Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/260/205/
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 10:43:03+00:00

Document:
Justia › US Law › US Case Law › US Supreme Court › Volume 260 › Southern Pacific Co. v. Olympian Dredging Co.
1. By the Act of September 19, 1890, c. 907, 26 Stat. 453, Congress assumed jurisdiction of the subject of obstructions to navigation and committed to the Secretary of War all necessary administrative power over such obstructions. P. 260 U. S. 208.
2. Under § 7 of that act, a new bridge over a navigable stream cannot lawfully be constructed by a railroad company before the location and plans have been approved by the Secretary of War; authority from the state legislature is not enough. P. 260 U. S. 208.
3. The power of the Secretary to approve or disapprove includes the power to condition an approval. P. 260 U. S. 208.
4. Where a railroad company, operating a lawful bridge, obtained the Secretary's approval for a new one nearby upon the condition that it remove the old one and remove the piers from the riverbed to a specified depth below lowest water level as shown by an existing and specified gauge, and fully complied with the condition, leaving the channel unobstructed, held that the condition was an authoritative determination of what was reasonably necessary to insure free and safe navigation, upon which the company was entitled to rely, and that where, many years later, the government, by dredging, lowered the bed and surface of the river so that stumps of the piles that had constituted the old piers protruded above the new bed, forming an obstruction which damaged a vessel, the Railroad Company was not liable. P. 260 U. S. 209.
Certiorari to a decree of the circuit court of appeals which reversed a decree of the district court dismissing a libel in admiralty for damages due to collision of the present respondent's vessel with an obstruction in a navigable channel.
"That said railway company, within 90 days after the completion of the new bridge, shall remove every portion of the present existing bridge, the old piers to be removed from the bed of the river to a depth of seven (7) feet below the level of the lowest low water, being a reading of 7.5 feet on the K Street gauge, Sacramento, California."
The new bridge was finished in 1895, and the destruction of the old bridge was completed early in the following year. The condition imposed by the Secretary of War was fully complied with. Indeed, it appears that the piles constituting the piers of the old bridge were cut down 3 or 4 feet lower than was required, to a level with or below the then existing bed of the river.
carried on dredging operations immediately below the bridge, so that the bed of the river was gradually lowered until, in 1918, when the injury in question occurred, the surface of the water was about seven feet lower than at the time the piles were destroyed, although the depth of the water remained approximately the same, with the result that the old stumps protruded several feet above the then existing bed of the river.
There is nothing to indicate that either of the petitioners had actual knowledge of the changed conditions which brought about the protrusion of the old piles above the bed of the river, or any knowledge that these piles were a menace to navigation.
On July 13, 1918, the dredger Thor, owned by respondent, on her way down the river, drifting with the current, struck on one or more protruding stumps, the upper portion of which had been destroyed, with the result that her hull was pierced and she sank.
The respondent filed a libel in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California against petitioners, asking damages for collision, and, after hearing, that court dismissed the libel. The circuit court of appeals, reversing the district court, held that petitioners were liable for this injury, notwithstanding their full compliance with the condition imposed by the Secretary of War, upon the ground that it was reasonably probable in 1895 that the channel of the river would shift and the conditions ensue which brought about the lowering of the river bed, and that, consequently, it was their duty to anticipate and to guard against the effect of these conditions upon the piles, and their failure to do so was actionable negligence.
for the alteration of existing bridges which interfered with free navigation (§§ 4 and 5); prohibited the dumping of waste material in such waters so as to obstruct navigation (§ 6); made it unlawful to build wharves, piers, and other structures named, without the permission of the Secretary of War, in such manner as to obstruct or impair navigation, or to commence the construction of any bridge over any such waters under any act of a state legislature until the location and plans therefore had been submitted to and approved by the Secretary of War, or to excavate or fill, or in any manner to alter or modify the course, location, condition, or capacity of the channel of said navigable water of the United States unless approved and authorized by the Secretary of War (§ 7). The amendment of 1892 did not alter § 7 in any respect material to this inquiry.
By this legislation, Congress assumed jurisdiction of the subject of obstructions to navigation and committed to the Secretary of War administrative power insofar as administration was necessary. Under § 7, it was not enough for the California Pacific Railroad Company to secure the authority of the California Legislature to build the new bridge; it was necessary in addition to have the location and plans approved by the Secretary of War before the bridge could be lawfully constructed. That the Secretary of War was authorized to impose the condition heretofore quoted does not admit of doubt. The power to approve implies the power to disapprove, and the power to disapprove necessarily includes the lesser power to condition an approval. In the light of this general assumption by Congress of control over the subject and of the large powers delegated to the Secretary, the condition imposed by that officer cannot be considered otherwise than as an authoritative determination of what was reasonably necessary to be done to insure free and safe navigation so far as the obstruction in question was concerned.
To hold, as did the circuit court of appeals, that this determination afforded no protection to petitioners, but that they relied upon it only at their peril, we think is a conclusion without warrant. Having complied with the direction of the Secretary, and having no further interest in anything at that point on the river, it seems altogether unreasonable to hold them to an indefinite and speculative responsibility for future changed conditions. The piles had been removed early in 1896, with an overgenerous observance of the directions of the Secretary. As matters then stood, the removal of the piles, so far as they constituted any obstruction or menace to navigation, was complete; that they afterwards became an obstruction was due to changes of a most radical character in the channel of the river, brought about, in the main, by the dredging operations of the government itself. Was the petitioner guilty of negligence in not anticipating the effect of these changes, which did not culminate in the conditions complained of until 22 years later? The question must be answered in the negative.
". . . Congress intended by its legislation to give the same force and effect to the decision of the Secretary of War that would have been accorded to direct action by it on the subject. It is for Congress, under the Constitution, to regulate the right of navigation by all appropriate means, to declare what is necessary to be done in order to free navigation from obstruction, and to prescribe the way in which the question of obstruction shall be determined. Its action in the premises cannot be revised or ignored by the courts or by juries, except that, when it provides for an investigation of the facts, upon notice and after hearing, before final action is taken, the courts can see to it that executive officers conform their action to the mode prescribed by Congress."
See also Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U. S. 364, 204 U. S. 385; The Douglas, 7 Probate Division,  157; Frost v. Railroad Co., 96 Me. 76; Maine Water Co. v. Knickerbocker Steam Towage Co., 99 Me. 473; The Plymouth, 225 F. 483.
Even if we leave out a consideration altogether the order of the Secretary of War, it is still difficult to see upon what just ground petitioners could be held liable.
operations of the government the effect of which appeared only after the lapse of a long period of years.
"While the railroad company was perhaps required to take notice of the changes in the course of the channel or stream from natural causes and provide against any injury that might result from such changes, it could not, in my opinion, be required to take notice of such radical changes as occurred here by the acts of the government, over which it had no control and which it had no reason to anticipate or provide against."
ordered removed by the Secretary of War. His order for their removal was complied with, and the channel was left by petitioners wholly unobstructed, in law and in fact. The obstruction did not develop until years afterward, and was due to causes which they were not bound to anticipate and provide against, and for which they were in no degree responsible.
The decree of the circuit court of appeals is therefore reversed, and that of the district court affirmed.

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