Source: https://divorce-for-men.com/resources/joint-custody-law/
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 21:02:53+00:00

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The only test for resolving custody disputes is in the best interest of the child, assessed from a child-centered perspective.
That there is conflict between parents is of itself not a sufficient basis for assuming that the child’s best interest will not be served.
In Tomlin v. Tomlin (1992), 69 B.C.L.R. (2d) 363 [Tab 12], Cohen J. reviewed the law on this question extensively. Cohen J.’s conclusion from this review: “What I take out of the development of the law on this subject is that the courts are no longer reluctant to order joint custody, joint guardianship or a variation on the role of the custodial and non-custodial parents where it is in the best interests of the child or children to do so, notwithstanding disagreement between the parents on the issue of custody.” (p. 390).
It is submitted that the law should not insist on complete agreement between the parties about what is in their children’s best interest. That would be an unrealistic standard and one which parents who live together do not have to meet.
It is submitted that in the case at bar, there was no evidence that any conflict between the mother and father was adversely affecting the child. To the contrary, the child was described as thriving by the mother.
Disagreement and some level of conflict is present between parents in almost all marriages, and, indeed, between parent and children. Clearly some degree of inter-parental and parent-child conflict is compatible with normal development. Children would grow up with a very distorted and unrealistic view of social relations if all conflict was absent.
Joint custody should be given a chance, with the child having an opportunity to enjoy the benefits of joint custody. Hood J. made such an order, commenting that:“I am equally impressed with the abilities of the parties and the close relationship they have each developed with [the child]. I am far less impressed with the evidence suggesting that joint custody would be doomed from the start, and that, accordingly, [the child] should not even have the reasonable chance of enjoying the fruits of a joint custody arrangement, which her parents are capable of developing in time. Upon a consideration of the evidence before me, I have concluded that she should have the opportunity to enjoy those benefits. If, as I say, it simply cannot work for legitimate reasons, [the child] will have lost nothing and will still enjoy the benefits open to her now, were I to award custody to one party with generous access to the other.”Fry v. Silkalns, supra [Tab 13] at p. 177.
Parents in intact families are likely to show some difference in their style of caretaking and their disciplining of children. There is no suggestion that this conflict is something a normal child cannot cope with.
Normal, healthy children such as the child is the case at bar, are able to adapt to varying sets of rules and expectations. Children quickly learn that grandparents, day care workers, or teachers may expect rather different standards of behaviour than parents at home.
It is submitted that a judge’s decision to not order joint custody must be based on objective evidence. It cannot be based on self-serving statements that joint custody will not work because, for example, the other spouse will be too litigious. One spouse should not be able to sabotage joint custody by making unsubstantiated allegations, or willfully choose to impede communication.
There is no evidence that in the time since the parties separated, they have not been able to work out whatever differences they might have had with respect to the child’s health, education and general overall welfare.
Where the question is whether or not joint custody should be imposed on parents, there must be some evidence, it is submitted, other than the custody dispute itself, that the parents cannot or will not share joint decision-making in the best interests of their children.
In paragraph 1 at the beginning of this Argument, I referenced the Anson case being a 1978 decision of Huddart J., as she then was, supra [Tab 15]. That was a leading case in its day. A leading case presently from our Court of Appeal on the subject is Robinson v. Filyk, Vancouver Registry Docket CA017385 [Tab 18]. The Judgment dated the 9th day of December, 1996, is also a Judgment of Madame Justice Huddart. It is emblamatic of the evolutionary progress that the law takes that, in Robinson Madame Justice Huddart takes issue with her own previous judgment in a progressive way.
This statement from our Court of Appeal demonstrates the reasons why there is a much more liberal granting of joint custody then there was only ten years ago.
For the Sake of the Children, the report from the Joint Committee of the House of Commons and Senate that was produced following meetings with the public across the country, recommended that the Divorce Act be amended to provide for a presumption of shared parenting. The Joint Committee thus gave significant status to the concept of shared parenting. The Federal Government of Canada has chosen to basically shelve it while it considers further “study”. However, courts across the land have taken up the concept of shared parenting and are rapidly putting flesh on the bones of the concept by making orders granting shared parenting schedules of equal time for children with each parent in circumstances where they would have been less likely to do so in the recent past.
Supported by the public, the psychologists and an increasing number of masters and judges, equal time shared parenting of children, post-separation, is clearly a concept that is gaining general acceptance. It is clearly in the best interests of children because it provides for minimum transfers back and forth, proper and significant equal time with both parents allowing for equal access and opportunity with both parents. It gives the best sense of schedule and security to children.
Some of the recent decisions, both from trial and interim applications, awarding equal time shared parenting and joint custody where one parent typically sought to be the sole custodial parent with “access” to the other parent every other weekend are as follows.
