Source: https://emilianomorrone.eu/2019/04/04/
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 01:06:22+00:00

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Actor Matthew Gray Gubler plays Dr. Spencer Reid on Criminal Minds for almost 14 years. Now that the end is in sight for the police procedural crime drama series, the 39-year-old actor shared his thoughts about the character.
On Tuesday, April 2, Matthew Gray Gubler made a guest appearance on Buzzfeed’s morning talk show, AM2DM (via Carter Matt). There, he talked about his newly released children book, “Rumple Buttercup: A Story of Bananas, Belonging, and Being Yourself,” and playing Dr. Spencer Reid on Criminal Minds for more than a decade.
According to Matthew Gray Gubler, “Rumple Buttercup: A Story of Bananas, Belonging, and Being Yourself” follows a little monster, Rumple Buttercup, who has five crooked teeth, three strands of hair, green skin, and his left foot is slightly bigger than his right. He spends his entire life hiding underground because he is worried that if people see him, they might think he is a little weird.
In addition to talking about his newly released children book, the actor also reflected on more than a decade of playing the fan-favorite character, Dr. Spencer Reid, on Criminal Minds. He said he truly adores the character and has so much respect for who he is and what he represents for the public.
Aside from being known as a genius with an IQ of 187, Dr. Spencer Reid is also known as a kind man with a big heart. He also does everything he can to make an impact on the lives of others and help those who are in need anyway he can.
“To play a character for that long, he becomes sort of part of you, and you luckily get to become part of him,” Matthew Gray Gubler said on his character. “And I really admire the character I get to play, and I’m just honored to get to do it,” he added.
Matthew Gray Gubler’s Dr. Spencer Reid will return in Criminal Minds Season 15 David Rossi (Joe Mantegna), Jennifer “JJ” Jareau (A. J. Cook), Dr. Tara Lewis (Aisha Tyler), Penelope Garcia (Kirsten Vangsness), Matt Simmons (Daniel Henney), Emily Prentiss (Paget Brewster) Luke Alvez (Adam Rodriguez), Krystall Richards (Gail O’Grady), Kristy Simmons (Kelly Frye), Portia Richards (Danielle C. Ryan), David Simmons (Declan Whaley), Henry LaMontagne (Mekhai Andersen), William LaMontagne Jr. (Josh Stewart), Andrew Mendoza (Stephen Bishop) and Lisa Douglas (Daniella Alonso).
No release date has been set for Criminal Minds Season 15 yet.
Somewhat paradoxically, many litigators are risk-averse. Perhaps that explains why so many of us have internalized a knee-jerk and literal interpretation of the ethical rules mandating “no contact” with individuals represented by counsel. Quite appropriately, the default position of many counsel is: “That guy has a lawyer, I cannot contact him without consent of his lawyer.” However, when it comes to criminal defense counsel in New York state, the reality is less clear.
New York Rule of Professional Conduct 4.2(a), titled “Communication with Person Represented by Counsel,” provides in part, that a lawyer “shall not communicate … about the subject of the representation with a party the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter” without prior consent of the other lawyer. Although the title refers to a represented “Person,” the relevant text refers to a represented “party.” The distinction is intentional. When a predecessor rule (Disciplinary Rule 7-104) was amended in 1999, it substituted the word “person” for “party,” tracking the same change made to ABA Model Rule 4.2 a few years earlier. Within months, however, the change was undone and the word “party” put back into the Rule. That word makes all the difference—at least in criminal cases. See In re Amgen, 2011 WL 2442047, at *10 n.17 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (discussing history of changes).
In civil cases, the Rule and the word “party” in particular have been broadly read. For example, the New York State Bar’s Committee on Professional Ethics has held that “[o]utside the criminal context” the Rule applies to “any person or entity who is represented in a matter,” whether in a transaction, a potential lawsuit not yet filed, or a pending action, and to “represented witnesses [and] potential witnesses … although they are not nominal parties to the lawsuit.” NY Eth. Op. 735 (2001). The same Opinion notes that this is the way the Rule has been “uniformly interpreted” in civil cases. But what about when this familiar understanding has been applied to a criminal matter?
The seminal case in the Second Circuit remains Grievance Committee v. Simels, 48 F.3d 640 (2d Cir. 1995). Simels represented Brook Davis in connection with a multi-defendant drug conspiracy. The weekend before the trial, a government witness was shot. The government charged Aaron Harper—who was not a defendant in the drug conspiracy trial—with attempted murder. The government subsequently told Simels that it also intended to charge his client with the shooting and that a confidential witness (Harper) would testify at the drug trial. Simels then met with Harper and obtained a written affidavit exonerating Davis. Simels knew that Harper was represented by an attorney in the shooting case. Once these facts become known in the drug case, the trial judge disqualified Simels and declared a mistrial.
