Source: http://lawspace.stmarytx.edu/item/2014STMULawBestBriefLoganAWheeler
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 13:49:34+00:00

Document:
Each year, each Legal Research and Writing faculty member submits one brief from her or his class to the St. Mary s Law Journal editorial board. The board then selects one winner from each 1L section, resulting in four briefs which represent the best brief from that section. The editorial board then selects a “super brief” from amongst those winners, representing the best brief of the 1L class. Results are announced at the annual Law Journal banquet in April.
MARTIN COUNTY AND MARTIN COUNTY BOARD, Petitioners, v. ANNE DHALIWAL, Respondent.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED I. Did the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventeenth Circuit apply the correct legal standard? Does the Martin County legislative prayer practice violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment?
OPINIONS BELOW The Opinion and Order of the Seventeenth Circuit (R. at 32) is unreported. The United States District Court for the Northern District of West Carolina’s Opinion and Order Granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (R. at 27) is unreported. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION The court of appeals entered judgment on February 1, 2013. (R. at 32.) Petitioner filed his petition for writ of certiorari on February 7, 2013. (R. at 35.) This Court granted the petition on May 20, 2013. (R. at 37.) This Court’s jurisdiction rests on 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) (2006). STANDARD OF REVIEW A district court’s fact findings and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from them are reviewed for clear error. Its legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION INVOLVED The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in relevant part: Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion…. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
no inquiry into the frequency of sectarian references in the prayers should be made. Thus, Martin County Board’s legislative prayer practice withstands constitutional scrutiny under the guidelines set forth by this Court, and the Board did not violate Anne Dhaliwal’s First Amendment rights under whichever available legal standard this Court adopts.
ARGUMENT I. THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTEENTH CIRCUIT ERRONEOUSLY APPLIED THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES TEST A. Legislative prayer is a well-established, constitutionally-valid tradition deserving of protection.
new and more broadly-drawn line for legislative prayer cases was established in Marsh so that all legislative prayer practices that stop short of either proselytizing or advancing one religion at the expense of others may be upheld under the Establishment Clause. See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 795-96. B. Application of the affiliation standard better conforms to the broad standard set forth by this Court in Marsh.
standard of review to carefully craft a neutral policy, but it also provides for an objective consideration of a prayer practice that can more easily be applied uniformly to future legislative prayer cases. In Rubin, the Ninth Circuit upheld the city council’s prayer practice even though most prayers were Christian because the council had developed a prayer policy that was carefully crafted to ensure its own evenhandedness and avoid violating the Establishment Clause. Rubin, 710 F.3d at 1097. The council had taken steps to be inclusive, and the fact that most prayers were Christian was merely a reflection of the city’s demographics and a function of the religious leaders who chose to respond to the city’s invitations. Id. at 1098. This country has long appreciated the highly-regarded principle of protecting diversity. Indeed, a primary aim of the First Amendment is to protect diversity of ideas and opinions generally and of religious beliefs specifically. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. When such a benign factor as local demographics is the primary reason for a majority of the prayers representing one religion, it would go against reason and this Court’s precedent to indiscriminately toss out the entire prayer practice. See Joyner, 653 F.3d at 363 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting). The clear directive of Marsh is that the government may not proselytize or advance one religion over others. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 795-96. Where a legislature has not crossed this line in its prayer practice, it has not violated the Establishment Clause. See id. The affiliation standard employed by the Ninth Circuit closely adheres to the legislative prayer guidelines established in and required by Marsh without arbitrarily adding considerations that would narrow the scope of the standard this Court outlined.
