Source: https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/how-justice-thomas-determines-the-original-meaning-of-article-ii-of-the-constitution
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 17:02:03+00:00

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The scope of the President’s powers under Article II of the Constitution has been a key topic during much of Justice Thomas’s twenty-five years on the Supreme Court. The attacks of September 11, 2001, for instance, prompted military responses testing the inherent constitutional authority of the President and the extent to which other branches can limit this authority.1 Accordingly, no discussion of Justice Thomas’s jurisprudence over the past quarter century would be complete without a thorough understanding of how he approaches Article II questions.
Justice Thomas has a well-known reputation for striving to decide constitutional issues in accordance with the original meaning of the Constitution.2 This Essay concerns a specific question about this methodology in cases concerning presidential powers: How does Justice Thomas determine the original meaning of Article II of the U.S. Constitution? The answer to this question has both academic and practical dimensions. The principal academic concerns are whether Justice Thomas’s approach is complete and logical and whether it accords with his approach in other constitutional issues. The answer is practical because it reveals what kinds of arguments and sources persuade Justice Thomas.
In this Essay, I seek to answer the question of how Justice Thomas determines the original meaning of Article II by making three observations based on opinions authored or joined by Justice Thomas. The Essay proceeds in two Parts. Part I discusses Justice Thomas’s typical approach to constitutional issues. Part II then notes how his approach differs in Article II cases.
Although known for his usual silence during oral argument, Justice Thomas is the most prolific writer of the current members of the Supreme Court. Last year, for example, Justice Thomas wrote almost twice as many opinions as any of his colleagues.33 His extensive collection of utterances on Article II facilitates an evaluation of his methodology. My three observations are (1) that Justice Thomas has a greater inclination to theorize about the nature of executive power under Article II than about other features of the Constitution; (2) that he relies on all of the most commonly cited historical sources when discerning the original meaning of the Constitution; and (3) that he looks primarily for the original objective meaning of Article II, rather than some other type of original meaning (such as the original intent of the Framers or the original understanding of the participants at the state ratification conventions).
Justice Thomas seems much more inclined to theorize about executive power than other aspects of constitutional law. As explained above, Justice Thomas usually focuses on specific questions about the meaning of individual words in the Constitution. He typically finds answers in dictionaries from the Founding Era and similar sources, and tends to eschew abstract constitutional arguments. But when interpreting Article II, he tends to move beyond the text and into the realm of theory.
A second explanation is that deciding Article II issues without resorting to theory is difficult due to the brevity of Article II’s text and the fact that many of its phrases appear to be terms of art. The President’s powers are given in the 320 words of Article II, Sections 2 and 3. In contrast, Congress’s powers are detailed in the 684 words of Article I, Sections 8 and 9. Even putting aside possible implications from the omission of the “herein granted” language, Article II simply contains much less detail. In addition, Article II uses compound phrases, such as “Commander in Chief” and “officer of the United States,” which would seem to have special meanings that would not appear in dictionaries.42 Narrow textual analysis, accordingly, may seem insufficient to resolve issues arising under Article II.
Justice Thomas routinely cites all seven of the key sources of original meaning that I have mentioned in his decisions on executive power. This observation may have practical significance for Supreme Court litigation. Parties who wish to persuade Justice Thomas in Article II cases should seek support in all of these sources. Though a full description of each of Justice Thomas’s majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions is beyond the scope of this Essay, an example of his reliance on each source will demonstrate the point.
Reliance on these sources of the original meaning is not merely a matter of preference when writing his own opinions. Justice Thomas joins the opinions of other Justices that cite these sources but typically declines to join the ones that do not. One example is NLRB v. Noel Canning, which concerned recess appointments.58 In that case, Justice Scalia wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment in which he cited various sources of the original meaning of the term “recess.”59 Justice Thomas joined this opinion.60 But Justice Thomas pointedly refused to join the entirety of the majority in Bank Markazi v. Peterson.61 In that case, the Court held that the Iran Threat Reduction Act of 2012 did not violate the separation of powers. Justice Thomas refused to join only Part II-C of the Court’s opinion, which spoke eloquently about executive determinations of foreign sovereign immunity.62 But because it did not cite any of the sources of original meaning that Justice Thomas typically relies on, he did not agree with the arguments.
