Source: https://www.josephine-smalls-miller-law-office.com/briefly-speaking/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 12:30:41+00:00

Document:
This grievance hearing was held on December 1, 2016 as a result of a referral from the Connecticut Appellate Court regarding four cases consolidated at a show cause hearing on December 4, 2014, an investigation by the Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel, and a referral by a superior court judge regarding three trial level cases handled by Respondent. Respondent was not notified [FN1] of the referral from the superior court judge until after a reply brief was filed in the Writ of Error before the Supreme Court pointing out disparate treatment of Respondent and a Caucasian attorney in two cases before that same judge.
The hearing focused on alleged violation of various rules under the Connecticut Code of Professional Responsibility, namely 1.1, 1.3, 3.1, 3.2, 3.4 (3) and 8.4 (4) regarding competence, diligence, fairness to opposing party and counsel, misconduct and conduct detrimental to the administration of justice.
FN1 While correspondence from the Disciplinary Counsel claims that the referral date preceded the filing of the reply brief, the refusal of the reviewing panel to permit questioning of the disciplinary counsel, means that there has been no opportunity to search out the truth of this. Reasonable minds could question whether the referral was made in retaliation for Respondent having presented evidence of racially disparate treatment.
At the hearing on December 1 Respondent was denied the right to present witnesses in support of her defense and was denied the right to question two members of the Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel. The reviewing committee vacated the subpoenas that had been served on Suzanne Sutton (who had investigated the claims against Respondent) and Beth Baldwin (who had handled the attempted disciplinary action against a comparator Caucasian attorney).
The scope of Respondent’s defense to the claims was limited by the reviewing panel when it determined that the four cases that had been heard by the Appellate Court could not be reviewed due to res judicata and collateral estoppel. The panel further heard argument [FN2] regarding whether the Supreme Court decision in Miller v. Connecticut Appellate Court, 320 Conn 759 (2016) regarding the scope of the Appellate Court referral should govern the hearing. That is, whether the Supreme Court allegation that the order of referral was to determine if Respondent’s conduct was “part of a larger pattern of irresponsibility” justifying investigation of conduct in state and [federal] court.
FN2 Respondent also submitted a written brief regarding the legal determination of the Supreme Court in response to the Writ of Error filed in the Appellate Court’s six month suspension of Respondent from practice before the Appellate Court.
In a sweepingly broad and unwarranted “interpretation” of the Appellate Court Order referring Respondent for investigation by the Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel, the Supreme Court set the tone for a pre-ordained decision to discipline Respondent regardless of the facts. Violating the statutory rules of construction, the Supreme Court utilized the fiction that the order of referral by the Appellate Court “could have been clearer”. This fiction was then used to broaden the referral from “a request for an investigation into the specific conduct giving rise to this writ of error….to a request for a determination of whether Miller’s conduct before the Appellate Court was part of a larger pattern of irresponsibility in Miller’s handling of her professional obligations.” Again ignoring the principle of strict construction, the court then stated “we do not know whether the Chief Disciplinary Counsel will find instances of neglectful or otherwise unacceptable conduct by Miller in the Superior Court…” Miller v. Appellate Court, 320 Conn. 759 (2016). This reviewing committee then broadened the referral even further by adding Respondent’s federal court cases to those be included among those examined.
As Justice Espinosa opined in LaPointe v. Commissioner of Correction, (Conn 2015) “[i]t is not necessary to engage in any ‘‘divination’’ to discern the impetus driving the majority’s decision. My conclusion is that the majority begins with the conviction that the petitioner is innocent, and only constructs its analysis after it has arrived at that conclusion,…” LaPointe dissent. In the instant case Respondent has been hailed before this reviewing panel with the foregone conclusion that she is guilty of misconduct even when the specific facts establish otherwise.
As noted in the brief submitted with regard to the issue of the scope of this hearing, Respondent has been hawkish in protesting the discriminatory and retaliatory manner that the judicial branch and its agents (disciplinary and grievance authorities) have treated her. This has included (a) a complaint of discrimination filed with the Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities against the Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel [CHRO Case No. 1610026] alleging a violation of C.G.S. § 46a-71; (b) a complaint with CHRO against the Statewide Grievance Committee [CHRO Case No. 1610342] also alleging a violation of C.G.S. § 46a-71; (c) a federal civil action in alleging discriminatory and retaliatory investigation by disciplinary authorities in Miller v. Carrasquilla, et al. Civil Action No. 3:15CV01111 (MPS). [FN3] This reviewing panel may also take judicial notice of the complaint of Respondent in Miller v. City of Bridgeport Police Department, et al.,[16-4102cv] presently on appeal to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals that alleges, inter alia, racial discrimination in the refusal to pay her as Caucasian lawyers, placement of her on a “no pay” list, attempted bribery, and tortious interference with her contracts with clients (e.g. Bridgeport Assistant City Attorney who encouraged Respondent’s client not to use her but recommended a Caucasian lawyer).
