Source: https://scocal.stanford.edu/opinion/rashidi-v-moser-34375
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 18:43:24+00:00

Document:
required by the MICRA cap.
particles were manufactured by Biosphere Medical, Inc. (Biosphere Medical).
When Rashidi awoke after surgery, he was permanently blind in one eye.
negligence per se, breach of express and implied warranty, and misrepresentation.
failed to disclose this risk, or the fact that the particles were irregular in size.
$250,000, conforming to the MICRA cap.
1431.2 imposes “a rule of strict proportionate liability” on noneconomic damages.
defendant is entitled to offset. (Espinoza, at p. 277; see Jones v. John Crane, Inc.
Cal.App.4th at p. 1320; Poire v. C.L. Peck/Jones Brothers Construction Corp.
award. Rashidi does not challenge this aspect of the judgment.
The court performed a different calculation for the Cedars-Sinai settlement.
economic losses and the remaining $233,345 to noneconomic losses.
burden of proving affirmative defenses and indemnity cross-claims.
offset under § 1431.2 must prove each fact essential to recovery).
plaintiff may recover from all defendant health care providers in a single action.
the settlements), exceeded the amount of damages awarded by the jury. (Id. at p.
impairment, disfigurement and other nonpecuniary damage.
fault on the part of any other defendant.
another would subvert MICRA‟s purpose.
Assn. v. City of Los Angeles (1979) 26 Cal.3d 86, 103; see Walnut Creek Manor v.
limited to amounts awarded by a court.
but effectively influenced the parties‟ settlement calculations.
of noneconomic damages below $250,000, and affirmed in all other respects.
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
Judge: Richard L. Fruin, Jr.
and Holly N. Boyer for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Kenneth R. Pedroza, Matthew S. Levinson and Cassidy C. Davenport for Defendant and Appellant.
Medical Association as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant.
Counsel as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant.
Petition for review after the Court of Appeal modified and affirmed the judgment in a civil action. The court limited review to the following issue: If a jury awards the plaintiff in a medical malpractice action non-economic damages against a healthcare provider defendant, does Civil Code section 3333.2 entitle that defendant to a setoff based on the amount of a pretrial settlement entered into by another healthcare provider that is attributable to non-economic losses or does the statutory rule that liability for non-economic damages is several only (not joint and several) bar such a setoff?
Plaintiff Hamid Rashidi went to Cedars-Sinai Medical Center's emergency room in April 2007, complaining of a severe nosebleed. After returning with similar symptoms a month later, Dr. Franklin Moser suggested surgery. During the surgery, Moser ran a catheter through an artery in Rashidi's leg up to his nose. Next, tiny particles—manufactured by Biosphere Medical, Inc.—were injected through the catheter in an effort to permanently block blood vessels in the nose. But the particles apparently traveled through small blood vessels to one of Rashidi's eyes, resulting in permanent blindness.
Rashidi sued Moser, Cedars-Sinai, and Biosphere Medical. He alleged medical malpractice and medical battery against Moser and Cedars-Sinai; and product liability, failure to warn, negligence per se, breach of express and implied warranty, and misrepresentation against Biosphere Medical.
Rashidi settled with Biosphere Medical for $2 million and with Cedars-Sinai for $350,000. Only Moser went to trial on the allegations.
At trial, Moser presented no evidence of Cedars-Sinai's fault, and insufficient evidence to support an instruction on Biosphere Medical's fault. The jury then found Moser liable for Rashidi's injuries, and awarded $125,000 for future medical care, $331,250 for past noneconomic damages, and $993,750 for future noneconomic damages.
The Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act of 1975, codified in relevant part at Section 3333.2 of the California Civil Code, places a $250,000 cap on noneconomic damages found at trial. In accordance with this cap, the trial court reduced the jury's noneconomic damages awards to $250,000.
But Moser requested a further setoff for Rashidi's pretrial settlements, reasoning that these amounts should count against the $250,000 cap for noneconomic damages, as well as reduce his joint liability for economic damages. The trial court rejected the claim since no basis existed for determining what part of the settlements constituted economic or noneconomic harms, and the jury hadn't found either of the settling parties liable.
