Source: http://cld.irmct.org/notions/show/125/burden-of-proof
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 23:43:51+00:00

Document:
If an appellant raises the vagueness of an indictment as a ground of appeal and it turns out that he never raised this issue at trial, then he has the burden of proving at the appellate stage that his ability to prepare his defence was materially impaired as a result of the defect in the indictment. If however he did raise this issue at trial, then the Prosecution has the burden of proving that the appellant’s defence was not materially impaired. See paragraph 25.
25. In considering whether a defect in the indictment has been cured by subsequent disclosure, the question arises as to which party has the burden of proof on the matter. In general, a party should not be permitted to refrain from making an objection to a matter which was apparent during the course of the trial, and to raise it only in the event of an adverse finding against that party. Failure to object in the Trial Chamber will usually result in the Appeals Chamber disregarding the argument on grounds of waiver. However, the importance of the right of an accused to be informed of the charges against him and the possibility that he will incur serious prejudice if material facts crucial to the Prosecution are communicated for the first time at trial suggest that the waiver doctrine should not entirely foreclose an accused from raising an indictment defect for the first time on appeal. Where, in such circumstances, an appellant raises a defect in the indictment for the first time on appeal, he bears the burden of proving that his ability to prepare his defence was materially impaired. On the other hand, when an accused has previously raised the issue of lack of notice before the Trial Chamber, the burden rests on the Prosecution to prove on appeal that the ability of the accused to prepare a defence was not materially impaired.
 Niyitegeka Appeal Judgement, para. 198.
 Niyitegeka Appeal Judgement, para. 199 referring to Kayishema and Ruzindana Appeal Judgement, para. 91.
 Niyitegeka Appeal Judgement, para. 200.
 Ntagerura et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 31; Kvočka et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 35; Niyitegeka Appeal Judgement, para. 200.
 Ntagerura et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 31; Kvočka et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 35, Niyitegeka Appeal Judgement, para. 200.
56. Finally, the Appeals Chamber notes its agreement with the Trial Chamber’s finding that an accused claiming to be unfit to stand trial bears the burden of so proving by a preponderance of the evidence. In this regard, the Appeals Chamber notes that this approach is consistent with the one used in common law jurisdictions where the burden of proof generally lies on the party which alleges the accused’s unfitness to stand trial and is considered to be discharged if this party can show its claim on the balance of probabilities.
 Decision of 26 May 2004, para. 38; see supra, para. 43.
 R. v. Podola  3 W.L.R. 718.
The Appeals Chamber also takes note of the aforementioned Nahak Decision in which the SPSC determined that the preponderance standard governs determinations of an accused’s fitness to stand trial (Nahak Decision, paras 57-59 referring to the Decision of 26 May 2004, para. 38: “[…] competence to stand trial is not an element of the offence with which the Defendant is charged” and, consequently, “it is not required that a defendant’s competence be proved by 'a higher standard as is required of the prosecutor when proving guilt in criminal cases’”; and paras 59-60, 67, 152 referring to the requirement that “proof that it is more probable than not […] has been demonstrated.”). The Appeals Chamber finally notes that the SPSC declined to define who bears the burden of proof and decided to evaluate the evidence on the matter “without depending on any 'onus of proof’ that might otherwise be imposed on the Defendant.” (ibid., paras 61-67).
Decision on Continuation of Appellate Proceedings for Gvero - 16.01.2013 POPOVIĆ et al.
21. […] An appellant claiming to be unfit to participate in the proceedings bears the burden of so proving by a preponderance of the evidence.
 See Strugar Appeal Judgement, para. 56.
24. The Appeals Chamber recalls that an accused does not bear the burden of proving his alibi beyond reasonable doubt. When an alibi is properly raised, the Prosecution must establish beyond reasonable doubt that, despite the alibi, the facts alleged are nevertheless true. The Appeals Chamber observes that the Trial Chamber correctly recalled the law and burden of proof to be applied in the assessment of alibi.
25. Furthermore, the Appeals Chamber has held that “Trial Chambers are endowed with the discretion to require corroboration”. In this respect, it was not unreasonable for the Trial Chamber to question the credibility of Munyakazi’s alibi in the absence of corroboration given the inherent self-interest of his testimony and the introduction of the alibi at the close of the case. Furthermore, the fact that the death of Kabungo and the mourning period were not specifically challenged during cross-examination does not prevent the Trial Chamber from doubting their veracity and taking the lack of corroboration into account when assessing the evidence. The Appeals Chamber has previously emphasized that a Trial Chamber is not required to accept as true statements unchallenged during cross-examination. Therefore, the Trial Chamber has not shifted the burden of proof in assessing Munyakazi’s alibi; all that it has done, and this quite properly, is to note that there was no supporting evidence of the alibi.
 Zigiranyirazo Appeal Judgement, para. 17.
 Zigiranyirazo Appeal Judgement, para. 18. See also Renzaho Appeal Judgement, para. 303.
 Trial Judgement, para. 35, quoting Zigiranyirazo Appeal Judgement, paras. 17, 18.
 Nchamihigo Appeal Judgement, para. 45.
 Karera Appeal Judgement, para. 29.
[O]bjections based on lack of notice should be specific and timely. The Appeals Chamber agrees with the Prosecution that blanket objections that “the entire indictment is defective” are insufficiently specific. As to timeliness, the objection should be raised at the pre-trial stage (for instance in a motion challenging the indictment) or at the time the evidence of a new material fact is introduced. However, an objection raised later at trial will not automatically lead to a shift in the burden of proof: the Trial Chamber must consider relevant factors, such as whether the Defence provided a reasonable explanation for its failure to raise the objection earlier in the trial.
The Trial Chamber did not consider Muvunyi’s objection to the form of paragraph 3.24 of the Indictment to be timely. Muvunyi has not advanced any reason suggesting that this conclusion was erroneous. It therefore falls to him to demonstrate that the preparation of his defence was prejudiced by the omission from the Indictment of the approximate time and place of the Gikonko meeting.
124. Muvunyi has failed to make such a demonstration. Indeed, the Appellant’s Brief does not address the question of prejudice suffered from the leading of evidence about the Gikonko meeting. In these circumstances, the Appeals Chamber finds that Muvunyi has not discharged his burden to demonstrate prejudice. Consequently, this sub-ground of appeal is dismissed.
