Source: https://www.utrechtjournal.org/articles/10.5334/ujiel.460/
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 10:56:18+00:00

Document:
The past decades have seen enormous growth in the agrochemical industry. Its pesticides and fertilisers promise to farmers worldwide an increase in yields and a decrease in labour input. The expansion of the pesticides industry results in tremendous costs to others – in the form of chronic illness, acute injuries, and environmental degradation. Such costs are borne disproportionately by farm and plantation workers in the Global South due to a perilous combination of weak regulation, lack of training and access to information, and meager resources for protective equipment. Agrochemical companies continue to claim that their products are safe when used correctly by farmers and regulated effectively by the state. Advocates have attempted to use litigation as a recourse for challenging the agrochemical industry. Civil litigation against pesticides manufacturers can directly address the injuries suffered from pesticide poisoning, but such lawsuits face a number of challenges and all too often leave workers and farmers without access to an effective remedy. This article explores the potential of complementary litigation which challenges the harmful sales practices of pesticide companies, as well as the precautionary principle, as an alternative to protect pesticide users against hazards.
Agrochemical companies continue to claim that their products are safe when used correctly by farmers and regulated effectively by the state. Relying on this assumption of safe use, companies continue to export highly toxic chemicals that have been banned elsewhere, and often fail to adequately label chemicals.
The present article addresses both public and civil litigation challenging (the risk of) personal injury to pesticides users and their communities. On the one hand, personal injury may occur as a result of pesticides being marketed in violation of existing safety regulations. On the other hand, personal injury can be seen even where a manufacturing company has fulfilled regulatory requirements. Health damages in the latter case provide increasing evidence of the dangerous reliance on the myth of “safe use”. According to the theory of safe use, pesticides may be applied by farmers and plantation workers without any health risks when applicants follow the prescribed precautionary measures (see Section III below). Market approval is frequently based on this assumption, whereas in reality pesticide sprayers often fail to implement the precautionary measures, a situation well known to regulatory authorities and companies alike. Frequently, those applying pesticides do not even have access to personal protective equipment. While health damages have thus turned into a foreseeable risk, the distribution of pesticides continues to be based on this assumption of “safe use”.
Using past and pending cases as points of reference, this article highlights the harmful practices of the agrochemical industry and considers potential litigation avenues for challenging the status quo, in particular negative health impacts on users and communities. In order to better assess the limitations and chances of litigation, this article proposes distinguishing between civil personal injury litigation and public litigation on sales practices. In the examples, the article draws heavily on the research and litigation experience of the authors in their collaboration with partners in India. The conclusions are based on personal experience, written accounts of pesticides litigation as well as jurisprudence from Argentina, the United States, France, Germany, Spain, the UK, and India. This article sums up the challenges of personal injury litigation and explores the potential of litigation which challenges the harmful sales practices of pesticide companies as a complementary approach to address negative impacts on the human right to health. As an illustration of such sales practices, the article addresses the labelling and export of pesticides. In addition, the article explores the potential of the precautionary principle to challenge the continued reliance on the “safe use” standard. Section II provides a brief background of the health risks associated with the use of pesticides and the global players that are at the helm of the agrochemical business. Section III explores the concept of safe use that underpins the actions of these global players and points out that the assumption of safe use is much closer to myth than reality. Section IV reviews instances of personal injury litigation and the challenges and hurdles faced by claimants. Section V outlines the potential of pesticide litigation to challenge the double standards applied by pesticide companies to business practices in their home countries versus the Global South, including examples of legal challenges to pesticide registration and labeling. Finally, Section VI discusses the potential of the precautionary principle in litigation.
The stakeholders’ concerns are not unwarranted. Consolidation on this scale means less competition, which may decrease incentives for research and development both within the larger companies and by smaller independent companies, which would find it nearly impossible to get a foothold within the industry.28 Less research and development in the industry generally could in turn lead to a decreased likelihood of investment in safer alternatives to currently manufactured products. The elimination of competition will also make it much easier for agrochemical companies to fix prices and influence the consumption rates of various products.29 If businesses decide to raise prices for either seeds or pesticides, farmers may be forced to cut costs in other areas, such as outlays for safety equipment or other labour-related costs.
Finally, mega-consolidation leads to a greater concentration of economic and political power in the hands of chemical companies. The agro-giants will have even more resources for lobbying legislatures, registration of pesticides and battling litigants. Extreme market consolidation also decreases the efficacy and availability of investor and consumer advocacy tools such as strategic divestment.
Another factor complicating the idea of “safe use” that underlies current pesticide approvals is the inconsistent and incomplete testing of agrochemicals. Pesticide companies and regulatory authorities rely on inadequate safety testing of the chemicals contained in pesticides. Pesticides may have different effects depending on the characteristics of the environments in which they are applied, or if they are combined with other pesticides. Testing related to the effects of cumulative exposure to multiple pesticides, as well as the specific effects of pesticide exposure on children, is severely lacking.39 Generally, the testing of pesticides is quite limited, but even more so in the Global South where research, resources, and training are scarce.40 These considerations coalesce, transforming the concept of “safe use” into a patent myth.
