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Justia › US Law › US Case Law › US Supreme Court › Volume 501 › Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc.
Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc.
regulations, but not under the DOL provisions. In Nos. 90-113 and 90-114, the Court of Appeals struck down the DOL regulations as being "more restrictive than" HEW's, reversing DOL's denial of benefits to two claimants whose eligibility was deemed rebutted under the fourth rebuttal provision.
Held: The third and fourth rebuttal provisions in the DOL regulations do not render those regulations "more restrictive than" the HEW regulations. Pp. 501 U. S. 695-706.
(a) The Secretary of Labor's determination that her interim regulations are not more restrictive than HEW's warrants deference from this Court. Deference to an agency's interpretation of ambiguous provisions in the statutes it is authorized to implement is appropriate when Congress has delegated policymaking authority to the agency. See, e.g., 467 U. S. S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 467 U. S. 866. Here, since the relevant legislation has produced a complex and highly technical regulatory program, requiring significant expertise in the identification and classification of medical eligibility criteria, and entailing the exercise of judgment grounded in policy concerns, Congress must have intended, with respect to the "not . . . more restrictive than" phrase, a delegation of broad policymaking discretion to the Secretary of Labor. This is evident from the statutory text, in that Congress declined to require that the DOL adopt the HEW interim regulations verbatim, and from the statute's legislative history, which demonstrates that the delegation was made with the intention that the black lung program evolve as technological expertise matured. Thus, the Secretary's authority necessarily entails the authority to interpret HEW's regulations and the discretion to promulgate interim regulations based on a reasonable interpretation thereof. Pp. 501 U. S. 696-699.
inquiry into the issue of disability causation or the existence of pneumoconiosis. The claimants' contention that § 410.490(b)(1) creates a "conclusive" presumption of entitlement without regard to the existence of competent evidence on these questions is deficient in two respects. First, the claimants' premise is inconsistent with the statutory text, which expressly provides that the presumptions in question will be rebuttable, and requires the Secretary of HEW to consider all relevant evidence. Second, although subsection (c)'s delineation of two rebuttal methods may support an inference that the drafter intended to exclude other methods, such an inference provides no guidance where its application would render a regulation inconsistent with the statute's purpose and language. The fact that the SSA, under the HEW regulations, appeared to award benefits to miners whose administrative files contained scant evidence of eligibility does not require the Secretary to forgo inquiries into disability causation and disease existence. The claimants' argument that HEW omitted such inquiries from its criteria based on a "cost/benefit" conclusion that the inquiries would engender inordinate delays, yet generate little probative evidence, finds scant support in contemporaneous analyses of the SSA awards; disregards entirely subsequent advances in medical technology that Congress could not have intended the HEW or the DOL to ignore; and is based on the unacceptable premise that the Secretary must demonstrate that her reasonable interpretation of HEW's regulations is consistent with HEW's contemporaneous interpretation of those regulations. Pp. 501 U. S. 699-706.
No. 89-1714, 890 F.2d 1295 (CA3 1989), affirmed; No. 90-113, 895 F.2d 178 (CA4 1990), and No. 90-114, 895 F.2d 173 (CA4 1990), reversed and remanded.
BLACKMUN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., and WHITE, MARSHALL, STEVENS, O'CONNOR, and SOUTER, JJ., joined. SCALIA, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 501 U. S. 706. KENNEDY, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the litigation.
The black lung benefits program, created by Congress, was to be administered first by the Social Security Administration (SSA) under the auspices of the then-existent Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW), and later by the Department of Labor (DOL). Congress authorized these Departments, during their respective tenures, to adopt interim regulations governing the adjudication of claims for black lung benefits, but constrained the Secretary of Labor by providing that the DOL regulations "shall not be more restrictive than" HEW's. This litigation calls upon us to determine whether the Secretary of Labor has complied with that constraint.
part to pneumoconiosis arising out of coal mine employment, and to the dependents and survivors of such miners. See Pittston Coal Group v. Sebben, 488 U. S. 105, 488 U. S. 108 (1988); Mullins Coal Co. v. Director, OWCP, 484 U. S. 135, 484 U. S. 138 (1987).
Through FCMHSA, Congress established a bifurcated system of compensating miners disabled by pneumoconiosis. [Footnote 1] Part B thereof created a temporary program administered by the Social Security Administration under the auspices of the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare. This program was intended for the processing of claims filed on or before December 31, 1972. Benefits awarded under part B were paid by the Federal Government. For claims filed after 1972, part C originally authorized a permanent program, administered by the Secretary of Labor, to be coordinated with federally approved state workmen's compensation programs. Benefits awarded under part C were to be paid by the claimants' coal mining employers.
coal mine employment, there "shall be a rebuttable presumption that his pneumoconiosis arose out of such employment." § 921(c)(1). Similarly, for a miner with at least 10 years of coal mine employment who "died from a respirable disease there shall be a rebuttable presumption that his death was due to pneumoconiosis." § 921(c)(2). Finally, there was an irrebuttable presumption that a miner presenting medical evidence demonstrating complicated pneumoconiosis was totally disabled as a result of that condition. § 921(c)(3). Consistent with these presumptions, HEW promulgated permanent regulations prescribing the methods and standards for establishing entitlement to black lung benefits under part B. See 20 CFR §§ 410.401 to 410.476 (1990).
have pneumoconiosis or that his respiratory or pulmonary impairment did not arise out of employment in a coal mine. 30 U.S.C. § 921(c)(4). Second, the 1972 amendments redefined "total disability" to permit an award of benefits on a showing that a miner was unable to perform his coal mining duties or other comparable work -- as opposed to the prior requirement that the miner demonstrate that he was unable to perform any job, see § 902(f) -- and prohibited HEW from denying a claim for benefits solely on the basis of a negative X-ray. § 923(b). Third, the 1972 amendments made it easier for survivors of a deceased miner who had been disabled due to pneumoconiosis but had died from a cause unrelated to the disease to demonstrate eligibility for benefits. See § 901. Finally, the amendments made clear that, "[i]n determining the validity of claims under [part B], all relevant evidence shall be considered." § 923(b).
