Source: http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/51898
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 04:13:30+00:00

Document:
RIDO MONTECILLO, PETITIONER,VS. IGNACIA REYNES AND SPOUSES REDEMPTOR AND ELISA ABUCAY, RESPONDENTS.
On March 24, 1993, the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 18, rendered a Decision declaring the deed of sale of a parcel of land in favor of petitioner null and void ab initio. The Court of Appeals, in its July 16, 1998 Decision as well as its February 11, 1999 Order denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration, affirmed the trial court’s decision in toto. Before this Court now is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Court of Appeals’ decision and order.
Respondents Ignacia Reynes (“Reynes” for brevity) and Spouses Abucay (“Abucay Spouses” for brevity) filed on June 20, 1984 a complaint for Declaration of Nullity and Quieting of Title against petitioner Rido Montecillo (“Montecillo” for brevity). Reynes asserted that she is the owner of a lot situated in Mabolo, Cebu City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 74196 and containing an area of 448 square meters (“Mabolo Lot” for brevity). In 1981, Reynes sold 185 square meters of the Mabolo Lot to the Abucay Spouses who built a residential house on the lot they bought.
A parcel of land (Lot 203-B-2-B of the subdivision plan Psd-07-01-00 2370, being a portion of Lot 203-B-2, described on plan (LRC) Psd-76821, L.R.C. (GLRO) Record No. 5988), situated in the Barrio of Mabolo, City of Cebu. Bounded on the SE., along line 1-2 by Lot 206; on the SW., along line 2-3, by Lot 202, both of Banilad Estate; on the NW., along line 4-5, by Lot 203-B-2-A of the subdivision of Four Hundred Forty Eight (448) square meters, more or less.
Reynes further alleged that Montecillo failed to pay the purchase price after the lapse of the one-month period, prompting Reynes to demand from Montecillo the return of the Deed of Sale. Since Montecillo refused to return the Deed of Sale, Reynes executed a document unilaterally revoking the sale and gave a copy of the document to Montecillo.
A parcel of land (Lot 203-B-2-B of the subdivision plan psd-07-01-002370, being a portion of Lot 203-B-2, described on plan (LRC) Psd 76821, LRC (GLRO) Record No. 5988) situated in Mabolo, Cebu City, along Arcilla Street, containing an area of total FOUR HUNDRED FORTY EIGHT (448) Square meters.
of which I am the absolute owner thereof free from all liens and encumbrances and warrant the same against claim of third persons and other deeds affecting said parcel of land other than that to the said spouses and inconsistent hereto is declared without any effect.
Reynes and the Abucay Spouses alleged that on June 18, 1984 they received information that the Register of Deeds of Cebu City issued Certificate of Title No. 90805 in the name of Montecillo for the Mabolo Lot.
Reynes and the Abucay Spouses argued that “for lack of consideration there (was) no meeting of the minds” between Reynes and Montecillo. Thus, the trial court should declare null and void ab initio Montecillo’s Deed of Sale, and order the cancellation of Certificate of Title No. 90805 in the name of Montecillo.
In his Answer, Montecillo, a bank executive with a B.S. Commerce degree, claimed he was a buyer in good faith and had actually paid the P47,000.00 consideration stated in his Deed of Sale. Montecillo, however, admitted he still owed Reynes a balance of P10,000.00. He also alleged that he paid P50,000.00 for the release of the chattel mortgage which he argued constituted a lien on the Mabolo Lot. He further alleged that he paid for the real property tax as well as the capital gains tax on the sale of the Mabolo Lot.
In their Reply, Reynes and the Abucay Spouses contended that Montecillo did not have authority to discharge the chattel mortgage, especially after Reynes revoked Montecillo’s Deed of Sale and gave the mortgagee a copy of the document of revocation. Reynes and the Abucay Spouses claimed that Montecillo secured the release of the chattel mortgage through machination. They further asserted that Montecillo took advantage of the real property taxes paid by the Abucay Spouses and surreptitiously caused the transfer of the title to the Mabolo Lot in his name.
