Source: https://www.animallaw.info/case/humane-society-western-region-v-snohomish-county
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 23:50:54+00:00

Document:
MARY ALICE THEILER, United States Magistrate Judge.
*1 Plaintiff Humane Society Western Region, doing business as Happy Paws Farm (Happy Paws), filed this lawsuit against Snohomish County (the County), alleging provisions of the Snohomish County Code (SCC) and the County's enforcement of such regulations violate its state and federal constitutional rights. ( See Dkt. 1.) The Court finds this matter appropriate for resolution without oral argument. Plaintiff avers that SCC provisions regulating barking (the “noise ordinances”) are unconstitutionally vague in violation of the state and federal constitutions and that the SCC provision governing the temporary housing of animals in shelters (the “temporary housing rule”) violates its federal constitutional right to substantive due process.FN1 Defendant moved the Court for summary judgment. (Dkt.26.) Now, having considered the papers and pleadings submitted by the parties, as well as the balance of the record in this matter, the Court concludes that defendant's summary judgment motion should be granted and the claims remaining in this case dismissed with prejudice.
FN3. While it does not appear that the current version of SCC 6.06.005 contains these or any other definitions for quiet hours and repetitive barking, the above version was in effect during the relevant time period ( see Dkt. 28 at ¶ 18 and Ex. K), and SCC 10.01.050(5)(b) and 10.01.020(29) continue to define quiet hours and repetitive barking as described above.
Summary judgment is appropriate when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law when the nonmoving party fails to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of his case with respect to which he has the burden of proof. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23. “[A] party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment may not rest upon mere allegation or denials of his pleading, but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)).
As noted above, plaintiff here pursues both state and federal constitutional claims. Its federal claims are brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48-49 (1988); Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir.1991). A local government unit or municipality can be sued as a “person” under § 1983. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691-94 (1978). However, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 solely because it employs a tortfeasor. Id. at 691. A plaintiff seeking to impose liability on a municipality under § 1983 must identify municipal “policy” or “custom” that caused his or her injury. Bd. of the County Comm's v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997). Here, for the reasons discussed below, the Court agrees with defendant that plaintiff's state and federal constitutional claims should be dismissed.
*3 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law[.]” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. “The substantive component of the Due Process Clause ‘forbids the government from depriving a person of life, liberty, or property in such a way that “shocks the conscience” or “interferes with rights implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.” ‘ “ Squaw Valley Dev. Co. v. Goldberg, 375 F.3d 936, 948 (9th Cir.2004) (quoting Nunez v. City of Los Angeles, 147 F.3d 867, 871 (9th Cir.1998) (quoted sources omitted)). “To establish a violation of substantive due process ..., a plaintiff is ordinarily required to prove that a challenged government action was ‘clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare’.” Patel v. Penman, 103 F.3d 868, 874 (9th Cir.1996) (quoting Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926) and citing Bateson v. Geisse, 857 F.2d 1300, 1303 (9th Cir.1988)).
Plaintiff argues that defendant violated its federal constitutional right to substantive due process through the deprivation of its property rights. Specifically, plaintiff argues that the County's enforcement of the temporary housing rule destroys its property rights in the dogs it cares for and its ability to use the land it leases to provide long-term care for animals in need.
In response to defendant's summary judgment motion, plaintiff voluntarily dismissed its claim based on an unconstitutional taking, but continues to argue that the County violated its federal constitutional right to substantive due process. Defendant replies that the voluntary dismissal of plaintiff's takings claim does not revive its substantive due process claim. Cf. Squaw Valley Dev. Co ., 375 F.3d at 949 (prohibition on substantive due process claims based on governmental interference with property rights “extends even to claims that would be unsuccessful takings claims.”) (citing Armendariz, 75 F.3d at 1325-26).
