Source: http://www.gerryarmstrong.org/50k/legal/related/4267.php
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 18:11:16+00:00

Document:
COURT OF APPEAL * SECOND DIST.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Raymond Cardenas, Judge. Affirmed. Rabinowitz, Boudin, Standard, Krinsky & Lieberman, Eric M. Lieberman, and William T. Drescher for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Lewis, D'Amato, Brisbois & Bisgaard, David B. Parker, Graham E. Berry, Jayesh Patel; Joseph A. Yanny, in pro per, for Defendants and Respondents.
Religious Technology Center, Church of Scientology International, and Church of Scientology of California (collectively, "Scientology") appeal from a judgment of dismissal which followed the granting without leave to amend of the motion of defendant Joseph Yanny  for judgment on the pleadings.
We find that the judgment was properly granted, and we shall therefore affirm it.
From approximately mid-1983 until the end of 1987, Yanny represented Scientology as its counsel in numerous legal matters. He was initially retained as Scientology's counsel by Vicki Aznaran, who was at the time President of the Religious Technology Center.
Shortly after Yanny ceased to represent Scientology, Aznaran and her husband, Richard Aznaran, a former chief of security for Scientology, told Yanny that Scientology had subjected them to extraordinary abuse and asked him to help them find an attorney who could represent them in a lawsuit against Scientology. The Aznarans stayed with Yanny at his home for about two weeks, and he referred them to various lawyers. On April 1, 1988, the Aznarans filed an action against Scientology in the United States Court for the Central District of California.
 Scientology's complaint named Yanny personally and also named Joseph H. Yanny, a Professional Law Corporation.
Superior Court ("Yanny I"), seeking an injunction and damages for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, tortious breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, constructive fraud, fraud, intentional interference with contract, civil conspiracy and conversion. Yanny cross-complained for unpaid legal fees.
 Scientology appealed that judgment. Its appeal was dismissed by this division on January 8, 1993 pursuant to rule 10, subdivision (c), Rules of Court, for failure to file the record on appeal within the time allowed.
for the Aznarans in that action. On July 18, it filed the present action in the superior court for damages for breach of fiduciary duty and a permanent injunction enjoining Yanny from "violating the fiduciary duties he owed to [Scientology] as a result of their former attorney-client relationship." In the superior court complaint, Scientology also sought damages and an injunction enjoining Yanny from violating duties owed to Scientology by representing one Gerald Armstrong, whom Scientology alleged Yanny was representing in matters adverse to Scientology. Scientology alleged that Yanny possessed confidential inforrnation which he obtained during his representation of Scientology and that he "traded on" that information in representing Scientology's adversaries, Armstrong and the Aznarans.
 A lawsuit between Armstrong and Scientology came before this court, and we filed an opinion in that case, Church of Scientology v. Armstrong (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 1060, on July 29, 1991, shortly after the filing of Scientology's complaint against Yanny. Yanny did not appear as Armstrong's counsel of record in that case, at least not on appeal. However, it appears he may have filed a brief as amicus curiae at some point in the proceedings.
that such [was] not, and [would] not at trial be, an issue in this case." Based upon this stipulation Yanny filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings.
The court granted the motion for judgment on the pleadings, concluding that Scientology could not maintain a cause of action for Yanny's alleged breach of fiduciary duties without pleading and proving an injury caused by such breach--without alleging, that is, an actual disclosure of Scientology's confidences to its adversaries. A subsequent motion for reconsideration of the court's ruling on the motion for judgment on the pleadings, or in the alternative, for leave to amend its complaint to allege actual disclosures of confidences, was denied on June 15, 1992. This timely appeal followed.
Scientology contends the trial court erred in: (1) holding it was not entitled to recover damages for Yanny's breach of fiduciary duty; (2) denying a permanent injunction against further breaches of such duty; (3) denying Scientology leave to amend its complaint.
2. Scientology Was Not Entitled To Recover Damages Against Yanny Without Pleading and Proving an Actual Disclosure of Confidences.
