Source: https://www.kwvisalaw.com/the-long-road-to-us-citizenship/
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 00:57:00+00:00

Document:
Naturalization is at the heart of what it means to be an American. It is the brass ring of immigration, the process of intentionally becoming a citizen of one’s adopted country. Citizenship confers the right to vote, the right to work for the federal government and its contractors, and safety from deportation in an age of heightened enforcement. We are a nation of immigrants, so every immigrant’s dream of becoming a United States citizen is the dream of our own ancestors, distant or recent -with exception for, and apologies to, the Native American First Peoples. The process of naturalization has grown more complex and costly in recent years, the application form itself has mushroomed from 10 to 21 pages, and completing the form and preparing for interview can be difficult to navigate, despite what may seem at first like simple requirements.
Certificate(s) of Disposition along with the N-400 application – all originals should be saved for the interview. Where an applicant seeks special accommodations or exemption from certain N-400 requirements due to a medical disability, a Form N-648 signed by a physician and copies of any supporting documents affirming the medical disability should be submitted with the N-400 application. In order for a medical waiver to be approved, the Form N-648 must include a diagnostic code from the current Diagnostic & Statistical Manual, and a statement by the physician explaining how the applicant’s medical condition renders them incapable of meeting one of the requirements.
After filing, the applicant will get a receipt notice, and thereafter an appointment for biometric processing at a local USCIS Application Support Center, where the applicant must present photo identification and have digital photographs and fingerprints taken. The purpose of biometric processing is twofold: it is both an identity check and a security and criminal background check. USCIS will compare the digital photos to the passport photos submitted in hard copy with the N-400 application. The applicant’s fingerprints will be forwarded to the FBI to check both nationally and internationally for criminal background and records pertaining to national security, terrorist and gang-related activity. While there is variation in the time it takes for security checks to clear, most applicants are scheduled for an N-400 interview three to five months after filing. While USCIS does not currently state this requirement on its N-400 interview appointment notices or accompanying document checklists, an applicant whose fingerprints were unreadable at a biometric processing appointment must obtain a Certificate of Good Conduct from the local police department and present it at the interview.
At the naturalization interview, all testimony is given under oath, the same as in a courtroom. The applicant will be asked to present all original passports including expired ones, permanent resident card, birth and marriage certificates, tax return, and any other documents relevant to the application, including any legal changes of name, citizenship or marital status. In addition to confirming the facts stated in the N-400 application, including proof of identity from birth up to the present, the applicant will be asked questions to confirm his or her ability to speak, read and write in the English language; basic knowledge and understanding of the fundamentals of United States history and civics; and to affirm support for our form of government and allegiance to the US Constitution. Some senior Immigration Services Officers have authority to approve a naturalization application at the time of interview; many others do not, and their cases must be reviewed by a supervisor before an N-400 can be approved.
Once the applicant has passed the tests of English and civics given at interview, and the examining officer or a supervisor deems the case approvable, the last step is a formal naturalization oath ceremony, where the applicant will surrender his or her permanent resident card, swear allegiance to the flag and Constitution of the United States of America, and receive a Certificate of Naturalization. Timing of the oath ceremony for approved naturalization applicants to become U.S. citizens depends on the federal court having jurisdiction over the state of residence. For example, in New Jersey, if an N-400 is approved at the time of interview, and staffing permits, the applicant may be sworn in on the same day, in the same building at the Newark District office of USCIS. By contrast, in New York, the federal courts retain exclusive jurisdiction over naturalization oath ceremonies, so approved N-400 applicants residing in New York may face a wait of two weeks to three months after a successful N-400 interview before an oath ceremony may be scheduled. Leadership of the New York District Office of USCIS has made valiant attempts to change this state of affairs, but their efforts to institute regular administrative oath ceremonies have been consistently rebuffed by the courts, except for ceremonial public events where large groups are naturalized. Exceptions to this practice exist for urgent timing situations, such as military applicants about to be deployed, and special medical situations, such as homebound applicants who are physically incapable of travel, who can be interviewed and sworn in at home by arrangement in advance with the New York District.
The most important step for any legal service provider assisting naturalization applicants is the initial screening, to determine whether the prospective applicant is indeed eligible to become a naturalized citizen, or whether filing an N -400 may set off a cascade of undesirable consequences, which might result in loss of residence through removal or rescission proceedings.
An applicant for naturalization must be lawfully admitted as a Permanent Resident1 must be at least 18 years of age,2 and must have maintained Lawful Permanent Resident status for at least five years,3 or for at least three years since marriage to a U.S. citizen with whom the applicant is living in marital union.4 Procedurally, civilian applicants residing in the United States and applying under either the regular five-year eligibility rules, or the three-year rules for spouses of US citizens, may file Form N-400 up to three months before the date on which they become eligible for naturalization5.
