Source: https://prisonwatchnetwork.org/2012/12/26/mulling-over-martinez-why-a-recent-supreme-court-case-might-get-you-into-federal-court-in-style/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 16:54:15+00:00

Document:
Changing the law for most federal habeas petitioners, Martinez established that if the petitioner had no attorney or had an ineffective attorney on state postconviction review, the petitioner’s failure to bring certain claims will no longer result in procedural default (explained below). Martinez applies only to those claims that could not have been brought at an earlier stage of criminal proceedings when the petitioner did have a right to counsel. I use the example of ineffective assistance of counsel in this column, but there will be others. I may consider which other claims could benefit from Martinez in a future piece. I also do not consider the role of Martinez for federal prisoners bringing their §2255 motions, but it seems to me that it could allow them to bring new claims on appeal from the denial of their § 2255 motions.
procedural default because it wasn’t his own fault that the claim hadn’t been raised. The cause here: Martinez’s postconviction attorney2 failed to raise the ineffective assistance claim in state courts.
Without such a right, a petitioner was bound by the acts of the attorney, who was deemed to be his agent just as in a civil case.
Martinez asserts that he is entitled to the effective assistance of counsel in connection with his first state petition for post-conviction relief. He asserts that a right to the assistance of counsel attaches to the presentation of a claim of error at the first tier of review, relying upon Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605, (2005) and Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963). Martinez recognizes the general rule that “there is no right to counsel in state collateral proceedings,” see Coleman, 501 U.S. at 755, 111 S.Ct. 2546, but asserts that there might be an exception where “state collateral review is the first place a prisoner can present a challenge to his conviction.” 501 U.S. at 755.
counsel at the time of the error. Thus, Martinez lost again.
Where, under state law, claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel must be raised in an initial review collateral proceeding, a procedural default will not bar a federal habeas court from hearing a substantial claim of ineffective assistance at trial if, in the initial-review collateral proceeding, there was no counsel or counsel in that proceeding was ineffective.
Just as it did in Maples v. Thomas14 earlier this term, the Martinez Court decided that an attorney’s misconduct in postconviction proceedings excused a procedural default, regardless of whether a right to counsel exists.
Forget for a moment the question of whether there’s a constitutional right to counsel on collateral appeal. Your guess is as good as mine when that will be resolved or what the answer will be. Let’s talk about how Martinez can help you if you didn’t have appointed counsel on Florida postconviction review.
The obvious benefit goes to those of you who want to bring a new claim of ineffective assistance in federal court that you didn’t think of on Florida postconviction review. Most of you did not study the law until you were faced with filing your 3.850 or 3.800 motions, so you may have discovered new legal theories that didn’t occur to you during the first round of review. Or, new facts may have come to light that allow you to make claims that didn’t seem plausible before. These would have been procedurally defaulted before Martinez, but now you can probably bring them. If this describes you, you can skip the next two paragraphs and see how else this will help you obtain the benefits of fullscale de novo federal review of your claim – and possibly appointed counsel as well.
For those of you who have not yet filed a Florida postconviction motion, Martinez could also do something for you that you might not realize: if you’re not appointed an attorney on collateral review, Martinez may give you a meaningful choice between having your claims heard in state or federal court. I’ll explain why you might want to do that before, but first I want to warn you that deliberately failing to bring claims in state court is still a very risky strategy. Martinez is a new case, and federal courts haven’t decided what its limits are. Conceivably, federal courts could rule that if you “deliberately bypass” the state courts15 by failing to bring a claim that you know you could have brought, Martinez does not apply – and then your claim will never be heard at all.
That said, it seems clear to me that Martinez makes the federal court a viable forum when it applies. The reason is that if Martinez applies, there’s no lower court decision to contend with. Let me explain why that makes a big difference.
I leave it to you to decide whether the average attorney appointed for a federal habeas case will be better than the average attorney appointed in Florida state postconviction proceedings.
Because there is no state court decision to defer to, Martinez-excused claims can prevail if the district judge thinks they should. Also, if you would definitely win under Eleventh Circuit (federal court of appeals) law but might not under Florida law, avoiding the “as determined by the Supreme Court” requirement is an attractive option. If you brought your claim in state court and lost, case law from the Eleventh Circuit law would not apply.
These are my thoughts on Martinez so far. In addition to letting you bring your claim in federal court, it helps you avoid the parts of AEDPA23 that have crippled federal courts. Whether your claim is better heard in state or federal court is not possible to predict in a general sense, but you might decide that the possibility is worth the risk. As always, I wish you luck.
Note 1. 132 S.Ct. 1309 (2012).
Note 2. See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 153 F.3d 1305, 1307 (11th Cir. 1998) (applying doctrine of procedural default to claims by federal prisoners under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 that were not raised at trial or on appeal); Snowden v.
