Source: http://editions.lib.umn.edu/mjlst/category/litigation/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 23:30:27+00:00

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3-D printing is the process of creating three dimensional objects by layering very thin layers of plastic into the desired shape. All you need is the printer, raw material, and a good blueprint. From gadgets and toys for home use to replacement organs, there are many things one can make. Some of the possibilities, however, pose significant legal concerns. At the heart of years of litigation is a group behind the designs for a working, 3-D printable firearm.
In 2013 Cody Wilson founded Defense Distributed to distribute and monetize 3-D printable gun designs. Defense Distributed’s first design, the Liberator, could fire a single shot. Plans for the Liberator were downloaded an estimated 100,000 times from the Defense Distributed website alone, and have since been hosted on several other sites. As of 9/25/2018, a search of the Defense Distributed file site DEFCAD turned up nine different designs for printable guns and gun parts. The group ultimately hopes to create a larger community of 3-D gun designers and printers.
Ignoring the national debate over firearms, 3-D printed guns pose a unique security risk. Making a gun is not illegal. Liberators are concerning because, like most 3-D printed objects, they are made of plastic. They aren’t detectable by metal detectors, and furthermore lack serial numbers or other identifying information. Per the Undetectable Firearms Act, undetectable guns have been illegal since 1988. While the Liberator design incorporates two metal pieces, one solely to set off metal detectors, the design doesn’t require them to function. Anyone with a 3-D printer can choose whether to include these pieces. Thus, these ‘ghost guns’ pose a substantial security risk.
The Liberator debuted on May 6th, 2013. Two days later, Defense Distributed took down the designs after the U.S. State Department deemed them a violation of export laws under the Arms Export Control Act. In 2015, citing 1st, 2nd and 5th Amendment arguments, Defense Distributed sued the United States in District Court (Defense Distributed v. U.S. Dept.t of State, 121 F.Supp.3d 680, (W.D.T.X. 2015)) and then, upon appeal, in the Fifth Circuit (838 F.3d 451, (5th Cir. 2016)) before being denied certiorari by the U.S. Supreme Court. Surprising some, the U.S. Government settled with Defense Distributed in 2018, giving the group license to upload the plans again as well as paying some of their legal fees. Only a few days after the plans were reuploaded however, Oregon and several states sued Defense Distributed, the U.S. State Department and others.(State of Washingtonv. U.S. Dept.of State2:18-cv-01115-RSL (W.D.W.A. 2018)). Subsequently U.S. District Judge Robert Lasnik issued a restraining order against Defense Distributed’s hosting of the plans.
So far, the injunction doesn’t seem to have done much. Near the end of the order is this phrase: “Regulation under the AECA means that the files cannot be uploaded to the internet, but they can be emailed, mailed, securely transmitted, or otherwise published within the United States.” Interpreting this literally, Defense Distributed removed the option to directly access digital plans but has continued sales through other means, namely mailing copies on USB sticks. At least 400 orders have been placed. Whether this workaround remains legal will likely be brought up in the future. For now it’s anyone’s guess whether Defense Distributed read it correctly or played a little too loose with the spirit of the injunction. My prediction is that Defense Distributed won’t be penalized: the options laid out in the injunction are too specific to be accidental.
The litigation is expected to continue. As of 9/25/2018, Defense Distributed has raised $342,000 for its legal expenses while receiving assistance from the Second Amendment Foundation and others. Meanwhile, a total of 21 Attorneys General are on the opposing side. They cheered the injunction but aim for more, potentially a complete ban on 3-D printable guns. The arrest of former Defense Distributed director Cody Wilson on unrelated charges has had no effect upon the case so far.
The Japanese company, emonster k.k., sued Apple in the U.S. on Wednesday, Oct. 18, 2017, claiming that Apple infringed emoster’s Animoji trademark with the iPhone X Animoji feature.
But first, what even is an Animoji? According it a Time article, an Animoji is an animal emoji that you can control with your face, and send to your friends. You simply pick an emoji, point the camera at your face, and speak. The Animoji captures your facial expression and voice. However, this technology has yet to reach consumer hands. Apple’s website says that the iPhone X, with the Animoji feature, will be available for preorder on Oct. 27, and will be available for purchase Nov. 3.
