Source: http://cabfinancial.com/articles/island-v-fedex-freight/
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 16:07:50+00:00

Document:
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115, restricts citation of unpublished opinions in California courts.
TAMIKO LOYD et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents.
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. John Shepard Wiley, Jr., Judge. Affirmed.
Wilshire Law Firm, PLC, Daniel B. Miller for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Yukevich & Cavanaugh, James J. Yukevich, Todd A. Cavanaugh, and Nina J. Kim for Defendant and Respondent.
Dermot Givens for Plaintiffs and Respondents.
*1 After a traffic accident took the life of a 29-year-old man, three people sought to sue for his wrongful death—his grandmother who raised him, his biological mother who occasionally provided him support, and his biological father who had been in prison all but one year of the man’s life. The trial court ruled that the biological mother had standing to sue for wrongful death, but the biological father did not. The biological father challenges that ruling as well as the court’s denial of his motion for reconsideration. We conclude there was no error and affirm.
Michael was born in March 1985. His birth certificate listed Tamiko Loyd (Tamiko) as his mother and Michael Myvett, Sr. as his father. DNA tests confirmed that Michael’s father was Andre Island (Island). Island was convicted of murder soon after Michael was conceived and served the next 28 years of his life in prison.
Michael grew up in the household of his maternal grandmother, Debra Loyd (Debra). Debra became Michael’s legal guardian in 1990, when he was five years old. Debra ended up paying for most of Michael’s upbringing, although Tamiko occasionally bought him school supplies, clothes and shoes. Debra and Tamiko gave conflicting accounts as to whether Tamiko lived in the household, but Tamiko periodically spent time with Michael as he was growing up.
Debra, Tamiko and Island signed a stipulation agreeing to a briefing schedule and evidentiary hearing to determine who could sue for Michael’s wrongful death.
In declarations attached to her briefs and through testimony at the hearing, Debra presented evidence that she was the only one to contribute to Michael’s upbringing and that Island never provided any financial support to Michael.
*2 The trial court ruled that Island did not have standing to sue for Michael’s wrongful death because Island had “failed to provide any support [to] and to communicate [with Michael] … for the … period” “prescribed” in section 6452.4 The court found Island’s testimony, based on its content and his demeanor, to be “self-serving, illogical and obviously improvised”; on that basis, the court found the testimony to be “unbelievable” and “rejected” it “in its entirety.” The court also disbelieved Tamiko’s testimony that Island had given her $800.
Island thereafter filed a timely motion for reconsideration of the trial court’s ruling on standing under Civil Procedure Code section 1008. He also requested relief from that ruling under Civil Procedure Code section 473, on the ground that Island and his attorney were justifiably surprised by (1) Debra’s argument that Island lacked standing under section 6452, because they believed the sole issue presented was whether Island was Michael’s biological father; and (2) Debra’s testimony that she did not send any letters to the parole board. Island sought to reopen the evidentiary hearing.
Island submitted several documents in support of his motion. He submitted a declaration from his counsel purporting to take the blame for “not anticipat[ing] that abandonment” under section 6452 “would be at issue.” Island also submitted an updated declaration that largely reaffirmed the statements in his prior declaration except to (1) provide additional details on which of his family members had passed along Island’s money to Tamiko to use for Michael’s support, and (2) upgrade the frequency of his communications with Michael from “regular” to “constant.” To bolster his statements, Island submitted (1) declarations from a few of his family members attesting that they had given money to Tamiko for Michael and that Island “had demonstrated that [he and Michael] had communicated on a regular basis”; (2) a print-out showing a $300 withdrawal from Island’s prison account shortly before Michael’s eighteenth birthday (but with no further detail on how it was used); (3) an undated birthday and father’s day card from Michael to Island; and (4) a letter from Michael to the parole board in 2000 (when Michael was 15) stating that he had “talked to [his] father and written him trying to develop a relationship with him.” Island additionally submitted a declaration from a handwriting expert who opined that Debra’s signature on the letters to the parole board matched other samples of Debra’s signature.
*3 Island filed a timely notice of appeal.
