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In International Technical Products Corp., the Tribunal held that force majeure conditions in Iran justified the claimant's suspension of performance and departure from Iran in December 1978 as well as the respondent's failure to make contractual payments for work not yet performed by the claimant. The parties had presented "[n]o detailed evidence as to when the force majeure ceased to exist or changed into something else";40 nonetheless, the Tribunal excused the claimant's subsequent failure to return to Iran on the ground that it had not been invited by the respondent to resume performance until 30 October 1979, which was only a few days before 4 November 1979, the date when militant Iranian students seized the United States Embassy in Tehran.41 Quoting Starrett Housing Corp.,42 the Tribunal noted that "at least after 4 November 1979 those American companies which had remained in Iran were forced to leave their projects and had to evacuate their personnel." It proceeded to hold that, while the situation that had started on 4 November 1979 excused the claimant from performing, in that "new situation [the respondent], on the other hand, was precluded from invoking force majeure in its contractual relationship" with the claimant.43 Thus, by this finding, the Tribunal concluded that Iran was at least partially responsible for the conditions that arose after 4 November 1979. The Tribunal went on to grant the claimant's claim for lost profits on unperformed contractual services.
In Gould, in contrast, the respondent's non-performance of its contractual payment obligations was justified, not as a result of a general disruption of banking operations, as in Sylvania, but rather as a result of the claimant's inability, due to force majeure, to provide certain contractually-required services in Iran. The Tribunal held: "Since there remained in great part the field and spare part services to supply, [the claimant's] inability to do so due to the social upheaval in Iran justified non-performance by both parties.61 The Tribunal found that the continuing presence of the claimant's representatives in Iran had become impossible, at least temporarily, and their absence had adversely affected the entire repair-service operation. "In those circumstances, the Respondent cannot be held to have been required to continue payments."62 The respondent's "suspension of its performance obligations as to the payment schedule ... must therefore be366 considered a result of the same force majeure conditions which led to the ... departure [of the claimant's representatives]."63 Because, according to the Tribunal, there were no realistic prospects for the claimant's return to Iran in light of the conditions in the country, it concluded - correctly, in my view - that by mid-1979 the contract had terminated because of frustration or impossibility of performance.64 Consequently, not the same force majeure conditions, as Westberg argues, but rather quite different "circumstances causing the force majeure"65 in effect justified the different conclusions reached by the Tribunal in Gould and Sylvania with respect to the effects of force majeure on the contracts at issue.
Concerning the methodology that the Tribunal has employed in determining who owes what to whom as a result of contract frustration, the Tribunal's award in Westinghouse Electric Corp.70 provides valuable insights. In the detailed and complex award in that case, which concerned a project for the establishment of maintenance capability for the Iranian Air Force's electronic equipment, the Tribunal determined the extent of performance and the extent of payments under 14 frustrated contracts (plus two contracts that had terminated otherwise). An analysis of the way in which the Tribunal determined the extent of the claimant's performance, which involved the provision of a multitude of different electronic maintenance equipment as well as all kinds of engineering and training services, is particularly instructive and may prove to be useful to other international tribunals faced with the difficult task of determining who owes what to whom as a result of premature contract termination when there is a paucity of evidence.
Concerning the computation of damages in unjust enrichment and quantum meruit cases, the Tribunal's practice has been to compensate claimants based on the extent to which the respondent state has been enriched by virtue of acquiring the property.94 In determining the compensation owed a claimant in the circumstances of a particular case, the Tribunal by and large took an approach372 similar to that reflected in the CENTRAL-List unjust enrichment Rule.95 For example, in Morrison-Knudsen, the Tribunal awarded compensation for expenses incurred in supplying an additional set of drawings of a planned motorway. While the contract provided that payment adjustments for extra services should be mutually agreed, there had been no such agreement between the parties. Nevertheless, the Tribunal held that, because the respondent had requested and accepted the additional work, the claimant was "entitled to its share of a reasonable sum for such work on the basis of quantum meruit".96 The Tribunal estimated the amount of compensation based on cost information provided by the claimant. In DIC of Delaware, which involved contracts for the construction of a large development of apartment buildings, the Tribunal awarded damages in quantum meruit to the claimants for work performed at the request and with the knowledge of the respondent, even though there was insufficient evidence that an enforceable contract had been signed. The Tribunal said that evidence of the value of the claimants' work was the formula used by the parties to determine compensation under contracts for the other phases of the project and was reflected in the relevant requisitions that the claimants submitted to the respondent. The Tribunal went on to award the amount of those requisitions.97 In Futura Trading Inc., the Tribunal awarded compensation on the theory of unjust enrichment for the value of 2000 wooden poles which were delivered but not paid for, although the Tribunal found that no contract had been concluded concerning the sale of the wooden poles to the respondent. The Tribunal considered "the invoiced amount of $542,809 to be a reasonable measure of the extent to which [the respondent] was enriched"98 and awarded that sum to the claimant.
