Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&amp;view=article&amp;id=51654:gr-164052-2008&amp;catid=1510&amp;Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 08:36:11+00:00

Document:
ANONAS CONSTRUCTION AND INDUSTRIAL SUPPLY CORPORATION, and ELISEO F. LIBUNAO, Petitioners, v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and LARRY NAFUAR, Respondents.
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated June 11, 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 76139.
On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) affirmed in toto the decision of the LA in a Resolution3 dated December 27, 2002. Petitioners did not file a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the NLRC. Instead, they filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the CA. On June 11, 2004, the CA rendered a Decision4 dismissing the petition and affirming the resolution of the NLRC.
Petitioners appealed the ruling before the NLRC which sustained the LA. Thereafter, the petitioners went to the CA on a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65.
In the main, the CA said that certiorari under Rule 65 is confined to issues of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion and does not include a correction or evaluation of the evidence, particularly when there is no conflict in the factual findings of the labor tribunals. It cited with approval the NLRC's pronouncement that there could have been no abandonment because by filing a complaint for illegal dismissal, the employee could not be said to have abandoned his work. Further, the appellate court found no adequate proof of willful disobedience by the employee, and noted that there was lack of compliance by the petitioners with the requirements of due process. Finally, the CA stressed that petitioners failed to file a motion for reconsideration from the NLRC decision which is a condition sine qua non for a petition for certiorari.
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE FINDINGS OF ILLEGAL DISMISSAL DESPITE CLEAR SHOWING THAT THE BASIS THEREOF IS HIGHLY SPECULATIVE AND CONJECTURAL.
The bottom line issue we are called upon to resolve is whether respondent Nafuar was illegally dismissed from employment.
Petitioners insist that the CA gravely erred when it relied on the NLRC findings which were sourced from alleged misapprehension of facts. Basically, petitioners' argument rests on the proposition that respondent Nafuar was not dismissed, but merely suspended, at the time he instituted his complaint for illegal dismissal on January 10, 2001. Thus, petitioners posit that the LA had no authority to take cognizance of a complaint for a non-existent dismissal. Accordingly, petitioners conclude that the LA and the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when they assumed jurisdiction over Nafuar's complaint.
Corollarily, petitioners maintain that the CA, by upholding the NLRC's ruling, encroached on the exercise of the company's authority to discipline its employees.
By adopting the CA's narrative as their own account of the factual antecedents of the case, the petitioners effectively admitted that the suspension of the respondent was simply a precursor of an intended dismissal, ostensibly on the ground of abandonment. Furthermore, respondents were not able to refute the factual finding of the LA, as affirmed by the CA, that petitioner company refused Nafuar's request to return to work after his suspension.
Petitioners allege insubordination, grave misconduct and abandonment as bases for Nafuar's termination. However, as uniformly found by the LA, the NLRC and the CA, they failed to substantiate their allegations with sufficient evidence. On top of this, it appears that respondent Nafuar was terminated without the benefit of due process.
While it is true that on record, there are memos dated January 3, 2001 and January 6, 2001 (marked as Annexes "B" and "C," [Petitioners'] Position Paper), there is no proof that the said memos were received by [Nafuar]. There is no notation on the aforesaid memos that [Nafuar] refused to sign. It was signed by one Ramiro Luntayao. This is not enough evidence to show proof that said memoranda were really known and received by [Nafuar].
[Petitioners] should have presented proof by submitting an affidavit executed by Ramiro Luntayao stating that he gave the memos to [Nafuar] and the latter refused to sign the same. Sad to say, no such evidence was presented by the [petitioners].
[Petitioners] further emphasize that [Nafuar] committed several infractions, to say the least, his being absent, his refusal to submit his written explanations and insubordination to the alleged [charges] against the latter. However, this (sic) infractions were denied by [Nafuar] that he committed them. In which case, the burden of proof is momentarily shifted to the employer/[petitioners] until they have shown sufficient facts and evidence establishing the infractions committed by [Nafuar].
Thus, even if we accept petitioners' submission that its initial disciplinary action was merely to suspend - not to dismiss - respondent Nafuar, it is obvious that the suspension would inevitably lead to the dismissal of Nafuar. Noteworthy is the fact that, in either case, petitioner failed to show ample proof of respondent's alleged infraction before the labor tribunals.
In light of these disquisitions, there appears no justifiable reason to disturb the assailed ruling of the CA.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 76139 is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioners.
1 Penned by Labor Arbiter Ermita T. Abrasaldo-Cuyuca.
3 Penned by Presiding Commissioner Raul T. Aquino, with Commissioners Victoriano R. Calaycay and Angelita A. Gacutan, concurring; rollo, pp. 32-47.
4 Penned by Associate Justice Buenaventura J. Guerrero, with Associate Justices Remedios Salazar-Fernando and Rosmari D. Carandang, concurring; rollo, pp. 23-31.
16 Fabela v. San Miguel Corporation, G.R. No. 150658, February 9, 2007, 515 SCRA 288; Digitel Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. v. Soriano, G.R. No. 166039, June 26, 2006, 492 SCRA 704.
17 Aurora Land Projects Corporation v. NLRC, G.R. No. 114733, January 2, 1997, 266 SCRA 48.
The employer may also terminate the employment of any employee due to the installation of labor-saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or cessation of operation of the establishment or undertaking unless the closing is for the purpose of circumventing the provisions of this Title x x x.
An employer may terminate the services of an employee who has been found to be suffering from any disease and whose continued employment is prohibited by law or is prejudicial to his health as well as to the health of his co-employees x x x.
Any employee may be retired upon reaching the retirement age established in the collective bargaining agreement or other applicable employment contract.
(b) Subject to the constitutional right of workers to security of tenure and their right to be protected against dismissal except for a just and authorized cause and without prejudice to the requirement of notice under Article 283 of this Code, the employer shall furnish the worker whose employment is sought to be terminated a written notice containing a statement of the causes for termination and shall afford the latter ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of his representative if he so desires in accordance with company rules and regulations promulgated pursuant to guidelines set by the Department of Labor and Employment.
22 Siemens Philippines, Inc. v. Enrico A. Domingo, G.R. No. 150488, July 28, 2008; Gregorio S. Saberola v. Ronald Suarez and Raymundo Lirasan, Jr., G.R. No. 151227, July 14, 2008.
23 Petron Corporation v. NLRC, G.R. No. 154532, October 27, 2006, 505 SCRA 596.
24 Labor Code, Art. 277.

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