Source: https://uvamentalhealthpolicy.org/case-law/category/8th+Amendment
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 05:56:47+00:00

Document:
Bruce Webster was convicted of kidnapping resulting in death and related offenses and was sentenced to death. These convictions and his death sentence were affirmed on direct appeal in Texas, and his motions for habeas relief, which were heard in Indiana where he resides on death row, were denied. Webster sought a rehearing en banc to address the question of whether he could file for a writ of habeas corpus to present new evidence demonstrating that he was categorically and constitutionally ineligible for the death penalty under Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) and Hall v. Florida, 134 S.Ct. 1986 (2014). Federal prisoners who claim to be convicted or sentenced in violation of the Constitution must present a claim for relief by a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Subsection (e) generally prevents a prisoner from making an application for a writ of habeas corpus. There is, however, a savings clause in § 2255(e) that allows a prisoner to apply for a writ of habeas corpus where “it appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.” A panel of the Seventh Circuit originally concluded that a claim of new evidence can never satisfy the standard in § 2255(e).
Background: Kevan Brumfield was convicted of first-degree murder in 1995 and sentenced to death. After exhausting his state court remedies, Brumfield filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana, arguing that he was intellectually disabled and thus ineligible for the death penalty under Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). The District Court held that the state courts had erred by failing to hold an Atkins hearing and granted Brumfield a writ of habeas corpus after holding such a hearing. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed without reaching the merits of the Atkins claim, holding that Brumfield had not satisfied the procedural requirements for habeas relief. The Supreme Court of the United States reversed, finding that he did meet the requirements, and remanded the case to the Fifth Circuit to ascertain whether the District Court’s determination that Brumfield was intellectually disabled was clear error.
Holdings: On remand, the Fifth Circuit held that the District Court’s determination was not clearly erroneous because it was “plausible in light of the record as a whole.” Although the State argued that prior assessments placed Brumfield consistently in the 70- 85 range,3 the Fifth Circuit noted that “no actual IQ scores…were reported anywhere in Brumfield’s records” and that tests provided only “descriptions of the ranges into which Brumfield’s scores fell”, and every expert witness before the district court “agreed that Brumfield’s scores satisfied the first prong of the intellectual disability test.” Additionally, the District Court found that Brumfield had significant conceptual limitations and “carefully explained its reasoning, identified the specific evidence it relied upon, and specifically credited the testimony of certain experts.” Where the court’s reasoning was so careful and its conclusions not implausible—even if it rejected the State’s equally coherent and plausible story—the Fifth Circuit refused to disturb or second-guess its findings. Although Brumfield was not formally diagnosed as intellectually disabled until after age 18, the district court found that the evidence produced showed this failure to diagnose was related to incentives in the school system not to identify students as intellectually disabled. Again, the district court pointed to specific evidence—Brumfield’s poor academic record, below grade reading comprehension, and etiological factors (e.g., low birth weight, family history of intellectual disability). The Fifth Circuit noted that these factors “certainly bolster[ed] the court’s conclusion that Brumfield’s intellectual disability manifested” before 18.
Inability of defendant to show manifestation of intellectual disability before age 18 does not, alone, result in failure of Atkins claim; Hall v. Florida requires a court to analyze all three prongs of the intellectual disability diagnostic standard, and requires a different legal analysis of the onset prior to age 18 prong than was undertaken by the trial court.
Background: Sonny Boy Oats, Jr., was tried and convicted of robbery and first-degree murder in 1979 and his conviction was affirmed on appeal. In 1994, he sought postconviction relief but was denied. Post-Atkins, he filed a motion to vacate his death sentence on the grounds that he was intellectually disabled. The circuit court held an evidentiary hearing and denied the motion, concluding that Oats had not been able to establish that his intellectual disability had manifested prior to age 18 as required by Florida’s statutory test for determining intellectual disability.
Holding: The Florida Supreme Court reversed, giving three reasons for its decision. First, it noted that the Supreme Court’s decision in Hall v. Florida indicated that the lower court should have addressed all three prongs of the intellectual disability diagnostic standard and not denied the claim based on the apparent failure to meet one of the prongs. Second, the Court held that the lower court failed to consider all of the testimony presented, including evidence from prior postconviction proceedings. Third, the Court found that the lower court erroneously conflated “manifested” with “diagnosed,” an error upon which it based its conclusion that Oats failed to establish his intellectual disability.
The circuit court erred in making its conclusion without weighing all testimony presented by defendant: The Florida Supreme Court also held that it was error for the circuit court not to consider all the testimony that Oats presented. The parties stipulated to consideration of the mental health evidence presented in a previous proceeding, and the circuit court did not require the parties to recall all witnesses who testified previously. In its decision, however, the circuit court stated that it was “not in a position to reevaluate the credibility of the witnesses who testified or the evidence” considered in those prior proceedings and simply accepted the postconviction court’s ruling. The Florida Supreme Court held that the lower court should have permitted the parties to recall the witnesses in a new proceeding and submit evidence so that it could be considered and weighed.
Legal standard for analyzing whether intellectual disability manifested before age 18: The Florida Supreme Court noted that the manifestation prong is used to ensure there was evidence of intellectual disability during the developmental period, and that to require evidence of diagnosis before age 18 would render the first two prongs of the standard moot. The Court pointed to the U.S. Supreme Court’s analysis in Hall as demonstrative of how evidence of manifestation, without affirmative diagnosis, can lead to a clear finding that the prong was established.

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