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Timestamp: 2019-04-25 06:39:20+00:00

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Jurisdiction over matrimonial actions, which include: actions for separation, annulment, or dissolution of marriage, divorce, declaration of the validity of a foreign judgment of divorce, and declaration of the validity or nullity of a marriage.
Family Court has ancillary jurisdiction in Article 4 child support, Article 8 family offense and custody, except when prior "matrimonial actions" are pending.
Paternity actions and adoption proceedings in Westchester County must be brought in Family Court. A divorce action cannot be brought in Family Court.
The Supreme and Family Courts both have jurisdiction over issues of child support and maintenance. However, once a divorce action is commenced in Supreme Court, a subsequent action for custody or support cannot be brought in Family Court while the divorce action is pending in Supreme Court.
If a divorce action is commenced in Supreme Court after the commencement of a support proceeding in Family Court, the Supreme Court has the power to remove the prior Family Court proceeding to Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court may refer an issue of support or may exercise its jurisdiction over support even where the Family Court has previously issued an Order. In such a situation, the Family Court's Order terminates when the Supreme Court makes an order of support, unless the Supreme Court decides to continue the Family Court's order.
This court is designed to allow one judge to hear all the legal issues, criminal - family court - matrimonial, that may arise when domestic violence occurs.
When a criminal case is pending in the Domestic Violence part of Supreme Court, the justice presiding in that part will transfer designated Family Court cases to the IDVC. The integrated court will handle petitions for: custody, visitation, paternity and family offenses. The court will also assume jurisdiction over a petition for support; although the support issue will still be heard initially by a Hearing Examiner. Any objections to the Hearing Examiner's determination will be filed with and determined by the justice presiding in the IDVC.
5) either party has been a resident for a continuous period of at least two (2) years preceding the DOC.
8. Connecticut or New Jersey: Consider if issues may involve grounds, licenses or degrees, separate property.
At last…we have No Fault Divorce in New York! To be granted a divorce on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of the marriage, all the plaintiff has to do is state under oath that the relationship between the parties has irretrievably broken down for a period of at least six months. A verified complaint is a "statement under oath." However, no divorce can be granted "unless and until" all the other issues (e.g., custody, support, equitable distribution) have been resolved.
To be granted a divorce on ground of cruel and inhuman treatment, plaintiff must show that defendant engaged in conduct "which so endangers the physical or mental well being of the plaintiff as renders it insafe or improper for the plaintiff to cohabit with the defendant'". DRL §170. Marriages of long duration require a higher degree of proof. See, Davey v. Davey, 293 A.D.2d 444, 445; Biegeleisen v. Biegeleisen, 253 A.D.2d 474, 475.
Physical abandonment: one of the parties moves out, and intends to stay away.
Plaintiff's claim of actual abandonment was insufficient because it occurred less than one year prior to commencement of action. See, Genovese v. Genovese, 261 A.D.2d 437; Emanuele v. Emanuele, 218 A.D.2d 726.
To be granted a divorce on the ground of constructive abandonment, a spouse claiming to have been constructively abandoned by other spouse must prove that the abandoning spouse unjustifiably refused to fulfill basic obligations of marriage and the abaondonment continued for at least one year. See, Lyons v. Lyons, 187 A.D.2d 415,416; Biegeleisen v. Biegeleisen, supra at 475; George m. v. Mary Ann M., 171 A.D.2d 651, 651-652; Caprise v. Caprise, 143 A.D.2d 968, 970. Refusal must be unjustified, willful and continue despite repeated requests. See, Lyons v. Lyons, supra at 416. "Where there is no proof that one spouse repeatedly requested a resumption of sexual relations, evidence that the other spouse reused a single request to engage in sexual relations is insufficient to sustain a cause of action for a divorce on the ground of constructive abandonment (see Caprise v. Caprise, supra at 970)."
