Source: https://www.malloylaw.com/blog/itemlist/category/3-copyright
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 03:52:09+00:00

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Written by John Fulton, Jr.
Today the Supreme Court agreed to hear a case concerning how costs are awarded under the Copyright Act. The Copyright Act provides that a court “in its discretion may allow the recovery of full costs” to a prevailing party under 17 U.S.C. § 505. Currently, there is a circuit split over what costs are recoverable. The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Eighth and Eleventh Circuits have held that the Copyright Act’s allowance of “full costs” is limited to taxable costs under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1920 and 1821. On the other hand, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has held that the Copyright Act also authorizes non-taxable costs.
The case is Rimini Street Inc. v. Oracle USA Inc., 17-1625, out of the Ninth Circuit.
The European Parliament has approved some proposed amendments to EU copyright law. The proposals must now pass a final step before becoming law. The stated intention of the amendments is to bring Europe’s copyright protection in line with how content is being created and used in the internet age. The text of the law is not yet finalized, and the vote on the finalized text will not occur until January 2019. However, speculation has only just begun as to what effect the proposed laws will have on the freedom of the internet. Of the 24 Articles proposed in the new Directive, 2 have received attention as being especially controversial: Article 11 and Article 13.
Article 13 proposes to increase copyright liability for popular websites that host user-submitted content. The current law places most of the responsibility for avoiding copyright infringement on the user who submits the content; but the proposed amendment redirects much of this liability to the hosting website. Commentators who criticize this proposed amendment include internet luminaries who argue the new law will stifle the freedom of information on the internet. These commentators believe that if the big internet companies who post user-submitted content are also required to police that content more closely, then that policing will necessarily be overbroad; and the result will be the muffling of the freedom of speech and creativity on the internet.
It is difficult to predict what effect the laws will have on the free flow of information and creativity on the internet. This unpredictability is especially true because the laws themselves are not yet finalized. So, between now and January 2019, the proposals are ripe for debate; and maybe the proposed laws are ripe for revision.
An original work of authorship is accorded copyright protection when the work is fixed in a tangible medium of expression (17 U.S.C. §102). However, a copyright owner cannot sue for infringement of the copyrighted work until either 1) “registration has been made” of the work to the Copyright Office, or 2) the work is refused registration by the Copyright Office and the required deposit, application, and fee have been delivered to the Copyright Office in proper form (17 U.S.C. §411).
The phrase “registration has been made” has been interpreted differently by different federal appeals courts. Some courts have ruled the phrase means that the application has been accepted and registered by the Copyright Office. Other courts have ruled the phrase means that a properly filed application for copyright has been received by the Copyright Office. These other courts find support in their interpretation from other statutes where the same phrase is understood to mean properly applying for registration. Supporters of both interpretations point to part 2) of the statute for support of their respective interpretation.
This conflict among federal appeals courts has been recognized in the highest courts, and now the Supreme Court has agreed to settle the dispute in the case, Fourth Estate Public Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com LLC, et al. Does the phrase “copyright registration being made” require only a properly filed application to be received by the Copyright Office? Or does that phrase require an action to be taken by the Copyright Office—either acceptance or refusal—in response to receipt of a properly filed application? The Supreme Court will soon answer that question.
Public Domain Day, January 1 in the U.S., marks the end of term of copyright protection for all copyrights expiring within the year. For the last 20 years, however, Public Domain Day in the U.S. has been largely uneventful, as there has been an effective freeze on copyright expiration since 1998. January 1, 2019 will be the first Public Domain Day since then that copyrighted works see their expiration and transition into the public domain in the U.S.
Grumpy Cat Limited, owner of copyrights and trademarks pertaining to the cat named Tardar Sauce (which gained notoriety for its permanent scowl shown in popular memes), licensed certain limited rights to Grenade Beverage in relation to its "Grumppuccino" iced coffee. After Grenade Beverage allegedly breached and exceeded the scope of the agreement by selling "Grumppuccino" t-shirts and other coffee products, Grumpy Cat Limited filed suit in the United States District Court for the Central District of California.
After three years of litigation, a jury ultimately found in favor of Grumpy Cat Limited -- with Tardar Sauce actually making an appearance at one point during the trial -- and awarded $710,000.00 in damages for trademark and copyright infringement. David Jonelis, lawyer for Grumpy Cat Limited, was quoted saying that it was "the first verdict ever rendered in favor of a viral meme," and that "memes have rights too."
The term “substantially similar” causes plenty of confusion in copyright infringement cases. Beyond the amorphous nature of the term, itself, courts use this language with subtly different meanings when evaluating the separate prongs of the test for infringement: (1) copying, and (2) misappropriation. It’s not enough to merely copy; to be liable for infringement, the defendant must take elements of a work that are original. Copying can be demonstrated by circumstantial evidence of access to the plaintiff’s work and substantial similarity of the defendant’s work, calling for only a probative level of similarity to support a factual conclusion of copying. However, the second prong, misappropriation, requires a qualitative analysis of the plaintiff’s work to determine the scope of copyright protection, which in turn yields a sliding, legal standard for infringement, i.e., whether the accused work is similar in terms of copying a substantial amount of protectable expression. The Ninth Circuit recently took that to the extreme in Sophia & Chloe v. Brighton Collectibles, a case involving jewelry as a sculptural work. Because Sophia & Chloe’s “Buddha Kiss” earrings were deemed to be so minimally original, and thus entitled to narrow copyright protection, the panel ruled that the proper standard for the misappropriation prong was “virtually identical” rather than “substantial similarity,” thereby re-invigorating a legal test most often used in the past for obscure cases involving multiple listing services and other content of limited creativity. In copyright litigation, the various meanings of substantially similar are definitely not virtually identical.

References: § 505
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 §102
 §411
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