Source: http://va.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20180305_0000162.WVA.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 12:23:29+00:00

Document:
John Anderson, a Virginia inmate proceeding by counsel, filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging the validity of his confinement on a judgment by the Appomattox County Circuit Court. Respondent filed a motion to dismiss, and Anderson responded, making the matter ripe for disposition. After review of the record, the court grants the motion to dismiss.
On April 7, 2015, Anderson pleaded guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, to a marijuana possession misdemeanor charge and six felonies: possession of a firearm while in possession of a Schedule I or II drug, possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute, possession of Adderall, possession of amphetamine/dextroamphetamine, and two counts of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The trial court imposed a $50 fine for the misdemeanor and sentenced Anderson to twenty-five years' imprisonment for the felonies, with seventeen years suspended. Anderson did not appeal.
However, Anderson did file a state habeas petition, in the Appomattox County Circuit Court, alleging a single claim: that trial counsel misadvised him to plead guilty by erroneously telling him that, if he declined the Commonwealth's plea offer, he would be exposed to additional charges with a potential mandatory minimum aggregate sentence of twenty-to-twenty-five years. The circuit court denied his petition, and the Supreme Court of Virginia refused review.
Anderson then filed the current petition for a writ of habeas corpus, raising the same claim as in his state petition.
Respondent acknowledges that Anderson's petition is timely and properly exhausted, but moves to dismiss the petition as without merit.
(2) [R]esulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). “Where, as here, the state court's application of governing federal law is challenged, it must be shown to be not only erroneous, but objectively unreasonable.” Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 5 (2003). Under this standard, “[a] state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree' on the correctness of the state court's decision.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). “In reviewing a habeas petition, federal courts must presume the correctness of a state court's factual determinations unless the habeas petitioner rebuts the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.” Green v. Johnson, 515 F.3d 290, 299 (4th Cir. 2008) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)).
Meanwhile, to state a constitutional claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must satisfy the two-pronged Strickland v. Washington test by showing (1) “that counsel's performance was deficient, ” and (2) “that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). “Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential, ” id. at 689, and counsel is “permitted to set priorities, determine trial strategy, and press those claims with the greatest chances of success.” United States v. Mason, 774 F.3d 824, 828 (4th Cir. 2014). When reviewing a Strickland claim under the AEDPA, the court's review is doubly deferential. See Harrington, 562 U.S. at 105.

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