Source: http://droit-tj.fr/spip.php?article431
Timestamp: 2017-08-22 01:48:44+00:00

Document:
Cour européenne des droits de l'homme, Religionsgemeinschaft der Zeugen Jehovas et autres c. Autriche, 31 juillet 2008 - Droit des cultes & Témoins de Jéhovah
Cour européenne des droits de l’homme, Religionsgemeinschaft der Zeugen (...)
Article 9 (Liberté de religion) - Article 14 (Discrimination)
Publié le 13 novembre 2016 - Modifié le 10 avril 2017
Retards importants dans l’octroi de la personnalité juridique à un groupe religieux : violation
Manque de cohérence dans l’application des critères à remplir en vue d’obtenir l’enregistrement en tant qu’organisation religieuse : violation
En fait Le droit autrichien permet aux organisations religieuses d’obtenir la personnalité morale en se faisant enregistrer en tant qu’association confessionnelle au sens de la loi de 1874 sur la reconnaissance juridique des associations confessionnelles ou en tant que communauté religieuse au sens de la loi de 1998 sur les communautés religieuses. Le statut d’association confessionnelle confère aux organisations qui en bénéficient des droits plus étendus que ceux d’une communauté religieuse mais ne peut être accordé qu’à celles ayant au moins 20 ans d’existence en Autriche ou qui bénéficient depuis au moins dix ans du statut de communauté religieuse.
En 1978, puis en 1997, un groupe de témoins de Jéhovah dont faisaient partie les quatre premiers requérants demanda aux autorités d’enregistrer l’association requérante en tant qu’association confessionnelle. Celles-ci refusèrent d’effectuer l’enregistrement sollicité et le ministre compétent informa les intéressés que la loi de 1874 ne leur conférait pas le droit d’obtenir une décision expresse. Après une procédure juridique complexe qui donna lieu, en 1995, à un arrêt de la Cour constitutionnelle reconnaissant à l’association requérante le droit d’obtenir une décision sur sa demande tendant à l’obtention du statut d’association confessionnelle, le ministre rejeta ladite demande pour des motifs touchant à l’organisation interne de l’association et à la manière dont celle-ci était perçue. Cette décision fut ultérieurement annulée par la Cour constitutionnelle, qui la jugea arbitraire et contraire au principe d’égalité. Par la suite, les témoins de Jéhovah se virent accorder le statut de communauté religieuse et la personnalité morale à la faveur d’une loi adoptée en 1998, ce qui les habilita à ester en justice et à agir devant les autorités autrichiennes, à acquérir et à administrer des biens sous leur propre nom, à établir des lieux de culte et à propager leur foi. Malgré cela, l’association requérante sollicita à nouveau l’octroi du statut d’association confessionnelle. Elle se le vit refuser au motif qu’elle n’était pas enregistrée depuis au moins dix ans en tant que communauté religieuse.
En droit Article 9 – Il s’est écoulé un important délai – 20 ans environ – entre le moment où l’association requérante a présenté sa demande tendant à l’obtention du statut d’association confessionnelle et celui où elle s’est vu accorder la personnalité morale. Durant ce laps de temps, elle a été privée de personnalité morale en Autriche. Il s’ensuit que les requérants ont subi une ingérence dans leur liberté religieuse. L’ingérence en question était « prévue par la loi » et poursuivait un « but légitime », à savoir la protection de la sûreté et de l’ordre publics. Le droit des communautés religieuses à l’autonomie est indispensable au pluralisme dans une société démocratique. Compte tenu de l’importance de ce droit, les autorités ne peuvent leur imposer qu’un délai d’attente raisonnablement court avant de leur accorder la personnalité morale. La possibilité offerte aux requérants de créer des associations auxiliaires dotées de la personnalité morale ne saurait suppléer le refus prolongé des autorités de conférer ce statut aux témoins de Jéhovah. Faute pour le Gouvernement d’avoir fourni des raisons « pertinentes » et « suffisantes » propres à justifier pareil refus, l’ingérence est allée au-delà de ce qui pouvait passer pour une restriction « nécessaire » à la liberté de religion des requérants.
Conclusion : violation de l’article 9 (six voix contre une).
Article 14 combiné avec l’article 9 – Le droit autrichien accorde aux associations confessionnelles de nombreux privilèges, notamment en matière fiscale. L’obligation de neutralité incombant aux autorités en ce qui concerne l’octroi desdits privilèges leur impose d’offrir à toutes les organisations religieuses une possibilité équitable de solliciter le bénéfice d’un statut particulier, en appliquant les critères pertinents sans discrimination. Le fait, pour les pouvoirs publics, d’imposer aux communautés religieuses dotées de la personnalité morale l’écoulement d’un délai avant qu’elles ne puissent prétendre à un statut plus solide d’institution de droit public soulève des questions délicates en ce qui concerne le devoir de neutralité et d’impartialité des autorités. S’il peut être nécessaire, à titre exceptionnel, de faire attendre dix ans une communauté religieuse avant de lui accorder le statut d’association confessionnelle – notamment dans le cas où la communauté en question, récemment créée, est inconnue – un tel délai ne se justifie guère en ce qui concerne des communautés telles que les témoins de Jéhovah, qui sont établies de longue date au plan tant national qu’international et dont l’existence est donc bien connue des autorités. Celles-ci devraient être en mesure de vérifier beaucoup plus rapidement si des communautés de ce type satisfont aux conditions posées par la législation nationale. S’appuyant sur l’exemple d’une autre communauté religieuse à laquelle le statut d’association confessionnelle fut accordé en 2003 bien qu’elle n’eût été enregistrée en tant que communauté religieuse qu’en 1998, la Cour conclut que l’Etat défendeur estime que l’application uniforme du délai de dix ans n’est pas un élément essentiel de sa politique à l’égard des cultes. Il s’ensuit que la différence de traitement dénoncée n’était pas fondée sur un « motif objectif et raisonnable ».
