Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/california/supreme-court/3d/9/470.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 02:22:56+00:00

Document:
Frank L. Williams, Jr., Public Defender, James R. Goff, David W. Duncan and James J. Barnett, Deputy Public Defenders, for Defendant and Appellant.
Evelle J. Younger, Attorney General, Herbert L. Ashby, Chief Assistant Attorney General, William E. James, Assistant Attorney General, Derald E. Granberg and Jay M. Bloom, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant appeals from a conviction of robbery (Pen. Code, § 211) following trial by jury. He asserts that prejudicial error occurred at trial, namely, two separate violations of the rule which forbids any adverse comment upon the exercise of his right to remain silent at trial. (See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 [14 L. Ed. 2d 106, 85 S. Ct. 1229].) We have concluded that although Griffin error occurred, that error was harmless beyond all reasonable doubt, in view of the relatively minor nature of the error and the overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt. Accordingly, we affirm the conviction.
The robbery victim, Mr. Olness, testified that on the day in question (June 29, 1971) he attended the La Paloma restaurant for dinner, carrying with him $147 in cash. Mr. Olness, who was 60 years old and suffering from cancer, had difficulty remembering many of the details surrounding the offense but in general he testified as follows: After his meal, Olness pulled out a "roll" of bills from his pocket and paid his dinner bill. He noticed that his cane was missing, and thereafter two men approached him and told him the cane was at one of their houses. Olness (who confessed that he was a "fool" to flash his money and then to follow these men outside) walked out of the restaurant with these men. One of them grabbed Olness, who fell to the ground; the other man, whom Olness identified as defendant Vargas, fn. 1 went through his pockets [9 Cal. 3d 473] and took his money. Olness testified that it was dark when the robbery occurred. After the robbery, Olness returned to the restaurant, reported the incident, and then went home. He called the police who, according to Olness, met him back at La Paloma. Four or five days later, Olness returned to La Paloma, where one of the restaurant employees, Trini Rubio Campio, pointed out to him two men (defendant Vargas and his codefendant Medina) whom she believed were the robbers. The police were called in and defendant and Medina were arrested.
Miss Campio also testified for the prosecution. Although she spoke only Spanish, her testimony was translated into English by an interpreter. Miss Campio stated that she is an employee of La Paloma, and that on the day in question she observed Mr. Olness, a regular customer, leave the restaurant after his dinner. Miss Campio also left the restaurant, to return to her apartment. Once outside, a small girl (the four-year-old child of another La Paloma employee) called to her. She saw Mr. Olness with two men in a vacant lot near the restaurant. The two men were defendant "Pete" Vargas and John Medina. Miss Campio identified defendant and explained that she had been acquainted with him and Medina for two or three months, as customers of La Paloma. In Miss Campio's words, "John -- I knew him less because I had seen him in there three or four times. Pete I saw quite often." (Italics added.) Miss Campio testified she was "absolutely positive" that the two men she saw were defendant and Medina.
According to Miss Campio, Mr. Olness was "[t]hrown on the ground" when she first observed him, and defendant, who was leaning over him, made a grabbing motion with his hand toward the side of Olness' pants pocket. Miss Campio "did not know what he [defendant] took, if anything." She said in a loud voice to defendant and Medina, who were approximately 25 feet away," Do not run. You will pay for it. I saw you." The men said nothing, but walked away from the area.
Neither Mr. Olness nor Miss Campio were positive that the incident occurred on June 29. Moreover, although Mr. Olness recalled that it was dark at the time, Miss Campio believed that it was still light. Miss Campio also thought that she had seen defendant in the restaurant nearly every day during the 10 days prior to June 29. A police witness testified, however, that defendant had been in jail on another charge until June 29.
Defendant and codefendant Medina chose not to testify and presented no defense, by way of alibi or otherwise. During his closing arguments to the jury, counsel for Medina apparently fn. 2 explained to the jury that the defendants were under no compulsion to testify. Thereafter, during the prosecutor's closing argument, the prosecutor agreed that defendants did not have to take the stand, but he inquired, "Why didn't they have some witnesses to say where they were on the 29th, on the evening of the 29th. They had to be somewhere ...." (No claim is made that these remarks constituted error.) Thereupon, a conference in chambers was held and the court cautioned the prosecutor against commenting further "as to the context of the defendants not taking the stand, why weren't witnesses called as to where they were, what they were doing ...."
Thereupon, defense counsel requested a further conference in chambers, during which they contended that the prosecutor's statement constituted "Griffin" error, justifying a mistrial. The court acknowledged that the question of error was "awfully close," but asked defense counsel if an admonishment to the jury would "satisfy" them. Counsel agreed to withdraw their motion for mistrial "if the Court makes a strong admonishment and states that type of argument is improper." Thereafter, the court admonished the jury to "disregard completely" the prosecutor's statement "regarding there being a failure to deny the defendants being there." The court explained that in a criminal case, the burden is on the prosecution, that defendants have a right to rely upon the state of the evidence at the close of the People's case, that they have a constitutional right not to take the stand, and that the jury should not draw any inferences of guilt from defendants' failure to testify.
