Source: https://lawentry.com/2018/08/22/court-of-justice-of-the-european-union-the-new-quasi-legislative-body/
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 18:00:14+00:00

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“Judicial power is a brute fact of political life in the European Union.”1 This notion precisely captures the significant function performed by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in the European Union (EU) legal system. For 60 years of being in action, the CJEU has a remarkable influence on the constitutional structure of the EU law and the Treaties. It has been said to devise some of the crucial features of the latter without an explicit textual basis, comprising: direct effect and the supremacy of the EU law along with a creative interpretation of the text. Subsequently, the Court has received constant admonition from the academic commentators “for its ruling by going further than barely interpretation of the Treaty and going into a sphere of policy-making.”2 Put differently, it has assumed a quasi-legislative role and has hence been awarded the titles like ‘activist’ and ‘undemocratic.’3 However, the purpose of this essay is in no way a thrashing exercise, to attack the legitimacy of the Court. Rather, it is an attempt to examine the accusations by the commentators and to see if they can outweigh the reasoning of the CJEU in its case laws.
Although the principle was formally established in this case, it was a result of a stern judicious interpretation of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (TEEC). As argued by the David Edwards, the former CJEU judge, VGL simply confirmed, though in an unequivocally pronounced way, the antecedent principles on which the case rested.6 In support, Derrick Wyatt took a doctrinal perspective to bring forward the fact that direct effect was neither new nor especially a groundbreaking principle.7 Rather, it was an ineluctable advancement that merely provided solidarity, continuity, and shape to the already enduring vaguely fragmented framework of doctrines in the treaties.
Conversely, it was contended that the doctrine of direct effect has not been expressly articulated in any of the European Treaties. CJEU, by consolidating the doctrine in the European law, and subsequently categorising it as to a greater extent a political actor, it gave no careful consideration to the peculiarities of treaties, nor to the element of Court being restricted by a craft-bound, legal rationality.8 The direct effect was an invention of the CJEU and an attempt to simply hide it behind the ‘façade of legalese.’9 VGL was therefore regarded as “unique judicial contribution to the making of Europe”10 by commentators.
The legal aspect of this principle was, however, questionable as an immediate consequence of the decision was a more effective judicial review of the member state law. It, along these lines, transformed the national individuals into a European Subject14 by taking the “Community law out of the hands of politicians and bureaucrats to give it to the people.”15 This was evident from cases such as Francovich16 wherein the citizens relied upon CJEU’s principle of compliance with respect to employment rights in the EU for bringing a claim against their own country.
It appears that the CJEU has acquired jurisprudence on areas that are not matters of transnational European importance, but of a local, national nature. Concerns have been raised as the CJEU can state illicit European laws and domestic laws that contravene the Treaty of Rome on subjects which were conventionally contemplated to be entirely the prerogative of the governments of the member states, including social policy, gender equality, industrial relations, and competition policy.21 It is thus, pointing towards the conclusion of the Court being an activist by undermining the sovereignty of the member states.
Time and again, in both VGL and Costa, the Court has restricted the scope of national law by using its power to expand and strengthen the scope of the EU regulations.22 The member state governments would never have voluntarily provided the treaty with such doctrines implying that the CJEU judges have crowned themselves as the masters of the treaties by dethroning the member states.23 Slaughter’s view fits here perfectly as he argues that the CJEU has diverted from its main aims that are engraved in the preamble to a self-centered one which holds “promotion of its own prestige and power by increasing the effectiveness of EU law”24 in a very provocative fashion under the seeming pretence of a wide interpretation of treaties.
However, as a response to the criticisms, Oreste Pollicino affirmed the teleological method of decision making as a “physiological expression of European jurisprudence and not a political degeneration of it.” 36 Moreover, this method is perfectly consistent with the dynamic and evolving nature of the European Community. Therefore, it can be reviewed as an acknowledged method of interpretation in the domain of public international law.
Wide interpretation, may be, is a matter of concern for some, but a narrow approach to interpreting the text is not welcoming either. It is evident from the case of Deurz and Geldermann v Council37 wherein it was held that a person must “show that he is somehow singled out by the regulation and injured more severely than the category to which it belongs, he will be unable to challenge it directly before the European Court.”38 This clearly is a defective decision owing to the monetary loss and exploitation of the fundamental rights of the citizens.
