Source: https://jwwartick.com/tag/women-pastors-the-ordination-of-women-in-biblical-lutheran-perspective/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 00:54:38+00:00

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Women Pastors? The Ordination of Women in Biblical Lutheran Perspective | J.W. Wartick -"Always Have a Reason"
I grew up as a member of the Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod, a church body which rejects the ordination of women to the role of pastor. The publishing branch of that denomination, Concordia Publishing House, put out a book entitled Women Pastors? The Ordination of Women in Biblical Lutheran Perspective edited by Matthew C. Harrison (who is the current President of the LCMS) and John T. Pless. I have decided to take the book on, chapter-by-chapter, for two reasons. 1) I am frequently asked why I support women pastors by friends, family, and people online who do not share my position, and I hope to show that the best arguments my former denomination can bring forward against women pastors fail. 2) I believe the position of the LCMS and other groups like it is deeply mistaken on this, and so it warrants interaction to show that they are wrong. I will, as I said, be tackling this book chapter-by-chapter, sometimes dividing chapters into multiple posts. Finally, I should note I am reviewing the first edition published in 2008. I have been informed that at least some changes were made shortly thereafter, including in particular the section on the Trinity which is, in the edition I own, disturbingly mistaken. I will continue with the edition I have at hand because, frankly, I don’t have a lot of money to use to get another edition. Yes, I’m aware the picture I used is for the third edition.
First, do an exercise for me. Search “gnostic heresy” on your preferred search engine. Now, look at Gnosticism on Wikipedia. Confused yet? I am–because Gnosticism is a radically diverse set of beliefs that has effectively had that label slapped on it. And, in modern times, virtually any position anyone wants to condemn theologically has been referred to as Gnosticism. The fluidity of the label is notorious, leading some thinkers to effectively give up the term, or at least argue it is much more diverse than we may think. But here, Brighton makes an effort to rebrand egalitarians–those who support the ordination of women–as some kind of modern Gnostic heresy. Let’s dive in.
Brighton begins the chapter with a series of questions, ultimately concluding with questions that effectively present Brighton’s thesis: “How did the role of women in Gnosticism relate to Gnostic theology, specifically the article of God? Secondly, this paper notes the oopposition of the early church to both the Gnostic practice or ordaining women and the Gnostic doctrine of God” (91). Related to this claim is his assertion that “It is quite clear that the early church saw an important and intimate connection between the practice of women serving as priests… and the doctrine and teaching about God” (ibid).
Brighton then cites a few church fathers speaking poorly about women being teachers in the church. For example, he quotes Tertullian as saying it is audacious to allow women “even to baptize!” (92). It is odd that Brighton would favorably quote this, because this goes against the Lutheran Confessions. The Augsburg Confession in Article VIII, states “Both the sacraments and the Word are efficacious because of the ordinance and command of Christ, even when offered by evil people.” In The Large Catechism, Fifth Part, “The Sacrament of the Altar,” Martin Luther states “Our conclusion is: Even though a scoundrel receives or administers the sacrament, it is the true sacrament… just as truly as when one uses it most worthily. For it is not founded on human holiness but on the Word of God.” (See more here on a Sacramental/Lutheran view of women in church leadership) Moreover, at various levels of being taught by people, including pastors, in the LCMS, I have been told that women may baptize, at least in the case of an emergency. But Brighton makes no reference to the Confessions, nor to the possibility that Tertullian may have gone too far. Instead, he presses on in his point.
Next, Brighton notes various ways women interacted in society in the Graeco-Roman world. Ultimately, he accurately states that “It is difficult… to be dogmatic… and certainly it is not possible to make a blanket statement about what was or was not socially acceptable” (93). After giving a very brief survey of some Gnostic sources, Brighton moves on to the role of women in Gnosticism. “In some of the Gnostic texts women appear equal to men in being authorities for the establishment of doctrine” (95). What is odd here is that though Brighton notes positive examples of women in the Gnostic texts, he ignores or excludes those which are negative. This is, perhaps, because he’s seeking to support his conclusion that “The role of women in Gnosticism is in striking contrast to the role that women held in Orthodox Christianity” (96). This statement, to put it bluntly, is historically vacuous. Brighton doesn’t demonstrate this whatsoever. Simply citing a few positive statements in a select few Gnostic writings does nothing to demonstrate the following essential points for Brighton to support his thesis: 1) that “orthodox Christianity” was a single unit with unified teaching in this time before Nicaea (and after, for that matter); 2) that Gnostics universally held to a different position on women than “orthodox Christians” universally did; 3) that Gnosticism spoke with one voice; 4) that orthodoxy spoke with one voice on women; 5) that Christians treated women differently in every case; 6) that no “orthodox” Christians had women as leaders (something which is demonstrably false–see concluding paragraph below). Any one of these points is deleterious to Brighton’s point, but together they show that he hasn’t even begun to make his case for such a strong conclusion.
Brighton states that in Gnosticism, God is portrayed as feminine. He argues that this is in “marked contrast to both the canonical scriptures and the orthodox church’s belief, in which the feminine element is absent in both thought and symbolism of God” (97). This is a surprising claim, given that very clear statements in the Bible itself are made in which feminine symbolism is used of God. For example, though Brighton earlier decries Gnosticism for seeing God as Wisdom and therefore feminine, Wisdom in Proverbs 1 and 8 has long been seen in many strands of orthodoxy to be a reference to God or even Christ, and is a decidedly feminine portrayal. Both men and women are created in the “image” of God in Genesis–which would suggest that both masculine and feminine aspects are present in the Godhead. In the Bible, God is seen as giving birth (Deuteronomy 32:18, which unites masculine and feminine imagery); as a comforting mother (Isaiah 66:13); as a mother bear (Hosea 13:8); as like a woman in labor (Isaiah 42:14); as a mother hen (Matthew 23:37); and more. If even one of these is a feminine symbol of God, Brighton is wrong, but it is clear that every single one of these is a feminine symbol of God and in church history there are plenty of “orthodox” Christians who saw feminine imagery of God as well, especially surrounding the Wisdom passages in Proverbs. Brighton is just wrong here, and it undermines essentially his entire argument in this section, which is based on a denial of any such imagery.
What is remarkable is that in the very next section, Brighton actually lists several of these examples, but doesn’t acknowledge in any way that this would present a problem for his thesis that it is “absent”! The rest of this section is spent on Brighton noting various other sources certain Gnostic groups used to see feminine imagery, but it hardly undermines anything that is actually present in the Bible! Brighton then attacks one strand of Gnostic thought that equivocates on good and evil and sees God as the source of evil, spending a few paragraphs attacking this notion. But nowhere does he actually link this to any modern feminist theology, nor does he link it to egalitarianism in any way.
In another surprising turn, Brighton’s conclusion follows this, and he re-asserts that the theology of God of Gnosticism was rejected, but then goes on to say that “this paper concludes that orthodox Christianity of the early church, with its theology of the Triune God, could not but reject the practice of the ordination of women into the public ministry” (105). What? Where does Brighton even make this connection in any real sense? He doesn’t actually argue that the early church saw this connection, nor did he demonstrate that there was a connection! Indeed, he even lists Bible verses that disprove one of his central claims! Yet here, he turns around and argues that somehow modern egalitarians are Gnostics? There is no connection made anywhere between the two schools of thought, other than the incidental fact that each ordains women (and Brighton even fails to adequately define Gnosticism or show that ordination of women was a universal Gnostic practice, which it almost certainly was not). There is no evidence here mustered against the ordination of women; it’s just a survey of Gnostic texts followed by Brighton’s rejection thereof.
Does this saying appear to align with Brighton’s theory that Gnostics favored women and are somehow equivalent to modern day egalitarians? Clearly not. But Brighton should have been aware of this and many, many other sayings and beliefs detrimental to women in Gnostic thought.
