Source: https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_cha_chapter5_rule20
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 01:03:18+00:00

Document:
Note: For practice concerning warnings when using booby-traps, see Rule 80. For practice concerning warnings when using landmines, see Rule 81.
Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, annexed to Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, The Hague, 29 July 1899, Article 26.
Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, annexed to Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, The Hague, 18 October 1907, Article 26.
Hague Convention (IX) concerning Bombardment by Naval Forces in Time of War, The Hague, 18 October 1907, Article 6.
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), Geneva, 8 June 1977, Article 57(2)(c). Article 57 was adopted by 90 votes in favour, none against and 4 abstentions. CDDH, Official Records, Vol. VI, CDDH/SR.42, 27 May 1977, p. 211.
Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, prepared by Francis Lieber, promulgated as General Order No. 100 by President Abraham Lincoln, Washington D.C., 24 April 1863, Article 19.
If a town or fortress, agglomeration of dwellings, or village, is defended, the officer in command of an attacking force must, before commencing a bombardment, except in assault, do all in his power to warn the authorities.
Project of an International Declaration concerning the Laws and Customs of War, Brussels, 27 August 1874, Article 16.
The Laws of War on Land, adopted by the Institute of International Law, Oxford, 9 September 1880, Article 33.
Article 8(c) of the 1956 New Delhi Draft Rules states that the person responsible for ordering or launching an attack shall, first of all, “whenever the circumstances allow, warn the civilian population in jeopardy, to enable it to take shelter”.
Draft Rules for the Limitation of the Dangers Incurred by the Civilian Population in Time of War, drafted by the International Committee of the Red Cross, September 1956, submitted to governments for their consideration on behalf of the 19th International Conference of the Red Cross, New Delhi, 28 October–7 November, Res. XIII, Article 8(c).
Argentina, Leyes de Guerra, PC-08-01, Público, Edición 1989, Estado Mayor Conjunto de las Fuerzas Armadas, aprobado por Resolución No. 489/89 del Ministerio de Defensa, 23 April 1990, § 4.07(1); see also Leyes de Guerra, RC-46-1, Público, II Edición 1969, Ejército Argentino, Edición original aprobado por el Comandante en Jefe del Ejército, 9 May 1967, § 1.012.
When a planned attack is likely to affect the civilian population, those making the attack are required to give, if practicable, effective advance warning of the attack to the authorities or civilian population. This requirement must obviously be applied in a commonsense manner in light of all other factors. If the proposed action is likely to be seriously compromised by a warning then there is no requirement to provide any warning.
Australia, Manual on Law of Armed Conflict, Australian Defence Force Publication, Operations Series, ADFP 37 – Interim Edition, 1994, § 551; see also §§ 425, 733 and 924.
Australia, The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 06.4, Australian Defence Headquarters, 11 May 2006, § 5.56; see also §§ 7.36 and 9.25.
Benin, Le Droit de la Guerre, III fascicules, Forces Armées du Bénin, Ministère de la Défense nationale, 1995, Fascicule III, p. 11; see also Fascicule III, p. 14 and Fascicule II, p. 7.
Burundi, Règlement n° 98 sur le droit international humanitaire, Ministère de la Défense Nationale et des Anciens Combattants, Projet “Moralisation” (BDI/B-05), August 2007, Part I bis, p. 63; see also Part I bis, pp. 23, 33, 81, 87 and 92.
Cameroon, Droit international humanitaire et droit de la guerre, Manuel de l’instructeur en vigueur dans les Forces Armées, Présidence de la République, Ministère de la Défense, Etat-major des Armées, Troisième Division, Edition 1992, p. 82.
An effective advance warning shall be given of attacks which may affect the civilian population, unless circumstances do not permit such a warning to be given. For tactical reasons, an attacking force may not give a warning in order to maintain the element of surprise.
Canada, The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Level, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 1999, p. 4-4, § 29.
Canada, The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Levels, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 13 August 2001, § 420.
Central African Republic, Le Droit de la Guerre, Fascicule No. 2: Formation pour l’obtention du certificat technique No. 2 (Chef de Groupe), du certificat Inter-Armé (CIA), du certificat d’aptitude de Chef de Patrouille (CACP), Ministère de la Défense, Forces Armées Centrafricaines, 1999, Chapter II, Section I, § 1.1.
Central African Republic, Le Droit de la Guerre, Fascicule No. 3: Formation pour l’obtention du Brevet d’Armes No. 1, du Brevet d’Armes No. 2 et le stage d’Officier de Police Judiciaire (OPJ), Ministère de la Défense, Forces Armées Centrafricaines, 1999, Chapter I, Section II, § 2.2.
Central African Republic, Le Droit de la Guerre, Fascicule No. 3: Formation pour l’obtention du Brevet d’Armes No. 1, du Brevet d’Armes No. 2 et le stage d’Officier de Police Judiciaire (OPJ), Ministère de la Défense, Forces Armées Centrafricaines, 1999, Chapter III, Section 2; see also Chapter III, Section 1.
Before concretely launching an attack which could have negative effects on the civilian population, the combatant will give advance warning in order to allow the population time to leave the area or at least to take shelter. The warning must, of course, be authentic and effective. It must reach the civilians for whom it is intended, leaving them sufficient time to react. The warnings can be distributed by radio or television, by dropping leaflets, or on the Internet. The force leading the attack can be dispensed from giving a warning if the circumstances do not allow it because it would compromise the purpose of the operation.
