Source: https://www.defenselitigationinsider.com/2017/01/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 00:59:55+00:00

Document:
On December 23, 2016 in Santa Clara, California, in Modisette v. Apple, Inc., 16CV304364, the family of a five-year-old girl killed in a car crash on Christmas Eve 2014 filed a lawsuit against Apple alleging that Apple’s FaceTime application distracted a driver and caused the death of Moriah Modisette. Like the majority of distracted driver accidents, this one could have been prevented. On the one hand, the driver could have waited until he stopped driving before using the FaceTime application. On the other hand, Apple could have designed a lock-out feature or warned FaceTime users of the dangers of driving while FaceTiming.
In Modisette v. Apple, Inc., the court must decide whether a smartphone manufacturer like Apple has a duty to protect the public and FaceTime users by preventing the use of the application while driving. FaceTime is a factory-installed video communication service similar to Skype and Google Hangouts that allows Apple device users to conduct one-on-one video calls. Ultimately, this case raises an important question: Should a smartphone manufacturer be liable for injuries caused by distracted drivers using a phone application, and if so, are distracted drivers a superseding intervening cause?
Plaintiffs allege that Apple’s iPhone was defective because Apple failed to install and implement the safer alternative design for which it sought a patent in December 2008, which was later issued in April 2014. The alternative design would “lock out” a driver’s ability to FaceTime while driving. In addition, Plaintiffs allege that Apple failed to warn drivers that FaceTiming while driving was likely to be dangerous. Plaintiffs further allege that the conduct of the driver is “inextricably intertwined” with Apple’s failure to implement the patented lock out feature, and as a result, Apple allegedly failed to exercise reasonable care.
This is not the first time Apple has been involved in a products liability lawsuit arising out of an accident caused by a distracted driver. In 2015, in Meador v. Apple, Inc. (2016) WL 4425527 (E.D.Tex.), Apple was sued for a 2013 crash involving a driver distracted by checking her text messages. The question raised in Meador is similar to the Modisette’s case: Does a smartphone manufacturer have a duty to prevent drivers from using the device while driving? On August 16, 2016, in a pretrial report and recommendation, United States Magistrate Judge K. Nicole Mitchell recommended that the case be dismissed with prejudice because a “real risk of injury did not materialize until [the driver] neglected her duty to safely operate her vehicle by diverting her attention to the roadway.” Meador v. Apple, Inc. (E.D. Tex., Aug. 16, 2016) WL 7665863, at 4. Thus, Judge Mitchell opined that Apple’s failure to lock out the driver did “nothing more than create the condition that made Plaintiffs’ injuries possible.” Id. As a result of Judge Mitchell’s recommendation, the Meador case has been stayed pending an order from the District Judge on Apple’s Motion to Dismiss.
The United States Supreme Court declined a petition for certiorari on Monday, January 9, in the matter of Ascira Partners, LLC v. Daniel, dashing hopes that the Justices would resolve conflicting federal law on jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act. The petition involved a massive medical malpractice action in Ohio which originated from medical care provided by a single doctor working at multiple medical care facilities. Originally, plaintiffs filed 226 individual lawsuits against the doctor and various medical providers in several different Ohio counties before the cases were consolidated before a single judge. At that point, the various plaintiffs requested that the court set all of the cases for one combined trial, or several smaller group trials. The court ultimately set four smaller trials and one large group trial which combined the claims of over 400 plaintiffs into a single case.
Following this consolidation, defendants sought to have the case removed from Ohio state court to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d), otherwise known as the “Class Action Fairness Act.” Among other provisions, this statute gives federal courts jurisdiction over certain monetary relief claims of 100 or more persons so long as the plaintiffs’ claims involve common questions of law or fact. The Ohio state court, however, determined that the case should stay in state court, as the “100 plaintiff” element of the statute was not satisfied. Under the state court’s view, federal jurisdiction under the statute is proper only when a single complaint contains at least 100 plaintiffs, not when where multiple suits are combined for trial to encompass the claims of more than 100 plaintiffs. Defendants asked the federal Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals to review this interpretation, arguing that the Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits had all previously determined exactly the opposite, that the 100 plaintiff threshold was, in fact, satisfied when plaintiffs decide to combine multiple cases for trial. When the Sixth Circuit implicitly adopted the state court’s interpretation by declining to weigh in, defendants sought review from the United States Supreme Court.
These “Circuit splits”, where Circuit Courts disagree on the interpretation of the law, are not uncommon. And it is certainly not uncommon for the Supreme Court to deny a party’s petition for review. The Supreme Court receives approximately 7,000 petitions each year, and accepts roughly 80 for oral argument and review. The Supreme Court’s denial of review in Ascira Parnters is nevertheless significant for mass tort defendants across the country.

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