Source: https://dc.fd.org/motions/appeals/smith1.htm
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 07:10:40+00:00

Document:
This appeal arises from a criminal prosecution of defendant-appellant Antonione xxxxxx by plaintiff-appellee, the United States of America. There are no intervenors or amici.
On November 17, 1998, a grand jury sitting in the District of Columbia returned a two-count indictment charging Antonione xxxxxx and Daniel Hamilton with transferring and possessing a semi-automatic assault weapon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(v)(1) (Count One), and with possession of a firearm and ammunition by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (Count Two) (A. at 10). (1) Upon a motion by the government, the district court dismissed Count One prior to trial (A. at 3). Upon a motion by the government, the district court dismissed the charges against Daniel Hamilton (A. at 5).
Mr. xxxxxx was sentenced on February 25, 2000, to 51 months' imprisonment, a three-year term of supervised release and a $100 special assessment (A. at 13). Mr. xxxxxx filed a timely notice of appeal on March 3, 2000 (A. at 19).
The case against appellant xxxxxx was made by Kevin Perry, who was a confidential informant cooperating with law enforcement in exchange for leniency in his own criminal cases. In 1996, Perry had been arrested and charged in Superior Court with distributing crack cocaine (Tr. 11/2/99 at 63, 103). Later that year, he was again arrested and charged in Superior Court, this time for kidnapping (Tr. 11/2/99 at 63, 103). While those charges were pending, Perry was arrested and charged in the United States District Court with distributing crack cocaine (Tr. 11/2/99 at 25, 108).
If convicted of the federal charge alone, Perry faced a prison sentence of 10 years to life (Tr. 11/2/99 at 60). He sought to save himself from such a lengthy term of years (and from any penalties in his two Superior Court cases) by helping law enforcement to make criminal cases against others (Tr. 11/2/99 at 25). In exchange for Mr. Perry's cooperation and guilty plea in the district court, the government agreed to move to dismiss Perry's two cases pending in Superior Court and to file a motion pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 in his district court case (Tr. 11/2/99 at 43, 59). (2) Perry believed that he would "benefit" if people were arrested based on his information or assistance (Tr. 11/2/99 at 100).
Although the case against appellant was Perry's first "deal" with law enforcement, he was involved in other "deals" prior to appellant's trial. The case agent from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, Frank Haera, was ask to vouch for the value of Perry's word in other criminal cases. Although most of the objections to this line of questioning were sustained, Haera was able to testify that, based on Perry's word, search warrants were executed, contraband was discovered, and people were arrested (Tr. 11/2/99 at 53-55).
Perry's first "deal" for the police began when, according to him, appellant xxxxxx fortuitously walked up to him on the street and asked if he was interested in buying a rifle (Tr. 11/2/99 at 67, 75, 82). (3) They agreed on a price of $900 (Tr. 11/2/99 at 67). On July 9, 1997, Perry contacted appellant and arranged to meet at Perry's apartment (Tr. 11/2/99 at 68). Appellant arrived at Perry's apartment just as an undercover officer left (Tr. 11/2/99 at 114). The officer identified appellant at trial (Tr. 11/2/99 at 114). Perry testified that he and appellant discussed how to get the rifle to Perry's apartment without being detected (Tr. 11/2/99 at 70). Appellant twice left and returned (Tr. 11/2/99 at 71-72). Finally, appellant returned with Daniel Hamilton ("Cat Face") (Tr. 11/2/99 at 72). Cat Face carried a box containing a loaded rifle and extra bullets (Tr. 11/2/99 at 39, 50, 72, 73). Perry gave appellant $900 and, according to Perry, appellant returned $40 to Perry "for doing the deal." (Tr. 11/2/99 at 74, 90). After appellant and Cat Face left the apartment, Perry reported to officers that he had the rifle (Tr. 11/2/99 at 74).
