Source: http://cabadvantage.com/articles/category/cases-from-bits/c64-volume-10-edition-9/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 00:36:09+00:00

Document:
Harris v. MVT Services, Inc.
LOUIS GUIROLA, JR., United States District Judge.
THE MATTER BEFORE THE COURT is the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment  filed by Defendant MVT Services, Inc. (“ MVT” ). Plaintiff has responded and the Defendant has replied. After due consideration of the submissions and the relevant law, it is the Court’s opinion that the Motion should be granted.
This lawsuit involves an accident between a tractor-trailer and an automobile on Mississippi Highway 53 at the Interstate 59 exit ramp.
On or about the 8th day of June, 2004, the Plaintiff, Megan Harris, was operating a motor vehicle along Highway 53 in Pearl River County, Mississippi. As the Plaintiff was traveling along Highway 53, a motor vehicle being driven by Jorge Garcia which was owned by Defendant, MVT Services, Inc., entered Highway 53 from the north bound exit ramp of Interstate 59 into the path of the vehicle being driven by Megan Harris and collided with it (hereinafter “ the Collision” ).
Plaintiff’s claims against MVT are for negligence and gross negligence of its employee, Jorge Garcia (Counts I and II). In addition, Plaintiff asserts claims of “ independent negligence” and “ independent gross negligence” against MVT for its violation of certain Federal MotorCarrier Safety Regulations and alleged negligent entrustment, hiring, training, supervision, and retention of Garcia (Counts III and IV). It is important to note that Defendants concede that Garcia was negligent in causing the accident and concede that MVT Services, Inc. is vicariously liable for its employee’s negligence. They assert, however, that they are entitled to summary judgment on all of the remaining claims. For the reasons discussed below, the Court finds that the Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law as to Counts II, III and IV of the Amended Complaint.
In addition to standard, state-law negligence claims of negligent entrustment, hiring, training, supervision and retention, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s violation of certain provisions of the Federal MotorCarrier Safety Regulations (“ FMCSR” ) is evidence of negligence per se. Violation of the FMCSR does not, in and of itself, create a cause of action for an injured plaintiff. See, e .g., Stewart v. Mitchell Transportation, 241 F.Supp.2d 1216, 1220 (D.Kan.2002); Schramm v. Foster, 341 F.Supp.2d 536, 547 (D.Md.2004). However, violation of a federal statute can be evidence of negligence per se, provided the plaintiff can show that she was a member of the class sought to be protected under the statute, that her injuries were of a type sought to be avoided, and that violation of the statute proximately caused her injuries.Gallagher Bassett Services, Inc. v. Jeffcoat, 887 So.2d 777, 787 (Miss.2004). But “ [a] finding of negligence per se does not end the inquiry-‘ [n]egligence per se supplies only the duty and the breach of a duty elements of a tort.’ The plaintiff must also prove that the breach of the duty proximately caused her damages.” Id. (citations omitted). In this case, it is unnecessary to examine whether Defendant’s alleged violations of the FMCSR constitute negligence per se. The negligence claims against the Defendant should be dismissed because Defendant MVT has admitted the negligence of its employee and has admitted its own vicarious liability for its employee’s negligence.
In a case such as the one sub judice in which the employer acknowledges liability for the acts of its employee, a plaintiff does not have to depend upon the negligent entrustment doctrine to recover from the employer for his injuries as liability of the employer is already established if the plaintiff can prove negligence of the employee. The need to show that the employer was negligent in having entrusted a motor vehicle to a driver it knew to be incompetent is obviated by the fact that the employer has admitted liability for any acts taken by that driver.
Id. at 18 (citations omitted). The court found that the negligent hiring, training and/or retention claims should be dismissed for the same reasons, citing Thacher v. Brennan, 657 F.Supp. 6, 10 (S.D.Miss.1986).“ [T]here is no need to show that the employer was negligent in hiring, training or retaining an employee in the event it concedes that it is liable for his actions.” Davis at 20.The Court agrees with this analysis, and finds that the Davis court’s conclusion should be applied to Plaintiff’s claims of negligent entrustment, hiring, training and retaining against the Defendant.
