Source: http://nullapoena.de/iur/allan.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 15:44:46+00:00

Document:
1. The case originated in an application (no. 48539/99) against the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ("the Convention") by a United Kingdom national, Mr Richard Roy Allan ("the applicant"), on 20 January 1999.
2. The applicant, who had been granted legal aid, was represented before the Court by Mr R. Turnberg, a lawyer practising in Manchester. The United Kingdom Government ("the Government") were represented by their Agent, Mr C. Whomersley of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
3. The applicant complains of the use of covert audio and video surveillance within his cell, the prison visiting area and upon a fellow prisoner and of the use of materials gained by these means at his trial for murder. He invokes Articles 6, 8 and 13 of the Convention.
4. The application was allocated to the Fourth Section of the Court (Rule 52 § 1 of the Rules of Court). Within that Section, the Chamber that would consider the case (Article 27 § 1 of the Convention) was constituted as provided in Rule 26 § 1 of the Rules of Court.
5. By a decision of 28 August 2001, the Chamber declared the application partly admissible.
6. On 1 November 2001 the Court changed the composition of its Sections (Rule 25 § 1 of the Rules of Court). The above application was transferred to the newly composed Fourth Section (Rule 52 § 1).
7. The applicant and the Government each filed observations on the merits (Rule 59 § 1). The Chamber decided, after consulting the parties, that no hearing on the merits was required (Rule 59 § 2 in fine). The parties replied in writing to each other's observations.
8. On 3 February 1995, Mr David Beesley, store manager, was shot dead in the manager's office of a Kwik-Save supermarket in Greater Manchester.
9. On 18 February 1995, the applicant and another man, by the name of Leroy Grant, were arrested on suspicion of having committed a late-evening robbery at the "Late Saver" shop, Cheadle. At the time, they were in possession of an 8 mm Beretta replica handgun. Charged in connection with this offence, Mr Grant admitted to the offence and several other late night shop robberies. The applicant denied involvement in any of the offences. On or about 20 February 1995, an anonymous informant told the police that the applicant had been involved in the murder of David Beesley.
10. On 20 February 1995, the applicant and Leroy Grant appeared in custody at the Stockport Magistrates' Court and were further remanded in custody to re-appear on 23 February 1995. On 20 February 1995, Detective Chief Inspector Dunn requested permission for the cell and the visiting areas used by the applicant and Leroy Grant to be bugged with audio and video technology, alleging that all regular methods of investigation to identify David Beesley's murderer had failed. The Chief Constable of the Greater Manchester Police granted authority on the same day for an unlimited period for both the police stations at Stockport and Cheadle Hulme. On 13 March 1995, similar authority was sought and obtained for the installation of a listening device with video system to be placed in the visiting area of Stretford Police Station, where the applicant was then held.
11. On 8 March 1995, the applicant was arrested for the murder and questioned. In the interviews with the police which followed, the police told the applicant that he was not obliged to say anything. He availed himself of that right.
12. During this time, visits to the applicant by his female friend, J.N.S, were recorded by audiotape and on video in the prison visiting area between 12 and 28 March 1995. The applicant and Leroy Grant were held for long periods in the same cell and recordings taken of their conversations from 20 February to 12 March 1995.
13. On 23 March 1995, H. was brought to Stretford Police Station. H. was a long-standing police informant with a criminal record who was arrested on 21 March 1995 for unrelated offences. He was placed in the applicant's cell for the purpose of eliciting information from the applicant. As asserted by the applicant, H. had every incentive to inform on him. Telephone conversations between H. and the police included comments by the police instructing H. to "push him for what you can" and disclosed evidence of concerted police coaching. After 20 April 1995, he associated regularly with the applicant who was remanded at Strangeways prison.
14. On 28 June 1995, the applicant was taken away from the prison to be interviewed by the police concerning the Kwik-Save robbery. He was attended and advised by his solicitor. During the course of the interview, the applicant was invited to comment on the recordings made in February and March 1995. He made no comment to any question. According to the applicant, he was interrogated at length by the police in an attempt to "rattle" or unsettle him, such that he would be more talkative and vulnerable to H. upon his return to the prison. H. had been fitted with recording devices. The recording thereby obtained was adduced in evidence at the applicant's trial.
