Source: https://www.bostoncriminallawyersblog.com/tag/bostoncriminallawyer/
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 21:15:11+00:00

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Although criminal defendants charged with 1st degree murder in Massachusetts do not have a right to bail, the Supreme Judicial Court recently ruled that a judge has discretion to afford them with a bail. In its decision in Vasquez v. Commonwealth, the SJC explained that bail had been granted in the court’s discretion in capital cases from early colonial times. This “common law” rule had not been changed or overruled by statute.
By way of background, the Massachusetts legislature rewrote the bail statute in 1971. In that amendment, c. 276, sec. 58 established a presumption of release on personal recognizance pending trial. That statute, however, specifically excludes persons charged with “an offense punishable by death”. That provision, however, was interpreted to mean that sec. 58 doesn’t apply to persons charged with murder in the first degree, even though the SJC, in 1981, ruled that the death penalty statute then in effect was unconstitutional. For that reason, sec. 58 does not preclude bail for a person charged with 1st degree murder and it is in the judge’s discretion whether or not grant it – despite that there is no “constitutional right” to be released on bail prior to trial.
With this backdrop, the SJC outlined what factors a judge should consider when a criminal defendant charged with 1st degree murder requests that he be afforded a bail. The factors or balancing test is similar to those that a judge would consider in granting bail to any other criminal defendant, including: the nature and circumstances of the allegations; the defendant’s family background, educational history, financial resources, and ties to the community. Other factors that might also be considered include the defendant’s prior criminal history and/or record of convictions; whether there is any history or record of defaults in court appearances; his character; and his mental condition. The SJC further noted that judge’s should also consider if the murder or other criminal offense charged involved any circumstances of domestic abuse or violation of a restraining order.
In the execution of a search warrant by Boston Police of a multi-family home, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court upheld a superior court ruling that the seizure of a shotgun was improper. Clarifying the protections of the 4th Amendment to the United States Constitution, the SJC affirmed intrusion into the “curtilage” of a common area of the multi-family property intruded into a constitutionally protected area and required suppression.
A criminal defendant appealed his conviction for possession of a loaded firearm without a license after trial where he was acquitted of the “predicate” offense of unlawful possession of a firearm. The Massachusetts Appeals Court held that a conviction on these verdicts could not stand because the crime of possession of a loaded firearm is a “sentencing enhancement”, which does not apply without a conviction for the predicate offense on the firearm possession.
The United States Supreme Court reversed the murder conviction of a Louisiana man and granted him a new trial, finding that the the prosecutor had withheld evidence that could have supported his defense at trial that could have cast doubt on the credibility of prosecution witnesses. This case, Weary v. Cain, is notable because the SJC expanded upon the principle concerning violations of a defendant’s due process rights when the prosecution withholds material evidence.
Under the rule pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, the suppression by the prosecutor of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. In Weary v. Cain, the SJC held that the defendant does not need to establish that “more likely than not” that he would have been acquitted if the withheld evidence had been admitted. Rather, the defendant claiming a “Brady violation” need only show that the evidence is sufficient to “undermine the confidence” in the verdict.
The issue of the reliability of eyewitness identifications has been a hot topic in Massachusetts courts the last few years. Several cases from the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court and Appeals Court have touched upon the danger of suggestiveness of eyewitness identifications, their reliability and consequently, their admissibility against defendants at trial. Commonwealth v. Johnson, decided by the SJC on February 12, 2016, is yet another decision highlighting suggestive identification issues.
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court recently considered a defendant’s challenge that his second degree murder conviction should be overturned because his constitutional rights were violated when the trial judge refused to grant immunity to potential defense witnesses. In the case of Commonwealth v. Brewer, although the SJC affirmed the defendant’s conviction, the court left open the issue of defendant’s, as opposed to only the government, having a means to offer immunity to potential witnesses.
In this case, the victim had been shot after leaving a party, though the evidence suggested that he was not the intended target of the shooting. The government called three witnesses who claimed the defendant was the shooter, one of whom was granted immunity in exchange for his testimony. The defense, however, attacked these witnesses’ credibility and asserted that one of these three witnesses was actually the shooter.

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