Source: https://eutopialaw.com/category/case-comments/
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 00:18:57+00:00

Document:
The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights precludes the “general and indiscriminate retention of traffic data and location data” and “the Member States may not impose a general obligation to retain data on providers of electronic communications services.” This is clear following the Court of Justice of the European Union’s judgment of 22 December 2016 inTele2 Sverige  which affirms that Court’s previous judgment in Digital Rights Ireland, from 2014. In that judgment the CJEU held that the EU’s Data Retention Directive was invalid. Some EU member states, such as Sweden and the U.K., then continued to oblige telecommunications providers to generally retain data under their national laws. In Tele2 Sverige the EU held that such national laws must similarly comply with the Charter’s data protection rules and may thus be similarly invalid.
The Tele2 Sverige judgment is of great significance for a number of reasons. First, the CJEU made clear that the data retention laws of member states must comply with EU data protection rules. Some member states thought that the derogations provided by EU Directive 2002/58 allowed them to introduce national laws governing the general retention of personal date by private companies outside the scope of EU data protection law and the judgment of the CJEU in Digital Rights Ireland in particular.
Fourth, the CJEU outlined the criteria a national data retention law needs to contain in order to comply with EU data protection law. Such a law must lay down clear and precise rules and impose minimum safeguards; it must indicate the circumstances and conditions under which data retention may be adopted as a preventative measure. This is to limit such retention to what the ECJ underlines as “strictly necessary.” Where data is retained, such retention must “meet objective criteria, that establish a connection between the data to be retained and the objective pursued.” These objective criteria must be assessed against objective evidence. While the CJEU does allow that member states may require that data may be retained, such requirements will not be easily or lightly imposed.
Fourth, the CJEU stated unequivocally that “the data concerned should be retained within the European Union.” This statement appears to preclude, or imply the need for further legislation authorising, the transfer of personal data outside the EU including the EEA.
The recent announcement by the European Commission (“the Commission”) that it is actively looking into the compatibility of the disciplinary measures exacted by the International Skating Union (“ISU”) with competition rules reminds us yet again of that there are few elements of modern life that are exempt from the scope of EU competition rules. The approach being undertaken by the Commission in the ISU case constitutes a logical extension of the recent interest shown by National Competition Authorities within the EU on the compatibility of governance rules of sports organisations with national and EU competition law.
Based in Lausanne, Switzerland, the ISU is the only body recognised by the International Olympic Committee (“IOC”) with the responsibility of administering the sports of ice figure skating and speed skating. In turn, its members are the various national ice-skating associations.
The Commission had initiated proceedings in relation to ISU’s eligibility rules in October 2015 following a complaint by two Dutch professional speed skaters, Mark Tuitert (gold medal winner at the 2010 Winter Olympics) and Niels Kerstholt.
After an extremely short formal investigation of less than a year, the Commission has announced that the rules imposed by the ISU might be in contravention of the EU prohibition on anti-competitive agreements under Article 101 TFEU.
More precisely, the Commission has informed the ISU of its preliminary view that its rules, under which athletes face severe penalties if they participate in speed skating events which have not been authorised by ISU, might infringe EU competition rules. Competition Commissioner Margrethe Vestager has indicated that the Commission’s concerns stem from the belief “that the penalties the ISU imposes on skaters through its eligibility rules are not aimed at preserving high standards in sport but rather serve to maintain the ISU’s control over speed skating. The ISU now has the opportunity to reply to our concerns”.
These accusations are outlined in a Statement of Objections addressed to the ISU, a document which informs the parties concerned of the competition allegations raised against them and which foresees that investigated entities can reply in writing and also request an Oral Hearing. While the issuance of a Statement of Objections does not prejudge the outcome of the investigation, it is relatively rare that the Commission backs away from its claims.
According to a blog post by the Complainants’ counsel, which includes a twitter exchange between a skate complainant and Commissioner Vestager, the complaint is based on the ISU’s intention to declare skaters as “persona non grata” where they participate in events organised by Icederby International, a private entity. Moreover, the Complainants contended that the ISU Eligibility Rules rendered ineligible a person skating or officiating in an event not endorsed by ISU and/or its Members (i.e., the individual national associations) from participating in ISU activities and competitions. According to the Complainant’s counsel, this sanction apparently applies not only to the skaters, but also extends to coaches, trainers, doctors, team attendants, team officials, judges, referees and even volunteers.
By way of rebuttal, the ISU noted in a recent press release that independent organisers can establish international tournaments on the ISU calendar, and that Icederby, an organisation which initiated the complaint that triggered the Commission’s investigation via the two speed skaters in question, recently received ISU authorisation to co-run an event.
High Court Brexit judgment: do all roads lead to Luxembourg?
This is a lightly edited version of a post that first appeared on the How to Crack a Nut blog.
The High Court has now issued its Judgment in the dispute about the UK Parliament’s necessary approval of a Brexit notification–see R (Miller) -V- Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union  EWHC 2768 (Admin). It has ruled that such Parliamentary approval is indeed required as a matter of UK constitutional and public law. The Government has already announced that it will appeal this decision to the UK Supreme Court (UKSC). The implications of such an appeal are important and need to be carefully considered. One such possible consequence is that the appeal (indirectly) brings the case to the docket of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).
In my view, an appeal of the High Court’s Judgment before the UKSC will indeed trigger a legal requirement under EU law for the UKSC to send a reference for a preliminary ruling to the CJEU. I have rehearsed most of my arguments on twitter earlier (see here and here) and this posts brings them together.

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