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Timestamp: 2019-04-22 19:27:22+00:00

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BACKUS v. FORT ST. UNION DEPOT CO.
'It is further ordered that within sixty days from the date of this order the Fort Street Union Depot Company is required to tender and pay to Absalom Backus, Jr., the sum of seventeen [169 U.S. 557, 563] thousand eight hundred and fifty dollars, and to A. Backus, Jr. & Sons the sum of seventy-eight thousand two hundred and ninety-three dollars, and to James N. Dean and William H. Davidson, executors, the sum of one dollar, together with their costs and expenses, if the same have been taxed, including an attorney fee of twenty-five dollars; and if the said parties or either of them refuse to accept the tender and payment of said sums, the Fort Street Union Depot Company is required to deposit the same, under the supervision of the clerk of this court, in the Detroit National Bank and to the credit of this cause, including said costs and expenses: provided, that, if said costs and expenses have not been taxed within the said sixty days, the same to be so deposited within five days after they are taxed.
'Said money shall remain on deposit in said bank, but at the risk of the petitioner, subject to be drawn therefrom, and to be paid to the parties entitled to the same, on orders signed by one of the judges of this court and countersigned by the clerk.
On December 2, 1891, the depot company appealed from the award of the jury, and from the confirmation thereof, to the supreme court of the state. On January 26, 1892, the depot company paid to the respondents, and they received, the amounts awarded to them, n d thereupon the depot company took full possession of the property, constructed its tracks, and has been ever since in possession and use of them. [169 U.S. 557, 564] On March 3, 1892, the appeal was argued in the supreme court, and on June 10, 1892, its decision was announced. 92 Mich. 33, 52 N. W. 790. It was held by a majority of the court (the chief justice dissenting) that the opinion expressed on the granting of the mandamus had too narrrowly restricted the powers of the circuit court, and it was ordered that the verdict of the jury, while confirmed so far as it determined the question of necessity, should be vacated and set aside so far as it awarded compensation, and that the cause be remanded to the circuit court, with directions to proceed with a new appraisal, the costs of the appeal to abide the event of such appraisal.
It was also held that the fact that the amount of the award and confirmation had been paid to the respondents, and the property taken possession of by the depot company, since the taking of the appeal, did not affect the right of the depot company to a new trial upon the question of compensation.
When the case was returned to the circuit court the respondents objected to any further proceedings, but the same was overruled, and a jury impaneled. The sessions of this jury were presided over by the circuit judge, and, after hearing the testimony and examining the property, it returned a verdict, assessing the damages of the individual respondent at the sum of $15,000, and of the corporation respondent at the sum of $48, 000. Thereupon, on motion of the depot company, and on December 28, 1893, the circuit court entered a judgment against the individual respondent for $ 2,850, the difference between the amount of the first and second awards, and a like judgment against the corporation respondent for $30,293, and also a judgment against both respondents for the costs of the appeal and subsequent proceedings, taxed at $4,168.20. On the 26th of June, 1894, the respondents filed their petition in the supreme court of the state of Michigan, praying for a writ of certiorari. The writ was allowed, whereby the entire record was transferred to that court, which, in an opinion filed on January 8, 1895, affirmed the proceedings below, with costs. 103 Mich. 556, 61 N. W. 787. Whereupon the plaintiffs below sued out this writ of error. [169 U.S. 557, 565] Don M. Dickinson, for plaintiff in error.
Fred. A. Baker, for defendants in error.
While in cases of this kind coming from the supreme court of a state, questions of fact passed upon in the state courts are not here open to review (Egan v. Hart, 165 U.S. 188 , 17 Sup. Ct. 300, and [169 U.S. 557, 566] cases cited in the opinion) it may not be inappropriate to notice that the award of compensation as finally sustained gave to the respondents the sum of $63,000. As the valuation they placed upon the plant, outside of the realty, was only $150,000, and of the realty the like sum of $150,000, though the realty cost in 1871 less than $30,000, and as none of the ground upon which the plant stood and the business was carried on was taken by the depot company, but only the use of the street in front thereof, and that not so as to exclude them from its use, it is obvious that the award, whether adequate or not, was not one in reckless disregard of their rights.