The Tribunal went on to award the claimant USD 750000, which the Tribunal stated was an "approximation"; of the compensation due the claimant for the373 respondent's 'actual use and benefit' of a container terminal between November/December 1980 and 28 November 1982, when the terminal, developed and improved by the claimant, was to revert to the respondent in accordance with the contract.100 Chamber One, in the same composition, once again relied on the "actual-use" standard some two years later in Flexi-Van Leasing, Inc.101 In adopting that standard for determining the extent of the enrichment, Sea-Land Service, Inc. and Flexi-Van Leasing, Inc. stand alone in the Tribunal's jurisprudence in unjust enrichment cases.
The Iran United St. Claims Tribunal, by consistently applying principles of commercial law in deciding many of the commercial cases before it, has contributed significantly to the stabilization and development of a multitude of principles and rules of the lex mercatoria.119 Indeed, the development of a body of international commercial law has 'made a quantum advance due to the work of the Tribunal',120 and its jurisprudence in commercial cases represents a veritable horn of plenty for those who are called to research and apply transnational commercial law, such as international arbitral tribunals and counsel engaged in international 378 commercial arbitration. No less importantly, the Tribunal's experience has shown that an international arbitral tribunal can efficiently decide cases 'on the basis of respect for law'121 by applying general principles of commercial law rather than national law.
27CENTRAL-List Rule, reprinted in Berger, Creeping Codification, supra note 2, at p. 288, and Berger, Introduction, supra note 4, at pp. 156-157.
28For a comprehensive discussion of the Tribunal's jurisprudence in force majeure cases, see Aldrich, supra note 6, at pp. 306-320.
29Gould Marketing, Inc. v. Ministry of National Defense of lran, Interlocutory Award No. ITL 24-49-2, 3 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 147, 152-53 (27 July 1983); Starrett Housing Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Interlocutory Award No. ITL 32-24-1, 4 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 122, 155 (19 December 1983); Department of the Environment of the Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America, Award No. 107-B53-1, 5 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 105, 110 (25 January 1984); Sylvania Technical Systems, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 180-64-1, 8 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 298, 308-9 (27 June 1985); International Technical Products Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 186-302-3, 9 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 10, 23-24 (19 August 1985); Questech, Inc. v. Ministry of National Defense of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 191-59-1, 9 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 107, 119 (25 September 1985); General Dynamics Telephone Systems Center, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 192-285-2, 9 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 153, 160 (4 October 1985); International Schools Services, Inc. v. National Iranian Copper Industries Co., Award No. 194-111-1, 9 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 187, 196 (10 October 1985) ("International School Services I"); Touche Ross and Co. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 197-480-1, 9 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 284, 294-95 (30 October 1985); Phelps Dodge International Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 218-135-2, 10 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 157, 173 para. 51 (19 March 1986); Computer Sciences Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 221-65-1, 10 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 269, 289 (16 April 1986); Richard D. Harza v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 232-97-2, 11 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 76, 91 para. 37 (2 May 1986); Ammann & Whitney v. Ministry of Housing and Urban Development, Award No. 248-198-1, 12 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 94, 104 (25 August 1986); American Bell International Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 255-48-3, 12 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 170, 184 para. 47 (19 September 1986); Henry, F. Teichmann, Inc. v. Hamadan Glass Co., Award No. 264-264-1, 13 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 124, 133 paras. 31-32 (12 November 1986); Anaconda Iran, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Interlocutory Award No. ITL 65-167-3, 13 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 199, 212-13 paras. 47-50 (10 December 1986); Ford Aerospace & Communications Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 289-93-1, 14 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 24, 35-36 paras. 45-46 (29 January 1987); International Schools Services, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 290-123-1, 14 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 65, 73 para. 27 (29 January 1987) ("International School Services II"); Exxon Research and Engineering Co. v. National Iranian Oil Co., Award No. 308-155-3, 15 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 3, 11 para. 30 (9 June 1987); Reliance Group, Inc. v. Oil Service Company of Iran, Award No. 315-115-3, 16 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 257, 269-71, paras. 46, 51 (10 September 1987); Mobil Oil Iran Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 311-74/76/81/150-3, 16 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 3, 38-39 paras. 114-17 (14 July 1987); Harris International Telecommunications, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 323-409-1, 17 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 31, 67 paras. 121-22 (2 November 1987); Lockheed Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 367-829-2, 18 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 292, 302 para. 40 (9 June 1988); Motorola, Inc. v. Iran National Airlines Corp., Award No. 373-481-3, 19 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 73, 80 para. 36, 85 para. 56 (28 June 1988); Avco Corp. v. Iran Aircraft Industries, Award No. 377-261-3, 19 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 200, 216-17 paras. 79-80 (18 July 1988); Houston Contracting Co. v. National Iranian Oil Co., Award No. 378-173-3, 20 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 3, 28 para. 87, 48-49 paras. 155-57 (22 July 1988); Stephen G. Shifflette v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 423-10645-1, 22 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 111, 115-16 para. 19 (12 June 1989); Watkins-Johnson Co. