Source: http://www.juricaf.org/arret/CONSEILDELEUROPE-COUREUROPEENNEDESDROITSDELHOMME-19750930-630173
Timestamp: 2017-01-16 15:35:56+00:00

Document:
Page d'accueil > Résultats de la recherche WINTERWERP c. PAYS-BAS
Type d'affaire : DecisionType de recours : Violation de l'Art. 6-1 ; Violation de l'Art. 8 ; Préjudice moral - constat de violation suffisantNumérotation : Numéro d'arrêt : 6301/73Identifiant URN:LEX : urn:lex;coe;cour.europeenne.droits.homme;arret;1975-09-30;6301.73 Analyses : (Art. 6-1) ACCES A UN TRIBUNAL, (Art. 6-1) DELAI RAISONNABLE, (Art. 6-1) DROITS ET OBLIGATIONS DE CARACTERE CIVIL, (Art. 6-1) PROCES EQUITABLE, (Art. 6-1) PROCES PUBLIC, (Art. 8-1) RESPECT DE LA CORRESPONDANCE, (Art. 8-2) DEFENSE DE L'ORDRE, (Art. 8-2) INGERENCE, (Art. 8-2) NECESSAIRE DANS UNE SOCIETE DEMOCRATIQUE, (Art. 8-2) PREVENTION DES INFRACTIONS PENALESParties : Demandeurs : WINTERWERPDéfendeurs : PAYS-BASTexte : APPLICATION/REQUÃTE NÂ° 6301/7 3 X . v/the NETHERLANDS X . c/PAYS-BA S DECISION of 30 September 1975 on the admissibility of the application DECISION du 30 septembre 1975 sur la recevabilitÃ© de la requÃªt e
Article 5, paragraph 1 (e) of the Convention : Necessity to interpret the expressions "procedure prescribed by law" and "lawful detention" . Article 5, para. 4 of the Convention : Scope of the guarantees enshrined in this provision . Detention o/ a person of unsound mind subjected to judicial control once a year, but his own requests to be discharged not submitted to the court. Article 5, peregrephe 11e) de te Convention : NÃ©cessitÃ© d'interprÃ©ter les termes "voies tÃ©gales" et "dÃ©tention rÃ©guliÃ©re". Article 5, paragraphe 4 de te Convention : Etendue des garanties prÃ©vues . ContrÃ´le judiciaire annuel de la dÃ©tention d'un malade mental, mais demandes de mise en /ibertÃ© formulÃ©es par lui non soumises au tribunal.
(English : see p . 39)
Les faits de la cause peuvent se rÃ©sumer comme suit : Le requÃ©rant, ressortissant nÃ©erlandais nÃ© le . . . 1924, est domiciliÃ© Ã Eindhoven . Par dÃ©cision du . . juin 1968, le juge cantonal d'Amersfoort a fait droit Ã une requÃªte de l'Ã©pouse du requÃ©rant en autorisant l'admission provisoire de celui-ci dans un Ã©tablissement pour malades mentaux Ã Amersfoort . Il ne semble pas que le requÃ©rant ait b cette occasion Ã©tÃ© entendu par le juge . Une telle audition n'Ã©tait au reste pas prÃ©vue par la loi sur les dÃ©ficients mentaux (Krankzinnigenwet) de 1884 avant les amendements introduits par la loi du 28 ao0t 1970 en portant modification . Par dÃ©cision du . . dÃ©cembre 1968, le tribunal d'arrondissement d'Utrecht a autorisÃ©, Ã la suite d'une nouvelle requÃªte, l'internement pour la durÃ©e d'un an . L'internement a Ã©tÃ© Ã© nouveau prolongÃ© par dÃ©cision du tribunal d'arrondissement d'Utrecht en date du . . dÃ©cembre 1969 . Le . . aoÃ»t 1970, le requÃ©rant a Ã©tÃ© transfÃ©rÃ© dans l'Ã©tablissement Z . Psychiatrische Inrichting Ã Eindhoven . Les . . janvier 1971, . . dÃ©cembre 1971, . . dÃ©cembre 1972 et . . dÃ©cembre 1973, le tribunal d'arrondissement de Bois-le-Duc a prolongÃ© d'un an la durÃ©e de l'internement . Le tribunal s'est Ã chaque fois basÃ© sur une dÃ©claration motivÃ©e du mÃ©decin attachÃ© Ã - 35 -
