Source: http://patents.hdp.com/?m=201609
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 16:30:22+00:00

Document:
real time responses to remote programming.
Making the case a historic artifact, the Federal Circuit found that because the Amended Complaint was filed in 2014, and the case was terminated when the complaint was dismissed in July 2015, the repeal of Form 18 did not apply to this case. Until the abrogation of Form 18, compliance with Form 18 ws sufficient to plead direct infringement, but because allegations of induced or contributory infringement have additional elements than direct infringement, they are not governed by Form 18.
A claim of joint infringement thus requires pleading facts sufficient to allow a reasonable inference that all steps of the claimed method are performed and either (1) one party exercises the requisite “direction or control” over the others’ performance or (2) the actors form a joint enterprise such that performance of every step is attributable to the controlling party.
The Federal Circuit found that Lyda was claiming joint infringement, and by his own admission did not plead in compliance with Iqbal and Twombly, and thus the case was properly dismissed.
In Intellectual Ventures v. Symantec, [2015-1769, 2015-1770, 2015-1771](September 30, 2016), the Federal Circuit affirmed summary judgment, that the asserted claims of the ‘050 and ‘142 patents were directed to ineligible subject matter, and reversed the finding that the asserted claim of the ‘610 patent covered eligible subject matter.
not suggest that the idea of “determining” and “outputting” is not abstract, much less that its implementation is not routine and conventional.
At Step 1 of the Alice/Mayo Test for the ‘601 patent, the Federal Circuit again found that patent was its own undoing, acknowledging that virus screening was known prior to the invention. As a result the Federal Circuit said that virus screening is both well-known and an abstract idea. The Federal Circuit disagreed that the narrowness of the claim made it patent eligible, noting that a narrow claim directed to an abstract idea is not necessarily patent eligible. The Federal Circuit said that the claims were directed to the use of conventional or generic technology in a nascent but wellknown environment, without any claim that the invention reflects an inventive solution to any problem presented by combining the two.
generic computer are categorically not eligible for patent.
Section 101 creates a “patent-free zone” and places within it the indispensable instruments of social, economic, and scientific endeavor.
He believes that Section 101, if properly applied, can preserve the Internet’s open architecture and weed out those patents that chill political expression and impermissibly obstruct the marketplace of ideas.
Mayer goes on to state that “m]ost of the First Amendment concerns associated with patent protection could be avoided if this court were willing to acknowledge that Alice sounded the death knell for software patents. Arguing that software is a form of language, he states that it is It is inherently abstract because it is merely an idea without physical embodiment, and concludes that all software implemented on a standard computer should be deemed categorically outside the bounds of section 101.
In the section 101 calculus, adding software (which is as abstract as language) to a conventional computer (which rightfully resides in the public domain) results in a patent eligibility score of zero.
They provide incentives at the wrong time.
Most fundamentally, generically implemented software invariably lacks the concrete borders the patent law demands.
patent thicket, ensuring that patent protection promotes, rather than impedes, “the onward march of science,” and allowing technological innovation to proceed apace.
When you stop and think about it, Newton’s Laws can be applied to the all-important issue of claim construction.
Newton’s First Law of Claim Construction: A term in a claim has its ordinary meaning to a person of skill in the art, unless acted upon by the specification or prosecution history.
Newton’s Second Law of Claim Construction: Claim scope is directly proportional to specification disclosure, and inversely proportional to the scope of the prior art. Put another way, claim scope is the product of the patent’s disclosure and the prior art.
Newton’s Third Law of Claim Construction: For every canon of claim construction, there is an equal an opposite canon of claim construction.
For example: Canon: “Each Word in Claim is Presumed to Have Meaning.” See Foremost In Packaging Sys. v. Cold Chain Technologies, 485 F.3d 1153 (2007); In re Gabapentin Patent Litigation, 503 F.3d 1254, (2007); Stumbo v. Eastman Outdoors, Inc., 508 F3d 1358, [85 USPQ2d 1275] (Fed. Cir. 2007); Bicon v. Straumann, 441 F.3d at 950 (2006)(Rejecting patentee’s proferred construction, in part because that construction would render some of the claim language superfluous.). Opposite Canon: “A Preamble is Generally Not a Limitation.” See Allen Eng’g Corp. v. Bartell Indus., Inc., 299 F.3d 1336, 1346 [63 USPQ2d 1769] (Fed. Cir. 2002)(“Generally”. . . the preamble does not limit the claims.”).
Look for more on Newton’s Third Law of Claim Construction in future posts.
However, it is not possible to write a truly functional claim that avoids 112(f). A claim element that does not use the word “means” is presumed to not invoke §112(f), but if it fails to recite “sufficiently definite structure” or recites “function without reciting sufficient structure for performing that function,” then that element will nevertheless be construed under 112(f). The standard is whether the words of the claim are understood by persons of ordinary skill in the art to have a sufficiently definite meaning as the name for structure. Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1346 [115 USPQ2d 1105] (Fed. Cir. 2015).
