Source: http://www.ahrlj.up.ac.za/de-wet-e-du-plessis-a
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 23:00:14+00:00

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The South African Constitutional Court has not yet had sufficient opportunity to clarify the meaning of positive obligations of the state imposed by the environmental right contained in section 24 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. The contribution attempts to determine some of the positive obligations of a substantive nature implied by this section. It does so by drawing inspiration from the way in which international (both universal and regional) human rights bodies have interpreted and applied relevant provisions of different human rights instruments within their respective jurisdictions. In addition, it illuminates the extent to which these obligations may have already been given effect to in domestic law. The human rights instruments that are considered for the purposes of this article include the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; the African Charter of Human and Peoples' Rights; the European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms; the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man; and the American Convention of Human Rights.
In light of the fact that the South African Constitutional Court has not yet had sufficient opportunity to clarify the meaning of section 24 of the Constitution,  this contribution attempts to determine some of the positive obligations with specific reference to substantive duties, implied by this section.  In doing so, it draws inspiration from the way in which international human rights bodies (both universal and regional) have interpreted and applied the relevant provisions of the respective human rights instruments within their jurisdiction. In addition, it illuminates the extent to which these obligations may already have been given effect to in domestic law.
The choice to focus on the substantive rather than the procedural is not intended to deny the added value of procedural obligations for environmental protection, nor their potential for strengthening the democratic process and environmental governance as a whole.  However, as these procedural obligations have thus far been fairly well-covered by constitutional, administrative and environmental law scholars and the South African courts, it seems appropriate to focus the attention on the more elusive substantive positive obligations flowing from the aforementioned human rights instruments.
Neither the European Convention nor any of its additional protocols explicitly protect any interest in the preservation of the environment. However, environmental interests may merit protection if and to the extent to which this is required for the protection of any of the other rights in the Convention.  Already under the former two-tier system of enforcement consisting of the European Commission of Human Rights (European Commission) and the European Court, the right to a private life, home and family (guaranteed in article 8(1) of the European Convention) emerged as the most likely vehicle for indirect substantive protection of environmental rights.  Since the replacement of the two-tier system by a single court on 1 November 1998, this role of article 8 has been developed further by the jurisprudence of the European Court.  The right to life in article 2 has also on occasion been relevant.  The latter article implies a high threshold in the form of a real and immediate risk to life, as such is not a prominent vehicle for the indirect protection of the environment under the European Convention.
Neither the American Declaration nor the American Convention explicitly guarantees any environmental rights.  Even so, the inter-American system of human rights, composed of the Inter-American Court and the Inter-American Commission, have provided indirect protection to the environment through the right to life, despite the high threshold applicable in this instance. The right to life is guaranteed both in article 1 of the American Declaration  and article 4 of the American Convention.  The Inter-American Commission and the Inter-American Court both adjudicate violations of human rights.  The primary difference between the two bodies is that the Inter-American Court has the authority to render binding judgments on the parties involved and order reparations, while the Inter-American Commission publishes non-binding (albeit authoritative) recommendations.  Moreover, whereas complaints received by the Inter-American Court pertain to the rights guaranteed in the American Convention, the Inter-American Commission may also receive complaints based on the rights guaranteed in the American Declaration in relation to those members of the Organization of American States (OAS) that have not yet ratified the Inter-American Convention.  The Inter-American Commission thus assumes a dual role.
The above having been said, a number of substantive positive obligations relevant to environmental protection have crystallised in the jurisprudence of the above-mentioned human rights bodies. These obligations are discussed in the subsequent paragraphs.
A broad obligation to engage in environmental assessments  and regulation pertaining to environmental damage can be derived from article 24 of the African Charter. A similar obligation can be derived from articles 2 and 8(1) of the European Convention, at least in those instances where the harm posed by a particular activity for the environment, and as a result for certain aspects of human life, is beyond dispute.
In essence, the above decisions all acknowledge a positive obligation on state authorities to engage in risk and/or impact assessments of activities that pose a danger to the environment and/or human health. In relation to article 24 of the African Charter, this obligation concerns the impact of the activity (such as oil drilling) on the environment as such, regardless of whether the environmental impact also results in a violation of other rights of individuals. In the case of articles 2 and 8(1) of the European Convention, the obligation would be narrower, as it would be directed only at the impact of the situation or activity (such as the operation of waste disposal) on the rights contained in articles 2 and 8(1) respectively.
When referring to these rights, the European Court frequently makes reference to the impact of the particular environmental situation on the health and well-being of the claimants. These concepts both potentially have broad meanings, but the European Court has not given clear direction in this regard. In the cases under discussion, the European Court referred to physical health only (and did not elaborate on mental health), while well-being was closely connected to the enjoyment of home and family life. Where these rights were rendered meaningless, for example because the affected persons had to give up their homes as a result of an enduring environmental situation, their well-being was negatively affected.
A positive duty to limit the economic exploitation of natural resources, as well as to prevent pollution of water, air and soil and eradicate the consequences thereof, can also be derived from the rights of indigenous peoples.  The Inter-American Commission has relied on the right to life as a vehicle for the protection of the way of life of indigenous peoples, whereas the HRC has relied on the right to culture, which constitutes an element of minority protection under article 27 of ICCPR.
On the whole, the substantive obligations for (indirect) protection of the environment distilled from international human rights bodies underscore the anthropocentric dimension of environmental protection. At the same time they remain rather general in nature. This can be explained in part by the fact that judicial bodies deal with individual cases and sets of facts as opposed to broad policy making, and have neither the expertise nor the democratic mandate to engage in the detailed regulation of specifics in a highly technical and rapidly-changing area of law.  Since this reality is linked to the nature of the judicial process itself, it is also visible in proceedings such as the SERAC case. In this decision, the African Commission interpreted article 24 of the African Charter, which explicitly guarantees the right to a satisfactory environment. Although a judicial body can in such an instance address environmental protection directly and more comprehensively than through indirect protection, the benchmarks it designs will depend on the circumstances of the case at hand. In addition, the explicit recognition of a right to a satisfactory environment would not relieve courts (or policy makers) from balancing the positive substantive obligations inherent in such a right with other legitimate public interests, including the economic development of an area or the country as a whole. A weighing of different interests will therefore always have to be undertaken when determining the scope of the positive obligations directed at environmental protection.
Even so, the substantive positive obligations pertaining to the environment, which have thus far been generated through international human rights bodies, illustrate the inter-twining of human life (health and well-being) and the environment. They serve as outer boundaries for government actions and omissions that can trigger state responsibility when crossed.  The subsequent paragraphs focus on the guidance that the South African legislature, executive and courts can infer from the (two strands of) substantive obligations identified above, when interpreting and enforcing section 24 of the Constitution.  In addition, there is an assessment of the extent to which these positive duties have already materialised in the South African context via legislation, judgments of the courts and/or recommendations of the South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC).
