Source: https://www.lawinsport.com/topics/articles/anti-doping/item/the-application-of-swiss-law-in-doping-cases-before-the-cas-and-the-swiss-federal-tribunal?category_id=121
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 08:29:23+00:00

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The Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) was established in 1984 by the International Olympic Committee (IOC) in order to create a supreme instance for sports disputes, away from the jurisdiction of State Courts. After a landmark decision rendered by the Swiss Federal Tribunal (SFT) in 1993 in the widely-known Gundel case, the CAS proceeded to a series of reforms in order to become an independent arbitral institution, as confirmed by a subsequent SFT judgment. As per Article R28 of the CAS Procedural Rules of the Code of Sports-related Arbitration (CAS Code), the seat of CAS arbitration is in Switzerland, notwithstanding where the hearings are held. This has the practical consequence that CAS proceedings are imperatively governed by the Swiss law of arbitration.
The World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) is also a foundation under Swiss private law and is based in Lausanne, Switzerland. In addition to WADA, the vast majority of the international federations that have adopted the WADA Code (WADC) are also domiciled in Switzerland. Under the relevant provisions of the WADC, appeals against doping disputes involving international-level athletes/ international events are brought before the CAS in Lausanne, Switzerland. WADA and other international organisations have also the right to appeal against doping-related decisions rendered by first instance bodies to the CAS without the need to exhaust internal remedies. Once the CAS award is rendered, the only way to challenge the award is before the SFT for the reasons exhaustively enumerated in the Swiss Private International Law Act (PILA).
Having their seat in Switzerland, CAS Panels must comply with the general legal framework for international arbitral tribunals provided in the 12th chapter of PILA. Pursuant to Article R28 CAS Code, the seat of the CAS arbitration is (always) Lausanne, Switzerland, irrespective of the place where the hearing is held. The application of Swiss law to the CAS arbitration must be distinguished by the law applicable to the merits and ensures the uniform application of procedural rules notwithstanding the venue of the sporting event or the nationality of athletes. Also, the fact that the seat of CAS arbitration is always Lausanne, Switzerland has the (important) consequence that all motions to set aside CAS awards can only be filed before the SFT, according to Article 190 para. 2 PILA.
According to Article R59 CAS Code, the award is final upon its notification to the parties. Thereafter, it is only possible to file a motion to set aside the award for formal reasons exhaustively enumerated in Article 190 para. 2 PILA. The grounds are the following: “a. where the sole arbitrator has been improperly appointed or where the arbitral tribunal has been improperly constituted; b. where the arbitral tribunal has wrongly accepted or denied jurisdiction; c. where the arbitral tribunal has ruled beyond the claims submitted to it, or failed to decide one of the claims; d. where the principle of equal treatment of the parties or their right to be heard in an adversary procedure has not been observed; e. where the award is incompatible with public policy”. It must be noted that the majority of these grounds are influenced by the more general international law principles and the New York Convention of 1958 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (NYC58). Notwithstanding the above, and like every national supreme judicial instance, the Swiss Supreme Court has established its own jurisprudence in application of Swiss law, and in particular mandatory Swiss law.
According to the CAS Code (Article R27 & Article R47 of the CAS Code) and the general rules on jurisdiction provided in Articles 177 ff. of the Swiss PILA, the basic condition to entertain an appeal is the existence of a valid arbitration clause. The Swiss PILA provides for a broad scope of arbitrable disputes, in that any “dispute involving financial interest may be the subject of an arbitration”, meaning that all sports disputes involving a professional athlete are arbitrable. The disciplinary character of doping disputes is not a hindrance to their arbitrability under Swiss law. As found by the SFT already in the Gundel judgment, the doping-related sanctions arise out of a private law relationship between an association and its members and can therefore be subject to arbitration, to the extent that the financial interest condition of Article 177 para. 1 PILA is fulfilled.
The majority of doping-related appeals filed with the CAS are based on arbitration clauses contained in the rules and regulations of the sports governing bodies that have ratified the WADC. Fairly common are also the “Player Entry Forms”, prior to the participation of an athlete in a major event / competition. A controversial and highly complicated issue arises in cases where the regulations of sports governing bodies include global references, i.e. generally refer to a set of rules that contain the arbitration clause.
