Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/241/87/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 04:20:46+00:00

Document:
Laws in force at the time and place of the making of a contract and which affect its validity, performance, and enforcement enter into and form a part of it, as if expressly referred to or incorporated therein.
A bill of lading is a contract, and, if interstate, it is to be construed in the light of the provision of the Carmack Amendment which prescribes how it shall be issued and makes the connecting carrier the agent of the receiving carrier for the purpose of completing the transportation and delivering the goods.
Whether, in construing an interstate bill of lading issued under the Carmack Amendment, due effect is given to the latter is a federal question.
A stipulation in a bill of lading of an interstate shipment of cattle that the shipper must, as a condition precedent to his right of recovery for injury to the cattle while in transit, give notice thereof in writing to some officer or station agent of the initial carrier before the cattle are removed from the place of destination or mingled with other livestock, is to be construed in the light of the Carmack Amendment, making the connecting or delivering carrier agent of the initial carrier, and notice given to the station agent or officer of the former operates as notice to the latter, and the fact that there is no officer or station agent primarily employed by the initial carrier at the point of destination does not relieve the shipper from compliance with the stipulation.
The facts, which involve the right of a shipper to recover from the carrier damages for injury to cattle being transported in interstate commerce owing to delay in transit and resulting decrease in weight, are stated in the opinion.
pass in the course of their transportation. By an indorsement on the bill of lading, the Burlington Company was designated as the connecting carrier. The shipment was accompanied by an attendant selected by the shipper and authorized to represent him in all matters pertaining to the general care and handling of the cattle. Upon reaching their destination, the cattle were delivered by the Burlington Company to an agent of the shipper, and were sold, removed, and mingled with other stock before any notice was given of a claim for injury to them while in transit.
"One of the defenses relied upon by the defendant is that no notice of claim for damages for loss or injury to the stock in question was given by the plaintiff to the defendant or to the connecting carrier, before the stock was removed from the place of destination or mingled with other stock. This provision of said contract is a reasonable one, binding upon the plaintiff, and, under the admissions in his reply, prevents him from recovering in this action, unless you find that . . . defendant expressly or impliedly by its conduct waived the giving of said notice in accordance with this provision of the contract."
The jury, evidently resolving the question of waiver against the defendant, returned a verdict for the plaintiff, and the judgment thereon was affirmed by the supreme court of the state. 50 Mont. 122.
upholding the validity of the stipulation for notice could not have been given, in the presence of the Montana statute (Laws 1909, c. 138) declaring such a stipulation void.
The supreme court, passing the question whether notice had been waived, interpreted the stipulation as requiring that the notice be given to an officer or station agent primarily employed by the Northern Pacific Company, and thereby excluding notice to an officer or station agent of the Burlington Company, and then held the stipulation unreasonable and inoperative because no officer or agent primarily employed by the Northern Pacific Company was accessible at the place of destination. Whether, in so interpreting the stipulation, that court gave proper effect to the Interstate Commerce Act and its amendments is the federal question pressed upon our attention, and we think it is fairly presented by the record. The shipment being interstate, that legislation was controlling; the through bill of lading was issued under it, the pleadings show that its application was invoked, and in the answer, as also in the instruction given at the defendant's request, there was a distinct assertion that notice was not given "to any officer or station agent of the defendant, or to any officer or station agent of the connecting carrier," which meant that the defendant was proceeding upon the theory that the stipulation, when read in connection with the Carmack Amendment, contemplated and recognized that notice to an officer or agent of the connecting carrier -- the Burlington Company -- would suffice.
due effect to the statute under which it was issued. True, the words "said company" in the stipulation, if read only in connection with an introductory sentence in the bill of lading, would seem to refer to the initial carrier alone, but when they are read in connection with the statute and other parts of the bill of lading, including the provision that its terms and conditions "shall inure to the benefit of" any connecting carrier, it is apparent that they embrace the carrier making the delivery as well as the initial carrier, especially as the former is, in legal contemplation, the agent of the latter.
The act of March 4, 1915, c. 176, 38 Stat. 1196, altering the terms of the Carmack Amendment, is without present bearing because passed long after this shipment was made.
For two reasons, I am unable to agree with the opinion of the Court.
First. If reiteration can establish a rule of law, it must be taken as settled that, in causes coming here by writs of error from state courts of last resort, we may not consider federal questions not specially set up below. And further, that such a question comes too late if raised for the first time after final decision in the highest state court by petition for rehearing unless this was actually entertained. St. Louis & San Francisco R. Co. v. Shepherd, 240 U. S. 240, 240 U. S. 241; McCorquodale v. Texas, 211 U. S. 432, 211 U. S. 437.
