccord quant au systÃ¨me que prÃ©voit la loi . Les rÃ©actions Ã ce texte montrent que nombreux sont ceux qui, comme le requÃ©rant, y voient une attaque contre des principes moraux fondamentaux . Mais il faut Ã©galement considÃ©rer que d'autres - en se plaÃ§ant aussi d'un point de vue Ã©thique - considÃ¨rent la loi comme en ayant fini avec une situation juridique inadmissible . Il n'appartient pas aux tribunaux de dÃ©cider si la solution Ã un problÃ¨me lÃ©gislatif difficile, et que le lÃ©gislateur a choisie lorsqu'il a adoptÃ© la loi de 1978, est ou non la meilleure . Sur ce point, les juges tout comme d'autres membres de notre sociÃ©tÃ© auront des opinions divergentes . La conciliation d'intÃ©rÃ©ts opposÃ©s que nÃ©cessitent les lois sur l'avortement est une tÃ che qui incombe au lÃ©gislateur et qui relÃ¨ve de sa responsabilitÃ© . Le pouvoir lÃ©gislatif est exercÃ© par le peuple par l'intermÃ©diaire du Parlement . La majoritÃ© parlementaire qui, en 1978, a adoptÃ© la loi sur l'avonement, tenait son mandat du peuple aprÃ¨s une campagne Ã©lectorale oÃ¹ la question de l'avortement avait occupÃ© une place prÃ©Ã©minente . Comme on l'a dÃ©jÃ dit, en 1983, aprÃ©s de nouvelles Ã©lections oÃ¹ la question de l'avortement a Ã©tÃ© de nouveau au centre des dÃ©bats, le Parlement a dÃ©cidÃ© en outre de ne pas prendre l'initiative d'un quelconque amendement Ã la loi . Il est clair que les tribunaux doivent respecter la solution retenue par le lÃ©gislateur . J'estime en consÃ©quence que [le requÃ©rant] n'a pas rÃ©ussi Ã contester la validitÃ© juridique de la loi sur l'avortement . e En vertu de cet arrÃ©t, le requÃ©rant fut licenciÃ© de son emploi . Cependant . par lettre du 6 septembre 1983 envoyÃ©e par le MinistÃ¨re du Culte et de l'Education . auquel un dÃ©cret royal du 15 janvier 1982 a dÃ©lÃ©guÃ© compÃ©tence pour accorder une dispense de dÃ©chÃ©ance des droits pastoraux suite Ã un Ã©ventuel jugement emportant licenciement, le MinistÃ¨re a dÃ©cidÃ© que le requÃ©rant ne serait pas dÃ©chu des droits qui dÃ©coulent de son ordination . Cela signifie que le requÃ©rant peut continuer Ã exercer des fonctions religieuses mais plus comme salariÃ© de l'Etat .
