Source: https://www.calattorneysfees.com/cases_experts/
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 16:11:18+00:00

Document:
Plaintiffs lost their medical malpractice/loss of consortium case against several defendants, and were then hit with about $80,000 in expert witness fees as costs because they did not beat defendants’ CCP § 998 offers. They argued principally on appeal, in Petrou v. Trites, Case No. B226747 (2d Dist., Div. 4 Dec. 13, 2012) (unpublished), that the offers were made in bad faith.
Second District Panel Reverses $2,350 Cost Award to SJM Winning Defendant.
Section 998/Expert Fee Reasonableness: Court Of Appeal Publishes Adams v. Ford Motor Co.
In our September 30, 2011 post, we discussed Adams v. Ford Motor Co., Case No. B225791, which involved whether a small monetary CCP § 998 offer was reasonable and in good faith in a difficult causation case, where the offer did contain an important “waiver of costs” feature. Also, there was a nice discussion on how to show reasonableness of substantial expert witness expenses in a costs memorandum battle.
We can now report that the Second District, Division 1 certified Adams for publication on October 19, 2011.
Year End Wrap-Up: Mike & Marc’s Top 20 Attorney’s Decision Fees Decisions--Part 2 of 2.
Here is the second installment of our top 20 decisions.
10. Jankey v. Lee, 181 Cal.App.4th 1173 (1st Dist., Div. 4 2010), review granted, No. S180890 (May 12, 2010) -- authored by Presiding Justice Ruvolo; discussed in our Feb. 6, 2010 post.
Attorney’s fees are awardable to a prevailing defendant under Civil Code § 55 without the necessity of showing a plaintiff’s action was “frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless,” disagreeing with Ninth Circuit’s Hubbard decision. This has been accepted for review by the California Supreme Court and is not published anymore, but available for reading in the California Reporter or research databases.
9. Plummer v. Day/Eisenberg, LLP, 184 Cal.App.4th 38 (4th Dist., Div. 3 2010) -- authored by Justice Ikola; discussed in our Apr. 30, 2010 post.
Contingency fee agreement-driven case with an attorney charging lien is not subject to the disclosure/consent requirements of Fletcher v. Davis, 33 Cal.4th 61, 71-72 (2004).
8. Conservatorship of Whitley, 50 Cal.4th 1206 (Cal. Sup. Cto. 2010) -- authored by Justice Moreno; discussed in our Dec. 22, 2010 post on Pappas v. Farr (2d Dist., Div. 6 2010) (unpublished).
Litigant’s personal pecuniary interests may not be used to disqualify the litigant from obtaining fees under California’s private attorney general statute (CCP § 1021.5); rather, the deciding court must focus on the financial burdens and incentives involved in bringing the lawsuit.
7. PNEC Corp. v. Meyer, 190 Cal.App.4th 66 (4th Dist., Div. 3 2010) -- authored by Justice Ikola; discussed in our Nov. 18, 2010 post.
Defendant successfully obtaining dismissal of action based on forum non conveniens is a prevailing party under Civil Code section 1717, extending the reasoning from Profits Concepts Mgt., Inc. v. Griffith, 162 Cal.App.4th 950 (2008) (an earlier case determining that a defendant successfully moving to quash service for lack of personal jurisdiction is a prevailing party, authored by Justice Fybel of the 4th Dist., Div. 3).
6. Lockton v. O’Rourke, 184 Cal.App.4th 1051 (2d Dist., Div. 4 2010) -- authored by Presiding Justice Epstein; discussed in our Apr. 24, 2010 post.
Contractual clause in retainer agreement allows attorney parties to recover for their efforts in collecting fees against clients, avoiding application of the Trope bar.
5. In re Mercury Interactive Corp., 618 F.3d 988 (9th Cir. 2010) -- authored by Circuit Judge Tashima (with a dissent by Circuit Judge Bybee); discussed in our Aug. 18, 2010 post.
Although refusing to articulate a bright-line rule, F.R.Civ. P. 23(h) does not contemplate that class members’ objections to class counsel fee requests have to be filed before the fee motion itself is filed, which denies the class the full and fair opportunity to examine and oppose the motion.
4. Estate of Manuel, 187 Cal.App.4th 400 (2d Dist., Div. 3 2010) -- authored by Acting Presiding Justice Croskey; discussed in our Aug. 11, 2010 post.
Costs of proof sanctions for failure to admit requests for admissions under Code of Civil Procedure § 2033.420(a) can only be assessed against a party, not the party’s counsel.
3. Thrifty Payless, Inc. v. Mariners Mile Gateway, LLC, 185 Cal.App.4th 1050 (4th Dist., Div. 3 2010) -- authored by Justice Moore; discussed in our June 23, 2010 post.
Expert witness fees awardable under contract clause can be recovered under routine costs memorandum approach, disagreeing with Carwash’s approach that the fees must be pled and proven at trial.
2. Donahue v. Donahue, 182 Cal.App.4th 259 (4th Dist., Div. 3 2010) -- authored by Justice Aronson; discussed in our Feb. 27, 2010 post.
Extensive discussion of factors that are probative in gauging the reasonableness of fees requested in probate trust litigation involving multiple attorneys, billings with duplicative entries, litigation inefficiencies, and block billing time entries.
1. Chavez v. City of Los Angeles, 47 Cal.4th 970 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 2010) -- authored by Justice Kennard; discussed in our Jan. 14, 2010 post.
