Source: http://www.worldcourts.com/icj/eng/decisions/1955.04.06_nottebohm.htm
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 20:47:11+00:00

Document:
M. Adolfo Molina Orantes, Dean of the Faculty of Jurisprudence of the University of Guatemala, as Counsel; Me. A. Dupont-Willemin, of the Geneva Bar, as Secretary.
By its Judgment of November 18th, 1953, the Court rejected the Preliminary Objection raised by the Government of the Republic of Guatemala to the Application of the Government of the Principality of Liechtenstein. At the same time it fixed time-limits for the further pleadings on the merits. These time-limits were subsequently extended by Orders of January 15th, May 8th and September 13th, 1954. The second phase of the case was ready [p6] for hearing on November 2nd, 1954, when the Rejoinder of the Government of Guatemala was filed.
Public hearings were held on February 10th, 11th, 14th to 19th, 21st to 24th and on March 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th and 8th, 1955. The Court included on the Bench M. Paul Guggenheim, Professor at the Graduate Institute of International Studies of Geneva and a Member of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, chosen as Judge ad hoc by the Government of Liechtenstein, and M. Carlos Garcia Bauer, Professor of the University of San Carlos, former Chairman of the Guatemalan Delegation to the General Assembly of the United Nations, chosen as Judge ad hoc by the Government of Guatemala.
The Agent for the Government of Guatemala having filed a number of new documents, after the closure of the written proceedings, without the consent of the other Party, the Court, in accordance with the provisions of Article 48, paragraph 2, of its Rules, bad, after hearing the Parties, to give its decision. Dr. Loewenfeld and Mr. Fawcett, on behalf of the Government of Liechtenstein, and M. Rolin, on behalf of the Government of Guatemala, addressed the Court on this question at the hearings on February 10th and nth, 1955. The decision of the Court was given at the opening of the hearing on February 14th, 1955. Having taken note of the fact that during the course of the hearings the Agent of the Government of Liechtenstein had given his consent to the production of certain of the new documents; taking into account the special circumstances in connection with the search for, and classification and presentation of, the documents in respect of which consent had been refused, the Court permitted the production of all the documents and reserved to the Agent of the Government of Liechtenstein the right, if he so desired, to avail himself of the opportunity provided for in the second paragraph of Article 48 of the Rules of Court, after having heard the contentions of the Agent of the Government of Guatemala based on these documents, and after such lapse of time as the Court might, on his request, deem just. The Agent of the Government of Liechtenstein, availing himself of this right, filed a number of documents on February 26th, 1955.
At the hearings on February 14th, 1955, and at the subsequent hearings, the Court heard the oral arguments and replies of Dr. Loewenfeld, Professor Sauser-Hall, Mr. Fawcett and Mr. Lipstein, on behalf of the Government of Liechtenstein, and of M. Pinto, M. Rolin and M. Molina, on behalf of the Government of Guatemala.
1. The Government of Guatemala in arresting, detaining, expelling and refusing to readmit Mr. Nottebohm and in seizing [p7]retaining his property without compensation acted in breach of their obligations under international law and consequently in a manner requiring the payment of reparation.
(ii) general damages to the amount of 645,000 Swiss francs.
3. In respect of the seizure and retention of the property of Mr. Nottebohm, the Government of Guatemala should submit an account of the profits accruing in respect of the various parts of the property since the dates on which they were seized and should pay the equivalent in Swiss francs (with interest at 6 % from the date of accrual) of such sum as may be found in that account to be owing by them. Further, the Government of Guatemala should pay damages (at present estimated at 300,000 Swiss francs per annum) representing the additional income which in the opinion of the Court would have been earned by the property if it had remained under the control of its lawful owner.
4. Further, the Government of Guatemala should restore to Mr. Nottebohm all his property which they have seized and retained together with damages for the deterioration of that property. Alternatively, they should pay to the Government of Liechtenstein the sum of 6,510,596 Swiss francs representing the estimated present market value of the seized property had it been maintained in its original condition."
(4) that in any event Mr. Nottebohm exhausted all the local remedies in Guatemala which he was able or required to exhaust under the municipal law of Guatemala and under international law.
As to the merits of its claim, the Government of Liechtenstein repeats the Final Conclusions set out in its Memorial at p. 51 and with reference to paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of those Final Conclusions, will further ask the Court to order, under Article 50 of the Statute, such inquiry as may be necessary into the account of profits and quantification of damages."
that the claim is admissible since the facts disclose a breach of international law by Guatemala in the treatment of the person and property of Mr. Frederic Nottebohm.
(8) if the Court should not make any Order as requested in (5)-(7), the Government of Liechtenstein repeats the final conclusions set out in its Memorial at page 51, and with reference to the paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of those final conclusions further asks the Court to order under Article 50 of the Statute such enquiry as may be necessary into the account of profits and quantification of damages."
further to declare that the Government of Guatemala shall be discharged from all responsibility on its acting in accordance with the provisions of Decree No. 900, which contains the law relating to Agrarian reform."
(1) on the ground of the absence of any prior diplomatic negotiations.
(2) on the ground that Nottebohm is not of Liechtenstein nationality.
(3) on the ground of the failure previously to exhaust the local remedies.
to declare that this contention is well founded at least in respect of reparation for injury allegedly caused to the person of Nottebohm and for the expropriation of property other than his immovable property and his interests in the immovable property held in the name of the firm of Nottebohm Hermanos.
consequently, to dismiss the claim of Liechtenstein.
to hold that the amount of damages to be awarded should be calculated in accordance with the Guatemalan law, namely, Decree 529 and, in respect of certain immovable property, the Agrarian Reform Law."
to record a finding on behalf of Guatemala that she expressly disputes the proposed valuations, which have no valid justification. "
By the Application filed on December 17th, 1951, the Government of Liechtenstein instituted proceedings before the Court in which it claimed restitution and compensation on the ground that the Government of Guatemala had "acted towards the person and property of Mr. Friedrich Nottebohm, a citizen of Liechtenstein, in a manner contrary to international law". In its Counter-Memorial, the Government of Guatemala contended that this claim was inadmissible on a number of grounds, and one of its objections to the admissibility of the claim related to the nationality of the person for whose protection Liechtenstein had seised che Court.
Guatemala has referred to a well-established principle of international law, which it expressed in Counter-Memorial, where it is stated that "it is the bond of nationality between the State and the individual which alone confers upon the State the right of diplomatic protection". This sentence is taken from a Judgment of the Permanent Court of International Justice (Series A/B, No. 76, p. 16), which relates to the form of diplomatic protection constituted by international judicial proceedings.
Liechtenstein considers itself to be acting in conformity with this principle and contends that Nottebohm is its national by virtue of the naturalization conferred upon him.
Nottebohm was born at Hamburg on September 16th, 1881. He was German by birth, and still possessed German nationality when, in October 1939, he applied for naturalization in Liechtenstein.
In 1905 he went to Guatemala. He took up residence there and made that country the headquarters of his business activities, which increased and prospered; these activities developed in the field of commerce, banking and plantations. Having been an employee in the firm of Nottebohm Hermanos, which had been founded by his brothers Juan and Arturo, he became their partner in 1912 and later, in 1937, he was made head of the firm. After 1905 he sometimes went to Germany on business and to other countries for holidays. He continued to have business connections in Germanv. He paid a few visits to a brother who had lived in Liech-tenstein since 1931. Some of his other brothers, relatives and friends were in Germany, others in Guatemala. He himself continued to have his fixed abode in Guatemala until 1943, that is to say, until the occurrence of the events which constitute the basis of the present dispute.
In 1939, after having provided for the safeguarding of his interests in Guatemala by a power of attorney given to the firm of Nottebohm Hermanos on March 22nd, he left that country at a date fixed by Counsel for Liechtenstein as at approximately the end of March or the beginning of April, when he seems to have gone to Hamburg, and later to have paid a few brief visits to Vaduz where he was at the beginning of October 1939. It was then, on October 9th, a little more than a month after the opening of the second World War marked by Germany's attack on Poland, that his attorney, Dr. Marxer, submitted an application for naturalization on behalf of Nottebohm.
"that the acceptance into the Home Corporation (Heimatverband) of a Liechtenstein commune has been promised to him in case of acquisition of the nationality of the State"; (2) that he will lose his former nationality as a result of naturalization, although this requirement may be waived under stated conditions. It further makes naturalization conditional upon compliance with the requirement of residence for at least three years in the territory of the Principality, although it is provided that "this requirement can be dispensed with in circumstances deserving special consideration and by way of exception". In addition, the applicant for naturalization is required to submit a number of documents, such as evidence of his residence in the territory of the Principality, a certificate of good conduct issued by the competent authority of the place of residence, documents relating to his property and income and, if he is not a resident in the Principality, proof that he has concluded an agreement with the Revenue authorities, "subsequent to the revenue commission of the presumptive home commune having been heard". The Law further provides for the payment by the applicant of a naturalization fee, which is fixed by the Princely Government and amounts to at least one half of the sum payable by the applicant for reception into the Home Corporation of a Liechtenstein commune, the promise of such reception constituting a condition under the Law for the grant of naturalization.
The Law reveals concern that naturalization should only be granted with knowledge of all the pertinent facts, in that it expressly provides for an enquiry into the relations of the applicant with the country of his former nationality, as well as into all other personal and family circumstances, and adds that "the grant of nationality is barred where these relations and circumstances are such as to cause apprehension that prejudice of any kind may enure to the State by reason of the admission to nationality".
As to the consideration of the application by the competent organs and the procedure to be followed by them, the Law provides that the Government, after having examined the application and the documents pertaining thereto, and after having obtained satisfactory information concerning the applicant, shall submit the application to the Diet. If the latter approves the application, the Government shall submit the requisite request to the Prince, who alone is entitled to confer nationality of the Principality.
Finally, the Law empowers the Princely Government, within a period of five years from the date of naturalization, to withdraw Liechtenstein nationality from any person who may have acquired it if it appears that the requirements laid down in the Law were not satisfied ; it likewise provides that the Government may at any time deprive a person of his nationality if the naturalization was fraudulently obtained.
On October 9th, 1939, Nottebohm, "resident in Guatemala since 1905 (at present residing as a visitor with his brother, Hermann Nottebohm, in Vaduz)", applied for admission as a national of Liechtenstein and, at the same time, for the previous conferment of citizenship in the Commune of Mauren. He sought dispensation from the condition of three years' residence as prescribed by law, without indicating the special circumstances warranting such waiver. He submitted a statement of the Credit Suisse in Zurich concerning his assets, and undertook to pay 25,000 Swiss francs to the Commune of Mauren, 12,500 Swiss francs to the State, to which was to be added the payment of dues in connection with the proceedings. He further stated that he had made "arrangements with the Revenue Authorities of the Government of Liechtenstein for the conclusion of a formal agreement to the effect that he will pay an annual tax of naturalization amounting to Swiss francs 1,000, of which Swiss francs 600 are payable to the Commune of Mauren and Swiss francs 400 are payable to the Principality of Liechtenstein, subject to the proviso that the payments of these taxes will be set off against ordinary taxes which will fall due if the applicant takes up residence in one of the Communes of the Principality". He further undertook to deposit as security a sum of 30,000 Swiss francs. He also gave certain general information as to his financial position and indicated that he would never become a burden to the Commune whose citizenship he was seeking.
Lastly, he requested "that naturalization proceedings be initiated and concluded before the Government of the Principality and before the Commune of Mauren without delay, that the application be then placed before the Diet with a favourable recommendation and, finally, that it be submitted with all necessary expedition to His Highness the Reigning Prince".
On the original typewritten application which has been produced in a photostatic copy, it can be seen that the name of the Commune of Mauren and the amounts to be paid were added by hand, a fact which gave rise to some argument on the part of Counsel for the Parties, There is also a reference to the "Vorausverständnis" of the Reigning Prince obtained on October 13th, 1939, which Liechtenstein interprets as showing the decision to grant naturalization, which interpretation has, however, been questioned. Finally, there is annexed to the application an otherwise blank sheet bearing the signature of the Reigning Prince, "Franz Josef", but without any date or other explanation.
A document dated October 15th, 1939, certifies that on that date the Commune of Mauren conferred the privilege of its citizenship upon Mr. Nottebohm and requested the Government to transmit it to the Diet for approval. A certificate of October 17th, 1939, [p16]evidences the payment of the taxes required to be paid by Mr. Nottebohm. On October 20th, 1939, Mr. Nottebohm took the oath of allegiance and a final arrangement concerning liability to taxation was concluded on October 23rd.
This was the procedure followed in the case of the naturalization of Nottebohm.
