Source: https://www.ptab.us/2013/06/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 09:47:15+00:00

Document:
First, the Examiner reasons that the proposed modification would have been an obvious change in shape with no change in function. Ans. 4 (citing In re Dailey, 357 F.2d 669 (CCPA 1966)).
A change of shape does not make a product nonobvious where the claimed shape is not of functional significance and accomplishes the same purpose as the prior art shape. In re Dailey 357 F.2d at 672-673. However, such is not the case here.
Because the proposed modification results in a change in function, the modification is more than an obvious variation of shape. See In re Gal, 980 F.2d 717, 719 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (finding of obvious design choice precluded when claimed structure and the function it performs are different from the prior art).
“[A]bsence from the reference of any claimed element negates anticipation.” Kloster Speedsteel AB v. Crucible, Inc., 793 F.2d 1565, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (citation omitted), overruled on other grounds by Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en banc).
We now hold that evidence of an accused inducer’s good-faith belief of invalidity may negate the requisite intent for induced infringement.1 This is, of course, not to say that such evidence precludes a finding of induced infringement. Rather, it is evidence that should be considered by the fact-finder in determining whether an accused party knew “that the induced acts constitute patent infringement.” Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2068.
1 In dissent, Judge Newman does little more than construct a straw man and set him ablaze. We certainly do not hold “that if the inducer of infringement believes in good faith that the patent is invalid, there can be no liability for induced infringement.” J. Newman Op. concurring-in-part, dissenting-in-part 1. Nor do we “include a belief in patent validity as a criterion of infringement.” Id. at 4.
To decide whether a patentee surrendered certain subject matter, we must determine "whether an objective observer viewing the prosecution history would conclude that the purpose of the patentee's amendment or argument" concerning a particular claim was for reasons of patentability, that is, "to overcome prior art and secure the patent." Kim v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 465 F.3d 1312, 1323 (Fed. Cir.2006).
“[A] general purpose computer is sufficient structure if the function of a term such as ‘means for processing’ requires no more than merely ‘processing,’ which any general-purpose computer may do without any special programming.” Ergo Licensing, LLC v. CareFusion 303, Inc., 673 F.3d 1361, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citing In re Katz Interactive Call Processing Patent Litigation 639 F.3d 1303, 1316-17 (Fed.Cir.2011)).
Our reviewing court, however, has held that “[i]n reexamination, ‘claims . . . are to be given their broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the specification, and . . . claim language should be read in light of the specification as it would be interpreted by one of ordinary skill in the art.’” In re NTP, Inc., 654 F.3d 1268, 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2011), quoting In re American Academy of Science Tech Center, 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004); see also In re Baxter Intern., Inc., 678 F.3d 1357, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (holding that because District Court proceedings and reexamination proceedings in the PTO apply different burdens of proof and rely on different records, the PTO did not err by failing to provide a detailed explanation as to why the PTO came to a different determination than did the court system). We will follow the Federal Circuit’s holding.
See Exxon Rsrch and Eng’g Co. v. U.S., 265 F.3d 1371, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“If the meaning of the claim is discernible, even though the task may be formidable and the conclusion may be one over which reasonable persons will disagree, we have held the claim sufficiently clear to avoid invalidity on indefiniteness grounds.”).
First, it will be rare that a patent infringement suit can be dismissed at the pleading stage for lack of patentable subject matter. This is so because every issued patent is presumed to have been issued properly, absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. See, e.g., CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp., __ F.3d __, 2013 WL 1920941, *33 (Fed. Cir. May 10, 2013) (Chief Judge Rader, and Judges Linn, Moore, and O’Malley, concluding that “any attack on an issued patent based on a challenge to the eligibility of the subject matter must be proven by clear and convincing evidence,” and Judges Lourie, Dyk, Prost, Reyna, and Wallach, concluding that a statutory presumption of validity applies when § 101 is raised as a basis for invalidity in district court proceedings.). Further, if Rule 12(b)(6) is used to assert an affirmative defense, dismissal is appropriate only if the well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint, construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, suffice to establish the defense. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215 (2007). Thus, the only plausible reading of the patent must be that there is clear and convincing evidence of ineligibility. For those reasons, Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal for lack of eligible subject matter will be the exception, not the rule.
After a prima facie case of obviousness has been made and rebuttal evidence submitted, all the evidence must be considered anew. In re Eli Lilly & Co., 902 F. 2d 943, 945 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (citing In re Piasecki, 745 F.2d 1468, 1472, 223 USPQ 785, 788 (Fed.Cir.1984)): Piaseki at 745 F.2d at 1472 ("Prima facie obviousness is a legal conclusion, not a fact. Facts established by rebuttal evidence must be evaluated along with the facts on which the earlier conclusion was reached, not against the conclusion itself." (quoting In re Rinehart, 531 F.2d 1048, 1052, 189 USPQ 143, 147 (CCPA 1976)).

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