Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/250/76/
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 04:25:54+00:00

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Justia › US Law › US Case Law › US Supreme Court › Volume 250 › Fillippon v. Albion Vein Slate Co.
In response to an inquiry from the jury, who had retired to consider of their verdict, the trial court sent them a supplementary instruction in writing on a question of contributory negligence. Held error, the parties and their counsel being absent and no opportunity being given them either to be present or to make timely objection. P. 250 U. S. 80.
An opportunity afterwards to except to an instruction and to the manner of giving it is not equivalent to an opportunity to be present during the proceedings, since the prime and essential function of an exception is to direct the mind of the trial judge to the point in question so that he may reconsider and change his ruling if convinced of error. P. 250 U. S. 81.
In jury trials, erroneous instructions are presumptively harmful. P. 250 U. S. 82.
An erroneous instruction may neutralize a correct one on the same subject and introduce material error. P. 250 U. S. 83.
Under the law of Pennsylvania, a servant who goes on with perilous work under the peremptory orders of his master, although knowing the attendant danger and having time to consider, is not guilty of contributory negligence unless he knows, or has reason to suppose, that the danger is inevitable or imminent. P. 250 U. S. 82.
his arm and crushed it so that amputation was necessary.
imminent that faced the plaintiff, and he, in the face of it, did the thing that he knew, as a reasonably careful man, under the circumstances, was dangerous, he is guilty of contributory negligence, and cannot recover."
"Whether the plaintiff, in pushing the wedge beneath the block of slate with his hand, having full knowledge of the risk involved, thereby became guilty of contributory negligence, even though told by Foreman Davis to 'push it under.'"
"If he was told to put it under as stated by the plaintiff and he did so, fully appreciating at the time the danger attending and having sufficient time to consider, when he was face to face with a situation that would have made a reasonably prudent man to disobey the orders of the foreman, notwithstanding, and he went ahead in spite of the dangers known to him and apparent, he is guilty of contributory negligence."
To this action of the court plaintiff excepted at the first opportunity upon grounds that raise two questions: (a) whether it was erroneous to give this supplementary instruction in the absence of the parties and without calling the jury in open court, and (b) whether the instruction so given was erroneous.
The jury having returned a verdict in favor of defendant, and a motion for a new trial having been denied, the resulting judgment was brought under the review of the circuit court of appeals, and there affirmed. 242 F. 258. Thereupon this writ of certiorari was allowed.
We entertain no doubt that the orderly conduct of a trial by jury, essential to the proper protection of the right to be heard, entitles the parties who attend for the purpose to be present in person or by counsel at all proceedings from the time the jury is impaneled until it is discharged after rendering the verdict. Where a jury has retired to consider of their verdict, and supplementary instructions are required either because asked for by the jury or for other reasons, they ought to be given either in the presence of counsel or after notice and an opportunity to be present, and written instructions ought not to be sent to the jury without notice to counsel and an opportunity to object. Under ordinary circumstances, and wherever practicable, the jury ought to be recalled to the courtroom, where counsel are entitled to anticipate, and bound to presume, in the absence of notice to the contrary, that all proceedings in the trial will be had. In this case, the trial court erred in giving a supplementary instruction to the jury in the absence of the parties and without affording them an opportunity either to be present or to make timely objection to the instruction. See Stewart v. Wyoming Ranche Co., 128 U. S. 389, 128 U. S. 390; Aerheart v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co., 99 F. 907, 910; Yates v. Whyel Coke Co., 221 F. 603, 608, and many decisions of the state courts collated in 17 L.R. A. (N.S.) 609; note to North Dakota v. Murphy, 17 N.D. 48.
was probable to arise under like circumstances, and hence affirmed the judgment.
It is not correct, however, to regard the opportunity of afterwards excepting to the instruction and to the manner of giving it as equivalent to an opportunity to be present during the proceedings. To so hold would be to overlook the primary and essential function of an exception, which is to direct the mind of the trial judge to the point in which it is supposed that he has erred in law, so that he may reconsider it and change his ruling if convinced of error, and that injustice and mistrials due to inadvertent errors may thus be obviated. United States v. U.S. Fidelity Co., 236 U. S. 512, 236 U. S. 529; Guerini Stone Co. v. Carlin Construction Co., 248 U. S. 334, 248 U. S. 348.
And, of course, in jury trials, erroneous rulings are presumptively injurious, especially those embodied in instructions to the jury, and they furnish ground for reversal unless it affirmatively appears that they were harmless.
In this case, so far from the supplementary instruction's being harmless, in our opinion it was erroneous and calculated to mislead the jury in that it excluded a material element that needed to be considered in determining whether plaintiff should be held guilty of contributory negligence under the particular hypothesis referred to in the jury's question.
used by extraordinary caution or skill, the rule is different. In such case, the master is liable for a resulting accident."
"If the defect was so great that obviously, with the use of the utmost skill and care, the danger was imminent, so much so that none but a reckless man would incur it, the employer would not be liable."
Patterson v. Pittsburgh & Connellsville R. Co., 76 Pa. 389, 394.
"If the master gives the servant to understand that he does not consider the risk one which a prudent person should refuse to undertake, the servant has a right to rely upon his master's judgment unless his own is so clearly opposed thereto that, in fact, he does not rely upon his master's opinion. A servant is not called upon to set up his own unaided judgment against that of his superiors, and he may rely upon their advice, and still more upon their orders, notwithstanding many misgivings of his own. The servant's dependent and inferior position is to be taken into consideration, and if the master gives him positive orders to go on with the work under perilous circumstances, the servant may recover for an injury thus incurred if the work was not inevitably and imminently dangerous."
Williams v. Clark, 204 Pa. 416, 418. To the same effect, Glew v. Pittsburgh Railways Co., 234 Pa. 238, 242-243; Moleskey v. South Fork Coal Mining Co., 247 Pa. 434, 437-438.
"Of course, if the master gives positive orders to go on with the work under perilous circumstances, the servant may recover for an injury thus incurred if the work was not inevitably or imminently dangerous."
block of slate with his hand, he fully appreciated the attendant danger and had sufficient time to consider, and if the situation was such as would have made a reasonably prudent man disobey the order, and he went ahead in spite of the dangers known to him and apparent, he was guilty of contributory negligence. The effect of this was to bar a recovery if the plaintiff knew of the attendant danger, although he did not know or have reason to suppose that the danger was inevitable or imminent -- that is, immediately threatening. We suppose it hardly could have been a point in dispute that plaintiff knew that the operation of pushing the wedge beneath a large block of slate with his hand was dangerous, for he was familiar with the work, knew what safeguard was customarily taken against this danger, expressed a fear of it upon the particular occasion, and requested time to get an implement to be used for his safety according to the custom. It was at this precise moment, according to the testimony, that the foreman or superintendent told him to "go ahead, go ahead," and, under the Pennsylvania decisions, he was entitled to rely upon the judgment and order of his superior if the work was not inevitably and imminently dangerous -- that is, threatening immediate injury upon the particular occasion. The jury very reasonably might conclude that neither plaintiff nor the foreman believed or had reason to believe that the work was inevitably and imminently dangerous; but if it was not, he was entitled, under the Pennsylvania decisions, to hold his employer responsible for the consequences of what he did under peremptory orders of the foreman, although he (the plaintiff) fully appreciated the general dangers, had time to consider, and went ahead notwithstanding.
The judgment under review will be reversed, and the cause remanded to the district court for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion.
* See Workmen's Compensation Act of 1915, Pa.Laws 1915, p. 736.

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