Source: http://oxcon.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law/9780190888985.001.0001/law-9780190888985-chapter-12
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 15:13:45+00:00

Document:
Praise for: Constitutional Democracy in Crisis?
(1) Trends Toward Constitutional Democracy have Stalled and may be Reversing.
(2) The Conventional Foundations of Constitutional Democracy are Weakening.
(3) Several Regimes Held up as Role Models of New Transformative Constitutional Democracies in the Recent Past are Now Facing Severe Tensions, While No New Model Constitutional Regime has Emerged During the Past Ten Years.
(4) Threats to Constitutional Democracy are Increasingly Global Rather than Distinctive to Particular Regimes.
(5) Constitutional Democracies must Perform more Tasks than Ever Before, with Higher, Potentially Catastrophic Costs for Policy Errors.
(6) Constitutional Problems in the United States may be Fueling Concerns that Constitutional Democracy is in Trouble.
Are We in a Period of Constitutional Crisis?
Are We Experiencing Constitutional Rot?
Whither the Global Democratic Recession?
A Crisis of What, Exactly?
A Step Change in Democracy and Its Components?
Democracies: Slow to Build, Quick to Break?
Cosmopolitan Versus Local: Undermining Democratic Governance.
Hostility and Degradation: Challenging Liberal Governance.
7 The Trump Presidency: A Constitutional Crisis in the United States?
Amend the Constitution or the Country?
Introduction—Institutional Design or Constitutional Values?
13 France and the Fifth Republic: Constitutional Crisis or Political Malaise?
Legitimacy Crisis as a Crisis of Constitutional Democracy?
18 State Capture or Institutional Resilience: Is There a Crisis of Constitutional Democracy in South Africa?
21 Israel: A Crisis of Liberal Democracy?
The Temporal Dimension of Democracy.
Type 1: Class Warfare Constitutions.
From: Constitutional Democracy in Crisis?
The Introduction to this volume warns of an impending global collapse of constitutional democracy, with threats emerging along a number of axes, including weakening foundations of constitutionalism, terrorism and environmental stresses, and ever-increasing policy demands from national populations. Evidence for this pessimistic view is amply provided by my fellow contributors, but the magnetic pull of a unifying narrative can sweep too broadly, obscuring meaningful distinctions.
Brexit has been included in this story of global democratic decline.1 In this chapter, however, I wish to resist the trope that links Brexit to this broader crisis of constitutionalism. Certainly, superficial similarities exist: a vein of extremist racialized politicking against immigrants and socioeconomic disparities among voters seem to mark Brexit as (p. 192) part of the global rise of populist nationalism. At bottom, however, Brexit is the ultimately unsurprising instantiation of two trends that have affected the United Kingdom for some time: a particular substantive ambivalence toward European integration and a specific malaise stemming from the challenges of Westminster-style parliamentary democracy.
Brexit does portend a constitutional moment in Britain, but it is one that exists in parallel to the global issues and is not of them. Brexit showcases the long-standing inconsistencies of the unusual and uniquely British version of “constitutional democracy”—a constitutional monarchy that operates without a written constitution under political expectations developed in the late nineteenth century. The historical constitution privileges parliamentary sovereignty over popular sovereignty, and the rise of referendum politics—of which Brexit is only the most recent example—has complicated and undermined that consensus, shining a bright light onto certain insufficiencies of the British system. But rather than serving as a harbinger of constitutional failure, Brexit might well usher in both democratic and constitutional renewal, providing the United Kingdom with an opportunity to clarify and concretize a new constitutional settlement for the twenty-first century.
The chapter next explores this turn to referendums and their surrounding political dynamics. It highlights how this use of direct democracy—heretofore unthinkable—has factored into a heightened sense of constitutional instability.3 It demonstrates that referendum politics have been marked by expediency and manipulation, tied to obtaining contingent electoral benefits or avoiding party fracture. And it claims that Brexit is the apotheosis of this trend: a high-stakes example of short-term political maneuvering. Only on this occasion, David Cameron misplayed his hand. The chapter explains how the Brexit referendum unfolded, and how the evolution of referendum politics over the (p. 193) preceding decades constrained the Cameron Government’s ability to manipulate and control the result. Cameron clearly did not anticipate the possibility of losing the vote or the serious constitutional problems that could ensue.4 Direct democracy “challenges the indirect, representative democracy that has been the essence of UK democracy. If the people vote one way, their representatives another, who should prevail, who is sovereign?”5 Prior to Brexit, this question had only been hypothetical, never tested. The Brexit vote and its aftermath are forcing a reckoning.
It is here that the chapter concludes, by arguing that Brexit is a moment of tremendous potential. Referendum politics have introduced the possibility of shifting from a system of parliamentary sovereignty to one of popular sovereignty. This transformation will require a written constitution, and Brexit may hasten its arrival. Of course, how precisely any new constitutional settlement would take shape is uncertain. Popular sovereignty does not require direct democracy; referendums themselves may not endure. But the transformation itself should be understood not as a constitutional rupture or failure, but as a new stage in the evolution of the deep-seated British commitment to constitutionalism, one that has been in development over the past eight hundred years.
The principle thus gives rise to the sense, as J.A.G. Griffith wrote in 1979, that “the constitution is no more and no less than what happens. Everything that happens is constitutional. And if nothing happened that would be constitutional also.”15 Griffith’s statement suggests that there are no limits on Parliament. But there may be political or moral ramifications to unconstitutional action. Better is the explanation provided by Lord Reid, who acknowledged that certain actions might be considered unconstitutional—that for moral or political reasons “most people would regard [them] as highly improper”—but recognized that such unconstitutionality “does not mean that it is beyond the power of Parliament to do such things.”16 Those actions could not be held invalid by a court of law.