Perhaps the most significant problem with Brighton’s position is that it discounts entirely those examples in the early church that run contrary to his point. For one, there are numerous examples in the New Testament itself of women in roles of leadership. Junia is an apostle; Phoebe and Priscilla are various levels of church leaders, women were clearly named as prophets numerous times, Lydia and Nympha are stated as having churches in their houses, and the fulfillment of Joel 2:28, in which there doesn’t appear to be a distinction whatsoever between men and women prophesying, is affirmed in Acts 2. For more on some of these, see here. But Brighton doesn’t account for any of these examples, nor does he deal with the documentary evidence in the early church of many other church leaders. Yet these are direct refutations of his thesis. Either he doesn’t know about these counter-examples, or he intentionally does not mention them. Either way, it is a significant oversight, and one that refutes him. Moreover, as we have seen several times above, simply charging others with Gnosticism is hardly a fruitful way to engage with other positions. This chapter is most accurately described as a lengthy move to poison the well against egalitarians.
Interpretations and Applications of 1 Corinthians 14:34-35– Those wondering about egalitarian interpretations of this passage can check out this post for brief looks at some of the major interpretations of the passage from an Egalitarian viewpoint.
Gieschen starts by noting that 1 Timothy 2 is a “battleground” text, often taken into account even so far as on issues of whether we should let women serve as lectors (people who read the texts) or vote in meetings (69). This chapter purports to settle the issue regarding exegesis of the text.
Before delving into exegesis, though, the question arises of how the text ought to be translated. The author translates the text himself, specifically 1 Timothy 2:12, as follows: “I do not permit a woman to teach or to exercise authority over a man, but [I want her] to keep quiet” (69, brackets are from Gieschen). Needless to say, this translation is highly controversial to begin with, particularly since the author decides to add in his own preferred way to read “keep quiet” by bracketing in his presumed meaning. Indeed, Gieschen’s translation differs markedly from the translation offered by Peter Kriewaldt and Geelong North in their own chapter on 1 Corinthians 14 and 1 Timothy 2. Their translation, instead of stating that “I want her” to keep quiet, as Gieschen suggests, has this clause as a continuation, simply saying “she must be silent” (52). Such a difference may not seem like much initially, but when one is going to go so far as to ask whether women ought to be kept from reading the Bible in worship based on this text, the importance of what is being said here multiplies dramatically. Moreover, given that Gieschen is providing his own translation, one might expect some defense of the meaning of authentein as “exercise authority.” As Marg Mowczko shows from a brief survey, however, the word’s meaning as simply “exercise authority” is highly contested, even from other Greek sources. Nevertheless, Gieschen offers no defense of this translation, and simply uses this translation for his exegesis. If one finds questions in his translation of the meaning of authentein, then much of what follows is also thrown into question.
Gieschen then goes into three alleged reasons why people are “overrun[ning]” this “biblical command” (69-70). First, he alleges that it is because “biblical authority has eroded… to the point where the demands of biblical texts simply are not heeded.” Second, some argue the command is “culturally conditioned.” Third, “feminism had a profound impact on the Western world.” These three allegations amount to poisoning the well from the start, a technique that, unfortunately, has been repeated throughout the book. It is simply assumed that if a reader does not come to the same conclusions as the authors, they must “not heed” biblical texts, they must dismiss them, or they have given into some bogeyman, whether Gnosticism (in the next chapter, this is the argument), some form of feminism their readers ought, apparently, to fear, or some kind of historical heresy. This does nothing to advance the argument and indeed seems to show just how little regard the authors have for those with whom they disagree.
Background is important, and Gieschen provides his own basic assumptions about 1 Timothy before delving into more exegesis. First, he holds that Paul did write this letter. Second, he argues it is the word of God. Third, he argues the “implied reader” of the text is churches across Asia Minor (73). Next, Gieschen goes into the context of 1 Timothy 2, stating that the context is “after addressing false teaching and before discussing congregational offices” (74-75). Oddly, when offering a translation of 1 Timothy 2:8-15, his translation of 2:12 is actually different from that offered at the beginning of the chapter. Here, it is “I [also] neither permit a woman to teach, nor [do I permit a woman] to exercise authority over a man, but [I want her] to keep quiet” (75). Again, this is a different translation by the author than he offered just pages before. This translation has additional brackets putting words into the text, presumably for clarity. These brackets, though, offer miles of intepretation inserted into the text, particularly when one looks at the brackets he inserts into verse 15, which he adds “[God-ordained role of]” in front of childbearing (itself a somewhat atypical translation). These brackets are, in fact, adding the author’s interpretative framework into the text, moving it in the directions the author prefers, and allowing him to state that women are to occupy certain roles, simply by adding it to the text of Scripture through brackets. The number of bracketed words added into the text here is alarming, but what many of them tend to do is shift the meaning towards a patriarchal understanding that is stronger than what seems to be in the text itself. It is alarming to see the author, who just a few paragraphs before was attacking his opponents for not taking Scripture seriously enough, seriously just add entire clauses with meaning (like “God-ordained role of”) into that very Word of God.
Finally, Gieschen moves into the exegesis of the text. Immediately, however, we encounter the problem we’ve encountered several times before: Gieschen prefers a reading of the text that selectively makes words literal or not based upon his preferred meaning. For example, he asserts that the quietness or silence of women is not to be understood as women having to be completely silent in worship. The text says quiet/silence, but it doesn’t mean that; what it means, according to Gieschen, is that women “are not to be in a verbal teaching mode during the service but to be in a ‘quiet’ learning mode” (78, emphasis his). So now, we have the author being selectively literal with this text, and then moving beyond selecting which parts to take literally into saying that what the text actually means to say is this longer text, that women are not to be in a “verbal teaching mode.” Well, one may wonder, why doesn’t Paul just say that, then?
Regarding public teaching, Gieschen goes on to argue that what is meant is that “I do not permit a woman to engage in the authoritative and public transmission of tradition about Christ and the Scriptures to men” (80). Again, one wonders why Paul didn’t simply state this rather clear exortation, relying instead upon his exegetes to do so for him. But smuggled in alongside this argument is the shift in meaning from “teach” to “authoritative and public transmission of tradition about Christ and the Scriptures.” This lengthy meaning derived from a single Greek word is simply placed into the text, once more moving the meaning of the text into Gieschen’s reading without argument. And, of course, because this lengthy reading of didaskein is taken to mean “authoritative and public transmission of tradition about Christ and the Scriptures,” Gieschen then feels comfortable to state that it “clearly prohibits woman [sic] from holding the pastoral office…” (81). Of course it does, when one imports a lengthy prohibition into a single word!
Here, though, we finally see Gieschen address the meaning of “exercise authority.” But rather than delving into the rather lengthy modern discussions of the meaning of this phrase in Greek, Gieschen cites a single article in his favor in order to state that it means exercise authority. Remarkably, however, Gieschen goes on to acknowledge the word’s meaning is generally “in the sense of ruling, controlling, or dominating without inherently possessing the authority to do so” (81). But this is exactly what many egalitarians have argued–that the word is a usurped authority or one wielded in such a way as to harm others. And if that is the proper translation, then the meaning of the text shifts: “I do not permit a woman to… (domineer/harm/hold authority wrongly over) a man.” And this is a reading that hardly undermines the egalitarian case. Indeed, if we agree with Gieschen here that the authority is exercised in a way of controlling/dominating, then we have moved into an egalitarian reading of the text–one that Gieschen himself apparently endorses partially only to undermine it by, apparently, holding that women inherently are unequal in authority (despite his earlier insistence that women are equal “before God” (71).
