Source: https://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-supreme-court/381/41.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 21:57:19+00:00

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Petitioners' decedents were passengers on an airliner which collided with a jet trainer assigned to the Maryland Air National Guard. The only survivor was the jet trainer pilot, whose negligence is not disputed. The pilot held a commission from the Governor of Maryland as an officer in the Maryland Air National Guard where he served on alternate Saturdays as a fighter pilot and Squadron Maintenance Officer. He was otherwise employed by the Guard as a civilian Aircraft Maintenance Chief under 32 U.S.C. 709, as a so-called "caretaker" of Guard property. This suit was brought against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act. The principal issue below was whether the pilot was in his military or civilian capacity at the time of the accident. The District Court found he was in a civilian status and awarded judgment for petitioners, but the Court of Appeals reversed. Held: In both his civilian and military capacities the pilot was an employee of the State of Maryland and thus the United States is not liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act for his negligence in either capacity. Pp. 46-53.
(a) Except when called into federal service, the Guard is in charge of the Governor of the State and its military members are state employees. Pp. 47-48.
(b) Civilian caretakers, while meeting federal requirements and receiving payment from the United States, are under the jurisdiction of the State Adjutant General and are performing a state function. Pp. 48-49.
(c) United States v. Holly, 192 F.2d 221, which held that civilian caretakers were employees of the United States, was decided on an incorrect construction of the National Defense Act. P. 50.
(d) Congressional enactments, despite the Holly line of cases, treat both military and civilian employees of the National Guard as state employees. Pp. 51-52.
Theodore E. Wolcott argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioners.
David L. Rose argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Cox, Assistant Attorney General Douglas, Nathan Lewin and Morton Hollander.
Louis G. Davidson, Richard W. Galiher, William E. Stewart, Jr., and Peter J. McBreen filed a brief as amici curiae, urging reversal.
Captain McCoy held a commission from the Governor of Maryland as an officer in the Maryland Air National Guard, and he served on alternate Saturdays as a fighter pilot and Squadron Maintenance Officer with the 104th Fighter Interceptor Squadron. During the rest of the month Captain McCoy was employed by the Guard in a civilian capacity as Aircraft Maintenance Chief under 32 U.S.C. 709 (1958 ed.), the so-called federal "caretaker" statute. 3 In his civilian capacity Captain McCoy [381 U.S. 41, 45] supervised the maintenance of the squadron aircraft assigned to the Air National Guard but owned by the United States. On the day of the accident, Captain McCoy had obtained permission from his superior to take a passenger on a flight in order to interest the passenger in joining the Air National Guard. The principal factual dispute below was whether at the time of the accident Captain McCoy was performing his duties with the Guard in a military or civilian capacity. A line of cases in the courts of appeals beginning with United States v. Holly, 192 F.2d 221 (C. A. 10th Cir., 1951), has held that civilian "caretakers" are employees of the United States for purposes of suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act. 4 Another line of cases has been equally consistent in treating military members of the Guard as employees of the States, not the Federal Government. 5 We do not deal with the factual question, on which the decision below turned. 6 since, in agreement with the views [381 U.S. 41, 46] of Judge Smith 7 and in disagreement with the Court of Appeals in the Meyer case, we hold that in both capacities Captain McCoy was an employee of the State of Maryland, and not of the United States. Hence the United States cannot be held liable under the Tort Claims Act for his negligence in either capacity.
The National Guard is the modern Militia reserved to the States by Art. I. 8, cl. 15, 16, of the Constitution. 8 It has only been in recent years that the National Guard has been an organized force, capable of being assimilated with ease into the regular military establishment of the United States. From the days of the Minutemen of Lexington and Concord until just before World War I, the various militias embodied the concept of a citizen army, but lacked the equipment and training necessary for their use as an integral part of the reserve force of the United States Armed Forces. 9 The passage of the National Defense Act of 1916 10 materially altered the status of the militias by constituting them as the National Guard. Pursuant to power vested in Congress by the Constitution (see n. 8), the Guard was to be [381 U.S. 41, 47] uniformed, equipped, and trained in much the same way as the regular army, subject to federal standards and capable of being "federalized" by units, rather than by drafting individual soldiers. 11 In return, Congress authorized the allocation of federal equipment to the Guard, and provided federal compensation for members of the Guard, supplementing any state emoluments. The Governor, however, remained in charge of the National Guard in each State except when the Guard was called into active federal service; in most instances the Governor administered the Guard through the State Adjutant General, 12 who was required by the Act to report periodically to the National Guard Bureau, a federal organization, on the Guard's reserve status. 13 The basic structure of the 1916 Act has been preserved to the present day.
It seems clear, then, that no significant distinction was intended between the method of employing military and civilian personnel of the National Guard.
