Source: https://de.scribd.com/document/40140968/Case-of-o-Halloran-and-Francis-v-the-United-Kingdom
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applicants”), on 3 April 2002 and 15 November 2001 respectively.
Mr D. Walton, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London.
Mrs L. PERRY. Wildhaber and Mr. on 27 September 2006 (Rule 59 § 3). The composition of the Grand Chamber was determined according to the provisions of Article 27 §§ 2 and 3 of the Convention and Rule 24 of the Rules of Court. none of the parties having objected to relinquishment (Article 30 of the Convention and Rule 72). Garlicki. MOORE. 5. they were declared admissible by a Chamber of that Section composed of the following judges: Mr J. Applicants. Mr Costa succeeded him in that capacity and took over the presidency of the Grand Chamber in the present case (Rule 9 § 2). Mr D. Mr J. Mr I. (b) for the applicants Mr B. Mr M. The Court heard addresses by Mr Emmerson and Mr Perry and their answers to questions put by judges. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT committing infringed his right not to incriminate himself. 4. A hearing took place in public in the Human Rights Building. Strasbourg. Both applicants relied on Article 6 §§ 1 and 2 of the Convention. Pellonpää continued to sit following the expiry of their terms of office. Ms L. O'Boyle. 6. Adviser.2 O'HALLORAN AND FRANCIS v. O'HALLORAN. Šikuta.WALTON. Casadevall. . Pavlovschi. Solicitor. Section Registrar. Mr J. Mijovič. Counsel. FRANCIS. Mr G. On 26 October 2004 the applications were joined and on 25 October 2005. On 19 January 2007 Mr Wildhaber's term as President of the Court came to an end. MAGEE. Mr D. The applications were allocated to the Fourth Section of the Court (Rule 52 § 1 of the Rules of Court). and also of Mr M. EMMERSON QC. Mr. Pellonpää. Advisers. Sir Nicolas Bratza. WELCH. Mr L. Agent. Mr M. FRIEDMAN. Mr J. Counsel. 7. There appeared before the Court: (a) for the Government Mr D. The applicants and the Government each filed written observations on the merits. CLARKE. Mr S. On 11 April 2006 the Chamber relinquished jurisdiction in favour of the Grand Chamber. in accordance with Article 23 § 7 of the Convention and Rule 24 § 4.
a vehicle of which the applicant was the registered keeper.. O'HALLORAN AND FRANCIS v. You have been named as the driver of the vehicle at the time of the alleged offence and have a legal obligation to comply with the provisions of the notice contained on page 2. 15809/02) 9. Thereafter the prosecution relied upon the photograph of the speeding vehicle and the admission obtained as a result of the section 172 demand. registration number T61 TBX. invoking sections 76 and 78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 read in conjunction with Article 6 of the Convention. . Mr O'Halloran (application no. Stott  2 WLR 817. at 04. ordered to pay GBP 150 costs and his licence endorsed with six penalty points. the applicant was summoned to attend North Essex Magistrates' Court where he was tried for driving in excess of the speed limit. He was again informed that a failure to provide information was a criminal offence under section 172 of the Road Traffic Act 1988. was caught on a speed camera driving at 69 miles per hour (mph) on the M11 motorway where the temporary speed limit was 40 mph. The applicant answered the letter confirming that he was the driver at the relevant time. 10. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT 3 THE FACTS I. On 17 April 2000. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE 8. the applicant sought to exclude the confession made in response to the notice of intention to prosecute. 12.. His application was refused in the light of the decision of the Privy Council in Brown v. On 27 March 2001. Prior to the trial.. respectively. The applicant was convicted and fined GBP 100. It is intended to institute proceedings against the driver for the offence of failing to comply with the speed limit .” 11.. the police camera enforcement unit of the Essex Constabulary wrote to the applicant: “I have photographic evidence that the driver of T61 TBX failed to comply with the speed limit .000 and 3-6 penalty points. I must warn you that if you fail to comply with this demand within 28 days you will commit an offence and be liable on conviction to a maximum penalty similar to that of the alleged offence itself – a fine of £1. On 7 April 2000. A. The attached notice of intention to prosecute (NIP) informed the applicant that it was intended to institute proceedings against the driver of the vehicle. He was asked to furnish the full name and address of the driver of the vehicle on the relevant occasion or to supply other information that was in his power to give and which would lead to the driver's identification. 13. The applicants were born in 1933 and 1939 and live in London and Petersfield.55 hours.
4 O'HALLORAN AND FRANCIS v. the admission that the defendant was indeed the driver should have been excluded under sections 76 and 78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 having regard to the Human Rights Act and the recent cases decided by the European Court as he had been obliged to incriminate himself?" 15. 20. Failure to supply this information may render you liable to prosecution. 23. 25624/02) 17. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT 14. the applicant asked the magistrates to state a case for the opinion of the High Court: "Whether in the circumstances of this case. On 19 October 2001. the Surrey Police sent the applicant a NIP in the following terms: "In accordance with section 1. B. apparently with reference to the applicant's proceeding with . Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988. Stott  2 WLR 817 held that section 172 did not infringe the said rights. The penalty on conviction for failure to supply the information is similar to that for the offence itself i. This allegation is supported by means of photographic/recorded video evidence. Under section 172 of the Road Traffic Act you are required to provide the information specified within 28 days of receipt of this notice. the applicant's application for judicial review of the magistrates' decision was refused. the applicant was summoned to the Magistrates' Court for failing to comply with section 172(3) of the Road Traffic Act 1988. On 23 April 2001. On 9 November 2001. On 11 April 2001. the Surrey Police informed the applicant that the appeal in Brown v. He obtained an adjournment.. On 28 August 2001. 18. the magistrates' clerk informed the applicant that the magistrates refused to state a case as the issue had already been decided definitively by the Privy Council in Brown v. Mr Francis (application no." 19. I hereby give you notice that proceedings are being considered against the driver of Alvis motor vehicle registration mark EYX 622 . 22.. 16. On 18 July 2001. You are recorded as the owner/keeper/driver or user for the above vehicle at the time of the alleged offence. the Magistrates' Court agreed to further postponement. the applicant wrote to the Surrey Police invoking his right to remain silent and privilege against self-incrimination. and you are required to provide the full name and address of the driver at the time and location specified. a fine and penalty points.e. On 19 June 2001. Stott (cited above) and the High Court in Director of Public Prosecutions v. On 17 July 2001. The applicant refused to supply the information. Wilson ( EWHC Admin 198). 21. A car of which the applicant was the registered keeper was caught on speed camera on 12 June 2001 driving at 47 mph where the speed limit was 30 mph.
On 8 February 2002. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT 5 an application in Strasbourg. GBP 1. Subsection 2 provides: "Where the driver of a vehicle is alleged to be guilty of an offence to which this section applies- (a) the person keeping the vehicle shall give such information as to the identity of the driver as he may be required to give by or on behalf of a chief officer of police. Road traffic legislation 25. The applicant wrote to the Court on 15 November 2001. Subsection (1) refers to the traffic offences to which the section applies. invoking Articles 6 §§ 1 and 2 of the Convention. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE A. He states that the fine was substantially heavier than that which would have been imposed if he had pleaded guilty to the speeding offence. on which date the applicant was convicted and fined GBP 750 with GBP 250 costs and 3 penalty points. a . Section 12(1) of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 provides that on summary trial for a relevant offence.” 26." Subsection 4 provides: “A person shall not be guilty of an offence by virtue of paragraph (a) of subsection (2) above if he shows that he did not know and could not with reasonable diligence have ascertained who the driver of the vehicle was. including speeding. 27. A person guilty of an offence under subsection 3 can be disqualified or have his licence endorsed with three penalty points. Section 172 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 ("the 1988 Act") deals with the duty to give information of a driver of a vehicle in certain circumstances. a person who fails to comply with a requirement under subsection (2) above shall be guilty of an offence. II. he may also be fined up to level three on the standard scale. They include parking on a cycle track (under section 21 of the 1988 Act) and causing death by reckless driving (section 1). offences under a number of other provisions. 24. including speeding offences. i. the Magistrates' Court cancelled the postponement and fixed the trial for 15 April 2002.” Subsection 3 provides: “Subject to the following provisions. and manslaughter by the driver of a motor vehicle.e. O'HALLORAN AND FRANCIS v.000. and (b) any other person shall if required as stated above give any information which it is in his power to give and may lead to the identification of the driver.
including the circumstances in which the evidence was obtained. B. The High Court of Justiciary allowed the defendant's appeal. or in consequence of anything said or done which was likely. finding that the prosecution could not rely on evidence of the admission which she had been compelled to make. Relevant domestic case-law 30. if it appears to the court that. Section 78 provides: “In any proceedings the court may refuse to allow evidence on which the prosecution proposes to rely to be given. in any proceedings where the prosecution proposes to give in evidence a confession made by an accused person.6 O'HALLORAN AND FRANCIS v. She was breathalysed and tested positive for alcohol consumption. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT statement in writing signed by the accused under section 172(2) of the 1988 Act that he was the driver of the vehicle on that occasion may be accepted as evidence of that fact. In Brown v. the admission of the evidence would have such an adverse effect on the fairness of the proceedings that the court ought not to admit it. in the circumstances existing at the time. Stott  2 WLR 817 the Privy Council considered the case of a woman arrested for shoplifting in the vicinity of a car that appeared to be hers. Section 76 provides "(1) In any proceedings a confession made by an accused person may be given in evidence against him in so far as it is relevant to any matter in issue in the proceedings and is not excluded by the court in pursuance of this section. The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 28. to render unreliable any confession which might be made by him in consequence thereof the court shall not allow the confession to be given in evidence against him except in so far as the prosecution proves to the court beyond reasonable doubt that the confession (notwithstanding that it may be true) was not obtained as aforesaid. (2) If." 29. The Procurator Fiscal sought to use her answer that she had been driving as the basis for a prosecution for driving with excess alcohol. . having regard to all the circumstances. it is represented to the court that the confession was or may have been obtained by oppression of the person who made it. With a view to ascertaining whether she had been guilty of driving her car while under the influence of alcohol (contrary to section 5 of the 1988 Act) the police served her with a section 172 notice." C.
