Source: https://www.morelaw.com/verdicts/case.asp?n=B279462&s=CA&d=119527
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 18:34:51+00:00

Document:
Re: Joe Ribakoff v. City of Long Beach, et al.
Case Style: Joe Ribakoff v. City of Long Beach, et al.
Police Officer who routinely provided security for meetings.
The cause was tried to the court on August 5 and 8, 2015.
voted on amending its rules on comments from the public.
concluded its business notwithstanding the interruptions.
which is discussed, post, in footnote 27.
Authority, who had been invited by the Board to do so, testified.
wanted to dispute the facts as presented by that speaker.
thereafter the Board voted on item 10.
a letter to the Board secretary for distribution to members.
Long Beach or with the Board, prior to filing his lawsuit.
of the Board on August 24, 2015, which she described as lengthy.
are not subject to the rule limiting speakers to three minutes.
was disruptive in the sense of not complying with the time limits.
that delayed the vote on an agenda item.
penalty of $25,000, and attorney fees.
limit is stated in the code for staff members to address the Board.
and as did staff to the Board.
submission, denying them on April 26, 2016.
place on August 24, 2015.
Ribakoff raises several sets of contentions in his appeal.
code applied to him at the August 24, 2015 Board meeting.
rights under the Bane Act and the Brown Act.
statutes is the Government Claims Act.
his claims that the speech codes violate art. I, § 2(a) of the Cal.
Business Bank v. Gevorgian (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 602, 613 . . .
support its decision.’ (Fladeboe v. American Isuzu Motors Inc.
error.” (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836; see Cal.
findings. A failure to find on an immaterial issue is not error.
1525 . . . ; [see] People v. Casa Blanca Convalescent Homes, Inc.
we independently review their meaning. (People ex rel. Lockyer v.
violates the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.
(1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 1075, 1082; accord, Bose Corp. v.
on that offer appears in the record.
claims for relief) was equitable.
on defendants’ Code of Civil Procedure section 631.8 motion.
August 24, 2015 Board meeting.
conveys standing to individuals to sue for violations of that act.
damages] . . . .
name and on his or her own behalf a civil action for damages, . . .
followed by two contacts with the police officer.
conclusion of the meeting without any untoward result.
he violated the Board’s speech rules at a future meeting.
speakers at Board meetings, he could expect to be arrested.
the speaker’s card on which the rule is written.
a right secured by either the federal or state constitutions.
limiting public speakers to three minutes on any agenda item.
the officer’s warning of the consequences if he does so.
Ribakoff with violence, but with arrest if he violated the law.
alleged interference or violation of a civil right. (Shoyoye v.
coercive) conduct apart from the threats to arrest/prosecute him.
violation of the Bane Act.
LBMC 2.03.140 is also flawed, we address these claims together.
meeting room, returning prior to the conclusion of the meeting.
standing to bring this cause of action, and in so ruling, erred.
any other local body created by state or federal statute.” (Gov.
standing in this case to assert his Brown Act claims.
within a specified period of time, the individual may file suit.
litigation. (See Center for Local Government Accountability v.
face and as applied, different considerations must be evaluated.
U.S. 451, 457 [107 S.Ct. 2502, 96 L.Ed.2d 398]; see Williams v.
a last resort.’” (Williams, supra, at p. 577, citing Broadrick v.
was applied of a protected right. (See, e.g., Broadrick v.
Marriage of Siller (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 36, 49 . . . .)” (Tobe v.
Board’s “criminal speech rules” are authorized by the Brown Act.
or federal law. (Cal. Const., art. XI, §§ 5, 7; see California Fed.
adopted” by the Board and are invalid for that reason as well.
evidence which he introduced at trial to substantiate this claim.
Kay.18 Ribakoff misunderstands the holding of Kay.
makes violation of this ordinance a misdemeanor.
considered taboo at a solemn ceremony of a fraternal order.
Supreme Court’s opinion in Madison Sch. Dist. v. Wisconsin Emp.
restriction was invalid suggests application to the present case.
which the views are sought to be expressed.
agency, or of the acts or omissions of the legislative body.
that his request to speak again was turned down.
was rejected based on the content of what he was going to say.
we find this argument to be factually and legally incorrect.
member of the public to speak on a particular agenda item.
presentations by staff or invited guests.
have the ability to regulate the length of those presentations.
and needs some reasonable limitation.
c. Public forum verses limited public forum.
the Norwalk City Code (former § 2-1.2, now § 2.08.020 (Ord.
further audience before the Council during that meeting. [¶] . . .
such as the Norwalk City Council—or meetings of the Board.
transferred without adjustment to this more structured situation.
highly important individual and governmental interests.
government designating ‘place or channel of communication . . .
immediate combat. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S.
accomplishing its business in a reasonably efficient manner.
the ordinance on its face is substantially and fatally overbroad.
legitimate sweep.’)” (White, supra, 900 F.2d at pp. 1425-1426, fn.
Ribakoff also relies on Norse v. City of Santa Cruz (9th Cir.
opportunity to citizens to address the Council at meetings.
fn. 4.) The Board offers similar opportunities.
speaker does not offend the First Amendment.27 (See Chaffee v.
the podium and commenced speaking over the open microphone.
this podium has to be reasonable. If there is no reason to . . .
restriction on the substance of the remarks.
California Rules of Court, rule 3.1590.
Outcome: The judgment is affirmed. Each party is to bear its own costs on appeal.

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