Source: http://www.dmlp.org/subject-area/slapps
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 14:13:47+00:00

Document:
Weican Null Meng; China Free Press, Inc.
Zhang Ziyi is an international motion picture actress who has appeared in films such as Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon and Memoirs of a Geisha. On June 14, 2012, Zhang filed a complaint in the Central District of California against the corporation China Free Press, Inc., alleged to be doing business as Boxun News, and Boxun News's owner, Weican Null Meng. The complaint alleged five claims: (1) libel per se, (2) false light invasion of privacy, (3) intentional interference with prospective economic advantage, (4) negligent interference with prospective economic advantage, and (5) unlawful and unfair business practices under California's Business and Professional Code.
The complaint asserted that Boxun News published three articles on its website that included statements that Zhang was a prostitute who had sexual relations with Chinese government officials, among others, and that she received "outlandish payments" for doing so. One article, it stated, claimed that Zhang was under investigation by Chinese authorities and had been banned from leaving China. According to the complaint, these reports had been republished by other media outlets around the world. The plaintiff claimed that the defendants "willfully, knowingly, oppressively, and maliciously conspired" to publish false and defamatory statements about Zhang in order to "damage her, harm her, expose her to hatred, contempt, ridicule and obloquy, damage her business, and wrongfully promote their own business interests" at her expense. In filing suit, Zhang sought: general, special, and punitive damages; attorney's fees; and injunctive relief.
On August 15, 2012, defendant Meng filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. Meng, a resident of North Carolina, said he administered the Boxun News website from North Carolina and that the site's servers are leased from a Texas company. He claimed that the site generates no revenue and has limited user interaction. Thus, Meng asserted that his contacts with California did not satisfy due process. He argued that the claims did not arise from his California activities, and that there was no foreseeable harm from the allegedly tortious material. Meng also disputed Zhang's assertion that China Free Press was doing business as Boxun, stating that they were separate and distinct entities.
On August 17, 2012, while his motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction was pending, Meng filed a special motion to strike the complaint under California Code of Civil Procedure § 425.16 -- California's anti-SLAPP statute. Meng asserted that he fulfilled the requirements under § 4.25.16 because (1) his expressive conduct was made in furtherance of his right of petition or free speech, and (2) his speech was connected to a public issue. He claimed that Boxun News' status as a news reporting agency, and publishing a story dealing with "corruption at high levels of the Chinese government, are archetypical examples of conduct made in furtherance of protected speech." Because the allegedly defamatory statements included allegations of Zhang having allegedly unlawful affairs with Bo Xilai, a prominent politician in the Chinese Central Communist Party, the motion stated, the allegations were incidental to "a major political scandal." Thus, Meng argued that because Bo Xilai's fitness for an office of public trust was involved, reporting on the alleged affair was a matter of public interest. The motion stated, "While some elements of the scandal may seem trite, our own country's experience shows us that from seemingly small sexual acts, great political consequences may flow."
The motion to strike claimed that because Zhang was a public figure, due to her international fame, she needed to prove that Meng published the statements with actual malice. He claimed that she could not satisfy this, as Meng had relied on information from trusted sources, verified the information with an independent source, and adhered to proper journalistic standards practiced by mainstream newspapers. Meng also claimed that his sources were entitled to anonymity for this matter and that "outing them for prosecution in China [was] the sole purpose of this litigation." He argued that the underlying information was "too politically sensitive" for distribution without anonymity protections, stating, "This is no mere conjecture: Boxun reporters have been imprisoned for their contributions to the site." In his motion, Meng sought dismissal of the case, as well as costs and attorney's fees.
On January 4, 2013, Zhang filed oppositions to both of Meng's motions. In her opposition to Meng's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, Zhang claimed that the court could exercise jurisdiction because Meng purposefully directed his conduct in California, Zhang's harm was likely to be felt in California, and Meng did not satisfy his burden to present a compelling case that the exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable.