In order to seek legal redress for the harms caused by the pesticides industry, those affected have turned to litigation. Such cases against pesticides manufacturers have the potential to provide claimants with compensation for their injuries, but also face a number of shortcomings and challenges. Jurisprudential research in a number of countries (UK, Argentina, India, United States, Germany, France, and Spain) yielded only a small number of cases in which those affected by pesticides poisoning filed a lawsuit against the manufacturer.41 Two cases – the DBCP and Lasso cases – are useful in illustrating the potential of, and the obstacles involved in injuries-based litigation.
An initial hurdle is that the law requires a plaintiff to show that a particular pesticide was responsible for the injury alleged. Showing this is exceptionally difficult in the context of pesticides-related injuries: unlike an injury such as asbestosis, which has a unique, scientifically-proven causal link to a hazardous product, pesticide-related injuries, like cancer or kidney disease, may generally be caused by many different factors. In addition, most pesticide users spray multiple pesticides over the course of many years. While proving causation is not an impossible feat, it is therefore difficult scientifically, absent exceptional circumstances. In addition, where strict liability does not apply, claimants also have to prove fault on the part of the defendant company. Strict liability overcomes this problem by assuming fault on the part of the manufacturer where dangerous goods are concerned or deficient products are marketed and covered by product liability legislation. In the case of pesticides, however, some jurisdictions (e.g. the Philippines) largely exclude pesticides from the product liability regime.42 Therefore, causation and fault are among the major stumbling blocks for personal injury litigation due to pesticide poisonings.
The Lasso case in France is one example in which exceptional circumstances were present– allowing the plaintiff to overcome the hurdle of proving causation – primarily because the injury occurred as the result of a single accident involving one single pesticide. In 2004, a French farmer named Paul François inadvertently inhaled the Monsanto pesticide, Lasso, after accidentally spraying himself in the face. He immediately lost consciousness and continued to experience serious neurological symptoms such as memory loss and vertigo.43 Attorneys for Mr. François asked the court to find Monsanto liable for his injuries because it failed to inform the consumer about the risks of inhaling the inactive ingredient monochlorobenzene in Lasso. Since Francois was unaware of the high volatility and danger of monchlorobenzene he could and did not take the necessary precautions.44 Lawyers for Monsanto insisted that there did not exist a sufficient causal link, yet the courts of first and second instance accepted that Lasso was the cause of the injury and held that Monsanto was indeed responsible for François’ poisoning.45 By virtue of a July 2017 order of the next appeal instance, the Cour de Cassation refered the case back to the lower court on the grounds that it did not sufficiently take into account product liability law.46 This order in fact quashes the prior decision and necessitates a reappraisal of both the question of inadequate labelling (i.e. fault) and causation.47 The case is still pending and the outcome uncertain.
The accident involving a single pesticide thus formed the context in which François was able to prove causation. More commonly, pesticide-related injuries are the result of prolonged exposure. Such was the case in the long-running DBCP case against pesticides manufacturer Dow Chemical and others (Dole, Shell, Chiquita, and Occidental Chemical) for the sterilisation of plantation workers in Central America. In the late 1970s, it was discovered that employees at a U.S. plant where the chemical dibromochloropropane (DBCP) was produced were becoming sterile as a result of their exposure to the chemical. DBCP was immediately banned in the U.S., but companies continued to export it to Africa, Ecuador, and the Philippines throughout the early and mid-80s where it was used by workers in banana plantations.48 In the 1980s workers began to file suits in both Nicaragua and the United States, alleging that the chemical had caused them to become sterile and seeking remuneration. Though the agriculture workers suffered from a number of different diseases that may have been caused by their exposure to pesticides, attorneys for the plaintiffs decided to strategically focus on the sterility issue because it is a rare condition to find, especially in such high concentration and the connection between the pesticide and sterility had been previously established. That strategy proved successful: courts in both the United States and Nicaragua found that the pesticide was responsible for the plaintiffs’ injuries.49 Due to the focus on sterility, the lawyers were thus able to meet the evidentiary standard to prove causation.
While the DBCP lawsuit initially constituted a legal victory, the companies sought to discredit the plaintiffs by accusing their attorneys of participating in fraud, colluding with members of the Nicaraguan justice system, and bribing witnesses. Years later, a hard sought multi-million dollar jury award in favour of the plaintiffs was vacated in 2011 and the Eleventh Circuit subsequently refused to enforce a judgment awarded to the workers in Nicaraguan court.50 Although this case is a useful example of the potential for litigating such cases, it is also illustrative of the real challenges of litigating directly against powerful companies.
As to proving fault, in the Lasso case, fault by Monsanto could be shown by the lack of appropriate information and warnings about the inactive ingredient on the label. Furthermore, in the DBCP case the health risks were known to the defendant companies who nevertheless continued to market their product without informing the agricultural workers, leading the lower court to award damages. Thus, claimaints will not easily receive compensation if the marketing complies with existing regulations or a public acknowledgement of the relationship between substance and health damage is lacking. This puts those users at a severe disadvantage who due to climatic conditions, lack of financial resources or sheer availability are not able to wear protective equipment.
