Source: https://www.utrechtjournal.org/articles/10.5334/ujiel.cl/
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 10:49:41+00:00

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While no business leaders have yet been charged before the International Criminal Court (ICC), such future proceedings will typically be conducted with reference to the accessorial mode of liability of aiding and abetting, under Article 25(3)(c) of the Rome Statute of the ICC. There exist diverse and competing interpretations of Article 25(3)(c). This paper aims to advocate the creation of a dominant interpretation of Article 25(3)(c) and, consequently, to the clarification of the potential responsibility of business leaders who aid or abet crimes under the jurisdiction of the Rome Statute, in two ways. First, it asks whether Article 25(3)(c) can be interpreted in harmony with the dominant practice on aiding and abetting in international criminal law generally. Second, it presents a case study on the provision of arms by the Russian corporation Rosoboronexport to the Syrian government, which is likely to have committed crimes against humanity since March 2011 and war crimes since mid-2012. The theoretical conclusions are applied to a discussion on the potential criminal responsibility of the Director General of Rosoboronexport for aiding and abetting the commission of international crimes by high-level Syrian officials.
This is not to say, however, that international criminal law has been entirely negligent of the economic aspects of armed conflict. To illustrate this, this paper only mentions some of the most important trials in international criminal law in which business leaders were tried.
On 1 July 2002, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), the first permanent court ‘to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern,’ entered into force.19 As of March 2014, no cases have been brought before the ICC that involved persons charged for acts they had committed in their capacity as business leaders. This supports the observation that ‘the legal framework for holding corporations and their individual agents criminally responsible at the international level is poorly developed and, even more so, poorly enforced’.20 Against this background, the aim of this article is to provide some thoughts on the ways in which business leaders may be held accountable before the ICC.
Although business leaders do commit international crimes directly and intentionally, for example by enslavement or pillaging, this is quite rare,21 and ‘[i]n most cases (…) corporations are only complicit in the crimes by aiding or abetting crimes committed by governments or paramilitary groups’.22 This paper supposes that future cases before the ICC involving business leaders will typically be made with reference to the accessorial liability mode of aiding and abetting under Article 25(3)(c) of the Rome Statute.23 Per Article 25(3)(c), individual criminal responsibility arises when a person ‘[f]or the purpose of facilitating the commission of [a crime under the jurisdiction of the Court], aids, abets or otherwise assists in its commission or its attempted commission, including providing the means for its commission’.24 Interpretations of this Article, as well as its relation to other parts of the Rome Statute, are diverse and competing. The question of how business leaders might be found responsible for their actions before the ICC is closely connected to the question of the preferable interpretation of Article 25(3)(c). Thus, the paper aims to articulate the actus reus (or material element) as well as the mens rea (or mental element) required by Article 25(3)(c) by examining to what extent these elements can be harmonised with existent case law, drawn predominantly from the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).
The paper then proceeds with a case study, in which its interpretation of Article 25(3)(c) is applied to a case of possible accessorial liability for provisions of armaments, including defence systems and missiles, by the Russian State-owned corporation Rosoboronexport to the government of the Syrian Arab Republic (Syria). The choice of this case study is not arbitrary; ‘there is little literature that thoroughly explores the relationship between these competing definitions [of aiding and abetting] in light of the intricacies of the global trade in weaponry’.25 The paper draws on reports by the United Nations’ Commission of Inquiry on Syria, which allege that the Syrian government has been committing crimes against humanity since March 2011 and war crimes since mid-2012. It considers possible evidence of the assistance by Rosoboronexport to the commission of these crimes. It asks whether the Director General of Rosoboronexport, Anatoly P. Isaikin,26 could prima facie be held individually criminally responsible for aiding and abetting these crimes under Article 25(3)(c) by providing weapons to Syria.
When compared with the statutory language of the ad hoc Tribunals, the Rome Statute version of aiding and abetting includes a number of novelties, such as the phrases ‘for the purpose of facilitating’, ‘otherwise assists’, ‘attempted’ and ‘including providing the means’, as well as the requirement in Article 30 that all modes of liability must satisfy the mens rea requirements specified therein. Debates on these novelties have not reached uniform conclusions. The following discussion therefore examines whether Article 25(3)(c) may be interpreted consistently with the dominant practices of international tribunals. This question is important as the Court should in the first place rely on its own Statute and should only draw on external case law ‘on clear methodological grounds’;38 this means that if it fits the Court, customary principles that have ‘developed over a significant period of time’ may contribute to the practice of the ICC.39 The following sections therefore examine whether the judgments of the Nuremberg Trials, the ICTY and ICTR point in the direction of applicable norms of customary international law that could provide guidance to the ICC.
Although the terms aiding and abetting are often used together and interchangeably, in the Akayesu Trial Judgment the ICTR discarded this appearance of synonymity by stating that aiding and abetting ‘are indeed different. Aiding means giving assistance to someone. Abetting, on the other hand, would involve facilitating the commission of an act by being sympathetic thereto.’43 Nevertheless, a finding of either of the two suffices for liability to attach. Competing interpretations exist as to the actus reus and mens rea of aiding and abetting. Because the Rome Statute lacks an explicit threshold for actus reus, it is important to consider the relevant judgments of the ad hoc Tribunals in this regard. The following discussion focuses on five particularly influential judgments: the Furundžija Trial Judgment,44 the Tadić Trial and Appeal Judgments,45 the Perišić Appeal Judgment and the Šainović et al Appeal Judgment.46Furundžija set forth an interpretation of aiding and abetting that has been followed by subsequent judgments,47 while the last four have been vital in the recent controversy over the notion of specific direction.
The Furundžija definition is significant because it allows the actus reus of aiding and abetting to be non-tangible; ‘action which decisively encourages the perpetrator is sufficient to amount to assistance’.63 Thus, material assistance need not actually be granted; ‘willingness to provide assistance, when made known to the perpetrator, would also suffice, if the offer of help in fact encouraged or facilitated the commission of the crime by the main perpetrator.’64 In the case of tangible assistance, however, such awareness is not required; ‘indeed, the principal may not even know about the accomplice’s contribution.’65 If a particular willingness to provide assistance (abetting) does not materialise into objective help (aiding), the willingness may nonetheless give rise to criminal liability. It thus makes sense to treat aiding and abetting together, as constituting one mode of liability.
The Tadić Appeal Judgment followed the Furundžija definition by requiring a substantial but not a direct effect, but ostensibly narrowed the previously set standard by adding that the act must be specifically directed to assist, encourage or lend moral support. Specific direction ‘establishes a culpable link between assistance provided by an accused individual and the crimes of principal perpetrators.’67 This notion has subsequently been followed by ‘many subsequent [ICTY] and ICTR appeal judgements,’ either explicitly or implicitly.68 However, in the Mrkšić and Šljivančanin Appeal Judgment specific direction was dismissed as ‘not an essential ingredient’.69 The ICTY reaffirmed the Mrkšić and Šljivančanin position in the Blagojević and Jokić Appeal Judgment (in which specific direction was characterised as an implicit requirement at most)70 and the Lukić and Lukić Appeal Judgment.71 The Tribunal reverted to the notion of specific direction as a separate, explicit requirement in the 2013 Perišić Appeal Judgment.72 Here, it rejected Mrkšić and Šljivančanin, holding that this deviation did not amount to the careful consideration necessary to depart from a previous decision because, among other reasons, Mrkšić and Šljivančanin only cited one case in its support, which confirmed that specific direction is a requisite element.73 The Perišić decision was subsequently criticised for its approach to specific direction, however, by the recent Appeal Judgments in Šainović et al by the ICTY and Taylor by the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL),74inter alia because the Tadić delineation of aiding and abetting had been made obiter75 and was not supported on any statutory or customary international law76 or State practice77 grounds. The balance may therefore be leaning towards not requiring specific direction.