 Motion for Judgement of Acquittal, para. 59 (“With respect to the sensitization meetings, the Prosecutor offered the testimony of Witnesses CCP, YAI, CCR, YAP. These sensitizing meetings as alleged in the indictment are not sufficiently plead as to victims of the crimes of genocide in each instance or what specific acts of genocide occurred in order to give the Accused notice of what Count 1 or Count 2 acts he must specifically defend against.”).
 Bagosora et al., Decision on Aloys Ntabakuze’s Interlocutory Appeal on Questions of Law Raised by the 29 June 2006 Trial Chamber I Decision on Motion for Exclusion of Evidence, para. 46 (internal citation omitted).
 Muvunyi, Decision on Tharcisse Muvunyi’s Motion for Judgement of Acquittal pursuant to Rule 98bis [The Prosecutor v. Tharcisse Muvunyi, Case No. ICTR-00-55A-T, Decision on Tharcisse Muvunyi’s Motion for Judgement of Acquittal pursuant to Rule 98bis, 13 October 2005], para. 41.
 Gacumbitsi Appeal Judgement, para. 51, quoting Niyitegeka Appeal Judgement, paras. 199, 200. See also Bagosora et al., Decision on Aloys Ntabakuze’s Interlocutory Appeal on Questions of Law Raised by the 29 June 2006 Trial Chamber I Decision on Motion for Exclusion of Evidence, paras. 45-47.
 Muvunyi Appeal Brief, paras. 80-81 (where he simply objects to the lack of notice). A similar situation occurred in Niyitegeka. In that case, the Appeals Chamber found that the Indictment was defective, that Niyitegeka had not objected to this during trial, and that the burden of showing prejudice was therefore on him. Since he had made no submissions as to how he was prejudiced, the Appeals Chamber held that the Trial Chamber did not err in convicting him. Niyitegeka Appeal Judgement, paras. 200, 207, 211.
With respect to alibi, the Chamber notes that in Musema, it was held that “[i]n raising the defence of alibi, the Accused not only denies that he committed the crimes for which he is charged but also asserts that he was elsewhere than at the scene of these crimes when they were committed. The onus is on the Prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the Accused. In establishing its case, when an alibi defence is introduced, the Prosecution must prove, beyond any reasonable doubt, that the Accused was present and committed the crimes for which he is charged and thereby discredit the alibi defence. The alibi defence does not carry a separate burden of proof. If the defence is reasonably possibly true, it must be successful”[footnote omitted].
417. The Appeals Chamber recalls that, in raising an alibi defence, the defendant is claiming that, objectively, he was not in a position to commit the crime. It is for the accused to decide what line of defence to adopt in order to raise doubt in the mind of the judges as to his responsibility for the offences charged, in this case by producing evidence tending to support or to establish the alleged alibi. The only purpose of an alibi is to cast reasonable doubt on the Prosecutor’s allegations, which must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. In alleging an alibi, the accused merely obliges the Prosecution to demonstrate that there is no reasonable likelihood that the alibi is true. In other words, the Prosecution must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that, “despite the alibi, the facts alleged are nevertheless true”.
In the present case, the Appeals Chamber found that the Trial Chamber’s assessment of the alibi evidence was erroneous and concluded that it had not been established beyond reasonable doubt that the Appellant committed the crimes in question (paras 413-474 of the Appeal Judgement).
 Kayishema and Ruzindana Appeal Judgement, para. 106. See also Niyitegeka Appeal Judgement, para. 60; Musema Appeal Judgement, para. 200.
 Musema Appeal Judgement, para. 202; Kayishema and Ruzindana Appeal Judgement, paras. 110-111.
Musema Appeal Judgement, para. 202. See also Limaj et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 63; Kamuhanda Appeal Judgement, para. 167; Kajelijeli Appeal Judgement, paras. 41-42.
326. When the Appellant raises a defect in the indictment for the first time on appeal, then he bears the burden of showing that his ability to prepare his defence was materially impaired. When, however, an accused has previously raised the issue of lack of notice before the Trial Chamber, the burden rests on the Prosecutor to prove on appeal that the ability of the accused to prepare a defence was not materially impaired. All of this is subject to the inherent jurisdiction of the Appeals Chamber to do justice in the case.
 Muhimana Appeal Judgement, paras. 80 and 199; Simić Appeal Judgement, para. 25; Ntagerura et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 31; Kvočka et al. Appeal Judgement., para. 35; Niyitegeka Appeal Judgement, para. 200.
 Ntagerura et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 31; Niyitegeka Appeal Judgement, para. 200.
It is settled jurisprudence before the two ad hoc Tribunals that in putting forward an alibi, a defendant need only produce evidence likely to raise a reasonable doubt in the Prosecution’s case. The burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt the facts charged remains squarely on the shoulders of the Prosecution. Indeed, it is incumbent on the Prosecution to establish beyond reasonable doubt that, despite the alibi, the facts alleged are nevertheless true.
43. Nothing in the foregoing requires the Prosecution, however, specifically to disprove each alibi witness’s testimony beyond reasonable doubt. Rather, the Prosecution’s burden is to prove the accused’s guilt as to the alleged crimes beyond reasonable doubt in spite of the proffered alibi.
 See Niyitegeka Appeal Judgement, para. 60 citing Kayishema and Ruzindana Appeal Judgement, para. 106.
 Niyitegeka Appeal Judgement, para. 60 (internal citations omitted). See also Čelebići Case Appeal Judgement, para. 581; Musema Appeal Judgement, para. 202; Kayishema and Ruzindana Appeal Judgement, para. 113.
91. The Appeals Chamber recalls that an accused does not bear the burden of proving his alibi beyond reasonable doubt. Rather, he must simply produce evidence tending to show that he was not present at the time of the alleged crime. If the alibi is reasonably possibly true, it must be accepted. Where an alibi is properly raised, the Prosecution must establish beyond reasonable doubt that, despite the alibi, the facts alleged are nevertheless true.
 See, e.g., Nchamihigo Appeal Judgement, para. 92; Zigiranyirazo Appeal Judgement, para. 17; Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 414.
 See, e.g., Nchamihigo Appeal Judgement, para. 92; Zigiranyirazo Appeal Judgement, para. 17; Musema Appeal Judgement, para. 202.
