Source: http://lebanoncountylegaljournal.org/commonwealth-of-pa-vs-stacy-hetrick-no-cp-38-cr-0000291-2009/
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 10:06:05+00:00

Document:
Defendant, who was charged with Forgery via Criminal Complaint filed on January 9, 2009, was the subject of a bench warrant that was issued on May 21, 2009 when she failed to appear at Call of the List as directed and was apprehended on that bench warrant more than eight (8) years later on October 6, 2017, filed a Motion for Dismissal of the charge pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. Rule 600, asserting that the Commonwealth did not employ due diligence to locate her while she was a fugitive.
1. Pa.R.Crim.P. Rule 600(A)(2)(a) provides that a trial in a court case in which a written complaint is filed shall commence within 365 days from the date upon which the complaint is filed.
2. Rule 600(C) provides that periods of delay at any stage of the proceedings caused by the Commonwealth when the Commonwealth failed to exercise due diligence shall be included in the computation of the time within which trial must commence with any other periods of delay being excluded from the computation.
3. Delays of trial that are attributable to the defendant are excluded from computation for purposes of determining a defendant’s speedy trial rights.
4. Under most circumstances, delay caused by a defendant’s voluntary choice not to appear in court can be excluded from consideration of a defendant’s speedy trial rights.
5. In order for the period of a defendant’s unavailability to be excludable, the defendant must have reasonable notice of the obligation to appear and voluntarily must choose to abscond from the court’s jurisdiction.
6. When a defendant does not have reasonable notice of an obligation to appear, the Commonwealth is required to employ due diligence to locate the defendant. If the Commonwealth does not employ due diligence in that circumstance, the time of the defendant’s absence is not excludable.
7. Where the defendant is on bail, has notice of the obligation to appear and fails to do so, the concept that the Commonwealth must exercise due diligence in apprehending the defendant is misplaced in a speedy trial analysis.
8. In light of the fact that Defendant had actual notice of the charge against her and that her counsel had requested a continuance of trial and defense counsel had actual notice that the continuance had been granted and the Call of the List date was scheduled on May 21, 2009, Defendant had constructive notice of the obligation to appear on May 21, 2009 and voluntarily elected not to do so such that the time in excess of eight (8) years during which she was a fugitive directly is attributable to Defendant and is excludable for purposes of Defendant’s speedy trial rights.
L.C.C.C.P. No. CP-38-CR-0000291-2009, Opinion by Bradford H. Charles, Judge, February 8, 2018.
AND NOW, this 8th day of February, 2018, upon review of the entire file, briefs submitted by both parties, and in accordance with the attached Opinion, the Defendant’s Motion for Dismissal Pursuant to Rule 600 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure is respectfully DENIED. A copy of this Order is to be served upon the District Attorney of Lebanon County, the DEFENDANT’s attorney, and the DEFENDANT by certified mail, return receipt requested.
The DEFENDANT chose to abscond from the jurisdiction of this Court for eight (8) years, four (4) months and fifteen (15) days. During this entire period of time, she was subject to a Bench Warrant as a result of her failure to appear. Today, she argues that the charges against her should be dismissed because the Commonwealth did not employ due diligence to locate her during the pendency of her fugitive status. Because a due diligence analysis is not required when a defendant causes her own unavailability, we reject the DEFENDANT’s request to dismiss charges under Pa.R.Crim.P. 600.
The underlying acts on which the case is predicated occurred in November of 2008. A criminal complaint alleging Forgery was filed on January 9th, 2009. On February 12th, 2009, the DEFENDANT waived her preliminary hearing and was released on unsecured bail. On March 18th, 2009, DEFENDANT waived her arraignment. On April 23rd, 2009, Defense Counsel requested a continuance in order to assist another Public Defender on another case, which was granted. The case was continued to May 21st, 2009. On that date, DEFENDANT failed to appear for the Call of the List and a Bench Warrant was issued. Then, over eight (8) years later, DEFENDANT was apprehended on that bench warrant on October 6, 2017.
Unsurprisingly, this statute has been subject to a significant amount of interpretation and the body of case law surrounding the prompt trial statute is enormous. Two fundamental cases of particular relevance, quoted often in other Rule 600 cases, are Commonwealth v. Matis, 710 A.2d 12 (Pa. 1998) and Commonwealth v. Cohen, 392 A.2d 1327 (Pa. 1978).
(ii) any continuance granted at the request of the defendant or the defendant’s attorney.
“Thus, the term excludable time has a specific meaning pursuant to Rule 1100(c), which dictates that only delay imputed to the defense can constitute excludable time. See Commonwealth v. Cook, 676 A.2d 639 (Pa. 1996); Commonwealth v. Robinson, 446 A.2d 895 (Pa. 1982). Delays caused solely by the Commonwealth cannot constitute excludable time.” Commonwealth v. Matis, 710 A.2d 12, 16 (Pa. 1998).
In Matis, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that a long-pending appeal by the Commonwealth to the Superior Court was improperly excluded from the calculation of time by the Trial Court because such an appeal was attributable to the Commonwealth. Id.
• Delays of a trial that are attributable to the defendant are excluded from computation for purposes of determining a defendant’s speedy trial rights.
