Source: https://openjurist.org/872/f2d/612
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 22:09:51+00:00

Document:
Gus A. Saper, Michael J. Hinton, Patrice M. Barron, Houston, Tex., for defendant-appellant.
Mervyn Hamburg, Atty., Appellate Section, Crim. Div., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., Paula C. Offenhauser, Asst. U.S. Atty., Henry K. Oncken, U.S. Atty., Houston, Tex., for plaintiff-appellee.
Before RUBIN, POLITZ, and JOHNSON, Circuit Judges.
Appellant Martin David Johnson, along with Cleo Scott and James Smith, was charged by federal grand jury of seven counts of federal firearm violations pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Sec. 371 and 26 U.S.C. Sec. 5861. Additionally, Johnson was charged with solicitation to commit an act of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 373. Johnson was acquitted of all counts except for the solicitation count. He was sentenced to five years' imprisonment. He appeals from that conviction.
The scenario which unfolded at trial began approximately one year before Johnson became involved with the events forming the basis for this prosecution.1 The principal players in this drama include paid undercover informant Thomas Benton Delashaw, III, who worked undercover using the name John Michael Bennett.2 Delashaw/Bennett posed as a pilot for another key figure, FBI agent Jerry Howe, who posed as entrepreneur Jerry Gaffney. Co-indictee James Smith was an employee of Allied Offshore Marine, an establishment co-owned by appellant Johnson, a former police officer. Of these, only Johnson and Delashaw/Bennett testified at trial. However, numerous tape recorded conversations involving the other players were introduced into evidence.
Our story begins in February of 1986, when Delashaw, going by the Bennett alias, met Smith while both were incarcerated in the Harris County jail. The two men were in daily contact during their tenure in prison and they often exchanged "war stories." In the course of these discussions, Smith told Delashaw/Bennett (hereinafter Delashaw) that Smith could furnish illegal weapons upon request, and that he had a significant amount of experience with automatic weapons, rockets, and grenades. Delashaw informed the FBI of Smith's boasting in exchange for remuneration.
After his release, Delashaw worked as an informant for several federal agencies. Specifically, Delashaw told Smith (who had also been released) that he was employed as a pilot for a wealthy individual who operated a timber company in Arkansas, but who was also a drug dealer on the side. The timber operator was identified as Jerry Gaffney, the undercover identity of FBI agent Howe (hereinafter Howe).
On November 8, Smith had a phone conversation with Delashaw in which Smith discussed his access to various weapons. Over the next several months, Smith and Delashaw had over 200 conversations, the majority of which were recorded by Delashaw with equipment supplied by the FBI. In the first recorded conversation, which occurred on November 18, 1986, Smith offered to sell weapons to Delashaw's employer. For the remainder of the year, the men spoke frequently about the prospect of Smith selling various kinds of weapons, including weapons which were semi-automatic when manufactured, but which could be converted to fully automatic by Smith's associate, co-indictee Scott.
During this period, Delashaw remained in the Houston area, but Smith moved to Florida. In January of 1987, Smith told Delashaw that he had been offered a job in Morgan City, Louisiana, as a boat engineer at Allied Marine Offshore (hereinafter Allied). Johnson co-owned Allied and resided in Louisiana. Prior to Smith's relocation to Louisiana, he met with Delashaw and Howe in a motel room in St. Augustine, Florida, where Howe purchased an Uzi automatic machine gun.
In February of 1987, Smith commenced working for Allied as an engine repairman. Smith maintained contact with Delashaw and continued his attempts to obtain weapons for resale to Howe. Delashaw informed Smith that Howe had sold the timber company and had purchased an offshore marine business headquartered in Houston. On February 17, 1987, Smith told Delashaw that he, Smith, had been retained "to perform a contract" to harm someone in the Houston area. The following day, in another telephone conversation, Smith indicated that the person who had hired him was attempting to locate the apartment in which the victim resided.
