Source: https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/12/20/government-person-nyipla-scotus-depends/id=104408/
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 22:52:25+00:00

Document:
On Monday, December 17, 2018, the New York Intellectual Property Association (“NYIPLA”) filed an amicus brief in support of neither party in Return Mail, Inc. v. United States Postal Service, No. 17-1594 (U.S.).
In the proceedings below, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“PTAB”) issued a final written decision in a Covered Business Method patent review (“CBM”) proceeding instituted based on a petition by the U.S. Postal Service (“USPS”), invalidating certain claims of a patent owned (and asserted in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims) by Return Mail, Inc. USPS is a “government entity” as recognized in United States Postal Serv. v. Flamingo Indus. (USA) Ltd., 540 U.S. 736, 748 (2004). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“Federal Circuit”) affirmed the PTAB’s holding that USPS has standing to file a petition to institute a CBM proceeding.
The U.S. Supreme Court granted Return Mail’s petition for a writ of certiorari on the question of whether the government is a “person” who may petition to institute review proceedings under the AIA.
While the NYIPLA took no position as to the ultimate merits of Petitioner Return Mail’s underlying position, i.e., whether the government is a “person” who may petition to institute a CBM proceeding under AIA § 18(a)(1)(B), the NYIPLA argued that it strongly believes that the Court should carefully consider the potential implications of interpreting “person” in Title 35 of the U.S. Code (“Patent Act”) and the AIA as including or excluding the government generally, and then issue only a narrow holding on the scope of “person” under AIA § 18(a)(1)(B) and, if at all, under 35 U.S.C. §§ 311(a) and 321(a).
In its brief, the NYIPLA argued that while the general rule is that “person” should be interpreted to exclude a sovereign, that rule is flexible and must be adjusted to the circumstances of the particular statute. United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600, 604-05 (1941). In the context of the Patent Act, the use of the term “person” is inconsistent and, consequently, the term must be defined in the context of the particular section in which it is used. Reliance upon the general definitions is inappropriate in light of how the definition of “person,” vis-a-vis governmental entities, functions within the context of the Patent Act.
The NYIPLA also urged that, despite the broad wording of the question presented, the holding in this case be expressly limited to construing “person” for purposes of CBM proceedings under Section 18 of the AIA, leaving the question for IPRs and PGRs open for decision on another day in a factually more appropriate vehicle.
In its brief, the NYIPLA also pointed out that prior to Congress’ enactment of the AIA, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office’s practice, as reflected in the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure, was that “persons” who could request ex parteand inter partesreexaminations included governmental entities. The legislative context relating to creation of post-issuance patent review proceedings and the PTO’s longstanding interpretation of “person” to include the governmental entities for purposes of ex parteandinter partesreexaminations together support the interpretation that the government is a “person” who may petition to institute IPR and PGR proceedings under the Patent Act. However, the context of CBM proceedings is not the same and may lead to a different conclusion.
Although the NYIPLA took no position on the merits of this dispute, it urged the Court to construe the meaning of “person” in the AIA based on the context of each specific provision in which it is used, and consonant with the noted internal inconsistency within the Patent Act, and to avoid any broad pronouncement on the meaning of “person” as generally used in the Patent Act, or otherwise.
The followings are excerpts on the internal inconsistency of the use of “person” throughout the Patent Act taken from the amicus brief.
A review of the use of the term “person” throughout Title 35 of the U.S. Code and the AIA reflects the inescapable conclusion that “person” cannot have a global definition in the Patent Act, but must be tied to the specific language of the relevant provision of the Patent Act. Thus, this Section analyzes the various instances in which the term “person” is used in the Patent Act to demonstrate that there is no single consistent use that will reflect whether a government entity like the USPS should be considered a “person” for purpose of 35 U.S.C. § 311(a), 35 U.S.C. § 321(a) and AIA § 18(a)(1)(B).
Some provisions of the Patent Act would not makeany sense if they are construed as requiring “person” to include a governmental entity.
The Director shall be a person who has a professional background and experience in patent or trademark law.
The administrative patent judges shall be persons of competent legal knowledge and scientific ability who are appointed by the Secretary, in consultation with the Director.
Of course, a “person” or “persons” in both of these sections could include an individual in a government office acting in an official capacity.
When an invention is made by two or more persons jointly, they shall apply for patent jointly and each make the required oath [that specifies the individuals who conceive and reduce to practice the invention], except as otherwise provided in this title.
Whenever through error a person is named in an application for patent as the inventor, or through an error an inventor is not named in an application, the Director may permit the application to be amended accordingly, under such terms as he prescribes.
Whenever through error a person is named in an issued patent as the inventor, or through error an inventor is not named in an issued patent, the Director may, on application of all the parties and assignees, with proof of the facts and such other requirements as may be imposed, issue a certificate correcting such error.
In this context, a “person” seems to be the individual that conceived the invention, and not an entity (such as the applicant or assignee). Of course, since Federal agencies may apply for patents on inventions made by individuals working for the agency, such “persons” could include a person in a government office.
35 U.S.C. § 201(c). Thus, in this context, a “person” seems to be an individual, and not an entity (e.g., small business firm, or nonprofit organization). Hence, here, “person” also is distinct from, and does not appear to include, a government entity.
Nothing in this chapter shall be deemed to convey to any person immunity from civil or criminal liability, or to create any defenses to actions, under any antitrust law.
35 U.S.C. § 211. This section suggests that “person” would not need to include government entities, since such entities would not need immunity from civil or criminal liability. However, “person” could include an individual working for the government, who may need such immunity.
Thus, in each of these instances, “person” is used in the Patent Act in a manner that would be inconsistent with defining it to include a government entity but could in at least some instances include an individual employed by the government, acting in his or her official capacity.
