Source: https://chambersofnitinchopra.wordpress.com/2015/05/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 10:17:54+00:00

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This was further refined in Abrams v. United States, 250 US 616:63 L Ed 1173 (1919), this time in a Holmesian dissent, to be clear and imminent danger. However, in most of the subsequent judgments of the US Supreme Court the test has been understood to mean to be “clear and present danger”. The test of “clear and present danger” has been used by the US Supreme Court in many varying situations and has been adjusted according to varying fact situations. It appears to have been repeatedly applied, see Terminiello v. Chicago, 93 L Ed 1131 : 337 Us 1 (1949), Brandenburg v. Ohio, 23 L Ed 2d 430 : 395 US 444.
The court has used the expression “tendency” to a particular act. Thus, in State of Bihar v. Shailabala Devi, 1952 SCR 654, an early decision of the Court said that an article, in order to be banned must have a tendency to excite persons to acts of violence. The test laid down in the said decision was that the article should be considered as a whole in a fair free liberal spirit and then it must be decided what effect it should have on the mind of a reasonable reader.
In Ramji Lal Modi v. State of U.P., 1957 SCR 860, the Court upheld Section 295-A of the Indian Penal Code only because it was read down to mean that aggravated forms of insults to religion must have a tendency to disrupt public order. Similarly, in Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar, 1962 Supp (2) SCR 769, Section 124-A of the Indian Penal Code was upheld construing it narrowly and stating that the offence would be complete if the words complained of have a tendency of creating public disorder by violence. It was added that merely creating disaffection or creating feelings of enmity in certain people was not good enough or else it would violate the fundamental right of free speech under Article 19(1)(a). Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, (2015) 5 SCC 1.
A criminal conspiracy is generally hatched in secrecy, owing to which, direct evidence is difficult to obtain. The offence can therefore be proved either by adducing circumstantial evidence, or by way of necessary implication. However, in the event that the circumstantial evidence is incomplete or vague, it becomes necessary for the prosecution to provide adequate proof regarding the meeting of minds, which is essential in order to hatch a criminal conspiracy, by adducing substantive evidence in the court. Furthermore, in order to constitute the offence of conspiracy, it is not necessary that the person involved has knowledge of all the stages of action. In fact, mere knowledge of the main object/purpose of conspiracy, would warrant the attraction of relevant penal provisions. Thus, an agreement between two persons to do, or to cause an illegal act, is the basic requirement of the offence of conspiracy under the penal statute. R. Shaji v. State of Kerala, (2014) 4 SCC (Cri) 185.
It has been held in Onkar Nath Mishra v. State, (2008) 2 SCC 561, that in the commission of the offence of criminal breach of trust, two distinct parts are involved. The first consists of the creation of an obligation in relation to the property over which dominion or control is acquired by the accused. The second is misappropriation or dealing with the property dishonestly and contrary to the terms of the obligation created.
“to establish a charge of criminal breach of trust, the prosecution is not obliged to prove the precise mode of conversion, misappropriation or misapplication by the accused of the property entrusted to him or over which he has dominion. The principal ingredient of the offence being dishonest misappropriation or conversion which may not ordinarily be a matter of direct proof, entrustment of property and failure in breach of an obligation to account for the property entrusted, if proved, may in the light of other circumstances, justifiably lead to an inference of dishonest misappropriation or conversion. Conviction of a person for the offence of criminal breach of trust may not, in all cases, be founded merely on his failure to account for the property entrusted to him, but where he is unable to account or renders an explanation for his failure to account which is untrue, an inference of misappropriation with dishonest intent may readily be made.” Ghanshyam v. State of Rajasthan, (2014) 4 SCC (Cri) 82.

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