Source: http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/47664
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 16:29:45+00:00

Document:
RENATO TICHANGCO; ROMEO RAMOS, FOR HIMSELF AND THE SAMAHANG MAGKAKAPITBAHAY NG DULONG GAGALANGIN; ANTONIO PASCO, FOR HIMSELF AND THE SAMAHANG MAGKAKAPITBAHAY NG BARANGAY 186; CELSO SANTIAGO, FOR HIMSELF AND THE SAMAHANG NAGKAKAISANG DAMDAMIN NG SUNOG APOG; AND ARTURO BALLO, FOR HIMSELF AND THE FEDERATION KAPIT-BISIG HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., PETITIONERS, VS. THE HONORABLE ALFREDO ENRIQUEZ, ADMINISTRATOR, LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY; THE LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY; AND/OR THE SUCCESSORS-IN-INTEREST OF SEVERINO MANOTOK, BENITA MANOTOK, AMBROSIO MANOTOK AND/OR RICARDO MANOTOK, NAMELY, PATRICIA L. TIONGSON AND/OR ELISA V. MANOTOK, RESPONDENTS.
Unless contrary substantial evidence is presented in the proper proceedings by the proper party, a Torrens certificate of title cannot be overturned. The Torrens system rests on stability -- on the assurance that once ownership is recorded in the proper registry, owners can rest easy on their properties.
Before us is a Petition for Review challenging the August 8, 2001 Decision and the October 29, 2002 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 54648. The assailed Decision affirmed the findings of the then Land Registration Authority (LRA) administrator, Alfredo Enriquez, that there were no legal grounds to initiate appropriate proceedings to nullify Original Certificate of Title (OCT) Nos. 820 and 7477 and the subsequent titles derived therefrom: Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 128240 to 128249, inclusive, and TCT No. 128270 -- all covering parcels of land in Tondo, Manila registered in the names of private respondents.
The challenged Resolution denied reconsideration.
The task force hence referred the matter to the LRA-OSG Task Force for appropriate action.
That in the course of examining the subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-7815, it appears that the adjoining on the N.E. and S.W. are Lots 1 and 3 of Plan Psu-174649 and Psu-11259 in the name of Severino Manotoc and beyond of which are Estero de Maypajo (10 to 12 meters wide), Estero de Sunog Apog (20 meters wide) and Sapang Visita, respectively.
“On the other hand, Lot 10 of Plan (LRC) Pcs-14684, ‘being a portion of the consolidation of Lots A, (LRC) Psd-7815, Psu-117259 & 55-A, Blk. 2918, Psd-11746’, was originally registered in Manila Registry of Deeds as OCT No. 820 (erroneously typed therein as OCT No. ‘520’) and OCT No. 7477. In other words, Lot 10 is the result of the earlier consolidation and subdivision of certain parcels of land covered by certificates of title which emanated from OCT No. 820 and OCT No. 7477, as evidenced by Plan (LRC) Pcs- 14648 (approved by LRA on 19 December 1972), Plan (LRC) Psd-7815 (approved by LRA on 24 July 1969), Plan Psu-117259 (appears to have been approved by the Bureau of Lands on 11 February 1936).
‘Applicant likewise contended that he, his coheirs and his late father, (Severino), had always believed that the land, sought for registration was a part, and in fact included, in their old registered property. Such contention could have been properly substantiated by the certificate of title covering the old property and the tax declaration for assessment purposes, showing whether it was bounded by the creeks now cited as boundaries of the Lot in question. But they were not presented as evidence.
“Based on the said decision, it would appear that the parcels of land covered by OCT No. 7477 were formerly part of Estero de Maypajo, Sapang Visita and Estero de Sunog Apog which had dried up.
The CA held that OCT No. 820 had been issued on January 7, 1907, not on January 31, 1905, as petitioners claim. True, Decree No. 1424 had been issued on January 31, 1905, but it was entered or transcribed in the registration book of the Register of Deeds only in 1907. Pursuant to Section 42 of Act No. 496 (otherwise known as the Land Registration Act), OCT No. 820 took effect on January 7, 1907, the date of the transcription of the decree. The record number of Decree No. 1424, however, should be 786. Further, the appellate court held that an OCT was conclusive on all matters stated therein. Hence, the fact that the copy of Decree No. 1424 was no longer extant in the records of the LRA was of no moment.
The CA also held that OCT No. 7477 was already incontrovertible, because it had been the subject of regular land registration proceedings. More than one year after its registration, the decree was not controverted by any adverse party.
