Source: https://www.ptab.us/2012/03/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 10:12:38+00:00

Document:
If the words of limitation can connote with equal force a structural characteristic of the product or a process used to obtain it, then the limitation is commonly interpreted in its structural sense. See, e.g., 3M Innovative Props. Co. v. Avery Dennison Corp., 350 F.3d 1365, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“[E]ven words of limitation that can connote with equal force a structural characteristic of the product or a process of manufacture are commonly and by default interpreted in their structural sense….”); Hazani v. U.S. Int’l. Trade Com’n., 126 F.3d 1473, 1479 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (holding that claims to a plate having a “chemically engraved” surface are best characterized as pure product claims, since the “chemically engraved” limitation, read in context, describes the product more by its structure than by the process used to obtain it); see also In re Garnero, 412 F.2d 276, 278-79 (CCPA 1969) (noting that past-tense verbs such as “ ‘intermixed,’ ‘ground in place,’ ‘press fitted,’ ‘etched,’ and ‘welded,’ all . . . at one time or another have been separately held capable of construction as structural, rather than process, limitations.”).
When the term “substantially” is recited by a claim, its meaning is determined from the specification. See Seattle Box Co., v. Indus. Crating & Packing, Inc., 731 F.2d 818, 826 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
“An examiner bears the initial burden of presenting a prima facie case of obviousness.” In re Huai-Hung Kao, 639 F.3d 1057, 1066 (Fed. Cir. 2011). “Once the examiner establishes a prima facie case of obviousness, the burden shifts to the applicant to rebut that case.” Id. If the applicant presents rebuttal evidence, such as unexpected results or that the prior art teaches away from the claimed invention, the Examiner “must consider the totality of the evidence to determine whether the obviousness rejection should stand.” Id.
In re Buchner, 929 F.2d 660, 661 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (A patent need not teach, and preferably omits, what is well known in the art).
The Federal Circuit Court has held in post-issuance patent infringement cases that the definiteness requirement “does not compel absolute clarity” and “only claims ‘not amenable to construction’ or ‘insolubly ambiguous’ are indefinite.” Datamize, LLC v. Plumtree Software, Inc., 417 F.3d 1342, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). The claim as a whole must be considered to determine whether it apprises one of ordinary skill in the art of its scope, and therefore serves the notice function required by 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph by providing clear warning to others as to what constitutes the infringement of the patent. Solomon v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 216 F.3d 1372, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2000)(emphasis added).
However, when a patent application is pending before the USPTO, “if a claim is amenable to two or more plausible claim constructions, the USPTO is justified in requiring the applicant to more precisely define the metes and bounds of the claimed invention by holding the claim unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, as indefinite.” Ex parte Miyazaki, 89 USPQ2d 1207, 1211 (BPAI 2008) (precedential).
Thus, a claim that is not indefinite under the Federal Circuit Court’s “insolubly ambiguous” standard (as applied to issued patent claims), may be considered indefinite under the USPTO Miyazaki standard of review that employs a lower threshold of ambiguity for pending patent application claims.

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