Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/new-york/other-courts/2007/2007-27196.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 08:02:22+00:00

Document:
[*1] In the Matter of the Adoption of John Doe, an Infant.
Cohen Lans LLP, New York City (Mara T. Thorpe of counsel), for ERJ. Cohen Hennessey Bienstock & Rabin P.C., New York City (Bonnie E. Rabin of counsel), for LMB.
In the realm of family law, the Legislature has carved out additional exceptions to those found in the Judiciary Law, namely: custody proceedings (Domestic Relations Law § 235 ), support proceedings (Family Ct Act § 433 [a]), paternity proceedings (Family Ct Act § 531), proceedings concerning whether a person is in need of supervision (Family Ct Act § 741 [b]), and child protective proceedings (Family Ct Act § 1043).[FN7] In addition, a more limited [*4]exception has been created in adult guardianship cases (Mental Hygiene Law § 81.14).[FN8] Neither Judiciary Law § 4 nor any other provision of the Domestic Relations Law or the Family Court Act provides judicial discretion for excluding the public from adoption proceedings.
It also is questionable whether Uniform Rules for Family Court § 205.4 (b)—containing guidelines for a court to consider in exercising its "inherent" and statutory discretion to exclude the public from a courtroom—has application in a proceeding to vacate an adoption. That is: can an administrative rule create an exception to section 4 of the Judiciary Law?
The court need not reach that potentially constitutional question. Even under Uniform Rules for Family Court § 205.4 (b)—which the parties agree applies[FN11] —respondent fails to overcome the strong presumption of an open court.
Section 205.4 (b) of the Uniform Rules for Family Court provides: "(b) The general public or any person may be excluded from a courtroom only if the judge presiding in the courtroom determines, on a case-by-case basis based upon supporting evidence, that such exclusion is warranted in that case. In exercising this inherent and statutory discretion, [*5]the judge may consider, among other factors, whether: "(1) the person is causing or is likely to cause a disruption in the proceedings; "(2) the presence of the person is objected to by one of the parties, including the law guardian, for a compelling reason; "(3) the orderly and sound administration of justice, including the nature of the proceeding, the privacy interests of individuals before the court, and the need for protection of the litigants, in particular, children, from harm, requires that some or all observers be excluded from the courtroom; "(4) less restrictive alternatives to exclusion are unavailable or inappropriate to the circumstances of the particular case."
A court presented with a request for closure under section 205.4 must therefore balance the heavy interests of the public, press, and society generally in an open trial against the harm that an open courtroom may cause to children. A court may find against the presumption only when evidence of that harm, or potential harm, is compelling. This in turn requires examination both of the severity of the harm and the quantum of evidence that is real, concrete and specific. It is in this light that respondent's allegations must be considered.
In addition, and as discussed infra, the weight of public, as opposed to merely private or prurient, interest in the trial must also be placed on the scale to determine whether closure should be permitted.
In her affidavit in support of this motion, respondent requests closure[FN12] for two reasons: First, she argues that because she, and to a lesser extent, LMB, have some notoriety, it is likely the media might report on the facts and testimony adduced at the hearing, or, as she writes, "the likelihood that sensitive information would be reported about the case in general—and about [John Doe] in particular—would be very strong." Second, she writes, "[m]y request . . . is prompted by my deep concern about the emotional harm I believe [John Doe] could sustain as a result of publicity attending this case" (emphasis added), noting that "the nature of the developmental and psychological risks an open courtroom would pose to [John Doe] are elaborated in [an] accompanying affirmation of Dr. Rodrigo Pizarro, a child psychiatrist." She goes on to state that "[m]ost urgently, I am concerned that [John Doe] not learn that he was adopted from the media or third parties."
Respondent's concerns, while understandable and no doubt heartfelt, fall far short of the standard set by case law under section 205.4.
