Source: https://premiumreduction.blog/tag/medical-insurance/
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 14:16:15+00:00

Document:
In Schram v. Dow Corning Corp., E.D. Mich., while traveling for business a long-term employee was accidentally struck on the head by another passenger’s luggage, causing a detached retina that required immediate surgery. She had recently changed positions within the company and her new manager asked her to postpone surgery, but she refused and was off work for approximately three weeks. Although no paperwork was filed for FMLA leave, Dow allowed the time off.
When she returned to work, she alleged the manager excluded her for meetings and began questioning her work, moved her office, refused accommodations for ongoing retina issues, and ridiculed her for vision problems in a meeting. Shortly thereafter, she was told her position was eliminated and she found another temporary position in the company for one year and then was terminated. Meanwhile, her former position was filled by a younger male employee with less marketing experience at a salary $40,000 higher than her old salary.
After leaving Dow, she sued alleging retaliation under the FMLA and Michigan workers’ compensation law, as well as disability and gender discrimination under Michigan law. The district court found in her favor, noting the timing of her injury, leave of absence, and her “position elimination” was sufficient to place her retaliation claims before a jury. The judge also found that the assignment of her identical role and job duties to a younger male with significantly less marketing experience could provide sufficient basis for a jury to find in favor on her discrimination claims.
In Buck v. Mercury Marine Corp., E.D. Wis., a machinist asked for, and was granted, a day off because he was upset that he had had to put his dog of 13 years to sleep. The next day, he called his supervisor and explained he had not been able to sleep since putting his dog to sleep and asked for the day off and was documented for an unexcused absence. The same day, he sought treatment and was diagnosed with “situational insomnia” and the doctor wrote him a note that he was in the clinic for evaluation of situational insomnia. Despite the note, the absence remained unexcused. Over the next three months, the employee accumulated several other unexcused absences that resulted in his termination and he filed suit under the FMLA.
While employees can file a single lawsuit in federal court for both federal and state-law claims against an employer, when judges dismiss the federal claims, they can also decline to hear the state claims. The employee can refile the claims in state court, but lower courts have disagreed about how much time employees have to do so.
Federal law provides that state-law claims will be “tolled” or paused while the claims are pending in federal court and for a period of 30 days after they are dismissed-unless state law provides for a longer tolling period. In Artis v. District of Columbia, the relevant state law limitations period had already passed when the employee’s claims were dismissed by the federal judge. The employer, therefore, argued that the worker only had a 30-day grace period to file her claims in state court.
However, the employee argued the tolling period began when the claim was first filed in federal court. In a 5-4 ruling, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed and held that the employee had 30 days plus whatever time had remained under the state statute of limitations when the federal lawsuit was initially filed.
In Solus Industrial Innovations, LLC v. Superior Court of Orange County, the Supreme Court has upheld the right of prosecutors to seek civil penalties under unfair competition statutes against employers violating work-safety statutes. While the company argued that the state plan for occupational safety and health should govern how employers with work-safety violations are treated, the court sided with prosecutors who argued they were targeting unfair business practices that arose from work-safety violations, not for the work-safety violations themselves. Although the decision is considered a landmark, it essentially validated an avenue that prosecutors have been using to go after unsafe corporate employers for decades.
When a delivery driver was fired by Grubhub for failure to make deliveries while on the app, he sued for back wages, overtime and expense reimbursement. While he received a fee for each delivery, the company also paid him a minimum hourly rate and, therefore, he argued he was an employee. Grubhub claimed that they are primarily a software development company, not a food delivery service, so delivery drivers are not key to their business and they did not have enough control over their drivers to classify them as employees. Noting the need to update the laws relating to the gig economy, the judge said overall Grubhub did not have control over his work and under current laws he is an independent contractor.
In Hernandez v. Hialeah Solid Waste Department, the treating physician prescribed facet joint injections and the claims adjuster approved, but with a different physician. The 1st District Court of Appeal said the statutes allow an employer to transfer the care of a worker from an attending provider only if the worker is not making appropriate progress in recuperation and the refusal to allow the treating physician to do the injections was “a de facto deauthorization of the doctor” and improper.