The July 9th events in Perry's apartment were captured on video. Perry, who was wheelchair bound, had been provided with a wheelchair that had been outfitted with hidden audio and video equipment in each arm (11/2/99 at 28, 69, 113). The video tape was played at trial (Tr. 11/2/99 at 77-92).
Q. Is it true that Perry had given you information that has led to the capture of other criminals?
Q. As a result of Mr. Perry's cooperation, have you been able to arrest other criminals?
Q. What happened -- well, let me rephrase this. With the information that Mr. Perry gave you, what did you do?
Q. Sure. Mr. Perry gave you certain information about individuals in the Park Morton complex; is that right?
A. The information that Mr. Perry gave me personally, I did a lot of different things with it. Some of the information was used to obtain search warrants. Some of the information was used to begin investigations on other people in that area that were committing crimes such as drug dealing and firearms possession.
Q. In any of those search warrants that were based on information given you by Perry, did you uncover contraband?
Q. And any of those investigations of other individuals that you started as a result of Mr. Perry's information, did any of those investigations lead to arrests?
Q. Agent Haera, based on what you know about the information Mr. Perry gave you, and the search warrants you've gotten and the arrests, do you believe that the information Mr. Perry gave you is truthful?
Haera's testimony that Kevin Perry's information led to the discovery of contraband and to arrests in other instances improperly bolstered Perry's credibility, was not relevant to any element of the charge here, was inadmissible extrinsic evidence of specific instances of conduct admitted for the purpose of supporting Perry's credibility, and invaded the province of the jury to determine witness credibility. See Fed.R.Evid. 401, 608(b). (5) See also United States v. Sanchez-Lima, 161 F.3d 545, 548-49 (9th Cir. 1998) (agent's testimony that he believed another agent's story to be truthful improperly bolstered witness's credibility; conviction reversed); Maurer v. Department of Corrections, 32 F.3d 1286, 1289 (8th Cir. 1994) (witness' testimony that victim seemed sincere when she reported crime improper vouching; conviction reversed); United States v. Taylor, 900 F.2d 779, 781-82 (4th Cir. 1990) (testimony that convictions had been obtained based on police informant's information improperly bolstered informant's credibility; conviction reversed); Cooper v. Sowders, 837 F.2d 284, 288 (6th Cir. 1988) (testimony that arrests were made based on police informant's information improperly bolstered informant's credibility; conviction reversed); United States v. Azure, 801 F.2d 336, 339-41 (8th Cir. 1986) (expert's testimony that victim's story was truthful improperly bolstered victim's credibility; conviction reversed).
In this case, the prosecutor's relentless pursuit of this line of questioning paid off. By the time Agent Haera finally was able to testify that Perry's information had led to discovery of contraband and to arrests, the jury clearly understood what the prosecutor sought with her questions. Having successfully driven her point home, the prosecutor hardly needed an answer to her final question: "[D]o you believe that the information Mr. Perry gave you is truthful?" By then, the jury was fully aware that in Agent Haera's professional opinion, Kevin Perry was a trustworthy and truthful person who had provided accurate information in other cases and upon whose word the jury could safely depend.
Having learned that law enforcement had found Perry to be trustworthy and truthful in other cases, the jurors could be relieved of their natural suspicion of Perry's testimony. See Taylor, 900 F.2d at 782-83 (where informer was only person actually present at tape-recorded buy, informer was "key witness" and "improper bolstering of his credibility could only have been quite prejudicial" to defendant").
Agent Haera then signaled that appellant was one of those people committing the drug, violent and murderous crimes in the Park Morton neighborhood by informing the jury, "we set up a transaction in order to purchase a - a rifle for a sum of money, which I believe was $900, from a person that we knew in the investigation as York." (Tr. 11/2/99 at 27). Agent Haera again informed the jury that he had had prior encounters with appellant: "That day we had made arrangements for Mr. Perry to purchase a rifle from a man named York, who I knew as Antonione xxxxxx . . . ." (Tr. 11/2/99 at 29). The prejudice from this "other crimes" testimony far outweighed any probative value and caused irreparable harm to appellant's defense, particularly his defense that Daniel Hamilton ("Cat Face") possessed the rifle.