An attorney's breach of the ethical duties of good faith and fidelity, which are owed by an attorney to his or her client, amounts to legal malpractice and is actionable. (Lysic v. Walcom (1968) 258 Cal.App.2d 136, 149; Ivy v. Pacific Automobile Ins. Co. (1958) 156 Cal.App.2d 652, 663; see generally Developments in the Law: Conflicts of Interest in the Legal Profession (1981) 94 Harv.L. Rev. 1244, 1486-1496.) However, like any other action for damages, a claim for breach of an attorney's fiduciary duty has minimum pleading requirements, namely, duty, breach, causation and damages. The absence of any one of these elements defeats the cause of action.
In particular, for a former client to plead a cause of action against its former attorney for damages for breach of the attorney's duties of loyalty and confidentiality, the client not only must show the existence and breach of a fiduciary duty, but also must show injury proximately caused by such breach. (Pierce v. Lyman (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 1093, 1101; Stockton Theatres, Inc. v. Palermo (1953) 121 Cal.App.2d 616, 625-627.) Yanny contends, in effect, that Scientology fails to state a cause of action against Yanny, because the allegations of its complaint do not establish causation or injury. We agree.
 See also, e.g., In re Complex Asbestos Litigation (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 572, 587; Henrikson v. Great American Savings & Loan (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 109, 113-114; Truck Ins. Exchange v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1050, 1056; Rosenfeld Construction Co. v. Superior Court (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 566, 575; Western Continental Operating Co. v. Natural Gas Corp. (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 752, 758-759; River West, Inc. v. Nickel (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 1297, 1302-1303; Elliott v. McFarland Unified School District (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 562, 569, fn. 6; Grove v. Grove Valve & RegulatorCo. (1963) 213 Cal.App.2d 646, 652.
 Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6068, in relevant part, provides: "It is the duty of an attorney to do all of the following: . . . (¶) (e) To maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself or herself to preserve the secrets, of his or her client . . . ."
rule 5-101 which preceded rule 4-101. Rule 3-110, subd. (d), provides: "A member shall not accept employment adverse to a client or former client where, by reason of the representation of the client or former client, the member has obtained confidential information material to the employment except with the informed written consent of the client or former client."
attorney's former and current representation and does not allege or show that the attorney actually possessed, disclosed or used confidential information. Scientology cites no binding or persuasive authority for the proposition that damages are or should be recoverable under such circumstances, and we can imagine no reason in policy to allow such recovery.
We are unconvinced by Scientology's claim that damages must be presumed in cases of an attorney's breach of fiduciary duty, just as they are presumed in cases of defamation per se. It is provided by statute that damages may be presumed in cases of libel per se. (Civ. Code, §§ 45a, 46, 48a.) No statute, and as we have observed, no judicial authority, provides for presumed damages for an attorney's breach of confidence. In addition, damages are presumed in defamation cases only where it is established that the defendant did indeed publish a statement, and the statement was of a kind which, on its face, has a natural tendency to injure a person's reputation. (Civ. Code, §§ 45a, 46; Slaughter v. Friedman (1982) 32 Cal.3d 149, 153.) Scientology would have the law go farther in cases of an attorney's breach of confidence and presume not only damage from the disclosure or use of a former client's confidences, but also the disclosure or use itself.
mere technical violation of a right, and that nominal damages and punitive damages may be recovered where the damage is substantial, but the amount is not susceptible of precise proof. (Staples v. Hoefke (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 1397, 1406;Avina v. Spurlock (1972) 28 Cal.App.3d 1086,1088.) But this does not mean that even nominal damages can be recovered where the plaintiff does not plead and prove an actual, if "technical," violation of a right, as opposed to showing the mere existence of circumstances posing a threat, even a serious one, that a right will be violated.
recovery, and it must be pled and proven, or an action for damages simply does not lie. The trial court thus quite properly granted judgment on the pleadings as to Scientology's claims for damages.
