Source: http://filosofialisboa.blogspot.com/2013/
Timestamp: 2017-06-28 01:45:43+00:00

Document:
Kant e Kierkegaard: Conferência de René Rosfort
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Célia Teixeira: The a priori and the analytic: the traditional connection
2013-14: Session 7
6 de Dezembro de 2013, 15:00
LanCog Research Group
www.lancog.com
Anna Marmodoro: Aristotle on the Problem of Common Sensibles SEMINAR SERIES IN ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY2013-14: Session 2Aristotle on the Problem of Common Sensibles Anna MarmodoroUniversity of Oxford29 November 2013, 15:00Faculdade de Letras de LisboaSala Mattos Romão (departamento de Filosofia)Abstract: Aristotle draws a distinction between qualities that are perceptible via a single sense only, the special sensibles, and qualities that are perceptible via more than one sense at once, the common sensibles. Why is this distinction important to Aristotle and how does he justify it? What are the ontology and the epistemology of the common sensibles, in light of Aristotle’s assumption that each sense organ is sensitive to only its own special sensibles? Does the problem of how the common sensibles get perceived give us reasons for giving up a ‘separatist’ view of sense experiences? Or rather can it be solved by postulating extra perceptual powers for the senses? Are more ‘parsimonious’ options viable? In this paper I engage with these and related questions, which have attracted the interest of Aristotelian scholars (Gregoric 2007, Johansen 2012) and philosophers of the mind (Tye 2007) alike. I offer my own reading of Aristotle’s account and examine its philosophical viability.ALL WELCOME!
Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de LisboaLanCog Group (Language, Mind and Cognition Research Group)http://www.lancog.com/Project Online Companion PTDC/FIL-FIL/121209/2010
Filosofia em Portugal,
RetractionsTeresa MarquesUniversity of Lisbon15 de Novembro de 2013, 15:00Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de LisboaSala Mattos Romão (departamento de Filosofia)Abstract: Retraction and disagreement data have been used against contextualism and in favor of relativism about certain types of claims. Among these figure epistemic modals, knowledge attributions, or value and personal taste claims. On the relativist proposal, sentences like “the ice cream might be in the fridge” or “Pocoyo is funny” only get assigned a truth-value relative to contexts of utterance, indices of evaluation, and contexts of assessment. On assessment relativism, the relevant perspective for the truth of an epistemic might claim, or of a claim of personal taste, is the epistemic evidence, or the standard of taste, of the assessor at the context of assessment. On contextualism (indexical or not) the relevant perspective is the epistemic evidence, or the standard of taste, that is determined at the context of utterance. It is the claim that contextualism cannot handle retraction and disagreement data that requires the admission of contexts of assessment. Assessment-relativism takes retractions to have a special normative role: a retraction is allegedly mandatory in the crucial cases where the contextualist does not obligate any retraction. This talk questions that retractions have such a normative role, and offers an alternative explanation that is compatible with contextualism. The aim is to show that assessment relativism is not a viable semantic alternative. I will first summarize the main objections in the literature against the obligatoriness of retractions in the crucial cases. I will then offer a suggestion for how a contextualist (indexical or not) can explain permissible retractions, without requiring contexts of assessment. If time allows, I'll also try to show that the objections to assessment relativism follow a general pattern of criticism.ALL WELCOME!
Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de LisboaLanCog Group (Language, Mind and Cognition Research Group)http://www.lancog.com/LANCOG SEMINAR2013-14: Session 5
