Source: https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/252/239
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 07:02:48+00:00

Document:
PIERCE et al. v. UNITED STATES.
Argued: Nov. 18 and 19, 1919.
Mr. Frederick A. Mohr, of Auburn, N. Y., for plaintiffs in error.
The third count charged that during the same period and on August 26, 1917, the United States being at war, etc., defendants at the city of Albany, etc., willfully and feloniously made, distributed, and conveyed to certain persons named and others to the grand jurors unknown certain false reports and false statements in certain pamphlets attached to and made a part of the indictment and headed 'The Price We Pay,' which false statements were in part as shown by certain extracts quoted from the pamphlet, with intent to interfere with the operation and success of the military and naval forces of the United States.
The present direct writ of error was sued out under section 238, Judicial Code (Comp. St. § 1215), because of contentions that the Selective Draft Act (Comp. St. 1918, Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, §§ 2044a-2044k) and the Espionage Act ( 40 Stat. 217) were unconstitutional. These have since been set at rest. Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U. S. 366, 38 Sup. Ct. 159, 62 L. Ed. 349, L. R. A. 1918C, 361, Ann. Cas. 1918B, 856; Schenck v. United States, 249 U. S. 47, 51, 39 Sup. Ct. 247, 63 L. Ed. 470; Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U. S. 204, 39 Sup. Ct. 249, 63 L. Ed. 561; Debs v. United States, 249 U. S. 211, 215, 39 Sup. Ct. 252, 63 L. Ed. 566. But our jurisdiction continues for the purpose of disposing of other questions raised in the record. Brolan v. United States, 236 U. S. 216, 35 Sup. Ct. 285, 59 L. Ed. 544.
It is insisted that there was error in refusing to sustain the demurrer, and this on the ground that (1) the facts and circumstances upon which the allegation of conspiracy rested were not stated; (2) there was a failure to set forth facts or circumstances showing unlawful motive or intent; (3) there was a failure to show a clear and present danger that the distribution of the pamphlet would bring about the evils that Congress sought to prevent by the enactment of the Espionage Act; and (4) that the statements contained in the pamphlet were not such as would naturally produce the forbidden consequences.
What we have recited of the second count shows a sufficiently definite averment of a conspiracy and overt acts under the provisions of title 1 of the Espionage Act. 1 The fourth section makes criminal a conspiracy 'to violate the provisions of sections two or three of this title,' provided one or more of the conspirators do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy. Such a conspiracy, thus attempted to be carried into effect, is none the less punishable because the conspirators fail to agree in advance upon the precise method in which the law shall be violated. It is true the averment of the conspiracy cannot be aided by the allegations respecting the overt acts. United States v. Britton, 108 U. S. 199, 205, 2 Sup. Ct. 531, 27 L. Ed. 698; Joplin Mercantile Co. v. United States, 236 U. S. 531, 563, 35 Sup. Ct. 291, 59 L. Ed. 705. On the other hand, while under section 4 of the Espionage Act, as under section 37 of the Criminal Code (Comp. St. § 10201), a mere conspiracy, without overt act done in pursuance of it, is not punishable criminally, yet the overt act need not be in and of itself a criminal act; still less need it constitute the very crime that is the object of the conspiracy. United States v. Rabinowich, 238 U. S. 78, 86, 35 Sup. Ct. 682, 59 L. Ed. 1211; Goldman v. United States, 245 U. S. 474, 477, 38 Sup. Ct. 166, 62 L. Ed. 410.
Upon the trial, defendants' counsel moved that the jury be directed to acquit the defendants, upon the ground that the evidence was not sufficient to sustain a conviction. Under the exceptions taken to the refusal of this motion it is urged that there was no proof (a) of conspiracy; (b) of criminal purpose or intent; (c) of the falsity of the statements contained in the pamphlet circulate; (d) of knowledge on defendants' part of such falsity; or (e) of circumstances creating a danger that its circulation would produce the evils which Congress sought to prevent; and further (f) that the pamphlet itself could not legitimately be construed as tending to produce the prohibited consequences.
'Agonies of torture will rend their flesh from their sinews, will crack their bones and disslove their lungs; every pang will be multiplied in its passage to you.
