Source: https://www.floridalegalblog.org/2011/09/
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 04:24:02+00:00

Document:
In Optimum Nutrition, Inc. v. Performance Trading Imp. Exp. & Com. Ltd. (3D10-3807), the Third District reversed a trial court's dismissal for failure to prosecute because the trial court did not provide an additional five days to respond after a notice of lack of prosecution was sent by mail.
"On July 29, 2010, the trial court issued a notice of lack of prosecution." Therefore, Optimum had to conduct record activity within the time frame provided by "Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.420(e)" which "provides that a party has sixty days to conduct record activity after service of the notice of lack of prosecution in order to avoid dismissal under the rule." Optimum filed a motion for summary judgment on the sixty-first day after the notice of lack of prosecution was mailed and the trial court dismissed the case.
The time period for an act to be computed after service of a notice, pleading, motion, order or paper served by mail includes five days which are added to the time. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.090; see Palmer v. Palmer, 582 So. 2d 639, 640 n.1 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991). Because the notice of lack of prosecution was served by mail upon Optimum, an additional five days must be added to the safe-harbor period, meaning the period for conducting record activity did not actually expire until Monday, October 4, 2010. As Optimum filed and served its motion for summary judgment on September 28, 2010, it effectively “conducted record activity” within the meaning of Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.420(e), as the expiration of the time period for service did not expire until five days after September 28, 2010.
The emphasis above was added by me.
[SunTrust] appeals the district court’s order denying its motion to compel plaintiff Sara Krinsk to submit her claims to arbitration pursuant to an arbitration agreement governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. The district court held that SunTrust had, by participating in the litigation for nine months prior to requesting that the case be submitted to arbitration, waived its contractual right to compel arbitration. In its appeal, SunTrust argues that Krinsk’s submission of an amended complaint revived its right to compel arbitration, notwithstanding its previous waiver of that right. We find merit in SunTrust’s argument and therefore vacate the order and remand to the district court for further proceedings.
Although, under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “an amended complaint supersedes the initial complaint and becomes the operative pleading in the case,” Lowery v. Ala. Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184, 1219 (11th Cir. 2007), the filing of an amended complaint does not automatically revive all defenses or objections that the defendant may have waived in response to the initial complaint.....However, the defendant will be allowed to plead anew in response to an amended complaint, as if it were the initial complaint, when the “amended complaint . . . changes the theory or scope of the case.” Brown v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 610 F. Supp. 76, 78 (S.D. Fla. 1985) (citing Joseph Bancroft & Sons Co. v. M. Lowenstein & Sons Co., 50 F.R.D. 415 (D. Del. 1970)). It simply would be unfair to allow the plaintiff to change the scope of the case without granting the defendant an opportunity to respond anew. Id.
Likewise, a defendant’s waiver of the right to compel arbitration is not automatically nullified by the plaintiff’s filing of an amended complaint....Rather, courts will permit the defendant to rescind his earlier waiver, and revive his right to compel arbitration, only if it is shown that the amended complaint unexpectedly changes the scope or theory of the plaintiff’s claims.
Here, the Amended Complaint is clearly not like the amended complaints in these latter cases. Although, as the district court concluded, the Amended Complaint does merely assert new claims based on the same operative facts as the claims in the Original Complaint, the Amended Complaint is by no means “immaterial.” That conclusion flatly ignored the significance of the new class definition in the Amended Complaint, which greatly broadened the potential scope of this litigation by opening the door to thousands—if not tens of thousands—of new class plaintiffs not contemplated in the original class definition by discarding the old definition’s limits on the class plaintiffs’ age and on the bases for their HELOC suspensions, and by expanding the class period from over three months to over three years.
This vast augmentation of the putative class so altered the shape of litigation that, despite its prior invocations of the judicial process, SunTrust should have been allowed to rescind its waiver of its right to arbitration.
Update: In Glarum v. LaSalle Bank National Association (4D10-1372), the Fourth District withdrew the opinion discussed below and issued a new opinion on rehearing. The new opinion is discussed HERE.
The court continued that "We find that Orsini’s affidavit constituted inadmissible hearsay and, as such, could not support LaSalle’s motion for summary judgment..."
Orsini did not know who, how, or when the data entries were made into Home Loan Services’s computer system. He could not state if the records were made in the regular course of business. He relied on date supplied by Litton Loan Servicing, with whose procedures he was even less familiar. Orsini could state that the data in the affidavit was accurate only insofar as it replicated the numbers derived from the company’s computer system. Despite Orsini’s intimate knowledge of how his company’s computer system works, he had no knowledge of how that data was produced, and he was not competent to authenticate that data. Accordingly, Orsini’s statements could not be admitted under section 90.803(6)(a), and the affidavit of indebtedness constituted inadmissible hearsay.
The trial court also entered sanctions against appellants’ counsel for filing a “form affidavit” from an expert, Rita Lord, who opined on the ability of lay persons to distinguish between original and high-quality copies of promissory notes. Lord did not represent in the affidavit that she reviewed the papers at issue in this case. Nevertheless, the trial court was distressed by appellants’ counsel’s habit of filing “the same affidavit in ten different cases, when [Lord] hasn’t seen the documents in this case.” The court awarded LaSalle its reasonable attorney’s fees for having to file a motion to strike Lord’s affidavit.
The trial court did not make any specific findings of bad faith on the record, and the sanctions order must be reversed without prejudice....“Upon remand, should the court be asked to reconsider the issue, any future hearing and order must comply with the requirements of Moakley.” [citation omitted].
The opinion was discussed in THIS Daily Business Review article titled "4th DCA bars affidavit over failure to verify" [subscription required].
In McCabe v. Florida Power and Light Company (4D10-1306), the "Plaintiff received the policy limits from his homeowner’s insurer and FIGA for his losses, as well as an additional $15,000 from FPL, totaling $296,900. He never signed a full release in favor of his insurance company, FIGA, or FPL for the loss. In this action, Plaintiff sought over $600,000 in itemized damages, executed an affidavit, and gave a deposition with regard thereto."
(1) the circuit court erred in granting final summary judgment, as the amount of damages is a fact still in dispute; and (2) the insurer’s and FIGA’s (the Florida Insurance Guaranty Association) satisfaction and releases do not bind Plaintiff even if FPL may be entitled to a collateral source set-off at some future point in the proceedings.

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