Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/160/598/
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 16:25:24+00:00

Document:
"involving disputed facts or controverted questions of law, where the amount in controversy exceeds three thousand dollars, or where the decision will affect a class of cases, or furnish a precedent for the future action of any Executive Department in the adjustment of a class of cases, without regard to the amount involved in the particular case, or where any authority, right, privilege or exemption is claimed or denied under the Constitution of the United States,"
may be transmitted to the Court of Claims by the head of such Department under Rev.Stat. § 1063 for final adjudication, provided, such claim be not barred by limitation, and be one of which, by reason of its subject matter and character, that court could take judicial cognizance at the voluntary suit of the claimant.
whether the claimant consents or not, may be transmitted under the Act of March 3, 1883, c. 116, to the Court of Claims by the head of the Executive Department in which it is pending for a report to such Department of facts and conclusions of law for "its guidance and action."
Any claim embraced by that section may, in the discretion of the Executive Department in which it is pending, and with the expressed consent of the plaintiff, be transmitted to the Court of Claims, under the Act of March 3, 1887, c. 359, without regard to the amount involved, for a report, merely advisory in its character, of facts or conclusions of law.
In every case involving a claim of money transmitted by the head of an Executive Department to the Court of Claims under the Act of March 3, 1883, c. 116, a final judgment or decree may be rendered when it appears to the satisfaction of the court, upon the facts established, that the case is one of which the court at the time such claim was filed in the Department, could have taken jurisdiction at the voluntary suit of the claimant, for purposes of final adjudication.
Whether the words "or matter" in the second section of that act embrace any matters except those involving the payment of money, and of which the Court of Claims under the statutes regulating its jurisdiction could at the voluntary suit of the claimant, take cognizance for purposes of final judgment or decree is not considered.
As the claim of the New York, the subject of controversy in this case, was presented to the Treasury Department before it was barred by limitation, its transmission by the Secretary of the Treasury to the Court of Claims for adjudication was only a continuation of the original proceeding commenced in that Department in 1862, and the delay by the Department in disposing of the matter before the expiration of six years after the cause of action accrued could not impair the rights of the state.
The $91,320.84 paid by the State of New York for interest upon its bonds issued in 1861 to defray the expenses to be incurred in raising troops for the national defense was a principal sum which the United States agreed to pay, and not interest within the meaning of the rule prohibiting the allowance of interest accruing upon claims against the United States prior to the rendition of judgment thereon.
The claim of the State of New York for money paid on account of interest to the commissioners of the Canal Fund is not one against the United States for interest as such, but is a claim for costs, charges, and expenses properly incurred and paid by the state in aid of the general government, and is embraced by the act of Congress declaring that the states would be indemnified by the general government for money so expended.
On the 3d day of January, 1889, the Secretary of the Treasury transmitted to the Court of Claims all the papers and vouchers relating to a claim of the State of New York against the United States, then pending in the Treasury Department, for interest paid on money borrowed and expended in enrolling, subsisting, clothing, supplying, arming, and equipping troops for the suppression of the rebellion of 1861. That claim, the Secretary certified, involved controverted questions of law and exceeded three thousand dollars in amount. The communication accompanying the papers stated that the case was transmitted to the Court of Claims under and by authority of section 1063 of the Revised Statutes, to be there proceeded in according to law.
In further prosecution of this claim, the state promptly filed its petition in the court below, and asked judgment against the United States for the sum of $131,188.02, with interest from the first day of July, 1862, together with such other relief as would be in conformity with law.
"The Secretary of the Treasury be, and he is hereby directed, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, to pay to the governor of any state, or to his duly authorized agents, the costs, charges, and expenses properly incurred by such state for enrolling, subsisting, clothing, supplying, arming, equipping, paying and transporting its troops employed in aiding to suppress the present insurrection against the United States, to be settled upon proper vouchers to be filed and passes upon by the proper accounting officers of the Treasury."
it was declared that the above act should be construed "to apply to expenses incurred as well after as before the date of the approval thereof." 12 Stat. 615.
