Source: https://ctc.usma.edu/the-threat-to-the-united-states-from-the-islamic-states-virtual-entrepreneurs/
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 14:51:13+00:00

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Abstract: Among the most recent evolutions of jihadi terrorist tactics in the West has been the rise of the virtual entrepreneur. The increased use of social media, often paired with applications that offer the option of encrypted messaging, has enabled members of groups like the Islamic State to make direct and lasting contact with radicalized Americans. In some cases, these individuals direct terror plots, and in others, they provide encouragement and motivation for attacks. In the United States, there are 14 known cases of terrorist-related activity involving 19 U.S.-based individuals where the involvement of an Islamic State virtual entrepreneur has been documented. This outsourcing of terrorism has been a game changer in Islamic State efforts to attack the West.
More frequently, however, these virtual plotters have acted in a more auxiliary capacity, plugging their Western contacts into wider extremist milieus (both online and offline) and encouraging extreme beliefs, while offering suggestions and options for mobilization. Indeed, because of the variety of roles they play, the authors have chosen to refer to these individuals as ‘virtual entrepreneurs,’ thus allowing for a broader encapsulation of the different categories of their involvement. Out of a total of 38 Islamic State-inspired domestic plots and attacks in the United States between March 1, 2014, and March 1, 2017, at least eight (21 percent) have involved some form of digital communication with virtual entrepreneurs.b The peak period for this activity was 2015, with virtual entrepreneurs involved in six separate plots. In addition, virtual entrepreneurs have also been involved in at least six other terrorism-related cases, including assisting with logistics related to traveling to join the Islamic State.c This brings the total number of U.S. terrorism cases linked to Islamic State virtual entrepreneurs to 14, involving 19 U.S.-based individuals.
This development is a reminder that the strategies and tactics pursued by the modern global jihad movement, as part of its efforts to maintain an international presence and ability to conduct attacks, are varied and evolving. Jihadi strategists swiftly adapt to the constantly shifting environments around them while opportunistically exploiting new technologies. One of the benefits of such increased contact with radicalized Westerners is that it has given the Islamic State wider scope to claim ownership of attacks that it had little to do with in reality. This allows it to inflate its impact and reach, which is crucial to the group’s propaganda efforts.
To some extent, the emergence of virtual entrepreneurs represents a hybrid between what are commonly seen as the two previous manifestations of the jihadi terrorist threat to the West: networked and inspired lone-attacker plots. The former relies on direct involvement by an organization in terms of training, direction, financing, and indoctrination. The lone-actor and now hybrid categories rely more on the creation of loosely connected milieus, often online, and the wide availability of an accessible form of global jihadi propaganda. Together, these help inspire individuals to carry out attacks on their own and in the name of the global jihad movement, or a specific group within it.
However, while the use of this tactic has increased as the Islamic State continues to exploit social media and online encryption technologies, the phenomenon of jihadi entrepreneurs making virtual connections with unaffiliated radicalized Westerners is certainly not new. As is often the case when discussing innovative jihadis, one need only look at the activities of the late Yemeni-American jihadi ideologue and recruiter Anwar al-Awlaki, who, via email, was in contact with a number of radicalized individuals in the West and who, in at least one case, helped plot a potential attack.d Social media and encrypted messaging apps, along with an expansion of jihadi territories across the globe, are all factors that have nonetheless added a new dimension to such virtual communications.
Due to the contact between Rahim and Hussain and subsequent activities by the plotters—including Rahim’s purchase of combat knives at the recommendation of Hussain “in case the ‘feds’ tried to arrest him”24—they soon became the subjects of law enforcement surveillance. On June 2, 2015, Rahim was approached by investigators while walking through a parking lot in Roslindale, Massachusetts, and shot dead after attempting to attack them with a knife. Rovinski pleaded guilty, and Wright is currently awaiting trial on terrorist charges.
