Source: http://grahnlaw.blogspot.com/2009/06/
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 06:12:32+00:00

Document:
“We hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, …”.
For the subjects of parliamentary sovereignty it may be difficult to understand that right is might, not the other way around.
The Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) in Germany has, again, scrutinized an EU reform treaty with the rights of the citizens as its yardstick, under the German Basic Law (Constitution; Grundgesetz).
As long as the European Union remains an organization based on sovereign states, the equality and the rights of citizens have to be safeguarded by the member states, by the national constitutional bodies which act on behalf of the peoples.
At the current stage of development, including the Treaty of Lisbon, these bodies are the Bundestag and Bundesrat (the German Parliament), and their participation needs to be enhanced.
If and when a uniform European people is constituted as the subject of legitimisation, and it is able to express its majority will in a politically effective manner that takes due account of equality in the context of the foundation of a European federal state, the road to a European federation is clear.
This would naturally require a change of the national Constitutions, in Germany and elsewhere.
The Federal Constitutional Court has closed no doors to the future. It just requires that the rights of the citizens are respected, to the extent possible under the Lisbon Treaty, or in a future federation based on EU citizens.
P.S. For comparison, read the divergent conclusions by Nosemonkey: German Constitutional Court Lisbon Treaty ruling (30 June 2009).
no. 2/2009 of 16 January 2009 and no. 9/2009 of 29 January 2009).
principle of the equality of states.
permanently supported by the intention of the sovereign Member States.
context of the supranational balancing of interest between the states.
area of application of the Federal Republic of Germany.
dignity and is the fundamental element of the principle of democracy.
pursuant to Article 79.3 GG.
formation of the economic, cultural and social circumstances of life.
programme of the European Union must therefore be sufficiently precise.
for integration of the legislative bodies can sufficiently develop.
nevertheless increase the level of legitimisation of the Staatenverbund.
48.7(3) TEU Lisbon as an orientation.
can still be predicted and determined by the German legislative bodies.
sentences 2 and 3 of the Basic Law.
and their use requires particular justification.
a specific statute under Article 23.1 sentence 2 GG.
is required by the provisions on legislation, of the Bundesrat.
democratic scope for decision-making that is required in this context.
Members, nor by Article 45 sentence 3 GG, new version.
This press release is also available in the original german version.
The reasoning is interesting for everyone who studies the unique political construct the European Union is at its current stage of development.
The German Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) in Karlsruhe has ruled on the constitutionality of the EU Treaty of Lisbon.
und Nr. 9/2009 vom 29. Januar 2009).
Anwendungsbereich der Bundesrepublik Deutschland voraus.
grundrechtsgleiches Recht mit der Verfassungsbeschwerde rügefähig (Art.
Gestaltungsmöglichkeiten durch gemeinsames koordiniertes Handeln stärkt.
auch der Grundsatz der Europarechtsfreundlichkeit.
organisierten Raum einer politischen Öffentlichkeit diskursiv entfalten.
unionsrechtlichen Subsidiaritätsprinzips (Art. 5 Abs. 2 EGV; Art. 5 Abs.
einzelne Vorschriften des Vertrags von Lissabon nicht in Frage gestellt.
Dies gilt zunächst für das vereinfachte Änderungsverfahren (vgl.
Gesetz im Sinne des Art. 23 Abs. 1 Satz 2 GG als lex specialis zu Art.
59 Abs. 2 GG voraus.
UAbs. 2 AEUV Gebrauch gemacht wird.
Vertrag von Lissabon beigefügten Erklärung Nr. 17 vorgesehen ist.
Gesetzesvorbehalt des Art. 23 Abs. 1 Satz 2 GG.
Europäischen Union insoweit gegen Art. 38 Abs. 1 in Verbindung mit Art.
insbesondere des Art. 23 Abs. 1 GG genügen.
The Federal Constitutional Court has also published the ruling, which will be studied with interest both in Germany and the rest of Europe.
Those who think that the European Union should develop according to the agreed and ratified treaty aims of an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe are likely to favour the emergence of a parliamentary system, based on the votes of EU citizens, with European level government.
In this respect, the Treaty of Lisbon is a step forward, because it strengthens the legislative powers of the European Parliament, by extending co-decision (the ordinary legislative procedure) to a number of policy areas or issues.
