Source: http://ne.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20180529_0002186.DNE.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 15:30:12+00:00

Document:
LINCOLN POLICE DEPARTMENT, et al., Defendants.
Plaintiff, Anthony Hancock, who is incarcerated at the Lincoln Correctional Center, has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis (Filing 7). The court now conducts an initial review of Plaintiff's Complaint to determine whether summary dismissal is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A.
Plaintiff brings this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action requesting injunctive relief and money damages against the Lincoln Police Department and four officers. Plaintiff alleges the officers gained access to his apartment on November 15, 2017, to question him about an alleged domestic assault, but then proceeded to ask him about drug dealing activities and to search the premises without a warrant. The officers allegedly justified the search by stating it was permitted as a condition of his parole.
“In the absence of a warrant, a search is reasonable only if it falls within a specific exception to the warrant requirement.” Riley v. California, 134 S.Ct. 2473, 2482 (2014). Plaintiff alleges in this case that the police officers claimed they had a right to search his apartment without a warrant as a condition of his parole, and he does not refute this claim by alleging any facts to the contrary in his Complaint. The officers' alleged basis for conducting the warrantless search is not necessarily wrong as a matter of law. The United States Supreme Court has held that a search conducted pursuant to state law, but without even a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, does not violate a parolee's Fourth Amendment rights. See Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 856-57 (2006). See also United States v. Jackson, 866 F.3d 982, 984-85 (8th Cir. 2017); United States v. Hamilton, 591 F.3d 1017, 1021-22 (8th Cir. 2010) (discussing Samson ruling).
Plaintiff complains that he was not administered Miranda warnings, but from the facts alleged, he does not appear to have been in custody while being questioned by the police. See United States v. Czichray, 378 F.3d 822, 826 (8th Cir. 2004) (“When a person is questioned on his own turf, we have observed repeatedly that the surroundings are “not indicative of the type of inherently coercive setting that normally accompanies a custodial interrogation.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted). In any event, “the remedy for a Miranda violation is the exclusion from evidence of any compelled self-incrimination, not a section 1983 action.” Hannon v. Sanner, 441 F.3d 635, 636 (8th Cir. 2006) (quoting Warren v. City of Lincoln, 864 F.2d 1436, 1442 (8th Cir. 1989) (en banc)).
The caption to Plaintiff's Complaint mentions “malicious prosecution” and “arrest in bad faith, ” but these claims presumably relate to the domestic assault charge, for which Plaintiff pleaded guilty. There are no facts alleged in the Complaint to support such claims, but even if there were, Plaintiff cannot bring a section 1983 action unless the conviction has been invalidated. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994) (affirming dismissal of § 1983 action against prosecutors and police for alleged constitutional violations that led to plaintiff's conviction).

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