Source: https://arizona.lexroll.com/adage-towing-recovery-v-city-of-tucson-187-ariz-396-app-1996/
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 16:13:23+00:00

Document:
ADAGE TOWING RECOVERY, INC., an Arizona corporation, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. CITY OF TUCSON, an Arizona governmental agency, and State of Arizona, Grant Woods, Attorney General, Defendants/Appellees.
No. 2 CA-CV 95-0242.Court of Appeals of Arizona, Division Two, Department A.
June 20, 1996. Review Denied January 14, 1997.
Appeal from the Superior Court, Pima County, Cause No. 304968, Bernardo P. Velasco, J.
Hirsh, Davis Piccarreta, P.C. by Robert J. Hirsh and David L. Bjorgaard, Tucson, for Plaintiff/Appellant.
Thomas J. Berning, City Attorney by Ronald M. Detrick, Tucson, for Defendant/Appellee City of Tucson.
Grant Woods, Attorney General by Sylvia E. Goodwin, Tucson, for Defendant/Appellee State of Arizona.
Vehicles parked in violation of property rules and regulations will be towed and stored at owners [sic] expense, creating a lien on vehicle for the charges of $65 impound, $2.50 per mile, $7 per day storage. Parking is a consent to a lien on my vehicle.
1) A.R.S. 9-499.05 does not permit a statutory basis for the creation of a lien upon towed and/or stored motor vehicles removed from private property pursuant to this statute.
2) Arizona common law does not permit the creation of a lien upon towed and/or stored motor vehicles removed from private property pursuant to A.R.S. 9-499.05.
3) In the absence of an ordinance pursuant to A.R.S. 9-499.05(A), an owner of private property may set forth the financial consequences of parking without permission on the owner’s property.
creates a legally binding contract between the towing company and the parking violator which would permit a towing company to seek relief for its contractual damages.
The court later clarified its decision by rejecting Adage’s contention that a “binding implied contract can be created with a sign including any provisions . . . . which includes the provision of an implied lien,” ruling instead that “[t]he posting of a sign stating a lien shall be created does not create a lien, express or implied, for towing or storage charges on the towed automobile.” This appeal followed.
Adage contends that, as a matter of law, the above-quoted sign (assuming proper posting, visibility and readability) can create a binding contract, including an implied, consensual possessory lien, between Adage and parking violators whose vehicles are impounded and stored by Adage at the request of property owners. Because the question is strictly one of law, our review is de novo. We will affirm the trial court’s decision if it is correct for any reason. Rancho Pescado, Inc. v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 140 Ariz. 174, 178, 680 P.2d 1235, 1239 (App. 1984).
(1984), our supreme court addressed the issue of whether a towing company had a lien on a vehicle for towing and storage charges when the vehicle was towed away for having been parked on posted private property without permission. In that case, “[s]igns prohibiting parking in the area indicated that violators’ automobiles would be towed away and a $75 towing fee incurred.”Id. at 114, 677 P.2d at 277. In concluding that the towing company had no valid lien, the court noted that “[a] common law lien arose only when some value was imparted to the automobile by `performing work or furnishing material’ for the vehicle.” Id.
at 115, 677 P.2d at 278, quoting Candler v. Ash, 53 Ohio App.2d 134, 136, 372 N.E.2d 617, 619 (1976). The court then held that “[a]ny lien for towing or storage of an automobile in Arizona must have a statutory basis.” 139 Ariz. at 115, 677 P.2d at 278 See also Currie v. Dooley, 132 Ariz. 584, 586-87, 647 P.2d 1182, 1184-85 (App. 1982); Fitzhugh v. City of Douglas, 122 Ariz. 599, 600, 596 P.2d 737, 738 (App. 1979) (“The existence of [a lien for storage] is strictly statutory and, being in derogation of the common law, such a right is entirely conditional on the statutory wording.”).
on Capson for that proposition, however, is misplaced. Although the court in Capson stated that “[t]here must be an express or implied agreement between the owner of the vehicle and the person doing the services” for a possessory, consensual lien to attach, 139 Ariz. at 116, 677 P.2d at 279, nothing in the decision supports Adage’s contention that its sign, as a matter of law, can create such a lien. Indeed, the supreme court not only found no common law possessory lien in Capson, it also noted that “even if there were an implied agreement to pay $75 for towing, there is no statutory basis for a lien to secure the payment of that amount.” Id. at 115, 677 P.2d at 278.
Halloran v. Spillane’s Servicenter, Inc., 41 Conn. Sup. 484, 495, 587 A.2d 176, 182 (1990). See also Younger v. Plunkett, 395 F. Supp. 702, 714-15 (E.D.Pa. 1975); Kunde, 41 Ill. App.3d at 228, 353 N.E.2d at 415.
Through a cross-issue raised in its answering brief, the city attempts to challenge and overturn the trial court’s ruling that “[a] sign that complies with A.R.S. 9-499.05 creates a legally binding contract between the towing company and the parking violator which would permit a towing company to seek relief for its contractual damages.” Because the city essentially seeks to modify the trial court’s decision in a manner that would “lessen the rights of the appellant,” the city was required to cross-appeal from that aspect of the trial court’s ruling and failed to do so. Ariz. R. Civ.App. P. 13(b)(3), 17B A.R.S. Accordingly, we do not address that issue. See Lewis v. Oliver, 178 Ariz. 330, 339, 873 P.2d 668, 677 (App. 1993), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 929, 115 S.Ct. 319, 130 L.Ed.2d 280 (1994).
LIVERMORE, J., and CHARLES E. ARES, J. Pro Tem., concur.
 This action was prompted by Adage’s contested towing and retention of a vehicle, and by an ongoing conflict between Adage and city and state law enforcement agencies over Adage’s asserted liens on towed vehicles and its refusal to release such vehicles until all claimed charges have been paid. Although the underlying facts were not fully developed or formally established in the trial court through affidavits, depositions or any evidentiary hearing, the parties agree, and the record indicates, that this case involves a justiciable issue and a genuine controversy between them. Thus, we are not being asked to render a mere advisory opinion on a moot, theoretical or abstract question See Arizona State Bd. of Directors for Junior Colleges v. Phoenix Union High School Dist., 102 Ariz. 69, 73, 424 P.2d 819, 823 (1967).
 Adage also sought a ruling that the combination of signs complied with A.R.S. § 9-499.05, whereas defendants requested a ruling that the signs, their manner of posting, and Adage violated the statute. The trial court declined to decide that issue, concluding that it should be litigated in Tucson City Court, and no party has appealed from that ruling.
2. Disposition of vehicles found in violation of the parking restrictions.
3. Maximum cost to the violator, including storage fees and any other charges that could result from the disposition of a vehicle parked in violation of parking restrictions.
4. Telephone number and address where the violator can locate his vehicle.
 We note that unsuccessful attempts have been made to have legislation enacted to grant towing companies a lien on towed vehicles. See, e.g., S. 1124, 42d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (1996); S, 1178, 41st Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (1995). S. 1124, for example, would have added language to A.R.S. § 33-1022(A) that “[t]owing companies have a lien on motor vehicles for the cost of towing materials, supplies, impoundment and storage of vehicles towed pursuant to a request of a law enforcement agency, the owner or possessor of the vehicle or the owner or agent of the real property from which the vehicle is towed.” That bill, however, did not pass the Arizona Senate.

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