Smith and Delashaw continued to discuss their gun deal. On March 4, Smith mentioned that Johnson had not yet disclosed the name of the intended victim. One week later, Delashaw repeated his offer to let Howe's men take care of the matter, but Smith indicated that he needed the money that Johnson had agreed to pay. Delashaw further testified that, in a conversation which took place on March 11, Smith told him that Johnson had enlisted the services of Smith to act as a body guard, armed with an automatic weapon, for a meeting which was to occur at sea.
On March 21, Smith informed Delashaw that the delivery of the machine guns would be postponed. Seven days later in a taped conversation, Johnson telephoned Howe to say that the mechanical operation necessary to prepare the weapons for delivery had not yet been performed. In the meantime, Johnson invited Howe and Delashaw to visit him in Morgan City, Louisiana, to look at boats. Delashaw and Howe arrived on March 31. While Johnson was giving the men a tour of Allied, they encountered Smith, who apologized for the delay in delivering the guns and explained that certain parts were still unavailable.
Johnson, testifying on his own behalf at the trial, disclaimed any knowledge that semi-automatic weapons were being illegally converted to automatic. Johnson indicated that Smith had suggested that Gaffney (Howe) was eager to make a gift of semi-automatic machine guns to his cousin. Because semi-automatic weapons could be legally purchased, Johnson decided to purchase the weapons and present them to Howe if Howe purchased a boat. Johnson testified that he did not realize that the "kits" the other men referred to were conversion kits; rather, he assumed that the machine guns had to be assembled. Johnson also testified that he began to believe that Howe was involved in organized crime, during this visit to Morgan City; he stated that he contacted Louisiana law enforcement officials to report the possibility that Howe was bringing drugs into the area. Johnson testified that his cooperation in the delivery of guns to Howe was prompted by fear for his safety and the safety of his family.
During the month of April, Smith and Delashaw were in frequent contact by telephone. The primary topic of their conversations was the machine guns which had still not yet been readied for delivery. In one conversation, Smith indicated that Johnson had left town suddenly; the men expressed concern that Johnson would attempt to undermine the gun deal by bargaining on his own. Smith informed Delashaw that they were insured against that possibility because Smith knew where Johnson's family resided and was aware of thousands of dollars worth of engines and other equipment that Johnson had stolen. Smith indicated that, if Johnson caused any problems, Johnson's family would be buried with legal problems. Delashaw encouraged Smith to itemize the stolen property so that the list could be used for insurance against double dealing.
Telephone conversations between Delashaw and Smith concerning the gun deal continued into May; occasionally they discussed the plan to harm the still unnamed victim. On May 12, Smith stated that he could not recall the victim's name, but knew that he was a firearms dealer in Houston. On May 14, Smith told Delashaw that he doubted that Johnson had sufficient funds to pay for the planned assault.
Ultimately, on June 3, Smith informed Delashaw that Johnson had identified the victim as Victor Mullen, a firearms dealer in Houston. Smith stated that Johnson had indicated that Mullen "dealt guns" and had once "informed on" Johnson. Delashaw encouraged Smith to let Howe's people take care of the matter. According to the testimony at trial, Delashaw and Howe had devised a plan to prevent the assault from actually taking place. Delashaw informed Smith that an associate named Joey, who was particularly adept with a baseball bat,4 could perform the deed. Smith warned Delashaw to use a team of men because it was believed that Mullen's apartment was full of guns. Smith indicated that Johnson wanted Mullen to receive a broken leg.
[t]hat from on or about May 6, 1987 through on or about July 10, 1987, ... MARTIN DAVID JOHNSON ... with intent, did solicit, induce and otherwise endeavor to persuade Jerry W. Howe, Special Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Tom Delashaw to engage in conduct constituting a felony that has as an element the use, attempted use or threatened use of physical force against the person and property of another in violation of the laws of the United States; that is, MARTIN DAVID JOHNSON, ... with intent, did solicit induce and otherwise endeavor to persuade Jerry W. Howe and Tom Delashaw to unlawfully take and obtain firearms from Victor James Mullen, Jr., a federally licensed firearms dealer, against his will by threats or violence, thereby interfering with commerce, to wit: robbery as proscribed by Title 18, United States Code, Section 1951.