'Black death will be a guest at every American fireside. Mothers and fathers and sisters, wives and sweethearts will know the weight of that awful vacancy left by the bullet which finds its mark.
'It is the price you pay for your stupidityyou who have rejected Socialism.
* * * 'This, you say, is a war for the rights of small nations and the first land sighted when you sail across the Atlantic is the nation of Ireland, which has suffered from England for three centuries more than what Germany has inflicted upon Belgium for three years.
'But go to it! Believe everything you are toldyou always have, and doubtless always will, believe them.
'For this waras every one who thinks or knows anything will say, whenever truth-telling becomes safe and possible again, This war is to determine the question, whether the chambers of commerce of the Allied Nations or of the Central Empires have the superior right to exploit undeveloped countries.
It was in evidence that defendants were members of the Socialist partya party 'organized in locals throughout the country'and affiliated with a local branch in the city of Albany. There was evidence that at a meeting of that branch, held July 11, 1917, at which Pierce was present, the question of distributing 'The Price We Pay' was brought up, sample copies obtained from the national organization at Chicago having been produced for examination and consideration; that the pamphlet was discussed, as well as the question of ordering a large number of copies from the national organization for distribution; it was stated that criminal proceedings were pending in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland against parties indicted for distributing the same pamphlet; some of the members present, one of them an attorney, advised against its distribution, and a motion was adopted not to distribute it until it was known to be legal. However, some action appears to have been taken towards procuring copies for distribution, for on July 17th a large bundle of them, said to have been 5,000 copies, was delivered at Pierce's house by the literature agent of the Albany local. At a meeting held July 25 the subject was again brought up, it having become known that in the criminal proceedings before mentioned the court had directed a verdict of acquittal; thereupon the resolution of July 11 was rescinded and distributors were called for. On July 29, defendants Pierce, Creo, and Zeilman met at Pierce's house about half past 5 o'clock in the morning, and immediately began distributing the pamphlets in large numbers throughout the city of Albany. Each of them took about 500 copies, and having agreed among themselves about the division of the territory, they went from house to house, leaving a copy upon each doorstep. They repeated this on successive Sundays until August 26, when they were arrested. Nelson acted with them as a distributor on the latter date, and perhaps on one previous occasion.
It was shown without dispute that defendants distributed the pamphlet'The Price We Pay'with full understanding of its contents; and this of itself furnished a ground for attributing to them an intent to bring about, and for finding that they attempted to bring about, any and all such consequences as reasonably might be anticipated from its distribution. If its probable effect was at all disputable, at least the jury fairly might believe that, under the circumstances existing, it would have a tendency to cause insubordination, disloyalty, and refusal of duty in the military and naval forces of the United States; that it amounted to an obstruction of the recruiting and enlistment service; and that it was intended to interfere with the success of our military and naval forces in the war in which the United States was then engaged. Evidently it was intended, as the jury found, to interfere with the conscription and recruitment services; to cause men eligible for the service to evade the draft; to bring home to them, and especially to their parents, sisters, wives, and sweethearts, a sense of impending personal loss, calculated to discourage the young men from entering the service; to arouse suspicion as to whether the chief law officer of the government was not more concerned in enforcing the strictness of military discipline than in protecting the people against improper speculation in their food supply; and to produce a belief that our participation in the war was the product of sordid and sinister motives, rather than a design to protect the interests and maintain the honor of the United States.
What interpretation ought to be placed upon the pamphlet, what would be the probable effect of distributing it in the mode adopted, and what were defendants' motives in doing this, were questions for the jury, not the court, to decide. Defendants took the witness stand and severally testified, in effect, that their sole purpose was to gain converts for Socialism, not to interfere with the operation or success of the naval or military forces of the United States. But their evidence was far from conclusive, and the jury very reasonably might findas evidently they didthat the protestations of innocence were insincere, and that the real purpose of defendantsindeed, the real object of the pamphletwas to hamper the government in the prosecution of the war.
