Source: http://fr-toen.cocolog-nifty.com/blog/cat14973198/index.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 11:51:14+00:00

Document:
California Assembly Bill 1179 (2005), Cal. Civ. Code Ann. §§1746-1746.5 (West 2009) (Act), prohibits the sale or rental of "violent video games" to minors, and requires their packaging to be labeled "18." The Act covers games "in which the range of options available to a player includes killing, maiming, dismembering, or sexually assaulting an image of a human being, if those acts are depicted" in a manner that "[a] reasonable person, considering the game as a whole, would find appeals to a deviant or morbid interest of minors," that is "patently offensive to prevailing standards in the community as to what is suitable for minors," and that "causes the game, as a whole, to lack serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for minors." §1746(d)(1)(A). Violation of the Act is punishable by a civil fine of up to $1,000. §1746.3.
BROWN, GOVERNOR OF CALIFORNIA, ET AL. v. ENTERTAINMENT MERCHANTS ASSOCIATION ET AL.
Held: The Act does not comport with the First Amendment. Pp. 2-18.
(a) Video games qualify for First Amendment protection. Like protected books, plays, and movies, they communicate ideas through familiar literary devices and features distinctive to the medium. And "the basic principles of freedom of speech... do not vary" with a new and different communication medium. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U. S. 495, 503. The most basic principle - that government lacks the power to restrict expression because of its message, ideas, subject matter, or content, Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union, 535 U. S. 564, 573 - is subject to a few limited exceptions for historically unprotected speech, such as obscenity, incitement, and fighting words. But a legislature cannot create new categories of unprotected speech simply by weighing the value of a particular category against its social costs and then punishing it if it fails the test. See United States v. Stevens, 559 U. S. ___, ___. Unlike the New York law upheld in Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U. S. 629, California's Act does not adjust the boundaries of an existing category of unprotected speech to ensure that a definition designed for adults is not uncritically applied to children. Instead, the State wishes to create a wholly new category of content-based regulation that is permissible only for speech directed at children. That is unprecedented and mistaken. This country has no tradition of specially restricting children's access to depictions of violence. And California's claim that "interactive" video games present special problems, in that the player participates in the violent action on screen and determines its outcome, is unpersuasive. Pp. 2-11.
(b) Because the Act imposes a restriction on the content of protected speech, it is invalid unless California can demonstrate that it passes strict scrutiny, i.e., it is justified by a compelling government interest and is narrowly drawn to serve that interest. R. A. V. v. St. Paul, 505 U. S. 377, 395. California cannot meet that standard. Psychological studies purporting to show a connection between exposure to violent video games and harmful effects on children do not prove that such exposure causes minors to act aggressively. Any demonstrated effects are both small and indistinguishable from effects produced by other media. Since California has declined to restrict those other media, e.g., Saturday morning cartoons, its video-game regulation is wildly underinclusive, raising serious doubts about whether the State is pursuing the interest it invokes or is instead disfavoring a particular speaker or viewpoint. California also cannot show that the Act's restrictions meet the alleged substantial need of parents who wish to restrict their children's access to violent videos. The video-game industry's voluntary rating system already accomplishes that to a large extent. Moreover, as a means of assisting parents the Act is greatly overinclusive, since not all of the children who are prohibited from purchasing violent video games have parents who disapprove of their doing so. The Act cannot satisfy strict scrutiny. Pp. 11-18.
The State's evidence is not compelling. California relies primarily on the research of Dr. Craig Anderson and a few other research psychologists whose studies purport to show a connection between exposure to violent video games and harmful effects on children. These studies have been rejected by every court to consider them, and with good reason: They do not prove that violent video games cause minors to act aggressively (which would at least be a beginning). Instead, "[n]early all of the research is based on correlation, not evidence of causation, and most of the studies suffer from significant, admitted flaws in methodology." Video Software Dealers Assn. 556 F. 3d, at 964. They show at best some correlation between exposure to violent entertainment and minuscule real-world effects, such as children's feeling more aggressive or making louder noises in the few minutes after playing a violent game than after playing a nonviolent game.
the Internet. Participating States should also place more emphasis on Internet and media literacy projects for vulnerable groups, particularly children.
Existent legal provisions allow several OSCE participating States to completely suspend all Internet communication and "switch off" Internet access for whole populations or segments of the public during times of war, states of emergency and in cases of imminent threat to national security. Reaffirming the importance of fully respecting the right to freedom of opinion and expression, the OSCE participating States should refrain from developing, introducing and applying "Internet kill switch" plans as they are incompatible with the fundamental right to information.
Definitional problems and inconsistencies exist with regards to certain speech based restrictions. Clarifications are needed to define what amounts to "extremism", "terrorist propaganda", "harmful" and "racist content" and "hate speech". Legal provisions are often vague and open to wide or subjective interpretation. Any restriction must meet the strict criteria under international and regional human rights law. The necessity for restricting the right to speak and receive information must be convincingly established to be compatible with international human rights standards.
Given the limited effectiveness of national laws and the lack of harmonization at international level to prosecute criminal online content, a number of OSCE participating States started to block access to online content deemed illegal and Web 2.0 based social media platforms situated outside their legal jurisdiction. As blocking mechanisms are not immune from significant deficiencies, they may result in the blocking of access to legitimate sites and content. Further, blocking is an extreme measure and has a very strong impact on freedom of expression and the free flow of information. Participating States should therefore refrain from using blocking as a permanent solution or as a means of punishment. Indefinite blocking of access to websites and Internet content could result to "prior restraint" and by suspending access to websites indefinitely states can largely overstep the narrow margin of appreciation afforded to them by international norms and standards.
The development of so-called "three-strikes" legal measures to combat Internet piracy in a number of participating States is worrisome. While countries have a legitimate interest to combat piracy, restricting or cutting off users' access to the Internet is a disproportionate response which is incompatible with OSCE commitments on the freedom to seek, receive and impart information, a right which in fact should be strengthened by the Internet. Participating States should refrain from developing or adopting legal measures which could result restricting citizens' access to the Internet. A discussion on whether or not current international standards on intellectual property protection are suited for our information society might be necessary.

References: §1746
 §1746
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 V.