Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=83834:58377&catid=1588&Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 04:33:10+00:00

Document:
G.R. No. 188801, October 15, 2014 - ROSARIO MATA CASTRO AND JOANNE BENEDICTA CHARISSIMA M. CASTRO, A.K.A. "MARIA SOCORRO M. CASTRO" AND "JAYROSE M. CASTRO," Petitioners, v. JOSE MARIA JED LEMUEL GREGORIO AND ANA MARIA REGINA GREGORIO, Respondents.
ROSARIO MATA CASTRO AND JOANNE BENEDICTA CHARISSIMA M. CASTRO, A.K.A. "MARIA SOCORRO M. CASTRO" AND "JAYROSE M. CASTRO," Petitioners, v. JOSE MARIA JED LEMUEL GREGORIO AND ANA MARIA REGINA GREGORIO, Respondents.
The policy of the law is clear. In order to maintain harmony, there must be a showing of notice and consent. This cannot be defeated by mere procedural devices. In all instances where it appears that a spouse attempts to adopt a child out of wedlock, the other spouse and other legitimate children must be personally notified through personal service of summons. It is not enough that they be deemed notified through constructive service.
The case originally stemmed from the adoption of Jose Maria Jed Lemuel Gregorio (Jéd) and Ana Maria Regina Gregorio (Regina) by Atty. Jose G. Castro (Jose). Jose is the estranged husband of Rosario Mata Castro (Rosario) and the father of Joanne Benedicta Charissima M. Castro (Joanne), also known by her baptismal name, "Maria Socorro M. Castro" and her nickname, "Jayrose."
According to the Home Study Report11 conducted by the Social Welfare Officer of the trial court, Jose belongs to a prominent and respected family, being one of the three children of former Governor Mauricio Castro.
On October 16, 2000, the trial court approved the adoption,18 having ruled that "[n]o opposition had been received by this Court from any person including the government which was represented by the Office of the Solicitor General."19 A certificate of finality20 was issued on February 9, 2006.
On May 26, 2009, the Court of Appeals denied the petition.
When Rosario and Joanne's motion for reconsideration was denied on July 10, 2009,39 they filed this petition.
The issue before this court is whether the Court of Appeals erred in denying the petition for annulment for failure of petitioners to (1) show that the trial court lacked jurisdiction and (2) show the existence of extrinsic fraud.
A petition for annulment of judgment is a remedy in equity so exceptional in nature that it may be availed of only when other remedies are wanting, and only if the judgment, final order or final resolution sought, to be annulled was rendered by a court lacking jurisdiction or through extrinsic fraud. Yet, the remedy, being exceptional in character, is not allowed to be so easily and readily abused by parties aggrieved by the final judgments, orders or resolutions. The Court has thus instituted safeguards by limiting the grounds for the annulment to lack of jurisdiction and extrinsic fraud, and by prescribing in Section 1 of Rule 47 of the Rules of Court that the petitioner should show that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner. A petition for annulment that ignores or disregards any of the safeguards cannot prosper.
The grant of adoption over respondents should be annulled as the trial court did not validly acquire jurisdiction over the proceedings, and the favorable decision was obtained through extrinsic fraud.
Petitioners argue that they should have been given notice by the trial court of the adoption, as adoption laws require their consent as a requisite in the proceedings.
It is settled that "the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action."55 As Jose filed the petition for adoption on August 1, 2000, it is Republic Act No. 855256 which applies over the proceedings. The law on adoption requires that the adoption by the father of a child born out of wedlock obtain not only the consent of his wife but also the consent of his legitimate children.
The law provides for several exceptions to the general rule, as in a situation where a spouse seeks to adopt his or her own children born out of wedlock. In this instance, joint adoption is not necessary. However, the spouse seeking to adopt must first obtain the consent of his or her spouse.
