Source: http://cl.bna.com/cl/19980422/951662a.htm
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 16:32:12+00:00

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the continuing vitality of our opinion in United States v.
other courts of appeals since our decision eight years ago.
issue and modify our views.
The facts regarding the bank robbery are not in dispute.
Bank of Philadelphia at 1424 Walnut Street in Philadelphia.
money in Askari's pants. They did not recover a weapon.
diminished capacity is limited to non[-]violent offenses . . . .
In United States v. Rosen, 896 F.2d 789, 791 (3d Cir.
Rehearing En Banc, Mar. 27, 1997.
contained in USSG � 4B1.24 governs the "non-violent"
United States v. Poff, 926 F.2d 588, 591-93 (7th Cir.
1991) (en banc) (6-5 decision); United States v.
States v. Borrayo, 898 F.2d 91, 94 (9th Cir. 1989).
"crime of violence" definition contained in� 4B1.2.
United States v. Weddle, 30 F.3d 532, 540 (4th Cir.
Askari, 1997 WL 92051, at *2 n.2.
violent offense under � 5K2.13.
decision in Askari for reconsideration en banc.
States, 116 S. Ct. 2035, 2047-48 (1996) (citations omitted).
legal conclusions." Id. at 2048.
need for incarceration to protect the public.
USSG � 5K2.13, p.s. (emphasis supplied).
serious potential risk of physical injury to another.
unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon.
robbery would never qualify as a "non-violent" offense.
"[d]efinitions of terms also may appear in other sections.
basis." USSG � 1B1.1, comment. (n.2).
or any savings and loan association.
v. Maddalena, 893 F.2d 815, 819 (6th Cir. 1989).
359, 363 (4th Cir.) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 117 S.
threat of bodily harm from the perpetrator's acts.
several courts of appeals interpreting "non-violent offense"
money through threat of injury, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
was received, their relatives would be harmed.
justifying departure below the guideline minimum.
of a crime of violence.
departure in USSG � 5K2.13 for "non-violent offenses."
Because defendant's crime constituted a "crime of violence,"
we found USSG � 5K2.13 inapplicable.
our decision in Rosen, 3d Cir. I.O.P. 9.1").
circuits are in accord with Rosen. See United States v.
`non-violent offense' is not defined in the guidelines.
United States v. Dailey, 24 F.3d 1323, 1327 (11th Cir.
cert. denied, 502 U.S. 827 (1991).
offense was in fact `non-violent' ").
the only detailed analyses of the issue presented").
of the first view -- that USSG � 4B1.2's "crime of violence"
definition controls USSG � 5K2.13's "non-violent offense"
bears the same meaning in both instances.
Poff, 926 F.2d at 591 (citations omitted).
`violent offense.' " Id. at 592.
also be a non-violent offense.
but guess as to its meaning.
Id. at 592 (citations omitted).
offenders, by definition, fail to meet this condition . . . .
not have authorized the district court to depart.
a defendant will manifest any form of violent behavior.
� 4B1.1 is a point that further commends it.
downward departure under � 5K2.13").
Judge Easterbrook, who authored the dissenting opinion.
Chatman and Weddle decisions here.
specifically incorporate the "crime of violence" definition.
term of art. It took a detailed definition to make it so.
better than they might, departure is permissible.
Poff, 926 F.2d at 594 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
Furthermore, these sections address different concerns.
incarceration because of an extensive criminal history.
incarceration, as set out in 18 U.S.C. � 3553(a)(2) . . . .
`term of art' designed to identify career offenders . . . .
their facts, might be interpreted as non-violent.
capacity' contributed to the commission of a crime.
of time the Guidelines would otherwise recommend.
violent, however, incapacitation is less important .. . .
specific inquiry not governed by the "crime of violence"
little sense to import a definition of "non-violent offense"
from the section on career offenders.
referenced must be determined on a case by case basis."
violence" definition is therefore one of limited applicability.
contributed to the commission of a crime.
articulated in USSG � 4B1.2 to USSG � 5K2.13.
court's review of the "facts and circumstances" of the crime.
offenders who may be dangerous to the public.
term "intimidation" means to make fearful or put into fear.
robbery convictions under the first paragraph of 18 U.S.C.
duress"), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1043 (1980).
acted in a non-violent manner.
In this case, Askari was found guilty of bank robbery.
or, you know, at that point I was, you know, scared.
Askari did not commit a "non-violent offense."
We will affirm the judgment of conviction and sentence.
term as Chief Judge on January 31, 1998.
disorder, but he concluded that Askari was competent to stand trial.
Following a second psychiatric evaluation before Askari's sentencing, Dr.
initially "exhibited delusional thinking and auditory hallucinations,"
now competent. (See App. at 62a-67a, 68a).
him at the bottom of the range with the discretion I have")).
sentence different from that described' ").
offender that tracks in large part the criteria set forth in 28 U.S.C.
� 4B1.1, including "crime of violence."
diminished capacity is limited to non[-]violent offenses").
provisions, policy statements and commentary." United States v.
1384, 1404-05 (3d Cir. 1994)).
Manual is binding on federal courts applies as well to policy statements."
USSG Ch. 3, Pt. A, intro. comment.
USSG Ch.4, Pt. A, intro. comment.
interpret") (citation omitted), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2413 (1997).
USSG � 2B3.1, comment. (n.6).
between the Poff dissent and Chatman is instructive.
policy statements of the Sentencing Commission.
18 U.S.C.A. � 3553(b) (West 1985 & Supp. 1997).
have been largely supplanted by the sentencing guidelines.
or is otherwise clear from the context." USSG� 1B1.1, comment. (n.1).
