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Timestamp: 2019-04-23 08:02:53+00:00

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Law Web: Whether Indian courts can recognize judgment and order of conviction of a foreign Court?
Whether Indian courts can recognize judgment and order of conviction of a foreign Court?
We now propose to consider the second question i.e. question No. (1)(b). We are of the considered view that, though the judgment and order of conviction of a foreign Court for the offence committed in India can be noticed/looked into and recognized by judicial and quasi judicial authorities in India, while exercising their judicial and quasi judicial powers, it cannot be said that the same will be ipso factobinding on such Courts and authorities. If we hold that such a judgment of a foreign Court for an offence committed in that country, is binding on the Courts and authorities in India while exercising their judicial and quasi judicial powers, it will amount to directly or indirectly enforcing the judgment of the foreign Court. What is the effect of such order of conviction, would depend upon variety of factors such as, nature of the proceedings, purpose for which the said order of conviction needs to be taken into consideration, nature of conviction and effect thereof on the proceedings, nature of consequences of the ultimate decision to be taken in the said proceedings, are some of the factors which will have to be taken into consideration while deciding as to how much and what weightage has to be given to such judgment and order of conviction. We are of the considered view that, no hard and fast rule can be laid for that purpose. The Courts and authorities, while exercising their judicial and quasi judicial powers will have to take a call on the facts and circumstances of each case and take a decision as to what is the effect of such judgment and order of conviction. The question No. (1)(b) is answered accordingly.
“Whether conviction of an Indian by a foreign Court for the offence committed in that country can be taken notice of by the Courts or authorities in India and such conviction would be binding on Courts and authority in India while trying such person for such offence in India?
(1) Whether conviction of an Indian by a foreign Court for the offence committed in that country can be taken notice of by the Courts or authorities in India and as to whether such conviction would be binding on Courts and authorities in India while exercising judicial and quasi judicial powers?
3. Since we are called upon to only answer the question, reference to the factual matrix would not be necessary.
4. We have heard Shri. Dada, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the Appellant in the First Appeal and Shri. Ponda, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondent. Though lengthy and elaborate arguments have been advanced by both Shri. Dada and Shri. Ponda, we will only deal with such of the arguments that are necessary for answering the reference.
5. Shri. Dada submitted that, the judgment and order of conviction by a foreign court for the offence committed in that country cannot even be looked into or no notice be taken of by the Indian Courts. Learned Senior Counsel submitted that, the view taken by the erstwhile Nagpur High Court in the case of Govind Kesheo Powarv. State of Madhya Pradesh1, lays down the correct position of law. He submitted that, the view taken by the Nagpur High Court is in tune with the view taken by the House of Lords in Huntington v. Attrill2, Kings Bench Division in Banco De Vizcaya v. Don Alphonso De Borbon3, Queens Bench in United States of America v. Inkley4, Kings Bench in Raulin v. Fischer5, Chancery Division in Frankfurther v. W.L. Exner Limited6, Ogden v. Folliott7, Wolff v. Oxholm8 and Lynch v. The Provisional Government of Paraguay. The learned Senior Counsel also relied on the Judgment of Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Union of India v. Susanta Kumar Mukharjee9. The learned Senior Counsel further submits that, it has been consistently held that the Court of one country would not directly or indirectly execute decree of the Court of another country and if the Court of one country is permitted to take note of decree of the Court of another country, it will amount to nothing else but indirect enforcement of decree of the foreign Court.
6. Per contra, Shri. Ponda, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondent, submits that, though judgment and order of conviction passed by the foreign Court may not be binding on the Courts in India, the same, however, could be noticed and recognized while exercising judicial or quasi judicial powers by the Courts and authorities as the case may be in India. The learned Counsel submits that, enforcement of a judgment of foreign court is distinct from recognizing or noticing the said judgment by the Courts and authorities in India. In this respect, the learned Counsel relied on the judgment of the Apex Court in Brace Transport Corporation of Monrovia, Bermuda v. Orient Middle East Lines Ltd., Saudi Arabia10. The learned Counsel also relies on the judgment of King's Bench in Ralli Brothers v. Compania Naviera Sota Y. Aznar11, of the Court of Appeal in the case of Regazzoni v. K.C. Sethia12, of the Chancery Division in the case of Emery v. Emery13, of the House of Lords in the case of Oppenheimer And Cattermole (Inspector of Taxes), Nothman and Cooper (Inspector of Taxes)14, and of the Court of Appeal in the case of Euro-Diam Ltd. v. Bathurst15.
