Source: http://jonathanpollard.org/2000/092000a.htm
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 04:12:18+00:00

Document:
Jonathan Jay Pollard, by his attorneys, Eliot Lauer and Jacques Semmelman of Curtis, Mallet-Prevost, Colt & Mosle LLP, respectfully submits this Memorandum of Law in support of his motion for resentencing. The motion is brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 and is based upon the deprivation of Pollard's Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel, and upon violations of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment that resulted from that deprivation of effective assistance.
Jonathan Jay Pollard is presently incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Institution in Butner, North Carolina, serving a sentence of life in prison. He was sentenced to life in prison after he pled guilty to a single count of conspiracy to commit espionage. He was sentenced to life in prison after delivering classified information to Israel, an ally of the United States. He was sentenced to life in prison despite his undisputed extensive cooperation with, and substantial assistance to, the U.S. government. He was sentenced to life in prison despite a plea agreement that provided that the U.S. government would not seek life in prison.
He was sentenced to life in prison because his attorney failed to protect his most basic constitutional rights at sentencing. Those rights included the constitutional right not to be sentenced on the basis of false or incorrect government allegations. Those rights also included the constitutional right to have the U.S. government honor the terms of a plea agreement. Pollard's attorney failed to protect those rights.
Perhaps most egregiously, Pollard's attorney never even filed a Notice of Appeal from his client's life sentence, and never informed Pollard that if he wished to appeal, he had to file a Notice of Appeal within ten days. By those omissions, the attorney deprived Pollard of direct judicial review of the life sentence and of the constitutionally defective process that led to it. After having failed to represent his client effectively at sentencing, and with his client sentenced to life in prison and locked incommunicado in a ward reserved for the criminally insane, Pollard's attorney sealed his client's fate by not even bothering to file a Notice of Appeal so that the Court of Appeals could review the life sentence.
In sum, Pollard was deprived of effective assistance of counsel in fundamental and serious ways. His sentence of life in prison was a result of that ineffective assistance.
The relief Pollard seeks is simple, and is mandated by law: That his sentence be vacated, and that he be resentenced on a full and accurate record, free of misstatement, and in a manner wholly compliant with the government's obligations under the plea agreement.
Each issue raised in this motion is based upon ineffective assistance of counsel.
First and foremost, Pollard was deprived of effective assistance of counsel as a result of his counsel's failure to file a Notice of Appeal from the life sentence and have the Court of Appeals review the life sentence and the constitutionally defective process that led to it. Pollard was also deprived of effective assistance of counsel as a result of his counsel's failure to inform him that if he wished to appeal his sentence, he would have to file a Notice of Appeal within ten days.
In a statement reported by U.P.I. immediately after sentence was imposed, Pollard's counsel cavalierly told the press that Pollard "has no avenue of appeal . . ." (Ex. CC) Counsel was wrong. Pollard had the right to direct appellate review of his life sentence. Because of his counsel's failure to file a Notice of Appeal, Pollard has never had direct appellate review of his sentence.
Pollard was deprived of effective assistance of counsel as a result of his counsel's failure to object at sentencing that the government was, for all intents and purposes, asking the Court to impose a life sentence, in violation of Pollard's plea agreement (the "Plea Agreement").
Counsel failed to inform Pollard that he had the right to a hearing at which the government would have to prove the allegations in the Weinberger Supplemental Declaration and at which the defense could offer rebuttal evidence.
Counsel failed to demand that the government prove its false allegation that Pollard had disclosed classified information during the second interview and had thereby breached the Court's Protective Order, or to tell Pollard that he had the right to a hearing on that issue.
Pollard was deprived of effective assistance of counsel as a result of his counsel's failure to deal competently with the government's allocution that went far beyond the "facts and circumstances of the offenses," to which the government had agreed in the Plea Agreement to limit its allocution. The government resorted to vicious ad hominem attacks on Pollard's character, calling him a "recidivist" who was "contemptuous of this Court's authority," "unworthy of trust," "traitorous," "arrogant," "deceitful," "without remorse," and "addicted to the high lifestyle." Even though these highly damaging attacks breached the Plea Agreement because they were not the "facts and circumstances of the offenses," counsel never objected.
In sum, there were many serious deficiencies in counsel's performance at and immediately following sentencing. Those deficiencies deprived Pollard of the effective assistance of counsel at two critical stages of the criminal processsentencing and direct appeal. Counsel's performance fell way below that of a reasonably competent attorney.
Pollard did not receive effective assistance of counsel, as required by the Sixth Amendment. Counsel's ineffectiveness resulted in a sentence imposed on the basis of incorrect and false government allegations, in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Counsel's shortcomings were responsible for Pollard's receiving the maximum sentence of life in prison despite his plea and his undisputed cooperation with the government.
Pollard is entitled to have his sentence vacated, and to be resentenced at a fair proceeding, represented by competent counsel.
As part of the Plea Agreement, Pollard agreed to continue his cooperation and to plead guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit espionage, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 794(c). The statute carried a maximum sentence of life in prison. Of course, Pollard bargained for and received something in return for pleading guilty and cooperating extensively. The Plea Agreement gave Pollard valuable rights that, individually and collectively, were designed to limit the likelihood that Pollard would receive the maximum sentence.
When he appears before the Court for sentencing for the offense to which he has agreed to plead guilty, the Government will bring to the Court's attention the nature, extent and value of his cooperation and testimony. . . In general, . . . the Government has agreed to represent that the information Mr. Pollard has provided is of considerable value to the Government's damage assessment analysis, its investigation of this criminal case, and the enforcement of the espionage laws.
As Judge Williams would later write, "[t]aken together, the government's three promises worked a substantial restraint on the government's allocution. Its commitments to restrict itself to facts and circumstances, and to assess Pollard's cooperation as having considerable value, closed off a means by which it might demand a life sentence in all but name." United States v. Pollard, 959 F.2d 1011, 1037 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (Williams, J., dissenting).
On March 4, 1987, after some fifteen months of extensive and valuable cooperation with the government, Pollard, represented by Hibey, was sentenced by the Hon. Aubrey E. Robinson to the maximum sentence of life in prison.
In 1990, Hamilton Fox III, Esq. ("Fox"), acting as Pollard's counsel, filed a motion to withdraw Pollard's guilty plea (the "1990 Motion"). The district court denied the motion. United States v. Pollard, 747 F. Supp. 797 (D.D.C. 1990). The Court of Appeals affirmed in a two-to-one decision, with Judge Williams dissenting. United States v. Pollard, 959 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
The 1990 Motion is the only § 2255 application ever filed on Pollard's behalf. None of the issues raised in the instant application were raised in the 1990 Motion.
To be sure, some of the issues raised in the instant motion touch upon some of the issues raised in the 1990 Motion. However, the 1990 Motion was strictly an attack on the government's misconduct. The 1990 Motion did not challenge Hibey's effectiveness in any way.
Fox's unwillingness to criticize Hibey, and his unwarranted praise for Hibey's work, doomed the 1990 Motion by rendering it inherently untenable. The Court of Appeals (in a two-to-one decision) could not reconcile (i) Fox's position that the government had acted in gross violation of Pollard's rights, with (ii) Hibey's failure to object to the government's conduct. See Pollard, 959 F.2d at 1025 (we "think it telling that Pollard's counsel, who reviewed and responded to Secretary Weinberger's submissions in detail and heard the government's argument, never claimed an implicit breach of the agreement not to seek a life sentence."); id. at 1028, 1030.
Fox's unwillingness to criticize Hibey effectively placed Fox in a position of conflicting loyalties. Whether or not Fox had consciously anticipated it when he took on Pollard's representation, as shown below there came a time during the course of litigating the 1990 Motion when Fox was forced to choose between loyalty to his client and loyalty to his colleague. Regrettably, Fox chose to support Hibey at the expense of his client.
We therefore respectfully submit that, inasmuch as Fox was proceeding despite an undisclosed conflicthis personal unwillingness to challenge Hibey's deficient performance no matter what the consequences to the clientPollard has not yet had his habeas corpus review of the sentence in any meaningful sense. The 1990 Motion was fundamentally flawed due to Fox's unwillingness to challenge the performance of a professional colleague.
This motion respectfully asks that the Court scrutinize Hibey's performance in light of the requirements of the Sixth Amendment. No court has ever done that, and no lawyer representing Pollard has ever asked a court to do that. Pollard himself, unaware until recently of these Sixth Amendment and due process issues, has never asked for a review of Hibey's performance against prevailing standards of professional conduct.
