Source: https://www.nationalpopularvote.com/section_9.16
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 20:38:29+00:00

Document:
9.16.1 MYTH: Interstate compacts are exotic and fishy.
9.16.2 MYTH: The topic of elections addressed by the National Popular Vote compact is not an appropriate subject for an interstate compact.
9.16.3 MYTH: The National Popular Vote compact is defective because Congress did not consent to it prior to its consideration by state legislatures.
9.16.4 MYTH: The National Popular Vote compact is defective because it fails to mention Congress in its text.
9.16.5 MYTH: The National Popular Vote compact requires congressional consent to become effective.
9.16.6 MYTH: The National Popular Vote compact requires congressional consent because of its withdrawal procedure.
9.16.7 MYTH: Adoption of the National Popular Vote compact would establish the precedent that interstate compacts can be used to accomplish something that would otherwise be unconstitutional.
9.16.8 MYTH: The National Popular Vote compact is a conspiracy.
Interstate compacts are authorized by the U.S. Constitution and are in widespread use by every state.
The U.S. Constitution authorizes states to enter into interstate compacts.
Interstate compacts predate the Constitution. One interstate compact approved at the time of the Articles of Confederation remained in force until 1958 (when it was replaced by an updated version).
The subject matter of existing interstate compacts varies widely and has included such topics as agriculture, boundaries, bridges, building construction and safety, child welfare, civil defense, conservation, corrections, crime control, cultural issues, education, emergency management, energy, facilities, flood control, gambling and lotteries, health, insurance, interstate school districts, low-level radioactive waste, metropolitan problems, motor vehicles, national guard, natural resources, navigation, parks and recreation, pest control, planning and development, ports, property, public safety, river basins, taxation, transportation, and water.
Multi-State Lottery Compact (which operates the Powerball lotto game in numerous states).
Compacts are often used on a nationwide basis. For example, the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children and the Interstate Compact on Juveniles are examples of compacts adhered to by all 50 states and the District of Columbia.
Numerous other compacts are listed in appendix M and discussed in chapter 5.
“Compacts are agreements between two or more states that bind them to the compacts’ provisions, just as a contract binds two or more parties in a business deal. As such, compacts are subject to the substantive principles of contract law and are protected by the constitutional prohibition against laws that impair the obligations of contracts (U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 10).
“That means that compacting states are bound to observe the terms of their agreements, even if those terms are inconsistent with other state laws. In short, compacts between states are somewhat like treaties between nations. Compacts have the force and effect of statutory law (whether enacted by statute or not) and they take precedence over conflicting state laws, regardless of when those laws are enacted.
The National Popular Vote plan is an interstate compact—a type of state law that is explicitly authorized by the U.S. Constitution to enable otherwise sovereign states to enter into legally enforceable contractual obligations with one another.
There are no constitutional restrictions on the subject matter of interstate compacts other than the implicit limitation that a compact’s subject matter must be among the powers that states are permitted to exercise.
The U.S. Constitution gives each state the “exclusive” and “plenary” power to choose the manner of appointing its presidential electors. Thus, the subject matter of the National Popular Vote compact is among the powers that the states are permitted to exercise.
The U.S. Constitution places no restriction on the subject matter of an interstate compact other than the implicit limitation that a compact’s subject matter must be among the powers that states are permitted to exercise. That implicit limitation does not apply to the subject matter of the National Popular Vote compact, because the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that states possess exclusive power to choose the method of awarding their electoral votes.
The National Popular Vote compact concerns the method of appointment of a state’s presidential electors.
Thus, the subject matter of the National Popular Vote compact is a state power.
The states have used interstate compacts in increasingly creative ways since the 1920s. The judiciary has been repeatedly asked to consider the validity of various novel compacts; however, we are aware of no case in which the courts have invalidated any interstate compact.
We are not aware of any case in which the courts have invalidated any interstate compact. Given the recent tendencies of the courts to accord even greater deference to states’ rights and even wider and freer use of interstate compacts by the states, it is unlikely that the courts would invalidate the National Popular Vote compact. The National Popular Vote compact is an example of federalism in action and of states exercising their rightful powers.
