Source: http://courts.mrsc.org/supreme/113wn2d/113wn2d0520.htm
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 04:46:41+00:00

Document:
Criminal Law - Evidence - Other Offenses or Acts - Test. Evidence of a criminal defendant's prior conviction is admissible under ER 404(b) if it is relevant to an element of the crime charged and its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect. The relevance requirement is satisfied if the purpose for which the evidence is sought to be introduced is of consequence to the outcome of the action and the evidence tends to make the existence of the identified fact more probable.
 Criminal Law - Evidence - Other Offenses or Acts - Identity - Test. Evidence of a defendant's prior criminal activity is admissible in a trial on a separately charged crime to prove identity under ER 404(b) if the method employed in both crimes is so distinctive that proof that the defendant committed the unrelated prior crime creates a high probability that the defendant also committed the charged crime.
 Criminal Law - Review - Issues Not Raised in Trial Court - Instructions. A reviewing court will not consider whether an improper instruction constituted prejudicial error if the criminal defendant failed to challenge the instruction at trial or on appeal.
 Criminal Law - Witnesses - Impeachment - Miranda Violation - Effect. A voluntary statement not preceded by required MIRANDA warnings may be used for impeachment purposes.
NAMES OF CONCURRING OR DISSENTING JUDGES: Utter, Pearson, Dolliver, Dore, and Smith, JJ., concur by separate opinions.
Supreme Court: Upon reconsideration of its prior decision reported at 111 Wn.2d 124, the court ADHERES to its AFFIRMANCE of the judgment. Nine justices hold that the two prior misdemeanor theft convictions were admissible to prove identity under ER 404(b), six justices hold prospectively that a defendant must take the stand and be subject to impeaching evidence under ER 609(a)(2) in order to preserve the issue for review, and five justices hold that theft convictions do not necessarily involve dishonesty for purposes of ER 609(a)(2).
NORM MALENG, PROSECUTING ATTORNEY, and CYNTHIA S.C. GANNETT, SENIOR APPELLATE ATTORNEY, for respondent.
The trial court orally instructed the jury just before it heard testimony from the victims of the prior misdemeanor thefts that the evidence was not to be considered by the jury for the purpose of proof that the defendant was a person of bad character or that he was a person with a predisposition to commit the crimes for which he was on trial; the court instructed that the evidence could be considered only for the limited purpose of determining whether it tends to prove a common plan or scheme as an essential element of the crime charged. Report of Proceedings, at 227. In jury instruction 15 the court similarly instructed the jury, adding, however, that the jury could consider the evidence for the limited purpose of determining whether the evidence tended "to prove a common plan or scheme, LACK OF ACCIDENT OR MISTAKE [as] an essential element of the crime charged." (Italics ours.) Clerk's Papers, at 54. The record is unclear, but the language adding lack of accident or mistake may have arisen because the prosecutor argued in response to defendant's motion for severance of the two counts that it was his understanding that the defense would be raising an alibi defense to both counts and would be arguing that it was not him, that there must be some mistake; the prosecutor argued the State should be allowed to show that there was no mistake, no accident, that the defendant used the same type of swindle each time. When the trial court thereafter ruled that the prior misdemeanors were admissible under ER 404(b), the court reasoned in part that the testimony would be in support of the argument against the absence of accident or mistake "that comparable type offenses would involve victims other than those involved in the immediate two offenses charged." Report of Proceedings, at 76. There is no indication who drafted the written jury instruction.
or false statement, regardless of the punishment.
the impact of our decision here.