During pre-trial, Montecillo claimed that the consideration for the sale of the Mabolo Lot was the amount he paid to Cebu Ice and Cold Storage Corporation (“Cebu Ice Storage” for brevity) for the mortgage debt of Bienvenido Jayag (“Jayag” for brevity). Montecillo argued that the release of the mortgage was necessary since the mortgage constituted a lien on the Mabolo Lot.
Reynes, however, stated that she had nothing to do with Jayag’s mortgage debt except that the house mortgaged by Jayag stood on a portion of the Mabolo Lot. Reynes further stated that the payment by Montecillo to release the mortgage on Jayag’s house is a matter between Montecillo and Jayag. The mortgage on the house, being a chattel mortgage, could not be interpreted in any way as an encumbrance on the Mabolo Lot. Reynes further claimed that the mortgage debt had long prescribed since the P47,000.00 mortgage debt was due for payment on January 30, 1967.
“WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the deed of sale in favor of defendant null and void and of no force and effect thereby ordering the cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 90805 of the Register of Deeds of Cebu City and to declare plaintiff Spouses Redemptor and Elisa Abucay as rightful vendees and Transfer Certificate of Title to the property subject matter of the suit issued in their names. The defendants are further directed to pay moral damages in the sum of P20,000.00 and attorney’s fees in the sum of P2,000.00 plus cost of the suit.
Not satisfied with the trial court’s Decision, Montecillo appealed the same to the Court of Appeals.
The appellate court affirmed the Decision of the trial court in toto and dismissed the appeal on the ground that Montecillo’s Deed of Sale is void for lack of consideration. The appellate court also denied Montecillo’s Motion for Reconsideration on the ground that it raised no new arguments.
Still dissatisfied, Montecillo filed the present petition for review on certiorari.
First issue: manner of payment of the P47,000.00 purchase price.
Thus, Montecillo’s payment to Cebu Ice Storage is not the payment that would extinguish Montecillo’s obligation to Reynes under the Deed of Sale.
It militates against common sense for Reynes to sell her Mabolo Lot for P47,000.00 if this entire amount would only go to Cebu Ice Storage, leaving not a single centavo to her for giving up ownership of a valuable property. This incredible allegation of Montecillo becomes even more absurd when one considers that Reynes did not benefit, directly or indirectly, from the payment of the P47,000.00 to Cebu Ice Storage.
Thus, Montecillo’s payment to Jayag’s creditor could not possibly redound to the benefit of Reynes. We find no reason to disturb the factual findings of the trial court. In petitions for review on certiorari as a mode of appeal under Rule 45, as in the instant case, a petitioner can raise only questions of law. This Court is not the proper venue to consider a factual issue as it is not a trier of facts.
Second issue: whether the Deed of Sale is void ab initio or only rescissible.
Montecillo argues that his Deed of Sale has all the requisites of a valid contract. Montecillo points out that he agreed to purchase, and Reynes agreed to sell, the Mabolo Lot at the price of P47,000.00. Thus, the three requisites for a valid contract concur: consent, object certain and consideration. Montecillo asserts there is no lack of consideration that would prevent the existence of a valid contract. Rather, there is only non-payment of the consideration within the period agreed upon for payment.
Montecillo argues there is only a breach of his obligation to pay the full purchase price on time. Such breach merely gives Reynes a right to ask for specific performance, or for annulment of the obligation to sell the Mabolo Lot. Montecillo maintains that in reciprocal obligations, the injured party can choose between fulfillment and rescission, or more properly cancellation, of the obligation under Article 1191 of the Civil Code. This Article also provides that the “court shall decree the rescission claimed, unless there be just cause authorizing the fixing of the period.” Montecillo claims that because Reynes failed to make a demand for payment, and instead unilaterally revoked Montecillo’s Deed of Sale, the court has a just cause to fix the period for payment of the balance of the purchase price.
These arguments are not persuasive.
Factual findings of the trial court are binding on us, especially if the Court of Appeals affirms such findings. We do not disturb such findings unless the evidence on record clearly does not support such findings or such findings are based on a patent misunderstanding of facts, which is not the case here. Thus, we find no reason to deviate from the findings of both the trial and appellate courts that no valid consideration supported Montecillo’s Deed of Sale.