3. Scientology Was Not Entitled to a Broad Injunction Affecting Yanny's Practice of Law in Other Courts.
injunction, the only means of enforcing it would be to bring a motion for contempt in any proceeding in which Yanny might be representing or assisting an adversary. Such a motion would raise the issue of whether Yanny was violating a duty to Scientology--precisely the issue which would be raised by an ordinary motion to disqualify Yanny, which could be brought without regard to the injunction.
Scientology denies a disqualification motion would be an effective remedy, and contends it has no effective remedy against threatened breaches by Yanny of his duties to it, because Yanny has acted in the past, and may act in the future, "behind the scenes" to give improper assistance to its adversaries, rather than appear in their behalf as attorney of record. Scientology argues that it is unclear whether a court would have jurisdiction to disqualify an attorney who does not make a formal appearance in an action and who denies any participation in it.
potential violation of the attorney's duties under generally applicable statutes and rules.
More fundamentally, the court below had no jurisdiction to grant the injunction Scientology sought. Scientology correctly argues that an attorney's former client can seek to disqualify the attorney from an improper successive representation in either of two ways: either (1) by a disqualification motion in the action in which the former attorney appears for the former's client's adversary (People ex rel. Deukmejian v. Brown, supra, 29 Cal.3d at p. 159; Big Bear Mun. Water Dist. v. Superior Court (1969) 269 Cal.App.2d 919, 927; Grove v. Grove Valve & Regulator Co., supra, 213 Cal.App.2d at p. 652); or (2) by a separate action to enjoin the adverse representation (Watchumna Water Co. v. Bailey (1932) 216 Cal. 564, 565, 574). However, even where a separate action for an injunction has successfully been brought, the injunction was directed only against the attorney's participation in specific lawsuits in courts whose proceedings are subject to the jurisdiction of the court issuing the injunction. (Ibid.) Scientology has cited no precedent for the kind of broad injunction which it seeks. Indeed, such authority as exists is squarely against the issuance of such an injunction.
any manner connected with a judicial proceeding before it, in every matter pertaining thereto." (Code Civ. Proc., § 128, subd. (a)(5); In re Complex Asbestos Litigation, supra, 232 Cal.App.3d at p. 600.) A superior court has no inherent or statutory power to control the conduct of persons in judicial proceedings pending or later to be brought before a different court, and indeed is not permitted to interfere with the process of another court of equal jurisdiction in a case properly before the latter. (Ibid.) This is a matter of fundamental comity between courts, which should not be set aside in what would amount to an ineffectual effort to enable Scientology, in one single proceeding, to prevent Yanny from ever using confidences he obtained while serving as its attorney to assist its adversaries in any proceeding at any time.
In sum, the injunction was both duplicative of existing remedies and beyond the court's jurisdiction. It was therefore properly denied.
4. The Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying Scientology The Opportunity to Amend Its Complaint.
to relief under any theory. (Concerned Citizens of Costa Mesa, Inc. v. 32nd Dist. Agricultural Assn. (1986) 42 Cal.3d 929, 936; Minsky v. City of Los Angeles (1974) 11 Cal.3d 113, 118.) However, under the specific circumstances of this case, Scientology could not possibly have amended its complaint to state a cause of action for damages for Yanny's alleged breach of duty, where Scientology had stipulated that it did not base any claim upon any alleged disclosure of confidences, and that the existence or nonexistence of any such disclosures would not be an issue in the case. In ruling on the motion for judgment on the pleadings, the court could take judicial notice of the stipulation. (Cantu v. Resolution Trust Corp. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 857, 877, and cases cited therein; Hughes v. Western MacArthur Co., supra, 192 Cal.App.3d at p. 955.) Nor could any possible amendment of the complaint have entitled Scientology to the broad injunction it sought, for such relief, as we have observed, was beyond the court's jurisdiction. Under these circumstances, the court did not abuse its discretion in entering judgment on the pleadings without leave to amend.
The judgment is affirmed. Costs on appeal are awarded to Yanny.

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