Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/410/719/
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 04:50:59+00:00

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Justia › US Law › US Case Law › US Supreme Court › Volume 410 › Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Water Dist.
Appellee district exists for the purpose of acquiring, storing, and distributing water for farming in the Tulare Lake Basin. Only landowners are qualified to elect the district's board of directors, votes being apportioned according to the assessed valuation of the lands. A three-judge District Court, against challenge by appellants, held that the limitation of the franchise to landowners comported with equal protection requirements.
1. Restricting the voters to landowners who may or may not be residents does not violate the principle enunciated in such cases as Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, and Kramer v. Union School District, 395 U. S. 621, that governing bodies should be selected in a popular election in which every person's vote is equal. Pp. 726- 410 U. S. 730.
(a) The activities of appellee district fall so disproportionately on landowners as a group that it is not unreasonable that the statutory framework focuses on the land benefited, rather than on people as such. Pp. 410 U. S. 726-728.
(b) Although appellee district has some governmental powers, it provides none of the general public services ordinarily attributed to a governing body. Pp. 410 U. S. 728-729.
2. Since assessments against landowners are the sole means by which expenses of appellee district are paid, it is not irrational to repose the franchise in landowners, but not residents. Pp. 410 U. S. 730-731.
3. The exclusion of lessees from voting does not violate the Equal Protection Clause, since the short-term lessee's interest may be substantially less than that of a landowner and, the franchise being exercisable by proxy, other lessees may negotiate to have the franchise included in their leases. Pp. 410 U. S. 731-733.
4. Weighting the vote according to assessed valuation of the land does not evade the principle that wealth has no relation to voter qualifications where, as here, the expense as well as the benefit is proportional to the land's assessed value. Pp. 410 U. S. 733-735.
REHNQUIST, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and STEWART WHITE BLACKMUN, and POWELL, JJ., joined. DOUGLAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN and MARSHALL, JJ., joined, post, p. 410 U. S. 735.
more than other constituents, we would have to confront the question whether such a body may be apportioned in ways which give greater influence to the citizens most affected by the organization's functions."
390 U.S. at 390 U. S. 483-484.
"These states and territories comprised the western third of the United States -- a vast empire in extent, but still sparsely settled. From a line east of the Rocky Mountains almost to the Pacific Ocean, and from the Canadian border to the boundary of Mexico -- an area greater than that of the original thirteen states -- the lands capable of redemption, in the main, constituted a desert, impossible of agricultural use without artificial irrigation."
dry and desolate lands into green fields and leafy orchards. . . ."
Californians, in common with other residents of the West, found the State's rivers and. streams in their natural state to present the familiar paradox of feast or famine. With melting snow in the high mountains in the spring, small streams became roaring freshets and the rivers they fed carried the potential for destructive floods. But with the end of the rainy season in the early spring, farmers depended entirely upon water from such streams and rivers until the rainy season again began in the fall. Long before that time, however, rivers which ran bank full in the spring had been reduced to a bare trickle of water.
But for less costly projects which would benefit a more restricted geographic area, the State was frequently either unable or unwilling to pledge its credit or its resources. The California Legislature therefore has authorized a number of instrumentalities, including water storage districts such as the appellee here, to provide a local response to water problems.
and distribution of water as well as any drainage or reclamation works connected therewith, and the generation and distribution of hydroelectric power may be provided for. [Footnote 4] Id. §§ 43000, 43025. They may fix tolls and charges for the use of water and collect them from all persons receiving the benefit of the water or other services in proportion to the services rendered. Id. § 43006. The costs of the projects are assessed against district land in accordance with the benefits accruing to each tract held in separate ownership. Id. §§ 46175, 46176. And land that is not benefited may be withdrawn from the district on petition. Id. § 48029.
Governance of the districts is undertaken by a board of directors. Id. § 40658. Each director is elected from one of the divisions within the district, id. § 39929, and each must take an official oath and execute a bond. Id. § 40301. General elections for the directors are to be held in odd-numbered years. Id. §§ 39027, 41300 et seq.
of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, in that only landowners are permitted to vote in water storage district general elections, and votes in those elections are apportioned according to the assessed valuation of the land. A three-judge court was convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2284, and the case was submitted on factual statements of the parties and briefs, without testimony or oral argument. A majority of the District Court held that both statutes comported with the dictates of the Equal Protection Clause, and appellants have appealed that judgment directly to this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1253.
