Source: http://arbitration-poland.com/key-issues/1,arbitration_award.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 14:01:55+00:00

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1. Accepting that an arbitration award does not have binding force or res judicata effect would totally undermine the purpose for the existence of arbitration.
2. Pursuant to Civil Procedure Code Art. 1212 §1, the state court is bound, under the rules set forth in Civil Procedure Code Art. 365, by a legally final and enforceable arbitration award, which also has res judicata effect in the respect indicated in Civil Procedure Code Art. 366.
3. Under Civil Procedure Code Art. 365, both the court and the parties are bound by a legally final and enforceable arbitration award issued in the case pending with their participation. This binding force means that such award is of a preclusive nature in another case between the same parties if the specific relationship exists between the award and the subsequently pending case consisting in the legally final prior ruling impacting the resolution of the pending case.
1. It is permissible to seek to set aside an arbitration award in part, if the challenged resolution can be separated from the remaining part of the award.
2. In a proceeding to set aside an arbitration award, the court cannot set aside the award in part if the petitioner applied to set aside the award in its entirety and there are grounds to grant the petition. This is because a demand to set aside an arbitration award in part is not a lesser included demand in a demand to set aside the award in its entirety; it is a different type of demand. Moreover, if the particular parts of the award interlock so that none of the parts can be separated from the other parts without materially deforming the entirety, it is impermissible to set aside the award in part.
3. Informing a party only in the justification of the award that (despite denying the claim in its entirety) one of the party’s demands was not considered because the fee for that claim was not paid, when that demand was the subject of examination during the evidentiary proceeding and was the subject of the response to the statement of claim and pleadings by both parties, while at the same time granting the demands of the opposing party in their entirety, which resolution was dependent on the resolution of the plaintiff’s demands, indicates that the arbitration award is contrary to the public policy clause, depriving the party of the ability to exercise the rights provided by regulations of substantive law and also indirectly depriving the party of a defence against the counterclaims of the opposing party. This method of proceeding before the arbitration court violates the party’s right to a fair and honest trial.
4. Resolving the respondent’s demands in their entirety before resolving the claimant’s complete demand, regardless of whether or not the party could apply for supplementation of the award, is also contrary to fundamental principles of the legal order, including violation of the principle of equal treatment of the parties. Moreover, the arbitration court would already be bound by the award issued by it in the part concerning the counterclaim, and thus it could not issue a ruling with different substantive legal consequences. Undoubtedly the principles of a fair trial require that the party be informed prior to issuance of an award of the possible taking of a procedural decision as to one of the party’s claims, regardless of whether the claimant’s claim is deemed to be an alternative claim (as it was worded, in the event that the main claim is not upheld) or as a separate procedural claim in an accumulation of claims.
5. The defence of the ineffectiveness of an arbitration clause may be asserted not only by the respondent, but also by the claimant. However, it is indicated in the legal literature that in such case, the claimant, as the party initiating the proceeding before the arbitration court, should make a thorough analysis of the factual and legal state of the case, including issues connected with the grounds for commencement of the proceeding before the arbitration court, and if it concludes that the clause is ineffective, it should file the case with the state court, which upon the objection of the respondent will resolve the issue of the effectiveness of the clause. As indicated in the literature, asserting the ineffectiveness of the clause only at this stage violates the principle of due diligence which a professional participant in commercial dealings is required to comply with.
6. An arbitration clause may cease to be in force in the instances set forth in Civil Procedure Code Art. 1168 and 1195 §4 or in the bankruptcy law, or in the occurrence of certain substantive legal events (e.g. repudiation of the legal consequences of a declaration of will), including those indicated by the parties as the reasons for the clause ceasing to be in force. The mere change in the rules of the arbitration court does not result in loss of force of the clause, either under the regulations currently in force or in accordance with the regulations in force on the date of conclusion of the clause.
7. The mere fact that one of the parties to the arbitration participated in creation of the list of arbitrators by nominating candidates for arbitrators from among persons who are authorities in the given field does not mean that there is dependency between the arbitrator and the party or that the party has greater rights. Despite the indirect influence of the banks over a portion of some panels of arbitrators, the rules of the Court of Arbitration at [the Polish Bank Association] ensure the impartially of the arbitration court and do not violate the principle of the equality of the parties in the arbitration proceeding. Because there are numerous arbitrators [on the list], and the party does not know which of them will hear the case and does not select a specific person as presiding arbitrator, it cannot be found that the party had greater rights than its opponent.
8. A petition to set aside an arbitration award may concern issues of the procedure followed only if fundamental principles of procedure before the arbitration court, arising out of a statute or specified by the parties, were not complied with (Civil Procedure Code Art. 1206 §1(4)). In essence this has to do with failure to comply with fundamental principles of civil procedure, but it was not demonstrated that the arbitration court failed to comply with such principles.
1. The state court considering a case seeking to set aside an arbitration award cannot re-examine the merits of the dispute. … Treating the scope of review by the state court differently would undermine the autonomy of arbitration, which would place it in a kind of protectorate of the state court system, thus distorting not only the ideals on which the functioning of arbitration is based but also the intention of the Parliament, which in modifying the rules for its functioning limits the scope of intervention by the state court system to exceptional instances expressly stated in the law.
2. The state court is not entitled to review whether the arbitration court properly determined the facts and properly evaluated the evidence. This falls within the bounds of the resolution on the merits of the asserted claims.
1. The fact that two arbitrators, constituting a majority of the panel, had already signed drafts of the awards was certainly not valid grounds for the presiding arbitrator to refuse to continue deliberations over the awards. This was not equivalent to the act of voting, not to mention equivalent to deliberations on the resolution and the grounds for the resolution. Refusal to continue the deliberations in order to discuss the comments means that it cannot be said that the deliberations were completed and voting was held on the awards. … As pointed out in the legal literature, the list of examples of violations with respect to regulations on voting, removal of an arbitrator and the award which were set forth in Civil Procedure Code Art. 712 §1(3) (in force through 16 October 2005) were not expressly carried over to the wording of Civil Procedure Code Art. 1206 §1(4). There is no doubt, however, that a violation of these rules should generally be treated as a violation of fundamental rules of procedure.
2. Ignoring evidence offered by a party because the arbitration court found the evidence to be unnecessary will not qualify as depriving the party of the ability to present a defence. Examination by the state court of whether the arbitration court correctly found such evidence to be unnecessary would constitute impermissible encroachment into the merits of the case. If the arbitration court ignored a certain portion of the defence presented by the party, while including in the grounds for the award a substantive explanation of the reasons it found the defence to be irrelevant, then the party’s allegation with respect to ignoring its defence is in reality directed against the substantive defence of the dispute and as such is impermissible.
The manner of service specified in Civil Procedure Code Art. 1160 should be applied also to arbitration awards. … There is no reason that the written notice referred to in Civil Procedure Code Art. 1160 should not also be understood to include an arbitration award.
