Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/242/27/
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 04:36:35+00:00

Document:
Mandamus, out of this Court, is a proper remedy for enforcing a criminal sentence where the district court which passed it has defeated its execution by an ultra vires order of suspension.
The proceeding should be directed to the district judge with a view to the annulment of the order of suspension, not to the clerk with a view to the issuance of a commitment in spite of it.
An accused person was duly sentenced in a district court of the United States pursuant to an act of Congress, and the court then immediately made an order that execution of the sentence be suspended "during the good behavior of the defendant," the effect of which, if sustained, would have been to exempt him permanently and absolutely from the punishment provided by the act and reflected in the sentence. Held that such a suspension -- the legal equivalent of an absolute and permanent refusal to impose any sentence under the statute -- was beyond the power of the court.
The Constitution assigns to the legislature the power to enact laws defining crimes and fixing the degree and method.of punishment, to the judiciary the power to try offenses under those laws and impose punishment within the limits and according to the methods therein provided, to the executive the power to relieve from the punishment so fixed by law and so judicially ascertained and imposed.
But the courts, albeit under the Constitution they are possessed inherently of a judicial discretionary authority which is ample for the wise performance of their duties in the trying of offenses and imposing of penalties as the laws provide, have no inherent constitutional power to mitigate or avert those penalties by refusing to indict them in individual cases.
Semble that, at common law, while the courts exercised a discretion to suspend either imposition or execution of sentence temporarily for purposes and in ways consistent with the due enforcement of the penal laws, so as to facilitate action by the pardoning power and avoid miscarriages of justice, they neither possessed nor claimed the power of permanent refusal to enforce them.
In weight and reason, the decisions of the state courts deny the power of suspension here in question.
The order of suspension, being essentially unconstitutional, may not be sustained because it accords with a practice (of longstanding though intermittent and not universal) indulged for the highest motives by many federal judges in Ohio and elsewhere.
The hardships and wrongs resulting from this practice and its annulment address themselves to the pardoning power; the evils which the practice was designed to avoid may be remedied for the future by appropriate legislation.
Under the exceptional circumstances of the case, this Court, exercising its discretion, to the end that ample time may be afforded for executive clemency or such other action as the situation may require, directs that the writ of mandamus do not issue until the end of the term unless earlier requested by the United States.
petition, the respondent's return, and the government's reply. The facts are stated in the opinion.
"that the execution of the sentence be, and it is hereby, suspended during the good behavior of the defendant, and for the purpose of this case this term of this court is kept open for five years."
"Modern notions, respecting the treatment of lawbreakers, abandon the theory that the imposition of the sentence is solely to punish, and now the best thought considers three elements properly to enter into the treatment of every criminal case after conviction. Punishment in some measure is still the object of sentence, but, affecting its extent and character, we consider the effect of the situation upon the individual, as tending to reform him from or to confirm him in a criminal career, and also the relation his case bears to the community in the effect of the disposition of it upon others of criminal tendencies."
him to his friends, acquaintances, and persons of his faith that they are unanimous in the belief that the exposure and humiliation of his conviction are a sufficient punishment, and that he can be saved to the good of society if nothing further is done with him."
"Passing now to the concrete case, we observe for the benefit of the United States that nothing exists in this case which moved the court to suspend the execution of sentence to prevent 'an abuse of the court's process, or to prevent an injustice being done to the defendant,' so far as it may be said that abstract justice required defendant to suffer for his crime. However, we considered the defendant from many standpoints to be as worthy of the benefit of the discretion to suspend the execution of his sentence as any other convict upon whom that favor has hitherto been bestowed."
Following a written demand which was thereafter made upon the clerk to issue a commitment, which was refused by him on the ground that the sentence had been suspended, and the further refusal of the judge to direct the clerk to issue such commitment, the United States sought and obtained a rule to show cause why a mandamus should not be awarded directing the judge to vacate the order of suspension, under which the subject is now before us for consideration.