If the civilians do not leave the town under siege, this does not signify that the commander who directs the attack is dispensed from his duties to take all the usual precautions listed above … Sure, violators could consider that it is in their interest to hold back the civilian population, or parts of that population, to serve as human shields, or to elicit the sympathy of the international opinion regarding the humanitarian situation of the population and thereby to discredit the enemy. Nevertheless, the force leading the attack can easily thwart these proceedings by respecting the law, giving warnings, giving time for an evacuation in the form of a ceasefire, and by ensuring that the civilians are granted passage in safe conditions towards a protected zone or place.
Côte d’Ivoire, Droit de la guerre, Manuel d’instruction, Livre III, Tome 1: Instruction de l’élève officier d’active de 1ère année, Manuel de l’élève, Ministère de la Défense, Forces Armées Nationales, November 2007, pp. 48 and 51; see also Droit de la guerre, Manuel d’instruction, Livre IV: Instruction du chef de section et du commandant de compagnie, Manuel de l’élève, Ministère de la Défense, Forces Armées Nationales, November 2007, pp. 70 and 72–73.
Effective advance warning shall be given of attacks which may affect the civilian population, unless circumstances do not permit. For tactical reasons, an attacking force may not give a warning in order to preserve the element of surprise.
Croatia, Basic Rules of the Law of Armed Conflicts – Commanders’ Manual, Republic of Croatia, Ministry of Defence, 1992, § 54; see also § 67.
When circumstances permit, advance warning should be given of attacks that might endanger noncombatants in the vicinity. Such warnings are not required, however, if mission accomplishment requires the element of surprise or the security of the attacking forces would be otherwise compromised.
Ecuador, Aspectos Importantes del Derecho Internacional Marítimo que Deben Tener Presente los Comandantes de los Buques, Academia de Guerra Naval, 1989, § 11.2; see also § 8.5.2.
Ecuador, Aspectos Importantes del Derecho Internacional Marítimo que Deben Tener Presente los Comandantes de los Buques, Academia de Guerra Naval, 1989, § 8.5.2.
Germany, Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts – Manual, DSK VV207320067, edited by The Federal Ministry of Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany, VR II 3, August 1992, English translation of ZDv 15/2, Humanitäres Völkerrecht in bewaffneten Konflikten – Handbuch, August 1992, § 457; see also §§ 414, 447 and 453.
When attacking a military objective, all necessary precautions shall be taken to spare as far as possible the civilian population located in the area or in the immediate vicinity of the object. If possible, the civilian population shall be warned of an attack.
Germany, Druckschrift Einsatz Nr. 03, Humanitäres Völkerrecht in bewaffneten Konflikten – Grundsätze, Erarbeitet nach ZDv 15/2, Humanitäres Völkerrecht in bewaffneten Konflikten – Handbuch, DSK SF009320187, Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, R II 3, August 2006, p. 4.
Italy, Manuale di diritto umanitario, Introduzione e Volume I, Usi e convenzioni di Guerra, SMD-G-014, Stato Maggiore della Difesa, I Reparto, Ufficio Addestramento e Regolamenti, Rome, 1991, Vol. I, § 18.
Italy, Regole elementari di diritto di guerra, SMD-G-012, Stato Maggiore della Difesa, I Reparto, Ufficio Addestramento e Regolamenti, Rome, 1991, § 54; see also § 67.
When the tactical situation permits, effective advance warning shall be given of attacks which may affect the civilian population (e.g. infantry fire to encourage civilian persons to seek shelter, discharge of leaflets from aircraft). The advance warning given shall allow the defender to take safeguard measures and to give appropriate information.
Kenya, Law of Armed Conflict, Military Basic Course (ORS), 4 Précis, The School of Military Police, 1997, Précis No. 4, p. 8; see also Précis No. 4, p. 2.
Madagascar, Le Droit des Conflits Armés, Ministère des Forces Armées, August 1994, Fiche No. 6-O, § 25; see also Fiche No. 7-O, § 12, Fiche No. 5-SO, § B and Fiche No. 9-SO, § C.
Netherlands, Toepassing Humanitair Oorlogsrecht, Voorschift No. 27-412/1, Koninklijke Landmacht, Ministerie van Defensie, 1993, p. V-12.
b. if warning enhances the risk of death or serious injury for you or any other person.
Netherlands, Aide-Mémoire voor IFOR Commandanten, First Edition, 21 December 1995, § 5.
Netherlands, Humanitair Oorlogsrecht: Handleiding, Voorschift No. 27-412, Koninklijke Landmacht, Militair Juridische Dienst, 2005, § 0447.
Netherlands, Humanitair Oorlogsrecht: Handleiding, Voorschift No. 27-412, Koninklijke Landmacht, Militair Juridische Dienst, 2005, § 0528.
Netherlands, Humanitair Oorlogsrecht: Handleiding, Voorschift No. 27-412, Koninklijke Landmacht, Militair Juridische Dienst, 2005, § 0542; see also § 0826 (protection of the civilian population).
If circumstances permit, advance warning should be given of an attack which may also affect the civilian population, to allow the authorities the opportunity to evacuate the civilian population. It is not obligatory to warn the civilian population of an attack where surprise is a decisive factor.
Netherlands, Humanitair Oorlogsrecht: Handleiding, Voorschift No. 27-412, Koninklijke Landmacht, Militair Juridische Dienst, 2005, § 0545.
