Source: https://www.ptab.us/2011/07/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 10:05:18+00:00

Document:
See In re Bush, 296 F.2d 491, 496 (CCPA 1961) (“[W]here a rejection is predicated on two references each containing pertinent disclosure which has been pointed out to the applicant, we deem it to be of no significance, but merely a matter of exposition, that the rejection is stated to be on A in view of B instead of on B in view of A, or to term one reference primary and the other secondary.”).
See Perfect Web Techs., Inc. v. InfoUSA, Inc., 587 F.3d 1324, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“while an analysis of obviousness always depends on evidence … it also may include recourse to logic, judgment, and common sense available to the person of ordinary skill that do not necessarily require explication in any reference”).
See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188 (S. Ct. 1981); In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967, 973 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (declining to reach an obviousness rejection on appeal after concluding many claims were non-statutory under § 101); In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 951 n.1 (noting that § 101 is a threshold requirement and that the Examiner may reject claims solely on that basis); In re Rice, 132 F.2d 140, 141 (CCPA 1942) (finding it unnecessary to reach rejection based on prior art after concluding claims were directed to nonstatutory subject matter); Ex Parte Gutta, 93 USPQ2d 1025, 1036 (BPAI 2009) (per curiam) (expanded panel) (precedential) (as the claims on appeal do not recite patent-eligible subject matter under § 101, the prior art rejections need not be considered).
A claim is not indefinite under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, if a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand what is claimed when the claim is read in light of the specification. Exxon Research & Eng'g Co. v. United States, 265 F.3d 1371, 1375 (Fed.Cir. 2001). Breadth in scope does not equal indefiniteness. In re Miller, 441 F.2d 689, 693 (CCPA 1971).

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