Before July 4, 1861, the State of New York, pursuant to a statute passed by its legislature April 15, 1861, c. 277 -- enlisted, enrolled, armed, equipped, and caused to be mustered into the military service of the United States for the period of two years of during the war thirty thousand troops, to be employed in suppressing the rebellion. That statute provided that all expenditures for arms, supplies, or equipments necessary for such forces should be made under the direction of the governor and other named officers, and that the moneys therefor should, on the certificate of the governor, be drawn from the Treasury on the warrant of the Comptroller in favor of such person or persons as from time to time were designated by the governor, and the sum of $3,000,000, or so much thereof as was necessary, was appropriated out of any moneys in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated to defray the expenses authorized by that act, or any other expenses of mustering the militia of the state, or any part thereof, into the service of the United States. That act also imposed, for the fiscal year commencing on the first day of October, 1861, a state tax to meet the expenses authorized, not to exceed two mills on each dollar of the valuation of real and personal property in the state. Laws of N.Y., 84th Session, 1861, page 634.
There was no money in the Treasury of the state in 1861 that had not been specifically appropriated for the expenses of the state government; none that could have been used to defray the expenses of enlisting, enrolling, arming, equipping, and mustering troops into the service of the United States.
Under the laws of the state, the moneys authorized to be raised by the Act of April 15, 1861, did not reach the state Treasury and were not available for use until the months of April and May, 1862.
statute of 1861. The moneys realized from this tax were paid into the state Treasury during the year 1862.
The state had no other means of raising the money required for the purpose of immediately defraying the expenses of enlisting, enrolling, arming, equipping, and mustering in such troops, except by borrowing money in anticipation of the collection of its taxes, and between June 3, 1861, and July 2, 1861, in order to provide for the public defense, it issued bonds in anticipation of such taxes to the amount of $1,250,000, payable on July 1, 1862, except that $100,000 was made payable June 1, 1862, at the rate of seven percent per annum, which at that time was the legal rate of interest under the laws of the state.
The issuing of these bonds was necessary for the purpose of providing the money required, and upon their sale, the full amount of their face value was received and was used and applied by the state, together with other moneys, in raising troops. The entire sum so expended between the 23d day of April, 1861, and the first day of January, 1862, was $2,873,501.19, exclusive of interest upon the bonds or loans made by the state for that purpose.
In addition to the above sums, the state during the years 1861 and 1862 paid, on account of interest that accrued on its bonds issued in anticipation of the tax for the public defense, the sum of $91,320.84.
By a statute of New York of April 12, 1862, the legislature specifically appropriated the sum of $1,250,000 for the redemption of Comptroller's bonds issued for loans in anticipation of the tax imposed by the Act of April 15, 1861, and the additional sum of $91,320.84 for the payment of the accruing interest on those bonds. Laws of N.Y. 1862, 85th Session, 364.
fund for the ultimate payment of what is known as the "canal debt." Const.N.Y. 1846, Art. VII, Sec. 1.
"New York, Canal Department, Albany, May 21, 1861. The Comptroller is to be permitted to use two millions of dollars of the Canal Fund moneys for military purposes until the 1st day of October next, when the commissioners of the Canal Fund will invest one million of dollars of the canal sinking fund under section 1, article 7, in the tax levied for military purposes until the first of July, 1862 at five percent, and the Comptroller may use one million of dollars of the tax levied to pay interest on the $12,000,000 debt until the first of January, 1862, when the commissioners will, if they have the means, replace that, or as large an amount as they may have the means to do it with, from the toll of the next fiscal year, so as that the whole advance from the Canal Fund on account of the tax be two millions of dollars. It is understood the Comptroller will retain the taxes now in process of collection for canal purposes until the above investments are made, paying the funds five percent interest therefor."
This order was signed by the commissioners of the Canal Fund.
the sum of $1,113,000, which sum, with interest, was placed in the Canal Fund on April 4, 1862. This left $510,501.19 unpaid of the moneys used from the Canal Fund.
