Source: https://www.worklawyers.com/workers-compensation-retaliation-california/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 00:40:44+00:00

Document:
California Law provides important protections for employees who file workers' compensation claims.
Many employers dislike workers’ compensation claims. Some even actively discourage employees from filing them. Importantly though, California law prohibits discrimination or retaliation against workers who are injured on the job.
This article explains the scope of an injured employee’s right to be free from retaliation for filing a workers’ compensation claim.
In many cases, the Workers’ Compensation Act is the “sole and exclusive remedy” for claims against an employer when an employee has been injured.5 This means that employees in difficult financial situations might have no choice but to file a workers’ compensation claim against their employer.
An employer’s insurance rates can be affected by workers’ compensation claims. So, many employers dislike these issues and some even attempt to retaliate against employees who pursue workers’ compensation benefits.
The broad nature of that policy favors employees who are fired or treated unfairly as the result of a job-related injury.10 As such, there are many types of retaliatory conduct that might be unlawful.
[A]n employer may not discharge an employee because of the employee’s absence from his job as the consequence of an injury sustained in the course and scope of employment.
California law prohibits employers from penalizing their employees for having a work-related injury or for making a workers’ compensation claim in connection with that injury.16 This protection extends further than mere firings.
An employee is injured while at work and takes a leave of absence to recover. When they return, they find out that their employer took away their seniority because of their absence from work.
If the worker who suffered an injury on the job is treated differently from other workers, detrimental treatment may be viewed as retaliatory.
The refusal to reinstate an employee to a former job may be the functional equivalent of firing that employee.21 In two circumstances, however, a refusal to reinstate an injured employee will not be regarded as discriminatory.
An employer claims that no work is available that the employee can do without risking further injury. If the employee presents evidence that he or she is capable of performing the job safely, it is fair to infer that the employer is discriminating against the employee because of the employee’s injury.
Whether an employee is no longer capable of performing the job and whether an employee’s former position was eliminated as a matter of business necessity are questions that can only be resolved by considering the specific facts of the case.
Yau v. Allen (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 144, 161 [“Physical and emotional injuries sustained in the course of employment are preempted by the workers’ compensation scheme and generally will not support an independent cause of action.”].
Shoemaker v. Myers (1990) 52 Cal.3d 1, 16 [“[T]he legal theory supporting such exclusive remedy provisions is a presumed ‘compensation bargain,’ pursuant to which the employer assumes liability for industrial personal injury or death without regard to fault in exchange for limitations on the amount of that liability. The employee is afforded relatively swift and certain payment of benefits to cure or relieve the effects of industrial injury without having to prove fault but, in exchange, gives up the wider range of damages potentially available in tort.”]; Labor Code, §§ 3600–3602.
Labor Code, § 3200, et seq.; Charles J. Vacanti, M.D., Inc. v. State Comp. Insurance Fund (2001) 24 Cal.4th 800, 810 [“Article XIV, section 4 of the California Constitution gives the Legislature ‘plenary power . . . to create, and enforce a complete system of workers’ compensation.’ Pursuant to this authority, the Legislature enacted the WCA—a comprehensive statutory scheme governing compensation given to California employees for injuries incurred in the course and scope of their employment.”].
S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Department of Industrial Relations (1989) 48 Cal.3d 341, 354 [“The Act intends comprehensive coverage of injuries in employment.”].
Labor Code, § 3600, subd. (a) [“Liability for the compensation provided by this division . . . shall, without regard to negligence, exist against an employer for any injury sustained by his or her employees arising out of and in the course of the employment and for the death of any employee if the injury proximately causes death . . . .”].
Fermino v. Fedco, Inc. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 701, 708 [“‘The employee is afforded relatively swift and certain payment of benefits to cure or relieve the effects of industrial injury without having to prove fault but, in exchange, gives up the wider range of damages potentially available in tort.'”], quoting Shoemaker v. Myers (1990) 52 Cal.3d 1, 16.
