Source: http://courts.mrsc.org/supreme/052wn2d/052wn2d0282.htm
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 01:10:32+00:00

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EMINENT DOMAIN - PUBLIC USE - TESTS. Under RCW 8.20.070, which requires that the court determine whether the contemplated use for which private lands are condemned is a public use, three prerequisites to an adjudication of a public use are recognized: that the use is really a public use; that the public interests require it; and that the property appropriated is necessary for the purpose; the first prerequisite being mandatory under Const. Art. I, § 16 (amendment 9).
 SAME - PUBLIC USE - HIGHWAYS. The acquisition of private property for the purpose of constructing and maintaining a public highway thereon is a public use within the meaning of Const. Art. I, § 16 (amendment 9) and RCW 8.20.070.
 SAME - PUBLIC INTEREST - EXPRESS HIGHWAY. In a proceeding by the state to condemn property for limited-access highway purposes, held that in order to effectuate the intention of the legislature expressed in RCW 47.10.700, 47.10.704, and 47.28.010, relating to the proposed freeway, the public interest required the taking of whatever portion of an entire acreage necessary for the construction, protection, and maintenance of the highway, as provided in RCW 47.12.010, where a series of ramps and interchanges, together with additional accelleration and decelleration lanes would be constructed on the land.
 SAME - PUBLIC NECESSITY - SELECTION OF LANDS TO BE TAKEN. In such a proceeding, the director of highways did not act arbitrarily, capriciously, or fraudulently in seeking to acquire certain parcels in the acreage, where the testimony justified the taking of tracts adjacent to land upon which ramps of a traffic interchange would be built and a tract enclosed by an "on-ramp" for actual construction and maintenance purposes.
 SAME. In such a proceeding, it was not arbitrary and capricious so as to establish constructive fraud to seek to take land within the reasonable right of way margins upon which the proposed freeway and its ramps were to be constructed, nor to seek to take land almost completely surrounded by new construction, including a structural over crossing, such land being "really necessary for the public use of the state" as required by RCW 8.04.070.
«1» Reported in 325 P. (2d) 300.
 See 14 A. L. R. 1350; 68 A. L. R. 837; 18 Am. Jur. 736.
of land could not be taken for the construction, protection, and maintenance of the highway as authorized by RCW 47.12.010, where it was shown that while the tracts were necessary for the wholly limited-access facility contemplated, they were not actually necessary for the purpose authorized in the statute.
 SAME - PUBLIC USE - LIMITED - ACCESS HIGHWAYS. A taking or damaging of private property for limited-access highway purposes is for a public use, since in RCW 47.52.001, the legislature has declared that it is the policy of the state to limit access to highway facilities in the interest of highway safety and for the preservation of the investment of the public in such facilities.
 HIGHWAYS - RIGHTS OF ABUTTING OWNERS - RIGHT OF INGRESS AND EGRESS. The owner of land abutting upon a conventional highway has an easement of ingress and egress, and the legislature has sought to protect such owners by providing in RCW 47.52.080 that no existing public highway shall be constructed as a limited-access facility except upon the waiver, purchase, or condemnation of the abutting owner's right of access thereto as therein provided.
 EMINENT DOMAIN - NATURE AND EXTENT OF POWER - STATUTES - CONSTRUCTION. Statutes of eminent domain, being in derogation of the common right, must be strictly construed, both as to the extent of the power and as to the manner of its exercise.
 SAME - LAND ABUTTING ON NEW LIMITED - ACCESS HIGHWAY. In such a proceeding, there was no bar to the acquisition of a tract of land under the provisions of RCW 47.52.050, providing for the acquisition of property for limited-access highway facilities, where an "offramp" to be constructed would separate the tract from an existing road, since the owners could not claim an easement of access to the newly constructed ramp because such easement had never in fact existed, and since after the construction of the ramp, the tract will not abut on an existing highway as defined by RCW 47.52.011.
