Source: http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/44215
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 16:01:51+00:00

Document:
CENTURY CANNING CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND GLORIA C. PALAD, RESPONDENTS.
This is a petition for review of the Decision dated 12 November 2001 and the Resolution dated 5 April 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 60379.
On 15 July 1997, Century Canning Corporation (petitioner) hired Gloria C. Palad (Palad) as "fish cleaner" at petitioner's tuna and sardines factory. Palad signed on 17 July 1997 an apprenticeship agreement with petitioner. Palad received an apprentice allowance of P138.75 daily. On 25 July 1997, petitioner submitted its apprenticeship program for approval to the Technical Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA) of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). On 26 September 1997, the TESDA approved petitioner's apprenticeship program.
According to petitioner, a performance evaluation was conducted on 15 November 1997, where petitioner gave Palad a rating of N.I. or "needs improvement" since she scored only 27.75% based on a 100% performance indicator. Furthermore, according to the performance evaluation, Palad incurred numerous tardiness and absences. As a consequence, petitioner issued a termination notice dated 22 November 1997 to Palad, informing her of her termination effective at the close of business hours of 28 November 1997.
Palad then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, underpayment of wages, and non- payment of pro-rated 13th month pay for the year 1997.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that the complaint for illegal dismissal filed by the complainant against the respondents in the above-entitled case should be, as it is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. However, the respondents are hereby ordered to pay the complainant the amount of ONE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED THIRTY-TWO PESOS (P1,632.00), representing her last salary and the amount of SEVEN THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED TWENTY EIGHT (P7,228.00) PESOS representing her prorated 13th month pay.
All other issues are likewise dismissed.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Arbiter dated 25 February 1999 is hereby MODIFIED in that, in addition, respondents are ordered to pay complainant's backwages for two (2) months in the amount of P7,176.00 (P138.75 x 26 x 2 mos.). All other dispositions of the Arbiter as appearing in the dispositive portion of his decision are AFFIRMED.
ordering private respondent to pay the costs of the suit.
The Court of Appeals held that the apprenticeship agreement which Palad signed was not valid and binding because it was executed more than two months before the TESDA approved petitioner's apprenticeship program. The Court of Appeals cited Nitto Enterprises v. National Labor Relations Commission, where it was held that prior approval by the DOLE of the proposed apprenticeship program is a condition sine qua non before an apprenticeship agreement can be validly entered into.
The Court of Appeals also held that petitioner illegally dismissed Palad. The Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner failed to show that Palad was properly apprised of the required standard of performance. The Court of Appeals likewise held that Palad was not afforded due process because petitioner did not comply with the twin requirements of notice and hearing.
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER HAD NOT ADEQUATELY PROVEN THE EXISTENCE OF A VALID CAUSE IN TERMINATING THE SERVICE OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT.
In the case at bench, the apprenticeship agreement between petitioner and private respondent was executed on May 28, 1990 allegedly employing the latter as an apprentice in the trade of "care maker/molder." On the same date, an apprenticeship program was prepared by petitioner and submitted to the Department of Labor and Employment. However, the apprenticeship agreement was filed only on June 7, 1990. Notwithstanding the absence of approval by the Department of Labor and Employment, the apprenticeship agreement was enforced the day it was signed.
Based on the evidence before us, petitioner did not comply with the requirements of the law. It is mandated that apprenticeship agreements entered into by the employer and apprentice shall be entered only in accordance with the apprenticeship program duly approved by the Minister of Labor and Employment.
Prior approval by the Department of Labor and Employment of the proposed apprenticeship program is, therefore, a condition sine qua non before an apprenticeship agreement can be validly entered into.
The act of filing the proposed apprenticeship program with the Department of Labor and Employment is a preliminary step towards its final approval and does not instantaneously give rise to an employer-apprentice relationship.
