Source: https://case-law.vlex.com/vid/388-u-s-263-606666158
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 15:46:43+00:00

Document:
1. The taking of handwriting exemplars did not violate petitioner's constitutional rights. Pp. 265-267.
(a) The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination reaches compulsory communications, but a mere handwriting exemplar, in contrast with the content of what is written, is an identifying physical characteristic outside its protection. Pp. 266-267.
(b) The taking of the exemplars was not a "critical" stage of the criminal proceedings entitling petitioner to the assistance of counsel; there is minimal risk that the absence of counsel might derogate from his right to a fair trial. P. 267.
2. Petitioner's request for reconsideration of Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232 (where the Court held that appropriate instructions to the jury would suffice to prevent prejudice to a defendant from references to him in a codefendant's statement) in connection with his codefendant's statements, need not be considered in view of the California Supreme Court's holding rejecting the Delli Paoli rationale, but finding that any error to petitioner by the admission of the statements was harmless. Pp. 267-268.
3. A closer examination of the record than was possible when certiorari was granted reveals that the facts with respect to the search and seizure claim are not sufficiently clear to permit resolution of that question, and certiorari on this issue is vacated as improvidently granted. P. 269.
4. The admission of the in-court identifications of petitioner without first determining that they were not tainted by the illegal lineup procedure but were of independent origin was constitutional error. United States v. Wade, ante, p. 218. Pp. 269-274.
(a) Since the record does not permit an informed judgment whether the in-court identifications at the two stages of the trial had an independent source, petitioner is entitled only to a vacation of his conviction, pending proceedings in California courts allowing the State to establish that the in-court identifications had an independent source or that their introduction in evidence was harmless error. P. 272.
(b) With respect to testimony of witnesses that they identified petitioner at the lineup, which is a direct result of an illegal procedure, the State is not entitled to show that such testimony had an independent source, but the California courts must, unless "able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt," grant petitioner a new trial if such testimony was at the guilt stage, or grant appropriate relief if it was at the penalty stage. Pp. 272-274.
Petitioner was convicted in the Superior Court of California of the armed robbery of the Mutual Savings and Loan Association of Alhambra and the murder of a police officer who entered during the course of the robbery. There were separate guilt and penalty stages of the trial before the same jury, which rendered a guilty verdict and imposed the death penalty. The California Supreme Court affirmed, 63 Cal.2d 690, 408 P.2d 365. We granted certiorari, 384 U.S. 985, and set the case for argument with Wade and with Stovall v. Denno, post, p. 293. [87 S.Ct. 1953] If our holding today in Wade is applied to this case, the issue whether admission of the in-court and lineup identifications is constitutional error which requires a new trial could be resolved on this record only after further proceedings in the California courts. We must therefore first determine whether petitioner's other contentions warrant any greater relief.
[The agent] did not tell Gilbert that the exemplars would not be used in any other investigation. Thus, even if Gilbert believed that his exemplars would not be used in California, it does not appear that the authorities improperly induced such belief.
written, like the voice or body itself, is an identifying physical characteristic outside its protection. United States v. Wade, supra, at 222-223. No claim its made that the content of the exemplars was testimonial or communicative matter. Cf. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616.
the accused has the opportunity for a meaningful confrontation of the [State's] case at trial through the ordinary processes of cross-examination of the [State's] expert [handwriting] witnesses and the presentation of the evidence of [87 S.Ct. 1954] his own [handwriting] experts.
United States v. Wade, supra, at 227-228.
168 Mass. 1 (1897), Kenneson v. West End St. Ry. Co.

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