Conferência de Abertura do Ano Lectivo de Filosofia
Oficina de Filosofia Analítica - OFA 9
Para mais informações clique neste LINK.
International Workshop on the Epistemology of Modality
Já saiu o número 3 da revista philosophy@Lisbon.
Para aceder a este número clique AQUI.
Fenomenologia e Ontologia. No Centenário de Ideen, de Edmund Husserl
Dias 21 e 22 de Outubro de 2013
Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa: Grupo de Pensamento Fenomenológico
Responsável: Pedro M. S. Alves
Javier san Martín – UNED, Madrid, CFLU, Lisboa
Carmen López – UNIED, Madrid
Jesús Diaz – UNED, Madrid
Denis Fisette – UNIV. QUÉBEC, Montréal
François de Gandt – UNIV. LILLE III, Lille
Jean-Pierre Renaudi – INST. FILOSOFIA, Porto, CFLUL, Lisboa
Emanuele Mariani – CFLUL, CEFI, IFP
Jairo Silva – UNIV. SÃO PAULO, S. Paulo
Carlos Alberto Moura – UNIV. SÃO PAULO, S. Paulo
Pedro Alves – FLUL, CFUL, Lisboa
Mafalda Blanc – FLUL, CFUL, Lisboa
Carlos Morujão – UNIV. CATÓLICA, CEFI, Lisboa
Ana Sousa – UNIV. LUSÓFONA, CFUL, Lisboa
Irene Borges-Duarte – UNIV- ÉVORA, IFP, Évora
Sérgio Fernandes – CFCUL, Lisboa
Filosofia e Arquitectura da Paisagem
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Estética da Natureza,
Filosofia da Paisagem,
University of Lisbon, Faculty of Letters
http://www.epistemologyofmodality.weebly.com
Registration is free, but if you're intending to attend, please do register (see below).
David Chalmers (Australian National University; New York University)
Bob Hale (University of Sheffield; Northern Institute of Philosophy at Aberdeen; King’s College London)
Sonia Roca-Royes (University of Stirling)
Daniele Sgaravatti (Università dell'Aquila)
Anand Vaidya (San José State University).
Confirmed accepted contributions:
Alexandre Billon (Université Lille-III)
Ottavio Bueno (University of Miami) and Scott Shalkowski (University of Leeds)
Bob Fischer (Texas State University-San Marcos)
Dusko Prelevic (University of Belgrade)
By sending an email to EpistemologyModalityLisbon@gmail.com.
Please include ‘registration’ in the subject, and let us know your name and affiliation (if applicable) in the mail's body.
João Branquinho (LanCog Group, University of Lisbon) and Sonia Roca-Royes (University of Stirling).
Prémio Prof. Doutor Joaquim Cerqueira Gonçalves
para alunos do 1.º ciclo/ cursos de
Artigo 1 (Objecto)
O Prémio Prof.
Doutor Joaquim Cerqueira Gonçalves é instituído anualmente pela Revista Philosophica e tem como objectivos a
promoção e o reconhecimento do trabalho de estudantes do 1º ciclo que se
debrucem sobre temáticas filosóficas ou que abordem filosoficamente temas de
qualquer outra área disciplinar.
Artigo 2 (Condições de admissão) Podem concorrer
ao Prémio os alunos inscritos num dos cursos de licenciatura da Faculdade de
Artigo 3 (Prémio)
consiste na publicação do trabalho premiado no número de Novembro da Revista Philosophica. O autor do trabalho premiado
terá ainda direito a uma colecção de livros do Centro de Filosofia da
Artigo 4 (Características dos trabalhos)
Os trabalhos a
concurso deverão ter sido aprovados numa qualquer disciplina dos cursos de 1º
ciclo da FLUL e deverão obedecer às seguintes especificações:
versar sobre uma temática de cariz filosófico ou apresentar uma abordagem
filosófica relativamente a um assunto de qualquer outra área disciplinar;
ter um máximo de 15 páginas A4, redigidas com fonte Times New Roman, tamanho 12
e espaçamento 1,5 de entrelinha;
ser enviados em formato Word ou PDF, sem qualquer elemento de identificação do
seu autor nas páginas do texto. Artigo 5 (Prazo e modo de submissão dos
a) Os trabalhos
deverão ser enviados até ao dia 15 de Julho de cada ano lectivo, para o
seguinte endereço electrónico: philosophica@fl.ul.pt
nome do ficheiro deverá corresponder unicamente ao título do trabalho.
identificação do autor deverá ser feita no corpo da mensagem electrónica à qual
o trabalho é anexado e deverá conter o nome completo do autor; o curso que
frequenta; a disciplina na qual o trabalho foi aprovado, o nome do Professor
responsável pela disciplina e o título do trabalho enviado.
autores serão notificados via e‑mail
