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The Voices of Wittgenstein: The Vienna Circle | Ludwig Wittgenstein, Gordon Baker, Michael Mackert, John Connolly, Vasilis Politis, Friederich Waismann | download
Utama The Voices of Wittgenstein: The Vienna Circle
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ISBN 10: 0415056446
ISBN 13: 9780415056441
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mit661
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sich640
auf636
wie627
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diese453
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einem360
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etwa317
regeln308
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frage282
etwas281
wortes264
denn263
sein260
zeichen255
nach244
dieses244
noch237
ausdruck232
sondern226
John R. Calamia, Mark S. Wolff, Richard J. Simonsen
Original German texts and
Transcribed, edited and with an introduction
Translated by Gordon Baker, Michael Mackert,
John Connolly and Vasilis Politis
© 2003 original German and translation, The Waismann
Executors; selection and editorial matter, Gordon Baker
ISBN 0-203-41202-8 Master e-book ISBN
ISBN 0-203-72026-1 (Adobe eReader Format)
ISBN 0–415–05644–6 (Print Edition)
1 Diktat für Schlick
Ist das Verstehen ein Zustand? (F 99) 2
Verstehen eines Satzes analog dem Verstehen einer Melodie als
Tritt das Verstehen aus der Sprache heraus? (F 84) 6
Bedeutungskörper (F 18) 10
Der Sinn als Schatten der Wirklichkeit (F 85) 16
Verstehen eines Genrebildes (F 102) 18
Das Verstehen als Auffassung (F 101) 20
Verstehen als privates Erlebnis 24
Denken (F 87) 26
Der Satz hat einen Sinn (F 86) 28
Erwartung und Motiv (F 4) 30
Denken (Fortsetzung) (F 87) 36
Möglichkeit (F 91) 38
Erwartung 42
Glaube (F 5) 46
Induktion (F 80) 52
Heucheln (F 6) 54
Versuchen 56
Ein Einwand (; F 15) 60
Wort und Vorstellung (F 47) 62
Die Sprache in ihrer Umgebung (F 89) 66
Über den Charakter der Beunruhigung (F 93) 68
Zwei Beschreibungen des Glaubens (F 7) 76
1 Dictation for Schlick
Is understanding a state? (F 99) 3
Understanding a proposition as analogous to understanding
a melody as a melody 7
Does understanding step outside language? (F 84) 7
Meaning-bodies (F 18) 11
Sense as the shadow of reality (F 85) 17
Understanding a picture (F 102) 19
Understanding as a way of seeing (F 101) 21
Understanding as a private experience 25
Thinking (F 87) 27
A proposition has a sense (F 86) 29
Expectation and reason [for action] (F 4) 31
Thinking (continued) (F 87) 37
Possibility (F 91) 39
Expectation 43
Belief (F 5) 47
Induction (F 80) 53
Pretending (F 6) 55
Trying 57
An objection (F 15) 61
Words and mental images (F 47) 63
Language in its surroundings (F 89) 67
On the character of disquiet (F 93) 69
Two descriptions of believing (F 7) 77
2 Notizbuch I
Zeichen (F 31) 84
Zeichen und Anzeichen (F 26) 88
Kausale Auffassung der Sprache (F 33) 90
Was ist ein Befehl? (F 34) 98
Grund und Ursache (F 13) 108
Widerlegung eines Einwands (F 97) 112
Verifikation (F 40) 116
Philosophie (F 35) 120
Das Folgen und die W-F-Notation (F 29) 126
Regel und Bedeutung (F 37) 132
Bedeutungskörper (F 18) 134
Folgen die Regeln aus der Bedeutung? (G 27) 142
Allgemeinheit (F 30) 162
Allgemeinheit 1 (F 73) 164
Allgemeinheit 1a (F 74) 168
Das Hineinsehen der Allgemeinheit (F 32) 170
Sehen und grammatische Auffassung (F 76) 176
Russell’s Logik (F 28) 178
Das Schlussgesetz (F 19) 184
Nichtaristotelische Logik (F 78) 186
Tautologie (F 27) 192
Anwendung der Logik (F 20) 192
Das Schliessen (F 103) 196
Vagheit (F 3) 212
Verbindung der Sprache mit der Wirklichkeit (F 36) 216
Ist die Abmachung die Ursache des Gebrauchs? (F 14) 222
Strukturbeschreibung (F 98) 224
Übersicht (F 16) 228
Rechtfertigung der Grammatik (F 2) 232
Interne Eigenschaft (F 77) 236
Allgemeinheit 2 (F 75) 238
Elementarsätze (F 41) 244
Zusammengesetztheit (F 38) 246
Zusammengesetztheit (F 71) 252
Was ist eine Regel? (F 21) 260
Grammatik der Regel (F 25) 268
3 Unsere Methode
Methode (G 28) 276
2 Notebook I
Signs (F 31) 85
Signs and indications (F 26) 89
The causal conception of language (F 36) 91
What is an order? (F 34) 99
Reason and cause (F 13) 109
Refutation of an objection (F 97) 113
Verification (F 40) 117
Philosophy (F 35) 121
Inference and T-F-notation (F 29) 127
Rules and meanings (F 37) 133
Bodies of meaning (F18) 135
Do rules follow from meanings? (G 27) 143
Generality (F 30) 163
Generality 1 (F 73) 165
Generality 1a (F 74) 169
Reading generality into [signs] (F 32) 171
The seeing of aspects in grammar (F 76) 177
Russell’s logic (F 28) 179
The law of inference (F 19) 185
Non-Aristotelian logic (F 78) 187
Tautology (F 27) 193
The application of logic (F 20) 193
Inferring (F 103) 197
Vagueness (F 3) 213
The connection of language with reality (F 36) 217
Is a convention the cause of use? (F14) 223
Structural description (F 98) 225
Overview (F 16) 229
The justification of grammar (F 2) 233
Internal properties (F 77) 237
Generality 2 (F 75) 239
Elementary propositions (F 41) 245
Complexity (F 38) 247
Complexity (F 71) 253
What is a rule? (F 21) 261
The grammar of a rule (F 25) 269
Method (G 28) 277
1. Beispiel 280
2. Beispiel 284
Zwei Einwände (F 15) 290
Zwei Einwände 296
Wesentliche und zufällige Züge (F 39) 302
Zwei Arten von Regeln (F 82) 304
Wesentliche und unwesentliche Regeln (F 83) 306
‘Man kann ihm nicht ins Herz sehen’ (F 63) 308
Überblick beruhigt (F 90) 308
4 Phänomenale Sprache
Phänomenale Sprache (F 62) 312
Idealismus und Realismus (F 22) 322
Erfahrung (F 42) 324
Physikalishe Farben (F 70) 328
Sein und Schein (F 61) 330
Zeit (F 64) 334
5 Die kausale Auffassung der Sprache
Kausale Auffassung I (F 11) 338
Kausale Theorie der Bedeutung (F 12) 342
Sinn der Hypothese (F 51) 344
Verifikation der Hypothese (F 52) 346
Wahrscheinlich, wahr, falsch (F 79) 348
Logische Konstanten (F 48) 352
Verneinung (F 57) 354
Verneinung (F 58) 364
Sinn der Negation (F 59) 372
Implikation (F 49) 372
Satzkalkül (F 54) 376
Satzkalkül (F 55) 380
Mitdenken (F 56) 384
Annahme (F 72) 384
‘Rot und grün an demselben Ort’ (TS 303 (Teil) ) 396
Rot und grün (G 30) 398
First example 281
Second example 285
Two objections (F 15) 291
Two objections 297
Essential and accidental characteristics (F 39) 303
Two kinds of rules (F 82) 305
Essential and inessential rules (F 83) 307
‘One can’t see into another’s heart’ (F 63) 309
An overview removes disquiet (F 90) 309
4 Phenomenal language
Phenomenal language (F 62) 313
Idealism and realism (F 22) 323
Experience (F 42) 325
Physical colours (F 70) 329
Appearance and reality (F 61) 331
Time (F 64) 335
5 The causal conception of meaning
The causal conception I (F 11) 339
The causal theory of meaning (F 12) 343
The sense of a hypothesis (F 51) 345
Verification of hypotheses (F 52) 347
Probable, true, false (F 79) 349
Logical constants (F 48) 353
Negation (F 57) 355
Negation (F 58) 365
The sense of negation (F 59) 373
[Material] implication (F 49) 373
The propositional calculus (F 54) 377
The propositional calculus (F 55) 381
Accompanying thoughts (F 56) 385
Supposals (F 72) 385
‘Red and green in the same place’ (TS 303) 397
Red and green (G 30) 399
8 Psychologische Begriffe
Arten des Wunsches (F 45) 412
Erwartung (F 46) 414
4 Ausdruck und Beschreibung (G 22) 416
5 Wunsch und Intensität des Wunsches (G 22) 422
6 Motiv (G 22) 424
7 Glaube (G 22) 428
Hören und Sehen (F 68) 434
Intention (F 23) 436
Ist das Verstehen ein psychischer Vorgang? (G 26) 438
Brentano (F 24) 442
Bedeutung als seelischer Akt (F 100) 450
Ist die Bedeutung etwas Einheitliches? (F 81) 456
Begriff und Vorstellung (F 65) 460
Bedeutung (G 25) 460
Sprachspiele zur Aufklärung psychologischer Begriffe (G 24) 466
Logik und Psychologie (F 69) 472
Ex[istenz] d[es] Fremdseelischen (F 92) 474
9 Metalogische Begriffe
Problem des Sokrates (F 1) 480
Wesen (F 94) 486
Wahrheit (F 9) 490
Sinn (F 43) 492
Unverifizierbare Sätze (F 44) 496
Sinnvoll und sinnlos (F 50) 498
Stellvertretung (F 60) 500
Abbildung (F 66) 506
Welche Rolle spielt die Zeichnung in der Geometrie? (F 53) 514
Geometrie (F 8) 518
Gesichtsraum (F 10) 520
[Erinnerungsvertrauen] 524
Kinds of desire (F 45) 413
Expectation (F 46) 415
4 Expression and description (G 22) 417
5 Desire and intensity of desire (G 22) 423
6 Motive (G 22) 425
7 Belief (G 22) 429
Hearing and seeing (F 68) 435
Intention (F 23) 437
Is understanding a mental process? (G 26) 439
Brentano (F 24) 443
Meaning as a mental act (F 100) 451
Is a meaning something unitary? (F 81) 457
Concepts and images (F 65) 461
Meaning (G 25) 461
Language-games for the clarification of psychological
concepts (G 24) 467
Logic and psychology (F 69) 473
The existence of other minds (F 92) 475
9 Metalogical concepts
Socrates’s problem (F 1) 481
Essence (F 94) 487
Truth (F 9) 491
Sense (F 43) 493
Unverifiable propositions (F 44) 497
Meaningful and meaningless (F 50) 499
Representation (F 60) 501
Depiction (F 66) 507
What role do diagrams play in geometry? (F 53) 515
Geometry (F 8) 519
Visual space (F 10) 521
[Trusting one’s memory] 525
Published works by Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein’s Lectures, Cambridge 1932–35, from the notes of
Alice Ambrose and Margaret MacDonald, ed. Alice Ambrose
(Blackwell, Oxford, 1979).
The ‘Big Typescript’ (TS 213): 1933, vi pp. table of contents,
768 pp. (forthcoming).