Nigeria, International Humanitarian Law (IHL), Directorate of Legal Services, Nigerian Army, 1994, p. 44, § 14; see also p. 45, § 16(c) and The Laws of War, by Lt. Col. L. Ode PSC, Nigerian Army, Lagos, undated, § 13.
When the tactical situation permits, effective advance warning must be given of attacks which may affect the civilian population (infantry fire to encourage civilians to take shelter, dropping leaflets from a plane, etc.).
The warning should be given in good time so that safety measures can be taken to significantly reduce the harmful effects of armed conflict.
Peru, Manual de Derecho Internacional Humanitario para las Fuerzas Armadas, Resolución Ministerial Nº 1394-2004-DE/CCFFAA/CDIH-FFAA, Lima, 1 December 2004, § 29.s; see also §§ 29.b.(4) and 107.a.
Only missions compatible with international humanitarian law can be planned.
Missions given to subordinates must include all the relevant details required to ensure respect for international humanitarian law (for example, appropriate preventive … warning measures).
Peru, Manual de Derecho Internacional Humanitario para las Fuerzas Armadas, Resolución Ministerial Nº 1394-2004-DE/CCFFAA/CDIH-FFAA, Lima, 1 December 2004, § 24.a.(10).
The warning must be given sufficiently in advance so that safety measures can be taken to significantly reduce the harmful effects of the war.
Peru, Manual de Derecho Internacional Humanitario y Derechos Humanos para las Fuerzas Armadas, Resolución Ministerial No. 049-2010/DE/VPD, Lima, 21 May 2010, § 30(s), p. 244; see also § 30(b)4, p. 242, and § 54, p. 424.
Missions given to subordinates must include all the relevant details to ensure respect for international humanitarian law (for example, appropriative preventive … warning measures).
Peru, Manual de Derecho Internacional Humanitario y Derechos Humanos para las Fuerzas Armadas, Resolución Ministerial No. 049-2010/DE/VPD, Lima, 21 May 2010, § 25(a)(10), p. 227.
South Africa, Presentation on the South African Approach to International Humanitarian Law, Appendix A, Chapter 4: International Humanitarian Law (The Law of Armed Conflict), National Defence Force, 1996, § 28(g). This manual is also included in Chapter 4 of the Draft Civic Education Manual of 1997.
Warning requirements. In terms of Article 57 of Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions, there is a general requirement to provide a warning before an attack if civilians are present. An exception to this rule is if surprise is a key element of attack.
South Africa, Revised Civic Education Manual, South African National Defence Force, 2004, Chapter 4, § 50(g).
Spain, Orientaciones. El Derecho de los Conflictos Armados, Tomo 1, Publicación OR7–004, (Edición Segunda), Mando de Adiestramiento y Doctrina, Dirección de Doctrina, Orgánica y Materiales, 2 November 2007, § 4.5.a.(1).(b); see also §§ 2.3.b.(2) , 2.4.c.(6) and 7.3.a.(1).
Switzerland, Lois et coutumes de la guerre (Extrait et commentaire), Règlement 51.7/II f, Armée Suisse, 1987, Article 29(1).
168 If military circumstances permit, effective advance warning must be given of attacks which may affect the civilian population.
Switzerland, Bases légales du comportement à l’engagement (BCE), Règlement 51.007/IVf, Swiss Army, issued based on Article 10 of the Ordinance on the Organization of the Federal Department for Defence, Civil Protection and Sports of 7 March 2003, entry into force on 1 July 2005, §§ 165 and 168.
Togo, Le Droit de la Guerre, III fascicules, Etat-major Général des Forces Armées Togolaises, Ministère de la Défense nationale, 1996, Fascicule III, p. 11; see also Fascicule III, p. 14 and Fascicule II, p. 7.
If the combat situation permits, an effective announcement of the offensive actions that may affect the civilian population shall be made in advance (e.g. preventive firing of light weapons to induce the civilians to go to shelters).
Ukraine, Manual on the Application of IHL Rules, Ministry of Defence, 11 September 2004, § 2.3.3.2; see also § 2.3.2.1.
If military exigencies permit, and unless surprise is considered to be an essential element of success, the commander of an attacking force must do all in his power to warn the authorities of a defended place before commencing a bombardment. There is, however, no obligation to give notice of an intended assault. Should there be no civilians left in the area, no such notice is required.
United Kingdom, The Law of War on Land being Part III of the Manual of Military Law, The War Office, HMSO, 1958, § 291; see also The Law of Armed Conflict, D/DAT/13/35/66, Army Code 71130 (Revised 1981), Ministry of Defence, prepared under the Direction of The Chief of the General Staff, 1981, Section 4, pp. 13–14, § 4(c).
United Kingdom, The Law of Armed Conflict, D/DAT/13/35/66, Army Code 71130 (Revised 1981), Ministry of Defence, prepared under the Direction of The Chief of the General Staff, 1981, Section 4, pp. 13–14, § 4(c).
There is a duty to give advance warning of an attack that “may” affect the civilian population, unless circumstances do not permit. Obviously, the point does not arise as a matter of law if military operations are being conducted in an area where there is no civilian population nor if the attack is not going to affect the civilian population at all. In other cases, the warning must be given in advance and it must be effective. The object of warnings is to enable civilians to take shelter or leave the area and to enable the civil defence authorities to take appropriate measures. To be effective the warning must be in time, sufficiently specific and comprehensible to enable them to do this.
