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Timestamp: 2019-04-19 18:23:56+00:00

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IP Law Watch blog is all about Legal issues, law and regulations concerning the world of IP.
Food traceability is another key use of blockchain technology. IBM’s blockchain-based food tracking network, Food Trust, has been joined by Nestle SA, Walmart, Unilever, and Carrefour. Carrefour, a French multinational retailer, initially used blockchain technology to ensure traceability of its line of chicken products, and recently announced that it would expand the technology to milk and other food products. In addition, South Korea has announced a pilot project to provide blockchain traceability of beef. Scottish whisky distiller William Grant also recently commenced a blockchain project to track its products.
At the April 3 program Implementing Blockchain: Navigating the Future with Distributed Ledger Technology hosted at K&L Gates’ Chicago office there were presentations by IBM’s Dan Spillane, Director – Growth Initiatives which discussed Food Trust as well as other blockchain solutions offered by IBM, and by Ed Honour, Chief Technology Architect, Tritanium Labs PTE Ltd,. another vendor that offers a traceability blockchain application for products.
Following the incorporation of BMW Telecommunications Ltd by Mr Whitehouse (whose initials were BMW), BMW issued the High Court proceeding seeking declarations and injunctions (even though the company’s name had since been changed).
In support of its allegations of passing off, BMW argued that that by including the initials ‘BMW’ in the name of BMW Telecommunications Ltd it would inherently lead to a misrepresentation that it was associated with the claimant. In support of its claim of trade mark infringement BMW relied on its ‘BMW’ word trademark for goods and services including vehicles and telecommunications.
In its defence the respondents argued that the company name was never advertised, but only used by the second defendant to invoice the rail companies for whom he had worked, so there would be no confusion.
In finding for BMW, the Court followed the earlier decision in British Telecommunications Plc v One in a Million Ltd  1 W.L.R. 903 in which registering domain names including then names of well-known companies was held to lead to a likelihood of false representation that the defendant was connected with the owner of the goodwill in the corporation names. While the BMW case concerned company names rather than domain names, the principles were equally applicable according to the decision of His Honour Judge Hacon.
The Court also considered that even if the defendant’s clients had not assumed association (as alleged by the defendants), if a substantial proportion of the public, when consulting the companies register and seeing the company’s name, would believe that there was no association with the claimant. The Court held that as BMW was a famous brand there would be no need for specialist evidence to establish the impression conveyed when consulting the register and that such confusion would arise. Accordingly, the claimant was granted summary judgment on passing off and trade mark infringement.
This case, whilst somewhat fact specific, should provide reassurance and comfort to brand owners (particularly those with global reach and notoriety) that the potential protection of their name can be wide ranging (and the mere registration of a company name could infringe their rights).
Given the Supreme Court’s Fourth Estate decision, there should be a flood of copyright applications at the U.S. Copyright Office given the low cost to file and average seven-month wait time to receive registration. Upon registration of the copyright, a copyright owner can recover for infringement that occurred both before and after registration. Expedited registration is available; however, even expedited processing may not provide a registration quickly enough for preliminary injunctive relief for works that do not qualify for Section 408(f)’s exception for works such as music and movies that are vulnerable to pre-distribution infringement.
Due to the unpredictability of knowing when someone will infringe a copyrighted work and the need to halt infringement in a timely manner, it is typically in the copyright owner’s best interest to routinely file copyright applications for any work of economic value with the potential to be infringed. Not only would routine registration set the stage for taking immediate action against infringers and seeking a preliminary injunction before extensive distribution and damage can be done, it also is a prerequisite for statutory damages and attorney fees, which are permitted only for registrations within three months of first publication of the work or before infringement. Otherwise, only provable compensatory damages within the limitations period are recoverable.
Section 411(a) of the Copyright Act of 1976 provides that “no civil action for infringement of the copyright in any United States work shall be instituted until…registration of the copyright claim has been made in accordance with this title.” The Ninth and Fifth Circuits followed the “application approach,” finding that a filed copyright application was sufficient to file a copyright infringement suit. The Tenth and Eleventh Circuits followed the “registration approach,” finding that registration of a work at the U.S. Copyright Office is required before commencing an infringement suit. The “application approach” was more favorable to copyright plaintiffs because the U.S. Copyright Office can take several months, and at times, more than a year, to issue a registration in the normal course (non-expedited).
The Court also found worth mentioning that Congress previously has not eliminated § 411(a)’s registration requirement despite additional revisions to § 411(a), including removal of foreign works from the section in order to comply with international treaties, as well as § 408(f)’s preregistration option for certain works. Section 408(f) provides limited exceptions where copyright owners may file an infringement suit before receiving registration, including circumstances involving a “live broadcast” or works vulnerable to pre-distribution infringement, such as movies or musical compositions. The Court determined that “§ 408(f)’s preregistration option…would have little utility if a completed application constituted registration,” further supporting Congress’s intent to require registration prior to commencing an infringement suit.
