Source: https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/100/371
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 06:49:48+00:00

Document:
6. Congress had power by the Constitution to enact sect. 5516 of the Revised Statutes, which makes it a penal offence against the United States for any officer of election, at an election held for a representative in Congress, to neglect to perform, or to violate, any duty in regard to such election, whether required by a law of the State or of the United States, or knowingly to do any act unauthorized by any such law, with intent to affect such election, or to make a fraudulent certificate of the result, &c., and sect. 5522, which makes it a penal offence for any officer or other person, with or without process, to obstruct, hinder, bribe, or interfere with a supervisor of election, or marshal, or deputy marshal in the performance of any duty required of them by any law of the United States, or to prevent their free attendance at the places of registration or election, &c.; also, sects. 2011, 2012, 2016, 2017, 2021, 2022, title xxvi, which authorize the circuit courts to appoint supervisors of such elections, and the marshal to appoint special deputies to aid and assist them, and which prescribe the duties of such supervisors and deputy marshals -- these being the laws provided in the [p372] enforcement Act of May 31, 1870, and the supplement thereto of Feb. 28, 1871, for supervising the elections of representatives, and for preventing frauds therein.
Congress my by law vest the appointment of such inferior officers as they think proper in the President alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of departments.
Before making this application, each petitioner, in the month of September last, presented a separate petition to the Chief Justice of this court (within whose circuit Baltimore is situated) at Lynn, in the State of Connecticut, where he then was, praying for a like habeas corpus to be relieved from the same imprisonment. The Chief Justice thereupon made an order that the said marshal and warden should show cause before him, on the second Tuesday of October, in the city of Washington, why such writs should not issue. That being the first day of the present term of this court, at the instance of the Chief Justice, the present application was made to the court by a new petition addressed thereto, and the petitions and papers which had been [p374] presented to the Chief Justice were, by consent, made a part of the case. The records of the several indictments and proceedings thereon were annexed to the respective original petitions, and are before us. These indictments were framed partly under sect. 5515 and partly under sect. 5522 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, and the principal questions raised by the application are whether those sections, and certain sections of the title of the Revised Statutes relating to the elective franchise which they are intended to enforce, are within the constitutional power of Congress to enact. If they are not, then it is contended that the Circuit Court has no jurisdiction of the cases, and that the convictions and sentences of imprisonment of the several petitioners were illegal and void.
The jurisdiction of this court to hear the case is the first point to be examined. The question is whether a party imprisoned under a sentence of a United States court, upon conviction of a crime created by and indictable under an unconstitutional act of Congress, may be discharged from imprisonment by this court on habeas corpus, although it has no appellate jurisdiction by writ of error over the judgment. It is objected that the case is one of original, and not appellate, jurisdiction, and, therefore, not within the jurisdiction of this court. But we are clearly of opinion that it is appellate in its character. It requires us to revise the act of the Circuit Court in making the warrants of commitment upon the convictions referred to. This, according to all the decisions, is an exercise of appellate power. Ex parte Burford, 3 Cranch 448; Ex parte Bollman and Swartout, 4 id. 100, 101; Ex parte Yerger, 8 Wall. 98.
That this court is authorized to exercise appellate jurisdiction by habeas corpus directly is a position sustained by abundant authority. It has general power to issue the writ, subject to the constitutional limitations of its jurisdiction, which are that it can only exercise original jurisdiction in cases affecting ambassadors, public ministers and consuls, and cases in which a State is a party, but has appellate jurisdiction in all other cases of Federal cognizance, "with such exceptions and under such regulations as Congress shall make." Having this general power to issue the writ, the court may issue it in the exercise of original jurisdiction where it has original jurisdiction; and [p375] may issue it in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction where it has such jurisdiction, which is in all cases not prohibited by law except those in which it has original jurisdiction only. Ex parte Bollman and Swartwout, supra; Ex parte Watkins, 3 Pet. 202; 7 id. 568; Ex parte Wells, 18 How. 307, 328; Ableman v Booth, 21 id. 506; Ex parte Yerger, 8 Wall. 85.