da boa recepção da candidatura e dos textos relativos à mesma.
Artigo 6 (Júri)
O Júri será
constituído pelos membros do Conselho Editorial da Revista Philosophica, sendo presidido pelo seu Director.
Artigo 7 (Deliberações
do Júri)
O Júri delibera com total independência e em plena liberdade de critério, por
maioria dos votos dos seus membros, cabendo, em caso de empate, ao Presidente
do Júri o voto de qualidade.
O Júri atribuirá o Prémio ao trabalho concorrente que considerar de maior
mérito científico, devendo essa escolha ser devidamente fundamentada e ficar
registada em acta.
A decisão do Júri é definitiva e não susceptível de apelo.
d) Os trabalhos
que não cumpram os critérios especificados no artigo 3 do presente regulamento ou
que sejam enviados fora do prazo não serão alvo de apreciação por parte do
Júri. e) Se as obras
concorrentes não apresentarem a qualidade exigida, o Júri poderá deliberar não
atribuir o Prémio. Artigo 8 (Disposições finais)
candidatura ao Prémio Prof. Doutor Joaquim Cerqueira Gonçalves implica a
aceitação do presente Regulamento.
b) Os casos
omissos serão deliberados pelo Conselho Editorial da Revista Philosophica.
aceitação do regulamento deste concurso implica a aceitação das normas de
funcionamento da revista Philosophica,
cujo regulamento geral e normas de publicação prevalecem sobre o presente
documento, excepto nas situações especificadas neste último.
Peter van Inwagen em Lisboa
LanCog Lectures in Metaphysics 2013 Peter van Inwagen, University of Notre DameLecture 1: Modes of Being and Quantification12 June 2013, 15:00, Faculty of Letters, University of Lisbon, Room 5.2Abstract: Modes of Being and Quantification. Many philosophers have held that being comes in various kinds or sorts or “modes.” Existenz and Bestand (Meinong), for example, or existence and subsistence (Russell), or être-en-soi and être-pour-soi (Sartre), or Vorhandenheit, Zuhandenheit, and Existenz (Heidegger). But if that is the case, what is the relation between these modes and the existential (or particular) quantifier? Kris McDaniel, who is friendly to the idea of modes of being, has recently suggested that each mode of being requires its own “specific” primitive and irreducible quantificational apparatus. Suppose, for example, that the modes of being are existence and subsistence. Then McDaniel’s position implies that we must recognize two independent specific quantifiers, the “existential quantifier” and the “subsistential quantifier” (each with its specific dual, its associated “version” of the universal quantifier). These two quantifiers are not to be thought of as restricted versions of the “generic” ‘∃’ of the logic texts; ‘∃’ is rather to be regarded as a “derived” abstraction, a “mere disjunction” of the existential and subsistential quantifiers. But McDaniel’s position must somehow come to terms with the fact that quantifiers of both sorts may occur in the same statement and a fortiori in the same argument. (Consider an argument whose premises and conclusion involve quantification over both mathematicians—who exist—and mathematical problems—which subsist.) This paper explores the following question: What rules of inference govern the formal validity of such “mixed” arguments? Various answers to this question are considered, none of which seems to be satisfactory. It is suggested that the absence of a satisfactory solution to this “problem of mixed inferences” casts doubt on the idea of modes of being.Lecture 2: Dispensing with Ontological Levels14 June 2013, 15:00, Faculty of Letters, University of Lisbon, Room 5.2Abstract: Dispensing with Ontological Levels: An Illustration. The following concepts are very closely related and perhaps even interdefinable: “ontological level”; “ontologically more/less fundamental than”; “ontologically grounded in”; “ontological status.” Have these concepts a place in metaphysics? It is suggested in this paper that there is a Bad Way to approach this question and a Good Way. The Bad Way is to propose examples of things to which these concepts are alleged to