Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&amp;view=article&amp;id=51694:gr-174536-2008&amp;catid=1510&amp;Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 14:16:48+00:00

Document:
G.R. No. 174536 - Roberto Y. Ponciano, Jr. v. CA, et al.
ROBERTO Y. PONCIANO, JR., Petitioner, v. LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
In the present Petition for Review,1 petitioner Roberto Y. Ponciano, Jr. primarily assails the Resolution2 dated 4 September 2006 of the Court of Appeals denying his plea for the admission of his Motion for Reconsideration in CA-G.R. CV No. 80705 and taking no action on said Motion since it was filed beyond the reglementary period. Petitioner prays of this Court to vacate and set aside the assailed Resolution and to order the reinstatement of his Motion for Reconsideration by the appellate court. In the alternative, petitioner implores that this Court directly vacate and set aside the Decision3 dated 22 February 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 80705, the subject of his Motion for Reconsideration, and render judgment reinstating the Decision4 dated 10 June 2003 of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 74, of Taguig, Metro Manila, in LRC Case No. 273, which confirmed and ordered the registration of petitioner's title over the contested parcel of land.
At the crux of the present controversy is a parcel of unregistered land (Lot 8689-D, Csd-00-000627, MCadm-590-D, Taguig Cadastral Mapping), situated in Barangay Wawa, Taguig, Metro Manila, measuring about 2,890 square meters (subject property).
Alleging to be the owner of the subject property, petitioner filed with the MeTC on 5 September 2001 an Application5 for the original registration thereof, which was docketed as LRC Case No. 273.
The MeTC set LRC Case No. 273 for initial hearing on 30 January 2002 at 10:00 a.m. Copies of the Notice of Initial Hearing were accordingly served, published, and posted.
1. That neither the [herein petitioner] nor his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the land in question for thirty (30) years in accordance with Section 48(b), Public Land Act, as amended by PD 1073 and R.A. No. 6940.
2. That the muniments of title, the tax declarations and tax payment receipts of [petitioner], if any, attached to or alleged in the application, do not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of bona-fide acquisition of the land applied for or of his open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation thereof in the concept of owner since June 12, 1945, or prior thereto. Said muniments of title do not appear to be genuine and the tax declarations and/or tax payment receipts indicate pretended possession of [petitioner] to be of recent vintage.
During the initial hearing of LRC Case No. 273 held on 30 January 2002, the MeTC issued, upon the motion of petitioner's counsel, an Order9 of general default against the whole world, except against the government (which, more appropriately, should be the respondent Republic), represented by the OSG through the Public Prosecutor.
Hearings were held in LRC Case No. 273 on 6 and 27 February 2002, wherein petitioner presented testimonial and documentary evidence in support of his Application.
The Public Prosecutor, being deputized by the OSG, did not offer any evidence on behalf of respondent Republic.
3. That Section 41 of Republic Act No. 4850, states that, "whenever Laguna Lake or Lake is used in this Act, the same shall refer to Laguna de Bay which is that area covered by the lake water when it is at the average annual maximum lake level of elevation of 12.50 meters, as referred to a datum 10.0 meters below mean low water (MLLW). Lands located at and below such elevation are public lands which form part of the bed of said lake (Section 14, R.A. 4850, as amended, underlining supplied [sic]).
WHEREFORE, finding the allegations in the application to have been sufficiently established by the [herein petitioner's] evidence, this Court hereby confirms the title of [petitioner] ROBERTO Y. PONCIANO, of legal age, Filipino, single with residence at No. 30 S. Santos St., Sto. Rosario, Pateros, Metro Manila over the subject parcel of land designated at Lot 8689-DC, Mcadm-590-D, Taguig, Cadastral Mapping under Conversion-Subdivision Plan Csd-00-000627 consisting of Two Thousand Eight Hundred Ninety (2,890) square meters and hereby order the registration of the same in his name.
Without seeking reconsideration of the afore-quoted MeTC Decision, respondent Republic, through the OSG, filed its Notice of Appeal.
The appeal of respondent Republic before the Court of Appeals was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 80705.
After an exchange of pleadings by the parties, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision27 dated 22 February 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No. 80705. The appellate court rejected the argument of respondent Republic that the subject property was unalienable because it formed part of the Laguna Lake bed under Republic Act No. 4890, otherwise known as the Laguna Lake Development Authority Act of 1966, as amended; and still part of the public domain. It took note that respondent Republic failed to present any evidence in support of its position.
"Applicant failed to prove specific acts showing the nature of its possession and that of its predecessors in interest. The applicant must present specific acts of ownership to substantiate the claim and cannot just offer general statements, which are mere conclusions of law than factual evidence of possession. Actual possession of land consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would naturally exercise over his own property.
