Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/450/333/
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 11:54:59+00:00

Document:
Petitioners, who were involved in an agreement to import marihuana and then to distribute it domestically, were convicted on separate counts of conspiracy to import marihuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 963, and conspiracy to distribute marihuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. These statutes are parts of different subchapters of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970. Petitioners received consecutive sentences on each count, the length of each of their combined sentences exceeding the maximum which could have been imposed either for a conviction of conspiracy to import or for a conviction of conspiracy to distribute. The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions and sentences.
1. Congress intended to permit the imposition of consecutive sentences for violations of §§ 846 and 963 even though such violations arose from a single agreement or conspiracy having dual objectives. Pp. 450 U. S. 336-343.
"where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not."
The statutory provisions involved here specify different ends as the proscribed object of the conspiracy -- "distribution" and "importation" -- and clearly satisfy the Blockburger test. Each provision requires proof of a fact that the other does not, and thus §§ 846 and 963 proscribe separate statutory offenses the violations of which can result in the imposition of consecutive sentences. Braverman v. United States, 317 U. S. 49 distinguished. Pp. 450 U. S. 337-340.
and legislated with it in mind. And the rule of lenity has no application in this case, since there is no statutory ambiguity. Pp. 450 U. S. 340-343.
2. The imposition of consecutive sentences for petitioners' violations of §§ 846 and 963 does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. In determining whether punishments imposed after a conviction are unconstitutionally multiple, the dispositive question is whether Congress intended to authorize separate punishments for the crimes. Where Congress intended, as it did here, to impose multiple punishments, imposition of such sentences does not violate the Constitution. Pp. 450 U. S. 343-344.
REHNQUIST, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and BRENNAN, WHITE, BLACKMUN, ad POWELL, JJ., joined. STEWART, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which MARSHALL and STEVENS, JJ., joined, post, p. 450 U. S. 344.
Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 449 U.S. 818 (1980).
The facts forming the basis of petitioners' convictions are set forth in the panel opinion of the Court of Appeals, United States v. Rodriguez, 585 F.2d 1234 (1978), and need not be repeated in detail here. For our purposes, we need only relate that the petitioners were involved in an agreement, the objectives of which were to import marihuana and then to distribute it domestically. Petitioners were charged and convicted under two separate statutory provisions, and received consecutive sentences. The length of each of their combined sentences exceeded the maximum 5-year sentence which could have been imposed either for a conviction of conspiracy to import or for a conviction of conspiracy to distribute.
"Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense defined in this subchapter is punishable by imprisonment or fine or both which may not exceed the maximum punishment prescribed for the offense, the commission of which was the object of the attempt or conspiracy."
This provision proscribes conspiracy to commit any offense defined in Subchapter I, including conspiracy to distribute marihuana, which is specifically prohibited in 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Section 846 authorizes imposition of a sentence of imprisonment or a fine that does not exceed the penalty specified for the object offense.
authorizes a sentence of imprisonment or a fine that does not exceed the penalties specified for the object offense. Thus, a conspiratorial agreement which envisages both the importation and distribution of marihuana violates both statutory provisions, each of which authorizes a separate punishment.
Petitioners do not dispute that their conspiracy to import and distribute marihuana violated both § 846 and § 963. Rather, petitioners contend it is not clear whether Congress intended to authorize multiple punishment for violation of these two statutes in a case involving only a single agreement or conspiracy, even though that isolated agreement had dual objectives. Petitioners argue that, because Congress has not spoken with the clarity required for this Court to find an "unambiguous intent to impose multiple punishment," we should invoke the rule of lenity and hold that the statutory ambiguity on this issue prevents the imposition of multiple punishment. Petitioners further contend that, even if cumulative punishment was authorized by Congress, such punishment is barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
with multiple objectives -- a question raised, rather than resolved, by the existence of both provisions.
"The applicable rule is that, where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not."
"[t]he established test for determining whether two offenses are sufficiently distinguishable to permit the imposition of cumulative punishment was stated in Blockburger v. United States. . . ."
punishment might be imposed, Blockburger requires that courts examine the offenses to ascertain 'whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not.' Id. at 284 U. S. 304. As Blockburger and other decisions applying its principle reveal, . . . the Court's application of the test focuses on the statutory elements of the offense. If each requires proof of a fact that the other does not, the Blockburger test is satisfied, notwithstanding a substantial overlap in the proof offered to establish the crimes."
"The fact that an offender violates by a single transaction several regulatory controls devised by Congress as means for dealing with a social evil as deleterious as it is difficult to combat does not make the several different regulatory controls single and identic."
357 U.S. at 357 U. S. 389.
other although the objects of the conspiracies may partially overlap."
328 U.S. at 328 U. S. 788.
The statutory provisions at issue here clearly satisfy the rule announced in Blockburger, and petitioners do not seriously contend otherwise. Sections 846 and 963 specify different ends as the proscribed object of the conspiracy -- distribution, as opposed to importation -- and it is beyond peradventure that "each provision requires proof of a fact [that] the other does not." Thus, application of the Blockburger rule to determine whether Congress has provided that these two statutory offenses be punished cumulatively results in the unequivocal determination that §§ 846 and 963, like §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, which were at issue in American Tobacco, proscribe separate statutory offenses the violations of which can result in the imposition of consecutive sentences.