If the functional term is found to have a sufficiently definite meaning as the name for structure, the prosecutor has succeeded in broadly claiming the invention, while if it is not found to have a sufficiently definite structural meaning, then 112(f) applies, whether or not that is what the prosecutor intended.
While converting the gerund “fastening” in the example above, to “fastener” would seem to be safe, one cannot be completely certain that the selected term conveys a sufficiently definite structural meaning. See Advanced Ground Info. Sys., Inc. v. Life360, Inc., 119 USPQ2d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 2016)(symbol generator) ; Media Rights Techs., Inc. v. Capital One Fin. Corp., 800 F.3d 1366, [116 USPQ2d 1144, 1148] (Fed. Cir. 2015)(compliance mechanism); Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339 [115 USPQ2d 1105, 1112 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (distributed learning control module). Thus, whenever a claim element is named functionally, the prosecutor should make sure that specification broadly discloses corresponding structure, in case the courts decide to construe the element under 112(f).
No. 7,970,379 was directed to an abstract idea. The patent was directed to to streaming regional broadcast signals to cellular telephones located outside the region served by the regional broadcaster.
The Federal Circuit began with the “abstract idea” stage of the two-stage framework device by the Supreme Court to determine patentability under Section 101. The “abstract idea” stage requires focus on the claimed advance over the prior art to determine if the “claim’s character as a whole” is directed to excluded subject matter.
The Federal Circuit noted that the claims were limited to cellphones, but merely limiting the field of use of the abstract idea to a particular existing technological environment does not render the claims any less abstract. The Federal Circuit further noted that the idea underlying the inventions in this case was akin to the ideas underlying the claims in several of this court’s recent cases. Although the technology at issue differed from that involved in TLI and Ultramercial, the Federal Circuit found the analysis of the “abstract idea” step in those cases instructive, as the patent involves the conveyance and manipulation of information using wireless communication and computer technology.
broadcast content through the use of conventional devices, without offering any technological means of effecting that concept. The Federal Circuit also distinguished Enfish as related to an improvement to computer functionality itself, while the claims in the patent in suit were not directed to an improvement in cellular telephones but simply to the use of cellular telephones as tools in the aid of a process focused on an abstract idea.
As to the second stage of the analysis, the Federal Circuit found no “inventive concept” that transforms the abstract idea of out-of-region delivery of regional broadcasting into a patent-eligible application of that abstract idea. The Federal Circuit said that the claim simply recites the use of generic features of cellular telephones, such as a storage medium and a graphical user interface, as well as routine functions, such as transmitting and receiving signals, to implement the underlying idea, and that was not enough.
In Affinity Labs of Texas v. Amazon.com, Inc., [2015-2080] (September 23, 2016) the Federal Circuit affirmed judgment on the pleadings that U.S. Patent No. 8,688,085 on a System and Method to Communicate Targeted Information was directed to unpatentable subject matter.
a consumer to receive copyrighted media in exchange for watching a selected advertisement was found to be an abstract idea.
technological innovation, noting the purely functional nature of the claim, which confirms that it is directed to an abstract idea, not to a concrete embodiment of that idea. The Federal Circuit said that claims thus do not go beyond stating the relevant functions in general terms, without limiting them to technical means for performing the functions that are arguably an advance over conventional computer and network technology.
solution of a “technological problem,” nor was it directed to an improvement in computer or network functionality. It claims the general concept of streaming user-selected content to a portable device. The addition of basic user customization features to the interface did not alter the abstract nature of the claims and does not add an inventive component that renders the claims patentable.
system that verbally announces a caller’s identity before the call is connected.as obvious under 35 USC 103.
Contrary to ClassCo’s argument, KSR does not require that a combination only unite old elements without changing their respective functions. KSR, 550 U.S. at 416. Instead, KSR teaches that “[a] person of ordinary skill is also a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton.” Id. at 421. And it explains that the ordinary artisan recognizes “that familiar items may have obvious uses beyond their primary purposes, and in many cases a person of ordinary skill will be able to fit the teachings of multiple patents together like pieces of a puzzle.” Id. at 420. The rationale of KSR does not support ClassCo’s theory that a person of ordinary skill can only perform combinations of a puzzle element A with a perfectly fitting puzzle element B.
The Federal Circuit concluded that the Board properly applied a flexible approach mandated by KSR.
it is error not to consider them.” The Federal Circuit said that a determination of whether a patent claim is invalid as obvious under § 103 requires consideration of all four Graham factors, and it is error to reach a conclusion of obviousness until all those factors are considered.
No. 10 Disclaiming claim scope during prosecution of the application. However, this disclaimer must be clear and unmistakable. Omega Engineering, Inc, v. Raytek Corp., 334 F.3d 1314, 1325-26 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
No. 9 Distinguishing the prior art. See, SkinMedica, Inc. v. Histogen Inc., 727 F.3d 1187 [108 U.S.P.Q.2d 1001] (Fed. Cir. 2013)(excluding the use of beads from the claimed three dimensional culturing based upon statements distinguishing the prior art).
