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Summary What does the right to life entail? Is it simply a right to simply live, or does it include more? The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has responded to this question in the affirmative. The right to life does in fact include a right to live in dignity, a right to a dignified existence. As such, it requires the realisation of certain socio-economic and cultural rights in the context of the right to life. The European Court of Human Rights however, does not employ the same approach. Even though it does accept the interpretation of socio-economic rights in the context of the rights protected by the European Convention of Human Rights, albeit it does not read Article 2 of the Convention through these rights. This thesis examines whether such an interpretation is possible. Going through the relevant jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court, a definition is reached on what the right to life in dignity is in the Inter-American context. Having taken that as a basis, the European aspect is examined, in relation to the right to life (Article 2), the prohibition of torture, degrading and inhuman treatment (Article 3) and the right to family and private life (Article 8). It is concluded that indeed, following the European Court’s interpretative practice, the right to life can be interpreted as a right to life in dignity when interpreted under the light of Articles 3 and 8. However, such a development seems unlikely in the current state of things.
Preface During autumn semester 2015-2016 I attended the “Human Rights and Cultural Diversity” course offered by the International Human Rights Law LL.M at Lund University. Throughout the duration of the course, I was amazed by the jurisprudential advancements of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and perplexed by the stance of the European Court of Human Rights, that has in occasion taken progressive decisions, but in no way to the extent of the Inter-American Court. At the same time, throughout this two-year program I have been thinking, that no human right always existed in the form that it exists today. Even the right to life, that today is self-evident, has had a progress in time. This seemed to me to be even more evident when comparing the two systems of human rights protection. And as such, I was led to the idea of writing about life in dignity in the European Convention on Human Rights. It has been an interesting trip, through wide jurisprudential waters. My supervisor, Alejandro Fuentes, has been guiding me through this journey, with his constructive advice and for that I would like to thank him. I would also like to thank my friends for the brainstorming and proofreading they volunteered to do. Last but certainly not least, I would like to thank my family and especially my mother for the support I have been given throughout these two years.
⃰In the citations, when using ECHR, I am referring to the ECtHR following its official citations method.
The European Court of Human Rights, however, stands far from this interpretation and still examines the right to life stricto sensu, as a negative obligation of the State to not deprive anyone arbitrarily of their life and as a positive obligation to protect its citizens from other individuals’ criminal activities (See below Chapter 3.1).
1.2 Research problem and question The European Court of Human Rights has only in certain circumstances recognized the application of socio-economic rights as part of the application of other Convention rights. However, the developments in society, as well as human rights law have advanced to such a level as to recognize that the right to life is not merely a life to live, but more likely a right to a “life in dignity” or a “dignified existence”. As such the realisation of certain socio-economic rights is of paramount importance in order to ensure complete protection of the right to life. Furthermore, the ECtHR has in Pretty v. the UK stated that Article 2 (the right to life) “is unconcerned with issues to do with the quality of living”. 7 The fact that the European Court of Human Rights does not recognize a right to life in dignity in the context of Art.2’s right to life diminishes the protection provided under said Article. This thesis answers whether the right to life in the European context of human rights can be interpreted as the right to life in dignity, as recognized by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.
Case of Pretty v. the United Kingdom, no. 2346/02, ECHR 2002 par. 37.
in the Inter-American Court. Based on this definition and after analyzing the rights to life, family and private life and the prohibition of torture, inhuman, degrading treatment in the European system, I examine if an interpretation, including the elements of the right to life in the Americas, can be acceptable at a European level.
the European Convention on Human Rights. Article 2 (the right to life) is the one examined in order to conclude if it can be interpreted as a right to life in dignity. It is of paramount importance to analyze this Article in order to ascertain where the ECtHR stands in regards to the right to life as of now. I have chosen to interpret Art.2 under Art.3 and 8 for the following reasons. To begin with, Article 3 is selected because of the interpretative leaps the ECtHR has made in regards with this Article. The ECtHR has incorporated under Art.3 notions, such as human dignity. At the same time, again under Art.3, the ECtHR has interpreted the lack of certain socio-economic rights as inhuman or/and degrading treatment. Art.8 is used because of its wide application by the ECtHR and its importance for the protection of socio-economic and cultural rights, as well as the fact that the ECtHR has stated in Pretty v. the UK, that issues concerning quality of life are examined under this Article (See below 3.1.2.1). Article 8 is further used because of the standards it sets for the right to private and family life to be respected. Under Art.8, the ECtHR has set the standards of respect for family and private life through the partial realisation of socio-economic rights. In these chapters not only is the jurisprudence of the European Court analyzed, but also the interpretative tools that the Court employs. This way I am able to interpret Art.2 under the light of Arts.3 and 8 and as such conclude on whether Art.2 can be interpreted as to encompass living in dignity. In doing so, the essay touches upon the nature of human and political rights. More specifically, it examines the character of rights as civil and political on the one hand and economic, social and cultural on the other. It looks into whether such a classification is at this point moot, or if there is still need to address human rights in such terms. It also examines the possibility for judicial claims of social, cultural, and economic rights.
in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India11 and Francis Coralie Mullin v. the Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi12 interpreted the right to life as a right “to live with human dignity”, including certain socio-economic rights to the right to life. However, these decisions are not examined, since the essay takes into consideration only the two regional systems and not domestic approaches to the issue. This however, could be a field for further investigation in the future. More specifically, the domestic jurisprudence could be examined in correlation with the international practice to conclude whether a customary character of a right to life in dignity can be traced.
Convention on Human Rights and the selected jurisprudence. In the end of the chapter, I analyze the case law of the ECtHR under these articles as a whole, after having made reference to the interpretative tools the Court uses. Cases that concern more than one of the aforementioned Articles are examined only once, under the chapter that is deemed more appropriate based on the violation found. In the conclusion, I sum up what is previously analyzed and I make my final remarks in relation to the research question.
The moment of conception was discussed in the case of Artavia Murillo et al. v. Costa Rica. See below 2.2.1.2. 14 Case of Myrna Mack Chang v. Guatemala, Judgment (Merits, Reparations and Costs), Inter-American Court of Human Rights 2003 par.152.
