Source: https://jeannehannah.typepad.com/blog_jeanne_hannah_traver/2008/04/what-if-father.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 22:55:20+00:00

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UPDATES IN MICHIGAN FAMILY LAW: What if father opposes adoption of child born out-of-wedlock?
The putative father (hereafter “Byron”) was told by friends that a person with whom he’d had a brief romantic relationship (“Zimmerman”) appeared to be pregnant. Zimmerman had not told Byron previously; he learned only about 2 weeks prior to Zimmerman giving birth. Zimmerman told Byron she planned to place the child for adoption.
March 1, 2007. The child “Steven” was born and was immediately placed with the prospective adoptive parents (“the Johnsons”).
April 9, 2007. Zimmerman filed a petition to terminate Byron’s rights, stating that she intended to voluntarily give up her rights if the court terminated Byron’s parental rights.
The court held a prompt hearing on the petition to terminate Byron’s parental rights. Byron did not fit into section 39(2) of the Adoption Code. MCL 722.39(2) because he had not established a custodial or support relationship with the child nor had he provided substantial and regular support or care in accordance with his ability to provide such support or care for the mother during pregnancy or for either mother or child after the child's birth during the 90 days before notice of the hearing was served upon him. Family lawyers have come to call putative fathers who fail to support or form custodial relationships in this context "do-nothing fathers."
As a result of having failed to fit into section 2, when Byron appeared at the hearing to contest the termination of his parental rights and the child’s placement for adoption, the trial court conducted a best interest hearing to determine whether it was in the child's best interest for his father's parental rights to be terminated.
At that best interest hearing, there was some detailed testimony regarding whether or not Byron was a “fit parent.” Salient facts were that Byron lived with his parents and lacked income to provide his own housing. His father was a recovering heroin addict who treated with methadone. Byron had joint custody of two other non-marital children, ages 2 and 4, who spent every other day with him. Byron’s sister sometimes lived in the same household. Byron had previously used marijuana and Vicodin. His marijuana use either had discontinued or had been reduced. He had minimal income. He was attending school to learn to be an electrician. He was engaged and this woman, who did not testify, was allegedly willing to co-parent his two children now living with him and also Steven if he were awarded custody.
Zimmerman was permitted to testify about her relationship with Byron but not about her own fitness as a parent.
After hearing the evidence, the trial court made specific findings on the best interest factors in the Adoption Code, MCL 722.22, and found that Byron was not unfit. The trial court denied the petition to terminate his parental rights and ordered the Johnsons to turn Steven over immediately to the care of Byron, despite the fact that no written order had yet been entered. Zimmerman then withdrew her consent to adoption. The trial court instructed Byron and Zimmerman to file the appropriate petitions in the family court to determine custody and parenting time.
July 26, 2007. The trial court’s order was entered.
August 3, 2007. The Johnsons filed an application for leave to appeal in the Court of Appeals together with a motion for an immediate stay of the order to place Steven with Byron.
August 3, 2007. The Court of Appeals granted this motion, stayed the order to place Steven with Byron and ordered Steven to be immediately returned to the Johnsons.
August 6, 2007. The trial court appointed an appellate attorney for Byron.
August 7, 2007. Byron’s court-appointed appellate attorney responded to the motion for stay.
August 8, 2007. The COA heard Byron’s request to deny a stay, which was submitted on the special motion docket, lifted the 8/3/2007 stay order, ordered that the trial court’s order be enforced (placing Steven with Byron), ordered that the matter be expedited, and placed the matter on the first available call list.
January 3, 2008. The Court of Appeals’ decision [For Publication] was issued—a mere four months later. This is an impressive response from the court in an adoption case, which must be given priority on all courts’ dockets in order to provide swift resolution and stability for infants.
In the COA, the Johnsons contended that the trial court erred in its best interest analysis, erred in placing Steven with Byron, and erred in giving Byron immediate custody.
"The trial court found that Byron's casual drug use, unstable relationships, and dependency were less significant than his employment stability, parenting history, and plans for a more-stable future. The trial court did not clearly err in concluding that Byron's shortcomings were attributable to immaturity and amenable to improvement. Being poor doesn’t disqualify a parent from being fit."
As a result, the COA affirmed the trial court's order denying the petition to terminate Byron's parental rights.
The grant of custody. Appellants next argued that the trial court erred in granting custody of Steven to Byron upon finding that it wasn’t in Steven’s best interests for Byron’s parental rights to be terminated. They argued that subsection 3 of the statute [MCL 722.39(3)] only allows a grant of custody to the putative father if the mother’s rights have been terminated. Since that did not occur here, they argued that the trial court should have determined whether it was in Steven’s best interests to be placed with his mother or with his father.