A fair number of scholarly analyses pertaining to the scope and meaning of section 24 is available,  and it is widely accepted that this provision imposes both negative and positive obligations on the state.  Even so, judicial interpretation and clarification of the state's obligations contained in this right are crucial to guide the conduct of the legislature and the executive in relation to environmental governance. So far domestic judicial guidance in this respect has been limited due to the absence of cases dealing squarely with specifically the positive (substantive) obligations contained in section 24. Still, this does not free the legislative or executive branches of government from their duty to design and implement a regulatory framework that gives effect to this provision. In doing so, the jurisprudence of the international human rights bodies discussed above constitute a useful point of reference. In addition, the South African courts can draw guidance from the international jurisprudence once the need arises to interpret the substantive meaning of the environmental right.
With the exception of the SERAC case before the African Commission,  the obligations pertaining to environmental protection identified by international human rights bodies were all distilled from non-environmental human rights. Therefore, the scope of the substantive environmental obligations derived from the rights in question is likely to be more limited than what can be expected from a right explicitly directed at environmental protection such as section 24 of the Constitution. At the same time, section 24 is likely to cover those environmentally-relevant obligations that can be distilled from non-environmental human rights. If these obligations can already be generated by relying on human rights not directly aimed at protecting the environment, it is hard to see how such obligations could not be implied by a right explicitly directed at environmental protection.  This overlap suggests that the positive obligations generated through relevant international jurisprudence create a minimum threshold for environmental protection.
Section 24(a) of the Constitution is broad and carries considerable potential meaning. Sections 24(b)(i) to (iii) list a number of positive state obligations such as the duty to prevent pollution and ecological degradation. These obligations are, however, without any detail. In principle, therefore, the added value of internationally-recognised positive obligations lies in clarifying the text and scope of section 24(a) as well as in concretising the obligations listed in section 24(b). With this in mind, the following section evaluates the potential meaning of the relevant international jurisprudence and the minimum threshold for environmental protection that it suggests, for the interpretation and enforcement of some of the positive duties that sections 24(a) and (b) impose on the state.
Section 24(a) read with section 7(2) of the Constitution places a positive duty on the state to ensure an environment that is conducive to health and well-being.  This obligation would inter alia imply environmental risk assessments in instances where a prevailing situation could be harmful to the health or well-being of individuals, in line with the Öneryildiz,  Lopez-Ostra  and Fadeyeva  cases. An environmental risk assessment can accordingly be triggered by potential hazards to human life, for example, human exposure to radioactive material or to high levels of uranium in drinking water. Section 24(b) further obliges the state to take reasonable legislative and other measures to promote conservation and secure ecologically sustainable development and the use of natural resources. It follows that an environmental impact assessment can also be triggered by potential harm to, or negative impacts on the natural environment per se as in the case of the development of an industrial site that would alter the ecological characteristics of an entire wetland, or for example a township development that would irreversibly disturb a significant portion of richly biodiverse grassland.
These obligations directed at the protection of natural resources are reminiscent of those contained in article 24 of the African Charter and confirmed by the SERAC case.  In this context it is important to note that the substantive obligations distilled from international human rights law stretch beyond the mere execution of environmental assessments. To be aware of the impact and risks that certain types of activities are likely to pose for humans and/or the natural environment is only one side to the positive duty of the state. Its regulatory system (including permitting, licensing, compliance monitoring, enforcement and other measures) must further be directed at the effective regulation, minimisation and prevention of environmental harm that may result from such activities. This translates into the duty to collect and record environmental information (on the state of the environment, environmental impacts, risks, etc.), and to act upon it. In this regard the Lopez-Ostra case  illustrates that when authorities are aware that a certain activity (in this case the operation of a private tannery waste treatment facility) takes place without the necessary environmental authorisation, it could reinforce a case against the state for non-compliance with its obligations under section 24 of the Constitution. The violation of article 2 of the European Convention identified in the Öneryildiz case  inter alia resulted from the fact that the authorities were aware of certain environmental dangers but refrained from taking action.
Some of the obligations related to environmental assessments and regulation that one finds in the international context have already found resonance in South African law. This applies in particular to environmental impact assessments (EIAs), which are widely accepted as one of the most successful environmental regulatory interventions to have emerged over the last four decades.  South Africa has a history of environmental impact assessments dating back to the 1970s.  An EIA is required to be able to obtain environmental authorisation prior to the commencement of certain listed activities. Both the EIA process and its requirements are currently regulated by chapter 5 of NEMA  combined with a set of EIA Regulations in terms of sections 24 of that Act.  NEMA determines that the potential consequences for or impacts on the environment of listed or specified activities  must be considered, investigated, assessed and reported on to the competent authority or the Minister of Minerals and Energy.  NEMA compels the competent authorities at national and provincial level to publish notices in the Government Gazette with the areas or activities that are subject to EIAs.  A variety of activities and areas are currently listed  and include, for example, the construction of facilities or infrastructure (including associated structures or infrastructure) for the temporary storage of hazardous waste; the transmission and distribution of electricity above ground with a capacity of more than 33 kilovolts and less than 120 kilovolts; and the development of a new facility or the transformation of an existing facility for storage or manufacturing, generally, which occupies an area of 1 000 square meters or more outside an existing area zoned for industrial purposes. The types of activity at stake in the Öneryildiz,  Lopez-Ostra,  Fadeyeva  and SERAC  cases are in principle all covered by at least one of the categories of activities or areas that are currently listed in terms of section 24 of NEMA.
Of relevance are at least three of the framework environmental management principles that apply across the Republic to the actions of all organs of state that may significantly affect the environment and which apply 'alongside … the state's responsibility to respect, protect, promote and fulfil the social and economic rights in chapter 2 of the Constitution'.  These principles are legally binding and should guide the interpretation, administration and implementation of NEMA, and any other law concerned with the protection or management of the environment.  NEMA requires 'the consideration of all relevant factors, including that a risk-averse and cautious approach is applied, which takes into account the limits of current knowledge about the consequences of decisions and actions'. In addition, 'negative impacts on the environment and on people's environmental rights must be anticipated and prevented, and where they cannot be altogether prevented, they must be minimised and remedied'.  It further provides that '(t)he social, economic and environmental impacts of activities, including disadvantages and benefits, must be considered, assessed and evaluated, and decisions must be appropriate in the light of such consideration and assessment.'  Formally, the NEMA principles above are judicially enforceable, but may nonetheless come across as a mere pooling of unclear terms and vague objectives. Even so, repeated references to 'risk' and 'impact' indicate that the state has a positive obligation to estimate and act upon environmental risks and impact as part of decision making and governance even in the event of an activity not listed in the EIA Regulations.  In essence, authorities must take decisions that are 'appropriate'.  NEMA links such appropriateness directly to known and unknown information about environmental impacts and risks. For example, in the (unlikely) event that the development of an off-shore wind-energy facility is not covered by any of the listed activities in the EIA Regulations, the section 2 NEMA principles still compel the state to apply its mind to the potential impact on marine life and the risks for conservation of the seabed. Another example would be if the facilities necessary for carbon sequestration were not (yet) covered by the EIA Regulations and where it would not (yet) be known if such facilities could harm human health in the long term. Even in such uncertain circumstances the state still has the duty to act with great caution in relation to potential harm and impact in terms of the overarching NEMA-principles.
