Source: http://peerreview.org/caselaw/shaller/shaller1.htm
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 04:08:48+00:00

Document:
Dr. Shaller contested his dismissal from the Veterans Administration after he protested substandard care of patients on ventilators by persons untrained in same.
stated below, we shall grant the motion in part, and deny the motion in part. The court shall also provide for an amended practice order to allow this matter to proceed.
This action was filed under the Federal Privacy Act by Dr. David A. Shaller against the Department of Veterans Affairs. It is the Plaintiff's belief that a proficiency report dated November 30, 1988, "contains false and misleading statements, misrepresentations, and inaccuracies." Document #10 at 2. In reliance on these alleged inaccuracies, the Plaintiff believes he received "an improper rating" of "low satisfactory". Id.
correction of factual inaccuracies and is not to be used to change managerial opinions or conclusions. Thus, this court "is powerless" to fulfill the Plaintiff's request. Doc. No. 7 at 5.
Moreover, counsel contends that since there is a comprehensive remedial scheme for viewing such personal matters, jurisdiction is lacking before the district court. Id. at 6.
The Plaintiff, however, counters that he is attempting only to correct factual inaccuracies culminating in an improper rating of "low satisfactory". Plaintiff's counsel believes that Doctor Shaller has no other legal avenue to pursue the results of his case and that the action is properly filed under the Privacy Act.
The Defendant has moved to dismiss this action believing that this court has no power to act on the Plaintiff's claim. Jurisdiction is deemed not to lie where the federal claim asserted is immaterial, insubstantial or frivolous. See Sassower v. Dosal, 744 F.Supp. 908 (D. Minn. 1990) citing Franklin v. Oregon Welfare Division, 662 F.2d 1337, 1342 (9th Cir. 1981).
(1974): Little is needed, however, for a plaintiff to assert a claim sufficient to give the federal court jurisdiction. Where the complaint "is so drawn as to seek recovery directly under the Constitution or laws of the United States," the district court must entertain the suit unless the federal claim "clearly appears to be immaterial and made solely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction or where such a claim is wholly insubstantial and frivolous". Spencer v. Casavilla, 903 F.2d 171, 173 (2d Cir..1990), citing Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 681, 66 S.Ct. 773, 775, 90 L.Ed. 939 (1946).
Labor, 607 F. Supp. 97 (N.D. Ca. 1985).
The Defendant has categorized the Plaintiff's challenge as having this court amend the agency's determination that he was rated "low-satisfactory". This court must acknowledge that we are powerless to do such an act. The Privacy Act does not contemplate that a court will constitute itself as a personnel rating authority to substitute its judgment for the evaluation of performance conducted by a government employee's superiors. Hewitt v. Grabicki, 794 F.2d 1373, 1378 (9th Cir. 1986) citing Turner v. Department of Army, 447 F.Supp. 1207, 1212-13 (D. D.C. 1978), aff"d mem., 593 F.2d 1372 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
dispute concerning the basic underlying facts, the court could not involve itself with the judgments made by the plaintiff's supervisors.
as to a matter of fact as opposed to expression of a judgment based on reliable facts. Russell, The Effect of the Privacy Act on Correction of Military Records, 79 Mil.L.Rev. 135, 142-145 (1978).
Hewitt, 794 F.2d at 1378-79.
medical records resulted in his supervisor's judgment to rate Shaller "low satisfactory" in Category I of the proficiency report. See Complaint, Doc. No. 1, Exhibit A.
The Plaintiff maintains, however, that he was not delinquent with any medical records and that, in his capacity as Chief Physician, he had not completed any discharge summaries in four years. Id., Exhibits B and F.
again, the Doctor believes that he was being singled out in retaliation for his complaints about the quality of care at the hospital.
At this point, it is unclear whether the inaccurate opinions based, in part, upon alleged erroneous facts can be addressed by this court. Under the circumstance, however, we believe that the challenge to the disputed factual record must go forward on the presumption that these alleged inaccuracies will expose any improprieties that may have occurred.
Accordingly, as to the claim brought under 5 U. S. C. S 552 (a) (g) (1) (A) , the Defendant's motion is denied.
claims that this court has no jurisdiction over the damage 6 claim for basically two reasons: (1) there is a grievance procedure available to the Plaintiff to address personnel matters that precludes review by this court; and (2) there has been no showing that Plaintiff satisfied the standard for presenting a damage claim under the Privacy Act.
Plaintiff in Doe v. F.B.I., 718 F.Supp. 90, 101-02 at n. 14 (D.D.C. 1989), correction or expungement of the record are more of a concern in this case.
his application for employment with the University of North Carolina KRON Scholars Program was rejected based upon the adverse and inaccurate information contained in the proficiency report. Whether this is true can not be resolved 7 on a motion to dismiss based on jurisdictional challenge. The burden lies with the Plaintiff when, at the appropriate time, he is placed to the test of proving his case. This may occur under Rule 56 disposition or at trial, but it can not be addressed at this stage of the proceedings.
Accordingly, as to the claim brought under 5 U.S.C. S552a(g)(1)(C), the Defendant"s motion is denied.
Finally, Plaintiff-has cited 5 U.S.C. S 552a(d) in an attempt to demonstrate the difficulty he has encountered in obtaining his records. From the briefs submitted by the parties, it would appear that there are no records that are missing or unobtainable, just that bureaucratic red tape has caused the Plaintiff to go though the "proper channels" before he obtained his records. To the extent that any claim has been presented, it does not appear to be substantial in nature. See Sassower v. Dosal, 744 F.Supp. 908 (D. Minn. 1990).
1. The Defendant's motion to dismiss is granted in part and denied in part.
2. As to the Plaintiff's claims presented under 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(g)(1)(A) and (C), the Defendant's motion is denied.
3. As to the Plaintiff's claim presented under 5 U.S.C. 552a(d), the Defendant's motion is granted.
(a) Trial Date - This matter is removed from the December 1991 trial list and placed on the June 1992 trial list.
(b) Discovery - All discovery shall be completed on or beforeFebruary 20, 1992.
(c) Motions - All dispositive motions shall be filed on or before April 15, 1992. All other motions shall be filed by May 15, 1992.
(e) other provisions of the Practice Order are to be observed, including the need periodic status reports to the court.

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