Source: https://www.ptab.us/2010/05/
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 08:00:33+00:00

Document:
possession of the claimed subject matter as of the filing date. . . .
and show that the inventor actually invented the invention claimed.
598 F. 3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc).
When a claim term merely states a purpose, an intended use, or a result, the term may not be considered a limitation of the claim. Rowe v. Dror, 112 F.3d 473, 478 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Texas Instruments Inc. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm’n, 988 F.2d 1165, 1172 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
In In re Venner, the court held that broadly providing an automatic or mechanical means to replace a manual activity which accomplished the same result is not sufficient to distinguish over the prior art. In re Venner, 262 F.2d 91, 95 (CCPA 1958).
Any special meaning assigned to a term “must be sufficiently clear in the specification that any departure from common usage would be so understood by a person of experience in the field of the invention.” Multiform Desiccants Inc. v. Medzam Ltd. , 133 F.3d 1473, 1477 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
“Unless the steps of a method actually recite an order, the steps are not ordinarily construed to require one.” Altiris Inc. v. Symantec Corp., 318 F.3d 1363, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Nominal recitations of structure in an otherwise ineligible method fail to make the method a statutory process. Ex parte Langmyr, 89 USPQ2d 1988, 1996 (BPAI 2008) (informative) (citing Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71-72 (1972)).
the use of the claimed article from the prior art . . . . [Internal citations omitted] The preamble limits the claimed invention if it is “necessary to give life, meaning, and vitality to the claim.” Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co. , 182 F.3d 1298, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 1999) . . . .
re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1479 (Fed. Cir. 1994) . . . .
Marrin v. Griffin, 94 USPQ2d 1140, 1143-44 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (dissent by J. Newman).
Kropa v. Robie, 187 F.2d 150 (1951).
Rowe v. Dror, 112 F.3d 473, 478 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
“Such broadening usages as ‘about’ must be given reasonable scope; they must be viewed by the decisionmaker as they would be understood by persons experienced in the field of the invention. Although it is rarely feasible to attach a precise limit to ‘about,’ the usage can usually be understood in light of the technology embodied in the invention.” Modine Manufacturing Co. v. U.S. ITC, 75 F.3d 1545, 1554 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
Obviousness does not require absolute predictability; however, at least some degree of predictability is required. Evidence showing there was no reasonable expectation of success can support a conclusion of non-obviousness. In re Rinehart, 531 F.2d 1048, 1053-54 (CCPA 1976).
it suggests that the developments flowing from its disclosures are unlikely to produce the objective of the applicant's invention. In re Gurley, 27 F.3d 551, 553 (Fed. Cir. 1994). A statement that a particular combination is not a preferred embodiment does not teach away absent clear discouragement of that combination.In re Fulton, 391 F.3d at 1199-1200.
Syntex LLC v. Apotex, Inc. 407 F.3d 1371, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
See Gurley, 27 F.3d at 553; see also, Para-Ordnance Manufacturing v. SGS Importers International Inc., 73 F.3d 1085, 1090 (Fed Cir. 1995) (a warning against use of an element, rather than omission of mention of the element, is required to find teaching away).
Collateral estoppel (also called issue preclusion) “precludes relitigation in a second suit of issues actually litigated and determined in the first suit.” In re Freeman, 30 F.3d 1459, 1465 (Fed. Cir. 1994). This doctrine applies only if: “(1) the issue is identical to one decided in the first action; (2) the issue was actually litigated in the first action; (3) resolution of the issue was essential to a final judgment in the first action; and (4) plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the first action.” Id.
“[W]ith original examination, the PTO must give claims their broadest reasonable construction consistent with the specification.” In re Suitco, No. 2009-1418, 2010 WL 1462294, at *3 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 14, 2010) (internal quotations and citation omitted). When a claim uses the open-ended term, “comprising,” “this court has instructed that any such construction be consistent with the specification . . . and that the claim language should be read in light of the specification as it would be interpreted by one of ordinary skill in the art.” Id. at *4 (citations, internal quotation marks, and emphasis omitted).
Invention or discovery is the requirement which constitutes the foundation of the right to obtain a patent . . . unless more ingenuity and skill were required in making or applying the said improvement than are possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business, there is an absence of that degree of skill and ingenuity which constitute the essential elements of every invention.
“Where . . . a patentee defines a structurally complete invention in the claim body and uses the preamble only to state a purpose or intended use for the invention, the preamble is not a claim limitation.” Rowe v. Dror, 112 F.3d 473, 478 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
The basic quid pro quo contemplated by the Constitution and the Congress for granting a patent monopoly is the benefit derived by the public from an invention with substantial utility. Unless and until a process is refined and developed to this point--where specific benefit exists in currently available form-- there is insufficient justification for permitting an applicant to engross what may prove to be a broad field.
Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534-35 (1966).
Courts have used the labels “practical utility” and “real world” utility interchangeably in determining whether an invention offers a “substantial” utility. Indeed, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals stated that “‘[p]ractical utility’ is a shorthand way of attributing ‘real-world’ value to claimed subject matter. In other words, one skilled in the art can use a claimed discovery in a manner which provides some immediate benefit to the public.” Nelson [v. Bowler, 626 F.2d 853, 856 (CCPA 1980)](emphasis added). It thus is clear that an application must show that an invention is useful to the public as disclosed in its current form, not that it may prove useful at some future date after further research. Simply put, to satisfy the “substantial” utility requirement, an asserted use must show that that claimed invention has a significant and presently available benefit to the public.
In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2005). “It is well established that the enablement requirement of § 112 incorporates the utility requirement of § 101.” Id. at 1378.
“Structural features that do not actually perform the recited function do not constitute corresponding structure and thus do not serve as claim limitations.” Golight, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, 355 F.3d 1327, 1334-35 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (quoting Asyst Techs., Inc. v. Empak, Inc., 268 F.3d 1364, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).

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