South Africa may be lauded for the fact that its legal framework for environmental risk and impact is fairly tight and seems to take due account of the positive environmental obligations that were distilled in international human rights jurisprudence. With a set of new EIA Regulations published in June 2010,  it also appears as if this area of environmental law is rapidly developing and under continuous scrutiny. This conclusion is not intended to deny the challenges that the state may face concerning the actual execution of its duties in relation to environmental impact, risk and regulation.  Likely challenges in this respect inter alia relate to the procedural dimension of estimating and regulating environmental risk and impact.  However, the current legislative framework provides necessary preliminary steps for ensuring that the state gives effect to section 24 of the Constitution in a manner that also gives due consideration to South Africa's international obligations.
Pure economic principles will no longer determine, in an unbridled fashion, whether a development is acceptable. Development, which may be regarded as economically and financially sound, will, in future, be balanced by its environmental impact, taking coherent cognisance of the principle of inter-generational equity and sustainable use of resources in order to arrive at an integrated management of the environment, sustainable development and socio-economic concerns. By elevating the environment to a fundamental judiciable human right, South Africa has irreversibly embarked on a road, which will lead to the goal of attaining a protected environment by an integrated approach, which takes into consideration, inter alia, socio-economic concerns and principles.
Furthermore, in the 2007 Fuel Retailers case,  the Constitutional Court confirmed that both the need to protect the environment and the need for social and economic development, as well as 'their impact on decisions affecting the environment and obligations of environmental authorities in this regard, are important constitutional questions'.  Similar to the BP case, this case dealt with the nature and scope of the obligation to consider the social, economic and environmental impact of the proposed establishment of a petrol filling station, as well as whether the environmental authorities complied with that obligation. With reference to section 24 of the Constitution, the Court confirmed that socio-economic development had to be balanced with environmental protection.  However, these references were of a broad and general nature and the Court did not engage in an analysis of the complexities inherent in such a balancing act.
It is worth noting that the distinctions between the concepts of 'indigenous' and 'traditional' communities are blurred and that it is fair to conclude that a certain measure of overlap exists within the South African context. For example, in its Preamble, the Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act (Traditional Leadership Act)  explicitly refers to indigenous communities as consisting of a 'diversity of cultural communities', which would imply that they also qualify as traditional communities. The Intellectual Property Laws Amendment Bill (IPLA Bill) of 2010,  for its part, defines an 'indigenous community' as 'any community of people currently living within the borders of the Republic, or who historically lived in the geographic area currently located within the borders of the Republic'. This definition would be broad enough to cover a variety of (traditional) communities that share, for example, a particular cultural or religious tradition.
The reasoning of international human rights bodies regarding the relationship between indigenous communities and the need for environmental protection is reinforced by a number of international instruments that protect the rights of indigenous people. Even though none of these instruments is legally binding on South Africa, they serve as a valuable source of interpretation of section 24 in a manner that compliments the standards distilled by human rights bodies. One such instrument is the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People (UN Declaration),  which explicitly recognises that respect for indigenous knowledge, cultures and traditional practices contributes to sustainable and equitable development and proper management of the environment. The Declaration makes it clear that indigenous people have the right to health, conservation and the protection of the environment.  Furthermore, the International Labour Organisation (ILO)'s Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention  (ILO Convention) provides that the rights of peoples concerned with the natural resources pertaining to their lands shall be specially safeguarded. These rights include the right of indigenous and tribal peoples to participate in the use, management and conservation of natural resources.
Internationally, the established view is that the natural habitat of indigenous peoples merits special protection due to their particular dependence for their way of life on such an environment.  This view has also been confirmed closer to home by the Botswana High Court in the case of Sesana and Others v Attorney-General.  In deciding this matter, and with reference to the UN Cobo Report,  the Court observed that there is 'a deeply spiritual relationship between indigenous peoples and their land'.  However, it is true that, despite the special relationship between indigenous people and their natural resource base, activities in various African countries grossly disturb this relationship.  It is against this backdrop that the positive substantive duties of section 24 of the Constitution must be interpreted.
At first sight it is more difficult to link the positive obligation to protect the way of life and culture of indigenous peoples to the text of section 24 of the Constitution, than it is in the case of the obligation to undertake environmental assessments. Neither indigenous peoples nor issues of tradition, religion or culture have been explicitly included in section 24. Still, the state has the obligation to fulfil the right of everyone in South Africa to an environment that is not detrimental to their health or well-being (section 24(a)) and to secure the ecologically-sustainable development and use of natural resources while promoting, inter alia, social development (section 24(b)). It seems likely that 'the way of life' of indigenous peoples and traditional communities fits within the realm of the protection afforded by a right that mentions notions such as 'health', 'well-being' and 'social development'. These are all intrinsically part of human life.
The Constitution provides further guidance in this regard. Section 31(1(a)) determines that persons belonging to a cultural, religious or linguistic community may not be denied the right, with other members of that community, to enjoy their culture, practise their religion and use their language. This wording is reminiscent of article 27 of ICCPR.  In line with the jurisprudence of the relevant international human rights decisions analysed above, one can interpret article 24 (combined with article 31) as obliging the state inter alia to demarcate certain natural resources such as land, waters or forests essential to the survival of indigenous people, to limit or even exclude certain commercial activities and development within this area, to prevent the risk of environmental pollution that could threaten the way of life of these communities, as well as to provide reparations in instances where members of these communities have suffered injury as a result of environmental degradation.
It seems therefore that South African law protects indigenous peoples' interests in the event of economic developments that may exploit their natural resources or otherwise impact on their natural habitat. Arguably, the strength of this protection will depend on the availability to indigenous communities of information in relation to proposed developments, the accessibility of environmental and legal knowledge, as well as the ability and means to take action. An indigenous community can only protect and enforce protection of its environmental interests when it fully grasps the long-term ecological impact and consequences (including financial risks and benefits) of a bio-prospecting project, for example.
At this point it is worth mentioning a few developments in the South African courts and before the SAHRC in relation to the protection of the way of life of indigenous and traditional communities. The decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal in Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town and Others  was based on section 31(1) of the Constitution. The question before the Court was whether the existence of graves and places of religious significance can be taken into account in township-establishment applications. The case concerned more than 20 graves that had special religious and cultural significance to the members of the Cape Town Muslim community. Two of the graves were so-called 'kramats' with particular spiritual significance. The Court held in favour of this traditional community, stating that the exercise of property rights could be constrained by the law and by the protection of other constitutional rights (legal interests) of a particular group of people. Even though this decision concerned a religious minority (which would satisfy the definition of a traditional community)  as opposed to an indigenous community and had a more nuanced bearing on environmental protection,  it reflects sensitivity on the part of the courts for heritage resources, cultural practices and the way of life of minorities.  It is likely that the courts will display a similar sensitivity towards the way of life of indigenous people, including their dependency on the preservation of a particular natural habitat.
