Source: http://mincovlaw.com/doc/Theberge_v_Galerie_dArt_du_Petit_Champlain_inc-SCC2002
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 21:01:51+00:00

Document:
McLachlin C.J. and L’Heureux-Dubé, Gonthier, Iacobucci, Major, Binnie and LeBel JJ.
Copyright � Infringement � Civil remedies � Ownership of copies � Definition of copyright � Art galleries transferring authorized reproductions of painter’s works from paper-backed posters to canvas for purposes of resale � Whether galleries “copied” artist’s works � Whether new artistic work was produced “in any material form” within meaning of s. 3(1) of Copyright Act � Whether painter’s copyright infringed � Whether seizure before judgment justified � Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42, ss. 3, 38(1).
Civil procedure � Provisional remedies � Seizure before judgment � Art galleries transferring authorized reproductions of painter’s works from paper-backed posters to canvas for purposes of resale � Painter having canvas-backed reproductions seized � Whether painter’s copyright infringed � Whether seizure before judgment justified � Code of Civil Procedure, R.S.Q., c. C-25, art. 734 � Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42, s. 38(1).
The respondent, a painter who enjoys a well-established international reputation, assigned by contract the right to publish reproductions, cards and other stationery products representing certain of his works to a publisher. The appellant art galleries purchased cards, photolithographs and posters embodying various of the artist’s works from the publisher, and then transferred the image to canvas. The process in issue here involves lifting the ink that was used in printing a paper poster and transferring it onto a canvas. Since this process leaves the poster blank, there is no increase in the total number of reproductions. The respondent applied for an injunction, accounting, and damages against the appellants in the Quebec Superior Court. He also obtained a writ of seizure before judgment, under art. 735 of the Code of Civil Procedure (“C.C.P.”), with respect to all of the canvas-backed reproductions embodying his works, claiming to have a deemed right of ownership in those items under s. 38(1) of the Copyright Act. Section 38(1) provides that the owner of the copyright in a work may recover possession of all infringing copies of that work. “Infringing”, in relation to a work, is defined in s. 2 of the Copyright Act as “any copy, including any colourable imitation, made or dealt with in contravention of this Act”. The appellants applied to have the seizure quashed. The Superior Court concluded that transferring an authorized paper reproduction onto canvas did not amount to infringement within the meaning of the Copyright Act, and ordered that the seizure be quashed. The Court of Appeal, finding that there had been infringement, set aside that decision and upheld the seizure before judgment with respect to the canvas-backed reproductions.
Held (L’Heureux-Dubé, Gonthier and LeBel JJ. dissenting): The appeal should be allowed. The order of the motions judge setting aside the seizure and ordering that the seized goods be returned to the appellants should be restored.
Per McLachlin C.J. and Iacobucci, Major and Binnie JJ.: The Copyright Act provides the respondent with both economic and moral rights to his work. The economic rights are based on a conception of artistic and literary works essentially as articles of commerce. Such rights can be assigned and the respondent can only assert under the Act the economic rights he has retained. Moral rights, which are not assignable, treat the ?uvre as an extension of the artist’s personality, possessing a dignity which is deserving of protection. The integrity of the work is infringed only if the work is modified to the prejudice of the honour or reputation of the author. Moral rights act as a continuing restraint on what purchasers can do with a work once it passes from the author, but respect must be given to the limitations that are an essential part of the moral rights created by Parliament. Economic rights should not be read so broadly that they cover the same ground as the moral rights, making inoperative the limits Parliament has imposed on moral rights.
In this case, the respondent is asserting a moral right in the guise of an economic right, and the attempt should be rejected. The appellants purchased lawfully reproduced posters of the respondent’s paintings and used a chemical process that allowed them to lift the ink layer from the paper (leaving it blank) and to display it on canvas. They were within their rights to do so as owners of the physical posters. There was no production (or reproduction) of a new artistic work “or any substantial part thereof in any material form” within the meaning of s. 3(1) of the Copyright Act.
The image “fixed” in ink on the posters was not reproduced. It was transferred from one display to another. An expansive reading of the economic rights whereby substitution of one backing for another constitutes a new “reproduction” that infringes the copyright holder’s rights even if the result is not prejudicial to his reputation tilts the balance too far in favour of the copyright holder and insufficiently recognizes the proprietary rights of the appellants in the physical posters which they purchased.
The historical scope of the notion of “reproduction” under the Copyright Act should be kept in mind. “Reproduction” has usually been defined as the act of producing additional or new copies of the work in any material form. While the Act recognizes that technologies have evolved by which expression could be reproduced in new ways, the important evolution of legal concepts in the field of copyright is not engaged by the facts here. This is a case of literal physical, mechanical transfer in which no multiplication takes place.
The separate structures in the Act to cover economic rights and moral rights show that a clear distinction and separation was intended. In terms of remedies, Parliament intended modification without reproduction to be dealt with under the provisions dealing with moral rights rather than economic rights. A contrary view would allow an artist who objected to a “modification” of an authorized reproduction to sidestep the important requirement of showing prejudice to honour or reputation in order to establish an infringement of moral rights.
Since the respondent has not brought himself within s. 38 of the Copyright Act, he had no authority to obtain a seizure of the appellants’ copies under art. 734 C.C.P. The respondent’s real complaint is more properly characterized as the alleged infringement of his “moral” rights and its potential impact on the market for his works. An art. 734 seizure before judgment is not available to an artist or author who relies on the alleged infringement of a moral right. The evaluation of a potential breach of moral rights calls for the exercise of a good deal of judgment. A distortion, mutilation or modification of a work is only actionable if it is to “the prejudice of the honour or reputation of the author”. The artist or writer should not become the judge in his own cause on such matters and it is therefore entirely understandable that Parliament should insist on prior judicial review before any seizure takes place based on an assertion of violation of moral rights. Whether a fuller record adduced at trial will demonstrate a breach of economic rights or moral rights will be for the trial judge to determine. At this stage, we need to decide only that the interlocutory record did not justify the seizure before judgment.
Per L’Heureux-Dubé, Gonthier and LeBel JJ. (dissenting): The Copyright Act provides protection for both copyright and the author’s moral rights. Copyright protects against the unlawful appropriation and distribution of creative expression. It is a patrimonial right that may be assigned. The subject-matter of copyright is a right in the work and not a personal right. The key factor is the work, including its material support, and not the idea expressed by the work. Moral rights are concerned primarily with protecting the integrity and paternity of the work, which is then regarded as an extension of the author’s personality. These are extra-patrimonial rights, which, by definition, are not assignable. The concepts of moral rights are inapplicable to the facts of this case.
In this case the appellants unlawfully reproduced the respondent’s works in a material form in breach of s. 3(1) of the Copyright Act. In order for a work to be reproduced, there is no requirement to establish that there has been an increase in the total number of copies of the work. Parliament did not protect the right only to reproduce the work as a whole but also to reproduce a substantial part of the work. It is therefore necessary to consider not only the quantitative aspect, but also the qualitative aspect. A restrictive analysis based solely on multiplication of the work could not provide the work with the necessary protection and would ignore the concept of “substantial part thereof”, which is protected by s. 3(1).