In their Motion for Reconsideration, petitioners raised the minority of the land registration applicants -- Severino, Benita, Ambrosio and Ricardo, all surnamed Manotok -- as an additional ground to nullify OCT No. 820. Ostensibly, they had filed their application without the assistance of a legally appointed guardian. The CA, however, denied petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit.
Hence, this present recourse entitled by petitioners as a “Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65,” filed on November 20, 2001.
On December 10, 2001, this Court (Third Division) dismissed the Petition, because certiorari was not a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal.
On February 6, 2002, the Court -- upon reconsideration -- deemed the Petition as one filed under Rule 45 and required respondents to comment thereon. After all, it had been submitted within the 15-day period required by Rule 45.
(2) Decree of Registration No. 1424 of January 31, 1905 (which led to the issuance of OCT No. 820) was issued before completion of the magnetic survey of the parcels of land covered by OCT No. 820 on November 15, 1906.
(11) Did respondent Court of Appeals violate Section 14, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution when it omitted in its narration of facts that the Magnetic Survey of the parcels of land covered by OCT No. 820 was made and completed only on November 15, 1906?
In simpler and more understandable language, the issues raised by petitioners are as follows: 1) whether OCT Nos. 820 and 7477 are valid; and 2) whether the CA complied with Section 14 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.
At the outset, this Court notes that petitioners erroneously anchor their Petition on Rule 65. Their remedy should be based on Rule 45, because they are appealing a final disposition of the Court of Appeals.
“Certiorari under Rule 65 is a remedy narrow in scope and inflexible in character. It is not a general utility tool in the legal workshop.” It involves a correction of errors of jurisdiction only, or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It is not a substitute for an appeal, when the latter remedy is available.
Indubitably, the CA had jurisdiction over petitioners’ appeal from the Resolution of the LRA and rendered the assailed Decision in the proper exercise of that jurisdiction. Under the circumstances, Rule 45 was the plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Since the Petition was filed within the 15-day period, in the interest of justice it shall be treated as one for review under Rule 45, and not for certiorari under Rule 65.
The fundamental purpose of the Land Registration Law (Act No. 496, now PD 1529) is to finally settle title to real property in order to preempt any question on the legality of the title -- except claims that were noted on the certificate itself at the time of registration or those that arose subsequent thereto. Consequently, once the title is registered under the said law, owners can rest secure on their ownership and possession.
The proceedings for the judicial registration of land under the Torrens system involve more consequences than an ordinary action would. Once a decree of registration is made under the Torrens system, and the reglementary period has passed within which the decree may be questioned, the title is perfected and cannot be collaterally questioned later on.
In assailing the validity of OCT No. 820, petitioners capitalize on the plain statement written on the face of the Certificate that the magnetic survey was completed only on November 15, 1906, while the decree had been issued earlier on January 31, 1905. They insist that the land registration court acquired no jurisdiction over the land that was the subject of the registration proceedings; and that -- as no survey had been made, completed and submitted to it -- therefore, the court had no authority to issue the decree.
We are not persuaded. Petitioners erroneously and baselessly speculate that the magnetic survey of the land was the only survey conducted, or that no other plan was submitted to the registration court, or that the land was not surveyed at all. Mere conclusions and speculations are not sufficient to defeat or impair the title of private respondents.
OCT No. 820 was issued more than 90 years ago in 1907, but the original Certificate is still existing in the records of the Register of Deeds. Having been issued under the Torrens system, the original Certificate enjoys a presumption of validity. Correlatively, it also carries a strong presumption that the provisions of the law governing the registration of land under the Torrens system have duly been followed.
Based on the foregoing, an original survey plan other than that completed in 1906 was presumably submitted to the land registration court prior to the issuance of the decree. In his Comment, then LRA Director Benjamin A. Flestado quoted a portion of the Decision in Land Registration Case No. N-1-LRC, Record No. N-1555, pertaining to the history of the two lots embraced in OCT No. 820. The Decision stated that a survey of those lots had been undertaken by American surveyors on or before 1905. That Decision is certainly more reliable than the plain assertions of petitioners, who obviously had no personal knowledge of the original land registration proceedings.
From the above, it is clear that a new survey may be conducted to conform to a decree, even after it has been issued.
In the same Comment, Director Flestado stated that Decree No. 1424, issued before the Second World War, had either been lost or destroyed during that war. Thus, it could no longer be the basis for determining which parcels of land were covered by the decree and on what date they had originally been surveyed.