l'Ã©tablissement, qui estimait nÃ©cessaire de prolonger l'internement . Il n'a par ailleurs pas entendu le requÃ©rant, conformÃ©ment Ã une facultA qui lui est ouverte par la loi . Le . . fÃ©vrier 1973, le requÃ©rant a adressÃ© une requÃªte au procureur, visant Ã obtenir sa mise en libertÃ© . AprÃ©s avoir demandÃ© l'avis du mÃ©decin de l'institution, le procureur a rejetÃ© la requÃªte le . . mai 1973, sans en rÃ©fÃ©rer au tribunal, ainsi que l'article 29 de la loi concernant les malades mentaux le lui permet dans certains cas . Au cours du mois d'avril 1974, le requÃ©rant a Ã©tÃ© remis en libertÃ© . Il a nÃ©anmoins Ã©tÃ© internÃ© Ã nouveau en dÃ©cembre 1974 .
Les griefs du requÃ©rant peuvent se rÃ©sumer comme suit - Il estime avoir Ã©tÃ© maintenu en dÃ©tention de faÃ§on arbitraire . - Il affirme n'avoir pas eu connaissance des dÃ©cisions de justice par lesquelles son internement a Ã©tÃ© prolongÃ© . ProcÃ©dure devant la Commission Le 16 mars 1975, la Commission a dÃ©cidÃ©, en application de l'article 42, par . 2 (b), de son RÃ©glement intÃ©rieur, de porter la requÃ¨te Ã la connaissance du Gouvernement des Pays-Bas pour que celui-ci prÃ©sente par Ã©crit ses observations sur la recevabilitÃ© . Ces observations ont Ã©tÃ© produites le 4 juin 1975 et communiquÃ©es au requÃ©rant qui, par lettre du 16 juin 1975, a manifestÃ© son intention de maintenir sa requÃªte . Observations Ã©crites du Gouvernemen t 1 . Dans ses observations, le Gouvernement fait valoir que le requÃ©rant a Ã©tÃ© placÃ© dans un Ã©tablissement psychiatrique en vertu d'une autorisation judiciaire dÃ©livrÃ©e conformÃ©ment Ã l'article 12 de la loi concernant les malades mentaux ("Krankzinnigenwet'1 . ConformÃ©ment Ã l'article 24 de cette mime loi, son internement a Ã©tÃ© prolongÃ© plusieurs fois . Cela n'est pas, en soi, contraire aux dispositions de l'article 5, paragraphes 1 (e) et 4, de la Convention de Sauvegarde des Droits de l'Homme et des LibertÃ©s fondamentales : a . le placement est expressÃ©ment autorisÃ© en vertu de l'article 5, paragraphe 1 (e . le placement s'est fait selon la procÃ©dure prÃ©vue par la loi et est donc conform e )b aux dispositions de l'article 5, paragraphe 1, deuxiÃ©me phrase ; c . le placement s'est fait par autorisation judiciaire . La privation de la libertÃ© n'a eu lieu qu'aprÃ©s que le juge eut donnÃ© l'autorisation de ce faire . Il n'y a donc pas de reison d'invoquer l'article 5, paragraphe 4, qui prÃ©voit un recours devant le tribunal lorsqu'il y a dÃ©jÃ© privation de libertÃ© ; d . la prolongation de l'internement se fait, conformÃ©ment aux articles 22, 23 et 24 de la loi concernant les malades mentaux, en vertu d'une autorisation judiciaire . Dans la mesure oÃ¹ l'article 5, paragraphe 4, de la Convention peut jouer un rÃ´le en la matiÃ©re, la lÃ©gislation nÃ©erlandaise satisfait sur ce point Ã la disposition en question . 2 . La non-signification des dÃ©cisions judiciaires au patient ne constitue pas, par ailleun:, une violation de la Convention : a . le texte de l'article 5, paragraphe 4, ne prescrit pas la forme que doit revÃªtir le recours devant le tribunal . Si les auteurs de la Convention avaient estimÃ© nÃ©cessaire de prÃ©voir des garanties sur le plan de la procÃ©dure, ils les auraient prÃ©vues expressÃ©ment dans le texte de la Convention ;
