Source: https://www.globallegalinsights.com/practice-areas/merger-control-laws-and-regulations/israel
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 01:04:25+00:00

Document:
The number of mergers notified to the Israel Antitrust Authority (the “IAA”) decreased in the past year: from 192 merger notifications filed in 2016, to 159 merger notifications filed in 2017 regarding which decisions were rendered. This figure is much lower than the average number of mergers filed in the years 2006 and 2007, at around 240 mergers. The high figures from those times, and the significant drop in the number of mergers filed in the years thereafter, can be explained by the large amount of economic activity that occurred prior to the 2008 financial crisis and its impact on the economy. Additionally, at that time, the IAA had yet to publish the Antitrust General Director’s Pre-merger Filing Guidelines of 2008, which, among others, clarified that certain types of transactions which were previously notified did not in fact require filing to the IAA.
The Restrictive Trade Practices Law (the “Antitrust Law”) provides a general procedural framework which applies to all mergers. The investigatory process is not formally divided into phases, and all mergers must be reviewed by the General Director up to 30 days from the date merger notifications are filed. The term may be extended by the Antitrust Tribunal or by consent of the merging parties. If the General Director does not render a decision within the prescribed time period, consent to the merger is deemed to have been given. The average review process in 2016 lasted 26.3 days upon submission of merger notifications. This review time is slightly shorter than the 2014 review time, which lasted on average 27 days. It is difficult to predict whether the average review time during 2017 was shorter or lengthier than that of 2016 (official 2017 data has not been published at the time of the publication): on the one hand, the fast-track procedure for competitively benign mergers (discussed below) has been in place for a full year. On the other hand, in cases that seem complicated to the IAA, it started seeking the parties’ consent in advance for an extension of several months of the review process.
On 8 May 2016, the IAA launched a three-month trial of a fast-track procedure for mergers that clearly do not raise a reasonable concern of causing significant harm to competition, called the ‘Ultra Green Merger Procedure’ (the IAA internally classifies mergers either green, yellow, red, and now – also ultra green, in accordance with their expected complexity and potential competitive effects). Following the trial period, the IAA concluded that the Ultra Green Merger Procedure was successful and significantly shortened review periods for mergers reviewed under the procedure. In fact, from the beginning of the trial period until the end of 2016, mergers reviewed under the Ultra Green Merger Procedure were cleared within 3.6 days on average.
According to the procedure’s terms, if a transaction clearly does not present a threat to competition and, within the framework of the merger filing, parties provide the IAA certain information (which is somewhat greater than the level of disclosure required in a standard merger filing), it will be internally classified as an ‘Ultra Green Merger’ by the IAA with the intent of issuing a clearance well before expiration of the 30-day investigation period. The decision to classify a transaction as “ultra green” is based primarily on the information provided by the merging parties. Thus, a full merger notification form is required, rather than the completion of an abbreviated merger notification. As a takeaway from the three-month trial period, the IAA decided to require that merging parties provide holding charts that fully detail direct holders of interest of each party, and the controlling parties of each such direct holder of interest.
97.5% of the mergers were cleared without conditions.
2.5% of the mergers were approved with conditions.
No mergers were blocked by the General Director.
Two transactions were withdrawn by the parties before a decision was rendered to avoid a formal IAA objection to the merger.
An analysis of the IAA’s track record during the last decade shows that the relative share of mergers that are blocked is stable, ranging from 0% to 2% at most, with another 1–3% of notifications withdrawn. These figures jumped sharply in 2012, with nearly 10% of mergers blocked or withdrawn, dropping back to average numbers in 2013 and 2014 and even further below in 2015. There has been an increase in the number of mergers blocked in 2016, a typical trend in the first year of a new General Director’s tenure. In 2017, no mergers were blocked. In 2018 the General Director has blocked, at the time of the publication, only one merger.
Over the years, there has been an evident decrease in the use of remedies by the IAA. While in the years 2000–2005 approximately 18% of merger decisions included remedies, the number decreased to only 6%–8% in recent years, to 0.6% in 2015 (the lowest share ever for such decisions), 1.6% in 2016 and 2.5% in 2017. The decline in use of remedies is in line with the IAA’s new guidance on remedies – see “Key policy developments”, below.
The main policy document regarding merger procedure has remained the “Antitrust General Director’s Pre-merger Filing Guidelines” published in 2008 (“the Pre-merger Guidelines”). In addition, the IAA published several years ago a detailed Q&A document relating to merger control procedure. In 2014, the IAA published an additional Q&A document, which contains detailed examples taken from pre-rulings filed to the IAA regarding merger control procedure.