A certificate of nationality has also been produced, signed on behalf of the Government of the Principality and dated October 20th, 1939, to the effect that Nottebohm was naturalized by Supreme Resolution of the Reigning Prince dated October 13th, 1939.
Having obtained a Liechtenstein passport, Nottebohm had it visa-ed by the Consul General of Guatemala in Zurich on December 1st, 1939, and returned to Guatemala at the beginning of 1940, where he resumed his former business activities and in particular the management of the firm of Nottebohm Hermanos.
Relying on the nationality thus conferred on Nottebohm, Liechtenstein considers itself entitled to seise the Court of its claim on his behalf, and its Final Conclusions contain two submissions in this connection. Liechtenstein requests the Court to find and declare, first, "that the naturalization of Mr. Frederic Nottebohm in Liechtenstein on October 13th, 1939, was not contrary to international law", and, secondly, "that Liechtenstein's claim on behalf of Mr. Nottebohm as a national of Liechtenstein is admissible before the Court".
The Final Conclusions of Guatemala, on the other hand, request the Court "to declare that the claim of the Principality of Liechtenstein is inadmissible", and set forth a number of grounds relating to the nationality of Liechtenstein granted to Nottebohm by naturalization.
Thus, the real issue before the Court is the admissibility of the claim of Liechtenstein in respect of Nottebohm. Liechtenstein's first submission referred to above is a reason advanced for a decision by the Court in favour of Liechtenstein, while the several grounds given by Guatemala on the question of nationality are intended as reasons for the inadmissibility of Liechtenstein's claim. The present task of the Court is limited to adjudicating upon the admissibility of the claim of Liechtenstein in respect of Nottebohm on the basis of such reasons as it may itself consider relevant and proper.
In order to decide upon the admissibility of the Application, the Court must ascertain whether the nationality conferred on Nottebohm by Liechtenstein by means of a naturalization which took [p17] place in the circumstances which have been described, can be validly invoked as against Guatemala, whether it bestows upon Liechtenstein a sufficient title to the exercise of protection in respect of Nottebohm as against Guatemala and therefore entitles it to seise the Court of a claim relating to him. In this connection, Counsel for Liechtenstein said: "the essential question is whether Mr. Nottebohm, having acquired the nationality of Liechtenstein, that acquisition of nationality is one which must be recognized by other States". This formulation is accurate, subject to the twofold reservation that, in the first place, what is involved is not recognition for all purposes but merely for the purposes of the admissibility of the Application, and, secondly, that what is involved is not recognition by all States but only by Guatemala.
The Court does not propose to go beyond the limited scope of the question which it has to decide, namely whether the nationality conferred on Nottebohm can be relied upon as against Guatemala in justification of the proceedings instituted before the Court. It must decide this question on the basis of international law; to do so is consistent with the nature of the question and with the nature of the Court's own function.
In order to establish that the Application must be held to be admissible, Liechtenstein has argued that Guatemala formerly recognized the naturalization which it now challenges and cannot therefore be heard to put forward a contention which is inconsistent with its former attitude.
Various documents, facts and actions have been relied upon in this connection.
Reliance has been placed on the fact that, on December 1st, 1939, the Consul General of Guatemala in Zurich entered a visa in the Liechtenstein passport of Mr. Nottebohm for his return to Guatemala; that on January 29th, 1940, Nottebohm informed the Ministry of External Affairs in Guatemala that he had adopted the nationality of Liechtenstein and therefore requested that the entry relating to him in the Register of Aliens should be altered accordingly, a request which was granted on January 31st; that on February 9th, 1940, a similar amendment was made to his identity document, and lastly, that a certificate to the same effect was issued to him by the Civil Registry of Guatemala on July 1st, 1940.
The acts of the Guatemalan authorities just referred to proceeded on the basis of the statements made to them by the person concerned. The one led to the other. The only purpose of the first, as appears from Article 9 of the Guatemalan law relating to pass[p18.] ports, was to make possible or facilitate entry into Guatemala, and nothing more. According to the Aliens Act of January 25th, 1936, Article 49, entry in the Register "constitutes a legal presumption that the alien possesses the nationality there attributed to him, but evidence to the contrary is admissible''. All of these acts have reference to the control of aliens in Guatemala and not to the exercise of diplomatic protection. When Nottebohm thus presented himself before the Guatemalan authorities, the latter had before them a private individual: there did not thus come into being any relationship between governments. There was nothing in all this to show that Guatemala then recognized that the naturalization conferred upon Nottebohm gave Liechtenstein any title to the exercise of protection.
Although the request sent by Nottebohm Hermanos to the Minister of Finance and Public Credit on September 13th, 1940, with reference to the inclusion of the firm on the British Statutory List, referred to the fact that only one of the partners was "a national of Liechtenstein/Switzerland", this point was only made incidentally, and the whole request was based on the consideration that the firm "is a wholly Guatemalan business" and on the interests of the "national economy". It was on this basis that the matter was discussed, and no reference whatsoever was made to any intervention by the Government of Liechtenstein at that time.
Similarly unconnected with the exercise of protection was the Note addressed on October 18th, 1943, by the Minister of External Affairs to the Swiss Consul who, having understood that the registration documents indicated that Nottebohm was a Swiss citizen of Liechtenstein, requested, in a Note of September 25th, 1943, that this matter might be clarified. He received the reply that there was no such indication of Swiss nationality in the documents and, although the Consul had referred to the representation of the interests of the Principality abroad by the representatives of the Swiss Government, the reply sent to him made no allusion to the exercise, by or on behalf of Liechtenstein, of protection in favour of Nottebohm.
When, on October 20th, 1943, the Swiss Consul asked that "Mr. Walter Schellenberg of Swiss nationality and Mr. Federico Nottebohm of Liechtenstein", who had been transferred to the United States Military Base for the purpose of being deported, should, "as citizens of neutral countries", be returned home, the Minister of External Affairs of Guatemala replied, on October 22nd, that the action taken was attributable to the authorities of the United States, and made no reference to the nationality of Nottebohm.[p19].
In a letter of the Swiss Consul of December 15th, 1944, to the Minister of External Affairs, reference is made to the entry on the Black Lists of "Frederick Nottebohm, a national of Liechtenstein". Neither the text of these lists nor any extract therefrom has been produced, but this is not germane to the present discussion. The important fact is that Guatemala, in its reply dated December 20th, 1944, expressly stated that it could not "recognize that Mr. Nottebohm, a German subject habitually resident in Guatemala, has acquired the nationality of Liechtenstein without changing his habitual residence". The Court has not at present to consider the validity of the ground put forward for disputing Nottebohm's nationality, which was subsequently put forward to justify the cancellation of his registration as a citizen of the "Condado" of Liechtenstein. It is sufficient for it to note that there is here an express denial by Guatemala of Nottebohm's Liechtenstein nationality.
Nottebohm's name having been removed from the Register of Resident Aliens, his relative Karl Heinz Nottebohm Stoltz, on July 24th, 1946, requested the cancellation of the decision and the restoration of Nottebohm's name to the Register as a citizen of Liechtenstein, putting forward a number of considerations, essentially based on the exclusive right of Liechtenstein to decide as to the nationality in question and the duty of Guatemala to conform to such decision. Far from accepting the considerations thus put forward, the Minister of External Affairs rejected the request, on August 1st, 1946, merely saying that it was pointless, since Nottebohm was no longer a resident of Guatemala.
There is nothing here to show that before the institution of proceedings Guatemala had recognized Liechtenstein's title to exercise protection in favour of Nottebohm and that it is thus precluded from denying such a title.
Nor can the Court find any recognition of such title in the communication signed by the Minister of External Affairs of Guatemala, addressed to the President of the Court, on September 9th, 1952. In this communication reference is made to measures taken against Nottebohm "who claims to be a national of the claimant State" ("quien se alega ser ciudadano del Estado reclamante"). Then, reference having been made to the claim presented by the Government of the Principality of Liechtenstein with regard to these measures, it is stated that the Government of Guatemala "is quite willing to begin negotiations with the Government of the said Principality with a view to arriving at an amicable solution, either in the sense of a direct settlement, an arbitration or judicial settlement". It would constitute an obstacle to the opening of negotiations for the purpose of reaching a settlement of an international dispute or of concluding a special agreement for arbitration and would hamper the use of the means of settlement recommended by Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations, to interpret an offer to have recourse [p20]to such negotiations or such means, consent to participate in them or actual participation, as implying the abandonment of any defence which a party may consider it is entitled to raise or as implying acceptance of any claim by the other party, when no such abandonment or acceptance has been expressed and where it does not indisputably follow from the attitude adopted. The Court cannot see in the communication of September 9th, 1952, any admission by Guatemala of the possession by Nottebohm of a nationality which it clearly disputed in its last official communication on this subject, namely, the letter of December 20th, 1944, to the Swiss Consul, still less can it find any recognition of Liechtenstein's title, based on such nationality, to exercise its protection and to seise the Court in the present case.
Since no proof has been adduced that Guatemala has recognized the title to the exercise of protection relied upon by Liechtenstein as being derived from the naturalization which it granted to Nottebohm, the Court must consider whether such an act of granting nationality by Liechtenstein directly entails an obligation on the part of Guatemala to recognize its effect, namely, Liechtenstein's right to exercise its protection. In other words, it must be deter-mined whether that unilateral act by Liechtenstein is one which can be relied upon against Guatemala in regard to the exercise of protection. The Court will deal with this question without considering that of the validity of Nottebohm's naturalization according to the law of Liechtenstein.
It is for Liechtenstein, as it is for every sovereign State, to settle by its own legislation the rules relating to the acquisition of its nationality, and to confer that nationality by naturalization granted by its own organs in accordance with that legislation. It is not necessary to determine whether international law imposes any limitations on its freedom of decision in this domain. Furthermore, nationality has its most immediate, its most far-reaching and, for most people, its only effects within the legal system of the State conferring it. Nationality serves above all to determine that the person upon whom it is conferred enjoys the rights and is bound by the obligations which the law of the State in question grants to or imposes on its nationals. This is implied in the wider concept that nationality is within the domestic jurisdiction of the State.
But the issue which the Court must decide is not one which pertains to the legal system of Liechtenstein. It does not depend on the law or on the decision of Liechtenstein whether that State is entitled to exercise its protection, in the case under consideration. To exercise protection, to apply to the Court, is to place one [p21]self on the plane of international law. It is international law which determines whether a State is entitled to exercise protection and to seise the Court.
The naturalization of Nottebohm was an act performed by Liechtenstein in the exercise of its domestic jurisdiction. The question to be decided is whether that act has the international effect here under consideration.
International practice provides many examples of acts performed by States in the exercise of their domestic jurisdiction which do not necessarily or automatically have international effect, which are not necessarily and automatically binding on other States or which are binding on them only subject to certain conditions: this is the case, for instance, of a judgment given by the competent court of a State which it is sought to invoke in another State.
In the present case it is necessary to determine whether the naturalization conferred on Nottebohm can be successfully invoked against Guatemala, whether, as has already been stated, it can be relied upon as against that State, so that Liechtenstein is thereby entitled to exercise its protection in favour of Nottebohm against Guatemala.
When one State has conferred its nationality upon an individual and another State has conferred its own nationality on the same person, it may occur that each of these States, considering itself to have acted in the exercise of its domestic jurisdiction, adheres to its own view and bases itself thereon in so far as its own actions are concerned. In so doing, each State remains within the limits of its domestic jurisdiction.
This situation may arise on the international plane and fall to be considered by international arbitrators or by the courts of a third State. If the arbitrators or the courts of such a State should confine themselves to the view that nationality is exclusively within the domestic jurisdiction of the State, it would be necessary for them to find that they were confronted by two contradictory assertions made by two sovereign States, assertions which they would conse-quently have to regard as of equal weight, which would oblige them to allow the contradiction to subsist and thus fail to resolve the conflict submitted to them.
In most cases arbitrators have not strictly speaking had to decide a conflict of nationality as between States, but rather to determine whether the nationality invoked by the applicant State was one which could be relied upon as against the respondent State, that is to say, whether it entitled the applicant State to exercise protection. International arbitrators, having before them allegations of nationality by the applicant State which were contested by the respondent State, have sought to ascertain whether nationality had been conferred by the applicant State in circumstances such as to give rise to an obligation on the part [p22] of the respondent State to recognize the effect of that nationality. In order to decide this question arbitrators have evolved certain principles for determining whether full international effect was to be attributed to the nationality invoked. The same issue is now before the Court: it must be resolved by applying the same principles.
The courts of third States, when confronted by a similar situation, have dealt with it in the same way. They have done so not in connection with the exercise of protection, which did not arise before them, but where two different nationalities have been invoked before them they have had, not indeed to decide such a dispute as between the two States concerned, but to determine whether a given foreign nationality which had been invoked before them was one which they ought to recognize.