16. H.Rep. No. 99-797, at 33, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6138, 6156.
(citations omitted), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1211 (1991).
the applicable statute is desirable. Id.
of violence to person or property." USSG � 2B3.3, comment. (n.1).
intimidation ([subsection] a-first paragraph)") (emphasis supplied), cert.
Sentencing Commission could delete the "non-violent offense"
current guidelines, we believe no distinction presently exists.
felon (1983). (See Presentence Report  29-32).
departure is not authorized by � 5K2.13 in this case.
different from that followed by the court.
requirement that the offense of conviction be "non-violent,"
determination of the defendant's state of mind.
conviction, not because those elements control the U.S.S.G.
view of the scope of the phrase "non-violent offense."
taken either "by force and violence" or "by intimidation"
evidence of such a need.
defendant's culpability in a robbery context.
this portion of the Chatman court's decision.
Judge Sloviter joins this concurring opinion.
position on the application of � 5K2.13 in such a case.
analytically distinct and will produce different results in other situations.
a departure) offenses that would be "crimes of violence" under U.S.S.G.
person of another or threat thereof is employed.
imprisoned not more than twenty-five years, or both.
situations. 18 U.S.C. � 2113(d).
when violence results in personal injury but not for violence per se.
Commission did not intend to import the "crime of violence"
definition from the career offender provision of U.S.S.G.
correct in rejecting our prior holding in United States v.
� 5K2.13, notwithstanding the elements of his crime.
because of a need to protect the public.
(7th Cir. 1991), as well as the holding in United States v.
States v. Weddle, 30 F.3d 532, 540 (4th Cir. 1994). Maj.
somewhat different view of the applicable standard." Maj.
violence barring any consideration as a "non-violent crime"
� 5K2.13 ought to be as limited as the majority concludes.
the majority then restricts the meaning of "non-violent"
case in deciding whether a crime is a `non-violent offense' "
than they might, departure is permissible.
Poff, 926 F.2d at 594 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
who is less culpable because of a reduced mental capacity.
if not deterred." Id. at 595.
mental capacity. . . .
reached through a fact-specific investigation.
whether the defendant committed a "non-violent offense,"
commit the offense of conviction.").
� 5K2.13 departure solely because of his robbery conviction.
as noted above, includes the elements of the offense).
completion of such an individualized inquiry.
additional considerations under the departure provision.
the judgment of the majority.
something other than the opposite of a "crime of violence."
colleagues take the position that the "crime of violence"
F.2d 91, 94 (9th Cir. 1989); see also United States v.
Chatman, 986 F.2d 1446, 1454-55 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (D.H.
a new perspective from which to appreciate its strength.
diverged in their efforts to come up with a new definition.
Reaching back to first principles of "modern criminology,"
to protect the public, and to provide just punishment." Maj.
actual force or a reasonable perception of a threat of force.
Commission codified at � 4B1.2(a).
standard for evaluating departures appears to do just that.
to reject Rosen in theory but has embraced it in fact.
involve a threat of force, as judged by a reasonable person.
standard but not under Rosen.
pursuant to a plea bargain).
� 5K2.13 as well as to these other sections.
BECKER, Chief Circuit Judge, Dissenting.
should be controlled by the definition of "crime of violence"
used elsewhere in the Sentencing Guidelines was incorrect.
cases.1 After invoking the Sentencing Reform Act, 18 U.S.C.
convictions under the first paragraph of 18 U.S.C.
sentence based on a finding of non-violent conduct.
violent" based on the statutory elements of the crime.
McKee's and Judge Garth's concurring opinions.
resulting from voluntary use of drugs or other intoxicants."
criminal history and base offense levels.
defined to include force or intimidation, see 18 U.S.C.
Cir. 1994), United States v. Chatman, 986 F.2d 1446 (D.C.
those individuals whose "reduced mental capacity"
for gain." Poff, 926 F.2d at 595 (Easterbrook, J.
deterrence also curtails its sanction." Id. . . .
is eligible for a downward departure.
mental capacity contributed to the commission of a crime."
See Op. at 21 (emphasis added).
adopt the fact-based inquiry necessary to its own position.
would otherwise govern a departure . . . under � 5K2.13."
violence." This restricts the meaning of "non-violent offense"
by "the very definition [the majority] holds does not apply."
See Concurr. Op. (McKee) at 38.
Rosen in theory but has embraced it in fact." See Concurr.
"by force and violence" or "by intimidation." See Op. at 12.
F.3d 359, 363 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 332 (1996).
not be controlled by the definition of "crime of violence"
majority's, I believe that it still comes up short.
irrelevant at the departure phase. See Concurr. Op.
as "non-violent" for � 5K2.13 purposes. See id. at 30, 34.
"non-violent." See id. at 31.
conclusion cannot be consistent with a rejection of Rosen.
violence as per se the same.
similarly not make such a distinction.
threatened but the threat is not realized." Concurr. Op.
legitimate threats and substantial violence differently.
a recent highly publicized incident in the Philadelphia area.
and told a teller "This is a robbery. I have a bomb on me."
Robbery, Philadelphia Inquirer, Dec. 30, 1997, at B1, B6.
Nygaard and Judge Roth join in this dissent.
that conduct proscribed by the first paragraph of 18 U.S.C. � 2113(a).
See Concurr. Op. (Stapleton) at 30.
never qualify as a `non-violent' offense.").
distinct options rather than taking a definite stance on this issue.
Act, 18 U.S.C. � 1951(b)(2) without force or the threat of force. See Op.
bank robbery convictions under the first paragraph of 18 U.S.C.
a departure under USSG � 5K2.13 as presently written.").
on the application of � 5K2.13 in such a case.").
determination should be made by the district court in the first instance.
that does not actually involve physical violence is a "non-violent offense."

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