The bare assertion of witnesses that the applicant of land had been in the open, adverse and continuous possession of the property for over thirty (30) years is hardly 'the well-nigh incontrovertible' evidence required in cases of this nature. In other words, facts constituting possession must be duly established by competent evidence."
Records show that Atty. Nestor C. Beltran (Atty. Beltran), petitioner's counsel in CA-G.R. CV No. 80705, received a copy of the Court of Appeals Decision dated 22 February 2006 on 28 February 2006. Petitioner, thus, had until 15 March 2006 to file his Motion for Reconsideration of the said Decision; yet, said Motion was filed only on 16 March 2006, or a day late. Petitioner followed up by filing Manifestations dated 10 and 21 April 2006 begging the indulgence of the appellate court to admit his Motion for Reconsideration, considering that the delayed filing thereof was a procedural lapse which should be considered as excusable negligence, and which did not impair the rights of the respondent Republic.
To begin with, basic is the legal truism in this jurisdiction that any party seeking to reconsider a judgment or final resolution must do so within fifteen (15) days from notice thereof (Section 1, Rule 52 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure).
The above rule is too elementary to even cause confusion upon any lawyer for that matter, unless compelling reasons actually exist to justify the relaxation of the prescriptive period mandated by law within which to file a motion for reconsideration.
"The period for filing a motion for reconsideration is non-extendible. The Appellate Court is, therefore, correct in ruling that '(t)he failure of the respondents to file their motion for reconsideration within the reglementary period renders the Decision sought to be reconsidered final and executory, thereby depriving this Court the power to alter, modify or reverse the same.' "
"It bears stressing once again that the undersigned got hold of the Notice of Judgment on March 2, 2006 and the Motion for Reconsideration was filed on March 16, 2006, or on the 14th day from receipt thereof. Upon verification of the records of the case, however, the undersigned counsel found out that the maid received the mail on February 28, 2006 but put the mail on its (sic) table only on March 2, 2006. The maid who received the mail earlier from the postman must have accidentally forgot to place the mail immediately on the undersigned counsel's table as time again instructed to her" (Rollo, pp. 115-116; Underscoring supplied).
1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of, or in excess of, jurisdiction in refusing to consider that the cause of the delay in filing the Motion for Reconsideration was due to excusable negligence, and in effect, denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in reversing the Decision, dated June 10, 2003, of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 74, Taguig, Metro Manila.
3. Whether or not the Laguna Lake Development Authority acted with grave abuse of discretion in declaring that the subject property cannot be appropriated or be subject of private ownership.
4. Whether or not the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack of, or excess of, jurisdiction for overlooking the evidence presented by the petitioner for his confirmation of imperfect title and declaring that petitioner failed to prove specific acts of ownership for confirmation of his title.
The Court addresses foremost the procedural issue of whether petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration should have been admitted by the Court of Appeals, for the jurisdiction of this Court over the instant Petition and the other substantive issues raised therein actually depends upon the resolution thereof.
Under Section 1, Rule 52 of the Rules of Court, a party may file a motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution within 15 days from notice thereof, with proof of service on the adverse party.
There is no question that petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration in CA-G.R. CV No. 80705 was filed one day beyond the reglementary period for doing so. Atty. Beltran, petitioner's former counsel, received notice and a copy of the 22 February 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals on 28 February 2006, and had only until 15 March 2006 to file petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration thereof. However, Atty. Beltran filed said Motion on 16 March 2006.
Upon petitioner, thus, falls the burden of proving to the satisfaction of the Court that cogent reasons exist herein to excuse his non-compliance with the reglementary period for filing a motion for reconsideration. Unfortunately, petitioner utterly failed in this regard.
Petitioner can only invoke the supposed excusable negligence of Atty. Beltran, his former counsel in CA-G.R. CV No. 80705. Petitioner points out that his Motion for Reconsideration was dated and ready as of 12 March 2006, yet Atty. Beltran was grossly negligent in filing said Motion only on 16 March 2006. For his part, Atty. Beltran manifested before the appellate court that he filed petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration a day late because his maid, who received the notice and copy of the 22 February 2006 Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 80705, did not immediately place the same on his desk.
The Court imposes upon the attorney the duty, to himself and to his clients, to invariably adopt a system whereby he can be sure of receiving promptly all judicial notices during his absence from his address of record. The attorney must so arrange matters that communications sent by mail, addressed to his office or residence, may reach him promptly.41 In earlier cases, the Court did not excuse a counsel's tardiness in complying with reglementary periods for filing pleadings attributed to the negligence of said counsel's secretary42 or clerk.43 In the same light, the Court can neither sanction the late filing by Atty. Beltran of the Motion for Reconsideration in CA-G.R. CV No. 80705 which he blamed on his maid, nor free petitioner from the effect of Atty. Beltran's faux pas.