There are different eligibility rules for spouses of certain US citizens working abroad for the US government, for an American research institution or US employer engaged in foreign trade, or for a US-based international organization of which the United States is member per treaty or statute.11 There are also different eligibility rules for applicants who have performed qualifying active duty service in a branch of the US military.12 These special classes of applicants may not apply three months in advance of their eligibility date, and are not subject to the physical presence and continuous residence requirements. However, all applicants for naturalization must be Lawful Permanent Residents, and must demonstrate good moral character.
Regular applicants for naturalization, who have a five-year statutory eligibility period under INA §316(a), must have been physically present in the United States for 30 months prior to applying for naturalization. Applicants living in marital union with a US citizen spouse, who have a three-year statutory eligibility period under INA §319(a), must have been physically present in the United States for 18 months prior to applying. This cumulative physical presence requirement for at least half of the statutory eligibility period seems straightforward enough – either a person is physically present within the boundaries of the United States on a given day, or not. However, permanent residents who engage in frequent international travel need to know how to count all the days they have spent in transit.
A travel day of which the applicant spent any part in the United States, even one minute, counts as a day present in the United States for purposes of the cumulative physical presence requirement.13 Thus, for any trip abroad, both the departure date and the arrival date count as days in the United States. At a naturalization interview, the examining officer will typically review the applicant’s current passport and all prior passports, both to verify the total number of days spent in the United States since the grant of permanent residence, and to verify the applicant’s immigration history prior to becoming a resident.
Unlike nonimmigrants, lawful permanent residents cannot avail themselves of the US Customs and Border Protection online electronic entry/departure records to retrieve the government records of their recent travel history, but must file a Freedom of Information Act request to obtain their travel history. However, they can still be negatively impacted by trends that have surfaced in the CBP entry/departure database, such as errors imported from airline flight manifests, sometimes including flights the person did not actually board, or failing to include entries or exits because of variations in name and how the inspecting officer entered the data.
Often referred to as single requirement, “continuous residence” for naturalization purposes actually has two separate parts, a country component covering the entire eligibility period, and a state component covering the three months prior to filing. The country part of the continuous residence requirement14 attempts to identify whether the applicant has maintained residence in the form of an actual primary place of abode in the United States, without interruption, throughout the statutory eligibility period. Residence is defined by law as “principal, actual dwelling place in fact, without regard to intent.”15 The state part of the continuous residence requirement,16 looks to whether the applicant has maintained an actual primary residence in the same state as the home address shown on Form N-400, for at least three months preceding the date of application, and still resides in that state at the time of interview. This determines how soon an applicant can file Form N-400 after moving across state lines, and which USCIS field office will receive the N-400 application file and conduct the interview. A move across state lines after filing Form N- 400 changes which office has jurisdiction, and thus requires the file to be transferred.
The regulations on continuous residence take into account a broad constellation of factors, and acknowledge that many people may have more than one residential address at a time that they may legitimately call home. Students attending school elsewhere than in their home state may use either their school address or home residence address when applying for naturalization.21 Applicants who have residences in multiple states are deemed to reside principally at the home address used for federal income tax return filings.22 Multiple-residence situations where the address used for income tax filings was not used by the applicant as an actual dwelling place require close examination, both to determine the facts of where the applicant actually resides, and also to identify whether any material misrepresentations were made in order to obtain immigration or tax benefits, either of which could be the basis for a bar to naturalization.
An applicant who has failed to file US income tax returns at any time since becoming a permanent resident25 or who filed a Form 1040- NR or state income tax return claiming non-resident status, raises a rebuttable presumption that he or she has abandoned permanent residence.26 Under the regulations, a non-resident US income tax return may be deemed prima facie evidence of intent to abandon residence in the United States. Claiming the Foreign Earned Income Exclusion under the Bona Fide Residence test may also have this effect, or it may be deemed to break continuity of residence, as it is a claim to be a tax resident of a foreign country; use of the FEIE under the Physical Presence test also requires close examination, as it means the person has spent 330 days of that year abroad. Other tax issues include claiming a proper tax filing status, as fraudulent returns would be a bar to good moral character.
While instructions provided by USCIS prior to the N-400 interview only require the applicant to bring a US income tax return for the single most recent past year, older past tax returns may be deemed probative and relevant to establish continuous residence, and may be requested by the examiner, especially where the applicant has a history of lengthy or frequent international travel.
The N-470 application is of limited utility, because the statute expressly disqualifies most of the people it purports to benefit. INA §316(b) requires the applicant to have spent 365 uninterrupted days of physical presence and continuous residence in the United States, prior to a transfer abroad for a year or more. Thus, the only applicants who qualify to preserve their continuity of residence for naturalization purposes are those who have not set foot outside the United States at all for at least one full calendar year after becoming a resident and before they are transferred abroad. This rarely occurs in real life – when any US company, research institution, government agency, or international organization is about to transfer a worker abroad for a posting that will last more than a year, it is overwhelmingly likely that the organization will have required that person to travel abroad frequently in all years preceding the transfer, and the worker is likely to have engaged in frequent international travel even in previous jobs.