No. 8 Criticizing the prior art. See, Chicago Board Options Exchange Inc. v. International Securities Exchange LLC, 677 F3d 1361 [102 USPQ2d 1683] (Fed. Cir. 2012)(limiting scope of claims based upon characterization of prior art as “antiquated,” and having “inherent inadequacies,” and “deficiencies.”); Scimed Life Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d 1337 [58 USPQ2d 1059] (Fed. Cir. 2001)(limiting claims to “coaxial lumen configuration” based, in part, criticisms of the dual lumen prior art in the Background Of the Invention.); Astrazeneca AB v. Mutual Pharmaceutical Co., 72 USPQ2d 1726 [72 USPQ2d 1726, 1730] (Fed. Cir. 2004)(limiting the meaning of solubilizer because of criticisms of prior art).
No. 7 Identifying “Objects” of the Invention. See, The Gentry Gallery Inc. v. The Berkline Corp., 45 USPQ2d 1498 (Fed. 1998)(liming the location of controls so that the claimed invention meets the objects).
No. 6 Failing to describe more than one embodiment. See, Wang Laboratories, Inc. v. America Online Inc., 197 F3d 1377 [53 USPQ 1161] (Fed. Cir. 1999)(determining that the claims were properly limited to the “only embodiment described.”); General American Transportation Corp. v. Cryo-Trans, Inc., 93 F.3d 766, 770, 772, [39 USPQ2d 1801, 1803, 1805-06] (Fed.Cir. 1996)(limiting the claims to the disclosure which was “not just the preferred embodiment of the invention; it is the only one described”); Watts v. XL Systems Inc., 232 F3d 877, 56 USPQ2d 1836 (Fed. Cir. 2000)(limiting sealingly connected because the specification “ only describes one method in which ‘tapered external threads [are] dimensioned’ to achieve the sealing connection.”); Modine Mfg. Co. v. United States Int’l Trade Comm’n, 75 F.3d 1545, 1551 [37 USPQ2d 1609, 1612] (Fed. Cir. 1996)(claimed limited to disclosed embodiment because “when the preferred embodiment is described in the specification as the invention itself, the claims are not necessarily entitled to a scope broader than that embodiment.”).
No. 5 Using i.e. instead of e.g. See Edwards Lifesciences LLC v. Cook Inc., 582 F3d 1322 [92 USPQ2d 1599] (Fed. Cir. 2009)(limiting the construction of the term malleable, because “the specification’s use of “i.e.” signals an intent to define the word to which it refers.”); see, also, Abbott Laboratories v. Novopharm Ltd., 323 F3d 1324 [66 USPQ2d 1200] (Fed. Cir. 2003).
No. 4 Incorporating definitions or limitations “by reference.” X2Y Attenuators, LLC v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 757 F.3d 1358 [111 USPQ2d 1607, 1610 (Fed. Cir. 2014)(claims limited by statements incorporated by reference).
No. 3 Failing to Identify described matter as “preferred.” See Honeywell International Inc. v. ITT Industries Inc., 452 F3d 1312 [79 USPQ2d 1294, 1299] (Fed. Cir. 2006)( limiting “fuel injection system component” to a fuel filter because a fuel filter was not merely discussed as a preferred embodiment); see, also, Cultor Corp. v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 224 F.3d 1328 [56 USPQ2d 1208](Fed. Cir. 2000)(Claims limited to use of citric acid where “preferably” language separated by a comma, and thus did not apply.).
No. 1 Describing “the invention” rather than embodiments of the invention. See, Honeywell International Inc. v. ITT Industries Inc., 452 F3d 1312 [79 USPQ2d 1294, 1299] (Fed. Cir. 2006)(limiting “fuel injection system component” to a fuel filter because at least four times the specification described it as “this invention” or “the present invention”); Pacing Techs., LLC v. Garmin Int’l, Inc., 778 F.3d 1021 [113 USPQ2d 1859, 1862] (Fed. Cir. 2015)(noting that “the present invention includes …” or “the present invention is …” or “all embodiments of the present invention are ….” limits the claims); Scimed Life Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d 1447 [58 USPQ2d 1059] (Fed. Cir. 2001)( limiting claims to “coaxial lumen configuration” based, in part, on description of “the invention” and “the present invention.”); Watts v. XL Sys., Inc., 232 F.3d 877 [56 USPQ2d 1836, 1840] (Fed. Cir. 2000)(limiting claims to use of misaligned taper angles based on description of “the present invention”); Astrazeneca AB v. Mutual Pharmaceutical Co., 384 F.3d 1333 [72 USPQ2d 1726, 1730] (Fed. Cir. 2004)(limiting claims to solubilizers suitable according to the invention).

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