Source: http://masscases.com/cases/distapp/2011/2011massappdiv237.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 12:06:04+00:00

Document:
Ronald J. Resmini and Shaun B. Spencer for the plaintiff.
Krystle G. Tadesse for the defendant.
After a motor vehicle accident on July 16, 2007 between vehicles operated by the parties here, Chamberlands attorney, Ronald J. Resmini (Attorney Resmini), made demand upon Liberty Mutual and, beginning in March of 2008, entered into settlement negotiations. On August 20, 2009, Liberty Mutuals adjuster proposed to Attorney Resmini that the parties resolve the claim by entering into binding arbitration with high-low parameters of $30,000.00 and $5,000.00.
Both the attorney and the adjuster understood, as would anyone in the legal or insurance claims profession, that this meant that the case would be submitted to an arbitrator for a final binding decision, but that Chamberland would not recover less than $5,000.00 and Liberty Mutual would not pay more than $30,000.00. Attorney Resmini countered with a proposed high-low between $45,000.00 and $5,000.00, and the two agreed upon parameters of $40,000.00 and $5,000.00.
There was no discussion between Attorney Resmini and Liberty Mutuals adjuster as to whether this agreement was subject to approval by their principals.
On September 3, 2008, Attorney Lili K. Geller (Attorney Geller), Liberty Mutuals staff attorney assigned to arrange, and represent Maiorano at, the arbitration, forwarded an arbitration agreement to Attorney Resmini, with the request that he return the document once signed and/or contact me to discuss any proposed changes. The agreement, as drafted, required signatures by both counsel and Chamberland. Attorney Geller sent out a discovery-type document request at the same time, and Attorney Resmini responded to it during the month of September. The arbitration agreement was never returned.
agreement, a high-low agreement, a fee schedule, and an invoice, charging each party $400.00. On October 22, 2009, Attorney Resmini sent back the Babik arbitration agreement form, signed by himself, a conflict disclosure form also signed by him, and a check for $400.00.
Attorney Resmini called Attorney Geller on October 30, 2009 and told her that Chamberland was unwilling to go forward with the arbitration as she believed the high of $40,000.00 was too low, given the Personal Injury Protection (PIP) offset of $7,532.00.
The arbitration did not take place, and, on February 3, 2010, Attorney Resmini commenced this action. Maiorano ultimately [Note 1] and successfully moved for a final judgment in his favor that incorporated an order to arbitrate, which Chamberland has appealed.
low agreement constituted settlement); Malick v. Seaview Lincoln Mercury, 940 A.2d 1221, 1225 (N.J. Super. 2008) ([A] high-low agreement is a type of settlement.); Shafer v. Cronk, 532 A.2d 1131, 1133 (N.J. Super. 1987); New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Farm Family Mut. Ins. Co., 231 A.D.2d 722, 723 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (high-low arbitration is functional equivalent of settlement); Power v. Tomarchio, 701 A.2d 1371, 1373 (Pa. Super. 1997).
The powers of an attorney representing a party in a case do not include the power to agree to a compromise settlement of it in an agreement for judgment. Precious v. ORourke, 270 Mass. 305, 308 (1930). This would seem to be all the more true in a case not yet put in suit.
More to the point, the question of whether an attorney has authority to bind a client by his action does not depend upon whether the action falls within some definition of the word settlement. While an attorney has broad powers in respect to the management and prosecution of a case affecting the remedy, he cannot do things which impair the cause of action without specific authority from his client. Friedberg v. Jablon, 287 Mass. 510, 514-515 (1934) (attorney for assignee plaintiff lacked authority for partial release of defendant). A high-low agreement is certainly one that would impair the cause of action. [Note 2] Id.
525 (1921), quoting New England Dredging Co. v. Rockport Granite Co., 149 Mass. 381, 382 (1889).
Accordingly, the judgment for defendant Maiorano and the allowances of both his motion for final judgment and motion to compel arbitration are vacated, and this case is returned to the Taunton Division of the District Court Department for trial.
[Note 1] Maiorano first obtained an interlocutory order requiring Chamberland to arbitrate. Chamberlands appeal to this Division was denied as interlocutory.
[Note 2] As our decision is based upon the high-low portion of the agreement, we do not consider the question of an attorneys authority, absent specific authorization, to enter into binding arbitration.

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