Source: https://www.brainpads.com/index.php/product-lines/impact-absorbent-head-wristbands/patent-judgement
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 04:14:12+00:00

Document:
Brain-Pad Inc., maker of mouth-guards and other protective products that reduce sports injuries, did not infringe on a competitor’s patent by designing and selling its own impact-protective headbands, a federal judge has ruled.
In arguing successfully for summary judgment, Brain-Pad’s lawyers from Archer & Greiner also highlighted the history of the patent in question. The legal team - Partners John C. Connell, John F. Letchford, and Charles J. Brown III, along with Associate Stephanie A. Gannon - showed that the original application was amended three times to overcome rejection by the patent examiner because of already-existing patents. The final version, tailored to secure patentability, contains features that are substantively distinct from the Brain-Pad design, Judge Thynge ruled. Thus, Brain-Pad was found not to infringe either literally or under the doctrine of equivalents. Judge Thynge’s ruling of summary judgment also rejected the competitor’s demand that Brain-Pad pay triple damages based on alleged losses from infringement.
Brain-Pad, based in Conshohocken, Pa., was founded in 1995 to promote, manufacture and distribute customized dual-arch mouth-guards designed to reduce the risk of concussion from lower jaw impacts while increasing endurance and performance. The company has become a leader in technology development in the sports impact-protection field, with products available in retail and wholesale outlets as well as through distributors, sports leagues, professional organizations, and school teams at the intermediate, high-school, college and university levels.
If you have questions about either the impact of this ruling or other intellectual property matters, please contact John C. Connell or John F. Letchford of Archer & Greiner’s Intellectual Property Group at (856) 795-2121.
Archer & Greiner, P.C., is a full-service law firm with more than 175 lawyers serving Fortune 100 clients, small to medium-sized businesses and individuals for more than 80 years. The firm has offices in Haddonfield, Princeton and Flemington, N.J.; Philadelphia, Pa.; New York, N.Y.; and Wilmington and Georgetown, Del. For more information, visit .archerlaw.com.
Stephanie A. Gannon, Archer & Greiner, P.C., 300 Delaware Avenue, Suite 1370, Wilmington. DE 19801.
This is a patent case. On October 29,2007 Innovative Patents, L.L.C. ("lnnovative")1 and Forcefield, LLC ("Forcefield")2 (collectively "plaintiffs") filed suit alleging that Brain-Pad, Inc. ("Brain-Pad" or "defendant")3 infringes U.S. Patent No. 7,234,174 ("the '174 patent") by making, using, selling and offering for sale within the United States apparatuses for enhancing force absorption and dissipation of forces, including the Brain-Pad Impact Protective Headband (the "accused device" or "Brain-Pad device").4 On January 4, 2008 Brain-Pad filed its answer asserting numerous defenses and counterclaims, and on February 19, 2008 filed an answer to the complaint with amended counterclaims for, inter alia, declaratory judgment that the'174 patent is invalid and unenforceable.5 Pursuant to Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. 6 and local practice, oral argument was held on December 17, 2009, regarding the parties' claim interpretations. The court set forth its construction memorandum of the disputed claim terms of the 1 Innovative is a limited liability company duly organized and existing under the laws of the State of New Jersey, with a principal place of business in Hackensack, New Jersey. 2 Forcefield is a limited liability company duly organized and existing under the laws of the State of New Jersey, with a principal place of business in Hackensack, New Jersey. 3 Brain-Pad is a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the State of Pennsylvania, with a principal place of business in Conshohocken, Pennsylvania. 40.1. 1 (Complaint). 50.1. 14; 0.1. 38. Plaintiffs filed their answer to defendant's counterclaims on March 17,2008. 0.1. 45. 652 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en bane), aff'd, 517 U.S. 370 (1996). 2 Case 1:07-cv-00680-MPT Document 184 Filed 06/29/10 Page 2 of 16 patent-in-suit on January 13, 2010.7 Currently before the court are plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment of patent infringement8 and defendant's cross motion for summary judgment of non-infringement. 9 Having considered the evidence of record and the arguments of the parties, this court will grant defendant's motion for summary judgment of non-infringement as to all claims of the'174 Patent, and deny plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment of infringement in its entirety.
7 0.1. 153 (Markman Order).
80.1. 160 (Motion for Summary Judgment of Infringement).
90.1. 157 (Motion for Summary Judgment of Non-Infringement).