The 10th Amendment independently addresses the question of whether the states are prohibited from exercising a particular power when the Constitution contains no specific prohibition against it and, therefore, the question of whether there are unstated implicit restrictions on the allowable methods for appointing presidential electors.
Section 1 of Article II contains only one restriction on state choices on the manner of appointing their presidential electors, namely that no state may appoint a member of Congress or federal appointees as presidential elector.
The 10th Amendment was ratified in 1791 (that is, after ratification of the original 1787 Constitution) and thus takes precedence over the original Constitution. Even if there were enforceable implicit restrictions in the original Constitution on state choices on the manner of appointing their presidential electors (perhaps in the form of penumbral emanations from section 1 of Article II), such implicit restrictions were extinguished in 1791 by the 10th Amendment.
In conclusion, nothing in the U.S. Constitution prevents states from using an interstate compact to specify the manner in which they choose their presidential electors.
Congressional consent is not required prior to a state legislature’s consideration of an interstate compact. Moreover, advance congressional consent is not the norm.
If a particular compact requires congressional consent, Congress generally considers the matter only after the compact has been approved by the combination of states required to bring the compact into effect.
● Most interstate compacts do not specifically mention congressional consent, regardless of whether the particular compact requires congressional consent.
Most compacts do not specifically mention congressional consent, regardless of whether the states involved intend to seek it.
For example, the Port Authority of New York Compact is silent as to congressional consent. The two states involved did not intend to seek congressional consent at the time that they entered into the compact. Later, they decided to seek congressional consent (and received it).
Conversely, the states involved in the Multistate Tax Compact (also silent as to the role of Congress) originally sought congressional consent, but, after realizing that they could not obtain it, the states proceeded to implement the compact without congressional consent. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in favor of the states (and upheld that sequence of events) in the 1978 case of U.S. Steel Corporation v. Multistate Tax Commission—the leading recent case on the issue of congressional consent of interstate compacts (discussed in detail in section 9.16.5).
There is no need for an interstate compact to mention Congress, even if the states involved intend to seek congressional consent.
The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that congressional consent is only necessary for interstate compacts that “encroach upon or interfere with the just supremacy of the United States.” Because the choice of method of appointing presidential electors is an “exclusive” and “plenary” state power, there is no encroachment on federal authority.
Nonetheless, National Popular Vote is working to obtain support for the compact in Congress.
The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled, in 1893 and in 1978, that the Compacts Clause can “not be read literally” in deciding the question of whether congressional consent is necessary for a particular interstate compact.
The 1978 case of U.S. Steel Corporation v. Multistate Tax Commission reinforced the Court’s 1893 decision as to the criteria for determining whether a particular interstate compact requires congressional consent.
The Multistate Tax Compact was formulated by state tax administrators to stave off federal encroachment on the power of the states to tax multi-state businesses. The compact created a commission empowered to conduct audits of businesses operating in multiple states and gave multistate businesses a choice of formulas for calculating their state taxes.
The Multistate Tax Compact provided that it would come into force when any seven or more states enacted it. By 1967, the requisite number of states had approved the compact.
The Multistate Tax Compact was submitted to Congress for its consent. After encountering fierce political opposition in Congress aroused by various business interests concerned about the more stringent tax audits anticipated under the compact, the compacting states proceeded to implement the compact without congressional consent. U.S. Steel and other companies challenged the states’ action.
The National Popular Vote compact would not be a “combination tending to the increase of political power in the states which may encroach upon or interfere with the just supremacy of the United States” because the choice of manner of appointing presidential electors is “exclusively” a state—not federal—power.
The absence of federal power—much less federal supremacy—over the awarding of electoral votes is made especially clear by comparing the constitutional provision (section 1 of Article I) dealing with presidential elections with the constitutional provision (section 4 of Article II) dealing with congressional elections.
As can be seen, section 4 of Article I gives states primary—but not exclusive—control over congressional elections. In contrast, section 1 of Article II gives the states exclusive control over the manner of appointing presidential electors.
The National Popular Vote compact would not encroach on the “just supremacy of the United States,” because the states have the exclusive power to choose the method of appointing their presidential electors.
