Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/3d/36/942.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 10:16:44+00:00

Document:
Evelle J. Younger, Attorney General, Edward A. Hinz, Jr., Chief Assistant Attorney General, William E. James, Assistant Attorney General, James T. McNally and Gregory W. Baugher, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
In an indictment filed in the County of Sacramento, defendant was charged with the crime of murder. The jury found defendant guilty of murder in the first degree. He appeals from the judgment of conviction.
On August 30, 1971, a Mr. Randle was hired by Folsom Prison as a laundry supervisor. After a week of orientation, he began his duties in the laundry and was working there on September 16, 1971. Another "free man," a Mr. Turner, was also working in the laundry on that date. Defendant, an inmate at Folsom, was assigned to the pressing room and worked there on September 16, 1971.
At about 12:20 p.m. on September 16, a laundry truck came to the back of the laundry area and Turner went there to supervise the unloading. Randle remained at the front door of the laundry room checking out inmates from the laundry area. As he was checking out the inmates, another inmate, whom Randle was unable to identify, came by and said there was a disturbance in the back of the laundry room. Randle detected a note of urgency in the inmate's voice.
Randle immediately proceeded to the back of the laundry. Enroute he heard a series of screams and thought they were emanating from the sock room. As he entered the door to the sock room he noticed Turner lying on the floor. An inmate was bending over Turner, straddling his prone body, and withdrawing his hand from the area of Turner's chest. Randle observed blood on the front of Turner's chest. He saw no one else in the area.
Randle came to an immediate halt just a few feet inside the door to the sock room. The inmate straddling Turner looked up at Randle who was able to identify him as the defendant. Randle had participated in a discussion earlier that day between Turner and the defendant relating to the defendant's attempt to obtain a job as a clerk for Randle. At that time Turner had explained to defendant that Randle already had a clerk.
When defendant saw Randle, he got up and began to approach him. Randle noticed that defendant was carrying in his hand a dull instrument which appeared to be between seven and ten inches long and had a dull, red color. Randle became frightened and ran out of the laundry room into the yard to summon help.
Randle ran to the yard shack and spoke with two correctional officers and told them what had happened. As they were talking, Turner staggered around the side of the laundry building and collapsed. A guard stationed [36 Cal. App. 3d 950] in a nearby guard tower thought he saw Turner stagger from the laundry followed by an inmate. Prison personnel attempted to assist Turner, and he was carried to the hospital where he subsequently died. During this time Turner said nothing more than "help me."
An associate warden, Randle and several officers secured a key to the laundry room (which had automatically locked) and gained entrance to the building. At this point Randle identified defendant as Turner's assailant.
When the officers entered the laundry, the defendant was not among the inmates remaining there. No weapons were found in the room during the subsequent search. There was a trial of blood leading from the sock room to the truck docking area.
While the search of the building was being conducted, Sergeant Cox was outside searching the inmates prior to their being returned to their cells. Cox had been advised that defendant was responsible for the stabbing incident. While conducting the search, Cox noticed defendant come around the corner of the bleacher area in the recreation yard, and move into a line of inmates. Defendant was then removed from the line and taken to the custody office. Sergeant Cox noticed what appeared to be blood stains on defendant's pants and socks.
During the afternoon of September 16, another search was made of the laundry area where an officer discovered a wadded up shirt in the sheet bin. In the pocket of the shirt was a medical slip with defendant's name on it. Defendant's laundry number was stamped on the front of the shirt, and the officer observed what appeared to be blood on one of the sleeves.
A search of the grounds revealed a knife located on a ledge above the showers near the weight lifting area of the yard. There appeared to be stains on the blade portion.
Blood stains found on defendant's clothing and on the blade of the knife were compared with that of the deceased and were found to be of the same blood type.
The cause of death was determined to be a stab wound to the left lung. However, there were multiple other wounds.
[1b] In this connection, the defendant contends on this appeal that there was a violent quarrel between defendant and Turner prior to the actual slaying. He claims that provocation for the ensuing fight resulted from Turner's refusal to grant defendant's request to be a laundry clerk for Randle. He also points out the multiple wounds on Turner as indicating circumstantial evidence of a preliminary heated quarrel, thus negating malice.
 Defendant contends his conviction must be reversed because he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial.
