Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/102589/dandridge-vs-williams
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 16:48:09+00:00

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1. The Maryland regulation is not prohibited by the Social Security Act. Pp. 397 U. S. 476 -483.
(a) A State has great latitude in dispensing its available funds, King v. Smith, 392 U. S. 309 , 392 U. S. 318 -319, and, given Maryland's finite resources available for public welfare demands, it is not prevented by the Act from sustaining as many families as it can and providing the largest families with somewhat less than their ascertained per capita standard of need. Pp. 397 U. S. 478 -480.
(b) The statutory standard in § 402(a)(10) of the Act that aid "shall be furnished with reasonable promptness to all eligible indiiduals," is not violated by the regulation, which does not deprive children of the largest families of aid, but reduces the family grant as a whole, and the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare has approved the Maryland scheme. Pp. 397 U. S. 480 -482.
(c) In its Social Security Amendments of 1967, Congress fully recognized that maximum grant regulations are permissible. Pp. 397 U. S. 482 -483.
2. The regulation does not violate the Equal Protection Clause. Pp. 397 U. S. 483 -487.
(a) The concept of overbreadth, though relevant where First Amendment considerations are involved, is not pertinent to state regulation in the social and economic field. Pp. 397 U. S. 484 -485.
(b) The regulation is rationally supportable and free from invidious discrimination, since it furthers the State's legitimate interest in encouraging employment and in maintaining an equitable balance between welfare families and the families of the working poor. Pp. 397 U. S. 486 -487.
With Dependent Children (AFDC) program, 42 U.S.C. § 601 et seq. (1964 ed. and Supp. IV), which originated with the Social Security Act of 1935. [ Footnote 1 ] Under this jointly financed program, a State computes the so-called "standard of need" of each eligible family unit within its borders. See generally Rosado v. Wyman, ante, p. 397 U. S. 397 . Some States provide that every family shall receive grants sufficient to meet fully the determined standard of need. Other States provide that each family unit shall receive a percentage of the determined need. Still others provide grants to most families in full accord with the ascertained standard of need, but impose an upper limit on the total amount of money any one family unit may receive. Maryland, through administrative adoption of a "maximum grant regulation," has followed this last course. This suit was brought by several AFDC recipients to enjoin the application of the Maryland maximum grant regulation on the ground that it is in conflict with the Social Security Act of 1935 and with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. A three-judge District Court, convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2281, held that the Maryland regulation violates the Equal Protection Clause. 297 F.Supp. 450. This direct appeal followed, 28 U.S.C. § 1253, and we noted probable jurisdiction, 396 U.S. 811.
if the appellees' position on this question is correct, there is no occasion to reach the constitutional issues. Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288 , 297 U. S. 346 -347 (Brandeis, J., concurring); Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U. S. 449 .
as their older siblings under the definition of "dependent child" fixed by federal law. [ Footnote 8 ] See King v. Smith, 392 U. S. 309 . Moreover, it is argued that the regulation, in limiting the amount of money any single household may receive, contravenes a basic purpose of the federal law by encouraging the parents of large families to "farm out" their children to relatives whose grants are not yet subject to the maximum limitation.
Id. at 392 U. S. 318 -319.
economics of scale -- to accommodate their needs to diminished per capita payments. The strong policy of the statute in favor of preserving family units does not prevent a State from sustaining as many families as it can, and providing the largest families somewhat less than their ascertained per capita standard of need. [ Footnote 10 ] Nor does the maximum grant system necessitate the dissolution of family bonds. For even if a parent should be inclined to increase his per capita family income by sending a child away, the federal law requires that the child, to be eligible for AFDC payments, must live with one of several enumerated relatives. [ Footnote 11 ] The kinship tie may be attenuated, but it cannot be destroyed.
noted, the practical effect of the Maryland regulation is that all children, even in very large families, do receive some aid. We find nothing in 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(10) (1964 ed., Supp. IV) that requires more than this. [ Footnote 12 ] So long as some aid is provided to all eligible families and all eligible children, the statute itself is not violated.
"[The State shall] provide that, by July 1, 1969, the amounts used by the State to determine the needs of individuals will have been adjusted to reflect fully changes in living costs since such amounts were established, and any maximum that the State imposes on the amount of aid paid to families will have been proportionately adjusted. "
era long ago passed into history. Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U. S. 726 .
In the area of economics and social welfare, a State does not violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because the classifications made by its laws are imperfect. If the classification has some "reasonable basis," it does not offend the Constitution simply because the classification "is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality." Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61 , 220 U. S. 78 .
