Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/272/429/
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 08:26:48+00:00

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Justia › US Law › US Case Law › US Supreme Court › Volume 272 › I.T.S. Rubber Co. v. Essex Rubber Co.
1. The Court may decline to consider points not presented in compliance with Rule 25, concerning briefs. P. 272 U. S. 431.
2. A decree of infringement recovered by a patentee in a suit against a dealer in goods embodying his invention, does not bind by estoppel the manufacturer of the goods, from whom the dealer procured them, where the manufacturer refused to become a party to or assume any control over the suit and took no part in it otherwise than in the adjustment of the damages after a decree pro confesso had been entered. P. 272 U. S. 432.
3. Patent 14,049, reissued, January 11, 1916, to the I.T.S. Company, as assignee, on an original patent to Tufford, of 1914, for resilient heels, is limited, as to Claims 5-9, to the specific form of three-point contact heel lift, whose upper side and breast edges, as well as all other points of the upper surface, lie below the plane passing through and defined by the rear upper edge and breast corners of the lift. P. 272 U. S. 434.
4. Where an applicant for a patent to cover a new combination is compelled by the rejection of his application by the Patent Office to narrow his claim by the introduction of a new element, he cannot, after the issue of the patent, broaden his claim by dropping that element. P. 272 U. S. 443.
5. Where a claim to a combination is thus restricted to specified elements, all must be regarded as material, and the limitations so imposed by the inventor must be strictly construed against him and looked upon as disclaimers. P. 272 U. S. 444.
6. And the patentee, having thus narrowed his claim to obtain the patent, may not thereafter, by construction or by resort to the doctrine of equivalents, give the claim the larger scope which it might have had without the amendments amounting to a disclaimer. P. 272 U. S. 444.
7. The claims in suit were not infringed by the heels made by defendant, which are not three-point-contact lifts, their upper side edges having no vertical curve and lying entirely in the same horizontal plane as the rear edge and breast corners. P. 272 U. S. 444.
This is a suit in equity brought by the U.S. Rubber Company against the Essex Rubber Company in the Federal District Court for Massachusetts, for the infringement of United States patent No. 14,049, on resilient heels, reissued to the I.T.S. Company January 11, 1916, as assignee, on an original patent to John G. Tufford, issued in 1914. After final hearing on the pleadings and proof, [Footnote 1] the bill was dismissed by the district court for want of infringement. This was affirmed by the circuit court of appeals. 1 F.2d 780. And there being a conflict of opinion with the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit as to the scope of the patent, this writ of certiorari was granted.
The Essex Company, which manufactures and sells the heels alleged to infringe, expressly admitted the validity of the reissued patent. And the only questions are, first, whether it is estopped to deny infringement; second, if not, whether infringement is shown.
here," and that the circuit court of appeals erred in holding that it was not estopped by the decrees in such suits. The argument in the brief, however, specifies and deals with only one of such prior suits, and there being as to the others no semblance of compliance with the requirements of Rule 25 of this Court, [Footnote 2] we need consider only the suit specifically relied on.
That was a suit brought by the I.T.S. Company against one Wendt, a dealer in Essex heels of a type involved in the present suit, in which infringement of the patent was adjudged. The I.T.S. Company contends that the Essex Company, although not a party of record, took entire control of the defense, participated in the suit until the final decree, paid all the expenses, and is now estopped from denying infringement as therein adjudged.
him for any losses he sustained by reason of the suit, suggested that he and counsel whom it had employed procure an adjustment of the damages and profits. Wendt and the counsel for the Essex Company thereupon secured an agreement to settle the case by Wendt's payment of $1,000. This was embodied in a stipulation signed by the I.T.S. Company's counsel and by the Essex Company's counsel as counsel for Wendt, and filed in the case. This stipulation, with the interlocutory decree, was thereafter made the basis of a final decree, readjudging the infringement, reciting the settlement, and adjudging that the I.T.S. Company recover of Wendt $1,000 and the costs of the suit. Wendt paid this judgment and was reimbursed by the Essex Company. The District Count further found specifically that, under the circumstances, the Essex Company did not control the suit, and held that, even though the I.T.S. Company understood that the counsel negotiating the settlement represented the Essex Company as well as Wendt in adjusting the damages, it was not estopped from contesting the question of infringement raised in the present case.
On the appeal the circuit court of appeals stated that the record showed clearly that the Essex Company refused to become a party to the suit or assume any control over it, and took no part in the conduct or control of the suit, "but only in the adjustment of the damages" after the pro confesso decree had been entered, and approved both the findings and ruling of the district court.
There is nothing which, under the well settled rule, Del Pozo v. Wilson Cypress Co., 269 U. S. 82, 269 U. S. 89, justifies us in disturbing the concurrent findings of fact of the two courts below, and we concur in their ruling that, on the facts thus found, the Essex Company is not estopped from contesting the question of infringement.
defense interposed by the Essex Company, which insists that the reissued patent, although valid, was so limited in scope by the proceedings in the Patent Office that the Essex heels do not infringe.