Aware that the typical sentence for Pollard's offense, spying for an ally, was just a few years in jail,4 and evidently concerned that Pollard might actually receive the benefit of his Plea Agreement and end up with less than a life sentence, the government began taking steps to ensure that that would not happen. Instead of honoring the deal it had made, the government embarked on a campaign that effectively rendered the Plea Agreement a nullity.
The campaign consisted of four elements. First, instead of just presenting the "facts and circumstances of the offenses," the government resorted to vicious attacks on Pollard's character. The objective was to inflame the judge with vitriolic characterizations, a tactic the Plea Agreement prohibited. The government asserted "that Pollard's expressions of remorse were both belated and hollow,' and grounded in the fact he was caught'; that Pollard was a recidivist' who was contemptuous of this Court's authority' and unworthy of trust,' that Pollard felt blind contempt' for the U.S. military, and had a warped' and skewed' perspective; that Pollard was traitorous,' arrogant [and] deceitful,' without remorse,' and literally addicted to the high lifestyle . . .'." Pollard, 959 F.2d at 1036 (Williams, J., dissenting) (citations to record omitted). These were not "facts and circumstances of the offenses" to which the government had agreed to limit its allocution. Hibey never objected.
The second prong of the government's campaign was to comply nominally with the requirement that it bring the extent and value of Pollard's cooperation to the attention of the sentencing judge, but then to tell the judge to disregard the cooperation in imposing sentence. Hibey objected, but never pursued a remedy either in the district court or via appeal.
The third component was to persuade the judge that Pollard was a dangerous, out-of-control recidivist who could not be trusted to keep confidential what he knew, and who had to be locked away forever so that he could never disclose anything. To bolster this argument, the government consented to have a journalist, Wolf Blitzer, enter the federal penitentiary and interview Pollard. The government then argued to the sentencing judge that Pollard had spoken to Blitzer without the approval of the specific government official identified in the Plea Agreement as the person who had to approve any interviews. Hibey failed to object, or to ask for a hearing to determine who within the government had authorized the interviews. Hibey even helped the government by erroneously conceding Pollard's wrongdoing.
The fourth aspect of the government's campaign was to make the sentencing judge believe that Pollard had caused greater harm to this country than had John Walker and other spies who had recently been convicted of espionage for the Soviet Union and sentenced to life in prison. A fortiori, since they had been sentenced to life, Pollard should not receive less. This aspect of the government's campaign would culminate in a devastating and false affidavit submitted the day before sentencing, in which Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger would assert that Pollard had caused greater harm to national security than had any other spy in the "year of the spy"a reference to Walker and the other recent cases. Again, Hibey failed to object or to ask for a hearing at which the government would have to prove its contentions.
were ruled out because the foreign nation involved is a U.S. ally, a potentially damaging signal would thereby be communicated to individuals . . . contemplating espionage activities in the United States." (Id. at p. 49) (emphasis added).
It is notable that in the recent espionage case of United States v. Jerry Whitworth, the defendant, who was charged with obtaining U.S. classified information for the Soviet Union, contended that he believed the information was being delivered by a coconspirator to Israel.
(Id. at p. 50 n.12) It was well publicized that Whitworth, a member of the Walker spy ring, had been sentenced to 365 years in prison. That sentence had been imposed on August 28, 1986roughly four months earlierand had been the subject of extensive media coverage. (Ex. X) It is inconceivable that Judge Robinson did not understand what the government was suggestingthat Pollard should not receive a "less severe sentence" than Whitworth.
This indirect suggestion that the Court sentence Pollard to life in prison was the first in a series of steps by the government to ensure that Pollard would receive a life sentence. This conduct was in breach of the Plea Agreement, in which the government had agreed not to ask for life. (Ex. A at 4(b)) Yet, Hibey was oblivious. He did not object.
Hibey thus only addressed the merits of the government's comparison of Pollard to other spies. Hibey never argued that, by telling the Court that it should not impose a "less severe sentence" than that imposed on those, such as Whitworth, who had spied for enemies of the United States and received life in prison, the government had breached the Plea Agreement.
A second significant event in the government's campaign to nullify the Plea Agreement and ask for a life sentence occurred in the context of Hibey's attempt to obtain the government's damage assessment in the Pelton case.
The government refused to produce the document. AUSA Leeper wrote: "[T]here is no rational relation between the classified information compromised in Pelton and that compromised by defendant here. . . . [T]he nature and volume of the classified information compromised in these cases varies so substantially that no basis exists for a comparison of the respective damage assessments." (Ex. H at pp. 1-2) (emphasis added).
Leeper went on to state, gratuitously, that in his view Pollard was a worse offender than Pelton, and that post-conviction, Pelton had cooperated, and that "notwithstanding his cooperation, Pelton was sentenced to life imprisonment." (Id. at p. 2) (emphasis added).
On February 13, 1987, Hibey moved to compel the government to produce the Pelton document. (Ex. I) Inexplicably, and notwithstanding the undisguised threat of life in prison in Leeper's letter, Hibey attached a copy of Leeper's letter to the motion papers. Hibey's inclusion of the letter had the effect of placing the government's impermissible syllogismthat Pollard was worse than Pelton, and that Pelton had been sentenced to lifebefore the sentencing judge. What the government could not do directly, Hibey did for it.
On February 17, 1987, the government submitted its opposition to the motion to compel. (Ex. J) The government argued that Pollard was not entitled to discovery "of evidence developed in an unrelated case." (Id. at p. 13) (emphasis added).
On February 18, 1987 the district court denied the motion to compel.
The government had successfully avoided discovery on the rationale that the requested damage assessment was from an "unrelated" case, and that "no basis exists for a comparison" of the damage caused by the two spies. (Ex. J at p. 13; Ex. H at p. 2) Yet, at sentencing, the government would argue that Pollard had caused more damage to national security than had any other spy in the "year of the spy," a small group that including Pelton. (Ex. AA) Even though the government, by comparing Pollard to the other spies, had given Hibey a basis to renew his motion for the Pelton damage assessment so that he could challenge the government's allegation that Pollard had caused greater harm, Hibey did not renew the motion. Nor did Hibey ever appeal the district court's denial of the motion. Hibey did nothing.
The coup de grace in the government's campaign for life in prison occurred on March 3, 1987the day before sentencing. Undoubtedly timing its submissions to achieve maximal impact on the sentencing judge, the government submitted two documentsa Reply Memorandum (Ex. L), and a Supplemental Declaration of Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger (the "Weinberger Supplemental Declaration") (Ex. N).
Secretary Weinberger advised the Court that he was submitting the Supplemental Declaration to supplement a prior submission and "to make known to the Court additional facts which have been brought to my attention." (Id. at 1) (emphasis added).
in view of the breadth, the critical importance to the U.S., and the high sensitivity of the information he sold to Israel.
Id. at 2 (emphasis added).
The government had no reason to mention the "year of the spy" other than to call the judge's attention to these other spies. By pointing out to the judge that this was the "year of the spy," and by then saying that Pollard had caused greater harm to national security than had any of these spies, the government was asking for a sentence as severe as those imposed on Walker, Whitworth and Peltonlife in prison. Without using the words "life in prison," the government was asking for a sentence of life in prison in none-too-subtle terms.
Yet, Hibey did not protest, either in writing or orally at the sentencing, that, by asking for life in prison in this manner, the government had violated the Plea Agreement.
At sentencing, the government claimed that the Blitzer interviews had been unauthorized. The government argued that Pollard had breached the Plea Agreement by giving the interviews, and that this behavior showed that he was arrogant, unwilling to yield to any authority, and dangerous. This was untrue as well as unfair. Pollard had sought and received government approval for the interviews. Pollard believed that the approval process had proceeded up the chain of government authority and that the Director of Naval Intelligence or his delegate had approved the interviews. (Pollard Decl. 26) Nevertheless, at no time did Hibey tell the sentencing judge any of the facts that would have shown that Pollard did not breach the Plea Agreement and that he certainly did not act in willful disregard of the commitment he had made in the Plea Agreement. Hibey never told the Court that Pollard had sought and obtained government consent for both interviews.
In Hibey's Sentencing Memorandum he erroneously confirmed the government's accusation, and even volunteered, inappropriately, that he had advised Pollard not to submit to the interviews. Citing to Pollard's "Judgmental Deterioration," Hibey wrote that Pollard had "lapsed" and "against better judgment and advice, ha[s] spoken to the press. Hopefully, this will be seen as an aberration, nothing more." (Ex. K at pp. 44-45) (emphasis added).
unauthorized disclosure of classified information has continued even after his arrest and incarceration. The evidence has revealed defendant's perception and belief that he need not conform his conduct to . . . espionage laws, plea agreements, or orders of this Court. Accordingly, we ask the Court to impose a sentence which reflects both the damage already inflicted by defendant upon the national security, as well as the continuing risk of disclosure posed by this defendant.
