Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&amp;view=article&amp;id=40410:g-r-no-128045-august-24,-2000-people-of-the-phil-v-rommel-deang,-et-al&amp;catid=1396&amp;Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 00:13:31+00:00

Document:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROMMEL DEANG, MELVIN ESPIRITU, and NICSON (or NIXON) CATLI, Accused-Appellants.
Though God has certainly set the time of Arthur Tanhueco’s birth, the three men accused in this case unblinkingly usurped God’s power to set the time of his death. In one virtual motion, they deprived him of his liberty; and demanded a considerable sum from his loved ones for his freedom, and yet, took his life despite achieving their purpose. For their acts, they shall have to answer to God and to society.
Once DEANG was in police custody, the police recovered P100,000 from him. He then implicated in his sworn statement ESPIRITU, CATLI, and Benito Catli (hereafter Benito) in the kidnapping for ransom of JAY-JAY. 10 Accordingly, on 25 August 1995, the information was amended to specifically identify the "Does." Pursuant to the Amended Information, 11 ESPIRITU, CATLI, and Benito were charged as Miller’s co-accused in the KIDNAPPING of JAY-JAY.
An unidentified male dead person, around 14 to 15 years old, wearing Giordano white shirt black pants, Gamosa shoes.
1.	Skull Fracture over left temporo parietal area.
2.	Multiple lacerated wds: 1-1/2 inches (L) temporo parietal area.
3.	Hematoma 2 inches over (R) eye.
. . . First, there is absolute necessity for the testimony of Benito Catli, for despite the presentation of witnesses by the prosecution, none of them testified on the exact manner the crime was committed. The question as to who masterminded the commission of the offense, the manner it was committed and the actual participation of the four accused. The existence of the alleged conspiracy can be gleaned from the sworn statement of Benito Catli. Second, the crime charged against the four accused is kidnapping for ransom with homicide. The testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution was limited to the fact of kidnapping and the fact of the victim’s death. The circumstances leading to the death of the victim and the manner he was killed was not yet established. Without accused Benito Catli’s testimony, no other direct evidence is available for the prosecution to prove the elements of the crime charged against the four accused. Third, his testimony was and could be corroborated by the prosecution’s witnesses . . . Fourth, he does not appear to be the most guilty. In his sworn statement, he was merely asked by the three other accused to join them in their already perceived plan of kidnapping a certain person . . . Fifth, there is no evidence that he has at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude.
5.	the sum of P50,000.00 as attorney’s fees.
The capital punishment having been imposed by the trial court, the assailed judgment is now with this Court on automatic review.
DEANG insists that the trial court erred in (a) convicting him on the basis of inadequate and insufficient evidence; (b) basing his conviction on his alleged extrajudicial confession which is inadmissible in evidence; (c) convicting him on the basis of illegally obtained evidence; (d) not upholding his constitutional right to counsel during his custodial investigation; and (e) not considering that he was illegally arrested and detained.
ESPIRITU, aside from asserting the lack of evidence to convict the three of them, assigns as error the failure of the trial court to appreciate his alibi.
CATLI avers that the trial court erred in: (a) proceeding with his arraignment without a preliminary investigation; (b) admitting in evidence, giving weight and credence to, and relying chiefly on the alleged extrajudicial confession of accused DEANG in convicting them; (c) granting the discharge of Benito Catli when he was the most guilty of the four accused and by giving weight to his testimony; (d) ignoring his defense of alibi; and (e) convicting him despite a clear lack of motive.
After a meticulous review of the voluminous records and the evidence adduced by the parties, this Court agrees with the findings of the trial court and, consequently, affirms the conviction of accused-appellants DEANG, ESPIRITU and CATLI.
JAY-JAY’s father Arturo also had a hand in piecing together the evidence against Accused-Appellants. He went to the place from where the telephone calls made by the kidnappers were traced and found his nephew, DEANG, conversing in front of the house with a man who was later identified as ESPIRITU. This eventually paved the way to the questioning of DEANG, who owned up the crime and supplied the information that, in turn, led the police to CATLI, ESPIRITU and Benito.
Recovered from the possession of DEANG were peso bills in the amount of P100,000, 28 which was part of the ransom money.
All the foregoing, especially the pivotal testimony of state witness Benito Catli, established beyond any shadow of a doubt that DEANG, ESPIRITU, and CATLI committed, and are guilty of, the crime for which they were charged, namely, kidnapping for ransom with homicide.
Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If a person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
DEANG asserts that he was not advised of his constitutional rights and that his confession was dictated by PO3 Primo Jamisolamin. He adds that the lawyer who assisted him, Atty. Mariano Y. Navarro, was not his counsel of choice and that the latter did not ascertain whether his confession was freely given. Moreover, he claims, Atty. Navarro did not see him write and sign the purported confession. DEANG further states that he was never asked any question at that time relating to the incident under investigation.
SPO2 Mario Nulud, who was present at the time DEANG was giving his confession, corroborated PO3 Jamisolamin’s testimony that DEANG was read his constitutional rights, and that the latter’s lawyer, Atty. Navarro, was present during the investigation.
a.	Karapatan mo ang magsawalang kibo sa anumang itatanong sa iyo.
b.	Karapatan mong magkaroon ng patnubay ng isang manananggol, ikaw ay bibigyan ng ating gobierno na walang bayad o sa sarili mong pili o kagustuhan. Ito ba ay nauunawaan mo?
Pagkatapos na maipabatid sa iyo ang inyong karapatan sa ilalim ng ating saligang batas na magsawalang kibo, nais mo bang ipagpatuloy ang imbestigasyong ito?
Kailangan mo ba ng isang manananggol?
Opo, Si Atty. Mariano Y. Navarro po (initialed).
Pinapaalala ko rin sa iyo na anumang salaysay ang ibibigay mo sa imbetigasyong ito ay maaring gamitin laban sa iyo. Ito ba ay nauunaawaan mo?
Handa ka na bang magbigay ng isang kusang loob na salaysay?
In light of the positive assertions of PO3 Jamisolamin and SPO2 Nulud, police officers who have not been shown to harbor any ill-motive in testifying against DEANG, and are even presumed to have acted regularly, the self-serving and uncorroborated claims of the latter must fail. The Court finds no constitutional and legal infirmity in the signed extrajudicial confession of DEANG and affirms its admissibility in evidence.
Neither is there merit in DEANG’S claim that his arrest and the search of his house were conducted in violation of his constitutional right against warrantless arrests and searches. As he did not question the legality of his arrest before he was arraigned, he is deemed to have waived such defense. In any case, no proof of the purported illegal arrest was ever presented by the defense. What is clear from the record is that, when invited by the police, he willingly submitted himself to investigation.
With regard to the alleged illegal search and seizure, SPO2 Mario Nulud testified that DEANG conceded to accompany the police to his house in order to surrender his share of the ransom money. He brought them to his room upstairs. There DEANG showed and gave to the police officer P100,000 in P500-peso bills, some of which were marked. 35 it must be reiterated at this point that a consented warrantless search is one of the exceptions to the proscription under Section 2, Article III, of the Constitution. 36 The consent of the owner of the house to the search effectively removed any badge of illegality.
Neither is the Court impressed with DEANG’s assertion that the students who witnessed the kidnapping of JAY-JAY pointed to Miller Capil as the one who forced JAY-JAY into the car. Arnel Mariano and Juliet Somera actually identified ESPIRITU as the culprit. A closer scrutiny of the testimonies of the witnesses reveals that Miller and ESPIRITU bear physical resemblance. On the other hand, DEANG was positively identified by Ranulfo-Quizon, who remembered him as the driver of the white Nissan Sentra used in abducting JAY-JAY. 37 Moreover, he was tagged by Benito Catli as one of the co-conspirators in the commission of the crime charged.
The common defense of DEANG, ESPIRITU, and CATLI is alibi. DEANG said he was in his house in Jesus St., Pulong Bulo, Angeles City when the kidnapping was executed on 5 July 1995. He was, however, positively identified by Quizon, who was almost hit by the white Nissan Sentra immediately after JAY-JAY was kidnapped.
ESPIRITU, on the other hand, claims that Benito Catli asked him to rent a car on 5 July 1995. He thus rented a car at Bali Cars at approximately half past six in the morning, after which he deposited the car at the residence of Benito Catli. He got back home in Timog Park, Angeles City, at around 7:00 a.m. then brought his niece to school at around 7:30. He left the school at around 8:00 o’clock and reached home some thirty minutes later, where he stayed the rest of the day.
CATLI maintains he was tending his sister’s store at Jesus St., Angeles City, the entire two months of July and August, including the 5th of July.
In light of the overwhelming evidence for the prosecution, establishing their authorship of and culpability for the crime charged, the alibis of DEANG, ESPIRITU, and CATLI were rightfully disregarded by the trial court as obvious fabrications.
4)	if the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is any of the parents, female or a public officer.
