Source: https://www.morrisjames.com/blogs-Delaware-Business-Litigation-Report,archives-2007
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 20:34:02+00:00

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Showing 112 posts from 2007.
United Rentals Inc v. RAM Holdings Inc. C.A. No. 3360-CC (December 12 and 21, 2007).
In these two decisions the Court of Chancery sets out how it will interpret a contract. Following the objective theory of contract interpretation, the court searches for the "common understanding" of the parties. It will not hear evidence of a party's subjective mental impressions or unilateral understandings.
However, the court will apply the "Forthright Negotiator Principle" when a contract is ambiguous. Under that approach, a reasonable interpretation of contract language of one of the parties will be binding on the other party to the contract if he knew or should have known of the other party's understanding and did not object to it when the contract was signed. Silence then may be fatal.
The Territory Of The Virgin Islands v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., C.A. No. 2505-VCS (December 20, 2007).
This decision upholds the law that Section 278 of the Delaware General Corporation Law ("DGCL") acts as a statute of repose to bar the filing of all litigation against a Delaware corporation after 3 years from the date of its dissolution.
As the court also notes, that means that a suit against stockholders under Section 325 of the DGCL for having received an improper liquidating distribution are also precluded under those circumstances.
Brown v. T-Ink, LLC ,C.A. No. 3190-VCP (December 18, 2007) Delaware courts have recently issued several decisions dealing with the scope of an agreement to arbitrate. This is yet another. The opinion is interesting for its explanation of the Delaware approach to determining whether it is for the arbitrator or the court to decide if an issue is subject to arbitration. Generally, that issue will be decided by the court unless there is a clear indication in the agreement that the arbitrator is to decide such questions. As this decision points out, references to the AAA rules and language including "all controversies" arising out of the parties' relationship indicate that an arbitrator should decide such issues.
Fogel v. U.S. Energy Systems, Inc., C.A. No. 3271-CC (December 13, 2007).
Directors often think that if they get together that is a real board of directors' meeting. Not so. As this decision holds, a board meeting is a formal event that must be preceded by the appropriate notice, be conducted by voting on the issues and otherwise be properly called and conducted. Gatherings of even all the directors that do not meet these tests are void.
Moreover, the consequence of holding a meeting void is that actions taken cannot be ratified later. Thus, even when all but one of the company's directors wanted to fire the CEO, their attempt to do so at a haste gathering of all the directors was ineffective.
Rembrandt Technologies, LP v. Harris Corp., 2007 WL 4237752 (Del. Super. Nov. 30, 2007).
Globis Partners LP v. Plumtree Software, Inc., C.A. No. 1577-VCP (November 30, 2007).
This decision explains why some attacks on a merger fail for want of a basis to avoid the business judgment rule and for a failure to make proper disclosure claims. The merger was a third-party transaction and the defendant directors received no unique benefit as a result. The Court held that granting those directors a right to indemnification, an acceleration of options and a cash out of vested options, did not constitute a special benefit that would make the directors interested parties. Hence, the business judgment rule applied.
The court also concluded that the complaint's disclosure claims lacked merit. For the most part, those claims were attacks on the merits of the investment banker's analysis attached to the proxy statement. That is not a claim of inadequate disclosure. Thus, the complaint was dismissed.
Sample v. Morgan, C.A. No. 1214-VCS (November 27, 2007).
In this major decision, the Court of Chancery has upheld its jurisdiction over a non-Delaware attorney who is alleged to have aided and abetted a breach of fiduciary duty by directors. Given the breadth of this decision, it has major implications for counsel to Delaware corporations.
First, the Court held that the attorney's arranging for the filing of a certificate with the Delaware Secretary of State satisfied the single act required to permit service of process on the attorney and his law firm under the Delaware Long Arm Statute. That is nothing new under Delaware law as other decisions have held that filing of such a certificate meets the statutory requirement for service.
Second, the Court held, in what may prove to be its most controversial decision, that Due Process was satisfied in subjecting the attorney to jurisdiction by a Delaware court. Noting that this "is a highly unusual case", the Court had no problem holding that giving advice on Delaware law and controlling the course of litigation in Delaware justified subjecting the attorney to jurisdiction here. What may prove to be controversial, however, are sections of the opinion that suggest that regularly providing advice on Delaware corporate law is sufficient to satisfy the requirement of Due Process in asserting jurisdiction over the non-Delaware lawyer for claims arising out of that advice.
Finally, the opinion holds that an attorney may be held liable for aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty when he knows his advice is being used to carry out the breach. This is important because the knowledge requirement may be satisfied when the lawyer claims expertise in Delaware law and his advice is wrong. The inference then is that he knows his advice is wrong. While this seems to go too far, it is not clear how far the logic of the opinion may be stretched by other courts.