(Id. at pp. 25-26) (emphasis added).
The government's claim that Pollard had breached the Protective Order by disclosing classified information was an entirely new allegation, made for the first time the day before sentencing. Yet, Hibey did not object to the last-minute timing of this allegation, and did not request a hearing or even an adjournment of the sentencing.
Also on March 3, 1987, the government served the Weinberger Supplemental Declaration, which cited the Blitzer interviews as proof that "there can be no doubt that he can, and will, continue to disclose U.S. secrets without regard to the impact it may have on U.S. national defense or foreign policy. Only a period of incarceration commensurate with the enduring quality of the national defense information he can yet impart, will provide a measure of protection against further damage to the national security." (Ex. N at 4) (emphasis added).
Hibey's responding memorandum merely stated that "Pollard's ill-advised interviews with Wolf Blitzer, while yielding grist for the Government's allocution, did not result in the disclosure of classified information." (Ex. M at p. 1) Hibey did not mention the government consent Pollard had obtained; he did not state that Pollard had not violated the Plea Agreement and had certainly not done so willfully; and he did not demand a hearing so that the truth could be determined.
However, the government placed this concession in a lengthy section entitled "FACTORS COMPELLING SUBSTANTIAL SENTENCE," in which the government, after briefly paying lip service to Pollard's cooperation, proceeded to argue that the sentencing judge should disregard it. (Id. at pp. 35, 37-39, 54-55) (emphasis in original).
This time, Hibey at least made an objection. In his Sentencing Memorandum, Hibey argued that "By failing to give Mr. Pollard proper credit for his cooperation, the Government has not honored its part of the plea bargain." (Ex. K at p. 42) (emphasis added).
Thus, Hibey expressly raised, as a breach of the Plea Agreement, the government's failure to advise the Court in good faith of the nature and extent of the cooperation. However, Hibey took no steps to secure a remedy for that breach. Hibey should have requested that the sentencing judge make a determination whether or not the government had breached the Plea Agreement. If it had, Pollard would have been entitled to specific performance of his Plea Agreement, or, if appropriate, withdrawal of his plea. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 263 (1971). Although Hibey objected, he failed to pursue a remedy.
Hibey continued to ignore or overlook the impropriety of these arguments. Instead he either argued the merits or inappropriately conceded the government's claim.
Hibey also failed to renew his motion to compel production of the Pelton damage assessment. The Court had previously denied the motion to compel after the government had represented that the Pelton case was "unrelated" (Ex. J at p. 13); now, however, the government had made it "related" by contrasting the damage caused by Pollard to that caused by Pelton and the other Soviet spies. It was incumbent on Hibey to pursue whatever evidence he could to challenge the government's unfavorable comparison with other spies and to test the government's methodology. Hibey did nothing.
Hibey did not even ask for an adjournment of the sentencing so that he could introduce evidence to rebut the last-minute Weinberger Supplemental Declaration. Instead, when the judge said, "I want to finish tonight," Hibey's response was "I understand that. We all do." (Ex. O at p. 25) (emphasis added).
Had Hibey not been so eager to conclude, and had he simply requested an adjournment to analyze and respond to the Weinberger Supplemental Declaration, Hibey would have been able to prove, merely by submitting public record materials, the falsity of the contention that Pollard had caused greater harm than had any other recent spy.
The National Security Agency had told the sentencing judge that Whitworth's disclosures "would constitute the most damaging impact ever suffered by the U.S. communications security establishment." (Id. at p. 10) (emphasis added).
The Weinberger Supplemental Declaration never alleged that Pollard had compromised information that had "war-winning implications," had "jeopardized the backbone of this country's national defense," or had jeopardized "countless lives of military personnel." Had Hibey simply submitted the docket materials from the Whitworth and Walker cases (Exs. U, V), he could have used the government's own words to rebut the Weinberger Supplemental Declaration. Hibey did not do that.
Instead, Hibey simply asserted, "there was no harm here akin to the cases of Walker and Whitworth and Pelton . . ." (Ex. O at p. 6) Hibey's assertion, however, was unsupported by evidence from those cases and was therefore meaningless.
Moreover, Hibey's assertion was further ineffective in that it did not put the government to its proof. Hibey should have insisted that the government either prove the contentions in the Weinberger Supplemental Declaration, or withdraw them. Instead, Hibey proclaimed that "the damage is simply not severe," and that "we do not believe that a case has been made out that the damage to the national security warrants the severest imposition of sentence that the court, in its discretion, may make." (Id. at pp. 6-7) Hibey should have demanded that the government prove that the damage to national security was greater than that caused by the other spiesor else withdraw that very damaging allegation.
[Pollard] tells us his injuries did not injure the United States in any way. Now, in taking that position, this defendant is saying, "
, when he states that as a result of Jonathan Pollard's activities enormous damage has been wrought to the national security."
(Id. at p. 36) (emphasis added). The government was asking the sentencing judge to resolve a disputed factual issue without any opportunity for the defense to cross-examine or test the government's assertion. Again, the situation cried out for a hearing. Hibey did not ask for one.
MR. HIBEY:	. . . what the government has offered this Court as proof of the serious damage to our national security is not, in fact, serious damage to the national security.
That depends entirely upon what credence I give to what I have heard, doesn't it?
That is correct, and that, in the final analysis, your Honor, is what I have to rely on.
(Id. at p. 54) (emphasis added).
Hibey was wrong. That is not what Hibey "ha[d] to rely on." Id. Pollard was entitled to a hearing. When the judge stated that his determination as to the extent of the damage to national security "depends entirely upon what credence I give to what I have heard," Hibey should have said that the Court can only give "credence" to the government's contention after there has been a full evidentiary hearing to determine the truth. Otherwise, the Court would be basing its credibility determination solely on an uncross-examined affidavitwhich is exactly what happened, to Pollard's enormous detriment.
In sum, Hibey was wholly ineffective in dealing with the Weinberger Supplemental Declaration. He failed to object to the undisguised request for a life sentence, he failed to ask for an adjournment, he failed to put the government to its proof, and he failed to offer rebuttal evidence available from the public record.
Hibey's handling of the Blitzer interview issue was even worse.
The government concluded with the contention "that when it comes to protecting against further disclosure of U.S. secrets, Jonathan Jay Pollard is not a man of his word. And in combination with the breadth of this man's knowledge, the depth of his memory and the complete lack of honor that he has demonstrated in these proceedings, I suggest to you, your Honor, he is a very dangerous man." (Id. at p. 44) (emphasis added).
THE COURT: You don't take the position, do you, that they are in compliance with my order?
MR. HIBEY:	. . . I don't believe that he is in violation of your order, becauseand that, because, your Honor, of what we argued yesterday in our pleadings, that the information that was discussed is, in fact, unclassified information."
Judge Robinson was evidently confusing the Plea Agreement (Ex. A at 9)which required approval by the government's designated overseer, the Director of Naval Intelligence, before any meeting with the presswith the Protective Order, which prohibited disclosure only of classified information. (Ex. E) Even though the judge was expressing the erroneous view that Pollard had breached a Court order by not obtaining clearance from the Director of Naval Intelligence, Hibey did not correct him. Judge Robinson was thus operating under the mistaken belief that Pollard had violated his Protective Order by speaking with Blitzer.
It was also apparent that Judge Robinson was very concerned about Pollard's attitude: "[T]he government is arguing . . . that that is consistent with his view that it is his determination on all these things that controls and not anybody else's, even when he is before the Court." (Ex. O at p. 60) Hibey should have told the judge that Pollard had acted in good faith and had secured governmental approval that he reasonably believed to be in accordance with the requirements of the Plea Agreement. Even if that were held not to rise to the level of strict technical compliance (a matter still subject to proof), it certainly reflected Pollard's good faith attitude, and rebutted the government's contention that he was arrogant, out-of-control, and unyielding to any authority.
Hibey was wrong to concede that the interviews were "unauthorized." They were authorized by the government. Without such authorization, Blitzer would not have gained entry to FCI Petersburg at all, much less equipped with a camera and a tape recorder.
Nor did Hibey have the right to disclose that Pollard had acted contrary to counsel's instructions, a disclosure Hibey first made in his Sentencing Memorandum (Ex. K at pp. 44-45), and then reiterated at the sentencing (Ex. O at p. 58). It is apparent that Hibey made that improper disclosure to preserve his own reputation in this high-profile case.10 Apart from the serious breach of the attorney-client privilege, there was no possible strategic benefitand much detrimentto Pollard as a result of that revelation. It bolstered the government's made-for-sentencing argument that Pollard was an incorrigible renegade who submitted to no one, not even his own attorney. It could only have further inflamed the sentencing judge.