The concept of Good Moral Character is like a photographic negative, defined by what it is not. While the law33 requires any applicant for naturalization to be “a person of good moral character” throughout the statutory eligibility period, and after filing up until the grant of citizenship, there is no affirmative statement of who qualifies as such a person. Instead, there is the vague and elastic remark in the old INS Interpretations that “standards of average citizens of the community in which the applicant resides” will be applied,34 thus acknowledging that the definition of good moral character is normative but fluid, and thus changes with public mores over time. While there is no authority on what is good moral character, there is plenty of statutory and other authority specifying what it is not, enumerating a host of actions and offenses which will result in a determination that the applicant lacks good moral character.
Due to immigration laws enacted in the 1990s that made sweeping changes to the Immigration & Nationality Act35, meting out harsh immigration consequences for many minor criminal offences, it is essential to review a potential naturalization applicant’s arrest history with great care and attention to detail. Minor, expunged, and sealed juvenile records for long- past offenses may have draconian consequences including denial of naturalization, removal (deportation) and loss of permanent residence, and possibly new criminal penalties should the person re-enter the United States thereafter.
An important feature of these mandatory bars to a finding of good moral character under INA §101(f) is the diverse range of timelines: some apply only to conduct or convictions within the statutory eligibility period, some reach further back in time to a specific enactment date, and some bars apply to conduct regardless of when it occurred.
Good moral character will be found lacking upon most indications of intentional misleading statements or conduct – and a material omission may be just as significant as an affirmative misstatement. Even if an applicant can affirmatively show good moral character for the entire statutory period, he or she may still have been inadmissible at the time residence was granted, and would still be deportable, although the five-year window for rescission of adjustment of status 64 may have passed. A person whose immigration history reveals fraud, intentional misrepresentation or omission of material facts in obtaining residence should never file an N-400 application. Past misstatements or omissions which do not meet the definition of false testimony under INA §101(f)(6) still bar the applicant under INA §318 as a person who obtained permanent residence unlawfully.
Indicators of fraud or concealment of material fact in the applicant’s immigration history, particularly those leading up to the grant of residence or the removal of conditions on residence, need to be explored in detail, regardless of when they occurred.
The naturalization applicant has the burden of proving that residence was obtained lawfully 65, and a finding of fraud or material misrepresentation in the green card process will result in more than denial of naturalization. It can lead to rescission of permanent residence, if discovered within five years of the grant of residence66 and to removal proceedings67 if discovered by USCIS at any time – even after a grant of citizenship.
Crimes involving moral turpitude (“CIMT”) have three effects: 1) a single CIMT within the statutory period is an automatic bar to naturalization; 2) a single CIMT within five years after the grant of residence, for which the sentence is one year or more, or any two CIMTs since the grant of residence, render the applicant removable 68; and, 3) a single CIMT at any time since the grant of residence renders the applicant inadmissible, thus prohibiting foreign travel. Unlike many other statutory bars, actual conviction of a CIMT is unnecessary if the applicant admits to committing the elements of the offense.
Any intentional act that permanently deprives another party of funds due to them for goods or services, whether that party is a government, a company, or an individual, is a CIMT, all the way down to turnstile-jumping and other fare-beating offenses.
Any offense with fraud as an essential element is a CIMT. 74 This ranges from mail fraud, tax fraud, benefits fraud, credit card fraud, and trafficking in counterfeit goods, to knowingly passing bad checks.
While simple assault and battery are not CIMTs because they lack a mens rea, crimes of violence entailing vicious motive, 75 use of a deadly weapon, 76 or threats of bodily harm 77 are CIMTs.
Sexual abuse of a minor 78 and domestic violence involving willful infliction of injury on a family member 79 are CIMTs.
These examples and precedents illustrate some general trends, but in every case it is essential to read and analyze the statute of conviction. If the statute defining the offense may cover conduct that does not require any intent or knowledge, then the offense may not be a Crime Involving Moral Turpitude.