Whether the printed words would in fact produce as a proximate result a material interference with the recruiting or enlistment service, or the operation or success of the forces of the United States, was a question for the jury to decide in view of all the circumstances of the time and considering the place and manner of distribution. Schenck v. United States, 249 U. S. 47, 52, 39 Sup. Ct. 247, 63 L. Ed. 470; Frohwerk v. United States, 249, U. S. 204, 208, 39 Sup. Ct. 249, 63 L. Ed. 561; Debs v. United States, 249 U. S. 211, 215, 39 Sup. Ct. 252, 63 L. Ed. 566.
The validity of the conviction upon the third count (the only one that includes Nelson) depends upon whether there was lawful evidence of the falsity of the statements contained in the pamphlet and tending to show that, knowing they were false, or disregarding their probable falsity, defendants willfully circulated it, with intent to interfere with the operation or success of the military or naval forces of the United States. The criticism of the evidence admitted to show the untruth of the statements about the Attorney General and about J. P. Morgan's loans to the Allies is not well founded; the evidence was admissible; but we hardly see that it was needed to convince a reasonable jury of the falsity of these and other statements contained in the pamphlet. Common knowledge (not to mention the President's address to Congress of April 2, 1917, and the Joint Resolution of April 6 declaring war 40 Stat. 1, which were introduced in evidence) would have sufficed to show at least that the statements as to the causes that led to the entry of the United States into the war against Germany were grossly false, and such common knowledge went to prove also that defendants knew they were untrue. That they were false if taken in a literal sense hardly is disputed. It is argued that they ought not to be taken literally. But when it is remembered that the pamphlet was intended to be circulated, and so far as defendants acted in the matter was circulated, among readers of all classes and conditions, it cannot be said as matter of law that no considerable number of them would understand the statements in a literal sense and take them seriously. The jury was warranted in finding the statements false in fact, and known to be so by the defendants, or else distributed recklessly, without effort to ascertain the truth (see Cooper v. Schlesinger, 111 U. S. 148, 155, 4 Sup. Ct. 360, 28 L. Ed. 382), and circulated willfully in order to interfere with the success of the forces of the United States. This is sufficient to sustain the conviction of all of the defendants upon the third count.
There being substantial evidence in support of the charges, the court would have erred if it had peremptorily directed an acquittal upon any of the counts. The question whether the effect of the evidence was such as to overcome any reasonable doubt of guilt was for the jury, not the court, to decide.
It is suggested that the clause of section 3'Whoever, when the United States is at war, shall willfully make or convey false reports or false statements with intent to interfere with the operation or success of the military or naval forces of the United States, or to promote the success of its enemies'cannot be construed to cover statements that on their face, to the common understanding, do not purport to convey anything new, but only to interpret or comment on matters pretended to be facts of public knowledge; and that however false the statements and with whatever evil purpose circulated, they are not punishable if accompanied with a pretense of commenting upon them as matters of public concern. We cannot accept such a construction; it unduly restricts the natural meaning of the clause, leaves little for it to operate upon, and disregards the context and the circumstances under which the statute was passed. In effect, it would allow the professed advocate of disloyalty to escape responsibility for statements however audaciously false, so long as he did but reiterate what had been said before; while his ignorant dupes, believing his statements and thereby persuaded to obstruct the recruiting or enlistment service, would be punishable by fine or imprisonment under the same section.
The conceded insufficiency of the first count of the indictment does not warrant a reversal, since the sentences imposed upon Pierce, Creo, and Zeilman did not exceed that which lawfully might have been imposed under the second, third, or sixth counts, so that the concurrent sentence under the first count adds nothing to their punishment. Claassen v. United States, 142 U. S. 140, 146, 12 Sup. Ct. 169, 35 L. Ed. 966; Evans v. United States (two cases) 153 U. S. 584, 595, 608, 14 Sup. Ct. 934, 939, 38 L. Ed. 830, 839; Putnam v. United States, 162 U. S. 687, 714, 16 Sup. Ct. 923, 40 L. Ed. 1118; Abrams v. United States, 250 U. S. 616, 619, 40 Sup. Ct. 17, 63 L. Ed. 1173.
