Source: https://www.hearsay.org.au/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1309&Itemid=35
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 14:13:45+00:00

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Hearsay ... the electronic journal of the Bar Association of Queensland - Failure to Arraign in Summary Proceedings: Formal Irregularity or Fatal Defect?
Failure to Arraign in Summary Proceedings: Formal Irregularity or Fatal Defect?
The following article by Anthony J H Morris Q.C. examines the consequences of failing to arraign a defendant in summary proceedings, having regard to the relevant statutory requirements and recent Queensland cases.
In recent years, a number of cases have come before Queensland appellate courts where the defendant at a summary trial – whether charged with a simple offence, or charged with an indictable offence tried summarily – has not been required formally to enter a plea. In some instances, this appears to have been a mere procedural oversight; in other instances, it appears that an abbreviated procedure has been adopted in the interests of efficiency.
It is, nonetheless, surprising how often such issues have arisen in Queensland’s appellate courts over recent years. If it is reasonable to extrapolate from the frequency of such appeals, which may represent only the “tip of the iceberg”, it could be concluded that actual procedural oversights – as distinct from the deliberate adoption of time-honoured formulæ or customary procedures – is endemic. And even more surprising is the fact that many of these recent appellate decisions have been determined without reference to the others of them.
(1) When the defendant is present at the hearing the substance of the complaint shall be stated to the defendant and the defendant shall be asked how he or she pleads.
(2) If the defendant pleads guilty, the Magistrates Court shall convict the defendant or make an order against the defendant or deal with the defendant in any manner authorised by law.
(c) to ask the defendant whether he or she wants the charge to be dealt with summarily.
(3) Whether or not the defendant is legally represented, unless the defendant informs the Magistrates Court that he or she wants to be tried by a jury, the Magistrates Court must ask whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty of the offence.
(4) If the defendant says ‘guilty’ the Magistrates Court must convict.
(5) If the defendant says ‘not guilty’ the Magistrates Court must hear the defence.
(6) After the defendant enters a plea, the Magistrates Court must then deal with the charge summarily.
... It appears from the material placed before this court that through inadvertence, no plea was ever taken by the magistrate. If that is right there was a breach of s 145 of the Justices Act 1886. Differing opinions have been expressed about the consequences of such a breach: See Rowen v. Strophair;12 Murray v. Northcott;13 Sesar v. Haymon;14 cf Daly v. Barlow.15 This case should serve as a timely reminder of the need to comply with the section. In the present case the non-compliance if any could not possibly have brought about any miscarriage of justice. That being so a grant of leave to appeal on this ground would be unwarranted.
In this case the appellant wanted to enter a plea of not guilty and there is no suggestion that the failure of the magistrate to take a plea formally in the case has in any way affected or influenced the outcome of the case. Accordingly the procedural error in this case does not require that the appellant’s conviction be set aside.
If there is a defect in the constitution of the court, the authorities suggest that the conviction will be set aside whether it might be thought to have affected the result or not. This is to be distinguished from procedural errors in the course of a trial by a duly constituted court. In such cases one examines whether the error might have affected the determinative process or the opportunity of acquittal for the accused, or even more generally if it might have affected the quality of the trial.
BENCH: Yes. I’ll get you to announce your appearance ... .
DEFENDANT’S SOLICITOR: [after announcing his name and firm name] Appearing on behalf of Mr McKinlay this morning.
BENCH: Yes. A charge of serious assault.
DEFENDANT’S SOLICITOR: Yes, your Honour. The matter was listed for a contested hearing this morning. I had some discussion with my friend this morning. For some reason, their office only had it listed as a mention. As such, no witnesses are available today. We had had some discussion as to the facts and the matter has resolved. It can now proceed by way of a plea of guilty.
DEFENDANT’S SOLICITOR: Yes, your Honour.
 The Justices Act 1886 (Qld) is relevantly different from the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) in that the definition of “defendant” in s 3 of the Justices Act does not include that person’s lawyer. It is arguable that a plea entered against a defendant who is present at the hearing will not be valid unless “the substance of the complaint” is stated to him at the hearing and he personally responds to the question how he pleads.
In Warcon,36 the point arose in a tangential, though ingenious, way. Counsel on behalf of Warcon argued that, for the purposes of sections 221 and 222 of the Justices Act 1886, he could not be taken to have pleaded guilty (so as to limit his right to appeal against conviction) when the strict requirements in section 552I of the Criminal Code had not been complied with on the summary trial of an indictable offence.
 Williams and Ellis both concerned proceedings conducted on indictment. The present case was a summary proceeding. In Ellis, the court proclaimed the fundamental importance of the defendant’s claim to direct participation in making the plea of guilty. In Williams, the court did not conclude the same fundamental importance attached to the personal making of the defendant’s plea of not guilty where the trial was obviously conducted in his presence on the premise that he had so pleaded.
 Neither case dealt with the summary disposition of an indictable offence. Neither dealt with the effect on the essential validity of summary proceedings of a legal representative, in the presence of and without comment or objection by the defendant, stating that he holds instructions to enter a plea of guilty.
 What occurred in the present case did not conform to the procedure required by s. 552I. As the respondent did not tell the magistrate he wanted to be tried by a jury, it was for the magistrate to ask him whether he pleaded guilty or not guilty. That did not happen. The defendant, himself, did not say “guilty”. If the proceedings were thereby irregular I am unable to conclude they were a nullity.