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 429-370-1, 22 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 218, 242 para. 89 (28 July 1989); Electronic Systems International, Inc. v. Ministry of Defense of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 430-814-1, 22 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 339, 355 para. 61 (28 July 1989); Rockwell International Systems, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 438-430-1, 23 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 150, 170 para. 88 (5 September 1989); Combustion Engineering, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 506-308-2, 26 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 60, 77 para. 61, 80 para. 71 (18 February 1991); General Electric Co. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 507-386-1, 26 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 148, 180 para. 111 (15 March 1991); Petrolane, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 518-131-2, 27 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 64, 80-81 paras. 48-51 (14 August 1991); William J. Levitt v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 520-210-3, 27 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 145, 166-67 para. 71 (29 August 1991); Collins Systems International, Inc. v. Navy of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 526- 431-2, 28 Iran U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 21, 35 para. 43 (20 January 1992); W. Jack Buckameier v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 528-941-3, 28 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 53, 84-85 para. 95 (6 March 1992); Unidyne Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 551-368-3, 29 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 310, 340-42 paras. 94-97 (10 November 1993); Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force, Award No. 579-389-2, 33 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 60, 78 para. 54, 80 paras. 60-61 (26 March 1997); Bank Markazi Iran v. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Award No. 595-823-3, para. 75 (16 November 1999) (not yet published in the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal Reports).
30See, e.g., Anaconda Iran, Inc., supra note 29, 13 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 211 para. 43 ("Under a variety of names most, if not all, legal systems recognize force majeure as an excuse for contractual non-performance. Force majeure therefore can be considered a general principle of law"); Mobil Oil Iran Inc., supra note 29, 16 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 39 para. 117.
31Anaconda Iran Inc., supra note 29, 13 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 211 para. 43. See also Mobil Oil Iran Inc., supra note 29, 16 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 39 para. 117 (force majeure is a general principle of law that applies "even when the contract is silent").
32Gould Marketing, Inc. (Interlocutory Award), supra note 29, 3 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 147.
34Sylvania Technical Systems, Inc. supra, note 29, 8 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 298.
37See text accompanying note 33.
38Sylvania Technical Systems, Inc., supra note 29, 8 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 309-10.
39Id. at p. 312. In rejecting the respondent's plea of force majeure, the Tribunal noted that the Iranian government had terminated the contract at issue as a result of a "deliberate policy decision not to continue with American contractors in a project that related to secret military intelligence operations" and that such a decision had been taken in view of an historic development, and do[es] not convey that performance by the [respondent] was prevented by events beyond its control. Id. at pp. 312-13.
40International Technical Products Corp., supra note 29, 9 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 24.
42Starrett Housing Corp., supra note 29, 4 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 155.
43International Technical Products Corp., supra note 29, 9 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 24.
44On 14 November 1979, US President Carter imposed economic sanctions on Iran in response to the 4 November seizure of the United States Embassy in Tehran. See text accompanying note 8.
45See, e.g., Gould Marketing, Inc. v. Ministry of National Defense of Iran, Final Award No. 136-49/50-2, 6 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 272, 279 (29 June 1984); Avco Corp., supra note 29, 19 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. 216-17 paras. 79-80; Collins Systems International, Inc., supra note 29, 28 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 35 para. 43; Unidyne Corp., supra note 29, 29 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 342 para. 97.
46See e.g., Gould Marketing, Inc. (Final Award), supra note 45, 6 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 279; Westinghouse Electric Corp., supra note 29, 33 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 171-72 paras. 367-68.
47Blount Brothers Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 215-52-1, 10 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 56 (6 March 1986).
48The question of the invocation of force majeure by a government agency for actions by its own government has been the subject of much debate. See, e.g., Karl-Heinz Böckstiegel, Arbitration and State Enterprises (Kluwer Law and Taxation Publisher, Deventer/Antwerp/Boston/Frankfurt/London, 1984) at pp. 37-39; Georges R. Delaume Law and Practice of Transnational Contracts (Oceans Publications Inc., New York/London/Rome 1988) at pp. 54-57; Thomas E. Carbonneau, "The Elaboration of Substantive Legal Norms and Arbitral Adjudication: The Case of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal" in The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal 1981-1983 - Seventh Sokol Colloquium (ed. Richard B. Lillich) (University Press of Virginia Charlottesville, 1984) at pp. 104, 116-17, 120.
49Blount Brothers Corp., supra note 47, 10 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 75. See also Bank Markazi Iran, supra note 29, at paras. 75-76 (holding, even if the Federal Reserve Bank of New York were considered an entity controlled by the government of the United States, it could, in the circumstances, invoke force majeure since it has its own legal personality distinct from the state). Accord C. Czarnikow Ltd. v. Centrala Handlu Zagranieznego Rolimpex, 1979 A.C. 351, discussed in Delaume, supra note 48, at p. 55, and Carbonneau, supra note 48, at pp. 116-17.
