Source: https://www.skat.dk/skat.aspx?oID=2063969
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 03:56:35+00:00

Document:
Appellanten fik i 1997 og 1998 nogle hollandske slagtere stillet til rådighed af et hollandsk selskab for at udføre arbejde her i landet. Parterne var enige om, at H1 bedømt efter kildeskattelovens regler skulle have indeholdt A-skat af de hollandske slagteres løn, jf. lovens § 2 og § 43.
Højesteret fastslog, at der ikke var grundlag for at antage, at Danmark og Holland havde indgået en aftale om fortolkningen af den dagældende dobbeltbeskatningsoverenskomst mellem de to lande, hvorefter overenskomsten var til hinder for beskatning efter kildeskatteloven i den foreliggende situation, eller at de to lande har fulgt en fælles praksis, som byggede på, at de var enige om en sådan fortolkning af overenskomsten. H1 var derfor indeholdelsespligtig ved udbetaling af A-indkomst til de hollandske slagtere.
Højesteret fastslog endvidere, at H1 hæftede for den manglende indeholdelse, jf. kildeskattelovens § 69.
Per Walsøe, Jytte Scharling, Jon Stokholm, Hanne Schmidt og Lars Hjortnæs.
I tidligere instans er afsagt dom af Vestre Landsrets 3. afdeling den 31. august 2010.
Appellanten, H1 K/S, har gentaget sin påstand.
With reference to the competent authority consideration pursuant to the Mutual Agreement Procedure of the 1957 Netherlands-Danish Treaty for the Avoidance of double Taxation (the Treaty), I would like to ask your attention for the following.
I have been informed that the Danish Customs and Tax Directorate has announced in a decision of 18 February 1997 (TSS 99/97-4061-425) that it has changed its position on the treatment of international hiring-out of labour under our Treaty. Denmark would consider the user of hired-out labour to be the employer, due to the fact that the Netherlands did not enter any observation or reservation on the concept of "hiring-out of labour" in Paragraph 8 of the Commentary on Article 15. According to the information, a resident of the Netherlands hired out to work in Denmark would as a rule be taxable in Denmark on his employment income from day one on.
With respect to this matter, I would like to be informed whether the information I received is right. If so, I would like to point out that Denmark did not settle this issue first in mutual agreement between the Netherlands and Denmark and therefore the Netherlands is not bound in any way to act correspondingly.
Last February there have been, as you know, renewed discussions within "Working Party 1" of the OECD about the international hiring-out of labour. From those discussions it is clear as yet there is no common understanding with respect to this subject. It is for that reason that I want you to know my views.
In general, the 183-day rule will be applied if a resident of a state is working as an employee in another state. From this rule of paragraph 2 of Article 15 in the OECD Model Convention, it follows that the remuneration which is derived by the employee, in such a case, shall be taxable only in the state of residence, if all three conditions are fulfilled. With respect to the second condition, for which the issue of "international hiring-out of labour" is adopted, it is of importance to conclude how to interpret the term "employer". For the definition of the term "employer" in the context of the Convention, substance should prevail over form. It means that, in accordance with the OECD Commentary, "each case should be examined to see whether the functions of employer were exercised mainly by the intermediary or by the user". With a view to this note in the OECD Commentary it is only under the circumstances as described in the Commentary to consider whether the functions of employer were exercised by the intermediary or user. Therefore, it is to my opinion not in conformity with the OECD-Commentary to consider the user as the employer in all cases, which seems to be the intent of the aforementioned Danish decision. To the contrary, each case should be examined to see whether the functions of employer were exercised mainly by the intermediary or by the user. It is therefore, according to the OECD-Commentary, up to the Contracting States to agree on the situations in which the intermediary does not fulfil the conditions required for him to be considered as the employer within the meaning of paragraph 2. It is this restricted approach, which limits the room for source taxation in general to abusive situations where the formal employment relation with the hirer of the labour is only meant as a means for evading taxation by the source state, that has the Netherlands consent and was the base for the Netherlands for not entering into an observation, unlike Switzerland.