 See, e.g., Nchamihigo Appeal Judgement, para. 93; Zigiranyirazo Appeal Judgement, para. 18; Karera Appeal Judgement, para. 330.
195. The Appeals Chamber recalls that where the Indictment is found to be defective, an appellant who raises a defect in the indictment for the first time on appeal bears the burden of showing that his ability to prepare his defence was materially impaired. Where, however, an accused had already raised the issue of lack of notice before the Trial Chamber, the burden rests on the Prosecution to demonstrate on appeal that the accused’s ability to prepare a defence was not materially impaired.
196. With regard to the Trial Chamber’s finding that Sagahutu issued an operational instruction in relation to the Belgian peacekeepers’ access to the Prime Minister’s residence and sent an armoured unit and supplies to his subordinates on the ground, the Trial Chamber relied on the evidence of Prosecution Witnesses AWC, ALN, DA, and HP. The Appeals Chamber notes that, in his closing arguments, Sagahutu made a general objection in relation to the pleading in the Indictment of the charge regarding the killing of the Prime Minister. Nonetheless, Sagahutu did not take specific issue with the introduction of particular material facts during the testimony of Witnesses AWC, ALN, DA, and HP. Therefore, the Appeals Chamber considers that Sagahutu did not make a specific and timely objection at trial to the lack of pleading in the Indictment of these material facts. In such circumstances, it falls on Sagahutu to demonstrate that the preparation of his defence was materially impaired by these omissions in the Indictment.
 Ntagerura et al. Appeal Judgement, paras. 31, 138; Kvočka et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 35; Niyitegeka Appeal Judgement, para. 200.
 Muvunyi I Appeal Judgement, para. 41; Ntagerura et al. Appeal Judgement, paras. 31, 138; Kvočka et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 35; Niyitegeka Appeal Judgement, para. 200.
 See Trial Judgement, paras. 1715-1720, 1740, 1744. See also Trial Judgement, paras. 1625-1628, 1632-1635, 1638, 1642, 1643.
 Sagahutu Closing Arguments, T. 25 June 2009 p. 83 (“Concerning the murder of [the] Prime Minister […] [i]n the Ntagerura [et al.] case, it was held that the Accused was charged [with] having planned, incited, committed, ordered or aided and abetted, and executed the alleged crimes. The Prosecutor should spell out the actions and the line of conduct of the Accused which give rise to the charges that are brought against him. This was not proven by the Prosecutor insofar as Captain Innocent Sagahutu is concerned”.). In his Closing Brief, Sagahutu generally objected to the Prosecution’s failure to plead in the Indictment his “role” in the killing of the Prime Minister. See Sagahutu Closing Brief [The Prosecutor v. Augustin Ndindiliyimana et al., Case No. ICTR-00-56-T, Mémoire final du Capitaine Innocent Sagahutu (confidential), 31 March 2009 (English translation filed on 16 June 2009)], para. 55 (“[a]ux paragraphes 78, 103 à 107, le Procureur ne montre pas le rôle que le Capitaine Sagahutu aurait joué en tant que commandant de l’Escadron A ou comme supérieur hiérarchique”.).
 On the issue of the armoured unit: Witness ALN, T. 29 September 2004 pp. 45, 47; Witness DA, T. 11 January 2005 pp. 40-44, 53; Witness AWC, T. 18 January 2006 pp. 29-31. On the issue of supplies: Witness DA, T. 11 January 2005 pp. 56-58, 65, 71; T. 12 January 2005 p. 7; T. 13 January 2005 p. 10; Witness HP, T. 9 May 2005 pp. 21, 22, 24. Sagahutu did not challenge the pleading of these material facts in the Indictment at trial. See Sagahutu Closing Brief, paras. 54-57, 71-74, 76-79, 225-230, 234, 236, 240, 509, 516, 663. The Appeals Chamber notes further that Sagahutu challenged the credibility of the testimonies of Witnesses DA, HP, and AWC relating to the allegation of sending supplies and an armoured unit. See Sagahutu Closing Brief, paras. 240, 242, 243, 246, 287, 289-292, 509, 516, fn. 241; Sagahutu Closing Arguments, T. 25 June 2009 pp. 83, 84. The Appeals Chamber notes that during examination-in-chief, Witness DA attributed the instruction regarding the access of the Belgian peacekeepers to the Prime Minister’s residence to Nzuwonemeye. See Witness DA, T. 11 January 2005 pp. 48 (“There was a message from Bizimungu and addressed to Sagahutu stating that Belgian soldiers wanted to get in where he was, and he was asking him to say whether he should allow those Belgian soldiers to get in”.), 49 (“Warrant Officer Bizimungu said that the vehicles on board which were -- where he was, wanted to get in where he was, that is, in the [P]rime [M]inister’s residence, and he was asking whether he should be allowed to let those vehicles get in where he was. That was the content of that message. […] That message was meant for Sagahutu, and the person who responded to it was the commander of the battalion, who said that they should let them in but that they shouldn’t be let out with anything whatsoever”.). However, during cross-examination, Witness DA attributed this instruction to Sagahutu. See Witness DA, T. 24 January 2005 p. 38 (“Q. Are you able then to say who was in charge of the radio during the day of 7th April 1994? […] Q. […] Are you able to tell the Court – let me rephrase my question. You heard Bizimungu call Major Nzuwonemeye? A. No, he was speaking, rather, to Sagahutu and not to Nzuwonemeye.”). It should be noted that the Trial Chamber in its summary of Witness DA’s evidence only referred to his evidence given during examination-in-chief. See Trial Judgement, paras. 1624-1631.
 See Ntagerura et al. Appeal Judgement, paras. 31, 138; Kvočka et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 35; Niyitegeka Appeal Judgement, para. 200.
15. Under Rule 73(A) of the Rules, the Prosecution has a positive and continuous obligation to, “as soon as practicable, disclose to the Defence any material that in [its] actual knowledge […] may suggest the innocence or mitigate the guilt of the accused or affect the credibility of Prosecution evidence”. The determination as to which material is subject to disclosure under this provision is a fact-based enquiry made by the Prosecution. Therefore, the Appeals Chamber will not intervene in the exercise of the Prosecution’s discretion unless it is shown that the Prosecution abused it and, where there is no evidence to the contrary, will assume that the Prosecution is acting in good faith. The Appeals Chamber recalls that the Prosecution’s obligation to disclose exculpatory material is essential to a fair trial, and notes that this obligation has always been interpreted broadly.