In sum, Hibey not only allowed but abetted the government's effort to portray Pollard, falsely, as a person so contemptuous of governmental authority that he brazenly violated his own Plea Agreement and a Protective Order by giving unauthorized interviews to a journalist. Hibey failed to advise the sentencing judge of the mitigating facts that would have contradicted the government's attempt to portray Pollard as defiant and incorrigible.
Even though it was evident that someone in the government had authorized the Blitzer interviews, Hibey never said so. Hibey never asked for a hearing to find out the truth. Hibey never told the judge about the government's consent. Hibey never mentioned Pollard's good faith belief that he had obtained the necessary approval. Hibey never argued that it was disingenuous and unfair for the government to claim that Pollard had arrogantly and willfully violated the Plea Agreement. Instead, Hibey told the judge that the government was right.
In a statement to the press, reported March 5, 1987 by U.P.I., Hibey announced that Pollard "has no avenue of appeal and will probably spend 30 years in prison." (Ex. CC) (emphasis added). Hibey was mistaken. Pollard had an avenue of appeal. He had the right to direct review of his sentence by the Court of Appeals. Hibey failed to pursue it.
Following the sentencing, although Hibey did not communicate with Pollard, he continued to represent Pollard for some time. As noted, Hibey did not file a Notice of Appeal. On June 25, 1987 Hibey filed a motion to reduce the sentence pursuant to Fed. R. Cr. P. 35.
On February 22, 1988, the district court denied the Rule 35 motion.
In sum, Hibey's handling of this case is inexplicable. It is not necessary for purposes of this motion to determine the interpersonal or other factors that caused Hibeya former Assistant U.S. Attorneyto fail so miserably in his representation of Pollard. The undisputed factssuch as the glaring, incomprehensible failure to file a Notice of Appeal from a life sentencespeak for themselves.
The decision whether or not to raise ineffective assistance of counsel should have been made by Pollard, not Fox. By unilaterally deciding not to raise ineffective assistance, or even to mention the subject to Pollard, Fox allowed his personal unwillingness to criticize a colleague to supersede his client's rights. This divided loyalty ultimately caused the downfall of Fox's 1990 Motion.
On March 12, 1990, Fox filed the 1990 Motion, seeking to withdraw Pollard's guilty plea. He raised three grounds.
The first ground was that the government had breached the Plea Agreement in three respects: (a) it had breached its agreement not to ask for a life sentence; (b) it had breached its agreement to limit its allocution to the facts and circumstances of the offenses; and (c) it had breached its agreement to inform the sentencing judge of Pollard's cooperation.
The second ground was that the government had improperly alleged at sentencing that Pollard had breached the Plea Agreement by giving the Blitzer interviews.
The third ground was that the guilty plea had been improperly coerced by linking, or "wiring" it to that of his then-wife, who was quite ill.
It was inevitable that a court considering these allegations of government misconduct would want to know how counsel below had reacted to the government's behavior. If counsel below had not objected, counsel's silence would be strong evidence that the government had done nothing wrong. Unless, of course, counsel below had acted ineffectively.
Fox studiously avoided any characterization that questioned Hibey's performance. For example, Fox argued that "[a]lthough his lawyers disputed the charge that Pollard had disclosed classified information to Blitzer, there was no hearing on whether the plea agreement was violated." (Ex. P at p. 11) Fox also devoted an entire section of his memorandum to the proposition that "The Court Should Have Held a Hearing To Determine Whether There Was a Breach of the plea agreement." (Id. at pp. 34-35) Not once did Fox mention that Hibey had the responsibility of requesting a hearing.
Surely Fox understood that hearings do not just materialize sua sponte. They have to be requested by counsel. Yet, Fox never said that it was Hibey who had failed to ask for a hearing.
Similarly, the other claims of government misconduct in the 1990 Motion raised questions of why Hibey had failed to object or to take any of the steps customarily taken by competent defense attorneys. Yet, Fox refrained from saying anything negative about Hibey.
The only explanation for Fox's handling of the 1990 Motion is that he was laboring under a self-imposed restraint pursuant to which he was unwilling to say anything critical of Hibey. This restraint was not a strategic consideration. To the contrary, it completely defeated Fox's strategy of challenging the government's behavior. Rather, it was a factor external to the defense that divided Fox's loyalties, akin to a conflict of interest.
On the issue of the Blitzer interviews, and in response to Fox's argument that there should have been a hearing to determine whether Pollard had violated the Plea Agreement by giving those interviews, the government argued that "a hearing would have been pointless because there was no factual dispute. . . . Counsel for Pollard conceded that Pollard's interview with a reporter . . . was ill-advised, unauthorized, there is no question in my mind' (at p. 60) and it was done without the pre-clearance procedure' (at 61)." (Id. at p. 30) And: "He could have complied with his plea agreement . . . he simply chose not to do so, and even his own lawyer conceded as much at the time." (Id. at p. 31) (emphasis added).
It was impossible for Foxwho was arguing that the interviews had been authorizednot to recognize that Hibey's concession to the contrary was an extremely damaging blunder. Yet, Fox yielded to his self-imposed restraint and did not say so.
The government also emphasized the failure to appeal: "Pollard could have raised these attacks on direct appeal . . . but he did not." (Id. at p. 39) Again, Fox could not bring himself to criticize Hibey's failure to appeal.
In his reply, despite the government's provocations, Fox continued to avoid criticizing Hibey. Fox acknowledged that the government was contending that Pollard's motion should be denied due to the "absence of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel . . ." (Ex. R at p. 5) (emphasis added) At this point in the litigation, Fox was forced by the government's arguments to make a choice: (a) he could protect his client's rights by finally conceding that Hibey had been ineffective, so that Hibey's silence and concessions should not be viewed as agreement that the government had acted properly; or (b) he could protect Hibey's reputation, but thereby jettison Pollard's claims of government misconduct. Fox chose the latter course. Instead of protecting his client's rights and criticizing Hibey's performance, Fox offered Hibey a gratuitous compliment: "We do not challenge the government's claim that Pollard's prior counsel skillfully negotiated a plea agreement and effectively allocuted for his client. Our criticism is not of prior counsel but of the government's failure to live up to its side of the bargain." (Id. at p. 7) Of course, since Hibey had not objected to "the government's failure to live up to its side of the bargain," Fox's largesse toward Hibey eviscerated any claim of government misconduct.
If there were any doubt that Fox's handling of the 1990 Motion was motivated by considerations external to the defense, his gratuitous compliment of Hibey, suicidal to Pollard's claims, cannot be explained in any other way. Fox's handling of the 1990 Motion can only be explained as the result of a personal decision not to attack or embarrass Hibey. Fox's gentlemanly restraint doomed the 1990 Motion, rendering it inherently unsound. As the Court of Appeals would later recognize, it was impossible to reconcile claims that the government had acted outrageously, with Hibey's failure to object.
On September 11, 1990, Judge Robinson denied the 1990 Motion. United States v. Pollard, 747 F. Supp. 797 (D.D.C. 1990).
In a two-to-one decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's denial of the 1990 Motion. United States v. Pollard, 959 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
The majority based its decision on two concepts.
The majority noted that, had Pollard taken a direct appeal, he would only have had to prove a breach of the Plea Agreement in order to secure the remedy of resentencing before a different judge. Id. at 1023 (citing Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971)). See also id. at 1029 n.11 ("In a direct appeal of a sentencing determination, if the appellate court concludes that the government breached a plea agreement, it grants relief. The appellate court does not try to decide whether the breach caused the judge to give a greater sentence than would have been levied otherwise.") Indeed, said the Court of Appeals, "[a]ny breach of a promise that induced a guilty plea ordinarily entitles the defendant on direct review either to specific performance and resentencing before a different judge or to withdrawal of the guilty plea, as the court deems appropriate." Id. at 1028 (emphasis added).
By contrast, on § 2255 review Pollard had to prove not only a breach but that his "sentence resulted from a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice,' or an omission inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of fair procedure.'" Id. at 1020 (internal citations omitted). The majority explained that "not all breaches of plea agreements can be said to result in complete miscarriages of justice; not all call for relief under § 2255." Id. at 1028. The majority went on to rule that "[t]he mood, atmosphere, or rhetoric' of the government's allocutionupon which the dissent reliesmight well justify relief on direct appeal of a sentence, but it is unlikely to satisfy the rigorous test of § 2255." Id. at 1029-30 (emphasis added).
