Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=82440:56312&catid=1575&Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 04:08:44+00:00

Document:
A.M. No. RTJ-11-2259 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 10-3441-RTJ), October 22, 2013 - MA. REGINA S. PERALTA, Complainant, v. JUDGE GEORGE E. OMELIO, Respondent.; A.M. NO. RTJ-11-2264 (FORMERLY OCA IPI NO. 10-3368-RTJ) - ROMUALDO G. MENDOZA, Complainant, v. JUDGE GEORGE E. OMELIO, Respondent.; A.M. NO. RTJ-11-2273 (FORMERLY OCA IPI NO. 10-3381-RTJ) - ATTY. ASTERIA E. CRUZABRA, Complainant, v. JUDGE GEORGE E. OMELIO, Respondent.
MA. REGINA S. PERALTA, Complainant, v. JUDGE GEORGE E. OMELIO, Respondent.
ROMUALDO G. MENDOZA, Complainant, v. JUDGE GEORGE E. OMELIO, Respondent.
ATTY. ASTERIA E. CRUZABRA, Complainant, v. JUDGE GEORGE E. OMELIO, Respondent.
Before the Court are three consolidated administrative complaints against respondent George E. Omelio, presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City, Branch 14, for gross ignorance of the law, grave misconduct, oppression, bias and partiality.
WHEREFORE, finding the instant petition well founded, the same is hereby granted.
The Registrar Register of Deeds of Davao City is hereby ordered to reconstitute the owners Original Duplicate copy of Original Certificate of Titles No. OCT No. 164, OCT No. 219, OCT No. 220, OCT No. 301, OCT No. 337, OCT No. 514 and OCT No. 67 with the approved Technical Description of said parcels of land attached with this petition be respectively inscribed thereto and that the titles to the said mentioned parcels of land be duly registered in the name of the original owner Constancio Guzman, and considering that the latter through his attorney-in-fact Bellie S. Artigas sold the same to herein petitioner (Exhs. “G” to “M”), the Register of Deeds, Davao City is further ordered to correspondingly issue Transfer Certificate of Titles over the subject parcels of land in the name of herein petitioner.
As there is already a doubt cast by these concerned sectors against the sense of impartiality and independence of the undersigned Presiding Judge he is therefore, voluntarily INHIBITING himself from further sitting in this case.
Let the record of this case be transmitted to the Office of the Executive Judge of this Court for re-raffling with the exception of Branch 14. SO ORDERED.
The case was re-raffled off to Branch 15, but the presiding judge thereof, after setting the OSG’s petition for relief from judgment for hearing and directing Denila to file her answer, eventually inhibited himself upon motion filed by Denila. The case was thus sent back to Branch 14.
The instant petition is DISMISSED.
On March 28, 2012, Justice Zenaida T. Galapate-Laguilles of the Court of Appeals Mindanao Station submitted her Report.39 She found the complaints in A.M. Nos. RTJ-11-2259 and RTJ-11-2264 lacking in factual and legal bases. However, she recommended that in A.M. No. RTJ-11-2273, respondent be suspended for three months and ordered to pay a fine of P30,000.00 for gross ignorance of the law, with a warning that any similar transgression in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
We agree with the findings and recommended penalty of the OCA.
In A.M. No. RTJ-11-2259, upon receiving the complaint on March 26, 2010, respondent granted the prayer for TRO after holding at his chambers a conference with the parties’ respective counsels who conformed to the issuance of a TRO. Peralta and her counsel thus had notice and the requirement of a summary hearing was substantially complied with. In any case, under Section 5,45 Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, respondent was allowed to issue ex parte a TRO of limited effectivity and, in that time, conduct a hearing to determine the propriety of extending the TRO or issuing a writ of preliminary injunction.
Indeed, as a matter of public policy, not every error or mistake committed by judges in the performance of their official duties renders them administratively liable.47 Only errors that are tainted with fraud, corruption or malice may be the subject of disciplinary actions. For administrative liability to attach, respondent must be shown to have been moved by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred or some other similar motive.48 Peralta failed to allege and prove any improper motive or bad faith on the part of respondent. She merely averred having suffered “undue emotional and financial hardships” because of respondent’s act. For this reason, her complaint against the respondent must be dismissed.
