Source: http://www.juricaf.org/arret/CONSEILDELEUROPE-COUREUROPEENNEDESDROITSDELHOMME-19780303-780677-760176
Timestamp: 2016-10-27 03:36:51+00:00

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WEBSTER c. ROYAUME-UNI
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Type d'affaire : DecisionType de recours : Partiellement irrecevable ; partiellement recevableNumérotation : Numéro d'arrêt : 7806/77;7601/76Identifiant URN:LEX : urn:lex;coe;cour.europeenne.droits.homme;arret;1978-03-03;7806.77 Analyses : (Art. 14) DISCRIMINATION, (Art. 9-1) LIBERTE DE RELIGIONParties : Demandeurs : WEBSTERDéfendeurs : ROYAUME-UNITexte : APPLICATION/REQUÃTE NÂ° 7806/77 Ronald Roger WEBSTER v/the UNITED KINGDOM Ronald Roger WEBSTER c/ROYAUME-UN I DECISION of 3 March 1978 on the admissibility of the application DECISION du 3 mars 1978 sur la recevabilitÃ© de la requÃ©t e
Article 11 of the Convention : Does this provision guarantee the right not to join a trade-union ? Application declared admissible . Article 25 of the Convention : Where an application concerns facts that affect, apart from the applicant, various other persons, the Commission examines it only in so far as the applicant is himseff affected . Competence ratfone personae of the Commission : The question whether an alleged violation of the Convention involves the responsibility of a High Contracting Party, must be examined in the light of the provision of the Convention which guarantees the particular right . In the case in point, State possibly responsible as the legislator and in any case as the employer.
Article 11 de la Convention : Cette disposition garantit-elle un droit de ne pas s'affilier Ã un syndicat ? RequÃªte dÃ©clarÃ©e recevable . Article 25 de la Convention . Lorsqu'une requÃ©te porte sur des faits qui affectent, outre le requÃ©rant, plusieurs autres personnes, la Commfssion ne l'examine que pour autant que le requÃ©rant est lui-mÃªme affectÃ© . CompÃ©tence ratione personae de fa Commission : La question de savoir si une violation allÃ©guÃ©e de la Convention est imputable Ã une Partie Contractante doit Ãªtre examinÃ©e en tenant compte de la disposition de fa Convention garantissant le droit dont il s'agit .
En l'espÃ©ce, Etat responsable Ã©ventuellement en tant que lÃ©gislateur et en tout cas en tant qu'employeur.
1/ranGais : voir p . 1761
The facts of the case may be summarised as follows The applicant is a citizen of the United Kingdom, born in 1914 and is presently residing in Southborough, near Tunbridge Wells . He is represented by Mr . J .A .S . Hall, barrister-at-law, J .E . Robbins, Solicitor and Mr . Mitchell-Heggs, barrister-at-law, acting under powers of attorney, dated 24 February 1978 and 18 February 1977 . From the statements and documents submitted, it appears that the applicant commenced employment with British Rail on 18 March 1958 where he worked until he received his dismissal notice on 3 June 1976 . On 28 August 1976 his contract of employment was terminated in accordance with the notice . Until the enactmenl of the Industrial Relations Act 1971, termination of a contract of employment was not subject to any special statutory restriction apart from a statutory minimum period of notice, but for the most part governed by common law and an employee could be lawfully dismissed on due notice being given regardless of whether the dismissal was or was not for reasons associated with non-membership of the union in a closed shop . If wrongfully dismissed without notice, an employeÃ© s remedy was to sue for the balance of the wages which would have been payable during a valid notice period . In 1970 the applicant was informed that his employer had agreed with the three railway trade unions that the terms of employment of the work force were to be changed so as to make union membership compulsory . At no stage was he asked whether he approved or disapproved Before the closed shop decision was put into effect the Industrial Relations Act 1971 was passed The Act changed the position radically by creating new statutory restrictions on an employer's right to dismiss an employee and, at the same time, giving individual employees a statutory right not to belong to a trade union . In principle, all employees were given the right not to be unfairly dismissed even if due contractual notice was given . Industrial Tribunals to which employees could complain if allegedly unfairly dismissed could order ihe employer to pay compensation to the employee or re-employ him ~f he could not satisfy the tribunal that one or more of the specified grounds for dismissal existed (conduct, capabdity, redundancy) and that it was reasonable in the circumstances to treat that ground as a reason for dismissal . Although by giving the individual employee a statutory right not to belong to a trade union the Act of 1971 thereby made closed shop agreements unenforceable, the Act also contained provisions : a . allowing employers and unions to enter into "agency shops" agreements which could make it a conditions of employment either t o
belong to one of the unions in question or make an appropriate contribution to the union funds . Employees with conscientious objections to belonging or contributing to the union were allowed to pay an equivalent sum to charity ; b . allowing (he establishment of approved closed shops in certain narrowly defined circumstances . In these cases conscientious objectors were only allowed to contribute to charity instead of joining rhe unio n
The Act of 1971 was repeated by the Trade Union and Labour Relations Act 1974 which, in the context of the closed shop, sought broadly to return to the position existing before 1971 : thus the right not to belong to a trade union and the consequent restriction on the establishment of closed shops were removed . In addition, Section 6 (5) of the Act provided that in general dismissal lor not being a member or refusing to remain a member of a union where a "union membership agreement", as it was described in the Act, was in force, was only to be regarded unfair if "the employee genuinely objected on grounds of religious belief to being a member of any trade union whatsoever or on any reasonable grounds to being a member of any particular trade union" Ithe words in italic were included by Parliament as a result of an amendment against the wishes of the Government) . In August 1975 notices appeared on the notice boards drawing the attention of staff to a change in their contracts of employment as a result of an agreement between the management and trade unions, dated July 1975 . The notice stated that as from 1 August 1975 membership of a recognised trade union was to be a condition of employment for staff covered by the agreement . In September 1975 the applicant had a meeting with his immediate supervisor and the local representative of the Transport and Salaried Staff Association IT .S .S .A .1 . It was explained to him at this meeting that a union membership agreement had been made between the British Railway Board and the three railway unions, the National Un :on of Railwaymen IN .UR .1, the T .S .S .A . and the Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen IAS .L .E .F .1 and that he was required to join the T .S .S .A . or the N .U .R ., the two unions applicable to his position as Clerical Officer . He was further informed that he could obtain exemption from the requirement to join one of those unions if he genuinely objectea on grounds of religious belief to being a member of any trade union whatsoever or on any reasonable grounds to being a member of a particular trade union . Around mid-September 1975 a Notice was pinned on the notice boards slating that it had been agreed that the acceptance of exemptlon on religiou s