The concept of “work” refers to any materialized and original form of expression. Fixation of the work in a medium is a condition sine qua non of the production of a work. Therefore, “producing” a work refers to the initial materialization and “reproducing” it refers to any subsequent material fixation that is modelled (in the causal sense) on its first fixation. Fixation of the work in a new medium is therefore the fundamental element of the act of “reproduc[ing] …in any material form whatever” what already existed in a first, original material form. That type of conduct amounts to plagiarism and constitutes an infringement of copyright under s. 3(1).
It is important to distinguish between the medium, which is protected by s. 3(1) and is inextricably connected to the work, and the concept of “structure” in s. 28.2(3) of the Copyright Act. A change to the medium is prohibited by s. 3(1), while a change to a physical structure containing the work will be prohibited by s. 28.2(3) if the author establishes that the new physical structure causes prejudice to the integrity of his or her work.
The Copyright Act provides that a copyright owner may dispose of his or her right, either wholly or partially, retaining the residue of the sole reproduction rights that were not assigned. The respondent had given his publishers very detailed authorization for the reproduction of his works. The contract between the respondent and his publishers must be interpreted in accordance with the general requirements of arts. 1425 to 1432 C.C.Q. The respondent never intended to assign in full his right to reproduce the works in question in any material form whatever. The contractual provisions, when construed as a whole, show that the right conferred is limited solely to reproduction on paper products, thereby excluding reproduction in any other material form, including affixing an image representing the respondent’s work onto a canvas. The use of the expression “other stationery products” implies that the products that are expressly authorized are also stationery products. The fact that the product may be framed, laminated or combined with other products also suggests that the product is in fact a stationery product, as the authorized medium is not physically altered and is still paper. The rights assigned by contract certainly do not include the ability to alter the authorized product by changing its medium.
By expressly confining the rights that were assigned to producing reproductions of his works on paper, the respondent therefore retained all his rights to produce reproductions on any other medium whatsoever. By transferring posters of the respondent’s works onto canvas, the appellants did in fact reproduce the respondent’s works or a substantial part thereof in any material form whatever, contrary to s. 3(1). The fact that the respondent did not consent means that his copyright was infringed. The appellants had therefore engaged in infringement and the respondent was entitled to seize the canvas-backed reproductions under art. 734(1) C.C.P. and s. 38(1) of the Copyright Act.
Distinguished: Apple Computer, Inc. v. Mackintosh Computers Ltd.,  1 F.C. 173, aff’d  1 F.C. 673, aff’d  2 S.C.R. 209; approved: Snow v. The Eaton Centre Ltd. (1982), 70 C.P.R. (2d) 105; Fetherling v. Boughner (1978), 40 C.P.R. (2d) 253; No Fear, Inc. v. Almo-Dante Mfg. (Canada) Ltd. (1997), 76 C.P.R. (3d) 414; referred to: Compo Co. v. Blue Crest Music Inc.,  1 S.C.R. 357; R. v. Stewart,  1 S.C.R. 963; Bishop v. Stevens,  2 S.C.R. 467; Morang and Co. v. LeSueur (1911), 45 S.C.R. 95; Millar v. Taylor (1769), 4 Burr. 2303, 98 E.R. 201; Underwriters’ Survey Bureau Ltd. v. Massie & Renwick Ltd.,  Ex. C.R. 15, rev’d  S.C.R. 218; Tom Hopkins International, Inc. v. Wall & Redekop Realty Ltd. (1984), 1 C.P.R. (3d) 348; Walter v. Lane,  A.C. 539; Compagnie Générale des Établissements Michelin�Michelin & Cie v. National Automobile, Aerospace, Transportation and General Workers Union of Canada (CAW-Canada),  2 F.C. 306; Mirage Editions, Inc. v. Albuquerque A.R.T. Co., 856 F.2d 1341 (1988); Crim., January 28, 1888, Bull. crim., No. 46, p. 68; Crim., December 2, 1964, Bull. crim., No. 320, p. 672; Crim., October 20, 1977, Bull. crim., No. 315, p. 801; Civ. 1st, May 5, 1976, Bull. civ., No. 161, p. 128; Paris, March 18, 1987, D. 1988.Somm.209, note Colombet; Civ. 1st, April 19, 1988, Bull. civ., No. 112, p. 76; Paris, April 27, 1945, Gaz. Pal. 1945.1.192; Hovener/Poortvliet, HR January 19, 1979, NJ 412; Frost v. Olive Series Publishing Co. (1908), 24 T.L.R. 649; C. M. Paula Co. v. Logan, 355 F.Supp. 189 (1973); Peker v. Masters Collection, 96 F.Supp.2d 216 (2000); Lee v. A.R.T. Co., 125 F.3d 580 (1997); King Features Syndicate, Inc. v. O. and M. Kleeman, Ltd.,  A.C. 417; Thériault v. Succession de Rémi Thériault,  C.S. 1120.
Fetherling v. Boughner (1978), 40 C.P.R. (2d) 253; Tri-Tex Co. v. Gideon,  R.J.Q. 2324; 2946-1993 Québec inc. v. Sysbyte Telecom inc., J.E. 2001-1143; Stopponi v. Bélanger,  R.D.J. 33; Molloy v. Bouchard,  R.J.Q. 1941; Compo Co. v. Blue Crest Music Inc.,  1 S.C.R. 357; Bishop v. Stevens,  2 S.C.R. 467; Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re),  1 S.C.R. 27; Cartwright v. Wharton (1912), 25 O.L.R. 357; Stevenson v. Crook,  Ex. C.R. 299; L. B. (Plastics) Ltd. v. Swish Products Ltd.,  R.P.C. 551; Apple Computer, Inc. v. Mackintosh Computers Ltd.,  1 F.C. 173, aff’d  1 F.C. 673, aff’d  2 S.C.R. 209; Compagnie Générale des Établissements Michelin -- Michelin & Cie v. National Automobile, Aerospace, Transportation and General Workers Union of Canada (CAW-Canada),  2 F.C. 306; Ladbroke (Football) Ltd. v. William Hill (Football) Ltd.,  1 W.L.R. 273; King Features Syndicate Inc. v. O. and M. Kleemann, Ltd.,  2 All E.R. 355.
Act to amend the Copyright Act and to amend other Acts in consequence thereof, L.R.C. 1985, c. 10 (4th Supp.) [formerly S.C. 1988, c. 15].
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Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42 [am. 1997, c. 24], ss. 2 “copyright”, “infringing”, 3(1), 6, 13(1), (4), 14.1 [ad. c. 10 (4th Supp.), s. 4], 14.2 [idem], 15(1), 27(1), 28.1 [idem, s. 6], 28.2 [idem], 29 - 32.2, 34(1), (2), 38.
Copyright Act, 1709 (U.K.), 8 Ann., c. 21.
Copyright Act of 1875, S.C. 1875, c. 88 [published at S.C. 1876, p. xvii].
Revised Berne Convention, art. 1.
United States Code, Title 17, s. 101.
Universal Copyright Convention (1952), Can. T.S. 1962 No. 13.
