Source: https://www.scribd.com/document/273762986/9-Bucton-vs-Gabar-pdf
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 04:00:31+00:00

Document:
based on the subdivision Plan and Technical Description above-mentioned. Bonifacio Regalado to intercede. Defendants repeatedly declined to accommodate plaintiffs. to cancel TCT No. Exhibit I. On the basis of the facts quoted above the trial court on February 14. plaintiffs were compelled to employ Atty. with the consent of defendants (who were living on their portion). When Josefina received the first amount of P1. plaintiffs had the entire land surveyed and subdivided preparatory to obtaining their separate title to their portion. Exhibit I-1. SO ORDERED. not payment of one-half of the price of the land (which was P3. This defense is devoid of merit. Plaintiffs then sought to obtain a separate title for their portion of the land in question. Exhibit 1-2. Defendants' evidence — based only on the testimony of defendant Josefina Llamoso Gabar — denies agreement to sell to plaintiffs one-half of the land in litigation.000.) Josefina Ll.000) pesos. counsel tried but failed. judgment is hereby rendered for plaintiffs: 1) Ordering defendants within thirty days from receipt hereof to execute a deed of conveyance in favor of plaintiffs of the portion of the land covered by OCT No.500 and to pay the costs. reads: Cagayan. Mis. sold to me by Mrs. indicated as Lot 337-B in the Subdivision Plan. Carmen Roa Villarin. the deed shall be executed in their behalf by the Provincial Sheriff of Misamis Oriental or his Deputy.000). upon presentation to him of the above-mentioned deed of conveyance. and that pertaining to plaintiffs. In the meantime.500 contracted on June 16. 6337. 1946 Received from Mrs. "(Sgd. . failed. victory currency. planting fruit trees and receiving the rentals of their buildings. II so that the same may be cancelled. Or. one to plaintiffs and another to defendants. Defendants remained unmoved. Their excuse: the entire land was still mortgaged with the Philippine National Bank as guarantee for defendants' loan of P3. Frustrated.00) pesos. 1970. and 3) Ordering defendants to pay unto plaintiffs attorney's fees in the amount of P1. and described in the Technical Description. which has cost plaintiffs P1. Exhibit A. II. this. 2) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Cagayan de Oro. which sum is one-half of the purchase value of Lot No. to wit. P1. which is the dividing line between the portion pertaining to defendants. Exhibit D. 1947 the spouses Villarin executed the deed of sale of the land abovementioned in favor of defendant Josefina Llamoso Gabar. to whom was issued on June 20. She declared that the amounts she had received from plaintiff Nicanora Gabar Bucton — first.500. this case. under Torrens Certificate of Title No. this time employing Atty. II. plaintiffs continued to insist on obtaining their separate title. as part payment of the one thousand five hundred (P1. cancelling OCT No. 1947: Exhibit D-1. 1947 TCT No. Gabar". Hence. Nicanora Gabar the sum of one thousand (P1. Plaintiffs persevered. Exhibit I. II and in its stead to issue Transfer Certificates of Title. giving the same excuse. Exhibit I. Jr. rendered judgment the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE. Aquilino Pimentel.In January. Exhibit I-2. January 19. Plaintiffs continued enjoying their portion of the land.000 the receipt she signed. 337. and ordering defendants to present and surrender to the Register of Deeds their TCT No. In 1953. then P400 — were loans. should defendants for any reason fail to do so.500 in attorney's fees. 6337. to persuade defendants to comply with their obligation to plaintiffs. too. After the survey and the planting of the concrete monuments defendants erected a fence from point 2 to point 4 of the plan.
Article 1434 of the Civil Code. The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues: 1. 1968. 1947. the plaintiffs' action to enforce the alleged written contract (Exh. for respondent Court of Appeals found as a fact "that plaintiffs really paid for a portion of the lot in question pursuant to their agreement with the defendants that they would own one-half (1/2) of the land.00-loan obtained by private respondents from petitioners on July 30. on the following legal disquisition: Appellees' alleged right of action was based on the receipt (Exh. 1946. 1946. therefore.00 on May 2. Upon a written contract. In the premises. II. 3. since petitioners' action was filed on February 15. continuous and physical possession thereof since the date of its purchase. A) was not brought within the prescriptive period of ten (10) years from the time the cause of action accrued.00 on January 19.000. 1951). and. the payment by petitioner by Nicanora Gabar Bucton of P1. their action to compel the vendors to execute a formal deed of conveyance so that the fact of their ownership may be inscribed in the corresponding certificate of title. when a deed of sale was executed in their favor by the Villarin spouses. or after the lapse of twenty-two (22) years and . her second payment of P400. which provides that "[w]hen a person who is not the owner of a thing sells or alienates and delivers it. they became such owners on January 24. The land in question is admittedly covered by a torrens title in the name of Josefina Llamoso Gabar so that the alleged possession of the land by the plaintiffs since 1947 is immaterial because ownership over registered realty may not be acquired by prescription or adverse possession (Section 40 of Act 496). 2 Thus. It is not without reluctance that in this case we are constrained to sustain the defense of prescription. 1 Although at the time said petitioner paid P1. such title passes by operation of law to the buyer or grantee.500. "A" which was executed way back on January 19.000. was nevertheless proved by both documentary and parole evidence. resulted in the full payment of the purchase price and the consequential acquisition by petitioners of ownership over one-half of the lot. An action arising from a written contract does not prescribe until after the lapse of ten (10) years from the date of action accrued. for we think that plaintiffs really paid for a portion of the lot in question pursuant to their agreement with the defendants that they would then own one-half of the land. Petitioners' appeal is predicated on the proposition that owners of the property by purchase from private respondents. 