b . les dÃ©cisions judiciaires sont communiquÃ©es Ã la direction de l'Ã©tablissement oÃ¹ est placÃ© l'intÃ©ressÃ© . Celle-ci peut juger, sur la base de l'Ã©volution de la maladie chez le patient, s'il est raisonnable de lui communiquer la dÃ©cision judiciaire . Ce rÃ©glement, qui s'Ã©ca rte des rÃ©gles juridiques gÃ©nÃ©rales, doit Ãªtre vu dans le contexte des relations pa rt iculiÃ©rement dÃ©lirates auxquelles il s'applique . Ceux qui l'ont conÃ§u sont partis de l'idÃ©e qu'en communiquant une dÃ©cision judiciaire Ã un patient sans Ã©tre sÃ¹r de pouvoir suffisamment faire face Ã ses rÃ©actions, on s'expose Ã des difficultÃ©s ; c . les remarques du point b . s'appliquent aussi Ã la libe rtÃ© qui revient au juge de dÃ©cider si le patient peut Ãªtre entendu avant la dÃ©livrance de l'autorisation d'internement ou de la prolongation d'une telle autorisation . 3 . Le fait que le procureur du roi n'a pas transmis au juge les requÃ©tes prÃ©sentÃ©es par l'intÃ©ressÃ© en vue de sa remise en libertÃ© ne constitue pas non plus, de l'avis du Gouvernement, une violation de la Convention . a . les procÃ©dures prÃ©vues aux articles 22, 23 et 24 de la loi concernant les malades mentaux garantissent un examen rÃ©gulier par le juge, de la lÃ©galitÃ© de l'internement d'un malade . Si, aprÃ¨s la derniÃ©re dÃ©cision judiciaire, l'Ã©tat de santÃ© du patient devient tel qu'il n'est plus justifiÃ© de poursuivre l'internement la mise en libertÃ© peut, selon la loi, se faire de trois faÃ§ons :
i . mise en libertÃ© sur dÃ©claration Ã©crite du mÃ©decin responsable (article 28 ) ii . mise en libertÃ© par le juge Ã la demande du patient ou d'un parent ou alliÃ© (article 29) ; iii . mise en libertÃ© sur l'ordre du procureur du roi ou, par son entremise, par le juge lanicle 30) : b . la marge d'apprÃ©ciation accordÃ©e au procureur du roi dans la procÃ©dure de l'article 29 de la loi concernant les malades mentaux doit Ã©tre vue dans le contexte des garanties prÃ©citÃ©es, et s'explique par le caractÃ¨re spÃ©cifique des requÃ©tes Ã©manant des patients . Bien que, en principe, chaque demande doive Ãªtre prise au sÃ©rieux, le risque de requÃ©tes sans fondement aucun est particuliÃ©rement grand . Souvent, la requÃ©te aura mÃ©me son origine dans les troubles mentaux dont souffre le patient ;
c . un rÃ©glement comme celui de l'article 29 de la loi qui vise, dans le respect des intÃ©rÃ©ts lÃ©gitimes des justiciables, Ã protÃ©ger les tribunaux d'un afflux de requÃ©tes manifestement non fondÃ©es est le pendant de l'article 27, paragraphe 2, de la Convention . Ce n'est que si l'on donne, dans la pratique, Ã la notion de Â« manifestement irrecevable Â» 1"klaarblijkelijk niet voor inwilliging watbaar'l une interprÃ©tation exagÃ©rÃ©ment large qu'il pourrait Ã©tre question d'un acte irrÃ©gulier dans le contexte de l'article 5, paragraphe 1 le), de la Convention . Le Gouvernement n'a encore constatÃ© aucune interprÃ©tation erronÃ©e ou trop large par le procureur du roi dans l'application de l'article 29 de la loi concernant les malades mentaux . 