Source: https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/407/514
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 18:16:11+00:00

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Page 538 it be necessary to consider whether there has been or would be prejudice to the defense at trial. '(T)he major evils protected against by the speedy trial guarantee exist quite apart from actual or possible prejudice to an accused's defense.' United States v. Marion, supra, at 320, 92 S.Ct., at 963. Of course, cases will differ among themselves as to the allowable time between charge and trial so as to permit prosecution and defense adequately to prepare their case. But unreasonable delay in run-of-the-mill criminal cases cannot be justified by simply asserting that the public resources provided by the State's criminal-justice system are limited and that each case must await its turn. As the Court points out, this approach also subverts the State's own goals in seeking to enforce its criminal laws.
The Sixth Amendment provides: 'In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining Witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.'2.'We hold here that the right to a speedy trial is as fundamental as any of the rights secured by the Sixth Amendment.' 386 U.S., at 223, 87 S.Ct., at 993.
There is no explanation in the record why, although Barker's initial trial was set for October 21, no continuance was sought until October 23, two days after trial should have begun.
Apparently Manning chose not to appeal these final two convictions.
The written motion Barker filed alleged that he had objected to every continuance since February 1959. The record does not reflect any objections until the motion to dismiss, filed in February 1962, and the objections to the continuances sought by the Commonwealth in March 1963 and June 1963.
Tr. of Oral Arg. 33.7 Report of the President's Commission on Crime in the District of Columbia 256 (1966).8 In Washington, D.C., in 1968, 70.1% of the persons arrested for robbery and released prior to trial were re-arrested while on bail. Mitchell, Bail Reform and the Constitutionality of Pretrial Detention, 55 Va.L.Rev. 1223, 1236 (1969), citing Report of the Judicial Council Committee to Study the Operation of the Bail Reform Act in the District of Columbia 2021 (1969).
The number of these offenses has been increasing. See Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, 1971, p. 321.10 '(I)t is desirable that punishment should follow offence as closely as possible; for its impression upon the minds of men is weakened by distance, and, besides, distance adds to the uncertainty of punishment, by affording new chances of escape.' J. Bentham, The Theory of Legislation 326 (Ogden ed. 1931).11 To Establish Justice, To Insure Domestic Tranquility, Final Report of the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence 152 (1969).12 Testimony of James V. Bennett, Director, Bureau of Prisons, Hearings on Federal Bail Procedures before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights and the Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 46 (1964).13 E.g., the 'Tombs' riots in New York City in 1970. N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1970, p. 1, col. 8.
The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society, A Report by the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice 131 (1967).15 '(I)n large measure because of the many procedural safeguards provided an accused, the ordinary procedures for criminal prosecution are designed to move at a deliberate pace. A requirement of unreasonable speed would have a deleterious effect both upon the rights of the accused and upon the ability of society to protect itself.' United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120, 86 S.Ct. 773, 776, 15 L.Ed.2d 627 (1966).
For examples, see American Bar Association Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Speedy Trial 1416 (Approved Draft 1968); Note, The Right to a Speedy Criminal Trial, 57 Col.L.Rev. 846, 863 (1957).18 Second Circuit Rules Regarding Prompt Disposition of Criminal Cases (1971).19 ABA Project, supra, n. 17, at 14. For an example of a proposed statutory rule, see Note, The Lagging Right to a Speedy Trial, 51 Va.L.Rev. 1587, 1619, (1965).