50See, e.g., Gould Marketing. Inc. (Interlocutory Award), supra note 29, 3 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 153; Sylvania Technical Systems, Inc., supra note 29, 8 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trip. Rep. 309-10; Anaconda Iran, Inc., supra note 29, 13 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 211 para. 41; General Electric Co., supra note 29, 26 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 180 para. 111; Westinghouse Electric Corp., supra note 29, 33 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 78 para. 54.
51The CENTRAL-List force majeure Rule provides that the affected party's "non-performance is excused" and that, "[i]f non-performance is temporary, performance of the contract is suspended during that time". See text accompanying note 27.
52See supra notes 29 and 32.
53Gould Marketing, Inc. (Interlocutory Award), supra note 29, 3 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 154.
54See, e.g., International Schools Services I, supra note 29, 9 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 196; Anaconda Iran, Inc., supra note 29, 13 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 211 para. 41; International Schools Services II, supra note 29, 14 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 72-73 paras. 23, 27; Mobil Oil Iran Inc., supra note 29, 16 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 39 para. 117; Stephen G. Shifflette, supra note 29, 22 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 15-16 para. 19; Combustion Engineering, Inc., supra note 29, 26 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 77 para 61, 80 para. 71, 116 para. 207; William, J. Levitt, supra note 29, 27 Iran-U.S. Cl Trib. Rep. 166-67 para. 71; Unidyne Corp., supra note 29, 29 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 342 paras. 97-98; Westinghouse Electric Corp., supra note 29, 33 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 80 para. 61, 136 para. 259, 169 para. 360, 175 para. 379. See also Queens Office Tower Associates v. Iran National Airlines Corp., Award No. 37-172-1, 2 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep 247, 251-52 (15 April 1983) (finding that an Iran Air lease of certain office commercial space in New York had been subject to a "combination of frustration of purpose and impossibility of payment" due to United States economic sanctions against Iran); Linen, Fortinberry and Associates, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 372-10513-2, 19 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 62, 70 para. 28 (28 June 1988) (holding that the purpose of a contract pursuant to which an American public relations firm was to promote the public image in the United States of the Pahlavi dynasty's Iran was frustrated by the success of the Islamic Revolution).
55The CENTRAL-List force majeure Rule, however, does deal with the situation where continued suspension of contractual performance becomes attributable to one of the parties: "If the period of non-performance becomes unreasonable and amounts to a fundamental non-performance, the other party may claim damages and terminate the contract." See text accompanying note 27.
57See John A. Westberg, International Transactions and Claims Involving Government Parties - Case Law of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal (International Law Institute, Washington D.C., 1991) at pp. 168-71, 182; Crook, "Debt and Contract Claims", supra note 22, at pp. 288-290; Crook, "Applicable Law", supra note 22, at p. 294.
58Sylvania Technical Systems, Inc., supra note 29, 8 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 309, and text accompanying note 35 ("Sylvania-test").
59Westberg, supra note 57, at p. 182.
60See Sylvania Technical Systems, Inc., supra note 29, 8 Iran-U.S. CL. Trib. Rep. 308-10, 312-13, and supra note 39.
61Gould Marketing, Inc. (Interlocutory Award), supra note 29, 3 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 153.
64See ibid. at p. 154.
65Sylvania-test, see supra note 58.
66Queens Office Tower Associates, supra note 54, 2 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 254.
67Gould Marketing, Inc. (Final Award), supra note 45, 6 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 274 (footnote omitted).
68See International School Services I, supra note 29, 9 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 196-97; Phelps Dodge International Corp., supra note 29, 10 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 173 para. 52; International Schools Services II, supra note 29, 14 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 73-74 para. 30; William J. Levitt, supra note 29, 27 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 167-68 paras. 74-76; Unidyne Corp., supra note 29, 29 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 342-43 para. 99; Westinghouse Electric Corp., supra note 29, 33 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 80-81 paras. 63-64. In Westinghouse Electric Corp., ibid. at p. 81 para. 64, the Tribunal set forth in clear and simple terms how it would determine who owed what to whom as a result of the frustration of the contracts at issue: "[The Tribunal] will determine the extent to which [the claimant] performed its obligations under each ... contract ... until such performance was made impossible, and whether, based on such performance, [the claimant] is entitled to receive further payments or, on the contrary, must return to the [respondent] part of the payments it received." See also Lockheed Corp., supra note 29, 18 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 303 para. 40 (holding that whether a contract is considered ultimately frustrated or expired by its own terms makes no difference in the settlement of accounts between the parties and the determination of what one owes to whom).