Kitharis v. Kitharis, Docket F980093, Vancouver Registry, May 11, 1998 [Tab 19]. On the first appearance interim application, Master Doolan awarded joint guardianship with respect to the children aged two, five and six, ordered a Section 15 report and ordered “that the children will spend one week with the father and then they will spend one week with the mother and they will alternate that arrangement until the access report is received and there is a hearing on the merits, if that must be”. The status quo at the time of the hearing was that the father had “access” to the children every second weekend. The Master, at paragraph 3, said, “there is a great deal of animosity…there have been many charges and counter-charges both against each other and other members of the family. It all evidences a great deal of unhappiness and hostility between the Parties… (counsel) is correct in that it is not reasonable on most of the issues to make a definitive finding, it would be unfair in the circumstances. It must be understood by the parents, as it is by their counsel, that this is not a contest between good parents and it is not a contest between good or better parents. The test is, what is in the best interests of the children”.At paragraph 4, the Master says: There is some evidence that may lead one to conclude that he may not be a good husband. There is also some evidence she may or may not be a good wife. It has been alleged that he is abusive. He denies that. There is some evidence that she has schemed to set him up, that is denied as well. There is very little evidence that either is a bad parent. I accept and have no difficulty in believing that they love their children. The evidence does not show that either the mother or the father are a danger to their children. Therefore, if the children were to live with their dad, I do not think there would be a danger. If the children stayed living with their mother, I do not think there would be a danger”.
Hamilton v. Hamilton, Docket 09927, Prince George Registry, May 30, 2000, Reasons for Judgment of Master Baker [Tab 20]. A six and a nine year old were made the joint guardian and custodial children of their parents despite the fact that each party went to “great pains to establish the other as the unreasonable in all of this…the parties have each failed so far to place their spousal problems above their responsibilities as parents. Each has demonstrated an inclination to pursue personal needs or goals regardless of how those pursuits or goals might affect the children”. Master Baker ordered a parenting schedule that would have the children parented four days in the primary care of one parent and then four days in the primary care of the other parent.
­Landers v. Evans Docket F992809, Vancouver Registry, July 21, 2000, Reasons for Judgment of Madam Justice Boyd [Tab 21]. The interim application before Madam Justice Boyd involved two girls, aged eight and twelve. The judge made no finding of fact as to which of the parents had traditionally been the primary caregiver.At paragraph 2, Her Ladyship stated, “the father seeks a true joint custody ‘shared parenting’ order, with the children spending one week on and one week off in each parent’s home. The mother seeks and order for sole custody with the father to have access to the children every alternate weekend as well as at other times, such as birthdays, statutory holidays and the like”.At paragraph 26, Her Ladyship stated, “On a review of all the evidence, I am left with the distinct impression that much of the last year or more has been spent by each parent essentially competing for he children and competing to demonstrate their stated skill or abilities to meet their needs. Both parents have suffered tremendous stress resulting from the marital breakdown an both have been unemployed. Whether consciously or not, both have used this opportunity to focus almost exclusively on the children, thus attempting to solidify their competing claims. It is clear the children have suffered from this ongoing struggle as the wife continually attempts to narrow and the husband continually attempts to expand his opportunities to parent the children. The children witness this ongoing struggle or at least experience the tension in each parent’s home and during the exchanges as they occur”.At paragraph 31, Her Ladyship stated, “At least at this juncture, it appears the difficulties and strains between the Parties (which are unfortunately borne by the children to some degree) are the reflection of the unresolved and somewhat fluid arrangement which has existed to this point. I believe that a true shared parenting plan, with the children spending one week on, one week off with either parent may allow for a dissipation of the parent’s ongoing conflict and the children’s resulting strain”.
Lindsey v. Lindsey Docket F990279, Vancouver Registry, April 14, 2000, Reasons for Judgment of Madam Justice Downs [Tab 22]. After 7 seven days of trial, Madam Justice Downs ordered that each parent have the day to day care of four year old Michael for “alternating four day periods”.At paragraph 1 in her Reasons for Judgment, Her Ladyship stated, “In January 1998, they separated. Michael was 17 months old. Ever since then, they have been at war over numerous issues, primarily issues about Michael’s care and control. It is my task to decide what parenting arrangements will be in Michael’s best interests.”Each parent sought sole custody as a result of “endless communication problems” that they each blamed on the other.
Hearn v. Hearn Docket E001004 Vancouver Registry, October 19, 2000, Reasons for Judgment of Master Baker [Tab 25] An interim application before Master Baker. The mother applied for interim sole custody of the couple’s three children, ages five, seven and eight. The father sought an equal sharing of the responsibility and time with the children. At paragraph 23 of his Reasons for Judgment the Master ordered, “The Parties shall therefore share joint custody and joint guardianship, and will share the day to day care of the children on an alternating weekly basis…”.
At paragraph 7, the Judge states, “Shared custody would require no more and perhaps fewer “transfers” of the children although the transfers would be for longer periods of time. The children would sleep in different beds oftener but both beds would be familiar and with a parent. The parenting burden would be shared n a much more equitable basis in a shared custody model than in the primary residence/access model. Parenting in a non-separated family is likely life’s most demanding task and there is much commentary on the burden of single parenting. Shared custody parents remain single parents but have the opportunity for respite. The children have the advantage of knowing each parent as a full-time parent rather than one as an access parent.