International arbitrators have decided in the same way numerous cases of dual nationality, where the question arose with regard to the exercise of protection. They have given their preference to the real and effective nationality, that which accorded with the facts, that based on stronger factual ties between the person concerned and one of the States whose nationality is involved. Different factors are taken into consideration, and their importance will vary from one case to the next: the habitual residence of the individual concerned is an important factor, but there are other factors such as the centre of his interests, his family ties, his participation in public life, attachment shown by him for a given country and inculcated in his children, etc.
Similarly, the courts of third States, when they have before them an individual whom two other States hold to be their national, seek to resolve the conflict by having recourse to international criteria and their prevailing tendency is to prefer the real and effective nationality.
The same tendency prevails in the writings of publicists and in practice. This notion is inherent in the provisions of Article 3, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court. National laws reflect this tendency when, inter alia, they make naturalization dependent on conditions indicating the existence of a link, which may vary in their purpose or in their nature but which are essentially concerned with this idea. The Liechtenstein Law of January 4th, 1934, is a good example.
The practice of certain States which refrain from exercising protection in favour of a naturalized person when the latter has in fact, by his prolonged absence, severed his links with what is no longer for him anything but his nominal country, manifests the view of these States that, in order to be capable of being invoked against another State, nationality must correspond with the factual situation. A similar view is manifested in the relevant provisions of the bilateral nationality treaties concluded between the United States of America and other States since 1868, such as [p23] those sometimes referred to as the Bancroft Treaties, and in the Pan-American Convention, signed at Rio de Janeiro on August 13th, 1906, on the status of naturalized citizens who resume residence in their country of origin.
The character thus recognized on the international level as pertaining to nationality is in no way inconsistent with the fact that international law leaves it to each State to lay down the rules governing the grant of its own nationality. The reason for this is that the diversity of demographic conditions has thus far made it impossible for any general agreement to be reached on the rules relating to nationality, although the latter by its very nature affects international relations. It has been considered that the best way of making such rules accord with the varying demographic conditions in different countries is to leave the fixing of such rules to the competence of each State. On the other hand, a State cannot claim that the rules it has thus laid down are entitled to recognition by another State unless it has acted in conformity with this general aim of making the legal bond of nationality accord with the individual's genuine connection with the State which assumes the defence of its citizens by means of protection as against other States.
The requirement that such a concordance must exist is to be found in the studies carried on in the course of the last thirty years upon the initiative and under the auspices of the League of Nations and the United Nations. It explains the provision which the Conference for the Codification of International Law, held at The Hague in 1930, inserted in Article 1 of the Convention relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws, laying down that the law enacted by a State for the purpose of determining who are its nationals "shall be recognized by other States in so far as it is consistent with .... international custom, and the principles of law generally recognized with regard to nationality". In the same spirit, Article 5 of the Convention refers to criteria of the individual's genuine connections for the purpose of resolving questions of dual nationality which arise in third States.
Diplomatic protection and protection by means of international judicial proceedings constitute measures for the defence of the rights of the State. As the Permanent Court of International Justice has said and has repeated, "by taking up the case of one of its subjects and by resorting to diplomatic action or international judicial proceedings on his behalf, a State is in reality asserting its own rights�its right to ensure, in the person of its subjects, respect for the rules of international law" (P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 2, p. 12, and Series A/B, Nos. 20-21, p. 17).
Since this is the character which nationality must present when it is invoked to furnish the State which has granted it with a title to the exercise of protection and to the institution of inter-national judicial proceedings, the Court must ascertain whether the nationality granted to Nottebohm by means of naturalization is of this character or, in other words, whether the factual con-nection between Nottebohm and Liechtenstein in the period preceding, contemporaneous with and following his naturalization appears to be sufficiently close, so preponderant in relation to any connection which may have existed between him and any other State, that it is possible to regard the nationality conferred upon him as real and effective, as the exact juridical expression of a social fact of a connection which existed previously or came into existence thereafter.
Naturalization is not a matter to be taken lightly. To seek and to obtain it is not something that happens frequently in the life of a human being. It involves his breaking of a bond of allegiance and his establishment of a new bond of allegiance. It may have far-reaching consequences and involve profound changes in the destiny of the individual who obtains it. It concerns him personally, and to consider it only from the point of view of its repercussions with regard to his property would be to misunderstand its profound significance. In order to appraise its international effect, it is impossible to disregard the circumstances in which it was conferred, the serious character which attaches to it, the real and effective, and not merely the verbal preference of the individual seeking it for the country which grants it to him.
At the time of his naturalization does Nottebohm appear to have been more closely attached by his tradition, his establishment, his interests, his activities, his family ties, his intentions for the near future to Liechtenstein than to any other State?
The essential facts appear with sufficient clarity from the record. The Court considers it unnecessary to have regard to the documents purporting to show that Nottebohm had or had not retained his interests in Germany, or to have regard to the alternative submission of Guatemala relating to a request to Liechten[p25]stein to produce further documents. It would further point out that the Government of Liechtenstein, in asking in its Final Conclusions for an adjournment of the oral proceedings and an opportunity to present further documents, did so only for the eventuality of the Application being held to be admissible and not for the purpose of throwing further light upon the question of the admissibility of the Application.
At the date when he applied for naturalization Nottebohm had been a German national from the time of his birth. He had always retained his connections with members of his family who had remained in Germany and he had always had business connections with that country. His country had been at war for more than a month, and there is nothing to indicate that the application for naturalization then made by Nottebohm was motivated by any desire to dissociate himself from the Government of his country.
He had been settled in Guatemala for 34 years. He had carried on his activities there. It was the main seat of his interests. He returned there shortly after his naturalization, and it remained the centre of his interests and of his business activities. He stayed there until his removal as a result of war measures in 1943. He subsequently attempted to return there, and he now complains of Guatemala's refusal to admit him. There, too, were several members of his family who sought to safeguard his interests.
In contrast, his actual connections with Liechtenstein were extremely tenuous. No settled abode, no prolonged residence in that country at the time of his application for naturalization: the application indicates that he was paying a visit there and confirms the transient character of this visit by its request that the naturalization proceedings should be initiated and concluded without delay. No intention of settling there was shown at that time or realized in the ensuing weeks, months or years�on the contrary, he returned to Guatemala very shortly after his naturalization and showed every intention of remaining there. If Nottebohm went to Liechtenstein in 1946, this was because of the refusal of Guatemala to admit him. No indication is given of the grounds warranting the waiver of the condition of residence, required by the 1934 Nationality Law, which waiver was implicitly granted to him. There is no allegation of any economic interests or of any activities exercised or to be exercised in Liechtenstein, and no manifestation of any intention whatsoever to transfer all or some of his interests and his business activities to Liechtenstein. It is unnecessary in this connection to attribute much importance to the promise to pay the taxes levied at the time of his naturalization. The only links to be discovered between the Principality and Nottebohm are the short sojourns already referred to and the presence in Vaduz of one of his brothers: but his brother's presence is referred [p26] to in his application for naturalization only as a reference to his good conduct. Furthermore, other members of his family have asserted Nottebohm's desire to spend his old age in Guatemala.
These facts clearly establish, on the one hand, the absence of any bond of attachment between Nottebohm and Liechtenstein and, on the other hand, the existence of a long-standing and close connection between him and Guatemala, a link which his naturalization in no way weakened. That naturalization was not based on any real prior connection with Liechtenstein, nor did it in any way alter the manner of life of the person upon whom it was conferred in exceptional circumstances of speed and accommodation. In both respects, it" was lacking in the genuineness requisite to an act of such importance, if it is to be entitled to be respected: by a State in the position of Guatemala. It was granted without regard to the concept of nationality adopted in international relations.
Naturalization was asked for not so much for the purpose of obtaining a legal recognition of Nottebohm's membership in fact in the population of Liechtenstein, as it was to enable him to substitute for his status as a national of a belligerent State that of a national of a neutral State, with the sole aim of thus coming within the protection of Liechtenstein but not of becoming wedded to its traditions, its interests, its way of life or of assuming the obligations�other than fiscal obligations�and exercising the rights pertaining to the status thus acquired.
Guatemala is under no obligation to recognize a nationality granted in such circumstances, Liechtenstein consequently is not entitled to extend its protection to Nottebohm vis-à-vis Guatemala and its claim must, for this reason, be held to be inadmissible.
The Court is not therefore called upon to deal with the other pleas in bar put forward by Guatemala or the Conclusions of the Parties other than those on which it is adjudicating in accordance with the reasons indicated above.
Done in French and English, the French text being authoritative, at the Peace Palace, The Hague, this sixth day of April, one thousand nine hundred and fifty-five; in three copies, one of which will be placed in the archives of the Court and the others will be transmitted to the Government of the Principality of Liechtenstein and to the Government of the Republic of Guatemala, respectively.
Judges Klaestad and Read, and M. Guggenheim, Judge ad hoc, have availed themselves of the right conferred on them by Article 57 of the Statute and have appended to the Judgment statements of their dissenting opinion.
The present Judgment deals with one of the three pleas in bar which, in this second phase of the proceedings, have been invoked by the Government of Guatemala. This plea in bar by that Government is based on the ground that the naturalization granted to Mr. Nottebohm by Liechtenstein is invalid because it is inconsistent with the national law of Liechtenstein as well as with. international law.
I. As to the national law of Liechtenstein, it is argued that the authorities of that State, in applying their Nationality Law of 4th January, 1934, have not observed its provisions, but in various respects departed therefrom, particularly with regard to the prescribed order in which Government, Diet and Commune were to deal with the application for naturalization. On this ground, the Court is invited to declare that Mr. Nottebohm has not properly acquired Liechtenstein nationality in accordance with the law of the Principality.
It is generally recognized that questions of naturalization of aliens are, in the absence of conventional rules, in principle within the exclusive competence of States, and that international law has left it to the States themselves to regulate in what manner and under what conditions their nationality may be conferred upon aliens. But if a State has in principle the exclusive competence to regulate questions of nationality by its own legislation without interference by other States, it is difficult to see on what ground its own interpretation and application of this same legislation could be open to challenge by other States. Such a challenge is possible in theory on the ground that the legislation or the application thereof is inconsistent with international law; but the question now under consideration is only whether the authorities of Liechtenstein have applied their local law in a manner consistent with the provisions of that local law.
The Permanent Court of International Justice has on several occasions considered what attitude the Court should take with regard to the national law of States, such as in Judgments No. 7 concerning German interests in Polish Upper Silesia and Nos. 14 and 15 in the Serbian and Brazilian Loans Cases. In accordance with the view expressed in those Judgments, it may be said that it would not be in conformity with the function for which the [p 29]Court is established if it proceeded to examine and decide whether the competent authorities of Liechtenstein have applied the various provisions of their Nationality Law of 1934 in a correct manner. The Court is not deemed to know the national law of the different States. It would hardly be possible for it to place its own construction upon the provisions of the Liechtenstein Nationality Law and to disregard the interpretation and application made by the competent local authorities. By so doing, the Court would substitute itself for these local authorities and pronounce upon matters which have no bearing on international law, and which therefore are solely within the competence of these authorities.
What the Court, in my opinion, can and must do with regard to the application of the Liechtenstein Nationality Law, is to ascertain whether the naturalization in question was in fact granted by the authority to which that law has attributed this competence. Article 12 prescribes that it is the Reigning Prince who alone is entitled to grant the nationality of the Principality. On the evidence submitted to the Court, I am satisfied that the Prince did in fact give his consent to the naturalization of Mr. Nottebohm.
II. The Government of Guatemala further contends that the naturalization was not granted in accordance with international law. It invokes the fact that Mr. Nottebohm had not established his residence in Liechtenstein before he applied for naturalization, and that he left the country soon after it was granted. Apart from conventional rules, international law does not, however, require previous residence in the country as a condition for naturalization, nor does it presuppose a subsequent residence there. This is shown by the fact that the national laws of a great number of States have�though generally providing for previous residence in the country�allowed dispensation from that requirement. The national law of Liechtenstein equally requires such previous residence (para. 6 (d) of the Nationality Law of 1934) but provides that this requirement may be dispensed with, as in fact it was in the present case. To exercise this discretionary power of dispensation is a matter solely within the competence of the Government of Liechtenstein.
The validity of the naturalization of Mr. Nottebohm is also contested on the ground that the Government of Liechtenstein has not proved the loss of his German nationality, as required by paragraph 6 (c) of the same Law of 1934. But this requirement also may be dispensed with according to that provision. It appears, however, that such dispensation was considered unnecessary in view of the provisions of Article 25 of the German Nationality Law of 1913, according to which he would lose his German nationality by acquiring the nationality of Liechtenstein. That he there-[p 30] by in fact lost his German nationality was, on 15th June, 1954, certified by the Senate of Hamburg.