Zhang's opposition to Meng's motion to strike argued that Meng failed to meet his burden under the anti-SLAPP statute. Zhang asserted that as a news outlet, Boxun News was not considered a public forum protected under the statute. She argued that the defamatory statements did not concern a matter of public interest -- giving examples of statements saying Zhang had several boyfriends -- as they had "nothing to do with Mr. Bo's fitness for office." Therefore, the opposition claimed, the defamatory statements were not related to any major political scandal, a public issue, or any public interest. Further, the opposition argued that even if a person is a public figure, not all discussion of her is a matter of public interest.
Zhang's opposition further argued that there was a probability that the plaintiff would prevail on her claims because she could satisfy the required elements and the allegedly defamatory statements caused her to lose at least two potential jobs. Furthermore, the opposition claimed that there was clear and convincing evidence that the defamatory statements were made with actual malice because (1) Meng's sources provided unsubstantiated information that was not first-hand knowledge, (2) Meng was skeptical of about reports he received and altered an article to try to make the story more believable, (3) Meng did not attempt to contact Zhang to get her side of the story before publishing, and (4) the articles "suggest a malicious campaign [and] increasingly take on a threatening tone," going beyond the ordinary practice of journalism. Alternatively, the opposition argued that if the court needed more evidence to prove actual malice, it should deny the motion so Zhang can obtain the names of the confidential sources and complete necessary discovery.
As of July 15, 2013, no hearing has been scheduled regarding the motion to dismiss or the motion to strike.
Read more about Zhang v. China Free Press, Inc.
In January 2012, a professor at St. Michael's College posted a profile of John D. Haywood, a candidate for President of the United States in the New Hampshire Democratic primary, to a college-owned website. His students, Logan R. Spillane and Christopher Hardy, had written the profile of Haywood to fulfill a requirement for a journalism class. In preparing to write the article, the students had spoken to Haywood on the phone, interviewed several of his associates in his home state of North Carolina, and read his campaign website.
On July 24, 2012, Haywood filed a pro se lawsuit for libel against St. Michael's College, Spillane, and Hardy, alleging that the profile of his candidacy contained false statements about his policy positions, and that this profile injured his reputation and reduced his chances of winning the election. He identified sixteen allegedly false statements, including that Haywood had offered "a solution to global warming which is to spray particles into the atmosphere as a way to reflect the sun's heat back into space, which, in his opinion, would cool the earth." Haywood denied that he ever claimed to have the solution to global warming. Instead, he identified particle insertion as "one of the most promising areas for research" into how to cool the planet.
Haywood also claimed that the students' efforts to contact his associates in North Carolina for comment were evidence of malice, because Haywood was trying to keep his candidacy a secret from his associates. The students' actions harmed him, he asserted, because they informed his friends and family, many of whom are Republicans, that he was running for president in a Democratic primary.
Haywood sought $120,202.15 to fully reimburse his advertising costs, an additional $1,000,000 in damages for the reputational injury he suffered in his community, and $50,000,000 in punitive damages.
The students and the college filed special motions to strike under Vermont's state anti-SLAPP statute, 12 V.S.A. § 1041. Both the students and the college argued that the lawsuit fell within the statute's scope, as "a suit arising from the defendant's exercise, in connection with a public issue, of the right to freedom of speech." 12 V.S.A. § 1041(a). The students' brief argued that that the fact that Haywood was running as a Democrat in New Hampshire is both undisputed and public, and therefore should not form the basis of a libel claim, and that the other claims of falsity were "quibbles and nitpicks." Both briefs argued that the suit was an improper attempt by the plaintiff to prevent the description of his policy stances in a manner he did not approve and asked the court to dismiss the libel claims and award costs and reasonable attorney's fees for all work associated with litigating the claims.
Haywood filed a response opposing the special motions to strike, arguing that it was the defendants who had had violated his First Amendment rights. Specifically, he claimed that the defendants infringed his right to expression by publishing a profile which may have led to "untold multitudes" not to read his webpage. Haywood further stated that the defendants had "no right to appeal an interlocutory order dismissing the motion under 12 V.S.A. section 1041 (g) as the federal courts of appeal are governed by the Interlocutory Appeals Act."
