Source: http://www.isthatlegal.ca/index.php?name=Crown
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 12:38:10+00:00

Document:
1. Meaning of the "Crown"
 For the reasons that follow I would dismiss the appeal and allow the cross-appeal. The appellants’ arguments are based on a literal “plain meaning” interpretation of the oath to the Queen in her personal capacity. Adopting the purposive approach to interpretation mandated by the Supreme Court of Canada, leads to the conclusion that their interpretation is incorrect because it is inconsistent with the history, purpose and intention behind the oath. The oath in the Act is remarkably similar to the oath required of members of Parliament and the Senate under The Constitution Act, 1867. In that oath, the reference to the Queen is symbolic of our form of government and the unwritten constitutional principle of democracy. The harmonization principle of interpretation leads to the conclusion that the oath in the Act should be given the same meaning.
 All Crown decision making is reviewable for abuse of process. However, as I will explain, exercises of prosecutorial discretion are only reviewable for abuse of process. In contrast, tactics and conduct before the court are subject to a wider range of review. The court may exercise its inherent jurisdiction to control its own processes even in the absence of abuse of process.
 This Court has repeatedly affirmed that prosecutorial discretion is a necessary part of a properly functioning criminal justice system: Beare, at p. 410; R. v. T. (V.), 1992 CanLII 88 (SCC),  1 S.C.R. 749, at pp. 758-62; R. v. Cook, 1997 CanLII 392 (SCC),  1 S.C.R. 1113, at para. 19. In Miazga v. Kvello Estate, 2009 SCC 51 (CanLII),  3 S.C.R. 339, at para. 47, the fundamental importance of prosecutorial discretion was said to lie, “not in protecting the interests of individual Crown attorneys, but in advancing the public interest by enabling prosecutors to make discretionary decisions in fulfilment of their professional obligations without fear of judicial or political interference, thus fulfilling their quasi-judicial role as ‘ministers of justice’”. More recently, in Sriskandarajah v. United States of America, 2012 SCC 70 (CanLII),  3 S.C.R. 609, at para. 27, this Court observed that “[n]ot only does prosecutorial discretion accord with the principles of fundamental justice — it constitutes an indispensable device for the effective enforcement of the criminal law”.
 Unfortunately, subsequent to this Court’s decision in Krieger v. Law Society of Alberta, 2002 SCC 65 (CanLII),  3 S.C.R. 372, confusion has arisen as to what is meant by “prosecutorial discretion” and the law has become cloudy. The present appeal provides an opportunity for clarification.
 Since Krieger, courts have struggled with the distinction between prosecutorial discretion, and tactics and conduct. The use of the word “core” in Krieger has led to a narrow definition of prosecutorial discretion, notwithstanding the expansive language used in Krieger to define the term, namely: “. . . decisions regarding the nature and extent of the prosecution and the Attorney General’s participation in it” (para. 47). Difficulty in defining the term has also led to confusion regarding the standard of review by which particular Crown decisions are to be assessed.
 The current appeal presents a good illustration of both problems. As noted earlier, the Newfoundland and Labrador Court of Appeal split on the issue of how to characterize the Crown’s decision to tender the Notice. Welsh J.A. held that it was a matter of “core” prosecutorial discretion, whereas Green C.J.N.L. and Rowe J.A. (following R. v. Gill, 2012 ONCA 607 (CanLII), 112 O.R. (3d) 423, at paras. 54-56), considered it to be a tactical decision and thus “outside [the] core” (para. 49).
 The court also diverged on the applicable standard of review. Welsh J.A. held that the distinction between core decisions and decisions falling outside the core was of no consequence as both types of decisions were reviewable on the same standard — the standard articulated in Gill, in which the Ontario Court of Appeal held that the decision to tender the Notice was reviewable if it (1) undermined the integrity of the administration of justice; (2) operated in a manner that rendered the sentencing proceedings fundamentally unfair; (3) was arbitrary; or (4) resulted in a limit on the accused’s liberty that was grossly disproportionate to the state interest in pursuing a particular course of action (Gill, at para. 59). Green C.J.N.L. and Rowe J.A. disagreed. In their view, tactical decisions (decisions “outside the core”) were reviewable according to the Gill standard, whereas “core” prosecutorial discretion was reviewable solely for abuse of process. The diverging views present in this case, and in many others, demonstrate the unsatisfactory state of the law.