Another legal challenge in such cases is the statute of limitations, which may make it difficult for claimants and their lawyers to prepare a case within the limited time available. People with pesticide-related illnesses may not exhibit symptoms or realise their illnesses until long after the exposure to pesticides occurred. In many countries, the clock starts ticking on the statute of limitations time-period once a person discovers the harm. Limitation periods for a tort claim are often very short, generally ranging between one and five years.53 If an injured person does not bring a suit within that time period, their claim and ability to receive compensation will be barred.
Other practical hurdles similarly impede many users from initiating civil litigation. While the pesticide users in the DBCP and Lasso cases were willing to initiate litigation, a significant hurdle to injuries-based litigation is actually that pesticide users who have been injured may not be willing to participate in a process that could put their job or personal security at risk. Non-unionised plantation workers, or farmers who work in areas in which the chemical companies have a particularly influential presence may find that it is not in their best interest to be associated with legal action. Such reluctance is often based on real experiences in which workers are intimidated into remaining silent about the abusive conditions they endure.54 Potential plaintiffs may also have suffered so greatly from their injuries that they are not physically or mentally capable of participating in a suit.
The number of cases on behalf of workers and farmers suffering from pesticide poisoning is completely disproportionate to the number of poisonings. Often, due to the myriad challenges mentioned above, the injured are left without access to a remedy. To address the widespread harm caused by pesticides, advocates have taken different legal routes, which are worthy of examination. The next section explores the potential of litigation that confronts the double standards in pesticide sale and distribution as an alternative legal avenue to protect pesticides users.
If injury-based litigation is not feasible, litigation focused on the inadequate sales practices of agrochemical companies is another way to seek enhanced protection against the harm caused by pesticide use. Inadequate sales practices include misleading advertising, lack of training and protective clothing, or the lack of health warnings and user instructions on the label. An example of litigation concerning misleading advertising is a 1996 complaint with the Consumer Frauds and Protection Bureau in New York. The claim successfully established that Monsanto’s advertisement of Glyphosate falsely described the pesticide as ‘less toxic to rats than table salt following acute oral ingestion’.55 It is vital that such litigation shows how and why sales practices are inadequate. This can be done through reference to the scientific assessment of the regulatory authorities as was done in the New York complaint. In the event that such research is absent or otherwise unavailable, the inadequacy of sales practices can be established by comparing the disparate standards of the distribution and use of pesticides in the Global North and South.
There is a multi-tiered systematic failure with respect to pesticide safety. The first issue is that poisonous chemicals that have been banned in the home countries of the European agrochemical companies are exported to, or manufactured by, subsidiaries in countries in the Global South, such as India.56 To ensure that importing governments are at all times informed about the restriction and banning decisions of other governments, the Rotterdam Convention implements a system to facilitate information exchange systems and “Prior Informed Consent” (PIC) for the import of a number of listed pesticides.57 Yet, states maintain the freedom to decide whether such information warrants the prohibition of import, and the PIC obligation only exists for the limited number of pesticides that were agreed to put on the list. For example, despite lobbying by civil society groups, Paraquat has not been listed as a substance covered for the PIC procedure under the Convention.
Since a number of Northern states have now prohibited certain hazardous pesticides that are still used in many countries of the Global South, the Rotterdam system has not led to a harmonisation of pesticide distribution. For example, while the registration of the pesticide Paraquat has not been renewed in the EU, it is easily available in India, where it is not even limited to “professional use”. In the EU, if a pesticide is approved only for professional use, pesticide users are required to obtain a certificate, which can only be obtained after specific training, the parameters of which are stipulated in detail in the relevant EU Directive.58 This system makes the functioning of the EU pesticide market enormously different from that in India, where – in the personal experience of the authors – anyone can enter a store in the small villages in Punjab and purchase highly hazardous pesticides. The Indian Insecticides Act (1968) and Insecticides Rules (1971) lack such licensing system for users.59 The double standard for export and registration is worsened by the double standards applied with respect to the labeling of chemicals: the labels on pesticides distributed in the Global South often lack key safety information or legible warnings. Finally, as already elaborated in earlier sections, there are considerable differences in the availability and use of protective equipment, as well as training, and disposal practices. In a variety of legal proceedings, advocates have challenged such registration and labeling practices on the basis of these double standards.
‘The provisions of this Regulation are underpinned by the precautionary principle in order to ensure that active substances or products placed on the market do not adversely affect human or animal health or the environment. In particular, Member States shall not be prevented from applying the precautionary principle where there is scientific uncertainty as to the risks with regard to human or animal health or the environment posed by the plant protection products to be authorised in their territory’.
Indian activists attempted to intervene in the proceedings with a PIL, arguing that no independent experts were present at the relevant meetings, but the claim was prevented from proceeding until after the Committee’s final decision was issued.81 Of the 66 pesticides under review, 47 were approved by the Expert Committee. Undeterred, Indian activists submitted another PIL petition in June 2016. The petition requested the cancellation of the registration of the remaining 47 pesticides and also asked for changes with respect to the Expert Committee, such as the inclusion of independent experts in the proceedings and the addition of public hearings to be held around the country before a registration decision is made.82 The PIL states that given the reality of how these pesticides are actually used, (e.g., without appropriate protective equipment, lack of proper disposal, etc.) banning the most dangerous pesticides in India is even more critical. The petition was supported by data showing all banning decisions and restrictions in the European Union and the United States. This litigation – still pending – challenges company sales practices, while avoiding the evidentiary challenge to prove causation between a pesticide and an injury in a specific case. It draws on the double standards of sales practices in different countries.