Metropolis Theatre Co. v. City of Chicago, 228 U. S. 61 , 228 U. S. 69 -70. "A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it." McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420 , 366 U. S. 426 .
choose between attacking every aspect of a problem or not attacking the problem at all. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61 . It is enough that the State's action be rationally based and free from invidious discrimination. The regulation before us meets that test.
We do not decide today that the Maryland regulation is wise, that it best fulfills the relevant social and economic objectives that Maryland might ideally espouse, or that a more just and humane system could not be devised. Conflicting claims of morality and intelligence are raised by opponents and proponents of almost every measure, certainly including the one before us. But the intractable economic, social, and even philosophical problems presented by public welfare assistance programs are not the business of this Court. The Constitution may impose certain procedural safeguards upon systems of welfare administration, Goldberg v. Kelly, ante, p. 397 U. S. 254 . But the Constitution does not empower this Court to second-guess state officials charged with the difficult responsibility of allocating limited public welfare funds among the myriad of potential recipients. Cf. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U. S. 548 , 301 U. S. 584 -585; Helvering v. Davis, 301 U. S. 619 , 301 U. S. 644 .
When attention has been focused on other issues, or when the court from which a case comes has expressed no views on a controlling question, it may be appropriate to remand the case, rather than deal with the merits of that question in this Court. See Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Flowers, 330 U. S. 464 , 330 U. S. 468 ; United States v. Ballard, 322 U. S. 78 , 322 U. S. 88 . That is not the situation here, however. The issue having been fully argued both here and in the District Court, consideration of the statutory claim is appropriate. Bondholders Committee v. Commissioner, 315 U. S. 189 , 315 U. S. 192 n. 2; H. Hart & H. Wechsler, The Federal Courts and the Federal System 1394 (1953). See also Jaffke v. Dunham, 352 U. S. 280 .
Cf. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 , where, by contrast, the Court found state interference with the constitutionally protected freedom of interstate travel.
It is important to note that there is no contention that the Maryland regulation is infected with a racially discriminatory purpose or effect such as to make it inherently suspect. Cf. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U. S. 184 .
I join the Court's opinion, with one reservation which I deem called for by certain implications that might be drawn from the opinion. As I stated in dissent in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 , 394 U. S. 658 -663 (1969), I find no solid basis for the doctrine there expounded that certain statutory classifications will be held to deny equal protection unless justified by a "compelling" governmental interest, while others will pass muster if they meet traditional equal protection standards. See also my dissenting opinion in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U. S. 641 , 384 U. S. 660 -661 (1969). Except with respect to racial classifications, to which unique historical considerations apply, see Shapiro, at 394 U. S. 659 , I believe the constitutional provisions assuring equal protection of the laws impose a standard of rationality of classification, long applied in the decisions of this Court, that does not depend upon the nature of the classification or interest involved.
It is on this basis, and not because this case involves only interests in "the area of economics and social welfare," ante at 397 U. S. 485 , that I join the Court's constitutional holding.
That dictum, made in the context of a case that dealt with Alabama's "substitute father" regulation, does little to clarify the limits of state authority. The holding in King was that the Alabama regulation, which denied AFDC benefits to the children of a mother who "cohabited" in or outside her home with an able-bodied man, was invalid because it defined "parent" in a manner inconsistent with § 406(a) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 606(a) (1964 ed., Supp. IV). The Court rejected the State's contention that its regulation was "a legitimate way of allocating its limited resources available for AFDC assistance." 392 U.S. at 392 U. S. 318 . Thus, whatever else may be said of the "latitude" extended to States in determining the benefits payable under AFDC, the holding in King makes clear that it does not include restrictions on the payment of benefits that are incompatible with the Social Security Act.
(Emphasis added.) It is significant in this respect that the Court in King referred only to a State's determination of the level of benefits " by the amount of funds it devotes to the [AFDC] program. " 392 U.S. at 392 U. S. 318 -319 (emphasis added). The language of § 401 and the language of the Court in King both reflect a concern that the Federal Government not require a state legislature to appropriate more money for welfare purposes than it is willing and able to appropriate. The use of the matching formula in § 403 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 603 (1964 ed., Supp. IV), supports this deference to the fiscal decisions of state legislatures. The question of a State's authority to pay less than its standard of need, however, has never been expressly decided.