"[T]his Court has firmly established the principle that the Equal Protection Clause does not make every minor difference in the application of laws to different groups a violation of our Constitution. But we have also held many times that 'invidious' distinctions cannot be enacted without a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. In determining whether or not a state law violates the Equal Protection Clause, we must consider the facts and circumstances behind the law, the interests which the State claims to be protecting, and the interests of those who are disadvantaged by the classification."
Id. at 393 U. S. 30.
We therefore turn now to the determination of whether the California statutory scheme establishing water storage districts violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
It is first argued that § 41000, limiting the vote to district landowners, is unconstitutional since non-landowning residents have as much interest in the operations of a district as landowners who may or may not be residents. Particularly, it is pointed out that the homes of residents may be damaged by floods within the district's boundaries, and that floods may, as with appellant Ellison, cause them to lose their jobs. Support for this position is said to come from the recent decisions of this Court striking down various state laws that limited voting to landowners, Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U. S. 204 (1970), Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U. S. 701 (1969), and Kramer v. Union School District, 395 U. S. 621 (1969).
In Kramer, the Court was confronted with a voter qualification statute for school district elections that limited the vote to otherwise qualified district residents who were either (1) the owners or lessees of taxable real property located within the district, (2) spouses of persons owning qualifying property, or (3) parents or guardians of children enrolled for a specified time during the preceding year in a local district school. Without reaching the issue of whether or not a State may in some circumstances limit the exercise of the franchise to those primarily interested or primarily affected by a given governmental unit, it was held that the above classifications did not meet that state-articulated goal, since they excluded many person who had distinct and direct interests in school meeting decisions, and included many persons who had, at best, remote and indirect interests. Id. at 395 U. S. 632-633.
called to approve the issuance of revenue bonds by a municipal utility were declared violative of the Equal Protection Clause since the operation of the utility systems affected virtually every resident of the city, not just the 40% of the registered voters who were also property taxpayers, and since the bonds were not in any way financed by property tax revenue. 395 U.S. at 395 U. S. 705. And the rationale of Cipriano was expanded to include general obligation bonds of municipalities in Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, supra. It was there noted that not only did those persons excluded from voting have a great interest in approving or disapproving municipal improvements, but they also contributed both directly through local taxes and indirectly through increased rents and costs to the servicing of the bonds. 399 U.S. at 399 U. S. 210-211.
"while not fully as broad as those of the Midland County Commissioners, certainly show that the trustees perform important governmental functions within the districts, and we think these powers are general enough and have sufficient impact throughout the district to justify the conclusion that the principle which we applied in Avery should also be applied here."
397 U.S. at 397 U. S. 53-54.
activities and so disproportionately affect different groups that a popular election in compliance with Reynolds, supra, might not be required, but certainly we see nothing in the present case that indicates that the activities of these trustees fit in that category. Education has traditionally been a vital governmental function, and these trustees, whose election the State has opened to all qualified voters, are governmental officials in every relevant sense of that term."
Id. at 397 U. S. 56.
services such as schools, housing, transportation, utilities, roads, or anything else of the type ordinarily financed by a municipal body. App. 86. There are no towns, shops, hospitals, or other facilities designed to improve the quality of life within the district boundaries, and it does not have a fire department, police, buses, or trains. Ibid.
of the appellee focuses on the land benefited, rather than on people as such. California has not opened the franchise to all residents, as Missouri had in Hadley, supra, nor to all residents, with some exceptions, as New York had in Kramer, supra. The franchise is extended to landowners, whether they reside in the district or out of it, and indeed whether or not they are natural persons who would be entitled to vote in a more traditional political election. Appellants do not challenge the enfranchisement of nonresident landowners or of corporate landowners for purposes of election of the directors of appellee. Thus, to sustain their contention that all residents of the district must be accorded a vote would not result merely in the striking down of an exclusion from what was otherwise a delineated class, but would instead engraft onto the statutory scheme a wholly new class of voters in addition to those enfranchised by the statute.
cost must ultimately be passed along to the consumers of the produce, food shoppers in far away metropolitan areas are to some extent likewise "affected" by the activities of the district. Constitutional adjudication cannot rest on any such "house that Jack built" foundation, however. The California Legislature could quite reasonably have concluded that the number of landowners and owners of sufficient amounts of acreage whose consent was necessary to organize the district would not have subjected their land to the lien of its possibly very substantial assessments unless they had a dominant voice in its control. Since the subjection of the owners' lands to such liens was the basis by which the district was to obtain financing, the proposed district had as a practical matter to attract landowner support. Nor, since assessments against landowners were to be the sole means by which the expenses of the district were to be paid, could it be said to be unfair or inequitable to repose the franchise in landowners but not residents. Landowners as a class were to bear the entire burden of the district's costs, and the State could rationally conclude that they, to the exclusion of residents, should be charged with responsibility for its operation. We conclude, therefore, that nothing in the Equal Protection Clause precluded California from limiting the voting for directors of appellee district by totally excluding those who merely reside within the district.
either by express agreement or by increased rentals, they have an equal interest in the costs.