In November 2008, then-Attorney General Michael Mukasey upended the analytical framework used by the Board of Immigration Appeals, Immigration Judges, and the Department of Homeland Security, and set forth a new three-step approach in the precedent decision Matter of Silva-Trevino 81. The first of these three steps was a statutory analysis, also called a “categorical approach” but altered substantially from the “minimum conduct” test to a test as to whether there was a “realistic probability, not a theoretical possibility” that the statute could apply to conduct not involving moral turpitude. If the statute could realistically be applied to both turpitudinous and non-turpitudinous conduct (known as a “divisible” statute), then step two of Silva-Trevino required a “modified categorical approach,” permit-ting examination of the record of conviction [deemed to include the indictment, judgment of conviction, jury instructions, signed guilty plea or plea transcript] in order to deter-mine the exact nature of the offense committed. If the record of conviction was still inconclusive as to whether the offense entailed moral turpitude because it was not an element of the crime, then step three permitted looking beyond the record of conviction and considering any other evidence necessary to determine whether the offense was a CIMT. The Silva-Trevino decision held that “a finding of moral turpitude under the Act requires that a perpetrator have committed the reprehensible act with some form of scienter.”82 This is minimally helpful in that it excludes strict liability offenses.
Its greatest departures from past analysis were substitution of a “realistic probability test” for the “minimum conduct” test, and allowing examination of evidence not contained in the record. This essentially allowed both immigration courts and federal courts to go on fishing expeditions for evidence of actual conduct outside the record of conviction.
The Supreme Court’s 2013 decisions in Moncrieffe v. Holder 85 and Descamps v. United States 86 have since modified the stance of the Board of Immigration Appeals. The resulting test for what a person was “convicted of” returns focus to the elements of the offense in the statute under which the person was convicted, rather than the facts of the underlying conduct. As of July 2014, in Matter of Chairez-Castrejon 87, the BIA has since clarified proper use of the categorical and modified categorical approach to determine the nature of a conviction, including analysis of both CIMTs and aggravated felonies. In Matter of Chairez-Castrejon 88 , the BIA applied Moncrieffe to focus on the minimum conduct covered under the state statute of conviction, without applying the ‘realistic probability’ test, and applied Descamps to permit examination of the record of conviction only when a statute is clearly “divisible” into separately enumerated crimes, at least one of which is a categorical match to the federal statute, in order to determine which one of them was the basis for the conviction.
Steps for analyzing a conviction to determine if it was (and still is) a CIMT: 1. Identify the federal statute that defines the generic offense at issue; 2. Compare the state statute of conviction to see if all the conduct proscribed by the state offense falls within the federal definition – if not, then the client may not have committed a CIMT; 3. Check the state statute to see if it is divisible, i.e. if it covers multiple alternative offenses – if yes, proceed with modified categorical approach; 4. If modified categorical approach applies, deter-mine which documents in the record of conviction a court may consider to determine which sub-offense was committed, and whether that is a CIMT.
For more on how to analyze Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude, see the most current editions of Immigration Consequences of Criminal Activity, by Mary E. Kramer; as well as Tooby’s Crimes of Moral Turpitude, and Tooby’s Categorical Analysis Tool Kit by Norton Tooby. For a more granular review of evolving case law on use of the categorical approach in immigration cases, see the excellent July 31, 2014 Practice Advisory on Matter of Chairez-Castrejon, by the National Immigration Project of the National Lawyers Guild and Immigrant Defense Project.
A single aggravated felony conviction bars naturalization automatically if occurring after November 29, 1990, may bar naturalization even if occurring prior to that date, and may trigger removal proceedings, regardless of when it occurred.
There is nothing intuitive or obvious about the definition of “aggravated felony” in the Immigration & Nationality Act: it includes some offenses that are mere misdemeanors under state law, as well as offenses committed in foreign countries where a term of imprisonment was served within the preceding 15 years. Every record of conviction must be carefully reviewed to see whether it falls within the purview of this section, and it is essential to examine current federal case law in the circuit where the conviction occurred.
As noted in the previous section, case-by-case analysis of the state statute of conviction is essential to determine whether the conviction was and still is an aggravated felony, with reference to the most current edition of a guide such as Aggravated Felonies, by Norton Tooby and JJ Rollin, and Tooby’s Categorical Analysis Tool Kit by Norton Tooby, plus AILA and Immigrant Defense Project practice advisories.
If modified categorical approach applies, determine which documents in the record of conviction a court may consider to determine which sub-offense was committed, and whether that is an aggravated felony.
Case law in the area of controlled substances is vast and changes rapidly, particularly with respect to which offenses get characterized as drug trafficking. A major split among circuits was resolved in December 2006, when the Supreme Court decided Lopez v. Gonzales,89 finding that a state offense for controlled substance possession only constitutes a “felony punishable under the Controlled Substances Act” if the proscribed conduct is also punishable as a felony under federal law. The Lopez decision had both favorable and unfavorable impacts: a single state conviction for first-time simple possession of a controlled substance is not deemed an aggravated felony trafficking offense. However, for a person with multiple drug possession convictions, under Lopez a second controlled substance conviction, even for simple possession, was treated as an aggravated felony, even if both were misdemeanors under state law. Mercifully, in 2010, this was scaled back by the Supreme Court’s decision in Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder 90, which requires the second state conviction to contain a recidivist provision that corresponds to the federal “recidivist possession” felony, in order for it to be deemed an aggravated felony. A person with two controlled substance convictions remains deportable even if neither one is an aggravated felony, but may be eligible for cancellation of removal and termination of proceedings to pursue naturalization.