The importance of the Lisbon Treaty should not be exaggerated. Special legislative procedures remain in many areas, with the Council in a privileged position. Treaty reform is still in the hands of the member states, not the representatives of EU citizens. Foreign, security and defence policy continue to be outside the effective control of the European Parliament, and even the Council’s powers are basically subject to unanimity, ensuring that the European Union remains a relative midget in world affairs. The member states block the resources (taxation) and make the strategic spending decisions (long term budget), although the European Parliament is allowed a wider role with regard to annual budgets.
Regardless of the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, an effective and democratic European Union is still a long way off.
The newly elected European Parliament will convene for the first time in about two weeks. It should start to formulate its priorities for the coming five years.
There are questions, where the European Parliament can function as a conscience and a catalyst or debate. There are also matters, where the EP has all the tools to gain the trust of EU citizens by wise internal decisions and practices.
As the only EU institution directly elected by the citizens, the European Parliament has an obligation to keep the question of EU reform alive. This requires the judicious use of own initiative reports on long term institutional reform towards real parliamentary democracy.
In the future, all running political affairs should be decided by simple majorities, abolishing the need for majorities of the component members (and thus the stifling “grand coalitions”).
The European elections 2009 and the political parties at European level (Europarties) showed weaknesses, which demand constructive initiatives and proposals in order to strengthen European level democracy.
The European Parliament needs to take a critical look at itself and its image. As shown by the Westminster expenses scandal, the EP has to change its attitude to openness, transparency and sound financial practices, although it has curbed some of the most flagrant excesses from the beginning of the new parliamentary term.
The European Parliament does a better job than the Council at informing the public about its legislative work (committee agendas, proposed amendments, reports) than the Council, but the same standards should be extended to the EP’s internal bodies, such as the Bureau and the Conference of Presidents, including the meeting documents. They should be made automatically and visibly accessible to the public in the same manner.
Internal audit reports should be made available automatically and followed up by proposals and decisions, including actions taken against wayward MEPs. Whistleblowers should be promoted instead of demoted.
• MEPs need to be open and transparent about how they spend their allowances and should publish all this information.
• MEPs should be obliged to produce receipts for all expenses, and receive allowances accordingly, rather than receive flat-rate expenses for office equipment, etc.
• All unused allowances, and allowances not supported with receipts, should be reimbursed back to the EU budget.
• Any MEP who is caught misusing allowances should, after a proper legal inquiry, be suspended and replaced.
The Institute of International and European Affairs (IIEA) in Dublin has published an explanation of the Lisbon Treaty guarantees to Ireland.
On its road to an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe, the European Union has as its task, by establishing a common market and an economic and monetary union and by implementing common policies or activities, to promote throughout the European Community a harmonious, balanced and sustainable development of economic activities, a high level of employment and of social protection, equality between men and women, sustainable and non-inflationary growth, a high degree of competitiveness and convergence of economic performance, a high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the environment, the raising of the standard of living and quality of life, and economic and social cohesion and solidarity among Member States (Article 1 TEC).
“3. The Union shall establish an internal market. It shall work for the sustainable development of Europe based on balanced economic growth and price stability, a highly competitive social market economy, aiming at full employment and social progress, and a high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the environment. It shall promote scientific and technological advance.
Legislation is an important instrument for the European Union promotes its aims, and the stream of Directives, Regulations and Decisions is impressive.
In principle, the objectives of the legislative acts are worthy, such as improved environmental standards, consumer protection, human safety, health and wellbeing.
While the legislation is often addressed to the member states, much of it targets businesses. Regulation leads to compliance costs for enterprises, and the combined cost of business regulation is too great to ignore at national and European level.
Much can be said for replacing different national rules by common norms for 27 EU member states (or 30 countries of the European Economic Area, EEA), but the economy in the internal market is not meant to be only “social”, but also “highly competitive”.
Given the importance of the European Union, both benefits and costs of business regulation need to be scrutinised carefully, because European level legislation affects about 500 million people.
 Promoting the design and application of better regulation tools at the EU level, notably simplification, reduction of administrative burdens and impact assessment.