The patent covers the part of a shoe commonly called a rubber heel, or cushion heel lift. [Footnote 3] This is usually made of rubber, and is attached to the under side of the leather heel so as to furnish a yielding, resilient heel, giving softness to the tread and quietness in walking. These heels, which are in common use, are of two types, the flat and the concavo-convex, both of which were old when Tufford made his invention. The flat heel, which is the older, is cemented to the leather and then fastened on by nails or screws. The driving in of the nails or screws, however, has a tendency to cause the rubber to spring away from the leather around the edges and produce an open seam. In the concavo-convex type the body of the rubber heel is curved downwards. It is attached to the leather heel, without any cement, by placing its upper concave side under the leather, pressing it upward flatly and then nailing or screwing it on tightly. This, through the tendency of the rubber to resume its original curved form, tends to keep it tightly pressed upwards against the leather and overcome the tendency of the flat heels to separate from the leather at the edges. This characteristic of the concavo-convex heels, often called "the tight-edge effect," was referred to as early as 1889 in Ferguson's patent No. 638,228.
"a front to rear sectional view through the lift in position disposed against the under side of a shoe heel and immediately prior to application thereto,"
median section, and of Figure 4, which is described as "a perspective view looking at the upper side of the lift removed."
"A heel lift of substantially nonmetalic resilient material having its body portion of concavo-convex form on every line of cross-section, the concave upper face lying entirely below a plane passing through the rear upper edge and the breast [Footnote 4] corners of the lift."
The last clause in this claim, which we have italicized, about which the present controversy turns, is contained in all the other claims in suit in identical or precisely equivalent words, except that, in Claim 8, the word "rear" does not appear before the words "upper edge." [Footnote 5] For immediate purposes, we treat Claim 5 as typical of all the claims in suit, passing for the moment the consideration of the question whether there is any essential distinction in respect to Claim 8.
The Essex Company contends: (1) That, by the proceedings in the Patent Office, these claims were limited to the form of concavo-convex heel lift in which the concave upper face lies entirely below a plane passing through the rear upper edge and breast corners -- that is, one in which, owing to the curvature of the upper face, only its rear edge and breast corners lie in the same horizontal plane, and its side and breast edges, as well as all other portions of its surface, lie below the plane passing through and defined by these three points -- this being referred to as the "three-point contract" form, since, when, the lift is brought in contact with the leather heel before being flattened, only the rear edge and two breast corners will touch the leather. (2) That the claims, thus limited, are not infringed by the Essex heels, as their upper side edges, having no vertical curve, lie in, and not below, the plane passing through the rear edge and breast corners.
The file wrapper shows that, on the application for the reissued patent, it contained, as first presented, no reference to the position of the upper rear edge and breast edges of the lift in relation to the other portions of its upper surface. Several new claims were submitted, some of which, at least, [Footnote 6] described a lift having its attaching face concave on every line of cross-section. These were rejected by the examiner on reference to Nerger's patent No. 611, 129. Another set of claims was then substituted describing a heel lift of resilient material comprising a body portion of concavo-convex form on every line of cross-section, and normally held in such form by its own inherent resiliency. These were also rejected by the examiner on reference to Nerger.
"By reference to Figs. 2 and 4 of the drawings, it will be seen that the concave upper face of the lift lies entirely below a plane tangent to the rear upper edge and the breast corners of the lift, whereby to cause the entire margin of said lift to exert a uniform pressure on the heel of a shoe when the lift is positioned on the heel and the convex face thereof depressed to flatten said lift."
"A heel lift of substantially nonmetalic resilient material having its body portion of concavo-convex form on every line of cross-section, the concave upper face lying entirely below a plane tangent to the rear upper edge and the breast corners of the lift."
"each of the Claims 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9, the applicant specifies that the concave upper face lies entirely below a plane tangent to the rear upper edge and the breast corners;"
and that these claims do "not read on the drawing, and are therefore rejected."
"By references to Figs. 2 and 4 of the drawings, it will be seen that the concave upper face of the lift lies entirely below a plane passing through the rear upper edge and breast corners of the lift. . . . In other words, owing to the curvature of the concave attaching face of the lift, the rear upper edge and breast corners of said concave attaching face are disposed in a plane above the upper side edges and the breast edges of the lift."
"A heel lift of substantially resilient material comprising a body portion, the attaching face of which is concave and the tread face convex on every line of cross-section, the rear upper edge and breast corners of the concave attaching face of the lift being disposed in a plane above the upper side and breast edges of said concave attaching face."
the breast corners and the rear edge of said lift or, in other words, the rear upper edge and breast corners of the concave attaching face are disposed in a plane above the upper side and breast edges thereof;"
that the showing in Figure 2 was therefore obviously erroneous, and, although Claim 10 read upon it without any correction, it did not clearly illustrate the applicant's invention, and that permission was requested to correct the drawing. This was granted, and Figure 2 was changed to the form which we have reproduced in this opinion, showing that the upper side and breast edges lie below a plane passing through the rear edge and breast corners. The new claims were then allowed, and the patent was reissued.