United Kingdom, The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, Ministry of Defence, 1 July 2004, § 5.32.8.
United Kingdom, The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, Ministry of Defence, 1 July 2004, § 12.26.
United States, Field Manual 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare, US Department of the Army, 18 July 1956, as modified by Change No. 1, 15 July 1976, § 43.
United States, Air Force Pamphlet 110-31, International Law – The Conduct of Armed Conflict and Air Operations, US Department of the Air Force, 1976, § 5-3(c)(1)(b)(iii).
The practice of states recognizes that warnings need not always be given. General warnings are more frequently given than specific warnings, lest the attacking force or the success of its mission be jeopardized. Warnings are relevant to the protection of the civilian population and need not be given when they are unlikely to be affected by the attack.
United States, Air Force Pamphlet 110-31, International Law – The Conduct of Armed Conflict and Air Operations, US Department of the Air Force, 1976, § 5-3(c)(2)(d).
United States, The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, NWP 1-14M/MCWP 5-2.1/COMDTPUB P5800.7, issued by the Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and Headquarters, US Marine Corps, and Department of Transportation, US Coast Guard, October 1995 (formerly NWP 9 (Rev. A)/FMFM 1-10, October 1989), § 11.2; see also § 8.5.2.
United States, The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, NWP 1-14M/MCWP 5-2.1/COMDTPUB P5800.7, issued by the Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and Headquarters, US Marine Corps, and Department of Transportation, US Coast Guard, October 1995 (formerly NWP 9 (Rev. A)/FMFM 1-10, October 1989), § 8.5.2.
Where the military situation permits, commanders should make every reasonable effort to warn the civilian population located in close proximity to a military objective targeted for bombardment. Warnings may be general rather than specific lest the bombarding force or the success of its mission be placed in jeopardy.
United States, The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, NWP 1-14M/MCWP 5-12.1/COMDTPUB P5800.7, issued by the Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and Headquarters, US Marine Corps, and Department of Homeland Security, US Coast Guard, July 2007, § 8.9.2.
When allowed by military necessity, the commander of units bombarding a defended place in which there are civilians or attacking military objectives putting the civilian population at risk should previously inform the population of the impending bombardment or attack so that it can evacuate. The competent commander shall be freed from this obligation if the bombardment undertaken is aimed at supporting units attacking a defended place in order to capture it, if information on the impending bombardment would jeopardize the military operation in question.
Yugoslavia, Socialist Federal Republic of, Propisi o Primeri Pravila Medjunarodnog Ratnog Prava u Oruzanim Snagama SFRJ, PrU-2, Savezni Sekretarijat za Narodnu Odbranu (Pravna Uprava), 1988, § 80.
The Report on the Practice of India refers to several pieces of legislation which provide that warning must be given before use of force for the maintenance of public order.
Report on the Practice of India, 1997, Chapter 1.6, referring to Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958, Punjab Disturbed Areas Act, 1983, Armed Forces (Punjab and Chandigarh) Special Powers Act, 1983, and Armed Forces (Jammu and Kashmir) Special Powers Act, 1990.
Under Ireland’s Geneva Conventions Act (1962), as amended in 1998, any “minor breach” of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, including violations of Article 57(2)(c), is a punishable offence.
Italy, Law of War Decree, 1938, as amended in 1992, Article 50.
Italy’s Wartime Military Penal Code (1941) punishes a commander who “omits, except where so required by military necessity, to take all possible steps to inform enemy authorities before commencing bombardment”.
Italy, Wartime Military Penal Code, 1941, Article 178.
[A] commander of attacking forces who, except as required by the necessities of military operations, fails, before beginning a bombing, to do everything possible to notify the authorities of the enemy stronghold, shall be punished by military confinement for up to three years, in accordance with the law and international agreements.
Somalia, Military Criminal Code, 1963, Article 362.
The precautionary principle is the cornerstone of a number of specific rules which are considered to have attained customary status and to be applicable in internal armed conflicts … Among these rules is … the obligation of the parties to a conflict to give effective advance warning of attacks which may affect the civilian population, unless circumstances do not permit.
The result that the order to attack was lawful under international law is not changed by the obligation in principle to give advance warning of attacks which may affect the civilian population (see Art. 57 para. 2 sub-para. c AP [1977 Additional Protocol] I; ICRC Customary IHL [Study] p. 62 ff). On the one hand, Colonel (Oberst) Klein justifiably assumed that the attack which he ordered would not affect civilians. On the other hand, this obligation contains the limitation that it may be excluded by the given circumstances. Thereby international humanitarian law acknowledges the legitimacy and military necessity of surprise attacks (see ICRC Customary IHL [Study] p. 64 …). This limitation applies in the present case because a warning could have defeated the legitimate military objective of killing Taliban.
Germany, Federal Court of Justice, Federal Prosecutor General, Fuel Tankers case, Decision, 16 April 2010, pp. 59–67.
