Source: http://masscases.com/cases/app/11/11massappct640.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 04:17:54+00:00

Document:
WHITE CONSTRUCTION CO., INC. vs. COMMONWEALTH [Note 1] (and a companion case [Note 2]).
PETITION filed in the Superior Court on March 7, 1973.
The case was heard by Connolly, J., on motion for summary judgment.
CIVIL ACTION commenced in the Superior Court Department on January 24, 1979.
The case was heard by Young, J., on motion for summary judgment and was reported by him to the Appeals Court.
Richard L. Neumeier & Robert M. Gault (Philander S. Ratzkoff & Alice D. Alexander with them) for Desmond & Lord, Inc.
KASS, J. Article XIII of the standard form of agreement employed -- and drafted -- by the Commonwealth in 1966 to hire architectural services conferred upon the architect an unconditional release of all liability, including design errors, before construction on the project involved even began. Because the language of Article XIII effectively nullifies the statutory mandate of G. L. c. 7, Section 30C, as appearing in St. 1953, c. 612, Section 5, and Section 30E, as amended by St. 1962, c. 757, Section 27, [Note 3] we do not give the text literal effect and reverse the judgments below.
Procedurally, the White Construction Co., Inc. (White), case began with a complaint under G. L. c. 258 against the Commonwealth in which White alleged, among other things, that the plans and specifications for the Science Classroom-Dining Hall Building at the State College in Lowell were so "fundamentally defective and inadequate" as to result in extra construction costs for which White, as the general contractor on the job, demanded compensation. The Commonwealth brought a third-party complaint [Note 4] against Desmond & Lord, Inc., the architectural firm which drew the plans and specifications for the Lowell State College job. Desmond & Lord moved for summary judgment on the third-party complaint. That motion was allowed and, upon a determination by the judge that there was no just reason for delay, [Note 5] judgment entered for Desmond & Lord.
College. [Note 6] Desmond & Lord brought Sepp Firnkas Engineering, Inc., a consulting structural engineering firm, into the case by third-party complaint. The form of contract which the Commonwealth used to employ Desmond & Lord in this case was identical to that involved in the White case. A different Superior Court judge allowed a motion for summary judgment in favor of Desmond & Lord and Sepp Firnkas because he felt bound by the summary judgment action taken by the judge in the earlier case. As between the same parties, the Commonwealth and Desmond & Lord, the same issue had come up, was essential to the judgment and was adjudicated. The second judge, therefore, believed his decision governed by the prior adjudication. Boyd v. Jamaica Plain Co-op. Bank, 7 Mass. App. Ct. 153, 155 (1979). Restatement (Second) of Judgments Section 68 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1977). Compare Rudow v. Fogel, 376 Mass. 587, 591-592 (1978). However, the second judge expressed "grave reservations concerning the substantive propriety of this result" and reported his interlocutory order [Note 7] allowing the motions for summary judgment to this court under Mass.R.Civ.P. 64, 365 Mass. 831 (1974). [Note 8] The two cases were then consolidated for argument.
"ARTICLE XIII. Release and Discharge.
Payment to the Designer by the Commonwealth pursuant to Paragraph 6 of ARTICLE XI above and acceptance of such payment by the Designer, shall release and forever discharge and Commonwealth and the Designer, respectively, from all claims, demands, and liabilities of every nature, whether in law or equity, asserted by either against the other and arising from or in any way connected with the Project, unless: (1) simultaneously with such acceptance the Designer shall advise the Commonwealth in writing of any such claim, demand, or liability asserted by the Designer against the Commonwealth; and (2) within six (6) months thereafter the Designer shall have taken action to enforce the same."
Paragraph 6 of Article XI provides that the architect shall be paid seventy-five percent of his fee "upon award of Construction Contract," less all payments previously made. [Note 9] Thus, by the literal terms of the contract, the architect is released from liability with all his supervisory work still to be done (those functions are discussed infra) and the correctness of his plans and specifications still to be tested.
