Source: https://bostonbarjournal.com/category/summer-2016-vol-60-3/
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 22:20:07+00:00

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Before I was appointed a judge, if someone had asked me to list the most interesting things that a trial judge does, I doubt that I would have included chatting with jurors after they have rendered their verdict. However, over the last seven years I have found those post-verdict conversations to be enlightening, reaffirming, and frequently entertaining.
In each county, Superior Court judges are assigned on a rotating basis, each week, to welcome the day’s pool of prospective jurors, as required by law. See G.L. c. 234A, § 65. Depending on the county in which you are sitting, your turn comes up every couple months. Judges take different approaches in their greetings. Part of my approach is try to convince my audience, some of whom are usually skeptical, that most people find jury service an interesting and rewarding experience. I go on to say that when we (judges) speak to jurors who have been seated on juries after they have returned their verdicts, we find that sometimes they have made new friends, they have learned something more about our criminal or civil justice system, and they always feel that they have made an important contribution to their community. I say this to encourage our potential jurors to serve, and also because I believe it is true.
While I have had the good fortune to speak to a great many juries over the past seven years, these are just personal observations and, therefore, only anecdotal. After I receive a verdict (or declare a mistrial) and formally thank the jurors for their service, I always tell the jurors in open court that I would like to thank them in a less formal setting in the jury room. I make it clear that this isn’t an order and they are free to go, but if they have time I hope they will stay a few moments. I don’t think that any juror has ever left before my court officer escorted me to the jury room. While some juries are polite, but clearly anxious to disperse and go on about their business, the majority of juries have questions they want to ask, suggestions they want to offer, or generally want to chat about their experience. I think that juries that have “bonded” during their service are more likely to linger.
After explaining that I do not want to know anything about what jurors said to one another or the course of their deliberations, which I hope they will hold confidential (although having returned their verdict they are freed from any legal obligations not to speak to others), I ask if any juror has any question, comment or observations. Sometimes that prompts a number of jurors to speak up and sometimes I have to prod with a few questions of my own before a conversation ensues. Here are some general observations.
Jurors take their responsibilities very seriously–they truly understand that they have been the judges of the facts of the case. Obviously, the subject matter of cases varies. Some cases are clearly more difficult to decide; some are more emotional; and in some the consequences of the verdict are clearly enormous. Frequently, jurors are physically exhausted at the end of their deliberations. It is not uncommon to find jurors in tears or fighting them back. I suspect sometimes that may be because a juror has been convinced to change his or her view of the evidence or a fact. Sometimes, it is because they have had to make an emotionally difficult decision.
I believe that jurors take very seriously their oath to apply my instructions to the facts as they find them. Personally, I don’t think that I have ever witnessed jury nullification. To the contrary, I have had jurors in tears in a personal injury case because they had found for the defendant, even though the plaintiff was very sympathetic or had suffered a debilitating injury. They had concluded that the defendant just was not negligent. On a number of occasions in criminal cases, it has been clear that the jurors thought that the defendant was probably guilty of the crime, but the prosecution had not proven guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Conversely, jurors have found defendants guilty, but expressed concern over the potential length of the sentence.
Frequently, jurors ask me if there was any additional evidence that had been excluded from trial. More often this comes up in criminal cases, but sometimes in civil cases as well. I don’t have the sense that the jurors are angry that evidence was not presented, they just wish that they had more material on which to base their decisions. I think that collectively juries are very good at figuring out where the missing pieces are in the chain of evidence or events.
A recurring comment is that jurors do not want the lawyers to repeat the same point, over and over. Innumerable times juries have told me that they got it the first time, certainly the second time, and by the fifth time they really didn’t want to hear about it again. Indeed, some juries find the repetition condescending not convincing. Often juries will point out that the trial bogged down over “stuff” that was not relevant to their decision making. It was as if the lawyer was afraid to leave something out. I think that jurors appreciate charts and graphs that make data understandable, although they will do their best to sort through materials themselves if they have to. In one case in which critical evidence was on a surveillance video, a technologically savvy juror displayed the video frame by frame during deliberations. Juries tell me that they try to get past which lawyer they liked the best, but obviously they appreciate lawyers who make their job easier.
I think that even in an informal setting there is a tendency for jurors to tell judges what they think the judge would like to hear. Nonetheless, when I ask, jurors overwhelming tell me that their jury service has been a rewarding experience and they would like to do it again—but not too soon (especially when the trial takes more than a week).