69See, e.g., International School Services I, supra note 29, 9 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 197-99 (awarding costs incurred prior to the date of termination of a contract to operate a school for American children in Iran, but rejecting claims for costs incurred after such date, including transportation and moving expenses, and for lost profits); Stephen G. Shifflette, supra note 29, 22 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 115-16 para. 19 (awarding compensation for the two weeks the claimant worked pursuant to a contract for teaching services in Iran, but not lost wages for the remainder of the semester); Combustion Engineering, Inc., supra note 29, 26 U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 77 paras. 62, 207 (dismissing claims for licence fees due subsequent to the termination of the licensing agreement); Unidyne Corp., supra note 29, 29 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 344 paras. 102-103 (awarding compensation for work performed but not paid for, but denying a claim for lost profits); Westinghouse Electric Corp., supra note 29, 33 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 81 para. 64, 126 para. 216 (awarding compensation for work performed but not paid for, but denying claim for lost profits).
70Westinghouse Electric Corp., supra note 29.
71Id. 33 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 80 para. 62; International Schools Services I, supra note 29, 9 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 196-97.
72See, e.g. Unidyne Corp., supra note 29, 9 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 343 para. 100; Westinghouse Electric Corp., supra note 29, 33 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 81 para. 64.
73CENTRAL-List Rule, reprinted in Berger, Creeping Codification, supra note 2, at p. 287, and Berger, "Introduction", supra note 4, at p. 160.
74Ultrasystems Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 27-84-3, 2 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 100, 111 (4 March 1983); Benjamin R. Isaiah v. Bank Mellat, Award No. 35-219-2, 2 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 232, 236-37 (30 March 1983); Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 135-33-1, 6 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep 149, 168-72 (22 June 1984); Morrison-Knudsen Pacific Ltd. v. Ministry of Roads and Transportation, Award No. 143-127-3, 7 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 54, 76 (13 July 1984); DIC of Delaware, Inc. v. Tehran Redevelopment Corp., Award No. 176-255-3, 8 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 144, 161-62 (26 April 1985); Futura Trading Inc. v. Khuzesran Water and Power Authority, Award No. 187-325-3, 9 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 46, 57-58 (19 August 1985); Schlegel Corp. v. National Iranian Copper Industries Co., Award No. 295-834-2, 14 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 176, 180-83 paras. 13-18 (27 March 1987); Mobil Oil Iran Inc., supra note 29, 16 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 19 para. 54; Uiterwyk Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 375-381-1, 19 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 107, 152 para. 157 (6 July 1988); Alfred Haber, P.A. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 437-10159-3, 23 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 133, 147 para. 58 (4 September 1989); W. Jack Buckameier, supra note 29, 28 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 85-87 paras. 98-101. The Tribunal has rejected claims for unjust enrichment or quantum meruit in the following cases: Dames & Moore v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 97-54-3, 4 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 212, 220-21 (20 December 1983); Morgan Equipment Co. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 100-280-2, 4 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 272, 278 (27 December 1983); T.C.S.B., Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 114-140-2, 5 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 160, 171-72 (16 March 1984); Component Builders, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Interim/Interlocutory Award No. ITM/ITL 51-395-3, 8 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 216, 223-24 (27 May 1985); Shannon and Wilson, Inc. v. Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, Award No. 207-217-2, 9 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 397, 402-3 paras. 20-22 (5 December 1985); Aeronutronic Overseas Services, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 238-158-1, 11 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 223, 238 para. 48 (20 June 1986); Flexi-Van Leasing, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 259-36-1, 12 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 335, 354-55 (13 October 1986); Futura Trading Inc. v. National Iranian Oil Co., Award No. 263-324-3, 13 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 99, 115 para. 58, 117 para. 64 (30 October 1986); Reliance Group, Inc., supra note 29, 16 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 272 para. 55; Lockheed Corp., supra note 29, 18 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 309-10 para. 63; Rockwell International Systems, Inc., supra note 29, 23 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 200 para. 190; Phibro Corp. v. Ministry of War-Etka Co. Ltd. Award No. 503-474-3, 26 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 15, 27 paras. 48-49 (18 January 1991); Consortium for International Development v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 512-455-1, 26 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 244, 251 para. 17 (15 May 1991); SeaCo, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 531-260-2, 28 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 198, 206-8 paras. 25-30 (25 June 1992). For a comprehensive discussion of the Tribunal's jurisprudence on unjust enrichment and quantum meruit, see Aldrich, supra note 6, at pp. 397-411.
75Brower & Brueschke, supra note 15, at p. 427.
76Consortium for International Development, supra note 74, 26 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 251 para. 17. See also Dames & Moore, supra note 74, 4 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 220-21; Component Builders, Inc., supra note 74, 8 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 223-24.
77T.C.S.B. Inc., supra note 74, 5 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 171. See also Aeronutronic Overseas Services, Inc., supra note 74, 11 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 238 para. 48; Flexi-Van Leasing, Inc., supra note 74, 12 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 353.
78Benjamin R. Isaiah, supra note 74, 2 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 232.