Trial courts have discretion to deny or reduce fee requests to winning plaintiffs in FEHA cases where a plaintiff’s success is minimal or there is a grossly inflated fee request.
First District, Division 5, Except for a $49 Adjustment, Tells Everyone to Go Home But For a Minor $1,000 Appellate Sanctions.
Salvio Street, LLC v. Lee, Case Nos. A122408/A123080 (1st Dist., Div. 5 July 29, 2010) (unpublished) is an interesting case, not just for the legal issues, but because it demonstrates how pragmatic appellate courts are when reviewing costs/fees issues after years and years of litigation. Yep, you guessed it—they affirm (with minor adjustments), reminding litigants that enough is enough. Or, as our post suggests, time for everyone to go home (if any house is remaining after the expenditure of costs and fees)!
In this “long-running saga” over the ownership of certain real property in the Bernal Heights neighborhood of San Francisco (the appellate court’s words, not ours), Salvio Street sought to quiet title to the property, but an attorney representing two parties claiming an ownership in the property (Lien and Yen) actually claimed his own separate interest in the property based on a fee agreement with his two clients. Salvio Street won, with attorney found to have no interest in the property. Salvio Street was awarded $8,190.05 in costs (out of a requested $13,183.97), but was denied any award of attorney’s fees (out of a requested $176,470.75). [Salvio Street relied on the fees clause in the Woo-Lien-Yen Purchase Agreement, which was involved in a prior appeal in the long-running saga.] Salvio Street and attorney Lee both appealed.
Second District, Division Three, Reminds Us Simple Mistake of Law or Fact is Not Necessarily in Excess of an Arbitrator's Powers.
Frederick Lax, former President and CEO of Tekelec, brought an arbitration proceeding against Tekelec, seeking compensation for options that were lost when Tekelec did not issue necessary financial statements until after the options expired. The arbitrator issued an award in favor of Lax, awarding Lax expert witness fees, in addition to damages, attorney's fees, and costs. The trial Court confirmed the award. One of the issues appealed - the only issue that concerns us -- is whether the arbitrator awarded expert fees improperly. Tekelec v. Lax, Case No. B212759 c/w B213669 (2nd Dist., Div. 3, July 30, 2009) (not to be published).
The reason there was a problem at all was that there were two fee clauses in Lax's separation agreement, and Tekelec sought to drive a wedge between the two clauses, arguing one expressly applied to arbitration, whereas the other did not. Paragraph 16.10 of the separation agreement, relating to arbitration, provided that "the prevailing party shall recover costs and attorneys' fees incurred in arbitration." Paragraph 16.12, relating to lawsuits, provided, "the prevailing party in such lawsuit shall be entitled to recover from the losing party all reasonable attorneys' fees, costs of suit and expenses (including the reasonable fees, costs and expenses of appeals)." The arbitrator's decision referred to the language in the provision applying to lawsuits as a basis for awarding expert fees. Tekelec, however, argued that expert witness fees are "expenses", awardable only in a lawsuit, but not in arbitration.
A mistake, perhaps, but not a fatal one.
DISCRETION, DISCRETION, DISCRETION: TRIAL JUDGES DO NOT HAVE TO CREDIT EXPERT TESTIMONY ON THE VALUE OF ATTORNEY SERVICES IN FEE CONTESTS.
Second District Unpublished Decision Affirms Trial Judge’s Rejection of Expert Testimony on the Value of Services in Deciding an Attorney’s Fees Motion.
Even unpublished decisions can contain instructive lessons for practitioners in opposing requests for attorney’s fees, reminding us all that the trial judge is the one ultimately vested with discretion in determining the proper amount of fee recovery.
Auto Auction Group, Inc. v. Ritz Leasing, Inc., Case No. B193602 (2d Dist., Div. 3, May 20, 2008) (unpublished) well illustrates this point.
There, defendants prevailed and moved to recover substantial fees and costs. The trial judge did award $377,917 in fees and $30,482 in costs to the prevailing party.
On appeal, the Second District affirmed in an unpublished decision.
Losing party’s main attack was to argue that the trial judge erred in sustaining an objection to an expert that analyzed the defense’s attorney bills and independently placed a much lower value on the amount of reasonable fees that should have been claimed. In rejecting the expert’s analysis, the trial court had indicated that expert testimony was inappropriate in connection with a motion for attorney’s fees. (PRACTICE POINTER—Expert testimony is frequently encountered in fee battles, such that its submission is not per se improper. See, e.g., City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 203 Cal.App.3d 78 (1988); Excelsior Union High School v. Lautrup, 269 Cal.App.2d 434 (1969).
The appellate court found that the trial judge’s refusal to consider the expert declaration was not an abuse of discretion. It primarily noted that a trial court can make its own independent determination of the value of legal services, even if it is “contrary to, or without the necessity for, expert testimony,” citing PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler, 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1096 (2000). The Court of Appeal also noted that the court had discounted clerical tasks of $12,000 from the fee request as well as $650 for a tangentially related matter. Because the contract and tort claims were inextricably intertwined, there was no necessity for apportionment of pretrial work.
This case shows the wide discretion given to trial judges in determining fees, with the winner obtaining over $400,000 in fees/costs from the losing side. As far as describing the breadth of discretion, the trial judge in this case may have said it best when quoting from a prior appellate decision: “Each courtroom comes equipped with a ‘legal expert,’ called the judge ….” Summers v. A.L. Gilbert Co., 69 Cal.App.4th 1155, 1181 (1999). In this case, the trial judge was the final decision maker of what fees and costs were proper in amount.

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