"all individuals wishing to make application for aid to families with dependent children shall have opportunity to do so, and that aid to [families with] dependent children shall be furnished with reasonable promptness to all eligible individuals. "
to meet those needs, as well as the definition of those individuals eligible to receive this aid, have expanded over the years. At first, only financial assistance was available. Now "family services" programs have been added. [ Footnote 2/2 ] In each case, however, the concern has been with meeting the needs of each eligible recipient.
At the outset, it should be emphasized exactly what is involved in determining whether this maximum grant regulation is consistent with and valid under the federal law. In administering its AFDC program, Maryland has established its own standards of need, and they are not under challenge in this litigation. Indeed, the District Court specifically refused to require additional appropriations on the part of the State or to permit appellees to recover a monetary judgment against the State. At the same time, however, there is no contention, nor could there be any, that the maximum grant regulation is in any manner related to calculation of need. [ Footnote 3/1 ] Rather, it arbitrarily cuts across state-defined standards of need to deny any additional assistance with respect to the fifth or any succeeding child in a family. [ Footnote 3/2 ] In short, the regulation represents no less than the refusal of the State to give any aid whatsoever for the support of certain dependent children who meet the standards of need that the State itself has established.
Since its inception in the Social Security Act of 1935, the focus of the federal AFDC program has been to provide benefits for the support of dependent children of needy families with a view toward maintaining and strengthening family life within the family unit. As succinctly stated by the Senate Committee on Finance, "[t]he objective of the aid to dependent children program is to provide cash assistance for needy children in their own homes. " [ Footnote 3/3 ] In meeting these objectives, moreover, Congress has provided the outlines that the AFDC plan is to follow if a State should choose to participate in the federal program. The maximum grant regulation, however, does not fall within these outlines or accord with the purposes of the Act. And the Court, by approving it, allows for a complete departure from the congressional intent.
It was to disapprove just such an arbitrary device to limit AFDC payments that Congress amended § 402(a)(10) in 1950 to provide that aid "shall be furnished with reasonable promptness to all eligible individuals. " (Emphasis added.) Surely, as my Brother DOUGLAS demonstrates, this statutory language means at least that the State must take into account the needs of, and provide aid with respect to, all needy dependent children. Indeed, that was our assessment of the congressional design embodied in the AFDC program in King v. Smith, 392 U. S. 309 , 392 U. S. 329 -330, 392 U. S. 333 (1968).
does not even dispute this effect. [ Footnote 3/6 ] The Court answers by saying that the family relationship "may be attenuated, but it cannot be destroyed." Yet it was just this kind of attenuation that, as the legislative history conclusively demonstrates, [ Footnote 3/7 ] Congress was concerned with eliminating in establishing the AFDC program. The Court's rationale takes a long step backward toward the time when persons were dependent upon the charity of their relative -- the very situation meant to be remedied by AFDC.
Richards v. United States, 369 U. S. 1 , 369 U. S. 11 (1962). We concluded in King v. Smith, supra, after an extensive review of the AFDC program, that Congress "intended to provide programs for the economic security and protection of all children," and did not intend "arbitrarily to leave one class of destitute children entirely without meaningful protection." 392 U.S. at 3 392 U. S. 30 . (Emphasis in original.) That reasoning is likewise applicable to the instant case, in which the maximum grant regulation excludes consideration of the needs of a certain class of dependent children in large families. It is apparent, therefore, that Maryland's maximum grant regulation is not consistent with the Social Security Act, and hence appellees were entitled to the injunction they obtained against its operation.
Yet, as a general principle, individuals should not be afforded different treatment by the State unless there is a relevant distinction between them, and "a statutory discrimination must be based on differences that are reasonably related to the purposes of the Act in which it is found." Morey v. Doud, 354 U. S. 457 , 354 U. S. 465 (1957). See Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe R. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U. S. 150 , 165 U. S. 155 (1897). Consequently, the State may not, in the provision of important services or the distribution of governmental payments, supply benefits to some individuals while denying them to others who are similarly situated. See, e.g., Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Edward County, 377 U. S. 218 (1964).
In the instant case, the only distinction between those children with respect to whom assistance is granted and those children who are denied such assistance is the size of the family into which the child permits himself to be born. The class of individuals with respect to whom payments are actually made (the first four or five eligible dependent children in a family), is grossly underinclusive in terms of the class that the AFDC program was designed to assist, namely, all needy dependent children. Such underinclusiveness manifests "a prima facie violation of the equal protection requirement of reasonable classification," [ Footnote 3/12 ] compelling the State to come forward with a persuasive justification for the classification.
Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61 , 220 U. S. 78 (1911). [ Footnote 3/13 ] On the other hand, if the classification affects a "fundamental right," then the state interest in perpetuating the classification must be "compelling" in order to be sustained. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, supra; Harper v. Board of Elections, 383 U. S. 663 (1966); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U. S. 184 (1964).
It is the individual interests here at stake that, as the Court concedes, most clearly distinguish this case from the "business regulation" equal protection cases. AFDC support to needy dependent children provides the stuff that sustains those children's lives: food, clothing, shelter. [ Footnote 3/16 ] And this Court has already recognized several times that, when a benefit, even a "gratuitous" benefit, is necessary to sustain life, stricter constitutional standards, both procedural [ Footnote 3/17 ] and substantive, [ Footnote 3/18 ] are applied to the deprivation of that benefit.
"[t]he saving of welfare costs cannot justify an otherwise invidious classification." Shapiro v. Thompson, supra, at 394 U. S. 633 . See Goldberg v. Kelly, ante, at 397 U. S. 266 .
Cf. Levy v. Louisiana, supra; King v. Smith, supra, at 392 U. S. 334 -336 (DOUGLAS, J., concurring); Doe v. Shapiro, 302 F.Supp. 761 (D.C. Conn.1969), appeal dismissed, 396 U. S. 488 (1970).
defects. [ Footnote 3/22 ] Moreover, it is relevant to note that both Congress and the State have adopted other measures that deal specifically with exactly those interests the State contends are advanced by the maximum grant regulation. Thus, for example, employable AFDC recipient are required to seek employment through the congressionally established Work Incentive Program, which provide an elaborate system of counseling, training, and incentive payments for heads of AFDC families. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 63644 (1964 ed., Supp. IV). [ Footnote 3/23 ] The existence of these alternatives does not, of course, conclusively establish the invalidity of the maximum grant regulation. It is certainly relevant, however, in appraising the overall interest of the State in the maintenance of the regulation.
Because of minor variations in the calculation of the subsistence needs of particular families, and because the maximum grant varies between $240 and $250 per month, depending upon the county in which a particular family resides, the cut-off point between families that receive the full subsistence allowance and those that do not is not precisely families of more than six members. In practice, it appears that the subsistence needs of a family of six members are fully met. The needs of the seventh member ( i.e., the fifth or sixth child, depending upon whether one or both parents are within the assistance unit), as defined by the State, are met, if at all, only to a very small extent. In the usual situation, no payments whatever would be made with respect to any additional eligible dependent children.
In various briefs submitted both to this Court and to other courts in analogous litigation, the Secretary of HEW and the Solicitor General have taken the occasion to label family maximum grant regulations as "arbitrary," oppressive of large families, as resulting in "patently different treatment of individuals," and having received, at least inferentially, the disfavor of Congress. See, e.g., Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Rosado v. Wyman, ante, p 397 U. S. 397 ; Brief of Robert H. Finch, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare as Amicus Curiae, Lampton v. Bonin, 299 F.Supp. 336, 304 F.Supp. 1384 (D.C.E.D.La.1969); Brief of Robert H. Finch, Jefferson v. Hackney, 304 F.Supp. 1332 (D.C.N.D.Tex.1969). Hence, the views of HEW on the precise issue presented in he instant case are, at the very best, ambiguous, and quite possibly the opposite of what the Court ascribes to it.
The maximum may be expressed in terms of a flat dollar amount, as a percentage of the individual's budgetary deficit ( i.e., the difference between need and other income), or in both ways. A system of individual maximums may, or may not, be combined with a family maximum, or, alternatively, a family maximum may be imposed in the absence of individual maximums. See generally HEW, State Maximums and Other Methods of Limiting Money Payments to Recipients of the Special Types of Public Assistance, Oct.1968 (NCSS Report D-3); Sparer, Social Welfare Law Testing, 12 Prac.Law. (No. 4) 13, 21 (1966). In addition, there are differing methods by which family maximums may be related to other resources available to the family. Some States, including Maryland, subtract available resources from the state-calculated need; in other jurisdictions, available resources are subtracted from the family maximum. See, e.g., Dews v. Henry, 297 F.Supp. 587 (D.C. Ariz.1969), involving litigation with respect to the Arizona family maximum.
These cases and those cited in n. 17, supra, suggest that, whether or not there is a constitutional "right" to subsistence (as to which see n. 14, supra ), deprivations of benefits necessary for subsistence will receive closer constitutional scrutiny, under both the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, than will deprivations of less essential forms of governmental entitlements.

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