Aside from its role in resurrecting the categorical approach in immigration cases generally, one of the most heartening effects of the Supreme Court’s 2013 decision in Moncrieffe v. Holder was its impact within the realm of controlled sub-stance cases. The Court found that Mr. Moncrieffe’s conviction under an indivisible Georgia state statute which did not require prosecutors to prove the amount, and did not distinguish between sharing a small amount of marijuana for no remuneration and possession with intent to distribute for sale, was overbroad and encompassed conduct that did not necessarily meet the federal definition of drug trafficking, hence he was not convicted of an aggravated felony.
Among crimes to have joined the long list of aggravated felonies are offenses for violating an order of protection. Because these types of statutes address the threat of future harm, any conviction for violating a “no contact” order, even via telephone or e-mail, may render the applicant ineligible to naturalize and deportable.
In sum, the specific criminal statute(s) under which a person was convicted must be examined case- by-case and reviewed in light of the most current analysis and case law for that type of offense. While there is a wide selection of hard copy reference works on how crimes are treated for immigration purposes, one of the best tools to start from is Mr. Tooby’s series of online checklists, freely available at http://nortontooby.com/resources/free/checklists – including the “Aggravated Felony Alphabetical Quick Checklist,” “Checklist of Federal Drug Offenses,” and “Checklist of Federal Aggravated Felony Firearms Offenses,” among others.
Convictions for DUI require close examination, including discussion of the underlying fact pattern and of what has transpired since in the way of rehabilitation, because they are not always an automatic bar, but under certain circumstances they may trigger two different automatic bars to naturalization.
If an applicant has multiple simple DUI convictions, none of which involve any complicating factors or sentences of a year or more, those convictions taken together raise the question of whether the applicant is barred as a habitual drunkard under INA §101(f)(1). There is no specific number of DUI arrests that trigger the habitual drunkard bar, so it is a mandatory bar applied in a discretionary manner. Naturalization examiners are urged to look closely at divorce decrees, gaps in housing and unexplained periods of unemployment for evidence of alcoholism. 94 This is problematic in light of the U.S. legal system’s embrace of the philosophy of Alcoholics Anonymous, where a person once deemed an alcoholic remains so indefinitely, even long after their behavior has reformed. While the habitual drunkard bar applies only to the statutory eligibility period, examiners are permitted to look at conduct outside the statutory period for consistency with later events 95, and even where behavior has reformed, may conclude that the applicant’s character has not been reformed.
Criminal records that have been expunged under rehabilitative statutes, pardon has been granted, and sealed juvenile records are among those least likely to be disclosed to counsel. Applicants must be advised that all such offenses remain available to immigration authorities, and some may be a bar to naturalization as well as grounds for removal.
A man still under 26 who has not registered for Selective Service and refuses to do so cannot demonstrate that he is eligible for naturalization, but must be afforded a reasonable opportunity to do so once he is made aware of the duty to register, even if he is made aware of the requirement at the naturalization interview.
A man between 26 and 31 years of age must provide evidence that his failure to register for Selective Service was not knowing and willful. To that end, USCIS will customarily accept a sworn statement or affidavit from the applicant stating that he was unaware of the requirement and only learned of it after his 26th birthday, but the applicant must also obtain a Status Information Letter from the Selective Service System and present it at the interview.
For an applicant over age 31 who failed to register, the conduct falls outside the five-year eligibility period, and thus should not serve as a basis for denial of naturalization, absent other evidence that he is not well disposed to the good order and happiness of the United States.
Since proof of Selective Service registration is normally required for males completing applications to college and for student loans, all men who attended college in the United States, even briefly, tend to have registered even if they do not remember having done so. For any man born after January 1, 1960, who cannot remember if he registered or not, checking a registration can be done online at SSS.gov, by entering the applicant’s name, date of birth and social security number.
A naturalization examiner would surely make note of an applicant’s unpaid parking tickets, 113 speeding tickets 114 or civil money judgments. 115 However, to date such failings have been struck down as the sole basis for denial of naturalization based on lack of good moral character; rather, they may be considered as a part of the whole picture.
At the time of the naturalization interview, the applicant must demonstrate competency in written and spoken English; must be attached to the principles of the Constitution and well disposed to the good order and happiness of the United States 119; and must demonstrate knowledge of the fundamentals of US history and government 120. The applicant must swear allegiance to the flag and Constitution of the United States 121, and must be willing to bear arms on behalf of the United States, perform noncombatant service, or work of national importance, if required by law. 122 Those with strong moral objections to combat service may just swear that they are willing to serve the US Armed Forces in a non-combatant capacity and to do work of national importance, if required to serve.