We are not, of course, bound to follow the decision in LUCE, as the federal courts are. A few courts have declined to accept the LUCE holding. STATE v. WHITEHEAD, 104 N.J. 353, 517 A.2d 373 (1986); PEOPLE v. CONTRERAS, 108 A.D.2d 627, 485 N.Y.S.2d 261 (1985); STATE v. MCCLURE, 298 Or. 336, 692 P.2d 579 (1984); COMMONWEALTH v. RICHARDSON, 347 Pa. Super. 564, 500 A.2d 1200 (1985). At least two courts have declined to decide yet whether they will adopt the LUCE holding. ASKEW v. UNITED STATES, 540 A.2d 760 (D.C. 1988); COMMONWEALTH v. CORDEIRO, _____ Mass. _____, 519 N.E.2d 1328 (1988); CF. STATE v. LAMB, 321 N.C. 633, 365 S.E.2d 600 (1988) (court declines to decide whether LUCE applies in context of rule 608(b)). The majority of the courts considering the question, however, have adopted the LUCE holding. STATE v. MEANS, 363 N.W.2d 565 (S.D. 1985); STATE v. GENTRY, 747 P.2d 1032 (Utah 1987); STATE v. MOFFETT, 729 S.W.2d 679 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1986), APPEAL DENIED, Feb. 9, 1987; JIMENEZ v. STATE, 480 So. 2d 705 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); STATE v. HARRELL, 199 Conn. 255, 506 A.2d 1041 (1986); RICHARDSON v. STATE, 733 S.W.2d 947 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987), VACATED ON OTHER GROUNDS, 761 S.W.2d 19 (1988); BENAVIDES v. STATE, 763 S.W.2d 587 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988), PETITION FOR REVIEW FILED, Feb. 27, 1989; STATE v. GLENN, 285 S.C. 384, 330 S.E.2d 285 (1985); PEOPLE v. BREWER, 720 P.2d 596 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985); STATE v. ALLIE, 147 Ariz. 320, 710 P.2d 430 (1985) (prior Arizona law was consistent with LUCE); PEOPLE v. COLLINS, 42 Cal. 3d 378, 722 P.2d 173, 228 Cal. Rptr. 899 (1986); STATE v. GARZA, 109 Idaho 40, 704 P.2d 944 (Ct. App. 1985); PEOPLE v. RUSH-BEY, 152 Ill. App. 3d 17, 503 N.E.2d 1193, APPEAL DENIED, 511 N.E.2d 435 (1987); PEOPLE v. REDMAN, 141 Ill. App. 3d 691, 490 N.E.2d 958, APPEAL DENIED, June 3 (1986); PEOPLE v. FINLEY, 431 Mich. 506, 431 N.W.2d 19 (1988); REED v. COMMONWEALTH, _____ Va. App. _____, 366 S.E.2d 274 (1988).
A few other courts have approved the LUCE reasoning in different contexts. PEOPLE v. WHITEHEAD, 116 Ill. 2d 425, 508 N.E.2d 687 (involving admissibility of statements during psychiatric examination for purposes of discrediting the defendant if he testified), CERT. DENIED, 108 S. Ct. 307 (1987); VAUPEL v. STATE, 708 P.2d 1248 (Wyo. 1985) (in context of rule 609(b)). The Alaska Court of Appeals appeared to favor LUCE in PAGE v. STATE, 725 P.2d 1082 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986), but later held the LUCE rule inapplicable where the record was otherwise adequate to address the trial court's ruling. WICKHAM v. STATE, 770 P.2d 757 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989). Finally, as the Minnesota Court of Appeals observed in STATE v. FORD, 381 N.W.2d 30, 32 n.1 (Minn. Ct. App.), REVIEW DENIED, Mar. 27 (1986) in a case decided 7 months after LUCE was handed down the Minnesota State Supreme Court reviewed a rule 609(a) issue raised by a defendant who failed to testify and found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting prior conviction evidence for impeachment purposes. STATE v. GRAHAM, 371 N.W.2d 204 (1985). The court did not address LUCE.
In LUCE the Court addressed the petitioners' argument based on cases involving Fifth Amendment challenges to state court rulings operating to dissuade defendants from testifying, and said that the Court "did not hold that a federal court's preliminary ruling on a question not reaching constitutional dimensions - such as a decision under Rule 609(a)- is reviewable on appeal." LUCE v. UNITED STATES, SUPRA at 42-43. It is evident that the Court in LUCE perceived no bar to its holding based upon Fifth Amendment concerns, nor, implicitly, upon Sixth Amendment concerns. We agree that there is no constitutional bar to the LUCE rule.
We do not think that requiring the defendant to take the stand in order to preserve alleged rule 609(a) error is measurably different from compelling the defendant to make the decision in the first place as to whether to testify if prior conviction evidence might be admitted; the defendant may have to choose between exercising his or her right to testify in his or her own behalf and face the possibility of being impeached, or remaining silent. While this may be a difficult choice, it is one necessarily inherent in every instance where prior conviction evidence may be admitted under Fed. R. Evid. 609(a) or ER 609(a).
