Source: https://betterchancery.com/2018/01/
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 22:48:13+00:00

Document:
Many custody agreements provide for one party to have “primary physical custody.” Many judgments incorporate similar language. You will find the term sprinkled throughout appellate decisions.
The fact is, though, there is no such thing as primary custody.
I posted about the misuse of the term, and how it can hurt your client, in an early post ‘way back in 2010.
¶7. Richard and Tracey have shared joint legal and physical custody of Logan since the original divorce decree. Joint physical custody does not require equal time with each parent, but it does require that the parents have “significant periods of physical custody . . . to assure a child of frequent and continuing contact with both parents.” Miss. Code Ann. § 93-5-24(5)(c) (Rev. 2013).
¶8. Tracey contends that the chancellor erred when he modified the schedule within the custody agreement. At trial and on appeal, both parties have incorrectly stated that Tracey has primary physical custody of Logan and that Richard has visitation. The original custody agreement, the 2013 modified custody agreement, and the appealed 2016 modified custody agreement all state that Tracey and Richard are both custodial parents – an important distinction for Richard. Neither party is categorized as having “primary physical custody,” nor is either party awarded visitation. Further our supreme court has emphasized that the term “primary physical custody” is not specified in section 93-5-24 and “cannot act to transform such express ‘joint physical custody’ into de facto sole physical custody with liberal visitation.” Porter v. Porter, 23 So. 3d 438, 446-47 (¶22) (Miss. 2009).
In other words, if you create a joint legal custody agreement, the court will enforce it as such. Even if Tracey had been expressly designated as the one with “primary custody,” Porter holds that the term does nothing to change the effect of joint physical custody. I suggest that the best practice is to banish the term from your documents.
If you are going to do any wrongful death practice at all, you must familiarize yourself with the MSSC’s decision in the seminal case of Long v. McKinney, 897 So.2d 160 (Miss. 2004), reh den. April 7, 2005.
The decision clarifies many important concepts involved in wrongful death claims, including priority of jurisdiction, the distinction between heirs and wrongful death beneficiaries, allocation of attorneys fees, costs and expenses, representation, conflicts of interest, and control of litigation.
What is important in this case to the chancery practitioner, however, is Justice Dickinson’s exposition on the role of chancery court.
Fn 13. The misunderstanding can be partly attributed to the Uniform Chancery Court Rules, which address petitions for authority to compromise, and petitions for allowance of attorney fees, in wrongful death suits. U.C.C.R. 6.10, 6.12. These rules apply only to wrongful death suits which require chancery jurisdiction. See discussion infra.
¶60. In the event the litigants wish to pursue a claim on behalf of the estate of the deceased, [Fn 14] such estate must, of course, be opened and administered through the chancery court. As is true in all estates administered through the chancery court, chancery approval is required for the appointment of the personal representative of the estate, whether executor, executrix, administrator or administratrix.
Fn 14. We recognize that, because of the limited recovery available to the estate in many cases, litigants may choose, with advice of counsel, to proceed without including a claim on behalf of the personal representative or the estate. As discussed infra, such decision should be made only after full disclosure to all who might benefit from the estate.
¶61. There is no general requirement under law that the personal representative obtain chancery approval to pursue the claims of the estate in the litigation. Nor is there a general requirement that counsel representing the personal representative and the estate in the litigation obtain prior chancery approval of such representation or the agreement for compensation of counsel. However, obtaining such prior approval is a widely accepted and wise practice.[Fn15] Such prior approval will, in most instances, avoid difficulty when the chancellor is approached for an order approving the accountings and the final distribution of estate proceeds, where such payments include compensation to counsel.
Fn 15. This is especially true where counsel representing the estate in the wrongful death litigation has not agreed, and does not intend, to represent the estate generally.
Determination of wrongful death beneficiaries.
Fn 16. Recognizing that the lack of a specific procedural framework for determining wrongful death beneficiaries is a handicap for practitioners, this Court – in its continuing review of procedural rules – will address this need.