"Zimmerman contends that a court is without authority to grant custody to a father unless subsection 3 applies. We disagree. The subsection mandates that custody be granted to a father if its conditions are satisfied, but that does not mean that the subsection prohibits an order granting custody to the father in other situations.
"Further, subsection 1 of the statute states that "the court shall inquire into [the father's] fitness and his ability to properly care for the child and shall determine whether the best interests of the child will be served by granting custody to him." MCL 710.39(1). While not explicitly directing the court to grant custody to a father who is determined to be fit and able to properly care for a child whose best interest would be served by such a placement, the statute implies that granting custody in this situation is appropriate. Contrary to appellants' arguments, we do not conclude that the trial court erred in granting immediate custody to Byron once it had completed its "best interest" determination in his favor."
The COA recognized that the trial court was faced with a difficult decision. Leaving Steven with the Johnsons would only increase their attachment and make it more difficult to give him up later if their appeal failed. Obviously, one of the parents had to be awarded custody. Since the mother had made the decision to give Steven up for adoption, the COA found it made sense for the trial court to award custody to Byron. In addition, the trial court was applying the best interest factors in the adoption code in this hearing. Although similar to those in the Child Custody Act, the trial court was obliged to use the CCA to determine the custodial rights of Zimmerman and Byron. Thus “custody” to Byron, even though “temporary,” was appropriate.
February 12, 2008. The Johnsons sought leave to appeal to the Michigan supreme court.
"The Court of Appeals erred in reviewing the circuit court’s order as one that gave respondent custody of the minor child. Instead, the circuit court ruled that it was awarding “temporary placement” of the child with respondent and further urged the parties to act quickly to settle the custody issue. "
The court affirmed the trial court’s ruling that the custody issue be resolved between the two biological parents, and directed that court to resolve the custody dispute in an expeditious manner, if that has not already occurred. All other aspects of the Court of Appeals judgment were affirmed.
What should family lawyers take away from this decision?
How big is the hurdle in a best interest hearing? First, a best interest hearing for a putative “do-nothing” father might not be such a huge burden as you might think. Certainly, Byron didn’t look like a guy who was going to be named “Father of the Year” anytime soon. (Not even close).
What could the mother have done differently? Here we have a biological mother who decided that she wasn’t ready to parent a child as a single parent. She did not terminate her pregnancy; she carried the baby to term.
The mother selected adoptive parents. She did not notify the father of the pregnancy. She did not want to place the baby with Byron, because she wanted a stable 2-parent family for the child.
The mother might have taken specific action that would have permitted the termination of Byron’s parental rights without having to have a best interest hearing for this “do-nothing” father.
She could have notified Byron earlier on in the pregnancy and let him dither and fail to provide “regular and substantial support to her during the pregnancy.” This is a fall-back position in case the next option did not work, might have provided her with more ammunition to work with, and might have permitted termination during a best interest hearing.
Better yet, she could have filed an ex parte petition with the probate court evidencing her intent to release or consent to adoption pursuant to section 34 of the adoption code. If the mother does this early enough and presents the court with evidence that the putative father was served with the notice of her intent to place the child for adoption at least 30 days prior to a hearing at which she will give her consent or release for adoption, then that putative father—if he has not, in the meantime, filed a notice of intent to claim paternity under section 33 with the court—is not entitled to receive notice of the hearing at which the mother’s consent or release for adoption will be given. As a result, his rights are terminated. He’s been identified. He’s been given his opportunity to step up to the plate. He has refused or failed. End of story. At the very least, the mother is no worse off than the mother in this case.
The liberty interest at issue in this case -- the interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children -- is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court. More than 75 years ago, in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 401, 67 L. Ed. 1042, 43 S. Ct. 625 (1923), we held that the "liberty" protected by the Due Process Clause includes the right of parents to "establish a home and bring up children" and "to control the education of their own." Two years later, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-535, 69 L. Ed. 1070, 45 S. Ct. 571 (1925), we again held that the "liberty of parents and guardians" includes the right "to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control." We explained in Pierce that "the child is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations." 268 U.S. at 535. We returned to the subject in Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 88 L. Ed. 645, 64 S. Ct. 438 (1944), and again confirmed that there is a constitutional dimension to the right of parents to direct the upbringing of their children. "It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary [530 U.S. 66] function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder." 321 U.S. at 166.