CALJIC No. 2.60: "It is a constitutional right of a defendant in a criminal trial that he may not be compelled to testify. Thus the decision as to whether he should testify is left to the defendant, acting with the advice and assistance of his attorney. You must not draw any inference of guilt from the fact that he does not testify, nor should this fact be discussed by you or enter into your deliberations in any way."
Defendant now contends that the prosecutor's comment upon defendant's failure to "deny" the robbery, coupled with the suggestion (in CALJIC No. 2.61) that defendant's failure to testify may, when supported by other evidence of guilt, be considered by the jury, constituted reversible error. We agree that error was committed in this regard, but we find it harmless in view of its limited nature, and the overwhelming evidence against defendant.
 At first glance, the words in Bethea appear substantially identical to the words at issue herein, namely, "there is no denial at all that they were there [robbing Mr. Olness]." Yet we believe that, although the question is close, the Bethea case is distinguishable. In the present case, the word "denial" connotes a personal response by the accused himself. Any witness could "explain" the facts, but only defendant himself could "deny" his presence at the crime scene. Accordingly, the jury could have interpreted the prosecutor's remarks as commenting upon defendant's failure to take the stand and deny his guilt.
It is quite possible that the prosecutor in this case only intended to point out to the jury that the defense had introduced no evidence to show that defendant or Medina were elsewhere during the robbery. Yet the language used by the prosecutor was sufficiently ambiguous in this respect to lead us to conclude that Griffin error was committed. We [9 Cal. 3d 477] analyze the question of the prejudicial effect of this error after reviewing an additional claim of Griffin error.
2. Error in Jury Instructions -- Defendant contends that CALJIC No. 2.61, set forth above, improperly permitted the jury to consider defendant's failure to testify in appraising his guilt or innocence. The People argue forcefully that CALJIC No. 2.61 accurately sets forth the "truism" that "the failure of a defendant to testify will not 'by itself' supply what the prosecution has failed to do -- present the evidence necessary to convict ...."  Yet, although this interpretation of the instruction was undoubtedly the intent of its framers, an ordinary juror reading it might assume that if the People have presented some evidence of guilt, the defendant's silence can then be considered as supplementing the People's case. Such an instruction would, of course, violate Griffin principles.
The Second District of the Court of Appeal, in two recent cases, has held that the giving of CALJIC No. 2.61, as it read in this case, was Griffin error. (People v. Williams, 22 Cal. App. 3d 34, 45-46 [99 Cal. Rptr. 103]; People v. Townsend, 20 Cal. App. 3d 919, 923-925 [98 Cal. Rptr. 8].) As stated in Williams (p. 45), "By this [instruction], the jurors were told, in effect, that they could not infer from the circumstance that defendant did not testify that a certain thing was true and use this alone as the support for a finding on their part that an element of the crime or an indication of guilt had been proved, but that they could use such inference along with other evidence to support such a finding. This demeaned the force of the preceding instruction [CALJIC No. 2.60, also given in the instant case] which had stated that they must not draw any inference of guilt. For despite that instruction they are being told that they can draw an inference from defendant's silence if they can use it along with some other evidence. This was error. [Citation.]" We agree that Griffin error was committed.
First of all, apart from the state of the evidence in this case, we note that the type of Griffin errors involved here are of a much less direct, and accordingly much less serious, nature than the Griffin errors present in most of the cases which have found such error prejudicial and grounds for reversal. For example, in Griffin itself, the prosecutor and the court had directly informed the jury that, in appraising defendant's guilt, it could take into consideration defendant's failure to testify. Similar error was committed in Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. 18, In re Banks, 4 Cal. 3d 337, 348-349 [93 Cal. Rptr. 591, 482 P.2d 215], and People v. Haston, 69 Cal. 2d 233, 254-255 [70 Cal. Rptr. 419, 444 P.2d 91].
 As in the Modesto and Morse cases, the prosecutor's remark here ("There is no denial at all that they were there") was brief and mild, and amounted to no more than an indirect comment upon defendant's failure to testify without suggesting that an inference of guilt should be drawn therefrom. Moreover, the trial court, at defendant's request, promptly admonished the jury and carefully explained to them that no adverse inferences were to be drawn from defendant's silence.
The erroneous instruction (CALJIC No. 2.61) was no more devastating in effect than the prosecutor's comment, for the error was buried within an otherwise proper instruction, and was preceded by another instruction (CALJIC No. 2.60) which correctly set forth defendant's constitutional right to remain silent, and the further principle that no adverse inferences could be drawn from his silence. The error which was committed was certainly less substantial than the errors in earlier cases, cited above, wherein the jury had been instructed that it could consider defendant's failure to testify.