Continuing in its goal to increase efficiency in the merger review process, in April 2017 the IAA announced that merger notifications (and requests for exemption for restrictive arrangements) would no longer need to be submitted to the IAA in hard copy form. Following a successful trial period, the IAA decided to allow parties to submit all of the relevant filing documents in electronic form, thereby increasing savings in resources for the business sector and the IAA, and decreasing environmental impact.
An important development in the area of merger enforcement was the July 2012 publication of the IAA’s Guidelines Regarding the Use of Enforcement Procedures of Financial Sanctions, which stated that the illegal execution of non-horizontal mergers would normally result in a financial sanction (an administrative tool) rather than criminal penalties, which could also be applied under the law. Illegal horizontal mergers are still subject to criminal enforcement.
In October 2016, the IAA published revised guidelines on the calculation of financial sanctions, which may also be relevant to parties who fail to notify a non-horizontal merger.
The first financial sanction decision regarding a “gun-jumping” violation was published by the IAA in 2015. Taking into account that competition was not hindered by the violation, as well as several other attenuating circumstances, the IAA considered that fines of around US$ 20K on the acquirer and US$ 1K on the seller would suffice. However, these figures were largely influenced by the very limited turnover of the parties involved. Higher amounts, ranging around US$ 100K, were imposed upon larger corporations, even absent harm to competition, as part of consent decrees.
The level of financial sanctions for merger control violations that had the potential to significantly harm competition is expected to be much higher.
In 2017, the IAA published a letter of intent regarding a planned imposition of financial sanctions on the Yenot Bitan supermarket chain, for Yenot Bitan’s alleged breach of the merger conditions in its recent acquisition of certain branches of the Mega supermarket chain. In March 2018, the IAA reached a consent decree with Yenot Bitan according to which Yenot Bitan will pay an amount of NIS 2m (approximately US$ 550k) for the alleged breach.
The General Director’s decisions in merger cases are subject to judicial review by the Antitrust Tribunal.
Once the General Director consents to a merger application, whether conditionally or unconditionally, any person who may be harmed by the merger, a trade association, as well as any consumers’ association, may appeal to the Antitrust Tribunal against the General Director’s decision. In the event that the General Director blocks a merger or stipulates conditions to his consent, each of the merging parties may appeal to the Antitrust Tribunal.
Section 22(c) of the Antitrust Law grants the Antitrust Tribunal the power to approve, revoke or amend the General Director’s decisions. This section was traditionally interpreted by courts starting from the Tnuva case (CA 2247/95 General Director v. Tnuva Central Cooperative for the Marketing of Agricultural Produce in Israel Ltd. (1995)) as giving the Antitrust Tribunal a right to hold a de novo judicial review, unbound by the analysis, factual findings or legal interpretations of the General Director. This interpretation was later narrowed in a line of decisions rendered by the Antitrust Tribunal and Supreme Court.
In Antitrust Authority v. Dor Alon Energy Israel (1998) Ltd,the Supreme Court disagreed with the Antitrust Tribunal’s stand that since the Tribunal’s review was de novo there was no significant weight to the conclusions reached by the General Director at the administrative level. While the Supreme Court did recognise the de novo review of the Tribunal, it decided that the General Director’s decision should form the basis and starting point for the Tribunal’s review, which should also take into account the knowledge, expertise and experience of the IAA’s personnel, who are highly professional specialists in various fields including law and economics. Therefore, the Antitrust Tribunal should attribute special importance to the General Director’s professional opinion. The Antitrust Tribunal can indeed deviate from the General Director’s decision, but it should not review the case as if it were a new proceeding, absent a General Director’s opinion.
In AT 36014-12-10 Caniel Packaging Industries Ltd. v. The General Director (2011), the Antitrust Tribunal mentioned the Supreme Court decision in Dor Alon and clarified that it was not the Supreme Court’s intention to narrow the scope of the Tribunal’s judicial review over the decisions of the General Director to a purely administrative standard of review (which is more focused on the decision-making process rather than the merits). However, the Tribunal explained that the Dor Alon decision prevents an appeal process which is not directly linked to the original decision. Moreover, the Antitrust Tribunal stated that the Dor Alon decision may have influence over which party carries the burden of proof, although the issue was left undecided and for that specific case (Caniel) the burden of proof was placed on the General Director.