Attached to defendant's opening brief is a declaration of defendant's trial counsel made under penalty of perjury. In that declaration he states that although defendant asked him to contact another inmate who would testify defendant was elsewhere at the time of the killing, counsel failed to contact this inmate. Defense counsel declares that under the pressures of time he neglected to investigate the matter. Defendant contends this declaration supports his contention.
[6a] As a second prong of this contention, defendant contends that trial counsel made serious mistakes based on ignorance of the law.
[8a] In Griffin v. California (1965) 380 U.S. 609, 615 [14 L. Ed. 2d 106, 110, 85 S. Ct. 1229], the court states: "We ... hold that the Fifth Amendment, in its direct application to the Federal Government, and in its bearing on the States by reason of the Fourteenth Amendment, forbids either comment by the prosecution on the accused's silence or instructions by the court that such silence is evidence of guilt."
"But let's look at the defense. What is the defense? There is no defense. There has not been one shred of evidence introduced in this trial indicating that Mr. Gaulden didn't commit this crime. Not one.
"This wasn't an assault on another inmate because of a beef they had had, this wasn't an assault on a guard because maybe the guard had harassed him or they were having trouble, this was an assault on a free man, a guy whose job it is just to fold towels and make sure that the laundry runs effectively.
[8b] Finally, even assuming that there was Griffin error, it was not prejudicial. In People v. Vargas, supra, 9 Cal.3d at page 478, the court states: "The applicable test for determining whether an error which violates [36 Cal. App. 3d 956] federal constitutional principles is reversible error is set forth in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 [17 L. Ed. 2d 705, 710-711, 87 S. Ct. 824, 24 A.L.R.3d 1065], wherein the court held that 'before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.' This determination 'must be based on our own reading of the record and on what seems to us to have been the probable impact of the ... [errors] on the minds of an average jury.' (Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 254 [23 L. Ed. 2d 284, 287-288, 89 S. Ct. 1726].)"
 Defendant also contends the court violated his rights under Griffin by giving CALJIC instructions Nos. 2.60 and 2.61. Defendant contends the trial judge gave these instructions on his own motion. However, the record is not clear whether the judge did so or whether the instructions were given on request of one of the parties.
CALJIC No. 2.60 provides: "It is a constitutional right of a defendant in a criminal trial that he may not be compelled to testify. Thus the decision as to whether he should testify is left to the defendant, acting with the advice and assistance of his attorney. You must not draw any inference of guilt from the fact that he does not testify, nor should this fact be discussed by you or enter into your deliberations in any way."
CALJIC No. 2.61 provides: "In deciding whether or not to testify, the defendant may choose to rely on the state of the evidence and upon the failure, if any, of the People to prove every essential element of the charge against him, and no lack of testimony on defendant's part will supply a failure of proof by the People so as to support a finding against him on any such essential element."
In the instant case, however, CALJIC No. 2.61 was given in its revised form. As noted in Vargas (p. 475, fn. 4), the objectionable language in that instruction has now been deleted, and thus the revised form does not permit any assumption that the defendant's silence can be used to supplement the People's evidence. Accordingly, we find no error since defendant's Fifth Amendment rights were protected.
Defendant next argues that reversal of his conviction is required because of certain specific acts of misconduct by the prosecutor during his argument to the jury. (See People v. Perez (1962) 58 Cal. 2d 229, 248-250 [23 Cal. Rptr. 569, 373 P.2d 617, 3 A.L.R.3d 946].) Although defendant uses a shotgun approach, we can isolate five instances cited by defendant as the basis for misconduct: (1) the prosecutor wrongly stated that defendant was charged with murder in the first degree; (2) the prosecutor [36 Cal. App. 3d 958] stated that defendant concealed a knife upon his person where there was no evidence to show that fact; (3) the prosecutor argued that the deceased was alone in the sock room according to the testimony of inmate Linker, when in fact Linker denied knowing who was there; the prosecutor put his own integrity into issue to bolster the credibility of prosecution witnesses; and (5) the prosecutor improperly suggested that the burden of proving innocence shifted to the defendant once the People closed their case.