Mónica Feria Tinta, Justiciability of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in the InterAmerican System of Protection of Human Rights: Beyond Traditional Paradigms and Notions, 2007, at 443. 16 The Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of the Guarantees of the Due Process of Law, Advisory Opinion, Inter-American Court of Human Rights 1999 at par.114 in Tinta. 2007 at 443. 17 Case of Artavia Murillo et al. ("In Vitro Fertilization") v. Costa Rica, Inter-American Court of Human Rights 2012 at par.71. 18 Article 26. Progressive Development: The States Parties undertake to adopt measures, both internally and through international cooperation, especially those of an economic and technical nature, with a view to achieving progressively, by legislation or other appropriate means, the full realization of the rights implicit in the economic, social, educational, scientific, and cultural standards set forth in the Charter of the Organization of American States as amended by the Protocol of Buenos Aires. 19 Article 29. Restrictions Regarding Interpretation: No provision of this Convention shall be interpreted as: a. permitting any State Party, group, or person to suppress the enjoyment or exercise of the rights and freedoms recognized in this Convention or to restrict them to a greater extent than is provided for herein; b. restricting the enjoyment or exercise of any right or freedom recognized by virtue of the laws of any State Party or by virtue of another convention to which one of the said states is a party; c. precluding other rights or guarantees that are inherent in the human personality or derived from representative democracy as a form of government; or d. excluding or limiting the effect that the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man and other international acts of the same nature may have.
2.2 Jurisprudence The right to life in the Inter-American context has been greatly developed by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. In this section, I analyze IACtHR’s relevant case law, firstly in relation to children and juvenile justice and secondly in relation to indigenous people. The cases are chosen based on the conclusions the IACtHR has reached in relation to the right to life; and the interpretation of the IACtHR in such a way as to ensure the effective protection of human rights. The cases clearly indicate both how the IACtHR interprets the right to life and the interpretative tools it uses to protect minorities and give effect to human rights. As such, they assist the formation of the definition of the right to life in 2.3 under which the right to life in the European context is examined in 4.
2.2.1 Children and juvenile justice Τhe Street Children case (See 2.2.2.1), is selected because the IACtHR made reference for the first time to a “right to life in dignity”. The In Vitro Fertilization case (See 2.2.1.2) is chosen because of the interpretation the Court employed in order to define the beginning of life.
Case of "Street Children" (Villagran-Morales et al.) v. Guatemala, Inter-American Court of Human Rights 1999. 22 Id. at. pars.76-121. 23 The Court firstly examined the right to personal liberty prescribed in Art.7 of the Convention and it found that the article was violated for the four of the applicants. Id. at. pars.122-136. 24 Id. at. par.144. 25 Ibid. 26 Ibid. 27 Dignity and human rights BERMA KLEIN GOLDEWIJK, et al., DIGNITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS : THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS (Schoten : Intersentia ; Ardsley : Transnational, 2002. 2002) at 48.
Antônio Augusto Cançado Trindade, The Right to Cultural Identity in the Evolving Jurisprudential Construction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, in MULTICULTURALISM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (2009) at 479. 29 Id. at.480. 30 ELIZABETH WICKS, THE RIGHT TO LIFE AND CONFLICTING INTERESTS (Oxford ; New York : Oxford University Press, 2010. 2010) at 218. 31 The case involved the death and injuries of underage inmates of a state-owned prison in Paraguay. The “Panchito López” Center (hereinafter “Center”) in Paraguay was a stateowned prison, designated at first as a young offender’s center, but due to its tactical advantages later converted into a high-security adult prison. The Center was thus relocated to a building designed as a private residence, which lacked the conditions necessary for incarceration. Consequently, juveniles residing in the Center were living under unsuitable conditions, which included but were not limited to lack of physical and psychological health care, education, hygienic conditions, nutrition, and education and resulted in sexual abuses and violence. The Center was overcrowded, many of the inmates were legally adults, and the guards of the Center were not adequate in numbers or in training. Clashes occurred frequently between the inmates and the guards. During the clashes, ten inmates died (nine because of a fire in the center and one from a shooting) and forty-two obtained injuries and burns. The Center was shut down on July 25th, 2001. The inmates were then transferred to adult prisons. Two more former Center inmates were stabbed and died while in prison. In its ruling, the Court found that in cases where incarceration is involved, a State has the obligation to provide the “minimum conditions befitting […] dignity as human beings”. The Court concluded that they were not suitable for the prisoners to “live with dignity” and that, the State failed to adopt the positive measures necessary in order to guarantee that.31 As such, the Court found a violation of Art.4. Case of the "Juvenile Reeducation Institute" v. Paraguay, Inter-American Court of Human Rights 2004. 32 Case of Artavia Murillo et al. ("In Vitro Fertilization") v. Costa Rica, 2012. 33 The applicants were couples that could not conceive naturally and could not perform IVF in Costa Rica following an absolute prohibition of the procedure by the Constitutional Court in March 15, 2000.
11(2) (Right to Privacy) 38 and 17(2) (Rights of the Family), 39 in relation to Article 1(1) of the American Convention. The Court, in this case, interpreted Art.4 in such a way as to take into consideration the rights of the future parents. The Article clearly refers to the “moment of conception” and the Court interpreted that moment in such a way as to allow greater freedom to people that wanted to perform IVF, in respect with their personality. The Court is not diminishing the protection under Art.4, but adjusts what the moment of conception is to modern-day criteria.40The interpretation of the Court is compatible with developments both in biomedicine and law.
2.2.2 Indigenous people Understanding the specific characteristics of indigenous people is essential in order to comprehend the approach of the IACtHR in its jurisprudence. Although there is no uniform definition on who constitute indigenous people, albeit some common characteristics are accepted. One of the most authoritative definitions comes from the Special Rapporteur of the SubCommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, José R. Martinez Cobo, in his study on the Problem of Discrimination against Indigenous People. The definition reads as follows: Indigenous communities, peoples and nations are those which, having a historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on their territories, consider themselves distinct from other entitled to recourse to a competent court in order that it may decide on the lawfulness of such threat, this remedy may not be restricted or abolished. The interested party or another person in his behalf is entitled to seek these remedies. 7. No one shall be detained for debt. This principle shall not limit the orders of a competent judicial authority issued for nonfulfillment of duties of support. 38 No one may be the object of arbitrary or abusive interference with his private life, his family, his home, or his correspondence, or of unlawful attacks on his honor or reputation. 39 The right of men and women of marriageable age to marry and to raise a family shall be recognized, if they meet the conditions required by domestic laws, insofar as such conditions do not affect the principle of nondiscrimination established in this Convention. 40 See contra Robert S Barker, Inverting Human Rights: The Inter-American Court versus Costa Rica, 47 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. (2015); Álvaro Paúl, Decision-Making Process of the Inter-American Court: An Analysis Prompted by the'In Vitro Fertilization'Case, 21 ILSA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW (2014).
UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1986/7 in United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs Division for Social Policy and Development Secretariat of the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, The Concept of Indigenous People (2004).
The common elements that can be traced from these definitions are the historical continuity of the populations, their close relation to the natural environment that they inhabit and their unique economic, social, cultural, and political system. In this part cases concerning claims of indigenous people alleging violations of their right to life and their right to property are examined. In regards with the indigenous people jurisprudence Yakye Axa (See 2.2.2.1) is selected because the IACtHR is correlating the living conditions of the community with the right to life, as such incorporating socio-economic and cultural rights to the right to life. Saramaka (See 2.2.2.2) is used due to the fact that the IACtHR extended the same protection that international law awarded to indigenous people, to a tribal community, acknowledging at the same time the importance of their cultural identity. Finally, the case of Awas Tingni (See 2.2.2.3) is chosen because the IACtHR connected the right to property of the indigenous community to their survival.
International Labour Organization, Convention concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries (No. 169) (1989) Art 1. 43 Case of the Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Inter-American Court of Human Rights 2005. 44 Id. at. par.50.
In Yakye Axa, the Court further stressed out that the rights of the indigenous peoples on their lands pre-existed any domestic legal system regulation and as such did not depend on its recognition. 50 The same conclusions were reached in the Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay.51In Sawhoyamaxa, the connection between the right to life and the indigenous’ cultural identity was made even clearer. Both cases have thus recognized the inclusion in the right to life of not only “minimum standard conditions” in general, but also of aspects that consider the cultural differences of indigenous people. Not only has the Court once more accepted the application of minimum living standards, including sanitation, access to health services etc. in the context of Art.4 but it also inserted an extra element; that of cultural identity.
Leonardo J. Alvarado, PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES' HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: LESSONS FROM THE CASE OF A WAS TINGNI v. NICARAGUA, 24 ARIZONA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW (2007) 615. 51 The natural habitat of the Sawhoyamaxa, an indigenous community residing in Paraguay, was eventually sold to private actors, due to Paraguay’s financial issues. The community was greatly dependent on their natural environment for their survival, by means of hunting, fishing, and gathering. The change in their natural environment led to a lack of means to support their living and to situations hindering for their health and ultimately their lives, with thirty members of the community dying because of the conditions. The community initiated proceedings claiming the ancestral land they have traditionally occupied as well as their recognition as a legal personality. The Court reiterated the importance of the right to life and the obligation of the State not to adhere both the negative and positive obligations deriving from the right to life. The Court stressed out that in order to assess in which situations the State is actually responsible for lives being at risk, the difficulties presented in each different situation should be taken into consideration. Art.4 should not be construed as imposing an “impossible or disproportionate burden” to the State. The Court examined the specific factual events of the present case. It concluded that Paraguay had not employed the necessary measures required in this situation. It did not act diligently, and when it did finally act the measures adopted were not “sufficient and adequate”. It concluded that the deaths resulted from the inability of the State to take the necessary measures in order to prevent them. It further emphasized that the measures Paraguay already took were not sufficient in said situation, due to the emergency situation the Sawhoyamaxa Community were into. In this context, it stressed out that the American Convention on Human Rights is to be interpreted in a way as to ensure effective protection in practice. Case of Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Inter-American Court of Human Rights 2006.
Case of the Saramaka People v. Suriname, Inter-American Court of Human Rights 2007. 53 The Saramakas are a tribe, forcefully moved by the colonizers from Africa to the current territory of Suriname. They have since inhabited that area and maintained a very close relationship with their land, to which they were dependent for their survival. 54 Case of the Saramaka People v. Suriname, 2007 pars.66-76. 55 Id. at. pars.78-86. 56 Article 1: 1. All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development. 2. All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international economic co-operation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and international law. In no case may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence. 3. The States Parties to the present Covenant, including those having responsibility for the administration of Non-Self-Governing and Trust Territories, shall promote the realization of the right of self-determination, and shall respect that right, in conformity with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. 57 Article 27: In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own language.
lack of legal personality, the Saramakas could not have “adequate and effective legal recourses” against violations of their right to property. Id. at.185. 62 Gaetano Pentassuglia, Evolving Protection of Minority Groups: Global Challenges and the Role of International Jurisprudence, 11 INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY LAW REVIEW (2009) at 199. 63 Id. at. 196. 64 Case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, Inter-American Court of Human Rights 2001. 65 The community is extremely reliant on their natural environment for their survival, as all their living activities involve the use of the land they inhabit. It entered into an agreement with the Maderas y Derivados de Nicaragua, S.A (MADENSA) for the management of the forest. MADENSA later entered into another agreement with MARENA, involving the “definition” of the communal lands. MARENA granted a concession to the SOLCARSA Corporation for the extraction of timber, in the territory used by the Awas Tingni. The concession was deemed unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of Justice of Nicaragua because the Regional Council of RAAN had not approved it and consequently SOLCARSA requested that approval. The approval was later granted and challenged to Nicaragua’s Constitutional Court without however being overturned Id par.103.
In regards with Art.25, the Court reiterated its previous findings. More specifically, it emphasized that Art.25 sets “the obligation of the States to offer, to all persons under their jurisdiction, an effective legal remedy against acts that violate their fundamental rights.” This obligation applies not only to rights prescribed in the American Convention but also to national legislation. The inexistence of such a “simple and rapid remedy” constitutes “a transgression of the Convention”. It also does not suffice that provisions providing for judicial protection exist, but they must be effective. The Court examined the existence of a procedure for the indigenous land titling and demarcation and concluded that such a procedure was non-existent. Moreover, it examined the administrative and judicial measures available and found that Nicaragua had not adopted the measures necessary. It thereby found a violation of Art.25 of the Convention in connection with Arts.1.1 and 2 of the Convention. Case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, 2001 pars.111-139. 67 Id. at. par.145. 68 Id. at. par.146. 69 Id. at. par.148. 70 Id. at. par.149. 71 Ibid. 72 Ibid.
enjoy, even to preserve their cultural legacy and transmit it to the future generations”. 73 After examining both the customary law of the Awas Tingni and the Nicaraguan Constitution the Court found a violation of Art.21 and the right to property of the Awas Tingni indigenous community. 74 The Court once again gave special emphasis to the cultural and spiritual elements of the indigenous community. More specifically, it took into consideration the link of the community with their territory as a cultural and spiritual element and emphasized that their maintenance was of great importance for the survival of the indigenous people. The Court “went into depth in an integral interpretation of the indigenous cosmovision, insofar as the relationship of the members of the community with their ancestral lands”.75 In the Awas Tingni case, the Court for the first time examined the rights of the indigenous community as collective rights of subjects of international law.76The Court interpreted the right to property as including the indigenous peoples’ cultural rights.