Applicants over age 65 are not automatically exempted from testing in English, and must meet one of the preceding English-language exemptions, but are eligible to request and take a reduced civics test with fewer questions. Applicants over age 75 are exempt from biometric processing, and thus are not required to pay the biometrics fee.
Procedurally, the English, history and civics questions, and inquiry into the applicant’s attachment to principles of the Constitution and willingness to perform military service, do not get addressed until the interview. However, those claiming an exemption from the English language requirement must claim it on Form N-400, to give USCIS advance notice of the need to make an interpreter available when scheduling, so that the naturalization interview and test can be conducted in the requested language – much like a medical disability requiring special accommodation, which must also be mentioned on the form at part 3 (questions H & I).
Applicants seeking to apply for naturalization after three years based on marriage to a US citizen 124 must be living together in marital union with that same spouse throughout the three-year eligibility period prior to filing, and up through the date of the interview. 125 “Marital union” means actually residing together under the same roof with the US citizen spouse. 126 Marital union is terminated by divorce, legal separation, death or expatriation 127; and may or may not be terminated by an informal voluntary separation, determined on a case-by-case basis. 128 There are two exceptions to the “marital union” requirement. One is for involuntary separations imposed by military service or mandatory work assignments by a private employer: involuntary separations are not deemed to sever the marital union. 129 The other exception is for an applicant who was originally the beneficiary of an immigrant visa petition by the US citizen, who became a victim of abuse and obtained lawful permanent residence under the Violence Against Women Act. 130 A naturalization applicant who obtained residence under VAWA need not be living with or still married to the abuser, and should include a copy of the I-360 petition approval notice with the N-400 application.
Applicants married to a US citizen filing under INA §319(a) must meet all the same basic eligibility requirements as regular applicants under INA §316(a), except that relevant time periods for establishing physical presence, continuous residence, and good moral character are reduced proportionally. They must have 18 months of physical presence in the United States, three years of continuous residence in the United States, and three years of good moral character. They must still have at least 3 months continuous residence in the state where they reside at the time of filing.
Recently-married applicants who file for naturalization as soon as they are eligible may not yet have had the conditions on their residence removed. Such applicants are eligible to naturalize 131 even if removal of condition has not been granted. 132 However, at least one court has read these provisions narrowly, finding that the law only permits filing for naturalization before conditions on residence are lifted, but that naturalization cannot be granted until removal of conditions has been granted. 133 USCIS examiners have authority to adjudicate a pending I-751 petition for removal of conditions on residence concurrently with an N -400 at the time of naturalization interview, but whether they will do so is at the discretion of individual District Offices, based on local staffing, training and scheduling resources.134 In districts such as New York where this practice is supported, it presents the practical problem of ensuring that both files arrive at the local office and are united in time for the naturalization interview, when the I-751 file must come from a different location than the N-400 file.
In addition to all passports and original identity documents, at an N-400 interview for naturalization under INA §319(a), the applicant will have to produce evidence of living in marital union for the entire three-year period, including joint income tax returns, leases or mortgage statements for the shared residence, joint bank statements, utility bills, insurance policies, etc., covering the three-year period, (as well as birth certificates of any children) to establish that both spouses have indeed been living together at the same address for that period. The US citizen spouse is not permitted to attend the naturalization interview with the applicant.
While the applicant and US citizen spouse stationed abroad must be living in marital union, under INA §319(b) there is no specified minimum period during which they must have been living together in marital union. Likewise, the applicant must demonstrate good moral character, but not for any specified period.
There are separate rules governing eligibility to naturalize for those who have performed a qualifying period of active duty service in a branch of the United State military, including the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, Coast Guard, certain Reserve components of the National Guard, and Selected Reserve of the Ready Reserve, or those who have performed active-duty military service during a designated period of hostilities. Military and veteran applicants for naturalization are exempt from filing fees, and exempt from the continuous residence and physical presence requirements. The rules are summarized in USCIS Publication M-599, Naturalization for Military Personnel.
Procedurally, military naturalization applications are all filed at the Nebraska Service Center, with the Military Support Unit. They are not filed with a lockbox because no fee receipts are involved, as military applicants are exempt from application filing fees and the fee for biometric processing. However, along with Form N- 400 they are required to submit additional forms that are not required of civilians, including a G-325B Biographic Information Form, and Form N-426, Request for Certification of Military or Naval Service, which must be certified by the appropriate officer in the applicant’s chain of command. Every military installation is supposed to have a designated point of contact to provide assistance to active service members applying for naturalization.
There is a separate provision under INA §329 for naturalization of veterans who have served honorably in the US military in a period of designated hostilities, including past conflicts such as World War I, World War II, the Korean and Vietnam wars, and including ongoing hostilities in Iraq and Afghanistan, for even one day.