«2» The court distinguished an Eleventh Circuit case remanded by the United States Supreme Court in light of LUCE, UNITED STATES v. DIMATTEO, 716 F.2d 1361 (11th Cir. 1983), VACATED AND REMANDED, 469 U.S. 1101, 83 L. Ed. 2d 767, 105 S. Ct. 769 (1985), on the basis that there the defendant did not rely on the law of the circuit in making his record for purposes of appeal. GIVENS, at 578.
We note that JOHNSON is no longer the law in federal courts, because the United States Supreme Court recently held, at least insofar as newly declared constitutional rules are concerned, "a new rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all cases, state or federal, pending on direct review or not yet final, with no exception for cases in which the new rule constitutes a 'clear break' with the past." GRIFFITH v. KENTUCKY, 479 U.S. 314, 328, 93 L. Ed. 2d 649, 107 S. Ct. 708 (1987). The Court noted in GRIFFITH, however, that retroactivity analysis in civil cases continues to be governed by the standard announced in CHEVRON OIL, GRIFFITH, at 322 n.8, which is the 3-factor analysis used by the Ninth and Third Circuits in deciding whether to apply LUCE retroactively. Of course, GIVENS and DUNBAR were decided before GRIFFITH and therefore did not address what effect, if any, the GRIFFITH holding would have in this area. GRIFFITH itself involved retroactivity of a new constitutional rule of criminal procedure beneficial to the defendant, and is replete with references to treating similarly situated defendants the same and providing all defendants whose cases are not yet final with the same benefit as the "lucky individual whose case was chosen as the occasion for announcing the new principle . . ." (Citations omitted.) GRIFFITH, at 327.
GRIFFITH is thus unclear as to whether its holding applies in cases where a new rule works to the disadvantage of the defendant. Moreover, GRIFFITH specifically involved a new constitutional rule, as had JOHNSON. At least one court has limited GRIFFITH's applicability to rules of constitutional dimension. DIGGS v. OWENS, 833 F.2d 439 (3d Cir. 1987), CERT. DENIED, 99 L. Ed. 2d 488 (1988).
S. Rep. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., REPRINTED IN 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 7051, 7061. Except for insignificant changes in language order, this is the same definition accorded the phrase by the House-Senate Conference Committee. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., REPRINTED IN 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 7098, 7103. We then explained that at common law the term crimen falsi referred to infamous crimes and that crimen falsi does not include the crime of simple petit larceny. We concluded that crimes of dishonesty "include only those crimes which contain elements in the nature of CRIMEN FALSI and which bear DIRECTLY on a defendant's propensity for truthfulness." BURTON, at 7. We observed that the majority of the circuits of the United States Court of Appeals hold that theft crimes are not automatically admissible under Fed. R. Evid. 609(a)(2). We held that "misdemeanor crimes of theft in general are inadmissible under ER 609(a)(2) unless there is some element of fraud or deceit (such as unlawful issuance of bank checks, RCW 9A.56.060)." BURTON, at 10.
«3» SEE, E.G., LINSKEY v. HECKER, 753 F.2d 199 (1st Cir. 1985); UNITED STATES v. HAYES, 553 F.2d 824, 827 (2d Cir.) (dicta), CERT. DENIED, 434 U.S. 867 (1977); GOVERNMENT OF v.I. v. TOTO, 529 F.2d 278 (3d Cir. 1976); UNITED STATES v. ASHLEY, 569 F.2d 975 (5th Cir.) (also, retracting language in UNITED STATES v. CARDEN, 529 F.2d 443 (5th Cir.), CERT. DENIED, 429 U.S. 848 (1976), suggesting that conviction for petit larceny is admissible under rule 609(a)(2)), CERT. DENIED, 439 U.S. 853 (1978); UNITED STATES v. YEO, 739 F.2d 385 (8th Cir. 1984); UNITED STATES v. ORTEGA, 561 F.2d 803 (9th Cir. 1977); UNITED STATES v. GLENN, 567 F.2d 1269 (9th Cir. 1982); UNITED STATES v. SEAMSTER, 568 F.2d 188 (10th Cir. 1978); UNITED STATES v. SMITH, 551 F.2d 348 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
«4» UNITED STATES v. GRANDMONT, 680 F.2d 867 (1st Cir. 1982); UNITED STATES v. HAYES, SUPRA; GOVERNMENT OF v.I. v. TOTO, SUPRA (absent "special circumstances" conviction of petit larceny is not a crime of crimen falsi); UNITED STATES v. YEO, SUPRA; UNITED STATES v. GLENN, SUPRA; UNITED STATES v. SEAMSTER, SUPRA; UNITED STATES v. SMITH, SUPRA.