What does a substantial contribution as the standard for the actus reus of aiding and abetting mean more specifically? The material connection between the act of the aider and abettor and the crime committed by the principal perpetrator has been said to encompass three distinct aspects, each of which may be characterised by a particular gradation of substantiality: geographical, temporal and causal connections.78 These are examined in turn.
It is uncontroversial that the act of the aider and abettor may occur at any time before or during the commission of the crime by the principal perpetrator. However, it is more disputed whether assistance that gives rise to accomplice liability could have taken place following the act of the crime.
Assuming that there may be different gradations of causation, it is uncontroversial that a causal connection between the act of the aider and abettor and that of the principal perpetrator in the strong sense of a conditio sine qua non is not required.92 It is more disputed, however, whether some weaker sense of a causal connection is required.
Article 25(3)(c) of the Rome Statute could be read as including a rather low causality requirement, as it concerns aiding and abetting the principal’s ‘commission or (…) attempted commission’ of a crime (emphasis added).93 If one favours the inclusion of a causality requirement, this might consist of causing the mere attempt of a commission, even if it is an unsuccessful one. However, there is nothing in the Rome Statute to suggest that a causal connection is necessary. Limited support for a causality requirement could be inferred from the Statute’s definition of the necessary mens rea attached to a consequence. As individual criminal responsibility in a case of aiding and abetting only arises through the accessorial object, i.e. on the condition of the existence of a link to a principal perpetrator and a principal act, the act of the aider and abettor must typically give rise to a consequence (rather than mere conduct, per Article 30(2)(a)), from which accessorial liability derives. Article 30(2)(b) of the Rome Statute reads as follows: ‘[i]n relation to a consequence, that person means to cause that consequence or is aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of events’ (emphasis added).94 While causation is thus included in the Rome Statute, meaning to cause a consequence or awareness of the likely occurrence of that consequence as a mens rea requirement does not lead to an actus reus requirement of the objective causation of a consequence.
The absence of a causality requirement from Article 25(3)(c) has been regarded as a failure.95 In the light of the ad hoc Tribunals’ cases, however, this conclusion is not obvious. Ambos cites the Tadić Trial Judgment in favour of the view that the aider and abettor’s act ‘must – in one way or another – have a causal relationship with the result.’96 However, the given paragraph in Tadić actually states that the act must only be ‘a contribution that in fact has an effect on the commission of the crime.’97 In any case, the importance that the Tribunal attached to this threshold might be questioned,98 as it also held that ‘aiding and abetting includes all acts of assistance by words or acts that lend encouragement or support, as long as the requisite intent is present.’99 Moreover, in the Furundžija Trial Judgment a causality requirement was rejected as an implication of the ILC’s term ‘direct,’ which the Tribunal considered misleading.100 Thus, because there does not exist any substantial support for upholding a causality requirement, the better interpretation would be that it is not required.
Customary international law does not require a geographical link between the act of the aider and abettor and that of the principal perpetrator. There exists some support for the notion of ex post facto aiding and abetting. As to causality, the actus reus need not be a conditio sine qua non; rather, ‘the Tribunals have required that the conduct of the aider and abettor have some effect on the commission of the crime by the principal perpetrator’ (emphasis in original).101 The inherent ambiguity of formulations such as some or substantial is not necessarily a weakness; the exact threshold cannot be captured in an abstract theory, but ‘only on a case by case basis taking into account modern theories of attribution.’102 The ICC’s mandate, limited to the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole, should be read as endorsing the consistent requirement before the ad hoc Tribunals of some actus reus threshold for aiding and abetting.
In relation to a consequence, that person means to cause that consequence or is aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of events.
However, Article 30(2)(b) does not require as high a mens rea threshold as suggested by Piragoff and Robinson and Cryer et al. The Rome Statute allows for a construction of the mens rea of aiding and abetting that may require not much more proof than under customary international law; on the one hand, mere recklessness is probably excluded, but on the other hand neither Article 30 nor Article 25(3)(c) actually requires one to mean to cause a consequence. It should be noted that Article 30(2)(b)(second alternative), which defines intent as ‘[awareness] that [a consequence] will occur in the ordinary course of events’, is verbatim the same as the definition of knowledge in relation to a consequence per Article 30(3)(second alternative). This situation means that ‘it would be a waste of the Court’s and the Prosecution’s resources to ever require’ a very high volitional element rather than awareness.116 Thus, generally, awareness suffices for a finding of individual criminal responsibility with respect to a crime defined as a consequence. Due to the addition ‘in the ordinary course of events’, Article 30 is stricter than the customary standard of recklessness. Rather, the cognitive element, in contrast to the ad hoc Tribunals’ standard, requires knowledge of said probability.
Nevertheless, it has been argued that ‘most legal scholars’ hold that under the Rome Statute the aider and abettor possesses the same intent as the principal perpetrator.117 Vest cites Ambos’s commentary on Article 25 in his favour, but Ambos, in the given paragraph,118 does not discuss aiding and abetting but rather another mode of liability. Vest also cites Werle’s Principles of International Criminal Law, but Werle actually holds that ‘[i]t is sufficient if the person assisting was aware of the essential elements of the crime’.119 Furthermore, the Furundžija Trial Judgment held that custom does not require the aider and abettor to share the mens rea of the principal perpetrator, but merely to have knowledge that his acts assist the principal.120 It is not clear, then, that the view that the aider and abettor must share the principal’s mental state is held by most legal scholars; the consensus appears to favour the opposite position.
However, the idea of an additional mens rea requirement as the purpose of facilitating a crime, exclusive to aiding and abetting, may come with profound practical difficulties. Because accessorial liability in general is concerned with those who lack such involvement as to fulfil the role of the principal perpetrator, the accessorial object is most properly understood in relation to a consequence which facilitates the commission of a crime, rather than conduct per se, i.e. conduct that would render one a principal perpetrator. If the accessorial object typically is a consequence, intent in accessorial liability must be established on the basis of Article 30(2)(b) (‘[i]n relation to a consequence, that person means to cause that consequence or is aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of events’). This means that for a finding of aiding and abetting Article 30 already requires that a person either possessed awareness that his conduct would ordinarily lead to the commission of a crime under the jurisdiction of the Court or meant to cause the crime. Crucially, it should be asked if the additional mens rea requirement of purposefully facilitating a crime would, in practice, meaningfully differ from the intent requirement of meaning to cause a consequence, so that separate pieces of evidence either fulfil the Article 30 requirement or the additional requirement exclusive to aiding and abetting. This question becomes especially prominent in the light of the phrase ‘[f]or the purposes of this article,’ which restricts the content of Article 30(2) and (3) to Article 30; thus, ‘[f]or the purpose of facilitating’ cannot be interpreted with the help of Article 30.
It might be an impracticable or fruitless exercise to aim to uphold the notion of a requirement additional to intent and knowledge, because the Court, if it endeavoured to find a real difference between a person’s purposeful facilitation and meaning to cause a consequence, would plausibly find it hard to interpret facts as evidencing one of the two, but not the other. Importantly, the cognitive standard is already raised by the formula ‘aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of events.’ Any element additional to the two standards of Article 30(2)(b), however defined exactly, could render Article 25(3)(c) unworkable. Thus, the words ‘[u]nless otherwise provided’ of Article 30(1) should, on practical grounds, not be interpreted as demanding an additional subjective requirement in the form of ‘[f]or the purpose of facilitating’.