The amount of interest at 5 percent per annum on the moneys of the Canal Fund during the time it was used by the state in raising troops was $48,187.13. But during the same time, the state had received interest on portions of those moneys, while lying in bank unused, to the amount of $8,319.95, and the net deficiency of the state on account of interest on such moneys during the period when they were so used was $39,867.18, which sum was paid into the Canal Fund from the state Treasury.
The total amount paid by the state for interest upon its bonds issued in anticipation of the tax for the public defense, and upon the moneys of the Canal Fund used for the purpose of defraying the expenses of raising and equipping troops, was $131,188.02. No part of that sum has been paid by the United States.
The moneys above specified as actually expended by the State of New York were necessarily expended for the purpose of enlisting, enrolling, subsisting, clothing, supplying, arming, equipping, paying, and transporting such troops, and causing them to be mustered into the military service of the United States, and were so paid and expended at the request of the civil and military authorities of the United States.
hereinbefore specified, amounting to $131,188.02, constituted a part.
The claim of the state for expenditures in furnishing troops with clothing and munitions of war was filed in the Treasury Department in May, 1862, and included the above items of interest. The claim for interest has from that time been suspended in the department, and was so suspended at the time it was transmitted to the Court of Claims.
The court, after finding the facts substantially as above stated, gave judgment in favor of the state for $91,320.84 on account of interest paid upon its bonds issued in anticipation of taxes imposed for the public defense. From that judgment the United States appealed. The state also appealed, and claims that it was entitled to judgment for the additional sum of $39,867.13, paid into what is called the "Canal Fund," as interest upon the moneys it had borrowed from that fund, to be repaid with interest.
The government has moved to dismiss the state's appeal, its contention being that the judgment brought here by the state for review is not obligatory in character and appealable, but only ancillary and advisory. This motion assumes that the court below was without jurisdiction under existing legislative enactments to render a final judgment, reviewable by this Court, upon any claim, whatever its amount, made against an Executive Department and transmitted to the Court of Claims to be there proceeded in according to law.
We recognize the importance of the question thus presented, and have bestowed upon it the most careful consideration. Its solution can be satisfactorily reached only by an examination of the various statutes regulating the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims, including those known as the "Bowman Act," of March 3, 1883, c. 116, 22 Stat. 485, and the Tucker Act, of March 3, 1887, c. 359, 24 Stat. 505.
costs, charges, and expenses properly incurred by any state in enrolling, subsisting, clothing, supplying, arming, equipping, paying, and transporting its troops to be employed in suppressing the rebellion of 1861. 12 Stat. 276.
The claim of New York was founded on the above Act of Congress of July 27, 1861, if not on contract with the United States. It was transmitted by the Secretary of the Treasury to the Court of Claims under section 1063 of the Revised Statutes as one involving controverted questions of law.
By the Act of June 25, 1868, c. 71, § 7, the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims was enlarged so as to embrace several classes of claims that might be transmitted to it by the head of an Executive Department for adjudication. 15 Stat. 75, 76.
the said court might, under existing laws take jurisdiction of on such voluntary action of the claimant."
"all cases transmitted by the head of any department, or upon the certificate of any Auditor or comptroller, according to the provisions of the preceding section, shall be proceeded in as other cases pending in the Court of Claims, and shall, in all respects, be subject to the same rules and regulations,"
"the amount of any final judgment or decree rendered in favor of the claimant, in any case transmitted to the Court of Claims under the two preceding sections, shall be paid out of any specific appropriation applicable to the case, if any such there be, and where no such appropriation exists, the judgment or decree shall be paid in the same manner as other judgments of the said court. "
We come now to what is known as the Bowman Act, of March 3, 1883, c. 116, entitled "An act to afford assistance and relief to Congress and the Executive Departments in the investigation of claims and demands against the government." 22 Stat. 485.
"SEC 1. Whenever a claim or matter is pending before any committee of the Senate or House of Representatives, or before either house of Congress, which involves the investigation and determination of facts, the committee or house may cause the same, with the vouchers, papers, proofs, and documents pertaining thereto, to be transmitted to the Court of Claims of the United States, and the same shall there be proceeded in under such rules as the court may adopt. When the facts shall have been found, the court shall not enter judgment thereon, but shall report the same to the committee or to the house by which the case was transmitted for its consideration."
