Source: https://www.tdslaw.com/resource/selected-leading-aboriginal-law-decisions/
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 15:19:05+00:00

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In order to secure to the Indians of the Province the continuance of the supply of game and fish for their support and subsistence, Canada agrees that the laws respecting game in force in the Province from time to time shall apply to the Indians within the boundaries thereof, provided, however, that the said Indians shall have the right, which the Province hereby assures to them, of hunting, trapping and fishing game and fish for food at all seasons of the year on all unoccupied Crown lands and on any other lands to which the said Indians may have a right of access.
This case is the origin of modern Aboriginal law. The Nishga sued for a declaration that their “Indian title” had never been extinguished. Six of seven judges agreed Aboriginal title could exist because Aboriginal people lived in Canada before the arrival of Europeans. This was a big step in the law as some argued that prior occupation did not matter; what mattered was whether the Crown formally recognized title in a statute. The real issue was whether the title had been extinguished. Three judges held that the title was extinguished; the other three judges held otherwise. The seventh and final vote did not address the Aboriginal law issues at all. He dismissed the claim on a technicality. Calder is less important as a legal precedent and more important for prompting Canada to take Aboriginal rights seriously. (The Nishga in this case are the same Nishga that signed a modern treaty in 2000 in north western BC).
This case is the origin of the principle that Canada can owe a fiduciary duty to Aboriginal people. Canada persuaded the Musqueam to surrender reserve land in Vancouver on certain terms so that the land could be developed into a golf course. Canada then leased the property to a golf club on significantly less advantageous terms than what Canada originally told the band. The band sued for breach of fiduciary duty. The Court found a breach and awarded the band $10 Million. In so doing, the Court rejected the argument that Canada simply owed the band a non-enforceable “political” duty as opposed to a legal duty.
This is the first case to consider the meaning of s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. A Musqueam man was fishing for food with a drift net longer than permitted. The Court held that s. 35 protected rights that existed as of 1982. Rights could only be extinguished by a clear and plain intention before 1982 and not by mere regulation. Further, rights could be justifiably infringed if (1) the government was pursuing a valid objective (e.g. conservation) and (2) the infringement was consistent with the fiduciary duty owed to Aboriginals. For the second part of the test, one could consider if (i) there was as little infringement as possible (ii) if fair compensation was paid in the case of expropriation and (iii) whether there had been consultation. The case was sent back to trial for consideration of whether the regulation on fishing was justifiable. This case laid the ground work for the duty of consultation that would arise 14 years later.
This case answered a question left open in Sparrow: What are Aboriginal rights and how are they proven? The Court held “in order to be an Aboriginal right an activity must be an element of a practice, custom or tradition integral to the distinctive culture of the Aboriginal group claiming the right”. The activity must be central to the Aboriginal group at the time of contact. In this case, Ms Van der Peet, a Sto:lo person, sold fish contrary to her food fishing licence (10 fish for $50). Commercial trade of fish occurred prior to contact, but was not integral to Sto:lo culture. Ms Van der Peet was convicted.
Three accused were charged with hunting moose out of season in Alberta. They claimed that they had a treaty right (Treaty No. 8) to hunt for food. The Court considered the effect of the Natural Resources Transfer Agreement (NRTA) on treaty rights. The NRTA allowed the treaty right to hunt for food to be exercised on all “unoccupied Crown lands” and on lands to which the Indians had a “right of access.” Lands that are put to a visible use incompatible with hunting are occupied and will not create a right of access to hunt on such lands. This case held that the Sparrow justification test applied to both Aboriginal rights and treaty rights. Two of the three accused were convicted because the land on which they were hunting were put to a visible, incompatible use- namely there were buildings on the land and indications that the land was recently harvested. The third accused was hunting on unoccupied Crown land, but the Court sent the matter back to trial to determine if the Crown could justify its hunting laws under the Sparrow test.
Delgamuukw v. British Columbia,  3 S.C.R.
This case considered the nature of Aboriginal title. Aboriginal title is a right in land that allows a group to use the land in almost any way deemed fit. The use need not be an Aboriginal right per se (e.g. the right to hunt). Title land can be used in many ways, but not in a way that is irreconcilable with the original connection with the land (e.g. cannot strip mine a land that was used as a hunting ground). Aboriginal title can only be surrendered to the Crown. It is also communally held land, not individually held land. To show Aboriginal title, the land must be exclusively occupied prior to sovereignty (not contact as is the case for Aboriginal rights). The case also affirmed that oral history evidence was admissible. Further, only Canada and not the provinces could extinguish Aboriginal rights. This claim by the Gitksan and Wet’suwet’en for title was remitted back to trial for determination.