In addition to these practical concerns, another argument, although admittedly more speculative, may be raised. It has been suggested with respect to some of the definitions of crimes in the Rome Statute, which require the actus reus to be ‘intentional’ or to be committed ‘intentionally’, that these additions are ‘likely superfluous, given the general rule in article 30.’127 During the negotiations on the Rome Statute, ‘intention(ally)’ was only added to the definitions of certain crimes to underline the impossibility of committing the actus reus non-intentionally.128 It could be speculated that the formula ‘for the purpose of facilitating’ in Article 25(3)(c) was added likewise to stress that aiding and abetting can only give rise to individual criminal responsibility if the intent requirement of Article 30 has been satisfied.
If not as an additional mens rea requirement, how should ‘[f]or the purpose of facilitating’ be interpreted? There exists considerable disagreement over this question; ‘[s]ome scholars believe that it imposes an intent requirement, while others believe that it leaves the traditional knowledge requirement intact’, or argue that the Rome Statute is not clear on the mens rea of aiding and abetting.129 Still others hold that ‘for the purpose of facilitating’ has no basis in customary international law.130 Nevertheless, it might be argued that the phrase does not go meaningfully beyond the relevant provisions of Article 30. The expression ‘for the purpose of facilitating’ was taken from the US Model Penal Code, which accords accomplice liability to a person who acts ‘with the purpose of promoting or facilitating.’131 This would imply ‘a specific subjective requirement stricter than mere knowledge.’132 However, the qualification of awareness in Article 30(2)(b)(second alternative) as ‘in the ordinary course of events’ already imposes a stricter requirement than mere recklessness; thus, ‘[f]or the purpose of facilitating’ in Article 25(3)(c) may not effectively increase the standard set by Article 30(2)(b).
Thus, it is possible and desirable to interpret Article 25(3)(c) as not requiring a mens rea additional to, or other than what is stipulated in Article 30. Rather, ‘[f]or the purpose of facilitating’ necessitates a mens rea that is higher than mere recklessness, which is incompatible with the precedents set by the ad hoc Tribunals. If it is asked, nonetheless, how this new standard should be specified, it is in the interest of the predictability of the law that it be considered that the definition of awareness in Article 30(2)(b) already departs from the customary standard of recklessness. Therefore, rather than interpreting ‘[f]or the purpose of facilitating’ as demanding direct intent, which would entail a very high volitional element, the better interpretation would be the lower standard of oblique intent (in common law terminology) or direct intent (or dolus directus) in the second degree (in civil law terminology). These gradations of intent share the requirement that ‘the perpetrator foresees as a certainty or as highly probable that certain consequences will flow from his or her conduct’, even if that person acts indifferently with respect to such consequences (emphases in original).133 Thus, if the preferable interpretation of ‘[f]or the purpose of facilitating’ is that it asks more than recklessness but should not maximally depart from custom, it should be read as demanding oblique intent. In this sense, it would not add anything to the Rome Statute’s definitions of intent or knowledge in relation to a consequence.
As part of the revolutionary protests across the Arab world, demonstrations commenced in Syria in March 2011 that rapidly turned violent and descended into a full-scale civil war that, as of March 2014, is still ongoing. According to the United Nation’s latest estimate, published on 27 July 2013, 100,000 deaths had been recorded since March 2011, as well as two million refugees and four million internally displaced persons.134 The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights estimated the number of deaths related to the war to be 146,065 on 13 March 2014.135 While reporting and fact-finding missions have been hindered because the government has tried to minimise reporting from the country, there have been many claims of violations of international law. The following provides an overview of the claim that the Syrian government has committed crimes against humanity and war crimes.136 It also presents suggestions that the Russian state-owned corporation Rosoboronexport has been assisting the Syrian government herein by means of the provision of a variety of arms.
Against this background, this paper will examine whether the Director General of Rosoboronexport may be prima facie criminally responsible for his company’s assistance to the commission of international crimes in Syria.
One of the world’s major arms companies and part of the Russian Technologies State Corporation, the Open Joint Stock Company Rosoboronexport (Rosoboronexport) ‘is the sole Russian state intermediary agency responsible for import/export of the full range of defence and dual-use end products, technologies and services.’145 Rosoboronexport has been an open joint stock company since 1 July 2011,146 whose sole stockholder is the Russian Federation.147 The company has been accused of violating international laws by delivering and agreeing to deliver arms to the Syrian government after the start of the latter’s commission of international crimes.148 Since 2007, Rosoboronexport has virtually been the sole Russian arms exporter and 78% of Syria’s imports of major conventional weapons have come from Russia.149 The company itself claims to account for more than 80% of arms exports from Russia.150 According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), a variety of arms was transferred in the period 2011-2013 from Russia to Syria. These have been included here in Appendix A. For the present discussion, the SIPRI data are suboptimal because many of the data are uncertain and because they concern arms deals and transfers concluded between Russia and Syria, not Rosoboronexport and Syria. Nonetheless, Rosoboronexport’s status as the sole State intermediary for the export of Russian arms151 suggests its involvement in the Russian-Syrian arms deals.
In order to determine the potential criminal responsibility arising out of Rosoboronexport’s arms deals with Syria, the role of Mr Isaikin is now examined. Mr Isaikin was appointed Director General of Rosoboronexport by Presidential Decree No 1574 on 23 November 2007.154 Unfortunately, there is a serious lack of information on the structure of the company and Mr Isaikin’s effective influence; Rosoboronexport ‘remains an opaque entity closed-in on itself’155 and ‘tops the ranks of Russia’s least transparent economic entities.’156 Nevertheless, according to The New York Times, Mr Isaikin is ‘a powerful figure in Russia’s military industry’.157 While more detailed information is required to draw any definitive conclusions, it appears that Mr Isaikin should have possessed at least significant influence (if not control) over the arms transfers to Syria listed in Appendix A, all of the deliveries of which followed his appointment as Director General. Prima facie, this would amount to a significant contribution to the commission of international crimes.
That granting additional confidence to the principal perpetrator can amount to aiding and abetting may have inspired the ruling in Kamuhanda on the provision per se of arms. Thus, even if none of the arms provided by Rosoboronexport to Syria were actually used for the commission of international crimes, Mr Isaikin’s role in the provision of arms may pass the threshold of significant assistance and thus amount to aiding and abetting – or, if one were to separate the terms, abetting specifically. Likewise, if (presently unavailable) evidence were to establish that the Syrian government has used Rosoboronexport’s arms, on some significant rather than merely incidental scale, then the ad hoc Tribunals’ actus reus standard for aiding (rather than abetting) the crimes committed in Syria would have been met. But these observations could be irrelevant before the ICC, as its Statute does not bind the Court to any actus reus standard for aiding and abetting.
The phrase ‘[f]or the purpose of facilitating’ in Article 25(3)(c) introduces a subjective mens rea threshold164 that consequently excludes the question of what the aider and abettor should have known and focuses on what he actually knew at the time of the commission of the actus reus.165 Because the evidentiary subjective threshold is substantially higher than the objective threshold and several questions cannot be answered at present,166 the following does not purport to authoritatively describe the mens rea of Mr Isaikin. Rather, it asks whether a prima facie case can be made that he fulfilled the mens rea requirement for aiding and abetting under the Rome Statute.
