Source: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/690805/
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 14:26:28+00:00

Document:
Bench: Das, Sudhi Ranjan (Cj), Das, S.K., Sarkar, A.K., Wanchoo, K.N., Hidayatullah, M.
Reorganisation Act, 1956 (XXXVII Of 1956), s. 8(1).
and State of Washington v. State of Oregon, (19O8) 2II	U.S.
amendment  must be referred back to the	 State	Legislature.
Arts. 117 and 118 of the Constitution.
47 Bom.	 L.R- 428, applied.
violation of Art. 3 Of the Constitution.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 342 of 1956. Appeal from the judgment and order dated September 14,1956, of the Bombay High Court, in Special Civil Application	No. 2496 of 1956.
R. V. S. Mani, for the appellant.
C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India, B. Sen, and R. H. Dhebar, for the respondents.
1959. August 28. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by S. K. DAS J.-This is an appeal on a certificate granted by the High Court	of Bombay under Art. 132 (1) of	the Constitution, and the question involved in the appeal is the true scope and	effect	of Art. 3 of	the Constitution, particularly of the proviso thereto as it stands after	the Constitution (Fifth Amendment) Act, 1955, 607 On December 22, 1953, the Prime Minister of India made a statement in Parliament to the effect	that a	Commission would be appointed	to examine "	objectively	and dispassionately'-' the question of the reorganisation of the States of the Indian Union " so that the welfare of	the people of each constituent unit as well as the nation as a whole is promoted ". This was followed by the appointment of a Commission under a resolution of the Union Government	in. the Ministry of Home Affairs, dated December 29, 1953.	The Commission submitted its report in due course and on April 18, 1956; a Bill was introduced in the House of the People (Lok Sabha) entitled The States Reorganisation Bill (No.	30 of 1956). Clauses 8, 9 and 10 of the said Bill contained a proposal for the formation of three separate units, namely, (1) Union territory of Bombay ; (2) State of	Maharashtra including Marathawada and Vidharbha;	and (3) State	of Gujurat	including Saurashtra and Cutch. The Bill	was introduced in the House of the People on the recommendation of the President, as required by the proviso to art. 3	of the Constitution. It was then referred to a Joint Select Committee of the House of the People (Lok Sabha) and	the Council of State (Rajya Sabha).	The Joint Select Committee made its report on July 16, 1956. Some of the	clauses	of the Bill were amended in Parliament and on being passed	by both Houses, it received the President's assent	on August 31, 1956, and became known as the States Reorganisation Act, 1956 (37 of 1956) hereinafter called the Act. It is necessary to read here s. 8(1)	of the	Act which instead	of constituting three separate units as	originally proposed in the Bill constituted a composite State of Bombay as stated therein.
(e) the	territories of the existing State of	Kutch;	and thereupon the said territories shall cease to form part	of the existing States of Bombay, Hyderabad, Madhya Pradesh, Saurashtra and Kutch, respectively."
The appointed day from which the new State of Bombay came into existence was defined in the Act as meaning November 1, 1956. But before that date, to wit, on September 12, 1956, the appellant herein filed a petition under Art. 226 of	the Constitution in the High Court of Judicature at	Bombay	in which he alleged, in substance, that the formation of	the composite State of Bombay as one unit instead of the three separate	units	as originally proposed in	the Bill contravened Art. 3 of the Constitution, inasmuch as	the Legislature of	the State of Bombay had no opportunity	of expressing its views on the formation of such a composite State. The appellant asked for a declaration that s. 8	and other consequential provisions of the Act were null and void and prayed for	an appropriate writ directing	the State Government of Bombay and the Union Government not to enforce and implement the same.	This writ petition was heard by the Bombay High Court on September 14, 1956, and by its judgment of even date, the High 609 Court dismissed	the petition, holding that there was	no violation or contravention of Art. 3 of	the Constitution. The appellant then obtained the necessary certificate under Art. 132(1) of the Constitution, and filed his	appeal	in this Court on	October 18, 1956 on the	strength of that certificate.