An army in an area under belligerent occupation is permitted to arrest local residents wanted by it, who endanger its security (see HCJ 102/82 Tsemel v. The Minister of Defense, 37 (3) PD 365, 369; HCJ 3239/02 Marab v. The Commander of IDF Forces in the Judea and Samaria Area, 57 (2) PD 349, 365). In this framework – and to the extent that it does not frustrate the military action intended to arrest the wanted person, the army is permitted – and at times even required – to give the wanted person an early warning. Thus it is possible to ensure the making of the arrest without injury to the civilian population (see regulation 26 of Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, The Hague, 18 October 1907 (hereinafter – The Hague Regulations); article 57(2) of Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977 (hereinafter – The First Protocol); see also Fleck The Handbook of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts (1995) 171, 223 (hereinafter – Fleck); rule 20 of 1 Customary International Humanitarian Law: Rules (2005) 62 (hereinafter – International Humanitarian Law)).
Israel, High Court of Justice, Adalah (Early Warning Procedure) case, Judgment, 6 October 2005, § 20.
1. … There is no trace – as opposed to what is stated in the order – that there was a visual mistake concerning the presence of a sniper … in the hotel. … [There is also no evidence] that the [US] tank was fired upon in the 35 minutes prior [to the attack on the hotel] or that there was anti-vehicle artillery capable of reaching it from the hotel, taking into account that the tank was more than 1500 metres away and that an RPG grenade launcher does not reach more than 650 metres. Even if there had been such a risk, the journalists in the hotel should have been warned.
2. Due to their similarity with this matter, we must refer to what has been said in relation to the fifth and sixth issues raised by the previous appellants concerning the existence of rational indications of the commission of an offence which violate the ius in bello, namely the norms of International Humanitarian Law that must be observed by belligerents.
Spain, Supreme Court, Couso case, Judgment, 13 July 2010, Section II(III), Octavo, §§ 1–2, p. 17; see also Section II(II), Sexto, § 2, p. 16.
The Report on the Practice of China includes an example of a warning issued by the People’s Liberation Army in order to protect local residents living on islands near the front.
Report on the Practice of China, 1997, Chapter 1.6.
The Report on the Practice of Egypt finds that warnings do not discharge the attacker from taking all necessary precautions towards the civilian population.
The instructions given to the French armed forces for the conduct of Opération Mistral, simulating a military operation under the right of self-defence or a mandate of the UN Security Council, state that “an individual warning must be given prior to any attack against a civilian ship or aircraft approaching or entering an exclusive or similar zone, to the extent that the tactical situation permits”.
The Report on the Practice of Iraq states that the issuing of prior public warnings to civilian populations has become established practice. It cites the examples of a general warning given by the President of Iraq to Iranian citizens, warnings issued by the General Command of the Iraqi armed forces to ships not to approach the zones of military operation in the Gulf and warning raids by Iraqi planes over Iranian cities.
Report on the Practice of Iraq, 1998, Chapter 1.6, referring to Press Conference by the Iraqi President, 10 November 1980, Encyclopedia of the Iraqi-Iranian War, Vol. I, p. 318, Military Communiqué No. 692, 29 April 1982, Military Communiqué No. 730, 2 June 1982, Military Communiqué No. 743, 7 June 1982, Military Communiqué No. 779, 17 July 1982, Military Communiqué No. 910, 21 November 1982, Speech of the President at the Iraqi Digla Secondary School in Kuwait, 6 February 1984 and Military Communiqué No. 1603, 29 September 1984.
The Iranian authorities have followed a steady practice of warning the civilian population of the cities before attacking. In this regard, before each bombardment, statements of the war information center or military communiqués were issued which asked the civilian population to leave the cities. Usually the name of the cities to be attacked were listed, and the civilians were asked to take refuge to four holy cities of Karbala, Najaf, Kazemein and Samera.
Report on the Practice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 1997, Chapter 1.6.
The report concludes that “the opinio juris of Iran is supportive of precautions in attack, and in practice the warnings can be considered as application of these precautions”.
In a briefing in 1982, the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared that all precautions had been taken by Israeli forces by giving an effective advance warning through the distribution of leaflets and appeals to the civilian population via radio and loudspeakers so that they could leave the operational zone temporarily.
Israel, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Department of Information, Briefing 342/18.7.82/3.10.108, 18 July 1982.
On 13 October 2000, Israeli helicopters carried out an air-strike on a Palestinian police station in Ramallah in retaliation for the killing of two Israeli soldiers the previous day. After the attack, a senior Israel Defense Force officer said that the military had made every effort to avoid casualties, warning the Palestinian police to evacuate their posts three hours before the strike. Warning shots were also fired minutes before the actual attack to warn off those who had not understood the earlier message.
Israel, Press briefing by the Director-General of Science, Culture and Sports, Coordinator of Information Policy and the Head of the IDF Operation Branch, Jerusalem, 13 October 2000; Suzanne Goldenberg, “Israel launches rocket attacks after frantic mob murders soldiers”, The Guardian, 13 October 2000.
The issue of “effective advance warning” is somewhat complicated. Unfortunately, due to current practices in the region, in which attacking forces are shielded within civilian populated localities (especially as regards the activities of the terrorist organizations in Lebanon), Israel is forced, quite often, to return fire at targets situated in close vicinity to civilians. Obviously, issuing advance warning of such counter fire is unfeasible from both military and logical perspectives (not only is time of an essence in such cases, but the civilian population is already all too aware of the fact that hostilities are taking place in their immediate area) … Nevertheless, Israel and the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] have, on several occasions in the past, made public advance warnings to the civilian population in Lebanon of impending hostilities. Such instances include the 1982 operation “Peace for Galilee”, during which the IDF dropped leaflets over cities in the vicinity of which hostilities were expected, thereby enabling those elements of the population uninvolved in the conflict to vacate the area beforehand. Similar practices were adopted by Israel in other Lebanese-related operations over the years … Israel has found that the use of advance warnings to the civilian population is feasible only prior to the commencement of hostilities in a general area, or in cases in which the elements of surprise or speed of response play no significant part.
