Source: https://connecticut.lexroll.com/algiere-v-general-dynamics-co-3466-crb-8-96-11-1-27-1998/
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 02:12:23+00:00

Document:
The claimant was represented by Nathan J. Shafner, Esq., O’Brien, Shafner, Stuart, Kelly Morris, P.C.
The respondent employer as self-insured was represented by John Greiner, Esq.
The respondents, CIGNA Property Casualty and Aetna Casualty Surety were represented by Stephen Eckern, Esq., and Margaret Corrigan, Esq.
The Second Injury Fund was represented by Matthew Beizer, Esq.
This Petition for Review from the October 29, 1996 Finding and Award of the Commissioner acting for the Eighth District was heard June 13, 1997 before a Compensation Review Board panel consisting of the Commission Chairman Jesse M. Frankl and Commissioners James J. Metro, and John A. Mastropietro.
The claimant seeks benefits pursuant to § 31-306 (a) as the dependent spouse of the decedent. On January 22, 1991 the decedent died as a result of leukemia, which the trial commissioner concluded was causally related to the decedent’s exposure to asbestos in the course of his employment. The underlying facts which give rise to this claim are as follows.
The decedent was employed by Electric Boat from 1957-1988 and there is no controversy among the parties that the decedent was exposed to asbestos from 1957 through 1975 or 1976. In December, 1985 the decedent became aware that he suffered from an irregular pulmonary condition. That condition was revealed as a result of an X-ray taken by the employer’s physician. Prior to that X-ray, the decedent had been suffering from a cough, respiratory problems and significant weight loss. The decedent then sought treatment with a pulmonary specialist. In April, 1986 a lung biopsy was performed. In the course of that lung biopsy various irregularities noted were occasional ferruginous bodies indicative of exposure to asbestos. In late 1986 the decedent was admitted into Rhode Island Hospital for swelling for his hands, various parts of his feet, a rash and shortness of breath. In the Fall, 1988 the decedent was hospitalized for progressive shortness of breath and a possible pulmonary infection.
The decedent last worked in August, 1988 due to his pulmonary condition. In 1988 the decedent filed for benefits pursuant to the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act. Thereafter, the decedent received permanent total disability benefits from August 31, 1988 to January 22, 1991 (the date of his death) pursuant to the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act.
The decedent’s claim for benefits pursuant to the Longshore Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act was given on a U.S. Dept. of Labor form which included on its face the following, “I hereby make claim for compensation benefits monetary and medical, under the LHWC State of Connecticut.” See Paragraph #6.
Over the years the decedent was examined by a number of physicians who provided various opinions as to the decedent’s diagnosis, causation and treatment. In 1986 the claimant was diagnosed as suffering from a rheumatic condition known as dermatomyositis. Dermatomyositis is described as “a rheumatic disease of unknown etiology which affects multiple body parts and systems including the skin, muscles, joints, lungs, heart and nervous system.” See Paragraph 32.
Due to his respiratory problems the decedent was put on high doses of steroids and ultimately immunosuppressants and chemotherapy. See Paragraph #33 and Respondent’s Exhibit 9 (SIF) Mar. 9, 1995, Jan. 23, 1995 Deposition of Dr. David Kern [hereinafter Jan. 23, 1995 Deposition of Dr. David Kern]. The decedent, as a result of the chemotherapy, developed leukemia which resulted in his death. A Voluntary Agreement executed by the claimant and the self-insured employer was approved in the Eighth District. In that Voluntary Agreement, the employer agreed to pay “widow’s benefits.” The appellants filed the instant appeal and present the following issues for review; whether the trial commissioner erred in concluding that the decedent’s claim was timely and whether the trier erred in concluding that the decedent’s death resulted from asbestosis and thus, was compensable.
No proceedings for compensation under the provisions of this chapter shall be maintained unless a written notice of claim for compensation is given within one year from the date of the accident or within three years from the first manifestation of a symptom of the occupational disease, as the case may be, which caused the personal injury, provided, if death has resulted within two years from the date of the accident or first manifestation of a symptom of the occupational disease, a dependent or dependents, or the legal representative of the deceased employee, may make claim for compensation within the two-year period or within one year from the date of death, whichever is later. Notice of a claim for compensation may be given to the employer or any commissioner and shall state, in simple language, the date and place of the accident and the nature of the injury resulting from the accident, or the date of the first manifestation of a symptom of the occupational disease and the nature of the disease, as the case may be, and the name and address of the employee and of the person in whose interest compensation is claimed.
