Source: http://yalejreg.com/nc/d-c-circuit-review-reviewed-the-baron-montesquieu-by-aaron-nielson/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 19:06:34+00:00

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Here is an interesting fact: the D.C. Circuit has invoked Charles-Louis de Secondat, baron de La Brède et de Montesquieu—better known as Charles de Montesquieu, the Baron Montesquieu, “ the celebrated Montesquieu,” or just Montesquieu—on at least nine separate occasions. Included in this list are some notable cases: Nixon v. Sirica, Buckley v. Valeo, and In re Sealed Case (rev’d sub nom. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988)). At first blush, it is odd to see that many cites to a mid-18th century Parisian. On reflection, however, these citations should not be all that surprising.
More than any other circuit court, the D.C. Circuit is confronted with separation-of-powers cases, and Montesquieu’s musings on that subject have long played an important role in the political philosophy of the United States. As Neomi Rao has demonstrated, Montesquieu was cited in the Supreme Court as early as 1810. And both the majority opinion and dissent in Myers v. United States cite Montesquieu.
PER CURIAM ORDER filed, on the courts own motion, that the parties be prepared to address at oral argument on April 12, 2016, the following questions: (1) What independent agencies now or historically have been headed by a single person? For this purpose, consider an independent agency as an agency whose head is not removable at will but is removable only for cause; and (2) If an independent agency headed by a single person violates Article II as interpreted in Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB, 561 U.S. 477 (2010), what would the appropriate remedy be? Would the appropriate remedy be to sever the tenure and for-cause provisions of this statute, see 12 U.S.C. 5491(c)? Cf. Free Enterprise Fund, 561 U.S. at 508-10. Or is there a more appropriate remedy? And how would the remedy affect the legality of the Director’s action in this case? Before Judges: Henderson, Kavanaugh and Randolph.
The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny. Were the federal Constitution, therefore, really chargeable with the accumulation of power, or with a mixture of powers, having a dangerous tendency to such an accumulation, no further arguments would be necessary to inspire a universal reprobation of the system. I persuade myself, however, that it will be made apparent to everyone, that the charge cannot be supported, and that the maxim on which it relies has been totally misconceived and misapplied. In order to form correct ideas on this important subject, it will be proper to investigate the sense in which the preservation of liberty requires that the three great departments of power should be separate and distinct. The oracle who is always consulted and cited on this subject is the celebrated Montesquieu.
– United States v. Scurry: Here the court confronted several issues surrounding cell phone wiretaps. Judge Rogers, joined by Judges Pillard and Williams rejected several of defendant Scurry’s arguments. But the trio reversed the denial of a motion to suppress, finding that a wire-tap order is facially insufficient when it fails to name the DOJ official who approved the application. It seems the orders at issue had asterisk marks instead of the name of the DOJ official. Since the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act requires the identity of the DOJ official who approves the application be listed on the order, and precedent limits the inquiry to the four corners of the order, Scurry argued that the omission rendered the order facially invalid. The government countered that the law shouldn’t be read so strictly. The panel not only rejected the United States’ argument, it found that suppression is required for a facially insufficient order. Further, and interesting from a separation-of-powers perspective, the panel counseled that the Criminal Resource Manual used by DOJ should be revised to prevent further errors of this type.
– Gordon v. Lynch: Gordon used to be involved in the business of selling cigarettes across state lines. He was previously granted a preliminary injunction against certain sales tax enforcement provisions of the Prevent All Cigarette Trafficking Act. However, the district court denied his motion for a permanent injunction because it found his case to be moot since he had said that “he had no intention to re-enter that business,” and the agency in charge of the Act also said it had no intention to enforce the provisions against him. He argued on appeal that a permanent injunction wouldn’t be moot because it would eliminate the possibility of “criminal and civil penalties for his past violations” and it “would shield him from collateral consequences in the form of civil actions by states in which he sold untaxed cigarettes.” Judge Williams, joined by Judge Brown (Chief Judge Garland again did not participate), affirmed the determination of mootness, in large part because government counsel said during oral argument that the United States wouldn’t seek to hold Gordon liable for past violations and because a permanent injunction in D.C. would not stop other jurisdictions from pursuing him.
– Nurriddin v. Bolden: Nurriddin brought various claims of retaliation and discrimination against his employer, NASA. The district court granted summary judgment to NASA on all the claims. In a per curiam opinion, Judges Brown and Randolph affirmed. For instance, the panel affirmed summary judgment on Nurriddin’s Title VII claims because “there is no basis whatsoever for a reasonable jury to infer either discrimination or retaliation” from the evidence in the record. Judge Wilkins dissented with regard to one aspect of the Court’s Title VII conclusion, contending that a jury could have sided with Nurriddin.
* John Locke, Alexis de Tocqueville, and Edmund Burke, for what it is worth, have been at least cited three times each. It appears that the D.C. Circuit has never cited Thomas Hobbes, though Thomas Paine has been cited at least twice. Benjamin Franklin has been cited a handful of times (by my count five). Plato has been cited a few times, as has Socrates, though they sometimes are cited together, as here: “I fear that Judge Bazelon is turning from Socrates, and his concern with the limits of knowledge, to Plato, and his quest for the ideal. Judges, however, must deal with the workaday world. In judicial review of administrative regulation courts have a dual role, of supervision of administrative agencies, and of responsible partnership in the public interest. They cannot fairly demand the perfect at the expense of the achievable.” Charles Dickens—not much of a philosopher, I suppose, but a keen observer of the human condition—has been cited at least 7 times (usually Bleak House).

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