Source: https://lonang.com/library/reference/story-commentaries-us-constitution/sto-116/
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 12:25:50+00:00

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§ 146. We have now finished our survey of the origin and political history of the colonies; and here we may pause for a short time for the purpose of some general reflections upon the subject.
§ 148. This proposition, however, though laid down in such general terms by very high authority, requires many limitations, and is to be understood with many restrictions. Such colonists do not carry with them the whole body of the English laws, as they then exist; for many of them must, from the nature of the case, be wholly inapplicable to their situation, and inconsistent with their comfort and prosperity. There is therefore, this necessary limitation implied, that they carry with them all the laws applicable to their situation, and not repugnant to the local and political circumstances, in which they are placed.
§ 149. Even as thus stated, the proposition is full of vagueness and perplexity; for it must still remain a question of intrinsic difficulty to say, what laws are, or are not applicable to their situation; and whether they are bound by the present state of things, or are at liberty to apply them in future by adoption, as the growth or interests of the colony may dictate.3 The English rules of inheritance, and of protection from personal injuries, the rights secured by Magna Charta, and the remedial course in the administration of justice, are examples as clear perhaps as any, which can be stated, as presumptively adopted, or applicable. And yet in the infancy of a colony some of these very rights, and privileges, and remedies, and rules, may be in fact inapplicable, or inconvenient, and impolitic.4 It is not perhaps easy to settle, what parts of the English laws are or are not in force in any such colony, until either by usage, or judicial determination, they have been recognized as of absolute force.
§ 152. There is great reason to doubt the accuracy of this statement in a legal view. We have already seen, that the European nations, by whom America was colonized, treated the subject in a very different manner.8 They claimed an absolute dominion over the whole territories afterwards occupied by them, not in virtue of any conquest of, or cession by tribe Indian natives; but as a right acquired by discovery.9 Some of them, indeed, obtained a sort of confirmatory grant from the papal authority. – But as between themselves they treated the dominion and title of territory as resulting from priority of discovery;10 and the European power, which had first discovered the country, and set up mark of possession, was deemed to have gained the right, though it had not yet formed a regular colony there.11 We have also seen, that the title of the Indians was not treated as a right of propriety and dominion; but as a mere of right of occupancy.12 As infidels, heathen, and savages, they were not allowed to possess the prerogatives belonging to absolute, sovereign and independent nations.*13 The territory, over which they wandered, and which they used for their temporary and fugitive purposes, was, in respect to Christians, deemed, as if it were inhabited only by brute animals. There is not a single grant from the British crown from the earliest grant of Elizabeth down to the latest of George the Second, that affects to look to any title, except that founded on discovery. Conquest or cession is not once alluded to. And it is impossible, that it should have been; for at the time when all the leading grants were respectively made, there had not been any conquest or cession from the natives of the territory comprehended in those grants. Even in respect to the territory of New York and New Jersey, which alone afford any pretence for a claim by conquest, they were conquered from the Dutch, and not from the natives; and were ceded to England by the treaty of Breda in 1667. But England claimed this very territory, not by right of this conquest, but by the prior right of discovery.14 The original grant was made to the Duke of York in 1664, founded upon this right, and the subsequent confirmation of his title did not depart from the original foundation.
1. 1 Bl. Comm. 107.
2. 2 P. Will. 75; 1 Bl. Common. 107; 2 sSalk. 411; Com. Dig. Ley. C.; Rex v Vaughn, 4 Burr. R. 2500; Chitty on Prerog.ch.3, p. 29, etc.
3. 1 Bl. Comm. 107; 2 Merivale R. 143, 159.
4. 1 Bl. Comm. 107; 1 Tucker’s Black. note E, 378, 384 et seq. 4 Burr. R. 2500; 2 Merivale R. 143, 157, 158; 2 Wilson’ Law Lect. 49 to 54.
5. Blankard v. Galy, 4 Mod. 222; S.C. 2 Salk. 411, 412; 2 Peere Will. 75; 1 Black. Comm. 107; Campbell v. Hall, Cow;. R. 204, 209, Calvin’s case, 7 Co. 1. 17. b; Com. Dig. Navigation, G. 1, 3; Id. Ley. C. 4 Burr. R. 2500; 2 Merivale R. 143, 157, 158.
6. Campbell v. Hall, Cow;. R. 204, 209; Chitty on Prerog. ch. 3, p. 29 etc.
7. 1 Bl. Comm 107; Chitty on Prerog. Ch. 3, p 29.
8. See ante, p. 4 to 20; 1 Chalm. Annals, 676; 3 Wilson’s Works, 234.
9. Vattel, B. 1, ch. 18, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209.
10. Johnson v. McIntosh, 8 Wheat. R. 543, 576, 595.
11. Penn v. Lord Baltimore, 1 Vez. 444, 451.
12. 3 Kent’s Comm. 308 to 313; 1 Chalm. Annals, 676, 677; 4 Jefferson’s Corresp 478; Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Peters’s R. 515.