"... '"It is the province of a district attorney to state to a jury the various conclusions that he draws from the evidence, and to make it clear to the jury what conclusions in his opinion should be drawn from the evidence introduced, so long as he keeps within the scope of conclusions which may properly be drawn." [Citation.] "The right of counsel [36 Cal. App. 3d 959] to discuss the merits of a case, both as to the law and facts, is very wide, and he has the right to state fully his views as to what the evidence shows, and as to the conclusions to be fairly drawn therefrom. The adverse party cannot complain if the reasoning be faulty and the deductions illogical, as such matters are ultimately for the consideration of the jury." [Citation.] In the argument before the jury, any reasonable inference may be drawn from the evidence, and it is a matter within the discretion of the trial court to determine whether counsel stays within the permissible range of discussion.' [Citation.]"
 In view of the above principles, our review of the record in this case demonstrates that the alleged errors complained of did not constitute such prejudicial error as to require reversal.
Furthermore, the comments referred to generally constitute no more than proper comment upon the evidence presented and what the prosecution reasonably thought the evidence proved.
For example, although the indictment charged murder, the prosecutor obviously sought to prove murder in the first degree and did so. This was proper argument. (Cf. People v. Wallace (1970) 13 Cal. App. 3d 608, 616 [91 Cal. Rptr. 643].) Likewise, with respect to the arguments that defendant concealed a knife upon his person and assaulted Turner alone in the sock room are both proper arguments since they were reasonable inferences from all of the evidence presented. We also note that, contrary to defendant's allegation, the prosecutor did not argue that the deceased was alone in the sock room according to the testimony of inmate Linker.
"You have heard the defense. The correctional officers, the correctional staff set up Jeffrey Gaulden. They conspired against him. They came in here and lied, and I guess that from Mr. Vaughn's argument, you can add me to the list, because as the evidence indicated, I was up there on the day of the crime after these events. I was up on the ledge where the knife was found. I was there when the photos were taken; and I guess if those witnesses [36 Cal. App. 3d 960] that I brought in here are guilty of perjury, then I am guilty of suborning perjury and I should be disbarred."
Finally, the defendant argues the prosecutor spoke as if the burden of proof passes to the defendant once the prosecution has put in some evidence on a particular point. For example, the defendant cites this statement of the prosecutor: "[I]t is my duty to prove the truth to you; and if I do, then it is his duty to defend himself against it; and I submit to you there is no evidence indicating he is not guilty of this crime."
We do not regard this statement as an instruction on burden of proof. It was proper comment on the state of the evidence, i.e., the defense produced no evidence to show that defendant was not the culprit. In any event, the trial court properly instructed the jury on reasonable doubt.
Defense counsel filed a sweeping pretrial motion requesting the production of the complete personnel files of all prison staff members and the inmate files of all prisoners that each side was considering calling to testify at trial. Defense counsel wanted these materials for impeachment purposes. The prosecution opposed the breadth of the motion but did offer to go through the files and disclose any material which might be relevant to impeachment. Eventually the trial court denied defendant's motion. He now assigns this as error.
In Engstrom v. Superior Court (1971) 20 Cal. App. 3d 240, 243 [97 Cal. Rptr. 484], the court states: "The theory behind criminal discovery was stated in People v. Riser (1956) 47 Cal. 2d 566, 586 [305 P.2d 1]: 'Absent some governmental requirement that information be kept confidential for the purposes of effective law enforcement, the state has no interest in denying the accused access to all evidence that can throw light on issues in the case, and in particular it has no interest in convicting on the testimony of witnesses who have not been as rigorously cross-examined and as thoroughly impeached as the evidence permits.' The same policy applies to information not in the prosecutor's possession but available at [36 Cal. App. 3d 961] his request from other agencies which are part of the criminal justice system."
"Our position does not reflect 'a swing of the pendulum' (Louisell, Modern Cal. Discovery (1963) 404) away from our fundamental concern that an accused be provided with a maximum of information that may illumine his case. (See People v. Riser (1956) 47 Cal. 2d 566, 586 [305 P.2d 1].) A defendant's motion for discovery must nevertheless describe the requested information with at least some degree of specificity and must be sustained by plausible justification."
[16a] Defendant contends that his conviction should be reduced by this court to murder in the second degree. He cites two main reasons. First, he contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict in that there is no substantial evidence the killing was committed by lying in wait or that it was willful, deliberate and premeditated. Second, he argues the court erroneously gave CALJIC instructions Nos. 3.30 and 3.34 in that these are instructions on general criminal intent applicable only to general intent crimes.
