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Timestamp: 2019-04-19 14:30:14+00:00

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ALVAN G. BERUBE & another [Note 1] vs. MCKESSON WINE & SPIRITS COMPANY.
On an appeal from an order allowing a motion for relief from a judgment of dismissal, the record in the case did not compel a conclusion either that the moving party's counsel had engaged in a conscious strategy to disobey the judge's order directing payment of costs or otherwise frustrate progress of the litigation [431-432]; or that the action was lacking in merit .
CIVIL ACTION commenced in the Superior Court on January 21, 1975.
A motion for relief from judgment was heard by Taveira, J.
Paul B. Galvani for the defendant.
George T. Bolger for the plaintiffs.
asserts that the judge made an error of law and abused his discretion by the allowance of the motion and the restoration of the case to the trial list. We rule under the circumstances of the case to the trial list. We rule under the circumstances of this case that the judge's action was justified.
The defendant filed a petition for review under the first paragraph of G. L. c. 231, Section 118. A single justice of this court denied plenary relief but authorized the defendant to prosecute an interlocutory appeal from the order granting relief from the judgment. Foreign Auto Import, Inc. v. Renault Northeast, Inc., 367 Mass. 464, 470 (1975). Mansfield v. GAF Corp., 5 Mass. App. Ct. 551 (1977).
We now appraise the defendant's contentions in the light of these standards.
1. The defendant first argues that the judge committed an error of law by his allowance of the motion. The argument in this regard is that no basis existed for the judge to exercise his discretion for two reasons: (1) plaintiffs' counsel in failing to pay the costs acted not out of neglect, but in pursuit of a conscious decision to avoid payment; and (2) no showing was made in support of the motion that the action was meritorious.
counsel did not file a petition, seeking relief from the order or for leave to take an interlocutory appeal, under the first paragraph of G. L. c. 231, Section 118, nor did he request that the judge report his order under the third paragraph of G. L. c. 231, Section 111, Mass.R.Civ.P. 64, 365 Mass. 831 -832 (1974). Despite these lapses, the record in our view does not compel a conclusion that plaintiffs' counsel engaged in a conscious strategy designed to disobey the judge's order or otherwise frustrate the progress of the litigation. The motions by plaintiffs' counsel to revoke the order as to costs or to enlarge the time for payment are consistent with an effort to obtain some relief from the order at the trial level. The judge's finding that the plaintiffs' principal counsel was under a medical disability and unavailable when the costs were imposed supplies the motivation for the effort to seek review of the order. The motions seeking relief from the costs reflect on the meaning of the futile notice of appeal. The circumstances, taken together, may well have indicated to the judge a confused and inept attempt to have the order as to costs reviewed in the hope that it would be abated in whole or in part. [Note 11] The whole of the conduct was also suffused with a demonstrable ignorance of the rules of appellate practice, [Note 12] since once the error was discovered the costs were promptly paid. We rule on the entire record that the judge was correct in declining to treat the conduct as part of a design to flout the court's order.
We also find that there was enough in the record to permit the judge to conclude that the action had merit. The standard in this regard does not require a showing of certainty of success. All that is necessary is an indication that the claim is one "worthy of judicial investigation because raising a material question of law meriting discussion and decision, or a real controversy as to essential facts arising from conflicting or doubtful evidence." Russell v. Foley, 278 Mass. 145, 148 (1932). See also Anderson v. Goodman, 341 Mass. 704, 705-706 (1961). The judge who had passed upon the rule 60 (b) (1) motion appears from the docket to have been involved with almost every pretrial motion argued in the case. We are not prepared to say that the absence of a finding as to a meritorious claim is automatically fatal to a motion of this type. While such a finding would be desirable, it appears from the judge's familiarity with the case, the extensive discovery that had been transacted, and the fact that on at least one occasion the parties were prepared to empanel a jury and put the issues to trial, that the action was one worthy of further judicial inquiry.
trial list would not disrupt the administration of justice in the county. Finally, there was slight, if any, prejudice to the defendant as a result of the granting of relief. All in all, we find that the judge's ruling was fair and made upon adequate consideration of several mitigating factors and the standards set forth above. Accordingly, we discern no abuse of discretion, although we would also have found no abuse of discretion if the judge had refused to allow the motion.
Order allowing motion for relief from judgment affirmed.
[Note 2] The rule provides that "[o]n motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect . . . ."
[Note 3] The reason for this request was the fact that the defendant had to bring in a witness from outside the Commonwealth.
[Note 4] The order provided that "[t]he action is to be dismissed if above moneys are not paid within thirty (30) days of the date of approval" of the costs incurred. Principal trial counsel for the plaintiffs had notified the court by letter filed in the clerk's office on May 8, 1978, that he was under doctor's care for a "condition which is very serious" and that he would not be able to try a case for "approximately one month." The defense apparently took the position that he would not assent to a continuance unless a formal motion for continuance were filed with the court and allowed.
