Source: https://cbaclelegalconnection.com/tag/grand-jury/
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 22:37:18+00:00

Document:
The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People v. Tee on Thursday, June 14, 2018.
Criminal Procedure—Grand Jury—Attempt to Influence a Public Servant—Jury—Predeliberation—Waiver—Evidence.
Tee was convicted of multiple charges, including two counts of attempting to influence a public servant.
On appeal, Tee contended that because the indictment received by the district court did not contain the signature of the grand jury foreperson, it did not confer jurisdiction and all charges must be dismissed. However, the signature of the foreperson need not be provided to the district court, and the court had jurisdiction.
Tee also contended that because two jurors engaged in predeliberation, he is entitled to a new trial. Here, defense counsel waived any error as to predeliberation.
Tee further argued that the two convictions for attempting to influence a public servant must be vacated because there was insufficient evidence supporting the convictions. Here, Tee was convicted of two counts of attempting to influence a public servant based on evidence that he made false reports of car accidents. The evidence was sufficient to support one count of attempting to influence a public servant where Tee provided information in person to a police officer who created a report based on what Tee had told him. However, the evidence was insufficient as to the other count where Tee filled in an accident report form on a computer terminal at a kiosk in the police department, because it did not show that Tee was attempting to influence a public servant.
Lastly, the attorney general conceded that the trial court violated Tee’s double jeopardy rights because it orally announced a 12-year sentence but the mittimus showed an 18-year sentence. The mittimus also incorrectly showed a conviction on a count that was dismissed.
The judgment was vacated as to one count and otherwise affirmed. The case was remanded to correct the mittimus.
The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in In re 2015–2016 Jefferson County Grand Jury on Monday, February 5, 2018.
Privileged Communications and Confidentiality—Crime–Fraud exception—Wiretapping.
A grand jury investigating M.W. and his company I.I. issued a subpoena duces tecum to I.I.’s attorney ordering her to produce all documents related to her representation of I.I. Along with the subpoena, the People served a notice of hearing to determine whether the documents were protected by the attorney-client privilege. In the notice, the People provided wiretap summaries as an offer of proof that the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege applied. Reasoning that I.I.’s entire endeavor was illegal, the district court ordered all of the attorney-client communications stripped of privilege without reviewing them in camera.
The Colorado Supreme Court held that a two-step process applies when a party seeks disclosure of attorney-client-privileged documents under the crime-fraud exception. First, before a court may review the privileged documents in camera, it must “require a showing of a factual basis adequate to support a good faith belief by a reasonable person that wrongful conduct sufficient to invoke the crime or fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege has occurred.” Caldwell v. Dist. Court, 644 P.2d 26, 33 (Colo. 1982). Second, the court may strip a communication of privilege only upon a showing of probable cause to believe that (1) the client was committing, or attempting to commit, a crime or fraud, and (2) the communication was made in furtherance of the putative crime or fraud. Because the People failed to make such a showing here, the district court abused its discretion in stripping the documents of privilege. The court also held that, based on the facts of this case, the district court should have required the People to disclose the applications and authorizations for the intercepts that it provided to support the subpoena under C.R.S. § 16-15-102(9) of Colorado’s wiretap statutes.
The Tenth Circuit published its opinion in In re Grand Jury Subpoena on Friday, March 1, 2013.
The appellant was the sole member of a limited liability company (LLC) whose federal income taxes were being investigated by a grand jury. The “Custodian of Records” of the LLC was subpoenaed to bring LLC records to the grand jury. As the records custodian, the appellant moved to quash the subpoena duces tecum on the ground that it violated his personal Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The district court denied the motion to quash and refused to grant a stay pending appeal. The appellant complied with the district court’s order to produce the records.
A protesting grand jury witness may seek appellate review only after the witness refuses to obey the subpoena and is held in contempt. The appellant argued that he came within the Perlman exception that allows a witness to appeal based on a third party’s intent to produce records. The appellant’s argument that the subpoena was directed to the custodian of records of the LLC and the capacity in which he claimed a privilege—as an individual entitled to the protection of the Fifth Amendment—was distinct from his capacity as the LLC’s records custodian did not qualify as a third-party situation. The Tenth Circuit dismissed the appeal because it lacked jurisdiction.
The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in In re Denver County Grand Jury, and Concerning the Grand Jury Report Issued December 8, 2010 on March 15, 2012.
This appeal involved the potential public release of a report, issued by a grand jury, that declined to return an indictment in an investigation involving alleged perjury. Special prosecutor Scott W. Storey, the First Judicial District Attorney, appealed the court’s order declining to release the report, contending that the report met the “public interest” criteria of CRS § 16-5-205.5. He also asserted that the court erroneously refused to extend the term of the grand jury so that it could consider whether to modify its report. The order was affirmed.
A Denver County grand jury convened in September 2010 to investigate allegations of perjury by a police officer. The grand jury did not return an indictment. It did, however, issue a report concerning its investigation, which identified purported deficiencies in policies and procedures relating primarily to the Denver Police Department. The grand jury sought to make the report public pursuant to CRS § 16-5-205.5. The trial court reviewed the report and declined to release it as a public document.
The special prosecutor asserted that the grand jury report contained allegations of government misfeasance within the meaning of CRS § 16-5-205.5(5) and, therefore, should have become a public document. Although CRS § 16-5-205.5 may provide for exposure of “government actions that fall short of criminal activity, but are nonetheless not good government,” misfeasance involves conduct that is not simply bad public policy, but an illegal, wrongful, or corrupt exercise of government power. The grand jury’s recommendations regarding public policy and other matters of judgment or discretion did not constitute allegations of government misfeasance under CRS § 16-5-205.5. The report does not sufficiently allege misfeasance and therefore does not qualify for public release.
The special prosecutor also contended that the court erroneously refused to extend the term of the grand jury so it could review and modify its report, or draft a new one, in light of the court’s order denying publication. The role of the district court is to review the report independently to determine whether, on its face, the report satisfies the requirement that it concern matters of public interest. The governing statutes cast the district court as an independent gatekeeper, not as an active partner in the publication of a report. Further, minor revisions or the use of different terminology would not change the fact that the grand jury report did not allege sufficient misconduct to permit publication under CRS § 16-5-205.5. The grand jury’s desire to revise its report for publication cannot override the court’s determination that the allegations in the report do not meet the public interest standard. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to extend the grand jury’s term.

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