The benefits to parliamentary politics of a two-party system are significant: centrism and decisive governing capacity. As Ivor Jennings wrote, “[t]he swing of the pendulum is a familiar feature of British politics. . . . Majorities are unstable, and the Opposition of to-day is the Government of tomorrow.”34 And thus, “an administration that does not encompass the median voter is fragile.”35 Extremist minority parties are usually shut out of government,36 and the instability of multiparty coalition government is largely avoided. Indeed, as Iain McLean has demonstrated, using more than 150 years of data, there is only a 0.17 probability of a coalition administration being formed at a general election.37 Of course, this claim of generalized centrism does not preclude policy swings from occurring when the majority shifts—particularly if parties are cohesive and distinct.38 Because a majority party can enact policies without seeking broader consensus,39 governance can be effective, efficient, and partisan. And historically,40 the two British parties have been both cohesive and distinct due to rigidity in class-based voting and strongly differentiated overarching policy positions about the use of government recourses.
A functioning system of centrist and effective Westminster-style parliamentary democracy might be that elusive democratic political system that “leaves [one] free not to care about it.”41 But if that world ever existed, it is certainly not today’s situation. These core (p. 197) elements of the consensus constitution are under strain—both from substantive shifts in the content and structure of governance and from an increasing dissatisfaction with political parties and the electoral system.
Britain is on a course of rapid change.42 Many scholars have addressed the substantive elements of institutional and structural change: the UK’s membership in the European Union;43 the enactment of a quasi-constitutional bill of rights;44 devolved legislative power to Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland;45 and the creation of a new Supreme Court;46 among other examples.47 At the same time, there has been an increasing and generalized dissatisfaction with party governance. Of course, changes to the substance of governance and frustration with the process of governance may not be linked. The two-party system, as critical as it appears to British politics, has been showing signs of decline for some time.48 Scholars have diagnosed the problem variously as a function of the electoral system itself,49 or as a result of: the decline in class-based voting, the rise of “alternative (p. 198) identities” that vie for primacy and encourage the creation of new parties to reflect those identities, and/or cultural changes, ranging from a modern lack of deference to hierarchy to increased media criticism of politics.50 But this Section suggests that substantive change itself—including the scope and amount of transformative legislation—is also negatively affecting the two-party system.
Foundational structural and institutional issues often do not hew to left-right divides over resource distribution. These questions are thus more likely to cut across party lines and to lead to party fragmentation.51 And indeed, debates over constitutional structure or purpose have divided the two main British parties internally, and in some cases given rise to single-issue or regional third parties.52 For example, European integration has not had a unidirectional political valence over time,53 making it an often divisive and cross-cutting issue. Other topics, such as regional devolution, have complicated parties’ national electoral politics, caused internal division, and encouraged the rise of regional parties. The party system is “increasingly fragmented,”54 with multiple third parties and viable regional parties,55 and in 2010, the country saw the first peacetime coalition government since the 1930s.
This decline (or perception of decline) in political party allegiance and effectiveness has observable effects in governance. Taking a definitive position on an issue that cuts across party lines or highlights internal party divisions can jeopardize party coherence. Because party cohesiveness is essential for effective governance,56 party divisions that result in “cross-voting” or “backbench revolts”57 threaten party leadership. It is hardly (p. 199) surprising, therefore, that political party leadership has sought ways to mitigate these threats.58 If engaging cross-cutting political issues is unavoidable, or if politicians fail to predict accurately which issues will create divisions, the obvious solution for legislators focused on re-election is to abdicate responsibility for them by deferring to other competent actors in the constitutional scheme.
On the most threatening cross-cutting or internally divisive political issues, however, the British political parties have found another group better placed than the judiciary—at least as a matter of democratic rhetoric—to which to defer: the electorate itself. Of course, just as with deference to the judiciary, deference to the electorate through the mechanism of a referendum sits uneasily in a world of parliamentary sovereignty. As outlined above, referendums have no competing external claim to bind Parliament, because the people have no external or preexisting authority. Furthermore, without express authorization by Parliamentary Act, referendums can have only advisory relevance. (p. 200) Nevertheless, by calling for the public’s views in a referendum, a government may be able to “circumnavigate the veto capacity of other actors” (such as recalcitrant backbenchers) in Parliament and externalize the costs of policy formation.62 And notwithstanding the complicated constitutional implications that referendums present, the ostensible benefits to party politics have driven this move to direct democracy.
Although the 1975 referendum was thought to be a “one-off departure from constitutional practice,”70 necessitated by the highly unusual transfer of sovereignty that joining Europe required, “once the precedent of the referendum had been conceded, it was difficult to prevent it[s] being invoked again.”71 Other contentious and complicated issues required addressing, particularly the mechanisms of governance within the regions of United Kingdom. Advisory regional referendums were held in 1973 in Northern Ireland on the peace process,72 and in 1979 in Scotland and Wales on devolution.
These later votes contributed to a developing micropolitics of referendums. The 1975 vote had showcased the advantages of a simple question reflecting the status quo, and the 1979 devolution referendums demonstrated that procedural mechanisms could be deployed to engineer the ultimate result. The ad hoc nature of the referendum process lent itself to manipulation; because any individual vote’s governing procedures were outlined in the very Act authorizing the referendum, politicians could play with process to try to influence substance. For example, in the Scottish referendum, on a turnout of 63.6 percent, the Scots voted 51.6 percent in favor of devolution to 48.4 percent against. But the referendum failed.73 The enabling Act had incorporated a threshold requirement, designed to be a poison pill: for devolution to occur, 40 percent of the total electorate (p. 202) had to vote yes. The Scottish referendum’s majority did not meet the threshold requirement: only 32.8 percent of the total electorate voted yes.74 Given the lower turnout expected in referendum voting, this overlay was intended to put a thumb on the scale in favor of the unitary state.