In subsequent cases also, we have recognized the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children. See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651, 31 L. Ed. 2d 551, 92 S. Ct. 1208 (1972) ("It is plain that the interest of a parent in the companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her children 'comes to this Court with a momentum for respect lacking when appeal is made to liberties which derive merely from shifting economic arrangements'" (citation omitted)); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232, 32 L. Ed. 2d 15, 92 S. Ct. 1526 (1972) ("The history and culture of Western civilization reflect a strong tradition of parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of their children. This primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition"); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255, 54 L. Ed. 2d 511, 98 S. Ct. 549 (1978) ("We have recognized on numerous occasions that the relationship between parent and child is constitutionally protected"); Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584, 602, 61 L. Ed. 2d 101, 99 S. Ct. 2493 (1979) ("Our jurisprudence historically has reflected Western civilization concepts of the family as a unit with broad parental authority over minor children. Our cases have consistently followed that course"); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 71 L. Ed. 2d 599, 102 S. Ct. 1388 (1982) (discussing "the fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child"); Glucksberg, supra, at 720 ("In a long line of cases, we have held that, in addition to the specific freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights, the 'liberty' specially protected by the Due Process Clause includes the right . . . to direct the education and upbringing of one's children" (citing Meyer and Pierce)). In light of this extensive precedent, it cannot now be doubted that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children.
In a widely known Michigan case, In re Clausen, 442 Mich 648 (1993)[the famous "Baby Jessica" case], the father did not even know that his girlfriend was pregnant. He was what is sometimes called a "do-nothing" father. However, he could not very well do something to support the mother during her pregnancy or the child after its birth because the child was transferred almost immediately from Iowa to Michigan (to the prospective adoptive parents) in a direct adoption. Eventually, after years and years of litigation--expensive litigation--the father eventually got his child back.
It sounds to me as though the deposition was for the purpose of establishing that Nick was a "do-nothing" father, and yet his position wasn't any different, apparently, that the father in the Clausen case.
At the hearing tomorrow, he has to be asked on the record if he wants to consent to the adoption of the children. His signature on the papers isn't enough. However, he would have a rough go of it without an attorney.
Someone sent me this article today, and I'm afraid it may to late to help my son.
My son, Nicholas Rogers, is going through this exact senario right now. Although, Idon't know if this may have helped his case had we recieved it before now, I'm afraid it's too late.
Just this morning, he signed papers giving the adoptive family rights to his twin sons, because his attorneys, Gomery and Assoc. told him he didn't do well at the deposition, and he wouldn't do well at his hearing, which was schedueled for tomorrow (Jan 13th, 2011), in Traverse City. They told him his best option was to go for open adoption. Said he could go with an court appt attorney, but, that probably wouldn't help.
He wanted his sons, he wanted to raise them. He's never even met them. They were given to the adoptive family, and wisked off to California before he could do anything. Before his attorneys would do anything. They had no idea they were gone until Nick told them. They 'thought' the adoptive family backed off when they learned that Nick wanted his sons, and never followed up to see if it was true. They didn't.
I feel our attorneys have procrastinate so badly in this case, that they feel the only recourse is to give up. Although, they said they could continue the fight for $1,500 more.
Nick is the father of 19 month old Brealon Rogers, and also fathered twin boys on Dec 3rd, 2011 by the same mother, Mallory Giles.
He is working, has a van, and is currently living here at home, knowing he'd need help with the first year or so of the babies lives. We have been preparing for the babies since we first learned of them. I do daycare in my home, so, all care of the children are covered by family, even while he works.
Nick is a loving, wonderful, thoughtful, dedicated, totally committed father, and makes me very proud of the man he is.
Yes, he's made bad decisions, his record isn't perfect (alcohol related incidents from 3 years ago) and he's stuggling like most of Michigan residents getting enough hours from his job.
He and my Grandsons will live here free, until he gets securely planted financially, and will always have a home here as long as they want and need.
He feels so defeated and broken, my heart breaks for my son. The attorneys let him feel useless and worthless, and in essence, like he is not good enough to raise his own sons.
Yes, apparently the adoptive family has tons of money, but, I don't believe money should be the deciding factor. The babies should not be given to the highest bidder. These Michigan babies should stay in Michigan, not reside across the country to California.
Nick does not fool himself thinking it will be easy to raise these little men, but, he is willing to do whatever it takes to keep them in our family, and always let them know they are loved.
He is a hard worker, and is willing to do what ever it takes to be the grown up, and take responsibility for his actions. He was so looking forward to accepting the consequences of his actions. He is hurting so badly that he did what the attorneys advised him to do. In my opinion..ill advised.
The thing that puts a twist in this whole saga, is that, just prior to the deposition (a day or two) Nick was informed that the mother was not only with him at the time of conception, but, also with one, possibly 2 other men. Now a paternity test is ordered.
Bottom line is...Nick had to give up because we are out of money to fight with, and we are heartbroken.
Thank you for reading this, I guess I just need to know...did he ever stand a chance?
I just can't stand by and wonder if we did everything possible to keep the boys in our family, with their father, although, as I said, he feels totally defeated. I'm seriously thinking of taking this matter to the media. Nobody we know or we talk to can believe this has gone the way it has. It's just wrong on so many levels.

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