Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/195/594/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 04:21:50+00:00

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Justia › US Law › US Case Law › US Supreme Court › Volume 195 › Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co.
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co. et al., ante, p. 195 U. S. 540, followed to effect that the Act of July 24, 1866, 14 Stat. 221, does not confer any right of eminent domain on telegraph companies and that a railroad company's right of way is not a public highway within the meaning of that act.
Eminent domain cannot be delegated, and the lessee of a corporation cannot exercise the power of condemnation conferred by legislature on the lessor.
plaintiff in error during the pending of the condemnation proceedings.
The Circuit Court refused to approve the bond tendered with the petition for condemnation and ordered the petition dismissed. 120 F. 362. The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed that action. 123 F. 33.
"to erect and construct works, edifices, fixtures and structures along and across any of the roads, highways, streets and waters within this State; the said works to be so placed as not to interfere with the common use of such roads, highways, streets and waters."
"No authority to enter upon the right of way of railroads was plainly and distinctly granted, and it is well settled that the right of eminent domain may be exercised by a corporation, in any case, only when granted in express terms or by necessary implication, and that property held and applied by one corporation for a public use cannot be appropriated by another for its use without authority clearly expressed, or which may be implied from the fact (which in this case does not exist) that the use claimed is absolutely necessary to the accomplishment of the purpose for which the claimant corporation was created. Penna. R. Co.'s App., 93 Pa.St. 150; Pittsburgh Junction R. Co.'s App., 122 Pa.St. 511; Sharon Ry. Co.'s App., 122 Pa.St. 533; Groff's App., 128 Pa.St. 621; Perry Co. R. v. N. & S.V. R. Co., 150 Pa.St. 193; Phillips v. D., W. & P. R. Co., 78 Pa.St. 177; Glover v.. Boston, 14 Gray 282."
and railroads too far -- indeed, have gone beyond analogy, and have contended for almost legal coincidence in attributes and effect.
"An act supplemental to an act entitled 'An act to incorporate the Atlantic and Ohio Telegraph Company, approved March 24, 1849, and to confirm certain agreements executed by said company,'"
approved May three, one thousand eight hundred and seventy-one, the same as if the said lease and contract had been made by virtue of express authority of law, the said act of assembly also providing that said Atlantic and Ohio Telegraph Company should have and possess all the rights, powers and privileges conferred by the third and fourth sections of the Act of the Legislature of Pennsylvania to incorporate the Eastern Telegraph Company, approved the fifth day of April, 1866.
of said Atlantic and Ohio Telegraph Company, including the right to appropriate, on inability to agree with the owner, all lands necessary for the construction, maintenance and operation of the said lines of telegraph from Philadelphia to Pittsburgh, with any and all such branches therefrom as it may think proper."
"SEC. 3. That the said corporation shall have power to connect by contract, with other persons or corporations having other telegraphic lines within or out of this state, for the purpose aforesaid, and it may also form a union with or lease to other corporations, associations or individuals, incorporated by this commonwealth or any other state, its own lines, with their fixtures and apparatus, or lease from any individuals, associations or corporations incorporated by this commonwealth, or any other state, their lines, fixtures and apparatus, and when such unions as aforesaid are formed the stock may form a common stock upon such terms and conditions as the said companies or associations respectively shall agree upon, and that as soon as such union shall be effected and a true copy of the agreement made for that purpose, duly certified under the corporate seal of the said companies, shall have been filed in the office of the secretary of the commonwealth, the stockholders of the said companies shall become one body, corporate and politic, under such name and style as they shall adopt and agree upon and embody in their certificate, with all the rights and privileges incident to a corporation and with all the rights, powers and privileges which, by virtue of this act, are vested in the company hereby incorporated."
"SEC. 4. That the said corporation shall have power to purchase, make, use and maintain any connecting or side lines."
was authorized to lease its lines to the Telegraph Company. A lease had already been made, as we have seen. Those sections also authorized the companies to "form a union" and "become a body corporate and politic, under such name and style" as they should adopt. That was not done. The Telegraph Company, therefore, is the simple lessee of the Atlantic and Ohio Company, and has only the powers of a lessee, and as such cannot exercise the right of eminent domain conferred on the Atlantic and Ohio Company.
"that the aforesaid corporate action of the Western Union Telegraph Company has been duly ratified and approved by corporate action in that behalf by the said Atlantic and Ohio Telegraph Company."
"rights and interests acquired thereby (that is, by the statutes and proceedings set out in the petition) by the said Western Union Telegraph Company, possession be adjudged to the Western Union Telegraph Company by this court of the said use, right and interests according to law, and that the title to the said rights and interests as against the defendant thereby vest in the said Western Union Telegraph Company for the purposes aforesaid. . . . "
If it can be said that, under the allegations of the petition, the Atlantic and Ohio Company retains its rights as the lessor of the Telegraph Company, still as to such rights it is a necessary party. To have made it a party might have precluded jurisdiction in the circuit court.
But the Telegraph Company contends for eminent domain in its own right as lessee of the Atlantic and Ohio Telegraph Company, and in its own name, and combats the view that it cannot receive a delegation of that power. The following cases are relied on: California Central Ry. Co. v. Hooper, 76 Cal. 404; Crolley v. Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry. Co., 30 Minn. 541; C. & W.I. R. Co. v. I.C. R. Co., 113 Ill. 156; Kip v. N.Y. & Harlem R. Co., 6 Hun. 24, aff'd, 67 N.Y. 227; Abbott v. N.Y. & N.E. R. Co., 145 Mass. 450.
These cases do not sustain the contention. In the case in 76 Cal., a corporation commenced proceedings in eminent domain. It afterwards consolidated with other corporations. The new corporation thus created was held to be entitled to continue the proceedings in its own name and for its benefit, because it had acquired that right in the manner provided by the statutes of the state.
In 30 Minn., a railroad corporation condemned, paid for, and took certain land for its right of way. Without constructing its road, it transferred the right of way to another railroad corporation. The owner of the land taken brought ejectment for it, alleging the invalidity of the transfer. It was held that his interests were not affected by the transfer, and he could not question the capacity of the first company to make, nor the second company to receive, the transfer.
"the needs of the lessees are as those of the lessor company, and any condemnation for their wants may proceed in such latter company's name, and it all the while stands responsible for the running of the road."
Kip v. N.Y. & H. R. Co., 6 Hun. 24; S.C., 67 N.Y. 227, were cited.
If this case supports one contention of the Telegraph Company, it destroys another. It establishes that, if the right of eminent domain is given to the Telegraph Company by the lease from the Atlantic and Ohio Telegraph Company, that right can only be exercised in the name of the latter company. And such is also the effect of the cited cases, or rather the cited case, for it is only one case appearing at different stages in the reports. The plaintiff in the case, who was appellant in the Court of Appeals (67 N.Y. 227), brought suit against the defendant company to restrain it from prosecuting proceedings to condemn certain lands owned by him in the City of New York. He had leased them to the company for twenty-one years, and his contention was that the condemnation proceedings would impair the obligation of the lease and should be enjoined.
"show that the delectus personarum is of little more than theoretical importance, and is the least determining element in the more common cases where the power is conferred."
The case is not like that at bar, and need not be further analyzed.
"Yet none of these leases or assignments can be construed to extend to the lessees or assignees the power to exercise the right of eminent domain, or to restrict the right of the legislature to alter or repeal the charters."
"The lease by the Norwich and Worcester Railroad Company did not make the lessees, or their representatives, parties to the grant of power to exercise the right of eminent domain. The right remained in the original corporation, and the legislature might properly deal with it exclusively in amending their [its] charter."

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