Although no relevant cases involving indigenous peoples have thus far come before the courts, the SAHRC Report on the Inquiry into Human Rights Violations in the Khomani San Community in the Andriesvale-Askham Area of 2004  explicitly highlights the environmental rights of the Khomani San people. The inquiry (research, public hearings and a final report) followed a number of alleged human rights violations in the area, subsequent to the settlement of the Khomani San's land claim in 1999 in terms of the national Land Reform Programme provided for by the Restitution of Land Rights Act.  Amongst others, the SAHRC's enquiry involved a consideration of the alleged violation by the state (the government in its entirety and specifically the Mier Local Municipality) of section 24 of the Constitution. The land of the Khomani San was found to lack the necessary environmental management practices to secure an environment not detrimental to health and well-being and the protection of this community's fragile and vulnerable natural resource base.  Furthermore, the SAHRC found that the Khomani San lacked access to basic environmental services such as access to water, sanitation and waste management.  The SAHRC's findings and recommendations acknowledged that section 24 in the broad sense imposes positive environmental duties on the state in relation to the Khomani San as an indigenous community.  However, no mention was made of a special kind of constitutional protection by virtue of this community's 'indigenous' status, nor of the international discourse on the close relationship between their natural environment and indigenous peoples' way of life.
In the final analysis the two strands of substantive obligations pertaining to the protection of the environment that were distilled from international human rights jurisprudence contribute to an improved understanding of the meaning and scope of section 24 of the South African Constitution. At first sight one might conclude that positive obligations to conduct and monitor environmental impact and risk assessments do not have much added value in the South African context, since these obligations have already been concretised extensively in domestic legislation. Similarly, there is domestic legislation in place to give effect to the obligation to preserve the culture and way of life of indigenous communities. However, so far the South African courts and other judicial bodies have not yet explicitly acknowledged that these obligations have a constitutional character, nor have they buttressed such an interpretation with international human rights jurisprudence. If South African judicial bodies were to do so, it would confirm the special nature of the obligations at stake, notably that they constitute a minimum threshold of protection, which cannot be discarded through policy whims of the legislature and the executive. In addition, such an approach would underscore the inter-twining of environmental protection with (other) human rights and therefore serve as an indication of the priority that environmental governance should receive at all levels of governance. Such recognition of priority can in turn serve as a useful tool for informing the public and political debate pertaining to the challenges that the state faces in relation to the implementation of its environmental obligations.
The above analysis further illustrates that international human rights jurisprudence has inherent limitations when identifying positive obligations pertaining to the environment. This is related to the fact that environmental protection per se is not yet a justiciable right before most international human rights bodies. As a result, these bodies can only distill positive obligations pertaining to the environment where they are also clearly linked to the protection of other (internationally justiciable) human rights. This reality necessarily limits the role of international human rights bodies in determining positive obligations directed at environmental protection to particular categories of cases. The only exception in this regard is the right to a satisfactory environment in article 24 of the African Charter which is justiciable before the African Commission and African Court of Human and Peoples' Rights. It is possible that in future these bodies may build on and further concretise the positive obligations identified in the SERAC case. Such a development would be of particular relevance to South Africa, given the broad scope of section 24 of the Constitution and the fact that South Africa is a party to the African Charter.
For the time being, however, South African courts may be confronted with the concretisation of particular substantive duties pertaining to section 24 of the Constitution, in relation to which international jurisprudence does not yet exist. In such a situation, the roles would be reversed in the sense that the South African courts could contribute to the development of international law in a bottom-up manner. By linking their interpretations explicitly to article 24 of the African Charter, which is binding on South Africa, domestic courts could provide the regional human rights bodies with an indication of the substantive meaning of this article. Some of the substantive questions that may arise before the courts in future could include the meaning of and positive obligations attached to the concepts of health and well-being (section 24(a) of the Constitution), how authorities are to determine and implement the notion of 'environmental benefit for future generations' (section 24(b) of the Constitution), as well as what may be regarded as 'reasonable' legislative and other measures on the part of the state given the limited and diminishing availability of natural resources such as water and minerals (section 24(b) of the Constitution).
When confronted with these questions, the courts will face the challenge of giving concrete meaning to constitutional and international obligations in an area that is highly technical and subject to rapid change and scientific development. It is to be expected that the domestic courts (like their international counterparts) will act prudently under these circumstances and limit their findings to the concrete context of the case at hand. However, this should not detract from the fact that their jurisprudence plays an important role in clarifying and enforcing the minimum threshold of protection pertaining to the environment that is mandated under the South African Constitution and international law.
 The authors wish to express their gratitude to the South Africa-Netherlands Research Programme on Alternatives in Development (SANPAD) for its financial support that enabled the research for this publication. This contribution also forms part of a project of the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO) titled 'The emerging international constitutional order: The implications of hierarchy in international law for the coherence and legitimacy of international decision-making' and a project of the South African National Research Foundation (NRF) titled 'Local government and environmental rights'. The authors would further like to express their gratitude to Proff Jonathan Verschuuren and Dinah Shelton for their valuable comments on an earlier draft.
 D Garcia San José Enforcing the human right to environment in Europe: A critical overview of the European Court of Human Rights case law (2004) 15.
 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996, assented to on 16 December 1996, http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/site/theconstitution/english-09.pdf (accessed 13 July 2010).
 The Constitutional Court's willingness to draw on international and foreign domestic law in its application of the Constitution has been shown in several of its judgments over the last couple of years. Two examples include S v Zuma & Others 1995 2 SA 642 (CC) paras 14-15 and Sanderson v Attorney, Eastern Cape 1998 2 SA 38 (CC) para 26.
 Although Fuel Retailers Association of Southern Africa v Director-General Environmental Management, Department of Agriculture, Conservation and Environment Mpumalanga Province & Others 2007 6 SA 4 (CC) (Fuel Retailers case) was decided by the Constitutional Court and based on parts of sec 24 of the Constitution (n 3 above), the case merely focused on the need to create a balance between sustainability considerations in public environmental decision making. In addressing the most recent case of environmental significance, Mazibuko v The City of Johannesburg & Others 2010 3 BCLR 239 (CC), the Constitutional Court primarily relied on the right to access to sufficient water provided for in sec 27 of the Constitution.
 The need for such a determination is clear from inter alia Feris's assessment as quoted by LJ Kotzé & AR Paterson 'South Africa' in LJ Kotzé & AR Paterson (eds) The role of the judiciary in environmental governance: Comparative perspectives (2009) 579.
 National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998 (NEMA), assented to on 19 November 1998, http://www.info.gov.za/view/DownloadFileAction?id="70641" (accessed 13 July 2010).
 Sec 2(4)(n) and ch 6 of NEMA (n 7 above).
 For a brief overview of the relevance of international human rights instruments and South African law, see J Dugard International law A South African perspective (2005) 336-340.
 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 4 November 1950, 213 UNTS 221.
 See extensively E de Wet 'The “friendly but cautious” reception of international law in the jurisprudence of the South African Constitutional Court: Some critical remarks' (2005) 28 Fordham International Law Review 1529.
 African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, 27 June 1981, 1520 UNTS 217.
 American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man, April 1948, reprinted in OAS/SerL/V/I4 Rev 9 (2003).