In August 2011, referring to Rosoboronexport’s arms deliveries to Syria, Mr Isaikin reportedly stated that ‘[a]s long as no sanctions have been declared yet and as long as there have been no instructions and directives from the government, we are obliged to comply with our contractual obligations, which we are doing now.’167 Similarly, in February 2012 The New York Times reported that Mr Isaikin said ‘that absent any new directive from the Kremlin, business with the Assad government would continue as before.’168 He stated that ‘[w]e understand the situation has become aggravated in Syria,’ but that, without a UNSC or other decision, ‘our cooperation with Syria — the military-technical cooperation — remains quite active and dynamic.’169Prima facie, at least since August 2011 Mr Isaikin has been aware of the fact that Rosoboronexport’s arms were being delivered to Syria while the human rights crisis in the country was deteriorating.
Mr Isaikin’s mens rea may be one of oblique intent, which requires the awareness of the certainty or high probability that certain consequences will flow from one’s actions. His statement that ‘whoever is planning an attack should think about’ Rosoboronexport’s provision of defence systems and missiles indicates his awareness of the consequences of such deliveries, namely a contribution to the maintenance of the Syrian crisis. It cannot presently be stated with certainty, however, that Mr Isaikin has been aware that Rosoboronexport’s arms transfers have with certainty or high probability aided and abetted the commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity by Syria.
In an effort to elicit responses from Mr Isaikin and the Russian Federation to the above discussion, the author of the present paper sent letters to Mr Isaikin and the Russian embassy in the Netherlands. The letters have been included as Appendices B and C to this paper. Upon submission of this paper, neither had been answered.
In this case, none of the other obstructions to admissibility in Article 17(1) apply. With reference to Article 17(1)(b), there is no indication that any State with jurisdiction has been investigating the situation in Syria for the purpose of the possible initiation of proceedings against Mr Isaikin. Neither is there any indication that he has already been convicted for Rosoboronexport’s involvement in Syria; the ne bis in idem principle in Article 17(1)(c) and Article 20 is thus respected. And, lastly, the possibility that Mr Isaikin is complicit in the commission of crimes against humanity and war crimes, when considered against the background of the severity of the Syrian civil war, strongly suggests that the case is of sufficient gravity to be admitted to the Court, per Article 17(1)(d).
More evidence is needed to decisively determine Mr Isaikin’s actus reus and mens rea. Nevertheless, on the basis of the Kamuhanda Judgment it may be argued, prima facie, that the actus reus threshold developed by the ad hoc Tribunals has been met. Because the Rome Statute has no actus reus threshold for aiding and abetting, Mr Isaikin could theoretically be prosecuted before the ICC for his public comments or Rosoboronexport’s delivery of only a small portion of the Russian-Syrian arms deals. However, this would not befit the mandate of the ICC, which is concerned only with ‘the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole.’180 The better option would be to demand that for a finding of criminal responsibility Mr Isaikin has significantly and with oblique intent contributed to the commission of crimes under the jurisdiction of the Court.
In the light of the tendency in international criminal law to marginalise attention for economic contributions to violations of international law, this paper has aimed to provide some thoughts on the ways in which business leaders may be held accountable before the ICC. It has argued that, because the liability of business leaders would most likely consist of aiding and abetting, the requirements of Article 25(3)(c) would have to be met. Given that the mandate of the ICC is restricted to prosecuting only the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole, it would be apt that the Court uphold the customary standard that the aider and abettor’s assistance to the principal perpetrator must have been significant or substantial. Nevertheless, the actus reus of the aider and abettor may be entirely geographically disconnected from that of the principal perpetrator and there exists (albeit very limited) support for the notion of ex post facto aiding and abetting under the Rome Statute. The mens rea for aiding and abetting under Article 25(3)(c) and Article 30(2)(b) should be interpreted as demanding oblique intent, which heightens the ad hoc Tribunals’ standard of recklessness. With the available facts concerning the involvement of Rosoboronexport and its Director General Anatoly P. Isaikin in the international crimes committed by Syria, the increased mens rea standard considerably hardens the making of a case against Mr Isaikin. Prima facie, the customary actus reus standard appears to have been met.
Ultimately, the capacity of international criminal law, at the ICC and elsewhere, to hold business leaders responsible for their assistance to perpetrators of international crimes is a political question. In the case of Rosoboronexport’s arms deals with Syria, the initiation of proceedings is unlikely; the fact that neither Russia nor Syria has ratified the Rome Statute means that the ICC lacks both personal and territorial jurisdiction, either of which is necessary as a precondition for the exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction in the cases of a referral of the situation by a State Party under Article 13(a) and the Prosecutor’s proprio motu initiation of investigations under Article 13(c). These conditions and the implausibility of a ‘self-referral’ by either State practically preclude the triggering of the Court’s jurisdiction by Article 13(a) and (c) of the Rome Statute. A referral of the situation to the Prosecutor by the UNSC under Article 13(b), likewise, is also implausible, given Russia’s veto powers in the Council.
If neither domestic jurisdictions nor the ICC could ensure criminal accountability for international crimes committed in Syria since March 2011, however, another option would be to establish an ad hoc tribunal with the appropriate jurisdiction. Such a tribunal could be established by the UNSC, as was done with the ICTY and ICTR, or could also possess a more hybrid character, with both international and national laws, judges and funding, as has been the case with the Special Court for Sierra Leone, the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, the Special Panels of the Dili District Court and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. However, because of the power and willingness of Russia and China to block UNSC decisions on Syria, the establishment of an ad hoc tribunal by the UNSC may be unlikely. Likewise, the construction of a hybrid court would be hampered by the hostility of the al-Assad government to any form of foreign intervention in the country barring by its allies.
C. Future prospects: corporate liability before the ICC?
One notion that would alter the prospects of the ICC’s capacity to tackle economic contributions to international crimes is the introduction of corporate criminal liability, which would complement rather than exclude individual criminal responsibility. At least four arguments speak in favour of this proposition. First, corporations are often much more potent and able to commit international crimes than separate individuals.185 Second, corporate criminal liability would ensure that business leaders cannot hide behind the structure of their company, which is sometimes specifically designed to avoid any form of criminal liability.186 Third, it would stimulate ‘the adoption of better standards, more responsible corporate behaviour and deterrence from future misconduct.’187 Fourth, corporate criminal liability would come with such forms of punishment as fines and, in rare cases, corporate dissolution, that could be more effective in halting the corporation’s malicious conduct than imprisonment of individual actors.188 However, it has also been suggested that economic sanctions ‘might appear totally inadequate compared to the harm caused by international crimes’ and that other forms of punishment, particularly adverse publicity, would be more effective deterrents.189 Additionally, the inherent limits to criminal liability may not always be respected when corporate criminal liability is used wherever the conventional alley of individual responsibility provides no satisfaction.190 There is also currently insufficient State support to provide any international tribunal criminal jurisdiction over legal persons.191 Still, the potential of corporate criminal liability and the limited support it enjoys192 merit a short examination of how corporate liability at the ICC could be envisioned.
During the Rome Diplomatic Conference for an International Criminal Court, whose conclusion marked the adoption of the Rome Statute, a proposal by the French delegation advocated the inclusion of criminal liability for legal persons in the Statute. The proposal was turned down, even though ‘in a number of aspects it [was] uncommonly modest and restrictive’: for example, as a sine qua non of corporate liability it requires that a natural person be convicted too.193 That person, according to the French proposal, must have been in a position of control in the corporation, on behalf of and with the explicit consent of which that person acted. One may think, in this regard, of those convicted in the Zyklon B and Industrialists cases, who ‘were the heads, hearts and hands of their companies and had full powers to steer their course’.194 It has been suggested that, if corporate liability were to be included in the Rome Statute, several requirements should be added to those stated in the French proposal; it would also be relevant whether the crimes occurred ‘in the daily course of the corporation’s activities,’ and whether the corporation made commercial profit from these crimes.195 Together, these requirements would ensure the individual criminal responsibility of the business leader and the attribution of the actus reus and mens rea of the business leader to the corporation.
