Source: https://www.juridicainternational.eu/index.php?id=12586
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 10:44:24+00:00

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The existing human rights catalogue was drafted in a time when environmental concerns were not yet an issue and hence fail to adequately address all environmental needs. However in a degrading environment no other human right can be secured. Recent decades have witnessed a debate on whether there is a need for an additional human right to a clean environment. As a consequence, environmental rights have been inserted in several international agreements and constitutions of various states.
The first aim of this article is to analyse the nature of the right to the environment and to come to an understanding of whether it is able to guarantee a higher level of environmental protection. The second aim is to analyse how efficiently the sections of the Estonian Constitution can be invoked for the protection of the environment and whether there is a need for amendments.
The development and current status of the right to the environment is analysed on the basis of international documents and the decisions of international tribunals. We face a question of whether there is any need for an additional formulation of environmental right if the existing catalogue of human rights is sufficient to address environmental concerns. Does the success in invoking existing human rights in environmental cases support this position?
The authors of this article are of the view that the environment is an independent value and needs as strict protection as other commonly agreed values such as the right to property or the right to life and health. Enlisting the right to the environment as a basic right in the Constitution would help to protect this value from the detrimental activities of private entities and also states.
The Estonian Constitution addresses environmental concerns explicitly in § 5 and § 53. In the lack of court practice the possible uses of these provisions remain unclear. However a proper interpretation of § 5 and § 53 would allow coherence with the legal system and at the same time maximum environmental protection.
The final question remains — do we have the appropriate legal basis to meet the needs of society in light of emerging environmental degradation or should and could we enact an additional guarantee, the basic right of an individual to a clean environment? The last chapter of this article proposes amendments to the wordings of § 5 and § 53 of the Estonian Constitution, taking into account the concepts of sustainable development and environmental space.
To conclude, even though existing human rights allow pursuit of environmental aims to a certain extent, the requirements for direct causation, level of harm to the claimant and the inability to represent future generations limit their efficiency greatly. In an anthropocentric framework environmental protection remains instrumental and thus unable to achieve its preventive and precautionary aims. As long as groups having direct interest in the state of the environment are prevented from effective remedies, it remains up to individuals to contest environmentally harmful activities. However with a view of the limited resources they possess, this option remains rather weak. Also the few successful cases are unlikely to have any impact within national frameworks and thus are unable to guide states towards allowing higher protection of the environment. Therefore it is submitted that specific environmental rights are necessary in order to fully realise protective aims and through them also sustainable development.
A fair number of states in Europe and the rest of the world have introduced environmental provisions to their constitutions since the 1970s.*20 However, such a right is mostly not directly enforceable and serves only as a state aim. The following chapter analyses the components that make up a clear and enforceable basic right to the environment.
as a state goal or as a principle?
Most of the provisions in European constitutions can be regarded as imposing duties on the state to take regulatory action for the protection and improvement of the environment.*25 They can be viewed either as a legal basis for environmental regulation or as declarations of state goal.
The normative contents of basic right to the environment should allow balancing of different interests. In the situation where the right to the environment is interdependent and indivisible from other basic rights’ norms and finds itself often in collision with them, too strict a rule is not an option. Stating a principle on the other hand, enables to include the aspect of proportionality and therefore to weigh different social, economic and environmental needs; also its necessity and appropriateness in a specific situation.*28 This kind of principle should nevertheless entail a binding nature in that it would be considered as “optimization order”*29 to find the best possible solution in a given factual as well as legal framework.
About 60 national constitutions enacting the right to the environment do it with a great variety of formulations. References are made e.g. to “clean”, “healthy”, “decent”, “viable”, “satisfactory”, “sustainable”.*31 Defining specific focus (such as “healthy environment”) is one option to solve the problem with excessively vague adjectives.*32 However international documents containing this kind of right have in most cases proven to be too narrow and therefore inappropriate to achieve environmental protection.
