Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=83768:58163&catid=1589&Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 08:39:05+00:00

Document:
A.M. No. RTJ-12-2336 (Formerly A.M. OCA-IPI No. 11-3695-RTJ), November 12, 2014 - ESTHER P. MAGLEO, Complainant, v. PRESIDING JUDGE ROWENA DE JUAN-QUINAGORAN AND BRANCH CLERK OE COURT ATTY. ADONIS LAURE, BOTH OF BRANCH 166, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, PASIG CITY, Respondents.
ESTHER P. MAGLEO, Complainant, v. PRESIDING JUDGE ROWENA DE JUAN-QUINAGORAN AND BRANCH CLERK OE COURT ATTY. ADONIS LAURE, BOTH OF BRANCH 166, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, PASIG CITY, Respondents.
This administrative case stemmed from a sworn Complaint-Affidavit,1 dated July 12, 2011, filed by Esther P. Magleo (complainant) charging respondents Judge Rowena De Juan-Quinagoran (respondent judge) and Atty. Adonis A. Laure, Clerk of Court V (respondent CoC), both of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1.66, Pasig City (RTC), with Gross Misconduct, Gross Partiality, Acts Unbecoming a Member of the Judiciary, Violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, and Conduct Unbecoming a Court Personnel relative to Criminal Case No. 137860-PSG, entitled People of the Philippines v. Esther Magleo y Pampolina, for Estafa under Article 315, paragraph l(b) of the Revised Penal Code.
Complainant is the accused in the aforementioned criminal case. She averred that in an Order, dated May 13, 2010, Judge Nicanor Manalo, Jr. (Judge Manalo) granted her demurrer to evidence and acquitted her of the charge of estafa. Thereafter, the prosecutor filed a motion to inhibit Judge Manalo from the case which was later re-raffled to Branch 166, RTC, Pasig City, presided over by respondent judge.
Complainant avers that, instead of motu proprio dismissing the case on ground of double jeopardy, respondent judge through her Order, dated November 4, 2010, overturned the order of acquittal and set the case for reception of defense evidence on February 23, 2011.2 Complainant filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by respondent judge in her February 2, 2011 Omnibus Order.
On February 11, 2011, complainant filed a petition for certiorari (With Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order) before the Court of Appeals (CA) questioning the propriety of the Omnibus Order.3 Complainant asserts that the November 4, 2010 and February 2, 2011 orders of respondent judge were indicative of her gross partiality and lack of knowledge of the existing laws and jurisprudence, violating complainant's right against double jeopardy.
Complainant avers that these acts show how cruel, ignorant and unorganized respondent judge is in running her office. It would also show that respondent clerk of court and the court staff exhibited hostility, partiality and wanton disregard of respect.
Clearly, when the accused filed the demurrer to evidence, the prosecution has not rested its case yet. Thus, the granting of the demurrer to evidence is not proper considering that it was filed prematurely.
[a] demurrer to evidence tests the sufficiency or insufficiency of the prosecution's evidence. As such, a demurrer to evidence or a motion for leave to file the same must be filed after the prosecution rests its case. But before an evidence may be admitted, the rules require that the same be formally offered, otherwise, it cannot be considered by the court. A prior formal offer of evidence concludes the case for the prosecution and determines the timeliness of the filing of a demurrer to evidence.
As held in Aquino v. Sison [G.R. No. 86025, November 28, 1989, 179 SCRA 648, 651,-652], the motion to dismiss for insufficiency of evidence filed by the accused after the conclusion of the cross-examination of the witness for the prosecution, is premature because the latter is still in the process of presenting evidence. The chemistry report relied upon by the court in granting the motion to dismiss was disregarded because it was not properly identified or formally offered as evidence. Verily, until such time that the prosecution closed its evidence, the defense cannot be considered to have seasonably filed a demurrer to evidence or a motion for leave to file the same.
Respondent judge explained that she did not immediately sign the draft order granting bail because she could not motu proprio lift the warrant of arrest as there was no motion filed by the complainant's lawyer.19 When complainant's lawyer, however, filed the proper motion to lift the order of arrest, she promptly acted on the motion and complainant was released immediately from NBI custody. She also stated that it was already beyond the control of the court if the PNP officers attempted to serve the warrant of arrest despite the order lifting the same.
In her 31 August 2011 Reply,20 complainant reiterates the allegations she made in her complaint, claiming she did not receive any copy of the notice of the hearing for 08 June 2011. In their 07 September 2011 Joint Rejoinder,21 respondents counters that complainant was duly informed of the 08 June 2011 hearing. On September 16, 2011, the OCA received complainant's Comment22 on the Joint Rejoinder with the attached affidavit of Ronald P. Magleo, her son, narrating the 15th and 16th June 2011 incidents. On September 23, 2011, the OCA received the Joint Reply23 to the Comment (on the Joint Rejoinder filed by the respondents). Finally, on October 4, 2011, complainant's Comment24 on Respondent Judge Joint Rejoinder was filed with the OCA.
The issue in this case is whether the respondents committed transgressions in the performance of their duties warranting the imposition of disciplinary penalties.
At the outset, this Court finds that there is no need to refer the administrative case to the CA as the facts and arguments stated in the pleadings are sufficient for proper adjudication of this case.