Two cases against Bayer in the German and Indian courts provide instructive examples of how the deficiencies in agrochemical labelling practice may be challenged through litigation. In October 2016, a complaint was submitted to the Chamber of Agriculture in North-Rhine Westphalia in Germany against Bayer for breaching the German Plant Protection Act by failing to ensure that warnings on the toxic pesticide Nativo 75 WG were included after export on the product bottles in India. When sold in the EU, the pesticide obligatorily includes a warning that it is ‘suspected of damaging the unborn child’ and when sold in India, the product contains no such warning.
Under the German pesticides law, pesticides may only be exported if the container is accompanied by instructions for use, including information about the potential negative impacts on human and animal health or the environment.85 Indian customers were likewise uninformed about the necessary protective equipment for skin and eyes. The German pesticides law requires that the UN Code of Conduct on the Distribution and Use of Pesticides is taken into account when exporting pesticides. According to the Code, pesticide exporting countries have to ensure that good trading practices are followed in the export of pesticides, especially with countries that have not yet established adequate regulatory schemes.86 Besides imposing a fine, the German plant protection service has the authority to take measures to prevent or end violations of the law. It could thus, for example, prohibit the export of Nativo as long as the product was not sold in India with an adequate warning.
This prohibition would serve to comply with Germany’s responsibilities under the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, a set of guidelines for States and companies to prevent, address and remedy human rights abuses committed in business operations. These principles do not create new international law obligations but elaborate on the implications of existing standards and practices for States and business and were endorsed by the Human Rights Council in June 2011.87 According to Principle 25, States are required to implement effective remedies to those affected by human rights abuse.88 This includes the adoption of appropriate administrative or legislative means, such as, in the above case, the prohibition to export Nativo.
The lack of adequate labelling of the Nativo pesticide not only potentially violated the German Plant Protection Act, but also Indian standards. In India, a petition was submitted to the Secretary of Agriculture alleging that Bayer and its subsidiary in India, Bayer CropScience Limited, violated the Insecticides Act ‘by failing to exercise due diligence to ensure that the hazardous characteristics of the Nativo product are communicated according to the regulatory regime in India’.89 Failure to provide necessary warnings constitutes the criminal offense of misbranding under the Indian Insecticides Act. Both suits thus appeal to their respective domestic legal frameworks in order to challenge the misbranding of Nativo and call attention to the potentially hazardous effects this omission has on the people of India.
There is a potential risk that litigating extensively on pesticides labelling practices will give the impression that proper labeling will lead to safe use. While proper labels are vitally important and “good labeling practice” must be adhered to cohesively, no matter where a company’s products are exported, good labels are not enough. Even the most thorough, understandable and complete label will not protect people who are affected indirectly by pesticide application or farmers who are unable to afford or effectively use PPE. It is, therefore, insufficient to focus solely on amending and enforcing proper labelling requirements for pesticides. Such efforts should not be abandoned, but must be part of a greater legal challenge to the myth of safe use. In the following section, therefore, litigation on the basis of the precautionary principle is proposed as a way to provide a more appropriate remedy.
By focusing on risk prevention, the precautionary principle emphasises the prevention of harm to people and the environment where scientific or technical uncertainty impedes the risk assessment, thus making it more difficult to prove causation. Unlike critiques levelled against the potentially overbroad use of the precautionary principle in the regulatory arena,105 introducing the precautionary principle in civil law litigation serves a specific goal. It aims to re-establish equality of arms where affected individuals lack the capacity to prove a causal link between their health damages and pesticide exposure or the negligent behaviour of the defendant company. Urruchua v. Arata reflects this point, where the court required appropriate precautionary measures by the employer. The same standard could apply to manufacturing companies who market hazardous pesticides by obliging them to ensure that appropriate precautionary measures are adopted by the end-user. Appropriate warnings on labels and leaflets are but one element to satisfy this responsibility.
This article thus argues that the problematic use practices employed by Indian farmers, for example, are foreseeable and should obligatorily play a role in business decisions about bringing a pesticide on the market. Based on company-wide incident reporting foreseen in corporate codes of conduct,106 and a fulfilment of the general due diligence responsibility to screen their business activities for potential human rights impacts,107 frequent “inadequate” use is no myth to companies. The precautionary principle would – in civil litigation – require plaintiffs to only show that the pesticides company has or should have been aware of the general non-adherence to recommended safety standards and consequently should have adopted the appropriate measures to guarantee safe use by e.g. organising available, adequate and affordable stock of personal protective equipment in the vicinity of end-users. Alternatively, companies should refrain from selling their products if they cannot ensure such safe use. Finally, the lack of appropriate testing methods related to the specific effects on children, women, and in cumulative effects with other chemicals in the environment should lead to a presumption of causation for the company to rebut. This means, in sum, if the use conditions in the real world deviate from the isolated environment of a testing laboratory, there is a reversal of the burden of proof regarding causation between the pesticide and the injury. In the same vein, the UN Special Rapporteurs on the right to food and on harzardous substances have recommended in a recent report to place strict liability on pesticides producers, which, in essence, relies on the same argument.108 Thus far, though, proceedings on the basis of the precautionary principle have not sufficiently addressed the responsibility of the pesticide manufacturers.