15. The applicant was interviewed again with his solicitor present on 29 June and 26 July 1995 and remained silent in face of the allegations.
16. On 25 July 1995, H. made a 59-60 page witness statement, detailing his conversations with the applicant and was released on bail on 4 August1995. His sentence was postponed until after he had given evidence at the applicant's trial. The high point of H.'s evidence was the assertion that the applicant had admitted his presence at the murder scene. This asserted admission was not part of the recorded interview and was disputed. The thrust of the applicant's case was that he was discussing robberies and did not accede to H.'s efforts to channel their conversation into a discussion of the murder. The audio and video recordings (or transcripts thereof) were utilised in the trial of the applicant. No evidence, other than the alleged admissions, connected the applicant with the killing of Mr Beesley.
17. In January 1998, the applicant's trial on one count of murder and a count of conspiracy to rob began before a jury. He was represented by leading counsel.
18. During his trial, the applicant's counsel challenged the admissibility of extracts from covert tape and video recordings of conversations of the applicant with Leroy Grant and J.N.S., under sections 76 and 78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 ("PACE"). The judge concluded that there was evidence on the tapes from which the jury could infer that the applicant was involved in the events of 3 February 1995, and it was not so unreliable that it could not be left to the jury to assess for themselves. The judge also rejected the applicant's counsel's arguments under sections 76 and 78 of PACE that the evidence from H. was obtained by oppression or by such impropriety as to render it inadmissible. He considered that the use of an informant to talk and listen to the accused over a substantial period of time did not result in any unfairness to the accused. The fact that H. might be considered as having much to gain in giving evidence was also a matter to be left to the jury in their assessment of the reliability of his evidence. The evidence was accordingly admitted before the jury. The judge's ruling on the admissibility of the evidence was given on 26 January 1998, after a voire dire and consisted of a judgment of 18 pages.
"So at the end of the day with regard to H. you have his evidence about the conversations that he had with [the applicant] and what the applicant said. You have the tape recordings of the conversations on 28 June when H. had been wired up, between the applicant and H., and you have the transcripts of the conversations between H. and the police. I suggest... that you approach the evidence of H. with the very greatest caution and care. He is a professional criminal. He behaved, and has behaved as he acknowledged, dishonestly and criminally for years. He saw the likelihood of advantage to himself, both in terms of bail and in the sentence that he was likely to receive. You have heard that he has not yet been sentenced on matters for which he was in custody in early 1995. The defence say if you consider the whole picture you simply cannot rely upon H.; quite unsafe to do so. The prosecution say the contents of the tapes of 28 June can be relied on and are consistent with what H. says the applicant had said to him previously, before he, H., was wired up. Of course tapes of ... conversations cannot possibly constitute any independent confirmation of what H. says about what the applicant had said to him previously, because, and you will understand the logic of that, the information is all coming from one source, namely H. and the witness cannot strengthen his own evidence essentially by repetition.
So, ladies and gentlemen, at the end of the day how do you regard H.? Was he or may he have been lying, or are you sure that he was telling the truth? If you are sure, for example, in relation to things said on the tapes of 28 June or other aspects of H.'s evidence that his evidence is true, that the applicant did say a number of things, what do those things mean? Do they point to his guilt, to his presence at Kwik-Save on 3 February 1995, or are they capable of meaning something else?..."
20. The judge also directed the jury concerning the possible drawing of inferences from the applicant's silence in police interview on 28 June, 29 June and 26 July 1995, pursuant to section 34 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994. He reminded the jury that the defence had contended that the applicant's silence had been adopted on legal advice because of the view that oppressive interrogation techniques were being used.
21. On 17 February 1998, after the jury had deliberated for a total of twenty one and a half hours, the applicant was convicted of murder before the Crown Court at Manchester by a 10-2 majority and sentenced to life imprisonment. The applicant thereafter lodged a notice of appeal, asserting, inter alia, that the judge ought to have excluded evidence of the audiotape and videotape recordings of the applicant's conversations with Leroy Grant and J.N.S. and the evidence of H. He also argued that the judge had erred in his directions as to the circumstances in which the jury could draw inferences from the applicant's failure to respond to police questions in interviews of 28 and 29 June, when the police strategy was to "spook" the applicant into a state of garrulousness when he returned to prison, where he had a conversation with H.