16. In order to establish that the Prosecution is in breach of its disclosure obligations, the applicant must: (i) identify specifically the material sought; (ii) present a prima facie showing of its probable exculpatory nature; and (iii) prove that the material requested is in the custody or under the control of the Prosecution. If the Appeals Chamber determines that the Prosecution is in breach of its disclosure obligations, the Appeals Chamber must examine whether the defence has been prejudiced by that failure before considering whether a remedy is appropriate.
 See also Rule 68(A) of the ICTR Rules.
 See, e.g., Decision on Augustin Ngirabatware’s Motion for Sanctions for the Prosecution and for an Order for Disclosure, 15 April 2014 (“Appeal Decision of 15 April 2014”), para. 12, referring to Justin Mugenzi and Prosper Mugiraneza v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-99-50-A, Decision on Motions for Relief for Rule 68 Violations, 24 September 2012 (“Mugenzi Appeal Decision of 24 September 2012”), para. 7, Ephrem Setako v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-04-81-A, Decision on Ephrem Setako’s Motion to Amend his Notice of Appeal and Motion to Admit Evidence, filed confidentially on 23 March 2011, public redacted version filed on 9 November 2011 (“Setako Appeal Decision of 9 November 2011”), para. 13, Jean de Dieu Kamuhanda v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-99-54A-R68, Decision on Motion for Disclosure, 4 March 2010 (“Kamuhanda Appeal Decision of 4 March 2010”), para. 14, Prosecutor v. Dario Kordić and Mario Čerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, Judgment, 17 December 2004, para. 183.
 See, e.g., Appeal Decision of 15 April 2014, para. 12, referring to Mugenzi Appeal Decision of 24 September 2012, para. 7, Kamuhanda Appeal Decision of 4 March 2010, para. 14; Ferdinand Nahimana et al. v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-99-52-A, Decision on Appellant Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza’s Motions for Leave to Present Additional Evidence Pursuant to Rule 115 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 8 December 2006 (“Barayagwiza Appeal Decision of 8 December 2006”) para. 34.
 See, e.g., Appeal Decision of 15 April 2014, para. 12, referring to Mugenzi Appeal Decision of 24 September 2012, para. 7; Setako Appeal Decision of 9 November 2011, para. 12; Callixte Kalimanzira v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-05-88-A, Judgement, 20 October 2010 (“Kalimanzira Appeal Judgement”), para. 18.
 See, e.g., Appeal Decision of 15 April 2014, para. 13, referring to Justin Mugenzi and Prosper Mugiraneza v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-99-50-A, Judgement, 4 February 2013 (“Mugenzi and Mugiraneza Appeal Judgement”), para. 39; Théoneste Bagosora et al. v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-98-41-A, Decision on Aloys Ntabakuze’s Motions for Disclosure, 18 January 2011, para. 7; Kamuhanda Appeal Decision of 4 March 2010, para. 14.
See, e.g., Appeal Decision of 15 April 2014, para. 13, referring to Mugenzi and Mugiraneza Appeal Judgement, para. 39; Setako Appeal Decision of 9 November 2011, para. 14; Kalimanzira Appeal Judgement, para. 18.
when an alibi is submitted by the Accused the burden of proof rests upon the Prosecution to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt in all aspects. Indeed, the Prosecution must prove “that the accused was present and committed the crimes for which he is charged and thereby discredit the alibi defence”. If the alibi is reasonably possibly true, it will be successful.
This definition is legally beyond reproach and shows that the Trial Chamber was aware of the applicable burden of proof.
 Trial Judgement, para. 84, referring to Musema Appeal Judgement, para. 205 (citations omitted).
16. The Appeals Chamber recalls that, in order to show that the Prosecution is in breach of its disclosure obligation pursuant to Rule 68(A) of the Rules, the Defence must identify specifically the materials sought, present a prima facie showing of their probable exculpatory nature, and prove the Prosecutor’s custody or control of the materials requested. Thus, contrary to the Appellant’s submission, his burden of proof could not be met by merely showing a prima facie case of custody or advancing a “presumption of possession”.
 See, e.g., Karemera Decision [The Prosecutor v. Édouard Karemera et al., Case No. ICTR-98-44-AR73.13, Decision on “Joseph Nzirorera’s Appeal From Decision on Tenth Rule 68 Motion”, 14 May 2008], para. 9; Prosecutor v. Miroslav Bralo, Case No. IT-95-17-A, Decision on Motions for Access to Ex Parte Portions of the Record on Appeal and For Disclosure of Mitigating Material, 30 August 2006, para. 31; Juvénal Kajelijeli v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-98-44A-A, Judgement, 23 May 2005, para. 262.
 Appeal [Appeal of the 30 October 2009 Trial Chamber II[’s] ‘Decision on Defence Motion for Disclosure and Return of Exculpatory Documents Seised from the Accused’, 27 November 2009], paras. 70, 73, 74; Reply [Reply to Respondent’s Response to Appeal of the 30 October 2009 Trial Chamber II[’s] ‘Decision on Defence Motion for Disclosure and Return of Exculpatory Documents Seised from the Accused’, 7 December 2009], paras. 12, 13. Referring to paragraph 17 of the Response, the Appellant notes that the Prosecution acknowledges that custody and control need only be shown on a prima facie basis (see Reply, para. 12). It is nevertheless clear from paragraphs 16, 18, and 19 of the Response [Respondent’s Response to Appeal of the 30 October 2009 Trial Chamber II’s ‘Decision on Defence Motion for Disclosure and Return of Exculpatory Documents Seised from the Appellant’, 1 December 2009] that the Prosecution has made a technical error.
28. The Appeals Chamber is not convinced that the Referral Chamber erred in failing to address the issue of which party bears the burden of proof, or that it placed an inappropriate burden on the Defence in this respect. In its submissions, the Prosecution acknowledged that it bore the burden of proof to demonstrate that Mr. Uwinkindi’s trial in Rwanda will be fair. The Appeals Chamber considers that, in cases where the Prosecution requests referral, it bears the burden of proof to demonstrate that the conditions set out in Rule 11bis of the Rules are met. However, the Appeals Chamber recalls that a designated trial chamber may also rely on any information and orders it reasonably finds necessary in determining whether the proceedings following the transfer will be fair. A review of the Impugned Decision as a whole reflects that the Referral Chamber correctly regarded the burden of proof as falling on the Prosecution and also acted within its discretion in relying on other information or its own orders to satisfy itself that Mr. Uwinkindi’s trial in Rwanda will be fair.