Plaintiff made prima facie showing of substantial compliance with the terms of the parties' separation agreement to be entitled to judgment as a matter of law pursuant to DRL §170(6) and defendant failed to create inference of fraud, fraud, duress, overreaching or unconscionability. See, Christian v. Christian, 42 N.Y.2d 63; Strangolagalli v. Strangolagalli, 295 A.D.2d 338; Kammerer v. Kammerer, 278 A.D.2d 282; Warren v. Rabinowitz, 228 A.D.2d 492.
Parent who had primary responsibility for the day-to-day care of their child. This factor acknowledges an implied pre-divorce de facto agreement between the parties as to the parties' respective child rearing responsibilities. Carr v. Carr, 171 Ad2d 776 (2d Dept 1991). Practice tip: argue on behalf of the primary care taking parent that this division of responsibilities constitutes evidence that the other spouse considers the primary care-taking spouse fit.
Examines the quality of interaction between a parent and child; who the--child looks to for comfort, guidance and assistance; the parent with, whom the child is most bonded. This factor is best assessed by a mental health professional such as the forensic evaluator.
This factor is not determinative, but is accorded weight see Eschbach; with the amount of weight depending on the child's age, maturity, the potential for pressure exerted by a parent upon the child's stated preference see Spetter v. Spetter, 133 Ad2d 750 (2d Dept 1997); Clara L v. Paul M., 251 AD2d 22 (1' Dept 1998) and the reason for the preference McCrocklin v. McCrocklin, 77 AD2d 624 (2d Dept 1990). Generally, courts will give great weight to wishes of an older child (13 -17 years), Bergson v. Bergson, 414 NYS2d 593 (1979) The law guardian or forensic evaluator can present the child's preference. Also, the child may be interviewed in camera see Lincoln v. Lincoln NY2d 270, 24 (1969) where the court recognized that interviewing a child, who is the subject of custody litigation, in private and out of the presence of the parties and their counsel, will limit the psychological danger to the child and will also be far more informative than the traditional procedure of the adversary system.
Because there is a preference for stability in the lives of children, the Court will give weight to the informal physical custodial arrangement of already physically separated parents see Lobo v. Muttee, 196 Ad2d 585 (2d Dept 1993). This factor is of primary importance in modification of custody proceedings. Practice note: this is a factor in advising clients seeking custody to remain in the marital residence.
The relative quality of the homes and the care-taking plans of each parent; including physical safety and adequate space see Lyons v. Lyons, 112 AD2d 232 (2d Dept 1985), inappropriate relationship between parent and paramour or parent's paramour and child; financial fitness Welman v. Dutch, 198 AD2d 791 (4h Dept 1993); employment history see Lukaszewicz v. Lukaszewicz, 256 AD2d 1031 (3d Dept 1999) and child care arrangements see Del Pgpa v. Del Papa, 172 AD2d 799 (2d Dep't 1991).
Courts have overwhelmingly strong policy for keeping siblings together to promote familial bonds. Eschbach v. Eschbach, 56 NY2d 167 (1982). However, the best interests of the children may outweigh reluctance to separate siblings. People ex rel Repetti, 377 NYS 571 (1975). In Copeland v. Copeland, 232 AD2d 922 (3d Dept 1996), the court determined that given the dynamics of family life, the rule that it is best to keep siblings together is not absolute and need not be applied where the record indicated that the best interest of each child lies with a different parent.
Where the Court awards sole decision-making authority regarding different issues to each parent; (i.e. father medical, mother educational) because the Court recognizes a particular parent's superior ability to deal with a particular issue, in their child's life see Frize v. Frize, 266 Ad2d 753 (3d- Dept 1999) or the Court is concerned that an award of sole legal custody to the residential parent may result in the exclusion of the non-residential parent from a meaningful relationship with the child see Hugh L v. Fhara N.Y.L.J. June 1, 2000, p. 29, col. 6. In Tran v. Tran. 716 NYS2d 5 (1st Dep't 2000), the court vested decision-making authority in the non-residential parent with respect to the child's therapy.
2. Joint decision-making on specified important decisions with day-to-day decision-making reserved to the parent present.
3. Joint fact gathering, consultation and decision-making and in the event of deadlock; mediation, arbitration or final decision-making to a particular parent.