I truly believe that if lawyers, or the public, were flies on the wall when judges chatted with jurors after a trial, it would make them believe what I believe, that while jury trials may not be the perfect way to resolve disputed issues of fact, they are the best way so far devised.
Mitchell Kaplan is a justice of the Superior Court and currently sits on the Business Litigation Session of the court. He was previously a partner at Choate, Hall, & Stewart and served as a law clerk to Hon. Joseph L. Tauro, USDC.
Throughout the past several decades, State and Federal appellate courts have candidly acknowledged the implicit biases of litigants and jurors. Although social science research has found that judges are just as susceptible to unconscious bias as the rest of the population, the paucity of case law acknowledging judicial bias underscores the need for introspection. Since confronting subconscious attitudes and stereotypes is challenging for many, the process of eradicating the influence of race and implicit bias on the Massachusetts judicial system is likely to take many years. Chinese philosopher Lao-Tzu said “the journey of a thousand miles begins with one step.” With that in mind, the Trial Court recently took the first step of its “thousand mile journey” to eliminate the influence of implicit bias by establishing the Departmental Race and Implicit Bias Advisory Committee.
The Committee was formed in response to feedback from attendees of the September 2015 All Court Conference on Race and Implicit Bias. According to Chief Justice Ralph Gants, the decision to hold the All Court Conference was prompted by recent events in Ferguson, New York, Baltimore, and Cleveland that “raised important questions about the intersection of race and justice in our country.” The Supreme Judicial Court recognized the value of examining the court’s role in “addressing race as it affects the pursuit of justice,” and “resolved to open a dialogue among Massachusetts judges” to consider the way implicit bias impacts the Commonwealth’s courts. The subsequent formation of the Committee was a way for the Trial Court to continue that dialogue at the departmental level.
In the most basic sense, implicit bias is “thoughts about other people you didn’t know you had.” Consequently, it is often difficult for individuals who do not fall victim to the impact of certain biases to identify the ways they are manifested. Within the Trial Court, however, implicit racial, cultural, gender and other biases have opportunities to exhibit themselves in myriad ways.
Implicit racial bias, for example, can manifest in the form of erroneous assumptions that a person of color is not a judge, attorney, or officer of the court. Implicit racial bias may also explain the disparity between the number of non-Hispanic whites and persons of color given the opportunity to participate in Drug Court, which offers offenders an opportunity for rehabilitation instead of incarceration. Indeed, while non-Hispanic whites in Massachusetts use illicit substances at slightly higher rates than members of racial and ethnic minorities, incarceration rates for distribution offenses that do not carry mandatory minimum sentences are six times higher for persons who identify as black. Juveniles are not exempt from the subconscious biases that fuel these trends. Of all the youths arrested for weapons offenses in 2010, white youths were arrested at approximately double the rate of black youths. However, of all the youths that were held in custody for weapons offenses, black youths comprised 52% while white youths represented a mere 16%.
Implicit cultural biases can lead Trial Court staff members to erroneous conclusions about a constituent’s demeanor. A judge or clerk interpreting a lack of eye contact as representative of disinterest may be less patient with a litigant who avoids eye contact than a judge or clerk who knows that in many cultures, eye contact is a sign of disrespect. Implicit gender biases have the potential to impact the outcome of familial disputes, such as the distribution of assets in a divorce or the likelihood of a male obtaining a protective order from an abusive partner as compared to the chances of a female requesting one on the same basis. One study found that 65% of transgender Massachusetts residents had experienced discrimination in an area of public accommodation. Discriminatory, or even preferential treatment may also arise from implicit biases concerning sexual preference, age, weight, disability, and religion, among others.
By way of the Committee, the Trial Court seeks to create a system that embraces and understands all people regardless of their identity. The Committee is comprised of Chief Justice Paula Carey and Court Administrator Harry Spence as well as one or more individuals (mostly judges) from each Trial Court Department who have been appointed by their respective chief justices. Committee members are charged with initiating a dialogue about implicit bias within their department and encouraging others to get involved with the effort to help all Trial Court staff members recognize that an egalitarian judicial system is the only way to build and promote public confidence and trust that the Trial Court will administer justice impartially to everyone that it serves.
The Committee recognizes that the implicit associations we hold “do not necessarily align with our declared beliefs,” and seeks to implement checks and balances that give Trial court staff members pause before they make a decision. Already, the Committee has created bench cards to be distributed all Trial Court justices and clerks that encourage them to engage in “more deliberative, effortful processing” when making a decision, and thereby discourage low-effort decision-making that relies on intuition informed by stereotypes or prejudice.