This article recommends that the practical insecurity of the use of pesticides on the ground and the widespread non-adherence to the standards of safe use are sufficiently taken into account. As long as business sales practices are predicated on the myth of safe use, personal injuries of farmers, plantation workers and their communities remain foreseeable for the time to come.
Acute and chronic injury, lack of safety and deep-seated inequity are endemic to the pesticides industry. Despite the severe illness and environmental degradation that the proliferation of toxic agrochemicals has caused, the global market continues apace, with multinational corporations reaping the benefits at the expense of agricultural workers in the Global South. In an effort to hold agrochemical companies responsible for unjust practices that violate statutory and human rights, advocates have turned to injury-based litigation, challenges to the double standards in market approval, exposing deficient labelling practices and the precautionary principle. Each of these avenues is integral to disrupting the status quo and each is accompanied by a unique set of challenges. Litigators should not shy away from cases in which those being injured failed to adhere to standards of “safe use”. The myth of safe use should be challenged. This can be done by pointing out that such uses (and subsequent health damages) are entirely foreseeable.
1Meriel Watts, ‘Replacing Chemicals with Biology: Phasing out Highly Hazardous Pesticides With Agroecology’ PAN International (2015) <https://www.panna.org/sites/default/files/Phasing-Out-HHPs-with-Agroecology.pdf> accessed 10 August 2018.
2Shawkat Alam, Sumudu Atapattu, Carmen G. Gonzalez, and Jona Razzaque (eds), International Environmental Law and the Global South (CUP 2015).
4Cavigliano Peralta, Viviana y otros c/Munipalidad de San Jorge y otros, s/amparo, Juzgado de Primera Instancia de D Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Distrito en lo Civil, Comercial y Laboral de San Jorge del 10 de junio de 2009, Sala II de la Cámara en lo Civil y Comercial de la ciudad de Santa Fe del 9 de diciembre de 2009, Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Distrito en lo Civil, Comercial y Laboral de San Jorge del 21 de febrero de 2011 y nuevamente de la segunda instancia interviniente el 19 de abril de 2012 con aclaratoria del 16 de junio de 2012.
5North Coast Rivers Alliance, et al. v. California Department of Food and Agriculture, Case No. 34-2015-80002005, Superior Court of California, County of Sacramento, Judgment of 8 January 2018.
6Pollinator Stewardship Council et al, v. US Environmental Protection Agency, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, No. 13-72346, Opinion of 10 September 2015.
8<https://www.justicepesticides.org/en/juridic-cases/?_sfm_case_nature=Civil%20court> accessed 29 August 2018.
9United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation, Code of Conduct on Pesticides Management (2013), art 2.
10‘Pesticides and Health Hazards: Facts and Figures’ (PAN Germany 2012) 5, citing M.C.R. Alavanja, J.A. Hoppin, F. Kamel, ‘Health Effects of Chronic Pesticide Exposure – Cancer and Neurotoxicity’ (2004) 25 Annual Review of Public Health 155–197.
11UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food (Effects of Pesticides on the Right to Food) (2017) A/HRC/34/48.
12ibid. This figure does not take into account the deaths resulting from purposeful ingestion of pesticides, a common method for committing suicide in the global south. Paula Barrios, ‘The Rotterdam Convention on Hazardous Chemicals: A Meaningful Step Toward Environmental Protection?’ (2003–2004) 16 Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 679.
14UN Human Rights Council (n 11) Barrios (n 13).
15PAN Asia and the Pacific and Tenaganita, ‘Poisoned and Silenced A Study of Pesticide Poisoning in the Plantations’ (2002) <https://www.publiceye.ch/fileadmin/files/documents/Syngenta/Poisoned-and-Silenced.pdf> accessed 10 August 2018.
16UN Human Rights Council (n 11) paras. 19 et seq.
17UNDP, ‘Chemicals and Gender’ UNDP Environment and Energy Group (2011) <http://www.undp.org/content/dam/aplaws/publication/en/publications/environment-energy/www-ee-library/chemicals-management/chemicals-and-gender/2011%20Chemical&Gender.pdf> accessed 10 August 2018.
18ibid. PAN UK, ‘Impacts of Pesticides on Women and Children’ (2017) <http://www.pan-uk.org/effects-pesticides-women-children/> accessed 10 August 2018; World Health Organization, ‘Summary of Principles for Evaluating Health Risks in Children Associated with Exposure to Chemicals’ (2011).
21New Media Advocacy Project, ‘Inadequate Pesticide Management in Punjab — Farmers Testify’ (2015) <https://vimeo.com/155547660/101153a8c1> accessed 10 August 2018.
22The estimate was done for the year 2014. European Commission, Case M.7962 ChemChina/Syngenta, Merger Procedure, Article 8 (2) Regulation (EC) 139/2004 (5 April 2017) paras 21–23.
23ibid. paras 29 and 32.
