Source: http://lawspace.stmarytx.edu/item/2010StMULawBestBriefOfSecPlayer
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 14:52:53+00:00

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The opinions of the District and Appeals Courts have not been reported. The opinions appear in the record.
bright line test, which limits Fourth Amendment rights and is mainly concerned with being easy for law enforcement to use. II. Tim Riggins has standing to challenge the reasonableness of the search of the rental car. Under both the modified bright line approach and the totality of circumstances approach, Tim Riggins has a legitimate expectation of privacy that would be recognized by society as set forth in Rakas. Tim Riggins’s wife rented the vehicle with a joint credit card and gave him permission to drive it. He treated the car as his own by keeping the keys on his key ring and keeping his belongings in the car. The modified bright line test would give Tim Riggins standing because he can show permission from the authorized renter. The totality of circumstances test would also give Tim Riggins standing because the facts as a whole show Tim Riggins had permission to use the car, was licensed to drive, and had a relationship with the renter and the rental company. Under either of these tests, Tim Riggins shows that he has both a subjective and an objective expectation of privacy. ARGUMENT I. AN UNAUTHORIZED DRIVER’S STANDING TO OBJECT TO A SEARCH OF A RENTAL VEHICLE BY LAW ENFORCEMENT IS SHOWN BY A LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY THAT SOCIETY IS PREPARED TO RECOGNIZE AS DEFINED IN RAKAS V. ILLINOIS. IT MUST BE DETERMINED USING THE MODIFIED BRIGHT LINE OR TOTALITY OF CIRCUMSTANCES APPROACH IN ORDER TO PROTECT THE INDIVIDUAL’S FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS AND THE GOVERNMENT’S INTEREST IN SEARCHES.
A. Rakas v. Illinois recognized a legitimate expectation of privacy as the grounds for standing under the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment protects citizens from unreasonable searches of “their persons, houses, papers and effects.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. The standing to challenge a search based on a legitimate expectation of privacy in the property searched is true to the Fourth Amendment.
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133 (1978). The Supreme Court in Rakas v. Illinois recognized that Fourth Amendment rights are personal which is shown by a subjective expectation of privacy. Id. at 137. In order to show that the expectation is legitimate it has to be one that society is prepared to recognize. Id. at 143. 1. Rakas recognized that Fourth Amendment rights are personal Rakas asserts that only those whose rights have been infringed may object to a search. Id. at 134, 35. Fourth Amendment rights are personal and cannot be asserted on behalf of another. Id. at 137. The main considerations in determining standing are whether there has been an injury and whether the individual, himself, has a protected right that was violated. Id. at 139. The Court held that the way to determine whether defendants had a protected right was to look to whether their expectation of privacy was legitimate. Id. at 143. An expectation of privacy would be found legitimate based on interests in real or personal property, or to what society would permit and recognize as legitimate for the individual claiming the right. Id. 2. The test for a legitimate expectation of privacy is both subjective and objective. A legitimate expectation of privacy is the measure for giving standing to object to a search because it allows for a personal right even if there is no property right. Id. at 143. A legitimate expectation of privacy has a clear subjective component, which can be asserted by the individual’s contention that he had a personal expectation of privacy in the property or premises searched. Id. However, to be legitimate, the expectation of privacy must also meet an objective standard. Id. This objective requirement can be found by looking to concepts of property law or what society would view and permit as reasonable. Id. A key principle in property law that gives one a legitimate expectation of privacy is the right to exclude others from property that one owns or lawfully possesses. Id.
3. Using a legitimate expectation of privacy for standing is true to the Fourth Amendment. Allowing individuals to challenge governmental searches protects them from the abuse of power that might ensue if the government were allowed to search unchecked. Id. at 134. This deterrent value has long been considered by the court to be of sufficient weight in balancing an individual’s interest against governmental interests in the use of probative evidence. Id. at 137. While the government has a valid interest in using evidence in prosecuting crimes, this interest is not to override the Fourth Amendment protections of being secure in one’s person, house, papers, and effects. Id. Accordingly, a test to determine whether the unauthorized driver of a rental car has standing to object to a search must determine whether the driver had a subjective expectation of privacy in the vehicle which society recognizes as reasonable.
extending standing too far: it does not extend standing to any unauthorized driver, but only those who have the renter’s permission. Thomas, 447 F.3d at 1199. C. The totality of circumstances test would also meet the interests of the individual and the government. The modified bright line test is not the only approach that can be used to remain true to the Fourth Amendment in determining an authorized driver’s standing to object to a search. Thomas, 447 F.3d at 1197. In United States v. Smith, the Sixth Circuit adopted the totality of circumstances test. 263 F.3d 571, 586 (6th Cir. 2001). The court, in following the principle in Rakas that no single factor is determinative, considered many factors in determining whether the defendant had standing to challenge the search of a rental car. Id. Courts have found that factors such as being a licensed driver, having the rental agreement, and having a relationship to the authorized driver show a legitimate expectation of privacy. Id. at 586-87; United States v. Eden, 190 Fed. App’x 416, 420 (6th Cir. 2006). 1. The objective expectation of privacy can be found by following the principle of Rakas that standing should be considered in light of surrounding circumstances as applied in the totality of circumstances test. The Sixth Circuit objects to the rigidity of the bright line test because it does not follow the principle in Rakas of considering all the surrounding circumstances. Smith, 263 F.3d at 586 (citing Rakas, 439 U.S. at 152.) The Smith court considers factors such as whether the unauthorized driver was a licensed driver; whether he had sufficient knowledge about the vehicle, which is represented in possession of the rental agreement; whether he had a relationship with the person who gave him permission; and whether he had a business relationship with the rental company. Id. These factors show that it was not illegal for the unauthorized driver to be driving. Id. His relationships and the fact that he had permission to drive the car show that he has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the car that society is prepared to recognize. Id. at 587.