GRIEFS Le requÃ©rant soutient que le libellÃ© de la loi norvÃ©gienne sur l'avortement du 16 juin 1978 est contraire Ã l'article 2 de la Convention . Il soutient Ã©galement que la Cour suprÃªme de NorvÃ¨ge est arrivÃ©e Ã une conclusion inexacte . Il soutient en outre dans ce contexte qu'en tant que rÃ¨gle de droit international, la Convention des Droits de l'Homme a prioritÃ© sur la lÃ©gislation interne . DÃ¨s lors, si la Commissio n 264
estime que la lÃ©gislation norvÃ©gienne est en la matiÃ©re contraire Ã la Convention, la consÃ©quence en est que la lÃ©gislation devra Ãªtre modifiÃ©e . Le requÃ©rant estime qu'il a un intÃ©r@t juridique direct Ã voir trancher le point de savoir si la lÃ©gislation norvÃ©gienne est ou non contraire Ã l'article 2 . Son cas est, selon lui, diffÃ©rent des prÃ©cÃ©dentes affaires dites d'avortement portÃ©es devant la Commission et oÃ¹ les requÃ©rants ont abordÃ© la question en leur qualitÃ© de citoyens ordinaires faisant valoir un intÃ©ri'.t gÃ©nÃ©ral, mais sans Ã©tre personnellement touchÃ©s par la lÃ©gislation nationale qu'ils attaquaient . Selon le requÃ©rant, son cas est diffÃ©rent puisqu'il a risquÃ© - et perdu - son emploi sur la question du caractÃ¨re acceptable de la loi norvÃ©gienne sur l'avortement, c'est-Ã -dire par rapport Ã la Convention des Droits de l'Homme . Il a donc un intÃ©ri'.t direct et personnel Ã l'examen de cette question . On ne saurait donc dire qu'en l'espÃ¨ce son intÃ©rÃªt soit de caractÃ¨re purement abstrait . Le requÃ©rant reprendra ses fonctions au sein de l'Eglise officielle norvÃ©gienne Ã condition que se trouve confirmÃ© son point de vue sur la loi en matiÃ¨re d'avortement . Il est convaincu qu'une dÃ©cision de la Commission ou de la Cour, fondÃ©e sur sa conception de la loi, dÃ©bouchera sur un amendement Ã la lÃ©gislation norvÃ©gienne . Le deuxiÃ¨me argument du requÃ©rant est que son licenciement est contraire Ã l'article 9 de la Convention . En effet, il a Ã©tÃ© licenciÃ© de son emploi alors que son point de vue sur la question de l'avonement est identique Ã celui de l'Eglise . Selon lui, son licenciement a Ã©tÃ© dÃ©cidÃ© contre le dÃ©sir des membres de sa paroisse et contre l'avis de son Ã©vÃªque . Il fait valoir, Ã cet Ã©gard, qu'un ministre du culte a des obligations mixtes, Ã l'Ã©gard de l'Eglise et Ã l'Ã©gard de l'Etat, et que les premiÃ¨res sont bien plus importantes que ses devoirs assez secondaires vis-Ã -vis de l'Etat . Il soutient, par consÃ©quent, qu'un ministre du culte ne saurait Ãªtre licenciÃ© contre les vo :ux de l'Eglise et qu'un licenciement prononcÃ© sur la seule demande des autoritÃ©s Ã©tatiques et confirmÃ© par le tribunal est une violation de la Convention .
EN DROIT Le requÃ©rant s'est plaint en premier lieu de ce que la loi norvÃ©gienne sur l'avor1. tement, telle qu'elle est fortnutÃ©e aprÃ¨s l'amendement du 16 juin 1978, est contraire Ã l'article 2 de la Convention . Il estime, en outre, Ã©tre personnellement touchÃ© par la lÃ©gislation en question puisqu'il a risquÃ© - et perdu - son emploi de curÃ© de Balsrjord dans l'Eglise d'Etat norvÃ©gienne en raison de son opinion sur la question . L'article 2 de la Convention Ã©nonce que le droit de toute personne Ã la vie est protÃ©gÃ© par la loi . La Convention n'autorise Ã priver de la vie que dans cenains cas Ã©numÃ©rÃ©s par la deuxiÃ¨me phrase de l'article 2 par . I, par l'article 2 par. 2 et par l'article 15 par . 2 de la Convention . Cependant, il est clair, selon l'article 25 par . 1 de la Convention . que la Commission ne peut Ã©tre saisie d'une requ8te adressÃ©e par une personne physique, une organisation non gouvernementale ou un groupe de particuliers que si la personne ,