 In an effort to clarify, I think we should start by recognizing that the term “prosecutorial discretion” is an expansive term that covers all “decisions regarding the nature and extent of the prosecution and the Attorney General’s participation in it” (Krieger, at para. 47). As this Court has repeatedly noted, “[p]rosecutorial discretion refers to the discretion exercised by the Attorney-General in matters within his authority in relation to the prosecution of criminal offences” (Krieger, at para. 44, citing Power, at p. 622, quoting D. Vanek, “Prosecutorial Discretion” (1988), 30 Crim. L.Q. 219, at p. 219 (emphasis added)). While it is likely impossible to create an exhaustive list of the decisions that fall within the nature and extent of a prosecution, further examples to those in Krieger include: the decision to repudiate a plea agreement (as in R. v. Nixon, 2011 SCC 34 (CanLII),  2 S.C.R. 566); the decision to pursue a dangerous offender application; the decision to prefer a direct indictment; the decision to charge multiple offences; the decision to negotiate a plea; the decision to proceed summarily or by indictment; and the decision to initiate an appeal. All pertain to the nature and extent of the prosecution. As can be seen, many stem from the provisions of the Code itself, including the decision in this case to tender the Notice.
 Manifestly, prosecutorial discretion is entitled to considerable deference. It is not, however, immune from all judicial oversight. This Court has repeatedly affirmed that prosecutorial discretion is reviewable for abuse of process: Krieger, at para. 32; Nixon, at para. 31; Miazga, at para. 46.
 The jurisprudence pertaining to the review of prosecutorial discretion has employed a range of terminology to describe the type of prosecutorial conduct that constitutes abuse of process. In Krieger, this Court used the term “flagrant impropriety” (para. 49). In Nixon, the Court held that the abuse of process doctrine is available where there is evidence that the Crown’s decision “undermines the integrity of the judicial process” or “results in trial unfairness” (para. 64). The Court also referred to “improper motive[s]” and “bad faith” in its discussion (para. 68).
 Regardless of the precise language used, the key point is this: abuse of process refers to Crown conduct that is egregious and seriously compromises trial fairness and/or the integrity of the justice system. Crown decisions motivated by prejudice against Aboriginal persons would certainly meet this standard.
 In sum, prosecutorial discretion is reviewable solely for abuse of process. The Gill test applied by the Newfoundland and Labrador Court of Appeal was developed at a time when courts were struggling with the post-Krieger “core” versus “outside the core” dichotomy. To the extent the Gill test suggests that conduct falling short of abuse of process may form a basis for reviewing prosecutorial discretion, respectfully, it should not be followed.
 The burden of proof for establishing abuse of process lies on the claimant, who must prove it on a balance of probabilities: Cook, at para. 62; R. v. O’Connor, 1995 CanLII 51 (SCC),  4 S.C.R. 411, at para. 69, per L’Heureux-Dubé J.; R. v. Jolivet, 2000 SCC 29 (CanLII),  1 S.C.R. 751, at para. 19. However, given the unique nature of prosecutorial discretion — specifically, the fact that the Crown will typically (if not always) be the only party who will know why a particular decision was made ― this Court in Nixon recognized that where prosecutorial discretion is challenged, the Crown may be required to provide reasons justifying its decision where the claimant establishes a proper evidentiary foundation: para. 60.
For our justice system to operate, trial judges must have some ability to control the course of proceedings before them. One such mechanism is the power to decline to embark upon an evidentiary hearing at the request of one of the parties when that party is unable to show a reasonable likelihood that the hearing can assist in determining the issues before the court.
 Requiring the claimant to establish a proper evidentiary foundation before embarking on an inquiry into the reasons behind the exercise of prosecutorial discretion respects the presumption that prosecutorial discretion is exercised in good faith: Application under s. 83.28 of the Criminal Code (Re), 2004 SCC 42 (CanLII),  2 S.C.R. 248, at para. 95. It also accords with this Court’s statement in Sriskandarajah, at para. 27, that “prosecutorial authorities are not bound to provide reasons for their decisions, absent evidence of bad faith or improper motives” (emphasis added).