 [Prosecutor’s Response Brief, 28 September 2011 (“Response Brief”)], para. 10.
 Stanković Appeal Decision, para. 50. See also Impugned Decision, para. 16.
103. The Appeals Chamber recalls that the Prosecution bears the burden of establishing facts material to the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt, and that suggesting that the Defence should present evidence proving the contrary would be an impermissible shift of such burden. In this case, the Trial Chamber essentially took the view that the Defence evidence on the events at Gisagara market was not inconsistent with the Prosecution evidence. It reasoned that since two credible and reliable Prosecution witnesses saw Ntawukulilyayo at the market, the fact that the Defence witnesses did not see him or hear of his presence at the market did not necessarily suggest that he was not there.
104. The Appeals Chamber finds no error in the Trial Chamber’s preference for positive eyewitness testimony, and does not consider that the Trial Chamber’s assessment of the Defence evidence in this regard suggests that Ntawukulilyayo was required to present witnesses who were able to negate the Prosecution evidence. The Trial Chamber found that “Witnesses AYQ and BAU provided convincing and consistent accounts of Ntawukulilyayo’s order to refugees to go to Kabuye hill.” It then considered the evidence that Ntawukulilyayo presented to show that he was not at the market that day. The Trial Chamber also considered Ntawukulilyayo’s evidence that the refugees had already left the market before he allegedly instructed them to move. In the Appeals Chamber’s view, the fact that the Trial Chamber considered that such evidence was “of limited probative value” and did “not raise doubt” or “concerns” about the Prosecution evidence does not constitute a reversal of the burden of proof.
 Milošević Appeal Judgement, para. 231.
 See Trial Judgement, paras. 253-262. See also ibid., para. 250.
 Trial Judgement, paras. 247-262. The Appeals Chamber notes that, in analyzing the Defence evidence seeking to discredit Witness AYQ based on her association with Avega and alleged procurement of false testimony, the Trial Chamber explicitly bore “in mind that the Defence carries no independent burden when seeking to raise doubt with elements of the Prosecution case.” See ibid., para. 245.
 Trial Judgement, para. 255. See also ibid., paras. 159, 161, 167, 179.
 Trial Judgement, paras. 253, 259, 261. See also ibid., para. 12.
 Trial Judgement, para. 250. See also ibid., para. 12.
14. Finally, the Appeals Chamber notes that it is the Appellant’s burden to demonstrate that each amendment should be permitted under the standards outlined above, including establishing lack of prejudice to the Prosecution.
 Blagojević Decision of 26 June 2006, para. 14.
226. The standard of proof at trial requires that a Trial Chamber may only find an accused guilty of a crime if the Prosecution has proved each element of that crime and of the mode of liability, and any fact which is indispensable for the conviction, beyond reasonable doubt. This standard applies whether the evidence evaluated is direct or circumstantial. The Appeals Chamber has previously endorsed an approach where, similar in parts to the present case, a Trial Chamber individually examined evidence with respect to a number of incidents and subsequently assessed the accused’s criminal responsibility for those incidents.
 See, e.g., Stakić Appeal Judgement, para. 219 (“A Trial Chamber may only find an accused guilty of a crime if the Prosecution has proved each element of that crime (as defined with respect to the relevant mode of liability) beyond a reasonable doubt.”); Ntagerura et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 174.
 Stakić Appeal Judgement, para. 219; Kupreškić et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 303; Kordić and Čerkez Appeal Judgement, para. 834.
 Kvočka et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 70 (citing with approval the approach of the Trial Chamber in Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić to determine whether certain incidents occurred beyond reasonable doubt before determining Galić’s individual criminal responsibility for those incidents).
17. An alibi does not constitute a defence in its proper sense. By raising an alibi, an accused is simply denying that he was in a position to commit the crime with which he was charged. An accused does not bear the burden of proving his alibi beyond reasonable doubt. Rather, “[h]e must simply produce the evidence tending to show that he was not present at the time of the alleged crime” or, otherwise stated, present evidence “likely to raise a reasonable doubt in the Prosecution case.” If the alibi is reasonably possibly true, it must be accepted.
18. Where an alibi is properly raised, the Prosecution must establish beyond reasonable doubt that, despite the alibi, the facts alleged are nevertheless true. The Prosecution may do so, for instance, by demonstrating that the alibi does not in fact reasonably account for the period when the accused is alleged to have committed the crime. Where the alibi evidence does prima facie account for the accused’s activities at the relevant time of the commission of the crime, the Prosecution must “eliminate the reasonable possibility that the alibi is true,” for example, by demonstrating that the alibi evidence is not credible.
20. In assessing whether a Trial Chamber, when using this type of language, has in fact shifted the burden of proof, the Appeals Chamber carries out an in-depth analysis of the specific findings related to a given incident. The Appeals Chamber has generally found that such language, while inappropriate, is not fatal when viewed in the broader context of a Trial Chamber’s findings. This is especially the case where the Trial Chamber accurately refers elsewhere in the judgement to the appropriate burden of proof for the evaluation of alibi evidence, its overall approach evinces a careful assessment of the alibi evidence, and its conclusion that the alibi evidence is ultimately not credible is reasonable when weighed against the evidence of participation in a crime.
39. Nonetheless, the Appeals Chamber finds that the Trial Chamber’s assessment of Zigiranyirazo’s alibi involves three serious errors that, taken together, invalidate his convictions based on the events at Kesho Hill. Specifically, the Trial Chamber erred by misapprehending the burden of proof in the context of alibi, failing to consider or provide a reasoned opinion with respect to relevant circumstantial evidence, and misconstruing key evidence which, properly considered, bolstered Zigiranyirazo’s alibi.
42. The Appeals Chamber emphasizes that a successful alibi does not require conclusive proof of an accused’s whereabouts. Indeed, there is no requirement that an alibi “exclude the possibility” that the accused committed a crime. The alibi need only raise reasonable doubt that the accused was in a position to commit the crime.
