Source: http://jaapl.org/content/33/1/126.full
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 01:16:27+00:00

Document:
In Archuleta v. Hedrick, 365 F.3d 644 (8th Cir. 2004), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit addresses the habeas and other remedies available to federal insanity acquittees who want to challenge their confinement, including whether insanity acquittees may attack their initial successful insanity defense.
The magistrate judge construed the petition as challenging “the administration of involuntary medication and Archuleta’s mental health commitment” and recommended that it be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Mr. Archuleta filed a pro se objection. The appellate court agreed with the magistrate judge and dismissed the petition without prejudice, for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Mr. Archuleta filed a pro se notice of appeal. The Eighth Circuit Court granted in forma pauperis status and appointed a federal public defender to defend Mr. Archuleta.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit began by noting that counsel’s framing of the dispute would raise “several complex and difficult threshold issues.” Among these were whether Mr. Archuleta could be considered a “prisoner” subject to the statutory exhaustion requirements of the Prison Litigation Reform Act and whether he may seek habeas corpus relief for a condition of confinement claim as a “federal inmate.” The court, however, concluded that counsel and the magistrate judge had “seriously misconstrued the gravamen” of the pro se habeas petition. Therefore, it reasoned that it did not need to resolve these issues.
The circuit court indicated that, because he was in custody in the Western District of Missouri, Mr. Archuleta invoked the right statute and chose the right forum for a § 2241 claim. However, it did not accept his claim of a right to discharge by relitigating the initial finding that he was not guilty by reason of insanity. Citing Curry v. Overholser, 287 F.2d 137 (D.C. Cir. 1960), the court explained that Mr. Archuleta may not collaterally attack his decision to assert a successful insanity defense. It characterized Mr. Archuleta’s belief that he had been held in medical custody longer than he would have been sentenced if found guilty of the charged offense as a “misconception.” The court explained that under 18 U.S.C. § 4246, a federal inmate who has completed his sentence may be committed for a longer period on the ground that he is dangerous because of mental illness. The court also noted that the statutory procedure and substantive standard under 18 U.S.C. § 4243, on which Mr. Archuleta was committed, are clearly constitutional.
The circuit court noted that Mr. Archuleta’s petition for conditional or constitutional release under 28 U.S.C. § 4243 is a cognizable claim because 28 U.S.C. § 2241 authorizes the habeas court to determine whether the petitioner is in custody in violation of the constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. It also noted that habeas corpus is an extraordinary remedy typically available only when the “petitioner has no other remedy.” It indicated that through 18 U.S.C § 4247(g) and (h), the court, not the FMC, could grant Mr. Archuleta the relief that he sought. The district court of Utah has discretion and jurisdiction to decide the motion brought under these statutes and therefore has jurisdiction over Mr. Archuleta’s pro se petition. The circuit court indicated that in these circumstances, a transfer of the petition under 28 U.S.C. § 1406 (a) is both permissible and appropriate.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit vacated the dismissal order and remanded to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Western District of Missouri, with directions to transfer the case to the U.S. District Court for the District of Utah, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). This statute allows the appellate court in which a case is wrongly filed to dismiss, or if it were in the interest of justice, transfer such case to any district in which it could have been brought.
Among many technical legal issues, this case brings to light the infrequently addressed question of whether insanity acquittees may withdraw their original insanity defense.
In the aforementioned Curry case, the appellant, through a complicated process, was found not guilty by reason of insanity of the charges of assault and mayhem and committed to St. Elizabeth’s Hospital. Mr. Curry filed a habeas corpus petition, arguing that his confinement was unconstitutional—largely because he claimed that he did not have the opportunity to petition for a new trial at which he might be entirely acquitted. The appellate court denied his habeas corpus petition for release from St. Elizabeth’s, and he appealed. The appellate court affirmed the lower court’s judgment: “Having thus elected to make himself a member of that ‘exceptional class’ of persons who seek verdicts of not guilty by reason of insanity…he cannot now be heard to complain of the statutory consequences of his election.” The court held that no direct attack upon the final judgment of acquittal by reason of insanity was possible. It also held that the collateral attack that he was not informed that a possible alternative to his commitment was to ask for a new trial was not a meaningful alternative.
By contrast, at least two insanity acquittees in Connecticut have been able to attack their insanity acquittals successfully via habeas corpus petitions. In State v. Connelly, 700 A.2d 694 (Conn. App. Ct. 1997) the petitioner had originally been found not guilty by reason of insanity of kidnapping and assault and was committed to the jurisdiction of the Psychiatric Security Review Board for a period of 10 years. Mr. Connelly filed a pro se writ of habeas corpus to vacate his insanity acquittal, arguing that he was not aware of his right to a trial without the use of an insanity defense. His insanity acquittal was vacated, and he was granted a new trial, at which he was found guilty of the same charges and was sentenced to 40 years of incarceration.
In the case of Miller v. Angliker, 848 F.2d 1312 (2nd Cir. 1988), the petitioner, after having been found not guilty by reason of insanity of multiple murder charges, petitioned the federal district court for a writ of habeas corpus. He contended that his confinement resulted from violation of his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel as well as his due process right to be provided with exculpatory information in the possession of the state. He indicated that both of these affected his decision to plead not guilty by reason of insanity rather than simply not guilty. The Second Circuit Court reversed the dismissal order and remanded the case to the district court to grant the writ unless, within a reasonable time, the state brought Mr. Miller to trial.
These cases illustrate that the issue of whether insanity acquittees may withdraw their original insanity plea in pursuit of some other alternative is not clearly settled. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has certainly been less sympathetic to an acquittee’s claim that he did not know he had other options than has the Second Circuit or the Connecticut Appellate Court. In the present case, the Eighth Circuit saw no reason to allow Archuleta the right to relitigate his insanity defense case.

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