Now, it	is both convenient and advisable to read at this stage Art. 3 of the	Constitution, as amended by	the Constitution (Fifth Amendment)	Act, 1955, the alleged violation of which is the main ground of attack by learned counsel for the appellant.
Provided that no Bill for the purpose shall be introduced in either House of Parliament except on the recommendation	of the President and unless, where the proposal contained	in the Bill affects the area, boundaries or name of any of	the States the Bill has been referred by the President to	the Legislature of that State for expressing its views thereon within such period as may be specified in the reference	or within such further period as the President may	allow	and the period so specified or allowed has expired.	" It is clear that by its substantive part the Article gives a certain	power to Parliament, viz., the power to make a	law in respect of any of the five matters mentioned in cls.	(a) to (e) thereof.	This power includes the making of a law	to increase	the area of any State; diminish the area of	any State; and alter the name of any State. The	substantive part is	followed by a proviso, which	lays down certain conditions for the exercise of the Power. It states that no Bill for the purpose (the word " purpose " obviously	has reference 610 to the	power of making law in respect of the matters mentioned in the substantive part) shall be introduced	in either House of Parliament except on the recommendation	of the President and unless, where the proposal contained	in the Bill affects the area, boundaries or name of any of	the States,	the Bill has been referred by the President to	the Legislature of that State for expressing its views thereon. Thus, the proviso lays down two conditions: one is that	no Bill shall be introduced except on the recommendation of the President, and	the second condition is that	where	the proposal contained in the Bill affects the area,	boundaries or name of any of the States, the Bill has to be referred by the President to the Legislature of the State for expressing its views thereon. The period within which	the State Legislature must express its views has to be specified	by the President; but the President may extend the	period	so specified. If, however, the period specified or extended expires and no views of the State Legislature are received, the second condition laid down in the proviso is fulfilled in spite of the fact that the views of the State Legislature have not been expressed.	The intention seems to be to give an opportunity to the State Legislature to express its views within the time allowed; if the State Legislature fails	to avail itself of that opportunity, such	failure does	not invalidate the	introduction of the Bill. Nor is there anything	in the proviso to indicate that Parliament must accept or act	upon the views of the	State Legislature. Indeed, two State Legislatures may express totally divergent views.	All that is contemplated is that Parliament should have before it the views of the State Legislatures as to the proposals contained in the Bill and then be free to deal with the Bill in any manner it thinks fit, following	the usual practice	and procedure prescribed by and	under	the rules of business. Thus the essential content of the second condition is a reference by the President of the proposal contained in the bill to the State Legislature	to express its views. thereon within the time allowed. It is worthy of note, and this has been properly emphasised in the judgment of the High 611 Court, that what has to be referred to the State Legislature by the President is the proposal contained in the Bill.	The proviso	does not say that if and when a proposal contained in the	Bill is modified subsequently by an amendment properly	moved and accepted in Parliament, there must be a fresh reference to the State Legislature and a	fresh bill must be	introduced. It was pointed out in the	course	of arguments that	if the second condition	required a fresh reference and a fresh bill for every amendment, it might result in an interminable process; because any	and every amendment of the original proposal contained in the Bill would then necessitate a fresh Bill and a fresh reference to the State Legislature. Other difficulties might also arise if such a construction were put on the proviso; for example, in a case where two or three States were involved, different views might be expressed by the Legislatures of different States.	If Parliament were to accept the views of one	of the Legislatures and not of the other, a fresh reference would still be necessary by reason of any amendment in	the original proposal contained in the Bill.