 Ndindabahizi Appeal Judgement, para. 66; Kajelijeli Appeal Judgement, paras. 41, 42; Kayishema and Ruzindana Appeal Judgement, para. 106; Delalić et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 581.
 Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 414; Ndindabahizi Appeal Judgement, para. 66; Kajelijeli Appeal Judgement, paras. 41, 42; Niyitegeka Appeal Judgement, para. 60; Musema Appeal Judgement, paras. 205, 206; Kayishema and Ruzindana Appeal Judgement, para. 106; Delalić et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 581.
 Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 414; Simba Appeal Judgement, para. 184; Karera Appeal Judgement, para. 331; Musema Appeal Judgement, para. 202; Kayishema and Ruzindana Appeal Judgement, para. 107.
 Musema Appeal Judgement, para. 202.
 Karera Appeal Judgement, para. 331 (internal citation omitted); Simba Appeal Judgement, para. 184 (internal citation omitted); Kajelijeli Appeal Judgement, para. 42 (internal citation omitted); Niyitegeka Appeal Judgement, para. 60.
 Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 414; Kamuhanda Appeal Judgement, para. 38; Kajelijeli Appeal Judgement, para. 41; Musema Appeal Judgement, paras. 205, 206.
 Karera Appeal Judgement, para. 330; Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 414; Simba Appeal Judgement, para. 184; Kajelijeli Appeal Judgement, para. 42; Niyitegeka Appeal Judgement, para. 60; Musema Appeal Judgement, paras. 205, 206; Kayishema and Ruzindana Appeal Judgement, para. 107. See also Limaj et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 64, quoting Limaj et al. Trial Judgement, para. 11 (“[A] finding that an alibi is false does not in itself ‘establish the opposite to what it asserts’. The Prosecution must not only rebut the validity of the alibi but also establish beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the Accused as alleged in the Indictment.”).
 Kajelijeli Appeal Judgement, para. 41 (internal citation omitted); Kayishema and Ruzindana Appeal Judgement, para. 106 (internal citation omitted). See also Limaj et al. Appeal Judgement, paras. 64, 65 (internal citation omitted); Delalić et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 581.
 See Limaj et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 65 (“When evaluating Haradin Bala’s alibi evidence, the Trial Chamber observed that ‘the testimony of most of the witnesses for the Defence for Haradin Bala does not necessarily negate the evidence that Haradin Bala remained in Llapushnik/Lapušnik after the end of May.’ The use of the phrase ‘to negate the evidence’ could be read in the sense that the Trial Chamber required Haradin Bala to negate the Prosecution evidence”), quoting Limaj et al. Trial Judgement, para. 647.
 See Kamuhanda Appeal Judgement, para. 39 (“the Appeals Chamber notes that in some instances the Trial Chamber applied language which prima facie supports the Appellant’s arguments [that the Trial Chamber shifted the burden of proof], for example in paragraph 174 of the [Kamuhanda] Trial Judgement: ‘[…] the evidence of Witness ALB does not exonerate the Accused from being present at Gikomero.’”) (emphasis in original).
 See Musema Appeal Judgement, para. 295 (“The wording ‘are by themselves, insufficient to refute the possibility’ used by the Trial Chamber with respect to alibi evidence might be an error on a point of law, had Musema’s evidence been sufficient to sustain a potential alibi.”)(emphasis in original), quoting Musema Trial Judgement, para. 740.
 Musema Appeal Judgement, para. 209.
 See, e.g., Musema Appeal Judgement, paras. 210, 211.
 See, e.g., Limaj et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 65; Kamuhanda Appeal Judgement, paras. 38-44; Musema Appeal Judgement, paras. 317, 318.
 Trial Judgement, para. 89 (“Pursuant to Article 20(3) of the Statute, an accused shall be presumed innocent until proven guilty. This presumption places on the Prosecution the burden of establishing the guilt of the accused, a burden which remains on the Prosecution throughout the entire trial. A finding of guilt may be reached only when a majority of the Trial Chamber is satisfied that guilt has been proved beyond reasonable doubt.”) (internal citation omitted).
 Trial Judgement, paras. 87, 88.
 See Simba Appeal Judgement, para. 185 (“The Appeals Chamber is further satisfied that the Trial Chamber correctly applied [the legal standard on alibi evidence] in its subsequent findings on alibi. The Trial Chamber first found that, although the alibi evidence for the period of 6-13 April 1994 ‘[did] not account for every moment of [the Appellant’s time]], viewed as a whole and when weighed against the Prosecution evidence, it [provided]] a reasonable and satisfactory explanation for [the Appellant’s]] activities [for this period]].’ The Appeals Chamber notes that this wording reflects that in assessing the alibi evidence for this period the Trial Chamber did not require the Defence to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt.”), quoting Simba Trial Judgement, para. 349. See also Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgement, paras. 428-431, 473, 474 (reversing a Trial Chamber finding that an alibi based on hearsay had not been established).
 See supra Section III.A.1 (Burden of Proof in the Assessment of Alibi). See also Muhimana Appeal Judgement, para. 18 (“An accused does not need to prove at trial that a crime ‘could not have occurred’ or ‘preclude the possibility that it could occur’.”).
 See supra Section III.A.1 (Burden of Proof in the Assessment of Alibi).
Decision on Disclosure - 18.05.2010 KAREMERA et al.
12. Pursuant to Rule 66(B) of the Rules, the Prosecutor shall permit the Defence, upon request, to inspect documents and other records in his custody or control if these records (i) are material to the preparation of the Defence case; (ii) are intended for use by the Prosecution as evidence at trial; or (iii) were obtained from or belonged to the accused. If the Defence is not satisfied with the Prosecution’s response to a request pursuant to Rule 66(B), it may request the Trial Chamber to order the inspection.
13. However, the Defence bears the burden of proving an alleged breach of the Prosecution’s obligations pursuant to a request under Rule 66(B) of the Rules. It must therefore (i) demonstrate that the material sought is in the custody or control of the Prosecution; (ii) establish prima facie the materiality of the document sought to the preparation of the defence case; and (iii) specifically identify the requested material.