In addition to raising the bar for successful challenges of the General Director’s merger decisions, the judicial review is fairly limited in its applicability for practical reasons. Normally such appeal proceedings span between two to four years. Merger transactions are normally carried out relatively swiftly and parties are usually unwilling to freeze their business development plans for years, waiting in uncertainty for a court decision. Therefore, merging parties who are informed by the General Director that he intends to block their transaction, often withdraw their application before the General Director grants his final and public decision.
A 2013 Supreme Court ruling, CA 6426/13 Azrieli Group v. Antitrust Authority (2013), halts a gradual erosion in the scope of judicial review of the General Director’s merger decisions. In this case, a party to the merger (the seller) notified the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange that the merger agreement had expired, since the General Director did not approve the merger. Furthermore, the seller did not join the appeal filed by the buyer to the Antitrust Tribunal. The Antitrust Tribunal decided that given that the merger agreement had expired, the appeal was theoretical and was therefore dismissed. Azrieli (the purchaser) appealed against the Antitrust Tribunal’s decision, and the Supreme Court sustained the appeal, overturning the Tribunal’s decision and reinstating Azrieli’s challenge against the General Director’s decision. The Court held that despite the seller’s cancellation of the merger transaction, the challenge had not become theoretical; and that the Tribunal had erred in concluding that it had no practical significance, given that the seller stated it was reasonably probable that it would re-enter the transaction, should the General Director’s decision be overturned. The Court further accepted Azrieli’s argument that the parties will not be required to re-file the transaction, should they enter a new merger agreement following the Tribunal’s approval. No less importantly, the Court ruled that the Tribunal can consider the competitive landscape at the time of the litigation, indicating that a broad de-novo assessment by the Tribunal is expected.
Section 30(a) of the Administrative Courts Law, 5752-1992 (the “Administrative Courts Law”), establishes the basic principle regarding a potential petitioner’s right to review and copy documents in the public authority’s case file, relating to the authority’s decision. This principle constitutes the source of an appellant’s right to view those documents held by the General Director relating to the decision under appeal. A party wishing to deviate from this rule bears the burden of proving that there is a valid ground for claiming that it is privileged. Once such a ground has been proven, the appellant’s review regarding these materials may be restricted, but only to the most minimal degree that is required.
Section 30(b) of the Administrative Courts Law specifies several types of privileges. This is the case, for example, when the documents have no relevance to the appealed decision; when the documents contain trade secrets; when the documents contain internal information such as minutes of meetings or decision drafts; or when disclosing the documents might infringe a right or a personal matter of a third party. Nevertheless, in accordance with the general principle that the file should be accessible to the appellant, the Section provides that reserving the right to review is allowed, “provided that review is not prevented for the reasons listed in this sub-section more than is required due to that reason”.
In general, the Supreme Court held in CA 4524/01 Ma’ariv Hotza’at Modi’in Ltd. v. the Antitrust General Director  IsrSC 57(4) 521 that an appellant’s interest in viewing the public authority’s documents on which the decision in its case is based, and the public interest in the “conduct of an exhaustive, just and complete process”, will prevail over the interest of those seeking to claim privilege in the preservation of their trade secrets. This is particularly true when it is possible to reduce potential harm regarding trade secrets by having privileged documents disclosed only to counsel (see also the decision of the Antitrust Tribunal regarding the same matter in AT (Jerusalem) 1/99 Yediot Ahronot Ltd. v. Antitrust General Director (2001)).
However, it seems that in recent years this balance has shifted towards protecting the interests of third parties who seek to prevent the exposure of sensitive information, even at the expense of appellants’ ability to process and analyse the information contained in the IAA’s documents. On several occasions, review of certain documents was completely denied. Other documents were accessed by a restricted number of counsels and experts and only in a location allocated for this purpose in the IAA’s offices, subject to severe confidentiality undertakings (“data room”). This trend further diminishes the ability of parties to contest the General Director’s decisions.
In AT (Jerusalem) 12407-10-13 Siemens AG v. the Antitrust General Director (2015), the Antitrust Tribunal rejected an attempt to erode further the rules established in the Ma’ariv case. The Antitrust Tribunal ordered that some of the internal documents of a third party, the Israel Electric Corporation (IEC), should be made available to the appellants’ counsels for review. The Tribunal rejected the argument that appellants’ counsels review should be restricted to the documents at the core of the IAA’s decision, as well as the claim that special protection should be afforded to IEC which, according to the IAA’s decision, was a victim of the appellants’ wrongdoing. The Supreme Court upheld the Tribunal’s decision.