This case is not a ground breaking case of Aboriginal law, but is well-known for two reasons. First, the accused Marshall is the same Donald Marshall who was wrongly convicted of murder. Second, the Marshall case prompted publicized clashes between Atlantic First Nations and commercial fishermen over control and use of the commercial fishery.
This case is the breakthrough for Métis rights. The Powleys shot a moose around Sault Ste. Marie, Ontario. They were charged with hunting without a licence. The Powleys were Métis who asserted an Aboriginal right to hunt for food. The Supreme Court agreed and acquitted the Powleys. In doing so, the Court noted that the Van der Peet test for showing Aboriginal rights applied to the Métis, but the time at which the right would have to exist was not contact but the date that Europeans took effective control over a Métis territory. The Court noted that a Métis person would have to show (i) he/she self-identified as Métis (ii) he/she had an ancestral connection to a rights-bearing Métis community and (iii) the person was accepted by the modern Métis community. On this last point, the Court noted that membership in a Métis organization could satisfy the community acceptance requirement but there must be some link between the organization and the historic Métis community.
These two cases created the duty of consultation and accommodation. The practical need for the duty arose from the fact that Aboriginal groups did not have satisfactory power to prevent or control resource development on lands to which they asserted, but had yet to prove, an Aboriginal right. As cases marched to court, the Crown could allow resource development on claimed land that could, in the opinion of the Aboriginal group, adversely impact their rights.
The duty was created to make the Crown (not private parties) engage in a dialogue with Aboriginal groups notwithstanding that a right had not been formally proven in court. The duty arises when the Crown has real or constructive knowledge of an Aboriginal rights claim and contemplates action that could adversely affect the right. Depending on the strength of the claim and the nature of the impact, the duty could range from notice of a potential decision to allowing an Aboriginal group the right to make submissions, participating in the decision making process and being provided with written reasons. In addition to creating the duty, the Court replaced the concept of a fiduciary duty seen in Guerin and Sparrow with the concept of the “Honour of the Crown.” While fiduciary duties can arise in situations of reserve surrenders, the Honour of the Crown now is the main concept that defines Crown/Aboriginal relationships.
In Haida, BC allowed a transfer of a “sustainable forest licence” from one company to another. The SFL did not allow cutting per se, but allowed strategic planning on timber cutting in the SFL area. The Crown did not consult with the Haida at all on the transfer thus the duty was not met. In Taku, the First Nation was part of a lengthy environmental review process. The First Nation did not want a road to be constructed to a mine. Due to the environmental review process, the Court held that the duty was met in this case.
This case held that the duty of consultation and accommodation could arise as an implied treaty term in the Prairie treaties. In this case, Canada planned to run a winter road through the reserve of Mikisew. The First Nation objected (as there was no consultation). Canada, again without consultation, decided to move the road to go around the reserve. The Court held that a duty was owed, but it was on the lower end of the spectrum. The road had minor impact and was on land that was surrendered via treaty to the Crown. The Crown was to give the First Nation notice of the road work, provide information on the road, and listen to the concerns of the First Nation. The duty was not met in this case because the Crown did not consult at all.
Where a modern land claim treaty has been concluded, the first step is to look at its provisions to determine the parties’ obligations, including any consultation obligations set out in the treaty. However, the Crown cannot contract out of its duty of honourably dealing with Aboriginal people. Although it was undisputed that the LSCFN Treaty is the “entire agreement” between the parties, the Treaty does not exist in isolation: the duty to consult is part of the legal framework in which it is to be performed so as to uphold the honour of the Crown. The purpose of such consultation was to manage the ongoing relationship between the Crown and the First Nations. The court found that LSCFN received appropriate notice and information and that the Crown considered LSCFN’s written submission in reaching its decision to grant the agricultural land application. The Crown had met its duty to consult.
The duty to consult will exist even in the context of a modern treaty, but it is likely the duty will be at the low end of the spectrum. The duty to consult, grounded in the honour of the Crown, forms part of the legal framework which informs treaties – both modern and older. The appropriate scope of consultation may be shaped by language used in treaties, but will principally depend on the aboriginal or treaty rights at issue and the extent to which contemplated Crown action adversely affects such rights. The Court additionally clarified that the affected trapper himself was exercising a “derivative benefit based on the collective interest of the First Nation” (para. 35) and therefore was not entitled to be consulted individually.
