Source: http://masscases.com/cases/sjc/449/449mass227.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 12:20:58+00:00

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Privileged Communication. Evidence, Privileged communication, Testimonial privilege. Practice, Criminal, Interlocutory appeal. Practice, Civil, Extraordinary review.
CIVIL ACTION commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk on January 17, 2006.
Victoria Kelleher for the defendant.
Christina E. Miller, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.
Karen Dean-Smith for the intervener.
social workers, and sexual assault and domestic violence counsellors. Based on the statutory language, we conclude that the Legislature did intend to create such a privilege.
that all of these records were privileged under various statutes, except for the records of communications with the AMHP. The judge reasoned that because G. L. c. 112, § 172, the statutory provision rendering communications with AMHPs confidential differed from other, similar provisions in its form, wording, and placement in the General Laws, it did not indicate a legislative intent to create a privilege.
The Commonwealth filed a petition in the county court seeking relief from the trial court judge's order. After allowing the GAL's motion to join or intervene, a single justice of this court reserved and reported the case to the full court.
Discussion. a. Relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3. [Note 6] A party seeking extraordinary relief pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, must demonstrate both a substantial claim of violation of substantive rights and error that cannot be remedied by ordinary appellate review. Dunbrack v. Commonwealth, 398 Mass. 502 , 504 (1986). Here, the issue of the existence of a privilege for AMHP communications is "a matter of general significance to the administration of justice." Commonwealth v. Babb, 389 Mass. 275 , 283 (1983). Furthermore, the error claimed by the Commonwealth is not remediable by any other means. See Commonwealth v. Bing Sial Liang, 434 Mass. 131 , 133 (2001). Thus, we proceed to the merits.
disclosure by G. L. c. 233, § 20B. [Note 8] Similarly, communications between social workers and their clients are made confidential by G. L. c. 112, § 135A, and privileged by G. L. c. 112, § 135B. Communications with sexual assault counsellors are deemed confidential pursuant to G. L. c. 233, § 20J, as are communications with domestic violence counsellors under G. L. c. 233, § 20K. Although neither of these latter two provisions contains the word "privilege," they nonetheless have been held to create an evidentiary privilege. See Commonwealth v. Tripolone, 425 Mass. 487 , 488-489 (1997); Commonwealth v. Two Juveniles, 397 Mass. 261 , 265 (1986). The question before us is whether the Legislature intended AMHPs, unlike all these other mental health providers, to be subject to a duty of confidentiality and yet not have their communications protected by an evidentiary privilege.
The plain text of the statute reflects a legislative intent to create an evidentiary privilege as well as a confidentiality rule. Most obviously, the statute specifically uses the term "privilege," referring to the confidentiality of communications with an AMHP as "[s]aid privilege." Any reading of the statute that ignored the word "privilege" would violate the canon that a statute "be construed 'so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous.' " Wolfe v. Gormally, 440 Mass. 699 , 704 (2004), quoting Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Commissioner of Ins., 427 Mass. 136 , 140 (1998). Furthermore, two of the four enumerated instances of "waiver" in the statute relate specifically to legal proceedings, see G. L. c. 112, § 172 (a), (b), indicating that the protections of the provision apply when disclosure is sought to be compelled through legal process. This is the very definition of a privilege.
It is true, as the Superior Court judge noted, that for some mental health providers, the Legislature has chosen to enact separate confidentiality and privilege provisions. See G. L. c. 112, §§ 135A, 135B (social workers); G. L. c. 112, § 129A, and G. L. c. 233, § 20B (psychologists and psychotherapists). Yet for other providers, a confidentiality rule and a privilege are created in the very same provision. See G. L. c. 233, §§ 20J (sexual assault counsellors), 20K (domestic violence counsellors). Nor do we dwell on the fact that the AMHP provision is found in the professional requirements chapter of the General Laws, rather than the evidentiary section, given that the social worker privilege, G. L. c. 112, § 135B, is found in that same chapter.
(2002). Here, however, as discussed supra, the Legislature's intention to create a privilege in G. L. c. 112, § 172, appears plain from the statutory text. The fact that the Legislature knew how to provide expressly for confidentiality without privilege, but did not do so, only reinforces this conclusion.