Moser appealed. The Court of Appeal reversed, holding first that the settlements could be allocated between economic and noneconomic damages using varying calculations. Next, the economic damages from both settlements should be applied to completely offset Moser's economic damages liability. And finally, the noneconomic damages paid by Cedars-Sinai—the only other medical provider covered by MICRA—should partially offset the jury's noneconomic damages award. This resulted in a total award of $16,655 for Rashidi. Rashidi petitioned for review in the Supreme Court only on the noneconomic damages issue.
1. Does MICRA require the reduction of a jury's noneconomic damages award in light of another defendant's pretrial settlement, even when the defendant who went to trial failed to establish the comparative fault of the settling defendant?
No. MICRA was enacted to address the problem of unpredictable jury awards, and restrains settlements only indirectly. So MICRA's cap applies only to damages awarded at trial. Furthermore, only a defendant who establishes—at trial—the settling defendant's degree of fault is entitled to a reduction in capped damages. The Court of Appeal is reversed.
In addition to MICRA, several California laws affected the Court of Appeal's ruling. Code of Civil Procedure section 877 allows a nonsettling defendant to set off the amount of a jointly liable tortfeasors settlement against damages awarded at trial. But Civil Code section 1431.2 imposes a "rule of strict proportionate liability" on noneconomic damages.
While the Court of Appeal recognized the requirement of proportionate—as opposed to joint—liability for noneconomic damages, it found that MICRA's $250,000 cap acted as a strict ceiling on a plaintiff's possible recovery, including both settlement dollars and damages awarded at trial. In other words, it held that MICRA created an exception to section 1431.2's proportionate liability requirement.
The Supreme Court reversed this holding. It held that, read properly, MICRA does not conflict with section 1431.2. Rather, MICRA applies only to "damages" awarded at trial, not "losses" recovered through settlement. Indeed MICRA's language entitles plaintiffs to "recover noneconomic losses to compensate for [pain and suffering]," yet limits the amount of "damages" to $250,000. From these sections the Court found that MICRA distinguishes between damages and losses, entitling Rashidi to unlimited settlement dollars.
In support of this point, the Court explained that damages—especially noneconomic damages—are ascertainable only at trial. "[Noneconomic damages] are inherently nonpecuniary, unliquidated and not readily subject to precise calculation. The amount of such damages is necessarily left to the subjective discretion of the trier of fact.” (Greater Westchester Homeowners Assn. v. City of Los Angeles (1979) 26 Cal.3d 86, 103.) So it makes sense to distinguish between damages awarded at trial and losses more generally.
In addition, the legislative history of MICRA supports Rashidi's argument. The Legislature intended MICRA to apply only to jury awards—thought to be unpredictable or arbitrary—not settlements. (Fein v. Permanente Medical Group (1985) 38 Cal.3d 137.) The $250,000 cap clearly affects settlements, albeit indirectly, since no party would rationally settle for more than the capped limit. But MICRA does not directly limit settlement amounts or create a setoff requirement for damages found at trial.
Furthermore, this result makes sense from a policy perspective. Enforcing section 1431.2's proportionate liability requirement enhances settlement prospects. For if nonsettling defendants were assured of an offset against noneconomic damages regardless of their degree of fault, any settlements would diminish other defendants' incentive to settle. Conversely, under Rashidi's theory—the correct one—settlements are encouraged, since nonsettling defendants must weigh both their potential liability for noneconomic damages and the prospect of proving the comparative fault of settling defendants.
In conclusion, the Court of Appeal is reversed insofar as it reduced Rashidi's noneconomic damages award against Moser below $250,000. If and only if Moser could have proven his codefendants' comparative fault would he be entitled to a proportionate reduction in noneconomic damages.
MetNews, Doctor Gets No Offset Against MICRA-Capped Award—S.C.
SCOCAL, Rashidi v. Moser , S214430 available at: (https://scocal.stanford.edu/opinion/rashidi-v-moser-34375) (last visited Sunday April 21, 2019).

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