As to the charges of gross ignorance of the law, partiality and prejudgment in A.M. No. RTJ-11-2264, the complaint focuses on respondent’s Order dated February 2, 2010 in Civil Case No. 32,245-2008 (for “Annulment of Judgment”) which granted the association’s (defendant in the unlawful detainer case decided by the MCTC) motion for reconsideration of the July 16, 2009 Order issued by Judge Europa to whom the case was initially assigned. Aside from the fact that said motion was filed after the lapse of 7 months and 5 days from June 22, 2009 when Judge Europa denied the association’s motion for reconsideration of the November 7, 2008 Order denying the association’s application for a writ of preliminary injunction, the Order sought to be reconsidered – the July 16, 2009 Order – was, in fact, irrelevant because it merely cancelled the scheduled pre-trial conference as Judge Europa, upon motion filed by the association, inhibited herself from further handling the case. Mendoza stresses that the February 2, 2010 Order issued by respondent granted the association’s application for a writ of preliminary injunction, which was already denied under Judge Europa’s November 7, 2008 Order. He thus accuses respondent of committing patently erroneous acts in abuse of his authority when he entertained the association’s Motion for Reconsideration dated January 29, 2010 despite being a second motion for reconsideration proscribed by the Rules of Court which was filed only months after the application for a writ of preliminary injunction was denied by Judge Europa, and notwithstanding that the July 16, 2009 Order refers to the cancellation of the pre-trial hearing and not the denial of the application for a writ of preliminary injunction. These acts, coupled with respondent’s “arguing in behalf” of the association’s counsel whom he even called “Congressman Mahipus,” strongly indicate respondent’s partiality to the association.
We agree with the OCA that while the association’s motion dated January 29, 2010 was a second motion for reconsideration, said motion did not violate the rule prohibiting the filing of a second motion for reconsideration.
An order granting or denying an application for preliminary injunction is interlocutory in nature.52 The November 7, 2008 order denying the application for a writ of preliminary injunction is not a final order, and hence the association’s filing of a second motion for reconsideration of the said order, is not prohibited. Being an interlocutory order which is not appealable,53 respondent’s subsequent order granting the application for preliminary injunction may be challenged in a petition for certiorari before the CA. Mendoza, however, opted to file this administrative complaint which contained no allegation that he had availed of the aforesaid remedy to set aside the writ issued by respondent.
In view of the foregoing reasons, Mendoza’s administrative complaint against respondent must be dismissed for lack of merit.
However, we find respondent administratively liable in A.M. No. RTJ-11-2273 for gross ignorance of the law in (a) refusing to adhere to a prior ruling of this Court against the reconstitution of certain OCTs; (b) reversing his previous inhibition in Sp. Proc. No. 7527-2004; and (c) taking cognizance of Denila’s motion for indirect contempt.
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the order dated May 12, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, of Davao City and another order dated July 11, 2003 which denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration in Special Proceedings Nos. 5913-01 to 5916-01.
The generative facts of this case follow.
On June 8, 2001, petitioner filed in the trial court four separate petitions for reconstitution of lost and/or destroyed original certificates of title (OCT) nos. 219, 337, 67 and 164.
Petitioner alleges that Constancio Guzman was the owner of several parcels of land located in Davao City. Constancio was beheaded by the Japanese soldiers on December 21, 1941. Thereafter, his common-law wife, Isabel Luna, also passed away. Constancio died without any direct heir and was survived by petitioner, a corporation whose stakeholders were sons, daughters and grandchildren of his only brother, the late Manuel Guzman.
In compliance with the court’s order, petitioner caused the publication of each petition in the Official Gazette for two consecutive weeks as well as the posting of copies of the four petitions at the City Hall and Hall of Justice of Davao City.
During the initial hearing on May 16, 2002, the trial court issued an order requiring the Register of Deeds of Davao City to submit a report on the status of the aforementioned certificates of title.