A second possibility is to amplify the general right with more specific formulations and parameters. This is done in the draft articles annexed to the Ksentini Report.*33 However that option could become too long and cumbersome for the text of the constitution.
The second inevitable question is who can rely on the right to the environment. In the case where the right to the environment is formulated as a basic right in a constitution, then certainly the state is the one obligated to supply means of protection in the form of specific legislation and policies as well as to refrain from activities detrimental to the environment.
Some European constitutions contain a duty of care provision*38 and some have added to the rights-based wording a general responsibility of all persons towards nature and the environment.*39 Such provisions relate to the ethics of responsibility, which implies that instead of rights we should speak about duties towards nature — because nature is not able to defend itself against harmful activities. But what if someone fails to fulfil this duty?
It becomes thus inevitable to vest the basic right to the environment with third-party applicability (Drittwirkung in German legal literature*40), meaning, that the norm should be applicable against the state as well as against third persons (groups, enterprises or individuals) causing environmental degradation.
The key to a successful enforcement process is found in clear definition, explicit and accessible procedures and effective remedies.
The opinions on judicial applicability and clarity of these provisions may not be correct ad infinitum as they have not taken into account that many of these provisions have not been grounds for court cases and that the vague wording may acquire substance case-by-case.
Even though the procedural aspect is decisive in enforcing the right by democratic means, it does not substitute the substantive content of the norm, but acts more like an instrumental right by giving the structural framework necessary for the realisation of the substantive right to the environment as well as other basic rights.*45 The procedure itself does not guarantee that when balanced against other rights, the environment is afforded proper weight and thus increasing availability of information, participation in decision-making and access to justice do not, on their own, lead to environmentally sustainableregulation, decisions or conditions.
Individuals and groups*46 should be able to actively seize the right to the environment and also less-privileged groups should be able to participate in the decision-making process.*47 It would be possible to define or delimit the number of groups by the requirement of special interest in the case. Interest could be shown in the professional aims and purposes of a non-governmental organisation.
The Preamble of the Estonian Constitution says that the Estonian state is, inter alia, a pledge to present and future generations for their social progress and general welfare.
Together with the objective of the state set out in the Preamble to guarantee present and future generations social progress and general welfare, § 5 makes sustainable development as a general state goal. This view has been supported by the Committee of Experts on the Constitution which has concluded in their final paper that § 5 should be viewed as setting a state goal to achieve sustainable use of natural resources and natural wealth.*52 The examination of the protocols of the Constitutional Assembly, where one of the members, speaking about this provision, says that the goal is to preserve the environment suitable for future generations, also supports the idea of sustainable development as a state goal.
“Natural resources and natural wealth”, as stated in § 5, cover all the possible aspects of the environment to which the sustainability imperative applies — starting with mineral wealth, forests, animals, fish and ending with clean air, clean water and biodiversity.
What is meant by “sustainable use of natural resources and wealth” and by the more general “sustainable development”? The definition of sustainable development and sustainable use can be deduced from international instruments Estonia has signed or is a party to.*53 International organisations and states agreed in the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development in the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development and Agenda 21 that development viewed only as an increase of material wealth is threatening mankind’s survival and the environment because it exceeds the carrying capacity of the biosphere as an ecosystem. The use of natural resources and wealth is sustainable only when it does not consume natural resources faster than they could be regenerated and does not burden the environment with amounts of waste and residuals that exceed its capacity to absorb them and does not degenerate biodiversity. This normative principle setting the direction and limits for the state action and inaction is binding on the state powers.
4.1.2. Can state goal be relied upon in courts?
The state goal is not granting any individual such rights the infringement of which would give legal standing in the courts, but individuals can rely on it in court cases and in their complaints to the Legal Chancellor. The judges, Legal Chancellor and the President can use conflict with this principle to submit a complaint to the Supreme Court for a law to be declared unconstitutional. The Legal Chancellor can also challenge state inaction to implement this principle.
According to § 53 everyone has a duty to preserve the living and natural environment. The secondary duty of compensation is not an object of current analysis.
