Source: https://www.thefire.org/speech-code-memorandum-for-university-of-illinois-at-urbana-champaign/
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 14:01:10+00:00

Document:
Thank you for contacting FIRE. This memorandum is in response to your request for information about how the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign’s (UIUC’s) policies could be revised to better protect students’ rights to free speech and expression.
FIRE rates a university as a “red light,” “yellow light,” or “green light” institution depending on the extent to which the university’s written policies restrict constitutionally protected speech and expression. UIUC is currently rated as a “yellow light” institution because of three policies that threaten protected speech on campus.
Fortunately, all three of these policies could easily be revised to better protect student speech.
FIRE would be thrilled to work with you and others to make UIUC a green light institution and to publicize this change through our extensive national media network. By simply revising these three policies, UIUC would be able to join a select group of colleges nationwide that have earned FIRE’s most favorable speech code rating.
What follows is a discussion of the specific free speech issues with each of UIUC’s three problematic policies, as well as proposed solutions for remedying those defects.
UIUC’s Office of Diversity, Equity, and Access maintains a page on “campus conduct” that contains several problematic provisions related to sexual and discriminatory harassment.
By contrast, this policy encompasses speech that does not rise to the levels of severity, pervasiveness, and objective offensiveness that legally define harassment. First, this provision conditions the permissibility of speech on the subjective reaction of the listener. Under the policy’s definition, it does not matter if the listener’s objections are reasonable or not; if verbal conduct persists despite an individual’s objection, it constitutes sexual harassment. Because speech codes that condition speech on subjective listener reaction place free speech rights at the mercy of the most sensitive listeners, courts have repeatedly struck down such policies. See DeJohn v. Temple University, 537 F.3d 301, 318 (3d Cir. 2008) (holding that because university policy failed to require that speech in question “objectively” create a hostile environment, it provided “no shelter for core protected speech”). See also Bair v. Shippensburg University, 280 F. Supp. 2d 357 (M.D. Pa. 2003) (“[R]egulations that prohibit speech on the basis of listener reaction alone are unconstitutional both in the public high school and university settings.”).
Second, while unwelcomeness is a necessary condition for speech to constitute harassment, it is not a sufficient one. So even if a reasonable person objected to the conduct in question (i.e., if the requirement of “objective offensiveness” were met), to be actionable as harassment the conduct must also be so severe and pervasive that the victim is “effectively denied equal access to an institution’s resources and opportunities.” So if a listener—even a reasonable listener—objected to speech simply because it was annoying, for example, the speaker would not necessarily be engaging in harassment by continuing to speak.
Fortunately, the problems with this policy can be easily resolved by simply replacing the inaccurate definition of sexual harassment with the Supreme Court’s Davis standard.
This language suffers from the same flaw as the language cited above: It implies that certain categories of speech, such as “derogatory jokes,” are prohibited across the board. Again, such lists of examples should either be stricken or should be explicitly tied to a constitutionally sound definition of harassment.
This policy threatens protected speech by urging students to report to the university “acts of intolerance,” which are not defined in the policy and which explicitly include verbal conduct (one of the listed examples of reportable conduct is “name calling”). Thus, an act of intolerance could potentially include any expression of sharply stated or deeply felt views on such contentious issues as illegal immigration, affirmative action, reproductive rights, and more, as long as another individual disagrees with those views and complains that they are “intolerant.” Yet such political and social commentary is at the core of what the First Amendment protects, and the Supreme Court has made clear that “speech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government,” reflecting “our profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.” Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74–75 (1964) (internal quotations omitted). A public university like UIUC cannot censor or punish speech simply because someone else finds it intolerant.
And while the policy does not explicitly state that all acts of intolerance are necessarily subject to disciplinary action, when the only conduct alleged is protected speech, even the act of investigation threatens the First Amendment rights of the person being investigated. See Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 245, 248 (1957) (noting that government investigations “are capable of encroaching upon the constitutional liberties of individuals” and have an “inhibiting effect in the flow of democratic expression”).
While UIUC is free to encourage tolerance as a value among its students, it may not impair, through investigation and/or threat of punishment, otherwise protected expression simply because others might find it intolerant.
This document is overly restrictive or, at the very least, is so confusingly worded that students will be unable to ascertain when and where they may engage in expressive activities on campus.
These defects likely render this policy unconstitutionally vague. The Supreme Court has held that laws must “give a person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly,” or else they are unconstitutionally vague. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108–09 (1972). Here, it would seem difficult if not impossible for a student—particularly a student not affiliated with a Registered Organization— reading this policy to know whether or not she was permitted to engage in spontaneous expressive activity anywhere on UIUC’s campus.
Moreover, if the policy does establish just two forums for students to engage in expressive activity, and/or require advanced registration of all student expressive activities, the policy is likely unconstitutionally overbroad. With regard to the university’s two “forum[s] for student expression,” while public universities may impose reasonable “time, place, and manner” restrictions on student expression, such restrictions must be “narrowly tailored” to serve a significant governmental interest. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (quoting Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)). There is nothing “reasonable” or “narrowly tailored” about transforming the vast majority of the university’s property—indeed, public property—into a censorship area by providing students with just two designated areas for free speech and leaving them uncertain as to other places on campus where they may exercise this precious right.
UIUC should also heed the lessons of recent litigation involving the University of Cincinnati, which suffered a defeat in federal court this August due to its own free speech zone policy. The university maintained a tiny free speech zone comprising just 0.1 percent of its 137-acre West Campus and further required that student activity in that area be registered with the school 10 business days in advance. In finding for the student group challenging this policy, a federal district court prohibited the University of Cincinnati from “[i]mposing or enforcing any policy restricting student speech in any designated public forum” on campus unless the restriction is “individually and narrowly tailored to serve a compelling University interest.” University of Cincinnati Chapter of Young Americans for Liberty v. Williams, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80967 (S.D. Ohio June 12, 2012).
To avoid a similar result, UIUC would be well advised to make clear that the free speech areas are merely suggested locations for expressive activities and that students may express themselves elsewhere on campus. The University of Mississippi, which earns a “green light” rating from FIRE, added the following language to its policy suggesting a particular area of campus for student expression: “Nothing in this section shall be interpreted as limiting the right of student expression elsewhere on the campus so long as the expressive activities or related student conduct does not violate any other applicable University policies.” UIUC could easily remedy the ambiguity of this portion of its event planning policy by adding similar language.
With regard to the advanced registration requirement, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that “[i]t is offensive—not only to the values protected by the First Amendment, but to the very notion of a free society—that in the context of everyday public discourse a citizen must first inform the government of her desire to speak to her neighbors and then obtain a permit to do so.” Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of NY, Inc. v. Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 165–66 (2002). Moreover, because rallies and demonstrations are often spontaneous responses to unfolding events, requiring students to wait 48 or even 24 hours before engaging in such activities may deprive them of the immediacy of their message and of the ability to truly connect with their audience. While it is perfectly reasonable for the university to ask students to provide advanced notice where possible for planning purposes, the university’s policy must make some explicit allowance for spontaneous expressive activities on campus.
We hope this memorandum is helpful in your efforts to promote speech code reform at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. FIRE stands ready to help in those efforts, so please keep us updated.

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