Source: https://rockymountaindefense.com/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 10:02:22+00:00

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Welcome to the New and Improved Rocky Mountain Defense Blog!
Welcome to the new and improved Rocky Mountain Defense Blog! Started about a decade ago by Federal Public Defender Virginia Grady, the Blog is written and maintained by lawyers and interns at the Federal Public Defender’s Office for the Districts of Colorado and Wyoming. We will keep you posted about federal criminal law developments in the Tenth Circuit and the United States Supreme Court.
(1) News You Can Use – case law summarizes with suggested takeaways for practical application.
(2) Practice Tips – strategies and suggestions for motions and appellate practice.
(3) Resources– links to helpful websites, blogs, and articles about federal criminal defense in the Tenth Circuit and nationally.
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In US v. Gaines, the Tenth Circuit vacated the denial of a motion to suppress in a published opinion, ruling: (1) the defendant was seized when police officers confronted him about reported drug sales in a parking lot; and (2) the subsequent discovery of an arrest warrant did not attenuate the connection between the seizure and the evidence. And they did so with style, buttressing their points with actual photographs of the alleged seizure in question. The opinion doesn’t break new legal ground, but it provides a nice review of some basic Fourth Amendment principles—and is a great example of creative appellate advocacy.
After Mr. Gaines got out of his car, one officer confronted him about the reported drug sale, observed an open container of alcohol, and smelled PCP. Officers told Mr. Gaines he would be detained. Mr. Gaines then grabbed a pouch from his car and fled the scene. He was soon captured. Meanwhile, police discovered cocaine, marijuana, PCP, drug paraphernalia, cash, and a handgun in his car. Mr. Gaines unsuccessfully moved to suppress this evidence, and was convicted after trial. He appealed the denial of his motion to suppress.
The Tenth Circuit vacated the denial of the suppression motion in a published opinion, focusing on two issues: (1) whether there was a seizure; and (2) whether the relationship between the seizure and the evidence was attenuated.
The Tenth Circuit found Mr. Gaines was seized because a reasonable person would not have felt free to leave the scene, and Mr. Gaines in fact yielded to the police’s show of authority. The opinion goes into a lot of detail about what specifically made the encounter a seizure, including that it involved uniformed police officers in marked police cars with flashing lights, where state law requires motorists to stop for flashing lights. The Court also emphasized one of the officers had gestured for Mr. Gaines to get out of his car before asking him an accusatory question.
The Tenth Circuit also rejected the government’s attempt to salvage the case through the attenuation doctrine. Under that doctrine, evidence does not need to be excluded if the Government can meet its heavy burden of showing that there is only a weak or attenuated connection to the asserted Fourth Amendment violation. When applying the attenuation doctrine, the court considers: (1) the temporal proximity between the alleged Fourth Amendment violation and the discovery of the evidence; (2) the presence or absence of intervening circumstances; and (3) the purpose and flagrancy of the police wrongdoing.
Specifically, the Tenth Circuit rejected the government’s arguments that either an outstanding arrest warrant or the subsequent development of probable cause established attenuation in this case. With respect to the warrant, the Tenth Circuit noted that executing the warrant and arresting Mr. Gaines would not automatically have allowed the search of his vehicle—citing the Court’s recent decision limiting officer authority to conduct warrantless searches of arrestees in US v. Knapp. The Court also observed that neither the warrant nor the observations arguably amounting to probable cause were discovered until after the challenged seizure. The Court therefore reasoned both the close temporal proximity and the absence of intervening circumstances weighed against application of the attenuation doctrine in this case.
Detail matters. Suppression motions often require fact-intensive inquiries, and as this case demonstrates, it’s useful to do everything you can to marshal the facts in your favor. Explain in detail exactly what happened: How many police officers were there? What were they wearing? What were they driving? And what exactly did they do when they encountered the defendant? And then those details to the relevant legal standard.
A picture is worth a thousand words. Check out the Opening Brief in this appeal(filed by the Kansas FPD). Sometimes, it’s useful not only to tell the court why your motion should be granted, but also show them. If there’s an image that really captures the essence of your argument, consider including it in your brief so your point doesn’t get lost in the shuffle. Nobody’s suggesting you file a comic book, but when done right, this technique shakes up legal writing and can be quite effective.
Arrest authority is not the end of the story. As the Tenth Circuit’s in-depth attenuation analysis demonstrates, the fact that police could have lawfully arrested your client doesn’t necessarily excuse any Fourth Amendment violations. Pick apart any attenuation argument to see if the Government’s claim holds up: Would an arrest really have led to the discovery of the evidence, independent of the Fourth Amendment violation? And can the warrant really be considered an “intervening event” that weakens the causal connection between the Fourth Amendment violation and the evidence sought to be excluded?