In a well-researched law review article, [Moliterno, James E. "Politically Motivated Bar Discipline"(2005) Faculty Publications, Paper 928 http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs/928] it has been documented that lawyers who represent unpopular causes or unpopular persons, who are not politically connected, or those who bore ethnic identities that the organized bar found threatening to its “homogeneity of thought" have been subjected to unwarranted discipline processes. Moliterno, Id.
This fierce criticism of certain lawyers has in the past come from the highest levels of judicial, government, and bar leadership. Ronald Reagan was openly hostile to legal services lawyers. Chief Justice Warren Burger gave substantial blame for the impending downfall of the profession to lawyers in political trials and encouraged the legal profession to apply "rigorous powers of discipline" to the misbehaving lawyers by using either the judicial or bar enforcement systems". To fail to use such discipline he warned, would allow "the jungle [to] clos[e] in on us.". Fred P. Graham, "Burger Assails Unruly Lawyers", N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 1971, (quoting and excerpting from speech).
In the case of noted attorney William Kunstler, the Association of the Bar of the City of New York so eagerly awaited the opportunity to discipline him that it began proceedings before the Chicago Seven trial had ended, violating its own rules of procedure. Tom Goldstein, Bar Group Withdraws Charges Against Kunstler, N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1974, at 34.
In dissenting from a Supreme Court's affirmance of a contempt conviction of a lawyer whose otherwise unblemished 24 year record resulted in disbarment because he deigned to represent an alleged Communist Party member, Justice Black wrote, "[T]his summary blasting of legal careers ... constitutes an overhanging menace to the security of every courtroom advocate in America. The menace is most ominous for lawyers who are obscure, unpopular, or defenders of unpopular persons or unorthodox causes." Sacher v. United States, 343 U. S. 1, 18 (1952 Black, J, dissenting).
The manner in which the disciplinary authorities in the instant case have chosen to go after and investigate Respondent for matters that hardly raise an eyebrow for others is explainable by the political and racial motivation because Respondent is a civil rights lawyer who litigates unpopular causes and is unapologetically black in her worldview. In a prior grievance hearing, the Chief Disciplinary Counsel has recommended a presentment against Respondent for the stated reason that she did not like Respondent’s “attitude” and in written communication in the same grievance that attorneys usually panic when confronted with a grievance. The attitude of the lawyer and their lack of fear should not be any factor in whether discipline is imposed or even recommended.
should examine the evidence and reach their determination.
As a practitioner in the area of civil rights litigation for thirty-six years, the paper trail that is sought to be created, is recognized by Respondent as a tried and true technique. That is, if it is claimed that there is incompetence regarding an African-American lawyer and few will question it. The disciplinary authorities, and this reviewing panel, must first ignore Respondent’s thirty-six years of spotless practice covering public and private sector, corporate in-house, defense and plaintiff representation. [R EX A] This panel need not accept Respondent’s own assessment of her competence but may look to the opinion of the same federal court judge who sanctioned her and thus set off multiple rounds of disciplinary actions. [R EX B] “It was evident …at trial that plaintiff’s counsel is a highly capable and skilled trial attorney, and that those skills were indispensable to the success of her client in this case, in which his testimony alone stood against the contrary testimony of numerous police officers. His counsel was thoroughly prepared, organized, and adept at all stages of argument and examination of witnesses.” [R EX B, page 3].
The obvious attempt to create a paper trail may be demonstrated by the referral made in the matter of Mazzo v. Town of Fairfield, CV12-6031781. In this matter it is claimed that Respondent failed to produce her client for a deposition and filed inappropriate caseflow requests. It is stunning that the judge making the referral and the reviewing panel failed to recognize that the very documents presented to prove the alleged incompetence themselves establish that the attorney who failed to produce his client was not Respondent, but another attorney in the case. [R EX D; R EX E; TR. 104, LL 26-27; TR. 105, LL 1-27; TR. 106, LL 1-12; TR. 107, LL 15-27; T. 108, LL 1-3] The claim is absolutely false that Respondent refused or failed to produce her client for deposition. The client’s deposition took place on two separate occasions. [TR. 63, LL 2-14] Rather than this matter demonstrating any incompetence or lack of diligence or any other rule violation by Respondent, it clearly demonstrates the willingness of the judicial branch and the disciplinary authorities to fail or refuse to even read the documentary evidence before them and to recommend discipline “just because they can”. If anyone should have been hailed before this reviewing panel, it should have been the Caucasian attorney who actually engaged in the alleged misconduct in refusing to present his client for deposition. To fail to discipline him demonstrates that there is a double standard, prima facie evidence of racial and political motivation in this probable cause finding against Respondent.