• Under most circumstances, time caused by a defendant’s voluntary choice not to appear in Court can be excluded from consideration of a defendant’s speedy trial time.
• In order for the period of the defendant’s unavailability to be excludable, the defendant must have reasonable notice of his/her obligation to appear and he/she must voluntarily choose to abscond from the jurisdiction of the Court.
• When a defendant does not have reasonable notice of his/her obligation to appear, the Commonwealth is required to employ due diligence to locate him/her. If the Commonwealth does not employ due diligence, the time of the defendant’s absence is not excludable.
Two less fundamental cases referenced in each Party’s brief apply the Cohen standard to a set of facts relatively similar to the facts of this case. The Defense cites Snyder, whereas the Prosecution cites Baird as examples of similar fact patterns under which the burden for a delay of trial was shifted off and on the Defendant, respectively.
Snyder involved a Defendant who had waived his Preliminary Hearing and been released on bail without a trial date. This satisfied the first part of Cohen “where a defendant undertakes to accept the status of bail during the pendency of court proceedings”. However, the court in Snyder determined that the second Cohen qualifier, “upon reasonable notice”, was absent. Commonwealth v. Snyder, 421 A.2d 438, 440 (Pa. Super. 1980); Commonwealth v. Cohen, 392 A.2d 1327 (Pa. 1978). In analyzing whether notice was sufficient, the Snyder court relied on another case: “Reasonable notice under Cohen includes personal service of written notice to the defendant, oral notice to the defendant and oral or written notice to defendant’s attorney of record.” Snyder at 440; quoting, Commonwealth v. Bundridge, 407 A.2d 406, 412 (1979). In Snyder, although the Commonwealth had sent notice to the Defendant of their trial date via certified mail, it was returned to sender. Thus, the Commonwealth had reason to know it had not been received. Id at 439. This shifted the burden back onto the Commonwealth to show due diligence. Id.
“We hold that it is the responsibility of defense counsel to advise a defendant of court proceedings requiring the defendant’s presence. Where defense counsel has actual notice of a proceeding and fails to so inform his or her client, the onus and consequences of such failure fall upon the defendant. The defendant’s failure to appear at the court proceeding, therefore, renders the defendant unavailable during the entire period between the date of the proceeding and the defendant’s subsequent apprehension by police.” Id.
“It remains for us to determine whether… defendant was in fact properly notified… we do not interpret it as requiring actual notice to appear. However, we also do not interpret Cohen as automatically allowing an exclusion… whenever the Commonwealth employs a reasonable form of notice.” Snyder at 441.
In Snyder, there was no indication that defense counsel had notice of the date of trial. Rather, the Commonwealth knew that the “reasonable notice” (certified mail) they had sent had not reached its target, and thus failed to rise to “proper notice” by itself. Id.
In this case, like in Baird, Defense Counsel’s explicit knowledge of the Court Date constitutes constructive notice to the DEFENDANT. Baird at 261. Furthermore, the circumstantial facts surrounding the notice provided in this case distinguish it from Snyder.
Even if it is true that the DEFENDANT in this case may not have received actual notice of the new trial date, she did know about the charges and she did know about her attorney’s request for a continuance. Moreover, the Commonwealth did not have the notice returned to sender. On the contrary, the motion for continuance is indicated to have been carbon copied to a “Stacy Hetrick”, and the Clerk of Courts has affixed a stamp indicating “PURSUANT TO Pa.R.Crim.P. 114 All parties are hereby notified this date: 4-2-09”. Order (4/2/2009). Furthermore, Defense Counsel indicated at the November 22, 2017 hearing that they had in fact mailed notification of the new date to the DEFENDANT. Commonwealth’s Brief in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 9. The more likely conclusion, and the one this Court has reached, is that the DEFENDANT knew about her legal obligations, and voluntarily chose to avoid them. This is precisely the type of evil that Cohen and its progeny are calculated to prevent.
“Where the defendant is on bail and has notice of his obligation to appear and fails to do so, a concept of due diligence in apprehending the fugitive is misplaced in a speedy trial analysis. To rule otherwise would permit a defendant who intentionally absented himself from a scheduled court hearing to have the charges against him dismissed if the Commonwealth’s efforts to locate him did not measure up to a court’s standard of due diligence. Such a result is obviously absurd.” Cohen, at 1331 (emphasis added).
At the outset, because criminal charges were filed on January 9, 2009 the 365 day limit imposed by Pa.R.Crim.Proc 600 would have run to January 10, 2010. We add 28 days to that deadline for the time between April 23, 2009, the original date of the call of the list, and May 21, 2009, the new date, as a result of the Defendant’s granted request for continuance. On May 21, 2009, the DEFENDANT failed to appear at the Call of the List and was a fugitive until October 6, 2017. This was eight (8) years, four (4) months, and fifteen (15) days directly attributable to the Defendant and therefore also added to the January 10, 2010 deadline to arrive at a new deadline date of July 23, 2018.
2 The portion of Snyder cited by the Defense “the mere issuance of a bench warrant does not establish due diligence” is from the subsequent analysis of 1100(C)(1) which the Court turned to after deciding the 1100(C)(3)(i) (Cohen) issue against the Commonwealth. Snyder at 442.

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