Next, just as in this case, the plaintiffs in Davis argued that they had stated a separate cause of action against the employer to hold the employer directly liable for the employee’s conduct. The court stated that it “ was unable to find, and was not cited to, any Mississippi case which allowed a plaintiff to recover damages on claims of negligent hiring, training or retention in addition to those that resulted because of the negligent acts of an employee.” Id. at 21.At this date, the state of the law in Mississippi on this issue remains the same. In the absence of a Mississippi case to the contrary, the Court concludes that the Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiff’s claims of “ independent negligence of MVT” and “ independent gross negligence of MVT” contained in Counts III and IV of the Amended Complaint.
Punitive damages may not be awarded if the claimant does not prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant, against whom punitive damages are sought, acted with actual malice, gross negligence which evidences a willful, wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others, or committed actual fraud.
Id. When deciding whether to submit the issue of punitive damages to a trier of fact, the trial court looks at the totality of the circumstances to determine if a reasonable, hypothetical trier of fact could find either malice or gross neglect/reckless disregard. Doe v. Salvation Army, 835 So.2d at 81. “ The facts must be highly unusual as punitive damages are only awarded in extreme cases .” Gamble ex rel. Gamble v. Dollar General Corp., 852 So.2d 5, 15 (Miss.2003) (citations omitted).
Plaintiff makes the following allegations in support of her claim for punitive damages: the driver was “ in gross violation” of certain FMCSR provisions regarding driving without rest “ and other FMCSR mandates;” the driver could not adequately read, write or speak English; and the driver “ pulled out in front of Plaintiff intending to drive over the island and go straight cross (sic) the intersection because he was lost and could not find a bathroom.” Pl. Am. Compl. 4; Pl. Resp. Memo. 26. The Plaintiff refers generally to the depositions of Rustie Milam, Raul Garcia, JoJohn Vega, Jorge Garcia and George Martinez to support her factual allegations, but does not identify any specific testimony which supports her punitive damages claim. Plaintiff is required to “ identify specific evidence in the record, and to articulate the ‘ precise manner’ in which that evidence support[s][her] claim.” Forsyth v. Barr, 19 F.3d 1527, 1537 (5th Cir.1994), citing Topalian v. Ehrman, 954 F.2d 1125, 1131 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,506 U.S. 825 (1992) and Krim v. BancTexas Group, Inc., 989 F.2d 1435, 1443 (5th Cir.1993).“ Rule 56 does not impose upon the district court a duty to sift through the record in search of evidence to support a party’s opposition to summary judgment” .Skotak v. Tenneco Resins, Inc., 953 F.2d 909, 915 & n. 7 (5th Cir.1992). Nevertheless, the Court has reviewed the five depositions referred to by the Plaintiff; Jorge Garcia, the driver; Rustie Milam, the Safety Supervisor at the time of the accident; George Martinez, Ms. Milam’s assistant; Raul Garcia, a previous Safety Director, and JoJohn Vega, Vice-President of Operations. The Court finds no clear and convincing evidence within these depositions that Garcia, MVT’s employee, acted with gross negligence evidencing a willful, wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others. According to Garcia’s testimony, he had exited the Interstate looking for a bathroom, did not see one off of Highway 53, and started across Highway 53 to get back on the Interstate. Def. Exh. “ A” 74. He was moving across Highway 53 at about 5 miles per hour when Plaintiff’s vehicle struck the rear truck axle. Id. at 72, 74.He had not seen her vehicle when he started across the Highway. Id. at 74.The remaining depositions contain no testimony relevant to the facts and circumstances of the accident. Plaintiff has therefore not shown facts which meet the statutory criteria governing punitive damages in Mississippi. Instead, this appears to be an ordinary negligence case involving a careless driver, not a wanton or reckless driver. The Defendant is therefore entitled to judgment as a matter of law as to Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Defendant’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment  is GRANTED.Plaintiff’s claims against the Defendant in Counts II, III and IV of the Amended Complaint are DISMISSED.
