Source: http://masscases.com/cases/sjc/366/366mass547.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 20:59:57+00:00

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BOARD OF SELECTMEN OF FRAMINGHAM vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION & another.
PETITION for a writ of certiorari filed in the Superior Court on January 26, 1973.
Robert H. Quinn, Attorney General (Edward D. Kalman, Assistant Attorney General, with him) for the Civil Service Commission.
Daniel D. Levenson (Jonathan J. Margolis with him) for the intervener, Robert Ablondi.
Arthur M. White for the Board of Selectmen of Framingham.
KAPLAN, J. The Civil Service Commission (commission) appeals from a decision of a judge of the Superior Court which, reversing the commission, suspends the intervener, a tenured policeman of the town of Framingham, until he conforms to a regulation of the police department concerning the hair styles that police officers in that town are entitled to affect. The Framingham board of selectmen (board), as "appointing authority," suspended the policeman for violation of the regulation; on review the commission reversed the board; on certiorari the judge of the Superior Court reversed the commission and affirmed the board's suspension order. We agree with the judge that the ground on which the commission went was wrong. The ground was that suspension cannot properly be for an indefinite period. But we disagree with the judge as to the disposition of the case. The commission, to which is committed in the first instance under the civil service law the question whether the board's order of suspension was "justified," did not decide that issue and rendered an incomplete and unclear decision, which in turn infected and confused the decision of the judge. Accordingly, there must be a reversal for remand to the commission.
neither possibility was in practice serious. The police chief stated that another reason for adopting the rule was to insure that the police presented a neat public image. He denied that he himself had any feeling against long hair, but he said that although lay people could look neat with long hair, policemen could not. It was also asserted that complaints had been received from the public about longhaired policemen, but admittedly none was in writing. Ablondi testified that much of his work as a policeman was with young people, and that his good relations with them were due at least in part to his hair style.
Upon this record, the hearing officer found as the main "subsidiary facts," "[t]hat the basis of the adoption of Rule 79A rested solely on appearance and had no relationship to the performance of police duties" (finding No. 5), and "[t]hat no compelling interest was shown here by the Appointing Authority for the purpose or justification of the adoption of Rule 79A." (Finding No. 12). [Note 2] On his findings the hearing officer was "inclined to conclude" that the appointing authority had "no just cause" for suspension, as the rule "had no valid or rational basis related to the performance of police work." He went on to say that if the commission felt that it had no authority or jurisdiction to pass on the validity of the rule, then just cause had been established. However, the hearing officer had a problem with the punishment that had been imposed. He thought that a suspension without a definite limit of time was in any case improper, and he therefore recommended reversal of the board's order and reinstatement of the employee.
The board then petitioned the Superior Court for a writ of certiorari under G. L. c. 249, Section 4 (before amendment by St. 1973, c. 1114, Section 289), to set aside the commission's order and confirm Ablondi's suspension. Ablondi was admitted to the proceedings as an intervener. The judge on consideration of the return to the writ held that the suspension was not improper by reason of its indefinite term, so as matter of law the commission should not have set it aside on that ground. But going further, he concluded that the commission had by implication found the suspension for violation of the rule "justified" apart from the question of the form of the suspension order, even though the commission had not explicitly said so. The judge also expressed his favorable opinion about the validity of the rule, as against the challenge that it infringed on a constitutionally protected right to wear one's hair as one pleased. The writ accordingly issued and the board's order was reinstated.
as he persists in a violation that is going on from day to day; here a suspension of fixed duration might well seem inapt, for further hearings and further suspensions would be in the offing, unless, indeed, the officer by sitting out a single suspension could earn future immunity from discipline for the offense. In Mayor of Newton v. Civil Serv. Commn. 333 Mass. 340, 343-344 (1955), the court described a suspension as "a temporary withdrawal or cessation . . . as distinguished from permanent severance," quoting from Bois v. Mayor of Fall River, 257 Mass. 471, 472 (1926); it said also, quoting from Commissioner of Labor & Indus. v. Downey, 290 Mass. 432, 434 (1935), that "[s]uspension imports the possibility or likelihood of return to the work when the reason for the suspension ceases to be operative. Dismissal imports an ending of the employment." Thus the gist of "suspension" is that the employee still has a chance to return to work and is not foreclosed. An indefinite suspension with return to work at the complete discretion of the appointing authority might indeed be bad as providing cover for what was in truth a termination of employment, but that is not the present case. It has been argued that St. 1969, c. 45, Section 1, codified at G. L. c. 31, Section 1, has made some change by defining "suspension" as the "temporary, involuntary separation from service for just cause," but that definition is compatible with what has been said, and it does not appear that the statute was intended to alter the existing view of "suspension."
statute requires that suspension rest on "just cause" and charges the commission with the duty of deciding whether such cause existed. Here the commission never found just cause. Its decision skirts this issue and takes refuge in the technical point of the character of the punishment. The judge, perhaps recognizing the limitations on his power in certiorari cases, attempted to piece out a finding of "just cause" from within the commission's decision. He did this by saying that "[t]he Commission, in not adopting the finding [No. 12] of the Hearings Officer that no compelling interest was shown by the Appointing Authority for the purpose or justification of the adoption of Rule 79A, would appear to negate the rationale for the finding [No. 5] that the basis of the adoption of Rule 79A rested solely on appearance and had no relationship to the performance of police duties." Whence the judge concluded that "[t]he ruling of the Commission imports a finding that the selectmen had just cause but exceeded their authority in suspending for an indefinite term." We think the judge's leap of reasoning was too drastic. It does not follow from the omission to make a finding that no compelling interest for the rule had been shown, that the contrary finding of a legally satisfactory support for the rule must necessarily have been made, although it was not expressed. Ironically enough, the Attorney General, representing the commission, argues in his brief in this court that the suspension, apart from its supposed technical defect, was without just cause.
did, although sowing confusion, and the potential for just the kind of error the judge made, by adopting finding No. 5 but not finding No. 12. In effect the judge in this case made his own independent finding of just cause for suspension -- and this was beyond his proper sphere on certiorari.