24Quan Le, ‘Impact of Agrochemical Mega Mergers on Developing Countries’ GMX Consulting (2017) <https://www.gmxconsulting.co.uk/single-post/2017/03/30/Impact-of-agrochemical-mega-mergers-on-developing-countries> accessed 10 August 2018.
25‘Africa: Agribusiness Giants on Merger Path’ AllAfrica (20 February 2017) <http://allafrica.com/stories/201702270838.html> accessed 10 August 2018; Jennifer Clapp, ‘Monsanto, Dow, Syngenta: Rush for Mega-mergers Puts Food Security at Risk’ The Guardian (5 May 2016) <https://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/2016/may/05/monsanto-dow-syngenta-rush-for-mega-mergers-puts-food-security-at-risk> accessed 11 August 2018.
26As of 5 April 2017, both the EU and US antitrust authorities approved the acquisition of the Swiss company, Syngenta, by the Chinese company, ChemChina. In March 2018 the EU commission also cleared Bayer’s acquisition of Monsanto albeit with a number of conditions pertaining mainly to diverstiture in monopoly sensitive business activities. <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-2282_en.htm> The merger of Dow and Dupont has was completed in September 2017 with the creation of DowDuPont holding company.
28See e.g., Sanjay Sanghoee, ‘Mega-mergers are Killing Innovation’ TIME (6 June 2014) <http://time.com/2837184/mega-merger-innovation/> accessed 11 August 2018; Diana Moss, ‘Mergers, Acquisition and Agricultural Biotechnology: Putting the Squeeze on Growers and Consumers?’ Truth on the Market (30 March 2017) <https://truthonthemarket.com/2017/03/31/mergers-innovation-and-agricultural-biotechnology/> accessed 11 August 2018.
29Diana Moss, Testimony before the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, 20 September 2016.
30See, e.g., Letter from Bayer to the FAO re: Ad Hoc Monitoring Report, 13 January 2016, document on file with the authors.
31CropLife ‘Guidelines for the Safe and Effective Use of Crop Protection Products’ (2006) <https://croplife.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf_files/Guidelines-for-the-safe-and-effective-use-of-crop-protection-products.pdf> accessed 11 August 2018.
32See Christos Damalas, Muhammad Khan, ‘Farmers’ Attitudes Towards Pesticides Labels: implications for Personal and Environmental Safety’ (2016) 62(4) International Journal of Pest Management 319 – 325; ‘New Media Advocacy Project 2015 (n 21); ECCHR, ‘Ad Hoc Monitoring Report Submitted to the FAO/WHO’ <https://www.ecchr.eu/en/business-and-human-rights/agro-industry/fao-who-complaint.html> accessed 11 August 2018.
34Article 3.5 of the Code of Conduct on the Distribution and Use of Pesticides.
35Mohammad Fareed, Manoj Kumar Pathak, Vipin Bihari, Ritul Kamal, Anup Kumar Srivastava, Chandrasekharan Nair Kesavachandran, ‘Adverse Respiratory Health and Hematological Alterations Among Agricultural Workers Occupationally Exposed to Organophosphate Pesticides: A Cross-Sectional Study in North India’ (2013) 8(8) PLOS ONE <http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0069755> accessed 11 August 2018.
38John Atkin and Klaus Leisinger, Safe and Effective Use of Crop Protection Products in Developing Countries (OUP 2000).
39Meriel Watts, Poisoning Our Future: Children and Pesticides, (Pesticides Action Network Asia & the Pacific 2013) 3, 106.
41Summaries of the unearthed legal cases on file with the authors. Also a collection of litigation on <www.justicepesticides.org> shows that only a very small number of cases is filed by or on behalf of those affected by pesticides poisoning against manufacturers.
42According to the Consumer Act of the Philippines, pesticides are by definition not considered as hazardous good and unlike drugs and cosmetics are also not separately treated in the Act. Article 4 (ak) (2) The Consumer Act Philippines, Republic Act No. 7394, April 13, 1992.
43‘Monsanto jugé responsable de l’intoxication d’un agriculteur francais’ Le Monde (13 February 2012) <https://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2012/02/13/monsanto-juge-responsable-de-l-intoxication-d-un-agriculteur-francais_1642727_3224.html> accessed 11 August 2018.
44See judgments: Tribunal de Grande Instance de Lyon, Quatrième Chambre, R.GNº07/07363, Numéro 2012/144, Jugement du 13 Février 2012, page 2; Cour d’appel de Lyon, 10 September 2015, Nº 12/02717.
45See judgments: Tribunal de Grande Instance de Lyon, Quatrième Chambre, R.G Nº 07/07363, Numéro 2012/144, Jugement du 13 Février 2012, page 2; Courd’appel de Lyon, 10 September 2015, Nº 12/02717.
46See judgment No. 284 of 7 July 2017 (15-25.651) – Court of Cassation – Mixed Chamber – ECLI: EN: CCASS: 2017.
47Judgment No. 284 of 7 July 2017, note 47.
48Diana J. Schemo, ‘U.S. Pesticide Kills Foreign Fruit Pickers’ Hopes’ New York Times (1995) <http://www.nytimes.com/1995/12/06/world/us-pesticide-kills-foreign-fruit-pickers-hopes.html?pagewanted=all> accessed 11 August 2018.
