Source: http://www.jptos.org/index.php?mact=News,cntnt01,default,0&cntnt01category=ITC&cntnt01returnid=80
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 02:16:19+00:00

Document:
Title uPI Semiconductor Corp. v. ITC, No. 2013-1157, -1159 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 25, 2014).
Issue Before the court are the appeal of respondent intervenor uPI Semiconductor Corp. (“uPI”) and the companion appeal of complainant-intervenors Richtek Technology Corp. and Richtek USA, Inc. (together “Richtek”) from rulings of the International Trade Commission in an action to enforce a Consent Order, Certain DC-DC Controllers and Products Containing Same, Inv. No. 337-TA-698 (75 Fed. Reg. 446).
uPI Semiconductor Corp., at *3.
Holding We affirm the Commission’s ruling that uPI violated the Consent Order as to the imports known as “formerly accused products,” and affirm the modified penalty for that violation. We reverse the ruling of no violation as to the “post-Consent Order” products. The case is remanded for further proceedings in accordance with our rulings herein.
TItle Align Tech., Inc. v. International Trade Commission (Fed. Circ. July 18, 2014).
Issue The International Trade Commission's regulations authorize the Commission to review a decision of an administrative law judge (ALJ) when that decision is designated as an "initial determination." [...] Here, the ALJ denied a motion via an order. This case requires us to consider whether the Commission's review of that order was procedurally sound.
Holding Because the Commission circumvented its own rules without waiving, suspending, or amending them, we find that its review of Order No. 57 was "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law."
Title Motorola Mobility, LLC v. ITC, No. 2012-1666 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 10, 2014) (non-precedential).
Issues [Whether the] Commission [was supported by substantial evidence when it] found that  the accused mobile devices imported and sold by Apple did not infringe claim 12 of Motorola’s U.S. Patent No. 6,272,333 (“’333 patent”) and that  Motorola failed to establish the technical prong of the domestic industry requirement.
Motorola at *2-3 (text added).
 Motorola’s [infringement] argument fails because Motorola has not identified a single change in accessibility in the accused Apple devices that causes both an update to the application registry and a communication of the change in accessibility to the fixed portion of the wireless network as required by the asserted claim.
 Motorola’s Droid 2 ha[s] the same relevant features as the corresponding operations on the accused Apple devices. As with infringement, Motorola’s arguments [are] inconsistent with the claim’s requirements that there be at least one change that alone triggers both an update to the application registry and for that specific change to be communicated to the fixed portion of the network.
Id. at * 10-11 (footnotes removed, text added).
Title Suprema Inc. / Cross Match Tech., Inc. v. ITC, No. 2012-1170, 2012-1026, -1124 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 13, 2013).
 We consider the propriety of the Commission’s limited whether a § 337(a)(1)(B)(i) violation may be predicated on a claim of induced infringement where the attendant direct infringement of the claimed method does not occur until post-importation.
Cross Match Tech., Inc. at *13.
 Suprema challenges the ALJ’s claim construction of a term appearing in the asserted claims [“said second lens unit being on the image side of the firstlens unit”], the infringement finding based on that claim interpretation, and the holding that Suprema failed to prove that the ’993 patent would have been obvious. […] Specifically, Suprema argues that the claimed lens system excludes “non-lens elements” and “off-axis optics” because those were disavowed in the written description of the ’993 patent. So there can be no non-lens elements between the “lens units,” Suprema believes, and the ALJ erred by not limiting the claims in this manner.
Id. at *26-27 (text added).
 Given the nature of the conduct proscribed in § 271(b) [which requires a showing of direct infringement even to show inducement] and the nature of the authority granted to the Commission in § 337 [focusing on the infringing nature of articles at the time of importation], we hold that the statutory grant of authority in § 337 cannot extend to the conduct proscribed in § 271(b) where the acts of underlying direct infringement occur post-importation.
Id. at *20 (text added).
 We agree with the ALJ that the absence of “constructional data” regarding the achromatic lens disclosed in the ’060 patent provides insufficient motivation for a person of skill in the art to seek out that data from the ’051 patent, and that Suprema has shown insufficient evidence to substitute the triplet lens disclosed in the ’051 patent for the “achromatic lens 28” of the ’060 patent.

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