grounds would apply only to those religious denominations which specifically proscribed members from joining a trade union . It stated further that confining exemption only to religious grounds depended upon the passing through Parliament of the Trade Union and Labour Relations IAmendmentl Bill and that the employees would be advlsed further on that point . On 29 October 1975 the applicant wrote to his immediate supervisor explaining that there were certain aspects of the situation which had been presented to him and which left him with some doubts as to what courses were open to him should he wish to claim exemption . At that time the Trade Union and Labour Relations IAmendmentl Bill had not been passed ihrough Parliament No reply was received to his letter of 29 October 1975 On 25 March 1976 the Trade Union and Labour Relations Act 1976 came into force which removed the "any reasonable grounds'' exception, leaving only the exception in respect of religious belief . On 2 April 1976 he was advised by letter from the Joint Staff Officer, that arrangements had been made for his claim for exemption to be heard by representatives of British Rail Southern Region and the trade unions on 6 April, in accordance with Clause 6 (B) ol the current Trade Union Management Agreement Since he had not yet made the submissions that he had said he would wish to make because he was still awaiting a reply to that same letter, he requested verbally a postponement of two weeks froni receiving a reply to his letter in order to allow him time to prepare a full and closely argued written submission . On 28 April, he received an instruction from the Establishment Officer to attend on 6 May for the hearing of his application for exemption By this time he had received only two replies to the questions posed in his letter of 29 October, and those replies came to him through hls solicitors . The applicant submitted that he did not want to join a trade union for Uie reasons that : i he believed that the United Kingdom was sliding into a state of totalitarianism or corporatism because the influence of the Trades Union Congress and member unions was beginning to dominate every facet of daily life . He did not believe that people should be coerced into membership of trade unions ; ii . he believed that the trade union systent was insufficient and unrepresentative through the default of their members who . but for a minority of their members, were disinterested in the proceedings ; Ã¼i . he did not believe that the disabilities inherent in the trade union system could be remedied by requiring private individuals to join unions . partlcularly when those unions supported views and had objectives diametricaCy opposed to the views and objectives of individuals required to obtain membership ; - 171 -
iv . he did not believe that unions acted in the best interests of workers they purported to represent or the country in general . He believed the effect of union wage demands was to cause widespread ecÃ´nomic difficulties as a result of pay claims which the country could not afford without the help of money borrowed from abroad, which in turn resulted in reduction of national purchasing pÃ´wer, an increase In unemployment, a reduction in the effectiveness of industry and caused a debilitating effect' on the â¢ social structure ; v he believed that the collective bargaining conducted by trad eunioskyrvcdutieswanfcoltivebakmail of the general public and he believed the individual should be rewarded according to his personal effectiveness and that the same rewards should not be given to all individuals irrespective of whether their work was good, bad or indifferent ; vi . he d i d not believe that the trade unions and their members should negotiate pay claims and other benefits from a position of strength to the detriment of other individuals who had not or could not have or might not even want to have similar negotiating strength ; vu he believed that the influence that the 1rade Union Movemeni had upon the country as a whole, the Government and management was not in the best interests of the country ; viÃ¼ . he believed that individuals should be allowed the freedom to express their opinions and convictions and to abide by such opinions and convictions without being threatened with the loss of their livelihood as a result of the "closed shop" practice ; ix he believed the individual should have the freedom to belong to an association or not io belong as he thought right ; X.
he was an opponent of the trade union movement as it operated today . He believed that the effect of the "closed shop" practice was to suppress all those in opposition to union principles by bringing about their dismissal and thus probably the loss of their means of livelihoo d
On 6 May 1976 he appeared before a panel consisting ot a representative of British Rail, a representative of the T .S .SA, and a representative of the N .U .R . He was accompanied, as he wasallowed to be, by a fellow employee . who was on the Management Staff of British Rail . On 3 June 1976 he received his dismissal notice which stated his claim for exemption had been disallowed and his services would no longer be required .-172
On 28 August 1976 his contract of employment was terminated in accordance with the said notice . On 1 September 1976 he took up a position on the administration of ihe National Association for Freedom . COMPLAINT S The applicant now complains that the United Kingdom, by having enforced the aforesaid provisions of the Parliamentary Acts of 1974 and 1976, and by having so far failed to amend these Acts, are preventing British subjects from exercising their freedom of thought, conscience, expression and association with others . He further complains that the United Kingdom is failing to provide adequate remedies for wrongful dismissal, in particular with regard to British subjects who lose their employment through abstaining from joining one of the trade unions recommended by the employers, in a situation such as the present application, wherein the applicant has no genuine objection based on reasonable grounds and, or, alternatively based on the grounds of exercising his freedom of conscience, expression and association provided by Articles 9, 10 and 11 of the Convention . He submits that such enforcement is tantamount to a violation of the Convention and, in particular of Articles 9, 10, 11 and 13 .