To that effect, a broad interpretation method can be deemed to be the only option and hence acceptable. The Commission did not come up with any recent treaty to keep up with the dynamic European environment and as a result, the court has been forced to take up an activist approach due to lack of legislative activism.39 A broad interpretation approach must, therefore, be acceptable. It has been allowed by the member states themselves in the interest of EU in its entirety. Indeed, it implies a greater appliance and adherence to the European law, ensuring the member states with assistance and advantages.
To conclude, Rasmussen’s words that “in its endeavour to make Europe, the ECJ went too far”40 holds less significance as till date no convincing contention has been brought forward to accuse the CJEU of going beyond its judicial function and therefore exercising judicial activism.41 If at some time in future, there is a scope of doubt, a creative approach can then be adopted to reach to a positive reasoning that “the potential role of the Court is much more promising, be it an alternative to specific legislation”42 hence overweighing all its criticisms.
1 A. Stone Sweet, The Judicial Construction of Europe (OUP, 2004), 9.
2 Martin Stiernstrom, ‘The Relationship between Community Law and National Law’ (2005) 5(33) Robert Schuman Paper Series.
(1998) 13 European Law Review.
4 Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos v Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen  ECR 1.
6 David Edwards, ‘Judicial Activism-Myth or Reality?’ (1996) Trenton Publishing.
7 Derrick Wyatt, ‘New Legal Order or Old?’ (1982) 7 ELR 147.
8 Andreas Grimmel, ‘Politics in Robes? The European Court of Justice and the Myth of Judicial Activism’ (2011) 11(2) Europa-Kolleg Hamburg.
9 Cohen and Vauchez, ‘Introduction: Law, Lawyers and Transnational Politics in the Production of Europe’ (2007) 32(1) Law and Social Inquiry 75-82.
10 Guiseppe Federico Mancini and David T. Keeling. ‘Democracy and the European Court of Justice’ (1994) 57(2) Modern Law Review 175-190.
13 Joseph Weiler, ‘Revisiting Van Gend en Loos: Subjectifying and Objectifying the Individual in Fiftieth Anniversary of the Judgment in Van Gend en Loos: 1963-2013’ (2013) Conference of the Court of Justice of the EU.
14 Gerard Conway, The Limits of Legal Reasoning and the European Court of Justice (first published, CUP 2012).
16 Case C-9/90 Francovich and Bonifaci v Republic of Italy  ECR I-5357.
17 Lord Denning, ‘Introduction’, in G. Smith, The European Court of Justice: Judges or Policy Makers? (London, Bruges Group, 1990).
18 Case 6/64 Flaminio Costa v ENEL  ECR 585.
19 Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle fur Getreide und Futtermittel  ECR 1125.
21 Karen Alter, ‘Who are the Masters of the Treaty? European Governments and the European Court of Justice’  52(1) International Organisation 121.
fabric of Integrationist Jurisprudence’  4 European Political Science Review 51. 23 Cruz, ‘The Changing Constitutional Role of the European Court of Justice’,  34 International Journal of Legal Information 224.
24 W. Mattli and A. Slaughter, ‘Revisiting the European Court of Justice’  52(1) International Organisation 187.
27 C. Carruba, M. Gabel and C. Hankla, ‘Understanding the Role of the ECJ in European Integration’  106(1) America Political Science Review 217.
30 HP Bulmer v Bollinger  EWCA Civ 14.
31 Takis Tridimas, ‘The Court of Justice and Judicial Activism’  21(3) ELR 204.
32 Case 283/81 CILFIT SA v Italian Ministry of Health  ECR 3415.
34 Joseph Weiler, ‘The Court of Justice on Trial’  24 Common Market Law Review.
36 Oreste Pollicino, ‘Legal Reasoning of the Court of Justice in Context of the Principle of Equality between Judicial Activism and Self-Restraint’  5 German LJ 283.
37 Case 26/86 Deurz and Geldermann v Council  ECR 941.
42 E. Brooks, ‘Crossing Borders: A critical review of the role of the ECJ in EU Health policy’  105(1) Health Policy 33.
43 Editorial, ‘A Court Within a Court: Is it time to rebuild the ECJ?’  34 ELR 173.

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