Lessees undoubtedly do have an interest in the activities of appellee district analogous to that of landowners in many respects. But in the type of special district we now have before us, the question for our determination is not whether or not we would have lumped them together had we been enacting the statute in question, but, instead, whether "if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify" California's decision to deny the franchise to lessees while granting it to landowners. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 366 U. S. 426 (1961).
The term "lessees" may embrace the holders of a wide spectrum of leasehold interests in land, from the month-to-month tenant holding under an oral lease, on the one hand, to the long-term lessee holding under a carefully negotiated written lease, on the other. The system which permitted a lessee for a very short term to vote might easily lend itself to manipulation on the part of large landowners because of the ease with which such landowners could create short-term interests on the part of loyal employees. And, even apart from the fear of such manipulation, California may well have felt that landowners would be unwilling to join in the forming of a water storage district if short-term lessees whose fortunes were not, in the long run, tied to the land were to have a major vote in the affairs of the district.
The administration of a voting system which allowed short-term lessees to vote could also pose significant difficulties. Apparently, assessment rolls as well as state and federal land lists are used by election boards in determining the qualifications of the voters. Calif.Water Code § 41016. Such lists, obviously, would not ordinarily disclose either long- or short-term leaseholds.
While reference could be made to appropriate conveyancing records to determine the existence of leases which had been recorded, leases for terms less than one year need not be recorded under California law in order to preserve the right of the lessee. Calif.Civil Code § 1214.
Finally, we note that California has not left the lessee without remedy for his disenfranchised state. Sections 41002 and 41005 of the California Water Code provide for voting in the general election by proxy. To the extent that a lessee entering into a lease of substantial duration, thereby likening his status more to that of a landowner, feels that the right to vote in the election of directors of the district is of sufficient import to him, he may bargain for that right at the time he negotiates his lease. And the longer the term of the lease, and the more the interest of the lessee becomes akin to that of the landowner, presumably the more willing the lessor will be to assign his right. Just as the lessee may by contract be required to reimburse the lessor for the district assessments, so he may by contract acquire the right to vote for district directors.
372 U. S. 368 (1963); Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U. S. 663 (1966).
Appellants' argument ignores the realities of water storage district operation. Since its formation in 1926, appellee district has put into operation four multi-million dollar projects. The last project involved the construction of two laterals from the Basin to the California State Aqueduct at a capital cost of about $2,500,000. Three small landowners having land aggregating somewhat under four acres with an assessed valuation of under $100 were given one vote each in the special election held for the approval of the project. The J. G. Boswell Company, which owns 61,665.54 acres with an assessed valuation of $3,782,220 was entitled to cast 37,825 votes in the election. By the same token, however, the assessment commissioners determined that the benefits of the project would be uniform as to all of the acres affected, and assessed the project equally as to all acreage. Each acre has to bear $13.26 of cost and the three small landowners, therefore, must pay a total of $46, whereas the company must pay $817,685 for its part. [Footnote 10] Thus, as the District Court found, "the benefits and burdens to each landowner . . . are in proportion to the assessed value of the land." 342 F.Supp. 144, 146. We cannot say that the California legislative decision to permit voting in the same proportion is not rationally based.
are rationally based, and therefore do not violate the Equal Protection Clause.
The history of the vast Central Valley Project in California is recounted in United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U. S. 725 (1950).
4 Waters and Water Rights § 345.3 (R. Clark ed.1970).
The actual adoption of district projects is long and involved. After a district undertakes a project, it must be approved by the California Department of Water Resources. Calif.Water Code § 42200 et seq. A report and the estimated cost of the project must be submitted to the California State Treasurer, who undertakes an independent investigation before declaring the project abandoned or approving the report. Id. § 42275 et seq. If the report is approved, a "special election" is called. Id. § 42325 et seq. In order for the project to be finally adopted, a majority of the votes and a majority of the voters must approve it. Id. §§ 42355-42550.
There is no evidence that the appellee district engages in the generation, sale, or distribution of hydroelectric power.