It is a general rule that, where a person has been committed under the judgment of another court of competent criminal jurisdiction, this court [the King's Bench] cannot review the sentence upon a return to a habeas corpus. In such cases, this court is not a court of appeal.
if the commitment be against law, as being made by one who had no jurisdiction of the cause, or for a matter for which by law no man ought to be punished, the court are to discharge.
Without attempting to decide how far this case may be regarded as law for the guidance of this court, we are clearly of opinion that the question raised in the cases before us is proper for consideration on habeas corpus. The validity of the judgments is assailed on the ground that the acts of Congress under which the indictments were found are unconstitutional. If this position is well taken, it affects the foundation of the whole proceedings. An unconstitutional law is void, and is as no law. An offence created by it is not a crime. A conviction under it is not merely erroneous, but is illegal and void, [p377] and cannot be a legal cause of imprisonment. It is true, if no writ of error lies, the judgment may be final in the sense that there may be no means of reversing it. But personal liberty is of so great moment in the eye of the law that the judgment of an inferior court affecting it is not deemed so conclusive but that, as we have seen, the question of the court's authority to try and imprison the party may be reviewed on habeas corpus by a superior court or judge having authority to award the writ. We are satisfied that the present is one of the cases in which this court is authorized to take such jurisdiction. We think so because, if the laws are unconstitutional and void, the Circuit Court acquired no jurisdiction of the causes. Its authority to indict and try the petitioners arose solely upon these laws.
That the said Henry Bowers, afterwards, to-wit, on the day and year aforesaid, at the said voting precinct within the district aforesaid, unlawfully did obstruct, hinder, and, by the use [p378] of his power and authority as such judge as aforesaid (which judge he then and there was), interfere with and prevent the said supervisor of election in the performance of a certain duty in respect to said election required of him, and which he was then and there authorized to perform by the law of the United States, in such case made and provided, to-wit, that of personally inspecting and scrutinizing, at the beginning of said day of election, and of the said election, the manner in which the voting was done at the said poll of election, by examining and seeing whether the ballot first voted at said poll of election was put and placed in a ballot box containing no ballots whatever, contrary to sect. 5522 of said statutes, and against the peace, government, and dignity of the United States.
(2d) That the said Justus J. Gude and the said Walter Tucker afterwards, to-wit, on the day and year aforesaid, at the said voting precinct of said ward of said city, unlawfully and by exercise of their power and authority as such judges as aforesaid, did prevent and hinder the free attendance and presence of the said James N. Schofield (who was then and there such deputy marshal as aforesaid, in the due execution of his said office) at the poll of said election of and for the said voting precinct, and the full and free access of the same deputy marshal to the same poll of election, contrary to the said last-mentioned section of said statutes (sect. 5522), and against the peace, government, and dignity of the United States.
(6th) That the said Justus J. Gude and the said Walter Tucker, on the day and year aforesaid, at the precinct aforesaid, within the district aforesaid (they being then and there such officers of said election as aforesaid), knowingly and unlawfully at the said election did a certain act, not then and there authorized by any law of the State of Maryland, and not authorized then and there by any law of the United States, by then and there fraudulently and clandestinely putting and placing in the ballot box of the said precinct twenty (and more) ballots (within the intent and meaning of sect. 561 of said statutes) which had not been voted at said election in said precinct before the ballots, [p379] then and there lawfully deposited in the same ballot box, had been counted, with intent thereby to affect said election and the result thereof, contrary to sect. 6515 of said statutes, and against the peace, government, and dignity of the United States.
These cases involve the question of the constitutionality of certain sections of title xxvi of the Revised Statutes, entitled "The Elective Franchise."
SECT. 2011. The judge of the Circuit Court of the United States wherein any city or town having upwards oft twenty thousand inhabitants is situated, upon being informed by two citizens thereof, prior to any registration of voters for, or any election at which a representative or delegate in Congress is to be voted for, that it is their desire to have such registration or election guarded and scrutinized, shall open the Circuit Court at the most convenient point in the circuit.