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APPEAL from a judgment of the Quebec Court of Appeal (2000), 9 C.P.R. (4th) 259, J.E. 2000-531,  Q.J. No. 412 (QL), setting aside a judgment of the Superior Court, J.E. 99-1991,  Q.J. No. 4472 (QL). Appeal allowed, L’Heureux-Dubé, Gonthier and LeBel JJ. dissenting.
Marzia Frascadore, for the appellants Galerie d’Art Yves Laroche inc. and Éditions Multi-Graph ltée.
Vincent Chiara, for the appellants Galerie d’Art du Petit Champlain inc., Galerie d’Art Laroche, Denis inc. and Serge Rosa.
Louis Linteau, for the respondent.
The judgment of McLachlin C.J. and Iacobucci, Major and Binnie JJ. was delivered by Binnie J.
4 I find myself in respectful disagreement with the conclusion of my colleague Gonthier J. In my view, the seizure was not authorized by the Copyright Act. The pre-judgment seizure provisions of art. 734 of the Quebec Code of Civil Procedure, R.S.Q., c. C-25, were thus not an available remedy. The seizure was therefore wrongful. I would allow the appeal.
5 Copyright in this country is a creature of statute and the rights and remedies it provides are exhaustive: Compo Co. v. Blue Crest Music Inc.,  1 S.C.R. 357, at p. 373; R. v. Stewart,  1 S.C.R. 963; Bishop v. Stevens,  2 S.C.R. 467, at p. 477.
6 This is not to say that Canadian copyright law lives in splendid isolation from the rest of the world. Canada has adhered to the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (1886) and subsequent revisions and additions, and other international treaties on the subject including the Universal Copyright Convention (1952), Can. T.S. 1962 No. 13. In light of the globalization of the so-called “cultural industries”, it is desirable, within the limits permitted by our own legislation, to harmonize our interpretation of copyright protection with other like-minded jurisdictions. That being said, there are some continuing conceptual differences between the droit d’auteur of the continental civiliste tradition and the English copyright tradition, and these differences seem to lie at the root of the misunderstanding which gave rise to the present appeal.
8 The respondent easily meets the first hurdle, which is to satisfy the statutory requirements for a copyright. There is no doubt that his talent is embodied in artistic works of great originality. These works were protected by copyright from the moment of their expression, without any requirement of registration or other formality on his part. The protection extends not only to the original painting (“artistic work”) but also to subsequent copies which embody the work. The respondent is thus entitled to the full measure of protection the Act allows. The question, however, is whether he went too far in obtaining a seizure before judgment of works which he, necessarily viewing the matter in his own interest, found to be infringing.
12 Generally speaking, Canadian copyright law has traditionally been more concerned with economic than moral rights. Our original Act, which came into force in 1924, substantially tracked the English Copyright Act, 1911 (U.K.), 1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 46. The principal economic benefit to the artist or author was (and is) the “sole right to produce or reproduce the work or any substantial part thereof in any material form whatever” (s. 3(1)) for his or her life plus fifty years (s. 6). The economic rights are based on a conception of artistic and literary works essentially as articles of commerce. (Indeed, the initial Copyright Act, 1709 (U.K.), 8 Ann., c. 21, was passed to assuage the concerns of printers, not authors.) Consistently with this view, such rights can be bought and sold either wholly or partially, and either generally or subject to territorial limitations, and either for the whole term of the copyright or for any part thereof (s. 13(4)). The owner of the copyright, thus, can be, but need not be, the author of the work. It was the respondent’s economic rights in enumerated works that were the subject-matter of an assignment to two poster manufacturers, Éditions Galerie L’Imagerie É.G.I. Ltée (“É.G.I.”) by contract dated October 29, 1996, and New York Graphic Society, Ltd. by contract dated February 3, 1997.
[translation] 19- Free use of the product.
15 Moral rights, by contrast, descend from the civil law tradition. They adopt a more elevated and less dollars and cents view of the relationship between an artist and his or her work. They treat the artist’s ?uvre as an extension of his or her personality, possessing a dignity which is deserving of protection. They focus on the artist’s right (which by s. 14.1(2) is not assignable, though it may be waived) to protect throughout the duration of the economic rights (even where these have been assigned elsewhere) both the integrity of the work and his or her authorship of it (or anonymity, as the author wishes).
I cannot agree that the sale of the manuscript of a book is subject to the same rules as the sale of any other article of commerce, e.g., paper, grain or lumber. The vendor of such things loses all dominion over them when once the contract is executed and the purchaser may deal with the thing which he has purchased as he chooses. It is his to keep, to alienate or to destroy. But …[a]fter the author has parted with his pecuniary interest in the manuscript, he retains a species of personal or moral right in the product of his brain.
28.2 (1) Il n’y a violation du droit à l’intégrité que si l’?uvre est, d’une manière préjudiciable à l’honneur ou à la réputation de l’auteur, déformée, mutilée ou autrement modifiée, ou utilisée en liaison avec un produit, une cause, un service ou une institution.
…[was] adamant in his belief that his naturalistic composition has been made to look ridiculous by the addition of ribbons and suggests [that] it is not unlike dangling earrings from the Venus de Milo.
Q. Is it not true, Mr. Théberge, that your position is that the canvas-backed reproductions that are now being made of your works are unlawful because you do not authorize them and especially because you are not paid a royalty for each reproduction that is made?
Q. So, is it ….
A. Being a party to the distribution of these things means that they assume that I hatched a plot in which I am a participant. I’m getting money, royalties or …that I make money off of it -- “otherwise, it’s just not possible. How can you allow such a thing, Mr. Théberge?” So there are clients who have originals, who have paid eight thousand dollars ($8,000), nine thousand dollars ($9,000) that they find reproduced on canvas all over, in slightly smaller or medium sizes, or depending on the size, and for forty dollars ($40), sixty dollars ($60), eighty dollars ($80) or one hundred and twenty dollars ($120)…. Me, Claude Théberge, the artist, I have nothing whatsoever to do with it, and want to put a stop to it. It’s just unreal. And especially, if I accepted money for that manoeuvre, I wouldn’t dare look myself in the mirror, Sir.
Q. So, this morning, it is your testimony, Mr. Théberge, that it is not a question of money ….
Thus a copyright springs into existence as soon as the work is written down or otherwise recorded in some reasonably permanent form (“fixated”).
(viii) The U.S. concept of a “recast, transformed, or adapted” derivative work would be introduced into our law without any legislative basis.
It is wise in any state, to encourage letters, and the painful researches of learned men. The easiest and most equal way of doing it, is, by securing to them the property of their own works….
38 My colleague, Gonthier J., takes the position that if the image were transferred from one piece of paper to a different piece of paper with no other “change”, there is a new “fixation” and that would be “reproduction”. But in what way has the legitimate economic interest of the copyright holder been infringed? The process began with a single poster and ended with a single poster. The image “fixed” in ink is the subject-matter of the intellectual property and it was not reproduced. It was transferred from one display to another. It is difficult to envisage any intellectual content let alone intellectual property embodied in the piece of blank paper peeled away, or in the piece of blank paper substituted for it. When Raphaël’s Madonna di Foligno was lifted for preservation purposes from its original canvas in 1799 under the direction of the chemist Berthollet and fixed to a new canvas, the resulting work was considered to be no less an original Raphaël. Similarly, when the frescoes of Pompeii were restored by replacement of the underlying plaster, the result was not classified as a “reproduction”, even though the old plaster was a constituent physical element of the original frescoes. If a comparable copyright situation arose, I do not think the artist would (or should) have a veto over a purchaser’s attempt to preserve the asset. These examples may be more spectacular than the humble swap of substrates of a paper poster, but the principle is the same and applies equally to authorized copies as well as to the original artistic work. In neither case is there reproduction within the meaning of the Act.