 Jean de Dieu Kamuhanda v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-99-54A-R68, Decision on Motion for Disclosure, 4 March 2010 (“Kamuhanda Disclosure Decision”), para. 14; The Prosecutor v. Édouard Karemera et al., Case No. ICTR-98-44-AR73.11, Decision on the Prosecution’s Interlocutory Appeal Concerning Disclosure Obligations, 23 January 2008 (“First Karemera Decision”), para 12. See also The Prosecutor v. Théoneste Bagosora et al., Case No. ICTR-98-41-AR73, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Relating to Disclosure Under Rule 66(B) of the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 25 September 2006 (“Bagosora Decision”), paras. 10, 11.
22. The Appeals Chamber further observes that in several instances, the Trial Chamber uses confusing language which could be viewed as shifting of the burden of proof onto the Defence to disprove the Prosecution’s case. In such instances, the Trial Chamber stated that “nothing in the evidence suggests” that a conclusion opposite to the one adopted by the Trial Chamber could be reached. The Appeals Chamber finds this language misleading and stresses that the Trial Chamber is required not only to apply the appropriate standard but also to articulate it correctly. That said, the Appeals Chamber considers that, subject to the analysis of the parties’ specific challenges below, the Trial Chamber in fact meant to state that all reasonable doubt was eliminated on the basis of the evidence cited in all such instances.
 E.g., Trial Judgement, paras 250, 266, 276, 289, 310, 324, 341, 354, 364, 393.
In raising the defence of alibi, the Accused not only denies that he committed the crimes for which he is charged but also asserts that he was elsewhere than at the scene of these crimes when they were committed. The onus is on the Prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the Accused. In establishing its case, when an alibi defence is introduced, the Prosecution must prove, beyond any reasonable doubt, that the accused was present and committed the crimes for which he is charged and thereby discredit the alibi defence. The alibi defence does not carry a separate burden of proof. If the defence is reasonably possibly true, it must be successful.
206. Musema accepts the above observation as a correct statement of the law as regards the burden and standard of proof. The Appeals Chamber is of the same opinion.
 Trial Judgement, para. 108 (emphasis added).
Appeal Judgement - 27.09.2007 LIMAJ et al.
24. […] The burden of proof on the Prosecution to establish facts beyond reasonable doubt does not necessarily require the Prosecution to establish that each piece of evidence independently establishes the relevant fact to that standard.
[a]n alibi […] is intended to raise reasonable doubt about the presence of the accused at the crime site, this being an element of the prosecution’s case, thus the burden of proof is on the prosecution.
[t]he burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt the facts charged remains squarely on the shoulders of the Prosecution. Indeed, it is incumbent on the Prosecution to establish beyond reasonable doubt that, despite the alibi, the facts alleged are nevertheless true.
This does not, however, require the Prosecution to specifically disprove each alibi witness’s testimony beyond reasonable doubt. Rather, the Prosecution’s burden is to prove the accused’s guilt as to the alleged crimes beyond reasonable doubt in spite of the proffered alibi.
So long as there is a factual foundation in the evidence for that alibi, the Accused bears no onus to establish that alibi; it is for the Prosecution to “eliminate any reasonable possibility that the evidence of alibi is true”. Further, as has been held by another Trial Chamber, a finding that an alibi is false does not in itself “establish the opposite to what it asserts”. The Prosecution must not only rebut the validity of the alibi but also establish beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the Accused as alleged in the Indictment.
 Kamuhanda Appeal Judgement, para. 167. See also Kajelijeli Appeal Judgement, paras 41-42, and Kayishema and Ruzindana Appeal Judgement, para. 111.
 Niyitegeka Appeal Judgement, para. 60 (internal footnotes omitted). See also Čelebići Appeal Judgement, para. 581; Musema Appeal Judgement, para. 202 (with reference to Kunarac et al. Trial Judgement, para. 625); Kayishema and Ruzindana Appeal Judgement, para. 113.
 Trial Judgement, para. 11, citing Vasiljević Trial Judgement, para. 15, fn. 7.
Decision on Death of Co-Accused - 24.09.2010 KAREMERA et al.
21. […] As noted above, the Trial Chamber explicitly recalled the principle of individual criminal responsibility and that the Prosecution must prove each element of each crime individually against each of the co-Accused. To the extent that they are charged with joint criminal enterprise and may thus be held accountable for acts of others in accordance with the common criminal purpose, the Appeals Chamber notes that Nzirorera’s death does not affect the burden to be met by the Prosecution in relation to Karemera and Ngirumpatse.
 Reasons for Impugned Decision, para. 14.
70. With respect to MLD1, the Trial Chamber held that “[t]]here are a number of aspects of MLD1’s account that are difficult to believe”. It further found that Vilić’s testimony “raise[s] serious questions as to the credibility of MLD10 in general and in respect of her alibi evidence regarding the Drina river and Varda factory incidents”. The Trial Chamber also found MLD15’s evidence “somewhat strange and artificial”. The Appeals Chamber considers that in making these findings, the Trial Chamber explained its reasons for concluding that the witnesses lacked credibility. Such language does not indicate a reversal of the burden of proof. On the contrary, it shows that the Trial Chamber carefully considered the evidence of these alibi witnesses.
71. The Trial Chamber considered that inconsistencies in witness testimonies “call into question the alibi as a whole, as [they cast] reasonable doubt on the alibi evidence” of MLD1, MLD10, and Marković. It also found that an “inconsistency resulting from MLD24’s evidence casts further doubt upon the veracity of the alibi presented as a whole.” The use of these phrases is unfortunate since, taken in isolation, they could be interpreted as requiring Milan Lukić to prove beyond reasonable doubt that he was in Belgrade at the time of the alleged crimes. However, the Appeals Chamber observes that such language must be viewed in the broader context of the Trial Chamber’s findings. The fact that the Trial Chamber in some instances used language which may be misunderstood does not necessarily mean that the Trial Chamber fundamentally misplaced the burden of proof.
72. The Trial Chamber articulated the correct legal standard applicable to the examination of alibi evidence. […] Thus, the Appeals Chamber considers that, when using this language, the Trial Chamber was explaining why it did not find that the proffered alibi raised a reasonable doubt in the Prosecution’s case. The Trial Chamber rejected Milan Lukić’s alibi after having considered the evidence as a whole. In these circumstances, the Appeals Chamber finds that Milan Lukić has failed to show that the Trial Chamber erred in law in assessing his alibi for the DrinaRiver and Varda Factory Incidents.