With one exception,[FN16] the cases cited by the parties in which appellate courts have permitted or required closure were Family Court child protective proceedings. They involved children who were the victims of abuse, harm or violence,[FN17] usually by parents,[FN18] such that, in their particular circumstances, publicity about the facts of the case would almost certainly cause them to be "re-victimized" (Matter of Ruben R., 219 AD2d 117, 128 [1st Dept 1996], supra), with all of the attendant harm that would entail. In those cases, the public's (and the press') right to access was insufficient to trump the compelling interest of the state "in protecting children from the possible harmful effects of disclosing to the public allegations and evidence of parental abuse and neglect." (Matter of Katherine B., 189 AD2d 443, 450 [2d Dept 1993], supra.) Unlike the traumatic circumstances of those cases, John Doe is not alleged to have suffered any harm to date, nor are there any allegations of abuse or neglect in this proceeding. The hearing that [*8]respondent seeks to close is limited solely to an issue of foreign law.
Matter of P.B. v C.C. (223 AD2d 294 [1st Dept 1996], supra), the decision relied upon most heavily by respondent, is entirely distinguishable based upon the alleged harm, as well as on a number of additional grounds discussed below.[FN19] In that case, the Appellate Division closed the courtroom in a custody trial pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 235 and section 205.4.[FN20] Six children were involved in their parents' highly publicized divorce proceeding, two of whom were well-known child actors. All parties sought closure for the children's protection, and extensive evidence of past and future harm was offered. The Appellate Division analogized the situation, in which "[n]umerous press reports concerning this case have already revealed allegations of alcohol and drug abuse and domestic violence," to two proceedings—Matter of Ruben R. (219 AD2d 117 [1st Dept 1996], supra) and Matter of Katherine B. (189 AD2d 443 [2d Dept 1993], supra)—in determining that the custody proceeding should be shielded from the press. (Matter of P.B. v C.C. at 296.) Significantly, the Court found [*9]that, "[a]s in both Ruben R. and Katherine B., the emotional and educational harm which has already occurred has been explicitly documented" (id. at 296-297 [emphasis added]). And, the Court noted, based on the extensive, specific, concrete proof submitted, "we deal here not with the children's 'privacy', but with the protection and preservation of their health and welfare" (id. at 298).
By contrast, the potential harm alleged in this case is far more like that in the ordinary contested custody case, which the Appellate Division has firmly rejected as a basis for closure under Domestic Relations Law § 235 (2).[FN21] The claim that publicity and exposure of intimate family details may be harmful to children in a celebrity divorce case prompted now Presiding Justice Tom, writing for the Court, to note: "If a custody trial can be closed to the public on the showing made here[FN22]then closure of the courtroom would be the rule, not the exception, in custody cases. The argument can always be made—in any case—that it is in the child's best interest to shield her life from public gaze. Neither Domestic Relations Law § 235 (2) nor Uniform Rules for Trial Courts § 205.4 contemplates such a result." (Anonymous v Anonymous, 263 AD2d 341, 344 [1st Dept 2000], supra; accord Merrick v Merrick, 154 Misc 2d 559 [Sup Ct, NY County 1992] [declining to close courtroom in celebrity divorce case despite allegations that publicity could be harmful to parties' older daughter and two younger adoptive children]; Sprecher v Sprecher, NYLJ, June 21, 1988, at 21, col 6, affd sub nom. Anonymous v Anonymous, 158 AD2d 296 [1st Dept 1990] [affirming trial court's refusal to close the courtroom in a highly publicized custody trial where, it was alleged, teachers, other children and parents were treating the child differently as a result of the publicity [*10]that she was being raised by Sullivanians, and modifying only to the extent of requiring an "anonymous" caption]; cf. Anonymous v Anonymous, 27 AD3d 356, 361 [1st Dept 2006] [in "child custody (cases) such relief (use of anonymous captions) should be granted only in the rare case, where, in considering the best interests of the children, there is a finding that their health and welfare would be protected, not their 'privacy' " (citations omitted)]).