4 . Le Gouvernement estime enfin que les faits sur lesquels se base la requÃªte confirment ce qui prÃ©cÃ©de . La demande de mise en libertÃ© introduite le . . fÃ©vrier 1973 n'a pas Ã©tÃ© prÃ©sentÃ©e par le procureur du roi au tribunal parce que l'Ã©tat de santÃ© de l'intÃ©ressÃ©, selon le mÃ©decin traitant qui conseillait le refus, ne s'Ã©tait pas modifiÃ© . Peu de temps auparavant, le . . dÃ©cembre 1972, le tribunal de Bois-le-Duc avait Ã©valuÃ© cet Ã©tat de santÃ© lorsque, en vertu de l'article 24 de la loi concernant les malades mentaux, il prolongea d'un an - par dÃ©cision portant cette date - l'autorisation de sÃ©jour dans un Ã©tablissement psychiatrique . Il ressort clairement des documents soumis Ã la Commission que les dispositions lÃ©gales ont Ã©tÃ© soigneusement respectÃ©es en l'espÃ¨ce .
Fait significatif, les dÃ©clarations mÃ©dicales rÃ©digÃ©es dans la pÃ©riode 1968-1973 concordent largement . Cela montre que l'Ã©volution de la maladie fut trÃ¨s lente . C'est pourquoi la dÃ©cision du procureur du roi - d'ailleurs communiquÃ©e au requÃ©rant - de ne pas prier le tribunal de trancher la question est pleinement justifiÃ©e aux yeux du Gouvernement . 5 . Le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas estime, vu ce qui prÃ©cÃ©de, que la requÃ©te doit Ã©tre dÃ©clarÃ©e irrecevable, parce qu'elle est manifestement mal fondÃ©e, en venu de l'a rticle 27, paragraphe 2, de la Convention .
EN DROI T InternÃ© en vertu d'une autorisation dÃ©livrÃ©e par un juge sur base de la loi nÃ©erlandaise concernant les dÃ©ficients mentaux, le requÃ©rant s'estime en dÃ©tention arbitraire . II se plaint de n'avoir pas eu connaissance des dÃ©cisions par lesquelles son internement a Ã©tÃ© prolongÃ© Ã plusieurs reprises et de n'avoir pas eu la possibilitÃ© d'8tre entendu par un juge .
La Commission a procÃ©dÃ© Ã un examen d'ensemble de la requÃªte sous l'angle de l'article 5 de la Convention . La Commission observe en premier lieu que la dÃ©tention dont se plaint le requÃ©rant a Ã©tÃ© ordonnÃ©e pour l'une des causes prÃ©vues et autorisÃ©es par l'article 5, par . 1(e), de la Convention . La question de savoir si, dans le cas d'espÃ¨ce, l'internement est compatible avec cette disposition, soulÃ©ve nÃ©anmoins diverses difficultÃ©s liÃ©es notamment Ã la signification de l'expression Â« dÃ©tention rÃ©guliÃ©re Â» ainsi qu'Ã l'Ã©tendue de l'obligation de respect des Â« voies lÃ©gales a lorsque certaines d'entre elles peuvent Ãªtre Ã©cartÃ©es par le juge . La Commission rappelle par ailleurs que, selon le paragraphe 4 de l'article 5 qui vaut entre autres pour les malades mentaux dÃ©tenus en vertu de l'alinÃ©a (e) du paragraphe 1, u toute personne privÃ©e de sa libertÃ© par arrestation ou dÃ©tention a le droit d'introduire un recours devant un tribunal, afin qu'il statue Ã bref dÃ©lai sur la lÃ©galitÃ© de sa dÃ©tention et ordonne sa libÃ©ration si la dÃ©tention est illÃ©gale x .
