Source: https://scocal.stanford.edu/opinion/people-v-lavender-34373
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 18:24:59+00:00

Document:
In this case, the parties agree that the deliberations were imperfect.
[they] could not consider that issue‖ and ―there was no further mention‖ of it.
Court of Appeal therefore reversed the convictions and ordered a new trial.
as any other material disputed facts, and to reconsider the motion for new trial.
to the indeterminate term for the murder.
All further unspecified references are to the Penal Code.
testify. The defense motion was supported by declarations from three jurors.
matter to enable the trial court to reconsider the motion.
The procedural history of defendants‘ jury misconduct claim is complex.
a reasonable probability of actual harm resulting from the misconduct. (People v.
pragmatic one, mindful of the ‗day-to-day realities of courtroom life‘ (Rushen v.
the jury of the court‘s instructions concerning defendants‘ decisions not to testify.
would necessarily be ineffective at dispelling the presumption of prejudice.
Hord suggests that a finding of unrebuttable prejudice is mandated here.
there any deliberation errors that went uncorrected by the other jurors. (Id. at pp.
from fellow jurors sets an unreasonably high bar for jury conduct. ―As MR.
U.S. 853, 863, quoting Powell, Jury Trial of Crimes (1966) 23 Wash. & Lee L.
objective evidence indicated the reminder would have been ineffective.
yet had the opportunity to resolve.
jury‘s discussion of their guilt.
claimed by defendants. (Krouse v. Graham (1977) 19 Cal.3d 59, 81; see People v.
resolve the factual disputes underlying the issue of prejudice. (See Green v.
(2006) 39 Cal.4th 168, 177; Aguilar v. Lerner (2004) 32 Cal.4th 974, 987; cf.
from resolving defendants‘ motion for new trial on its merits.
to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with our opinion.
Petition for review after the Court of Appeal reversed a judgment of conviction of criminal offenses. This case presents the following issue: Did the Court of Appeal err by reversing defendants' convictions for juror misconduct and remanding for a new trial rather than remanding for an evidentiary hearing into the misconduct?
Defendants Floyd Lavender and Michael James Gaines were convicted of the kidnapping and first degree murder of Courtney Bowser, and the torture of Bowser and two other victims, Kristen Martin and Michael Hughes. The defendants were each sentenced to a term of 25 years to life for the murder, plus a consecutive five-year term for kidnapping, as well as three concurrent life terms for torture.
Defendants filed a motion for new trial alleging that the jurors improperly discussed and considered defendants’ decisions not to testify. The defense motion was supported by declarations from three jurors. The declarations stated that the jury discussed the defendants’ decision “at length,” that it “played a large part in our decision,” and that the defendants’ decision “made them appear guilty to us.” S209975 at 4-5.
In opposition, the prosecution submitted a declaration from the jury foreperson as well as new declarations from two of the jurors who had previously submitted declarations for the defense. The foreperson declaration stated that “[t]he only discussion that occurred during deliberations regarding the defendants not testifying is when one of the jurors mentioned it. I immediately admonished that juror that we could not consider that issue.” Id. at 5. The two new juror declarations contained similar claims about the nature of the discussion.
In reply, defendants offered the declaration of the defense investigator, who asserted that the new juror declarations were different from what the jurors initially told him. Id. at 5-6.
The trial court denied defendants’ motion for new trial. The court determined that jury misconduct did occur, but that the presumption of prejudice to the defendants was rebutted because the foreperson reminded the jury to follow the court’s instructions.
The Court of Appeal reversed. The Court of Appeal reasoned that the presumption of prejudice was not rebutted in this case because the jury’s discussion “was expressly linked to the adverse inference of guilt to be drawn from the failure to testify . . . . “ Id. at 7. The court found a reasonable probability defendants were actually harmed by the misconduct in this case, which “turned entirely on close and substantial credibility assessments.” Id. at 8.
The Supreme Court of California granted review and directed the Court of Appeal to vacate its decision and “reconsider the cause” in light of cases which had remanded for an evidentiary hearing on a claim of jury misconduct. Id. On remand, the Court of Appeal modified its opinion and again reversed. A majority of the Court of Appeal “remain[ed] convinced the misconduct by this jury…was presumptively prejudicial and, because the evidentiary basis for the guilty verdict appeared diaphanous and was in many respects in disarray, the record in this case is inadequate to rebut that presumption.” Id.
The Supreme Court of California again granted review.
1)	Was the presumption of prejudice from juror misconduct rebutted when the jurors were reminded not to consider the decision of defendants not to testify?
2)	Should a party be estopped from requesting a new evidentiary hearing to determine juror prejudice, or have they forfeited their request for an evidentiary hearing, when the party successfully argued at trial that no hearing was necessary?
3)	Is there a need to resolve material and disputed facts that underlie the issue of juror prejudice in this case?
4)	Should the trial court hold an evidentiary hearing to resolve the factual disputes underlying the issue of prejudice?