would undermine her right to a fair trial... An admission of driving may. This regime is imposed not because owning or driving cars is a privilege or indulgence granted by the State but because the possession and use of cars (like. (1) Section 172 provides for the putting of a single. be enough to convict a driver of an offence . There being a clear public interest in enforcement of road traffic legislation the crucial question in this case is whether section 172 represents a disproportionate response. for the benefit of the public. for doing so. cannot be doubted.. or one that undermines a defendant's right to a fair trial. and the penalty for declining to answer under the section is moderate and non-custodial.. held inter alia: "The high incidence of death and injury on the roads caused by the misuse of motor vehicles is a very serious problem common to almost all developed societies.. giving the leading judgment. this distinction should not in my opinion be pushed too far. provide proof of a fact necessary to convict. It is true that the respondent's answer whether given orally or in writing would create new evidence which did not exist until she spoke or wrote. Lord Bingham. in all save exceptional circumstances. (3) All who own or drive motor cars know that by doing so they subject themselves to a regulatory regime. but the section does not sanction prolonged questioning about facts alleged to give rise to criminal offences such as understandably was held to be objectionable in Saunders. There is in the present case no suggestion of improper coercion or oppression such as might give rise to unreliable admissions and so contribute to a miscarriage of justice. I reach that conclusion for a number of reasons. incomplete though they are. the percentage of alcohol in her blood was a fact. prosecuting and punishing offending drivers. O'HALLORAN AND FRANCIS v. of course. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT 7 31. as here. (2) While the High Court was entitled to distinguish . it is not easy to see why a requirement to answer a question is objectionable and a requirement to undergo a breath test is not. properly applied. Under some legal systems (Spain.) are recognised to have the potential to cause grave . existing before she blew into the breathalyser machine.. I do not for my part consider that section 172. if an admission of being the driver is relied on at trial. Belgium and France are examples) the registered owner is presumed to be the driver guilty of minor traffic infractions unless he shows that some other person was driving at the relevant time or establishes some other ground of exoneration. Yet no criticism is made of the requirement that the respondent undergo a breath test. The need to address it in an effective way. But the whole purpose of requiring her to blow into the machine (on pain of a criminal penalty if she refused) was to obtain evidence not available until she did so and the reading so obtained could.. between the giving of an answer under section 172 and the provision of physical samples. and if there were evidence of such conduct the trial judge would have ample power to exclude evidence of the admission. In contrast.. does represent a disproportionate response to this serious social problem. Among other ways in which democratic societies have sought to address it is by subjecting the use of motor vehicles to a regime of regulation and making provision for enforcement by identifying. Materials . nor do I think that reliance on the respondent's admission in the present case.. and had the authority of the European Court in Saunders . since it is not without more an offence to drive a car. the Privy Council found that the use of the admission did not infringe the requirements of Article 6. for example. On appeal by the Procurator Fiscal. reveal different responses to the problem of enforcement. simple question. The answer cannot of itself incriminate the suspect. it may be acknowledged. shotguns ..
Article 6 of the Convention provides. If the present argument is a good one it has been available to British citizens since 1966. Mr O'Halloran for driving in excess of the speed limit. THE LAW ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 §§ 1 AND 2 OF THE CONVENTION 32.. might not be said to have impliedly accepted the regulatory regime.. criticised the legislation as unfair at any time up to now.. France. whether the balance between the interests of the community at large and the interests of the individual is struck in a manner unduly prejudicial to the individual.. If... . by [a] . In the determination of .. viewing this situation in the round. everyone is entitled to a fair . but someone who was not the owner or driver would not incriminate himself whatever answer he gave.” A.. Wilson  EWHC Admin 198." The decision was adopted by the English High Court in Director of Public Prosecutions v. Applicability of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention 33. but no one in this country has to my knowledge.. The Court finds that the applicants were “substantially affected” by the Notices of Intended Prosecution they received. hearing . 35. one asks whether section 172 represents a disproportionate legislative response to the problem of maintaining road safety.8 O'HALLORAN AND FRANCIS v. I would feel bound to give negative answers. if not the owner or driver. such that they were “charged” with their respective speeding offences within the autonomous meaning of that term in Article 6 of the Convention (see Serves v. The applicants submitted that the criminal limb of Article 6 § 1 was applicable in their case because each of them had received a Notice of Intended Prosecution. and each of them was fined. so far as relevant. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT injury. The applicants complained that they had been subject to compulsion to give incriminating evidence in violation of the right to remain silent and the privilege against self-incrimination. It is true that section 172(2)(b) permits a question to be asked of "any other person" who. any criminal charge against him. The Government did not suggest that Article 6 § 1 was not applicable to the cases. 2. whether (in short) the leading of this evidence would infringe a basic human right of the respondent.. tribunal. and Mr Francis for refusing to give the name of the driver on the occasion at issue. 34. as follows: “1. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.
ECHR 2002-V) and also to the general principle that it is primarily for national law to regulate the admissibility of evidence. p. France. judgment of 17 December 1996. 35394/97. Saunders v. Compliance with Article 6 § 1 of the Convention 1. § 45. they referred to the limitations on access to court (e. Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-VI. The Government submitted that the privilege against self- incrimination and the right to remain silent were not absolute and their application could be limited by reference to other legitimate aims in the public interest. 256-A.g. the United Kingdom [GC]. Series A no. and the simple fact of being the driver of a . to case-law showing that in certain circumstances Contracting States were permitted to reverse the onus of proof of certain matters provided that this did not disturb the fair balance between the interests of the individual and the general interests of the community (e. no. 38. In addition to the cases on the right to remain silent (e. the United Kingdom. the United Kingdom. there was no obvious generally effective alternative to the power contained in section 172 and without such a power it would be impossible to investigate and prosecute traffic offences effectively.N. The Government argued that the power under section 172 to obtain an answer to the question who was driving a car when a suspected motoring offence was committed and to use that answer as evidence in a prosecution or. §§ 43-45. judgment of 25 February 1993. alternatively. 2172. 34209/96.g. There were very good reasons why the owner should be required to identify the driver: driving offences are intended to deter dangerous conduct which causes risk to the public and deterrence depended on effective enforcement (research showed that speed cameras etc had reduced crashes by up to 28%). Series A no. O'HALLORAN AND FRANCIS v. ECHR 2000-V). § 28). § 38. § 58). Series A no. Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-VI. to acceptable limitations on the rights of the defence in cases on equality of arms (Fitt v. Article 6 of the Convention can be applicable to cases of compulsion to give evidence even in the absence of any other proceedings. judgment of 7 October 1988. Khan v. ECHR 2000-II) and the questioning of witnesses (S. v. 29777/96. no. § 47. France. B. Ashingdane v. § 42). 36. 93. or where an applicant is acquitted in the underlying proceedings (Funke v. §§ 39 and 40 and Heaney and McGuinness v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT 9 judgment of 20 October 1997. ECHR 2000-XII). 34720/97. to prosecute a person who failed to provide information was compatible with Article 6. no.g. the United Kingdom. no. § 62). The Court accepts that Article 6 is applicable in the present case.g. 141-A. Ireland. judgment of 28 May 1985. Sweden. including incriminating evidence (e. The parties' submissions 37. Salabiaku v. In any event.
They argued that an actual or potential defendant could not be compelled on pain of penalty to provide information which only he was capable of providing and which could not be provided by documents or physical evidence independent of his will.000. applied to criminal proceedings of all kinds without distinction. The applicants submitted that the serious problem caused by the misuse of motor vehicles was not sufficient to justify a system of compulsion which extinguished the essence of the rights under Article 6. 39. or the use of incriminating information obtained compulsorily outside the context of the criminal proceedings themselves. The relatively minor nature of the penalties was irrelevant as the Article 6 rights. It provided for the putting of a single question in particular circumstances and all the usual protections against the use of unreliable evidence or evidence obtained by improper means remained in place. including the principle against self-incrimination and right to remain silent. confirmed that the existing regime was not strictly necessary in a democratic society. The Government considered that the use of section 172 was more limited in its effect on drivers than would-be alternatives such as the drawing of adverse inferences from a failure on the part of a registered keeper to provide the name of the driver when required to do so. Nor did section 172 breach the presumption of innocence as the overall burden of proof remained on the prosecution. would achieve the same end. while the maximum penalty was only a fine of GBP 1. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT motor car was not in itself incriminating. The applicants considered that the existence of other legislative techniques in bringing about the same or similar results but in a manner less intrusive of the rights of the accused (the drawing of adverse inferences from a failure to answer questions.10 O'HALLORAN AND FRANCIS v. They rejected the Government's arguments that there was any protection against use of the material in the provisions of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) as sections 76 and 78 of PACE could not . They recalled that in the cases of Saunders and Heaney and McGuinness (both cited above) the Court had held that the public interest could not be invoked to justify the use of answers compulsorily obtained. or establishing a statutory presumption of fact that the registered owner was the driver unless he or she provided evidence to the contrary). asserting that methods of indirect compulsion. 41. They disputed that there was no obvious alternative. The prosecution were required to prove their case without recourse to coercion in defiance of the will of the accused. The Government also considered that the very fact that other legislative techniques could bring about substantially the same result indicated that questions of proportionality – rather than the absolute nature of the rights suggested by the applicants in cases of direct compulsion – were at issue. or a statutory presumption of fact that the registered driver was the driver at the material time unless he showed otherwise. 42. 40.
