Source: https://cbaclelegalconnection.com/author/cbaclestaff/
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 08:29:08+00:00

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The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People in Interest of S.K. on Thursday, March 7, 2019.
Americans with Disabilities Act—Reasonable Accommodations—Termination of Parental Rights—Dependency and Neglect—Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
The Gunnison County Department of Health and Human Services (Department) received reports that S.K. was failing to thrive. The Department initiated a dependency and neglect case and took custody of S.K.
The parents stipulated that the child was dependent and neglected because she was without proper care through no fault of their own. The juvenile court adopted treatment plans for the parents and appointed a guardian ad litem for each parent. Ultimately, the Department moved to terminate the legal relationships between S.K. and the parents. Mother and father filed a joint motion requesting (1) a finding that the Department had not made reasonable efforts to reunify them with the child, (2) dismissal of the termination motion, and (3) amendment of the treatment plans to provide reasonable accommodations under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Following a hearing, the court rejected the parents’ arguments and terminated their parental rights.
On appeal, the parents challenged the appropriateness of their treatment plans, the efforts the Department made to reunify them with the child, and the extent of reasonable accommodations required under the ADA. An appropriate treatment plan is one that is approved by the court and is reasonably calculated to render the parent fit to provide adequate parenting within a reasonable time and that relates to the child’s needs. When evaluating parental unfitness and the likelihood that a parent’s conduct or condition will change, the court must consider whether reasonable efforts have been unable to rehabilitate the parent. The reasonable efforts standard is met when services are provided in accordance with C.R.S. § 19-3-208, including appropriate assessments and referrals and mental health and substance abuse treatment services, if funding is available. Title II of the ADA prohibits a public entity from discriminating against a qualified individual with disabilities in the provision or operation of public services, programs, or activities. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 applies the same requirement to entities that receive federal financial assistance. There is an affirmative duty placed on a public entity to make reasonable accommodations for qualified individuals with disabilities.
Whether a parent is a qualified individual with a disability under the ADA is a case-by-case determination. When a parent in a dependency and neglect proceeding has a disability under the ADA, the Department and the juvenile court must make reasonable accommodations for the parent’s disability in the treatment plan and the rehabilitative services provided. When deciding whether to terminate parental rights, the juvenile court must consider whether reasonable accommodations were made for the parent’s disability in determining whether the parent’s treatment plan was appropriate and reasonable efforts were made to rehabilitate the parent. The juvenile court’s primary concern is the child’s health and safety.
Here, it was undisputed that both parents had serious intellectual and developmental disabilities. Though these were disabilities under the ADA, the ADA does not restrict a court from terminating parental rights when the parent, even after reasonable accommodations, is unable to meet his child’s needs. The juvenile court considered the many services offered to the parents in concluding that the Department provided services that reasonably accommodated the parent’s limitations; the parents’ treatment plans were appropriate; and the Department made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the parents. These conclusions were supported by the record.
Mother contended that the juvenile court erred in finding that she was an unfit parent and her conduct or condition was unlikely to change in a reasonable time. The record evidence, including the opinions of professional evaluators, did not support this argument. The juvenile court did not err in concluding that mother was an unfit parent and her conduct or condition was unlikely to change in a reasonable time.
Father argued that placing the child with the paternal grandmother was a less drastic alternative to termination. The record showed that a home study resulted in the paternal grandmother being denied placement for the child and otherwise supported the juvenile court’s determination that there was no less drastic alternative to termination.
The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Heotis v. Colorado State Board of Education on Thursday, March 7, 2019.
Teacher’s License—C.R.S. § 19-3-304(2)(l) Reporting Duties—Constitutionality.
Several months before the expiration of her teacher’s license, Hoetis submitted a renewal application to the Colorado State Board of Education (the Board). The Board denied her application because while Heotis was employed as a public school teacher, she did not report to authorities that her then-husband had sexually abused their daughter. The Board determined her failure to report the abuse was unethical under Colorado’s Teacher Licensing Act, C.R.S. § 22-60.5-107(4) (the Act). An administrative law judge (ALJ) upheld the Board’s decision, and the district court upheld the Board’s final order.
On appeal, Heotis argued that the Act violates due process on its face and as applied because the disciplinary options provided to the Board by the Act are too limited as compared to the greater disciplinary flexibility provided to other licensing boards. The court of appeals found no authority to support the proposition that the greater flexibility in other licensing statues represents a constitutional minimum. Hoetis failed to establish that the Act is unconstitutional.
Hoetis also contended that there was insufficient evidence to support the conclusion that she engaged in unethical behavior. She argued that she was not required to report the abuse of her daughter. C.R.S. § 19-3-304(2)(l) required Heotis, as a public school teacher, and thus a mandatory reporter, to immediately report any known or suspected child abuse or neglect. This duty applies irrespective of the circumstances in which the reporter learns of or suspects abuse or neglect. The statute reflects a moral standard in the community for teachers. Substantial evidence in the record supported the Board’s conclusion that Heotis engaged in unethical conduct through her failure to report because it offended the morals of the community.
Hoetis further argued that she was excused from reporting based on evidence that she suffered from battered woman syndrome. The statute does include an exception for persons suffering from battered woman syndrome. Moreover, there was substantial evidence in the record that Hoetis did not report because she was trying to keep her family together, not because of battered woman syndrome.
The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in Garner v. People on Monday, March 18, 2019.
