Source: http://ethics.state.fl.us/Documents/Orders/2001/01-011FO.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 16:15:52+00:00

Document:
����������� This matter came before the State of Florida Commission on Ethics, meeting in public session on October 16, 2003, pursuant to the Recommended Order of the Division of Administrative Hearings' Administrative Law Judge rendered in this matter on April 25, 2003.
actions or judgment would thereby be influenced, and by using his position to engage in sexually or romantically oriented comments, behavior, and/or invitations to female staff members.� The matter was then forwarded to the Division of Administrative Hearings for assignment of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) to conduct the formal hearing and prepare a recommended order.� A formal evidentiary hearing was held on January 13-14, 17, 22, 24, and 27, 2003.� A transcript was filed with the ALJ and both parties timely filed proposed recommended orders.� In addition, the Respondent filed a Memorandum of Law urging dismissal of all ethics charges involving �sexual harassment.�� The ALJ�s recommended order was transmitted to the Commission and to the parties on April 25, 2003, and the parties were notified of their right to file exceptions to the recommended order.� Thereafter, the Advocate filed exceptions to the ALJ�s recommended order and the Respondent filed a response to the Advocate�s exceptions. ��The Respondent also submitted a �Chronological Summary of Events,� and the Advocate submitted a response.
� Finally, as a practical matter, the undersigned effectively has done what the Commission wants--i.e. 'reconsider[ed] the evidence of record for additional findings in light of the . . . substituted Conclusions of Law'--and resolved not to replace or supplement any existing findings of fact with new ones.� This is because, even when viewed through the prism of the Commission's substituted Conclusions of Law, the findings of fact still look to the undersigned to be thorough and complete, responsive to each and every material allegation, and decisive as to all the issues of material fact in dispute.� Having covered the factual waterfront, there is simply nothing more the undersigned can do.
Thus, the matter is back before the Commission for final agency action.
����������� Under Section 120.57(1)(l), Florida Statutes, an agency may reject or modify the conclusions of law and interpretations of administrative rules contained in the recommended order.� However, the agency may not reject or modify findings of fact made by the ALJ unless a review of the entire record demonstrates that the findings were not based on competent, substantial evidence or that the proceedings on which the findings were based did not comply with the essential requirements of law.� See, e.g., Freeze v. Dept. of Business Regulation, 556 So. 2d 1204 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990); and Florida Department of Corrections v. Bradley, 510 So. 2d 1122 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987).� Competent, substantial evidence has been defined by the Florida Supreme Court as such evidence as is "sufficiently relevant and material that a reasonable mind would accept it as adequate to support the conclusions reached."� DeGroot v. Sheffield, 95 So. 2d 912, 916 (Fla. 1957).
����������� The agency may not reweigh the evidence, resolve conflicts therein, or judge the credibility of witnesses, because those are matters within the sole province of the ALJ.� Heifetz v. Dept. of Business Regulation, 475 So. 2d 1277, 1281 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985).� Consequently, if the record of the DOAH proceedings discloses any competent, substantial evidence to support a finding of fact made by the ALJ, the Commission is bound by that finding.
����������� Under Section 120.57(1)(l), Florida Statutes, an agency may reject or modify the conclusions of law over which it has substantive jurisdiction and interpretation of administrative rules over which it has substantive jurisdiction.� When rejecting or modifying such conclusion of law or interpretation of administrative rule, the agency must state with particularity its reasons for rejecting or modifying such conclusion of law or interpretation of administrative rule and must make a finding that its substituted conclusion of law or interpretation of administrative rule is as or more reasonable than that which was rejected or modified.
����������� Having reviewed the recommended order and the entire record of the proceeding, the Advocate�s exceptions and the Respondent's response thereto, and having heard the arguments of the parties, the Commission makes the following findings, conclusions, rulings and recommendations.
Section 120.57(1)(k), Florida Statutes, and Rule 28-106.217, Florida Administrative Code, contemplate only the filing of exceptions to the recommended order and a response to the other party�s exceptions.� Inasmuch as this purported �Chronological Summary� is neither, it will not be considered nor addressed in our rulings on the exceptions.
Notwithstanding, the ALJ chose not to believe these witnesses over the Respondent's denials.� Under the statutory and case law, we cannot reweigh the evidence and reach a contrary result where, as here, the ALJ's findings of fact are supported by competent substantial evidence and the proceedings complied with the essential requirements of law.� Therefore, the Advocate's exceptions to the ALJ's findings of fact are rejected.
The second, third, fourth, and fifth paragraphs of Endnote 6 to Paragraph 11 are stricken.
� Findings of fact in a prosecution for violation of Section 112.313(6), Florida Statute, must be based on clear and convincing evidence.� Section 120.57(1)(j), Florida Statutes; Latham v. Florida Commission on Ethics, 694 So.2d 83 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997).
