Source: https://www.profinfo.pl/sklep/zeszyty-naukowe-uniwersytetu-jagiellonskiego-prace-z-prawa-wlasnosci-intelektualnej,7436,r,2015,nr,2.html
Timestamp: 2020-08-13 08:38:31+00:00

Document:
Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego. Prace z Prawa Własności Intelektualnej - Zeszyt 2 (128) (Druk, PDF) - Profinfo.pl
Kod towaru: KAM-6003 2015128
Kilka uwag o dozwolonym użytku w prawie autorskim
Ewolucja modelu autorstwa filmowego w prawie polskim
Wykonywanie autorskich praw osobistych po śmierci twórcy
Ochrona praw autorskich w świetle modelu procedury cywilnej i karnej - uwagi na tle wielkiej nowelizacji kodeksu postępowania karnego
Strona internetowa w świetle prawa autorskiego
Karolina Dacyl-Kwilosz
Status prawnoautorski obiektu architektonicznego
Addressing the need to improve the functioning of the European trade mark system: defining relevant market for the purposes of the genuine use of the Community Trade Mark and alternative enhancements
Impulsem do napisania tych uwag była analiza prawna przygotowana przez European Copyright Society na tle orzeczenia w sprawie Deckmyn. Jej autorzy dopatrują się w tym wyroku generalnej zmiany podejścia Trybunału Sprawiedliwości (dalej jako TS) w kierunku rozluźnienia dotychczasowej restrykcyjnej interpretacji zarówno testu trójstopniowego, jak i zawężającej wykładni postanowieńdyrektywy internetowej dotyczących postaci dozwolonego użytku. Dorozumianą przyczyną tego zwrotu w orzecznictwie TS jest potrzeba szerszego uwzględniania podstawowych praw człowieka, a zwłaszcza prawa do swobody twórczości (ang. freedom of expression). Wydaje się, że w części ta analiza ma trochę życzeniowy charakter. Odnoszę wrażenie, że zbyt optymistyczne jest dopatrywanie się w tym orzeczeniu generalnej zmiany podejścia TS do dozwolonego użytku w dyrektywie 2001/29/WE. Nie można przy tym wykluczyć, że autorzy tej opinii, wybitni europejscy naukowcy, chcą tą drogą wpłynąć na dalszą ewolucję orzecznictwa TS - jeszcze bardziej liberalizującą warunki stwierdzania istnienia dozwolonego użytku. W artykule kontynuuję podejście European Copyright Society do dozwolonego użytku. Dotyczy to także badania jego konsekwencji w świetle stosowania prawa w Polsce oraz kilku szczegółowych zagadnień m.in. związanych ze stosowaniem testu trójstopniowego. Poglądy tu wyrażone wiążą się z moim przekonaniem, że współcześnie w wielu sferach prawo autorskie zdecydowanie wprowadza nadmiernie wysoki poziom ochrony utworów. Generalnie ujmując, celem tej wypowiedzi jest uzasadnienie kontrowersyjnej tezy, że (też w świetle orzecznictwa TS) dopuszczalna jest wykładnia rozszerzająca postanowień dotyczących dozwolonego użytku zarówno w przypadku dyrektywy 2001/29/WE, jak i prawa krajowego. Co więcej, pojawia się nawet możliwość, przy interpretacji prawa krajowego, stosowania analogii. W istocie zatem w części wnioski w tej wypowiedzi są bardziej radykalne niż proponowane przez European Copyright Society. Przypomnijmy, że w świetle reguł przyjętych w prawie UE prawo autorskie nie jest objęte bezwzględną ochroną  może ono być ograniczane, m.in. ze względu na inne prawa podstawowe. Chodzi tu przede wszystkim o uwzględnianie okoliczności, że przy określaniu granic prawa do własności, w ramach którego jest chroniona w art. 17 Karty Praw Podstawowych Unii Europejskiej własność intelektualna, należy brać pod uwagę art. 11 ust. 1 KPP, zapewniający, iż Każdy ma prawo do wolności wypowiedzi. Prawo to obejmuje wolność posiadania poglądów oraz otrzymywania i przekazywania informacji i idei bez ingerencji władz publicznych i bez względu na granice państwowe. Ale źródłami ograniczeń tego prawa wyłącznego, które znajdują swój wyraz m.in. w przepisach o dozwolonym użytku, są szerzej ujmowane interesy publiczne związane m.in. z edukacją, badaniami naukowymi, upowszechnianiem kultury, dostępem do informacji, zapewnieniem warunków dla rozwoju twórczości oraz interesy osobiste użytkowników. Dodajmy, że także TS wskazywał, iż przy określaniu zakresu ochrony autorskiej należy uwzględniać: wspieranie interesu publicznego związanego z promowaniem badań i prywatnych studiów poprzez upowszechnianie wiedzy, interesy użytkowników utworów objętych ochroną, którzy pragną udostępniać je publicznie w celu badań lub prywatnych studiów prowadzonych przez osoby prywatne, umożliwienie i zapewnienie rozwoju nowych technologii oraz zapewnienie stosownego dostępu do nich użytkownikom.