On July 25, 2002, the Acting Registrar of Deeds of Davao City, Atty. Florenda Patriarca, submitted a report showing that: (1) OCT No. 337 in the name of spouses Constancio Guzman and Isabel Luna had already been cancelled and was the subject of several transfers, the latest being to the Republic of the Philippines; (2) OCT No. 219 in the name of spouses Constancio Guzman and Isabel Luna had likewise been cancelled and, was the subject of several transfers, the latest being in favor of Antonio Arroyo; (3) OCT No. 164 in the name of spouses Constancio Guzman and Isabel Luna was the subject of several transfers and was now registered in the name of Antonio Arroyo; (4) OCT No. 67 in the name of Constancio Guzman alone had also been cancelled and transferred several times, the latest being in the name of Madeline Marfori.
On November 25, 2002, Madeline Marfori and Beatriz Gutierrez opposed the petitions for reconstitution and filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the petitions failed to satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of RA 26.
On May 12, 2003, the trial court issued an order dismissing all the petitions for reconstitution as it was clear from the report of the Register of Deeds that OCT Nos. 337, 219, 164 and 67 were neither mutilated, destroyed nor lost but were in fact cancelled as a result of voluntary and involuntary transfers.
At the outset, it should be stated that there is here a blatant disregard of the hierarchy of courts and no exceptional or compelling circumstance has been cited by petitioner why direct recourse to this Court should be allowed. In Tano v. Socrates, this Court declared that the propensity of litigants and lawyers to disregard the hierarchy of courts must be stopped in its tracks, not only because it wastes the precious time of this Court but also because it delays the adjudication of a case which has to be remanded or referred to the proper forum.
Under Resolution61 dated February 16, 2004, this Court issued a final denial of the motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners in the above-cited case. In its petition for relief from judgment, the OSG brought to the attention of respondent the foregoing ruling as the Republic’s good and valid defense against Denila’s claim. While respondent inhibited himself from the case he eventually resumed handling the case after the presiding judge of Branch 15 inhibited himself upon motion filed by Denila. Instead of giving serious consideration to the meritorious defense raised by the Republic, respondent denied the petition for relief, finding both the City Prosecutor and Cruzabra at fault, the former in not filing a motion for reconsideration and the latter in her “wrong interpretation of the Rules” when she filed instead a consulta before the LRA. The City Prosecutor moved to reconsider the denial of the Republic’s petition for relief from judgment, but respondent denied it on the flimsy reason that the notice of hearing was addressed to the Clerk of Court.
In Republic v. Tuastumban,62 the Court enumerated what needs to be shown before the issuance of an order for reconstitution: (a) that the certificate of title had been lost or destroyed; (b) that the documents presented by petitioner are sufficient and proper to warrant reconstitution of the lost or destroyed certificate of title; (c) that the petitioner is the registered owner of the property or has an interest therein; (d) that the certificate of title was in force at the time it was lost or destroyed; and (e) that the description, area and boundaries of the property are substantially the same as those contained in the lost or destroyed certificate of title.63 That OCT Nos. 164, 219, 337 and 67 are already cancelled titles was definitively settled by this Court. Respondent’s stubborn disregard of our pronouncement that the said titles can no longer be reconstituted is a violation of his mandate to apply the relevant statutes and jurisprudence in deciding cases.
The said decisions, more importantly, “form part of the legal system,” and failure of any court to apply them shall constitute an abdication of its duty to resolve a dispute in accordance with law, and shall be a ground for administrative action against an inferior court magistrate.
With respect to OCT Nos. 220, 301 and 514, the LRA urged the RTC to re-examine the correctness of its order to reconstitute the said titles in the hearing of the Republic’s petition for relief from judgment since said titles were found to have been cancelled on account of various transactions. The LRA resolution on Consulta No. 4581 was presented by Cruzabra as her defense to the motion for contempt filed by Denila in the reconstitution case after the petition for indirect contempt (Civil Case No. 32,387-08) was dismissed by Judge Carpio.
In his March 4, 2010 Order declaring Cruzabra and Paralisan in contempt of court, respondent brushed aside the LRA’s findings on the subject OCTs. Respondent instead faulted the Register of Deeds for issuing the derivative titles “despite existence of the subject original certificates of titles in the files of the Land Registration Authority.”66 This stance of respondent is perplexing considering that in the March 4, 2008 Decision, respondent narrated that Denila’s witness, Myrna Fernandez, Chief of the LRA’s Document Section Docket Division, who presented in court certified true copies of the original copies in their file of the subject OCTs, “further testified that as record custodian they only keep a record of the said titles and as to the cancellation thereof, it is the Register of Deeds of the said place that makes the cancellation without need of any communication or information on their end.”67 It is thus clear that the present condition of the titles is to be verified not from the LRA but with the local Registry of Deeds where instruments of conveyance and other transactions are recorded. Indeed, the records reveal that respondent persistently ignored these findings on the status of the subject OCTs, including the previous ruling of this Court, as he even blamed the OSG for raising the matter only in their petition for relief from judgment.