In 1956 Congress authorized federal disbursing officers to withhold from the salaries of civilian caretakers amounts needed by the States for their retirement systems. Although Congress was aware of the Holly line of cases, 33 the Senate report stated that authority was [381 U.S. 41, 52] necessary since "[t]hese employees, although paid from Federal funds, are considered to be State rather than Federal employees. Accordingly, State authorities have been unable to make the usual deduction of the employee's contribution into the retirement system." S. Rep. No. 2045, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956).
In so holding we are not unmindful that this doubtless leaves those who suffered from this accident without effective legal redress for their losses. 39 It is nevertheless our duty to take the law as we find it, remitting those aggrieved to whatever requirement may be deemed appropriate by Congress. which in affording the administrative remedies, unfortunately not available here (see n. 37), has shown itself not impervious to the moral demands of such distressing situations.
"(b) Subject to the provisions of chapter 171 of this title, the district courts . . . shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the United States, for money damages, accruing on and after January 1, 1945, for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred."
"`Employee of the government' includes officers or employees of any federal agency, members of the military or naval forces of the [381 U.S. 41, 43] United States, and persons acting on behalf of a federal agency in an official capacity, temporarily or permanently in the service of the United States, whether with or without compensation."
[ Footnote 2 ] We are informed that such litigation is pending in Illinois, Ohio, and New York.
"(a) Under such regulations as the Secretary of the Army may prescribe, funds allotted by him for the Army National Guard may be spent for the compensation of competent persons to care for material, armament, and equipment of the Army National Guard. Under such regulations as the Secretary of the Air Force may prescribe, funds allotted by him for the Air National Guard may be spent for the compensation of competent persons to care for material, armament, and equipment of the Air National Guard. A caretaker employed under this subsection may also perform clerical duties incidental to his employment and other duties that do not interfere with the performance of his duties as caretaker.
"(b) Enlisted members of the National Guard and civilians may be employed as caretakers under this section. However, if a unit has more than one caretaker, one of them must be an enlisted member. Compensation under this section is in addition to compensation otherwise provided for a member of the National Guard.
"(c) Under regulations to be prescribed by the Secretary concerned, material, armament, and equipment of the Army National Guard or Air National Guard of a State or Territory, Puerto Rico, the Canal Zone, or the District of Columbia may be placed in a common pool for care, maintenance, and storage. Not more than 15 caretakers may be employed for each of those pools.
"(d) Under regulations to be prescribed by the Secretary concerned, one commissioned officer of the National Guard in a grade below major may be employed for each pool set up under subsection (c) and for each squadron of the Air National Guard. Commissioned officers may not be otherwise employed under this section.
"(e) Funds appropriated by Congress for the National Guard are in addition to funds appropriated by the several States and Territories, [381 U.S. 41, 45] Puerto Rico, the Canal Zone, and the District of Columbia for the National Guard, and are available for the hire of caretakers and clerks.
"(f) The Secretary concerned shall fix the salaries of clerks and caretakers authorized to be employed under this section, and shall designate the person to employ them."
[ Footnote 4 ] Elmo v. United States, 197 F.2d 230 (C. A. 5th Cir.); United States v. Duncan, 197 F.2d 233 (C. A. 5th Cir.); Courtney v. United States, 230 F.2d 112 (C. A. 2d Cir.); United States v. Wendt, 242 F.2d 854 (C. A. 9th Cir.).
[ Footnote 5 ] Williams v. United States, 189 F.2d 607 (C. A. 10th Cir.); Dover v. United States, 192 F.2d 431 (C. A. 5th Cir.); McCranie v. United States, 199 F.2d 581 (C. A. 5th Cir.); Storer Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 251 F.2d 268 (C. A. 5th Cir.); Bristow v. United States, 309 F.2d 465 (C. A. 6th Cir.); Pattno v. United States, 311 F.2d 604 (C. A. 10th Cir.); Blackwell v. United States, 321 F.2d 96 (C. A. 5th Cir.).
[ Footnote 6 ] A majority of the Court of Appeals held, contrary to the District Court, that McCoy was acting in his military capacity at the time of the accident.
[ Footnote 7 ] Of the other two members of the panel, Judge Hastie did not reach the question whether civilian Guard employees were embraced within the Tort Claims Act, and Judge Staley was in accord with the views of the District of Columbia Circuit in Meyer.
[ Footnote 8 ] "The Congress shall have Power . . .
[ Footnote 9 ] See generally, Wiener, The Militia Clause of the Constitution, 54 Harv. L. Rev. 181 (1940).
[ Footnote 10 ] 39 Stat. 166 (1916).
[ Footnote 11 ] National Defense Act, 111, now 10 U.S.C. 672 (1964 ed.). See Wiener, supra, n. 9.
[ Footnote 12 ] See 32 U.S.C. 314 (1958 ed.).
[ Footnote 13 ] National Defense Act, 66, as amended, now 32 U.S.C. 314 (d) (1958 ed.).