However, corporate criminal liability suffers from conceptual difficulties. The following discussion only focuses on one of them: the question of the mens rea of a corporation. The French proposal stipulated that for a corporation to incur criminal liability, the convicted individual person must have acted on behalf of and with the explicit consent of the corporation. Thus, the corporation must have consented to, or at least accepted, the actus reus of the convicted individual.196 Given that meaningful consent or acceptance presupposes a certain degree of power, however, consent and acceptance can generally only be granted by business leaders (individually or collectively). In this way, the mentes reae of corporations and their leaders would coincide; if the same or similar acti rei are alleged, then this would lead to the risk that a conviction of a business leader almost automatically entails a simultaneous conviction of the business itself. The distinction between the natural person of the business leader and the legal person of the business would be blurred. The introduction of corporate liability in the Rome Statute would require, as a precondition, that the question of this distinction as well as other issues197 be overcome.
In addition, if the export is not prohibited under Article 6, State Parties must nonetheless assess, prior to authorisation of the export, whether the arms could be used to commit or facilitate, inter alia, serious violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law.200 The Treaty allows for the settlement of disputes relating to its interpretation or application by judicial settlement and arbitration, among other means.201 Thus, upon entry into force the Treaty will have the potential to significantly restrain the contributions of the global arms trade to violations of international law.
Even with a fully functioning Arms Trade Treaty, of course, businesses and other economic actors will continue to fuel and commit violations of international law. If anything, in 2014 there is more, not less verity in Cassese’s 1986 observation that, in spite of the sizeable economic and political power of many corporations, their global operations and interactions with States, including in arbitration, States are reluctant to place a corresponding degree of international legal responsibility on corporations.202 In addition to the existence of the Arms Trade Treaty and a limited number of international criminal law cases involving business leaders, some soft law instruments are now in place that address human rights obligations of corporations.203 Nevertheless, the project of international law continues to be largely incapable of holding economic actors accountable for their contributions to armed conflict and human rights violations. It is time for this to change.
1AE Kramer, ‘Russia Sending Missile Systems to Shield Syria’ The New York Times (New York, 15 June 2012) <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/16/world/europe/russia-sending-air-and-sea-defenses-to-syria.html?_r=0> accessed 16 March 2014.
2G Baars, ‘Law(yers) congealing capitalism: On the (im)possibility of restraining business in conflict through international criminal law’ (PhD dissertation, University College London 2012) 3.
3One such notable exception is war crimes against property. The Rome Statute includes, in this regard, the destruction, appropriation, seizure and pillage of property; Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (adopted 17 July 1998, entered into force 1 July 2002) art 8(2)(a).
4J Kyriakakis, ‘Justice after War: Economic Actors, Economic Crimes, and the Moral Imperative for Accountability after War’ in L May and A Forcehimes (eds), Morality, Jus Post Bellum, and International Law (CUP 2012).
5F Jessberger, ‘On the Origins of Individual Criminal Responsibility under International Law for Business Activity’ (2010) 8 J Int’l Crim Just 783, 801.
6Judgment of the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal 1946 (1947) 41 AJIL 172, 223.
8Trial of Carl Krauch and Twenty-Two Others (1948), X L Rep Trials War Crim 1.
9A Cassese and others, International Criminal Law: Cases and Commentary (OUP 2011) 248.
10Trial of Carl Krauch and Twenty-Two Others (n 8) 36-7.
11Trial of Alfried Felix Alwyn Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach and Eleven Others (1948), X L Rep Trials War Crim 69.
13Trial of Friedrich Flick and Five Others (1947), IX L Rep Trials War Crim 1.
15MD Byrne, ‘When in Rome: Aiding and Abetting in Wang Xiaoning v Yahoo’ (2008-2009) 34 Brook J Int’l L 151, 177.
16Trial of Bruno Tesch and Two Others (1946), I L Rep Trials War Crim 93.
18H van der Wilt, ‘Corporate Criminal Responsibility for International Crimes: Exploring the Possibilities’ (2013) 12 Chinese JIL 43, 52.
19Rome Statute (n 3) art 1.
20OK Fauchald and J Stigen, ‘Corporate Responsibility before International Institutions’ (2009) 40 Geo Wash Int’l L Rev 1025, 1035.
21Van der Wilt, ‘Corporate Criminal Responsibility’ (n 18) 64.
22Fauchald and Stigen (n 20) 1034.
23Business leaders could also incur individual criminal responsibility under other accessorial modes of liability provided for in the Rome Statute. For a discussion on business leaders and Article 25(3)(d) see H Vest, ‘Business Leaders and the Modes of Individual Criminal Responsibility under International Law’ (2010) 8 JICJ 851, 864-65.
24Rome Statute (n 3) art 25(3)(c).
25JG Stewart, ‘Atrocity, Commerce and Accountability: The International Criminal Liability of Corporate Actors’ (2010) 8 JICJ 313, 323.
26An alternative spelling is Anatoly P Isaykin.
27S Wirth, ‘Committing liability in international criminal law’ in C Stahn and G Sluiter (eds), The Emerging Practice of the International Criminal Court (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2009) 329.
28K Ambos, ‘Article 25: Individual Criminal Responsibility’ in O Triffterer (ed), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (2nd edn, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft 2008) 477.
31KAA Khan, R Dixon, Archbold, International Criminal Courts: Practice, Procedure and Evidence (Sweet & Maxwell 2009) 865; Prosecutor v Brđanin (Appeal Judgment) IT-99-36-A, A Ch (3 April 2007) 355.
32WA Schabas, ‘Enforcing international humanitarian law: Catching the accomplices’ (2001) 83 Int’l Rev Red Cross 439, 447; Prosecutor v Akayesu (Trial Judgment) ICTR-96-4-T, T Ch I (2 September 1998) 530.
33G Werle, Principals of International Criminal Law (TMC Asser Press 2009) 279.
34Rome Statute (n 3) art 30.
36Updated Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (last amended 7 July 2009) art 7(1); Statute for the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (last amended 16 December 2009) art 6(1).
37Rome Statute (n 3) art 25.
38V Nerlich, ‘The status of ICTY and ICTR precedent in proceedings before the ICC’ in C Stahn and G Sluiter (eds), The Emerging Practice of the International Criminal Court (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2009) 325.
39S Finnin, ‘Mental Elements under Article 30 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Comparative Analysis’ (2012) 61 Int’l & Comp LQ 325, 354.
40AJ Sebok, ‘Taking Tort Law Seriously in the Alien Tort Statute’ (2007-2008) 33 Brook J Int’l L 871, 883.
43Prosecutor v Akayesu (Judgment) (n 32) 484.
44Prosecutor v Furundžija (Trial Judgment) ICTY-95-17/1-T, T Ch II (10 December 1998).
45Prosecutor v Tadić (Trial Judgment) ICTY-94-1-T, T Ch II (7 May 1997); Prosecutor v Tadić (Appeal Judgment) ICTY-94-1-A, A Ch (15 July 1999).
46Prosecutor v Perišić (Appeal Judgment) IT-04-81-A, A Ch (28 February 2013); Prosecutor v Šainović et al (Appeal Judgment) IT-05-87-A, A Ch (23 January 2014).
