Source: https://louisvilledivorce.typepad.com/info/child_custody_and_visitation/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 14:52:53+00:00

Document:
ROBISON V. THEELE, ET AL.
Mother lived with her parents (hereinafter “grandparents”), and passed away after treatment for cancer, which mother underwent during dissolution proceedings. Father exercised visitation regularly during the proceedings and mother’s cancer treatment. At the time of the Mother’s death, the Trial Court awarded Grandparents a “status quo ex parte” order to keep Father’s visitation in place. Subsequently, the Trial Court awarded de facto custodian status to Grandparents, gave Grandparents sole custody, and granted Father supervised visitation with his children. The Trial Court did not make findings supporting its Judgement. The Appellate Court vacated and remanded the Trial Court’s Judgement.
First, the Appellate Court holds there is no authority for a “status quo ex parte” order, The Trial Court should have followed the KRS 620.060(3) procedure which provides for an emergency custody order. Second, they hold there were no findings to support the Trial Court’s award of de facto custodianship to Grandparents and reiterate the superior rights of natural parents. The Appellate Court also holds that the dissolution proceedings between Father and Mother tolled the time period required for the grandparents to establish their de facto custodian claim, as custody issues were contested in the divorce proceeding. Finally, the Appellate Court holds the Trial Court did not make the requite findings to award grandparent visitation which must overcome the presumption that a parent acts in the child’s best interest when denying grandparent visitation.
While not a family court case, as an action against a court appointed psychologist, this case is important to family law practitioners.
A father filed an action against a court appointed psychologist making a custody evaluation. The father alleged slander and libel arguing the psychologist did not act in good faith in making a verbal report to the CFHFS and in her written Custodial Evaluation Report. The father also argued the psychologist breached the good faith and fair dealing contractual requirement of the Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”). The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the psychologist.
The Appellate Court affirms the Trial Court holding there was not sufficient evidence to prove the psychologist was not acting in good faith or was acting with knowledge of falsity. The Appellate Court holds a court-appointed psychologist is given quasi-judicial immunity in order to complete the job effectively and immunity applied in the case at hand. The Appellate Court also points out that a court-appointed task is not one that falls under the authority of the UCC, hence summary judgment was appropriate.
The Circuit Court used the report and investigation of a Guardian Ad Litem (GAL) to make findings a custody modification was appropriate. The Appellate Court applied Morgan v. Getter, 441 S.W.3d 94 (Ky. 2014) and held the Circuit Court “erroneously appointed the GAL to represent the child and to conduct an investigation and file a report…” The appellate court emphasized the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Morgan, particularly the ethical and constitutional problems with conflating a Friend of the Court with a GAL. The Appellate Court reversed and remanded the Circuit Court Order modifying parenting custody, as the error was not harmless because the only facts cited in the order were from the GAL’s report.
Award of grandparent visitation reversed because court failed to apply the modified best interest standard to consider the objection of mother who is presumed fit. Court must presume a fit parent is making decisions in the best interest of the child. Case was remanded for a new evidentiary hearing at which grandparents must provide clear and convincing evidence that visitation is in the child’s best interest and trial court must use Walker factors and provide written findings of fact.
In a custody matter, can a Guardian Ad Litem (“GAL”) serve as both an attorney for the minor child involved in the custody dispute, as well as an investigator for the Family Court?
In 2011, Getter petitioned to modify custody for the parties’ only remaining minor child. The Family Court subsequently appointed a GAL for the minor child. The GAL filed a report based on interviews and a visit to the residence of the custodial parent, Morgan. In the report, the GAL ultimately recommended the minor child be allowed to relocate to Florida and live with Getter.
At the hearing, Morgan requested to cross-examine the GAL about the report favoring Getter. The Family Court denied this request and the hearing progressed. Morgan moved to strike the GAL’s report, and the Court deferred ruling on the motion. Ultimately, the Court gave Getter joint custody with primary physical custody. The minor child relocated to Florida with Getter. Morgan appealed the decision, but during the appellate process the minor child turned eighteen.
The Court first looks to the issue of mootness, as the minor child turned eighteen making moot any decision on the child’s custody. The Court formed a public interest exception to the mootness rule, differentiating it from the capable of repetition rule used in prior cases.
The Court then holds that the elements of the public interest exception are present in the current case, as (1) the proper role of a GAL is a “substantial question of a public nature;” (2) Family Courts addressing custody would benefit from future guidance; and (3) issues regarding the proper role of GALs are certain to occur in many other cases and will likely evade review, especially when the dispute involves older children.