Without an agreement about the issue of "international hiring-out of labour" between the Netherlands and Denmark, any divergence in interpretation could lead to double taxation or, under our new treaty, exemption. A resident of Denmark who is hired out to work in the Netherlands could, according to the aforementioned Danish decision, be exempt of tax in the Netherlands if his stay does not last more than 183 days and could also be exempt of tax in Denmark as a result of the fact that the Dutch user of the labour is deemed to be the employer. In the other case where a resident of the Netherlands is hired out to work in Denmark in the same way, there could be double taxation. As a matter of fact I have all ready been informed by Dutch companies of their worries about the possibility of double taxation. Perhaps cases of double taxation between the Netherlands and Denmark have already been brought to your attention as well.
To prevent such double taxation or exemption, I would appreciate to hear about your opinion in this matter soon, especially to see to which extent there is a possible divergence of characterization between the Netherlands and Denmark.
Thank you for your letter of 30 March 1998, concerning hiring out of labour, and the Danish Customs and Tax Directorates decision of 18 February 1997 (TSS 99/97-4061-425).
From the letter it seems, that you are of the opinion, that the Tax Directorate has changed the interpretation of the term "employer" when applying the Netherlands-Danish Treaty, to cases of international hiring-out of labour.
The situation is somewhat different. Sometime around 1987, the Netherlands competent authorities had the view that the 183-days rule should be applicable even in cases of hiring-out of labour. In other words, the hiring-out of labour concept was not recognized by the Netherlands at that time in relation to the application of the Netherlands-Danish Treaty.
As a consequence of this, the Danish tax authorities were instructed in 87, that the rules of international hiring-out of labour should not be used in relation to the Netherlands-Danish Treaty.
The decision of 18 February 1997 to which you are referring, states, that since there is no reservation from the Netherlands to the Commentaries to the latest OECD-model, Article 15, this means, that the rules of international hiring-out of labour are applicable to the Netherlands-Danish Treaty.
This follows in our understanding the general principle, that older treaties are interpreted dynamically in accordance with the development in the OECD model-treaty when it comes to broader and more precise descriptions in the Commentaries of the application of the Articles of the model. Since the Netherlands hasn't a reservation to Article 15 as far as the Commentaries dealing with international hiring-out of labour are concerned, we see this as a general acceptance on your part of the concept as described in the Commentaries. This is also the reason why we haven't approached you through a mutual agreement procedure on this matter.
The decision of 18 February 1997 expressly refers to the guidelines and criterions laid down in paragraph 8 of the Commentaries to Article 15 of the OECD-model, as far as the understanding of "international hiring-out of labour" is concerned. It is not a question of replacing one understanding of "employer" with a new one. Nor do we consider the user in all cases as the employer. As a matter of fact I have difficulties in finding any deviations in principle between our interpretations.
This being said there might of course be individual cases, where there are of different opinions based on the facts and circumstances of the cases. I am sure, that such cases can be solved through mutual agreement, since no one is interested in creating double exemption or double taxation.
So to repeat once more what it is all about. From not using the rules of international hiring-out of labour at all, effective from 1997 we apply those rules in relation to the Netherlands-Danish Treaty, but strictly within the framework of paragraph 8 of the Commentaries to Article 15 of the OECD-model.
I hope this explanation is satisfactory to you. If you see any difficulties please do not hesitate to write me again.
Thank you for your above-mentioned letter, concerning international hiring out of labour, which issue I brought to you attention in my letter of 30 March 1998. I would like to respond to your letter and also inform you on some actual cases of double taxation that we meanwhile have received.
I would like to explain more extensively why the Netherlands did not enter any observation or reservation on the concept of international hiring out of labour in paragraph 8 of the Commentary on Article 15. I consider this explanation important as this was for Denmark the immediate cause to change its rules of international hiring-out of labour in relation to the Netherlands.