Article 41 – 10 000 EUR pour préjudice moral.
Note d’information sur la jurisprudence de la Cour (N° 110 - 2008)
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the last‑mentioned date :
1. The case originated in an application (no. 40825/98) against the Republic of Austria lodged with the European Commission of Human Rights (“the Commission”) under former Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a religious community, Religionsgemeinschaft der Zeugen Jehovas in Österreich, and four Austrian nationals, Franz Aigner, Kurt Binder, Karl Kopetzky and Johann Renolder (“the applicants”), on 27 February 1998.
2. The applicants were represented by Mr R. Kohlhofer DR., a lawyer practising in Vienna. The Austrian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Ambassador F. Trauttmansdorff, Head of the International Law Department at the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
1. Period before the Constitutional Court’s decision of 4 October 1995
8. On 25 September 1978 the second to fifth applicants and two other claimants requested the Federal Minister for Education and Arts (Bundesminister für Unterricht und Kunst) to recognise the first applicant as a religious society (Religionsgesellschaft) under the 1874 Recognition Act (Anerkennungsgesetz). Since the Minister did not respond, the applicants subsequently filed a complaint (Beschwerde) with the Ombudsman’s Office (Volksanwaltschaft) about the Minister’s inactivity.
9. On 5 February 1981 the Ombudsman’s Office issued a statement concerning the complaint. It considered that the Minister’s inactivity for almost two years constituted an undesirable state of affairs in public administration (Missstand im Bereich der öffentlichen Verwaltung) even though the authority was not formally obliged under the applicable law to take a decision since recognition of a religious society had to be taken in the form of a decree (Verordnung). However, since an agreement had been reached in a meeting between the applicants and the Ministry on 3 December 1980, no further steps were required by the Ombudsman’s Office. The contents of this agreement were not disclosed by the applicants.
13. On 14 January 1992 the Federal Government (Bundesregierung) submitted their observations to the Constitutional Court. On 27 April 1992 the Constitutional Court asked the Federal Government to submit supplementary observations, which were filed on 2 June 1992. The Federal Government argued, inter alia, that the provisions at issue were in conformity with the Federal Constitution as it was possible for the applicants to found a religious association under the Associations Act (Vereinsgesetz).
14. On 25 June 1992 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicants’ complaint as inadmissible. Relying on Article 13 of the Convention, the court considered that they were not directly affected by the impugned provisions as, in the light of its judgment of 1988 (VfSlg [Judgments and Decisions of the Constitutional Court] 11.931/1988), they had a right to have their case determined by an administrative authority. However, they had not exhausted the legal remedies available to them since they had failed to lodge an application under Article 132 of the Federal Constitution with the Administrative Court (Verwaltungsgerichtshof) against the Minister’s failure to give a decision (Säumnisbeschwerde).
16. On 22 March 1993 the Administrative Court rejected the applicants’ request as inadmissible. Referring to its previous case-law on the matter, it found that under the 1874 Recognition Act, a positive decision had to be taken by the competent minister in the form of a decree (Verordnung), whereas under Article 132 of the Federal Constitution, the Administrative Court was only competent to deliver individual decisions (Bescheide) and not decrees in the place of an administrative authority.
18. On 10 March 1994 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicants’ complaint as inadmissible. It found that it had already decided the matter in its decision of 25 June 1992. As an obiter dictum the court indicated, however, that the second to fifth applicants might request the Constitutional Court to examine a complaint under Article 144 of the Federal Constitution against the Minister’s failure to decide on the request for recognition. Once the Constitutional Court refused this request, they could apply to the Constitutional Court under Article 138 of the Federal Constitution for determination of a case where two courts (namely the Administrative Court and the Constitutional Court) declined jurisdiction (negativer Kompetenzkonflikt).
19. On 9 May 1994 the second to fifth applicants lodged such a complaint, which the Constitutional Court on 21 June 1994 rejected as inadmissible for lack of jurisdiction. It held that there was no legal provision entitling it to decide on applications about an authority’s failure to give a decision.
21. On 23 June 1995 the Constitutional Court held an oral hearing. On 4 October 1995 the court quashed the Administrative Court’s decision of 22 March 1993 and decided that the Administrative Court had jurisdiction to decide on the applicants’ complaint of 30 July 1992. The Constitutional Court found that under the 1874 Recognition Act a religious body had a subjective right to recognition as a religious society provided that the conditions laid down in that Act were met. The rule of law required that such a right be an enforceable one, in other words, that refusal to grant recognition should be subject to review by the Austrian courts and not left to the sole discretion of the administrative authorities. In order to guarantee such a review it was necessary for a negative decision refusing recognition to be taken in the form of a written decision (Bescheid). Under the Austrian legal order, only when taking such decisions were the competent authorities bound to deal with a request by a party, whereas no such obligation existed with regard to decrees (Verordnungen). A positive decision had to be taken in the form of a decree as it not only had effect vis-à-vis the parties but also vis-à-vis the general public.
2. Period after the Constitutional Court’s decision of 4 October 1995
22. On 18 December 1995 the Administrative Court ordered the Federal Minister for Education and Cultural Affairs (Bundesminister für Unterricht und kulturelle Angelegenheiten – “the Minister”) to submit the case file within two months and to communicate the arguments in favour of and against recognition.