The disciplinary authorities and the referring court have made a mountain out of a molehill. When the Caucasian attorney in the Mazzo case failed to file even a caseflow request, failed to file any motion for continuance, and did not appear for jury selection, ABSOLUTELY NOTHING, was done to sanction him for his conduct. [TR. 113, LL 17-27; TR. 114, LL 1-6; R EX G] By contrast, one of Respondent’s cases was dismissed by the same court, when she did not appear for jury selection due to illness. Mezsaros v. Banks, CV12-6027816; [TR. 113, LL 21-26].
Respondent failed to show reasonable diligence in violation of Rule 1.1. Two examples will be used to demonstrate that the judicial branch has strained in its efforts to create a paper trail for sanctioning Respondent. In Willis v. Community Health Services, AC 36955, [FN4] the Appellate Court dismissed an appeal [FN5] for the purported reason that a certificate of transcript was not timely filed. At the time of the show cause hearing [FN6] in this matter Respondent explained that she was out of the country when a rule nisi order was issued requesting the filing of a transcript. Although the date for complying with the rule nisi had passed by the time Respondent returned to the country, in a motion to open the dismissal it was explained that the transcript in question had actually been filed with the court some five months earlier in the same case but only under a different docket number. This was apparently deemed to be such egregious misconduct that the Appellate Court nevertheless dismissed the appeal.
FN4 Although the reviewing panel has apparently concluded that res judicata applies so that no new evidence was received regarding this matter. However, the undisputed facts may be taken judicial notice of for examination of the point being made by Respondent.
FN5 Although the reviewing panel apparently deems this matter to be governed by principles of res judicata or collateral estoppel, it may nevertheless take judicial notice of the underlying facts of the case.
A. ….when the reference is made to me taking 119 days that was because I was seeking to get other counsel for Mr. Banks. I was well aware that Judge Bellis was not going to open the motion to open the judgment. And so I tried to get someone else for him thinking that if he were represented by someone other than me, maybe he might have a chance of her opening it, but was unsuccessful in finding anyone else to take the case on.
Q. Okay. Why do you saw that you were well aware that Judge Bellis wasn’t going to grant the motion to open?
A. That would take a bit of telling, but if you listen to it, there had been a number of instances where it has been made clear to me that Judge Bellis would side with whoever was opposing counsel whatever case I was on. Even the referrals that she’s made to the Disciplinary Counsel I think when we go through some of the other cases are going to establish that. In one specific instance, I had a conversation with Judge Bellis at my request in her office because of something that I had heard from opposing counsel in the Cimmino case.
Q. Okay. But that has nothing to do with this case, right?
A. No, you’re asking me why I felt Judge Bellis would not open the motion and I’m telling you why. There’s a long history between Judge Bellis and I. So that’s why I’m answering that question if you want me to continue.
Q. I think you’ve given me an idea that you indicate that you felt that Judge Bellis wouldn’t.
Notably, three of the four trial level cases referred to this reviewing panel were cited by Judge Bellis as examples of alleged incompetence, lack of diligence, etc. by Respondent (i.e. Stone, Mezzaros, and Mazzo). If advice has been given to attorneys who are opposite Respondent on one case, it is a fair question whether these referrals were motivated by something other than the claimed lack of competence, skill, or diligence. Respectfully, it is submitted that there is an insufficient showing of clear and convincing evidence to support these claims.
The comparator evidence regarding attorney Peters-Hamlin demonstrates how little regard the Disciplinary Counsel has for instances when attorneys engage in misconduct and conduct detrimental to the administration of justice. This attorney was suspended for seven years by the New York State and Federal Court, disbarred in Maryland state court but has never been reprimanded by Connecticut State or Federal courts except for a retroactive suspension. The state judicial website does not list any reprimand of her and she has not lost a single day of legal practice. Her misconduct is amply demonstrated that “while serving as lead counsel for a plaintiff in a trade secrets infringement suit in New York, instructed a first-year associate to “mark-up” deposition transcripts and claim them as attorney work product; knowingly made false statements to mislead the court as to these events; and made copies and ordered additional copies of deposition transcripts for use in another matter, in contravention of court confidentiality orders. Respondent engaged in conduct involving repeated intentional dishonesty, misrepresentations, and deceit.” Judicial notice may be taken by this reviewing panel of the matter of Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Kristan Peters-Hamlin, Misc. Docket AG No. 30, September Term, 2015. Opinion by Hotten, M. Peters-Hamlin pursued her appeal of a seven year suspension for seven years, during which time all consideration of reciprocal discipline was held in abeyance by Connecticut State and Federal courts. At the end of this extended period of appeals, a Connecticut superior court judge found that Peters-Hamlin had “suffered enough” and that no discipline was warranted. If Connecticut disciplinary authorities could overlook this history of misconduct by this Caucasian female attorney, then it has no genuine cause to discipline Respondent.