The remedial appropriateness of the writ of mandamus is at the threshold questioned, but we dispose of the subject by a mere reference to adjudged cases conclusively establishing the want of foundation for the contention. Ex Parte Bradley, 7 Wall. 364; Life & Fire Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 8 Pet. 291; In re Winn, 213 U.S.
458; In re Metropolitan Trust Co., 218 U. S. 312; Ex Parte Metropolitan Water Company, 220 U. S. 539. In addition, however, it is urged that, as the right to resort to the extraordinary remedy by mandamus must rest upon the assumption that the order of suspension was absolutely void, therefore the rule for the writ should have been directed not against the judge, but against the clerk, to compel him to issue the commitment. But we pass from its consideration, as we are of opinion that its want of merit will be completely demonstrated by the slightest appreciation of the judicial duties of the court below and the ministerial relation of the clerk of the court to the same.
The return to the rule and the statement in support of the same lucidly portray the contentions involved in the question of power to be decided, and the subject in all its aspects has been elaborately discussed, not only by the printed arguments of the parties, but, in addition, light has been thrown on the general question by an argument submitted by the New York State Probation Commission, explaining the statutory system of parol prevailing in that state, and by an able argument presented by members of the bar of the First Circuit in behalf of a practice of mitigating or pretermitting, when deemed necessary, the statutory punishment for crimes, which it is declared has prevailed in the United States courts in that circuit for many years.
into play. Passing the question whether this assumed restriction is not, in the nature of things, imaginary as the result of the scope of the authority asserted, let us come to dispose of the contention made by examining the propositions relied upon to sustain it.
They are: 1. that the right to refuse to impose a sentence fixed by statute, or to refuse to execute such a sentence when imposed, is a discretion inhering in the judicial power to try and punish violations of the criminal law; 2. that even if there be doubt on this subject as an original proposition, such doubt is dispelled as the right was recognized and frequently exerted at common law; 3. that the power claimed has also been recognized by decisions of state courts and of United States courts of original jurisdiction to such an extent that the doctrine is now to be considered as not open to controversy; 4. that, whatever may be the possibility of dispute as to this last view, at least it cannot be denied that, in both the state and federal courts over a very long period of time, the power here asserted has been exercised, often with the express, and constantly with the tacit, approval of the administrative officers of the state and federal governments, and has been also tacitly recognized by the inaction of the legislative department during the long time the practice has prevailed, to such an extent that the authority claimed has in practice become a part of the administration of criminal law, both state and federal, not subject to be now questioned or overthrown because of mere doubts of the theoretical accuracy of the conceptions upon which it is founded.
1. The contention as to inherent judicial power.
ample right to exercise reasonable -- that is, judicial -- discretion to enable them to wisely exert their authority. But these concessions afford no ground for the contention as to power here made, since it must rest upon the proposition that the power to enforce begets inherently a discretion to permanently refuse to do so. And the effect of the proposition urged upon the distribution of powers made by the Constitution will become apparent when it is observed that indisputable also is it that the authority to define and fix the punishment for crime is legislative, and includes the right in advance to bring within judicial discretion for the purpose of executing the statute elements of consideration which would be otherwise beyond the scope of judicial authority, and that the right to relieve from the punishment fixed by law and ascertained according to the methods by it provided, belongs to the executive department.
The proposition might well be left with the demonstration which results from these considerations, but the disregard of the Constitution which would result from sustaining the proposition is made, if possible, plainer by considering that, if it be that the plain legislative command fixing a specific punishment for crime is subject to be permanently set aside by an implied judicial power upon considerations extraneous to the legality of the conviction, it would seem necessarily to follow that there could be likewise implied a discretionary authority to permanently refuse to try a criminal charge because of the conclusion that a particular act made criminal by law ought not to be treated as criminal. And thus it would come to pass that the possession by the judicial department of power to permanently refuse to enforce a law would result in the destruction of the conceded powers of the other departments, and hence leave no law to be enforced.