Wittgenstein’s Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics,
Cambridge 1939, ed. C. Diamond (Harvester Press, Sussex,
Wittgenstein’s Lectures on Philosophy of Psychology 1946–7, notes
by P. T. Geach, K. J. Shah, A. C. Jackson, ed. P. T. Geach
(Harvester Wheatsheaf, Hemel Hempstead, 1988).
Philosophical Grammar, ed. R. Rhees, tr. A. J. P. Kenny
(Blackwell, Oxford, 1974).
Philosophical Investigations, ed. G. E. M. Anscombe and R.
Rhees, tr. G. E. M. Anscombe (Blackwell, Oxford, 1958).
Philosophical Occasions 1912–51, ed. J. Klagge and A. Nordmann (Hackett, Indianapolis, 1993).
Philosophical Remarks, ed. R. Rhees, tr. R. Hargreaves and R.
White (Blackwell, Oxford, 1975).
Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, ed. G. H. von
Wright, R. Rhees, G. E. M. Anscombe, revised edition (Blackwell, Oxford, 1978).
Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, Volume I, ed. G. E. M.
Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, Volume II, ed. G. H.
von Wright and H. Nyman, tr. C. G. Luckhardt and M. A. E.
Aue (Blackwell, Oxford, 1980).
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, tr. D. F. Pears and B. F.
McGuinness (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1961).
Ludwig Wittgenstein und der Wiener Kreis, shorthand notes
recorded by F. Waismann, ed. B. F. McGuinness (Blackwell,
Oxford, 1967). (English translation Wittgenstein and the
Vienna Circle (Blackwell, Oxford, 1979).)
Zettel, ed. G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright, tr. G. E.
M. Anscombe (Blackwell, Oxford, 1967).
Unpublished writings by Wittgenstein
All references to unpublished material cited in the von Wright catalogue
(G. H. von Wright, Wittgenstein (Blackwell, Oxford, 1982), pp. 35ff.)
are by MS or TS number followed by page number.
Published works by Waismann
How I See Philosophy, ed. R. Harré (Macmillan and St Martin’s
Press, London and New York, 1968).
Logik, Sprache, Philosophie, ed. G. P. Baker and B. F. McGuinness (Reclam, Stuttgart, 1976).
The Principles of Linguistic Philosophy, ed. R. Harré (Macmillan
and St Martin’s Press, London and New York, 1965; 2nd
edition, Macmillan, London, 1997).
Unpublished papers by Waismann
Wi:MS
‘Diktat für Schlick’, Dec. 1932 (TS 302).
Dictation (perhaps to Schlick) of ‘Grosses Format’ (MS 140).
The material gathered together in this volume consists of the original
German texts and translations into English of a selected, edited and
organized version of two sets of typescripts found among Friedrich
Waismann’s papers after his death in 1959. Most of these papers are now
deposited in the Bodleian Library at Oxford, and a catalogue of this archive has been compiled by Joachim Schulte and published in Zeitschrift für
philosophische Forschung (1979).
All of the texts presented here date from the period 1928–39, though
none of them is accompanied by any explicit indication of either its origin
or its purpose.1 In one case (‘Diktat für Schlick’), external evidence suggests the text to be a typescript of a dictation to Waismann of material
that Ludwig Wittgenstein wished to transmit to Moritz Schlick; this
probably dates from December 1932. In most other cases, the nature and
dating of each individual text must be inferred from its style or content.
With the exception of one fragment of a dictation by Wittgenstein to
Schlick (‘Rot und Grün an demselben Ort’) and one short typescript
whose style suggests its having been drafted by Schlick (‘Erinnergunsvertrauen’), all of the texts presented here were transcribed
or composed by Waismann. All of them relate more or less directly to
Wittgenstein, and all of them are connected with the project of writing
the intended first volume of the Vienna Circle’s series of publications
(Die wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung) which was to be entitled Logik,
Sprache, Philosophie.
A few of the typescripts were produced on English-manufactured typing paper.
They must postdate Waismann’s coming to Cambridge in October 1937.
if possible, what the provenance of these various texts may be. In some
cases, it is evident that the texts are Waismann’s verbatim transcriptions of
dictations or discussions with Wittgenstein. In most other cases, their
derivation from Wittgenstein seems to be mediated by Waismann
through his own redrafting of some remarks and through his imposing an
overall pattern of organization on them. Where direct comparisons are
possible, Waismann’s redraftings of individual remarks seem to be minimal or conservative, and this suggests that most remarks can be treated
as authoritative exposition of Wittgenstein’s thinking. The same point
does not hold for the sequencing and juxtaposition of remarks in some
of the longer texts.
The closest analogue to this corpus of texts is the material published as
Ludwig Wittgenstein und der Wiener Kreis (and the translation Ludwig
Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle). That material is transcribed directly
from shorthand notes that Waismann took during conversations with
Wittgenstein. There are three main differences:
1) Those conversations have precise dates between 18 December 1929
and 1 July 1932, whereas these typescripts bear no dates at all.
2) It is certain that the former text consists of notes of these conversations, and most of the material is explicitly attributed to Wittgenstein,
whereas these typescripts carry no specifications of their origins.
3) Some of the texts presented here are demonstrably not transcriptions
of dictations. Some are Waismann’s own redraftings of other texts
which do seem to be transcripts of dictations by Wittgenstein.
At the same time, there is one crucial similarity. From the outset, for
the purpose of writing Logik, Sprache, Philosophie, Wittgenstein gave
Schlick and Waismann authority to use all of the material that they had
collected both from his dictations and from various typescripts. He
reconfirmed this when he ultimately withdrew from further direct participation in the project. Like Ludwig Wittgenstein und der Wiener Kreis,
this book is the publication of an important part of Waismann’s Nachlass,
and authorship is therefore appropriately ascribed to Waismann.
To arrive at a better understanding of these texts, we must clarify their
origins and their purpose. I will start with a sketch of Waismann’s career.
Waismann was born 21 March 1896 in Vienna. He was of Jewish descent, the son of a Russian father and a German mother. (The unorthodox
spelling of his surname suggests a transliteration from the Cyrillic spelling
of the Yiddish name more normally given the Roman spelling ‘Weissmann’.) Schooled in Vienna, he then took a degree in physics at Vienna
University in 1922 as an external student. It was to be much later (1936)
that he received a doctorate for his accumulated philosophical
In 1922 he came into contact with Moritz Schlick, professor of philosophy and later founder of the Vienna Circle. Thenceforth Waismann
acted as Schlick’s unofficial assistant, eventually running his graduate
seminar. At the same time he was engaged in teaching at the Volkshochschule. Through Schlick’s influence, he held the post of librarian of the
philosophy faculty from 1929 to 1936. He supplemented his modest
income by giving private tuition in both mathematics and philosophy.
His academic life in Vienna was a patchwork of activities, and his status
was always precarious and dependent on Schlick’s patronage.
Though Schlick published in 1918 his book Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre, in which he defended the thesis that all deductive reasoning must
be syllogistic in form, he later became persuaded of the soundness of
Russell’s position that a successful defence of empiricism must be based
on the ‘New Logic’ rather than the ‘Old Logic’. The mathematician
Hans Hahn gave a seminar in 1922 that brought to Schlick’s attention
the idea that Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus had made an
important breakthrough by showing that the propositions of logic (of
the New Logic) are all tautologies; they are uniformly ‘senseless’, i.e. they
say nothing. This has the obvious corollary that sophisticated Russellian
logical analysis holds no threat to the empiricist principle that all substantial knowledge is empirical. As a consequence of his philosophical
conversion, and in response to the encouragement of Reidemeister,
Schlick steered the discussion of his circle of academic colleagues into a
detailed analysis of the Tractatus. This topic occupied them for two entire
academic years, 1924–25 and 1925–26.
As early as December 1924, Schlick pursued this interest by seeking
personal contact with Wittgenstein, but this initiative did not succeed
until February 1927. Having established an intellectual rapport, Schlick
soon tried to widen the influence of Wittgenstein on the thinking of his
circle by introducing Carnap, Feigl and Waismann into discussions with
Wittgenstein. This seems to have produced too much friction, so that by
1929 it was only Schlick and Waismann who had regular meetings with
Wittgenstein. Waismann kept shorthand notes of these meetings for
the next two years. (Transcriptions of these notes were assembled and
published as Ludwig Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle.)
By 1929, the association of Schlick’s coterie with Wittgenstein’s
thinking became formal and public. The ‘Manifesto’ was written by five
members of this group to thank Schlick for declining to take a chair in
Germany, and with its publication the Vienna Circle was born as a tightly
knit group dedicated to the execution of a common programme. The
Manifesto declared Wittgenstein to be one of the main inspirations of its
work (together with Russell and Einstein). Schlick evidently held the
Tractatus to be the source of the Circle’s conception of logic as well
as the origin of the so-called Principle of Verifiability and the idea that
philosophy should focus on the logical analysis of language. He decided
that it should be a central task of the Circle’s programme to make
Wittgenstein’s ideas more readily intelligible, and apparently he assigned
to Waismann the task of gathering, organizing and expounding these
ideas. Schlick envisaged Waismann’s book as the leading volume in a
series (Die wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung) that was to develop the
views of the Vienna Circle. Both this first volume and the project for the
series were advertised in the journal Erkenntnis in 1930. Waismann’s
book, under the title Logik, Sprache, Philosophie, was to be a systematic
presentation of Wittgenstein’s ideas on logic, language and philosophy.
Thenceforth Waismann acted as the primary expositor of, and spokesman for, Wittgenstein’s point of view, both at meetings of the Circle and
in the wider world, most notably at international conferences at Prague
in 1929 and at Königsberg in 1930. He and Schlick became identified as
the ‘conservative’ wing in the evolution of logical positivism as their
views progressively diverged from those of the self-styled ‘radical’ wing
spearheaded by Neurath.
From shorthand notes of conversations with Wittgenstein, supplemented by dictations and typescripts, Waismann wrote a number of
preliminary lectures and articles on Wittgenstein’s conception of mathematics, his view of logic, and his treatment of identity and probability.
At the same time, the project for the book underwent several transformations. In the first phase, Wittgenstein clarified for Waismann aspects
of the Tractatus, and supplied Waismann directly with his new ideas
about proposition-systems (Satzsysteme) and hypotheses (Hypothesen);
Waismann alone was to take responsibility for the overall structure of the
work, and he was to be its author. In the second phase, Wittgenstein
decided that the outcome would be tolerable only if he took a far more
active role, and he certainly envisaged being co-author (with Waismann)
of the book. During this period, he dictated fresh material both to
Waismann and to Schlick, and he also provided typescripts from which
Waismann made extensive excerpts. This collaboration was an on and off
affair, in part because of Wittgenstein’s intermittent presence in Vienna;
the exact modus operandi probably varied from time to time. Ultimately
frustration on both sides brought formal collaboration to an end. Wittgenstein washed his hands of the project, though expressly licensing
Waismann to complete the book as he (and Schlick) saw fit. In carrying
on this Schlick-directed project, Waismann must have felt some sense of
estrangement from his philosophical mentor.
The first offshoot of this lengthy period of collaboration was a different
book, Einführung in das mathematische Denken (Vienna, 1936). Here
Waismann combined his own account of the logical analysis of the
natural, rational and real numbers with the development of some
of Wittgenstein’s leading ideas (criticisms of Frege and the conception of
different systems of numbers as being internally closed or complete). This
yielded the first comprehensive overview of the nature of mathematics
along Wittgensteinian lines.
