Source: http://pa.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20180126_0000721.MPA.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 05:59:46+00:00

Document:
LAUREL HARRY, et al., Defendants.
Now pending before the court are two motions to dismiss the surviving claims in Rosa-Diaz's amended complaint. (Docs. 40 and 43.) On June 29, 2017, the first motion to dismiss was filed on behalf of the remaining DOC Defendants: corrections officers (“COs”) Alianiello, Dempsey, Johnson, McBeth, Rost, and Walsh; corrections counselor Arnold; registered nurse psychologist Iachini; unit manager Digby; and business manager Gimble. (Doc. 40.) On July 6, 2017, the lone additional remaining Defendant, psychiatric certified registered nurse practitioner (“PCRNP”) A. Woods, also filed the other motion to dismiss. (Doc. 43.) For the reasons set forth below, we recommend that, with the narrow exception noted below, the motions to dismiss be granted.
The plaintiff, Gabriel Rosa-Diaz, is a state inmate who was housed at SCI-Camp Hill from April 2016 through June 2017. (Doc. 13, ¶¶ 5-27; Doc. 38.) During that time period, Rosa-Diaz alleges that he was subjected to mistreatment and a variety of harsh conditions at the hands of prison staff and medical contractors. (Doc. 13.) The issues complained of in Rosa-Diaz's initial complaint have been narrowed by the filing of his amended complaint and this court's two prior screening reviews. Nonetheless, Rosa-Diaz continues to assert a wide array of claims.
As a result of these alleged constitutional infractions, Rosa-Diaz seeks wide-ranging injunctive relief, along with compensatory and punitive damages. (Doc. 13.) Notably, Rosa-Diaz demands injunctive relief from several Defendants at SCI-Camp Hill even though he acknowledges that he is no longer housed at that facility.
Both the DOC Defendants and PCRNP Woods have filed briefs in support of their respective motions to dismiss, arguing that Rosa-Diaz fails to establish a violation of a constitutional right. (Docs. 41 and 44.) Rosa-Diaz filed an omnibus brief in opposition to the two motions to dismiss on August 1, 2017, and also attached several exhibits. (Docs. 47 and 47-1.) The DOC Defendants then filed a reply brief on August 15, 2017, and Rosa-Diaz submitted a sur reply thereafter. (Docs. 50 and 52.) Having been fully briefed, these motions to dismiss are now ripe for resolution.
Standards of pleading have been in the forefront of jurisprudence in recent years. Beginning with the Supreme Court's opinion in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) continuing with our opinion in Phillips [v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir. 2008)]and culminating recently with the Supreme Court's decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal ___U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009) pleading standards have seemingly shifted from simple notice pleading to a more heightened form of pleading, requiring a plaintiff to plead more than the possibility of relief to survive a motion to dismiss.
Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 209-10 (3d Cir. 2009).
In considering whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the Court must accept as true all allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are to be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jordan v. Fox Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, Inc., 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). However, a court “need not credit a complaint's bald assertions or legal conclusions when deciding a motion to dismiss.” Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). Additionally, a court need not "assume that a . . . plaintiff can prove facts that the . . . plaintiff has not alleged." Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). As the Supreme Court of the United States held in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), in order to state a valid cause of action a plaintiff must provide some factual grounds for relief, which “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of actions will not do.” Id. at 555. Furthermore, “factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id.
[B]egin by identifying pleadings that because they are no more than conclusions are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.
[A]fter Iqbal, when presented with a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, district courts should conduct a two-part analysis. First, the factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated. The District Court must accept all of the complaint's well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any legal conclusions. Second, a District Court must then determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a “plausible claim for relief.” In other words, a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff's entitlement to relief. A complaint has to “show” such an entitlement with its facts.
Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210-11.

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