1. Application by the arbitration court of the substantive law applicable in the case is subject to review by the common court only insofar as required by the evaluation of the arbitration award, made by the court on its initiative, under the public policy clause set forth in Civil Procedure Code Art. 1206 §2(2), in terms of the award’s possible inconsistency with fundamental principles of the Polish legal system.
2. Alongside the principles of freedom of contract and the enforceability of contracts, the fundamental principles of the Polish legal system also include principles setting the boundaries of the freedom of contract and, in consequence, the limits of application of the principle of enforceability of contracts. These are more specifically the principle of business freedom, the principle of contractual fairness, and the principle of the compensatory nature of liability in damages, interpreted in compliance with the constitutional requirement of proportionality (Constitution Art. 31(3)), opposing inclusion in contracts of monetary consideration as a sanction for violation of an obligation in an amount far removed from the dimension of the loss, so that it becomes primarily a quasi-penal measure and leads to enrichment of the other party.
3. The reduction of the agreed contractual penalty by the arbitration court did not display the features of an arbitrary limitation of the legal consequences of providing for the contractual penalty, but fell within the bounds of statutory authority.
4. Any irregularities in application of Civil Code Art. 484 §2 by the arbitration court not resulting in the inconsistency of the award issued by it with the fundamental principles of the legal system could not be relevant in proceedings to set aside the award.
The state court hearing a petition to set aside an arbitration award may consider whether in the specific case there were valid grounds justifying a departure [by the arbitration court] from the rule of being bound by a legally final judgment, and reference to the circumstances permitting reopening of proceedings before a state court should be helpful in this respect. … From the point of view of the grounds for reopening proceedings, there is nothing preventing new factual circumstances from being disclosed as a result of actions conducted by an expert in a different case, after the end of the proceeding that would be reopened. It is essential that they be circumstances that already existed during the course of the completed proceeding.
1. Under Art. 1197 §3 of the Civil Procedure Code, an arbitration award is a less formalized document than a state court judgment. In particular, it should be agreed that the identification of the parties to the proceeding before the arbitral tribunal does not have to be included in the caption of the award, but at any place in the award. It should be deemed sufficient to include the designation of the parties in the operative wording of the award using the phrase “awards against respondent X in favour of claimant Y the amount Z,” or to identify the parties in the justification for the award, which is an integral part of the award.
2. Art. 1214 §3 of the Civil Procedure Code has to do with a situation in which enforcement of the arbitration award would result in violation of [fundamental principles of the legal order]. This provision thus requires attention to the substantive content of the arbitration award, that is, to assess the adjudicated claim in terms of the permissibility of its realization in light of fundamental principles of the legal order of the Republic of Poland. This does not refer however to formal irregularities committed by the arbitral tribunal.
1. Participation in a judicial proceeding by entities lacking judicial capacity would result in the invalidity of the proceeding, while issuance of an arbitration award with respect to such entities would be regarded as a violation of the fundamental principles of the legal order of the Republic of Poland, because it would violate one of the fundamental procedural rules that only a party vested with judicial capacity can be a party to proceedings. Moreover, such an award would also violate the fundamental principle of civil law that only entities vested with legal capacity can be the subject of civil-law rights and obligations.
2. If a party raises the objection that the arbitration court lacks jurisdiction or the objection that a demand asserted by the opposing party exceeds the bounds of the arbitration clause (Civil Procedure Code Art. 1180 §2), and the arbitration court deems these objections unfounded, the arbitration court may issue an award, stating therein that it deemed the objections raised to be unfounded, or overrule the objections in a separate order. In the first instance, the correctness of the position of the arbitration court on the objection raised by the party may be reviewed in a petition to set aside the arbitration award. However, if the arbitration court issues an order overruling the objection, review of the correctness of this position by the state court may occur only under the procedure provided for in Civil Procedure Code Art. 1180 §3, i.e. by the party who raised the objection applying to the state court for a ruling within two weeks after service of the order on the party. The party’s failure to initiate such procedure for review of the order issued by the arbitration court deprives the party of the possibility of effectively basing a petition to set aside the arbitration award on the same objections constituting grounds for a petition to set aside an arbitration award under Civil Procedure Code Art. 1206 §1 (1) and (3).
3. The arbitration court’s violation of regulations of law, even regulations that are mandatorily applicable, does not necessarily mean violation of fundamental principles of the legal order, even if the arbitration court resolves the dispute according to the law governing the given relationship, when under Civil Procedure Code Art. 1194 §1 the parties did not authorize it to decide on the basis of general principles of law or equity.
4. The intervention by the arbitration court with respect to the demand presented concerned … the method of fulfilment of the performance demanded. In procedural law there are no more specific rules of a fundamental nature referring to ruling on the manner of fulfilling the performance demanded in the statement of claim by several persons. The case law permits a certain intervention by the court here, e.g. awarding the demanded amount in solidum instead of jointly and severally, and vice versa. … From the point of view of the principle that it is up to the parties to frame their demands [dyspozytywność] it is essential that the identity of the subject of the demand be maintained, and the scope and factual grounds justifying upholding the demand. With respect to the demand that was asserted, the arbitration award maintained the identity of the debtor and the creditor, the type of relief, its amount and indivisibility, and also the factual grounds justifying granting the relief.
5. The essence of this agreement [a consortium] is at least similar to the agreement of an ordinary partnership [spółka cywilna], and sometimes contains the essential elements thereof, which justifies application of the regulations governing ordinary partnerships as relevant to the relations between members of the consortium, including the regulations concerning joint commonality [wspólność łączna]. … It does not violate the public policy clause for the arbitration court to award damages to three entities “jointly” despite the lack of a legal relationship among these entities creating joint commonality among them.
6. The arbitration court’s ruling on the basis of the regulations of applicable law, if the parties do not provide otherwise (Civil Procedure Code Art. 1194 §1), is one of the fundamental principles of procedure before the arbitration court. Therefore violation of this principle by the arbitration court may be asserted as an allegation of violation of Civil Procedure Code Art. 1206 §1(4). Under this allegation, however, the state court cannot be expected to review the substantive correctness of the award issued by the arbitration court.
7. The position that suffering injury as a result of non-performance or improper performance of an obligation arising out of a contract does not justify wilful satisfaction of the claim for damages out of the established security, contrary to the conditions agreed with the counterparty, does not violate fundamental principles of the legal order, i.e. the principles of the rule of law (Constitution Art. 2), protection of property rights and equality of counterparties cooperating with one another (Constitution Art. 20), economic liberty (Constitution Art. 22), and equality before the law (Constitution Art. 32(2)).
1. Even though (if the parties did not agree otherwise) the arbitral tribunal shall resolve a dispute applying the regulations of substantive law applicable to the legal relationship, violation of substantive law by the arbitral tribunal is grounds for a petition to set aside the award only if as a result of the violation, the award is contrary to fundamental principles of the legal order of the Republic of Poland. In other words, if despite a violation of substantive law the award cannot be said to be contrary to fundamental principles of the legal order, the mere violation cannot constitute an effective basis for demanding that the award be set aside.
