Source: http://masscases.com/cases/land/2018/2018-17-000701-MEMO%20&%20ORDER.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 14:42:58+00:00

Document:
KEITH L. MILLER, Individually and as Trustee of the MRFS NOMINEE TRUST, v. CITY OF GLOUCESTER.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ALLOWING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS.
Keith L. Miller, Individually (Miller) and as Trustee of the MRFS Nominee Trust (Trust), filed a Verified Complaint (Complaint) bringing a single cause of action under G.L. c. 240, § 14A, to challenge the validity of a special permit granted in 2015 by the City Council of the City of Gloucester (City). The Complaint suffers from multiple defects. First, an appeal brought under G.L. c. 40A, § 17, not a claim under G.L. c. 240, § 14A, is the exclusive remedy for a person aggrieved by a decision of a special permit granting authority. Further, Miller seeks untimely relief which G.L. c 240, § 14A, does not empower this court to grant. Finally, having already brought a § 17 appeal in the Essex County Superior Court, which was adjudicated and is currently pending on appeal, Miller is estopped under the doctrine of claim preclusion from relitigating the same claim under different statutory authority in the Land Court. As discussed below, the City's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is allowed and the claims set forth in the Complaint are dismissed with prejudice.
The Verified Complaint (Compl.) in this action was filed on December 8, 2017. The Defendant's Answer to Plaintiff's Verified Complaint was filed on January 10, 2018. A case management conference was held on January 19, 2018, at which the Assented to Motion of Plaintiff, Keith L. Miller, to Join Keith L. Miller, Trustee, as Indispensable Party (Mot. to Join) was filed and allowed but the court. The Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Its Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Def's. Mem.) were filed on March 5, 2018. The Opposition of Plaintiff to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Affidavit of Keith Miller, and Plaintiff's Notice of Intent to Treat Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Under Mass. R. Civ. P. Rule 12(C) as Rule 56 Motion for Summary Judgment were filed on April 2, 2018. The court heard the Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings on April 10, 2018, and took the matter under advisement. This Memorandum and Order follows.
1. Miller as Trustee of the Trust owns property located at 23, 30, and 35 Jebeka Lane, Gloucester, Massachusetts. Compl. ¶ 1; Mot. to Join.
2. By a Decision dated August 11, 2015, and filed with the City Clerk on August 13, 2015 (Decision), the City Council of the City of Gloucester granted a special permit (Special Permit) under the Zoning Ordinance of the City of Gloucester (Ordinance) for the "construction, operation and maintenance of a Personal Wireless Service Facility (Tower)." Compl. ¶¶ 14-17 & Exh. B.
3. On August 27, 2015, Miller filed a complaint in the Essex County Superior Court (Superior Court), Civil Action No. 1577-CV-01439 (Superior Court Action), appealing the Decision pursuant to G.L. c. 40A, § 17. In the Superior Court Action complaint, Miller sought to have the Special Permit annulled, sought a declaratory judgment that the City exceeded its authority under the Ordinance, and sought a declaratory judgment invalidating a variance issued by the Zoning Board of Appeals of the City of Gloucester on December 18, 2014 (ZBA Decision). Compl. ¶ 20; Def's. Mem. Exhs. 2-3.
is eighty (80) feet, plus or minus." Def's. Mem. Exh. 2.
5. On January 15, 2016, the Superior Court dismissed Miller's claim for declaratory judgment in the Superior Court Action as it pertained to the ZBA Decision, finding that "Miller failed to timely appeal the ZBA's December Decision, in accordance with the twenty-day period set forth in G.L. c. 40A, § 17. He cannot, now, use the declaratory judgment statute to circumvent this requirement." Def's. Mem. Exh. 3.
6. In an Order dated January 11, 2018, the Superior Court dismissed the Superior Court Action, finding that Miller did not have standing to contest the Special Permit under G.L. c. 40A, § 17. Def's. Mem. Exh. 4. The judgment of dismissal in the Superior Court Action was docketed on January 19, 2018. Def's. Mem. Exh. 5.
7. Miller filed a notice of appeal in the Superior Court Action on February 9, 2018. Def's. Mem. Exh. 5.
The court may make binding determinations of right interpreting such ordinances, by-laws or regulations whether any consequential judgment or relief is or could be claimed or not.
seek[s] a determination as to the extent which a local zoning ordinance affects a proposed use of land." HRPT Medical Bldgs. Realty Trust v. Boston Zonign Com'n, 20 LCR 94 , 96, aff'd 82 Mass. App. Ct. 1116 (2012).
