Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&amp;view=article&amp;id=33863:g-r-no-103395-november-22,-1993-people-of-the-phil-v-exequiel-aniscal&amp;catid=1308&amp;Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 12:09:13+00:00

Document:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. EXEQUIEL ANISCAL, alias Ekil, and MANSUETO REDULLA, alias Chito, Accused. MANSUETO REDULLA, Accused-Appellant.
Alfonso C. Damalerio for Accused-Appellant.
For Juana Bañocia Vda. de Valles, the onset of the sunset years upon her widowed life had not deterred her from pursuing a thriving transportation and other lucrative businesses in Maribojoc, Bohol. The passing of March 16, 1990 under this state of affairs would have gone by uneventfully were it not for the shocking news that her townmates in Maribojoc received early that day. "Nang Juana," as she was fondly called and referred to, had been killed in the course of and consequent to a robbery committed in her residence.
"That on or about the 16th of March, 1990, in the Municipality of Maribojoc, Province of Bohol, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring, confederating and mutually helping with (sic) one another, with intent to gain, and by the use of violence or intimidation upon a person and by reason of or on the occasion thereof, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and tie the victim with a piece of cloth which covered her head and face, including her nose and mouth, while her hands and feet were tied with a strong nylon belt of which, as a consequence, the victim Juana Bañocia Vda. de Valles died of asphyxia due to suffocation, and, thereafter, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and against the will and without the consent of the owner thereof, take, steal, and carry away cash in the amount of Four Hundred Thousand pesos, and assorted jewelries amounting to Two Hundred Thousand Pesos, or in the total amount of Six Hundred Thousand Pesos (P600,000.00), Philippine Currency, all belonging to the said victim Juana Bañocia Vda. de Valles, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the offended victim.
At about 8:00 A.M. of the same day, Pat. Jabines met Pedro Ramones by chance at a store in Barrio San Vicente. The latter, when informed by the policeman of the robbery and slaying of the deceased, disclosed his brief encounter supposedly with appellant and the Aniscals the previous night. Jabines thereupon urged him to execute an affidavit and to testify in court against the suspects but he refused as he was allegedly afraid of the Aniscals. After almost two months, however, he appeared to have had a change of heart and he decided to testify against the suspects. 10 What induced him to do so does not appear in the record.
"WHEREFORE, the Court finds and so holds accused Mansueto Redulla, alias Chito, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of Robbery with Homicide defined and penalized under Article 293 in relation to Article 294, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code and sentences him to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA. The accused is hereby ordered to return one-half of the amount of P400,000.00 cash and the assorted jewelries or their value in the amount of one-half of P200,000.00. He is further ordered to pay one-half of P30,000.00 as death indemnity and one-half of P50,000.00 as moral damages, to the heirs of the deceased Juana Bañocia Valles, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
The court below evidently convicted appellant on the basis of circumstantial evidence. It is this Court’s view, after a careful evaluation of the circumstances of the case at bar, that said evidence cannot persuade us, with the inner strength of moral certainty, to conclude that appellant’s guilt has been proved beyond peradventure of a reasonable doubt.
In the case at bar, the lower court relied primarily on the evidence of the prosecution consisting chiefly of Pedro Ramones’ oral testimony and sworn statement. Ramones was the sole witness who testified about the alleged presence of appellant and the Aniscal brothers in the vicinity of the victim’s residence at about the time that the robbery may have taken place. We are unable to agree, however, with the findings of the trial court thereon, as there are highly significant inconsistencies and improbabilities therein which render the veracity of Ramones’ account dubious and unacceptable for appellant’s conviction.
Now, according to Ramones, the reason for his belated appearance in court is that he feared for his life. However, the curious fact is that the Aniscal brothers and appellant were admittedly his good friends, a circumstance which renders his fears of reprisal clearly unfounded. 21 This is borne out by his trusting and confiding behavior when after he supposedly met and disclosed to Pat. Jabines the events of the previous night, he proceeded to the residence of the brothers in order to ask them what they were doing when he saw them near the victim’s residence. 22 Hence, if it was true that he dreaded the Aniscals, then it stands to reason that he would not have gone to their house with braggadocio and ask them incriminating questions indicative of his suspicions and thereby place his life in danger. The fact that he acted as he did shows that he knew he had nothing to fear at the hands of the brothers.
One important point also stands out in bold relief in this episode. Ramones was positive that on that occasion he definitely saw Wilfredo Aniscal walking beside the concrete fence of the victim’s house. In fact, Ramones allegedly saw him first and had all the opportunity to be able to identify him, unlike appellant and Exequiel Aniscal who, according to this witness, he only saw later in passing before they jumped over the wall and ran away. Yet, a formal investigation debunked this testimony of Ramones for, in fact, the case against Wilfredo Aniscal was later dismissed. Obviously, therefore, if Ramones’ identification of Wilfredo Aniscal and the alleged presence of the latter at the scene could not be believed, with much more reason should his identification of and imputation against appellant stand completely discredited.
