Source: https://thelegaltaxi.com/Home/SRM_Civil_AdministrativeSample
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 13:48:24+00:00

Document:
RE: Writ on administrative agency's quasi legislative action formulating a regulation.
Writ on administrative agency's quasi legislative action formulating a regulation.
Generally, when taking a writ under the standard California Statute of civil procedure CCP 1085 (not an administrative writ) petitioner is limited to the "Administrative Record".
Administrative Record is defined in the Government Code sections 11347.3 et seq. There are some exceptions where extra record materials have been submitted and approved by California appellate courts. I am familiar with the California cases Western States Petroleum Association, Stauffer Chemical Company, Outfitter Properties LLC, and California Oak Foundation -- are there cases from other states or federal cases that I could use as persuasive authority?
See above. There are some documents from the administrative agency s official web site that I want to include in addition to the administrative record they have produced. Also, I now know there were emails which were not produced and there might be other electronically stored information which was not produced.
Whether court can take notice of extra- records with administrative records under a non administrative writ.
California Statute of Civil Procedure, California Government Code and Case Law.
1.	You want to supplement the administrative record on appeal with two items of information: excerpts from the agency’s website and (potentially) e-mails within the agency that may pertain to its decision-making process.
2.	As you perceived on the Western States case, the courts disfavor expanding the record at this stage, although they do not close the door completely supplementing the record in very limited circumstances.
3.	Following the Western States case (and citing it), San Joaquin County Local Agency Formation Commission v. Superior Court, 162 Cal. App. 4th 159, 167 (Cal. App. 3d Dist. 2008) comes to an essentially identical conclusion based upon Western States and the relevant statutes.
4.	In addition to searching further in California, we searched other state jurisdictions and federal cases. We found none that we believe provide any definitive arguments in your favor, although we do include reference to what we reviewed so that you can check our efforts and determine if you have a precedent (favorable or not) that we may not have appreciated.
Following are the statutes and cases that we have reviewed (including those that you identified). We have included portions at some length for your consideration, and we’ve left in highlighting or added italics that we hope might prove useful to you.
(a) A writ of mandate may be issued by any court to any inferior tribunal, corporation, board, or person, to compel the performance of an act which the law specially enjoins, as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or to compel the admission of a party to the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which the party is entitled, and from which the party is unlawfully precluded by that inferior tribunal, corporation, board, or person.
(b) The appellate division of the superior court may grant a writ of mandate directed to the superior court in a limited civil case or in a misdemeanor or infraction case. Where the appellate division grants a writ of mandate directed to the superior court, the superior court is an inferior tribunal for purposes of this chapter.
(a)	Every agency shall maintain a file of each rulemaking that shall be deemed to be the record for that rulemaking proceeding. Commencing no later than the date that the notice of the proposed action is published in the California Regulatory Notice Register, and during all subsequent periods of time that the file is in the agency s possession, the agency shall make the file available to the public for inspection and copying during regular business hours.
(3) The determination, together with the supporting data required by paragraph (5) of subdivision (a) of Section 11346.5.
(4) The determination, together with the supporting data required by paragraph (8) of subdivision (a) of Section 11346.5.
(5) The estimate, together with the supporting data and calculations, required by paragraph (6) of subdivision (a) of Section 11346.5.
(6) All data and other factual information, any studies or reports, and written comments submitted to the agency in connection with the adoption, amendment, or repeal of the regulation.
(7) All data and other factual information, technical, theoretical, and empirical studies or reports, if any, on which the agency is relying in the adoption, amendment, or repeal of a regulation, including any economic impact assessment or standardized regulatory impact analysis as required by Section 11346.3.
(11) Any other information, statement, report, or data that the agency is required by law to consider or prepare in connection with the adoption, amendment, or repeal of a regulation.
The District does not address the issue of privilege; instead, it argues SJLAFCO s writ petition is premature. The District argues that because the discovery order requires disclosure of only unprivileged information, an actual dispute may never arise. The District contends SJLAFCO has not shown an abuse of discretion in the discovery order. We disagree.