2. The construction of a petition to set aside an arbitration award indicates that this measure is not used to conduct substantive review by the state court of the correctness of the resolution by the arbitral tribunal, similar to appellate review in judicial proceedings.
3. An award is contrary to fundamental principles of the legal order when this concerns constitutional principles of the socio-economic system or leading principles governing specific fields of substantive law. The fundamental principles of the legal order constituting the basis for evaluation of an arbitration award should be understood not only as constitutional norms, but also the leading norms in specific fields of law. … The procedural legal order may be the basis for evaluation of an arbitration award in two aspects. First, the compliance of the procedure which led to issuance of the arbitration award with fundamental procedural principles of the legal order is subject to evaluation. Second, the consequences of the arbitration award from the point of view of their compliance with the procedural public order are subject to evaluation, i.e., whether they are reconcilable with the system of procedural law, e.g. whether they violate res judicata or the rights of third parties.
4. A party forfeits the right to challenge an arbitration award through a petition to set aside the award due to failure to raise objections to an arbitrator subject, in the party’s view, to removal, if the party did not demand removal in the proceeding before the arbitral tribunal.
5. The requirements established for persons serving as arbitrator should be combined with the entitlement of a party to the proceeding to obtain knowledge about any potential ties between the arbitrator and the entities appearing in the proceeding. Generally it is left to the party to evaluate whether the circumstances constitute grounds for a decision whether to select an arbitrator or a decision to challenge the arbitrator. In this sense, the arbitrator’s own assessment is irrelevant, as the essence of the fairness of the procedure is connected with external evaluations made by others.
6. Indeed, the right to a fair trial provided in Art. 45(1) of the Polish Constitution, an element of which is consideration of the case by an independent court in a fairly conducted proceeding, does fall within the fundamental principles of the legal order whose violation the state court must examine at its own initiative. However, it is indicated in the case law and the legal literature that Art. 45 of the Constitution does not apply at all to arbitration, only the state courts.
7. The institution of recusal of a judge is provided for by the Civil Procedure Code both in proceedings before the state court and in proceedings before an arbitration court. The fundamental difference in the regulation of this institution is that in a proceeding before an arbitration court, the code does not provide for removal of the arbitrator or presiding arbitrator by operation of law, as is the case with respect to a judge in proceedings before the state court (Civil Procedure Code Art. 48). The grounds for challenging an arbitrator indicated in Civil Procedure Code Art. 1174 §2 are circumstances raising justified doubts as to his impartiality or independence, as well as lack of qualifications specified in the parties’ agreement. The grounds for recusal of a judge listed in Art. 48 and 49 do not apply to challenge of an arbitrator, but in interpreting the concept of circumstances raising justified doubts as to impartiality or independence Art. 48 and 49 may have auxiliary application. In a proceeding before a state court, under Civil Procedure Code Art. 379(4), participation by a judge recused by operation of law becomes grounds for the invalidity of the proceeding and constitutes grounds to vacate the judgment by the appellate court, as well as by the Supreme Court, and this ground shall be considered by both of these courts at their own initiative (Civil Procedure Code Art. 378 §2 and 39311). … The Civil Procedure Code does not provide for such absolute invalidity in proceedings before an arbitration court. If a party did not challenge an arbitrator or presiding arbitrator despite possessing knowledge of the grounds for challenge, there are no legal grounds to challenge the arbitration award. As an exception only, participation in an arbitration panel by an arbitrator or presiding arbitrator whose rights and obligations could be affected by the result in the case could constitute grounds for setting aside the award, which did not occur in this case. This is because violation of the principle that no one can be a judge in his own case (nemo in re sua judex) would undoubtedly conflict with the fundamental principles of the legal order of the Republic of Poland.
1. Review of an arbitration award by the state court cannot turn into a full consideration of the merits of the dispute submitted to arbitration for resolution. Nonetheless, the obligation to examine whether the challenged award violates fundamental principles of the legal order usually cannot be conducted properly without the state court’s reference to the case file. Sticking only to the wording of the arbitration award itself would render such review illusory.
2. Unlike the state court, the arbitration court is not bound to apply the law strictly, even if the parties have not authorized it to resolve the dispute under principles of equity. The only limitation on the arbitration court in this respect is the fundamental principles of the legal order (for example the principle of the compensatory nature of liability in damages and the principle of protection of property rights). Not every violation of substantive law by an arbitration court, nor every erroneous interpretation or improper application or failure to apply a legal norm may be held to be a violation of fundamental principles of the legal order.
3. The rule expressed in Civil Code Art. 379 §1 of the separateness of performance is not one of the rules whose violation would conflict with the foundations of the legal order of the Republic of Poland. It suffices to point out that the parties to the agreement may exclude this rule by providing for solidarity among the creditors (Civil Code Art. 369 in connection with Art. 367 §1).
4. An objection of the lack of jurisdiction of the arbitration court is subject to preclusion if it is not asserted within the time indicated in Civil Procedure Code Art. 1180 §2. In that case, a petition to set aside the arbitration award can no longer effectively rely on the basis set forth in Civil Procedure Code Art. 1206 §1(1). In the event of assertion of the objection of lack of jurisdiction, the arbitration court may rule on its own jurisdiction in a separate order, but that is left to its discretion. If the arbitration court is convinced of the existence of a valid arbitration agreement, it may also consider the case on the merits without first issuing an order concerning the asserted objections to its jurisdiction. In the latter case, it is obvious that a party may base its petition to set aside the arbitration award on the allegation of violation of Civil Procedure Code Art. 1206 §1(1), because it did not previously have any possibility of presenting this objection to the state court for its review. It is different in the case of issuance by the arbitration court of an order overruling the objection of its lack of jurisdiction. Then the parties may seek a ruling by the state court within 14 days after service of the order on them. The judicial proceedings in this respect are at two instances (Civil Procedure Code Art. 1180 §3).
5. A party which has exhausted the procedure specified in Civil Procedure Code Art. 1180 §3 cannot later, in a petition to set aside the award, again assert the objection of the absence of an arbitration agreement or its invalidity or ineffectiveness. This conclusion may be drawn from Civil Procedure Code Art. 365 §1 in connection with Art. 1207 §2 or in connection with Art. 13 §2. … Referring the order of the arbitration court to the court of first instance, and then the party’s failure to file an interlocutory appeal against an order against it, also closes the path to reassertion of the objection of the lack of jurisdiction of the arbitration court on the grounds indicated in Civil Procedure Code Art. 1206 §1(1). There are no grounds for distinguishing the litigation stance of a party which exhausted the recourse to both instances and a party which did not file an interlocutory appeal against the order of the court of first instance, and in consequence the order obtained finality. In both cases the legally final orders are binding on the parties and the courts pursuant to Civil Procedure Code Art. 365 §1.