The first question that needs an answer is who is bound by the duty. The duty to preserve the environment is primarily addressed to individuals and legal persons. The main problem is whether the state and municipalities are also addressees of this duty.
3. excluding the state leaves an individual no option to challenge the state action or inaction and thus conflicts with the rule of law that demands for procedures and grounds to be set for the individual to go to court against the state.
The next question is about the content of this obligation — what is meant by “preservation of living and natural environment”? These concepts have the same content as the ‘sustainable use’ of the state goal in subchapter 4.1.1.
The basic obligation can be implemented by the state only when the Parliament has further elaborated its content. Private persons can thus be obliged to preserve the nature in a certain way only when the law provides so. This reservation has its roots in § 3 (1) and § 13 (2).*56 The only way to affect situations where there is no law to regulate certain environmental issues that clearly cause irreversible harm to the environment is through the Legal Chancellor. To challenge state inaction in the field of lawmaking through courts is not possible in the Estonian legal system.
The question here is about the level of protection guaranteed by the Constitution. The level of protection is a question of value-judgement. Setting sustainable use of natural resources as one of the fundamental aims of the state and using comparatively radical wording for the environmental section implies great value to environmental protection and environment as such.The level of protection question cannot be decided on an abstract basis. Its contents will wash out in the light of specific cases and it is very clear that the modern world cannot evade tolerating damages to the environment up to a certain level.
The state has been guaranteed a wide discretion in determining the level of protection and means for achieving it. Nevertheless this has partly been determined by international obligations and partly by the existing level of protection. Lowering this level (e.g. closing protected areas, accepting higher emissions) would constitute a breach of § 53 since such action cannot be considered as preserving the environment.
4.1.4. Is there a right to sustainable living and natural environment?
Yes, the obligation of § 53 has a corresponding everyone’s right to sustainable living and the natural environment.
When somebody has a subjective right to something, there is always somebody who has an obligation to either actively or passively respect this right. The same applies to obligations — when there is an obligation, there is always somebody who has a subjective right to the object of this obligation and a relative subjective right to demand the fulfilment of this obligation.
The state obligation*59 that is objectively formulated in the basic rights chapter is not complemented with a subjective right only in cases where there are strong arguments against that. This can be so when the state’s obligation serves collective goals only.*60 Since every individual is interested in a living and natural environment of a certain quality, § 53 serves both collective goals and individual interests. Therefore § 53 gives rise to a subjective right that can be invoked in courts.
For its full realisation the Constitution has to be open for adjudication. For this reason it is important to interpret § 53 as granting subjective rights to individuals and legal persons. The possible difficulties in its application cannot justify declaring this section mere constitutional lyrics or, at best, justification for environmental regulation.
b) to demand compensation for environmental damage according to acts of parliament.
b) duty to compensate for the damages caused to the environment.
b) right to demand creation of guarantees for protection of the environment from the state.
The state may demand preservation of the environment from the individuals insofar as it has been prescribed by law. The state cannot be a subject of a basic right to the preserved environment.
Since most of the environmental threats are caused by private actors rather than the state, it is important to view this right as granting state protection against private environmentally hazardous activities. This would enable individuals to go to court against the state on the grounds that the state is violating its obligation to preserve the environment and the right to the preserved environment of the individual by allowing harmful activities.
– for the corresponding right to sustainable natural environment not being breached.
(1)Everyone has a duty to preserve the living and natural environment in a condition where the use of resources and production of waste does not exceed the environment’s ability to reproduce these resources and absorbing the waste does not degrade biological diversity.
(2)Everyone has a duty to compensate for the excessive use of resources and production of waste and for damage caused to the environment.
(3)The procedure for compensation shall be provided by law.
(4)Everybody shall be guaranteed by law access to justice and the right to participation at all levels of decision-making in environmental matters.
Full implementation of this duty would yield structural changes in economic and social systems. To some extent we have to tolerate environmental harm and this mechanism of tolerance is based on the second paragraph whereby the state by establishing a system of compensation is allowed to determine the level of tolerable environmental harm.