W polskim ustawodawstwie model autorstwa filmowego przeszedł interesującą ewolucję. Przez pierwszych 70 lat obowiązywania na scalonym po zaborach terytorium prawa polskiego, a więc pod rządami ustaw autorskich z lat: 19261, 19522 i 19943, pierwotnym podmiotem praw do filmu był z zasady producent. Natomiast od lipca 2000 r.4 rolę pierwotnych właścicieli praw do filmu przejęli współtwórcy, tzn. osoby, które wniosły twórczy wkład w powstanie filmu.
W nauce polskiej od lat wiele kontrowersji wywołuje pytanie o los autorskich praw osobistych po śmierci twórcy. Podstawowe znaczenie ma w tym względzie wykładnia art. 16 ustawy o prawie autorskim i prawach pokrewnych1. Przepis ten stanowi dla wielu przedstawicieli doktryny oparcie dla tezy o wieczności autorskich praw osobistych, które w niezmienionej postaci trwają, choć podmiot, dzięki któremu powstały, już nie istnieje. Czy jednak słusznie, czy istotnie obowiązujące przepisy przesądzają tę kwestię w sposób tak zdecydowany, jak to jest do tej pory postrzegane?
Ochrona praw autorskich może być realizowana za pomocą różnych środków, w odmiennych typach postępowań. Wybór jednej z możliwych dróg dochodzenia roszczeń: cywilnej albo karnej ma istotne znaczenie dla uprawnionego, z uwagi na odmienny poziom kontradyktoryjności oraz wymaganego stopnia zaangażowania uprawnionego w prowadzenie spraw. To w procedurze, a nie w prawie materialnym, tkwią czynniki decydujące o atrakcyjności wyboru środków karnych i cywilnych. Celem niniejszego artykułu jest zarówno zweryfikowanie przedstawionej powyżej tezy, jak i zbadanie wpływu wielkiej nowelizacji kodeksu postępowania karnego, która zacznie obowiązywać od 1.07.2015 r., na dokonywany przez uprawnionego wybór jednej z dróg postępowania. Rozważania są oparte również na wynikach badań akt oraz danych statystycznych.
Choć ze stron internetowych korzystamy już od ponad 20 lat, to do tej pory brakuje w polskiej literaturze szerszego opracowania monograficznego, które podjęłoby próbę ich kompleksowej analizy z punktu widzenia prawa autorskiego. W wypowiedziach poszczególnych przedstawicieli doktryny możemy odnaleźć jedynie sporadyczne nawiązania do tego tematu. Poza pojedynczymi wyrokami kwestia ta w zasadzie nie znalazła również szerszego odzwierciedlenia w polskim orzecznictwie. W takiej sytuacji w celu pogłębienia analizy tego tematu zasadne wydaje się odwołanie do wypowiedzi nauki prawa oraz judykatury innych krajów. W niniejszym artykule zostanie przedstawione zapatrywanie na omawiane zagadnienie z punktu widzenia prawa polskiego, niemieckiego i amerykańskiego.
Polskie prawo autorskie nie reguluje wyraźnie relacji między prawami architektów, twórców utworów architektonicznych a prawami inwestorów i właścicieli budynków, do których zderzenia dochodzi często na tle korzystania z obiektu architektonicznego. Z uwagi na specyfikę ochrony tego typu utworów kolizji nie da się całkowicie wyeliminować na etapie zawierania umowy, przez co stan niepewności stron co do zakresu przysługujących im uprawnień trwa zazwyczaj aż do momentu wydania orzeczenia w toczącej się już sprawie przez sąd, którego wątpliwości co do uwzględnionych ostatecznie argumentów są prezentowane w postaci mało przekonywającego uzasadnienia. Dlatego istotne wydaje się rozważenie, którym obiektom powinna w ogóle przysługiwać ochrona prawnoautorska (jakie przesłanki powinny zostać przez dany obiekt spełnione) oraz jak daleko ochrona ta powinna sięgać, aby obu stronom potencjalnego konfliktu zagwarantować jak najszerszą realizację ich ustawowych uprawnień.