In addition to the severity or kind of harm that might result from an open courtroom, the courts also have carefully scrutinized the kind of proof offered to demonstrate such harm, eschewing [*11]allegations that are speculative and/or not concretely grounded in personal (and often professional) observation of the child's situation and response to prior publicity (see Merrick v Merrick, 154 Misc 2d 559 [Sup Ct, NY County 1992], supra).
Besides the general public interest in open trials, independent interests[FN28] are implicated by the issues to be determined in this trial on Cambodian law. First, determination of the meaning of the adoption permission certificates under Cambodian law may affect the many families who, in bringing Cambodian children to this country, have relied on the certificates they obtained to [*12]establish their children's adoptive status. According to papers submitted by LMB, while some parents of Cambodian children have commenced "re-adoption" proceedings in this and other states, many other parents have assumed that they obtained completed adoptions in Cambodia which ensure their children's immigration and citizenship status.[FN29] Thus, the very legal issue to be determined—based upon the testimony of experts on Cambodian law, including government officials—is a matter of significant public concern to the community of parents who are raising Cambodian children in this country.
The fact that ERJ's witness list includes two Cambodian government officials, Samheng Boros and Mao Sovadei, Chief of Cabinet, and Director, Child Welfare Department, respectively, of the Ministry of Social Affairs, Veterans and Youth Rehabilitation, Kingdom of Cambodia,[FN30] is also significant.[FN31] The United States Government has been scrutinizing Cambodian adoption laws and procedures as it considers whether to lift the December 2001 ban on Cambodian visas imposed by the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services in the Department of Homeland Security. The ban, which has been the subject of great public interest,[FN32] was prompted by "very serious concerns about baby-selling and rampant document fraud" (Catherine Barry, Deputy Assistant Sec'y for Overseas Citizens Servs, Bur of Consular Aff, Remarks Before Subcomm on E Asian & Pac Aff, Senate Comm on Foreign Relations, Washington, D.C., June 8, 2006).
Respondent argues that because adoption records are sealed as a matter of law, court proceedings involving adoption should similarly be subject to secrecy[FN33] and/or that section 205.4 should be construed to effectuate the policies that underlie the sealing statute, Domestic Relations Law § 114. While, at first blush, the argument has some appeal, it ignores the very different interests served by sealing adoption records, as demonstrated by history[FN34] and settled case law, which interests are notably absent here. Those interests are: (1) Protecting the identity of birth parents (see, e.g. Matter of Linda F. M., 52 NY2d 236, 239 , supra ["confidentiality . . . provides the natural parents with an anonymity that they may consider vital"]; Golan v Louise Wise Servs., 69 NY2d 343, 347  ["(confidentiality ensures) the privacy of (the adoption) process for those men and women who are confronted with [*14]the circumstances of an unwanted pregnancy or inability to provide the necessary care for their children" (citations omitted)]). (2) Protecting the privacy of adoptive parents and their newly formed family (see e.g. Matter of Linda F. M., 52 NY2d 236, 239 , supra ["confidentiality . . . permits the adoptive parents to develop a close relationship with the child free from interference or distraction," including protection against possible blackmail]). (3) Protecting the child from knowledge of his/her illegitimacy[FN35] (see e.g. Matter of Linda F. M., 52 NY2d 236, 239 , supra ["confidentiality . . . shields the adopted child from possibly disturbing facts surrounding his or her birth and parentage"];[FN36] Matter of Anonymous, 89 Misc 2d 132, 133-134 [Sur Ct, Queens County 1976, Laurino, S.] [confidentiality "protects adopted children who are illegitimate from any possible stigma they might otherwise have to bear because of their birth"]).
Besides sealing the courtroom, respondent seeks an order directing that all papers in the proceeding, including all orders, motion papers, exhibits, and transcripts of the hearing, be kept [*15]under seal. The court has previously ruled by decision dated August 17, 2006 that the court records underlying LMB's motion to vacate John Doe's adoption shall be sealed.