 American Convention on Human Rights, 21 November 1969, 1144 UNTS 123.
 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171.
 D Shelton 'The environmental jurisprudence of the international human rights tribunals' in R Picolotti & JD Taillant (eds) Linking human rights and the environment (2005) 12.
 In the absence of an international supervisory body that renders authoritative decisions on the scope of treaty obligations, it is up to the state parties themselves to determine the scope of the obligations. See F Viljoen International human rights law in Africa (2007) 28-30.
 See Dugard (n 9 above) 16-26. For comments on international law and the South African Constitution from an environmental law perspective, see also J Glazewski Environmental law in South Africa (2005) 29-30.
 See K O'Regan 'Human rights and democracy – A new global debate: Reflections on the first ten years of South Africa's Constitutional Court' (2004) 32 International Journal of Legal Information 207.
 P Birnie & AE Boyle International law and the environment (2002) 259. The importance of international developments in domestic sustainable development policy is also recognised in the South African context in the (as it was called at the time) Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism (DEAT) People-planet-prosperity: Draft strategic framework development strategy for sustainable development in South Africa (2006) 22.
 Birnie & Boyle (n 20 above) 257.
 D Bodansky 'The use of international sources in constitutional opinion' (2004) 32 Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law 425; see also O Tshosa National law and international human rights law cases of Botswana, Namibia and Zimbabwe (2001) 10; J Verschuuren De zorg van de overheid en het recht van de burger (1994) 79.
 See in particular A Ulvsbäck Standardising individual environmental protection (2004) 1-2 15-16. See also AR Mowbray The development of positive obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights by the European Court of Human Rights (2004) 183.
 See in particular Social and Economic Rights Action Centre (SERAC) & Another v Nigeria (2001) AHRLR 60 (ACHPR 2001) (SERAC case) paras 44-46. The African Commission also identified a fourth type of obligation, namely, that of promoting human rights; sec 7(2) of the Constitution similarly refers to the promotion of rights. However, this category, which concerns actions that promote tolerance or develop infrastructure, would also be adequately covered by the obligation of fulfilment; see also D Shelton 'International decisions' (2002) 96 American Journal of International Law 938-939.
 Inter-American Court Marcel Claude-Reyes & Others v Chile (Merits, Reparations and Costs) judgment of 19 September 2006, Case 12.108, Report 60/03, http://www.corteidh.or.cr/casos.cfm (accessed 13 July 2010); see Inter-American Commission Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Ecuador (Ecuador Report) OEA/serL/V/II66 Doc 10 Rev 1, (1997), http://www.cidh.oas.org/countryrep/ecuador-eng/index%20-%20ecuador.htm (accessed 13 July 2010); European Court Anna Maria Guerra & 39 Others v Italy, judgment of 19 February 1998 (Guerra case) (1998) I Reports of Judgments and Decisions 64; European Court Öneryildiz v Turkey (GC) (Öneryildiz case) judgment of 30 November 2004 (2004-XII) Reports of Judgments and Decisions 657; European Court Tătar v Romania (Tătar case) judgment of 27 January 2009 (unreported), Case 67021/01.
 SERAC case (n 24 above) para 53; HRC Apirana Mahuika & Others v New Zealand, decision of 16 November 2000, Comm 547/1993, UN Doc CCPR/C/70/D/547/1993 (Mahuika case); HRC Länsman & Others v Finland (No 2) (Länsman case) decision of 22 November 1996, Comm 671/1995, UN Doc CCPR/C/58/D/671/1995; Inter-American Court Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v Nicaragua (Awas Tingni case) judgment of 31 August 2001 (Ser C) No 79 (2001).
 See SERAC case (n 24 above) para 53; Claude-Reyes case (n 25 above); European Court Hatton v United Kingdom (GC) (Hatton GC case) judgment of 8 July 2003 (2003) 37 EHRR 28, paras 113-116.
 See inter alia cases cited in nn 25-27 above.
 See Kotzé & Paterson (n 6 above) 579-586 for an overview of some environmental cases in South Africa that concerned issues of administrative justice, access to information and locus standi.
 On this point, see D Shelton 'Human rights and the environment: Problems and possibilities' (2008) 38 Environmental Policy and Law 44.
 D Shelton 'Human rights and the environment' in H Stockinger et al (eds) Updating international nuclear law (2007) 161.
 The individual complaints procedure resulted from art 55 of the African Charter in conjunction with ch XVII of the Rules of Procedures of the African Commission, 10 June 1995, http://www.achpr.org/english/_info/rules_en.html (accessed 13 July 2010); See also F Viljoen 'The African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights' in C Heyns (ed) Human rights law in Africa (2004) 420 ff; See also F Ouguergouz The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (2003) 485 ff.
 See text of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights, 6 October 1998 CAB/LEG/66.5, http://www.chr.up.ac.za (accessed 13 July 2010). At the time of writing, the African Court had only dealt with one case which was declared admissible. See Michelot Yoyogombaye v Senegal, African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights, Appl 001/2008, judgment, 15 December 2009, http://www.african-court.org/en/cases/latest-judgments/ (accessed 13 July 2010).
 See extensively F Viljoen & L Louw 'State compliance with the recommendations of the African Commission on Human Rights and Peoples' Rights, 1994-2004' (2007) 101 American Journal of International Law 1 ff.
 See art 1 of the First Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 302; See also SN Carlson & G Gisvol Practical guide to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (2003) 11.
 Art 27 of ICCPR determines that '[i]n those states in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own language'.
 See Garcia San José (n 2 above) 29-30. This anthropocentric approach to environmental protection, whereby environmental harm must affect human well-being before human rights guarantees can be invoked, implies that unless there is a specific right to a healthy or ecologically-balanced environment, international human rights procedures cannot be used on behalf of the environment or to prevent threats to other species or to ecological processes. See Shelton (n 30 above) 45; For criticism on the limits of the anthropocentric approach, see G Lohmann 'Sollte es ein individuelles Menschenrecht auf eine angemessene Umwelt geben?' in PG Kirchenschläger & T Kirchenschläger (eds) Menschenrechte und Umwelt (2008) 104. See also A Peters 'Gibt es ein Menschenrecht auf saubere Umwelt? Menschenrechte und Umweltschutz: Zur Synergie völkerrechtlicher Teilregime' in Kirchenschläger & Kirchenschläger (above) 225-226.
 The single court consists of a chamber system with the possibility of appeal to the Grand Chamber. For a brief overview of the 'old' and 'new' systems of protection provided by the European Convention, see C Ovey & RCA White Jacobs & White. The European Convention on Human Rights (2006) 8 ff.
 It is worth noting that art 11 of the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Protocol of San Salvador), 17 November 1988, OAS TS No 69, guarantees the right to a healthy environment. However, art 11 cannot form the object of an individual petition before the Inter-American Commission or the Inter-American Court and is therefore not directly enforceable. See Ulvsbäck (n 23 above) 28; see also IK Scott 'The Inter-American system of human rights: An effective means of environmental protection' (2000) 19 Virginia Environmental Law Journal 201.