"designed to 'permit prompt and vigorous processing of the large backlog of claims' that had developed during the early phases of administering part B."
Sebben, 488 U.S. at 488 U. S. 109 quoting 20 CFR § 410.490(a) (1973). [Footnote 2] These interim regulations established adjudicatory rules for processing part B claims that permit the invocation of a presumption of eligibility upon demonstration by the claimant of specified factors, and a subsequent opportunity for the Social Security Administration, in administering the program, to rebut the presumption.
"impairment established in accordance with paragraph (b)(1) of this section arose out of coal mine employment (see §§ 410.416 and 410.456)."
Once a claimant invokes the presumption of eligibility under § 410.490(b), the HEW interim regulations permit rebuttal by the SSA upon a showing that the miner is doing his usual coal mine work or comparable and gainful work, or is capable of doing such work. See § 410.490(c).
claims approval rate was significantly below that of the SSA. See Lopatto, supra, at 691. Accordingly, Congress turned its attention once again to the black lung benefits program.
The Black Lung Benefits Reform Act of 1977 (BLBRA), 92 Stat. 95, approved and effective Mar. 1, 1978, further liberalized the criteria for eligibility for black lung benefits in several ways. First, the Act expanded the definition of pneumoconiosis to include "sequelae" of the disease, including respiratory and pulmonary impairments arising out of coal mine employment. See 30 U.S.C. § 902(b). Second, BLBRA required the DOL to accept a board certified or board-eligible radiologist's interpretation of submitted X-rays if the films met minimal quality standards, thereby prohibiting the DOL from denying a claim based on a secondary assessment of the X-rays provided by a Government-funded radiologist. See § 923(b). Finally, the BLBRA added a fifth presumption of eligibility, and otherwise altered the entitlement structure to make it easier for survivors of a deceased long-term miner to obtain benefits. See §§ 921(c)(5) and 902(f).
In addition to liberalizing the statutory prerequisites to benefit entitlement, the BLBRA authorized the DOL to adopt its own interim regulations for processing part C claims filed before March 31, 1980. In so doing, Congress required that the "[c]riteria applied by the Secretary of Labor . . . shall not be more restrictive than the criteria applicable to a claim filed on June 30, 1973." § 902(f)(2).
under these two provisions, however, a claimant need not prove that the "impairment . . . arose out of coal mine employment," as was required under the HEW interim regulations. See § 410.490(b)(2).
In addition, the DOL interim regulations add three methods of invoking the presumption of eligibility not included in the HEW interim regulations. Specifically, under the DOL regulations, a claimant can invoke the presumption of total disability due to pneumoconiosis by submitting blood gas studies that demonstrate the presence of an impairment in the transfer of oxygen from the lung alveoli to the blood; by submitting other medical evidence establishing the presence of a totally disabling respiratory or pulmonary impairment; or, in the case of a deceased miner for whom no medical evidence is available, by submitting a survivor's affidavit demonstrating such a disability. See §§ 727.203(a)(3), (4), and (5).
Finally, the DOL interim regulations provide four methods for rebutting the presumptions established under § 727.203. Two of the rebuttal provisions mimic those in the HEW regulations, permitting rebuttal upon a showing that the miner is performing or is able to perform his coal mining or comparable work. See §§ 727.203(b)(1) and (2). The other two rebuttal provisions are at issue in these cases. Under these provisions, a presumption of total disability due to pneumoconiosis can be rebutted if "[t]he evidence establishes that the total disability or death of the miner did not arise in whole or in part out of coal mine employment," or if "[t]he evidence establishes that the miner does not, or did not, have pneumoconiosis." See §§ 727.203(b)(3) and (4).
statutory authority. In No. 89-1714, Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit concluded that the DOL interim regulations were not more restrictive. BethEnergy Mines, Inc. v. Director, OWCP, 890 F.2d 1295 (1989). John Pauley, the now-deceased husband of petitioner Harriet Pauley, filed a claim for black lung benefits on April 21, 1978, after he had worked 30 years in the underground mines of Pennsylvania. Pauley stopped working soon after he filed his claim for benefits. At a formal hearing on November 5, 1987, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that Pauley had begun to experience shortness of breath, coughing, and fatigue in 1974, and that those symptoms had gradually worsened, causing him to leave his job in the mines. The ALJ also found that Pauley had arthritis requiring several medications daily, had suffered a stroke in January, 1987, and had smoked cigarettes for 34 years until he stopped in 1974.