Complainant asserts that respondent judge committed gross ignorance of the law and evident partiality when she overturned the order granting the demurrer to evidence because it would constitute as a violation to her constitutional right against double jeopardy. Complainant argues that a dismissal due to such order is considered as acquittal which bars a subsequent opening of the criminal case.
People v. Tan31 eruditely instructs that double jeopardy will not attach when the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, such as where the prosecution was denied the opportunity to present its case or where the trial was a sham. In addition, in People v. Bocar,32 this Court rule that there is no double jeopardy when the prosecution was not allowed to complete its presentation of evidence by the trial court.
The circumstances obtaining in this controversy placed it within the realm of the exception.
The records demonstrate that the prosecution, with respondent Oilink International Corporation as private complainant, had not yet rested its case when the Demurrer to Evidence was filed and eventually granted by the RTC Branch 161.
Though the CA decision has not reached finality, it only goes to show that the respondent judge acted in good faith as she merely followed precedents.
In the February 2, 2011 Omnibus Order of respondent judge, it was stated that the next scheduled hearing was on February 23, 2011.34 On the said date, however, respondent judge was on leave of absence due to an illness. The Constancia, dated February 23, 2011, stated that the trial was to resume on June 8, 2011.
Complainant asserts that she did not receive the February 23, 2011 Constancia and, for said reason, she was not able to attend the June 8, 2011 hearing. The respondents, however, were able to submit numerous documentary proofs stating that complainant indeed received the notice of hearing, to wit: (1) Certified true copy of the subject Constancia, dated February 23, 2011; together with the two return cards pasted on the back thereof; (3) the certified true copy of the court calendar for June 8, 2011; and (4) the Post Office Certification that complainant and her counsel were notified about the said hearing date.
Between the bare allegations of complainant that she did not receive the Constancia and the substantiated claim of the respondents that the notices were served, the Court tends to believe the latter. Thus, complainant has no acceptable excuse to be absent on the June 8, 2011 hearing. Her failure to attend now seems to be a deliberate attempt to ignore such important trial date and the consequences of her absence are attributable to her alone.
Jurisprudence dictates that the primary requisite before a bench warrant shall be issued is that the absent-party was duly informed of the hearing date but unjustifiably failed to attend so.37 As stated above, complainant was undeniably notified of the June 8, 2011 hearing but she failed to attend.
Complainant also averred that respondent judge committed erroneous conduct (1) when she issued a bench warrant without specifically stating the amount of bail bond and (2) for not motu proprio lifting the bail bond when complainant's son and lawyer showed their willingness to apply for bail.
Moreover, there is nothing in the Rules which mandates a judge to motu proprio lift the bench warrant once the accused expresses his intent to be released on bail. Without any provision to the contrary, Section 1, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court40 governs such that a motion must be filed to seek affirmative relief. In the present case, respondent judge acted within the scope of her authority when she required complainant's son and lawyer to file an ex parte motion to lift the order of arrest. When the motion was filed and the prosecutor did not express any objection, respondent judge deemed it fit to impose the same amount of bail at P40,000.00. Respondent judge immediately entertained complainant's son and lawyer when they came to her branch despite her scheduled hearing and as a result, complainant was released on that same day.
While the allegations of complainant were not fully substantiated, the Court disagrees with the respondents that disrespectful remarks made by court personnel should be tolerated and even considered "justified remarks." The respondents, and all court personnel for that matter, should be reminded that the image of the Judiciary is mirrored in the kind of conduct, official or otherwise, which the personnel within its employ display, from the judge to the lowliest clerk. Impolite language and improper tone should be avoided. Professionalism, respect for the rights of others, good manners and right conduct are expected of all judicial officers and employees. Thus, all employees are required to preserve the Judiciary's good name and standing as a true temple of justice.43 For such improper remarks, the respondents and their court personnel are admonished.
WHEREFORE, the complaint against respondents Judge Rowena De Juan-Quinagoran and Branch Clerk of Court Atty. Adonis Laure is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Respondents and their court personnel, however, are hereby ADMONISHED to be always courteous in dealing with litigants and the public in the performance of official duties.
Carpio, (Chairperson), Brion, Del Castillo, and Leonen, JJ., concur.
27Bautista v. Cuneta-Pangilinan, G.R. No. 189754, October 24, 2012 684 SCRA 521, citing People v. Laguio, Jr., 547 Phil. 296 (2007).
30People v. Laguio, Jr., 547 Phil. 296, 310 (2007).
31 G.R. No. 167526, July 26, 2010, 625 SCRA 388, 396-397, citing People v. Laguio, Jr., 547 Phil. 296 310(2007).
35 Section 2(b), Rule 1 14, Rules of Court.
36 Black Law's Dictionary, 9th Ed., p. 1722 (2009).
37Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Lorenzo, 595 Phil. 618 (2008); Talag v. Judge Reyes, AM. No. R.TJ-04-1852, June 3, 2004, 430 SCRA 428: Ang v. Judge Quilala, 444 Phil. 742 (2003).
39 Section 9, Rule 114, Rules of Court.
40 Section 1. Motion defined. A motion is an application for relief other than by a pleading.
42Rollo, pp. 95, 96, 101.
43Judge Mariano v. Mondala, 591 Phil. 33, 41 (2008), citiing Casanova, Jr. v. Cajayon 448 Phil 573, 582 (2003).

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