'(1) They were denied the fundamental right to have an ascertainment and determination of the amount of compensation and its final payment before being deprived of their property.
'(2) They were denied the protection of that guaranty of the state constitution providing that the questions of compensation and necessity should be passed upon by one and the same jury, and of the settled, uniform, and unreversed construction of the constitution to that effect by the state judiciary in respect of all other citizens.
'(3) They were denied the protection of a trial on the questions of necessity and compensation by the tribunal [169 U.S. 557, 567] guarantied by the constitution of the state, in accordance with the settled, uniform, and unreversed construction of that constitution in respect of all other citizens.
'(4) They were denied that measure of just compensation for their property taken, guarantied by the constitutions, federal and state, as the same was and is accorded to all other persons than themselves.
'(5) They were denied a hearing and deprived of a hearing guarantied by the constitutions, federal and state, as 'due process of law,' when summoned into court as appellees to defend their property, rights, and themselves from imputations upon them.
'(6) Finally, having been deprived of their property sought by the railroad company for its purposes, their personal assets of the value of one hundred and ten thousand ($110,000) dollars were taken from them under the color of a judgment and process unknown to the constitution and statutes of Michigan, and unknown to jurisprudence, whereby they were deprived of their property without 'due process of law."
Attention is called to the fact that while upon the return of the first verdict the respondents moved to confirm it, which motion was denied by the circuit court, and the verdict set aside, yet after the decision of the supreme court awarding the writ of mandamus they did not renew that motion; that the petitioner alone asked for confirmation, though, as expressly stated, for the purpose of taking an appeal to the supreme court; that, after the order of confirmation had be n entered, it paid the amount of the award to the respondents, which sum was accepted by them; and that thereupon it took possession of the property, and has since continued in undisturbed possession and use. It is insisted that such payment and taking possession created under the constitution and statutes of Michigan a finality so far as the depot company was concerned, and that to this effect had been the repeated adjudications of the supreme court of the state. The argument is that the property owner has a constitutional right to have the amount of his compensation finally determined and [169 U.S. 557, 568] paid before yielding possession; that the party seeking condemnation (in this case the depot company) cannot be let into possession until after all question as to the compensation has been finally settled, and the amount thereof paid; that it cannot take advantage of one report or verdict, pay the sum fixed by it, obtain possession, and still litigate the question of amount; that, if it does then pay and take possession, its right to further litigate is ended. But the supreme court of the state held against this contention, and we must assume therefrom that it is not warranted by the constitution and statutes of the state. Indeed, the language of that constitution is, 'made or secured.' Does this amount to a denial of the right to that protection to property which is guarantied by the fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution? In other words, is it beyond the power of a state to authorize in condemnation cases the taking of possession prior to the final determination of the amount of compensation and payment thereof? This question is fully answered by the opinions of this court in Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kan. Ry. Co., 135 U.S. 641 , 10 Sup. Ct. 965, and Sweet v. Rechel, 159 U.S. 380 , 16 Sup. Ct. 43. There can be no doubt that, if adequate provision for compensation is made, authority may be granted for taking possession, pending inquiry as to the amount which must be paid and before any final determination thereof.
Neither can it be said that there is any fundamental right secured by the constitution of the United States to have the questions of compensation and necessity both passed upon by one and the same jury. In many states the question of necessity is never submitted to the jury which passes upon the question of compensation. It is either settled affirmatively by the legislature, or left to the judgment of the corporation invested with the right to take property by condemnation. The question of necessity is not one of a judicial character, but rather one for determination by the lawmaking branch of the government. Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403 , 406; U. S. v. Jones, 109 U.S. 513 , 3 Sup. Ct. 346; Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kan. Ry. Co., supra.