"Each voter may vote in each precinct in which any of the land owned by him is situated and may cast one vote for each one hundred dollars ($100), or fraction thereof, worth of his land, exclusive of improvements, minerals, and mineral rights therein, in the precinct."
The board has the power to employ and discharge persons on a regular staff and to contract for the construction of district projects. Calif.Water Code § 43152. It can condemn private property for use in such projects, id. §§ 43530-43533, and may cooperate (including contract) with other agencies, state and federal. Id. § 43151. Both general obligation bonds and interest-bearing warrants may be authorized. Id. §§ 44900-45900.
Appellants strongly urge that districts have the power to, and do, engage in flood control activities. The interest of such activities to residents is said to be obvious, since houses may be destroyed and, as in the case of appellant Ellison, jobs may disappear. But Calif.Water Code § 43151 provides that any agreement entered into with the State or the United States must be "for a purpose appertaining to or beneficial to the project of the district. . . ." And the statute which assertedly gives support to the flood control activities, id., § 44000, simply states that a district "may cooperate and contract with the state . . . or the United States" for the purpose of "flood control." Id. § 44001. Thus, any flood control activities are incident to the exercise of the district's primary functions of water storage and distribution.
Appellants point out that, since the flood of 1969, the district has received about $250,000 in flood relief funds from the federal Government, and that the residents, like other American citizens, have paid their share of that money, and are therefore entitled to vote. Cf. Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U. S. 204 (1970). But their status as district residents bears no more relation to the flood relief money than that of any other United States citizen, and would seem to provide no more compelling reason for granting such residents the right to vote than the citizenry at large.
As was pointed out in n 3, small landowners are protected from crippling assessments resulting from district projects by the dual vote which must be taken in order to approve a project. Not only must a majority of the votes be cast for approval, but also a majority of the voters must approve. In this case, about 189 landowners constitute a majority and 189 of the smallest landowners in the district have only 2.34% of the land.
Third. Only agricultural landowners are entitled to vote, and their vote is weighted, one vote for each one hundred dollars of assessed valuation as provided in § 41001 of the California Water Code.
There are 189 landowners who own up to 80 acres each. These 189 represent 2.34% of the agricultural acreage of the district. There are 193,000 acres in the district. Petitioner Salyer Land Co. is one large operator, West Lake Farms and South Lake Farms are also large operators. The largest is J. G. Boswell Co. These four farm almost 85% of all the land in the district. Of these, J. G. Boswell Co. commands the greatest number of votes, 37,825, which are enough to give it a majority of the board of directors. As a result, it is permanently in the saddle. Almost all of the 77 residents of the district are disfranchised. The hold of J. G. Boswell Co. is so strong that there has been no election since 1947, making little point of the provision in § 41300 of the California Water Code for an election every other year.
The result has been calamitous to some who, though landless, have even more to fear from floods than the ephemeral corporation.
Provisions authorizing a selective franchise are disfavored, because they "always pose the danger of denying some citizens any effective voice in the governmental affairs which substantially affect their lives." Kramer v. Union School District, 395 U. S. 621, 395 U. S. 627. In order to overcome this strong presumption, it had to be shown up to now (1) that there is a compelling state interest for the exclusion, and (2) that the exclusions are necessary to promote the State's articulated goal. Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, supra; Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U. S. 701; Kramer v. Union School District, supra. See also Police Jury of Vermillion Parish v. Hebert, 404 U. S. 807; Stewart v. Parish School Board of St. Charles, 310 F.Supp. 1172, aff'd, 400 U.S. 884. In my view, appellants in this case have made a sufficient showing to invoke the above principles, and the presumption thus established has not been overcome.
economic burdens of district operations can fall on residents qua residents, and the operations of the districts primarily affect the land within their boundaries."
From its inception in 1926, this district has had repeated flood control problems. Four rivers, Kings, Kern, Tule, and Kaweah, enter Tulare Lake Basin. South of Tulare Lake Basin is Buena Vista Lake. In the past, Buena Vista has been used to protect Tulare Lake Basin by storing Kern River water in the former. That is how Tulare Lake Basin was protected from menacing floods in 1952. But that was not done in the great 1969 flood, the result being that 88,000 of the 193,000 acres in respondent district were flooded. The board of the respondent district -- dominated by the big landowner J. G. Boswell Co. -- voted 6-4 to table the motion that would put into operation the machinery to divert the flood waters to the Buena Vista Lake. The reason is that J. G. Boswell Co. had a long-term agricultural lease in the Buena Vista Lake Basin, and flooding it would have interfered with the planting, growing, and harvesting of crops the next season.
who lives in the district, is not an agricultural landowner. But his residence was 15 1/2 feet below the water level of the crest of the flood in 1969.