22. On 31 July 1998, he was refused leave to appeal against his conviction by a single judge. His renewed application was refused by the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) on 18 January 1999, after a hearing at which he was represented by leading counsel. In the court's judgment of that date, Lord Justice Rose found that the trial judge gave a very careful and impeccable ruling as regards the admissibility of the tapes and evidence of H. and that he had considered all the matters which he should have considered and had not considered any matter which he ought not to have considered. There was no basis for holding that the exercise of his discretion had been so flawed that the Court of Appeal should intervene. In so far as the applicant complained that the judge should have warned the jury not to take into account the applicant's failure to answer police questioning in the light of the police strategy to "spook" him, Lord Justice Rose found that the judge had given an entirely appropriate direction to the jury in the circumstances of the case.
use of equipment must be operationally feasible.
In judging how far the seriousness of the crime under investigation justifies the use of a particular surveillance technique, authorising officers should satisfy themselves that the degree of intrusion into the privacy of those affected is commensurate with the seriousness of the offence."
24. The Guidelines also state that there may be circumstances in which material so obtained could appropriately be used in evidence at subsequent court proceedings.
25. The 1997 Act provides a statutory basis for the authorisation of police surveillance operations involving interference with property or wireless telegraphy. The relevant sections relating to the authorisation of surveillance operations, including the procedures to be adopted in the authorisation process, entered into force on 22 February 1998.
26. Since 25 September 2000, these controls have been augmented by Part II of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 ("RIPA"). In particular, covert surveillance in a police cell is now governed by sections 26(3) and 48(1) of RIPA. RIPA also establishes a statutory Investigatory Powers Tribunal to deal with complaints about intrusive surveillance and the use of informants by the police.
(1) In any proceedings a confession made by an accused person may be given in evidence against him in so far as it is relevant to any matter in issue in the proceedings and is not excluded by the court in pursuance of this section.
the court shall not allow the confession to be given in evidence against him except in so far as the prosecution proves to the court beyond reasonable doubt that the confession, notwithstanding that it might be true, was not obtained as aforesaid."
"In any proceedings the court may refuse to allow evidence on which the prosecution proposes to rely to be given if it appears to the court that, having regard to all the circumstances, including the circumstances in which the evidence was obtained, the admission of the evidence would have such an adverse effect on the fairness of the proceedings that the court ought not to admit it."
29. The parties have referred to cases concerning the use of informers to obtain incriminating statements from persons in police custody.
When the police use subterfuge to interrogate an accused after he had advised them that he does not wish to speak to them, they are improperly eliciting information that they were unable to obtain by respecting the suspect's constitutional right to silence: the suspect's rights are breached because he has been deprived of his choice. However, in the absence of eliciting behaviour on the part of the police, there is no violation of the accused's right to choose whether or not to speak to the police. If the suspect speaks, it is by his or her own choice, and he or she must be taken to have accepted the risk that the recipient may inform the police."
"The right to silence is triggered when the accused is subjected to the coercive powers of the state through his or her detention. The right protects against the use of state power to subvert the right of an accused to choose whether or not to speak to the authorities. Where the informer who allegedly acted to subvert the right to silence of the accused is not obviously a state agent, the analysis must focus on both the relationship between the informer and the state and the relationship between the informer and the accused. The right to silence will only be infringed where the informer was acting as an agent of the state at the time the accused made the statement and where it was the informer who caused the accused to make the statement. Accordingly two distinct inquiries are required. First ... was the evidence obtained by an agent of the state? Second, was the evidence elicited? The right to silence... will be violated only if both questions are answered in the affirmative.
Applying the above principles to the facts of this case, it is clear that the informer was an agent of the state for the purposes of the right to silence in section 7 [of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms]. The conversation here would not have occurred or would have been materially different but for the authorities' intervention. Furthermore, the impugned statement was elicited. Parts of the conversation were functionally the equivalent of an interrogation and the appellant's trust in the informer as a friend was used to undermine the appellant's confidence in his lawyer's advice to remain silent and to create a mental state in which the appellant was more likely to talk."