This observation might be more interesting and possibly more useful if a review of the cases showed that Justice Thomas favored some sources more than others. Such a discovery might yield further insight into Justice Thomas’s views about the President’s powers or suggest what litigants should emphasize when trying to persuade Justice Thomas. But I could discern no such evidence. Justice Thomas considers all of the leading sources relevant and apparently has not weighted any of them more or less heavily.
In deciding questions under Article II, Justice Thomas adheres to his general approach of seeking the original objective meaning. For example, as noted above, Justice Thomas in Zivotofsky announced that he was looking for the “understanding of executive power [that] prevailed in America” in the Founding Era, rather than looking for the original intent of the Framers or original understanding of the participants at the state ratifying conventions. But Justice Thomas has not looked exclusively at the sources, like dictionaries, that best reveal that meaning. Instead, he confirms the original objective meaning by looking at other sources of the original meaning. Again, Bond v. United States presents an indicative example.63 In Bond, he cited both evidence of the original understanding as shown by the records of the ratification debates and the objective meaning shown in dictionaries. Litigants before the Court therefore should not overlook evidence that might bolster arguments that focus specifically on the original objective meaning of the Constitution.
Justice Thomas’s approach to executive power appears to be consistent with his general practice of looking for evidence of the original public meaning of constitutional terms and confirming that meaning with all pertinent historical sources. The practical conclusions from my observations are twofold. First, a litigator who hopes to persuade Justice Thomas in an Article II case should attempt to find support in all seven of the historical sources discussed above. Second, the same litigator also should consider making arguments based on theories of executive power—such as those concerning the competence and authority of the President compared to Congress and the Courts—even though Justice Thomas generally decides other kinds of constitutional questions with a focus more on the text of the Constitution than on abstract principles.
Gregory Maggs is a Professor of Law at The George Washington University Law School. This paper was presented at a panel on Justice Thomas and Article II at the Yale Federalist Society’s conference, “Celebrating Justice Thomas: 25 Years on the Supreme Court.” I was a law clerk for Justice Thomas during the Supreme Court October Term 1991. My conclusions in this paper are based on my reading of Justice Thomas’s published opinions and not on any non-public information. I am very grateful to the Yale Federalist Society for hosting the conference and inviting me to participate.
Preferred Citation: Gregory E. Maggs, How Justice Thomas Determines the Original Meaning of Article II of the Constitution, 127 Yale L.J. F. 210 (2017), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/how-justice-thomas-determines-the-original-meaning-of-article-ii-of-the-constitution.
Id. at 828 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
See Maggs, supra note 2, at 509.
McDonald, 561 U.S. at 828 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
514 U.S. 549, 585 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
536 U.S. 452, 493 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
8 Simplicius, Commentaria in Aristotelem 208 (Charles L. Kalbfleisch ed., 1907).
See Mass. Const. pt. I, ch. II, § 1, art. VII (1780).
272 U.S. 52, 110 (1926).
487 U.S. 654, 719 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 678 (Thomas J., dissenting).
135 S. Ct. 2076, 2096 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
U.S. Const. art. I, § 1 (emphasis added).
Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2098.
135 S. Ct. 1199, 1216 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment).
Id. at 1203 (majority opinion).
See id. at 1214 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
135 S. Ct. at 2076.
See id. at 2102 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
548 U.S. 557, 678 (2006) (Thomas, J, dissenting).
See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 509 (plurality opinion).
See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 567 (majority opinion).
See id. at 2592 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
136 S. Ct. 1310 (2016).
See id. at 1316 n.*.
134 S. Ct. 2077, 2102 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (addressing the President’s inherent constitutional power to establish military tribunals to try enemy combatants for war crimes defined by the President); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (considering the President’s authority to detain suspected enemy combatants without bringing them before a federal judge or neutral tribunal).
See generally Gregory E. Maggs, Which Original Meaning of the Constitution Matters to Justice Thomas?, 4 N.Y.U. J.L. & Liberty 494 (2009) (discussing Justice Thomas’s originalism).
See, e.g., Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 554 U.S. 191, 218 (2008) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Because the Court’s holding is not supported by the original meaning of the Sixth Amendment or any reasonable interpretation of our precedents, I respectfully dissent.”).
See, e.g., John Eastman, Reflections on Justice Thomas’s Twenty Years on the Bench, 88 U. Det. Mercy L. Rev. 691, 704 (2011) (comparing Justice Thomas’s and Justice Scalia’s treatments of precedent).