§ 44). ECHR 2001-III). to have that evidence excluded from his trial. the . relating to operations of interest to [the customs] department” which they believed must exist (Article 65 of the Customs Code). To the extent possible. however. and Shannon v. amongst other things. O'HALLORAN AND FRANCIS v. The case of Mr O'Halloran appears at first sight to resemble the case of Saunders (referred to above). The central issue in each case. had been obtained in breach of Article 6. J. and in each of which the Court considered the fine independently of the existence or outcome of underlying proceedings. 6563/03. The Court found that the attempt to compel the applicant himself to provide the evidence of the offences he had allegedly committed infringed his right to remain silent and not to contribute to incriminating himself (Funke.. is whether the coercion of a person who is the subject of a charge of speeding under section 172 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 (“the 1998 Act”) to make statements which incriminate him or might lead to his incrimination is compatible with Article 6 of the Convention. in which the applicant complained of the use in criminal proceedings of evidence which. and attempted. As the applicants had been subject to pending criminal proceedings and not a purely regulatory inquiry when subjected to direct compulsion. would seem to be more similar to the cases of Funke (cited above). The Court first notes that the applicants were in different factual situations. unsuccessfully. Mr Francis' case. In the case of Funke. and was convicted for the refusal.. Mr O'Halloran accepted that he had been the driver on the occasion at issue. 46. The Court's assessment (a) Introduction 43. the United Kingdom. He was then convicted of speeding. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT 11 exclude testimony collected in accordance with a statutory provision. cited above. 44. he claimed. there had therefore been breaches of both Article 6 §§ 1 and 2 of the Convention. the applicant was convicted for his failure to produce “papers and documents . Heaney and McGuinness (cited above). (b) The Court's case-law 45. the Court will therefore consider the two cases together. 4 October 2005). on the other hand.B. Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-I) case concerned. The Court elaborated no further on the nature of the right to remain silent and not to contribute to incriminating oneself. Mr Francis refused to give the name of the driver at the time and date referred to in his Notice of Intended Prosecution. v. in each of which the applicant was fined for not providing information. (no. Switzerland (no. 31827/96. 2. The John Murray (judgment of 8 February 1996.
it was self-evident that it was incompatible with the immunities to base a conviction solely or mainly on the accused's silence or on a refusal to answer questions or to give evidence himself. cited above §§ 67 and 69). By providing the accused with protection against improper compulsion by the authorities these immunities contribute to avoiding miscarriages of justice and to securing the aims of Article 6” (John Murray. The Court referred to the cases of John Murray and Funke. It did not extend to the use in criminal proceedings of material which may be obtained from the accused through the use of compulsory powers but which had an existence independent of the will of the suspect. The Court held that the question whether the use made by the prosecution of the statements obtained from the applicant by the inspectors under compulsion amounted to an unjustifiable infringement of the right “had to be examined in the light of all the circumstances of the case”: in particular. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT drawing of inferences from a person's silence during questioning and trial. The conclusion was that the “right to remain silent” was not absolute (ibid. such as breath. “destroyed the very essence of the privilege against self-incrimination” (ibid. it had to be determined whether the applicant had been subjected to compulsion to give evidence and whether the use made of the resulting testimony offended the basic principles of a fair procedure under Article 6 § 1 (Saunders. 47. the Court noted that the applicant's silence did not amount to a criminal offence or contempt of court. § 47). to attend before inspectors and to assist inspectors in their investigation on pain of a fine or committal to prison for two years.§ 49). cited above. The applicant in the case of Serves (cited above) was called as a witness in proceedings in which he had initially been charged as an accused.. be regarded as an indication of guilt (ibid.. in itself. where the degree of compulsion had.12 O'HALLORAN AND FRANCIS v. The Court found that there was no doubt that “the right to remain silent under police questioning and the privilege against self-incrimination are generally recognised international standards which lie at the heart of the notion of a fair trial . blood and urine samples.. the immunities could and should not prevent the accused's silence from being taken into account in situations which clearly called for an explanation. and that silence could not..§ 48). 48. On the one hand. The Court saw two extremes. The domestic provisions required company officers to produce books and documents. The case of Saunders concerned the use at the applicant's criminal trial of statements which had been obtained under legal compulsion under the Companies Act 1985. In discussing the degree of compulsion in the case. and found that the right not to incriminate oneself was primarily concerned with respecting the will of an accused person to remain silent. § 45). The Court thus distinguished the case from Funke. although at the date of the witness summons and the subsequent proceedings the relevant steps of the investigation had been declared void. On the other hand.. He declined to take the oath as a witness under the Code of Criminal . in effect.
In the case of Heaney and McGuinness. Thereafter. with reference back to § 24). 8 April 2004) was fined for giving inaccurate information in reply to a request from the District Authority under the Motor Vehicles Act to disclose the name and address of the driver of his car on a particular date. It then found. §§ 32-56). After reviewing the case-law and finding Article 6 §§ 1 and 2 to be applicable. R. Commission's decision of 5 September 1989. Austria (nos. there was no link between the criminal proceedings which had been initiated against persons unknown and the proceedings in which the applicant was fined for giving inaccurate information (Weh. “in effect destroyed the very essence of their privilege against self-incrimination and their right to remain silent”. and imprisoned for failing to give an account of their movements.. In the case of Shannon (cited above) the applicant was required to give information to an investigator into theft and false accounting under the Proceeds of Crime (Northern Ireland) Order 1996. the fines were imposed before a risk of self-incrimination ever arose (Serves... 15135/89. after considering the various procedural protections available. He did not attend an . 49. namely. §§ 43- 47). 15136/89 and 15137/89. who had been arrested in connection with a bombing. The Court found that in the case before it. Austria (no. [of specified offences]”. and H. cited above. 50. p. v. that the “degree of compulsion” imposed on the applicants. They were acquitted of the substantive offence. Accordingly. The Court accepted that it would have been admissible for the applicant to refuse to answer questions from the judge that were likely to steer him in the direction of self-incriminating evidence. Proceedings had already been opened against unknown offenders. §§ 47-58. the Court accepted that the right to remain silent and the right not to incriminate oneself were not absolute rights. Decisions and Reports 62. 319). a conviction and imprisonment for failing to give “a full account of [their] movements and actions during any specified period and all information in [their] possession in relation to the commission or intended commission . O'HALLORAN AND FRANCIS v. referred to above. declined to answer questions under special legislation requiring an individual to provide a full account of his movements and actions during a specified period. but found on the facts that the fine in the case was imposed in order to ensure that statements were truthful. the applicants. cited above. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT 13 Procedure on the ground that evidence he might be called to give before the investigating judge would have been self-incriminating. The Court declined to rely on the earlier cases of P. The applicant in the case of Weh v. 51. rather than to force the witness to give evidence. and it noted that the applicant had been required to do no more than state a simple fact – who had been the driver of his car – which was not in itself incriminating. the Court considered that the security and public order concerns relied on by the Government could not justify the provision (Heaney and McGuinness. 38544/97.