Second, in reaching the conclusion that Pollard had failed to meet his enhanced burden under § 2255 of proving not only that the government had breached the Plea Agreement, but that the "miscarriage of justice" standard had been satisfied, the majority relied heavily on Hibey's failures to object at critical times during the sentencing process.
think it telling that Pollard's counsel, who reviewed and responded to Secretary Weinberger's submissions in detail and heard the government's argument, never claimed an implicit breach of the agreement not to seek a life sentence.
Id. at 1025 (emphasis added).
when the government's allocution included an unflattering presentation of Pollard's character and motive.
Id. at 1028 (emphasis added). See also id. at 1030.
Finally, on the issue of whether the government had breached the Plea Agreement by failing to give good faith credit for Pollard's cooperation, the majority noted that "Pollard's counsel initially objected at sentencing to the government's description of his cooperation, but he subsequently abandoned this objection." Id. at 1026.
In sum, the majority was unable to reconcile Hibey's repeated failures to object, with Fox's allegations that the government had engaged in significant misconduct. Fox's unilateral determination to refrain from criticizing Hibey's performance proved to be disastrous to Pollard's motion.
In a very strong dissent, Judge Williams found that Pollard had sustained his heavy burden under § 2255. Judge Williams found that the government had made three "promises of significance": it had agreed to inform the judge of the "nature, extent and value" of Pollard's cooperation; it had agreed that "it would not ask for a life sentence"; and it had "limited its reserved right of allocution to the facts and circumstances' of Pollard's crimes." Id. at 1034.
Judge Williams observed that "[t]aken together, the government's three promises worked a substantial restraint on the government's allocution. Its commitments to restrict itself to facts and circumstances, and to assess Pollard's cooperation as having considerable value, closed off a means by which it might demand a life sentence in all but name." Id. at 1037 (emphasis added). Judge Williams found that "The government complied in spirit with none of its promises; with the third, it complied in neither letter nor spirit." Id. at 1034.
On the first promise, Judge Williams found that "by placing the discussion" of Pollard's cooperation "square in the middle of its reasons why the sentence should be substantial, and by its heavy stress on the cooperation's imperfections, it succeeded in conveying the impression that, overall, the value was not considerable' but slight." Id. at 1035. Judge Williams found this tactic to be a breach of the Plea Agreement. Id.
[T]he repeated use of superlatives implied an appeal for the maximum. Weinberger's reference to treason took the point further. Whereas treason carries the death penalty, and involves aiding the nation's enemies, Pollard was charged with espionage, carrying a maximum of life imprisonment and encompassing aid even to friendly nations . . . . [T]he government's barrage expressed a viewpoint that the government had promised not to express. Weinberger's subtext was that the heaviest possible sentence was the lightest that was just.
Id. at 1035-36 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). Judge Williams found that the government was not entitled "to wheel out the heaviest rhetorical weapons, calling for a life sentence in all but name." Id. at 1036.
Finally, on the issue of the government's allocution as to the "facts and circumstances" of the offense, Judge Williams contrasted the text of Pollard's Plea Agreement with that of his wife's plea agreement, and noted, as did the majority, that "the contrast with the language in Anne Pollard's plea agreement suggests that here the parties intended to exclude some otherwise acceptable elements of an allocution." Id. at 1036; see also id. at 1027. Judge Williams found that "if the limit meant anything, it could not allow the government to wrap the raw facts in an inflammatory rhetoric," id. at 1037, which the government had done. Id. at 1036.
Judge Williams concluded that "because the government's breach of the plea agreement was a fundamental miscarriage of justice requiring relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, I dissent." Id. at 1032. Judge Williams would have ordered that "Pollard's sentence . . . be vacated and the case remanded for resentencing." Id. at 1039.
Pollard's ignorance is understandable. Not only did no one ever challenge Hibey's performance, to the contrary both the government and Fox had praised Hibey's work. (Ex. Q at p. 4; Ex. R at p. 7) Quite understandably, the district judge saw no reason to take a different position sua sponte. See Pollard, 747 F. Supp. at 807. On this record, it was impossible for Pollard to learn the truth about the serious deficiencies in Hibey's representation.
The relief sought in this motion is that Pollard's sentence be vacated and that he be resentenced on a full and accurate record, free of misstatement, and in a manner wholly compliant with the government's obligations under the Plea Agreement. Pollard does not seek to withdraw his guilty plea.
As shown below, Hibey's ineffective representation deprived Pollard of his constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel, and was a material factor in the Court's sentencing him to life in prison. Hibey's failure to appeal doomed Pollard to an unappealed sentence of life in prison.
No court has ever scrutinized Hibey's failure to file a Notice of Appeal, or to inform Pollard that if he wished to appeal, he would have to file a Notice of Appeal within ten days. This was a fundamental and egregious deprivation of Pollard's rights, as it eliminated any direct review of his life sentence.
No court has ever scrutinized Hibey's handling of the Blitzer interview issue, including his failure to assert that Pollard had sought and obtained government approval, his erroneous admission to the contrary, his disclosure that Pollard had given the interviews against his advice; his failure to request a hearing to establish that the government had authorized the interviews; and his failure to demand that the government prove its false allegation that Pollard had disclosed classified information during the second interview.
Nor could these issues have been raised before, given Fox's self-imposed restraint that prevented him from criticizing Hibey.
Pollard is entitled to an evidentiary hearing, at which Hibey should be required to take the stand in court and explain, under oath and subject to cross-examination, why he did or failed to do the various things identified in this motion. Following that, this Court should grant relief and issue an order vacating the sentence and setting the case down for resentencing.
A defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel for sentencing, Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984), as well as for appeal, Roe v. Flores-Ortega, __ U.S. __, 120 S. Ct. 1029, 1034 (2000). Hibey's ineffective performance deprived Pollard of his Sixth Amendment rights in both phases.
First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires a showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel's error's were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair [proceeding], a [proceeding] whose result was reliable.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
To establish that counsel's performance was "deficient," a "defendant must show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." Id. at 688. Counsel's performance is measured against objective professional standards. See United States v. Johnson, 475 F.2d 1297, 1300 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (citing, inter alia, Standards Relating to the Defense Function, Approved Draft, 1971, ABA Project on Standards for Criminal Justice (1971); United States v. Pinkney, 551 F.2d 1241, 1248 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
To establish "prejudice," a defendant "must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
Hibey failed to perform in accordance with professional standards in numerous respects. His performance was therefore "deficient" within the meaning of Strickland. As shown below (Point Two), his deficiencies severely prejudiced Pollard. Pollard has demonstrated ineffective assistance of counsel.
The Supreme Court has recently held that the Strickland test applies where counsel fails to file a Notice of Appeal from a sentence. See Flores-Ortega, 120 S.Ct. at 1034.
To determine whether a failure to file a Notice of Appeal constitutes deficient representation under Strickland, the Court must first determine "whether counsel consulted with the defendant about taking an appeal." Flores-Ortega, 120 S.Ct. at 1035. In this context, "consulting" means "advising the defendant about the advantages and disadvantages of taking an appeal, and making a reasonable effort to discover the defendant's wishes." Id.
Counsel has a constitutionally-imposed duty to consult with the defendant about an appeal when there is reason to think either (1) that a rational defendant would want to appeal (for example, because there are nonfrivolous grounds for appeal), or (2) that this particular defendant reasonably demonstrated to counsel that he was interested in appealing.
Id. at 1036 (emphasis added).
In deciding whether a failure to consult about an appeal constitutes ineffective assistance, "courts must take into account all the information counsel knew or should have known." Id. "We expect," said the Court, "that courts . . . will find, in the vast majority of cases, that counsel had a duty to consult with the defendant about an appeal." Id. (emphasis added).
Hibey knew or should have known that there were valid appellate issues. Hibey had objected that the government's failure to credit Pollard's cooperation was a breach of the Plea Agreement. (Ex. K at p. 42) This was a valid issue for appeal. See Pollard, 959 F.2d at 1019. Hibey had also moved to obtain the Pelton damage assessment. The judge had denied the motion after the government had represented that the Pelton case was "unrelated." (Ex. J at p. 13) After the Weinberger Supplemental Declaration compared Pollard to Pelton and other spies in the "year of the spy," Hibey should have appealed the denial of the motion to compel.
Furthermore, while Hibey seems to have blinded himself to the government's breaches of the Plea Agreement and other acts of misconduct, an effective appellate counsel replacing Hibey would have recognized the government's misconduct, as well as Hibey's deficiencies throughout the sentencing process, and would have raised on direct appeal both the government's misconduct and Hibey's ineffectiveness as grounds for vacating the sentence.