The jury acquitted Johnson of the first seven counts, but found him guilty of the solicitation count.
Johnson raises a plethora of grounds on appeal citing to alleged error occurring at all phases of the adversary process. We have carefully examined each ground asserted by Johnson, and find no reversible error.
Prior to trial, defense counsel received an anonymous letter stating that Agent Howe had been the subject of many internal inquiries concerning his abuse of authority and misconduct. The letter further asserted that Howe was the subject of an investigation at the time that the events surrounding this investigation transpired, and that Howe was prohibited from associating with criminal informants or from conducting undercover investigations. Based on this information, defense counsel moved for the production of Howe's personnel file and the FBI guidelines governing the use of criminal informants pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963).
This motion was denied. The district court ruled that the Government was not required to produce the Guidelines. Agent Howe's file was submitted to the court for an in camera inspection. The court, after inspecting the material, held a hearing on the matter after which the court ruled that the material was not discoverable. The documents were sealed by court order.
the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.
Brady, 373 U.S. at 87-88, 83 S.Ct. at 1196-97. The rule set out in Brady is a corollary of the proposition that the Government is in the unique position of being an advocate while striving to obtain a just result. Brady 's purpose is to ensure that a miscarriage of justice does not occur, "not to displace the adversary system as the primary means by which truth is uncovered." United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 3380, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985). Balancing these two competing roles of the Government, the Supreme Court in Bagley determined that a prosecutor need not deliver his entire file to defense counsel. Such a broad right of discovery would too drastically alter the present system of criminal justice.
are not intended to, do not, and may not be relied upon to, create any rights, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by any party in any matter, civil or criminal, nor do they place any limitations on otherwise lawful investigative or litigative prerogatives of the Department of Justice.
Johnson also fails to demonstrate reversible error resulting from the nondisclosure of Agent Howe's personnel file. Johnson asserted that the material should be disclosed for impeachment purposes. Specifically, Johnson argued that he was denied the ability to inquire into Howe's truth and veracity before the jury.
... in every real sense of the word Agent Howe did take the stand. There were some 198 audio tapes, some twenty-three to twenty-five videotapes of which Agent Howe participated in, either directly or indirectly ... Most of those were played before the jury and so ... his credibility was at issue here.
Defense counsel does not argue that the material withheld was exculpatory in nature. Rather, as indicated, the defense takes the position that the evidence could be used to impeach Agent Howe and would tend to indicate that Johnson was entrapped.
Any information sought for its impeachment value can only be of impeachment use if it is admissible pursuant to the rules of evidence. Here Howe never took the stand, so his credibility was never directly called into question. However, as a declarant in a hearsay statement, evidence tending to impeach Howe's tendency for truth and veracity would be admissible. Fed.R.Evid. 806.
a constitutional error occurs ... only if the evidence is material in the sense that its suppression undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.
Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678, 105 S.Ct. at 3381.
Examined in the context of the entire record, there is nothing in the withheld information that tends to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial. Even had the contents of Howe's personnel file been revealed to the jury, we discern no reasonable probability that the result would have been different.
The district court responded properly by conducting an in camera investigation in light of the accusations set out in the anonymous letter; that inspection satisfies our overriding concern with the justice of a finding of guilt. Where the district court's inspection reveals nothing within the scope of Brady, the motion for production is properly denied. The prosecutor is not obliged to open up his files to the defendant for an open-ended fishing expedition for Brady material merely because of an anonymous letter. The district court took the course most prudent under such circumstances; no reversible error has been indicated.
Johnson argues that the district court erred in overruling Johnson's motion for acquittal or new trial based on the finding that entrapment had not been established as a matter of law. Additionally, Johnson argues that the district court abused its discretion in failing to submit Johnson's proffered jury instruction on the definition of "agent." We determine that entrapment was not established as a matter of law, and the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing the proposed defense instruction.