«5» Oregon Rule of Evidence 609, codified at Or. Rev. Stat. 40.355 (1987), was amended by the "Crime Victims' Bill of Rights," proposed by initiative petition and enacted by the voters on November 4, 1986, effective December 4, 1986. The rule now includes as admissible for impeachment purposes crimes which "involved false statement or dishonesty."
This lack of focus on the term "dishonesty" by the federal courts is consistent with the emphasis those courts place on the congressional conference reports' definition of the phrase dishonesty or false statement.
Rather than concentrating on federal interpretation of the federal rule, we will examine the meaning of ER 609(a)(2) without using federal case law and federal legislative history as a starting point. In a similar vein, while we have examined the evidence rules, statutes and case law of the other states to assess their law respecting admissibility of prior conviction evidence for impeachment purposes, we are mindful of the substantial differences in the applicable rules from state to state. A few examples: Alabama allows admission of prior crimes involving moral turpitude, Ala. Code 12-21-162 (1975, 1986 repl., Supp. 1988); Colorado allows admission of prior felonies, Colo. Rev. Stat. 13-90-101 (1987 & Supp. 1988); North Carolina allows admission of crimes punishable by more than 60 days' confinement, N.C. Gen. Stat. ch. 8C, rule 609 (1986); Michigan's rule expressly allows admission of crimes containing an element of theft, Michigan R. Evid. 609 (West 1989); and Montana does not allow admission of prior conviction evidence for impeachment purposes, Montana R. Evid. 609 (1989).
Nonetheless, we note that a number of states with rules similar to ours have concluded that theft crimes involve dishonesty or false statement. SEE, E.G., STATE v. PAGE, 449 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 1984) (theft, robbery, and related crimes are per se admissible as crimes involving dishonesty); STATE v. DAY, 94 N.M. 753, 617 P.2d 142 (robbery involves dishonesty), CERT. DENIED, 449 U.S. 860 (1980); STATE v. MELENDREZ, 91 N.M. 259, 572 P.2d 1267 (Ct. App. 1977) (shoplifting involves dishonesty or false statement); STATE v. TOLLIVER, 33 Ohio App. 3d 110, 514 N.E.2d 922 (1986) (theft offense involves dishonesty or false statement); SEEGARS v. STATE, 655 P.2d 563 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982) (robbery involves dishonesty or false statement); KENNEDY v. STATE, 640 P.2d 971 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982) (petit larceny involves dishonesty or false statement); STATE v. GALLANT, 307 Or. 152, 764 P.2d 920 (1988) (second degree theft by shoplifting is a crime involving dishonesty); COMMONWEALTH v. RANDALL, 515 Pa. 410, 528 A.2d 1326 (1987) (court judicially adopts rule 609(a)(2); burglary involves dishonesty or false statement); COMMONWEALTH v. BELLS, 373 Pa. Super. 57, 540 A.2d 297 (1988) (theft involves dishonesty); STATE v. BUTLER, 626 S.W.2d 6 (Tenn. 1981) (shoplifting involves dishonesty or false statement) (Tennessee adopted 609(a) and (b) in STATE v. MORGAN, 541 S.W.2d 385 (Tenn. 1976)). In WEBSTER v. STATE, 284 Ark. 206, 680 S.W.2d 906 (1984), the Arkansas Supreme Court concluded that grand larceny involves dishonesty. However, later in POLLARD v. STATE, 296 Ark. 299, 756 S.W.2d 455, 456 n.2 (1988), that court declined to address admissibility of prior larceny convictions under rule 609(a)(2) on the ground that it ultimately held that the trial court correctly admitted the convictions under rule 609(a)(1). In STATE v. CINTRON, 680 P.2d 33 (Utah 1984), the Utah State Supreme Court held that, under identical language to that in rule 609 in then rule 21, theft involves dishonesty. The viability of that holding was questioned by the Utah Court of Appeals which held that the new rule 609(a) requires examination of the underlying facts before a determination can be made as to whether a theft crime involves dishonesty. STATE v. WIGHT, 765 P.2d 12 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