THE LA W 1 . The applicant has originally complained that the Government of the United Kingdom by having enforced, and so far having failed to amend, the provisions of the Trade Unions and Industrial Relations Act 1974 as amended by the 1976 Act which allow that British subjects lose their employment through abstaining from joining one of the recommended trade unions on grounds other than provided by the said Acts, have interfered with their freedom of conscience, expression and association contrary to the Articles 9, 10 and 11 of the Convention . As the respondent Government must be held responsible for the acts of the British Railways Board, in casu his dismissal after having refused to join one of these unions, this, in the applicant's submission, equally constitutes a breach of the said Articles of the Convention . The applicant has further complained that ihe Government of the United Kingdom have failed to provide an adequate remedy or redress in such situation, contrary to Article 13 of the Conventio n As a general remark the Commission first observes that the present application is practically identical with Application No . 7601/76, Young and James v . the United Kingdom', which was declared admissible o n Je9 u .N . y, D .
11 July 1977 and is still pending before it . Those two applicants, too, had been dismissed by British Rail after they had refused to join the recommended trade unions for similar reasons , The Commission will deal with the present application in the light of the findings contained in the above decision and of the submissions of the parties in the present case . The Commission notes that the present applicant, in his original submissions, asserted that the respondent Government had violated the rights and freedoms at issue vis-9-vis British subjects more generally . However, since the Convention does not provide for applications in the form of an actio popularis, the Commission, while accepting that the issues raised in the present application affect a number of persons, will consider it only insofar as the applicant himself is concerned . 2 . The Government of the United Kingdom have submitted, as they have previously done in Application No . 7601/76, that the present application was incompatible with the provisions of the Convention 2tione personae . This objection to admissibility has been further developed in the present case, and particularly at the oral hearing, but it remains in essence the same, namely a denial of state responsibility . In their submission the British Railways Board was established under the Transport Act 1962 as amended by the 1968 and 1974 Acts as a public authority which acted in matters of personnel and closed shop agreements as an autonomous body . Moreover, the members of the Board although appointed by the Secretary of State were not servants of the Crown, but just running a commercial organisation engaged in providing in a commercial way goods and services . The Government further submitted that it was true that the Secretary of State might give to the Board inter alia directions of a general character in relation to matters which appeared to him to affect the national interest, but that no direction had been given in relation to the subject matter of the present application as the Government's policy in this respect was that of neutrality . The applicant, on the other hand, submitted that, as to the question of Government responsibility, he first of all relied upon the Commission's decision on the admissibility in the case of Youna and Jaines, which case in his opinion was indistinguishable from the present case . Moreover, in his submission, British Rail was essentially different from a company or a commercial undertaking . It was a public authority, subject to ministerial control and to the control of Parliament, dependent on public funds and administered, or intended to be administered, in the interests of the community rather than in the interests of the shareholders, whether public or private . - 174-
The Commission considers that the responsibility of a High Contracting Party for any possible breach of the Convention must be determined by the interpretation and application of the substantive provisions of the Convention . In this particular case it is the interpretation of Article 11 which appears to be the main issue . Therefore, if Article 11 were to protect every person from being forced to become a member of a trade union in a closed shop situation, the responsibility of the High Contracting Party concerned is engaged, prima facie, where express legislation makes such situation possible . It follows that, if Article 11 protects such a right, the Industrial Relations Act 1974 as amended by the 1976 Act which establishes the legal presumption that dismissal for failure to join a trade union shoud be regarded as fair and therefore forces a person either to join the union or to be dismissed from his employment, may engage the responsibility of the respondent Government under the Convention . But even if it is accepted that the existence of the legislation concerned does not in itself amount to an interference with this presumed right, it is still possible that with regard to nationalised industries the responsibility of the High Contracting Party concerned, acting as an employer under the relevant legislation, is engaged . In this respect the facts presented, in particular the provisions of the Transport Act 1962 as amended by the 1968 and 1974 Acts, seem to make it clear that the authorities of the State are entitled to exercise such control over British Rail, a nationalised industry, that, for purposes of the Convention and in particular its Article 11, they must be considered as the "employer" ot British Rail within the meaning of the Judgement of the European Court of Human Rights in the Swedish Engine Drivers case (cf . para . 37 of the Court's Judgment of 6 February 1976), which seems to be applicable mutatrs mutandis to the present case . The Commission theretore consideres that for the purposes of its competence rarione personae under Article 25 of the Convention, the respondent Government must be regarded as being responsible tor the acts complained of . It follows that this application cannot be declared inadmissible as being incompatible with the Convention 2tione personae under Article 25 . The Commission has finally examined whether or not the application is 3 manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 121 of the Convention . As has been stated above, the questions raised by the applicant mainl y require tha interpretation and application of Article 11 of the Convention . This issue has been raised in earlier cases, which did not, on the facts presented, call for any decisive finding by the Commission on that point (see , - 175 -
inter alia, Application No . 4072/69, Yearbook 13, p . 708) . However, a practically identical issue arose in Application No . 7601/76 (Young and James v . the United Kingdom) . As this case is still pending before the Commission, no opinion on ihis point has yet been expressed . In the present case the Commission has carried out a preliminary examination of the information and arguments submitted by the parties . The Commission finds that the issues raised in the application are of such complexity that their determination should depend upon an examination of their merits .For these reasons, the Commissio n DECLARES ADMISSIBLE and retains the application, without in any way prejudging the merits of the case .
