Source: http://www.employmentandlabour.com/tag/british-columbia
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 17:06:55+00:00

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In a recent grievance decision, Re Prince George and Prince George Firefighters, Local 1372 (Williams), 2016 CarswellBC 2591, a labour arbitrator reinstated a firefighter whose employment was terminated after being found guilty of possession of a stolen boat and trailer.
The arbitrator concluded that in order to justify terminating a unionized employee, there must be a sufficient nexus between the employee’s misconduct away from work, and his employment duties.
The Grievor had been a firefighter for 11 years with a pristine work record. There were no concerns with his honesty or work. In 2012, he purchased a boat and trailer for $9,500 from a fellow firefighter. The boat, reportedly worth approximately $30,000, had been stolen. The state of the Grievor’s knowledge when he purchased the boat was disputed.
The Grievor was arrested in 2013. The RCMP phoned the Grievor and asked to attend his property to investigate a tip that a stolen boat was located on his property. Within minutes of the call, the Grievor hooked the boat and trailer up to his car and began towing it away from his property. However, the Grievor’s property was under surveillance and he was arrested.
The Grievor lied about his acquisition of the boat and trailer in his initial statement to police, providing a story about how he purchased the boat, and three different purchase prices. He later admitted to the RCMP that he bought the boat from a fellow firefighter for much less, but he did not admit to knowing the boat was stolen. However, he made some comments that he had doubts about the deal, and suggested he “had an inkling in the pit of his stomach” about it.
The employer investigated and the Grievor reluctantly admitted to the arrest. The Grievor was placed on leave, but the employer did not initially ask if he knew the boat was stolen. When asked in a subsequent interview, the Grievor said it was a “grey area”. He also advised the employer of his attempt to flee with the boat. The employer allowed the Grievor to return to work with conditions, accepting that he was being forthright.
In the criminal proceedings, the court did not accept the Grievor’s evidence, and he was found to have known the boat was stolen. The trial was widely reported in the local media.
Upon learning of the verdict, the employer terminated the Grievor’s employment. The employer’s reasons, as stated at arbitration, included: the comments made by the judge regarding the non-acceptance of the Grievor’s evidence and his credibility, dishonesty and lack of judgment; the media reports and negative publicity; and concerns about the Grievor’s honesty during the employer’s investigation.
The arbitrator found it difficult to reconcile evidence regarding the Grievor’s police statement and his evidence at trial and arbitration that he had no concern the boat was stolen. She noted that she had “grave doubts” as to his understanding of the underlying issue of his honesty. Nevertheless, she proceeded to consider the question of whether termination was excessive in the circumstances.
The conduct causes difficulty in the way the employer properly carries out its function of efficiently managing its works and efficiently directing its working force.
The arbitrator found there was no direct link between the misconduct and the Grievor’s duties. There was no suggestion he could not be trusted to do his firefighting duties. The arbitrator accepted that it was an isolated incident by an employee with a pristine work record, not likely to be repeated. Moreover, he was not in a fiduciary position, and his duties did not expose him to the temptation of greed.
In short, the arbitrator concluded that there was an insufficient nexus between the Grievor’s misconduct and his duties to warrant termination. Accordingly, the arbitrator reinstated the Grievor, but declined to award wages, seniority or benefits from the date of termination to the date of reinstatement.
Criminal convictions in and of themselves may not justify termination of an employee on the basis of dishonesty and lack of trust. Despite findings of misconduct in criminal proceedings, employers terminating for cause must establish that the misconduct actually relates in more than a general manner to the duties to be performed by the employee.
British Columbia employers are reminded that the general minimum wage in British Columbia increased on September 15, 2016 to $10.85 per hour, up from $10.45 per hour. The liquor server minimum wage also increased to $9.60 per hour. Employers are reminded to update their employment contracts and practices to ensure they reflect the new minimum wage.
Both the British Columbia and the Federal Government have recently introduced legislation to amend their respective human rights legislation to include gender identity and gender expression among the protected grounds of discrimination. These amendments will mean that individuals will have a right under the respective legislation to make a complaint if they have been discriminated against because of their gender identity or expression, including in employment settings.
Federally regulated employers and employers in British Columbia should review and update their policies on non-discrimination to ensure that these two new prohibited grounds of discrimination are covered.
British Columbia’s Human Rights Code Amendment Act, 2016, S.B.C. 2016, c.26 was passed on July 25, 2016 and came into force on July 28, 2016 whereas the Federal Bill C-16 passed first reading in the House of Commons on May 17, 2016 and has yet to become law.