One of the biggest sources of confusion, in my experience, is the disconnect between the status of persons as heirs and as wrongful death beneficiaries. The categories overlap, but they are not the same. A person may be a wrongful death beneficiary, and yet not be an heir. You need to read and stidy the statutes to learn the difference and to be able to identify all of the individuals who must be included. Merely filing an action to determine and discover unknown heirs at law will not identify all the wrongful death beneficiaries.
From a chancellor’s perspective, I think the most important aspect of all is that of the minor’s settlement. You can make any agreement in circuit court about how to settle the wrongful death action, but you can not tie the hands of the chancellor as to whether the settlement is reasonable or adequate for the child(ren), or as the amount of fees to which it is subject, or to its amount.
R11(b) provides sanctions for non-compliance.
So how do the following comport with R11?
Attorney prepares and files an affidavit of diligent inquiry stating that the affiant is the sole heir of the decedent. The attorney is relying solely on the word of the affiant-client. Turns out that the affiant has two sisters in another state.
Attorney files an affidavit on behalf of the client taking the client’s word that she looked everywhere for her daughter to take custody of her child, and the daughter is not to be found in Mississippi. A simple Facebook search would have located the daughter in Gulfport.
Attorney files a verified application for injunction swearing that efforts have been made to give notice, but that notice should not be required. On inquiry by the judge it is disclosed that counsel has been in discussions about the matter with an attorney representing the opposing party, and that attorney’s office is directly across the street from the courthouse.
Attorney signs off on a divorce complaint alleging HCIT and adultery knowing from interviews with the client that there is not enough evidence to support either ground.
If good faith and professional responsibility are the fundamental considerations behind R11, then I think it requires more than taking your client’s word for it and filing pleadings that prove to be wrong. Notice that I said wrong, and not fraudulent. But that’s a thin line.
Chancery courts are frequently called upon to limit a parent’s visitation with a child, usually because that parent has had limited contact with the child up to that point. Aside from the fact that the proposed solution only seems to add to the distance between parent and child, what does Mississippi law require in such a situation?
¶25. Here … there is no indication that standard visitation would be detrimental to the child. … The chancellor awarded Michael overnight visitation and further awarded standard summer- and holiday-visitation privileges. While the chancellor did not place the same restrictions at issue in Fields, he did in fact restrict Michael’s visitation, as Michael’s weekend visitations did not include Friday.
¶26. “Except in unusual circumstances, a noncustodial parent is entitled to unrestricted standard or liberal visitation.” Deborah H. Bell, Bell on Mississippi Family Law § 5.08 (1st ed. 2005) (citing Cox v. Moulds, 490 So. 2d 866, 870 (Miss. 1986)). Standard visitation includes “two weekends a month until Sunday afternoon and at least five weeks of summer visitation[,] plus some holiday visitation.” Id. (citing Messer v. Messer, 850 So. 2d 161, 167 (¶22) (Miss. Ct. App. 2003); [Fields v.] Fields, 830 So. 2d at 1269 (¶12); Chalk v. Lentz, 744 So. 2d 789, 792 (¶9) (Miss. Ct. App. 1999)). “Awarding less is an abuse of discretion unless there is concrete proof of actual harm to a child.” Id. “Appropriate visitation restrictions often relate to abusive behavior, drug or alcohol abuse, or mental illness.” Id. at § 5.08.
¶27. Here, there is no evidence of actual harm to E.M.S., nor is there evidence of abusive behavior, drug or alcohol abuse, or mental illness by Michael. Instead, the chancellor found Michael’s lack of bonding with E.M.S. as the reason to restrict Michael’s visitation. However, such restriction seems counterproductive. Indeed, it is unclear how limiting visitation between Michael and E.M.S. would strengthen the parent-child bond. Moreover, the record shows that at the time of the amended judgment, Michael had been “bonding” with E.M.S. for at least four hours per week for almost one year.
