Source: https://scocal.stanford.edu/opinion/riverside-county-sheriffs-dept-v-stiglitz-34371
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 18:12:58+00:00

Document:
for officer personnel records, commonly referred to as a Pitchess motion.
Rights Act (Gov. Code, § 3300 et seq.).
chose arbitrator Jan Stiglitz as the hearing officer.
(See Pegues v. Civil Service Com. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 95, 105-106; Talmo v.
believed were relevant to her claim.
The department sought a writ of administrative mandate in superior court.
department‘s mandate petition, relying upon Brown.
criticizing its reasoning. We affirm.
on Pitchess motions. That argument fails in light of the governing statutes.
Cal.4th 499, 518-519.) We consider the applicable statutes in turn.
criminal cases. (See Commission on Peace Officer Standards & Training v.
1043 and 1045 appear in division 8 of the Evidence Code dealing with privileges.
and ―arbitration proceedings‖ (Cal. Law Revision Com. com., reprinted at 29B pt.
nonjudicial proceedings (id., foll. § 910, pp. 216-217).
§ 1045, subd. (a).) Certain categories of information are not discoverable.2 (Evid.
judicial officers may rule on them.
in a body not authorized to rule on it.
Evidence Code sections 1043 and 1045 appear.
motion from an administrative proceeding to the superior courts. It did not do so.
case or controversy pending in the superior court.
Unspecified statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
production of the records sought, or by any proper order of disclosure.
administrative proceeding to the superior court.
superior court could then review the records under Evidence Code section 1045.
to in the statutory language.
section 187 requires an independent grant of jurisdiction by constitution or statute.
administrative hearing officers to decide such motions without court intervention.
Illinois, Inc. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 953, 967-968 (control of litigation); Walker v.
cases to the municipal court).
Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1436 (1977–1978 Reg. Sess.) as introduced, p. 7; Sen.
amended Apr. 3, 1978; Assem. Com. on Crim. Justice, Analysis of Sen. Bill No.
to substantively limit who may rule on Pitchess motions.
proceeding.‖ (Cal. Law Revision Com. com., 29B pt. 3A West‘s Ann. Evid.
statute would render the reference to Evidence Code section 915 mere surplusage.
could not have intended to provide for the idle act of filing ineffectual motions.
Our conclusion is also consistent with the purposes behind the POBRA.
public safety officers by the public agencies which employ them.‖ (White v.
discovery to be ordered in an administrative hearing furthers these goals.
balance a litigant‘s discovery interest with an officer‘s confidentiality interest.
interests must still be balanced when ruling on a Pitchess motion.
Chapter 4 of Division 3.‖).
connection with the proceeding in which it is sought.
released in lieu of personnel records.
privacy interests while permitting focused discovery.
defense is invalid or that the discovery she seeks is irrelevant to that defense.
only whether the licensee drove with a blood-alcohol level above the legal limit.
facts involving a driver‘s license suspension.
is unrelated to an arrest, Evidence Code section 1047‘s limitation does not apply.
Evidence Code section 1047‘s legislative history supports Alt‘s conclusion.
alleging the use of excessive force by a peace officer in connection with an arrest.
expressly alerted the Legislature to the limitation recognized by Alt.
People v. Gaines (2009) 46 Cal.4th 172, 181, footnote 2.
seeking discovery may seek to have the matter referred to the superior court.
that are so remote as to make disclosure of little or no practical benefit.‖ (Evid.
privacy in his or her personnel records.‖ (Mooc, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 1220, maj.
optional at the request of the officer or other person who could assert the privilege.
Sen. Amend. to Sen. Bill No. 1436 (1977-1978 Reg. Sess.) Apr. 3, 1978, p. 3; Sen.
Amend. to Sen. Bill No. 1436 (1977-1978 Reg. Sess.) Apr. 17, 1978, p. 3; Assem.
notwithstanding a court‘s finding that it was relevant to the litigation at issue.
which the court would determine the relevancy of the material sought‖ (Assem.
(1977-1978 Reg. Sess.) Aug. 18, 1978, p. 2, italics added, underlining omitted).
legislative history would have mentioned it at least once.
review to exclude certain categories of information regardless of relevance.
relevance under Evidence Code section 1045. (See California Highway Patrol v.
peace officer will have no input‖ into his selection. (Conc. & dis. opn., post, at p.
Code section 915, at pages 15-16, ante.
camera materials claimed to be privileged. (Gov. Code, former § 11507.7, subds.
had these provisions in mind when enacting the Pitchess scheme.
