Source: https://elawnora.blogspot.com/2018/01/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 08:51:44+00:00

Document:
What is the standard of originality for copyright in works of applied art, and industrial models and designs? Is there an EU rule or can Member States decide to set their own threshold to protection?
This, in a nutshell, is the very interesting and potentially controversial issue that the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has just been asked to address in a brand-new reference from Portugal, ie Cofemel, C-683/17.
(1) The reference is not really about EU law as such, but rather CJEU's interpretation of EU law ("the CJEU's interpretation").
(2) This suggests that the reference may be about whether and to what extent the string of CJEU originality cases - in this instance these are likely to be in particular Infopaq, BSA, FAPL, Painer and, above all, Flos - has removed the possibility for Member States to set their own standard of originality for works of applied art, and industrial models and designs.
As readers know, EU legislature has harmonized the originality standard to a limited extent, in the sense that relevant directives have touched upon it solely with regard to computer programs (Article 1(3) of the Software Directive), databases (Article 3(1) of the Database Directive), and photographs (Article 6 of the Term Directive).
In relation to such subject-matter protection arises any time the work in question is sufficiently original, ie it is "its author's own intellectual creation".
Yet, in its landmark Infopaq decision - by attempting to define the concept of reproduction 'in part' within Article 2 of the InfoSoc Directive [ie the same provision that is now at stake in Cofemel] - the CJEU also undertook the de facto harmonization of the standard of originality.
By relying on a teleological interpretation of the various EU directives, as well as the Berne Convention, the Court stated in fact that also for works protected under the InfoSoc Directive - which, as such, does not envisage any particular notion of originality - the applicable standard would be that of "author's own intellectual creation".
The Court clarified further the concept of originality in subsequent decisions. In particular, in BSA it held that the standard of originality requires that the author expresses “his creativity in an original manner”. In FAPL it added that originality as author’s own intellectual creation requires exerting “creative freedom”. The CJEU refined further its construction of the standard of protection in its subsequent decision in Painer. There, it held that what is required is for the author “to express his creative abilities in the production of the work by making free and creative choices”, so that he “can stamp the work created with his ‘personal touch’”.
"A design protected by a design right registered in or in respect of a Member State in accordance with this Directive shall also be eligible for protection under the law of copyright of that State as from the date on which the design was created or fixed in any form. The extent to which, and the conditions under which, such a protection is conferred, including the level of originality required, shall be determined by each Member State."
However, the Flos case has made things rather complicated.
This was a reference from Italy, essentially asking about the compatibility with EU law of certain Italian provisions that the Court of First Instance of Milan had deemed potentially incompatible with the principle of cumulation envisaged under EU law (for a while the Italian approach to protection was based on the principle of scindibilità (separability)).
The CJEU held that EU law prohibits Member States from denying copyright protection to designs that meet the requirements for copyright protection - including designs other than registered ones (subject to Article 17) - and suggested (although rather ambiguously) that Member States cannot set any particular requirements as to how protection is achieved.
In this sense, the implication may be that - if a design is eligible for protection under the InfoSoc Directive and is, as such, original in the sense clarified by the CJEU - then Member States cannot deny such protection.
"the judgment in Flos indicates that the items here in issue, although unprotected under Italian copyright law during the relevant period, were entitled to protection under EU copyright law" [para 31].
"it is conceivable that copyright protection for works which may be unregistered designs could arise under other directives concerning copyright, in particular Directive 2001/29, if the conditions for that directive’s application are met, a matter which falls to be determined by the national court." [para 34].
The Flos decision has given rise to contrasting interpretations [for a thoughtful analysis of the judgment, see here], and led to the repeal of national provisions (including, in the UK, section 52 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act).
Hopefully in Cofemel the CJEU will reflect upon the actual breadth and legacy of its earlier case law on originality, which has been arguably prompted by - yes - a significant judicial activism, but an activism motivated and supported by internal market-building concerns.
While doing so, the Court will also (possibly) answer the questions referred by the Portuguese Supreme Court and clarify the conditions for copyright protection in works of applied art and industrial models and designs. This is not an easy area of IP law, as - across the Atlantic - the recent decision of the US Supreme Court in Star Athletica demonstrates.
The possibility to seek an injunction against an intermediary whose services are used by third parties to infringe an IP right has proved an important tool in the hands of rightholders, including in the online context.
In the UK, since the first copyright blocking injunction granted in Newzbin 2 the rule has been that, while rightholders/applicants bear the costs of application for an injunction, internet service providers (ISPs) have to pay the implementation costs.
The issue whether this approach is correct, including from a domestic - rather than EU - law standpoint, is at the centre of the UK Supreme Court instalment of the Cartier litigation [also the French Supreme Court has recently weighed in on this issue, as Mathilde reported here].
Readers will remember that both the High Court [here and here] and the Court of Appeal [here] confirmed the availability of blocking injunctions in cases other than copyright.
Despite the lack of specific implementation into UK law of the third sentence of Article 11 of the Enforcement Directive, the provision contained in Section 37(1) of the Senior Courts Act 1981 could be in fact regarded as the appropriate legislative basis to grant jurisdiction also in this area.
The “entirely correct” decision of Arnold J was confirmed in appeal.
How much, did you say?!
The Court of Appeal decision contains the dissent of Briggs LJ (as he then was) regarding the responsibility for the costs of an injunction. In particular, he held the view that what has become the traditional cost allocation for intermediary injunctions would not be correct under English law.
The Court of Appeal decision has been subsequently appealed to the UK Supreme Court [as The IPKat reported here]. Thanks to a very good Katfriend, the IPKat has learned something more about this latest round.
"The Cartier appeal is listed for a full day in the Supreme Court next Tuesday 30 January 2018.
Presided by Lord Mance, the other four judges will be Lord Kerr, Lord Sumption, Lord Reed & Lord Hodge.
1. The threshold conditions for the imposition of an order requiring ISPs to block (or attempt to block) access to websites infringing registered trade marks.
2. Whether ISPs should be required to bear the costs of trade mark driven website blocking.
The Internet Service Providers’ Association (ISPA) sought permission to intervene in the appeal, but such permission was refused.
· The Motion Picture Association."

References: CJEU 
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