Report on the Practice of Israel, 1997, Chapter 1.6.
[W]henever it is possible without jeopardizing the operation, Israel issues advance notice to the local residents through various media, including dropping leaflets, to distance themselves from areas in which Hizballah is operating and from places in which weaponry is stored.
Whenever we intend to target a munitions depot in a building in which a family resides, Israeli Intelligence devotes great effort to find the telephone number of that family, phone them and ask them to leave the house two hours before in order that they not be harmed.
Israel, Statement by Defense Minister Amir Peretz to the Knesset, 31 July 2006.
Finally, whenever possible without jeopardizing the operation, Israel issued advance notice to the local residents through various media, including dropping leaflets, radio broadcasts and contacts with local leaders, to distance themselves from areas in which Hizbullah was operating and from places in which its weaponry was being stored.
Israel, Israel’s War with Hizbullah. Preserving Humanitarian Principles While Combating Terrorism, Diplomatic Notes No. 1, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Israel, April 2007, pp. 14-15.
Despite the urgent need to prevent the continuous firing of missiles into Israel by Hizbullah, Israel recognized the need to take measures to avoid, and in any event to minimize, civilian casualties. Among the measures taken by Israel was the printing of millions of fliers, written in Arabic, which were dispersed over populated areas, explaining that due to Hizbullah activity, residents should evacuate these areas in order to avoid being hurt. These messages were also broadcast through PA systems and through radio broadcasts on the Al-Mashrek station, broadcasting out of Israel in Arabic. Additionally, Israeli officials contacted the mayors and local leaders of a number of villages in order to ensure the evacuation of residents.
Israel, Israel’s War with Hizbullah. Preserving Humanitarian Principles While Combating Terrorism, Diplomatic Notes No. 1, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Israel, April 2007, p. 19.
[W]e decided to avoid civilian casualties by sending a warning message to a place from which we knew the terrorists act. … We prefer to attack an empty building which is being used to manufacture rockets, even taking into consideration that the terrorists will leave the place.
Israel, Briefing to the Diplomatic Corps by the Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, 3 March 2008.
[B]efore this military operation, we called on the civilians to leave those places that they know are Hamas headquarters or places where Hamas people live or have gathered, in order to attack Israel. … And maybe Israel is the only state in which warnings are given in advance to the civilian population to leave a place that we know we need to target a few minutes later, a few hours later or a few days later.
Israel, Briefing to the Diplomatic Corps by the Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, 28 December 2008.
[W]here it [is] possible to do so without compromising the effectiveness of an operation, the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] makes strenuous efforts to give advance notice to the civilian population in the vicinity of military targets, including places used by terrorists for storing weapons and launching attacks, so that they have an opportunity to leave the area. The warnings are carried out by means of the dropping of leaflets in Arabic, telephone calls and radio announcements. By encouraging civilians to leave such areas, these means have been found to be effective in saving lives.
Israel, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Background paper, Responding to Hamas Attacks from Gaza: Issues of Proportionality, December 2008, § 4.
136. As a stark example, consider an adversary that launches mortars or anti-tank missiles from within civilian areas. There may be no choice except to return fire, even though this creates jeopardy for the civilians in the vicinity. Issuing an advance warning of the counter-fire may also be impractical, because it gives the shooter time to move. For this reason, advance warnings to the civilian population may be feasible mostly before hostilities begin in a particular area, or where the lack of surprise or speed of response does not significantly affect military advantage.
210. … IDF [Israel Defense Forces] forces imposed on themselves a multi-faceted system of early warnings, which made their operations far more complex and largely eliminated the element of surprise the IDF might have otherwise gained in its battle against Hamas. In many cases, IDF forces provided not one but multiple warnings prior to each attack and used sophisticated technology to confirm the departure of civilians and minimise collateral damage.
Israel, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Operation in Gaza 27 December 2008–18 January 2009: Factual and Legal Aspects, 29 July 2009, §§ 134, 136–137, 210 and 225.
262. The IDF also made special efforts to notify civilians of impending IDF operations and to instruct them how to avoid harm. The early warnings system was comprised of several layers that were complementary to each other.
263. First, general warnings were used, calling on civilians to stay away from sites where Hamas was conducting combat activities. In addition, regional warnings were distributed in certain areas, calling on civilians to leave those areas before IDF forces operated in them. Efforts were made to include in these warnings sufficient information to the residents, including a timeframe for the evacuation and designated specific routes for this purpose leading to safe areas. Far from having no place to flee, residents could – and the vast majority did – move to safe locations. Finally, specific warnings were issued to residents of particular buildings before attack.
- Radio Broadcasts and Phone Calls: The IDF conveyed instructions and advance warnings to residents by local radio broadcasts with IDF announcements and by about 165,000 phone calls. This involved specific notices as well as a daily news broadcast (the latter from 31 December onwards).
