Source: https://en.m.wikisource.org/wiki/Pleasants_v._Fant
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 13:24:23+00:00

Document:
The bills of exception disclosed the testimony on which this instruction was founded, and the question now before this court was whether the verdict founded on that instruction should be set aside and the judgment reversed.
The direct testimony offered to prove the partnership was confined to the statements of Fant in a conversation with one of the plaintiffs and a clerk in their office, and the deposition of Keene, a partner of Keene & Co. The substance of the former was that Fant denied that he was a partner, said he knew from some experience what was necessary to make him a partner, and admitted that he had procured for Keene a loan of $10,000 in gold from a bank of which he was president, and that he was to receive part of the profits of Keene's venture in purchasing cotton with that money, as compensation for procuring the loan. What portion of the profits he was to receive was not stated.
After the admission of this testimony, the plaintiffs, on the ground that they had sufficiently shown a relation between Fant and Keene to admit of Keene's declaration to third persons as to Fant's interest, offered to prove by one of the plaintiffs, that Keene had told him Fant was a partner, and asked that the plaintiffs would advance money enough on the cotton then in their possession as brokers to enable him to pay Fant his money and let him out of the firm. This offer was objected to and the objection sustained by the court.
A large amount of testimony, however, was admitted, the object of which was to show that Fant, as president of the bank, was in the habit of using the money of the bank in private speculations, without the knowledge of the directors, but which was very feeble and far from establishing that fact.
1. The English rule laid down in Waugh v. Carver,  makes a participation in profits conclusive proof of partnership under all circumstances.
It is settled law that a Circuit Court has no authority to order a peremptory nonsuit against the plaintiff's will.  But very nearly the same result is reached if after a plaintiff has given what he deems sufficient evidence of his case, and which does confessedly tend to prove it, the court may tell the jury what this court told the jury below.
^1 2 Henry Blackstone, 235; S.C.. reported with notes in 1 Smith's Leading Cases, 7th ed., p. 1289.
^2 24 Howard, 542, 543.
^4 Hesketh v. Blanchard, 4 East, 144 (8 Wallace, 222); Gouthwaite v. Duckworth, 12 East, 422; Cheap v. Cramond, 4 Barnewall & Alderson, 667; Parker v. Canfield, 37 Connecticut, 250; Taylor v. Terme, 3 Harris & Johnson, 505; Benson v. Ketchum, 14 Maryland, 355; Sheridan v. Medara, 2 Stockton, 475; Bearce v. Washburn, 43 Maine, 564; Brownlee v. Allen, 21 Missouri, 123; Wood v. Vallette, 7 Ohio, 178; Catskill Bank v. Gray, 14 Barbour, 477; Pierson v. Steinmyer, 4 Richardson's South Carolina (Law), 310.
^5 Cox v. Hickman, 8 House of Lords Cases, 268; Bullen v. Sharp, 1 Law Reports (C. P.), 86.
^6 Rosenstock v. Tormey, 32 Maryland, 182, 183; Irvine v. Buckaloe, 12 Sergeant & Rawle, 35; Roberts v. Gresley, 3 Carrington & Paine, 380; National Bank v. Mechanics' Bank, 36 Maryland, 5.
^7 Elmore v. Grymes, 1 Peters, 469.

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