apply. (E.g., the unit set of Socrates is on a lower ontological level than, is ontologically less fundamental than, is ontologically grounded in, and does not enjoy the special ontological status of, Socrates.) The Good Way is to consider both well-worked-out metaphysical systems that make use of these concepts and well-worked-out systems that do not, and (assuming that there are systems of both sorts) to ask whether, in general, the better systems employ these concepts or the better systems eschew them. Before any such comparative evaluation can be carried out, however, we must have the competing systems on the table. This paper is intended only to accomplish one part of that preliminary undertaking—to put one metaphysical system on to the table and to formulate it in a way that brings the fact that there is no place in it for the concept “ontological level” (etc.) into sharp focus.
Sara Bizarro: The Puzzle of Mental Imagery
SEMINAR SERIES IN ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY2012-13: Session 14The Puzzle of Mental ImagerySara Bizarro (University of Lisbon, LanCog Group)7 de Junho de 2013, 15:00Faculdade de Letras de LisboaSala Mattos Romão (departamento de Filosofia)Abstract: The mental imagery debate, a debate about the nature of certain allegedly pictorial mental representations, is still undecided. On one side of the debate, we have those who argue that mental imagery is propositional in its nature, or at least a lot less pictorial than we like to think, while on the other side of the debate, we have those who defend that mental imagery is essentially pictorial in nature. In this paper, an attempt is made to clarify both positions with the examples usually brought up to illustrate them. In view of these examples, some conclusions are reached. Mental imagery is said to be not very detailed and have pictorial aspects that are similar to those that exist in regular perception. Mental imagery is also said to be cognitively permeable. Elaborate encoding across modalities is said to be more efficient than within modalities, thus supporting a dual code hypothesis of mental representation.Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de LisboaLanCog Group (Language, Mind and Cognition Research Group)http://www.lancog.com/Project Online Companion PTDC/FIL-FIL/121209/2010Instituto Filosófico de Pedro Hispano, Departamento de Filosofia da ULALL WELCOME!
Viriato Soromenho-Marques: "Europa Federal. Utopia ou Necessidade?"
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Living at the Present Moment - Fabrice Correia (Un. Neuchâtel)
SEMINAR SERIES IN ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY2012-13: Session 13Living at the Present MomentFabrice Correia (University of Neuchâtel)31 de Maio de 2013, 15:00Faculdade de Letras de LisboaSala Mattos Romão (departamento de Filosofia)Abstract: The growing block theory and the moving spotlight theory - two of the main theories of temporal existence which take temporal passage seriously - have recently been accused of leading to a grave epistemic issue: on either view, we cannot know that it's now now. The objection is considered by some prominent philosophers to be very powerful. I offer a precise characterisation of these views (and, in so doing, of other related views in the area like e.g. presentism), and use it to undermine the objection. The presentation is largely based on joint work with Sven Rosenkranz.ALL WELCOME!
Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de LisboaLanCog Group (Language, Mind and Cognition Research Group)http://www.lancog.com/Project Online Companion PTDC/FIL-FIL/121209/2010Instituto Filosófico de Pedro Hispano, Departamento de Filosofia da UL
Célia Teixeira: The a priori and the analytic: the...
Conferência de Abertura do Ano Lectivo de Filosofi...
International Workshop on the Epistemology of Moda...
Viriato Soromenho-Marques: "Europa Federal. Utopia...
Living at the Present Moment - Fabrice Correia (Un...

References: Artigo 1

Artigo 2

Artigo 3

Artigo 4
 Artigo 5

Artigo 6

Artigo 7
 artigo 3
 Artigo 8