Source: https://aeaj.org/page/Subsidiary-protection-detention-and-accelerated-procedure-in-Slovenian-jurisprudence-on-asylum
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 00:57:05+00:00

Document:
The Administrative Court has no backlogs in asylum disputes. The Administrative Court adjudicates manifestly ill-founded cases in 7 days and the other asylum cases within 30 days.  These are the instructive time limit, which are respected. The procedure before the Supreme Court represents the third instance, or the second instance within the judicial branch. An appeal against a judgment of the Administrative Court to the Supreme Court has no limitation except a time limit and that errors in assessment of facts in the judgment of the Administrative Court can be the subject of review of the Supreme Court only if those facts were established in the procedure before the Administrative Court. Based on the Article 40 of the Asylum Act, the asylum seeker has permission to remain in Slovenia until the final ruling of the Supreme Court. The last possible legal remedy in Slovenia is a constitutional complaint to the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Slovenia in the case of a human rights violation in a procedure before the Supreme Court.
In the following two subsections the relevant question from the administrative practice and jurisprudence in relation to subsidiary (or humanitarian) protection are examined, firstly in the period before the transposition of the Qualification Directive with the commentary on its impact on actual interpretation of subsidiary protection and secondly in the period after February 2006, when the Article 2(e) and Article 15 of the Qualification Directive have been transposed into Asylum Act.
From this interpretation it is not clear why “the nature” of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment could be used as an argument against the clear fact that the legislator had enlarged a legal ground for humanitarian asylum from the Article 3 to the entire Convention. In any way, what is very clear from these developments is that a restrictive interpretation of humanitarian status from the period before February 2006 can be considered as a reasonable prediction that courts will adopt a restrictive interpretation also under the transposed provisions of the subsidiary protection from the Qualification Directive. The recent case law which is described in the next section confirms this argument.
Judicial control of detention of asylum seekers (and illegally staying third country nationals) is one of the milestones for the preservation of the rule of law, especially under the circumstances of intensive security concerns in the European societies. To simplify this topic, there is a fundamental requirement that detention of persons is not arbitrarily regulated or arbitrarily decided in individual case. It is important to note that the EU law does not regulate detention thoroughly. The Qualification directive has no provision on this point, the Procedures Directive has only a very general provision of Article 18,  while the Reception Directive regulates only restriction on freedom of movement.  Only the forthcoming directive on common standards and procedures in member States for returning illegally staying third country nationals intends to regulate the issue of detention a little more thoroughly.  This means that the basic standards for detention of asylum seekers are set in the case-law of the ECHR, in the Constitutional law and national legislation of the Member States.
In judicial review of legality of decision of the determining authority to detain asylum seekers according to the Article 27 of the Asylum Act,  the Administrative Court took the starting point from the case of Amuur v. France.  The first legal question for the Administrative Court was whether the detention of asylum seekers in the Asylum Home or in the Centre for Foreigners means restriction (or deprivation) of personal liberty (Article 5 of the Convention, which corresponds to the Article 19 of the Constitution Act) or whether it means restriction (or deprivation) of freedom of movement (Article 2 of Protocol 4 to the Convention, which corresponds to the Article 32 of the Constitution Act). Despite the fact that Article 27 of the Asylum Act uses the term (a temporary restriction of) "freedom of movement", the Administrative Court said that this provision should be interpreted in light of the judgment of the ECHR in the case of Amuur, where the ECHRs states that in order to determine whether someone has been deprived of his liberty the starting point must be his/her concrete situation, and account must be taken of a whole range of criteria such as type, duration, effects and manner of implementation of the measure in question and that the difference between deprivation of and restriction of liberty is merely one of degree or intensity, and not of nature or substance. Because of the need of assessment of those criteria, a hearing of an applicant before a court, as provided in the Asylum Act, is so important. If the Administrative Court would establish in the specific case that the restriction of personal liberty is at stake, then the prescribed procedural guarantees for review of legality of such decision from Asylum Act would need to be interpreted in respect of the procedural guarantees from the Article 5(2), (3) and (4) of the Convention. However, if the Administrative Court would establish that under the given factual circumstances restriction of freedom of movement is at stake, then the procedural guarantees from the Asylum Act would need to be interpreted in the light of procedural guarantees from the Article 2 of the Protocol no. 4 to the Convention. But in both cases the right to effective legal remedy from Article 13 should be respected as well. The Administrative Court compared the actual circumstances of the given case  with the circumstances from the case of Amuur v. France and concluded that the contested decision means a restriction of freedom of movement and not a restriction on the right to liberty and security of person.  However, this was not a judgment that would have an importance of a precedence, since the Administrative Court adopted the standard of the ECHR that the question whether it is a restriction of personal liberty or a restriction of freedom of movement at stake depends on actual circumstances of each individual case.