to achieve standing that were not present in those cases. Boruff, 909 F.2d at 117 (mentioning knowledge of rental policy); Obregon, 748 F.2d at 1374 (mentioning lack of relationship with rental agency); Riazco, 91 F.3d at 755 (mentioning lack of permission). This language suggests that if there had been more support, those courts could have found a legitimate expectation of privacy in another way. 1. Language in Rakas suggests that the bright line approach is too strict The Supreme Court in Rakas stated that while property rights are not solely determinative, individuals who own or lawfully possess or control property usually have a recognized expectation of privacy therein due to their right to exclude others. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143. The District Court in Riazco stated that it is not unlawful to allow an unauthorized driver to use a rental car; it simply is a premise on which a rental agreement could be cancelled. Riazco, 91 F.3d at 754. See also United States v. Cooper, 133 F.3d 1394 (11th Cir. 1998) (finding driver of rental car could challenge a search even after his the rental expired). Thus, a person driving a rental car is not in unlawful possession of the car simply because his name is not listed as an authorized driver on the rental agreement. Thomas, 447 F.3d at 1198. Accordingly, his lawful possession or control of the car would show he has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the car. In Thomas, the Ninth Circuit followed the intent of Rakas in holding that prior Supreme Court cases invalidate the bright line approach of only giving authorized drivers listed on the rental agreement standing because it may not adequately represent the nature of the unauthorized driver’s use of the car and does not take into account joint authority over the car. Thomas, 447 F.3d at 1198-99. The court went on to say that the right to exclude others and possession are more telling than a name on the rental agreement and are sufficient for standing. Id. at 1199.
privacy and that this subjective expectation be objectively apparent as one that society recognizes as legitimate. Muhammad, 58 F.3d at 355. The court finds that an objective expectation of privacy exists when the defendant shows at least some evidence that the lawful renter gave him permission to drive the rental car. Id. In light of this case, Tim Riggins meets the requirements. He showed a subjective expectation by denying consent to search when asked by the officer and by using the car as his own. R. at 4. He showed the requisite objective expectation by the testimony of the authorized driver, his wife, that he had permission, which completes the requirements under Rakas for standing to object to the search. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143; R. at 5. The Ninth Circuit rejects the bright line approach because it does not consider the nature of the use by the unauthorized driver. Thomas, 447 F.3d at 1198-99. The Thomas court holds that if the unauthorized driver has the authorized driver’s permission to use the car, he has a joint authority, which gives him standing to object to the search. Id. at 1199. Under this reasoning, because Tim Riggins had his wife’s permission to use the rental car, he had joint authority over the car while he was using it, which gives him a recognized and legitimate expectation of privacy in the car. B. Tim Riggins has standing under the totality of circumstances approach. Further support for Tim Riggins’s legitimate expectation of privacy in the rental car can be found considering his situation in light of the totality of circumstances test. The Sixth Circuit in Smith finds the bright line test is too rigid and inappropriate to determine standing in light of all the surrounding circumstances of the case. Smith, 263 F.3d at 586. Smith recognizes that the Supreme Court does not usually consider one single factor to be determinative. Id. 1. Tim Riggins had a legitimate expectation of privacy based on the totality of circumstances under United States v. Smith.
with the rental company. R. at 5. These factors suggest that Tim Riggins has standing to object to a search of his rental car. CONCLUSION Rakas held that a subjective and objective expectation of privacy that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable would give standing to object to a government search. It also held that Fourth Amendment rights are personal and cannot be vicariously asserted. The modified bright line test and the totality of circumstances test are true to Rakas and the Fourth Amendment. These approaches show that the unauthorized driver, himself, has both a legitimate subjective and objective expectation of privacy in the rental car. Current trends in rental agreements show that society is prepared to recognize a spouse as an authorized driver of the rental car even when not named on the agreement. Prior Supreme Court cases also show that it is reasonable for family members to each have privacy interests in shared spaces and for nonowners to have a legitimate privacy interest in property over which they have a joint authority. These factors suggest that the modified bright line test or the totality of circumstances test better protect individual rights than the bright line test. The government’s interest in protecting Fourth Amendment rights supersedes its interest in having evidence available for prosecution. Even so, the modified bright line test and the totality of circumstances test meet the government’s need of having an easy to use test without expanding standing so far as to interfere with prosecution of criminal activity. Under either a modified bright line or a totality of circumstances test, Tim Riggins meets the factors necessary to show standing to object to the search of his vehicle.
APPENDIX U.S. Const. amend IV The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Kellie Player, “Best Brief Contest Winner: Tim Riggins v. United States of America 09-9100 Brief for Petitioner Winner of the 2010 Best Brief Contest at St. Mary's University School of Law,” St. Mary's Law Digital Repository, accessed April 24, 2019, http://lawspace.stmarytx.edu/item/2010StMULawBestBriefOfSecPlayer.

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