En l'espÃ©ce, le requÃ©rant n'a pu effectivement demander sa mise en libertÃ© au tribunal d'arrondissement, en application de l'article 29 de la loi prÃ©citÃ©e . Le procureur du roi a, en effet, dÃ©cidÃ© de ne pas transmettre sa requÃ©te au juge compÃ©tent . Les dÃ©cisions annuelles de ce tribunal satisfont-elles par ailleurs Ã l'exigence d'un contrBle de lÃ©galitÃ© ouvert sur recours ? Cette question soulÃ¨ve diverses difficultÃ©s liÃ©es Ã l'interprÃ©tation du paragraphe 4 de l'article 5 . II importe en particulier de dÃ©terminer si, lorsqu'il a autorisÃ© la prolongation de la dÃ©tention du requÃ©rant, le tribunal d'arrondissement Ã©tait effectivement un tribunal au sens de ladite disposition, offrant des garanties suffisantes Ã l'individu, eu Ã©gard Ã la nature particuliÃ©re de la cause (cf . Cour europÃ©enne des Droits de l'Homme, Affaires De Wilde, Ooms et Versyp, arrÃ©t du 18 juin 1971, par . 76 et 78) . A la lumiÃ©re de ces considÃ©rations, la Commission estime que les problÃ©mes qu i se posent en l'espÃ©ce se rÃ©vÃ©lent assez complexes pour que leur solution doive relever de l'examen du fond de l'affaire .
Les griefs du requÃ©rant ne sauraient dÃ©s lors Ã©tre rejetÃ©s pour dÃ©faut manifeste de fondement, au sens de l'article 27, par . 2, de la Convention . La Commission observe par ailleurs que ces griefs ne se heurtent Ã aucune autre cause d'incompÃ©tence ou d'irrecevabilitÃ© . Par ces motifs, la Commissio n DÃCLARE LA REQUÃTE RECEVABLE . (TRANSLATION )
THE FACTS The facts of the case may be summarised as follow s The applicant is a Netherlands citizen, born on . . . 1924 and resident at Eindhoven . By a decision of . . June 1968, the Cantonal Court ("Kentonrechter'1 of Amers . foort complied with a request from the applicant's wife by ordering his temporary admission to a home for the mentally ill at Amersfoort . It does not appear that the applicant was given a hearing by the court on this occasion . In any case, no provision for a hearing of this kind was made in the Insane Persons Act IKrankzinnigenwet) of 1884 before it was amended by the Act of 28 August 1970 . Following a further request, the District Court of Utrecht, by decision of . . . December 1968, ordered the applicant to be confined for a year by a decision of the District Court o f .Hisconfemtwaurhxnde Utrecht of . . December 1969 . On . . August 1970, the applicant was moved to the institution Z . Psychiatrische lnrichting at Eindhoven . On . . January 1971, . . December 1971, . . December 1972 and . . December 1973, the District Court of 's Hertogenbosch extended the period of the applicant's confinement for a further year . On each occasion the court based its decision on a statement by the doctor attached to the establishment giving reasons why the applicant ought to remain there . As is permitted under Dutch law, it did not give the applicant a hearing . On . . February 1973 the applicant sent a request for his discharge to the Public Prosecutor . After seeking the opinion of the institution's doctor, the Public Prosecutor refused the request on . . May 1973 without referring it to the court, as he is entitled to do in certain cases under Section 29 of the Insane Persons Act . In April 1974 the applicant was discharged . However, he was committed again in December 1974 . The ,rpplicant's complaints can be summarised as follows - He considers that he was detained in an arbitrary manner . - He maintains that he was not informed of the court decisions by which his confinement was prolonged . Proceedings before the Commissio n On 16 March 1975 the Commission decided, in accordance with Rule 42 (3) Ibl of its Rules of Procedure, that notice of the application should be given to th e
Netherlands Government in order that the latter could submit its observations in writing on the admissibility of the application . The observations were produced on 4 June 1975 and were forwarded to the applicant ; in a letter dated 16 June 1975 he gave notice of his intention to let his application stand .