A trial court discovery order is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. (Cadiz Land Co. v. Rail Cycle, supra, 83 Cal.App.4th at p. 117.)“The scope of discretion always resides in the particular law being applied, i.e., in the ‘legal principles governing the subject of [the] action … .’ Action that transgresses the confines of the applicable principles of law is outside the scope of discretion and we call such action an ‘abuse’ of discretion. [Citation.]”(City of Sacramento v. Drew (1989) 207 Cal. App. 3d 1287, 1297 [255 Cal. Rptr. 704].) Here the discovery order transgresses the confines of Western States, supra, 9 Cal.4th 559; it permits discovery of matters that are not admissible in a challenge to a quasi-legislative decision.
Further, the discovery order violates the deliberative process privilege. The District contends the information sought here is distinguishable from that in City of Fairfield v. Superior Court, supra, 14 Cal.3d 768. There the disappointed applicant sought discovery of the evidence examined and relied upon by the commission and its reasoning process in rejecting the application. (Id. at p. 773.) The same is sought here. The District seeks what information SJLAFCO had when it made the decision and what information was necessary to change the minds of the commissioners.
The discovery order requires the deponents to provide information that is not admissible under Western States, supra, 9 Cal.4th 559, because it is extra-record evidence and is privileged because it goes to the decision making process of the commissioners. Permitting such discovery was an abuse of discretion.
In assessing the validity of a quasi-legislative regulation in an action for mandamus under Code of Civil Procedure section 1085, “[o]ur inquiry necessarily is confined to the question whether the classification is “arbitrary, capricious, or [without] reasonable or rational basis.”[Citations.]’”(Yamaha, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 11.) Furthermore, “[u]nless otherwise provided by law, ‘the petitioner always bears the burden of proof in a mandate proceeding brought under Code of Civil Procedure section 1085.’ (California Correctional Peace Officers Assn. v. State Personnel Bd. (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1133, 1154 [43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 693, 899 P.2d 79].) Thus, it is petitioner s burden to establish that [the agency s] decision was arbitrary, capricious, entirely lacking in evidentiary support, unlawful, or procedurally unfair.” (Khan v. Los Angeles City Employees Retirement System (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 98, 106 [113 Cal. Rptr. 3d 417].)When inquiring into whether a regulation is arbitrary, capricious, or lacking in evidentiary support, the “ ‘ “ ‘ “court must ensure that an agency has adequately considered all relevant factors, and has demonstrated a rational connection between those factors, the choice made, and the purposes of the enabling statute.” [Citation.]’ ” ’ ” ( Golden Drugs Co., Inc. v. Maxwell-Jolly (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 1455, 1466 [102 Cal. Rptr. 3d 446] (Golden Drugs).) Because we address the validity of the amendments as adopted in 2002, we consider only the administrative record before the agency at that time.
Review under administrative mandamus (§ 21168) and review under traditional mandamus (§ 21168.5) share many of the same characteristics. There is no practical difference between the standards of review applied under traditional or administrative mandamus. ( Gentry v. City of Murrieta (1995) 36 Cal. App. 4th 1359, 1375 [43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 170] (Gentry).) The [*1390] remedies available remain the same. ( Woods v. Superior Court (1981) 28 Cal. 3d 668, 673-674 [170 Cal. Rptr. 484, 620 P.2d 1032].) The critical distinction for our purposes is the record available for review. When an agency s quasi-judicial determination is reviewed by administrative mandamus, judicial review is generally limited to the evidence in the record of the agency proceedings. (See § 21168; Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5, subd. (c).) By recent Supreme Court authority which worked a substantial change in the law, when an agency s quasi-legislative decision is reviewed by traditional mandamus, judicial review is also ordinarily limited to the administrative record.(Western States, supra, 9 Cal. 4th at p. 576.) However, if the action challenges a ministerial or informal administrative action and the facts are in dispute, extra-record evidence may be necessary for adequate review "because there is often little or no administrative record in such cases."
While Friends attempt to distinguish Western States on numerous grounds, it cannot escape the broad reasoning the Supreme Court used to support its decision. In restricting review of a quasi-legislative decision to the administrative record, the court s overriding concern was that the consideration of extra-record evidence would empower the court to engage in independent fact finding rather than engaging in a review of the agency s discretionary decision. Differences aside, there can be no doubt that Western States substantially weakens Friends position in support of the consideration of extra-record evidence in this case.