Additionally, a number of courts having rules similar to ours, except that prior convictions involving dishonesty or false statement are not per se admissible but rather admissibility depends upon a balancing procedure, have also concluded that theft crimes involve dishonesty or false statement. SEE, E.G., LOWELL v. STATE, 574 P.2d 1281 (Alaska 1978) (grand larceny involves dishonesty or false statement); PEOPLE v. SPATES, 77 Ill. 2d 193, 395 N.E.2d 563 (1979) (misdemeanor theft involves dishonesty or false statement); STATE v. RUAN, 419 N.W.2d 734 (Iowa Ct. App. 1987) (conspiracy to commit third degree theft involves dishonesty); STATE v. WILLARD, 351 N.W.2d 516 (Iowa 1984) (under statute preceding rule, but with essentially the same language albeit limited to felonies, theft is a felony involving dishonesty or false statement).
A number of courts faced with a rule the same as ours or a rule similar to ours have held, to the contrary, that theft crimes do not involve dishonesty or false statement. SEE, E.G., STATE v. WILLIAMS, 212 Neb. 860, 326 N.W.2d 678 (1982) (in the absence of something other than ordinary stealing, petit larceny is not crimen falsi and not a crime involving dishonesty or false statement); STATE v. EUGENE, 340 N.W.2d 18 (N.D. 1983) (possession of stolen property and burglary); STATE v. DARVEAUX, 318 N.W.2d 44 (Minn. 1982) (misdemeanor shoplifting); BUT SEE STATE v. STANIFER, 382 N.W.2d 213 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (robbery is a crime involving dishonesty).
In any event, we return to basics. We begin with the principle that, while as the author of the rule we are in a position to interpret the meaning sought to be conveyed by the rule, we approach our rules as though they had been drafted by the Legislature and give the words their ordinary meaning. HEINEMANN v. WHITMAN CY., 105 Wn.2d 796, 802, 718 P.2d 789 (1986); STATE EX REL. SCHILLBERG v. EVERETT DIST. JUSTICE COURT, 90 Wn.2d 794, 797, 585 P.2d 1177 (1978). The term "dishonest" implies the act or practice of telling a lie, or of cheating, deceiving, and stealing. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 650 (1981). Crimes of theft involve stealing, and are clearly encompassed within the term dishonest. Moreover, we agree with former Chief Justice Burger's statement when with the United States Circuit Court of Appeals that "[i]n common human experience acts of deceit, fraud, cheating, or stealing, . . . are universally regarded as conduct which reflects adversely on a man's honesty and integrity." GORDON v. UNITED STATES, 383 F.2d 936, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1967), CERT. DENIED, 390 U.S. 1029, 20 L. Ed. 2d 287, 88 S. Ct. 1421 (1968).
We note that in STATE v. COE, 101 Wn.2d 772, 775, 684 P.2d 668 (1984), we relied on BURTON in concluding that shoplifting was not admissible under ER 609(a)(2), and, in so doing, we quoted UNITED STATES v. ORTEGA, 561 F.2d 803, 806 (9th Cir. 1977): "An absence of respect for the property . . . is not an indicium of a propensity toward testimonial dishonesty." We believe our adoption of this view ill advised. The act of taking property is positively dishonest. It makes no sense to us, upon weighing this matter, to distinguish crimes of theft on the basis that they involve the taking of another's property. We perceive no reason to believe that a person's propensity to lie may be demonstrated by past acts of lying but not by past acts of dishonest conduct. The sole purpose of impeachment evidence is to enlighten the jury with respect to the defendant's credibility as a witness. STATE v. JONES, 101 Wn.2d at 118. This purpose is met by allowing admissibility of prior convictions evidencing dishonesty, regardless of the fact that the conduct had as its purpose the taking of another's property.