First, the testimony had essentially no probative value. It should be been excluded, therefore, under Rule 401 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The testimony was ostensibly to establish that "York" and "xxxxxx" were the same person. But it was completely unnecessary for that purpose. The defense had never claimed that appellant did not use the nickname "York." Nor did the government need evidence that appellant was known to law enforcement. That fact was probative of no element of the charge.
To the extent the prior investigation testimony had any probative value, it was substantially outweighed by the tremendous prejudice inherent in it and should have been excluded under Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. (6) "To carry out the Rule 403 balance, we must assess the degree of probity of the evidence, which, in turn, depends on its relation to the evidence and strategy presented at trial in general." United States v. Mitchell, 49 F.3d 769, 776 (D.C. Cir. 1995). The knowledge that appellant was the subject of an investigation - including narcotic trafficking, violent crimes, and even "unsolved murders" - had little probative value but irreparably damaged appellant in the eyes of the jury. (7) The jurors' willingness to entertain a reasonable doubt as to Kevin Perry's identification of appellant (and not Daniel Hamilton) as the seller surely disappeared when they learned that this was not the first time Mr. xxxxxx attracted police attention. The evidence elicited from Agent Haera served no purpose but to smear appellant with an image of drugs, violence and murder. Its admission contributed to the prejudice resulting from Haera's bolstering of Perry's testimony, which requires a new trial.
You're going to hear that in July of 1997, Antonione xxxxxx, who by the way, goes by other names -- he's known as York, or known as Abdul Mines -- he was living in the Park Morton public housing complex . . . .
A. Yes. I do. I know him to go by Antonione xxxxxx, and I also know him to go by Abdul Mines.
Q. Okay. Mr. Perry, do you know a man named Antonione xxxxxx?
A. After conducting a heading on - for the video camera on the wheelchair, I at that time took his wheelchair and was leaving out of the apartment. Opening the door, that's when I noticed the target at the time who was identified by the last name of xxxxxx, a/k/a York.
The only evidence that you've heard is that the defendant, Antonoine xxxxxx, York, Abdul Mines, sold this gun to Kevin Perry for $900."
Appellant's aliases were not relevant to any matter to be legitimately proved at trial. That evidence too should be been excluded under Rule 401 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The repeated use of the aliases served to prejudice appellant by casting him as a criminal who found it "necessary to conceal his identity." United States v. Grayson, 166 F.2d 863, 867 (2d Cir. 1948) ("[A]n alias - even a single alias - can serve no purpose but to arouse suspicion that the accused is a person who has found it useful or necessary to conceal his identity."). See also United States v. Cowden, 545 F.2d 257, 267-68 (1st Cir. 1976) ("It is best to avoid the use of an alias particularly where, as here, there seems to be no relevant purpose for including it in the indictment."); United States v. Beedle, 463 F.2d 721, 724 (3d Cir. 1972) ("The practice of allowing aliases to exist has been condemned where as they serve no useful purpose either to identify the accused or to protect him from double jeopardy.") (citations omitted). Even if Kevin Perry's testimony that he knew appellant as "York" were permissible, its marginal relevance was outweighed by the prejudicial impact of the repeated testimony about the aliases from each witness and the repeated commentary by the prosecutor. The testimony should have been excluded under Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
I HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing brief for appellant, Antonione xxxxxx, does not exceed the number of words permitted by D.C. Circuit Rule 28(d).
2. In addition, Perry's law enforcement handlers supplemented his social security disability check by giving him thousands of dollars for food, clothing, rent, telephone, utilities, a pager, transportation, his children's expenses, and to move to a new residence (Tr. 11/2/99 at 26, 46-47, 65-66, 104-1079). They also paid him a cash award for his information (Tr. 11/2/99 at 26, 47).
3. Perry testified that he had known appellant for ten or more years (Tr. 11/2/99 at 66).

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