The Second Circuit’s totality of the circumstances test requires impermissible parsing of the language of legislative prayers and undermines the efforts of legislatures that actively maintain neutral policies.
prayers will naturally reflect the religions of the prayer leaders and not the preferences of the legislative body. Joyner, 653 F.3d at 363 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting). To punish legislatures by banning their prayer practices for something so out of their control as the community’s demographics would be to ban legitimate prayer practices where such a ban is not warranted by this Court. See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 794. Furthermore, the totality of the circumstances test is highly subjective and thus more malleable and more likely to be applied differently throughout the nation’s courts. The result would be uncertainty for legislative bodies that are interested in maintaining constitutionally sound prayer practices, which this Court has recognized is a legitimate right of American governmental bodies. Id. at 792; Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 602; Joyner, 653 F.3d at 346. D. The Fourth Circuit’s frequency test demands impermissible parsing of the language of legislative prayers and narrows the scope of what constitutes a valid legislative prayer practice under Marsh.
U.S. at 794-95. To the contrary, this Court has stated that the government should ordinarily not have any role in determining the content of public prayers. Lee, 505 U.S. at 588. The Fourth Circuit has interpreted the Establishment Clause as requiring legislative prayers to embrace a non-sectarian ideal. Joyner, 653 F.3d at 347. See Simpson v. Chesterfield Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 404 F.3d 276, 278 (4th Cir. 2005). It has explicitly stated that it only approves legislative prayer when it is nonsectarian in both policy and practice. Id. at 348. However, this Court has never held that such a narrow scope is required for legislative prayer practices to be constitutional. Indeed, this Court held that even the nonsectarian prayer at issue in Lee v. Weisman violated the Establishment Clause. Lee, 505 U.S. at 581. Reviewing Marsh as informed by Lee and Allegheny, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the major cases decided by this Court that inform legislative prayer jurisprudence do not direct courts to inquire into the content of prayers unless and until the prayer opportunity has been exploited to advance a particular religious belief. Pelphrey v. Cobb Cnty., 547 F.3d 1263, 1271 (11th Cir. 2008). Although this Court considered the nonsectarian nature of the chaplain’s prayers in Marsh, the nonsectarian nature of the prayers did not form the basis for any bright-line rule. Id. The Fourth Circuit, having implemented such a narrow standard, seems to be creating its own limitations on legislative prayer policies, and these limitations go far beyond the requirements established by this Court. The most appropriate policy a legislative body can take to avoid proselytizing or advancing one religion over others is to accept and welcome any volunteer from an established, local congregation and to consistently provide them with the same instructions.
MARTIN COUNTY BOARD’S LEGISLATIVE PRAYER PRACTICE DOES NOT VIOLATE THE FIRST AMENDMENT ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE A. Under the affiliation standard, Martin County Board’s legislative prayer practice is constitutional.
frequency of Christian prayers resulted from an unconstitutional act by the Board and not merely a result of Martin County’s demographics. Unless Anne Dhaliwal can show the Board engaged in purposeful discrimination, her point is moot. See Pelphrey, 547 F.3d at 1281. Under the affiliation standard, Martin County Board’s efforts to maintain a neutral prayer policy tend to show no attempted affiliation with Christianity over other religions, faiths or beliefs, thus the Board’s policy should be deemed valid under the Establishment Clause. B. Martin County Board’s legislative prayer policy also withstands constitutional scrutiny under either the totality of the circumstances test or the frequency test.
sectarian references unless and until it has established that Martin County Board’s practice proselytized or advanced one religion over others. In the instant case, Martin County Board did not cross this threshold under any of the available legal standards. Utilizing the frequency standard to parse the content of the prayers given is, therefore, not appropriate. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 794-95.
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE I certify that the Brief for Petitioners contains 4,469 words, starting from the beginning (first word) of the statement of the case section and ending with the end (last word) of the conclusion. I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
Logan A. Wheeler, “Best Brief Contest Winner: Martin County v. Anne Dhaliwal, 12-696a Brief for Respondent Winner of the 2014 Best Brief Contest at St. Mary's University School of Law,” St. Mary's Law Digital Repository, accessed April 24, 2019, http://lawspace.stmarytx.edu/item/2014STMULawBestBriefLoganAWheeler.

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