What is called 'distributing literature' is a means commonly used by the Socialist party to increase its membership and otherwise to advance the cause it advocates. To this end the national organization with headquarters at Chicago publishes such 'literature' from time to time and sends sample copies to the local organizations. These, when they approve, purchase copies and call upon members to volunteer for service in making the distribution locally. Some time before July 11, 1917, a local of the Socialist party at Albany, New York, received from the national organization sample copies of a four-page leaflet entitled 'The Price We Pay,' written by Irwin St. John Tucker, an Episcopal clergyman and a man of sufficient prominence to have been included in the 1916-1917 edition of 'Who's Who in America.' The proposal to distribute this leaflet came up for action at a meeting of the Albany local held on July 11, 1917. A member who was a lawyer called attention to the fact that the question whether it was legal to distribute this leaflet was involved in a case pending in Baltimore in the District Court of the United States; and it was voted 'not to distribute 'The Price We Pay' until we know if it is legal.' The case referred to was an indictment under the Selective Draft Act for conspiracy to obstruct recruiting by means of distributing the leaflet. Shortly after the July 11th meeting it became known that District Judge Rose had directed an acquittal in that case; and at the next meeting of the local, held July 25th, it was voted to rescind the motion 'against distributing 'The Price We Pay' and call for distributors.' Four members of the local, two of them native Americans, one a naturalized citizen, and the fourth a foreigner who had filed his first naturalization papers, volunteered as distributors. They distributed about 5,000 copies by hand in Albany.
In New York a different view was taken, and an indictment in six counts was found against the four distributors. Two of the counts were eliminated at the trial. On the other four there were convictions, and on each a sentence of fine and imprisonment. But one of the four counts was abandoned by the government in this court. There remain for consideration count 3, which charges a violation of section 3 of the Espionage Act by making false reports and false statements, with the intent 'to interfere with the operation and success of the military and naval forces,' and counts 2 and 6, also involving section 3 of the Espionage Act, the one for conspiring, the other for at tempting, 'to cause insubordination, disloyalty and refusal of duty in the military and naval forces.' Demurrers to the several counts and motions that a verdict be directed for the several defendants were overruled.
(1) The statement or report must be of something capable of being proved false in fact. The expression of an opinion, for instance, whether sound or unsound, might conceivably afford a sufficient basis for the charge of attempting to cause insubordination, disloyalty or refusal of duty, or for the charge of obstructing recruiting; but, because an opinion is not capable of being proved false in fact, a statement of it cannot be made the basis of a prosecution of the first class.
Into that seething, heaving swamp of torn flesh and floating entrails they will be plunged, in regiments, divisions and armies, screaming as they go.
Many a highland home will wail and croon for many a year, because of these crumpled masses of carrion, wrapped in their plaids, upon a far French hillside.
It is the price you pay for your stupidityyou who have rejected Socialism.
Wheat, corn, potatoes, are far above the Civil War mark; eggs, butter, meatall these things are almost beyond a poor family's reach.
The Attorney General of the United States is so busy sending to prison men who do not stand up when the Star Spangled Banner is played, that he has no time to protect the food supply from gamblers.
Starvation begins to stare us in the faceand we, people of the richest and most productive land on earth are told to starve ourselves yet further because our allies must be fed.
But go to it! Believe everything you are toldyou always have and doubtless always will, believe them.
We are beholding the spectacle of whole nations working as one person for the accomplishment of a single endnamely killing.
Now you call every person traitor, slacker, proenemy who will not go crazy on the subject of killing; and you have turned the whole energy of the nations of the world into the service of their kings for the purpose of killingkilling killing.
Those idle taunts, those thoughtless jeers, that refusal to listen, to be fair-mindedyou are paying for them now.
For this waras every one who thinks or knows anything will say, whenever truth-telling becomes safe and possible again, This war is to determine the question, whether the chambers of commerce of the Allied Nations or of the Central Empires have the superior right to exploit undeveloped countries.
Socialism would have settled that question; it would determine that to every producer shall be given all the value of what he produces; so that nothing would be left over for exploiters or investors.
With that great question settled there would be no cause for war.
Until thenyou will keep on paying the price!
First. From this leaflet, which is divided into six chapters, there are set forth, in count 3, five sentences as constituting the false statements or reports willfully conveyed by defendants with the intent to interfere with the operation and success of the military and naval forces of the United States.
