Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/93635/chicago-r-i-p-ry-co-vs-perry
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 14:24:29+00:00

Document:
Appellant Chicago, R.i. and P. Ry. Co.
1. Where an issue upon the constitutionality of a state statute, though not actively litigated in the trial court, is actually decided by the state court of last resort in favor of the statute, its judgment is reviewable here under Jud.Code, § 237, as amended September 6, 1916. P. 259 U. S. 551 .
2. The law of Oklahoma requiring public service corporations to issue to employees, when discharged from or voluntarily quitting their service, letters setting forth the nature of service rendered by such employees, and its duration, with a true statement of the cause of discharge or leaving, is consistent with due process and the equal protection of the laws. Pp. 259 U. S. 555 -556. Prudential Insurance Co. v. Cheek, ante, 259 U. S. 530 .
3. Provisions that such letters shall be on plain paper selected by the employee, signed in ink and sealed by the superintendent or manager, and free from superfluous figures, words, designs, etc., are likewise valid. P. 259 U. S. 555 .
Defendant in error moves to dismiss the writ of error on the ground that the constitutionality of the act was not really at issue; that the trial judge's instructions to the jury show that the only substantial question was whether the statements made in the letter actually given by the defendant were false and derogatory, and whether plaintiff had suffered damage thereby. But since the court of last resort of the state actually dealt with and passed upon the question raised by plaintiff in error as to the validity of the statute upon the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution of the United States, and decided in favor of its validity, it is clear that, under the first paragraph of § 237, Judicial Code, as amended by Act of September 6, 1916, c. 448, 39 Stat. 726, we have jurisdiction to pass upon the question, and the motion to dismiss must be denied. Miedreich v. Lauenstein, 232 U. S. 236 , 232 U. S. 243 ; North Carolina R. Co. v. Zachary, 232 U. S. 248 , 232 U. S. 257 .
assumption that failed to recognize existing conditions; that the welfare of employees affected that of entire communities and the whole public. The decision of the Supreme Court of Missouri in Cheek v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America, 192 S.W. 387, affirmed this day in our No. 149, ante, 259 U. S. 259 , was cited with approval, and the statute attacked held not to deny to defendant due process of law nor to constitute an illegal infringement upon the right of contract.
Except for the particular requirements contained in the proviso, the statute here in question does not differ substantially from the Missouri statute this day sustained in Prudential Insurance Co. of America v. Cheek, ante, 259 U. S. 530 , and may be sustained as against the contention that it is inconsistent with the guaranty of "due process of law," for the reasons set forth in the opinion in that case.
provisions are designed to insure the authenticity of the document to prevent fabrication and alteration, and to make sure that it shall not only be fair and plain upon its face, but shall exclude any cryptic meaning. They are contrived to prevent the purpose of the act from being set at naught by the giving of fraudulent service letters, which, while bearing one meaning to the employee, might bear another and very different one to the prospective employer to whom they might be presented. The act being valid in its main purpose, these provisions, intended to carry it into effect, must be sustained. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. McGuire, 219 U. S. 549 , 219 U. S. 570 ; Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U. S. 1 , 223 U. S. 52 .
The contention that the Service Letter Law denies to plaintiff in error the equal protection of the laws is rested upon the fact that it is made to apply to public service corporations (and contractors working for them), to the exclusion of other corporations, individuals, and partnerships said to employ labor under similar circumstances. This is described as arbitrary classification. We are not advised of the precise reasons why the legislature chose to put the policy of this statute into effect as to public service corporations, without going further; nor is it worth while to inquire. It may have been that the public had a greater interest in the personnel of the public service corporations, or that the legislature deemed it expedient to begin with them as an experiment, or any one of a number of other reasons. It was peculiarly a matter for the legislature to decide, and not the least substantial ground is present for believing they acted arbitrarily. We feel safe in relying upon the general presumption that they "knew what they were about." Middleton v. Texas Power & Light Co., 249 U. S. 152 , 249 U. S. 157 -158, and cases cited.

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