54.������ The parties have stipulated that the Respondent, as a Leon County Commissioner, was a public officer subject to the requirements of Part III, Chapter 112, Florida Statues.
57.������ Acting with the knowledge of one�s position of power relative to the weaker position of a target is a use of office.� See, In re: Raymond Bruner, 2 FALR 1034 (Ethics 1980), appeal dism�d., Bruner v. Commission on Ethics, 384 So. 2d 1339 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980).
58.������ In addition, in cases involving the use of office to make sexual advances, the Commission has found significance in the fact that the advances are made on public time, amid the trappings of the official�s public office.� See, In re: Ambrose Garner, 5 FALR 105-A (Ethics 1982) aff�d., Garner v. Commission on Ethics, 439 So. 2d 894 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1983) (noting: �the unwanted sexual advances were made either in the Respondent's office at the Community College during normal working hours, or while the Respondent and the female personnel were engaged in business relating to the college�), and In re: Alfred Welch, 14 FALR 4275 (Ethics 1992) (Respondent�s �actions were taken either in his office during normal working hours or were sufficiently connected to his official position�).
59.������ Testimony as to fear of negative employment consequences is also a factor to be considered in determining whether a use of office has occurred.� The interpretation of the target is relevant, as, �a threat is not a state of mind in the threatener; it is an appearance to the victim.�� U.S. v. Holzer, 816 F.2d 304, 310 (C.A.7 1987)� In Holzer, a judge repeatedly asked lawyers appearing before him for loans.� No overt threats were made and there was no evidence that the judge did actually retaliate against anyone who turned him down.� The court said, �When a judge urgently and insistently asks a lawyer in a case before him for a loan, the request connotes an implied threat (or so a jury could reasonably conclude) to rule against the lawyer if he turns the judge down,� and that the judge �could leave [the lawyers] to draw the natural inference that if they didn't play ball he might retaliate.�� Id. at 310.
61.������ Securing sexual favors from employees is a special privilege or benefit.� In re: Raymond Bruner, 2 FALR 1034, 1036-A (Ethics 1980); appeal dismissed, Bruner v. Commission on Ethics, 384 So. 2d 1339 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980).� Sexual favors are a benefit as the term is used in the statute, (Garner v. Commission on Ethics, 439 So.2d 894 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1983), as is the ability to engage in sexual comments and lewd actions.� In re: Lawrence R. Hawkins, 18 FALR 2078, 2093 (Ethics 1995).
62.������ Corrupt intent is shown where the officer acted with wrongful intent, that is, with reasonable notice that his conduct was inconsistent with the proper performance of public duties and would be a violation of the law or the Code of Ethics in part III of chapter 112, (Blackburn v. Commission on Ethics, 589 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) and the action is inconsistent with the proper performance of the officer�s public duties.
63.������ Prior Commission final orders and opinions provide fair and reasonable notice as to what conduct is prohibited by Section 112.313(6).� Blackburn, supra.
����������� The findings of fact as set forth in the recommended order are hereby adopted.
����������� 1.�������� The ALJ's conclusions of law, except as rejected or modified herein, are hereby adopted.
2.�������� Based upon our review of the complete record, there is competent substantial evidence to support the ALJ's findings of fact and his ultimate finding that the Respondent did not violate Sections 112.313(2) and 112.313(6), Florida Statutes.
Accordingly, the Commission on Ethics finds that the Respondent, as an employee of the Florida Department of Transportation and as a member of the Leon County Board of County Commissioners, did not violate Sections 112.313(2) and 112.313(6), Florida Statutes, as alleged in the complaint.� Therefore, the complaint is hereby dismissed.
DONE and ORDERED by the State of Florida Commission on Ethics meeting in public session on October 16, 2003.
� THIS ORDER CONSTITUTES FINAL AGENCY ACTION. ANY PARTY WHO IS ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY THIS ORDER HAS THE RIGHT TO SEEK JUDICIAL REVIEW UNDER SECTION 120.68, FLORIDA STATUTES, BY FILING A NOTICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL PURSUANT TO RULE 9.110 FLORIDA RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE, WITH THE CLERK OF THE COMMISSION ON ETHICS, 3600 Maclay Boulevard South, Suite 201, P.O. DRAWER 15709, TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32317-5709; AND BY FILING A COPY OF THE NOTICE OF APPEAL ATTACHED TO WHICH IS A CONFORMED COPY OF THE ORDER DESIGNATED IN THE NOTICE OF APPEAL ACCOMPANIED BY THE APPLICABLE FILING FEES WITH THE APPROPRIATE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL. THE NOTICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITHIN 30 DAYS OF THE DATE THIS ORDER IS RENDERED.

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.