The college replied to Haywood's response, noting that the motion to strike "is not an appeal and § 1041(g) is not relevant at this time." However, the college argued that, "to the extent Plaintiff is arguing that 12 V.S.A. § 1041 is a state statute that incorporates aspects of state procedure, the District Court for the District of Vermont has already ruled that this is no bar to bringing an anti-SLAPP motion to strike in federal court," citing to Bible & Gospel Trust. 1:07-CV-17, 2008 WL 5245644 (D. Vt. Dec. 12, 2008).
On Sept. 26, 2012, St. Michael's college filed a motion to dismiss. The motion argued for the application of North Carolina defamation law, because the alleged defamation constituted an "aggregate communication," as it was published online, and Haywood was domiciled in North Carolina at the time of publication. The college further argued that, as a matter of law, the profile was not libel per se under North Carolina law, because all of the disputed statements, when considered on their face, and without reference to the context surrounding the publication, were simple descriptions of policy positions which did not subject Haywood to ridicule or disgrace.
The college also argued that, even if Vermont or New Hampshire law applied, the defendants' statements would not be defamatory, because they would not tend to lower the plaintiff in the esteem of a respectable group of people.
Finally, the college argued that Haywood is a public figure and therefore must show that the defendants acted with actual malice, knowing the statement was false or acting with reckless disregard for the truth. Haywood could not show actual malice, it argued, because the complaint contained nothing more than "naked assertions " that did not constitute even a "bare factual showing that the Defendant purposefully acted without concern for the truth."
The students also filed a motion to dismiss, which the college joined. The students' motion noted that the only evidence of actual malice cited in Haywood's brief was an allegation that the students interviewed his associates in North Carolina "for one purpose only: pressuring the Plaintiff from continuing his campaign." The students argued that these interviews were not evidence of malice, but were part of standard journalistic practice. The students also argued that the complaint did not allege injury for which damages could be awarded, arguing that "[i]t is not a reasonable inference nor reasonably foreseeable nor a proximate cause that a St. Mike's freshman journalism class assignment actually derailed a fringe candidate's campaign to unseat an incumbent President."
Following Haywood's filing of an amended complaint, which further addressed the embarrassment allegedly caused by the statements at issue, both the students and the college renewed their motions to dismiss and their motions to strike.
Haywood responded to the renewed motions, reiterating his prior arguments and alleging that the special motions to strike were frivolous and intended to delay and that costs should be awarded if he was required to travel to a hearing on the Motion to Strike.
On December 14, 2012, after supplemental briefing on the anti-SLAPP provision, the court issued an opinion and order granting the defendants' renewed motions to dismiss the amended complaint for failure to state a claim and defendants' special motions to strike under Vermont's anti-SLAPP statute. The Court awarded the defendants costs and reasonable attorney's fees.
In evaluating the 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss, the court ruled that Vermont law indicated that the law of the state where the plaintiff was domiciled controlled. However, it noted that special damages can occur in more than one jurisdiction. It therefore ruled that Haywood could seek damages for the loss of the election under New Hampshire law, and for his reputational injury under North Carolina law. However, the court determined that Haywood's claim must be dismissed under either North Carolina or New Hampshire law.
The court held that Haywood failed to state a libel claim because: (1) his claim did not satisfy the elements of libel under North Carolina law; (2) his claim did not establish the state of mind or injury elements of a libel claim under New Hampshire law; and (3) his claim did not establish that the profile was written or published with actual malice.
The court held that the profile was not libel under North Carolina law because it did not impugn the plaintiff's character, finding that the policy positions described in the profile were, in many cases, "simply a hair's breadth away from Plaintiff's true position," and not "so outlandish" that they would expose him to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule. The court also found that Haywood had not identified any contextual elements that would alter a reader's understanding of the profile and provided "no factual underpinnings to his conclusory allegation that the student Defendants intended to defame Plaintiff." Rather, the court found that the "students had a contrary motive, as they submitted the Profile in fulfillment of an assignment in journalism, a profession that relies on factually accurate reporting. They had nothing to gain, and a grade to lose, by writing falsehoods." Finally, the court concluded that "[d]amages are particularly "speculative and uncertain" in this case, given that Plaintiff lost the election by a significant vote ratio (more than 116 to 1)." Aycock v. Padgett, 516 S.E.2d 907, 910 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999) ("[t]he notion that the loss of an election constitutes special damages for which a court may grant relief is far too speculative and uncertain to entertain.").