In reaching its decision, the Second Circuit noted its concern that “the broad and ambiguous interpretation of ‘party’ employed by the Committee threaten[ed] to chill all sorts of investigations essential to a defense attorney’s preparation for trial . … Taken to its extreme, the Committee’s interpretation of ‘party’ might well bar defense counsel from contacting represented co-targets during the investigative phase of a large conspiracy.” Simels, 48 F.3d at 650-51. The Second Circuit made clear that Simels’s contact of a represented cooperating witness slated to testify against his client who was also a “potential codefendant” in charges relating to the shooting was “critical pre-trial investigation,” part of “providing the effective defense and the zealous representation required by the Sixth Amendment.” 48 F.3d at 651. Indeed, on somewhat similar facts, another court held that a defense lawyer who failed to contact such a witness had rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. Wisconsin v. Reno, 378 Wis.2d 740, at * 4-6 (2017).
United States v. Santiago-Lugo, 162 F.R.D. 11, 13 (D.P.R. 1995); cf. Simels, 48 F.3d at 651 (“defense counsel [may contact] represented co-targets during the investigative phase”). Along these lines, it has been held that a “subject or target of a grand jury investigation is not, by virtue of that status, a ‘party’ to a ‘matter’ within the meaning of the no-contact rule.” In re Amgen, 2011 WL 2442047, at * 10 (E.D.N.Y. 2011).
But what happens if an indictment is returned and someone who had been a “co-target” of an investigation becomes a co-defendant in the same indictment? At that point, she is a “party” in the same “matter” and the Rule applies with full force, forbidding unconsented contact. See In re Chan, 271 F. Supp. 2d 539 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Santiago-Lugo, 162 F.R.D. at *13-14.
The Rule may also apply outside the context of co-defendants in the same matter. What about parallel DOJ and SEC investigations? At least one district court in the Second Circuit has held that such parallel investigations were the same “matter.” In United States v. Nouri, prosecutors arranged for two cooperating witnesses to tape-record the target of the criminal investigation (Nouri), knowing that he was represented by counsel in the SEC investigation. Then-District Judge Chin held that Nouri’s representation in the civil SEC case was “imputed” to the criminal case because the SEC and DOJ were “working together” investigating the same conduct. 611 F. Supp. 2d 380, 386 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). At the time of the recordings, neither the SEC nor DOJ had initiated proceedings, yet Judge Chin “conclude[d] that the SEC and DOJ investigations were the same ‘matter’” for purposes of the Rule. This holding seems at least somewhat inconsistent with the Second Circuit’s view that defense counsel may contact “represented co-targets during the investigative phase,” including “potential codefendants,” as well as Amgen’s holding that the target of a grand jury investigation is not “a ‘party’ to a ‘matter’” at all. Significantly, Nouri involved an undercover operation by the prosecution. While that perhaps explains the ruling, the case underscores the central point that defense counsel must tread carefully when weighing whether to contact a represented individual. While the rule in Simels seems to provide substantial leeway to criminal defense counsel, close attention must be given to the particular facts of a given case, including due consideration of jurisdictional questions (such as whether there is any chance that the ethical rules of a state other than New York might govern). While talking to a represented person might rarely be the right decision in a criminal case, one should be mindful that it can be an option.
As to former employees, the analysis in New York is straightforward. Leaving aside all the other issues discussed above, ex parte interviews of former employees of a represented company adverse to your client in a civil matter “‘are neither unethical nor legally prohibited.’” Bacote v. Riverbay, 2017 WL 945103 at * 8 (S.D.N.Y. 2017). Certain current employees of WWW would not be considered “represented” even though WWW itself plainly was. See generally Niesig v. Team I, 76 N.Y. 2d 363 (1990) (current employees could be interviewed without company’s consent unless, e.g., they are the company’s “alter ego”). Even those executives who are likely to be deemed “represented” in the investigation, as well as executives who in fact have individual counsel, would seem to fall into the bucket of “represented co-targets during the investigative phase of a large conspiracy,” Simels, 48 F.3d at 650-51, and hence arguably are fair game. Indeed, pursuant to most of the cases discussed above, under Simels and its New York progeny, counsel could contact directly current or former employees of WWW (whether or not regarded as “represented,” either by company counsel or even their own individual counsel) up until your client and that WWW employee are indicted in the same indictment.
One must be mindful of the problematic decision in Nouri and, more fundamentally, contrary decisions from other jurisdictions. Nonetheless, a fair reading of the only Second Circuit case on point suggests that in criminal matters a defense lawyer has substantial leeway within which to zealously represent the client, even when that is in some tension with the “no-contact” rule. The modest suggestion of this article is that criminal defense counsel in New York give that due consideration, with care and prudence.
John M. Hillebrecht and Courtney Gilligan Saleski are national co-chairs of the white-collar, corporate crime, and investigations practice at DLA Piper LLP (US).

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