Schlick’s murder in 1936 changed everything yet again. In practical
terms, it made impossible Waismann’s previous modus vivendi: it
coincided with the termination of his employment as faculty librarian,
and it destroyed his opportunities for supporting himself by private teaching. More importantly, however, it transformed the whole intellectual
scene for him. It inspired him, as a memorial, to gather together and
publish Schlick’s later papers (Gesammelte Aufsätze 1926–1936); Waismann contributed his own eulogistic preface. At the same time, a sense
of piety towards Schlick and the need to establish his own academic
reputation spurred him on to complete the writing of Logik, Sprache,
Philosophie. Now free from all external interference, he completed the
text of the book by June 1937, though he did not consider it fully fit to
print (druckfertig) until early 1938.
Meanwhile, the increasingly hostile and threatening political climate
and his lack of academic employment in Austria forced Waismann to seek
to get away to England. He managed to obtain funding for a single term
in Cambridge, arriving there in October 1937. By the end of this term,
he was reluctant to return to Vienna, and he found further funding for a
second term. He also decided to delay handing over to Springer the final
text of Logik, Sprache, Philosophie. Thereafter, the Anschluss made it
impossible for him to return to Vienna, so he was forced to stay on in
Cambridge as a refugee. He subsisted in part on special payments from
the Moral Sciences Board, in return for which he gave lectures on logic to
mathematicians in 1938–39.
Waismann’s presence in Cambridge created some awkwardnesses,
practical as well as intellectual. When Wittgenstein returned in Easter
Term 1938, he was as much in need of financial support as Waismann,
and the two of them were in competition for support from the Moral
Sciences Board until Wittgenstein was appointed professor in February
1939. Moreover, in his lectures in 1937–38, Waismann made use of
specially prepared translations of some parts of Logik, Sprache, Philosophie.
This produced a philosophical tension, potentially a clash of views. In
Easter Term 1938, Waismann was apparently expounding some of
Wittgenstein’s earlier ideas while Wittgenstein himself was developing
fresh material in his own classes. Wittgenstein did nothing to soften the
difficulties, allegedly discouraging, or even forbidding, his own students
from attending Waismann’s lectures. This slight deeply embittered
Waismann. Nonetheless, the two had some meetings together, and
Waismann was given the opportunity to read a copy of the 1938 typescript of Philosophical Investigations.
Waismann faced further difficulty in establishing an academic reputation in England. With the help of Neurath, he secured a contract with a
Dutch publisher (van Stockum and Zoon) to bring out a German edition
of Logik, Sprache, Philosophie. At the same time, Margaret (Ramsey) Paul
was enlisted to produce an English translation of the book, and this was
typeset in August to September 1939 for publication by Routledge and
Kegan Paul. It was evident that Wittgenstein was strongly opposed to
this second-hand presentation of his own somewhat out-of-date ideas,
though it is equally clear that a translation of Logik, Sprache, Philosophie
was Waismann’s best hope of gaining recognition among Englishspeaking philosophers. (The three papers that he published in 1938–39
are in large part translations of parts of the book.)
The German invasion of Holland scuppered the publication of the
German text of the book. For unknown reasons the scheme for publishing the English translation was aborted. Had the book appeared at this
time, it would surely have created something of a philosophical sensation.
Wittgenstein’s ideas, though topical and controversial, were not widely
Various friends advised Waismann that his prospects would be better in
Oxford than in Cambridge. He was given the chance to lecture there in
Michaelmas Term 1939, and he then secured grants from Magdalen and
All Souls’ Colleges. All of this made it possible for him to move to Oxford
in February 1940. Classified as an enemy alien, he suffered the humiliation of being interned in Paignton, Devon, from 22 July to 3 October
1940. Thereafter, by dint of anonymous contributions made by some
colleagues and friends to supplement the necessarily meagre funds he
received as a refugee (from the Society for the Protection of Science and
Learning and of Refugee Scholars), he scraped by for five years holding a
sort of appointment paid for by funds released by Collingwood’s death
and Ryle’s war service. In 1945, the post of University Lecturer in the
philosophy of mathematics was created for him. He became reader in
1950, and finally reader in the philosophy of science in 1955.
His lectures at Oxford are reported to have been a considerable source
of intellectual excitement. He played a leading role in the transition of
logical empiricism into ‘ordinary language philosophy’. This movement
was associated with Oxford and spearheaded by J. L. Austin and Gilbert
Ryle. Waismann was one of the principals in the supporting cast, and his
thinking influenced such colleagues as Stuart Hampshire and Herbert
Hart. Consequently, like Wittgenstein, he was a protagonist in both of the
principal developments within analytic philosophy in the mid twentieth
century. In recognition of the importance of his later work, he was
elected a Fellow of the British Academy in July 1955.
His reputation in England rested primarily on three papers. The first,
‘Verifiability’ (1945), suggested modifications of the principle of verification to accommodate the essential indeterminacy of symbolism (the
‘open texture’ of concepts). The second, ‘Language-Strata’ (1953),
explored various ‘loose’ logical relations between different domains of
discourse (e.g. between psychological concepts and descriptions of overt
human behaviour); it developed the notion of non-reductive conceptual
ties between systems of statements (Satzsysteme or language-strata). The
third, ‘How I See Philosophy’ (1956), distinguished philosophical arguments from deductive demonstrations of theses and instead illustrated
how to treat philosophical problems by a distinctive method having some
resemblances with psychoanalysis. In Waismann’s view, the philosopher
is to engage in discussion with a troubled individual whose goal is that
this person should acknowledge his own internal intellectual conflicts and
dissolve his problems by coming to view things in new ways.
Much work has been published since his death. The final text of Logik,
Sprache, Philosophie, though destroyed by the fire-bombing of the Dutch
publisher, was reconstructed from earlier drafts and published in 1976.
The English translation, whose 1939 galley proofs were extensively corrected by Waismann himself, appeared in 1965 under the rather misleading title The Principles of Linguistic Philosophy. (Both have received little
attention in England; at best they have been misunderstood as his own
interpretation of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations, at worst as
his misappropriating or plagiarizing Wittgenstein’s works.) The book
Lectures on the Philosophy of Mathematics (1982) has been reconstructed
from his notes and manuscripts, mostly preparations for lectures at
Oxford in the 1950s. Wille und Motiv appeared in 1988 (and an English
translation in 1995), though it probably dates from the 1940s.
Much of his writing has remained unpublished. This corpus includes a
complete book (in English) on the concept of causality; a vast quantity
of shorthand notebooks, typescripts, manuscripts and corrected galley
proofs that relate to Logik, Sprache, Philosophie (and its translation into
English); and a collection of poems and aphorisms (in German) in which
Waismann despaired about other philosophers and about life in
In many respects, his life was full of difficulties and unhappiness. His
wife Hermine, whom he married in 1929, committed suicide in 1942.
Ten years later their son Thomas did the same. Waismann died in Oxford
on 4 November 1959.
The Vienna Circle project: Logik, Sprache,
This sketch of Waismann’s career provides a preliminary orientation for
considering the texts presented here. All of them date from the 1930s,
when Waismann’s principal concern was to produce formulations of
Wittgenstein’s ideas on logic, language, mathematics and philosophy.
They are evidently drafts of material for his book. Most were superseded
by later drafts or the final text, while some were put aside as irrelevant
(especially texts treating various psychological concepts).
In fact, closer analysis of the multi-stage project of producing this book
suggests that nearly all of these texts date from the middle phase in which
Wittgenstein was collaborating closely with Waismann. In many cases,
they seem to be transcriptions of material that Wittgenstein dictated to
Waismann, and all of them seem to be rooted in Wittgenstein’s dictations
or typescripts, probably with minimal editing by Waismann. In content,
they belong with the evolution of Wittgenstein’s thinking in the period
1931–34. The significance of this point emerges from a slightly more
detailed account of the history of the book.
The project of Waismann’s writing Logik, Sprache, Philosophie must
have originated before Wittgenstein returned to Cambridge in January
1929. Waismann was to give a lucid formulation of the leading ideas of
the Tractatus so that they would be accessible to a wider public, while
consultation with Wittgenstein was to ensure that the account was correct and fully up to date. Three things independently support this
hypothesis. First, Schlick later reported that he wrote his preface for this
projected book in 1928; apparently he had it printed and circulated to
friends at that time.2 Second, Wittgenstein wrote to Waismann in June to
I have worked a great deal recently, and with good success, so I
should be glad of an opportunity to explain a number of things
This remark seems to presuppose that he then saw himself as having some
obligation to make contributions to work that Waismann had in hand.
Third, Waismann himself contributed to the Manifesto (published in
September 1929), a sketch of the contents of the Tractatus. Nonetheless,
little substantial progress seems to have been made on this common
project during the first year. When Wittgenstein returned to Vienna in
the summer of 1929, Schlick was away in America and Waismann was
otherwise occupied, having just married.
Formal meetings with Wittgenstein did begin in the Christmas
vacation of 1929–30, and they continued with some frequency in subsequent vacations up to the end of 1931. This covers the whole period of
the first phase of Waismann’s endeavour to write Logik, Sprache,
In this form the book was announced in an advertisement in Erkenntnis I (1930) as Volume I of the Circle’s series of publications Schriften
zur wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung. In it, Waismann was to present the
contents of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. That was his specific task, and its
execution was seen to be fundamental to the full presentation of the
Circle’s ‘scientific world-view’.
The scope and structure of the projected book is made clear in the
Kritik der Philosophie durch die Logik. Mit Vorrede von M.
(Schr. z. wiss. Weltauff., Bd. I) Springer Verlag, Wien (in
Diese Schrift ist im wesentlichen eine Darstellung der Gedanken
von Wittgenstein (TLP). Was an ihr neu ist und worauf es ihr
It is reprinted in LSP (1976).
wesentlich ankommt, ist die logische Anordnung und Gliederung
I. Logik (Sinn, Bedeutung, Wahrheit, Wahrheitsfunktionen, Wesen der Logik)
II. Sprache (Analyse der Aussagen, Atomsätze,
Logische Abbildung, Grenzen der Sprache)
III. Philosophie (Anwendung der Ergebnisse auf
Probleme der Philosophie)
A critique of philosophy through logic. With a preface by M.
This work is essentially a representation of the ideas of
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. What is new in it and what distinguishes
it is the logical ordering and concatenation of these thoughts.
Contents: I. Logic (sense, reference, truth, truth-functions, the
essence of logic)
II. Language (the analysis of propositions, atomic
propositions, logical picturing, the limits of
III. Philosophy (application of the results to the
problems of philosophy)
Waismann seems to have made substantial progress in executing the
book in accord with this scheme. As early as 15 August 1930, he reported
to Schlick that a few good weeks of undisturbed work would see it finished. But at that point he became absorbed in the task of presenting
Wittgenstein’s conception of mathematics at a conference at Königsberg
in September 1930. Thereafter Waismann took up work on the project. His work included his issuing several versions of an epitome of
Wittgenstein’s up-dated thinking (‘Thesen’) and his preparing a long
exposition of the Tractatus for a lecture in Vienna on 15 March 1931.