The emergence of referendum politics in the late twentieth century can be seen as a shift away from parliamentary sovereignty, but expedient, haphazard, and untheorized direct democracy only obliquely hinted at true popular sovereignty. Crucial questions abounded and went unresolved: On what topics should referendums be called? When should they be called? How should they be called? What are the procedural mechanisms for calling referendums? Who can vote? Should there be numerical thresholds? Should there be regional thresholds? Will the result of a particular referendum be binding on Parliament? Can a referendum result be overturned? It may have been that, had answers to these questions been made clear, Cameron would not have agreed to a referendum on Europe or the result may have been different, in light of complicated constitutional trade-offs that would have required resolution. But no one (aside from academics) really wanted to lift the lid on that constitutional Pandora’s box. Now, in the aftermath of Brexit, the questions are demanding answers, and the box is wide open.
European integration has always been a subject of ambivalence in the United Kingdom.96 Stephen George’s 1990 book title, An Awkward Partner, nicely encapsulates the UK’s relationship to Europe, then as now.97 This uncertainty over Britain’s place in Europe is reflected clearly in the history of referendum politics. Whether the seeds for Brexit were sown in 1975 during the first referendum on European membership, in 1995 with the rise of the single-issue parties advocating for a referendum on European membership, or during the Blair Government when referendums on dividing and sharing legislative power were provided in the devolution context, it had long been a strong possibility that there would be a referendum on continued membership in the EU.
At the close of the polls on June 23, 2016, 17.4 million voters (51.9 percent) supported Leave, and 16.1 million (48.1 percent) voted to Remain in the European Union. Since the vote, many commentators have sliced and diced that roughly 4 percent margin. There is a general consensus that long-standing British skepticism of European integration combined with economic anxiety and nativist fears to produce a convergence of interests resulting in Leave.98 But this merger of interests does not make Brexit a mass populist movement. From the outset, David Cameron’s decision to provide this in/out referendum had more to do with affluent Eurosceptics and sovereigntist parliamentary backbenchers threatening the cohesion of the Conservative Party than it did populist pressure. At most, Brexit was a populist moment, facilitated by party weakness and expedient referendum politics.
To support this point, this Section evaluates a selection of Cameron’s choices and highlights the broader influences of referendum politics on Brexit political maneuvering.
The new Cameron Government also quickly confronted the challenges of navigating referendum politics in an interconnected scheme of parliamentary governance. Actions that would have secured advantageous procedures (and results) for the referendum were unavailable given their broader political consequences. Two such examples include providing vote thresholds for the regions and lowering the minimum voting age. Incorporating a Scottish threshold requirement for the EU referendum might well have ensured a Remain victory, and an ex ante rule incorporating a quasi-federal aspect to national referendums would make sense in a country with ongoing devolution and meaningful power at the regional level.109 But the Conservative Party was opposed to further autonomy for Scotland, making any concession difficult,110 and the concept of thresholds was redolent of the manipulative referendum policymaking that occurred in the 1970s. The strategic calculation would have been obvious and inflammatory to the backbenchers—voters in Scotland were known to be far more pro-European than those in other regions of Britain. Requiring Scottish support would have ensured a Remain victory.
Regarding the voting age, members of the House of Lords sought to amend the Bill to allow sixteen- and seventeen-year olds to vote.111 Making up almost 2.9 percent of the (p. 209) population,112 these younger voters were thought to favor Remain. But they were also likely Labour supporters. Once again, the Cameron Government was in a bind: “Agreeing to give the vote to 16- and 17-year-olds in the EU referendum [could] have meant it would be necessary to make the same concession in the general election.”113 The Cameron Government thus fought the effort by the Lords; the Commons rejected the extension of the franchise, and the House of Lords decided not to press the issue.114 In the referendum vote, over 60 percent of people over sixty-five voted Leave; and roughly 70 percent of the eighteen- to twenty-four-year olds voted Remain.115 The higher turnout of the older people amplified the Leave vote on generational grounds; it is uncertain how much of a shift adding the sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds would have made, but it clearly would have narrowed the gap.
The aftermath of Brexit has called national attention to the vagaries of referendum politics and is forcing a reckoning with the obfuscations, weaknesses, and uncertainties in British constitutionalism. The immediate concern is with Brexit itself. In the wake of the referendum, both major parties are now internally divided.129 The cross-cutting nature of the issue means that neither the Conservatives nor the Labour Party wants to re-campaign on Europe; both parties sidelined the European issue for the 2017 elections by treating the 2016 referendum as binding and final. By avoiding Europe, this approach appeared to strengthen the two-party system: Single-issue UKIP voters reverted to their original party affiliations, and even the regional parties garnered fewer seats.130 But this may be the calm before the storm. Recent polls suggest that half of voters are in favor of a second referendum, with 34 percent opposed and 16 percent uncertain.131 How long will or can party politics prevent the accommodation of public demand for a second poll? Pressure for another vote will only increase the demand for clarity on long-standing issues. If the people are to be sovereign, on what questions? When and how?
Regularizing referendums within the current constitutional landscape seems nearly impossible. An attempt to provide a principled rule has focused on regional devolution-related referendums,138 perhaps reflecting the more generalized (and global) approach to holding referendums in instances where a “major reallocation of sovereign rights” is contemplated—in other words, when distributing (or redistributing) territorially bounded policy autonomy.139 But British referendums have not heretofore been limited to this principle, and thus no constitutional convention yet exists for constraining future governments in this way.
Constitutional scholar Robert Hazell has declared that “referendums are now an established part of our democracy, and there is no going back.”140 But this declaration dramatically overstates the situation. Referendums have not been properly integrated into the current constitutional consensus, and it is unlikely that they will be able to be so absorbed. Perhaps it is more precise to argue that the people themselves, outside of Parliament, are now being trusted with occasional constitutional decision-making, and that this shift has staying power.
If popular sovereignty is becoming an established part of British democracy, securing the people’s role will eventually require a written constitution. Once ratified by the people, a written constitution could later be amended through any number of possible mechanisms. Whether such amendment would incorporate direct democracy is uncertain; the populist undertones of Brexit may well dampen British enthusiasm for further unmediated demands for democratic input. But if referendums are contemplated,141 a written constitution could create enforceable answers to the many procedural and substantive questions listed above.