24. On 25 March 1996 the Administrative Court opened preliminary proceedings (Vorverfahren) and ordered the Minister to decide within three months on the applicants’ request for recognition. The Federal Minister failed to do so.
25. On 28 April 1997 the Administrative Court issued a binding decision (Erkenntnis) to the effect that the Minister had a duty to decide on the request for recognition within eight weeks and set out the principles which the Minister had to take into account when taking this decision. On 3 June 1997 the applicants submitted further observations and arguments in their favour to the Minister.
26. On 21 July 1997 the Minister dismissed the applicants’ request. It found that the Jehovah’s Witnesses could not be recognised as a religious society under the 1874 Recognition Act because of their unclear internal organisation and their negative attitude towards the State and its institutions. Reference was further made to their refusal to perform military service or any form of alternative service for conscientious objectors, to participate in local community life and elections and to undergo certain types of medical treatment such as blood transfusions.
27. On 3 September 1997 the applicants lodged a complaint against the Minister’s decision with the Constitutional Court.
29. On 11 March 1998 the Constitutional Court quashed the Minister’s decision of 21 July 1997 and referred the case back to the Minister. It noted that the Minister had neither filed submissions nor submitted the case file, with the result that the decision had to be taken on the basis of the complainants’ submissions. The court noted that they had, inter alia, argued that the Minister had taken his decision without a proper investigation, basing it on documents of which the complainants had not been informed and on which they had not been given the opportunity to comment. Since the case file was not available to the Constitutional Court, this allegation could not have been refuted. The Constitutional Court therefore concluded that the Minister’s decision was arbitrary and violated the principle of equality (Gleichheitsgrundsatz).
30. Meanwhile, on 10 January 1998, the Act on the Legal Status of Registered Religious Communities (Bundesgesetz über die Rechtspersönlichkeit von religiösen Bekenntnisgemeinschaften, hereafter referred to as “the 1998 Religious Communities Act”) had entered into force. Thus, the Minister found that he had to deal with the applicants’ request for recognition under the 1874 Recognition Act as a request under section 11(2) of the 1998 Religious Communities Act. On 20 July 1998 the Minister decided that the first applicant had acquired legal personality as a registered religious community within the meaning of the Religious Communities Act as from 11 July 1998. That decision was served on the applicants on 29 July 1998.
34. On 14 March 2001 the Constitutional Court dismissed the complaint. It found that the ten-year waiting period for registered religious communities as a precondition for a successful application for recognition under the 1874 Recognition Act was in conformity with the Federal Constitution and referred to its previous decision of 3 March 2001 (VfSlg. 16.102/2001) on that issue. The decision was served on the applicants’ lawyer on 29 March 2001.
36. On 14 September 2004 the Administrative Court dismissed the applicants’ complaint, finding that it concerned in essence questions of the constitutionality and interpretation of section 11(1) of the 1998 Religious Communities Act, which, in the light of the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 14 March 2001, did not raise a problem in terms of the Federal Constitution. The Federal Minister had therefore correctly applied that provision. The decision was served on the applicants’ lawyer on 25 October 2004.
37. Under Article 14 of the Basic Law, everybody is granted freedom of conscience and belief. The enjoyment of civil and political rights is independent from religious belief ; however, the manifestation of religious belief may not derogate from civic obligations.
44. The legal personality of the Roman Catholic Church is, on the one hand, regarded as historically recognised, and, on the other hand, explicitly recognised in an international treaty, the Concordat between the Holy See and the Republic of Austria (Federal Law Gazette II, No. 2/1934 – Konkordat zwischen dem Heiligen Stuhle und der Republik Österreich, BGBl. II Nr. 2/1934).
45. The following are examples of special laws recognising religious societies :
(a) Act on the External Legal Status of the Israelite Religious Society, Official Gazette of the Austrian Empire, No. 57/1890 (Gesetz über die äußeren Rechtsverhältnisse der Israelitischen Religionsgesellschaft, RGBl. 57/1890) ;
(b) Act of 15 July 1912 on the recognition of followers of Islam [according to the Hanafi rite] as a religious society, Official Gazette of the Austrian Empire No. 159/1912 (Gesetz vom 15. Juli 1912, betreffend die Anerkennung der Anhänger des Islam [nach hanefitischen Ritus] als Religionsgesellschaft, RGBl. Nr. 159/1912) ;
(c) Federal Act on the External Legal Status of the Evangelical Church, Federal Law Gazette No. 182/1961 (Bundesgesetz vom 6. Juli 1961 über die äußeren Rechtsverhältnisse der Evangelischen Kirche, BGBl. Nr. 182/1961) ;
(d) Federal Act on the External Legal Status of the Greek Orthodox Church in Austria, Federal Law Gazette No. 229/1967 (Bundesgesetz über die äußeren Rechtsverhältnisse der Griechisch-Orientalischen Kirche in Österreich, BGBl. Nr. 182/1961) ;
47. The Religious Communities Act entered into force on 10 January 1998. Pursuant to Section 2(3) of the Act, the Federal Minister for Education and Culture has to rule in a formal written decision (Bescheid) on the acquisition of legal personality by the religious community. In the same decision the Minister has to dissolve any association whose purpose was to disseminate the religious teachings of the religious community concerned (section 2(4)). The religious community has the right to call itself a “publicly-registered religious community”.