 SAME - PROPERTY ABUTTING ON EXISTING HIGHWAYS. In such a proceeding, held that a tract of land could not be taken for the purpose of establishing a limited-access facility without first following the statutory procedure detailed in RCW 47.52.072 through 47.52.075, where, after construction, the tract will continue to abut, as before construction, upon two existing public highways, which are neither new or relocated, nor a portion of a relocated highway within the provisions of RCW 47.52.011.
Certiorari to review an order of the superior court for King county, No. 507497, Royal, J. entered October 11, 1957, adjudicating that the proposed taking and damaging of certain property by the state was for a public use and was necessary for state highway purposes. Affirmed, as modified.
Carlson, Newlands & Reha and Paul Sinnitt, for relators.
The Attorney General, Delbert W. Johnson and George H. Holt, Assistants, for respondent.
This matter comes before the court pursuant to the issuance of a writ of certiorari to review condemnation proceedings had in the respondent court, which culminated in the entry of an order adjudicating that the proposed taking and damaging of certain land owned by relators in King county was for a public use and was necessary for state highway purposes.
An understanding of the legal problem involved requires a detailed description of the manner in which the state proposes to take and damage the relators' land in connection with construction of the new state highway.
The land sought to be condemned consists of 23.9 acres of fiat lowland, quadrangular in shape. It is bounded on the north by the south city limits of Seattle, and on the east by Empire way (an existing state highway extending north and south). The south boundary is located approximately two hundred feet south of the south shoulder of an existing public highway, Boeing access road (hereinafter referred to as Boeing road), which extends in a generally east-west direction across the entire width of relators' land. On the west, an existing railroad right of way borders relators' land. The land is subject to an existing easement, two hundred feet in width, upon which Boeing road is maintained.
Because the land is bisected by Boeing road, two separate, approximately rectangular, tracts are formed, the northerly tract being the larger. Both tracts had unlimited access to Empire way and to Boeing road at the time this proceeding was commenced.
This entire acreage (consisting of the two separate parts just mentioned) was purchased by relators in March, 1954, for the purpose of future industrial development. At the time of the initial hearing of this matter (August, 1957) one of the relators estimated the value of the entire acreage at in excess of one-half million dollars.
On May 15, 1957, the director of highways filed a petition for an order declaring that this entire tract was necessary for the public use, namely, for "the construction, maintenance and operation of Primary State Highway No. 1, as a limited access highway." This highway, as proposed, will be a six-laned freeway having three northbound and three southbound lanes, divided by a median, and will be part of the Tacoma-Seattle-Everett freeway. Traffic will be channelized, and access to and from the freeway will be wholly controlled. The proposed freeway will cross both of relators' tracts in a generally northwesterly-southeasterly direction, bisecting each of them. Hence, relators' land will be quartered by the intersection formed by the crossing of Boeing road over the proposed freeway.
In order to facilitate the movement of traffic from the freeway to the nearby Empire way and Boeing road (and from these highways to the freeway) and yet maintain fully controlled access to and from the freeway, a series of ramps and interchanges, together with additional acceleration and deceleration lanes (to and from these ramps and interchanges), will be constructed, partially upon the land now owned by relators and partially upon adjoining lands. The proposed design of these facilities entirely eliminates left turns on to, or off of, the freeway.
clockwise. Likewise, the areas affected by these ramps are lettered similarly.
property during the ensuing year, because, if the land were condemned, they would be unable to recoup disbursements made for improvements during that time.
The map approved April 17, 1956, contemplated entry of the freeway onto relators' property in the southwest corner of the northerly tract, crossing diagonally to the northeast from Boeing road. Actual construction upon relators' land under this plan would have been confined approximately to the area designated "B" on the above diagram. The eastern boundary of the limited access area paralleled the easterly margin of the freeway.
This plan made no provision for ramps connecting the freeway with Boeing road which would have affected relators' tract south thereof. Hence, under the plan proposed at that time, only about nine acres on the westerly side of relators' property north of Boeing road would have been required for highway purposes. Thus relators would have retained approximately fifteen acres of usable land.