In 2009, John McCormick, an equity partner in the law firm Fasken Martineau DuMoulin LLP (the “Firm”) filed a complaint with the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal, alleging the Firm’s requirement that equity partners retire from the partnership and divest their equity at age 65 was age discrimination in employment, contrary to section 13 of the British Columbia Human Rights Code, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 210 (the “Code”).
The Firm applied to have the complaint dismissed on the basis that the matter was not within the jurisdiction of the tribunal, and that there was no prospect that the complaint would succeed. The Firm’s primary position was that because Mr. McCormick was an equity partner in the firm, there was no employment relationship that could be the subject of a complaint under section 13 of the Code. The Tribunal denied the Firm’s application to dismiss however, and concluded that the relationship between Mr. McCormick and the Firm was one of “employment” for the purposes of the Code.
On judicial review, Justice Bruce of the Supreme Court of British Columbia agreed with the Tribunal, indicating that the application of the Code must be based on a conclusion that the complainant and the alleged offender are in an employment relationship in fact and in substance. In Mr. McCormick’s case, many of the attributes of his relationship with the Firm were the same as those found in a traditional employer/employee relationship and therefore the Tribunal’s decision to deny the Firm’s application to dismiss was justified.
The Court of Appeal disagreed however, and held that despite the broad, liberal and purposive interpretation that must be given to the Code, it is a legal impossibility for a partner to be employed by the partnership of which he or she is a member. The fact that the Firm’s management may exercise similar aspects of control over the partners as may be exercised by the management of a corporation over its employees does not change the relationship from one of partners running a business to one of employment by one group of partners over an individual partner. Accordingly, in a unanimous decision the Court of Appeal determined that there was no employment relationship, so the complaint should be dismissed. Mr. McCormick was subsequently granted leave to appeal this decision of the Court of Appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.
In this case, the Supreme Court confirmed that the Code is quasi-constitutional legislation and that the definition of employment for the purposes of the Code must be approached “consistently with the generous, aspirational purposes set out in s. 3 of the Code and understood in light of the protective nature of human rights legislation which ‘is often the final refuge of the disadvantaged and the disenfranchised’ and of ‘the most vulnerable members of society’”. (at para. 19, references omitted) Nevertheless, even considered in this philosophical framework, the Court found that the protections of the Code could not extend to Mr. McCormick.
Importantly, Justice Abella held that control and dependency are more than a function of whether a worker receives immediate direction from or is affected by the decisions of others, but whether the employee has the ability to influence decisions which critically affect his or her working life. In the case of Mr. McCormick, as an equity partner for some 30 years, he was part of a collective of individuals who had control over workplace conditions and remuneration—i.e. he was part of the collective employer and was not necessarily someone who was in a vulnerable position vis-à-vis that group. The Firm’s management structure and administrative polices to which Mr. McCormick was subject were not viewed as limitations on his autonomy making him dependent on the Firm, but rather, were viewed as necessary incidents of its management. Furthermore, though his income was pooled with his colleagues, his remuneration was set in accordance with his contributions to the Firm, in accordance with polices he would have had a right to vote to implement, and he drew income from the Firm’s profits and was liable for its debts and losses. Overall, the Court found that he was not working for the benefit of someone else, but to his own benefit.
Referring specifically to the decision of the Human Rights Tribunal, Justice Abella found that the Tribunal, in considering the control aspect of the relationship had given insufficient consideration to the underlying power dynamics of the relationship between Mr. McCormick and the Firm, and had focused unduly on the administrative polices which governed his activities within the Firm. In this case, where there was no genuine control over Mr. McCormick, an employment relationship could not be established for the purposes of the Code.
Justice Abella was careful not to close the door on other partners being found to be employees for the purposes of the Code in other circumstances. However, she was clear that such a situation would require normal partnership rights, powers and protections to be “greatly diminished”. (at para. 46). The Court was also careful to point out in obiter that while Mr. McCormick might not be able to avail himself of the protections of the Code, partners alleging discrimination nevertheless could have recourse against their partners with respect to the duties of utmost fairness and good faith required by the Partnership Act. However, the Court was careful to avoid commenting on whether such recourse was available in this instance.
Noteworthy, also released today was the United Kingdom Supreme Court decision of Clyde & Co LLP and another v. Bates van Winkelhof,  UKSC 32. In that case, an equity partner in a law firm sought whistleblower protection granted to employees under the Employment Rights Act 1996. In this decision the Supreme Court came to the conclusion that the partner was a “worker” (as defined) for the purposes of that legislation. In that case, the Court was clear that there was no contract of employment between the partner and the firm in question, rather the decision turned on whether under the partnership agreement in question, the partner had undertaken “to do or perform personally any work or services for another party to the contract whose status is not by virtue of the contract that of a client or customer of any profession or business undertaking carried on by that individual.” In this case, whether or not the partner was a worker turned largely on interpretation of the applicable statute in conjunction with the applicable partnership legislation. However, the Court also reviewed the concept of “subordination” (a permutation of the control and dependency test) and held that because the partner could not market her services to anyone other than the firm with which she was employed, and because she was an integral part of her business, she fell within the definition of worker in that case. Notably, the partner in question, although an equity partner, was junior in the sense that she received a fixed income and that there was a level of Senior Equity Partner above her, the antecedents to which appeared to fall more in line with the traditional benefits of partnership. Nevertheless, the Court in Clyde & Co did not necessarily focus on these factors in rendering its decision.