7. Shri. Ponda, the learned Counsel for the Respondent, relying on the Judgment of the learned Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Indian and General Investment Trust Ltd. v. Sri. Ramchandra Mardaraja Deo, Raja of Khalikote16, submits that the Indian Courts are not bound to follow the rules of private international law, as are laid down by the English Courts. He submits that, Indian Courts are free to evolve their own rules of private international law and follow the same.
8. Shri. Ponda, relying on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of State (NCT of Delhi) v. Brijesh Singh17, submits that the principle that “crime is local” cannot be stretched to such an extent that the judgment and order of conviction by foreign Court even cannot be looked into by the Courts in India. The learned Counsel submits that, the view taken by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Avinashkumar Bhasin v. Air India, Bombay18, lays down the correct position of law and as such, the question needs to be answered that, though the judgment and order of conviction by the foreign Court for offence committed in that country may or may not be binding on the Courts in India, the same can be very well looked into or recognized while exercising judicial and quasi judicial powers by the Courts and authorities in India.
9. Perusal of the Order dated 5/11/2014 passed by the learned Single Judge, would reveal that the learned Single Judge has found that, there is a conflict between the view taken by a Division Bench of Nagpur High Court in the case of Govind Kesheo Powar (cited supra) and in the case of Avinashkumar Bhasin (cited supra). The learned Single Judge found that, in order to resolve the conflict between the aforesaid two judgments, it will be necessary that the question is decided by the Full Bench.
10. We have some reservations as to whether the judgment of Nagpur High Court, whose successor is now Madhya Pradesh High Court, would be binding on the learned Single Judge of this Court and as to whether the learned Single Judge was bound to follow the Judgment of a Division Bench of the Nagpur High Court. However, since the reference has already been made to us and since an important question, which may have wider ramifications, is involved, we propose to decide the said issue.
(1)(b) Whether such a conviction would be binding on the Courts and authorities in India while exercising their judicial and/or quasi judicial powers?
13. It could be seen from the aforesaid observations that, the Privy Council in the said case reiterated the well recognized principle that crimes are local and therefore they are only cognizable and punishable in the country where they are committed. Their Lordships further recognized a principle that Courts of no country execute penal laws of another. However, in the said case, after considering the factual and legal position, their Lordships ultimately came to the conclusion that, an action on behalf of Government of New York is not in the sense, penal or in other words, for punishment of an offence against municipal law.
15. The principle laid down by the Privy Council in the case of Huntington v. Attrill (cited supra) has been reiterated and followed by the King's Bench in Banco De Vizcaya (cited supra). It was held by their Lordships that, the Plaintiffs were not asserting their own rights at all but that of the Spanish State. As such, judgment in their favour would involve execution of foreign penal law. It was found that, the Plaintiffs are not asserting their contractual rights as they originally existed but those rights as attested by the decrees of Spanish State.
17. Again, their Lordships of the King's Bench Division in the case of Raulin v. Fischer19 have held that, where an offender has been convicted and also saddled with damages for the injury may be awarded by the same judgment and in such a case the judgment is severable and that the portion of it awarding damages to the injured person is not within the rule of international law, which prohibits Courts of justice, from executing the penal judgments of a foreign Court.