Junaid Hussain and Reyaad Khan had begun their attempts to direct plots in the United States as early as 2014, when they used social media to solicit Minnesota resident Abdul Raheem Ali-Skelton to “carry out an attack in the United States.”25 During the previous months, he had been interacting and debating with Islamic State members on social media and was soon referred to the two Legion members. Ali-Skelton refused their request, however, and was later arrested and convicted for lying about his contact with the Legion.
While it is in their roles as direct plotters that virtual entrepreneurs gain the most attention, much of their work has involved encouraging their contacts to take on more extreme positions and helping them make connections in real-world foreign fighter networks.
By mid-2015, Sullivan had planned to buy an assault rifle at a local gun show and expressed a desire to kill up to 1,000 people.29 Perturbed by his son’s behavior, which included destroying Buddha statues and other non-Islamic religious items, Sullivan’s father called 911 and informed authorities of his suspicion that his son was becoming an Islamic State supporter.30 After subsequently entering into conversations with an FBI undercover agent in which he discussed his intentions to carry out an attack, he was arrested in June 2015 and pleaded guilty to providing material support to terrorism. Sullivan’s case is indicative of the wider impact of virtual entrepreneurs in the United States beyond direct attack planning.31 He was not only provided with the encouragement, reassurance, and comradery he needed, but he also received specific advice on how to ensure his attack could provide the most benefit to the Islamic State.
Al-Sudani was also heavily involved in encouraging New York-based Islamic State supporter Emanuel Lutchman to plan an attack in the city. They began communicating online in December 2015 after Lutchman found al-Sudani’s contact in an Islamic State-produced online document.41 During these discussions, Lutchman expressed his desire to travel to Libya in order join the Islamic State, but he was told by al-Sudani that he first had to prove himself to the group by executing an attack in the United States. Al-Sudani also pointed out that due to his location “behind enemy lines,” Lutchman’s real utility to the Islamic State was as a domestic terrorist.42 He told Lutchman to plan an attack for New Year’s Eve 2015, when he would have easy access to large crowds. He also offered Lutchman various pieces of advice both to ensure that the operation was as effective as possible and to avoid capture beforehand. Once the operation was complete, al-Sudani promised Lutchman he would vouch for him to the Islamic State after he arrived in Libya.
By late December, Lutchman—while maintaining regular contact with al-Sudani, who continued to offer advice and moral support—had begun plotting an attack with three accomplices. He was unaware, however, that all of these individuals were working for the FBI. On December 28, Lutchman identified a restaurant in Rochester, New York, as a target and began planning an attack that entailed taking hostages and executing them with a machete.43 Two days later, he recorded the video al-Sudani had requested of him. Holding his index finger aloft, he pledged allegiance to the Islamic State and announced that “the blood that you spill of the Muslim overseas, we gonna spill the blood of the kuffar [unbelievers].”44 He was arrested immediately afterward, and in August 2016, Lutchman pleaded guilty to conspiracy to provide material support to the Islamic State.
The virtual entrepreneurs of the Islamic State appear to be issuing similar sets of instructions to their American contacts, almost as if they are working from a common script. For example, al-Sudani asked two things of Lutchman that match what Hussain had advised Usaamah Abdullah Rahim and Justin Sullivan. Lutchman was told to carry a weapon with him at all times in case the authorities attempted to arrest him, so that if “something happens, kill them all.”45 Al-Sudani also asked Lutchman to send him a written message and videos announcing his bay`a (allegiance) to the Islamic State, which could be released after the attack and allow the group to claim responsibility and “let the worlds know [ISIL is] coming.”46 While it is unclear if Islamic State virtual entrepreneurs are sharing information and tradecraft amongst themselves, this certainly would appear to be the case.