Specifically for doping cases, the SFT has been following a liberal approach when it comes to the validity of an arbitration agreement in favour of CAS in order to have an international instance in the fight against doping. Accordingly, global references are valid if they can be understood as the acceptance of the arbitration clause included in the agreement. The SFT also held that the CAS arbitration clause is “branchentypisch” in professional sports, meaning that professional athletes could not validly argue that they ignored the existence of a CAS arbitration clause in order to challenge its validity.
So far, the SFT has interpreted the scope of CAS arbitration clauses in numerous judgments related to doping. According to the principle of trust (“principe de la confiance” in French, “Vertrauensprinzip” in German), an arbitration clause through a global reference is binding on a party that is aware of its existence and does not raise any objections e.g., if an athlete validly consents through his signature of the specimen agreement / of the entry form to the major competition, whose regulations expressly contained the arbitration clause. However, when an athlete signs a player entry form for a specific championship, this does not constitute a broader arbitration agreement (or a general consent / blanket consent) outside the scope of the event.
An example of application of Swiss law can be found in the case of Essendon (a professional Australian football club). In this case, the CAS imposed a two-year suspension upon 32 Essendon’s players for use of the prohibited substance Thymosin Beta 4 in the framework of the players’ supplements program in 2012. The players subsequently filed a motion to set aside the CAS award before the SFT holding that CAS had exceeded its jurisdiction (Article 190 para. 2 b PILA) by deciding the case de novo. Although the players had filed their objections as to the full power of the Panel’s review (which, according to the applicable version of the AFL Anti-Doping Code 2010 would be a limited review), they subsequently signed the Order of Procedure (which included the Panel’s decision to rule de novo) without reservations. The SFT therefore rejected the athletes’ motion, in essence holding that they had lost their right to challenge the jurisdiction due to their conduct during the proceedings.
Notwithstanding its finding, the SFT did consider the issue jurisdiction and held (as an obiter dictum) that the jurisdictional issue (and in particular the validity of the arbitration agreement) is determined according to Swiss law. Under Swiss law, and according to the binding CAS Rules (Article R57 of the CAS Code) it is not possible to reduce the full scrutiny of the appeal through a different arbitration agreement. When such agreement is made, it constitutes an agreement with “partially impossible content” (“defective” arbitration clause), which is not invalid as such (under Swiss law): in these cases, it is important to determine, whether the parties would have still opted for CAS had they been aware of such “impossible content” of the agreement.
Parties who have validly challenged the appointment of one of the arbitrators before the CAS can subsequently file a motion to set aside a CAS award based on the first ground for annulment of an arbitral award (Article 190 para. 2 a PILA). Although, according to the jurisprudence of the Swiss Federal Tribunal, arbitrators are presumed to perform their tasks in an independent and impartial way, the SFT will review the independence of the challenged arbitrators and the validity of the ICAS decision in this respect. The parties who wish to challenge a CAS arbitrator have to do so as soon as they know about it. An issue of particular relevance in this respect is the one of “recurring appointments” of arbitrators, in particular by sports governing bodies. The IBA Guidelines regarding conflicts of interests provide that the practice of recurring appointments might be justified in specialized forms of arbitration. According to the jurisprudence of the SFT, an arbitrator who accepted specific assignments several years prior to the CAS proceedings in question, “a university professor who merely put his expertise at the service of the sport community in the general interest (i.e. codifying Anti-Doping Rules and reviewing their application)” does not violate Article 190 para. 2 a PILA.
The right to be heard and the equality of the parties in adversarial proceedings PILA) is an internationally recognized legal principle and is also provided in Article 182 (3) PILA. A violation of these rights constitutes a ground for appeal und. Under the jurisprudence of the SFT, the parties have to raise all procedural objections / concerns in a timely manner, failing which they lose their right to validly argue violation of their procedural rights. The Panel must take into consideration all the parties’ legal and factual submissions which are relevant for rendering its decision. Four motions to set aside CAS awards have so far been (partly or totally) accepted on this ground by the SFT and only one case relating to a doping suspension. In these cases, the CAS Panel will re-hear the case and remedy the elements violated through the previous award.
A CAS award can be annulled if it violates (procedural or substantive) public policy (Article 190 (2) (e) PILA). The Swiss Federal Tribunal has offered a wide variety of what constitutes (and what falls outside the scope of) public policy, also within the context of doping cases. An award can only be annulled for substantive reasons if it violates substantive public policy. The Federal Tribunal has reiterated in many cases its view that such notion is to be interpreted very narrowly and covers only “fundamental principles that are widely recognized and should underlie any system of law according to the prevailing conceptions in Switzerland”. The SFT has acknowledged that the principles of strict liability and sanctions do not violate substantive public policy. With specific regard to anti-doping rules, the Federal Tribunal found that awards that excessively restrict athletes’ personality rights may, under specific circumstances, violate the substantive public policy. The issue of personality rights under Swiss law is also relevant in doping cases and is further examined below.