39 The Quebec Court of Appeal adopted a more restricted view than does my colleague, suggesting that the violation of economic rights lay not simply in “fixation” but in moving the ink film from a paper substrate to a substrate of a more costly material, namely canvas ( Q.J. No. 412 (QL), at paras. 18-23). (This was thought to place the respondent’s work for resale in a different market niche, as discussed below.) This too, in my view, goes too far. If the “new” substrate material were made of a smooth sheet of vellum (calf) or papyrus, the result would have the identical appearance to the original paper. How has the copyright holder’s interest in the “intellectual” property been harmed by such a change in the material composition of the backing? Does the mischief only emerge in appearances, i.e., if the new piece of paper has a textured finish, or is pebbled to look like canvas? No one would deny the world of difference between the original artistic work and a mechanically produced copy, but we are talking here about moving the same physical layer of inks around different blank substrates.
See also to the same effect: No Fear, Inc. v. Almo-Dante Mfg. (Canada) Ltd. (1997), 76 C.P.R. (3d) 414 (F.C.T.D.).
45 My colleague takes the view (at para. 139) that reproduction does not necessarily imply multiplication of the thing reproduced. In this connection, he refers to Apple Computer, Inc. v. Mackintosh Computers Ltd.,  1 F.C. 173, 10 C.P.R. (3d) 1 (T.D.), aff’d  1 F.C. 673 (C.A.), aff’d  2 S.C.R. 209. In that case, however, multiplication was admitted ( 1 F.C. 673, at p. 697). The issue was not the meaning of reproduction but whether a computer silicon chip could be the subject-matter of copyright protection. The computer program at issue was multiplied when reproduced in the form of a ROM chip. When the process was complete, the original written text of the program still existed, as did the subsequent renditions of it in code within the plaintiff’s systems as well as the new reproduction etched in the memory cells of the defendant’s chip (pp. 11-12 C.P.R.). In Apple Computer the copyright issue was whether literal multiplication might nevertheless not constitute a “reproduction” for purposes of the Copyright Act. The facts here pose the opposite question, namely whether there is “reproduction” without multiplication.
46 My colleague also cites Compagnie Générale des Établissements Michelin--Michelin & Cie v. National Automobile, Aerospace, Transportation and General Workers Union of Canada (CAW-Canada),  2 F.C. 306 (T.D.). In that case, the defendant union, in an organized campaign against Michelin, reproduced in its leaflets Michelin’s “fanciful happy marshmallow-like” man shown stomping on the head of a worker. The union denied substantial reproduction of Michelin’s copyrighted figure because of minor differences in the rendition (“qualitative” differences). The defence was rejected. There was, accordingly, reproduction, but there was also multiplication of the copyrighted image in each of the union’s leaflets.
48 It is of interest that our courts have not given an independent meaning to “produce” as distinguished from “reproduce” in s. 3(1) of the Act. Nor have the courts done so under the English Act. In fact, in that country, the word “produce” was thought to be of such little consequence that it was eliminated from the Act by amendment in 1956 (H. G. Richard and L. Carrière, eds., Canadian Copyright Act Annotated (loose-leaf), vol. 1, at p. 3-7). See also C. Brunet, “Copyright: The Economic Rights”, in G. F. Henderson, ed., Copyright and Confidential Information Law of Canada (1994), 129, at pp. 136-37, and McKeown, supra, at p. 421.
49 The U.S. legislation expressly incorporates a definition of “derivative work”, as happens for example when a cartoon character is turned into a puppet, or a tragic novel is turned into a musical comedy. In such circumstances there is, in a sense, a “production” rather than a reproduction. However, the examples of what might be called derivative works listed in s. 3(1)(a) to (e) of our Act are consistent with the notion of reproduction because they all imply the creation of new copies or manifestations of the work. In the application of the ink transfer method, however, there is no derivation, reproduction or production of a new and original work which incorporates the respondent’s artistic work.
51 My colleague relies (at para. 142) on the respondent’s exclusive right under s. 3(1) to produce or reproduce his work “or any substantial part thereof in any material form whatever”. Under this provision, an infringer does not escape liability by reproducing a substantial part of the artistic work as opposed to the whole of it. An individual who copies a novel does not avoid the penalties set out for infringement simply by changing a few words and, likewise, an individual cannot copy with impunity simply by changing the medium. A playwright would be liable if he or she put on the stage a substantial part (but not the whole) of a copyrighted novel. There would clearly be reproduction of that part, i.e., the part of the novel in which intellectual property subsists. After the production, the novel would still exist intact, as would the new play. Here the layer of inks, in which resides the artistic content, rests intact and there is no such multiplication of a “substantial part” of the poster.
55 The position taken by the Quebec Court of Appeal, nevertheless, echoes the debate in some U.S. courts about the proper allocation of compensation where a new way has been found to exploit the work in a market or market niche perhaps not anticipated by the creator of the underlying work, who thus may not have captured the highest price to be charged for the sale or use of that underlying work: see Mirage Editions, Inc. v. Albuquerque A.R.T. Co., 856 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1988); A. B. Cohen, “When Does a Work Infringe the Derivative Works Right of a Copyright Owner?” (1999), 17 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 623, at p. 654.
56 I shall refer below to the U.S. concept of a “derivative work”, but for the moment it is sufficient to say that by 1996 and 1997 when É.G.I. and New York Graphic Society, Ltd. contracts were entered into, the “ink transfer process” was well established in the poster art industry. The respondent’s position is that he does not want to enter that market, not that it was unknown or unforeseen. The question he poses in this case is whether his economic rights under the Copyright Act permit him to prevent others from entering that market using existing (and paid for) copies of his work.
57 As previously noted, s. 28.2(1) of the Act provides that even a purchaser of the tangible object may not “distor[t], mutilat[e] or otherwise modif[y]” (emphasis added) the work “to the prejudice of the honour or reputation of the author”. It seems clear, at least by negative implication, that a modification of a work by the purchaser which does not “prejudice …the honour or reputation of the author” was intended by Parliament to be within the purchaser’s rights.
58 In addition, as a secondary point, s. 28.2(3) of the Act provides that a change in “the physical … structure containing a work …shall not, by that act alone, constitute a distortion, mutilation or other modification of the work”. To the extent a change in substrate can be said to change the “physical structure” containing the respondent’s work, it does not “by that act alone” amount to a violation of a moral right either.