The Court’s strict interpretation of language approach in Fourth Estate,interpreting the word “registration” to mean exactly that, registration and not application, is also seen in the Court’s Rimini Street, Inc. v. Oracle USA, Inc. decision, issued unanimously on the same day as Fourth Estate. In Rimini Street, the Court determined that “full costs” under § 505 of the Copyright Act did not authorize the appellate court to award litigation costs beyond those specified by Congress in the general costs statutes applicable to all federal court actions. Rather, “‘full costs’ are all the ‘costs’ otherwise available under the law.” Those costs consist only of the six categories specified in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1821 and 1920, essentially (1) clerk and marshal fees, (2) transcript fees, (3) printing and witness fees and costs, (4) exemplification and copying fees, (5) docket fees, and (6) compensation of court-appointed experts and interpreters. At trial, a jury agreed with Oracle that Rimini Street, while providing software support services to Oracle customers, copied Oracle‘s software without authorization. The Ninth Circuit allowed Oracle to recover $12.8 million in litigation expenses, as well as $3.4 million in costs and $28.5 million in attorney’s fees, in addition to the jury award of $35.6 million for copyright infringement and $14.4 million for violation of state computer access statutes. Although Rimini Street lost its copyright infringement case to Oracle, its successful appeal of the Ninth Circuit’s allowance of litigation expenses saved it $12.8 million.
Content owners in the publishing, music, television, film, photography, and videogame industries routinely file copyright registration to protect the content they create and distribute. Routine registration in the software technology industry sector and other areas is less prevalent. For software, as for other types of content, the requirements are not onerous and also allow for the protection of confidential source codes. Oracle’s recent Supreme Court defeat should not distract us from noticing that even in that defeat Oracle did receive an award of $28.5 million in attorneys’ fees and $3.4 million in costs (together, nearly equaling the copyright infringement damages award) noted above in the Rimini Street decision. The award of that $31.9 million was possible only because Oracle had timely registered its software.
 The cost to file a copyright application is relatively low (approximately $55 for a standard electronic filing fee) and the average time to registration is a relatively long wait for a copyright registration at the U.S. Copyright Office (on average six to nine months if not expedited, and currently at seven months).
 U. S. Copyright Office, Special Handling: Circular No. 10, pp. 1–2 (2017), https://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ10.pdf (expedited registration available for a higher fee of $800).
 17 U.S.C. § 412 (statutory damages allowed up to $150,000 per infringed work).
 Cosmetic Ideas, Inc. v. IAC/Interactive, 606 F.3d 612 (9th Cir. 2010); Positive Black Talk v. Cash Money Records, 394 F.3d 357 (5th Cir. 2004); La Resolana Architects v. Clay Realtors, 416 F.3d 1195 (10th Cir. 2005); M.G.B. Homes, Inc. v. Ameron Homes, 903 F.2d 1486 (11th Cir. 1990); Fourth Estate Public Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, 856 F.3d 1338 (11th Cir. 2017).
 Fourth Estate, slip op. at 8 (internal quotes omitted).
 Id., slip op. at 9.
 Id., slip op. at 3.
 Id., slip op. at 6-7.
 Rimini Street, Inc. v. Oracle USA, Inc. 586 U. S. ____ (slip op., March 4, 2019).
 Id., slip op. at 1.
 Id., slip op. at 2.
 See 37 C.F.R. §202.20 (deposit of copies and phonorecords for copyright registration).
Further, while the parties had continued trial preparation in the absence of a stay, such efforts had inevitably moved the parties “preparation for the court case closer to completion for the time when the IPR is concluded and th[e] litigation resumes.” Notably, the plaintiff had consented to stays in other co-pending cases, which undercut the plaintiff’s argument that it would be prejudiced by a delay. While there may have been some prejudice to the plaintiff, a delay of disposition, it was only a minor factor cutting against the stay.
While trial was only three months away and discovery was nearly complete, Judge Bryson noted that “the most burdensome parts of the case—filing and responding to pretrial motions, preparing for trial, going through the trial process, and engaging in post-trial motions practice—all [lay] in the future.” Indeed, stays had been granted much closer to trial, as Judge Bryson pointed to a number of cases that were stayed three weeks before trial, ten weeks before trial, eight weeks before trial, and seven weeks before trial. While much work had already been done, Judge Bryson noted that “[d]enying a stay because of the progress of the case to this point would impose significant expenses on the parties that might be avoided if the stay results in the simplification of further court proceedings.” This factor also ultimately weighed slightly against a stay.