The presence of any of these two circumstances — the ransom demand or the death of the victim — already calls for the imposition for the death penalty. Here, they are both present. The guilt of DEANG, ESPIRITU, and CATLI for the kidnapping for ransom and death of JAY-JAY having been established beyond reasonable doubt, the Court has no other recourse but to agree with the penalty imposed by the trial court.
Four Justices of the Court have continued to maintain their view that Republic Act No. 7659 is unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes the death penalty. Nevertheless, they submit to the ruling of the majority to the effect that this law is constitutional and that the death penalty can be lawfully imposed in the case at bar.
In the matter of damages, the Court notes that the trial court awarded actual damages in the amount of P30,000 for wake and funeral expenses, and P10,000 as expenses for transporting the victim’s body from Batangas to Pampanga. These must be deleted for lack of supporting evidence. The amount of the ransom money, less P100,000, must, however, be returned to the Tanhuecos.
The award of moral damages in the amount of P3 million must be reduced to P500,000.
(3)	the amounts of P50,000 as indemnity for the death of Arthur Tanhueco, and P100,000 as exemplary damages, are hereby also awarded.
The awards of restitution of the ransom money in the amount of P1,480,000, less the P100,000 which was recovered, and attorney’s fees in the amount of P50,000, stand.
The aforesaid awards shall be paid to the heirs of Arthur Tanhueco and accused-appellants are solidarity liable for the payment thereof.
In accordance with Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659, upon finality of this decision, let the records of this case be forwarded to the Office of the President for possible exercise of pardoning power.
1.	Original Record (OR), vol. 3, 1006-1038; Rollo, 66-98. Per Judge Eliezer R. de los Santos.
2.	Entitled "An Act to Impose the Death Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes, Amending for that Purpose the Revised Penal Code as Amended, Other Special Laws, and for Other Purposes," which took effect on 31 December 1993 (People v. Simon, 234 SCRA 555 ).
3.	TSN, 17 May 1996, 17-19; 21 May 1996, 24-26.
4.	TSN, 20 October 1995, 35-36.
5.	TSN, 8 December 1995, 20-21; TSN, 7 November 1995, 19-20.
6.	TSN, 8 December 1995, 32.
8.	OR, vol. 1, 1.
9.	TSN, 7 November 1995, 25-26.
10.	OR, vol. 2, 528-530.
11.	OR, vol. 1, 59-60.
13.	OR, vol. 1, 78.
14.	OR, vol. 1, 82-83.
19.	OR, vol. 1, 394-395.
20.	Id., 414-419, 422-430, 432-438.
21.	OR, vol. 2, 441-443.
24.	OR, vol. 3, 1038.
25.	People v. Diaz, 262 SCRA 723, 732 .
26.	TSN, 15 March 1996, 12, 35-36.
27.	OR, vol. 3, 1031-1032.
30.	OR, vol. 3, 1032-1033.
31.	Section 2(d); Republic Act No. 7438.
32.	TSN, 21 November 1995, 14.
34.	OR, vol. 2, 528.
35.	TSN, 28 November 1995, 12-14.
36.	See Mustang v. CA, 257 SCRA 430, 449-450 ; I JOAQUIN G. BERNAS, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES: A COMMENTARY, 1987 ED., 104-105.
37.	TSN, 20 October 1995, 35-36.
38.	OR, vol. 2, 478-485; Per Romeo A. Brawner, J., Minerva Gonzaga-Reyes and Buenaventura J. Guerrero, JJ., concurring.
40.	Paderanga v. Drilon, 196 SCRA 86, 90 .
41.	People v. Casiano, 1 SCRA 478, 483 ; Socrates v. Sandiganbayan, 253 SCRA 773, 792 .
42.	OR, vol. 1, 124-125; See People v. Villanueva, 265 SCRA 318 .
43.	People v. Jamero, 133 PHIL. 127 ; People v. Torrefranca, 151 SCRA 143 ; Bogo-Medellin Milling Co., Inc. v. Son, 209 SCRA 329, 337-338 ; See People v. Armada, 225 SCRA 644 .
44.	People v. Alviar, 59 SCRA 136, 160 .
45.	People v. De la Cruz, 217 SCRA 283 ; People v. Kenysis, 221 SCRA 628 ; People v. Kyamko, 222 SCRA 183 .
46.	People v. Dela Cruz, 229 SCRA 755 .
47.	Article 2230, Civil Code.
48.	Del Rosario v. Court of Appeals, 267 SCRA 158, 173 , citing Mecenas v. Court of Appeals, 180 SCRA 83 .
49.	Article 2229, Civil Code.
50.	People v. Verde, 302 SCRA 690, 706 .

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