(See also R. G. Howell, L. Vincent and M. D. Manson, Intellectual Property Law: Cases and Materials (1999), at p. 383.) This is not to say that moral rights do not have an economic dimension (e.g., there may be an economic aspect to being able to control the personality-invested “moral” rights of integrity and attribution) or to deny that there is a moral rights aspect to copyright (e.g., a critic may reproduce parts of the text of a book when reviewing it, but it will be considered a breach of the author’s economic rights unless his or her authorship is attributed). However, in terms of remedies, the distinction in the Act between the two sets of rights is clear.
63 Under the civiliste tradition, and particularly in France, the right of reproduction was interpreted to include not only the right to make new copies of the work (reproduction stricto sensu) but also what is called by French jurists the “right of destination” (droit de destination). The right of destination gives the author or artist the right to control to a considerable extent the use that is made of authorized copies of his or her work: see generally A. Lucas and H.-J. Lucas, Traité de la propriété littéraire & artistique (1994), at p. 235; F. Pollaud-Dulian, Le droit de destination: le sort des exemplaires en droit d’auteur (1989). See alsoCrim., January 28, 1888, Bull. crim., No. 46, p. 68; Crim., December 2, 1964, Bull. crim., No. 320, p. 672; Crim., October 20, 1977, Bull. crim., No. 315, p. 801; Civ. 1st, May 5, 1976, Bull. civ., No. 161, p. 128; Paris, March 18, 1987, D. 1988.Somm.209, note Colombet; Civ. 1st, April 19, 1988, Bull. civ., No. 112, p. 76; Paris, April 27, 1945, Gaz. Pal. 1945.1.192.
64 The “droit de destination” applies in other civiliste jurisdictions. Thus in Hovener/Poortvliet, HR January 19, 1979, NJ 412, brought to our attention by counsel for the respondent, the Netherlands Supreme Court found a violation of the droit d’auteur where a purchaser of an authorized art calendar cut out the pictures, stuck them to coasters, and resold them. This was regarded by the court as an altogether new and different “publication”. In Frost v. Olive Series Publishing Co. (1908), 24 T.L.R. 649 (Ch. Div.), by contrast, the English court did not regard as an infringement the cutting out of pictures from books, pasting them on cards, and reselling. “[The recirculation of] objects already in existence is not reproduction in a material form”: Laddie et al., supra, at p. 614.
[T]|he process …involves the use of acrylic resin, emulsions, or similar compounds which act as a transfer medium to strip the printed indicia from the original surface on which it is printed, whereupon the image carrying film is applied to another article, such as the plaster base of a wall plaque. In effect, a decal picture is created.
The process utilized by defendant that is now in question results in the use of the original image on a ceramic plaque; such process is not a “reproduction or duplication”.
…United States court decisions, even where the factual situations are similar, must be scrutinized very carefully because of some fundamental differences in copyright concepts which have been adopted in the legislation of that country.
73 I should note that while there is no explicit and independent concept of “derivative work” in our Act, the words “produce or reproduce the work …in any material form whatever” in s. 3(1) confers on artists and authors the exclusive right to control the preparation of derivative works such as the union leaflet incorporating and multiplying the Michelin man in the Michelin case, supra. See generally, McKeown, supra, at p. 64. In King Features Syndicate, Inc. v. O. and M. Kleeman, Ltd.,  A.C. 417 (H.L.), under a provision in the English Act similar to s. 3(1) of our Act, the plaintiff’s copyright in the cartoon character “Popeye the Sailor” was held to be infringed by an unauthorized doll, i.e., the two dimensional character was reproduced without authorization in a new three-dimensional form. See also W. J. Braithwaite, “Derivative Works in Canadian Copyright Law” (1982), 20 Osgoode Hall L.J. 191, at p. 203. To the extent, however, that the respondent seeks to enlarge the protection of s. 3(1) by reading in the general words “recast, transformed, or adapted” as a free-standing source of entitlement, his remedy lies in Parliament, not the courts.
76 I agree with Gonthier J. that an art. 734 seizure before judgment is not available to an artist or author who relies on the alleged infringement of a moral right.
79 I conclude therefore that at this stage of the interlocutory proceedings, the respondent has not brought himself within s. 38 of the Copyright Act and therefore had no authority to obtain a seizure of the appellants’ copies under art. 734 of the Quebec Code of Civil Procedure. Whether a fuller record adduced at trial will demonstrate a breach of economic rights or moral rights will be for the trial judge to determine. At this stage, we need to decide only that the interlocutory record did not justify the seizure before judgment.
Show Dissent by Gonthier J.
81 The issue in this case involves the validity of a seizure before judgment under s. 38(1) of the Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42 (“C.A.”), and art. 734(1) of the Quebec Code of Civil Procedure, R.S.Q., c. C-25 (“C.C.P.”). The only matter before this Court is the seizure of the canvas-backed reproductions of the paper posters that embody the respondent artist’s works. In order to dispose of that question, however, we must first determine whether the process of transferring a poster onto canvas can give rise to an infringement of the exclusive rights conferred by the C.A. and thereby constitute a form of copyright infringement.
84 The respondent had nonetheless contractually authorized the reproduction of some of his works, being careful to define the exact scope and type of reproductions authorized. As a representative contract, the parties introduced in evidence a written agreement dated October 29, 1996, in which the respondent assigned the right to publish 10,000 reproductions, 100,000 cards and other stationery products representing the work Célébration to Éditions Galerie L’Imagerie É.G.I. Ltée (“É.G.I.”). Under the heading [translation] “Product(s)”, the contract provides as follows: [translation] “Reproduction 50 x 60cm - 19.7 x 23.6. - No. 6304 and/or cards and/or stationery”. Then, under the heading [translation] “Printing(s)” it specifies “Maximum ten thousand (10,000) reproductions and/or one hundred thousand (100,000) cards and/or stationery as advised”. And under the heading [translation] “Compensation”, it stipulates that [translation] “the publisher will give the artist, free of charge, twenty-five (25) reproductions and/or one hundred (100) cards as artist’s proofs”.
[translation] The product is offered for sale without restriction as to use, i.e. it may be framed, laminated or combined with other products and such uses shall not be considered to have generated products or sub-products other than those provided for in this contract.
as if those copies or plates were the property of the copyright owner.
91 He relied first on art. 19 of the representative contract, which stipulates: [translation] “[t]he product is offered for sale without restriction as to use, i.e. it may be framed, laminated or combined with other products and such uses shall not be considered to have generated products or sub-products other than those provided for in this contract” (emphasis added). Thus, he apparently interpreted that clause as conferring broad authority to alter the substrate or medium of the work.
92 Bélanger J. relied heavily on the reasoning of Southey J. in Fetherling v. Boughner (1978), 40 C.P.R. (2d) 253 (Ont. H.C.). He also observed that the process of transferring onto canvas [translation] “does not in any way constitute new, unauthorized copies of the work” (para. 6), since the image is physically transferred from the paper onto the canvas. Bélanger J. added that the cards in the possession of the appellant Serge Rosa had all been purchased from the authorized publisher, É.G.I.
94 Since this was an interlocutory proceeding, the respondent had to bring a motion for leave to appeal under arts. 26 and 511 C.C.P. Nuss J.A., sitting as a single judge, allowed the motion but [translation] “only as it relates to the quashing of the seizure and the release ordered with respect to goods that are reproductions on canvas” (emphasis added). The issue in the Court of Appeal was therefore substantially narrower. This Court may not dispose of any issue that was not before the Court of Appeal.