MALCOLM LANGFORD, SOCIAL RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE : EMERGING TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2008. 2008) at 388. 78 Paloma Morais Correa, Poverty as a Violation of Human Rights: The Case of Street Children in Guatemala and Brazil [article] (2013) at 341. 79 Tinta. 2007 at 448. 80 Jo M. Pasqualucci, Right to a Dignified Life (Vida Digna): The Integration of Economic and Social Rights with Civil and Political Rights in the Inter-American Human Rights System, The [article] (2008) at 3. 81 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Frequently Asked Questions on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights § Factsheet No. 33 (2008) at 13. 82 Pasqualucci, Right to a Dignified Life (Vida Digna): The Integration of Economic and Social Rights with Civil and Political Rights in the Inter-American Human Rights System, The [article]. 2008] at 31. 83 Tinta. 2007 at 437.
Thomas M. Antkowiak, Moiwana Village v. Suriname: A Portal into Recent Jurisprudential Developments of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 25 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2007) at 271. 85 Maya Indigenous Communities of the Toledo District v. Belize, Inter-American Court of Human Rights 2004 in INDIGENOUS AND TRIBAL PEOPLES' RIGHTS OVER THEIR ANCESTRAL LANDS AND NATURAL RESOURCES: NORMS AND JURISPRUDENCE OF THE INTER-AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM, 35 AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW (2011) at 297. 86 Mary and Carrie Dann v. United States of America, Inter-American Court of Human Rights 2002 in AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW, (2011) at 304. 87 Alvarado, ARIZONA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW, (2007) at 614. 88 Id. at.617. 89 Correa, Poverty as a Violation of Human Rights: The Case of Street Children in Guatemala and Brazil [article]. 2013] at 346. 90 Alexandra R. Harrington, INTERNALIZING HUMAN RIGHTS IN LATIN AMERICA: THE ROLE OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM, 26 TEMPLE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW JOURNAL (2012) at 11.
Case of the Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, 2005;Case of Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, 2006;Case of the Saramaka People v. Suriname, 2007;Case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, 2001 105 Case of the Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, 2005;Case of Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, 2006;Case of the Saramaka People v. Suriname, 2007;Case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, 2001. 106 Case of Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, 2006 par.155.
3 The European Convention on Human Rights In this part, I examine Articles 2 (the right to life), 3 (prohibition of torture, degrading and inhuman treatment) and 8 (the right to family and private life) of the European Convention on Human Rights. I firstly, provide general information on the Articles and examine the case law under these provisions. I then proceed to analyze the case law as a whole, while considering the interpretative tools employed by the ECHR. At the end of the chapter, there is a summary pointing out the most important findings of the Chapter.
3.1.2 ECtHR’s jurisprudence The case of Pretty v. the United Kingdom, is used due to the reference of the ECtHR to “quality of living” and its findings under Art.8. The case of Osman is used due to the ECtHR’s reference to a State’s positive obligations under Art.2. Cyprus v. Turkey is used due to the use of social rights in relation to the right to life. Öneryildiz and Necheva are also employed for the same reason, and they extend further the application of socio-economic rights. All cases are related to the problem at hand since they examine States’ positive obligations in relation to the right to life as well as the possible incorporation of socio-economic rights in the context of the right to life.
Council of Europe, Protocol No. 13 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms Concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty in all Circumstances. 2002] See further 3.2.2.1, 3.2.2.2. 109 Korff Douwe, The right to life A guide to the implementation of Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 2006] at 7. 110 Case of Pretty v. the United Kingdom, 2002.
aspect” or a “quality of living” aspect and a choice of “what the person wants to do with his or her life”. 111 It further stated that Article 2 cannot, without a distortion of language, be interpreted as conferring the diametrically opposite right, namely a right to die; nor can it create a right to self-determination in the sense of conferring on an individual the entitlement to choose death rather than life.
The Court thus found that there was no violation of Art.2. In relation to Art.3, the applicant alleged that the criminal prosecution that her husband would face if he assisted her committing suicide constituted inhuman and degrading treatment in part of the UK because it failed to protect her from her suffering. The Court stressed out that whereas it does apply a dynamic and flexible approach to the interpretation of the Convention, which is a living instrument, any interpretation must also accord with the fundamental objectives of the Convention and its coherence as a system of human rights protection. Article 3 must be construed in harmony with Article 2.
As such, the Court found that not allowing the applicant to choose the way she finished what she considered as an “undignified and distressing end to her life” did amount to an interference under Art.8. However, it found that said interference was “necessary in a democratic society” “for the protection of the rights of others” since States are allowed to enact criminal legislation to ensure the protection of their population. As such, it found no violation of Art.8. The case of Pretty v. the UK is important in relation to the issue at hand for various reasons. First of all, it stated that issues of “quality living” are not included in Art.2. However, this must be construed in the context of assisted suicide that this case involved. Furthermore, in subsequent cases (See Necheva v. Bulgaria at 3.1.2.5), the Court clearly took the quality of living into consideration. Secondly, the Court clearly connected Art.2 and 3 and stated that Art.3 must be construed in accordance with Art.2.112 Thirdly, the Court brought forth the notion of dignity under Art.8 and concluded that issues regarding the “quality of living” are traced within this Article.
After examining the line of events leading to the fatal shooting, the Court concluded that the police did not know, or could not have known that the lives of the Osman family were in danger. As such, the Court found that there had been no violation of Art.2 and the right to life. 117 Even though the Court found no violation in regards to the right to life in the present case, albeit it is the first time that it made clear reference to positive obligations of a State under and the right to life. The Court further stated that any positive obligation should not pose an “impossible or disproportionate burden” to the State. However, “this does not amount to a blanket exception to duties under the right to life whenever the issue of funding is raised”. 118 The first time when the Court analyzed the positive obligations of a State in regards with Art.2 was the Osman case. Even though the Court did not find a violation, in that case, it “[…] identif[ied] and qualif[ied] the positive obligation of the State to protect individuals within its jurisdiction”. 119 The Court has thus found that a State does have positive obligations under Art.2.