4. Joint fact gathering and consultation with sole decision-making to a particular parent.
5. Sole decision-making by a particular parent after consultation.
6. Each parent exercises sole decision-making on a specific sphere of issues.
5. educational decisions including private v public school, selecting a college, and hiring tutors.
6. health-related decisions including selecting physicians, following treatment recommendations; obtaining mental health services, and orthodontia, teaching about birth control and emergency treatment.
8. miscellaneous decisions such as discipline, vacations, driving and extra--curricula activities.
There is a presumption that access to both parents is in the best interests of a child. Access is both a parent's and child's right. see Gerald D. v. Lucille S., 188 AD2d 650 (2d Dept 1992).
2. do holiday celebrations entail travel to distant relatives?
7. if holiday on Monday, Sunday overnight?
1 . Suspended - Visitation may be suspended if it is inimical to the child' welfare see Licitra v. Licitra, 255 AD2d 394 (2d Dept 1999) and Weiss v. Weiss, 52 NY2d 170.
2. Restricted - The court may place restrictions on visitation based on the needs of the child and or parental fitness. In Lozada v. Lozada., 270 AD2d 422 (2d Dept 2000) the Court limited visitation with an incarcerated parent to 6 time per year. In McNenny v. McNenny, 159 AD2d 440 (1st Dept 1990) the court restricted visitation with a two year old to no overnights, but see Shink v. Shink, 140 AD2d 506 (2d Dept 1988). In Landau the Court conditioned expanding visitation on a parent's cooperation with therapeutic services. In Monahan v. Monahan, 178 AD2d 829 (3d Dept 1991) the Court refused to restrict midweek visitation. In Zion v. Zion, 201 AD2d 404 (1st Dept 1994) the court restricted contact to telephonic communications.
3. Supervised - The courts have also restricted visitation by requiring supervision as recommended by a psychological professional see Laura AK v. TiMpthy M, 204 AD2d 325 (2d Dept 1994) and due to safety issues see D'Errico v. D'Erric-P,, 158 AD2d 503 (2d Dept 1990). For a case which awards restricted, supervised and suspended visitation see Allen v. Farrow, 197 AD2d 327 (1st 1994).
i. Family Court has a contract with the YWCA to provide onsite supervision at no cost to the client.
When relocation is proposed, the courts begin with the proposition that the child's best interest generally lie in being nurtured and guided by both natural parents. Although divorced custodial parents may ordinarily pursue their lives as they see fit, they are bound by the fundamental principle that it a decision to have a child imposes on each parent the obligation to protect the child's relationship with the other parent. Weiss v. Weiss, 52 NY 2d 171 (1981). In Tropea v. Tropea, 87 NY2d 727 (1996) the Court found that the relocation preserved regular and meaningful visitation and was in the best interests of the children. This case signals a departure from the prior "exceptional circumstances" standard.
Under New York's Child Support Standards Act (CSSA), a court must always determine the basic child support obligation, even if the court ultimately deviates from this amount in formulating the final child support award. A court may deviate from this basic child support obligation only under extraordinary circumstances, as described in the statute.
This formula is applied to combined parental income of up to $136,000; the parties are each responsible for their pro rata share. For combined incomes over $136,000, the Court may apply the formula to some or all of the excess, or can make a different determination based on ten factors in the CSSA (DRL §240 (1-b)(f)).
Pro rata share of reasonable child care expenses while the custodial parent is working, attending school, job training. Summer camp should be specified in lieu of childcare.
Pro rata share of reasonable health care expenses that are not covered by health insurance (i.e., "unreimbursed medical insurance").
Childcare expenses while the custodial parent is looking for work.
Child's educational costs, such as private school or college tuition.
Child's educational enrichment costs, such as tutoring.
4. Deviations from the basic child support obligationFactors to be considered to determine if the non-custodial parent's pro rata share of basic child support would be "unjust or inappropriate."
A court may, as part of an award of child support, require a non-custodial parent to contribute his share of the cost of a college education (see, DRL § 240 [1-b] [b] ; FCA § 413  [c] ).
