Source: https://trustbclp.com/2013/10/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 04:22:36+00:00

Document:
Individual trustees who must administer real property often attempt to save the trust money by personally making certain improvements, repairs, or maintenance to the property. They then charge the trust for the work they performed. As the Nebraska Court of Appeals points out in In re Estate of Robb, however, these acts – however well-intentioned – may be self-dealing and can put the trustee in a position of a conflict of interest, which can warrant removal from that fiduciary position.
Congratulations to our colleague, Douglas J. Stanley, who was recently elected as the newest Missouri Fellow in the American College of Trusts and Estates Counsel (ACTEC ).
What Does It Take To Trigger The Shortened Statute Of Limitations For Breach Of Fiduciary Duty?
In many ways, Georgia’s 2010 Trust Code is like no other. The drafters of the Trust Code looked at the 1991 Georgia Trust Act, Uniform Trust Code, and trust laws in other jurisdictions to arrive at a code that is in some ways similar to that of other states but in other ways uniquely Georgia. Within the last year or two, questions arising under the 2010 Trust Code have started to make their way into decisions of the Georgia Court of Appeals and, more recently, into the decisions of the Georgia Supreme Court.
In the most recent of these decisions, Hasty v. Castleberry (a counterpart of which we looked at here), the Georgia Supreme Court looked at one of the concepts Georgia borrowed from the UTC (shortened statute of limitations after a “report”) and one of the uniquely Georgia concepts (diversification).
The 7520 Rate for November 2013 is dropping to 2.0%.
The November 2013 Federal interest rates can be found here.
Dead Man Walking? Is a Deceased Person Incapacitated?
A Missouri Court recently ruled in In the Estate of Betty Jean Collins v. Tina Shoemaker (Mo. App. W.D. #75448, August 6, 2013) that a person who had died was not “incapacitated” for purposes of a Health Care Power of Attorney (HCPOA). The court decided that the right of sepulcher expressly granted by Collins in her HCPOA to her great-niece did not ever become effective so that, on the death of Collins, her great-niece as her health care attorney in fact had no power to carry out Collins’ wishes to have her body cremated.
The words in a trust instrument mean something. So, too, does the absence of words in the trust instrument. Therefore, when in a trust instrument a grantor gives a trustee the authority to favor one beneficiary over another, gives broad discretion in making discretionary distributions, does not require the trustee to consider certain information in making discretionary distributions, or permits a concentration of assets, the trustee – and a court – should carefully consider those words.
In O’Riley v. U.S. Bank, N.A., a Missouri appellate court reviewed a situation where a trustee supposedly favored a grantor’s spouse over his children in making discretionary distributions and in investing trust assets.
What if all the termination events in a testamentary trust occured before the testator dies? In Whitehead v. Whitehead, a Mississippi appellate court suggested that we still have to read the documents constructing the testamentary scheme together to effectuate the intent of the testator.
What did John J. Whitehead, Jr.’s will and codicils show when read together?
Once again, the Internal Revenue Service reminds us in PLR 201330011 that a distribution from an IRA to a residuary beneficiary will not result in recognition of IRD (also known as income in respect of a decedent) to the estate or trust, as only the residuary beneficiary will recognize the IRD.
Update: On October 1, 2013, in Vandenheede v. Vecchio, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan’s judgment for the Defendants Vecchio and Borschke. Plaintiff Mary C. Vandenheede sued Defendants alleging tax fraud under 26 U.S.C. § 7434. The district court granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment based on the fact that violations of 26 U.S.C. § 7434(a) fall on the “filer,” and not on every person involved in preparing the return. The Court upheld the district court’s judgment because the Plaintiff failed to provide particularized facts from which one could infer that the Defendants knowingly issued false returns to the IRS. Also, the Court stated that the Plaintiff failed to suggest a different or preferable way in which the Defendants should have categorized payments to her on the tax returns.

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