l'organisation ou le groupe peut se prÃ©tendre victime d'une violation par l'une des Hautes Parties Contractantes des droits reconnus dans la Convention . La Commission rappelle Ã cet Ã©gard sa jurisprudence antÃ©rieure selon laquelle elle n'est compÃ©tente pour examiner la compatibilitÃ© d'une loi nationale avec la Convention que dans l'application de cene loi Ã un cas concret, mais qu'elle ne l'est pas pour examiner in abstracto la compatibilitÃ© de cette loi avec la Convention . La Commission se rÃ©f8re en particulier Ã sa dÃ©cision No 867/60- 29 .5 .61 . Recueil 6 p . 34 concernant une situation analogue : l'introduction en NorvÃ¨ge d'une nouvelle lÃ©gislation sur l'avortement, oÃ¹ elle a fait application du principe ci-dessus . La Commission se rÃ©fÃ©re Ã©galement Ã la dÃ©cision No 7045/75 . 10 .12 .76, D .R . 7 p . 87, dans laquelle elle a conclu que le requÃ©rant ne pouvait pas se prÃ©tendre affectÃ© par les dispositions nouvelles autrement que n'importe quel autre citoyen . D'autre part . la Commission a Ã©galement, dans sa dÃ©cision No 6959/75, 19 .5 .76, D .R . 5 p . 103, dÃ©veloppÃ© le principe ci-dessus, en ce sens que l'application de la loi dans un cas concret ne signifie pas nÃ©cessairement application par un organe judiciaire ou autre . 11 suffit que le requÃ©rant soit immÃ©diatement concemÃ© par cette loi . Enfin, la Commission rappelle Ã©galement sa dÃ©cision No 8416/79 . 13 .5 .80, D .R . 19 p . 244, dans laquelle elle a admis qu'en tant que pÃ¨re potentiel, le requÃ©rant Ã©tait affectÃ© de maniÃ¨re assez Ã©troite par l'interruption de la grossesse de son Ã©pouse pour se prÃ©tendre victime, au sens de l'article 25 de la Convention, de la lÃ©gislation incriminÃ©e . S'agissant du point de savoir si le requÃ©rant peut Ãªtre considÃ©rÃ© comme victime d'une violation de l'article 2 de la Convention au sens de l'article 25, la Commission a examinÃ© le cas en fonction des critÃ¨res Ã©noncÃ©s dans les dÃ©cisions prÃ©citÃ©es . La Commission rappelle que le requÃ©rant estime avoir un intÃ©rÃ©t juridique direct Ã faire dÃ©cider si la loi norvÃ©gienne est ou non contraire Ã l'article 2 . Son cas serait diffÃ©rent des affaires dites d'avortement prÃ©cÃ©demment portÃ©es devant la Commission et oÃ¹ les requÃ©rants abordaient la question en leur qualitÃ© de citoyens ordinaires faisant jouer un intÃ©rÃ¨t gÃ©nÃ©ral . mais sans Ãªtre personnellement affectÃ©s par la lÃ©gislation interne qu'ils attaquaient . Lui a risquÃ© - et perdu - son emploi sur la question du caractÃ¨re acceptable de la loi norvÃ©gienne sur l'avortement, c'est-Ã dire par rapport Ã la Convention des Droits de l'Homme . Il maintient dÃ©s lors avoir un intÃ©rÃªt personnel et direct Ã voir examiner la question et l'on ne saurait dire qu'en l'espÃ¨ce son intÃ©rÃ©t soit purement abstrait . Le requÃ©rant reprendra ses fonctions dans l'Eglise officielle de NorvÃ¨ge Ã condition que se trouve confirmÃ© son point de vue sur la loi de l'avonement . Il est convaincu qu'une dÃ©cision de la Commission ou de la Cour fondÃ©e sur sa conception de la loi entrainera un amendement Ã la lÃ©gislation norvÃ©gienne . La Commission estime, conforrnÃ©ment Ã sajurisprudence prÃ©citÃ©e, qu'une personne ne peut se prÃ©tendre victime d'une violation de la Convention que si elle peut dÃ©montrer qu'elle est personnellement affectÃ©e par les circonstances de l'espÃ¨ce .