A recent decision of the B.C. Court of Appeal has endorsed a novel approach to post-employment competition by upholding an employment contract whereby the employee was required to compensate the employer if she competed soon after her employment ended. In Rhebergen v. Creston Veterinary Clinic Ltd., 2014 BCCA 97, a newly licensed veterinarian signed a three-year employment contract with an established veterinarian clinic in a rural community. Under the contract, the veterinarian was required to pay her employer a set amount if she set up a practice in the same area within three years of the employment contract being terminated. The veterinarian left the clinic after fourteen months and soon established a mobile veterinary practice in the area. The veterinarian went to court to have the payment clause declared unenforceable.
The Court recognized that there were two approaches in establishing whether such a clause was a restraint of trade, either a “functional” approach, which asks whether the clause attempts to, or effectively does, restrain trade, or a “formalist” approach, in which the clause must be structured as a prohibition against competition, which does not include “mere disincentives”. The formalist approach is more commonly used in Ontario, but the B.C. Court of Appeal adopted the functional approach in its analysis, and concluded that the clause was, in fact, a restraint of trade.
Notwithstanding that the clause was found to be a restraint of trade, the Court held that the clause was not a penalty because it reasonably compensated the employer for the costs incurred in training the new veterinarian. The Court split on whether the clause was ambiguous and therefore unenforceable. A non-competition clause is ambiguous if it is not clear as to activity, time or geography. The majority of the Court concluded that there was only one reasonable interpretation to the clause and it was not ambiguous. The clause was therefore enforceable by the employer, and the veterinarian was required to pay the amounts under the contract to her former employer as a result of her competition.
This case demonstrates the continually evolving nature of post-employment covenants, and the fact that courts will give employers some latitude to develop contractual “tools” to provide protection (or at least give financial compensation) in the event a former employee engages in competition soon after employment. The fact that the Court of Appeal was not unanimous demonstrates, however, that this is a complex area requiring careful drafting of contractual terms.
The PRPP legislation is aimed to enhance pension coverage in B.C., where according to the Ministry of Finance News Release, approximately two-thirds of the workforce has no access to a registered pension plan.
﻿Information about the federal government’s rules regarding PRPPs can be found here.
FMC will continue to monitor the legislation and provide updates on the implementation of PRPPs in British Columbia and across Canada. For more information please contact Colin Galinski at 604-443-7133 or colin.galinski@fmc-law.com.
The Vancouver Sun has reported that a British Columbia jury recently awarded employee Larry Higginson over half a million dollars in punitive damages, on top of a $236,000 award for wrongful dismissal, taking damages flowing from a wrongful dismissal to new heights in Higginson v. Babine Forest Products Ltd. and Hampton Lumber Mills Inc.
The Jury decision is not reported, however according to reports, Mr. Higginson had been employed for 34 years with the Defendant, Babine Forest Products Ltd., until he was dismissed on October 14, 2009, apparently for just cause. The employer alleged that Mr. Higginson failed to perform his duties as a manager. In response, Mr. Higginson alleged that cause had not been established and that the employer had set him up for termination of employment, had made his working environment miserable and had alleged cause to avoid the obligation to pay notice of termination of employment to long-term employees.
The Prince George B.C. jury found that the employer did not have cause to terminate his employment, and awarded damages in excess of $800,000 as a result of the wrongful dismissal.
Such a large punitive damages award has not been seen since the 2008 Ontario Superior Court of Justice awarded $500,000 to a wrongfully dismissed employee in Keays v. Honda Canada Inc. However, in Keays, the Supreme Court of Canada (2008 SCC 39) overturned the punitive damages award on appeal.
A Notice of Appeal was filed in Higginson on July 18, 2012.
This article originally appeared on occupationalhealthandsafetylaw.com.
In hopes of driving up immunization rates among BC health care workers, the Government of British Columbia is imposing strict flu-season requirements on workers who come into contact with patients at publicly-funded health care facilities or in the community. Starting with the upcoming flu season, applicable health care workers (including health-authority staff, physicians and residents, volunteers, students, contractors and vendors) will be required to either obtain a seasonal influenza vaccine or to generally don a mask at all times during the flu season.
