Source: http://www.voiceforthedefenseonline.com/story/social-media-evidence
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 14:31:56+00:00

Document:
Social media evidence is coming to a courtroom near you. A study done by the Pew Research Center (PRC) revealed that 85% of adults are internet users and 67% are smartphone users.4 Of those, 72% of online adults use Facebook, representing 62% of all American adults.5 And just when you thought social media could not possibly get any more popular, PRC reports, “the proportion of Instagram, Pinterest, and LinkedIn users who use each respective site daily has increased significantly since September 2014.”6 Consequently, we as criminal lawyers must know how to capture, admit, and challenge social media evidence in our cases.
As an issue of first impression, a California federal district court held private messages, comments, and wall postings were protected by the SCA.10 Consistent with this holding, Facebook says the “contents of a communication” includes “messages, timeline posts, comments, photos, and videos.”11 So Facebook refuses to provide them except when required.
Due to its age, courts have complained about the inapplicability of the SCA.12 Because it was written prior to the arrival of the internet and the World Wide Web, courts have struggled to analyze problems involving modern technology like Facebook, Instagram, and Snapchat.
In short, the best way to obtain content of communications is to bypass the provider altogether and go directly to the subscriber.
The SCA provides two avenues for law enforcement to obtain easier access to the content of communications—required disclosure pursuant to a valid warrant or a court order.
The SCA requires a social media provider to disclose the contents of a communication (A) without notice to the subscriber if the request is pursuant to a valid state or federal search warrant, or (B) with notice if the request is pursuant to a valid administrative, grand jury, or trial subpoena.20 But often law enforcement seeks delayed notice under 18 U.S.C. § 2705.
Snapchat: Custodian of Records Snapchat, Inc. 63 Market Street Venice, CA 90291, or by email to lawenforcement@snapchat.com.
If you are seeking content (messages, comments, likes, postings, and tweets), the social media provider will most likely object in writing and disregard your subpoena. If your subpoena seeks “non-content information” about the account holder, the social media provider will most likely comply, assuming you properly domesticated your subpoena. But no one really cares that much about the non-content information. The best way—and the method preferred by providers—to obtain content is to subpoena the subscriber directly.
Each provider’s law enforcement guide provides steps on how to direct a user to download their own content.31 Because this download contains your profile information, you should keep it secure and be careful when storing, sending, or uploading it to any other services.
By far the easiest way to capture social media evidence is to take a screenshot. Known by different names, “[a] screenshot, screen capture, screen cap, cap, screen dump, or screengrab is an image taken by a person to record the visible items displayed on the monitor, television, or other visual output device in use.”33 By taking a screenshot, you can see exactly what was posted, by whom, and typically when it was posted. You can then print the screenshot, take it to court, and mark it with an exhibit sticker. All that’s left is to overcome hearsay issues and authenticate the evidence, which is explained in Part VIII.B.
Texas’ leading case on authentication of social media evidence is Tienda v. State.62 The Court recognized “there is no single approach to authentication that will work in all instances.”63 So what will work?
There are at least two ways to fix the Dering problem. First, the original posts are usually by some news/media outlet. You could subpoena the news reporter who posted the information on the news site’s social media account. Today, news stations keep track of what is trending and can likely comment on whether or not this was a “hot” story in the particular jurisdiction. Second, you could subpoena each of the named users. If you’re not sure who they are or only have a username, you could subpoena their non-content information—i.e., name, email address, credit card information, and login IP address(es) with a properly domesticated Texas subpoena to the provider.76 Using the information you receive, you or an investigator can likely track down good contact information for the subscriber. Then, subpoena them to testify and ask them enough questions to establish whether they are responsible for the particular post. This should satisfy Tienda and overcome Dering.
If the SCA seems one-sided in favor of the government, it is. It only allows governmental entities to obtain user content by warrant or probable-cause court order.77 The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure specifically allow only the government to seek a warrant.78 The Texas rules are silent, but it is unlikely a judge would issue a warrant requested by the defense. This leaves defendants needing subscriber content to prove a defensive theory in a tough place. There are a few challenges that can, and need to be, made to the SCA in its current form.
