Source: https://www.scribd.com/document/321206873/Sharon-Burnette-v-Helen-Fahey-4th-Cir-2012
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 20:50:39+00:00

Document:
Genre's role in parole work.
Virginia Parole Board; JACKIE T.
Virginia Parole Board; RUDOLPH C.
Robert A. Angle, Robert M. Luck, III, TROUTMAN SANDERS, LLP, Richmond, Virginia; Abigail Turner, Alex R.
Gulotta, Gail Starling Marshall, LEGAL AID JUSTICE CENTER, Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellants. Kenneth T.
Cuccinelli, II, Attorney General of Virginia, Stephen R.
for persons who committed crimes prior to 1995, however.
remaining on his sentence. Id. 53.1-154.
who have served as least ten years of their imposed sentences.
upon a finding of "compelling reasons."
felony that the Board considers to be violent."
of the five Board members.
himself and to society upon his release.
numbers led participants in the court system, including defendants and sentencing judges, to anticipate early release.
of the original offense as the reason for 95% of the denials.
least twenty-three years of his or her term of imprisonment.
records, the Board has denied parole to each Inmate on multiple occasions.
and circumstances of his crimes.
based only on the seriousness of his crimes.
Larry Macon committed his offenses in 1976.
criminal history consisted of three minor juvenile offenses and an adult gambling offense.
of the crimes and, occasionally, McClains conviction of a crime while incarcerated.
he has incurred no infractions while imprisoned.
commission of crimes while incarcerated.
one factor, the offense for which the prisoner is incarcerated.
the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution.
reason for the denial of parole.
ers, no new inmates were becoming eligible for parole.
failed to state a plausible claim for a due process violation.
support an ex post facto claim.
for failure to state a claim, assuming all well-pleaded, nonconclusory factual allegations in the complaint to be true."
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
veracity of "bare legal conclusions." Aziz, 658 F.3d at 391.
against unlawful deprivations of life, liberty, or property. U.S.
U.S. 471, 481 (1972); Slezak, 21 F.3d at 593.
rights imparted by Virginia law.
parole release." Gaston v. Taylor, 946 F.2d 340, 344 (4th Cir.
also Hill, 64 F.3d at 170.
Once a state has "create[d] a liberty interest, the Due Process Clause requires fair procedures for its vindication."
Swarthout v. Cooke, 131 S. Ct. 859, 862 (2011) (per curiam).
in the parole context, "the procedures required are minimal."
Swarthout, 131 S. Ct. at 862.
denial of parole." Vann, 73 F.3d at 522 (quoting Franklin v.
appear before the Board." Franklin, 569 F.2d at 800.
parole, the Board provided a reason or reasons for its denial.
another reasoneither instead of or in addition to this factorto explain its decision.
demonstrated consistently excellent institutional behavior.
to release them based on the seriousness of their crimes.
the process and decision would comply fully with constitutional demands.
affirm the district courts dismissal of the due process claim.
204, 207 (4th Cir. 2000) (quoting U.S. Const. art. I, 10, cl.
the Board has altered or eliminated since 1994.
possibleinference that the Board is looking at only one factor, particularly in light of the discordant implications of the statistical allegations.
Clause, to the consideration of multiple factors in parole determinations.
"by its own terms" or through "practical implementation"
creates a "significant risk" of extending the period of incarceration to which he is subject. Id. at 255.
promulgated by administrative agencies pursuant to a delegation of legislative authority. See United States v. Ellen, 961 F.2d 462, 465 (4th Cir.
Ex Post Facto Clause. 233 F.3d at 208 (assessing a new policy of the Virginia Parole Board).
binding," function as "the starting point and the initial benchmark" in federal sentencing. Id. at 200 & n.8 (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S.
changes and a significant risk of extended punishment.
Post Facto Clause to the Boards policies.
subject to the ex post facto limitation.
crimes "hardly amount[s] to an ex post facto violation"
tougher." Foster, 595 F.3d at 362.
offenders. This is not actionable.
parole consideration. For this reason, I respectfully dissent.
The majority and I are in agreement on several points.
ered for parole, Hill v. Jackson, 64 F.3d 163 (4th Cir. 1995).
569 F.2d 784, 800 (4th Cir. 1976) (en banc).
this to be the case,2 and we should not do so today.
This interpretation is both hyper-literal and leads to absurd results.
considerationall without ever looking at the inmates file. Such a formalistic view of the Due Process Clause cannot be countenanced.
factors" in makings its decisions. Bloodgood, 783 F.2d at 475.
(quoting Gaston v. Taylor, 946 F.2d 340, 344 (4th Cir. 1991)).
have implied that the Board must consider at least some factors beyond the nature of the offense.
parole process into an empty formality.
deny them parole. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
members cast votes to grant or deny parole electronically. J.A.
instead, it has adopted an informal "policy manual." J.A. 22.
has been denied parole 22 times, all for the same reason. J.A. 32.
offense. These allegations are sufficient to surmount the relatively low burden of surviving a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.
the offense, and no other factor, on at least one occasion.
"Fundamental fairness [is] the touchstone of due process."
district courts 12(b)(6) dismissal and remand for further proceedings.
Germany - Panel Nomination & Election Schedule Notification IPE-2018.

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