Legislature contemplated that the repealed APA discovery procedure would apply.
Pitchess statutes makes any reference to the APA.
different scheme would have any application to the Pitchess statutes.
included the power to examine privileged materials if necessary to make a ruling.
Legislature never amended the Pitchess statutes to reflect this asserted intent.
court,‖ making no reference to ALJs or the APA.
other statutes tangentially related to the APA.
to it a position about the applicability of the APA that it has not taken. (Id. at p.
the former APA transfer mechanism when enacting the Pitchess scheme.
materials in the context of such a motion.
allegedly privileged and confidential documents to determine their discoverability.
Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 (Pitchess).
should do. This cannot be what the Legislature intended.
In 1965, the Legislature first codified in one place the rules of evidence.
Judiciary, Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 333 (1965 Reg. Sess.) 2 Sen. J. (1965 Reg.
subd. (a); see § 905 [defining ― ‗Presiding officer‘ ‖]; Cal. Law Revision Com.
This principle applies fully to each section I discuss.
in camera review ―applies only when a court is ruling on the claim of privilege.
required, for example, in an administrative proceeding.‖ (Cal. Law Revision Com.
Instead, parties seeking discovery needed a court order compelling disclosure.
necessary ―to protect persons claiming privileges in nonjudicial proceedings.
be privileged.‖ (Cal. Law Revision Com. com., 29B pt. 3A West‘s Ann. Evid.
will be held, naming as [a] respondent the party‖ refusing to provide discovery.
of the Evidence Code. (Gov. Code, former § 11507.7, subd. (d); Stats. 1968, ch.
without review by an actual court.
should be required. (See Gov. Code, former § 11507.7, subds. (d), (e); Stats.
under section 1040 the interest in disclosure against the interest in confidentiality.
The Legislature responded by creating a new statutory peace officer privilege.
A hearing is required absent waiver by the governmental agency with custody.
examining records ―in chambers in conformity with Section 915.‖ (§ 1045, subd.
protective orders (id., subd. (e)).
firmly established practice. We should take the Legislature at its word.
camera. (E.g., id. at pp. 3–5; Assem. Com. on Criminal Justice, Analysis of Sen.
Bill No. 1436 (1977–1978 Reg. Sess.) as amended Aug. 7, 1978, p. 2; Assem.
the Commission, the Legislature substantially updated and modernized the APA.
(Stats. 1995, ch. 938, p. 7104; see Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control v.
expect the legislative history to so indicate. Instead, there is only silence.
authorized by section 11507.7 was eliminated. (See Gov. Code, § 11507.7, subd.
the Pitchess statutes might have interacted; the issue is, after all, long since moot.
that uniquely, in Evidence Code section 1045, it acted inadvertently and implicitly.
legislative intent to substantively limit who may rule on Pitchess motions‖ (maj.
officer. By its terms, the statute does not.
Legislature has chosen by giving it effect.
how the statutory scheme, correctly applied, would operate here.
records, and may rule on whether a showing has been made to warrant discovery.
consent of the officer whose personnel records are sought, the matter is at an end.
any other order ―which justice requires‖ (id., subd. (d)).
affirmatively seek in camera review. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 23-24; e.g., Assem.
discovery was opposed, in camera review would follow as a matter of course.
codified in the in camera review provisions of section 1045.
Hayes & Cunningham, Dennis J. Hayes, Adam E. Chaikin and Amanda K. Hansen for Intervener and Appellant.
Party in Interest and Appellant and Real Party in Interest and Respondent.
and Real Party in Interest and Respondent.
Appellant and Real Party in Interest and Respondent.
Intervener and Appellant, Real Party in Interest and Appellant and Real Party in Interest and Respondent.
Ferguson, Praet & Sherman, Jon F. Hamilton, Kimberly A. Wah and Bruce D. Praet for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent.
Petition for review after the Court of Appeal reversed an order granting a petition for writ of administrative mandate. The court limited review to the following issue: Does the hearing officer in an administrative appeal of the dismissal of a correctional officer employed by a county sheriff's department have the authority to grant a motion under Pitchess v. Superior Court, 11 Cal.3d 531 (1974)?
Deputy correctional officer Kristy Drinkwater was fired by the Riverside County Sheriff‘s Department for allegedly falsifying her payroll forms. Drinkwater appealed the termination according to the terms of a memorandum of understanding between the Riverside Sheriff’s Association and the County of Riverside that provided for an administrative appeal. Drinkwater planned to bring a disparate treatment defense, arguing that other Riverside County Sheriff’s Department personnel had committed similar misconduct and received less severe punishments. Accordingly, Drinkwater filed a motion for discovery, commonly called a Pitchess motion, seeking disciplinary records for other employees who had been investigated and disciplined for similar misconduct. Arbitrator Jan Stiglitz served as the hearing officer at the appeal.