 Working more closely with Member States to ensure that better regulation principles are applied consistently throughout the EU by all regulators.
The Commission’s own assessment of its agenda is the Communication Third strategic review of Better Regulation in the European Union (Brussels, 28.1.2009, COM(2009) 15 final).
The Communication presents efforts to cut “red tape” by scrapping obsolete legislation and codifying existing legal acts. The implications of proposed new laws are scrutinised through impact assessments, with new Impact assessment guidelines (since 15 January 2009; SEC(2009) 92).
Open Europe’s publication Out of control? Measuring a decade of EU regulation was published in February 2009, which means that some of the questions it raises may have been addressed in the Communication (and accompanying documents) as well as the new Impact assessment guidelines.
Despite the efforts, the costs of regulation have continued to rise.
Administrative costs have been at the centre of attention, with the EU scrapping obsolete legislation and simplifying existing laws. The wider costs of compliance with regulation, fees and licenses as well as knock-on effects have been less well scrutinised.
Open Europe correctly underlines the importance of European level regulation, meaning that a purely domestic (UK) agenda is too limited in scope.
The newly elected European Parliament is starting its work and the legislative engine, the new Commission, will begin to set its priorities from the end of this year (1 November 2009).
Open Europe’s remarks and suggestions need to be taken seriously by the EU institutions, comparing them to the latest Communication and Impact assessment guidelines.
Although Open Europe dealt with national issues from a British perspective, all national governments could profit from many of the suggestions, both with regard to their contributions to Council work and to their domestic agendas on sensible regulation.
A level playing-field within the EU (EEA) is desirable, but far from enough. A highly competitive social market economy needs to be competitive in a global context as well.
The United Kingdom refused to join at the beginning, then applied for membership in 1961, and was finally accepted as a member from 1973.
Time enough to read the first two lines of the treaty, I would think.
Open Europe lobbies actively on European issues through critical comment, a daily press summary highlighting almost every derogatory news item available, media appearances, op-ed articles and participation in events.
The torrent of negative comment raised my interest to find out what Open Europe is lobbying for, in other words what the “reformed” European Union would look like.
I found a web document called Our vision. When I asked, Open Europe admitted that they do not have one document that sets out their reform agenda in one place. However, for specific reform proposals they recommended Chapter 5 of their publication Out of control? Measuring a decade of EU regulation and The European Parliament – What does it do and how does it affect your everyday life?
Every member state has signed up to the aim of an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe. This aim is the first one stated in the preamble of the Treaty establishing the European Community (since the Treaty of Rome, 1957, EEC Treaty). Article 1 of the Treaty on European Union sets out that the establishment of the EU marks a new step in the process of creating this closer union among the peoples of Europe.
The process and the direction are clear, but the treaties do not spell out the speed or the ultimate goals (finalité) of European integration.
Since I am primarily interested in the overall vision of Open Europe, Our vision remains the main source for assessing their alternative vision. For systematic reasons, I will choose the order of the issues and the comments.
By calling for a flexible European Union, based on voluntary cooperation, Open Europe rejects the basic aim of the treaties, at least for the United Kingdom.
It looks hard to reconcile a repudiation of an organisation’s main aims with continued membership. The logical option would be for Britain to withdraw from the European Union.
Open Europe sees that the current process of integration leads to failure, deadlock and crisis. The UK (and other member states) could seek a looser relationship with the centre - for example replacing their current mode of membership by free trade and single market agreements with the other member states.
Logically, the “looser relationship” would mean secession.
This option would be clear-cut, with participation in the single market through international agreements with the European Union (member states). The models already exist.
Then there is the Swiss model, marginally more independent. Switzerland concludes bilateral agreements with the European Union (including Schengen).
The drawback of both models is that the outsiders can mainly accept (or reject) what the European Union has cooked up. They can influence outcomes through consultation and lobbying, but they are not present when the EU institutions reach the internal outcomes.
In my opinion, Open Europe needs to do much more to indicate the course of action to take and to assess the consequences if Britain withdraws from the European Union, which would be the logical option considering its rejection of the basic treaty aims.
Open Europe’s other option is that the EU as a whole could be restructured to accommodate different members’ conflicting interests.