2. The contention as to support for the proposition at common law.
"Reprieves or stays of judgment or execution are of three kinds, viz.:"
"I. Ex mandato regis. . . ."
"II. Ex arbitrio judicis. Sometimes the judge reprieves before judgment, as where he is not satisfied with the verdict, or the evidence is uncertain, or the indictment insufficient, or doubtful whether within clergy, and sometimes after judgment, if it be a small felony, tho out of clergy, or in order to a pardon or transportation. Crompt. Just. 22b, and these arbitrary reprieves may be granted or taken off by the justices of gaol-delivery, altho their sessions be adjourned or finished, and this by reason of common usage. Dy. 205a."
"III. Ex necessitate legis, which is in case of pregnancy, where a woman is convict of felony or treason."
"The only other remaining ways of avoiding the execution of the judgment are by a reprieve or a pardon, whereof the former is temporary only, the latter permanent."
"I. A reprieve (from reprendre, to take back), is the withdrawing of a sentence for an interval of time; whereby the execution is suspended. This may be, first, ex arbitrio judicis, either before or after judgment, as where the judge is not satisfied with the verdict, or the evidence is suspicious, or the indictment is insufficient, or he is doubtful whether the offense be within clergy, or sometimes if it be a small felony, or any favourable circumstances appear in the criminal's character, in order to give room to apply to the Crown for either an absolute or conditional pardon. These arbitrary reprieves may be granted or taken off by the justices of gaol delivery, although their session be finished, and their commission expired, but this rather by common usage, than of strict right. "
"Reprieves may also be ex necessitate legis, as where a woman is capitally convicted, and pleads her pregnancy; though this is no cause to stay the judgment, yet it is to respite the execution till she be delivered. This is a mercy dictated by the law of nature, in favorem prolis."
While it may not be doubted under the common law as thus stated that courts possessed and asserted the right to exert judicial discretion in the enforcement of the law to temporarily suspend either the imposition of sentence or its execution when imposed to the end that pardon might be procured, or that a violation of law in other respects might be prevented, we are unable to perceive any ground for sustaining the proposition that, at common law, the courts possessed or claimed the right which is here insisted upon. No elaboration could make this plainer than does the text of the passages quoted. It is true that, owing to the want of power in common law courts to grant new trials, and to the absence of a right to review convictions in a higher court, it is, we think, to be conceded: (a) that both suspensions of sentence and suspensions of the enforcement of sentences temporary in character were often resorted to on grounds of error or miscarriage of justice which, under our system, would be corrected either by new trials or by the exercise of the power to review; (b) that not infrequently, where the suspension either of the imposition of a sentence or of its execution was made for the purpose of enabling a pardon to be sought or bestowed, by a failure to further proceed in the criminal cause in the future, although no pardon had been sought or obtained, the punishment fixed by law was escaped. But neither of these conditions serve to convert the mere exercise of a judicial discretion to temporarily suspend for the accomplishment of a purpose contemplated by law into the existence of an arbitrary judicial power to permanently refuse to enforce the law.
And we can deduce no support for the contrary contention from the rulings in 2 Dyer, 165a, 205a, and 235a, since those cases but illustrate the exercise of the conceded, reasonable, discretionary power to reprieve to enable a lawful end to be attained. Nor from the fact that common law courts possessed the power by recognizance to secure good behavior -- that is, to enforce the law -- do we think any support is afforded for the proposition that those courts possessed the arbitrary discretion to permanently decline to enforce the law. The cases of Rex v. Hart, 30 How. State Trials 1344 and Regina v. Dunn, 12 Q.B. 1026, 1041, certainly do not tend to so establish, since they simply manifest the exertion of the power of the courts after a conviction and the suffering of the legal penalty to exact from the convicted person a bond for his good behavior thereafter.
