Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/209/447/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 18:18:57+00:00

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Justia › US Law › US Case Law › US Supreme Court › Volume 209 › United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co.
Statutes of limitation with regard to land affect the right even if in terms only directed against the remedy. The Act of March 3, 1891, c. 561, § 8, 26 Stat. 1099, providing that suit to vacate and annul patents theretofore issued shall only be brought within five years after the passage of the act, applies to a void patent, and where suit has not been brought within the prescribed period, a patent of public land, whether reserved or not, must be held good, and to have the same effect a though valid in the first place.
On the admission of Michigan to the Union, the bed of the Sault Ste. Marie, whether strait or river, passed to the state, and small unsurveyed island therein became subject to the law of the state.
land bordering on the Sault Ste. Marie takes to the center line, including small unsurveyed islands between the mainland and the center line; nor are the rights of riparian owners to the center affected by the fact that the stream is a boundary.
This is a bill in equity brought by the United States to remove a cloud from its alleged title to two islands, numbered 1 and 2, in the Sault Ste. Marie, between Lake Huron and Lake Superior. The islands are in the rapids of the river or strait, on the American side of the Canada boundary line, and near to a strip of shore lying between the rapids and the United States ship canal referred to in United States v. Michigan, 190 U. S. 379. The defendant claims this strip and the islands under a patent from the United States, dated December 15, 1883, describing that land as bounded by the River St. Mary on the east, north, and west. The United States says that the patent was void because the land had been reserved for public purposes, and that, even if it was valid, the islands did not pass. The defendant replies that the land was not reserved, and also sets up the statute of limitations. Act of March 3, 1891, c. 561, § 8. 26 Stat. 1099. The circuit court dismissed the bill, and its decree was affirmed by the circuit court of appeals. 152 F. 25.
to be good. The statute just referred to provides that "suits by the United States to vacate and annul any patent heretofore issued shall only be brought within five years from the passage of this act" -- that is to say, from March 3, 1891. This land, whether reserved or not, was public land of the United States, and in kind open to sale and conveyance through the Land Department. United States v. Winona & St. Peter R. Co., 165 U. S. 463, 165 U. S. 476. The patent had been issued in 1883 by the President in due form and in the regular way. Whether or not he had authority to make it, the United States had power to make it or to validate it when made, since the interest of the United States was the only one concerned. We can see no reason for doubting that the statute, which is the voice of the United States, had that effect. It is said that the instrument was void, and hence was no patent. But the statute presupposes an instrument that might be declared void. When it refers to "any patent heretofore issued," it describes the purport and source of the document, not its legal effect. If the act were confined to valid patents, it would be almost or quite without use. Leffingwell v. Warren, 2 Black 599.
In form, the statute only bars suits to annul the patent. But statutes of limitation, with regard to land at least, which cannot escape from the jurisdiction, generally are held to affect the right, even if in terms only directed against the remedy. Leffingwell v. Warren, 2 Black 599, 67 U. S. 605; Sharon v. Tucker, 144 U. S. 533; Davis v. Mills, 194 U. S. 451, 194 U. S. 457. This statute must be taken to mean that the patent is to be held good, and is to have the same effect against the United States that it would have had if it had been valid in the first place. See United States v. Winona & St. Peter R. Co., 165 U. S. 463, 165 U. S. 476.
the incorporation of Michigan as a state. The bill admits and alleges that the bed of the river, or strait, surrounding the islands passed to Michigan when Michigan became a state, Pollard v. Hagan, 3 How. 212; Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U. S. 1, subject to the same public trusts and limitations as lands under tidewaters on the borders of the sea. Illinois Central R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U. S. 387. But it sets up that the islands remained the property of the United States, and it argues that, in such circumstances, the islands did not pass by the patent of the neighboring land.
The act offering Michigan admission to the Union provided that no right was conferred upon the state "to interfere with the sale by the United States, and under their authority, of the vacant and unsold lands within the limits of the said state." Act of June 15, 1836, c. 99, § 4. 5 Stat. 49, 50. And again, by a condition that the state should "never interfere with the primary disposal of the soil within the same by the United States." Act of June 23, 1836, c. 121. Fifth. 5 Stat. 59, 60. The islands are little more than rocks, rising very slightly above the level of the water and contain respectively a small fraction of an acre and a little more than an acre. They were unsurveyed and of no apparent value. We cannot think that these provisions excepted such islands from the admitted transfer to the state of the bed of the streams surrounding them. If they did not, then, whether the title remains in the state or passed to the defendant with the land conveyed by the patent, the bill must fail.
"when that can be done without substantial impairment of the interest of the public in such waters, and subject to the paramount right of Congress to control their navigation so far as may be necessary for the regulation of commerce."
But it cannot be pretended that private ownership of the bed of the stream or of the islands, subject to the public rights, will impair the interest of the public in the waters of the Sault Ste. Marie. See Kaukauna Water Power Co. v. Green Bay & Mississippi Canal Co., 142 U. S. 254, 142 U. S. 271-272. Therefore, if, by the law of Michigan, the bed of the river or strait would pass to a grantee of the upland, we may assume that it passed to the defendant, and we may assume further that the islands also passed. If, as we think, they belonged to the state, they passed along with the bed of the river. If they had belonged to the United States, probably they would have passed as unsurveyed islands and neglected fragments pass. Whitaker v. McBride, 197 U. S. 510; Grand Rapids & Indiana R. Co. v. Butler, 159 U. S. 87, 159 U. S. 91-92. Of course, other nice questions are suggested and might be asked -- for instance, how it would be if the title to the bed of the stream was in the state and did not pass with the upland, and the islands remained to the United States. It still would be a reasonable proposition that the islands followed the upland. But, in the view that we have taken, that may be left in doubt.
applies to the Sault Ste. Marie, whatever it be called. The fact that it is a boundary has not been held to make a difference. The riparian proprietors upon it own to the center. Ryan v. Brown, 18 Mich. 196; Scranton v. Wheeler, 113 Mich. 565, 567; Demp v. Stradley, 134 Mich. 676. See also Scranton v. Wheeler, 57 F. 803, 812; Lorman v. Benson, 8 Mich. 18; Water Commissioners v. Detroit, 117 Mich. 458, 462. We see no plausible ground for the claim of the United States.

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