III. The view has been expressed that the relationship established between State and individual by naturalization must presuppose the existence of a physical or real link or a substantial connection attaching the individual to the State. It is thereby implied that a mere common and effective will, not vitiated by fraud, is not sufficient for the creation of the relationship of nationality. It may be questioned whether this view is a true expression of a binding rule of international law.
When the Court, in the Asylum case, was confronted with a contention relating to an alleged right of a unilateral and definitive qualification of the offence committed by the refugee, it based itself on the principle of State sovereignty and held that a party which relies on a custom derogating from that principle must prove that the rule invoked is in accordance with a constant and uniform State practice accepted as law. The same method would seem to be applicable in the present case. Having to base oneself on the ground that questions of naturalization are in principle within the exclusive competence of States, one should, as in the Asylum case, enquire whether a rule derogating from that principle is established in such a manner that it has become binding on Liechtenstein. The Government of Guatemala would have to prove that such a custom is in accordance with a constant and uniform State practice "accepted as law" (Article 38, para. 1 (b) of the Court's Statute). But no evidence is produced by that Government purporting to establish the existence of such a custom.
IV. The present Judgment does not decide the question, in dispute between the Parties, whether the naturalization granted to Mr. Nottebohm was valid or invalid either under the national law of Liechtenstein or under international law. Leaving this question open, it decides that the Government of Liechtenstein is not, under international law, entitled to extend its protection to him as against Guatemala.
A solution upon these lines�severance of diplomatic protection from the question of nationality, and restriction of the right of protection�was never invoked by the Government of Guatemala, nor discussed by the Government of Liechtenstein. It does not conform with the argument and evidence which the Parties have submitted to the Court, and the Government of Liechtenstein has had no occasion to define its attitude and prove its eventual contentions with regard to this solution, whereby its claim is now dismissed. In such circumstances, it is difficult to discuss the merits of such a solution except on a theoretical basis; but I shall mention some facts which show how necessary it would have been, in the interest [p 31] of a proper administration of justice, to afford to the Parties an opportunity to argue this point before it is decided.
Mr. Nottebohm went to Liechtenstein in 1946 after having been liberated from his internment in the United States of America. It is seen from Annex 5, paragraph 18, and Annex 6, paragraph 20, of the Memorial, and paragraph 106 of the Rejoinder, that he must have arrived in Liechtenstein before May 6th, 1946. He established his residence in that country and has lived there ever since.
The record of this case shows that a number of measures were taken by the Government of Guatemala against property of Mr. Nottebohm at a time when he was permanently residing in Liechtenstein. When expropriation measures were taken against his property by virtue of the Legislative Decree No. 630 of 25th May, 1949, he had been living in Liechtenstein for more than three years.
As the Judgment has not decided that the naturalization granted to Mr. Nottebohm on 13th October, 1939, is invalid under Liechtenstein law, one must, for the purpose of deciding the present plea in bar, assume that it is valid. In such circumstances, it is difficult to see on what legal basis the Government of Liechtenstein could be considered as being debarred from affording diplomatic protection to him in respect of measures taken by the Government of Guatemala against his property at a time when he was a permanent resident in Liechtenstein. His link or connection with that country was at that time of such a character that the reasons relied on in the Judgment should constitute a solid ground for the recognition of the right of the Government of Liechtenstein to extend its protection to him as against Guatemala in respect of all measures taken against his property during his permanent residence in Liechtenstein.
V. It is alleged by the Government of Guatemala that the Government of Liechtenstein, by granting its nationality to a German national at a time when Germany was at war, has committed an abuse of right or a fraud. For the purpose of the present case, it is unnecessary to express any views as to the possible applicability of the notion of abuse of right in international law. All I need say is that it would, if so applicable, in my view presuppose the infliction of some kind of injury upon the legitimate interests of Guatemala by the naturalization of Mr. Nottebohm. But it is not shown that an injury of any kind was thereby inflicted upon Guatemala, which at that time was a neutral State.
As to the contention that fraud was committed by the Government of Liechtenstein, it suffices to say that no evidence has been produced in support of such a contention. The various irregularities [p 32]-in the naturalization procedure of which the Government of Guatemala has complained, and the financial conditions fixed for the grant of naturalization, cannot be considered as involving a fraud.
"Reserves to the Agent of the Government of Liechtenstein the right, if he so desires, to avail himself of the opportunity provided for in the second paragraph of Article 48 of the Rules of Court, after hearing the contentions of the Agent of the Government of Guatemala based on these documents, and after such lapse of time as the Court may, on his request, deem just."
On the basis of these new documents, Counsel for Guatemala submitted at the oral hearing the new allegation that part of the property of the firm Nottebohm Hermanos of Guatemala, which the Government of Liechtenstein now claims on behalf of Mr. Nottebohm, in reality belonged to the firm Nottebohm & Co. of Hamburg, and that Mr. Nottebohm, by obtaining Liechtenstein nationality, attempted in a fraudulenf manner to protect German property from the consequences of the war. Counsel qualified the case as a "cloaking case".
"(5) to adjourn the oral pleadings for not less than three months in order that the Government of Liechtenstein may obtain and assemble documents in support of comments on the new documents produced by the Government of Guatemala."
A consideration of the merits would render previous compliance with this request necessary. Not only has the Government of Liechtenstein acquired a right, by virtue of Article 48, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Court, to submit documents in support of its comments upon the new documents produced by the Agent of Guatemala, but this right was expressly reserved to the Agent of Liechtenstein by the Court's decision of February 14th. A finding on the plea [p 33] in bar concerning nationality (diplomatie protection) presupposes, in my opinion, a consideration of the merits ; it depends, as I have attempted to show, on the question whether Mr. Nottebohm committed a fraud when he applied for and obtained Liechtenstein nationality. This question of fraud is so closely connected with the merits of the case that it cannot be decided apart from them and without any appraisal of the various relevant facts which may be disclosed by a consideration of the merits, including the new documents produced by the Government of Guatemala and the documents which the Government of Liechtenstein has become entitled to produce.
This procedural situation also affects the two other pleas in bar invoked by the Government of Guatemala. The plea as to the alleged necessity of previous diplomatic negotiations could only arise if it were held that Mr. Nottebohm has validly acquired Liechtenstein nationality. Only in that case would the Government of Liechtenstein be qualified to present his claim to the Court. Only then could a relevant question arise as to negotiations between the two Governments concerning the claim. Similar considerations apply to the plea in bar as to the exhaustion of local remedies. If it were held that Mr. Nottebohm has not validly acquired the nationality of Liechtenstein, the question whether he has exhausted remedies in Guatemala could not arise before the Court.
For these reasons I have voted for the adjournment of the case.
I am unable to concur in the Judgment of the Court, which, holds that the claim submitted by the Principality of Liechtenstein is inadmissible. It is, therefore, necessary for me to indicate my conclusions as to the proper disposition of the plea in bar, and to give my reasons. In doing so, I must examine certain of the grounds which were relied on by Counsel, in the Pleadings and during the Oral Proceedings, but which were not adopted as a basis for the Judgment.
At the outset, I consider that the very nature of a plea in bar controls the examination of the issues. The allowance of a plea in bar prevents an examination by the Court of the issues of law and fact which consitute the merits of the case. It would be unjust to refuse to examine a claim on the merits on the basis of findings of law or fact which might be reversed if the merits were considered and dealt with.
Accordingly, it is necessary, at this stage, to proceed upon the assumption that all of Liechtenstein's contentions on the merits, fact and law, are well-founded; and that Guatemala's contentions on the merits may be ill-founded.
There is another aspect of this case which I cannot overlook. Mr. Nottebohm was arrested on October 19th, 1943, by the Guatemalan authorities, who were acting not for reasons of their own but at the instance of the United States Government. He was turned over to the armed forces of the United States on the same day. Three days later he was deported to the United States and interned there for two years and three months. There was no trial or inquiry in either country and he was not given the opportunity of confronting his accusers or defending himself, or giving evidence on his own behalf.
In 1944 a series of fifty-seven legal proceedings was commenced against Mr. Nottebohm, designed to expropriate, without compensation to him, all of his properties, whether movable or immovable. The proceedings involved more than one hundred and seventy one appeals of various kinds. Counsel for Guatemala has demonstrated, in a fair and competent manner, the existence of a network of litigation, which could not be dealt with effectively in the absence of the principally interested party. Further, all of the cases involved, as a central and vital issue, the charge against Mr. Nottebohm of treasonable conduct.
It is common ground that Mr. Nottebohm was not permitted to return to Guatemala. He was thus prevented from assuming the personal direction of the complex network of litigation. He was [p35] allowed no opportunity to give evidence of the charges made against him, or to confront his accusers in open court. In such circumstances I am bound to proceed on the assumption that Liechtenstein might be entitled to a finding of denial of justice, if the case should be considered on the merits.
In view of this situation, I cannot overlook the fact that the allowance of the plea in bar would ensure that justice would not be done on any plane, national or international. I do not think that a plea in bar, which would have such an effect, should be granted, unless the grounds on which it is based are beyond doubt.
With these considerations in mind, it is necessary to examine the single issue that the Court must decide in order to reject or allow the plea in bar based on the ground of nationality. The issue for decision is: whether, in the circumstances of this case and vis-à-vis Guatemala, Liechtenstein is entitled, under the rules of international law, to afford diplomatic protection to Mr.Nottebohm.
It is necessary to deal with the different grounds which have been relied on in the Pleadings and in the Oral Proceedings.
The first ground for holding that the claim is inadmissible, which is contained in paragraph 2 (a) of the Final Conclusions of Guatemala, may be stated shortly: that Mr. Nottebohm did not acquire Liechtenstein nationality in accordance with the law of the Principality. While the Judgment of the Court does not rely on this ground, I must state my position, in order to justify my conclusion that the plea in bar as a whole should be joined to the merits.
Here, the production of the certificate of naturalization, and the adoption of the claim by Liechtenstein, establish a prima facie case. The Court can go back of the certificate and disregard it on proof of fraud in the application for or grant of the naturalization, or in the obtaining or issuing of the certificate. But there has been no such proof.
It has been argued that the Court can and should examine the Liechtenstein law and the procedure followed by the Liechtenstein authorities when the naturalization was granted. It has been contended that they did not comply with the law and that, as a result of their defaults, the naturalization granted was a nullity. I have reached the conclusion that the claim cannot be rejected on the ground of non-compliance with the national law, and shall give my reasons in summary form.
To begin with, it is necessary to take into account the jurisprudence of the Permanent Court. Two principles of law have been established. The judgment in The Mavrommatis Jerusalem Con-[p 36]cessions�Series A, No. 5, at page 30�settled the rule that the burden of proof is on the party, that alleges the nullity of a legal act under the national law, to prove it.
The other principle is to be found in a long series of decisions, which applied the principle: that "municipal laws are merely facts which express the will and constitute the activities of States" and that the Court does not interpret the national law as such.
Polish Upper Silesia�Series A, No. 7, page 19.
Serbian Loans�Series A, Nos. 20/21, page 46.
Brazilian Loans�Series A, Nos. 20/21, page 124.
Lighthouses Case (France/Greece)�Series A/B, No. 62, page 22.
Panevezys-Saldutiskis Railway Case�Series A/B, No. 76, page 19.
In the present case, Guatemala has alleged the invalidity or nullity of the legal act of naturalization under the national law. The burden of proof is on Guatemala to prove it. But has not furnished any admissible evidence; such as the testimony of a jurist learned and experienced in Liechtenstein law, or an opinion from the Highest Court in that country. The case has been presented as if this Court was competent to interpret the Liechtenstein law as such, and to pass upon its application to the special circumstances of this case. It has been argued without consideration of the provisions of the Liechtenstein law regarding the interpretation of statutes or of the decisions of its courts.
Accordingly, the contention of the respondent Government, as regards invalidity under the national law, fails through lack of evidence to support it.
But this is not merely a case of failure of proof. Even if the Liechtenstein Law of 1934 is interpreted without regard to the rules of interpretation, procedure and administrative law in force in that country, it is impossible to reach the conclusion that the naturalization was a nullity. There is a fundamental error in the method of interpretation adopted by Counsel, both in the Pleadings and in the Oral Proceedings.
It has been argued that the Liechtenstein authorities disregarded the provisions of the Law of 1934 in two respects: it is said that they inverted the order in which the different steps in the procedure were to be carried out. It is also said that they did not comply with certain essential requirements laid down in the Law, The conclusion was reached that the naturalization was invalid, because of non-conformity with the laws of the Principality.