Landowners -- large or small, resident or nonresident lessees or landlords, sharecroppers [Footnote 2/4] or owners -- all should have a say. But irrigation, water storage, the building of levees, and flood control, implicate the entire community. All residents of the district must be granted the franchise.
Stewart v. Parish School Board of St. Charles, 310 F.Supp. 1172, aff'd, 400 U.S. 884. As a non-landowning bachelor was held to be entitled to vote on matters affecting education, Kramer v. Union School District, supra, so all the prospective victims of mismanaged flood control projects should be entitled to vote in water district elections, whether they be resident non-landowners, resident or nonresident lessees, and whether they own 10 acres or 10,000 acres. Moreover, their votes should be equal regardless of the value of their holdings, for when it comes to performance of governmental functions, all enter the polls on an equal basis.
"a special purpose unit of government assigned the performance of functions affecting definable groups of constituents more than other constituents."
impact throughout the district to justify the conclusion that the principle which we applied in Avery should also be applied here."
Id. at 397 U. S. 53-54. (Emphasis added; footnote omitted) Measured by the Hadley test, the Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District surely performs "important governmental functions" which "have sufficient impact throughout the district" to justify the application of the Avery principle.
this water storage district escapes the constitutional restraints relative to a franchise within a governmental unit.
"Legislators represent people, not trees or acres. Legislators are elected by voters, not farms or cities or economic interests. As long as ours is a representative form of government, and our legislatures are those instruments of government elected directly by and directly representative of the people, the right to elect legislators in a free and unimpaired fashion is a bedrock of our political system."
Id. at 377 U. S. 562.
It is indeed grotesque to think of corporations voting within the framework of political representation of people. Corporations were held to be "persons" for purposes both of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment [Footnote 2/14] and of the Equal Protection Clause. [Footnote 2/15] Yet, it is unthinkable in terms of the American tradition that corporations should be admitted to the franchise. Could a State allot voting rights to its corporations, weighting each vote according to the wealth of the corporation? Or could it follow the rule of one corporation, one vote?
It would be a radical and revolutionary step to take, as it would change our whole concept of the franchise. California takes part of that step here by allowing corporations to vote in these water district matters [Footnote 2/16] that entail performance of vital governmental functions. One corporation can outvote 77 individuals in this district. Four corporations can exercise these governmental powers as they choose, leaving every individual inhabitant with a weak, ineffective voice. The result is a corporate political kingdom undreamed of by those who wrote our Constitution.
Calif.Stat. 1921, C. 914, § 58.
Tarpey v. McClure, 190 Cal. 593, 213 P. 983.
Since 1938, sharecroppers have been included in federal regulations defining "farmers" who are entitled to vote on referenda concerning marketing quotas under the Agricultural Adjustment Act.
"Farmers engaged in the production of a commodity. For purposes of referenda with respect to marketing quotas for tobacco, extra long staple cotton, rice and peanuts, the phrase 'farmers engaged in the production of a commodity' includes any person who is entitled to share in a crop of the commodity, or the proceeds thereof because he shares in the risks of production of the crop as an owner, landlord, tenant, or sharecropper (landlord whose return from the crop is fixed regardless of the amount of the crop produced is excluded) on a farm on which such crop is planted in a workmanlike manner for harvest: Provided, That any failure to harvest the crop because of conditions beyond the control of such person shall not affect his status as a farmer engaged in the production of the crop. In addition, the phrase 'farmers engaged in the production of a commodity' also includes each person who it is determined would have had an interest as a producer in the commodity on a farm for which a farm allotment for the crop of the commodity was established and no acreage of the crop was planted but an acreage of the crop was regarded as planted for history acreage purposes under the applicable commodity regulations."
Glenn-Colusa Irrigation District v. Ohrt, 31 Cal.App.2d 619, 623, 88 P.2d 763, 765.
Section 43158. See also id. § 39061.
In re Madera Irrigation District, 92 Cal. 296, 322, 28 P. 272, 278.
Calif.Water Code §§ 42200, 43000, 43025, 44001.
Minneapolis & St. Louis R. Co. v. Beckwith, 129 U. S. 26, 129 U. S. 28.
Pembina Consolidated Silver Mining & Milling Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U. S. 181, 125 U. S. 188-189; Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific R. Co., 118 U. S. 394, 118 U. S. 397.

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 § 1214
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 § 345
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 § 41300
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