But more important, respondent granted the petition for reconstitution in Sp. Proc. 7527-2004 despite non-compliance with the requirements under R.A. No. 26.
SEC. 12. Petitions for reconstitution from sources enumerated in Sections 2(c), 2(d), 2(e), 2(f), 3(c), 3(d), 3(e) and/or 3(f) of this Act, shall be filed with the proper Court of First Instance, by the registered owner, his assigns, or any person having an interest in the property. The petition shall state or contain, among other things, the following: (a) that the owner’s duplicate of the certificate of title had been lost or destroyed; (b) that no co-owner’s mortgagee’s or lessee’s duplicate had been issued, or, if any had been issued, the same had been lost or destroyed; (c) the location, area and boundaries of the property; (d) the nature and description of the buildings or improvements, if any, which do not belong to the owner of the land, and the names and addresses of the owners of such buildings or improvements; (e) the names and addresses of the occupants or persons in possession of the property, of the owners of the adjoining properties and all persons who may have any interest in the property; (f) a detailed description of the encumbrances, if any, affecting the property; and (g) a statement that no deeds or other instruments affecting the property have been presented for registration, or, if there be any, the registration thereof has not been accomplished, as yet. All the documents, or authenticated copies thereof, to be introduced in evidence in support of the petition for reconstitution shall be attached thereto and filed with the same: Provided, That in case the reconstitution is to be made exclusively from sources enumerated in Section 2(f) or 3(f) of this Act, the petition shall be further be accompanied with a plan and technical description of the property duly approved by the Chief of the General Land Registration Office, or with a certified copy of the description taken from a prior certificate of title covering the same property.
In this case, the petition for reconstitution of the subject OCTs is based on Section 2 (c), that is, on certified true copies of the said titles issued by a legal custodian from the LRA. However, the amended petition and the notice of hearing failed to state the names and addresses of the occupants or persons in possession of the property and all persons who may have any interest in the property as required by Section 12. There is also no compliance with the required service of notice to the said occupants, possessors and all persons who may have any interest in the property.
Records reveal that Denila indeed failed to disclose in her amended petition for reconstitution that there are occupants and possessors in the properties covered by the subject OCTs. Third parties, including the City Government of Davao filed motions for intervention in CA-G.R. SP 03270-MIN and manifested before the CA Cagayan de Oro City that several structures and buildings, including a barangay hall, a police station and a major public highway would be affected by the order for the issuance of a fencing permit and writ of demolition issued by respondent. These occupants and possessors have not been notified of the reconstitution proceedings. The March 4, 2008 decision itself shows that no notice was sent to any occupant, possessor or person who may have an interest in the properties.
As may be noted, Section 13 of R.A. No. 26 specifically enumerates the manner of notifying interested parties of the petition for reconstitution, namely: (a) publication in the Official Gazette; (b) posting on the main entrance of the provincial capitol building and of the municipal building of the municipality or city in which the land is situated; and (c) by registered mail or otherwise, to every person named in the notice. The notification process being mandatory, non-compliance with publication and posting requirements would be fatal to the jurisdiction of the reconstituting trial court and invalidates the whole reconstitution proceedings. So would failure to notify, in the manner specifically prescribed in said Section 13, interested persons of the initial hearing date. Contextually, Section 13 particularly requires that the notice of the hearing be sent to the property occupant or other persons interested, by registered mail or otherwise. The term “otherwise” could only contemplate a notifying mode other than publication, posting, or thru the mail. That other mode could only refer to service of notice by hand or other similar mode of delivery.