(p. 214) In a recent inquiry, the House of Commons Political and Constitutional Reform Committee canvassed the public, politicians, lawyers, and scholars on the issue of a written constitution. Those advocating in favor claimed it had “become too easy for governments to implement political and constitutional reforms to suit their own political convenience.”142 But the committee report concluded that historical tradition outweighed these threats of expediency.143 Brexit may have finally changed this calculus. History has not been kind to Pontius Pilate.
* I am grateful for helpful comments from the co-editors of the volume, as well as from Emily Kadens, Travis Lenkner, Julie Smith, and the members of the Northwestern Pritzker Zodiac Group. Michael Gajewsky provided excellent research assistance. This chapter draws in part on work previously published in Erin F. Delaney, “Judiciary Rising: Constitutional Change in the United Kingdom,” Northwestern University Law Review 108 (2014): 548–553, and Erin F. Delaney, “Stability in Flexibility: A British Lens on Constitutional Success,” in Assessing Constitutional Performance, eds. Thomas Ginsburg and Aziz Huq (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 393, 397.
1 Note, for example, the first paragraph of the Introduction to this volume. Mark A. Graber, Sanford Levinson, and Mark Tushnet, “Constitutional Democracy in Crisis? Introduction,” in Constitutional Democracy in Crisis?, ed. Mark A. Graber, Sanford Levinson, and Mark Tushnet (New York, Oxford University Press, 2018), 1.
2 The use of the word “referendums” is preferred in the United Kingdom. “Referendum” is a Latin gerund and thus has no plural. “The Latin plural gerundive referenda, meaning ‘things to be referred’, necessarily connotes a plurality of issues.” Referendums, therefore, is “logically preferable as a plural form meaning ballots on one issue.” University of College London, Constitution Unit, “Report of the Commission on the Conduct of Referendums,” 100 (n. 1) (1996), http://www.ucl.ac.uk/constitution-unit/research/electionsandreferendums/conduct-of-referendums [hereinafter Conduct of Referendums] (taking advice provided by the editors of the Oxford English Dictionary).
3 See generally Delaney, “Stability in Flexibility,” 393–420.
4 See Adam Evans, “Planning for Brexit: The Case of the 1975 Referendum,” The Political Quarterly 89 (2017): 127–133.
5 House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, Referendums in the United Kingdom, 20 (¶ 58) (2010), 12th Report of Session 2009–10. [hereinafter Referendums Report] (quoting Referendums Report: Minutes of Evidence Taken Before the Select Committee on the Constitution, Session 2009–2010 (undated) (“Memorandum by Peter Browning”) 112–113).
6 Lord Scarman, “Why Britain Needs a Written Constitution,” Commonwealth Law Bulletin 19, no. 1 (1993): 317, 319.
7 Peter Hennessy, The Hidden Wiring: Unearthing the British Constitution (London: Victor Gollancz 1995), 6 (citing Lord Callaghan).
8 David Feldman, “None, One or Several? Perspectives on the UK’s Constitution(s),” Cambridge Law Journal 64, no. 2 (2005): 346.
9 Feldman, “None, One or Several?,” 347.
10 A.V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, 8th ed. (London: MacMillion, 1915), 37.
15 J.A.G. Griffith, “The Political Constitution,” Modern Law Review 42, no. 1 (1979): 19.
16 Madzimbamuto v. Lardner-Burke,  1 A.C. 645, 723 (P.C.) (appeal taken from S. Rhodesia).
17 Walter Bagehot, The English Constitution, 2nd ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 1872), 204–205.
18 See Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Parliamentary Sovereignty: Contemporary Debates (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 18–47.
19 Martin Loughlin, The British Constitution: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 28.
20 D.J. Galligan, “The Constitutional Future of the UK: ‘Matters of High Concernment’,” in Constitution in Crisis, ed. D.J. Galligan (London: I.B. Tauris, 2017), 161.
22 Richard Bellamy, Political Constitutionalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2007), 147–175.
23 See Judith Bara, Albert Weale, and Aude Biquelet, “Deliberative Democracy and the Analysis of Parliamentary Debate,” (paper, ECPR Joint Sessions, Helsinki, Finland, May 7–12, 2007). Cf. Ivor Jennings, The British Constitution, 3rd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1954), 81–84 (discussing the important role of the opposition and parliamentary debate in informing policy).
24 Jennings, The British Constitution, 146.
25 Jennings, The British Constitution, 149–150.
26 This simple statement contains more layers in practice: explicating individual ministerial responsibility raises questions about the role of the civil service and the interaction between individual responsibility and the collective cabinet responsibility for government decisions.
27 See Representing the People: A Survey among Members of Statewide and Sub-state Parliaments, eds. Kris Deschouwer and Sam Depauw (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).
28 Some scholars argue that the development of the cabinet system itself (with “not only executive but also legislative predominance”) fostered the growth in party cohesion in the nineteenth century. See Gary W Cox, The Efficient Secret (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).
30 Jennings, The British Constitution, 56.
31 See generally Maurice Duverger, Political Parties (London: Methuen, 1954).
32 David Sanders, “The UK’s Changing Party System: The Prospects for a Party Realignment at Westminster,” Journal of the British Academy 5 (May 2017): 94.
34 Jennings, The British Constitution, 32.
35 Iain McLean, “ ‘England Does Not Love Coalitions’: The Most Misused Political Quotation in the Book,” Government and Opposition 47 (2012): 6.
36 Peter Leyland, The Constitution of the United Kingdom (Oxford: Hart Publishing 2012), 113.
37 McLean, “England Does Not Love Coalitions,” 6.
38 The present system can cause rapid shifts in power and “lurches from the relatively extreme positions adopted by the Labour and Conservative Parties.” Leyland, The Constitution of the U.K., 113.
