Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&amp;view=article&amp;id=50634:gr-156224-2008&amp;catid=1502&amp;Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 02:22:05+00:00

Document:
G.R. No. 156224 - HEIRS OF PANFILO F. ABALOS v. AURORA A. BUCAL, ET AL.
HEIRS OF PANFILO F. ABALOS,1 Petitioners, v. AURORA A. BUCAL, DEMETRIO BUCAL, ARTEMIO F. ABALOS, LIGAYA U. ABALOS, ROMULO F. ABALOS, JESUSA O. ABALOS, MAURO F. ABALOS and LUZVIMINDA R. ABALOS, Respondents.
This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules on Civil Procedure assails the August 31, 2001 Decision2 and November 20, 2002 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 39138, which affirmed with modification the May 25, 1992 Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lingayen, Pangasinan, Branch 39, in Civil Case No. 16289.
that said properties were administered by Teodorica; that following their mother's death, there was a verbal agreement among Faustino, Pedro and Panfilo that Faustino would administer all the properties left by their parents except those given by Teodorica to each of the siblings as their partial advance inheritance; that taking undue advantage of his position and in clear breach of the trust and confidence reposed on him, Faustino, by means of fraud and machination, took possession of the properties given to Maria and Roman upon their death and transferred some of the administered properties in his name and/or in the name of his heirs or disposed of them in favor of third parties; that since his administration of the properties, Faustino has not made any accounting of the produce, appropriating them almost to himself; and that Panfilo repeatedly demanded the partition of the properties but Faustino refused to do so despite earnest efforts towards amicable settlement.
c. to defendant, Danilo Abalos, is that fishpond, parcel E referred to as "Emong," and the - portion of the fishpond, Parcel H referred to as "Pinirat" and his advance inheritance of his father Pedro Abalos, Parcel G.
v. the defendants to pay the costs of the suit.
Respondents claimed that on two separate occasions in December 1985 Panfilo sought to execute the decision by attempting to take possession of the lands in question through the use of force, threat, violence and intimidation. In addition, to satisfy the damages awarded to Panfilo, the deputy sheriff also levied upon parcels (b) and (c) above-described for the purpose of selling the same at public auction, in regard to which they also filed their respective notice of third-party claim. Respondents argued that to compel them to abide by the writ of execution and notice of levy issued by the court in Civil Case No. 15465 would amount to deprivation of property without due process of law because the decision rendered in said case is not binding upon them as they were not made parties thereto and they became owners thereof prior to the institution of the case.
In the Objection to the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction,20 Answer,21 and Memorandum of Authorities22 filed by Panfilo, he stressed that the title, right or interest of respondents with respect to the fishponds mentioned in sub-paragraphs (a), (d), and (f) of paragraph III of the Complaint had already been declared null and void in Civil Case No. 15465 by a co-equal and competent court and affirmed with finality by this Court. It was averred that respondents were never in possession of the fishponds as he was the one peacefully placed in its possession by the deputy sheriff. For failing to intervene in Civil Case No. 15465, Panfilo asserted that respondents are now barred by the principles of res judicata and estoppel in pais.
On July 21, 1986, however, the trial court ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.23 Concurring with the position of respondents, it held that the principle of res judicatadoes not apply since there is no identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action between Civil Case No. 15465 and the present case. In Civil Case No. 15465, the parties are Panfilo, as plaintiff, and Faustino Abalos and Danilo Abalos, as defendants, while in the present case, the parties are the children of Faustino Abalos and their respective spouses, as plaintiffs, and Panfilo, as defendant; in the former, the principal action is for partition while in the latter, the suit is for quieting of title, possession, annulment of document and damages. The trial court opined that while it is true that respondents Aurora, Artemio, Romulo, and Mauro are legitimate children and compulsory heirs of Faustino Abalos, the documents showing their acquisition of the properties in question revealed that they became owners thereof not through their father alone but also by way of third persons who were not parties in Civil Case No. 15465. Moreover, they acquired their ownership prior to the institution of said case.
Assailing the aforesaid Order, Panfilo filed a Petition for Certioraribefore this Court. In a Resolution, the petition was referred to the CA, which later dismissed the same for lack of merit .24 The CA ruled that, for not being impleaded as parties, respondents are considered as "third persons" in Civil Case No. 15465 since they did not in any way participate or intervene in the partition. Neither did the trial court violate the principle that no court has the power to interfere by injunction with the judgments or decrees of a court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction having equal power. The CA viewed that the writ of execution was issued for the specific purpose of levying upon the properties of Faustino Abalos, not that of respondents, as the judgment debtor in Civil Case No. 15465.