Second, object that your client is being denied the effective assistance of counsel. The Sixth Amendment imposes a duty on counsel to investigate and, when necessary, present defensive evidence.80 The federal statutory restriction on the defense’s access to the evidence prohibits defense counsel from fulfilling this constitutional duty.
Fortunately but infrequently, courts started recognizing the sweeping nature of the scope of warrants and court orders for user data.85 Commonly, if the state or federal government obtained evidence from your client’s social media, they did it pursuant to an “any and all” warrant or court order.86 Undoubtedly this data contains all types of private communication, most of which will not be relevant to whatever law enforcement was initially after.
Watch out for “any and all” social media evidence warrants. You must object that the warrant or court order was overbroad and did not limit its request to the particular data it sought. For example, the government should limit message content to messages between specific users and times it has probable cause of evidence of wrongdoing.87 Social media providers already segregate data, so limiting requests is not difficult.
As long as social media continues to saturate our everyday lives, it will continue to play a huge role in our courtrooms. When a Rodney Bradford walks into your office, you must know how to obtain and authenticate social media evidence.91 The best ways to obtain social media content are to get a search warrant, subpoena the user directly, or have someone screenshot the particular post, tweet, message, or snap you want to use as evidence. By presenting sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to link the accountholder to the account, and the particular social media, you have satisfied Tienda’s authentication test. On the other hand, constitutional challenges need to be made to the SCA in its current form. If the prosecution has social media evidence in its discovery, you must scrutinize the authorizing affidavit, specifically looking for overbroad requests lacking particularity.
1. Special thanks to Rudy Moisiuc, a third-year law student at Texas Tech University School of Law, for his help writing and editing this article.
2. Vanessa Juarez, Facebook Status Update Provides Alibi, CNN (Nov. 13, 2009), www.cnn.com/2009/CRIME/11/12/facebook.alibi/index.html?eref=rss_us.
4. Maev Duggan, Mobile Messaging and Social Media, Pew Research Center (Aug. 19, 2015), www.pewinternet.org/2015/08/19/mobile-messaging-and-social-media-2015/. An update of the study found Facebook continues to be America’s most popular social networking platform by a substantial margin: Nearly eight-in-ten online Americans (79%) now use Facebook, more than double the share that uses Twitter (24%), Pinterest (31%), Instagram (32%), or LinkedIn (29%). Shannon Greenwood, Andrew Perrin, & Maeve Duggan, Social Media Update 2016, Pew Research Center (Nov. 11, 2016), www.pewinternet.org/2016/11/11/social-media-update-2016/.
8. “The SCA defines an ECS [Electronic Communication Service] provider as ‘any service which provides to users thereof the ability to send or receive wire or electronic communications.’” Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 972 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15)). The Crispin court also drew a distinction between whether entities qualified as ECSs or Remote Computing Services (RCS), concluding that an entity providing messaging services is an ECS for messages that were unopened and unread by the recipient, but the same entity transforms to an RCS after the messages were opened, read, and retained by the recipient. Id. at 987. The opinion has been widely criticized as “applying outdated law to new technology.” Rick E. Kubler & Holly A. Miller, Recent Developments in Discovery of Social Media Content, at 7, available at goo.gl/jGEZkb (last visited Feb. 24, 2017) (citing Joshua Briones and Ana Tagvoryan, Social Media as Evidence 40 (2013)).
9. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(1) (emphasis added). Separately, the SCA also prohibits: 1. electronic communications services from 2. knowingly divulging, 3. “a record or other information pertaining to a subscriber to or customer of such service,” 4. “to any governmental entity.” Id. § 2702(a)(3) (emphasis added).
10. Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 991 (C.D. Cal. 2010).
11. Letter from Facebook Security to author (Oct. 9, 2013) (on file with author) [hereinafter Facebook Objections].
12. See, e.g., Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, 302 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 2002).
13. Email Privacy Act, H.R. 387 115th Cong. (2017), available at www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/387/text. The bill has not yet been voted on by the Senate.