In this case, (1) there is a clear liberty interest in the care and custody of a minor child; (2) the Court’s actions significantly altered Morgan’s ability to care for and have custody of the minor child, and (3) the State has no interest in disallowing the testimony of the GAL. Based on this analysis, the Court concludes that Morgan’s due process rights include the right to cross-examine the GAL in the custody proceeding.
The Family Court erred by allowing the report and disallowing a cross-examination of the GAL authoring the report, violating Morgan’s due process rights. The Court held that due process is compromised when attorneys serve as both investigators for the court and attorneys for minors involved in custody disputes. Because of this inherent conflict, the court holds that a GAL cannot serve as both an investigator for the Court and an attorney for the minor child.
Instead of using a GAL as an investigator, a Family Court may appoint a de facto Friend of the Court (“FOC”) to serve as an investigator under KRS 403.300(1) and FRCPP 6(2)(f). The investigator can file a report, but must be available for cross-examination. Alternately, a Family Court may appoint a GAL to represent the child under FRCPP 6(2)(e). As a representative of the child, the attorney cannot put her own credibility at issues.
The Court also makes a distinction between an attorney representing the child’s best interest from an attorney representing the child’s express interest. The Court holds a GAL should represent the child’s best interest as children have diminished capacity. An attorney is authorized under SCR 3.130-1.14(b) to reasonably protect a client with diminished capacity. Thus, a GAL may balance the wishes of a child with the child’s best interest.
Family Courts will need to alter current practices, appointing a de facto FOC to investigate on behalf of the Court and/or appointing a GAL to represent the child. The appointment of both a de facto FOC and GAL are available to the Court, but are not requirements for proceeding in a custody matter.
The Appellate Court reversed and remanded a Trial Court Order for reinitiation of contact between a mother and her two children. The Appellate Court first held that the Trial Court’s original order conditioning reinitiation on compliance with all therapeutic recommendations was never modified, set aside, or reversed. Therefore, the mother was bound by it. The mother’s noncompliance with the original order was enough to bar reinitiation of contact.
The court reiterated the principle that when there is a previous denial of visitation, there is no presumption visitation is in the child’s best interest. The mother’s DVO prohibiting contact which her children destroyed the presumption visitation was in her children’s best interest. It is the child’s best interest which controls the decision to resume visitation. In this case, the court held reinitiation was not the children’s best interest because none of the experts believed visitation should resume, the mother had ongoing mental health problems, and the conditions of the previous order had not been met. The desire of the children to see their mother was not sufficient evidence visitation was in their best interest.
Residency in KY is not a requirement for continuing jurisdiction. The central inquiry is whether child maintained a substantial connection with KY. UCCJEA is concerned with child's connection to the state, not a particular county.
Crews v. Shofner Child custody may be established only after conducting a hearing even when party is otherwise entitled to a default judgment.
Failure to file two affidavits in support of motion to modify child custody inside two years from final decree does not divest the court of subject matter jurisdiction, overruling Petrey v. Cain. While motion may have lacked requisite number of affidavits, because party did not raise the issue before trial court she cannot raise deficiency on appeal.
We will be following this one closely. Here is the Ky Court of Appeals opinion.
Ex-Wife appealed Family Court’s order granting Ex-Husband’s motion requesting that minor child relocate to reside with him in Florida.
Husband and Wife with two children from the marriage divorced in 2003. Ex-Wife had sole custody of the children, and Ex-Husband visited the children periodically with supervised visitation. When the oldest child reached the age of majority, she moved to Florida to attend college near Ex-Husband. Ex-Husband filed a motion for the younger daughter to reside with him in Florida. The Family Court appointed a guardian ad litem (GAL) to represent the child. The GAL filed a report with the court, and the court held a hearing, later ordering that the child could relocate to Florida and live with Ex-Husband. Ex-Wife appealed.
Ex-Wife argued that the court erred when it did not allow her to call the GAL as a witness and denied her request to strike the GAL’s report. Ex-Wife also argued that the court did not follow the law governing a change of custody and improperly determined that the relocation was in the child’s best interest.
