Source: http://masscases.com/cases/app/78/78massappct111.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 08:40:20+00:00

Document:
JAMES L. BERLO, JR. vs. CITY OF BOSTON.
Present: COHEN, GRAINGER, & MEADE, JJ.
Statute, Construction. Municipal Corporations, Fire department. Public Employment, Suspension. Superior Court, Jurisdiction.
CIVIL ACTION commenced in the Superior Court Department on May 15, 2007.
Motions to dismiss and to reconsider were heard by Nancy S. Holtz, J.
Thomas F. Feeney for the plaintiff.
Evan C. Ouellette, Assistant Corporation Counsel, for the defendant.
GRAINGER, J. On March 12, 2007, the plaintiff, a captain in the city of Boston's fire department (department), tested positive for a narcotic on a random drug test administered by the department. He appeals from the dismissal by a judge of the Superior Court of his amended complaint, which sought review of a decision issued by the department's hearing board (board) confirming the imposition of a month's suspension by the department. The plaintiff contends that the judge erred in holding that the court lacked jurisdiction to review the board's decision. We affirm.
Discussion. Statutory terms should be given effect consistent with their ordinary meaning and with regard to the intent of the Legislature, unless doing so "would achieve an illogical result." Sullivan v. Brookline, 435 Mass. 353 , 360 (2001). In addition, it is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that no part of a statute "is to be regarded as superfluous, but each is to be given its ordinary meaning . . . ." Commonwealth v. Woods Hole, Martha's Vineyard & Nantucket S.S. Authy., 352 Mass. 617 , 618 (1967), quoting from Bolster v. Commissioner of Corps. & Taxn., 319 Mass. 81 , 84-85 (1946). Further, "[i]n interpreting a statute, . . . [we] must consider the entire statutory scheme by looking to the language of the statute as a whole." Arlington Contributory Retirement Bd. v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 75 Mass. App. Ct. 437 , 442 (2009). The plaintiff invoked three statutory provisions to support his application for relief directly to the Superior Court. We consider them in turn.
mistakenly substituted for the plaintiff's, his suspension would not be for "just cause" regardless of the department's careful adherence to the notice and hearing requirements.
General Laws c. 31, § 42. General Laws c. 31, § 42, as amended through St. 1981, c. 767, § 19, first addresses a claim that the appointing authority failed to follow the "requirements" of § 41. In such a case the employee is directed to file a complaint with the commission. "Requirements" refers, as we have stated, to the procedural requirements -- time deadlines, notice, and hearing -- of § 41. This is demonstrated by the second paragraph of § 42 which, having dealt with the "requirements" of § 41, goes on to provide that the claimant may "at the same time request a hearing as to whether there was just cause for the action of the appointing authority" (emphasis added).
The plaintiff relies on language contained in the third paragraph of § 42, which confers jurisdiction in the Supreme Judicial Court or the Superior Court "over any civil action for the reinstatement of any person alleged to have been illegally discharged, removed, [or] suspended . . . ." The term "illegally discharged" refers to a failure to meet the legal requirements of § 41, which, as we have stated, are procedural in nature. These requirements do not refer to the merits of the case; they are imposed for the benefit of the culpable and blameless alike. While this third paragraph arguably provides an alternative avenue to appeal a claim of procedural irregularity, we do not address that issue because the plaintiff makes no such claim. The plaintiff's claim that he has a valid prescription from his physician for the controlled substance for which he tested positive falls squarely within the category of a challenge for lack of just cause.
writing to the commission." Further resolving any possible doubt, the second paragraph of section 43 specifically refers to the commission's need to determine whether there was "just cause for an action taken against such person" in resolving an appeal under that provision. The plaintiff was required to appeal the decision "within ten days after receiving written notice of such decision." He failed to do so even though the decision itself informed him of this requirement.
[Note 1] The defendant, city of Boston (city), filed a motion to dismiss the Superior Court action, maintaining that the court lacked jurisdiction as the plaintiff had failed to exhaust all administrative remedies by forgoing an appeal to the commission. Though the motion judge initially denied the motion, she ultimately granted the motion to dismiss on reconsideration.
[Note 2] We note again that the statute deals separately with substance and procedure. A person who achieves a desired result from an appointing authority, even one generated pursuant to a faulty process, is not a person "aggrieved by the decision."
[Note 3] Specifically the plaintiff alleges that the Boston fire department's hearing board is a State agency subject to the Administrative Procedure Act, G. L. c. 30A, and that the city's motion for reconsideration of the denial of the motion to dismiss was subject to the requirements of Mass.R.Civ.P. 59, 65 Mass. 827 (1974), and Mass.R.Civ.P. 60, 365 Mass. 828 (1974), which apply to final judgments.

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