In the recent ONEL v. OMEL judgment (C-149/11), the Court of Justice has again referred to the market concerned for the purpose of assessing genuine use of a trade mark. But does trade mark law define the relevant concept of market? Should this concept be assimilated to the market concept in competition law given their close origins. This paper aims at comparing market concepts in trade mark and competition law and assessing coherence, usefulness and objectiveness of the relevant concepts. The opportunity is also taken to suggest subsidiary solutions to the problems related to the lenient approach to the requirement of genuine use of the Community Trade Mark.
Several remarks about permitted use in copyright law
Evolution of film authorship model in the Polish law
Exercise of copyright after the authors death
Copyright protection in the models of civil procedure and criminal procedure - remarks against the background of major amendments to the Code of Criminal Procedure
Website under copyright law
Copyright status of architectural structures
The stimulus for writing down these remarks was the legal analysis prepared by the European Copyright Society against the background of the Deckmyn judgment. Its authors perceive this judgment as a sign of an overall change in the approach of the Court of Justice of the EU (CoJ) towards relaxing its so far restrictive interpretation of both the three tier test and the narrowing interpretation of the provisions of the Internet Directive concerning the forms of permitted use. The implied reason for this U-turn in CoJ case law is the need for broader consideration of fundamental human rights and especially the freedom of expression. It seems that this analysis is partly wishful thinking. I have an impression that it is too optimistic to perceive this judgment as an overall change in the approach of the CoJ to Directive 2001/29/EC. We cannot exclude this way that authors of the opinion, outstanding European scholars, wish to influence further evolution of CoJ case law by liberalizing even more the conditions of finding permitted use. In this article, I continue the approach of the European Copyright Society to permitted use. This applies also to examining its consequences in the light of applying the law in Poland and several detailed issues relating, among other things, to application of the three tier test. The views expressed here are based on my conviction that currently, in many spheres, copyright law introduces excessive levels of protection of works. Generally speaking, the aim of this article is justifying the controversial thesis that (also in the light of CoJ case law) it is permissible to apply a broadening interpretation of the provisions on permitted use both in the case of Directive 2001/29/EC and national legislation. Moreover, when interpreting national legislation, it is even possible to apply analogies. So in essence the conclusions of this article are more radical than proposals of the European Copyright Society. Let us bear in mind that in the light of principles adopted in EU law, copyright does not enjoy absolute protection: it can be restricted, for instance, due to other fundamental rights. This concerns mainly taking into account the fact that, when determining the limits of the right to property, under which right intellectual property is protected by Art. 17 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, one should consider Art. 11(1) of the Charter asserting that Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. But the sources of restrictions upon this exclusive right, which are expressed, among other things, by the provisions on permitted use, are the more broadly perceived public interests relating to e.g. education, scientific research, dissemination of culture, ensuring access to information, providing conditions for development of creative activity, as well as personal interests of users. Let us also add that also the CoJ indicated that when determining the scope of copyright law protection the following should be taken into consideration: supporting the public interest in promotion of research and private studies through dissemination of knowledge; interests of users of the protected works, who wish to make them publicly available for the purpose of research or private studies done by private individuals; enabling and ensuring the development of new technologies, as well as safeguarding users adequate access to them.
Over the several decades of existence of copyright law in Poland there have been a few changes in the wording of provisions relating to entities rights in a film. Subsequent amendments have resulted in replacing the producer-centred model of film protection with the author-centred one. The former usually prefers the so-called static approach, in which joint authorship of a film is connected with ascribing a specific part of the film work to the author. The latter is associated with the so-called dynamic approach, which draws attention to creation of the film out of processed creative contributions made by the persons who take part in filmmaking. In this paper, the writer presents, on the basis of reading of subsequent texts of copyright statutes, the process of transition from the solutions typical of the static approach to those that are commonly associated with the dynamic approach. At the same time, she points out the complexities in maintaining a uniform approach to joint authorship, which occur in the context of change of the basic model of film authorship.