Figures like al-Sudani and Hussain gained such respect among English-speaking Islamic State supporters around the world that they were also sought out online in order to give their blessing for attacks, much in the same way that extremist sheikhs provided fatwas in the past. Around the same time that Ohio resident Munir Abdulkader was coordinating his attack with Hussain, a young man from New York was looking for approval for a “martyrdom attack.”47 According to court records submitted as part of a plea agreement, the man in question, Munther Omar Saleh, reached out to Hussain for advice on behalf of his friend Fareed Mumuni, stating “akh (a brother) who is planning on hitting a black car cop [police car] with a pressure cooker, the black car keeps following him, and he wants to avenge our akhs (brothers) who have been raided and blocked from hijrah. Is it permissible for him to do the attack and die purposely in the process?” Hussain responded, “Yes akhi (my brother) he can do an isthishadi (martyrdom) operation on the police akhi if he has no other way to fight them he can do it.” Not one to miss an opportunity for propaganda production, Hussain also told Saleh to have Mumuni send any martyrdom video directly to him.48 h When the FBI arrived at Mumuni’s house to execute a search warrant, he attacked one of the special agents with a knife, stabbing him repeatedly but failing to penetrate his body armor.49 He was instructed to do so by Hussain, and this is consistent with the type of instructions he gave to Rahim and al-Sudani to Lutchman.
In December 2014, Miski engaged with Simpson via Twitter direct messages during which both men discussed their support for the January 2015 attacks in Paris and their shared admiration for al-Awlaki. It appears that, among other things, Simpson was using Miski as a way to receive advice and information from a jihadi sheikh with connections to Miski. On December 7, 2014, Simpson, using his Twitter handle @birdofgreen, messaged Miski’s account @Muhajir_1436_Miski: “Did the brother interpret the dream for you? Or not yet.” Miski soon responded, telling Simpson that “he said the Hoor al-Ayn is waiting for you eagerly.”58 The Hoor al-Ayn are virgins that jihadi ideologues claim are promised to recruits who carry out suicide operations, and Miski’s reference to this is telling. While it is not clear what Simpson’s dream was about, it can be reasonably surmised that it was related to a possible operation he had discussed with Miski, who was all too happy to offer encouragement.
Miski and Simpson also communicated via Twitter about the gathering in Garland. In April 2015, a week before the attack, Simpson expressed his frustration about the event over Twitter, saying “When will they ever learn? They are planning on selecting the best picture drawn of Rasulullah (saws) [a reference to the Prophet Mohammad] in Texas.” Miski soon retweeted the message and also posted his own statement encouraging Americans to attack the event, telling his followers that “The brothers from the Charlie Hebdo attack did their part. It’s time for brothers in the #US to do their part.”61 This was a reference to the January 2015 al-Qa`ida-linked killings at the offices of French satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo, known for its frequent depictions of the Prophet Mohammad.
Beyond their various degrees of direct contact with a myriad of radicalized Americans, the impact of virtual entrepreneurs, while significant, is difficult to measure. Their activities and the public profiles they cultivated have nonetheless made them beacons of inspiration for their fellow Western jihadis, many of whom have no doubt been motivated after witnessing what they were able to achieve.
Social media, coupled with the ever-increasing availability of applications that offer encrypted messaging, has given virtual entrepreneurs the ability to both bypass Western counterterrorism measures and build close, trusting online relationships with recruits. As a result, virtual entrepreneurs have come to be seen by their followers as leadership figures from whom they can draw inspiration and take advice and instruction on how to act on their extreme beliefs.
The story is similar in the United States. Since 2015, as seen in the cases of Abdulkader and Lutchman, some have been directed away from their initial intention to join the Islamic State by virtual entrepreneurs who ask them to instead focus on domestic attacks due to difficulties associated with travel. The authors’ current data shows that virtual entrepreneurs were involved in 21 percent of the total 38 plots in the United States in the same period as the European study.k While this number is lower—and in 2016, there was only one documented instance of a virtual entrepreneur being involved in a domestic plot (compared to six in 2015)—it may change. Due to the time it takes for cases to go to court, it will be some time before additional details come to light. It is worth noting as well that three of the most influential members of the Legion—Hussain, Hostey, and Khan—were killed in 2015, while Miski was arrested that same year and al-Sudani was killed in mid-2016. Whether or not they can be replaced remains to be seen.