The Government's written observation s 1 . In its observations, the Government submitted that the applicant had been committed to a psychiatric home by virtue of an order issued by a court in accordance with Section 12 of the Insane Persons Act 1"Krankzinnigenwet'l . His confinement had then been prolonged several times in accordance with Section 24 of the same act . This was not in itself contrary to the provisions of Article 5 (1) lel and (4) of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, because a . detention was expressly authorised by paragraph 1 (e) of Article 5 ; b . the applicant was committed according to the procedure prescribed by law and his detention was therefore in conformity with the provisions of the second sentence of paragraph I of Article 5 ; c . the applicant's detention was authorised by law and he was deprived of his liberty only after the judge had made an order to that effect, so that there were no grounds for relying on paragraph 4 of Article 5, which gives a person already deprived of liberty the right to take proceedings before a court ; d . the extension of the applicant's confinement was authorised by a court under the terms of Sections 22, 23 and 24 of the Insame Persons Act and insofar as paragraph 4 of Article 5 of the Convention was applicable here, Netherlands legislation complied with the provision in question on this point . 2 . The fact that the patient was not informed of the court decisions did not constitute a breach of the Convention either, for the following reasons : a . Paragraph 4 of Article 5 did not specify what form court proceedings were to take whereas, if the authors of the Convention had thought it necessary to provide procedural safeguards, they would have done so expressly in the text of the Convention . b . The head of the establishment to which the person concerned was committed was informed of the court decisions and could judge whether it was reasonable to inform the patient thereof, on the basis of the way in which his illness was progressing . This arrangement, which departed from the general legal rules, must be seen in the context of the particularly delicate relationships involved . Those who devised it proceeded on the assumption that difficulties might well arise if a patient were informed of a court decision without the assurance that this reaction could be dealt with adequately . c . The reason given under b . also applied to the court's discretion to decide whether the patient should be given a hearing . before the issue or extension of a confinement order . 3 . In the Government's opinion, the fact that the Public Prosecutor did not forward the patient's request for discharge to the court did not constitute a breach of the Convention either, for the following reasons . According to the procedure laid down in Sections 22, 23 and 24 of the Insan e :a Persons Act the court reconsidered at regular intervals whether a patient's confine-
ment was lawful . If, after the patient's state of health changed in such a way as no longer to justify his being confined, he might, according to the act, be discharged by three different procedures : i . discharge as a result of a written statement made by the doctor in charge (Section 28) ; ii . discharge by the court at the request of the patient or of a relation or connection (Section 291 ; iii . discharge by order of the Public Prosecutor or, on his recommendation, by the court (Section 30) . The latitude left to the Public Prosecutor in proceeding under Section 29 of the Insane Persons Act must be seen in the context of the safeguards already mentioned and was justified by the specific nature of patients' applications . Although as a rule each request must be taken seriously, the risk of their being completely undounded was particularly large . Indeed, The application was very often the outcome of the patient's mental disorder . A provision such as Section 29 of the act, whose purpose it was, out of respect for the legitimate interests of the ordinary citizen, to protect the courts against a flood of manifestly ill-founded applications, was the counterpart to Article 27 (2) of the Convention . Only if the notion of "manifestly inadmissible" ("klaerblijkelijk niet voor inwilliging vetbaar'1 were given an excessively wide interpretation could there be any question of an unlawful act within the meaning of Article 5 (1) (e) of the Convention . The Government had not yet found any case where the Public Prosecutor had made an interpretation that was mistaken or too wide in applying Section 29 of the Insane Persons Act . 4 . Lastly, the Government considered that the facts on which the application was based confirmed the above . The request for discharge made by the applicant on . . February 1973 had not been forwarded to the court by the Public Prosecutor because, according to the medical practitioner who advocated its rejection, there had been no change in the patient's state of health . Shortly before, on . . December 1972, the court of 's Hertogenbosch had made an appraisal of his state of health when, in a decision of the same date, it extended the order committing the applicant to a psychiatric home for a further year, in pursuance of Section 24 of the Insane Persons Act . The documents submitted to the Commission clearly showed that, in this particular case, the provisions of the law had been scrupulously respected .