"Par. 6. The said shipper further agrees that, as a condition precedent to his right to recover any damages for loss or injury to any of said stock, he will give notice in writing of his claim therefor to some officer or station agent of the said company before said stock has been removed from the place of destination or mingled with other stock."
"Par. 9. The terms, conditions and limitations hereby imposed shall inure to the benefit of each and every carrier, beyond the route of said company, to which the said property may come for purpose of transportation."
"Appellant did not brief nor argue the reasonableness of the provisions of paragraph 6 of said contract from the view point considered by the court on page 3 to line 5 of page 7 of the opinion for the reason that no such question was raised by the plaintiff in the court below. In fact, the only grounds upon which the plaintiff attacked said provisions of the contract in his answer was that it"
"is unreasonable, unjust, burdensome, against the policy of the law, and contrary to the express provisions of chapter 138 of Session Laws of the State of Montana for 1909."
"Not until his brief was filed in this court did such question appear in the case."
notice to show a compliance with such provision in an action brought against the initial carrier, we did not consider the question as presented for the first time in respondent's brief of any importance, and did not even reply thereto in our oral argument."
"Under section 9 of said contract, the terms and conditions thereof inure to the benefit of the connecting carrier. Therefore, such notice should be given to some officer or station agent of such carrier at point of delivery when damages are claimed."
"The importance of this is apparent when considered in connection with the Carmack Amendment to the interstate commerce law."
The only ground for reversal now seriously relied upon is that the Carmack Amendment (June 29, 1906, § 7, c. 3591, 34 Stat. 584, 595) made "the connecting carrier, and therefore its agents, the agents of the initial carrier," and consequently the court below wrongly held, because no officer or station agent primarily employed by Northern Pacific Railway was shown to have been in Chicago, paragraph 6 was unreasonable and inoperative, and notice to a Burlington agent would not have been effective for any purpose. I fail to find that this point was definitely raised at any stage prior to the application for rehearing, and counsel for the railroad below seem to have been equally unsuccessful. If they had already wittingly relied upon it, they would hardly have burdened their argument for rehearing with an excuse for failure so to do. Former opinions imperatively demand that the foundation for our jurisdiction be laid in plain view, and not around a corner, where only an esoteric eye can detect it. Seaboard Air Line v. Duvall, 225 U. S. 477, 225 U. S. 487.
for the purpose, among others, of limiting and diminishing their common law liabilities, and if there be any doubt arising from the language used as to its proper meaning or construction, the words should be construed most strongly against the companies, because their officers or agents prepared the instrument, and as the Court is to interpret such language, it is, as stated by Mr. Justice Harlan, in delivering the opinion of the Court in National Bank v. Insurance Co., 95 U. S. 673, 95 U. S. 679: 'Both reasonable and just that its own words should be construed most strongly against itself.'"
Tex. & Pac. Ry. v. Reiss, 183 U. S. 621, 183 U. S. 626.
"agreement, made the day above stated between the Northern Pacific Railway Company, hereinafter called the 'Company,' and R. J. Wall, hereinafter called the 'Shipper,'"
"Par. 7. It is further agreed and provided that no suit or action to recover any damages for loss or injury to any of said stock, or for the recovery of any claim by virtue of this contract, shall be sustained by any court against said Company unless suit or action shall be commenced within sixty (60) days after the damage shall occur, and on any suit or action commenced against said Company after the expiration of said sixty (60) days, the lapse of time shall be taken and deemed conclusive evidence against the validity of said claim, any statute to the contrary notwithstanding."
"Par. 8. The said Company shall not be liable for the nondelivery or loss of, nor for injuries suffered by, any of the stock beyond the line of its own railroad. "
had elapsed. If the paragraph in question be construed to mean that a written notice mailed from Chicago to any station agent of the Northern Pacific Company, even the agent at Seattle, would suffice, it is senseless. If it is construed to mean that the shipper should travel from Chicago to St. Paul, and make personal service of the notice upon an officer or station agent of the Northern Pacific Company, then it is unreasonable to the point of being unconscionable. Whether the company had an officer or station agent at Chicago -- at a point where it has no road -- upon whom service of this notice could have been made was a matter peculiarly within its own knowledge, and for this reason the burden was upon it to make proof of such fact."
Manifestly its language has given rise to a very grave doubt; therefore I think the contract should be construed most strongly against the company, and with a view to preserve shipper's rights. The construction placed upon paragraph 6 by the state supreme court, when sitting within surroundings designed to stimulate clear thinking, is diametrically opposed to the one now adopted. In such circumstances, it appears to me hardly reasonable to say that a stockman at a wayside Montana station was bound instantly to apprehend the true interpretation, notwithstanding any mental quickening which he may have received from a "rough wind" and a modest thermometer pointing to only "7 or 8 degrees below zero."

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