3. The support for the power asserted claimed to be derived from the adjudication of state and federal courts.
Coming first to the state courts, undoubtedly there is conflict in the decisions. The area, however, of conflict will be narrowed by briefly stating and contrasting the cases. We shall do so by referring chronologically to the cases denying the power, and then to those relied upon to establish it.
"We know that a practice has prevailed to some extent of inflicting fines with a provision that they should be diminished or remitted altogether upon matter thereafter to be done, or shown to the court by the person convicted. But we can find no authority in law for this practice, and feel ourselves bound, upon this first occasion when it is brought judicially to our notice, to declare it illegal. "
"I am of the opinion the court does not possess the power to suspend sentence indefinitely in any case. As I understand the law, it is the duty of the court, unless application be made for a new trial, or a motion in arrest of judgment be made for some defect in the indictment, to pronounce judgment upon every prisoner convicted of crime by a jury who pleads guilty. An indefinite suspension of the sentence prescribed by law is a quasi-pardon, provided the prisoner be discharged from imprisonment. No court in the state has any pardoning power. That power is vested exclusively in the governor."
"Now it is no doubt competent for a criminal court, after conviction, to stay for a time its sentence, and many good reasons may be suggested for doing so -- such as to give opportunity for a motion for a new trial or in arrest, or to enable the judge to better satisfy his own mind what the punishment ought to be, Commonwealth v. Dowdican's Bail, 115 Mass. 133, but it was not a suspension of judgment of this sort that was requested or desired in this case; it was not a mere postponement; it was not delay for any purpose of better advising the judicial mind what ought to be done, but it was an entire and absolute remission of all penalty and the excusing of all guilt. In other words, what was requested of the judge was that he should take advantage of the fact that he alone was empowered to pass sentence, and, by postponing indefinitely the performance of this duty, indirectly, but to completed effect, grant to the respondent a pardon for his crime."
In 1874, in Commonwealth v. Dowdican's Bail, 115 Mass. 133, the right in a criminal case "to lay the case on file" and postpone the sentence was sustained, the court declaring that the practice had long existed, and was recognized by statutes, one of which regulated the granting of parol by courts in liquor cases.
The case just cited was approvingly referred to in Sylvester v. State, 65 N.H.193, and declared to express the practice long prevailing in New Hampshire.
In 1894, in People ex Rel. Forsyth v. Court of Sessions, 141 N.Y. 288, in holding that a trial court had power to permanently suspend a sentence for reasons dehors the legality of the conviction, it was declared that such power existed at common law, and hence prevailed in the state, this being supported by a quotation from Hale's Pleas of the Crown. In addition, it was said, referring to a state parol statute enacted subsequent to the conviction, that such statute, while it conferred no new or other power than that possessed at common law, nevertheless imposed the duty to see to it that the power was not lost to impose future punishment after the release if the condition of suspension was violated.
which we shall hereafter consider, we think it clear that the long and settled line of authority to which we have previously referred, denying the existence of the power, is in no way weakened by the rulings which lie at the basis of the cases relied upon to the contrary. In the first place, on the face of the opinion in Commonwealth v. Dowdican's Bail, supra, it would seem certain that that case treated the power as being brought by the state legislation which was referred to within the domain of reasonable discretion, since, by the effect of that legislation, the right to exert such power, if not directly authorized, was at least, by essential implication, sanctioned by the state law. In the second place, insofar as the Forsyth case, supra, is concerned and its declaration as to what was the common law upon the subject, the error thus fallen into is not only demonstrated by what we have said as to the common law, but is additionally shown by the fact that the quotation from Hale's Pleas of the Crown, made in the opinion, contains clauses supporting the opinion expressed as to the common law when in fact the clauses in question, it would seem, were, by some error of citation, mistakenly attributed to Hale. We say this because the clauses referred to and attributed to Hale in the quotation are not found in any edition of the Pleas of the Crown which we have been able to examine, and it is stated by counsel for the United States that, after diligent search, no passage containing the clauses has been discovered, and the existence of any edition of the work containing them is not pointed out by opposing counsel. But whether this be well founded or not, as the conclusion concerning the common law which the case expressed is, we think, obviously unsound, we are unable, on the authority of such a mistaken view, to disregard the long established and sound rule laid down in the many state cases which we have quoted.