BUDGET RENT-A-CAR SYSTEM, INC., et al., Defendants and Respondents.
Background: Motorist who was injured in traffic collision in Alabama, allegedly caused by an overturned truck, brought action against truck’s lessor and others, alleging motor vehicle negligence, general negligence, and negligence per se. The Superior Court, Los Angeles County, No. BC297942,George Wu, J., granted summary judgment in favor of truck lessor. Motorist appealed.
Plaintiff Mario Castro (Castro), a California resident, sustained physical injuries in a traffic collision in Alabama allegedly caused by an overturned truck owned by defendant and respondent Budget Rent-A-Car System, Inc. (Budget). Prior to the accident, Budget had leased the truck that overturned to defendant Carlos Diaz, doing business as Carlos Diaz Fresh Produce (Diaz). At the time of the accident, Diaz’s employee, defendant Jose Lopez (Lopez), was driving Budget’s leased truck while allegedly intoxicated.
Plaintiffs sued Budget and others in California state court for negligence and lost consortium. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Budget on the grounds that Alabama law-not federal or California law-applied and that under Alabama’s common law doctrine governing the permissive use of motor vehicles (permissive user law), Budget was not responsible for the negligence of either Diaz or Lopez. On appeal, plaintiffs contend that federal law or the common law nondelegable duty doctrine should apply, either of which would result in Budget’s liability. They argue that at the time of the accident, Budget qualified as a “ motorcarrier” under applicable federal law, and as a consequence is financially responsible for their injuries.
We hold that in connection with the accident, Budget was not a “ motorcarrier” as that term is defined in the relevant federal statutes, regulations, and case law and therefore is not liable under federal law or the common law nondelegable duty doctrine. As the trial court ruled, Budget’s liability to plaintiffs is governed by Alabama’s permissive user law that entitled Budget to summary judgment. We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.
On July 22, 2002, Castro, a California resident, was a passenger in a vehicle that was involved in an accident on Interstate 20 in the State of Alabama. Budget owned the other vehicle involved in the accident and had leased it to Diaz in Alabama. Budget’s truck was operated by Lopez at the time of the accident.
Budget is in the business of renting or leasing motor vehicles to be operated on the public highways. Budget’s truck was leased for commercial use to Diaz to transport produce from Alabama across state lines to Florida. Budget leased the truck to Diaz on July 14, 2002, with knowledge that the truck would be used in the course of Diaz’s business, and with the knowledge that the truck might be used to conduct business across state lines. On July 22, 2002, Budget’s truck was registered and licensed in the State of California. Budget’s truck weighed over 10,000 pounds.
Diaz purchased liability protection from Budget on July 14, 2002, for the business rental of Budget’s truck because he did not have insurance. On July 22, 2002, Budget possessed a certificate of self-insurance issued by the State of Alabama.
Budget filed a motion for summary judgment on the grounds that Alabama law applied and that under Alabama’s permissive user law, Budget was not liable for the negligence of either Diaz or Lopez. Plaintiffs opposed the motion, arguing that Budget was a “ motorcarrier” subject to the federal statutes and regulations governing interstate motor transportation and therefore responsible for plaintiffs’ damages. In support of their opposition to the motion, plaintiffs filed the declaration of an expert who opined that Budget was a motorcarrier subject to federal regulation, including the regulatory provisions that require minimum insurance coverage of $750,000.
The trial court ruled that the federal statutes and regulations upon which plaintiffs relied did not apply to Budget, that Alabama law controlled the liability issue, and that Budget was entitled to summary judgment. The trial court subsequently entered judgment in favor of Budget and against plaintiffs. Plaintiffs timely appealed.
