Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/312/926/608696/
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 03:05:33+00:00

Document:
Joseph P. Tamburino, argued, Minneapolis, MN, for appellant.
Jeffrey S. Paulsen, argued, Minneapolis, MN, for appellee.
Before LOKEN, BEAM and MELLOY, Circuit Judges.
In August of 2000, Washam began working for "Nutri-Tech," a nutrition store located in College Station, Texas. While at Nutri-Tech, Washam began using and selling products containing 1,4-Butanediol. Washam researched 1,4-Butanediol in order to ascertain its legality, and he determined that a similar substance, GHB, was illegal and that another similar substance, gamma-butyrolactone (GBL), was an illegal analogue to GHB, but 1,4-Butanediol was not listed as an illegal substance. Through the owner of Nutri-Tech, Washam began importing 1,4-Butanediol from Mexico for sale in the United States for human consumption.
Dr. James DeFrancesco, a Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA") chemist, also testified for the government. He said that 1,4-Butanediol and GHB are both linear compounds containing four carbons and that there is only one difference between the substances on one side of their molecules. He stated that this difference does not preclude a substantially similar chemical structure and that his opinion, and the official opinion of the DEA, was that 1,4-Butanediol was an analogue of GHB under the definition in the Analogue Statute.
The jury heard all of this expert testimony, was instructed to determine whether 1,4-Butanediol is a controlled substance analogue under the Analogue Statute, determined that it was a controlled substance analogue, and found Washam guilty of distributing a controlled substance analogue. Washam appeals this determination, claiming that the definition of a controlled substance analogue in 21 U.S.C. § 802(32) is void for vagueness because it fails to provide notice of the conduct proscribed and because it lends itself to arbitrary enforcement.
We review a constitutional challenge to a federal statute de novo. United States v. Whiting, 165 F.3d 631, 633 (8th Cir. 1999).
The Fifth Amendment guarantees every citizen the right to due process. Stemming from this guarantee is the concept that vague statutes are void. Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391, 46 S. Ct. 126, 70 L. Ed. 322 (1926). " [A] statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of law." Id. "Void for vagueness simply means that criminal responsibility should not attach where one could not reasonably understand that his contemplated conduct is proscribed." United States v. Nat'l Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 32-33, 83 S. Ct. 594, 9 L. Ed. 2d 561 (1963). " [L]aws [must] give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly. Vague laws may trap the innocent by not providing fair warning." Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108, 92 S. Ct. 2294, 33 L. Ed. 2d 222 (1972). " [V]agueness challenges to statutes which do not involve First Amendment freedoms must be examined in the light of the facts of the case at hand." United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 550, 95 S. Ct. 710, 42 L. Ed. 2d 706 (1975).
In determining whether a statute is unconstitutionally vague on the facts at hand, we apply a two-part test. First, the statute must provide adequate notice of the proscribed conduct. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357, 103 S. Ct. 1855, 75 L. Ed. 2d 903 (1983). Second, the statute must not lend itself to arbitrary enforcement. Id. at 358, 103 S. Ct. 1855. Washam argues that section 802(32) violates both parts of this test because the statute does not provide adequate notice of proscribed conduct and because it allows for arbitrary enforcement.
(iii) with respect to a particular person, which such person represents or intends to have a stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous system that is substantially similar to or greater than the ... effect on the central nervous system of a controlled substance in schedule I or II.
Washam argues that there is no consensus in the scientific community regarding whether 1,4-Butanediol has a "substantially similar" chemical structure to GHB under provision (i) of this definition, and thus the definition is unconstitutionally vague as applied. The government argues that Washam had actual notice that his conduct was illegal and so he cannot claim that the statute is void for vagueness as applied to him. Additionally the government argues that a person of common intelligence has sufficient notice under the statute that 1,4-Butanediol is a controlled substance analogue. We agree with the government.
We think the government's "actual notice" argument has some appeal and is supported by United States v. Saffo, 227 F.3d 1260, 1270 (10th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 974, 121 S. Ct. 1608, 149 L. Ed. 2d 473 (2001). In Saffo, the defendant challenged a statute as unconstitutionally vague. The court held that the defendant could not sustain the challenge because she concealed her activities and lied to DEA agents, which showed that she had actual knowledge of the illegality of her actions. Id. Thus, the defendant was not in "a situation where she `could not reasonably understand that [her] contemplated conduct [was] proscribed.'" Id. (quoting Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 757, 94 S. Ct. 2547, 41 L. Ed. 2d 439 (1974)) (first alteration in original). Similarly, the evidence in the present case shows that Washam knew his conduct was illegal because even though the shipping label said not to ingest, Washam told the buyers how much to ingest, he charged an exorbitant mark-up price on the chemical, and he commented about other chemicals that were legal for human consumption.