"The Princely Government may, within five years from the date of acquisition thereof, deprive a foreign national of the citizenship of the Principality which has been granted to him, if it appears that the requirements laid down in this law as governing the grant thereof were not satisfied. It is entitled, however, at any time, to deprive a person of the citizenship of the Principality if the acquisition thereof has come about in a fraudulent manner."
It is clear that the naturalization of Mr. Nottebohm could have been revoked at any time within five years of the grant, if it had appeared that any of "the requirements laid down in this law were not satisfied". It is equally clear that, after the expiration of the five-year period�-i.e. in October 1944�the naturalization became indefeasible, apart from fraud. In such circumstances, it is not open to me, nearly sixteen years after the event and in the absence of fraud, to find that the naturalization was invalid under the Liechtenstein law.
The second ground for holding that the claim is inadmissible, which is contained in paragraph 2 (b) of the Final Conclusions of Guatemala, may be stated shortly: that naturalization was not granted to Mr. Nottebohm in accordance with the generally recognized principles in regard to nationality.
Conclusion 2 (b)is obviously defective. The Court cannot determine "generally recognized principles" or decide cases on the basis of such principles. Its competence is limited by the peremptory and mandatory provisions of Article 38 of the Statute, to decision "in accordance with international law".
However, the position taken by Counsel makes it clear that the Final Conclusion 2 (b) was intended to raise the issue of abuse of right.
Abuse of right is based on the assumption that there is a right to be abused. In the present case it is based upon the assumption that Liechtenstein had the right under international law to naturalize Mr. Nottebohm, but that, in view of the special circumstances and the manner in which the right was exercised, there was an improper exercise of the right�an exercise so outrageous and unconscionable that its result, i.e. the national status conferred on Mr. Nottebohm, could not be invoked against Guatemala.
The doctrine of abuse of right cannot be invoked by one State against another unless the State which is admittedly exercising its rights under international law causes damage to the State invoking the doctrine.
As this ground is not relied upon in the Judgment of the Court, it is unnecessary for me to examine the particular grounds relied [p 38] on by Counsel. It is sufficient to point out that Liechtenstein caused no damage to Guatemala, and that it is therefore necessary to reject the Final Conclusion 2 (b).
The third ground for holding that the claim is inadmissible, which is contained in paragraph 2 (c) of the Final Conclusions of Guatemala, is based on fraud.
It is impossible to separate the aspects of fraud which are relevant to the plea in bar from those which concern the merits. The greater part of the evidence adduced in support of the charge of fraud was contained in considerably more than one hundred documents. From these documents a few were selected and brought to the attention of the Court. The remaining documents were not placed at the disposition of the Court.
In these circumstances, it is not possible for me to found any conclusion based on fraud at this stage in the case. I am therefore of the opinion that the Guatemalan Final Conclusion 2 (c) should be joined to the merits.
There is another aspect of the question, which must be considered. The Judgment of the Court is based upon the ground that the naturalization of Mr. Nottebohm was not a genuine transaction. It is pointed out that it did not lead to any alteration in his manner of life; and that it was acquired, not for the purpose of obtaining legal recognition of his membership in fact of the population of Liechtenstein, but for the purpose of obtaining neutral status and the diplomatic protection of a neutral State.
This ground, to which I shall refer as the link theory, as it is based on the quality of the relation between Mr. Nottebohm and Liechtenstein, cannot be related to the Final Conclusions of Guatemala, or to the argument in the Pleadings and Oral Proceedings.
As a Judge of this Court, I am bound to apply the principle of international law, thus declared by this Court. I cannot concur in the adoption of this ground�not included in the Conclusions and not argued by either Party�as the basis for the allowance of the plea in bar, and for the prevention of its discussion, consideration and disposition on the merits.
Nevertheless, in view of the course followed by the majority, I must examine this ground for holding that the grant of naturalization did not give rise to a right of protection, and indicate some of the difficulties which prevent my concurrence.
To begin with, I do not question the desirability of establishing some limitation on the wide discretionary power possessed by sovereign States: the right, under international law, to determine, under their own laws, who are their own nationals and to protect such nationals.
Nevertheless, I am bound, by Article 38 of the Statute, to apply international law as it is�positive law�and not international law as it might be if a Codification Conference succeeded in establishing new rules limiting the conferring of nationality by sovereign States. It is, therefore, necessary to consider whether there are any rules of positive international law requiring a substantial relationship between the individual and the State, in order that a valid grant of nationality may give rise to a right of diplomatic protection.
"It is for each State to determine under its own law who are its nationals. This law shall be recognized by other States in so far as it is consistent with international conventions, international custom, and the principles of law generally recognized with regard to nationality."
No "international conventions" are involved and no "international custom" has been proved. There remain "the principles of law generally recognized with regard to nationality", and it is on this qualification of the generality of the rule in Article 1 that Guatemala has relied both in the Pleadings and in the Oral Proceedings.
"As to the first point, it is necessary in the first place to determine what, in the absence of general international conventions binding upon the Principality of Liechtenstein, is the content of international law in the light of which the international validity of that State's law must be examined.
It must be acknowledged that in this connection there is no system of customary rules nor any rigid principles by which States are bound.
As M. Scelle has indicated, it is rather in the realm of 'abuse of power' (or of competence or of right) that the courts must consider in each case whether there has been a breach of international law (Scelle�Cours de Droit international public, Paris, 1948, p. 84)."
This position was maintained in the Oral Proceedings.
It is therefore clear that the Government of Guatemala considers that there are no firm principles of law generally recognized with regard to nationality, but that the right of Liechtenstein to determine under its own law that Mr. Nottebohm was its own national, and the correlative obligation of Guatemala to recognize the Liechtenstein law in this regard�opposability�are limited not by rigid rules of international law, but only by the rules regarding abuse of right and fraud.
I have mentioned that no "international conventions" are involved and that no "international custom has been proved". It has been conceded by Guatemala that "there is no system of customary rules", but the link theory is supported by the view that certain international conventions suggest the existence of a trend. I must deal with this point before considering whether the firm view of the law on which the two Parties are in complete agreement should be rejected.
The first international convention is Article 3 (2) of the Statute, which deals with the problem of double nationality. It has nothing to do with diplomatic protection and is not in any sense relevant to the problem under consideration. It is true that it accepts as a test in the case of double nationality the place in which the person "ordinarily exercises civil and political rights". Even if this test [p 41] can be dragged from an entirely different setting and applied to the present case, it does not contribute much to the solution. Mr. Nottebohm has, in the course of the last fifty years, been linked with four States. He was a German national during thirty-four years, but exercised neither civil nor political rights in that country. He was ordinarily resident in Guatemala for nearly forty years, but exercised no political rights at any time in that country and has been prevented from exercising important civil rights for twelve years. He was a prisoner in the United States of America for more than two years, where he exercised neither civil nor political rights. Since his release, he has been accorded full civil rights in the United States and has exercised them freely, but he has had no political rights in that country. He has had full civil rights in Liechtenstein for nearly sixteen years, and has exercised full political rights for nine. Article 3 (2) certainly does not weaken the Liechtenstein position.
The United States of America, between the years 1868 and 1928, concluded bilateral conventions with about eighteen countries, not including Liechtenstein, which limited the power of protecting naturalized persons who returned to their countries of origin. The same sort of restriction on the opposability of naturalization was incorporated in a Pan-American Convention concluded at Rio de Janeiro in 1906. Liechtenstein was precluded from participation. Venezuela refused to sign the Convention. Bolivia, Cuba, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay signed the Convention but did not ratify it. Brazil and Guatemala have both denounced its provisions.
The fact that it was considered necessary to conclude the series of bilateral conventions and to establish the multilateral Convention referred to above indicates that the countries concerned were not content to rely on the possible existence of a rule of positive international law qualifying the right of protection. Further, even within that part of the Western hemisphere which is South of the 49th Parallel, the ratifications of the multilateral Convention were not sufficiently general to indicate consensus of the countries concerned. Taking them together, the Conventions are too few and far between to indicate a trend or to show the general consensus on the part of States which is essential to the establishment of a rule of positive international law.
There have been many instances of double nationality in which international tribunals have been compelled to decide between conflicting claims. In such cases, it has been necessary to choose; and the choice has been determined by the relative strength of the association between the individual concerned and his national State. There have been many instances in which a State has refused to recognize that the naturalization of one of its own citizens has given rise to a right of diplomatic protection, or in which it has refused to treat naturalization as exempting him from the obligations incident to his original citizenship, such as military service.
But the problems presented by conflicting claims to nationality and by double nationality do not arise in this case. There can be no doubt that Mr. Nottebohm lost his German nationality of origin upon his naturalization in Liechtenstein in October 1939. I do not think that it is permissible to transfer criteria designed for cases of double nationality to an essentially different type of relationship.
It is noteworthy that, apart from the cases of double nationality, no instance has been cited to the Court in which a State has successfully refused to recognize that nationality, lawfully conferred and maintained, did not give rise to a right of diplomatic protection.
There are other difficulties presented by the link theory. In the case of Mr. Nottebohm, it relies upon a finding of fact that there is nothing to indicate that his application for naturalization abroad was motivated by any desire to break his ties with the Government of Germany. I am unable to concur in making this finding at the present stage in the case. He had no ties with the Government of Germany, although there is abundant evidence to the effect that he had links with the country, as distinct from the Government. There are substantial difficulties which need to be considered.
In the first place, I do not think that international law, apart from abuse of right and fraud, permits the consideration of the motives which led to naturalization as determining its effects.
In the second place, the finding depends upon the examination of issues which are part of the merits and which cannot be decided when dealing with the plea in bar.
In the third place, the breaking of ties with the country of origin is not essential to valid and opposable naturalization. International law recognizes double nationality and the present trend in State practice is towards double nationality, which necessarily involves maintenance of the ties with the country of [p 43] origin. It is noteworthy that in the United Kingdom the policy of recognizing the automatic loss of British nationality on naturalization abroad, which had been adopted in 1870, was abandoned in 1948. Under the new British legislation, on naturalization abroad, a British citizen normally maintains his ties with his country of origin.
In the fourth place, I am unable to agree that there is nothing to indicate that Mr. Nottebohm's naturalization was motivated by a desire to break his ties with Germany. There are three facts which prove that he was determined to break his ties with Germany. The first is the fact of his application for naturalization, the second is the taking of his oath of allegiance to Liechtenstein, and the third is his obtaining a certificate of naturalization and a Liechtenstein passport.
The link theory is based, in part, on the fact that Liechtenstein waived the requirement of three years' residence. At the time of the naturalization, Mr. Nottebohm was temporarily resident in Liechtenstein; but he had not established domicile, and had no immediate intention to do so. But I have difficulty in regarding lack of residence as a decisive factor in the case.
It has been conceded by Counsel for Guatemala that "the majority of States, in one form or another, either by their law or in their practice, allow for exceptional cases in which they exempt the applicant for naturalization from the requirement of proof of long-continued prior residence". This is another point on which both Parties are in agreement, and the position has been fully established in the case.
Counsel for Guatemala proceeded to contend that the lack of residence, in the circumstances, might be taken into account in determining whether there had been an abuse of right by Liechtenstein, but I have already dealt with that aspect of the case.
It is also suggested that the naturalization of Mr. Nottebohm was lacking in genuineness, and did not give rise to a right of protection, because of his subsequent conduct: that he did not abandon his residence and his business activities in Guatemala, establish a business in Liechtenstein, and take up permanent residence. Along the same lines, it is suggested that he did not incorporate himself in the body politic which constitutes the Liechtenstein State.
In considering this point, it is necessary to bear in mind that there is no rule of international law which would justify me in taking into account subsequent conduct as relevant to the validity and opposability of naturalization. Nevertheless I am unable to avoid consideration of his conduct since October 1939.
I have difficulty in accepting the position taken with regard to the nature of the State and the incorporation of an individual in the State by naturalization. To my mind the State is a concept broad enough to include not merely the territory and its inhabitants but also those of its citizens who are resident abroad but linked to it by allegiance. Most States regard non-resident citizens as a part of the body politic. In the case of many countries such as China, France, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, the non-resident citizens form an important part of the body politic and are numbered in their hundreds of thousands or millions. Many of these non-resident citizens have never been within the confines of the home State. I can see no reason why the pattern of the body politic of Liechtenstein should or must be different from that of other States.