¶28. “Our courts have adopted a policy of maintaining relationships between parents and their children even though the parent may be non-custodial.” Fields, 830 So. 2d at 1267 (¶6). The best interests of the minor child should be the paramount consideration . . . while respecting the rights of the noncustodial parent and the objective of creating an environment conducive to developing as close and loving a relationship as possible between parent and child. Bell on Mississippi Family Law at § 5.07 (quoting Chalk, 744 So. 2d at 792 (¶9)).
¶29. “[A]bsent evidence that the child [would be] harmed by standard visitation, the chancellor may not impose limitations on the visitation privileges of the non[-]custodial parent.” Fields, 830 So. 2d at 1268 (¶8). Here, as in Fields, there is no evidence to support the chancellor’s restrictions on Michael’s visitation with E.M.S. See id. at 1269 (¶12). Moreover, there is no evidence that E.M.S. would be harmed by standard visitation. Accordingly, we find the chancellor abused his discretion in restricting Michael’s visitation, and reverse and remand with instructions to award Michael standard visitation with E.M.S., to include Fridays.
If you’re looking to limit visitation, you’ve got to have evidence that amounts to concrete proof of harm to the child. That will often relate to abusive behavior, drug or alcohol abuse, or mental illness. It’s not enough to suggest that the child will suffer.
Also, if it is necessary to build a relationship, I suggest you ask the court to graduate the visitation schedule over a reasonable period, building toward full, standard visitation. If you will notice above, at ¶27, the court noted that Michael had gone through just that sort of familiarization period. In your case, give some thought to what would be reasonable and offer a proposed visitation schedule in writing through your client’s testimony. Your client should be prepared to testify in defense of the proposal, and why it is the way it is. In making a decision, the judge will decide how reasonably to graduate it, and the length of time required, which will depend on the facts of the case, but you should not expect it to be a lengthy, drawn-out process.
Judge Greenlee, joined by Irving and Carlton, wrote a spirited dissent arguing that the chancellor did not abuse his discretion and that the COA should not substitute its judgment for that of the chancellor.
Some time in November of last year, I began to notice vehicles parked outside the courthouse, their engines idling. People apparently were leaving their car engines running while they ran into the courthouse to conduct some brief (I suppose) business. I would say on average I observed this phenomenon once a day up to Christmas.
It would have been more or less understandable if the perpetrators were suffering through some of our more recent sub-zero weather, but before Christmas the weather was mostly balmy.
No person driving or in charge of a motor vehicle shall permit it to stand unattended without first stopping the engine, locking the ignition and removing the key, and, when standing upon any perceptible grade, without effectively setting the brake thereon and turning the front wheels to the curb or side of the highway.
MCA 63-3-201 makes failure to comply with the above a misdemeanor.
The illegality of unattended idling vehicles came to my attention recently when I read of Mississippians in Jackson and Biloxi being ticketed for the offense. One of those cases was on private property.
Now, I am not privy to the legislature’s thinking when it decided to adopt this measure, but I am willing to bet that environmental concerns were somewhere near the bottom of the top-ten reasons behind it. Most likely it was the product of the liability insurance lobby trying to address res ipsa loquitur and per-se-negligence liability insurance implications. The law is in the chapter on “Rules of the Road” — not the private driveway, and refers to the “curb” and “side of the highway,” connoting public ways. So I doubt that the lawmakers intended to make criminals of private citizens warming up their cars in their own garages on a frosty December morn.
If the goal of the law is to criminalize silly, even stupid behavior, then I think that it has zeroed in on a worthy target. Leaving your car idling while you run into Winn-Dixie to pick up a few things, or into City Hall to pay your water bill, or into the courthouse to buy your tag, just strikes me as a self-indulgent, unnecessary exercise (I do, however, plead guilty to leaving my truck running in 22° cold while I picked up my dry cleaning on the frigid morning that I wrote this).