Writing from California on 10 September 1931, Schlick commented that
he took it for granted that the text would soon be ready for publication,
expecting it to have appeared before he returned to Vienna in March
1932. Meanwhile Wittgenstein dictated new material to Waismann; when
Schlick was absent in America, Waismann had this typed up from his
shorthand notes and posted to Schlick. Waismann also received some
typescripts from Wittgenstein to facilitate the work of expounding his
Despite all this activity, Logik, Sprache, Philosophie never reached completion in this form. Wittgenstein became gradually more and more
opposed to the book, ultimately trying to kill off the whole project. He
wrote to Schlick on 20 November 1931, apologizing for his own part in
delaying the book and excusing this by a lack of enthusiasm for the enterprise: ‘I am convinced that Waismann would present many things in a
form completely different from what I take to be correct’. It seems probable that what provoked this negative response was Waismann’s having
recently redrafted and recirculated the document ‘Thesen’ (at Schlick’s
request!). Wittgenstein took a harsh view of this ‘rehash’ of the ‘dogmatic’ theses of the Tractatus when he met Waismann on 9 December
1931: he declared that the whole attitude expressed in that book was ‘no
longer justified’. Wittgenstein also criticized Schlick’s enthusiasm for the
Tractatus. He made the emphatic disclaimer: ‘There are very, very many
statements of the book with which I today disagree!’ In short, he came to
see a negative value in the project that Waismann was trying to finish with
Schlick’s support and under his direction. In Wittgenstein’s view, Logik,
Sprache, Philosophie would present a motley of mutually inconsistent
ideas in an unacceptably dogmatic style. To forestall this caricature of his
thinking, he apparently vetoed the publication in its originally advertised
What he proposed as an alternative was evidently that he himself
should take the lead in determining the entire content and the overall
structure of Logik, Sprache, Philosophie. Waismann was to adhere closely
to his explicit instructions. In this way, Wittgenstein was able to honour
his long-standing promise to Schlick to make his conception of logic and
language available through the Circle’s publications while at the same
time protecting himself against what he took to be the risk of serious
misrepresentation. Work began immediately according to this new
specification. Wittgenstein had eleven separate meetings with Waismann during the Easter vacation of 1932, and many more during vacations in the next two years. It seems highly probable that Waismann
took down dictations at many of these meetings, just as he had done
previously. He was supplied with further raw material for his work. He
certainly made use of a large typescript on philosophy of mathematics
(printed as Part II of Philosophical Grammar), The Blue Book and a
German translation of part of The Brown Book; he apparently saw some
parts of the ‘Big Typescript’. Wittgenstein dictated other material to
Schlick for transmission to Waismann; in particular, the long typescript
‘Wi:MS’.3
Waismann was apparently presented with outlines for integrating
remarks drawn from all these sources into continuous texts of chapters of
a book expounding Wittgenstein’s philosophical grammar. During termtime, when Wittgenstein was absent in Cambridge, Waismann would
turn to the execution of these plans, and he would present the results to
Wittgenstein during the succeeding vacations. Wittgenstein would comment in detail on these drafts, suggesting reorganization or deletion
of old material or the addition of new ideas. In many cases, he required
extensive modifications, even to previously agreed arguments, and
sometimes he demanded that Waismann start over again from scratch.
Waismann found this work very frustrating; it seemed to him to make no
steady progress towards an agreed goal. With great restraint he described
his problems to Schlick in a letter dated 9 August 1934:
He [Wittgenstein] has the great gift of always seeing things as if
for the first time. But it shows, I think, how difficult collaborative
work with him is, since he is always following up the inspiration of
the moment and demolishing what he has previously sketched
In a more despairing tone, Waismann went on to complain:
But all one sees is that the structure is being demolished bit by bit
and that everything is gradually taking on an entirely different
appearance, so that one almost gets the feeling that it doesn’t
matter at all how the thoughts are put together since in the end
nothing is left as it was.
Despite three years of steady effort, Logik, Sprache, Philosophie must have
seemed to Waismann to be at least as far from completion at the end of
1934 as it had been at the start of 1932.
Two aspects of this second phase of writing the book were crucially
This item is absent from von Wright’s published catalogue of Wittgenstein’s
papers. It exists among Schlick’s papers in the form of shorthand notes. This
suggests that Wittgenstein may have dictated it to Schlick from the ‘Zweite
Umarbeitung’ of the ‘Big Typescript’, a manuscript which Rhees used as the basis
for the opening part of Part I of Philosophical Grammar. The label ‘Wi:MS’ (in
Waismann’s hand) is taken from the folder in which this text was found.
different from the original scheme. First, the presumption was dropped
that Wittgenstein’s contemporary views could be represented as slight
modifications of, or improvements to, the central theses of the Tractatus.
Instead, Logik, Sprache, Philosophie was to begin from a clean slate in
giving an account of his new philosophy. (This is evident in much of the
text, e.g. in the treatment of propositional connectives and quantifiers,
and of the mutual exclusion of colours.) Second, Wittgenstein became a
co-author. There is no extant evidence about whether this arrangement
was made formal from the outset, but by late 1934 it was clearly understood that both names were to appear on the title page of the envisaged
publication. (In his letter to Schlick of 9 August 1934, Waismann
expressed his uneasiness that his own name should appear on the title
page at all, since it seemed to him then that there was no respect in which
the book was his book.) This scheme of formal co-authorship is a radical
difference between the second and the first phase of the project for Logik,
Sprache, Philosophie. It was a crucial part of the revised plan that most of
Wittgenstein’s ideas should be presented in his own words and according
to his own ordering. (The charge that Waismann was involved in plagiarism cannot get a purchase on this phase of the project!) Logik, Sprache,
Philosophie was to be not a book about Wittgenstein’s philosophy of logic
and language, but an authoritative presentation of it. (It was not to be
a representation (Darstellung) of his ideas, but an ordering of them
(Anordnen der Gedanken).)4
This second project foundered as the first one had. Sometime towards
the end of 1934, Waismann persuaded Schlick that the scheme was
unworkable. Nothing could possibly come of it since no sooner was
something done than it was immediately undone. The two of them held
‘a mid-night meeting’ with Wittgenstein to try to resolve this crisis
(according to Karl Menger’s recollection of a letter from Waismann
which recounted the history of Logik, Sprache, Philosophie). The upshot
was that Wittgenstein withdrew from co-authorship and, indeed, from
any further participation in writing the book, at the same time authorizing the two of them to proceed with the enterprise just as they saw
fit. He washed his hands of what he had once called ‘that Waismann
business’ (‘die Waismannssache’). But Wittgenstein did not sabotage
Schlick’s plan to present the conception of logic in Tractatus as part of
the foundations of the Circle’s world-view.
Thereafter Waismann had no regular contact with Wittgenstein even
CV 28 (1937)
during vacations. Some temporary friction was occasioned by Waismann’s publication of the article ‘Über den Begriff der Identität’ in Erkenntnis VI (1936). There he elaborated on various ideas derived from
Wittgenstein: ‘the same’ has different meanings depending on what is
taken to be the criterion of identity, and the question whether two things
are empirically distinguishable must be distinguished from the question
whether it makes sense to ask whether they can be distinguished. Waismann included this blanket acknowledgement:
For valuable suggestions in developing the present view, the
author is indebted to numerous conversations with Mr. Ludwig
Wittgenstein concerning, among other things, the concept of
Wittgenstein complained in a letter of 19 May 1936 that this was a totally
inadequate acknowledgement of Waismann’s indebtedness to him; in
particular, the phrase ‘valuable stimuli’ is alleged to give an entirely false
impression. Waismann apologized at length, noting his perplexity about
knowing how to draft an appropriate acknowledgement for fear of seeming to attribute to Wittgenstein ideas that he might wish to disown.
Waismann consulted with Schlick about how best to patch matters up,
and he himself proposed that a note be inserted in Erkenntnis containing
whatever Wittgenstein thought to be the exact extent of Waismann’s
intellectual indebtedness to him. Though this was never done, Waismann
took the greatest care in drafting similar acknowledgements in subsequent
It is noteworthy that, at Wittgenstein’s request, Waismann went to the
house in Vienna after Schlick’s death to check that all of his manuscript
books were present. Waismann was thus entrusted with a serious
responsibility. The episode also suggests that Wittgenstein had loaned
one or more of these ledgers to Schlick and was anxious about whether all
of this material had been returned.5
Shortly after Schlick’s murder in June 1936, Waismann entered into
negotiations with Springer Verlag for the publication of Logik, Sprache,
Philosophie under the revised title Das philosophische Denken, and he
signed a contract with them for its publication under his own name alone.
The book was to be dedicated to Schlick’s memory and published, just
This information comes from recent research by Brian McGuinness.
as originally intended, as Volume I of the series Schriften zur wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung. This contract was not executed. When Waismann
had completed the text early in 1937, he solicited Neurath’s help in
arranging for its publication in Holland. Though he secured another
contract and submitted a final typescript of the book, that plan too was
frustrated by the outbreak of war.
Even this sketchy account of the project of writing Logik, Sprache,
Philosophie suffices to make clear how very different its three phases were
from each other. In the first, Waismann was to produce a tripartite synopsis of Wittgenstein’s ideas on logic, language and philosophy, and this
was to be grounded primarily in the Tractatus. In the second, Wittgenstein undertook to supply and organize his new ideas on these subjects,
aiming to present, with Waismann’s active assistance, what might be
called a philosophical grammar. In the third, Waismann was left with a
free hand to construct a book on this same subject-matter, and he composed a synthesis of themes taken mostly from Wittgenstein but in part
from Schlick as well. He was probably responsible for the overall structure of the book, especially for the bipartite structure which separates
direct treatment of some specific philosophical problems from the outline
of a more systematic philosophical grammar.
It is of crucial importance for understanding and appreciating the texts
translated in this volume to realize that they mostly date from this second
phase of the enterprise. Some of them are the raw materials from which
Waismann sought to fabricate the text of a book co-authored with
Wittgenstein. Others must be intermediate stages in the process of
production. But all of them belong to a sustained attempt to present
Wittgenstein’s thinking accurately, even as much as possible in his very
own words. This makes them of great philosophical interest.
Waismann’s modus operandi
In a very general sense, the initial conception of the enterprise persisted
unmodified through all three of its phases: Waismann’s brief was always
to present a reordering and concatenation of Wittgenstein’s thoughts.
His method of working was equally unchanging. Waismann’s task was to
build a text from formulations of Wittgenstein’s ideas which were scattered in various texts and dictations; he had to extract clear and authoritative statements as building-blocks (as it were, Gedankenbausteine) and
then construct out of them a text with a perspicuous global structure. In
the middle phase, Wittgenstein was to supervise this work closely and to
suggest modifications or improvements to Waismann’s execution of the
programme. In order to forestall criticism, it was natural for Waismann to
try generally to preserve Wittgenstein’s precise wording of particular
remarks or paragraphs. He seems to have limited himself to interspersing
relatively few remarks which were meant to make clear some implications of Wittgenstein’s remarks and their relationships to each other.6
Waismann saw his task as comparable to taking a motley of pearls
of various sizes from a drawer and stringing them together into a necklace. The result was to be an elegant and perspicuous presentation of
Wittgenstein’s thoughts as much as possible in Wittgenstein’s own
words. (As it were, an übersichtliche Zusammenstellung [a perspicuous
arrangement] of Wittgenstein’s philosophy.)