In the First, Third and Fourth Departments, the application of a credit for college expenses is discretionary and generally limited to the cost of room and board (see, Finkelstein v. Finkelstein, 268 A.D.2d 273, 275 [1st Dep't 2000]; Paro v. Paro, 215 A.D.2d 965, 966 [3d Dep't 1995]; Houck v. Houck, 246 A.D.2d 905, 906 [3d Dep't 1988]; Burns v. Burns, 233 A.D.2d 852, 853 [4th Dep't 1996]). On a case-by-case basis, where appropriate, trial courts in these departments may order a reduction in basic child support commensurate with the non-custodial parent's pro rata share of the costs of food and lodging at college.
However, in the Second Department, the rule is that the trial court is to give the non-custodial parent a credit against child support for any amounts he or she contributes toward college expenses when the child lives away from home while attending college. In Sheridan v. Sperber, 269 A.D.2d 432, 702 N.Y.S.2d 894 (2d Dep't 2000), the court left no room for doubt that the "college credit" is both mandatory and coextensive with the non-custodial parent's contribution to any college expenses, including tuition. See also, Jablonski v. Jablonski, 25 A.D.2d 692 ; Justino v. Justino, 238 A.D.2d 549 ; Vainchenker v. Vainchenker, 242 A.D.2d 620 ).
The dollar-for-dollar mandatory credit for college expenses does not apply where there is an agreement between the parents that does not provide for the downward modification of child support if the non-custodial parent contributes to college expenses. Thus, the court in Maurer v. Erdheim, 738 N.Y.S.2d 885 (2d Dep't 2002) held that the non-custodial parent does not get a credit against child support for his contribution toward college expenses because the Stipulation of Settlement did not provide for it.
where, as here, the parents' custodial arrangement splits the children's physical custody so that neither can be said to have physical custody of the children for a majority of the time, the parent having the greater pro rata share of the child support obligation, determined after application of the three-step statutory formula of the CSSA, should be identified as the "noncustodial" parent for the purpose of support regardless of the labels employed by the parties [citations omitted]. That parent must be directed to pay his or her pro rata share of the child support obligation to the other parent unless "statutory formula yields a result that is unjust or inappropriate" [citations omitted].
V. EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION: Factors In Determining Spouse's "Equitable Share"
(i) Wife awarded eighty percent of the proceeds from the sale of the marital residence where the wife was forty--two years old, lacked any formal education and had an inability to ach ieve financial independence. Pagan v. Pagan, 138 A.D.2d 685, 526 N.Y.S.2d 498 (2d Dep’t 1988).
(ii) Wife's comparatively small financial contributions earlier in the marriage were held to be very significant since they enabled the husband to pursue his own education and career opportunities. Ander son v. Anderson, 153 A.D.2d 823, 545 N.Y.S.2d 335 (2d Dep’t 1989).
Failure to Sign Joint Tax Return: Any adverse financial consequences of a party's refusal to sign a joint and/or amended tax return proffered by the other spouse can be taken into account in distributing the marital property. Teich v. Teich , 240 A.D.2d 258, 658 N.Y.S.2d 599 (1st Dep’t 1997).
(iii) The shared liability caused by a spouse's failure to properly report income to the taxing authorities. Moody v. Moody, 17 2 A.D.2d 730, 569 N.Y.S.2d 116 (2d Dep’t 1991).
(a) Wife's involvement in an adulterous relationship did not rise to the level of such egregious or uncivilized conduct as to warrant depriving her of an equal share of the marital assets. Lestrange v. Lestrange, 148 A.D.2d 587, 539 N.Y.S.2d 53 (2d Dep’t 1989). Outcome the same even when wife’s affair produced a child that the wife led husband to believe was his own child, Howard S. v. Lillian S., 14 N.Y.3d 431 (2010).
Based upon the parties ______ income tax returns, the Husband ("Payor") represents that his gross income in ____ totaled $_______, and the Wife ("Payee") represents that her gross income in ____ totaled $_______.
3. Reasonable Needs vs. Preseparation Standard of Living. Cassano v. Cassano, 111 A.D.2d 208 (Second Dep't 1985).
DRL § 236, Part (B)(6)(a) sets out the statutory factors to be considered by a court in determining maintenance, and in determining the amount and duration of maintenance.