In Dobbs Tire & Auto v. IWCC, two employers unsuccessfully contested the award of benefits to two injured workers. The employers paid the awards plus interest, one at 0.11% and the other at 0.13%. The employees contested the rates in different county courts, and one court dismissed the complaint, while the other found the interest rate should be 9%. The cases were consolidated upon appeal.
While the Appellate Court explained that the Code of Civil Procedure Section 2-1303 provides that judgments recovered in any court will draw interest at a rate of 9% per year until satisfied, it only applies “if and when the arbitrator’s award or commission’s decision becomes an enforceable judgment,” because the employer has failed to pay. An employer that makes payment of an award, accrued installments, and Section 19(n) interest before the injured worker files a motion to enforce is not subject to the 9% interest. Section 19(n) provides for interest at a rate equal to the yield on indebtedness issued by the United States government with a 26-week maturity next previously auctioned on the day on which the decision is filed.
In Buhe v. Amica Mutual Insurance Co., a federal judge ruled against an insurance company’s summary judgment in a suit filed by a former adjuster fired after an 11-month, unresolved workers’ comp claim. The adjuster fell off a roof while investigating a homeowner’s claim and suffered injuries to his lower limbs and shoulder, requiring several surgeries and rehabilitation.
The insurance company knew that the adjuster ran a mortgage company on the side.
While he said someone else oversaw the office activities of his mortgage firm when he was injured, an adjuster said surveillance revealed he was working for his own company while collecting workers’ compensation. He filed for bankruptcy but did not include his comp payments, claiming ignorance. He then filed the suit against Amica, asserting claims of discrimination under the ADA when the company allegedly failed to accommodate him, and retaliatory discharge and promissory estoppel, related to his bankruptcy filing. Amica followed with a summary judgment against his claims.
In Clark v. Dairy Farmers of America, a woman worker who was the shortest worker in the plant broke her rib and doctors discovered she had a lesion near the fracture. Further tests revealed that the lesion was Langerhans cell histiocytosis, a rare malignancy which can weaken a bone to the point where it can fail under a force that is less than normal. While an administrative law judge denied the claim for comp, the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission reversed and the Court of Appeals agreed.
A worker is entitled to benefits if there is “personal injury” that was caused by an “accident.” Although the worker was injured performing her normal job duties, this time was unusual because she felt and heard a pop in her chest and she could not raise her right arm.
In Blackwell v. Howard Industries, the Court of Appeals ruled that a worker who suffered an elbow injury and who refused to participate in physical therapy (PT) sessions was not entitled to permanent total disability benefits. The Court of Appeals noted the worker received varying levels of treatment, evaluation and medical records reviews from at least 15 different physicians.
In Escobar v. JBS USA, the Court of Appeals ruled that a worker was entitled to temporary total disability benefits for a back injury but said the compensation court had erred in determining which medical bills the employer had to pay. A tenderloin puller, the worker allegedly injured his back and received treatment from an onsite nurse but continued to complain of pain and saw several doctors, with one stating that the subjective back pain was out of proportion to the physical examination.
The compensation court determined that he suffered a compensable back injury and that he was entitled to temporary total disability benefits. However, the Court found that the compensation court ordered payment for “unfamiliar and undocumented” treatments that were not clearly related to the work injury.
In Galster v. Keen Transport, an appellate court ruled that the state workers’ compensation system had jurisdiction over a resident’s claim for an out-of-state accident while working for an out-of-state employer. A trucker who resided in New York worked for a Pennsylvania company, making deliveries of highway construction equipment all over the U.S. He injured his shoulder while shifting equipment in his trailer in Illinois.
After his injury, the company secured medical care for him in New York, as well as a light-duty job. The trucker filed a comp claim in New York, while the company filed one in Pennsylvania and contested the New York claim. The Appellate Division’s 3rd Department affirmed lower court decisions, noting New York has jurisdiction over a claim for an injury occurring outside the state where there are “sufficient significant contacts” between the employment and New York.
In Park v. Corizon Health Inc., a worker was exposed to pepper spray while working in a prison when a guard discharged a canister to subdue an inmate. She sought medical care for her symptoms, returned briefly to work, and then took off almost one year. She filed a claim, asserting that her exposure to pepper spray had exacerbated her pre-existing fibromyalgia.