While there is little relevance of Swiss law in terms of burden and standard of proof in doping cases (these questions are extensively regulated in the text of the WADC), the admissibility of specific forms of evidence is a question that is determined, at least to a certain extent, according to Swiss law. More specifically, when a Panel determines the admissibility of evidence, it must be guided by - and comply with - the Swiss procedural public policy. In this respect, the SFT (within its review of potential violations of procedural public policy) has rendered judgments dealing with the admissibility of illegally obtained evidence and the question of protected witnesses in doping and other disciplinary cases.
Swiss law is also pretty relevant in provisional measures ordered by the CAS. Article R37 CAS Code has incorporated the general provision of Article 183 Swiss PILA. The criteria used by the Division President or the Panel when deciding whether to grant the provisional measures are largely inspired by the jurisprudence of the ordinary Swiss courts when deciding on similar requests. Accordingly, the three criteria that have to be cumulatively met are “whether the relief is necessary to protect the applicant from irreparable harm, the likelihood of success on the merits of the claim, and whether the interests of the Applicant outweigh those of the Respondent(s)”. Article 13.1 of the 2015 WADC provides that “Decisions (…) shall remain in effect while under appeal unless the appellate body orders otherwise”. In order to be admitted, the request has to be complete and accompanied by sufficient evidence.
Apart from the request for provisional measures before the CAS, it is possible to request provisional relief together with the motion to set aside a CAS award before the SFT. There are numerous examples of similar requests, in particular requesting the stay of a doping suspension and the reinstatement of athletes before major competitions. Again, the procedure follows Swiss law and specifically Articles 103-105 of the Federal Tribunal Act. In August 2016, the SFT dismissed the requests for provisional measures filed by Y. Isinbayeva and S. Shubenkov requesting the SFT to be allowed to participate in the Rio Olympic Games. The SFT equally rejected the request for provisional measures filed by the RPC (together with the motion to set aside the CAS Award in the matter RPC v. IPC) in an effort to block the IPC decision to suspend the entire RPC (and its athletes) preventing them from participating in the Rio Paralympic Games.
Article R58 of the CAS Code has adapted Article 187 Swiss PILA to sports arbitration and reads as follows: “The Panel shall decide the dispute according to the applicable regulations and, subsidiarily, to the rules of law chosen by the parties or, in the absence of such a choice, according to the law of the country in which the federation, association or sports-related body which has issued the challenged decision is domiciled or according to the rules of law that the Panel deems appropriate. (…)”. Since not only WADA but also the vast majority of sports federations are based in Switzerland, Swiss law applies “subsidiarily” in most cases. There are, however, also cases where another national law applies subsidiarily, either because the international federation is based in another country, or because the appeal is governed by the national anti-doping regulations. In some cases, the CAS has even applied Swiss law to doping disputes even though the applicable regulations expressly specified a different law, in an effort to achieve coherence in the interpretation of the anti-doping rules through the CAS case law.
An example of Swiss law applying “subsidiarily” to the merits of a doping-related case can be found in CAS 2014/A/3604. In this case, the single issue was whether the athlete (an ice-hockey player) had a prohibited substance in his body during his participation at the Sochi Olympic Games. The Panel applied the WADC, the ADR, and the WADA International Standard for Laboratories (ISL) and Swiss law subsidiarily. The appellant challenged in particular the validity of the IOC DC decision, due to the fact that it was signed only by its chairman and therefore there were doubts as to whether it was a truly collegiate decision. Under Swiss law, the signature of the Chairman alone did not invalidate the IOC DC decision. Even if such requirement existed, it would constitute excessive formalism to hold that the sole signature of the Chairman would invalidate the decision.
Swiss law protects personality rights in Articles 27-28 of the Swiss Civil Code. Through the years, the SFT has developed the notion of personality rights including various rights such as “the right to health, physical integrity, honour, professional standing, the right personal fulfilment through sporting activities and the right to economic freedom”. Since the ineligibility period for an anti-doping rule violation de facto restricts the economic freedom of the athlete, it is necessary to have a justification under Article 28 para. 2 of the Swiss CC. In CAS proceedings, the violation of personality rights has been examined in the context of non-doping-related cases.