32. In Liew  3 S.C.R. 227, the accused was arrested in connection with a cocaine deal and the police also pretended to arrest the undercover officer who negotiated the transaction. They were placed together in an interview room where the accused initiated a conversation referring to the arrest. The undercover officer asked the accused, "What happened?" and stated "Yeah. They got my fingerprints on the dope". The accused replied "Lee and me too". The Supreme Court found nothing to suggest that the exchange was the functional equivalent of an interrogation. It was of no consequence that the police officer was engaged in a subterfuge, permitted himself to be misidentified or lied, so long as the responses were not actively elicited or the result of interrogation. In this case the conversation had been initiated by the accused and the police officer picked up the flow and content of the conversation without directing or redirecting it in a sensitive area. Nor was there any relationship of trust between the accused and the officer or any appearance that the accused was obligated or vulnerable to the officer.
"Subterfuge, ruses and tricks may be lawfully employed by the police, acting in the public interest. ... The critical question is not whether the accused has been tricked and secretly recorded. It is not even whether the trick has resulted in self-incrimination, electronically preserved to do great damage to the accused at trial. It is whether the trick may be thought to involve such unfairness to the accused or otherwise to be so contrary to public policy that a court should exercise its discretion to exclude notwithstanding its high probative value. In the case of covertly obtained confessions, the line of forbidden conduct will be crossed if the confession may be said to have been elicited by police (or by a person acting as an agent of the police) in unfair derogation of the suspect's right to exercise a free choice to speak or to be silent."
35. The Government accepted, following the judgment in Khan v. the United Kingdom (no. 35394/97, [Section 3], ECHR 2000-V, judgment of 12 May 2000, §§ 26-28) that the use of the audio and video recording devices in the applicant's cell, the prison visiting area and on a fellow prisoner amounted to an interference with the applicant's right to private life under Article 8 § 1 of the Convention and that the measures were not used "in accordance with law" within the meaning of Article 8 § 2 of the Convention.
36. The Court recalls, as in the above-mentioned Khan case, that at the relevant time there existed no statutory system to regulate the use of covert recording devices by the police. The interferences disclosed by the measures implemented in respect of the applicant were therefore not "in accordance with the law" as required by the second paragraph of Article 8 and there have thus been violations of this provision.
38. As regards the use of the evidence from the surveillance at trial, the applicant submitted that the remarks recorded on tape were not an accurate reflection of the Kwik-Save murder, referring to discrepancies with regard to what in fact happened. The time over which the recordings were made, namely, weeks, was oppressive. As he was aware of the possible recording, he was in a no-win situation as if he whispered or gestured that was said to be incriminating and if his remarks were not incriminating he was said to be tailoring his remarks for the microphone. The tapes were also used in the police interviews to unsettle the applicant and set him up for adverse inferences in the event that he exercised his right to silence. This case was also different from the Khan v. the United Kingdom case relied on by the Government as the recording in this case was much more invasive and protracted and the evidence obtained filled with inaccuracies and unreliable.
39. The police used H. not as an inanimate listening post but as a means of conducting surreptitious interrogation, circumventing the protections for a suspect who has availed himself of legal advice and exercised the right to silence (referring to Canadian authorities finding that this constitutes a violation of the right to silence, Hebert  2 SCR 151 and Broyles  3 SCR). In particular on 28 June 1995, the applicant was removed from prison to a police station and interrogated for a day as a "softening up" process prior to his being questioned by H. The applicant's conviction was based substantially, if not decisively, on the evidence of H. who was a persistent criminal under threat of sentencing which would depend on his role in the applicant's trial. The one and only alleged admission by the applicant of presence at the scene of the murder was not recorded but rested solely on the word of H. This was in all the circumstances unfair and oppressive. The applicant further disputed that he suspected H.'s role in this respect or in any way can be regarded as waiving his right to complain about it.
