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Timestamp: 2019-04-20 04:14:21+00:00

Document:
The United States Supreme Court has turned down your request for review of your case. A copy of the decision is enclosed. As you know, the Supreme Court hears only a small fraction of the cases presented to it each year.
At this point, my work on your case is at an end. You have no further avenues for review. Obviously, if you have any questions, you should feel free to contact me.
Constitutional Provisions and Statutes ........................................... 2.
Statement of the Case ....................................................... 2.
Reasons for Granting the Writ ................................................. 7.
I. The Appeals Court Erred In Applying The Collateral Bar Rule To This Case ..... 7.
II. The Collateral Bar Rule Is Unconstitutional ............................. 15.
III. The Order Was Not Reasonably Specific ............................... 15.
IV. The Order Was No Longer In Effect on the Day of the "Violation" ........... 16.
Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 97 S.Ct. 1491 (1977) .............................. 14.
Bush Ranch, Inc. v. El DuPont De Nemours & Co, 99 F. 3d 363, 370, (1 ^ Cir. t'996) ..'..'.. 8.
Castro v. United States, 775 F.2d 399, 408 (1" Cir. 1984) ........................... 11.
Chambers v. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, 207, U.S. 142, 148. 28 S. Ct. 34,35 (1907) .... 10.
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 62, 92 S. Ct. 1983 (1872) ............................. 13.
German v. Vance, 868 F.2d 9, 11 (1" Cir. 1989) .................................. 13.
Goldbergv. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 90 S.Ct. 1011 (1970) ...'. ......................... 13.
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 95 S. Ct. 729 (1975) ................................ 13.
In re Criminal Contempt Proceedings Against Craw ford, 133 F. Supp. 2d 249 (W.D.N.Y. 2001) .......................................................... 9.
In re Establishment Inspection of Hem Iron Works, Inc., 881 F. 2d 722 (9th Cir.1989) ................................................... 9., 14., 15.,17.
In re Providence Journal, 820 F.2d 1342, 1346 (1st Cir. 1986) modified on reh 'g en bane, 820 F. 2d 1354 (1" Cir. 1987) ...................... 6., 9., 14.
InreRogerNovak, 932F.2d 1397 (11th Cir. 1991) .............................. 9., 14.
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 1075 (1970) ............................ 8.
Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S. Ct. 893, 902 (1976) ....................... 13.
Pavilonis v. King, 626 F.2d 1075, 1079 (1st Cir. 1980) .......................... 11, 12.
Simmons v. Dickhaut, 904, F.2d 182, 183 (1st Cir. 1986) ............................ 10.
Siresv. Gabriel, 748 F.2d 49, 51 (1st Cir. 1984) .................................. 11.
United States v. Bernandine, 237 F.3d 1279, 1282 (11th Cir. 2001) ..................... 8.
United States y. Burstyn, 838 F.2d 1322, 1325, (11th Cir. 1989) ,.......,...., .^. ........ 8.
United States v. Cutler, 58, F.3d 825 (2d. Cir. 1995) ................................ 9.
United States v. Michaud, 928, F. 2d 13, 15 (1st Cir. 1991) ................ '. ........ 7., 8.
United States v. Mine Workers V. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 114 S. Ct. 2552, 2556 (1994) ..... 8.
United States v. Mourad, 289 F. 3d 174 (1" Cir. 2002) ......................... 2., 6., 7.
United States v. Nightingale, 703 F.2d 17, 19 (1" Cir. 1983) .......................... 8.
United States v. Perry, 116 F.3d 952 (1st Cir. 1997) ................................ 13.
United States v. Trudell, 563, F.2d 889. 891 (8th Cir. 1997) .......................... 17.
United States v. Walker, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19701 (W.D.N.Y., December 22, 1994) .... 9.
Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 320 (1967) ....................... 6., 8, 14.
Statutes 18 U.S.C. �1(1) ..................................................... 13.,17.