As in all sanctions, the control of proportionality is systematically made in doping-related sanctions by CAS panels. Proportionality is a widely recognized principle in the Swiss legal system (emanating from constitutional and administrative law) and also a recognized principle under EU law. The WADC includes provisions aiming at guaranteeing proportionality in the context of doping-related sanctions but the principle of proportionality is also systematically examined by CAS Panels. In CAS jurisprudence and for doping-related sanctions, proportionality means that “the severity of a sanction must be proportionate to the offense committed. To be proportionate, the sanction must not exceed that which is reasonably required in the search of the justifiable aim”. The Panel thus controls (on a case by case basis and within the limits of the WADC) whether the sanction exceeds the justifiable aim and is therefore unlawful.
The issue of proportionality was also extensively discussed in some recent CAS procedures. A recent example can be found in CAS 2016/A/4745, the Panel examined the proportionality of the IPC decision to suspend the RPC without reservation or exceptions for the Russian Paralympic athletes. Some of the criteria considered were the “magnitude of the failure” of the RPC in what was found to be the “biggest doping scandal in sports history” and the zero tolerance Anti-Doping policy. Furthermore, the fight against doping constituted an “overriding public interest” and the damage caused by the non-compliance with the WADA Code was found to be substantial and there were found no obvious alternatives to the suspension of the RPC. Overall, the Panel found the IPC goals to be legitimate and the measure taken (i.e. the suspension of the RPC) to be appropriate to achieve the goals pursued, and the IPC decision was not in breach of its statutory provisions.
Although the WADC harmonized the different anti-doping regulations and created a truly international regime for anti-doping rule violations, Swiss law continues to have a significant importance in the adjudication of doping-related procedures before the CAS. The importance of Swiss law is more evident when it comes to the procedural law, since the CAS is based in Switzerland and has to comply with the more general legal framework of international arbitral institutions seated in Switzerland (as the lex arbitri). As to the law applicable to the merits, Swiss law applies “subsidiarily” in all cases where the federation whose body issued the appealed decision is based in Switzerland. The importance of the law applicable to the merits is limited compared to the law applicable to the proceedings, also due to the fact that many legal concepts are internationally legal principles (e.g. the principle of proportionality).
 See more on the history of CAS in Mavromati / Reeb, the Code of the Court of Arbitration for Sport: Commentary, Cases & Materials, Kluwer Law International 2015, pp. 1-15.
 SFT 4P.217/1992, Judgment of 15 March 1993 (Gundel).
 SFT 4P.267-270/2002, Judgment of 27 May 2003 (Lazutina / Danilova).
 See e.g. cases where the CAS hearing was held in another country (see e.g. the Essendon CAS Award which is further analysed below, CAS 2015/A/4059, WADA v. Th. Bellchambers et al., AFL & ASADA, award of 11 January 2016).
 Article 13.1.3 WADC and 13.2.3 WADC. See also Mike Morgan, The Relevance of Swiss Law in Doping Disputes, Revue de droit Suisse, Vol. 132, 2013 / 03, pp. 341-351.
 For international arbitration in Switzerland, copy available to view here: https://www.andreasbucher-law.ch/images/stories/pil_act_1987_as_amended_until_1_7_2014.pdf (last accessed 5 April 2017). For domestic arbitration, the relevant provisions of the Swiss Code of Civil Procedure (CCP) apply.
 We must note that Swiss law applies as the « lex loci arbitri », that is the law of the place where the arbitration takes place.
 See also Antonio Rigozzi, International Sports Arbitration: Why does Swiss Law Matter?, p. 439 ff.
 See SFT 4P.217/1992, Judgment of 15 March 1993 (Gundel).
 See SFT 4P.172/2006, Judgment of 22 March 2007 (Cañas) & SFT 4A_460/2008, Judgment of 12 January 2009 (Dodô), para. 6.2.
 On the Player Entry Forms as valid arbitration agreements see also, generally SFT 4A_358/2009, Judgment of 06 November 2009 (Busch).
 See the Wilhelmshaven decision of the German Federal Tribunal issued on 20 September 2016 (Wilhelmshaven e.V. v. NFV, II ZR 25/15). In this case, however, the subject matter of the dispute was not a doping-related matter but rather a sanction for not complying with a CAS award.
 See generally SFT 4P.267-270/2002, Judgment of 27 May 2003 (Lazutina / Danilova).
