Source: https://securitiesdiary.com/2015/02/11/u-s-v-georgiou-3rd-circuit-panel-decision-makes-a-mockery-of-brady-disclosures-and-jencks-act-compliance/
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 10:12:31+00:00

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We previously discussed the Third Circuit’s flawed analysis in United States v. Georgiou of the extraterritorial application of the federal securities laws to trading activity centered abroad, based solely on the fact that some trades entered into abroad were executed with the involvement of market makers in the United States. See Third Circuit Adopts “Craven Watchdog” Standard for Extraterriorial Reach of Securities Laws in U.S. v. Georgiou. We now turn to a different respect in which that panel decision disappoints. The defendant in Georgiou recently filed a petition for rehearing en banc on different grounds, focusing on the panel’s use of invalid standards in applying Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). The issues raised in the brief are significant. A copy of the motion for rehearing is available here: Georgiou Petition for Rehearing En Banc.
Brady is the landmark Supreme Court decision that ended the ability of the Government to hide from defendants exculpatory evidence in its possession. Mr. Georgiou raises serious concerns that the panel improperly limited the Brady rule, in a manner inconsistent with previous Third Circuit (and other appellate court) holdings, by allowing the Government to avoid the consequences of failing to make required Brady disclosures based on whether the defendant acted diligently to try to obtain those materials himself. By using this standard, the panel allowed the prosecutors to get away with withholding evidence that could have strongly undercut the credibility of the Government’s key witness. The withheld information was revealed only in sentencing proceedings for that witness after the Georgiou trial was over.
As the brief in support of the Georgiou petition describes, the approach adopted by the Third Circuit panel allowed a blatant evasion of the obligations imposed on the Government to disclose exculpatory evidence in its possession. The degree of diligence used by the defense to obtain that same information simply should not be relevant. To be blunt, it is not too great a burden to demand that Government lawyers satisfy their duties to make required disclosures without permitting them to insulate their failures from consequences by making an issue of defense diligence. Whether defense counsel is diligent or not, Government lawyers need to recognize their duties and perform them, period. Anything less undermines the criminal justice process.
Unfortunately, there is a near-constant need to have the courts assure that prosecutors meet their obligations. Prosecutors seem addicted to trying to win cases through sharp practices rather than a thorough presentation of the facts to the judge or jury. It never ceases to amaze me that prosecutors consistently try to minimize the effect of Brady by avoiding the disclosure of potential exculpatory material in their possession. An attempt to deprive the defendant of information that might be useful at trial reflects a prosecutor’s willful effort to prevent a fair and just trial. It should not be tolerated by the senior lawyers that manage prosecution teams, and it should not be tolerated by the courts. Indeed, a knowing avoidance of Brady obligations should expose prosecutors to court and bar sanctions, and in some instances be prosecuted as an obstruction of justice. Prosecutors routinely take the narrowest view possible of Brady obligations, but why they do so is a mystery to me. What do they think they are achieving by depriving the defendant of potentially relevant evidence? Do they really think that their views that a defendant is guilty as charged are so reliable that the jury should not be permitted to consider all of the evidence? The job of a prosecutor is not to engineer a conviction, but to try to assure that a fair adjudication occurs. Instead of allowing prosecutors to play games to avoid Brady obligations, U.S. Attorneys should demand that their assistants err on the side of producing potentially exculpatory evidence.
Since that did not occur here, it was up to the courts to elevate justice above the prosecutors’ hubris, or their single-minded desire for a notch in the belt. Alas, that did not occur. Instead of casting a jaundiced eye on the prosecution’s questionable disclosure decisions, the Third Circuit panel bent over backwards to justify or exonerate those decisions. It should have held the prosecutors’ feet to the fire, because adhering to principles that foster a fair and just adjudication is far, far more important than the result in a particular case. The Third Circuit panel abdicated its role to hold overly-zealous prosecutors in check.
The petition points out another serious error by the Third Circuit panel. The Government never produced to the defense notes of witness interviews by Government officials of the prosecution’s key witness. Any such materials known to the prosecutors should have been produced under Brady if aspects of the interviews were exculpatory, and under the Jencks Act because they reflect previous statements of one of the Government’s witnesses. The panel ruled that even though the SEC was in possession of notes of these interviews, they were not required to be produced by DOJ prosecutors because they were in the possession of the SEC, not the DOJ. As a result, in the court’s view, these materials “were not within the possession of the prosecutorial arm of the government” and therefore prosecutors were absolved of the duty to produce them, even if they knew they existed and could easily have obtained them. That is a truly absurd position which has been soundly repudiated by other courts. Those courts rightfully recognize that accepting this fiction would make a “mockery” of the Brady and Jencks Act disclosure requirements. See, e.g., United States v. Gupta, 848 F. Supp. 2d 491, 493-95 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
In this case, as in most criminal cases involving allegations of key securities violations, the DOJ worked hand-in-hand with the SEC, often jointly participating in interviews. To permit avoidance of disclosures by the DOJ based on which government employee took or retained those notes — whether they were SEC officials, FBI agents, U.S. mail inspectors, or some other agency employee — is a gross elevation of form over substance. All of the law enforcement agencies in these cases cooperate and work together, and all of them should be required to treat these notes as jointly-held materials. To rule otherwise does, indeed, make a mockery of justice.
Mr. Georgiou faces an uphill battle in his effort to win reconsideration of the decision or en banc review, or, failing so, in getting a grant of certiorari from the Supreme Court. But if the panel decision stands as written, it represents an embarrassment to criminal justice, regardless of whether Mr. Georgiou is guilty of the crimes charged.
This entry was posted in Criminal Securities Prosecutions, Securities Law and tagged 3rd Circuit, Brady disclosures, Brady material, Brady v. Maryland, Circuit panel, DOJ, DOJ SEC cooperation, due process, extraterritoriality, Georgiou, Georgiou Petition, Jencks, Jencks Act, lawyer, legal analysis, petition for rehearing, rehearing, rehearing en banc, SEC enforcement, securities, securities fraud, securities law, securities litigation, Third Circuit, U.S. v. Georgiou on February 11, 2015 by Straight Arrow.

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