This case confirmed the Haida principles and expanded the law of Aboriginal consultation, including the remedies available to First Nations. Fifty years ago the Province gave the water rights in the Nechako River (Carrier Sekani traditional lands) to Alcan Aluminum Inc. to use it to generate power. First Nations were never consulted. BC Hydro went to the BC Utilities Commission (BCUC) for approval of a contract to buy electricity from Alcan. The Carrier Sekani Tribal Council objected on the basis that they had not been consulted. There were two main issues before the SCC: 1) did the BCUC have to consider consultation at all (the Court said it did), and 2) did the energy purchase agreement trigger a duty to consult? The Court said it did not give rise to a duty to consult. The agreement would not adversely impact the claims or rights of the First Nations and that an underlying infringement in and of itself would not constitute an adverse impact giving rise to a duty to consult. The infringement occurred 50 years ago, so the Court found no duty to consult on the energy purchase agreement. The Court considered whether the obligation to consult or accommodate Aboriginal concerns may be “delegated”, either expressly or by implication, to a third party. The Court stated that a legislature may delegate its duty to consult to a “tribunal”. However, in the absence of express or implied authorization, the tribunal in Rio Tinto, the British Columbia Utilities Commission, was found to have had no authority to undertake consultations with the Carrier Sekani First Nations.
The Manitoba Métis sought a declaration that the lands they were promised in the Manitoba Act, 1870 were not provided in accordance with the Crown’s fiduciary and honour of the Crown obligations. The Supreme Court granted the MMF’s appeal and held that the federal Crown failed to implement the land grant provision set out in s.31 of the Manitoba Act, 1870 in accordance with the honour of the Crown.
The relationship between the Métis and the Crown is fiduciary in nature; however, that does not mean all dealings between the Crown and the Métis give rise to fiduciary duties. The Supreme Court said that in order to give rise to a fiduciary duty the collectively-held interest must be distinctly aboriginal. The Court held that the federal government was not under a fiduciary duty in its administration of the lands under s.31.
This case is about claims to Aboriginal title and rights in an extensive area of west central British Columbia. The Xeni Gwet’in First Nations Government share a common culture, history and language with members of five other bands; together these bands make up the Tsilhqot’in Nation. The Xeni Gwet’in First Nation sought declarations of Aboriginal rights and title in response to proposed logging in an area called Tachelach’ed (also known as “the Brittany Triangle”). The area claimed (the Claim Area) makes up about five percent of the Tsilhqot’in Nation’s traditional lands.
The Court declared Aboriginal Title to approximately 1900 km2 of the Claim Area, including Xeni (Nemiah Valley) stretching north into Tachelach’ed (Brittany Triangle) and along the Tsilhqox (Chilko River). The claim to Aboriginal title was limited to public land and does not include privately held lands. This is the first time in Canadian history that a court has declared Aboriginal title to lands outside of a reserve.
The Court held that Aboriginal title is not restricted to small, intensively used sites, but extends to all the territory that a First Nation regularly and exclusively used when Crown asserted sovereignty. Aboriginal title gives the Tsilhqot’in the right to control the land. This means the lands can be managed according to Tsilhqot’in laws and governance, and the Tsilhqot’in have the right to the economic benefits of the land and its resources. The only limit is that Aboriginal Title lands cannot be developed in a way that deprives future generations of the control and benefit of the land.
The Court also held that the government must first seek consent from the Aboriginal peoples before interfering with Aboriginal title lands. If consent cannot be obtained, the government cannot interfere with Aboriginal title unless is can justify the infringement. The Court indicated that infringements of Aboriginal title will not be lightly justified. In this appeal, the Court confirmed that clear cut forestry proposed for the Claim Area was not justified.
Proven Aboriginal rights were not at issue before the Supreme Court as those rights were confirmed in the Court of Appeal.
This Supreme Court case clarifies and extends federal jurisdiction to Métis and non-status Indians (MNSI). The Plaintiffs sought declarations that: (1) MNSI are “Indians” within the meaning of section 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867; (2) the federal Crown owes a fiduciary duty to MNSI as Aboriginal people; and (3) that MNSI have a right to be consulted and negotiated with by the federal government. The first declaration was granted and the others were dismissed.
The Court concluded that the term “Indian” under section 91(24) encompasses MNSI. The second and third requests were dismissed as there is previous case law which stated that the Crown owed both a fiduciary duty and a duty of consultation to Canada’s Aboriginal peoples, and as such a declaration in regard to the second and third requests would simply be restating law. The federal government now has jurisdiction over Métis and non-status Indians. This move qualifies these groups as “Indians” under the Constitution Act, 1867. The Court found that issues of whether MSNI hold rights under s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 are distinct from the issue of federal powers under s. 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867.
(24) Indians, and Lands reserved for the Indians.
