Source: http://cl.bna.com/cl/19990414/63512.htm
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 16:30:16+00:00

Document:
In this case, we consider the specificity required in a motion to suppress evidence under Penal Code section 1538.5 (section 1538.5). We conclude that a defendant must state the grounds for the motion with sufficient particularity to give notice to the prosecution of the sort of evidence it will need to present in response. In this case, we find that defendant's moving papers were sufficient to provide this notice to the prosecution, and that he did not narrow the scope of his motion at the hearing. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal, but we remand for consideration of whether the trial court's judgment should be affirmed on alternative grounds.
On April 3, 1996, about 8:30 a.m., Tuolumne County Sheriff's Deputy Robin Hunt began surveilling a brown Chevrolet pickup truck that he saw parked outside a home where he suspected "drug activity." He called Deputy John F. Oliver for assistance. About 15 minutes later, Hunt saw the truck make a right turn at an intersection without signaling. He stopped the truck, and defendant, who was the driver, produced an identification card, but no driver's license. Hunt ran a check on the status of defendant's driver's license and learned that it had expired.
Because defendant was the vehicle's sole occupant and his license had expired, department policy required Hunt to tow the vehicle and fill out a "CHP 180," which is a standard California Highway Patrol form. Department policy also required Hunt to take an inventory of the vehicle's contents. The purpose of the CHP 180 form and the inventory is, among other things, to preserve a record of the physical condition of the vehicle and its contents when police took possession of it. When Deputy Oliver arrived to assist, Hunt asked him to fill out the CHP 180 form while Hunt took the inventory.
In taking the inventory, Hunt saw three leather bags on the front bench seat of the truck right next to the driver's seat. He opened the bags and found methamphetamine. At this point, Oliver stopped filling out the CHP 180 form and watched defendant while Hunt continued to take the inventory. Hunt also called for narcotics officers to take over the investigation. Before they arrived, however, Hunt arrested defendant for possession of methamphetamine, handcuffed him, and put him in the patrol car. The officers never completed the CHP 180 form or the inventory list.
By information dated May 9, 1996, the Tuolumne County District Attorney charged defendant with transportation of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379, subd. (a)), possession of methamphetamine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378), and possession of an opiate (Health & Saf. Code, § 11350, subd. (a)). The information further alleged with respect to each count that defendant had a prior serious felony conviction (Pen. Code, § 667, subds. (b)-(i)), that he had served four prior prison terms (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)), and that he was ineligible for probation (Pen. Code, § 1203, subd. (e)(4)).
On June 24, 1996, defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence, including the methamphetamine police found in his truck. (§ 1538.5, subd. (a).) In his moving papers and at the subsequent hearing, defendant tried to show that the traffic stop was a "ruse" or a "pretext" for searching the truck. He argued that the police lacked probable cause to stop him, because the right turn that he had made without signaling was part of the "natural flow of traffic," and therefore a turn signal was not necessary. He also pointed out that Deputy Hunt called for Deputy Oliver's assistance before making the traffic stop, arguing that Hunt would not have needed Oliver's assistance for an ordinary traffic stop. He asserted that the police had never actually intended to inventory the contents of the truck; rather, the inventory was an after-the-fact justification for a search that violated his Fourth Amendment rights. (U.S. Const., 4th Amend.) In this regard, he emphasized that the police had never completed the inventory. Finally, he asserted that the police had no policy governing inventory searches.
The court denied the motion to suppress without stating its reasons, and, later the same day, defendant pleaded guilty to transportation of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379, subd. (a)) and admitted three of the prior prison term allegations. Defendant waived his right to appeal, but he expressly reserved his right to appeal the court's denial of his suppression motion. The prosecution then moved to dismiss the other charges and allegations, and the court granted the motion. On July 22, 1996, the court sentenced defendant to six years in prison, representing the middle term of three years for transportation of methamphetamine, plus three consecutive one-year enhancements for the three prior prison terms. The court also ordered defendant to pay a $1,200 restitution fine (Pen. Code, § 2085.5) and a $50 laboratory fee (Health & Saf. Code, § 11372.5).