 Before proceeding to these contentions, we review the rules regarding an attack on the sufficiency of the evidence which are succinctly set forth in People v. Reilly (1970) 3 Cal. 3d 421, 425 [90 Cal. Rptr. 417, 475 P.2d 649]: "An appellate court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to respondent and presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence. [Citations.] '"If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact's findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances might also be reasonably reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant a reversal of the judgment."' [Citations.]  The test on appeal is whether substantial evidence supports the conclusion of the trier of fact, not whether the evidence proves guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] The appellate court must determine whether a reasonable trier of fact could have found the prosecution sustained its burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citations.]"
 "It is settled that 'To establish the crime of first degree murder, direct evidence of a deliberate and premeditated purpose to kill is not required. The necessary elements of deliberation and premeditation may be inferred from proof of such facts and circumstances as will furnish a reasonable foundation for such an inference, and where the evidence is not in law insufficient, the matter is exclusively within the province of the trier of fact to determine.' [Citations.]"
In the instant case, the jury was instructed on both deliberate and premeditated murder and on murder by lying in wait.
As stated in People v. Anderson (1968) 70 Cal. 2d 15, 26-27 [73 Cal. Rptr. 550, 447 P.2d 942]: "The type of evidence which this court has found sufficient to sustain a finding of premeditation and deliberation falls into three basic categories: (1) facts about how and what defendant did prior to the actual killing which show that the defendant was engaged in activity directed toward, and, explicable as intended to result in, the killing -- what may be characterized as 'planning' activity; (2) facts about the defendant's prior relationship and/or conduct with the victim from which the jury could reasonably infer a 'motive' to kill the victim, which inference of motive, together with facts of type (1) or (3), would in turn support an inference that the killing was the result of 'a pre-existing reflection' and 'careful thought and weighing of considerations' rather than 'mere unconsidered or rash impulse hastily executed' (People v. Thomas, supra, 25 Cal. 2d 880, at pp. 898, 900, 901 [156 P.2d 7]); (3) facts about the nature of the killing from which the jury could infer that the manner of killing was so particular and exacting that the defendant must have intentionally killed according to a 'preconceived design' to take his victim's life in a particular way for a 'reason' which the jury can reasonably infer from facts of type (1) or (2).
From our review of the record we conclude that the verdict was clearly justified under Anderson since there was evidence of "planning activity" (defendant arming himself with a knife and secreting himself in the sock room), a prior relationship leading to a motive (rejection of defendant as Randle's clerk), and the manner of killing (multiple wounds). Thus, the verdict was proper under either of the two theories propounded to the jury.
Furthermore, even if the giving of the general intent instruction was error, it was not prejudicial. As stated in People v. Hill, supra, 67 Cal.2d at page 119: "No miscarriage of justice (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13) results where the jury could not have been misled by an unnecessary instruction on general intent (People v. Smith, 223 Cal. App. 2d 225,233 [35 Cal. Rptr. 719]; nor is the error prejudicial where the nature of the acts done by the accused preclude belief that they were done without specific intent (People v. Booth, supra, 111 Cal. App. 2d 106, 109 [243 P.2d 872].)"
 In his closing brief, defendant argues for the first time that he is entitled to a new trial under Penal Code section 1202 since the trial court did not grant him a hearing on his pro se motion for a new trial which was denied. The trial court properly denied the motion.
Penal Code section 1202 provides: "If no sufficient cause is alleged or appears to the court at the time fixed for pronouncing judgment, as provided in Section 1191 of this code, why judgment should not be pronounced, it must thereupon be rendered; and if not rendered or pronounced within the time so fixed or to which it is continued under the provisions of Section 1191 of this code, then the defendant shall be entitled to a new trial. If the court shall refuse to hear a defendant's motion for a new trial or when made shall neglect to determine such motion before pronouncing judgment or the making of an order granting probation, then the defendant shall be entitled to a new trial."
Judgment was pronounced and rendered on May 30, 1972. Defendant's motion pro se was made after such time and thus was untimely and improperly filed.
Richardson, P. J., and Good, J., concurred.

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