The appellants argue that although the dependent spouse’s claim was filed within one year of the date of death, the claim is untimely as the decedent’s notice of his claim did not satisfy the statutory prerequisites of § 31-294. Specifically, the appellants argue that the notice on the U.S. Dept. of Labor’s form for federal Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation benefits with an indication that the decedent was also making a claim for benefits under Connecticut’s Workers’ Compensation Act was not legally sufficient under § 31-294. The appellants argue that the information contained in the federal form was not sufficient to apprise the employer that a claim for benefits under Connecticut’s Workers’ Compensation Act was being claimed. We disagree. However, before providing our analysis as to how we have determined the decedent’s notice was timely we must first review why the decedent’s notice is relevant to the dependent spouse’s claim for benefits.
In an analogous case heard by this panel, Buck v. General Dynamics,3324 CRB-2-96-4 (January 21, 1998) [hereinafter Buck II] we concluded that where a dependent spouse’s claim for benefits is filed within one year of the date of death due to the decedent’s alleged work related heart attack, but some years beyond the time for which the decedent himself arguably could have made the claim, the dependent spouse’s claim is untimely in the absence of a notice by the decedent through whom benefits are claimed. Specifically, in Buck II we noted that the mere filing of a claim under the federal Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act is not legally sufficient per se for the purpose of §31-294. We noted in Buck II there was no information contained in the federal Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation notice of claim to apprise the employer that a potential claim under Connecticut’s Workers’ Compensation Act may be pending. However, we think the matter at hand is quite dissimilar as the information contained in this federal Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act notice of claim informed the employer of the potential claim for benefits under Connecticut’s Workers’ Compensation Act. Thus, applying the analysis of Buck II to this case we believe that the notice requirements were met.
The purpose of 31-294, in particular, is to alert the employer to the fact that a person has sustained an injury that may be compensable; Gesmundo v. Bush, 133 Conn. 607, 612, 53 A.2d 392 (1947) (discussing legislative intent underlying predecessor to 31-294); and that such person “is claiming or proposes to claim compensation under the Act.” (Emphasis added.) Rehtarchik v. Hoyt-Messinger Corporation, 118 Conn. 315, 317, 172A. 353 (1934) (same).
We believe that the notice filed by the decedent sufficiently apprised the employer of the personal injury suffered by the decedent and its alleged causal nexus to the decedent’s employment. Upon receipt of the notice filed by the decedent the employer could reasonably foresee that it may need to defend its liability for a potential claim under Chapter 568. Had the decedent chosen to exercise his right to Connecticut Workers’ Compensation benefits, his notice, arguably complied with §31-294.
Furthermore, in Buck II, one of our paramount concerns was the public policy which underpins statutes of limitations generally, i.e., after a given period of time a party should be sheltered from liability and after a reasonable lapse of time people should be free to “plan their affairs with a degree of certainty, free from the disruptive burden of protracted and unknown potential liability.” (citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Keegan v. Aetna Life Casualty, 42 Conn. App. 803, 809 (1996).
Thus, if one construes Buck II as standing for the proposition that the dependent spouse’s notice for benefits is dependent upon an analysis of the timeliness of the decedent’s notice then under the factual circumstances at hand the claimant’s notice is timely.
Next we consider the appellants’ argument that the decedent’s death did not arise in and out of the course of his employment. In essence, the appellants seek to have us reassess the evidence and the factual findings of the trial commissioner. We do not engage in de novo review. Unless the facts as found by the trier are without evidence, contrary to law or based on unreasonable factual inferences, the findings must stand. Fairv. People’s Savings Bank, 207 Conn. 535 (1988).
The trier found that on Nov. 6, 1989, Dr. David Kern concluded that the “decedent’s disabling lung condition was due to pulmonary asbestosis and asbestos-related pleural disease.” See Paragraph 36 and Paragraph 46, See also, Jan. 23, 1995 Deposition of Dr. David Kern. It is quite clear from the trier’s findings that there was an array of medical opinions and diagnoses regarding the decedent’s condition. The determination of the issue as to causation is a matter within the purview of the trial commissioner.
In the instant case the trier found that the claimant suffered from a lung disorder which resulted from his exposure to asbestos in the work place. As a result of his lung disorder, the claimant was treated with high doses of steroids and ultimately chemotherapy due to problems associated with high doses of corticosteroids. The chemotherapy resulted in the decedent’s development of leukemia and subsequent death. Our review of the Finding and Award reflect findings and conclusions which are supported by the evidence, not contrary to law nor based on unreasonable or impermissible factual inferences. See Fair, supra. Therefore, the factual findings and conclusion of the trial commissioner must stand.
6 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 107, 108 n. 1, 590 CRD-1-87 (Feb. 23, 1989).
5 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 99, 610 CRB-8-87 (June 9, 1988). We thus, deny the appellee’s Motion To Dismiss.
We therefore, affirm the trial Commissioner’s decision and dismiss the instant appeal.
 It does not appear that the decedent pursued a claim for benefits under Connecticut’s chapter 568 for his disability during his lifetime. However, the decedent was paid $73,888.80 in benefits under the Longshore Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act.

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