49Tellez v. Dole Food Co., No. BC312852, 2008 WL 744052 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. Cnty. Mar. 7, 2008) (trial order); for the Nicaraguan cases see Paul Santoyo, ‘Bananas of Wrath: How Nicaragua May Have Dealt Forum Non Conveniens a Fatal Blow Removing the Doctrine as an Obstacle to Achieving Corporate Accountability’ (2005) 27(3) Houston Journal of International Law 703, 729–733.
50Coram Vobis Ruling, Tellez v. Dole Food Co., 2008 WL 744052 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 11, 2011).
51UN Human Rights Council (n 11) para. 9.
52Personal conversations of the authors with plantation workers in the Philippines and farmers in India (September 2014, March 2015, June 2016).
53For example, most states in the United States have a two-year limitation. See e.g., § 735 ILCS 5/13-202; Cal. Code Civ. Proc., § 340.8; in India the limitation period for tort based litigation is even shorter and actions expire in one year, Limitation Act, Schedule, Part. VII – suits relating to tort, No. 72.
54See ‘Indonesia: Government Must Investigate Wilmar Labour Practices as Company Attempts to Cover up Abuse Claims’ (Amnesty International 2017) <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/03/indonesia-government-must-investigate-wilmar/> accessed 11 August 2018.
55Attorney General of the State of New York. Consumer Frauds and Protection Bureau. Environmental Protection Bureau. 1996. In the matter of Monsanto Company, respondent. Assurance of discontinuance pursuant to executive law §63(15). New York, NY.
56Marcelo Firpo Porto, Bruno Milanez, Wagner Lopes Soares & Armando Meyer, ‘Double Standards and the International Trade of Pesticides: The Brazilian Case’ (2010) 16(1) International Journal of Occupational and Environmental Health 24–35; Danny Hakim, ‘This Pesticide is Prohibited in Britain. Why is it Still Being Exported? The New York Times (20 December 2016) <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/20/business/paraquat-weed-killer-pesticide.html> accessed 11 August 2018.
57‘The Convention covers pesticides and industrial chemicals that have been banned or severely restricted for health or environmental reasons by Parties and which have been notified by Parties for inclusion in the PIC procedure’. <http://www.pic.int/TheConvention/Overview/tabid/1044/language/en-US/Default.aspx> accessed 11 August 2018.
58Directive 2009/128 ordered Member States to set up certification systems for professional users of pesticides.
59Insecticides Act [46 of 1968, Dt. 2–9–1968]; Insecticides Rules 1971.
60Report of the Special Rapporteur on Hazardous Substances, Baskut Tuncak, UN Human Rights Council, A/HRC/33/41/Add.2 (2016).
61‘International Code of Conduct on the Distribution and Use of Pesticides, Guidelines for the Registration of Pesticides’ FAO (2010).
62Erika Rosenthal, ‘The Tragedy of Tauccamarca: a Human Rights Perspective on the Pesticide Poisoning Deaths of 4 Children in the Peruvian Andes’ (2003) 9(1) International Journal of Occupational and Environmental Health 53–58.
63UN Human Rights Council (n 11) para 10.
66The initial proceedings: Expediente No. 2001-29561-0-0100-j-cl-7, Séptimo Juzgado Especializado de Lima; for further developments in the case until it stalled: Red de Acciónen Agricultura Alternativa (RAAA) Peru, Caso Tauccamarca – Ayuda Memoria (August 2011).
67Dileep Kumar, Paraquat Dichloride Retailing in India: A Case Study from West Bengal (PAN India 2017) <http://www.pan-india.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/Paraquat-retainiling-in-India_PAN-India-04.2017.pdf> accessed 12 August 2018.
68Firpo Porto (n 56) 28–32.
69See interim decision: order of August 28, 2015 in the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi, W.P. (C) 8207/2015 & CM No. 17208/2015.
70Case T-229/04, Kingdom of Sweden v. Commission of the European Communities, Judgment of the Court of First Instance (11 July 2007) ECLI:EU:T:2007:217.
71Richard Isenring, Adverse Health Effects Caused by Paraquat – A Bibliography of Documented Evidence (Public Eye 2017) 3 <https://www.publiceye.ch/fileadmin/files/documents/Syngenta/Paraquat/PE_Paraquat_2-17_def.pdf> accessed 12 August 2018.
72John Madeley, Paraquat – Syngenta’s Controversial Herbicide (Public Eye 2002) <https://www.publiceye.ch/fileadmin/files/documents/Syngenta/Paraquat/2002_Paraquat_Syngentas_Controversial_Herbicide.pdf> accessed 12 August 2018.
73A. M. Sabzghabaee, N. Eizadi-Mood, K. Montazeri, A. Yaraghi, M. Golabi, ‘Fatality in Paraquat Poisoning’ (2010) 51(6) Singapore Medican Journal 496–500.
74United States Environmental Protection Agency, ‘Paraquat Dichloride: One Sip Can Kill’ <https://www.epa.gov/pesticide-worker-safety/paraquat-dichloride-one-sip-can-kill> accessed 12 August 2018.
76Kingdom of Sweden v. Commission of the European Communities (n 70).