Many of the details of Waismann’s methods of concatenating and
reordering Wittgenstein’s thoughts are clearly evident from the texts
translated here. It can be studied in some detail by comparing the full
text of ‘Diktat für Schlick’ with the sequence of short typescripts that
Waismann excerpted from this source. Nearly all of the original dictation
is exploited in Waismann’s attempts to work towards the text of Logik,
Sprache, Philosophie, and apart from some re-ordering and minor omissions, the resultant texts are in very close correspondence with the original. His aim in constructing short essays under specific headings was
clearly to fashion out of a sizeable body of somewhat amorphous material
some clearly defined and internally well-structured blocks of text from
which he could construct chapters by fitting them together in an
appropriate order. Indeed, it is clear from the back-references and
forward-references which he introduced that his quarrying and shaping
of these building-blocks was informed from the earliest stages by an
overall conception of how the book was to be constructed.
Waismann seems to have seen his role as rather minimalist.
(Wittgenstein may have taken a different view. He may have been alluding to Logik, Sprache, Philosophie when he remarked that ‘my results . . .,
variously misunderstood, more or less mangled or watered down, were in
circulation’.) In fact, Waismann engaged in three principal activities.
1) He frequently rearranged the order in which points are made without any further substantial modifications to the dictated text. His aim
was evidently to present the components of an argument in a more
orderly or more readily surveyable manner, e.g. to eliminate some of the
This policy of minimal editorial intervention can be clearly illustrated by a detailed
analysis of the published text of LSP Ch. III, §§1–2.
criss-crossing characteristic of Wittgenstein’s expositions and to coordinate points on the same topic which are scattered about in various
dictations and writings. In this respect, he had the temerity to suppose
that he could improve on Wittgenstein’s own formulations of his own
ideas! Perhaps he did accomplish this feat.7 Perhaps not, if style and content cannot readily be separated from one another in Wittgenstein’s writings. (On this more negative evaluation, Waismann’s activity might even
be said to exemplify Wittgenstein’s ironic observation: ‘It is typical of
the Jewish mind to understand another’s work better than the other
himself.’)8
2) At least in the earlier stages, Waismann had to (and did) emphasize
the compatibility and continuity of Wittgenstein’s later ideas with the
leading motifs of the Tractatus. He worked on the project under
Schlick’s aegis, and Schlick continued to view the Tractatus as one of the
pillars of logical empiricism and to exploit some of its principal ideas9
even after Wittgenstein had made clear to him that there were many,
many formulations of that book with which he was no longer in agreement. Schlick’s fixed view of the particular purpose of Logik, Sprache,
Philosophie must have generated at least some of the tension which made
Waismann’s collaboration with Wittgenstein difficult and slow.
3) Waismann had in view a global arrangement and hence comprehensive rearrangements of Wittgenstein’s widely dispersed thoughts.10 With
more or less advice from Wittgenstein, he had to organize remarks
according to recognizable topics, ultimately arranging them into chapters
on such themes as proper names, generic names, explanations of meaning,
logical connectives, etc. Moreover, he aimed to construct a text which
would have the cumulative structure of typical philosophical works, so
In a letter to Carnap, dated 4 March 1937, Waismann claimed to have done just
this in LSP: ‘. . . I have, by dint of arduous work, constructed an orderly whole
out of [Wittgenstein’s] countless thoughts that in his own work form a chaotic
muddle . . .’ But the impression of chaos may have resulted from blindness to a
very different pattern of thinking which is clearly visible in Wittgenstein’s work.
CV, p. 19.
In his lectures ‘Form and Content’, he stressed the importance of the saying/
showing distinction and the doctrine of the logical isomorphism of a declarative
sentence with the state of affairs which it symbolizes.
Or, more circumspectly, it might be claimed that at any particular time he had in
mind some definite overall structure of the book, but not that there was a single
overall structure which guided his activities at every stage. The original tripartite
structure of LSP was jettisoned in the second phase, i.e. by the end of 1931.
that he could build later arguments on points already established. Even at
the stage of assembling the book’s building-blocks, he inserted crossreferences of this sort (e.g. ‘We have already shown that . . .’ or ‘A similar
point holds for the sense of a sentence, so we can be briefer here’). These
policies may have gone very much against the grain of Wittgenstein,
who seems to have preferred to deal directly with specific problems and
consequently followed a quite different strategy in organizing his
In one sense, then, Waismann is appropriately regarded as the author
of the material published in this book. But in another sense, Wittgenstein
too can be seen as the author. One set of typescripts (listed under the
contents of Chapter 1 and presented in footnotes) is closely based on
‘Diktat für Schlick’. Another (comprising Chapter 2) seems to be transcriptions of dictations which were taken in shorthand (Notebook I). On
the assumption that many of the typescripts within the collections ‘Ältere
Reste’ and ‘Vorstufen’ bear the same relation to Wittgenstein’s dictations,
Waismann’s preparatory studies for Logik, Sprache, Philosophie consist of
some expositions which differ only very marginally from Wittgenstein’s
exegeses of his own ideas. This material has a very good claim to
being treated as authoritative in the exposition and critical analysis of
Wittgenstein’s philosophy in the period 1928–36.
The title: Voices of Wittgenstein
This is solely my responsibility. It is meant to carry three immediate
implications. First, verbal communication by Wittgenstein is evidently
the ultimate source (fons et origo) of most of this material; we can hear his
voice throughout these texts. Second, the time-span of the relevant dictations was several years during which his ideas seem to have undergone
substantial development; in a sense, he spoke with different voices over
this period, and we are probably hearing different voices in different texts
here.11 Finally, his ideas are reworked in some of these texts by Waismann, and even in one by Schlick; although both of them saw themselves
as expounding Wittgenstein’s principles and practising his method of
philosophizing (what Logik, Sprache, Philosophie calls ‘our method’), they
In particular, the notion of an hypothesis, which played an important role in
WWK, PR and PG, later disappeared from his thinking (BB, EPB and TS 220).
This suggests that the content of Ch. 6 has a relatively early origin.
each speak from somewhat different points of view.12 In short, it seems
that there is a complicated mélange of different voices in these texts, and
the title is intended to emphasize this plurality.
All those ideas seem indisputable. But there is a further rationale which
is important though more speculative. The picture I want to encourage is
one of Wittgenstein’s repeatedly presenting relatively self-contained discussions which are directed at eliminating certain serious prejudices or
replacing particular unconscious pictures. These may be more or less
extensive, ranging in length from a single paragraph to a substantial portion of a text (e.g. Philosophical Investigations §§65–142 are concerned
with the prejudice that there must be a general form of the proposition).
The crucial point is that these are not envisaged as being cumulative or
additive;13 consequently, they are also not to be seen as giving rise to
potential conflict. Each discussion is a purpose-specific portrait which is
meant to capture a particular physiognomy in the use of words.14 On
this view, Wittgenstein approaches the same points over and over again
from different directions. There is a dialectic in which various overviews (Übersichten) are juxtaposed to a limited range of prejudices
(Vorurteilen). We should, as it were, hear different voices even in roughly
simultaneous sequences of remarks.
This conception suggests the possibility of hearing new voices of
Wittgenstein in this corpus of texts. These are new relative to his hitherto
This difference is visible even in the text of LSP (PLP). It is Schlick who is concerned with the epistemological problem of the reliability of memory (LSP; cf.
AE), and it is he too who tried to develop a particular version of the
Abbildungstheorie der Sprache (the picture theory of meaning) by extending ideas
taken from TLP. On the other hand, it is Waismann who tries to use the technique
of clarifying concepts for the purpose of dissolving certain serious confusions in
logic, mathematics and physics (LSP).
It is ironic that Waismann disregards this point in trying to piece together a
systematic philosophical grammar from the materials supplied to him by
Wittgenstein. No doubt with Schlick’s encouragement, he adopted the strategy of
organizing Part II of LSP systematically, i.e. topic by topic. (How else could LSP
make a serious contribution to ‘the scientific worldview’?) This strategy might
explain much of the friction between Wittgenstein and Waismann, perhaps even
the double change of policy about co-authorship.
For the purpose of eliminating philosophical prejudices, systematic or comprehensive descriptions of the grammar of words would be completely pointless – just as
pointless as trying to eliminate racism or sexism by confronting someone with
psychological, sociological or economic data. In both cases, such facts will be set
aside as ‘atypical’ or ‘unrepresentative’.
recognized voices. He may make novel applications of distinctive ideas,
or he may more clearly exhibit methods of dealing with philosophical
problems. Several seem especially noteworthy.
He concedes that it is in principle impossible to confront the prejudice
that every proposition must be composite with a decisive counterexample, but he goes on to make a suggestion that might (and in his own
case, actually did) effect a conversion to a new point of view (Umstellung
der Auffassung), namely to consider gesture-language.15 There is a wellknown anecdote about a conversation with Sraffa which occasioned his
giving up this vital component of the picture theory of meaning in TLP.
(Sraffa made some Neapolitan gesture of disdain and asked, ‘What is the
logical form of this?’.) Combining these two points in a single discussion
(‘Zusammengesetztheit’ (F 71); cf. PLP 317–18) is of the greatest interest; it makes clear exactly why the prejudice cannot be characterized as a
mistake (cf. PI §110) and why the discussion is not considered to be a
Wittgenstein suggests that his method (‘our method’) resembles psychoanalysis in certain respects. He illustrates this remark with a discussion
of Heidegger’s notorious thesis ‘The nothing noths’. His discussion does
not take the form of showing exactly why this remark makes no sense, but
rather of seeking to uncover the picture which motivates or drives
Heidegger to make a statement which is so obviously nonsensical. He
suggests that this statement engages with nothing in the gear-train
of Heidegger’s thinking. Finally, he adds some remarks about what
may motivate a philosopher to say something which has no content or
implications. All of this discussion (DS 28–30; ‘Üeber den Charakter
der Beunruhigung’ (F 93)) has clear implications for reading many of
Wittgenstein’s remarks on other topics. In particular, there is frequent
recurrence of the method of seeking out pictures which motivate particular metaphysical statements or philosophical questions; e.g. what drives
Russell to claim that ‘this’ and ‘that’ are the only genuine proper names
(PI §39) or what underlies Augustine’s worry about how it is possible to
measure time (PLP 42). Reminders of everyday use are often used to
clarify the motives for metaphysical uses of words, not for the more
orthodox purpose of regulating or correcting philosophers’ utterances.
The slogan ‘Thinking is operating with signs’ is called a particular
conception (Auffassung) of the use of ‘thinking’ (‘Denken’ (F 87)), and
He also draws attention to a language of concrete symbols, e.g. to the possibility of
using a drawing of a red circle to represent a particular red circle (F 71).
it is associated with other remarks explicitly labelled as synopses or
surviews (Überblicken, übersichtliche Darstellungen) of the use of the
grammar of ‘belief ’ and ‘expect’ (‘Glaube’ (F 5) and ‘Erwartung’ (F 46)).16
This conception is undoubtedly of the greatest importance. It surely
helps to explain why he keeps going back to this slogan in the course of
The Blue and Brown Books. The only explicit example of an Übersicht in
his published work is the diagram of the colour-octahedron (PR 51–52).
