Source: https://elawnora.blogspot.com/2017/10/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 08:52:51+00:00

Document:
On 19 October last IPKat and the British Literary and Artistic Copyright Association (BLACA) partnered once again and organised a panel discussion on the implications that the departure of the UK from the EU (aka 'Brexit) will have on UK copyright law.
Moderated by myself, the panel featured Sir Richard Arnold (High Court Judge, Chancery Division), Nicholas Saunders (Barrister, Brick Court Chambers), Ros Lynch (Copyright and IP Enforcement Director, IPO), Ian Moss (Director Public Affairs, BPI), Tom Ohta (Senior IP lawyer, BT), and Estelle Derclaye (Professor of IP Law, University of Nottingham).
Asked what EU development has had the biggest impact - for better or worse - on UK copyright, Sir Richard highlighted at the outset how a number of developments would have occurred independently from UK membership of the EU. These include the changes mandated by the WIPO Copyright Treaties, TRIPS, the Marrakesh Treaty and the Beijing Treaty. However, there have been also legislative interventions prompted by EU membership, including the introduction into UK law of the resale royalty right (droit de suite).
In all this, however, the learned judge noted that what has had a systemic impact has been in particular the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), which has touched upon basic concepts such as originality (which Prof Derclaye said to require more than just sufficient skill, labour or effort, as per the traditional UK approach) and has resulted in UK courts embedding - as is apparent from the SAS case - the idea/expression dichotomy into UK law. Also Mr Saunders stressed the relevance of CJEU jurisprudence, and discussed the case of the right of communication to the public, which so far has been subject to nearly 20 references for a preliminary ruling.
I asked Sir Richard whether he thought that CJEU case law also mandates an open-ended approach to copyright subject-matter. Sir Richard and the other panellists noted that it is not sure that EU law - or rather CJEU interpretation of it - requires to adopt this approach and possibly (but not necessarily) further clarity might be provided when the CJEU decides Levola Hengelo, C-310/17, ie the cheese case [see here].
The discussion then moved to the policy initiatives that UK Government might need to take in the copyright area. Ms Lynch highlighted how, compared to other areas of IP, copyright is not particularly problematic. However, some adjustments would be required, eg with regard to the database right, and the country of origin principle.
When asked about the perspective of UK creative industries, Mr Moss noted how there are some pressing issues to address, including with regard to live performances. Uncertainties over immigration rules post-Brexit, as well as potential visa requirements for UK musicians and performers travelling abroad and EU nationals coming to the UK, should be addressed as soon as possible in order to avoid having to cancel shows that - for 2019 - have already started being arranged and booked. With regard to copyright rules, Mr Moss noted that certain aspects of the proposal for a directive on copyright in the Digital Single Market should be transposed into UK law, even in a scenario of hard Brexit.
Turning to the issue of enforcement, Mr Ohta noted that UK courts have developed a solid jurisprudence on jurisdiction over intermediary injunctions. The discussion then moved to the issue of responsibility for implementation costs of injunctions granted against intermediaries. It will be crucial to see what the UK Supreme Court decides in Cartier next year.
The audience engaged with questions and comments, and was particularly interested in the relevance of CJEU case law post-Brexit. According to s6 of the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill [see here for the progress of the Bill], "[a] court or tribunal— (a) [shall not be] bound by any principles laid down, or any decisions made, on or after exit day by the European Court, and (b) cannot refer any matter to the European Court on or after exit day." However, "A court or tribunal need not have regard to anything done on or after exit day by the European Court, another EU entity or the EU but may do so if it considers it appropriate to do so." What that will mean remains unclear.
