Source: http://halakhah.com/kethuboth/kethuboth_34.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 05:40:54+00:00

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R. Simeon, who says: An unfit slaughtering is not called1 slaughtering. This might be right with regard to [the slaughtering for] idolatry and [the slaughtering of] the ox that is to be stoned, but the slaughtering on Sabbath is a fit slaughtering, for we learnt: If someone has slaughtered [an animal] on Sabbath or the Day of Atonement, although he is guilty of [a transgression for which he forfeits] his life,2 his slaughtering is a fit one?3 — He holds the opinion of R. Johanan ha-Sandalar,4 for it has been taught: If someone has cooked on Sabbath, [if] by mistake, he may eat it, [and if] wilfully he may not eat it: This is the view of R. Meir. R. Judah says: [If] by mistake, he may eat it after the outgoing5 of the Sabbath, [if] wilfully, he may never eat it. R. Johanan hasandalar says: [If] wilfully, others may eat it after the outgoing of the Sabbath, but not he, [if] wilfully, neither he nor others may eat it.6 What is the reason of R. Johanan ha-Sandalar? As R. Hiyya expounded at the entrance of the house of the Prince:7 [It is written:] 'Ye shall keep the Sabbath therefore, for it is holy unto you'.8 [From this we derive:] As what is holy is forbidden to be eaten, so what has been prepared9 on the Sabbath is forbidden to be eaten. If [so, you might say that] as what is holy is forbidden to be enjoyed,10 so what has been prepared on the Sabbath should be forbidden to be enjoyed? — It says 'unto you'; from this we learn: It shall belong to you.11 You might think [that it is forbidden to eat] even [what has been prepared on the Sabbath] by mistake,12 [therefore] it is said: every one that profaneth it shall surely be put to death.13 [This teaches that only] when [the act was done] wilfully,14 have I told thee [that it is forbidden as that which is holy] but not [if it was done] by mistake.
Lit., 'its name is not'. An act of slaughter that does not for any reason whatsoever effect the ritual fitness of the animal to be eaten is not considered by them in the eye of the law a slaughter.
According to R. Johanan ha-Sandalar what has been cooked on Sabbath wilfully must not be eaten by any few. The same would apply to what has been slaughtered wilfully on Sabbath. Thus one can say that the slaughtering on Sabbath is an unfit slaughtering.
I. e., to have any use or benefit from it.
Although one may not eat it, one may have other uses or benefits from it, e.g., one may sell it to one who is not a Jew and is therefore not bound by these laws.
If he did not know it was Sabbath (Rashi).
For which the death penalty is inflicted.
I. e., the Sabbath itself.
The prohibition is therefore only Rabbinical.
Who stole an animal and slaughtered it on Sabbath.
From paying four- or fivefold. Since the animal is, according to Biblical law, fit for food, it should be considered a fit slaughter.
Lit., the rest', i.e., the other two cases mentioned: the serving of idols and the ox condemned to death.
The throat of the animal.
For any use as an animal slaughtered for idol worship v. Hul. 40a.
Cutting the throat of the animal until the slaughtering of the animal is complete to make it fit for food.
It has already become forbidden to the owner for any use and has thus ceased to be in his possession. He should therefore be free from paying four- or fivefold.
The idol. The idolatrous act is to take place when the slaughtering has been completed. Consequently he was slaughtering what was the owner's.
The owner's. An ox that is to be stoned for goring a person is forbidden for any use. It is therefore regarded as not belonging any more to the owner. And he should therefore be free from paying four- or fivefold.
By killing a person. Cf. Ex. XXI, 28.
I. e., while in the possession of the keeper.
Although the condemned animal has no value, the liability of the keeper, who has to return the animal to its owner, is discharged by the keeper returning the animal to its owner.
Since the thief stole the condemned animal the keeper cannot return it to the owner and he has to pay to the owner the value of the animal as it was when he entrusted it to him. The ox that is to be stoned has therefore a money.value for the keeper. The thief must therefore pay the four- or fivefold. For fuller notes on the whole passage beginning from 'Resh Lakish said' etc., 33b, v. B.K. (Sonc. ed.) pp. 407-410.
and R. Meir holds the view that [though generally] one may receive the lashes and pay, one cannot receive the death penalty and pay1 but these [cases]2 are different, because the Torah has enacted something novel in [the matter of] fine,3 and [therefore]4 he has to pay, although he has to suffer the death penalty.5 And Rabbah follows his own principle, for Rabba said: If he had a kid which he had stolen and he slaughtered it on Sabbath, he is bound,6 for he was already guilty of stealing before he came to the profanation7 of the Sabbath; [but] if he stole and slaughtered it on Sabbath he is free,8 for if there is no stealing9 there is no slaughtering and no selling.
