Source: https://cbaclelegalconnection.com/2012/09/05/
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 19:53:32+00:00

Document:
The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Colorado Common Cause v. Gessler, Secretary of State on August 30, 2012.
This case arose out of a challenge to the Colorado Secretary of State’s (Secretary) rulemaking authority brought by plaintiffs, Colorado Common Cause and Colorado Ethics Watch, pursuant to CRS § 24-4-106. The Secretary appealed the trial court’s order finding he exceeded his rulemaking authority in promulgating Rule 4.27. [Rule 4.27 has since been renumbered as Rule 4.1, 8 Code Colo. Regs. 1505–6.] The order was affirmed.
In 2002, Colorado voters adopted the Campaign and Political Finance Amendment (Amendment), which sets forth specific disclosure requirements that apply to various categories of participants in the elections process. The Amendment also regulates “issue committees” that advocate for or against ballot issues or questions. The Amendment incorporates the registration and disclosure requirements set forth in the Fair Campaign Practices Act (Act). In November 2010, a panel of the Tenth Circuit held in Sampson v. Buescher, 625 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir. 2010), that the financial burden of complying with the registration and reporting requirements for issue committees was substantial and the public interest in such information was minimal.
In response to Sampson, the Secretary commenced a rulemaking process to implement the decision. As part of this process, the Secretary published proposed Rule 4.27, which ultimately was adopted.Rule 4.27 states that “[a]n issue committee shall not be subject to any of the requirements of [the Amendment] or [the Act] until the issue committee has accepted $5,000 or more in contributions or made expenditures of $5,000 or more during an election cycle.” The contributions and expenditure made before reaching this threshold are not required to be reported.
Plaintiffs sued under CRS § 24-4-106. The trial court held that the Secretary had exceeded his rulemaking authority and dismissed the Secretary’s counterclaim for a declaration that the definition of issues committee is unenforceable until such a rule is adopted.
The Court of Appeals noted that an agency does not have authority to promulgate rules that modify or contravene statutory or constitutional provisions. Rule 4.27 creates a contribution and expenditure threshold of $5,000 that triggers an issue committee’s duty to register and disclose. The Act establishes a threshold of $200. On its face, Rule 4.27 conflicts with the clear requirements of Colorado law. Thus, unless Sampson abrogated the $200 threshold, the Secretary lacked the authority to promulgate the rule. The Secretary argued Sampson did just that. The Court disagreed.
The Tenth Circuit declined to address the facial challenge to Colorado’s campaign finance laws, holding only that the application of those laws under the specific facts of Sampson unconstitutionally burdened their freedom of association. The Circuit specifically acknowledged that Colorado campaign finance laws may be constitutionally applied outside of the context presented in Sampson. Consequently, Rule 4.27 sweeps far too broadly. The rule was set aside as void and the order was affirmed.
The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Progressive Casualty Insurance Co. v. Moore on August 30, 2012.
Denial of Benefits—Statutory Notice Requirements—Commercial Versus Personal Policies.
In this declaratory judgment action, S. Bryan Moore appealed the judgment entered in favor of Progressive Casualty Insurance Company. The judgment was affirmed.
Moore was involved in a car accident. Progressive Casualty Insurance Co. (Progressive) denied his claim for insurance benefits because his automobile insurance policy had expired months earlier.
Moore contended that the trial court misapprehended the applicability of CRS § 10-4-110.5. Specifically, Moore argued that the policy had renewed automatically because Progressive had failed to comply with the statutory notice requirements. However, § 10-4-110.5 applies only to commercial automobile insurance policies, and Moore’s policy was not commercial. Therefore, the trial court’s ruling was affirmed.
The Tenth Circuit published its opinion in United States v. De Vaughn on August 31, 2012.
The defendant, Jay De Vaughn, pleaded guilty to mailing threatening communications and made this plea unconditionally, without reserving a right to appeal. De Vaughn appealed, saying his statements did not constitute threats, and making an as-applied First Amendment argument. Because the government failed to raise the preclusive effect of his guilty plea, the court analyzed whether it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal before concluding that it did under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
Generally, “a voluntary and unconditional guilty plea waives all non-jurisdictional defenses.” The Tenth Circuit applied United States v. Cotton to hold that an argument that an indictment or information does not charge a crime against the United States is not jurisdictional.
“A guilty plea waives all defenses except those that go to the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction and the narrow class of constitutional claims involving the right not to be haled into court.” The Tenth Circuit held that the defendant’s First Amendment argument did not involve subject matter jurisdiction.
Because the government waived the preclusive effect of defendant’s guilty plea, the court reviewed the defendant’s arguments for plain error and found none.
The Tenth Circuit published its opinion in Sosa-Valenzuela v. Holder on August 31, 2012.
Baltazar Sosa-Valenzuela, a lawful permanent resident, shot a gang member and was convicted. The INS (now the DHS) sought to deport him. Sosa-Valenzuela sought a § 212 waiver (since repealed) and later, adjustment of status due to his marriage to an American citizen. An immigration judge (IJ) granted both requests and denied the DHS’s motion to reconsider. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) vacated the IJ’s § 212 waiver and adjustment of status.
The BIA has broad appellate jurisdiction under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1 and reviews IJ decisions de novo. It also is required to apply new law to its decisions. The BIA’s broad powers of collateral review do not violate a petitioner’s due process rights because “the only protections afforded are the minimal procedural due process rights for an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Sosa-Valenzuela was afforded that opportunity.
The Tenth Circuit remanded to the BIA to reevaluate the § 212 waiver decision because the case it relied on in finding Sosa-Valenzuela was ineligible for the waiver had later been found unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476 (2011). The court affirmed the BIA’s denial of adjustment of status due to marriage because its review of the BIA’s exercise of discretion is limited under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 to constitutional claims or questions of law, neither of which was present here.
On Friday, August 31, 2012, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued two published opinions and three unpublished opinions.

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