Source: https://collections.lib.utah.edu/details?id=1130790
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 06:47:52+00:00

Document:
ROTATION IN USE OF WATER 621 A New Mexico case involved the relative rights of a prior appropriator who had a permit for the all-year use of 5 second-feet of water, and a junior appropriator who applied for and obtained a permit for 4)6. second-feet out of the same supply for winter use only, basing his application upon a claim that the earlier appropriator's right to such water, as a result of nonuse during the winter, had been lost by forfeiture for such season. The supreme court rejected the later appropriator's claim of forfeiture and held that he was a junior appropriator only, at any time of the year. In doing so, the court held that no case of rotation was involved here; and observed that even if it were, whether a rule of rotation could be worked out under the circumstances was doubtful. "This case differs from those arising on community ditches, where all of the rights are usually of the same dignity, and rotation is frequently awarded as a means of dividing the water on an equitable basis."138 The Utah Supreme Court said that as rotation of irrigation waters aids materially in saving of water and enlarging its duty, "the courts favor, whenever possible, that system." It was admitted that the power to compel rotation as against a nonconsenting water user might not then (in 1917) be thoroughly settled.139 But subsequent decisions of this court appear to have settled this matter in the affirmative, particularly one rendered in 1960 in which the court said: It appears that the objective of achieving the most economical use of the water will be served by the order made directing that it be used under a rotation system, and that it will result neither in hardship nor injustice to the plaintiff. Accordingly we see no basis to justify interference with the conclusion reached by the trial court in refusing to issue an injunction.140 In a Washington case, the rights of the parties to the action were defined on a percentage basis by court decree. After certain of these parties petitioned the State administrator to adopt a plan of rotation, the administrator entered an order suggesting such a plan. The supreme court held that unless the parties could agree upon some plan of rotation, all that the administrator could do was to give each party the percentage awarded him by the decree.141 In a subsequent decision rendered in the course of a statutory adjudication, this court declared that inclusion of a plan of rotation should first be considered and adjusted by the State administrator, which had not been "adopted entirely" by him here. "We think that neither the trial court nor ourselves 13*Harkey v. Smith, 31 N. Mex. 521, 530-531, 247 Pac. 550 (1926). 139Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. v. ShUrtliff, 49 Utah 569, 589, 164 Pac. 856 (1917). 140Crawford v. Lehi In. Co., 10 Utah (2d); 165, 169, 350 Pac. (2d) 147 (1960). See also Rocky Ford Canal Co. v. Cox, 92 Utah 148, 158, 59 Pac. (2d) 935 (1936), "When necessary, periods of rotation may be imposed;" Dameron Valley Res. & Canal Co. v. Bleak, 61 Utah 230, 237, 211 Pac. 974 (1922). 1AlOsborn v. Chase, 119 Wash. 476,479, 205 Pac. 844 (1922).

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