In my opinion Mr. Nottebohm incorporated himself in the nonresident part of the body politic of Liechtenstein. From the instant of his naturalization to the date of the Judgment of this Court, he has not departed in his conduct from the position of a member of the Liechtenstein State. He began by obtaining a passport in October 1939 and a visa from the Consulate of Guatemala. On his arrival in Guatemala in January 1940, he immediately informed the Guatemalan Government and had himself registered as a citizen of Liechtenstein. Upon his arrest in October 1943, he obtained the diplomatic protection of Liechtenstein through the medium of the Swiss Consul. On the commencement of the confiscation of his properties, he obtained diplomatic protection from the same source and channel. After his release from internment he was accorded full civil rights by the Government of the United States of America and instituted and successfully maintained proceedings and negotiations in Washington with a view to obtaining the [p45] release of assets which had been blocked, upon the ground that he was a national of Liechtenstein. During the last nine years he has been an active and resident member of the body politic of that State.
As regards residence and business, there is no rule of international law requiring a naturalized person to undertake business activities and to reside in the country of his allegiance. However, considering the question of subsequent conduct, I am unable to disregard what really did happen.
To begin with, Mr. Nottebohm was 58 years of age at the time �or within two years of the normal retirement age in the type of business activity in which he was engaged. The evidence shows that he was actually contemplating retirement. In October 1939 he was largely occupied with plans to save the business, but I find it hard to believe that he was not also thinking in terms of retirement and that Vaduz was in his mind. Out of the 15 1/2 years which have elapsed since naturalization, Mr. Nottebohm has spent less than four in Guatemala, more than two in the United States, and nine years in Vaduz.
It is true that, in the applications which were made in 1945 on his behalf with a view to his return to Guatemala, it was stated that he intended to resume his domicile in that country. But I am unable to overlook the fact that his return was absolutely essential in order to conduct the 57 law suits to which I have referred above and to clear his own good name from the charges of disloyalty which had been made against him. I do not think that too much weight can be given to the statements made by his kinsfolk in Guatemala with a view to obtaining the right of re-admission to that country.
The essential fact is that when, in 1946, he was released in midwinter in North Dakota, deprived of all that he possessed in Guatemala and with all of his assets in the United States blocked, be went back to the country of his allegiance. In my opinion, the fact of his return to Liechtenstein and of his admission to Liechtenstein is convincing evidence of the real, and effective character of his link with Liechtenstein. It was an unequivocal assertion by him through his conduct of the fact of his Liechtenstein nationality, and an unequivocal recognition of that fact by Liechtenstein.
The second finding is that the naturalization was conferred in exceptional circumstances of speed and accommodation. There are many countries, beside Liechtenstein, in which expedition and good will are regarded as administrative virtues. I do not think that these qualities impair the effectiveness or genuineness of their administrative acts.
The link theory has been based on the view that the essential character of naturalization and the relation between a State and its national justify the conclusion that the naturalization of Mr. Nottebohm, though valid, was unreal and incapable of giving rise to the right of diplomatic protection. 1 have difficulty in adopting this view and it becomes necessary to consider the nature of naturalization and diplomatic protection and the juridical character of the relationships which arose between Guatemala and Liechtenstein on Mr. Nottebohm's return in 1940.
Nationality, and the relation between a citizen and the State to which he owes allegiance, are of such a character that they demand certainty. When one considers the occasions for invoking the relationship�emigration and immigration; travel; treason; exercise of political rights and functions; military service and the like�it becomes evident that certainty is essential. There must be objective tests, readily established, for the existence and recognition of the status. That is why the practice of States has steadfastly rejected vague and subjective tests for the right to confer nationality�sincerity, fidelity, durability, lack of substantial connection�and has clung to the rule of the almost unfettered discretionary power of the State, as embodied in Article 1 of The Hague Draft Convention of 1931.
Nationality and diplomatic protection are closely inter-related. The general rule of international law is that nationality gives rise to a right of diplomatic protection.
As a result of the admission of an alien, whether as a permanent settler or as a visitor, a whole series of legal relationships come into being. There are two States concerned, to which I shall refer as the receiving State and the protecting State. The receiving State becomes subject to a series of legal duties vis-à-vis the protecting State, particularly the duty of reasonable and fair treatment. It acquires rights vis-à-vis the protecting State and the individual, particularly the rights incident to local allegiance and the right of deportation to the protecting State. At the same time the protecting State acquires correlative rights and obligations vis-à-vis the receiving State, particularly a diminution of its rights as against the individual resulting from the local alle-giance, the right to assert diplomatic protection and the obligation to receive the individual on deportation. This network of rights and obligations is fundamentally conventional in its origin�it begins with a voluntary act of the protecting State in permitting the individual to take up residence in the other country, and the voluntary act of admission by the receiving State. The scope and content of the rights are, however, largely defined by positive international law. Nevertheless, the receiving State has control at all stages because it can bring the situation to an end by deportation.
The position is illustrated by what actually happened in the present case. Mr. Nottebohm went to Guatemala 50 years ago as a German national and as a permanent settler. Upon his admission as an immigrant, the whole series of legal relationships came into being between Guatemala and Germany. Guatemala was under a legal obligation vis-à-vis Germany to accord reasonable and fair treatment. Guatemala had the right to deport Mr. Nottebohm to Germany and to no other place. Germany had the right of diplomatic protection and was under the legal obligation to receive him on deportation.
As a result of the naturalization in October 1939, the whole network of legal relationships between Guatemala and Germany as regards Mr. Nottebohm came to an end.
Mr. Nottebohm returned to Guatemala in January 1940, having brought about a fundamental change in his legal relationships in that country. He no longer had the status of a permanently settled alien of German nationality. He was entering with a Liechtenstein passport and with Liechtenstein protection.
In my opinion, as a result of Mr. Nottebohm's admission to Guatemala and establishment under the Guatemalan law as a resident of Liechtenstein nationality, a series of legal relationships arose between Guatemala and Liechtenstein, the nature of which has been sufficiently indicated above. From that time on Guatemala had the right to deport Mr. Nottebohm to Liechtenstein, and Liechtenstein was under the correlative obligation to receive him on deportation. Liechtenstein was entitled as of right to furnish diplomatic protection to Mr. Nottebohm in Guatemala, and when that right was exercised in October 1943, it was not questioned by Guatemala.
I am unable to concur in the view that the acceptance of Mr. Nottebohm by the Guatemalan authorities as a settler of Liechtenstein nationality did not bring into being a relationship between the two Governments. I do not think that the position of Guatemala is in any way different from that of other States and I do not think that it was possible for Guatemala to prevent the coming into being of the same kind of legal relationships which would have taken place if Mr. Nottebohm had landed as a settler in any other country.
When a series of legal relationships, rights and duties exists between two States, it is not open to one of the States to bring the situation to an end by its unilateral action. In my opinion such relationships came into being between Guatemala and Liechtenstein when the former State accepted Mr. Nottebohm in 1940. It was open to Guatemala to terminate the position by deportation but not to extinguish the right of Liechtenstein under international law to protect its own national without the consent of that country.
There is one more aspect of this question to which I must refer. It is suggested that Mr. Nottebohm obtained his naturalization with the sole motive of avoiding the legal consequences of his nationality of origin. He was a German and Germany was at war, but not with Guatemala. There can be little doubt that this was one of his motives, but whether it was his sole motive is a matter of speculation.
There is apparently abundant evidence on this aspect of the case to which I have not had access; evidence which would prove or disprove the contention that the naturalization was part of a fraudulent scheme. But it is not permissible for me to look at that evidence in dealing with a plea in bar. I must proceed at this stage on the assumption that the naturalization was obtained in good faith and without fraud.
It has been complained that the purpose of the naturalization was to avoid the operation of war-time measures in the event that Guatemala ultimately became involved in way with Germany. In [p 49] October 1939, if Mr. Nottebohm read the newspapers�which is highly probable�he knew that Guatemala, in concert with the other Pan-American States, was making every effort to maintain neutrality. It is far more likely that, remembering the experience of Nottebohm Hermanos during the first World War, he was seeking to protect his assets in the United States. The suggestion that he foresaw Guatemalan belligerency is not supported by any evidence and I cannot accept it.
Further, even if his main purpose had been to protect his property and business in the event of Guatemalan belligerency, I do not think that it affected the validity or opposability of the naturalization. There was no rule of international law and no rule in the laws of Guatemala at the time forbidding such a course of action. Mr. Nottebohm did not conceal me naturalization and. informed the Government of Guatemala on the highest level on his return to the country.
I do not think that I am justified in taking Mr. Nottebohm's-motives into consideration�in the absence of fraud or injury to Guatemala�but even if this particular motive is considered, it cannot be regarded as preventing the existence of the right of diplomatic protection.
In view of the foregoing circumstances it is necessary for me to reach the conclusion that the two Parties before the Court were right in adopting the position that the right of Liechtenstein to determine under its own law that Mr. Nottebohm was its own national, and the correlative obligation of Guatemala to recognize the Liechtenstein law in this regard are limited not by rigid rules of international law, but only by the rules regarding abuse of right and fraud.
Accordingly I am of the opinion that the Court should reject the Guatemalan Final Conclusions 2 (a) and 2 (b), join the Conclusion 2 (c) to the merits, and proceed to an examination of the other pleas in bar contained in the Guatemalan Final Conclusions 1 and 3.
Having, to my regret, been unable to concur in the Judgment of the Court I feel it my duty to state my dissenting opinion.
[p 51] tribunals to examine certificates of nationality, reference may also be made to the decision of Commissioner Nielsen in the case of Hatton v. United Mexican States (Reports of International Arbitral Awards, United Nations, September 26th, 1928, Volume IV, p. 331) which rightly places emphasis on the obligation to furnish proof of nationality."Convincing proof of nationality is requisite not only from the standpoint of international law, but as juris-dictional requirement."
2. These decisions are in accordance with a more general rule: the rule requiring proof of nationality is only a particular application of the rule that an international tribunal is competent to decide upon the validity of a rule or an act under municipal law if such rule or act is relevant to the international dispute under examination. The rule or act under municipal law is to be regarded merely as a fact but such facts may be proved "by means of any researches which the Court may think fit to undertake or to cause to be undertaken". (P.C.I.J., Brazilian Loans case, Series A 20/21, p. 124). Moreover the same decision states: "all that can be said in this respect is that the Court may possibly be obliged to obtain knowledge regarding the municipal law which has to be applied". Cf. also P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 7, p. 19; Series A, Nos. 20/21, p. 46; Series A/B, No. 62, p. 22; Series A/B, No. 76, p.19.
3. An international tribunal is not therefore bound to confine itself to the statements of national authorities relating to their application of the rules of municipal law. Accordingly it may consider the facts in a manner different from that of municipal courts. But an international tribunal must never lose sight of the fact that it is called upon to consider municipal law for the purpose of exercising a competence conferred on it by international law. It is not its function to decide upon the domestic validity of municipal law, that is to say, to exercise the powers of a court of appeal with regard to municipal law. What then is its function ? An international tribunal must only be concerned with municipal law and, in particular, with nationality, as a fact determining the admissibility of a claim brought before an international judicial organ. The plaintiff must therefore prove that nationality has been conferred by means of a valid act in accordance with the municipal law of the claimant State; and the defendant, if he disputes this, must establish the contrary (P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 5, P. 30).
In this connexion, however, the Court must confine itself within certain clearly defined limits. This limitation upon the competence of the Court is based on two entirely different considerations: on the one hand, when investigating the application of the municipal law by the municipal authorities, the Court must confine itself to examining whether such application is in accordance with the obligations which international law imposes on the State in question; on the other hand, having regard to the fact that, according to the practice of international law, municipal law does not form part of the body of legal rules which it applies directly, the Court is obliged to reach a decision in regard to municipal law on the basis of evidence submitted to it in the proceedings. It cannot freely examine the application and interpretation of municipal law but can merely enquire into the application of municipal law as a question of fact, alleged or disputed by the parties and, in the light of its own knowledge, in order to determine whether the facts are correct or incorrect.
5. Since the law of Liechtenstein applies primarily within the national sphere, it is the competent State authorities, and these authorities alone, which are entitled to determine whether the law relating to naturalization has been correctly applied, that is to say, whether, in the present case, sufficient reasons existed for waiving the requirement that the applicant must have "ordinarily resided in the territory of the Principality of Liechtenstein at least three years" and whether the application for naturalization was "deserving [of] special consideration" and also whether the applicant could be exempted from this requirement "by way of exception" (see Art. 6 of the Liechtenstein Law on the Acquisition and Loss of Nationality of 4th January, 1934). Even the State Court of Liechtenstein is incompetent to review the considerations of expediency upon which legal acts, decided upon and applied by virtue of a discretionary power of the administrative authorities, are based. This is in accordance with the generally recognized principles of Swiss and German administrative law. It has, moreover, received confirmation in the judicial decisions of the State Court of the Principality, as is shown by its decision of 20th July, 1950, concerning the grant of a concession for a hotel (Gastbewerbehaus-Konzession). (See Rapport de Gestion of the Princely Government to the Diet for the year 1950, pp. 83 et sqq.) It was there stated that, in accordance with Article 40 of the Law relating to the State Court, the latter could only give decisions on questions of law and not with regard to the discretionary power of administrative authorities. In my opinion the Court is not entitled to assume the functions of a supervisory judicial body which does not exist under the domestic law.