In November 2016, the IAA published a draft amendment to the Antitrust Law dealing with, inter alia¸discovery proceedings in appeals on the General Director’s decisions. The IAA explains that such amendment is required in order to make the discovery process more efficient. Under the applicable legal regime, a potential petitioner may review and copy documents in the IAA’s case file that relate to the IAA’s decision. However, if such documents are subject to a certain privilege, the petitioner is not entitled to review the documents, unless he obtained an approval by the Antitrust Tribunal. In appeals conducted before the Antitrust Tribunal, petitioners oftentimes submit motions to review privileged documents, while deliberating such motions may take substantial judicial resources and harm the efficiency of the appeal proceedings. Consequently, the draft amendment proposes that the power to grant access to certain privileged documents (mostly documents that contain confidential information of third parties’) will be vested in the General Director, subject to appeal before the Antitrust Tribunal. If the General Director decides to grant access to a certain privileged document – the document, as a default, will not be presented to the petitioner itself, but rather only to its counsel and expert.
Key industry sectors reviewed, and approach adopted, to market definition, barriers to entry, nature of international competition, etc.
In recent years, the IAA has blocked several mergers in industries characterised by high concentration and a significant degree of product or market heterogeneity. These mergers illustrate the importance attributed by the IAA to a more detailed economic analysis, which goes beyond market definition and a simple assessment of market shares. These cases also demonstrate the IAA’s tendency to adopt rather narrow market definitions in branded goods and to adamantly preserve market independence of maverick firms.
In April 2016 the IAA blocked the proposed merger between mobile telecommunications carriers, Cellcom and Golan Telecom. For many years, the local mobile telecommunications market was dominated by three carriers: Partner, Cellcom and Pelephone. A government reform executed in 2011/12 successfully increased competition in the mobile telecommunications market and led to significant price decreases of services to consumers. New entrants, Golan Telecom and Hot Mobile, were seen as mavericks in the market. The IAA determined that the disappearance of Golan, a typical maverick, would likely significantly reduce incentives to compete, leading to the pre-reform days in which cellular operators demonstrated low oligopoly competition.
In April 2016 the IAA also blocked the acquisition of Electra-Bar by Mei Eden. Both companies are active in the area of importing and marketing filtered water dispensers, related maintenance services and the sale of water filters. According to the IAA, the two parties are direct competitors in their filtered water dispenser activities. The IAA further argued that the market entry by both companies facilitated competition to incumbent monopoly, Strauss-Tami4. Given the high level of product heterogeneity and the importance of branding, non-branded competitors could not have mitigated the expected adverse effect resulting from the 3-to-2 decrease in the number of branded players.
In recent years, numerous Israeli startup companies have been acquired by foreign companies. For reasons related to the fact that most acquisitions were made by foreign firms that lacked sufficient Israeli nexus, as well as the fact that most startup companies do not meet the filing thresholds, normally no filings were made in these cases. Notwithstanding, the General Director is not blind to these acquisitions of Israeli companies and their potential effect on local competition. In past years, the IAA reviewed several startup acquisitions, such as the acquisition of the navigation startup Waze by Google, and the acquisition of Mobileye by Intel.
The substantive test under Section 21(a) of the Antitrust Law is “reasonable likelihood that, as a result of the proposed merger, competition in the relevant market may be significantly harmed or that the public would be injured”.
In assessing the possible competitive outcome of a merger, the IAA usually applies the same methodology as the relevant US and EC authorities. The IAA would normally define the relevant market and then, if necessary, assess the relevant market shares of the parties, the existence of barriers to entry and expansion in the market, as well as other economic factors which may indicate how likely it is that the merger would result in either unilateral or coordinated effects.
The definition of the relevant market is mostly based on qualitative evidence, usually obtained by conversations with the merging parties and other market participants, internal documents, surveys, public records, information from other governmental agencies, and much more. In cases where the qualitative analysis is not sufficiently informative, the IAA may seek to strengthen it with quantitative analysis (critical loss analysis, price correlations, etc.).
The IAA has increased the use of econometric analysis in recent years, but the analysis is still fundamentally qualitative. In January 2017 the IAA published a study on the methodology for defining markets utilising econometric models of demand. The study demonstrates the use of an econometric model for the evaluation of demand elasticity on the basis of consumer behaviour in order to define markets. The IAA notes, however, that the form of analysis demonstrated in the study is remarkable in its complexity and breadth and falls outside the scope of the IAA’s resources in its day-to-day operations.