Stiglitz initially denied Drinkwater’s motion for discovery, because under California Evidence Code Sections 1043 and 1045, Drinkwater, and not the sheriff’s department, had the burden to identify the the employees whose records she sought. Drinkwater subsequently renewed her motion, supporting it with more specific information and identifying the employees by name. Stiglitz found good cause and granted Drinkwater’s motion.
The sheriff’s department sought an administrative mandate in superior court, compelling Stiglitz to vacate the decision. The superior court granted the mandate, agreeing with the sheriff's department that Pitchess motions were not properly the subject of administrative hearings, and ordered Stiglitz to reverse his previous order.
The Riverside Sheriff’s Association then sought to intervene and requested a new hearing. Intervention and a new hearing were granted, but the superior court again denied Drinkwater’s motion for discovery. Drinkwater and the Riverside Sheriff’s Association sought review, and the court of appeal reversed the superior court’s decision.
Whether an administrative hearing body in an appeal from the dismissal of a county sheriff’s department correctional officer may rule on a motion seeking discovery of peace officer personnel records under Pitchess v. Superior Court, 11 Cal.3d 531 (1974).
Affirming the appellate court’s decision, the Supreme Court held, by a 5-2 vote, that an administrative body has the authority to rule on a Pitchess motion when hearing an administrative appeal from discipline imposed on a correctional officer.
After examining the language of California Evidence Code Section 1043, the court determined that a Pitchess motion may be filed in an appropriate administrative body and that the language reflected a legislative intent that administrative officers, not just judicial officers, be allowed to hear and decide such motions.
A Pitchess motion proceeds in two steps. Under Section 1043, the movant must file a motion with an appropriate court or administrative body and establish good cause for the discovery request. Upon a showing of good cause, an in camera hearing, or private review, must be granted pursuant to California Evidence Code Section 1045 to assess the relevance of the requested discovery material.
The sheriff’s department argued that references to the “court” in Section 1045 as the entity that presides over the in camera hearing were more important than the reference to an “administrative body” in Section 1043. The court, however, stressed that use of the term “court” in one section did not invalidate the use of the term “administrative body” in another section, and if the Legislature had intended to preclude administrative bodies from hearing Pitchess motions, it had had the opportunity to make that clear. The court reasoned that if a Pitchess motion were not allowed to be filed with an administrative body, then Section 1043 would be authorizing the “idle act” of filing a motion with an entity not authorized to rule on it. Moreover, since Section 1043 did not provide for a transfer mechanism for Pitchess motions from an administrative body to a superior court, the Legislature must have intended to grant administrative hearing officers the authority to decide such motions.
Finally, the court determined that its holding was consistent with the purposes of the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act (POBRA) which provides for the right to administratively appeal an adverse employment decision. The court also explained that its conclusion was consistent with the Pitchess scheme of balancing a litigant’s discovery interest against an officer’s confidentiality interest. Here, the court distinguished Brown v. Valverde, a 2010 case holding that only judicial officers may rule on Pitchess motions in a DMV administrative license suspension hearing. The sheriff’s department had relied heavily on Brown in its argument. Unlike Brown, where a Pitchess motion would have frustrated the legislative intent to quickly remove unsafe drivers from the road and the relevance of the discovery was questionable, the sheriff’s department in this case conceded that Drinkwater’s request was relevant to her claim and did not call into question the credibility of the officers whose records were requested. Moreover, the existence of confidentiality safeguards in this case that protected the privacy of the requested files was in line with the purposes behind POBRA and the Pitchess discovery scheme. The court concluded that the precedential value of Brown is limited to its facts and administrative license suspension hearings.
Two Justices concurred in part and dissented in part. They concurred that Pitchess motions can be brought before administrative bodies and administrative hearing officers can hear Pitchess motions and rule on them. However, they argued that hearing officers should not have the power to review privileged and confidential information in the context of a Pitchess motion; only judicial officers should conduct the in camera hearings.
SCOCAL, Riverside County Sheriff's Dept. v. Stiglitz , 60 Cal.4th 624 (2014); 339 P.3d 295 (2014); 181 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1 (2014) available at: (https://scocal.stanford.edu/opinion/riverside-county-sheriffs-dept-v-stiglitz-34371) (last visited Sunday April 21, 2019).

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