Raven v. Oakland Unified Sch. Dist. (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 1347, 1364.
Judson Steel Corp. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1978) 22 Cal.3d 658, 666–667.
Labor Code, § 132a, subd. (3).
City of Moorpark v. Superior Court (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1143, 1147 [“Labor Code section 132a . . . prohibits employers from discriminating against employees ‘who are injured in the course and scope of their employment.’ When an injury of this kind results in disability, we have held that section 132a prohibits discrimination based on the disability.”].
Barns v. Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 524, 537 [“To hold that [an employee]’s participation in rehabilitation services warranted a forfeiture of employment rights would subvert the fundamental policy of section 132a by authorizing discrimination against employees based solely on the exercise of statutory rights under the workers’ compensation laws.”].
California Ins. Guarantee Assn. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 1528, 1539, fn. 9 [“Vocational rehabilitation maintenance allowance is a benefit due to a worker engaged in job retraining after the worker has become medically permanent and stationary.”].
Judson Steel Corp. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1978) 22 Cal.3d 658, 667.
Barns v. Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 524, 531 [“[A] worker proves a violation of section 132a by showing that as the result of an industrial injury, the employer engaged in conduct detrimental to the worker.”].
Department of Rehabilitation v. Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1281, 1300 [“By prohibiting ‘discrimination’ in section 132a, we assume the Legislature meant to prohibit treating injured employees differently, making them suffer disadvantages not visited on other employees because the employee was injured or had made a claim.”].
Department of Rehabilitation v. Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1281, 1300.
Barns v. Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 524, 534 [discussing principles that govern “the right to discharge, or the duty to reinstate, disabled workers”].
Judson Steel Corp. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1978) 22 Cal.3d 658, 667 [“Section 132a does not compel an employer to ignore the realities of doing business by ‘reemploying’ unqualified employees . . . .”].
Dyer v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Board (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1376, 1381 [“The judge concluded that it was discriminatory for the employer not to take steps to accommodate Dyer’s disability and that her ability to perform to the standards established by the employer should not have been measured when her ability to perform was affected by her injury.”].
Judson Steel Corp. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1978) 22 Cal.3d 658, 667 [“Section 132a does not compel an employer to ignore the realities of doing business by ‘reemploying’ unqualified employees or employees for whom positions are no longer available.”].
Barns v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 524, 531 [“[A] worker proves a violation of section 132a by showing that as the result of an industrial injury, the employer engaged in conduct detrimental to the worker. If the worker makes this showing, the burden shifts to the employer to show that its conduct was necessitated by the realities of doing business. . . . [T]he employer must demonstrate that its action was ‘necessary’ and ‘directly linked to business realities.'”].
Western Electric v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Board (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d 629, 644–645.
Dyer v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Board (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1376, 1385 [“The civil penalty is a 50 percent increase in the employee’s compensation award, up to $10,000. That penalty applies without regard to proof of actual loss or damage or of any other showing beyond that of discrimination itself.”].
See, e.g, Sunline Transit Agency v. Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1277 (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 292, 305 [refusal to allow injured employee to return to work “fell outside the scope of the workers’ compensation bargain”].
City of Moorpark v. Superior Court (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1143, 1158. Note, however, that an employee might be disabled within the meaning of the Workers’ Compensation Act but not within the meaning of the Fair Employment and Housing Act. Ibid. Whether a disability discrimination claim should be made under the Workers’ Compensation Act, the Fair Employment and Housing Act, or any other law will depend upon an employment attorney’s evaluation of the worker’s medical condition in addition to other relevant facts.
Charles J. Vacanti, M.D., Inc. v. State Compensation Insurance Fund (2001) 24 Cal.4th 800, 814 [“Courts have also allowed an employee to recover economic damages on a wrongful termination claim because the damages arose out of the act of termination-and not out of an injury to the employee’s person.”].

References: v. 
 v. 
 § 3200
 v. 
 v. 
 § 3600
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 132
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.