Because respondent BethEnergy did not contest the presence of coal workers' pneumoconiosis, the ALJ found that the presumption had been invoked under § 727.203(a)(1). Turning to the rebuttal evidence, the judge concluded that Pauley was not engaged in his usual coal mine work or comparable and gainful work, and that Pauley was totally disabled from returning to coal mining or comparable employment. See §§ 727.203(b)(1) and (2). The judge then weighed the evidence submitted under § 727.203(b)(3), and determined that respondent BethEnergy had sustained its burden of establishing that pneumoconiosis was not a contributing factor in Pauley's total disability and, accordingly, that his disability did not "arise in whole or in part out of coal mine employment." § 727.203(b)(3). See Carozza v. United States Steel Corp., 727 F.2d 74 (CA3 1984).
HEW interim regulations to Pauley's claim. He first concluded that respondent BethEnergy's concession that Pauley had pneumoconiosis arising out of coal mining employment was sufficient to invoke the presumption of total disability due to pneumoconiosis under § 410.490(b). Because the evidence demonstrated Pauley's inability to work, and the ALJ interpreted § 410.490(c) as precluding rebuttal of the presumption by "showing that the claimant's total disability is unrelated to his coal mine employment," the judge found that BethEnergy could not carry its burden on rebuttal, and that Pauley was entitled to benefits.
"perfectly evident that no set of regulations under [the Benefits Act] may provide that a claimant who is statutorily barred from recovery may nevertheless recover."
"unless it was the intention of the Secretary to permit rebuttal by a showing that the claimant's disability did not arise at least in part from coal mine employment."
by 30 years of cigarette smoking and obesity. The Benefits Review Board affirmed, concluding that the ALJ's decision was supported by substantial evidence.
The Court of Appeals reversed. Taylor v. Clinchfield Coal Co., 895 F.2d 178 (1990). The court first dismissed the argument that the DOL interim regulations cannot be considered more restrictive than HEW's as applied to Taylor because Taylor invoked the presumption of eligibility based on arterial blood gas studies, a method of invocation available under the DOL regulations but not under HEW's, and was therefore unable to use the rebuttal provisions of the HEW interim regulations as a benchmark. Id. at 182. The court reasoned that it was a "matter of indifference" how the claimant invoked the presumption of eligibility, and rejected the argument that the rebuttal provisions must be evaluated in light of corresponding invocation provisions.
"It is the fact of establishment of the presumption and the substance thereof which is of consequence in this case, not the number of the regulation which provides for such establishment."
"allow the consideration of evidence disputing both the presence of pneumoconiosis and the connection between total disability and coal mine employment."
One judge dissented. Noting that the panel's decision was in conflict with the Sixth Circuit in Youghiogheny and Ohio Coal Co. v. Milliken, 866 F.2d 195 (1989), and with the Third Circuit in Pauley, he concluded that those decisions "do less violence to congressional intent, and avoid . . . upsetting the statutory scheme." 895 F.2d at 184.
showing that the claimant does not have pneumoconiosis, the court stated that the ALJ's finding that Dayton does not have pneumoconiosis "is superfluous and has no bearing on the case." Id. at 176, n. *.
In the BLBRA, Congress specifically constrained the Secretary of Labor's discretion through the directive that the criteria applied to part C claims could "not be more restrictive than" that applied to part B claims. 30 U.S.C. § 902(f)(2). The claimants and the dissent urge that this restriction is unambiguous, and that no deference is due the Secretary's determination that her interim regulations are not more restrictive than the HEW's. In the alternative, both the claimants and the dissent argue that, regardless of whether the statutory mandate is clear, the only interpretation of the HEW interim regulations that warrants deference is the interpretation given those regulations by the Secretary of HEW. In our view, this position misunderstands the principles underlying judicial deference to agency interpretations, as well as the scope of authority delegated to the Secretary of Labor in the BLBRA.
delegation of administrative authority"); Chevron, 467 U.S. at 467 U. S. 864-866.
It is precisely this recognition that informs our determination that deference to the Secretary is appropriate here. The Black Lung Benefits Act has produced a complex and highly technical regulatory program. The identification and classification of medical eligibility criteria necessarily require significant expertise, and entail the exercise of judgment grounded in policy concerns. In those circumstances, courts appropriately defer to the agency entrusted by Congress to make such policy determinations. See Martin v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 499 U. S. 144, 499 U. S. 152-153 (1991); Aluminum Co. of America v. Central Lincoln Peoples' Utility District, 467 U. S. 380, 467 U. S. 390 (1984).
In Sebben, we declined to defer to the Secretary's interpretation of the term "criteria" as used in § 902(f)(2), as including only medical, but not evidentiary, criteria, because we found Congress' intent to include all criteria in that provision to be manifest. See Sebben, 488 U.S. at 488 U. S. 113-114. With respect to the phrase "not . . . more restrictive than," Congress' intent is similarly clear: the phrase cannot be read except as a delegation of interpretive authority to the Secretary of Labor.
establish eligibility criteria. . . . It is intended that, pursuant to this authority, the Secretary of Labor will make every effort to incorporate within his regulations . . . to the extent feasible the advances made by medical science in the diagnosis and treatment of pneumoconiosis . . . since the promulgation in 1972 of the Secretary of HEW's medical eligibility criteria."
S.Rep. No. 95-209, p. 13 (1977).
"such [new] regulations shall not provide more restrictive criteria than [the HEW interim regulations], except that, in determining claims under such criteria, all relevant medical evidence shall be considered."