S'agissant de la comparaison entre la lÃ©gislation sur l'avortement et l'article 2 de la Convention, cette question pose Ã©videmment la suivante : qui peut prÃ©tendre Ãªtre personnellement affectÃ© par la situation? La Conunission a reconnu qu'un pÃ¨re potentiel peut se prÃ©tendre victime d'une violation allÃ©guÃ©e de l'article 2 mais, par ailleurs, elle a rejetÃ© des requÃªtes dans lesquelles, pour respectables que soient ses motifs, le requÃ©rant n'a pas pu montrer avoir Ã©tÃ© affectÃ© par la nouvelle lÃ©gislation autrement qu'un quelconque autre citoyen . La Commission n'estime pas qu'en l'espÃ¨ce le requÃ©rant ait Ã©tÃ© affectÃ© par la lÃ©gislation nouvelle autrement que les autres citoyens . En effet, l'amendement Ã la loi sur l'avortement ne l'a pas directement affectÃ© dans sa vie familiale, ni dans ses obligations de curÃ© de paroisse . Il est exact que le requÃ©rant a perdu son poste, mais ce n'Ã©tait pas une consÃ©quence de la loi sur l'avortement en tant que telle, mais du fait que le requÃ©rant a refusÃ©, vu son opinion sur la loi, d'accomplir des fonctions qui relevaient des devoirs de sa charge . Le requÃ©rant considÃ©rait ces fonctions comme relevant de la partie Ã©tatique de la charge de curÃ© . Il ne cÃ©lÃ©brait plus aucun mariage, n'examinait plus si les futurs Ã©poux remplissaient les conditions requises, ni ne s'occupait plus de conciliations . Il refusait de tenir le registre des naissances, de recevoir le courrier en provenance du Gouvernement et de percevoir le salaire versÃ© par le Gouvemement . La Commission estime que, mÃ©me si le comportement du requÃ©rant s'expliquait par son opposition Ã la loi sur l'avortement, les sanctions qui lui ont Ã©tÃ© infligÃ©es ne sauraient conduire Ã la conclusion qu'il peut se prÃ©tendre, au sens de l'article 25 de la Convention, victime de la lÃ©gislation litigieuse . La Commission en conclut, dÃ¨s lors, que les questions soulevÃ©es par le requÃ©rant sont des questions abstraites au sens oÃ¹ l'entend la Commission dans sajurisprudence constante . Il s'ensuit qu'en ce qui conceme ce grief, le requÃ©rant ne peut pas se prÃ©tendre victime d'une violation de la Convention . La requÃªte est, dÃ¨s lors, sur ce point, incompatible ratione personae avec les dispositions de la Convention et doit en consÃ©quence Ã©tre rejetÃ©e, conformÃ©ment Ã l'article 27 par . 2 de la Convention . 2 . Le requÃ©rant s'est plaint Ã©galement que la loi norvÃ©gienne sur l'avortement, telle qu'amendÃ©e le 16 juin 197 8 , mÃ©connait les droits que lui reconnaÃ®t l'article 9 de la Convention en ce qu'il a Ã©tÃ© licenciÃ© de son emploi alors que ses idÃ©es sur la question de l'avonement sont les mÃ¨mes que celles de l'Eglise . L'article 9 de la Convention est ainsi libellÃ© : â¢ 1 . Toute personne a droit Ã la libertÃ© de pensÃ©e, de conscience et de religion ; ce droit implique la libertÃ© de changer de religion ou de conviction, ainsi que la libertÃ© de manifester sa religion ou sa conviction individuellement ou collectivement, en public ou en privÃ©, par le culte, l'enseignement, les pratiques et l'accomplissement des rites .