So why is Apple being sued over this? Well, it’s not the actual technology that’s at issue. It’s the name Animoji. emonster’s complaint states that Enrique Bonansea created the Animoji app in 2014. This app allowed users to customize moving text and images and send them in messages. The United States Patent and Trademark Office registered Animoji to Bonansea on March 31, 2015, who later assigned the trademark to emoster in Aug. 2017, according to the complaint. Bonansea also claims that he received requests from companies, that he believes were fronts for Apple, to sell the trademark in Animoji. But these requests were denied, according to the complaint.
The complaint also provides more information that sheds light on the fact that Apple probably knew it was infringing emonster’s trademark in Animoji. The day before Apple announced its iPhone X and the Animoji feature, Apple filed a petition with the United States Patent and Trademark Office requesting that the office cancel the Animoji trademark because emonster, Inc. didn’t exist at the time of the application for the trademark. This was a simple mistake and the paperwork should have said emonster k.k. instead of emonster, Inc.; emonster was unable to fix the error because the cancellation proceeding was already pending. To be safe, emonster applied again for registration of the trademark Animoji in Sept. 2017, but this time under the correct name, emonster k.k..
Additionally, Apple knew about emonster’s app because it was available on the Apple App Store. Apple also helped emonster remove apps that infringed emonster’s trademark, the complaint stated. Nevertheless, Apple still went forward with using Animoji as the name for it’s new technology.
The complaint also alleges that emonster did send Apple a cease-and-desist letter, but Apple continued to use name Animoji for its new technology. emonster requests that Apple be enjoined from using the name Animoji, and claims that it is also entitled to recover Apple’s profits from using the name, any ascertainable damages emonster has, and the costs emonster incurs from the suit.
It’s unclear what this means for Apple and the release of the iPhone X, which is in the very near future. At this time, Apple has yet to comment on the lawsuit.
For the past 13 years, Coca-Cola has been trying to trademark nothing. Well not actually nothing. Zero. As in zero calories. During this time, the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) has denied trademarking Zero for soft drinks, as the term was either generic (Referring to the genus of the good, i.e. Coke Zero as a zero calorie sports drink) or merely descriptive (Describing what the good is, i.e. “Zero” describing “Coke” as a zero-calorie version of the drink); neither of which is distinctive enough upon the Abercrombie spectrum to warrant trademark protection.
Not surprisingly, other large soft drink companies have opposed allowing Coke to register “Zero”, as no other company would be able to use “Zero” on their own mark subsequent to Coke obtaining such a trademark. This past May, the TTAB issued a ruling in favor of Coke (over the opposition of Dr. Pepper Snapple Group) allowing Coke to register numerous trademarks containing “Zero” for their soft drinks. The TTAB held that “Zero” had “acquired distinctiveness through a showing of secondary meaning”, which is a fancy way of saying that Coke had proven that the millions of dollars they had spent on marketing “Zero” meant that consumers of soft drinks were now likely to associate the term “Zero” with the Coca-Cola brand.
The TTAB ruling also contemplates Coke’s trademark infringement claim against Dr. Pepper’s “Diet Rite Pure Zero” mark for likelihood of confusion. For a mark to infringe upon another, the potentially infringing mark must cause confusion to the consuming public as to source, i.e. a showing that consumers of soft drinks would confuse the source of “Diet Rite Pure Zero” with “Coke Zero” given the distinctiveness of the “Coke Zero” mark. The TTAB essentially punts the infringement issue, dismissing Coke’s infringement claim for a failure to prove priority (because Coke could not show that they had acquired distinctiveness through before Dr. Pepper’s use of the term “Zero”, there was no infringement cause of action).
Dr. Pepper Snapple has appealed the issue of distinctiveness to the Federal Circuit, asking the court to find “Zero” as generic for zero-calorie soft drinks. That appeal is still pending. Assuming the TTAB’s finding of acquired distinctiveness for “Coke Zero” holds, the question becomes whether future uses of “[Soft Drink X] Zero” will be barred by the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) for likelihood of confusion with “Coke Zero”? Or does this TTAB ruling only prevent future use of “Zero” on its own as a mark for soft drinks?
The similarity or dissimilarity and nature of the goods described in an application or registration or in connection with which a prior mark is in use.
