Source: http://newgafamilylaw.com/category/modification/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 16:23:16+00:00

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Custody vested in Father. The Court of Appeals affirmed the modification of a previous custody award and grant of primary physical custody of the child to the biological father, holding that evidence supported the trial court’s findings that a material change of condition affecting the welfare of the child occurred and the change in custody was in the child’s best interest. The Court held that what began as a temporary custodial arrangement when the mother moved to Oklahoma in 2004, leaving the child in the care and custody of his maternal grandmother in Missouri, and arguably could still be construed as such when the parents entered into a 2006 consent order modifying the father’s visitation rights, evolved into a permanent custodial arrangement by the time the father filed his petition for change of custody in 2009, and the mother’s voluntary surrender of physical custody and control of the child to his grandmother resulted in a material change in condition. Additional evidence supporting the finding of a material change in condition included the grandmother’s limitation of some of the father’s visitation, the exclusion of the father from important medical decisions affecting the child, and the failure to notify the father when the mother executed powers of attorney in loco parentis in favor of the grandmother. The Court also held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the award of primary physical custody to the father was in the best interest of the child, as a prima facie right of custody is vested in the non-custodial parent when the custodial parent voluntarily surrenders custody to a third party; a rebuttable presumption provides that it is in the best interest of the child to award custody to a parent rather than a third party; and the father presented evidence that he is a fit and qualified parent to have primary physical custody and will be able to meet the needs of the child in adjusting to a new home.
If you have questions about how child custody or when Custody vested in Father – for more information, contact the Remboldt Law Firm at 404-348-4081 for a free consultation.
This entry was posted in Custody, Grandparents, Modification, Parental Rights, Visitation and tagged Child Custody, grandparent, Modification, Visitation on October 13, 2016 by Cynthia J Remboldt.
GA Court vacated Alaska Court custody determination. Here are the facts of the case. The Court of Appeals partially vacated the order modifying an Alaska court’s custody determination, holding that the trial court erred in continuing custody of the children with the mother’s parents based on its finding that the mother failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that returning custody of the children to her would be in the best interest of the children. Because the case involved a custody dispute between custodial third parties and a noncustodial parent seeking reunification with her children, the appropriate standard of proof was the best interest of the child standard set forth in O.C.G.A. § 19-7-1 (b.1), as narrowly construed in Clark v. Wade, 273 Ga. 587 (2001), such that the mother’s parents, not the mother, had the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the children would suffer either physical harm or significant, long-term emotional harm if they were returned to the mother’s custody. However, the Court affirmed the remaining portions of the order, holding that the trial court was authorized to modify the Alaska court determination pursuant to Part 2 of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, O.C.G.A. § 19-9-40 et. seq., since the plain language of O.C.G.A. § § 19-9-85 and 19-9-86 do not require that a custody determination of another state be registered before it can be modified in accordance with Part 2. Finally, the trial court did not erroneously take jurisdiction over and try a pending Alaska case, where the Georgia court properly assumed jurisdiction pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 19-9-63 to try proceedings filed in the Georgia court seeking to modify the Alaska court custody determination, and the issues raised by the mother’s petition filed in the Alaska court seeking custody of the children were tried in the Georgia court by express or implied agreement of the parties and the court.
This entry was posted in Custody, Jurisdiction, Modification and tagged Child Custody, Jurisdiction, Modification on July 12, 2012 by Cynthia J Remboldt.
GA Court of Appeals found trial court lacked jurisdiction over the father’s petition for change of child custody.
The Court of Appeals reversed the denial of Sherry N. Sumner’s motion to dismiss Marcus C. Batchelor’s petition for change of child custody based on lack of jurisdiction, holding that the trial court erred in finding that venue was proper in Effingham county, since the original divorce order awarded custody of the children to Sumner, Sumner challenged the trial court’s jurisdiction in her responsive pleading, and she presented ample evidence that her residence was in Chatham county.
This entry was posted in Custody, Jurisdiction, Modification, Parental Rights and tagged Child Custody, Jurisdiction on May 17, 2012 by Cynthia J Remboldt.
GA Supreme Court partially reversed the final judgment in the parties’ divorce case.
The Supreme Court partially reversed the final judgment in the parties’ divorce case, holding that the trial court improperly denied the father’s motion for new trial based on the incorporation of a parenting plan providing that the child’s therapist had the authority to determine the termination of supervision of the father’s overnight visitation with the child. Because the provision was a material change in visitation that allowed for an automatic change of the father’s visitation without judicial scrutiny into the child’s best interests, it constituted an invalid self-executing change of visitation that the trial court should not have included in the judgment and divorce decree.
This entry was posted in Modification, Parental Rights, Visitation and tagged Modification, Parental Rights, Visitation on March 22, 2012 by Cynthia J Remboldt.
GA Order refusing to allow husband to seek downward modification of child support, reversed.
Order refusing to allow husband to seek downward modification of child support pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15 (j), reversed, as floor amount of child support provided in parties’ settlement agreement did not construe clear and express waiver of right of modification; parties’ decision not to include in their agreement well-worn waiver language set forth in Varn v. Varn, 242 Ga. 309 (1978), or its equivalent, suggested that they did not intend to forbid statutory downward modification of husband’s child support obligation, even below floor amount.
This entry was posted in Child Support, Modification and tagged Child Support, Modification on January 26, 2012 by Cynthia J Remboldt.
Trial court’s corder entered in post-divorce lititation, AFFIRMED; trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding mother in contempt for taking parties’ 11 year-old son to counseling because trial court’s previous order gave father final decision-making authority for child’s health and medical issues, and father disappoved of therapist to wom mother took child; trial court did not err when, after finding that mother withheld visitation from father, it dismissed contempt, visitation, and custody portions of mother’s petiton and did not permit mother to present evidence on merits of dismissed claims, pursuant to OCGA 19-9-24 (b); because mother filed current petition for modificaiton of child support 11 months after trial court dismissed her earlier petition for modificaiton of child support, trial court did not err in dismissing portion of mother’s peition seeking modificaiton of child support, pursuant to OCGA 19-6-15 (k)(2); trial court did not err as matter of law when it refused to allow guardian ad litem to interview child’s therapist without father’s consent because mother previously consented to entry of modified consent order appointing guardian ad litem and providing that guardian was not authorized to speak with child’s therapist without permission of both parents; trial court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered mother to pay remainder of fees owed guardian ad litem because mother was ot prevailing party, and no statute required that trial court consider parties’ relative financial circumstances when apportioning shares of guardian’s fees pursuant to consent order ; trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to apply rule of sequestration to unidentifed woman in courtroom because woman did not testify; trial court did not lack jurisdiction to deny mother’s motion to set aside award of attorneys’ fees, despite fact that mother previously filed notice of appeal from underlaying judgment, because underlying judgment was final, and trial court’s award of attorney’s fees did not supplment, ament, alther, ormodify that judgment; mother’s application for sicretionary review of denial or her motion to set aside award of attorneys’ fees, proper, because where both OCGA 5-6-34 (a) and 5-6-35(a) are involved, application for appeal is required when uderlying subject matter of appeal is listed in 5-6-34(a).
Avren v. Garten, S11A0688 (05/16/2011).
This entry was posted in Child Support, Custody, Jurisdiction, Modification, Visitation and tagged Child Cupport, Child Custody, Dismissal, Jurisdiction, Modificaiton, Visitation Rights on July 19, 2011 by Cynthia J Remboldt.

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