 Art 4 of the American Convention states: 'Every person has the right to have his life respected. This right shall be protected by law and, in general, from the moment of conception. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.' See also Scott (n 42 above) 201.
 Scott (n 42 above) 200.
 Art 64 of the American Convention also provides for a broad jurisdiction in relation to advisory opinions. For a discussion, see Scott (n 42 above) 206-207.
 Scott (n 42 above) 201 205. Although this implies that the Inter-American Commission formally relies on different standards when reviewing human rights complaints against different OAS member states, on a practical level the standards in the American Declaration and American Convention often overlap and function as one set of standards.
 Environmental assessments refer in this context to either environmental impact assessments or environmental risk assessments. Due to some overlap no strict distinction between the two types of environmental assessments is made for purposes of this article. An environmental impact assessment is generally defined as a competent scientific analysis of the possible impacts on the environment, which is required by decision makers prior to the approval of certain activities or developments. See with reference to Robinson, JFC DiMento 'Science and environmental decision making: The potential role of environmental impact assessment' (2005) 45 Natural Resources Journal 297. An environmental risk assessment is more narrowly described as the process for identifying hazards and transforming related scientific data into meaningful information about the undesired effects of human activities on the environment; as well as combining it with an evaluation of the consequences. See F Klopf et al 'A road map to a better NEPA: Why environmental risk assessments should be used to analyse the environmental consequences of complex federal actions' (2007) 8 Sustainable Development Law and Policy 38.
 SERAC case (n 24 above).
 Under the African Charter, some indirect environmental protection has also been recognised through the right to health in art 16(1). In Free Legal Assistance Group & Others v Zaire (Free Legal Assistance Group case) (2000) AHRLR 74 (ACHPR 1995), the African Commission was confronted with the provision of safe drinking water. In determining that the failure by the government to provide such a basic service constituted a violation of the African Charter, the African Commission only focused on art 16(1) and refrained from making the obvious link to art 24 of the African Charter; See M van der Linde & L Louw 'Considering the interpretation and implementation of art 24 of the African Charter on Human Rights and Peoples' Rights in light of the SERAC communication' (2003) 3 African Human Rights Law Journal 177.
 SERAC case (n 24 above) 'Summary of the facts'; see also Van der Linde & Louw (n 50 above) 168; see Viljoen (n 17 above) 288.
 SERAC case (n 24 above) para 52.
 SERAC case (n 24 above) para 52; Van der Linde & Louw (n 50 above) 178; Viljoen (n 17 above) 288.
 SERAC case (n 24 above) para 53.
 Öneryildiz case (n 25 above) 657.
 Öneryildiz case (n 25 above) para 71 ff; Shelton (n 31 above) 145.
 Shelton (n 31 above) 145 166.
 European Convention (n 10 above).
 Art 2 European Convention (n 41 above); European Court Lopez-Ostra v Spain (Lopez-Ostra case) judgment of 9 December 1994 (1995) 20 EHRR 277 para 51. However, it remains essential to determine whether the adverse effects of the environmental pollution had a detrimental effect on one or more of the rights explicitly mentioned in art 8(1). It is not the purpose of that article (or any other in the European Convention) to prevent or address environmental pollution as such; See also Ovey & White (n 40 above) 286; J Verschuuren 'Invloed van het EVRM op het materiële omgevingsrecht in Nederland' in T Barkhuysen et al De betekenis van het EVRM voor het materiële bestuursrecht, VAR preadviezen No 132 (2004) 266.
 Lopez-Ostra case (n 59 above) para 51.
 As above. See also M Fitzmaurice & J Marshall 'The human right to a clean environment – Phantom or reality? The European Court of Human Rights and English courts' perspective on balancing rights in environmental cases' (2007) 76 Nordic Journal of International Law 117.
 European Court Fadeyeva v Russia (Fadeyeva case) judgment of 9 June 2005 (2005) 40 ECHR 376.
 Fadeyeva case (n 62 above) paras 67 & 68. See also Fitzmaurice & Marshall (n 61 above) 128-129.
 Fadeyeva case (n 62 above) para 134; Ovey & White (n 40 above) 28; Fitzmaurice & Marshall (n 61 above) 130.
 European Court Hatton v United Kingdom (GC) (Hatton GC case) judgment of 8 July 2003 (2003) 37 EHRR 28 paras 43-45; Similarly, European Court Powell & Raynor v United Kingdom (Powell & Raynor case) judgment of 21 February 1990 (1990) 12 EHRR 355. This case also confirmed that the right to enjoyment of property protected in art 1 of Protocol 1 of the European Convention can also be affected by pollution or other environmental harm, where such harm has resulted in a very substantial reduction of the property at stake. However, in practice, this right has played a marginal role in the indirect protection of the environment in the jurisprudence of the European Court.
 Hatton GC case (n 65 above) paras 113-116. From a procedural perspective it is worth noting that the Grand Chamber held that the absence of a judicial review procedure which could determine whether the introduction of a new night flight schedule at Heathrow violated the private and family life of those in the vicinity, constituted a violation of the right to a remedy under art 13 of the European Convention. See also Fitzmaurice & Marshall (n 61 above) 126; S Zeichen 'Das Recht auf unversehrte Umwelt und die Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention' in M Geistlinger (ed) Umweltrecht in Mittel- und Osteuropa im International und Europäischen Kontext (2004) 58.
 See also Garcia San José (n 2 above) 56.
 Hatton GC case (n 27 above) paras 126-129; Garcia San José (n 2 above) 63; S Greer The European Convention on Human Rights. Achievements, problems and prospects (2007) 264.
 D Shelton (n 31 above) 145 166.
 Scott (n 42 above) 215.
 Scott (n 42 above) 212.
 Inter-American Court Comunidad Yanomami v Brazil (Yanomami case), decision of 5 March 1985, Case 7615, Res 12/85, reprinted in Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and Inter-American Court of Human Rights Inter-American Yearbook of Human Rights (1985), http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/84.85eng/Brazil7615.htm (accessed 13 July 2010). See also KSA Ebeku 'The right to a satisfactory environment and the African Commission' (2003) 3 African Human Rights Law Journal 149; Shelton (n 16 above) 20.
 Yanomani case (n 72 above) consideration 10; Scott (n 42 above) 215.
 Ecuador Report (n 25 above).
 Ecuador Report (n 25 above) 77 ff; Shelton (n 16 above) 20 22.
 HRC Chief Bernard Ominayak and the Lubicon Lake Band v Canada (Lubicon Lake Band case) decision of 10 May 1990, Communication 167/1984 UN Doc CCPR/C/38/D/167/1984 para 33. See also Peters (n 38 above) 218.
 The flipside of the coin is that the rights of indigenous peoples may also at times be limited in order to protect the environment. This was confirmed by the HRC in the Mahuika case (n 26 above). In this case the government of New Zealand had regulated the fishing rights of the Maori community after a complicated process of consultation, in an attempt to conserve natural resources against the background of a dramatic growth in the fishing industry. The HRC confirmed that there was no violation of art 27 of ICCPR in this instance.