Entrapment is an affirmative defense designed to ensure that persons not be held criminally liable for acts which they were induced to commit, without prior predisposition to engage in such activity, by law enforcement officials. In order to be entitled to rely on a defense of entrapment, a defendant must present some evidence that Government conduct created a substantial risk that an offense would be committed by a person other than one ready to commit it. Once this prima facie showing of entrapment has been made, the burden falls on the Government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was predisposed to commit the crime, and, therefore, was not entrapped. Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 108 S.Ct. 883, 888, 99 L.Ed.2d 54 (1988), United States v. Toro, 840 F.2d 1221 (5th Cir.1988). The relevant focus is on the defendant's predisposition, intent or willingness to commit the crime prior to any contact with the Government agents rather than on the conduct of the agent. United States v. Yater, 756 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 901, 106 S.Ct. 225, 88 L.Ed.2d 226 (1985).
When a court determines that no reasonable jury could find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant was predisposed to commit the crime, then the court may determine that entrapment has been established as a matter of law. Where there is some evidence to support a finding of predisposition, the issue is properly presented to the jury. On appeal from a conviction wherein the jury has rejected the entrapment defense, the standard of review is the same as that which applies to the sufficiency of the evidence. Consequently, this Court must look to the evidence to determine whether, viewing reasonable inferences and credibility choices in the light most favorable to the Government, a reasonable jury could find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant was predisposed to commit the offense. United States v. Duvall, 846 F.2d 966 (5th Cir.1988).
In this case, a reasonable jury could find that Johnson was not entrapped. The evidence shows that neither the informant nor the Government knew Mullen prior to Johnson's initiation of the scheme to confront or do harm to Mullen. Although Johnson points to his own testimony indicating that he intended only to have Mullen scared, not harmed, this Court must look to the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government. There is significant indicia in the record that the plan was, and had always been, to harm Mullen. Johnson took an active part in the plan to harm Mullen; much of his enthusiastic support is captured on videotape. Given the presence of Johnson's "unbridled enthusiasm," United States v. Anderton, 679 F.2d 1199, 1201 (5th Cir.1982), as well as the absence of overwhelming evidence to the contrary, the district court properly rejected the claim of entrapment as a matter of law. Duvall, 846 F.2d 966.
Johnson argues that, although he may have initiated the encounter with Mullen, the initial suggestion to acquire Mullen's guns was made by the Government. Although the Government disputes this contention, the resolution of this dispute does not affect our ruling. A defendant claiming entrapment must show more than the fact that the Government first solicited him or provided the opportunity for the crime. United States v. Hill, 626 F.2d 1301 (5th Cir.1980). As the Government noted at oral argument, an opportunity was provided and Johnson jumped in with both feet. Our focus, however, is not on the creation of the opportunity to commit the crime, but on the defendant's predisposition. In this case, there is evidence indicating that Johnson had prior dealings with weapons, and that Mullen had cheated a friend of Johnson's in a gun deal. Consequently, there was evidence of predisposition both to harm and to acquire the weapons. The district court did not err in submitting the question of entrapment to the jury.
[y]ou are instructed that the term "agent" and/or "Government agent" means any person acting as a paid informant for the Government or law enforcement officers, or a person working with, for, or in behalf of the Government agents, or a private citizen who is or becomes an unknowing pawn of the Goverment.
The second version was essentially the same, although it excluded the final phrase beginning with "or a private citizen...." Defendant's Proposed Jury Instruction, Record Vol. I at 175, 177. The district court rejected the proposed instructions.
Johnson argues that the district court's refusal to utilize the defendant's proposed instruction was error. A trial court is given broad discretion to fashion jury instructions. This Court will reverse only upon a determination that the district court has abused its discretion; here no such abuse of discretion has been shown.
Where a person has no previous intent or purpose to violate the law but is induced or persuaded by law enforcement officers or their agents, such as, for example, a paid informant, to commit a crime, he is a victim of entrapment and the law as matter of policy forbids his conviction in such a case.