Singletary, 135 F.3d 732, 735-76 (11th Cir. 1998) (explaining that claims not “exhausted” in state court are procedurally defaulted if they could no longer be raised at the time the federal court consider a 28 U.S.C. §2255 petition).
Note 3. Arizona is one of a few states that appoint counsel for every first postconviction proceeding. Ariz. Rule Crim. Proc. 32.4(c)(2). Rule 3.111(b)(2) of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure allows appointment of counsel on postconviction review, but does not offer any criteria for deciding when counsel should be ppointed. Rule 3.851(b) makes appointment of counsel mandatory for postconviction proceedings in capital cases.
Note 4. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 753–754, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991).
Note 5. Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555, 107 S.Ct. 1990, 95 L.Ed.2d 539 (1987) (“We have never held that prisoners have a constitutional right to counsel when mounting collateral attacks upon their convictions”).
Note 6. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986).
Note 7. Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500 (2003) (explaining that “almost all jurisdictions prefer that ineffective assistance claims be presented on collateral attack”).
governing the right to counsel both at trial and on appeal.
Note 10. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
Note 11. Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605, 609 (2005).
Note 12. 623 F.3d at 739-40.
Note 13. Id. at 740.
by abandoning him without notice, but explaining that where no right to counsel exists, a petitioner is bound by the acts and omissions of his attorney under “well settled principles of agency law”) (quotation omitted).
Note 15. “Deliberate bypass” is an older standard for deciding whether a claim was procedurally defaulted. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963). This standard is no longer applied in habeas corpus. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977). Nevertheless, it could be revived for petitioners who fail to bring a claim for the sole reason that they want to secure the benefits I discuss in this column.
Note 16. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(B) (emphasis added). In addition to this requirement, a petitioner must show that theclaim either relies on a new, retroactive rule of constitutional law or depends on facts that could not have been discovered earlier. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (e)(2)(A).
Note 17. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 432 (2000).
Note 19. Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Court, Rule 8(c) (“§2254 Rules”) (“If an evidentiary hearing is warranted, the judge must appoint an attorney to represent a petitioner who qualifies to have counsel appointed under 18 U.S.C. § 3006A.” (governing appointment of counsel for indents)).
Note 20. McGriff v. Dep’t of Corr., 338 F.3d 1231, 1235 (“If the Supreme Court had intended a § 2254 petitioner to have a more substantial right to counsel than those provided by the Constitution, we would expect to see language to that effect in the text of the rule. We find no such language in Rule 8(c). We therefore turn to the Constitution not for authority, but instruction.”).
Note 21. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
Note 22. Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009).
Note 23. The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, passed in 1996, significantly narrowed the scope of federal habeas review.
Gray R. Proctor is currently on the Board of Directors for the Florida Postconviction Legal Aid Organization and practices law in Orlando, Florida, representing clients in criminal appeals and state and federal habeas corpus proceedings. Gray R. Proctor’s legal career really began during his second year at Vanderbilt University Law School.
Professor Nancy King (co-author of West’s Criminal Procedure treatise and Assistant Reporter for the Advisory Committee for the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure) had just undertaken her groundbreaking empirical study of federal habeas litigation in district courts, and Gray was lucky enough to serve as a research assistant on that project. Over the course of the habeas project, Gray reviewed over 800 non-capital habeas cases and 100 capital habeas cases throughout the country, documenting which claims and defenses were raised and the eventual ruling. This study is cited by Justice Scalia in the Martinez dissent.
ruling would have to be filtered through federal postconviction rules. His particular interest in Padilla is whether it will be applied retroactively; the Supreme Court heard oral arguments on this issue in Chaidez v. United States, and those who wish to place bets on how it will be decided should contact Gray directly.
Afterward, Gray served as a Staff Attorney for the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, drafting memoranda and opinions for appeals of criminal cases, postconviction proceedings, prisoner civil rights suits, and the occasional miscellaneous federal suit.
Gray left the Fourth Circuit to serve as deputy director of the American Bar Association’s National Inventory of the Collateral Consequences of Conviction, a free, internet-based catalog of laws and regulations in every United States jurisdiction that impose a civil consequence due solely to a criminal conviction (think felon disenfranchisement). Gray continues to serve in that capacity under Director and former U.S. Pardon Attorney Margaret C. Love, balancing his commitment to that project with his appellate, postconviction, and civil rights law practice in Orlando, FL.
This entry was posted in 2012, Florida, Florida Postconviction Legal Perspectives, ineffective assistance of counsel, legal issues, Martinez v Ryan and tagged 2012, Florida, Florida Postconviction Legal Perspectives, ineffective assistance of counsel, legal issues, Martinez v Ryan. Bookmark the permalink.
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