Source: http://legalarium.com/ttabquotes/Color.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 14:26:58+00:00

Document:
Color marks are marks that consist solely of one or more colors used on particular objects. For marks used in connection with goods, the color may be used on the entire surface of the goods, on a portion of the goods, or on all or part of the packaging for the goods. For example, a color trademark might consist of purple used on a salad bowl, pink used on the handle of a shovel, or a blue background and a pink circle used on all or part of a product package. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., Inc., 514 U.S. 159, 34 USPQ2d 1161 (1995) (green-gold used on dry cleaning press pads held to be a protectible trademark, where the color had acquired secondary meaning); In re Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 774 F.2d 1116, 227 USPQ 417 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (the color pink as applied to fibrous glass residential insulation registrable where the evidence showed the color had acquired secondary meaning). Similarly, service marks may consist of color used on all or part of materials used in the advertising and rendering of the services.
Color marks are never inherently distinctive, and cannot be registered on the Principal Register without a showing of acquired distinctiveness under §2(f) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. §1052(f). Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 211-212, 54 USPQ2d 1065, 1068 (2000). See TMEP §1202.05(a) and cases cited therein.
Color, whether a single overall color or multiple colors applied in a specific and arbitrary fashion, is usually perceived as an ornamental feature of the goods or services. Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1124, 227 USPQ at 422; In re Hudson News Co., 39 USPQ2d 1915, 1923 (TTAB 1996), aff’d per curiam, 114 F.3d 1207 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“blue motif” used in retail stores would likely be perceived by prospective purchasers as “nothing more than interior decoration” that “could be found in any number of retail establishments. Undoubtedly such features are usually perceived as interior decoration or ornamentation.”) However, color can function as a mark if it is used in the manner of a trademark/service mark and if it is perceived by the purchasing public to identify and distinguish the goods or services on or in connection with which it is used and to indicate their source. The United States Supreme Court has held that color alone may, sometimes, meet the basic legal requirements for a trademark. When it does, there is no rule that prevents color from serving as a mark. Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 161, 34 USPQ2d at 1162. If a color is not functional and is shown to have acquired distinctiveness on or in connection with the applicant’s goods or services, it is registrable as a mark.
Functional color marks are not registrable. See TMEP §1202.05(b) and cases cited therein.
Color can function as a trademark.
Saint-Gobain Corporation v. 3M Company, Opposition No. 91119166, (TTAB 2007).
The Supreme Court has held that color alone can function as a trademark. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., 514 U.S. 159, 39 USPQ2d 1161, 1162 (1995) (“We conclude that, sometimes, a color will meet ordinary legal trademark requirements”).
In re Sunburst Products, Inc., Serial No. 74/300,843, (TTAB 1999).
There is no question that color may be the subject of a trademark. Qualitex Co., supra.
Color marks are registerable upon evidence of acquired distinctiveness.
Applicant, in this case where it seeks registration of its purple color applied to coated abrasives, requests registration under the provision of Section 2(f) on the ground that it has acquired distinctiveness. Therefore, applicant’s mark is only registrable on the Principal Register if applicant has submitted sufficient evidence that its mark has acquired distinctiveness. “Distinctiveness is acquired by ‘substantially exclusive and continuous use’ of the mark in commerce.” In re Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corporation, 774 F.2d 1116, 227 USPQ 417, 424 n.11 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
A color mark can never be inherently distinctive.
The Supreme Court has also made it clear that “with respect to at least one category of mark -— colors -- we have held that no mark can ever be inherently distinctive.” Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v. Samara Brothers Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 54 USPQ2d 1065, 1068 (2000).
The mere fact that applicant’s design/color is one of a kind does not necessarily mean that it is inherently distinctive.
First, while it may be true that applicant’s particular color scheme may be argued to be “unique” or novel to the extent that no other company uses this precise design, the fact that applicant’s design may be said to be the one and only of its kind does not necessarily mean that it is inherently distinctive. See In re E S Robbins Corp., 30 USPQ2d 1540, 1542-3 (TTAB 1992).
Color cannot serve as a trademark if the use of the color is functional.
“Like any other mark, the use of color -- if functional – cannot serve as a trademark.” Brunswick II, 32 USPQ2d at 1120.
A heavy burden exists for registering a color mark.
Furthermore, as our principal reviewing court has observed: “By their nature color marks carry a difficult burden in demonstrating distinctiveness and trademark character.” Owens-Corning, 227 USPQ at 424.
Color cannot be registered where granting exclusive use of the color would severely restrict competition.
"In contrast to the many shades of color available for fiberglass insulation, the evidence shows that the color palette available for the manufacture of fly rods is extremely limited. One limiting factor is the method by which the color is applied to the rod. The rod is made in part of graphite, which is a carbon and so is naturally black, and the color is applied as a dye, not a paint. Only a few dark shades successfully mask the black base and colors applied to it darken deeply. Under these circumstances, granting exclusive use of a color to one manufacturer would severely restrict competition; there would be little left for the rest of the world." R.L. Winston Rod Co. v. Sage Manufacturing Co., 838 F. Supp. 1396, 29 USPQ2d 1779, 1781 (D. Mont. 1993). See also Qualitex, 34 USPQ2d at 1165 (“[If] a ‘color depletion’ or “color scarcity’ problem does arise -- the trademark doctrine of ‘functionality’ normally would seem available to prevent the anticompetitive consequences”).