The way international hiring-out of labour should be applied depends to a large extent on how the term "employer" should be interpreted. The term "employer" in Article 15 of the OECD Model, as we see it, refers primarily to the definition under domestic law.
Under Dutch domestic law employment is primarily a formal concept. As a consequence, labour agencies, for example, are legally recognized to be employers already since the early fifties. In practice, following the formal concept of the term "employer" implies in general that also the conditions of the material concept of paragraph 8 of the OECD-Commentary have been fulfilled. To that effect, I can inform you that in the Netherlands the same "substance over form" approach is being followed as in paragraph 8 of the OECD-Commentary if it occurs that the employer is only a intermediary and in fact does not fulfil any of the vital functions of the employer according to the material concept. It is this "substance over form" approach that we fully subscribe and for which it was not considered necessary to make any observation or reservation to the OECD Commentary. I have to add that although this "substance over form" approach is not restricted to abusive cases, in many situations it will have a bearing on such cases.
Although the Netherlands fully subscribe the Commentary, it is probably being read diffently than in Denmark. Reference can be made to the differences in both our domestic law on the interpretation of the term "employer". Also within the OECD the discussion on the scope of the Commentary in this issue is still pending; an unambiguous interpretation is not yet achieved. This means that the issue has to be solved in bilateral agreement.
The term "employer" refers primarily to the definition under domestic law. In case of conflicting rules in Contracting States, as is the case between the Netherlands and Denmark, the material concept described in the Commentary serves as a tie-braker rule. According to the Commentary, in those conflicting situations each case should be examined to see whether the functions of employer were exercised mainly by the intermediary or by the user. And it is up to the Contracting States to agree on the situations in which the intermediary does not fulfil the conditions required for him to be considered as the employer within the meaning of paragraph 2 of Article 15. For that purpose I would appreciate it if you could give me an explanation on the circumstances under which Denmark considers the user as the employer. Further, I would like to learn from you which criteria in your opinions could drive as a base for mutual agreement on those cases in which the intermediary is considered not to fulfil the conditions required for him to be considered as the employer.
The other case concerns G1, that has 10-12 employees working in Denmark for H1 in ...1, Denmark. G1 is a Netherlands labour agency with approcimately 1.000 employees. Most of them are employed in the Netherlands. As I already mentioned, in the Netherlands labour agencies are legally recognized to be employers already since the early fifties. In fact the labour agencies have, like many other industrial and public sectors, there own collective labour agreement which reflects the working conditions of all employees that work in the labour agencies sector. The background of such an labour agency is that employees are fully employed as a result of their permanent appointment with this agency. Such a specialized agency deploys their staff to their customers who need employees on a temporary basis. G1 is ultimately responsible for their employees that are deployed at other enterprises. They are responsible for the work that is performed and are in position to appoint or fire any employee. The fee for the work that is charged by G1 is calculated on the amount of actual working hours, provided that a certain production figure is achieved. If this production figure is not achieved a lower fee will be charged. G1 is responsible for the remuneration of the employees for their work in Denmark. With respect to this remuneration, G1 has actually paid in the Netherlands wages tax on behalf of the employees. From the tax adviser of G1 I learned that on the issue of taxation in Denmark discussion with the Danish authorities is still pending. When also in Denmark wages tax or income tax will be levied on the income of the Dutch employees. I would appreciate if you could consider, since already tax has been paid on the income in the Netherlands, to give a deferral on the recovery of the tax burden in Denmark until we have solved the double taxation in mutual agreement. If such a mutual agreement procedure would result in a taxing right for Denmark, the Netherlands could lend assistance in the collection of these Danish taxes if it occurs to be necessary.
