Source: https://en.m.wikisource.org/wiki/Railroad_Company_v._Trimble
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 09:17:12+00:00

Document:
'Section 11. That every patent shall be assignable in law, either as to the whole interest or any undivided part thereof, by any instrument in writing; which assignment, and also every grant and conveyance of the exclusive right under any patent to make and use, and to grant to others to make and use the thing patented within and throughout any specified part or portion of the United States, shall be recorded, &c.
On the application of the same administrator, Stone, the patent of 1846 was extended for seven years from the 28th of August, 1860.
On the 30th of May, 1861, Trimble executed a deed, duly recorded, of 'all his property and estate, whatsoever and wheresoever, of every kind and description,' to Anne Trimble (his wife) and Georgiana Presstman, in trust, &c.
The Philadelphia, Wilmington, and Baltimore Railroad Company during the years 1864, 1865, and 1866, that is to say, during the term of the extension, having built certain bridges in Maryland, adopting Howe's improvement, Trimble, his wife, and Presstman brought suit for damages. Plea not guilty, &c. There was no question as to the validity of the patent, the only point being whether the assignment of July 9th, 1844, from Howe to Trimble passed Howe's interest in the extension of 1846.
The plaintiffs having put the case, as already stated, before the jury, the defendant gave in evidence an assignment dated April 1st, 1861, from Howe's administrator, Joseph Stone, to a certain Daniel Stone, of Philadelphia, of all the administrator's interest in the patent of 1846, and its extension, for the State above mentioned. This was followed by proof of an agreement between Trimble and Daniel Stone, dated 30th September, 1846. This agreement, which was not recorded until July 27th, 1864, and after Stone's death, which event took place in December, 1863, recited the agreement between Trimble and Howe and the payments thereby stipulated to be made by Trimble. Stone covenanted to pay one-half of the instalments still unpaid as they should mature.
A copartnership between the parties in the business of building bridges under Howe's patents was then made by the agreement, and it was stipulated that if either party should at any time desire a dissolution, Trimble should name a sum which he would be willing to give or take for a moiety of the rights which he acquired from Howe, including the payments to Howe, and that Stone should thereupon decide whether he would buy or sell; and, further, that the contract might be dissolved at the expiration of six months after notice from either party.
Next followed an assignment dated June 11th, 1864, from this Shaw, receiver, to Burton, of all the interest of Daniel Stone and Trimble, as partners in the Howe patents.
Next was produced an assignment from Joseph Stone, administrator of Daniel Stone, to the same Burton, dated March 6th, 1865, in which he transfers to the assignee all the interest of the deceased in the Howe patents and extension.
The plaintiffs, by way of rebutting evidence, then proved by Trimble that Daniel Stone never made any of the payments stipulated to be paid by him in the agreement offered in evidence by the defendant; that by common consent, the agreement never went into operation in any way, because Stone was unable to comply with any of his engagements made in said agreement, and left their witness to pay, and the witness was compelled to pay, the instalments still due on the original purchase, which the witness himself did; that Stone never claimed any right or interest whatever during his life under that agreement, nor did he ever pretend to act under it; but, on the contrary, always recognized the witness's exclusive right to the interest referred to in said agreement, and acted as the witness's agent under a power of attorney, in constructing bridges thereunder, paying the witness a part of the profits as a compensation for the privileges. The witness further proved that he never was a resident or citizen, nor were any of the plaintiffs, at any time, residents or citizens of Pennsylvania.
This instruction the court gave.
The defendant presented eight prayers, of which the court granted the first and seventh, and refused the rest.
The second was to the effect, that Trimble did not acquire by Howe's assignment, or that of his administrator, a legal title to the extension of the patent, and that the deed of trust executed by Trimble passed no legal title to the grantees.
The third maintained that the articles of copartnership between Trimble and Stone passed Trimble's title to a moiety of his interest in the patents, and that in the absence of any proof of a reconveyance in writing Trimble had no exclusive legal right in the extended term of the patent.
The fourth affirmed the validity of the receiver's deed to Durton, and that the proceedings in Pennsylvania, and that deed divested Trimble's entire interest.
The fifth was a corollary to the fourth, and assumed that as the deed of trust was not recorded in the Patent Office when the proceedings in Pennsylvania took place, it cannot operate to Burton's prejudice if neither he, the complainant, nor the receiver had any knowledge of it.
The sixth asserted that the assignment by Howe's administrator to Daniel Stone, passed the legal right under the extension to said Stone.
The seventh, touching limitations, was granted.
The eighth asked an instruction that there was no evidence in the case from which the jury could find that the plaintiffs had an exclusive legal title to the use of the Howe improvement at the time of the infringement.
Under these instructions, excepted to by the defendant, the jury found a verdict of $12,500 for the plaintiff, and after judgment the case was brought here on error.
1. The alleged infringements occurred during the extended term of the patent, but the plaintiffs below did not adduce any evidence of title in that term. There is nothing in the agreement, nor in the assignment, relied on by them, which would justify the conclusion, that the parties had in contemplation the possible extension of the patents, or any of them. Wilson v. Rousseau,  seems in point. There a covenant by the patentee, prior to the Patent Act of 1836, whose 18th section authorized extensions, that the covenantee should have the benefit of any improvement in the machinery or alteration or renewal of the patent, did not include an extension by an administrator under that act; and other cases favor that view.  The defendant's second and eighth prayers ought to have been granted.
2. Even if there had been, in the agreement or assignment, or in both, a covenant, providing for an interest in any extension, it would, as respects third parties, have vested but an equitable right. By estoppel, the subsequently accruing right feeding the estoppel-it might, in a suit inter partes, even at law, have clothed the covenantee with a legal right. But, however this might be in such case, it could not create a legal right, to be enforced by the covenantee, or his assigns, in an action at law, against a stranger to the covenant.
3. But even if Trimble had an inchoate right, in the possible extension of the patent of 1846, his agreement with Daniel Stone passed to Daniel Stone one-half of such right; and, of course, the plaintiffs (assuming the agreement to be operative), would not have such exclusive title, as would enable them to maintain this suit.
5. Without entering into any discussion of the merits of the suit in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, it was shown that it was still pending; and that the court, by a receiver, had taken possession of the interest of Trimble in the patent right, long before the commencement of this suit. Coming into question, collaterally, in this suit, comity requires that the action of that court should not be declared a nullity in law. It was a proceeding in a court of equity; and partnership matters are properly cognizable in equity. It was a case in a matter within its jurisdiction. The appointment of a receiver is an ordinary exercise of power, for the purpose of preserving property, pending litigation; and it is the province of every court, having possession of a cause, to decide for itself, whether, upon the state of case before it, it is expected to exercise the power. The averments of the bill presented a strong case for prompt interference.
Messrs. B. C. Presttman and S. T. Wallis, contra.
^1 5 Stat. at Large, 121, 123.
^3 Wilson v. Simpson, 9 Id. 109; Bloomer v. McQuewan, 14 Id. 539; Hartshorn v. Day, 19 Id. 220; Chaffee v. Boston Belting Company, 22 Id. 223; Day v. Union Rubber Company, 3 Blatchford, 491, 504.
^4 Philadelphia and Trenton Railroad Company v. Stimpson, 14 Peters, 461; Hartshorn v. Day, 19 Howard, 220; Troy Iron and Nail Factory v. Corning, 1 Blatchford, 472.

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