Director of the Bureau of Building Construction that neither he nor his predecessors (the affidavit is undated but was filed in court on December 27, 1979) interpreted Article XIII to release the designer when a project proceeded to construction; i.e., the release provision was to operate only in case where the Commonwealth abandoned, during the design stage, the project for which the architect was drawing plans. A release, however, which is unequivocal in its terms cannot be explained by parol evidence. Radovsky v. Wexler, 273 Mass. 254, 258 (1930). If any exclusion from the scope of the release were intended, it would have to be stated. Schuster v. Baskin, 354 Mass. 137, 140 (1968). Gaudette v. Kelly, 7 Mass. App. Ct. 100, 104-105 (1979).
full time to the work of the project, oversee continuously the detail of construction, keep informed at all times of the financial status of the project, and make such investigations for and reports and recommendations to the designer or the director as either may require; . . ." In addition, in report recommended, and the Legislature enacted (see St. 1953, c. 612, Section 5), G. L. c. 7, Section 30E, which requires the designer to make recommendations on change orders proposed during the course of construction.
Those statutory requirements the Commonwealth faithfully incorporated in its contract. Notably, Article V, which deals with the scope of the designer's services, describes a third phase of the designer's work -- a construction phase -- during which the designer is to: "(3) visit the site or sites of the Project at least weekly to inspect the progress and quality of construction of the Project; (4) require each Consultant [Note 11] . . . to make similar visits for the same purpose during the progress of that portion of the . . . construction to which the consultant's services relate and to report in writing thereon to the Designer; (5) report periodically to the Bureau [of Building Construction in the Division of Central Services of the Commonwealth's Executive Office for Administration and Finance] in writing on the progress of construction of the Project; (6) condemn all Project work which shall fail to conform to the Contract Documents; . . . (8) . . . act on all requests for change in plans, specifications, or contracts for the Project; and (9) upon written instructions from the Director [of Building Construction] furnish working plans and specifications for any such change." Article VII of the contract requires the designer to furnish to the Commonwealth a complete set of "as built" (i.e., with modifications in the original plans annotated) drawings on linen or mylar together with two copies of the "as built" plans.
Since the contract contains what the statute requires, Desmond & Lord argues, there is no occasion to talk about the agreement's inconsistency with the statutory mandate. This argument, however, fails egregiously to pass the common sense test to which superficially logical arguments must be subjected. Presumably the representatives of the Commonwealth did not sign the contract with their fingers crossed behind their backs. As the Superior Court judge in the second case (involving Cape Cod Community College) observed, "the contract is thus self defeating." There is no point in calling upon the architect to make weekly site visits to inspect the progress and quality of construction, to report periodically to the Bureau and to rule on change orders if, reading Article XIII literally, the architect may, without incurring any liability, do that work incompetently or not at all. To be sure, there remains to the Commonwealth the leverage of holding up payments of the balance of the architect's fee (twenty-five percent), [Note 12] but the statutory purpose of having the designer, who knows his own plans better than someone else, inspect the work he has designed and administer change orders would be thwarted.
to put in force a piece of legislation effectual to remedy the evil at which it appears to be aimed." Morse v. Boston, 253 Mass. 247, 252 (1925). Contract provisions which go beyond the scope of the statute are void. Cf. New England Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Brockton, 332 Mass. 662, 664-666 (1955) (municipality may not require rate discount by ordinance because State enabling legislation conferred no rate-making power upon cities and towns); Ferrante v. Board of Appeals of Northampton, 345 Mass. 158, 162-163 (1962) (zoning restrictions cannot be forfeited by action of public officers in disregard of statute); New City Hotel Co. v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Commn., 347 Mass. 539, 542 (1964) (right of public to have liquor laws properly enforced cannot be forfeited by failure of officials to act). "The public interest in the enforcement of the laws of the Commonwealth cannot be defeated by failures of public officials to perform their duties." Doris v. Police Commr. of Boston, 374 Mass. 443, 449 (1978). Desmond & Lord, for its part, is bound by the general rule that persons who deal with a governmental agency must take notice of limitations upon that agency's contracting power and cannot recover upon a contract which oversteps those limitations. Adalian Bros., v. Boston, 323 Mass. 629, 631 (1949). Sancta Maria Hosp. v. Cambridge, 369 Mass. 586, 595 (1976). Marlborough v. Cybulski, Ohnemus & Associates, 370 Mass. 157, 160-161 (1976). Lawrence v. Falzarano, 7 Mass. App. Ct. 591, 596 (1979), rev'd on other grounds, 380 Mass. 18 (1980).
In the case brought by White Construction Co., Inc., the judgment is reversed; in the case brought by the Commonwealth, the orders for summary judgment are reversed.
[Note 1] Desmond & Lord, Inc., third-party defendant.
[Note 2] Commonwealth v. Farwell Construction Corp.; Jefferson Construction Company; V & V Construction Co., Inc.; Loranger Construction Corp.; and Desmond & Lord, Inc., defendants. Sepp Firnkas Engineering, Inc., third-party defendant.