August 22,2002, and issued as U.S. Patent No. 6,675,395 on January 13, 2004. 11 '174 patent, Abstract. 12 '174 patent, 1 :12-14.
the apparatus functioning to absorb perspiration and absorb and dissipate impact forces, with only remaining forces distributed to the user.
The apparatus as described in claim 1, wherein the insert is soft, pliable padding material with consistent memory.
The apparatus as described in claim 1, wherein the insert is a semirigid polymeric material.
The apparatus as described in claim 3, wherein the polymeriC material is selected from the ground [sic] consisting of polyurethane, polymers, and co-polymers, alone or in combination. 13 '174 patent, 3:45-47. 14 '174 patent, 3:63-66.
The apparatus as described in claim 1, wherein the insert comprises apertures which function to allow air to pass therethrough.
The apparatus as described in claim 1, wherein ends of the sweatband are permanently affixed to one another and the sweatband is slid over an area intended to be protected.
The apparatus as described in claim 1, wherein the apparatus is utilized in activities selected from the group consisting of soccer, basketball, football, hockey, baseball, softball, lacrosse, skiing, horseback riding, climbing, skateboarding, roller skating, cycling, motorcycling, automobile racing, and snowmobiling.
9. The apparatus as described in claim 1, wherein the sweatband may be washed with the insert permanently in place.
15 0.1. 153 at 2. 16 Id. at 3. 171d. at 4. 181d. at 5.
19 Id. at 7. 2°ld. 21 Id. at 8.
22 Anderson v. Uberly Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986).
24 Telemac Cellular Corp. v. Topp Telecom, Inc., 247 F.3d 1316, 1323 (Fed. Cir.
26 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
1336 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 28 Telemac, 247 F.3d 1323. 29 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 976 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 3D Bai v. L & L Wings, Inc., 160 F.3d 1350,1353 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 31 South wall Techs., Inc. V. CardinallG Co., 54 F.3d 1570, 1575 (Fed. Cir.
1995). 32 See generally Warner-Jenkinson CO. V. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997). 33 Festa Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 535 U.S. 722, 734 (2002).
34 Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950).
35 Festa, 535 U.S. at 734.
39 Panduit Corp. v. HellermannTyton Corp., 451 F.3d 819, 826 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Seachange Int'l, Inc. v. C-COR, Inc., 413 F.3d 1361,1378 (Fed. Cir. 2005».
Summary judgment of non-infringement is appropriate in this case because no reasonable jury could find that the Brain-Pad insert is "curved in configuration" as required by Claim 1 of the '174 Patent.
Claim 1 of the '174 Patent requires the insert of the accused device to be "curved in configuration." In its Markman ruling, this court construed "curved in configuration" to mean "preformed, arcuate and having first and second ends."40 The Brain-Pad insert, however, is not preformed and arcuate-it is a flaccid, shapeless loop of perforated elastomeric material. Plaintiffs suggest that an "arcuate" shape is imparted to the Brain-Pad insert because it is "preformed" into a loop, but a loop in this case cannot be equated with an arc. The Brain-Pad insert, being flaccid, is only "arcuate" when set carefully on its long side or placed on a round substrate. When set on its short side or held in the hand, it falls flat. Literal infringement cannot be found here merely because the insert assumes a curved shape when placed in the correct orientation or on the correct substrate.
40 0.1. 153 at 4.
from Claim 1, "intended area," which this court construed to mean "at least one insert can be positioned in a variety of places within the sweatband, including covering the entire horizontal circumference of the head."41 Plaintiffs contend that the inset need not have first and second ends because it may also cover the entire horizontal circumference of the head. Yet an insert may provide full horizontal coverage of the head while still having first and second ends. Moreover, this court's construction of "curved in configuration" clearly requires first and second ends of the insert no matter how great its horizontal coverage. Plaintiffs cannot eliminate one required limitation of the '174 Patent by showing that a different limitation is met. Based on this evidence, no reasonable jury could find Claim 1 of the '174 Patent literally infringed by the Brain-Pad device.
42 See 0.1. 171 at DA-333.
43 0.1. 171 at DA-33S; DA-353; DA-370.
The undisputed facts thus show that Dr. Abraham's amendments, made to secure the patent over a rejection for obviousness, narrowed the scope of Claim 1 by introducing a new limitation on the curvature of the insert. His amendment is therefore presumed to be a general disclaimer of the territory between the original claim and the amended claim, and the burden is on plaintiffs to overcome that presumption.
44 0.1. 171 at DA-341; DA-356; DA-374. Strikeouts indicate removed text; underlines indicate added text.