101. J. 100. cited above. Switzerland.). for example.. Reports 1998-IV. The right not to incriminate oneself.. Saunders v. ECHR 1999-V. the existence of any relevant safeguards in the procedures and the use to which any material so obtained is put (see. ECHR 2006-. inter alia. the Court recalled that not all coercive measures gave rise to a conclusion of an unjustified interference with the right not to incriminate oneself. Spain (dec. ECHR 2001- III. In examining whether a procedure has extinguished the very essence of the privilege against self-incrimination. it does not lay down any rules on the admissibility of evidence as such. § 40. to the following elements: the nature and degree of the compulsion.While Article 6 guarantees the right to a fair hearing. 52. p. that the right not to incriminate oneself is primarily concerned with respecting the will of an accused person to remain silent. the Court recalls that these are generally recognised international standards which lie at the heart of the notion of a fair procedure under Article 6. in the protection of the accused against improper compulsion by the authorities. §§ 51-55.. ECHR 2002-IX]. p. v. As regards the use of evidence obtained in breach of the right to silence and the privilege against self-incrimination.. the United Kingdom. 1462.B. Switzerland.. Heaney and McGuinness. it does not extend to the use in criminal proceedings of material which may be obtained from the accused through the use of compulsory powers but which has an existence independent of the will of the suspect. Germany ([GC]. . 48539/99. 31827/96. Heaney and McGuinness. §§ 45-46. judgment of 9 June 1998. As to a justification for the coercive measures. which is primarily a matter for regulation under national law (see Schenk v. [.] § 68. The case of Jalloh v. the United Kingdom. § 64. Although the applicant was acquitted in the underlying proceedings against him for false accounting and conspiracy to defraud arising from the same set of facts. §§ 26-40).. no. Portugal. thereby contributing to the avoidance of miscarriages of justice and to the fulfilment of the aims of Article 6.14 O'HALLORAN AND FRANCIS v. no.. The Court considered the right to remain silent and the privilege against self-incrimination in the following terms: “94. § 44). and Allan. judgment of 12 July 1988. no.. and Allan [Allan v. . The Court found that neither the security context nor the available procedural protection could justify the measures in the case (Shannon. 43486/98. cited above. no. Tirado Ortiz and Lozano Martin v. 54810/00. in particular. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT interview to give the information. As commonly understood in the legal systems of the Contracting Parties to the Convention and elsewhere. Their rationale lies. the Court will have regard. cited above. The Court has consistently held. and was fined. the Court concluded that it was open to the applicant to complain of an interference with his right not to incriminate himself. Series A no... 102. which had been obtained by the forcible administration of emetics. in particular. 29. Teixeira de Castro v. § 44). however.) concerned the use of evidence in the form of drugs swallowed by the applicant. cited above. presupposes that the prosecution in a criminal case seek to prove their case against the accused without resort to evidence obtained through methods of coercion or oppression in defiance of the will of the accused (see. inter alia. § 34). 140. .
a defendant is requested to endure passively a minor interference with his physical integrity (for example when blood or hair samples or bodily tissue are taken). a breath test or a blood sample. the evidence at issue in the present case. Tirado Ortiz and Lozano Martin. However.B. could be considered to fall into the category of material having an existence independent of the will of the suspect. Thirdly. O'HALLORAN AND FRANCIS v. the existence of any relevant safeguards in the procedure. the weight of the public interest in the investigation and punishment of the offence at issue. as pointed out by the . the Court will have regard. Moreover. namely. ECHR 1999-V]). drugs hidden in the applicant's body which were obtained by the forcible administration of emetics. Secondly. v. The procedure used in the applicant's case is in striking contrast to procedures for obtaining. 43486/98. to the following factors: the nature and degree of compulsion used to obtain the evidence. [T]he principle against self-incrimination is applicable to the present proceedings. the use of which is generally not prohibited in criminal proceedings. inter alia.” (c) The Court's assessment 53. [(dec. and the use to which any material so obtained is put. in turn.). in general. the administration of emetics was used to retrieve real evidence in defiance of the applicant's will. this procedure was not without risk to the applicant's health. . for example. Firstly. The applicants contended that the right to remain silent and the right not to incriminate oneself are absolute rights and that to apply any form of direct compulsion to require an accused person to make incriminatory statements against his will of itself destroys the very essence of that right. Procedures of the latter kind do not. for example. 114. these procedures are. attain the minimum level of severity so as to contravene Article 3. As noted earlier. Switzerland cases. 117. 116. The Court is unable to accept this. compelling the applicant in the instant case to regurgitate the evidence sought required the forcible introduction of a tube through his nose and the administration of a substance so as to provoke a pathological reaction in his body.. unless in exceptional circumstances. To obtain such material. the presence of alcohol or drugs. Even if the defendant's active participation is required. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT 15 113. In contrast. In order to determine whether the applicant's right not to incriminate himself has been violated. the degree of force used in the present case differs significantly from the degree of compulsion normally required to obtain the types of material referred to in the Saunders case. there are several elements which distinguish the present case from the examples listed in Saunders. In the Court's view. justified under Article 8 § 2 as being necessary for the prevention of criminal offences (see. no. the evidence in the present case was obtained by means of a procedure which violated Article 3. Conversely. as with the impugned measures in the Funke and J. 115. it can be seen from Saunders that this concerns material produced by the normal functioning of the body (such as.. for example. urine or voice samples). though constituting an interference with the suspect's right to respect for private life. It is true. breath. the bodily material listed in the Saunders case concerned material obtained by coercion for forensic examination with a view to detecting.
they were required to provide the full name and address of the driver at the time and on the occasion specified. what constitutes a fair trial cannot be the subject of a single unvarying rule but must depend on the circumstances of the particular case. v. and the use to which any material so obtained was put. In the light of the principles contained in its Jalloh judgment. in the Court's Jalloh judgment. cited above. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT applicants.B. the existence of any relevant safeguards in the procedure.000. on the contrary. to his conviction. Switzerland to encompass cases in which coercion to hand over incriminatory evidence was in issue (Jalloh. 54. more recently. the Court will focus on the nature and degree of compulsion used to obtain the evidence. or might have contributed. however. §§ 113-116). 55.16 O'HALLORAN AND FRANCIS v. were set out in the Notice of Intended Prosecution each applicant received. They were informed that. It does not. the Court observes that the Jalloh case was not treated as one falling within the “real” evidence exception in the Saunders judgment. the Court held that the case was to be treated as one of self-incrimination according to the broader meaning given to that term in the cases of Funke and J. The penalty for failure by the applicants to give information was a fine of up to GBP 1. The Court accepts that the factual circumstances of Jalloh were very different from the present case. or to attempt to obtain the evidence in the case of Mr Francis. The nature and degree of the compulsion used to obtain the evidence in the case of Mr O'Halloran. as registered keepers of their vehicles. that in all the cases to date in which “direct compulsion” was applied to require an actual or potential suspect to provide information which contributed. the Court has found a violation of the applicant's privilege against self-incrimination. This was confirmed in the specific context of the right to remain silent in the case of Heaney and McGuinness and. Even if a clear distinction could be drawn in every case between the use of compulsion to obtain incriminatory statements on the one hand and “real” evidence of an incriminatory nature on the other. While the right to a fair trial under Article 6 is an unqualified right. 56. follow that any direct compulsion will automatically result in a violation. and . It is nevertheless unpersuaded by the applicants' argument. The applicants maintained that the Jalloh case was distinguishable from the present in that it concerned not the obtaining by compulsion of incriminatory statements but rather the use of “real” evidence of the kind indicated in the Saunders judgment such as breath. in which the Court identified the factors to which it would have regard in determining whether the applicant's privilege against self- incrimination had been violated. blood and urine samples and thus was an exception to the general rule laid down in that judgment. They were each informed that failure to provide the information was a criminal offence under section 172 of the Road Traffic Act 1988. and in order to determine whether the essence of the applicants' right to remain silent and privilege against self-incrimination was infringed.
. as was the compulsion in other cases in which fines were threatened or imposed for failure to provide information. In the present case.. § 24). O'HALLORAN AND FRANCIS v. Section 172 (2)(a) applies only where the driver of the vehicle is alleged to have committed a relevant offence. This regime is imposed not because owning or driving cars is a privilege or indulgence granted by the State but because the possession and use of cars (like. Those who choose to keep and drive motor cars can be taken to have accepted certain responsibilities and obligations as part of the regulatory regime relating to motor vehicles. for example. in which applicants have been subjected to statutory powers requiring production of “papers and documents of any kind relating to operations of interest to [the] department” (Funke. that “All who own or drive motor cars know that by doing so they subject themselves to a regulatory regime. cited above. which imposes a specific duty on the registered keeper of a vehicle to give information about the driver of the vehicle in certain circumstances.. at a certain time .” (Weh judgment cited above. and authorises the police to require information only “as to the identity of the driver”. Stott (see paragraph 31 above).B v. 58. § 24). and in that of Shannon. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT 17 disqualification from driving or an endorsement of three penalty points on their driving licence. Switzerland. A further aspect of the compulsion applied in the present cases is the limited nature of the inquiry which the police were authorised to undertake. the compulsion was imposed in the context of section 172 of the Road Traffic Act.. these responsibilities include the obligation. to inform the authorities of the identity of the driver on that occasion. shotguns . which might be relevant for the assessment of taxes” (J. referred to above... The information is thus markedly more restricted than in previous cases. and in the legal framework of the United Kingdom. The Court found no violation of Article 6 in that case on the ground that no proceedings were pending or anticipated against him. the compulsion flowed from the fact. as Lord Bingham expressed it in the Privy Council in the case of Brown v. to “information as to who had driven a certain motor vehicle .. § 39). It noted that the requirement to state a simple fact – who had been the driver of the car – was . The information requested of the applicant in the case of Weh was limited. § 30).” (referred to above. or of “documents etc.. The Court accepts that the compulsion was of a direct nature. 57. information could be sought (with only a limited legal professional privilege restriction) on any matter which appeared to the investigator to relate to the investigation (see reference at § 23 of the Shannon judgment referred to above). In the case of Heaney and McGuinness the applicants were required to give a “full account of [their] movements and actions during any specified period . The Court notes that although both the compulsion and the underlying offences were “criminal” in nature.) are recognised to have the potential to cause grave injury”. as in the present case. in the event of suspected commission of road traffic offences.