95 The three judges agreed that the respondent’s appeal should be allowed:  Q.J. No. 412 (QL). Michaud C.J.Q. and Delisle J.A. wrote separate reasons, however, each emphasizing different aspects. Beauregard J.A. concurred in their analysis.
96 Michaud C.J.Q. first stated that the publishing contracts showed that the respondent had consented only to paper-backed reproductions and not canvas-backed reproductions. He also distinguished laminating, framing or mounting a paper-backed reproduction onto another substrate from transferring a paper-backed reproduction onto canvas. While the basic nature of a paper-backed reproduction remains the same when it is glued, framed or laminated, transferring a reproduction onto canvas changes its nature. Furthermore, the value of a paper-backed reproduction that is framed or laminated is equal to the sum of the value of the poster and the cost of the process, while transferring a reproduction onto canvas allows a vendor to charge more than the sum of the costs.
97 Michaud C.J.Q. therefore concluded that the original painting had indeed been reproduced, even though the technique used for doing it consisted in transferring a paper-backed reproduction onto canvas. In addition, the rights of the artist had in fact been infringed even though the rights of the authorized publishers might not have been.
98 Delisle J.A, reviewed a number of relevant sections of the C.A. He first considered the definition of “infringing” in s. 2, that is any copy of a work made or dealt with in contravention of that Act. Then he referred to the sole right to “produce or reproduce …in any material form whatsoever” in s. 3(1). He then cited the description in s. 27 of what constitutes an infringement of copyright: “for any person to do, without the consent of the owner of the copyright, anything that by this Act only the owner of the copyright has the right to do”. He then interpreted those provisions and concluded that the canvas-backed reproductions in question, which had been made without the consent of the respondent, constituted a reproduction of his works in a different form, and was therefore infringement.
(1) Interaction Between Article 734(1) C.C.P. and Section 38(1) C.A.
101 Article 734(1) C.C.P. allows a plaintiff to seize before judgment the movable property which he has a right to revendicate. Section 38(1) C.A. provides that “the owner of the copyright in a work …may recover possession of all infringing copies of that work …and take proceedings for seizure of those copies …before judgment if, under the law of Canada or of the province in which those proceedings are taken, a person is entitled to take such proceedings, as if those copies …were the property of the copyright owner”.
102 The fate of the revendication and seizure is therefore inextricably tied to the determination of the issue of infringement. If the canvas-backed reproductions constitute infringing copies of the respondent’s works, the respondent is entitled to revendicate them under s. 38(1) C.A. That right of revendication will then serve as the basis for the right of seizure before judgment under art. 734(1) C.C.P. (see, for example, Tri-Tex Co. v. Gideon,  R.J.Q. 2324 (C.A.); 2946-1993 Québec inc. v. Sysbyte Telecom inc., Sup. Ct. Mtl. No. 500-05-064484-015, May 2, 2001, J.E. 2001-1143).
104 A decision with respect to the sufficiency of the affidavit in support of a seizure before judgment is not, strictly speaking, a decision on the merits of the case. The judge who analyses the issue of sufficiency must nonetheless examine the logical connection between the facts alleged and the right to seize before judgment (Stopponi v. Bélanger,  R.D.J. 33 (C.A.), at p. 37).
105 In this case, however, the question of the connection between the facts and the right to seize is completely indistinguishable from the question of the infringement of the respondent’s copyright. This is so by reason of s. 38(1) C.A., which states that “the owner of the copyright in a work …may recover possession of all infringing copies of that work …and take proceedings for seizure of those copies …before judgment if, under the law of Canada or of the province in which those proceedings are taken, a person is entitled to take such proceedings, as if those copies …were the property of the copyright owner” (emphasis added). “Infringing”, as defined by s. 2 C.A., requires an infringement of the copyright. In other words, in order to conclude that the process of transferring onto canvas gives rise to an act of infringement, it must first be established that it constitutes a copyright infringement.
106 In short, in order for the facts in the affidavit to meet the sufficiency requirement in the C.C.P.,they must establish that an infringement has occurred. The issues of sufficiency and copyright infringement therefore involve the same elements of fact and law. Since the relevant facts were admitted, the legal issue is all that remains to be decided. That issue is a narrow one, and calls for a determination of whether the process of transferring onto canvas amounts to infringement.
108 While a seizure before judgment under art. 734 C.C.P. may be carried out without prior approval by a judge, it must also be noted that this is a conservatory measure the purpose of which is simply to [translation] “obtain possession of property that is in dispute …and place it under the authority of the court until it has determined the respective rights of the parties” (see C. Belleau, “Des mesures provisionnelles”, in D. Ferland and B. Emery, eds., Précis de procédure civile du Québec (3rd ed. 1997), vol. 2, 301, at p. 307; Molloy v. Bouchard,  R.J.Q. 1941 (Sup. Ct.)). As was previously mentioned, seizure before judgment does not, strictly speaking, call for a determination of the merits of the case. That is in fact why the affidavit in support of the application for a writ need only set out sufficient supporting facts, and those facts must be accepted by the judge who hears the motion to quash under art. 738 C.C.P.
[translation] It is said in the theatre lobby that it is not noble for authors to write for the worthless pursuit of money, they who pride themselves on their claim to fame. Indeed, they are right, fame is appealing. But they forget that nature condemns us to dine 365 times in order to bask in glory merely for a year. For the authors, they are not defending a privilege, but the sacred right of all rights to retain ownership of their works….
In the event of disagreement regarding the meaning of specific provisions, it will be up to the courts to interpret them, referring to the ordinary meaning of the words and the purpose and spirit of the Act(Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re),  1 S.C.R. 27, at para. 21).
114 In Canada, the first real Copyright Act was enacted in 1921 (S.C. 1921, c. 24) and came into force in 1924, although canvases were already protected by The Copyright Act of 1875, S.C. 1875, c. 88, an Act validated by the British Parliament by The Canada Copyright Act, 1875 (U.K.), 38 & 39 Vict., c. 53. (For an analysis of the sources of copyright in Canada, see P.-E. Moyse, “La nature du droit d’auteur: droit de propriété ou monopole?” (1998), 43 McGill L.J. 507.) The Act of 1921 was designed to enable Canadian authors to benefit from the protection provided by the provisions of the Berne Convention, which was adopted in 1886 and ratified by Great Britain on behalf of Canada. The purpose of the Convention was to establish an international code and to create a Union of States “for the protection of the rights of authors in their literary and artistic works” (Revised Berne Convention, art. 1). Generally, copyright enables the owner to prevent the unauthorized plagiarism and distribution of an original work. It is therefore these acts themselves that are prohibited, without regard to their purpose, be it mercenary or otherwise. In some respects, copyright is also similar to a real right; inter alia, it is an exclusive right that can be set up against anyone. The intangible subject-matter that it protects distinguishes it, however, from a right in a material thing. In short, given the sui generis nature of copyright, we must be circumspect in proposing any analogy to other rights.