There are a number of factors that may influence this. The first of these is whether the Islamic State and other jihadi groups intent on striking the West maintain enough territory to continue harboring individuals with the capability to inspire and plan attacks via the internet. While virtual entrepreneurs can technically be just as effective while operating outside of jihadi-held territory, it is not so simple. They may, for example, lose credibility in the eyes of Western jihadis gained by the likes of Hussain and Miski who, due to their locations, were able to present themselves as legitimate members of terrorist organizations. This potential lack of safe havens would also likely make virtual entrepreneurs more vulnerable to interception by Western security services.
[a] The plots are often referred to as ‘Islamic State-enabled.’ While this typology is useful, it is also problematic as it may suggest that the plots are planned by the Islamic State leadership. It remains unclear if Islamic State virtual entrepreneurs are taking direction from senior Islamic State figures or acting independently.
[b] The eight separate plots involved 13 individuals in total. They are Fareed Mumuni and Munther Omar Saleh (2015); David Daoud Wright and Nicholas Rovinski (2015); Munir Abdulkader (2015); Justin Nojan Sullivan (2015); Jalil Ibn Ameer Aziz (2015); Emanuel Lutchman (2015); Abdul Malik Abdul Kareem (2015); and Mohamed Bailor Jalloh (2016). The dates provided here reflect when the defendants were charged, as opposed to when the offense was carried out or contact was made with the virtual entrepreneur. Three individuals were killed either conducting their operation or during attempts to arrest them. Garland attackers Nadir Soofi and Elton Simpson were killed while conducting their operation. Usaamah Abdullah Rahim was killed when officers tried to arrest him. Soofi and Simpson committed the attack with assistance from Adbul Malik Abdul Kareem. Source: court documents.
[c] They are Avin Brown (2014), Mohammed Hamzah Khan (2014), Nader Elhuzayel (2015), Ardit Ferizi (2015), Aaron T. Daniels (2016), and Abdul Raheem Habil Ali-Skelton (2016).
[d] This was the case of British Airways employee Rajib Karim. For more, see Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens, “As American as Apple Pie: How Anwar al-Awlaki Became the Face of Western Jihad,” International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, September 11, 2011, and Scott Shane, Objective Troy (New York: Tim Duggan Books, 2016).
[e] The membership of the Legion has yet to be fully identified. At the very least, it publicly consisted of British citizens Junaid Hussain (also known as Abu Hussain al-Britani) and his wife, Sally Jones (also known as Umm Hussain al-Britani); Reyaad Khan (also known as Abu Dujana); Raphael Hostey (also known as Abu Qaqa); and Trinidadian citizen Shawn Parson (also known as Abu Khalid al-Amriki). Based on conversations with individuals familiar with the group, the authors also strongly suspect that another British national, Omar Hussain (also known as Abu Sa’eed al-Britani), is also a member. Abu Sa’ad al-Sudani was not a member of the Legion but had close coordination with the group. For example, in at least one instance, Omar Hussain edited the online postings of al-Sudani.
[f] Since early 2015, the Islamic State has attempted to coax, and later coerce, al-Shabaab to switch its allegiances from al-Qa`ida. The leadership has fiercely and violently resisted these efforts, imprisoning and killing any suspected Islamic State sympathizers.
[g] While such an approach is useful and necessary in order to better understand the threat, the levels of involvement of virtual entrepreneurs remain fluid and defy precise categorization.
[h] Although the court records do not explicitly name the ‘ISIL Facilitator,’ the U.S. attorney announced it was Junaid Hussain in remarks to the press.
[i] Elton Simpson’s online discussions with Hussain were presented as evidence for the prosecution in United States v. Abdul Malik Abdul Kareem (2016).
[j] According to the study, a further “twelve plots can with a high degree of certainty be linked to IS’s section for international operations and the Abaaoud-network. Nearly all of [these twelve] involve returning foreign fighters.” Petter Nesser, Anne Stenersen, and Emilie Oftedal, “Jihadi Terrorism in Europe: The IS-Effect,” Perspectives on Terrorism 10:6 (2016).