- Dropping of Leaflets: During the Gaza Operation, the IDF dropped a total of some 2,500,000 leaflets of various kinds in the Gaza Strip. Some of the leaflets warned civilians to distance themselves from military targets, including buildings containing weapons, ammunitions or tunnels, or areas where terrorist activity was being conducted. Other leaflets directed residents to leave a particular location and move to a safe zone by a certain route and within a defined period of time. Such leaflets were distributed, for instance, in the northern Gaza neighbourhood of Sajaiya. While warnings were a significant tool to reduce the likelihood of civilian casualties, IDF forces did not consider the distribution of leaflets alone as sufficient to presume the absence of civilians at the relevant locations.
265. While the warning systems implemented by the IDF did not provide a 100 per cent guarantee against civilian casualties, they were, in fact, highly effective. Aerial video surveillance by IDF forces confirmed the departure of civilians from targeted areas prior to the attack as a direct result of the warnings.
Israel, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Operation in Gaza 27 December 2008–18 January 2009: Factual and Legal Aspects, 29 July 2009, §§ 262–265.
The Report on the Practice of Jordan notes that a booklet on the law of armed conflict prepared by the ICRC is used by military commanders. The booklet refers to the obligation to give an effective advance warning prior to an attack.
There are no written laws which require precautions to be taken in attack. However, during the communist insurgency, the imposition of curfews and announcements by the Department of Information to inform civilians to remain indoors or not to enter certain areas during certain periods served as an indirect warning to the civilian population.
Report on the Practice of Malaysia, 1997, Interviews with members of the Malaysian armed forces and Ministry of Home Affairs, Chapter 1.6.
It has been reported that, during the conflict in Chechnya, the Russian Federation dropped leaflets throughout Grozny, ordering all Chechens to leave the city within five days. The leaflets stated: “Those who remain will be viewed as terrorists and bandits. They will be destroyed by artillery and aviation. There will be no more talks. All those who do not leave the city will be destroyed.” A Russian general told reporters that the leaflets were a humanitarian warning meant to protect civilians, not an ultimatum.
Stephanie Kriner, “Weak and Hungry Chechens Forced to Flee Grozny”, DisasterRelief.org, 7 December 1999; see also SIPRI Yearbook 2000, Oxford University Press, 2000, pp. 176–177.
Military responses to guerrilla tactics must be in conformity with the requirements of international humanitarian law. There is a consensus today that the majority of the provisions of [the 1977] Additional Protocol I apply equally to non-international conflicts through customary law. … Even if combatants blend in with the civilian population and use it as a human shield in violation of the law, it is necessary … to spare civilians as much as possible (for example by warning them in advance).
Switzerland, Federal Council, Report on IHL and Current Armed Conflicts, 17 September 2010, Section 3.4, p. 13.
It is reported that, during the war in the South Atlantic, UK forces gave prior notice of their intention to bomb Goose Green and specified that such notice was given in accordance with the relevant laws.
War in the Falklands: the Campaign in Pictures, Sunday Express Magazine Team, London, 1982, Report on UK Practice, 1997, Chapter 1.6.
United Kingdom, House of Commons, Written Statement by the Secretary of State for Defence, Hansard, 23 February 2009, Vol. 488, Written Statements, col. 18W.
During the Second World War, before the atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, the US reportedly warned Japanese authorities that certain towns could be heavily bombed and that civilians should be evacuated. Similar warnings were reportedly issued in the European theatre of war.
Leslie C. Green, The Contemporary Law of Armed Conflict, Melland Schill Monographs in International Law, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1993, p. 148.
It is reported that, during the Korean War, US forces planned that “several days prior to the attack planes would drop leaflets over Pyongyang warning civilians to stay away from military installations of any kind”.
Robert F. Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea 1950–1953, Office of Air Force History, US Air Force, Washington, D.C., Revised edition, 1983, p. 516; see also p. 518.
In 1987, the Deputy Legal Adviser of the US Department of State stated that the United States supported the requirement that “effective advance warning be given of attacks which may affect the civilian population, unless circumstances do not permit”.
A warning need not be specific; it may be a blanket warning, delivered by leaflets and/or radio, advising the civilian population of an enemy nation to avoid remaining in proximity to military objectives. The “unless circumstances do not permit” recognizes the importance of the element of surprise. Where surprise is important to mission accomplishment and allowable risk to friendly forces, a warning is not required.
United States, Message from the Department of the Army to the legal adviser of the US Army forces deployed in the Gulf, 11 January 1991, § 8(I), Report on US Practice, 1997, Chapter 1.6.
There is no law of war requirement that a combatant must be “warned” before he or she is subject to the application of lawful, lethal force … [The opinion then cites Article 26 of the 1907 Hague Regulations and refers to Article 6 of the 1907 Hague Convention (IX).] Article 57, paragraph 2(c) of Protocol I Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions of 8 June 1977 contains a more relaxed but similar requirement, updating the two 1907 provisions while reconciling the slight difference between them. Although not a party to this treaty, the United States regards this provision as a re-codification of customary international law. The warning requirement cited above was for the purpose of enabling the civilian population to take appropriate steps to protect themselves from the collateral effects of attack of military objectives, or otherwise from the effects of war; it is not an obligation to warn combatants of their imminent attack. The exception to the warning requirement, relieving a commander from the obligation in cases of assault (stated more generally as “unless circumstances do not permit” in the 1977 Additional Protocol I) recognizes the legitimate use of the fundamental military element of surprise in the attack of enemy military forces in order to reduce risk to the attacking force and to increase its chance for successful accomplishment of its mission.
United States, Legality of Silencers/Suppressors, Memorandum for Chief, Operational Law, Headquarters, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), 9 June 1995, pp. 6–7.