In deciding whether to permit the sealing of exhibits admitted in the course of the hearing on Cambodian law and/or the transcript of the hearing, 22 NYCRR 216.1 applies. Section 216.1 provides that, in the absence of a statute or rule to the contrary, a court may not seal records, in whole or in part, except upon a particularized finding of good cause. To determine whether good cause exists, the court is required to weigh the interests of the public against those of the parties. As the rule makes clear, court records, like the hearing itself, are presumed open to the public, thus placing the burden on respondent to establish that the particular circumstances of this case justify sealing.
With respect to exhibits admitted at trial, to the extent those exhibits contain information that would otherwise be protected from disclosure under the provisions of Domestic Relations Law § 114, which mandates the sealing of all papers in adoption proceedings, they will remain under seal. To the extent such exhibits contain information that would not typically appear in an adoption file but would nevertheless, if made public, implicate the policy concerns protected under Domestic Relations Law § 114, as discussed above, that information will also remain under seal. Inasmuch as the parties have yet to disclose the exhibits they intend to introduce at trial, it is impossible to render a more exacting determination at this time. The decision whether to seal any exhibit admitted into evidence will be made on an individualized basis.
With respect to respondent's request to seal the trial transcript, public access to the transcript is equivalent to the public's right to attend the hearing itself. Accordingly, this request is denied.
Furthermore, respondent's request that the decisions and orders of this court be filed under seal is denied. Such decisions and orders have been and will continue to be issued under the "Baby Doe" caption.
Footnote 1: Foreign law is an issue of fact to be found by the court (Read v Lehigh Val. R.R. Co., 284 NY 435, 444 ; Hull v Mitcheson, 64 NY 639, 640 ). When affidavits submitted by the parties' expert witnesses are contradictory, a hearing is required (see Rawitz v Rawitz, 31 AD2d 832, 833 [2d Dept 1969]).
Footnote 2: LMB also cross-moves for a protective order for certain witnesses he intends to call at the hearing. That cross motion is disposed of in a separate opinion.
Footnote 3: The readoption was granted by this court, without opposition, on April 12, 2006. On August 1, 2006, LMB filed a motion to vacate the adoption, alleging that he should have been made a party to the proceeding. He took the position that he had previously obtained a final, completed adoption of John Doe, as evidenced by a June 23, 2004 certificate issued to him by the Cambodian government. After LMB's certificate was issued, however, he wrote a letter to the Cambodian authorities purportedly renouncing his adoption. Some 16 months later, a virtually identical certificate was issued by the Cambodian government to ERJ. LMB contends that the purported renunciation signed by him is a legal nullity under New York law, which he suggests governs any surrender of his parental rights.
After LMB sought to vacate the adoption in this court, ERJ claimed for the first time that the certificate issued by the Cambodian authorities constituted mere permission to adopt John Doe, so that LMB had obtained no rights to the child under Cambodian law and was not entitled either to notice or to process in the adoption proceeding commenced by her. The meaning of the certificates under Cambodian law is thus a first critical step in untangling a complex and sometimes unsavory set of allegations in this proceeding.
"[O]pen examination of witnesses viva voce, in the presence of all mankind, is much more conducive to the clearing up of the truth, than the private and secret examination . . . where a witness may frequently depose that in private, which he will be ashamed to testify in a public and solemn tribunal."
Footnote 6: As the Appellate Division has written: "Public access to court proceedings is strongly favored, both as a matter of constitutional law (Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v Virginia, 448 US 555) and as statutory imperative (Judiciary Law § 4)" (Anonymous v Anonymous, 158 AD2d 296, 297 [1st Dept 1990]).
Footnote 7: Prior to 1997, Family Courts acted as though these limited privacy provisions applied throughout the Family Court Act (see Besharov, Practice Commentaries McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 29A, Family Ct Act § 1043, at 125 [1999 ed]). The Administrative Board of the court system mandated an end to that practice by adding the current subdivision (a) to section 205.4 of the Uniform Rules for Family Court (22 NYCRR). It provides, inter alia: "(a) The Family Court is open to the public. Members of the public, including the news media, shall have access to all courtrooms, lobbies, public waiting areas and other common areas of Family Court otherwise open to individuals having business before the court."