Applying this well-entrenched doctrine to the instant case, we rule that Montecillo’s Deed of Sale is null and void ab initio for lack of consideration.
One of the three essential requisites of a valid contract is consent of the parties on the object and cause of the contract. In a contract of sale, the parties must agree not only on the price, but also on the manner of payment of the price. An agreement on the price but a disagreement on the manner of its payment will not result in consent, thus preventing the existence of a valid contract for lack of consent. This lack of consent is separate and distinct from lack of consideration where the contract states that the price has been paid when in fact it has never been paid.
Reynes expected Montecillo to pay him directly the P47,000.00 purchase price within one month after the signing of the Deed of Sale. On the other hand, Montecillo thought that his agreement with Reynes required him to pay the P47,000.00 purchase price to Cebu Ice Storage to settle Jayag’s mortgage debt. Montecillo also acknowledged a balance of P10,000.00 in favor of Reynes although this amount is not stated in Montecillo’s Deed of Sale. Thus, there was no consent, or meeting of the minds, between Reynes and Montecillo on the manner of payment. This prevented the existence of a valid contract because of lack of consent.
In summary, Montecillo’s Deed of Sale is null and void ab initio not only for lack of consideration, but also for lack of consent. The cancellation of TCT No. 90805 in the name of Montecillo is in order as there was no valid contract transferring ownership of the Mabolo Lot from Reynes to Montecillo.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision dated July 16, 1998 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 41349 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
Puno, (Chairman), Panganiban, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
 Penned by Judge Galicano C. Arriesgado; Records of Civil Case No. CEB-2335, pp. 70-77.
 Fourth Division composed of Justices Omar U. Amin (ponente), Minerva P. Gonzaga-Reyes (now retired Justice of the Supreme Court) and Hector L. Hofilena; CA-G.R. CV No. 41349.
 Rollo, pp. 14-15; signed by Justice Omar U. Amin and concurred in by Justices Hector L. Hofilena and Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (now Court Administrator of the Supreme Court).
 Under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure.
 TSN dated December 16, 1987, cross-examination of Natividad Branzuela, p. 3.
 TSN dated October 27, 1987, cross-examination of Ignacia Reynes, p. 5; Exhibit 1, Defendant’s Offer of Exhibits dated August 26, 1989.
 Records of Civil Case No. CEB-2335, p. 115.
 TSN dated August 26, 1985, direct testimony of Bartolome Reynes, p. 29.
 Records of Civil Case No. CEB-2335, p. 17.
 Amended Complaint dated December 4, 1984, p. 2.
 TSN dated December 19, 1988, cross-examination of Rido Montecillo, p. 8.
 Rollo, pp. 18-24; Court Of Appeals Decision dated July 16, 1998.
 Rollo, pp. 14-15; Court Of Appeals Resolution dated February 11, 1999.
 Rollo, p. 66; Petitioner’s Memorandum dated May 25, 2000.
 Records of Civil Case No. CEB-2335, pp. 134-135.
 Cormero v. Court of Appeals, 247 SCRA 291 (1995).
 As used here, the term rescission refers to cancellation of a reciprocal obligation under Article 1191 of the Civil Code, and does not mean a rescissible contract under Article 1381 of the same Code.
The inured party may choose between the fulfillment and the rescission of the obligation, with the payment of damages in either case. He may also seek rescission, even after he has chosen fulfillment, if the latter should become impossible.
The court shall decree the rescission claimed, unless there be just cause authorizing the fixing of the period.
 Records of Civil Case No. CEB-2335, pp. 134 -135.
 Philippine National Construction Corporation v. Mars Construction Enterprises, Inc., 325 SCRA 624 (2000).
 Austria v. Court of Appeals, 327 SCRA 668 (2000).
 San Miguel Properties Philippines., Inc. v. Huang, 336 SCRA 737 (2000), citing Ang Yu Asuncion v. Court of Appeals, 238 SCRA 602 (1994).
 74 SCRA 83; See also Rongavilla v. Court of Appeals, 294 SCRA 289 (1998); Yu Bu Guan v. Elvira Ong, G.R. No. 144735, October 18, 2001.
 Rollo, p. 8; Petition, p. 6.

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