These two things seem radically different – as different as verbal and
ostensive definition: one might even point to the diagram and encourage
somebody to read off from it various licit and illicit combinations of
colour-words. (This idea is held to be dangerous: the diagram may serve
as a compact formulation of a set of rules, but it does not at all replace
rules of grammar (‘Bedeutungskörper’ (F 18); cf. ‘Welche Rolle spielt die
Zeichnung in der Geometrie?’ (F 53)).) Wittgenstein envisages severe
resistance to the formula ‘Thinking is operating with signs’. There is the
entrenched picture of thinking as a mental process lying behind the
expression of thoughts, so he makes it his principal business to deflect
objections to this formula (cf. ‘Zwei Einwände’ (F 15) and ‘Intention’
(F 23)). These might be decisive reasons for rejecting ‘operating with signs’
as an analysis of ‘thinking’ or as an explanation of the meaning of this
word. But they are not reasons against accepting this remark as an epitome
(konciser Auszug; cf. (F 6)) or a life-like portrait (cf. DS 27) of the grammar of ‘think’. (A parallel remark is made about ‘conviction’ (Überzeugung): the best representation of a feeling of conviction is the intonation
(Tonfall) of an utterance.)17 This strategy is of the greatest interest and
importance. This discussion bears directly on the controversial question of
how to interpret ‘Übersicht’ and ‘übersichtliche Darstellung’ (PI §122).18
Likewise the comparison of a proposition with a ruler is characterized as an Übersicht which allows one to discern a system in a set of rules (Übersicht’ (F 16)); and
the intonation of heart-felt conviction serves as a perspicuous representation
(übersichtliche Darstellung) of the grammar of conviction (‘Glaube’ (F 5)).
Here again natural objections have to be deflected; e.g. the idea that any speaker
can combine any propositional content with any intonation whatever (DS 23;
‘Heucheln’ (F 6); ‘Ausdruck und Beschreibung’ §5 (G 22)). Even though this
proposal does not ‘fully correspond with reality’, it still gives the best picture of the
intensity of conviction (‘Ausdruck und Beschreibung’ §7).
One view is developed in detail in ‘Übersicht’ (G. P. Baker and P. M. S. Hacker,
Wittgenstein: Understanding and Meaning (Blackwell and Chicago University
Press, Oxford and Chicago, 1980)). An antithetical interpretation is proposed and
documented in Gordon Baker ‘PI §122: neglected aspects’ in R. L. Arrington
and H-J. Glock (eds) Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations: Text and Context
(Routledge, London and New York, 1991).
It has important implications for many other remarks such as ‘The meaning of a word is its use in the language’ and ‘Arithmetical equations are
rules of grammar’. These are regularly attacked and defended as if they
were conceptual analyses, whereas they may well be intended to have the
same status as ‘Thinking is operating with signs’, namely to pick out a
reference point, to pinpoint a centre of variation for describing the
grammar of ‘think’ (LPP 25, 142), or to indicate methods of investigation (Betrachtungsweise) (cf. LFM 55, 103). The status of these two
kinds of remark is entirely different.19
Wittgenstein discusses the idea that rules for the use of a particular
word are indissolubly linked and answerable to something external (what
he calls ‘meaning-bodies’ (Bedeutungskörper)). This is a source of much
confusion, especially in logic and mathematics (‘Bedeutungskörper’ (F
18)). We are apt to think that theorems about cubes can be read off the
nature of a cube or that the rule of double-negation elimination follows
from the truth-table for negation (‘Regel und Bedeutung’ (F 37) and
‘Welche Rolle spielt die Zeichnung in der Geometrie?’ (F 53); cf. PG 52–
55; LFM 282).20 As an antidote to this temptation a different conception
is proposed, namely regarding geometrical diagrams or truth-tables as
(merely) part of the language or symbolism of geometry and logic. They
are not to be seen as lying behind theorems of geometry or rules of inference as a sort of ‘logical machinery’, but rather as representing a system
of rules in a perspicuous manner.21 We need to overcome a prejudice
against seeing them as symbols in their own right. The campaign against
‘meaning-bodies’ has important implications. It might well explain, for
example, why Wittgenstein dropped using the colour-octahedron as an
instance of perspicuous representation (übersichtliche Darstellung),22
In particular, citing deviant cases does not contradict a conception (say, of thinking as operating with signs), but rather makes a positive contribution to filling out
a more detailed description of the use of a word where this might be wanted (LPP
25, 142).
A related picture is that in contradictions the meanings of words are a mechanism
which jams (LFM 190). Another picture is that behind words there are imperceptible bodies which determine whether a series of words fit together meaningfully or
not (PLP 235).
‘Zeichen und Anzeichen’ (F 29) is the source of the remark: ‘[The geometrical
cube] is here only a model which enables me to express the rules so that they can
be taken in at a glance’ (PLP 236).
Though the colour-octahedron is still cited with approval in ‘Regel und
Bedeutung’ (F 37): ‘Er . . . gestaltet sie [die Regeln] Übersichtlicher’ (cf. LSP 343).
namely because it seems specifically to reinforce a prejudice which was a
principal target in many later discussions: as long as we see it as something from which rules for using colour-words are to be read off, it is
liable to work mischief.
A distinctive conception of philosophical problems is conspicuous in
these texts. They are described over and over again with terms that have
strong psychological connotations. The most frequent and general one is
‘disquiet’ (‘Unruhe’ or ‘Beunruhigung’), but others occur such as ‘anxiety’ (‘Angst’) and ‘irritation’. Note in particular the title and contents of
‘On the character of disquiet’ (‘Über den Charakter der Beunruhigung’
(F 93). The elimination of philosophical problems is described in similar
terms, especially as ‘stilling of disquiet’ (‘Beruhigung’ or ‘Stillung der
Unruhe’). Note in particular the title and contents of ‘Overviews remove
disquiet’ (‘Überblick beruhigt’ (F 90)). One might be tempted to dismiss
this psychological idiom as mere hyperbole; or one might see these disturbing states of mind as mere accompaniments of strictly conceptual
puzzles or confusions. But instead one might strive to make better sense
of it by trying to relate these ‘problems’ to the ‘solutions’ that are presented here. Wittgenstein suggests eliminating the disquiet generated by
the appearance of uniqueness by the technique of surrounding something
with a wide range of cases which indicate gradual transitions to other
things (DS 28; ‘Überblick beruhigt’ (F 90)), and he notes that a change
of notation can transform someone’s attitude towards something (DS
28–29). Such ideas are puzzling precisely to the extent that we ignore or
discount his conception of philosophical problems as intellectual disturbances which have distinctive objects. We might learn from these texts to
pay much closer attention in other texts to such terms as ‘disquiet’,
‘obsession’ and ‘prejudice’. And we might see why he takes prejudices
and unconscious pictures to generate internal conflicts (PI §112).
These are five cases where sensitive readers may come to hear new
voices in these texts; or, more accurately, they are cases where reading
these texts may help one to hear voices which are already there to be
heard in many other texts as well. All seem to be instances of our failing
‘to understand something that is already in plain view’ (cf. PI §89);
here ‘we fail to be struck by what, once seen, is most striking and most
powerful’ (PI §129). There are probably many more cases of a similar
kind. I hope that the idea of a multiplicity of voices in these texts
will encourage perceptive readers to seek out some other cases for
Several sets of papers found in Waismann’s Nachlass after his death in
1959 relate to the project of writing Logik, Sprache, Philosophie. There
were the galley proofs of the English translation (dating from 1939),
supplemented by extensive corrections, modifications, additions, etc.
made by Waismann himself (perhaps over an extended period); this provided the text of The Principles of Linguistic Philosophy (1963). There
were various versions of chapters of the original German text which corresponded more or less closely to the English galley proofs; although the
final German typescript was destroyed in Holland in an incendiary attack,
it proved possible to reconstruct more than 95 per cent of the text
verbatim from these earlier versions, and this text was published as Logik,
Sprache, Philosophie (1976).
In addition to these fairly finished texts, there were three other sets of
1) Various series of notebooks which contained texts mostly written in
shorthand. One set of these notebooks, entitled ‘Wittgenstein 1–8’,
proved to consist largely of transcriptions of conversations which Wittgenstein had with Waismann and Schlick in Vienna during the period
1929–31; this material has been published under the title Wittgenstein
und der Wiener Kreis (1979). Another, entitled Vorarbeit 1–8, contains
shorthand versions of various short texts, some of which correspond to
extant typescripts. (Namely the texts catalogued as F 64, 70, 79, 44, 26,
56, 59, 68 and 45 – in the ordering of these shorthand notes.) There are
two other sets of notebooks, both probably incomplete. One set bears
Roman numerals, the other random Roman letters. Two of these have
close correspondence with extant typescripts. One labelled ‘M’ contains a
sequence of excerpts from ‘Diktat für Schlick’; the other labelled with
the Roman numeral ‘I’ seems to be a sequence of related dictations
by Wittgenstein, and I have used it for ordering the twenty-four
typescripts transcribed from this source (our Chapter 2).
2) Two folders, one titled ‘Ältere Reste’ and the other ‘Vorstufen’,
which contained roughly 150 short typescripts, many with subsequent
emendations in longhand and shorthand. Some of these correspond
closely to chapter-sections of Logik, Sprache, Philosophie, but others deal
with topics not covered in the book as published (e.g. ‘Denken’,
‘Glaube’, ‘Erfahrung’). It is roughly 115 of these 150 typescripts that
constitute the nucleus of the present work. Catalogues of the relevant
subsets of these two sets of typescripts will be given below to provide a
system for cross-references in this volume.
3) Various typescripts that are derived from Wittgenstein’s texts
or dictations: the typescript of ‘Diktat für Schlick’, the typescript ‘Wi:MS’
(possibly dictated to Schlick) based on the ‘Zweite Umarbeitung’ of
the ‘Big Typescript’,23 and a German translation of a substantial part
of The Brown Book (subsequently published as Eine philosophische
Betrachtung).24
A preliminary comparison of the typescripts with each other and with
the shorthand notebooks shows some significant correspondences. Several (e.g. ‘Geometrie’ and ‘Gesichtsraum’) are clearly typed from the
notes that comprise Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle. A handful are
excerpts or rearrangements of parts of the text of ‘Diktat für Schlick’ (e.g.
‘Glaube’ and ‘Zwei Einwände’). In many cases, the presence of a typescript is correlated with particular marks inserted in the table of contents
of various ones of the shorthand notebooks, and careful inspection of the
shorthand texts suffices to establish a prima facie case for an exact correspondence of texts even in absence of a complete, independent
deciphering of the shorthand. In short, much of this material seems to be
closely interrelated, to derive more or less directly from Wittgenstein’s
own formulations of his ideas, and to relate, sometimes to a high degree,
to the completed text of Logik, Sprache, Philosophie.
These conclusions motivated the project of making a thorough and
detailed examination of all this material, and it has eventuated in this
edition of those of Waismann’s papers which related to the composition
of Logik, Sprache, Philosophie.
There seems no room for doubt that much of this material consists of
larger or smaller fragments of Wittgenstein’s own exposition of his ideas
in the period 1929–36, principally in the period 1931–34. Consequently,
it constitutes what is perhaps the only remaining hitherto-unknown
primary source material for clarifying Wittgenstein’s thinking (and its
development during the early 1930s). It covers some topics (e.g. ‘the
causal theory of meaning’, the ‘intentionality’ of the mental) not much
discussed elsewhere by Wittgenstein, and it throws fresh light on some
matters of dispute (e.g. his conception of übersichtliche Darstellungen, his
remarks about method in philosophy, and his notion of Annahme).
Waismann’s title ‘Wi:MS’ is presumably an abbreviation of ‘Wittgenstein: Moritz
Schlick’, not of ‘Wittgenstein: manuscript’.