1 TRADUCTION I EN FAI T Les faits de la cause peuvent se rÃ©sumer comme sui t Le requÃ©rant, de nationalitÃ© britannique, est nÃ© en 1914 et rÃ©side prÃ©sentement A Southborough, prÃ©s de Tunbridge Wells . II est reprÃ©sentÃ© par Me J .A .S . Hall, barrister, Me J .E . Robins, solicitor et Me Mitchell-Heggs, barrister, agissant en vertu de procurations datÃ©es du 24 fÃ©vrier 1978 et du 18 fÃ©vrier 1977 . Il ressort des dÃ©clarations et des documents qui ont Ã©tÃ© prÃ©sentÃ©s, que le requÃ©rant, entrÃ© aux chemins de fer britanniques (British Rail) le 18 mars 1958, a travaillÃ© dans cette entreprise jusqu'9 rÃ©ception de sa lettre de licenciement, le 3 juin 1976 . Son contrat de travail a pris fin le 28 aoÃ»t 1976 conformÃ©ment aux termes de cette lettre . Jusqu'8 l'entrÃ©e en vigueur de la loi de 1971 sur les relations professionnelles (Industrial Relations Act), la cessation d'un contrat de travail, qui n'Ã©tait soumise Ã aucune restriction lÃ©gale particuliÃ©re, hormis un dÃ©lai de prÃ©avis minimum fixÃ© par la loi, Ã©tait rÃ©gie pour l'essentiel par la Â« common law n ; un salariÃ© pouvait Ãªtre rÃ©guliÃ©rement licenciÃ© sous rÃ©serve d'un prÃ©avis suffisant, que cette mesure soit liÃ©e ou non au fait qu'il n'Ã©tait pas affiliÃ© au syndicat bÃ©nÃ©ficiant du monopole de l'embauche dans son entreprise . S'il avait Ã©tÃ© licenciÃ© injustement et sans prÃ©avis, le salariÃ© n'avait d'autre recours que de rÃ©clamer en justice le montant des salaires qu'il aurait perÃ§us pendant une pÃ©riode de prÃ©avis rÃ©guliÃ©re .
En 1970, le requÃ©rant a Ã©tÃ© informÃ© que son employeur s'Ã©tait mis d'accord avec les trois syndicats de cheminots pour modifier les conditions d'emploi de maniÃ©re Ã rendre obligatoire l'affiliation Ã un syndicat . A aucun moment il ne lui a Ã©tÃ© demandÃ© s'il approuvait ou dÃ©sapprouvait cet accord . C'est avant l'entrÃ©e en vigueur de cette dÃ©cision que la loi de 1971 sur les relations professionnelles a Ã©tÃ© votÃ©e . Cette loi modifiait la situation du tout au tout, en apportant des restrictions supplÃ©mentaires au droit des employeurs de licencier leurs salariÃ©s et, parallÃ¨lement, en donnant aux salariÃ©s individuels le droit de ne pas se syndiquer . En principe, tous les salariÃ©s se sont vu confÃ©rer le droit de ne pas Ãªtre injustement licenciÃ©s, mÃªme aprÃ©s avoir reÃ§u le dÃ©lai de prÃ©avis contractuel . Les tribunaux du travail (Industrial Tribunalsl, que les salariÃ©s pouvaient saisir en cas de licenciement injuste, pouvaient ordonner Ã l'employeur de dÃ©dommager le salariÃ© ou de le rÃ©intÃ©grer, s'il n'Ã©tait pas parvenu Ã convaincre le tribunal qu'il existait un ou plusieurs motifs de licenciement prÃ©vus (comportement, aptitude, excÃ©dent de maind'ceuvrel, qu'il Ã©tait raisonnable, dans les circonstances, de considÃ©rer ce ou ces motifs comme une raison valable de licencier le salariÃ© . En reconnaissant Ã chaque salariÃ© le droit de ne pas se syndiquer, la loi de 1971 rendait inopÃ©rants les accords de monopole syndical d'embauche toutefois, elle contenait par ailleurs des dispositions : a . autorisant les employeurs et les syndicats Ã conclure des accords 1Â« agency shop Â» agreementsl pouvant subordonner l'emploi Ã l'appartenance Ã l'un des syndicats en question ou au versement d'une somme dÃ©terminÃ©e au fonds du syndicat . Les salariÃ©s se refusant, pour des motifs de conscience, Ã se syndiquer ou Ã verser ladite somme au syndicat, Ã©taient autorisÃ©s Ã verser une somme Ã©quivalente Ã une ceuvre de bienfaisance ; b . autorisant la conclusion d'accords agrÃ©Ã©s de monopole syndical d'embauche dans certaines circonstanr,es bien dÃ©finies . En pareil cas, les objecteurs de conscience qui ne voulaient pas se syndiquer n'avaient d'autre solution que de verser une certaine somme Ã une ceuvre de bienfaisance . La loi de 1971 a Ã©tÃ© abrogÃ©e par la loi de 1974 sur les syndicats et les relations du travail (Trade Union and Labour Relations Act) qui, quant aux accords de monopole svndical d'embauche, tendait pour l'essentiel Ã revenir Ã la situation antÃ©rieure Ã 1971 ; ainsi, cette loi supprimait le droit de ne pas se syndiquer et la restriction Ã laquelle Ã©tait soumise la conclusion d'accords de monopole syndical d'embauche . En outre, l'article 6, paragraphe 5 de la loi prÃ©voyait d'une maniÃ¨re gÃ©nÃ©rale qu'un licenciement pour refus de se syndiquer ou de demeurer membre d'un syndicat, lorsqu'Ã©tait en vigueur un accord en matiÃ©re d'appartenance syndicale IÂ« union memberships agreement nl tel que dÃ©crit dans l a
