Source: https://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-3rd-circuit/1753406.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 19:03:25+00:00

Document:
Before: FISHER, VANASKIE and KRAUSE, Circuit Judges.
Hyman Garcia was sentenced to nine months' imprisonment for violating conditions of his supervised release. Alleging that his right of allocution was violated, Garcia appeals from that sentence. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.
In 2011, Hyman Garcia was sentenced to 57 months' imprisonment followed by three years' supervised release after he pleaded guilty to distributing crack cocaine and possessing a firearm after a felony conviction. After his release from prison, Garcia was arrested for violating six conditions of his supervised release.
The District Court held a supervised release revocation hearing. During that hearing, Garcia admitted that he violated all six conditions of his supervision, including the condition that he notify his probation officer of any change in address.1 The parties disputed, however, the extent and nature of his failure to notify probation of his change in address. Garcia maintained that, although he properly lived at the address he provided to probation—his Aunt's home in Allentown, Pennsylvania—he traveled back and forth between there and an unreported address in Bethlehem, Pennsylvania.2 The government, by contrast, argued he was living at the unreported address in Bethlehem to hide from his probation officer.
The Court reconvened the supervised release revocation hearing. Because of the condition of the Bethlehem home, and because Garcia had lied to the Court about maintaining his primary residence in Allentown, the government recommended that Garcia serve his sentence in prison.7 In response, Garcia maintained that he was not hiding from probation, but trying to avoid jeopardizing his Aunt's receipt of Section 8 housing. He added that the Bethlehem residence was suitable for house arrest because his ownership of the property had been established by deed and a landline was installed to facilitate electronic monitoring.8 Despite those arguments, the District Court found that the Bethlehem address was not suitable for home confinement because (1) it was unapproved, (2) there was nothing to show whether it was fully paid for, and (3) utilities could be turned off at any time.9 The Court added that it no longer thought that a prison sentence was unfair because Garcia had lied on numerous occasions.
Ultimately, the Court entered an order sentencing Garcia to nine-months' imprisonment with no supervised release to follow. Garcia timely appealed.
The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction over this case under 18 U.S.C. § 3231 and 18 U.S.C. § 3583. This Court has appellate jurisdiction over this case under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).
“ ‘[T]he right of allocution is deeply rooted in our legal tradition’ and dates back to at least the fifteenth century.”23 It was codified by Congress in 1944 through the promulgation of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure Rule 32, and, at a supervised release revocation hearing, it affords a defendant “an opportunity to make a statement and present any information in mitigation” before a sentence is imposed.24 As we have stated previously, “the critical purpose of Rule 32 is threefold: (1) to allow the defendant to present mitigating circumstances, (2) to permit the defendant to present personal characteristics ․, and (3) to preserve the appearance of fairness in the criminal justice system.”25 On appeal, Garcia argues that the District Court plainly erred by depriving him of his right to an allocution. Based upon that alleged error, he asks us to vacate the District Court's sentence and remand for resentencing.
Because Garcia's right of allocution was not violated, the District Court committed no clear error, and relief is not warranted under Rule 52(b).
For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm.
16. 115 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 1997).
20. United States v. Adams, 252 F.3d 276, 284 (3d Cir. 2001).
21. United States v. Calabretta, 831 F.3d 128, 132 (3d Cir. 2016).
22. Id. (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 736 (1993)).
23. United States v. Ward, 732 F.3d 175, 180-81 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Adams, 252 F.3d at 282).
24. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(b)(2)(E); see also Ward, 732 F.3d at 181.
25. Ward, 732 F.3d at 181.
27. Ward, 732 F.3d at 182.
31. See Li, 115 F.3d at 130-33.

References: § 3231
 § 3583
 § 1291
 § 3742
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