That the Motion for Reconsideration was filed only a day late is of no moment. The Court had previously refused to admit motions for reconsideration which were filed only one46 or two47 days late.
It is clear from the foregoing that the unjustified delay in the filing of petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration in CA-G.R. CV No. 80705 is not just a procedural lapse, but also a jurisdictional defect which effectively prevents this Court from taking cognizance of the Petition at bar.
Petitioner cannot claim that he has been deprived of due process. He was able to fully participate in the proceedings before the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 80705. The Court of Appeals actually took into consideration petitioner's evidence when it rendered its Decision dated 22 February 2006; only, it found that said evidence failed to establish specific acts of ownership over the subject property in compliance with the possessory requirements of the law for an imperfect title. Petitioner was not arbitrarily deprived of his right to file a motion for reconsideration of the Decision dated 22 February 2006 of the Court of Appeals; petitioner failed to avail himself of such a remedy within the reglementary period prescribed by law.
Moreover, even if, for the sake of argument, the Court can take cognizance of the present Petition in its appellate jurisdiction, it would still deny the same for lack of merit.
(a) [Repealed by Presidential Decree No. 1073].
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the applications for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
It is also worthy to point out that petitioner's insistence that the subject property and the other surrounding properties are being used for residential purposes does not work in his favor, and even militates against him. Taken together with the declaration, for realty tax purposes, by petitioner himself that the subject property is bamboo land, as well as the claim of respondent LLDA that the same property is part of the Laguna Lake bed, there is an apparent and unsettled confusion on the proper classification of the subject property.
The classification of the subject property is important for it determines the applicable statutory requirements and procedures for the proper disposition thereof. Confirmation or legalization of an imperfect or incomplete title under Section 48, Title II of the Public Land Act, as amended, applies only to agricultural lands. Lands of the public domain for residential, commercial, or industrial purposes,52 on the other hand, are governed by Sections 58 to 68, Title III of the same statute. Without a definite classification of the subject property, there results reasonable doubt as to the appropriate legal means for petitioner to acquire title to the same.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review is hereby DENIED. Costs against the petitioner Roberto Y. Ponciano, Jr.
*** Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. was designated to sit as additional member replacing Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura per Raffle dated 12 March 2008.
2 Penned by Associate Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr., with Associate Justices Rosmari D. Carandang and Monina Arevalo-Zenarosa, concurring; rollo, pp. 36-39.
4 Penned by Assisting Judge Silvino T. Pampilo, Jr.; rollo, pp. 19-26.
9 Penned by Judge Benjamin T. Pozon; id. at 28-30.
11 According to petitioner, Dolores informed him that she bought the subject property from her father Eleuterio in 1967 (TSN, 6 February 2002, p. 9). However, petitioner's witness, Crispina Viar Vda. De Garcia, narrated that the subject property was bought by Dolores from Eleuterio in 1966 (TSN, 6 February 2002, p. 19).
12 TSN, 6 February 2002, p. 20.
18 Id. at 13, 284-285.
20 TSN, 6 February 2002, p. 13-16.
22 Order penned by Judge Benjamin T. Pozon; records, p. 297.
35 Philippine Coconut Authority v. Garrido, 424 Phil. 904, 909 (2002).
36 Tan v. Tan, G.R. No. 133805, 29 June 2004, 433 SCRA 44, 49, citing Basco v. Court of Appeals, 383 Phil. 671, 685-686 (2000). Macabingkil v. People's Homesite and Housing Corp., 164 Phil. 328, 340-341 (1976).
37 359 Phil. 210, 220 (1998).
38 Tesoro v. Court of Appeals, 153 Phil. 580, 588 (1973).
39 Rule 37, Rules of Court.
40 Amil v. Court of Appeals, 374 Phil. 659, 665 (1999).
41 Republic v. Arro, G.R. No. L-48241, 11 June 1987, 150 SCRA 625, 630.
43 Fabella v. Tancinco, 86 Phil. 543, 547 (1950).
45 BolaÃ±os v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. L-68458, 7 August 1985, 138 SCRA 99, 104.
46 Philippine Coconut Authority v. Garrido, supra note 35 at 909.
47 Vda. De Victoria v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 147550, 26 January 2005, 449 SCRA 319, 330-331.
48 Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. L-74191, 21 December 1987, 156 SCRA 740, 746.
49 Melotindos v. Tobias, 439 Phil. 910, 916 (2002).
50 G.R. No. 81200, 17 October 1990, 190 SCRA 525, 533-534.
51 Republic v. Herbieto, G.R. No. 156117, 26 May 2005, 459 SCRA 183, 201-202; Almeda v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 85322, 30 April 1991, 196 SCRA 476, 480-481; Vallarta v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. L-74957, 30 June 1987, 151 SCRA 679, 690; Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-40402, 16 March 1987, 148 SCRA 480, 492.

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