 Länsman case (n 26 above); Shelton (n 16 above) 8; S Joseph et al The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Cases, materials and commentary (2005) 777.
 See Shelton (n 16 above) 18.
 See also Inter-American Commission of Human Rights, Third Report on the Situation in Paraguay (IACHR Paraguay Report) OEA/Ser.L/V/II 110 Doc 52, 9 March 2001; Shelton (n 31 above) 158.
 D Bodansky & J Brunnée 'Introduction: The role of national courts in the field of international environmental law' in M Anderson & P Galizzi (eds) International environmental law in national courts (2002) 7.
 Bodansky & Brunnée (n 82 above) 8; Shelton (n 31 above) 159.
 It is acknowledged that constitutional interpretation requires that a right such as the environmental right be interpreted with, inter alia, contextual factors, constitutional values, the impact and scope of other constitutional rights as well as applicable internal limitations and the limitation clause (sec 36 of the Constitution) in mind. Guidance from international case law can accordingly only be a part of the domestic interpretation process.
 See, eg, the following: Glazewski (n 18 above) 67-68 72-81; M Kidd Environmental law (2008) 18-23; I Currie & J de Waal The Bill of Rights handbook (2005) 521-530; L Feris 'The socio-economic nature of section 24(b) of the Constitution – Some thoughts on HTF Developers (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism (2008) 23 SA Public Law 194-207; L Feris & D Tladi 'Environmental rights' in D Brand & C Heyns (eds) Socio-economic rights in South Africa (2005) 249; Kotzé & Paterson (n 6 above) 560-562 572-579; AA du Plessis Fulfilment of South Africa's constitutional environmental right in the local government sphere (2009).
 These duties arise from an inclusive reading of secs 24 and 7(2) of the Constitution. Sec 7(2) determines that '[t]he state must respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights'.
 Although the possibility exists that these internationally-recognised duties may assist further in the interpretation of other rights in the Constitution (eg the right to life or the right to dignity), it will not be discussed in any detail here.
 The exact meaning of health and well-being in this context has not yet been confirmed by the courts. Health in this context seems to refer to protection against environmental conditions that would negatively affect human health, such as excessive air or water pollution and exposure to toxic substances. Well-being seems to refer to environmental conditions that are not necessarily harmful to human health but that may otherwise negatively affect the interests that people hold in the environment, such as the aesthetic value of a wetland that attracts different bird species or the spiritual or religious value attached to a sacred forest.
 Öneryildiz case (n 25 above).
 Lopez-Ostra case (n 59 above).
 Fadeyeva case (n 62 above).
 More than 100 countries around the globe have adopted some form of EIA through legislation. See F Retief & LJ Kotzé 'The lion, the ape and the donkey: Cursory observations on the misinterpretation and misrepresentation of Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) in the chronicles of fuel retailers' unpublished conference paper delivered on 31 May 2009 at the Annual Environmental Law Association Conference, Johannesburg, South Africa.
 For a brief overview of the development of the EIA system in South Africa, see UN Economic Commission for Africa's report entitled Review of the Application of Environmental Impact Assessment in Selected African Countries (EIA Review) (2005) 24 http://www.unitednationonline.org/eca_programmes/sdd/documents/EIA_book_final_sm.pdf (accessed 13 July 2010).
 Government Notices R385, R386 & R387 (EIA Regulations) in Government Gazette 28753, 21 April 2006, http://www.environment.gov.za/ (accessed 13 July 2010).
 In this context, sec 1 of NEMA (n 7 above) broadly defines 'activities' as policies, programmes, processes, plans and projects.
 Sec 24(1) of NEMA (n 7 above).
 Sec 24D of NEMA (n 7 above).
 See the extensive list of activities in Government Notice R386 in Government Gazette 28753, 21 April 2006 (n 99 above).
 Erection and operation of a waste collection site in close proximity of a human dwelling (Öneryildiz case (n 25 above)).
 Erection and operation of a waste treatment facility (Lopez-Ostra case (n 59 above)).
 Erection and operation of a steel manufacturing plant (Fadeyeva case (n 62 above)).
 Oil extraction (SERAC case (n 24 above)).
 Sec 2(1)(a) of NEMA (n 7 above).
 Sec 2(1)(e) of NEMA (n 7 above).
 Secs 2(4)(a)(vii) & (viii) of NEMA (n 7 above) (our emphasis).
 Sec 2(4)(i) of NEMA (n 7 above) (our emphasis).
 EIA Regulations (n 99 above).
 See sec 2(4)(i) of NEMA (n 7 above).
 Amendments to the EIA Regulations (n 99 above) have recently been finalised by Department of Water Affairs and Forestry. The new Regulations were published on 18 June 2010 and will soon come into effect on a date to be announced. The 2010 Regulations can be retrieved via http://www.environment.gov.za/ (accessed 13 July 2010).
 For a discussion of some of the challenges that are generally experienced in relation to the institutionalisation of EIA systems and the conducting of EIAs per se, see EIA Review (n 97 above).
 An in-depth assessment of the effectiveness of the EIA system that considers in detail, eg, the qualifications and conduct of EIA practitioners, the scientific quality of assessments, fraud and corruption or the effectiveness of government in the issuing of records of decisions and monitoring of compliance, falls beyond the scope of this article. For further analysis, see SAIEA Improving the effectiveness of environmental impact assessment and strategic environmental assessment in Southern Africa (2003) 29-30 http://www.saiea.com/html/may_2003.pdf (accessed 13 July 2010).
 See, eg, Sasol Oil (Pty) Ltd & Another v Metcalfe NO 2004 5 SA 161 (W); All the Best Trading CC t/a Parkville Motors & Others v SN Nayagar Property Development and Construction CC & Others 2005 3 SA 396 (T); MEC for Agriculture, Conservation, Environment and Land Affairs v Sasol Oil (Pty) Ltd & Another 2006 5 SA 483 (SCA); and Capital Park Motors CC & Another v Shell South Africa Marketing (Pty) Ltd & Others (unreported)  JOL 20072 (T).
 This is in line with the Constitutional Court's approach. In the case of South African National Defence Union v Minister of Defence 2007 5 SA 400 (CC) 51, 52 O'Regan J confirmed that '[w]here legislation is enacted to give effect to a constitutional right, a litigant may not bypass that legislation and rely directly on the Constitution without challenging the legislation as failing short of the constitutional standard'.
 BP Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd v MEC for Agriculture, Conservation, Environment and Land Affairs (BP case) 2004 5 SA 124 (W).
 Sec 24(b) of the Constitution makes explicit reference to the notion of sustainable development. In terms of sec 1 of NEMA (n 7 above), sustainable development is defined in the South African context as 'the integration of social, economic and environmental factors into planning, implementation and decision making so as to ensure that development serves present and future generations'.
 See for a more detailed discussion of this case Kotzé & Paterson (n 6 above) 573-575.
 BP case (n 119 above) para B-D 144.
 Fuel Retailers case (n 5 above).
 Fuel Retailers case (n 5 above) para 41.
 Fuel Retailers case (n 5 above) paras 44-45. Although the facts were quite different, the Constitutional Court's thinking seems to signify the reasoning of the HRC in the Länsman case (n 26 above).