All of these texts have subsequently been physically separated from Waismann’s
papers and deposited with Wittgenstein’s papers in the Library of Trinity College,
On the other hand, the material must be used with circumspection.
The evidence for its constituting an authentic and authoritative
exposition of Wittgenstein’s ideas is at best indirect. This falls into three
1) extensive verbatim overlap with authenticated texts (e.g. with ‘Diktat
für Schlick’);
2) many uses of first-person singular constructions where the reference
of the pronoun is clearly Wittgenstein (e.g. ‘Im Traktat dachte ich,
dass . . .’);
3) Waismann’s care in preserving the exact wording of many remarks
through sequential revisions of the texts (e.g. while reordering them
or interespersing them with different explanatory comments).25
However powerful this evidence may be judged to be, it does not
amount to Wittgenstein’s having stamped any particular remark, let alone
any one of Waismann’s complete texts, with his Imprimatur. Nonetheless, it would be manifestly perverse and irrational to rate this collection
of texts as worthless for clarifying Wittgenstein’s ideas. Most of it has at
least as great a claim to be authentic as the material of Wittgenstein and
the Vienna Circle (which has proved to be very illuminating on many
points). Indeed, it seems closely comparable to Part I of Philosophical
Grammar, which is a different selection of remarks that the editor (Rush
Rhees) made from extensive typescripts, most of which were used by
Waismann as well. To whatever extent we judge any individual text to be
Waismann’s own interpretation of Wittgenstein, we should acknowledge
that Waismann was uniquely well placed at that time to present an
authoritative and accurate interpretation of Wittgenstein’s ideas. The
upshot is a corpus of texts many parts of which must have originated in
his words and been vetted at some stage by Wittgenstein himself.
Not everything translated here may be pure gold, but there are surely
substantial nuggets to be found within it.
There is in fact a fourth source: the grouping and ordering of the material in the
shorthand notebooks. A text which is typed from shorthand notes which occur in
the middle of a sequence of transcriptions of material which on one of the other
grounds can be ascribed to Wittgenstein acquires a stronger claim to authenticity
than it would have if it were considered only in isolation. (This point applies
particularly to the twenty-four typescripts made from the notebook numbered ‘I’.)
Catalogues and tables of contents
Ältere Reste
Problem des Socrates
Rechtfertigung der Grammatik
Erwartung u. Motiv
Zwei Beschreibungen des Glaubens
Kausale Auffassung I
Kausale Theorie der Bedeutung
Ist die Abmachung die Ursache des Gebrauchs?
[Klärung]
Das Schlussgesetz
Anwendung der Logik
Grammatik der Regel
Zeichen und Anzeichen
Russell’s Logik
Das Folgen und die W-F-Notation
Das Hineinsehen der Allgemeinheit
Kausale Auffassung der Sprache
Verbindung der Sprache mit der Wirklichkeit
Regel und Bedeutung
Zusammengesetztheit
Wesentliche und zufällige Züge
Elementarsätze
Unverifizierbare Sätze
Arten des Wunsches
Wort und Vorstellung
Logischen Konstanten
Sinnvoll und sinnlos
Sinn der Hypothese
Verifikation der Hypothese
Welche Rolle spielt die Zeichnung in der Geometrie?
Sinn der Negation
Phänomenale Sprache
Man kann ihm nicht ins Herz sehen
Logik und Psychologie
Physikalische Farben
Allgemeinheit 1
Allgemeinheit la
Allgemeinheit 2
Sehen und grammatische Auffassung
Interne Eigenschaft
Nichtaristotlische Logik
Wahrscheinlich, wahr, falsch
Ist die Bedeutung etwas Einheitliches?
Zwei Arten von Regeln
Wesentliche und unwesentliche Regeln
Tritt das Verstehen aus der Sprache heraus?
Der Sinn als Schatten der Wirklichkeit
Der Satz hat einen Sinn
(Zwei Einwände)
Die Sprache in ihrer Umgebung
Existenz des Fremdseelischen
Über den Charakter der Beunruhigung
Erinnerungsvertrauen
Widerlegung eines Einwands
Ist das Verstehen ein Zustand?
(Seelischer Akt)
Das Verstehen als Auffassung
Das Verstehen eines Bildes
Das Schliessen
G 23 Ausdruck und Beschreibung
24 Sprachspiele zur Aufklärung psychologischer
26 Ist das Verstehen ein psychischer Vorgang?
27 Folgen die Regeln aus der Bedeutung?
28 Methode
29 Vagheit
30 Rot und Grün
Notebook I 26
*Kausale Auffassung der Sprache27
Zeichen, Name, Träger, Bedeutung, Gegenstand
*Was ist ein Befehl?
*Verifikation 1
*Philosophie 1
*Das Folgen in der W-F-Notation
*Ein Gleichnis /Regel und Bedeutung/
*Allgemeinheit 1
*Das Hineinsehen der Allgemeinheit
*Russells Logik
*Vagheit
*Verbindung der Sprache mit der Wirklichkeit
*Rechtfertigung der Grammatik
Interne Relation
*Allgemeinheit 2
*Elementarsätze
*Zusammengesetzheit
*Was ist eine Regel?
*Verifikation 2
Vollständige Verifizierbarkeit
*Philosophie 2
Sinnvoll, möglich
Freges Behauptungszeichen
Schlagworte und Fragen
Zur kausalen Auffassung der Sprache
Editorial strategy and practice
1) The texts presented, here are the typed material in the documents
preserved among ‘Ältere Reste’ and ‘Vorstufen’ except in a very few cases
This notebook is catalogued as D 7.
The asterisk and the underlining correspond to two different recurring symbols
pencilled into the tables of contents of most of the shorthand notebooks.
where manuscript corrections have been accepted as corrections of clear
typographical errors. Later additions and deletions in longhand have
been noted as variants, but preference has been given to the original text.
Additions in shorthand have been systematically ignored in constructing
the published texts.
2) Variant readings are presented for the most part in footnotes. In
other cases, typed text which is cancelled in longhand revisions is presented first in the form \ . . . \ , and longhand additions are indicated in
the form / . . . /.
3) Chapter 1 is a single continuous text, dictated by Wittgenstein to
Waismann: ‘Diktat für Schlick’ (TS 302 in von Wright’s catalogue of
Wittgenstein’s Nachlass). Chapter 2 is a set of homogeneous typescripts
whose source is a single shorthand notebook; the ordering of these texts
is taken from this notebook, and it makes clear most of the crossreferences among these typescripts. In all other cases, the grouping and
ordering of the texts is the responsibility of the editor. Groupings are
motivated to emphasize themes that are important in Wittgenstein’s
work in the early 1930s, and the ordering is meant to maximize the
intelligibility of the individual typescripts.
4) A few closely related texts are presented in parallel columns. This
should help to make transparent how they correspond to each other, and
it should also clarify, at least in some measure, Waismann’s methods of
5) The texts translated here are not at all homogeneous, and to some
degree they overlap with one another. In addition, some are closely
related to discussions in some of Wittgenstein’s published texts (especially to parts of Philosophical Grammar).28 This may generate an occasional sense of ‘déjà lu’ among sensitive readers. (In this respect, these
texts might be said to be authentic replications of Wittgenstein’s ideas,
since his own writings are strings of remarks which criss-cross and overlap
in complicated ways.) There seems no way of removing all cases of
internal repetition of remarks without making some individual typescripts
difficult to read as continuous texts.
This is no accident. Waismann had access to a typescript (‘Wi:MS’) dictated from
the manuscript of the ‘Zweite Umarbeitung’ which Rush Rhees used as the basis
for constructing much of Part I of Philosophical Grammar.
Policy of translation
We have aimed at an accurate, literal translation which sticks closely to the
sentence-structure and punctuation of the original texts. While generally
aiming to translate the same word uniformly within each individual text,
we have not tried to construct and adhere to a systematic translationscheme in dealing with the whole corpus. In some cases, this would make
no sense; the term ‘Satz’, for example, occasionally means ‘sentence’,
often a sentence regarded as the expression of a thought (‘proposition’),
and sometimes ‘theorem’ (say, of geometry). In other cases, some
variation produces smoother readings in different contexts; the term
‘Auffassung’, for example, we have usually translated as ‘conception’, but
sometimes as ‘way of seeing’.
We have followed a subordinate policy of trying to maximize the continuity between our translation and existing English translations of
closely related texts. This has two facets. The principal one is respecting
the wording of the English text of Principles of Linguistic Philosophy
(which originated as a translation of Logik, Sprache, Philosophie). This
makes it easier for English-speaking readers to coordinate the preparatory
texts gathered together here with final text of LSP without having
recourse to the German, and it also takes advantage of Waismann’s own
extensive contribution to the precise wording of the published version of
The Principles of Linguistic Philosophy. Our other policy is to pay attention
to the wording of the The Blue and Brown Books and to that of the English translations of closely related texts among Wittgenstein’s works
(WWK, PR, PG). This too is intended to help English-speaking readers
to coordinate the dictated or reworked material presented here with what
is currently available of Wittgenstein’s work from the first half of the
1930s. Since much of the philosophical and historical interest of the texts
we have translated lies in these connections, it seems advisable to put
them in plain view on the surface of our translations, at least in so far as
this is possible without serious sacrifice in accuracy.
Permission to publish the original texts and English translations of these
dictations and drafts for Logik, Sprache, Philosophie was generously
granted more than a decade ago by Waismann’s literary executors, Sir
Isaiah Berlin and Sir Stuart Hampshire.
I am especially grateful to Brian McGuinness for steady encouragement
and good advice over three decades. It was he who originally gave me
access to Waismann’s papers and stressed their potential importance. In
respect of the preface, he has generously contributed much biographical
and bibliographical information.
I wish to thank Talbot Taylor for his staunch moral support for
this project and also for his generous financial support of a significant
proportion of the translation.
I am indebted to my three co-translators for their close attention to
detail, their care in getting things right, and their great patience in
dealing with my numerous queries, suggestions and objections.
I am grateful to many people for help in eliminating errors of transcription from the German texts. In addition to the translators, I should make
special mention of Dr Severin Schroeder and the team of translators who
produced the French text (Dictées à Waismann et pour Schlick (Presses
Universitaires de France, Paris, 1995)).
Finally, I am indebted to St John’s College, Oxford, for secretarial
When Gordon Baker passed away in the summer of 2002 he had only
recently submitted The Voices of Wittgenstein to Routledge, in a version
which, for all its roughness, was virtually finished and which he must have
felt he could no longer take to completion. But his work on this project
goes back a number of years – I was still a graduate student when he first
asked me to contribute to the translation. So when, on his untimely
death, I was asked to oversee the final preparation of the manuscript for
publication, I was very glad to do so, and to commemorate a friend and
teacher. This involved mainly a final revision of the translation and an
attempt to ensure a degree of uniformity of style and terminology among
the different co-translators. In this I also received much help from John
Vasilis Politis,
The late Gordon Baker and his collaborators have done a remarkable job
of reconstruction, which has brought us as near as one can get to the book
that Waismann and Wittgenstein were preparing together in the early
1930s. It was to be a digest of Wittgenstein’s thought as understood by
the two members of the Vienna Circle whom he found sympathetic and
who certainly felt sympathy for him: Waismann himself and Moritz Schlick.