3.1.1. Den pågældende var skattepligtig i Nederlandene i årene 1995 og 1996 i hele året. I det [sic] pågældende år var han ansat i et nederlandsk selskab (i det følgende kaldet "Anpartsselskabet"), som er en del af en international koncern. Koncernen har datterselskaber i flere europæiske lande, herunder Danmark. Selskaberne i koncernen udsender medarbejdere til koncernselskaber i andre lande med henblik på der at udføre arbejde. I den forbindelse debiterer det udlejende selskab det lejende selskab for forud aftalte faste beløb pr. dag, udsendelsen varer. Disse faste beløb er opbygget på samme måde som de faste beløb, der anvendes i forbindelse med eksterne kunder, der lejer personale, nemlig de gennemsnitlige lønomkostninger, opgjort pr. dag, for medarbejdere i samme kategori som den pågældende.
3.1.2. I 1995, og 1996 har den pågældende været udsendt til Danmark i henholdsvis fireogtredive og tyve dage. I Danmark har han udført arbejde på on- og offshore boresteder tilhørende Anpartsselskabets danske søsterselskab. Den pågældende har fået udbetalt vederlaget for det af den pågældende udførte arbejde i Danmark af Anpartsselskabet. Anpartsselskabet har i forbindelse med dette arbejde i henhold til den ovenfor under punkt 3.1.1 omhandlede videredebiteringsaftale pr. udsendelsesdag debiteret sit danske søsterselskab for et beløb stort USD 600.
3.2. I kassationsanken er tvistigheden begrænset til spørgsmålet, om beskatningen af den pågældendes indkomster af dennes arbejde i Danmark i medfør af den dansk-nederlandske dobbeltbeskatningsaftale af 20. februar 1957, som ændret den 20. januar 1966 (i det følgende kaldet "Dobbeltbeskatningsaftalen"), skal tillægges Danmark eller Nederlandene. Gerechtshof har kendt for ret, at retten til at beskatte disse indkomster tilkommer Nederlandene.
3.3.1. Dobbeltbeskatningsaftalens artikel 14 omhandler hvem, det tilkommer at beskatte vederlag oppebåret for arbejde eller tjenesteydelser. Såfremt der er tale om vederlag for arbejde, der er udført som led i varetagelsen af et ansættelsesforhold (som i nærværende tilfælde), er det nærliggende at opfatte "en fysisk person eller et selskab", som omhandlet i Dobbeltbeskatningsaftalens artikel 14, litra b, som "arbejdsgiver".
3.3.2. For at en fysisk person eller et selskab skal kunne betragtes som arbejdsgiver, er i den forbindelse påkrævet, at den pågældende arbejdstager med hensyn til udøvelsen af sit arbejde i beskæftigelsesstaten indgår i et over-/underordnelsesforhold til denne person (jf. Nederlandenes Højesterets afgørelse af 28. februar 2003, nr. 37224, i BNB ["retspraksis i skattesager"] 2004/138). I den omstændighed, at der skal være tale om en arbejdsgiver, ligger endvidere implicit kravet om, at arbejdet skal udføres for den pågældende persons eller for det pågældende selskabs regning og risiko. Det sidstnævnte krav indebærer, at udgifterne til arbejdet (det arbejdsvederlag, der betales til arbejdstageren for det pågældende arbejde) bæres af denne "arbejdsgiver", samt at det er denne "arbejdsgiver", der oppebærer fortjenesten af arbejdet og bærer de risici og tab, der hidrører fra arbejdet (jf. Nederlandenes Højesterets afgørelse af 12. oktober 2001, nr. 35478, i BNB ["retspraksis i skattesager"] 2002/65).
3.3.3 Hvis vederlaget for det arbejde, der er udført i beskæftigelsesstaten, er udbetalt af en arbejdsgiver i den anden stat, er det en betingelse for spørgsmålet, om arbejdsvederlaget er afholdt af en arbejdsgiver i beskæftigelsesstaten, at arbejdsgiveren i den anden stat individualiseret har videredebiteret de pågældende udgifter til arbejdsgiveren i beskæftigelsesstaten. I forbindelse med denne videredebitering kan tages udgangspunkt i de for arbejdstageren generelt beregnede lønomkostninger pr. tidsenhed, for eksempel et beløb pr. dag.