B.C. Provincial Health Officer Dr. Perry Kendall, who recommended these measures to the Provincial Government, wrote that less than 50 percent of health care workers are immunized against influenza each year, despite being in contact with high risk populations such as seniors, pregnant women, young children, and the immuno-compromised. Citing evidence from long-term care facilities that health care worker vaccinations results in diminished illness and fewer deaths each flu season, the physician argued that “[g]etting the flu shot should be considered standard patient safety practice for all health-care workers who come into contact with patients – as important as following effective hand hygiene practices, staying home when ill or wearing a mask in the operating room.” British Columbia will be the first jurisdiction in Canada to implement such a policy.
According to media outlets, the unions representing health care workers are generally supportive of vaccinations, although the British Columbia Nurses Union has said it will not yet formally respond to the directive and has rather referred to its October 2011 Press Release on the issue where it stated that vaccinations should be promoted through education, rather than through a punitive approach by the employer.
A Government of British Columbia “Backgrounder”, cites influenza as causing the most deaths among vaccine-preventable diseases.
According to Dr. Kendall, in U.S. jurisdictions where similar requirements have been imposed, health care worker immunizations levels have reached approximately 95 percent.
On August 2, 2012, the British Columbia Supreme Court issued its judgment in the case of Danielisz v. Hercules Forwarding Inc. (2012 BCSC 1155). In Danielisz, the plaintiff was a customs broker with the defendant employer. At the time of her alleged constructive dismissal, the plaintiff was a Director of the employer (as the employer apparently required a licensed customs broker on its Board of Directors) and was manager of the customs department.
The employer’s office staff had a history of dissension and interpersonal difficulties. The Plaintiff claimed that she tried to overcome these difficulties, but that the other staff, including her subordinates, had ganged-up on her. She also claimed that her employer had undermined her authority by favouring lighter discipline for a staff member than the Plaintiff had originally imposed.
After a meeting at which the employer had tried to resolve some of the conflicts in the workplace, the Plaintiff commenced a sick leave which she claimed was caused by workplace stress. The Plaintiff ultimately went on Employment Insurance sickness benefits, attempted to make a claim with respect to the workplace stress to WorkSafeBC, and filed a complaint of constructive dismissal under section 66 of the Employment Standards Act. The workers’ compensation claim was denied, and the Plaintiff withdrew her complaint under the Employment Standards Act at the mediation.
Shortly after the mediation, the Plaintiff relocated to Kelowna, British Columbia, enrolled her son in school, obtained new employment and advised a co-worker by email that she was unwilling to return to the Defendant employer. However, in her communications with the defendant employer, the Plaintiff asserted that she would be willing to return to work with the Defendant at some point after her concerns with the workplace were resolved. In response, the Defendant employer asserted that the Plaintiff, by filing her complaint under the Employment Standards Act, had repudiated her employment agreement. The employer proceeded to replace the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff then filed her action claiming damages for constructive dismissal.
Discussing the elements of the Plaintiff’s claim, the Court noted that whether or not a constructive dismissal has occurred depends on an objective assessment of all the evidence, rather than the employee’s subjective view of events. Further, the court held that where the allegations of constructive dismissal relate to claims of undermined authority or the behaviour of co-workers, the Plaintiff must show that the conduct in the workplace was such that a reasonable person in the circumstances should not be expected to persevere in the employment. Not every criticism by an employer or dispute among co-workers will sufficiently poison the work environment such that the employment relationship is undermined.
Applying these principles to the case at bar, the Court declined to find that the Plaintiff had been constructively dismissed. The Court found that the Plaintiff had been less than forthright about her own contributions to the negative work environment (finding that the “Plaintiff was engaged in ‘poisoning the work environment’ as much as she was ‘the targeted employee’”), and further, that the employer had not undermined her authority by imposing a lesser discipline on one of her subordinates. The evidence showed that although the Plaintiff’s immediate supervisor was an ineffective manager, he still reinforced her authority after this particular event.
The bottom line, to the Court, was that despite the unpleasant atmosphere, the work was getting done, the Plaintiff was not being forced to bear more than could be reasonably expected, and the Plaintiff had done little to try and improve the situation. Dismissing the Plaintiff’s claim, the Court found that the Plaintiff’s claim to WorkSafeBC and the complaint under the Employment Standards Act, combined with her relocation and new employment and conflicts in her statements to her employer and others, suggested that she had no intention of returning to work, and had rather hoped to extract some form of compensation from her employer. All of this, the Court held, amounted to a repudiation of the terms of her employment. Her constructive dismissal claim was dismissed.

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