Source: http://www.bracheichler.com/?p=6455
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 00:41:27+00:00

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The recent Appellate Division decision, J.G. v. J.H., approved for publication this month, reaffirms the principles set forth by New Jersey Courts that a plenary hearing is necessary, if not required, when making determinations concerning parenting time, custody, and a child’s best interests, whether the parents, are married, divorced, or unmarried and custody is contested. The decision confirms that there can be no distinction regarding the parent’s marital status. It further affirms that consideration of the custody factors (N.J.S.A. 9:2-4(c)) is required, with the parties being afforded the right to have mediation, discovery, lay, and expert testimony and an evaluation of the child’s best interests. Courts may limit the scope of discovery but should not deny it outright without good cause. While the case does not provide anything entirely new, it does reaffirm the core principles in contested child custody matters that a fair plenary hearing must be undertaken with consideration of all the factors in N.J.S.A. 9:2-4 before a court may decide a parenting and custody arrangement that serves the child’s best interest. This applies to all family part dockets.
If you encounter matters concerning custody or parenting time, Brach Eichler’s team of family attorneys are highly skilled in the area of child custody matters, particularly high conflict cases, which includes representing clients from mediation through trial and appeal.
Once again, New Jersey provides a conflicting remedy for a child of divorce attending college compared to a child in an intact family. In an unpublished (non-precedential) decision, the Appellate Court affirmed a trial court order finding that a child was not bound by a property settlement agreement requiring her to apply for college loans. Carl J. Soranno, Esq. of the Family Law Department previously wrote on this issue for the New Jersey Law Journal in January of 2015. Unfortunately, it appears that the situation for divorced parents has only gotten worse.
The parents in M.F.W. v. G.O. were divorced in 2003. At the time their daughter was five years old. The parties entered into a property settlement agreement which required both parents to contribute toward college expenses. The Agreement also required their daughter to apply for all “loans, grants, aid, and scholarships available to her, the proceeds of which shall be first applied to college costs.” In 2016, the daughter was accepted at Georgetown University – a school with a first semester tuition of over $30,000. The parties then filed motions over the payment of the daughter’s education costs and child support (among other issues not addressed in this post).
On the issue of college costs, the trial court ruled that it was “unfair and unjust” to require the child to apply for and utilize “loans, grants, aid, and scholarships” before the parents would be required to contribute. The court also found a change in circumstances warranting a modification of the Agreement; i.e., both parents’ incomes and assets had increased since the divorce. Consequently, the court determined that the parties could afford to send their daughter to Georgetown University without requiring their daughter to apply for loans first. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision, which was reached without a plenary hearing. The Court wrote that “because it was the parents’ obligation to pay for college and they had the ability to do so” it was unfair for the daughter to obtain loans.
The M.F.W. v. G.O. decision is another blow to divorced parents. While intact families can make the decision about whether and how they want to contribute to their child’s college education, divorced parents are forced to abide by a judge’s determination on how to finance college. The parents in M.F.W. v. G.O. tried to make their own decision in their settlement agreement on how to pay for college, only to have the court reject their agreement in favor of the child. The provision included in the parties’ settlement agreement was standard and is included in many settlements. Although the parents’ income had increased (from approximately $130,000 per year combined to $300,000 per year combined), it will still be difficult to pay tuition of over $30,000 per semester with no financial contribution from the daughter. It is discouraging that parties could enter into these terms only to find out years later that they are unenforceable. In sum, divorced parents who litigate over college costs have little to no control over the outcome.
Although the bulk of the M.F.W. v. G.O. decision creates a legal headache for divorced parents and family law practitioners, the opinion did affirm the trial court’s decision not to hold a plenary hearing on the issue of college costs and child support. Most prior decisions on similar issues confirmed the need for a plenary hearing – and thus created a significant cost to any litigant seeking the relief. Nevertheless, the M.F.W. v. G.O. decision confirms the risk for parents litigating college costs. Although avoiding a plenary hearing can save money for a client, the risk over what the judge will order regarding college costs outweighs any benefit.
In a case of first impression, the Appellate Division has ruled that the Title 9 hearsay exceptions that are authorized for abuse and neglect investigations is not applicable to parental termination cases under Title 30 and that D.C.P.P. may not rely solely upon that uncorroborated hearsay from children to support a termination of parental rights. In the matter entitled Division of Child Protection and Permanency v. T.U.B. and J.E.C. (https://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/attorneys/assets/opinions/appellate/published/a2565-15.pdf), the Court ruled that Title 30 (which outlines process for termination of parental rights) does not allow the Court to rely uncorroborated hearsay statements from children when considering the termination of a parent’s rights. In the case, a man identified only as J.E.C. was living with his son, identified by the fictitious name of Calvin, with J.E.C.'s girlfriend, T.C., and her two minor female daughters, given the fictitious names of Jenny and Sandy. At one point, the girls alleged that they were raped by J.E.C., and the DCPP launched an investigation. Following a hearing, the trial court terminated J.E.C.'s parental rights after relying heavily on the girls' uncorroborated hearsay testimony (which is permitted under Title 9). In reversing, the Appellate Division ruled that the trial court committed reversible error by relying upon the Title 9 hearsay exception as the plain statutory language of Title 30 does not extend the exception to trials involving the termination of parental rights. The court held that such an expansion would violate a parent’s due process rights.
