Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/37/511/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 04:47:26+00:00

Document:
The decision of the Court in the case of Foster & Elam v. Neilson, 2 Pet. 254, by which grants made by the Crown of Spain, after the Treaty of St. Ildefonso, of lands west of the River Perdido, and which were by the United States declared to be within the Territory of Louisiana ceded by France to the United States were declared void, affirmed.
Congress, in order to guard against imposition, declared by the law of 1804 that all grants of land made by the Spanish authorities in the territory west of the Perdido after the date of the Treaty of St. Ildefonso should be null and void, excepting those to actual settlers acquired before December 20, 1803.
The controversy in relation to the country lying between the Mississippi and the Perdido Rivers and the validity of the grants made by Spain in the disputed territory after the cession of Louisiana to the United States were carefully examined and decided in the case of Foster & Elam v. Neilson. This Court in that case decided that the question of boundary between the United States and Spain was a question for the political departments of the government; that the legislative and executive branches having decided the question, the courts of the United States are bound to regard the boundary determined by them as the true one; that grants made by the Spanish authorities of lands which, according to this boundary line belonged to the United States, gave no title to the grantees in opposition to those claiming under the United States unless the Spanish grants were protected by the subsequent arrangements made between the two governments, and that no such arrangements were to be found in the treaty of 1819, by which Spain ceded the Floridas to the United States according to the fair import of its words and its true construction.
"shall be ratified and confirmed to the persons in possession of the lands to the same extent that the same grants would be valid if the territories had remained under the dominion of His Catholic Majesty,"
"that the ratification and confirmation which were promised must be the act of the legislature, and until such shall be passed, the Court is not at liberty to disregard the existing laws on the subject."
of cession in 1819. It is of such grants that the Court spoke when it declared them to be confirmed and protected by the true construction of the treaty, and that they do not need the aid of an act of Congress to ratify and confirm the title of the purchaser. The Court does not apply this principle to grants made within the Territory of Louisiana. The case of Foster & Elam v. Neilson must in all other respects be considered as affirmed by the case of Percheman;, as it underwent a careful examination in that case and as none of its principles was questioned except that referred to.
The leading principle in the case of Foster & Elam v. Neilson which declares that the boundary line determined on as the true one by the political departments of the government, must be recognized as the true one by the judicial departments was after that case directly acknowledged and affirmed by this Court in 1832 in the case of United States v. Arredondo, 8 Pet. 711, and this decision was given by the Court with the same information before it as to the meaning of the Spanish side of the treaty which is mentioned in the case of Percheman.
In the District Court of Louisiana, the plaintiff in error, a resident in Cuba, on 26 January, 1836, filed a petition stating that on 1 September, 1806, he purchased of the Spanish government, for a valuable consideration, and was put into possession of the same, fifteen thousand arpents of land, divided into three tracts or parcels having such marks and bounds as are laid down in the original plots and surveys annexed to the deed of sale by Juan Ventura Morales, then intendant of the Spanish government, dated 5 September, 1806. Certified copies of the deed of sale, plots, and surveys were annexed to the petition.
The petition stated that Samuel Lee, a resident in the Parish of Feliciana and a citizen of the state, had taken possession of ten thousand arpents, part of the said grant, which is situated in the now State of Louisiana, and refuses to deliver up the same. The petitioner prays to be put in possession of the said land &c.
government or the officers thereof to make grants or sales of land therein."
On 27 February, 1837, the District Court of Louisiana entered a judgment in favor of the defendant, and the plaintiff prosecuted this appeal.
At the hearing of this case in the district court, certain documentary evidence was offered by the plaintiff which was not received by the court, and the plaintiff took an exception to the rejection of the same. This bill of exceptions, containing all the documents offered and rejected in the court below, was sent up with the record.
In this case, the appellant claims ten thousand arpents of land, being part of a grant for fifteen thousand arpents which he alleges in his petition were granted to him by the Spanish authorities in 1806. The land is situated in the State of Louisiana and in the territory lying north of the Iberville and between the Perdido and the Mississippi which was so long a subject of controversy between the United States and Spain and which was finally settled by the cession of the Floridas to the United States by the Treaty of February 22, 1819.
nature towards the obtaining of any grant, title or claim to such lands, and under whatsoever authority transacted or pretended, be, and the same are hereby declared to be and to have been from the beginning null all void and of no effect in law or in equity."
The titles of actual settlers, acquired before 20 December, 1803, are excepted by a proviso from the operation of this section.
The grant under which the appellant, Garcia, claims falls within the provisions of this section, and as this law of Congress has never been repealed or modified in relation to grants made by the Spanish authorities, the appellant has no title at law or in equity unless it can be shown that the act of Congress in question, upon some ground or other, is void and inoperative and that the courts of the United States are bound to recognize a title acquired in opposition to its provisions.
have subverted those principles which govern the relations between the legislature and judicial departments, and mark the limits of each."
"If the rights of the parties are in any degree changed, that change must be produced by the subsequent arrangements made between the two governments."
"It is not improbable that terms were selected which might not compromise the dignity of either government and which each might understand consistently with its former pretensions. But if a court of the United States would have been bound under the state of things existing on the signature of the treaty to consider the territory then composing a part of the State of Louisiana as rightfully belonging to the United States, it would be difficult to construe this article into an admission that it belonged rightfully to His Catholic Majesty."
"The form of this ratification ought not, in its opinion, to change the natural construction of the words of the eighth article or extend them to embrace grants not otherwise intended to be confirmed by it."
it had proclaimed to be void, as being for lands within the American territory."
"shall be ratified and confirmed to the persons in possession of the lands to the same extent that the same grants would be valid if the territories had remained under the dominion of His Catholic Majesty."