The factual issues are: (1) With respect to parcels A, D, and F, whether or not the plaintiffs claiming ownership and possession over said parcels are the lawful owners and possessors thereof by virtue of genuine and duly executed documents of sale, quitclaim and renunciation of rights; (2) Whether or not plaintiffs' predecessors-in-interest were the lawful owners and possessors of parcels A, D and F; (3) Whether or not Faustino Abalos and his wife [Teodorica] Ferrer were awarded the properties subject of partition proceedings in Civil Case No. 15465; (4) Whether or not by virtue of the decision rendered in that partition proceedings, the fishpond referred to as Duyao which is parcel A, D and F was awarded; (5) Whether or not pursuant to the decision of the Supreme Court in appealed case No. 713355 the defendant Panfilo Abalos was placed in possession by the Deputy Sheriff Romulo Jimenez duly assisted by the members of the police force of Binmaley, sometime on or about the last part of December 1985.
Likewise, in the course of the trial and in their respective memoranda,32 the parties admitted that parcels (a) and (d) are portions of a fishpond locally known as Duyao33 and are parts of parcel (d) stated in the Complaint of Civil Case No. 15465, which was to be held in common pro-indiviso by the heirs of Francisco Abalos.
Thus, the controversy was narrowed down to only two (2) properties, namely: the fishpond located at Linoc, Binmaley, Pangasinan, locally known as Duyao, and the fishpond located at Canaoalan, Binmaley, Pangasinan, locally known as Pinirat.
4. No award of damages, and no costs.
The trial court made the following factual findings: that the original owners of the two fishponds were spouses Francisco Abalos and Teodorica Ferrer, who died on May 4, 1928 and June 2, 1945, respectively; that the spouses had five (5) children, namely: (a) Maria, who died single on March 20, 1972; (b) Roman, who died single on June 10, 1944; (c) Panfilo, petitioner herein; (d) Pedro, who died on May 11, 1971 and was survived by his only child, Danilo; and (e) Faustino, whose children Aurora, Artemio, Romulo and Mauro are among the respondents herein; that Roman predeceased his mother, hence, when the latter died only four of the siblings inherited the Duyao, becoming its pro-indiviso co-owners; that on November 11, 1968, Maria sold her - share to Romulo, who, in turn, sold the same to Aurora; that in view of the sale, the said portion of the Duyao should have been excluded from the Decision in Civil Case No. 15465 for the reason that said case refers to the partition of the estate only of spouses Francisco and Teodorica; that Romulo is not the owner the other - portion of the Duyao for failure to establish his ownership thereon and also considering that it could have been the same - portion that he sold to Aurora; and that the Decision in Civil Case No. 15465 has res judicata effect with respect to the Pinirat since the deed of sale executed by Faustino in favor of Romulo and Mauro was simulated and employed merely to defraud the other heirs.
1. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADJUDICATING ONE-FOURTH PORTION OF THE FISHPOND KNOWN AS "DUYAO" TO PLAINTIFFS DEMETRIO BUCAL AND AURORA ABALOS - BUCAL, NOTWITHSTANDING THAT SAID ENTIRE FISHPOND WAS AWARDED TO DEFENDANT PANFILO ABALOS IN CIVIL CASE NO. 15465, ENTITLED "PANFILO ABALOS v. FAUSTINO ABALOS & DANILO ABALOS."
2. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADJUDICATING ONE-FOURTH PORTION OF THE FISHPOND KNOWN AS "DUYAO" TO PLAINTIFFS DEMETRIO BUCAL AND AURORA ABALOS-BUCAL, AS ALLEGED INHERITANCE OF MARIA ABALOS FROM HER LATE PARENTS, NOTWITHSTANDING THAT MARIA ABALOS ALREADY INHERITED FROM HER LATE PARENTS THE PARCEL OF RESIDENTIAL LAND DESCRIBED AS PARCEL (C) IN PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT.
3. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADJUDICATING ONE-FOURTH PORTION OF THE FISHPOND KNOWN AS "DUYAO" TO PLAINTIFFS DEMETRIO BUCAL AND AURORA ABALOS-BUCAL, NOTWITHSTANDING THAT THE FINAL DECISION IN CIVIL CASE  EXPRESSLY ANNULLED ALL DOCUMENTS AND INSTRUMENTS WHICH TRANSFERRED SAID PROPERTIES AND ARE CONSIDERED INCONSISTENT WITH THE PARTITION ORDERED IN SAID CIVIL CASE.
4. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT TREATING THE PLAINTIFFS AS IN ESTOPPEL.
1. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE LATE SPOUSES FRANCISCO ABALOS AND TEODORICA FERRER LEFT AN INTESTATE ESTATE CONSISTING OF FIVE PARCELS OF LAND ONLY.
2. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT ONE-FOURTH PRO INDIVISO OF THE LAND KNOWN AS ["DUYAO"] WAS THE SHARE OF FAUSTINO ABALOS, WHICH HE QUITCLAIMED IN FAVOR OF HIS SON ROMULO ABALOS, AND IN APPLYING RES JUDICATA.
3. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE LAND KNOWN AS "PINIRAT" WAS THE SHARE OF FAUSTINO ABALOS, WHICH HE SOLD TO HIS SONS, THE PLAINTIFFS ROMULO AND MAURO ABALOS, AND IN APPLYING RES JUDICATA.
4. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN VOIDING THE INSTRUMENTS OF TRANSFER EXECUTED BY FAUSTINO ABALOS IN FAVOR OF ROMULO ABALOS OF HIS - SHARE OF THE ["DUYAO"] LOT AND IN FAVOR OF MAURO ABALOS AND ROMULO ABALOS OF THE "PINIRAT" LOT.
On August 31, 2001, the CA rendered its Decision.38 According to the appellate court, the first and second assigned errors of Panfilo are unmeritorious on the ground that the disposition of the trial court in Civil Case No. 15465 insofar as the Duyao is concerned has no factual and legal basis. It also held untenable his third and fourth assigned errors, noting that the principles of res judicata and estoppel are not applicable in this case since respondents were not made parties to Civil Case No. 15465 despite their acquisition of the contested parcels prior to the commencement of said case. Finally, Panfilo's fifth assigned error was rejected, saying that this Court already settled the issue of res judicata in G.R. No. 77965 when petitioner questioned the propriety of the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction.
On the other hand, the CA ruled that the first assigned error of respondents was rendered moot and academic since it was stipulated and agreed upon during the pre-trial of the present case that the dispute covers only parcels (a), (d) and (f). The second assigned error, nonetheless, was affirmed, observing that the Duyao property was co-owned pro-indiviso by the four remaining children of spouses Francisco and Teodorica; hence, Faustino's transfer of his - share during his lifetime in favor of his son Romulo is perfectly legal. However, the CA denied the third assigned error as it found that the Pinirat was Roman Abalos' advance legitime, which, upon his death, was inherited by his remaining siblings. Since Maria subsequently died without transferring her share, her part of the Pinirat should be divided among Pedro (which is transmitted to Danilo), Faustino and Panfilo. As Faustino's share over the Pinirat is with respect to 1/3 portion thereof, he could validly convey only such part to Romulo and Mauro.
3. No pronouncement as to cost.
Echoing the same grounds relied upon by their father, petitioners now claim that the CA seriously erred in failing to consider the finality of the Decision in Civil Case No. 15465. According to them, the finding that respondents became owners of the subject properties prior to the institution of said case in effect modified the disposition and distribution previously ordered. Petitioners opine that when the CA ruled that respondents have acquired ownership of the questioned parcels prior to the commencement of Civil Case No. 15465 it had disregarded the conclusiveness of a final judgment rendered in said case which decreed the annulment of all documents and/or instruments transferring said properties and were considered inconsistent with the order of partition. They contend that sustaining the conclusion of the CA would allow the re-opening of the factual issue of whether the documents, which were the source of respondents' alleged title, were valid - an issue that was dealt with in an extensive hearing on the merits conducted in said case and supported by testimonial and documentary evidence for the purpose. Being the prevailing party in Civil Case No. 15465, in regard to which respondents had remained silent and did not even care to intervene or question, petitioners assert that they already acquired a vested right over the entire Duyao and - portion of the Pinirat. They also oppose the CA's failure to recognize that estoppel and laches have already set in to bar respondents from further pursuing their claims.
In the instant case, the fourth requisite, in particular the identity of parties, is clearly wanting.
The foregoing rule still stands.
Indeed, Panfilo, the father of petitioners, should have impleaded respondents when he filed Civil Case No. 15465 since at that time the latter were already claiming ownership over the subject fishponds, which were transferred in their names prior to the commencement of the case. Petitioners cannot shift to respondents the burden of joining the case because they are not duty bound to intervene therein and they have every right to institute an independent action: First, intervention is not compulsory or mandatory but merely optional and permissive;44 and Second, as the persons who are in actual possession of the fishponds they claim to own, respondents may wait until their possession are in fact disturbed before taking steps to vindicate their rights. Understandably, at the time of the institution and pendency of Civil Case No. 15465, respondents still had no definite idea as to how the very nature of the partition case could actually affect their possession.