47S Finnin, Elements of Accessorial Modes of Liability: Article 25(3)(b) and (c) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2012) 74; Prosecutor v Perišić (Appeal Judgment) (n 46) 28.
48International Law Commission, Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind (1996) art 2(3)(d).
50Schabas, ‘Enforcing international humanitarian law’ (n 32) 448.
51R Cryer and others, An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure (3rd edn, CUP 2011) 377.
53Rome Statute (n 3) art 1; Finnin, Elements of Accessorial Modes of Liability (n 47) 137.
54ILC, Report of the Commission to the General Assembly on the work of its 48th Session (1996) A/CN.4/SER.A/1996/Add.l (Part 2) 21.
55Prosecutor v Furundžija (Trial Judgment) (n 44) 231.
57Statute of the International Court of Justice (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945) art 38(1).
58Finnin, Elements of Accessorial Modes of Liability (n 47) 125.
59ILC, Draft Code (n 48) art 2(3)(d).
60Prosecutor v Furundžija (Trial Judgment) (n 44) 232.
62For a list, see: Finnin, Elements of Accessorial Modes of Liability (n 47) 74.
63Prosecutor v Furundžija (Trial Judgment) (n 44) 230.
65Prosecutor v Tadić (Appeal Judgment) (n 45) 229 ii.
67Prosecutor v Perišić (Appeal Judgment) (n 46) 37.
69Prosecutor v Mrkšić and Šljivančanin (Appeal Judgment) IT-95-13/1-A, A Ch (5 May 2009) 159.
70Prosecutor v Blagojević and Jokić (Appeal Judgment) IT-02-60-A, A Ch (9 May 2007) 189.
71Prosecutor v Lukić and Lukić (Appeal Judgment) IT-98-32/1-A, A Ch (4 December 2012) 424.
72Prosecutor v Perišić (Appeal Judgment) (n 46) 32-36.
74Prosecutor v Šainović et al (Appeal Judgment) (n 46) 1617-1625, 1650; Prosecutor v Taylor (Appeal Judgment) SCSL-03-01-A, A Ch (26 September 2013) 471-481.
75Prosecutor v Šainović et al (Appeal Judgment) (n 46) 1623; Prosecutor v Taylor (Appeal Judgment) (n 74) 478.
76Prosecutor v Šainović et al (Appeal Judgment) (n 46) 1626-42; Prosecutor v Taylor (Appeal Judgment) (n 74) 473-4.
77Prosecutor v Šainović et al (Appeal Judgment) (n 46) 1643-45; Prosecutor v Taylor (Appeal Judgment) (n 74) 474.
78Finnin, Elements of Accessorial Modes of Liability (n 47) 82.
79Prosecutor v Perišić (Appeal Judgment) (n 46) 39.
80For a list of cases, see Finnin, Elements of Accessorial Modes of Liability (n 47) 83.
81United States v Hans Altfuldisch et al (1947), Deputy Judge Advocate’s Office, 7708 War Crimes Group, Review and Recommendations of the Deputy Judge Advocate for War Crimes, Case No 000.50.5 4.
82Prosecutor v Furundžija (Trial Judgment) (n 44) 209.
83United States v Hans Altfuldisch et al (n 81) 4, 17-8.
84Prosecutor v Furundžija (Trial Judgment) (n 44) 209.
85Prosecutor v Tadić (Trial Judgment) (n 45) 679.
86ILC, ‘Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1996’ (n 54) (volume I) 40, (volume II part 2) 21.
88Prosecutor v Furundžija (Trial Judgment) (n 44) 230; Prosecutor v Haradinaj et al (Trial Judgment) ICTY-04-84-T, T Ch I (3 April 2008) 145.
89Finnin, Elements of Accessorial Modes of Liability (n 47) 88.
92Prosecutor v Furundžija (Trial Judgment) (n 44) 209; Vest (n 23) 857; Ambos (n 28) 483; M Ewela Badar, ‘Participation in Crimes in the Jurisprudence of the ICTY and ICTR’ in WA Schabas and N Bernaz (eds), Routledge Handbook of International Criminal Law (Routledge 2011) 251.
93Rome Statute (n 3) art 25(3)(c).
97Prosecutor v Tadić (Trial Judgment) (n 45) 688.
99Prosecutor v Tadić (Trial Judgment) (n 45) 689.
100Prosecutor v Furundžija (Trial Judgment) (n 44) 232.
101Finnin, Elements of Accessorial Modes of Liability (n 47) 127.
103Prosecutor v Orić (Appeal Judgment) IT-03-68-A, A Ch (3 July 2008) 43; Prosecutor v Mrkšić and Šljivančanin (Appeal Judgment) (n 69) 146; Prosecutor v Nahimana et al (Appeal Judgment) ICTR-99-52-A, A Ch (28 November 2007) 482; Prosecutor v Krnojelac (Appeal Judgment) IT-97-25-A, A Ch (17 September 2003) 51.
104I Bantekas, International Criminal Law (4th ed, Hart Publishing 2010) 69.
105Prosecutor v Tadić (Trial Judgment) (n 45) 687.
106Trial of Gustav Becker, Wilhelm Weber and 18 Others (Judgment) (1947), VII L Rep Trials War Crim 67 71.
107Schabas, ‘Enforcing international humanitarian law’ (n 32) 446.
108Prosecutor v Perišić (Appeal Judgment) (n 46), Joint separate opinion of Judges Theodor Meron and Carmel Agius 3.
109Prosecutor v Taylor (Appeal Judgment) (n 74) ; Prosecutor v Šainović et al (Appeal Judgment) (n 46) 1649.
110Rome Statute (n 3) art 30.
111DK Piragoff and D Robinson, ‘Article 30: Mental Element’ in O Triffterer (ed), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Observers’ Notes, Article by Article (2nd edn, Beck 2008) 860.
112Cryer and others (n 51) 377.
114WA Schabas, The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome Statute (OUP 2010) 436.
116Finnin, Elements of Accessorial Modes of Liability (n 47) 191.
120Prosecutor v Furundžija (Trial Judgment) (n 44) 236.
121Finnin, ‘Mental Elements’ (n 39) 356-7.
122Rome Statute (n 3) art 30(1).
123Finnin, ‘Mental Elements’ (n 39) 354.
127Piragoff and Robinson (n 111) 855.
130Robert Cryer, Prosecuting International Crimes: Selectivity and the International Criminal Law Regime (CUP 2005) 315-6.
131Model Penal Code (American Law Institute, 1985) art 2.06(3)(a); Ambos (n 28) 483; Vest (n 23) 861.
133Finnin, ‘Mental Elements’ (n 39) 332.
134UN News Centre, ‘Talks on chemical weapons probe “productive” – UN and Syria jointly say’ <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=45510#.Uy8jA4WYXiA> accessed 23 March 2014.
135Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, [foreign-source: ] ’ةيروسلا ةروثلا ةقالطنا ذنم اوضق ًافلأ 146 نم رثكأ‘ <http://syriahr.com/index.php?option=com_news&nid=16470&Itemid=2&task=displaynews#.UyN044WYXiD> accessed 23 March 2014.
136In doing so, this paper aims to remain neutral towards claims that other actors have also committed international crimes.
137Letter from the Permanent Mission of Switzerland to the United Nations to Mohammad Masood Khan, President of the Security Council for the month of January 2013 (14 January 2013) <http://www.news.admin.ch/NSBSubscriber/message/attachments/29290.pdf> accessed 24 March 2014.
138Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic’ <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/IICISyria/Pages/IndependentInternationalCommission.aspx> accessed 23 March 2014.
139United Nations Human Rights Council, Resolution S-17/1 (2011) UN Doc A/HRC/S-17/1.