The Kentucky Family Rule[s] of Practice and Procedure provide that a GAL may be appointed by the court, but the rules specifically differentiates between GALs and other professionals who may be used in a custody proceeding. The GAL in this case was appointed to represent the child. The GAL was a licensed attorney, and would have violated the ethical rules governing confidential communications and acting as an advocate when the lawyer is likely to be a witness. Although Kentucky law does not specifically define the role of a GAL in custody proceedings, the Family Court properly denied the GAL’s testimony due to the ethical concerns presented.
The court also properly denied Ex-Wife’s motion to strike the GAL report. The court appointed the GAL to counsel the court in formulating a decision. The court has considerable discretion in this area, and it would have been a waste of resources to disregard the report. Because of the inherent conflict and potential for prejudice created by the ambiguity in the statute, the proper role for a GAL in child custody issues should be scrutinized by the General Assembly or Supreme Court. A review of the law in other jurisdictions regarding the role of GALs in custody proceedings did not yield consistent results. Some states prohibit a GAL from testifying, while other states have statutes explicitly stating the role of the GAL and the GAL report and under what circumstances a GAL can be called as a witness and cross-examined. Nevertheless, in this case, the testimony of the witnesses at the custody hearing was thorough and was relied upon more than the GAL report in the court’s decision. Any error from allowing the GAL report to be considered was harmless.
KRS 403.340(3) provides that a court must not change a prior custody determination, unless there is a change in the circumstances of the child or the custodian, and the modification is in the best interests of the child. The Family Court found that Ex-Husband had increased his visitation, that the older sister had moved away from the home to live with Ex-Husband, and the relationship between Ex-Wife and the child had deteriorated. The relocation was in the child’s best interest because Ex-Wife, Ex-Husband, the older sister, and the child all testified at the hearing, and each of Ex-Wife’s concerns about the relocation were addressed in the court’s order. Overall, the court accepted the child’s explanation of the toxic relationship that had developed between her and her mother.
Judge Denise Clayton wrote separately, concurring with the result. Judge Clayton stated that it was improper to admit the GAL’s report because the GAL was the child’s legal representative. The court reached the correct result, but the parties should have never been in the position where the child’s legal representative was also serving as an expert to the court.
Sandra Spreacker appeals from an order of Greenup Family Court which determined that Denise Vaughn, the paternal Great-Aunt of the minor child (B.C.), to be the de facto custodian of that child.
In July, 2010 while baby-sitting B.C., Vaughn noticed severe diaper rash. She contacted Spreacker who requested that B.C. be returned home the next day. The next day, however, Spreacker was arrested. The child’s father was already incarcerated. Although Vaughn had physical custody, she did not have legal custody, so she filed a petition for juvenile dependency, neglect, and abuse in Boyd County.
On July 7, 2010, Boyd District Court granted emergency custody to Vaughn and granted her custody after a temporary removal hearing on July 12. On July 27, Vaughn amended her petition to allege B.C. was medically neglected. After an adjudication hearing on September 14 during which B.C.’s parents admitted to neglect, the court ordered B.C. to remain in Vaughn’s custody.
On January 3, 2011, Vaughn filed a petition for custody in Greenup, her home county. At a hearing on May 3, 2011, the Greenup Family Court found that Vaughn was a de facto custodian and awarded her custody of B.C. This appeal followed.
The Greenup Family Court found that B.C. continuously resided with Vaughn who made sure the child received all necessary medical procedures and Vaughn was the primary financial supporter. B.C. had a Kentucky medical card before custody was awarded to Vaughn and received money from Kinship Care which merely covered daycare expenses. Spreacker argues that Vaughn was not the primary financial support because of these benefits. The Court of Appeals disagreed and said the government benefits only supplemented what Vaughn provided and the benefits did not supplant the primary support of the child.
The Court of Appeals distinguished this case from those involving foster parents, who receive support from the Cabinet. B.C. was never in the custody of the Cabinet and Vaughn is not a foster parent. KRS 403.270 requires a de facto custodian to serve as the “primary” – not the “sole” caregiver and financial supporter.
The Court of Appeals found that because the child is under the age of three and was never “placed” by the Cabinet, the statutory criteria was satisfied. Moreover, the CA held that because Spreacker did not commence a separate action to regain custody, she did not toll the calculation of the statutory time for establishing a de facto custodian.
Former life-partner of Child’s adoptive mother appealed from FC’s denial of her motion for joint custody, visitation and to set child support due to lack of standing.