Neither was there anything in the proceedings actually had [169 U.S. 557, 569] before the last jury and in the circuit court which conflicts with any mandate of the federal constitution. Counsel say that the respondents were entitled to a trial by a jury of inquest, but were forced to trial before a common-law jury, presided over and controlled by the circuit judge. But the constitution of the United States does not forbid a trial of the question of the amount of compensation before an ordinary common-law jury, or require, on the other hand, that it must be before such a jury. It is within the power of the state to provide that the amount shall be determined in the first instance by commissioners, subject to an appeal to the courts for trial in the ordinary way; or it may provide that the question shall be settled by a sheriff's jury, as it was constituted at common law, without the presence of a trial judge. These are questions of procedure which do not enter into or form the basis of fundamental right. All that is essential is that in some appropriate way, before some properly constituted tribunal, inquiry shall be made as to the amount of compensation, and, when this has been provided, there is that due process f law which is required by the federal constitution. Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548, 593 , 17 S. Sup. Ct. 966. These considerations dispose of all the objections embraced in the first three contentions of counsel, so far as those objections run to the validity of the proceedings actually had, providing those proceedings were warranted by the constitution and statutes of the state.
But it is insisted that those proceedings were not so warranted; that the settled, uniform, and unreversed construction thereof by the supreme court of the state theretofore forbade them, and hence there was a discrimination against the respondents, and they were denied that equal protection of the laws which the federal constitution guaranties. Thus, for instance, it is insisted that the previous rulings of the courts, both trial and supreme, had been to the effect that a jury called under these condemnation statutes was a jury of inquest, and not a trial jury, whereas, in this case, the ruling was practically to the contrary, and the respondents were compelled to submit their rights to a trial jury, subject to the control of [169 U.S. 557, 570] the presiding judge, as in ordinary common-law cases. We deem it unnecessary to review the many authorities from the supreme court of Michigan cited by counsel, or determine whether the ruling in this case as to methods of procedure and the true construction of the statute is or is not in harmony with prior decisions of that court. Accepting the contention of counsel, that in this case the supreme court of the state has put a different construction on the state statutes from that theretofore given, and has sustained modes of procedure different from those which had previously obtained, still it does not follow that this court has a right to interfere, and say that the present ruling is erroneous, and the prior construction correct, or that the change of construction works a denial of any fundamental rights. There is no vested right in a mode of procedure. Each succeeding legislature may establish a different one, providing, only, that in each is preserved the essential elements of protection. The fact that one construction has been placed upon a statute by the highest court of the state does not make that construction beyond change. Suppose it were true, in the fullest sense of counsel's contention, that for a series of years the courts had ruled that the jury in condemnation cases was a jury of inquest, or in the nature of a sheriff's jury,-one determining for itself all matters of law and fact,- and that in this case, for the first time, they held otherwise, and that such jury was a commonlaw jury, subject to be controlled by the presiding judge, whose duty it was to determine all questions of law; and still, whatever might be thought of the propriety of such a change of construction, there is in it nothing to justify this court in reversing the judgment of the state court, and denying the correctness or validity of this last ruling. We fail to see why the presence of the judge with this jury, his assumption of power to control its proceedings, his instructions to it on questions of law, necessarily vitiated the proceedings. Grant that such a course had never been taken before; grant that it had never been held to be a proper proceeding; grant that it was unexpected by counsel,-and yet, if the judge's rulings and instructions were in themselves correct, and the propriety of [169 U.S. 557, 571] his presence and control be held by the supreme court of the state warranted by the statutes, we do not perceive that any right possessed under the constitution of the United States has been violated.