140UNHRC, ‘Report of the independent international commission of inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic’ (23 November 2011) UN Doc A/HRC/S-17/2/Add.1 1, 20.
141UNHRC, ‘Report of the independent international commission of inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic’ (22 February 2012) UN Doc A/HRC/19/69 22.
143UNHRC, ‘Report of the independent international commission of inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic’ (16 August 2012) UN Doc A/HRC/21/50 1.
144ibid 48; UNHRC, ‘Report of the independent international commission of inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic’ (5 February 2013) UN Doc A/HRC/22/59 127; UNHRC, ‘Report of the independent international commission of inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic’ (12 February 2014) UN Doc A/HRC/25/65 25.
145Open Joint Stock Company Rosoboronexport (Rosoboronexport), ‘Rosoboronexport · Status’ <http://roe.ru/roe/eng_status.html> accessed 16 March 2014.
147Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation, ‘Press Release’ (5 October 2011) <http://www.fsvts.gov.ru/materialsf/66A5E3C6232F007344257920004A3192.html> accessed 16 March 2014.
148K Roth, ‘Letter to Rosoboronexport on Syrian Weapons Supplies’ Human Rights Watch (6 April 2012) <http://www.hrw.org/node/107677> accessed 16 March 2014.
150Rosoboronexport, ‘Rosoboronexport · Status’ (n 145).
153RIA Novosti, ‘Russian Arms Exporter Sold $13.2Bln in 2013’ (27 January 2014) <http://en.ria.ru/military_news/20140127/186951155/Russian-Arms-Exporter-Sold-132Bln-in-2013.html> accessed 16 March 2014.
154Rosoboronexport, ‘Rosoboronexport · Director General’ <http://roe.ru/roe/eng_gd.html> accessed 16 March 2014; Decree of the President of the Russian Federation, ‘On the General Director of Federal State Unitary Enterprise Rosoboronexport’ No 1574 (26 November 2007).
155L-M Clouet, ‘Rosoboronexport, Spearhead of the Russian Arms Industry’ (2007) Russie.NEI.Visions No 22, 6.
156A Kassianova, ‘Enter Rosoboronexport’ (2006) PONARS Policy Memo No 406, 2.
158Kramer (n 1); RIA Novosti, ‘Russia’s Rosoboronexport to Continue Arms Supplies to Syria’ (12 June 2012) <http://en.ria.ru/military_news/20120612/173985454.html> accessed 16 March 2014.
159Prosecutor v Kamuhanda (Appeal Judgment) ICTR-99-54A-A, A Ch (19 September 2005) 384.
160The Judgment states that ‘[t]he Accused told those present that he would bring ‘equipment’ for them to start ?,g [sic] that they should distribute those weapons and ?…g [sic] that he would return to see if they had begun the killings, or so that the killings could start.’ ibid 383.
163Trial of Franz Schonfeld and Nine Others (1946), XI L Rep Trials War Crim 64, 70.
165JL Hood, ‘What is Reasonable Cause to Believe?: The Mens Rea Required for Conviction Under 21 U.S.C. § 841’ (2009-2010) 30 Pace L Rev 1360, 1362.
166One question that cannot presently be adequately addressed, for example, is that of the possible relief, under Article 33 of the Rome Statute, of Mr Isaikin’s individual criminal responsibility if he aided and abetted pursuant to superior orders. According to such an argument, Mr Isaikin, even in his capacity as Director General of Rosoboronexport, could be relieved of individual criminal responsibility because his company, in executing contracts signed between Russia and Syria, has been merely carrying out orders imposed on it by the Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation, over which the President of the Russian Federation presides. In addition to this legal obligation to carry out orders, a relief of superior orders under Article 33 requires that the person did not know that the order, which may not have been manifestly unlawful, was unlawful. At present, there is insufficient evidence available to decide on this question.
167Interfax-AVN, ‘Russia & CIS Defense Industry Weekly’ (17 August 2011).
168DM Herszenhorn, ‘For Syria, Reliant on Russia for Weapons and Food, Old Bonds Run Deep’ The New York Times (18 February 2012) <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/world/middleeast/for-russia-and-syria-bonds-are-old-and-deep.html> accessed 24 March 2014.
172Rome Statute (n 3) art 17(1)(a).
173The nationality principle is recognised by Russian domestic law; Criminal Code of the Russian Federation No 63-FZ of 13 June 1996 (last amended 1 March 2012) art 12(1). Aside from the traditional principles of jurisdiction, Mr Isaikin could also be prosecuted under the header of universal jurisdiction, perhaps the most disputed principle of jurisdiction. One of the most obvious options for a prosecution of an alleged violation of the law of nations on the basis of universal jurisdiction has been to take the case under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS). However, the US Supreme Court in Kiobel held that the ATS applies only to violations of the law of nations committed within the territory of the United States. Thus, it appears that the ATS can no longer be used to invoke universal jurisdiction; Kiobel et al v Royal Dutch Petroleum Co et al, 569 US __ (2013).
174UNHRC, ‘Report of the independent international commission of inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic’ (5 February 2013) (n 144) 86; UNHRC, ‘Report of the independent international commission of inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic’ (16 August 2012) (n 143) 77.
175Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (adopted 12 August 1949, entered into force 21 October 1950) 75 UNTS 31 art 49; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (adopted 12 August 1949, entered into force 21 October 1950) 75 UNTS 85 art 50; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (12 August 1949, entered into force 21 October 1950) 75 UNTS 135 art 129; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (adopted 12 August 1949, entered into force 21 October 1950) 75 UNTS 287 art 146.
177Prosecutor v Tadić (Trial Judgment) (n 45) 559.
178For example, see: Prosecutor v Furundžija (Trial Judgment) (n 44); Prosecutor v Akayesu (Trial Judgment) (n 32); Prosecutor v Brđanin (Trial Judgment) IT-99-36-T, T Ch II (1 September 2004).
179UNHRC, ‘Report of the independent international commission of inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic’ (5 February 2013) (n 144) 127.
180Rome Statute (n 3) art 1.
181Baars (n 2) 3; Kyriakakis (n 4) 113-14; Jessberger (n 5) 801; Fauchald and Stigen (n 20) 1035.
182L Moreno Ocampo, ‘Communications Received by the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC’ International Criminal Court: The Prosecutor (The Hague, 16 July 2003) <http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/9B5B8D79-C9C2-4515-906E-125113CE6064/277680/16_july__english1.pdf> accessed 17 March 2014.
185Van der Wilt (n 18) 73.
186Nora Gotzmann, ‘Legal Personality of the Corporation and International Criminal Law: Globalisation, Corporate Human Rights Abuses and the Rome Statute’ (2008) 1 QLSR 1, 43.
189Fauchald and Stigen (n 20) 1042.
190M Kremnitzer, ‘A Possible Case for Imposing Criminal Liability on Corporations in International Criminal Law’ (2010) 8 JICJ 909, 911.
191Fauchald and Stigen (n 20) 1041.
192ILC, ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fiftieth session, Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-third session, Supplement No 10’ (20 April - 12 June and 27 July - 14 August 1998) UN Doc A/53/10 77; JG Ruggie, ‘Business and Human Rights: The Evolving International Agenda’ (2007) Corporate Social Responsibility Initiative Working Paper No 38, 17 <http://www.hks.harvard.edu/m-rcbg/CSRI/publications/workingpaper_38_ruggie.pdf> accessed 19 March 2014.
193Van der Wilt (n 18) 46-48.
