Source: https://wcc.state.ct.us/crb/2019/6243crb.htm
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 01:57:28+00:00

Document:
The claimant was represented by Jonathan H. Dodd, Esq., The Dodd Law Firm, L.L.C., Ten Corporate Center, 1781 Highland Avenue, Suite 105, Cheshire, CT 06410.
The respondent was represented by Lawrence G. Widem, Esq., Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General, 55 Elm Street, P.O. Box 120, Hartford, CT 06141-0120.
SCOTT A. BARTON, COMMISSIONER: The claimant has appealed from the February 1, 2018 Revised Finding and Orders after Motions to Correct from Both Parties (finding) issued by Commissioner Christine L. Engel (commissioner). In the finding, the commissioner determined that for the purposes of General Statutes § 5-142 (a), the claimant’s compensation rate should be calculated on the basis of a twenty-eight hour workweek.2 The claimant argues that her job was based on a thirty-two hour workweek. Twenty-eight hours per week was the standard workweek, and as a condition of her employment, she was required to work four hours per week standard overtime. The commissioner, in reliance upon an arbitration decision limiting vacation and personal leave accruals to those earned based on a twenty-eight hour workweek, determined that for the purposes of § 5-142 (a), the claimant should be compensated based on a twenty-eight hour workweek. Upon review, we conclude that this was not the “full salary” the claimant was earning at the time she was injured and our precedent such as Boulay v. Waterbury, 9 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 111, 941 CRD-5-89-11 (April 8, 1991), aff’d, 27 Conn. App. 483 (1992), cert. denied, 223 Conn. 905 (1982), stands for the proposition that a collective bargaining agreement cannot agree to provide for a different level of benefits than is mandated under our statute. Accordingly, we vacate the finding as to the claimant’s compensation rate and remand for a new finding based on the claimant working a thirty-two hour workweek.
The following facts are relevant to our inquiry. The formal hearing in this matter involved three issues: the compensability of the claimant’s hypersomnia; the length of time the claimant was entitled to temporary total disability benefits; and the compensation rate at which the claimant was entitled to § 5-142 (a) benefits. The first two issues were resolved in the finding and were not appealed and we will not address them at this juncture. The commissioner noted in the finding that there had been a prior formal hearing in this claim and took administrative notice of various findings from that decision. As for the issues regarding § 5-142 (a), the commissioner noted that the parties had stipulated that this statute applied to this claim and that pursuant to this statute, the claimant was entitled to her “full salary” while she was totally disabled. Findings, ¶ 4. She also noted that counsel for the claimant cited Vecca v. State, 29 Conn. App. 559 (1992), for the proposition that “full salary” was defined as “an employee’s base pay prior to the inclusion of overtime pay or other salary enhancements.” Id., 563; Findings, ¶ 5.
The commissioner considered testimony from the claimant and from Attorney Sandra Fae Brown-Brewton, the Assistant Chief of Labor Relations for the State of Connecticut Office of Policy and Management, Office of Labor Relations, on the issue of what the claimant’s “full salary” entailed. The claimant testified that she was hired for her current position in 2011 by the State of Connecticut (state) at the Department of Mental Health and Addiction Services (DMHAS), was paid for eight hours of work per day, and her workweek was thirty-two hours per week. The commissioner noted that at a prior formal hearing on August 27, 2014, the claimant testified that her position was a “28-hour position” and the additional four hours per week were called “built-in standard overtime.” August 27, 2014 Transcript, pp. 16-17; Findings, ¶ 27. The claimant noted that her union had filed a grievance at some point after 2011 as to the classification of twenty-eight hours per week as regular work hours and four hours as overtime, but the commissioner noted that she did not submit a copy of such a grievance decision as evidence. The claimant did testify that in most two-week periods, she worked seventy-two hours.
Brown-Brewton testified as to the respondent’s position and presented as evidence an Opinion and Award between the state and the claimant’s bargaining unit dated June 13, 2015 (arbitration decision). See Respondent’s Exhibit 2 (July 17, 2017). She testified that this arbitration decision dealt with vacation and personal time accruals which the union believed should have been calculated on the basis of a thirty-two hour workweek. Brown-Brewton also testified that “28 plus 4 employees” had basic employment of twenty-eight hours per week and regularly work four or more hours a week of overtime. Any hours beyond twenty-eight hours per week is considered overtime no matter how often the employee works those hours. Brown-Brewton said that the union had previously brought up the issue of deeming “28 plus 4 employees” as being “thirty-two hour per week” employees, but the union withdrew that issue. She also testified that the state’s position is that the base pay for someone hired to work or scheduled to work twenty-eight hours is based on a twenty-eight hour workweek, and any hours beyond that are deemed overtime. Their base pay is based on a twenty-eight hour workweek and not a thirty-two hour workweek.