On May 7, 1957, the director of highways approved a map superseding that of April 17, 1956. The later map proposed construction as indicated on the above diagram. However, the east boundary of the area in which access was planned to be limited north of Boeing road was established on the west side of the Empire way right of way.
provided in this resolution that abuttors' rights of access within the area be acquired.
"The evidence indicated that there was a lack of plans for the extension of the highway in either direction from the proposed interchange. Further, the evidence indicated a long period of indecision and vacillation on the part of the petitioner. Suddenly out of all this comes a conclusion by the petitioner that the respondents' property is needed for an interchange to connect a highway running north and south upon a right of way for which no planned location exists.
"This court is disposed to rule that the condemnation of a substantial piece of extremely valuable, scarce and important land for the purpose of building a highway interchange, without knowing that the proposed highway is planned to connect to the interchange, is not a public purpose. This would be true, even though the law is clearly established that condemnation for use as a public highway is a public use within the requirements of RCW Chapter 47.52.
"However, the decision indicated above, which the evidence compels, does not appeal to the common sense of this court. For many years the public press has carried many news items about a proposed freeway between Everett and Tacoma. The court finds it impossible to believe that the petitioner did not have an existing plan to connect the proposed interchange to the long-sought and overdue proposed Tacoma-Everett freeway.
"The court will entertain a motion by petitioner to reopen the case for the introduction of evidence on this point. If such a motion has not been served and filed within one week from the date of this memorandum, the court will entertain the presentation from respondents of appropriate documents dismissing this petition, all in accordance with applicable rules of court."
freeway both north and south from relators' land. These exhibits show the contemplated route of the freeway and the locations of interchanges northward through Seattle, as well as the proposed general scheme of construction south of relators' land.
Alternate routes, depending upon the location of the Duwamish river crossing, approach relators' land from the south. For the purpose of this case, it will make no difference which of these routes is ultimately selected.
At the conclusion of the second hearing, the trial court rendered his oral decision in favor of the state. Thereafter, the order adjudicating public use, which is before us for review, was entered.
"1. In granting an Order Adjudicating Public Use authorizing the State to condemn 4.5 acres of land adjacent to the Boeing Access Road and Primary State Highway No. 2, Empire Way, and 2.5 acres adjacent to the Boeing Access Road and the railroad, which will not be used for highway construction.
"2. In permitting the State to limit access without an access hearing as required by RCW 47.52.072 through 47.52.075.
"3. In failing to dismiss the State's petition." Because these assignments of error are interrelated, they will be considered together.
Certain objections made by relators challenge the ability of the state to complete the contemplated highway. These matters relate to certain conditions which must be met before the state may qualify for apportioned Federal matching funds which will, in large measure, be used to finance construction. Relators fear that the highway presently proposed will not be constructed. But these matters are not germane to the issues before the court in determining the right of the condemnor to an order adjudicating public use and necessity.
"At the time and place appointed for hearing the petition [as provided in RCW 8.04.010 and 8.04.020], . . . if the court has satisfactory proof that all parties interested in the lands, . . . described in the petition have been duly served with notice, and is further satisfied by competent proof that the contemplated use for which the lands, . . . sought to be appropriated is really necessary for the public use of the state, it shall make and enter an order, to be recorded in the minutes of the court, . . . adjudicating that the contemplated use for which the lands, . . . are sought to be appropriated is really a public use of the state.
"Under . . . [RCW 8.20.070], three prerequisites to an adjudication of public use are recognized: (1) That the use is really a public use; (2) that the public interests require it; and (3) that the property appropriated is necessary for the purpose. [Citing cases.]"
See, also, State v. Slater, 51 Wn. (2d) 271, 317 P. (2d) 519 (1957), and State v. Hatchard, 49 Wn. (2d) 442, 302 P. (2d) 478 (1956).
"Whenever an attempt is made to take private property for a use alleged to be public, the question whether the contemplated use be really public shall be a judicial question, and determined as such, without regard to any legislative assertion that the use is public: Provided, that the taking of private property by the state for land reclamation and settlement purposes is hereby declared to be for public use."
