Source: http://ga.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20180305_0000136.NGA.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 17:59:17+00:00

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This action is before the court on the magistrate judge's report and recommendation (“R&R”) [Doc. No. 275]. The movant has filed objections thereto [Doc. No. 283].
In reviewing a magistrate judge's R&R, the district court “shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). “Parties filing objections to a magistrate's report and recommendation must specifically identify those findings objected to. Frivolous, conclusive, or general objections need not be considered by the district court.” United States v. Schultz, 565 F.3d 1353, 1361 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting Marsden v. Moore, 847 F.2d 1536, 1548 (11th Cir. 1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The district judge must “give fresh consideration to those issues to which specific objection has been made by a party.” Jeffrey S. v. State Bd. of Educ. of Ga., 896 F.2d 507, 512 (11th Cir. 1990) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Absent objection, the district judge “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings and recommendations made by the magistrate judge, ” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), and “need only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation, ” Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, advisory committee note, 1983 Addition, Subdivision (b).
The movant and his co-defendant Ronn Darnell Sterling were indicted for aiding and abetting one another pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2 in committing the substantive crimes of (1) armed bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and (d); (2) possession of a firearm in relation to a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) and (c)(1)(C)(i); and (3) possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) & 924(a)(2). Superseding Indictment [Doc. No. 120].
During pretrial proceedings, the movant sought to suppress evidence recovered from a gray Dodge Stratus owned by the movant and his wife. The motion was denied.
The movant and his co-defendant were tried before a jury beginning on January 17, 2012. On January 20, 2012, the jury convicted both defendants on all counts [Doc. No. 147]. This court sentenced the movant to 363 months' imprisonment [Doc. No. 165].
After the movant filed a timely notice of appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the movant's and his co-defendant's convictions and sentences by order dated November 21, 2013. United States v. Sterling, 738 F.3d 228 (11th Cir. 2013). The Eleventh Circuit considered and rejected the movant's arguments that (1) the trial court improperly admitted evidence of the movant and his co-defendant's prior convictions; and (2) there was a lack of sufficient evidence to support all charges against the movant. Id. at 238-39.
The movant now collaterally challenges his convictions and sentences on the following grounds: (1) trial counsel was ineffective regarding the Fourth Amendment challenge to the investigatory stop and search; (2) trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object and seek suppression of unsubstantiated criminal evidence; and (3) the movant is actually innocent of all aiding and abetting counts.
Under the Sixth Amendment, a defendant has the right to “reasonably effective” legal assistance. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). To show constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must establish that (1) counsel's representation was deficient and (2) counsel's deficient representation prejudiced him. Id. at 690-92; Bottoson v. Moore, 234 F.3d 526, 532 (11th Cir. 2000) (stating that the court may resolve an ineffective assistance claim based on either prong).
Under the first prong, a movant must show that “in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. “[C]ounsel's conduct is presumed reasonable, [and] a petitioner must establish that no competent counsel would have taken the action that his counsel did take.” Chandler v. United States, 218 F.3d 1305, 1315 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc). To prove ineffectiveness, a movant must show that his attorney's representation “fell outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance.” Id. at 1314 (internal quotation marks omitted). When evaluating an attorney's performance, the court must be highly deferential and “avoid second-guessing counsel's performance.” Id. Moreover, when reviewing counsel's performance, the court “must evaluate the reasonableness of counsel's performance from counsel's perspective at the time, ” not with the distortion of hindsight. Id. at 1316.
Under the second Strickland prong, a movant “must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.

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