The commissioner also noted that the claimant’s hours of employment and weekly wage determination were governed by a collective bargaining agreement between her union and the state. The commissioner also reviewed the terms of the arbitration decision and noted that it determined that the state did not violate the collective bargaining agreement in the manner in which it calculated personal leave accruals for the “28+4 employees” at DMHAS (utilizing a twenty-eight hour workweek) thus denying the union’s grievance. The commissioner also noted that the claimant had not raised the workweek issue herself with her union; nor were they aware she had filed a workers’ compensation claim.
Based on these facts, the commissioner determined that the claimant’s testimony that her base salary should be calculated on a thirty-two hour per week basis was not persuasive. She found her testimony from the 2014 formal hearing that her position was a twenty-eight hour a week position persuasive but her testimony as to the number of hours she generally worked at present was not relevant to her compensation rate in 2012. Reviewing the arbitration decision, the commissioner determined that it allowed her to conclude that it created a separate class of “28+4 employees” at DMHAS, and by reading the arbitration decision in conjunction with Brown-Brewton’s testimony, which was deemed persuasive, it enabled the commissioner to conclude that the base salary of a “28+4 employee” should be calculated on a twenty-eight hour workweek. As a result, in Order, ¶ III of the finding, the commissioner determined that the claimant’s compensation rate pursuant to § 5-142 (a) should be calculated based on a twenty-eight hour workweek.
Both the claimant and the respondent filed motions to correct the original finding. The claimant’s motion to correct was denied in its entirety while the commissioner incorporated some corrections suggested by the respondent in the revised finding which reached the same result as to what relief was due the claimant. The claimant filed a timely appeal from the finding, arguing that it was error to find the claimant’s base salary for the purposes of § 5-142 (a) was based on a twenty-eight hour workweek and not a thirty-two hour workweek. The respondent argues that the reasoning in the arbitration decision should be binding on this tribunal and the commissioner was correct to rely upon this decision.
We note that the facts relevant to this appeal are not the subject of a substantive dispute. We will therefore focus our review on appeal to whether the commissioner appropriately applied the law. Nonetheless, we still extend great deference to the findings of a commissioner. “The trial commissioner’s factual findings and conclusions must stand unless they are without evidence, contrary to law or based on unreasonable or impermissible factual inferences.” Russo v. Hartford, 4769 CRB-1-04-1 (December 15, 2004), citing Fair v. People’s Savings Bank, 207 Conn. 535, 539 (1988). Moreover, “[a]s with any discretionary action of the trial court, appellate review requires every reasonable presumption in favor of the action, and the ultimate issue for us is whether the trial court could have reasonably concluded as it did.” Burton v. Mottolese, 267 Conn. 1, 54 (2003), quoting Thalheim v. Greenwich, 256 Conn. 628, 656 (2001). “This presumption, however, can be challenged by the argument that the trial commissioner did not properly apply the law or has reached a finding of fact inconsistent with the evidence presented at the formal hearing.” Christensen v. H & L Plastics Co., Inc., 5171 CRB-3-06-12 (November 19, 2007).
The essential question is what defines the term “full salary” for the claimant? The respondent argues that pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement, the “full salary” was what the claimant earned in a twenty-eight hour workweek, and her earnings from the four hours of “overtime” under the “28+4” schedule were in excess of her “full salary.” The claimant argues that that constitutes a semantic argument and her standard workweek during the period relevant to calculation of a § 5-142 (a) compensation rate was a thirty-two hour workweek. Upon review, we conclude that based on the facts herein, a twenty-eight hour workweek was not a “full” workweek for the claimant and compensating her on that basis would be providing her less than her “full salary” during her period of disability.
We have reviewed the relevant case law on this matter. We note that it is clear that overtime earnings have generally been determined to be above and beyond the “full salary” that a claimant should receive as a benefit under § 5-142 (a). See Palmer v. State/Fairfield Hills, 9 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 53, 900 CRD-4-89-7 (February 4, 1991), and Vecca, supra, 561-62. The claimant points to a letter offering her the current position as establishing a standard schedule of four eight-hour shifts per week. See Claimant’s Exhibit A (August 27, 2014). The evidence presented at the formal hearing established that the claimant was paid at the same hourly rate for the hours she worked after she worked twenty-eight hours per week up to working thirty-two hours per week. The claimant also argues that the testimony of Brown-Brewton and the terms of the arbitration decision should be limited to the issue of vacation and personal time accruals and are not dispositive of the issue of what a “full salary” is for the claimant for the purposes of § 5-142 (a).
