Source: https://llrx.com/2018/10/the-government-must-now-obtain-a-warrant-to-compel-disclosure-of-cell-phone-location-records/?share=google-plus-1
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 04:56:13+00:00

Document:
In 2011, the police arrested four men for a series of armed robberies in Detroit, Michigan. One of them confessed that he had participated in the robbery of nine stores in Michigan and Ohio. He provided cell phone numbers for some of the other participants, including Timothy Carpenter. Under the Stored Communications Act (SCA), the government obtained orders directing the wireless service providers to turn over records for those cell phone numbers. The records included cell site location information for the target telephones at call origination and at call termination for incoming and outgoing calls. The government intended to use the CSLI to prove that Carpenter was in the vicinity of each of the robberies at the time it was committed. MetroPCS produced records for defendant Carpenter covering a period of 127 days, and Sprint produced records for two days, for “roaming” charges that were incurred while Carpenter was driving in Ohio.
Defense counsel moved to suppress, citing U S. v. Jones, and arguing that before the government may collect such data, the Fourth Amendment requires that it obtain a search warrant, pursuant to a showing of probable cause. In Jones, the Supreme Court had held that the 4th Amendment was violated when the police recorded the defendant’s movements for twenty-eight days with a GPS tracking device that they had secretly attached to his car. The District Court in Carpenter rejected defense counsel’s argument, and denied suppression. It held that the government’s collection of cell-site records, created and maintained by defendant’s wireless carrier, was not a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The “historical” CSLI was admitted into evidence at Carpenter’s trial, and he was convicted of several robberies and related charges.
The Supreme Court explained that the digital data at issue in Carpenter – personal location information maintained by a third party – does not fit neatly under existing precedents but lies at the intersection of two lines of cases. One line holds that a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his physical location and movements, i.e., Jones  (GPS tracking device on car); and the other holds that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily turned over to third parties, e.g., Smith v. Maryland  (records of dialed telephone numbers held by telephone company) and United States v. Miller (financial records held by bank).
The Court acknowledged the Government’s contention that CSLI data is less precise than GPS information, but observed that the prosecutor thought the data accurate enough to highlight it during closing arguments in Carpenter’s trial. Moreover, the accuracy of CSLI is rapidly approaching GPS-level precision, and whatever rule the Court adopts “must take account of more sophisticated systems that are already in use or in development” (citing Kyllo ).  In Kyllo, it was held that use of a thermal imager to detect persons inside a residence was a “search” that required a warrant.
The Court concluded that the government’s acquisition of the cell-site records was a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and that the Government was obligated to obtain a warrant supported by probable cause. “[R]easonable grounds” for believing that records are “relevant and material to an ongoing investigation” (18 U.S.C. §2703[d]), “falls well short of the probable cause required for a warrant.” Thus, an order obtained under §2703[d] of the SCA is not a permissible mechanism for accessing historical cell-site records.
The Supreme Court characterized its holding in Carpenter as “a narrow one,” stating that it does not disturb the application of Smith and Miller, or call into question conventional surveillance techniques and tools, such as security cameras. It does not address other business records that might incidentally reveal location information; and it does not consider other collection techniques involving foreign affairs or national security. The opinion also does not address “real-time” cell-site information.
Although the Court states that the Government will generally need a warrant to access CSLI, it acknowledges that case-specific exceptions, such as exigent circumstances, may support a warrantless search. Another recognized exception to the warrant requirement is that the government acted in “good faith” in reliance upon a statute, which may apply even if the statute is subsequently declared unconstitutional. In the Sixth Circuit, the concurring opinion stated that the authorities had acted in the “good faith” in implementing the Stored Communications Act; and therefore, suppression had been properly denied, even though there had been a Fourth Amendment violation. If the prosecution asserted the “good faith” exception in the lower Court, suppression could be denied on that alternative ground on remand.
2.18 U.S.C. § 2703(d); 819 F.3d 880, 884 (6th Cir. 2012).
3. 819 F.3d, at 886.
5. Carpenter, slip op., at 3, 11 n 3.
6. 565 U.S. 400, 404 (2012).
7. 819 F.3d at 884.
9. id., at 885, 890, 893.
10. Carpenter, slip op., at 11,18-19.
12. Carpenter, slip op., at 5, 12.
13. 389 U.S., at 348, 351.
14. Carpenter, slip op., at 5 (citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735).
15. 565 U.S., at 404.
16. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
17. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
18. Carpenter, slip op., at 7-10.
20. 573 U.S., __ , __ (2014).
21. Carpenter, slip op., at 13.
23. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
24. Carpenter, slip op., at 14.
25. Carpenter, slip op., at 12-15 (citing Kyllo, 533 U.S., at 36).
26. 425 U.S., at 442.
27. Carpenter, slip op., at 16-17.
30. Carpenter, slip op., at 17.
35. 819 F.3d, at 897.
36. Carpenter, slip. op., at 18.
39. id., at 11, n 3.
41. United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 774-776 (6th Cir. 2012).
42. 819 F.3d, at 894-895.
43. Carpenter, slip op., at 11 n 3.
44. KENNEDY, J., dissenting (slip op., at 2).
45. Carpenter, slip op., at 18-22.
46. U S. v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 905-926 (1984).
47. 819 F.3d, at 894-896 (citing US. v. Leon).

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