Order of creation is a major buzz-theme for complementarians, and we see Gieschen wield it here. He argues that there is a “created order” that grounds his interpretation of this passage. What is that created order? He simply appeals to verse 13 in which Paul says Adam was created first, then Eve. But, as many, many have pointed out, this bald-faced appeal is extremely inconsistent, because any number of creatures, dirt, skies, and clouds were all created before Adam. So if “created order” is simply the order in which things were created, this argument turns into an absurdity. Now, many complementarians will insist this misrepresents their argument, but Gieschen, like so many others, fails to go beyond this simple reading of “first Adam, then Eve” as if it solves everything for them. One might as easily say “first cats, then Adam.” Gieschen is concerned, though, with proving that this “order of creation” (however defined) is not “nullified” or undone. Rather than acknowledging that Galatains 3:28 presents a massive problem with his reading, however, Gieschen enlists that text by saying that “differences in genders and roles do not imply that women are inferior to men…” How not? Just because Galatians 3:28 says so? But Galatians 3:28 actually says “There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither slave nor free, there is no male and female, for you are all one in Christ Jesus” (ESV). Once again, Gieschen is using a text that seemingly says the opposite of what he wants it to–“there is no male and female”–in order to say what he does want it to: male and female genders have different roles which are put into creation order for all time and are in no way contradicted by saying “no male and female.” But this the height of eisegesis rather than exegesis–Gieschen is reading into Galatians 3:28 that which is not there. Indeed, Gieschen’s ultimate defense of his position is to punt it to the Lutheran Church–Missouri Synod’s theological statements, rather than defending his readings from the text. The quote he offers doesn’t cite Scripture to back up its twisted reading of orders of creation and redemption; it simply asserts their position.
Finally, Gieschen looks at the “saved through child-bearing” in verse 15 briefly, arguing that it must mean some kind of role for women. Why? It seems because it most closely matches Gieschen’s own reading of the context.
This chapter on 1 Timothy 2 is problematic in several ways, as we’ve seen. There’s no need to rehearse all the errors Gieschen makes in his translation or exegesis. What is important is to note that Gieschen’s own understanding of one of the key clauses in the text–the meaning of “authority” is one that egalitarians can–and do–argue for themselves. Ultimately, it seems that it is Gieschen’s theological presuppositions that guide his reading of the text, locking in words to specific meanings, selectively being literal when needed, adding words where needed, and expanding words to mean entire sentences. Once again we see that the complementarian reading of the text is far from a plain-sense reading of Scripture as is so often argued.
Interpretations and Applications of 1 Corinthians 14:34-35– Those wondering about egalitarian interpretations of this same passage can check out this post for brief looks at some of the major interpretations of the passage from an Egalitarian viewpoint.
Bryce begins by noting an argument for the text here being an interpolation. Though no ancient manuscripts omit the verses, the placement is unclear because some manuscripts have it placed after verse 40, while others have it where it generally appears in modern English translations after verse 33. Bryce surveys the manuscripts and argues that the placement of the verses after verse 40 stems from a single, no longer extant Western manuscript (61).
Interestingly, Bryce then turns to a section in which he tries to discern who the alleged scribe is who may have tried to take 1 Cor. 14:34-35 out of the text. One of the aspects of the profile of this alleged single scribe is that “He opposed the exclusion of women from the ordained ministry and sought to reverse the traditional ecclesiastical practice of his day” (63). But what is this based upon? Nothing more than a conclusion that a non-extant single manuscript led to the verses being seen as a possible interpolation in the Western text type. Of course, those who have read a lot of textual criticism know conclusions based on extrapolated manuscripts aren’t uncommon; but to go from that extrapolation to theological conclusions about the alleged single (and male) scribe who may have taken the verses out of their context seems to be an exercise in mythmaking.
Yet Bryce is not content to merely leave it at some unnamed scribe of allegedly questionable theological motivations. Instead, he goes on to argue that the scribe is none other than the heretic Marcion! Just in case readers are confused by this jump, I want to outline the argument here. Bryce argues first that the evidence for 14:34-35 coming after verse 40 (and therefore possibly being an interpolation due to it being a “floating text” is only found in the Western tradition. Because it is only in a few manuscripts, he posits that the evidence comes originally from a single, earlier manuscript that no longer exists. Because it being an interpolation would aid those who believe women may be pastors [never mind any other possible motivations], he argues that it must be from a scribe who stood against his own tradition’s practice of not ordaining women. Now, he argues that this scribe was Marcion because Paul was “Marcion’s hero” and Marcion practiced exegesis by cutting out verses he didn’t like wholesale (64). Marcion used the Western text type, Bryce argues, and he would have had the motivation to take out these verses from the original text. From there, Bryce concludes that “Marcion had motive, opportunity, and an established modus operandi to excise this offensive passage and reclaim, what was for him, the pure text of St. Paul” (65).
Simply reading through this maze of reasoning ought to be enough to lead readers to question it, but there are any number of problems with his hypotheses. First, he has presented no actual reason to even think that the omission or movement of the text was intentional other than that it is a convenient text for his own position (and therefore someone would want to remove it). Second, Marcion’s creation of his own texts seems to have been rather notorious even in his own time, as Bryce notes in his own argument. If that’s the case, then why would a man who went from basically cutting out the Old Testament from the Bible go to such effort to try to remove a single verse? Why not simply publish an entirely new New Testament with all of his excisions therein instead of trying to plant a single manuscript somewhere to deceive later generations? Third, Bryce’s argument assumes quite a bit about how manuscripts can be transmitted intentionally by reading intention behind such a transmission of an alleged non-interpolation. After all, to read intent rather than error into the “mistake” is an evaluation of purpose of the scribe, one clearly not warranted when by Bryce’s own admission we don’t even have the alleged single original source manuscript. Fourth, Bryce’s own analysis of the text does not warrant his conclusion that the verses in question must have been original to the text (see next paragraph). Fifth, Bryce’s attempt to place a notorious heretic as the one to blame for evidence for an interpolation looks unfortunately like an attempt to poison the well against his opponents. Sixth, Bryce’s analysis of the textual critical data is mistaken (see below).
Codex Vaticanus’s evidence that 1 Cor 14:34-35 is an interpolation is especially important for several reasons. Its distigme (mark of a textual variant) at the end of v. 33 with no corresponding distigme at the end of v. 40 is evidence of a textual variant that was not the Western displacement was written prior to Codex Vaticanus.
So Bryce’s conclusion that the textual evidence can or should be traced back to a single Western manuscript is incorrect. Codex Vaticanus’s textual evidence reveals that the textual variant goes beyond the Western text type. This single piece of counter-evidence guts much of Bryce’s theorizing both regarding how pervasive the variant is and, certainly, all of his hypotheses about Marcion being responsible. Payne’s article also notes several issues with Bryce’s analysis of MS. 88, as interested readers can peruse.
It is interesting to note that in this subheading (in the first edition, anyway), the verses noted are different from those in the chapter title, though the authors don’t actually address verse 15 in their verse-by-verse analysis.
Kriewaldt and North begin by noting the context of the letter- “to Timothy in Ephesus, the economic, political, and religious center of Asia Minor. In that region, the social position of women was well developed. There were numerous female doctors there. In politics, women were thoroughly involved in leadership. Female philosophers were known to teach…” (50). Moreover, they state that “In Paul’s day the Greek and Roman world was awash with priestesses” (ibid). With this context in mind, the authors here argue that Paul is going against the cultural norms of the surrounding environment. They also note that “False teaching had invaded the church in Ephesus…” and “sowed dissension…” According to them, “One of its features led women to discard traditional roles…” (51). They allege that part of the problem was that women “were endeavoring to teach the apostolic word…” (51-52), which is taken to be a bad thing (“false teaching”). Women, they argue, were to learn in full submission, which they take to mean “submit to Christ’s Word and those who teach it. Paul is not saying that all women are to be submissive to all males” (52).
1 Timothy 2:12 is taken to mean that a woman ought not teach or exercise authority over a man. Kriewaldt and North argue that Paul’s saying “I do not permit” cannot suggest a personal opinion because the letter “bristles with apostolic authority” which “suggests that apostolic authority underlies and pervades this whole section…” (52). Specifically, however, women are “not permitted to teach the apostolic doctrine or engage in apostolic ministry of the Word in the worship assembly” (ibid). Verse 13 is taken to mean that “God’s will” is “revealed through the priority of Adam’s Creation… Adam was created first. ‘First’ is not merely first in time, but carries with it a position of leadership, authority, and responsibility (1 Cor. 12:28…)” (53). In response to those who say that making this argument means animals are are masters, the authors dismiss it by saying “That is really scraping the barrel!” (ibid). Verse 14, they argue, shows that the man “who was meant to be the leader and head, fell down on the job… He deliberately and knowingly chose to listen to the woman and thereby sinned by following her teaching” (54).