It cannot be over-emphasized that R.A. No. 26 specifically provides the special requirements and procedures that must be followed before the court can properly act, assume and acquire jurisdiction over the petition and grant the reconstitution prayed for. These requirements, as the Court has repeatedly declared, are mandatory. Publication of notice in the Official Gazette and the posting thereof in provincial capitol and city/municipal buildings would not be sufficient. The service of the notice of hearing to parties affected by the petition for reconstitution, notably actual occupant/s of the land, either by registered mail or hand delivery must also be made. In the case at bar, the “posting of the notice at the place where TCT No. 95585 is situated” is not, as urged by petitioner, tantamount to compliance with the mandatory requirement that notice by registered mail or otherwise be sent to the person named in the notice.
Here, respondent’s bad faith in disregarding the jurisdictional requirements in reconstitution proceedings is evident in his order for the issuance of a fencing permit and writ of demolition in favor of Denila. Respondent should have been alerted by the presence of actual occupants and possessors when, after the finality of the March 4, 2008 Decision which ordered the reconstitution of the subject OCTs, Denila moved for the issuance of a writ of demolition for such belied her allegation in the amended petition that “[T]here are no buildings or other structures of strong materials on the above-mentioned pieces of land, which do not belong to the herein petitioner”77 and the absence of any name and address of any occupant, possessor or person who may have an interest in the properties.
But respondent’s bad faith is most evident in his reversal of his inhibition in Sp. Proc. No. 7527-2004 to act upon the petition for relief from judgment. Respondent voluntarily inhibited himself after rendition of the decision, only to resume handling the case and immediately denied the said petition for relief despite the previous order of Judge Tanjili setting the petition for hearing, and completely ignoring the jurisdictional defects of the decision raised by the OSG and Cruzabra.
SECTION 1. Disqualification of judges. — No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above.
In his September 3, 2008 Order, respondent after accepting the criticism of concerned sectors particularly on his speedy rendition of judgment in Sp. Proc. No. 7527-2004 even if he had just taken over Branch 14, and acknowledging that he merely copied the draft decision of the former presiding judge, voluntarily inhibited himself from further acting on the case for the reason that “there is already a doubt cast” on his sense of impartiality and independence. Notwithstanding this perceived bias and partiality on his part, respondent readily reassumed jurisdiction over the case when Judge Tanjili, to whom the case was re-raffled off, inhibited himself upon motion filed by Denila, and subsequently denied the petition for relief.
Further reinforcing his perceived lack of impartiality are respondent’s actuations in the indirect contempt proceedings lodged by Denila against Cruzabra who persistently refused to implement the said decision.
Sec. 4. How proceedings commenced. — Proceedings for indirect contempt may be initiated motu proprio by the court against which the contempt was committed by an order or any other formal charge requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt.
While the first contempt proceeding against Cruzabra was initiated by Denila in a verified motion and was separately docketed and heard (Civil Case No. 32,387-08), a second charge of contempt was later filed by Denila in the reconstitution case (Sp. Proc. No. 7527-2004) by way of a motion. Respondent after declaring Cruzabra in contempt of court in Civil Case No. 32,387-08 and ordering her arrest, inhibited himself upon the ground that he was apprised of a previous pleading he had signed relating to one of the properties involved in the reconstitution case. But when Civil Case No. 32,387-08 was dismissed by Judge Carpio, to whom the case was re-raffled off and who heard Cruzabra’s motion for reconsideration, Denila filed a motion to declare Cruzabra, Paralisan and Administrator Ulep in contempt of court in the reconstitution case. This time, unmindful of his previous inhibition in Civil Case No. 32,387-08 (December 17, 2009 Order), respondent took cognizance of the motion for contempt. After hearing, respondent declared Cruzabra and Paralisan in contempt of court and immediately issued warrants of arrest against them (the previous warrant of arrest against Cruzabra was recalled by Judge Carpio).