It thus appears that the applicant acquiesced in the successive rejections by the examiner on reference to Nerger of claims for a lift having its attaching face concave on every line of cross-section and for a lift of resilient material of a concavo-convex form on every line of cross-section, and that, to meet this reference, he amended the specification so as to state not only that the concave upper surface lies entirely below a plane passing through the rear upper edge and breast corners, but that, "in other words," owing to the curvature of the concave attaching face, the rear upper edge and breast corners are disposed in a plane above the upper side and breast edges; amended the claims to describe a lift whose concave upper surface lies entirely below a plane passing through the rear upper edge and breast corners, and finally changed his drawing so as to correspond precisely with these amendments -- and that then, and not until then, were the claims allowed.
the plane passing through the rear edge and breast corners.
There is no ground for differentiating Claims 5 to 9 from claim 10 in this respect in order to give effect to Claim 10. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit expressly declined to rest its conclusion on this ground. 260 F. at 948. And as to this it suffices to say that, as was pointed out by the district judge, Claims 5 to 9 are sufficiently differentiated in other respects by the presence of subsidiary elements relating to the character of the material, nail openings, etc., that do not appear in Claim 10.
We find, further, no significance in the substitution of the words "passing through" for "tangent to" in the specification and claims. These phrases were used interchangeably by the examiner. The applicant pointed out no distinction in their meaning, and, so far as appears, merely adopted "passing through" as the preferred form of equivalent expressions. And they have no difference in meaning as used in the specification and claims; the one phrase as well as the other aptly defining the plane passing through the upper rear edge and breast corners.
which he had in mind and permitted the examiner to pass upon the claim under a misapprehension as to its language. It was also stated by the district judge that, at the preliminary hearing on the motion to dismiss, the I.T.S. Company recognized that this clause in Claim 8 read the same as in the other claims; that this had apparently been its position before other courts where these claims had been considered, [Footnote 7] and that it did not change its position in this respect until after the circuit court of appeals on the hearing in that court on the motion to dismiss had called attention to the omission of the word "rear." We concur in the finding of the district judge that the omission of the word "rear" was through a clerical error due to oversight, and that both the counsel for the applicant and the examiner understood that it was contained in Claim 8 as well as the others, and we are of opinion that the claim should be construed and have the same effect as if it had been included. This is not in any real sense, a remaking of the claim, but is merely giving to it the meaning which was intended by the applicant and understood by the examiner.
U.S. 354, 112 U. S. 359; Parker & Whipple Co. v. Yale Lock Co., 123 U. S. 87, 123 U. S. 97. And, so construed, it would not read on the specification and drawings of the reissued patent.
"may not, by construction or by resort to the doctrine of equivalents, give to the claim the larger scope which it might have had without the amendments, which amount to a disclaimer."
Weber Elec. Co. v. Freeman Elec. Co., 256 U. S. 668, 256 U. S. 677.
material element, and having thus narrowed the claims, cannot, as was said in the Weber Electric Company case, now enlarge their scope by a resort to the doctrine of equivalents. This would render nugatory the specific limitation.
Various intermediate proceedings, on a preliminary motion to dismiss, appear in 270 F. 593, 276 F. 478, and in 281 F. 5.
"concise statement of the case containing all that is material to the consideration of the questions presented, with appropriate page references to the printed record,"
cl. 2(d); a "specification of such of the assigned errors as are intended to be urged," cl. 2(e), and an "argument . . . exhibiting clearly the points of fact and of law being presented," cl. 2(f), 266 U.S. 671.
The under layers of shoe heels were called "lifts" by the cobblers.
The "breast" is the front face of the heel.
All these claims are set forth in full in the opinion of the circuit court of appeals in 1 F.2d at 781.
The file wrapper does not set forth all of these claims.
Thus, in the U.S. Rubber Co. case, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit stated that "each of Claims 5 to 9, inclusive" contain the limiting clause referring to "a plane passing through the rear upper edge and breast corners."
Fetzer & Spies Leather Co. v. U.S. Rubber Co., 260 F. 939, United States Rubber Co. v. U.S. Rubber Co., 260 F. 950, supra, Tee Pee Rubber Co. v. U.S. Rubber Co., 268 F. 250, Hill Rubber Heel Co. v. U.S. Rubber Co., 269 F. 270, U.S. Rubber Co. v. Tee Pee Rubber Co.,288 F. 794, in the Sixth Circuit, and United States Rubber Co. v. U.S. Rubber Co., 288 F. 786, in the Seventh Circuit.

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