Source: https://www.tdcaa.com/journal/lone-star-grand-jury-selection-and-independence-part-2/
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 20:09:59+00:00

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The previous article in this two-part series considered the selection of grand jurors.1 In this article the focus is on the authority of the grand jury.
In the U.S.A., cynics assert that the grand jury is simply a prosecutor’s “rubberstamp”: The prosecutor presents a case and makes a recommendation, which the grand jury contentedly affirms. Hence that hackneyed culinary expression that a prosecutor can indict anything—including a ham sandwich.4 No doubt an overbearing prosecutor can dominate a grand jury and influence its decisions, but one who does so, especially as a matter of course, denies himself the very protection the grand jury affords, performs a gross disservice to the community by stripping the grand jury of its independent role in determining the propriety of felony charges, and renders the grand jurors’ service nugatory.
A properly constituted and informed grand jury working within its discretion serves as the first pre-conviction integrity unit in a felony prosecution. While those routinely involved in the legal system, such as law enforcement, investigate and file cases, and counsel and magistrates serve to inform and protect defendants’ rights, a grand jury, like its sister, the petit jury, is the opportunity for those not directly connected to the daily business of criminal justice to temper the adversarial process with common sense, compassion, non-technical review, and to bring to bear their diverse viewpoints. Free of the clutter of legal niceties but within a statutory framework, the jurors determine what they as a body believe is the proper and just result—a “true bill” or “no bill.” Their input not only protects the innocent and pursues the guilty but also assists, shields, and guides the prosecution. By virtue of its role, a grand jury lends integrity to the felony offender justice system.
The authority of the grand jury is, if fully exercised, awesome—especially in light of the members’ lack of uniform legal training (which may be their greatest asset as they are free from the restraint of technical rules7) and the powers they wield.
And much of the grand jury’s power devolves from the trial court. Thus, a grand jury “remains an appendage of the court” and “may depend in large part on the enforcement powers of the court.”17 This relationship with the trial court provides the grand jury with its teeth and usually keeps grand juries operating within the bounds of the law.
Second, the prosecutor appears in an advisory capacity. In fact, the prosecutor assists the grand jury at its pleasure. The grand jurors may seek advice from the prosecutor on “any matter of law” or on “any question” concerning “the proper discharge of their duties.”25 But the grand jury can turn to the appointing court instead. Indeed, grand jurors can seek advice from the court “touching any matter before them,” so long as they do not reveal the particular accusation before them.26 On its face, then, the topics on which a trial court may advise are much broader than that of the prosecutor. Also, there is no statutory authority for a prosecutor to rein in a grand jury—although communicating any problem to the appointing trial judge should suffice with a cooperative judge.
An almost mystical aura pervades grand jury proceedings because they are shrouded in secrecy—the uninitiated may even suspect something like the practice of witchcraft. Indeed, in these days of open government and demands for full disclosure of the prosecution’s files, this veil provides fertile grounds for conspiracy theorists. But the “covert” operations of the grand jury are also essential to its authority.
1 See The Texas Prosecutor, Vol. 42, No.1, January–February 2012 issue.
2 See Wikipedia (ever a useful starting place for general research, but sometimes less than authoritative), available at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Grand_jury.
3 Most of the information in this paragraph is drawn from Professor Susan W. Brenner’s website on grand juries in the U.S.A. available at: http://uspolitics.about.com/gi/o.htm?zi=1/XJ&zTi=1&sdn=uspolitics&cdn=newsissues&tm=56&gps=231_486_1276_573&f=00&tt=2&bt=0&bts=1&st=11&zu=http%3A//www.udayton.edu/%7Egrandjur/index.htm. Professor Brenner is the NCR distinguished Professor of Law and Technology at the University of Dayton School of Law.
4 The saying is apparently attributed to Judge Sol Wachtler, the former Chief Judge of New York State. See www.websters-online-dictionary.org/ definitions/grand+jury?cx=partner-pub-0939 450753529744%3Av0qd01-tdlq&cof=FORID% 3A9&ie=UTF-8&q=grand+jury&sa=Search#906. May he be sorry he coined it!
5 I borrow this apt analogy from Williamson County District Attorney John Bradley’s Grand Jury presentation at the 2011 TDCAA Elected Prosecutor Conference.
6 Traditionally, most criminal cases are resolved by plea bargain agreements and only a few felony proceedings are initiated by information.
7 See, e.g., Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 362 (1956) (“in this country … the grand jury has convened as a body of laymen, free from technical rules, acting in secret, pledged to indict no one because of prejudice and to free no one because of special favor”).
8 See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. arts. 20.09, 20.17–19.
9 See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 20.09.
10 A recent illustration of a grand jury’s ability to investigate the elected district attorney is to be found in In re Guerra, District and County Attorney for Willacy County, Texas, 235 S.W. 3d 392, 415 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi, 2007) (orig. proceeding) (conditionally granting writ of mandamus to have magistrate order’s appointing an attorney pro tem set aside, but also observing that, in the face of a grand jury initiating an investigation of a prosecutor, a trial court may disqualify the prosecutor and appoint an attorney pro tem “to preserve the integrity of the court and aid in the administration of justice”).
11 See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 20.07.
12 See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 20.10.
13 See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 20.11.
14 United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 346 (1974); United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 12-15 (1973).
15 See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 20.15; Ex parte Edone, 740 S.W.2d 446, 448-49 (Tex. Crim. App.1987) (testimony); Ex parte Marek, 635 S.W.2d 35, (Tex Crim. App. 1983) (documents).
16 United States v. Sells Engineering, 463 U.S. 418, 424 (1983).
18 Ex parte Edone, 740 S.W.2d 446, 448 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).
20 The irreverent analogy that jumps to mind is the relationship between someone and his dog.
21 See, e.g., id., at 408 n.55.
22 See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. arts. 20.03, 20.04, 20.10, 20.11, 20.15, 20.19, 20.20.
23 See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. arts. 20.03, 20.11.
24 See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 20.20.
25 See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 20.05.
26 Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 20.06.
27 Stern v. State ex rel. Ansel, 869 S. W.2d 614, 621 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1994) (writ denied) (referring to the prosecutors duty to take custody of evidence submitted for the grand jury’s consideration).
28 See id., quoting Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 218-19 (1979) (footnotes and citations omitted).
29 Sells Engineering, 463 U.S. at 424, quoting United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 503, 513 (1943).
30 Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 19.34.
31 Whittington v. State, 680 S.W.2d 505, 512 (Tex. App. —Tyler 1984, pet. ref’d).

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