Our conclusion in this regard is not inconsistent with our earlier decision in Braverman v. United States, 317 U. S. 49 (1942), on which petitioners rely so heavily. Petitioners argue that Blockburger cannot be used for divining legislative intent when the statutes at issue are conspiracy statutes. Quoting Braverman, they argue that whether the objective of a single agreement is to commit one or many crimes, it is in either case the agreement which constitutes the conspiracy which the statute punishes.
"The one agreement cannot be taken to be several agreements, and hence several conspiracies, because it envisages the violation of several statutes, rather than one."
differs from successive acts which violate a single penal statute and from a single act which violates two statutes. See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U. S. 299, 284 U. S. 301-4; Albrecht v. United States, 273 U. S. 1, 273 U. S. 11-12. The single agreement is the prohibited conspiracy, and however diverse its objects, it violates but a single statute, § 37 of the Criminal Code. For such a violation, only the single penalty prescribed by the statute can be imposed."
"In contrast to the single conspiracy described in [Braverman] in separate counts, all charged under the general conspiracy statute, . . . we have here separate statutory offenses, one a conspiracy in restraint of trade that may stop short of monopoly and the other a conspiracy to monopolize that may not be content with restraint short of monopoly. One is made criminal by § 1 and the other by § 2 of the Sherman Act."
328 U.S. at 328 U. S. 788. See also Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U. S. 640, 328 U. S. 642-643 (1946).
"'This policy of lenity means that the Court will not interpret a federal criminal statute so as to increase the penalty that it places on an individual when such an interpretation can be based on no more than a guess as to what Congress intended.'"
"at the end of the process of construing what Congress has expressed, not at the beginning as an overriding consideration of being lenient to wrongdoers."
Callanan v. United States, supra, at 364 U. S. 596.
In light of these principles, the rule of lenity simply has no application in this case; we are not confronted with any statutory ambiguity. To the contrary, we are presented with statutory provisions which are unambiguous on their face and a legislative history which gives us no reason to pause over the manner in which these provisions should be interpreted.
"reveals the determination of Congress to turn the screw of the criminal machinery -- detection, prosecution and punishment -- tighter and tighter."
Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. at 357 U. S. 390.
"protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal. It protects against a second prosecution for the offense after conviction. And it protects against multiple punishments for the same offense."
North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U. S. 711, 395 U. S. 717 (1969) (footnotes omitted).
"the question whether punishments imposed by a court after a defendant's conviction upon criminal charges are unconstitutionally multiple cannot be resolved without determining what punishments the Legislative Branch has authorized."
"[w]here consecutive sentences are imposed at a single criminal trial, the role of the constitutional guarantee is limited to assuring that the court does not exceed its legislative authorization by imposing multiple punishments for the same offense."
"section 1013 [now 21 U.S.C. § 963] -- relating to attempts and conspiracies -- . . . will take effect at the same time as the comparable provisions of title II [Subchapter I of the Act encompassing, inter alia, § 846]."
The petitioners also argue that, in numerous instances, the Government has charged a single conspiracy to import and distribute marihuana in one count. The inconsistency in the Government's behavior supports a finding of an absence of clear congressional intent with regard to the appropriatness of multiple punishment. The Government responds to this argument by noting that, in 1977, the Justice Department. advised all United States Attorneys that conspiracy to import and distribute should be charged as separate counts. We find that neither argument sheds light on the intent of Congress in this regard.
Petitioners' contention that a single conspiracy which violates both § 846 and § 963 constitutes the "same offense" for double jeopardy purposes is wrong. We noted in Brown v. Ohio that the established test for determining whether two offenses are the "same offense" is the rule set forth in Blockburger -- the same rule on which we relied in determining congressional intent. As has been previously discussed, conspiracy to import marihuana in violation of § 963 and conspiracy to distribute marihuana in violation of § 846 clearly meet the Blockburger standard. It is well settled that a single transaction can give rise to distinct offenses under separate statutes without violating the Double Jeopardy Clause. See, e.g., Harris v. United States, 359 U. S. 19 (1959); Gore v. United States, 357 U. S. 386 (1958). This is true even though the "single transaction" is an agreement or conspiracy. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U. S. 781 (1946).
JUSTICE STEWART, with whom JUSTICE MARSALL and JUSTICE STEVENS join, concurring in the judgment.
court after a defendant's conviction upon criminal charges are unconstitutionally multiple cannot be resolved without determining what punishments the Legislative Branch has authorized."
"[T]he question of what punishments are constitutionally permissible is not different from the question of what punishments the Legislative Branch intended to be imposed. Where Congress intended, as it did here, to impose multiple punishments, imposition of such sentences does not violate the Constitution."
Ante at 450 U. S. 344. These statements are supported by neither precedent nor reasoning, and are unnecessary to reach the Court's conclusion.
No matter how clearly it spoke, Congress could not constitutionally provide for cumulative punishments unless each statutory offense required proof of a fact that the other did not, under the criterion of Blockburger v. United States, 284 U. S. 299.
Since Congress has created two offenses here, and since each requires proof of a fact that the other does not, I concur in the judgment.

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