Eyewitnesses—Identification Evidence and Procedures—In-Court Identification.
The supreme court reviewed whether due process or the Colorado Rules of Evidence required the exclusion of victim-witnesses’ in-court identifications of defendant, where each witness had failed to identify defendant in a photographic array before trial and almost three years had elapsed between the crime and the confrontations. The court held that where an in-court identification is not preceded by an impermissibly suggestive pretrial identification procedure arranged by law enforcement, and where nothing beyond the inherent suggestiveness of the ordinary courtroom setting made the in-court identification itself constitutionally suspect, due process does not require the trial court to prescreen the identification for reliability. Here, because defendant alleged no impropriety regarding the pretrial photographic arrays, and the record revealed nothing unusually suggestive about the circumstances of the witnesses’ in-court identifications, the in-court identifications did not violate due process. The court further held that defendant’s evidentiary arguments were unpreserved, and the trial court’s admission of the identifications was not plain error under CRE 403, 602, or 701. Accordingly, the court affirmed the court of appeals’ judgment.
The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People v. Roehrs on Thursday, March 7, 2019.
Criminal Law—Judge—Recusal—Personal Knowledge—Extrajudicial Source Doctrine— Colorado Code of Judicial Conduct Rule 2.11(A)(1)—Appearance of Impropriety—Disqualification.
Roehrs was an interested party in a dependency and neglect hearing at which Judge Cisneros presided. At the hearing, Sergeant Couch testified concerning Roehrs’s presence at the scene of an investigation that he was conducting. During Sergeant Couch’s testimony, Roehrs stood up, walked toward the witness stand, and said, “You’re a liar. I am going to have your job.” Judge Cisneros asked Roehrs to leave the courtroom, which Roehrs did. After Sergeant Couch’s testimony, Roehrs threatened him in the courtroom hallway. Judge Cisneros later called Sergeant Couch and the attorneys into her chambers to discuss what had happened outside the courtroom.
The People charged Roehrs with retaliation against a witness, harassment, and intimidating a witness. Before trial, Roehrs’s counsel moved to recuse Judge Cisneros. Judge Cisneros denied the motion, ruling that Roehrs failed to prove bias or personal knowledge of the disputed facts. Judge Cisneros presided over Roehrs’s criminal trial. Roehrs contested a number of factual issues. A jury found Roehrs guilty of retaliation against a witness and harassment.
On appeal, Roehrs contended that the trial court erred in denying her motion to recuse because she had personal knowledge of disputed facts and was a material witness to Roehrs’s conduct; thus, there was an appearance of bias or prejudice. Judge Cisneros was not a likely material witness. But under Colorado Code of Judicial Conduct Rule 2.11(A)(1), a judge need not be a likely material witness for disqualification to be mandated; all that is required is personal knowledge of the facts that are in dispute. The court of appeals examined the scope of the extrajudicial source doctrine and concluded that although knowledge gained in the course of a judge’s courtroom duties does not normally prevent a trial judge from presiding over subsequent, related proceedings, when a trial judge witnesses all or part of a crime in the courtroom, she has personal knowledge of facts that are in dispute within the meaning of Rule 2.11(A)(1). Here, the judge witnessed part of the crime and thus had personal knowledge of disputed facts. Accordingly, Roehrs’s motion was sufficient to raise an appearance of bias or prejudice and Judge Cisneros’s continued participation in the trial was improper.
The judgment of conviction was reversed and the case was remanded with directions to grant appellant a new trial before a different judge.
The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in In the Matter of Laurie A. Booras on Monday, March 11, 2019.
In this judicial disciplinary proceeding, the supreme court considered the exceptions of a now-former Colorado Court of Appeals judge to the Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline’s (Commission’s) recommendation that the judge be removed from office and ordered to pay the costs the Commission incurred in this matter.
The Commission’s recommendation was based on factual findings and conclusions of law determining that the judge had violated Canon 1, Rule 1.2, Canon 3, Rule 3.1, and Canon 3, Rule 3.5 of the Colorado Code of Judicial Conduct by (1) disclosing confidential information belonging to the court of appeals (namely, the vote of a court of appeals division on a case prior to the issuance of the decision in that case) to an intimate, non-spousal partner, and (2) using inappropriate racial epithets in communications with that intimate partner, including a racially derogatory reference to a court of appeals colleague.
The supreme court concluded that the Commission properly found that the judge’s communications with the judge’s then-intimate partner were not protected by the First Amendment. The court further concluded that, given the judge’s resignation, which the judge tendered and which became effective after the Commission made its recommendation, the court need not decide whether the judge’s removal from office was an appropriate sanction. Rather, the court concluded that the appropriate sanction in this case is the acceptance of the judge’s resignation, the imposition of a public censure, and an order requiring the judge to pay the Commission’s costs in this matter.
The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in Johnson v. People on Monday, March 11, 2019.
Jury Instructions—Reasonable Doubt—Burden of Proof—Due Process.
In this case, the supreme court considered whether the trial court’s jury instruction defining “hesitate to act” lowered the prosecution’s burden of proof in violation of due process. The court held that the instruction did not lower the prosecution’s burden of proof in violation of due process. Because the instruction was nonsensical, given only once during voir dire, not referenced by either party at any time, and flanked by the proper instruction regarding the burden of proof at the beginning and end of trial, there is not a reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the instruction and applied it in a manner that lowered the prosecution’s burden.

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