Source: http://massachusettslandlords.com/porter-v-clarendon-ins-insurance/
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 07:03:26+00:00

Document:
January 12, 2010. – April 26, 2010.
Ventures.” The trust filed an answer and counterclaim, alleging that it began occupying the property in 1983, thereby acquiring title by adverse possession. At some point during that underlying lawsuit, Vermont Mutual began defending the trust.
On March 2, 2006, Vermont Mutual sent letters to Greater New York and Clarendon, demanding that those insurers contribute to the defense of the underlying lawsuit. Greater New York and Clarendon refused to defend. On March 21, 2007, Vermont Mutual and the trust sued Greater New York and Clarendon in the lawsuit that led to this appeal. The complaint sought, inter alia, a declaration that Greater New York and Clarendon had a duty to defend the trust in the underlying lawsuit, and the two insurers owed Vermont Mutual the value of the services it had rendered in defense of the trust. Shortly thereafter, in April, 2007, the trust settled the underlying lawsuit with a payment of $27,500 to Circle Ventures. [FN6] Greater New York, Clarendon, and Vermont Mutual filed cross motions for summary judgment in this case. On February 19, 2009, a Superior Court judge granted summary judgment to Greater New York and Clarendon on all counts, and denied summary judgment to Vermont Mutual on the declaratory judgment counts. The motion judge read the underlying complaint as stating a claim only for trespass from September, 2004, forward, and ruled that the trespass therefore did not occur during the policy periods of the Greater New York or Clarendon policies. She further ruled that certain coverage exclusions applied to the underlying lawsuit. She concluded that Greater New York and Clarendon had neither a duty to defend, nor a duty to indemnify the trust in the underlying lawsuit.
damage did not “occur” during their respective policy periods because the Circle Ventures complaint only sought damages for trespass after 2004. Second, they argue that the policies’ own, rent, or occupy exclusion applies because the insured occupied the disputed land by trespassing. Third, they argue that the policies’ your work exclusion applies because the insured built the retaining wall. [FN9] We disagree with each of these contentions. 1. Continuous trespass. The Circle Ventures complaint, read broadly, reasonably stated a claim for negligent trespass during the policy periods of both Greater New York and Clarendon. See Sterilite, supra. The complaint alleged $25,000 in damages as a direct and proximate result of the trust’s continuing trespass, and “refusal to remove the retaining wall, including the cost of removing the wall and the wrongful use of the Circle Ventures property.” A trespass may occur continuously. See Silverleib v. Hebshie, 33 Mass.App.Ct. 911, 913 (1992). When a trespass is caused by the erection of a permanent structure, that trespass commences on a date certain, and the trespass continues as long as the offending structure remains. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 161(1) (1965). See also Asiala v. Fitchburg, 24 Mass.App.Ct. 13, 19 (1987) (“where a continuing nuisance exists [because of a negligently constructed retaining wall], the invasion of the plaintiff’s interest recurs daily and her cause of action will not be time barred even if she first became aware of the nuisance more than three years before bringing an action”). Here, the trust built a retaining wall and paved two parking spaces on an abutter’s property some time before 2000. The retaining wall and parking spaces remained on the abutter’s property until the abutter sued in 2004. The trespass, therefore, occurred continuously, for the duration of all three policies. See Silverleib, supra at 912; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 161(1) (1965). The defendants nonetheless argue that the underlying complaint only sought damages for the refusal to remove the retaining wall following the September 13, 2004, demand letter, and not for the earlier trespass. As explained above, paragraph eight of the underlying complaint reads more broadly than that. In determining whether the allegations of the complaint reasonably “adumbrate a claim covered by the policy terms,” we do not adopt the narrow construction proposed by the defendant. See Sterilite, supra. In J. D’Amico, Inc. v. Boston, 345 Mass. 218, 224 (1962), for example, the Supreme Judicial Court ruled that a complaint seeking relief for an intentional trespass could adumbrate a claim for a negligent trespass. There, a contractor cut down several trees while repairing a street. Id. at 219-220. The owner of the trees sued the contractor, seeking damages for wilfully cutting down the trees. Id. at 220. The Supreme Judicial Court ruled that, while the contractor’s general liability policy would exclude coverage for wilful trespass, the complaint was broad enough to adumbrate a claim for negligent trespass. Id. at 224. The court therefore found the insurer had a duty to defend the contractor. Ibid. We likewise conclude that the complaint here adequately stated a claim for continuing trespass–caused by placement of the retaining wall and the parking spaces on the abutter’s property–occurring during the periods of time covered by the insurance policies. See Sterilite, 17 Mass.App.Ct. at 319. 2. Exclusions. The Greater New York and Clarendon policies both exclude coverage for property damage to, [p]roperty you own, rent, or occupy. Greater New York and Clarendon argue that because the insured occupied the disputed property by erecting a retaining wall and paving two parking spaces, there was no coverage. We disagree.
judgment of the Superior Court allowing summary judgment for the defendant insurers. So ordered.
