Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/262/544/
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 02:38:55+00:00

Document:
1. A corporation which goes into a state other than that of its creation for the lawful purpose of repossessing itself, by a permissible action in her courts, of specific personal property unlawfully taken out of its possession elsewhere and fraudulently carried into that state is a person within the jurisdiction of that state within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, for all the purposes of that, undertaking, and entitled to the equal protection of the laws. P. 262 U. S. 549.
examination, except when served with notice and subpoena within the state, and then only in the county where service is had, and which limits such examinations, in the case of residents of the state, individual or corporate, to the county of their residence, violates the Equal Protection Clause. Id.
Error to a judgment of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin sustaining two orders, one for examination of the plaintiff before answer and the second striking out its complaint and dismissing its action for failure to comply with the first.
to the controversy, and then and there to submit to an examination by the defendant. The order was sought and granted on the ground that the examination would better enable the defendant to plead to the complaint, which as yet it had not done. The plaintiff was not engaged in any business in Wisconsin, nor had it complied with the law of that state prescribing conditions on which it might do so. It had no property in the state other than the automobile, and it had gone into the state only for the purpose of instituting and prosecuting the action to repossess itself of that vehicle. Its secretary was not within the state, nor did it have any representative there other than the attorneys who were prosecuting the action in its behalf. For itself and its secretary, it consented that such an examination as was sought might be had at Louisville at any time and before any officer the court might designate, but it objected to any order requiring that the examination be had in Milwaukee. The objection was overruled, and the court put in the order a direction that the defendant tender to the plaintiff for its secretary the railroad fare from the southern boundary of Wisconsin to Milwaukee and return, being $4.74, and one day's witness fee, being $1.50. The tender was made and declined, and the secretary, with the plaintiff's approval, refused to comply with the order. Because of this, the court, on the defendant's motion and over the plaintiff's objection, made a further order striking the plaintiff's complaint from the files and dismissing its cause of action, with costs. On appeal to the supreme court of the state, both orders were sustained over the plaintiff's contention that they and the statute under which they were made violate the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. 171 Wis. 586. To obtain a review of the judgment of the Supreme Court, the case was brought here on writ of error under § 237 of the Judicial Code.
"party, his or its assignor, officer, agent or employee, or of the person who was such officer, agent or employee at the time of the occurrence"
"In case a foreign corporation is a party, the examination of its president, secretary, other principal officer, assignor or agent or employee, or the person who was such, or either of them at the time of the occurrence of the facts made the subject of the examination may be had under the provisions of this section in any county of this state. The court may also, upon motion and such terms as may be just, fix a time and place in this state for such examination of any of said persons. Such persons so sought to be examined as aforesaid shall attend at such time and place and submit to the examination, and then and there have with him all papers, books, files, records, things, and matters in the possession of such person by reason of his relation to such corporation, relevant to the controversy. Such person sought to be examined as aforesaid shall attend at such time and place and submit to the examination, and, if required, attend for the purpose of reading and signing such deposition, without service of subpoena. "
"If any officer, agent or employee, or any person who was such officer, agent, or employee of a foreign corporation at the time of the occurrence of the facts made the subject of the examination be lawfully required to appear and testify as provided in this chapter either within or without the state . . . shall refuse and neglect to have with him any papers, books, files, records, things, and matters in the possession of such party relevant to the controversy, such party may be punished as for a contempt and in the discretion of the court, the pleading of such foreign corporation stricken out, and judgment given against it as upon default or failure of proof."
of sub. 6 regarding nonresidence would be wholly unnecessary. These considerations move us to construe the statute as not empowering the court to order the examination of a nonresident to take place within this state when he cannot be personally served with notice and subpoena."
By subdivision 7 of § 4096, before quoted, an exception was made as to foreign corporations whereby examinations within the state might be ordered and compelled against them regardless of their nonresidence and of any inability to obtain service on them in the state. Thus, they were subjected to a rule much more onerous than that applicable to nonresident individuals in like situations, and also more onerous than that applicable to resident suitors, whether individuals or corporations. The Supreme Court justified this difference in legislative treatment and also the order for an examination in this case on the ground that they amounted to no more than a reasonable exercise of the authority of the state over a nonresident corporation coming voluntarily into the state to seek a remedy in her courts against a resident defendant.