Like many likelihood of confusion cases, the analysis would likely come down to (1) similarity between the marks in terms of sight, sound, and meaning, and (2) whether or not either side could show actual confusion or a lack of such. For example, Coke would argue that any subsequent use of “Zero” in connection with a soft drink would be likely to confuse consumers that (according to the TTAB ruling) have come to associate “Zero” and soft drinks with Coca-Cola products. On the other hand, any subsequent user of “Zero” for soft drinks would likely have to rely upon a dissimilarity in appearance of the mark (as “Zero” would be the same in terms of sound and meaning), or show a lack of actual confusion between the two marks. Otherwise, the potential subsequent user could attempt to argue that “Coke Zero” is the mark in its entirety, and that “[Soft Drink X] Zero” is inherently dissimilar in its nature and thus, unlikely to cause consumer confusion.
Ok. Sorry Doc. Brown, but vehicular technology is not quite to where Back to the Future thought it would be in 2017; but, there are a substantial amount of companies making investments into autonomous vehicles. Ford invested $1 billion to acquire an artificial intelligence startup company that had been founded by engineers previously employed by Google and Uber with the intent to develop self-driving vehicles. Tesla already has an autopilot feature in all of its vehicles. Tesla includes a warning on its website that the use of the Self-Driving functionality maybe limited depending on regulations that vary by jurisdiction.
The societal benefits could be vast. With level 4 autonomy on household vehicles, parents and siblings need not worry about driving the kids to soccer practice because the car is fully capable of doing it for them. Additionally, the ridesharing economy, which has grown incredibly fast over the past few years, would likely see a drastic shift away from human drivers. Companies have already begun to make vehicles for the purpose of clean energy ride sharing using autonomous vehicles such as Ollie. Ollie is an electric and 3D printed bus that can be summoned by those in need of a ride in a similar fashion to Uber.
While this self-driving vehicle technology is exciting, are we really there yet? Last June, a fatal car accident occurred involving a Tesla using its autopilot function. The driver in this case had previously touted his car saving him from an accident; he was very confident in the ability of his vehicle. It was later reported by a witness that there was a portable DVD player in the car that was found playing Harry Potter at the time of the accident. If this witness is correct, the driver of the vehicle violated the Tesla disclaimer that reads the autopilot feature “is an assist feature that requires you to keep your hands on the steering wheel at all times.” Some experts argue these manufacturers have to be more upfront about the limitations of their autopilot feature and how drivers should be cautious in the use of this advanced technology. It is no question that the driver of the Tesla (if you can call him that?) was reckless in the use of this technology. But what about the liability of the vehicle manufacturer?
The deceased’s family hired a product defect litigation law firm to conduct an investigation in conjunction with the federal government’s investigation. The goal of these investigations was to determine if Tesla is at fault for the vehicle’s autopilot feature failing to stop. Recently, news broke that the government investigation concluded that no recall must be made for the Tesla vehicles nor did the government levy any fines to the automaker. The government reported that the autopilot feature was not defective at the time of the crash because it was built to protect the driver from rear-end collisions (the man’s car rear-ended a truck) and also gave notice to consumers that the driver must remain fully attentive to the operation of the vehicle.
Legally, it appears that plaintiffs won’t likely have much luck in suits against Tesla in cases like this. The company requires purchasers to sign a contract stating the autopilot function is not to be considered self-driving and that they are aware they will have to remain attentive and keep their hands on the wheel at all times. However, Tesla operates on an interesting structure where purchasers buy directly from the manufacturer which may give them more of the ability to engage in these types of contracts with their consumers. Other automobile manufacturers may have a more difficult time maneuvering around liability for accidents that occur when the vehicle is driving itself. Car companies are going to have to ensure they provide repeated reminders to consumers that, until technology is tested and confidence in the feature is significantly higher, that the autopilot features are in the beta-testing mode and driver attention and intervention is still required.
To bring a suit in any judicial court in the United States, an individual, or group of individuals must satisfy Article III’s standing requirement. As recently clarified by the Supreme Court in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016), to meet this requirement, a “plaintiff must have (1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Id. at 1547. When cases involving data breaches have entered the Federal Circuit courts, there has been some disagreement as to whether the risk of future harm from data breaches, and the costs spent to prevent this harm, qualify as “injuries in fact,” Article III’s first prong.