That there were non-frivolous grounds for appealing from the sentence is reinforced by the Court of Appeals' opinion affirming the district court's denial of the 1990 Motion. The Court stated that "[t]he mood, atmosphere, or rhetoric' of the government's allocutionupon which the dissent reliesmight well justify relief on direct appeal of a sentence . . . ." Pollard, 959 F.2d at 1029.
In sum, Hibey had two responsibilities in connection with Pollard's appeal rights. First, he had the duty to consult with Pollard concerning an appeal. He did not do that. (Pollard Decl. 42) Second, since there were non-frivolous grounds for appeal, and since a rational defendant who had just been sentenced to life in prison would have wanted to pursue an appeal, Hibey had a duty to file a Notice of Appeal on Pollard's behalf. He did not do that either.
Hibey's shortcomings are underscored by his statement to the media, reported by U.P.I. the day after sentencing, that Pollard "has no avenue of appeal . . ." (Ex. CC) Hibey was wrong.
Hibey did not even perform the ministerial task of filing a Notice of Appeal. Even though Hibey continued to serve as counsel of record for Pollard after the sentencing, as manifested by his filing of a Rule 35 motion on June 25, 1987, Hibey never spoke with Pollard after sentencing. (Pollard Decl. 43) Following the sentencing, after a day or so at the D.C. jail and FCI Petersburg (during which Hibey did not contact his client), Pollard was transferred to Springfield, MO and held incommunicado in a ward reserved for the criminally insane. (Pollard Decl. 46) The least Hibey could have done is to file a Notice of Appeal, even if he had to ask the Court to appoint the public defender to handle the appeal. Hibey did not even do that.
There is simply no justification for Hibey's failure to appeal Pollard's life sentence. Hibey acted in gross dereliction of his duties as counsel. Under the Strickland test, now expressly made applicable to a failure to appeal by Flores-Ortega, Pollard was denied effective assistance of counsel.
As set forth above, the government's demand for a life sentence included (a) the improper depiction of Pollard as a dangerous recidivist who had to be put away forever so that he could never reveal classified information, and (b) the prohibited syllogism that (i) the Soviet spies had received life sentences, (ii) Pollard had caused even more damage than they had, therefore (iii) Pollard should not receive a less severe sentence than they had received. The government presented these arguments to devastating effect. Hibey did not object.
By failing to object to these breaches of the Plea Agreement, Hibey's performance fell far below objective professional standards. Failure to object to the government's breach of a plea agreement constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. See, e.g., United States v. De la Fuente, 8 F.3d 1333, 1337 (9th Cir. 1993).
In addition, the judicial findings in this case leave no doubt that Hibey's failure to object to the government's implicit demand for a life sentence and to the allocution beyond the "facts and circumstances" constituted ineffective representation. Judge Williams found without hesitation that the government had breached the Plea Agreement in both respects. Pollard, 959 F.2d at 1034-37. The majority did not agree, but explained that it could not agree because of the enhanced burden of proof faced by Pollard in the 1990 Motion. Id. at 1029-30.
What was manifest to Judge Williams, and at least arguable to the majoritythat the government's behavior was a breach of the Plea Agreementpassed by Hibey unnoticed. A competent lawyer would have recognized the issue and would have objected.
A competent lawyer would also have pursued a remedy for the government's breach. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971) established the remedy for the government's breach of a plea agreement: specific performance of the agreement, or, in the court's discretion, the opportunity to withdraw the guilty plea. Id. at 263.
In one instance where Hibey did object that the government had breached the Plea Agreement, he failed to pursue a remedy. Hibey objected that by failing to give good faith credit to Pollard's cooperation, the government had breached the Plea Agreement. (Ex. K at p. 42) However, Hibey "abandoned this objection." Pollard, 959 F.2d at 1026.
Hibey should have objected to each of the government's breaches of the Plea Agreement. He should have followed those objections with a demand for appropriate relief.
Hibey's failures to object to the government's breaches of the Plea Agreement, and to pursue remedies for those breaches, fell well below professional standards and deprived Pollard of effective assistance of counsel.
Hibey failed to object to the timing of two critical and very damaging government accusations, both made at the last possible momentMarch 3, 1987, the day before sentencing.
When the government makes new and highly damaging accusations one day before sentencing, common sense alone should compel an attorney to request an adjournment. However, this issue goes beyond mere common sense; the right to an adjournment is of constitutional dimension. The D.C. Circuit has held that "sentencing is a critical phase of the criminal justice process, and that [s]entencing by ambush should be avoided even more studiously than trial by ambush.'" United States v. Fogel, 829 F.2d 77, 91 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (citation omitted). Because "due process and fairness require that a defendant be afforded a meaningful opportunity to rebut any information presented to the court for consideration at sentencing," the government's filing of a memorandum one day before sentencing is highly objectionable because it does "not provide the defendant with anything approximating a meaningful opportunity' to review the information and to prepare a rebuttal." Id. See also United States v. Hinton, 631 F.2d 769, 780-83 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (where defense counsel received Jencks Act material for first time on morning of defendant's trial, but did not request a recess to study the documents, defendant was deprived of effective assistance of counsel).
As a matter of due process, the government's March 3, 1987 allegations entitled Pollard to an adjournment of his sentence so that he and his counsel could review and respond to those allegations. The district judge would have been obligated to grant a request for an adjournment. See United States v. Robin, 545 F.2d 775 (2d Cir. 1976) (remanding for resentencing where defense counsel requested adjournment to study and rebut government memorandum which he saw only three days before sentencing, adjournment was denied, and sentencing court relied heavily on memorandum in imposing sentence).
By his failure to request an adjournment, and by his insistence on pressing forward with sentencing, Hibey's performance fell far below professional standards of competence, and deprived Pollard of effective assistance of counsel.
Hibey failed to raise appropriate challenges to three critical disputed factual assertions made by the government: (1) that Pollard had caused greater damage than the Soviet spies; (2) that the government had not authorized the Blitzer interviews; (3) that Pollard had revealed classified information to Blitzer during the second interview.
Faced with these extremely serious allegations, each disputed by Pollard, Hibey should have (a) demanded an evidentiary hearing so that the truth could be determined; (b) demanded that the government prove the allegations at the hearing or withdraw them; (c) offered rebuttal evidence; and (d) demanded judicial findings of fact. Hibey did none of these things. Instead, Hibey merely asserted that Pollard had not caused more harm than the Soviet spies; asserted that Pollard had not revealed classified information to Blitzer; and erroneously conceded that Pollard had not secured authorization for the Blitzer interviews.
A defendant has a due process right not to be sentenced on the basis of inaccurate information. See, e.g., United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447 (1972); Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 740-41 (1948). By failing to raise appropriate challenges to the government's false allegations, Hibey deprived Pollard of effective representation, resulting in a violation of Pollard's due process rights.
Defendant had a full opportunity to review the Weinberger Declaration, unredacted, prior to sentencing. He challenged its reliability and its veracity in a very general way, but offered nothing specific to contradict it, though the Court noted and counsel agreed that defendant himself was quite able to assess the technical aspects of the Declaration. Defendant merely claimed the document was "speculative," "seriously flawed" and exaggerated.
Pollard, 747 F. Supp. at 803 (emphasis added).
Defendant's counsel contested the idea that the interview revealed classified information, but he agreed fully with the Court that defendant had utterly failed to comply procedurally with the provision [of the Plea Agreement] quoted above. There was no factual dispute whatsoever in that regard.
Id. at 805 (emphasis added).
The ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures (1980 ed. & 1986 Supp.) (the "ABA Standards"),14 in effect at the time of Pollard's sentencing, set forth the standards by which defense counsel should handle disputed factual accusations made by the government at sentencing.
persons who rendered reports to the court and persons providing information contained in such reports. . . .
[E]vidence offered by the parties should be subjected to cross-examination.
The guiding principle should be the provision of an effective opportunity for both parties to rebut all allegations likely to have a significant effect on the sentence imposed.
ABA Standards § 18-6.4 (emphasis added).
as a narcotics dealer or as a member of organized crime should be sufficient to shift the burden without the defense being forced to make any evidentiary showing of the negative fact it claims is correct (i.e., that the defendant is not such a professional criminal). In so providing, these standards merely codify the case law . . . .
Id. at p. 18-466 (emphasis added).
The ABA Standards are based upon, and are fully consistent with, case law in this jurisdiction and elsewhere. See, e.g., Kramer v. United States, 798 F.2d 192, 194 (7th Cir. 1986) (if sentencing court intends to rely on disputed information in determining sentence, it must hold hearing); United States v. Fogel, 829 F.2d 77, 90-91 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (defendant has right to rebut inaccurate government contentions at sentencing); see also Fed. R. Cr. P. 32 (1987).