H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 95-864, p. 16 (1977), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1977, pp. 237, 309 (emphasis added). As delegated by Congress, then, the Secretary's authority to promulgate interim regulations "not . . . more restrictive than" the HEW interim regulations necessarily entails the authority to interpret HEW's regulations and the discretion to promulgate interim regulations based on a reasonable interpretation thereof. From this congressional delegation derives the Secretary's entitlement to judicial deference.
"the Social Security regulations, while less explicit, similarly do not limit the evidence which can be considered in rebutting the interim presumption."
See 43 Fed.Reg. 36,826 (1978). Moreover, this position has been faithfully advanced by each Secretary since the regulations were promulgated. See e.g., Sebben, 488 U.S. at 488 U. S. 119. Accordingly, the Secretary's defense of her interim regulations warrants deference from this Court.
Having determined that the Secretary's position is entitled to deference, we must decide whether this position is reasonable. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 467 U. S. 845. The claimants and the dissent argue that this issue can be resolved simply by comparing the two interim regulations. This argument is straightforward; it reasons that the mere existence of regulatory provisions permitting rebuttal of statutory elements not rebuttable under the HEW interim regulations renders the DOL interim regulations more restrictive than HEW's and, as a consequence renders the Secretary's interpretation unreasonable. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 22-24. Specifically, the claimants and the dissent assert that the HEW interim regulations plainly contain no provision, either in the invocation subsection or in the rebuttal subsection, that directs factual inquiry into the issue of disability causation or the existence of pneumoconiosis. Accordingly, under the claimants' reading of the regulations, there is no manner in which the DOL interim regulations can be seen to be "not . . . more restrictive than" the HEW regulations.
in a most confusing manner"); id. at 488 U. S. 129 (dissenting opinion) (assuming that the drafters "promulgated a scrivener's error"). In our view, the Secretary presents the more reasoned interpretation of this complex regulatory structure, an interpretation that has the additional benefit of providing coherence among the statute and the two interim regulations.
The premise underlying the Secretary's interpretation of the HEW interim regulations is that the regulations were adopted to ensure that miners who were disabled due to pneumoconiosis arising out of coal mine employment would receive benefits from the black lung program. Under the Secretary's view, it disserves congressional intent to interpret HEW's interim regulations to allow recovery by miners who do not have pneumoconiosis or whose total disability did not arise, at least in part, from their coal mine employment. We agree. See Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U. S. 1, 428 U. S. 22, n. 21 (1976) ("[A]n operator can be liable only for pneumoconiosis arising out of employment in a coal mine"); Mullins Coal Co. v. Director, OWCP, 484 U. S. 135, 484 U. S. 158 (1987) ("[I]f a miner is not actually suffering from the type of ailment with which Congress was concerned, there is no justification for presuming that the miner is entitled to benefits").
"If a miner was employed for 10 years or more in the Nation's coal mines, and is suffering or suffered from pneumoconiosis, it will be presumed, in the absence of persuasive evidence to the contrary, that the pneumoconiosis arose out of such employment."
[of HEW] to permit rebuttal by a showing that the claimant's disability did not arise at least in part from coal mine employment."
The claimants respond that the Secretary has not adopted the most natural reading of subsection (b)(2). Specifically, the claimants argue that miners who have 10 years of coal mine experience and satisfy the requirements of subsection (b)(1) automatically obtain the presumption of causation that § 410.416 or § 410.456 confers, and thereby satisfy the causation requirement inherent in the Act. In addition, the claimants point out that the reference in the HEW rebuttal provisions to § 410.412(a)(1) may best be read as a reference only to the definition of the term "comparable and gainful work," not to the disability causation provision of § 410.412(a). While it is possible that the claimants' parsing of these impenetrable regulations would be consistent with accepted canons of construction, it is axiomatic that the Secretary's interpretation need not be the best or most natural one by grammatical or other standards. EEOC v. Commercial Office Products Co., 486 U. S. 107, 486 U. S. 115 (1988). Rather, the Secretary's view need be only reasonable to warrant deference. Ibid.; Mullins, 484 U.S. at 484 U. S. 159.
would lead to "absurd or futile results . . . plainly at variance with the policy of the legislation as a whole") (internal quotations omitted).
In asserting that the Secretary's interpretation is untenable, the claimants essentially argue that the Secretary is not justified in interpreting the HEW interim regulations in conformance with their authorizing statute. According to the claimants, the HEW officials charged with administering the black lung benefits program and with drafting the HEW interim regulations believed that it was virtually impossible to determine medically whether a miner's respiratory impairment was actually caused by pneumoconiosis or whether his total disability arose out of his coal mine employment. Faced with such medical uncertainty, and instructed to ensure the "prompt and vigorous processing of the large backlog of claims," see 20 CFR § 410.490(a) (1990), the claimants assert that HEW omitted from its criteria factual inquiries into disability causation and the existence of pneumoconiosis based on a "cost/benefit" conclusion that such inquiries would engender inordinate delay, yet generate little probative evidence. [Footnote 9] The dissent presents a similar view. Post at 501 U. S. 716-719.