The question is not presented of a distinct ruling by a state court that one party is entitled to certain rights and the benefits of certain modes of procedure, and that another party similarly situated is not entitled to them. An act of the legislature which in terms gave to one individual certain rights, and denied to another similarly situated the same rights, might be challenged n the ground of unjust discrimination and a denial of the equal protection of the laws. But that does not prevent a legislature, which has established a certain rule of procedure, and continued it in force for years, from subsequently repealing the act, and establishing an entirely different mode of procedure. In other words, there is no absolute right vested in the individual as against the power of the legislature to change modes of procedure. And a similar thought controls where the courts of the state have construed a statute as prescribing one form of procedure, and parties have acted under that construction, and then subsequently the same court has held that the statute was theretofore misconstrued, and really provided a different mode of procedure. This last adjudication cannot be set aside in the federal courts on the ground of an unjust discrimination or a denial of the equal protection of the laws.
We, of course, do not mean to affirm that there has been by the supreme court of the state such a change of adjudication. We simply in this respect accept the contention of counsel for the respondents, and hold that, even if the facts be as claimed by him, they furnish no ground for interference by this court. It should be noticed, in passing, however, that nearly all, if not absolutely all, of the cases which he cites from the supreme court of Michigan arose under the provisions respecting condemnation in the general railroad act, while these proceedings were had under the union depot act, and, although the two acts may be substantially similar, yet this adjudication is under a different statute from that [169 U.S. 557, 572] under which most, if not all, of the prior decisions were made.
'Court: A question which arises in my mind is this: There is no question but what the Backuses are entitled to full compensation for such damages as they may suffer; but does not the other rule also attach, and that is, that the jury are not in any way to consider any speculative damages or any probable damages?
'Mr. Dickinson: They can only consider the damages which are actually shown, but the other rule follows, may it please your honor, that they are not to estimate those damages for a year, or estimate the present injury done by the railroad, but they must assume that the railroad is running to its maximum capacity, that it has other railroads, that it may double, treble, or quadruple its trains, so far as that is concerned, and they must estimate the damage for the future time, not for a year, or three years, or five years, or ten years.
And this was all which was said in reference to the measure of compensation. Now, it is insisted by counsel that the profits which the manufacturing plant was making were to be taken into consideration by the jury in awarding compensation, inasmuch as the business of that plant was seriously interrupted, if not practically destroyed, by this condemnation; that, inasmuch as the query was suggested by the judge during the argument whether profits did not come within the rule as to speculative damages, the failure to charge distinctly that they were proper subjects of consideration was equivalent to an instruction that they were not to be considered, and that, therefore, the true rule of compensation was not given to the jury.
It is evident that the judge did not attempt to define the several elements which enter into the general fact of compensation, or the various matters to be considered by the jury. He simply charged generally that, as this was an arbitrary taking of the property of the respondents, they were entitled to full compensation, and left to the jury the duty of determining what should be such compensation, telling them plainly that they were vested with large powers and great discretion. If it be said that the judge had intimated by his query that the matter of profits came within the rule applicable to speculative damages, it must also be noticed that, further on, he suggested that the profitableness of a business was to be taken into consideration in estimating the value. It is true he nowhere instructed the jury to make the profits of the business the criterio of value, nor, indeed, would he have been justified in so doing. The profitableness of the business was undoubtedly a matter to be considered, and so the judge fairly intimated in [169 U.S. 557, 575] these prior colloquies. But the profits of a business are not destroyed unless the business is not only there stopped, but also one which in its nature cannot be carried on elsewhere. If it can be transferred to a new place, and there prosecuted successfully, then the total profits are not appropriated, and the injury is that which flows from the change of location.
But beyond this no special instructions were asked by the respondents at the time of the giving of the charge. The statute (section 3466) provides that the judge 'may attend said jury, to decide questions of law.' So far as he gave instructions, it is obvious that he stated that which was the law, and the real objection is that he did not go further, and enter into a more minute description of the elements which were to be taken into consideration by the jury in fixing the amount of compensation; that they may, from the colloquies which had taken place during the arguments, have drawn improper inferences as to the limit to which they were warranted in going; and that those inferences he failed to correct by specifically stating what matters they should consider. A sufficient answer is that the respondents did not ask any further instructions. All they did was to except to what had been stated. By wellsettled rules no appellate court would under such circumstances be required to set aside the judgment of the trial court. Shutte v. Thompson, 15 Wall. 151, 164; Insurance Co. v. Snyder, 93 U.S. 393 ; Railway Co. v. Volk, 151 U.S. 73 , 14 Sup. Ct. 239; Isaacs v. U. S. 159 U.S. 487 , 16 Sup. Ct. 51.