3.4. Gerechtshof har for sin afgørelse, at det er Nederlandene, der har ret til at beskatte den pågældendes indkomster af dennes arbejde i Danmark, lagt til grund, at den pågældendes arbejde i Danmark blev udført for eller til gavn for Anpartsselskabet, og at der ikke synes at være nogen grund til, at der i den forbindelse ikke skulle kunne tillægges væsentlig betydning til den mellem Anpartsselskabet og den pågældende gældende ansættelseskontrakt, der også omfatter den pågældendes arbejde i udlandet. Det fremgår af præmisserne 3.3.1 til og med 3.3.3, at Gerechtshof ved at træffe sin afgørelse som gengivet ovenfor, har anlagt en urigtig retsopfattelse. Anbringendet er således at tage til følge. Gerechtshofs afgørelse vil være at ophæve.
3.5.1. Nederlandenes Højesteret kan afgøre det stridspunkt, der er omhandlet ovenfor under 3.2. Gerechtshof har lagt til grund - hvilket er ubestridt i kassationsanken - (præmis 4.5), at den pågældende under sit arbejde i Danmark har måttet rette sig efter konkrete anvisninger fra Anpartsselskabets danske søsterselskab. Det må herefter konkluderes, at den pågældende indgik i et over-/underordnelsesforhold til det danske søsterselskab. Gerechtshof har endvidere lagt til grund - hvilket ligeledes er ubestridt i kassationsanken - (præmis 4.5), at dette søsterselskab er ansvarligt for resultatet af den pågældendes arbejde. Dermed har Gerechtshof åbenbart (også) sigtet til, at fortjenesten af arbejdet blev oppebåret af det danske søsterselskab, og at de risici og tab, der hidrører fra arbejdet, blev båret af dette. Det er desuden godtgjort, at Anpartsselskabet i forbindelse med udlejningen af den pågældende pr. dag, udsendelsen varede, har debiteret det danske søsterselskab for et beløb, der er baseret på de gennemsnitlige lønomkostninger for medarbejdere i samme kategori som den pågældende. Betingelsen om, at lønomkostningerne individualiseret er videredebiteret til arbejdsgiveren i beskæftigelsesstaten, er hermed opfyldt. Det følger af ovenstående, at Anpartsselskabets danske søsterselskab med hensyn til det arbejde, som den pågældende har udført i Danmark, er at betragte som den pågældendes arbejdsgiver, hvilket medfører, at retten til at beskatte den pågældendes indkomster af dette arbejde tilkommer Danmark i medfør af Dobbeltbeskatningsaftalens artikel 14.
Den hollandske højesteret traf samme dag en tilsvarende afgørelse vedrørende indkomståret 1997 (dom nr. 38.850 af 1. december 2006).
De hollandske slagtere, som H1 K/S bl.a. i 1997 og 1998 fik stillet til rådighed af G1 for at udføre arbejde her i landet, var, bedømt efter kildeskattelovens regler om arbejdsudleje, begrænset skattepligtige til Danmark, og der var tale om A-indkomst, jf. lovens § 2, stk. 1, litra c, og § 43, stk. 2, litra h.
Den dagældende dobbeltbeskatningsoverenskomst mellem Danmark og Holland indeholder i artikel 14 en bestemmelse, hvorefter retten til at beskatte lønindtægt undtagelsesvis tilkommer bopælslandet - og ikke som efter hovedreglen det land, hvor arbejdet er udført - bl.a. på betingelse af, at arbejdstageren har opholdt sig i højst 183 dage inden for et år i det land, hvor arbejdet er udført, jf. litra a, og at arbejdet er udført for eller på vegne af en person eller et selskab, der ikke er hjemmehørende i det land, hvor arbejdet er udført, jf. litra b. Overenskomsten indeholder ingen definition af udtrykket "udført for", og Højesteret tiltræder, at det efter ordlyden må anses for et åbent spørgsmål, om arbejdsudleje skulle henføres til undtagelsesreglen eller hovedreglen. Der er endvidere ikke oplysninger om, at staterne, da overenskomsten blev indgået, gjorde sig nogen forestillinger herom. Højesteret tiltræder herefter, at udtrykket "udført for" ved Danmarks anvendelse af overenskomsten skal have den betydning, som det har efter dansk lovgivning, medmindre andet følger af sammenhængen, jf. overenskomstens artikel 2, stk. 2.
