Source: https://en.m.wikisource.org/wiki/Younger_v._Harris/Concurrence_Stewart
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 22:56:58+00:00

Document:
The Court confines itself to deciding the policy considerations that, in our federal system, must prevail when federal courts are asked to interfere with pending state prosecutions. Within this area, we hold that a federal court must not, save in exceptional and extremely limited circumstances, intervene by way of either injunction or declaration in an existing state criminal prosecution.  Such circumstances exist only when there is a threat of irreparable injury "both great and immediate." A threat of this nature might be shown if the state criminal statute in question were patently and flagrantly unconstitutional on its face, ante at 53-54; cf. Evers v. Dwyer, 358 U.S. 202, or if there has been bad faith and harassment — official lawlessness — in a statute's enforcement, ante at 47-49. In such circumstances, the reasons of policy for deferring to state adjudication are outweighed by the injury flowing from the very bringing of the state proceedings, by the perversion of the very process that is supposed to provide vindication, and by the need for speedy and effective action to protect federal rights. Cf. Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780.
^ . See also Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611, 613-614, n. 3; Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 484 n. 2.
^ . These considerations would not, to be sure, support any distinction between civil and criminal proceedings should the ban of 28 U.S.C. § 2283 which makes no such distinction, be held unaffected by 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
^ . The negative pregnant in this sentence — that a federal court may, as a matter of policy, intervene when such "exceptional and extremely limited circumstances" are found — is subject to any further limitations that may be placed on such intervention by 28 U.S.C. § 2283.

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