We recognize that the SSA, under the HEW interim regulations, appeared to award benefits to miners whose administrative files contained scant evidence of eligibility. See The Comptroller General of the United States, General Accounting Office, Report to Congress: Examination of Allegations Concerning Administration of the Black Lung Benefits Program 6-10, included in Hearings on H.R. 10760 and S. 3183 before the Subcommittee on Labor of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 440-444 (1976). We are not, however, persuaded that this circumstance requires the Secretary to award black lung benefits to claimants who do not have pneumoconiosis or whose disability did not arise in whole or in part out of coal mine employment. As an initial matter, contemporaneous analyses of claims approved by the HEW provide little support for the argument that the HEW made a "cost/benefit" decision to forgo inquiry into disease existence or disability causation. Rather, many of the claims allegedly awarded on the basis of insufficient evidence involved miners who were unable to present sufficient evidence of medical disability, not those who did not suffer from pneumoconiosis or were disabled by other causes. See ibid.; see also The Comptroller General of the United States, General Accounting Office, Program to Pay Black Lung Benefits to Miners and Their Survivors -- Improvements Are Needed, 45-47 (1977); H.R.Rep. No. 95-151, pp. 73-74 (1977) (Minority Views and Separate Views). Moreover, this argument ignores entirely the advances in medical technology that have occurred since the promulgation of the HEW interim regulations, advances that Congress could not have intended either the HEW or the DOL to ignore in administering the program. See S.Rep. No. 95-209, p. 13 (1977).
demonstrate that her interpretation of the HEW interim regulations comports with HEW's contemporaneous interpretation of those regulations. As is stated above, the Secretary's interpretation of HEW's interim regulations is entitled to deference so long as it is reasonable. An interpretation that harmonizes an agency's regulations with their authorizing statute is presumptively reasonable, and claimants have not persuaded us that the presumption is unfounded in this case.
We conclude that the Secretary of Labor has not acted unreasonably, or inconsistently with § 402(f)(2) of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 as amended by the Black Lung Benefits Act, in promulgating interim regulations that permit the presumption of entitlement to black lung benefits to be rebutted with evidence demonstrating that the miner does not, or did not, have pneumoconiosis, or that the miner's disability does not, or did not, arise out of coal mine employment. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Third Circuit in No. 89-1714. The judgments of the Fourth Circuit in No. 90-113 and No. 90-114 are reversed, and those cases are remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. No costs are allowed in any of these cases.
JUSTICE KENNEDY took no part in the consideration or decision of this litigation.
Pneumoconiosis was identified by the Surgeon General as "a chronic chest disease caused by the accumulation of fine coal dust particles in the human lung." S.Rep. No. 95-209, p. 5 (1977). What he described as simple pneumoconiosis seldom produces significant ventilation impairment, but it may reduce the ability of the lung to transfer oxygen to the blood. Complicated pneumoconiosis is a more serious disease, for the patient "incurs progressive massive fibrosis as a complex reaction to dust and other factors." In its complicated stage, pneumoconiosis "usually produces marked pulmonary impairment and considerable respiratory disability." Ibid.
Although the 1972 amendments did not direct the Secretary of HEW to promulgate these new interim regulations, the Report of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare contained a strongly worded invitation to do so. See S.Rep. No. 92-743, p. 18 (1972), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1972, p. 2322 ("Accordingly, the Committee expects the Secretary to adopt such interim evidentiary rules and disability evaluation criteria as will permit prompt and vigorous processing of the large backlog of claims consistent with the language and intent of these amendments").
In light of this Court's decision in Sebben, the Court of Appeals interpreted § 410.490(c) as permitting rebuttal of the presumption on a showing that the claimant's disability was not caused by coal mine employment. 895 F.2d at 183. The court therefore remanded the case for further consideration of that issue. It appears that the Fourth Circuit has since retreated from this view, and now considers the HEW interim regulations to permit only two rebuttal methods. See Robinette v. Director, OWCP, 902 F.2d 1566 (CA4 1990) (judgment entry), cert. pending, No. 90-172.
In light of this conclusion, the Board found it unnecessary to review the determination that Consolidation had successfully rebutted the presumption under subsection (b)(2) of the DOL interim regulations.
In addition to the Third Circuit, the Seventh Circuit has concluded that the third rebuttal provision of the DOL interim regulation is not more restrictive than the criteria applied by the HEW. See Patrich v. Old Ben Coal Co., 926 F.2d 1482, 1488 (1991). The Seventh Circuit did not address the fourth rebuttal provision. The Sixth Circuit also has refused to invalidate the third and fourth rebuttal provisions of the DOL interim regulation, and continues to apply these provisions to all part C claims, regardless of whether the presumption is invoked under § 410.490 or § 727.203. See Youghiogheny and Ohio Coal Co. v. Milliken, 866 F.2d 195, 202 (1989).
In Sebben, the Court concluded that the DOL interim regulations were more restrictive than the HEW's to the extent that the DOL's invocation provision did not permit invocation of the presumption without 10 years of coal mining experience. See 488 U.S. at 488 U. S. 113. The Sebben Court did not address the issue now before us: the validity of the third and fourth rebuttal provisions contained in the DOL interim regulations. See id. at 488 U. S. 119.
"there is no meaningful difference between a procedure which creates a presumption and then allows evidence to rebut it and one which denies the presumption in the first place if the same evidence is offered."
See Patrich, 926 F.2d at 1488.