Respondent once again displayed an utter disregard of the duty to apply settled laws and rules of procedure when he entertained the second contempt charge under a mere motion, which is not permitted by the Rules. Worse, it was done notwithstanding respondent’s earlier voluntary inhibition in the indirect contempt case (Civil Case No. 32,387-08), which only raised suspicion of respondent’s unusual interest in the immediate execution of the March 4, 2008 Decision despite its jurisdictional defects. The two cases being so closely related, it did not matter that respondent’s previous inhibition on the matter of contempt was in the separate case (Civil Case No. 32,387-08) and not in Sp. Proc. No. 7527-2004. Notably, respondent inhibited himself from the indirect contempt case only after adjudging Cruzabra in contempt of court and issuing a warrant of arrest against her and, the motion for contempt in the reconstitution case involved the very same act of Cruzabra’s refusal to comply with the March 4, 2008 Decision and was filed only after Judge Carpio had dismissed the indirect contempt case and ruled that Cruzabra’s refusal to comply with the March 4, 2008 Decision was not contumacious.
All the foregoing considered, we find respondent guilty of gross ignorance of law and procedure and violation of Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, which merit administrative sanction.
As pointed out by the OCA, this is not the first time respondent was found administratively liable. In A.M. No. MTJ-08-1701 (OCA IPI No. 08-1964-MTJ) entitled “Milagros Villa Abrille versus Judge George Omelio, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 4, Davao City and Deputy Sheriff Philip N. Betil, Branch 3, Same Court,” respondent was found administratively liable for violation of a Supreme Court Circular for which he was fined with the amount of P10,000.00.87 And in A.M. No. RT J-12-232188 decided just last year, respondent was found guilty of four counts of gross ignorance of the law for the following acts: (a) refusal to recognize spouses Crisologo as indispensable parties; (b) granting a contentious motion in violation of the three-day notice rule; (c) non-compliance with the rules on summons; and (d) rendering a decision in an indirect contempt case that cancels an annotation of a Sheriff’s Certificate of Sale on two titles without notifying the buyers, in violation of the latter’s right to due process. For the said infractions, respondent was penalized with fine of P40,000.00.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Judge George E. Omelio, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Davao City is found GUILTY of Gross Ignorance of the Law and violation of Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct and is hereby DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE, with forfeiture of all his retirement benefits, except his accrued leave credits, and with perpetual disqualification for re-employment in any branch, agency or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations.
Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Leonardo-De Castro, Brion, Peralta, Bersamin, Abad, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza, Reyes, Perlas-Bernabe, and Leonen, JJ., concur.
Velasco, Jr., J., no part due to relationship to party.
Del Castillo, J., on official leave.
1Rollo (A.M. No. RTJ-11-2259), p. 1.
2 Id. at 2-3, 15-19, 31.
5Rollo (A.M. No. RTJ-11-2264), pp. 1-25.
6 Id. at 1-2, 28-34.
8Rollo (A.M. No. RTJ-11-2273), pp. 1, 26 & 29.
9 Id. at 1-3; records, pp. 70-78, 89-90 (Annexes “A,” “B” and “F” of Complainant’s Position Paper).
11Rollo (A.M. No. RTJ-11-2273), p. 29.
14 Id. at 4; records, pp. 106-112.
16 Id. at 115-118; rollo (A.M. No. RTJ-11-2273), pp. 51-53.
17Rollo (A.M. No. RTJ-11-2273), pp. 45-47.
19Rollo (A.M. No. RTJ-11-2273), p. 74.
23 Id. at 214-219; rollo (A.M. No. RTJ-11-2273), p. 128.
27 G.R. No. 159579, November 24, 2003 (Resolution), rollo (A.M. No. RTJ-11-2273), pp. 109-112.
36 Id. at 295, 305-306, 308.
37 Id. at 306-307, 353.
38 Id. at 314, 319-321.
39Rollo (A.M. No. RTJ-11-2259), pp. 90-116.
41Rollo (A.M. No. RTJ-11-2264), pp. 154-155.
However, and subject to the provisions of the preceding sections, if the matter is of extreme urgency and the applicant will suffer grave injustice and irreparable injury, the executive judge of a multiple-sala court or the presiding judge of a single-sala court may issue ex parte a temporary restraining order effective for only seventy-two (72) hours from issuance but he shall immediately comply with the provisions of the next preceding section as to service of summons and the documents to be served therewith. Thereafter, within the aforesaid seventy-two (72) hours, the judge before whom the case is pending shall conduct a summary hearing to determine whether the temporary restraining order shall be extended until the application for preliminary injunction can be heard. In no case shall the total period of effectivity of the temporary restraining order exceed twenty (20) days, including the original seventy-two (72) hours provided herein.
