Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/319/182/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 11:03:24+00:00

Document:
to restrain the enforcement of regulations or price orders under that Act, and withdraws that jurisdiction from every other court, state or federal. P. 319 U. S. 186.
2. The Constitution does not require Congress to confer equity jurisdiction on any particular inferior federal court. P. 319 U. S. 187.
3. Congress had power to restrict the equity jurisdiction to restrain enforcement of the Emergency Price Control Act, or of regulations under it, to the Emergency Court, and, upon review of its decisions, to this Court, and to require that a plaintiff seeking such equitable relief resort to the Emergency Court only after pursuing the prescribed administrative procedure. P. 319 U. S. 188.
4. The Emergency Price Control Act, § 204(d), in providing that "no court, Federal, State, or Territorial, shall have jurisdiction or power to . . . restrain, enjoin, or set aside . . . any provision of this Act," is not open to the objection that it withholds from all courts authority to pass upon the constitutionality of any provision of the Act or of any order or regulation under it. The Act itself, § 204, saves to the Emergency Court, and, upon review of its decisions, to this Court, authority to determine whether any regulation, order, or price schedule promulgated under it is "not in accordance with law," and this permits that the constitutional validity of the Act, and of orders and regulations under it, be so determined. P. 319 U. S. 188.
5. Assuming that review in the Emergency Court is inadequate to protect constitutional rights because § 204(c) prohibits all interlocutory relief by that court, the separability clause of § 303 would require that effect be given to the other provisions of § 204, including that which withholds from the district courts authority to enjoin enforcement of the Act. P. 319 U. S. 189.
Appeal from a decree of the District Court of three judges which dismissed for want of jurisdiction an appeal seeking an injunction against enforcement of price regulations prescribed under the Emergency Price Control Act.
The question for our decision is whether the jurisdiction of the district court below to enjoin the enforcement of price regulations prescribed by the Administrator under the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, 56 Stat. 23, was validly withdrawn by § 204(d) of the Act. Appellants brought this suit in the district court for the District of New Jersey for an injunction restraining appellee, the United States Attorney for that district, from the prosecution of pending and prospective criminal proceedings against appellants for violation of §§ 4(a) and 205(b) of the Act, and of Maximum Price Regulation No. 169. In view of the provisions of § 204(d) of the Act, the district court of three judges, 28 U.S.C. § 380a, dismissed the suit for want of jurisdiction to entertain it.
prices fixed by Regulation No. 169; that enforcement of the Regulation will preclude appellants' continuance in business as meat wholesalers; that the Act, as thus applied to appellants, is a denial of due process in violation of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution, and involves an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the Administrator; that appellee threatens to prosecute appellants for each sale of meat at a price greater than that fixed by the Regulation, and to subject them to the fine and imprisonment prescribed by §§ 4 and 205(b) of the Act for violations of the Act or of price regulations prescribed by the Administrator under the Act, and that such enforcement by repeated prosecutions of appellants will irreparably injure them in their business and property.
"the Administrator shall either grant or deny such protest in whole or in part, notice such protest for hearing, or provide an opportunity to present further evidence in connection therewith. In the event that the Administrator denies any such protest in whole or in part, he shall inform the protestant of the grounds upon which such decision is based, and of any economic data and other facts of which the Administrator has taken official notice."
his objections and praying that the regulation, order, or price schedule protested be enjoined or set aside in whole or in part."
"unless the complainant establishes to the satisfaction of the court that the regulation, order, or price schedule is not in accordance with law, or is arbitrary or capricious."
Under subsections (b) and (d), decisions of the Emergency Court may, by writ of certiorari, be brought for review to the Supreme Court, which is required to advance the cause on its docket and to expedite the disposition of it.
Although, by following the procedure prescribed by these provisions of the Act, appellants could have raised and obtained review of the questions presented by their bill of complaint, they did not protest the price regulation which they challenge, and they took no proceedings for review of it by the Emergency Court. Appellants are thus seeking the aid of the district court to restrain the enforcement of an administrative order without pursuing the administrative remedy provided by the statute (cf. Illinois Commerce Commission v. Thomson, 318 U. S. 675, 318 U. S. 686), and without recourse to the judicial review by the Emergency Court of Appeals and by this Court which the statute affords.
order, or price schedule, or to stay, restrain, enjoin, or set aside, in whole or in part, any provision of this Act authorizing the issuance of such regulations or orders, or making effective any such price schedule, or any provision of any such regulation, order, or price schedule, or to restrain or enjoin the enforcement of any such provision."
"of investing them with jurisdiction either limited, concurrent, or exclusive, and of withholding jurisdiction from them in the exact degrees and character which to Congress may seem proper for the public good."
Stevenson v. Fain, 195 U. S. 165, 195 U. S. 167; Kentucky v. Powers, 201 U. S. 1, 201 U. S. 24; Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U. S. 371, 308 U. S. 376. In the light of the explicit language of the Constitution and our decisions, it is plain that Congress has power to provide that the equity jurisdiction to restrain enforcement of the Act, or of regulations promulgated under it, be restricted to the Emergency Court, and, upon review of its decisions, to this Court. Nor can we doubt the authority of Congress to require that a plaintiff seeking such equitable relief resort to the Emergency Court only after pursuing the prescribed administrative procedure.
to this Court, authority to determine whether any regulation, order, or price schedule promulgated under the Act is "not in accordance with law, or is arbitrary or capricious." We think it plain that orders and regulations involving an unconstitutional application of the statute are "not in accordance with law" within the meaning of this clause, and that the constitutional validity of the Act, and of orders and regulations under it, may be determined upon the prescribed review in the Emergency Court.
Appellants also contend that the review in the Emergency Court is inadequate to protect their constitutional rights, and that § 204 is therefore unconstitutional, because § 204(c) prohibits all interlocutory relief by that court. We need not pass upon the constitutionality of this restriction. For, in any event, the separability clause of § 303 of the Act, would require us to give effect to the other provisions of § 204, including that withholding from the district courts authority to enjoin enforcement of the Act -- a provision which, as we have seen, is subject to no unconstitutional infirmity.
Since appellants seek only an injunction which the district court is without authority to give, their bill of complaint was rightly dismissed. We have no occasion to determine now whether, or to what extent, appellants may challenge the constitutionality of the Act or the Regulation in courts other than the Emergency Court, either by way of defense to a criminal prosecution or in a civil suit brought for some other purpose than to restrain enforcement of the Act or regulations issued under it.

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