loi, ne devait Ãªtre considÃ©rÃ© comme injuste que si Â« le salariÃ© se refusait de bonne foi, pour des raisons de convictions religieuses, Ã s'affilier Ã un quelconque syndicat, ou bien encore pour des motifs raisonnables, Ã s Ã¢lJilier Ã un syndicar dÃ©rerminÃ© n (le membre de phrase soulignÃ© a Ã©tÃ© insÃ©rÃ© par le Parlement Ã la suite d'un amendement adoptÃ© contrairement aux vceux du Gouvernement) . En aoÃ»t 1975, des avis apposÃ©s sur les panneaux d'affichage ont attirÃ© l'attention des membres du personnel sur une modification intervenue dans leur contrat de travail par suite d'un accord conclu entre la direction et les syndicats, en juillet 1975 . II y Ã©tait indiquÃ© qu'9 compter du 1ar aoÃ»t 1975, les agents visÃ©s par l'accord devraient, sous peine de perdre leur emploi, Ãªtre affiliÃ©s Ã un syndicat agrÃ©Ã© . En septembre 1975, le requÃ©rant a eu un entretien avec son supÃ©rieur hiÃ©rarchique immÃ©diat et le dÃ©lÃ©guÃ© local du Â« Transport Salaried Staff Association n(TSSA ) ISyndicat des employÃ©s des transportsl . Il lui a Ã©tÃ© expliquÃ© Ã cette rÃ©union qu'un accord en matiÃ©re d'affiliation syndicale lunion membership agreement) avait Ã©tÃ© passÃ© entre le Conseil des Chemins de fer britanniques et les trois syndicats de cheminots, Ã savoir le Â« National Union of Railwaymen n(NUR ) (Syndicat national des cheminots), le TSSA et l'u Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen Â»(Syndicat des mÃ©caniciens et chauffeurs) et qu'il lui Ã©tait demandÃ© de s'affilier au TSSA ou au NUR, ces deux syndicats convenant Ã sa situation d'employÃ© de bureau . Il Ã©tait informÃ©, en outre, qu'il pouvait se faire dispenser de l'obligation de s'affilier Ã l'un de ces syndicats s'il se refusait de bonne foi, pour des raisons de convictions religieuses, Ã adhÃ©rer Ã quelque syndicat que ce f01, ou encore pour des motifs raisonnables, Ã adhÃ©rer Ã un syndicat dÃ©terminÃ© . Vers la mi-septembre 1975, un avis apposÃ© sur les panneaux d'affichage a prÃ©cisÃ© qu'il avait Ã©tÃ© convenu que l'octroi de la dispense pour des raisons de convictions religieuses ne s'appliquerait qu'Ã l'Ã©gard des confessions religieuses qui interdisaient expressÃ©ment Ã leurs membres de se syndiquer . Il Ã©tait indiquÃ©, en outre, que la limitation de la dispense Ã des raisons de convictions religieuses Ã©tait subordonnÃ©e au vote par le Parlement du projet de loi modificatif de la loi sur les syndicats et les relations du travail, et qÃ»e les agents seraient informÃ©s ultÃ©rieurement sur ce point . Le 29 octobre 1975, le requÃ©rant a Ã©crit Ã son supÃ©rieur hiÃ©rarchique immÃ©diat pour lui dire que certains aspects de la situation qui lui avaient Ã©tÃ© prÃ©sentÃ©s le laissaient dans le doute quant aux voies qui lui seraient ouverles au cas oÃ¹ il souhaiterait bÃ©nÃ©ficier de la dispense . A cette Ã©poque, leprojet de loi modificatif de la loi sur les syndicats et les relations du travail n'avait pas encore Ã©tÃ© votÃ© par le Parlement . Le requÃ©rant n'a pas reÃ§u de rÃ©ponse Ã sa lettre du 29 octobre 1975 . Le 25 mars 1976, la loi de 1976 sur les syndicats et les relations du travail est entrÃ©e en vigueur, supprimant l'exception Â« pou r - 178-
des motifs raisonnables Â» et ne reprenant que l'exception pour raison de convictions religieuses . Le 2 avril 1976, le responsable des liaisons entre le Directeur et les syndicats (joint staff officer) l'a informÃ© par lettre que des dispositions avaient Ã©tÃ© prises pour que sa demande de dispense soit entendue par des reprÃ©sentants de la RÃ©gion mÃ©ridionale des Chemins de fer britanniques et par les syndicats le 6 avril, conformÃ©ment Ã l'article 6 (B) de la Convention syndical - direction en vigueur Ã l'Ã©poque . Comme il n'avait pas encore prÃ©sentÃ© les arguments qu'il avait dÃ©clarÃ© vouloir formuler, vu qu'il attendait toujours une rÃ©ponse Ã cette mÃªme lettre, il a demandÃ© verbalement un report de deux semaines Ã compter de la rÃ©ception d'une rÃ©ponse Ã sa lettre, de maniÃ¨re Ã avoir le temps d'Ã©tablir par Ã©crit un dossier complet et argumemt . Le 28 avril, le chef du personnel l'a invitÃ© Ã assister, le 6 mai, Ã l'audition de sa demande de dispense . A cette Ã©poque, il n'avait reÃ§u que deux rÃ©ponses aux questions posÃ©es dans sa lettre du 29 octobre, et ces rÃ©ponses lui Ã©taient parvenues par l'intermÃ©diaire de ses solicitors . Le requÃ©rant a fait valoir qu'il ne souhaitait pas se syndiquer pour les raisons suivantes : i . il pensait que le Royaume-Uni glissait vers le totalitarisme ou le corporatisme, du fait que l'influence du Trade Union Congress et des syndicats membres commenÃ§ait Ã dominer tous les aspects de la vie quotidienne A ses yeux, les gens ne devaient pas Ã©tre obligÃ©s de se syndiquer ; ii . il considÃ©rait que le mouvement