6. A party that sought a ruling on jurisdiction pursuant to Civil Procedure Code Art. 1180 §3 and obtained an unfavourable order from the state court cannot assert the same objections under Civil Procedure Code Art. 1206 §1(1), regardless of whether the state court ruled at one or both instances.
7. The law essentially equalizes—in terms of legal consequences—the failure to assert the objection of lack of jurisdiction of the arbitration court within the time indicated in Civil Procedure Code Art. 1180 §2 with the respondent’s inclination (consent) to consideration of the case by the arbitration court. An interpretation accepting the preclusion specified in Art. 1180 §2 but at the same time permitting non-recourse to the procedure for judicial review set forth in Art. 1180 §3 and accepting the possibility of not disputing the jurisdictional order of the arbitration court until the petition to set aside the award would be an inconsistent interpretation and largely eliminate the benefits for both parties to the arbitration proceeding flowing from the 2005 amendment to the Civil Procedure Code.
8. In its review, the state court cannot re-evaluate the evidence to determine whether it would have made the same factual findings as those presented in the arbitration award under review. Disputing the arbitration award in this respect would be possibly only if the defects founds were so fundamental that they would qualify as a violation of fundamental principles of civil procedure. Evaluation of the award in terms of the fundamental principles of substantive law must not be turned into appellate review.
1. The rule of the binding force of legally final judicial rulings, as an element of the values protected under the Constitution and in the international order making up a state governed by the rule of law, which the Republic of Poland is, is included among the fundamental principles of the legal order of the Republic of Poland.
2. The state judicial system and arbitration are not identical. The lack of identity does not mean, however, that arbitration courts, and particularly their rulings, are irrelevant for the judicial system. While it is true that under Art. 175 of the Constitution, justice is dispensed by the state courts, it should be clearly stressed that as part of the dispensation of justice, the state courts oversee the activity of arbitration courts, and more precisely the rulings issued by them.
3. A ruling by a state court on recognition or enforcement of an arbitration award results in ascribing to the award the same force that rulings of state courts have, which is clearly confirmed by Civil Procedure Code Art. 1212 §1. This means that such a ruling, thanks to the state court ruling connected with it, must be treated in legal dealings the same as any other ruling of a state court. ... If an arbitration ruling has the same force as a ruling of a state court, this means that Civil Procedure Code Art. 365 §1 [i.e. preclusive effect] applies to it. Civil Procedure Code Art. 1212 does not provide for any exceptions from the equivalence of the effects of the arbitration court ruling to a state court ruling.
4. If the parties and the arbitration court appointed by them wish the ruling of the arbitration court to be equivalent in its effects to a state court ruling, they must take into consideration that the arbitration court has already ruled preclusively in the same matter between the same parties. If the prior ruling by the arbitration court has already been recognized or enforced by the state court, this has fundamental significance for the ability to recognize a further ruling issued between the same parties. A state court which is ruling on recognition or enforcement of a further ruling may not ignore the fact that the state court has already spoken on the same matter. In other words, the court will be bound by the ruling of the state court that recognized or enforced the prior arbitration court ruling.
5. It follows from Civil Procedure Code Art. 365 §1 that a court ruling on recognition of a second arbitration ruling, being bound by the prior ruling also by a state court, should not permit two rulings to be found in legal circulation which decided the same preclusive issue differently in the same matter between the same parties.
6. The lack of a basis to apply the regulations on a proceeding upon a petition to reopen [a legally final judgment] directly to assessment of an arbitration award, and on the other hand the lack in Polish law of a regulation for reopening a proceeding with respect to arbitration awards, cannot result in the unfettered discretion of an arbitration court in determining whether to take into consideration an earlier award in which a certain issue was already preclusively ruled on between the same parties. … If the arbitration court expects its award to be recognized, it should take into consideration the prior resolution of the preclusive issue in the award that was already recognized with legal finality by the state court. When examining the permissibility of a departure from this rule, the court in a proceeding to set aside an arbitration award may not rely on the mere assertion by the arbitration court that new facts or evidence has appeared in the case, but should determine, applying as relevant the criteria for assessment developed in the context of the legal regulations for reopening of a proceeding concluded in a legally final judgment, whether they are truly new facts and evidence, and whether the party could have asserted them in the prior proceeding.
1. Factual findings by the arbitration court are generally binding on the state court hearing a petition by a party dissatisfied with the resolution of the case by the arbitration court. The proceeding before the state court is not in the nature of the review proper to a common court of second instance, however, but is limited to the grounds expressly stated by the regulations, which are the permissible legal grounds for a petition to set aside an arbitration award (Civil Procedure Code Art. 1206 §§ 1 and 2).
2. Only if the state court finds that the [evidentiary] procedure was not conducted at all or was conducted incompletely, or was clearly conducted defectively, in violation of the rules of logical understanding and linking of facts in a chain of cause and effect, with selective admission of evidence in the case, admitting evidence only from one side, excluding without justification evidence offered by the opposing side, and the like, may it be found that the requirements referred to in Civil Procedure Code Art. 1206 §1(4) were not met. ... This provision should be interpreted narrowly, limiting the possibility of upsetting an arbitration award to the principles of a fair trial and procedural violations that could have an effect on the arbitration award.
3. The defendant’s argument that the principles of civil liability for injury do not belong to the fundamental principles of the legal order in Poland cannot be sustained. Under the civil law, and thus in private legal relationships, as a result of various events—particularly dangerous acts, acts arising out of commercial activity, vehicular traffic, as well as legal acts—the occurrence of injury is of universal dimensions and requires legal regulations guaranteeing liability in damages. Regulations in this respect belong to the fundamental norms of the law of obligations, and under tort liability and contractual liability may be regarded as forming some of the fundamental principles of the legal order of the state.
4. Art. 45 of the Polish Constitution does not refer at all to arbitration, but only to the state courts.
1. An arbitration award may be said to be contrary to the fundamental principles of the legal order … only with respect to constitutional principles of the socio-economic system or the leading principles governing specific fields of substantive law.
2. The defectiveness of an arbitration award consisting of violation of fundamental principles of the legal order must appear from the wording of the ruling as such, and not from violation of the regulations for procedure before the arbitration court.
3. The fundamental principles of the legal order, constituting the basis for assessment of an arbitration award, should be understood to include not only constitutional norms, but also the leading norms in specific fields of law.
4. Consideration of a petition [to set aside an arbitration award] generally does not include a review of the consistency of the arbitration award with substantive law, a review of whether the award is supported by the facts cited in the justification for the award, or whether such facts were properly established, although of course a ruling based on a selective, unreliable assessment of the evidence does violate the rule of law.