Any other factor that the court deems just and proper.
Court's Discretion - DRL § 236(b)(1)(a) provides that maintenance may be awarded for a definite or indefinite period of time to meet the reasonable needs of a party to a matrimonial action.
Terminates upon death of either party or upon remarriage of recipient. DRL § 236, Part B, (6)(c).
In Mazzone v. Mazzone, 736 N.Y.S.2d 683 (2d Dep't 2001), the court upheld nondurational maintenance for disabled wife.
In Schenfeld v. Schenfeld, 289 A.D.2d 219, 734 N.Y.S.2d 465 (2d Dep't 2000), the court modified nondurational maintenance to wife so that it would cease when wife reaches 65 years.
The parties' agreement must provide that the maintenance will terminate upon the happening of a certain event such as remarriage; if not, maintenance will continue. Slagsvol v. Schenck, 213 A.D.2d 537, 624 N.Y.S.2d 182 (2d Dep't 1995).
RULE: The court in deciding equitable distribution must set forth the factors it considered in its decision and such requirement may not be waived by either party or counsel. (DRL §236(B)(5)(g)). The court must set forth these factors in a clear and comprehensive manner. Dunne v. Dunne, 172 A.D.2d 482, 567 N.Y.S.2d 838 (2d Dep’t 1991).In most instances, the non-custodial parent must pay child support pursuant to CSSA.
Joint legal custody envisions a form of shared decision-making on specified issues; usually including health, education, religion and welfare. Although there is no legal presumption in favor of joint custody in NYS, there is often a judicial preference in favor of joint legal custody. The Court does have the authority to order joint custody where there is a history of mature and civilized decision-making in the best interests of the children see Guarnier v. Guarnier, 155 AD2d 744 (3d Dept. 1989) but see Voelker v. Keptner, 156 AD2d 144 (4th Dept 1989).
DRL 240 (1) requires an allegation in a sworn pleading proven by a preponderance of the evidence JD v. ND, 170 Misc2d 877 (Fam Ct West Co 1996) and ER v. GBR, 648 NYS.2d 257 (Fam Ct West Co 1996). The presence of a child during domestic abuse often warrants the denial of custody to an abuser. In any action concerning custody or visitation where domestic violence is alleged, the court must consider the effects of such domestic violence upon the best interests of the child. Wissink v. Wissink, 749 NYS2d 550 (2d Dep't 2002). The court held that domestic violence committed in the presence of the children was sufficient to establish neglect per se In Re Lonnell J., N.Y.L.J. May 21, 1998, p. 25, col. 3 (Vt Dep't 1999). The courts determined that a change in circumstances warranting a custody modification was shown when the children were repeatedly exposed to domestic violence against their mother by her new husband. Bishop vs. Livingston, 475 N.Y.S.2d 588 (3rd Dep't 2002). Although the court-ordered clinical evaluator and the law guardian recommended awarding custody of the children to the father, the court's analysis of the impact of the father's domestic violence on the mother resulted in the court granting custody to the mother ER- v. GBR, 649 NYS2d 257 (Fam. Ct West Co 1996).such as lack of supervision, excessive school absences, excessive corporal punishment, etc. FCA Art 10. The requisite "extraordinary circumstances" existed to justify depriving the father of custody of his son based on his sexual abuse of said child. The Court awarded custody to a non-biological parent. Parliament v. Harris, 697 NYS2d 694 (1999). However, false allegations may be viewed as interference with the parent/child relationship warranting a custody award to the other parent Turner v. Turner, 260 AD2d 953 (3d Dept 1999) - The court took notice of father's alcohol dependency problem despite its recognition that he was a loving parent and custody was awarded to mother MM M v. Albert JM, 154 AD2d 354 (2d Dept 1989) Despite mother's paraplegia resulting from a car accident, the court determined it was in the best interests of the child to remain with her mother. Hatz v. Hatz, 97 AD2d 629 (3d Dept 1982).

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