SECT. 2012. The judge shall appoint two supervisors of election for every election district in such city or town.
SECT. 2016. The supervisors are authorized and required to attend all times and places fixed for registration of voters; [p380] to challenge such as they deem proper; to cause such names to be registered as they may think proper to be so marked; to inspect and scrutinize such register of voters, and for purposes of identification to affix their signatures to each page of the original list.
SEC. 2017. The supervisors are required to attend the times and places for holding elections of representatives or delegates in Congress, and of counting the votes cast; to challenge any vote the legality of which they may doubt; to be present continually where the ballot boxes are kept, until every vote cast has been counted, and the proper returns made, required under any law of the United States, or any State, territorial, or municipal law, and to personally inspect and scrutinize at any and all times, on the day of election, the manner in which the poll books, registry lists, and tallies are kept; whether the same are required by any law of the United States or any State, territorial, or municipal laws.
SECT. 2021. Requires the marshal, whenever any election at which representatives or delegates in Congress are to be chosen, upon application by two citizens in cities or towns of more than twenty thousand inhabitants, to appoint special deputy marshals, whose duty it shall be to aid and assist the supervisors in the discharge of their duties, and attend with them at all registrations of voters or election at which representatives to Congress may be voted for.
SEC. 2022. Requires the marshal, and his general and special deputies, to keep the peace and protect the supervisors in the discharge of their duties; preserve order at such place of registration and at such polls; prevent fraudulent registration and voting, or fraudulent conduct on the part of any officer of election, and immediately to arrest any person who commits, or attempts to commit, any of the offences prohibited herein, or any offence against the laws of the United States.
SECT. 5515. Every officer of an election at which any representative or delegate in Congress is voted for, whether such officer of election be appointed or created by or under any law or authority of the United States, or by or under any State, territorial, district, or municipal law or authority, who neglects or refuses to perform any duty in regard to such election required of him by any law of the United States, or of any State or Territory thereof; or who violates any duty so imposed; or who knowingly does any acts thereby unauthorized, with intent to affect any such election, or the result thereof; or who fraudulently makes any false certificate of the result of such election in regard to such representative or delegate; or who withholds, conceals, or destroys any certificate of record so required by law respecting the election of any such representative or delegate; or who neglects or refuses to make and return such certificate as required by law; or who aids, counsels, procures, or advises any voter, person, or officer to do any act by this or any of the preceding sections made a crime, or to omit to do any duty the omission of which is by this or any of such sections made a crime, or attempts to do so, shall be punished as prescribed in sect. 5511.
SECT. 5522. Every person, whether with or without any authority, power, or process, or pretended authority, power, or process, of any State, Territory, or municipality, who obstructs, hinders, assaults, or by bribes, solicitation, or otherwise, interferes with or prevents the supervisors of election, or either of them, or the marshal or his general or special deputies, or either of them, in the performance of any duty required of them, or either of them, or which he or they, or either of them, may be authorized to perform by any law of the United States in the execution of process or otherwise, or who, by any of the means before mentioned hinders or prevents the free attendance and presence at such places of registration, or at such polls of election, or full and free access and egress to and from any such place of registration or poll of election, or in going to and from any such place of registration or poll of election, or to and from any room where any such registration or election or canvass of votes, or of making any returns or certificates thereof, may be had, or who molests, interferes with, removes, or ejects from any such place of registration or poll of election, or of canvassing votes cast thereat, or of making returns or certificates thereof, any supervisor of election, the marshal, or his general or special deputies, or either of them; or who threatens, or attempts, or offers so to do, or refuses or neglects to aid and assist any supervisor [p382] of election, or the marshal or his general or special deputies, or either of them, in the performance of his or their duties, when required by him or them, or either of them, to give such aid and assistance shall be liable to instant arrest without process, and shall be punished by imprisonment not more than two years, or by a fine of not more than $3,000, or by both such fine and imprisonment, and shall pay the cost of the prosecution.