79Article VII, para. 2, of the Claims Settlement Declaration provides that "[c]laims of nationals of Iran or the United States, as the case may be, means claims owned continuously, from the date on which the claim arose to the date on which this Agreement enters into force, by nationals of that state. ..." Claims Settlement Declaration, supra note 12, art. VII, para. 2.
80Benjamin R. Isaiah, supra note 74, 2 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 236-37.
83Sea-Land Service, Inc., supra note 74, 6 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 168. See also Flexi-Van Leasing, Inc., supra note 74, 12 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 352-53.
84Sea-Land Service. Inc., supra note 74, 6 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 169.
87See Morgan Equipment Co., supra note 74, 4 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 278 (rejecting a claim based on unjust enrichment by an equipment supplier who shipped parts to a purchaser who was acting as a contractor, not an agent, for the Iranian Navy); Shannon and Wilson, Inc., supra note 74, 9 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 402-3 paras 20-22 (rejecting a claim for lack of proof that the respondent had been unjustly enriched, but noting, in dicta, that, by contracting only with a third party, and not with the respondent, the claimant assumed the risk that the third party might not be able to collect all the funds it considered due from the respondent); SeaCo, Inc., supra note 74, 28 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 206-8 paras 25-30 (denying a claim based on unjust enrichment for want of proof that the respondent's enrichment and the claimant's detriment arose as a consequence of the same act or event and distinguishing on the facts the Tribunal's award in Schlegel Corp., supra note 74).
88Schlegel Corp., supra note 74, 14 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 182 para. 16.
90Id. at pp. 182-83 para. 17.
92See Ultrasystems Inc., supra note 74, 2 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 111 (holding that the respondent's request for work, and the claimant's performance provided in accordance with that request, rendered the respondent liable at least in quantum meruit, without regard to the contract); Morrison-Knudsen Pacific Ltd.; supra note 74, 7 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 76 (holding that the claimant was entitled to a reasonable sum as compensation in quantum meruit for additional work performed at the respondent's request where the contract provided that payment adjustments for extra services should be mutually agreed upon by the parties and where no such agreement was made); DIC of Delaware, Inc., supra note 74, 8 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 161-62 (holding that the claimant was entitled to compensation in quantum meruit for work performend at the request and with the knowledge of the respondent, even though there was insufficient evidence that an enforceable contract had been signed).
94The Tribunal's practice in unjust enrichment and quantum meruit cases to compensate claimants based on the extent to which the respondent state has been enriched stands in stark contrast to its practice in expropriation cases, where the Tribunal took the view that "compensation had to be measured by the loss to property owner rather than the gain, if any, by the expropriating State." Aldrich, supra note 6, at p. 227. In an early expropriation award, Tippetts, Abbett, McCarthy, Stratton v. TAMS-AFFA Consulting Engineers of Iran, the Tribunal stated with respect to the standard of compensation: The Claimant is entitled under international law and general principles of law to compensation for the full value of the property of which it was deprived. The Tribunal prefers the term "deprivation" to the term "taking," although they are largely synonymous, because the latter may be understood to imply that the Government has acquired something of value, which is not required. Tippetts, Abbett, McCarthy, Stratton v. TAMS-AFFA Consulting Engineers of Iran, Award No. 141-7-2, 6 Iran- U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 219, 225 (29 June 1984) (footnote omitted). See also Amoco International Finance Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 310-56-3, 15 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 189, 269 para. 259 (14 July 1987) (rejecting the theory of unjust enrichment as an appropriate basis for compensation in expropriation cases).
95The CENTRAL-List unjust enrichment Rule provides that the value of the enrichment shall be determined "according to the contractually agreed price or market price, including full compensation for the use (usefruct) of the subject matter of the enrichment." Seetext accompanying note 73.
96Morrison-Knudsen Pacific Ltd., supra note 74, 7 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 76.
97DIC of Delaware, Inc., supra note 74, 8 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 162.
98Futura Trading Inc., supra note 74, 9 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 57.
99Sea-Land Service, inc., supra note 74, 6 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 196-71.
100See ibid. at p. 172. In a powerful dissent, Arbitrator Howard M. Holtzmann took issue with what he called the majority's "transmogrification"; of the measure of "actual benefit" into "actual use". Separate opinion of Howard M. Holtzmann, 6 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 175, 215-16. He agreed that, in a situation where one party has been enriched at the expense of another in the absence of wrongdoing, it was "not a novelty" to measure compensation, not by injured party's loss, but rather by the enriched party's "actual benefit". Citing authority, he went on to say: "Actual benefit", however, has seldom if ever been equated with "actual use", the standard the Majority purports to apply. This is probably so because of the injustice that would result to the injured party if property with a determinable value could be cheapened by reference to the potentially wasteful or improvident uses to which it may be put by the party acquiring it. Another reason that an "actual use" standard has seldom if ever been adopted is its inherent difficulty in application. Evidence of "actual use"- if that is understood, as it is by the Majority, to mean the actual frequency of use given a piece of property- is almost always difficult to obtain and is generally available only to the respondent State. Thus, such evidence is actually lacking, as it is in the case. For this reason, even in this cases which mention the "use" by a respondent of the property at issue, the evidence has generally indicated- as in this case- only that the property had come into the respondent's hands and had been used to some extent by it. Having ascertained this fact, tribunals have not itemized and valued such "uses", but have awarded injured parties the value of the transferred property. Ibid. at pp. 213-14. In Mr. Holtzmann's view, the figure of USD 750000, which he stated the majority had pulled out of the air, was "derisory". Id. at p. 213.