1. The circumstances under which the collateral bar rule precludes a challenge to a court order in a proceeding for criminal contempt based on an alleged violation of that order.
2. Whether the collateral bar rule is constitutional.
3. Whether a court order barring a citizen from a United States courthouse in perpetuity is reasonably specific.
4. Whether a federal bankruptcy court order barring a litigant from the courthouse remains in effect after the litigation has ended.
The Petitioner, Alphonse Mourad, respectfully prays for issuance of a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, entered on May 14, 2002, affirming the judgment and sentence of the United States District Court for the District ofMassachusetts.
The Per Curiam opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in United States v. Mourad is reproduced in Appendix "A" and is reported, at 289 F.3d 174 (r'lCir. 2002).
The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, affirming the Petitioner's conviction and sentence, entered in the Appeals Court docket on May 14, 2002. This petition is filed within ninety (90) days of that date. The Petitioner invokes this Court's jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. �54(1).
Mourad challenges his conviction on charges of criminal contempt, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. � 401(3), and the refusal by the district court and court of appeals to entertain his challenge to the subject court order under the so-called collateral bar rule. He also challenges the constitutionality and effectiveness of the order on the day of the alleged violation.
Section 401(3) of Title 18 of the United States Code provides as follows: "A court of the United States shall have power to punish by fine or imprisonment, at its discretion, such contempt of its authority, and none other, as -- ... (3) [disobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command."
the District of Massachusetts, Case No. 96-10123-CJK, In re V&M Management. Inc. Petitioner Alphonse Mourad ("Mourad") had been a principal in V&M Management and played an active role in the bankruptcy proceeding before Judge Carol J. Kenner.
i . Alphonse Mourad, the Debtor's sole shareholder, director and .'./i , , .n officer, has twice - on Thursday November 5, 1998 and Friday, November 13, 1998 - appeared at the premises of this Court in attempts to disrupt Court business by vowing not to leave the premises of the Bankruptcy Court and courtrooms.
Therefore, it is hereby ORDERED that, except for the hearing on this case scheduled for November 30, 1998, Alphonse Mourad is barred from entering the Eleventh Floor of the O'Neill Building, 10 Causeway Street, Boston, Massachusetts, until further order of this Court.
No hearing was held on the Order before it went into effect.
This Order was docketed by Judge Kenner's clerk and sent to the parties on the "cc" list on page 2, including Mourad. The Eleventh Floor of the O'Neill Building houses the bankruptcy courtrooms and the clerk's office. Deputy Marshal Stephen Donaher testified that he observed another deputy serve in hand Mourad with a copy of the order on that day.
Deputy Donaher saw Mourad enter the Eleventh floor of the O'Neill Building on May 12, 1999. He saw Mourad pass through the metal detector and pick up a bag off the x-ray machine. Donaher testified that he heard Mourad say to court security officers that, "[h]e was here to be arrested, to violate the court order, and he had asked where the marshal was." Donaher admitted that, when he saw Mourad, in the "back of my head, I realized that he wanted to be arrested,..."
After taking Mourad into a conference room, Donaher arrested him. Another court security officer, James Sartori, testified that he heard Mourad remark on May 12, 1999 that he desired to be arrested.
On occasions prior to May 12, 1999, Mourad appeared on the Eleventh floor of the building with papers to file, waited outside the security area, and court security officers assisted him by taking his papers to the clerk's office for filing.
i arrested when he appeared in court the next day.
deadline on a state claim that had been removed to the bankruptcy court.
On cross examination, Mourad admitted that he had not appealed nor sought reconsideration of the November 16, 1998 order.
from challenging the lawfulness of the order. Mourad argued that the order was facially invalid because it purported to bar him permanently from the Eleventh floor of the O'Neill Building, and because it did not, on its face, provide for judicial review. He also argued that the order was ambiguous and that it no longer was in effect on the day of the alleged violation.