The catchall topic of “conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice” is obviously an important one. However, the laudable and lofty purpose of ensuring proper administration of justice has little meaning when there are clear examples when the administration of justice is ignored as regards some members of the bar. See for example the seven year inaction by the Disciplinary Counsel before it sought any action to discipline Attorney Kristen Peters-Hamlin. [FST-CV15-6024364; In Re Peters-Hamlin 3:08gp00018 (JCH)] See also the refusal of Disciplinary Counsel to seek any meaningful discipline of Attorneys Michael Koskoff and Kathleen Nastri in the matter of D’Attillo v. Koskoff, Koskoff & Bieder; NNH-CV14-6051836] See also Christian B. Shelton of Branford the lawyer who drafted a "fictitious" consulting contract that became evidence in former Governor Rowland's 2014 trial received an official reprimand but was permitted to keep his license to practice law. If the disciplinary authorities were truly concerned about the administration of justice, they would not ignore such obvious instances of misconduct by other attorneys who are well-connected and Caucasian.
As the U. S. Supreme Court has said "[p]recision of regulation must be the touchstone in an area so closely touching our most precious freedoms." N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U. S. 415 (1963). Cf. In Re Primus, 435 U. S. 412 (1978). There is more than ample evidence that Respondent has been subjected to a double standard imposing discipline and the threat of discipline in order to chill her civil rights litigation on her own behalf and that of her clients.
More than fifty years ago the United States Supreme Court said that a “State may not, under the guise of prohibiting professional misconduct, ignore constitutional rights”. [Emphasis added] See Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U. S. 232 (1957); Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U. S. 252 (1957). Cf. In re Sawyer, 360 U. S. 622 (1959). NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U. S. 449, 461 (1958). When lawyers are disciplined for the purpose of silencing their "non-homogenous voices" the public at large is harmed.
"Some politically motivated bar complaints or bar actions may have technical merit, at least at the time of their initiation. But even the meritorious ones would not be filed in the usual course of things without the impetus of some political or other untoward motivation. In the absence of merit, if a bar complaint bears other marks of political action (other interests of the complaining party, context of the complaint), a political motive for the action is highly likely. When the bar complaint is demonstrably meritless, it fits a historical pattern of politically motivated discipline." Moliterno, Id.
This reviewing panel has been convened for the purpose of carrying out the politically motivated complaints from the Connecticut Judicial Branch and disciplinary authorities to silence Respondent for her refusal to think and speak homogeneously, in lock step with the majority Caucasian bar. It is respectfully submitted that this reviewing panel should have the courage to reject the politically motivated efforts of the disciplinary authorities and the judicial branch to create a paper trail for continued discipline of Respondent.
Josephine Smalls Miller, self-represented, the plaintiff in error.
brief, George Jepsen, attorney general, for the defendant in error.
ROGERS, C.J., and PALMER, ZARELLA, EVELEIGH, McDONALD, ESPINOSA and ROBINSON, Js.
This case is before us on a writ of error brought by the plaintiff in error, Josephine Smalls Miller, who claims that the Appellate Court abused its discretion in suspending her from the practice of law before that court for a period of six months, in addition to imposing other sanctions, due to her failure to comply with Appellate Court rules and deadlines, and for filing a frivolous appeal. We disagree and, accordingly, dismiss the writ of error.
pursuant to General Statutes § 51–84,1 and costs and payment of expenses, including attorney's fees, to the opposing part[ies].” (Footnote added.) The Appellate Court also ordered opposing counsel in three of the aforementioned cases to appear at the hearing and to present argument on the following then pending motions: (1) the defendant's motion for attorney's fees in Coble; (2) the plaintiff's motion to open the dismissal of the appeal in Willis; and (3) the plaintiff's motion to set aside rule nisi No. 142267 in Cimmino.
On December 3, 2014, the Appellate Court conducted a hearing at which Miller presented oral argument as to why she believed sanctions in the aforementioned matters were unwarranted. Miller also submitted a written memorandum of law in support of her position.
brief and appendix. Please also submit the electronic confirmation receipt for the refiled electronic version.” As of the date of the show cause hearing, Miller had not filed the required certifications and confirmation in Addo.
followed by a six month extension on December 16, 2013, with a due date for the brief and appendix of July 1, 2014. Six weeks after that date, on August 19, 2014, Miller requested a third extension, which the Appellate Court denied. On August 26, 2014, the Appellate Court issued an order nisi to Miller advising her that the appeal in Cimmino would be dismissed if the brief and appendix were not filed by September 9, 2014. The record indicates that, at the time of the December 3, 2014 show cause hearing, those materials still had not been filed.
to Miller, all of her appellate work is performed on a pro bono basis. Miller further indicated that the Appellate Court's treatment of her appeared to be racially motivated and reminded her of how she was treated in the late 1970s as a court employee in Georgia.
In 2013, Miller refiled the action in Coble on behalf of the plaintiff in that case pursuant to the accidental failure of suit statute, General Statutes § 52–592. Thereafter, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment. In a deposition of Miller taken in connection with that motion, she stated that the original action had failed because, as a solo practitioner, she had no one to teach her the “ins and outs” of Connecticut practice, and, as a result, she was “ignorant” of the rules of practice. Miller also stated that she was overwhelmed by work in her practice and had adopted a “hit or miss” approach to civil procedure.
the second action was meritless and not brought in good faith.