1) The presumption of prejudice is rebutted in a case “where . . . a mistake by one or more jurors during deliberations is promptly followed by a reminder from a fellow juror to disregard a defendant’s decision not to take the stand,” and where “the discussion of the forbidden topic thereafter ceases, without any objective evidence that the reminder of the court’s instructions was ineffective.” Id. at 16.
2) The People are not estopped from requesting a new evidentiary hearing to determine juror prejudice, and they have not forfeited their request for such a hearing, even when they argued successfully at trial that no hearing was necessary, because new evidence relevant to juror prejudice has subsequently entered the record.
3) There are several material and disputed facts that underlie the issue of juror prejudice in this case and the trial court must resolve these disputes.
4) The trial court has discretion to determine whether it needs to hold an evidentiary hearing to resolve the factual disputes underlying the issue of prejudice.
5) The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, the trial court order denying defendants’ motion for new trial is vacated, and the matter is remanded to the trial court for reconsideration.
The court found that jury misconduct did occur in this case because the jury violated the trial court’s instructions not to discuss the fact that the defendants did not testify. This misconduct, in turn, gave rise to a “presumption of prejudice, which may be rebutted by an affirmative evidentiary showing that prejudice does not exist or by a reviewing court’s examination of the entire record to determine whether there is a reasonable probability of actual harm resulting from the misconduct.” (Citing People v. Williams (2006) 40 Cal.4th 287, 333; People v. Loker (2008) 44 Cal. 4th 691; People v. Avila (2009) 46 Cal.4th 680 (; People v. Brasure (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1037, 1060 ; People v. Hord (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 711; People v. Leonard (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1370; Race v. Pung (8th Cir. 1990) 907 F.2d 83, 11; Perez v. Marshall (S.D.Cal. 1996) 946 F.Supp. 1521). The court disagreed with the Court of Appeal’s heavy reliance on People v. Cissna (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1105. The court found Cissna was distinguishable, because in Cissna a juror met with and discussed the case with a non-juror friend during the trial on a twice-daily basis, beginning with the first day of testimony. The court reasoned that unlike Cissna, in the present case there was no indication of repeated and ongoing misconduct that went uncorrected by other jurors.
The court emphasized that jury deliberations involve the “conduct of human beings who are fallible,” id. at 15, and that to “ ‘demand theoretical perfection from every juror during the course of a trial is unrealistic.’ ” (In re Carpenter (1995) 9 Cal.4th 634, 655). Id. The court went on to observe, “to assume that jurors who wade into a forbidden topic in the course of deliberations can never be put right again by a reminder from the trial judge or from fellow jurors sets an unreasonably high bar for jury conduct.” Id.
At the same time, the court observed that there were still several material and disputed facts underlying the issue of prejudice that had to be resolved, before a final determination of prejudice could be made. For example, there had not yet been a “full and fair determination” that the foreperson actually reminded the jury of the court’s instructions, because the declaration of the defense investigator which disputed this fact was excluded by the trial court. Id. at 16. In addition, the People’s declarations asserted that the jury discussion of defendants’ choices was merely “mentioned” by one juror and the discussion was very brief. Id. at 17. The defendants’ declarations, on the other hand, asserted a more lengthy discussion, and linked the discussion to the jury’s discussion of the defendants’ guilt. And finally, the trial court had not investigated whether any objective circumstances indicate that a reminder to the jury to follow the court’s instructions was not effective in this case. For example, if the jury persisted in its discussion even after being admonished to stop, this could confirm the existence of prejudice.
The court ordered the trial court to resolve these factual disputes, but determined that it was within the trial court’s discretion to determine whether an evidentiary hearing was necessary in order to do so (citing People v. Hedgecock (1990) 51 Cal.3d 395, 415). Id. at 18.
Finally, the Court held that the People should not be estopped from requesting an evidentiary hearing, nor had they forfeited their request, simply because they had successfully argued at trial that no hearing was necessary. The court reasoned that the People’s initial argument at trial was based on the fact that the trial court had excluded large portions of the defense declarations, and thus key factual questions remained uncontested at that time. The Court of Appeals subsequently admitted some of this evidence and thus threw the factual record into greater dispute. The court thus concluded that it is reasonable for the People to adjust their argument to request a new evidentiary hearing to resolve the disputed matters.
TAGS: Criminal Law, Motion for New Trial, Jury Deliberations, Jury Discussions, Jury Misconduct, Jury Instructions, Court Instructions, Evidentiary Hearing, Defendant Testimony, Defendant Not Testifying, Correction of Jury Misconduct, Admonishment of Jury Misconduct, Remedying Jury Misconduct, Presumption of Prejudice, Actual Harm, Inference of Guilt, Adverse Inference, Material and Disputed Facts, People v. Loker.
Annotation by Zain Yoonas, Stanford Law School Class of 2015.
SCOCAL, People v. Lavender , S209975 available at: (https://scocal.stanford.edu/opinion/people-v-lavender-34373) (last visited Sunday April 21, 2019).

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