Apart from a minimum core of common rules, participation in EU policies should be voluntary. The less integrationist member states should not stop groups of other countries from pursuing deeper integration among themselves within the EU framework.
Countries would be allowed to opt in or out of: the common foreign and security policy; border control; justice and home affairs legislation; the CAP and CFP; cross-Europe emissions trading; external aid and other EU spending policies (e.g. on research). It would also mean allowing member states to take back control of regional aid and to repeal some legislation which is currently tacked inappropriately onto the internal market (like the Working Time Directive).
In my view, Open Europe’s view of the future European Union is incompatible with the aim to achieve ever closer union, under the existing treaties, as expressed by the timid reforms in the Treaty of Lisbon and especially with regard to the global challenges of the 21st century. Beyond the Lisbon Treaty, a unified foreign and security policy, including a future common defence, are prerequisites for Europe as an influential actor on the global stage. Effective powers require democratic government at EU level. Economic policy, resources (taxation) and some internal policies need to be strengthened.
But Open Europe’s vision of the dismantled European Union à-la-carte has one redeeming feature, worth further study.
Open Europe recognises that less integrationist countries should not stop (groups of) other countries from pursuing deeper integration within the EU framework. It does, however, raise a number of questions, which need to be addressed.
The European Union is based on international treaties, concluded between the member states, subject to unanimous agreement and ratification by all member states. The powers (competences) of the EU are laid down in these treaties, in some detail.
The enlarged European Union is almost impossible to reform, as shown by the painful road since the Nice summit in December 2000. The proposed reforms (Lisbon Treaty) are at the level of the least reform-minded countries.
Open Europe’s principles of unhindered progress and voluntary participation require new ground rules. In the near future, as long as intergovernmental conferences (with or without conventions) agree on treaty reform, a qualified majority of member states should be allowed to progress, as long as the minority is allowed to opt out of the policy area and future implementation.
It is hard to believe that anti-integrationist countries would abide by a promise to let the majority progress, or that future treaties would be ratified by all member states. Therefore, the European Union would have to agree on coming treaties entering into force among the ratifying states.
It is more natural that the minority opts out, than that the majority is forced to establish special procedures among itself, such as enhanced or permanent structured cooperation. The participating countries would constitute the Council with regard to each policy area. Governance would be messy, but somehow possible.
The supranational institutions of the European Union would, however, give rise to more serious questions. Should the MEPs of the opting-out nations be allowed to legislate on all matters, if their states of origin are exempt from duties pertaining to important policy areas? Should the fringe nations be given the same weight in the Commission, the Court of Justice, the consultative bodies and agencies?
On the other hand, after massive opt-outs some member states would be quick to demand lower contributions to the EU budget.
Open Europe needs to look closer at the implications of a European Union à-la-carte, if it wants to present it as a credible alternative.
Long term, the EU treaties need to be replaced by a basic law, which can be amended at EU level, by democratically legitimate institutions, by qualified majorities. How does Open Europe envision the situation of fringe countries in this context?
Open Europe has been consistently long on critique, but short on constructive proposals. It is high time to set out the alternatives for the United Kingdom (and perhaps some other member states) in much more detail, both secession and some sort of minimal membership, which would satisfy not only British preferences but the aspirations of the European mainstream.
What does the Prague declaration of the European Conservatives and Reformists Group (ECRG) in the European Parliament tell us about the future policies of the new political group, built around the UK Conservative Party of David Cameron and William Hague (26 MEPs), the Polish Law and Justice Party (PiS) of the Kaczynski twins (15 MEPs) and the Czech Civic Democratic Party (ODS) of Mirek Topolanek (formerly Vaclav Klaus) (9 MEPs), with a fluctuating number of individual representatives from other member states?
The ECRG has presented ten short principles. The part looked at the preamble. The second part presented the principles from 1 to 5, and this third part contains the remaining principles, one at a time, with subjective comments.
The plethora of common interests between the United States and the European Union – values, trade, foreign, security and defence – are reduced and made subservient to the defence alliance NATO, although the US needs a coherent Europe to deal with in all mutual areas and as an ally in the world. Despite the importance of NATO, the US has more pressing global challenges to think about, and twenty years after the fall of the Soviet Union it has a right to expect that the EU will be able to defend itself in most conceivable situations before long.