"SEC. 2. When a claim or matter is pending in any of the Executive Departments which may involve controverted questions of fact or law, the head of such department may transmit the same, with the vouchers, papers, proofs, and documents pertaining thereto, to said court, and the same shall be there proceeded in under such rules as the court may adopt. When the facts and conclusions of law shall have been found, the court shall not enter judgment thereon, but shall report its findings and opinions to the department by which it was transmitted for its guidance and action."
As the Bowman Act contains no words of express repeal, the question arises whether, by necessary implication, its second section superseded section 1063 of the Revised Statutes, in respect of claims transmitted by an Executive Department to the Court of Claims.
or against a claim transmitted under that act; the duty of the court, in cases involving controverted questions of fact or law transmitted to and heard by it under the Bowman Act, being only to report its findings of fact and conclusions of law to the proper department, for "its guidance and action."
"the last statute is so broad in its terms, and so clear and explicit in its words, as to show that it was intended to cover the whole subject, and therefore to displace the prior statute."
Frost v. Wenie, 157 U. S. 46, 157 U. S. 58.
Court of Claims jurisdiction to render judgment in cases coming before it under the Revised Statutes. The object of that act is expressed in its title, and was to afford assistance and relief to Congress and the Executive Departments in the investigation of claims and demands against the government. To that end, and in respect of claims and demands involving controverted questions of fact or law, and pending in the Executive Departments, authority was given to the heads of such departments, upon their own motion, and whether the claimant desired it or not, to obtain, for their "guidance and action," findings of fact and conclusions of law, without regard to the amount involved. Billings v. United States, 23 Ct.Cl. 166, 174. Neither expressly nor by necessary implication did that act take from an Executive Department the right to send to the Court of Claims for final adjudication any claim made against it that was embraced by section 1063 of the Revised Statutes. So far as the Bowman Act related to claims for money pending in an Executive Department, it only authorized the head of the department to send them to that court for a report of facts and conclusions that would not have the force of a judgment reviewable by this Court. In this view, there is no conflict between the Bowman Act and the Revised Statutes. As there are no words of repeal in the Bowman Act, we have given it such construction as will make it consistent with previous legislation, and thus avoid the abrogation of existing statutes which Congress had not repealed, either expressly or by necessary implication. The second section of the Bowman Act should be construed as if it were a proviso to section 1063 of the Revised Statutes. Thus construed, the later statute is not in conflict with the earlier one.
We turn now to the Act of March 3, 1887, c. 359, known as the Tucker Act, entitled "An act to provide for the bringing of suits against the government of the United States." 24 Stat. 505.
except for pensions, or upon any regulation of an Executive Department, or upon any contract, expressed or implied, with the government of the United States, or for damages, liquidated or unliquidated, in cases not sounding in tort, in respect of which claims the party would be entitled to redress against the United States either in a court of law, equity, or admiralty, if the United States were suable, nothing, however, in that section to be construed as giving to any of the courts mentioned in the act jurisdiction to hear and determine claims growing out of the late Civil War, and commonly known as "war claims," nor other claims theretofore rejected, or reported on adversely by any court, department, or commission authorized to hear and determine the same. Jurisdiction was also given of all set-offs, counterclaims, claims for damages, whether liquidated or unliquidated, or other demands whatsoever on the part of the government of the United States against any claimant. It also provided that no suit against the government of the United States should be allowed under that act unless the same was brought within six years after the right accrued for which the claim is made.
"SEC. 12. That when any claim or matter may be pending in any of the Executive Departments which involves controverted questions of fact or law, the head of such department, with the consent of the claimant, may transmit the same, with the vouchers, papers, proofs and documents pertaining thereto, to said Court of Claims, and the same shall be there proceeded in under such rules as the court may adopt. When the facts and conclusions of law shall have been found, the court shall report its findings to the department by which it was transmitted."
upon the facts established, that it has jurisdiction to render judgment or decree thereon under existing laws or under the provisions of this act, it shall proceed to do so, giving to either party such further opportunity for hearing as in its judgment justice shall require, and report its proceedings therein to either house of Congress or to the department by which the same was referred to said court."