In the absence of any decree of legal separation or annulment, Jose and Rosario remained legally married despite their de facto separation. For Jose to be eligible to adopt Jed and Regina, Rosario must first signify her consent to the adoption. Jose, however, did not validly obtain Rosario's consent. His submission of a fraudulent affidavit of consent in her name cannot be considered compliance of the requisites of the law. Had Rosario been given notice by the trial court of the proceedings, she would have had a reasonable opportunity to contest the validity of the affidavit. Since her consent was not obtained, Jose was ineligible to adopt.
The consent of the adopter's other children is necessary as it ensures harmony among the prospective siblings. It also sufficiently puts the other children on notice that they will have to share their parent's love and care, as well as their future legitimes, with another person.
It is undisputed that Joanne was Jose and Rosario's legitimate child and that she was over 10 years old at the time of the adoption proceedings. Her written consent, therefore, was necessary for the adoption to be valid.
To circumvent this requirement, however, Jose manifested to the trial court that he and Rosario were childless, thereby preventing Joanne from being notified of the proceedings. As her written consent was never obtained, the adoption was not valid.
For the adoption to be valid, petitioners' consent was required by Republic Act No. 8552. Personal service of summons should have been effected on the spouse and all legitimate children to ensure that their substantive rights are protected. It is not enough to rely on constructive notice as in this case. Surreptitious use of procedural technicalities cannot be privileged over substantive statutory rights.
Since the trial court failed to personally serve notice on Rosario and Joanne of the proceedings, it never validly acquired jurisdiction.
The appellate court, in denying the petition, ruled that while fraud may have been committed in this case, it was only intrinsic fraud, rather than extrinsic fraud. This is erroneous.
An action for annulment based on extrinsic fraud must be brought within four years from discovery.61 Petitioners alleged that they were made aware of the adoption only in 2005. The filing of this petition on October 18, 2007 is within the period allowed by the rules.
The badges of fraud are present in this case.
Second, using the process of delayed registration,69 Jose was able to secure birth certificates for Jed and Regina showing him to be the father and Larry as merely the informant.70 Worse still is that two different sets of fraudulent certificates were procured: one showing that Jose and Lilibeth were married on December 4, 1986 in Manila,71 and another wherein the portion for the mother's name was not filled in at all.72 The birth certificates of Jed and Regina from the National Statistics Office, however, show that their father was Larry R. Rentegrado.73 These certificates are in clear contradiction to the birth certificates submitted by Jose to the trial court in support of his petition for adoption.
All these tactics were employed by Jose, not only to induce the trial court in approving his petition, but also to prevent Rosario and Joanne from participating in the proceedings or opposing the petition.
When fraud is employed by a party precisely to prevent the participation of any other interested party, as in this case, then the fraud is extrinsic, regardless of whether the fraud was committed through the use of forged documents or perjured testimony during the trial.
Jose's actions prevented Rosario and Joanne from having a reasonable opportunity to contest the adoption. Had Rosario and Joanne been allowed to participate, the trial court would have hesitated to grant Jose's petition since he failed to fulfill the necessary requirements under the law. There can be no other conclusion than that because of Jose's acts, the trial court granted the decree of adoption under fraudulent circumstances.
Unfortunately, Jose's death carried with it the extinguishment of any of his criminal liabilities.78 Republic Act No. 8552 also fails to provide any provision on the status of adoption decrees if the adoption is found to have been obtained fraudulently. Petitioners also cannot invoke Article VI, Section 19 of Republic Act No. 855279 since rescission of adoption can only be availed of by the adoptee. Petitioners, therefore, are left with no other remedy in law other than the annulment of the judgment.
The fraud employed in this case has been to Joanne's prejudice. There is reason to believe that Joanne has grown up having never experienced the love and care of a father, her parents having separated a year after her birth. She has never even benefited from any monetary support from her father. Despite all these adversities, Joanne was able to obtain a medical degree from the University of the Philippines College of Medicine80 and is now working as a doctor in Canada.81 These accomplishments, however, are poor substitutes if the injustice done upon her is allowed to continue.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision dated October 16, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court of Batac, Ilocos Norte, Branch 17 in SP. Proc. No. 3445-17 is rendered NULL and VOID.