[Note 3] The provision of Sections 30C and 30E were carried forward, without material change, to G. L. c. 6A, Sections 23 and 25, respectively, by St. 1969, c. 704, Section 3, and to G. L. c. 7, Sections 41 and 43, by St. 1975, c. 311, Section 2. Sections 41 and 43 were repealed by St. 1980, c. 579, Section 7, which substituted a different scheme for designer selection and construction administration. See G. L. c. 7, Sections 42A-42K, inclusive.
[Note 4] See Mass.R.Civ.P. 7 and 14, 365 Mass. 748 and 760 (1974).
[Note 5] See Mass.R.Civ.P. 54(b), 365 Mass. 821 (1974).
[Note 6] Jefferson Construction Company built the Commons Building; V & V Construction Co., Inc., built the Gymnasium and Maintenance Building; Loranger Construction Corp. built the Administration -- Library Building; and Farwell Construction Corp. built the Auditorium -- Arts Center Building.
[Note 7] The second judge declined to order entry of judgment under Mass. R.Civ.P. 54(b).
[Note 8] We need not decide whether the taking of an appeal by the Commonwealth from the judgment in the first case stayed its preclusive effect. See Commonwealth v. 707 Main Corp., 371 Mass. 374, 377-378 n.2 (1976).
[Note 9] The first five subparagraphs of Article XI provide for progress payments at various stages of the design work, e.g., submission of preliminary plans and outline specifications; approval of preliminary plans and specifications; when working plans and specifications are sixty percent complete, and so forth.
[Note 10] See note 3, supra.
[Note 11] E.g., the mechanical engineer, the electrical engineer, or the structural engineer.
[Note 12] Article XI of the contract provides that this balance is paid in six installments as the construction work proceeds.
[Note 13] Performance of design and supervision duties by the same architect is not inevitable in private contracts between owners and architects. Document B 141 (1977 ed.) published by the American Institute of Architects and entitled "Standard Form of Agreement Between Owner and Architect," although it treats supervision by the architect as the norm in par. 1.5, contemplates in par. 1.5.2 that other provisions may be made by modifications to the standard agreement.
[Note 14] Texts which consider agreements for architectural services assume that the architect shall be liable for design defects, see, e.g., Parker & Adams, The A.I.A. Standard Contract Forms and the Law 5-6 (1954), and, in discussing disclaimers of liability, do not go beyond disclaimers of responsibility for the acts of contractors and limits on consequential damages. See par. 1.1.21 of A.I.A. Document B 131 as appearing in Sweet, Legal Aspects of Architecture, Engineering and the Construction Process 880 (1970); Document B 141 (1977 ed.) published by American Institute of Architects pars. 1.55, 1.5.10 and 1.5.13; 1 & 2 Dib, Forms and Agreements for Architects, Engineers and Contractors c. 2, Section 13 and c. 9, Section 18 (1977 rev.).
Two States have declared unconstitutional on unreasonable classification grounds, a special limitation period on actions against architects, engineers, and contractors for damages arising from defective design or defective construction. See Skinner v. Anderson, 38 Ill. 2d 455, 459-461 (1967), and Broome v. Truluck, 270 S.C. 227, 230-231 (1978). We do not intimate whether we would reach the same conclusion of unconstitutionality.
[Note 15] The parties have not briefed, and we do not decide, whether in Massachusetts a person licensed by the State to practice a profession may limit prospectively his liability for errors and omissions. Attempts by physicians and hospitals to limit their liability for negligence have been defeated on the ground that exculpatory provisions may stand only if the duties concerned do not involve the public interest. Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of California, 60 Cal. 2d 92, 96 (1963). Belshaw v. Feinstein, 258 Cal. App. 2d 711, 725-727 (1968). Olson v. Molzen, 558 S.W.2d 429, 431-432 (Tenn. 1977). Sometimes the inability of a physician to avoid liability for negligent conduct has simply been assumed as obvious. See Kozan v. Comstock, 270 F.2d 839, 845 (5th Cir. 1959). See Annot., 6 A.L.R. 3d 704 (1963). See generally 15 Williston, Contracts Section 1751 (3d ed. 1972) concerning provisions avoiding liability where status of a party imposes greater responsibility upon him than upon an ordinary person. For a case comparing the professional responsibility of an architect to that of a physician, see Coombs v. Beede, 89 Me. 187, 188 (1896).

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