An exception for the admission of evidence "that could not be produced at the administrative level in the exercise of reasonable diligence . . . ." (Western States, supra, 9 Cal. 4th at p. 578.) Citing Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5, subdivision (e), the court stated, "Extra-record evidence is admissible in administrative mandamus proceedings under such circumstances ( Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5, subd. (e)) and we see no reason to apply a different rule in traditional mandamus proceedings."(Western States, supra, at p. 578.)But the court further ruled that this exception could not be extended to expert testimony and reports prepared after the agency decision, under the premise that, not having existed then, they could not have been discovered with reasonable diligence. Such a range of admissibility, the court explained, "would seriously undermine the finality of quasi-legislative administrative decisions": a dissatisfied party could produce the report of "an expert who is likewise dissatisfied," obtain a judicial remand, and thereafter repeat the same process.
Evidence outside the administrative record generally is inadmissible to show that the agency has not proceeded in the manner required by law.( Western States Petroleum Assn. v. Superior Court (1995) 9 Cal. 4th 559, 565, 574-576 [38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 139, 888 P.2d 1268].) However, extra-record evidence is admissible if the proponent shows that the evidence existed before the agency made its decision, but that it was impossible in the exercise of reasonable diligence to present it to the agency before the decision was made. ( Id., at p. 578.) Also, arguably, extra-record evidence may be admissible to show "agency misconduct." ( Id., at pp. 575-576, fn. 5.) Thus, if a project opponent argues that the agency failed to proceed in the manner required by law because the EIR failed to disclose information that is not in the administrative record, it must first overcome the general rule that such information is inadmissible by showing that one of these exceptions applies.
However, taking judicial notice of other materials is not obligatory. The standard rule in administrative cases requires the reviewing court to confine its inquiry to the administrative record unless there is a reason given to justify the expansion of the record. See Animal Defense Council v. Hodel, 840 F.2d 1432, 1436 (9th Cir. 1988). The Ninth Circuit has laid out an array of reasons for which the record might be expanded. First, the district court may expand the record "when necessary to explain the agency s action" by obtaining "from the agency, either through affidavits or testimony, such additional explanation of the reasons for the agency decision as may prove necessary." Id. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Second, where "the agency has relied on documents or materials not included in the record," the district court may look beyond the administrative record. Id. Third, "discovery may be permitted if supplementation of the record is necessary to explain technical terms or complex subject matter involved in the agency action." Id.
Plaintiff asks the court to "take judicial notice of this publicly available" congressional staff report. Pl. s Mot. for J. at 6 n.2 (citing Global Computer Enters., Inc. v. United States, 88 Fed. Cl. 52, 70 (2009)). While the congressional staff report may qualify for judicial notice, pursuant to Rule 201 of the FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE, this does not exempt plaintiff from having to meet the independent requirements for supplementation of the administrative record in a bid protest. In Global Computer Enterprises, the court took judicial notice of certain publicly available, extra-record materials, which were proffered by the plaintiff, only after concluding that "the agency-produced administrative record d[id] not permit meaningful judicial review," 88 Fed. Cl. at 62, and that supplementation was warranted, id. at 63.
This holding suggests that if you can argue that the record is somehow incomplete, then you stand a much better chance of successfully arguing for admissibility of the website information under the provision of judicial notice.
Your policy arguments under the case law strike us as well made; however, the strong language in the Western States and San Joaquin will likely negate those policy arguments.
You could ask the reviewing court to take judicial notice of the website information, and if refused, attempt an offer of proof (assuming the court allows you some type of hearing of record).
As to the requested EIS data, you can’t make an offer of proof without the evidence in hand, so you might want to suggest an in-camera review by the court pursuant to production of the data. This at least gets this court and any reviewing court to look at the information, even if it doesn’t make it into the record.
Finally, if all of the above fails, you can reference the website information via a brief to the court on the substantive issues. Reference to a public source such as this should prove objectionable, and even if the State objects, what have you lost? The court will have to read it to rule upon it. Again, it gets the information to the court, albeit through the back door.

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