including protection against the use of unreliable evidence and evidence obtained by oppression or other improper means (but not including a challenge to the admissibility of the statement under section 172).18 O'HALLORAN AND FRANCIS v. he attempted to challenge the admission of the statement under sections 76 and 78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. and there is no question of a conviction arising in the underlying proceedings in respect solely of the information obtained as a result of section 172(2)(a). and the defendant could give evidence and call witnesses if he wished. 60. The question of the use of the statements in criminal proceedings did not arise. section 172 does not sanction prolonged questioning about facts alleged to give rise to criminal offences. as his refusal to make a statement was not used as evidence: it constituted the offence itself (see Allen v.). §§ 53-54). 63. Again as noted in the case of Brown v. no offence is committed under section 172(2)(a) if the keeper of the vehicle shows that he did not know and could not with reasonable diligence have known who the driver of the vehicle was. and the risk of unreliable admissions is negligible. 62. Having regard to all the circumstances of the case. ECHR 2002-VIII). 59. 61. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT not in itself incriminating (ibid. the identity of the driver is only one element in the offence of speeding. . including the special nature of the regulatory regime at issue and the limited nature of the information sought by a notice under section 172 of the Road Traffic Act 1988. Mr O'Halloran's statement that he was the driver of his car was admissible as evidence of that fact by virtue of section 12(1) of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 (see paragraph 27 above). Accordingly. although the challenge was unsuccessful. Stott. As Mr Francis refused to make a statement. The Court in the case of Jalloh referred to the existence of relevant safeguards in the procedure. and the penalty for declining to answer is “moderate and non-custodial”. there has been no violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. and he was duly convicted of speeding. the Court considers that the essence of the applicants' right to remain silent and their privilege against self-incrimination has not been destroyed. At his trial. and indeed the underlying proceedings were never pursued. Further. As to the use to which the statements were put. it could not be used in the underlying proceedings. In cases where the coercive measures of section 172 of the 1988 Act are applied. the Court notes that by section 172(4). Stott (paragraph 31 above).. 76574/01. as Lord Bingham noted in Brown v. The offence is thus not one of strict liability. It remained for the prosecution to prove the offence beyond reasonable doubt in ordinary proceedings. the United Kingdom (dec. no.
Article 6 § 2 of the Convention 64. The Court finds that no separate issue arises to be considered under Article 6 § 2 of the Convention. 2. Holds by fifteen votes to two that there has been no violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. (b) Dissenting opinion of Mr Pavlovschi. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT 19 C. J. 65. The applicants referred to Article 6 § 2 of the Convention and the presumption of innocence in the course of their submissions. on 29 June 2007. O'HALLORAN AND FRANCIS v. Holds unanimously that no separate issue arises under Article 6 § 2 of the Convention. Strasbourg. (c) Dissenting opinion of Mr Myjer. Jean-Paul COSTA President Vincent BERGER Jurisconsult In accordance with Article 45 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 74 § 2 of the Rules of Court. FOR THESE REASONS. Done in English and in French. V.B.-P. and delivered at a public hearing in the Human Rights Building. but made no separate complaint in respect of the provision.C. the following separate opinions are annexed to this judgment: (a) Concurring opinion of Mr Borrego Borrego. . THE COURT 1.
20 O'HALLORAN AND FRANCIS v. I regret that I am unable to subscribe to the approach and reasoning adopted by the majority in this judgment. Where human rights are concerned. The “wider public” becomes in this instance the “even wider public”. the figure could now be in excess of 400 million. Consequently. a particular effort is called for where. with the result that all the issues concerned (terrorism. In my view. From that we can deduce that. in the present case. . as in the present case. the question of road traffic. I believe that the Court is on the wrong track in the present case. the issue is one which affects hundreds of millions of citizens. as far back as the French Revolution. is of very direct interest to. we cannot and must not forget that. This is made no less true by the fact that the circumstances of the Jalloh case are very different to those of the present case (paragraph 54) – something which. I do not share this view. while the Court should always endeavour to draft its judgments in a simple and clear manner in order to make them easier to understand. the route taken to arrive at the final result is. I believe. sacrosanct approach which views human rights as abstract rights which are set in stone. all of which are placed on the same footing. road traffic offences and so on) are mixed up together. In 2004 there were 216 million private motor vehicles in the European Union alone. To my mind. Humans are individuals but. they become human citizens. According to this school of thought. Eight cases are cited. moreover. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE BORREGO BORREGO (Translation) Although I too voted against finding a violation. as members of society. drug trafficking. the phrase used was “rights of man and the citizen”. It is true that the crucial component of a judgment is the operative provisions (the finding of a violation or no violation). every bit as important. human rights are not intended to enable the individual to live in society. a considerable number of European citizens. The present judgment sets out and explores in detail the Court's case-law concerning the right to remain silent and not to incriminate oneself. the path chosen by the Court in the present judgment follows the individualist. including road traffic offences. the Court attempts to justify its reasoning “[i]n the light of the principles contained in its Jalloh judgment” (paragraph 55). However. for all the member States of the Council of Europe. but to place society at the service of the individual. seems obvious to me – or by the fact that the examination of the Jalloh judgment (paragraph 55) is confined to just some of the principles set out therein. After an almost two-page-long citation from Jalloh. and has a very direct impact on.
. These regulations clearly entail certain responsibilities. the fruit of countless efforts and sacrifices. End of story. In order to preserve this extraordinary achievement. which form the subject of the applications we have examined today. according to that opinion. the deprivation of their liberty and failure to respect their private lives on the part of the authorities might not amount to a breach by the State of its positive obligations. It would have been sufficient to say. If indeed. The Court. in my opinion.”. However..... know that by doing so they subject themselves to a regulatory regime. and which might one day lead the Court to examine under Articles 5 and 8 of the Convention whether. citing the entire case-law on the right to remain silent and the privilege against self-incrimination and then applying the resulting principles in order to arrive at a conclusion which merely adds a further shade of nuance complicates matters for no good reason. I would point out that. that by owning and driving a motor car. we must ask: why spend twelve pages trying to explain what everyone already knows? Making simple things complicated is tantamount to choosing a path which is not only wrong but dangerous. O'HALLORAN AND FRANCIS v. “[a]ll .. a member of the Privy Council. in line with the approach adopted by the Privy Council (paragraph 31) and others. when individuals are stuck in a traffic jam. we must also. Human rights constitute a tremendous asset to modern society. accepts the wise reasoning of Lord Bingham. we must continue to combat acts of tyranny.. avoid playing with fire by placing on the same footing the duty to cooperate of car-owning citizens and the right not to incriminate oneself. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT 21 CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE BORREGO BORREGO This obvious fact would have been a good reason for making the judgment shorter and clearer.”. “[a]ll who own or drive motor cars know. the human citizen accepts the existence of the motor vehicle regulations and undertakes to comply with them in order to be able to live as a member of society. in paragraph 57. In the instant case.
In its judicial practice this Court has already had a chance to examine some aspects of the prohibition of compulsory self-incrimination and the presumption of innocence as they exist in different European states. and was fined for failure to supply the information. The applicants' cars were photographed by police speed cameras at a speed trap. Allow me here to repeat the words of Judge Walsh in his concurring opinion in the case of Saunders v. His attempts to have the evidence excluded were unsuccessful. whereupon the applicants received a notice of intended prosecution (NIP) which informed them that proceedings were to be instituted against them as actual or potential defendants in connection with a specified road traffic offence for which the police had technical and photographic evidence.. In my opinion there are some issues of crucial importance to understanding and correctly adjudicating the present case. The circumstances of the present case give us a further opportunity to examine these rather difficult questions. Under the threat of criminal prosecution. and was fined for speeding. or because they were convicted for refusing to give self-incriminating information. Mr O'Halloran informed the police that he had been the driver. The penalties for the substantive offence and for failure to supply the information are similar. Mr Francis. on being required to furnish the name and address of the driver of his car. In accordance with section 172 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 the applicants were asked in each case – as registered keepers of the vehicles in question. relying on his right to silence and the privilege against self-incrimination. Failure to comply with this statutory request constitutes a criminal offence. which had been photographed – who had been the driver of the car on the occasion in question. They allege a violation of Article 6 §§ 1 and 2. and also to express its vision on what is and is not acceptable in this field in a democratic society and in the circumstances of our daily lives.. and were convicted on the strength of that confession.22 O'HALLORAN AND FRANCIS v. it is about much more important issues such as the fundamental principles governing modern criminal procedure and the basic elements of the notion of a fair trial. The applicants claim that their right not to incriminate themselves was violated – either because they gave the information under threat of a fine. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE PAVLOVSCHI The case before us is both interesting from a legal point of view and important for the cause of human rights protection. the United Kingdom: “. This case is not just about police cameras and speed traps.it is important to bear in mind that this case does not concern only a rule of evidence but is concerned with the . refused to do so.