On the other hand, where a person already has the readiness and willingness to break the law, the mere fact that the government agents provided what appeared to be a favorable opportunity is not entrapment. For example, it is not entrapment for a government agent to pretend to be someone else and to offer either directly or through an informer or other decoy to engage in an unlawful transaction.
If then the jury should find beyond a reasonable doubt from the evidence in the case that before anything at all occurred respecting the alleged offense involved in this case the Defendant was ready and willing to commit a crime such as those charged in the indictment whenever opportunity was afforded and that the government officers or their agents, such as [a] paid informant, did no more than offer the opportunity, then the jury should find that the Defendant is not a victim of entrapment.
On the other hand, if the evidence in the case should leave you with a reasonable doubt whether the Defendant had the previous intent or purpose to commit an offense of the character charged, apart from the indictment (sic) [inducement] or persuasion of some officer or agent of the government, then it is your duty to find him not guilty.
Record Vol. 27; Record Vol. 1 at 31-32.
Johnson correctly points out that this Court has held that the Government may entrap a defendant through the actions of an ignorant pawn. Johnson, however, is incorrect in his assertion that the district court's failure to submit the ignorant pawn/agent instruction to the jury is reversible error. When a defendant properly requests an instruction on a theory of defense that is supported by some evidence, it is reversible error not to adequately present the theory. Here, the theory of defense was entrapment; an instruction on such a defense was presented to the jury. Our review is confined to a determination as to whether the instruction as a whole accurately reflects the law. United States v. Magee, 821 F.2d 234 (5th Cir.1987). The instruction did so; the court spoke of "a paid informant" as an example of an agent, but in no way limited the jury from considering Smith an agent of the Government. Furthermore, although the jury posed several questions during deliberations, including a request for the definition of "inducement," the jury never expressed any confusion as to whether Smith could be considered an agent of the Government. The instruction submitted to the jury was not an improper statement of the law; no reversible error has been shown.
Johnson also objected to the admission of certain statements by Smith which were admitted as nonhearsay statements of a co-conspirator. Specifically, Johnson objects to statements made by Smith which include assertions that he, Smith, once killed a girl in New Orleans while testing a gun, that Smith knew about working letter bombs, that Smith was stealing boat parts at Johnson's request, and that Johnson had blown up a boat. The district court admitted the statements pursuant to Rule 801(d)(2)(E) after making the required findings, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a conspiracy existed as to the solicitation of harm to Mullen and the robbery of Mullen's guns, that Johnson and the declarant (Smith) were members of that conspiracy, and that the statement was made in the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy.
Johnson argues that the statements were improperly admitted because they have nothing to do with advancing the objectives of a conspiracy to get guns by harming Mullen. Pursuant to Rule 801(d)(2)(E), only those statements which were made in furtherance of the conspiracy are admissible as nonhearsay. This Court has indicated that the term "in furtherance" should be broadly construed. United States v. James, 510 F.2d 546 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Vasquez v. United States, 423 U.S. 855, 96 S.Ct. 105, 46 L.Ed.2d 81 (1975). For example, we have indicated that statements which are puffing or boasts, but which are used to obtain the confidence of the person toward whom the statement is directed, are properly considered to be statements in furtherance of the conspiracy. United States v. McGuire, 608 F.2d 1028 (5th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 910, 100 S.Ct. 1838, 64 L.Ed.2d 262 (1980).
In this case, the statements made by Smith concerning himself indicate his prowess with weapons and his ruthless nature. Since Johnson hired Smith to make the hit on Mullen, these kind of statements which tend to indicate the presence of qualities necessary for a hit man, were admissible as boasts made in furtherance of the conspiracy. The statements by Smith regarding Johnson were also admissible as tending to show intent to solicit harm on another. We cannot hold, in light of the above enumerated grounds for admissibility, that the district court committed reversible error by admitting the evidence as statements of a co-conspirator.