268 Pac. 603 (1928); State ex rel. Flick v. Superior Court, 144 Wash. 124, 257 Pac. 231 (1927).
However, long before the enactment of the present statute, our legislature recognized the inadequacy of existing highway facilities connecting the cities named therein. In 1953, the legislature first considered the construction of this improvement by enacting Laws of 1953, chapter 183, p. 393, which authorized the Washington toll bridge authority to study, and, if feasible, after approval of the state highway commission, to locate, construct, and finance an express highway from Tacoma through Seattle to Everett. The substantive provisions of that act, except for appropriations, were expressly repealed in the enactment of Laws of 1955, chapter 268, p. 1092 (RCW 47.59), which also provided for the construction of this facility as a toll road (until the costs of construction should be repaid). However, the later act was held unconstitutional in Washington Toll Bridge Authority v. State, 49 Wn. (2d) 520, 304 P. (2d) 676 (1956).
Interstate and Defense Highways" in the interests Of national defense and commerce. Federal matching funds, at an approximate ratio of nine Federal dollars per one state dollar, were made available to the several states, subject to certain conditions.
At its next session, the legislature, in order to enable the state to take advantage of this Federal aid program for the financing of this much needed highway facility, enacted Laws of 1957, chapter 189, p. 715 (RCW 47.10.700 through 47.10.724).
"In order to facilitate vehicular traffic through and between the cities of Tacoma, Seattle and Everett and to remove the present handicaps and hazards over and along primary state highway No. 1 as presently established [RCW 47.16.010], the state highway commission is authorized to realign, redesign and reconstruct primary state highway No. 1 upon a newly located right of way or upon portions of existing right of way through and between the cities of Tacoma, Seattle and Everett and as an additional alternate route by-passing Seattle east of Lake Washington. The route of the proposed project is established as follows: Beginning in the vicinity of Ponders Corner, thence in a general northeasterly and northerly direction through the cities of Tacoma and Seattle to a point in the vicinity of the city of Everett and as an additional alternate route bypassing Seattle east of Lake Washington."
necessary for the "construction, protection, and maintenance of" this state highway, as in RCW 47.12.010 provided. Hence, the ultimate question to be resolved concerns the third prerequisite aforementioned, viz., whether the property proposed to be appropriated is necessary for that purpose.
"Prior to the passage of this act, this court had in effect said as much in State v. Superior Court, 111 Wash. 542, 191 Pac. 413, and State ex rel. Urquhart v. Superior Court, 112 Wash. 34, 191 Pac. 416, and, after the passage of the act, in State ex rel. Hanson v. Superior Court, 117 Wash. 399, 201 Pac. 1, affirmed the law, and there is nothing in the statute or decisions from which the court at this time has any inclination to depart."
Nor have we since departed from the rule there announced. See State ex rel. Bremerton Bridge Co. v. Superior Court, supra, and cases cited therein.
in the record justifies the taking of tracts "D," "E," "F," and the small tract lying northeast of tract "F" (enclosed by "on-ramp" No. 4, Boeing road and Empire way) for actual construction and maintenance purposes. The director of highways has not acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or fraudulently in seeking to acquire these parcels of land for the state.
 Of course, the land within reasonable right of way margins, upon which the proposed freeway and its many ramps are to be actually constructed, is "really necessary for the public use of the state." (RCW 8.04.070.) Likewise, because tract "C" will be almost completely surrounded by new construction, including the structural overcrossing on Boeing road, we are unable to say that the taking thereof is arbitrary or capricious so as to establish constructive fraud.
 Tracts "A" and "B" present a different problem. The state's evidence revealed, and the diagram clearly shows, that these tracts are not necessary for actual highway construction or maintenance. Although there is testimony that the highway department intends to landscape tract "B," thereby beautifying the area, our attention has not been called to any statute which authorizes the director of highways to condemn private property for that purpose. We think that a fair summary of the evidence shows that, while not being actually necessary for construction and maintenance purposes, these tracts are necessary in order to establish the wholly limited access facility contemplated in the above diagram. Having affirmatively shown that tracts "A" and "B" are not actually necessary for the purposes mentioned in RCW 47.12.010, the third prerequisite announced in State ex rel. Bremerton Bridge Co. v. Superior Court, supra, has not been satisfied. Consequently, these tracts (not being necessary) cannot be taken for the purposes authorized by that statute.
