Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/97503/board-county-comm-rs-vs-seber
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 08:41:58+00:00

Document:
1. Lands theretofore purchased with restricted funds derived from an oil and gas lease of restricted allotted lands of a Creek Indian held, under the Act of June 20, 1936, immune from tax by Oklahoma for the year 1937 where, on the assessment date, the Indian owned a life estate in such lands subject to restrictions against alienation except with the approval of the Secretary of the Interior. P. 318 U. S. 709 .
(a) The tax immunity granted by the Act of June 20, 1936, was not limited to lands purchased for landless Indians. P. 318 U. S. 710 .
(b) An Indian has "title" within the meaning of the Act if his interest in the property is such that, but for the Act, he would be subjected to the tax. P. 318 U. S. 711 .
to valid restrictions against alienation except with the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, held, under the Act of My 19, 1937, immune from tax by Oklahoma where, prior to the assessment date, the lands have been properly designated by such grantees as homestead lands. P. 318 U. S. 712 .
(a) The tax immunity granted by the Act of May 19, 1937, does not extend only to land purchased for landless Indians. P. 318 U. S. 712 .
(b) The tax exemption granted by the 1937 Act is not personal to the Indian whose restricted funds were used to purchase the land; nor does it extend to the land in the hands of the Creek Indian grantees only until 1956. P. 318 U. S. 712 .
(c) It is immaterial that the Creek Indian grantees in this case are citizen of the United States. P. 318 U. S. 718 .
3. The Act of June 20, 1936, and the Act of May 19, 1937, as here applied, are constitutional. P. 318 U. S. 715 .
4. The grant of citizenship is not inconsistent with the status of Indians as wards whose property is subject to the plenary control of the federal government. P. 318 U. S. 718 .
5. Creek Indians of the half blood or more, though they be unenrolled, are tribal Indians subject to federal control. P. 318 U. S. 718 .
This petition for certiorari presents the questions whether certain lands held by respondent Indians, subject to restrictions against alienation and encumbrance without the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, were exempt from Oklahoma real estate taxes for the year 1937 by virtue of the Act of June 20, 1936, 49 Stat. 1542; [ Footnote 1 ] whether a portion of those lands were exempt for subsequent years by virtue of the Act of 1936 as amended by the Act of May 19, 1937, 50 Stat. 188; [ Footnote 2 ] and whether the Acts of 1936 and 1937, so applied, are constitutional.
land. She was given title subject to a condition against alienation or encumbrance without approval of the Secretary prior to April 26, 1931. [ Footnote 3 ] Before that date, with the approval of the Secretary, she reserved a life estate and conveyed the fee to her children, full-blood but unenrolled Creeks and respondents here, subject to a like condition against alienation or encumbrance without the approval of the Secretary with the exception that the restriction had no definite time limitation. On December 10, 1937, Wosey John Deere conveyed her life estate to respondents so that they became full owners subject to a restriction against alienation or encumbrance without the approval of the Secretary. Both conveyances were in consideration of love and affection. Thereafter, on December 16, 1937, respondents designated the two rural tracts, totaling eighty-seven and one-half acres, as a tax exempt homestead under the provisions of the Act of May 19, 1937, and the Secretary approved this designation on March 24, 1938.
governing the tax status of restricted allotted lands of the Creeks. [ Footnote 13 ] The Act does not say, however, and there is not a word to suggest that, upon transfer of the lands to Indian heirs or grantees, subject to restrictions, the exemption is either to terminate or else extend only until 1956. If Congress had intended either result, it could easily have expressed those purposes. It did neither, but provided instead that the lands, while restricted, were to remain nontaxable until it directed otherwise. In the absence of explicit Congressional direction, we do not think we should hold the exemption personal or attempt to derive an applicable principle from the complicated and admittedly ambiguous statutes governing the tax status of restricted allotted Creek lands. Respondents received the land, which they have designated as a homestead, subject to restrictions of indefinite duration which the Secretary of the Interior had authority to impose. [ Footnote 14 ] It seems only fair, as the clear words of the 1937 Act provide, that the tax exemption should follow the restrictions and continue so long as they do, unless Congress meanwhile provides to the contrary. Even if the 1937 Act were ambiguous, we think this interpretation should be taken. Cf. United States v. Reily, 290 U. S. 33 , 290 U. S. 39 .