But a more complete and satisfactory answer is that whatever error there may have been affords no ground for the interference of this court. The respondents were not thereby deprived of any rights secured by the federal constitution. They were not denied 'due process of law.' The proceedings were had before a duly-constituted tribunal, in accordance with the declared law of the state, with full opportunity to be heard. Nor were they denied 'the equal protection of the laws.' The rule as to the necessity of asking special instructions was administered in this case no differently than in others. Marchant v. Railroad Co., 153 U.S. 380 , 14 Sup. Ct. 894. [169 U.S. 557, 576] The error, if any there be, was not one 'in absolute disregard of their right to just compensation,' but was only error in the administration of the law under which those proceedings were instituted. As clearly pointed out in Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. City of Chicago, supra, it is not every error occurring in a state court in the administration of its law concerning condemnation of private property for public purposes that opens the door to review by this court. We are not called upon to search the record simply to inquire whether there may or may not have been errors in the proceedings. Our limit of interference is reached when it appears that no fundamental rights have been disregarded by the state tribunals.
With reference to the first, it is enough to say that the respondents did not appeal to the supreme court, and that under section 3468 it would seem that that court was called upon to consider only such objections as had been particularly specified. 'Either party may appeal, by o tice in writing.' 'Such notice shall specify the objections.' 'The supreme court shall pass on such objections only, and all other objections, if any, shall be deemed to have been waived.' No objection to the finding of the jury as to the question of necessity had been made by the appellant, and therefore was to be treated as waived. Under those circumstances it cannot be said that the supreme court deprived the respondents of any rights by refusing to hear counsel in respect to the question of necessity or connected with its determination.
With regard to the second, technically, the decision on the mandamus proceeding and that on the appeal did not conflict. [169 U.S. 557, 577] The writ of mandamus directed the circuit judge to set aside the order which he had entered vacating the award. It thus in effect declared that that judge ought not to have made such an order. On the appeal the supreme court itself ordered that the award be set aside, and a new jury impaneled, and remanded it to the circuit court for such new appraisal. This is within the letter of the statute (section 3468): 'On the hearing of such appeal, the court may direct a new appraisal before the same or new commissioners or jury, in its discretion.' The decision by the supreme court, that it had power to set aside the verdict and order a new appraisal, was not a reversal of a ruling that the circuit court had no such power, although it may suggest consequences somewhat singular. Appreciating that fact, in the last opinion the court declared that in the former decision its language restricting the power of the circuit court had been too strong.
Coming, now, to the last point, the supreme court held that, as upon the second appraisal the damages were less than those awarded on the first, and the amount of the first had been paid to the respondents, the petitioner was entitled to a judgment for the difference. The language of the statute (section 3468) is: 'But if the amount is diminished, the difference shall be refunded to the company by the party to whom the same may have been paid, and judgments therefor and for all costs of the appeal shall be rendered against the party so appealing.' It may be that this language is not entirely apt, for in this case the party appealing was not the landowner, but the depot company, and so it cannot be said that judgments were rendered against 'the party appealing.' But the true intent of the statute is obvious, and at any rate we are bound to accept the construction placed upon it by the supreme court, and hold that it means that if the last appraisal was less than the first, and the amount of the first had been paid, the company was entitled to recover the difference from the party to whom it had been paid. Nothing is said, it is true, in the statute about execution, but the supreme court ruled that under the general statutes the recovery of the judgment carried with it a right to an execution. [169 U.S. 557, 578] These are all the questions in this case. We find nothing in them which justifies an interference by this court with the proceedings of the state courts,-nothing in which it can be said that any ruling of those courts was in absolute disregard of the respondents' right to compensation. The judgment must, therefore, be affirmed.
