Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/250/46/
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 22:13:35+00:00

Document:
Justia › US Law › US Case Law › US Supreme Court › Volume 250 › Ball Engineering Co. v. J. G. White & Co.
"the United States all have the right to take possession of, wherever they may be, and to retain all materials, tools, buildings, tramways, cars, etc., or any part or parts of same prepared for use or in use in the prosecution of the work, . . . under purchase at a valuation to be determined by the Engineer Officer in charge"
held not applicable, in invitum, to property belonging to, and which had been used in the construction by, a third party. P. 250 U. S. 54.
States, and that the new contractor, having so taken and used the property, was liable to its owner for the conversion. Id. United States v. Buffalo Pitts Co., 234 U. S. 228, distinguished.
the alleged conversion of a contractor's plant and equipment which was prepared for use in prosecuting the work of constructing lock and dam No. 6, on the Trinity River in the State of Texas, and all of which, including buildings, were located upon the site of the lock and dam at the time of the alleged conversion. The action was tried before a referee, designated under the Connecticut practice a committee. Two trials were had, the first resulting in a judgment in favor of the plaintiff for the value of the converted property. 212 F. 1009. That judgment was reversed by the circuit court of appeals ( 223 F. 618), and a new trial ordered which took place before the same committee and upon the same evidence and the same findings of fact, in order to conform to the decision of the circuit court of appeals, judgment was rendered in favor of the defendant, and this was affirmed by the circuit court of appeals on the authority of its prior decision. 241 F. 989. The case is here upon writ of certiorari.
The United States filed its brief amicus curiae, contending that the decision of the circuit court of appeals to the effect that the United States is liable under the Tucker Act when property of a third person is taken by one of its agents, under the circumstances disclosed, was erroneous.
On July 10, 1906, the United States entered into a contract with the Hubbard Building & Realty Company to construct lock and dam No. 6 on the Trinity River, Texas.
A partnership composed of George A. Carden and P. D. C. Ball, known as the Ball-Carden Company, in the year 1908 placed a considerable amount of property, consisting of materials, machinery, and tools, on the site of the lock and dam No. 6, and used them in constructing the lock and dam until the month of May, 1909.
and discontinued the work theretofore carried on by it in the construction of the lock and dam. Carden transferred all his interest to Ball, who, under the name of the Ball Engineering Company, continued the work until on or about September 8, 1909.
It does not appear under what circumstances the Ball-Carden Company or Ball operating as the Ball Engineering Company undertook the performance of the work.
On September 9, 1909, work upon said lock and dam was abandoned; on October 22, 1909, the government annulled the contract with the Hubbard Company pursuant to its provisions.
On April 2, 1910, the Ball Engineering Company was organized under the laws of Missouri, and P. D. C. Ball transferred to it all of the property mentioned in the complaint.
Ball Engineering Company was valued by it at $11,578, which amount was credited on account of the Hubbard Company, but the United States neither paid nor credited the purchase price or rental of the property to the Ball Company.
"Annulment. -- In case of the annulment of this contract as conditionally provided for in the form of contract adopted and used by the engineering department of the army, the United States shall have the right to take possession of, wherever they may be, and to retain all materials, tools, buildings, tramways, cars, etc., or any part or parts of same, prepared for use or in use in the prosecution of the work, together with any or all leases, rights of way or quarry privileges, under purchase at a valuation to be determined by the engineer officer in charge."
The government would not allow the Ball Company to take possession of any of the property used in the construction of the lock and dam. This property the United States leased to the defendant, who used the same in completing the work, and thereafter returned all of it to the government, except, of course, such material as had been used in construction.
prosecution of the work, for which he will be charged a fair rental or purchase value, to be determined by the engineer officer in charge. It must, however, be clearly understood that, since the ownership of the above-mentioned plant and materials is not free from doubt, the United States does not undertake to transfer title, does not guarantee peaceable possession and uninterrupted use, and will not defend any action or writ that may be instituted against the contractor concerning the same, nor be responsible for nor assume any expenses or cost in connection therewith. Nothing that may result from the exercise of the above-mentioned right shall be made the basis of a claim against the United States or its officers or agents."
"made no proprietary claim, and therefore was bound to pay the real owner for the property, whether the taking was tortious or not. It fully recognized this obligation by crediting the Hubbard Company with the value. The fact that it recognized the wrong person as owner and erroneously relied upon the contract with the Hubbard Company, by which the plaintiff was not bound, in no respect changed the material fact that it had taken the property and acquired title thereto."
"In the present case, as we have said, there is nothing to show that the government expected to use the engine and appurtenances without compensation. It did not dispute the mortgage, and the findings of fact clearly show that, if the government had the right to take the property notwithstanding the mortgage interest which the plaintiff had in it, it made no claim of right to take and use it without compensation as against the prior outstanding mortgage, which distinctly reserved the right to take and sell the property under the circumstances shown and which after the breach of condition vested the right of possession and the right to convert the property in the mortgagee."
It was further pointed out that the government had authority under an act of Congress to acquire any property necessary for the purpose stated, and, if need be, to appropriate it. We held that the facts found brought the case within the principles decided in former cases, and made the United States liable not for a tortious act, but upon implied contract.
The subject was again reviewed by this Court in a case decided at this term, Temple v. United States, 248 U.S.
"If the plaintiff can recover, it must be upon an implied contract. For, under the Tucker Act, the consent of the United States to be sued is (so far as here material) limited to claims founded 'upon any contract, express or implied,' and a remedy for claims sounding in tort is expressly denied. Bigby v. United States, 188 U. S. 400. Hijo v. United States, 194 U. S. 315, 194 U. S. 323. As stated in United States v. Lynah, 188 U. S. 445, 188 U. S. 462, 188 U. S. 465:"
"The law will imply a promise to make the required compensation, where property to which the government asserts no title is taken, pursuant to an act of Congress, as private property to be applied for public uses;"
"But, in the case at bar, both the pleadings and the facts found preclude the implication of a promise to pay. For the property applied to the public use is not, and was not conceded to be, in the plaintiff."

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