as a principle to be upheld in ordinary criminal trials also (see the concurring opinion of Judge Walsh in Saunders v. Likewise.. either retained or appointed. if not quite all. Anything you say can and will be used against you in a court of law.. this Miranda rule has become a fundamental legal provision enshrined in national legislation. first of all.lp. Opposition to the oath became so widespread that there gradually emerged the common-law doctrine whereby a man had a privilege to refuse to testify against himself. In so far as it relates to the issue at stake here. O'HALLORAN AND FRANCIS v. Now. By the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in England the oath ex officio was employed even by the Court of Star Chamber to detect those who dared to criticise the king.. the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent. knowingly and intelligently. .” 1 See Miranda v. You have the right to speak to an attorney.com/scripts/getcase.findlaw. not simply in respect of the special kind of procedure referred to above but. that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him..” The United States Supreme Court Opinion in the case of Miranda v. 436 (1966) http://caselaw. Arizona. Particular attention was paid to the development of this issue by common-law legal systems and. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT 23 DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE PAVLOVSCHI existence of the fundamental right against compulsory self- incrimination . if the individual is alone and indicates in any 1 manner that he does not wish to be interrogated. when ecclesiastical courts began to administer what was called the “oath ex officio” to suspected heretics.” Since that time. and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney. however. If you cannot afford a lawyer..”. delivered in 1966. the amendment reads as follows: “No person shall be .. compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. one will be provided for you at government expense. The emergence of the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination in English common law can be traced back to the thirteenth century. the police may not question him. The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights.. was a landmark ruling concerning confessions.pl/court=US&vol=384&invol=436. judgment of 17 December 1996. through evolution of the common law. provided the waiver is made voluntarily. by the authorities in the United States. and to have an attorney present during any questioning.S.Prior to any questioning. he indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking there can be no questioning. the United Kingdom. In the second part of the eighteenth century the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States was enacted. Arizona 384 U.. In that case the Supreme Court stated as follows: “. If.. I fully subscribe to these words. a typical Miranda warning goes as follows: “You have the right to remain silent. Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-VI). in the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions.
htm. . No statement obtained by threats or trickery can be used as evidence in court. and that if he does it can be used against him in court. unlawful influence. the answer so given shall not be used or admissible in evidence against him in any criminal trial or other criminal proceeding against him thereafter taking place. such as those of the present case. Article 31 of the Code provides that no person may compel any person to incriminate himself or to answer any question the answer to which may tend to incriminate him. other than a prosecution for perjury in the giving of that evidence or for the giving of contradictory evidence.org/mil/ucmj19970615. S..” (Canada Evidence Act.compelled to answer. In my opinion...and is . No person may interrogate. for instance.J. No statement obtained from any person in violation of this article. or unlawful inducement may be received in evidence against him in a trial by court-martial2. an accused or a person suspected of an offence without first informing him of the nature of the accusation and advising him that he does not have to make any statement regarding the offence of which he is accused or suspected and that any statement made by him may be used as evidence against him in a trial by court-martial. Before being questioned a person should be told the nature of the offence of which he is accused and that he has the right not to make any statement. However – and I would like to emphasise this fact – this evidence cannot be used for the purposes of prosecuting that defendant. Article 31 “Compulsory Self-Incrimination Prohibited” http://www. provides as follows: “Where with respect to any question a witness objects to answer on the grounds that his answer may tend to criminate him. (R.. C-5) In the case of R . Nowadays the prohibition of compulsory self-incrimination has become a generally recognised standard in the field of criminal procedure. the Supreme Court of Canada ruled as follows: 2 See Uniform Code of Military Justice. the majority has committed a fundamental mistake in accepting the Government's position that obtaining self-incriminating statements under the threat of criminal prosecution can be considered as a permissible method of prosecution in certain very specific circumstances. or request any statement from. Of course the majority is right in stating that the right to remain silent is not absolute. This is not only wrong. or through the use of coercion.v.).24 O'HALLORAN AND FRANCIS v. There are indeed some jurisdictions which allow self-incriminating evidence to be obtained from the accused under compulsion.constitution. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE PAVLOVSCHI The general understanding of this procedural rule is that nobody can be forced to answer questions or to give evidence that may help to prove his own guilt. but is also an extremely dangerous approach. In this respect the US Uniform Code of Military Justice is very illustrative. Canadian criminal procedure.
. not inquisitorial.ca/en/1995/1995rcs1- 451/1995rcs1-451.. Both the common law and the Charter draw a fundamental distinction between incriminating evidence and self-incriminating evidence: the former is evidence which tends to establish the accused's guilt.J. or to refuse to answer'. state and federal. The s.. which provides partial immunity against prosecution in relation to self-incriminating evidence submitted by an accused under compulsion. . where the Court spoke of the accused's 'free choice to admit. In other words the person must not have been compelled to incriminate himself.. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT 25 DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE PAVLOVSCHI “. .. The person claiming the exemption has the burden of satisfying the judge that in all the circumstances the prejudice to his interests overbears the necessity of obtaining the evidence. .'... or based upon his own communication. United States...lexum. while the latter is evidence which tends to establish the accused's guilt by his own admission..” In the US legal system the issue of obtaining confessions can be settled by means of a non-prosecution agreement. [I]n Bram v. In this case the US Supreme Court ruled as follows: “Brown v. in appropriate circumstances. . but not the former3.. the issue is controlled by that portion of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Hogan is of particular interest... to allow a suspect to call his wife until he confessed (..R. 451 http://scc. nor obtained by any direct or implied promises. under certain circumstances.. commanding that no person 'shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself' (. as far as the US legal system is concerned. We have held inadmissible even a confession secured by so mild a whip as the refusal.. and may not by coercion prove a charge against an accused out of his own mouth. Defining 'self-incrimination' over-inclusively as arising whenever the state obtains evidence which it could not have obtained 'but for' the individual's participation would take the notion of self-incrimination far beyond the communicative character that grounds it at common law.C. S (R. . In general. O'HALLORAN AND FRANCIS v. . are thus constitutionally compelled to establish guilt by evidence independently and freely secured. wherever a question arises whether a confession is incompetent because not voluntary. [it] must not be extracted by any sort of threats or violence. the Court held that '[i]n criminal trials. it is worth noting that the American judiciary treats the privilege against self-incrimination as a Constitutional principle. Since the Fourteenth Amendment 3 See: R v.. California...)  1 S.. The shift reflects recognition that the American system of criminal prosecution is accusatorial. and that the Fifth Amendment privilege is its essential mainstay. to deny. Governments.html. the constitutional inquiry is not whether the conduct of state officers in obtaining the confession was shocking..umontreal..) The marked shift to the federal standard in state cases began with Lisenba v.) Under this test. was the first case in which the Court held that the Due Process Clause prohibited the States from using the accused's coerced confessions against him. but whether the confession was 'free and voluntary: that is.. Mississippi . however slight. nor by the exertion of any improper influence. In this respect the case of Malloy v.The right of an accused not to be forced into assisting in his own prosecution is perhaps the most important principle in criminal law and the principles of fundamental justice require that courts retain the discretion to exempt witnesses from being compelled to testify.. 7 principle against self-incrimination that is fundamental to justice requires protection against the use of compelled evidence which tends to establish the accused's guilt on the basis of the latter grounds.. in the courts of the United States..
com/cgi- bin/getcase. § 45). no. ECHR 2000-XII. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE PAVLOVSCHI prohibits the States from inducing a person to confess through 'sympathy falsely aroused' . the United Kingdom. as held in Twining. and J. 31827/96. Reports 1997-VI. in the protection of the accused against improper compulsion by the authorities. § 40. The Fourteenth Amendment secures against state invasion the same privilege that the Fifth Amendment guarantees against federal infringement – the right of a person to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will. cited above. 2064. § 64. to compel him to answer questions that might incriminate him. France. Switzerland. and Heaney and McGuinness. § 46.S. judgment of 4 See Malloy v. Ireland. and to suffer no penalty. judgment of 20 October 1997. Hogan. § 69. 1 (1964) http://caselaw.pl?friend=nytimes&navby=case&court=us&vol=378&invol=1. In this sense the right in question is closely linked to the presumption of innocence contained in Article 6 § 2 of the Convention (see Saunders v. there are cases relating to the use of compulsion for the purpose of obtaining information which might incriminate the person concerned in pending or anticipated criminal proceedings against him. pp. the right to silence and the right not to incriminate oneself are generally recognised international standards which lie at the heart of the notion of a fair procedure under Article 6. § 40).. p. . the United Kingdom. or other like inducement far short of 'compulsion by torture'.. Their rationale lies. p.lp. thereby contributing to the avoidance of miscarriages of justice and to the fulfilment of the aims of Article 6 (see John Murray v. p. .26 O'HALLORAN AND FRANCIS v. Heaney and McGuinness v. 49. v. The right not to incriminate oneself is primarily concerned with respecting the will of an accused person to remain silent (see Saunders. for such 4 silence . France. 34720/97. ECHR 2001-III). judgment of 8 February 1996.. 378 U. inter alia.B. § 68. A recapitulation of the Court's case-law concerning this issue can be found in the Weh judgment. Reports 1996-VI. although not specifically mentioned in Article 6 of the Convention. 2173-74. in other words. no. it follows a fortiori that it also forbids the States to resort to imprisonment. judgment of 17 December 1996.findlaw. cited above. Serves v. First. Reports 1996-I.. in respect of an offence with which that person has been “charged” within the autonomous meaning of Article 6 § 1 (see Funke v. A perusal of the Court's case-law shows that there are two types of cases in which it has found violations of the right to silence and the privilege against self-incrimination.” Our Court has also contributed to development of the doctrine of the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. The right not to incriminate oneself in particular presupposes that the prosecution in a criminal case seek to prove their case against the accused without resort to evidence obtained through methods of coercion or oppression in defiance of the will of the accused. 2064. In that judgment the Court reiterates that. as here.
