Source: https://secondcircuit.lexroll.com/xia-v-holder-414-fed-appx-359-2nd-cir-2011/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 07:17:32+00:00

Document:
Meizhen XIA, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent.
No. 10-979-ag.United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
Tony West, Assistant Attorney General; Anthony P. Nicastro, Senior Litigation Counsel; Bernard A. Joseph, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
PRESENT: ROGER J. MINER, B.D. PARKER and PETER W. HALL, Circuit Judges.
Meizhen Xia, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a March 9, 2010 order of the BIA denying Xia’s motion to remand and affirming the December 19, 2008 decision of Immigration Judge (“IJ”) George T. Chew, which pretermitted her application for asylum as untimely and denied her application for withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Meizhen Xia, No. A089 254 386 (B.I.A. Mar. 9, 2010), aff’g No. A089 254 386 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Dec. 19, 2008). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of this case.
(2d Cir. 2007); Li Yong Cao, v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 421 F.3d 149, 156 (2d Cir. 2005).
Under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(3), we lack jurisdiction to review the agency’s finding that an asylum application was untimely under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B), or its finding of neither changed nor extraordinary circumstances excusing the untimeliness under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D). Notwithstanding that provision, we retain jurisdiction to review constitutional claims and “questions of law.”8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D). We therefore consider Xia’s argument that the agency applied the wrong legal standard in pretermitting her asylum application because it raises a question of law See Ilyas Khan v. Gonzales, 495 F.3d 31, 35 (2d Cir. 2007).
(2d Cir. 2006) (explaining that “[t]he overarching test for deeming a remand futile” is whether “the reviewing court can `confidently predict’ that the agency would reach the same decision absent the errors that were made”); see also Coo He Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 428 F.3d 391, 401 (2d Cir. 2005).
Xia’s arguments regarding her eligibility for relief based on the birth of her two U.S.-citizen children are largely foreclosed by our decision in Jian Hui Shoo v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 157-67 (2d Cir. 2008), which found, under evidence similar to that submitted here, no error in the agency’s conclusion that such evidence was insufficient to establish a well-founded fear of persecution, id.
at 156-57. Contrary to Xia’s argument, a reasonable fact-finder would not be compelled to conclude that the agency ignored any material evidence in the record. See id. at 169 (recognizing that the Court has rejected the notion that the agency must “expressly parse or refute on the record each individual argument or piece of evidence offered by the petitioner” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Xiao Ji Chen, 471 F.3d at 337 n. 17 (2d Cir. 2006) (presuming that the agency “has taken into account all of the evidence before [it], unless the record compellingly suggests otherwise”). Moreover, the agency did not err in finding that the letters and statements Xia submitted were no material to her claimed fear of future persecution because they did not detail the forced sterilizations of similarly situated individuals — namely, those who gave birth to two children in the United States. See Jian Hui Shao, 546 F.3d at 160-61. Substantial evidence thus supports the agency’s determination that Xia failed to demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution in China based on the birth of her two U.S.-citizen children. The agency reasonably denied her application for relief based on this claim. See id. at 157-67; see also Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 155-57 (2d Cir. 2006) (finding that an IJ’s denial of asylum necessarily precludes the success of an alien’s withholding of removal and CAT claims where those claims are based on the same factual predicate as an the asylum claim).
throughout the country. Moreover, we find no error in the IJ’s determination that Xia failed to demonstrate that officials in China were aware of her Christian beliefs or that they would inflict harm on her rising to the level of persecution on account of those beliefs. See Hongsheng Leng v. Mukasey, 528 F.3d 135, 142-43 (2d Cir. 2008). Substantial evidence supports the agency’s finding that Xia failed to demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution based on her Christian beliefs and activities, and the agency reasonably denied her application based on that claim. See id.; see also Paul, 444 F.3d at 156.
Xia argues that the BIA’s denial of her motion to remand was legally erroneous because the sole ground upon which the BIA relied was Xia’s failure to provide her own affidavit in support of the motion. The record does not support this argument.
The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Xia’s motion to remand. It reasonably determined that Jin Fu Chen’s statement failed to establish Xia’s prima facie eligibility for relief because Chen was not similarly situated to Xia insofar as his purportedly forced sterilization occurred seven years prior to Xia’s motion to remand, his children were from Japan and not the United States, and he voluntarily registered his children in his household registry. See Jian Hui Shoo, 546 F.3d at 159-61.

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