Truman and Lillard were in a marriage-like relationship for four years prior to Lillard obtaining temporary guardianship of her six-month-old nephew, Thomas. Truman and Lillard had discussed plans to start a family, but at that time were waiting to do so as they were both full-time students. However, because Thomas was her nephew and needed a healthy home, Lillard began the adoption process, which was finalized in 2008. The couple was aware that they could not legally jointly adopt Thomas in Kentucky. Although Truman assisted in raising Thomas as one of his “Mommies”, no steps were taken to establish parenting rights for her. In February 2010, the couple broke up and Truman left the Mississippi home she shared with Lillard and Thomas. After a domestic dispute in which Truman attempted to take Thomas, Lillard moved to Lexington with Thomas, obtained a restraining order against Truman, refused further communications from her, and refused to allow her to spend any time with Thomas. Truman filed a petition for joint custody and visitation and volunteered to pay child support. In October 2010, the parties agreed to a visitation order. Lillard subsequently relocated again, to Bowling Green, and sought a transfer of the case to Warren FC based on her new address, which was denied. In November 2010, Fayette FC held a hearing based on whether Lillard had waived her superior right to custody pursuant to Mullins v. Picklesimer. FC orally found she had not, though no written orders were entered. In August 2011, Truman petitioned the court for a status hearing and for written orders on the waiver issue. FC did so, finding Lillard had not waived her superior right and that Truman had no custodial rights, and denied Truman’s request for visitation and for a new trial. Truman appealed, arguing that FC erred by: 1. Failing to transfer the matter to Warren FC; 2. Failing to make sufficient findings of fact on visitation; 3. Incorrectly relying on Picklesimer regarding visitation; and 4. Entering findings of fact not supported by the evidence.
CA disagreed with all of Truman’s contentions. First, Truman’s argument regarding transfer to Warren FC was completely inconsistent with her actions in Fayette FC, and CA held she was judicially estopped from challenging FC’s action which was consistent with her requested relief.
Regarding the sufficiency of findings on visitation, CA held that FC did make findings in this regard and that FC is not required to address every piece of evidence or argument by counsel for findings to be sufficient. So long as FC’s findings reflect a good faith effort at fact-finding and complies with CR 52.01, the findings will be sufficient. CA found that FC’s findings did so and were sufficient.
Next, CA addressed whether FC should have relied on Picklesimer on the visitation issue or if it should have applied the in loco parentis doctrine. CA noted that this reliance was appropriate and that the in loco parentis doctrine has been replaced by the de facto custodian statute; thus, non-parents may attain standing to seek custody or visitation of a child only if they qualify as de facto custodians, if the legal parent has waived her superior right to custody, or if the parent is unfit.
Lastly, CA disagreed with Truman’s contention that the findings of fact relative to custody were not supported by the evidence. CA held, “Although we appreciate the substantial and significant relationship Truman had with Thomas, she was not his parent, she could not qualify as a de facto custodian, and he resided with his only parent, Lillard. … This case serves as an illustration of the exception to Mullins, where we distinguish a non-parent truly acting in the capacity as a parent from the many people who may love, care for and support a child . . . . Not every person who genuinely loves and cares for a child gains custodial rights; waiver requires significantly more. There was no error.
Father appealed FC’s order awarding joint custody of his children along with the children’s deceased mother’s nephew and wife, contending that deceased mother’s nephew and wife did not have standing to pursue custody.
Father and Mother shared joint custody of twins after divorce, with Mother providing twins’ primary residence and Father receiving standard visitation schedule. Three years’ later, Father’s visitation was suspended following a social services investigation alleging he had abused his minor daughter (the twins’ half-sister). Father later received visitation once again, but for minimal periods of time. However, he consistently failed to exercise the time he was given and had very little involvement in the twins’ lives over the next six years while Mother was still alive. Meanwhile, Mother’s nephew, his wife and their children, who were approximately the same age as the twins, spent substantial amounts of time with them during the same time period.
The day that Mother died, Nephew and Wife filed petition for emergency custody, indicating in the Petition that Father’s whereabouts were not known. FC granted them emergency custody and two days later, they were granted temporary custody after a temporary removal hearing. They filed for permanent custody a few weeks later. After another temporary custody hearing a few months later, the parties agreed that Father would have visitation with children 4 days a week for the next 2 months. Father again neglected to exercise his visitation. FC drastically limited visitation again but Father still did not exercise all time that was allotted to him. After final hearing, FC found Nephew and Wife had standing pursuant to KRS 403.822(1)(b)1 and KRS 403.800(13); that Father should not have custody because he had inflicted emotional harm on the twins, exhibited moral delinquency, and had abandoned the twins; and that Nephew and Wife should share joint custody with Father but Nephew and Wife would provide primary residence for twins with Father receiving the same drastically limited visitation. Father appealed.
