Source: https://openjurist.org/173/us/464
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 10:24:46+00:00

Document:
This case arose from a motion by the Indians to dismiss the appeal of the United States for want of jurisdiction, or, in the alternative, to affirm the judgment of the court of claims upon the ground that the question involved is so frivolous as not to need further argument, and also from a counter motion by the United States for an order upon the court of claims to make a further finding of facts.
By an act of congress passed January 28, 1893 (27 Stat. 426), the court of claims was authorized to hear and determine, and to enter up judgment upon, the claims of the Indians 'who were parties to the treaty of Buffalo Creek, New York,' of January 15, 1838, to enforce an alleged liability of the United States for the value of certain lands in Kansas set apart for these Indians, and subsequently sold by the United States, as well as for certain amounts of money agreed to be paid upon their removal.
(3) That the tribes for whom the Kansas lands were intended as a future home were the Senecas, Onondagas, Cayugas, Tuscaroras, Oneidas, St. Regis, Stockbridges, Munsees, and Brothertowns, residing in the state of New York, as found in the first finding of fact by the court of claims.
But, if these be material facts, they were equally so when the findings were made at the first hearing; and the attention of the court should have been then called to the matter, and a more particular finding requested. The motion contemplates an order upon the court to send up the testimony upon which it had found the ultimate fact, that these three tribes were parties to the treaty, and inferentially for us to pass upon the sufficiency of that testimony to establish such ultimate fact. If the finding f these probative facts were deemed material, within the case of U. S. v. Pugh, 99 U. S. 265, application should have been made when the case was first sent here for a finding of such facts. In the Pugh Case the court of claims found certain circumstantial facts, and the question this court was called upon to decide was whether those facts were sufficient to support the judgment. But this court did not hold that, where the court of claims was satisfied that the evidence before it fully established a fact, it was bound to insert all the evidence upon that point, if the losing party thought the court made a mistake. This court has repeatedly held that the findings of the court of claims in an action at law determine all matters of fact, like the verdict of a jury, and that where there is any evidence of a fact which they find, and no exception is taken, their finding is final. Stone v. U. S., 164 U. S. 380, 17 Sup. Ct. 71; Desmore v. U. S., 93 U. S. 605; Talbert v. U. S., 155 U. S. 45, 15 Sup. Ct. 4. And in McClure v. U. S., 116 U. S. 145, 6 Sup. Ct. 321, this court distinctly held that it would not remand a case to the court of claims, with directions to return whether certain distinct propositions, in requests for findings of fact, presented to that court at the trial of the case, were established and proved by the evidence, if it appeared that the object of the request to have it so remanded was to ask this court to determine questions of fact upon the evidence. In The Santa Maria, 10 Wheat. 431, 444, it was said by Mr. Justice Story: 'We think, therefore, that upon principle every existing claim which the party has omitted to make at the hearing upon the merits, and before the final decree, is to be considered as waived by him, and is not to be entertained in any future proceedings; and when a decree has been made, which is in its own terms absolute, it is to be carried into effect according to those terms, and excludes all inquiry between the litigating parties as to liens or claims which might have been attached to it by the court, if they had been previously brought to its notice.' See, also, Hickman v. Ft. Scott, 141 U. S. 415, 12 Sup. Ct. 9.
But it is difficult to see how the proposed findings, if made, could be deemed material. This court held that the treaty of Buffalo Creek was a grant in praesenti of a certain tract of lands in Kansas, described by metes and bounds. The second article of the treaty indicates that the grant was made upon the basis of 320 acres for each inhabitant; the recital, being '320 acres for each soul of said Indians, as their numbers are at present computed.' But the grant was not of 320 acres for each soul, but of a tract of land en bloc. Under the decision of the court a present title thereto passed to the Indians. This being the case, the United States are in no position to show that the government erred in its computation of souls, or that certain tribes who are named in the treaty did not assent to it. If the land passed under the treaty, then it is only a question between the Indians themselves who were signatories thereto or assented to its terms. The only object of the proposed order, though it is but faintly outlined in the briefs, must be to show that if the Stockbridges, Munsees, and Brothertowns never assented to the treaty, the grant should be reduced in the proportion of 320 acres to each member of these tribes. But this is an indirect attack upon the decree. The case was remanded to the court of claims, not to determine who were actually parties to the treaty, or to recompute the number of souls, or in any other way to reduce the extent of the grant, but to render a judgment for the amount received by the government for the Kansas lands, less an amount of lands upon the basis of which settlement had been made with the Tonawandas, and less the 10,240 acres allowed to 32 New York Indians, 'together with such other deductions as may seem to the court below to be just.' But there is nothing to indicate t at the court of claims was at liberty to redetermine who were parties to the treaty, and entitled to the benefit of its provisions. That question had already been settled beyond recall. The motion for additional findings must therefore be denied.
The denial of this motion practically disposes of the appeal, as the action of the court below in its supplemental findings was in strict conformity with the mandate of this court. It found the amount of land sold by the United States, the cost and expense of surveying and platting said lands, the number of acres allowed to the Tonawanda band, the number allotted to the 32 Indians; and, after deducting the expense of surveying and platting, the amount paid by the United States in settlement of the Tonawanda band and 32 Indians, there remained of the value of the land, at $1.25 per acre, the sum of $1,967,056. The court further found who the New York Indians were, who were parties to the treaty, and, as a conclusion of law, judgment was entered for the above amount. This court has repeatedly held that a second writ of error does not bring up the whole record for re-examination, but only the proceedings subsequent to the mandate; and if those proceedings are merely such as the mandate commands, and are necessary to its execution, the writ of error will be dismissed, as any other rule would enable the losing party to delay the issuing of the mandate indefinitely. The Santa Maria, 10 Wheat. 431; Roberts v. Cooper, 20 How. 467; Tyler v. Magwire, 17 Wall. 253; The Lady Pike, 96 U. S. 461; Supervisors v. Kenicott, 94 U. S. 498; Stewart v. Salamon, 97 U. S. 361.
In Stewart v. Salamon, supra, Mr. Chief Justice Waite observed: 'An appeal will not be entertained by this court from a decree entered in a circuit or other inferior court in exact accordance with our mandate upon a previous appeal. Such a decree, when entered, is, in effect, our decree, and the appeal would be from ourselves to ourselves. If such an appeal is taken, however, we will, upon the application of the appellee, examine the decree entered, and, if it conforms to the mandate, dismiss the case, with costs. If it does not, the case will be remanded, with proper directions for the correction of the error. The same rule applies to writs of error.' Humphrey v. Baker, 103 U. S. 736; Clark v. Keith, 106 U. S. 464, 1 Sup. Ct. 568; Mackall v. Richards, 116 U. S. 45, 6 Sup. Ct. 234.
any donation of land for public purposes; and the court finds that the price at which the defendants sold the land wasnot increased because of any donation of other lands for public purposes. The court finds that the cost and expense pense of surveying and platting said lands was the sum of $45,000. The court finds that the number of acres allowed the Tonawanda band of the claimants in the settlement of their claim was 208,000 acres, which, at the price of $1.25 per acre, less the proportionate cost and expense of surveying and platting, amounts to the sum of $254,800. The number of acres allotted to the 32 Indians, as set forth in finding 12, was 10,340 acres, which, at the rate of $1.25 per acre, less the proportionate cost and expense of surveying and platting, amounts to $12,544.

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