Source: https://case-law.vlex.com/vid/429-p-3d-603-770577901
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 20:13:40+00:00

Document:
Attorney: Taryn R. Tomasa, Deputy Public Defender, for Defendant-Appellant Hinebaugh. Richard D. Gronna, Honolulu, for Defendant-Appellant Ayala. Donn Fudo and Stephen K. Tsuhima, Deputy Prosecuting Attorneys, City and County of Honolulu, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Taryn R. Tomasa, Deputy Public Defender, for Defendant-Appellant Hinebaugh.
Richard D. Gronna, Honolulu, for Defendant-Appellant Ayala.
Donn Fudo and Stephen K. Tsuhima, Deputy Prosecuting Attorneys, City and County of Honolulu, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
After a jury trial, the Circuit Court convicted Hinebaugh and Ayala of Count 1 - Attempted Murder in the Second Degree, in violation of Hawaii Revised Statues (HRS) § § 705-500 (2014), 707-701.5 (2014), and 706-656 (2014); Count 2 - Robbery in the First Degree, in violation of HRS § 708-840 (Supp. 2013) and/or 708-840(1)(b)(i) (Supp. 2013); Count 3 - Kidnapping, in violation of HRS § 707-720(1)(e) (2014); Count 5 - Identity Theft in the Second Degree, in violation of HRS § 708-839.7 (2014); and Count 6 - Theft in the Second Degree, in violation of HRS § 708-831(1)(b)(2014). Hinebaugh was also convicted of Count 4 - Unauthorized Possession of Confidential Personal Information, in violation of HRS § 708-839.55 (2014).
On appeal, Hinebaugh and Ayala4 contend that the Circuit Court improperly admitted certain physical and testimonial evidence, and Ayala contends that the Circuit Court improperly excluded evidence of Hinebaughs juvenile conviction and abused its discretion in denying his motion for severance. Hinebaugh contends that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct by improperly commenting on her exercising her right not to testify, improperly shifting a burden of proof to Hinebaugh, and presenting improper character evidence.
After a careful review and consideration of the parties arguments, the record on appeal, and relevant legal authorities, we resolve Hinebaugh and Ayalas points on appeal as follows and affirm Hinebaugh and Ayalas Judgments of Conviction and Sentence.
Ayala contends that testimony regarding zip ties should have been excluded because zip ties were not utilized in the commission of the offenses5, and both Ayala and Hinebaugh contend that admission of the evidence constituted impermissible character evidence under Hawaii Rules of Evidence (HRE) Rule 404(a) and impermissible evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts under HRE Rule 404(b)6 . We disagree.
1. The Circuit Court properly excluded evidence of Hinebaughs juvenile conviction.
Ayala contends that he should have been allowed to introduce Hinebaughs juvenile conviction for arson and attempted murder of her father to prove that Hinebaugh had motive to attack CW. However, admission of the juvenile conviction would only show Hinebaughs motive or plan to injure her father, not make it more or less probable that she had a possible motive or plan to injure CW. Therefore, the conviction was inadmissible under HRE Rules 401, 4029, and 404(b), and the Circuit Court properly excluded evidence of Hinebaughs juvenile conviction.
2. The Circuit Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Ayalas motion for severance.
Ayala contends that the failure to sever his trial from that of Hinebaugh denied him a fair trial. The joint trial would have denied Ayala a fair trial if one of the following situations were present: (1) where the core of each defense is in irreconcilable conflict with the other, (2) where the defendant in question is prevented from introducing evidence that would have been admissible in that defendants separate trial not involving other defendants, and (3) where evidence damaging to the defendant in question is admitted and it would not have been admissible in that defendants separate trial not involving other defendants.
State v. Timas, 82 Hawaii 499, 511, 923 P.2d 916, 928 (App. 1996). "The defendant has the burden of proving a denial of a fair trial." Id. Upon review of a motion to sever, the appellate court "may not conclude that the defendant suffered prejudice from a joint trial unless it first concludes that a defendant was denied a fair trial. What might have happened had the motion for severance been granted is irrelevant speculation." Id. at 512, 923 P.2d at 929 (ellipsis and brackets omitted).
Ayala argues that the first two situations apply to this case.10 First, although the defendants defenses differ, they are not irreconcilable. Unlike Walton, where both the prosecution and Waltons co-defendant asserted that Walton stabbed the victim, State v. Walton, 133 Hawaii 66, 86, 324 P.3d 876, 897 (2014), this is not such a case. According to Ayala, Hinebaughs defense was that "[CW]s abandonment instilled the hatred of Hinebaugh that led to the assault" while Ayalas defense was that "he did not harbor such ill will or hatred towards [CW.]" However, that each had different motivations for their participation did not render their defenses irreconcilable. As Hinebaughs counsel succinctly stated, Ayala and Hinebaughs defenses were not inconsistent, but, rather, inconvenient.
Regarding the limitation of evidence, Ayala rests his argument for severance solely on his inability to introduce evidence of Hinebaughs juvenile conviction. As discussed, supra, the Circuit Court properly excluded the evidence of the conviction on relevance grounds, and separate trials would not have transformed the evidence from irrelevant to relevant. We hold that Ayala was not denied a fair trial by Circuit Courts denying his motion for severance.
3. The Circuit Court properly instructed the jury on Assault in the First Degree.

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