1. That the power to make regulations as to the times, places, and manner of holding elections for representatives in Congress, granted to Congress by the Constitution, is an exclusive power when exercised by Congress.
2. That this power, when so exercised, being exclusive of all interference therein by the States, must be so exercised as [p383] not to interfere with or come in collision with regulations presented in that behalf by the States unless it provides for the complete control over the whole subject over which it is exercised.
3. That, when put in operation by Congress, it must take the place of all State regulations of the subject regulated, which subject must be entirely and completely controlled and provided for by Congress.
The times, places, and manner of holding elections for senators and representatives shall be prescribed in each State by the legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time, by law, make or alter such regulations, except as to the place of choosing Senators.
It seems to us that the natural sense of these word is the contrary of that assumed by the counsel of the petitioners. After first authorizing the States to prescribe the regulations, it is added, "The Congress may at any time, by law, make or alter such regulations." "Make or alter:" What is the plain meaning of these words? If not under the prepossession of some abstract theory of the relations between the State and national governments, we should not have any difficulty in understanding them. There is no declaration that the regulations shall be made either wholly by the State legislatures or wholly by Congress. If Congress does not interfere, of course, they may be made wholly by the State; but if it chooses to interfere, there is nothing in the words to prevent its doing so, either wholly or partially. On the contrary, their necessary implication is that it may do either. It may either make the regulations or it may alter them. If it only alters, leaving, as manifest convenience requires, the general organization of the polls to the State, there results a necessary cooperation of the two governments in regulating the subject. But no repugnance [p384] in the system of regulations can arise thence, for the power of Congress over the subject is paramount. It may be exercised as and when Congress sees fit to exercise it. When exercised, the action of Congress, so far as it extends and conflicts with the regulations of the State, necessarily supersedes them. This is implied in the power to "make or alter."
The peculiarity of the case consists in the concurrent authority of the two sovereignties, State and National, over the same [p385] subject matter. This, however, is not entirely without a parallel. The regulation of foreign and interstate commerce is conferred by the Constitution upon Congress. It is not expressly taken away from the States. But where the subject matter is one of a national character or one that requires a uniform rule, it has been held that the power of Congress is exclusive. On the contrary, where neither of these circumstances exist, it has been held that State regulations are not unconstitutional. In the absence of congressional regulation, which would be of paramount authority when adopted, they are valid and binding. This subject was largely discussed in the case of Cooley v. Board of Wardens of Port of Philadelphia, 12 How. 299. That was a case of pilotage. In 1789, Congress had passed a law declaring that all pilots should continue to be regulated in conformity with the laws of the States respectively wherein they should be. Hence, each State continued to administer its own laws, or passed new laws for the regulation of pilots in its harbors. Pennsylvania passed the law then in question in 1803. Yet the Supreme Court held that this was clearly a regulation of commerce, and that the State laws could not be upheld without supposing that, in cases like that of pilotage, not requiring a national and uniform regulation, the power of the States to make regulations of commerce, in the absence of congressional regulation, still remained. The court held that the power did so remain, subject to those qualifications, and the State law was sustained under that view.
Here, then, is a case of concurrent authority of the State and national governments, in which that of the latter is paramount. In 1837, Congress interfered with the State regulations on the subject of pilotage so far as to authorize the pilots of adjoining States, separated only by navigable waters, to pilot ships and vessels into the ports of either State located on such waters. It has since made various regulations respecting pilots taking charge of steam vessels, imposing upon them peculiar duties and requiring of them peculiar qualifications. It seems to us that there can be no doubt of the power of Congress to impose any regulations it sees fit upon pilots, and to subject them to such penalties for breach of duty as it may deem [p386] expedient. The States continue in the exercise of the power to regulate pilotage subject to the paramount right of the national government. If dissatisfied with congressional interference, should such interference at any time be imposed, any State might, if it chose, withdraw its regulations altogether, and leave the whole subject to be regulated by Congress. But so long as it continues its pilotage system, it must acquiesce in such additional regulations as Congress may see fit to make.