By statute, the “heirs” of a deceased person may sue “for the loss of companionship and for other losses suffered [by those heirs] as a result of [the] decedent’s death.” (Quiroz v. Seventh Ave. Center (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1256, 1263; Code Civ. Proc., §§ 377.60-377.62.) Where, as here, a decedent dies without any “surviving spouse, domestic partner, children, [or] issue of deceased children,” the wrongful death statute confers standing to sue for wrongful death on “the persons … who would be entitled to the property of the decedent by intestate succession.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 377.60; Rosales v. Battle (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 1178, 1185.) The law of intestate succession specifies that where a person dies without a surviving spouse or descendants, his property—and, as incorporated into the wrongful death statutes, standing to sue for wrongful death—goes to “the decedent’s parent or parents equally” (§ 6402, subd. (b)) unless section 6452 specifies otherwise (§ 6452, subd. (b)).
The second element specifies that a parent loses his right to sue for wrongful death if he either (1) did not make “an effort to provide for the [decedent’s] support” “or” (2) did not “communicat[e] with the [decedent]” for the last seven years of the decedent’s minority. This reading is dictated by the plain text of section 6452 because it separates these two requirements with the word “or”—not “and.” (Accord, Melamed v. City of Long Beach (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 70, 79 [“Ordinarily, the word ‘and’ connotes a conjunctive meaning, while the word ‘or’ implies a disjunctive or alternative meaning.”].) This reading is also confirmed by the statute’s legislative history: “[I]n order to inherit from a child, a parent who has intentionally abandoned a minor for more than [seven] years must both financially support the child and communicate with the child.” (Sen. Judicial Com. Rep., Assem. Bill No. 490, (2013-2014, Reg. Sess.) as amended May 23, 2013, p. 5), available at http://www.:leginfo.ca.gov/pub/13-14/bill/asm/ab_0451-0500/ab_490_cfa_20130603_135138_sen_comm.html (italics added); see also Concurrence in Sen. Amen., Assem. Bill No. 490, p. 4 [“The bill provides that parents will be disinherited if, with the intent to abandon their child, they left the child and without an effort to support or to communicate with the child, or both, for at least seven years that continued until the end of the child’s minority.”], available at http://www.leginfo.ca.go/pub/13-14/bill/asm/ab_0451-0500/ab_490_cfa_20130613_164015_asm_floor.html.
*4 Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that Island did not make “an effort to provide for” Michael’s support during the last seven years of Michael’s minority. The sole evidence that Island ever provided such support was Island’s and Tamiko’s testimony, and the trial court explicitly and resoundingly rejected their testimony on this point as not credible. Because our review for substantial evidence requires us to “review the record in the light most favorable to the” trial court’s findings (King v. State of California (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 265, 278) and, more to the point, does not permit us to reweigh credibility determinations except in very unusual situations (People v. Prunty (2015) 62 Cal.4th 59, 89), we must defer to the trial court’s credibility findings. This leaves no evidence of Island’s financial support and hence presumptive evidence of his intent to abandon Michael. Debra’s testimony that Island never provided any financial support while Michael lived in her home also supports the trial court’s finding.
Island levels two broad challenges against the trial court’s reasoning.
First, he contends that we must overturn the trial court’s findings even under substantial evidence review. To begin, Island asserts that the trial court was wrong to reject his testimony as not credible because a court may do so only if there is a conflict in the evidence; here, Island continues, there was no conflict because Debra’s evidence that he did not support Michael did not refute his testimony that he did support Michael through payments made directly to Tamiko (rather than to Debra). We reject this assertion because a trial court “ ‘may reject in toto the testimony of a witness, even though the witness is uncontradicted’ ” (Foreman & Clark Corp. v. Fallon (1971) 3 Cal.3d 875, 890); no conflict is necessary. Substantial evidence review also requires us to draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the court’s findings (King, supra, 242 Cal.App.4th at p. 278-279), and we may reasonably infer that Debra—as the person who paid the bills for Michael—would know if she had fewer bills to pay due to financial support from Island.