There are several issues with Kriewaldt and North’s analysis of 1 Timothy 2:11-15. First, and most obviously, though the section heading says they take it to go through verse 15, as almost every commentator does that I have read, they fail to so much as remark on verse 15. Yet verse 15 may be a pivotal verse in the understanding of the whole passage, though it is generally acknowledged as an extraordinarily difficult passage to interpret. What does it mean to say that the woman is saved through [the?] childbirth? Is it a reference to Christ? Is it a note that women do indeed have some kind of power? Is it a bringing women back into equality with men by noting no man exists without a woman? We don’t know Kriewaldt and North’s own opinion because they excluded the verse from their comments and utterly ignored what seem to be the closing remarks of Paul in the section they are trying to interpret properly.
The cultural context is quite interesting because Kriewaldt and North emphasize false teaching over the cultural context. That is, they use the context briefly to frame it as Paul going against the context, but don’t tie context and false teaching together. When we do tie them together, it seems to be sensible to think that perhaps women were teaching in the churches (a cultural norm in the area) but were the ones teaching falsely. Thus, Paul’s teaching for women to be silenced would be directed at this false teaching, which Kriewaldt and North explicitly mention as a major issue in the church in Ephesus (51). Thus, Paul’s silencing of women ought to be understood as localized, but normative. Localized, because it applies to the Ephesian church in the specific case of women spreading false teaching. Normative, because it allows a rule where an entire group of people may be silenced in order to stop false teaching. If, for example, a number of elderly people had imbibed false teaching and continued to spread it, it may be appropriate to call for their silence such that the false teaching does not continue to spread.
Another issue in just the first few pages is why Kriewaldt and North take women “endeavoring to teach the apostolic word” as a bad thing. After all, would they not agree that if it is true women are to be silenced from public teaching, they ought to teach that very apostolic teaching to others? Is it not a strange situation in which anyone is considered a false teacher for wishing to teach the apostolic word? Yet that is exactly what Kriewaldt and North charge women with in the Ephesian Church! The false teaching isn’t actually a teaching on their view; rather, the false teaching is related simply to which chromosomes those people doing the teaching have! This nonsensical reduction of false teaching to actually teaching the apostolic word as a woman shows, frankly, the lengths to which some are willing to go to silence women. The preconception that women ought not teach is what is dominating the interpretation here, not the text itself. Think about it abstractly: is it really false teaching for anyone to teach the apostolic word? Really, truly? But Kriewaldt and North come back later and once again insist women are not to “teach the apostolic doctrine.” I find this doubling down astonishing. Imagine actually using the Bible to insist that about 50% of all humans on the planet may not actually teach that which the apostles do, or that they ought not even endeavor to teach the apostolic word. Incredible.
Kriewaldt and North also seem to contradict Henry Hamann in the same volume, who himself argues that women should not hold political office or other positions of authority over men. Yet in this chapter, Kriewaldt and North suggest submission is not to all men everywhere, just in the specific instance of teaching apostolic word (strange as that is). Thus, despite the fact that this book tries to present what is seen as the unified teaching of the Bible and church, its authors can’t even agree on how much women ought to be submissive.
It is odd for Kriewaldt and North to take other verses in the same letter to mean that the entire section must be explicitly apostolic teaching that persist for all time. Do they use the same reasoning in 1 Timothy 5:23 and insist no one drinks water but rather imbibes wine for stomach illness? That goes a bit against what my doctor has advised, but the authors of our chapter insist that the entire section takes on the authority of eternal commands because Paul’s claim of apostolic authority is scattered throughout the letter. But, as we’ve noted with other authors in this same book, it becomes clear Kriewaldt and North don’t actually mean that. Rather, they mean it when it suits their own theological perspectives.
I am so pleased that Kriewaldt and North take 1 Corinthians 12:28 as a clear example of a list of authority. As I’ve noted before, if they do acknowledge this, they’ve already conceded women hold more authority than pastors, which clearly undermines their entire argument. As every other author has done at some point so far in the book, Kriewaldt and North fail to actually counter the arguments of their theological opponents. When it is noted that Paul’s appeal actually is to the temporal order of the creation of male and female, they dismiss the clear point that animals were created before people as an argument that “scrapes the bottom of the barrel!” Truly? If so, it ought to be simple enough to refute. But they don’t engage it, apparently hoping their readers will quickly dismiss arguments that show the absurdity of their position simply because they do so. Their disdain for women is once again shown by the lurid language of the first man stumbling and falling down on the job and indeed sinning simply by listening to his wife! This position has absolutely nothing redemptive to offer women and it contradicts itself.
Kriewaldt and North fail completely to show that the passages they address exclude women from the ministry. Their selective editing of the text to exclude passages that may be difficult to fit with their reading is just one issue. Far more problematic are their simplistic dismissal of opponents’ arguments without engagement, the self-contradiction inherent in their views, the failure to actually address the totality of the culture to which the letters were addressed, inconsistent literalism, their poisoning of the well, lack of knowledge or engagement with textual critical issues, and many more serious difficulties demonstrate that the complementarian perspective does not adequately address these texts. This is particularly important, because these two passages are the most powerful ones typically mustered by complementarians.
Peter Kriewaldt and Geelong North seek to demonstrate that the titular verses show women may not be pastors. While Jesus “elevated the status of women,” they say, it is nevertheless the case that “Jesus entrusted the oversight of the Church to men only…” (45).
The first thing that strikes me in this chapter are the verses selected. Why begin at 14:33B and extend only to 38? Why do the authors cut verse 15 of 1 Timothy 2 out of its immediate context with the verses preceding it? Of course, the authors must limit the scope at some point. That’s not a question. But when there is a question of whether verse 33 is a continuous clause and when verse 15 is highly relevant to the interpretation of the rest of the passage, one must wonder why those verses were excised in this exegetical chapter. Readers can’t know. But especially with 1 Timothy 2:15, it is quite clear that it is a continuation of the previous thoughts and should not be cut off. From the outset, Kriewaldt and North miss out on key aspects of interpreting these texts.
Kriewaldt and North acknowledge that we know “that Corinth had a number of cults that included priestesses…” (45). Thus, they argue, Paul’s silencing of women “runs counter to the pagan culture in Corinth. He is not culturally conditioned” (ibid).
Surprisingly, Kriewaldt and North feel confident enough to say “The integrity of this passage is certain. There is no manuscript evidence for the omission of these verses from chapter 14, though some manuscripts place them after v. 40” (46). In this, the authors are simply mistaken. Not only are they wrong to say that the textual integrity is “certain,” but also to say that there is no manuscript evidence for their omission. Certainty, as the word is typically understood, implies the kind of 100% clear textual integrity that rarely exists. But 1 Corinthians 14:34-35 does not have that integrity. Not only do the verses exist in different places (after 1 Corinthians 14:40) in some manuscripts–thus demonstrating that the passage does not have a “certain” place in the text–but as Philip B. Payne and others have demonstrated, there are some serious questions about the textual transmission of this text. As he notes, the fact of the movement of the passage itself is rather alarming for those who wish to claim textual certainty: “Similarly, it is highly unlikely that if the text were originally in Paul’s letter after v. 40, that any later scribe would move that text to follow v. 33. We know it is highly unlikely since no scribe of any surviving manuscript (and there are thousands) of any of Paul’s letters ever did anything like this in any other passage of Paul’s letters.” But apart from the movement in the text, there is the issue of textual markings that indicate textual variants “Codex Vaticanus’s evidence that 1 Cor 14:34-35 is an interpolation is especially important for several reasons. Its distigme (mark of a textual variant) at the end of v. 33 with no corresponding distigme at the end of v. 40 is evidence of a textual variant that was not the Western displacement was written prior to Codex Vaticanus.” So how is it that Kriewaldt and North may claim that the passage is “certain” in its integrity? How may they say that there is “no manuscript evidence for the omission of these verses…”? Simply put, it must be due either to misleading the reader or ignorance of the fact that just such evidence does exist. And if these passages are an interpolation, there is no need to even continue to engage them. Those unconvinced by the textual evidence–which is, again, quite strong–will see below that even when we do take the passage as original to the letter, there is little reason to think it means women may not be pastors.