By its sixteenth section, all laws and parts of laws inconsistent with that act were repealed.
What is the scope of the twelfth section of the Tucker Act? Did that section supersede section 1063 of the Revised Statutes, or section 2 of the Bowman Act?
act to afford assistance and relief to Congress and the Executive Departments in the investigation of claims and demands against the government' [the Bowman Act], and report to such house the facts in the case and the amount, where the same can be liquidated,"
etc. It thus appears that any bill, except for a pension, in either house of Congress, providing for the payment of a claim against the United States, legal or equitable, or for a grant, gift, or bounty to any person, may be transmitted to the Court of Claims, to be proceeded in -- not, let it be observed, under the Tucker Act, but under the Bowman Act of March 3, 1883 -- and to report the facts, etc., to such house. It is impossible, therefore, to hold that the Tucker Act displaced or repealed the second section of the Bowman Act.
In our opinion, the twelfth section of the Tucker Act should be construed as not referring to claims which an Executive Department, proceeding under section 1063 of the Revised Statutes, seeks to have finally adjudicated by the Court of Claims, nor to claims described in that section, in respect of which the department, upon its own motion, and whether the claimant consents or not, desires from that court a report, under the Bowman Act, of facts and law for its guidance and action. It refers only to claims which the head of an Executive Department, with the expressed consent of the claimant, may send to the Court of Claims in order to obtain a report of facts and law which the department may regard as only advisory. It no doubt often happened that the head of a department did not desire action by the Court of Claims in relation to a particular claim, but, in order to meet the wishes of the claimant, was willing to have a finding by that court which was not followed by a judgment, nor by any report for the guidance and action of the department. So that section 1063 of the Revised Statutes, the second section of the Bowman Act, and the twelfth section of the Tucker Act may be regarded as parts of one general system, covering different states of case, and standing together without conflict in any essential particular.
an act of Congress, was within the general jurisdiction of the Court of Claims. If not barred by limitation, it could, in the discretion of the Secretary of the Treasury, have been transmitted or certified to the Court of Claims under the Bowman Act, after its passage, for a finding of facts or law, and that court, when the Tucker Act came into operation, could, under its thirteenth section, have rendered a final judgment, sending, however, to the Treasury Department a report of its proceedings. But the Secretary of the Treasury, in the exercise of an authority given him by statute and never withdrawn, chose to certify or transmit this claim to the Court of Claims, under section 1063 of the Revised Statutes, for final adjudication.
Touching the suggestion that the twelfth section of the Tucker Act entirely superseded the second section of the Bowman Act, it may be further observed that the Tucker Act repeals only such previous statutes as were inconsistent with its provisions. There is no inconsistency between the sections just named -- one, as we have said (the second section of the Bowman Act) relating to claims involving controverted questions of fact or law, which an Executive Department may transmit to the Court of Claims without consulting the wishes of the claimant, in order to obtain a report of facts and law for its guidance and action; the other (the twelfth section of the Tucker Act) relating to claims of the same class transmitted to that court with the expressed consent of the claimant in order to obtain a report of facts and law that would be only advisory in its character.
Bowman Act, the thirteenth section of the Tucker Act, authorizing a final judgment or decree where the claim was one of which the court could originally have taken jurisdiction for purposes of final adjudication, would not have made special reference to cases coming before the Court of Claims under the Bowman Act.
"involving disputed facts or controverted questions of law where the amount in controversy exceeds three thousand dollars, or where the decision will affect a class of cases, or furnish a precedent for the future action of any Executive Department in the adjustment of a class of cases, without regard to the amount involved in the particular case, or where any authority, right, privilege, or exemption is claimed or denied under the Constitution of the United States"
may be transmitted to the Court of Claims by the head of such department under section 1063 of the Revised Statutes for final adjudication, provided such claim be not barred by limitation and be one of which, by reason of its subject matter and character, that court could take judicial cognizance at the voluntary suit of the claimant.