Rabbah said further: If he had a kid which he had stolen and had slaughtered it at the place he broke into,10 he is bound,11 for he was already guilty of stealing before he came to the transgression of breaking in;12 [but] if he stole and slaughtered it in the place he broke into,13 he is free, for if there is no stealing, there is no slaughtering and no selling. And it was necessary [to state both cases]. For if he had let us hear [the case of the] Sabbath [I would have said that he is free from payment] because its prohibition is a perpetual prohibition,14 but [in the case of] breaking in, which is only a prohibition for the moment,15 I might say, [that it is] not [so].16 And if he had let us hear [the case of] breaking in [I would say that he is free from payment] because his breaking in is his warning,17 but [with regard to the] Sabbath, [in] which [case] a warning is required, I might say that [it is] not [so].18 [Therefore] it is necessary [to state both cases].
And they48 follow their own principles,49 for when R. Dimi came [from Palestine] he said: He who has committed inadvertently an act which, if he had committed it wilfully, would have been punishable with death or with lashes, and [which is also punishable] with something else,50 R. Johanan says [that] he is bound,51 and Resh Lakish says [that] he is free.52 R. Johanan says [that] he is bound, for they did not warn him.53 Resh Lakish says [that] he is free,54 for since he is free if they warned him, so he is free also when they did not warn him.
In the case of the slaughtering of the stolen animal, supra 33b.
A fine of four or five times the value of the animal is in itself a novel law.
In view of the novel law in these cases.
The crime of stealing is, as it were, wiped out by the more serious transgression of profaning the Sabbath. There is, therefore, no payment of principal. And since there is no payment of the principal, there is also no payment of the fine for the slaughtering and selling.
[H] means here both: the place he broke into and the time of breaking into the place. This breaking in took place after the stealing of the kid, which was a separate act. Cf. Ex. XXII, 2.
In which case he may forfeit his life, v. Ex. XXII, 2.
Here the stealing and breaking in are one act.
I. e., if he has profaned the Sabbath and incurred the death penalty, this penalty can always be inflicted.
The thief's life is forfeit only when he is 'found breaking in'. If he is found later his life is not forfeited, v. Ex. XXII, 2.
I. e., that he is not free from payment.
I. e., he may be killed without a warning.
From paying the fine. For the stealing and the Sabbath desecration by means of the slaughtering were committed simultaneously.
Lit., 'come to let us hear'.
Which Rabbah applies to the kid.
I. e., before he desecrated the Sabbath. And therefore he should have to pay the fine when he slaughters it on Sabbath.
That the stealing coincides with the slaughtering, and he is therefore free from payment if he slaughters the borrowed cow on Sabbath.
I. e., to his children.
I. e., a cow which the father had borrowed.
Lit., 'all the days of the borrowing'.
Lit., 'for its accident'. The children are not responsible because they did not borrow it.
Which is generally estimated to be two-thirds of the ordinary price, cf. B.B. 146b.
[H], i.e., property which is a security for the payments which would have to be made. He left them (landed) property and with it the obligation which rests upon such property. The chief point in the phrase is the obligation for which such property is a security, and which was passed on to the children.
I.e., they are not responsible for the accident only if their father did not leave them an obligation of property.
When they slaughtered and ate it.
Who says that the obligation is incurred when the accident happens. According to the opposing view, the father left them the obligation, which therefore was incurred at the time of borrowing.
Where the father left them landed property, they are made to pay the full value of the meat since they ought to have been more careful.
Lit., 'and this is the view of R. Papa'. The obligation is incurred with the accident, and at the time of the accident there was no borrower, since the person that borrowed the cow was dead.
Who explains the Mishnah as dealing with a case where there was no warning. v. supra 32b.
Who explains the Mishnah as representing the view of R. Meir, v. supra 33b.
Since the offence carries with it the penalty of lashes, there is no money payment even where lashes are not inflicted.
I.e., the payment of money.
To make the money payment.
From making the money payment.
And so there is no death penalty, and therefore he pays.

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