At any rate, by legal presumption, public officers are deemed to have regularly performed their official duties. Thus, the proceedings for land registration that led to the issuance of OCT No. 820 are presumed to have regularly and properly been conducted. To overturn this legal presumption carelessly -- more than 90 years since the termination of the case -- will not only endanger judicial stability, but also violate the underlying principle of the Torrens system. Indeed, to do so would reduce the vaunted legal indefeasibility of Torrens titles to meaningless verbiage.
In the same vein, we reject the contention of petitioners that OCT No. 820 is null and void on the ground that the applicants for land registration were minors who were not assisted by a legal guardian. They allege that while the names of the minor applicants were contained in the title, no legal guardian was named therein.
Again, petitioners rely on mere speculations and conjectures, which cannot be sustained by this Court. The mere failure to mention on the title the names of the legal guardians does not necessarily imply their absence during the actual land registration proceedings. Besides, the absence of legal guardians cannot be used as a basis for depriving minors of benefits that have accrued to them. If at all, it could be a ground to invalidate an imprudent attack against their interest, not to deprive them of any advantage or gain.
The Director of Lands filed an opposition alleging that the parcels of land are public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines and the applicant has no title and possession under claim of ownership since 26 July 1894; that on 18 November 1950, a decision was rendered denying the application, which decision was appealed to the Court of Appeals in due time; that eventually the Decision dated 18 November 1950 was set aside and a new trial was ordered; that pursuant to the order of CA for new trial, the Chief Surveyor of LRC was ordered “to determine whether or not said parcels of land. . . are included in any certificate of title of the applicant”; that in due time, the LRC submitted a report stating that the lands “are not included in any of the TCT Nos. 49286, 24542 and 24522 submitted to this Commission by the applicant” and that said certificates of title “cover Lots 55-A, 55-B and 55-C, Block No. 2918 of the subdivision plan Psd-11746” which lots adjoin the parcels of land subject matter of the instant case (Record No. 1555); that during the trial, the applicant testified that the lands in question are not included in the land described in OCT No. 820; that the said parcels of land were believed by him and his predecessors as included therein “because on the West the first parcel in OCT No. 820, the boundary is the Sunog Apog Creek, and that on the South, the boundary is the Sapang Visita”; that the first parcel of land covered by OCT No. 820 was subdivided into 3 Lots, known as Lots 55-a, 55-b and 55-c, the last two Lots were bought by the applicant from Ricardo Manotok (1 August 1946) and Benita Manotok de Geronimo (17 September 1949) while Lot 55-a was adjudicated to him and now covered by TCT No. 49286.
As things stand now, private respondents have in their favor a judicial pronouncement showing, prima facie at least, that the expanded areas do not belong to the public domain, and that they have acquired rights of ownership over them by accretion. In brief, they have overcome the presumption that the land is within an unclassified property of the public domain.
While registration proceedings are judicial, they involve more consequences than an ordinary action would. The entire world, including the government, is given a chance to participate in the case.
After the registration is completed and finalized in the regular course, the rights of all adverse claimants are foreclosed by the decree of registration. The government itself assumes the burden of giving notice to all parties. The very purpose and intent of the law, however, would be defeated by permitting persons to litigate again on the basis of the same adverse claims in the registration proceedings, after they have already been given the opportunity to do so. For them to raise the same questions anew would be to cast doubt again upon the validity of the registered title.
Actual fraud proceeds from an intentional deception perpetrated through the misrepresentation or the concealment of a material fact. The fraud is extrinsic if it is employed to deprive parties of their day in court and thus prevent them from asserting their right to the property registered in the name of the applicant. The fraud is intrinsic if that which is alleged in the petition to set aside the decree is the fraud involved in the same proceedings in which the parties seeking relief have had ample opportunity to assert their right, to attack the document presented by the applicant for registration, and to cross-examine the witnesses who have testified thereon. Inquiry into this latter kind of fraud is barred after the judgment of the land registration court has become final.
Petitioners fail to convince the Court that the facts they rely upon to justify a review of the decree in question constitute actual extrinsic fraud.
Finally, assuming arguendo that the validity of the two titles may still be impugned, petitioners do not have any legal standing to ask directly for their annulment.
We can only infer the interest, supposedly in their favor, from their allegation that they were occupants of a portion of the parcel covered by OCT Nos. 820 and 7477, which they perceive to be public land. Petitioners were neither applicants nor claimants of any preferential right over the aforesaid disputed lands. Being too vague, too highly speculative and uncertain, their presumed interest does not suffice to constitute a legal right or interest that would grant them standing in court.
