Source: https://caselaw.findlaw.com/al-supreme-court/1684909.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 00:55:20+00:00

Document:
Mark TRENIER v. CITY OF PRICHARD and Troy Ephriam, Mayor.
Mark Trenier appeals from the trial court's summary judgment in favor of the City of Prichard and its mayor, Troy Ephriam. We affirm.
The mayoral election for the City of Prichard was held in October 2012, at which time Troy Ephriam, who had served on the city council, was elected mayor of the City of Prichard, defeating Mayor Davis. Before the conclusion of his mayoral term in 2012, Mayor Davis on two separate occasions attempted to have the city council approve subsequent employment agreements for Trenier and to have him reappointed as the fire chief; both attempts, however, were unsuccessful. Although Trenier's employment agreement expired on April 19, 2012, he continued to serve as fire chief until April 8, 2013, at which time newly elected Mayor Ephriam notified him that his employment was officially terminated.
“1. My name is Troy Ephriam, the duly elected Mayor of the City of Prichard, and I am familiar with the facts and circumstances surrounding the former employment of Mark Joseph Trenier as the Fire Chief of the City of Prichard, as well as the events giving rise to [Trenier's] Complaint in this matter.
“2. Prior to being elected Mayor of the City of Prichard, I was duly elected and served as a Prichard City Councilman, representing District Four, from 2001 until my election as Mayor in October 2012.
“3. Under Alabama Code § 11–43C–38(a) (1975), the Prichard City Council is required to approve any appointment made by the Mayor of the City of Prichard for the position of fire chief.
“4. In making such appointments, it is an accepted practice for the Mayor of the City of Prichard to utilize employment contracts which enumerate the terms under which an appointee for the position of fire chief will serve. Additionally, it is an accepted practice for the Mayor of the City of Prichard, and the Prichard City Council, to utilize employment agreements for a specific, limited term to effectuate the appointment and removal process of a fire and police chief under Alabama Code § 11–43C–38 (1975).
“5. On April 19, 2007, I was serving as a duly elected member of the City Council for the City of Prichard, representing the citizens of District Four.
“6. On or about April 19, 2007, former Mayor Ron Davis and Mark Joseph Trenier signed a proposed employment agreement, in which Mark Trenier agreed to provide services as Chief of the Prichard Fire Department.
“7. The Agreement provided that Mark Trenier would commence performance under the Agreement upon execution by the City of Prichard, for a period of five (5) years.
“8. After the Agreement was signed by former Mayor Davis and Mark Trenier, it was submitted to the Prichard City Council for review and approval, and the Prichard City Council accordingly considered a motion to approve the proposed Agreement on April 19, 2007.
“9. As reflected in the Prichard City Council minutes for April 19, 2007, the Prichard City Council unanimously carried the motion, and approved the proposed Agreement between the City of Prichard and Mark Trenier.
“10. At the time the City Council entertained the motion to approve the proposed 2007 Employment Agreement between Mark Trenier and the City of Prichard, it was my understanding that the motion was to approve the explicit terms of the Agreement, including its provisions limiting Mark Trenier's employment to a term of five (5) years.
“11. I further understood that no additional vote, motion, or other action on behalf of the Prichard City Council was necessary to terminate the employment of Mark Trenier after the expiration of the Agreement's five-year term. More particularly, I understood that the proposed Agreement was meant to serve as the Council's approval of both the initiation and conclusion of Mr. Trenier's employment in the position of fire chief.
“12. Former Mayor Ron Davis made two (2) unsuccessful attempts to have subsequent employment contracts for Mark Trenier approved prior to the conclusion of his mayoral term in 2012, and to have Mark Trenier re-appointed as fire chief.
“13. On March 22, 2012, prior to former Mayor Davis's defeat in the 2012 Prichard mayoral election, the Prichard City Council considered a motion to approve a subsequent employment agreement between Mark Trenier and the City of Prichard, identical to the agreement previously approved on April 19, 2007. The March 22, 2012, motion to approve the additional employment contract of Mark Joseph Trenier failed to carry, gaining only two (2) of the required four (4) ‘yea’ votes necessary to approve the contract.
