Source: https://www.thefire.org/first-amendment-library/decision/scull-v-virginia-ex-rel-committee-on-law-reform-and-racial-activities/
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 13:51:00+00:00

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VIRGINIA EX REL. COMMITTEE ON LAW REFORM AND RACIAL ACTIVITIES.
CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA.
David H. Scull was convicted of contempt in the Circuit Court of Arlington County, Virginia, for refusing to obey a decision of that court ordering him to answer a number of questions put to him by a Legislative Investigative Committee of the Virginia General Assembly. On *345 appeal the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed without opinion. Scull contended at the Committee hearings, in the courts below, and in this Court that the Virginia statute authorizing the investigation, both on its face and as applied, violated the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. He claimed, among other things, that: (1) The Committee was “established and given investigative authority, as part of a legislative program of `massive resistance’ to the United States Constitution and the Supreme Court’s desegregation decisions, in order to harass, vilify, and publicly embarrass members of the NAACP and others who are attempting to secure integrated public schooling in Virginia.” (2) The questions asked him violated his rights of free speech, assembly and petition by constituting an unjustified restraint upon his associations with others in “legal and laudable political and humanitarian causes.” (3) “The information sought from [him] was neither intended to, nor could reasonably be expected to, assist the Legislature in any proper legislative function.” (4) Despite his requests, repeated at every stage of the proceedings, the Committee failed to inform him “in what respect its questions were pertinent to the subject under inquiry . . . .” We granted certiorari to consider these constitutional challenges to the validity of petitioner’s contempt conviction. 357 U. S. 903. After careful consideration, we find it unnecessary to pass on any of these constitutional questions except the last one because we think the record discloses an unmistakable cloudiness in the testimony of the Committee Chairman as to what was sought of Scull, as well as why it was sought. Scull was therefore not given a fair opportunity, at the peril of contempt, to determine whether he was within his rights in refusing to answer and consequently his conviction must fall under the procedural requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Scull appeared before the Thomson Committee, as ordered. He answered several questions about his publishing business, and then was asked whether he belonged “to an organization known as The Fairfax County Council on Human Relations.” He replied that “on advice of counsel I wish to state that the language of the subpoena delivered to me was so broad and vague . . . that before going further I wish to ask you to tell me the specific subject of your inquiry today, so that I may judge which of your questions are pertinent.” Chairman Thomson told him that the general subjects under inquiry were “threefold”: (1) the tax status of racial organizations and of contributions to them; (2) the effect of integration or its threat on the public schools of Virginia and on the State’s general welfare; and (3) the violation of certain statutes *348 against “champerty, barratry, and maintenance, or the unauthorized practice of the law.” He told Scull, however, that several of these subjects “primarily do not deal with you.” Scull then filed a statement of his objections to the questioning and emphasized that he had not been “properly informed of the subject of inquiry.” Without clarifying Chairman Thomson’s ambiguous statement or specifying which of the “several” subjects did not apply to Scull, the Committee proceeded to ask the 31 questions listed in the footnote below.
*349 It is difficult to see how some of these questions have any relationship to the subjects the Committee was authorized to investigate, or how Scull could possibly discover any such relationship from the Chairman’s statement*350 It does seem that several of the questions asked were aimed at connecting Scull with barratry or champerty, but it was never made wholly clear to Scull, either before or after the questioning, that this was one of the subjects under inquiry as far as he was concerned. Nevertheless, Scull was cited to appear before the Circuit Court to show cause why he should not be compelled to answer.
“For my personal standpoint, I would say that the one dealing with the taxable status does not affect him here, and likewise the one—I have forgotten whether I stated it or not, but I would think that the integration or the threat of integration on public school systems, on the general welfare, would apply.
Chairman Thomson: “A. If the transcript says it there, I said it.
“Q. Which of those three were you referring to when you said, `Several which primarily do not deal with you’?
“Q. Would you just state for the record so that it is clear on the record which ones you were referring to that did not deal with Mr. Scull?
“A. The violation of those statutes dealing with champerty, barratry, and maintenance, and general unauthorized practice of the law.
“Q. Those did not deal with Mr. Scull?
*352 “A. No, no; I think in the connection that we are dealing with here, that the ones spoken of first did not apply; only the latter one did apply that I was making.
The judge who ordered Scull to answer the questions made no clearer statement of their pertinence to the investigation or to basic state interests than had the Committee Chairman. His holding was merely that “the questions are of a preliminary nature and in developing the inquiry to secure the information which the Committee is after appears to the Court to be perfectly proper line of inquiry.” He at no time analyzed the individual questions asked, nor explained to Scull what it was that the Committee wanted from him and how the questions put to him related to these desires.
The events leading to Scull’s subpoena, as well as the questions asked him, make it unmistakably clear that the Committee’s investigation touched an area of speech. press, and association of vital public importance. In NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U. S. 449, 460-466, this Court *353 held that such areas of individual liberty cannot be invaded unless a compelling state interest is clearly shown. But we do not reach that question because the record shows that the purposes of the inquiry, as announced by the Chairman, were so unclear, in fact conflicting, that Scull did not have an opportunity of understanding the basis for the questions or any justification on the part of the Committee for seeking the information he refused to give. See Watkins v. United States, 354 U. S. 178, 208-209, 214-215. To sustain his conviction for contempt under these circumstances would be to send him to jail for a crime he could not with reasonable certainty know he was committing. This Court has often held that fundamental fairness requires that such reasonable certainty exist. See Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U. S. 451, 453; Jordan v. De George, 341 U. S. 223, 230; Watkins v. United States, 354 U. S. 178, 208-209, 214-215, 217; Flaxer v. United States, 358 U. S. 147, 151. Certainty is all the more essential when vagueness might induce individuals to forego their rights of speech, press, and association for fear of violating an unclear law. Winters v. New York, 333 U. S. 507. Such is plainly the case here. The information given to Scull was far too wavering, confused and cloudy to sustain his conviction.
 See Va. Acts 1956, S. J. Res. 3.
 See generally, Va. Acts, E. S. 1956, cc. 31-37, 56-71.
“(3) determining the effect which integration or the threat of integration could have on the operation of the public schools in the State or the general welfare of the State and whether the laws of barratry, champerty and maintenance are being violated in connection therewith.” Va. Acts, E. S. 1956, c. 37.
 Question 28 asked if the Communist Party used Box 218; Question 30 asked if Scull had ever been called as a witness before a Congressional Committee; Question 31 asked if his name had ever been cited by any Congressional Committee as being on any list of members of any organizations that are cited as subversive. Nothing in the language of the Act authorizing the Committee or in the statement of Chairman Thomson about the subjects under inquiry could lead Scull to think that it was the Committee’s duty to investigate Communist or subversive activities.
 See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U. S. 449, 460-466; United States v. Rumely, 345 U. S. 41. Among the questions asked were several dealing directly with political activity. Question 19, for example asked if Mr. Warren D. Quenstedt, a candidate for Congress had used Scull’s post-office box.

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