Article 57 of the Labor Code provides that the State aims to "establish a national apprenticeship program through the participation of employers, workers and government and non-government agencies" and "to establish apprenticeship standards for the protection of apprentices." To translate such objectives into existence, prior approval of the DOLE to any apprenticeship program has to be secured as a condition sine qua non before any such apprenticeship agreement can be fully enforced. The role of the DOLE in apprenticeship programs and agreements cannot be debased.
In this case, the apprenticeship agreement was entered into between the parties before petitioner filed its apprenticeship program with the TESDA for approval. Petitioner and Palad executed the apprenticeship agreement on 17 July 1997 wherein it was stated that the training would start on 17 July 1997 and would end approximately in December 1997. On 25 July 1997, petitioner submitted for approval its apprenticeship program, which the TESDA subsequently approved on 26 September 1997. Clearly, the apprenticeship agreement was enforced even before the TESDA approved petitioner's apprenticeship program. Thus, the apprenticeship agreement is void because it lacked prior approval from the TESDA.
The TESDA's approval of the employer's apprenticeship program is required before the employer is allowed to hire apprentices. Prior approval from the TESDA is necessary to ensure that only employers in the highly technical industries may employ apprentices and only in apprenticeable occupations. Thus, under RA 7796, employers can only hire apprentices for apprenticeable occupations which must be officially endorsed by a tripartite body and approved for apprenticeship by the TESDA. This is to ensure the protection of apprentices and to obviate possible abuses by prospective employers who may want to take advantage of the lower wage rates for apprentices and circumvent the right of the employees to be secure in their employment.
The requisite TESDA approval of the apprenticeship program prior to the hiring of apprentices was further emphasized by the DOLE with the issuance of Department Order No. 68-04 on 18 August 2004. Department Order No. 68-04, which provides the guidelines in the implementation of the Apprenticeship and Employment Program of the government, specifically states that no enterprise shall be allowed to hire apprentices unless its apprenticeship program is registered and approved by TESDA.
Since Palad is not considered an apprentice because the apprenticeship agreement was enforced before the TESDA's approval of petitioner's apprenticeship program, Palad is deemed a regular employee performing the job of a "fish cleaner." Clearly, the job of a "fish cleaner" is necessary in petitioner's business as a tuna and sardines factory. Under Article 280 of the Labor Code, an employment is deemed regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer.
We shall now resolve whether petitioner illegally dismissed Palad.
Under Article 279 of the Labor Code, an employer may terminate the services of an employee for just causes or for authorized causes. Furthermore, under Article 277(b) of the Labor Code, the employer must send the employee who is about to be terminated, a written notice stating the causes for termination and must give the employee the opportunity to be heard and to defend himself. Thus, to constitute valid dismissal from employment, two requisites must concur: (1) the dismissal must be for a just or authorized cause; and (2) the employee must be afforded an opportunity to be heard and to defend himself.
In this case, the Labor Arbiter held that petitioner terminated Palad for habitual absenteeism and poor efficiency of performance. Under Section 25, Rule VI, Book II of the Implementing Rules of the Labor Code, habitual absenteeism and poor efficiency of performance are among the valid causes for which the employer may terminate the apprenticeship agreement after the probationary period.
As to the validity of complainant's dismissal in her status as an apprentice, suffice to state that the findings of the Arbiter that complainant was dismissed due to failure to meet the standards is nebulous. What clearly appears is that complainant already passed the probationary status of the apprenticeship agreement of 200 hours at the time she was terminated on 28 November 1997 which was already the fourth month of the apprenticeship period of 1000 hours. As such, under the Code, she can only be dismissed for cause, in this case, for poor efficiency of performance on the job or in the classroom for a prolonged period despite warnings duly given to the apprentice.
We noted that no clear and sufficient evidence exist to warrant her dismissal as an apprentice during the agreed period. Besides the absence of any written warnings given to complainant reminding her of "poor performance," respondents' evidence in this respect consisted of an indecipherable or unauthenticated xerox of the performance evaluation allegedly conducted on complainant. This is of doubtful authenticity and/or credibility, being not only incomplete in the sense that appearing thereon is a signature (not that of complainant) side by side with a date indicated as "1/16/98". From the looks of it, this signature is close to and appertains to the typewritten position of "Division/Department Head", which is below the signature of complainant's immediate superior who made the evaluation indicated as "11-15-97."