Section 5 should specify more precisely what exactly is meant under ‘sustainable use’. This should again be done through the concept of environmental space. Section 5 should set environmentally and socially sustainable development of the society as a state goal.
The state goal in the field of environmental protection is a sustainable society. Environmental sustainability can be achieved by fitting all the activities in the available environmental space by reducing environmental impact through more effective use of natural resources. This would automatically lead to an environment of high quality and the protection of the rights of future generations.
Existing human rights do not allow protection of the environment before the actual harm has occurred and are thus too anthropocentric and instrumental. Environmental considerations are not always afforded sufficient weight with other interests.
National legal frameworks enable taking into account specificities of each country and thus to formulate the basic right to a clean environment with a proper focus. Development of case law allows the overcoming of further problems with definition and enforcement. Public participation plays a crucial role in it.
The bearers of the basic obligation to preserve the living and natural environment as stipulated in § 53 of the Estonian Constitution are individuals, legal persons, the state and municipalities.
The basic obligation in § 53 of the Estonian Constitution gives rise to a subjective right to sustainable environment that can be invoked in the courts.
The state can demand protection of the environment from the individuals insofar as it has been prescribed by law. The state cannot be a subject of a basic right to sustainable environment.
Although the present wording of the Estonian Constitution can be construed in the light of the concept of environmental space (or the carrying capacity of ecosystems) it should state more clearly what is meant under this concept and connect it to the environmental basic right.
The activities in Estonia must fit into the carrying capacity of the ecosystem. This could be done by setting limits to these actions in the Constitution. Amending the rights chapter provides the advantage of allowing the rights to be invoked in courts by individuals.
1 African Charter on Human Rights and Peoples’ Rights, Organization of African Unity (OAU) Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev. 5 (1982) and Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1989).
2 One of the reasons for this could be the fear of additional numerous claims that would devalue or debase the human rights currency. See D. Shelton. The right to environment. – A. Eide, J. Helgesen (eds.). The future of human rights protection in a changing world. Oslo: Norwegian University Press, 1991. p. 198.
4 Norms that indirectly allow environmental protection can be referred to as “derivative environmental rights”. R. Churchill. Environmental rights in existing human rights treaties. – A. Boyle, M. R. Anderson (eds.). Human Rights Approaches to Environmental Protection. Oxford: Clarendon, 1997, p. 100.
5 P. Sands. Human rights, environment and the Lopez-Ostra case: context and consequences. – European Human Rights Law Review, 1996, No. 6, pp. 597–618.
6 The decision of the European Court of Human Rights, 9 June 1998, App. No. 23413/94. – European Human Rights Reports (hereinafter: EHRR) 1998, 27, 212.
7 A. A. Cancado Trindade. Human rights and the environment. – J. Symonides (ed.). Human rights: new dimensions and challenges. Aldershot: Ashgate/Dartmouth, 1998, p. 117.
8 The court has invoked the proportionality test when deciding over the proper balance between the individual and society interests. Very often such cases concern noise pollution. See the decisions of European Commission of Human Rights (ECommHR) in Arrondelle v. UK, 15 July 1980, App. No. 7889/77. – Decisions and Reports of the Commission of Human Rights (DR) 1980, 19, 186; 13 May 1982. – DR 1982, 26, 5; Baggs v. United Kingdom, 16 October 1985, App. No. 9310/81. – DR 1985, 44, 13 and ECHR, Powell and Rayner v. United Kingdom, 21 February 1990, App. No. 172. – EHRR 1990, 12, 355; most recent judgment is ECHR, Hatton and others v. United Kingdom, 2 October 2001, App. No. 36022/97. – EHRR 2002, 34, 1.
9 LCB v. United Kingdom (Note 6); see also the judgment of UK High Court in Reay and Hope v British Nuclear Fuels, Queen’s Bench Division, 22 November 1993. – Medical Reports 1994, 5, 1.