Judge Bryson was most clear however, that the “most important factor bearing on whether to grant a stay is whether the stay is likely to simplify issues at trial.” Regardless of how the IPR was resolved, a large portion of the litigation would fall away: either the PTAB confirms validity of certain claims and the estoppel provisions of 35 U.S.C. 315(e)(2) prevent certain validity challenges, or some or all of the claims are cancelled. Despite not all asserted claims being in IPR, Judge Bryson was comfortable saying that resolution one way or the other on what asserted claims were instituted would indeed simplify the case for trial. He noted that the case involved complex technology and the potential for the removal of one of the asserted patents heavily favored simplification.
Further, “the expertise of the PTAB judges in th[e] field of art is likely to be of considerable assistance to the Court in this complex case.” Indeed, any guidance from the USPTO “regarding validity of the patents would be of invaluable assistance to this court.” Judge Bryson, a Federal Circuit judge, recognizes that a duplication of efforts between a jury and the expertise of the patent office is a waste of efforts.
The weighing of the factors resulted in two factors slightly favoring against a stay (as would normally be the case late in the life of the case) and one factor heavily favoring for a stay (as is also normally the case where any asserted claims are instituted). In view of the totality of the circumstances, Judge Bryson concluded that a stay was warranted. His guidance is particularly useful for Petitioners at all stages of litigation who are seeking to stay their ongoing district court litigation while their IPR challenges navigate the patent office.
Landoll S.r.L, an Italian manufacturer of professional cosmetics bearing the trade marks NASHI and NASHI ARGAN, sells its products through a selective distribution system. Essentially, retailers are only authorised to sell Landoll’s products if they meet certain criteria such as that the products must be applied by trained beauty professionals. Landoll successfully obtained a preliminary injunction to stop a retailer who had not been authorised under these criteria making sales via its website and via a third party online marketplace.
The principle of exhaustion provides that a trade mark owner may not oppose the further commercialisation of goods that bear their trade mark and are distributed in the EEA with their consent, unless there are “legitimate reasons” to do so. The retailer argued that, under this principle, it was entitled to sell the NASHI products in the EEA.
The Court of Milan found, applying the Coty judgment of the Court of Justice of the EU, that Landoll had implemented a legitimate selective distribution system, limiting the distribution of its products to authorised dealers in order to safeguard the brand of its products. It also found that the retailer’s actions resulted in actual harm to the NASHI brands. On this basis, the court found that there was a “legitimate reason” preventing the operation of the exhaustion principle.
The Court ordered withdrawal of the products from the market along with an order for publication of the injunction on the reseller’s website for 30 days. As this was a preliminary injunction decision, there is no final decision on the matter as yet. However, this judgment will be persuasive for other courts applying EU trade mark law and we expect the reasoning to be followed in similar actions.
The decision is good news for trade mark holders who already have a selective distribution system in place, as it establishes that such holders may use their IP rights to limit unauthorised sales as well as through competition law. For trade mark holders who do not operate such a distribution model, this case provides a clear illustration as to why they should consider whether changes to their models may be appropriate in order to ensure their branded products are adequately protected.
The new scheme provides for a modern support system and improvement of the conditions for the functioning of the audiovisual industry in Poland. Its aim is to strengthen the position of the Polish audiovisual sector on the international market, increase the competitiveness of domestic companies operating in the sector, and, in the long run, attract foreign investments into Poland.
Audiovisual producers, co-producers or service providers for the production of audiovisual works will be able to submit an application to the PISF. After a formal evaluation and a so-called qualification test encompassing the criteria prescribed in the act, the PISF will conclude an agreement with the producer that will guarantee reimbursement of part of the eligible costs incurred. Financial support will be granted in the amount of 30% of eligible costs; however, this sum cannot exceed 80% of the total costs of the audiovisual production.
Support can be granted to Polish producers, co-producers or service providers, as well as to EU/EFTA producers, provided that they open a branch office in Poland.
Under the Act, service providers can qualify for support only if neither the producer of the audiovisual work nor any of the co-producers is based in the Republic of Poland.
The financial support will only be granted once the production or a part of it has been completed and all costs associated therewith have been incurred by the producer, as well as after an audit of the documentation by an independent audit firm. In order to receive financial support, the audiovisual producer should incur certain eligible costs in Poland. Only on the basis of actual costs incurred in Poland will the producer be able to receive a refund. It is also important that before receiving the support, the producer is obliged to pay taxes related to the audiovisual production in Poland.
using a Polish film infrastructure.
Only applicants who pass the above test (and having obtained at least 51% of the points available) may receive financial support for audiovisual productions.
The annual budget for subsidies related to the introduced scheme has been set at a maximum level of PLN 200 million (EUR 46 million) for the first year, and similar sums for the subsequent years, with annual inflation adjustments.
The support per calendar year is limited to PLN 20 million (EUR 4.7 million) per applicant and PLN 15 million (EUR 3.5 million) per project.
Pursuant to the act, at least 10% of the amount assigned for financial support by the PISF each year will be allocated to the production of animated films and series.
The new provisions will come into force one month after their publication in the Journal of Laws.

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