In a recent decision, Ricci v. Ricci, the Appellate Division addressed emancipation and parents’ obligation to pay college costs for a child who has left the parent’s home. This case is unique in that it involved divorced parents who agreed their daughter, Caitlyn, should be emancipated. Caitlyn disagreed and legally intervened, causing years of litigation which – according to the Appellate Division – has only just begun.
There was no dispute that Caitlyn had disciplinary problems which began in high school. These issues, which continued after Caitlyn graduated in 2012, caused significant family strife. In February 2013, at the age of nineteen (19), Caitlyn moved from her mother’s home to reside with her grandparents. Based on Caitlyn’s conduct and what the Ricci parents perceived to be an obvious desire to be independent of their control, Caitlyn’s parents agreed it was no longer necessary or appropriate to continue supporting their daughter financially. The parents signed a Consent Order emancipating Caitlyn and stopping child support.
Legal action followed, and Caitlyn asked the Court to vacate the Consent Order and require her parents to provide financial support for college. The parents objected, but two Orders were subsequently entered against them “un-emancipating” Caitlyn and requiring them to contribute towards her college tuition. The Ricci parents appealed.
The Appellate Division’s decision outlined the law governing emancipation and college contribution in New Jersey, and found that neither issue was properly considered. The Court first advised there should have been an examination of the events triggering Caitlyn’s departure from her mother’s home in 2013 and her subsequent emancipation. Following existing law, the Court advised: when determining if a child should be emancipated, judges must focus on whether that child has moved beyond the influence of his or her parents and obtained total independence from them.
Second, the Court could not uphold the conclusion that Caitlyn had been un-emancipated, since the trial court did not make the required findings or hold a plenary hearing (essentially a shortened trial) on the issue. Because there was no requisite finding of un-emancipation, the Order requiring the Riccis to pay for Caitlyn’s college expenses was also improper and had to be vacated. In remanding the matter back to the trial court for a hearing, the Court underscored that the threshold question of emancipation is fact-sensitive and must precede any consideration of a parent’s obligation to contribute towards the cost of college. In other words, Caitlyn will first have to prove she was un-emancipated before the trial court can conduct an analysis about whether her parents should be required to contribute towards her college expenses.
The Appellate Division got it right in the Ricci case; i.e., the Court identified a series of procedural mistakes and ultimately remanded the case to the trial court for the proper proceedings. That’s because under New Jersey law, any time there is a significant factual dispute between the parties (which almost always occurs in Family Court matters), a plenary hearing is required. But there is some truth to the legal maxim “justice delayed is justice denied”, and plenary hearings often take months or even years to complete. Therein lies the issue. By affording the Riccis their “day in court”, the Appellate Division effectively ensured this litigation won’t be ending soon. Practically speaking, the Riccis could be sharing the cost of Caitlyn’s wedding before they resolve college costs.
Despite its holding, the Appellate Division acknowledged the trial court judges in this case made the best equitable decisions based on what was before them. They did so without requiring a plenary hearing – recognizing the limited resources of the parties and the court. This type of “swift justice” is something practitioners demand on a regular basis. However, judges will often avoid this because it’s technically contrary to applicable law and leaves most litigants feeling unsatisfied. The bottom line: litigation in Family Court is often a “no-win” for both parents and children. Although easier said than done, a family feud is best resolved without involving the courts and it’s worth exploring mediation or other forms of dispute resolution.
In the published decision of A.M.C. v. P.B., the New Jersey Appellate Division reviewed and reversed a trial court’s denial of a final restraining order (FRO) under the New Jersey Prevention of Domestic Violence Act. In so doing, the Court reviewed the seminal case Silver v. Silver which required the victim to establish (1) a qualifying relationship with the abuser; (2) that the abuser committed one or more of the predicate acts of domestic violence identified in the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act; and (3) there is a need for the protection of an FRO going forward. In the recent decision, the Appellate Division reviewed the step three. In the A.M.C. v. P.B. trial, the trial court determined that the victim satisfied the requirements of (1) and (2), but failed to meet (3). Consequently, the trial court determined that a final restraining order was not necessary to protect the victim from future acts of domestic violence. On appeal, the Appellate Division reviewed and reversed this finding.