Second. Any claim embraced by section 1063 of the Revised Statutes, without regard to its amount, and whether the claimant consents or not, may be transmitted under the Bowman Act to the Court of Claims by the head of the Executive Department in which it is pending, for a report to such department of facts and conclusions of law for "its guidance and action."
Third. Any claim embraced by that section may, in the discretion of the Executive Department in which it is pending, and with the expressed consent of the plaintiff, be transmitted to the Court of Claims under the Tucker Act, without regard to the amount involved, for a report, merely advisory in its character, of facts or conclusions of law.
by the head of an Executive Department to the Court of Claims under the Bowman Act, a final judgment or decree may be rendered when it appears to the satisfaction of the court, upon the facts established, that the case is one of which the court at the time such claim was filed in the department, could have taken jurisdiction at the voluntary suit of the claimant for purposes of final adjudication.
Whether the words "or matter" in the second section of the Bowman Act embrace any matters, except those involving the payment of money, and of which the Court of Claims, under the statutes regulating its jurisdiction, could at the voluntary suit of the claimant, take cognizance for purposes of final judgment or decree need not be now considered.
It results that, as the claim of New York exceeded three thousand dollars, and was certified under section 1063 of the Revised Statutes as one involving controverted questions of law, the court below had jurisdiction to proceed to a final judgment unless, as suggested by the assistant Attorney General, the claim, when transmitted to the Court of Claims by the Secretary of the Treasury, was barred by limitation.
At the time the claim of New York was filed in the Treasury Department, there was no statute of limitations in force expressly applicable to cases in the Court of Claims. But by the Act of March 2, 1863, c. 92, § 10, it was provided that (with certain exceptions that have no application to this case), every claim against the United States cognizable by the Court of Claims should be barred unless the petition setting forth a statement of it was filed in or transmitted to that court within six years after the claim first accrued, claims that had accrued before the passage of that act not to be barred if filed or transmitted, as above stated, within three years after the passage of the act. 12 Stat. 765, 767. This limitation of six years was preserved in the Revised Statutes and in the Tucker Act. Rev.Stat. § 1069, 24 Stat. 505.
"The general rule that limitation does not operate by its own force as a bar, but is a defense, and that the party making such a defense must plead the statute if he wishes the benefit of its provisions, has no application to suits in the Court of Claims against the United States. An individual may waive such a defense either expressly or by failing to plead the statute, but the government has not expressly or by implication conferred authority upon any of its officers to waive the limitation imposed by statute upon suits against the United States in the Court of Claims. Since the government is not liable to be sued as of right by any claimant, and since it has assented to a judgment's being rendered against it only in certain classes of cases brought within a prescribed period after the cause of action accrued, a judgment in the Court of Claims for the amount of a claim which the record or evidence shows to be barred by the statute would be erroneous."
To the same effect was DeArnaud v. United States, 151 U. S. 483, 151 U. S. 495.
the same demand which had previously and in due time been presented at the proper department for settlement. These views find support in the fact that the act of 1868 describes claims presented at an Executive Department for settlement, and which belong to the classes specified in its seventh section, as cases which may be transmitted to the Court of Claims."
"And all the cases mentioned in this section, which shall be transmitted by the head of an Executive Department, or upon the certificate of any Auditor or Comptroller, shall be proceeded in as other cases pending in said court, and shall, in all respects, be subject to the same rules and regulations,"
"with right of appeal. The cases thus transmitted for judicial determination are, in the sense of the act, commenced against the government when the claim is originally presented at the department for examination and settlement. Upon their transfer to the Court of Claims, they are to be 'proceeded in as other cases in said court.'"
"The duty of the court, under such circumstances, whether limitation was pleaded or not, was to dismiss the petition, for the statute, in our opinion, makes it a condition or qualification of the right to a judgment against the United States that -- except where the claimant labors under some of the disabilities specified in the statutes -- the claim must be put in suit by the voluntary action of the claimant, or be presented to the proper department for settlement within six years after suit could be commenced thereon against the government."
rights of the state. Of course, if the claim had not been presented to the Treasury Department before the expiration of that period, the Court of Claims could not have entertained jurisdiction of it.