but a personal exemption or else allows the exemption only until 1956. While the question need not be decided, it is appropriate to notice that the purpose of the 1936 Act makes it at least doubtful whether that Act afforded only a personal exemption. Assuming, however, that it did, there is nothing to indicate that the 1937 Act, contrary to its terms, incorporated the same limitation. The applicable committee report sheds no light one way or another. [ Footnote 16 ] There is no inconsistency between the object of the 1937 Act to limit the sweeping exemption of all lands, granted by the 1936 Act, to homestead lands, and a purpose to enlarge the exemption accorded to the relatively small amount of homestead lands so that it would apply to restricted homesteads passing to Indian heirs or grantees. The fact that extensive changes in language were made in the 1937 Act is persuasive, moreover, that a change in sense from the presumed personal exemption of the 1936 Act was intended. If the only object of the 1937 Act was to limit the application of the 1936 Act (with its assumed personal exemption) to homesteads, that purpose could have been accomplished simply by substituting the word "homesteads" for the word "lands." We cannot accept the view that the substantial changes in language were only matters of style. Furthermore, it has not been suggested that respondents, as takers from the original purchaser, were incompetent to designate the lands as a homestead under the 1937 Act. If they could do that, as we and apparently the Secretary of the Interior think they could, [ Footnote 17 ] it would seem to follow that, having properly designated their homestead under the Act, they are entitled to the tax exemption afforded restricted homesteads by the Act until Congress otherwise directs.
Shaw v. Gibson-Zahniser Oil Corp., 276 U. S. 575 , 276 U. S. 580 -581.
Indians subject to federal control. [ Footnote 25 ] Respondents fall in this class.
In Sunderland v. United States, 266 U. S. 226 , it was held that the Secretary of the Interior had power to impose such a restriction against alienation or encumbrance with respect to lands purchased for Indians of the Five Civilized Tribes (of which the Creeks are one) with the proceeds from sales of their restricted allotted lands. We think it clear that he also has authority to impose such restrictions upon lands purchased with restricted funds from leases of restricted allotted lands ( see Shaw v. Gibson-Zahniser Oil Corp., 276 U. S. 575 , and United States v. Brown, 8 F.2d 564, at 568), and to make those restrictions run with the lands in the hands of Indian grantees. Cf. Drummond v. United States, 34 F.2d 755, 758, 759; United States v. Goldfeder, 112 F.2d 615.
See Shaw v. Oil Corp., 276 U. S. 575 .
See United States v. Kagama, supra; Choctaw Nation v. United States, 119 U. S. 1 , 119 U. S. 27 ; Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 174 U. S. 445 , 174 U. S. 486 ; Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U. S. 553 , 187 U. S. 566 -568; Tiger v. Western Investment Co., 221 U. S. 286 , 221 U. S. 310 -317; United States v. Sandoval, 231 U. S. 28 , 231 U. S. 45 -47; Brader v. James, 246 U. S. 88 , 246 U. S. 96 ; Sunderland v. United States, 266 U. S. 226 , 266 U. S. 233 -234; United States v. Ramsey, 271 U. S. 467 , 271 U. S. 469 -471; United States v. McGowan, 302 U. S. 535 , 302 U. S. 538 -539; Board of Comm'rs v. United States, 308 U. S. 343 , 308 U. S. 349 .
The land involved in the Rickert case was a trust allotment, rather than a restricted fee. The power of Congress over both types of allotments, however, is the same. See United States v. Ramsey, 271 U. S. 467 , 271 U. S. 471 .
There is no need to go back of 1928 except to say that, for our purposes, the effect of prior legislation was that grantees of original allottees were not within the existing tax exemptions, [ Footnote 2/3 ] which were, for the most part, to expire at the latest in 1931. [ Footnote 2/4 ] In some instances, restrictions extended to lands held by heirs of allottees, but for the limited period. [ Footnote 2/5 ] In 1928, Congress extended existing restrictions on some lands -- both allotted and inherited -- to 1956, but at the same time removed existing restrictions on others. 45 Stat. 495. The existing tax exemption was cut down in scope to one hundred sixty acres of each Indian's holding, but was also extended more clearly to cover the land in the hands of "any full blood Indian heir or devisee," though not beyond 1956. 45 Stat. 495, as amended by 45 Stat. 733, 734.
of Wosey John Deere's grantees may be doubted. [ Footnote 2/7 ] But, whether or not the statute applies specifically to this case, it shows the latest phase of Congressional policy, prior to 1936, as to the kind of exemption given to members of the Creek Nation and the persons entitled to its benefit.

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