This position of the ECHR means that the Administrative Court could no longer stand on the position that detention of asylum seekers in Slovenia comes under the regulation of Article 2 of Protocol no. 4 to the Convention, but it is a subject of the first or the second limb of Article 5(1)(f), because it cannot be considered any more that asylum seekers are “authorised to be on the territory”, or they are not “lawfully within the territory of a State” in terms of Article 2 of the Protocol no. 4 to the Convention. However, the judgment in case of Saadi should have no affect on national jurisprudence on the use of proportionality principle, since this principle is enshrined in the Article 15(3) of the Constitution Act and in the Article 27 of the Asylum Act. But as I describe, on this point the Administrative Court and the Supreme Court have different stands.
The legal developments in jurisprudence on the accelerated procedure are highly relevant in Slovenia, since almost all disputes that are brought before the Administrative Court are decided by the determining authority in the accelerated procedure. These cases the Administrative Court has to adjudicate in 7 days. However, despite this requirement of promptness the rule of law in its fundamental component parts has to be preserved.
For the comparison with the case-law on credibility assessment in other European countries it is perhaps worth to note that under the well-established administrative practice and jurisprudence in Slovenia, if an applicant enters Slovenia illegally and ask for asylum after being two days illegally in Slovenia, especially if he/she is caught by the police, he/she is considered not to be credible.  In the assessment of credibility his/her statement, notified by a police (but not signed by a foreigner), can be used as an evidence against his/her credibility,  although at that point he/she was not yet an asylum applicant and an asylum procedure has not yet started. I do not see problem in this restrictive approach as long as an asylum applicant is coming from the generally considered safe countries, which is in fact the case with our jurisprudence, where the great majority of applicants are coming from the former republics of Yugoslavia.
 In 2005 there were 389 lawsuits in asylum matters filed at the Administrative Court. In 2006 372 lawsuits were filed in asylum matters (Annual Report of the Administrative Court for the Year 2005 (23. 2. 2006) and for the Year 2006 (22. 2. 2007). The great majority of applicants are coming from the former republics of Yugoslavia.
 Article 39 (1) of the Asylum Act says that administrative court shall decide on the basis of findings assessed in course of the procedure at the first instance. The third paragraph of the same provision says if the administrative court determines that the authority of the first instance established incomplete or erroneous facts, or if the circumstances which gave rise to the decision of the first instance have changed, the court shall supplement the procedure, correct the above mentioned deficiencies by quashing and replacing the first instance decision with its own.
 However, this does not mean that the whole procedure is speedy, since in many occasions asylum procedures last considerable long. See introductory examples related to the subsidiary protection in section 2. of this paper.
 Humanitarian asylum is highly relevant in Slovenia, because more then 80% of all asylums that were granted to refugees in Slovenia up to 2003 were the so-called humanitarian asylums. This percentage has decreased in 2004 (Zalar, Boštjan, 2006, The Experiences and Challenges for Adjudication on Refugee law in Slovenia, International Journal of Refugee Law, 18, 1, 118-181).
 The Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third country nationals and stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection and the content of the protection granted (hereinafter referred to as the Qualification Directive, O J L 304/12, 30. 9. 2004, Article 2(e) and Article 15.
 Official Journal of the Republic of Slovenia, no. 67/2001.
 Judgment in case of U 2580/2005 of 20 January 2006.
 Zalar, Boštjan, 2006, The Experiences /.../ - see reference in the footnote no. 4.
 Recitals 6., 9., 25., Article 2(e) and (f) and Article 18 of the Qualification Directive. Article 18 of the Qualification Directive says „Member States shall grant subsidiary protection /.../.“ In this respect the Asylum Act has correctly transposed the provisions from the Qualification Directive.
 This is also a relevant question for the Commission of the European Communities (Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, A More Efficient Common European Asylum System: The Single Procedure as the Next Step, Brussels, 15. 7. 2004 COM 2004 503 final, SEC 2004 937, para. 24).