48. Section 4 specifies the necessary contents of the statutes of the religious community. Among other things, they must specify the community’s name, which must be clearly distinguishable from the name of any existing religious community or society. They must further set out the main principles of the religious community’s faith, the aims and duties deriving from it, the rights and duties of the community’s adherents, including the conditions for terminating membership (it is further specified that no fee for leaving the religious community may be charged), how its bodies are appointed, who represents the religious community externally and how the community’s financial resources are raised. Lastly, the statutes must contain provisions on the liquidation of the religious community, ensuring that the assets acquired are not used for ends contrary to religious purposes.
49. Under section 5, the Federal Minister must refuse to grant legal personality to a religious community if, in view of its teachings or practice, this is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedom of others ; this is in particular the case if its activities involve incitement to commit criminal offences, obstruction of the psychological development of adolescents or undermining of people’s mental integrity, or if the statutes do not comply with section 4.
51. Section 9 specifies the reasons for termination of a community’s legal personality. Legal personality ceases to exist if the religious community dissolves itself or if the acknowledgment of its legal personality is revoked. Reasons for revoking legal personality are set out in subsection (2) : for example, if the reasons for granting legal personality no longer subsist or if for more than one year no bodies representing the religious community externally have been appointed.
54. Section 11(1) of the Religious Communities Act establishes additional criteria for a successful application under the Recognition Act, such as the existence of the religious association for at least twenty years in Austria and for at least ten years as a registered religious community ; a minimum number of two adherents per thousand members of the Austrian population (at the moment, this means about 16,000 persons) ; the use of income and other assets for religious purposes, including charity activities ; a positive attitude towards society and the State ; and no illegal interference as regards the community’s relationship with recognised or other religious societies.
56. The applicants complained that the refusal of the Austrian authorities to grant legal personality to the first applicant by conferring on it the status of a religious society under the Recognition Act violated their right to freedom of religion. They further submitted that the legal personality conferred on the first applicant under the Religious Communities Act was limited and insufficient for the purposes of Article 9 of the Convention. The applicants also relied on Article 11 of the Convention. These provisions read as follows :
57. The applicants submitted that the refusal of the Austrian authorities to grant legal personality to the first applicant by conferring on it the status of a religious society recognised under the Recognition Act violated their right to freedom of religion. In particular, before July 1998, the first applicant could not have been established as a legal entity and, thus, could not have entered into legal relations, concluded contracts or acquired assets. The first applicant had, thus far, no internal autonomy, could not hire the necessary religious ministers and was not entitled to perform its pastoral work for believers in hospitals or prisons. The second to fifth applicants, as leading executives of the first applicant, were also limited in exercising their right to freedom of religion. Neither the Basic Law 1867 nor the 1998 Religious Communities Act provided explicitly for the internal autonomy of a religious community. The Constitutional Court had found (in its judgment of 3 March 2001, B1713/98 – see paragraph 34 above) that registered religious communities, unlike recognised religious societies, did not enjoy the right to comprehensive organisation and administration of their internal affairs without State interference. Lastly, the applicants contested that they would have had the possibility of forming an association under the Associations Act. They referred to the Constitutional Court’s finding of 1929 (VfSlg. 1265/1929), confirming the administrative authorities’ practice not to allow religious societies to form an association, and thus refusing the request of the Jehovah’s Witnesses (Ernste Bibelforscher) to set up an association. Thereafter the Jehovah’s Witnesses had not tried again to form an association, but auxiliary associations (Hilfsvereine) with specialised religious aims had been created. The two examples of associations submitted by the Government were likewise merely auxiliary associations. It was not until the enactment of the 2002 Associations Act that religious societies had been allowed to set up an association.
58. The Government contested that there had been an interference with the applicants’ right to freedom of religion. Since the entry into force of the 1919 Treaty of St Germain, all Austrian inhabitants had been allowed to practise publicly and privately their thought, religion and beliefs, irrespective of whether their religious society, community or church was recognised or had legal status. The right to autonomous administration of the entity’s internal organisation was likewise guaranteed. Referring to a judgment of the Constitutional Court (VfSlg. 10.915/1986), the Government contended that the refusal of recognition did not impede the applicants’ exercise of their right to freedom of religion within the meaning of Article 9 of the Convention. Against this background, they contested that the first applicant had no legal personality in Austria, was legally non-existent and could not acquire assets or enter into legal relations, because these allegations concerned the first applicant’s situation before it had obtained legal personality as a registered religious community on 11 July 1998. Even before the entry into force of the 1998 Religious Communities Act, the first applicant had had the possibility of setting up an association with a religious purpose under the Associations Act, as the Federation of Evangelical Municipalities in Austria (Bund Evangelikaler Gemeinden in Österreich) had on 21 March 1992, and the Church of Scientology in Austria (Scientology Kirche Österreich) on 20 May 1984. However, the applicants did not appear to have made any efforts to that end.
59. The Government maintained that the status conferred on the first applicant as a registered religious community under the 1998 Religious Communities Act complied with the requirements of Article 9 ; it only provided a legal status and in no way restricted the exercise or enjoyment of the right to freedom of religion. In conclusion, there had been no interference with the applicants’ rights under Article 9 of the Convention.