On August 22, 1996, defendant filed a timely notice of appeal, arguing that the court should have granted his suppression motion, and, on August 28, 1996, the trial court issued a certificate of probable cause for appeal, though one was not necessary. (See § 1538.5, subd. (m).) On appeal, defendant argued the police were not following a preexisting policy and therefore violated his right to be free from "unreasonable searches and seizures" when they opened the leather bags containing the methamphetamine. (U.S. Const., 4th Amend.; see also Florida v. Wells (1990) 495 U.S. 1 (Wells).) He asserted that, though the police may have had a policy requiring them to take an inventory of the contents of a vehicle before towing it, they had no policy governing the opening of closed containers during the course of this inventory.
The Court of Appeal affirmed. Following the reasoning of People v. Auer (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 1664 (Auer), the court held that defendant did not preserve the closed-container issue for appeal because he did not raise it adequately in the trial court. According to the court, allowing defendant to raise this theory on appeal "would be unfair both to the People and to the trial court." The court added, "We have no way of knowing what evidence the prosecutor might have adduced on the merits of this issue." Because the court concluded that defendant's motion was not sufficiently specific to put the prosecution on notice, it did not address the merits of his appeal.
We granted defendant's petition for review in order to consider the specificity required in a motion to suppress evidence.
Here, the record indicates that the police had a policy requiring them to inventory the contents of a vehicle before towing it, but, as in Wells, the record contains "no evidence of any . . . policy on the opening of closed containers." (Wells, supra, 495 U.S. at p. 3.) Of course, Wells does not require a written policy governing closed containers or a policy that leaves no room for police discretion, but the record must at least indicate that police were following some "standardized criteria" or "established routine" when they elected to open the containers (id. at p. 4), and the record here fails to do so.
While Wells clearly supports defendant's argument that the police did not conduct a valid inventory search, the question here is whether defendant adequately raised this issue in the trial court, and thus preserved the issue for appeal. Defendant's trial court brief in support of his motion to suppress asserted that the search was improper because the police had no policy governing the taking of an inventory. The brief also cited and quoted the portion of Wells that requires a specific policy or practice governing the opening of closed containers. But the main thrust of defendant's brief was that the police stopped his truck without probable cause, not that the inventory search was improper. The Court of Appeal found this brief insufficient to bring the issue of a policy governing closed containers to the attention of the prosecution and the court. We disagree.
Section 1538.5 governs motions to suppress evidence obtained as a result of a search or seizure. At the time of the trial court proceedings in this case, section 1538.5, subdivision (a), provided: "A defendant may move . . . to suppress as evidence any tangible or intangible thing obtained as a result of a search or seizure on either of the following grounds: [¶] (1) The search or seizure without a warrant was unreasonable. [¶] (2) The search or seizure with a warrant was unreasonable because . . . [for specified reasons, the warrant was inadequate]." (Stats. 1993, ch. 761, § 2.) Here, of course, the search was without a warrant. Defendant notes that the prosecution has the burden of proving, if it can, some justification for a warrantless search or seizure (Badillo v. Superior Court (1956) 46 Cal.2d 269, 272 (Badillo); see also People v. Williams (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1268, 1300; Guidi v. Superior Court (1973) 10 Cal.3d 1, 15, fn. 15), and therefore a warrantless search is presumptively unreasonable. Citing this rule, defendant argues that he needed to be no more specific than to assert a warrantless search in order to satisfy his obligation under section 1538.5. He argues that, once defendants have made a prima facie showing that the police proceeded without a warrant, the prosecution must prove a justification for the search or seizure, defendants need not respond, and, if the prosecution's justification is somehow inadequate, defendants can raise that inadequacy for the first time on appeal.
The Attorney General, on the other hand, argues that defendants must give notice to the prosecution of the precise theory under which they assert the warrantless search or seizure violated their Fourth Amendment rights. As part of this requirement, the Attorney General argues defendants must highlight the flaws in any justification that the prosecution offers for the search or seizure, thereby enabling the prosecution to supplement the record if necessary.