Additionally, even if we overlook Washam's actual knowledge that his conduct was illegal, we still find that the Analogue Statute is not vague as applied to him because a person of ordinary intelligence would have reasonably known that selling 1,4-Butanediol for human consumption violated the statute. See Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108-09, 92 S. Ct. 2294. The term "substantially similar," as used in the statute, does not mean "exactly the same." There obviously will be differences in chemical structures between an "analogue" chemical and a schedule I or II chemical. If two chemicals' structures are exactly the same, the chemical in question would no longer be an "analogue," but instead it would be the same chemical as the listed chemical. Thus, some level of difference is acceptable between an analogue's chemical structure and a proscribed chemical's structure.
We have held that all experts need not agree on whether two drugs' chemical structures are "substantially similar" in order to affirm a conviction under the Analogue Statute. United States v. McKinney, 79 F.3d 105, 108 (8th Cir. 1996), vacated on other grounds, 520 U.S. 1226, 117 S. Ct. 1816, 137 L. Ed. 2d 1025 (1997); but see Forbes, 806 F. Supp. at 237 (application of Analogue Statute to alphaethyltryptamine void for vagueness because government's own witnesses differed as to whether the chemical had a substantially similar structure to a controlled substance). Rather than unanimous expert ratification, we look to whether the statute gave adequate warning, under a specific set of facts, that the defendant's behavior was a criminal offense. McKinney, 79 F.3d at 108.
The difficulty is determining when "some notice" is enough notice. In United States v. Fisher, the Eleventh Circuit determined that defendants had enough notice that GBL is a chemical analogue to GHB. 289 F.3d 1329, 1339 (11th Cir. 2002). In coming to this conclusion, the court found it relevant that GBL was a listed chemical and that Congress had stated that GBL was a chemical analogue to GHB in its proposed rules. Id. at 1336. When Congress commented that GBL was a chemical analogue to GHB, it also mentioned that 1,4-Butanediol was the same sort of analogue.
Placement of Gamma-Butyrolactone in List I of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. § 802(34)), 65 Fed.Reg. 21645 (April 24, 2000) (codified at 21 C.F.R. § 1310). This piece of explicit notice, in addition to the fact that 1,4-Butanediol turns into GHB in the body and has the same effect as GHB, aids us in concluding that there is sufficient notice that 1,4-Butanediol is a chemical analogue of GHB. See Fisher, 289 F.3d at 1336.
United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221, 23 L. Ed. 563 (1875).
There is some superficial appeal to Washam's comparison between 1,4-Butanediol and MSG, the common food additive that also becomes GHB in the human body. But Washam's conclusion that the Analogue Statute lends itself to arbitrary enforcement because it allows for a distinction between the two substances is flawed. The statute does not allow for arbitrary enforcement because the statute itself requires a two-step inquiry before law enforcement may extend its application to a new chemical. The first step in the statute is to determine whether a chemical is substantially similar in chemical structure to a listed chemical. 21 U.S.C. § 802(32) (A) (i). Beyond this inquiry is the requirement that the chemical either has the same effect as the listed chemical on the human body, or it is intended to have such an effect. Id. § 802(32) (A) (ii), (iii). Utilizing these two steps, MSG could not be proscribed by the Analogue Statute. While MSG may be substantially similar in physical and chemical structure to GHB, just as is 1,4-Butanediol, MSG does not have similar effects on the human body, nor do food producers intend for MSG to have the same effect as GHB. Thus, MSG would not satisfy the second prong of the statute. To the contrary, 1,4-Butanediol is substantially similar in physical and chemical structure to GHB and it has a similar effect on the human body as GHB. This violates the statute. Thus, applying the Analogue Statute to 1,4-Butanediol and not to MSG is not proof of arbitrary enforcement, rather it is proof that the statute is narrowly drawn to proscribe only those chemicals which are dangerous and intended to be used in an illegal manner.
Additionally, the court in Roberts held that effects on the human body could not be considered in determining whether the chemicals were "substantially similar" under the first part of the statute. Roberts, 2002 WL 31014834 at *5. We disagree. While the effects on the human body must be similar in order to satisfy the second part of the statute, this does not prevent consideration of the effects on the human body when determining whether the chemical satisfies the "substantially similar" requirement of the first portion of the law. In this regard, we think it is extraordinarily relevant that 1,4-Butanediol transforms into GHB upon ingestion with similar physical results.
While there is some debate as to how this provision is to be read, we agree with the courts who have read the three requirements in the conjunctive. Thus, part (i) must be satisfied and either part (ii) or part (iii) must also be satisfied See United States v. Forbes, 806 F. Supp. 232, 235-36 (D. Colo. 1992).

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