To prove the alleged falsity of these statements the government gravely called as a witness a major in the regular army with 28 years' experience, who has been assigned since July 5, 1917, to recruiting work. He testified that 'recruiting' has to do with the volunteer service and has nothing to do with the drafting system and that the word 'impress' has no place in the recruiting service. The subject of his testimony was a matter, not of fact, but of law, and as a statement of law it was erroneous. That 'recruiting is gaining fresh supplies for the forces, as well by draft as otherwise,' had been assumed by the Circuit Court of Appeals for that circuit in Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 246 Fed. 24, 158 C. C. A. 250, L. R. A. 1918C, 79, Ann. Cas. 1918B, 999 (decided 11 days before this testimony was given), and was later expressly held by this court in Schenck v. United States, 249 U. S. 47, 53, 39 Sup. Ct. 247, 63 L. Ed. 470. The third of the sentences charged as false was obviously neither a statement nor a report, but a prediction; and it was later verified. 2 That the prediction made in the leaflet was later verified is, of course, immaterial; but the fact shows the danger of extending beyond its appropriate sphere the scope of a charge of falsity.
The cause of a waras of most human actionis not single. War is ordinarily the result of many co-operating causes, many different conditions, acts and motives. Historians rarely agree in their judgment as to what was the determining factor in a particular war, even when they write under circumstances where detachment and the availability of evidence from all sources minimizes both prejudice and other sources of error; for individuals, and classes of individuals, attach significance to those things which are significant to them, and, as the contributing causes cannot be subjected, like a chemical combination in a test tube, to qualitative and quantitative analysis, so as to weigh and value the various elements, the historians differ necessarily in their judgments. One finds the determining cause of war in a great man; another in an idea, a belief, an economic necessity, a trade advantage, a sinister machination, or an accident. It is for this reason largely that men seek to interpret anew in each age, and often with each new generation, the important events in the world's history.
That all who voted for the Joint Resolution of April 6, 1917, did not do so for the reasons assigned by the President in his address to Congress on April 2, is demonstrated by the discussions in the House and in the Senate. 3 That debate discloses, also, that both in the Senate and in the House the loans to the Allies and the desire to insure their repayment in full were declared to have been instrumental in bringing about in our country the sentiment in favor of the war. 4 However strongly we may believe that these loans were not the slightest makeweight, much less a determining factor, in the country's decision, the fact that some of our representatives in the Senate and the House declared otherwise on one of the most solemn occasions in the history of the nation should help us to understand that statements like that here charged to be false are in essence matters of opinion and judgment, not matters of fact to be determined by a jury upon or without evidence, and that even the President's address, which set forth high moral grounds justifying our entry into the war, may not be accepted as establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that a statement ascribing a base motive was criminally false. All the alleged false statements were an interpretation and discussion of public facts of public interest. If the proceeding had been for libel, the defense of privilege might have been interposed. Gandia v. Pettingill, 222 U. S. 452, 32 Sup. Ct. 127, 56 L. Ed. 267. There is no reason to believe that Congress, in prohibiting a special class of false statements intended to interfere with what was obviously comment as distinguished from a statement.
The presiding judge ruled that expressions of opinion were not punishable as false statements under the act; but he left it to the jury to determine whether the five sentences in question were statements of facts or expressions of opinion. As this determination was to be made from the reading of the leaflet unaffected by any extrinsic evidence the question was one for the court. To hold that a jury may make punishable statements of conclusions or of opinion, like those here involved, by declaring them to be statements of facts and to be false would practically deny members of small political parties freedom of criticism and of discussion in times when feelings run high and the questions involved are deemed fundamental.
There is nothing in the act compelling or indeed justifying such a construction of it, and I cannot believe that Congress in passing, and the President in approving it, conceived that such a construction was possible.
The gravamen of the third count is the charge of willfully conveying in time of war false statements with the intent to interfere with the operation and success of our military or naval forces. One who did that would be called a traitor to his country. The defendants, humble members of the Socialist party, performed as distributors of the leaflet what would ordinarily be deemed merely a menial service. To hold them guilty under the third count is to convict not them alone, but, in effect, their party, or at least its responsible leaders, of treason, as that word is commonly understood. I cannot believe that there is any basis in our law for such a condemnation on this record.