“14. On October 25, 2012, two days after I defeated former Mayor Davis in the 2012 Prichard mayoral runoff, the Prichard City Council again considered a motion to approve an identical employment agreement, and to approve the re-appointment of Mark Trenier as fire chief. The October 25, 2012, motion also failed to gain the requisite four (4) City Council votes necessary to carry the motion.
“15. Due to my participation as a candidate in the 2012 Prichard mayoral elections, I abstained from both the March 22, 2012, and October 25, 2012, votes.
“16. After I assumed the office of Mayor of the City of Prichard, I allowed Mark Trenier to continue carrying out the duties of Prichard Fire Chief on a probationary and/or interim basis. On multiple occasions, I discussed with Mark Trenier that he remained employed solely on a probationary and/or interim basis, pending a thorough review of the Prichard Fire Department by my administration, including interviews with employees and an assessment of the department's leadership. I made it clear to Mark Trenier that I would not submit my recommendation to the city council for his renewal and/or re-appointment as fire chief unless I was satisfied with his leadership after the departmental review. I further informed Mark Trenier that I would not submit him as a candidate for re-appointment to the Prichard City Council if I determined that the City of Prichard was [not] best served by his continued leadership of the Fire Department.
“17. During this interim period, Mark Trenier never raised an objection to his status as probationary and/or interim fire chief, [to] the position that his tenure as fire chief had expired under the terms of his 2007 Employment Agreement as approved by the Prichard City Council, or [to the fact] that his re-appointment may not be submitted to the city council for approval after a departmental review by my administration.
Trenier also filed his own motion for a partial summary judgment on the issue of liability, supported by his verified complaint as well as documents proffered by Mayor Ephriam and the City of Prichard in support of their jointly filed motion for a summary judgment. The trial court conducted hearings on January 10, 2014, and February 28, 2014, and thereafter entered a summary judgment in favor of Mayor Ephriam and the City of Prichard. Trenier appealed.
Chapman Nursing Home, Inc. v. McDonald, 985 So.2d 914, 919 (Ala.2007). Because the facts are undisputed, we are presented with a question of law, and our review is de novo.
On appeal, Trenier does not dispute that his appointment to the position of fire chief of the City of Prichard complied with the requirements of § 11–43C–38(a); he does not dispute the validity of his employment agreement; and he does not dispute that Mayor Ephriam had a right to seek his removal from that position. Instead, he challenges Mayor Ephriam's “unilateral” exercise of that right of removal. Specifically, he argues that Mayor Ephriam was required to follow the removal mandates of § 11–43C–38(a), which state that a fire chief “shall be removed from office only upon recommendation by the mayor with the approval of four council members.” (Emphasis added.) According to Trenier, once the city council voted on April 19, 2007, to approve his appointment as fire chief, the position remained his until he either resigned or was removed from office by at least four members of the city council based upon a recommendation of the mayor. Trenier further asserts that the existence of an employment agreement within the context of a statutory appointment of a fire chief or a police chief does not alter the fact that four votes are necessary for removal of that chief.1 Mayor Ephriam and the City of Prichard, on the other hand, assert that it was common practice on the part of the mayor and the city council to use employment agreements for specific limited terms to effectuate both the appointment and removal mandates of § 11–43C–38(a) and that once the city council voted to approve Trenier's agreement for a limited term, no further action was needed to remove him from office in the event he was not reappointed.
Norfolk Southern Ry. v. Johnson, 740 So.2d 392, 396 (Ala.1999).
(Emphasis added.) Mayor Davis appointed Trenier to the position of fire chief of the City of Prichard pursuant to the powers bestowed upon him by § 11–43C–37, and the appointment complied with § 11–43C–38(a).