Kriewaldt and North claim that “Paul says that his commands are followed in all the churches” (46). Though it is true that the passage begins “As in all the congregations of the saints,” but this is not the same as saying his commands are followed in all churches. The language itself seems more passive than that, and some English translations do not have this clause as the beginning of a sentence but rather as the conclusion of 14:33 and the clause preceding it (see examples here). However, the authors of this essay do not make an argument for preferring to cut the verse in half where they do, even though it is clearly germane to their interpretation as follows.
One of the places Kriewaldt and North attempt to drive a point of division between women and authority in the text is by challenging what it means to prophesy. “Prophecy is not preaching; it is speech directly inspired by God… Although instruction and learning are connected with prophecy, it is not an institution that is constantly ready for action…. It is quite different from preaching and official teaching of the apostolic word. Prophecy, then, is open also for women. Scripture refers to a number of women prophets…” (46). It has already been noted, however, that this concession makes it very clear women hold positions of authority higher than those of male teachers (see the argument here, for example). It is interesting, though, that on Kreiwald and North’s own discussion, they admit that women may give “speech directly inspired by God.” What is odd, then, is that they then seem to think that prophecy is less authoritative than the act of teaching or preaching. As if somehow having direct revelation from God (as noted p. 46) is less authoritative than simply expounding upon that same revelation! This seems backwards. If God chooses to use women to directly reveal God’s own word, is it not a strange position that would then say “Ah, but God would not actually let women teach about that word they delivered”? Yet that is what readers are expected to believe, and indeed to affirm as if it were just obvious from the text, for Kreiwaldt and North immediately go on to say that women are to “be silent” when it comes to “prophecy… being weighted and evaluated” (47).
The meaning of lalein is much discussed on the literature related to this passage, and Kriewaldt and North argue that it means “speak” but specifically “authoritative teaching,” for they insist that it is a “a synonym for authoritative teaching” (47). Indeed, they go so far as to say that lalein “certainly doesn’t mean chattering or strident speaking,” despite the fact that some studies have shown exactly that, and (as noted in the previous link), ancient evidence in a dictionary and elsewhere suggests that is exactly what it means. Such studies would greatly undermine the interpretation the authors give here, but as we have seen throughout the book so far, serious studies by those who disagree are largely ignored or dismissed.
Kriewaldt and North give four reasons that “women are to be silent and are not to speak” (47). First, they claim it is “the ecumenical practice of all the churches” (ibid). As we’ve mentioned, this begs the question regarding where they put the clause about the commands from Paul. The authors don’t actually establish that it was this ecumenical practice; nor do they address serious NT counter-examples (eg. Phoebe, Junia), nor do they do anything to demonstrate that 1 Corinthians 14:34-35 is actually next to the clause about “all the congregations of the saints” despite their own admission that some manuscripts place it after verse 40! Each of these would be highly relevant to their claim here, but none of these points is addressed beyond the mere dismissal of opposing viewpoints. Second, they claim that the submission of women is due to the “Law” (capital “L,” of course, though no argument is made). This Law, they claim “probably has to do with the whole Pentateuch.” Yet as many interpreters have noted (see discussion of this part of the passage here), there is serious difficulty discerning exactly where this is supposed to be found in the Law. Some have suggested it is actually related to the culture surrounding Corinth, rabbinic teaching, or other extrabiblical sources. Our authors, however, say it is related to Genesis 2:18-25 (ibid). But nothing in Genesis 2 says anything specifically about woman submitting to man. There is nothing there. So how can it be that this is what Paul is referring to? It seems like the reason to suggest this is because it best fits Kreiwaldt and North’s preconceptions of what the text ought to say and refer to, rather than any relevant evidence from the texts themselves. They do go on to say that it is due to “order of creation” (47-48), which is certainly a weak argument. Too often, as here, a bare appeal is made to “order of creation” without any reference for what that is supposed to mean. Indeed, it seems the reader is just supposed to assume that that order of creation is submission of women, but that begs the question. Moreover, if we are serious about the mere order of creation–that is, what comes first in creation–as a grounding for submission, then men everywhere ought to be submitting to all other animals, the heavenly bodies, dirt, the seas, etc.–for according to the order of creation, all of these things were created first. Of course, I don’t actually believe that; but the point is it is incredibly easy to make the malleable term “order of creation” mean whatever one wishes, and much more difficult to ground it in the texts.
The third reason given, after a brief aside in which the authors dismiss “mutual submission” in Ephesians 5, is that “It is disgraceful” for women to speak (49). They argue that the shame is “theological rather than… social” (ibid) such that it is “shameful to God for a woman to assume a teaching role in the church…” (49). But again, given that women are already allowed to present direct revelation from God, it is hard to see why a much less authoritative form of speech would somehow be shameful. The authors once again ignore this intriguing dilemma. They then address briefly 1 Cor. 14:36, which seems a bit of a strange question given Kriewaldt and North’s view. Indeed, it seems more likely that Paul is here showing that he is answering a false teaching that originated in Corinth as he does elsewhere, but the authors of this essay take it to mean that the church must submit to Christ’s word, which is of course what they already told us it is.
The fourth and final reason for women to be silent is “because anyone filled with the Spirit would have to admit that what Paul is saying is really a command of the Lord!” (49). This is a blatant kind of poisoning the well. What Kriewaldt and North say here, seriously, is that anyone who disagrees with their interpretation is not filled with the Spirit! After all, if they were, then they would just accept this interpretation of the text and force women into silence. This kind of questioning the salvation of those with whom one disagrees is unbecoming and nothing more than an attack on fellow believers with whom the authors disagree. It is unfit for a scholarly work.
Thus far, we have seen that Kriewaldt and North essentially assume their position is correct and then turn to question the salvation of those with whom they disagree on whether women ought to be silenced. They fail to deal with the serious textual critical issues related to the placement of the passage at question; they appeal baldly to “order of creation” as if that term is a settled issue, and they fail to account for the cultural context of the Corinthian church.
 ‘Phrynichus, the ancient dictionarian, defined the term as “to talk nonsense.” The word is used of gossip, prattling, babbling, animal sounds, and musical instruments. During the classical period, it usually was employed in a contemptuous sense. Debrunner, writing in the Kittel-Friedrich Theological Dictionary of the New Testament, states “Lalein can also be used quite objectively of speech when there is reference to sound rather than meaning.”‘ See “Pandemonium and Silence at Corinth” by Catherine Clark Kroeger.
We analyzed Gärtner’s arguments about the context for women in the New Testament. Now we turn to his notion of “The Basic Concept of Saint Paul in First Corinthians.” First, he notes that 1 Corinthians 12 provides “a distribution, a division… of services and gifts of grace in the congregation.” The point here is quite well taken because it is true that 1 Corinthians 12, especially verse 28 makes explicit a listing of gifts in the church which ranks prophets above that gift of teachers. Yet it is very clear in the New Testament that women may be prophets, and so they may, according to Paul, outrank the role of teacher, which is typically taken as the pastoral role (see my exposition of this argument, below, and more explicitly, with Alice Guinther, here ). (I should note that Gärtner himself maintains that “teacher” is equivalent to pastor on page 37.) This order, Gärtner maintains, remains in the church despite the unity in Christ as seen in Galatians. Once again, I agree, though it is interesting that Galatians 3:28, which he alludes to, explicitly makes it clear that in Christ there is “no male and female,” as the Greek states. Thus, Gärtner’s interpretation has the difficulty of trying to separate what Christ has united, dividing male and female from each other and plugging them into different levels and roles in the church. A better interpretation, and one that does not require one to maintain that 1 Corinthians 12:28 can work against Galatians 3:28, is that the roles of 1 Corinthians 12:28 remain in place, but the artificial divisions that we so often make–Jew-Gentile; slave-free; male-female–are not the basis for those roles.