18. Several other English Judgments have been cited by Shri. Dada. We do not find that reference to all of them is necessary inasmuch as position of law, as stated therein, is identical with the view taken in the case of Huntington v. Attrill (cited supra) wherein their Lordships observed that even in the case of civil proceeding which has an effect of directly or indirectly enforcing punishment for breach of penal laws of the other country, Courts would not enforce the same. Again, in the case of Banco De Vizcaya (cited supra), their Lordships found that Plaintiffs were not asserting their contractual rights as they originally existed but those rights altered by the decrees of the Spanish Government. It was observed that such of the rights sought to be enforced by the Plaintiffs therein would directly or indirectly involve an execution of penal laws of the Spanish Republic. In the case of United States of America (supra), it was found that the purpose of the Plaintiff's action was execution of their public law process aimed to ensure the attendance of those charged with criminal offence before their criminal court and as such, High Court in U.K. has no jurisdiction to entertain the Plaintiff's action.
19. It could thus be seen that ratio of the aforesaid judgments would be that, if a decree passed under penal law by foreign Court is sought to be enforced directly or indirectly through British Courts, the same would not be permissible. It is on a principle that, Courts of no country execute penal laws of another.
20. No doubt, Shri. Dada is justified in relying on the judgment of the Division Bench of Nagpur High Court in the case of Govind Kesheo Powar v. State of Madhya Pradesh20 and a Division Bench of Calcutta High Court in the case of Union of Indiav. Susanta Kumar Mukharjee21. However, issue in both these judgment is decided on the basis of English judgments, which we propose to analyse hereinafter. In any case, both these judgments only will have persuasive value for this larger Bench.
21. However, the question that we are faced here with is not as to whether a penal decree of a foreign Court could be enforced by the Indian Courts. The question is, as to whether the Courts and authorities in India, while exercising their judicial and quasi judicial powers, should not at all even notice or take into consideration at all the penal decrees of a foreign Court for the offence committed in that country, even if they find the same to be relevant for deciding the question before them.
22. A Division Bench of this Court in Avinashkumar Bhasin (cited supra) has held that, such a conviction by a Court of one country can be taken notice of in another country for any purpose whatsoever.
24. It could thus be seen that an Award, if it has to be enforced, it has necessarily to be recognised. However, the converse is not necessary. The recognition may ipso facto be not enforceable. In this background, we propose to examine the question referred to us and re-framed by us as above.
26. Perusal of the aforesaid observations would reveal that, their Lordships held that, as to whether revenue laws of the foreign country, when the contract is to be performed, can be taken into consideration or not while enforcing the same in English Courts, requires reconsideration in view of obligations of international comity as now understood.
31. It could thus be seen that Lord Birkett also observes that, it is wrong to say that one shall take no notice of laws of the other country, as distinct from saying that one shall not enforce such laws.
33. It could thus be seen that, Parker L.J. also agrees with what has been said by Denning, L.J. that, the words used by Lord Mansfield in Holman v. Johnson [1 Cowp. 341, 343] are very wide indeed. His Lordship further goes on to observe that this statement has been referred to with approval by the House of Lords in the recent case of Government of India v. Taylor ( A.C. 491); but it is equally clear that the wording of Lord Mansfield in certain respects, at any rate, is, taken literally, too wide. He refers to the observations of Kingsmill Moore J. in Peter Buchanan Ltd. and Macharg v. Mc. Vey ([1955 AC 516 n, 523), wherein, he has expressed a doubt, whether Lord Mansfield intended his remarks to preclude a court from informing itself as to the provisions of a foreign revenue law in order to determine the question whether a foreign transaction was or was not fraudulent and void according to the law of that country.
36. It could thus be seen that, their Lordships held that, if the English Courts were to refuse to recognize legislation by a sovereign state relating to assets situated within its own territories or to the status of its own nationals on the ground that the legislation was utterly immoral and unjust, this could obviously embarrass the Crown in its relations with a sovereign state whose independence it recognised and with whom it had and hoped to maintain normal friendly relations.
38. It could thus be seen that their Lordships have clearly rejected the argument that, the understated invoice did not constitute any breach of English law but only of German law, and of a German revenue law at that. Their Lordships held that, if English law were to counterance an agreement involving the commission of a criminal offence in a friendly foreign country with impunity by holding that on that ground the agreement is not to be regarded as contrary to public policy, would be an argument of extraordinary nature. Their Lordships held that the view taken in the case of Regazzoni v. K.C. Sethia (cited supra) appears to fly in the face of all principles of comity.