The court denied Mourad's Rule 29 motion, finding that the evidence in the government's case supported a finding that the order still was in effect on May 12, 1999 and that Mourad knew of the order and violated it on May 12, 1999. Judge Lindsay acknowledged questions concerning whether Judge Kenner should have granted Mourad a hearing prior to issuing the order and whether the order deprived Mourad of his rights under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. Despite these findings, the trial judge precluded Mourad from challenging the order under the collateral bar rule, holding that the order was not "patently unconstitutional."
the O'Neill Building rather than the United States Courthouse, the location of his initial appearance, where the statement was made.
doctors' reports. Mourad takes numerous medications for high blood pressure, as well as sleep medications. Judge Lindsay agreed that the medical reports showed an abnormal or high "PSA."
reviewing the trial judge's ruling de novo, that the subject order remained in effect on the day in question, even though the bankruptcy court had closed the bankruptcy case months earlier. Id. at 179-180. Lastly, the court of appeals found sufficient evidence to support the conviction, including evidence that the Petitioner's violation of the order had been "willful." Id. at 180.
In affirming defendant-appellant Mourad's conviction for criminal contempt, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that Mourad could not challenge the validity or constitutionality of the subject order, because the collateral bar rule severely limits the opportunity to challenge an order once it has been violated. United States v. Mourad. 289 F.3d 174, 177-179 (1st Cir. 2002). The application of the collateral bar rule to this case was erroneous.
Rule 42 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure empowers the courts to punish those persons who disobey their authority. By statute, codified at 18 U.S.C. � 401, the Congress has provided criminal penalties for willful violations of court orders. Section 401(3) provides that, "A court of the United States shall have the power to punish by fine or imprisonment, at its discretion, such contempt of its authority, and none other, as - ... (3) Disobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree or command."
Because the first element of an offense under Section 401(3) is a showing that the subject order was "lawful" and of "reasonable specificity," many defendants, Mourad included, defend the charges by challenging the validity of the order.1 Obviously, the government bears the burden of proving each element beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Winship. 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1069, 1075 (1970). As part of this burden, it is entirely appropriate for the trial court to permit the defendant to challenge the order.
criminal contempt case, challenge the validity of the order. Walker v City of Birmingham. 388 U.S. 307, 87 S.Ct. 1824, 1829-1830 (1967). The rule precludes raising challenges to an order in a collateral, criminal proceeding. Id.
lAn order is "reasonably specific" "only if it is 'clear, definite and unambiguous in requiring the action in question.'" United States v. Bemandine. 237 F.3d 1279, 1282 (11th Cir. 2001) (quotins Bush Ranch. Inc. v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co.. 99 F.3d 363, 370 (11th Cir.
on the first element of the offense.
at 1346-1347. The court further noted that, if a party could not collaterally challenge a transparently invalid order, courts would be able to exercise powers not within its authority, "a cpncept inconsistent with the notion that the judiciary may exercise only those powers entrusted to it by law." Id. at 1347. "Blind obedience to all court orders is not required." Id. at fn. 28, Although a court order demands respect, "so does the right of the citizen to be free of clearly improper exercises of judicial authority." Providence Journal I. 820 F.3d at 1347. The exception makes sense because, when a court issues a transparently invalid order, "the court is acting so far in excess of its authority that it has no right to expect compliance and no interest is protected by requiring compliance." Id. at 1347. Courts must be vigilant to make sure that the contempt power is not abused, because, "[t]hat the contempt power is subject to abuse is well understood." 3 Wright & Miller Fed. Prac. & Proc. Crim. 2d � 702 (1982).
Most circuit courts of appeal that have addressed the issue have agreed with the First Circuit as to the "transparent invalidity" exception to the collateral bar rule. See United States v, Cutler. 58 F.3d 825 (2d Cir. 1995); In re Roger Novak. 932 F.2d 1397 (11th Cir. 1991); In re Establishment Inspection of Her Iron Works. Inc.. 881 F.2d 722 (9th Cir. 1989); In re Criminal Contempt Proceedings Against Crawford. 133 F.Supp.2d 249 (W.D.N.Y. 2001); United States v. Walker, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19701 (W.D.N.Y., December 22. 1994); United States v. Terrv.