15. See Part II.A.2 infra.
16. See, e.g., Romano v. Steelcase, 907 N.Y.S.2d 650, 654 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010); Kubler & Miller, Recent Developments in Discovery of Social Media Content, at *8.
17. Facebook Law Enforcement Guidelines, Facebook (2009), available at www.eff.org/files/filenode/social_network/facebook2009_sn_leg-doj.pdf (last visited Apr. 17, 2017).
18. Information for Law Enforcement Authorities, Facebook, www.facebook.com/safety/groups/law/guidelines/ (last visited Apr. 17, 2017).
19. See www.facebook.com/help/131112897028467. Users can also view recent IP addresses in their Account Settings under Security Settings/Active Sessions. Id. Users do not have access to historical IP information without legal process. Id.
20. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b).
22. The phrase “reasonable belief” first appeared in Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 576 (1980) (discussing police entry into home to make a warrantless arrest). Since Payton, legal scholars have debated its meaning but, at bottom, it is at least the amount of proof required for a detention under Terry v. Ohio, and “may require something more than an investigative stop based on reasonable suspicion.” Duran v. Indiana, 930 N.E.2d 10, 16 (Ind. 2010).
23. See Facebook Objections, supra note 14.
24. Special thanks to Michael Mowla of Cedar Hill for researching and compiling this list of steps to domesticate a Texas subpoena in California.
27. Each of the providers listed includes a caveat on their guides that they will accept service for “convenience,” but that they do not waive objections to jurisdiction or proper service.
28. Information for Law Enforcement Authorities, Facebook, www.facebook.com/safety/groups/law/guidelines/ (last visited Apr. 17, 2017).
29. Information for Law Enforcement, Instagram, https://help.instagram.com/494561080557017/ (last visited Apr. 17, 2017).
30. Twitter, however, “does not currently offer users a self-serve method to obtain other, non-public information (e.g., IP logs) about their Twitter accounts. If a Twitter user requires his or her non-public account information, please direct the user to send a request to Twitter via our privacy form. We will respond with further instructions.” Guidelines for Law Enforcement, Twitter, https://support.twitter.com/articles/41949#8 (last visited Apr. 17, 2017).
31. EInformation for Law Enforcement Authorities, Facebook, www.facebook.com/safety/groups/law/guidelines/ (last visited Apr. 17, 2017).
32. Accessing Your Facebook Data, Facebook, www.facebook.com/help/405183566203254?helpref=faq_content (last visited April 17, 2017). For more information about how to download data, and what is included, see Id.
33. Screenshot, Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Screenshot (last visited April 17, 2017).
34. To find out what is actually collected, however, you should take a look at the privacy policies of the specific social media service for the information you seek.
35. Information for Law Enforcement Authorities, Facebook, www.facebook.com/safety/groups/law/guidelines/ (last visited April 17, 2017).
39. Guidelines for Law Enforcement, Twitter, https://support.twitter.com/articles/41949 (last visited April 17, 2017).
43. Information for Law Enforcement, Instagram, https://help.instagram.com/494561080557017 (last visited April 17, 2017).
47. Snapchat Law Enforcement Guide at 5, Snapchat, www.snapchat.com/static_files/lawenforcement.pdf?version=20150604 (last visited April 17, 2017).
51. Mailhoit v. Home Depot, 285 F.R.D. 566 (C.D. Cal. 2012).
53. George E. Dix & John M. Schmolesky, 43 Tex. Prac., Criminal Practice & Procedure § 32:26 (3d ed.) (citing various cases on materiality).
54. Allied Concrete Co. v. Lester, 736 S.E.2d 699, 702 (Va. 2013).
58. Agreed Disposition Memorandum Order, In the Matter of Matthew B. Murray, No. 11-070-088405 and 11-070-088422 (Va. State Bar Disciplinary Board filed July, 2013), available at www.vsb.org/docs/Murray-092513.pdf.