2 Id. at 37-62. The decision was penned by Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando (Chairperson) and concurred in by Associate 'Justices Rebecca De Guia-Salvador and Rosalinda Asuncion Vicente of the Special Former Seventh Division.
4 Id. at 38-39 and 48.
5 Id. at 39 and 48.
14 Id. at 80 and 83-84.
33 Id. at 153-158 and 226-227.
34 Id. at 41 and 136.
47 Id. at 311 and 313.
49 Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 47, sec. 1.
50 G.R. No. 161122, September 24, 2012, 681 SCRA580 [Per J. Bersamin, First Division].
51 Id. at 586-587, citing People v. Bitanga, 552 Phil. 686, 693 (2007) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, Third Division]; Fraginal v. Heirs of Toribia Belmonte Paranal, 545 Phil. 425, 432 (2007) [Per J. Austria- Martinez, Third Division]; Macalalag v. Ombudsman, 468 Phil. 918, 923 (2004) [Per J. Vitug, Third Division]; Apo Fruits Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 622 Phil. 215, 231 (2009) [Per J. Bersamin, En Bane]; Peña v. Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), 533 Phil. 670, 689-690 (2006) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, First Division]; Gallardo-Corro v. Gallardo, 403 Phil. 498, 511 (2001) [Per J. Bellosillo, Second Division].
52 RULES of Civil Procedure, Rule 47, sec. 2 and sec. 3.
53Barco v. Court of Appeals, 465 Phil. 39, 57 (2004) [Per J. Tinga, Second Division].
54Bulawan v. Aquende, G.R. No. 182819, June 22, 2011, 652 SCRA 585, 594 [Per J. Carpio, Second Division], citing Alaban v. Court of Appeals, 507 Phil. 682, 694 (2005) [Per J. Tinga, Second Division].
55 Republic v. Court of Appeals and Zenaida Bobiles, G.R. No. 92326, January 24, 1992, 205 SCRA 356, 363 [Per J. Regalado, Second Division], citing Ramos, et al. v. Central Bank of the Philippines, 148-B Phil. 1047, 1066 (1971) [Per J. J.B.L. Reyes, En Bane].
56 Domestic Adoption Act of 1998.
57 606 Phil. 82 (2009) [Per J. Carpio, First Division].
58 Id. at 89-90, citing Republic v. Toledano, G.R. No. 94147, June 8, 1994, 233 SCRA 9, 13 [Per J. Puno, Second Division].
59 G.R. No. 187409, November 16, 2011, 660 SCRA 323 [Per J. Reyes, Second Division].
60 Id. at 327, citing Amihan Bus Lines, Inc. v. Romars International Gases Corporation, G.R. No. 180819, July 5, 2010, 623 SCRA 406, 411 [Per J. Nachura, Second Division].
61 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Rule 47, sec. 3.
69 Id. at 155 and 158.
70 Id. at 153 and 156.
71 Id. at 154 and 157.
72 Id. at 153 and 156.
75 Id. at 14. The allegedly fraudulent affidavit of consent was not attached in the rollo.
77 Pinausukan Seafood House v. Far East Bank and Trust, G.R. No. 159926, January 20, 2014 [Per J. Bersamin, First Division], citing Ybañez v. Court of Appeals, 323 Phil. 643, 656 (1996) [Per J. Francisco, Third Division] and Strait Times Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 356 Phil. 217, 226 (1998) [Per J. Panganiban, First Division].
78 Rev. Pen. Code, art. 89.
SEC. 19. Grounds for Rescission of Adoption. — Upon petition of the adoptee, with the assistance of the Department if a minor or if over eighteen (18) years of age but is incapacitated, as guardian/counsel, the adoption may be rescinded on any of the following grounds committed by the adopter(s): (a) repeated physical and verbal maltreatment by the adopter(s) despite having undergone counseling; (b) attempt on the life of the adoptee; (c) sexual assault or violence; or (d) abandonment and failure to comply with parental obligations.

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 art. 89