In rejecting the trial court’s finding, the court opined that the trial court misapplied (3) to the case and improperly created mitigation factors (length of relationship and lack of children) that were not contained within the New Jersey Prevention of Domestic Violence Act to find against the issuance of a FRO. Consequently, the Appellate Division exercised original jurisdiction and issued a FRO. This case stands for the general proposition that when there exists a physical assault on a victim, the general presumption weighs in favor of the issuance of a FRO. From a practitioner’s standpoint, this case represents a tool for victims of domestic violence to guarantee that they receive the strongest civil protection available under the New Jersey Prevention of Domestic Violence Act.
A recent Chancery Division case upheld New Jersey’s new palimony statute as constitutional. The fact that the court upheld the palimony law as constitutional was not surprising, but it did confirm the shift away from the prior case of Devaney v. L’Esperance which held cohabitation was not necessary for a palimony claim and reinforced the requirement that palimony agreements be in writing. The case also criticized the Plaintiff for her frivolous claims and may serve as support for awarding sanctions in future cases where a plaintiff attempts to utilize creative arguments to circumvent the palimony statute.
The Plaintiff in the Chancery Division case of Lee v. Kim brought a suit against her ex-boyfriend and the Attorney General of New Jersey alleging a palimony claim and that the new palimony statute violated her rights to equal protection, privacy, and due process under the Constitution. Ms. Lee filed her suit after the conclusion of a two year relationship with Dr. Kim. Since the parties began dating after the enactment of the palimony statute, Ms. Lee’s claim for palimony was subject to the requirements of the statute; that the agreement be in writing and that the parties to the agreement be represented by counsel. However, Ms. Lee and Dr. Kim never entered into a written agreement. Therefore, Ms. Lee’s complaint for palimony was based solely on alleged oral promises made by Dr. Kim. The court denied each of Ms. Lee’s constitutional arguments and ultimately dismissed her complaint with prejudice.
The Lee v. Kim decision reflects the trend in family courts to limit protracted litigation and make valuable court time available for other cases. Today, with the shortage of judges in many of the family courts, access to a judge to determine issues such as palimony is limited. The court in the Lee matter dismissed Ms. Lee’s case on the papers without oral argument. The decision also sharply criticized Ms. Lee for wasting time and money with her frivolous palimony litigation. Many judges are reluctant to critique a lawyer’s creative litigation decision, so the opinion in Lee makes clear that courts are unwilling to indulge cases such as this and stands as a warning to other plaintiffs and attorneys.
On May 4, 2016, in the unpublished decision of Strunck v. Figueroa, the Appellate Division reaffirmed longstanding jurisdictional jurisprudence involving bankruptcy and divorce. In the case, the parties divorced in August 2011. As part of the divorce, the Plaintiff was awarded the sum of $23,369 to be transferred from Defendant’s Fidelity account by way of Qualified Domestic Relations Order. The divorce decree further directed that the Plaintiff be responsible for the preparation and cost of the QDRO.
However, prior to the amount being transferred, the Defendant withdrew all funds from the Fidelity and filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. In the bankruptcy petition, the Defendant listed the Plaintiff’s $23,369 claim as being incurred on August 2011 alleging that the amount was an obligation arising out of a matrimonial judgment and not a domestic support obligation.
Plaintiff received notice of the bankruptcy petition and the inclusion of the $23,369 as an unsecured claim in that petition. The Plaintiff chose not to file an adversary proceeding to challenge the dischargeability of the claim. As no objection was reached by the bankruptcy court, the Defendant was granted a discharge of the claim and all other debts.
Thereafter, the Plaintiff elected to pursue an alternative course to recover the $23,369. More than a year after the discharge, the Plaintiff filed a complaint against the Defendant in the Superior Court alleging conversion of the asset. He contended that the Defendant falsely stated in a bankruptcy petition that she was not holding the property of another and sought to enforce litigants rights based upon the divorce decree.
On appeal, the Appellate Division held that Plaintiff’s decision to not file an adversary proceeding in the bankruptcy matter resulted in the Plaintiff being estopped from later seeking to collect discharged claim. Effectively, the Court noted that the Plaintiff failed to protect his rights by not participating in the bankruptcy proceeding, including but not limited to appealing the discharge of the debt. The decision, while unpublished, should reinforce practitioners close scrutiny of bankruptcy proceedings in a post divorce judgment world. The warning from the courts of New Jersey is that when such a proceeding is filed, a client should avail themselves of appropriate bankruptcy counsel and appear in the bankruptcy matter if there is any dispute as to the listing of a any obligation that arises out of a divorce judgment.

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