Although § 11–43C–38(a) makes no mention of a specific term in office, nothing in the plain language of the statute prohibits a city from using an employment contract with a limiting term to satisfy the approval mandates of the statute, which is precisely what occurred in this case. And, as previously indicated in note 1, supra, none of the parties challenges the mayor's or the city council's authority to enter into a multiyear contract with an appointed, at-will, employee for that employee's services. In fact, Mayor Ephriam stated in his affidavit that “it is an accepted practice for the Mayor of the City of Prichard to utilize employment [agreements] which enumerate the terms under which an appointee for the position of fire chief will serve.” Accordingly, during the five-year term that Trenier served as fire chief pursuant to his employment agreement he was afforded the protections of § 11–43C–38(a), and his removal from that position could be effected “only upon recommendation of the mayor with the approval of four council members.” Moreover, “contracts of employment that ․ specify a definite period terminate by their own terms at the end of such period ․ See Northrop v. Kirby, 454 F.Supp. 698, 701 (N.D.Ala.1978).” Shirley v. Lin, 548 So.2d 1329, 1332 (Ala.1989)(emphasis added). Trenier admits in his brief in response to Mayor Ephriam and the City of Prichard's motion for a summary judgment that his five-year term under the employment agreement expired on April 19, 2012.
“In attempting to resolve the dispute over the statutory interpretation, the Court was unable to find any appellate opinions that directly address or even cite [§ 11–43C–38(a) ]. The Court is similarly unaware of any Attorney General Opinion that sheds light on whether a city council in a Class 5 municipality has to vote to remove a police chief after a specific term in an employment contract has expired. The Court accordingly is of the opinion that the best guidance for answering this question comes from the general principles of employment contract law.
“It is well settled that there are two types of employment contracts: at will employment and employment for a specific term or undertaking. 19 Williston on Contracts § 54:39 (4th ed.). If employment is for a specific term, the employee can only be fired for good cause, whereas an at will employee can be fired for good, bad, or no cause. Id. This rule is followed in Alabama. Under employment at will, ‘an employee may be discharged for any reason, good or bad, or even for no reason at all.’ Johnson v. City of Marion, 743 So.2d 481, 483 (Ala.Civ.App.1999) (quoting Ex parte Amoco Fabrics & Fiber Co., 729 So.2d 336, 339 (Ala.1998)).
“It is clear that Gardner was originally an employee for a specific term. His contract contained a specific two-year term. Consequently, the Court finds that the City properly conceded that Gardner was entitled to protections of [§ 11–43C–38(a) ] during the term of his employment. The Court agrees with the City's position that after the expiration of the term, the post of police chief was effectively vacant, and the next step was for the Mayor to appoint a new chief or reappoint Gardner and submit the choice to the council for a vote. However, even if Gardner's employment did continue for the one month he retained the position, he was at best an at will employee who served at the pleasure of the Mayor who is the appointment authority for the position of police chief. Under [§ 11–43C–37(2), Ala.Code 1975], the mayor has the power to ‘appoint and remove, when necessary and for the good of the service, all officers and employees of the city except those appointed by the council.’ Because Gardner's employment had lapsed after November 20, 2012, the Mayor needed to take action on submitting a name for police chief to the city council for the good of the city.
City of Prichard v. Gardner, (CV. No.2012–902834.00, January 16, 2013) (emphasis added).
Further, although § 11–43C–38(a) does require that removal of an officer such as the fire chief be recommended and approved by four council members, nothing in the plain wording of the statute requires that that approval should or can be achieved in a specific manner. Instead, the statute requires only a recommendation of removal by the mayor and that the recommendation be approved by four council members. Accordingly, it is reasonable to conclude that Trenier's removal was “approved” once the city council voted (upon Mayor Davis's recommendation) to approve the initial agreement, which by its very terms expired on April 19, 2012. Although not controlling, this conclusion is supported by Mayor Ephriam's unchallenged affidavit testimony that “it is an accepted practice for the Mayor of the City of Prichard, and the Prichard City Council, to utilize employment agreements for a specific, limited term to effectuate the appointment and removal process of a fire and police chief under [§ 11–43C–38(a) ].” (Emphasis added.) Mayor Ephriam also testified that it was his understanding that “no additional vote, motion, or other action on behalf of the Prichard City Council was necessary to terminate the employment of Mark Trenier after the expiration of the Agreement's five-year term.” In the absence of a controlling basis provided by Trenier to the contrary, this Court concludes that Mayor Ephriam and the City of Prichard's interpretation of the statute is reasonable and persuasive. Consequently, once Trenier's employment agreement expired on April 19, 2012, without a subsequent agreement being approved, he merely served at the pleasure of Mayor Ephriam, and his employment could be terminated at will by either the mayor or Trenier. See Ex parte Amoco Fabrics & Fiber Co., 729 So.2d 336, 339 (Ala.1998) (“[I]n the absence of a contract providing otherwise, employment in this state is at-will, terminable at the will of either party. Under this doctrine, an employee may be discharged for any reason, good or bad, or even for no reason at all .”).