We conclude that taking another's property by theft, including shoplifting, or by robbery involves dishonesty and that these crimes are per se admissible for impeachment purposes under ER 609(a)(2). While we agree that assaultive crimes usually do not involve dishonesty but instead involve "acts of violence which may, in fact, 'result from a short temper, a combative nature, extreme provocation, or other causes, [and] have little or no direct bearing on honesty and veracity'", STATE v. THOMPSON, 95 Wn.2d 888, 891, 632 P.2d 50 (1981) (quoting GORDON v. UNITED STATES, SUPRA at 940), we include robbery as per se admissible under ER 609(a)(2) because it is not purely an assaultive crime, but also involves the larcenous taking of property.
CONCURRING JUDGES: Callow, C.J., and Andersen and Durham, JJ., concur.
«6» I differ with the Court of Appeals over the treatment of one issue: that of looking to the underlying facts of crimes involving theft to determine admissibility under ER 609(a)(2). I believe this analysis is contrary to our rule developed in STATE v. NEWTON, 109 Wn.2d 69, 77-78, 743 P.2d 254 (1987).
The opinion by Justice Brachtenbach would overrule STATE v. PAM, 98 Wn.2d 748, 659 P.2d 454 (1983); STATE v. KOLOSKE, 100 Wn.2d 889, 676 P.2d 456 (1984); and STATE v. LEFEVER, 102 Wn.2d 777, 690 P.2d 574 (1984), which hold that a defendant must make a timely offer of proof in order to contest on appeal the denial of a motion in limine excluding impeachment evidence under ER 609(a)(2). Instead, following LUCE v. UNITED STATES, 469 U.S. 38, 83 L. Ed. 2d 443, 105 S. Ct. 460 (1984), the opinion by Justice Brachtenbach would have the criminal defendant take the stand and be subjected to the impeaching evidence in front of a jury before being able to appeal the issue.
PEOPLE v. COLLINS, 42 Cal. 3d 378, 398, 722 P.2d 173, 187, 228 Cal. Rptr. 899 (1986) (Broussard, J., concurring and dissenting). A constitutional right, then, becomes manipulated by new demands of trial tactics.
This problem does not occur when the defendant is able to preserve his objection for appeal by an offer of proof. It may be true, as pointed out by the Supreme Court in LUCE, that an offer of proof may differ in content from actual testimony subject to cross examination. LUCE, at 41 n.5. That problem can be remedied by methods other than forcing a defendant to testify before a jury when he would choose to remain silent. A defendant could make an extended offer of proof or could, as suggested by three members of the California Supreme Court, testify in camera after the prosecution closed its case. SEE COLLINS, 722 P.2d at 187 (Broussard, J., concurring and dissenting). As the opinion by Justice Brachtenbach itself points out, we are not compelled to follow federal precedent on the rules of evidence. Opinion by Justice Brachtenbach, at 547-48; CF. ORWICK v. SEATTLE, 103 Wn.2d 249, 692 P.2d 793 (1984). Other states have chosen not to follow LUCE. SEE, E.G., PEOPLE v. CONTRERAS, 108 A.D.2d 627, 485 N.Y.S.2d 261 (1985); STATE v. MCCLURE, 298 Or. 336, 692 P.2d 579, 584 n.4 (1984). I would rather adopt a rule which serves the policy interest identified by the opinion by Justice Brachtenbach and yet protects the rights of the defendant.
 I also take issue with the opinion by Justice Brachtenbach over its rejection of the rule in STATE v. BURTON, 101 Wn.2d 1, 676 P.2d 975 (1984), as well as the rule adopted by a majority of this country's federal courts. See opinion by Justice Brachtenbach, at 547 footnote 3. The opinion by Justice Brachtenbach concludes instead that all crimes involving theft are per se dishonest and automatically admissible under ER 609(a)(2). Instead of following the federal legislative history behind ER 609, the opinion by Justice Brachtenbach engages in its own "plain language" interpretation of the rule. Thus, this new construction of ER 609 is not based on the reports of those who drafted it but on passages from Webster's dictionary and the intuition of Justice Brachtenbach's opinion. By so doing, the opinion by Justice Brachtenbach would make no distinction- for the credibility-driven purposes of ER 609(a)(2) between the person who steals a loaf of bread and the one who swindles his victims out of their savings. Further, by allowing the admission of crimes such as robbery, burglary, theft, and perhaps kidnapping under the per se standard of ER 609(a)(2), the opinion by Justice Brachtenbach effectively emasculates the balancing test in 609(a)(1).