2. 1946 to February 15. 1.00 to respondent Josefina Gabar as purchase price of one-half of the lot now covered by TCT No.Appeal was interposed by private respondents with the Court of Appeals. A) which was executed way back on January 19. which reversed the judgment of the trial court and ordered petitioners' complaint dismissed. although not consigned in a public instrument or formal writing. is nevertheless valid and binding between petitioners and private respondents. Petitioners therefore became owners of the one-half portion of the lot in question by virtue of a sale which. when the complaint was filed in this case. one cannot sleep on one's right and expect it to be preserved in its pristine purity. The error of respondent Court of Appeals in holding that petitioners' right of action had already prescribed stems from its belief that the action of petitioners is based on the receipt Exh. up to the amount of P100. From January 19. 1946. Therefore.00 as part payment of the purchase price on January 19." If eternal vigilance is the price of safety. We hold that the present appeal is meritorious. But we cannot apply ethical principles in lieu of express statutory provisions. had not yet prescribed when they filed the present action." That sale. Upon a judgment. private respondents were not yet the owners of the lot. There is no question that petitioner Nicanora Gabar Bucton paid P1. 2. This period of ten (10) years is expressly provided for in Article 1144 of the Civil Code. though not evidenced by a formal deed. 1946. Upon an obligation created by law. 1948. in the view of said appellate court. twenty-two (22) years and twenty-six (26) days had elapsed." is applicable. for the time-honored rule is that even a verbal contract of sale or real estate produces legal effects between the parties. and being in actual.000. and later the seller or grantor acquires title thereto. It is by law provided that: "ART.00 (out of the P1. 1968. 1144. and the compensation.
Rhea. vs. since the delivery of possession of the land sold had consummated the sale and transferred title to the purchaser.. p. 47) The doctrine was reiterated recently in Gallar v. One who claims property which is in the possession of another must. the decision and resolution of respondent Court of Appeals appealed from are hereby reversed. 683. 1 ä w phï 1 .B. the date of said document. it is an established rule of American jurisprudence (made applicable in this jurisdiction by Art.. speaking thru Mr. 328. Pajimula. See also Castrillo.. to remove the cloud upon the appellee's ownership by the refusal of the appellants to recognize the sale made by their predecessors. L-24419. Guerrero v. 10 Phil. 14). 62.R. the reason for this rule being that while the owner in fee continues liable to an action. it seems. the sale was consummated and title was transferred to the appellee. 334. et al. in its Civil Case No. Jur. Costs against private respondents. the action for conveyance is one to quiet title. is revived. 4 L-20954. explained that. invoke remedy within the statutory period. Barredo. et al. He may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title in attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right.L. But the rule that the statute of limitations is not available as a defense to an action to remove a cloud from title can only be invoked by a complainant when he is in possession. or suit upon the adverse claim. proceeding. 20 L. Court of Appeals. 3 103 Phil. as against one who is asserting some adverse claim or lien thereon.. actually.. March 31.. et al. Aquino. claiming to be owners thereof. Considering that the foregoing circumstances obtain in the present case. i. Fabiana. 108 Phil. Castrillo.. is not barred while the plaintiff or his grantors remain in actual possession of the land. ibid. Justice J. Reyes. ñë t Footnotes 1 Couto v. 3 this Court. Cooper vs. 47. May 24. 460 (1907). The prevailing rule is that the right of a plaintiff to have his title to land quieted. Court of Appeals.. are the receipts issued by private respondents to petitioners. Inland Empire Land Co. 1968. et al.. "B" and Exh. "E"). et al.. 1057. Cortes. Branch IV. 245 Pac. et al. or to assert any superior equity in his favor. v. 12 Phil.. evidencing payments by the latter of the purchase price of one-half of the lot. 20 SCRA 186. since all it seeks is to quiet title. the same is already barred according to the provisions of Article 1144 of the New Civil Code. 480 of the New Civil Code) that actions to quiet title to property in the possession of the plaintiff are imprescriptible (44 Am. In Sapto. Zaldivar (Chairman). that the action is actually not for specific performance. 553.Arellano Law Foundation . Paez Vda. as well as the other documents of similar import (Exh. Jur. the action is imprescriptible. Miguel. de Cruz. which entitles them to a conveyance of the property. The real and ultimate basis of petitioners' action is their ownership of one-half of the lot coupled with their possession thereof. 1964. 930. and the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental. and that. The aforecited document (Exh.A. 52. 1967.e. under the circumstances no enforcement of the contract is needed. 2 Llacer v.twenty-six (26) days from. he has a continuing right to the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and determine the nature of such claim and its effect on his title. v. The Law phil Proj ect . 138 Wash. 3004. 686-87. 4 where We ruled that by the delivery of the possession of the land. Estoque v. to remove the cloud cast upon appellee's ownership as a result of appellant's refusal to recognize the sale made by his predecessor.. JJ. "A"). Husain. 8 Phil. Grant County. We held therein that ". 439. 24 SCRA 59. We hold that petitioners' action has not prescribed. Muñoz de Bustillo. Inquimboy v. 459. 53 (1908).. 10 SCRA 549. July 15. 1054. Fernandez. and that as plaintiffappellee is in possession of the land. 191. et al. (44 Am. WHEREFORE. p.. concur. v. Fernando.

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