Indeed, it appears that the Labor Arbiter's conclusion that petitioner validly terminated Palad was based mainly on the performance evaluation allegedly conducted by petitioner. However, Palad alleges that she had no knowledge of the performance evaluation conducted and that she was not even informed of the result of the alleged performance evaluation. Palad also claims she did not receive a notice of dismissal, nor was she given the chance to explain. According to petitioner, Palad did not receive the termination notice because Palad allegedly stopped reporting for work after being informed of the result of the evaluation.
Under Article 227 of the Labor Code, the employer has the burden of proving that the termination was for a valid or authorized cause. Petitioner failed to substantiate its claim that Palad was terminated for valid reasons. In fact, the NLRC found that petitioner failed to prove the authenticity of the performance evaluation which petitioner claims to have conducted on Palad, where Palad received a performance rating of only 27.75%. Petitioner merely relies on the performance evaluation to prove Palad's inefficiency. It was likewise not shown that petitioner ever apprised Palad of the performance standards set by the company. When the alleged valid cause for the termination of employment is not clearly proven, as in this case, the law considers the matter a case of illegal dismissal.
Furthermore, Palad was not accorded due process. Even if petitioner did conduct a performance evaluation on Palad, petitioner failed to warn Palad of her alleged poor performance. In fact, Palad denies any knowledge of the performance evaluation conducted and of the result thereof. Petitioner likewise admits that Palad did not receive the notice of termination because Palad allegedly stopped reporting for work. The records are bereft of evidence to show that petitioner ever gave Palad the opportunity to explain and defend herself. Clearly, the two requisites for a valid dismissal are lacking in this case.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision dated 12 November 2001 and the Resolution dated 5 April 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 60379.
 Penned by Associate Justice Elvi John S. Asuncion with Associate Justices Romeo A. Brawner and Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr., concurring.
 G.R. No. 114337, 29 September 1995, 248 SCRA 654.
 Article 58(b) of the Labor Code.
 Article 57(3) of the Labor Code.
 Otherwise known as the TESDA Act of 1994.
 See Article 60 of the Labor Code.
Apprenticeship -- training within employment involving a contract between an apprentice and an enterprise on an apprenticeable occupation.
Apprentice -- a person undergoing training for an approved apprenticeable occupation during an established period and covered by an apprenticeship agreement.
Apprenticeship Agreement -- a contract wherein a prospective enterprise binds himself to train the apprentice who, in turn, accepts the terms of training for a recognized apprenticeable occupation emphasizing the rights, duties and responsibilities of each party.
Apprenticeable Occupation -- an occupation officially approved for apprenticeship by TESDA.
ART. 280. Regular and casual employment. -- The provisions of written agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreements of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer except where the employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking, the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or service to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season.
 ART. 279. Security of Tenure. -- In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by this Title. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement.
 ART. 283. Closure of establishment and reduction of personnel. -- The employer may also terminate the employment of any employee due to the installation of labor saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or cessation of operation of the establishment or undertaking unless the closing is for the purpose of circumventing the provisions of this Title x x x.
 Skippers United Pacific, Inc. v. Maguad, G.R. No. 166363, 15 August 2006, 498 SCRA 639.
 Manly Express, Inc. v. Payong, Jr., G.R. No. 167462, 25 October 2005, 474 SCRA 323; Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 153180, 2 September 2005, 469 SCRA 353.
 Philippine National Bank v. Cabansag, G.R. No. 157010, 21 June 2005, 460 SCRA 514.
After a thorough evaluation of your work, attitude and performance, the management found out that you have been performing below the standard established by the company. As such, we regret to inform you that your employment shall be terminated effective at the close of business hours of NOV. 28, 1997.
Please proceed to the HRD office for your clearance.

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ART. 280
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 ART. 283
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