Source: https://en.m.wikisource.org/wiki/M%27Arthur_v._Porter
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 21:02:43+00:00

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ERROR to the circuit court of the United States for the district of Ohio.
'This was an action of ejectment which came up on a writ of error to the circuit court of the United States for the district of Ohio. One of the questions in dispute on the trial of the cause below, was the boundary line between the lands of the plaintiff and defendant. Surveys had been made of the premises in dispute according to the pretensions of each party. These surveys, with the explanatory depositions taken on the ground, were placed on file and used in evidence on the trial. The jury, instead of a verdict according to the claim of either party, found an intermediate line. Their verdict was in these words, viz.
The case was argued by Mr Vinton and Mr Doddridge, for the plaintiff in error; and by Mr Ewing, for the defendant.
Mr Vinton, for the plaintiff.
The plaintiff below having title, in the opinion of the jury, to a part of the land claimed by him, it is admitted they had a right, if they chose, to find in his favour a general verdict of guilty. And in that case he would have taken possession at his peril of more than he was actually entitled to possess. But the jury, instead of a general verdict, thought proper to find a verdict for so much only as the plaintiff had title to.
Had they a right so to find? and if they had, is it not plain the court had no power to deny its exercise?
Where a verdict is rendered for part only of the premises demanded, the part found must be described with certainty: but numerous authorities show that the jury may find a part. Gilbert's Law of Ejectment, 200; Pemble v. Stearne, Raymond's Rep. 165; 1 Institute, 227; Cro. Jac. 113; Siderfin, 232; Cro. Jac. 631; 6 Munford, 25; 1 Mun. 162; 17 Sergand Rawle, 431; 16 Serg. and Rawle, 245; 17 Serg. and Rawle, 393.
Gilbert, in his Law of Ejectment (page 61), says, 'if an ejectment is brought for an acre of land, by metes and bounds, and the jury find half an acre, without specifying metes and bounds, the verdict is bad; because the sheriff cannot deliver possession.' The authorities cited above clearly establish the right of the jury to find a part of the premises claimed. It is, emphatically, the duty of the jury to find facts: but by the interposition of the court, in this case, they were restrained, and that office was vertually taken out of their hands.
A leading object of judicial investigation is to reduce disputed and uncertain facts to certainty. But in a question of disputed boundary, it is obvious that a general verdict, without describing the dividing line, or other specification, leaves the parties precisely where they began, and establishes nothing. And if in such a case the plaintiff has a right to demand at the hands of the jury a general verdict, it is clearly not practicable to try a question of boundary by the action of ejectment. A position which, it is presumed, no one will attempt to maintain.
The court, in their instruction to the jury, appear to have fallen into an error in the application of the rule of law to be met with in the books, 'that the plaintiff will take possession at his peril.' On examination it will be found it is used for a different purpose than that to which it is to be applied in this case. It had its origin in this way.
In all the cases where the courts have holden this language, it will be found that exception had been taken to the sufficiency of the description of the premises in the declaration, after a general verdict. The above cited case of Cottingham v. King is a leading case in point. This principle, therefore, is resorted to, to heal or cure the uncertainty of the declaration, and is not applicable to the verdict. If a verdict is uncertain, the judgment is not rendered upon it and the rule applied to help out the verdict; but the verdict is set aside, or judgment reversed, and a venire de novo awarded. Clay v. White, 1 Mun. 162; Gregory v. Jackson, 6 Mun. 25; Martin v. Martin, 17 Serg. and Rawle, 431; 16 Serg. and Rawle, 245: and see also the extract above from Gilbert's Ejectment. In the case of Gregory v. Jackson, which was an ejectment for one thousand acres of land, and a verdict for four hundred, part of the premises, without designating the boundaries-error was brought after judgment-the doctrine now contended for, was strongly insisted upon in argument, and overruled:-the judgment was reversed and a venire awarded. There are many instances to be found of verdicts similar to that tendered by the jury in this case. The verdict in the case of Green v. Watrous, above cited, is of that description.
In the case of Hopkins v. Myers, 1 Constitutional Court's Rep. 56 (South Carolina), the similitude of the verdict, even in its form, to the one in the present case, is very striking.
This authority does not show that, in the example put of a verdict for twenty acres, such finding of the jury may be disregarded or set aside, and a general verdict directed to be found in its stead; but it proves that upon such a verdict the plaintiff may take a judgment to recover his term in the premises; and since he is restrained from taking out execution for more than was found by the verdict, it is quite immaterial whether the judgment, in its form, is general or special. The verdict in either case is the guide to the sheriff to direct him how to deliver possession, Gilbert's Evidence, 109; Conner v. West, 5 Burr. 2673; Watrous v. Green, 17 Serg. and Rawle, 393; Gilbert's Ejectment, 61; Cro. Jac. 631.
If, in the present case, the plaintiff below had permitted the verdict tendered by the jury to be recorded, and had taken a judgment for his term generally, it would have been liable to no exception. The defendant would have had no cause of complaint, since execution could issue for the part only found by the jury and described in their verdict.
But now he has cause to complain, since there is no restriction upon the plaintiff in taking out execution for, and going into possession of all he ever demanded.
Mr Ewing, for the defendant in error, contended, that it was the duty of the jury to find a general verdict: unless with the consent of the parties a special verdict could not be given. The plaintiff in an ejectment who recovers, takes possession under the direction of the court, and this he does at his peril. A reference to the notes of the judges who presided at the trial will show the extent of the recovery, and regulate the proceedings of the party.
The only question in the case is, whether the judgment entered is erroneous, or whether a general judgment should have been entered on the finding of the jury. Cited Adams on Ejectment, 297; 2 Bibb's Reports, 236.
Mr Doddridge, in reply, argued, that there was a material difference between an action of ejectment to try title, and that in which he whole question was one of boundary. The case cited by the counsel for the defendant in error, from Bibb's Reports, was of the former character, and was therefore not applicable to the question before the court. That case is also at variance with all the cases referred to in the opening argument for the plaintiff in error. The distinction is well known in England, and it is one which must necessarily arise under the Virginia land system. This system involves, in most cases, questions of boundary.
The action of ejectment is a creation of courts, and is to be moulded to meet the justice of the case. The practice under it in Virginia, is different from that of England.
The order of survey is a material proceeding in Virginia in the action of ejectment; and it is made an order in the cause. It is analogous to a view in England; and the survey so made becomes a part of the issue, presenting the very question which is to be decided by the jury. The witnesses are called by the surveyor before him, and he locates the bounds of the land.
The order of survey and return becomes a part of the record, and the verdict of the jury is usually entered on the back of the survey, for the express purpose of showing what has been recovered.

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