There is, likewise, a parallel significance to be derived from his initial disclosure to Pat. Jabines on the morning of March 17, 1990 and his subsequent refusal, despite the proddings of the police officer, to have any participation in the case because of his alleged fear of the Aniscals. If Ramones had really been afraid of the Aniscal brothers, then he would not have precipitately made that revelation to anybody, much less to a person in authority like Pat. Jabines. To be sure, Ramones must have known that the consequent investigation which such information would trigger could not but involve him in the case and expose him to the very risk that he supposedly sought to avoid.
What is more, his affidavit unaccountably fails to mention his supposed meeting with Pat. Jabines in the early morning of March 17, 1990. In said affidavit, he only claims to have learned about the robbery and the victim’s death that very morning but from whom, he did not state. In contrast, when he was called to testify before the trial court about the chance encounter, he went to great lengths expounding on his meeting with Pat. Jabines at a sari-sari store and the policeman’s unsuccessful attempt to convince him to testify against the Aniscals and to execute an affidavit as well. What caused these mercurial changes in his attitude and deportment over time — from his initial refusal to testify, to his subsequently executing an affidavit, and then his expanded version in court — are worth judicial rumination.
It also bears notice that, unlike the Aniscal brothers who were his original co-accused, appellant did not take flight as they did. That is why when the prosecution felt that it had already made out a case from the sluggish police investigation, appellant was readily available and was forthwith apprehended by the authorities. Ordinarily, non-flight by itself is not sufficient to discharge an accused, the same being inconclusive proof of innocence. 29 But this circumstance becomes crucial in negating the criminal liability of an accused when viewed in the context of the weak evidence on record. 30 This exceptive part of the doctrinal rule applies to the present case.
Parenthetically, we find it rather unfair, if not irregular, for the trial court to undermine appellant’s credibility by its unilateral observation that "his demeanor on the witness stand as well as his actuations during the trial at his seat, which the presiding judge closely monitored, easily revealed a guilty conscience with his restless reaction whenever his name was mentioned by the prosecution witnesses." 38 This is not only non sequitur but also trenches on a denial of procedural due process under the guise of a judicial finding which, however, stands unexplained and is purely conjectural.
ACCORDINGLY, on the ground of reasonable doubt, the judgment appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another one is hereby entered ACQUITTING accused-appellant Mansueto Redulla of the crime charged. His immediate release from detention is hereby ordered, unless for some other lawful cause his further detention is warranted.
1.	Original Record, 28; Rollo, 16.
5.	TSN, February 20, 1991, 5-9.
6.	Ibid., March 4, 1991, 5-6.
7.	Ibid., id., 4, 6-7.
8.	TSN, February 20, 1991, 22-24; Records of Documentary Evidence, 3, 7; Exhibits B and D.
9.	TSN, March 4, 1991, 19.
10.	Ibid., February 20, 1991, 9-10; March 4, 1991, 4.
11.	TSN, April 2, 1991, 2-5; March 19, 1991, 17-19.
12.	Ibid., April 2, 1991, 4-15.
13.	Original Record, 41, 48.
14.	Ibid., 94; per Judge Andres S. Santos.
15.	Brief for the Accused-Appellant, 1; Rollo, 34.
16.	People v. Cagadas, Jr., Et Al., 193 SCRA 216 (1991).
17.	People v. Austria, Et Al., 195 SCRA 700 (1991).
18.	People v. Iran, Et Al., 216 SCRA 575 (1992).
19.	People v. Libag, 184 SCRA 707 (1990).
20.	People v. Mandapat, 196 SCRA 157 (1991).
21.	TSN, February 20, 1991, 3, 8; March 4, 1991, 21.
22.	TSN, February 20, 1991, 11-12; Original Record, 2; Exhibit A.
23.	People v. Deberto, Et Al., 205 SCRA 291 (1992).
24.	Original Record, 2; Exhibit A.
25.	TSN, February 20, 1991, 4-5.
26.	People v. Gabatin, Et Al., 203 SCRA 225 (1991).
27.	People v. Uson, G.R. No. 101313, July 5, 1993.
28.	TSN, April 2, 1991, 25-26; March 20, 1991, 6.
29.	People v. Macalino, 209 SCRA 788 (1992).
30.	People v. Austria, Et Al., supra.
31.	People v. Cruz, Et Al., 191 SCRA 377 (1990).
33.	People v. Miscala, 202 SCRA 26 (1991).
34.	People v. Ambih, G.R. No. 101006, September 3, 1993.
35.	People v. Jalon, 215 SCRA 680 (1992).
36.	People v. Viray, Et. Al. SCRA 320 (1991).
37.	People v. Lazarte, 200 SCRA 361 (1991).

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