Our concern is not with the admission of the statements pursuant to the "other purpose" language of Rule 404(b). Rather, the only potential ground for remand which we discern arising from the admission of these statements would result from the district court's failure to make an on-the-record finding that the probative value of this evidence outweighs the prejudicial effect.12 We have examined this issue carefully, and for the reasons set forth below, we conclude that no error has been shown.
Johnson argues that the district court committed numerous errors in its treatment of this extrinsic evidence. As Johnson correctly notes in his brief to this Court, any proferred extrinsic evidence must first be determined to be relevant to an issue other than the defendant's character, and its probative value must outweigh its prejudicial impact. United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 911 (5th Cir.1978) (en banc), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 920, 99 S.Ct. 1244, 59 L.Ed.2d 472 (1979).
Within the scope of the relevancy determination, the district court must make a finding that the event in fact occurred. Beechum at 913. Johnson notes that no independent proof that he committed the alleged acts was introduced. He argues that the jury could not find that the acts occurred, and therefore the ultimate preliminary question of relevance should never have been reached.
No "independent proof" was necessary. Whether appellant committed the alleged offenses was a question of fact for the jury; it was to be resolved against the Government only where the jury could not have found the preliminary fact to exist. The testimony of the single witness who related the conversations and confirmed the accuracy of the tapes was sufficient for the jury to find that the conduct occurred. United States v. Punch, 722 F.2d 146, 152 (5th Cir.1983); United States v. Mortazavi, 702 F.2d 526 (5th Cir.1983). Further, to the extent that the extrinsic acts were contained in statements uttered by appellant himself, their admissibility was virtually automatic as admissions by a party opponent. Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(A). Appellant depicted himself as a nonviolent individual who had no intent to physically harm Victor Mullen. He also denied conspiring to transfer weapons, the dangerous propensity of which had been unlawfully heightened by a conversion to automatic firing capability. Appellant's boasts to the effect that he once had Smith destroy a Corvette automobile belonging to someone who owed appellant money, and similar comments involving violence, were relevant to the issues of intent, knowledge, plan and the like whether or not appellant actually had caused the destruction of the vehicle. See United States v. Walker, 710 F.2d 1062, 1067 (5th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1005, 104 S.Ct. 995, 79 L.Ed.2d 229 (1984).
Having determined that the evidence has successfully transcended the relevancy hurdle, we turn now to the district court's failure to make an on-the-record finding that the probative value of the evidence outweighed the prejudicial effect. This Court indicated in United States v. Robinson, 700 F.2d 205 (5th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1008, 104 S.Ct. 1003, 79 L.Ed.2d 235 (1984), that the trial judge's assessment pursuant to Rule 403 that the probative value of the evidence outweighs the prejudicial effect should be on the record. However, absent a specific request by counsel that such an on-the-record finding be made, the trial court's failure to do so does not automatically warrant a remand. United States v. Merkt, 794 F.2d 950, 963 (5th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 946, 107 S.Ct. 1603, 94 L.Ed.2d 789 (1987). Counsel did not contemporaneously press the matter of an on-the-record finding, consequently, no remand for this purpose is mandated.
Our inquiry therefore turns to whether the district court abused its discretion by admitting the extrinsic offense evidence. No abuse of discretion has been demonstrated. A trial judge is armed with wide discretion in determining relevancy and admissibility in such cases. In this case, the judge felt that any prejudice to the defendant, Johnson, was outweighed by the probative value. We cannot say that this determination was error.
During cross-examination of Johnson, the Government's attorney displayed a baseball bat in violation of a prior court admonishment. Johnson's counsel immediately moved for a mistrial, which the district court overruled. Johnson now argues that such a ruling was error, that a mistrial should have been granted because of the highly inflammatory nature of the display, and, because the prosecution goaded defense counsel into requesting a mistrial, that double jeopardy prevents the retrial of appellant Johnson. See Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 102 S.Ct.2083, 72 L.Ed.2d 416 (1982).