As to the supposed conflict that may arise between the officers appointed by the State and national governments for superintending the election, no more insuperable difficulty need arise than in the application of the regulations adopted by each respectively. The regulations of Congress being constitutionally paramount, the duties imposed thereby upon the officers of the United States, so far as they have respect to the same matters, must necessarily be paramount to those to be performed by the officers of the State. If both cannot be performed, the latter are pro tanto superseded, and cease to be duties. If the power of Congress over the subject is supervisory and paramount, as we have seen it to be, and if officers or agents are created for carrying out its regulations, it follows as a necessary consequence that such officers and agents must have the requisite authority to act without obstruction or interference from the officers of the State. No greater subordination, in kind or degree, exists in this case than in any other. It exists to the same extent between the different officers appointed by the State, when the State alone regulates the election. One officer cannot interfere with the duties of another, or obstruct or hinder him in the performance of them. Where there is a disposition to act harmoniously, there is no [p387] danger of disturbance between those who have different duties to perform. When the rightful authority of the general government is once conceded and acquiesced in, the apprehended difficulties will disappear. Let a spirit of national as well as local patriotism once prevail, let unfounded jealousies cease, and we shall hear no more about the impossibility of harmonious action between the national and State governments in a matter in which they have a mutual interest.
It is objected that Congress has no power to enforce State laws or to punish State officers, and especially has no power to punish them for violating the laws of their own State. As a general proposition, this is undoubtedly true; but when, in the performance of their functions, State officers are called upon to fulfill duties which they owe to the United States as well as to the State, has the former no means of compelling such fulfillment? [p388] Yet that is the case here. It is the duty of the States to elect representatives to Congress. The due and fair election of these representatives is of vital importance to the United States. The government of the United States is no less concerned in the transaction than the State government is. It certainly is not bound to stand by as a passive spectator when duties are violated and outrageous frauds are committed. It is directly interested in the faithful performance, by the officers of election, of their respective duties. Those duties are owed as well to the United States as to the State. This necessarily follows from the mixed character of the transaction -- State and national. A violation of duty is an offence against the United States, for which the offender is justly amenable to that government. No official position can shelter him from this responsibility. In view of the fact that Congress has plenary and paramount jurisdiction over the whole subject, it seems almost absurd to say that an officer who receives or has custody of the ballots given for a representative owes no duty to the national government which Congress can enforce; or that an officer who stuffs the ballot box cannot be made amenable to the United States. If Congress has not, prior to the passage of the present laws, imposed any penalties to prevent and punish frauds and violations of duty committed by officers of election, it has been because the exigency has not been deemed sufficient to require it, and not because Congress had not the requisite power.
The objection that the laws and regulations, the violation of which is made punishable by the acts of Congress, are State laws and have not been adopted by Congress is no sufficient answer to the power of Congress to impose punishment. It is true that Congress has not deemed it necessary to interfere with the duties of the ordinary officers of election, but has been content to leave them as prescribed by State laws. It has only created additional sanctions for their performance, and provided means of supervision in order more effectually to secure such performance. The imposition of punishment implies a prohibition of the act punished. The State laws which Congress sees no occasion to alter, but which it allows to stand, are in effect adopted by Congress. It simply demands their fulfillment. [p389] Content to leave the laws as they are, it is not content with the means provided for their enforcement. It provides additional means for that purpose, and we think it is entirely within its constitutional power to do so. It is simply the exercise of the power to make additional regulations.
It is almost certain that, in the benignant spirit in which the institutions both of the State and Federal systems are administered, an offender who should have suffered the penalties denounced by the one would not be subjected [p390] a second time to punishment by the other for acts essentially the same -- unless, indeed, this might occur in instances of peculiar enormity, or where the public safety demanded extraordinary rigor. But were a contrary course of policy or action either probable or usual, this would by no means justify the conclusion that offences falling within the competency of different authorities to restrain or punish them would not properly be subjected to the consequences which those authorities might ordain and affix to their perpetration.