 Finally, I note that the content of a Crown policy or guideline may be relevant when a court is considering a challenge to the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. Policy statements or guidelines are capable of informing the debate as to whether a Crown prosecutor’s conduct was appropriate in the particular circumstances. See R. J. Frater, Prosecutorial Misconduct (2009), at p. 259. For example, a decision by a Crown prosecutor that appears to contravene a Crown policy or guideline may provide some evidence that assists the claimant in establishing the threshold evidentiary foundation. However, as the intervener the Director of Public Prosecutions of Canada submits, Crown policies and guidelines do not have the force of law, and cannot themselves be subjected to Charter scrutiny in the abstract: see R. v. Beaudry, 2007 SCC 5 (CanLII),  1 S.C.R. 190, at para. 45 (discussing police practices manuals).
. R v Fercan Developments Inc.
 The second category in the framework for review of Crown activity was referred to in Krieger as “tactics or conduct before the court”: para. 47. As stated in Krieger, “such decisions are governed by the inherent jurisdiction of the court to control its own processes once the Attorney General has elected to enter into that forum” (para. 47).
 Superior courts possess inherent jurisdiction to ensure that the machinery of the court functions in an orderly and effective manner: R. v. Cunningham, 2010 SCC 10 (CanLII),  1 S.C.R. 331, at para. 18; Ontario v. Criminal Lawyers’ Association of Ontario, 2013 SCC 43 (CanLII),  3 S.C.R. 3, at para. 26. Similarly, in order to function as courts of law, statutory courts have implicit powers that derive from the court’s authority to control its own process: Cunningham, at para.18. This jurisdiction includes the power to penalize counsel for ignoring rulings or orders, or for inappropriate behaviour such as tardiness, incivility, abusive cross-examination, improper opening or closing addresses or inappropriate attire. Sanctions may include orders to comply, adjournments, extensions of time, warnings, cost awards, dismissals, and contempt proceedings.
In an adversarial system of criminal trials, trial judges must, barring exceptional circumstances, defer to the tactical decisions of counsel . . . . [C]ounsel will generally be in a better position to assess the wisdom, in light of their overall trial strategy, of a particular tactical decision than is the trial judge. By contrast, trial judges are expected to be impartial arbiters of the dispute before them; the more a trial judge second-guesses or overrides the decisions of counsel, the greater is the risk that the trial judge will, in either appearance or reality, cease being a neutral arbiter and instead become an advocate for one party. . . .
The corollary of the preceding is that trial judges should seldom take it upon themselves, let alone be required, to second-guess the tactical decisions of counsel. Of course, trial judges are still required to “make sure that [the trial] remains fair and is conducted in accordance with the relevant laws and the principles of fundamental justice”: Lavallee, Rackel & Heintz v. Canada (Attorney General), 2002 SCC 61 (CanLII),  3 S.C.R. 209, at para. 68.
 Crown counsel is entitled to have a trial strategy and to modify it as the trial unfolds, provided that the modification does not result in unfairness to the accused: Jolivet, at para. 21. Likewise, as this Court recently held in R. v. Auclair, 2014 SCC 6 (CanLII),  1 S.C.R. 83, a judge may exceptionally override a Crown tactical decision in order to prevent a Charter violation.
 Finally, as with all Crown decision making, courtroom tactics or conduct may amount to abuse of process, but abuse of process is not a precondition for judicial intervention as it is for matters of prosecutorial discretion.
 In about 1950, Parliament, drawing on the Crown Proceedings Act, 1947 (U.K.), 10 & 11 Geo. 6, c. 44, that had been enacted in the United Kingdom, began to impose limits on the scope of the common law Crown immunity. In 1953, it passed the Crown Liability Act, S.C. 1952‑53, c. 30 (Morley, at p. 1‑41; Hogg, Monahan and Wright, at p. 9), which had the effect of expanding Crown liability and thus bringing the Crown’s legal position closer to that of ordinary litigants. That Crown Liability Act was the predecessor of the CLPA that is at issue in this appeal. Today, Crown immunity still exists at the federal level in the context of civil proceedings, but only within the limits set in the CLPA and the Federal Courts Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.F‑7, the scope of which Parliament remains free to change (Brun, Tremblay and Brouillet, at paras. IX. 72 to IX. 73). It follows that the Crown is not in exactly the same legal position as ordinary litigants, since it still retains certain residual privileges and immunities under the current legislation.

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