Last Spring, I wrote a note concerning Article III standing in data breach litigation in which I highlighted the Federal Circuit split on the issue and argued that the reasoning of the 7th Circuit court in Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Group, LLC, 794 F.3d 688 (7th Cir. 2015) was superior to its sister courts and made for better law. In Remijas, the plaintiffs were a class of individuals whose credit and debit card information had been stolen when Neiman Marcus Group, LLC experienced a data breach. A portion of the class had not yet experienced any fraudulent charges on their accounts and were asserting Article III standing based upon the risk of future harm and the time and money spent mitigating this risk. In holding that these Plaintiffs had satisfied Article III’s injury in fact requirement, the court made a critical inference that when a hacker steals a consumer’s private information, “[p]resumably, the purpose of the hack is, sooner or later, to make fraudulent charges or assume [the] consumers’ identit[y].” Id. at 693.
This inference is in stark contrast to the line of reasoning engaged in by the 3rd Circuit in Reilly v. Ceridian Corp. 664 F.3d 38 (3rd Cir. 2011). The facts of Reilly were similar to Remijas, except that in Reilly, Ceridian Corp., the company that had experienced the data breach, stated only that their firewall had been breached and that their customers’ information may have been stolen. In my note, mentioned supra, I argued that this difference in facts was not enough to wholly distinguish the two cases and overcome a circuit split, in part due to the Reilly court’s characterization of the risk of future harm. The Reilly court found that the risk of misuse of information was highly attenuated, reasoning that whether the Plaintiffs experience an injury depended on a series of “if’s,” including “if the hacker read, copied, and understood the hacked information, and if the hacker attempts to use the information, and if he does so successfully.” Id. at 43 (emphasis in original).
Often in the law, we are faced with an imperfect or incomplete set of facts. Any time an individual’s intent is an issue in a case, this is a certainty. When faced with these situations, lawyers have long utilized inferences to differentiate between more likely and less likely scenarios for what the missing facts are. In the case of a data breach, it is almost always the case that both parties will have little to no knowledge of the intent, capabilities, or plans of the hacker. However, it seems to me that there is room for reasonable inferences to be made about these facts. When a hacker is sophisticated enough to breach a company’s defenses and access data, it makes sense to assume they are sophisticated enough to utilize that data. Further, because there is risk involved in executing a data breach, because it is illegal, it makes sense to assume that the hacker seeks to gain from this act. Thus, as between the Reilly and Remijas courts’ characterizations of the likelihood of misuse of data, it seemed to me that the better rule is to assume that the hacker is able to utilize the data and plans to do so in the future. Further, if there are facts tending to show that this inference is wrong, it is much more likely at the pleading stage that the Defendant Corporation would be in possession of this information than the Plaintiff(s).
Since Remijas, there have been two data breach cases that have made it to the Federal Circuit courts on the issue of Article III standing. In Lewert v. P.F. Chang’s China Bistro, Inc., 819 F.3d 963, 965 (7th Cir. 2016), the court unsurprisingly followed the precedent set forth in their recent case, Remijas, in finding that Article III standing was properly alleged. In Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., a recent 6th Circuit case, the court had to make an Article III ruling without the constraint of an earlier ruling in their Circuit, leaving the court open to choose what rule and reasoning to apply. Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., No. 15-3386, 2016 WL 4728027, (6th Cir. Sept. 12, 2016). In the case, the Plaintiffs alleged, among other claims, negligence and bailment; these claims were dismissed by the district court for lack of Article III standing. In alleging that they had suffered an injury in fact, the Plaintiffs alleged “a substantial risk of harm, coupled with reasonably incurred mitigation costs.” Id. at 3. In holding that this was sufficient to establish Article III standing at the pleading stage, the Galaria court found the inference made by the Remijas court to be persuasive, stating that “[w]here a data breach targets personal information, a reasonable inference can be drawn that the hackers will use the victims’ data for the fraudulent purposes alleged in Plaintiffs’ complaints.” Moving forward, it will be intriguing to watch how Federal Circuits who have not faced this issue, like the 6th circuit before deciding Galaria, rule on this issue and whether, if the 3rd Circuit keeps its current reasoning, this issue will eventually make its way to the Supreme Court of the United States.

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