“Legal standing has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged act. Interest means a material interest in issue that is affected by the questioned act or instrument, as distinguished from a mere incidental interest in the question involved.” Since the parcels they claim are properties of the public domain, only the government can bring an action to nullify the TCTs.
Petitioners attack the validity of the assailed CA Decision for its failure to mention that a magnetic survey was completed only on November 15, 1906, a fact that they perceived to be crucial to the determination of the case. The untenability of such grasping at straws can easily be demonstrated.
In its assailed Decision, the CA affirmed the resolution of LRA Administrator Enriquez. The appellate court deliberated on the law and the reasons it relied upon in its determination of the issues presented only after giving a detailed account and assessment of the factual antecedents found by respondent administrator.
This constitutional provision deals with the disposition of petitions for review and of motions for reconsideration. In appellate courts, the rule does not require any comprehensive statement of facts or mention of the applicable law, but merely a statement of the “legal basis” for denying due course.
Thus, there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement when a collegiate appellate court, after deliberation, decides to deny a motion; states that the questions raised are factual or have already been passed upon; or cites some other legal basis. There is no need to explain fully the court’s denial, since the facts and the law have already been laid out in the assailed Decision.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision and Resolution AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
 Rollo, pp. 3-23. Petitioners erroneously labeled their recourse as one for “certiorari” under “Rule 65.” Since they are questioning a decision of the Court of Appeals, the proper remedy is a petition for review under Rule 45. Inasmuch as the herein Petition had actually been filed within the 15-day regulatory period, the Court treated the Petition as one filed under Rule 45.
 Id., pp. 59-68. Fifteenth Division. Penned by Justice Romeo A. Brawner (Division chairman), with the concurrence of Justices Remedios Salazar-Fernando and Rebecca de Guia-Salvador (members).
 CA Decision, pp. 2-5; rollo, pp. 60-63.
 See CA Resolution, p. 1; rollo, p. 86.
 See Resolution; id., p. 88.
 This case was deemed submitted for decision on October 10, 2002, upon this Court’s receipt of petitioners’ Reply to the Memorandum of public respondents. Petitioners’ Memorandum was received on July 23, 2002, that of private respondents’ on August 9, 2002, and that of public respondents on September 24, 2002. Petitioners’ Memorandum was signed by Atty. Reynaldo B. Aralar; private respondents’ by Atty. Felix B. Lerio; and public respondents’ by Asst. Solicitors General Carlos N. Ortega and Josefina C. Castillo and Solicitor Violeta A. Ticzon.
 Petitioners’ Memorandum, pp. 5-6; rollo, pp. 190-191.
 Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 129368, August 25, 2003, per Callejo Sr., J.
 Ibid. De Castro v. Delta Motor Sales Corp., 57 SCRA 344, May 31, 1974.
 Reyes and Nadres v. Borbon, 50 Phil. 791, September 30, 1927.
 Benin v. Tuason, 156 Phil. 525, June 28, 1974.
 Legarda and Prieto v. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590, October 2, 1915.
 Abad v. Government of the Philippines, 103 Phil 247, March 29, 1958.
 Ramos v. Hon. Rodriguez, 314 Phil. 326, May 29, 1995.
 73 Phil. 578, May 14, 1942.
 Ibid, per Paras, J. Emphasis supplied.
 Cited by Director Flestado in his Comment, pp. 7-8; rollo, pp. 284-285.
 Republic vs. Alon, 199 SCRA 396, July 18, 1991.
 Castelo v. Director of Lands, 48 Phil. 589, January 12, 1926.
 Legarda and Prieto v. Saleeby, supra.
 Peña, Registration of Land Titles and Deeds, 1994 ed., p. 126 citing Flores v. Valdepeñas, 58 O.G. 38, September 17, 1962, CA; Libudan v. Palma Gil, GR Nos. L-21163 & L-25495, May 17, 1972; 45 SCRA 17.
 Heirs of Manuel A. Roxas v. Court of Appeals, 337 Phil. 41, March 21, 1997.
 Frias v. Esquivel, 115 Phil. 755, July 31, 1962.
 Velarde v. Social Justice Society, GR No. 159357, April 28, 2004, per Panganiban, J.
 Urquiaga v. Court of Appeals, 361 Phil. 660, January 22, 1999; Roxas v. Cuevas, 8 Phil. 469, August 31, 1907.
 Air France v. Carrascoso, 124 Phil. 724, 728, September 28, 1966, per Sanchez, J.
 Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary (1996), p. 893.
 Komatsu Industries (Phils.), Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 352 Phil. 440, April 24, 1998.

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