it suffices to say that we have been referred to no opinion maintaining the asserted power, and, on the contrary, in the opinion in the only case in which the subject was considered, it was expressly decided the power was wanting. United States v. Wilson, 46 F. 748 (1891). It is true that, in the District of Columbia, the existence of the power was maintained. Miller v. United States, 41 App.D.C. 52 (1913). But the unsoundness of the grounds upon which the conclusion was based is demonstrated by what we have previously said, and, aside from this, as the subject was covered by an act of Congress conferring power of parol (Act of June 25, 1910, 36 Stat. 864), the case requires no further consideration.
4. The duty to recognize the power as lawful because of its exertion in practice by the state and federal courts, and the implications arising therefrom.
There is no doubt that, in some states, without reference to probation legislation or an affirmative recognition of any doctrine supporting the power, it was originally exerted, and the right to continue to do so came to be recognized solely as the result of the prior practice. State ex Rel. Gehrmann v. Osborne, 79 N.J.Eq. 430.
the United States; indeed, it is said that, in Ohio, where the power, as we have seen, was recognized as existing, it was exerted by Mr. Justice Matthews of this Court when sitting at circuit, and there and elsewhere, it is pointed out, the power was also exerted in some instances by other judges then or subsequently members of this Court. But yet it is also true that, numerous as are the instances of the exertion of the power, the practice was by no means universal, many United States judges, even in a district where the power had been exerted, on a change of incumbency, persistently refusing to exert the power on the ground that it was not possessed. Indeed, so far was this the case that we think it may be said that the exertion of the power under the circumstances stated was intermittent, and was not universal, but partial.
amounts to a refusal by the judicial power to perform a duty resting upon it, and, as a consequence thereof, to an interference with both the legislative and executive authority as fixed by the Constitution. The fact that it is said in argument that many persons, exceeding two thousand, are now at large who otherwise would be imprisoned as the result of the exertion of the power in the past, and that misery and anguish and miscarriage of justice may come to many innocent persons by now declaring the practice illegal, presents a grave situation. But we are admonished that no authority exists to cure wrongs resulting from a violation of the Constitution in the past, however meritorious may have been the motive giving rise to it, by sanctioning a disregard of that instrument in the future. On the contrary, so far as wrong resulting from an attempt to do away with the consequences of the mistaken exercise of the power in the past is concerned, complete remedy may be afforded by the exertion of the pardoning power; and, so far as the future is concerned, that is, the causing of the imposition of penalties as fixed to be subject, by probation legislation or such other means as the legislative mind may devise, to such judicial discretion as may be adequate to enable courts to meet, by the exercise of an enlarged but wise discretion, the infinite variations which may be presented to them for judgment, recourse must be had to Congress, whose legislative power on the subject is, in the very nature of things, adequately complete.
While the conclusions just stated inevitably exact that the rule which is before us be made absolute and that the mandamus issue, nevertheless we are of opinion that the exceptional conditions which we have described require that we exercise that reasonable discretion with which we are vested to temporarily suspend the issue of the writ so as to afford ample time for executive clemency or such other action as may be required to meet the situation.
And, for this purpose, the issue of the writ will be stayed until the end of this term, unless the United States otherwise requests, when it will go as a matter of course.
