Source: https://leb.fbi.gov/articles/legal-digest/legal-digest-the-supreme-court-analyzes-major-fourth-amendment-issues-in-dog-sniff-cases
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 03:37:59+00:00

Document:
On October 31, 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court heard oral arguments in two separate cases from Florida, each presenting a different constitutional issue involved in law enforcement agencies’ use of drug-sniffing canines. The fact that the Court granted certiorari for both cases in the same term and entertained oral arguments for them on the same day caused some pundits to comment that the Court had “gone to the dogs” or had experienced a “dog-day afternoon.”1 These cases, however, because of the underlying issues involved, were no laughing matter to the law enforcement community.
One of the two cases involved whether probable cause—a bedrock Fourth Amendment concern—existed at the time law enforcement action (the dog sniff) was taken. The second examined whether a search under the Fourth Amendment even had occurred when a drug-sniffing dog alerted to the presence of contraband outside a homeowner’s front door. Clearly, these two cases have the potential to greatly impact how departments employ drug-sniffing canines.
Harris moved to suppress the evidence recovered in the first search on the grounds that the dog alert indicating the presence of narcotics did not provide the deputy with probable cause, which, in turn, had allowed the search. His argument was based not on the quality of training received by Aldo and his handler but on Aldo’s certification and performance in the field—particularly, the two stops of Harris’ “seemingly narcotics-free” truck.6 At the hearing to settle the issue, testimony revealed that Aldo’s certification (which Florida law did not require) had expired the year before the relevant stop involving Harris and that Aldo’s handler did not keep complete records of Aldo’s performance in the field. Rather, only records of alerts resulting in arrests were maintained.
A unanimous U.S. Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Florida Supreme Court. In doing so, the Court relied on its earlier evaluations of the probable cause standard. Justice Elena Kagan, writing for the entire Court, pointed out that “[a] police officer has probable cause to conduct a search when the facts available to him would warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that contraband or evidence of a crime is present.”11 She then reiterated that “[t]he test for probable cause is not reducible to ‘precise definition or quantification.’”12 Kagan emphasized that the Court’s prior decisions “rejected rigid rules, bright-line tests, and mechanistic inquiries” in favor of their practical and commonsensical standard based on the totality of the circumstances.13 In rejecting the Florida Supreme Court’s decision, the U.S. Supreme Court pointed out that its Florida counterpart had “flouted this established approach to determining probable cause. To assess the reliability of a drug-detection dog, the Florida court [had] created a strict evidentiary checklist, whose every item the State [would have to] tick off.”14 Based on this approach, the Court wondered how a “rookie dog” ever could satisfy the state court’s test because the absence of any field performance records inevitably would preclude a finding of probable cause.
A short recitation of the facts leading up to the legal dispute is important for law enforcement officers who handle drug-sniffing canines. When a detective with the Miami-Dade, Florida, Police Department received an unverified tip that Joelis Jardines was growing marijuana in his home, the department teamed with DEA to investigate. A surveillance team observed Jardines’ home and noted no activity; however, the group could not see inside the residence. A trained canine handler and his drug-sniffing dog (trained to detect marijuana, cocaine, heroin, and several other drugs) approached Jardines’ front porch. While doing so the dog sensed one of the odors he had been trained to detect and began “energetically exploring the area for the strongest point source for that odor.”18 After his exploring, the dog sat down at the base of the front door, indicating it as the strongest source. The dog was on a 6-foot leash during this entire incident. The handler and canine then left the scene after the handler informed the investigating detective of the positive alert.
Before examining its decision, it is important to note that the U.S. Supreme Court limited its review of the case to the question of whether the handler and the dog approaching and being on the front porch to detect drug odors constituted a Fourth Amendment search. It is settled that the action of a dog sniffing certain odors in a place where the animal has a legal right to be does not constitute a search.20 And, of course, the Court dealt with the issue of probable cause being satisfied from a positive alert by a trained dog earlier in the Harris case discussed at length in this article.
Turning first to what homeowners typically invite people (including “solicitors, hawkers, and peddlers of all kinds”) to do, the Court noted that there typically is an “implicit license [that] permits [a] visitor to approach the home by the front path, knock promptly, wait briefly to be received, and then (absent invitation to linger longer) leave.”27 Writing for a slim majority of five justices, Justice Antonin Scalia even pointed out that Girl Scouts and trick-or-treaters abide by this traditional invitation routinely. Scalia then concluded that “a police officer not armed with a warrant” could do the same as that is “no more than any private citizen might do.”28 However, that is not what happened in the present case.