FN1. Of 1915 Beacon Street Condominium Trust.
FN2. Vermont Mutual Insurance Company.
FN3. Greater New York Mutual Insurance Company.
FN4. Nothing in the record indicates the precise date of construction. The unverified reply of the trust in the underlying lawsuit claims that the trust exercised exclusive control over the parcel since at least 1983. The unverified complaint in this lawsuit claims, Witnesses have testified that the structure which the plaintiff alleges constituted the trespass existed from the late 1990’s [sic ] through 2004. Vermont Mutual’s motion for summary judgment below says, During the course of discovery it was learned that the concrete retaining wall and two parking spaces had existed upon land allegedly owned by Circle Ventures, LLC since at least 2000.
FN5. The record, as presented to us, does not indicate when Vermont Mutual first became involved in the underlying lawsuit. For purposes of our decision, however, the precise date is immaterial.
two parking spaces since the date of their construction. Greater New York and Clarendon, however, claim that nothing in the summary judgment record supports that claim. Regardless, this issue cannot be resolved based on the record before us.
FN7. This opinion considers only whether Greater New York and Clarendon had a duty to defend the insured in the 2004 trespass action. The Superior Court judge ruled that they had neither a duty to defend, nor a duty to indemnify, and therefore granted summary judgment to the defendants. On appeal, the insured and Vermont Mutual argue only that the defendants had a duty to defend. We therefore need not address the narrower question whether the defendants had a duty to indemnify.
FN8. We consider the Greater New York policy and the Clarendon policy together because their relevant language is identical.
FN9. Greater New York raised a statute of limitations defense for the first time in a letter to the court, pursuant to Mass.R.A.P. 16(l), as amended, 386 Mass. 1247 (1982), three weeks after oral argument. We decline to address the issue because it is not properly before us.
FN10. Further support for our position is provided by cases holding that the “care, custody, or control” exclusion cannot apply where the insured took control of the damaged property without permission. In light of that similarity, we are persuaded by the decisions of several other jurisdictions, holding that the care, custody, and control exclusion cannot apply where the insured took control of the damaged property without permission. See, e.g., Great American Indem. Co. of N.Y. v. Saltzman, 213 F.2d 743, 747-748 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 862 (1954) (insured trespassed into aircraft, engaged engines, and crashed plane into nearby hangar). U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Schnabel, 504 P.2d 847, 851 (Alaska 1972) (contractor built road across plaintiff’s property without permission); Ferguson v. Birmingham Fire Ins. Co., 460 P.2d 342, 346 (Or.1969) (insured’s employee cut down trees on abutter’s property); P & M Stone Co. v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 100 N.W.2d 28, 30 (Iowa 1959) (insured’s employee, in attempting to dislodge his stranded automobile using plaintiff’s bulldozer, damaged bulldozer). See also 9 Couch, Insurance § 126:16 (discussing similarity of owned or occupied and care, custody, or control provisions). In each case, the courts have interpreted the exclusion narrowly, ruling that a trespasser does not exercise control over the damaged property for purposes of the exclusion.
the motion judge relied at least in part on this argument in granting summary judgment for Clarendon, we will address the issue for both defendants.
FN12. A similar argument was made in Perkins Ins. Co. v. Miller, 854 N.E.2d 693, 700 (Ill.App.Ct.2006). There, a tree-clearing company contracting with another party mistakenly cleared three lots owned by the plaintiff. Id. at 695. The company’s general liability insurer refused to defend the ensuing lawsuit, citing the your work provision. Ibid. The Illinois Appeals Court ruled that the exclusion did not apply as it was at best ambiguous. Id. at 701. See Thommes v. Milwaukee Ins. Co., 641 N.W.2d 877, 883 (Minn.2002) (similar facts).

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