2 . La libertÃ© de manifester sa religion ou ses convictions ne peut faire l'objet d'autres restrictions que celles qui, prÃ©vues par la loi, constituent des mesures nÃ©cessaires, dans une sociÃ©tÃ© dÃ©mocratique, Ã la sÃ©curitÃ© publique, Ã la protection de l'ordre, de la santÃ© ou de la morale publiques ou Ã la protection des droits et libertÃ©s d'autrui . â¢ La Commission souligne en premier lieu que le droit d'occuper une fonction, que ce soit dans l'Eglise officielle ou en gÃ©nÃ©ral, n'est pas, en tant que tel- garanti par la Convention . NÃ©anmoins, elle estime concevable que- dans certaines circonstances, le licenciement d'un fonctionnaire pour dÃ©sobÃ©issance pose un problÃ¨me sur le terrain de l'article 9 . Cependant, dans les circonstances de l'espÃ¨ce, aucun problÃ¨me de ce genre ne se pose et ceci pour la raison suivante . La Commission estime qu'au sein d'une Eglise officielle, un pasteur a non seulement souscrit Ã des obligations religieuses, mais acceptÃ© aussi certaines obligations vis-Ã -vis de l'Etat . Si les exigences de l'Etat se trouvent Ã©tre en conflit avec ses convictions, il a la libertÃ© de renoncer Ã ses fonctions de pasteur au sein de l'Eglise officielle, et la Commission considÃ¨re qu'il s'agit lÃ d'une ultime garantie de son droit Ã la libertÃ© de pensÃ©e, de conscience et de religion . En l'espÃ¨ce, la Commission rappelle que le requÃ©rant a refusÃ© de s'acquitter des fonctions qui relevaient des devoirs de sa charge et qu'il a perdu ladite charge . Elle rappelle Ã©galement que le requÃ©rant a conservÃ© les droits pastoraux dÃ©coulant de son ordination, ce qui l'autorise Ã exercer des fonctions religieuses . Enfin, il est rappelÃ© que les opinions religieuses du requÃ©rant, notamment ses idÃ©es sur la question de l'avortement, sont compatibles avec celles de l'Eglise officielle de NorvÃ¨ge . Cependant, ce ne sont pas les idÃ©es exprimÃ©es par le requÃ©rant qui ont conduit Ã son licenciement . La Commission estime que ce licenciement est dÃ» Ã son refus de s'acquitter de fonctions qui Ã©taient des obligations administratives de sa charge . Selon la Commission, ce refus n'exprime pas en fin de compte la conviction ou les idÃ©es religieuses du requÃ©rant et ne saurait, dÃ¨s lors, Ã¨tre considÃ©rÃ© comme relevant en lui-mÃ©me de la protection de l'article 9 par . I, mÃ¨me s'il Ã©tait motivÃ© par ces idÃ©es ou cette conviction (cf.Arrowsmith c/Royaume-Uni, rapport Comm . 12 .10 .7 8 , par. 71, D .R . 19 p . 49) . Le requÃ©rant n'a pas montrÃ© avoir fait l'objet d'une quelconque pression pour changer de point de vue ou avoir Ã©tÃ© emp@chÃ© de manifester sa religion ou sa conviction . Il s'ensuit que le licenciement du requÃ©rant n'a absolument pas interfÃ©rÃ© avec l'exercice des droits que lui reconnait l'article 9 de la Convention et que la requÃªte est donc, sur ce point, manifestement mal fondÃ©e au sens de l'article 27 par . 2 de la Convention . Par ces motifs, la Commissio n DÃCLARE LA REQUÃTE IRRECEVABLE .
268Origine de la décision Pays : Conseil de l'EuropeJuridiction : Cour européenne des droits de l'hommeFormation : Cour (chambre)Date de la décision : 08/03/1985Fonds documentaire : HUDOC Haut de page

References: l'article 10
 l'article 10
 l'article 21
 l'article 10
 l'article 2
 l'article 2
 l'article 2
 l'article 2
 l'article 2
 l'article 9
 l'article 2
 L'article 2
 l'article 2
 l'article 2
 l'article 15
 l'article 25
 l'article 25
 l'article 2
 l'article 25
 l'article 2
 l'article 2
 l'article 2
 l'article 25
 l'article 27
 l'article 9
 L'article 9
 l'article 9
 l'article 9
 l'article 9
 l'article 27