Source: https://openjurist.org/14/f1d/778
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 09:00:07+00:00

Document:
which they were given, it seems to me the interests of comIOOrce,confidence in commercial paper, and prevention of multiplicity of suits will be best subserved. The plaintiffs, then, being only entitled to recover the difference between the market value of the goods at the time of the breach and the contract prfce, it remains to consider the evidence on this point. The contract was made thirtieth of July, 1881, and the breach occurred December 28, 1881. One of the plaintiffs testified that as the season advanced there was a rise in price of two dollars to three dollars per ton, and that he thinks in December he would have had to pay thretl dollars advance for the same goods. One of the defendants testified that there was no material change in price between June and December, and that after December the goods could have been bought at less than the contract price. The only disinterested witness is a manufacturer of tertilizers in Baltimore city, who testifies that although there was an advance in September and October, that the price weakened in November and December, and may have dropped again in Baltimore to the old price, though he thinks in the south the rise may have continued until January; hut that after January there was a fall in price, as there was a. decline in the price of the crude materials. He remarks upon some differences of price between fresh and damp fertilizer, and that which is old and dry; but that difference does not seem to be material in this case, as under the contract the fertilizer was deliverable in the cotton states, where this difference is not important. Ona review of the whole testimony on, this question of the market price, I do not find that it has 80 satisfied me of any advance in price that I could feel safe in finding it to be a fact. Verdict for nominal damages, each party to pay theil' own costs.
See Lawnmw v. MOIYisania, 12 FED. REP. 850.
A solicitor cl\nnot require payment in advance.of the substitution. of another as a condition precedent, when by agreement he was to receive nothing unless the suit resulted favorably, and before there has been any recovery.
But where a solicitor had agreed with his client to conduct a suit for a contingent fee, and the client reserved the right to employ another attorney at any time in his stead, and the first solicitor had advanced certain funds and disbursements in the conduct of the suit, it was held, that these disbursements should be paid back to the solicitor before a substitution; and that the order of substitution should contain a condition to protect the solicitor as for a lien for his services in the event of ultimate recovery by the client. in the suit.
Barlow it Olney, for motion. Roger M. Sherman, against.
the only answer required. The general right of the client to change his attorney at his election is universally recognized by the authorities. This right is indispensable, in view of the delicate and confi· dential relations which exist between attorney and client, and the peril to the client's interests engendered by friction or distrust. The right must be exercised, however, by application to the court, in order to preserve regularity in the conduct of suits, and to prevent the confusion which might ensue if a party were at liberty to change his attorney without the knowledge of the court. Mumford v. Murray, 1 Ropk. Ch. 4:26. When its intervention is asked for the substitution of an attorney, the court will hold the client to fairdealing, and will refuse its assistance to any attempt to take an unfair advantage of one of its officers. In this behalf courts have frequently and usually required the client to discharge the attorney's claim for services in the suit as a condition of substitution. But this is merely the exercise of a reasonable discretion, not the a,pplication of an inflexible rule. As is said in 8loo v. Law, 4: Blatchf. 269, "the consent is sometimes given upon terms, and sometimes without terms; sometimes upon condition that the fees of the first solicitor be paid, and sometimes without such condition." The just discretion which should control this application will be exercised by permitting a substitution upon the terms a,greed to in adva,nce by the solicitor and client, thus enforcing the conditions ma,de by themselves. Ordinarily, when there is an a,greement tha,t the attorney shll get his fees out of the fund in suit, there is an implied rondition tha,t he is to be continued in charge until an available fund is realized. Hallings v. Booth, 2 Fost. & F. 220. But here the agreement wa,s that the client might 13ubstitute a new attorney at will. .Whetherthe attorney will ever be entitled to any fee cannot now be known, because his compensation. depends. upon the result of the suit. If nothing should be realized he will not be entitled to any fee. If thereis a, fund rea,lized he will be entitled to that measure of compensation for what he has already done, which is to be found in the value of his services, and the peculiar circumstances that properly tend to increase the ordinary scale of charges for professional services. By. the Code of Civil Procedure of this state the attorney has a liell for his c,ompeusation upon the cause of action which a,ttaches to any decision or judgment in his client's favor. Section 66. Whether this .statute has any applica,tion here, it not necessary to decide.
section 914, Rev. St., conforming the practice in the federal and state courts, the same lien should attach in an action in this court; or it may be that it is to be deemed a statute of general scope, not confined to procedure in the courts of the state, which, as the law of the state where the contract was to be performed, is the law which controls the obligations of the parties to the agreement. However this may be, in view of some of the exceptional features of the case, it is equi. table that provision in the nature of such a lien should be secured to the solicitor here, so that he will be fully protected, not only if a decree is obtained, but also if any settlement is made between the parties. The complainant is a non-resident. If there is a recovery in. the suit, it will be attributed largely, if not mainly, to the services already rendered by the solicitor. It appears, also, that certain funds have been a.dvanced by the solicitor, or by clients of his not parties to the record; but interested in the litigation, for tbedisbursements of the action, outside of the agreement between the solicitor and complainant. These should be reimbursed the solicitor now. An order may be entered for the change of solicitors upon payment of the disbursements already made or incurred by the solicitor in the suit, which will be ascertained by a reference to a master, if not agreed upon. The order will also contain lit condition to protect the solie· itor as for lit lien upon the cause of action to the extent of the eptitled to; to be ascercompensation which he may ultimately tained by reference to a master, or by action at the election oHhe solicitor, if not agreed upon.