Substantially the same views are expressed in United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, referring to these cases, and we do not well see how the doctrine they contain can be controverted. A variety of instances may be readily suggested in which it would be necessary or proper to apply it. Suppose, for example, a State judge having power under the naturalization [p391] laws to admit aliens to citizenship should utter false certificates of naturalization, can it be doubted that he could be indicted under the act of Congress providing penalties for that offence, even though he might also, under the State laws, be indictable for forgery as well as liable to impeachment? So, if Congress, as it might, should pass a law fixing the standard of weights and measures, and imposing a penalty for sealing false weights and false measures, but leaving to the States the matter of inspecting and sealing those used by the people, would not an offender, filling the office of sealer under a State law, be amenable to the United States as well as to the State?
We have thus gone over the principal reasons of a special character relied on by the petitioners for maintaining the general proposition for which they contend -- namely, that, in the regulation of elections for representatives, the national and State governments cannot cooperate, but must act exclusively of each other, so that, if Congress assumes to regulate the subject at all, it must assume exclusive control of the whole subject. The more general reason assigned, to-wit, that the nature of sovereignty is such as to preclude the joint cooperation of two sovereigns even in a matter in which they are mutually concerned, is not, in our judgment, of sufficient force to prevent concurrent and harmonious action on the part of the national and State governments in the election of representatives. It is, at most, [p392] an argument ab inconveniente. There is nothing in the Constitution to forbid such cooperation in this case. On the contrary, as already said, we think it clear that the clause of the Constitution relating to the regulation of such elections contemplates such cooperation whenever Congress deems it expedient to interfere merely to alter or add to existing regulations of the State. If the two governments had an entire equality of jurisdiction, there might be an intrinsic difficulty in such cooperation. Then the adoption by the State government of a system of regulations might exclude the action of Congress. By first taking jurisdiction of the subject, the State would acquire exclusive jurisdiction in virtue of a well known principle applicable to courts having coordinate jurisdiction over the same matter. But no such equality exists in the present case. The power of Congress, as we have seen, is paramount, and may be exercised at any time, and to any extent which it deems expedient, and so far as it is exercised, and no farther, the regulations effected supersede those of the State which are inconsistent therewith.
As a general rule, it is no doubt expedient and wise that the operations of the State and national governments should, as far as practicable, be conducted separately in order to avoid undue jealousies and jars and conflicts of jurisdiction and power. But there is no reason for laying this down as a rule of universal application. It should never be made to override the plain and manifest dictates of the Constitution itself. We cannot yield to such a transcendental view of state sovereignty. The Constitution and laws of the United States are the supreme law of the land, and to these every citizen of every State owes obedience, whether in his individual or official capacity. There are very few subjects, it is true, in which our system of government, complicated as it is, requires or gives room for conjoint action between the State and national sovereignties. Generally, the powers given by the Constitution to the government of the United States are given over distinct branches of sovereignty from which the State governments, either expressly or by necessary implication, are excluded. But in this case expressly, and in some others by implication, as we have seen in the case of pilotage, a concurrent jurisdiction is contemplated, that of [p393] the State, however, being subordinate to that of the United States, whereby all question of precedency is eliminated.