§ 47 with a reference to John Murray. For instance. 8 April 2004). in principle. O'HALLORAN AND FRANCIS v. in itself raised an issue under Article 6 § 1 (see Saunders. § 82-83. 52792/99. no. 28). §§ 66-71). cited above. the Court accepts that the right to silence and the right not to incriminate oneself are not absolute. the United Kingdom. Vasileva v. p. ECHR 2002-VIII). cited above.L. as to the obligation to reveal one's identity to the police in certain situations. 2000- IX). see also I. Series A no.J. no. §§ 55-59. 15. 22. § 47). and Others v. p. For the first time. cited above. the United Kingdom (dec.). 38544/97. Second. However. Indeed. ibid. it was not suggested in Saunders that the procedure whereby the applicant was requested to answer questions on his company and financial affairs. and J. the Court adopted what appears to be a wholly new approach to self-incrimination. it is also important to reiterate that Article 6 § 2 does not prohibit.B. and Others. 141. for instance. 49. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT 27 DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE PAVLOVSCHI 25 February 1993. cited above. (See Weh v. § 100).L. it also follows from the Court's case-law that the privilege against self-incrimination does not per se prohibit the use of compulsory powers to obtain information outside the context of criminal proceedings against the person concerned. cited above. § 44.J. p. judgment of 7 October 1988. 2064. 25 September 2003). no. the drawing of inferences from an accused's silence may be admissible (see Heaney and McGuinness. with a possible penalty of up to two years' imprisonment. (b) the . To this recapitulation some more rules could be added: In Jalloh. the use of presumptions in criminal law (see Salabiaku v.. obligations to inform the authorities are a common feature of the Contracting States' legal orders and may concern a wide range of issues (see for instance. Series A no. and I. Denmark. although a penalty was attached to a failure to comply and the applicant was actually fined for making a false declaration. The Court noted that there were no pending or anticipated criminal proceedings against the applicant and the fact that he may have lied in order to prevent the revenue authorities from uncovering conduct which might possibly lead to a prosecution did not suffice to bring the privilege against self-incrimination into play (see Allen v. p. Moreover. 76574/01. 256-A. Austria. no. there are cases concerning the use of incriminating information compulsorily obtained outside the context of criminal proceedings in a subsequent criminal prosecution (see Saunders. it considered the following factors: (a) the nature and degree of compulsion used to obtain the evidence. Heaney and McGuinness. § 67. § 34.. p. in a recent case the Court found that a requirement to make a declaration of assets to the tax authorities did not disclose any issue under Article 6 § 1. Given the close link between the right not to incriminate oneself and the presumption of innocence. Furthermore. hence. 29522/95. France.
Unfortunately. and (d) the use to which any material so obtained is put (see Jalloh v. 63207/00. no. from the most simple to the most complex. The public interest cannot be invoked to justify the use of answers compulsorily obtained in a non-judicial investigation to incriminate the accused during the trial proceedings (see Saunders. It was merely in his capacity as the registered car owner that he was required to give information. we can find some indications which might help us to establish such a definition.. because no attempt was made to determine the meaning of the word “incriminating” and how it differs from “self-incriminating”. and can be considered as subjecting the individuals concerned to a legal compulsion to give evidence against themselves. the Court stated as follows: “. It is of crucial importance to provide an answer to the question whether or not the information which the applicants were requested to submit to the investigating authorities was really “self-incriminating”.. § 74). Germany [GC]. cited above.. apply to criminal proceedings in respect of all types of criminal offences without distinction. the provisions of section 172 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 amount to a deviation from the principle of prohibition of “compulsory self-incrimination” and a breach of the right to silence. In comparable circumstances in Rieg v. Moreover. I cannot agree with the above statement. cited above.” (§ 54)..28 O'HALLORAN AND FRANCIS v. the applicants in this case were actually subjected to legal compulsion to give evidence which incriminated them. They were also used by counsel for the applicant's co-accused to cast doubt on the . §§ 117-121.. In Saunders.. the First Section stated as follows: “. The security and public order concerns relied on by the Government cannot justify a provision which extinguishes the very essence of the applicants' rights to silence and against self-incrimination guaranteed by Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (see Heaney and McGuiness. The general requirements of fairness contained in Article 6. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE PAVLOVSCHI weight of the public interest in the investigation and punishment of the offence at issue.there were clearly instances where the statements were used by the prosecution to incriminating effect in order to establish the applicant's knowledge of payments to persons involved in the share-support operation and to call into question his honesty . he was only required to state a simple fact – namely who had been the driver of his car – which is not in itself incriminating .). § 58).. (c) the existence of any relevant safeguards in the procedure. On the other hand. Nevertheless... our case-law does not provide us with a clear definition of this notion. Moreover. 54810/00. Austria (no. without answering this question it is not possible in abstracto to determine whether a statement is or is not incriminating. including the right not to incriminate oneself.. ECHR 2006-. 24 March 2005). In my view. Personally.
I would like to draw readers' attention to the fact that the punishment laid down by the United Kingdom legislation for failure to disclose information about a person alleged to have committed a criminal offence is equal to the punishment laid down for the criminal offence itself. Coming back to the applicants. As far as Mr O'Halloran is concerned. the evidence available to the Court supports the claim that the transcripts of the applicants answers. is incompatible with the Convention standards. was that offence committed by Mr O'Halloran? While the prosecuting authorities did have evidence concerning his speeding car and – accordingly – concerning an offence that had been committed. The Government failed to submit any other proof relating to the defendant apart from Mr O'Halloran's own statements. O'HALLORAN AND FRANCIS v. With reference to the “degree of compulsion”. It is perfectly obvious that for an individual to state that he was the driver of a car which was speeding illegally is tantamount to a confession that he was in breach of the speed regulations. In sum. were used in the course of the proceedings in a manner which sought to incriminate the applicant. compelling an accused to provide self-incriminating evidence contrary to his will under the threat of criminal prosecution amounts to a kind of compulsion which runs counter to the notion of a fair trial and. So. in the particular circumstances of this case. accordingly. from this authority we are entitled to draw the conclusion that evidence supplied by a defendant and used or intended to be used in order to establish his or her guilt in committing a criminal act can be considered as “self-incriminating”. I find this “degree of compulsion” disproportionately high. was a traffic offence committed and second. I would ask two questions: first. Accordingly. I agree with the applicants' argument that they were required to submit crucial information which would result in their conviction of the charges laid against them. the issue of Mr O'Halloran's role as defendant is not that simple. . It is also obvious that the prosecution did not have any other evidence against the applicant as a defendant and that without his confession there would have been no conviction. In my view. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT 29 DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE PAVLOVSCHI applicant's version of events (see paragraph 32 above). whether directly self-incriminating or not. It is clear from the judgment (see paragraph 57) that these statements were obtained by the prosecuting authority under compulsion of “a direct nature” – the threat of criminal punishment – and that it intended to and indeed did use them in order to prove the applicant's guilt.” (emphasis added). I feel it necessary to mention the following considerations. the applicants were compelled by the authorities of the respondent State to commit an act of “self-incrimination”.
. Unlike the first applicant. alternatively.” (see Heaney and McGuiness. § 58). Put more simply – he was punished for making use of his fundamental right not to incriminate himself. why not accept the same approach to areas of . the Court ruled that it must be determined whether the applicant had been subjected to compulsion to give evidence and whether the use made of the resulting testimony at his trial offended the basic principles of a fair procedure inherent in Article 6 § 1. In their view. Given that. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE PAVLOVSCHI In Saunders. was compatible with Article 6. In my view. deterrence depended on effective enforcement. there was no obvious generally effective alternative to the power contained in section 172. according to which “. Furthermore. including the basic principles of a fair trial. he was punished for his refusal to give self-incriminating evidence. the use made of this evidence did offend the principles of fundamental justice. it is very difficult for me to accept that the United Kingdom legislation permits deviation from the basic principles of a fair trial for minor offences which do not present any particularly serious threat to society. This runs counter to the above-mentioned case-law. cited above.. Where Mr Francis is concerned the situation is slightly different. in Jalloh. I consider that the overall approach should be similar to that taken with regard to the first applicant. there were very good reasons why the owner should be required to identify the driver: the punishment of driving offences was intended to deter drivers from dangerous conduct which caused risk to the public. As a result. Mr O'Halloran was subjected to compulsion to give evidence and yes.the security and public order concerns relied on by the Government cannot justify a provision which extinguishes the very essence of the applicants' rights to silence and against self-incrimination guaranteed by Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. if we accept policy reasons as a valid ground for violation of the prohibition of compulsory self-incrimination or the presumption of innocence for offences which present a minor danger. In the instant case. Yes. of which the right not to incriminate oneself is a constituent element. that the power under section 172 to obtain an answer to the question who was driving a car when a suspected motoring offence was committed and to use that answer as evidence in a prosecution or. inter alia. he chose to make use of his right not to incriminate himself and refused to provide information. this argument is clearly based on policy considerations. In seeking to explain the deviation from the general principles established by the Court in its previous case-law the Government argued..30 O'HALLORAN AND FRANCIS v. to prosecute a person who failed to provide information. my answer to both these questions is in the affirmative.. and without such a power it would be impossible to investigate and prosecute traffic offences effectively (see paragraph 38 of the judgment). Despite this difference. the Court expressly found that the requirements of fairness applied equally to all types of criminal proceedings.