The government was claiming that Pollard had caused greater damage than any other spy in the "year of the spy." The government was also claiming that Pollard was a dangerous recidivist whose defiant and unrepentant attitude was proven by his having given unauthorized interviews to Blitzer. Under the ABA Standards, a competent defense attorney would have objected vigorously to these contentions, and would have put the government to its proof. Hibey should have demanded an evidentiary hearing, with right of cross-examination.
In sum, Hibey's failure to mount an effective challenge to the government's disputed factual accusations deprived Pollard of effective representation, and resulted in a sentence based upon materially false information, in violation of Pollard's due process rights.
Not only did Hibey fail to mount an effective challenge to the government's assertion that the Blitzer interviews had occurred without government consent, Hibey did two things that were even worse. First, he erroneously conceded that the interviews were "unauthorized." (Ex. O at p. 60) Second, he breached the attorney-client privilege by improperly disclosing that he had advised Pollard not to give the interviews. (Ex. K at pp. 44-45) In both respects, Hibey seriously violated professional standards.
Even though Pollard had told Hibey about the government consent he had sought and obtained (Pollard Decl. 24), and even though it was self-evident that the Blitzer interviews inside FCI Petersburg had been authorized by the government, Hibey disastrously conceded the very opposite. This was ineffective representation at its worst.
Not only did Hibey improperly disclose privileged advice, he did so under circumstances that could only have harmed Pollard. There was no conceivable benefit to Pollard for the judge to know that Pollard had disregarded his attorney's advice. That bolstered the government's specious claim that Pollard was an out-of-control renegade who had to be put away forever to ensure his silence. Pollard had the right to disregard his attorney's advice without the risk that his attorney would disclose that fact to the sentencing judge.
Hibey wanted to protect his reputation in this high profile case. In doing so, he violated fundamental norms. His behavior constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.
The second component of the Strickland test is a showing of prejudice. The "prejudice" component requires a showing that counsel's deficient performance renders the result "unreliable" or the proceeding "fundamentally unfair." Williams v. Taylor, __ U.S. __, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1513 n. 17 (2000). Prejudice exists when there is a "reasonable probability" that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. A "reasonable probability" is a probability "sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id.
Prejudice can be established in two ways. First, through affirmative proof. Second, under certain circumstances the law presumes prejudice.
Pollard has established prejudice both ways. Prejudice is presumed from Hibey's failure to file a Notice of Appeal. In addition, the record affirmatively demonstrates prejudice from Hibey's deficiencies in numerous respects.
In the context of failure to appeal or to consult concerning an appeal, a defendant must demonstrate that counsel's deficiency "actually cause[d] the forfeiture of the defendant's appeal." Roe v. Flores-Ortega, __ U.S. __, 120 S.Ct. 1029, 1037 (2000). In other words, the "defendant must demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's deficient failure to consult with him about an appeal, he would have timely appealed." Id.
Once the defendant establishes that counsel's constitutionally deficient performance deprived him of an appeal that he otherwise would have taken, prejudice is presumed. Id. at 1038-39. In particular, where there are non-frivolous grounds for appeal, prejudice is presumed. Id. at 1039. No further showing is required as to the merits of defendant's appellate arguments; at this point, "the defendant has made out a successful ineffective assistance of counsel claim entitling him to an appeal." Id.
Hibey's failure to appeal caused the forfeiture of an appeal that Pollard would certainly have taken. (Pollard Decl. 42) There were bona fide issues for appeal. (See Point One) Under Flores-Ortega, prejudice is presumed.
On this ground alone, the Court should issue an order vacating the sentence and remanding for resentencing.
Pollard need not rely entirely on a presumption of prejudice. He has demonstrably suffered actual prejudice as a result of Hibey's deficiencies.
Judge Robinson relied heavily upon Hibey's unjustified silences and erroneous concessions in deciding what sentence to impose. Whether or not the Blitzer interviews had been authorized turned out to be highly material to Judge Robinson. Judge Robinson's opinion denying the 1990 Motion provides insight into his reasons for imposing sentence. Judge Robinson quoted Hibey's concession that the interviews were "unauthorized," and noted that Hibey "agreed fully with the Court that defendant had utterly failed to comply" with the Plea Agreement. Pollard, 747 F. Supp. at 805 & n.7 (emphasis added). Judge Robinson found this to be relevant to "defendant's veracity" and to "defendant's view that his assessment of what could or could not be disclosed should control." Id. at 805.
Of course, Pollard had not "utterly failed to comply." At a minimum, he had tried to comply in good faith, and believed he had done so. An evidentiary hearing would very likely have confirmed his actual compliance. By recklessly admitting the opposite to Judge Robinson, Hibey helped seal Pollard's fate.
Moreover, Hibey's failure to challenge the Weinberger Supplemental Declaration led Judge Robinson to conclude that its assertions were true. Judge Robinson noted that Hibey "offered nothing specific to contradict it . . . Defendant merely claimed the document was speculative,' seriously flawed' and exaggerated." Id. at 803.
With respect to the government's failure to give proper credit to Pollard's cooperation, Judge Robinson found that "prior to sentencing the Court and the parties addressed this very issue. Defendant made no further objection on the question." Id. at 804. Again, Hibey's failure to deal competently with the issue prejudiced Pollard.
In its 1992 opinion, the Court of Appeals repeatedly relied on Hibey's conduct to the detriment of Pollard. For example, the majority found it "telling that Pollard's counsel . . . never claimed an implicit breach of the agreement not to seek a life sentence." Pollard, 959 F.2d at 1025. On the issue of whether the government had breached the Plea Agreement by allocuting well beyond the facts and circumstances of the offenses, the majority stated that "a good deal of weight must be placed on the contemporaneous interpretation of Pollard's counsel, who apparently thought nothing amiss when the government's allocution included an unflattering presentation of Pollard's character and motive." Id. at 1028.
That Pollard suffered prejudice from Hibey's failure to appeal is likewise evident from the 1992 Court of Appeals opinion. The Court emphasized that the standard of review of a sentence via § 2255 challenge is much more burdensome than the standard on a direct appeal, id. at 1020; that, had Pollard brought a direct appeal, he would only have had to prove a breach of the Plea Agreement in order to secure the remedy of resentencing before a different judge, id. at 1023; and that "[t]he mood, atmosphere, or rhetoric' of the government's allocution . . . might well justify relief on direct appeal of a sentence, but it is unlikely to satisfy the rigorous test of § 2255," id. at 1029-30.
In sum, judicial findings in this case establish that Pollard suffered actual prejudice as a result of Hibey's deficiencies. Pollard's sentencing proceeding was "fundamentally unfair," and the sentence itself "unreliable." Williams, 120 S.Ct at 1513 n.17. The record contains evidence more than "sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome" of the sentencing proceeding. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
Pollard has satisfied the "prejudice" component of Strickland.
Pollard has satisfied the "cause and prejudice" standard of Strickland. He is entitled to a remedy for the prejudice he has suffered as a result of Hibey's ineffectiveness.
In Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971), the Supreme Court established the remedy for the government's breach of a plea agreement: "specific performance of the agreement on the plea, in which case petitioner should be resentenced by a different judge," or, in the lower court's discretion, "the opportunity to withdraw his plea of guilty." Id. at 263.
Under Roe v. Flores-Ortega, __ U.S. __, 120 S.Ct. 1029 (2000), the remedy for a deprivation of an appeal caused by ineffective assistance of counsel is to allow the defendant to appeal. Id. at 1039. Procedurally, the defendant should be resentenced, so that he may pursue an appeal from that sentence. See, e.g., United States v. Peak, 992 F.2d 39, 42 (4th Cir. 1993).
Pollard is not seeking to withdraw his guilty plea. He asks only that he be resentenced at a proceeding where he is represented by competent counsel, on a record untainted by government misconduct and in full compliance with his Plea Agreement. He has never had that. He is entitled to it. See, e.g., United States v. Robin, 545 F.2d 775, 779 (2d Cir. 1976) ("Where there is a possibility that sentence was imposed on the basis of false information or false assumptions concerning the defendant . . . the sentence will be vacated."); United States v. Wolff, 127 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (vacating sentence based upon government's breach of plea agreement, and remanding for resentencing), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 929 (1998); United States v. Mitchell, 136 F.3d 1192 (8th Cir. 1998) (remanding for resentencing where government violated spirit of plea agreement).
Because the government's false allegations were never challenged due to Hibey's ineffectiveness at sentencing, and because these allegations were relied upon by the sentencing judge in imposing a life sentence, see Pollard, 747 F. Supp. at 803-05, the Court should vacate the sentence and resentence Pollard on a full and accurate record, free of misstatement, and in a manner wholly compliant with the government's obligations under the Plea Agreement.