In recent years, judges and scholars have recognized that the Constitution may have more than one original meaning, depending on how the term is defined. See Maggs, supra note 2, at 496-500.
See id.; The Federalist Papers (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); The Debates in the Several State Conventions, on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution, as Recommended by the General Convention at Philadelphia, in 1787 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1891).
See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 562 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2104 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 204 (1926) (McReynolds, J., dissenting) (citing the Articles of Confederation).
See, e.g., Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 184 (1994) (Souter, J., concurring); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 317 (1936).
See, e.g., N.L.R.B. v. SW Gen., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 929, 935 (2017); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 691 (2006) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 774 (1982) (White, J., dissenting); Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 186 n.1 (1994) (Souter, J., concurring).
See, e.g., N.L.R.B. v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2570 (2014); Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 510 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
See, e.g., N.L.R.B. v. Sw. Gen., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 929, 946 (2017); Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2104 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
See generally Gregory E. Maggs, A Concise Guide to the Articles of Confederation as a Source for Determining the Original Meaning of the Constitution, 84 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 397 (2017) (explaining how the Articles provide evidence of the Constitution’s original meaning).
See Freytag v. Comm’r., 501 U.S. 868, 904 n.4 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
See 1 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 21 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) [hereinafter Farrand’s Records] (May 29); id. at 63, 64, 66, 68, 70 (June 1); id. at 74, 80, 81, 88, 90 (June 2); id. at 96, 109, 113 (June 4); id. at 116, 119 (June 5); id. at 175 (June 9); id. at 224, 236 (June 13); id. at 244 (June 15); id. at 292, 300 (June 18); 2 Farrand’s Records 29 (July 17); id. at 41 (July 18); id. at 52, 57 (July 19); id. at 61-63 (July 20); id. at 73, 80 (July 21); id. at 95 (July 23); id. at 99, 102 (July 24); id. at 109 (July 25); id. at 116, 118, 121 (July 26); id. at 185-186 (Aug. 6); id. at 196 (Aug. 7); id. at 297 (Aug. 15); id. at 319 (Aug. 17); id. at 328 (Aug. 18); id. at 335, 342 (Aug. 20); id. at 367 (Aug. 22); id. at 389, 395 (Aug. 23); id. at 401, 404, 405 (Aug. 24); id. at 411, 418, 419, 420 (Aug. 25); id. at 426, 427 (Aug. 27); id. at 494, 495, 497, 499 (Sept. 4); id. at 511 (Sept. 5); id. at 521 (Sept. 6); id. at 535, 538, 541 (Sept. 7); id. at 547, 553 (Sept. 8); id. at 564 (Sept. 10); id. at 626-27, 636, 638-39 (Sept. 15). See generally Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner, The Founder’s Constitution §§ 2.2.1-3, 2.3 (2001) (identifying these excerpts from the records of the Constitutional Convention).
See id. at 2 Farrand’s Records 132, 134-136, 143, 145, 146, 155, 157, 158, 169, 171, 172 (Committee of Detail); id. at 572-575, 598-600 (Committee of Style).
For background concerning the Federalist Papers, see Gregory E. Maggs, A Concise Guide to the Federalist Papers as a Source of the Original Meaning of the United States Constitution, 87 B.U. L. Rev. 801 (2007).
For background concerning the state ratification debates, see Gregory E. Maggs, A Concise Guide to the Records of the State Ratifying Conventions as a Source of the Original Meaning of the United States Constitution, 2009 U. Ill. L. Rev. 457.
354 U.S. 1, 15 & n.32 (1957) (stating that the Treaty Power does not permit the “prohibitions of the Constitution . . . [to] be nullified by the Executive or by the Executive and the Senate combined”).
See Gregory E. Maggs, A Concise Guide to Using Dictionaries from the Founding Era To Determine the Original Meaning of the Constitution, 82 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 358 (2014).
See The Statistics, 130 Harv. L. Rev. 507, 507 (2016) (indicating that Justice Thomas wrote thirty-nine opinions, while Justice Alito, the next most prolific author, wrote twenty).
See, e.g., Jennifer L. Mascott, Who Are “Officers of the United States”?, 70 Stan. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2018), http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2918952 [http://perma.cc/P3Z6-GPLP] (discussing the original meaning of “Officers of the United States”).
See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 580 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing The Federalist Nos. 23, 34, 41); Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 679, 691 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing The Federalist Nos. 47, 70).

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