40. The Government submitted, relying on the case of Khan v. the United Kingdom cited above, that the admission at trial of recorded evidence obtained secretly by the police under the Guidelines did not violate this provision. The surveillance had been lawful in domestic terms, there was no reason to suppose that the tapes were not an accurate reflection of what was said, they had not been obtained under any form of pressure and the applicant had an opportunity under domestic law to challenge their use. Furthermore, the tapes were not the only evidence against the applicant and the jury were made fully aware of any possible deficiencies in this evidence. There was no basis on which to distinguish this case from Khan, as in that case no violation was found despite the fact that the recording involved trespass and the evidence was obtained the only evidence against the applicant, whereas in this case the surveillance was lawful under domestic law and the recordings were not the only evidence against the applicant, as there was also the evidence of H. They argued that in serious cases such as murder there was a particularly strong public interest in admitting such material, provided as here the applicant had an opportunity to challenge its use.
41. Concerning the testimony of H., the Government pointed out that questions of admissibility of evidence are for domestic courts. Issues of H.'s credibility and reliability were fully argued and explained to the jury which was in a good position to determine whether any findings of fact could be drawn from his statements. The applicant's counsel had been able to cross-examine H. Furthermore, the applicant had spoken voluntarily to H., knowing or at least suspecting that his conversations were being recorded and therefore must be taken as waiving his right to complain about it. There was accordingly no unfairness contrary to Article 6 § 1 in the use of this evidence at trial. Finally, the Government disputed the relevance of the Canadian cases cited by the applicant, noting that the Hebert case concerned the use of evidence actively elicited by an undercover agent (not covert audio or video recordings) and which was the only evidence against the accused, while in the Broyles case the information given by the accused to his visitor was obtained in the functional equivalent of an interrogation and the accused's special trust in his friend exploited.
42. The Court re-iterates that its duty, according to Article 19 of the Convention, is to ensure the observance of the engagements undertaken by the Contracting States to the Convention. In particular, it is not its function to deal with errors of fact or of law allegedly committed by a national court unless and in so far as they may have infringed rights and freedoms protected by the Convention. While Article 6 guarantees the right to a fair hearing, it does not lay down any rules on the admissibility of evidence as such, which is therefore primarily a matter for regulation under national law (the Schenk v. Switzerland judgment of 12 July 1988, Series A no. 140, §§ 45 and 46, and, for a more recent example in a different context, Teixeira de Castro v. Portugal, Reports 1998-IV, § 34). It is not the role of the Court to determine, as a matter of principle, whether particular types of evidence – for example, unlawfully obtained evidence – may be admissible or, indeed, whether the applicant was guilty or not. The question which must be answered is whether the proceedings as a whole, including the way in which the evidence was obtained, were fair. This involves an examination of the "unlawfulness" in question and, where violation of another Convention right is concerned, the nature of the violation found.
43. In that context, regard must also be had to whether the rights of the defence have been respected, in particular whether the applicant was given the opportunity of challenging the authenticity of the evidence and opposing its use, as well as the opportunity of examining any relevant witnesses; whether the admissions made by the applicant during the conversations were made voluntarily, there being no entrapment and the applicant being under no inducement to make such admissions (Khan, § 36); and the quality of the evidence, including whether the circumstances in which it was obtained cast doubts on its reliability or accuracy (Khan, § 37). While no problem of fairness necessarily arises where the evidence obtained was unsupported by other material, it may be noted that where the evidence is very strong and there is no risk of its being unreliable, the need for supporting evidence is correspondingly weaker (Khan, § 37).
44. As regards the privilege against self-incrimination or the right to silence, the Court has re-iterated that these are generally recognised international standards which lie at the heart of a fair procedure. Their aim is to provide an accused with protection against improper compulsion by the authorities and thus to avoid miscarriages of justice and secure the aims of Article 6 (John Murray v. the United Kingdom judgment of 8 February 1996, Reports 1996-I, p. 49, § 45). The right not to incriminate oneself is primarily concerned with respecting the will of an accused person to remain silent and presupposes that the prosecution in a criminal case seeks to prove the case against the accused without resort to evidence obtained through methods of coercion or oppression in defiance of the will of the accused (Saunders v. the United Kingdom judgment of 17 December 1996, Reports 1996-VI, p. 2064, §§ 68-69). In examining whether a procedure has extinguished the very essence of the privilege against self-incrimination, the Court will examine the nature and degree of the compulsion, the existence of any relevant safeguards in the procedures and the use to which any material so obtained is put (see e.g. Heaney and McGuinness v. Ireland, no. 34720/97, judgment of 21 December 2000, §§ 54-55, and J.B. v. Switzerland, no. 31827/96, judgment of 3 May 2001).