Other provisions of the Patent Act would lead to bizarre results if “person” were universally construed to exclude government entities.
(b)(2)(C) A disclosure shall not be prior art to a claimed invention under subsection (a)(2) if . . . the subject matter disclosed and the claimed invention, not later than the effective filing date of the claimed invention, were owned by the same person or subject to an obligation of assignment to the same person.
35 U.S.C. §§ 102(a) and 102(b)(2)(C).
If the scope of “person” in Section 102 excludes government entities, that means either such government entities are not entitled to patents under Section 102(a), which is inconsistent with 35 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1), or the government’s patents are not invalid under the conditions of Section 102(a). Further, under such a construction, government patents would not be entitled to the exclusion set forth in Section 102(b)(2)(C). Neither of these interpretations can be correct.
An application for patent for an invention filed in this country by any person who has, or whose legal representatives or assigns have, previously regularly filed an application for a patent for the same invention in a foreign country which affords similar privileges in the case of applications filed in the United States or to citizens of the United States, or in a WTO member country, shall have the same effect as the same application would have if filed in this country on the date on which the application for patent for the same invention was first filed in such foreign country, if the application in this country is filed within 12 months from the earliest date on which such foreign application was filed.
If the scope of “person” excludes the government, the governmental entities do not need foreign filing license to file applications abroad.
In addition to 35 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) authorizing Federal agencies to apply for patents, 37 C.F.R. § 1.46 makes clear that “person” includes assignees, which would include government entities.
A reissued patent shall not abridge or affect the right of any person or that person’s successors in business who, prior to the grant of a reissue, made, purchased, offered to sell, or used within the United States, or imported into the United States, anything patented by the reissued patent, to continue the use of, to offer to sell, or to sell to others to be used, offered for sale, or sold, the specific thing so made, purchased, offered for sale, used, or imported unless the making, using, offering for sale, or selling of such thing infringes a valid claim of the reissued patent which was in the original patent.
Any proposed amended or new claim determined to be patentable and incorporated into a patent following an inter partes review under this chapter shall have the same effect as that specified in section 252 for reissued patents on the right of any person who made, purchased, or used within the United States, or imported into the United States, anything patented by such proposed amended or new claim, or who made substantial preparation therefor, before the issuance of a certificate under subsection (b).
35 U.S.C. § 318(c); see also 35 U.S.C. § 328(c).
35 U.S.C. § 301 (2012 ed.).
Any person at any time may file a request for reexamination by the Office of any claim of a patent on the basis of any prior art cited under the provisions of section 301.
35 U.S.C. § 302. Such a position would be inconsistent with current PTO practice as set forth in MPEP § 2203 (citing prior art) and MPEP § 2212 (ex parte reexamination) and contrary to the historical practice as discussed in Section III infra.
Any State, any instrumentality of a State, and any officer or employee of a State or instrumentality of a State, acting in his official capacity, shall not be immune, under the eleventh amendment of the Constitution of the United States or under any other doctrine of sovereign immunity, from suit in Federal court by any person, including any governmental or nongovernmental entity, for infringement of a patent under section 271, or for any other violation under this title.
In view of the foregoing, it is clear that in some provisions of the Patent Act, the term “person” necessarily should be interpreted to include the government (e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 296(a), expressly including government in the definition of “person”), while in other provisions the term “person” should be interpreted to exclude the government (see, e.g., 35 U.S.C. §§ 3(a) and 6(a), which clearly exclude the governmental entities like the USPS, but would include individuals in the government’s employ).
Accordingly, reliance on universal definitions from the Dictionary Act, 1 U.S.C. §§ 1 and 8, governing the U.S. Code in general, and likewise on other general definitions of “persons” from relevant case law (e.g., Cooper), may well cause inadvertent problems with respect to the Patent Act. Rather, as set forth below, the answer to the question posed by this case should depend on the legislative context relating to creation of various post-issuance patent challenge proceedings and the PTO’s longstanding interpretation of “person” to include the governmental entities for purposes of ex parte and inter partes reexaminations. Cf. Cooper, 312 U.S. at 604-05 (“[T]here is no hard and fast rule of exclusion. The purpose, the subject matter, the context, the legislative history, and the executive interpretation of the statute are aids to construction which may indicate an intent, by the use of the term, to bring state or nation within the scope of the law.”).
 Cf.35 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) (“Each Federal agency is authorized to . . . apply for, obtain, and maintain patents or other forms of protection in the United States and in foreign countries on inventions in which the Federal Government owns a right, title, or interest . . . .”).
 See37 C.F.R. § 1.46(a) (“A person to whom the inventor has assigned or is under an obligation to assign the invention may make an application for patent.”).
 SeeMPEP § 2203 (9thed. Rev. 08.2017, Jan. 2018) (“35 U.S.C. 301 states that ‘Any person at any time may cite to the Office. . . . ‘ ‘Any person’ may bea corporate or governmental entityas well as an individual.”); MPEP § 2212 (9thed. Rev. 08.2017, Jan. 2018) (“35 U.S.C. 302 and 37 CFR 1.510(a) both indicate that ‘any person’ may file a request for reexamination of a patent. Accordingly, there are no persons who are excluded from being able to seek reexamination. Corporations and/or governmental entities are included within the scope of the term ‘any person’.”).
The “102 person” argument used here does not properly portray the context of how that section is to be read.
The reading of the section is geared to the original inventor — an item exemplified in the Stanford v. Roche case — and to which, the AIA was very clear that it was NOT changing.
The better contextual understanding for those section then is to read person as real person and that privies of that real person (which may well include juristic persons including a Soveriegn. This type of reading does not constrain and better distinguishes the question to the Court.

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