"The Secretary may rebut such presumption only by establishing that (A) such miner does not, or did not, have pneumoconiosis, or that (B) his respiratory or pulmonary impairment did not arise out of, or in connection with, employment in a coal mine."
Written as a limiting provision, this section indicates Congress' understanding that these rebuttal methods are among those permitted with respect to other presumption provisions.
"[t]o establish entitlement to benefits on the basis of a coal miner's total disability due to pneumoconiosis, a claimant must submit the evidence necessary to establish that he is a coal miner . . . who is . . . totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis, and that his pneumoconiosis arose out of employment in the Nation's coal mines."
I respectfully dissent. The disputed regulatory language is complex, but it is not ambiguous, and I do not think Chevron deference, See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 (1984), requires us to accept the strained and implausible construction advanced by the Department of Labor (DOL). In my judgment, at least one of the claimants before us is entitled to benefits under the statute.
As an initial matter, the Court misconstrues our Chevron jurisprudence. Chevron requires that we defer to an agency's interpretation of its organic statute once we determine that that statute is ambiguous. No one contends that the relevant statutory language ("shall not be more restrictive than") is ambiguous. See Pittston Coal Group v. Sebben, 488 U. S. 105, 488 U. S. 113-114 (1988) (explaining that particular phrase). The only serious question surrounds the regulations of the then-extant Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) to which the statute refers. I agree that those regulations are complex, perhaps even "Byzantine," ante at 501 U. S. 699, but that alone is insufficient to invoke Chevron deference. Deference is appropriate where the relevant language, carefully considered, can yield more than one reasonable interpretation, not where discerning the only possible interpretation requires a taxing inquiry. Chevron is a recognition that the ambiguities in statutes are to be resolved by the agencies charged with implementing them, not a declaration that, when statutory construction becomes difficult, we will throw up our hands and let regulatory agencies do it for us. In my view, the HEW regulations referred to by the present statute are susceptible of only one meaning, although they are so intricate that that meaning is not immediately accessible.
there, it seems a bit greedy for the Secretary to use Chevron to launch the Labor Department's own cross-border attack here. In my view, the only legitimate claimant to deference with regard to the present regulations is the agency that drafted them.
"Criteria applied by the Secretary of Labor . . . [to Black Lung claims filed prior to April 1, 1980] shall not be more restrictive [i.e., shall not be less favorable to claimants] than the criteria applicable to a claim filed on June 30, 1973."
"(a) Establishing interim presumption. A miner who engaged in coal mine employment . . . will be presumed to be totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis . . . if one of the following medical requirements is met:"
"(1) A chest roentgenogram (X-ray), biopsy, or autopsy establishes the existence of pneumoconiosis (see § 410.428 of this title);"
"(2) Ventilatory studies establish the presence of a chronic respiratory or pulmonary disease . . ."
"(3) Blood gas studies . . . demonstrate the presence of an impairment in the transfer of oxygen from the lung alveoli to the blood . . ."
"(4) Other medical evidence . . . establishes the presence of a totally disabling respiratory or pulmonary impairment;"
"(b) Rebuttal of interim presumption. In adjudicating a claim under this subpart, all relevant medical evidence shall be considered. The presumption in paragraph (a) of this section shall be rebutted if: "
"(1) The evidence establishes that the individual is, in fact, doing his usual coal mine work or comparable and gainful work (see § 410.412(a)(1) of this title); or"
"(2) In light of all relevant evidence it is established that the individual is able to do his usual coal mine work or comparable and gainful work (see § 410.412(a)(1) of this title); or"
"(3) The evidence establishes that the total disability or death of the miner did not arise in whole or in part out of coal mine employment; or"
"(4) The evidence establishes that the miner does not, or did not, have pneumoconiosis."
20 CFR § 727.203 (1990).
"(b) Interim presumption. With respect to a miner who files a claim for benefits before July 1, 1973 . . . such miner will be presumed to be totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis . . . if:"
"(1) One of the following medical requirements is met:"
"(i) A chest roentgenogram (X-ray), biopsy, or autopsy establishes the existence of pneumoconiosis (see § 410.428); or"
"(ii) In the case of a miner employed for at least 15 years in underground or comparable coal mine employment, ventilatory studies establish the presence of a chronic respiratory or pulmonary disease"
"(2) The impairment established in accordance with paragraph (b)(1) of this section arose out of coal mine employment (see §§ 410.416 and 410.456)."
"(c) Rebuttal of Presumption. The presumption in paragraph (b) of this section may be rebutted if: "
"(1) There is evidence that the individual is, in fact, doing his usual coal mine work or comparable and gainful work (see § 410.412(a)(1)), or"
"(2) Other evidence, including physical performance tests . . . establish that the individual is able to do his usual coal mine work or comparable and gainful work (see § 410.412(a)(1))."
The relationship between the two regulations is apparent because they use a similar structure and, in large part, similar language. Both allow claimants to invoke a presumption of disability due to pneumoconiosis upon the presentation of certain medical evidence (the HEW regulations provide for two types of medical evidence while the DOL regulations provide for four). Both specify certain ways in which that presumption may be rebutted. The HEW regulations, however, specify only two methods of rebuttal (both relating to the extent of the disability), while the DOL regulations authorize four methods (the two expressed in the HEW regulations plus two more: (1) that pneumoconiosis did not cause the disability, and (2) that the miner does not have pneumoconiosis).