Case of L.C.B v. the United Kingdom, 14/1997/798/1001, ECHR 1998 at 36 in Case of Osman v. the United Kingdom, 1998. 116 Case of Osman v. the United Kingdom, 1998 par.116. 117 Id. at. par.122. 118 WICKS, The right to life and conflicting interests. 2010 at 223. 119 Stuart E. Hendin, Evolution of the Right to Life by the European Court of Human Rights, The [article] (2004) at 81.
the municipality was aware of that fact from various reports. In 1992, a methane explosion occurred in the neighborhood. 132 Case of Öneryildiz v. Turkey, 2004 pars.9-43. 133 Id. at. par.89. 134 Id. at. par.90. 135 Id. at. par.94. 136 Id. at. par.110 and 118.
imminence of a natural hazard that has been clearly identifiable” (emphasis added). When turning to the facts of the present case the Court found that, there has indeed been a violation of Art.2, because “there was no justification for the authorities’ omissions” to adopt the measures required in order to avoid the danger in the applicants’ right to life. 144 Id. at. par.133. 145 Affaire Nencheva et Autres c. Bulgarie, no 48609/06, ECHR 2013. 146 All children died under unspecified conditions. Their medical records were not updated. During the period that the deaths occurred (1996-1997), Bulgaria’s socio-economic conditions were extremely hard. The Dzhurkovo center was awarded approximately the equivalent of 0,80EUR per day per inmate. In addition, the center was stationed in a secluded area, where the nearest hospital was 40km away and there were no means to transfer sick kids. There was no adequate heating, because of the oil shortage. The center was being heated one hour in the morning and one in the evening and, therefore, the inner temperature was around 12-15 Celsius degrees. The nutrition conditions were extremely poor and where often based on voluntaries from the nearby villages. The hygienic conditions were extremely bad, seeing that the staff could not wash and dry the clothes or linen as often as necessary. The director of the facility and the municipal authorities made official complaints about the situation in the center, requested for additional resources, and warned the central authorities about the seriousness of the situation since September 1996, and finally, grants were provided in February and April 1997. At that point, five children had already died. 147 Bulgaria raised an issue of exhaustion of local remedies. The Court ruled that in the present case the exhaustion of local remedies and the context of the case are closely related and as such found the case admissible. In regards to the procedural aspect of the right to life the Court stated that under Art.2, the State has an obligation to ensure the judicial or administrative response in case of life loss, as well as to take all appropriate measures to ensure that such a response is effective. It is not however required that one specific procedure is followed (i.e civil, criminal or administrative), as long as the procedure chosen corresponds to the graveness of the events and is effective. This cannot be construed as imposing an obligation to prosecute. However, at the same time, domestic Courts cannot leave unpunished unlawful interferences with the right to life.
endangered the lives of vulnerable children requiring specific and intense care. The Court then pointed out that the authorities were made aware of the circumstances already three months before the first death occurred and did not act. These events were not, noted the Court, sudden, occasional and unexpected, but a regular occurrence. The Court stated that since the State was aware of this situation, it had an obligation to take immediate, emergency measures in order to deal with the condition, regardless of the actions of the parents, as well as to provide an explanation for the deaths of the children. 148 As a result, the Court found a violation of Art.2 of the Convention. In Nencheva, the Court concluded that Bulgaria’s inaction in light of the conditions in the center amounted to a violation of Art.2. The Court referred to the specific situation in the center, that included unsuitable conditions of living, especially for physically and mentally ill children, and malnutrition. The State’s inability to provide the appropriate living conditions and prevent the deaths of children was considered a violation of Art.2. We can thus see that in this case, the Court has included living conditions and aspects of social rights in its ruling. Even though, it was a case of life-loss of people dependent on the State, albeit the deaths occurred because of the extremely poor living conditions in the center, thus adding a consideration of social rights in the context of Art.2.
The Court also analyzed the procedural process. More specifically, it pointed out that prompt investigations are required, and that regardless of the nature of the case, the State did not initiate proceedings for two years, and as a result material piece of evidence were destroyed and people deceased. The State did not conduct a thorough, effective investigation into the causes of the deaths and did not extend it to people other than three employers, when from the facts of the case it follows that the authorities could also be investigated. The Court thus found a violation of Art.2 in the procedural aspect as well.
Reidy Aisling, The prohibition of torture A guide to the implementation of Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights § Human rights handbook, No. 6 (Council of Europe, 2003). 150 Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 1950] Art.3 “No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” 151 Reidy Aisling, The prohibition of torture A guide to the implementation of Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 2003] at 8. 152 The Greek Case. (1969) at 168. 153 Case of Chahal v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 22414/93, ECHR 1996 par.79. 154 HARRIS, et al., Law of the European convention on human rights. 2009 at 70.
3.2.2 ECtHR jurisprudence Soering examines the way human dignity is affected by death penalty and the death row phenomenon, as well as the relation between Art.2 and Art.3. Al-Saadoon extends the previous findings of Soering and the relation between Art.2 and Art.3. In M.S.S, Larioshina and Moldovan the ECtHR includes certain and different socio-economic rights in the interpretation of Art.3. These cases are used since they are incorporating socio-economic rights and Art.2 is interpreted in the light of Art.3 (See below 4 and 1.4 Methodology).
WHITE, et al., Jacobs, White and Ovey, the European convention on human rights. 2010 at 177. 156 Case of Soering v. the United Kingdom, no. 14038/88, ECHR 1989. 157 Mr. Soering murdered his girlfriend’s parents in Virginia, US. 158 At that point, the death penalty was not abolished in the context of the Council of Europe. The death penalty was abolished in all circumstances with Protocol 13 to the Convention, in 2002.
phenomenon” that the applicant would be subjected to, could constitute a violation of Art.3 and found that it does. In the case of Soering, the Court interpreted Art.3 under the light of Art.2. It considered the evolution of the law and State practice in regards with death penalty. Even though, it found that death penalty does not amount as “inhuman or degrading treatment” under Art.3, albeit it found that the death-row phenomenon does, thus providing an effective protection of the applicant’s rights.
“inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment” in Article 3 as including the death penalty”. 163The Court reiterated that a violation under Articles 2 and 3 can arise in cases of expulsion and expulsion when death penalty is a possibility respectively. When assessing the facts of the case it found that there had been a violation of Art.3 of the Convention and as such there was no need to examine Art.2. In Al Saadoon the ECtHR connected Art.2 and the right to life with Art.3 and the prohibition of torture, inhuman and degrading treatment. In contrast to what the Court found in Soering, now it stated that the second paragraph of Art.2 cannot any longer limit the application of Art.3 in cases of death penalty. Its interpretation of the right to life in connection to Art.3 has thus evolved. In its analysis the Court clearly referred to the “inherent dignity of all human beings” and connected it with the protection of the right to life.
Case of Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v. the United Kingdom, 2010 at 120 See Case of Soering v. the United Kingdom, 1989 at 3.2.2.1. 164 Case of M.S.S v. Belgium and Greece [GC], no. 30696/09, ECHR 2011. 165 Id. at. pars.9-53. 166 Case of Labita v. Italy, no. 26772/95, ECHR 2000 at 119 in Case of M.S.S v. Belgium and Greece [GC], 2011 par.218.
Case of Kudla v. Poland, no. 30210/96, ECHR 2000 at 91 in Case of M.S.S v. Belgium and Greece [GC], 2011. 168 Case of Pretty v. the United Kingdom, 2002 at 52 in Case of M.S.S v. Belgium and Greece [GC], 2011 par.220. 169 Case of Kudla v. Poland, 2000 at 94 in Case of M.S.S v. Belgium and Greece [GC], 2011. 170 Case of M.S.S v. Belgium and Greece [GC], 2011 par.223. 171 Case of Chapman v. the United Kingdom, no. 27238/95, ECHR 2001 at 99 in Case of M.S.S v. Belgium and Greece [GC], 2011. 172 Affaire Muslim c. Turkey, no 53566/99, ECHR 2005 at 85 in Case of M.S.S v. Belgium and Greece [GC], 2011 par.249. 173 Budina v. Russia, no. 45603/05, ECHR 2009 in Case of M.S.S v. Belgium and Greece [GC], 2011 par.220.
3.2.2.4 Case of Larioshina v. Russia179 In this case the applicant, Mrs. Larioshina, was claiming that the pension provided to her by the Russian state was not sufficient for her to live in dignity and thus constituted inhuman and degrading treatment. The Court reiterated that the Convention does not guarantee socioeconomic rights per se. However, in cases where the amount of support by the State, when an individual is fully dependent on the State, is so low that the physical and mental health of the person is put into jeopardy, an issue can be raised under Art.3 of the Convention. It did not however find a violation of Art.3. Even though the Court stated that the ECHR does not guarantee socioeconomic rights, albeit it also made clear that in cases when the person is totally dependent on the State and its physical and mental health is put in danger by the lack of resources, an issue in regards with Art.3 might arise. As such, the Court has considered the application of socio-economic rights in the context of Art.3 in regards to living conditions based on lack of resources.
In A.A v. Greece, A.A, a Palestinian national entered Greece illegally and requested asylum which was not registered. He was then put in detention and the prosecutor of Samos ordered his expulsion. A.A resubmitted an asylum request, which was now registered but denied. A.A filed a complaint with the ECtHR, for inter alia a violation of Art.3 of the Convention because of his living conditions in the detention center. The Court gave special emphasis on the living conditions of the detention center. It emphasized that the building was not suitable to accommodate this amount of people; the hygiene was “deplorable”; there was no possibility for leisure or meals; the sanitary installations were common for men and women, did not have doors and were covered in used water; in order to make phone calls the detainees had to bribe the guards; there was no health center or the possibility to be transferred to the hospital. The Court further invoked UN reports referred to conditions against human dignity. In regards with the present case, the Court concluded that due to the fact that the applicant was not duly transferred to a hospital as well his overall living conditions, Art.3 was violated. Affaire A.A c. Gréce, no 12186/08, ECHR 2010. 179 Schoukens Paul, The Right to Access Health Care: Health Care according to International and European Social Security Law Instruments, (2008) at 45 in INTERNATIONAL HEALTH LAW: SOLIDARITY AND JUSTICE IN HEALTH CARE (den Exter A.P ed., Maklu. 2008).
Case of Moldovan and Others v. Romania (Judgment No.2), nos. 41138/98 and 64320/01, ECHR 2005. 181 After a bar brawl turned deadly, large scale events occurred in Hădăreni, Romania with dominant Roma population. More specifically, three Roma men, brothers Rapa Lupian Lăcătuş and Aurel Pardalian Lăcătuş and Mircea Zoltan began a fight with non-Rom Cheţan Gligor. Cheţan’s son, Crăciun, who came to his father’s aid, died in the conflict. Following the death of Cheţan Crăciun, the word spread in the village, and angry villagers gathered outside the house where all three men were hiding, demanding that they come out. When the men declined, the mob set fire to the house. The two brothers tried to escape, but were caught by the mob and beaten to death. The third man did not flee and was burnt alive in the house. The events continued for days, with Roma property being set on fire. The police were not acting to prevent the arsons, while police officers were reportedly a part of the events, either by directly participating or by inciting the acts. When the case was brought to the Romanian courts, the compensations awarded to the victims were extremely low. At the same time, the people charged with the homicides of the three men faced very low sentences. Id at pars.15-78. 182 Case of Moldovan and Others v. Romania (Judgment No.2), 2005 par.98. 183 Id. at. par.100.
The Court once again found a violation of Art.3 because of the living conditions the applicants were under, that interfered with their “human dignity”.
Kilkelly Ursula, Handbook No.1: The right to respect for private and family life. A guide to the implementation of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (2001). 188 Case of López Ostra v. Spain, no. 16798/90, 1994 par.51.
3.3.2 ECtHR’s jurisprudence The cases of V.C v. Slovakia and Connors v. the United Kingdom are chosen because of the ECtHR’s approach to the cultural diversity issues as well as the inclusion of socio-economic rights in Art.8. López Ostra and Hatton insert environmental considerations in Art.8. Sidabras and Dziautas further includes social rights in the context of Art.8.