Highway No. 1, as a limited access highway." Our inquiry, then, is whether or not tracts "A" and/or "B" may be condemned by the state for the purpose of establishing a limited access facility.
"Unrestricted access to and from public highways has resulted in congestion and peril for the traveler. It has caused undue slowing of all traffic in many areas. The investment of the public in highway facilities has been impaired and highway facilities costing vast sums of money will have to be relocated and reconstructed. It is the declared policy of this state to limit access to the highway facilities of this state in the interest of highway safety and for the preservation of the investment of the public in such facilities."
It cannot, therefore, be asserted that a taking or damaging of private property for this purpose is not for a "public use." See State ex rel. Eastvold v. Superior Court, 47 Wn. (2d) 335, 287 P. (2d)494 (1955).
"The highway authorities of the state . . . may plan, designate, establish, regulate, vacate, alter, improve, construct, maintain, and provide limited access facilities for public use wherever such . . . authorities are of the opinion that traffic conditions, present or future, will justify such special facilities."
"No existing highway, road or street, or portion of an existing highway, road or street may be established as a limited access facility until the owners or reputed owners of the abutting property of the section affected, as indicated in the tax rolls of the county be given notice of such proposal and an opportunity to be heard thereon."
"For the purposes of this chapter, the term `existing highway' shall include all highways, roads and streets duly established, constructed, and in use. It shall not include new highways, roads or streets, or relocated highways, roads or streets, or portions of existing highways, roads or streets which are relocated."
"Statutes of eminent domain being in derogation of the common right must be strictly construed, both as to the extent of the power and as to the manner of its exercise."
See State ex rel. Mower v. Superior Court, 43 Wn. (2d) 123, 260 P. (2d) 355 (1953).
newly constructed, will separate this tract from Boeing road. Since this "off-ramp" is to be newly constructed, relators cannot claim an easement of access to it, because an easement has never in fact existed. State v. Caikins, supra. And since, after the construction of off-ramp No. 2, tract "B" will not abut upon an existing highway as defined in RCW 47.52.011, there exists no bar to the acquisition of this tract under the provisions of RCW 47.52.050.
 Tract "A," however, before and after construction, will abut upon Empire way and Boeing road, both existing public highways, which are neither new nor relocated, nor is there evidence to show that either of them is a portion of a relocated highway within the purview of RCW 47.52.011.
Strictly construed, RCW 47.52.050, which empowers the highway authorities to condemn property for limited-access facilities, is subject to the statutory conditions contained in RCW 47.52.080 and 47.52.072. For that reason, we must conclude that tract "A" cannot be taken by the state highway authorities for the purpose of establishing a limited-access facility without first following the statutory procedure detailed by the legislature in RCW 47.52.072 through RCW 47.52.075.
Concerning the contention of relators (raised for the first time in their reply brief) that they are entitled to damages occasioned as a result of the holding of this property in abeyance, pursuant to the provisions of RCW 47.28.025 and 47.28.026, we express no opinion.
Our conclusion is that the order before us for review must be affirmed as to all of relators' property except that portion designated as tract "A" on the above diagram. As to that portion, the state shall, within sixty days from the going down of the remittitur, file in the superior court its election, in writing, to proceed either (a) to comply with the provisions of RCW 47.52.072 et seq., in order to acquire limited access rights with respect to Empire way and Boeing road, or (b) to file an amended petition designating an easterly boundary for the proposed right of way for state primary highway No. 1 across tract "A."
In the latter event, the cause is remanded to the trial court for the taking of evidence as to the reasonableness of the part of tract "A" then proposed to be taken for highway purposes, and for the entry of an order adjudicating public use and necessity based on such evidence and consistent with the views expressed in this opinion.
In all other respects, the order before us for review is hereby affirmed. Relators shall recover their costs in this court.
HILL, C. J., WEAVER, ROSELLINI, and FOSTER, JJ., concur.

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