E.g., Pines v. District Court of Woodbury County, 233 Iowa 1284, 10 N.W.2d 574 (1943). See generally Note, The Right to a Speedy (Criminal Trial, 57 Col.L.Rev. 846, 853 (1957); Note, The Lagging Right to a Speedy Trial, 51 Va.L.Rev. 1587, 16011602 (1965).21 See State v. Maldonado, 92 Ariz. 70, 373 P.2d 583 (en banc), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 928, 83 S.Ct. 299, 9 L.Ed.2d 236 (1962); Hicks v. People, 148 Colo. 26, 364 P.2d 877 (1961) (en banc); People v. Prosser, 309 N.Y. 353, 130 N.E.2d 891 (1955); Zehrlaut v. State, 230 Ind. 175, 102 N.E.2d 203 (1951); Flanary v. Commonwealth, 184 Va. 204, 35 S.E.2d 135 (1945); Ex parte Chalfant, 81 W.Va. 93, 93 S.E. 1032 (1917); State v. Hess, 180 Kan. 472, 304 P.2d 474 (1956); State v. Dodson, 226 Or. 458, 360 P.2d 782 (1961). But see State v. Vawter, 236 Or. 85, 386 P.2d 915 (1963).22 See United States v. Hill, 310 F.2d 601 (CA4 1962); Bruce v. United States, 351 F.2d 318 (CA5 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 921, 86 S.Ct. 1370, 16 L.Ed.2d 553 (1966); United States v. Perez, 398 F.2d 658 (CA7 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1080, 89 S.Ct. 851, 21 L.Ed.2d 772 (1969); Pietch v. United States, 110 F.2d 817 (CA10), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 648, 60 S.Ct. 1100, 84 L.Ed. 1414 (1940); Smith v. United States, 118 U.S.App.D.C. 38, 331 F.2d 784 (1964) (en banc). The opinion below in this case demonstrates that the Sixth Circuit Takes a similar approach. 'As an indication of the importance which these courts have attached to the demand rule, see Perez, supra, in which the court held that a defendant waived any speedy trial claim, because he knew of an indictment and made no demand for an immediate trial, even though the record gave no indication that he was represented by counsel at the time when he should have made his demand, and even though he was not informed by th court or the prosecution of his right to a speedy trial.
Although stating that they recognize a demand rule, the approach of the Eighth and Ninth Circuits seems to be that a denial of speedy trial can be found despite an absence of a demand under some circumstances. See Bandy v. United States, 408 F.2d 518 (CA8 1969) (a purposeful or oppressive delay may overcome a failure to demand); Moser v. United States, 381 F.2d 363 (CA9 1967) (despite a failure to demand, the court balanced other considerations). The Second Circuit's approach is unclear. There are cases in which a failure to demand is strictly construed as a waiver. E.g., United States v. DeMasi, 445 F.2d 251 (1971). In other cases, the court has seemed to be willing to consider claims in which there was no demand. E.g., United States ex rel. Solomon v. Mancusi, 412 F.2d 88, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 936, 90 S.Ct. 269, 24 L.Ed.2d 236 (1969). Certainly the District Courts in the Second Circuit have not regarded the demand rule as being rigid. See United States v. Mann, 291 F.Supp. 268 (SDNY 1968); United States v. Dillon, 183 F.Supp. 541 (SDNY 1960). The First Circuit also seems to reject the more rigid approach. Compare United States v. Butler, 426 F.2d 1275 (1970), with Needel v. Scafati, 412 F.2d 761, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 861, 90 S.Ct. 133, 24 L.Ed.2d 113 (1969).24 See n. 2, supra.
'If a defendant deliberately by-passes state procedure for some strategic, tactical, or other reason, a federal judge on habeas corpus may deny relief if he finds that the by-passing was the considered choice of the petitioner. The demand doctrine presupposes that failure to demand trial is a deliberate choice for supposed advantage on the assumption that delay always benefits the accused, but the delay does not inherently benefit the accused any more than it does the state. Consequently, a man should not be presumed to have exercised a deliberate choice because of silence or inaction that could equally mean that he is unaware of the necessity for a demand.' Note, The Lagging Right to a Speedy Trial, 51 Va.L.Rev. 1587, 1610 (1965) (footnotes omitted).
As Mr. Chief Justice Burger wrote for the Court in Dickey v. Florida: 'Although a great many accused persons seek to put off the confrontation as long as possible, the right to a prompt inquiry into criminal charges is fundamental and the duty of the charging authority is to provide a prompt trial.' 398 U.S. 30, 3738, 90 S.Ct. 1564, 1569, 26 L.Ed.2d 26 (footnote omitted).27 As a circuit judge, Mr. Justice Blackmun wrote: 'The government and, for that matter, the trial court are not without responsibility for the expeditious trial of criminal cases. The burden for trial promptness is not solely upon the defense. The right to 'a speedy . . . trial's is constitutionally guaranteed and, as such, is not to be honored only for the vigilant and the knowledgeable.' Hodges v. United States, 408 F.2d 543, 551 (CA8 1969).
