Source: http://vt.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20180110_0000063.DVT.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 12:29:50+00:00

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Concluding that his claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations and that they are otherwise meritless, I recommend that Raghoonanan's § 2255 Motion be DENIED.
After hearing arguments of counsel and affording Raghoonanan an opportunity to speak, the court sentenced Raghoonanan to a total term of 145 months: an 85-month term under Count One and a 60-month term under Count Six, each term to run consecutively with the other term. (Id. at 40.) In arriving at this sentence, the court appropriately weighed the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). The court analyzed the nature and circumstances of the conspiracy, noting that Raghoonanan used firearms to threaten other people, that the conspiracy continued for a long period of time, and that a substantial amount of drugs were distributed resulting in significant “human wreckage.” (Id. at 34-36.) The court also reviewed Raghoonanan's personal history and characteristics, observing that Raghoonanan had effectively wasted his intelligence and organizational skills on the conspiracy. (Id. at 38.) Balancing these factors, the court imposed the 145-month term of imprisonment, a sentence that fell in the middle of the 10- to 13-year sentencing range set forth in the Plea Agreement. (Doc. 80 at 5, ¶ 12.) Raghoonanan did not directly appeal any aspect of his conviction or sentence.
As discussed below, the various claims that Raghoonanan raises in his Motion and Amended Motion are barred by the statute of limitations because they were not brought within one year of the four triggering dates set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(1)-(4). Further, even if the claims were timely, they are meritless.
Raghoonanan asserts that his sentence should be set aside based on three general contentions: (1) his counsel provided ineffective representation in multiple ways; (2) the Supreme Court's decision in Dean, 137 S.Ct. 1170, requires this court to vacate his sentence for possessing a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking crime under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i); and (3), his conviction for violating § 924(c)(1)(A)(i) should be vacated in light of Johnson, 135 S.Ct. 2551. (Docs. 210, 229.) Below, each argument is addressed in turn, keeping in mind that, as a pro se litigant, Raghoonanan's submissions must be construed liberally and his arguments must be accorded “special solicitude.” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 475 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation omitted).
28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(1)-(4). Because he did not appeal from his sentence, Raghoonanan's conviction became final on October 31, 2013, the date when his time for filing an appeal expired. Raghoonanan filed his § 2255 Motion on May 1, 2017, (see Doc. 210), three and a half years after his conviction became final. (Doc. 146.) Thus, Raghoonanan's Motion is barred by 2255(f)(1). Nevertheless, Raghoonanan asserts that his § 2255 Motion is timely under § 2255(f)(3), which requires a § 2255 motion to be filed within one year from “the date on which the right[s] asserted [by the petitioner were] initially recognized by the Supreme Court, ” if those newly recognized rights have been “made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3); (see also Doc. 210-1 at 3-4).
Under § 2255(f)(3), the limitations period commences on the date the Supreme Court “initially recognized” the right asserted by the prisoner. Dodd v. United States, 545 U.S. 353, 357 (2005) (“An applicant has one year from the date on which the right he asserts was initially recognized by this Court.”). To assert his ineffective assistance of counsel claims, Raghoonanan relies on two Supreme Court decisions: Watson, 552 U.S. 74');">552 U.S. 74 and McFadden, 135 S.Ct. 2298. As explained in greater detail below, neither Watson nor McFadden has any bearing on the offenses for which Raghoonanan was convicted. Under § 2255(f)(3), moreover, Raghoonanan did not file the instant Motion within one year of either case.
In Watson, the Supreme Court held that trading drugs for a gun cannot constitute a “use” of a firearm for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). 552 U.S. at 83. The Court decided Watson on December 10, 2007, approximately 10 years before the pretrial proceedings that led to Raghoonanan's guilty plea and conviction. (Doc. 146.) Because Watson was decided before Raghoonanan's conviction became final, 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3) affords him no relief as to that claim.
In McFadden, the Supreme Court held that when a defendant is charged with dealing a controlled substance analogue, the government must show that “the defendant knew that the substance was controlled under the [Controlled Substances Act] or the Analogue Act, even if he did not know its identity.” 135 S.Ct. at 2302. The Court decided McFadden on June 18, 2015, almost two years before Raghoonanan filed the present § 2255 Motion. Compare McFadden, 135 S.Ct. 2298, with (Doc. 210). Thus, the date on which Raghoonanan's conviction became final is the controlling statute of limitations date under § 2255(f)(1). As with the Watson claims, because Raghoonanan did not file his § 2255 Motion within one year of the date in which his conviction became final, that claim is untimely as well. Dodd, 545 U.S. at 357 (holding § 2255 motion filed almost two years from date of decision was untimely).
Raghoonanan also asserts that his counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the Superseding Indictment based on a Sixth Circuit decision: United States v. Combs, 369 F.3d 925 (6th Cir. 2004). In Combs, the court held that 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) provides for two distinct offenses, one in which the offender “uses or carries” the firearm “during and in relation to” a drug trafficking crime (the “use” offense), and the other in which the offender “possesses” the firearm “in furtherance of” the drug trafficking crime (the “possession” offense). Again, Raghoonanan cannot overcome the statute of limitations. Combs was decided by the Sixth Circuit and did not create a right recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactive by the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3). Further, the Sixth Circuit decided Combs more than a year before Raghoonanan filed the instant Motions, giving Raghoonanan one year to seek collateral review under § 2255(f)(3), which he failed to do. As a result, Raghoonanan's ineffective-assistance claim based on Combs is barred by the statute of limitations.

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