101Flexi-Van Leasing, Inc., supra note 74, 12 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 354. See also Dissenting Opinion of Howard M. Holtzmann in Flexi-Van Leasing, Inc., 12 Iran U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 356, 363 (stating, citing authority, that other international tribunals, rather than requiring proof of "actual use", have held that a benefit constituting unjust enrichment occurs when goods are available for use by a state, regardless of whether the claimant can show particular instances of that use).
102CENTRAL-List Rule, reprinted in Berger, Creeping Codification, supra note 2, at p. 295, and Berger, "Introduction", supra note 4, at p. 149.
103CENTRAL-List Rule, reprinted in Berger, Creeping Codification, supra note 2 at p. 295, and Berger, 'Introduction', supra note 4, at p. 148.
104Pomeroy Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 51-41-3, 2 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 391, 397 (8 June 1983). See also RayGo Wagner Equipment Co. v. Star Line Iran Co., Award No. 20-17-3, Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 411, 413-14 (15 December 1982); Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Bank Markazi Iran, Award No. 46-57-2, 2 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 334, 339 (25 May 1983); R.N. Pomeroy v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 50-40-3, 2 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 372-380 (8 June 1983); Chas. T. Main International, Inc. v. Khuzestan Water and Power Authority, Award No. ITL. 23-120-2, 3 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 156, 163-64 (27 July 1983).
105Stephen G. Shifflette, supra note 29, 22 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 115 para 18. See also DIC of Delaware, Inc., supra note 74, 8 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 161 and Combustion Engineering, Inc., supra note 29, 26 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 106 paras 161-63 (both holding that it is general principle of law that one can prove the existence of an enforceable contract through evidence demonstating part performance) and Woodward - Clyde Consultants v. Islamic Republic Iran, Award No. 73-67-3, 3 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 239, 247 (2 September 1983) (holding that where the respondent orally consented to the claimant's services and paid for some of them, the respondent could not now avoid liability merely because neither party observed contract formalities').
106Intrend International, Inc. v. Imperial Iranian Air Force, Award No. 59-220-2, 3 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 110, 115 (27 July 1983).
107General Dynamics Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 123-283-3, 5 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 386, 394-95 (16 April 1984). Other cases in which the Tribunal has relied on the contemporaneous conduct of the parties in deciding questions of formation, validity, and interpretation of contracts include: Computer Sciences Corp., supra note 29, 10 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 283; Reading and Bates Drilling Co. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 355-10633-2, 18 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 164, 172 para. 20 (16 March 1988); Seismograph Service Corp. v. National Iranian Oil Co., Award No. 420-443-3, 22 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 3, 16 paras 41-42 (31 March 1989).
108Rexnord Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 21-132-3, 2 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 6, 12 (10 January 1983). See also Westinghouse Electric Corp., supra note 29, 33 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 154 para. 317 (rejecting for want of proof a claim that the claimant had charged exorbitant prices for spare parts on the ground that the respondent, as late as 1979, long after it had complained to the claimant about the prices, paid a number of the claimant's spares invoices).
109See John Carl Warnecke and Associates v. Bank Mellat, Award No. 72-124-3, 3 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep 256, 261 (2 September 1983). Other cases in which the Tribunal has given significant weight to a party's failure to raise contemporaneous complaints include: Gould Marketing, Inc. (Final Award), supra note 45, 6 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 277; Harnischfeger Corp. v. Ministry of Roads and Transportation, Award No. 144-180-3, 7 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 90, 103 (13 July 1984);Blount Brothers Corp., supra note 47, 10 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 67; The Trustees of Columbia University in the City of New York v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 222-10517-1, 10 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 319, 326 para. 30 (16 April 1986); Logos Development Corp. v. Information Systems Iran of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 228-487-3, 11 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 53, 65 para. 50 (30 April 1986), Mc Laughlin Enterprises, Ltd. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 253-289-1, 12 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 146, 150-51 para. 16 (16 September 1986); Ford Aerospace and Communications Corp., supra note 29, 14 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 36, para. 47; Seismograph Service Corp., supra note 107, 22 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 53-54 para. 193, 83 para. 320; Anaconda Iran, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Final Award No. 539-167-3, 29 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 320, 341-42 paras. 64-65, 367 para. 119 (29 October 1992); Westinghouse Electrc Corp., supra note 29, 33 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 89 para 91. See also infra notes 117 and 118.