Plaintiffs contend that Budget is a motorcarrier subject to the “ control and responsibility” requirements of federal law (49 U.S.C. § 14102(a)(4); 49 C.F.R. § 376.12(c)(1) (2006); see Transamerican Freight Lines, Inc. v. Brada Miller Freight Systems (1975) 423 U.S. 28, 29, 96 S.Ct. 229, 46 L.Ed.2d 169) and is therefore liable for Diaz’s negligent operation of Budget’s truck. In support of this contention, plaintiffs rely on the federal statute and regulations that require motorcarriers to maintain specified levels of financial responsibility in the form of insurance or self-insurance. (49 U.S.C. § 31139; 49 C.F.R. § 387.1, et seq. (2006).) According to plaintiffs, Budget, through self-insurance, voluntarily complied with the minimum financial responsibility requirements under federal law, thereby demonstrating that Budget is a motorcarrier subject to those requirements. The issue therefore is whether Budget, as a lessor of the vehicle involved in the accident, qualifies as a motorcarrier in connection with that incident, so as to be subject to the federal “ control and responsibility” requirements upon which plaintiffs rely.
Moreover, 49 United States Code section 31139(c)-the statute under which the financial responsibility regulations were promulgated-cross-references the definition of “ motor private carrier” contained in 49 United States Code section 13102(15). That a provision in the financial responsibility statute cross-references and incorporates the definition of “ motor private carrier” in 49 United States Code section 13102 suggests that the general definitions in section 13102, including the definition of a “ motorcarrier” in subdivision (14) quoted above, are applicable to section 31139 and the financial responsibility regulations promulgated under it.
Plaintiffs contend that Budget, as the lessor of the truck that caused Castro’s injuries, qualifies as a motorcarrier under federal law, and is therefore financially responsible for their injuries. But the code sections and regulations we have quoted do not mention “ lessors” in the various definitions of “ motorcarrier,” “ motor private carrier,” or “ for-hire” carriage. If Congress or the DOT had intended to extend to lessors of equipment (including lessor owners) the financial responsibility requirements imposed under title 49 of the United States Code, the code sections and regulations that define those requirements should contain some explicit reference to lessors that would cover vehicle leasing companies such as Budget. The absence of any such reference in the applicable code sections and regulations supports the conclusion that they do not apply to lessors of vehicles.
Notwithstanding the absence of any reference to lessors in the code sections and regulations upon which they rely, plaintiffs maintain that Budget is a federally regulated motorcarrier because it is in the business of leasing to others commercial vehicles that will be used to transport goods or property across state lines, and it is compensated for that activity. Budget correctly counters that the mere act of leasing the truck to Diaz did not qualify it as a motorcarrier because it did not retain possession or control over the truck or otherwise operate the truck to transport goods. Budget cites Del Real v. United States Fire Insurance Crum & Forster (E.D.Cal.1998) 64 F.Supp.2d 958(Del Real ) in support of its position.
Plaintiffs contend that Del Real, supra, 64 F.Supp.2d 958 is distinguishable from this case because here Budget was using a lease arrangement with Diaz to disguise that it qualified as a “ motorcarrier” under federal law and to avoid the financial responsibility requirements imposed under that law. The undisputed facts in the instant case, however, do not fit the typical situation in which a lease arrangement is used to disguise the provision of transportation services in an attempt to avoid the application of the safety and financial responsibility requirements of federal law.These facts show that there was a lease agreement between the parties, nothing more. There are no facts showing that agreement was not legitimate and not entered into in good faith, or that Budget was trying to evade the letter or spirit of the law. There is nothing about the straightforward lease agreement that suggests or implies that Budget was engaging in the transportation of goods or property for compensation. On this record, Budget was not a motorcarrier within the meaning of the applicable federal statutes and regulations.
Plaintiffs emphasize that in certain documents filed with the DOT, Budget identified itself as an “ Interstate Carrier” engaged in the business of transporting “ general freight” and “ household goods.” Therefore, according to plaintiffs, there is a triable issue of fact concerning whether Budget was acting as a motorcarrier in connection with Diaz’s lease of the truck from Budget.