"The tradition of open courtrooms has always been a fundamental feature of our justice system, and is imbedded in our federal and state constitutions. With the establishment of the Family Court 35 years ago, a somewhat conflicting culture developed. Proceedings, although presumptively open to the public, generally took place behind closed doors to protect the privacy of children and families. . . .
"In June 1997, the Administrative Board amended Family Court Rule § 205.4, declaring to the legal community and the public, in no uncertain terms, that '[t]he Family Court is open to the public' . . .
Footnote 8: See Matter of Astor, 13 Misc 3d 1203(A), 2006 NY Slip Op 51677(U) (Sup Ct, NY County 2006) (vacating, with limited exception, interim sealing order in celebrated Brooke Astor case in light of important First Amendment considerations).
Footnote 9: The only case on which respondent relies, other than cases involving attempts to unseal adoption records, is Matter of P.B. v C.C. (223 AD2d 294 [1st Dept 1996]), a custody proceeding governed by Domestic Relations Law § 235 (2).
Footnote 11: Uniform Rules for Family Court § 205.4 (b) has been applied to custody disputes in Supreme Court (see e.g., Anonymous v Anonymous, 263 AD2d 341, 343 [1st Dept 2000]).
Footnote 12: In addition to closure, respondent requests an order "pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 114, directing that all papers in the proceeding, including, without limitation, all orders, transcripts, exhibits, and motion papers be kept under seal." For purposes of this discussion, her request will be treated as one for closure; the sealing of particular records, as opposed to the transcript, is dealt with separately hereinbelow.
Footnote 14: The hypothetical includes many uncontroverted facts, but also omits "facts" which LMB has alleged and believes critical to understanding John Doe's situation.
Footnote 16: Matter of P.B. v C.C. (223 AD2d 294 [1st Dept 1996]), discussed infra, was a custody proceeding in Supreme Court, brought prior to the 1997 amendment.
Footnote 17: There is also a line of cases involving delinquency proceedings, which is more akin to criminal cases with the special constitutional consideration criminal trials entail (e.g., Matter of M.F., 12 Misc 3d 1164[A], 2006 NY Slip Op 51027[U] [Fam Ct, Bronx County 2006]). Neither party has cited to nor relies upon those cases, which are thus excluded from the analysis here.
Footnote 19: These include: (1) the insufficient and speculative nature of the evidence presented to support respondent's claim of potential harm to John Doe; (2) the fact that, in contradistinction to this contested motion, all parties requested closure; (3) the existence in that case of specific statutory authority to close the proceeding, namely, Domestic Relations Law § 235 (2); (4) an enhanced public interest in this case based upon current federal governmental consideration of Cambodian adoption law and procedures, in connection with the possible lifting of the Immigration and Naturalization Service ban on visas for Cambodian adoptees, and the particular interest of parents who have depended upon "certificates" issued by the Cambodian government, the legal effect of which is at issue in this hearing; and (5) the Court's concern in P.B. v C.C., not present in this trial on foreign law, about the impossibility of "anticipat[ing] exactly what will be elicited in the examination and cross-examination of witnesses . . . The best efforts of a well-intentioned Judge cannot adequately protect against devastating revelations or allegations which may be adduced in the course of . . . [this] hotly contested and acrimonious litigation" (Matter of P.B. v C.C., 223 AD2d 294, 297-298 [1st Dept 1996], supra).
"If the evidence on the trial of such an action or proceeding be such that public interest requires that the examination of the witnesses should not be public, the court or referee may exclude all persons from the room except the parties to the action and their counsel, and in such case may order the evidence, when filed with the clerk, sealed up, to be exhibited only to the parties to the action or proceeding or someone interested, on order of the court."
