Source: http://www.kringandchung.com/News-Events-Publications/Publications-1/The-Continuing-Violation-Doctrine-Extends-The-Statute-Of-Limitations-In-Employment-Cases.shtml
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 16:37:23+00:00

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The law is clear about what must be proven to prevail under the doctrine: when an employer engages in a continuing course of unlawful conduct under the FEHA (e.g., harassment, discrimination, retaliation, et al) that does not establish a constructive discharge, the statute of limitations will not run until either (a) the conduct is brought to an end (e.g., the employer ceases the unlawful conduct or the employee resigns); or (b) the employee realizes that further effort on his or her part to end the unlawful conduct will be futile  (e.g., the employer makes clear by words or conduct that any further attempts by the employee to obtain a reasonable accommodation will be fruitless).
The doctrine also requires a showing of a continuing violation: (1) the conduct occurring within the limitations period is similar in kind to the conduct outside the period; (2) the conduct was reasonably frequent; and (3) the conduct had not yet become permanent (i.e., permanency is achieved when the harassing conduct stops; the employee resigns; or the employee is on notice that further efforts to end the harassment will be futile).  To illustrate, as in the first example, the unwelcome touching committed by the employee's colleague is similar in kind (harassment) to the sexual comments made for two years prior; the conduct was reasonably frequent because it occurred on a continuing basis; and there was no permanency because the harassment did not stop.
For employers, it remains imperative to immediately address and cease any unlawful employment practice because the continuing violation doctrine may extend the time an aggrieved employee has to bring an action. On the other hand, this doctrine enables an employee who believes they have been subjected to an unlawful employment practice that occurred more than one year ago to possibly still bring a claim.
 Cal. Gov't Code § 12960.
 Cucuzza v. City of Santa Clara (2002) 104 Cal. App. 4th 1031 at 1042.
 Dominguez v. Washington Mutual Bank (2008) 168 Cal. App. 4th 714 at 721.
 Richards v. CH2M Hill, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal. 4th 798, 811-824.
 Acuna v. San Diego Gas & Electric Company (2013) 217 Cal. App. 4th 1402 at 1412.
 Dominguez, Id. at 721, 724.
 Jumaane v. City of Los Angeles (2015) WL 6940142.

References: § 12960
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