Second, Gärtner turns to 1 Corinthians 14. He appeals to the notion of order of creation to say that women may not be pastors (33). Yet it is unclear exactly how this connection is made. The notion of “order of creation” is left rather abstractly, and, as we have seen, seems to be confusing on Gärtner’s own account because he inconsistently applies it in different contexts. He then goes on to state that “What women’s duties are in the congregation is not described in detail” (34), though he apparently is certain one of the duties cannot be administration of the Eucharist or some other aspect of the “office” (still undefined). He argues that women being silent is “not a crass command to forbid women from taking part in the service” but rather, like being silent instead of speaking in tongues without an interpreter, is qualified (38). What that qualification is is not derived from the text–for the text does not say anything about the “office” or “ministry” related to silence. Instead, Gärtner assumes that’s what the silences is meant to apply to. He goes so far as to say that it would be “absurd to say that the apostle meant to speak about women who sat and whispered, disturbing the service…” (38). “Absurd”! Yet he himself has already granted that the text must be qualified in its silencing. Why is it then absurd to think that it is about women disturbing the service? I don’t know, and Gärtner doesn’t give any insight into that except for saying that such an interpretation “cannot be drawn from either text or context” (ibid). Why not? Gärtner doesn’t say. But throughout the entirety of 1 Corinthians, we find Paul is interested in order of worship. Over and over again, Gärtner appeals to order of creation, as Paul appeals to order in worship, giving us insight into the roles and spiritual gifts found in the church (1 Corinthians 12) as well how to pray (1 Corinthians 11), etc. So why would it be absurd to think that Paul, in 1 Corinthians 14, is continuing his thought process, instructing the specific church of Corinth in maintaining order in church by not having women asking questions and disrupting the service, especially when it is followed by an instruction for women to learn from their husbands at home (eg. perhaps saving their questions for a more appropriate time)? I can’t say, but Gärtner seems intent on dismissing it. Nevertheless, it seems clear that rather than being absurd, such an interpretation would be directly in line with the rest of Paul’s purpose in the letter! Gärtner’s thesis about what Paul means in 35 by a “law of the Lord” could just as easily align with order in worship.
Finally, Gärtner ends with a section on the subordination of women. He alleges that “the Christian idea of man and woman signifies something completely new, that is not at all the same as that found in the Jewish conception of woman and marriage” (41). Not at all the same? So when the Jewish conception of woman and marriage included things like… monogamy… the Christian conception is “not at all the same”? Really? I certainly hope not, because that would mean that there is a radical disconnect on the doctrine of humanity between Christian and Jew at the time of Christ, yet most of the early followers of Christ were Jewish. Yes, I agree with Gärtner that life in Christ changes things and leads to a new creation, but to suggest that Christianity is somehow a complete overthrow of the faith of the Jews at the time–that of the Hebrew Scriptures–seems clearly mistaken. As we have already seen, Gärtner continues to overstate his case.
Once again, to 1 Corinthians 12:28, Gärtner as almost any interpreter I have read, maintains that “teacher” in 1 Corinthians 12:28 is the role we would take to mean “pastor.” Moreover, he grants that 1 Corinthians 12:28 is a list of roles being differentiated, specifically as an “order” given by God (35). From that, all we have to do is show that women may be in one of the roles above that of teacher. And because women are explicitly stated in both the Old and New Testaments as being prophets, which explicitly rank above teachers in 1 Corinthians 12:28, we find that women may have–and have had–more authority than pastors. Thus, to exclude women from the pastoral ministry due to some notion of “authority” is nonsensical. Nevertheless, Gärtner makes the effort, without apparently being aware of the inherent contradiction in his position.
Now that we’ve finished our look at Gärtner’s arguments, we can return to the thesis he presented at the beginning of the chapter, as we outlined in Part 1. He wrote, “Does the New Testament contain any direct teaching about the relationship between man and woman in the office of the ministry? The answer to this question is an unequivocal yes” (27). Did Gärtner prove this thesis? In the first part, we saw that the only thing Gärtner did was look at the context of the passages, none of which provides a definitive or “unequivocal” verse that has direct teaching about the relationship between man and woman in the office of the ministry. Indeed, the very fact that he spends so long merely on context makes one wonder about his thesis. In the analysis here, Gärtner finally does try to present 1 Corinthians 14:34-35 as a kind of proof text, but even there he merely alludes to the order of creation to try to make his point. There is no direct verse that Gärtner presents anywhere, and the one time he finally attempts to site a verse, he doesn’t claim it fulfills his thesis but instead appeals to a completely different context (Genesis) and the assumption that this ties back into women pastors. Gärtner’s thesis does not carry. He has presented nothing to show that the NT contains “direct teaching about the relationship between man and woman in the office of the ministry,” let alone done so “unequivocally.” Yet he claims that is exactly what is there. His claim fails on his own grounds, and, as we have shown throughout these two posts, the few claims he does make have serious issues as well.
Gärtner’s chapter begins by asking and answering a question “Does the New Testament contain any direct teaching about the relationship between man and woman in the office of the ministry? The answer to this question is an unequivocal yes” (27). Such a statement suggests that he will demonstrate that there is a verse, somewhere, that specifically teaches about the relationship between man and woman in the office of the ministry. After all, his claim is that one can unequivocally say that yes, the New Testament does contain such direct teaching. As we explore this chapter, we will return to this question a few times and ask whether Gärtner’s claim is correct.
Gärtner states that the ministry must be set into a larger New Testament context. Addressing 1 Corinthians 14:34 and 1 Timothy 2:12, intriguingly again pointed to as the apparent proof against women pastors, he states that a view that teaches that those verses are “intended to correct some irregularities” at the time of the writings of the letters “does not correspond with the material Paul presents” (27). To prove this, he notes that in 1 Corinthians, Paul “deals with a number of questions which have been put to him by the congregation” (ibid). He uses the example of eating meat sacrificed to idols and says that Paul “places the question in the larger context” because it “is considered in relation to the doctrine of God as the only God…” (27-28).
Expanding on the context, Gärtner appeals to the choosing of the apostles, Jesus’ conception of marriage and creation, the Christian as new creation, and heresy in Corinth in order to make his argument that women are excluded from the ministry. We’ll briefly sketch out his argument. Jesus’ apostles, Gärtner argues, are all men (29). He notes that these apostles are “leaders of the new people of God,” something important we will consider below. He also states that “although the most esteemed women… who were part of the closest circle of disciples, were present in Jerusalem during the Passover festival, it was only the apostles themselves who were invited to be present at the Last Supper… By immemorial custom both women and children shared in this dinner fellowship. Yet, this is the time that Jesus breaks that tradition and gathers only the twelve around Him” (ibid). Regarding Jesus’ concept of marriage and creation, Gärtner walks through Matthew 19:3ff in which Jesus discusses marriage (30-31). The Christian as new creation Gärtner states, after pointing to texts talking about the Christian as new creation, that “in the life of the church, the true relationship between male and female can take place” (31). Regarding Heresy in Corinth, Gärtner paints an image of the Corinthians as seeing themselves getting direct revelation from God and having everything spiritualized such that people could set above “the fundamental command of fellowship and love to the neighbor.” Then, he states that Paul teaches that “salvation rests upon creation” and that the “office” (he doesn’t, on p. 33, specify which one or the definition thereof) “is related to the order of creation; and according to the order of creation, the human race is divided into man and woman” (32-34).