may still treat the first attorney as the acting attorney; Powell v. Richard1 W. Bl. 8; McPherson v. Robinson, 1 Doug. 217; Grant v. White, 6 Cal. 55. And if its consent to a substitution has not beeu obtained, the court will disregard the acts of the second attorney. JeJ'ome v. Boetam, 1 Wend. 293. '£he consent of the court to the substitution should be entered of record, and notice thereof given to the attorney of record, who may be compelled by the court to sign a written consent to the substitution. Trust v. Repool', 15 How. Pl'. 570; Robinson v. MoClellan, 1 How. Pl'. 89. · TERMS OF CONSENT-ATTORNEY'S LIEN AND PAYMENT FOR FEES. The matter of consent is largely governed by the discretion of the court, which mayor may not impose conditions. Consent will be given only upon terms that are just. A court will protect its otlicers; and it may require payment of fees earned before allowing the substitution sought. Wolfv. 'l'rochelman, 5 Robert. 611; Bolton v. Tate, 1 Swanst. 84; Hoffman v. Van Nostl'and,14 Abb. Pl'. 336, which decides that this l'ule applies even to a nominal party who un- , dertakes to substitute a IIew attorney. Whether payment of fees is required as a condition precedent to substitution, the attorney's lien for fees earned is not destroyed or affected by the change of attorneys. Newton v. Harland,4 Scott, N. R. 709; Men'iwether v. Mellish, 13 Ves. 101; Twort v. Dayrell,13 Ves. 295; Hazlett v. Gill, 19 Abb., Pl'. 353. Thus, where a board of supervisors by their vote discharged a firm of attorneys, it was decided that they must pay the firm's, reasonable claims, which should be ascertained by a reference; and, further, it was held that the attorneys were not bound to conselltto a substitution, 01' to deliver the papers upon which they had a lien, until their fees were ascertained and paid. Boa1'd v. Broadhead, 44 How. Pl'. HI. And the fact that the attorney removed hali! other sufficient security for hi& costs is no reason for the rule requiring costs to be paid before substitution. Witt v. Ames, 11 W. Rep. 751., Further, the bringing ;of an attachment by the attorney against the client to compel him to pay fees is no grollnd for ordering the solicitor to be removed from the cause without payment of fees. Sloo v. Law, 4 Blatchf, 268. Payment of fees upon substitution' cannot, however, be compelled by proceedings against the client for contempt. Gardne1' v. Tyler, 5 Abb. Pl'. (N.8.) 33; S. C. 36 How. Pl'. 63; Harley v. Collett, 7 Dow!. Pl'. 599. If there is an order for changing upon payment of the first attorney's bill. upon taxation and delivery up of papers the first attorney is entitled to,the possession and C,ontrol of the order to enable him to enforce the payment of'his bill. Alger v. He.fford, 1 '£auTit. 38; Newton v.Harland, 4 Scott, (N. 8.)769; , In Stevenson v. Stevenson, 3 Edw. Ch. 359. it is decided that a court will not make'the ment of solicitors' costs a condition of the substitution, but will leave hini. to his remedy at law against the client, andpreserV6 to him' any lien: he may have on papers or a fund in court. In another case it is held that if the party desires papers in the possessibn of the attorney removed. they must til'st discharge his lien for' fees, and that if the attorney does not insist, upon this the order for substitution must provi<le that the taxable costs in theactioll," if collected on the termination of the action, be paid to tire first, attorney, to whom, it was said,tlley eqmtably belonged. Prentili8 v. Li'lllnf/stun, 60 How. Pl'. 380.
(Tenn.) 497. But where one attorney gave a note to another to collect without instructions as to its ownership, and the money collected was remitted to the payee of the note, whose name was indorsed on the note, it was held that this remittance, the payee not being the owner, did 1I0t discharge the collecting a1'torney from liability to his immediate principal; and that the action of the latter for the money would not be defeated by proof that he was himself the agent of the indorsee, unless the indorsee had asserted his right to the money as against his client. Lewis v. Peck, 10 Ala. 142.
INJUNCTroN-VIOLATION OF ORDER STAYING SUITS.
Where a bankrupt obtained an injunction order from this court staying all suits and proceedings against him on the part of certain creditors, their agents and attorneys, to collect certain specified debts, and thereupon. a suit by one of the creditors was discontinued, and afterwards a new sult was brought through the same attorneys in the state court for the recovery of the same debt, with allegations of fraud, held, thatthe last-named suit was a violation of the injunction order.
2. SAME--VAOATING ORDER OF ARltElST.
This court has no authority to vacate an order of arrest for fraud granted by the state court, though it may restrain the proceedings thereon.
On motion to punish the attorney for contempt, the proof of service of the injunction was held too loose and general; and a reference was ordered to take further proof in respect to the service of the injunction order, Held, also, that the contempt, if proved, was not waived by the bankrupt's noticing the cause for trial in the state court.

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