 Judgment of the Supreme Court, I-Up-578/2002, 22 May 2002, judgment of the Administrative Court, U-1765/2003, 12 Nov. 2003.
 Zalar, Boštjan, 2006, The Experiences /.../ - see footnote no.4.
 UNHCR Observations on the European Commission Communication on "A More Efficient Common European Asylum System: The Single Procedure as the Next Step", COM 2004 503 final; Annex SEC 2004 937, 15 July 2004, para. 5.
 See in particular, the X and Y v. the Netherlands, judgment of 26 March 1985, Series A, no. 91, pp.11-13, paras. 22-27.
 Niemetz v. Germany, judgment of 16 December 1992, Series A, no. 251-B, p.11, para. 29.
 In case Tyrer v. the United Kingdom (judgment of 25 April 1978, Series A, no. 26) the Court held that corporal punishment may constitute an assault on a person’s dignity and physical integrity as protected under Article 3 of the Convention. However, in order for punishment to be degrading and in breach of Article 3, the humiliation or debasement involved must attain a particular level of severity and must in any event be other than that unusual element of humiliation inherent in any punishment (Case of Costello-Roberts v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 23. February 1993, para. 30).
 This is the expression of the European Court of Human Rights in cases concerning Article 3 of the ECHR50: Soering v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 7 July 1989, Series A, no. 161, pp. 35-36, paras. 90-91; the Cruz Varas and Others v. Sweden, judgment of 20 March 1991, Series A, no. 201, p. 28, para. 69; the Vilvarajah and Others v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 30 October 1991, Series A, no. 215, p. 36, paras. 107-108; the Chahal v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 15 November 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-V, p. 1859, paras. 95-97.
 Case of Osman v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 28 October 1998.
 See: Recommendation No. R (99) 23 to member states on Family Reunion for Refugees and Other Persons in Need of International Protection, adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 15 December 1999 at the meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies and Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family reunification, OJ L 251/12, 3. 10. 2003; see also judgments of the European Court of Human Rights: Dalia v. France, judgment of 19 February 1998; Boujlifa v. France, judgment of 21 October 1997, Mehemi v. France judgment of 26 September 1997, Boujaïdi v. France judgment of 26 September 1997; Bouchelkia v. France, judgment of 29 January 1997; Gûl v. Switzerland, judgment of 19 February 1996; Ahmut v. the Netherlands, judgment of 28 November 1996; Nasri v. France, judgment of 13 July 1995; Beldjoudi v. France, judgment of 26 march 1992; Berrehab v. the Netherlands, judgment of 21 June 1988.
 Soering v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 7 July 1989; Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, judgment of 4 February 2005.
 Selmouni v. France, judgment of 28 July 1999.
 Osman v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 28 October 1998.
 Chahal v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 15 November 1996; Amuur v. France, judgment of 25 June 1996.
 Beldjoudi v. France, judgment of 26 march 1992; Moustaquim v. Belgium, judgment of 18 February 1991.
 Zalar, Boštjan, 2006, The Experiences /.../ - see footnote no. 4.
 The Article 18 of the Constitution corresponds to the Article 3 of the Convention.
 Here the Constitutional Court makes reference to the UNHCR Manual on Refugee Protection and the European Convention on Human Rights, Regional Bureau for Europe, Department of International Protection (Ruling of the Constitutional Court in case of Up-422/03 of 10 July 2003, para. 6.
 The content of international protection (Chapter VII of the Qualification Directive) has been transposed by the Government Regulation, published in Official Journal no. 33/2004 (with the effect started on 19 April 2004), and by its amendments (no. 129/2004 and 112/2006).
 The rest of legal provisions from the Qualification Directive is expected to be transposed in the following months by new Asylum Act, which is now in the phase of preparation at the Ministry of Interior.
 Article 1(3) and Article 2(1)(5) of the Asylum Act.
 Judgments of the Administrative Court in case of Mahija and Ramiz Berisha v. the Ministry of Interior (U 425/2007, 28 March 2007 ) and in case of Halilović v. the Ministry of Interior (U 480/2007, 25 April 2007).
 N. v. Finland, judgment of 26 July, para. 158.
 D. v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 2 May 1997, para. 49; Bensaid v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 6 February 2001; Hukić v. Sweden, judgment of 27 september 2005; Rrustemaj and Others v. Sweden, judgment of 15 November 2005.