The cases which have considered the prejudicial effect of errors similar to those committed in the instant case almost uniformly have found those errors to be harmless. (See People v. Morse, supra, 70 Cal. 2d 711, 729-730; [9 Cal. 3d 480] People v. Modesto, supra, 66 Cal. 2d 695, 712-714; People v. Ross, 67 Cal. 2d 64, 73 [60 Cal. Rptr. 254, 429 P.2d 606]; People v. Townsend, supra, 20 Cal. App. 3d 919, 925 [CALJIC No. 2.61]; People v. Ham, supra, 7 Cal. App. 3d 768, 784; People v. Burns, supra, 270 Cal. App. 2d 238, 249; People v. Gioviannini, supra, 260 Cal. App. 2d 597, 604-605; People v. Northern, supra, 256 Cal. App. 2d 28, 30-31; People v. Crawford, supra, 253 Cal. App. 2d 524, 535-536.) The one exception appears to be People v. Williams, supra, 22 Cal. App. 3d 34, 46, wherein (as here) indirect prosecution comment upon defendant's failure to testify was combined with the giving of CALJIC No. 2.61. In Williams, however, the Griffin error was aggravated by "a breakdown in legal representation [by defense counsel] which substantially reduced the strength of defendant's claim of total diminished capacity" (p. 50), together with three erroneous instructions regarding intent, insanity and unconsciousness.
Moreover, in Williams (as in all of the decisions we have reviewed which reversed convictions for Griffin error), "the decision [as to defendant's guilt] was a close one." (P. 39; see p. 46, fn. 11.) fn. 6 Accordingly, the court could not say beyond a reasonable doubt that the combination of errors committed in that case was harmless. (P. 58.) In the instant case, however, the case against defendant was overwhelming: The defense presented no alibi witnesses or other exculpatory evidence, and defendant was positively identified as one of the robbers by the victim and an eyewitness. The victim, Mr. Olness, was evidently quite confused regarding the time and circumstances of the robbery, fn. 7 yet he remained unshaken regarding his identification of defendant. Miss Campio was even more positive that defendant was one of the robbers, for she actually had known defendant ("Pete") for some time prior to the incident. Her [9 Cal. 3d 481] prior acquaintance with defendant made wholly irrelevant her apparent error in believing that defendant had been frequenting the La Paloma restaurant during the 10 days prior to the robbery.
FN 1. At a pretrial lineup, Olness identified defendant with some hesitation, explaining that defendant was wearing a goatee and sideburns when he robbed Olness, but was clean shaven at the lineup. At trial Olness stated that he was "positive" that defendant had robbed him. However, he admitted that his certainty was reinforced by the fact that a witness, Miss Campio, pointed out Vargas to him as his assailant. Nevertheless, Olness insisted that he independently recognized Vargas, stating that "when I get a good look at a man, I will never forget a man or a woman."
FN 2. That portion of the transcript which contains the jury arguments of defense counsel has not been made part of the record in this case. However, recorded colloquy between the trial judge and counsel in chambers indicates that Medina's counsel initiated the discussion regarding defendants' failure to testify.
FN 3. The clerk's transcript indicates that these instructions were "requested by defendant," but nowhere does the record disclose which defendant made the request.
FN 4. CALJIC No. 2.61 has now been amended to delete the italicized words.
FN 5. Thus, under the rule in Bethea, the prosecutor's initial comments, set forth above, regarding the lack of alibi witnesses was not Griffin error.
FN 6. For example, in Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. 18, 24, the evidence against defendants was wholly circumstantial. In In re Banks, supra, 4 Cal. 3d 337, the eyewitness' identifications were tainted by a suggestive lineup, the descriptions did not closely match defendant, there was no evidence that defendant was preparing to commit a robbery, defendant's actions differed from the modus operandi of the suspected robber, and defendant was able to explain satisfactorily the presence of cash in his pockets, the denominations of which failed to match those taken by the robber. In People v. Haston, supra, 69 Cal. 2d 233, defendant presented an alibi defense, was able to rebut other prosecution evidence, and the witnesses to the crime did not see the robbers' faces, since they wore masks.
FN 7. Olness, whose confusion may be explained by the unfortunate state of his health, believed that the robbery occurred in darkness, although Miss Campio testified that the sun was still out. Many of the details given by Olness regarding events immediately following the robbery were contradicted by the testimony of the officer who answered Olness' call to report the robbery. None of these inconsistencies however, pertained to the occurrence of the robbery itself.
FN 8. Defendant also contended on appeal that the trial court erred in not entertaining during the course of trial defendant's motion to suppress a photograph of codefendant Medina used by the People to refresh Miss Campio's memory regarding Medina's facial hair at the time of the robbery. (Evidently, Medina had shaved off his moustache subsequent to the robbery.) This photograph was a jail "mug shot" arising from a prior arrest of Medina; defendant evidently sought to show that Medina's arrest was illegal, and that this photograph was the unlawful fruit of that arrest and hence inadmissible. Subsequent to the trial of this case, however, we decided People v. McInnis, 6 Cal. 3d 821 [100 Cal. Rptr. 618, 494 P.2d 690], and held that the People may use as evidence in a subsequent, unrelated trial a photograph taken following an earlier illegal arrest. Accordingly, defendant's motion was without merit.

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