61. The Court reiterates that, as enshrined in Article 9, freedom of thought, conscience and religion is one of the foundations of a “democratic society” within the meaning of the Convention. While religious freedom is primarily a matter of individual conscience, it also implies, inter alia, freedom to “manifest [one’s] religion” alone and in private or in community with others, in public and within the circle of those whose faith one shares. Bearing witness in words and deeds is bound up with the existence of religious convictions (see Kokkinakis v. Greece, judgment of 25 May 1993, Series A no. 260, p. 17, § 31 ; and Buscarini and Others v. San Marino [GC], no. 24645/94, § 34, ECHR 1999-I). Since religious communities traditionally exist in the form of organised structures, Article 9 must be interpreted in the light of Article 11 of the Convention, which safeguards associative life against unjustified State interference. Indeed, the autonomous existence of religious communities is indispensable for pluralism in a democratic society and is, thus, an issue at the very heart of the protection which Article 9 affords (see Hasan and Chaush, cited above, § 62).
62. The Court reiterates further that the ability to establish a legal entity in order to act collectively in a field of mutual interest is one of the most important aspects of freedom of association, without which that right would be deprived of any meaning. The Court has consistently held the view that a refusal by the domestic authorities to grant legal-entity status to an association of individuals amounts to an interference with the applicants’ exercise of their right to freedom of association (see Gorzelik and Others v. Poland [GC], no. 44158/98, § 52 et passim, 17 February 2004, and Sidiropoulos and Others v. Greece, judgment of 10 July 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998‑IV, § 31 et passim). Where the organisation of the religious community was at issue, a refusal to recognise it has also been found to constitute interference with the applicants’ right to freedom of religion under Article 9 of the Convention (see Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and Others v. Moldova, no 45701/99, § 105, ECHR 2001-XII).
63. In addition, one of the means of exercising the right to manifest one’s religion, especially for a religious community, in its collective dimension, is the possibility of ensuring judicial protection of the community, its members and its assets, so that Article 9 must be seen not only in the light of Article 11, but also in the light of Article 6 (see, mutatis mutandis, Sidiropoulos and Others v. Greece, judgment of 10 July 1998, Reports 1998-IV, p. 1614, § 40 ; Canea Catholic Church v. Greece, judgment of 16 December 1997, Reports 1997-VIII, p. 2857, §§ 33 and 40-41 ; and Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and Others, cited above, § 118).
64. The Court must first determine whether there was an interference with the applicants’ right to freedom of religion. In this connection it observes that in 1978 some of the applicants and other persons applied for recognition of the first applicant as a religious society under the 1874 Recognition Act, thereby seeking to have legal personality conferred on the first applicant. After complex proceedings, on 20 July 1998 the first applicant was granted legal personality under the Religious Communities Act, which had been passed in the meantime.
67. The fact that no instances of interference with the community life of the Jehovah’s Witnesses have been reported during this period and that the first applicant’s lack of legal personality may be compensated in part by running auxiliary associations, as stated by the applicants, is not decisive. The Court reiterates in this connection that the existence of a violation is conceivable even in the absence of prejudice or damage ; the question whether an applicant has actually been placed in an unfavourable position is not a matter for Article 34 of the Convention and the issue of damage becomes relevant only in the context of Article 41 (see, among many authorities, Marckx v. Belgium, judgment of 13 June 1979, Series A no. 31, § 27 ; Eckle v. Germany, judgment of 15 July 1982, Series A no. 51, § 66 ; and Wassink v. the Netherlands, judgment of 27 September 1990, Series A no. 185-A, § 38 ; see also The Moscow Branch of the Salvation Army v. Russia, no. 72881/01, § 64-65, ECHR 2006‑... ; Church of Scientology Moscow v. Russia, no. 18147/02, § 72, 5 April 2007).
68. The Court therefore considers that there has been an interference with the applicants’ right to freedom of religion, as guaranteed by Article 9 § 1 of the Convention.
69. In order to determine whether that interference entailed a breach of the Convention, the Court must decide whether it satisfied the requirements of Article 9 § 2, that is, whether it was “prescribed by law”, pursued a legitimate aim for the purposes of that provision and was “necessary in a democratic society”.
71. The Court refers to its established case-law to the effect that the terms “prescribed by law” and “in accordance with the law” in Articles 8 to 11 of the Convention not only require that the impugned measures have some basis in domestic law, but also refer to the quality of the law in question, which must be sufficiently accessible and foreseeable as to its effects, that is, formulated with sufficient precision to enable the individual – if need be with appropriate advice – to regulate his conduct (see The Sunday Times v. the United Kingdom (no. 1), judgment of 26 April 1979, Series A no. 30, p. 31, § 49 ; Larissis and Others v. Greece, judgment of 24 February 1998, Reports 1998-I, p. 378, § 40 ; Hashman and Harrup v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 25594/94, § 31, ECHR 1999-VIII ; and Rotaru v. Romania [GC], no. 28341/95, § 52, ECHR 2000-V).