 Judgments of the ECHR in cases of Bensaid v. the United Kingdom (para. 35), Salkić and Others v. Sweden, D. v. the United Kingdom (para. 50), Hukić v. Sweden.
 Judgments of the ECHR in cases of Bensaid v. the United Kingdom (para. 34), Salkić and Others v. Sweden, D. v. the United Kingdom (para. 49).
 Judgments of the ECHR in cases of D. v the United Kingdom (para. 54) and Rrustemaj and Others v. Sweden.
 D. v. the United Kingdom, paras. 51 and 53.
 Apart form this concrete cases, where health conditions of applicants were relevant in terms of Article 3 of the Convention, the general position of the ECHR that „Article 3 may extend to situation where the danger emanates from the consequences to health from the effects of serious illness was taken in case of T. I. v. the United Kingdom (App. no. 43844/98, Decision of 7 march 2000).
 Applicants have remained illegally in Sweden for several years even though their applications for residence permits have been repeatedly rejected by the Swedish immigration authorities and they have been ordered to leave the country.
 Handyside Case, judgment of 7 December 1976.
 Recital 12 says that the best interest of the child should be a primary consideration of member States when implementing this Directive.
 Recital 10 of the Qualification Directive says that this Directive respects the fundamental rights and observes the principles recognised in particular by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
 Case of Leyla Şahin v. Turkey, judgment of 5. 10. 2005, para. 152.
 Council Directive 2005/85/EC of 1 December 2005 on minimum standards on procedures in member States for Granting and withdrawing refugee status, o J L, 326713, 13. 12. 2005. This Article says that member States shall not hold a person in detention for the sole reason that he/she is an applicant for asylum. Where an applicant for asylum is held in detention, Member States shall ensure that there is a possibility of speedy judicial review.
 Council Directive 2003/9/EC of 27 January 2003 laying down minimum standards for the reception of asylum seekers (O J L 31/18, 6. 2. 2003). Article 7 of the Reception Directive regulates the possibility to assign certain area to asylum seeker, where he/she can move freely, the possibility to decide on the residence of the asylum seeker or the possibility to confine an applicant to a particular place.
- since he/she endangers life of others or property.
Article 36 states that abuse of asylum procedure means: substantiation based on a false identity or forged document; the false presentation of reasons in an application; the deliberate destruction of a passport or any other document that might be relevant for the procedure; if an applicant conceals having lodged a previous asylum application in another country, in particular if he or she uses a false identity; if an applicant files an application in order to postpone forced removal.
 Judgment of the ECHR from 20 may 1996.
 Judgment of the Administrative Court in case of U 2554/05 from 29 November 2004.
 Respecting the circumstances in cases of Cyprus v. Turkey [App. Nos 6780/74, 6950/75, 4 EHRR, (1976) Com Rep, CM Res DH (79)] and Ashingdane v. The United Kingdom (Series A 93, 1985, para. 42) the Administrative Court could also adopt the position that the right from Art. 5 of the Convention is at stake.
 For example, judgment of the Administrative Court in case of U 1097/2006 from 9 May 2006.
 For example: case I Up 1499/2006 from 25 October 2006. The Supreme Court relies on Article 75. of the Aliens Act which regulates by which document an alien can identify him/herself, although in the general provisions of the Aliens Act it is stated that Aliens Act does not apply for asylum seekers, except if this is stated in Asylum Act or in Aliens Act.
 According to the Article 27(2) freedom of movement may be restricted within a defined territory or within the particular institution, like Asylum Home or Centre for Foreigners.
 Judgment of the Supreme Court in cases I Up 1499/2006 from 25 October 2006 and I Up 1519/2006 from 8. November 2006.
 In cases where the Administrative Court relies on Article 2 of the Protocol no. 4 to the Convention the Administrative Court obviously holds an opinion that an asylum seeker whose liberty of movement has been restricted, is lawfully within the territory of a State, although he/she entered illegally.
 Article 5 (1)(b) says no one shall be deprived of his liberty save in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law.
 Article 5(1)(f) says no one shall be deprived of his liberty save in case of lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law.
 This is the main reason for detention of asylum seekers in Slovenia.
 In case of Vasilieva v. Denmark the ECHR says that a reasonable balance needs to be established between the importance of securing the fulfilment of the obligations in general and the importance of the right to liberty (judgment of the ECHR of 25 September 2003, para. 38).
