Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/204/426/
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 00:38:29+00:00

Document:
Justia › US Law › US Case Law › US Supreme Court › Volume 204 › Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co.
When the Act to Regulate Commerce was enacted, there was contrariety of opinion whether, when a rate charged by a carrier was in and of itself reasonable, the person from whom such a charge was exacted had at common law an action against the carrier because of damage asserted to have been suffered by a discrimination against such person or a preference given by the carrier to another. Parsons v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry., 167 U. S. 447, 167 U. S. 455; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 145 U. S. 263, 145 U. S. 275. That the Act to Regulate Commerce was intended to afford an effective means for redressing the wrongs resulting from unjust discrimination and undue preference is undoubted. Indeed, it is not open to controversy that to provide for these subjects was among the principal purposes of the act. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas Pacific Ry. Co., 167 U. S. 479, 167 U. S. 494. And it is apparent that the means by which these great purposes were to be accomplished was the placing upon all carriers the positive duty to establish schedules of reasonable rates which should have a uniform application to all, and which should not be departed from so long as the established schedule remained unaltered in the manner provided by law. Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas Pacific Ry. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 162 U. S. 184, 167 U. S. 167 U.S. 479.
In Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Mugg, 202 U. S. 242, the facts were as follows: on an interstate shipment, a given rate, less than the lawful schedule rate, was quoted to the shipper by the agent of the railroad at the point of shipment. On the arrival of the goods at their destination, the road exacted the schedule rate, whilst the shipper insisted he was entitled to the lower and quoted rate. And a recovery of the excess collected over the quoted rate was allowed by a court of the State of Texas. Reversing the judgment, it was here held that the rate fixed in the schedule filed pursuant to the Act to Regulate Commerce was controlling, that it was beyond the power of the carrier to depart from such rates in favor of any shipper, and that the erroneous quotation of rates made by the agent of the railroad did not justify recovery, since to do so would be, in effect, enabling the shipper, whose duty it was to ascertain the published rate, to secure a preference over other shippers, contrary to the Act to Regulate Commerce.

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.