Source: https://www.ptab.us/2011/02/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 09:56:03+00:00

Document:
To the extent that the definitions argued by Appellant (Br. 11) and provided by the Examiner (Ans. 12) are inconsistent with the definition provided in Appellant’s Specification, we rely upon the definition in Appellant’s Specification. Digital Biometrics, Inc. v. Identix, Inc., 149 F.3d 1335, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (when the intrinsic record is clear, we do not give weight to an inconsistent dictionary definition).
“A machine is a concrete thing, consisting of parts, or of certain devices and combination of devices. This includes every mechanical device or combination of mechanical powers and devices to perform some function and produce a certain effect or result.” In re Ferguson, 558 F.3d 1359, 1364 (quoting In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2007), reh'g denied en banc, 515 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2008), and cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 70 (2008)).
A structure may be expressed as one of several alternatives if those alternatives present no uncertainty or ambiguity with respect to the question of scope or clarity of the claims. 35 U.S.C. §112, 2nd paragraph; see also In re Harnisch, 631 F.2d 716, 724 (CCPA 1980). The mere fact that components are claimed as members of a Markush group cannot be relied upon to establish the equivalency of these components. In re Ruff, 256 F.2d 590, 592 (CCPA 1958).
Notice, Clarification on the Procedure for Seeking Review of a Finding of a Substantial New Question of Patentability in Ex Parte Reexamination Procedures, 75 Fed. Reg. 36,357 (June 25, 2010).
An argument made to the Office constitutes a disclaimer only if it is “clear and unmistakable.” Schindler Elevator Corp. v. Otis Elevator Co., 593 F.3d 1275, 1285 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Endo Pharms., Inc., 438 F.3d 1123, 1136 (Fed. Cir. 2006). An “ambiguous disavowal” will not suffice. Computer Docking Station Corp. v. Dell, Inc., 519 F.3d 1366, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
Whether a reference teaches away from a claimed invention is a question of fact. See In re Harris, 409 F.3d 1339, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2005). “A reference may be said to teach away when a person of ordinary skill, upon reading the reference, … would be led in a direction divergent from the path that was taken by the applicant.” In re Haruna, 249 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (quoting Tec Air, Inc. v. Denso Mfg. Mich., Inc., 192 F.3d 1353, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). “When a piece of prior art ‘suggests that the line of development flowing from the reference’s disclosure is unlikely to be productive of the result sought by the applicant’ the piece of prior art is said to ‘teach away’ from the claimed invention.” Medichem, S.A. v. Rolabo, S.L., 437 F.3d 1157, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (quoting In re Gurley, 27 F.3d 551, 553 (Fed. Cir. 1994)). A prior art reference must be considered in its entirety, i.e., as a whole, including portions that would lead away from the claimed invention. See W.L. Gore & Assoc., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1983). However, “[t]he prior art’s mere disclosure of more than one alternative does not constitute a teaching away from any of these alternatives because such disclosure does not criticize, discredit, or otherwise discourage the solution claimed . . . ” In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
Where the invention is a process, the product resulting from that process must have utility in order for the process to have utility. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519 (1966).
show[ing] that an invention is useful to the public as disclosed in its current form, not that it may prove useful at some future date after further research. Simply put, to satisfy the “substantial” utility requirement, an asserted use must show that that claimed invention has a significant and presently available benefit to the public.
See Texas Instr. Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 988 F.2d 1165, 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (Claim language cannot be mere surplusage. An express limitation cannot be read out of the claim).
In Spears, the two levels of benefits are never different, and thus the “communicating” step would impermissibly be rendered superfluous. See Unique Concepts, Inc. v. Brown, 939 F.2d 1558, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (two distinct claim elements should each be given full effect).
Moreover, a teaching away requires disparagement. See In re Gurley, 27 F.3d 551, 553 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (“[a]reference may be said to teach away when a person of ordinary skill, upon [examining] the reference, would be discouraged from following the path set out in the reference, or would be led in a direction divergent from the path that was taken by the applicant”).
It is the claims that define the invention and, therefore, the absence in the prior art of subject matter not included in the claims cannot be a basis for patentability. See Constant v. Advanced Micro-Devices, Inc., 848 F.2d 1560, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1988); see In re Self, 671 F.2d 1344, 1348 (CCPA 1982) (“Many of appellant's arguments fail from the outset because . . . they are not based on limitations appearing in the claims.”).
It is well settled that a reference may be relied upon for all that it would have reasonably suggested to one having ordinary skill the art. Merck & Co. v. Biocraft Labs., Inc., 874 F.2d 804, 807 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
Consistent with the principle that all limitations in a claim must be considered to be meaningful, it is improper to rely on the same structure in the Rönnberg reference as being responsive to two different elements (first and second attachment members) in claims 1, 43, and 44. See, Lantech, Inc. v. Keip Machine Co., 32 F.3d 542 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (in infringement context, a single conveyor held to not meet claim element requiring at least two conveyors); In re Robertson, 169 F.3d 743 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (claim requiring three separate means not anticipated by structure containing two means where one of the two means was argued to meet two of the three claimed means).

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