People v. Kennedy, 58 Mich. 372 (1885); Gray v. State, 107 Ind. 177 (1886); People v. Blackburn, 6 Utah, 347 (1890); State v. Voss, 80 Ia. 46 (1891); People ex Rel. Benton v. Court, 8 N.Y.Crim.Rep. 355 (1892), affirmed in 66 Hun. 550 (1893); In re Strickler, 51 Kan. 700 (1893); People ex Rel. Smith v. Allen, 155 Ill. 61 (1895); In re Markuson, 5 N.D. 180 (1895); In re Webb, 89 Wis. 354 (1895); United States v. Folsom, 8 N.M. 651 (1896); State v. Murphy, 23 Nev. 390 (1897); Neal v. State, 104 Ga. 509 (1898); Republic v. Pedro, 11 Haw. 287 (1898); In re Beck, 63 Kan. 57 (1901); Miller v. Evans, 115 Ia. 101 (1901); People ex Rel. Boenert v. Barrett, 202 Ill. 287 (1903); In re Flint, 25 Utah 338 (1903); State v. Dalton, 109 Tenn. 544 (1902); Grundel v. People, 33 Colo.191 (1905); Tuttle v. Lang, 100 Me. 123 (1905); McCampbell v. State, 116 Tenn. 98 (1905); In re St. Hilaire, 101 Me. 522 (1906); Tanner v. Wiggins, 54 Fla. 203 (1907); State v. Hockett, 129 Mo.App. 639 (1908); Ex Parte Clendenning, 22 Okla. 108 (1908); Ex Parte Cornwall, 223 Mo. 259 (1909); Wall v. Jones, 135 Ga. 425 (1910); State v. Smith, 173 Ind. 388 (1909); State ex Rel. Cary v. Langum, 112 Minn. 121 (1910); In re Peterson, 19 Idaho 433; State v. Abbott, 87 S.C. 466 (1911); Spencer v. State, 125 Tenn. 64 (1911); State ex Rel. Dawson v. Sapp, 87 Kan. 740 (1912); Daniel v. Persons, 137 Ga. 826 (1912); State v. Sturgis, 110 Me. 96 (1912); State v. Talberth, 109 Me. 575 (1912); Fuller v. State, 100 Miss. 811 (1912); Ex Parte Bugg, 163 Mo.App. 44 (1912); Snodgrass v. State, 67 Tex.Crim.Rep. 615 (1912); Roberts v. Wansley, 137 Ga. 439 (1912); Hancock v. Rogers, 140 Ga. 688 (1913); Brabandt v. Commonwealth, 157 Ky. 130 (1914); In re Hart, 29 N.D. 38 (1914); Reese v. Olsen, 44 Utah 318 (1914).
State v. Addy, 43 N.J.L. 113 (1881); People v. Mueller, 15 Chicago Legal News 364 (1883); Commonwealth v. Maloney, 145 Mass. 205 (1887); Ex Parte Williams, 26 Fla. 310 (1890); State v. Crook, 115 N.C. 760 (1894); State v. Whitt, 117 N.C. 804 (1895); People ex Rel. Dunnigan v. Webster, 14 Misc. 617 (1895); Weber v. State, 58 Ohio St. 616 (1898); Schaefer v. State, 7 Ohio Cir.Ct. (N.S.) 292 (1905); In re Clara Lee, 3 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 533 (1905); State v. Hilton, 151 N.C. 687 (1909); State ex Rel. Buckley v. Drew, 75 N.H. 402 (1909); State ex Rel. O'Connor v. Drew, 75 N.H. 604 (1910); In re Hinson, 159 N.C. 250 (1911); State ex Rel. Gehrmann v. Osborne, 79 N.J.Eq. 430 (1911); People v. Goodrich, 149 N.Y.Supp. 406 (1914); State v. Tripp, 168 N.C. 150 (1914); State v. Johnson, 169 N.C. 311 (1915). See Greene v. State, 88 Ark. 290 (1908); Joiner v. State, 94 Ark.198 (1910); People v. Patrich, 118 Cal. 332 (1897); Commonwealth ex Rel. Nuber v. Keeper, 6 Pa.Super.Ct. 420 (1898); Commonwealth v. Dunleavy, 16 Pa.Super.Ct. 380 (1901).

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