Source: https://www.lawfareblog.com/golsteyn-case-and-civilian-oversight-military-justice
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 11:07:06+00:00

Document:
I find much to applaud in Maj. (P) Dan Maurer’s thoughtful Lawfare post on potential unlawful command influence (UCI) issues associated with the president’s tweet about the controversial case of Maj. Matthew Golsteyn. While UCI is, as the courts have said frequently, the “mortal enemy of military justice,” it is important to carefully distinguish the facts to avoid eroding the importance of civilian oversight of the military justice system. That oversight is a critical aspect of civilian control of the armed forces so essential to a democracy.
Maurer characterizes this tweet as what he claims is “still another political encroachment [by Trump] into military affairs.” He suggests that the Supreme Court’s decision in the recent case of Ortiz v. United States transformed the military justice system—which, constitutionally-speaking, is creature of Congress’ Article I, Section 8 power to “make rules” for the military, and not part of the Article III judiciary—into something so akin to the civilian judiciary that the Uniform Code of Military Justice (or “UCMJ” as, codified at 10 U.S.C. § 801, et. seq.), not to mention the entire corpus Supreme Court military justice precedent, is eviscerated with respect to the role of the commander.
Maurer assumes that the president is, in effect, just another military commander for military justice purposes, and then extrapolates his theory about Ortiz to apply to military justice prohibitions about UCI. Maurer goes too far in this contention. Of course, the president is the commander-in-chief and as such he exercises the attributes of command. However, as an elected civilian his role is, by design, broader than that of military commanders who, unlike the president, aren’t part of the Constitution’s scheme for ensuring civilian oversight of the military’s Article I justice system. Because Maurer doesn’t sufficiently differentiate the president’s distinct oversight responsibilities (in terms of both Article II and the UCMJ) from those of uniformed commanders, he believes that the president’s announcement of his intent to review Golsteyn’s case infringes upon judicial independence as understood in the Article III “frame”—and is, therefore, UCI corruptive of civil-military relations.
In the military justice system, the president would be a “superior competent authority” within the meaning of R.C.M. 401(a). While rather unusual, it isn’t necessarily improper for a senior commander to review a case with a view towards determining whether or not to withhold from a subordinate commander the authority to decide its disposition. This authority includes the civilian commander-in-chief.
Put another way, it is perfectly legal for the president to reserve to him- or herself the decision as to how a case is resolved within the military justice system.
The provision of the UCMJ that concerns UCI, 10 U.S.C. § 837, does provide that “no person subject to this chapter may attempt to coerce or, by any unauthorized means, influence the action of a court-martial or any other military tribunal or any member thereof, in reaching the findings or sentence in any case, or the action of any convening, approving, or reviewing authority with respect to his judicial acts.” However, a president announcing he will review a case doesn’t breach this provision.
This conclusion has never been sanctioned by the Supreme Court. But even if CAAF is correct, a due process-based UCI claim would concern the rights of the accused. The allegation in the Golsteyn case is that the president’s tweet is somehow harmful to the government decision (or not) to exercise prosecutorial power. In any event, the government does not have—nor does Hutchins suggest it does—a “due process [UCI] right” of any sort.
Maurer does cite comments by President Obama regarding his desire for dishonorable discharges to be meted out in sexual assault cases. In one trial-level case, Obama’s remarks caused the trial judge to impose “a curative remedy in that case that barred a punitive discharge if the accused had been found guilty”—but there are no appellate decisions. Again, this case involved an accused’s right, not something to which the government was entitled.
More to the point, since the president has clear authority under R.C.M. 401, it would not be improper for him to announce that he is going to review a case. That is, doing so isn’t an “unauthorized means” of influencing a military justice action, because the law authorizes the president, if he wishes, to decide whether or not the case goes forward to trial. To reiterate, there is simply no textual or due process impediment to the president announcing he would be “reviewing” a military justice case.
In fact, Trump’s decision to review a single military case at this early stage is a relatively modest instance of civilian oversight. There are many precedents showing far greater involvement by presidents. For example, President Lincoln reviewed more than 1,600 military justice cases during the Civil War. President Coolidge was reportedly personally involved in the Billy Mitchell court-martial. In Ex parte Quirin, President Franklin Roosevelt ordered Nazi saboteurs tried by a military commission instead of a civilian court even though one of the accused was a U.S. citizen. And there was Nixon’s release of Lt. William Calley to house arrest after Calley’s court-martial conviction for murdering 22 South Vietnamese civilians at My Lai in 1968.
Maurer mentions that the Trump tweet is “prompting speculation over whether Trump might derail the case by issuing a pardon.” I can’t recall a military justice case in which a pardon was issued before conviction, but there have been many civilian cases in which that’s occurred. For example, the Washington Post reports that “President Jimmy Carter pardoned hundreds of thousands of Vietnam draft evaders, including those who had not been charged or convicted.” Nothing in the Constitution bars such “preemptive” pardons for those in uniform.
In terms of pardons and commutations of those actually convicted in military courts, there is ample precedent: President Obama famously commuted the sentence of Chelsea Manning (see here), and also pardoned or commuted at least two other court-martial convicts (David Raymond Mannix and Edgar Leopold Kranz, Jr). I am not aware of a pardon for murder, but the Supreme Court in Schick v. Reed upheld the commutation (by President Eisenhower) of a court-martial death sentence to life without the possibility of parole.
But I doubt that “fully informed” members of the public would be much concerned about a presidential review if they understood that the law explicitly permits the president to do so. Moreover, my bet is that a “fully informed” member of the public would likely want civilian oversight of the military justice system.
In my experience of more than three decades in uniform, including service as a prosecutor, defense counsel and military judge, the public often believes the military justice system is vastly more draconian than it actually is. In the 2009 case of U.S. v. Denedo, for example, Chief Justice John Roberts cited with approval the 1957 case of Reid v. Covert for the proposition that "traditionally, military justice has been a rough form of justice emphasizing summary procedures, speedy convictions and stern penalties with a view to maintaining obedience and fighting fitness in the ranks."
Particularly in an era where the nation is dependent upon citizens volunteering for military service, the public has a right to expect that civilian leaders accountable to the electorate will ensure that those who do don the uniform are treated fairly. What’s more, my sense is that a “fully informed” member of the public would also appreciate that the purpose of the military justice system needs to be broader than that of its civilian counterpart.
All this uniqueness militates for robust civilian oversight of this separate society where citizens’ rights must yield for the greater good. While UCI is rightly decried, there is also lawful command influence in the military justice system, and it can be appropriately wielded by civilian leaders. We saw that last summer when former Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis, acting in his civilian capacity, issued a letter to commanders about military justice.
In a democracy, elected civilian leaders ought to be exercising oversight over the activities of the armed forces, including the justice system that provides accountability for those forces. Among other things, when properly done civilian oversight can serve as a bulwark against unfairness in the ranks. It doesn’t hurt for military leaders to be reminded from time to time that their civilian boss is watching.

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