Miller, on behalf of the plaintiff in Coble, appealed to the Appellate Court, claiming that the trial court incorrectly determined that the earlier nonsuit was not the result of mistake, inadvertence or excusable neglect and, as a result, also improperly concluded that the accidental failure of suit statute did not apply. Thereafter, the defendant in Coble filed a motion to dismiss the appeal as frivolous, which the Appellate Court granted. In its order dismissing the appeal, the Appellate Court stated that “[t]he entire panel recommends that the full court [also] consider the imposition of sanctions against [Miller].” At the December 3, 2014 hearing to show cause, Miller argued that such sanctions were unwarranted because reasonable minds could differ as to whether the appeal was frivolous, as evidenced by the fact that one of the judges of the Appellate Court had voted to deny the defendant's motion to dismiss the appeal.
On December 9, 2014, the Appellate Court issued an order stating that, “[a]fter reviewing ... Miller's conduct in [Coble, Willis, Cimmino and Addo ], the Appellate Court has determined that [Miller] has exhibited a persistent pattern of irresponsibility in handling her professional obligations before [the Appellate] [C]ourt.
... Miller's conduct has included the filing of [a] frivolous [appeal] and the failure to file, or to file in timely and appropriate fashion, all documents and materials necessary for the perfection and prosecution of appeals before [the Appellate] [C]ourt.
open the dismissal of the appeal in Willis, and denied the defendant's motion for attorney's fees in Coble.7 The Appellate Court permitted Miller to continue prosecuting the appeal in Addo, however, as long as Miller filed, within ten days of the issuance of the court's order, the missing “certifications ... [and] a copy of the November 10, 2014 electronic confirmation receipt indicating that the brief and appendix were submitted electronically in compliance with Practice Book [§] 67–2(g)....” When Miller failed to file those documents in a timely manner, however, the Appellate Court dismissed the appeal in Addo as well.
provides the exclusive list of misconduct for which an attorney may be sanctioned. Indeed, Miller contends that “[t]here have been no reported cases found [in which] Connecticut courts have sanctioned an attorney for alleged failures to comply with rules of appellate procedure such as filing deadlines, electronic filing requirements, or the filing of a transcript.” Miller also argues that the sanctions that the Appellate Court imposed, namely, a six month suspension, referral to the Chief Disciplinary Counsel for consideration of whatever further action might be appropriate, and dismissal of Miller's four Appellate Court cases, were disproportionate to the alleged misconduct. Miller maintains, in fact, that a close examination of each of those cases “shows no irresponsibility” on her part. We are not persuaded by Miller's claims.
for them to be able to manage their own affairs so as to achieve an orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Srager v. Koenig, 42 Conn.App. 617, 620, 681 A.2d 323, cert. denied, 239 Conn. 935, 936, 684 A.2d 709 (1996) ; see also Briggs v. McWeeny, 260 Conn. 296, 335, 796 A.2d 516 (2002) (“[a] court is free to determine in each case, as may seem best in light of the entire record before it, whether a sanction is appropriate and, if so, what the sanction should be” [emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted] ).
Statewide Grievance Committee v. Rozbicki, 211 Conn. 232, 238–39, 558 A.2d 986 (1989), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1094, 112 S.Ct. 1170, 117 L.Ed.2d 416 (1992). “As with any discretionary action of the ... court, appellate review requires every reasonable presumption in favor of the action, and the ultimate issue ... is whether the ... court could have reasonably concluded as it did.... Therefore, whether this court would have imposed a different sanction ... is irrelevant.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Thalheim v. Greenwich, 256 Conn. 628, 656, 775 A.2d 947 (2001). A uniform standard of clear and convincing evidence applies to attorney disciplinary proceedings, “regardless of the nature of the sanction ultimately imposed.”Statewide Grievance Committee v. Presnick, 215 Conn. 162, 171–72, 575 A.2d 210 (1990).
Applying the foregoing principles to the facts of the present case, we conclude that the Appellate Court did not abuse its discretion in suspending Miller from the practice of law before that court for a period of six months on the basis of her repeated failure to meet deadlines, to comply with the rules of practice, and for filing a frivolous appeal. See, e.g., Srager v. Koenig, supra, 42 Conn.App. at 621–24, 681 A.2d 323 (attorney suspended from practice before Appellate Court for six months on basis of repeated noncompliance with rules of practice and failure to timely file court documents). This court previously has observed that, “[i]n order to fulfill our responsibility of dispensing justice we in the judiciary must adopt an effective system of caseflow management.