As a final wrap-up question, I asked the panellists to indicate one area of copyright that they would like to see changed after Brexit, should the UK have the power to do so. Sir Richard noted that, although he was not indicating any specific preference, the UK might have a discussion around the re-introduction of s52 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act (CDPA) [which the UK repealed as a consequence of the CJEU Flos decision]. Prof Derclaye, Mr Ohta and Mr Saunders indicated case law on communication to the public as being in need of some rethinking, with Mr Saunders also adding the introduction of a new private copying exception [s28B CDPA was repealed shortly after it was introduced, on grounds that Government had failed to provide appropriate evidence as to why there was no need of a fair compensation requirement]. Mr Moss said there is no particular need to reform UK copyright law, although greater cooperation from intermediaries would be good. Considering how busy the UK IPO is already with other IP rights, Ms Lynch concluded by saying that she wishes that no immediate changes are necessary.
A few weeks ago this blog reported on the judgment of the German Federal Court of Justice which decided that the presumption of knowledge envisaged by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in GS Media [Katposts here] for for-profit link providers would not be applicable to search engines due to their importance to the functioning of the internet.
I have been made aware that this decision is not an isolated instance, and a similar line of reasoning can be found also in another recent German judgment, ie the one of the Regional Court of Hamburg issued earlier this year (308 O 151/17). Also this ruling shows a certain disagreement with recent CJEU case law on the right of communication to the public, including in the linking context, and warns against the dangers of intending the GS Media presumption of knowledge in too a broad sense.
The decision orginated in the context of proceedings brought against the operator of a product search engine which lists furniture and home accessories for sale. The results are obtained by aggregating the listings of over 200 online shops. Further to a certain search, the defendant’s site displays results which consists of photographs (stored on third-party sites) of relevant products and links to the various listings.
The claimant submitted that, by displaying this result, the defendant made an unauthorised act of communication to the public pursuant to §§ 15(2) UrhG and 19a UrhG.
Being a for-profit undertaking, according to the claimant, the defendant had an obligation to ensure that the links displayed through its search engine would be to lawful content.
The Hamburg court dismissed the action, holding that the simple linking of a work hosted on a third-party site by way of 'framing' does not constitute an act of making available to the public within §19a UrhG. Referring to the decisions in Die Realität I and II, according to the court this is so because it is the operator of the third-party site that decides on the making available of the work at issue.
Accordingly, the only provision that might come into consideration is the 'unnamed' right of communication to the public within §15(2) UrhG. To determine whether that would be actually the case, the court deemed it necessary to review relevant CJEU case law on Article 3(1) of the InfoSoc Directive.
The Hamburg court recalled the requirements of (1) an act of communication (2) directed to a public, as well as the other interdependent criteria employed by the CJEU and the 'indispensable intervention' of the user. The court then focused on the GS Media presumption of knowledge for link providers that act with a profit-making intention.
The court excluded that there would be a communication to the public in the case at issue. Although the requirement of the 'new public' was met, the act at issue would not take place with the indispensable intervention of the defendant, ie - as the CJEU held in Filmspeler [here] - an intervention made “with full knowledge of the consequences” of such conduct.
According to the Hamburg court, the defendant in this case - although operating for a profit - had neither positive knowledge of the unlawfulness of the offer displayed through its search engine, nor could it have acquired knowledge of the offer’s unlawfulness in a reasonable way. The court also noted that a platform like Amazon is not usually associated with unlawful listings.
The links displayed were created through a completely automated process and the relevant offers were not subject to any editing or other manual control. This means that it cannot be assumed that the defendant had knowledge that the offer at issue incorporated content that would infringe the claimant's rights.
In addition, upon becoming aware of the unlawfulness of the listing, the defendant promptly removed it.
According to the court, considering that the defendant's databank contains 50 million offers, it would be unreasonable to expect that every single link is checked beforehand. In the event of (several) completely automated processes it cannot be expected that the GS Media presumption operates in relation to each and every link. Referring to the Opinion of Advocate General Szpunar in Ziggo [here], the Hamburg court held that holding otherwise would extend liability to every imaginable far-removed contribution due to negligible lack of knowledge and, therefore, on the basis of merely fictitious intention.