H1 har gjort gældende, at Danmark var uberettiget til uden forudgående aftale med Holland med virkning fra 1997 at anvende kildeskattelovens regler om arbejdsudleje i forhold til arbejdsudleje fra Holland og dermed beskatte de hollandske slagteres løn, idet Danmark og Holland i 1987 havde indgået en aftale om at fortolke overenskomstens artikel 14, litra b, således, at 183-dages reglen i litra a fandt anvendelse ved arbejdsudleje, og idet de to lande fra 1987 også fulgte en fælles praksis, der byggede på en sådan enighed om fortolkningen.
Højesteret finder, at der efter bevisførelsen ikke er grundlag for at antage, at Danmark og Holland i 1987 (eller senere) har indgået en aftale om fortolkningen af overenskomstens artikel 14 i forhold til arbejdsudleje, eller at de to lande har fulgt en fælles praksis, som byggede på, at de var enige om fortolkningen af overenskomsten i forhold til arbejdsudleje. Det, der skete, var, at Danmark på daværende tidspunkt besluttede ikke at anvende kildeskattelovens regler om arbejdsudleje i forhold til lande, der havde tilkendegivet, at de ved arbejdsudleje anså udlejeren for at være arbejdstagerens arbejdsgiver.
Højesteret finder endvidere, at det efter indholdet af brevvekslingen fra 1998 og følgende år mellem de hollandske og danske skattemyndigheder og efter udfaldet af dommene afsagt af den hollandske højesteret i 2006 må lægges til grund, at Holland i 1997, da Danmark ændrede den nævnte praksis i forhold til Holland, ikke (længere) i alle tilfælde anså udlejeren for at være arbejdstagerens arbejdsgiver og dermed den, som arbejdet blev udført for. Højesteret finder, at det på grundlag heraf må antages, at der ikke forelå en kollision mellem hollandsk og dansk beskatningsret, men alene en uenighed mellem de danske og hollandske skattemyndigheder om den konkrete bedømmelse af den foreliggende sag.
Herefter og i øvrigt af de grunde, landsretten har anført, tiltræder Højesteret, at H1 i den omtvistede periode var indeholdelsespligtig ved udbetaling af A-indkomst til de hollandske slagtere, jf. kildeskattelovens § 46, stk. 1, 2. pkt.
Sagen drejer sig for Højesteret om perioden fra den 1. november 1997 til den 31. december 1998. H1 var bekendt med grundlaget for, at vederlagene til de hollandske slagtere var A-indkomst i medfør af kildeskattelovens § 2, stk. 1, litra c, jf. § 43, stk. 1[stk. 2.red.SKAT], litra h. Herefter og i øvrigt af de grunde, der er anført af landsretten, tiltræder Højesteret, at selskabet er ansvarlig for manglende indeholdelse af A-skat i den nævnte periode, jf. kildeskattelovens § 69, stk. 1. Det kan ikke føre til et andet resultat, at der i 1998 var drøftelser mellem de danske og hollandske skattemyndigheder om, hvilket af de to lande der i medfør af dobbeltbeskatningsoverenskomsten havde ret til at beskatte ved arbejdsudleje.
I sagsomkostninger for Højesteret skal H1 K/S betale 75.000 kr. til Skatteministeriet.

References: § 2
 § 43
 § 69
 § 2
 § 43
 § 46
 § 2
 § 43
 § 69