Before proceeding with his argument to the jury, Mr. Dickinson, the attorney for the plaintiffs in error, called the attention of the trial court to some of the principles which, in his judgment, should control the ascertainment of the just compensation to which they were entitled. Addressing the court in the presence of the jury, he said: 'Now, as to what is compensation, I refer your honor to the case of Grand Rapids & I. R. Co. v. Heisel, 47 Mich. 398, 11 N. W. 215: 'It need hardly be said that nothing can be fairly termed compensation which does not put the party injured in as good a condition as he would have been if the injury had not occurred. Nothing short of this is adequate compensation. In the case of land actually taken, it includes its value, or the amount to which the value of the property from which it is taken is depreciated, and in Jubb v. Dock Co., 9 Q. B. 443, it was held, where the property taken was a brewery in [169 U.S. 557, 579] operation, the damages included the necessary loss in finding another place of business. In cases where damage is by injury aside from the actual taking of property, the rule has been to make the party whole as nearly as practicable, and where it affected the rental value or enjoyment the same principle has been applied as in other cases. There is no reason, and, so far as we can discover, no law, which allows the wrongdoer to cast any portion of an actual and appreciable loss on the party whom he injures . [In this case the same rule of damages would apply as in the Grand Rapids & I. R. Co. Case, and the suit was brought for damages, and the question was what was compensation.] In such a case as this, it is in the power of the company, and always has been, to have the compensation settled once for all, and to get any benefit which the law attaches to such a method of ascertainment. Until this is done the possession is a continual wrong."
The views expressed by counsel for the plaintiffs in error as to the principles which should guide the jury in the matter of compensation were sustained by the authorities. In addition to the cases in 47 and 70 Mich., above referred to, reference may be made to many others decided by the supreme court of Michigan.
See, also, Railroad Co. v. Chesebro, 74 Mich. 466, 42 N. W. 69, where the court said: 'An owner has a right to be indemnified for anything that he may have lost. The farming test, which is the one petitioner sought to apply, would be of no particular use in a great many cases of suburban lands. ... The mere taking of four acres for a right of way could not be regarded, in any sensible point of view, as compensated by one-tenth of the value of the forty acres, taking acre for acre. [169 U.S. 557, 585] The damages in such a case must be such as to fully make good all that results, directly or indirectly, to the injury of the owners in the whole premises and interests affected, and not merely the strip taken.' Further: 'The jury here, as in all cases where no certain measure exists, must trust somewhat to their own judgment. That is one of the purposes for which juries of inquest are provided. They are expected to view the premises and use their own senses. ... But the purpose throughout is to give all the damages which they reasonably discover, past or present, and to result, but no more. No one can read this record without seeing that the jury did not deal fully with the case. It is manifest that they gave no damages beyond what they assumed to be the price of four acres by the acre. ... It cannot be said there is any real conflict as to the damages arising from the cutting off one part from the other of the forty acres, and this was left out altogether, unless they regarded the proofs of value wantonly, which we cannot believe.' See, also, Pearsall v. Supervisors, 74 Mich. 561, 42 N. W. 77; Barnes v. Railway Co., 65 Mich. 251, 32 N. W. 426; Grand Rapids v. Grand Rapids & I. R. Co., 58 Mich. 641, 648, 26 N. W. 159; Toledo, A. A. & N. M. Ry. Co. v. Detroit, L. & N. R. Co., 62 Mich. 564, 29 N. W. 500; Commissioners of Parks & Boulevards of City of Detroit v. Chicago, D. & C. G. T. J. R. Co., 91 Mich. 291, 51 N. W. 934; Commissioners of Parks & Boulevards of City of Detroi v. Michigan Cent. R. Co., 90 Mich. 385, 51 N. W. 447; City of Grand Rapids v. Bennett, 106 Mich. 529, 64 N. W. 585.

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