available from the Connecticut Bar Association pertaining to civil practice and procedure in Connecticut courts, and to certify to the court within four months that he had listened to the tapes and read the entire Connecticut Practice Book, including the rules concerning professional conduct” [internal quotation marks omitted] ); CFM of Connecticut, Inc. v. Chowdhury, 239 Conn. 375, 386, 685 A.2d 1108 (1996) (appeal was dismissed on basis of attorney's failure to comply with rules of practice and court's order nisi), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Salmon, 250 Conn. 147, 735 A.2d 333 (1999) ; see also Gionfrido v. Wharf Realty, Inc., supra, 193 Conn. at 31, 34, 474 A.2d 787 (trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing case on basis of attorney's failure to appear for voir dire); In re Mongillo, supra, 190 Conn. at 690, 461 A.2d 1387 (“It is undisputed that a rule of the Superior Court required the appellant's attendance at the call of the calendar at 10 a.m. It is also undisputed that he was late. It is therefore not open to question that the Superior Court had the authority to impose a fine against the appellant for his tardiness.”); Venezia v. Kennedy, 165 Conn. 183, 184–85, 332 A.2d 102 (1973) (trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing case due to plaintiff's failure to prosecute case diligently).
that “[t]he essence of the [A]ppellate [Court's] finding against [her] is that the trial [transcript was] ... not timely ordered.” Contrary to Miller's assertion, the Appellate Court did not dismiss the appeal in Cimmino because the transcript was not timely ordered. The Appellate Court dismissed the appeal because, after granting Miller two extensions to file the brief and appendix, she failed to file them when they were due on July 1, 2014. Instead, Miller waited six weeks and then filed a motion for an additional extension of time, which the Appellate Court had little choice but to deny pursuant to Practice Book § 66–1(e), which provides: “A motion for extension of time shall be filed at least ten days before the expiration of the time limit sought to be extended or, if the cause for such extension arises during the ten day period, as soon as reasonably possible after such cause has arisen. No motion under this rule shall be granted unless it is filed before the time limit sought to be extended by such motion has expired. ” (Emphasis added.) Thus, on August 26, 2014, the court informed Miller that the appeal would be dismissed if the brief and appendix were not filed within two weeks. As we previously noted, Miller missed that deadline as well.
they are wholly unfounded. As we previously indicated, prior to the issuance of the order to show cause in Addo, Miller was notified by the Appellate Court on two separate occasions that the brief and appendix she previously had filed in that case were not compliant with Practice Book § 67–2 and would have to be refiled. In light of these notices, which we can only assume Miller ignored or did not read, her repeated assertion that the brief and appendix were removed from the website in an effort to damage her credibility with the Appellate Court underscores the propriety of that court's determination not only that Miller's handling of her cases threatened the vital interests of her clients, but also that she had demonstrated a regrettable inability to accept personal responsibility for her professional mistakes.
Miller was asked to provide assurances to the Appellate Court that such conduct would not be repeated going forward, Miller could offer no such assurances. In light of the foregoing, the Appellate Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to set aside the dismissal of the appeal in Willis. Nor did it abuse its discretion in considering Miller's transgressions in Willis as further reason to suspend her from practice before the Appellate Court until such time as she improved her knowledge of the appellate rules of practice and could offer that court persuasive assurances that she would implement the necessary changes in her law practice to ensure compliance with those rules.
of law in support of its motion for summary judgment, the defendant in Coble outlined in painstaking detail the torturous procedural history culminating in the judgment of nonsuit. In granting the motion for summary judgment in Coble, the trial court specifically relied on that history, as outlined in the defendant's motion for summary judgment, as the basis for its determination that the plaintiff in Coble could not avail herself of the accidental failure of suit statute. The trial court subsequently supplemented its decision with a special finding pursuant to § 52–226a that the refiled action in Coble was meritless and not brought in good faith. Miller did not seek an articulation of that finding.
On appeal to the Appellate Court from the granting of summary judgment in Coble, Miller did not challenge the trial court's determination that the action was meritless and not brought in good faith. Instead, she argued that the trial court incorrectly concluded that the accidental failure of suit statute did not apply because, according to Miller, her failure to comply with the rules of practice when she filed the initial action in Coble was the result of an honest misunderstanding of the applicable rules. Because Miller failed to challenge the trial court's determination that the refiled action in Coble was without merit and not brought in good faith, however, the Appellate Court properly credited that determination and granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the appeal as frivolous. In her writ of error, Miller again fails to explain why the trial court's judgment regarding the merits of the refiled action in Coble was improper. We, therefore, like the Appellate Court, have no occasion to disturb that determination.
also expresses concern that the referral could result in duplicative sanctions for the conduct described herein.
Counsel for whatever action, if any, may be appropriate with respect to Miller's conduct in the Superior Court.
1 General Statutes § 51–84 provides: “(a) Attorneys admitted by the Superior Court shall be attorneys of all courts and shall be subject to the rules and orders of the courts before which they act.