‘Our philosophy’ Waismann called it, and with justice, for it represented a
phase in that continual discussion that philosophy had to be, if they and
Wittgenstein in particular were to be right. It is true that Wittgenstein was
then (as always) too intent on tearing down what he had built up, so he and
Waismann had to move on to separate projects, but Waismann carefully
preserved the fragments, which have now been reassembled like marquetry
to give us a coherent and apparently synchronous cross-section of an
important movement in modern thought.
Here we have a critique of language, of symbolism, of rules, of the
ideas of Russell and Ramsey, and of many other topics; it is not identical
with any of Wittgenstein’s manuscripts or the typescripts he had prepared,
but one can see how it emerges from them and takes form through the
collaboration of the master, his friend and his disciple. It is worked
material not comparatively raw data like the conversations published in
Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle and it has its proper value as such. On
the other hand it is closer to the original inspiration and more representative of the early thirties than Waismann’s later summa, Principles of Linguistic Philosophy (not his own title). This at once new and old work is an
important addition to Wittgensteinian studies and indeed to the history
of philosophy in general.
DIKTAT FÜR SCHLICK
Ist das Verstehen ein Zustand?1
Versteht man einen Satz oder ist es erst ein Satz, wenn man ihn versteht?
Ist das Verständnis ein Vorgang oder Zustand, der das Hören oder
Lesen des Satzes begleitet? Wie lange braucht das Verstehen eines
Wortes? Was heisst es, das Schachspiel zu verstehen? Ist es ein Bewusstseinszustand?2 Die Kenntnis des Schachspieles ist kein Bewusstseinszustand,3 so wenig wie die Kenntnis des Multiplizierens oder die Fähigkeit,
das Alphabet aufzusagen. Andererseits wird der, welcher multiplizieren
kann, beim Multiplizieren andere Bewusstseinszustände haben als der,
welcher es nicht kann.4 Man könnte sagen: ein Wort verstehen heisst,
es gebrauchen können. (Dies entspricht jedenfalls einer Weise des
Gebrauchs des Wortes ‘verstehen’.) Die Fähigkeit, das Wort zu
gebrauchen, ist kein Bewusstseinszustand, der den Gebrauch des Wortes
begleitet. (Dies ist eine grammatische Bemerkung.)
Wenn man eine Fähigkeit einen Zustand nennt, dann ist sie ein
Zustand im Sinn der Physiologie oder der Zustand eines Seelenmodells.
Die Aussage, dass dieser Zustand besteht, ist eine Hypothese. Der
Gegensatz hierzu ist z.B. der Zustand der Zahnschmerzen.5 (Angenommen, wir wollten den Ausdruck ‘unbewusste Zahnschmerzen’ so
The title comes from F 99.
For the first four questions, F 99 substitutes: ‘Wir haben das Verstehen mit einem
Können verglichen und haben gesagt, dass das Können jedenfalls kein Zustand ist’.
Variant: ‘Die Kenntnis des Schachspieles ist z.B. kein Bewusstseinszustand, der
die einzelnen Züge begleitet . . .’ (F 99).
F 99 omits the rest of this paragraph.
DICTATION FOR SCHLICK
Is understanding a state?1
Does one understand a proposition is it only a proposition if one
understands it?
Is understanding a process or state which accompanies hearing or reading a proposition? How long does it take to understand a word? What
does it mean to understand the game of chess? Is this a state of consciousness?2 Knowing how to play chess is not a state of consciousness3
any more than knowing how to multiply or the ability to repeat the
alphabet. On the other hand, somebody who knows how to multiply is,
while carrying out multiplications, in another state of consciousness than
somebody who lacks this ability.4 One could say: to understand a word
means to know how to use it. (This corresponds at least to one way of
using the word ‘understand’.) The ability to use a word is not a state of
consciousness that accompanies the use of the word. (This is a grammatical remark.)
If an ability is called a state, then it is a state in a physiological sense or
the state of a mind-model. The statement that this state obtains is a
hypothesis. The opposite of this is, e.g., the state of toothache.5 (Suppose
that we wished to use the expression ‘unconscious toothache’ in this way:
‘I have unconscious toothache’ is to mean ‘I have a diseased tooth that
For the previous four questions, F 99 substitutes: ‘We have compared understanding with an ability and we have said that an ability is, at any event, not a state’.
Variant: ‘Knowing the game of chess, e.g., is not a state of consciousness that
accompanies the individual moves . . .’ (F 99).
D I K TAT F Ü R S C H L I C K
gebrauchen: ich habe unbewusste Zahnschmerzen soll heissen: ich habe
einen schlechten Zahn, der mich nicht schmerzt. Diese Ausdrucksweise
mag für manche Zwecke praktisch sein. Hat man aber damit Zahnschmerzen gleichsam an einem dunklen Ort entdeckt, wo man früher
keine vermutet hatte? Wenn man nun zwischen bewussten und unbewussten Zahnschmerzen unterscheidet, und beide Zustände nennt, so
hat das Wort ‘Zustand’ in jedem dieser Fälle eine andere Grammatik. Vgl.
sichtbare und unsichtbare Farben.)
Dem Ausdruck ‘einen Satz verstehen’ analog ist der Ausdruck ‘einen
Satz meinen’. Man kann nun entweder fragen: ‘Was meinst du mit
diesem Satz?’ oder: ‘Meinst du diesen Satz?’ Auf die erste Frage antwortet ein weiterer Satz, und daher hat diese Frage auch nach einem
weiteren Satz gefragt. Das Meinen im zweiten Sinne ist etwa etwas im
Ernst meinen, im Spass meinen und dem analog ist etwas mit Überzeugung sagen oder ohne Überzeugung. Hier kann man ‘Überzeugung’ ein
Phänomen nennen, welches den Satz begleitet, und zwar kann man für
unsere Zwecke für Überzeugung den Ausdruck der Überzeugung,
nämlich z.B. den Tonfall setzen. Man könnte nun unsere erste Frage so
auffassen:6 Ist es ein Satz erst mit dem richtigen Tonfall oder ist das ein
Satz, was betont wird? Und die Antwort darauf wäre: wie du willst.
Beiläufig gesprochen: ist der Tonfall dem Sinn wesentlich, so können wir
von zwei Sätzen reden, welche den gleichen Wortlaut aber verschiedenen
Tonfall haben.
Mit der Aussage, das Schrift- oder Lautbild sei ein Satz nur wenn man
es versteht, will man auch sagen, das Schriftbild sei ein Satz nur auf dem
Hintergrund eines grammatischen Systems. Ich gebrauche hier absichtlich das irreführende Wort ‘Hintergrund’, weil es uns so ist, als stünde
die Kenntnis des Systems gleichsam fühlbar hinter dem besondern Satz.
Am Grunde dieses Irrtums liegt die Unklarheit über die Grammatik der
sogenannten seelischen Zustände, wie etwa besonders des Wissens und
Könnens. ‘Ein Satz ist ein solcher nur in einem grammatischen System’
ist analog ‘eine Spielhandlung ist eine solche nur im System des Spieles’.
Die Kenntnis des Multiplizierens steht nicht wie ein Hintergrund hinter
der einzelnen Multiplikation.
Müssen wir einen Satz deuten, damit er ein Satz wird? (Die Frage ist
dieselbe wie die erste.)7 Was heisst es aber einen Satz deuten? Es kann
Variant: ‘Die Frage, mit der wir anfangen, Könnte jetzt so aufgefasst werden: . . .’
(F 99).
Variant: ‘(Das ist wieder unsere Ausgangsfrage.)’ (F 99).
D I C TAT I O N F O R S C H L I C K
does not cause me pain’. This mode of expression might be useful for
some purposes. But has one thereby discovered toothache, as it were, in
an obscure place where it had not previously been suspected? If one now
distinguishes between conscious and unconscious toothache and calls
them both states, then the word ‘state’ has a different grammar in each of
these cases. Cf. visible and invisible colours.)
Analogous to the expression ‘to understand a proposition’ is the
expression ‘to mean a proposition’. One can ask ‘What do you mean by
this proposition?’ or ‘Do you mean this proposition?’. To the first question another proposition would be the answer, and hence this question
has asked for a further proposition. Meaning in the second sense is, say,
to mean something seriously, or in jest, and the analogue of this is to say
something with conviction or without conviction. Here one could call
‘conviction’ a phenomenon that accompanies the proposition, and for
our purposes, one may indeed replace conviction with the expression of
conviction, namely, e.g., an intonation. One could now take our first
question in this way:6 Is it a proposition only [when spoken] with the
correct intonation or is a proposition that which is given intonation? And
the answer to this would be: it is up to you to decide. Roughly speaking:
if intonation is essential to the sense [of a proposition], then we can speak
of two propositions which consist of the same sequence of words but
differ in intonation.
With the statement that a written or spoken structure is a proposition
only if it is understood, one also wants to say that what is written is a
proposition only against the background of a grammatical system. Here I
deliberately use the misleading word ‘background’ since it seems to us
as if knowledge of the system stands, as it were, palpably behind the
individual proposition. Underlying this mistake we find an unclarity
about the grammar of so-called mental states, in particular about knowledge and ability. ‘A proposition is such only in a grammatical system’ is
analogous to ‘a move in a game is such only in the system of the game’.
Knowledge of how to multiply does not stand as a background behind
each individual multiplication.
Must we interpret a proposition for it to become a proposition? (The
question is the same as the first one.)7 But what does it mean to interpret
Variant: ‘The question with which we began could now be conceived in this
way: . . .’ (F 99).
Variant: ‘(This is once again our initial question.)’ (F 99).
heissen: ihn in ein anderes Zeichen übersetzen. Dann antwortet die Deutung auf die Frage: ‘Wie verstehst du diesen Satz?’ und hier kann man
natürlich sagen, es ist nicht nötig, den Satz zu deuten, damit er ein Satz
wird. Denn warum sollen wir ihn erst durch einen andern Satz ersetzen
müssen? Man könnte ja die Deutung in diesem Sinn auch als Zusatz des
ersten sagen, und wäre es nun richtig zu sagen, ein Satz hat nur Sinn mit
einem Zusatz? Wir könnten unsere erste Frage aber auch analog auffassen
der Frage: ist es ein Satz erst, wenn die Interpunktionszeichen gesetzt
sind oder setzen wir die Interpunktionszeichen in einem Satz? Hierüber
können wir willkürlich bestimmen.
Verstehen eines Satzes analog dem Verstehen einer
Melodie als Melodie
Tritt das Verstehen aus der Sprache heraus? 8
Der Gegensatz zu dieser Auffassung ist die Idee, dass das Verstehen eines
Satzes im Heraustreten aus der Sprache besteht, nämlich darin, dass man
die Verbindung zwischen der Sprache und der Wirklichkeit herstellt. Das
Vorbild dieses Heraustretens aus der Sprache und des Herstellens eines
Übergangs zur Wirklichkeit gibt uns die hinweisende Definition. Die
hinweisende Definition ersetzt ein Zeichen durch ein anderes. Man kann
sagen: sie ersetzt die Wortsprache durch eine Gebärdensprache.9 Es
könnte sein, dass die Worte nur dazu dienen, durch den Mechanismus
der Assoziation Bilder hervorrufen, welche die eigentlichen Zeichen sind.
In diesem Sinne bräuchten uns diese Worte nicht zu interessieren.10

References: §110
 §39
 §122
 §5
 §7
 §122
 §112
 §89
 §129