The Workers’ Compensation Board overturned the award by a workers’ compensation law judge, finding there was no causal connection. The Appellate Division’s 3rd Department said the board determines the factual issue of whether a causal relationship exists, and its determination will not change when supported by substantial evidence. The court noted there was conflicting medical testimony, there is no known medical cause of fibromyalgia, and that its symptoms are fleeting and vary considerably among individuals. Therefore, the Board’s decision to credit the opinion of the IME rheumatologist over that of the other physicians was entirely reasonable.
The Appellate Division’s 3rd Department said that a worker can establish an occupational disease by demonstrating a recognizable link between the medical condition and a distinctive feature of employment and with no contradictory medical evidence, the worker had succeeded in doing so.
In Neckles v. Harris Teeter, a meat cutter injured his hip, back, and arm at work and a functional capacity evaluation revealed that he would not be able to return to his job. A vocational rehabilitation specialist reported it would be “difficult” for him to secure a job in an open job market because of his limited work history, transferrable skills and age.
A few years later the company filed a motion asserting that the worker was no longer disabled. The Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the Industrial Commission, which said the worker had not met his burden of proving that it would be futile for him to look for work. When appealed to the Supreme Court, it ordered the matter remanded to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration in light of the 2017 decision in Wilkes v. City of Greenville. In Wilkes, the Supreme Court ruled that a worker who can demonstrate a total incapacity for employment because of physical and vocational limitations does not also need to show that a job search would be futile. The Court of Appeals noted the case has to go back to the commission to make specific findings addressing the worker’s wage-earning capacity in light of his pre-existing and coexisting conditions.
The ruling in Frankiewicz v. WCAB (Kinder Morgan) denied benefits to a chemical operator for a psychiatric injury from exposure to a diesel fuel leak. Under state law, a claim must involve a combination of physical and mental injuries in order for mental injuries to be compensable, unless the mental injury was the result of exposure to “abnormal working conditions.” In this case, it was found that the worker only experienced transient symptoms that did not constitute a physical injury. These included headache, nausea, violent vomiting, choking, a runny nose and watery eyes after he was exposed to a discharge of diesel fuel from a plant a mile away. Following the incident, he began to suffer from panic attacks, anxiety and depression and doctors agreed the exposure had caused a mental injury.
The courts determined that he did not prove that he had been exposed to an abnormal working condition and the “transient” physical symptoms were insufficient to support an application of the physical-mental standard.
In Tankersley v. Batesville Casket Co., a long-term employee injured his arm and shoulder and surgery was recommended. However, the worker had congestive heart failure and decided not to undergo surgery. He returned to work with restrictions but eventually was laid off because the company had no work within his restrictions. A vocational counselor determined he had no transferrable skills and was 100% vocationally disabled because of the restrictions.
When a judge apportioned 90% of the liability for the award to the company and 10% to the state’s Second Injury Fund, the company appealed arguing the disability was caused in large part by pre-existing medical conditions. The court found that the ruling was based solely on the arm and shoulder injuries and the vocational counselor’s findings were based on the restrictions, thus the evidence did not preponderate against the trial judge’s apportionment decision.
In Ehr v. West Bend Mut. Ins. Co. (In re Estate of Rivera), the Court of Appeals issued a decision that temporary workers have the right to file a suit against their temporary employer if they do not make a workers’ compensation claim. The case involved Carlos Rivera, a temporary employee of Alex Drywell, who was killed on the job in a one-car accident. Assigned to work for Alpine Insulation, Rivera was in an Alpine-owned vehicle, driven by an Alpine employee when the car crashed. The Alpine employee was later found to be at fault in the accident.
His estate filed a wrongful death suit against Alpine and the insurance company rather than claim death benefits under workers’ comp. The appeals court overturned a lower court and said that the exclusive remedy portion of the Workers’ Compensation Act doesn’t bar a temporary employee from bringing a claim against their temporary employer, if they had not made a claim for compensation, even if they were a “loaned employee.” The court determined that his estate could not bring a suit against Alex Drywall but was free to bring a suit against Alpine since Alpine was not technically his employer.
It’s expected that the case will be appealed to the Supreme Court.
Every February, the American Bar Association’s (ABA) Federal Labor Standards Legislation Committee publishes a comprehensive report of FMLA decisions handed down by the federal courts in the previous year. This handy report summarizes every FMLA decision from 2017 in a user-friendly manner.

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.