Although we agree that the prosecutor should not have displayed the baseball bat, we cannot conclude that such action constituted "prosecutorial overreaching" so as to warrant a mistrial. Prosecutorial overreaching occurs when the Government, through either gross negligence or deliberate misconduct, causes aggravating circumstances to develop which seriously prejudices a defendant to the extent that a continuation of the proceeding would result in a conviction. Kennedy, 102 S.Ct. 2083.
Prosecutor: ... I have not decided to use a baseball bat as demonstrative evidence, but may I ask the Court.
The Court: Let's talk about it before you bring it in.
Prosecutor: Well, it's over here hidden, but I just wanted to ask.
It's a Louisville Slugger and has not been marked.
Record Vol. 19 at 50.
Prosecutor: Your Honor, at this time we respectfully move for a mistrial. That was strictly calculated.
The Court: Whatever. It's not on the record.
Defense counsel: Mr. Woodward [the prosecutor] went over behind the podium that was behind the column there and picked up a baseball bat and starting swinging it and showed it and displayed it to the jury.
The Court: I am not sure he swung it. He lifted it up and he went over and placed it on the table, in view of the jury, at the time you got up and objected.
Record Vol. 25 at 17.
The court then dismissed the jury and a brief hearing was held. Thereafter, the court overruled the motion for mistrial. The court did not err in making this determination. The display of the bat on the table was not accompanied by the histrionics implied by the defense. Furthermore, the bat itself was not highly inflammatory, especially in light of the numerous machine guns that had already been displayed before the jury. This is not a situation where the jury viewed a photograph of the victim of a baseball bat assault. Rather, the bat was nothing more than a common item of which the jury members had already formed a mental picture. While we cannot condone the actions of the prosecutor, neither can we determine that his error in judgment requires reversal of Johnson's conviction.13 The court admonished the jury on their return to disregard the display and to give it no consideration whatsoever. Our theory of jurisprudence rests on the jury's ability to follow instructions. See Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84, 95, 75 S.Ct. 158, 99 L.Ed. 101 (1954). We assume the jury in this case did so.
Our final concern in this case is the cumulative effect of the background evidence of arms-dealing between Delashaw and Smith, combined with the display of the baseball bat. At oral argument, defense counsel suggested that the background evidence, which was introduced to clarify the sequence of events for the jury, was really introduced as a subtle tactic to slander Johnson. Having examined the record, we cannot say that the background information, even combined with the unauthorized display of the baseball bat, unduly prejudiced Johnson.
This was a factually complex case. The evidence introduced was essential to the jury's understanding of the two conspiracies: (1) to acquire and convert weapons to fully automatic capability; and (2) to injure Mullen and steal his guns. The jury was limited to considering the pre-February 17 evidence as background only. As noted above, we presume the jury followed such admonishment. Especially in light of the jury's acquittal of Johnson on the first seven counts, there is nothing in the record to indicate that the jury improperly considered the background evidence.
Johnson appealed to this Court on numerous grounds. We have reviewed the record in this case, and considered each ground on appeal. Those grounds worthy of discussion are discussed above. We conclude that reversible error has not been demonstrated; Johnson's conviction is affirmed.
Johnson testified that Smith was following him and had threatened his family. He stated that concern for his well-being prompted his cooperation in the Mullen matter.
With regard to the plan to harm Mullen, Johnson admitted making statements which could be construed as encouraging harm. However, Johnson stated that he only wanted to scare Mullen. Nevertheless, he acknowledged statements, captured on tape, to the effect that Mullen was an "easy mark," that Johnson liked using an out of town "hit man," that he wanted Mullen injured "for organized crime figures in New Orleans," and that he wanted the Rolex stolen. Johnson denied initiating the plan to steal Mullen's guns. Johnson argues that, after four months of enduring threats, he finally said that Joey should break Mullen's legs, tie his head in a toilet, and steal Mullen's guns. Despite Johnson's assertion that he finally succumbed to the threats of violence, and despite his status as a former police officer, Johnson admitted that he never reported to law enforcement officials that he feared for his life.

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