banditry. given that so many people choose to breach it even under the threat of criminal prosecution. organised crime and other truly dangerous forms of criminal behaviour? If the public interest in catching minor offenders (persons committing speeding or parking offences) is so great as to justify limitations on the privilege against self-incrimination. if that is not possible owing to the huge number of offences committed by the population. if there are so many breaches of a prohibition. that such offences represent hundreds of thousands if not millions of cases. My understanding is the following. maybe the time has come to review speed limits and to set limits that would more correctly reflect peoples' needs. to decriminalise an act which is so widely committed that it can be considered as normal rather than exceptional. It means that the prohibition does not reflect a pressing social need. and that the State is unable to ensure that in each of this vast number of cases all the procedural guarantees have been complied with. Moreover. murder. And if this is the case. We cannot force people in the twenty-first century to ride bicycles or start jogging instead of enjoying the advantages which our civilisation brings. what would be the position when the issue concerned serious offences? Is the public interest in catching those who commit crimes which cost people's lives less great than in catching those who slightly exceed the speed limit? In my view it is illogical for persons who have committed minor offences to find themselves in a less favourable situation than those who have committed acts which are truly dangerous to society. Equally. In my opinion. there should be no “third way” in the field of criminal liability. In my view. I am very much afraid that if one begins seeking to justify departures from the basic principles of modern criminal procedure and the very essence of the notion of a fair trial for reasons of policy. In my view. and if the Court starts accepting such reasons. I understand the reasoning behind the departure from the basic principles of a fair trial in the case of speed violations: namely. but I do not accept it. the saying “the ends justify the means” is clearly not applicable to the present situation. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT 31 DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE PAVLOVSCHI legitimate public concern which might justify encroaching on the absolute nature of Article 6 rights: terrorism. it clearly means that something is wrong with the prohibition. the government is free to breach the fundamental rights of hundreds of thousands of its citizens in the field of speed regulations. I repeat: I understand this line of reasoning. O'HALLORAN AND FRANCIS v. . we will face a real threat to the European public order as protected by the Convention. I think that in such situations any Contracting State to the Convention has just two options – either to prosecute offenders in full compliance with the requirements of Article 6 or. it is difficult for me to accept the argument that hundreds of thousands of speeding motorists are wrong and only the government is right.
THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE PAVLOVSCHI The last thing I would like to mention is the following.. when one of their number faces criminal prosecution and trial. At the end of paragraph 57 the Court reaches the following conclusion: “. In my opinion. to inform the authorities of the identity of the driver on the occasion. . in the event of suspected commission of road traffic offences. and in the legal framework of the United Kingdom. motor car drivers are under an obligation to comply with the various traffic regulations. Of course...32 O'HALLORAN AND FRANCIS v. These are the reasons which prevent me from sharing the position taken by the majority in the present case. Those who choose to keep and drive motor cars can be taken to have accepted certain responsibilities and obligations as part of the regulatory regime relating to motor vehicles. However. regardless of how heavy a burden this entails.” (see paragraph 57). This is another argument with which I am unable to agree. it would run counter to the letter and the spirit of the Convention to allow member States to apply to a huge swathe of the population such a “blanket” statutory deprivation of their fundamental rights in the field of criminal law and criminal procedure. these responsibilities include the obligation. he or she must enjoy all the guarantees provided by Article 6.. and there should be no doubt about this.
the majority find no violation because this case is about “implied consent”. 5. I have chosen to write my own dissenting opinion. But I also agree with the applicants that the serious problem caused by the misuse of motor vehicles is not sufficient to justify a system of compulsion which extinguishes the essence of the rights under Article 6. for instance. the Netherlands (dec. O'HALLORAN AND FRANCIS v. Stott – accept that “[t]hose who choose to keep and drive motor cars can be taken to have accepted certain responsibilities and obligations as part of the regulatory regime relating to motor violations.). that deterrence depends on effective enforcement. The Government's argument that “the very fact that other legislative techniques could bring substantially about the same result indicates that questions of proportionality – rather than the absolute nature of the rights suggested by the applicants in cases of direct compulsion – were at issue” (paragraph 39) is unconvincing. And it is clear that this is the case in all Contracting States. these responsibilities include the obligation. for example. To put it plainly. Although this has not been expressly mentioned in the judgment. it saves me from indicating where I dissent from his dissent. then one should not choose a wrong way. 3. Besides. 2. The dissenting opinion of Judge Pavlovschi contains many elements to which I fully subscribe. Falk v. and that the authorities should have the power to investigate and prosecute traffic offences effectively. They have. I disagree with the opinion of the majority that there has been no violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. 4. and in the legal framework of the United Kingdom. Even so. no. a number of Contracting States have used various legislative techniques avoiding the pitfalls at issue in the present case. In paragraph 57 of the judgment the majority – having quoted and endorsed the views of Lord Bingham in the case of Brown v. Practice shows that in order to be able to investigate and prosecute traffic offences effectively without unduly limiting the rights of the defence. 66273/01. In my opinion the applicants were right in submitting that the United Kingdom has just chosen the wrong legal solution to deal with the problems caused by the misuse of motor vehicles. 19 October 2004). This enables me to elaborate on points which are not mentioned in the dissenting opinion of Judge Pavlovschi. chosen to draw adverse inferences from a failure to answer questions. however effective it may be. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT 33 DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE MYJER 1. or established a statutory but rebuttable presumption of fact that the registered owner of the motor vehicle was the driver in question (see. I take the Government's point that the definition in criminal law of driving offences is intended to deter dangerous conduct that may well cause serious harm and even injury to members of the public. if the desired result can be achieved by proceeding in a way that is both effective and right. in the event of .
judgment of 17 December 1996). paragraph 55.” I do not agree with that view. Our own case-law makes it very clear that some rights under Article 6 can indeed be waived. In quoting and endorsing the views of Lord Bingham. Since. which sets out the criteria on which the Court bases its examination “[i]n the light of the principles contained in its Jalloh judgment and in order to determine whether the essence of the applicant's right to remain silent and privilege against self-incrimination was infringed”. however. and the use to which any material so obtained was put). the majority rightly accepted that (the criminal limb of) Article 6 is applicable in the present case (which is consistent with the . 6. the present judgment might be considered as a legal continuum to that judgment. to use another phrase from the Court's case-law (Saunders v. I accept that. to inform the authorities of the identity of the driver on that occasion.34 O'HALLORAN AND FRANCIS v. But. But I sincerely doubt whether the majority accept the corollary which is unavoidable if the judgment in the present case is to be consistent with that case-law: under the British system. provided that this is done unambiguously and in an unequivocal manner. However. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE MYJER suspected commission of road traffic offences. Surprisingly. all those who own or drive cars are automatically presumed to have given up unambiguously and unequivocally the right to remain silent. makes no mention of the public interest criterion: it only mentions the other Jalloh criteria (the nature and degree of compulsion used to obtain the evidence. the majority in fact also seem to play the “public interest” card in the form of a rather tricky new criterion which was first stated in § 117 (but not in § 101) of the Jalloh judgment in order to determine whether the right not to incriminate oneself has been violated: “the weight of the public interest in the investigation and punishment of the offence at issue”. This is. in my opinion. It is clear that I do not agree with the majority in this respect. 7. and also that the failure to do so may in itself be an offence. a new criterion which is incompatible with the established case-law that the use of incriminating statements obtained from the accused under compulsion in such a way as to extinguish the very essence of the right to remain silent. today's judgment also shows what may happen if “the weight of the public interest” is allowed to play a role in deciding whether or not the right to remain silent should be upheld. moreover. cannot in principle be justified by reference to the public interest served. in paragraphs 35 and 36. Just to make this point clear: I accept that the driver of a car may be obliged to carry his driving licence with him and to surrender it to a police officer immediately when so requested. In the criminal context the use of the right to remain silent should not be an offence in itself. the existence of any relevant safeguards in the procedure. when it comes to the identity of the driver of a car. the United Kingdom. a driving licence has “an existence independent of the will” of the driver concerned. The licence may be read but the lips of the owner may remain sealed. having regard especially to this new Jalloh criterion.
where Section 172 of the Road Traffic Act provides that where the driver of a vehicle is alleged to be guilty of an offence. if one will. and the registered owner who fails to give such information is guilty of an offence. But my consent to such an approach would have had to be conditional on the provision of safeguards against abuse – and express. . 14 to the Convention (the new Article 35 § 2 (b) of the Convention) which. It is well known that the Court is faced with an enormous backlog. in my opinion. also have accepted that the right to remain silent ought to have been respected. not implied. the present judgment appears to anticipate for a particular category of cases. the registered owner of that vehicle (or any other person) must give information as to the identity of the driver. Series A no. which would mean reversing Öztürk and accepting that from now on the handling of traffic offences would no longer fall within the ambit of Article 6. This has prompted. 73) it should. 21 February 1984. the new admissibility criterion that is due to be introduced by Protocol No. Germany judgment. a de minimis non curat praetor rule for this “Treaty of Rome” was inevitable. That is not the case under the system in the United Kingdom. then I might have agreed with such an approach. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT 35 DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE MYJER reasoning in the Öztürk v. 8. among other things. If in fact the majority had decided unequivocally that. in order to be able to deal with the real core human rights issues. O'HALLORAN AND FRANCIS v. even when he himself was the driver.

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