6. If the question of F. Nottebohm's acquisition of Liechtenstein nationality is considered from this angle, it is beyond doubt that [p 53] he must be regarded as a national of the Principality.A naturalization to which the supreme organs of the Principality, the Reigning Prince and the Diet, have given their consent, in accordance with Article 12 of the Law on the Acquisition and Loss of Nationality� as they did in the case of F. Nottebohm�is a valid naturalization. Moreover there is also a presumption juris and de jure in favour of the validity of the acts of these supreme authorities, since Liechtenstein law does not provide for the judicial control of acts performed by these authorities in the exercise of their discretionary power.
7. Moreover, in order to determine the validity of a naturalization, an international tribunal must also bear in mind that, from the moment of his naturalization, Liechtenstein has never ceased to regard F. Nottebohm as one of its nationals; this attitude was likewise adopted by Switzerland, the Power representing Liechtenstein interests abroad, as appears from the Certificate of the Swiss Clearing Office of 24th July, 1946 (Reply, Annex 18, p. 90), and probably also by Guatemala, at least until a date which it is difficult to determine from the documents. Finally, F. Nottebohm, who in fact lost his German nationality in consequence of his naturalization, has never invoked the protection of any State other than Liechtenstein; he returned to Liechtenstein in 1946 and never changed his residence thereafter.
1. In addition to the question whether Liechtenstein nationality was validly and effectively granted to F. Nottebohm according to Liechtenstein law, a further question arises, as is stated in one of the Conclusions of Guatemala, namely, whether Liechtenstein nationality was granted to F. Nottebohm in accordance with the generally recognized principles in regard to nationality. In my opinion, however, it is not this abstract problem which calls for consideration in the present case, but rather the more concrete problem of determining whether diplomatic protection resulting from the grant of Liechtenstein nationality can be relied upon as against Guatemala in virtue of the general rules of international law.
3. International law furnishes examples of situations in which the grant of nationality is invalid, with the direct consequence that it cannot form the basis of diplomatic protection. The inadmissibility of a claim on the ground that diplomatic protection cannot be invoked is then merely the result of the absence of the effects of nationality on the international level. This also gives rise to other consequences, such as the non-recognition of the personal status which, being claimed on the basis of the grant of nationality, is held to be null and void, or the loss of the right to claim the benefit of treaty rights reserved to nationals of the State concerned. If, on the international level, we examine the cases in which the absence of a valid bond between the State and the individual to whom the State has granted its nationality has been recognized in practice, it will be found that such a bond has only been held to be lacking when the person concerned possessed a second nationality or when his State of adoption has granted its nationality by compulsion, that is to say, without the consent of the person concerned, or without the State whose nationality is to be lost having consented to the withdrawal of its own nationality.
It is in such circumstances and in such circumstances alone, where the bond between the State and the individual is lacking to so great an extent, that third States are not bound to recognize the naturalization nor to accede to a claim to the right to exercise protection. Thus third States are not bound to consider the children of foreign diplomats born in the territory of a State which attributes its nationality to them as nationals of that State (cf. Article 12 of The Hague Convention of 1930 on Certain Questions relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws). The ownership of land is not by itself a sufficient legal title for the grant of nationality (cf. the awards of the German-Mexican Claims Commission, American Journal of International Law, 1933, p. 69). The Ordinance of the German Reich of August 23rd, 1942, which authorized the grant of German nationality to certain classes of the population in territories not subject to German sovereignty but occupied by Germany, was not bound to be recognized by third States because it was contrary to certain obligations binding on Germany under general international law (cf. Annuaire suisse de droit international, Vol. I, 1944, pp. 79 et sqq.). The compulsory reintegration of a former national resident abroad is unlawful if the person concerned has lost his nationality by its withdrawal and if a new bond has not been created between him and the State wishing to reintegrate him in his former nationality (Jugdments of the Swiss Federal Court, Vol. 72,1, p. 410; Vol. 74,1, pp. 346 et sqq.).
All these situations are, however, somewhat exceptional. In the case of F. Nottebohm, the grant of Liechtenstein nationality did [p 55] not fall within any of these categories, all the more so since he voluntarily acquired Liechtenstein nationality and by so doing automatically lost his German nationality by virtue of Article 25 of the German Nationality Law of 22nd July, 1913, a fact which is, in my opinion, of vital importance for determining the "effective-ness" of Liechtenstein naturalization on the international level. No proof has been furnished in the proceedings to the effect that F. Nottebohm availed himself of the right granted by this Article, according to which nationality was not lost by a person who, before acquiring a foreign nationality, obtained from the competent authorities of his State a written authorization to retain his original nationality. On the contrary, the certificate of the Senate of the Free Hanseatic City of Hamburg of 15th June, 1954, attests the loss of German nationality by F. Nottebohm in consequence of his naturalization in Liechtenstein (Reply, Annex 19, p. 91).
4. Are there other situations, apart from those which have been referred to, in which third States are entitled to regard the naturalization of a foreign national as inoperative when the foreign national has agreed to the grant of nationality and when his former nationality has not been retained? To be justified in saying so, it would be necessary to point to repeated and recurrent acts on the international level, which would establish that, in circumstances identical with or similar to those in which naturalization was granted to F. Nottebohm by Liechtenstein, third States have refused to recognize the naturalization so that it can be said that an established usage has developed displaying the characteristics of a general practice accepted as law (Article 38, paragraph 1 (b), of the Statute of the Court and P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 10, p. 28; I.C.J. Asylum case, Reports 1950, pp. 276 et sqq.). No evidence of such a custom, which would forbid the grant of nationality in the circumstances in which Liechtenstein granted her nationality to F. Nottebohm, has been given in these proceedings. It is not sufficient for this purpose merely to affirm�without any evidence�that there is no other State law permitting naturalization in the circumstances in which it was granted to F. Nottebohm.
5. Moreover, none of the attempts made to define the "bond of attachment" according to criteria other than those which have just been mentioned and which are in accordance with existing international law, has succeeded. This failure to arrive at such a definition is not fortuitous. It arises from the fact that in order to define the bond necessary to make naturalization binding, it is sought to supplement the objective criteria (absence of compulsion in relation to the applicant; dual nationality; the grant of nationality without withdrawal of nationality by the State to which the naturalized person formerly belonged) by subjective considerations such as the "genuineness of the application", "loyalty to the new State", "creation of a centre of economic interests in the new State", "the [p 56] intention to become integrated in the national community"; or, again, rules are stated which are in no way in accordance with present international practice, or vague principles are formulated which would open the door to arbitrary decisions. International law does not, for example, in any way prohibit a State from claiming as its nationals, at the moment of their birth, the descendants of its nationals who have been resident abroad for centuries and whose only link with the State which grants its nationality is to be found in descent, without the requirement of any other element connecting them with that State, such as religion, language, social conceptions, traditions, manners, way of life, etc. (see, for example, Swiss Civil Code, Art. 263, para. 1, 270, 324, para. 1; and Art. 10 of the Federal Law on the Acquisition and Loss of Swiss Nationality of September 29th, 1952; Art. 4 of the Liechtenstein Law on the Acquisition and Loss of Nationality). It is difficult to see how it can be maintained that the conditions necessary to render naturalization valid and effective on the international level have only been complied with if at the time of application for naturalization there existed one of those subjective bonds of attachment which have just been referred to.
6. In order to judge as to the bond between the State and its national, that is to say, in order to ascertain whether this bond is real and effective and not merely fictitious, international law only has regard to the external elements of legal facts to which it attaches certain consequences, without concerning itself with the mental attitude of the legal person responsible for a juridical act such as the act of naturalization, and without considering the motives (which it is very difficult to determine), which have led the individual to apply for naturalization. This view is in no way inconsistent with the provisions of Article 1 of the Convention on Certain Questions relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws adopted by the Conference for the Codification of International Law, held at The Hague in 1930. According to this Article, the law enacted by a State for determining who are its nationals "shall be recognized by other States in so far as it is consistent with .... international custom and the principles of law generally recognized with regard to nationality". This rule, the correct interpretation of which has been the subject of dispute among writers, contains no criterion requiring an "effective" bond in the case of nationality. It merely refers to the rules of international custom and the principles of law generally recognized with regard to nationality, principles which do not forbid the grant of nationality in the circumstances in which Liechtenstein granted its nationality to F. Nottebohm.
7. Nor is it possible to maintain that the bond established between a State and its national is in all circumstances closer than that existing between a State and an individual connected with it by some other link, as, for example, permanent residence. When the [p 57] development of modern law in civilized States is closely considered, it is even possible to affirm that the rights and duties of an individual vis-a-vis the State of his permanent residence, are frequently more numerous than those which link him to the State of which he is a national. There are certain rules of private law governing conflicts of law which clearly illustrate this situation. In these circumstances, the assertion that there exists an especially close link between the State and its national can hardly bear the absolute character which is frequently attributed to it. This link is, in any case, weakened when nationality becomes dissociated from permanent residence as well as in the case of dual nationality, where two or several States claim a right to the attachment of the individual in question and require him to fulfil the duties inherent in nationality, a situation which is in no way contrary to general international law. Moreover, international law contains no rule which makes the effectiveness of nationality dependent upon a sentimental bond between the naturalizing State and the naturalized individual.
8. It has, however, been asserted, both in the written and oral proceedings, that it is necessary to consider the problem of the validity of the act of naturalization apart from the existence of a specific rule of customary law prohibiting Liechtenstein from naturalizing F. Nottebohm in such circumstances, but that a more general complaint could be levelled against Liechtenstein on the one hand and Nottebohm on the other, namely, the absence of a real and genuine intent which is a condition for the validity of legal acts in international law. Nevertheless, it cannot be contended that the naturalization of F. Nottebohm was vitiated by the absence of a genuine intent on the part of Liechtenstein to naturalize him or on the part of F. Nottebohm himself. The reality of the naturalization cannot be called in question. There was no question of a fictitious marriage between Liechtenstein and Nottebohm. In this connexion it is necessary to have regard to the subsequent conduct of Nottebohm, which never varied after naturalization. He always behaved exclusively as a Liechtenstein national and, in taking up the case of its national, the Principality has shown the serious character of the bond linking it with its national. The extent to which the Court can consider the "genuineness" of naturalization as an element of proof in regard to the reality and effectiveness of naturalization, is confined within the limits which have just been stated.
Since F. Nottebohm was not himself subject to any duties based on the principles of international law, it is also unnecessary to consider whether he acted in "good faith" when he applied for naturalization. No rule of general international law�that is to say, no customary rule nor general principle of law recognized by civilized nations within the meaning of Article 38, 1 (b) and (c),[p 58] of the Statute of the Court�lays down such a requirement and no international responsibility can be incurred by the Principality for not having considered the application for naturalization from this point of view, which would render the naturalization wholly or partly inoperative as against Guatemala, a neutral country at the time of the naturalization of Nottebohm. It would be inadmissible to seek to impose a requirement in this respect, that the naturalizing State or applicant for naturalization should foresee uncertain events which might take place in the future with a greater or lesser degree of probability.
9. Even if it were admitted that the Court is entitled to enquire into the motives which led F. Nottebohm to apply for Liechtenstein nationality, it is necessary to point out that F. Nottebohm in no way failed to observe the principles of good faith as defined by the municipal law of civilized States and in particular by Article 2 of the Civil Code of Liechtenstein of 1926. F. Nottebohm did not conceal any essential or subordinate element for the consideration of his application by the Liechtenstein authorities which could therefore decide upon the application with full knowledge of the facts. There was therefore no "lack of loyalty" on the part of F. Nottebohm, no failure to keep his word which, in certain circumstances, could render the legal act irregular for the purposes of the application and interpretation of the Liechtenstein Law on the Acquisition and Loss of Nationality. Only if it could be proved that F. Nottebohm acted in a fraudulent manner, for example, by concealing German property with the help of the naturalization, might it be possible, if certain conditions were fulfilled, to speak of a failure on the part of F. Nottebohm to observe the principle of good faith vis-!!!ä-vis the Principality and perhaps also vis-à-vis Guatemala. Such concealment might, as I shall show, justify the non-recognition of Liechtenstein nationality. In such a case, however, it would not be the absence of good faith which would be the decisive element in the fact that Liechtenstein nationality could not be invoked, but the wrongful character of the fraudulent transaction of concealment of which the acquisition of Liechtenstein nationality would only be one of the constituent elements.
