Source: http://ksag.washburnlaw.edu/opinions/2002/2002-054.htm
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 02:46:45+00:00

Document:
There is no life, liberty, and property interest in public office that is protected by due process. The actions of the Lyon County Clerk under the circumstances presented do not result in a due process violation. Cited herein: K.S.A. 2001 Supp. 19-204; K.S.A. 25-26a04; Kan. Const., Bill of Rights, § 1; U.S. Const., Amend. XIV.
As Lyon County Attorney, you request our opinion regarding whether due process rights of public officials and voters are violated when member district boundaries are changed without public notice being given to the officials and voters. You raise the issue because of a situation that has developed in regard to member district boundaries for the Board of County Commissioners for Lyon County.
In this opinion, we address only whether a change in the member district boundaries under the facts as presented violates any due process rights of the Commissioners and voters of the County.
The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides in part that "[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. . . ." The Kansas Constitution provides similar protection under Section 1 of the Bill of Rights: "All men are possessed of equal and inalienable natural rights, among which are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." In Leek v. Theis,(14) the Kansas Supreme Court reviewed the due process rights of a person appointed to public office.
"Due process considerations mandate that when an interest involving life, liberty and property rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment are implicated, the right to some kind of a prior hearing is paramount. Board of Regents v. Roth, [408 U.S. 564, 569, 570, 33 L.Ed.2d 570, 92 S.Ct. 2701 (1972)]; also, Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 25 L.Ed.2d 287, 90 S.Ct. 1011 (1970). But the range of interest protected by procedural due process is not infinite. This court must look to the nature of the interest at stake. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481, 33 L.Ed.2d 484, 92 S.Ct. 2593 (1972).
"Here the nature of the interest is the right to hold a public office. Can this be said to be encompassed within the terms 'liberty' or 'property'? We think not.
"'. . . To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it. It is a purpose of the ancient institution of property to protect those claims upon which people rely in their daily lives, reliance that must not be arbitrarily undermined. . . .' [408 U.S. at] 577.
"Clearly, it is only a vested right which cannot be taken away except by due process of law. 16 Am.Jur.2d § 365, p. 694.
"'The office of warden of the state penitentiary is created for the public convenience, and the incumbent of the office is the mere agent of the public, who, by virtue of his appointment, acquires the right to exercise the functions of the office and receive the prescribed compensation until the end of his term, or until such time as there may be a resignation or forfeiture of and removal from the office in the manner provided by law; but he ha(d) no property or vested right in such office.' (Emphasis added.) [Lynch, 55 Kan. at 367,] Syl. ¶ 1.
"'Officers are created for the administration of public affairs. When a person is inducted into an office, he thereby becomes empowered to exercise its powers and to perform its duties, not for his, but for the public, benefit. It would be a misnomer and a perversion of terms to say that an incumbent owned an office or had any title to it.' . . ." [Lynch, 55 Kan. at] 372.
"'The general doctrine is that, in the absence of constitutional limitations, the Legislature may prescribe how and by whom offices shall be filled. There is no contract right or property interest in an office, and hence some of the constitutional principles invoked have no application. An office is a public agency, and an officer is a mere agent of the public, entitled to exercise the functions and perform the duties of the office for the public benefit, and not for his own. The main consideration in the selection of officers and agents is the public welfare, and the state, like any other principal, may select its agents, may determine for itself who can best accomplish its purpose, and whose appointment will best subserve the public good. . . .' (Emphasis added.) [Goodrich, 68 Kan. at] 768.
The principle is applicable when the public office involved is an elected position.(16) "[T]he nature of the relation of a public officer to the public is inconsistent with either a property or a contract right."(17) "[P]ublic office is not property" that elicits protection under the Due Process Clause.(18) Nor is there a liberty interest in public office.(19) Therefore, there is no life, liberty, and property interest in public office that is protected by due process. The actions of the Lyon County Clerk under the circumstances presented do not result in a due process violation.
1. Correspondence, Marcus Goodman, October 29, 2002; Emporia/Lyon County Precinct Boundary Lines, Vernon L. McKinzie, July 8, 2002. See K.S.A. 2001 Supp. 19-204.
2. Correspondence, Marcus Goodman, October 29, 2002; Emporia/Lyon County Precinct Boundary Lines, Vernon L. McKinzie, July 8, 2002 ("December 15, 2002, Vernon L. and Nancy B. McKinzie received voter notification cards from the Lyon County Clerk listing them in Precinct 10").
3. Emporia/Lyon County Precinct Boundary Lines, Vernon L. McKinzie, July 8, 2002.
5. Correspondence, Marcus Goodman, October 29, 2002; Emporia/Lyon County Precinct Boundary Lines, Vernon L. McKinzie, July 8, 2002.
6. Correspondence, Marcus Goodman, October 29, 2002.
7. Correspondence, Marcus Goodman, October 29, 2002; Emporia/Lyon County Precinct Boundary Lines, Vernon L. McKinzie, July 8, 2002.
8. Emporia/Lyon County Precinct Boundary Lines, Vernon L. McKinzie, July 8, 2002.
9. Correspondence, Marcus Goodman, October 29, 2002; Emporia/Lyon County Precinct Boundary Lines, Vernon L. McKinzie, July 8, 2002.
10. Emporia/Lyon County Precinct Boundary Lines, Vernon L. McKinzie, July 8, 2002.
11. Correspondence, Marcus Goodman, October 29, 2002; Emporia/Lyon County Precinct Boundary Lines, Vernon L. McKinzie, July 8, 2002. See K.S.A. 25-26a04.
12. Emporia/Lyon County Precinct Boundary Lines, Vernon L. McKinzie, July 8, 2002 ("There was immediate concern that the boundary may have actually changed in 1990 and not been recorded. . . . [T]he prior Clerk may have overlooked it and it could have happened in 1985").
14. 217 Kan. 784 (1975).
15. Leek v. Theis, 217 Kan. 784, 810-12 (1975). See Warren v. City of Junction City, Kansas, 176 F.Supp.2d 1118, 1124 (D. Kan. 2001).
16. Attorney General Opinions No. 2000-5, 97-18, 93-49. See also Tarrant County v. Ashmore, 635 S.W.2d 417 (Tex. 1982).
17. Taylor v. Beckham, 178 U.S. 548, 577, 44 L.Ed.2d 1187, 20 S.Ct. 890 (1900).
18. Id. at 576. See also Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 7, 88 L.Ed.2d 497, 64 S.Ct. 397 (1944).
19. 26 Am.Jur.2d Elections § 210 (1996).

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