*4 Plaintiff's substantive due process claim posits an unconstitutional taking of its property. ( See, e.g., Dkt. 30, Ex. A at 12 (plaintiff answered an interrogatory about its substantive due process allegation in part: “As written and as applied, the County's actions are unconstitutional and is a taking of plaintiff's property”).) Therefore, as argued by defendant, this claim is foreclosed by the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause, regardless of whether or not plaintiff pursues a takings claim. See Squaw Valley Dev. Co., 375 F.3d at 949-50 (“The blanket prohibition applies even to a disguised takings claim. As we have explained, landowners ‘cannot sidestep Armendariz by re-characterizing their claim as lying solely in substantive due process.’ ”) (quoting Macri v. King County, 126 F.3d 1125, 1129 (9th Cir.1997) and citing Buckles v. King County, 191 F.3d 1127, 1137 (9th Cir.1999) (precluding a substantive due process claim based on “spot zoning” and explaining that “changing the label will not change the result”).) Moreover, for the reasons described below, “[e]ven assuming that some room remains for substantive due process claims in the context of deprivations of property,” id. at 950, plaintiff's federal substantive due process claim would fail on the merits.
FN5. The parties phrased their substantive due process arguments in terms of the analysis of a state constitutional violation. See Presbytery of Seattle v. King County, 114 Wn.2d 320, 330, 787 P.2d 907 (1990) (under Washington law, to determine whether a regulation violates due process, the court asks: (1) whether it is aimed at achieving a legitimate public purpose; (2) whether it uses means that are reasonably necessary to achieve that purpose; and (3) whether it is unduly oppressive on the land owner). Although plaintiff has since dropped its state claim, the arguments remain relevant to the remaining federal claim.
FN6. Although plaintiff does not point to any declarations in support of its arguments as to the temporary housing rule ( see Dkt. 34 at 19-21), it elsewhere references declarations from veterinarians in support of the proposition that “[a] dog should not be adopted out until it is ready, regardless of a time factor.” ( Id. at 4 (citing Dkt. 35, Exs. A-E).) Defendant seeks to strike these declarations ( see Dkt. 42) given that plaintiff failed to identify these veterinarians in its initial disclosures or at anytime thereafter. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(c)(1) (“A party that without substantial justification fails to disclose information required by Rule 26(a) or 26(e)(1) [which govern initial disclosures and required supplements thereof] ... is not, unless such failure is harmless, permitted to use as evidence at trial, at a hearing, or on a motion for any witness or information not so disclosed.”); Pickern v. Pier 1 Imports (U.S.), Inc., 457 F.3d 963, 969 n. 1 (9th Cir.2006) (“It is not an abuse of discretion to exclude a party's expert testimony when that party failed to disclose the expert report by the scheduling deadline and that party reasonably could have anticipated the necessity of the witness at the time of the deadline.”) Defendant also seeks to strike declarations of fact witnesses (Dkt.35, Exs.M-P), exhibits ( id., Exs. O, Q-R), and the cited declaration of Linda Hunter, the latter of which was never submitted to the Court. While defendant improperly put its request to strike in a separate motion, see Local Civil Rule 7(g) (requests to strike must be included in the responsive brief, not a separate motion), it does raise legitimate concerns. However, in finding defendant entitled to summary judgment, the Court declines to specifically address all of the arguments raised in defendant's motion to strike.
FN7. Plaintiff asserts in its opposition that such options were not offered to it “until very recently.” (Dkt. 34 at 6.) However, the declaration cited in support was never submitted to the Court and the assertion is contradicted by a County memorandum submitted by plaintiff and the Notice and Order, both of which reflect that the option of creating a non-boarding commercial kennel was, in fact, presented to and rejected by Ms. Hunter in May 2003. (Dkt. 35, Ex. H and Dkt. 28, Ex. F at 3.) While these documents refer to the option of creating a “personal” non-boarding commercial kennel ( id.), this option is reasonably understood to refer to a non-boarding commercial kennel as described in SCC 6.06.005(10).
In sum, plaintiff's federal substantive due process claim is foreclosed by the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause and, even if considered through the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court finds no basis for concluding that the temporary housing rule violates plaintiff's federal constitutional rights. As such, defendant is entitled to summary dismissal of this claim.