In 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"). The statute amended 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in various respects.
Under AEDPA, a petitioner may file a second § 2255 motion only under specified circumstances. These statutory requirements do not apply in this case. As shown below, controlling case law establishes that AEDPA does not retroactively deprive a petitioner of the right to assert claims that would have been viable prior to its enactment. Such claims are determined under pre-AEDPA standards. That is the case here. Although he was completely unaware of it, Pollard has had a viable § 2255 motion based upon ineffectiveness of counsel since 1987. The enactment of AEDPA cannot eliminate Pollard's right to bring this motion.
As shown below, Pollard satisfies the pre-AEDPA requirements for bringing this motion, as set forth in McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991). This motion should be determined on the merits.
In United States v. Ortiz, 136 F.3d 161 (D.C. Cir. 1998), the Court held that AEDPA cannot retroactively deprive a litigant of an existing right. Id. at 165-66. In particular, where petitioner files a second § 2255 motion, the first motion having been filed prior to AEDPA's enactment, application of AEDPA to the second motion will be deemed "impermissibly retroactive" if the movant can satisfy the "cause and prejudice" standard of McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991). See Ortiz, 136 F.2d at 166.
As shown below, this motion satisfies the McCleskey standard.
In McCleskey, the Supreme Court established a "cause and prejudice" test for bringing a second § 2255 motion. 499 U.S. at 493. McCleskey also preserved, as an alternative, the "fundamental miscarriage of justice" exception that has long been ingrained in federal habeas corpus law. Id. at 495; see Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 319-21 (1995).
If Pollard had had unconflicted legal representation in connection with the 1990 Motion, he would have raised all of the claims he is raising now. (Pollard Decl. 60) Pollard failed to raise these claims in the 1990 Motion only because his attorney, Fox, was operating under a self-imposed restraint that caused him not to inform Pollard of Hibey's deficiencies or of Pollard's rights based on those deficiencies. (Id. at 50-52) Pollard therefore has "cause" for failing to raise the ineffective assistance claims in the 1990 Motion.
In addition, Pollard was severely prejudiced in two respects. First, Fox's failure to raise meritorious ineffective assistance claims deprived Pollard of those claims in the 1990 Motion. Second, Fox's failure to raise those claims decimated the claims that Fox did bring, i.e., claims of government breaches of the Plea Agreement and other misconduct. In sum, Pollard satisfies the McCleskey "cause and prejudice" standard.
This case also involves a "fundamental miscarriage of justice." Pollard's sentence was based on false factual accusations that went unchallenged by Hibey. Pollard should not have to spend the rest of his life in jail because Hibey was ineffective at sentencing and failed even to file a Notice of Appeal, while Fox had an impediment that kept him from criticizing Hibey. It would be a fundamental miscarriage of justice if this motion were barred procedurally.
Had Pollard known in 1990 that he had a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, he would have insisted that Fox assert it. (Pollard Decl. 60) The reason Pollard did not assert a claim for ineffective assistance until now is that he never knew he had such a claim to assert. (Id. at 50-52) And the reason Pollard did not know he had such a claim is that Fox was laboring under a self-imposed restraint that prevented him from telling Pollard the truth.
To a non-lawyer, the entire record created the convincing but false illusion that Hibey had done a competent job. The government argued vehemently that Hibey had done an excellent job for Pollard. Fox agreed enthusiastically. It is no wonder that Pollard was completely unaware until now of the serious shortcomings in Hibey's representation.
Pollard's lack of knowledge that he had a claim for ineffective assistance was the result of Fox's undisclosed unwillingness to challenge Hibey, and therefore constitutes "cause" under McCleskey for Pollard's failure to assert those claims before now. The "cause" requirement is satisfied if "some objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel's efforts" to raise the claims in the first motion. McCleskey, 499 U.S. at 493 (emphasis added).
An analogous situation occurred in Hollis v. Davis, 941 F.2d 1471 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 938 (1992). In 1959, a black defendant had been convicted of burglary in Alabama by an all-white jury. Counsel had not objected to the composition of the jury pool. No appeal had been taken.
Over the next thirty-one years, defendant filed three federal habeas corpus petitions. In his third, ultimately successful petition, he raised for the first time claims of ineffective assistance of counsel based upon the failure to challenge the composition of the jury pool.
The defendant faced the procedural hurdle of showing "cause" and "prejudice" for the failure to raise the jury composition issue in the trial court in a timely manner. Id. at 1476. The "cause" requirement could be satisfied by showing that "some objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel's efforts" to raise the issue. Id. (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986)).
At an evidentiary hearing held in connection with the third habeas petition, trial counsel testified that, while he had no recollection of the case, in 1959 he would not have challenged the racial composition of the jury pool, and did not recall being aware in 1959 that it was illegal to exclude black persons from jury pools. Id. The district court denied the petition, based largely upon the defendant's delay in bringing his claims. Id. at 1474.
The Court of Appeals reversed, and directed the district court to issue the writ. Going well beyond, and even contrary to, the record at the evidentiary hearing, the Court of Appeals surmised that "[t]here is a . . . possibility . . . that [counsel] knew of the right" to a racially representative jury pool, "but didn't raise it out of fear for his own practice and reputation. Such a motivation would not have been unusual at the time." Id. at 1478. The Court concluded that "even if [counsel's] representation was not constitutionally ineffective under Strickland, if he did not object to the racial composition of the county's jury list out of fear of community reaction or loss of practice, such failure is an objective factor external to the defense' which is cause' for the procedural default." Id. at 1479 (emphasis added) (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. at 488).
Similarly here, Fox's failure to criticize Hibey's performance had no strategic basis but was motivated by a desire not to offend or embarrass a professional colleague. See Jamison v. Collins, No. C-1-94-175, 1998 WL 1543563, at *46 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 21, 1998) (noting that if new counsel were to raise ineffective assistance claim against prior counsel, this would likely cause "professional affront" and "inevitable rift" between them). As the Court of Appeals inferred in Hollis, Fox's motivation was driven by personal objectives, was "external" to the defense, and constitutes "cause" for Pollard's failure to raise the ineffective assistance claims until now.
Pollard satisfies the "prejudice" requirement of McCleskey, in two respects. First, in 1990, as now, Pollard had viable claims for ineffective assistance of counsel based upon the issues raised in this motion. Fox's failure to raise these claims in his 1990 Motion deprived the Court of the opportunity to rule on those claims at that time.
Second, for the reasons set forth throughout this motion, Fox's failure to raise ineffective assistance in the 1990 Motion rendered that motion untenable, and doomed it to failure. Had Fox raised ineffective assistance, the Court would have recognized Hibey's silences and concessions as the result of ineffective representation, and not as evidence that the government had done nothing wrong. See Pollard, 959 F.2d at 1025-26, 1028, 1030. The Court's heavy reliance on Hibey's conduct, treated as if it were the conduct of an effective lawyer as Fox had urged (Ex. R at p. 7), is direct proof of the prejudice to Pollard from Fox's refusal to challenge Hibey's performance.
Even in the absence of "cause and prejudice," McCleskey permits a second § 2255 motion if failure to consider its merits would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.
The "fundamental miscarriage of justice" exception is based upon the principle that "habeas corpus is, at its core, an equitable remedy." Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 319 (1995). The Supreme Court has consistently recognized that "'[i]n appropriate cases,' the principles of comity and finality that inform the concepts of cause and prejudice must yield' to the imperative of correcting a fundamentally unjust incarceration.'" Id. at 320-21 (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495-96 (1986)).
The facts of this case cry out for application of the "fundamental miscarriage of justice" exception. Pollard did not hold back any claims in the 1990 Motion. He had no motive for doing so. To the contrary, he had every reason to raise every possible ground for relief. It was Fox who unilaterally decided to protect Hibey.
At a bare minimum, there is no conceivable justification for Hibey's failure to file a Notice of Appeal or for Fox's unwillingness to raise that failure in the 1990 Motion as a ground for relief.
Pollard's life sentence was based on false factual allegations that Hibey did not challenge. It would be a fundamental miscarriage of justice to say that, because of Hibey's shortcomings and Fox's reluctance to criticize a collegue, no appellate court can ever conduct a direct review of Pollard's life sentence. Pollard should not have to spend the rest of his life in jail based upon false accusations simply because one member of the D.C. Bar could not bring himself to criticize another.
The Court should set this matter down for an evidentiary hearing, following which it should enter an order vacating Pollard's sentence of life in prison and ordering that he be resentenced.

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