And in deciding the case of Foster & Elam v. Neilson, the Court held that even if this stipulation applied to lands in the territory in question, yet the words used did not import a present confirmation by virtue of the treaty itself, but that they were words of contract between the two nations, and that "the legislature must execute the contract;" "that the ratification and confirmation which are promised must be the act of the legislature," and "until such act shall be passed, the Court is not at liberty to disregard the existing laws on the subject." Afterwards, in the case of United States v. Percheman, 7 Pet. 86, in reviewing these words of the eighth article of the treaty, the Court, for the reasons then assigned, came to a different conclusion and held that the words used were words of present confirmation by the treaty where the land had been rightfully granted before the cession, and that it did not need the aid of an act of Congress to ratify and confirm the grant. This language was, however, applied by the Court and intended to apply to grants made in a territory which belonged to Spain at the time of the grant. The case before the Court was one of that description. It was in relation to a grant of land in Florida, which unquestionably belonged to Spain at the time the grant was made, and where the Spanish authorities had an undoubted right to grant until the treaty of cession in 1819. It is of such grants that the Court spoke when it declared them to be confirmed and protected by the true construction of the treaty, and that it did not need the aid of an act of Congress to ratify and confirm the title of the purchaser.
according to its true boundary, and where Spain had no right to grant lands after the cession to France by the Treaty of St. Ildefonso in 1800, as hereinbefore mentioned. On the contrary, although the Court, in the case of United States v. Percheman, refer to the case of Foster & Elam v. Neilson and carefully explain the reasons which led it to change its opinion as to the true construction of the words "shall be confirmed" in the eighth article of the treaty; yet it used no expression from which it can be inferred that the opinion of the Court had changed in relation to any other principle decided in Foster & Elam v. Neilson. And as that case was then under review, and manifestly at that time underwent a careful examination by the Court, and as none of its principles was questioned except the one above mentioned, the case of Foster & Elam v. Neilson must in all other respects be considered as affirmed by that of United States v. Percheman. Indeed, we are not aware of any case in which its authority has been doubted by the Court in any of its principles, with the single exception above-mentioned. Expressions may perhaps be found in some opinions delivered here which, detached from the case under consideration, might create some doubt upon the subject. But these expressions must always be taken with reference to the particular subject matter in the mind of the Court, and when this just rule of construction is applied to the language used, it will be found that there is no case in which the Court ever designed to shake the authority of the case now relied on or to question the principles there decided; further than is hereinbefore stated. So far from it, the leading principle of the case, which declares that the boundary line determined on as the true one by the political departments of the government must be recognized as the true one by the judicial department, was subsequently directly acknowledged and affirmed by this Court in 1832 in the case of United States v. Arredondo, 6 Pet. 711. And this decision was given with the same information before them as to the meaning of the Spanish side of the treaty, which is mentioned in the case of Percheman, and consequently that information could not have shaken the confidence of the Court in any of the opinions pronounced in Foster & Elam v. Neilson further than has been already stated.
grant was made by the Spanish authority; it decides that this grant is not embraced by the eighth article of the treaty which ceded the Floridas to the United States; that the stipulations in that article are confined to the territory which belonged to Spain at the time of the cession, according to the American construction of the treaty, and that the exception of the three grants made in the ratification of this treaty by the King of Spain cannot enlarge the meaning of the words used in the eighth article and cannot, in the language of the Court, "extend them to embrace grants not otherwise intended to be confirmed," or grants "which it [the American government] had proclaimed to be void as being for lands within the American territory." These principles, thus settled by this Court, cover the whole ground now in controversy.
"In this view of the matter, it is perfectly clear that the grants made by North Carolina and Tennessee, under which the defendant claimed, were not rightfully made, because they were originally beyond her territorial boundary, and that the grant under which the claimants claim was rightfully made because it was within the territorial boundary of Virginia."
"If the States of North Carolina and Tennessee could not rightfully grant the land in question, and the States of Virginia and Kentucky could, the invalidity of the grants of the former arises not from any violation of the obligation of the grant, but from an intrinsic defect of title in the states."
and refused to deliver it to the United States. But her conduct was in this respect in violation of the rights of the United States, and of the obligation of treaties. The United States did not immediately take forcible possession, as it might justly have done, and preferred a more pacific and magnanimous policy towards a weaker adversary. Yet its forbearance could upon no just grounds impair its rights or legalize the wrongful grants of Spain made in a territory which did not belong to her, for the authorities of the United States made known by every means in their power their inflexible determination to assert the rights of this country, and Congress, in order to guard against imposition and injustice, declared by law in 1804 that all grants of land made by the Spanish authorities after the date of the Treaty of St. Ildefonso would be null and void, excepting only those to actual settlers acquired before December 20, 1803.
The present appellant procured his title from Spain after the passage of this law. The land granted to him belonged not to Spain, but to the United States, and notice had been given in the most public and authentic manner that the Spanish grants would confer no title before the appellant obtained his grant. Upon what ground of law or equity, then, can the United States be now required to make good this grant? It had done nothing to mislead him, but had taken every measure to warn him and everyone else that it would not submit to have the soil which belonged to the United States granted away by a foreign power. If he has been deceived, he has either deceived himself or been misled by the Spanish authorities, and has no right to complain of the conduct of the United States. And if either Spain or the United States intended to provide for these grants in Louisiana by the treaty ceding the Floridas, it is impossible to believe that words would not have been used which clearly embraced them, and would have left no doubt as to the intention of the parties to the treaty.
settled to be now disturbed, and we think the court below was right in rejecting the testimony stated in the exception, which, if even properly authenticated, could not upon established principles have shown title in the appellant under a Spanish grant made in 1806.
This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Louisiana and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof it is now here ordered and adjudged by this Court that the judgment of the said district court in this cause be and the same is hereby affirmed with costs.

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