My reading is that it is an error to do anything to keep the UK within the European Union based on its foreign policy influence or military capabilities, as long as Britain is opposed to using them for the common good.
Young democracies need support, from Morocco to Murmansk, but the crux of the matter is how we are going to achieve coherent and cohesive European Union action with regard to the Eastern Partnership, the Union for the Mediterranean or Russia. The sovereign integrity of each EU member state is a recipe for disaster.
Improved immigration control and asylum procedures seem to be in line with the EU’s aims under the Hague Programme and the future Stockholm Programme on justice and home affairs (area of freedom, security and justice).
Given the participating parties, it is surprising thing that the European Conservatives mention these policies in a document on the European Union. Great Britain has opted out of the Schengen area of free internal travel and external border control. Under the Lisbon Treaty Britain would opt out of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, and together with Poland from the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights containing the guiding values with regard to individuals.
The ECRG parties are hardly the ones most famous for promoting effective, but fair responses to the common challenges of migration and asylum.
Who could oppose such gifted platitudes?
The European Conservatives are potential saboteurs in the evolving foreign, security and defence area. They are hardly credible as European reformers in the area of freedom, security and justice, either.
With almost nothing to give, it remains a mystery why they don’t act forcefully for their countries to withdraw from the European Union.
The ECRG has presented ten short principles. The previous post looked at the preamble. Now we present the principles, one at a time, with subjective comments.
Conspicuously absent is any mention of an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe, the main aim of European integration since the Treaty of Rome (EEC Treaty) more than 50 years ago; thus, an objective every member state has embraced when joining the European Communities or the European Union. The ECRG rejects the basic tenet of the European Community (European Union).
Free enterprise is but an unnamed part of the European Community task to promote a harmonious, balanced and sustainable development of economic activities and a high level of employment and of social protection. In the Treaty of Lisbon this has been defined as a highly competitive social market economy. The ECRG does not pay even lip service to the European Community’s (European Union’s) concept of a social market economy.
The member states form a customs union and they are treaty bound to contribute to the harmonious development of world trade, the progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade and the lowering of customs barriers. The ECRG’s aim to promote free and fair trade is compatible with the stated aims of the EC (EU), and the ECRG is probably a force for positive change with regard to foot-dragging member states.
Free and fair competition is in line with the EC (EU) aim to ensure competition in the internal market.
Minimal national regulation has contributed to burdening taxpayers with trillions of debt because of reckless financial institutions and failing regulators, so the minimal regulation credo seems to come from the backbone of Conservative thought rather than from the brain.
The huge socialised liabilities caused by the financial mess and the economic downturn undermine the credibility of the call for lower taxation. Add the rising burdens of ageing societies, and lower taxation (a national competence) turns intellectually dishonest.
Small government is a populist and reductionist view of the public sector. I would prefer smart government, i.e. effective and efficient.
Individual freedom seems to be designed for the privileged, and the ECRG makes no effort to indicate how their (national) prosperity would benefit society as a whole.
All in all, there is nothing compassionate about this brand of Conservatism, and precious little to place it near the European mainstream of socially responsible government.
Freedom of the individual seems to be rooted in the absence of government action, and more personal responsibility looks like the free choice to sink or swim without societal help. Most Nordic Conservatives would see these unadorned principles as callous, because they lack any reference to the wellbeing of society as a whole.
If the ECRG is interested in a rounded and modern message on EU citizens’ rights, it should promote the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.
There is no attempt to explain where and how of greater democratic accountability.
The energy policy targets are crucial and commendable, but much more is needed to make them into viable policies.
Is this a sop to the Polish Law and Justice Party (PiS), a tacit approval of its Catholic agenda against deviants?
The ECRG does not use the words nationalism or nationalistic, but that is what the sovereign integrity of the nation state indicates as their ideological backbone.
Anti-federalism further underlines the commitment to solve European level and global problems at national level.
Every EU legislative proposal is screened with regard to subsidiarity and proportionality, so this is the third phrasing in one sentence of a minimalist view of the role of the European Union.
This far, the European Conservatives and Reformists Group (ECRG) could contribute to the European Union’s aims with regard to international trade and competition in the internal market, although they reject the consensus on economic and social policy.