[k] While the authors’ dataset covers an additional five months (up to March 2017), this does not impact the figures.
 Rukmini Callimachi, “Not ‘Lone Wolves’ After All: How ISIS Guides World’s Terror Plots From Afar,” New York Times, February 4, 2017; Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Madeleine Blackman, “ISIL’s Virtual Planners: A Critical Terrorist Innovation,” War on the Rocks, January 4, 2017; Bridget Moreng, “ISIS’ Virtual Puppeteers,” Foreign Affairs, September 21, 2016.
 Michael B. Steinbach, “How Technology Has Transformed the Terrorist Threat Fifteen Years After 9/11,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, September 21, 2016.
 Amarnath Amarasingam, “An Interview with Rachid Kassim, Jihadist Orchestrating Attacks in France,” Jihadology.net, November 18, 2016; Stacy Meichtry and Sam Schechner, “How Islamic State Weaponized the Chat App to Direct Attacks on the West,” Wall Street Journal, October 20, 2016.
 Ryan Browne and Paul Cruickshank, “US-led coalition targets top ISIS figure in Iraq strike,” CNN, February 10, 2017.
 Press Briefing by Pentagon Press Secretary Peter Cook, Department of Defense, 2016.
 United States v. Justin Nojan Sullivan (2016), Factual Basis, p. 4.
 “Cardiff jihadist Reyaad Khan, 21, killed by RAF drone,” BBC News, September 7, 2015.
 William Watkinson, “Baby-faced Isis recruiter from Manchester killed in Syria, say reports,” International Business Times, May 2, 2016.
 Abu Sa’ad al-Sudani, Day of Sahawaat, July 4, 2015.
 Dan Joseph and Harun Maruf, “American Al-Shabab, Nabbed in Somalia, Denies IS Links,” Voice of America, December 8, 2015; “Terror Charges Unsealed in Minneapolis Against Eight Men, Justice Department Announces,” Department of Justice, November 23, 2009.
 Mukhtar Ibrahim, “Minn. al-Shabab fighter surrenders in Somalia,” MPR News, December 7, 2015; Joseph and Maruf.
 United States v. Munir Abdulkader (2016), Information, p. 1; United States v. Munir Abdulkader (2015), Affidavit in Support of a Criminal Complaint, p. 3.
 United States v. Munir Abdulkader (2016), Plea Agreement, 8; United States v. Munir Abdulkader (2016), Information, p. 2; United States v. Munir Abdulkader (2015), Criminal Complaint, p. 1.
 United States v. Munir Abdulkader (2016), Sentencing Memorandum, p. 3.
 United States v. Munir Abdulkader (2016), Sentencing Minutes, p. 55.
 United States v. Munir Abdulkader (2016), Sentencing Memorandum, p. 10.
 United States v. Munir Abdulkader (2016), Sentencing Minutes, pp. 68, 78.
 United States v. Munir Abdulkader (2016), Sentencing Memorandum, p. 13.
 United States v. David Daoud Wright (2017), Second Superseding Indictment, p. 5.
 United States v. Abdul Raheem Ali-Skelton (2016), Defendant’s Position on Sentencing Factors.
 United States v. Justin Nojan Sullivan (2016), Factual Basis, pp. 2, 5, 15.
 United States v. Justin Nojan Sullivan (2016), Factual Basis, p. 21.
 United States v. Justin Nojan Sullivan (2016), Factual Basis, p. 2.
 United States v. Justin Nojan Sullivan (2016), Criminal Complaint, p. 4.
 United States v. Jalil Ibn Ameer Aziz (2015), Criminal Complaint, p. 13.
 United States v. Jalil Ibn Ameer Aziz (2015), Criminal Complaint, p. 14.
 United States v. Jalil Ibn Ameer Aziz (2017), Government’s Opposition to Defendant’s Motions in Limine, p. 11.