We are referring to these difficulties not because we think that a forced meaning should be given to the words of	the proviso	to avoid certain difficulties which may arise.	We are of	the view that the words of the	proviso	are clear enough and bear their ordinary plain meaning. According	to the accepted connotation of the words used in the proviso, the second condition means what it states and what has to be referred to the State Legislature is the proposal contained in the Bill; it has no such drastic effect as to require a fresh reference	every time an amendment of the proposal contained in the Bill is moved and accepted in	accordance with the rules of procedure of Parliament. That in the present case the States Reorganisation Bill	was introduced on the recommendation of the President has	not been disputed; nor has it been disputed that the proposal contained in the Bill was referred to the State Legislatures concerned and their views were received, According	to learned counsel for 612 the appellant, however, this was not enough compliance with the second condition of the proviso.	He has put	his argument	in several ways. Firstly, he has contended that the word " State " in Art. 3 should be given a larger connotation so	as to	mean and include not	merely	the geographical entity called the State, but its	people	as well: this, according to learned counsel for the	appellant, is the	" democratic process " incorporated in Art. 3	and according to this democratic process, so learned counsel has argued,	the representatives of the people of the State	of Bombay assembled in the State Legislature should have been given an opportunity of expressing their views not merely on the proposal originally contained in the Bill, but on	any substantial modification thereof. Secondly and following the same line of argument, he has contended that the word " Bill " should be given an extended meaning so as to include any amendment, at least any substantial amendment, of	the proposal	contained in	the Bill; and	thirdly, he	has contended that in the present case the formation of a	new Bombay State as one unit was so different from	the three units originally proposed in the Bill that it was not really an amendment of the original proposal but a new I proposal altogether for which a fresh Bill and a fresh reference were necessary.
We proceed now	to consider these contentions. It	is necessary to state at	the outset that our task is	to determine on a proper construction the true scope and effect of Art. 3 of the Constitution, with particular reference	to the second condition laid down by the proviso thereto.	We bring to our task such considerations as are germane to	the interpretation	of an	organic instrument	like	the Constitution; but it will be improper to import into	the question of construction doctrines of democratic theory	and practice	obtaining in other countries,	unrelated to	the tenor, scheme and words of the provisions which we have	to construe. In plain and unambiguous language, the proviso to Art. 3 of the Constitution states that where the proposal contained in the Bill affects the area, boundaries or name of any of the States, the Bill must be referred by the 613 President to the Legislature of the State for expressing its views.	It does not appear to us that any	special	or recondite doctrine of " democratic process " is involved therein.	Learned counsel for the appellant has invited	our attention to Art. IV, s. 3, of the American Constitution which says inter alia that " no new State shall be formed or erected within the jurisdiction of any other State, nor	any State be formed by the junction of two or more	States	or parts of States without the consent of the Legislatures	of the State concerned as well as of the Congress." That provision is quite different	from the proviso we	are considering: the former requires the consent of	the State Legislature whereas the essential requirement of our proviso is a, reference by the President of the proposal contained in the	Bill for the expression of its views by	the State Legislature. For this	reason we do not think that	the decisions relied on by learned counsel for the appellant (State of Louisiana v. State of Mississipi (1), and State of Washington v. State of Oregon(1)) are in point.	The expression I State' occurs in Art. 3,	and as has been observed in the State of Texas v. George W. White (3), that expression may	have different meanings: it may mean a territorial region, or people united in political relation living in that region or it may refer	to the	government under which the people live or it may even	convey	the combined idea of territory, people and government. Article 1 of our Constitution says that India is a Union of States and the States and the territories thereof are specified	in a Schedule. There is, therefore, no difficulty	in understanding what is meant by the expression	'State'	in Art. 3.	It obviously refers to the States in	the First Schedule	and the I Legislature of the State' refers to	the Legislature which each State has under	the Constitution. That being the position we see no reasons for importing into the Construction of Art. 3 any doctrinaire consideration	of the sanctity of the rights of States or even for giving	an extended	meaning to the expression I State' occurring therein.	None of the constituent units of the (1) (1905) 202 U.S. 1.	(2) (1908) 211 U.S. 127. (3) (i869) 74 U.S. 700.
Indian Union was sovereign and independent in the sense	the American	colonies or the Swiss Cantons	were before they formed their federal unions. The Constituent Assembly	of India, deriving	its power from the sovereign people,	was unfettered by	any previous commitment in evolving	a constitutional	pattern	suitable to	the genius	and requirements of the Indian people as a whole. Unlike some other federal legislatures, Parliament, representing	the people of India as a whole, has been vested with	the exclusive power	of admitting or establishing new States, increasing or diminishing the area of an existing State	or altering its boundaries, the Legislature or Legislatures	of the States concerned having only the right to an	expression of views on the proposals. It is significant that	for making such territorial adjustments it is not necessary even to invoke the provisions	governing constitutional amendments.