10 Noel Narvii Tauira and Eighteen others v. France , 4 December 1995, App. No. 28204/95. – DR 1995, 83, 112. The applicants claimed that nuclear testing on Mururoa atoll could generate a risk of pollution.
11 The decision of European Commission of Human Rights 1 July 1996, App. No. 30003/96. – EHRR 1996, 3, 801. The applicants claimed that their right to private and family life has been infringed by the existence of a nearby railway station, which fostered the transport of nuclear waste.
13 The decision of European Commission of Human Rights 25 November 1993, App. No. 14282/88. – EHRR 1993, 18, 175.
14 See also the decision of European Commission of Human Rights Balmer-Schafroth and Others v. Switzerland 26 August 1997, App. No. 22110/93. – EHRR 1997, 25, 598, where applicants living within 5 kilometers of a nuclear power station claimed that in view of their right to bodily integrity and their property rights, an operation permit should not have been granted to the plant. Court found article 6 inapplicable, because there was not a sufficient link between the decision to give the permit and the possible harm to physical integrity and because no serious, specific or imminent danger was proven. In his dissenting opinion, Judge Pettiti pointed to the fact that the decision clearly undermined the precautionary principle.
15 The decision of European Commission of Human Rights 9 December 1994, App. No. 16798/90. – EHRR 1995, 20, 277. Lopez-Ostra submitted that the fumes and smells from a badly managed waste treatment plant had caused health problems to her family members.
16 The success of Lopez-Ostra gave rise to many cases, especially by gypsies claiming their right to natural surroundings. See M. Demerieux. Deriving environmental rights from the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. – Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 2001, vol. 21, No. 3, p. 530.
17 The decision of European Commission of Human Rights 19 February 1998, App. No. 14967/89. – EHRR 1998, 26, 357.
18 The decision of European Commission of Human Rights 18 February 1991, App. No. 12033/86. – EHRR 1991, 13, 784. The case concerned the interpretation of Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms Protocol No. 1 article 1(2) that allows states to enforce property laws in view of the general interest.
19 In Oerlemans v. The Netherlands, ECtHR, 27 November 1991, App. No. 12565/86. – Reports on Judgments and Decisions Series A-219. The Court stated that it “[…] recognizes that the State enjoys a wide margin of appreciation with regard both to choosing the means of enforcement and to ascertaining whether the consequences of enforcement are justified in the general interest for the purpose of achieving the object of the law in question”.
21 J. G. Merrills. Environmental protection and human rights: Conceptual aspects. – A. Boyle, M. R. Anderson (Note 4), p. 38.
22 See the statement that “Often, the real value of a human right is that it is available as a moral trump card precisely when legal arrangements fail.” M. R. Anderson. Human Rights Approaches to Environmental Protection: an overview. – A. Boyle, M. R. Anderson (Note 4), p. 12.
23 M. Ernits sees § 53 of the Estonian Constitution to be only a guiding principle for the legislator. Põhiõiguste mõiste ja tähtsus õigussüsteemis (The Concept and Importance of Fundamental Rights in the Legal System). – Juridica, 1996, No. 9, pp. 463–471 (in Estonian).
24 See C. Fabre. Social Rights under the Constitution: government and the decent life, chapter 3.2.3. “From moral rights to Constitutional Rights”. Oxford: Clarendon, 2000, pp. 98–105.
25 R. Seerden, M. Heldeweg (eds.). Comparative Environmental Law in Europe. An Introduction to Public Environmental Law in EU Member States. Antwerpen: Maklu, 1996. p. 427.
26 M. Rodi. Public Environmental Law in Germany. – R. Seerden, M. Heldeweg (Note 25), p. 151.
28 R. Alexy. Kollisioon ja kaalumine kui põhiõiguste dogmaatika põhiprobleemid (Conflict and Weighing in the Doctrine of Fundamental Rights). – Juridica, 2001, No. 1, pp. 5–13 (in Estonian); see also R. Dworkin. Taking Rights Seriously. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977, pp. 22–39.