[ Footnote 14 ] "Funds allotted by the Secretary of War for the support of the National Guard shall be available . . . for the compensation of competent help for the care of the material, animals, and equipment thereof, under such regulations as the Secretary of War may prescribe: Provided, That the men to be compensated, not to exceed five for each battery or troop, shall be duly enlisted therein and shall be detailed by the battery or troop commander, under such regulations as the Secretary of War may prescribe, and shall be paid by the United States disbursing officer in each State, Territory, and the District of Columbia." 39 Stat. 205.
[ Footnote 15 ] Act of June 19, 1935, 49 Stat. 391.
[ Footnote 16 ] See S. Rep. No. 635, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 2-3, quoted infra, p. 51.
[ Footnote 17 ] Detailed requirements for civilian caretakers are set out in Air National Guard Regulation No. 40-01, dated December 20, 1954 (hereinafter ANGR 40-01), and Air National Guard Manual No. 40-01, dated March 1, 1958.
[ Footnote 18 ] National Defense Act, 83, 39 Stat. 203, 204, now 32 U.S.C. 702 (d) (1958 ed.).
[ Footnote 19 ] Id., 87, now 32 U.S.C. 710 (1958 ed.).
[ Footnote 20 ] In 1926 Congress authorized the employment of National Guard officers as caretakers, limited to one per squadron, in order to provide "an officer constantly on duty at the flying field for the supervision of flying training." H. R. Rep. No. 1031, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 3, explaining the amendment to 90 of the National Defense Act, enacted as Act of May 28, 1926, 44 Stat. 673, now 32 U.S.C. 709 (d) (1958 ed.). See also S. Rep. No. 785, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. Training, of course, was a duty reserved to the States by 91 of the National Defense Act and by Art. I, 8, cl. 16, of the Constitution.
[ Footnote 21 ] Hearings before the Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 1303.
[ Footnote 22 ] ANGR 40-01, §§ 3 (b), 7 (a).
[ Footnote 23 ] Id., § 3.
[ Footnote 24 ] Act of Aug. 14, 1935, c. 531, 49 Stat. 620, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 418 (b) (5) (1958 ed.).
[ Footnote 25 ] Act of June 15, 1956, c. 390, 70 Stat. 283, as amended, 5 U.S.C. 84d (1964 ed.).
"Air National Guard civilian personnel are considered to be employees of the State, Territory, Puerto Rico, or the District of Columbia (21 Comp Gen Dec. 305)."
[ Footnote 27 ] 27 Comp. Dec. 344 (1920).
[ Footnote 28 ] 21 Comp. Gen. 305 (1941).
[ Footnote 29 ] See S. Rep. No. 1502, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 6; H. R. Rep. No. 1928, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 6.
[ Footnote 30 ] Supra, n. 15, now 32 U.S.C. 709 (f) (1958 ed.) (emphasis supplied).
[ Footnote 31 ] S. Rep. No. 635, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 2-3.
[ Footnote 32 ] S. Rep. No. 1987, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 45-46; H. R. Rep. No. 1698, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 50.
[ Footnote 33 ] S. Rep. No. 2045, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 4.
[ Footnote 34 ] S. 1764 and H. R. 5435, 86th Cong., 2d Sess.
[ Footnote 35 ] Act of September 13, 1960, 74 Stat. 878, 32 U.S.C. 715 (1958 ed., Supp. IV). If the claim is for more than $5,000 and the Secretary deems it meritorious he may award up to $5,000 and certify the balance to Congress for appropriate action.
[ Footnote 36 ] See S. Rep. No. 1502, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 11; Hearings before Subcommittee No. 2 of the House Committee on the Judiciary on H. R. 5435 and H. R. 9315, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 6-7.
[ Footnote 37 ] See S. Rep. No. 1502, supra; H. R. Rep. No. 1928, supra. The 1960 Act does not cover the accident involved in these cases, since the collision occurred in 1958.
[ Footnote 38 ] Petitioners contend that the judgments of the District of Columbia Circuit in Meyer should be given collateral estoppel effect here, even though petitioners were not parties in Meyer. See Restatement, Judgments 93, comment b; Developments in the Law - Res Judicata, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 818, 865, 870-871 (1952); but see United States v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 709, aff'd on other grounds sub nom. United Air Lines, Inc. v. Wiener, 335 F.2d 379, writ of cert. dismissed under Rule 60, 379 U.S. 951 . We reject the Government's contention that the point was not preserved below. Having regard to the fact that the decision in Meyer came down during the interval between the argument and decision of Levin, we think that the estoppel challenge was properly and timely raised in the petition for rehearing in Levin. However, we need not reach the merits of the challenge since the judgment in Meyer, also pending in this Court (see p. 43, supra), must, in any event, now fall in consequence of our decision in the cases before us.

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