In Garza v. Idaho, the Supreme Court recently ruled 6-3 that, if a defendant wants to appeal, defense counsel must always file a notice of appeal — even if the defendant has signed an appeal waiver and even if counsel judges an appeal to be frivolous or self-defeating. The opinion clarifies trial counsel’s obligations during the post-trial period. And the lineup of the Justices is potentially revealing.
Later, Mr. Garza sought post-conviction relief, claiming that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to file a notice of appeal despite Mr. Garza’s requests. The Supreme Court’s prior decision in Roe v. Flores-Ortega lent support to Mr. Garza’s claim. The Court had held in Flores-Ortega that trial counsel’s failure to file a notice of appeal when the client requests an appeal amounts to ineffective assistance of counsel. But the Idaho courts denied Mr. Garza’s claim, purporting to distinguish Flores-Ortega on the basis of the appeal waiver in Mr. Garza’s case.
The Supreme Court reversed in an opinion authored by Justice Sotomayor and joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Kagan, and Kavanaugh. Assessing the two elements of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim — deficient performance and prejudice — the Court held that, even in the face of appeal waiver, both elements are met when counsel disregards a defendant’s request to file an appeal.
Addressing the deficient performance element, the Court rejected the State’s argument that counsel could strategically decide not to file an appeal for fear of risking a breach of the plea agreement. The Court explained that, first, “simply filing a notice of appeal does not necessarily breach a plea agreement, given the possibility that the defendant will end up raising claims beyond the waiver’s scope.” Second, “the bare decision whether to appeal is ultimately the defendant’s, not counsel’s, to make.” The Court noted that defense counsel’s obligation to perform the “purely ministerial task” of filing a notice of appeal did not imply an obligation to file a merits brief in the court of appeals, as defense counsel may move to withdraw from representing the defendant on appeal if the appeal would be frivolous.
Addressing the prejudice element, the Court held that a presumption of prejudice applied because counsel’s deficient performance “forfeit[ed] an appellate proceeding all together,” and there was no principled way to assess the reliability of a proceeding that never took place. An appeal waiver does not show that a defendant has no right to an appellate proceeding, the Court explained, because there are some issues that can always be appealed notwithstanding an appeal waiver — including but not limited to the issue of whether the appeal waiver itself was knowing and voluntary. The Court rejected the federal government’s argument for a case-by-case assessment of whether the defendant planned to raise an issue outside the scope of the appeal waiver as unworkable.
Whether to appeal is up to the client. The defendant’s right to decide whether to appeal his case is a vital procedural protection.While defense counsel may advise the client that an appeal would be pointless, the client’s decision to proceed on appeal controls — just like the client controls other final decisions including whether to plead guilty or go to trial. An amicus brief filed in the Garza litigation explains why fundamental principles of constitutional law and legal ethics vest the final decision to appeal in the client.
If the client wants to appeal, counsel must file a notice of appeal, even if the plea agreement contains an appellate waiver. Defense counsel must always file a notice of appeal when the client expresses the desire to appeal. In Roe v. Flores-Ortega, the Supreme Court held that when an attorney “disregards specific instructions from the defendant to file a notice of appeal,” the attorney has rendered deficient representation, and the defendant should be “presum[ed]” to have suffered prejudice. 528 U.S. 470 (2000). Garza teaches that the existence of an appeal waiver in a plea agreement does not change counsel’s fundamental obligations in this area.
Garza resolves a circuit split but doesn’t really change Tenth Circuit law. Since 2005, the Tenth Circuit has applied the rule in Flores-Ortega with equal force where a defendant enters a guilty plea containing an appeal waiver. In U.S. v. Garrett, the Tenth Circuit held that an “[a]ppellate waiver does not foreclose all appellate review” a sentence, and if the defendant “actually asked counsel to perfect an appeal, and counsel ignored the request, he will be entitled to a delayed appeal.”See US v Garrett, 402 F.3d 1262, 1266 (10th Cir. 2005).
Of course, you may end up filing an Anders brief. If you think the appeal is frivolous, keep in mind the procedure under Anders v California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). That is, when a client asks his lawyer to file an arguably frivolous appeal, the lawyer should file a notice of appeal, submit “a brief referring to anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal,” and request permission to withdraw. This procedure, requiring lawyers to file “Anders briefs,” allows defense counsel to act “with honor and without conflict,” and it preserves defendants’ right to appeal. For additional requirements on Anders briefs in the Tenth Circuit, see the Tenth Circuit Rules on the subject, particularly 10th Cir. R. 46.4(B)(1) through (3), and US v Cervantes, 795 F.3d 1189, 1190 (10th Cir. 2015).