29 R. Alexy (Note 28), p. 5.
30 The idea is supported by P. W. Birnie and A. Boyle in that even though they argue against the necessity to construe a right to the environment on an international level, they nevertheless acknowledge, that the same arguments may not hold sway in national frameworks. See P. W. Birnie, A. Boyle. International law and the environment. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 266; also in A. Boyle. The Role of International Human Rights Law in the Protection of the Environment. – A. Boyle, M. R. Anderson (Note 4), p. 64.
31 Final Report of the UN Special Rapporteur F. Z. Ksentini, Human Rights and Environment (hereinafter referred to as the Ksentini Report), Annex III Developments in national legislation and practices, UN Economic and Social Council Commission on Human Rights Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 46th session, 17 August 1994, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/9. Available at: http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/TestFrame/eeab2b6937bccaa18025675c005779c3?Opendocument (10.06.2003). See also K. Bosselmann. Human Rights and the Environment: Redefining Fundamental Principles. Available at: http://www.arbld.unimelb.edu.au/envjust/papers/allpapers/bosselmann/home.htm (15.04.2003).
32 P. W. Birnie, A. Boyle (Note 30), p. 256.
33 Ksentini Report (Note 31).
34 A. Kiss, D. Shelton. International Environmental Law. New York: Transnational Publications, 1991, p. 24.
35 A. Kiss. Définition et nature juridique d’un droit de l’homme ? l’environnement in Environnement et droits de l’homme, UNESCO, 1987, as cited in S. Prakash. The right to the Environment. Emerging Implications in Theory and Praxis. – Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, 1995, vol. 13, No. 4, p. 425.
36 See Perusoikeuskomitean mietintö 1992:3. Helsinki, 1992, pp. 358–359. For a reasoning of whether we should also accord rights to natural objects, see also S. Douglas-Scott. Environmental Rights: Taking the Environment Seriously? – L. Gearty, A. Tomkins (eds.). Understanding Human Rights. London, New York: Pinter, 1999, pp. 440–446.
37 P. Cullet. Definition of an Environmental Right in a Human Rights Context. – Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, 1995, vol. 13, No. 1, p. 32.
38 E.g. article 20 of the Finnish Constitution. – Official Journal, 731/1999. Available at http://www.finlex.fi/pdf/saadkaan/E9990731.PDF (17.07.2003).
40 See C. Starck. Human Rights and Private Law in German Constitutional Development and in the Jurisdiction of the Federal Constitutional Court. – D. Friedman, D. Barak-Erez (eds.). Human Rights in Private Law, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2001, p. 97.
41 E.g. article 110b of the Norwegian Constitution. Available at http://www.odin.dep.no/odin/engelsk/norway/system/032005-990424/ (17.07.2003); article 45 of the Spanish Constitution. Available at http://www.senado.es/constitu_i/index.html (17.7.2003), article 66 of the Portuguese Constitution. Available at http://www.portugal.gov.pt/en/Political+System/Constitution/default.htm (17.7.2003).
42 Only in cases where the government has drastically lowered the level of environmental protection Austrian and Dutch citizens may have a justiciable claim. (R. Seerden, M. Heldeweg (Note 25), p. 427).
43 C. Calliess. Umweltgrundrechte im Recht der Europäischen Union. – K. Bosselmann (ed.). Ökologische Grundrechte. Zum Verhältnis zwischen individueller Freiheit und Natur. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1998, p. 212.
44 On an international level such rights are afforded by the UN Convention on the Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice. – Environmental Matters, at http://www.unece.org/env/pp/documents/cep43e.pdf (27.04.2003); also European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, article 10.
45 P. Cullet (Note 37), p. 37. It has frequently been argued that procedural rights, contrary to a substantial environmental right, are a powerful tool in environmental protection. See e.g.. K.-H. Ladeur. Environmental Constitutional Law. – G. Winter (ed.). European Environmental Law. A Comparative Perspective. Ashgate: Dartmouth/Aldershot, 1996, p. 24; G. Handl. Human rights and protection of the environment. – A. Eide, C. Krause, A. Rosas (eds.). Economic, social and cultural rights. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2001, p. 327.