Case of Johnston and Others v. Ireland, no. 9697/82, ECHR 1986, Case of Marckx v. Belgium, no. 6833/74, ECHR 1979 in HARRIS, et al., Law of the European convention on human rights. 2009 at 372. 190 Case of Keegan v. Ireland, ECHR 2006 and Case of Kearns v. France, no. 35991/04, ECHR 2008 in HARRIS, et al., Law of the European convention on human rights. 2009 at 372. 191 Case of X, Y and Z v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 21830/93, ECHR 1997 in HARRIS, et al., Law of the European convention on human rights. 2009 at 372. 192 HARRIS, et al., Law of the European convention on human rights. 2009 at 371. 193 Roagna Ivana, Protecting the right to respect for private and family life under the European Convention on Human Rights (Council of Europe 2012) at 11.
Art.2 is also interpreted under Art.8 (See below at 4), due to the importance of this Article in the inclusion of socio-economic and cultural life as well as the “quality of living” considerations (See above 1.4 Methodology).
3.3.2.2 Case of Connors v. the United Kingdom204 The applicant alleged violations of Art.8 for his forceful eviction from the plot he owned.205 In assessing Art.8 the Court reiterated that an interference will be considered “necessary in a democratic society” for a legitimate aim if it answers a “pressing social need” and, in particular, if it is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.
The Court then applied the aforementioned principles to the facts of the present case, concluded that the eviction did not follow the required procedural safeguards and as such found a violation of Art.8.212 The Court made important steps in including socio-economic and cultural rights in the context of Art.8. More specifically, it made clear reference to a “gypsy way of life”, “different lifestyle” and positive obligations in order to “facilitate” both. Moreover, the Court has accepted that in the issue of social and economic policies and more specifically housing, States have a wide margin of appreciation. This however means that the Court can still examine these policies, even in a lesser extent. This was apparent in the present case. The Court uplifted the importance of Art.8 and stressed out that in the case of Art.8 which concerns important aspects of a human entity, things are different. And it indeed found a violation of Art.8 for the applicant’s eviction. We can thus conclude that there is a consideration of socioeconomic and cultural policies in the context of Art.8.
malfunctioned, with gas fumes, pestilential smells being released and the residents of that particular area had to be evacuated and relocated by the local authorities for three months. Following complaints by the residents, the plant eventually closed, but certain nuisances continue and can have drawbacks on the health of the nearby residents. Mrs. López Ostra brought proceedings before the domestic courts, alleging an interference with the peaceful enjoyment of her home, her physical and psychological integrity, her liberty and safety and asked for a cessation of the activities. Her request was rejected. She then brought proceedings before the Supreme and Constitutional Court of Spain, but both times her case was dismissed. Id. at. pars.6-29. 215 Id. at. par.51. 216 Ibid. 217 Case of López Ostra v. Spain, 1994 par.58. 218 Aalt Willem Heringa, Private Life of the Protection of the Environment, Lopez-Ostra v. Spain, 2 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. L. (1995) at 201. 219 Case of Hatton and Others v. the United Kingdom, no.36022/97, ECHR 2003. 220 Mrs. Hatton and the other applicants were living in close proximity to Heathrow airport. Due to the noise, many of them had to move and others developed health issues. 221 Case of Hatton and Others v. the United Kingdom, 2003 par.96.
may apply in environmental cases whether the pollution is directly caused by the State or whether State responsibility arises from the failure to regulate private industry properly. 222 In cases where State decisions affect environmental issues, the Court’s assessment may be twofold; firstly, a control that the “merits of the government’s decision” are compatible with Art.8 and secondly that through the decision process due regards was awarded to the “interests of the individual”. However, it did not find a violation of Art.8 based on the facts of the present case.
proportionate and it found that it was not.237As such, it found a violation of Art.14 in conjunction with Art.8.238 In Sidabras the Court made the following very important distinction; it emphasized that nothing bans the Court from examining social and economic rights in the context of the Convention. The Court made that distinction in the context of the right to work. One could go so far as to say that it included figments of the right to work in the right to private and family life, by stating that restrictions to the private employment of a person owned to the loyalty to the State are disproportionate.
the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty. 3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context:(a) Any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions; (b) Any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation; (c) Any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties. 4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended”. 242 J. G. MERRILLS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE E UROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS (Manchester : Manchester University Press, 1993. 1993) at 69. 243 WHITE, et al., Jacobs, White and Ovey, the European convention on human rights. 2010 at 66. 244 HARRIS, et al., Law of the European convention on human rights. 2009 at 5. 245 Id. at.6. 246 Case of Klass and Others v. Germany, no. 5029/71, ECHR 1978 in Rudolf Bernhardt, Thoughts on the Interpretation of Human Rights Treaties in FRANZ MATSCHER, et al., PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS: THE EUROPEAN DIMENSION : STUDIES IN HONOUR OF GÉRARD J. WIARDA = PROTECTION DES DROITS DE L'HOMME: LA DIMENSION EUROPÉENNE : MÉLANGES EN L'HONNEUR DE GÉRARD J. WIARDA (Köln : Heymann, cop. 1988. 1988) at 70. 247 Added by the author: “An evolutive interpretation is an interpretation where a term is given a meaning that changes over time” in Helmersen, EUR. J. LEGAL STUD., (2013) at 162.
It is argued that the Court is at times, and more frequently employing an “integrated255 or holistic256 approach to human rights”. According to this approach “civil and political rights have inherent socio-economic components” which “should open up the possibility of the implementation of social rights, or some of their components, through petition procedures of civil and political rights”, which was apparent in Sidabras.257 In relation to positive obligation owed by the States under, for example Art.8 and environmental matters, they can be construed as either “the discovery of obligations that were always implicit in the guarantees concerned or as the addition of new obligations for [S]tates”.258 In its interpretation, the Court includes the principles of proportionality 259 and the margin of appreciation.260 Proportionality applies in cases of restrictions of the rights,261 positive obligations,262 non-discrimination cases, 263 and under Art.15.264 The principle does not apply under Art.3 of the Convention that inserts an absolute prohibition. 265 In reaching common “definitions”, the Court is employing “comparative law techniques”. If a common ground is reached, then that will apply.
