Source: http://voiceforthedefenseonline.com/print/1601
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 08:23:00+00:00

Document:
This would render evidence admissible despite violations of the U.S. Constitution, Amendment IV. This article is loosely based on the motion for rehearing, the petition for writ of certiorari pending at the time of the writing, and a passion for the Bill of Rights, especially the Fourth Amendment.
The Mazuca holding makes it difficult to ascertain the appropriate scope of an unlawful stop. “So, while the initial traffic stop was illegal, [the police] never went beyond the bounds of what would have been constitutionally permissible had the stop in fact been justified at its inception.”32 A seizure must be reasonably related to the circumstances that justified the stop in the first place.33 In Ohio v. Robinette, Justice Ginsburg discussed the need to evaluate both the reason for the initial detention as well as the scope of the detention to ensure that police officers are not using traffic stops merely as a means to conduct “fishing expeditions.”34 How long can law enforcement detain someone without a valid reason? One supposes until they find one.
Coolidge v. New Hampshire35 places the burden on the prosecution to establish that any search or seizure was justified under an exception to the warrant requirement. Conversely, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals would require the defense to show the taint was not attenuated, creating a presumption of lawful intent on the part of law enforcement.36 The Texas Court specifically notes, “There is no indication that they were making traffic stops for any purpose other than to enforce the traffic laws or that they harbored the specific hope or expectation that they might obtain the consent of motorists to search their vehicles or identify motorists with outstanding arrest warrants so that they might conduct searches incident to arrest.”37 This language clearly places the burden on the defense to show that law enforcement was acting with the motive to violate the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rather than on the State to show that the officer had an altruistic motive.
There are many frightening implications of the Mazuca case. Not discussed is the lack of deference to the factual findings made by the trial judge who actually heard the testimony and observed the witnesses. This trend of the Court of Criminal Appeals making factual findings is disturbing and merits its own article. Is the future of the exclusionary rule in jeopardy? If what is found justifies the way it is found, what protection can the Fourth Amendment give? Are general warrants now lawful for everyone or just those unable to pay their traffic fines? If violating the Fourth Amendment is not flagrant behavior on the part of law enforcement, what is? Why is the burden of proof on the defense and the subjective intent of law enforcement suddenly relevant after years of consistent holdings otherwise? And perhaps, most importantly, exactly how is the accused to show what a cop was thinking?
1. “Having once recognized that the right to privacy embodied in the Fourth Amendment is enforceable against the States, and the right to be secure against rude invasions of privacy by state officers is, therefore, constitutional in origin, we can no longer permit that right to remain an empty promise.” Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659–60, 81 S. Ct. 1684; 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (1961).
2. Mazuca v. State, 375 S. W. 3d 294, 310 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). (Judge Price wrote for the majority, Judges Myers, Johnson, Keller and Womack dissenting).
3. United States v. Lopez, 443 F. 3d 1280 (10th Cir. 2006); United States v. Luckett, 484 F. 2d 89 (9th Cir. 1973); People v. Padgett, 932 P. 2d 810 (Colo. 1997); Sikes v. State, 448 S.E. 2d 560 (S.C. 1994); State v. Daniel, 12 S.W. 3d 420 (Tenn. 2000); St. George v. State, 237 S.W. 3d 720 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); State v. Topanotes, 76 p. 3d 1159 (Utah 2003). Discovering Arrest Warrants: Intervening Police Conduct and Foreseeability, 118 Yale L.J. 177 (2008).
4. St. George v. State, 237 S.W. 3d 720 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
6. Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249; 127 S. Ct. 2400; 168 L. Ed. 2d 132 (2007). The case was remanded to the California Supreme Court to see if the outstanding warrants attenuated the taint of the unlawful stop. The California Supreme Court happily found that the warrants did attenuate the taint, that stopping someone without a valid reason was not flagrant behavior on behalf of law enforcement. People v. Brendlin, 195 P. 3d 1074 (California Supreme Court, 2008, cert. denied).
7. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 595, 126 S. Ct. 2159; 165 L. Ed. 56 (2006).
8. Mazuca, supra, at p. 300.
9. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153; 96 S. Ct. 2909; 49 L. Ed. 2d 859 (1976).
10. Hudson, supra, 547 U.S. at 603.
11. Justices Breyer, Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg.
12. Hudson, supra, at p. 605.
13. Hudson, Id., p. 608.
14. Judges Price, Alcala, Hervey, Keasler, and Cochran.
15. This is my best guess based on the SCOTUS decision in United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945; 181 L. Ed. 2d 911 (2012) (J. Sotomayor’s concurrence).
16. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132; 45 S. Ct. 280; 69 L. Ed. 543 (1923), citing Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616; 6 S. Ct. 524; 29 L. Ed 746 (1886).
17. U.S. Constitution, Amendment IV.
18. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573; 583–584; 100 S. Ct. 1371; 63 L. Ed. 2d 639 (1980).
19. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393.
20. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385; 391; 40 S. Ct. 182; 64 L. Ed. 319 (1920).
22. INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 217 n. 5; 104 S. Ct. 1758; 80 L. Ed. 2d 247 (1984) (noting that officers who entered into consent-based encounters were lawfully present in the factory pursuant to consent or a warrant).
23. Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849; 179 L. Ed. 2d 865 (2011).
24. Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 166; 92 S. Ct. 839; 31 L. Ed. 2d 110, (1972) citing United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221.
25. Mazuca, supra, p. 310 [emphasis in the original].
26. Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 166; 92 S. Ct. 839; 31 L. Ed. 2d 110 (1972).
27. Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 166; 92 S. Ct. 839; 31 L. Ed. 2d 110 (1972).
28. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352; 103 S. Ct. 1855; 75 L. Ed. 2d 903 (1983).
29. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 274; 93 S. Ct. 2535; 37 L. ed. 2d 596 (1973), citing Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180 (1949) (Jackson, J. dissenting).
30. Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 170; 92 S. Ct. 839; 31 L. Ed. 2d 110 (1972), citing Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97–98.
31. Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32; 121 S. Ct. 447; 148 L. Ed. 2d 333 (2000).
33. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19–20; 20 L. Ed. 2d 889; 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968).
34. Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 41; 136 L. Ed. 2d 347; 117 S. Ct. 417 (1996) (Ginsburg J, concurring).
35. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443; 454–55; 29 L. Ed. 2d 564; 91 S. Ct. 2022 (1971).
36. Is Monge v. State, 315 S. W. 3d 35, 40 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010), over-ruled? Monge is a recent CCA case that places the burden on the State to show attenuation.
37. Mazuca v. State, 375 S. W. 294, 310 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).
39. Director General of Railroads v. Kastenbaum, 263 U.S. 25, 27; 44 S. Ct. 52; 68 L. Ed. 146; (1923).
40. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411; 416; 101 S. Ct. 690; 66 L. Ed. 2d 621 (1984) [emphasis added].
41. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806; 813; 116 S. Ct. 1769; 135 L. Ed. 2d 89 (1996).
42. Ashcroft v. Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074; 2083; 179 L.Ed. 2d 1149 (2011).
43. Stacey v. Emery, 97 U.S. 642; 645; 24 L. Ed. 1035; (1878).

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