The IAA attributes special importance in merger investigations to direct evidence, such as natural experiments, internal documents, and market surveys.
In 2011, the IAA published the “Guidelines for Competitive Analysis of Horizontal Mergers”, which describe the theoretical economic and legal foundations upon which the IAA’s merger review is based.
First, the IAA will identify the relevant product and geographical markets in which the merging companies operate. The definition of the relevant market is based on the hypothetical monopolist test, which is implemented using practical indices such as differences in the functional use of the products, price differences, price correlation, the perspectives of market participants, differences in quality, etc.
Second, the IAA will identify the players in the market, their market shares, and the level of concentration before and after the merger.
The guidelines stress that the merger investigation does not rest solely on static analysis. Therefore, when the initial assessment yields that the merger raises significant concerns, the IAA will enter a more detailed analysis of the “dynamic aspects”, i.e. the possibility that the new entry or expansion of existing players in the market will mitigate the immediate and potentially harmful effects of the merger.
The analysis of entry and expansion will focus on a variety of entry and switching barriers, including regulatory barriers, scale economics, network effects, strategic behaviour by incumbent firms, branding, access to essential inputs, and much more.
If the analysis results in a conclusion that the merger is anticompetitive, the IAA will examine whether there are available remedies that can eliminate the potential harm to competition.
Efficiency defence – If the IAA is convinced that there are efficiencies directly resulting from the merger that outweigh the potential harm to competition, the merger will be approved. In order to enjoy the efficiency defence, one must meet certain conditions: (a) the efficiency must be merger-specific, in the sense that the parties cannot obtain similar efficiencies in any other way; and (b) the efficiency must be significant, timely and such that the benefits will mostly be passed on to the consumers and outweigh the harm inflicted on them by the loss of competition.
The failing firm doctrine – This doctrine refers to situations by which the acquired entity is financially unsustainable and will likely exit the market, even absent the merger. In such cases, there is no causal link between the merger and the injury to competition. In 2010, the IAA published guidelines detailing the legal basis and the practical requirements to meet the defence.
As aforementioned, the merger control procedure in Israel does not have a formal classification method. However, it is not uncommon for parties seeking swift approval for complicated mergers to offer upfront remedies, attempting to expedite the review process. An excellent example for such an approach is the Bezeq-012smile merger.
In that case, the parties identified several overlapping areas which were seemingly meaningful and would possibly have required a lengthy review. In order to avoid such lengthy proceedings, the parties suggested divestment of the overlapping activities at the outset.
However, it is more common that remedies are discussed only if the IAA reaches a tentative conclusion that the proposed merger may significantly lessen competition in the market. In such cases, the parties may propose remedies that will eliminate the harm to competition or, alternatively, the IAA may stipulate the conditions that are required in order to have the merger approved, and these can then be discussed with the parties.
In 2011, the IAA issued guidelines for merger remedies detailing key principles of its remedies policy – see “Key policy developments”, below. In a nutshell, the new guidelines express a preference for structural remedies over behavioural remedies. Interestingly, the clear majority of remedies imposed until 2011 were behavioural, while in 2011 most cases involved structural remedies.
In 2011, the IAA published the “Guidelines on Remedies for Mergers that Raise a Reasonable Concern for Significant Harm to Competition”.
The document outlines the governing legal principles of merger remedies, two of which stand out: (a) the IAA is authorised to request remedies only if the merger, as it was originally proposed, presents a concrete danger that competition will be significantly harmed. In other words, the IAA may impose conditions only for mergers that it can otherwise block; and (b) remedies are preferable whenever they are capable of mitigating the harm to competition.
The guidelines explain that the decision on whether remedies are suitable in a particular case and if so, what sort is based on the specific circumstances. Among the considerations that serve an important role in such analysis are: the theory of harm to competition; how effective is the remedy; the ability to enforce the remedy and to monitor deviations of the parties from such remedy; the remedy duration; and the ability of the merging parties to comply with the remedy.
The guidelines explain that the IAA will generally prefer structural remedies over behavioural remedies. The IAA alleges that structural remedies are generally more effective as they deal with the proverbial disease rather than the symptoms. Moreover, they do not require complex and constant monitoring, demand fewer public resources, and are executed within a defined and often brief time period. However, the IAA acknowledges that in certain instances behavioural remedies, or a mix of behavioural and structural remedies, would be more appropriate.