syndicaliste Ã©tait dÃ©ficient et non reprÃ©sentatif, du fait que la grande majoritÃ© de ses membres se dÃ©sintÃ©ressait de ses activitÃ©s ; il ne pensait pas qu'on pouvait remÃ©dier aux insuffisances inhÃ©rentes au mouvement syndicaliste en obligeant les individus Ã s'affilier Ã des syndicats, paniculiÃ©rement lorsque ceux-ci militaient en faveur de conceptions et poursuivaient des objectifs diamÃ©tralement opposÃ©s aux conceptions et aux objectifs des individus auxquels on demandait de se syndiquer ; iv . il n'estimait pas que les syndicats agissaient au mieux des intÃ©rÃ©ts des travailleurs qu'ils prÃ©tendaient reprÃ©senter, non plus que de ceux du pays en gÃ©nÃ©ral . Il pensait que les revendications salariales des syndicats avaient pour effet de plonger le pays dans de graves difficultÃ©s Ã©conomiques ; en effet, le pays ne pouvait y rÃ©pondre qu'en empruntant des fonds Ã l'Ã©tranger, ce qui, d'une part, entrainait une rÃ©duction du pouvoir d'achat national, une augmentation du chÃ´mage et une baisse de la production dans l'industrie et, d'autre part, exerÃ§ait un effet dÃ©bilitant sur la structure sociale ; v . il estimait que les nÃ©gociations collectives menÃ©es par les syndicats dans des entreprises-clÃ©s du secteur des services revenaient, e n
rÃ©alitÃ©, Ã exercer un chantage collectif sur le grand public, et il pensait que l'individu devait Ãªtre rÃ©tribuÃ© en fonction de son efficacitÃ© personnelle, et que les mÃªmes rÃ©tributions ne devraient pas Ã©tre accordÃ©es Ã tous les individus, en faisant abstraction de la question de savoir si leur travail Ã©tait bon . mauvais ou passable ; vi . il ne pensait pas que les syndicats et leurs adhÃ©rents devaient nÃ©gocier des augmentations de salaire et d'autres avantages Ã partir d'une position de force, et ce au dÃ©triment d'autres individus qui n'avaient pas, ne pouvaient pas avoir ou ne souhailaient mÃªme pas avoir une force de marchandage Ã©quivalente ; vii . il estimait que l'influence exercÃ©e par le syndicalisme sur l'ensemble du pays, le Gouvernement et le patronat n'allait pas dans le sens des intÃ©rÃªts bien compris du pays ; viii . il pensait que les individus devaient Ãªtre libres d'exprimer leurs opinions et leurs convictions, et de s'y tenir sans Ãªtre menacÃ©s pour autant de perdre leurs moyens d'existence par l'effet des accords de monopole syndical d'embauche ; ix . il pensait que l'individu devait Ãªtre libre de s'affilier ou non Ã une association comme il le jugeait bon ; x
il Ã©tait opposÃ© au mouvement syndicaliste tel qu'il fonctionnait Ã l'Ã©poque . Il pensait que la pratique des accords de monopole syndical d'embauche revenait Ã Ã©liminer tous ceux qui Ã©taient opposÃ©s aux principes syndicaux, en provoquant leur licenciement et probaleinent, par 18-mÃ©me, la perte de leurs moyens d'existence .
Le 6 mai 1976 , il â¢a comparu devant une commission composÃ©e d'un reprÃ©sentant des Chemins de fer britanniques, d'un reprÃ©sentant du TSSA et d'un reprÃ©semant NUR . Il Ã©tait accompagnÃ©, comme il y Ã©tait autorisÃ©, d'un cadre de la direction des Chemins de fer britanniques . Le 3 juin 1976, il a reÃ§u sa lettre de licenciement, qui dÃ©clarait que sa demande de dispense avait Ã©tÃ© rejetÃ©e et qu'on n'avait plus besoin de ses services . Le 28 ao0t 1976, son contrat de travail a pris fin conformÃ©ment aux termes de ladite lettre 1 septembre 1976, il occupe un poste dans l'administratio n .Depuisl1^ de l'Association nationale pour la libertÃ© INational Association for Freedom) .
GRIEFS Le requÃ©rant se plaint qu'en promulguant les dispositions susmentionnÃ©es des lois de 1974 et 1976 et en s'Ã©tant abstenu jusqu'Ã prÃ©sent d'amender ces lois, le Royaume-Uni empÃªche ses ressortissants d'exerce r
leur libertÃ© de pensÃ©e, de conscience, d'expression et d'association . II se plaint, en outre, que le Royaume-Uni n'octroie pas des secours appropriÃ©s en cas de licenciement abusif, en particulier aux ressortissants britanniques qui perdent leur emploi pour avoir refusÃ© d'adhÃ©rer Ã l'un des syndicats recommandÃ©s par les employeurs, et ce, dans une situation, comme celle qui caractÃ©rise la prÃ©sente requÃªte, oÃ¹ le requÃ©rant oppose au principe de cette adhÃ©sion un refus de bonne foi qui est fondÃ© non pas sur des convictions religieuses, mais soit sur des motifs raisonnables soit sur le droit d'exercer sa libertÃ© de conscience, d'expression et d'association garanti par les articles 9, 10 et 11 de la Convention, soit sur ces deux raisons Ã la fois . Il fait valoir que la promulgation desdites dispositions Ã©quivaut Ã une violation de la Convention et, en particulier, de ses articles 9, 10, 11 et 13 .
