Source: https://www.ptab.us/2013/03/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 10:11:20+00:00

Document:
The Examiner rejected claims 14 and 15 under 35 USC § 112, second paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which Appellants regard as the invention. Supp. Ans. 3-43 (citing In re Donaldson Co., 16 F.3d 1189, 1195 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc) (“[I]f one employs means plus function language in a claim, one must set forth in the specification an adequate disclosure showing what is meant by that language. If an applicant fails to set forth an adequate disclosure, the applicant has in effect failed to particularly point out and distinctly claim the invention as required by the second paragraph of section 112.”)). For a computer-implemented means-plus-function claim limitation that invokes 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6, the corresponding structure is required to be more than simply a general purpose computer. Aristocrat Techs. Austl. Pty Ltd. v. Int’l Game Tech., 521 F.3d 1328, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2008). The corresponding structure for a computer-implemented function must include the algorithm as well as the general purpose computer. WMS Gaming, Inc. v. Int’l Game Tech., 184 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 1999). The written description must at least disclose the algorithm that transforms the general purpose microprocessor to a special purpose computer programmed to perform the claimed function. Aristocrat, 521 F.3d at 1338.
2664 Ex Parte Moreb 11260437 - (D) HUGHES 103 DICKINSON WRIGHT PLLC CAMARGO, MARLY S.B.
The record reflects that it is common sense that a surveillance audio/video system be portable. See In re Lindberg, 194 F.2d 732, 735 (CCPA 1952) (Portability of a claimed device is insufficient to patentably distinguish the device over an otherwise old (known) device unless there are new or unexpected results.).
In re Sasse, 629 F.2d 675, 681 (CCPA 1980) (when the reference relied on expressly anticipates or makes obvious all of the elements of the claimed invention, the reference is presumed to be operable, and the appellant must rebut this presumption with a preponderance of evidence).
It has long been understood that invention is not confined to the particular form or mode described. See, e.g., Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405 (1908).
“[A]lthough a method claim necessarily recites the steps of the method in a particular order, as a general rule the claim is not limited to performance of the steps in the order recited, unless the claim explicitly or implicitly requires a specific order.” Baldwin Graphics Systems, Inc. v. Siebert, Inc., 512 F.3d 1338, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2008); see also Interactive Gift Express, Inc. v. Compuserve Inc., 256 F.3d 1323, 1342-43 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
To satisfy the due diligence showing requirement of 37 C.F.R. § 1.131, Appellant must present proof of diligence, no matter how short the period to be covered. In re Mulder, 716 F.2d 1542, 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (noting that focusing on the shortness of the period to be covered—two days—is misleading where there is no evidence of record showing diligence). Moreover, to establish diligence, the inventor must provide specific details as to what was done and when it was done during the critical period. See Gould v. Schawlow, 363 F.2d 908, 918 (CCPA 1966).
To establish diligence for constructive reduction to practice, the attorney’s diligence must be shown. “[R]easonable diligence can be shown if it is established that the attorney worked reasonably hard on the particular application in question during the continuous critical period.” Cf. Bey v. Kollonitsch, 806 F.2d 1024, 1027 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (interference). “[The inventor’s] records did not show the exact days when activity specific to this application occurred. Thus, we cannot say that the board clearly erred in finding that ‘the documented activities with regard to [the present application] are insufficient by themselves to prove diligence.’” Id. at 1028 (second brackets in original). “[I]t may not be possible for a patent attorney to begin working on an application at the moment the inventor makes the disclosure, because the attorney may already have a backlog of other cases demanding his attention” so that “the courts have recognized that reasonable diligence is all that is required of the attorney.” Id. “Generally, the patent attorney must show that unrelated cases are taken up in chronological order, thus, the attorney has the burden of keeping good records of the dates when cases are docketed as well as the dates when specific work is done on the applications.” Id.
As the Federal Circuit has explained, even post-KSR, “patents are not barred just because it was obvious 'to explore a new technology or general approach that seemed to be a promising field of experimentation, where the prior art gave only general guidance as to the particular form of the claimed invention or how to achieve it.'” Procter & Gamble Co. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., 566 F.3d 989, 997 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (quoting In re O’Farrell, 853 F.2d 894, 903 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
In Phillips, we held that while “the specification [should be used] to interpret the meaning of a claim,” courts must not “import[ ] limitations from the specification into the claim.” Id. at 1323. We specifically noted that it is improper to “confin[e] the claims to th[e] embodiments” found in the specification, as Trans Texas asks us to do. Id.
In re Trans Texas Holdings Corp., 498 F.3d 1290, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
The Federal Circuit noted that “[u]nder Phillips, dictionary definitions are also pertinent. See id. at 1318 (‘[T]he court has observed that dictionaries … can be useful in claim construction.’).” Id. at 1299. The Federal Circuit expressly commented that there were multiple dictionary definitions for the term “directly” but chose the “broadest” definition. See Trans Texas Holdings, 489 F.3d at 1299. Thus, the Federal Circuit affirmed a Board decision in which the Board selected a dictionary definition that was broader than the examples disclosed in the Specification and was the broader dictionary definition. See Trans Texas Holdings, 489 F.3d at 1298-1299.
Thus, the machine-or-transformation test remains a useful tool for determining whether a claim covers an abstract idea. See e.g., Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber, 674 F. 3d 1315, 1331 et seq. (Fed. Cir. 2012).

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