40 Strong party discipline emerged in the late nineteenth century. Andrew C. Eggers and Arthur Spirling, “Party Cohesion in Westminster Systems: Inducements, Replacement and Discipline in the House of Commons, 1836–1910,” British Journal of Political Science 46 (2016): 567–589.
41 Clive James, “A Point of View,” BBC Radio 4, broadcast April 12, 2009, http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b006qng8. Paul Webb, Tim Bale, and Paul Taggart, “Deliberative versus Parliamentary Democracy in the UK: An Experimental Study,” Sussex European Institute Working Paper No. 118 (2010), http://www.sussex.ac.uk/sei/publications/seiworkingpapers. Cf. John Hibbing and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse, Stealth Democracy: Americans’ Beliefs about How Government Should Work (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
42 Anthony King, Does the United Kingdom Still Have a Constitution? (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2001) 53 (“[T]he United Kingdom’s constitution changed more between 1970 and 2000, and especially between 1997 and 2000, than during any comparable period since at least the middle of the 18th century.”). See also Delaney, “Stability in Flexibility,” 413–414.
43 See, e.g., Elizabeth Wicks, The Evolution of a Constitution: Eight Key Moments in British Constitutional History (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2006), 137–165; N.W. Barber, “The Afterlife of Parliamentary Sovereignty,” International Journal of Constitutional Law 9, no. 1 (2011): 144–154; Adam Tucker, “Uncertainty in the Rule of Recognition and in the Doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty,” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 31 (2011): 61, 72–77.
44 See, e.g., Vernon Bogdanor, The New British Constitution (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2009), 68; Roger Masterman, The Separation of Powers in the Contemporary Constitution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 48, 152.
45 David Jenkins, “Both Ends against the Middle: European Integration, Devolution, and the Sites of Sovereignty in the United Kingdom,” Temple International and Comparative Law Journal 16, no. 1 (Spring 2002): 17; Mitchell, Devolution in the UK, 15, 134–135; Johan Steyn, Democracy through Law (Burlington: Ashgate, 2004), xvi–xvii; Robert Hazell, “Reinventing the Constitution: Can the State Survive?” Public Law 1999 (1999): 86.
48 S.E. Finer, “The Decline of Party?,” in Parties and Democracy in Britain and America, ed. Vernon Bogdanor (New York: Praeger, 1984), 6; see also Peter Mair, “The Party System,” in The Oxford Handbook of British Politics, ed. Matthew Flinders et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 285. As with other aspects of British political life, some of the perception of decline may be the cost of a harder and closer look at the institution itself—the halcyon days of history were never as bright as remembered. See Webb, “Are British Political Parties in Decline?,” 316.
49 A public perception of a “democratic deficit” is more likely to occur in systems with plurality voting, because they “exhibit the highest disparities between parties’ vote shares and parliamentary seat shares.” Sanders, “The UK’s Changing Party System,” 94. In the United Kingdom, a “single party receiving between 40 per cent and 45 per cent of the national vote stands a good chance of gaining an overall majority of seats in the House of Commons and therefore of forming a government.” Leyland, The Constitution of the U.K., 110 (noting that Labour achieved an overall majority of 180 seats with just under 44 percent of the popular vote in 1997).
50 See Sanders, “The UK’s Changing Party System,” 102–112. Note also that the percentage of people who have “no party identification” has risen to a high-water mark of 20 percent. Ibid., 107.
51 Matters of moral disagreement might also present this problem. But conscience issues, which usually “arise as a result of private members’ bills,” are often treated as “matters for a free vote in parliament in part because opinions on how to resolve them cut across party lines and are of special significance to parliamentarians as individuals.” Albert Weale, Aude Bicquelet, and Judith Bara, “Debating Abortion, Deliberative Reciprocity and Parliamentary Advocacy,” Political Studies 60 (2012): 646.
52 See Peter Mair, “The Party System,” 292–294 (discussing cleavages and decline in electoral alignments). Cf. Webb, “Are British Political Parties in Decline?,” 316.
53 See Erin Delaney, “The Labour Party’s Changing Relationship to Europe: The Expansion of European Social Policy,” Journal of European Integration History 8, no. 1 (January 2002).
54 Sanders, “The UK’s Changing Party System,” 92.
55 By breaking “old habits,” regional elections themselves are also weakening two-party politics at Westminster. Sanders, “The UK’s Changing Party System,” 102; Mair, “The Party System,” 298.
56 Leyland, The Constitution of the U.K., 112.
57 Adrian Blau, “Majoritarianism under Pressure: The Electoral and Party Systems,” in Constitutional Futures Revisited, ed. Robert Hazell (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 234; see also Philip Crowley and Mark Stuart, “Backbench Rebellion in the House of Commons, 1997–2010: Making a Policy Difference or Barking at the Moon?,” 2012, http://webpages.dcu.ie/~leg/Cowley.pdf.
58 Of course, when there is sufficient electoral churn, a broader party realignment may occur, recalibrating the system. The historical example in Britain is the replacement of the Liberal Party by the Labour Party in 1931, the culmination of a decade-long process. Chris Cook and John Stevenson, A History of British Elections since 1689 (London: Routledge, 2014), 143–149. Given the current political landscape, it would appear that a major realignment could (and perhaps should) be in order, but it is unlikely. See generally Sanders, “The UK’s Changing Party System.” See also Peter Mair, “The Party System,” 295–298. As David Sanders has said, “Conservatives do not have a history of splitting and Labour activists and MPs have a visceral fear (if not hatred) of it.” Sanders, 118. And, in any event, the ability of a meaningful third party to challenge the hegemony does not happen overnight; it takes time. McLean, “England Does Not Love Coalitions,” 9 (“During a Duvergerian tipping point, it is not clear to the average voter which party is the most effective challenge to the hegemon, and the strong two-party effect is not reinstated until the answer to that question is clear.”).