[p 59] nationalities can only avail himself of the diplomatic protection of one of the States of which he is a national vis-à-vis the other and this is so wherever he may be resident. According to the prevailing view, a State can only grant its diplomatic protection to an individual who possessed its nationality at the time when the event giving rise to the diplomatic protection took place, and who has retained such nationality uninterruptedly up to the time when the claim is presented. This dissociation of nationality from diplomatic protection is normally confined to situations in which the individual has two nationalities�either cumulatively or in succession�with the result that the right of protection may always be exercised by one State, thus preserving the possibility of a claim being asserted on the international level.
11. Nor is this statement of the position inconsistent with the fact that the courts of third States and international tribunals have, on many occasions, had to settle disputes in which two States claimed the same individual as their national and that in such cases the prevailing tendency has been to give preference to the real and effective nationality, a view which forms the basis of Article 5 of the Convention of 1930 relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws. The test of effective connection with respect to nationality has only been laid down for the purpose of resolving conflicts arising out of dual nationality, in regard to which third States must choose between one nationality, held to be the more real and effective one, and a second nationality held to be the less real and effective. The test has also been applied between two States each of which wishes to exercise diplomatic protection on behalf of the same person.
As for the Bancroft Treaties, which were invoked during the course of the proceedings, I consider it incorrect to regard these Treaties as constituting a precedent for the case of F. Nottebohm. Apart from the fact that these were bilateral treaties concluded in 1868 between the United States of America on the one hand and the States of Wurtemberg, Bavaria, Baden, Hesse and the North German Confederation on the other, they were abrogated on 6th April, 1917 (see Hackworth, Digest of International Law, Vol. III, p. 384), at the time of the entry of the United States of America into the first World War and cannot therefore be regarded as reflecting the rules of general international law, since these provisions were mainly concerned with the loss of nationality and the American diplomatic protection of persons of German origin, naturalized in the United States and taking up their residence again in Germany without the intention of returning to the United States. The main purpose of these treaties was to annul the effects of American nationality granted to persons who had no wish to reside in the United States and who returned to their country of origin frequently in order to evade the obligations of military service. As regards persons [p 60] possessing dual nationality�American nationality and the nationality of one of the German States in question�the Bancroft Treaties sought to give effect to the nationality of the country of habitual residence (cf. Moore, A Digest of International Law, Vol. III, pp. 358 et sqq.).
The present case is entirely different. F. Nottebohm was not a Liechtenstein national who went to Guatemala and was naturalized in that country and thereafter returned to Liechtenstein in order to take up residence there. Moreover, no conflict of dual nationality arises in his case. To allow Guatemala to hold that Liechtenstein's claim to exercise diplomatic protection is inadmissible against Guatemala would lead to the consequence that F. Nottebohm, having lost his German nationality by acquiring the nationality of Liechtenstein, would no longer be able to invoke the diplomatic protection of any State. Such a dissociation of nationality from diplomatic protection is not supported by any customary rule nor by any general principle of law recognized by civilized nations, within the meaning of Article 38 (1) (b) and (c) of the Statute of the Court. I consider that such a rule of international law could only be applied, in the present case, especially on consideration of a preliminary objection, with the consent of both parties, in accordance with Article 38 (2) of its Statute.
12. Moreover, to dissociate the question of the validity of nationality from that of diplomatic protection leaves a further problem unsolved. Is the question one of the general non-validity of the naturalization on the international level, thus going beyond the limited right of third States to deny the claim to exercise diplomatic protection, or does such non-validity merely affect the right of Liechtenstein to exercise diplomatic protection as against Guatemala?
The scope of the judicial decision extends beyond the effects provided for in Article 59 of the Statute.
13. On the other hand, the reasons relied on�namely the absence of a sufficient bond of attachment, which debarred Liechtenstein from exercising diplomatic protection as against Guatemala�affect the claims relating to damage caused at the time when F. Nottebohm had not yet established a permanent residence in the Principality. Even if these grounds are admitted, however, I consider that there is nothing to prevent Liechtenstein from putting forward claims relating to the period when F. Nottebohm took up permanent residence at Vaduz as from 1946 (see Rejoinder, p. 45). Since the events giving rise to the damage suffered by F. Nottebohm in respect of his property�as to which damage, claims have been put forward against Guatemala�occurred within the period subsequent to 1946, and in particular since Liechtenstein's application was presented to the Court on 17th December, 1951, and since the expropriation measures in regard to which reparation is claimed by the Principality were only applied after the year 1949, and in particular after the enactment of Legislative Decree No. 630 of 13th July, 1949, relating to the Law on the Liquidation of Matters arising out of the War (see Counter-Memorial, Annex 39, p. 126), there is nothing to prevent F. Notte-bohm's nationality deploying its ordinary effects as against Guatemala, even if it is considered that factual ties stronger than those created in 1939 by naturalization, are essential for the purpose of enabling a State to exercise diplomatic protection on behalf of its nationals.
It cannot be denied, if this reasoning, which I consider goes beyond the requirement of general international law, is adopted, that F. Nottebohm, after a permanent residence of more than three years in Liechtenstein, is entitled to put forward certain of his claims against Guatemala, and that Liechtenstein is entitled to take up the case of its national. Since F. Nottebohm certainly had Liechtenstein nationality, which was supported by a "bond" of residence at the time when the claim was addressed to Guatemala (1951), Liechtenstein, in this connexion, fulfils all the requirements which, in international practice, have been the subject of dispute, as to the date which is to be preferred, that is to say, the date when the national Government espouses the claim, the date when the claim is presented to a representative of the defendant Government, the date when it is brought before an international tribunal, or even the date when the claim is settled (cf. E. Borchard, Protection diplomatique des Nationaux à l'Étranger, Annuaire de l'Institut de droit international, 1931, Vol. I, p. 284).
On the other hand there is no doubt that the events giving rise to the dispute, that is to say, the damage suffered in respect [p 62] of expropriated property, occurred at a time subsequent to the final establishment of F. Nottebohm in Liechtenstein. In this connexion it is also necessary to point out that all the strict tests laid down for the purpose of determining the national character of a claim, which were considered during the preliminary discussions for the 1930 Conference on the Codification of International Law, were complied with in the present case (cf. League of Nations, Doc. C.75.M.69.1929.V., pp. 140 et sqq.).
The fact that the Guatemalan Law of 1949 on the Liquidation of Matters arising out of the War, in accordance with Article 7 of Legislative Decree No. 630, regarded as enemy nationals those persons who possessed the nationality of any of the States with which Guatemala was at war or who had such nationality on 7th October, 1938, although they claimed to have acquired another nationality after that date, does not further modify the essential elements of the question under consideration, that is to say, that the events giving rise to the dispute occurred at a time when F. Nottebohm was a Liechtenstein national. It is not for a third State to decide the validity of a foreign nationality for the purpose of rendering inoperative the exercise of diplomatic protection, with the possible exception of the special case of concealment of enemy property, which will be dealt with under III below and which, being a matter concerned with the merits of the case, cannot be considered in connexion with a plea in bar.
Since no final measure of expropriation, in respect of which a claim for reparation has been put forward by Liechtenstein, was adopted before F. Nottebohm's return to the State, of which he was a national, in 1946, and since all these measures were only carried out after he took up permanent residence in Liechtenstein, I fail to see how it is possible to invoke the absence of any bond of attachment between Liechtenstein and F. Nottebohm (even if in this connexion one were to admit the existence of requirements going beyond what is laid down by general inter-national law on this question) for the purpose of denying that Liechtenstein had the right to take up the case of its national in 1951 with respect to unlawful acts alleged to have been committed after 1946.
(a) The rule of international law that nationality should not be dissociated from diplomatic protection in cases where the protected person has only one nationality, and where the facts giving rise to the dispute have occurred after the grant of such nationality, would be modified retroactively sixteen[p63]years after F. Nottebohm's naturalization in Liechtenstein. This situation is all the more serious since the main facts giving rise to the dispute only occurred after 1949, three years after F. Nottebohm finally established himself in Liechtenstein and, by prolonged residence there, created solid bonds of attachment, the absence of which has been relied upon by the respondent party in the written and oral proceedings as a ground for the view that Liechtenstein is not entitled to exercise diplomatic protection in favour of F. Nottebohm against Guatemala. I. consider that even if one shared this view, one must at least recognize the right to exercise diplomatic protection as regards the injury suffered by F. Nottebohm after 1946, especially the injury resulting from the measures taken following the enactment of Legis-lative Decree No. 630 of July 13th, 1949.
(b) Even if it be admitted that nationality can be dissociated from diplomatic protection in the present case, there remains the question as to what are the consequences of the total or partial invalidity under international law of a nationality validly acquired under municipal law. Is the invalidity confined to the sphere of diplomatic protection, or does it extend to the other effects of nationality on the international level, for example, treaty rights enjoyed by the nationals of a particular State in regard to monetary exchange, establishment and access to the municipal courts of a third State, etc.?
(c) A refusal to recognize nationality and therefore the right to exercise diplomatic protection, would render the application of the latter�the only protection available to States under general international law enabling them to put forward the claims of individuals against third States�even more difficult then it already is.
If the right of protection is abolished, it becomes impossible to consider the merits of certain claims alleging a violation of the rules of international law. If no other State is in a position to exercice diplomatic protection, as in the present case, claims put forward on behalf of an individual, whose nationality is disputed or held to be inoperative on the international level and who enjoys no other nationality, would have to be abandoned. The protection of the individual which is so precarious under existing international law would be weakened even further and I consider that this would be contrary to the basic principle embodied in Article 15 (1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on December 8th, 1948, according to which everyone has the right to a nationality. Furthermore, refusal to exercise protec[p 64]tion is not in accordance with the frequent attempts made at the present time to prevent the increase in the number of cases of stateless persons and to provide protection against acts violating the fundamental human rights recognized by international law as a minimum standard, without distinction as to nationality, religion or race.
15. The finding that the Application is not admissible on the grounds of nationality prevents the Court from considering the merits of the case and thus from deciding whether the respondent State is or is not guilty of an unlawful act as regards Liechtenstein and its national, who has no other legal means of protection at his disposal. Moreover, a preliminary objection must be strictly interpreted. It must not prevent justice from being done.
1. There is no rational principle or judicial decision in either private or public international law to justify the view that a new nationality which has been acquired for the purpose of avoiding, in the future, certain effects of a former nationality should be regarded as invalid. Even if it were admitted, although this has not been proved, that F. Nottebohm became a Liechtenstein national with the object of evading the consequences of his German nationality, it is necessary to point out that this change in his status was not effected during the War between Guatemala and Germany but long before that time. It is therefore impossible to speak of a change in the status of a person from that of an enemy national to that of a neutral national which might, in certain circumstances, have been the case had the naturalization taken place while Guatemala and Germany were in a state of war.
[p 65]directed, on the ground that a legal act may be vitiated by fraud and that the respondent party is therefore justified in alleging that it is a nullity.
The acquisition of nationality in such cases forms part of a transaction which is to be regarded as generally fraudulent, with the possible result that the injured belligerent State may refuse to recognize the change of nationality, and not merely that diplomatic protection cannot be relied upon. Nevertheless, it will always be difficult to prove the existence of such a fraudulent operation.
3. Moreover, whatever the solution of this problem may be, it would have been necessary, for the purpose of examining it and of arriving at a solution, to consider the merits of the dispute. In this connexion, the Court should have given the applicant party the opportunity of collecting all the evidence with the object of enabling the Court to ascertain whether, in the particular case, the allegation of concealing property was justified and that therefore Guatemala was not bound to recognize the Liechtenstein nationality of F. Nottebohm. Since proof of concealment of property has not been adduced, I consider that the Court should have joined the objection to the admissibility on the ground of nationality to the merits. This should also have been the case as regards the two other grounds of inadmissibility, since their fate is bound up with the objection based on nationality. Indeed, if the latter objection is upheld, it becomes unnecessary to consider Guatemala's objection to the admissibility on the ground of prior diplomatic negotiations and non-exhaustion of local remedies.
4. Moreover, the decision of the Court given at the public sitting of February 14th, 1955, expressly reserved the right of Liechtenstein, under Article 48, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Court, to submit documents in support of its comments on the new documents produced by the other Party. The Court should therefore have granted the application for an adjournment made by the Government of the Principality of Liechtenstein.

References: V. 
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 Art. 6
 Art. 263
 Art. 10
 Art. 4