*6 Under Washington law, a statute is presumed constitutional and the challenging party bears the burden of proving vagueness beyond a reasonable doubt. Haley v. Medical Disciplinary Bd., 117 Wn.2d 720, 739, 818 P.2d 1062 (1991). Also, under either federal or state law, courts recognize that “[s]ome measure of vagueness is inherent in the use of language[,]” given that, “ ‘[c]ondemned to the use of words, we can never expect mathematical certainty from our language.’ “ Id. at 740 (quoting Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110 (1972)).
Plaintiff argues that the noise ordinances invite subjective evaluation resulting in arbitrary enforcement. It points to the absence of any reference to identifiable levels of noise, noting that the ordinances apply only to noises that are repetitive, whether or not louder than the sound of a pin dropping. Plaintiff also points to the testimony of County License Inspector Patrick Vollandt, who interpreted the statute to allow a finding of repetitive barking even with seven-minute lapses between barks, and the testimony of License Inspector John Korsborn, who appeared to entirely disregard the specific statutory language at issue. ( See Dkt. 35 Ex. I at 41 (Vollandt agreed that an instance of “barking in minute one and then not another bark until minute nine” would constitute repetitive barking) and Ex. J at 28-29 (Korsborn testified to taking a “common sense approach” in investigating barking complaints and not looking at his watch in so doing).) Plaintiff also asserts that while enforcing the noise ordinances against Happy Paws, the County ignored complaints made about other neighborhood dogs. However, again, plaintiff's arguments fail.
The absence of identifiable levels of noise, or decibel levels, does not render the noise ordinances unconstitutionally vague. Instead, as argued by defendant and as acknowledged in the SCC, not all noises are conducive to measurement on such a basis. See SCC 10.01.020(25) (defining “public disturbance noises” as “any sound which, because of its random or infrequent occurrence, is not conducive to measurement under the quantitative standards established in SCC 10.01.030[ ]”). Reasonably concluding that the noise produced by barking dogs does not easily allow for such measurement, the County developed a method by which to determine whether a violation had occurred; that is, where there is continuous barking for more than five minutes or non-continuous barking constituting ten or more minutes in a thirty-minute period. Plaintiff fails to demonstrate that this method is not easily understood by individuals of ordinary intelligence or that it fails to protect against arbitrary enforcement. Moreover, given that the ordinances in question explicitly target dog barking, plaintiff's comparison to the noise of a pin dropping is not well taken.
*7 Nor does the testimony of the license inspectors support plaintiff's position. In fact, License Inspector Vollandt's testimony was entirely in keeping with the clear language of the statute: “As far as repetitive barking, what I do is I go out for a period of half an hour, listen, make a note at the time when I hear barking for the duration.... Five dogs barking at once doesn't go five times. That's once. Once dog barking for five seconds, that's once.... I try to total up the amount. Like I say, I keep a scratch pad[.]” (Dkt. 35, Ex. I at 38-40.) Also, while License Inspector Korsborn admitted he did not pay attention to the specific language of the statute, his testimony supports the conclusion that an understanding of the noise ordinances is a matter of “common sense” and that the County did not arbitrarily pursue only complaints made against Happy Paws. ( Id., Ex. J at 28-29 (“I've just used common sense. If in fact it was irritating to me, I figured it was irritating the neighbors, and I would tell people, Hey, get your act squared away. And that was basically how I handled things. I didn't necessarily go by the code exactly.”) and at 27 (referring to and describing practices during investigations at “several different kennels”).) Further, as asserted by defendant, this individual's apparent “prosecutorial discretion” does not in itself establish that the noise ordinances authorize or encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. See, e.g., United States v. Ninety-Five Firearms, 28 F.3d 940, 941-42 (9th Cir.1994) (in considering a federal agent's decision to allow certain conduct based on a desire to be fair, even though he knew it was not in accordance with the law, the court stated: “That such prosecutorial discretion may be exercised by law enforcement officers is not evidence that [the statutes in question] ‘encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.’ ”) (quoted source omitted).
Therefore, given the above, plaintiff fails to demonstrate that the noise ordinances are unconstitutionally vague. Accordingly, defendant is also entitled to summary dismissal of this claim.
For the reasons described above, defendant's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. Plaintiff's claims and this case are hereby DISMISSED with prejudice.

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