110Collins Systems International ,Inc., supra note 29, 28 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 31 para. 29. See also ibid. at p. 32 para 34 (While the Tribunal has not considered itself bound by the parties' view as to whether a contract terminated, ... it has generally taken into account contemporaneous behavior in deciding that question'). Accord Westinghouse Electric Corp., supra note 29, 33 Iran U-S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 78 para. 53. See also Itel International Corp. v. Social Security Organization of Iran, Award No. 479-476-2, 24 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 272, 283 para. 38 (23 May 1990); General Electric Co., supra note 29, 26 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 158-61 paras. 32-40.
111Westinghouse Electric Corp., supra note 29, 33 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 137. See also ibid. at p. 169 para. 360, 175 para. 379. The Tribunal applied similar reasoning in General Dynamics Telephone Systems Center, Inc., supra note 29, 9 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib Rep. 159-60. See also Kimberly-Clark Corp., supra note 104, 2 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 341-42.
112See Oil Field of Texas, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 258-43-1, 12 Iran U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 308317 para. 35 (8 October 1986).
113Combustion Engineering, Inc., supra note 29, 26 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 125-26 para. 240.
114Collins Systems International, Inc. supra note 29, 28 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 39 para. 59. Cases in which the Tribunal has held that a party had waived a contractual right include: Lischem Corp. v. Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, Award No. 140-194-2, 7 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 18, 23 (29 June 1984); Blount Brothers Corp., supra note 47, 10 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 68; Logos Development Corp., supra note 109, 11 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 64 para. 43; Howard Needles Tammen and Bergendoff v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 244-68-2, 11 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 302, 330-31 paras. 105-107 (8 August 1986); Onesco, Inc. v. National Iranian Gas Co., Award No. 254-263-2, 12 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 160, 167 para. 21 (18 September 1986); Cosmos Engineering, Inc. v. Ministry of Roads and Transportation, Award No. 271-334-2, 13 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 179, 184-85 paras. 20-21 (24 November 1986); Whittaker Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, award No. 301-286-1, 14 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 263, 269-70 paras. 25-26 (27 April 1987). See also Phillips Petroleum Co. Iran v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 425-39-2, 21 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 79, 155-56 paras. 198-99 (29 June 1989). Cases in which Tribunal has found that a party had not waived its contractual rights include General Dynamics Telephone Systems Center, Inc., supra note 29, 9 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 162-63 and Unidyne Corp., supra note 29, 29 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 326 para. 48.
115See, e.g. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 145-35-5, 7 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 181, 190-91 (6 August 1984); DIC of Delaware, Inc., supra note 74, 8 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 164; Sylvania Technical Systems, Inc., supra note 29, 8 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 316; Questech, Inc., supra note 29, 9 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 126; Touche Ross and Co., supra note 29, 9 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep 298; Ford Aerospace and Communications Corp., supra note 29, 14 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 41 para. 62; Harris International Telecommunications, Inc., supra note 29, 17 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 73 para. 143; Houston Contracting Co., supra note 29, 20 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 24-25 para. 73; Rockwell International Systems, Inc., supra note 29, 23 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 183 para. 127, 188 para. 188; Collins Systems International, Inc., supra note 29, 28 Iran-U.S. 38-39 para. 57; Westinghouse Electric Corp., supra note 29, 33 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 113 para. 164, 180-81 paras. 394-95; Gulf Associates, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 594-385-2, para. 127 (7 October 1999) (not yet published in the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal Reports).
116See Westinghouse Electric corp., supra note 29, 33 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 180-81 paras. 394-95.
117See, e.g., Richard D. Harza, supra note 29, 11 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 114 para. 99; The Austin Co. v. Machine Sazi Arak, Award No. 257-295-2, 12 Iran-U.S Cl. Trib. Rep. 288, 294-95 paras. 31-32 (30 September 1986); Westinghouse Electric Corp., supra note 29, 33 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 105-6 para. 141; 139-40 para 271.
118DIC of Delaware, Inc., supra note 74, 8 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 176.
119It would extend beyond the scope of this article to explore whether the Tribunal, in its jurisprudence, has also developed any rules that now or in the future may be included in the body of the lex mercatoria. Berger describes this sort of evolution process as the 'development of individual rules from mere candidates to genuine components of die lex mercatoria.' Berger, Introduction, supra note 4, at p. 140 (footnote omitted). See also ibid. at pp. 140-44. On a related note, Crook writes that '[i]t would be useful to analyze the tribunal's contract cases in greater detail, to further examine key principles to be refined and appliecl in the future.' Crook, 'Debt and Contract Claims', supra note 22, at p. 300.
120Brower and Brueschke., supra note 15, at p. 669.
121Claims Settlement Declaration, supra note 12, article V. See text accompanying note 20.

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