At paragraph 8, the Master states, “These parents have the resources to make the shared custody model work. It offers them and the children advantages not available in other parenting plans. There is no evidence to suggest the children cannot adapt to a change. Shared custody may not be a significant departure from the current situation. The children have had ongoing and extensive contact with the Defendant since separation and are familiar with him and his living situation. He is familiar with their circumstances and their needs and he is their father. The children ought to be able to know him as a parent particularly in these relatively early days of their lives in a new family situation”.
At paragraph 9, the Judge states, “The Plaintiff and the Defendant will be the joint custodians of the children and have equal time (or as otherwise agreed) as primary residence parents. I am inclined to the Defendant’s suggestion of a two week rotation of primary residence but they should be at liberty to speak to that issue if they cannot resolve it”.
Pullman v. Pullman Docket D041328 New Westminster Registry, November 16, 2000. [Tab 27] After nine days of trial during which the mother sought sole custody with limited visitation by the children to their father, and a Section 15 report by Robert Colby who recommended that the mother be the primary residential parent, Mr. Justice McKinnon ordered that the two daughters of the marriage, aged 5 and 7, be under the joint custodial care of both parents and that a shared parenting schedule of week on/week off be implemented.At paragraph 27, Mr. Justice McKinnon states, “I do not wish to dwell upon the faults or weaknesses of these parents. We all suffer deficiencies. I merely point out that, although much of the trial was taken up with complaints against one another, neither is a bad person nor does either suffer any serious problems that might impact adversely on the children”.At paragraph 28, the Judge stated, “Mr. Pullman candidly admits that Ms. Pullman is a loving, caring mother who has devoted herself to the children’s well-being. She carefully researches every area impacting upon the children, from food to school’.At paragraph 29, the Judge states, “Ms. Pullman is less generous in her assessment of Mr. Pullman and I must say that troubled me somewhat”.
At paragraph 30, the Judge states, “Ms. Pullman seems incapable of setting aside prior differences when assessing Mr. Pullman’s parenting abilities. She offered several very minor complaints in support of her position for sole custody but nothing of any significance whatever”.
At paragraph 31, the Judge states, “Ms. Pullman essentially complains that because they do not ‘get along’ a joint custody order would not work. Each party cited incidents in support of complaints about one another either as parents or as an example of uncooperative behavior. These were all very minor transgressions that simply indicate two people with different approaches and ideas”.
At paragraph 32, the Judge states, “Although Mr. Pullman offers a different style of parenting, in my view he is no less loving, protective and dedicated to his children than Ms. Pullman. I was impressed with his stance that custody should be joint. Unlike Ms. Pullman, he did not seek sole custody, though he conceded he would take it if offered”.
At paragraph 39, the Judge states, “Witnesses called by both on this trial merely confirmed my impression that both are good parents. However, each has a different parenting approach that grates on the other”.
For a long time there was a debate among judges about when joint custody should be granted and when sole custody should be granted. Some thought that it is in the best interest of the children to have only one parent make the decision, even though the other has generous access. Some judges thought that joint custody should only be granted when both parents agree to it.
Others thought that joint custody should be granted even if there was no agreement as it is in the best interest of the children to cooperate. Some thought there should be a presumption that parents continue to have joint custody after they separate like they had before they separated unless it can be shown why there should not be joint custody.
Both the British Columbia Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Canada have now provided direction to trial judges in this respect. The Court of Appeal, in Robinson v. Filyk 91996), 84 B.C.A.C. 180 followed an earlier decision of the Supreme Court of Canada called Gordon v. Goertz,  2 S.C.R. 27. These courts have said that there should be no starting presumption or point of view by judges about what is best for children. What a judge must be concerned about is what arrangement is best for the particular child before the court, given that child’s situation and that of the child’s parents.
In Gordon v. Goertz the Supreme Court of Canada said (at p. 58) that Parliament did not entrust the court with the best interests of most children. It entrusted the court with the best interests of the particular child whose custody arrangement fell to be determined.
At paragraph 58, the Judge states, “The professional assessment at bar, with which I agree, is that these children should be in the joint custody of both parents. I respectfully disagree with Mr. Colby (the Section 15 psychologist) that the “primary residence be with Mrs. Pullman”.
At paragraph 60, the Judge states, “The parties live reasonably close together. They have resolved school issues that seemed a problem when Mr. Colby made his recommendations. Each has, or is capable of having, a comfortable home environment in which the girls can be secure and happy. In my view , a week about arrangement would be far preferable to a convoluted “generous access” provision”.
At paragraph 61, the Judge states, “I therefore order joint custody with week about residence”.
Pullman v. Pullman 2000 BCSC 1654 After nine days of trial during which the mother sought sole custody with limited visitation by the children to their father, and a Section 15 Report by Robert Colby recommended that the mother be the primary residential parent, Mr. Justice MacKinnon ordered that the two daughters of the marriage, aged five and seven, be under the joint custodial care of both parents and that a shared parenting schedule of week on week off be implemented.

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