 For a detailed discussion, see Country Report of the Research Project by the International Labor Organization (ILO) and the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Constitutional and Legislative Protection of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: South Africa (2009) 3-4 (ILO & African Commission Country Report) http://www.chr.up.ac.za/indigenous/country_ reports/Country_reports_SouthAfrica.pdf (accessed 13 July 2010).
 Ch 12 of the Constitution acknowledges the role of 'traditional' leadership; according to sec 2 of Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Amendment Act 41 of 2003, http://www.saflii.org/za/legis/num_act/tlagfa2003431.pdf (accessed 13 July 2010) (Traditional Leadership Act), a community is recognised as a 'traditional' community for purposes of application of the Act if it is subject to a system of traditional leadership and observes a system of customary law.
 Traditional Leadership Act (n 127 above).
 Intellectual Property Laws Amendment Bill (IPLA Bill) of 2010, http://www.pmg.org.za/ files/bills/100422b8-10_0.pdf (accessed 13 July 2010).
 See also ILO & African Commission Country Report (n 126 above) 47, which submitted that sec 24 of the Constitution should be seen as a mechanism to protect the environment of South Africa's indigenous people.
 See the Preamble of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People (UN Declaration) adopted on 13 September 2007, http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/DRIPS_en.pdf (accessed 13 July 2010). South Africa has signed the Declaration at the time of its adoption. For a discussion of the Declaration with a focus on its meaning for indigenous communities in Africa, see WJM van Genugten 'Protection of indigenous peoples on the African continent: Concepts, position seeking, and the interaction of legal systems' (2010) 104 American Journal of International Law 29-65.
 Art 29 of the UN Declaration.
 Art 15 of the ILO Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention adopted on 27 June 1989 (ILO Convention) http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/convde.pl?C169 (accessed 13 July 2010). South Africa and most other African countries have not ratified the ILO Convention.
 Already in 1983, the ECOSOC Final Report on the Problem of Discrimination against Indigenous People, submitted by Special Rapporteur José R Martinez Cobo (Cobo Report) underscored the complexity and deep-seated implications of the relationship between indigenous communities and their land as reminiscent of their natural resource base. The Cobo Report is available at http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/MCS_xxi_xxii_e.pdf (accessed 13 July 2010).
 Sesana & Others v Attorney-General (Sesana case), High Court judgment, Misca No 52 of 2002; ILDC 665 (BW 2006).
 Cobo Report (n 134 above).
 Sesana case (n 135 above) para H.1.5.b.
 Van Genugten (n 131 above) 32-34. In relation to the pastoralist indigenous communities of other African countries such as Nigeria and Tanzania, conflicts over land and other natural resources between these communities and state authorities are reportedly increasing 'at an alarming rate'; see International Working Group for Indigenous Affairs The Indigenous world yearbook (2009) 13 http://www.iwgia.org/sw29940.asp (accessed 13 July 2010). These tensions are of an ethnic nature and follow the forceful removal of indigenous communities from what they regard as 'their' land; For a critical view of the way in which climate change affects the way of life some of the pastoralist indigenous communities in Africa and the role of governments in addressing this impact through mitigation and adaptation strategies, see JO Simel 'The threat posed by climate change to pastorolists in Africa' in International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs Climate change and indigenous affairs 34-43, http://www.iwgia.org/sw29928.asp (accessed 13 July 2010).
 ICCPR (n 15 above); see also sec 30 of the Constitution, which determines that '[e]veryone has the right to use the language and to participate in the cultural life of their choice, but no one exercising these rights may do so in a manner inconsistent with any provision of the Bill of Rights'.
 National Heritage Resources Act 25 (NHRA) of 1999, assented to on 28 April 1999, http://www.saflii.org/za/legis/num_act/nhra1999278.pdf (accessed 13 July 2010). The importance of this Act for purposes of the protection of the environment of indigenous people is illuminated in the Country Report (n 126 above).
 Sec 1 of NHRA (n 140 above).
 Sec 5(7) of NHRA (n 140 above).
 Sec 2(4)(g) of NEMA (n 7 above). Unfortunately the meaning of 'decision' and 'indigenous knowledge' is not clarified in the Act. It can, however, be derived from the scope of application of NEMA that a decision pertains to any decision taken in the public or private domain that is or could be of environmental relevance. Indigenous knowledge is in a very technical way defined in the IPLA Bill (n 129 above) as 'traditional intellectual property' which is reminiscent of indigenous knowledge systems and which comprises of traditional works, traditional designs, traditional performances and traditional terms and expressions.
 Policy Framework for the Protection of Indigenous Knowledge through the Intellectual Property System (Policy Framework) of 2008, http://www.dti.gov.za/ccrd/ip/policy.pdf (accessed 13 July 2010).
 Policy Framework (n 145 above) 9.
 National Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act 10 (Biodiversity Act) of 2004, assented to 7 June 2004, http://www.info.gov.za/acts/2004/a10-04/index.html (accessed 13 July 2010).
 Bio-prospecting is defined in sec 1 of the National Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act (n 147 above) as any research on, or development or application of, indigenous biological resources for commercial or industrial exploitation, and includes inter alia the utilisation for purposes of such research or development of any information regarding any traditional uses of indigenous biological resources by indigenous communities. An example is the commercialisation of the medicinal uses of the indigenous Hoodia plant as originally discovered by the San people.
 Sec 82(1) of the Biodiversity Act (n 147 above).
 Sec 83 of the Biodiversity Act (n 147 above).
 Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd v The City of Cape Town & Others (25/08)  ZASCA 85; 2010 1 SA 333 (SCA) (3 September 2009).
 For the definition of a 'traditional community', see n 127 above.
 See the inclusion of cultural interests in the definition of the environment, sec 1 of NEMA (n 7 above). Note also that the NHRA (n 140 above) is often classified as an environmental law despite it being administered by the national department responsible for arts and culture.
 In this regard, although this matter dealt specifically with the retrospective application (statutory interpretation) of sec 28 of NEMA (n 7 above), the case of Bareki NO & Another v Gencor Ltd & Others 2006 1 SA 432 (TPD) should be noted. It addressed the historic pollution caused by an asbestos mine. The main applicant was a traditional leader acting in his own name and on behalf of the community living adjacent to the mine. The applicants alleged that the mine caused, and continued to cause, significant pollution due to the dispersion of asbestos fibers, which were causing ill health in the traditional community. The court confirmed, without further elaboration, that pollution and degradation of the environment present a serious health risk to residents and occupiers of the areas concerned, as well as a significant threat to the environmental integrity of the region.
 SAHRC Report on the Inquiry into Human Rights Violations in the Khomani San Community in the Andriesvale-Askham Area (November 2004). This report is on file with the authors.
 Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 of 1994, assented to 25 November 1994, http://www.info.gov.za/acts/1994/a22-94.pdf (accessed 13 July 2010).
 SAHRC Report (n 155 above) 28.
 SAHRC Report (n 155 above) 12.
 SAHRC Report (n 155 above) 11 28.

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