It was significant that the medical reports drawn up between 1968 and 1973 were largely similar, which showed that the illness had evolved extremely slowly . The Public Prosecutor's decision not to ask the court to settle the question-of which, incidentally, the applicant was informed-was, therefore, fully justified in the Government's opinion . 5 . In view of the above, the Netherlands Government considered that the application must be found inadmissible under Article 27 (2) of the Convention as manifestly illfounded .
THE LA W The applicant, who was confined in pursuance of an order made by a court on the basis of the Netherlands Insane Persons Act, considers that he is being arbitrarily detained .
He complains that he was not informed of the decisions by which his confinement was several times extended and that he was not allowed a hearing by a court . The Commission has examined the entire application with reference to Article 5 of the Convention . Firstly the Commission observes that the confinement order of which the applicant complains was made for one of the reasons listed in and authorised by Article 5(1) (e) of the Convention . However, the question whether, in this particular case, confinement was compatible with this provision raises various difficulties connected with the meaning of the expression "lawful detention" and the extent of the obligation to observe the "procedure prescribed by law" when some part or parts of this procedure may be waived by the court .
Secondly, the Commission recalls that, according to paragraph 4 of Article 5 which applies, inter alia, to persons of unsound mind who are detained in accordance with sub-paragraph (e) of paragraph 1, "everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful" . In the case in point, the applicant was not in practice able to apply to the District Court of his release under Section 29 of the aforementioned act, since the Public Prosecutor decided not to forward his request to the competent judge . Again, do the decisions made annually by the court represent a means of checking the lawfulness of detention by means of the proceedings prescribed by the Convention? This question raises various difficulties connected with the interpretation of paragraph 4 of Article 5 . In particular, it is important to decide whether, when the District Court authorised extension of the applicant's confinement, it was really a court within the meaning of the above provision and afforded the individual sufficient safeguards, having regard to the special nature of the case (cf . European Court of Human Rights, De Wilde, Ooms and Versyp Cases ("Vagrancy" Cases)- Judgment of 18 June 1971, para . 76 and 78 ) . In view of the above, the Commission finds that the problems raised in the case in point are complex enough for their solution to require consideration of the merits of the case . The applicant's complaints cannot therefore be rejected as manifestly ill-founded, within the meaning of Article 27 (2) of the Convention . The Commission also observes that there is no other obstacle to these complaints as regards either jurisdiction or admissibility . Now, therefore, the Commissio n DECLARES THE APPLICATION ADMISSIBLE .
- 42 -Origine de la décision Pays : Conseil de l'EuropeJuridiction : Cour européenne des droits de l'hommeFormation : Cour (plénière)Date de la décision : 30/09/1975Fonds documentaire : HUDOC Haut de page

References: l'article 29
 l'article 42
 l'article 12
 l'article 24
 l'article 5
 l'article 5
 l'article 5
 l'article 5
 l'article 5
 l'article 5
 l'article 29
 l'article 29
 l'article 27
 l'article 5
 l'article 29
 l'article 24
 l'article 5
 l'article 5
 l'article 5
 l'article 29
 l'article 5
 l'article 27