[Note 5] Apparently the parties concluded that even though the amount of the costs had been approved on June 22, 1978, the thirty-day time period for payment would not commence running until June 24, 1978, with a two-day period for formal notification to be sent by the clerk's office to counsel.
[Note 6] He also moved at the same time to enlarge the time for compliance with the order assessing costs, although the costs had already been paid in full.
[Note 7] The judge found that the actions of counsel fell into the category of excusable neglect and expressly found that "on the circumstances here where plaintiffs' counsel was under some medical disability during parts of the periods involved, and was for a period, involved in a murder trial and further, albeit late, the costs assessed were paid . . ." relief should be granted. The judge had been involved with the case from the outset and had acted upon most of the contested motions. He relied upon statements of fact contained in the brief of the plaintiffs' counsel as true and "incorporated the brief into the record in lieu of an affidavit."
[Note 8] The defendant relies heavily on the statements of Chief Justice Rugg in Alpert v. Mercury Publishing Co., 272 Mass. 43, 45 (1930), that petitions to vacate judgment should be allowed "sparingly" and "only to promote the ends of justice, and not to relieve against slovenly preparation or other conduct not dictated by fidelity to the courts." That case involved a discontinuance by the plaintiff on the eve of trial when a late claim for a jury was denied, and the commencement of a second action with a jury demand which was subsequently dismissed. The circumstances there indicated a definite attempt to subvert the earlier ruling, and we find the facts clearly distinguishable from the facts here.
[Note 9] The divergent results of the cases that have been decided under the counterpart Federal rule (Fed.R.Civ.P. 60[b]) are collected in 11 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure Section 2858 (1973). See also Restatement (Second) of Judgments Section 115, Reporter's Notes to Comment b (Proposed Tent. Draft No. 6, 1979) and cases cited therein; Kane, Relief From Federal Judgments: A Morass Unrelieved by a Rule, 30 Hastings L.J. 41 (1978); Annot., 21 A.L.R.3d 1255 (1968).
[Note 10] We recognize that there is respectable authority for the proposition that the negligence of a lawyer should not, except under extraordinary circumstances, be found excusable and that the negligence when it occurs should be attributed to the client. See United States v. Erdoss, 440 F.2d 1221, 1223 (2d Cir. 1971); Universal Film Exchanges, Inc. v. Lust, 479 F.2d 573, 576-577 (4th Cir. 1973); Brown v. E.W. Bliss Co., 72 F.R.D. 198, 199-200 (D. Md. 1976) ("a trial court should adopt no . . . solicitous attitude for the client of a defaulting attorney . . . . [T]he time has come for lawyers to be responsible for their mistakes and their lack of attention to their professional responsibilities"). A categorical application of such a philosophy, far from reducing trial congestion, will probably increase it by replacing the dismissed action with a new action for malpractice. As a result several circuits have approached the entire problem of granting relief from judgments with a liberal attitude. See Tozer v. Krause, 189 F.2d 242 (3d Cir. 1951); Consolidated Gas & Equip. Co. of America v. Carver, 257 F.2d 111, 114 (10th Cir. 1958); Rooks v. American Brass Co., 263 F.2d 166 (6th Cir. 1959); Hutton v. Fisher, 359 F.2d 913 (3d Cir. 1966); Dormeyer v. M.J. Sales & Distrib. Co., 461 F.2d 40 (7th Cir. 1972).
[Note 11] Consider these comments: "The desire to seek immediate appellate review of a lower court interlocutory order is, of course, a common one. The adversary system being what it is, almost every interlocutory order of the lower courts produces a lawyer who feels his client has been injured. Not infrequently, this feeling assumes such a transcendent character that the lawyer seeks some avenue by which he can immediately communicate this sense of wrong to a higher court with jurisdiction to do something about it." Henn, Civil Interlocutory Appeals in the Massachusetts State Courts, 62 Mass.L.Q. 225 (1977).
[Note 12] The area of interlocutory appeals has been characterized as a subject of confusion and misunderstanding. "Few subjects seem to be more misunderstood among Massachusetts lawyers than that of interlocutory appeals . . . ." Henn, supra at 225.
[Note 13] The Restatement amplifies on the factors to be considered in this fashion: "The factors relating to the particular case include the magnitude and consequences of the judgment, the relative clarity with which it appears that the judgment was unjust, the relative fault of the parties, . . . the requirements of diligence . . . and the equities in the interests of reliance. Factors relating to the system of justice are the degree of diligence and competence expected of counsel (since many of the cases involve lapses on their part), the extent to which the court should rely on the adversary presentations in contrast with seeking a just result on its own initiative, the balance to be struck between finality and correctness of judgments, and the distribution of responsibility for deciding upon relief between the trial court and the appellate court." Restatement (Second) of Judgments Section 122, Comment g (Proposed Tent. Draft No. 6, 1979).

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