59. Tienda v. State, 358 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (discussing Tex.R. Evid. 401, 402, 901).
62. Id. at 633. In Tienda v. State, three MySpace pages, their accompanying subscriber reports, and affidavits subpoenaed from MySpace were offered as evidence against a defendant who was a suspect in a drive-by shooting. Id. at 635. The court looked at four specific sets of facts involving the account in determining whether a rational jury could find that the MySpace page was created and posted to by the defendant: (1) that the accounts had pictures posted to them displaying the defendant’s unique tattoos, eyeglasses, and earring; (2) that at least one account referenced music played at a victim’s funeral; (3) that the accounts made references to the defendant’s associated gang; and (4) messages sent from the account referring to (a) specific shootings involved, (b) a party the defendant believed was a ‘‘snitch’’, and (c) the ankle monitor defendant had been wearing for the past year, all of which were sent from accounts of users with defendant’s name or nickname, and sent from an email address of defendant’s name. Id. at 645. The court held that there was “ample circumstantial evidence . . . to support a finding that the MySpace pages belonged to the appellant and that he created and maintained them.” Id. See also United States v. Barnes, 803 F.3d 209, 215 (5th Cir. 2015).
63. Tienda, 358 S.W.2d at 640 (citation omitted).
65. Dering v. State, 465 S.W.3d 668, 671 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2015, no pet.) (citing Tienda, 358 S.W.3d at 642).
67. Tienda, 358 S.W.3d at 639.
68. Dering v. State, 465 S.W.3d 668, 670 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2015, no pet.).
76. See supra, Part II.B.1.
77. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2703 Required Disclosure of Customer Communications or Records.
78. Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(b).
79. Cf. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
80. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 680 (1984).
81. Cf. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 320, 94 S. Ct. 1105, 1112, 39 L. Ed. 2d 347 (1974) (“The State could have protected Green from exposure of his juvenile adjudication in these circumstances by refraining from using him to make out its case; the State cannot, consistent with the right of confrontation, require the petitioner to bear the full burden of vindicating the State’s interest in the secrecy of juvenile criminal records.”); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19, 87 S. Ct. 1920, 1923, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1019 (1967) (“Just as an accused has the right to confront the prosecution’s witnesses for the purpose of challenging their testimony, he has the right to present his own witnesses to establish a defense. This right is a fundamental element of due process of law.”).
82. Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2620 (2011) (“A statute may no more lawfully chip away at the authority of the Judicial Branch than it may eliminate it entirely.”).
83. See Heckers v. Fowler, 69 U.S. 123, 128, 17 L.Ed. 759 (1864) (explaining that federal courts have authority to make all necessary rules for orderly conduct of their business provided such rules are not repugnant to the laws of the United States); see also Degen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820, 827, 116 S.Ct. 1777, 135 L.Ed.2d 102 (1996) (“A federal court has at its disposal an array of means to enforce its orders, including dismissal in appropriate case; its powers include those furnished by federal rule, and by inherent authority”); see, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 37, 41(b); Tex. Gov’t Code § 21.00l(a).
84. Id.; cf. Williams v. State, 707 S.W.2d 40, 45–46 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (citing Tex. Const. art. V) (“[T]he Legislature may not interfere with the functions and powers of the judicial branch so as to usurp those functions and powers.”).
85. United State v. Comprehensive Drug Inc., 621 F.3d 1162, 1176 (9th Cir. 2010) (“This pressing need of law enforcement for broad authorization to examine electronic records, so persuasively demonstrated in the introduction to the original warrant in this case  creates a serious risk that every warrant for electronic information will become, in effect, a general warrant, rendering the Fourth Amendment irrelevant.”).
86. See generally, Adam M. Gershowitz, The Post-Riley Search Warrant: Search Protocols and Particularity in Cell Phone Searches, 69 Vand. L. Rev. 585 (2016).
88. E.g., United States Law Enforcement Requests for Data, Facebook, https://govtrequests.facebook.com/country/United%20States/2016-H1/.
89. E.g., 2016 Transparency Report: January to June 2016, Dropbox, www.dropbox.com/transparency.
91. Juarez, Facebook Status Update Provides Alibi, supra note 5.

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