Source: http://dentisty.org/certified-for-publication.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 02:43:21+00:00

Document:
Defendant California Dental Association (CDA) appeals from the denial of its motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16,1 commonly known as the anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation) statute, to strike two virtually identical complaints brought against it by several individuals and nonprofit organizations. The complaints allege four causes of action under California’s unfair competition law, Business and Professions Code section 17200 et seq. (UCL), each predicated on a different legal theory, challenging an alleged “course of conduct and a business practice spanning over many decades in order to assure that patients do not receive accurate information regarding mercury amalgam fillings.”2 The trial court denied the motion, finding that although the actions arise out of CDA’s acts in furtherance of its right of free speech or right of petition, plaintiffs made a prima facie showing that they were likely to prevail in the action. For the reasons explained below, we conclude that the motion should have been granted.
More specifically, the complaints allege deceptive conduct “in at least seven distinct categories,” namely: falsely representing that amalgam is silver in brochures distributed to the public, hiding the existence of mercury in dental fillings from the public by telling dentists to avoid using the word “mercury” in their disclosures to patients, hiding the ADA’s economic stake in amalgam sales by failing to disclose the revenues ADA receives from manufacturers for issuing its “Seal of Acceptance” for amalgam products, hiding the controversy about the health effects of mercury, “gag[ging] dentists who believe amalgam is dangerous” “through the guise of so-called ‘ethical’ rules” which prevent dentists “from informing patients of the dangers of mercury by pronouncing as ‘unethical’ the practice of even suggesting the removal of amalgam due to their toxicity,” hiding the dangerous environmental impact of amalgam from the public by using a “powerful lobbying presence” to secure administrative orders freeing dentists from accountability for the environmental impact of amalgam, and creating a third-party reimbursement program (Delta Dental Plans) which favors the use of amalgam. While many of these allegations relate primarily if not exclusively to ADA, which did not join in the anti-SLAPP motion and is not a party to the appeal, CDA is alleged to be directly responsible for the public distribution of false information concerning amalgam and for the enforcement of the rule of ethics that plaintiffs challenge.
The fourth cause of action bases the asserted UCL violation upon the allegation that all of the practices described in the complaints violate the public policy expressed in the Health and Safety Code “that the public should be informed about exposures to chemicals that cause cancer, birth defects, or other reproductive harm . . . and that such exposures must be eliminated wherever and whenever possible.”5 Finally, the fifth cause of action alleges that defendants’ “representations through their correspondence, brochures, literature, their so-called ‘ethical’ rules, and actions, both express and implied, that amalgam is safe for use and that there is no health concern related thereto” are false and that such public deception constitutes an unfair and deceptive practice within the meaning of the UCL.
Within the time limits prescribed by section 425.16, subdivision (f), CDA moved to strike the consolidated complaints under the anti-SLAPP statute. CDA argued that it is a nonprofit professional organization that has no financial interest in the manufacture or sale of dental amalgam, and that it was being sued solely for disseminating information “to the public and to dentists regarding an important public health issue within its area of expertise — the safety of dental amalgam.” Based in part upon studies conducted by the Dental Board of California and the United States Department of Health and Human Services, its position as reflected in the literature it distributed “is that no valid scientific evidence exists that dental amalgam poses any health risks -- other than rare, localized allergic reactions. Thus no medical reason exists for dental patients to spend thousands of dollars to have functional dental amalgam removed or to avoid having the material placed in their mouths as part of normal dental treatment.” CDA argued that the complaints should be stricken because they arise from the exercise of its constitutional right of free speech in connection with an issue of public interest. Further, it argued that plaintiffs could not satisfy their burden of demonstrating a probability they would prevail because all of CDA’s communications were privileged under Civil Code section 47, subdivision (c) and because its conduct in distributing literature concerning dental amalgam “constitutes classic, non-commercial free speech, and cannot in any way be characterized as a ‘business act or practice’” within the meaning of Business and Professions Code section 17200.
In denying the motion to strike, the trial court found “that Plaintiffs’ lawsuits arise out of Defendant’s acts in furtherance of its right of free speech or right of petition. However, . . . Plaintiffs have made a prima facie case relating to amalgam’s safety, and have established that there is a probability that Plaintiffs will prevail on their claim . . . . See Church of Scientology of Calif. vs. Wollersheim, 42 Cal.App.4th 628, 654 (1996).” CDA has timely appealed from the denial, as it is entitled to do under section 425.16, subdivision (j).
1.What is the Standard for Determining Whether a Cause of Action Alleging Both Protected and Nonprotected Activity is “Based on” Conduct in Furtherance of Protected Rights?
CDA unquestionably is correct that in opposing the special motion to strike in the trial court and on appeal, plaintiffs have mischaracterized their own pleadings. Plaintiffs argue that none of their causes of action challenge CDA’s public advocacy of the safety of dental amalgam. This may be true of the second and third causes of action, which focus on CDA’s enforcement of the advisory opinion. The fourth and fifth causes of action, however, challenge the lawfulness not only of this ethical proscription, but also of CDA’s distribution of brochures and other public statements which plaintiffs claim deceive the public concerning the health effects of dental amalgam.