There are already a number of interesting issues to explore in Gärtner’s essay. First, the question of what “office” he is referencing throughout is quite relevant. Though it is possible to divert conversation in important issues by constantly punting to definitions, the notion of “office” is a central aspect of Gärtner’s argument so far, yet it remains undefined. We do not find him providing his own definition of ordination, as Hamann did, and so are left to simply guess exactly what he means by the word throughout the essay. As Hamann found in trying to define ordination and the ministry, it is extremely difficult to find the modern idea of what a pastor is in the New Testament (Hamann ultimately admitted his own definition could not be found therein). But because Gärtner is so focused on showing that women may not hold the “office,” one must ask what that office itself is. One would not find the answer in Gärtner’s essay. The closest he comes is by stating it is the “office of the ministry” (27). Second, Gärtner’s admission that the apostles are leaders of the new people of God is particularly on point because one of the arguments against using Junia (Romans 16:7) as an example of a woman leading is that apostles are merely ones sent by God (turning the Greek literal than using it as it is throughout the NT, as an office. Gärtner here concedes this point, and so the fact that Junia was a woman apostle overthrows his entire position.
Third, Gärtner’s argument about only the Twelve being at the Last Supper is not part of the biblical text. Indeed, he even says that women were not invited to it, specifically (31). Yet in the accounts of the Last Supper, there is no such clear exclusion. Gärtner’s point relies upon an argument from silence, excluding those who were not explicitly mentioned. Yet if we used the exact same kind of argumentation, all kinds of contradictions in the NT occur. For example, Mark 16:5 mentions only one young man (angel) at the tomb of Jesus. Gärtner’s methodology would insist that this would entail there was only one angel. Yet Luke 24:4 and John 20:12 each state there were two. But if we use the lack of explicit mention to exclude those not mentioned, as Gärtner does in relation to the Last Supper, we have a direct contradiction in the Bible. Of course that is a poor argument for a contradiction, because having two angels means that at least one was present. The silence regarding the second angel does not exclude his presence in the tomb. Similarly, just because no women or children or other followers of Jesus are explicitly mentioned in the accounts of the Last Supper (though Matthew and Mark both use the generic term “disciples” and then mention specifically the Twelve as for sure being there, thus making it rather clearly open to others being there as “disciples” who had helped prepare for the Passover), one cannot exclude them any more than one could seriously charge Mark and Luke with a contradiction. Another way to think about it is this way: All of the Twelve were Jewish. Does this mean that pastors must be Jewish? After all, it is quite clear that no Gentiles were among the Twelve. So Jesus only invited Jews to dine with him at the Last Supper, suggesting that no Gentiles may be pastors, right? No. Gärtner wouldn’t agree, I’m sure, but then his point about the Twelve being men must also be conceded as incidental.
Fourth, Gärtner’s point about the new creation is to merely assert his point: that male and female are most exactly expressed in the church. But of course verses like Galatians 3:28, also Pauline, point to the reality that such distinctions as male and female in the body of Christ are not germane. Yet even if one disagrees with me on that point, Gärtner does nothing to make this aspect of his argument anything more than an assertion. Fifth, Gärtner does little to demonstrate that the heresy in Corinth is that which he asserts, and even less to show that even if he is correct that it all goes back to an kind of charismatic overthrow of the order of creation, that that has anything to do with women pastors. He simply assumes his readers will make a connection for him. But there doesn’t seem to be any relevant connection between his notion of the alleged heretical teaching at Corinth and that of women pastors. He doesn’t even argue for it. Sixth, allowing for the heresy in Corinth to be part of the interpretation actually works against him, because, as has been argued, it certainly seems possible that 1 Corinthians 14:34-35 is part of that heresy that Paul then argues against.
Thus far, context has done little for Gärtner.
See Part 1 of this chapter here.
Hamann notes that “One might get the impression that the prohibition of female leadership in the church is something of an arbitrary opinion of the apostle…” (21). He argues that, instead, “Paul’s views on this matter [women in the church] are embedded in his theology of creation, the fall of man, and the redemption through Jesus Christ” (ibid).
First, I would note that I believe Hamann is deeply mistaken here in adding the issue of gender roles into the basics of the Gospel. By placing gender roles on the same level as creation, the fall, and redemption, Hamann is dangerously close to adding to the Gospel and taking away from the Lutheran doctrine of Christ alone. He is confounding the Gospel by making it equivalent to the demand that women stay silent (however qualified) in the church.
Second, how does Hamann justify this claim? He does so by arguing that 1 Corinthians has a whole theology of “the place of woman,” borrowing heavily from Peter Brunner. Effectively, by weaving together 1 Corinthians 11, Genesis 2, and Ephesians 5 with Paul’s thought, he argues that “head” must mean some kind of structure of authority (21, 22). Interestingly, Hamann’s own reading seems to undercut this interpretation because he goes on to say that “woman is ‘from’ man” (21), an interpretation that fits better with the typical egalitarian reading of “head” as “source.” Genesis 3 is taken to show that woman is to submit to man because the fall of humanity didn’t occur until “it also became the sin of Adam.” Yet in Genesis 3, we see that each of the players is held accountable, despite trying to shift responsibility. Hamann’s analysis here does little to support the notion that head = authority, and a clearer reading of the account would be source. After all, in Genesis 2, which Hamann seems to take to support his position, woman is taken from man, as Hamann himself states. But that would make man a source of woman, would it not? Moreover, multiple studies of the Greek seem to suggest that “source” is a more natural reading of the text. See here, here, or here for example. Thus, Hamann’s exegesis is critically mistaken on the meaning of the term kephale.
Hamann provides responses to two objections in this section. First, the objection that “the church is inconsistent in prohibiting the ordination of women while allowing women a whole host of other activities which are just as contrary to the apostolic directive as the pastorate” (24). His counter-argument is to say that the things like singing or speaking “would not fall under Paul’s rule” (ibid). But of course this is to simply make an assertion. He nowhere provides any reason for narrowing the prohibitions to ordination, and as noted in part 1 of this review, he himself admits his definition of “ordination” is nowhere found in the New Testament. Thus, Hamann has simply made an invented definition that he then asserts is Paul’s true meaning, without providing any exegetical reason for limiting the scope of his reading of the Pauline prohibitions. I believe this objection carries for a number of reasons, most simply because Hamann fails to provide any reason to narrow the meaning of 1 Corinthians 14:34-35 and thus makes it a verse he cannot consistently read literally. And, as noted, Hamann simply asserts the contrary without argument.
The second objection Hamann notes is that some would argue complementarians ought to expand the scope of their prohibitions by “protest[ing] against women taking up positions of authority in non-ecclesiastical spheres, in society and in politics” (24). Remarkably, Hamann’s response to this argument is to say that “if anywhere, then at least in the church Christians should insist on the role of women which fits the created order. Not every development in the world can be changed or even challenged by the church, but a witness to the proper state of affairs can be given by what goes on in the church. And the complaint of the prophet may not be so far off the mark: ‘My people–children are their oppressors and women rule over them’ (Isaiah 3:12)” (24-25). That’s right, Hamann simply states that the church can’t stop everything, and his clear implication is that women ought not hold such positions of authority. This certainly allows for a more consistent position, but it is one that means, apparently, no woman can hold authority over men. It is the enshrinement of patriarchy in the church and the world at large. That is what Hamann explicitly affirms.
Hamann then notes various roles women may have in the church. Interestingly, one of these includes the “baptizing those who have been approved by the pastor… and the dispensing of the cup at the Lord’s Supper” (25), despite Hamann explicitly having “the administration of the sacraments of Baptism and the Lord’s Supper” as part of his invented definition of ordination (14). Inconsistency looms time and again, and Hamann is not the only one guilty of it in this volume, as we shall see in posts to come.
Hamann begins with a quote from the Lutheran Church of Australia’s Theses of Agreement: “Though women prophets were used by the Spirit of God… 1 Cor. 14:34-35 and 1 Tim. 2:11-14 prohibit a woman from being called into the office of the public ministry for the proclamation of the Word and the administration of the Sacrament…” (13). Already, I am left wondering what Hamann and the Lutheran Church of Australia thinks prophets are/were. Anyway, Hamann goes on to state, interestingly, that these words were “formulated in the early 1950s,” a time, he apparently thinks, at which point “agitation about and for female ordination had hardly begun” (13). It is possible Hamann simply means within the specific branch of American Lutheranism he inhabits, but he doesn’t say that. In any case, women were ordained in the United States in the 1800s across multiple denominations. Looking into church history, it is easy to find women ordained throughout time.