 “Raleigh Man Pleads Guilty to Conspiring to Provide Material Support for Terrorism,” U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs, October 16, 2014.
 United States v. Mohammed Hamzah Khan (2016), Government’s Sentencing Memorandum, p. 4; Janet Reitman, “The Children of ISIS,” Rolling Stone, March 25, 2015.
 United States v. Mohamed Bailor Jalloh, Sentencing Memorandum, p. 3.
 United States v. Mohamed Bailor Jalloh, Sentencing Memorandum, p. 4.
 United States v. Mohamed Bailor Jalloh, Affidavit in Support of a Criminal Complaint, p. 7.
 “Former Army National Guardsman Sentenced to 11 Years for Attempting to Provide Material Support to ISIL,” U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs, February 10, 2017.
 United States v. Emanuel L. Lutchman, Plea Agreement, p. 4.
 United States v. Emanuel L. Lutchman, Plea Agreement, p. 5.
 United States v. Emanuel L. Lutchman, Plea Agreement, p. 6.
 United States v. Emanuel L. Lutchman, Plea Agreement, p. 9.
 “Two New York City Residents Pleaded Guilty to All Charges in Terrorism Case,” U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs, February 10, 2017.
 United States v. Munther Omar Saleh (2015), Government Plea Memo.
 United States v. Fareed Mumuni, Criminal Complaint, pp. 2, 8.
 United States v. Abdul Malik Abdul Kareem (2016), Exhibit 7, p. 15.
 Rukmini Callimachi, “Clues on Twitter Show Ties Between Texas Gunman and ISIS Network,” New York Times, May 11, 2015.
 Holly Yan, “ISIS claims responsibility for Garland, Texas, shooting,” CNN, May 5, 2015.
 United States v. Munir Abdulkader (2016), Sentencing Minutes, p. 70.
 James Eng, “FBI Director: Encrypted Messages Stymied Probe of Garland Shooting,” NBC News, December 9, 2015; reporting by Evan Perez, CNN Situation Room, December 17, 2015.
 Scott Shane and Fernanda Santos, “Elton Simpson Eluded U.S. Inquiry Before Texas Shootout,” New York Times, May 6, 2015.
 Libor Jany, “Former Twin Cities man and ISIL recruiter linked to thwarted terrorist plots in U.S.,” Star Tribune, July 3, 2015.
 United States v. Abdul Malik Abdul Kareem (2016), Exhibit 7, pp. 2, 7, 8.
 United States v. Abdul Malik Abdul Kareem (2016), Exhibit 7, p. 3.
 United States v. Abdul Malik Abdul Kareem (2016), Exhibit 7, p. 7.
 Jim Sciutto, Pamela Brown, Paul Cruickshank, and Paul Murphy, “Texas attacker tweeted with overseas terrorists,” CNN, May 5, 2015.
 Libor Jany, “Former Twin Cities man and ISIL recruiter linked to thwarted terrorist plots in U.S.,” Minneapolis Star Tribune, July 3, 2015.
 United States v. Abdullahi Yusuf and Abdi Nur (2014), Criminal Complaint and Affidavit, p. 17.
 Austin Nolen, “Declaration Exclusive: Names of Alleged Co-Conspirators In Philly ISIL Case Revealed,” Declaration, June 10, 2016.
 For a comprehensive analysis of the Islamic State’s plans to survive online, see Charlie Winter, “Media Jihad: The Islamic State’s Doctrine for Information Warfare,” International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, 2017.
 Robert Mackey, “Telegram Messaging App Closes Channels Used by ISIS,” New York Times, November 18, 2015.
 Paul Cruickshank, “A View from the CT Foxhole: Peter Edge, ICE acting deputy director, and Wil van Gemert, EUROPOL deputy director,” CTC Sentinel 10:1 (2017).
 Cecelia Kang and Matt Apuzzo, “U.S. Asks Tech and Entertainment Industries Help in Fighting Terrorism,” New York Times, February 24, 2016.

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