The Committee also understands that exposure to stigmatized group members “can help individuals negate stereotypes . . . and ‘unlearn’ the associations that underlie implicit bias.” Accordingly, the Committee intends to identify and encourage the use of diverse recruiting resources, and advance staff members’ cultural awareness through workshops and other forms of training. This fall, the Committee plans to introduce a resource bank on the Trial Court’s intranet to ensure that the materials distributed at these trainings are accessible to all. To create a judicial system that is user-friendly for everyone, the Committee also plans to assess the experiences of Trial Court users through surveys and focus groups, and is considering the implementation of educational opportunities for pro se litigants who are struggling to comply with their legal obligations.
If you are interested in assessing your own implicit biases, Harvard University’s Project Implicit has free online tests available that allow you to assess subconscious preferences based on race, gender, and sexuality, among others.
Judge Kenneth V. Desmond, Jr. has served on the Massachusetts Judiciary for eleven years. He was appointed to the Massachusetts Superior Court in December 2012 and prior to that served on the Boston Municipal Court. He is a Trustee of the Flaschner Judicial Institute and Chair of the Trial Court’s Departmental Race and Implicit Bias Advisory Committee. Judge Desmond is a graduate of Tufts University and Boston College Law School.
The opioid epidemic, in Massachusetts and nationwide, is a public health crisis demanding the attention and resources of all facets of government. One tool that has seen substantially increased usage is M.G.L. c. 123, § 35 (“Section 35”), which permits involuntary commitment of persons with alcohol or substance use disorder for treatment of up to 90 days if a court finds that they present a likelihood of doing serious harm to themselves or others. A petition under this section often accompanies an arraignment on criminal charges related to substance use, although not every individual subject to a Section 35 petition also faces criminal charges. The increase in usage has also spurred increased attention to the standards and processes that should apply to proceedings under Section 35. The involuntary commitment of women without any criminal charges to a correctional facility (MCI-Framingham) for treatment has been the focus of the most criticism and concern, including in articles in this Journal.
In response to the scrutiny, the Legislature and courts alike have recently updated and clarified the law. First, in July 2015, the Trial Court promulgated Uniform Trial Court Rules (“Uniform § 35 Rules”) to govern Section 35 commitment proceedings, which Rules went into effect February 1, 2016. Second, this past November, the Supreme Judicial Court issued its decision in In the Matter of G.P., “concerning the operation of § 35 as well as the … uniform § 35 rules.” 473 Mass. 112, 113 (2015). Third, in January 2016, the Legislature passed House Bill 3956, signed into law as Chapter 8 of the Acts of 2016 and effective April 24, 2016, which specifically amended Section 35 to bar sending women without criminal involvement to state prison for treatment. Finally, House Bill 4056 (“Opioid Bill”), passed and signed into law in March 2016, made one additional small change, extending the warrants for arrest under Section 35 for up to 5 business days. Once these changes are fully implemented, many of the previous concerns relating to Section 35—including the inherent limitations of the court system as a mechanism to access treatment services; the increasing number of individuals, in particular women, who are civilly committed to state prisons for treatment; and need for greater uniformity in commitment hearings—should be allayed. This article addresses the primary changes and clarifications made as a result of this recent court and legislative action.
Second, and most celebrated, under amended Section 35, women without criminal convictions may no longer be sent to MCI-Framingham for treatment when no beds at other facilities are available. To implement this reform, a total of forty-three new beds have been designated for women at Taunton State Hospital and Lemuel Shattuck Hospital to cover the estimated additional need. Under a new provision, however, a judge may evaluate the need to commit an individual to a secure facility “as the only appropriate setting for treatment” (often based on risk of violence)—men to MCI-Bridgewater and women to an as yet to be designated facility approved by the Department of Mental Health or the Department of Public Health.
Third, to standardize and expedite hearings, the new Uniform § 35 Rules clarify several procedural points. When a petition is first filed, the court must make an initial assessment to determine: 1) whether a proper party under the statute has made the filing and there exists a reasonable basis to believe the standard can be met; and 2) whether the respondent, i.e., the individual subject to the petition, is present and, if not, whether that particular court is the best venue to hear the petition.