1. A petition to set aside an arbitration award is an extraordinary means of review of arbitration rulings by the state court. It is not an appeal, but combines the features of an extraordinary means of challenge with a claim to establish a right or legal relationship. But it cannot be agreed that it is a type of appeal or means of challenge.
2. The list of grounds for a petition to set aside an arbitration award provided in Civil Procedure Code Art. 1206 §§ 1 and 2 are exhaustive in nature; that is, the court may not set aside an arbitration award for reasons other than those set forth in this provision. It should nonetheless be pointed out that one of the grounds for the petition—the public policy clause—is in the nature of a general clause, which means that the list of circumstances which may justify setting aside an award is not closed.
3. Not every violation of the rules for procedure before the arbitration court established by the parties or arising under the code should result in setting aside an arbitration award. It is justified to accept by way of interpretation that the fundamental rules of procedure are those whose violation could have an effect on the result in the proceeding before the arbitration court in the specific case.
4. With respect to review of arbitration awards, the purpose of the public policy clause is to protect the national legal system against resolutions that are incompatible with the system. The resolution by the arbitration court, understood as an individual and concrete norm expressed in the arbitration award, as well as the method by which it was issued, is subject to assessment from the point of view of compatibility with the fundamental principles of the legal system.
5. The state court does not review the correctness of the arbitrators’ resolution, but it must examine and assess it in order to review the compatibility of the resolution with public policy. In other words, the state court should—at least insofar as the allegation of incompatibility [with public policy] arises—create a model of the ruling which in its opinion is correct, and then compare that to the arbitrators’ resolution, in order to determine whether the nature and scale of the inconsistency justifies the allegation of violation of public policy.
6. A gross and obvious discrepancy between the facts appearing from the arbitration case file (or facts that are commonly known or known to the state court in its official capacity) and the facts assumed as the basis for the award may not remain entirely beyond the scope of interest of the state court.
7. In the meaning of consistency with the fundamental principles of the legal system of the Republic of Poland, the point of the Parliament was not that a ruling be consistent with all regulations of Polish law, but only that there be consistency with the fundamental principles of the legal system of the Republic of Poland.
8. The principle of the enforceability of contracts belongs to the group of fundamental principles of the Polish legal system. It is not absolute in nature, however, and is subject to a number of statutory exceptions. One of them is Civil Code Art. 5, setting forth the notion of abuse of a subjective right.
9. The principle of estoppel (venire contra factum proprium) and the clean-hands doctrine are not counted among the fundamental principles of arbitration court procedure and are not recognized as a part of the legal system of the Republic of Poland.
10. The rule of impartiality leads the arbitrators to maintain an impartial attitude toward the case and the participants in the proceeding. In turn, the formal equality of the parties is manifest in the right to be heard and equal procedural measures. The principle of equality in the proceeding before the arbitration court has two aspects: hearing out the parties by the arbitration court, and the opportunity to present their allegations and evidence to support them (the opportunity to use the same procedural measures). The principle of directness requires that evidence be taken before the full panel of the arbitration court.
11. If no injury was caused, awarding damages should be regarded as inconsistent with the fundamental principles of the legal system of the Republic of Poland.
1. In a petition to set aside an arbitration award, review of the merits of the case decided by the arbitration court is excluded.
2. Fundamental principles of the legal order should be understood to mean not only fundamental principles of the social and political system, reflected in constitutional principles, but also the overriding principles governing specific fields of law. … Examples that have been held to be violations of the fundamental principles of the legal order within the meaning of Civil Procedure Code Art. 1206 §2(2) include violation of the principle of the autonomy of civil-law entities and the principle of economic liberty, awarding damages where no injury has been suffered, or accepting the effectiveness of setoff under conditions in which specific regulations exclude such possibility.
1. A petition to set aside an arbitration award is an extraordinary means of review intended to set aside the award if at least one of the grounds exhaustively set forth in Civil Procedure Code Art. 1206 is justified.
2. When considering a petition [to set aside an arbitration award], the state court is bound by the grounds alleged by the petitioner. Only two of the grounds set forth in Civil Procedure Code Art. 1206 §2 are considered on the court’s motion: the non-arbitrability if the dispute and inconsistency of the arbitration award with the fundamental principles of the legal order of the Republic of Poland.
3. The assessment of whether an arbitration award is contrary to fundamental principles of the legal order is addressed to the content of the award, and not the correctness of the procedure before the arbitration court or the composition of the panel. … An arbitration award may be set aside under the public policy clause if it is found that the results included in the content of the award are not consistent with a specific norm which is regarded as one of the fundamental principles of the legal order in force in Poland. ... These principles include not only constitutional norms, but also the overriding norms in specific fields of law.
4. The requirements made of persons serving as arbitrators should be combined with a party’s right to learn about any ties the arbitrator may have to entities appearing in the proceeding. It is up to the party to evaluate such circumstances as grounds for a decision to select an arbitrator or to seek removal of an arbitrator. The arbitrator’s self-assessment is irrelevant, because the essence of a fair procedure is tied to objective judgment by others. ... The fundamental principles of the legal order include the right to a court as provided in Art. 45(1) of the Polish Constitution, an element of which is a party’s right to have its case heard by an independent court, in a fairly conducted procedure.
1. Violation by the arbitration court of regulations of substantive law or erroneous interpretation thereof, even if resulting in an erroneous ruling, does not in itself—even if it really did occur—constitute a violation of the fundamental principles of the legal system.
2. Civil Procedure Code Art. 1185 indicates that the consultation among the arbitrators may occur at any place (and thus even in a hospital).
3. Drawing up and signing the award is not an act that requires the preparation of minutes. As provided in §31 of the Rules [of the Court of Arbitration at the Polish Chamber of Commerce], minutes are prepared of a hearing and any act of the arbitration court. The mere physical drawing up of the text of the award is not an act of the arbitration court; it is a technical, auxiliary act, which may be performed by only one person at a time. Signing of the award, which is an act addressed to the members of the panel of arbitrators, should be analyzed similarly. Placement of a signature by each of the arbitrators is the act of the arbitrator alone, not of the panel of arbitrators. It thus does not require the preparation of minutes, which is reserved for an act of the entire arbitration court.
4. Only a violation of the “fundamental” rules of procedure before the arbitration court (Civil Procedure Code Art. 1206 §1(4)) may be grounds for setting aside an arbitration award. … Issues connected with drawing up the minutes of the consultation among the arbitrators and issuance of the award cannot be regarded as belonging to this group. Even if minutes of these actions actually should have been prepared, the lack thereof would not mean that a “fundamental” rule of procedure had been violated, but only a rule of order.
1. [When the state court has set aside an arbitration award] it is necessary for the claimant to file a new claim before a new arbitration court, or at least a written declaration of assertion before such arbitration court of the claims in the previous scope or as amended. From such time (or, currently, from the date of service of such document on the opposing party, Civil Procedure Code Art. 1186), a new proceeding is commenced before the arbitration court which is not a continuation of the previous proceeding that resulted in the arbitration award that was set aside.