The Complaint does not seek the kind of reliefa declaration as to the validity or extent of a provision of the Ordinance as it applies to a propertythat § 14A is intended to provide. While cast as a petition for a determination of the extent of the applicable Ordinance provisions, the Complaint actually seeks a declaration that the Special Permit was improperly granted under the Ordinance. In other words, Miller seeks not an interpretation of the Ordinance, but a determination of the validity of the particular Special Permit; that is, that the City exceeded its authority by failing to correctly apply its zoning regulations in granting the Special Permit. Simply put, the relief that Miller seeks under G.L. c. 240, § 14A, is not relief that the court is empowered by that statute to grant. This alone is sufficient to allow the City's motion.
The proper avenue for Miller's claim, which seeks not the sort of prospective determination available from G.L. c. 240, § 14A, but rather a determination that the Decision exceeded the City's authority, is an appeal under G.L. c. 40A, § 17. An appeal under § 17 is the "exclusive" remedy of a person aggrieved by a decision of a special permit granting authority. G.L. c. 40A, § 17. Courts of the Commonwealth are "not disposed to circumvent the clear intent of th[e] statute," by allowing zoning appeals to go forward under any other jurisdictional ground. Lincoln v. Board of Appeals of Framingham, 346 Mass. 418 , 420 (1963); see de Araujo Brito v. Provincetown, 361 Mass. 868 , 869 (1972); Cannistra v. Rando, 17 LCR 313 , 314 (2009).
Even if this court were persuaded to let Miller amend the Complaint to state a claim under G.L. c. 40A, § 17, that claim would be barred ab initio for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Section 17 requires that an appeal of a decision of a special permit granting authority be filed, if at all, within 20 days of the challenged decision being filed with the city clerk. G.L. c. 40A, § 17. Here the Decision was filed with the City on August 13, 2015, and the Complaint in this action was not filed until December 8, 2017, more than two years later. The court is "without jurisdiction to entertain an appeal from a decision of a board of appeals [or other special permit granting authority] if the plaintiff has failed to file a notice of the appeal in the clerk's office within twenty days after the filing of the board's decision." O'Blenes v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Lynn, 397 Mass. 555 , 558 (1986).
Miller in fact already brought the appropriate G.L. c. 40A, § 17, appeal of the Decision in the Superior Court Action. Notwithstanding that G.L. c. 240, § 14A, does not imbue this court with the power to grant the relief Miller seeks, even if such relief were possible, the current action is wholly duplicative of the Superior Court Action in which Miller's appeal of the Decision has already been adjudicated. Because Miller seeks exactly the same relief in this action that he did in the Superior Court Action, albeit under different statutory authority, his claim is barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion.
Miller seeks duplicative relief for a claim already adjudicated by the Superior Court and is therefore estopped under the doctrine of claim preclusion from maintaining this action. Further, even if preclusion did not bar his claim, the relief he seeks is not available under G.L. c. 240, § 14A. Finally, as an appeal under G.L. c. 40A, § 17, is the exclusive remedy for a person aggrieved by a special permit decision, and appeals under that section must be brought within 20 days of the disputed decision being filed with the city clerk, this court lacks jurisdiction to hear Miller's claim which was not filed for more than two years after the Special Permit issued.
For the foregoing reasons, the Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is ALLOWED. Judgment shall enter dismissing Miller's Complaint with prejudice.
[Note 1] The court can take judicial notice of certain recorded documents. See Mass. G. Evid. 201(b); Jarosz, 436 Mass. at 529-530; Fitzpatrick v. Yeaman, 16 LCR 601 , 602, n.4 (2008); Ramos v. Jones, 23 LCR 93 , n. 2 (2015).
[Note 2] Even if the court were to convert the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings to a summary judgment motion, considering Miller's additional materials and drawing all inferences in his favor, Willitts v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Boston, 411 Mass. 202 , 203 (1991), the outcome of the motion would be the same.
[Note 3] "[A] trial court judgment is final and has preclusive effect regardless of the fact that it is on appeal." O'Brien v. Hanover Ins. Co., 427 Mass. 194 , 201 (1998).

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