In discussing whether the National Popular Vote compact requires congressional consent, Tara Ross, an opponent of the National Popular Vote compact, has argued that the federal government has an “interest” in the compact.
As discussed at length in section 9.1.1, section 9.1.2, section 9.1.3, section 9.1.4, and section 9.1.6, the National Popular Vote compact would not change “the presidential election procedure described in the Constitution.” Indeed, no state law or compact can do that. Instead, the National Popular Vote compact would change state winner-take-all statutes. None of these state winner-take-all statutes was originally adopted by means of a federal constitutional amendment. None of these state statutes has constitutional status. The winner-take-all rule was not debated by the Constitutional Convention or mentioned in the Federalist Papers. It was used by only three states in the nation’s first presidential election in 1789, and all three states (Maryland, New Hampshire, and Pennsylvania) abandoned it by 1800. It was not until the 11th presidential election (1828) that the winner-take-all rule was used by a majority of the states. The winner-take-all rule did not come into widespread use until the Founders had been dead for decades. All of these state statutes may be changed in the same manner as they were adopted, namely by passage of a new state law changing the state’s method of appointing its own presidential electors. Thus, the National Popular Vote compact should not arouse federal “interest” in protecting the constitutional amendment process.
“The dissent appears to confuse potential impact on ‘federal interests’ with threats to ‘federal supremacy.’ It dwells at some length on the unsuccessful efforts to obtain express congressional approval of this Compact, relying on the introduction of bills that never reached the floor of either House. This history of congressional inaction is viewed as ‘demonstrat[ing] … a federal interest in the rules for apportioning multistate and multinational income,’ and as showing ‘a potential impact on federal concerns.’ Post, at 488, 489. That there is a federal interest no one denies.
“The dissent’s focus on the existence of federal concerns misreads Virginia v. Tennessee and New Hampshire v. Maine. The relevant inquiry under those decisions is whether a compact tends to increase the political power of the States in a way that ‘may encroach upon or interfere with the just supremacy of the United States.’ Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S., at 519. Absent a threat of encroachment or interference through enhanced state power, the existence of a federal interest is irrelevant. Indeed, every state cooperative action touching interstate or foreign commerce implicates some federal interest. Were that the test under the Compact Clause, virtually all interstate agreements and reciprocal legislation would require congressional approval.
“In this case, the Multistate Tax Compact is concerned with a number of state activities that affect interstate and foreign commerce. But as we have indicated at some length in this opinion, the terms of the Compact do not enhance the power of the member States to affect federal supremacy in those areas.
“The dissent appears to argue that the political influence of the member States is enhanced by this Compact, making it more difficult—in terms of the political process—to enact pre-emptive legislation. We may assume that there is strength in numbers and organization. But enhanced capacity to lobby within the federal legislative process falls far short of threatened ‘encroach[ment] upon or interfer[ence] with the just supremacy of the United States.’ Federal power in the relevant areas remains plenary; no action authorized by the Constitution is ‘foreclosed,’ see post, at 491, to the Federal Government acting through Congress or the treaty-making power.
An interstate compact may potentially affect non-member states.
In a dissenting opinion in U.S. Steel Corporation v. Multistate Tax Commission, U.S. Supreme Court Justices Byron White and Harry Blackmun suggested that courts could consider the possible adverse effects of a compact on non-compacting states in deciding whether congressional consent is necessary for a particular compact.
“Appellants’ final Compact Clause argument charges that the Compact impairs the sovereign rights of nonmember States. Appellants declare, without explanation, that if the use of the unitary business and combination methods continues to spread among the Western States, unfairness in taxation—presumably the risks of multiple taxation—will be avoidable only through the efforts of some coordinating body. Appellants cite the belief of the Commission’s Executive Director that the Commission represents the only available vehicle for effective coordination, and conclude that the Compact exerts undue pressure to join upon nonmember States in violation of their ‘sovereign right’ to refuse.
“We find no support for this conclusion. It has not been shown that any unfair taxation of multistate business resulting from the disparate use of combination and other methods will redound to the benefit of any particular group of States or to the harm of others. Even if the existence of such a situation were demonstrated, it could not be ascribed to the existence of the Compact. Each member State is free to adopt the auditing procedures it thinks best, just as it could if the Compact did not exist. Risks of unfairness and double taxation, then, are independent of the Compact.