The American Bar Association also rejects the rigid demand-waiver rule: 'One reason for this position is that there are a number of situations, such as where the defendant is unaware of the charge or where the defendant is without counsel, in which it is unfair to require a demand . . . Jurisdictions with a demand requirement are faced with the continuing problem of defining exceptions, a process which has not always been carried out with uniformity . . . More important, the demand requirement is inconsistent with the public interest in prompt disposition of criminal cases. . . . (T)he trial of a criminal case should not be unreasonably delayed merely because the defendant does not think that it is in his best interest to seek prompt disposition of the charge.' ABA Project, supra, n. 17, at 17.
Nothing we have said should be interpreted as disapproving a presumptive rule adopted by a court in the exercise of its supervisory powers which establishes a fixed time period within which cases must normally be brought. See n. 18, supra.30 See, e.g., United States v. Simmons, 338 F.2d 804, 807 (CA2 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 983, 85 S.Ct. 1352, 14 L.Ed.2d 276 (1965); Note, The Right to a Speedy Trial, 20 Stan.L.Rev. 476, 478 n. 15 (1968). In his concurring opinion in Dickey, Mr. Justice Brennan identified three factors for consideration: the source of the delay, the reasons for it, and whether the delay prejudiced the interests protected by the right. 398 U.S., at 48, 90 S.Ct., at 1574. He included consideration of the defendant's failure to assert his right in the cause-of-delay category, and he thought the length of delay was relevant primarily to the reasons for delay and its prejudicial effects. Id., n. 12. In essence, however, there is little difference between his approach and the one we adopt today. See also Note, The Right to a Speedy Trial, supra, for another slightly different approach.
For example, the First Circuit thought a delay of nine months overly long, absent a good reason, in a case that depended on eyewitness testimony. United States v. Butler, 426 F.2d 1275, 1277 (1970).32 We have indicated on previous occasions that it is improper for the prosecution intentionally to delay 'to gain some tactical advantage over (defendants) or to harass them.' United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 325, 92 S.Ct. 455, 466, 30 L.Ed.2d 468 (1971). See Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S. 354, 361, 77 S.Ct. 481, 485486, 1 L.Ed.2d 393 (1957).
United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S., at 120, 86 S.Ct., at 776; Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 377378, 89 S.Ct. 575, 576577, 21 L.Ed.2d 607 (1969). In Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 221222, 87 S.Ct. 988, 992993, 18 L.Ed.2d 1 (1967), we indicated that a defendant awaiting trial on bond might be subjected to public scorn, deprived of employment, and chilled in the exercise of his right to speak for, associate with, and participate in unpopular political causes.34 See To Establish Justice, To Insure Domestic Tranquility, Final Report of the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence 152 (1969).
There is statistical evidence that persons who are detained between arrest and trial are more likely to receive prison sentences than those who obtain pretrial release, although other factors bear upon this correlation. See Wald, Pretrial Detention and Ultimate Freedom: A Statistrical Study, 39 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 631 (1964).36 For an example of how the speedy trial issue should be approached, see Judge Frankel's excellent opinion in United States v. Mann, 291 F.Supp. 268 (SDNY 1968).
Hindsight is, of course, 20/20, but we cannot help noting that if Barker had moved immediately and persistently for a speedy trial following indictment, and if he had been successful, he would have undoubtedly been acquitted since Manning's testimony was crucial to the Cmmonwealth's case. It could not have been anticipated at the outset, however, that Manning would have been tried six times over a four-year period. Thus, the decision to gamble on Manning's acquittal may have been a prudent choice at the time it was made.
At oral argument, counsel for Barker stated: 'That was after the sheriff, the material witness, was ill; the man who had arrested the petitioner, yes. And the Sixth Circuit held that this was a sufficient reason for delay, and we don't deny this. We concede that this was sufficient for the delay from March 1963 to October, but it does not explain the delays prior to that.' Tr. of Oral Arg. 1920.
UNITED STATES, Petitioner v. John VON NEUMANN, Respondent.
UNITED STATES, Petitioner v. Larry Lee TAYLOR.
Lyman A. MOORE, Petitioner, v. State of ILLINOIS.

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