That introduction aside, I’d like to simply focus on the meat of Hamann’s argument, which is, one would think, the exegesis of passages of Scripture. One would then be mistaken. Rather, Hamann’s focus is rather 4-ish theses, which he does little more than provide proof texts for rather than deep exegesis. We will look at them individually.
Hamann’s first thesis is “The New Testament gives no support at all for the ordination of women” (14, emphasis removed). Such a thesis is indeed a universal negative that is doubly affirmed. It’s not just no support; Hamann suggests there is no support at all. How does he arrive at this thesis? First, he defines ordination “as authorization and commissioning to do the work of a pastor or minister of the church, a task involving control and pastoral care of a congregation, the public independent teaching of the Gospel and the administration of the sacraments of Baptism and the Lord’s Supper, and the public carrying out of the task of announcing the absolution or, on occasion, the retention of sins” (14). I can hardly wonder why Hamann is then able to claim the NT doesn’t support the ordination of women: after all, there is nowhere in the New Testament where anyone is ordained thusly. But Hamann is quick to add, “Offices exactly corresponding to this definition cannot be shown to have existed in the New Testament…” (ibid). The understatement here is palpable. Hamann would be unable to come up with a single instance of any such office anywhere in the New Testament whatsoever. So he sustains his argument by punting it, pointing to Acts 20:28 instead as a “direction like that [of his view of ordination]” (ibid).
Thesis 1, then, is flatlined from the beginning because the author himself admits he can’t even affirm his own definition of ordination is found in the New Testament… only that it might have a “direction” pointed towards his definition. But Hamann doesn’t actually exegete any texts to support that his definition of ordination is the way the New Testament was pointing. He simply assumes it, and believes his readers will go along. Of course, he later states “No woman appears in the NT as carrying out an independent pastoral charge, as defined above.” Well of course not, because his definition by his own admission doesn’t appear in the NT.
Think about that for a moment. Hamann is willing to dismiss those who translate the name as Junia, which is what the Greek seems to state, because he prefers the masculine Junias for theological purposes. But the name Junias has not “a single shred of evidence” of ever having existed in the ancient world. Hamann, however, doesn’t interact with serious studies of the name Junia. Instead, he simply asserts that because an English translation of his choosing uses Junias, that doubt is cast upon those who believe Junia is the proper reading. Such is apparently the best exegetical support he can find. To be frank, it may very well be, because, again, the invention of Junia as male is just that: an invention, and one that can be demonstrated by studying the Greek and contemporary sources. Moreover, even the Nestle Aland Greek New Testament uses “Junia” rather than having the alleged name Junias or its supposed longer root name.
Hamann believes, however, that the formidable challenge of Junia can be simply dismissed (despite our demonstration that it cannot). He does, however, believe that Galatians 3:28 might provide a stronger argument against his thesis. In dealing with the text, however, he simply says that “the declaration of [v. 28]… has to do with the oneness of all those who are in Christ, infants included… Believing and baptized women do not suddenly cease to be women” (15). Apparently, for Hamann, oneness in Christ means that women are still women (okay so far, I suppose) and that apparently means women cannot be pastors. But how does that actually follow from the Galatians text? It doesn’t, though as we will see below, Hamann, like many complementarians, simply imports his interpretation of other passages (specifically 1 Corinthians 14:34-35 and 2 Timothy 2:11-14) into Galatians 3:28. Galatians 3:28 gives no indication of role differentiation in the body of Christ between men and women. But complementarians like Hamann must have it there, so they get it from outside the text–indeed from an entirely different letter–and bring it to the text. This isn’t exegesis, it is a theological assumption layered onto the text.
Given that Junia provides a direct contradiction of Hamann’s point, and that Hamann himself admits that his definition of ordination isn’t actually found in the New Testament, and that Galatians 3:28 is simply dismissed, I believe it is fair to say that his first thesis fails.
Hamann next states his second thesis: “there is specific NT prohibition of the ordination of women” (16). The first problem with this thesis is that his definition of ordination, as he stated and admitted above, is unsustainable from the biblical text. So because his definition of ordination, as he himself says, “cannot be shown to have existed in the New Testament,” (14) it would be impossible to use the New Testament to exclude anyone from such a position. Nevertheless, he presses on. For the sake of engagement, we will hereafter simply assume that Hamann’s definition of ordination is wrong and simply let ordination mean pastoral office.
Hamann of course cites the two texts thought by many to exclude women from the pastoral ministry, 1 Corinthians 14:34-35 and 1 Timothy 2:11-14. Now, 1 Corinthians 14:34-35 is perhaps an interpolation, which would immediately exclude it from any meaningful discussion of the biblical text. But supposing it is original to the text, Hamann and others’ interpretation still faces difficulties. After all, in the very same letter, Paul writes about women praying (1 Corinthians 11), but the passage being pressed tells women to be silent. This apparent contradiction can only be resolved in a few ways, and it should be unsurprising that excluding women from the office of the ministry is not one of the consistent ways to do this. First, as already noted, it could simply be that the 14:34-35 is an interpolation, so the apparent contradiction which seems fairly strong simply didn’t exist in the original text. Second, Paul could be concerned, as he is in the rest of this section, with orderliness in worship. Thus, women, who were often uneducated in the ancient world, may have been interrupting worship with questions, and so are instead being told to go ask their husbands at home the questions they have instead of interrupting. Third, the passage could be part of the method of quotation-refutation: Paul is quoting the Corinthians their own position so that he may refute it with what follows (see here for a lengthy defense of this position). If any of these is correct, then Hamann’s use of the text fails.
But think if Hamann is correct. If he is, then Paul is clearly stating here that women must be silent in churches. Do women stay silent in your church? If you’re in the LCMS, or a different complementarian body, are women allowed to read from Scripture; do they sing the hymns; do they respond in prayer; do they say “amen”? All of these would be women not being silent. But the verse itself says “the women should keep silent in the churches. For they are not permitted to speak, but should be in submission, as the Law also says” (ESV). I don’t see anything there about allowing women to sing, give praise, respond, or pray! So any churches which allow these things are contradicting their own literal reading of the text. This demonstrates another difficulty with such a reading: even those who affirm what they say are a literal reading cannot follow the text. Moreover, it would mean Paul contradicts himself. So 1 Corinthians 14:34-35 cannot be used to exclude women from the pastoral ministry.
(4) Deny that Paul actually wrote 1 Timothy (the view of many scholars, though not of most evangelical scholars).
Keener goes on to note that Paul frequently addresses specific situations in his letters, and argues that this passage is one of those times. He cites numerous reasons why this would be the case. In this same letter, Paul notes that some have been deceived by silly myths (4:7)- it is entirely possible that women were among those deceived and so are being silenced to stop the spread of heretical or pagan ideas in the church–a plausible, temporal tactic to stop false teaching until it can be corrected or rebutted. What’s interesting is Hamann himself admits that this is the cultural context of the letter, stating that “women were quite prominent in heathen cults” (19). That’s exactly the point, and the cultural context is important, but generally ignored, as far as interpreting the text is concerned, by Hamann. Most importantly, though, it is worth saying that once again complementarians fail to read this passage in the literal way they wish, because they always qualify it in some sense. Even if this is a direct command from Paul, Keener notes, we do not follow all of his direct commands, such as drinking wine to help with stomach ailments (5:23). But why not? Selective readings of the text is the easiest way to answer this.
Hamann does attempt to argue that the notion of “authority” in this passage is that of teaching authority, but his position places him against many, many biblical scholars. Instead, the concept of authority restricted in this passage seems to be that of authority taken up wrongly. Yet even if Hamann is correct, his interpretation, as already shown, is strained at best.
Now, we’ve seen that Hamann’s reading of these passages fail because they cannot be reconciled with the rest of Pauline teaching or because they are inconsistently literal. If one reading of a biblical text allows for a consistent reading that can be applied to all situations, that one ought to be preferred. Thus, the egalitarian reading is to be preferred, and Hamann has failed to demonstrate his second thesis.
We will examine the rest of the chapter in my next post on the book.

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