Plaintiffs’ evidence arguably may raise a triable issue of fact as to whether, as a general matter, Budget was a registered carrier authorized to transport goods or property interstate for compensation. That evidence, however, does not address the issue in this case-whether Budget was acting as a motorcarrier in connection with the accident in question. As we have concluded, Budget was not a motorcarrier in connection with the accident because Budget’s lease transaction did not constitute the business of transporting goods for hire. It was not hired to transport the load of produce being shipped by Diaz, did not dispatch or employ Lopez to deliver the produce, and was not transporting the produce itself as a private carrier. In connection with the vehicle lease in question, Budget was not a motorcarrier under federal law, and therefore federal law does not render it liable to plaintiffs.
Under California’s nondelegable duty doctrine, “ a carrier who undertakes an activity (1) which can be lawfully carried on only under a public franchise or authority and (2) which involves possible danger to the public is liable to a third person for harm caused by the negligence of the carrier’s independent contractor.” (Serna, supra, 110 Cal.App.4th at p. 1486, 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 835.)Plaintiffs contend that Budget was conducting business under a federal franchise as a motorcarrier, and, under the nondelegable duty doctrine, Budget is responsible for Diaz’s negligence regardless of Alabama’s permissive user law.
The rule stated in Serna, supra, 110 Cal.App.4th 1475, 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 835 has no application to the facts here. The Serna case presented the paradigm in which a shipper contracts with a carrier operating under a franchise to transport the shipper’s goods interstate, and the carrier arranges for a subcontractor to perform the transportation services on the carrier’s behalf. Under the nondelegable duty doctrine discussed above, the carrier is treated in such cases as if it owned the truck and employed the driver for purposes of determining the carrier’s liability for the negligence of the subcontractor.
Here, it is undisputed that Budget did not contract with anyone to transport the produce that was being hauled by Lopez at the time of the accident. Nor did Budget subcontract with Diaz to perform transportation services on Budget’s behalf. Budget leased the truck to Diaz under a lease agreement, and Diaz performed the transportation of goods using an employee, Lopez. In leasing the truck to Diaz, Budget did not engage in an activity that could lawfully be carried out only under a public franchise or authority. Moreover, Budget did not engage in an activity that was potentially dangerous to the public, as was the defendant’s transportation of goods across state lines in Serna, supra, 110 Cal.App.4th 1475, 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 835.Instead, as discussed above, Budget’s business lease activity in this case was “ not regulated” under the federal statutes and regulations upon which plaintiffs rely because Budget was not acting as a “ motorcarrier,” and therefore was not subject to the financial responsibility requirements governing such carriers. Thus, unlike the situation in Serna, which turned on the question of exempt goods, here the business activity itself is not subject to the federal regulations in issue. As a result, Budget had no duty under the common law nondelegable duty doctrine to assume financial responsibility for Diaz’s negligence.
As discussed above, the federal law upon which plaintiffs rely does not apply to the facts of this case. We therefore agree with Budget that either Alabama or California law should be applied to the issue of Budget’s liability to plaintiffs. Under the undisputed facts of this case, and as the trial court correctly ruled, Alabama’s permissive user law controls that issue and entitles Budget to a judgment in its favor as a matter of law.
Alabama also has a legitimate interest in not subjecting its residents and businesses to the laws of other states that expand liability based on vehicle ownership beyond the traditional common law principles discussed above, such as agency and negligent entrustment. And it has a further interest in not having vehicle owners and drivers in its jurisdiction subjected to different liabilities based on the fortuity of which state a plaintiff happens to be a resident. Thus, Alabama has an interest in the uniform application of motor vehicle laws to owners and drivers in Alabama.
Based on the foregoing authorities, it appears that Vehicle Code section 17150 is directed primarily at motivating vehicle owners who allow others to use their vehicles within California to exercise care in the selection and supervision of such permissive users, and at protecting persons using California roadways. Thus, applying California’s statute to Budget’s conduct within the state of Alabama would not further California’s interest in controlling the permissive use of vehicles within California’s borders and in compensating accident victims injured on California roadways.
California, however, does have a legitimate governmental interest in having its permissive user statute applied based on Castro’s status as a California resident. Application of that statute to circumstances such as these would serve to ensure that California residents injured in traffic accidents in other states would be compensated for their injuries and not become dependent on the resources of California for necessary medical, disability, and unemployment benefits.

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