 Case of Chala v. the United Kingdom, judgment of the ECHR from 15 November 1996, paras. 112, 113, Čonka v. Belgium, no. 51564/99, ECHR 2002-I, para. 38.
 Case of Saadi v. the United Kingdom, para. 44.
 Ibid. para. 44. In this case a detention at Oakington (United Kingdom) centre is used only for those who did not present a risk of absconding, but only for the reason to use efficiently the so called fast-track asylum procedure.
 Article 37(b) says that the arrest, detention or imprisonment of a child shall be in conformity with the law and shall be used only as a measure of last resort and for the shortest appropriate period of time.
 Respecting the particular circumstances of a given case, in this kind of asylum and immigration disputes a reference could be made to the judgment of the ECHr in case of Mubilanzila Mayeka and Kaniki Mitunga v. Belgium, where the issue of holding a 5 years old unaccompanied child in a detention together with adults was at stake. (See: Comments from the Standpoint of the Rule of Law on the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on common standards and procedures in Member states for returning illegally staying third-country nationals COM (2005) 391, 1. 9. 2005, based on a statement elaborated by Judge Boštjan Zalar, member and co-chair of the Working Party, April 2007).
 Article 22 regulates the principle of equal protection under the law.
 See: the Procedures Directive, Article 8(2)(b), (3), (4), Article 9(1(2), Article 10(19(d), Article 13(3) and Article 14(2).
 Abuses of procedure are: argumentation based on a false identity or forged document; the false presentation of reasons in an application; the deliberate destruction of a passport or any other document that might be relevant for the procedure; if an applicant conceals having lodged a previous asylum application in another country, in particular if he or she uses a false identity; if an applicant files an application in order to postpone forced removal.
 While the Administrative Court interpreted these provisions in the light of the respect of the ban on formal rules of evidence (judgment of the Administrative Court in case U 2374/04 of 13 January 2005), the Supreme Court did not accept the interpretation of the Administrative Court.
 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: Article 26 (pacta sunt servanda); Article 27 (a party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty); Article 31 (a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of the subject and purpose).
 Judgment of the Administrative Court in case U 2165/2004 of 15 December 2004, judgment of the Supreme Court in case I-Up 35/2005 of 19 January 2005.
 O J L 050, 25/02/2003.
 Judgments of the Supreme Court in cases I-Up 197/2005 of 16. 2. 2005, I Up 1253/05 of 9 November 2005.
 Cases Up-240/05 of 21 April 2005 and Up-794/05 of 20 October 2005.
 Article 22 of the Constitution states that each person shall be guaranteed equality in the protection of his rights in any proceedings before a court, as well as before any governmental body, local government body or statutory authority which determines the rights, obligations or legal entitlements of such person.
 Article 28(2) of the Procedural Directive states that in the cases mentioned in Article 23(4)(b) and in cases of unfounded applications for asylum in which any of the circumstances listed in Article 23(4)(a) and (c) to (o) apply, Member States may also consider an application as manifestly unfounded, where it is defined as such in the national legislation. In my opinion this provision means that in the case of misleading or presentation of false information or documents (Article 23(4)(d)) an application should also be unfounded and then may the authority reject the application as manifestly unfounded. For a relevant comparison see also Article 8(1) and Article 12(6) of the Procedural Directive.
 For example: judgments in cases of U 2374/04 of 13 January 2005, U 2404/05 of 16 november 2005.
 Judgments of the Supreme Court in cases I Up 515/2005 and I Up 505/2005 of 11 May 2005 and case I Up 610/2005 of 18 May 2005.
 Article 36(5) of the Asylum Act.
 Judgment of the Supreme Court in case of I-Up-867/2002, 18 July 2003.
 Office of the UUNHCR, Geneva, Reedited, January 1992, paras. 203-204.
 Judgment of the Supreme Court in case of I-Up-906/2001, 24 Oct. 2001. This standard corresponds to the UNHCR’s guidelines published in the Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status, revised, Geneva, January 1992 (principles and methods, paragraph 199), although this guideline was not cited by the Supreme Court in that judgment.
 Judgments of the Supreme Court in cases of I Up 2991/2006 of 28 March 2007, I Up 110/2007 of 1 February 2007, I up 174/2007 of 15 February 2007.
 Judgment of the Supreme Court in case of I Up 265/2007 of 28 February 2007.

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