It may be contended that, despite the command of the civil service statute that the commission decide just cause, the judge on certiorari might himself initially decide the issue where the evidence presented before the commission was so clear that only one answer was possible as matter of law. Were that argument accepted, it would not save the judge's decision, for he did not purport to rule on that basis, and the facts were in dispute. It would in all events be doubtful wisdom, except possibly in the clearest of cases, for a judge to act without the benefit of a judgment on such material questions by the commission with its specialized function in matters of the civil service.
Reversal for remand to the commission is therefore in order, and because of the confusion in the present record we think the commission should undertake a fresh hearing.
The commission will need to take up and consider the factual matters underlying the issue of the constitutional validity of the regulation since these matters are here intrinsic to a decision as to "just cause." See Bettigole v. Assessors of Springfield, 343 Mass. 223 (1961); Stone v. Springfield, 341 Mass. 246, 247-248 (1960). So far as the hearing examiner intimated that the commission might casually avoid the task, he was incorrect. Of course in saying so we cast no doubt on the fundamental rule that the ultimately controlling decision of a constitutional issue is for the courts. See, e.g., Coffee-Rich, Inc. v. Commissioner of Pub. Health, 348 Mass. 414 (1965). Cf. School Comm. of Springfield v. Board of Educ. 362 Mass. 417, 430-432 (1972) (statute requires board to release funds on receipt of racial balance plan from school committee; inquiry into constitutionality of plan is for court).
F. 2d 213 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. den. 400 U.S. 850 (1970); King v. Saddleback Junior College Dist. 445 F. 2d 932 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. den. 404 U.S. 979 (1971); Karr v. Schmidt, 460 F. 2d 609 (5th Cir. 1972) (eight to seven), see, on motion to vacate stay, 401 U.S. 1201 (1971) (no such right). See also Freeman v. Flake, 448 F. 2d 258 (10th Cir. 1971).
In his discussion of the constitutionality of the regulation, the judge cited the Richards case approvingly (it involved a student). We share the general views expressed in that case. As the Richards court wrote, "the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment establishes a sphere of personal liberty for every individual," and "the enumeration of certain rights in the Bill of Rights has not been construed . . . to preclude the existence of other substantive rights implicit in the `liberty' assurance of the Due Process Clause." Id. at 1284. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-535 (1925) (right to send children to private school); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-400 (1923) (right to have children taught the German language). It may be suggested that the right to wear one's hair according to one's own taste is too trivial a matter to be worthy of constitutional note. But "`liberty' seems to us an incomplete protection if it encompasses only the right to do momentous acts." We conclude with the Richards court that "within the commodious concept of liberty, embracing freedoms great and small, is the right to wear one's hair as he wishes." Id. at 1284, 1285.
Order of the Superior Court reversed, with direction to remand to the Civil Service Commission.
[Note 1] The critical words of Section 43 (a) are: "He shall not be discharged, removed, suspended for a period exceeding five days . . . except for just cause . . . ."
[Note 2] There were findings of twelve "subsidiary facts" in all. See note 3 below.
[Note 3] The full text of the commission decision was: "Voted: To accept the report of the Hearing Officer, to adopt findings of fact 1 through 11, that the action of the appointing authority constitutes an indefinite suspension in that it does not spell out a specific period of time, and that this type of punitive action violates Chapter 31 and adjudicated cases under it, and that therefore the action of the appointing authority is reversed and the employee is to be reinstated to his position without loss of compensation."
[Note 4] There was rather inconclusive discussion between the hearing officer and counsel in the present case about which side had the laboring oar.
[Note 5] A government interest rising to the level of a "compelling" interest, as in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969), need not be shown. See Richards v. Thurston, supra, at 1284.
[Note 6] We must warn against the too hasty assimilation of the police with the military for the present purpose. Anderson v. Laird, 437 F. 2d 912 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. den. 404 U.S. 865 (1971), a military case mentioned by the judge below, in fact reaches its conclusion by first distinguishing the claim of one in military service from that of a civilian. Id. at 914. See also Dwen v. Barry, supra, at 1128, rejecting the military/police analogy in a case involving the police.
[Note 7] See also two cases sustaining police regulations but without recognizing a specific constitutional right. Greenwald v. Frank, 40 App. Div. 2d (N. Y.) 717 (1972), affd. 32 N. Y. 2d 862 (1973); Akridge v. Barres, 122 N. J. Super. 476 (1973), affd. 65 N. J. 266 (1974).
[Note 8] The only decision cited in Leonard v. School Comm. of Attleboro, 349 Mass. 704 (1965), regarding regulation of student appearance, Pugsley v. Sellmeyer, 158 Ark. 247, 254 (1923), upheld a school's refusal to admit an eighteen year old girl because she wore "face paint or cosmetics." The year was 1923. The decision could hardly be carried over intact to 1974. In fact the pace of change appears to have accelerated steeply in recent years.

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