2. The petition to set aside the arbitration award ... dated 16 December 2006, filed under the new regulations, commenced a case before the state court to set aside the arbitration award, and under the rule set forth in Art. 2 of the amending act [Act dated 28 July 2005 Amending the Civil Procedure Code (Journal of Laws Dz.U. No. 178 item 1478)] it was conducted in accordance with the new regulations. This means that the petitioner should base it in procedural respects on the new regulations for such procedure provided in Part Five, Title VII of the Civil Procedure Code; however, because the subject of the petition is the award and the proceeding before the arbitration court conducted in accordance with the former regulations, on substantive legal grounds the petition may rely only on the former rules, because the arbitration court was required to apply those rules and not the new ones. The grounds for the petition should thus be based on the former regulations.
3. In light of the circumstances of conclusion of the agreement, its purpose, and the statements by the attorneys before the arbitration court ... and failure for nearly five years to assert the lack of an arbitration clause, the intent of the parties ... was, as correctly found by the courts of both instances, to submit disputes arising under the agreement to the arbitration court for resolution, and not only mediation. … This position ... does not lead to validation of the lack of an arbitration clause by the behaviour of the parties before the arbitration court and the state courts or to avoidance of the requirement for written form of an arbitration clause, but constitutes only an interpretation of the declarations of will of the parties concerning an unclear arbitration clause expressed in written form and made ... in accordance with the requirements of Civil Code Art. 65.
4. An arbitration court is not a “court” or “other state body or body of the public administration” within the meaning of Civil Procedure Code Art. 365 §1, nor is there another “instance provided by statute” in which an arbitration court is bound by the award by another arbitration court, even concerning the same parties and the same claims.
5. An arbitration award, insofar as it denies a petition in some part with legal finality, does not have res judicata effect within the meaning of Civil Procedure Code Art. 365.
1. The schedule of fees for actions of the arbitration court constituting an annex to the rules of the court in force from 1 January 2000, which does not require payment of an arbitration fee on a defence of setoff, was applicable to the case decided by the arbitration court. … As the arbitration court failed to consider the defence of setoff because of failure to pay the arbitration fee, the allegation in the appeal that the procedure before the arbitration court was not observed in the arbitration proceeding is correct. … In consequence, it should be held that the petition to set aside the arbitration award on the basis of Civil Procedure Code Art. 712 §1(3) is justified by the wording of this provision.
2. Submission of the dispute existing between the parties for resolution by the arbitration court does not justify the conclusion that the parties waive the right to a fair and thorough procedure assuring the ability to satisfy the legal interests of the parties which are worthy of protection. The right to a fair procedure is a pillar of a democratic state governed by the rule of law, and for these reasons violation of such right justifies the conclusion that the rule of law was violated. This will be the case more specifically in the event of failure to consider the defence of setoff asserted by the party as a result of the arbitration court’s application of a regulation that was not in force with respect to payment of a fee as a condition for consideration of the motion. The principle of fair procedure requires consideration of the defence of setoff duly asserted by the respondent.
1. The constitutive elements of an arbitration award are defined by Civil Procedure Code Art. 708 §1, which is a regulation of mandatory applicability. One of these elements is a resolution of the demands of the parties (Art. 708 §1(4)). Thus it should be accepted that any ruling by the arbitration court containing the indicated elements, including a resolution of the demands of the parties, constitutes an arbitration award within the meaning of Book Three of the Civil Procedure Code, regardless of the form given to the ruling by the arbitration court.
2. In its case law, the Supreme Court has stressed on numerous occasions that the type of appellate instrument must be determined by the subject of the resolution, and not the form which the court gave to the ruling. ... This view applies also to rulings by an arbitration court.
1. The defectiveness of an arbitration award in violating the rule of law must appear from the very wording of the ruling, and not from violation of regulations concerning proceedings before such court. Procedural violations might justify only some other ground for setting aside the arbitration award.
2. The minimum requirements that must be met by the justification for an arbitration award are set forth in Civil Procedure Code Art. 708 §1(5). If the grounds by which the arbitration court was guided when ruling on the demands of the parties may be deduced from the justification, that is sufficient for these requirements to be deemed to be satisfied.
3. The view cannot be accepted ... that the duty to conduct a thorough investigation of the circumstances necessary to resolve the case (Civil Procedure Code Art. 705 §2, third sentence) is performed by assessing the allegations of the parties and indicating why some of them are found to be valid and others not. Such assessment is made at the stage of making the ruling, and is expressed in the justification for the ruling made. Investigation of the circumstances that are relevant (essential) to the case occurs at an earlier phase of the proceeding and consists of hearing the parties, permitting them to submit statements with respect to the motions and allegations of the opposing party and the result of the evidentiary proceedings, and finally receiving evidence necessary to illuminate the circumstances essential to resolve the case.
Refusal to sign an award, which is contrary to the assumptions of the procedure before the arbitration court and may, for example, result in liability to the parties for loss, should be stated expressly and not done in an implicit manner.
A finding that an award is inconsistent with the facts does not always result in setting aside the award. It is accepted that an application alleging violation of the rule of law is justified when the effect of an arbitration award conflicts with fundamental principles of the legal order of the state.
1. Pursuant to Civil Procedure Code Art. 712 §1(4), an arbitration award may be set aside if the ruling on the demands of the parties violates the rule of law or principles of social coexistence. This provision enacts a general clause representing the principle of domestic public policy. This means that violation or incorrect interpretation of substantive law, and the resulting defect of the ruling, in and of itself does not constitute a violation of the rule of law. A violation of substantive law must be such that it would result in issuance of a ruling that would by its content violate fundamental principles of the rule of law, particularly situations where a ruling is issued using an institution that is impermissible by operation of law.
2. Incorrect interpretation of substantive law and other violations not rising to such level cannot lead to a finding that the grounds for the petition set forth in Civil Procedure Code Art. 712 §1(4) have been met.
1. A petition to set aside an arbitration award is not ... an appeal, but a procedural measure with a nature similar to a petition to reopen a proceeding.
2. The statement in the second sentence of Civil Procedure Code Art. 705 §2 that an arbitration court is not bound by civil procedure regulations does not refer to mandatorily applicable regulations set forth in Book Three of the code. Civil Procedure Code Art. 712–715, which have this character, apply in every arbitration proceeding. The lack of any indication to this effect in the rules defining the procedure before the arbitration court therefore does not exclude the permissibility of filing a petition with the state court to set aside an award issued by a permanent arbitration court (Civil Procedure Code Art. 695).
An arbitration award issued during the German occupation pursuant to an arbitration clause concluded by the parties despite the non-existence of a dispute between them but only in order to ascribe the legal form to an agreement which according to Polish law requires the form of a public document does not violate public policy.
