Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=83393:57512&catid=1587&Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 20:27:42+00:00

Document:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LEO DE LA TRINIDAD Y OBALLES, Accused-Appellant.
Before this Court is an appeal assailing the 24 March 2011 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 04288. The CA affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 25, Naga City, Camarines Sur finding the accused guilty of violating Section 11, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Drugs Act of 2002.
The police operatives proceeded to conduct a briefing for the execution of the search warrants. The said briefing was made at the Conference Room of the Naga City Police Office on 21 October 2008, at about 4:10 A.M.15 The briefing of the team was photographed. Among those present are the members of the raiding team16 and the mandatory witnesses, i.e. representative from the DOJ, Carlo Lamberto Tayo; media representative, Roy Ranoco; elected punong barangay of Sabang, Naga City Jose Jacobo and Kagawad Eugene Froyalde of Sabang, Naga City.
In a Decision dated 16 November 2009, the trial court found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged. The RTC found that the prosecution succeeded in proving beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the appellant for violation of Section 11, Article II, R.A. No. 9165. Appellant was sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00).
The RTC ruled that the evidence presented during the trial adequately proved all the elements of the offense. It held that appellant, not being authorized by law, with full knowledge that the items were dangerous drugs, had actual and exclusive possession, control and dominion over the drugs found in his house.29 It likewise held that the officers strictly complied with the guidelines prescribed by law on how drug operations should be conducted by law enforcers and in taking custody and control of the seized drugs.30 On the other hand, accused failed to present any substantial evidence to establish his defense of frame-up. The RTC placed more weight on the affirmative testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, rather than the denials of the accused because positive testimonies are weightier than negative ones.31 With the positive identification made by the government witnesses as the perpetrator of the crime, his self-serving denial is worthless.32 Since there was nothing in the record to show that the arresting team and the prosecution witnesses were actuated by improper motives, their affirmative statements proving appellant’s culpability were respected by the trial court.
The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC, upon a finding that all of the elements of illegal sale of dangerous drug have been sufficiently established by the prosecution. It found credible the statements of prosecution witnesses about what transpired during and after the test-buy, service of search warrant, and arrest of the accused. Further, it ruled that the prosecution has proven as unbroken the chain of custody of evidence. The CA likewise upheld the findings of the trial court that the entire operation conducted by the police officers enjoyed the presumption of regularity, absent any showing of illmotive on the part of those who conducted the same.
The trial court gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the crime charged despite the prosecution’s failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The ruling of this Court in People v. Lagman39 is instructive. It held that illegal possession of regulated drugs is mala prohibita, and, as such, criminal intent is not an essential element. However, the prosecution must prove that the accused had the intent to possess (animus posidendi) the drugs. Possession, under the law, includes not only actual possession, but also constructive possession. Actual possession exists when the drug is in the immediate possession or control of the accused. On the other hand, constructive possession exists when the drug is under the dominion and control of the accused or when he has the right to exercise dominion and control over the place where it is found. Exclusive possession or control is not necessary. The accused cannot avoid conviction if his right to exercise control and dominion over the place where the contraband is located, is shared with another.
It must be emphasized that the finding of illicit drugs and paraphernalia in a house or building owned or occupied by a particular person raises the presumption of knowledge and possession thereof which, standing alone, is sufficient to convict.40 Here, accused-appellant failed to present any evidence to overcome such presumption. He merely insisted that he was framed and had no knowledge of where the prohibited drugs came from. In the absence of any contrary evidence, he is deemed to be in full control and dominion of the drugs found in his house.
Accused-appellant argues that the corpus delicti has not been clearly established. He points out that although SPO1 Aguilar allegedly placed his markings on the confiscated items, no such marking was indicated in the certificate of inventory, nor were the weight of the said specimens indicated thereon. He further argues that the markings allegedly placed on the specimens seized were not even indicated in the return of the search warrant.41 Thus, he centers his argument on the contention that the integrity of the dangerous drugs was not ensured and its identity was not established with moral integrity.