While plaintiffs’ allegations concerning the enforcement of the advisory opinion are woven into the fourth and fifth causes of action, as pleaded these causes of action are also based in significant part on the allegedly false and misleading dissemination of public statements concerning the safety of dental amalgam. These allegations are not merely collateral or surplussage, and they cannot be ignored in determining whether the threshold has been crossed to invoke scrutiny under section 425.16.
2. Plaintiffs Cannot Prevail on the Fourth and Fifth Causes of Action, Which Therefore Must Be Dismissed.
In concluding that plaintiffs had made a sufficient showing to overcome the motion, the trial court apparently relied upon the expert evidence submitted by plaintiffs that creates a triable issue as to whether the mercury in dental amalgam poses a risk to the health of the patient. The sufficiency of this factual issue to defeat the motion is disputed by CDA on three grounds, the principal contention being that its public statements concerning the safety of amalgam constitute an exercise of its right of free speech which is not subject to prior judicial restraint, whether its views are right or wrong.10 Plaintiffs respond with the contention that CDA’s statements constitute commercial speech which, if false, is not entitled to constitutional protection. (E.g., Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp. (1983) 463 U.S. 60, 64-65; National Com’n Egg Nutrition v. F.T.C. (7th Cir. 1978) 570 F.2d 157.) However, in the present posture of this case, it is not necessary to decide whether CDA’s public statements concerning the safety of dental amalgam are or are not commercial speech under the recent decision of the California Supreme Court in Kasky v. Nike, Inc. (2002) 27 Cal.4th 939, cert. granted ___U.S.___ [123 S.Ct. 817], or to speculate whether the United States Supreme Court will adhere to the standards articulated in that opinion.
Since plaintiffs have effectively withdrawn their claim that CDA’s distribution of literature and dissemination of public statements should be enjoined because the information which they contain is false, plaintiffs obviously will not prevail upon such a claim, regardless of the merits of their position concerning commercial free speech or concerning any of CDA’s other contentions. (See 9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1997) Appeal, § 597, pp. 631-632; Browne v. Superior Court (1940) 16 Cal.2d 593.) Because plaintiffs necessarily will not prevail upon a claim they have withdrawn, the special motion to dismiss the fourth and fifth causes of action should have been granted.
This result follows from the conclusion above that a plaintiff may not amend its pleading to avoid an anti-SLAPP motion. Because the plaintiffs included in their fourth and fifth causes of action material allegations concerning CDA’s dissemination of views which they sought to restrict, those causes of action came within the scope of section 425.16, subdivision (b). Faced with a special motion to dismiss, plaintiffs could not remove the causes of action from the reach of the statute by attempting to narrow or amend their complaints. Neither can they avoid the necessity of establishing a probability of prevailing by withdrawing their challenge to the protected activity and limiting their attack to nonprotected activity.
The upshot of this analysis accords with the legislative objective of section 425.16, to provide a prompt and efficient method of disposing of unmeritorious claims challenging the exercise of constitutionally protected rights, without permitting special motions to strike to preempt other procedures specified in the Code of Civil Procedure for challenging the sufficiency of all other claims. Our approach encourages the party filing a complaint to consider carefully at the outset whether to include an attack on the exercise of the First Amendment rights the Legislature sought to protect by the enactment of section 425.16. Here, the fourth and fifth causes of action as filed sought in significant part to restrict CDA’s public pronouncements on the health effects of dental amalgam. These causes of action attacked CDA’s constitutionally protected right of speech and, plaintiffs having failed to show a likelihood of prevailing on these claims, the causes of action must be dismissed.
Plaintiffs argue that the conduct of CDA that is challenged in the second and third causes of action is not the adoption of the advisory opinion, but its enforcement. These causes of action are grounded on the allegation that the defendants are violating provisions of the Business and Professions Code making it contrary to the public policy of this state to “terminate, retaliate against, or otherwise penalize . . . prohibit, restrict, or in any way discourage” health care providers for advocating appropriate health care. (§§ 510, 2056.) The causes of action allege that defendants have “prevented and continue to prevent dentists from even suggesting the removal of dental amalgam based on its toxicity” and that they “have otherwise retaliated against dentists who disclose to their patients the toxicity of mercury by forcing the enforcement of their gag rules.” Nonetheless, in determining whether these claims arise from conduct in furtherance of protected activity for purposes of an anti-SLAPP motion, the court must consider not only the pleadings but the factual showing made in support of and in opposition to the special motion to dismiss. (Navellier, supra, 29 Cal.4th at pp. 88-89.) Despite the pejorative allegations in the complaint, accusing CDA of “preventing” dentists from speaking to their patients and “retaliating” against those who do, the factual showing made by plaintiffs in opposition to the motion reflects nothing resembling such conduct.