115 Moreover, the purpose of copyright is not to protect the ideas or opinions expressed by the creator, but rather the various means and forms by which those ideas are communicated (J. S. McKeown, Fox Canadian Law of Copyright and Industrial Designs (3rd ed. 2000), at p. 60; Cartwright v. Wharton (1912), 25 O.L.R. 357 (H.C.); Stevenson v. Crook,  Ex. C.R. 299, at p. 307; L. B. (Plastics) Ltd. v. Swish Products Ltd.,  R.P.C. 551 (H.L.)). In other words, it is the formal expression of those ideas or opinions that is protected by copyright.
[translation] What the term “copy-right” very certainly reveals is the actual function of copyright. It is an exclusive right and, as it applies to the part that relates to the commercial exploitation of the work, a true monopoly on reproduction…. Canadian law inherited that aspect while remaining receptive to the French doctrines, particularly because of Quebec’s influence. This does great credit to our law since the Canadian Parliament is more inclined than any other legislature to stay attuned to external developments in order to mould its own rules.
…Thus, in Canadian statutes, the intention is to establish both a right that is centered on the person of the author, this being derived from the civil structures of the right of ownership, and a definitely dynamic right centered on its economic function, which reflects the theories underlying the concept of monopoly.
118 Copyright protects against the unlawful appropriation and distribution of creative expression. With respect to a work, that right includes the right: (i) “to produce or reproduce the work or any substantial part thereof in any material form whatever”, (ii) “to perform the work or any substantial part thereof in public”, and (iii) “to publish the work or any substantial part thereof”, as well as a series of other rights derived from those fundamental rights (s. 3(1) C.A.). Copyright is a patrimonial right that may be assigned, as provided in s. 13(4) C.A.
[T]|he purpose of the Copyright Act is and always has been to grant a monopoly. No distinction is made therein as to the purpose of the work created � for entertainment, instruction or other purposes. The legislation historically, in my view had two purposes: to encourage disclosure of works for the “advancement of learning”, and to protect and reward the intellectual effort of the author (for a limited period of time) in the work.
125 A seizure under s. 38(1) C.A. therefore requires that there be infringing copies of works orof any other subject-matter of copyright. As I explained earlier, the outcome of this case depends entirely on the determination of the question of infringement.
128 “Infringing”, in relation to a work in which copyright subsists, is defined in s. 2 C.A. as “any copy, including any colourable imitation, made or dealt with in contravention of this Act”. Infringement can therefore arise from two distinct sources: (i) a copy made in contravention of the C.A. or (ii) a copy dealt with in contravention of that Act.
130 In the case of a copy dealt with in contravention of the Act, the copy itself was not necessarily an infringement of the C.A. Rather, it was dealt with in contravention of that Act. We might then ask whether the expression “copy …dealt with in contravention of this Act” requires the commission of acts that are contrary to s. 3(1) C.A. (s. 27 C.A.), or whether it can refer to a copy that resulted solely in an infringement of the author’s moral rights (s. 28.1 C.A.).
133 Section 38(1) C.A. provides that the owner of the copyright may recover possession of all infringing copies of that work or other subject-matter. This means that the right to recover possession of infringing copies is given to the owner of the copyright and not to the author himself or herself. The owner of the copyright and the author may be one and the same person or two different persons. In the latter case, it would be illogical for a copyright owner other than the author himself or herself to be entitled to recover possession of copies of a work the reproduction of which was an infringement only of the author’s moral rights. Although, as I observed earlier, those rights attach solely to the person of the author and may not be assigned, the expanded interpretation of the expression “copy …dealt with in contravention of [the] Act” proposed by the respondent would lead to just that outcome.
134 Furthermore, the definition of infringement cited refers to “a work in which copyright subsists”. It also seems that only where there is an infringement of copyright will the measures described in s. 38(1) C.A. be justified. Therefore, in the case of a work, a “copy …dealt with in contravention of [the] Act” refers only to a copy dealt with in contravention of s. 3(1) C.A. The statutory history of the provisions in question confirms that conclusion: the provisions relating to moral rights were added in 1988 (R.S.C. 1985, c. 10 (4th Supp.), formerly S.C. 1988, c. 15), while the meaning of s. 38(1) C.A. and of the definition of “infringing” have always been the same, for all practical purposes, since the Act was enacted in 1921.
(c) Application of Section 3(1) C.A.
137 I find that there are three distinct concepts in this subsection, which are crucial in resolving this case. First, s. 3(1) confers the “sole right to produce or reproduce”; second, it protects the work in its entirety “or any substantial part thereof”; third, it specifies that the protection applies to the work “in any material form whatever”. Let us examine what these concepts mean.
139 It appears that the primary and essential meaning of the word “reproduce” as it appears in s. 3(1) C.A. is “produce a copy …of” or “cause to be seen …again” or “give a specified quality or result when copied”. Accordingly, in order for a work to be reproduced, there is no requirement whatsoever to establish that there has been an increase in the total number of copies of the work. The nature of the protection that copyright confers confirms that interpretation.
[T]|he opening words of subsection 1(2), now section 3 of the Act, were purposely drafted broadly enough to encompass new technologies which had not been thought of when the Act was drafted.
146 “[R]eproduc[ing] [a] work …in any material form whatever” therefore simply means “rematerializing” what already existed in a first, original material form. A person who models a subsequent materialization on the original materialization therefore reproduces the work in a material form and has therefore produced the work a second time.
147 Since material fixation is essential for the production of a work, it is also essential for reproduction of the work. Fixation of the work in a new medium is therefore the fundamental element of the act of “reproduc[ing] …in any material form whatever”. However, while the work is an original creation, the reproduction of the work is necessarily not. Reproducing a work therefore consists mainly of the subsequent non-original material fixation of a first original material fixation. That type of conduct amounts to plagiarism and constitutes an infringement of the rights of the copyright owner under s. 3(1) C.A.
148 It may be pointed out that the expressions “reproduce a work” and “reproduce a work in any material form” are pleonastic since in all cases, reproducing a work involves a new materialization derived from the original one. However, s. 3(1) does not say only “reproduce …in a material form”; rather, it says “reproduce [a] work …in any material form whatever” (emphasis added). That is an appropriate and carefully worded recognition that a work may be reproduced even if the new medium is different.
149 Having regard to the foregoing, it is clear that multiplication of the number of copies of a work is not an essential element of the act of “reproduc[ing] …in any material form whatever”. It does not matter that the process which produces a new materialization eliminates another; all that matters is that a new act of fixation occurs. Therefore, what we must count in order to determine whether a work has been reproduced is not the total number of copies of the work in existence after the rematerialization, but the number of materializations that occurred over time.
(3) Pour l’application du présent article, ne constitue pas nécessairement une déformation, mutilation ou autre modification de l’?uvre un changement de lieu, du cadre de son exposition ou de la structure qui la contient ou toute mesure de restauration ou de conservation prise de bonne foi.
156 Two comments must be made. First, my colleague places the emphasis on the expression “shall not”. A comparative analysis shows that Parliament emphasizes, rather, “shall not, by that act alone”, which corresponds to “ne constitue pas nécessairement” in the French version. By using the negative, it allows authors to show that a change in structure can amount to a modification of the work and cause prejudice to the author’s honour or reputation, therefore infringing his or her moral rights.