802 F.Supp. 1094 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
The order in this case was transparently invalid for two reasons: (1) it purported to bar Mourad from the bankruptcy court with no termination date and was therefore not reasonably specific; and (2) it entered without notice and hearing.
As to the first point, the operative part of the order provided as follows: "It is hereby ORDERED that, except only for the hearing in this case scheduled for November 30, 1998, Alphonse Mourad is barred from entering the Eleventh Floor of the O'Neill Building, 10 Causeway Street, Boston, Massachusetts, until farther order of this Court." (emphasis added).
With no termination date, the order apparently was effective in perpetuity. To Mourad, reading the plain meaning of Judge Kenner's words, there was no date upon which he could safely re-enter the bankruptcy court. And, it should be kept in mind that the Eleventh Floor is the nucleus of the court: the clerk's office, the Trustees' offices and the courtrooms. The essential business of the bankruptcy court is conducted there. By barring Mourad permanently from those rooms, Judge Kenner effectively cut him off from the most important part of the court. Whether Judge Kenner subjectively believed that she could or would modify the order was irrelevant to a pro se litigant such as Mourad.
Barring Mourad from the Eleventh Floor interfered with his rights under the United States Constitution to address the court. The right of access to courts is a discrete, constitutional right derived from various sources, including the privileges and immunities clause and the First Amendment. See Simmons v. Dickhaut. 804 F.2d 182, 183 (1" Cir. 1986) (citing Wolffv. McDOnnell. 418 U.S. 539, 579, 28 S.Ct. 2963, 2986 (1974); Chambers v. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. 207 U.S. 142, 148, 28 S.Ct. 34, 35 (1907); and California Motor Transport Co. v.
litigant from a court - particularly based on the sketchy record in this case - is an extreme use of judicial power that could border on abuse. Under such circumstances, Mourad should not have been forced to litigate the validity of the order through the courts. The collateral bar rule did not apply here. He had the right to challenge the validity of the order in defense of the criminal proceeding.
that would support entry of the order on an emergency basis without notice or hearing. See. e.g.. Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(b) (ex parte temporary restraining order may last only ten (10) days). This is not a case, for example, where Mourad disrupted a hearing by refusing to comply with decorum or respond to inquiries or commandments of the court. See, e.g.. United States v. Perry. 116 F. 3d 952 (1st Cir, 1997) (defendant in racketeering trial urinated on carpet in opep court, in plain view of judge). Nor did he threaten the judge, court personnel or other litigants or lawyers. The case was prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. �1(3), dealing with alleged disobedience of court orders.
prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. � 401(1), which prohibits, "[mjisbehavior of any person in [the court's] presence or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice." Since the facts giving rise to this case were not immediate and presented no emergency, there was no reason to deny Mourad the notice and a hearing.
The due process clause requires at a minimum that deprivation of life, liberty or property by adjudication be preceded by notice and opportunity to be heard appropriate to the nature of the case. Goss v. Lopez. 419 U.S. 565, 95 S.Ct. 729 (1975); Fuentes v. Shevin. 407 U.S. 67, 92 S.Ct. 1983 (1972) (replevin of personal property violated procedural due process where statute provided no opportunity for notice and hearing). The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. Matthews v. Eldridee. 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 902 (1976); Goldbere v. Kellv. 397 U.S. 254, 90 S.Ct. 1011 (1970). And, the court of appeals held in an earlier case: "It can be a deprivation of life, liberty or property without due process of law, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, for state officials to deny a person access to the courts." Germany v. Vance. 868 F.2d 9, 11 (1st Cir.
1989) (citing Bounds v. Smith. 430 U.S. 817, 97 S.Ct. 1491 (1977)).