The question in this case is not, of course, whether defendant brought a motion to suppress, but whether his motion was sufficiently specific. But, like the first question, this specificity question does not depend on the allocation of the burden of proof. True, we have held in the context of a motion for acquittal that defendants need not specify "the gaps in the prosecution's case" because to impose that requirement would be inconsistent with the prosecution's burden of proof. (People v. Belton (1979) 23 Cal.3d 516, 522.) But that holding merely reflects the usual correlation between the burden of raising an issue and the burden of proof. It is irrelevant to our resolution of the same question in this very different context, where the prosecution may be able to relitigate the suppression issue after reversal on appeal (§ 1538.5, subd. (j)), and therefore any lack of specificity in the trial court will only delay the proceeding. In sum, the circumstance that the prosecution has the burden of proof does not preclude our holding that, at least in this context, defendants must precisely pinpoint the subject matter of that proof.
Section 1538.5, by its terms, authorizes a motion to suppress if "[t]he search or seizure without a warrant was unreasonable." (Italics added.) "The clear implication of the subsection is that the evidence need not be suppressed, if the seizure was reasonable. To state the implication positively: a warrantless seizure of evidence may be valid if reasonable cause for the seizure exists." (People v. Curley (1970) 12 Cal.App.3d 732, 746.) Therefore, defendants must do more than merely assert that the search or seizure was without a warrant. The search or seizure must also be unreasonable; that is, it must not fall within any exception to the warrant requirement. To address properly both concepts included in section 1538.5, defendants have the burden of (1) asserting the search or seizure was without a warrant, and (2) explaining why it was unreasonable under the circumstances.
In this regard, section 1538.5 is consistent with generally applicable and long-standing rules of motion practice. A motion is an application to the court for an order. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1003.) In general, the moving party must carry the initial burden of informing its opponent and the court of the specific basis for its motion. (See, e.g., Cal. Rules of Court, rule 313(a), (b).) If the rule were otherwise, then the party opposing the motion would have to try to guess, and then refute, every possible basis for the motion, which would always be inefficient and would often produce arbitrary results. Similarly, when defendants move to suppress evidence under section 1538.5, they must inform the prosecution and the court of the specific basis for their motion.
Nevertheless, we can discern no reason for requiring defendants to guess what justification the prosecution will offer at the risk of forfeiting the right to challenge that justification. Under such a rule, defendants would routinely safeguard their rights by enumerating, and then refuting, every possible justification for a warrantless search or seizure. Motions to suppress would be filled with pages of unnecessary argument about justifications that the prosecution is readily willing to concede are inapplicable. Because law enforcement personnel, not the defendant, made the decision to proceed without a warrant, they, not the defendant, are in the best position to know what justification, if any, they had for doing so.
Moreover, once the prosecution has offered a justification for a warrantless search or seizure, defendants must present any arguments as to why that justification is inadequate. (See, e.g., People v. Coleman (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 321, 324-325 (Coleman).) Otherwise, defendants would not meet their burden under section 1538.5 of specifying why the search or seizure without a warrant was "unreasonable." This specificity requirement does not place the burden of proof on defendants. (Cf. People v. Sedillo (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 616, 624 (Sedillo).) As noted, the burden of raising an issue is distinct from the burden of proof. The prosecution retains the burden of proving that the warrantless search or seizure was reasonable under the circumstances. (Badillo, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 272; Stats. 1997, ch. 279, § 5.) But, if defendants detect a critical gap in the prosecution's proof or a flaw in its legal analysis, they must object on that basis to admission of the evidence or risk forfeiting the issue on appeal.
In sum, we conclude that under section 1538.5, as in the case of any other motion, defendants must specify the precise grounds for suppression of the evidence in question, and, where a warrantless search or seizure is the basis for the motion, this burden includes specifying the inadequacy of any justifications for the search or seizure. In the interest of efficiency, however, defendants need not guess what justifications the prosecution will argue. Instead, they can wait for the prosecution to present a justification. Moreover, in specifying the inadequacy of the prosecution's justifications, defendants do not have to help the prosecution step-by-step to make its case. The degree of specificity that is appropriate will depend on the legal issue the defendant is raising and the surrounding circumstances. Defendants need only be specific enough to give the prosecution and the court reasonable notice. Defendants cannot, however, lay a trap for the prosecution by remaining completely silent until the appeal about issues the prosecution may have overlooked.