Further, Island correctly notes that a trial court’s finding that a witness was not credible at most “ ‘remove[s] that testimony from the evidentiary mix’ ” but does not constitute “ ‘affirmative evidence of a contrary conclusion.’ [Citation.]” (Moran v. Foster Wheeler Energy Corp. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 500, 518.) From this, he argues that the trial court’s finding that he was not credible does not erase Tamiko’s testimony that Island gave her $800. This argument ignores that the trial court specifically rejected Tamiko’s testimony on this point as not credible. That the trial court did not reject Tamiko’s testimony about the degree of communication between Island and Michael does not matter because the absence of any effort to provide financial support is enough, by itself, to divest Island of standing to sue for wrongful death. This evidence of communication between Island and Michael also does not rebut the presumptive intent to abandon: If it did, section 6452 would effectively require proof of both no effort to provide financial support and no communication; however, as explained above, the statute’s plain language makes the absence of either disqualifying.
*5 We reject Island’s argument that section 6452 does not apply at all to “incarcerated” parents or that incarceration automatically rebuts the presumptive intent to abandon that arises from non-support or non-communication. The statute’s plain text spells out no such effect, and that text controls over language found in the legislative history. (Olson v. Automobile Club of Southern California (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1142, 1151 [“courts must analyze a statute’s plain language, and may look to the legislative history underlying a statute’s enactment only if the plain language is ambiguous”].) Looking to section 6452 ’s legislative history does not lead to a different result. Although that history contains some comments that could be read to endorse an absolute exception for incarcerated parents, the bulk of the history simply acknowledges that incarcerated parents may have an easier time showing that their lack of financial support or communication was not due to an intent to abandon. This is of little assistance to Island because he testified that he provided financial support and communication notwithstanding his incarceration, and the trial court rejected that testimony as not credible.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Island had not provided a “satisfactory explanation” for not contesting the applicability of section 6452 at the initial hearing. In her initial, pre-hearing brief, Debra argued that “Island Does Not Have Standing To Be A Plaintiff In The Wrongful Death Action of Michael Myvett, Jr.”; cited section 6452, subdivision (a)(3); and argued that Island “did not contribute any support during Michael’s lifetime.” In her pre-hearing reply brief, Debra argued that “[e]ven if … Island can establish himself as the natural parent[,] he ignores Probate Code section 6452” and criticized Island’s evidence of “provid[ing] [Michael] support.” In his response to these findings, Island declared that he “provide[d] … resources” to Michael and “regularly communicated” with him. Because Debra raised the applicability of section 6452 prior to the hearing and because Island’s response tracked the key elements of section 6452, subdivision (a)(3), we conclude the trial court had ample reason to find that Island had been put on notice of section 6452 ’s applicability prior to the hearing.
Island raises three arguments in response.
Second, Island contends that the scope of the hearing was not clear because the trial court said it “misunderstood” Debra’s case after Debra argued, in closing, that Island did not have standing under section 6452. However, the court’s expression of misunderstanding regarding Debra’s argument at the end of the hearing does not have any effect on what Island should have known the issues would be at the outset of the hearing. As explained above, the pre-hearing briefs raised the applicability of section 6452 as a distinct issue.
Third, Island argues that the trial court was wrong to rely upon Island’s failure to conduct discovery because the parties’ stipulation for resolving the issue of standing did not expressly refer to discovery. Because Debra’s filings put him on notice of the section 6452 issue, we need not consider whether discovery would have put him on further notice.
*6 The orders are affirmed. Federal Express and Debra are entitled to their costs on appeal.
Because several of the involved parties have the same last names, we use first names for clarity. We mean no disrespect.
Debra also sued for survivor benefits, but that claim is not at issue in this appeal.
All further statutory references are to the Probate Code unless otherwise indicated.
The court rejected Debra’s argument that Tamiko had abandoned Michael within the meaning of section 6452 because the evidence showed that Tamiko supported and communicated with Michael during his minority. We affirmed the ruling regarding Tamiko in Loyd v. Loyd, (Nov. 29, 2018, B285512) [nonpub. opn.] ).
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