For BethEnergy, however, things would have been different: § 727.203(b)(3) does not have a counterpart in the HEW regulations. The only rebuttal expressly contemplated by the HEW regulations is that the claimant is not in fact disabled -- but Pauley concededly was. It appears, therefore, that BethEnergy could not have challenged the causal link between the pneumoconiosis and the disability under the HEW regulations, and thus would have had no defense.
In my view, this argument is self-evidently correct, and is obscured only by the technical complexity of the regulatory provisions. But the statutory structure, as opposed to the actual language, is simple. Under the HEW regulations, we assume "x," but "x" may be rebutted by a showing of "a" or "b." Under the DOL regulations, we likewise assume "x," but "x" may be rebutted by a showing of "a" or "b" or "c" or "d." It defies common sense to argue that, given this structure, the two regulations are in fact identical, and that Pauley, whose claim could be defeated by a showing of "c" but not by a showing of "a" or "b," was no worse off under the latter regime. Yet that is precisely the argument the Court accepts.
present circumstances in the light of limited medical resources and techniques. Accordingly, the Congress stated its expectancy that the Secretary would adopt such interim evidentiary rules and disability evaluation criteria as would permit prompt and vigorous processing of the large backlog of claims. . . ."
"[T]he rebuttal provisions of the interim Labor regulation . . . permi[t] rebuttal not only on the grounds available in the interim HEW regulation (§ 410.490(c)), but also on the basis that 'the total disability or death of the miner did not arise in whole or in part out of coal mine employment,' or that 'the miner does not, or did not, have pneumoconiosis.' See §§ 727.203(b)(1) (4)."
488 U.S. at 488 U. S. 111 (emphasis added).
Although I think the HEW regulations clear (albeit complex) on their face, I turn now to the specific arguments why they should nevertheless not be read to limit rebuttal opportunities.
did not arise from coal mine employment. That argument might be correct if "impairment" in subsection (b)(2) of the HEW regulations meant the same as "disability" in the DOL regulations. It does not. Subsection (b)(2) of the HEW regulations refers to the "impairment" established in subsection (b)(1); that subsection discusses proof of the existence of pneumoconiosis. The (b)(2) "impairment," then, is the disease itself. Thus, it is open to the employer under the HEW regulations to show, for example, that Pauley's pneumoconiosis did not arise from coal mine employment. But here everyone agrees that it did -- the relevant question is whether Pauley's disability arose from his pneumoconiosis. That is where DOL diverges from HEW, for DOL's regulations allow proof that the disability did not arise from the disease, and thus from coal mine employment; the HEW regulations require only a showing that the impairment -- i.e., the pneumoconiosis -- arose from coal mine employment, and presume the causal link between the impairment and the disability.
disease, which (2) arose from coal mine employment. Subsection (b)(1) of the HEW regulations says the claimant must prove the first point, and says how to do it (by submitting the specified medical evidence, and thereby raising the presumption). Subsection (b)(2) says that the claimant must also prove the second point (to which the presumption is irrelevant). To contest a finding of pneumoconiosis, the employer may wish to argue either (1) that the miner has a chronic dust disease but it did not arise from coal mine employment; or (2) that the miner does not have a chronic dust disease. Subsection (b)(2) of the HEW regulations allows the employer to argue the former, but it says nothing about the latter; and subsection (b)(1) bars the latter argument, via the presumption, if the miner offers the specified medical evidence. DOL's fourth rebuttal allows the employer to argue either point -- and thus, impermissibly, offers additional recourse to the employer.
"(a) A miner shall be considered totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis if:"
"(1) His pneumoconiosis prevents him from engaging in gainful work in the immediate area of his residence requiring the skills and abilities comparable to those of any work in a mine or mines in which he previously engaged with some regularity and over a substantial period of time. . . ."
Because this provision begins with references to the miner's disability due to pneumoconiosis, the employers believe it would be reasonable to construe it as authorizing the argument either that the miner does not have the disease or that the disease is not causing the disability. I do not find this a plausible explanation of the reference to § 410.412(a)(1). The logical reason for cross-referencing that provision was to include within the explicit rebuttal provision the more complete definition of "gainful work" that the incorporated section affords. Had HEW intended to create additional rebuttal provisions, it would simply have done so, explicitly and in parallel with the other rebuttal provisions, rather than backhandedly, through the incorporation by reference.
statute, but concludes that "the Secretary's view need be only reasonable to warrant deference." Ante at 501 U. S. 702. While I do not even think the foregoing argument reasonable (nor do I think the Secretary entitled to deference, see supra at 501 U. S. 707-708), I note that the Secretary herself does not advance it. Certainly private parties' speculation as to what the Secretary could have thought warrants no deference.
The Government's second line of attack centers upon its claim that the HEW regulations, if read to limit rebuttal, would violate the Black Lung Benefits Act. That argument has potential force, for we are more willing to depart from the natural import of language when adhering to it would render a regulation unauthorized or a statute unconstitutional. It is important to note at the outset, however, that the Government has a heavy burden in this regard. Had the HEW regulations been challenged before this Court as inconsistent with the statute, we would have owed Chevron deference to the Secretary (of HEW). The Government's present argument depends on a showing not that a natural reading of the HEW regulations produces less than the best reading of the statute, but that it produces an unreasonable one.