The greatest difficulty in coming to a just conclusion arises from mistaken notions with regard to the relations which subsist [p394] between the State and national governments. It seems to be often overlooked that a national constitution has been adopted in this country, establishing real government therein, operating upon persons and territory and things, and which, moreover, is, or should be, as dear to every American citizen as his State government is. Whenever the true conception of the nature of this government is once conceded, no real difficulty will arise in the just interpretation of its powers. But if we allow ourselves to regard it as a hostile organization, opposed to the proper sovereignty and dignity of the State governments, we shall continue to be vexed with difficulties as to its jurisdiction and authority. No greater jealousy is required to be exercised towards this government in reference to the preservation of our liberties than is proper to be exercised towards the State governments. Its powers are limited in number, and clearly defined, and its action within the scope of those powers is restrained by a sufficiently rigid bill of rights for the protection of its citizens from oppression. The true interest of the people of this country requires that both the national and State governments should be allowed, without jealous interference on either side, to exercise all the powers which respectively belong to them according to a fair and practical construction of the Constitution. State rights and the rights of the United States should be equally respected. Both are essential to the preservation of our liberties and the perpetuity of our institutions. But, in endeavoring to vindicate the one, we should not allow our zeal to nullify or impair the other.
Several other questions bearing upon the present controversy have been raised by the counsel of the petitioners. Somewhat akin to the argument which has been considered is the objection that the deputy marshals authorized by the act of Congress to be created and to attend the elections are authorized to keep the peace, and that this is a duty which belongs to the State authorities alone. It is argued that the preservation of peace and good order in society is not within the powers confided to the government of the United States, but belongs exclusively to the States. Here again we are met with the theory that the government of the United States does not rest upon the soil and territory of the country. We think that this theory is [p395] founded on an entire misconception of the nature and powers of that government. We hold it to be an incontrovertible principle that the government of the United States may, by means of physical force, exercised through its official agents, execute on every foot of American soil the powers and functions that belong to it. This necessarily involves the power to command obedience to its laws, and hence the power to keep the peace to that extent.
Why do we have marshals at all if they cannot physically lay their hands on persons and things in the performance of their proper duties? What functions can they perform if they cannot use force? In executing the processes of the courts, must they call on the nearest constable for protection? must they rely on him to use the requisite compulsion, and to keep the peace whilst they are soliciting and entreating the parties and bystanders to allow the law to take its course? This is [p396] the necessary consequence of the positions that are assumed. If we indulge in such impracticable views as these, and keep on refining and re-refining, we shall drive the national government out of the United States, and relegate it to the District of Columbia, or perhaps to some foreign soil. We shall bring it back to a condition of greater helplessness than that of the old confederation.
The next point raised is that the act of Congress proposes to operate on officers or persons authorized by State laws to perform certain duties under them, and to require them to disobey [p397] and disregard State laws when they come in conflict with the act of Congress; that it thereby, of necessity, produces collision, and is therefore void. This point has been already fully considered. We have shown, as we think, that, where the regulations of Congress conflict with those of the State, it is the latter which are void, and not the regulations of Congress, and that the laws of the State, insofar as they are inconsistent with the laws of Congress on the same subject, cease to have effect as laws.
the Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of such inferior officers as they think proper in the President alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of departments.
The true doctrine, as we conceive, is this that, whilst the States are really sovereign as to all matters which have not [p399] been granted to the jurisdiction and control of the United States, the Constitution and constitutional laws of the latter are, as we have already said, the supreme law of the land, and, when they conflict with the laws of the States, they are of paramount authority and obligation. This is the fundamental principle on which the authority of the Constitution is based, and unless it be conceded in practice, as well as theory, the fabric of our institutions, as it was contemplated by its founders, cannot stand. The questions involved have respect not more to the autonomy and existence of the States than to the continued existence of the United States as a government to which every American citizen may look for security and protection in every part of the land.
See Mr. JUSTICE FIELD's opinion, infra, p. 404.
CROSS v. STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA.
SMILEY v. HOLM, as Secretary of State of Minnesota.
TESTA et al. v. KATT.
UNITED STATES, Plff. in Err., v. MATHEW T. GRADWELL et al. NO 683. UNITED STATES, Plff. in Err., v. CHARLES HAMBLY et al. NO 684. UNITED STATES, Plff. in Err., v. EDWARD O'TOOLE et al. NO 775. UNITED STATES, Plff. in Err., v. EDWARD O'TOOLE et al. NO 776.

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