the right to bring the action was plain. See Charter Oak Life Insurance Co. v. Sawyer, 44 Wis. 387; Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Bashford, 120 Wis. 281; Sioux Remedy Co. v. Cope, 235 U. S. 197. To have denied that right would in effect have deprived the plaintiff of its property and have been an intolerable injustice. That the plaintiff owed its corporate existence to Kentucky did not enable Wisconsin to treat its plight with indifference. It was a "person" within the meaning of both the due process clause and the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific R. Co., 118 U. S. 394, 118 U. S. 396; Covington & Lexington Turnpike Co. v. Sandford, 164 U. S. 578, 164 U. S. 592; Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466, 169 U. S. 522; Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Vosburg, 238 U. S. 56. The latter clause declares that no state shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws," meaning, of course, the protection of laws applying equally to all in the same situation. The words "within its jurisdiction" are comprehensive, but we have no need for attempting a full definition of them here. It is enough to say that, when the plaintiff went into Wisconsin, as it did, for the obviously lawful purpose of repossessing itself, by a permissible action in her courts, of specific personal property unlawfully taken out of its possession elsewhere and fraudulently carried into that state, it was, in our opinion, within her jurisdiction for all the purposes of that undertaking. See Southern Ry. Co. v. Greene, 216 U. S. 400; Blake v. McClung, 172 U. S. 239. And we think there is no tenable ground for regarding it as any less entitled to the equal protection of the laws in that state than an individual would have been in the same circumstances; for, as was held in Gulf, Colorado, & Sante Fe Ry. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U. S. 154, "a state has no more power to deny to corporations the equal protection of the law than it has to individual citizens."
No doubt a corporation of one state seeking relief in the courts of another must conform to the prevailing modes of proceeding in those courts and submit to reasonable rules respecting the payment of costs or giving security therefor and the like (see Canadian Northern Ry. Co. v. Eggen, 252 U. S. 553, 252 U. S. 561); but it cannot be subjected, merely because it is such a corporation, to onerous requirements having no reasonable support in that fact and not laid on other suitors in like situations. Here, the statute authorized the imposition, and there was imposed on the plaintiff a highly burdensome requirement because of its corporate origin -- a requirement which, under the statute, could not be laid on an individual suitor in the same situation. The discrimination was essentially arbitrary. There could be no reason for requiring a corporate resident of Louisville to send its secretary, papers, files, and books to Milwaukee for the purposes of an adversary examination that would not apply equally to an individual resident of Louisville in a like case. The discrimination is further illustrated by the provision that, as to all residents of Wisconsin, individual and corporate, the examination should be had in the county of their residence, no matter what its distance from the place of suit.
We hold that the statute, as it was applied in this case, was invalid, and the orders made under it were erroneous as denying to the plaintiff the equal protection of the laws. This conclusion renders it unnecessary to consider the contention made under the due process clause.
* After the proceedings in the Milwaukee court, some changes were made in this procedural measure, but the changes do not affect the orders in question.
have reasonably required the nonresident plaintiff who invoked its process to submit within the state to examination as a witness and to an inspection of relevant books and papers. If the order for examination was legal, it was proper to dismiss the suit in case the order was disobeyed. That there may be cases in which oral examination of a plaintiff in the presence of defendant and by counsel familiar with the matter in issue is essential to an adequate presentation of the facts cannot be doubted. If so, it is within the power of a state to require that a plaintiff shall submit to such preliminary examination somewhere. Whether this was a case requiring such examination could be determined properly only upon hearing the parties, and for such hearing opportunity was given by the judge of the trial court. If this was a case in which oral examination and inspection of the documents was essential to an adequate presentation of the matter in controversy, it was necessary, in order to secure it, that either the plaintiff's secretary should go to Milwaukee for examination or that defendant and counsel should go to Louisville. Whether under such circumstances the plaintiff should in fairness be required to come to the place where he instituted suit, or the defendants be obliged to go with counsel to the plaintiff's place of residence, was likewise a matter which could properly be determined only upon hearing the parties, and this opportunity was given by the judge of the trial court. It cannot be that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment deprives a state of the power to authorize its courts to so mould their process as to secure in this way the adequate presentation of a case.
of Wisconsin, was not a person "within its jurisdiction." Moreover, the statutory provision complained of put nonresidents substantially upon an equality with residents. Compare Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U. S. 160, 242 U. S. 167. No question of interstate commerce is involved. In my opinion, the equal protection clause does not prevent Wisconsin from moulding, in the case of foreign corporations, the details of its judicial procedure to accord with the requirements of justice.

References: § 237
 § 4096
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.