Source: https://cbaclelegalconnection.com/tag/trust-and-estate-law/
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 08:23:50+00:00

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The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in In re Estate of Yudkin on Thursday, February 21, 2019.
Yudkin, the decedent, died intestate. Yudkin’s ex-wife Shtutman sought informal appointment as the personal representative of his estate. Appellant Dareuskaya objected to Shtutman’s appointment, claiming that she was Yudkin’s common law wife and thus had priority as the personal representative. After an evidentiary hearing, the magistrate, sitting in probate, found that even though Yudkin and Dareuskaya agreed to be married, cohabitated for eight years, and had a reputation in their community as a married couple, no common law marriage existed because they did not file joint tax returns and other indicia of a common law marriage were absent.
On appeal, Dareuskaya argued that the magistrate erred in concluding a common law marriage did not exist despite finding that the couple cohabitated and had a reputation in the community as married. Under People v. Lucero, 747 P.2d 660 (Colo. 1987), if there is an agreement to be married and the parties cohabitate and have a reputation in the community as husband and wife, a common law marriage has been established. Further, any actions taken (or not taken) by the parties after those essential factors are established are legally irrelevant. Here, the magistrate specifically found that Yudkin and Dareuskaya agreed to be husband and wife and that cohabitation and reputation in the community were established. The magistrate’s determination that no common law marriage was proven was an abuse of discretion.
The magistrate’s order rejecting Dareuskaya’s claim of a common law marriage was reversed and the case was remanded.
The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in In re Interest of Arguello on Thursday, February 7, 2019.
Arguello is an adult resident of Pueblo who suffers from dementia, developmental disability, and mental health illness. The court appointed Baslick as emergency guardian when medical decisions needed to be made and family was unavailable. Baslick works for Colorado Bluesky Enterprises, Inc. (Bluesky), which provides Arguello with case management services. Soon after Baslick’s appointment, several individuals petitioned the court to be appointed permanent guardian.
The court appointed a court visitor to prepare a visitor’s report concerning all prospective guardians. The first visitor’s report did not recommend Baslick because of her employment with Bluesky and the existence of a potential conflict of interest under C.R.S. § 15-13-310(4), which precludes a long-term care provider from also serving as a guardian. After several hearings and finding no suitable guardian from among the petitioners, the court sua sponte appointed the Arc of Pueblo (ARC) as the permanent guardian. Bluesky and Baslick moved for reconsideration, and the district court denied the motion.
On appeal, Bluesky argued that it is not a long-term care provider under the statute and the court erred in applying the statutory prohibition to Baslick. Here, while Bluesky may not fall “squarely” within the definition of a long-term care provider, the facts demonstrate a potential conflict of interest between Bluesky and Baslick that rendered her unsuitable as a guardian for Arguello. Bluesky provides substantial assistance to Arguello in the form of case management services. As guardian, Baslick would be able to recommend increased funding for Arguello and thereby generate revenues for Bluesky. She would also have oversight of Bluesky’s case management services and could be hesitant, as a Bluesky employee, to question Bluesky’s actions. Accordingly, the district court’s conclusion is supported by the record, and the court acted within its discretion in finding that Arguello’s best interests would not be served by appointing Baslick.
Bluesky next contended that the court violated the statutory mandate in C.R.S. § 15-14-305(1) by appointing ARC without first appointing a visitor and receiving a report. The court is required to appoint a visitor for every petition for guardianship filed, and all prospective guardians must undergo the statutory vetting process set forth in C.R.S. §§ 15-14-304 and -305 before appointment may occur. The trial court erred in sua sponte appointing a guardian who did not go through this process.
The order appointing ARC as guardian for Arguello was reversed, and the case was remanded to appoint a visitor and follow the statutory procedure to appoint a guardian for Arguello. The order was otherwise affirmed.
The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in In re Estate of Rabin on Thursday, December 28, 2018.
A division of the court of appeals considers whether the right of a probate estate’s personal representative to possession of the decedent’s property under section 15-12-709, C.R.S. 2018, encompasses the right to access the decedent’s non-probate legal files, or whether such access conflicts with the rule that the attorney-client privilege survives the death of the client. The division holds that it does not conflict, because the personal representative steps into the shoes of the decedent and becomes the privilege holder. Therefore, the personal representative is entitled to the legal files absent contrary instructions in the will.
The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in In re Estate of Little on Thursday, November 29, 2018.
Family Law—Common Law Marriage—Probate—Wills—Reformation to Correct Mistakes.
Little’s will devised her estate to her spouse Curry, from whom she later divorced. After her death, Curry claimed that he was entitled to inherit under Little’s will because they had remarried at common law before she died. Alternatively, he sought reformation of the will, contending that Little intended to devise her estate to him regardless of their marital status. The trial court found that Curry failed to show he and Little remarried at common law, and Curry otherwise lacked standing to seek reformation of her will.
On appeal, Curry contended that the provisions in Little’s will devising her estate to him were revived by their common law remarriage under C.R.S. § 15-11-804(5). There was substantial evidence in the record to support the trial court’s findings that Curry and Little were not common law married after their divorce.
Alternatively, Curry contended that the trial court erroneously found he lacked standing to seek reformation of Little’s will under C.R.S. § 15-11-806 because when Little executed her will, she intended for him to inherit her estate regardless of their marital status. The court of appeals reviewed the statutory scheme and found no indication that the General Assembly intended to exclude a former spouse from pursuing reformation under C.R.S. § 15-11-806, or that it intended C.R.S. § 15-11-804(5) to be an ex-spouse’s sole and exclusive remedy for avoiding a statutory revocation due to a divorce. Accordingly, Curry had standing to pursue his reformation claim.
The order determining that Little and Curry were not common law remarried was affirmed. The dismissal of Curry’s reformation claim was reversed and the case was remanded.
On Friday, August 31, 2018, the Colorado State Judicial Branch released Rule Change 2018(11), adopted June 28, 2018, and effective September 1, 2018. The rule change adopts the proposed revisions to the Colorado Rules of Probate Procedure. The changes to the Probate Rules were proposed by a task force that included many members of the CBA Trust & Estate Section. The task force reworked, renumbered, and revised the Rules.
The new Probate Rules are available here. In addition to the adoption of the new Probate Rules, the court also adopted changes to several of the probate JDF forms. These changes are also available here. The special mental health forms were not adopted.
For a redline and clean version of Rule Change 2018(11), click here. For all of the Colorado Supreme Court’s adopted and proposed rule changes, click here.
The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in Roberts v. Bruce on Monday, June 18, 2018.
In this case, the supreme court considered whether a trial court may award attorney fees under C.R.S. § 13-17-102 for conduct occurring outside Colorado courts. Reviewing the plain language of 13-17-102, the court concluded that an award of attorney fees pursuant to that section is limited to conduct occurring in Colorado courts and therefore affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals.

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