The three-year statute of limitations under 10 Del. C. § 8106, which begins to run at the time of the alleged breach in the case of a contract claim and at the time the injury occurs for a tort claim, may be tolled by, among other circumstances, the absence of observable factors that would place a layman on notice. This exception is called the date of discovery rule. When it applies, the statute of limitations begins to run when the defect is or should have been discovered.
In this legal malpractice action, the Superior Court held that the statute of limitations expired prior to the filing of the complaint and that it was not tolled because “multiple factors and plaintiff’s own statements indicate knowledge of the relevant facts which establish a potential claim . . . .” The plaintiff argued that the defendant attorneys fraudulently concealed his potential tax liability, but based on the evidence, the court concluded that the plaintiff should have discovered this fact, at the very least, by the time he hired an independent consultant who brought the matter to his attention.
Ryan v. Gifford, C.A. No. 2213-CC (November 21, 2007).
In 2003, Delaware amended its long arm statute to cover corporate officers who served in that capacity after January 1, 2004. Past decisions under the director section of this statute have focused on when a defendant is subject to it for acts committed before the date the statute deems the defendant's holding a corporate office is consent to jurisdiction by a Delaware court. Consistent with that case law, this decision holds that prior bad acts do not constitute continuing wrongs that subject the defendant to Delaware jurisdiction after January 1, 2004.
Of course, the decision also holds that there are acts some of the defendants committed before that date which were further implemented after that date and that may subject them to jurisdiction. For example, receiving a back dated option before January 1, 2004 does not subject the officer to jurisdiction in Delaware unless after that date he commits further acts, such as concealing that the option was back dated.
Melzer v. CNET Networks, Inc., C.A. No. 3023-CC (November 21, 2007).
The scope of inspection rights may be affected by when a stockholder first acquired her stock. If the inspection is to investigate alleged wrongdoing, the rationale for granting inspection is to permit the filing of a derivative suit if the inspection shows that it is warranted. Hence, prior case law has held that inspection of records existing before the petitioner became a stockholder is not warranted because the stockholder has no right to sue for those pre-ownership wrongs under Delaware law.
This decision extends inspection rights when the potential claim is for a Caremark case alleging a "sustained or systematic failure" of oversight. Then, the Court held, showing past failures is relevant to showing a sustained wrong that culminated in damage to the entity after the petitioner became a stockholder. Under that rationale, the scope of inspection may extend to pre-ownership records.
Bernstein v. Tractmanager Inc., C.A. No. 7263-VCL (November 20, 2007).
This decision illustrates the perils in converting from an LLC to a corporate form without considering the consequences. Here, the LLC involved did not provide for mandatory advancement rights. The LLC was then converted into a Delaware corporation whose bylaws did provide for advancement as a matter of right. Quite possibly this was thought to be a good idea as the attorney who did the conversion was about to be sued by the entity and was a director who now thought he was covered. Unfortunately, the LLC did not provide for advancement and the Court of Chancery held that it was the LLC's operating agreement that controlled the right to advancement. Thus, advancement was denied.
The lesson here is that in converting from one form of entity to another do not assume that the new entity is obligated to fulfill all the obligations that might have been the responsibility of its predecessor. That was the losing party's argument. The problem was that the LLC was not obligated to him and thus, there was no liability to follow upon conversion. If you want the new entity to be liable then say so.
Hildreth v. Castle Dental Centers, Inc., Del. Sup. C.A. No. 195, 2007 (November 15, 2007).
A tricky issue arises when a defective certificate of incorporation causes stock to be void. Here, the preferred stock was validly authorized but there was not enough common stock to fulfill the conversion rights of the preferred. The Supreme Court held that the defect was with the common stock, not with the preferred. Hence, one defect in the "contract" will not invalidate the whole contract.
This case demonstrates that a Delaware court will not consider extrinsic evidence of the parties’ intent at the time of entering an agreement if the terms of the document are unambiguous.
The buyer/plaintiff purchased a transmission business called Goodeal Discount Transmissions of Dover, Inc., thinking it was a sole proprietorship. But after the closing, the franchisor—not the seller—came knocking on the buyer’s door seeking unpaid franchise fees and stating the amount to be paid going forward. Soon thereafter, the buyer sued the seller/former owner for breach of contract for failing to disclose that the business was a franchise, for breach of the contractual warranties, and for fraudulent misrepresentation.
Seidensticker v. The Gasparilla Inn Inc., C.A. No. 2555-CC (November 8, 2007).
In this decision, the Court of Chancery has once again held that a contract means what it says, not what the parties say they subjectively intended. Thus, if the contract is unambiguous in its language, the Court will not accept explanations of what it was supposed to mean. Instead, the Court will enforce the contract as written. This opinion is useful for its review of recent case law that some have suggested adopted a "subjective" theory of contract interpretation under which, as the Cheshire Cat once said, "A word means what I say it means." Not so in Delaware.

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