In particular, Ross has identified three potential “interests” of non-compacting states in the National Popular Vote compact.
“NPV deprives these states of their opportunity, under the Constitution’s amendment process, to participate in any decision made about changing the nation’s presidential election system.
Concerning Ross’ second point, Article V is the part of the U.S. Constitution that deals with constitutional amendments. The National Popular Vote compact would not change the Constitution. It is an exercise of an exclusive power already granted to the states under section 1 of Article II of the Constitution, namely the power of each state to appoint its own presidential electors in the manner it chooses. The compact would change state winner-take-all statutes that came into widespread use more than four decades after the Constitution was ratified. None of these state winner-take-all statutes was originally adopted by means of a federal constitutional amendment, and none has constitutional status. All of these state statutes may be changed in the same manner as they were adopted, namely by passage of a new state law changing the state’s method of appointing its own presidential electors. See section 9.1.1, section 9.1.2, section 9.1.3, section 9.1.4, and section 9.1.6.
Ross’ third point concerns the potential effect on the political value of a vote cast by voters in some non-compacting states.
The National Popular Vote compact would treat votes cast in all 50 states and the District of Columbia equally. A vote cast in a compacting state would be, in every way, equal to a vote cast in a non-compacting state. The National Popular Vote compact would not confer any advantage on states belonging to the compact as compared to non-compacting states.
Ross is, in effect, arguing that certain battleground states might have a constitutional right to maintain the excess political value of votes cast in their states, but that disadvantaged or altruistic states have no right or ability to create equality in the political value of everyone’s votes by exercising their independent constitutional power over the method of awarding their own electoral votes.
Of course, it has always been the case that one state’s choice of the manner of appointing its presidential electors has affected the political value of a vote cast in other states. For example, the use of the winner-take-all rule by a closely divided battleground state plainly diminishes the political value of the votes cast by citizens in the non-battleground states.
It is inherent in the grant by the U.S. Constitution, to each state, of the power to choose the method of appointing its presidential electors that one state’s decision can enhance the political value of its vote and thereby impact (diminish) the political value of the vote in other states. This is a direct consequence of federalism and the fact that the Constitution gave each individual state the power to decide the method of appointing its own presidential electors.
A present-day battleground state could, of course, eliminate the political effect of its winner-take-all rule on other states by changing its method of appointing its presidential electors. For example, if a battleground state were to change its winner-take-all statute to a proportional method for awarding electoral votes, presidential candidates would pay less attention to that state because only one electoral vote would probably be at stake in the state. However, we are not aware of anyone who currently argues that any present-day battleground state has a constitutional obligation to make such a change in order to reduce its impact on the political value of a vote in the non-battleground states.
If the Constitution gives a closely divided battleground state the power to choose a method of awarding its electoral votes that increases the political value of votes cast in its state, it also gives the power to non-battleground states to choose a method for awarding their electoral votes to counter-balance the political effect of the decision made by the battleground state (and, arguably, create a better overall system in the process).
In any case, the electoral votes of the non-compacting states would continue to be cast in the manner specified by the laws of those states. The electoral votes of the non-compacting states would continue to be counted in the Electoral College in the manner provided by the Constitution. In practical terms, that means that the non-compacting states would continue to cast their votes for the winner of the statewide popular vote (or district-wide popular vote in Maine and Nebraska) after the National Popular Vote compact is implemented. No non-compacting state would be compelled to cast its electoral votes for the winner of the national popular vote.
The political impact of the winner-take-all rule on other states has long been recognized as a political reality. It is not California’s winner-take-all rule or Wyoming’s winner-take-all rule that makes a vote in California and a vote Wyoming politically irrelevant in presidential elections. Indeed, a vote in California and a vote in Wyoming are equal as a result of the widespread use of the state-by-state winner-take-all rule, and both are equally worthless. Instead, it is the use of the winner-take-all rule in closely divided battleground states that diminishes the political value of the votes cast in California and Wyoming.