The GAL, as intervener, urges a broader ground in support of our decision today: that the mental health records at issue are constitutionally protected, irrespective of any statutory privilege. However, we generally decline to reach constitutional questions where, as here, there is a readily available statutory ground that renders such a decision unnecessary. See Commonwealth v. Bartlett, 374 Mass. 744 , 749 (1978).
Conclusion. We conclude that G. L. c. 112, § 172, creates an evidentiary privilege encompassing communications with AMHPs. The case is remanded to the county court for entry of an appropriate order.
[Note 1] Karen Dean-Smith, guardian ad litem, intervener.
[Note 2] General Laws c. 112, § 172, provides that "[a]ny communication between an allied mental health or human services professional and a client shall be deemed to be confidential. Said privilege shall be subject to waiver only in the following circumstances," and lists four exceptions set forth infra.
[Note 3] The statute defines an AMHP as "a licensed marriage and family therapist, a licensed rehabilitation counselor, a licensed educational psychologist or a licensed mental health counselor" (emphasis added). G. L. c. 112, § 163.
[Note 4] The outcome of this case is not affected by our recent revision of the Bishop-Fuller protocol in Commonwealth v. Dwyer, 448 Mass. 122 (2006). The Dwyer decision changed only the procedure for seeking access to privileged records, not the substantive law of evidentiary privilege. That revised protocol will govern subsequent proceedings in this case on remand. See id. at 124 (Dwyer protocol applies "to all criminal cases tried after the issuance of the rescript in this case").
[Note 5] The GAL did not assert a privilege as to the records of one complainant's visit to a school nurse.
[Note 6] Although the defendant argued before the single justice that relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3, was not available to the Commonwealth in this case, he does not raise this argument before the full court.
[Note 7] Confidentiality rules impose a duty of nondisclosure "in all circumstances," Commonwealth v. Brandwein, 435 Mass. 623 , 628 n.7 (2002), while evidentiary privileges are specifically applicable to legal proceedings, see id. at 628-629. See also 1 D.M. Greenwald, E.F. Malone & R.R. Stauffer, Testimonial Privileges § 7.32 (3d ed. 2005) ("Confidentiality laws regulate both testimonial and nontestimonial disclosures . . .").
[Note 8] Because the statutory definition of "psychotherapist" includes providers other than licensed psychologists, see G. L. c. 233, § 20B, the psychologist confidentiality rule and the psychotherapist privilege are not strictly co-extensive. The discrepancy is not material to this appeal.
[Note 9] It is of little relevance that the Legislature chose, some time later, to outline a social worker evidentiary privilege in a separate provision, G. L. c. 112, § 135B, despite the fact that G. L. c. 112, § 135, was already recognized as creating such a privilege in Collett. See St. 1989, c. 535, § 1. The Legislature often adopts subsequent enactments simply to clarify the law. See DiMarzo v. American Mut. Ins. Co., 389 Mass. 85 , 103 (1983).
[Note 10] General Laws c. 112, § 135B, provides in relevant part: "Except as hereinafter provided, in any court proceeding and in any proceeding preliminary thereto and in legislative and administrative proceedings, a client shall have the privilege of refusing to disclose and of preventing a witness from disclosing, any communication, wherever made, between said client and a social worker . . . relative to the diagnosis or treatment of the client's mental or emotional condition."
"A sexual assault counsellor shall not disclose such confidential communication, without the prior written consent of the victim . . . . Such confidential communications shall not be subject to discovery and shall be inadmissible in any criminal or civil proceeding without the prior written consent of the victim to whom the report, record, working paper or memorandum relates."
[Note 12] In this case, for instance, the complainants received services from numerous mental health professionals, and might not even have been aware of the different occupational titles of different providers, let alone the possibility of a significant distinction in the legal protection of communications made to them. Yet "if the purpose of the privilege is to be served, the participants in the confidential conversation 'must be able to predict with some degree of certainty whether particular discussions will be protected. An uncertain privilege . . . is little better than no privilege at all.' " Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 18 (1996), quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981).

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