Strictly speaking, the aforecited provision of the IRR does not even require that the certificate of inventory must indicate the markings and the weight of the seized items. In fact, the rule even sanctions substantial compliance with the procedure to establish a chain of custody, as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are property preserved by the apprehending officers. In People v. Pringas,42 the Court recognized that the strict compliance with the requirements of Section 21 may not always be possible under field conditions; the police operates under varied conditions, and cannot at all times attend to all the niceties of the procedures in the handling of confiscated evidence.
The integrity of the evidence is presumed to have been preserved unless there is a showing of bad faith, ill will, or proof that the evidence has been tampered with. Accused-appellant bear the burden of showing that the evidence was tampered or meddled with in order to overcome the presumption of regularity in the handling of exhibits by public officers and the presumption that public officers properly discharged their duties.44 Accused-appellant in this case failed to present any plausible reason to impute ill motive on the part of the arresting officers. Thus, the testimonies of the apprehending officers deserve full faith and credit.45 In fact, accused-appellant did not even question the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. He anchored his appeal solely on his allegation of frame-up and denial and on the alleged broken chain of the custody of the seized drugs.
In sum, we find no reason to modify or set aside the decision of the CA. Accused-appellant was correctly found to be guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED and the 24 March 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 04288 is hereby AFFIRMED.
1Rollo, pp. 105-118; Penned by Associate Justice Mariflor P. Punzalan Castillo with Associate Justices Josefina Guevara-Salonga and Franchito N. Diamante, concurring.
3 TSN, 12 February 2009, p. 4.
4 TSN, 19 March 2009, p. 4.
5 TSN, 12 February 2009, p. 5.
6 TSN, 19 March 2009, p. 7.
7 TSN, 12 February 2009, p. 9.
8 TSN, 19 March 2009, p. 8.
9 TSN, 12 February 2009, p. 10.
11 TSN, 19 March 2009, p. 9.
15 TSN, 12 February 2009, p. 16.
16 Members of the Intelligence Section who participated in the operation were SPO1 Aguilar, SPO1 Abrantes, PO3 Quintin Tusara, PO1 Louie Ordonez, and PO1 Albao.
17 TSN, 12 February 2009, p. 20.
21 TSN, 19 March 2009, p. 19.
22 TSN, 12 February 2009, pp. 25-26.
23 TSN, 19 March 2009, pp. 25-26.
25 TSN, 12 February 2009, pp. 33-34.
28 CA rollo, p. 49; Brief for the Accused-Appellant.
30 Id. at 144 citing Sec. 21, R.A. No. 9165.
31 Id. citing People v. Macario, 310 Phil. 581 (1995).
32People v. Aquino, 379 Phil. 845, 853 (2000).
33 CA rollo, p. 10.
35People v. Ulama, G.R. No. 186530, 14 December 2011, 662 SCRA 599, 613.
36 People v. Bagares, G.R. No. 99026, 4 August 1994, 235 SCRA 30, 35.
37People v. Quiamanlon, G.R. No. 191198, 26 January 2011, 640 Phil. 697, 716 citing People v. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 177777, 4 December 2009, 607 SCRA 377, 390-396 further citing People v. Pringas, G.R. No. 175928, 31 August 2007, 531 SCRA 828, 846.
38 Id. citing Buenaventura v. People, G.R. No. 171578, 8 August 2007, 529 SCRA 500, 513.
39 593 Phil. 617, 625 (2008) citing People v. Tira, G.R. No. 139615, 28 May 2004, 430 SCRA 134.
40 Id. citing People v. Torres, 533 Phil. 227 (2006).
41 CA rollo, p. 52.
42 G.R. No. 175928, 31 August 2007, 531 SCRA 828.
44 People v. Miranda, 560 Phil. 795, 810 (2007).
45 See People v. Macabalang, 538 Phil. 137, 155 (2006).

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