Source: http://marcusmediation.com/mediation-message-no-93/
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 02:57:13+00:00

Document:
Once again, I’m summarizing the mediation and arbitration topics I wrote about in the previous eleven months. Before discussing them, thank you for your support in helping me to be honored by the Daily Journal as a Top 50 California Neutral for the sixth time in the last seven years.
This year’s Mediation Messages started with an analysis of two true mediation topics (the joint caucus and binding mediation) but then segued into substantive, evidentiary and procedural subjects that impact the value of a case and, thus, settlement – which, of course, is the raison d’etrê of mediations. Refer to the Mediation Messages or Arbitration Insights identified below on my website (www.marcusmediation.com) if the following summaries do not suffice.
The evolution of the joint caucus was discussed in Mediation Message no 83 (January 2013). The practice of holding a joint caucus at the beginning of every mediation has now been replaced by separate caucuses. Nonetheless, a joint caucus at the beginning of mediation can be helpful if a complaint has not yet been or just been filed and there has been no or little discovery. A joint caucus later in mediation can be useful when discussions have bogged down regarding a factual or legal issue and the mediator believes that the best way to break this impasse is to have the attorneys get together to clarify or explain their respective positions.
In Mediation Message No, 84 (February 2013), I looked at binding mediation, in which a neutral, by agreement of the parties, makes a binding determination regarding the dispute after an unsuccessful mediation. The process was sanctioned in Bowers v. Lucia Companies (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 724. Although binding mediation may be an appropriate remedy to settle a case, before initiating that process, the parties should require the agreed-upon neutrals to disclose all potential conflicts and make sure that they, too, have waived the conflict that mediators, and about to be arbitrators, might be influenced by argument that they heard in separate mediation caucuses. The better process is to not have the same person mediate and arbitrate a matter.
Judicial admissions were discussed in Mediation Message no. 86 (April 2013). Dang v. Smith (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 646 advises that “statements in a pleading are always admissible against the pleader to prove the matter asserted — as is any other statement by a party.” (Id. at p. 657.) Barsegian v. Kessler & Kessler (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 446 applied a narrower interpretation to such admissions, observing that “not every factual allegation in a complaint automatically constitutes a judicial admission.” Instead, Barsegian noted that “a judicial admission is ordinarily a factual allegation by one party that is admitted by the opposing party. The factual allegation is removed from the issues in the litigation because the parties agree as to its truth. Thus, facts to which adverse parties stipulate are judicially admitted. (Citation.) Similarly, in discovery when a party propounds requests for admission, any facts admitted by the responding party constitute judicial admissions. (Citation.) And when an answer admits certain factual allegations contained in a complaint or cross-complaint, those facts are likewise judicially admitted. (Citation.)” (Id. at p. 451.) Barsegian’s analysis misses the point that judicial admissions may also occur when a party’s legal language is inconsistent with a previously held position and thus is “conclusively deemed true.” (Dang v. Smith, supra, at p. 657.) Therefore, the defendant in Dang could use the plaintiff’s allegation in the complaint to its benefit, without having to admit or stipulate to it (as Barsegian so holds), because the plaintiff had taken a position inconsistent with a previous claim.
The five-year deadline to try a case (see Mediation Message no. 87 [May 2013]) was not a factor in the halcyon days of adequate court-funding. But, with recent budget shortfalls, it is again a potential issue, which makes Gonzalez v. County of Los Angeles (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1124 worth considering. Gonzalez holds that the five-year deadline is tolled when the action is submitted to mediation during the last six months of the five-year period.
Stipulations for judgment were the subject of Mediation Message no. 89 (July 2013) since they are often incorporated as terms in settlement documents. Greentree Financial Group, Inc. v. Executive Sports, Inc. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 495 holds that such stipulations cannot include unenforceable penalties and that “The amount set as liquidated damages ‘must represent the result of a reasonable endeavor by the parties to estimate a fair average compensation for any loss that may be sustained.’” (Id. at p. 499.) Greentree does not hold, as is commonly believed, that stipulations for judgment cannot provide for the amount of damages requested in a complaint. The case states only that the amount of the judgment must bear a reasonable relationship to any actual damages that might flow from the defendant’s failure to comply with the stipulation’s financial terms.
Mediation Message no. 91 (September 2013) was about human frailties, including greed, bad judgment and overreaching. In Ellis v. Toshiba America Information Systems, Inc. (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 853, a plaintiff’s attorney, after the settlement of a consumer class action, first asked for over $24 million in fees and then almost $13 million in fees and costs. The trial court, with the appellate court affirming, awarded the attorney nothing in fees and sanctioned her $165,000 because her billing records were inconsistent and contained omissions, the total number of hours claimed was excessive, her efforts to promote the fee claim were self-serving and not for the benefit of the class and she had been unprofessional in fighting discovery of her time records.
Arbitration Insight no. 24 (October 2013) analyzed Mt. Holyoke Homes, LP, et al. v. Jeffer Mangels Butler & Mitchell, LLP (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 1299, which holds that arbitrators must disclose references of parties to arbitrations on the arbitrators’ web sites or resumes. According to Mt. Holyoke, the age of the reference, that the person being referenced had no professional relationship with the arbitrator and that the reference was discoverable on the internet are irrelevant. Instead, “An objective observer reasonably could conclude that an arbitrator listing a prominent litigator as a reference on his resume would be reluctant to rule against the law firm in which that attorney is a partner as a defendant in a legal malpractice action.” (Id. at p. 1313.) At the time this summary was written, the California Supreme Court had not yet indicated whether it would grant a hearing in Mt. Holyoke.

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