Don’t just assume an appellate waiver is enforceable. Like it or not, appeal waivers are a part of plea agreements in the Tenth Circuit. But appellate waivers are not absolute and even the broadest waivers can sometimes be challenged. Review the appellate waiver enforcement analysis in US v Hahn, the key case on the issue in the Tenth Circuit, to determine if the appeal falls within the scope of the appellate waiver, if the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his appellate rights, or whether waiver will result in a miscarriage of justice.
Last week, the Supreme Court decided Timbs v. Indiana, agreeing 9-0 that the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause is incorporated against the states. The Court held that – like almost every other part of the Bill of Rights – the excessive fines clause restricts state and local governments to the same extent as the federal government.
In 1993, the Supreme Court applied the Excessive Fines Clause to in rem forfeiture proceedings in Austin v. United States. In rem forfeitures are essentially civil law suits instituted against property rather than people, which allow the government to take possession of the “rem” (thing) because of some connection to a crime, without actually convicting their owners or even proving their owners guilt. But the Court had never applied the Clause to state or local proceedings.
In Timbs, the Court held the Excessive Fines Clause limited Indiana’s ability to complete an in rem forfeiture of a Land Rover SUV that its owner had used to transport heroin. Mr. Timbs had recently purchased the seized SUV for $42,000 with insurance money received upon his father’s death–over four times the amount of money that he could have been fined in his criminal case. A lower Indiana court had already found this was an excessive fine under the U.S. Constitution. The Indiana Supreme Court reversed that decision based only on its erroneous determination that the Excessive Fines Clause was not incorporated against the states. Therefore, incorporation was the only issue in front of the U.S. Supreme Court. This case was not about whether, in fact, the forfeiture of the SUV was an excessive fine.
The Supreme Court set out a lengthy history of the prohibition on excessive fines. Because of this history, the Court held that the Excessive Fines Clause is both “fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty” and “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition” – only one of which had to be true for incorporation to be appropriate. Timbs v. Indiana, 586 U.S. ___, slip op. at 3 (2019).
The country has taken notice of civil asset forfeiture, or “legalized theft” as it has been called. And, now, so has the Supreme Court. This is essentially a unanimous decision. Justice Thomas wrote for himself, as he often does, to explain that rights should be incorporated against states under the Privileges and Immunities Clause and not the Due Process Clause. Justice Gorsuch indicated in a concurrence that he is likely to agree if that specific issue is ever squarely before the court. But all of the Justices were concerned about the frequency and creativity with which the government has violated the right to be free of excessive fines.
If your client is losing her stuff, no matter what agency or court is taking it, and no matter what mechanism is being used, think about an Excessive Fines Clause challenge.
State court, federal court, it really does not matter. It will almost always be true that incorporated federal constitutional rights are to be interpreted identically no matter where you are. Once again, the Court noted and then distinguished the only exception: the Sixth Amendment’s Jury Clause. It requires jury trials in all felony cases, but it only requires unanimous verdicts in federal criminal cases. Why? “The result of an unusual division among the Justices.” Op. at 3 n. 1. Will something like that happen again? Probably not.
Hester v. United States, an opinion by Justice Gorsuch (joined by Justice Sotomayor), flags an issue that defense counsel should be preserving in appropriate cases. Certiorari was denied in Hester, but the issue may attract enough votes for a grant of certiorari in the future.
The question presented in Hester was whether Apprendi v. New Jersey applies to restitution orders. Apprendi requires that a jury find beyond a reasonable doubt any fact that increases the maximum sentence for an offense. Mr. Hester maintained that Apprendi required a jury to find the facts supporting the amount of restitution that was ordered for his offense. The circuits, including the Tenth Circuit, have uniformly rejected this argument. The Supreme Court declined to review the issue in Hester, but Justices Gorsuch and Sotomayor dissented from the denial of certiorari.
Equally telling about the merits of the government’s argument against applying Apprendi to restitution is Justice Alito’s opinion concurring in the denial of certiorari. He does not defend the lower courts’ interpretation of Apprendi but, instead, suggests Apprendi should be overruled.
In cases where the applicability or amount of restitution is disputed, preserve an argument that Apprendi requires that the applicability and amount of restitution be determined by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. You can preserve the argument by filing a written objection to the PSR’s recommendation that restitution be ordered and by raising the argument again at the sentencing hearing.