45 0.1. 171 at DA-348; DA-363 (emphasis added).
amendment was peripheral, or not directly relevant, to the alleged equivalent.'>46 In this regard, the Federal Circuit has advised that "an amendment made to avoid prior art that contains the equivalent in question is not tangential; it is central to allowance of the claim."47 Plaintiffs argue that the references cited in the examiner's rejection did not teach straight inserts, but this is both factually incorrect and ultimately unpersuasive. It is factually incorrect because the Robertson Patent clearly discloses the very equivalent at issue-a flat, compliant insert that obtains curvature from the substrate on which it is placed.48 It is also unpersuasive because "there is no principle of patent law that the scope of a surrender of subject matter during prosecution is limited to what is absolutely necessary to avoid a prior art reference that was the basis for an examiner's rejection."49 Indeed, where patentees have surrendered more than necessary to secure patentability, the Federal Circuit has consistently held them to the scope of what they ultimately claim, and "not allowed them to assert that claims should be interpreted as if they had surrendered only what they had to. "50 The question, then, is whether a competitor of ordinary skill in the art reading these amendments alongside Dr.
46 Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 344 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (en banc).
48 Figures 2 and 3 of the Robertson Patent clearly show an embodiment of the insert that is flat in configuration. Figure 6 of Robertson shows the same insert embodiment curving horizontally when placed on the user's head. Finally, although the preferred embodiment of the Robertson insert is vertically curved "to generally conform to the curvature of the head in the area used for heading a soccer ball," the specification is clear that the insert can also "be flat on both of the main opposed surfaces." Robertson Patent, 3: 25-29.
49 Norian Corp. v. Stryker Corp., 432 F.3d 1356, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
50 Id. at 1362 (collecting cases).
In this case, the answer to that question is yes. Dr. Abraham's amendments expressly spoke to the curvature of the insert where his original claim was not so particular. Furthermore, Dr. Abraham's explanations in the public record of prosecution confirm that each amendment-including "that the at least one insert be curved in configuration"-was made "to more particularly point out and distinctly claim" the invention. Simply put, the only objectively apparent reason for limiting the curvature of the insert was to distinguish Dr. Abraham's application from the prior art and thereby secure patentability.52 Having surrendered a claim to non-curved inserts during prosecution, plaintiffs cannot now complain of infringement by their equivalents.
51 See Wenger Mfg., Inc. v. Coating Mach. Sys., Inc., 239 F. 3d 1225, 1239 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ("[T]he relevant inquiry is whether a competitor would reasonably believe that the applicant had surrendered the relevant subject matter.") (quoting Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1457 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
52 See Festo, 344 F .3d at 1369 ("[T]he inquiry into whether a patentee can rebut the Festo presumption under the 'tangential' criterion focuses on the patentee's objectively apparent reason for the narrowing amendment.").
53 0.1. 153 at 7.
deformation," but whether that resistance is easily overcome, allowing the insert to be folded and shaped without damaging it. Here, the flaccid loop insert of the Brain-Pad device can be easily folded, bent, and shaped with little or (in this court's experience) no resistance and without any structural damage thereto.55 It is completely pliable.
54 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989).
55 The error in plaintiffs' argument is further highlighted by their suggestion of synthetic oil as an example of a polymer that is not semi-rigid, which implies that all polymers that do not flow are semi-rigid. This defies common sense as well as the plain meaning of "pliable," which the Oxford English Dictionary uses in reference to solid substances as well as liquid ones.
56 D.1. 153 at 7.
57 See Initial Expert Report of Michael L. Gililland, D.1. 171 at DA-217-18 (admitting that the Brain-Pad device exhibits the limitations of Claims 4-9).
independent Claim 1 is not itself infringed.58 Because the Brain-Pad device does not infringe independent Claim 1 of the '174 Patent, summary judgment of non-infringement will be granted as to dependent Claims 2-9 as well.
See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 112; Jeneric/Pentron, Inc. v. Dillon Co., Inc., 205 F.3d 1377,1383 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ("[A] dependent claim, by nature, incorporates all the limitations of the claim to which it refers.").
59 Joy Techs. Inc. v. Flakt, Inc., 6 F.3d 770,774 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (collecting cases).
60 Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 830 (Fed. Cir. 1992). See also Beatrice Foods Co. v. New England Printing and Lithographing Co., 923 F.2d 1576, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (explaining that enhanced damages may be awarded "only as a penalty for an infringer's increased culpability," and not as compensation "to rectify what the district court views as an inadequacy in actual damages awarded.").

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