EN DROI T 1 . Le requÃ©rant s'est plaint initialement qu'en promulguant et en s'abstenant de modifier les dispositions de la loi de 1974 sur les syndicats et les relations professionnelles, telles qu'amendÃ©es par la loi de 1976, qui permettent de priver de leur emploi les ressortissants britanniques qui refusent d'adhÃ©rer Ã l'un des syndicats recommandÃ©s pour d'autres raisons que celles prÃ©vues par lesdites lois, le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni a portÃ© atteinie Ã leur libertÃ© de conscience, d'expression et d'association garantie par les articles 9, 10 et 11 de la Convention . Etant donnÃ© que le Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur doit Ãªtre tenu pour responsable des actes du Conseil des Chemins de fer britanniques, c'est-Ã -dire en l'espÃ©ce du licenciement dont il a fait l'objet pour avoir refusÃ© de s'affilier Ã l'un de ces syndicats, cette mesure constitue Ã©galement, selon le requÃ©rant, une violation desdits articles de la Convention . Le requÃ©rant s'est plaint, en outre, que le Gouvernement du RoyaumeUni n'octroie pas un recours adÃ©quat en pareille situation, ce qui viole l'arlicle 13 de la Convention . D'une faÃ§on gÃ©nÃ©rale, la Commission relÃ¨ve tout d'abord que la prÃ©sente requÃªte est pratiquement identique Ã la requÃ¨te NÂ° 7601/76, Young et James contre le Royaume-Uniâ¢, dÃ©clarÃ©e recevable le 11 juillet 1977 et encore pendante devant elle . Ces deux requÃ©rants avaient Ã©galement Ã©tÃ© â¢ Gr.enciÃ©s par les Chemins de fer britanniques pour avoir refusÃ©, pour des raisons analogues, d'adhÃ©rer aux syndicats recommandÃ©s . La Commission examinera la prÃ©sente requÃªte Ã la lumiÃ©re des considÃ©rations contenues dans la dÃ©cision susmentionnÃ©e, ainsi que des argument s â¢ Cf . D .R . 9, P . 126 . - 181 -
prÃ©sentÃ©s par les parties Ã la prÃ©sente affaire . La Commission relÃ©ve que, dans son exposÃ© initial, le prÃ©sent requÃ©rant a prÃ©tendu que le Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur avait violÃ© les droits et libertÃ©s en question des ressortissants britanniques en gÃ©nÃ©ral . Toutefois, comme la Convention ne prÃ©voit pas l'examen des requÃªtes prenant la forme d'une actio popularis, la Commission, tout en reconnaissant que les points soulevÃ©s dans la prÃ©sente requÃ©te affectent un certain nombre de personnes, n'examinera celle-ci que dans la mesure oÃ¹ le requÃ©rant lui-mÃ¨me est intÃ©ressÃ© . Le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni a fait valoir, comme il l'avait fai t .2 prÃ©cÃ©demment Ã l'occasion de la requÃ©te NÂ° 7601/76, que la prÃ©sente requÃ©te est incompatible ratione personae avec les dispositions de la Convention . Cette exception d'irrecevabilitÃ© a Ã©tÃ© dÃ©veloppÃ©e dans la prÃ©sente affaire, paÂ«iculiÃ¨rement Ã l'audience contradictoire, mais elle demeure fondamentalement la mÃ¨me, Ã savoir une nÃ©gation de la responsabilitÃ© de l'Etat . Selon les observations du Gouvernement, le Conseil des Chemins de fer britanniques a Ã©tÃ© crÃ©Ã© envertu de la loi 1962 sur les transports, amendÃ©e par les lois de 1968 et 1974, sous la forme d'un Ã©tablissement public qui agit de maniÃ¨re autonome dans le domaine des questions de personnel et des accords de monopole syndical d'embauche . En outre, bien que dÃ©signÃ©s par le Ministre, les membres du Conseil ne sont pas des fonctionnaires de la Couronne, mais dirigent simplement une entreprise commerciale qui offre des biens et des services sur le marchÃ© . Il est exact, selon le Gouvernement, que le Ministre peut donner au Conseil, notamment, des directives d'ordre gÃ©nÃ©ral sur les questions . qui lui paraissent mettre en cause Ã'intÃ©r@t national, mais aucune directive n'a Ã©tÃ© donnÃ©e au sujet de la question qui fait l'objet de la prÃ©sente requÃªte car le Gouvernement pratique une politique de neutralitÃ© Ã cet Ã©gard . De son cÃ´tÃ©, le requÃ©rant a fait valoir qu'en ce qui concerne la question de la responsabilitÃ© du Gouvernement, il invoquait tout d'abord la dÃ©cision de la Commissionsur la recevabilitÃ© de l'affaire Young et James, affaire qui, selon lui, ne peut pas se distinguer de la prÃ©sente . En outre, il a prÃ©tendu que les Chemins de fer britanniques diffÃ©rent fondamentalement d'une sociÃ©lÃ© ou d'une entreprfse commerciale . Il s'agit d'une entreprise publique, soumise au contrÃ´le du Ministre et du Parlement, tributaire de fonds publics et administrÃ©e ou censÃ©e Ãªtre administrÃ©e dans l'intÃ©rÃ©t de la collectivitÃ©, plutÃ´t que dans celui des actionnaires, publics ou privÃ©s . La Commission considÃ©re que la responsabilitÃ© d'une Haute Parti e Contractante Ã raison de toute violation Ã©ventuelle de la Convention doit 8tre dÃ©terminÃ©e par l'interprÃ©tation et l'application des dispositions de fond de la Convention . En l'espÃ¨ce, c'est l'interprÃ©tation de l'article 11 qui semble Ãªtre le problÃ©me majeur . - 182 -