Court of Appeal decisions addressing the specificity required in a motion to suppress evidence are generally consistent with this rule. Most of those decisions follow either People v. Manning (1973) 33 Cal.App.3d 586, 589 (Manning) or Wilder v. Superior Court (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 90 (Wilder). Though some decisions argue that Manning and Wilder are in conflict, we find them reconcilable.
In Wilder, the Court of Appeal, without discussing Manning, adopted what some courts have characterized as a conflicting rule. In Wilder, a police officer told the defendant that he would impound the defendant's van if the defendant did not drive it to the Visalia Police Department. (Wilder, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at p. 93.) Once the van was at the police department, the officer contacted individuals who had reported thefts to the police, and they identified certain items located on the van--including a sunroof, rearview mirrors, and a luggage rack--as their missing property. (Ibid.) The defendant moved to suppress these items because the police officer had seized them without a warrant when he ordered the defendant to drive the van to Visalia. (Id. at pp. 92, 94-95.) The trial court denied the motion to suppress (id. at p. 93), and the defendant sought a writ of mandate (id. at p. 92).
In Wilder, on the other hand, the defendant moved to suppress certain evidence, expressly asserting that a police officer had seized it without a warrant. (Wilder, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at p. 96.) The defendant also presented a prima facie case to support his assertion. (Id. at p. 93.) Under those circumstances, he had satisfied his initial obligation, and the prosecution then had the burden of proving some justification for the police officer's actions. The Manning court acknowledged this principle, saying, "[T]he burden is clearly upon the defendant, as moving party, to raise the issue of illegally obtained evidence. [Citation.] It has been held, however, that . . . [a defendant who raises the issue] makes 'a prima facie case' when he establishes that an arrest or search was made without a warrant and that 'the burden then rests upon the prosecution to show proper justification.' " (Manning, supra, 33 Cal.App.3d at p. 600, italics added.) The Court of Appeal in Wilder correctly criticized the trial court for "erroneously . . . requir[ing the defendant] to assert specific attacks upon the warrantless seizure . . . before [the prosecution] articulated its justification for the seizure." (Wilder, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at p. 96.) The court's "obvious solution" was also correct: "The prosecutor should have pleaded his justification prior to the hearing . . . [and the defendant] should have been allowed an opportunity to file a written response to the attempted justification prior to the hearing." (Id. at pp. 96-97.) The defendant could also have waited until after the hearing and challenged the prosecution's proof of its justification.
Accordingly, we see no conflict between Wilder and Manning, but we do not read Wilder as holding that defendants need do nothing more than assert that evidence was seized without a warrant in order to preserve Fourth Amendment issues for appeal. Defendants must also point out specific inadequacies in the prosecution's justifications for the warrantless search. We disapprove Britton, supra, 156 Cal.App.3d 689, Sedillo, supra, 135 Cal.App.3d 616, and Palmquist, supra, 123 Cal.App.3d 1, to the extent they suggest otherwise.
Our conclusion--that defendants must specify the precise grounds for a motion to suppress, including pointing out any inadequacies in the prosecution's justifications for a warrantless search or seizure, but they do not have to guess what those justifications will be--also does not conflict with recent amendments to the Penal Code, including section 1538.5. In 1997, the Legislature amended section 1538.5, redesignating subdivision (a) as (a)(1) and adding subdivision (a)(2), which provides: "A motion pursuant to paragraph (1) shall be made in writing and accompanied by a memorandum of points and authorities . . . [which] shall set forth the factual basis and the legal authorities that demonstrate why the motion should be granted." (Stats. 1997, ch. 279, § 3, italics added.) This amendment was one among many that relate primarily to the timing of a motion to suppress and do not purport to alter specificity requirements. (Legis. Counsel's Dig., Sen. Bill No. 123 (1997-1998 Reg. Sess.).) Therefore, the amendment has no direct bearing on the issue we decide here. Moreover, the amendment merely begs the question: In setting forth "the factual basis and the legal authorities" that support a motion to suppress, how specific must defendants be?