A change in the direction of the IAA’s approach towards applying stricter criteria to proposed mergers seems to have occurred in 2012. This impression was supported by the large number of blocked mergers and withdrawals of merger notifications in that year. Further insights can be gathered based on explicit remarks made by the former General Director, Prof. Gilo, such as those made in the 2012 to 2014 annual IAA conferences. These statements demonstrate that the IAA intends to block not only mergers that significantly harm competition, but also mergers in markets leaning towards higher concentration, as well as mergers that raise less concrete concerns for diminished competition, whether actual or potential. The notion that the policy has changed seems to explain the lower number of transactions blocked in 2013 and 2014, as complex transactions were likely terminated while on the drawing board. The current General Director blocked four mergers in 2016, most of them in her first few months in office, signalling that mergers will continue to be closely monitored by the IAA. At the same time, the General Director’s introduction of several reforms to the merger control process show a clear interest in increasing efficiency, however her decisions thus far indicate that she will continue to apply a rather strict approach.
In 2014, the IAA published the “Guidelines Regarding Information Exchange in the Course of Due Diligence Prior to a Transaction Between Competitors”. The guidelines provide theoretical principles and a procedural framework for conducting due diligence in transactions that require the transfer of sensitive information. While the guidelines characterise certain types of competitively sensitive information and suggest ways to transfer such data legally, they confer the ultimate discretion regarding the due diligence process, and the potential liability that comes with it, to the merging parties.
The premise of the guidelines which is economically and empirically controversial is that, in general, parties’ uncertainty as to market conditions and their competitors’ capabilities and plans contributes to competition; hence, any reduction in uncertainty can harm competition. Accordingly, the guidelines define “competitively sensitive information” very broadly.
The General Director does not establish a sweeping categorical rule regarding the exchange of such information, and presumably there are certain circumstances in which the exchange of such information would not pose a real competitive hazard.
The guidelines present a number of rules for due diligence that are aimed at minimising harm to competition in a manner that is consistent with the Antitrust Law, such as: the identification of competitively sensitive information; the evaluation of the necessity of information disclosure; the disclosure of information subject to a confidentiality undertaking; and the external review, or review by employees who are not involved in pricing, marketing, and sales, in fields where there is a competitive overlap and documentation requirements. Furthermore, a preference should be displayed for aggregate, outdated and non-concrete information.
In August 2015, the former General Director, Prof. Gilo, who adopted hard-line policies during his tenure, resigned from his post amid disagreement with government officials over competition regulation in the natural gas market. Prof. Gilo was replaced by an antitrust practitioner, Michal Halperin, who formerly served as chief legal counsel of the IAA during the years 2002–2006.
General Director Halperin blocked four transactions in her first year in office, three of which were blocked within the first three months of her term. The contentious Golan Telecom-Cellcom transaction, a 5-to-4 merger in the cellular services market, triggered public discourse and was blocked in April 2016. Several weeks earlier, a merger between Elektra and Mey Eden in the in-home water bar market (a 3-to-2 merger) was blocked. The General Director also blocked mergers that received less public attention. In May 2016, a merger between parties active in online restaurant indices, online reservation services and restaurant accommodation software services, was blocked (Click to Eat and Zap Group), due to both parties having significant market shares in the relevant markets and significant barriers to entry and expansion in such markets. In October 2016, a merger between manufacturers of white and printed envelopes was blocked (Gvaram and Emka). In January 2018 the acting General Director blocked a high-profile merger in the aviation industry – between El Al, Israel’s national carrier, and Israir which is one of three (including El Al) Israeli airlines.
The Bill suggests a significant increase in the turnover threshold which triggers merger filing. The Bill proposes to increase the turnover threshold, such that the joint sales turnover of the merging parties which triggers merger control will be increased from NIS 150 million (approximately US$ 42 million) to NIS 360 million (approximately US$ 100 million). Another requirement – that the turnover of at least two of the merging parties will be at least NIS 10 million (approximately US$ 2.8 million) – remains unchanged. There are two other filing thresholds based on market shares, that will not change: (a) as a result of the merger, the market share of the merging firms will exceed 50% in a relevant market; or (b) if one of the parties to the merger already has more than 50% share in a relevant market.
The Bill also proposes to subject not-for-profit associations to the merger control regime.
In addition, the Bill proposes to provide power to the General Director to extend the merger review period from 30 days to 150 days, by a reasoned administrative decision. Currently, the General Director must render a decision within 30 days, which can be extended only by a judicial decree or the consent of the parties.

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.