The fact that an execution clause has not been affixed to an arbitration award in accordance with Civil Procedure Code Art. 594(2) and Execution Ordinance §54(3) has only the negative consequence that the plaintiffs may not enforce their claim by way of execution before obtaining such clause, due to the lack of a writ of enforcement (Civil Procedure Code Art. 540), but this does not affect the fact that the claim adjudged by such award remains due and payable, or the right to setoff, which is based on the Obligations Code rather than the [Civil Procedure] Code provisions concerning judicial execution proceedings.
1. Civil Procedure Code Art. 150, which permits service at night only upon prior order by the director of the court, does not apply to arbitration procedure, where the general regulation of Civil Procedure Code Art. 500 §1 provides only that the arbitration court shall serve copies of the award on the parties, against written proof of service, but does not prescribe the manner of service.
3. The allegation that the arbitration award does not explain the grounds for monetary obligations is unjustified, because the parties released the arbitration court from the duty to provide a justification for the award.
1. If the parties have not specified the procedure, the arbitration court shall specify the procedure in its own discretion. In this respect, the arbitration court is not subject to any restrictions other than those set forth in the act ([Civil Procedure Code] Art. 503 §1(3)), i.e. in the regulations concerning procedure before the arbitration court (Art. 497–502). These regulations do not require the arbitration court to specify its procedure in writing, nor do they prohibit the arbitration court from changing the procedure it has adopted for another procedure, and, finally, they do not prohibit the arbitration court from departing in certain instances from the procedure it has previously specified.
2. The place of issuance of an award is the place identified by the arbitration court in the award. Stating as this place the place in which the award was handed down within the meaning of [Civil Procedure Code] Art. 497 is recommended; however, so long as the arbitration court is not bound by the procedure specified by the parties themselves (Art. 494 §1), it may determine in its own discretion which place to identify in the award as the place of issuance of the award, so long as it is not contrary to the rule set forth in Art. 497. Such a decision by the arbitration court may fall within the scope of specifying the procedure.
3. The regulations in the act concerning procedure before the arbitration court ([Civil Procedure Code] Art. 494–502) do not contain provisions on announcement of the award, and it may thus be issued without announcement. Nor does the act tie any consequences to announcement of the award, which it does not provide for announcement of at all. Consequences are, however, tied to service of copies of the award, as specified in Art. 500 §1, and under Art. 504 §1 a petition to set aside an arbitration award must be filed within one month after service of the award. The date of issuance of an award is therefore not the date of its announcement.
1. Civil Procedure Code Art. 503 §1 is limited to an enumeration of the grounds for setting aside an arbitration award, while Art. 505 requires the regulations concerning a proceeding initiated by a statement of claim to be applied in a proceeding upon a petition to set aside an arbitration award. It follows from this that Civil Procedure Code Art. 408 §2 and Art. 437 concerning partial setting aside of a judgment are also applicable to arbitration awards.
2. The substance of the arbitration award determines whether in the given instance it may be set aside in part and to what extent, obviously within the bounds of Civil Procedure Code Art. 503 §1. Partial setting aside of an award will not be permissible if the specific parts of the award are interconnected in such a way that none of them may be removed from the others without materially deforming the whole. If, however, the arbitration court exceeded the bounds of the arbitration clause (Civil Procedure Code Art. 503 §1(4)), and the ruling in this regard may without harm be separated from the rest of the award, there is no barrier preventing partial setting aside of the award.
3. The parties could supplement the arbitration clause during the hearing before the arbitration court, but because of the requirement for written form of the clause (Civil Procedure Code Art. 480 §2), such supplementation would also have to be made in that form, and thus in the minutes signed by the parties.
4. The state court is competent to consider only formal grounds for setting aside an arbitration award, except that it will also consider in substantive terms whether the award violates public policy or good practice (Civil Procedure Code Art. 503 §1(4)).
5. Waiver of the right to challenge the award would have to be express in order to be effective, and the plaintiff’s statement that it accepts the award does not satisfy this requirement, and in any event was made to the arbitration court and not to the defendant.
Under Civil Procedure Code Art. 501 §2 and Art. 502, an arbitration award has the weight of a judicial ruling and is equivalent to a state court judgment. Because pursuant to Art. 82 §2 of the Notaries Law judicial rulings effectively take the place of the form of a notarial deed, the arbitration award is thus valid and effective despite the absence of the form of a notarial deed, and does not violate public policy, because it was issued in compliance with applicable regulations of law.
1. Civil Procedure Code Art. 503 provides for the ability to set aside an arbitration award only in exceptional circumstances, and such provisions are subject to strict rather than expansive interpretation. As a result, in case of doubt, the award should be maintained in force rather than set aside.
2. It follows from the concept of “resolution” that an award by an arbitration court should be of a type that definitively ends the dispute, and from which it will be apparent in what manner the dispute was resolved, so that any doubts or potential further disputes in this respect are excluded.
1. From the perspective of Austrian civil procedure regulations, failure to submit the original arbitration clause to the arbitration court does not justify ineffectiveness of the arbitration award, as this result follows under § 595(1) of the [former Austrian] Civil Procedure Code only from lack of an arbitration clause.
2. The state court is not a higher instance with respect to the arbitration court, and thus determinations made by the arbitration court within its discretion may not be appealed against.
3. The lack of justification of an arbitration award is not included in § 595 of the [former Austrian] Civil Procedure Code as grounds for ineffectiveness of the arbitration award.
The finding ... that the parties entered into an arbitration clause and obtained an arbitration award with the intention of circumventing regulations of law imposing requirements for transfer of ownership is sufficient grounds to refuse to issue a writ of enforcement (Zw. Pr. Vol. X, Part 1, Art. 1528).
If the parties do not appear at the time set for announcement of the arbitration award, or if the award was not announced to the parties, the award is deemed to be announced on the last day of the period set for issuance of the award.
Lack of a signature on the award by an arbitrator who has been outvoted cannot be grounds for invalidating the arbitration award.
1. An arbitrator may not be ordered to sign the arbitration award by resort to the courts. Such a procedure is not provided for by the civil procedure code, which in a separate chapter governs the entire proceeding before the arbitration court. It only imposes an obligation on an arbitrator who fails to perform the duties connected with accepting the role of an arbitrator to redress the loss caused by such failure.
2. Signing of the arbitration award that has been handed down is the same obligation as the obligation to issue an award, as the signature is an essential requirement for the effectiveness of the arbitration award.
An arbitration clause signed for a joint-stock company by only one commercial proxy is invalid if a signature for the company by a single person is not provided for in the commercial register.
What is relevant for the content of an arbitration award is only the wording of the award, not the intent of particular arbitrators.
An arbitration award may be effective only for or against a person who in a written document has submitted a disputed right or disputed legal relationship to determination by the arbitration court.