Don’t be deterred from preserving a sound argument just because the circuits have uniformly rejected it. The circuits can be (and have been) uniformly wrong!
The Supreme Court recently decided the consolidated cases of United States v. Stitt (and United States v. Sims), No. 17-765, 2018 WL 6439818 (U.S. Dec. 10, 2018). The opinion holds that burglary of a vehicle adapted for overnight accommodation of persons is a generic burglary for purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act.
The Stitt opinion is another in a line of cases that have asked whether certain burglary convictions qualify as predicate offenses under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). The defendants in these cases, Victor J. Stitt and Jason Daniel Sims, were each convicted in federal court of unlawfully possessing a firearm, in violation of 18 U. S. C. §922(g)(1). The sentencing judge in each case imposed the mandatory minimum 15-year prison term that the ACCA requires for §922(g)(1) offenders who have at least three previous convictions for certain “violent” or drug-related felonies, §924(e)(1), based in part on burglary convictions.
The Supreme Court has previously stated that burglary of a vehicle is not a valid ACCA predicate. But the narrower question in this case was whether statutes that cover burglaries of vehicles that have been adapted or customarily used for overnight accommodation should qualify as ACCA predicates because they fall within the “generic” definition of burglary.
Recall that the categorical approach first adopted Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990), requires courts to evaluate a prior state conviction by reference to the elements of the state offense, rather than to the defendant’s conduct. In other words, you can’t look at the underlying facts of the prior conviction to figure out whether the predicate counts. A prior state burglary conviction does not qualify under the ACCA where “the elements of [the relevant state statute] are broader than those of generic burglary.” Mathis v. United States, 136 S.Ct. 2243 (2016). Burglary statutes that cover vehicles as one possible means of committing the crime are therefore excluded from being predicate ACCA offenses because the statutes are overbroad. See, e.g., Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2250. (holding that Iowa statute covering burglary of “any building, structure, [or] land, water, or air vehicle” was overbroad and indivisible and thus did not qualify as an ACCA predicate).
Stitt’s prior convictions were for violations of a Tennessee statute that defines “[a]ggravated burglary” as “burglary of a habitation.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39–14–403(a) (1997). It further defines “[h]abitation” to include: (1) “any structure, including … mobile homes, trailers, and tents, which is designed or adapted for the overnight accommodation of persons,” and (2) any “self-propelled vehicle that is designed or adapted for the overnight accommodation of persons and is actually occupied at the time of initial entry by the defendant.” §§ 39–14–401(1)(A), (B) (emphasis added).
Similarly, Sims’ prior convictions were for violations of an Arkansas statute that prohibits burglary of a “residential occupiable structure.” Ark. Code Ann. § 5–39–201(a)(1) (Michie 1997). The statute defines “[r]esidential occupiable structure” to include: “a vehicle, building, or other structure: (A) [w]here any person lives; or (B) [w]hich is customarily used for overnight accommodation of persons whether or not a person is actually present.” § 5–39–101(1) (emphasis added).
In both cases, the District Courts found the state statutory crimes fell within the scope of the word “burglary” in the Armed Career Criminal Act and consequently imposed that statute’s mandatory sentence enhancement. In both cases, the relevant Court of Appeals held that the statutory crimes did not fall within the scope of the word “burglary,” vacated the sentence, and remanded for resentencing. The Government sought certiorari in both cases in part because of a circuit split that included an old Tenth Circuit case, United States v. Spring, 80 F.3d 1450, 1462 (10th Cir. 1996), which held that such burglary convictions would qualify as ACCA predicates.
The Supreme Court surveyed state statutes from 1986 and earlier and determined that “a majority of state burglary statutes covered vehicles adapted or customarily used for lodging.” Stitt, 2018 WL 6439818, at *4. As a result, such burglary convictions were included within the definition of “generic burglary.” In so doing, the Supreme Court reversed the decisions below of the Sixth and Eighth Circuits, and also abrogated contrary precedent in the Fourth and Ninth Circuits. See United States v. White, 836 F.3d 437, 446 (4th Cir. 2016); United States v. Grisel, 488 F.3d 844 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc). Justice Breyer wrote the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Burglary convictions/statutes that cover vehicles plain and simple are still out, but statutes that cover vehicles “adapted for overnight accommodation of persons” will now qualify as ACCA predicates—as long as they are not overbroad and indivisible in some other way.
For a refresher on the categorical approach, see Mathis v. United States, 136 S.Ct. 2243 (2016), available here.
Remember: burglary convictions are NEVER crimes of violence under the career offender provisions of the Guidelines (this case affects only potential ACCA clients).

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