“It is not so important to categorize the function of the color, however, as it is to determine whether manufacturers have a competitive need for using a limited number of colors. If competitive factors restrict the availability of color, then color may be functional.” 29 USPQ2d at 1781.
Evidence: Extensive evidence of the use of color is not necessarily sufficient to support registration.
Applicant also points out that it has spent several million dollars promoting its purple products and that the sales of its products have grown steadily. However, we note that even more extensive evidence of this type was not necessarily sufficient when the involved mark was a color mark applied to outboard motors: Applicant has sold large numbers of its engines in a wide variety of sizes for almost thirty years in only one color: black. As noted above, applicant has spent over a hundred million dollars advertising its engines, all of which have been black, and three billion dollars worth of these products have been sold. This extensive presence in the marketplace is bound to create recognition of the fact that applicant's engines are black. The evidence also shows that while applicant is not the exclusive purveyor of black outboard engines, applicant is responsible for the majority of them. That a large portion of the relevant purchasing public knows applicant makes black engines is understandable under these circumstances. British Seagull Ltd. v. Brunswick Corp., 28 USPQ2d 1197, 1203 (TTAB 1993) (“Brunswick I”), aff’d, 35 F.3d 1527, 32 USPQ2d 1120 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (“Brunswick II”).
Evidence: When seeking to register a color in a field where color is common, sales and advertising evidence not necessarily sufficient, by themselves, to demonstrate that a color has acquired distinctiveness.
While some of applicant’s advertising supports applicant’s claim of acquired distinctiveness, inasmuch as applicant is seeking registration of a color in a field where color is common, sales and advertising evidence would ordinarily not be sufficient by itself to demonstrate that its color has acquired distinctiveness.
Evidence: A telephone survey concerning color is not inherently unreliable.
Regarding the objection that a telephone survey should be virtually meaningless, we ultimately agree with opposer that, despite our initial misgivings, a telephone survey involving a color, at least under the facts of this case, is not inherently unreliable. To the extent that opposer’s survey is subject to criticism, it could also be criticized as erring on the side of over-inclusion, because any customer who saw any shade of the color purple as indicating a single source for coated abrasives would have responded affirmatively.
If others have used differing shades of the color sought to be registered, the relevant public is less likely to view the color as an indicator of origin and instead view the color as mere ornamentation lacking in trademark function.
However, the fact that other shades of purple are not the same as applicant’s shade does not mean that these products are irrelevant. Edward Weck Inc., 17 USPQ2d at 1145 (“Since others have used this same color, albeit a different shade of the color green, the relevant public is less likely to view the color as an indicator of origin than as mere ornamentation lacking in trademark function”). See also Brunswick I, 28 USPQ2d at 1203 (“When the party which claims that matter has become distinctive of its goods is faced with use by others of the same or similar matter on the same goods, that party has a difficult burden to meet”).
Applicant has a difficult burden to demonstrate the distinctiveness of its claimed color where the use of colors is common in the field.
We note that where “the use of colors is common in a field, an applicant has a difficult burden in demonstrating distinctiveness of its claimed color.” In re Howard S. Leight and Associates Inc., 39 USPQ2d 1058, 1060 (TTAB 1996). This is not a case such as Owens-Corning where color is an unusual feature for paper and cloth abrasives. Rather, it is a case where color is used by others in the field for a variety of reasons.
Trade dress, including color, is registrable if it is not de jure functional and if it is distinctive, either inherently so or by virtue of acquired distinctiveness.
A mere refinement of a common color scheme would be recognized by the public as merely a different form of ornamentation and not sufficiently distinctive to signify origin.
Applying this framework to the case at hand, applicant’s design mark is nothing more than a mere refinement of a common or basic color scheme for sports watches and therefore would not immediately be recognized or perceived as a source indicator. That is to say, we believe that applicant’s design would be viewed by prospective purchasers as just a slightly different ornamentation. The matching bezel and watch strap color and contrasting bezel and watch case color are essentially minor variations of a common way of adorning sports watches (contrasting colors of bezel and strap). The evidence of record, applicant’s disclaimer in this case (indicating that no claim is made to the exclusive right to use colored watch bezels and straps, nor to contrasting colors per se), as well as counsel’s admission at the oral hearing demonstrate that contrasting bezel and watch strap colors are in the public domain. In other words, if a competitor is free to use, say, a bezel in the color red and a watch strap in the color blue, applicant’s red bezel and matching red watch band are unlikely to be considered sufficiently distinctive in and of themselves to signify origin. Rather, we believe that purchasers will merely look upon these matching colors (and contrasting watch color) as a different form of ornamentation.
Evidence: Advertisements, promotions, and catalogs of a product, without more, are not evidence of the efficacy of applicant’s efforts to promote recognition of its product’s appearance as a trademark.