The opinion by Justice Brachtenbach and I differ about the connotations of the word "dishonesty" in this context. Because this term is not unambiguous, I think it best to refer to the federal legislative history behind it. That history indicates that the offenses intended to be admissible under the rule are those involving active deception. SEE STATE v. NEWTON, 109 Wn.2d 69, 77-78, 743 P.2d 254 (1987); STATE v. BURTON, 101 Wn.2d at 1-2.
I also take issue with Justice Brachtenbach's opinion in its overruling STATE v. JONES, 101 Wn.2d 113, 677 P.2d 131 (1984), to the extent that case establishes a constitutional harmless error standard for the erroneous admission of evidence under ER 609. The admission of past convictions for impeachment purposes has an impact upon a defendant's decision to testify. A defendant's right to testify - as well as his right to remain silent - is of federal as well as state constitutional magnitude. SEE U.S. Const. amend. 5; Const. art. 1, 9, 22. Any ruling having an effect on these rights is consequently of constitutional proportions. The opinion by Justice Brachtenbach reasons its result is proper by stating that a defendant has no right to testify free of impeachment. Opinion by Justice Brachtenbach, at 554. While this is true, the statement in Justice Brachtenbach's opinion does not fully acknowledge that its rule puts pressure on a defendant's decision to testify or to remain silent, thus affecting constitutional rights.
The opinion by Justice Brachtenbach further declares that there is no logic behind recognizing a constitutional error standard for ER 609 while maintaining a nonconstitutional standard for ER 404. There is an answer to the puzzle in Justice Brachtenbach's opinion. ER 609 directly affects defendant during his testimony, while ER 404 does not. Therefore, the former puts pressure on the rights to testify and to remain silent. Because the latter does not, it is logical to retain two standards for these two rules.
I do agree with the opinion by Justice Brachtenbach, however, in overruling STATE v. LAUREANO, 101 Wn.2d 745, 682 P.2d 889 (1984). Insofar as that case allows the presumptive admission of past convictions under ER 609 after earlier admission under ER 404(b), it has no place in our body of evidence law.
On the basis of the above, then, I concur with the opinion by Justice Brachtenbach in its result but not its reasoning.
CONCURRING JUDGES: Dolliver and Smith, JJ., concur with Utter, J.
 I agree with the concurrence to the extent it takes issue with the conclusion in Justice Brachtenbach's opinion that all crimes involving theft are per se dishonest. In reaching such a conclusion, the opinion by Justice Brachtenbach implicitly ignores the purpose behind ER 609(a)(2). That rule allows the admission of evidence of past crimes only for the purpose of impeaching the defendant's CREDIBILITY. As the concurrence notes, when the defendant's veracity is the issue, the per se rule in Justice Brachtenbach's opinion may wholly fail to serve the theoretical purpose of impeachment, while ensuring prejudice in the eyes of the jury.
Despite my agreement with this portion of the concurrence, I am constrained to write separately to note the error it contains regarding the issue of the appealability of an erroneous ER 609(a)(2) ruling. The concurrence argues that requiring the defendant to actually take the stand before being able to appeal the ruling violates Fifth Amendment guaranties. That is not the case.
The concurrence frames the issue as one of "forcing" the defendant to testify in order to preserve error. In point of fact, impeachment evidence is admissible only in the instance where the defendant actually takes the stand. Thus, where a defendant does not wish to testify, an improper in limine ruling simply does not affect that defendant. The rule in Justice Brachtenbach's opinion does nothing more than confront this defendant with a decision every criminal defendant must ultimately reach; that is, whether to testify.
With these explanations, I concur in the result.
CONCURRING JUDGES: Dore, J., concurs with Pearson, J.
POST-OPINION INFORMATION: After modification, further reconsideration denied March 1, 1990.

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 art. 1
 v.