The court also held that the profile was not libel under New Hampshire law, because New Hampshire law requires the plaintiff to demonstrate an injury to his reputation, and the only reputational injury Haywood alleged was that his friends and family discovered that he was running as a Democrat.
The court also found that Haywood failed to satisfy his burden to prove the students' state of mind. A New Hampshire plaintiff can only recover compensatory damages if he shows the defendants were negligent, and Haywood did not allege negligence. The court likewise found that Haywood could not meet the heightened standard for defamation that applies to public figures under the First Amendment. The court noted that, as a person running for the highest public office in the country, Haywood was a public figure for purposes of defamation law and needed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that a defamatory falsehood was made with actual malice. His allegations that the students contacted his associates to pressure him into ceasing his campaign did not rise above a speculative level, as there was "no immediately apparent reason why the student Defendants would have such a motivation." The court concluded that Haywood was conflating the actual malice standard with malice in the colloquial sense and overlooking the fact that the reckless disregard standard is subjective and requires an assessment of the defendant's actual state of mind.
The court then turned to the motions to strike under Vermont's anti-SLAPP law. The court noted that some federal courts have decided that state anti-SLAPP provisions conflict with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and have therefore declined to apply them in federal court. However, the District Court followed the District of Vermont's earlier holding in Bible & Gospel Trust that there is no direct conflict between the Vermont anti-SLAPP statute and the Federal Rules, and that "the state interest outweighs any federal interest."
In evaluating the merits of the anti-SLAPP motions, the court looked primarily to California precedent interpreting an analogous anti-SLAPP provision, because the Vermont Supreme Court had not interpreted the Vermont anti-SLAPP statute.
The court concluded that the defendants met their threshold burden of proving that their conduct is protected by the anti-SLAPP statute because (1) the profile was published in a public forum, and (2) the publication was in furtherance of the students' right to free speech and involved speech concerning a public issue. Citing CA law, the court found that "[a]n Internet website that is accessible to the general public ...is a public forum." Cole v. Patricia A. Meyer & Associates, APC, 206 Cal. App. 4th 1095, 1121 (Cal. App. 2d 2012).
The court also found that "it is clear that the writing of the profile was an exercise of the students' freedom of speech." It noted that California courts have identified three categories of speech concerning a public issue: (1) the subject of the statement precipitating the claim was a person or entity in the public eye; (2) the statement precipitating the claim involved conduct that could affect large numbers of people beyond the direct participants; and (3) whether the statement or activity precipitating the claim involved a topic of widespread public interest." Wilbanks, 121 Cal. App. 4th at 898.22. The students' speech concerned a public issue under all three definitions: (1) as a candidate for President, Haywood was in the public eye; (2) Haywood's candidacy had the potential to affect large numbers of people; and (3) the election (and each issue addressed in the profile) was a topic of widespread public interest.
Finding the Plaintiff's burden satisfied, the court then considered whether the plaintiff could prove that: (1) the defendant's exercise of his or her right to freedom of speech was devoid of any reasonable factual support and any arguable basis in law; and (2) the defendant's acts caused actual injury to the plaintiff. The court found that Haywood failed to make that showing.
The statements in the profile had reasonable factual support, according to the court, because they were quite similar to the statements on Haywood's campaign website. The court further found that defendants' speech had a "decidedly firm basis in law" because, as it ruled in granting the defendants' motions to dismiss, Haywood's claim was not legally sufficient. Finally, court found that the actual injury Haywood alleged was "highly speculative, considering that he lost the primary by an overwhelming margin; the Profile was published only on the St. Michael's College website; and Plaintiff's alleged reputational injury derived primarily from a true statement contained in the Profile."
Finally, the court held that the defendants were entitled to the entirety of their attorney's fees and costs, not just those relating to the litigation of the anti-SLAPP motions. The court's analysis of Vermont law governing other fee shifting provisions led him to conclude that the Vermont courts would interpret the fee-shifting clause broadly. The court held that the legal work on the various motions was "inextricably linked," and "severance of the work ... is untenable." Finally, the court held that this interpretation of the fee shifting provision advanced "the policy of the anti-SLAPP statute, as it guarantees that costly litigation will not chill protected expression."