The Appellate Court in Boulay, supra, affirmed this commission’s position that the commission must interpret its statutes independently and is not bound by collective bargaining agreements which may result in an award of benefits inconsistent with our statutes. Since that decision, there have been further decisions demonstrating that a claimant cannot bargain away his or her rights in order to seek redress before this commission for benefits under the statute. See Leonetti v. MacDermid, Inc., 310 Conn. 195 (2013), and Zolla v. John Cheeseman Trucking, Inc., 5261 CRB-5-07-8 (August 4, 2008), appeal dismissed, A.C. 30251 (March 5, 2009).
Nonetheless, had the arbitration decision unequivocally determined that the claimant’s “full salary” was based on a twenty-eight hour workweek, we would affirm the finding in this case, as the commissioner’s decision would have been based on probative evidence relevant to the issue at hand. After reviewing the arbitration decision, we find it did not address this issue directly and we are unwilling to infer that it was intended to address this issue. The sole issue addressed in the arbitration decision was the accrual of personal leave time as provided for in the collective bargaining agreement. The state noted that “28+4 employees” had been accruing time in the same manner since 1988 and argued that changing the accrual approach should be left to future negotiations. See Respondent’s Exhibit 2 (July 17, 2017), p. 8.
In his decision, the arbitrator noted that the relevant provision of the collective bargaining agreement did not mention “28+4 employees” id., 9, and the state was asserting a practice in place since 1988. Id., 9-10. Since “[n]otions of fairness and equity... simply cannot be read into the Parties’ Agreement,” the arbitrator ruled for the state. Id., 10. The arbitration decision does not discuss the term “salary” or “overtime” at any point within the four corners of the document. A more reasonable inference from reading this document is that the position proffered by the state in this matter is that at some point in the past the state decided to limit personal time accruals for part-time employees by adopting the “28+4 schedule” and the union had failed to address the issue in previous negotiations.
We reach this conclusion in part based on what the commonly accepted definition of “overtime” is. As defined in Black’s Law Dictionary (8th Ed. 2004), overtime is “[t]he hours worked by an employee in excess of a standard day or week.” (Emphasis added.) The claimant’s testimony was that her standard workweek was that of four eight-hour shifts. Indeed, she described that difference between twenty-eight hours and thirty-two hours a week as being “built-in standard overtime.” (Emphasis added.) Findings, ¶ 27. Our review of Brown-Brewton’s testimony indicates that she did not refute this characterization. Her testimony was that the state could mandate that the claimant work the difference between twenty-eight hours and thirty-two hours at the state’s direction. See July 17, 2017 Transcript, pp. 30-31. As a result, the evidence herein was that the claimant’s standard workweek was thirty-two hours per week.
Essentially, the paradigm that the state persuaded the commissioner to adopt in this case was that the claimant’s “standard workweek” was twenty-eight hours a week and that her full salary should be calculated for § 5-142 (a) purposes on that basis. The difficulty with this theory is that when the evidence showed the claimant was actually expected to work thirty-two hours a week, the “28+4” schedule yields what the Appellate Court in Vecca, supra, deemed “bizarre results.” Id., n.4. In Vecca, in which the Appellate Court declined to allow a claimant to add overtime earnings to the base for § 5-142 (a), the court noted that “[u]nder the claimant’s interpretation of the statute, two similarly situated state employees will receive different benefits under § 5-142 (a) simply because one happened to work more overtime or on a shift paying a differential during the pay period preceding the injury.” Id. We are not persuaded that it is a more reasonable result to have two different employees who regularly worked a thirty-two hour workweek shift receiving a different level of compensation under this statute based on whether their employer classified certain work hours as “standard overtime.” 5 Since a claimant is entitled to compensation based on his or her “full salary,” see Jones v. Mansfield Training School, 220 Conn. 721, 725 (1992), we believe that under the facts as presented herein, the claimant’s full salary must be calculated based on what a commonly understood “base salary” would be; i.e., the actual hours she was contractually obligated to work on a regular basis during the period prior to injury, regardless if such hours are labeled “overtime” by her employer.
Therefore, we vacate Order III of the finding and remand this matter to establish the claimant’s § 5-142 (a) compensation rate as being based on a thirty-two hour workweek.
Commissioners Peter C. Mlynarczyk and Brenda D. Jannotta concur in this opinion.

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