39. In the light of the aforesaid discussion, it appears to be a settled principle of law laid down by English Court that, though the decrees of penal laws of foreign country cannot be enforced in United Kingdom, the laws of foreign countries and especially the countries with which the United Kingdom has friendly relations, cannot only be looked into but on the principle of comity are required to be given due recognition.
40. We find that, if the argument, as advanced by Shri. Dada is to be accepted, and if we are inclined to hold that the judgment and order of conviction as recorded by a foreign Court, for the offence committed in the foreign country cannot even be looked into, it may have even an effect of depriving an Indian citizen of the fundamental right available to him under Article 20(2) of the Constitution and to any person under Section 300 of the Code of Criminal Procedure Code.
“20. Protection in respect of conviction for offences.- (1) No person shall be convicted of any offence except for violation of a law in force at the time of the commission of the act charged as an offence, nor be subjected to a penalty greater than that which might have been inflicted under the law in force at the time of the commission of the offence.
43. It provides that, a person who is once tried by a Court of competent jurisdiction for an offence and convicted or acquitted of such offence while such conviction or acquittal remains in force, would not be tried again for the same offence. It further provides that, on the same facts, he cannot be tried again for any other offence for which a different charge from the one made against him might have been made under sub-section (1) of section 221, or for which he might have been convicted under sub-section (2) thereof.
44. It could thus be seen that, a valuable right is not only available to Indian citizen but any person if he has been either convicted or acquitted of such offence by the Court of competent jurisdiction. He cannot be tried again while such conviction or acquittal remains in force. Not only that, he cannot also be tried on the same facts for any other offence for which a different charge from the one made against him might have been made under sub-section (1) of section 221, or for which he might have been convicted under sub-section (2) thereof. No doubt, sub-sections (2) to (5) carve out exceptions under which such person could be tried.
46. It could thus be seen that, the provisions of IPC would also apply to any offence committed by any citizen of India in any place without and beyond India. It would also apply to any offence committed by any person on any ship or aircraft registered in India wherever it may be. It would also apply to any offence committed by any person in any place without and beyond India committing offence targeting a computer resource located in India. The Explanation (a) thereof provides that the word “offence” includes every act committed outside India which, if committed in India, would be punishable under the Code.
47. To give an illustration, if an Indian citizen commits murder in United Kingdom, in view of provisions of Section 4 of the I.P.C., he would be deemed to have committed an offence also in India and the provisions of the Code would apply to him. If such a person is already tried in the United Kingdom and undergone a sentence for the same, in view of provisions of Section 4 of the IPC, he is also liable to be tried in India for having committed murder because, it will be an offence punishable under section 302 of IPC. However, such a citizen would be entitled to the protection of double jeopardy under sub-clause (2) of Article 20 and even if he is acquitted upon a trial by a competent Court, he cannot be tried in view of Section 300 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The question would be, how such a citizen would prove his earlier conviction or acquittal. If the argument of Shri. Dada is to be accepted then such a judgment of conviction or acquittal could not even be noticed by the Courts in India.
48. Take another illustration of a foreign national, who is travelling on a ship or aircraft registered in India. He commits crime while on the ship or aircraft which is within the jurisdiction of foreign country. He is tried in that country and either convicted or acquitted. The crime is also an offence under I.P.C. In view of provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 4 of the IPC, he would also be liable to be tried in India. However, in view of protection guaranteed under Article 20(2) of the Constitution read with Section 300 of the Criminal Procedure Code, even such a foreign national cannot be compelled to face a second trial. How would he prove his prior conviction or acquittal and get protection under Article 20(2) of the Constitution or Section 300 of Cr.P.C. if judgment of conviction or acquittal cannot even be noticed by the Courts in India.
49. We are of the considered view that, if we accept the argument that judgment and order of conviction and acquittal passed by the foreign Court cannot at all be looked into by Indian Courts is accepted, it would have devastating result, of depriving a person of his right under Article 20(2) and under Section 300 of Cr.P.C.