59 See generally Mark A. Graber, “The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the Judiciary,” Studies in American Political Development 7, no. 1 (Spring 1993): 35.
60 On the Constitutional Reform Act, 2005, c. 4 and the changes to the judiciary, see Roger Masterman, The Separation of Powers; see also Erin F. Delaney, “Searching for Constitutional Meaning in Institutional Design: The Debate over Judicial Appointments in the United Kingdom,” International Journal of Constitutional Law 14, no. 3 (July 2016): 752.
61 See Delaney, “Judiciary Rising,” 590–594.
62 Matthew Flinders, Democratic Drift (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 234.
63 Vernon Bogdanor, “Conclusion,” in The British Constitution in the Twentieth Century, ed. Vernon Bogdanor (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 691. Other suggestions included using the referendum “as a regular part of government, to be used on issues where the two Houses reached deadlock and when 200 MPs petitioned for one.” Conduct of Referendums, 19 (¶ 21) (1996).
65 Conduct of Referendums, 14 (¶ 1). The Report notes that some proposals “resurfaced periodically, including the suggestion by Winston Churchill in May 1945 that [a referendum] be used to extend the term of the wartime coalition Government.” Conduct of Referendums, 19 (¶ 21).
66 Cf. Vernon Bogdanor, The People and the Party System (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 69 (regarding the referendum, “the urge towards popular participation or self-government has not played a very important part in its advocacy”).
67 David Butler and Uwe Kitzinger, The 1975 Referendum (London: Macmillan, 1976), 12 (quoting Callaghan).
68 Delaney, “The Labour Party’s Changing Relationship to Europe,” 127–133.
69 House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, Referendums in the United Kingdom, 9 (2010), 12th Report of Session 2009–10 [hereinafter Referendums Report].
70 Conduct of Referendums, 22 (¶ 27).
72 The first regional referendum (the “Northern Ireland Border Poll”) was held in Northern Ireland in 1973, during the heart of The Troubles and after the suspension of the Stormont Parliament. Northern Ireland (Border Poll) Act, 1972, c. 77 and Northern Ireland (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1972, c. 22. The question—whether Northern Ireland should remain a part of the United Kingdom or join the Irish Republic—passed overwhelming in favor of remaining in the United Kingdom. But the turnout was only 58.7 percent and the poll was boycotted by Irish nationalists. Conduct of Referendums, 20 (¶ 23).
73 The Welsh referendum was a clearer case. On 58.8 percent turnout, an overwhelming 79.7 percent voted no. Richard Dewdney, House of Commons Library, Research Paper 97/113, Results of Devolution Referendums (1979 & 1997) 9–10 (1997).
75 Conservative Party Manifesto, 1997 General Election.
76 Cf. Michael Temple, “New Labour’s Third Way: Pragmatism and Governance,” British Journal of Politics and International Relations 2, no. 3 (2000): 302.
77 Referendums Report, 7 (¶ 3) (including “the adoption of the European single currency; the adoption of a new electoral system for the House of Commons; the establishment of a devolved Scottish parliament; the establishment of a devolved Welsh Assembly; the establishment of a Greater London Authority; and the establishment of Elected Regional Assemblies”).
78 In 1997, Scotland and Wales voted on devolution, prior to the introduction of devolution legislation in Parliament, in regional referendums that sought a simple majority position with no threshold requirements. These referendums were not binding on Parliament, but the favorable results, particularly strong in Scotland, eased the way for devolution legislation in the Scotland Act (1998) and the Government of Wales Act (1998). With a turnout of 60.2 percent, 73.4 percent voted in favor of the establishment of a Scottish Parliament. In Wales, the voters were more evenly divided—on a 50.1 percent turnout, 50.3 percent voted for devolution and 49.7 percent voted against. Feargal McGuinness et al., House of Commons Library, Research Paper 12/43, UK Election Statistics: 1918–2012, at 51–53 (2012). Similarly, in May 1998, the Blair Government held the promised referendum in Northern Ireland on the Good Friday Agreement, a referendum that, in combination with one held in the Republic of Ireland, cemented the Agreement and allowed for the passage of the Northern Ireland Act (1998). And finally, Londoners were given a chance to weigh in on their local government, providing a referendum on the creation of the Greater London Authority; 72 percent of the voters were in favor, but only on a paltry 34 percent turnout. Referendums Report, 10.
79 Cf. Aileen McHarg, “Reforming the United Kingdom Constitution: Law, Convention, Soft Law,” Modern Law Review 71, no. 6 (2008): 875.
80 Some have questioned whether the Blair Government’s choice to “programme” certain bills through standing committees breached the convention that first-class constitutional bills should not be sent to standing committees. See Paul Seaward and Paul Silk, “The House of Commons,” in The British Constitution in the Twentieth Century, ed. Vernon Bogdanor (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 160.
81 Geoffrey Marshall, “The Constitution: Its Theory and Interpretation,” in The British Constitution in the Twentieth Century, ed. Vernon Bogdanor (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 62.
82 Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act, 2000, c. 41, § 104(2).
83 See Electoral Commission, “The 2004 North East regional assembly and local government referendums,” ¶¶ 2.13–2.17 (2005) (“The Commission’s role is wholly advisory but the Government adopted many of the Commission’s recommendations to make the questions more intelligible.); Electoral Commission, “Referendum on membership of the European Union: Assessment of the Electoral Commission on the proposed referendum question,” at ¶¶ 2.2–2.10 (2015). The Electoral Commission’s suggested wording was, in fact, the wording that appeared on the ballot for Brexit.
84 Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act, 2000, c. 41, §§ 108, 109, 110.
85 See Referendums Report, 36 (¶ 146) (noting that notwithstanding timing rules in the PPERA, “the overall timetable for the conduct of any referendum is in government hands”).
86 BBC, “MPs Back Referendum on Voting System,” February 9, 2010, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/8505255.stm.
