Source: http://masscases.com/cases/app/2/2massappct332.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 08:36:57+00:00

Document:
INVESTORS AUTOMOTIVE HOLDING COMPANY, INC. vs. ALICE M. DONOVAN & others.
BILL IN EQUITY filed in the Superior Court on August 24, 1972.
Lawrence B. Litwak for the plaintiff.
Saugus, has appealed from a final declaratory decree of the Superior Court adverse to its contention that it is entitled to use the premises for the storage and retail sale of gasoline. The case is here on the trial judge's response to the plaintiff's request under G. L. c. 214, Section 23 (as amended through St. 1947, c. 365, Section 2), for a report of material facts and on a report of all the evidence.
The premises in question are located at 425 Broadway in Saugus, and the only building located thereon is and has been used by the plaintiff in conducting an automatic car wash business. [Note 1] The critical provisions of the lease read: "7. A. The premises demised hereunder can be used by the lessee for the conduct of a car wash operation and for any and all purposes incident or allied thereto. Further, the premises may also be used for any other lawful purpose with the written consent of the lessor which shall not be unreasonably withheld." The plaintiff introduced evidence to the effect that it had obtained a license from the proper authorities for the storage and sale of gasoline (G. L. c. 148, Section 13), evidence of its request to some of the defendants for their permission to use the premises for that purpose and of the refusal of such request, and evidence designed to convince the judge (so far as it might be a question of fact) that the sale of gasoline is incidental or allied to the conduct of a car wash operation. The defendants rested without offering any evidence.
the "findings" already voluntarily made by him as his report of material facts. See Save-Mor Supermarkets, Inc. v. Skelly Detective Serv. Inc. 359 Mass. 221 , 223 (1971); Flynn v. Wallace, 359 Mass. 711 , 714 (1971). Those "findings" were clearly insufficient to meet the requirements of a statutory report under G. L. c. 214, Section 23. Sidlow v. Gosselin, 310 Mass. 395 , 396-397 (1941). Vergnani v. Vergnani, 321 Mass. 699 , 700-701 (1947). Lawson v. Lawson, 340 Mass. 781 (1959). The plaintiff took no exception to the judge's refusal to comply with the statute (see Vergnani v. Vergnani, 321 Mass. 699 , 701 ; Bearce v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Brockton, 351 Mass. 316 , 318 ). As the evidence is reported in full, we shall not remand the case for further findings by the trial judge. See G. L. c. 231, Section 125A, as amended. The question thus resolves itself into one of how far we should go in attempting to decide the case according to our own judgment of the uncontradicted evidence and undisputed facts. Compare Skil Corp. v. Barnet, 337 Mass. 485 , 487-488 (1958), and the cases cited therein. For this purpose we must examine the evidence (primarily oral) offered by the plaintiff during the course of a brief trial, having in mind that we are in no position to judge the credibility of either of the two witnesses called by the plaintiff.
The final decree declares that "[i]t is not unreasonable for the . . . [defendants] to deny the . . . [plaintiff] the right to store and sell gasoline at retail on the demised premises." The quoted statement suggests the distinct possibility that the plaintiff failed to convince the trial judge that the defendants had acted unreasonably in withholding their consent to the plaintiff's request. See Nassif v. Boston & Maine R.R. 340 Mass. 557 , 564-565 (1960); Donoghue v. Prynnwood Corp. 356 Mass. 703 , 707-708 (1970); Broad & Branford Place Corp. v. J. J. Hockenjos Co. 132 N. J. L. 229, 232-233, 235-236 (1944). We need not speculate further as to the actual basis for the judge's determination; there is nothing in the evidence summarized above which requires us to reverse that determination, and we shall not do so.
lease of the premises in question had been assigned to the plaintiff, the specific examples given by him of the supposed trend in the industry were located in California, Ohio, New York, and "overseas"; there was no evidence whatsoever with respect to the existence of any trend in the metropolitan Boston area in 1967, when the defendants had originally let the premises in question (not then new) to the plaintiff's assignor. Other equally broad general testimony to the effect that "the sale of gasoline is related to the car wash industry" had no persuasive tendency to prove whatever conditions may have existed in or around Saugus in 1967.
[Note 1] The building is nowhere described. Contrast Silk v. Commonwealth, 1 Mass. App. Ct. 149 , 150-151 (1973).
[Note 2] No such lease, if there was one, was offered in evidence.
[Note 3] There was no evidence that either of the remaining two defendants was ever made aware of the plaintiff's request.
[Note 4] The bill in this case was filed on August 24, 1972.
[Note 5] On this record our conclusion as of any date later than 1967 would be no different.

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.