The second line of argument presented on behalf of	the appellant is that the word I Bill' in the proviso must	be interpreted to include an amendment of any of the clauses of the Bill, at least any substantial amendment thereof,	and any proposal contained in such amendment must be referred to the State Legislature for expression of its views. We	do not think that this interpretation is correct. Wherever the introduction of	an amendment is subject to a condition precedent, as in the case of financial bills, the Consti- tution has used the expression I A bill or amendments', e.g. in Art. 117. No such expression occurs in art 3. Secondly, under Art. 118 Parliament has power to make rules of its own procedure and conduct of business, including the moving	of amendments etc.	Rule 80 of the rules of procedure of	the House of the People (Lok Sabha) lays down the	conditions which govern the admissibility of amendments to clauses	or schedules of a Bill, and one of the conditions is that	an amendment shall be within the scope of the Bill and relevant to the	subject matter of the clause to which it relates. Article	122 (1) of the Constitution says that the validity of any	proceedings in Parliament shall not be	called	in question on the ground of any alleged 615 irregularity of procedure. In view of these provisions,	we cannot accept an interpretation of Art. 3 which may nullify the effect of Art. 122, an interpretation moreover which	is based not on the words used therein but on certain abstract and somewhat illusory ideas of what learned counsel for	the appellant has characterised as the democratic process. We recognise that the formation of a new composite State	of Bombay as in s. 8 of the Act was a substantial modification of the	original proposal of three units contained in	the Bill. That, however, does not mean that it was not a proper amendment of the original proposal or that	the State Legislature had no opportunity of expressing its views	on all aspects of the subject matter of the proposal. The High Court rightly pointed out that in the debates in the State Legislature several members spoke in favour of a composite State of Bombay. The point to note is that many different views were expressed in respect of the subject matter of the original proposal of three units, and as a matter of fact it cannot be said that-the State Legislature had no opportunity of expressing its views in favour of one composite unit instead of three units if it so desired.	It cannot be said that the proposal of one unit instead of three was	not relevant or pertinent to the subject matter of the original proposal. ID T. H. Vakil v. Bombay Presidency	Radio Club Ltd. (1), a decision on which	learned counsel for	the appellant has relied, the question arose of the power of the chairman	of a club to rule an amendment out of	order.	It was said therein that (1) an amendment must be	germane	to the subject-matter of the original proposition and (2)	it must not be a direct negative thereof. Judged by these	two conditions, it cannot be said that the proposal of one unit instead	of three was not germane to the	subject-matter	of the original proposal or was a direct negative thereof.	We are unable, therefore, to accept the third contention	of learned	counsel	for the appellant to the effect that	the formation of a new Bombay State as envisaged in s. 8 of	the Act was so completely divorced from the proposal contained in (1) (1944) 47 Bom. L.R. 428.
the Bill that it was in reality a new bill and therefore a fresh reference was necessary.
(e) of Art. 3 an amendment was to be proposed and accepted changing (for example) the name of a State. We do not think that we	need answer such a hypothetical question except merely to say that if an amendment is of such a character that it is not really an amendment and is clearly violative of Art.	the question then will be not the validity	of proceedings in	Parliament but the	violation of	a constitutional	provision. That, however, is not	the position in the present case.
For these reasons, we hold that there was no violation	of Art. 3 and the Act or any of its provisions are not invalid on that ground.
The appeal accordingly fails and is dismissed with costs.

References: v. 
 Art. 3
 V. 
 Art. 132
 Art. 3
 art. 3
 Art. 226
 Art. 3
 Art. 3
 Art. 132
 Art. 3
 Art. 3
 Art. 3
 Art. 3
 Art. 3
 v. 
 v. 
 Art. 3
 v. 
 Art. 3
 Art. 3
 Art. 117
 art 3
 Art. 118
 Art. 3
 Art. 122
 v. 
 Art. 3
 Art. 3