Notwithstanding that individuals are increasingly looking to “section” themselves to access treatment when other treatment resources are unavailable or inadequate, under Section 35, an individual may not file a petition on his own behalf. Nevertheless, if the court determines that there is a strong basis for a petition, the court may ask a police officer or court official (often a probation officer) to step in as the statutorily qualified petitioner. Once the court finds both a reasonable basis for the petition and a proper petitioner, the petition may not be withdrawn or dismissed without leave of the court. This restriction against voluntary termination recognizes the public health and safety concerns underlying Section 35 proceedings and may help address the problem that occurs when family members or other petitioners develop cold feet as a result of pushback they may receive from a reticent respondent.
Under the second inquiry, if the respondent is present in court, the hearing must go forward without delay in that court (and bail should be set if the respondent is also arraigned on criminal charges). There are no venue restrictions for Section 35 petitions based on residency or otherwise, and adult hearings may proceed in juvenile court and vice versa. This frees petitioners to go to the court nearest to where they are able to locate the respondent, the court where criminal charges are pending, or the court nearest to where the petitioner may live or work (particularly where the petitioner is a treating physician or police officer).
When the respondent is not present at the time the petition is filed, the court may evaluate whether it is the most appropriate court to maintain the petition, and may issue a summons or, more frequently, a warrant for the respondent’s apprehension and return to that court during court hours only. The new Opioid Bill extended the time that the warrant may be returned from three to five business days. When a respondent is located far enough away from the originating court such that travel there during court hours is not practicable, officers may instead take the respondent to the nearest court, which can seek to have the petition transferred to that court. The Uniform § 35 Rules also clarify that the petitioner need not be present for the hearing to go forward (or she may appear remotely). This is helpful where a petition must be transferred to another court but the petitioner is unable to timely travel to the new court, as well as in those cases where the petitioner may be an on-duty treating physician who cannot leave the hospital.
Finally, in light of the respondent’s liberty interests at stake, in In the Matter of G.P., the Supreme Judicial Court clarified the standards for involuntary, civil commitment under the statute. The two primary rulings in the case establish that the appropriate standard of proof is clear and convincing evidence and that substantially reliable hearsay is admissible. This holding make Section 35 hearings analogous to probation violation hearings—a familiar standard for those in the criminal justice system.
The Court also addressed the type of evidence necessary to sustain a finding of clear and convincing evidence of likelihood of serious harm directly resulting from alcohol and/or substance use. Such risk can be established by demonstrating a substantial risk of physical self-harm, harm to others, or by showing that the respondent’s judgment is impaired to such a degree that there is a very substantial risk of physical impairment or injury. Each of the three methods also requires a showing of imminence of harm, which for purposes of Section 35 means not that the risk of harm must be immediate, but rather that it must materialize in the reasonably short term—meaning days or weeks rather than months. The Court elaborated on the types of evidence which would credibly support such an imminent risk: specific threats, proximate in time or numerous in nature, with the seriousness of the threats or past harm carefully weighed. Where a risk of harm to others is alleged, it must be of a substantial level of force and intensity to be categorized as “violent behavior” or “serious physical harm” under the statute. A simple pushing of another out of the way, for example, is not sufficient.
Under the third method (impaired judgment), the Court explained that the type of harm that may suffice was akin to an inability of the respondent to treat an injury or medical condition (e.g., failure to take prescribed medication or obtain regular dialysis) or a risk due to extreme weather conditions, and an inability of the respondent’s “community” to adequately address the risk. The ability of the respondent’s community to provide protection would likely be lower where an individual is homeless or living only with elderly parents or small children. A risk of overdosing may be sufficient under this prong, but only where “strong and specific evidence [is] presented that the risk of overdosing is indeed imminent and the degree of probability she will do so is high.” In the Matter of G.P., 473 Mass. at 129 n.23. A recent nonfatal overdose would likely satisfy this prong.
Both In the Matter of G.P. and the Uniform § 35 Rules address and protect a respondent’s right to present independent medical evidence and to appeal any commitment, allowing for both motions to reconsider and expedited review on appeal.
These recent changes bring consistency, transparency, and increased fairness to Section 35 proceedings. And with the additional dedicated Section 35 treatment beds allocated for women, increased fairness also means access to meaningful treatment and rehabilitation resources.
Crystal L. Lyons is an Assistant District Attorney in the Appeals & Training Bureau of the Middlesex District Attorney’s Office, and a member of the BBJ Board of Editors. She previously practiced business litigation, clerked for the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, and graduated Order of the Coif from UCLA School of Law. This article represents the opinions and legal conclusions of its author and not necessarily those of the Middlesex District Attorney’s Office.

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