The Founding Fathers intended, as part of the political compromise that led to the Constitution, to confer a certain amount of extra influence on the less populous states by giving every state a bonus of two electoral votes corresponding to its two U.S. Senators. The Founders also intended that the Constitution’s formula for allocating electoral votes would give the bigger states a larger amount of influence in presidential elections. Their goals with respect to both small states and big states were never achieved because of the emergence of political parties in the 1796 presidential election and the subsequent widespread adoption by the states of the winner-take-all rule (mostly in the 1820s and 1830s). The winner-take-all rule drastically altered the political value of votes cast in both small and big states throughout the country.
Interstate comparisons of the political value of a vote are not, according to past judicial rulings, a legal basis for contesting any state’s decision to adopt a certain method of appointing its own presidential electors under Article II, section 1, clause 2 of the Constitution.
In 1966, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to act in response to a complaint concerning the political impact of one state’s choice of the manner of appointing its presidential electors on another state. In State of Delaware v. State of New York, Delaware led a group of 12 predominantly small states (including North Dakota, South Dakota, Wyoming, Utah, Arkansas, Kansas, Oklahoma, Iowa, Kentucky, Florida, and Pennsylvania) in suing New York in the U.S. Supreme Court. At the time of this lawsuit, New York was not only a closely divided battleground but also the state possessing the largest number of electoral votes (43). Delaware argued that New York’s decision to use the winner-take-all rule effectively disenfranchised voters in the 12 plaintiff states. New York’s (defendant) brief is especially pertinent. Despite the fact that the case was brought under the Court’s original jurisdiction, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to hear the case (presumably because of the well-established constitutional provision that the manner of awarding electoral votes is exclusively a state decision).
In 1968, the constitutionality of the winner-take-all rule was challenged in Williams v. Virginia State Board of Elections. A federal court in Virginia upheld the winner-take-all rule. The full opinion can be found in appendix FF. The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed this decision in a per curiam decision in 1969. See section 9.1.18.
There is an additional independent argument that the potential political impact on non-compacting states should not be a consideration in evaluating a compact concerned with how states choose to appoint their presidential electors.
Article I confers on “each state” the power to choose the manner of electing its members of Congress; however, it subjects those state decisions to being overridden at the national level. Congress has, on occasion, overridden state choices that it deemed to not be in the national interest (e.g., electing members of the U.S. House of Representatives at-large, instead of from single-member districts).
Article II is different in that state decisions are not subjected to such congressional scrutiny. “Each state” is empowered to choose the manner of appointing its presidential electors, irrespective of Congress’ opinion of the method.
Of course, there is always the possibility that the U.S. Supreme Court might change the legal standards concerning congressional consent contained in its 1893 and 1978 rulings. Because there could be litigation about congressional consent, National Popular Vote is working to obtain support for the compact in Congress.
Because Congress typically considers a compact only after the compact has been approved by the combination of states required to bring the compact into effect, one would expect that any action in Congress would occur after the compact had been approved by the 25 (or so) states possessing the requisite majority of the electoral votes (i.e., 270 of 538).
Congressional consent can be explicitly conferred by a majority vote in both the U.S. House and Senate and approval of the President (or enactment by a two-thirds majority if the President vetoes the bill).
The question of congressional consent is discussed in greater detail in chapter 5.
The specific additional question of congressional consent in relation to a compact’s withdrawal procedure is discussed in section 9.16.6.
The test as to whether an interstate compact requires congressional consent is based on whether the compact encroaches on federal supremacy—not on the compact’s withdrawal procedure.
The Interstate Compact for the Placement of Children is an example of a judicially upheld compact that did not require congressional consent to become effective and that imposes a two-year delay on the effectiveness of a state’s withdrawal.
In U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Commission, the U.S. Supreme Court made three observations about the characteristics of the Multistate Tax Compact, including the fact that states could withdraw from that particular compact without delay.
The Multistate Tax Compact permits withdrawal from the compact, without delay or advance notice to other states.
“Any party state may withdraw from this compact by enacting a statute repealing the same. No withdrawal shall affect any liability already incurred by or chargeable to a party state prior to the time of such withdrawal.
(3) The compacting states cannot withdraw from the agreement at any time.