Footnote 22: The forensic psychiatrist, unlike the psychiatrist here, actually examined the child. He spoke of the " 'unnecessary and known risk' that '[k]nowledge of the details of [the child's family life] will certainly filter down from adults to [the child's] peers,' " and concluded that " 'allowing the public and/or the press to attend [the custody] trial will be to expose [the child] to a significantly greater risk of future mental health problems' " (Anonymous v Anonymous, 263 AD2d 341, 344 [1st Dept 2000], supra). Nevertheless, the Court distinguished this potential harm from the expected "damaging information justifying closure" (id. [internal quotation marks omitted]) in Matter of P.B. v C.C. (supra), also decided under Domestic Relations Law § 235 (2).
Footnote 25: See, for example, recent accounts involving adopted Asian children in the popular press (Andy Newman, A Chinese Orphan's Journey To a Jewish Rite of Passage, New York Times, Mar. 8, 2007, at A1; Steve Fishman, Parenting: Red Diaper Brigade, New York Magazine, June 12, 2000, at 42 ["Walk into any Upper West Side playground or Park Slope day-care center, or visit a pre-k or a play group in the Village or Chelsea, and you're likely to spot Chinese girls . . . with white parents"]), as well as the wide coverage of celebrity adoptions such as Angelina Jolie's recent adoption of a Vietnamese orphan (Angelina's Viet Man, New York Post, Mar. 22, 2007, at 1; Angelina's Tot a Real "Home" Boy, New York Post, Mar. 22, 2007, at 16).
Footnote 26: The adults, at least, can presumably be cautioned against this by their supervisors.
Footnote 27: Respondent concedes that John Doe should and will eventually know of his adoptive status.
Footnote 29: Some parents in both of these categories appear on LMB's witness list and are the subject of his cross motion for a protective order.
Footnote 30: The Ministry of Social Affairs, Veterans and Youth Rehabilitation issued the certificates in question.
Footnote 33: While the Uniform Adoption Act provided for both sealing records and closing adoption hearings (Uniform Adoption Act  § 13 ), and other states have enacted statutes closing adoption proceedings (see e.g., Fla Stat Ann § 63.162), our Legislature has chosen to continue only the sealing requirements it imposed from 1924 to 1938 when the current Domestic Relations Law § 114 was enacted. The Legislature clearly knows how to close proceedings if it so chooses, as, for example, in Domestic Relations Law § 235 (2). Its failure to do so with regard to adoptions can only be "cured," if appropriate, by statute, not by judicial construction, as proposed here by respondent.
In New York, the Legislature first authorized courts to seal adoption records in 1924 (Matter of Walker, 64 NY2d 354, 360 , citing L 1924, ch 323, § 3, amending Domestic Relations Law § 113), and made confidentiality mandatory in 1938 (Alma Socy. Inc. v Mellon, 601 F2d 1225, 1235 [2d Cir 1979], citing L 1938, ch 606; L 1968, ch 1038). The purposes behind sealing statutes, reflecting in part the mores of the day, were to protect the identity of birth parents, shielding them from the humiliation of public knowledge of unwanted pregnancies or inability to support; to protect adoptive parents from possible interference by the birth parents; and to shield the adopted child from the stigmatization of illegitimacy. (Secrets and Lies, supra at 38 [tracing the imposition of a "wall of secrecy" in the twentieth century and postulating that sealing statutes arose in response to market forces as "(t)he economic depressions of the 1920s and 1930s created a surfeit of poor children whose birth families could not (afford to) care for them"].) In order to encourage state-controlled, agency adoptions, rather than the previously common practice of private, contractual arrangements, "Mandatory confidentiality was the missing feature needed to attract adopting parents to the more highly regulated agency sector" (id.).
Footnote 35: See Secrets and Lies, supra at 34 n 91, 36 n 97 (tracing New York statutes in 1916 and 1924 mandating that "the fact of illegitimacy shall in no case appear upon the record").

References: § 235
 § 433
 § 531
 § 741
 § 1043
 § 81
 § 4
 § 205
 § 205
 § 235
 § 235
 § 235
 § 205
 § 114
 § 114
 § 114
 § 4
 § 1043
 § 205
 § 235
 § 205
 § 114
 § 235
 § 235
 § 13
 § 63
 § 114
 § 235
 § 3
 § 113