51. If the contention of the Appellant that the judgment and order of conviction could not have been noticed in India is to be accepted, then their Lordships of the Apex Court also could not have considered the judgment and order of conviction as recorded by US Court. If the argument is to be accepted, the Appellant Jitendra Panchal, apart from other charges which he was facing for the offence under the NDPS Act, could also have been tried for part of the offence that he had committed in US territory, if it was punishable under the Indian Law.
52. We further find that the said argument, if accepted, would also be against the public policy and principle of comity of Nations. Let us consider an illustration. An Indian citizen while residing in a foreign nation commits a crime involving moral turpitude and is sentenced for that offence by a foreign court and after undergoing sentence, he returns to India and desires to contest elections, for which conviction for an offence involving moral turpitude is a disqualification. If the argument of the Appellant that the judgment and order of conviction cannot be looked into is to be accepted, not only it would be contrary to public policy of not permitting a person convicted for offence involving moral turpitude to contest elections, it would also be against the breach of the comity which should exist between the countries. As observed by Lord Salmon in Oppenheimer (cited supra), it would have an effect of embarrassing Indian Sovereign in its relations with other Sovereign States, whose independence it recognizes and with whom it has and hoped to maintain normal friendly relations.
53. In any event, English Courts in the cases of Regazzoni (supra), Oppenheimer(supra) and Euro-Diam Ltd. (supra) have consistently taken a view that, though English Courts would not enforce a penal decree of foreign nation, they are not precluded from taking into consideration the foreign penal laws. Not only that, it is their consistent view that, in order to avoid breach of comity, such penal laws should be given due recognition by English Courts also.
54. We have already referred to the observations of the Apex Court in Brace Transport Corporation of Monrovia (supra), wherein their Lordships state that there is a distinction between enforcement and recognition.
57. A slight distinction of facts, as held by their Lordships, with the application of same principle of law, would lead to diagonally diverse results. The ratio as could be culled out from the said judgment is that, it has to be presumed that, Legislature, when it enacted Section 10(m) of the C.P. and Berar Local Government Act, it did not intend to include therein offences committed by the citizens of Madhya Pradesh in foreign territories. We find that, the question as to whether the judgment and order of conviction as recorded by foreign Court for the offence committed in that country can be looked into or noticed or recognized for any other purposes by the Courts or authorities in India, did not fall for consideration before the Nagpur High Court.
58. Insofar as Judgment of Division Bench of this Court in the case of Avinashkumar Bhasin (cited supra) is concerned, we find that the question, as to whether the judgment and order of conviction can be taken notice in India for any other purposes directly fell for consideration. As such, we do not see any apparent conflict in the two views. However, in the light of discussion hereinabove, we find that the view taken by the Division Bench of this Court in Avinashkumar Bhasin(cited supra) lays down the correct position of law.
59. We therefore answer the first question viz question No. (1)(a) in the affirmative.
60. We now propose to consider the second question i.e. question No. (1)(b). We are of the considered view that, though the judgment and order of conviction of a foreign Court for the offence committed in India can be noticed/looked into and recognized by judicial and quasi judicial authorities in India, while exercising their judicial and quasi judicial powers, it cannot be said that the same will be ipso factobinding on such Courts and authorities. If we hold that such a judgment of a foreign Court for an offence committed in that country, is binding on the Courts and authorities in India while exercising their judicial and quasi judicial powers, it will amount to directly or indirectly enforcing the judgment of the foreign Court. What is the effect of such order of conviction, would depend upon variety of factors such as, nature of the proceedings, purpose for which the said order of conviction needs to be taken into consideration, nature of conviction and effect thereof on the proceedings, nature of consequences of the ultimate decision to be taken in the said proceedings, are some of the factors which will have to be taken into consideration while deciding as to how much and what weightage has to be given to such judgment and order of conviction. We are of the considered view that, no hard and fast rule can be laid for that purpose. The Courts and authorities, while exercising their judicial and quasi judicial powers will have to take a call on the facts and circumstances of each case and take a decision as to what is the effect of such judgment and order of conviction. The question No. (1)(b) is answered accordingly.
61. Before we part, we must place on record our appreciation for valuable assistance rendered to us by Shri. Dada and Shri. Ponda.

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