 See also SFT 4P.230/2000, Judgment of 7 February 2001 (Stanley Roberts).
 SFT 4A_428/2011, Judgment of 13 February 2012 (Wickmayer).
 The SFT has admitted two motions to set aside a doping-related CAS award based on jurisdictional grounds: SFT 4A_358/2009, Judgment of 06 November 2009 (Busch); SFT 4A_456/2009, Judgment of 03 May 2010 (Athletics South Africa).
 SFT 4C_44/1996, Judgment of 31 October 1996 (Nagel); SFT 4P.230/2000, Judgment of 7 February 2001 (Stanley Roberts); SFT 4A_460/2008, Judgment of 9 January 2009 (Dodô).
 SFT 4A_358/2009, Judgment of 6 November 2009 (Busch), at 3.2.3.
 CAS 2015/A/4059 WADA v. Th. Bellchambers et al., AFL & ASADA, award of 11 January 2016.
 See 4A_102/2016, Judgment of 27 September 2016. See also Voser / Bell, https://www.swlegal.ch/Publications/Arbitration-Case-Digest/Requirement-under-Swiss-law-confirmed-to-timely-an.aspx (of 16 Nov. 2016).
 See BGE 138 III 29 E.2.3.2, p. 37; SFT 4A_102/2016, Judgment of 27 September 2016, (Essendon) at 3.4. Also, the Players did not claim that they would not have opted for CAS had they known that it was not possible to restrict CAS’ power of review.
 See BGE 138 III 29, E.2.3 and BGE 131 III 467 E. 1.2.
 SFT 4A_234/2010, Judgment of 29 October 2010, (Valverde II) para. 3.2.2.
 Notwithstanding the so-called “duty of curiosity” of the parties’ counsel, arbitrators should systematically disclose a maximum of information before their appointment. See also 4A_110/2012, Judgment of 9 October 2012 (Paulissen).
 In this case, the University Professor who was challenged (Prof. Ulrich Haas) was Chair of the Group of Independent Observers at the 2004 Olympic Games and Member of the Expert Group for the 2009 WADC.
 SFT 4A_234/2010, Judgment of 29 October 2010 (Valverde II).
 Knoll, ad Art. 182 PILA, in Arbitration in Switzerland – The Practitioner’s Guide, p. 111.
 E.g. CAS 2005/A/951, Cañas, revised award of 23 May 2007; SFT 4P.172/2006, Judgment of 22 March 2007 (Cañas). This is the only doping-related CAS award that was admitted by the SFT based on Article 190 para. 2 d PILA.
 ATF 132 III 389, para. 2.2.3 (X v. Y), Judgment of 3 August 2006.
 SFT 4A_148/2006, Judgment of 10 January 2007, par. 7.3.2.
 Although the first - and only - case where the Federal Tribunal annulled a CAS award based on this ground was a non-doping case (SFT 4A_558/2011, Judgment of 27 March 2012, (Matuzalem) para. 4.3.2), the protection of personality rights is also a major issue that is taken into consideration by the Federal Tribunal within the context of doping-related cases.
 In this respect, the IBA Rules on taking of evidence in international arbitration (2010) can also be used as guidance by the arbitral tribunal. Under Article 184 para. 2 PILA, although arbitral tribunals lack coercive powers, they can request the assistance of state courts in order to gather evidence.
 See ATF 4A_362/2013 of 27 March 2014, X. v. FFU, at 3.2.2. See ATF 4A_448/2013 of 27 March 2013, A. v. FFU, at 3.2.2. See CAS 2010/A/2267, Metalist et al. v. FFU, award of 2 August 2013. See also Rigozzi, A. / Quinn, B., ‘Evidentiary Issues Before CAS’, in International Sports Law and Jurisprudence of the CAS, 4th CAS & SAV/FSA Conference Lausanne 2012, ed. Bernasconi, M. (Bern: Weblaw, 2014), p. 11.
 It is also possible, under specific conditions, to have anonymous witnesses, see CAS 2009/A/1920, FK Pobeda et al. v. UEFA, award of 15 April 2010, para. 72. See also ATF 6S.59/2006 of 2 November 2006, X., ATF 133 I 33.
 CAS 2015/A/4129 D. Demirev et al. IWF, award of 6 October 2015, para. 49.