The death of the author does not eliminate the need to protect authors moral rights; frequently a situation occurs in which these rights need to be exercised. The laws in force in Poland do not in any way determine directly what the position of legal successors of the late author is with reference to moral rights that they enjoyed during their life, neither do they provide us with any timeframe for the moral rights. There are several theories presented in the works of legal academics which concern the issue of moral rights after the authors death. Unfortunately, none of them correspond to contemporary needs of exercising copyright after the authors death. It needs to be noted, however, that personal copyright may also have financial value. This observation does not need to be synonymous with neglecting the traditional division into moral and economic rights. This fact forces us to look again at the issue of inheriting authors moral rights. Since at least some of them, including the right to the first publication and the right to integrity of the work in particular, may have financial value, then there is no reason to exclude the possibility of transferring the rights to legal successors of the deceased author. Limiting the estate referred to in paragraph 2 of Art. 922 of the Civil Code concerns the right and obligations strictly connected with the deceased. This notion partly coincides with the notion of moral rights, however, they are not identical. Legal regulations concerning copyright are not contrary to this thesis. The obstacle to transferring the rights to legal successors is most certainly not the contents of Art. 16 of the Copyright Act. According to its literal interpretation, it is not the link between the author and the work that is being transferred, but the right to it. The aforementioned link is a synonym of authorship understood as a certain fact. Such understanding of the notion allows one to explain why, in the words of the legislator, it cannot be waived or transferred. The fact of being an author is a phenomenon that, once occurred, cannot be changed.
The purpose of the article to verify the thesis that it is procedural law, not substantive law, wherein lie the factors determining the attractiveness of choosing of one of the paths of copyright protection over the other. This conclusion follows mainly from comparing the scope of regulation of substantive criminal law in all acts which have been in force since 1926 until now. It has undergone only slight modifications. There have been, however, significant amendments in the procedural regulations concerning how proceedings are initiated and this should be seen as the cause of growing importance of criminal law means. Later in the article, nationwide Polish statistics are discussed, with an indication of the number of criminal and civil cases, that confirm the thesis of the dominant role of criminal means of copyright protection. These results are confronted with the results of an inspection of case files within the area of jurisdiction of a court located in a big Polish city. The results show very high efficiency of criminal means, both in cases involving typical criminal activity with the use of illegal media and illegal activity in which the Internet is used. At the same time, examination of files indicates the danger of excessive use of criminal sanctions with respect to small, borderline infringements of copyright by consumers of cultural goods. The research results are the point of departure for an analysis of differences in the functions of civil and criminal procedures from theoretical law perspective. These differences affect the degree of adversarial character of both procedures. As the criminal procedure is more independent of substantive criminal law than the civil procedure is of substantive civil law, the trend can be reversed. This is the direction which the legislator takes in the major amendments to the Code of Criminal Procedure. The amendments include several solutions which may (but need not to) reverse the current proportions in the numbers of civil and criminal cases. Achieving a more adversarial character may produce a positive result in the field of copyright protection, by reducing the structural inequality between the parties. This writer, however, gives a negative assessment of the amendments relating to other types of offences, outside the realm of copyright law, in particular serious crimes. Then what is at stake is the protection of public interest, not just the interest of the aggrieved party, which may be an argument against excessively adversarial character of proceedings. The paper discusses also the issue of obtaining IP numbers of Internet users by means of various kinds of software, often violating their privacy. Amendments to the Code of Criminal Procedure can introduce some order in this field, setting the boundaries of permissible activities.
It is hard to view websites as a brand new category of works since they have been in use for more than 20 years now. Nevertheless, in different jurisdictions websites still prove problematic for judges and scholars who struggle with different legal theories trying to answer questions regarding copyrightability of the website. Every website consists of two elements: the code and the graphic design. In this writers opinion it is safe to assume that the code of a website, written in a programming language like PHP or Java, in most cases will be considered a computer program, and as such protected by copyright law, provided that it meets the requirements outlined in a given copyright statute. As for the visual layer of a website, which is often considered as constituting something of its user interface, its protectability as a whole seems somehow problematic in different countries. German courts, for instance, seem to approve such a possibility, while stressing the functional nature of websites, thus expecting them to have a higher threshold of originality as compared to the threshold required of the so-called works of pure art. In the United States the question of the right basis for protection of the whole websites graphic design (look and feel) goes back to the first cases involving protection of the graphic user interface of computer programs, and yet it is still not clear from the available case law whether the look and feel of a website can be protected under the US Copyright Act. Some scholars argue that the trade dress law could be better suited for that purpose. In Polish literature and case law, on the other hand, the issue of protecting website graphics in its entirety on the ground of the copyright law has not yet arisen. The writer believes that the graphic design of a website as a whole can be considered as a work protected by the Polish Act on Copyright and Related Rights. Individuality and originality, the two main requirements stated in the aforementioned act, can be found in the compilation of different elements and means of expression used in creating websites. This view can be backed up by several published judgments of Polish courts.
