Source: https://www.scribd.com/document/321206963/United-States-v-Winfield-665-F-3d-107-4th-Cir-2012
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 10:36:44+00:00

Document:
for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Richmond.
Henry E. Hudson, District Judge.
Before GREGORY, SHEDD, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
opinion, in which Judge Shedd and Judge Davis joined.
DEFENDER, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant. Neil H.
hearing. For the following reasons, we affirm.
began on August 31, 2007.
the state charges within seventy-two hours of being arrested.
charged with distribution of cocaine and conspiracy to distribute cocaine under Virginia law.
that the court should only proceed on the "technical"
order imposing the sentence did not explicitly revoke Winfields supervised release.
Winfields imprisonment. Winfield timely appealed.
We review de novo a challenge of a district courts jurisdiction to rule upon alleged violations of supervised release.
United States v. Barton, 26 F.3d 490, 491 (4th Cir. 1994).
expiration of one year of supervised release . . .
the expiration or termination of the term of supervised release . . .
each other or the state sentences.
or electronic signaling devices . . . .
the following legal significance: "it ends the period of supervision, and with it, the district courts power to further adjudicate violations or impose additional prison time."
new term of supervised release after re-incarceration. Id. at 703-04.
The current version of subsection (e)(3) reads, "The court may, . . .
of supervised release after the completion of the prison sentence. Id. at 712-13.
and thus we consider it waived.
twelve-month sentence for supervised-release violations arising from Winfields state convictions.
release continued to have some effect after the terms revocation); United States v. Johnson, 243 F. Appx at 668-69.
the Third Circuit cases are distinguishable from his case.
Both Winfield and the Government adopt this position in their briefs.
supervised release after his re-incarceration to retain its jurisdiction over Winfields revoked term.
exceed the statutory maximum for re-incarceration.
procedures in both the May 18 and September 17 hearings.
Johnson, 243 F. Appx at 668-69. To counter the Third Circuits reasoning, Winfield cites United States v. Brooks, No.
during the three-day period before his voluntary surrender. Id.
years of imprisonment pursuant to 3583(e)(3).
which the defendant committed a new violation was not considered part of the defendants term of supervised release.
conditions of the supervision during that time. Id.
against piecemeal appeals, and create "logistical problems"
challenge his May 18 sentence but only appeals his September 17 sentence.
context of correcting an error as it pertains to a term of supervised release or whether 3583(e) independently governs.
States v. Navarro-Espinosa, 30 F.3d 1169, 1171 (9th Cir.
release; there is an independent rule [: 3583(e)(2)] governing corrections of that nature."). But see United States v.
with the defendants state prison sentence); United States v.
time period specified under Rule 35(a)); United States v.
courts jurisdiction to alter a revocation sentence).
supervised release not adjudicated in the first hearing. Winfields reliance on Rule 35 in this context is misplaced.
For these reasons, we affirm the district courts judgment.
Taylor v. Deangelis, United States Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit, No. 10-2154, March 22, 2011.

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.

 v.

 v.

 v.