On the other hand, Panfilo had personal knowledge that respondents acquired ownership of the properties prior to the filing of Civil Case No. 15465, that they are in actual possession thereof, and that they have declared the lands in their names for taxation purposes. Panfilo could not be ignorant of these because he resided in the same locality where the properties are found.45 Quite startling, however, is that he did not bother to implead respondents in the partition case despite all these and the fact that the defendants therein raised the point that Faustino was not the owner of some of the lands in question and that they belong to others not parties to the case.46 As his successors-in-interest, petitioners must suffer from Panfilo's evident omission.
Even if res judicata requires not absolute but substantial identity of parties, still there exists substantial identity only when the "additional" party acts in the same capacity or is in privity with the parties in the former action.47 In this case, while it is true that respondents are legitimate children and relatives by affinity of Faustino it is more important to remember that, as shown by their documents of acquisition, they became owners of the subject fishponds not through Faustino alone but also from a third person (i.e., Maria Abalos). Respondents are asserting their own rights and interests which are distinct and separate from those of Faustino's claim as a hereditary heir of Francisco Abalos. Hence, they cannot be considered as privies to the judgment rendered in Civil Case No. 15465. Unfortunately for petitioners, they relied solely on their untenable defense of res judicata instead of contesting the genuineness and due execution of respondents' documentary evidence.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the August 31, 2001 Decision and November 20, 2002 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 39138 are AFFIRMED.
1 The original petitioner in this case was Panfilo F. Abalos. After his death on April 23, 2003, he was substituted, with prior leave of court, by his children, namely: Florentina Abalos-Castro, Rustica Abalos-Ricardo, Magdalina Abalos-Garcia, Wilfredo Abalos and Vila Abalos-Buada (rollo, pp. 178-183).
2 Penned by Associate Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr., with Associate Justices B.A. Adefuin-De la Cruz and Mercedes Gozo-Dadole, concurring.
4 Penned by Judge Eugenio G. Ramos.
5 Evidence Folder for the Petitioners, pp. 1-5.
7 Evidence Folder for the Petitioners, pp. 1-3.
24 Id. at 162, 323-331.
26 Id. at 333-336, 383.
27 Id. at 452-465, 501-503, 537.
29 Id. at 407-410, 439-443.
32 Id. at 750-770, 775-812.
33 Also spelled as "Doyao" in the records.
36 CA Rollo, pp. 51-52.
40 Id. at 204-208, 255.
41 See Khemani v. Heirs of Anastacio Trinidad, G.R. No. 147340, December 13, 2007, p. 8, citing Oropeza Marketing Corp. v. Allied Banking Corp., 441 Phil. 551 (2002).
42 Heirs of Igmedio Maglaque v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 163360, June 8, 2007, 524 SCRA 234, 240; Heirs of Rosendo Lasam v. Umengan, G.R. No. 168156, December 6, 2006, 510 SCRA 496, 510; and Rivera v. Heirs of Romualdo Villanueva, G.R. No. 141501, July 21, 2006, 496 SCRA 135, 140.
Art. 499. The partition of a thing owned in common shall not prejudice third persons, who shall retain the rights of mortgage, servitude, or any other real rights belonging to them before the division was made. Personal rights pertaining to third persons against the co-ownership shall also remain in force, notwithstanding the partition.
44 See Cruzcosa v. Hon. H. Concepcion, et al., 101 Phil 146, 150 (1957), as cited in California Bus Lines, Inc. v. State Investment House, Inc., 463 Phil. 689, 711 (2003), and Mabayo Farms, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 435 Phil. 112, 119 (2002).
47 Khemani v. Heirs of Anastacio Trinidad, G.R. No. 147340, December 13, 2007, p. 9.
48 SECTION 1, RULE 69.
49 Sepulveda, Sr. v. Pelaez, G.R. No. 152195, January 31, 2005, 450 SCRA 302, 312.
50 See Galicia v. Manliquez Vda. De Mindo, G.R. No. 155785, April 13, 2007, 521 SCRA 85, 93-95; Moldes v. Villanueva, G.R. No. 161955, August 31, 2005, 468 SCRA 697, 708; and Sepulveda, Sr. v. Pelaez, G.R. No. 152195, January 31, 2005, 450 SCRA 302, 314.
51 Dapar v. Biascan, G.R. No. 141880, September 27, 2004, 439 SCRA 179, 197.
52 G.R. No. 152862, July 26, 2004, 435 SCRA 232.
53 Id. at 239. See also Heirs of Velasquez v. Court of Appeals, 382 Phil. 438, 453-454 (2000).
54 See Sandejas v. Sps. Ignacio, G.R. No. 155033, December 19, 2007, p. 9; Antonio v. Sps. Santos, et al., G.R. No. 149238, November 22, 2007, p. 6; and College Assurance Plan v. Belfranlt Development Inc., G.R. No. 155604, November 22, 2007, p. 8.

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