 Otherwise it cannot be allowed by the Division President or the Panel, see e.g. CAS 2016/A/4708, Belarus Canoe Association & Belarusian Senior Men’s Canoe and Kayak team members v. ICF, award of 23 January 2017, para. 81.
 Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler / Antonio Rigozzi, Arbitrage international, Droit et pratique à la lumière de la LDIP, 2nd ed. (Zurich: Weblaw, 2010), n 781. See also Massimo Coccia, The Jurisprudence of the Swiss Federal Tribunal in Challenges Against CAS Awards, CAS Bulletin, 2 (2013), pp. 5-19.
 See SFT 4A_444-446/2016 (Isinbayeva & Shubenkov), Order of 8 August 2016, https://www.bger.ch/33_4a_444_2016_d.pdf.
 See also SFT 4A_470/2016 (RPC) Order of 30 August 2016, see the press release: https://www.bger.ch/fr/press-news-4a_470_2016-t.pdf).
 From a wide selection of cases see e.g. CAS 2015/A/4160 WADA v. IWF & D. Gogia, award of 17 March 2016, para. 50; see also CAS 2014/A/3734 WADA, v. V. Lukanin & IWF, award of 16 December 2014, para. 34.
 There are some International Federations that are based in another country, see also CAS 2014/A/3685, E. Sachenbacher-Stehle v. IBU, award of 4 February 2015, para. 50.
 See e.g. CAS 2016/O/4702 IAAF v. ARAF & M. Dyldin, award of 6 January 2017, para. 61 & CAS 2016/O/4504, IAAF v. ARAF & V. Mokhnev, award of 23 December 2016, where the Panels applied the IAAF ADR and Monegasque law.
 See CAS 2006/A/1025, M. Puerta v. ITF, para. 10.6-10.8, where the CAS applied Swiss law even though the ITF ADR were expressly subject to English law.
 CAS 2014/A/3604, R. Freibergs v. IOC, award of 17 December 2014, para. 80.
 See Mike Morgan (see above), p. 4. See also SFT 4A_558/2011 of 27 March 2012, at 6.1; see also ATF 134 Ill 193.
 Justification is possible by law, by the athlete’s consent or by the existence of an overriding interest. See Margareta Baddeley, Droits de la personnalité et arbitrage: le dilemme des sanctions sportives, in : Mélanges en l’honneur de Pierre Tercier, Geneva/Zurich/Basel, 2008, p. 711.
 CAS 2005/C/976 & 986, FIFA & WADA, Advisory Opinion of 21 April 2006, para. 124.
 See e.g. the provisions related to the elimination or reduction of the sanction for non-fault or negligence or for non-significant fault or negligence Article 10.5 of the 2015 WADC.
 CAS 2005/A/830, Squizzato v. FINA, award of 15 July 2005, para. 10.24.
 See CAS Advisory Opinion CAS 2005/C/976 & 986 FIFA & WADA, para. 139.
 CAS 2006/A/1025 M. Puerta v. ITF; CAS 2010/A/2268, I. v. FIA.
 CAS 2016/A/4745, RPC v. IPC, award of 30 August 2016, para. 73 ff.
 CAS 2016/A/4745, RPC v. IPC, award of 30 August 2016, para. 85 f. Also, as was confirmed in CAS OG 16/09 (RWF v. IWF), it is possible to suspend a member federation for breach of its Anti-Doping Policy and based on the “reliable information” of the IP Report.
 CAS 2016/A/4745, RPC v. IPC, award of 30 August 2016, para. 90.
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Despina is a qualified lawyer with many years of experience in international sports law and arbitration and the founder of SportLegis, a highly specialized international sports law practice based in Lausanne (Switzerland). She is an Accredited Mediator and a Fellow of the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators (FCIArb). She sits as arbitrator in international arbitrations administered by Sport Resolutions (UK) and is a member of the Doping Hearing Panel of the International Powerlifting Federation. Despina served as Managing Counsel at the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) for nine years, where she was responsible for the drafting of legal opinions, mediation proceedings, the scrutinizing of CAS awards and appeals to the Swiss Federal Tribunal.
Antonio Rigozzi is the partner in charge of the sports arbitration practice at Lévy Kaufmann-Kohler. He has extensive arbitration, litigation and dispute resolution experience across all the main areas of sports law, in a wide array of sports including football, Formula 1, sailing, athletics, ice hockey, swimming and cycling. As counsel, he represents and advises athletes, teams and sports-governing bodies before the CAS, the BAT and the Swiss courts.

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