The date of issuance of the award by the arbitration court should be stated in the award itself. A subsequent declaration by the arbitrators, even though made in writing, is of no legal significance because the functions of the arbitration court cease entirely upon issuance of the award (Art. 1394 of the [former Russian] Civil Procedure Code). Nor is it permissible to admit the testimony of witnesses in order to determine the date of the arbitration award. The infraction committed by the arbitration court in omitting the date does not invalidate the award if the award was filed with the state court prior to the end of the period in which the award was supposed to made and it is confirmed through this procedure that the deadline was not missed.
A clause providing for a panel composed of two arbitrators in the event that one of the arbitrators refuses to take part in the hearing and issuance of the award is legally possible and effective, but in that case the two arbitrators would have to conduct the hearing and issue the award. Then, without a doubt, only the two arbitrators holding sessions and deciding the case would be required to sign the arbitration award (§592 of the [former Austrian] Civil Procedure Code).
1. The Supreme Court does not share the legal view that because of dispatch and service of a copy of the arbitration award on the plaintiff after 10 May 1927, the award in question should be regarded as not having been issued during the period specified in the submission to arbitration, and thus invalid. Because the award was adopted by all three arbitrators and signed by them prior to 10 May 1927, the award must be regarded as issued on time, regardless of when it was served on the parties.
2. The award in question is invalid because the plaintiff was not heard by all three arbitrators prior to resolution of the case covered by the submission to arbitration.
1. It cannot be assumed that the parties, when not only certain of their rights and obligations arising out of the legal act in question are challenged, but the legal act as such, did not intend to make use of the assistance of the arbitration court. Therefore, despite the invalidity (not to mention the ineffectiveness) of the deed itself, the arbitration clause, only mechanically connected to the deed, remains in force.
2. Unless otherwise provided by the parties, the arbitration court is not bound by procedural regulations, particularly the provisions of the [former German] Civil Procedure Code, when hearing the case submitted to it.
3. An arbitration award must set forth the reasons; that is, it must contain an objective justification for the operative wording of the award issued. Whether such justification is accurate, exhaustive or consistent with the state of facts cannot be reviewed by the common court under §1041 of the [former German] Civil Procedure Code, because it is not an appellate instance with respect to the arbitration court.
1. While the arbitration court is not bound in its procedure by civil procedure regulations ([former Austrian] Civil Procedure Code § 587), nonetheless the bounds of the task of the arbitration court must be designated (see [former Austrian] Civil Procedure Code § 595(5)).
2. In the absence of the defendant (in an arbitration court) the relief sought may not be amended and arbitrarily determined relief granted against the defendant without notice to the defendant. … Such procedure violates the mandatorily applicable rule of [former Austrian] Civil Procedure Code § 587 of the necessity to hear out the parties or give them at least the opportunity of a defence, and renders the arbitration award ineffective ([former Austrian] Civil Procedure Code § 595 (2) and (5)).
In order for the court to permit execution, evidence must be presented to the court that an arbitration award constituting a writ of enforcement was issued by a properly appointed arbitration court, and such evidence is presented by the submission to arbitration, constituting in the given instance an integral part of the writ of enforcement.
1. An arbitration court is not a state institution, but operates on the basis of an agreement by the parties ([former Russian] Civil Procedure Code Art. 1367), and thus the regulations on the official language, in force in state offices, do not apply there.
2. For an award written by the arbitration court in a foreign language, in order to obtain a writ of enforcement, which must be issued only in Polish, it is necessary to submit a duly certified translation, which will serve as the basis for the judicial actions connected with issuance of a writ of enforcement and enforcement of the award.
1. A finding by the courts of two instances that an arbitration award is unenforceable is essentially a consequence of the judicially confirmed invalidity of the award, depriving it of force and effect.
2. The objective invalidity [of the arbitration award] could occur only if the scope of authority of the arbitration court was not specified at all or was extended generally, without closer description, to any and all disputes between the parties.
An arbitration award may be served on a party who has departed to a place unknown after issuance of the award, via a guardian for an absent person, appointed by the court for this purpose.
Because it was found that the petitioner had not signed the arbitration clause, through placement of her signature or her mark, it was correctly ruled that the arbitration award issued on the basis of such clause was ineffective, and with respect to both petitioners; from the nature of the legal relationship which was to be determined by the arbitration award, there is an apparent uniformity of interest for both of the petitioners.

References: Art. 1212
 §1
 Art. 365
 Art. 366
 Art. 365
 Art. 1168
 §4
 Art. 1206
 §1
 Art. 712
 §1
 Art. 1206
 §1
 Art. 1160
 Art. 1160
 Art. 1206
 §2
 Art. 31
 Art. 484
 §2
 Art. 1197
 §3
 Art. 1214
 §3
 Art. 1180
 §2
 Art. 1180
 §3
 Art. 1206
 §1
 Art. 1194
 §1
 Art. 1194
 §1
 Art. 1206
 §1
 Art. 2
 Art. 20
 Art. 22
 Art. 32
 Art. 45
 Art. 45
 Art. 48
 Art. 1174
 §2
 Art. 48
 Art. 48
 Art. 379
 Art. 378
 §2
 Art. 379
 §1
 Art. 369
 Art. 367
 §1
 Art. 1180
 §2
 Art. 1206
 §1
 Art. 1206
 §1
 Art. 1180
 §3
 Art. 1180
 §3
 Art. 365
 §1
 Art. 1207
 §2
 Art. 13
 §2
 Art. 1206
 §1
 Art. 365
 §1
 Art. 1180
 §3
 Art. 1206
 §1
 Art. 1180
 §2
 Art. 1180
 §2
 Art. 1180
 §3
 Art. 175
 Art. 1212
 §1
 Art. 365
 §1
 Art. 1212
 Art. 365
 §1
 Art. 1206
 Art. 1206
 §1
 Art. 45
 Art. 1206
 Art. 5
 Art. 1206
 §2
 Art. 1206
 Art. 1206
 §2
 Art. 45
 Art. 1185
 §31
 Art. 1206
 §1
 Art. 1186
 Art. 2
 Art. 65
 Art. 365
 §1
 Art. 365
 Art. 712
 §1
 Art. 708
 §1
 §1
 Art. 708
 §1
 Art. 705
 §2
 Art. 712
 §1
 Art. 712
 §1
 Art. 705
 §2
 Art. 712
 Art. 695
 Art. 594
 §54
 Art. 540
 Art. 150
 Art. 500
 §1
 Art. 503
 §1
 Art. 497
 §1
 Art. 497
 Art. 494
 Art. 500
 §1
 Art. 504
 §1
 Art. 503
 §1
 Art. 505
 Art. 408
 §2
 Art. 437
 Art. 503
 §1
 Art. 503
 §1
 Art. 480
 §2
 Art. 503
 §1
 Art. 501
 §2
 Art. 502
 Art. 82
 §2
 Art. 503
 § 595
 § 595
 Art. 1528
 §1041
 § 587
 § 595
 § 587
 § 595
 Art. 1367