Source: http://co.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20180326_0000393.DCO.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 19:09:21+00:00

Document:
DR. FNU ALLRED, DR. NIXON ROBERTS, CAPTAIN FNU KLINE, and WARDEN FNU T. K. COZZA-RHODES, Defendants.
On January 1, 2017, Plaintiff Brian Lamont Sweeney (“Plaintiff”) filed a Complaint (ECF No. 1) (“Complaint”) asserting claims for deprivation of his Eighth Amendment rights against Defendants Dr. (FNU) Allred, Dr. Nixon Roberts, Captain (FNU) Kline, and Warden (FNU) T.K. Cozza-Rhodes (collectively, “Defendants”). On June 9, 2017 Defendants filed their Motion for Summary Judgment for Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies (ECF No. 31) (“Motion”). Plaintiff filed his Response to Defendant's Motion (ECF No. 49) (“Response”) on September 8, 2017, to which Defendants filed a Reply (ECF No. 50) (“Reply”) on September 12, 2017. On December 6, 2017, United States Magistrate Judge Mark L. Carman issued his Recommendation and Order (ECF No. 54) (“Recommendation”) granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff filed his “Objections to Magistrate's Recommendation and Order” (ECF No. 59) (“Objection”) on January 8, 2018. For the reasons set forth below, Judge Carman's Recommendation is adopted in its entirety and Plaintiff's Objection is overruled.
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, is a prisoner in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) and was formerly housed at United States Penitentiary Florence (“USP Florence”). (ECF No. 1 at 10.) Plaintiff claims that on or about February 21, 2015, while at USP Florence, he slipped and fell in his cell, injuring his jaw. (Id. ¶¶ 8-9.) The fall “loosened seven teeth in [Plaintiff's] lower jaw.” (Id. ¶ 9.) According to Plaintiff, he was taken to the Lieutenant's office, where the Lieutenant “called [Plaintiff] a liar and ordered that [Plaintiff] be placed in the Special Housing Unit (‘SHU'), for administrative segregation, until [Plaintiff] changed his story.” (Id. ¶ 12, 14.) Plaintiff claims he “informed SHU staff of his injuries and his need for treatment, and a liquid diet, upon his admittance in SHU” (id. ¶ 16) and that “SHU staff refused to provide treatment or document [Plaintiff's] need for a liquid diet” (id. ¶ 18).
When a magistrate judge issues a recommendation on a dispositive matter, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(3) requires that the district court judge “determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge's [recommendation] that has been properly objected to.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(3). In conducting its review, “[t]he district court judge may accept, reject, or modify the recommendation; receive further evidence; or return the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.” Id. An objection is proper if it is filed within fourteen days of the Magistrate Judge's recommendation and is specific enough to enable the “district judge to focus attention on those issues-factual and legal-that are at the heart of the parties' dispute.” United States v. 2121 East 30th Street, 73 F.3d 1057, 1059 (10th Cir. 1996) (quoting Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 147 (1985)).
Further, the Court is mindful of Plaintiff's pro se status, and accordingly reads his pleadings and filings liberally. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); Trackwell v. United States Gov't, 472 F.3d 1242, 1243 (10th Cir. 2007). The Court, however, cannot act as advocate for Plaintiff, who still must comply with the fundamental requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991); see also Ledbetter v. City of Topeka, Kan., 318 F.3d 1183, 1188 (10th Cir. 2003).
Summary judgment is appropriate only if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Henderson v. Inter-Chem Coal Co., Inc., 41 F.3d 567, 569 (10th Cir. 1994). Whether there is a genuine dispute as to a material fact depends upon whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or, conversely, is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1986); Stone v. Autoliv ASP, Inc., 210 F.3d 1132 (10th Cir. 2000).
A fact is “material” if it pertains to an element of a claim or defense; a factual dispute is “genuine” if the evidence is so contradictory that if the matter went to trial, a reasonable jury could return a verdict for either party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. The Court must resolve factual ambiguities against the moving party, thus favoring the right to a trial. Houston v. Nat'l Gen. Ins. Co., 817 F.2d 83, 85 (10th Cir. 1987).

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