“16. After I assumed the office of Mayor of the City of Prichard, I allowed Mark Trenier to continue carrying out the duties of Prichard Fire Chief on a probationary and/or interim basis . On multiple occasions, I discussed with Mark Trenier that he remained employed solely on a probationary and/or interim basis, pending a thorough review of the Prichard Fire Department by my administration, including interviews with employees and an assessment of the department's leadership. I made it clear to Mark Trenier that I would not submit my recommendation to the City Council for his renewal and/or re-appointment as fire chief unless I was satisfied with his leadership after the departmental review. I further informed Mark Trenier that I would not submit him as a candidate for re-appointment to the Prichard City Council if I determined that the City of Prichard was [not] best served by his continued leadership of the Fire Department.
(Emphasis added.) Trenier does not challenge on appeal Mayor Ephriam's affidavit testimony before the trial court. As further noted by Mayor Ephriam, Trenier never raised an objection to his status as probationary and/or interim fire chief. Accordingly, Trenier is not entitled to any relief on this claim.
Trenier's employment agreement commenced on April 19, 2007, and extended for a limited term of five years; the city council unanimously approved the agreement for this limited term; the city council's approval complied with § 11–43C–38(a), which requires the approval of four council members; and once the employment agreement expired on its own terms on April 19, 2012, with no new employment agreement in place, Trenier continued serving as fire chief as an at-will employee at the pleasure of Mayor Ephriam, and his employment could be terminated by either Trenier or Mayor Ephriam. Ex parte Amoco Fabrics & Fiber Co., supra. Because nothing in the plain language of § 11–43C–38(a) prohibits the City of Prichard from using an employment agreement with a limited term for the purpose of satisfying both the approval and/or removal mandates of the statute, the city council's initial action approving the employment agreement that was due to expire on April 19, 2012, impliedly satisfied the removal mandates of § 11–43C–38(a), and it was unnecessary for the city council to formalize what it had already approved, because requiring it to do so would be illogical and would produce the same result. Accordingly, the summary judgment in favor of Mayor Ephriam and the City of Prichard is affirmed.
1. We note that neither Trenier nor Mayor Ephriam and the City of Prichard have provided this Court with any argument concerning whether a governing body such as the city council or the mayor has the authority to have an appointed, at-will, position, such as a fire chief, made lawful through a multiyear contract for services. We further note that the term of Trenier's employment agreement exceeded Mayor Davis's term of office.
2. We note the trial court's action in entering a summary judgment in favor of Mayor Ephriam and the City of Prichard was primarily based on its conclusion that the appointment of fire chief under § 11–43C–38(a) cannot extend beyond the term of the appointing mayor, explaining that the fire chief's appointment and service “is inexorably linked to that of the appointing mayor” and “[t]his appointing authority is essential so that an incoming mayor's specific public safety directives may be properly carried out, and that his/or general executive, administrative, and supervisory powers may be properly executed.” However, as properly noted by Trenier, had the legislature intended to limit the term of fire chief to the term of the appointing mayor, the legislature could have added language to this effect, but it did not. See Noonan v. East–West Beltline, Inc., 487 So.2d 237, 239 (Ala.1986) (“It is not proper for a court to read into the statute something which the legislature did not include although it could have easily done so.”). Accordingly, although the trial court's legal conclusion appears logical under the circumstances, this Court cannot not read into § 11–43C–38(a) something the legislature did not include. Id.
MURDOCK, MAIN, and BRYAN, JJ., concur. MOORE, C.J., concurs in the result.

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