5 “The [plaintiff] could have challenged the merits of the judgment of dismissal by taking a timely appeal therefrom. On an appeal from a judgment following a denial of a motion to open pursuant to § 52–212(a), however, the standard of appellate review is whether the trial court's judgment was an abuse of its discretion.” Ruddock v. Burrowes, 243 Conn. 569, 571 n. 4, 706 A.2d 967 (1998).
7 The defendant's motion for attorney's fees in Coble was denied without prejudice to the defendant's right to seek such fees in the trial court.
9 It is well established that, in order to avail herself of the accidental failure of suit statute, Miller was required “to make a factual showing that the prior dismissal was a matter of form in the sense that the ... noncompliance with a court order occurred in circumstances such as mistake, inadvertence or excusable neglect ... [and], even in the disciplinary context, only egregious conduct will bar recourse to [the statute].” (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Worth v. Commissioner of Transportation, 135 Conn.App. 506, 518–19, 43 A.3d 199, cert. denied, 305 Conn. 919, 47 A.3d 389 (2012).
Josephine Smalls Miller, has been a practicing attorney for thirty-six years; a member of the Connecticut Bar since 2004, a past member of the Michigan Bar, the Georgia Bar, the U. S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, the District of Connecticut, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals and the United States Supreme Court.
Amici has been dedicated to identifying and rectifying civil rights abuses and other serious miscarriages of justice. Most recently, she has sought to bring attention to the politically motivated discipline of African-American attorneys like herself. Given the paucity of attorneys who have the inclination or political will to speak truth to power in this important area of attorney discipline, any opportunity to draw the attention of the Connecticut courts to its obligation to ensure a just and fair civil and criminal justice system is of interest to Amici.
In cases like this one, where the judicial and bar enforcement authorities reach deep back into the past in order to find a basis for attorney discipline, and to apply the extraordinary sanction of a year long suspension under circumstances where lawyers with far more egregious allegations go unscathed, the court must at least examine the possibility that the discipline has been imposed for a political reason that is not tethered to any issue of attorney ethics.
The historical pattern of attorney discipline establishes that lawyers who are ethnically alien, who represent unpopular causes or unpopular persons or who merely fail the test of "homogeneous thought" are often disciplined for meritless reasons. Here, the trial court’s suspension of Attorney Elder for alleged misconduct occurring more than ten years prior to the grievance complaint more likely than not has been affected by the inevitable push of the Connecticut courts and bar enforcement officials to maintain the status quo and cleanse itself of lawyers thought to be "impure" .
In a well-researched law review article, [Moliterno, James E. "Politically Motivated Bar Discipline"(2005) Faculty Publications, Paper 928 http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs/928] it has been documented that lawyers who represent unpopular causes or unpopular persons, who are not politically connected, or those who bore ethnic identities that the organized bar found threatening to its "homogeneity of thought" have been subjected to unwarranted discipline processes. Moliterno, Id.
In a wide variety of contexts, such lawyers were disciplined or threatened with discipline because “their collective fault in the eyes of the organized, traditional strength-center of the bar was the disruption to the legal, social, and cultural status quo that their work promised." Moliterno, Id.
In the case of noted attorney William Kunstler, the Association of the Bar of the City of New York so eagerly awaited the opportunity to discipline him that it began proceedings before the Chicago Seven trial had ended, violating its own rules of procedure. Tom Goldstein, Bar Group Withdraws Charges Against Kunstler, N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1974, at 34. In the instant case, disciplinary authorities have violated the plain meaning of its own rule regarding the statute of limitations for attorney grievances in its eagerness to discipline Attorney Elder.
In dissenting from a Supreme Court's affirmance of a contempt conviction of a lawyer whose otherwise unblemished 24 year record resulted in disbarment because he deigned to represent an alleged Communist Party member, Justice Black wrote, "[T]his summary blasting of legal careers ... constitutes an overhanging menace to the security of every courtroom advocate in America. The menace is most ominous for lawyers who are obscure, unpopular, or defenders of unpopular persons or unorthodox causes." Sacher v. United States, 343 U. S. 1, 18 (1952 Black, J, dissenting). Likewise, Attorney Elder has had an unblemished thirty year record as a lawyer, and he sat as a member of the Connecticut Board of Pardons for twenty years.
This court must not revert to the atavistic requirement of "homogeneous thinking" among members of the legal profession. To do so will undermine the purported goal of diversity. As part of its strategic plan, the Judicial Branch has stated that it "… will provide a diverse and culturally competent environment that is sensitive to the values and responsive to the needs of all who interact with it." Advisory Committee on Cultural Competency, Annual Report to Chief Justice Chase T. Rogers, July 2013. If the Judicial Branch is to do more than give lip service to the matter of diversity, it cannot treat its African-American attorneys differently than others.
under the guise of prohibiting professional misconduct, ignore constitutional rights".
Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U. S. 252 (1957). Cf. In re Sawyer. 360 U. S. 622 (1959).
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patteron, 357 U. S. 449, 461 (1958).