With these principles in mind, we turn to the facts of this case. Defendant here moved to suppress evidence that Deputy Hunt seized from closed leather bags found in defendant's truck. In his moving papers, defendant argued that the police lacked probable cause to stop his truck, and they had no policy governing inventory searches. Defendant thus anticipated the prosecution's justifications for the warrantless search of his truck and asserted inadequacies in those justifications. The defendant skipped the steps of first asserting a warrantless search, then waiting for the prosecution to justify the search, and only then challenging the justifications.
Here, the prosecution justified the warrantless search of defendant's truck by asserting (1) the search was incident to a lawful arrest of defendant (see Knowles v. Iowa (1998) ___ U.S. ___ [119 S.Ct. 484, 487-488]; New York v. Belton (1981) 453 U.S. 454, 460-461), and (2) the police were taking an inventory of the truck. As noted, defendant correctly anticipated both justifications, and, with respect to the second justification, which is at issue here, his trial court brief adequately put the prosecution on notice that it had to prove a policy specifically governing the opening of closed containers.
First, the brief expressly asserted that "the Tuolumne County Sheriff's Office has no written policy or procedure for inventory searches." Arguably, that assertion alone was sufficient to raise the closed container issue. The brief made express reference to a "policy," and United States Supreme Court precedent made clear to the prosecution what elements that policy had to include. Specifically, because an inventory search "must not be a ruse for a general rummaging," the prosecution had to prove the existence of a "policy or practice" governing Deputy Hunt's decision to open closed containers. (Wells, supra, 495 U.S. at p. 4.) Furthermore, if Hunt was truly following a policy, not searching for drugs, when he decided to open the leather bags in defendant's truck, then he would have cited this policy when he explained to the prosecuting attorney his reasons for opening the bags without a warrant. Therefore, the prosecution cannot credibly claim to have been unaware that defendant's reference to a "policy" meant a policy governing the opening of closed containers.
Second, defendant cited and quoted from Wells as follows: ". . . Florida Highway Patrol had no policy whatever with respect to the opening of closed containers encountered during an inventory search. We hold that absent such a policy, the instant search was not sufficiently regulated to satisfy the Fourth Amendment . . . ." (Wells, supra, 495 U.S. at pp. 4-5, italics added.) Thus, defendant's motion made clear to the prosecution that it would have to prove not just any policy, but, more specifically, a policy governing Deputy Hunt's decision to open the leather bags.
Nor do we accept the Attorney General's assertion that defense counsel's oral argument at the hearing on the motion to suppress somehow conceded the issue of whether the police had a policy governing the opening of closed containers. First, defense counsel did not expressly concede the issue. Counsel was of course free to focus his oral argument on one aspect of his motion and not another. Therefore, we find no significance in the fact that defense counsel did not specifically discuss the issue. Second, defense counsel did specifically refer to the inadequacy of the inventory search. Therefore, counsel did not ignore the issue altogether. Third, defense counsel's argument came after the prosecution presented evidence. Therefore, nothing in that argument can explain the gap in the prosecution's evidence. And fourth, the court abruptly interrupted defense counsel's argument in order to make its ruling. Therefore, we do not know what additional arguments defense counsel might have made.
Because of the risk that an inventory search will be "a ruse for a general rummaging," a risk that this case particularly exemplifies, a valid inventory search must adhere to a preexisting policy or practice. (Wells, supra, 495 U.S. at p. 4.) This rule may require the prosecution to prove more than the existence of some general policy authorizing inventory searches; when relevant, the prosecution must also prove a policy or practice governing the opening of closed containers encountered during an inventory search. (Id. at pp. 4-5.) Here, by raising the question whether the inventory search was pursuant to a preexisting policy and by quoting from Wells, defendant adequately put the prosecution on notice as to the specifics of the policy it needed to prove. Nevertheless, the prosecution failed to meet its burden.

References: § 11379
 § 11378
 § 11350
 § 667
 § 667
 § 1203
 § 11379
 § 2085
 § 11372
 § 1538
 v. 
 v. 
 § 2
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 1003
 v. 
 v. 
 § 5
 v. 
 v. 
 § 3
 v. 
 v.