The particular nature of architectural structures and the imprecise provisions of the Polish copyright law make their legal status unclear and enigmatic. The situation becomes complex upon completion of the construction, in case of collision of authors rights with ownership right, which seems to be more evident, thus prevailing. Such collisions are burdensome for the entities in their attempts to delimit the scope of their rights and privileges. Contractual elimination of this kind of conflictis difficult or even impossible; therefore, this state of uncertainty lasts very often until the issue of a valid judgement, often on unconvincing grounds. In connection with the above, it becomes a matter of great importance to consider which of the architectural structures should be protected by copyright, as well as how far the protection should extend in order to guarantee both parties to the potential dispute the broadest possible exercise of their legal rights. The first part of the article discusses the prerequisites that an architectural object should meet to be recognized as a copyrighted work. Creative activity of individual nature is the most difficult to verify ofall of the prerequisites listed in Article 1 of the Polish Act on Copyright and Related Rights, as it plays a double role. Fulfilling this condition determines if the object can be included in the category of protected works and also what the scope of copyright protection is. Mutually permeating art and technology is what constitutes the particularity of the architectural works, reflected in their aesthetic, but also utility functions. It is beyond dispute that choices made by architects are very often determined by technical, constructional and official requirements. It makes their final creation closer to the conventional product than to the creative one. The next subject brought up in the article is a multitude of the physical media. Architectural works are the best example that works can be recorded on diverse media; however, this does not mean that we deal with different works then. It should be emphasised that although architectural design is a basic form of record, it is its realisation  an architectural structure  that can affect an average passer-by in the aesthetic manner, giving them the opportunity to discover its artistry. Due to the latter form of record, architectural works enjoy particular copyright protection reflected especially at the stage of concluding the contract. The Polish Act on Copyright and Related Rights provides for a number of restrictions regarding the contents of the agreement,creates some presumptions related to this matter and introduces modifications in the permissible use of protected works. However, the main reflection contained in the article focuses on seeking a balance between the rights of both parties: architects and investors or owners of the buildings before, during and after realisation of the structure. The balance needs to reconcile the right to the integrity of the work (to have the contents and form of the authors work inviolable and properly used) with the right resulting from ownership right: the right to make changes in the architectural structure. The solution proposed in the Polish copyright law does not depart from the statutory assumptionsmade in other European countries, since neitherof the conflicting right s is recognised as the absolute one. Therefore, exercising these rights shall involve statutory restrictions, as well as respect the principles of community life. Evaluation of each particular case seems to be the only legitimate resolution of the potential dispute. This article is an attempt at putting together guidelines for such evaluation.
The requirement of genuine use of a Community Trade Mark is being considered in terms of its territorial aspect, which has recently caused much controversy, sprung up by the ONEL v OMEL judgment of the CJEU, as the interpretation of the requirement departed from blindly accepting the use in one Member State as sufficient. As a starting point to set a new standard for assessing genuine use, the problem of CTMs genuine use requirement is set against the background of the connection and interdependence between the CTM system and the national trade mark protection systems in order to show how its application influences the fragile balance between those two levels of trade mark protection in Europe. Next, an overview is provided of what the notion of genuine use in fact is and what meaning it was given in CJEUs jurisprudence, special attention being given to the territorial aspect of genuine use and important cases in this respect. Based on that framework, the task is undertaken to determine the territorial scope that CTMs use should cover in order for it to be genuine. Argument is made that the principle of coexistence of the CTM and the national trade marks as well as the wording of specific provisions in the CTM Regulation suggest the interpretation that the use of a CTM ought to be territorially wider than what is expected of a national trade mark. The argument that the unitary character of the mark excludes the possibility of setting any territorial boundaries which the use has to fill is questioned as the unitary character of the CTM has not always prevailed in the past (see the Chronopost case). The market penetration approach, based on the evaluation of whether a trade mark penetrated the market excessively enough to give grounds for its protection, can prove useful, regard being had (apart from the factors usually taken into account, such as the volume of sales of trademarked products) to the importance of the consumers perspective on whether the use of the CTM was significant. The idea to evaluate the use with respect to EU territorial zones seems to be a valuable contribution. There is no easy or obvious method of defining the market on which genuine use would have to be proven, as the concept of relevant market defined for the purposes of competition law turns out to be inapplicable. As for the guidelines concerning the volume of use once the market is delimited, one can attempt to formulate a de minimis rule that below a certain threshold it is assumed that the CTM use cannot be considered as genuine for the purposes of maintaining the protection (the author deems it possible despite CJEUs contrary opinion in La Mer). In addition to that, certain improvements to the CTM system are pondered with a view to neutralising the detrimental effect that the liberal approach to the genuine use requirement has on the functioning of the CTM system.

References: art. 17
 art. 11
 art. 16
 Art. 17
 Art. 11
 Art. 922
 Art. 16