The only specific instance of alleged enforcement of the advisory opinion to which plaintiffs referred in either their complaints or their papers opposing the special motion to strike is the incident involving Dr. Domb. However, Domb’s declaration contains no indication that CDA has done anything to prevent him from speaking to his patients or to others, much less that he has been subjected to any form of retaliation. An investigation was apparently conducted by Domb’s local dental society to determine whether he had engaged in unethical advertising; Domb was exonerated, but was advised to exercise caution when speaking in public and told that making “inappropriately alarming claims about a restorative procedure deemed safe and effective would seem to be imprudent.” Giving such advice, however, without more, involves nothing beyond the exercise of the association’s right to express its views. While Domb may have considered the letter he received from the society to be “threatening,” his subjective interpretation adds nothing to what the evidence shows that the dental society actually did. Based on the complete record before the court on the special motion to strike, the second and third causes of action are supported by nothing more than CDA’s adherence to the ethical views formulated by the ADA. The broad conclusory allegations of more extreme conduct, which might present different considerations, were not substantiated by plaintiffs’ evidence and must be disregarded.12 So viewing these causes of action, they too challenge nothing other than CDA’s protected right to speak out on the amalgam controversy, and they too were required to be dismissed unless plaintiffs made the necessary prima facie showing that they would prevail on these claims.
The Domb declaration also contains the only factual showing plaintiffs made that CDA has engaged in unlawful methods of enforcing the advisory opinion. And, for the very same reasons, this lone declaration fails to carry the plaintiffs’ burden. As indicated in the discussion concerning the fourth and fifth causes of action, plaintiffs have disclaimed any intention to prohibit CDA from publicly expressing its views concerning the safety of dental amalgam, so that there is no need to consider whether its views are right or wrong or whether the expression of those views constitutes commercial or noncommercial speech. And, since the Domb declaration evidences no conduct by CDA other than expressing its agreement with the ethical views articulated by the ADA, there is no evidence of any conduct that might entitle plaintiffs to prevail on their second or third causes of action. Hence, CDA’s motion should have been granted with respect to these causes of action as well, despite the existence of a genuine controversy concerning the safety of dental amalgam.
The order denying the special motion to strike is reversed and the matter remanded with instructions to grant the motion and dismiss the action against CDA.
Fred J. Hiestand for The Civil Justice Association of California (CJAC).
1  All statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure, unless otherwise indicated.
2  The complaints each contained a first cause of action under the UCL and Proposition 65 (Health & Saf. Code, § 25249.6), but that cause of action was settled and is not before this court on appeal. The complaints also named the American Dental Association as a defendant, but this association is not before the court on appeal.
4  Business and Professions Code section 2056, subdivision (c) also contains the explicit prohibition that “No person shall terminate, retaliate against, or otherwise penalize a physician and surgeon for that advocacy, nor shall any person prohibit, restrict, or in any way discourage a physician and surgeon from communicating to a patient information in furtherance of medically appropriate health care.” (Supp. 2003.) Thus far in the litigation, there has been no occasion to consider whether section 2056 has any application to dentists.
5  The first cause of action was based explicitly upon the failure to provide warnings required by Proposition 65, Health and Safety Code section 25249.6. We have no occasion to consider whether the terms of the partial settlement agreement removing this cause of action have any application to the fourth cause of action.
6  One of the complaints also prays for an order directing the defendants to establish a fund for medical monitoring of infants and others exposed to mercury.
7  Plaintiffs also argued that even if CDA’s conduct were deemed to arise out of the exercise of its right of free speech, there were numerous reasons, including the falsity of CDA’s safety assurances, for which plaintiffs probably would prevail in the litigation.
8  Cf., e.g., Massae v. Superior Court (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 527, 535-536 [for purpose of determining proper venue, “[i]f several types of relief are sought, it makes sense first to identify the ‘main relief’ sought, and then to concentrate on characterizing only the ‘main relief’ as local or transitory”]; Leeper v. Beltrami (1959) 53 Cal.2d 195, 214 [“the modern tendency [in deciding between conflicting statutes of limitations in a mixed action] is to look beyond the relief sought, and to view the matter from the basic cause of action giving rise to the plaintiff's right to relief”]; Brown Materials Co., Ltd. v. Angus (1937) 20 Cal.App.2d 32, 38 [allegations incidental to actual cause of action in complaint should not deprive defendant of choice of venue].
12  Conceivably CDA might expel a member for advocating a view with which the association disagreed. Such a step would present the question whether such expulsion was protected by the First Amendment’s right of association (compare Boy Scouts of America v. Dale (2000) 530 U.S. 640 with Board of Directors. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte (1987) 481 U.S. 537) if not the right of free speech. Hypothetically, CDA might engage in other forms of activity meant to punish a dentist who disregarded its views concerning dental amalgam, such as a group boycott or the issuance of defamatory statements concerning the dentist. We emphasize that the record contains absolutely no indication that CDA has threatened or engaged in any such conduct. We do not address whether any such speculative activity would be deemed in furtherance of protected rights under section 425.16, much less whether the activity would be permissible under all of the statutory and constitutional provisions that would have to be considered, depending upon what that conduct might be.

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 597
 v. 
 § 25249
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.