45. The Court recalls that the recordings made of the applicant in the police station and prison when he was with Leroy Grant, J.N.S. and H. and the testimony of H. who had been placed in the applicant's cell by the police to obtain evidence against him constituted the principal evidence relied on by the prosecution at his trial.
46. The Court observes, firstly, that as in the Khan case the material obtained by audio and video recordings was not unlawful in the sense of being contrary to domestic criminal law. Similarly, there is no suggestion that any admissions made by the applicant during the conversations taped with Leroy Grant and J.N.S. were not voluntary in the sense that the applicant was coerced into making them or that there was any entrapment or inducement. Indeed, the applicant has stated that he was aware that he was possibly being taped while in the police station.
47. The applicant has argued that the evidence from the recordings was unreliable and contained many inconsistencies, while the Government have pointed to the admissions that it contained which were probative of the applicant's knowledge of the incident. As the applicant alleges that he knew of the possible recording and as the tapes indicated that a certain amount of whispering or gesturing was being carried out at times, the Court considers that an assessment of the strength or the reliability of the evidence concerned is not a straightforward matter. The applicant's conduct as a whole must have played a role in the assessment of the evidence and this Court is not well placed to express a view. In those circumstances, the existence of fair procedures to examine the admissibility and test the reliability of the evidence takes on even greater importance.
48. In that regard, the Court recalls that the applicant's counsel challenged the admissibility of the recordings in a voire dire, and was able to put forward arguments to exclude the evidence as unreliable, unfair or obtained in an oppressive manner. The judge in a careful ruling however admitted the evidence, finding that it was of probative value and had not been shown to be so unreliable that it could not be left to the jury to decide for themselves. This decision was reviewed on appeal by the Court of Appeal which found that the judge had taken into account all the relevant factors and that his ruling could not be faulted. At each step of the procedure, the applicant had therefore been given an opportunity to challenge the reliability and significance of the recording evidence. The Court is not persuaded that the use of the taped material concerning Leroy Grant and J.N.S. at the applicant's trial conflicted with the requirements of fairness guaranteed by Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
49. Theapplicant's second ground of objection, concerning the way in which the informer H. was used by the police to obtain evidence including taped conversations with the applicant, a written statement and oral testimony about other allegedly incriminating conversations, raises more complex issues.
50. While the right to silence and the privilege against incrimination are primarily designed to protect against improper compulsion by the authorities and the obtaining of evidence through methods of coercion or oppression in defiance of the will of the accused, the scope of the right is not confined to cases where duress has been brought to bear on the accused or where the will of the accused has been directly overborne in some way. The right, which the Court has previously observed is at the heart of the notion of a fair procedure, serves in principle to protect the freedom of a suspected person to choose whether to speak or to remain silent under police questioning. Such freedom of choice is effectively undermined in a case in which, the suspect having elected to remain silent during questioning, the authorities use subterfuge to elicit from the suspect confessions or other statements of an incriminatory nature which they were unable to obtain during such questioning and where the confessions or statements thereby obtained are adduced in evidence at trial.
51. Whether the right to silence is undermined to such an extent as to give rise to a violation of Article 6 of the Convention depends on all the circumstances of the individual case. In this regard, however, some guidance may be found in the decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada, referred to in paragraphs 30-32 above, in which the right to silence, in circumstances which bore some similarity to those in the present case, was examined in the context of section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The Canadian Supreme Court there expressed the view that, where the informer who allegedly acted to subvert the right to silence of the accused was not obviously a state agent, the analysis should focus on both the relationship between the informer and the state and the relationship between the informer and the accused: the right to silence would only be infringed where the informer was acting as an agent of the state at the time the accused made the statement and where it was the informer who caused the accused to make the statement. Whether an informer was to be regarded as a state agent depended on whether the exchange between the accused and the informer would have taken place, in the form and manner in which it did, but for the intervention of the authorities. Whether the evidence in question was to be regarded as having been elicited by the informer depended on whether the conversation between him and the accused was the functional equivalent of an interrogation, as well as on the nature of the relationship between the informer and the accused.