13. In order to secure to the Indians of the Province the continuance of the supply of game and fish for their support and subsistence, Canada agrees that the laws respecting game in force in the Province from time to time shall apply to the Indians within the boundaries thereof, provided, however, that the said Indians shall have the right, which the Province hereby assures to them, of hunting, trapping and fishing game and fish for food at all seasons of the year on all unoccupied Crown lands and on any other lands to which the said Indians may have a right of access.
(b) a power conferred on the council of a band shall be deemed not to be exercised unless it is exercised pursuant to the consent of a majority of the councillors of the band present at a meeting of the council duly convened.
(1) Subject to subsection (2), any deed, lease, contract, instrument, document or agreement of any kind, whether written or oral, by which a band or a member of a band purports to permit a person other than a member of that band to occupy or use a reserve or to reside or otherwise exercise any rights on a reserve is void.
(2) The Minister may by permit in writing authorize any person for a period not exceeding one year, or with the consent of the council of the band for any longer period, to occupy or use a reserve or to reside or otherwise exercise rights on a reserve.
(1) Where by an Act of Parliament or a provincial legislature Her Majesty in right of a province, a municipal or local authority or a corporation is empowered to take or to use lands or any interest therein without the consent of the owner, the power may, with the consent of the Governor in Council and subject to any terms that may be prescribed by the Governor in Council, be exercised in relation to lands in a reserve or any interest therein.
Subject to the terms of any treaty and any other Act of Parliament, all laws of general application from time to time in force in any province are applicable to and in respect of Indians in the province, except to the extent that those laws are inconsistent with this Act or the First Nations Fiscal Management Act, or with any order, rule, regulation or law of a band made under those Acts, and except to the extent that those provincial laws make provision for any matter for which provision is made by or under those Acts.
89 (1) Subject to this Act, the real and personal property of an Indian or a band situated on a reserve is not subject to charge, pledge, mortgage, attachment, levy, seizure, distress or execution in favour or at the instance of any person other than an Indian or a band.
(1.1) Notwithstanding subsection (1), a leasehold interest in designated lands is subject to charge, pledge, mortgage, attachment, levy, seizure, distress and execution.
(2) A person who sells to a band or a member of a band a chattel under an agreement whereby the right of property or right of possession thereto remains wholly or in part in the seller may exercise his rights under the agreement notwithstanding that the chattel is situated on a reserve.
 Van der Peet is part of a trilogy of cases- the other two being R. v. Gladstone (commercial right to harvest herring spawn on kelp recognized for the Heiltsuk) and R v. NTC Smokehouse (Sheshaht and Opetchesaht people did not have Aboriginal right to commercially fish salmon).
 1996 was a busy year for Aboriginal law. In addition to Badger and the Van der Peet trilogy, the Court held as follows: R. v. Nikal (requirement for Aboriginal people to obtain a free fishing licence held to unjustifiably infringe Aboriginal right), R v. Pamajewon (self-government deemed to be too imprecise to be an Aboriginal right); R v Cote (one need not show Aboriginal title to prove an Aboriginal right, the two rights are different) R v. Adams (extinguishing Aboriginal title in itself does not mean that Aboriginal rights have been extinguished).
Taking note of the recommendation of the Human Rights Council contained in its resolution 1/2 of 29 June 2006,1 by which the Council adopted the text of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Recalling its resolution 61/178 of 20 December 2006, by which it decided to defer consideration of and action on the Declaration to allow time for further consultations thereon, and also decided to conclude its consideration before the end of the sixty-first session of the General Assembly, Adopts the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples as contained in the annex to the present resolution.
Supplement No. 53 (A/61/53), part one, chap. II, sect. A.
2.See resolution 2200 A (XXI), annex.
3.A/CONF.157/24 (Part I), chap. III.
Declaration of Human Rights4 and international human rights law.
based on their indigenous origin or identity.
of any kind may arise from the exercise of such a right.
and retain their own names for communities, places and persons.
all levels and forms of education of the State without discrimination.
appropriately reflected in education and public information.
and retraining, housing, sanitation, health and social security.
in the implementation of this Declaration.
and guarantees against all forms of violence and discrimination.
all social and health services.
the full realization of this right.
future generations in this regard.
as well as those which they have otherwise acquired.
the right to participate in this process.
their free, prior and informed consent.
peoples affected by such materials, are duly implemented.
their lands or territories for military activities.
or exploitation of mineral, water or other resources.
or membership in accordance with their customs and traditions.
citizenship of the States in which they live.
of individuals to their communities.
the implementation of this right.
to achieve the ends of this Declaration.
affecting them shall be established.
to male and female indigenous individuals.
political unity of sovereign and independent States.
compelling requirements of a democratic society.

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