73. The Court therefore accepts that the interference in question was “prescribed by law”.
83. The applicants submitted that the status of a registered religious community was inferior to that of a religious society, and that this constituted discrimination prohibited by the Convention. They relied on Article 14 read in conjunction with Article 9 and 11 of the Convention. Article 14 of the Convention, in so far as relevant, reads as follows :
84. The applicants submitted that the status of a registered religious community was inferior to that of a religious society and insufficient. They contended that the first applicant was subject to State control in respect of its religious doctrine, its rules on membership and the administration of its assets pursuant to sections 3-5 and 11 of the 1998 Religious Communities Act. They repeated in essence their above complaints. In particular, the applicants disputed the necessity of the ten-year waiting period, as the recognition of the Coptic Orthodox Church by a specific law in 2003 (see paragraph 45(e) above) proved the contrary. The Coptic Orthodox Church had only existed in Austria since 1976 and had been registered as a religious community in 1998. The applicants argued that most of the registered religious communities and even most of the recognised religious societies did not fulfil the criterion for the minimum number of adherents, which showed that this requirement was unnecessary for the observance of public duties, contrary to what the Government maintained. Since the first applicant, which was the fifth largest religious community in Austria and was thus even bigger than most recognised religious societies, also complied with the necessary number of adherents, it should have been recognised a long time ago. Further, the requirement of the use of income and other assets for religious purposes, including charity activities, was discriminatory as it interfered in an unjustified way with the first applicant’s internal administration and organisation, in breach of both Article 9 of the Convention and Article 15 of the Basic Law 1867. The prerequisite of a positive attitude towards society and the State was discriminatory as it was not required in respect of any other natural or legal personality in Austria. Further, it did not meet the “prescribed by law” requirement under Article 9 § 2 of the Convention. The same applied to the criterion of non-interference with other religious societies. Moreover, under Austrian law, recognised religious societies enjoyed privileged treatment in various fields which did not extend to religious communities.
85. The Government contended that there had been no discrimination of the applicants in respect of the first applicant’s status as a registered recognised community, as the criteria introduced by section 11 of the 1998 Religious Communities Act had already corresponded to the administrative authorities’ practice for granting recognition under the 1874 Recognition Act before the entry into force of the 1998 Act. In respect of the ten-year waiting period for registered religious communities, the Government referred to the Constitutional Court’s finding of 3 March 2001 (VfSlg. 12.102/2001) that that requirement served the legitimate aim of ensuring that the competent authority could verify during this period of time whether the religious community was ready to integrate into the existing legal order, in particular whether it performed unlawful activities as a consequence of which legal personality had to be withdrawn (section 9(2) and section 5(1) of the Religious Communities Act). Examples of such unlawful activities were incitement to commit criminal offences, endangering the psychological development of minors, violating the psychological integrity of persons or using psychotherapeutic methods to disseminate its religious beliefs.
86. As regards the requirement of a certain number of adherents, the Government maintained that this criterion was not only important for the religious community’s existence but also for ensuring that certain duties were fulfilled, such as organising and monitoring the teaching of its beliefs in schools. The precondition of the use of income for religious purposes was also provided for under the 1874 Recognition Act (sections 5 and 6) and was thus not new. Since recognised religious societies obtained the status of a legal person under public law, which entailed duties and obligations in the public interest, the requirement of a positive attitude towards society and the State – meaning acceptance of a pluralistic State and the basic principles of the rule of law, which did not preclude the disapproval of particular provisions for reasons of conscience – did not appear discriminatory. Finally, the obligation not to interfere illegally with recognised or other religious societies was not discriminatory either.
87. The Court reiterates that Article 14 complements the other substantive provisions of the Convention and its Protocols. It has no independent existence, since it has effect solely in relation to the “rights and freedoms” safeguarded by those provisions. Although the application of Article 14 does not presuppose a breach of one or more of such provisions, and to this extent it is autonomous, there can be no room for its application unless the facts of the case fall within the ambit of one or more of the latter (see Petrovic v. Austria, judgment of 27 March 1998, Reports 1998-II, p. 585, § 22). Moreover, a difference of treatment is discriminatory if it has no objective and reasonable justification, that is, if it does not pursue a legitimate aim or if there is not a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised (ibid., § 30).
90. The Court would point out at the outset that in proceedings originating in an application lodged under Article 34 of the Convention it has to confine itself, as far as possible, to the examination of the concrete case before it. Its task is not to review domestic law and practice in abstracto and to express a view as to the compatibility of the provisions of legislation with the Convention, but to determine whether the manner in which they were applied to or affected the applicant gave rise to a violation of the Convention (see Eriksson v. Sweden, judgment of 22 June 1989, Series A no. 156, p. 23, § 54 ; Findlay v. United Kingdom, judgment of 25 February 1997, Reports 1997-I, p. 279, § 67 ; and Fédération Chrétienne des Témoins de Jéhovah de France v. France (dec.), no. 53430/99, ECHR 2001-XI). Accordingly, by the term “victim”, Article 34 of the Convention means the person directly affected by the act or omission which is in issue. Article 34 of the Convention may not be used to found an action in the nature of an actio popularis. It may only exceptionally entitle individuals to contend that a law violates their rights by itself, in the absence of an individual measure of implementation, if they run the risk of being directly affected by it (see Open Door and Dublin Well Woman v. Ireland, judgment of 29 October 1992, Series A no. 246, p. 22, § 44 ; Norris v. Ireland, judgment of 26 October 1988, Series A no. 142, pp. 15-16, §§ 30-32 ; and S.L. v. Austria (dec.), no. 45330/99, 22 November 2001).
91. The applicants further complained of the discriminatory nature of section 11 of the 1998 Religious Communities Act. This provision amended the Recognition Act in that it introduced further requirements for recognition as a religious society. In particular, it requires the existence of the religious association for at least twenty years in Austria and for at least ten years as a registered religious community ; a minimum number of two adherents per thousand members of the Austrian population (at the moment, this means about 16,000 persons) ; the use of income and other assets for religious purposes, including charity activities ; a positive attitude towards society and the State ; and no illegal interference as regards the association’s relationship with recognised or other religious societies.