The incorrectness of von Spakovsky’s interpretation of the Supreme Court’s 1978 decision in U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Commission is demonstrated by the 1991 case of McComb v. Wambaugh dealing with the enforceability of the Interstate Compact for the Placement of Children.
The Interstate Compact for the Placement of Children did not require congressional consent to become effective, and it delayed withdrawal for two years.
“The Constitution recognizes compacts in Article I, section 10, clause 3, which reads, ‘No state shall, without the Consent of the Congress ... enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State.’ Despite the broad wording of the clause Congressional approval is necessary only when a Compact is ‘directed to the formation of any combination tending to the increase of political power in the States, which may encroach upon or interfere with the just supremacy of the United States.’ United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452, 468, 98 S.Ct. 799, 810, 54 L.Ed.2d 682 (1978) (quoting Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 519, 13 S.Ct. 728, 734, 37 L.Ed. 537 (1893)).
“Because Congressional consent was neither given nor required, the Compact does not express federal law. Cf. Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 440, 101 S.Ct. 703, 707, 66 L.Ed.2d 641 (1981). Consequently, this Compact must be construed as state law. See Engdahl, Construction of Interstate Compacts: A Questionable Federal Question, 51 Va.L.Rev. 987, 1017 (1965) (‘[T]he construction of a compact not requiring consent ... will not present a federal question....’).
Von Spakovsky’s “prongs” are not part of any “test” as to whether congressional consent is necessary for an interstate compact to become effective. In particular, the withdrawal provisions of a compact do not determine whether the compact requires congressional consent to become effective.
The Compacts Clause of the U.S. Constitution permits states to enter into interstate compacts, but does not expand state powers. All compacts must be consistent with the U.S. Constitution.
Several opponents of the National Popular Vote compact have argued that adoption of the National Popular Vote compact would establish a precedent that interstate compacts can be used to accomplish something that would otherwise be unconstitutional.
Opponents have argued, for example, that adopting the National Popular Vote compact would establish a precedent that could be used to negate a woman’s existing constitutional right to an abortion.
The Compacts Clause of the U.S. Constitution permits states to enter into interstate compacts; however, the Compacts Clause does not expand state powers. All compacts must be consistent with the U.S. Constitution. In particular, a compact’s subject matter must be among the powers that the states are permitted to exercise (as discussed in section 9.16.2).
This invalid line of argument by opponents is based on the opponents’ own invalid argument that a federal constitutional amendment is necessary to change the winner-take-all method of appointing a state’s presidential electors. In fact, the National Popular Vote compact does not change anything in the U.S. Constitution, and therefore no federal constitutional amendment is necessary (as discussed at length in section 9.1.1, section 9.1.2, section 9.1.3, section 9.1.4, and section 9.1.6). Instead, the National Popular Vote compact changes state winner-take-all statutes that came into widespread use more than four decades after the Constitution was ratified. None of these state winner-take-all statutes was originally adopted by means of a federal constitutional amendment. These state winner-take-all statutes do not have constitutional status. Winner-take-all statutes may be changed in the same manner in which they were adopted, namely by passage of a new state law changing the state’s method of appointing its own presidential electors.
An interstate compact is not a “conspiracy” but a mechanism provided by the U.S. Constitution that enables sovereign states to enter voluntarily into binding contractual arrangements with one another.
A “conspiracy” is an agreement to commit a crime.
An interstate compact is not a “conspiracy,” but, instead, a mechanism provided by the U.S. Constitution that enables sovereign states to enter voluntarily into binding contractual arrangements with one another.
Words, such as “conspiracy,” “collusion,” and “scheme,” do not change the fact that the states have the power, under the U.S. Constitution, to award their own electoral votes in the manner that they see fit.
 U.S. Constitution. Article I, section 10, clause 1.
 Council of State Governments. 2003. Interstate Compacts and Agencies 2003. Lexington, KY: The Council of State Governments. Page 6.
 U.S. Constitution. Article II, section 1, clause 2.
 McPherson v. Blacker. 146 U.S. 1 at 35. 1892.
 There have been cases where a higher court has invalidated a ruling by a lower court invalidating an interstate compact. See, for example, West Virginia ex rel. Dyer v. Sims. 341 U.S. 22. 1950.