Applicants under this section are eligible for naturalization regard-less of age, deportability under INA §318, or qualifying as an “alien enemy” under INA §331 by virtue of being a national, citizen, subject or denizen of a country with which the United States is at war.
This article is intended to offer a useful guide to the basic requirements for naturalization, and a variety of common issues that arise in evaluating and pursuing an N-400 application. However, no article on naturalization can be truly comprehensive, because the law defining so many of its elements is constantly evolving.
INA §318, §316(a)(1); 8 CFR §316.2(a)(2).
INA §334 (b); 8 CFR §316.2(a)(1).
INA §316(a)(1); 8 CFR §316.2(a)(3).
INA §319(a); 8 CFR §319.1(a)(2),(3).
INA §334(a); 8 CFR §310.2.
INA §316(a)(1); INA §319(a); 8 CFR §316.2(a)(4); 8 CFR 319.1(a)(4).
INA §316(a)(2); INA §319(a); 8 CFR §316.2(a)(3); 8 CFR 319.1(a)(3).
M-476 Guide to Naturalization, p.24.
INA §316(a)(2); INA§319(a); 8 CFR §316.2(a)(3); 8 §CFR 319.1(a)(3).
INA §316(b), 8 CFR §316.5(c)(1)(i).
Li v. Chertoff, 490 F. Supp.2d 130 (D. Massachusetts 2007).
i.e., any applicant who earned enough to owe income taxes: Applicants who have not filed income tax returns for years in which they were Lawful Permanent Residents, but earned less than the standard deduction and had no obligation to file a tax return in such years, are not deemed to have indicated any intent to abandon residence.
INA §316(b); 8 CFR §316.5(d).
Required period of good moral character: under INA §316(a)(3), five years; under INA §319(a), three years; under INA §319(b), at time of interview but no specified prior period; under INA §328, one year. Under INA §329, no specified period.
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214(“AEDPA”) & The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Division C of Pub.L. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546, (“IIRAIRA”).
INA §101(f)(3), incorporating INA 212(a)(2)(D).
INA §101(f)(3), incorporating INA 212(a)(6)(E).
INA §101(f)(3), incorporating INA 212(a)(10)(A).
INA §101(f)(3), incorporating INA 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). Like “good moral character”, a “crime involving moral turpitude” is not defined by statute.
INA §101(f)(3), incorporating INA §212(a)(2)(A)(i)(II).
INA §101(f)(3), incorporating INA §212(a)(2)(B).
INA §101(f)(3), incorporating INA §212(a)(2)(C)(i).
INA §101(f)(3), incorporating INA §212(a)(2)(C)(ii).
While INA §101(f)(8) on its face seems retroactive to any aggravated felony ever, 8 CFR §316.10(b)(1)(ii) limits its application to convictions on or after November 29, 1990, effective date of the IMMACT 90 expanded definition of ‘aggravated felony’. “Date of conviction” for purposes of this section is the date of sentencing or date the judgment was entered. Puello v. BCIS, 511 F.3d 324 (2d Cir. 2007). This permanent bar applies even if relief was granted under INA §212(c). Letter of Acting Asst. Comm’r., Adjudications, Miller, HQ316-C (May 5, 1993) reprinted in 70 Int. Rel. 752, 769-70 (June 7, 1993).
Matter of L-D-E-, 8 I&N Dec. 399 (BIA 1959).
Matter of G-, 6 I&N Dec. 208 (BIA 1954); Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759 (1988).
Matter of Ngan, 10 I&N Dec. 825 (BIA 1964); Matter of G-L-T-, 8 I&N Dec. 403 (BIA 1959).
Phinpathya v. INS, 673 F.2d 1013 (9th Cir. 1981), reversed on other grounds, 464 U.S. 183 (1984).
Bernal v. INS, 154 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 1998); Matter of R-S-J-, 22I&N Dec. 863 (BIA 1999).
Misrepresentations in the alien’s own application are covered by INA §212(a)(6) (C)(i), but those on behalf of someone else may trigger the ground of inadmissibility for alien smuggling under INA §212(a)(6)(E). See 9 FAM 40.63, Note 4.4.
INA 212(a)(6)(C)(ii). No waiver under §212(i) is available.
Ateka v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 954, 956-957 (8th Cir. 2004).
Includes a benefit under the INA or any other federal or state law, per Jamieson v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 765 (8th Cir. 2005).
INA §274A(b)(5), Limitation on use of attestation form.-A form designated or established by the Attorney General under this subsection and any information contained in or appended to such form, may not be used for purposes other than for enforcement of this Act and sections 1001, 1028, 1546 and 1621 of title 18,United States Code.
See INS Memorandum from Acting Assoc. Commissioner Joseph R. Greene, April 6, 1998, on “Section 212(a)(6)(C)(ii) Relating to False Claims to US Citizenship,” AILA InfoNet Doc. No. 98040691.