“(2) The grounds on which the person may appeal include that the Magistrates Court erred by deciding the conviction or sentence summarily.
 In this case, the respondent’s legal representative, in the presence of the respondent, said “I am instructed to enter a plea of guilty to that charge.” Thereafter the proceedings were conducted on that plea. Neither the prosecution nor the respondent objected. The respondent still makes no objection. The respondent was convicted and sentenced and the matter has passed into judgment.
“BENCH: So accordingly, what I’m going to do is I’m going to sentence you to a term of imprisonment. I - you’ll be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 10 months. Now, taking into account your engagement with Helem Yumba and your age, I will order that fixed parole date be as at today, the 3rd of September 2010; right. Now, that means that you will be on parole for a period of 10 months from today, right.
Now if you breach parole, you know what can happen - you can come back before this Court and be ordered to - you know, you can serve - end up serving a term of imprisonment, ultimately, do you understand that?
BENCH: Now, one of the requirements will be that you must report today to the Probation and Parole Office at Rockhampton. If you don’t, you will be in immediate breach of parole; do you understand that?
 There is no submission that justice has miscarried. In my view the conviction is valid unless and until the plea is set aside according to well-recognised principles governing an application to withdraw a plea of guilty or an appeal against conviction after a plea of guilty.
Another decision of Judge Devereaux, PPG,44 concerned a defendant in summary proceedings on whose behalf a guilty plea was entered by “a solicitor with considerable experience”. The solicitor was acting – in rather singular circumstances – as “friend of the Court”.
I proceed on the basis that a lawyer acting for a person may tell the court the person pleads guilty, effectively entering the plea on the defendant’s behalf. I am not satisfied that occurred in the present case because it is far from clear that the solicitor was engaged in a solicitor/client relationship with the appellant. He offered assistance as friend of the court and his appearance was so recorded. In the circumstances, I am not prepared to infer, despite the manner in which the solicitor made submissions, that the solicitor was even temporarily retained to act for the appellant.
This result was doubtless contributed to by the fact that in neither case had the Judge been referred to the relevant Queensland authorities. Nor, in Brown (which was decided in Townsville on 6 December 2011), was Judge Durward told about the decision of Judge Devereaux in Warcon (decided in Rockhampton on 7 March 2011).
Where indictable offences are to be heard and determined summarily, each offence must be read to the defendant and a separate plea taken to each offence, after it is read to the defendant. A failure to follow that procedure is in my view, an incurable irregularity that will result in a conviction on a plea of guilty being quashed on appeal and the sentence imposed being set aside.
Even allowing for the fact that His Honour did not have the benefit of reference to the previous Queensland appellate decisions relating to this question, it seems difficult to justify Judge Durward’s conclusion that what occurred amounts to “an incurable irregularity that will result in a conviction on a plea of guilty being quashed on appeal and the sentence imposed being set aside”. Significantly, this point was conceded by the respondent’s counsel, which possibly explains the fact that His Honour was not taken to the relevant authorities, although His Honour commented that “[t]he concession ... was a proper concession to make in the circumstances”.
Whilst both section 145(1) of the Act and section 552I of the Code contain the word “substance”, the procedure in the Code section is more detailed and specific.
This, with respect, would appear to be a particularly tenuous basis for holding that, in effect, the one is merely directory, whilst the other is mandatory.
Despite some obvious difficulties in reconciling this line of authorities, it seems that some conclusions may be expressed with a degree of confidence.
enter a plea of “guilty” or “not guilty” on the defendant’s behalf.
(3) On the other hand, it has been held that a guilty plea cannot be entered on a defendant’s behalf by a lawyer who is not retained by the defendant, such as one acting as amicus curiæ.51 The same reasoning would suggest that a guilty plea should not be accepted from an unqualified person, such as a “McKenzie friend”,52 who is assisting, or purporting to act for, the defendant; though a different conclusion may be open if such a person has applied for, and been formally granted, leave to appear for the defendant.
(4) Some authorities suggest that a self-represented defendant may also choose to “take the charge as read” and enter a plea without being formally arraigned.53 However, it is desirable that particular care be taken in such cases, to ensure that there is compliance with the substance – and preferably the letter – of the requirements in section 145 of the Justices Act 1886.
(5) Nonetheless, if the defendant makes it clear that he or she wishes to contest the charge, and if the magistrate proceeds on the basis that a plea of “not guilty” has been entered, it is difficult to imagine any circumstances in which an appellate court would overturn any conviction which is otherwise sustainable on the evidence.
that the defendant manifested a clear intention of admitting guilt.
elect for a summary hearing.
(2) However, in light of the decision of Judge Durward in Brown v. Queensland Police Service54 – and despite the contrary view of Judge Devereaux in Commissioner of Police v. Warcon55 – strict compliance with the requirements in section 552I of the Criminal Code must be regarded as the preferable course, even if non-compliance may not necessarily result in a successful appeal.
being a qualified lawyer, is not retained specifically to act for the defendant.
(4) Certainly, in all cases where the defendant is self-represented, nothing less than strict compliance with the requirements in section 552I of the Criminal Code should be entertained.
(5) But, that said, there is much force in the view of Judge Devereaux56 that non-compliance with s.552I, though an irregularity, does not necessarily render the proceedings a nullity.
that the defendant manifested a clear intention of electing to be tried summarily.
Compare Ellis (1973) 57 Cr.App.R. 571 at 575.

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