96. The Court reiterates that Article 14 does not prohibit a member State from treating groups differently in order to correct “factual inequalities” between them ; indeed in certain circumstances a failure to attempt to correct inequality through different treatment may in itself give rise to a breach of that Article (see “Case relating to certain aspects of the laws on the use of languages in education in Belgium” (merits), judgment of 23 July 1968, Series A no. 6, § 10, and Thlimmenos v. Greece [GC], no. 34369/97, § 44, ECHR 2000-IV). A difference of treatment is, however, discriminatory if it has no objective and reasonable justification ; in other words, if it does not pursue a legitimate aim or if there is not a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised. The Contracting State enjoys a margin of appreciation in assessing whether and to what extent differences in otherwise similar situations justify a different treatment (see Van Raalte v. the Netherlands, judgment of 21 February 1997, Reports 1997-I, § 39).
101. Article 6, as far as relevant, provides as follows :
103. As regards the length of the proceedings, they contested that the Austrian authorities had not been responsible for the delay. In particular, in their observations of 19 December 2003, the applicants submitted that they had requested recognition as far back as September 1978. As the Minister had failed to give a decision, the Ombudsman’s Office, further to a complaint by the applicants, issued a notice on 5 February 1981 finding that the inactivity of the Minister constituted an undesirable state of affairs in public administration (Missstand im Bereich der öffentlichen Verwaltung). The applicants pointed out that the Constitutional Court had already found in 1988 (VfSlg. 11.931/1988) that the Ministry was obliged to decide on a request for recognition. The lapse of time of nine years between their first request for recognition in 1978 and the one they submitted in 1987 had already been in breach of the reasonable-time requirement under Article 6 of the Convention. In 1992 the Constitutional Court had again decided that the applicants had a right to obtain a decision and even their complaint about the authority’s inactivity had not resulted in a decision. Only in December 1995 had the Administrative Court followed the Constitutional Court’s opinion and requested the Minister to give a decision and to submit the case file, but the Minister had failed to comply. It was not until the Administrative Court’s decision of 28 April 1997 that the Minister had been obliged to take a decision on the request for recognition. The Minister’s inactivity between 1992 and 1997, despite numerous requests to give a decision – even, eventually, by both the highest courts – could not be considered to have been unattributable to the administrative authorities as the Government contended. The Administrative Court and the Constitutional Court had likewise not decided speedily. Moreover, the proceedings were not complex ; they only involved one issue, namely the availability of a legal remedy as provided for by Article 13 of the Convention. In addition, the determination of the requirements for recognition was not complicated and did not justify delaying a decision from 1978 until 2008, which would be the first possible date for recognition after the entry into force of the 1998 Religious Communities Act. In conclusion, all the delays were exclusively attributable to the Austrian authorities.
104. The Government contested that Article 6 was applicable to the case, arguing that the subject-matter of the proceedings was the applicants’ request to obtain legal personality and the ensuing status of a public-law corporation under the 1874 Recognition Act. However, irrespective of the fact that the applicants had had the possibility of obtaining legal status as an association, as well as the fact that the first applicant had been granted legal status under the 1998 Religious Communities Act with effect from 11 July 1998, the Government found that it was not discernable to what extent a decision in recognition proceedings determined “civil rights and obligations”, within the meaning of Article 6, since recognition also entailed the assumption of public duties on the part of a religious community. Referring to the cases of Canea Catholic Church (cited above, §§ 41-42) and Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and Others (cited above, §§ 141-142), the Government submitted that the question of non-recognition or recognition under the 1874 Recognition Act did not have any bearing on the first applicant’s assets either.
105. Assuming that Article 6 was applicable, the Government argued that the duration of the proceedings was reasonable and resulted from the complexity of the case. Such complexity could be inferred from the difficulties in implementing a law dating back to 1874 and from the process of finding a solution to the diverging legal opinions of the Constitutional Court, on the one hand, and the Administrative Court, on the other, on the question whether or not the first applicant had a right to obtain an individual decision if the requirements for recognition under the 1874 Recognition Act were not met. It was only from 28 April 1997, when the Administrative Court had departed from its previous case-law and adopted the Constitutional Court’s view that the first applicant had a right to obtain a decision, that this legal conflict had been resolved. As regards the conduct of the administrative authorities and courts, the Government submitted that no delays had occurred ; in particular, the Administrative Court and the Constitutional Court had taken their decisions as quickly as possible.
106. The Court reiterates that the applicability of Article 6 depends on whether there was a dispute over (civil) « rights and obligations » which can be said, at least on arguable grounds, to be recognised under domestic law, and, if so, whether this « right » was of a « civil » character within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 (see Oerlemans v. the Netherlands, judgment of 27 November 1991, Series A no. 219, pp. 20-21, §§ 45-49).
115. The Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and with reference to the following criteria : the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicants and the relevant authorities (see, among other authorities, Pélissier and Sassi v. France [GC], no. 25444/94, § 67, ECHR 1999-II).
Article 13 reads as follows :
119. The applicants argued that for more than 110 years both the highest courts in Austria had been of the opinion that there was no remedy against an administrative authority’s failure to decide on a request for recognition. Only in 1988 had the Constitutional Court held for the first time that the right to recognition was legally enforceable, a position which the Administrative Court had eventually acknowledged in 1997. With the entry into force of the 1998 Registered Religious Communities Act, the right to recognition had again been suspended. Thus, throughout a period of 130 years after the enactment of the 1874 Recognition Act there had been no enforceable remedy available for recognition.
120. The Government submitted that the applicants’ right under Article 13 of the Convention had not been violated. Though the present proceedings were of some complexity, they showed that the Federal Constitution provided for remedies for legal protection, of which the applicants had made use.