Under INA §246(a), the government has the burden of proof in rescission proceedings, and the standard of proof is by clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence. Matter of Masri, 22 I&N Dec. 1145, 1149 (BIA 1999); Matter of Hernandez-Puente, 20 I&N Dec. 335, 337 (BIA 1991); Matter of Pereira, 19 I&N Dec. 169, 171 (BIA 1984).
Per INA §237(a)(1)(A), for having been inadmissible due to a misrepresentation under 212(a)(6)(C)(i) at the time of admission or adjustment of status.
Matter of Franklin, 20 I&N Dec. 867, 868 (BIA 1994), aff’d 72 F.3d 571 (8th Cir. 1995); Matter of Short, 20 I&N Dec. 136, 139 (BIA 1989); Matter of Flores, 17 I&N Dec. 225, 227 (BIA 1980).
Matter of Silva-Trevino, 24 I&N Dec. 687, 689 n.1 and 706 n.5 (AG 2008).
Matter of V-Z-S-, 22 I&N Dec.1338, n.12 (BIA 2000).
Matter of Grazley, 14 I&N Dec. 330 (BIA 1973); Matter of Jurado, 24 I&N Dec. 29 (BIA 2006).
Matter of Gordon, 20 I&N Dec.52 (BIA 1989).
Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223 (1951); Matter of Flores, 17 I&N Dec. 225 (BIA 1980).
Matter of Sanudo, 23 I&N Dec. 968, 971 (BIA 2006), et al.
Matter of Medina, 16 I&N Dec.611 (BIA 1976).
Matter of Ajami, 22 I&N Dec. (BIA 1999); Matter of B, 6 I&N Dec. 98 (BIA 1954).
Padilla v. Gonzales, 397 F.3d 1016 (7th Cir. 2005).
Matter of Tran, 21 I&N Dec. 291, 294 (BIA 1996).
Matter of Khourn, 101 I&N Dec. 1041 (BIA 1997).
24 I&N Dec. 687 (AG 2008).
Jean-Louis v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 582 F.3d 462 (3rd Cir. 2009); Fajardo v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 659 F.3d 1303 (11th Cir. 2011); Prudencio v. Holder, 669 F.3d 472 (4th Cir. 2012); Olivas-Motta v. Holder, 716 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2013); Silva-Trevino v. Holder, 742 F.3d 197 (5th Cir. 2014).
Ali v. Mukasey, 521 F.3d 737 (7th Cir. 2008), Bobadilla v. Holder, 679 F.3d 1052 (8th Cir. 2012).
133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013).
26 I&N Dec.349 (BIA 2014).
127 S. Ct. 625 (2006).
560 U.S.___, 130 S.Ct. 2577 (2010).
23 I&N Dec. 78 (BIA May 9, 2001).
Matter of Lopez-Meza, 22 I&N Dec. 1188 (BIA 1999).
Leocal v. Ashcroft, 541 U.S. 1 (2004).
Adjudicator’s Field Manual, Chapter 74.2 (g)(12)(B).
8 CFR §316.10(b)(3)(i). Refers to court-ordered spousal or child support. It has a mens rea element, so USCIS examiners must consider reasons for failure to pay; involuntary loss of employment or other source of income may be deemed a mitigating circumstance.
Memorandum of William Yates, “Effect of Failure to Register for Selective Service on Naturalization Eligibility,” (June 18, 1999), AILA InfoNet Doc. No. 990 10740, citing attached opinion of INS General Counsel Paul Virtue (April 27, 1998).
Yin-Shing Woo v. U.S., 288 F.3d 434, 435 (2d Cir. 1961).
Etape v. Napolitano, 664 F.Supp. 2d 498, 518 (D. Md. 2009).
Puciaty v. DOJ, 125 F. Supp. 2d 1035, 1040-41 (D. Hawaii 2000).
INA 312; 8 CFR §312.1(b).
Under INA §319(a) or §319(b).
INA §§216(e), 216A(e); 8 CFR §216.1.
Abghari v. Gonzales, 569 F.Supp.2d 1336 (C.D. Cal.2009).
Minutes of 02/05/2004 AILA/VSC Liaison Teleconference, AILA InfoNet Doc. No. 04021366.
INA §319(b)(2); 8 CFR §319.2.
8 CFR 319.2(a)(3) & (4).
Qualifying American research institutions and international organizations of which the US is a member are listed at 8 CFR §316.20.
Memorandum of Donald Neufeld, “Acceptance of DD Form 214…”(April 29, 2009), AILA InfoNet Doc. No. 09050464.
Lopez v. Henley, 416 F.3d 455, 457 (5th Cir. 2008); Nolan v. Holmes, 334 F.3d 189 (2d. Cir. 2003).

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