For the reasons we have stated, the motion of the United States to dismiss the appeal of the state is denied, and we proceed to the examination of the case upon its merits.
The entire sum for which the state asked judgment was $131,188.02, of which $91,320.84 represented the amount paid as interest on moneys borrowed for the purpose of raising troops for the national defense, and for the repayment of which, with interest at seven percent, the state executed its short-time bonds. The balance, $39,867.18, represented the amount paid as interest on moneys received by way of loan from the Canal Fund, and applied by the state for the same purpose.
"is not to be awarded against a sovereign government unless its consent to pay interest has been manifested by an act of its legislature or by a lawful contract of its executive officers."
United States v. North Carolina, 136 U. S. 211, 136 U. S. 216; United States v. Bayard, 127 U. S. 251, 127 U. S. 260.
The allowance of the $91,320.84 would not contravene either the statute or the general rule to which we have adverted. The duty of suppressing armed rebellion having for its object the overthrow of the national government was primarily upon that government, and not upon the several states composing the Union. New York came promptly to the assistance of the national government by enrolling, subsisting, clothing, supplying, arming, equipping, paying, and transporting troops to be employed in putting down the rebellion.
"Adopt such measures as may be necessary to fill up your regiments as rapidly as possible. We need the men. Let me know the best the Empire State can do to aid the country in the present emergency."
1862, he telegraphed: "The government will refund the state for the advances for troops as speedily as the Treasurer can obtain funds for that purpose." Liberally interpreted, it is clear that the Acts of July 27, 1861, and March 8, 1862, created, on the part of the United States, an obligation to indemnify the states for any costs, charges, and expenses properly incurred for the purposes expressed in the act of 1861, the title of which shows that its object was "to indemnify the states for expenses incurred by them in defense of the United States."
interest so paid constitutes a debt from the United States to the state. It is as if the United States had itself borrowed the money though the agency of the state. We therefore hold that the court below did not err in adjudging that the $91,320.84 paid by the state for interest upon its bonds issued in 1861 to defray the expenses to be incurred in raising troops for the national defense was a principal sum which the United States agreed to pay, and not interest, within the meaning of the rule prohibiting the allowance of interest accruing upon claims against the United States prior to the rendition of judgment thereon.
The Court of Claims disallowed so much of the state's demand as represented interest paid by it on moneys borrowed from the Canal Fund. The installment of interest paid into that fund by the state was $48, 187.13. But, as the state itself earned interest to the amount of $8,319.95 on a part of the money obtained by it from the commissioners of the Canal Fund, it only claimed $39,867.18 on account of interest paid to that fund. The Canal Fund was made by the constitution of the state a sinking fund for the ultimate liquidation of what is known as the "canal debt" of New York. In April and May, 1861, $2,039,663.06 from the taxes of 1860 reached the Treasury of the state, and under the Constitution and laws of New York, that amount should have been invested in securities for the benefit of the Canal Fund, and the interest derived from those securities paid into the fund. The state was permitted to use a part of the above sum under an agreement by its officers that interest thereon at the rate of five percent should be paid. It recognized and fulfilled that agreement, and now claims that the interest it so paid to the Canal Fund constituted a charge or expense properly incurred in raising, subsisting, and supplying troops to suppress the rebellion.
the Canal Fund, except as provided in its constitution and laws. It could not legally have become a party to any arrangement or agreement involving the use, without interest, of the moneys of the Canal Fund that had been set apart for the ultimate payment of the canal debt.
We are of opinion that the claim of the state for money paid on account of interest to the commissioners of the Canal Fund is not one against the United States for interest as such, but is a claim for costs, changes, and expenses properly incurred and paid by the state in aid of the general government, and is embraced by the act of Congress declaring that the states would be indemnified by the general government for moneys so expended.
As the state was entitled to a larger sum than $91,320.84, the judgment is reversed, and the cause is remanded, with directions for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

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