Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/295/639/
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 21:56:22+00:00

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Justia › US Law › US Case Law › US Supreme Court › Volume 295 › Ickes v. Virginia-Colorado Development Corp.
Ickes v. Virginia-Colorado Development Corp.
1. Under R.S. § 2324, a default in performance of annual labor on a mining claim renders it subject to relocation by some other claimant, but it does not affect the locator's rights as regards the United States, and he is entitled to preserve his claim by resuming work after default and before relocation. P. 295 U. S. 644.
2. The Secretary of the Interior has authority to determine that a claim is invalid for lack of discovery, for fraud or other defect, or that it is subject to cancellation for abandonment. P. 295 U. S. 645.
proceedings in which it declared that, because of the default, the claims were void. Held, that the case was within the exception in the Mineral Leasing Act, and that the proceedings were without authority and were properly enjoined in a suit against the Secretary of the Interior. P. 295 U. S. 645.
643 App.D.C. 47, 60 F.2d 123, affirmed.
The Virginia-Colorado Development Corporation brought this suit to obtain a mandatory injunction against the Secretary of the Interior requiring him to vacate certain adverse proceedings and his decision declaring certain placer claims of the plaintiff to be void. Motion to dismiss the bill of complaint was denied, and, on defendant's refusal to plead further, plaintiff obtained a decree which the Court of Appeals affirmed. 63 App.D.C. 47, 69 F.2d 123. This Court granted a writ of certiorari in view of the question as to the construction of the Mineral Leasing Act, February 25, 1920, c. 85, §§ 1, 37, 41 Stat. 437; 30 U.S.C. §§ 181, 193.
The bill alleged that, in June, 1917, under § 2324 of the Revised Statutes, plaintiff located certain oil shale placer claims on mineral lands of the United States in Colorado, and thereupon became the owner of the claims and entitled to their exclusive possession; that from that time until and including the year ending July 1, 1930, the annual assessment work required by the statute was performed on each of the claims; that during the year ending July 1, 1931, the assessment work was not performed, and had not been resumed before September 4, 1931, or since, but that plaintiff then intended to resume work, and had made arrangements for that resumption which would have been had but for the action of defendant; that plaintiff had not abandoned or intended to abandon any of the claims, and that no charge to that effect had been made; that, about September 4, 1931, adverse proceedings were initiated by the Department of the Interior, through the General Land Office, with the filling of a "challenge" to plaintiff's title and right of possession and by "posting such challenge on the said claims;" that the challenge was based on the sole ground that plaintiff had not performed the annual assessment work, and that "the United States resumed possession of said land."
"no relocation of any of the claims by any person since plaintiff's failure to perform the annual assessment work, and that there had been no application by anyone to lease any of the claims from the United States."
by the Secretary of the Interior, whose decision had been promulgated declaring that the United States had taken possession for its own purposes, thus in effect decreeing a forfeiture.
"and thereafter maintained in compliance with the laws under which initiated, which claims may be perfected under such laws, including discovery. [Footnote 1]"
"was not necessary to preserve the possessory right, with all the incidents of ownership above stated, as against the United States, but only as against subsequent relocators. So far as the government was concerned, failure to do assessment work for any year was without effect. Whenever $500 worth of labor in the aggregate had been performed, other requirements aside, the owner became entitled to a patent, even though, in some years, annual assessment labor had been omitted."
There was authority in the Secretary of the Interior, by appropriate proceedings, to determine that a claim was invalid for lack of discovery, fraud, or other defect, or that it was subject to cancellation by reason of abandonment. Cameron v. United States, 252 U. S. 450, 252 U. S. 460; Cole v. Ralph, 252 U. S. 286, 252 U. S. 296; Black v. Elkhorn Mining Co., 163 U. S. 445, 163 U. S. 450; Brown v. Gurney, 201 U. S. 184, 201 U. S. 192-193; Farrell v. Lockhart, 210 U. S. 142, 210 U. S. 147.
lack of discovery, fraud, or other defect. There is no ground for a charge of abandonment. The allegations of the bill, admitted by the motion to dismiss, dispose of any such contention. Plaintiff had lost no rights by failure to do the annual assessment work; that failure gave the government no ground of forfeiture. Wilbur v. Krushnic, supra.
How could the valid claims of plaintiff be "thereafter maintained in compliance with the laws under which initiated"? Manifestly, by a resumption of work. Plaintiff was entitled to resume, and the bill alleged that plaintiff had made arrangements for resumption, and that work would have been resumed if the Department of the Interior had not intervened. Plaintiff's rights after resumption would have been as if "no default had occurred." Belk v. Meagher, supra. Such a resumption would have been an act "not in derogation, but in affirmance, of the original location," and thereby the claim would have been "maintained." As we said in Wilbur v. Krushnic, supra, p. 280 U. S. 318, "[s]uch resumption does not restore a lost estate . . . ; it preserves an existing estate."
In this view, plaintiff came directly within the exception. The government invokes the new policy of the Leasing Act abolishing the practice of location. But the saving provision of § 37 is a part of the policy of the act. Its terms explicitly declare the will of Congress as to valid existing claims, with full understanding of the status of such claims under the prior law.
"challenge" to the "valid existence" of a claim must have some proper basis. No such basis is shown.
"Sec. 37. That the deposits of coal, phosphate, sodium, oil, oil shale, and gas, herein referred to, in lands valuable for such minerals, including lands and deposits described in the joint resolution entitled 'Joint resolution authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to permit the continuation of coal mining operations on certain lands in Wyoming,' approved August 1, 1912 (Thirty-seventh Statutes at Large, p. 1346), shall be subject to disposition only in the form and manner provided in this Act, except as to valid claims existent at date of the passage of this Act and thereafter maintained in compliance with the laws under which initiated, which claims may be perfected under such laws, including discovery."

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