The introduction of the trained canine and the explicit quest to uncover contraband and evidence changed this from a situation involving a routine invitee to a much more invasive governmental action. The Court contrasted finding “a visitor knocking on the door” with finding “that same visitor exploring the front path with a metal detector or marching his bloodhound into the garden before saying hello and asking permission.” While the former would be invited, the latter would be highly unwelcomed. In fact, it “would inspire most [people] to—well, call the police,” the Court noted.29 While the express or implied license of most homeowners allows people (including law enforcement officers) to enter their porch to knock on their door and briefly wait for a response, the scope of that license is limited and does not allow anyone to linger on that same porch with a trained dog.
Law enforcement officers appreciate easy-to-apply legal principles. Both dog-sniff cases discussed herein set forth straightforward guidance for canine handlers. As Justice Scalia noted in his majority opinion in Jardines, applying the Court’s Fourth Amendment property-rights search test is easy when a drug-sniffing canine is brought onto a homeowner’s curtilage. The U.S. Supreme Court also affirmed a fairly straightforward, common-sense-type test for determining probable cause in its Harris drug-sniffing dog case.
The principles on which these cases were decided are at the very core of the Fourth Amendment—that is, how to determine whether “probable cause” exists and whether a “search” has occurred. Together, these two Florida-generated cases involving law enforcement’s use of drug dogs have given law enforcement officers solid guidance on determining whether they have probable cause and whether their actions will constitute a search for Fourth Amendment purposes. Law enforcement officers will be able to put these principles to use in their daily activities—not just when using canines but in a whole host of other law enforcement activities, as well.
1 Michael Doyle, “Drug-Sniffing Cases Send Supreme Court to the Dogs,” The Miami Herald, October 26, 2012, http://www.miamiherald.com/2012/10/26/3068148/drug-sniffing-cases-send-supreme.html; and Dana Milbank, “The Supreme Court’s Dog-Day Afternoon,” The Washington Post, October 31, 2012, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-10-31/opinions/ 35500075_1_police-dog-justice-elena-kagan-chief-justice.
2 568 U.S. ___ (2013).
3 U.S. Const. amend. IV provides that “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.” The U.S. Supreme Court has concluded that this language dictates that searches conducted without a warrant are per se unreasonable, subject to limited and delineated exceptions. These exceptions include motor vehicle searches (Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925)) when there is probable cause to believe evidence is contained in a motor vehicle.
4 Supra note 2, at ___, slip op. at 2.
6 Id. at ___, slip op. at 3.
7 Florida v. Harris, 71 So. 3d 756, 767 (Fla. 2011).
9 Id. at 769; and Id. at 769, 774.
10 Supra note 2, at ___, slip op. at 4, quoting Florida v. Harris, n. 7 at 773.
11 Supra note 2, at ___, slip op. at 5 (internal quotations omitted).
12 Id. at ___, slip op. at 5 (quoting, Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003)).
13 Supra note 2, at ___, slip op. at 5; and Supra note 13, also citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983).
14 Supra note 2 at ___, slip op. at 5-6.
15 Supra note 2 at ___, slip op. at 9.
17 569 U.S. ___, (2013); and 569 U.S. at ___, slip op. at 1.
18 Id. at ___, slip op. at 2.
19 Id. at ___, slip op. at 3 (parenthetical in original), citing Florida v. Jardines, 73 So. 3d 34 (2011).
20 United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983); Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005).
21 Id. at ___, slip op. at 3 (quoting U.S. v. Jones, 565 U.S. ___, ___ n.3 (2012))(slip op., at 6, n. 3.).
22 U.S. v. Jones, 565 U.S. ___ (2012).
23 Supra note 19 at ___, slip op. at 4.
24 Id. (quoting Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984)).
26 Supra note 19 at ___, slip op. at 6.
28 Supra note 19 at ___, slip op. at 6-7 (quoting Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. ___, ___ (2011) (slip op., at 16)).
29 Supra note 19 at ___, slip op. at 7.
31 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
32 It should be noted, however, that in a concurring opinion written by Justice Kagan and with whom Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor joined, Justice Kagan concluded that the activity in this case also would have satisfied the Katz “reasonable expectation of privacy” definition of a Fourth Amendment search. On the other hand, Justice Alito, in his dissenting opinion joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy and Breyer, determined that the activity in this case would not have satisfied the Katz “reasonable expectation of privacy” definition and, therefore, did not constitute a Katz-type search. Justice Alito also opined that the activity did not constitute a trespass and, therefore, was not a search under either search theory.
33 Supra note 19 at ___, slip op. at 9 (quoting United States v. Jones.); 565 U.S. ___, ___, slip op. at 8 (2012) (emphasis in original)).
34 Supra note 19 at ___, slip op. at 9.

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.