CA agreed with Father that Nephew and Wife did not have standing to pursue custody action. While CA agreed that KRS 403.822 was appropriately relied upon by FC in its analysis of standing in this case, FC misinterpreted and misapplied KRS 403.800(13), which defines “a person acting as a parent” who might have standing under KRS 403.822. Such a person must have legal custody or claim a right to legal custody AND have or have had physical custody of the child for six months of the year preceding the custody action. Here, Nephew and Wife had custody for less than a month prior to filing their petition. CA disagreed with Nephew and Wife’s interpretation that the six month limitation should only be imposed on parties who no longer have physical custody, and thus did not apply to them as the custodians at the time of filing. CA, on a matter of first impression, found that the six month requirement applies to any party seeking custody, regardless of the current physical custody status. Thus, Nephew and Wife did not have standing to pursue custody of twins.
Ex-Husband appealed FC’s order, contending that FC erred by imputing income to him for child support purposes, by arbitrarily reducing his parenting time, and by making an unequal division of the marital estate.
CA agreed with Ex-Husband that there was no substantial evidence to support FC’s finding that he had not regularly exercised the parenting time allotted to him before trial, and that evidence clearly showed that he saw children on an almost daily basis. CA held that FC clearly erred on this issue and remanded for further consideration of the issue.
CA agreed with Ex-Husband that as there was no evidence introduced to show the strength or nature of prevailing job opportunities or the expected earnings levels in the community, and as FC gave no explanation as to how it determined that Ex-Husband could be expected to earn at the same level as Ex-Wife, there were inadequate findings for CA to conduct meaningful review of the decision and the issue was remanded to FC for further findings.
CA did not agree with Ex-Husband that FC erred by not giving him equal share of marital estate. CA found no evidence that FC considered any factors other than statutory criteria and that FC did not abuse its discretion in the division.
CA did not agree with Ex-Husband that FC erred by failing to permit him to oversee the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act accounts of the children. CA noted that under statutory provisions, Ex-Wife as monitor of the accounts must keep records available for inspection and that Ex-Husband was permitted to inspect the account.
Jennifer Rice appeals from the order of Bracken Circuit Court denying her motion to alter, amend or vacate its order adopting the report of the Domestic Relations Commissioner which designated Willard Rice, her former husband, primary residential custodian of their three minor children during the school year. She argues that the trial court abused its discretion and that naming Willard primary custodian was palpable error and should be reversed.
When the parties were divorced in 2009, they agreed to grant temporary custody to Willard so the children could continue their homeschooling with Willard’s mother. In their separation agreement, the parties specified that beginning in January, 2010 the parties would share joint custody. The children would be homeschooled by the paternal grandmother when in Willard’s custody and by Jennifer when she had custody.
In October, 2010 Jennifer filed a motion for change of custody requesting that she be designated primary residential custodian and an order requiring children to attend public schools, alleging that test results revealed the children were not functioning at grade level.
A Guardian Ad Litem was appointed, who concluded both parents would be suitable as residential parents and recommended that Jennifer be the primary custodian because of the GAL’s belief that public school would be more beneficial. After the GAL’s report, the parties agreed the children would attend public school regardless of which parent was named primary custodian. The Court referred the issue of custody to the Domestic Relations Commissioner.
The DRC determined that the children should live with Willard during the school year and spend 3 out of 4 weekends each month with Jennifer, allowing the children to remain in or near the home where they grew up and near the paternal grandparents who had been regular babysitters. Willard had a long-term job and stable home, while Jennifer was unemployed and had unstable living arrangements.
The Court entered an order confirming the DRC’s report. Jennifer filed a motion to alter, amend or vacate the order alleging that the DRC’s findings and the GAL’s report supported her contention that it was in the best interest of the children for her to be designated primary residential parent. Jennifer’s motion was denied, the order confirming the DRC’s report was reaffirmed and Jennifer filed this appeal.
Jennifer was not precluded from raising a palpable error claim on appeal pursuant to CR 61.02. The Court of Appeals, however, disagreed that granting custody to Willard during the school year was palpable error that should be reversed.