In many ways, Mourad presents a more compelling exception to the collateral bar rule than the newspaper in Providence Journal. Not a lawyer, he represented himself. Unlike a big city daily newspaper, he could not afford to pay an army of seasoned litigators to assert his rights. He was simply a citizen who was admonished by a federal judge that he could never return to the physical premises of the bankruptcy court. Under these circumstances, it would be grossly unfair - and a perverted extension of the collateral bar rule - to preclude Mourad from raising the unconstitutionality of the order in his defense in a criminal case, where he faced the prospect of loss of liberty, probation or a fine.
This case presents an opportunity for this Court to clarify the standards governing the "transparent invalidity" exception to the collateral bar rule. In Walker v. City of Birmingham. this Court suggested the exception, which the First Circuit and other courts of appeals (namely, the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits in Novak and Hem Iron Works, supra.) have adopted. The problem in implementation is that those courts have set such a high standard that the exception has become meaningless. In fact, research disclosed no reported decision in which a litigant was allowed to challenge a court order as transparently invalid. (See cases cited at pages 9-10 of this brief, supra).
One solution would be for this Court to set forth a rule that an order is "transparently invalid" if it enters without procedural due process (i.e. notice and hearing) or, on its face, is invalid. As applied to this case, the order clearly fits this requirement because the bankruptcy judge provided no hearing and purported to extend her order into the indefinite future.
that the rule violates the Constitution.
As discussed above, the rule gives the government a "bye" on the first element of a section 401(3) prosecution. Because of the rule, the defendant has almost no viable means of challenging the validity and/or specificity of the subject court order. It shifts the burden of proof to the accused - unconstitutionally - to prove, not only that the order was invalid, but that it was transparently invalid. As even a cursory review of the case law will show, this requirement is almost impossible for any defendant to surmount. If the defendant has not followed the proper channels in the underlying proceeding, he has lost forever an important arrow in his defensive quiver. Particularly here, where Mourad did not have the benefit of counsel, the result is patently unfair.
defense ofunconstitutionality in a criminal proceeding. Obviously, the more prudent strategic approach would be to seek immediate review of the order. However, a defendant who chooses not to avail himself of immediate review should not have the argument foreclosed later.
it was a disproportionate response based on an insufficient record. Judge Kenner made only the most general findings of fact to support the order, which purported to bar a litigant permanently from the courtrooms and clerk's office of the bankruptcy court. Third, the order deprived Mourad of his right of access to the courts without providing him fundamental due process. And, as set forth in Section III, infra.. the order was no longer in effect, on the day of the alleged violation.
Because the order was invalid and unconstitutional, the district court erred in finding Mourad guilty for violating it.
IV. The Order Was No Longer In Effect On The Day Of The "Violation"
Judge Kenner's order barring Mourad from the Eleventh Floor of the O'Neill Building was entered on November 16, 1998. On December 23, 1998, Judge Kenner allowed the Amended Motion for Entry of Final Decree Closing Bankruptcy Case. (Exhibit 11 at trial; A. 25). In doing so, Judge Kenner "closed" the bankruptcy case involving V&M Management except for two matters specifically excepted. She finally resolved these matters (dealing mostly with Mouard's claims that he originally had filed in state court) on November 10, 1999.
from the closing of the case.
With no underlying case, the order was no longer effective. A somewhat analogous situation was discussed (albeit in dicta) in In re Establishment Inspection of Hem Iron Works. Inc.. 881 F.2d 722, 726-727 (9th Cir. 1989). There, the court noted that an order may be violated (without running afoul of the collateral bar rule) is it rested upon a defective jurisdictional base. "If a court order issues without personal or subject matter jurisdiction, the decree may be violated without incurring the penalty of criminal contempt. In such a case, the original order is deemed a nullity." Id. Although, in this case. the bankruptcy court had personal and subject matter jurisdiction to issue the November 16, 1998 order, it lost that jurisdiction on December 23, 1998.
For all of the foregoing reasons, the petitioner respectfully requests that the Court accept his petition for a writ of certiorari and reverse his conviction.

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