Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=82742:56542-1&catid=1579&Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 01:47:09+00:00

Document:
G.R. No. 188747, January 29, 2014 - MANILA WATER COMPANY, Petitioner, v. CARLITO DEL ROSARIO, Respondent.
MANILA WATER COMPANY, Petitioner, v. CARLITO DEL ROSARIO, Respondent.
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 filed pursuant to Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, assailing the 31 March 2009 Decision2 rendered by the Fifth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA–G.R. SP No. 92583. In its assailed decision, the appellate court: (1) reversed as grave abuse of discretion the Resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) which dismissed the petition of Manila Water Company (Manila Water) on technical grounds; and (2) proceeded to affirm with modification the ruling of the Labor Arbiter. Manila Water was ordered to pay respondent Carlito Del Rosario (Del Rosario) separation pay to be computed from 1 August 1997 up to June 2000.
In a Resolution3 dated 7 July 2009, the appellate court refused to reconsider its earlier decision.
On 22 October 1979, Del Rosario was employed as Instrument Technician by Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS). Sometime in 1996, MWSS was reorganized pursuant to Republic Act No. 8041 or the National Water Crisis Act of 1995, and its implementing guidelines – Executive Order No. 286. Because of the reorganization, Manila Water absorbed some employees of MWSS including Del Rosario. On 1 August 1997, Del Rosario officially became an employee of Manila Water.
Sometime in May 2000, Manila Water discovered that 24 water meters were missing in its stockroom. Upon initial investigation, it appeared that Del Rosario and his co–employee, a certain Danilo Manguera, were involved in the pilferage and the sale of water meters to the company’s contractor. Consequently, Manila Water issued a Memorandum dated 23 June 2000, directing Del Rosario to explain in writing within 72 hours why he should not be dealt with administratively for the loss of the said water meters.4 In his letter–explanation,5 Del Rosario confessed his involvement in the act charged and pleaded for forgiveness, promising not to commit similar acts in the future.
This prompted Del Rosario to file an action for illegal dismissal claiming that his severance from employment is without just cause. In his Position Paper submitted before the labor officer, Del Rosario averred that his admission to the misconduct charged was not voluntary but was coerced by the company. Such admission therefore, made without the assistance of a counsel, could not be made basis in terminating his employment.
WHEREFORE, viewed from the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the complaint for illegal dismissal for lack of merit.
In a Resolution11 dated 30 September 2003, the NLRC dismissed the appeal interposed by Manila Water for its failure to append a certification against forum shopping in its Memorandum of Appeal.
Similarly ill–fated was Manila Water’s Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the NLRC in a Resolution12 dated 28 April 2005.
In a Resolution14 dated 7 July 2009, the Court of Appeals refused to reconsider its earlier decision.
Our focus will be on the propriety of the award for separation pay.
Sec. 7. Termination of employment by employer. &mdash The just causes for terminating the services of an employee shall be those provided in Article 282 of the Code. The separation from work of an employee for a just cause does not entitle him to the termination pay provided in the Code, without prejudice, however, to whatever rights, benefits and privileges he may have under the applicable individual or collective agreement with the employer or voluntary employer policy or practice.
A contrary rule would, as the petitioner correctly argues, have the effect, of rewarding rather than punishing the erring employee for his offense. And we do not agree that the punishment is his dismissal only and that the separation pay has nothing to do with the wrong he has committed. Of course it has. Indeed, if the employee who steals from the company is granted separation pay even as he is validly dismissed, it is not unlikely that he will commit a similar offense in his next employment because he thinks he can expect a like leniency if he is again found out. This kind of misplaced compassion is not going to do labor in general any good as it will encourage the infiltration of its ranks by those who do not deserve the protection and concern of the Constitution.
Guided by the foregoing rules, we have carefully treaded the path of compassionate justice in the subsequent cases so as not to slip and favor labor at the expense of management.
In Tirazona v. Phillippine EDS Techno–Service, Inc. (PET, Inc.),31 we denied the award of separation pay to an employee who was dismissed from employment due to loss of trust and confidence.
While [this] Court commiserates with the plight of Tirazona, who has recently manifested that she has since been suffering from her poor health condition, the Court cannot grant her plea for the award of financial benefits based solely on this unfortunate circumstance. For all its conceded merit, equity is available only in the absence of law and not as its replacement. Equity as an exceptional extenuating circumstance does not favor, nor may it be used to reward, the indolent or the wrongdoer for that matter. This Court will not allow a party, in guise of equity, to benefit from its own fault.32 (Emphasis supplied).
The attendant circumstances in the present case considered, we are constrained to deny Del Rosario separation pay since the admitted cause of his dismissal amounts to serious misconduct. He is not only responsible for the loss of the water meters in flagrant violation of the company’s policy but his act is in utter disregard of his partnership with his employer in the pursuit of mutual benefits.
In the recent case of Daabay v. Coca–Cola Bottlers,33 this Court reiterated our ruling in Toyota and disallowed the payment of separation pay to an employee who was found guilty of stealing the company’s property. We repeated that an award of separation pay in such an instance is misplaced compassion for the undeserving who may find their way back and weaken the fiber of labor.
Although long years of service might generally be considered for the award of separation benefits or some form of financial assistance to mitigate the effects of termination, this case is not the appropriate instance for generosity under the Labor Code nor under our prior decisions. The fact that private respondent served petitioner for more than twenty years with no negative record prior to his dismissal, in our view of this case, does not call for such award of benefits, since his violation reflects a regrettable lack of loyalty and worse, betrayal of the company. If an employee’s length of service is to be regarded as a justification for moderating the penalty of dismissal, such gesture will actually become a prize for disloyalty, distorting the meaning of social justice and undermining the efforts of labor to cleanse its ranks of undesirables.34 (Emphasis supplied).
Indubitably, the appellate court erred in awarding separation pay to Del Rosario without taking into consideration that the transgression he committed constitutes a serious offense. The grant of separation pay to a dismissed employee is determined by the cause of the dismissal. The years of service may determine how much separation pay may be awarded. It is, however, not the reason why such pay should be granted at all.
In sum, we hold that the award of separation pay or any other kind of financial assistance to Del Rosario, under the nomenclature of compassionate justice, is not warranted in the instant case. A contrary rule would have the effect of rewarding rather than punishing an erring employee, disturbing the noble concept of social justice.
2 Penned by Associate Justice Fernanda Lampas Peralta with Associate Justices Remedios A. Salazar–Fernando and Apolinario D. Brusuelas, Jr., concurring. Id. at 25–36.
19Unilever Philippines, Inc. v. Rivera, G.R. No. 201701, 3 June 3013.
As an exception, he may assign an error where the purpose is to maintain the judgment on other grounds, but he cannot seek modification or reversal of the judgment or affirmative relief unless he has also appealed or filed a separate action. See Aklan College, Inc. v. Enero, G.R. No. 178309, 27 January 2009, 577 SCRA 64, 80.
20Daabay v. Coca–Cola Bottlers Phils., Inc., G.R. No. 199890, 19 August 2013.
21Manuel v. N.C. Construction Supply, 346 Phil. 1014, 1024 (1997).
23Central Pangasinan Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 555 Phil. 134, 138–139 (2007).
24Unilever Philippines v. Rivera, supra note 19.
26 247 Phil. 641 (1988).
28 562 Phil. 759 (2007).
31 G.R. No. 169712, 20 January 2009, 576 SCRA 625.
34 Supra note 23 at 139–140.

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