"it disserves Congressional intent to interpret HEW's interim regulations to allow recovery by miners who do not have pneumoconiosis or whose total disability did not arise, at least in part, from their coal mine employment,"
reliable procedures. As with all presumptions, their preclusion of full litigation of some issues left open the possibility that some claimants would receive benefits to which, in a perfect world, they would not be entitled. That is a necessary consequence of attempting to resolve complex and possibly indeterminate claims with a minimum of delay. I cannot say that, in striking such a balance, HEW violated a clear policy of Congress, for Congress itself had taken up the Black Lung issue in 1972 in part because of a perception that adjudication of claims was moving too slowly.
"the authorizing statute . . . expressly provides that the presumptions in question will be rebuttable, see 30 U.S.C. §§ 921(c)(1), (2), and (4), and requires the Secretary of HEW to consider all relevant evidence in adjudicating claims. . . . See 30 U.S.C. § 923(b)."
"If a miner who is suffering or suffered from pneumoconiosis was employed for ten years or more in one or more coal mines there shall be a rebuttable presumption that his pneumoconiosis arose out of such employment."
That provision is simply irrelevant to the issue of whether rebuttal must be allowed as to either the existence of pneumoconiosis or the causal link between the disease and the disability. The HEW regulations do not purport to establish an irrebuttable presumption relating to the link between the disease and employment in coal mines.
"If a deceased miner was employed for ten years or more in one or more coal mines and died from a respirable disease there shall be a rebuttable presumption that his death was due to pneumoconiosis."
It is plausible to read that section as foreclosing HEW from establishing an irrebuttable presumption of causation based solely on death after 10 years' service.
But that is not what the HEW regulations do. Rather, they establish an irrebuttable presumption based upon 10 years' service plus substantial additional medical evidence. It is not inconsistent to say that certain evidence establishes a rebuttal presumption and additional, more persuasive evidence establishes an irrebuttable presumption.
Section 921(c)(4) is the most relevant, for it establishes a presumption of disability based upon a showing of pneumoconiosis. It then states in relevant part that "[t]he Secretary may rebut such presumption only by establishing that (A) such miner does not, or did not, have pneumoconiosis. . . ." (Emphasis added). It is true that this rebuttal provision tracks the fourth rebuttal provision of the DOL regulations. However, § 921(c)(4) is permissive. It establishes the ways in which the Secretary may rebut a presumption, but does not require that the Secretary use them. It is not inconsistent with the statute for the Secretary to decide that such rebuttal attempts would involve more administrative expense than they could justify, and thus to adopt regulations declining to exercise the option.
is at least ambiguous as to whether the Secretary could elect not to contest claims based on certain evidence. Since we owe the Secretary (of HEW) Chevron deference in construing the statute, I cannot say that, if the Secretary had taken that position (as he apparently did in promulgating the regulations), we would not have accepted it as a permissible interpretation.
The Government's final argument is that the HEW regulations do not expressly preclude rebuttal on grounds other than those specified. Thus, even if expanded rebuttal is not specifically provided for, neither is it foreclosed; the statute adopting the HEW regulations is simply ambiguous as to its availability, and we should defer to DOL's view that it should exist. It is true that the HEW regulations do not say that these are the only two ways to rebut the presumption. That is, however, the reasonable implication, as is suggested by the hoary canon of construction, expressio unius est exclusio alterius. When a provision sets forth a general rule followed by specific exceptions to that rule, one must assume -- absent other evidence -- that no further exceptions are intended. The Court argues that the principle of expressio unius is not absolute, and may be rejected where its application "would render a regulation inconsistent with the purpose and language of the authorizing statute." Ante at 501 U. S. 703. That is assuredly true; it is only one of many possible indications of meaning. Cf. Burns v. United States, 501 U.S. 501 U. S. 136-138 (1991) (invocation of expressio unius inappropriate where it would lead to absurd and arguably unconstitutional results). It is a strong indication, however, and the problem here is that there are no others. As discussed above, limitation of rebuttal is not contrary to the text or purpose of the authorizing statute, and neither the Government nor the Court offers any other reason for thinking that the listed exceptions are not exclusive.
presumption to be rebutted, since, under the HEW regulations, he would not have been entitled to the presumption in the first place. Accordingly, I would reverse in No. 90-113.
The HEW regulations also contain a separate provision that would have required Pauley to show that his medical condition arose from working in a coal mine. § 410.490(b)(2). While that requirement is not set forth as a separate provision in the DOL regulations, it is presumably a part of § 727.203(b)(4), which requires that the miner have pneumoconiosis. Pneumoconiosis is specifically defined as a disease arising from work in a coal mine. 30 U.S.C. § 902(b). It is not contested that Pauley's pneumoconiosis arose from work in the mine -- only that it, rather than his other ailments, was the cause of his disability.
In its permanent regulations HEW did not use the § 410.490 interim presumption. Significantly, the permanent regulations also outlined an extensive procedure for contesting the link between a miner's pneumoconiosis and his disabilities. See § 410.426. The fact that this provision was not contained in the interim procedures suggests that HEW thought disability causation would not be an issue there -- and conforms to the view, see § 410.490(a), that the interim presumptions would serve as a blunt instrument for adjudication until full evidentiary procedures could be developed.
Even if the Secretary of Labor were the proper party to claim Chevron deference in interpreting these regulations, I find her arguments to the contrary so implausible that I would not accept them in any event.

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