On the other hand, the European Conservatives reject the basic aim of European integration and they prefer nationalism to common procedures and solutions. They offer no promise of a European Union able to speak with one voice on the global stage. Their minimalist message is not only anti-federalist, but against European mainstream political thought.
What do we know about the politics of the European Conservatives and Reformists Group (ECRG) in the European Parliament?
The strongest manifestation is the establishment of the new political group, built around the UK Conservative Party of David Cameron and William Hague (26 MEPs), the Polish Law and Justice Party (PiS) of the Kaczynski twins (15 MEPs) and the Czech Civic Democratic Party (ODS) of Mirek Topolanek (formerly Vaclav Klaus) (9 MEPs), with a fluctuating number of individual representatives from other member states.
The Tories and the ODS left the EPP-ED group, the home of the mainstream group of the European People’s Party (EPP) and the sub-group European Democrats (ED). The divorce from the European mainstream is accentuated by the new union with the nationalist and populist PiS on the fringes.
There is not much to go on with regard to policies, but the three main parties have agreed on some common principles, the so called Prague declaration.
Let us look at the declaration and provide some subjective comment on its contents.
The euphemism Euroskeptic is mainly used by people who oppose European integration and in many cases propose breaking up the European Union, or at least their country’s secession from the EU. Anti-EU and anti-European are preferable terms.
Eurorealism is seen as a softer version of anti-EU action. European integration as a process leading to closer political union is rejected. Dismantling parts of the institutional EU and repatriating some powers to the member states are distinct possibilities. This is the first – and key – auto-definition of the ECRG.
Without using the word, the ECRG defines itself as nationalist, because the Eurorealism, openness, accountability and democracy it mentions as the cornerstones of EU reform are all subject to the respect of the sovereignty of their nations, i.e. the member states.
The political scope of the “reformed” European Union is practically reduced to the economic area: economic recovery, growth and competitiveness.
P.S. The European Citizen has written a thoughtful blog post on the new political group: The European Conservatives and Reformists (24 June 2009).
Here is a recommendation to those who want to read quality posts (in French) on European, international and French political and legal issues: Regards-citoyens.
The blog is run by a collective and frequently updated. The posts are well documented.
• Comment les européens et les partenaires internationaux de la France vont-ils interprêter la nomination de Pierre Lellouche au poste de secrétaire d'Etat aux affaires européennes ?
The only disturbing aspect is the lack of description of the aims of the blog and the team behind it (impressum). There is no reason to be ashamed or even modest about either.
The UK Conservatives have announced the establishment of a new political group in the European Parliament: the European Conservatives and Reformists Group (ECRG).
At least the following Euroblogs have commented: Jon Worth, Nosemonkey, Julien Frisch, Coulisses de Bruxelles and La Oreja de Europa.
At the latest count the new group seems to have 56 MEPs, and it may pick up a few more before the inaugural session of the EP on 14 July 2009. The ECRG will probably be the fourth largest group in numbers.
There is no group in the European Parliament with enough votes to amend legislation on its own, so a majority of the component members (736) has to be sought over party lines. These coalitions will be formed among the four groups in the European mainstream.
The European Parliament is going to function through the mainstream groups. The British voters have backed only 29 MEPs (out of 72) who will exert real influence by sitting in the groups with power.
Opposition groups to the left and the right of the European mainstream will be able to table and to air their alternative proposals, or vote with the majority, but they are going to remain marginal.
British business interests and the US administration have seen the first omens of a future Conservative government led by David Cameron and William Hague.
By the way: Looking at the make-up, the addition of the word “Reformists” to the name of the ECRG expresses a profound sense of humour.
Sweden has published the Work programme for the Swedish Presidency of the EU 1 July --- 31 December 2009.
EU Lisbon Treaty: “Meaningless” Irish guarantees?
Did the European Council nominate Barroso?
Instant Barroso ─ delayed Commission?
European elections 2009: What happens next?
How much law is EU law?
European elections in Britain: In or out?
European Union: What to do with Britain?

References: Art. 5
 Art. 23
 Art.
59
 Art. 23
 Art. 38
 Art. 23