 Oregon v. Mitchell. 400 U.S. 112 at 286–287. 1970.
 There have been cases where a higher court corrected a ruling by a lower court invalidating an interstate compact. See, for example, West Virginia ex rel. Dyer v. Sims. 341 U.S. 22. 1950.
 The original Constitution contains few specific restrictions on state action that bear on the appointment of presidential electors. Thus, under Article II, section 1, clause 1, a state legislature may, for example, pass a law making it a crime to commit fraud in a presidential election. However, a state legislature certainly may not pass an ex post facto (retroactive) law making it a crime to commit fraud in a previous presidential election. Similarly, a state legislature may not pass a law imposing criminal penalties on specifically named persons who may have committed fraudulent acts in connection with a presidential election (that is, a bill of attainder). Also, the Constitution’s explicit prohibition against a “law impairing the obligation of contract” operates as a restraint on the delegation of power contained in section 1 of Article II. Of course, various later amendments restrict state choices, including the 14th Amendment (equal protection), the 15th Amendment (prohibiting denial of the vote on account of “race, color, or previous condition of servitude”), the 19th Amendment (woman’s suffrage), the 24th amendment (prohibiting poll taxes), and the 26th Amendment (18-year-old vote).
 Congress has, on rare occasions, consented to compacts in advance of action by the states. For example, Congress consented in advance to certain interstate crime control compacts in the Crime Control Consent Act of 1934. Other examples include the Weeks Act of 1911 and the Tobacco Control Act of 1936. See section 5.9.
 Virginia v. Tennessee. 148 U.S. 503 at 521. 1893.
 U.S. Steel Corporation v. Multistate Tax Commission. 434 U.S. 452. 1978.
 Virginia v. Tennessee. 148 U.S. 503 at 519. 1893.
 Virginia v. Tennessee. 148 U.S. 503. 1893.
 The Gillette Company et al. v. Franchise Tax Board. Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Four. July 24, 2012. Page 4. Appendix GG contains the full opinion.
 New Hampshire v. Maine, 426 U.S. 363. 1976.
 U.S. Steel Corporation v. Multistate Tax Commission. 434 U.S. 452. at 459–460. 1978.
 McPherson v. Blacker. 146 U.S. 1 at 29. 1892.
 U.S. Steel Corporation v. Multistate Tax Commission. 434 U.S. 452 at 473. 1978. Justice Powell wrote the opinion of the Court, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Brennan, Stewart, Marshall, Rehnquist, and Stevens.
 Ross, Tara. 2010. Federalism & Separation of Powers: Legal and Logistical Ramifications of the National Popular Vote Plan. Engage. Volume 11. Number 2. September 2010. Page 40.
 U.S. Steel Corporation v. Multistate Tax Commission. 434 U.S. 452 at 479. 1978.
 U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Commission. 434 U.S. at 494. 1978.
 Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 472 U.S. 159 at 176. 1985.
 Williams v. Virginia State Board of Elections, 288 F. Supp. 622 - Dist. Court, ED Virginia 1968.
 Williams v. Virginia State Board of Elections. 393 U.S. 320 (1969) (per curiam).
 The Interstate Compact for the Placement of Children was written with the expectation that congressional consent would not be required if its membership were limited to states of the United States, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico. However, the compact invites the federal government of Canada and Canadian provincial governments to become members. The compact specifically recognizes that congressional consent would be required if a Canadian entity desired to become a party to the compact by saying, “This compact shall be open to joinder by any state, territory, or possession of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and, with the consent of congress, the government of Canada or any province thereof.” As of 1991, no Canadian entity had sought membership in the compact, and the compact was thus put into operation without congressional consent.
 McComb v. Wambaugh, 934 F.2d 474 at 479 (3d Cir. 1991).
 U.S. Steel Corporation v. Multistate Tax Commission. 434 U.S. 452 at 473. 1978.
 See section 9.11 for answers to Professor Hardaway’s concern about withdrawal.
 Ross, Tara. 2004. Enlightened Democracy: The Case for the Electoral College. Los Angeles, CA: World Ahead Publishing Company. Page 235.

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