46 For the discussion on the role of NGOs in environmental protection see J. Cameron, R. Mackenzie. Access to Environmental Justice and Procedural Rights in International Institutions. – A. Boyle, M. R. Anderson (Note 4), pp. 137–151.
47 Shelton notes, that “High short-term costs involved in many environmental protection measures often make environmental decisions unpopular with economically affected communities. The recognition that environmental protection is a core value and right can be particularly valuable in countering this disapproval and ensuring that the long-term needs of humanity are not sacrificed to short-term interests.” D. Shelton (Note 2), p. 191.
48 This was the case in Hungary, see G. Bandi. The Right to Environment in Theory and Practice: The Hungarian Experience. – Connecticut Journal of International Law, 1993, No. 2, pp. 439–467.
49 S. Prakash (Note 35), p. 423.
50 For a list of effective preventive measures see B. van Dyke. Proposal to introduce the right to a healthy environment into the European Convention regime. – Virginia Environmental Law Journal, 1994, No. 2, p. 338.
51 For analysis of the precautionary principle see J. Morris (ed.). Rethinking Risk and the Precautionary Principle. Oxford: Butterworth, 2000; T. O’Riordan, J. Cameron (eds.). Interpreting the precautionary principle. London: Earthscan Publications Ltd., 1994.
52 E.-J. Truuväli et al. Eesti Vabariigi põhiseadus. Kommenteeritud väljaanne (Constitution of the Republic of Estonia. Commented Edition). Tallinn: Õigusteabe AS Juura, 2002, commentary to § 5 at pp. 69–70 (in Estonian).
53 Definition of sustainable use through sustainable development has been founded on Michael Decleris’ work on legal aspects of sustainable development. M. Decleris. The law of sustainable development. General principles. Brussels: European Commission, 2000.
55 R. Alexy. Põhiõigused Eesti põhiseaduses (Basic Rights in Estonian Constitution). – Juridica Special Edition, 2001, p. 30 (in Estonian).
57 L. D. Eriksson. Environmental Rights as a Constitutional Problem. – Retfaerd Special Issue, 1994, p. 107.
58 K.-H. Ladeur (Note 45), p. 19.
59 Section 53 gives rise to a state obligation to protect the environment, see subchapter 4.1.3.
60 R. Alexy (Note 55), pp. 20–21, as could be the case with § 27 (1) of the Estonian Constitution.
61 Right to procedure — the decision of the Supreme Court en banc, 28 October 2002, No. (3-4-1-5-02), para. 30. – Riigi Teataja (the State Gazette) III 2002, 28, 308 (in Estonian); right to good governance — the decision of the Constitutional Review Chamber of the Supreme Court, 17 February 2003, No. (3-4-1-1-03), para. 16. – Riigi Teataja (the State Gazette) III 2003, 5, 48 (in Estonian).
62 The decision of Tallinn Administrative Court in Hürden v. Harku Municipality in 5 June 2003, administrative case 3-693/2002.
63 The state inaction in the field of lawmaking may not be challenged by individuals in the court, but can be done through the Legal Chancellor.
64 K.-H. Ladeur (Note 45), p. 21.
65 The right to sustainable environment should obtain its content the way state goal has been given a content (see subchapter 4.1.1 and 4.1.3).
66 The concept of environmental space was first used in a study by Wuppertal Institute for Climate, Environment and Energy (http://www.foeeurope.org/sustainability/europe/study/t-frame-study.htm (04.04.2003), the ecological constitutional reform and the resulting structural changes in the society and economy have been discussed by Marek Strandberg. – M. Strandberg. Kahe maja kokkupanekust (Uniting Ecology and Economy). Lehed ja Tähed. Tallinn: MTÜ Loodusajakiri, 2003, pp. 179–194 (in Estonian).

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