46Atty. Lacurom v. Judge Tienzo, 561 Phil. 376, 382-383 (2007), citing Dr. Cruz v. Judge Iturralde, 450 Phil. 77, 85 (2003).
47 Id. at 383, citing Planas v. Reyes, A.M. No. RTJ-05-1905, February 23, 2005, 452 SCRA 146, 155.
49Republic v. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division), G.R. No. 152375, December 13, 2011, 662 SCRA 152, 178.
50 338 Phil. 433 (1997).
52Australian Professional Realty, Inc. v. Municipality of Padre Garcia, Batangas Province, G.R. No. 183367, March 14, 2012, 668 SCRA 253, 260, citing City of Naga v. Asuncion, G.R. No. 174042, July 9, 2008, 557 SCRA 528, 541 and Ex-Mayor Tambaoan v. Court of Appeals, 417 Phil. 683 (2001).
54Government Service Insurance System v. Judge Pacquing, 543 Phil. 1, 11 (2007), citing Webb v. People, 342 Phil. 206 (1997).
55 Id., citing Balayo v. Judge Buban, Jr., 372 Phil. 688, 696 (1999).
56Australian Professional Realty, Inc. v. Municipality of Padre Garcia, Batangas Province, supra note 52, at 261-262, citing Barbieto v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 184645, October 30, 2009, 604 SCRA 825, 840.
57Medina v. Canoy, A.M. No. RTJ-11-2298, February 22, 2012, 666 SCRA 424, 433, citing Chief Prosecutor Zuño v. Judge Cabredo, 450 Phil. 89, 97 (2003) and Judge Cabatingan, Sr. (Ret.) v. Judge Arcueno, 436 Phil. 341, 350 (2002).
58Amante-Descallar v. Ramas, A.M. No. RTJ-08-2142 [OCA-IPI No. 08-2779-RTJ], March 20, 2009, 582 SCRA 22, 39.
62 G.R. No. 173210, April 24, 2009, 586 SCRA 600, 613-614.
63 As cited in Republic v. Catarroja, G.R. No. 171774, February 12, 2010, 612 SCRA 472, 478.
64 336 Phil. 824 (1997).
66Rollo (A.M. No. RTJ-11-2273), p. 126.
68Opriasa v. The City Government of Quezon City, 540 Phil. 256, 266 (2006), citing Republic of the Phil. v. Court of Appeals, 368 Phil. 412, 421 (1999). See also Puzon v. Sta. Lucia Realty and Development, Inc., 406 Phil. 263 (2001).
69Dordas v. Court of Appeals, 337 Phil. 59, 67 (1997).
70 See Opriasa v. The City Government of Quezon City, supra note 68, at 265-266.
71San Agustin v. Court of Appeals, 422 Phil. 686, 695 (2001).
72 522 Phil. 155 (2006).
74 343 Phil. 115 (1997).
75 201 Phil. 727 (1982).
76Ortigas & Co. Ltd. Partnership v. Velasco, supra note 74, at 136, also citing Republic v. Court of Appeals, 183 Phil. 426 (1979); Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, 190 Phil. 311 (1981); Tahanan Development Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 203 Phil. 652 (1982).
77Rollo (A.M. No. RTJ-11-2273), p. 71.
78Laresma v. Abellana, 484 Phil. 766, 779 (2004).
79 Section 1, Art. III, Bill of Rights.
80 People v. Hon. Ong, 523 Phil. 347, 356 (2006), citing Gutierrez v. Santos, 112 Phil. 184, 189 (1961) and Rallos v. Gako, Jr., 385 Phil. 4, 20 (2000).
82 353 Phil. 740 (1998).
84Madula v. Judge Santos, 457 Phil. 625, 634 (2003).
85Mallari v. Government Service Insurance System, G.R No. 157659, January 25, 2010, 611 SCRA 32, 51.
86 Effective October 1, 2001.
87 Resolution of the Third Division dated July 28, 2008, see rollo (A.M. No. RTJ-11-2273), pp. 416-417.
88Crisologo v. Omelio, October 3, 2012, 682 SCRA 154, 190 & 192.
89 Comilang v. Belen, A.M. No. RTJ-10-2216, June 26, 2012, 674 SCRA 477, 490.

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