13. To do but justice to those times, it is proper to state, that this pretension did not obtain universal approbation. On the contrary, it was opposed by some of the most enlightened ecclesiastics and philosophers of those days, as unjust and absurd; and especially by two Spanish writers of eminent worth, Soto and Victoria. See Sir James McIntosh’s elegant treatise on the Progress of Ethical Philosophy, Philadelphia edit. 1832, p. 49, 50.
14. 4 Wheaton, 575, 576, 588. See also 1 Tuck. Black. Appx. 332. 1 Chalm. Annals, 676.
15. Vattel, B.1, ch. 18, 208,209; 3 Kent’s Comm. 312, 313.
16. 4 Wheat. R. 590, 591, 596; 1 Grahame’s Hist. of America, 44; 3 Kent’s Comm. 311; Worcester v. State of Georgia, 6 Peters’s Sup. Ct. Rep. 515.
17. 2 Salk. 411, 412; See also Nall v. Campbell, Cowp. R. 204, 211, 212; 1 Chalm. Ann. 14,15, 678, 679, 689, 690; 1 Chalm. Opinions, 194; 2 Chalm. Opinions, 202; Chitty on Prerog. ch. 2; 2 Wilson’s Law Lect. 48, 49.
18. Vattel, B.1, ch.18, 209;1 Chalm. Annals, 676, 677, 678, 679; 8 Wheat R. 595; Grotius, B. 2, ch. 9, 10.
19. 1 Chalm Ann 677; Id. 14,1,658; 2 Wilson’s Law Lect 48, 49; 3 Wilson’s Law Lect. 234, 235.
20. Robertson’s v. Row, 1 Atk. R. 543, 544; Vaughan R. 300, 400; Show. Parl. Cas. 31; 8 Wheat. R. 595; 1 Turk. Black. Comm. App. 382, 383; Dummer’s Defence, 1 American Tracts, 18.
21. Rex v. Brampton, 10 East R. 22, 288, 289.
22. That of Pennsylvania, 1 Grahame’s Hist. 41, note; 1 Chalm. Annals, 14,15, 639, 640,658; 2 Wilson’s Law Lect. 48, 49.
23. Stokes’s Colon. 30; Hall v. Campbell, Cowp. R. 204. 212; 1 Turk. Black. Comm. App. 383, 384; Chitty Prerog. 32, 33.
24. Notwithstanding the clearness of this doctrine, both from the language of the charters, and the whole course of judicial decisions, Mr. Jefferson has treated it with an extraordinary degree of derision, if not of contempt. “I deride (says he) with you the ordinary doctrine, that we brought with us from England the common law rights. This narrow notion was a favourite in the first moment of rallying to our rights against Great Britain. But it was that of men, who felt their right, before they had thought of their explanation. The truth is, that we brought with us the rights of men, of expatriated men. On our arrival here the question would at once arise, by what law will we govern ourselves? The resolution seems to have been, by that system, with which we are familiar; to be altered by ourselves occasionally, and adapted to our new situation.” 4 Jefferson’s Corresp. 178.
How differently did the Congress of 1774 think. They unanimously resolved, “That the respective colonies are entitled to the common law of England, and more especially to the great and inestimable privilege of being tried by their peers of the vicinage according to the course of that law.” They further resolved, “that they were entitled to the benefit of such of the English statutes, as existed at the time of their colonization, and which they have by experience respectively found to be applicable to their several and local circumstances.” They also resolved, that their ancestors at the time of their emigration were “entitled” (not to the rights of men, of expatriated men, but) “to all the rights, liberties, and immunities of free and natural born subjects within the realm of England.” Journal of Congress, Declaration of Rights of the Colonies, Oct. 14, 1774, p. 27 to 31. 1 Chalm. Opinion, 202, 220, 295; 1 Chalm. Annals 677, 681, 682; 1 Tuck. Black. Comm. 385; 1 Kent’s Comm. 322; Journal of Congress, 1774, p. 28, 29; 2 Wilson’s Law Lect. 48, 49, 50; I Tuck. Black. Comm. App. 380 to 384; Van Ness v. Packard, 2 Peters’s Sup. R. 137, 144.
25. 2 Wilson’s Law Lect. 48 to 55; 1 Tuck. Black. Comm. App. 380 to 384; 1 Chalm. Opinions, 220.
arbitrary will? – My design is not here to discuss the subject, (for that would require a volume,) but rather to suggest some of the difficulties attendant upon the subject. Those readers, who are desirous of more ample information, are referred to Duponceau on the Jurisdiction of the Courts of the United States; to 1 Tucker’s Black. Comm. App. Note E, p. 372; to 1 Kent’s Comm. Lect. 16, p. 311 to 322; to the report of the Virginia legislature of 1799-1800; to Rawle on the Constitution, ch. 30, p. 258; to the North American Review, July, 1825; and to Mr. Bayard’s speech in the Debates on the Judiciary, in 1802, p. 372, etc. Some other remarks illustrative of it will necessarily arise in discussing the subject of Impeachments.

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