77In addition to India, Britain also exports Paraquat to Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Indonesia, and South Africa, among other countries; Hakim (n 56).
78EC Regulation No. 304/2003, Information required for exports contained in Annex III.
79Section 5 Insecticides Act [46 of 1968, Dt. 2–9–1968].
80See the list by the CIBRC: source of import and list of indigenous manufactuerers of insecticides update on 31 December 2017; minutes of 362nd Special Meeting of the Registration Committee held on 22 Decembe 2015 <http://cibrc.nic.in/rcpage.htm> accessed 12 August 2018.
81See order of 28 August 2015 in the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi, W.P. (C) 8207/2015 & CM No. 17208/2015.
82Order of 22 August 2017 at High Court of Delhi at New Delhi, W.P. (C) 2091/2017.
83PAN India (n 67); New Media Advocacy Project (n 21).
84World Health Organization, ‘Guidelines on the Prevention of Toxic Exposures’ (2004) <www.who.int/ipcs/features/prevention_guidelines.pdf> accessed 12 August 2018.
85§25 (2), German Plant Protection Law.
87Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, ‘Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, John Ruggie’ UN Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (21 March 2011) para 14; endorsed by the Human Rights Council in its resolution 17/4 of 16 June 2011.
89Revision Petition Under Sec. 11 of Insecticide Act, 1968 to the Central Government, submitted by Swadeshi Andolan, Annexure B, para 1.
90See (n 45). The court in the French Lasso case cited article 1245-3 of the French civil code in finding that ‘a product that has a lack of information as to the precautions necessary for its use is defective’.
91Steve Davies, ‘Syngenta to Pay $1.2 M for Selling Misbranded Pesticides’ AgriPulse (16 September 2016) <http://www.agri-pulse.com/Syngenta-to-pay-for-selling-misbranded-pesticides-09162016.asp> accessed 12 August 2018; ‘EPA Requires Syngenta to Label Pesticides Accurately’ EPA (8 May 2014) <http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/8b770facf5edf6f185257359003fb69e/a1bd726f96e6963985257cd2006308b0!OpenDocument> accessed 12 August 2018.
92According to Art. 3 (k) (iii) in conjunction with Art. 29 (1) (a) second alternative, 29 (1) (i) Indian Insecticides Act (1968), misbranding of a pesticide by omitting a warning or caution on its label which may be necessary and sufficient to prevent risk to human beings shall be punishable with imprisonment of maximum two years or a fine.
93According to § 25 (1) 1 in conjunction with §68 (1) No. 19, §68 (3) of the German Plant Protection Law the violation of the conditions for the export of a pesticide can be sanctioned with a fine of up to 10.000€.
94UN Human Rights Committee, ‘Concluding Observations on the Sixth Periodic Report of Germany’ (2012) adopted by the Committee at its 106th Session, 15 October to 2 November, CCPR/C/DEU/CO/6.
95Letter of the Chamber of Agriculture in response to the complaint (7 November 2016) on file with authors.
96See e.g. Article 1(3) EU Regulation on the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH).
97Amrit Dhillon, ‘Childhoods Lost: Disabilities and Seizures Blight India’s Endosulfan Victims’ The Guardian (15 February 2017) <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2017/feb/15/childhoods-lost-disabilities-seizures-blight-india-kerala-endosulfan-victims> accessed 12 August 2018.
98High Court of Kerala, Thiruvamkulam Nature Lovers Movement v. Plantation Corporation of Kerala (2002), O.P. Nos. 20716/2002, 17026/2002, 16300/2002 & 29371 of 2001 para 6–10.
99Stockholm Convention Clearing House, ‘History of the Negotiations of the Stockholm Convention’ (2008) <http://chm.pops.int/TheConvention/Overview/History/Overview/tabid/3549/Default.aspx> accessed 12 August 2018.
100Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (adopted on 22 May 2001, entry into force 17 May 2004) <http://www.pops.int/TheConvention/Overview/TextoftheConvention/tabid/2232/Default.aspx> accessed 12 August 2018; art. 8 (9).
101See Peralta v. San Jorge I y II (2009, 2011, 2012), Chamber of Appeals in Civil and Commercial Affairs of Santa Fe and District Court of the District of Santa Fe in Civil, Commercial and Labor Affairs.
102Bruce Pardy, ‘Applying the Precautionary Principle to Private Persons: Should it Affect Civil and Criminal Liability?’ (2002) 43(1) Les Cahiers de droit 63–78.
103Urruchua Clara, Beatriz (for herself and in representation of her children Ignacio R. and Francisco V Osterrieth) v. Arata, Domingo and others, civil action (21 August 2013) National Chamber of Appeals in Labor Affairs.
105Sunstein warns against the use of the precautionary principle in the regulatory arena: Cass R. Sunstein, ‘Beyond the Precautionary Principle’ (2003) The Law School of the University of Chicago, Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper No. 38.
106See e.g. Principle 11 Product Stewardship Policy of Bayer AG <http://www.bayercentral.com.au/resources/uploads/brochure/file9163.pdf> accessed 12 August 2018.
107UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (n 87) Principle 17.
108UN Human Rights Council (n 11) para 106 d.

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