87 Under the proposed alternative vote system, voters would rank the candidates in order of preference instead of selecting just one candidate. If a candidate received a majority of the number-one slot votes, that candidate was the winner. If no candidate received a majority of the votes, then the candidate with the fewest votes was eliminated. The votes of the voters who selected the candidate with the fewest votes as their first choice then had their second choice evaluated. This process continued until a candidate received a majority of the votes and was declared the winner.
88 The Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition Agreement, May 12, 2010.
89 McLean, “England Does Not Love Coalitions,” 10.
90 Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Act, 2011, c.1, § 8.
91 515 Parl. Deb. H.C. (6th ser.) (2010) col. 41.
92 Lord Rooker, 722 Parl. Deb. H.L. (5th ser.) (2010) col. 1400–01 (against referendums); 725 Parl. Deb. H.L. (5th ser.) (2011) col. 16–34 (proposed amendment).
93 While Westminster had to authorize the referendum to take place, The Scotland Act 1998 (Modification of Schedule 5) Order 2013, it was the Scottish Parliament that ran the referendum and set its terms under the Scottish Independence Referendum Act, 2013, asp 14.
94 In response to the ballot question, “Should Scotland be an independent country?,” 2,001,926 (55.30 percent) voted no and 1,617,989 (44.70 percent) voted yes. “Scottish Referendum: Scotland Votes ‘No’ to Independence,” BBC News, September 19, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-scotland-29270441.
95 Note that in California, for example, the initiative and referendum procedures to enact constitutional amendments cannot sidestep legislative approval if the amendment would be radically transformative. An amendment that is tantamount to a constitutional revision requires a two-thirds vote of both houses of the California legislature before it is submitted to voters. Cal. Const. art. XVIII, § 2. And in Canada, the Supreme Court of Canada was unwilling to allow Quebecois secession to go forward without a mechanism of national negotiation. Reference re Secession of Quebec,  2 S.C.R. 217, 220–222 (“[S]ecession of a province ‘under the Constitution’ could not be achieved unilaterally, that is, without principled negotiation with other participants in Confederation within the existing constitutional framework.”).
96 See John Curtice, “Why Leave Won the UK’s EU Referendum,” Journal of Common Market Studies 52, no. S1 (2017): 20–24. Curtice surveys Eurobarometer polls from 1992 to 2016 asking how individuals from the UK identified. In spring 2016, 60 percent of those asked said they were British and denied being European—exactly in line with the average since 1992. British Social Attitudes polls found only one-eighth of British people pick “European” as an identity. Nowhere else in Europe do so few voters acknowledge some kind of European identity.
97 Stephen George, An Awkward Partner (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990).
98 Leave was supported by a core group of affluent Eurosceptics (roughly 23 percent of the population); they voted at high numbers. It is true that they would not have succeeded without the help of two other distinct social groups: those who are economically deprived/anti-immigrant and the older working classes (Labour). Kirby Swales, Understanding the Leave Vote (London: NatCen Social Research, 2016), 27.
99 See Philip Cowley, “The Most Rebellious Parliament of the Post War Era,” Political Insight Blog (Political Studies Association), March 28, 2015, https://www.psa.ac.uk/insight-plus/blog/most-rebellious-parliament-post-war-era. If after a voice vote in the House of Commons, the result is uncertain, a division of the House may be requested. During the division, the MPs will physically walk into different lobbies in the House to demonstrate whether they are voting “aye” or “no.” Mark Sanford, Divisions in the House of Commons: House of Commons Background Paper (London: House of Commons Library, August 2013) SN/PC/06401, http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/SN06401, 5.
100 Julie Smith, “David Cameron’s EU Renegotiation and Referendum Pledge: A Case of Déjà Vu?,” British Politics 11, no. 3 (2016): 328. For example, in 2014, a letter was sent to Cameron, “signed by 95 Conservative MPs (out of a total of 303), demanding a bill to give the Westminster Parliament a veto on European legislation. All signatories to the letter must have known that this was incompatible with remaining in the EU under the terms of the British 1972 European Communities Act.” It was an act of grandstanding to send a message. Nathaniel Copsey and Tim Haughton, “Farewell Britannia?,” Journal of Common Market Studies 52, no. S1 (2014): 78.
101 See Smith, Déjà Vu?, 329 (“[I]t meant that the sceptics on his backbenches who had beleaguered his premiership until that time would mostly remain silent until after the general election.”); see also Copsey and Haughton, “Farewell Britannia?,” 75 (backbenchers); Curtice, “Why Leave Won,” 25 (UKIP).
102 Julie Smith, “Gambling on Europe: David Cameron and the 2016 Referendum,” British Politics 13, no. 1 (2018): 4. ; see also Curtice, “Why Leave Won,” 25.
103 The Labour Party won only 30 percent of the vote, hurt by the success of the Scottish National Party (SNP), which took fifty-six of the fifty-nine Scottish seats, becoming the third largest party in Parliament on 4.7 percent of the vote. The Liberal Democrats were decimated, retaining only eight seats and wining roughly 8 percent of the vote.
104 Arend Lijphart’s formula suggests a 35 percent notional effective threshold for the United Kingdom. Arend Lijphart, “Democracies: Forms, Performance, and Constitutional Engineering,” European Journal of Political Research 25, no. 1 (1994); Mair, “The Party System,” 285.
105 Smith, “Gambling,” 14 (arguing that there was no widespread popular demand for a referendum).
106 See Smith, “Déjà Vu?,” 333.
109 Switzerland integrates local and regional governments in their many referendums. See Theo Shiller, Local Direct Democracy in Europe (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2011), 11.
110 Cf. Katrine Bussey and Jon Stone, “David Cameron Says He Could Give Scotland More Powers after Meeting with Nicola Sturgeon,” The Independent, May 15, 2015, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/david-cameron-considering-giving-scotland-more-powers-after-meeting-with-nicola-sturgeon-10253335.html.
