Source: http://russfamilylaw.ca/legal-services/mobility-applications/
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 08:38:44+00:00

Document:
It is clear that the custodial parent’s reason for moving is not to be considered, unless it relates to the parent’s ability to meet the needs of the child. For example, a custodial parent seeking to move to disrupt access might demonstrate a lack of consideration for the child’s best interests, which would weigh against the custodial parent: see Gordon v. Goertz at ¶ 23; Nunweiler at ¶ 33.
 Also of note, in cases where a custodial parent says that they will not move if the child is not permitted to move with them, a court has the option of maintaining the status quo rather than permitting the custodial parent to move with the child or changing custody: see Karpodinis v. Kantas 2006 BCCA 272 (CanLII), (2006), 55 B.C.L.R. (4th) 90, 2006 BCCA 272 at ¶ 20 (although stating that the status quo must not be overemphasized).
 With reference to the best interests of the child test, McLachlin J. recognized that by the nature of the subject matter and the multitude of factors at play, “a measure of indeterminacy” was inevitable at: at para. 20. She further observed that two statutory provisions, one relating to the conduct of the parents and the other fostering maximal beneficial contact between the child and both parents, provided guidance in relation to the best interests test.
20 The best interests of the child test has been characterized as “indeterminate” and “more useful as legal aspiration than as legal analysis”: per Abella J.A. in MacGyver v. Richards (1995), 11 R.F.L. (4th) 432 (Ont. C.A.), at p. 443. Nevertheless, it stands as an eloquent expression of Parliament’s view that the ultimate and only issue when it comes to custody and access is the welfare of the child whose future is at stake. The multitude of factors that may impinge on the child’s best interest make a measure of indeterminacy inevitable. A more precise test would risk sacrificing the child’s best interests to expediency and certainty. Moreover, Parliament has offered assistance by providing two specific directions – one relating to the conduct of the parents, the other to the ideal of maximizing beneficial contact between the child and both parents.
22 This stipulation is important in applications for variation of custody based on relocation of the custodial parent. All too often, such applications have descended into inquiries into the custodial parent’s reason or motive for moving (see Carter v. Brooks (1990), 30 R.F.L. (3d) 53 (Ont. C.A.); Colley v. Colley (1991), 31 R.F.L. (3d) 281 (Ont. U.F.C.), and J. G. McLeod, Annotation to Williams v. Williams (1992), 38 R.F.L. (3d) 100, at p. 103). If the move is considered “necessary”, the decision is considered justified, entitling the parent to retain custody in the new location. If, on the other hand, it is made for a less noble reason, the custodial parent may be required to choose between losing custody or moving. The focus thus shifts from the best interests of the child to the conduct of the custodial parent.
23 Under the Divorce Act, the custodial parent’s conduct can be considered only if relevant to his or her ability to act as parent of the child. Usually, the reasons or motives for moving will not be relevant to the custodial parent’s parenting ability. Occasionally, however, the motive may reflect adversely on the parent’s perception of the needs of the child or the parent’s judgment about how they may best be fulfilled. For example, the decision of a custodial parent to move solely to thwart salutary contact between the child and access parent might be argued to show a lack of appreciation for the child’s best interests: see McGowan v. McGowan (1979), 11 R.F.L. (2d) 281 (Ont. H.C.); Wells v. Wells (1984), 38 R.F.L. (2d) 405 (Sask. Q.B.), aff’d (1984), 42 R.F.L. (2d) 166 (Sask. C.A.). However, absent a connection to parenting ability, the custodial parent’s reason for moving should not enter into the inquiry.
 The second factor which Parliament specifically chose to mention in assessing the best interests of the child is maximum contact between the child and both parents. Both ss. 16(10) and 17(9) of the Act require that “the court shall give effect to the principle that a child of the marriage should have as much contact with each former spouse as is consistent with the best interests of the child”. The sections go on to say that for this purpose, the court “shall take into consideration the willingness of [the applicant] to facilitate” the child’s contact with the non-custodial parent. The “maximum contact” principle, as it has been called, is mandatory, but not absolute. The Act only obliges the judge to respect it to the extent that such contact is consistent with the child’s best interests; if other factors show that it would not be in the child’s best interests, the court can and should restrict contact: Young v. Young,  4 S.C.R. 3, at pp. 117-18, per McLachlin J.
 An underlying assumption in Gordon v. Goertz is that the “maximum contact” principle militates against relocation because the proposed move will usually adversely affect the access parent’s ability to see the child, which is contrary to Parliament’s stated intention of promoting maximum contact between the child and both parents. A court is therefore faced with having to balance the benefits of the proposed relocation against the child’s interests in maintaining maximum contact with the access parent and may decide against permitting the move: see Karpodinis v. Kantas (2006), 55 B.C.L.R. (4th) 90, 2006 BCCA 272; leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused (16 November 2006). The maximum contact principle is not an absolute one but it is a mandatory consideration when determining whether a proposed relocation is in the best interests of the child. There are cases where the other principles will outweigh the negative effects of decreased contact with one parent and thus the custodial parent is permitted to move. This Court’s decision in Lowcay v. Lowcay (2000), 8 R.F.L. (5th) 313, 2000 BCCA 447 is an example.
 The issue for determination is “what is in the best interests of the child” having regard to all the relevant circumstances relating to the child’s needs and the ability of the respective parents to satisfy them. Each case turns on its unique circumstances. I am guided by the principles enunciated in Gordon v. Goertz, 1996 CanLII 191 (S.C.C.),  2 S.C.R. 27 (S.C.C.) and Nunweiler v. Nunweiler,  B.C.J. No. 935 (B.C.C.A.).

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