Haywood filed a notice of appeal pro se on Jan. 2, 2013.
Dr. Aaron Filler filed a complaint against former patient Susan Walker in Los Angeles Superior Court on May 31, 2011. In his complaint, Filler alleged defamation and interference with prospective economic advantage in response to Walker's review of Dr. Filler on a physician rating site.
On August 24, 2011, Walker filed a motion to strike based on California Code of Civil Procedure §§ 425.16 and 45, California's anti-SLAPP statute. Walker's motion argues that Walker is shielded from liability as the "dissemination of consumer information about medical care is a vital ‘public issue' and the internet is a ‘public forum,' and that Dr. Filler is a public figure subject to the burden of proving actual malice. Filler filed an opposition to this motion on September 16, 2011, also requesting leave to amend the complaint to plead more specific factual allegations to establish actual malice. Walker replied to Filler's opposition on September 22, 2011.
After a hearing on April 19, 2011, Walker's motion to strike was granted. In the order filed on May 8, 2012, Judge Elizabeth White held that Filler's claims arose from Walker's act of free speech in connection with a public issue under CCP § 425.16 and that Filler did not establish a probability of prevailing on these claims. In accordance with this order, Judge White later ordered Filler to pay $50,259.65 to Walker for attorneys' fees and costs.
Read more about Filler, et al. v. Walker, et al.
On February 11, 2011, former United States Department of Agriculture official Shirley Sherrod filed in District of Columbia Superior Court a defamation lawsuit against Andrew Breitbart and Larry O'Connor, two individuals involved with the prominent conservative political blog BigGovernment.com. The complaint also names a John Doe defendant.
The complaint stems from a March 2010 speech Sherrod gave to the NAACP, and the defendants' subsequent treatment of that speech. On July 19, 2010, Breitbart posted on BigGovernment an edited video of Sherrod's speech, along with allegations that Sherrod carried out her USDA duties "through the prism of race and class distinctions." The complaint also discusses slides added to the video of the speech that allege that Sherrod "discriminates against people due to their race." Along with Breitbart's post discussing Sherrod's speech, the complaint also alleges that O'Connor posted the edited video to YouTube, and that the John Doe defendant provided Breitbart and O'Connor with the unedited video and assisted in editing it.
After the defendants' alleged actions, Sherrod left her job with the USDA; the complaint alleges that the White House asked for her resignation because of the edited video and ensuing media uproar. Sherrod's complaint alleges defamation (for the edited video, blog post, and a Twitter post promoting the video and post), false light, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, and also seeks punitive damages.
The defendants removed the case to the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. Sherrod responded by moving to remand, arguing that the other defendants knew that the John Doe lived in Georgia (where Sherrod lives), and that Doe's citizenship defeats federal diversity jurisdiction. The defendants opposed remand on the grounds that a John Doe defendant's citizenship is irrelevant for diversity-jurisdiction purposes.
On the same day (April 18) that they filed their opposition to remand, the defendants moved to dismiss, both pursuant to Federal Rule 12(b) and under the D.C. Anti-SLAPP Act. The Rule 12(b) motion argues improper venue (with an alternative request to move the case to California, where Breitbart and O'Connor live), as well as substantive grounds (that the blog post was non-actionable opinion, and that the edited video was an accurate depiction of Sherrod's speech). The anti-SLAPP motion incorporates the motion to dismiss in arguing that Sherrod cannot show that her claims are likely to succeed.
On May 19, Sherrod filed memoranda opposing both motions to dismiss. Her opposition to the anti-SLAPP motion argues, among other things, that the D.C. Anti-SLAPP Act was passed after the lawsuit began and does not apply retroactively, and/or that it does not apply in federal court. Her opposition to the Rule 12(b) motion argues both that venue in D.C. is proper, and that the defendants' comments are non-opinion and "indefensible." Sherrod also filed a reply in further support of her motion to remand. On June 3, the defendants filed replies in support of both motions to dismiss.

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