The folly of leaving your car running idle was brought home to me back in the 1990’s when the Mayor of Meridian emerged from a downtown restaurant after lunch and discovered a city police patrol car idling in a parking space in front of the establishment, with the keys in the ignition. The Mayor hopped behind the wheel and drove the car three blocks to the police station, where he parked and locked the car, pocketing the keys. When the officer returned to where he had parked his vehicle and discovered it missing, he radioed in that it had been stolen, and an APB was issued. A frantic search ensued, and in an hour or so the misplaced car was found right in front of the police station. Somehow the keys were located in the Mayor’s office, and in order to recover his wayward key ring the sheepish officer had to submit to the Mayor’s tongue-lashing. Considering the scope of unpleasantries that could have occurred if some malefactor had gotten hold of his car rather than the Mayor, the officer was lucky to get off so lightly.
That incident highlights something we all have observed: law enforcement officers often leave their official vehicles running while they step away to tend to other business. I suppose it’s a time-saving measure in the event of an emergency. Other first responders do, too, even with their private vehicles, although that can get carried to extremes. As I finished fueling my truck one day, an SUV pulled up to the pump behind me, and out jumped a young woman in EMT gear. An EMT tag adorned the front of the vehicle. She kept her engine running as she began pumping. I was happy to exit the scene as promptly as I could before everything went up in a Hollywoodesque blaze of glory.
But don’t blame the perpetrators. We are governed by the Law of Unattended Consequences.
First, the testator must request them to attest the will [Green v. Pearson, 145 Miss. 23, 110 So. 862, 864 (1927)]; second, they must see the testator sign the will [Matter of Jefferson’s Will, 349 So.3d 1032, 1036 (Miss. 1977)]; third, they must know that the document is the testator’s last will and testament [Estate of Griffith v. Griffith, 20 So.2d 1190, 1194 (Miss. 2010)]; and finally, they must satisfy themselves that the testator is of sound and disposing mind and capable of making a will [Matter of Jefferson’s Will, Id.]. Estate of Holmes, 103 So.3d 1150 at ¶ 10 (Miss. 2012).
I blogged about the concept here.
As the attorney, you have a duty above that of the witnesses to ensure that your client, the testator, is competent to make decisions that result in a valid will.
Can you tell me the purpose of today’s meeting?
What have you decided to do regarding your Will?
Can you tell me what a Will is?
Do you know or can you approximate the extent of your estate?
Who in your family may survive you?
Can you tell me in your own words what you would like to happen to your estate after you die?
Do you believe that a Will is necessary? What do you believe would happen if you do not have a Will?
Can you tell me how your Will may affect your family?
How well does this Will represent your wishes?
How did you reach your decisions when you thought about your Will?
What was important to you in reaching your decision?
What are the advantages and disadvantages of your decision?
Were there other possibilities that you considered but decided against? What were your reasons? What makes Person A a better choice as your heir than Person B?
As the population ages, lawyers will increasingly need to detect intact versus impaired decision-making capacities. Lawyers can directly screen for decisional capacity … . In so doing, they rely on more than simple impressions of their clients, or on family members’ subjective, at times conflicted, views. Clients can mask their deficits and family members can misjudge the severity of those deficits, or be motivated by self-interest. Primary care physicians are often asked to determine competency, but they may not be trained to assess cognition, and their opinions may lack validity. This explains why physician competency evaluations often disagree. Unless a client’s decision-making capacities are specifically assessed, the presence or absence of those capacities cannot be presumed.
If you will conduct this inquiry in the presence of the subscribing witnesses, you can ensure that they can competently testify later if necessary about the testator’s testamentary capacity.
I suggest you make this template a form that you keep with the client’s file, including a dated note that it was discussed with the client, and including any observations. Also have the subscribing witnesses sign it. That could prove to be an invaluable aid in the event of a will contest.
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