A verdict should have been directed for the defendants on these counts also because the leaflet was not distributed under such circumstances, nor was it of such a nature, as to create a clear and present danger of causing either insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny or refusal of duty in the military or naval forces. The leaflet contains lurid and perhaps exaggerated pictures of the horrors of war. Its arguments as to the causes of this war may appear to us shallow and grossly unfair. The remedy proposed may seem to us worse than the evil which, it is argued, will be thereby removed. But the leaflet, far from counseling disobedience to law, points to the hopelessness of protest, under the existing system, pictures the irresistible power of the military arm of the government, and indicates that acquiescence is a necessity. Insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny and refusal of duty in the military or naval forces are very serious crimes. It is not conceivable that any man of ordinary intelligence and normal judgment would be induced by anything in the leaflet to commit them and thereby risk the severe punishment prescribed for such offenses. Certainly there was no clear and present danger that such would be the result. The leaflet was not even distributed among those in the military or the naval service. It was distributed among civilians; and since the conviction on the first count has been abandoned here by the government, we have no occasion to consider whether the leaflet might have discouraged voluntary enlistment or obedience to the provisions of the Selective Draft Act.
Extract from Act June 15, 1917, c. 30, 40 Stat. 217, 219.
Section 4: 'If two or more persons conspire to violate the provisions of sections two or three of this title, and one or more of such persons does any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each of the parties to such conspiracy shall be punished as in said sections provided in the case of the doing of the act the accomplishment of which is the object of such conspiracy. Except as above provided conspiracies to commit offenses under this title shall be punished as provided by section thirty-seven of the act to codify, revise, and amend the penal laws of the United States approved March fourth, nineteen hundred and nine.' Comp. St. 1918, Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, §§ 10212c, 10212d.
On May 20, 1918 ( 40 Stat. 557, c. 79 [Comp. St. 1918, Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, §§ 2044n-2044q]), Congress, by joint resolution extended the draft to males who had since June 5, 1917, attained the age of twenty-one and authorized the President to extend it to those thereafter attaining that age. Under this act June 5, 1918, was fixed as the date for the second registration. Subsequently August 24, 1918, was fixed for the supplemental registration of all coming of age between June 5, 1918, and August 24, 1918. 40 Stat. 1834, 40 Stat. 1781. By Act Aug. 31, 1918, c. 166, 40 Stat. 955, the provisions of the draft law were extended to persons between the ages of 18 and 45. Under this act, September 12, 1918, was fixed as the date for the third registration. 40 Stat. 1840.
See 55 Cong. Rec. 253, 254, 344, 354, 357, 407.
'* * * There is no doubt in any mind but the enormous amount of money loaned to the Allies in this country has been instrumental in bringing about a public sentiment in favor of our country taking a course that would make every debt bond worth a hundred cents on the dollar and making the payment of every debt certain and sure.' 55 Cong. Rec. p. 213.
'Already we have loaned the Allies, through our banking system, up to December 31, 1916, the enormous sum of $2,325,900,000 in formal loans. Other huge sums have been loaned and billions have been added since that date. 'Where your treasures are, there will be your heart also.' That is one of the reasons why we are about to enter this war. No wonder the Morgans and the munition makers desire war. * * * Our financiers desire that Uncle Sam underwrite these and other huge loans and fight to defend their financial interests, that there may be no final loss.' 55 Cong. Rec. 362.
'Likewise, Mr. Chairman, the J. Pierpont Morgans, and their associates, who have floated war loans running into the millions which they now want the United States to guarantee by entering the European war. * * *' 55 Cong. Rec. 372.
GORIN v. UNITED STATES. SALICH v. UNITED STATES.
MILK WAGON DRIVERS UNION OF CHICAGO, LOCAL 753, et al. v. MEADOWMOOR DAIRIES, Inc.
BRAVERMAN v. UNITED STATES. WAINER v. UNITED STATES.
JIN FUEY MOY v. UNITED STATES.
SINGER et al. v. UNITED STATES.
Oleta O'Connor YATES, Henry Steinberg, Loretta Starvus Stack, et al., Petitioners, v. UNITED STATES of America. William SCHNEIDERMAN, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES of America. AI RICHMOND and Philip Marshall Connelly, Petitioners, v. UNITED STATES of America.
GITLOW v. PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK.

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