52. In the present case, the Court notes that in his interviews with the police following his arrest the applicant had, on the advice of his solicitor, consistently availed himself of his right to silence. H., who was a longstanding police informer, was placed in the applicant's cell in Stretford Police Station and later at the same prison for the specific purpose of eliciting from the applicant information implicating him in the offences of which he was suspected. The evidence adduced at the applicant's trial showed that the police had coached H. and instructed him to "push him for what you can". In contrast to the position in the Khan case, the admissions allegedly made by the applicant to H., and which formed the main or decisive evidence against him at trial, were not spontaneous and unprompted statements volunteered by the applicant, but were induced by the persistent questioning of H., who, at the instance of the police, channelled their conversations into discussions of the murder in circumstances which can be regarded as the functional equivalent of interrogation, without any of the safeguards which would attach to a formal police interview, including the attendance of a solicitor and the issuing of the usual caution. While it is true that there was no special relationship between the applicant and H. and that no factors of direct coercion have been identified, the Court considers that the applicant would have been subject to psychological pressures which impinged on the "voluntariness" of the disclosures allegedly made by the applicant to H.: he was a suspect in a murder case, in detention and under direct pressure from the police in interrogations about the murder, and would have been susceptible to persuasion to take H., with whom he shared a cell for some weeks, into his confidence. In those circumstances, the information gained by the use of H. in this way may be regarded as having been obtained in defiance of the will of the applicant and its use at trial impinged on the applicant's right to silence and privilege against self-incrimination.
53. Accordingly, there has been in this respect a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
55. The Government accepting that the applicant did not enjoy an effective remedy in domestic law at the relevant time in respect of the violations of his right to private life under Article 8, the Court finds that there has been a violation of Article 13 of the Convention in this regard.
57. The applicant claimed a reasonable sum for the violations of his right to privacy, referring to the fact that the recording in his cell lasted for five weeks, that the visits from his girlfriend were recorded visually and orally and that his conversations with H. were recorded after a full day's interrogation by the police who intended to "spook" him. He also claims non-pecuniary damages for his violation of his right to a fair trial on the basis that the main corpus of the evidence against him resulted from violations.
58. The Government submitted that it was only in exceptional cases that a breach of Article 6 would require an award of just satisfaction, the Court refraining from speculation as to the outcome of the proceedings. They pointed out that any trial would have caused the applicant anxiety and stress and that he had in any event been aware of the recording and there was no element of pressure or exploitation. No award was appropriate in their view.
59. The Court recalls that the applicant's right to respect for private life was violated in several respects and that he had no effective remedy under domestic law. It considers that the applicant must thereby have suffered some feelings of frustration and invasion of privacy which is not sufficiently compensated by a finding of violation. As regards the finding of a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in regard to the use of the informer H. and his evidence at trial, it finds it inappropriate to speculate as to the outcome of the trial in other circumstances and considers that a finding of a violation constitutes just satisfaction in that respect.
60. The Court awards the applicant 1,642 euros (EUR) for non-pecuniary damage.
61. The applicant claimed a total of 11,822.89 pounds sterling (GBP) for legal costs and expenses, including GBP 5,875 for counsel's fees (inclusive of value-added tax (VAT)) and GBP 5,947.89 for solicitors' fees and expenses.
62. The Government considered that this was a large sum for a case examined on written submissions and that the fee rate of GBP 180 per hour for the applicant's solicitors was high and was charged at full rate, ratherthan half rate for travelling and waiting time. They also found the claims of counsel for up to 25 hours work on one set of observations and six hours for another set to be overstated. They proposed that a reasonable figure would be GBP 7,500 inclusive of VAT.
63. The Court considers that the sums claimed are on the high side for a case in which no oral hearing was held. It awards the sum of EUR 12,800, plus any value-added tax which may be payable.
64. The applicable interest rate is the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank plus three percentage points (see no. 28957/95, Christine Goodwin v. the United Kingdom [GC], judgment of 11 July 2002, to be published in ECHR 2002-..., § 124).
Done in English, and notified in writing on 5 November 2002, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

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