121. The Court reiterates that Article 13 of the Convention guarantees the availability at national level of a remedy to enforce the substance of the Convention rights and freedoms in whatever form they may happen to be secured in the domestic legal order. The effect of Article 13 is thus to require the provision of a domestic remedy to deal with the substance of an “arguable complaint” under the Convention and to grant appropriate relief (see, among many other authorities, Kudła v. Poland [GC], no. 30210/96, § 157, ECHR 2000-XI).
122. The scope of the Contracting States’ obligations under Article 13 varies depending on the nature of the applicant’s complaint ; however, the remedy required by Article 13 must be “effective” in practice as well as in law (see, for example, İlhan v. Turkey [GC], no. 22277/93, § 97, ECHR 2000-VII). The term “effective” is also considered to mean that the remedy must be adequate and accessible (see Paulino Tomás v. Portugal (dec.), no. 58698/00, ECHR 2003-VIII).
124. Article 41 of the Convention provides :
125. The applicants submitted that they were entitled to compensation for non-pecuniary damage because of the breaches of the Convention that had occurred. They had suffered serious damage to their reputation because of the failure to recognise the first applicant as a religious community on an equal footing with other religious communities and societies in Austria and because of its treatment as a dangerous sect by the Austrian authorities in the past. Furthermore, the particularly long period during which its recognition as a religious society had been refused should be taken into account. They left it to the Court to determine the amount to award in damages but pointed to previous and comparable cases, such as Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and Others (cited above, § 146), in which the Court had granted 20,000 euros (EUR) for non-pecuniary damage (no. 45701/99, § 146, ECHR 2001‑XII).
127. The Government disputed the applicants’ claims. As to the claim for non-pecuniary damage, they submitted that in any case the finding of a violation would constitute sufficient redress. Further, the sum implicitly claimed was excessive because the case of Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and Others was not comparable to the present one. In the former case the applicant community had not been granted legal personality at all, whereas in the present case the first applicant had been recognised as a religious community in the course of the proceedings.
128. As to pecuniary damage the Government submitted that the claim submitted by the applicants under this head was likewise excessive and unjustified. The Government submitted in particular that the associations which had been founded in order to support and facilitate the first applicant’s religious activities and which had been subject to liability for inheritance and gift tax and real-property tax could have applied for tax privileges on the ground that they pursued non-profitable or charitable purposes. According to the 2001 Guidelines for Associations (Vereins-richtlinien 2001), issued by the Federal Ministry for Finance, associations such as the ones mentioned by the applicants were eligible for tax privileges.
130. Since there must be a causal link between the violation found and the damage alleged in order for an award to be made for pecuniary damage, the Court considers that such a causal link would only exist if, in the absence of one of the violations found, the applicants would have been entitled to the tax privilege on the lack of which they based their claim. The Court has found a breach of Article 14 read in conjunction with Article 9 in that the Austrian authorities, in rejecting the applicants’ request of 22 July 1998 for recognition of the first applicant as a religious society, relied on a ground which was discriminatory. As there are various other requirements under the relevant law for recognition as a religious society and the first applicant would not have been automatically entitled to such recognition had the Austrian authorities not relied on that ground, the Court cannot speculate as to the outcome of such proceedings (see, mutatis mutandis, Société Colas Est and Others v. France, no. 37971/97, § 54, ECHR 2002‑III). Consequently, it makes no award under this head
131. The applicants claimed EUR 77,091.22 for costs incurred in the domestic proceedings and EUR 68,702.53 for costs incurred in the proceedings before the Court. The latter amount included the sum of EUR 5,226 for assistance by Mr Daniel, a United Kingdom barrister, to the applicant’s principal lawyer, Mr Kohlhofer, in advising him on the Court’s case-law under Article 41 of the Convention. These sums included value-added tax (VAT).
132. In the Government’s submission, the applicants’ claims for costs were excessive. As regards the domestic proceedings, the applicants were only entitled to reimbursement of costs incurred for those steps taken in the course of the proceedings which had served to prevent the violation of the Convention found. Thus, only the procedural steps taken after the decision of the Federal Minister of Education and Cultural Affairs of 21 July 1997 could be taken into account. Moreover, the costs should have been calculated on the basis of the Autonomous Remuneration Guidelines and not the Lawyers’ Remuneration Act, which would have resulted in a smaller amount. The number of joined parties for which costs were claimed was also questionable. As to the claim for reimbursement of expenses incurred for a further lawyer assisting Mr Kohlhofer, the Government could not see why there was any need for assistance in formulating claims under Article 41 of the Convention.
1. Holds by six votes to one that there has been a violation of Article 9 of the Convention ;
2. Holds by six votes to one that there has been a violation of Article 14 of the Convention read in conjunction with Article 9 ;
3. Holds unanimously that there has been a violation of Article 6 of the Convention ;
4. Holds unanimously that there has been no violation of Article 13 of the Convention ;
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicants, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 10,000 (ten thousand euros) in respect of non-pecuniary damage and EUR 42,000 (forty-two thousand euros) in respect of costs and expenses, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicants ;
6. Dismisses unanimously the remainder of the applicants’ claim for just satisfaction.

References: § 31
 § 34
 § 62
 § 52
 § 31
 § 105
 § 40
 § 118
 § 27
 § 66
 § 38
 § 64
 § 72
 § 1
 § 2
 § 49
 § 40
 § 31
 § 52
 § 2
 § 22
 § 30
 § 54
 § 67
 § 44
 § 10
 § 44
 § 39
 § 1
 § 67
 § 157
 § 97
 § 146
 § 146
 § 54
 § 2