Source: https://case-law.vlex.com/vid/435-u-s-829-606861906
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 20:23:17+00:00

Document:
A Virginia statute makes it a crime to divulge information regarding proceedings before a state judicial review commission that is authorized to hear complaints about judges' disability or misconduct. For printing in its newspaper an article accurately reporting on a pending inquiry by the commission and identifying the judge whose conduct was being investigated, appellant publisher was convicted of violating the statute. Rejecting appellant's contention that the statute violated the First Amendment as made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth, the Virginia Supreme Court affirmed.
Held: The First Amendment does not permit the criminal punishment of third persons who are strangers to proceedings before such a commission for divulging or publishing truthful information regarding confidential proceedings of the commission. Pp. 837-845.
(a) A major purpose of the First Amendment is to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs, which includes discussion of the operations of the courts and judicial conduct, and the article published by appellant's newspaper served the interests of public scrutiny of such matters. Pp. 838-839.
(b) [98 S.Ct. 1537] The question is not whether the confidentiality of commission proceedings serves legitimate state interests, but whether those interests are sufficient to justify encroaching on First Amendment guarantees that the imposition of criminal sanctions entails. Injury to the reputation of judges or the institutional reputation of courts is not sufficient to justify "repressing speech that would otherwise be free." New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 272-273. Pp. 839-842.
(c) The mere fact that the legislature found a clear and present danger to the orderly administration of justice justifying enactment of the challenged statute did not preclude the necessity of proof that such danger existed. This Court has consistently rejected the argument that out-of-court comments on pending cases or grand jury investigations constituted a clear and present danger to the administration of justice. See Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252; Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331; Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367; Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375. If the "clear and present danger" test could not be satisfied in those cases, a fortiori it could not be satisfied here. Pp. 842-845.
(d) Much of the risk to the orderly administration of justice can be eliminated through careful internal procedures to protect the confidentiality of commission proceedings. P. 845.
217 Va. 699, 233 S.E.2d 120, reversed and remanded.
BURGER, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which WHITE, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, REHNQUIST, and STEVENS, JJ., joined. STEWART, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 848. BRENNAN and POWELL, JJ., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
[n]o formal complaint has been filed by the commission [98 S.Ct. 1538] against [the judge], indicating either that the five-man panel found insufficient cause for action or that the case is still under review.
App. 47a. A month later, on November 5, a grand jury indicted Landmark for violating Va.Code § 2.1-37.13 (1973) by "unlawfully divulg[ing] the identification of a Judge of a Court not of record, which said Judge was the subject of an investigation and hearing" by the Commission.
had denied Landmark's motion to quash or dismiss the indictment on the grounds that the statutory provision did not, in terms, apply to the article in question, and that it could not be so applied consistently with the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The essential facts were stipulated, and revealed that, at the time the article was published, the Commission had not filed a formal complaint with the Supreme Court of Virginia concerning the judge under investigation.2 The only witness at the trial, Joseph W. Dunn, Jr., Managing Editor of the Virginian Pilot, testified that he decided to print the information about the Commission proceedings because he felt that the subject was a matter of public importance which should be brought to the attention of the Pilot's readers. Mr. Dunn acknowledged he was aware that it was a misdemeanor for anyone participating in Commission proceedings to divulge information about those proceedings, but testified that he did not understand the statute to apply to newspaper reports about the proceedings. He further testified that no reporter, employee, or representative of Landmark had been subpoenaed by or had appeared before the Commission in connection with the proceedings described in the October 4 article.
a confrontation between the First Amendment guaranty of freedom of the press and a Virginia statute which imposes criminal sanctions for breach of the confidentiality of proceedings before the Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission.
At the outset, it rejected Landmark's claim that Va.Code § 2.137.13 (1973) applied only to the participants in a Commission proceeding or to the initial disclosure of confidential information.
"Clearly, Landmark's actions violated [the statute] and rendered it liable to imposition of the sanctions prescribed. . . ." 217 Va. 699, 703, 233 S.E.2d 120, 123.
Considering these matters, we believe it can be said safely, without need of hard in-court evidence, that, absent a requirement of confidentiality, the Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission could not [98 S.Ct. 1539] function properly or discharge effectively its intended purpose. Thus, sanctions are indispensable to the suppression of a clear and present danger posed by the premature disclosure of the Commission's sensitive proceedings -- the imminent impairment of the effectiveness of the Commission and the accompanying immediate threat to the orderly administration of justice.
At the present time it appears that 47 States, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico have established, by constitution, statute, or court rule, some type of judicial inquiry and disciplinary procedures.4 All of these jurisdictions, with the apparent exception of Puerto Rico, provide for the confidentiality of judicial disciplinary proceedings, although, in most, the guarantee of confidentiality extends only to the point when a formal complaint is filed with the State Supreme Court or equivalent body.5 Cf. ABA Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Function of the Trial Judge § 9.1 (App. Draft 1972).

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