En consÃ©quence, si la protection accordÃ©e par l'article 11 consiste Ã entpÃ©cher que quiconque soit forcÃ© d'adhÃ©rer Ã un syndicat jouissant du monopole de l'embauche, la responsabilitÃ© de la Haute Partie Contractante concernÃ©e serait engagÃ©e . Ã premier examen, dans le cas oÃ¹ une disposition lÃ©gislative expresse rendrait pareille situation possible . Il s'ensuit que si l'article 11 protÃ¨ge l'exercice d'un tel droit, la loi de 1974 sur les relations professionnelles, amendÃ©e par la loi de 1976 qui Ã©tablit la prÃ©somption lÃ©gale qu'un licenciement pour refus de se syndiquer devrait &tre considÃ©rÃ© comme Ã©quitable, et qui oblige une personne, en consÃ©quence, Ã adhÃ©rer au syndicat sous peine d'Ã©tre licenciÃ©e, peut engager la ,esponsabilitÃ© du Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur au regard de la Convention . Mais mÃ¨me si l'on admet que l'existence de la lÃ©gislation en question n'Ã©quivaut pas par elle-mÃªme Ã une ingÃ©rence dans l'exercice de ce droit prÃ©sumÃ©, il est encore possible qu'en ce qui concerne les entreprises nationalisÃ©es, la responsabilitÃ© de la Haute Partie Contractante intÃ©ressÃ©e, agissant en qualitÃ© d'employeur dans le cadre de la lÃ©gislation pertinente, soit engagÃ©e . A cet Ã©gard, les faits prÃ©sentÃ©s, et en particulier les dispositions de la loi de 1962 sur les transports amendÃ©e par les lois de 1968 et 1974, montrent clairement, semble-t-il, que les autoritÃ©s de l'Etat sont habilitÃ©es Ã exercer sur les Chemins de fer britanniques, entreprise nationalisÃ©e, un contr8le tel que du point de vue de la Convention et en particulier de son article 11 . elles doivent Ã©tre considÃ©rÃ©es comme l'a employeur Â», en ce qui concerne les Chemins de fer britanniques, au sens de l'arrÃªt rendu par la Cour europÃ©enne des Droits de l'Homme dans l'Affaire des conducteurs de locomotive suÃ©dois Icf . par . 37 de l'arrÃªt de la Cour du 6 fÃ©vrier 1976), qui, par analogie, paralt Ãªtre applicable Ã la prÃ©sente affaire . En consÃ©quence, la Commission considÃ¨re que pour trancher la question de sa compÃ©tence ratione personae sous l'angle de l'article 25 de la Convention, il convient de prÃ©sumer que le Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur est responsable des actes incriminÃ©s . Il s'ensuit que cette requÃ«te ne peut pas Ãªtre dÃ©clarÃ©e irrecevable comme incompatible avec la Convention ratione personae sous l'angle de l'article 25 . 3 . En dernier lieu, la Commission a recherchÃ© si la requÃªte est manifestement mal fondÃ©e au sens de l'article 27, paragraphe 2 de la Convention . Comme il a Ã©tÃ© dit ci-dessus, les questions soulevÃ©es par la requÃªt e requiÃ©rentprincipalement l'interprÃ©tation et l'application de l'article 11 de la Convention . Ce point a Ã©tÃ© soulevÃ© lors d'affaires prÃ©cÃ©dentes, qui n'appelaient pas, au vu des faits prÃ©sentÃ©s, une dÃ©cision dÃ©finitive de la Commission sur ce point (cf . notamment la requÃªte NÂ° 4072/69, Annuaire 13, p . 709) .
Toutefois, une question pratiquement identique s'est posÃ©e Ã l'occasion de la requÃªte NÂ° 7601/76 (Young et James contre le Royaume-Uni) . Comme cette affaire est encore pendante devant la Commission, aucun avis n'a encore AtÃ© exprimÃ© sur ce point . En l'espÃ©ce, aprÃ¨s avoir effectuÃ© un examen prÃ©liminaire des faits et arguments prÃ©sentÃ©s par les panies, la Commission considÃ¨re que les questions soulevÃ©es sont d'une complexitÃ© telle que la dÃ©cision doit dÃ©pendre d'un examen du fond de l'affaire . Pour ces motifs, la Commissio n DÃCLARE RECEVABLE et retient la requÃªte, sans prÃ©juger en aucune maniÃ¨re le fond de l'affaire .
- 18q_Origine de la décision Pays : Conseil de l'EuropeJuridiction : Cour européenne des droits de l'hommeFormation : Commission (plénière)Date de la décision : 03/03/1978Fonds documentaire : HUDOC Haut de page

References: in casu
 l'article 6
 l'article 6
 l'article 11
 l'article 11
 l'article 11
 l'article 25
 l'article 25
 l'article 27
 l'article 11