The court added that any different interpretation would also result in an undue compression of one's own freedom to conduct a business, as per Article 16 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
As to whether things would change in the event that the link provider adopts third-party content as its own (which in any case was not what happened here), the court stated that this remains uncertain at the EU level.
The decision of the Hamburg court, similarly to the one of the Federal Court of Justice, warns against an overly broad understanding of both communication to the public and the obligations imposed on link providers that operate for profit, especially if these handle a high number of links.
Some aspects of the CJEU judgments discussed by the German courts are ambiguous and in need of further clarification. One might wonder whether national courts are best placed to carry out such an explanatory task or whether, instead, clarification at the CJEU level might be a better option to avoid inconsistent applications of relevant judgments by national courts.
The (until fairly recently little-known) copyright exception in Article 5(3)(h) of the InfoSoc Directive allowing Member States to authorize the "use of works, such as works of architecture or sculpture, made to be located permanently in public places", also known as freedom of panorama, has been subject to increasingly frequent (and heated) discussion over the past few years.
Freedom of panorama: from niche to ubiquitous?
At the EU level, in her report MEP Julia Reda proposed to make the exception mandatory for all Member States to have. At the moment, however, there seems to be no real discussion around this issue, nor does it seem that the EU Commission intends to propose legislation in this sense.
At the national levels legislatures and courts have been busy addressing this area of copyright [a handy overview of national approaches (both at the EU and non-EU levels) to freedom of panorama is available here].
Examples of the former include the recent initiatives in Belgium [Article XI.190(2/1°) of the Code de Droit Économique, introduced in 2015] and France [Article L 122-5 No 11 of the Code de la propriété intellectuelle, introduced in 2016 - here], which have resulted in the adoption of specific exceptions allowing freedom of panorama.
An example of the latter is the (rather) controversial 2016 decision of the Swedish Supreme Court [here] that arguably interpreted narrowly the relevant exception in section 24(1) of the Swedish Copyright Act. The decision was applied earlier this year by the Swedish Patent and Market Court.
As an EU Member State, Italy occupies a relatively peculiar position. While formally Italian copyright law does not envisage an exception allowing freedom of panorama, a certain freedom is nonetheless recognized by means of other provisions [here].
As Italy also expressly includes works of architecture among protectable subject-matter, it is the perfect candidate to see how those who would be harmed by the introduction of a specific exception allowing freedom of panorama would react to the introduction of a specific exception.
This is indeed what the Associazione Wikimedia Italia sought to discover earlier this year, when it conducted a survey among architects based in different parts of Italy, obtaining over 600 responses.
The results [available here] are very interesting.
First, the facts: only one respondent stated to have every received payment for a photograph taken of their work.
More generally, over 70% of those surveyed stated that they are not aware that permission is required to make reproductions of works of architecture, sculptures et sim permanently located on public display. Nearly 60% thinks that it would not be reasonably possible for, eg, a photographer to locate and contact relevant rightholders to seek permission.
Associazione Wikimedia Italia also asked respondents whether they agreed with a freedom of panorama provision, described as following: the ability to take a photo of a work of yours visible from the public street, distribute it with a free license and add it to a Wikipedia article, all without your permission. 11.5 % of the respondents believed this to be a bad thing for them or in general, while 68.6 % declared it to be a good thing and around 20 % gave a more nuanced response, generally stressing that the photographer should if possible state the provenance and name the architect/author.
It would be interesting to see if the results of the survey changed in different Member States. Overall, however, it appears that - at least in Italy - architects may be more concerned about attribution of the work, rather than licensing use upon payment of a fee.
The survey results also prompt a broader reflection on the goals pursued by certain policy initiatives and whether they would be really beneficial to their ... beneficiaries. In this sense, a fairly immediate connection is with the discussion currently being undertaken around the introduction of an EU press publishers' right, further to somewhat similar initiatives in Germany and Spain. Would the beneficiaries of this new neightbouring right (if adopted) uncontroversially benefit from it?

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