With respect to Jennifer’s allegation of abuse of discretion, the Court of Appeals considered whether the trial judge’s findings were clearly erroneous or an abuse of discretion which “implied arbitrary action or capricious disposition under the circumstances, at least an unreasonable and unfair decision.” Kuprion v. Fitzgerald, 888 S.W.2d 679, 684 (Ky. 1994)(citations omitted).
Jennifer claimed the trial court’s ruling gave the appearance of improperly favoring grandparents over parents. Although the grandparents watched the children while Willard was working, it did not mean the court granted custody to the grandparents. Modification of the custody agreement was not warranted on the basis of a work schedule.
The Court of Appeals considered the applicable factors in KRS 403.270(2) and held that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion by deferring to the DRC’s recommendations, even though Jennifer claimed the grandfather was in poor health and there was an active DVO against him related to corporal punishment of the children.
The Court of Appeals held that without clearly erroneous findings by the DRC, there was no palpable error or abuse of discretion by the trial court. The trial court’s order denying Jennifer’s motion to alter, amend or vacate the DRC report is affirmed.
Aaron Kidd appealed from the Perry Circuit Court ruling related to the custody of his daughter, Jaiden. The Court awarded joint custody to Kidd and Jaiden’s maternal great-grandparents, James and Irene Combs, designated the Combses as the primary residential custodians and ordered visitation for Kidd and Jaiden’s mother, Shannon Combs. Kidd contests the Court’s designation of the Combses as de facto custodians and the custody ruling.
Aaron Kidd and Shannon Combs, Jaiden’s parents, never married, but began living together in Lexington in October 2001. Jaiden was born in July, 2002. In February, 2003, Aaron sustained a gunshot wound to the face in the line of duty as a police officer, in a confrontation in which Aaron shot and killed his attacker. The ensuing controversy and safety concerns led Shannon to ask her grandparents (who had raised her) to take Jaiden to Hazard until Aaron recovered and the investigations were complete. When Aaron returned to work as a police officer, Shannon was working and attending college, so they decided to leave Jaiden with the Combses until Shannon completed her education. The parents visited the child in Hazard and the child visited them in Lexington. When Aaron and Shannon broke up in 2006, a paternity test established that Aaron was Jaiden’s father.
Jaiden lived with the Combses from 2003 until 2007. In 2006 it was determined that Jaiden needed dental care but Shannon was afraid to allow the required general anesthesia to be administered. In 2007, Aaron took Jaiden to his own dentist, who performed the necessary extractions and fillings.
In July, 2007 Shannon filed a petition against Aaron for custody and child support and he filed a counterclaim seeking custody of Jaiden. After a temporary custody hearing on August 3, 2007, the Court found the Combses to be de facto custodians and granted them temporary custody. The Combses moved to intervene and for de facto custody. The motion to intervene was granted, the petition was filed and a guardian ad litem was appointed for Jaiden.
A Domestic Relations Commissioner conducted a hearing in February, 2009. The GAL recommended joint custody to the Combses and Aaron, and the DRC recommended sole custody to the Combses, with visitation to Aaron and Shannon. The Court awarded joint custody to the Combses and Aaron with reasonable visitation for Shannon. Aaron appealed the custody ruling and the Combses cross-appealed from the joint custody award, seeking sole custody of Jaiden.
During the pendency of the Appeal, Irene Combs died. Aaron moved to remand this case to circuit court for consideration of his motion to modify custody because of the change in circumstances. After an evidentiary hearing, James and Aaron were awarded joint custody, James continuing as primary residential custodian and visitation as previously ordered for Shannon and Aaron. The case returned to the Court of Appeals to determine if the Combses were properly named as de facto custodians and joined as parties after the temporary custody hearing.
The Court of Appeals held that the circuit court had statutory authority to join the Combses as parties to the custody action and allow them to intervene and petition for custody once it found they met the requirements to be de facto custodians. To determine if the Combses were properly named de facto custodians, the Court of Appeals explained that the meet this status, a person must have been the child’s primary caregiver and the primary financial supporter of the child.
The Court found that the Combses had been primary caregivers and financial supporters of Jaiden and provided her only real home in her first five years. Aaron argued that a six-week period when he took Jaiden to his home broke the period of time required to qualify as a de facto custodian. This was rejected by the Court because the Combses never agreed that Aaron was taking the child for more than a week’s visit.
The Court of Appeals held that the Circuit Court did not abuse its discretion in designating the Combses as de facto custodians and affirmed the 2009 custody award.

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