WHITE, et al., Jacobs, White and Ovey, the European convention on human rights. 2010 at 69. 267 Case of Connors v. the United Kingdom, 2004. 268 HARRIS, et al., Law of the European convention on human rights. 2009 at 12 See 3.3. 269 Hendin, Evolution of the Right to Life by the European Court of Human Rights, The [article]. 2004] at 109. 270 HARRIS, et al., Law of the European convention on human rights. 2009 at 66. 271 Id. at. 48. 272 Korff Douwe, The right to life A guide to the implementation of Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 2006] at 65.
Clayton, Asylum Seekers in Europe: M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece [notes]. 2011] at 765. 285 Id. at.766. 286 Schoukens Paul, The Right to Access Health Care: Health Care according to International and European Social Security Law Instruments. 2008 at 530. 287 Natasa Mavronicola, Crime, Punishment and Article 3 ECHR: Puzzles and Prospects of Applying an Absolute Right in a Penal Context, 15 HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW (2015) at 741. 288 HARRIS, et al., Law of the European convention on human rights. 2009 at 422.
develop in line with social and technical developments”. 289 Besides, the Court itself found that “private life is a broad concept, incapable of exhaustive definition”.290 The Court has expanded the right to private life in a big part of human activities. This expansion “holds out a promise of protection of individual interests”. 291The margin of appreciation doctrine has assisted in this direction. And even though the Court respects States’ margin of appreciation, albeit it requires that certain procedural safeguards are met.292 The Court made a “conceptual shift within Article 8”, which “extends considerably the scope of the ECHR, including, in some cases, areas which had not been originally envisaged, i.e economic and social rights, environmental rights, etc.”293This was evident in the case of Sidabras and Dziautas v. Lithuania, where the Court included a social right, the right to work, in the interpretation of Art.8.294 It is a characteristic case of the State’s positive obligations in order for the rights of the Convention to be fully enjoyed. 295 The Court has thus “develop[ed] the interest protected to take into account changing circumstances and understandings without being confined by an established theoretical framework”296This is apparent from the Court’s approach to environmental issues and their relation to Art.8,297as for example in López Ostra.
3.5 Concluding remarks The Court has made steps forward in the interpretation of the rights to life, private and family life and the prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatment. More specifically, it considered the inclusion of socio-economic rights in the right to life (Cyprus v. Turkey), the prohibition of degrading and inhuman treatment (M.S.S v. Greece and Belgium) and the right to private and family life (López Ostra, Sidabras and Dziautas). The Court has expanded the application of both Art.3 and 8 and has acknowledged the existence of positive obligations under all three Articles. The Court did so by employing a teleological, evolutive, effective and holistic interpretation of the European Convention. This interpretation takes into account the fact that the European Convention aims to the protection of human rights; that the Convention is a living instrument; that the rights under the Convention ought to be protected effectively; and that the Convention ought to be read as a whole.
Richard Desgagne, Integrating Environmental Values into the European Convention on Human Rights, 1995, at 273. 299 Heringa, MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. L., (1995) at 203. 300 Id. at.204.
Court referred to the “gypsy way of life”. The Court has thus included these socio-economic rights in its findings under Articles 3 and 8. Turning to the first line of argumentation, the finding of the Court in Leander in relation to the ECHR’s interpretation, that it should be read as a whole, is relevant in this context. Articles 3 and 8 are part of the European Convention and under their interpretation, socio-economic rights that are linked to human dignity are included. 301 Consequently, Article 2 if read in the light of Articles 3 and 8, seeing that the Convention is to be read as a whole, will extend to include the socioeconomic rights found in these articles and as such as a right to live in dignity, as defined above. Indeed, this would be an example of the ECtHR’s integrated approach to human rights, as described in 3.4. Secondly, as the ECtHR has repeatedly stated, the purpose of the Convention is the effective protection of human rights. As has been shown in the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court and especially in relation to vulnerable groups, the right to life cannot be effectively protected, if its interpretation includes only the right not to be arbitrarily deprived of one’s life. Especially for vulnerable groups (e.g mentally ill in Necheva, Roma in V.C and Connors, asylum seekers in M.S.S, S.D and A.A etc.), the right to life ought to include the realisation of further rights in order not to be violated. That was evident in the cases concerning indigenous people before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. It was also evident in the case of Necheva, where the State ought to have provided better housing conditions, sanitation, nutrition and access to health care to mentally ill children under its protection. As such, in order for the right to life to be effectively protected under the ECHR, the ECtHR must employ a wider interpretation of Art.2, as a right to life in dignity.
See Mantouvalou, EUROPEAN LAW REVIEW, (2005).
appreciation” in these matters. In cases of vulnerable groups though, special consideration must be given, that might also include the realisation of certain of the aforementioned rights in the context of Art.2 and the right to life. Financial figures and their achievement should not be used to the detriment of those in need of special protection. A careful consideration and regulation of financial policies could be formed in a way that would allow the right to life to be fully protected, without a burdensome situation for the State. A development leading to a definition of the right to life as a right to a “dignified life” in the European system as in the Inter-American seems unlikely at this point. The reasons behind it are multidimensional. First of all, courts are reluctant to make decisions “about allocating resources”.307 At the same time, the reasons are also political. The ECtHR is only functional as long as its decisions are being followed by the Member-States. If it started imposing obligations that States considered unreasonable or burdensome, it is unlikely that they would follow them. As such the effectiveness of the Court would be severely injured. Life evolves. Conditions change. The effective protection of human rights presupposes that the law is interpreted according to these changes. If the right to life does not enlarge to include something more, it will shortly not be able to cover all conditions that will fall into its ambit. It is important that it includes more, both in quantity and in quality; that it takes into consideration vulnerabilities and cultural characteristics. The real challenge is that the law evolves. For the right to life cannot be really protected any longer as it is; it needs to evolve as well.
WICKS, The right to life and conflicting interests. 2010 at 222; Sandra Fredman, Human rights transformed: positive duties and positive rights, (2006).
(Dordrecht : Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, cop. 2001, 2., rev.
MARK VAN HOECKE, METHODOLOGIES OF LEGAL RESEARCH. [ELEKTRONISK RESURS] : WHAT KIND OF METHOD FOR WHAT KIND OF DISCIPLINE?
ANCESTRAL LANDS AND NATURAL RESOURCES: NORMS AND JURISPRUDENCE OF THE INTER-AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM, 35 AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW (2011) Leonardo J. Alvarado, PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES' HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: LESSONS FROM THE CASE OF A WAS TINGNI v.
Report "Beyond the Right to Life: The Right to Live in Dignity in"

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