111 George Parker, “Cameron Defeated as Lords Vote to Extend Age Limit in EU Poll,” Financial Times, November 18, 2015, https://www.ft.com/content/3b365be6-8e1d-11e5-a549-b89a1dfede9b; Patrick Wintour, “Lords Reject Attempt to Lower EU Referendum Voting Age to 16,” Guardian (UK), December 14, 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/dec/14/lords-reject--lower-eu-referendum-voting-age-16.
115 Tony Helm, “EU Referendum: Youth Turnout Almost Twice as High as First Thought,” The Observer, July 10, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jul/09/young-people-referendum-turnout-brexit-twice-as-high.
116 Electoral Commission, “Referendum on Membership of the European Union: Assessment of the Electoral Commission on the Proposed Referendum Question,” ¶ 1.2, ¶¶ 2.6–2.7, ¶ 3.19, ¶ 3.35 (2015).
117 Electoral Commission, ¶ 2.7.
118 Jessica Elgot, “EU Referendum’s Reworded Question Welcomed by Experts and Campaigners,” Guardian (UK), September 1, 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/sep/01/eu-referendums-reworded-question-welcomed-by-experts-and-campaigners.
119 Curtice, “Why Leave Won,” 25.
121 Curtice, “Why Leave Won,” 25 (“Polling certainly persistently suggested that voters were more inclined to believe what Mr. Johnson said about Brexit than they were the utterances of any other politician, including the Prime Minister.”).
123 The Labour Party itself shares responsibility for the result. Party leader Jeremy Corbyn was notoriously ambivalent on Europe, having voted against joining in 1975. And when Gisela Stuart, a Labour MP, became co-chair with Gove of Vote Leave, her high-profile position added to a skew in the impressions of the electorate. More than a quarter of voters believed the Labour Party to be divided on Europe, when, in fact, the Parliamentary Labour Party was 96 percent in favor of Remain. Swales, Understanding the Leave Vote, 21.
125 Curtice, “Why Leave Won,” 26.
126 R (Miller) v. Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union,  UKSC 5 ¶¶ 119–120 (appeal taken from  EWHC 2768 (Admin) and  NIQB 85).
128 Vernon Bogdanor, “On ‘Popular Sovereignty’,” in Constitution in Crisis, ed. D.J. Galligan (London: I.B. Tauris, 2017), 39.
129 See Swales, Understanding the Leave Vote, 27; Smith, “Gambling,” 4.
131 Dan Roberts, “Brexit: Britons Favour Second Referendum by 16-Point Margin–Poll,” Guardian (UK), January 26, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/jan/26/britons-favour-second-referendum-brexit-icm-poll.
132 For more information, see Independent Commission on Referendums, http://www.ucl.ac.uk/constitution-unit/research/electionsandreferendums/icreferendums.
133 Popular initiatives in states in the United States have covered such topics as condom usage in adult films (California Proposition 60, 2016, https://oag.ca.gov/initiatives/search?populate=adult+films) and marijuana legalization (California Proposition 64, 2016, https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/initiatives/pdfs/15-0103%20%28Marijuana%29_1.pdf).
134 Efforts to “constitutionalize” certain acts by fiat have not been respected. For example, the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011, c. 14, requires that elections shall occur every fifth year, § 1(3), unless the House of Commons passes a no-confidence motion or a motion, by a two-thirds majority, that early elections shall be held, § 2. Nevertheless, Theresa May unilaterally announced elections without seeking such a motion first. Peter Walker, Rowena Mason, and Jessica Elgot, “Snap Elections and the Fixed-Term Parliaments Act: What Happens Next?,” Guardian (UK), April 18, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/apr/18/what-is-the-fixed-term-parliaments-act. The House of Commons did pass such a motion after the fact. Heather Stewart and Anushka Asthana, “Theresa May Wins Commons Backing for 8 June General Election,” Guardian (UK), April 19, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/apr/19/theresa-may-wins-commons-backing-8-june-general-election.
135 See Referendums Report: Minutes of Evidence Taken Before the Select Committee on the Constitution, Session 2009–2010 (February 10, 2010) (“Memorandum by the [Brown] Government”): 94 (“The decision as to whether or not a referendum should be held should be made on a case-by-case basis. We do not believe that an objective test could be established as to the circumstances in which a referendum should and should not be held.”).
136 Referendums Report, 23 (¶ 75).
137 Referendums Report, Minutes of Evidence Taken Before the Select Committee on the Constitution, Session 2009–2010 (January 20, 2010) (“Memorandum by Professor Vernon Bogdanor”): 45.
138 Six of the nine referendums analyzed by the Referendums Report concerned devolution and Northern Ireland. Referendums Report, 9–10. Since the compilation of that Report, an additional Welsh devolution referendum was called in 2011, National Assembly for Wales Referendum (Assembly Act Provisions) (Referendum Question, Date of Referendum Etc.) Order 2010, http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2010/2837/pdfs/uksi_20102837_en.pdf, and the Scottish Independence Referendum was called in 2014, which might be considered an extreme devolution measure. Scottish Independence Referendum Act 2014, asp 14, http://www.legislation.gov.uk/asp/2013/14/pdfs/asp_20130014_en.pdf.
139 Micha Germann and Fernando Mendez, “Contested Sovereignty: Mapping Referendums on the Reallocation of Sovereign Authority over Time and Space,” (paper, ECPR General Conference, Glasgow, UK, September 3–6, 2014), 7.
140 Robert Hazell, “We Need Fewer Referendums, with Higher Thresholds,” in Constitution in Crisis, ed. D.J. Galligan (London: I.B. Tauris, 2017), 67. See also Referendums Report, 25 (quoting Hazell).
141 Lawrence LeDuc, The Politics of Direct Democracy (Ontario: Broadview Press, 2003).
143 A New Magna Carta, 24.

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