157 Second, my colleague seems to want to give the concept of “physical structure containing a work”, which Parliament rendered as “la structure qui …contient [l’?uvre]”, a meaning that cannot stand up to an analysis of the concept of “work” (?uvre in French). In my opinion, by referring to the concept of physical structure rather than medium (s. 3(1) C.A.), Parliament is making a vital distinction and is insteadreferring, in s. 28.2(3) C.A., to a physical structure that is superimposed onto the work. As Binnie J. pointed out in his analysis of copyright, copyright protects only works, not ideas. As I explained earlier, a work necessarily includes the medium. A change to the medium is prohibited by s. 3(1) C.A.,while a change to a physical structure containing the work will be prohibited by s. 28.2(3) if the author establishes that the new physical structure causes prejudice to the integrity of his or her work.
158 In determining the meaning of “reproduc[ing] …in any material form whatever”, it is completely irrelevant that the consequence of one materialization destroys another. Obviously, when a person reproduces a work and at the same time destroys a copy of it, we assume that the person derives some benefit from doing so. In this case, for example, the appellants sold the canvas-backed reproductions of the respondent’s works at a much higher price than the paper-backed reproductions. However, there would be unlawful reproduction even if the re-materialization process resulted in an economic loss as a result of the destruction of another copy.
159 We must now address the issue on which the entire case is predicated: whether transferring a poster representing a work onto canvas constitutes infringement. In order for infringement to have occurred, there must have been an infringement of the copyright conferred under s. 3(1) C.A. Section 27 C.A. defines such an infringement as “do[ing], without the consent of the owner of the copyright, anything that by this Act only the owner of the copyright has the right to do”. In short, in order for infringement to have occurred, a work must have been plagiarized or unlawfully appropriated. In the case of a painting, infringement will occur, inter alia, when the painting as a whole or any substantial part thereof is reproduced in any material form whatever, in the words of s. 3(1) C.A.
162 We must therefore first determine the scope of the reproduction rights that were granted, which will at the same time establish the scope of the rights that the respondent retained. That determination calls for a simultaneous examination of certain provisions of the Act and the terms of the contract between the respondent and É.G.I. We will then need to determine whether transferring an image from one medium to another amounts to “produc[ing] or reproduc[ing] the work or any substantial part thereof in any material form whatever” within the meaning of s. 3(1) C.A.
166 Prima facie, the question of the legal nature of the contract between the respondent and É.G.I. might generate some disagreement. We might well ask whether it comprised an assignment or a mere concession (or licence). In the first case, it would amount to the assignment of the sole right, which may be set up against everyone to produce and reproduce in any material form whatever, while in the second case, it would amount only to the grant of a personal “interest”, and the respondent would retain his right in full. The limitation on the number of paintings, in particular, suggests that this was a mere concession, or licence. In any event, I do not believe that this kind of characterization is necessary for the purposes of this case. We may conclude, simply by reviewing the contractual provisions with respect to the authorized medium, that the respondent never intended to assign in full his right to reproduce the works in question in any material form whatever. The only right that he assigned was the right to reproduce his works on paper, thereby excluding reproduction in any other material form.
170 First, under the heading [translation] “Product(s)”, it states: [translation] “Reproduction 50 x 60cm - 19.7 x 23.6. - No. 6304 and/or cards and/or stationery” (emphasis added). Second, under the heading [translation] “Printing(s)”, it specifies [translation] “Maximum ten thousand (10,000) reproductions and/or one hundred thousand (100,000) cards and/or stationery as advised”. And third, under the heading [translation] “Compensation”, it stipulates that [translation] “the publisher will give the artist, free of charge, twenty-five (25) reproductions and/or one hundred (100) cards as artist’s proofs” (emphasis added).
171 The use in the contract of the term “reproduction” might, prima facie, create some ambiguity since that word carries more than one meaning. In its most general sense, it may simply refer to any item that has been copied from an original. However, when we look at the context specific to the contract between the respondent and É.G.I. (art. 1429 C.C.Q.), it is clear that this is not the meaning that was intended.
172 First, the nature of the contract must be considered (art. 1426 C.C.Q.): it is a contract between the respondent and a publisher whose business consists of publishing reproductions on paper. It would therefore be illogical for the contract to allow any “reproduction” of the work in the most general meaning of the word. Second, the notation “No. 6304” that follows the dimensions of the authorized reproductions and is part of the description of those reproductions seems to suggest that a specific standard of paper or sheet of paper has been selected. And third, when we see that the publisher agreed to give the artist 25 of those “reproductions”, free of charge, the only conclusion we can reach is that what is referred to as “reproductions” is in fact paper posters: it would defy all logic to suggest that the respondent could have agreed to be given 25 “reproductions” of his works, in the broadest sense, as compensation. In short, there is no doubt, in my opinion, that the respondent had authorized only the reproductions on paper medium, in the sense of “poster”.
The fact that the product may be framed, laminated or combined with other products also suggests that the product is in fact a stationery product. I also note that the authorized medium is not physically altered and is still paper, in the case both of framing and of laminating the product or combining it with other products. The following distinctions must therefore be made: (1) framing, lamination and any other type of arrangement, which leaves the paper medium intact and identifiable, and (2) transferring onto canvas, which results in a complete substitution of medium.
175 The appellants’ final argument was that the provision in art. 19 that the “product is offered for sale without restriction as to use” allows for paper reproductions to be transferred onto canvas. I see two fatal objections to that argument, however.
176 First, it is the paper product that is offered for sale without restriction as to use; in other words, the paper product may be used in different ways. However, this does not imply that its fundamental nature could be altered. On the contrary: the rights assigned by contract certainly do not include the ability to alter the authorized product by changing its medium. Unlike the process of transferring an image to canvas, neither framing nor lamination results in that kind of change to the nature of the paper product. Furthermore, as I explained in greater detail in the previous section of the analysis, they also do not result in a “copy of the work in any material form whatever”.
177 Second, art. 19 stipulates that “[t]he product is offered for sale without restriction as to use, i.e. it may be framed, laminated or combined with other products” (emphasis added). While the abbreviation “e.g.” (“for example”) could leave room for some extrapolation, the abbreviation “i.e.” (“that is”) has a clear restrictive meaning. Accordingly, the sale of the paper product without restriction as to use is strictly limited to framing, laminating and combining with other products. The ability to do something else, specifically, to transfer the product onto canvas, cannot be inferred from that enumeration.
Appeal allowed with costs in the cause, L’Heureux-Dubé, Gonthier and LeBel JJ. dissenting.
Solicitors for the appellants Galerie d’Art Yves Laroche inc. and Éditions Multi-Graph ltée: Gowling Lafleur Henderson, Montréal.
Solicitors for the appellants Galerie d’Art du Petit Champlain inc., Galerie d’Art Laroche, Denis inc. and Serge Rosa: Chiara & Associés, Montréal.
Solicitors for the respondent: Laurin, Lamarre, Linteau & Montcalm, Montréal.
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