In U.S. practice, bombardment warnings have often been general in their terms, e.g. advising civilians to avoid war-supporting industries, in order not to alert the air defense forces of an impending attack on a specific target. Such was the case in the Korean War.
In the early morning of 11 April , Israeli aircraft and artillery began an intensive bombardment of southern Lebanon as well as targets in the Beirut area and in the Bekaa valley … In the first few days of the operation, Israeli air force and artillery attacked selected targets, including the homes of persons suspected to be affiliated with Hizbullah. At the same time, an IDF-controlled radio station in southern Lebanon broadcast threats of further bombardments, set deadlines for the inhabitants to leave and stated that once the deadline had passed IDF [Israel Defense Forces] would regard all who remained as legitimate targets. By 13 April, some 90 towns and villages, including Tyre and villages north of the Litani river, had thus been placed under threat. As a result of these threats and the Israeli bombardment, about a quarter of the inhabitants, more than 100,000, left UNIFIL’s area of operation and Tyre. Around 5,000 persons sought refuge inside UNIFIL positions and at its logistic base in Tyre. Given the large number of inhabitants who remained behind, IDF did not in fact treat the whole area as a free-fire zone.
UN Secretary-General, Report on UNIFIL, UN Doc. S/1996/575, 20 July 1996, §§ 10–13.
Although NATO alleged that it had made “every possible effort to avoid civilian casualties and collateral damage”, some doubts have been expressed as to the specificity of the warning given to civilians by NATO of its intended strike, and whether the notice would have constituted “effective warning … of attacks which may affect the civilian population, unless circumstances do not permit” as required by Article 57(2) of Additional Protocol I. Evidence on this point is somewhat contradictory. On the one hand, NATO officials in Brussels are alleged to have told Amnesty International that they did not give a specific warning as it would have endangered the pilots. On this view, it is possible that casualties among civilians working at the RTS may have been heightened because of NATO’s apparent failure to provide clear advance warning of the attack, as required by Article 57(2). On the other hand, foreign media representatives were apparently forewarned of the attack. As Western journalists were reportedly warned by their employers to stay away from the television station before the attack, it would also appear that some Yugoslav officials may have expected that the building was about to be struck … Although knowledge on the part of Yugoslav officials of the impending attack would not divest NATO of its obligation to forewarn civilians under Article 57(2), it may nevertheless imply that the Yugoslav authorities may be partially responsible for the civilian casualties resulting from the attack and may suggest that the advance notice given by NATO may have in fact been sufficient under the circumstances.
ICTY, Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, The Hague, 14 June 2000, § 77.
When the tactical situation permits, effective advance warning shall be given of attacks which may affect the civilian population (e.g. infantry fire to encourage civilian persons to seek shelter, discharge of leaflets from aircraft).
Frédéric de Mulinen, Handbook on the Law of War for Armed Forces, ICRC, Geneva, 1987, § 436; see also § 459.
In an appeal issued in October 1973, the ICRC urged all the belligerents in the conflict in the Middle East (Egypt, Iraq, Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic) to observe forthwith, in particular, the provisions of, inter alia, Article 50(1)(c) of the draft Additional Protocol I, which stated in part: “Whenever circumstances so permit, advance warning shall be given of attacks which may affect the civilian population.” All governments concerned replied favourably.
In 1985, in the context of the conflict in El Salvador, the FMLN warned all social sectors of the country that they should avoid “those places visited by military elements, both from the army of the puppet regime as well as foreign military personnel involved in repressive and genocidal activities against the popular revolutionary movement”, for these places would be considered military objectives. The FMLN also warned owners of property who leased it to foreign military advisers that their property would be considered military objectives.
Communication by the FMLN, June 1985, § 4, Estudios Centroamericanos, Universidad Centroamericana José Simeón Cañas, Vol. XL, Nos. 441–442, July–August 1985, p. 581.
In February 1993, the FPR in Rwanda reportedly warned the civilian population of Kidaho of an imminent assault, asking them to leave the town.
Association rwandaise pour la défense des droits de la personne et des libertés publiques, Rapport sur les droits de l’homme au Rwanda, octobre 1992–octobre 1993, Kigali, December 1993, p. 114.
The military operations did not confine themselves within the zone ordered evacuated by the United Nations. The NGO’s, but not the civilian population, were given warning to evacuate the outskirts surrounding the delineated sector. The fighting spread to the peripheries of the area where no orders had been given to evacuate: consequently, the civilian population north of Afgoi road was caught in the fighting.
MSF, Communication on the violations of humanitarian law in Somalia during UNOSOM operations, 20 July 1993, p. 2.
According to the Report on SPLM/A Practice, the SPLM/A has persistently warned civilians to evacuate the towns on which a siege or an attack is intended. During the 1984–1991 military operations, Radio SPLA issued warnings to the civilian populations living in villages in southern Sudan.
Report on SPLM/A Practice, 1998, Chapter 1.6.
However, there was no warning from NATO that a specific attack on RTS [Serbian state radio and television] headquarters was imminent. NATO officials in Brussels told Amnesty International that they did not give a specific warning as it would have endangered the pilots.
Amnesty International, NATO/Federal Republic of Yugoslavia: “Collateral Damage” or Unlawful Killings? Violations of the Laws of War by NATO during Operation Allied Force, AI Index EUR 70/18/00, London, June 2000, p. 47.

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