197It would also have to be asked, for example, how the above requirements relating to the corporate actus reus and mens rea would be integrated into the Rome Statute. In addition to the necessary modification of Article 25(1) on the restriction of the Statute’s jurisdiction to natural persons, it would have to be considered that if corporate liability, like the liability of business leaders, would typically consist of aiding and abetting, then the conditions of Article 25(3)(c) would have to be met, including the oblique intent standard of ‘[f]or the purpose of facilitating.’ This would require a higher mens rea standard than the explicit consent or acceptance requirement suggested by Van der Wilt. Alternatively, a separate and novel clause specifically addressing corporate liability could be included.
198Arms Trade Treaty (adopted 2 April 2013, open for signature 3 June 2013) UN Doc A/RES/67/234.
202A Cassese, International Law in a Divided World (OUP 1986) 103.
203Notable among these are the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises.
204Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Arms Transfers Database, ‘Transfers of major conventional weapons: sorted by supplier. Deals with deliveries or orders made for year range 2011 to 2013’ accessed 23 March 2014.
205Open Joint Stock Company Rosoboronexport, ‘Rosoboronexport · Status’ <http://roe.ru/roe/eng_status.html> accessed 2 April 2013.
206AE Kramer, ‘Russia Sending Missile Systems to Shield Syria’ (The New York Times, 15 June 2012) <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/16/world/europe/russia-sending-air-and-sea-defenses-to-syria.html?_r=0> accessed 2 April 2013; Interfax-AVN, ‘Russia & CIS Defense Industry Weekly’ (17 August 2011); David M Herszenhorn, ‘For Syria, Reliant on Russia for Weapons and Food, Old Bonds Run Deep’ The New York Times (18 February 2012) <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/world/middleeast/for-russia-and-syria-bonds-are-old-and-deep.html> accessed 2 April 2013.
207Open Joint Stock Company Rosoboronexport, ‘Rosoboronexport · Status’ <http://roe.ru/roe/eng_status.html> accessed 2 April 2013.
208AE Kramer, ‘Russia Sending Missile Systems to Shield Syria’ (The New York Times, 15 June 2012) <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/16/world/europe/russia-sending-air-and-sea-defenses-to-syria.html?_r=0> accessed 2 April 2013; Interfax-AVN, ‘Russia & CIS Defense Industry Weekly’ (17 August 2011); David M. Herszenhorn, ‘For Syria, Reliant on Russia for Weapons and Food, Old Bonds Run Deep’ The New York Times (18 February 2012) <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/world/middleeast/for-russia-and-syria-bonds-are-old-and-deep.html> accessed 2 April 2013.
Candidate MA International Law (2015) at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Switzerland. BA Liberal Arts & Sciences (2013) at Leiden University College The Hague. The author would like to thank Joe Powderly, Dan Saxon, Alinta Geling, Sanne Nusselder, Bob van Meijeren, Pieter Wezeman and the Editorial Board of the Utrecht Journal of International and European Law.
36 96K9 Pantsyr-S1 Mobile AD system 2006 2008-2013 36 Part of $400-730 million deal; number could be up to 50.
12 S-125 Pechora-2M SAM system 2007 2011-2013 12 $200 million deal; Syrian SA-3 SAM systems rebuilt to Pechora M2 version.
72 Yakhont/SS-N-26 Anti-ship missile 2007 2010-2011 72 Bastion (SS-C-5) coastal defence system.
700 9M311/SA-19 Grison SAM 2006 2008-2013 700 Part of $400 million deal; for Pantsyr AD systems.
Herewith I would like to bring to your attention that, in your capacity as the Director General of Rosoboronexport, you may be individually criminally responsible for aiding and abetting the commission of crimes in the Syrian Arab Republic potentially under the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague, The Netherlands.
There are several suggestions that your company has been assisting the commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity by the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011. According to the Arms Transfers Database of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, several contracts were or are in force that provide for the transfers of conventional weapons from the Russian Federation to the Syrian Arab Republic in the period 2011-2013. These transfers are listed in the annex to this letter. Given Rosoboronexport’s status as “the sole Russian State intermediary agency responsible for import/export of the full range of defense and dual-use end products, technologies and services,”205 and your public statements regarding the delivery of weapons by Rosoboronexport to Syria,206 it appears likely that your company has indeed been transferring armaments to the Government of Syria, in spite of the human rights tragedy and civil war that have been devastating the country since March 2011.
Indeed, according to the United Nations’ independent international commission of inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic (COI), the Syrian Government has been committing crimes against humanity since March 2011 and war crimes since the summer months of 2012. Under the Rome Statute of the ICC, the Court has jurisdiction with respect to, inter alia, crimes against humanity and war crimes. The deliveries of arms by Rosoboronexport to Syria, as well as your comments relating to these deliveries, may constitute evidence of your aiding and abetting the crimes committed by the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic. Per Article 25(3)(c) of the Rome Statute, aiding and abetting crimes under the jurisdiction of the Court gives rise to individual criminal responsibility.
On the basis of these facts I have developed a prima facie case against you and Rosoboronexport, and I will be sharing this research with NGOs and other interested parties.
Given the severity of the human rights crisis in the Syrian Arab Republic and of the refugee crisis in the wider region I urge you to immediately halt all arms transfers of Rosoboronexport to the Syrian Arab Republic, so that your company may cease any and all involvement it may have in these tragedies. I would appreciate a response from you concerning your potential criminal liability for your company’s involvement in the commission of international crimes in Syria.
Herewith I would like to bring to your attention that Mr Anatoly P. Isaikin, the Director General of Rosoboronexport, of which the Russian Federation is the sole stakeholder, may be individually criminally responsible for aiding and abetting the commission of crimes in the Syrian Arab Republic potentially under the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague, The Netherlands.
There are several suggestions that Rosoboronexport has been assisting the commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity by the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011. According to the Arms Transfers Database of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, several contracts were or are in force that provide for the transfers of conventional weapons from the Russian Federation to the Syrian Arab Republic in the period 2011-2013. These transfers are listed in the annex to this letter. Given Rosoboronexport’s status as “the sole Russian State intermediary agency responsible for import/export of the full range of defense and dual-use end products, technologies and services,”207 and Mr Isaikin’s public statements regarding the delivery of weapons by Rosoboronexport to Syria,208 it appears likely that his company has indeed been transferring armaments to the Government of Syria, in spite of the human rights tragedy and civil war that have been devastating the country since March 2011.
Indeed, according to the United Nations’ independent international commission of inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic (COI), the Syrian Government has been committing crimes against humanity since March 2011 and war crimes since the summer months of 2012. Under the Rome Statute of the ICC, the Court has jurisdiction with respect to, inter alia, crimes against humanity and war crimes. The deliveries of arms by Rosoboronexport to Syria, as well as Mr Isaikin’s comments relating to these deliveries, may constitute evidence of his aiding and abetting the crimes committed by the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic. Per Article 25(3)(c) of the Rome Statute, aiding and abetting crimes under the jurisdiction of the Court gives rise to individual criminal responsibility.
On the basis of these facts I have developed a prima facie case against Mr Isaikin and Rosoboronexport, and I will be sharing this research with NGOs and other interested parties.
Bearing in mind the severity of the human rights crisis in the Syrian Arab Republic and of the refugee crisis in the wider region, I would like to ask whether you are aware of the fact that Rosoboronexport has been transferring arms to the Syrian Arab Republic, and what the Russian Federation is doing with regard to the potential criminal liability of Mr Isaikin for Rosoboronexport’s involvement in the commission of international crimes in the Syrian Arab Republic.

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