We agree with the Examining Attorney that, although applicant has displayed its goods in its catalogs and, to some extent, in advertisements and promotions (magazine covers), there is no evidence showing that purchasers or potential purchasers of applicant’s watches recognize the specifically claimed features in this application as an indication of origin. That is to say, although applicant may want purchasers and potential purchasers to view the matching and contrasting colors as applicant’s trademark, there is simply no evidence of the effectiveness of applicant’s efforts in this regard to promote recognition as a trademark of this specific aspect of the watches’ appearance. Applicant has not shown that it has promoted its color scheme as a trademark in its catalogs (some parts of which do not even clearly show that the strap is the same color as the bezel), and there is no indication that potential purchasers would view this as more than a picture of the goods. See In re Pingel Enterprise Inc., 46 USPQ2d 1811 (TTAB 1998). The color scheme has simply not been advanced as a means of recognizing applicant as the source of its watches (unlike the mark SHARK shown thereon).
Evidence: Sales and advertising figures are not determinative of the success of applicant’s attempts to develop distinctiveness of its asserted color scheme.
Furthermore, the claimed popularity of applicant’s watches8 may well result from other features of its products which are deemed superior by the purchasing public. Moreover, applicant’s sales and advertising figures are not determinative of the success of applicant’s attempts to develop distinctiveness of its asserted color scheme. In re Pingel, supra (sales growth over time does not suffice to establish that purchasing public has come to view petcock configuration as a trademark for motorcycle fuel valves) and In re Semel, 189 USPQ 285 (TTAB 1975).
FOOTNOTE 8 "We have nothing which indicates the relative size of applicant’s sales to those of competitors. See Fossil Inc. v. Fossil Group, 49 USPQ2d 1452, 1457 (TTAB 1998) and General Mills Inc. v. Health Valley Foods, 24 USPQ2d 1270, 1227 (TTAB 1992).
Case Finding: In many color functionality cases, the final color of the product is typically dictated by aesthetic considerations.
This case is different from most color functionality cases. In the typical color case, the final color of the product is normally dictated by aesthetic considerations. In Owens-Corning, the Court found that a “pink color mark registered for fibrous glass insulation does not confer a ‘monopoly’ or act as a barrier to entry in the market. It has no relationship to production of fibrous glass insulation. It serves the classical trademark function of indicating the origin of the goods.” 227 USPQ at 421. Furthermore, the record revealed that Owens-Corning was the only manufacturer to color insulation, which was ordinarily a light yellow-white coloring. 227 USPQ at 420. Similarly, in Brunswick II, the basic color of the engines after the manufacturing process was not an issue.
Case Finding: Cases where the product was not alleged to come in a variety of colors as a result of the manufacturing process.
In these Federal Circuit cases, the product was not alleged to come in a variety of colors as a result of the manufacturing process. The products all seemed to come in a basic color that was then dyed or painted the desired color. See also In re Ferris Corp., 59 USPQ2d 1587 (TTAB 2000) (Pink for bandages); In re Orange Communications Inc., 41 USPQ2d 1036 (TTAB 1996) (Orange and yellow pay telephones); Edward Weck Inc., 17 USPQ2d 1142 (Green for surgical instruments).
Case Finding: Brunskwick II did not set out a rule that a color is function if it is the only shade available.
Further, applicant argues that “3M Purple is not the only shade available” citing Brunswick II (Brief at 48). First, Brunswick II did not set out a rule that a color is functional if it is the only shade available. Second, Brunswick II is distinguishable because there was no indication that outboard engines came in a variety of colors as a result of the materials used in the manufacturing process. In contrast, here the record establishes that coated abrasives come in a variety of natural colors and these products are often then dyed for a variety of reasons. Therefore, the situation in R.L. Winston is analogous, because naturally dark-colored abrasives would then need to be dyed often with a dark color.
Case finding: Applicant’s use of color is functional and not entitled to registration.
However, as discussed above, we find that applicant has not sustained this burden of showing that there is no competitive need for others to use the color purple and that its deep purple color is not functional. “[I]f the use of color on the applicant’s goods serves a non-trademark purpose that hinders competition, the de jure functionality doctrine precludes trademark protection.” Brunswick II, 32 USPQ2d at 1123. In view of the fact that color, especially color that is dark in nature, both natural and dyed, is a common and useful feature in the field of coated abrasives, applicant’s color purple is functional because “exclusive use of the feature would put competitors at a significant non-reputation-related disadvantage.” Qualitex, 34 USPQ2d at 1164.
The mere use of TM or “trademarked” may be an assertion of a claim of trademark but it does not automatically transform a word, design, color or sound into a trademark.
FOOTNOTE 16 "There is nothing in the record to indicate what applicant means when it refers to the sound as “trademarked.” It is not federally registered and there is no evidence that it is the subject of any state registration. Accordingly, we can only take these references to be the equivalent of a TM designation or the like, i.e., an assertion or claim that the sound serves the function of a trademark. However, the mere use of TM or “trademarked” does not automatically transform a word, design, color or sound into a trademark. See In re Aerospace Optics Inc., 78 USPQ2d 1861, 1864 (TTAB 2006)."

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