While we can determine the number of reported cases of professional discipline, we can never determine the number of lawyers silenced and the number of clients who went unrepresented. Justice Douglas described the professional phenomenon as a "black silence of fear." William O. Douglas, "The Black Silence of Fear" N.Y.Times January 13, 1952 (magazine) at 7, 37-38. When lawyers are disciplined for the purpose of silencing their "non-homogenous voices" the public at large is harmed.
In the case at bar Disciplinary Counsel has established no reason why the ten year old grievance was not dismissed as untimely. There was nothing extraordinary about the allegations that warranted a tolling of the statute, the alleged victim was an attorney who surely knew not to sit on his rights, and indeed the alleged victim's grievance complaint was not even the matter upon which probable cause was found. Moreover, the context of the suspension where the trial court refused to stay the one year period pending appeal was uncharacteristically harsh when compared with other attorney conduct that was far more egregious.  "Bar discipline machinery has moved slowly, if not at all against the politically well-connected." Moliterno, Id. There is no known case, other than the instant one where the rule of §2-32 (a)(2)(E) has been applied to a lawyer so far past the six year statute of limitations and in the absence of some clear and continuing violation. See also Miller v. Connecticut Appellate Court, (SC19346) where no other reported case could be found where a Connecticut attorney was summoned before an en banc session of the Appellate Court for disciplinary purposes (i.e. alleged procedural rules violations). The inherent power of the court to act sui generis is not as completely unfettered as found by the trial court and Disciplinary Counsel. Such unfettered discretion will result in an unjust and unworkable standard that is no standard.
By its application of Practice Book section §2-32 (a)(2)(E) to attorney conduct that occurred more than ten years before the grievance complaint and ignoring the long-held rule of a six year statute of limitations, the trial court has introduced an objectionable quality of vagueness and overbreadth into the area of attorney discipline.
As the U. S. Supreme Court has said "[p]recision of regulation must be the touchstone in an area so closely touching our most precious freedoms." N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U. S. 415 (1963). Cf. In Re Primus, 435 U. S. 412 (1978). A lawyer's property interest in his or her legal profession, still for some a noble profession, must be accorded great protection. In his book Brennan and Democracy (2005), Frank Michelman suggested that the reasoning in Button had “remarkable implications” directly attacking the idea that " law stands neutrally and impartially above and apart from politics,". Further, when Connecticut courts sought to uphold a prohibition on admission to the bar of resident aliens, the U. S. Supreme Court said "[i]t requires no argument to show that the right to work for a living in the common occupations of the community is of the very essence of the personal freedom and opportunity it was the purpose of the [Fourteenth}Amendment to secure. In Re Griffiths, 413 U. S. 717 (1973) citing Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33, 35 (1915).
While the NAACP v. Button case relied upon the First Amendment for its majority holding, there is no question that the action of Virginia's legislative and judicial branches was to attack African-American lawyers or those who espoused racial equality through litigation. Attorney Elder has raised the issue of racial disparity in treatment. Notably Disciplinary Counsel has chosen not to address this issue. This court must have a resolute determination to acknowledge and correct the injustice of racial disparity in treatment of African-American lawyers because as stated by the Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., " injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere."
One commentator has said that "politically motivated bar complaints"… those that would not be lodged but for a political motivation … are not pursued to vindicate the lawyer ethics issues raised by the complaints, but rather to achieve some political goal or effect. Such complaints often play a part in a larger drama. … and usually such bar actions lack [genuine] merit." Moliterno, Id. When genuine merit is lacking, such as in the case at bar, the regulation of attorney conduct becomes tainted, precision of regulation is discarded, and the public confidence in the system of justice is undermined. How many more careers, indeed how many more lives, must be destroyed before the courts finally open the door to diversity?
For the foregoing reasons, it is urged that this Court grant the appeal of Attorney Elder and reverse the decision of the trial court to suspend his license to practice law. Furthermore, the court in its supervisory role should initiate an investigatory commission to determine the extent to which African-American lawyers in Connecticut are treated with disparity in their appearances before the courts and/or the handling of their cases.
 See for example the seven year inaction by the Disciplinary Counsel before it sought any action to discipline Attorney Kristen Peters-Hamlin after she was suspended for seven years by the New York State Bar, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, and the District of Connecticut. [FST-CV15-6024364; In Re Peters-Hamlin 3:08gp00018(JCH)] See also the refusal of Disciplinary Counsel to seek any meaningful discipline of Attorneys Michael Koskoff and Kathleen Nastri in the matter of D’Attillo v. Koskoff, Koskoff & Bieder; NNH-CV14-6051836] See also Christian B. Shelton of Branford the lawyer who drafted a "fictitious" consulting contract that became evidence in former Governor Rowland's 2014 trial received an official reprimand but was permitted to keep his license to practice law.
 Similarly in Miller v. Connecticut Appellate Court, AC19436, the issue of racial disparity raised by Plaintiff in error was acknowledged by the Court but then ignored.

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