Source: http://patents.hdp.com/?m=201707
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 16:25:20+00:00

Document:
In Soft Gel Techs., Inc. v. Jarrow Formulas, Inc., [16-1814](July 26, 2017), the Federal Circuit affirmed the PTAB decision review inter partes reexamination, that claims in U.S. Patent Nos. 8,124,072, 8,105,583, and 8,147,826, directed to CoQ10 in solvents known as monoterpenes, were invalid for obviousness.
taught or suggested that the claimed new compound would be formed, or taught or suggested making the claimed new compound by any method, or taught or suggested that this new compound would have the properties of stability, solubility, and dissociability that it exhibited.
a previously unknown compound.” Finding that the prior art contains no teaching or suggestion of this new compound, or that it would form during lyophilization, the Federal Circuit concluded that the invention was not obvious.
new chemical compound, or that this new compound would solve the previously intractable problems of bortezomib formulation.
In the end, this is a triumph of “unexpected results” over what it technically obvious, or at least what is the inherent result of what is technically obvious. The Federal Circuit suggested otherwise, noting that “[a] result is obvious when it is ‘the natural result flowing from the operation as taught,’ or a ‘property that is necessarily present’ when applying a process disclosed in the prior art,” and finding that Sandoz “failed to show that it was obvious to use mannitol to make an ester during lyophilization, or that the ester would solve the problems experienced with bortezomib. The Federal Circuit’s analysis seems to put more weight on the obviousness of the unexpected results, than the obviousness of the process that resulted in unexpected results.
There are many benefits to employing means + function claiming under 35 USC §112(f) and the Federal Circuit recently pointed out a new one: protecting your claims from the application by the Broadest Reasonable Interpretation (BRI) claim construction paradigm employed by USPTO in reexaminations. reissues, PGRs, IPRs and CBMRs. In IPCOM GmbH & Co. v. HRC Corp., [2016-1474] (July 7, 2017), previously discussed here, the Federal Circuit said that the PTO may not disregard the structure disclosed in the specification corresponding to means + function elements when rendering a patentability determination.
guidance for those who must apply the new standards. Finally he calls out Congress for focusing more on the relatively minor problem of frivolous assertion, rather than addressing the more significant issue of patent eligibility.
In view of all the developments of the past few years, to pile on still more patent “reform” at this juncture when the system is still reeling from the destabilizing and degrading effects of recent interventions by all three Branches seems inappropriate.
Hopefully, Congress will follow his very wise counsel.
In Genband US LLC v. Metaswitch Networks Corp., [2017-1148] (July 1-, 2017), the Federal Circuit vacated the denial of a permanent injunction, and remanded for reconsideration.
The jury found U.S. Patent Nos. 6,772,210; 6,791,971; 6,885,658; 6,934,279; 7,995,589; 7,047,561; 7,184,427; and 7,990,984 not invalid and infringed, and awarded $8,168,400 in damages, but the district court denied a permanent injunction. The district court rested its denial entirely on the determination that Genband failed to show that it would suffer irreparable harm from continued infringement. The court declared that Genband had to prove that “the patented features drive demand for the product.],” but the Federal Circuit could not be sure that the district court applied the proper nexus, i.e. whether the district court required that the patented feature be “the driver” or simply “a driver.” The Federal Circuit said it is sufficient that the record established that the patented features influence consumers’ perceptions of and desire for these products. Based upon the district court’s opinion, the Federal Circuit had no basis for inferring that the district court actually used the correct standard, rather than an unduly stringent test, to interpret and apply the “drive demand” standard.
increased the product’s desirability, that soundly supports an inference of causation of a significant number of purchasers’ decisions.
The Federal Circuit determined that remand was needed for the district court to clarify its how Genband’s evidence was not sufficient.
In Adjustacam LLC v. Newegg, Inc., [2016-1882] (July 5, 2017) the Federal Circuit reversed the district courts decision not to award attorneys’ fees to defendant after plaintiff voluntarily dismissing its complaint after a Markman hearing.
and Newegg appealed to Federal Circuit, which remanded in view of Octane Fitness. On remand the district court again denied attorneys fees.
As to the second reason, the Federal Circuit found that the record developed over the past five years points to this case as standing out from others with respect to the substantive strength of AdjustaCam’s litigating position. While the infringement claim may have been weak at the time of filing, after the district court’s Markman order, the lawsuit was baseless. The Federal Circuit found that no reasonable factfinder could conclude that Newegg’s products infringe; therefore, AdjustaCam’s litigation position was baseless, and the district court’s conclusion otherwise was clearly erroneous. The Federal Circuit further found that AdjustaCam litigated the case in an “unreasonable manner.” The Federal Circuit also noted that AdjustaCam relied upon a supplemental declaration making new infringement arguments executed two years after the initial fees determination, although the Federal Circuit did not appear to consider that the standard for award of fees changed in the intervening two years.
The Federal Circuit concluded that the totality of the circumstances demonstrates other dubious behavior that, when considered collectively, warrants fees under § 285.
contentions well past an adverse Markman order and expert discovery as enough to tip the balance in favor of exceptionality.

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