362. The Appeals Chamber further finds that the Trial Chamber properly applied this burden of proof. Sredoje Lukić refers to the Trial Chamber’s finding that “certain aspects of the alibi evidence [were] difficult to believe”, as well as the finding that witness accounts were “implausible”. The Appeals Chamber is of the view that these considerations do not indicate a reversal of the burden of proof.
 Trial Judgement, para. 223 (emphasis added).
 Trial Judgement, para. 226 (emphasis added).
 Cf. Zigiranyirazo Appeal Judgement, para. 20.
 Kamuhanda Appeal Judgement, para. 39.
 Trial Judgement, paras 230, 329.
128. […] [T]he Chamber recalls that it is not conducting a trial de novo.
137. The Appeals Chamber notes at the outset that, in respect of alleged errors of fact, the burden of showing that the Trial Chamber’s findings were unreasonable is on Kayishema. This standard of appellate review means that the “task of hearing, assessing and weighing the evidence presented at trial is left” to the Trial Chamber. Hence, the Appeals Chamber must give “a margin of deference” to factual findings reached by the Trial Chamber. One aspect of such burden is that it is up to the Appellant to draw the attention of the Appeals Chamber to the part of the record on appeal, which in his view supports the claim he is making. From a practical standpoint, it is the responsibility of the Appellant to indicate clearly which particular evidentiary material he relies upon. Claims that are not supported by such precise references to the relevant parts of the record on appeal will normally fail, on the ground that the Appellant has not discharged the applicable burden.
See also paras. 146, 237, 244, 255, 258, 295 and 320.
 See, for instance: “Decision relating to the Appellant’s motion for extension of time-limits and admission of additional evidence” in The Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-I-A, 15 October 1998, ICTY Appeals Chamber, para. 41; see also, in the same connection, Furundžija Appeal Judgement, para. 40.
 Tadić Appeal Judgement, para. 64, Aleksovski Appeal Judgement, para. 63, and Čelebiči Appeal Judgement para. 506.
 References should be made to relevant transcript page(s) and/or exhibit(s).
 Tadić Appeal Judgement, para. 64.
The Appeals Chamber recalls that in conformity with the principle of presumption of innocence, as enunciated in the Judgement, supra, it is the duty of the Prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
108. […] [T]he Appeals Chamber recalls that in a criminal case, the accused’s role at the level of preparation of the case should not be confused with his role at the trial stage before the Trial Chamber.
109. Indeed, the Appeals Chamber notes that Rule 67 (A) (ii) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence provides that when the Defence intends to enter the defence of alibi, in addition to the duty to notify the Prosecutor thereof, the accused must also provide the evidence upon which he intends to rely to establish his alibi. This rule, which applies at the level of case-preparation, only governs the reciprocal disclosure of evidence.
110. The Appeals Chamber is therefore of the opinion that this provision places no onus of proof on the Defence, in that it does not require the Defence to prove the existence of the facts, but rather provides for disclosure of evidence in support of the alibi. Thus, as reflected in Rule 67 referred to above, the Defence is required to disclose to the Prosecutor the place or places at which the accused claims to have been present at the time of the alleged crimes and, if it so desires, produce probative evidence tending to show that since the accused was at a particular location at a specific time, there was cause for reasonable doubt as to his presence at the scene of the crime at the alleged time. The accused is therefore at liberty to provide the Prosecution with such evidence as may establish the credibility of the alibi raised.
111. Consequently, it is the opinion of the Appeals Chamber that the purpose of entering a defence of alibi or establishing it at the stage of reciprocal disclosure of evidence is only to enable the Prosecutor to consolidate evidence of the accused’s criminal responsibility with respect to the crimes charged. Thus, during the trial, it is up to the accused to adopt a defence strategy enabling him to raise a doubt in the minds of the Judges as to his responsibility for the said crimes, and this, by adducing evidence to justify or prove the alibi.
112. […] The Appeals Chamber is aware of the fact that failure to prove an alibi must not be construed as an indication of the Accused’s guilt. However, the Chamber affirms that the issue of disclosure of evidence falls within the preparation of the case and precedes the production of evidence at trial. If the Defence is not in a position to produce evidence of the accused’s whereabouts, it is, nevertheless, at liberty to disclose to the Prosecutor, and then produce before the Trial Chamber, all evidentiary material likely to raise doubts as to the accused’s responsibility for the crimes charged. Accordingly, the Appeals Chamber holds that this cannot be considered as shifting the burden of proof at the trial.
113. The Appeals Chamber recalls that at the trial stage, the Trial Chamber limited itself to assessing the evidence presented by the parties. The Prosecutor must always prove the existence of the facts charged as well as the accused’s responsibility therefor. The Defence, for its part, must produce evidence before the Chamber in support of its claims that the crimes charged cannot be imputed to the accused because of his alibi. However, in that case, the burden of proof is not shouldered by the Defence. It is merely required to produce evidence likely to raise reasonable doubt regarding the case of the Prosecution.
 Čelebići Appeal Judgement, para. 581 : “It is a common misuse of the word to describe an alibi as a “defence”. If a defendant raises an alibi, he is merely denying that he was in a position to commit the crime with which he is charged. That is not a defence in its true sense at all. By raising that issue, the defendant does no more than require the Prosecution to eliminate the reasonable possibility that the alibi is true”.
 Kunarac Trial Judgement, para. 625 : “The Prosecution bore the onus of establishing the facts alleged in the Indictment. Having raised the issue of alibi, the accused bore no onus in establishing that alibi. It was for the Prosecution to establish that, despite the evidence of the alibi, the facts alleged in the indictment were nevertheless true”.
 See also the section of this Judgement on fair trial (III, A, paras. 50-51).
[…] (ii) The Defence shall notify the Prosecutor of its intention to enter: (a) The Defence of alibi; in which case the notification shall specify the place or places at which the accused claims to have been present at the time of the alleged crime and the names and addresses of witnesses and any other evidence upon which the accused intends to rely to establish the alibi”.
 However, the Appeals Chamber is of the opinion that evidence showing solely that the accused was not present at the scene of the crime, without providing any specific alibi, does not, generally speaking, show proof of alibi.
52. A preliminary matter of a general nature concerns the burden of proof. The question at issue in this Motion is whether the Appellant is entitled to a right given to him by the appeal process which he has invoked. It is for him to establish his entitlement to the right which he claims. Accordingly, it is for the Appellant to prove the elements of the entitlement.

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