Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/231/341/
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 14:05:27+00:00

Document:
Restrictions on alienation imposed by § 5 of the Act of February 8, 1887, 24 Stat. 388, c. 119, on an allotment to a Sisseton and Wahpeton Indian remained until the actual issuing of patent carrying full and unrestricted title, and were not removed instantly on its passage by an act of Congress permitting the Secretary of the Interior to issue such a patent.
An act of Congress authorizing and empowering the Secretary of the Interior to shorten the period of alienation of an Indian allotment construed in this case a being permissive only, and not effecting the removal of the restrictions prior to the actual issuing of the patent by the Secretary.
A deed by an Indian of an allotment subject to restrictions on alienation is absolutely void if made before final patent, even if made after passage of an act of Congress permitting the Secretary of the Interior to issue such patent; nor does the unrestricted title subsequently acquired by the allottee under the patent inure to the benefit of the grantee. Starr v. Long Jim, 227 U. S. 613.
A state statute cannot make a deed the basis of subsequently acquired title to Indian allotment lands when the federal statute has pronounced such a deed entirely void.
The facts, which involve the title to land allotted to an Indian of the Sisseton and Wahpeton tribe under the Act of February 8, 1887, and the effect of subsequent action by Congress in regard thereto on the restrictions against alienation, are stated in the opinion.
for in this act by the Secretary of the Interior, he shall cause patents to issue therefor in the name of the allottees, which patents shall be of the legal effect and declare that the United States does and will hold the land thus allotted for the period of twenty-five years in trust for the sole use and benefit of the Indian to whom such allotment shall have been made, or, in case of his decease, of his heirs, according to the laws of the state or territory where such land is located, and that, at the expiration of said period, the United States will convey the same by patent to said Indian or his heirs, as aforesaid, in fee, discharged of said trust and free of all charge or encumbrance whatsoever: Provided, That the President of the United States may in any case, in his discretion, extend the period. And if any conveyance shall be made of the lands set apart and allotted as herein provided, or any contract made touching the same, before the expiration of the time above mentioned, such conveyance or contract shall be absolutely null and void."
"That the Secretary of the Interior is hereby authorized and empowered to issue a patent to Henry A. Quinn for the east half of the northwest quarter, the northeast quarter of the southwest quarter, and the northwest quarter of the southeast quarter of section thirty-two, township one hundred and twenty-five north, range fifty west of the fifth principal meridian, South Dakota."
Interior, June 29, 1905, in the exercise of the authority and power given by this provision.
Upon the trial, it appeared that the plaintiff claimed under two warranty deeds from the allottee, one made and acknowledged May 31, 1905, and recorded June 2 following, and the other purporting to have been made May 30, and acknowledged July 3, 1905, but not recorded. The defendant claimed under a deed from the allottee executed and delivered July 10, 1905, and recorded the same day. The matters in controversy were (1) whether the plaintiff's deed of May 31 was void because made and delivered before the unrestricted patent was issued, (2) the real date of the acknowledgment and delivery of the plaintiff's unrecorded deed, and whether it was void for the like reason, and (3) whether the defendant purchased with notice of the plaintiff's claim under the latter deed. That deed was admitted in evidence over the objection of the defendant, and the ruling was made the subject of a special exception.
the ground that the plaintiff's deed of May 31 was valid, and, being a warranty deed purporting to convey the land in fee simple, the title subsequently acquired through the unrestricted patent inured to the plaintiff by operation of a statute of the state. Rev.Civ.Code, § 947, subdiv. 4. Reaching that conclusion, the court deemed it unnecessary to consider or decide the questions presented respecting the plaintiff's unrecorded deed and the effect to be given to it.
The federal question presented for decision by us is whether the restrictions upon alienation imposed upon the allottee by § 5 of the Act of 1887 were instantly removed by the Act of March 3, 1905, or remained in force until the issuing of the patent carrying the full and unrestricted title. The defendant sought to maintain the latter view, but the state court sustained the other.
convey to him by patent the fee, discharged of the trust, and free of any charge or encumbrance, and, as a safeguard against improvident conveyances or contracts made in anticipation of the ultimate or real patent, it was expressly provided that any conveyance of the land, or any contract touching the same, made before the expiration of the trust period should be absolutely null and void. It is thus made plain that it was the intention of Congress that the title should remain in the United States during the entire trust period, and that, when conveyed to the allottee or his heirs by the ultimate patent at the expiration of that period, it should be unaffected by any prior conveyance or contract touching the land.
and their presence in others is not indicative of a difference in meaning and purpose. We conclude that the restrictions upon alienation contained in the Act of 1887 were not instantly removed by the Act of 1905, but remained in force as to this allotment until the Secretary of the Interior, in the exercise of the authority conferred by the latter act, terminated the trust period by issuing the final patent passing the fee.
As that patent was issued June 29, 1905, and as the deed from the allottee upon which alone the judgment of affirmance was rested was made and delivered May 31 preceding, it follows that this deed was, in the language of the statute, absolutely null and void, and that the title subsequently acquired by the allottee through the final patent could not inure to the plaintiff in virtue of his being the grantee in that deed. See Starr v. Long Jim, 227 U. S. 613, 227 U. S. 624. A state statute could not make it the basis of passing subsequently acquired title when the federal statute pronounces it entirely void. See Bagnell v. Broderick, 13 Pet. 436, 38 U. S. 450; Gibson v. Chouteau, 13 Wall. 92, 80 U. S. 99.
The judgment is accordingly reversed, and the cause remanded, but without prejudice to the power of the supreme court of the state to proceed to a determination of the questions which were left open by its opinion. See Murdock v. Memphis, 20 Wall. 590, 87 U. S. 635-636.

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