Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=82129:g-r-no-184536,-august-14,-2013-masayuki-hasegawa,-petitioner,-v-leila-f-giron,-respondent&catid=1573&Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 09:15:47+00:00

Document:
MASAYUKI HASEGAWA, Petitioner, v. LEILA F. GIRON, Respondent.
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to nullify the Decision1 dated 30 June 2008 and Resolution2 dated 18 September 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 100091. The appellate court reversed and set aside the Resolutions of the Department of Justice (DOJ), which dismissed respondent Leila F. Giron’s complaint for kidnapping and serious illegal detention against petitioner Masayuki Hasegawa.
On 16 September 2006, respondent filed a Complaint-Affidavit for Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention against petitioner and several John Does. Respondent alleged that sometime on December 2005, she and her officemate, Leonarda Marcos (Marcos) filed a complaint against their employer Pacific Consultants International, J.F. Cancio & Associates, Jaime F. Cancio, Tesa Tagalo and petitioner for illegal salary deductions, non-payment of 13th month pay, and non-remittance of SSS contributions. Respondent averred that since the filing of said complaint, they have been subjected to threats and verbal abuse by petitioner to pressure them to withdraw the complaint. Respondent had also filed separate complaints for grave threats, grave coercion, slander and unjust vexation against petitioner. Said cases are pending before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Pasay City.
In a Resolution11 dated 5 January 2007, Senior State Prosecutor Emilie Fe M. De Los Santos dismissed the complaint for lack of probable cause.
Respondent filed an appeal from the Resolution of the prosecutor dismissing her complaint. In her Petition for Review before the DOJ, respondent claimed that the Investigating Prosecutor gravely erred when she recommended the dismissal of the case against petitioner despite overwhelming evidence showing the existence of probable cause. She thus prayed for the reversal of the Resolution of the Investigating Prosecutor.
Finding no basis to overturn the findings of the Investigating Prosecutor, then Secretary of Justice Raul M. Gonzales dismissed the petition on 11 April 2007.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRIEVOUS ERROR IN REVERSING THE FINDING OF THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE THAT NO PROBABLE CAUSE EXISTS IN THE INSTANT CASE.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRIEVOUS ERROR IN GRANTING RESPONDENT’S PETITION FOR CERTIORARI DESPITE RAISING QUESTIONS OF FACT AND BEING UNMERITORIOUS.
Petitioner insists that there was no showing that the Secretary of Justice acted with grave abuse of discretion in ruling that no probable cause exists to indict him for the crimes charged. Petitioner asserts that the Secretary of Justice clearly and sufficiently explained the reasons why no probable cause exists in this case. Petitioner faults the appellate court for also having done what it has charged the Secretary of Justice of doing, i.e., deliberating point by point the issues and arguments raised by the parties in its Decision. Petitioner also faults the appellate court for overlooking the fact that the kidnapping and serious illegal detention charges are but the fourth in a series of successive cases filed by respondent against petitioner, all of which were dismissed by the BID, NLRC and MeTC of Pasay City. Petitioner argues that a review of facts and evidence made by the appellate court is not the province of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari. Finally, petitioner contends that the appellate court should have dismissed outright respondent’s petition for certiorari for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and for being the wrong mode of appeal.
Directed to file her Comment, respondent counters that in preliminary investigation cases, such as that done in this case, there is, as yet no occasion for the parties to display their full and exhaustive evidence, as a mere finding that the kidnapping might have been committed by petitioner is already sufficient.
The grant by the Court of Appeals of the certiorari petition is a determination that the DOJ committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing the criminal complaint for kidnapping and serious illegal detention for lack of probable cause.
The decision whether or not to dismiss the criminal complaint against the accused depends on the sound discretion of the prosecutor. Courts will not interfere with the conduct of preliminary investigations, or reinvestigations, or in the determination of what constitutes sufficient probable cause for the filing of the corresponding information against an offender. Courts are not empowered to substitute their own judgment for that of the executive branch. Differently stated, as the matter of whether to prosecute or not is purely discretionary on his part, courts cannot compel a public prosecutor to file the corresponding information, upon a complaint, where he finds the evidence before him insufficient to warrant the filing of an action in court. In sum, the prosecutor’s findings on the existence of probable cause are not subject to review by the courts, unless these are patently shown to have been made with grave abuse of discretion.18 We find such reason for judicial review here present. We sustain the appellate court’s reversal of the ruling of the Secretary of the DOJ.
in the commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances are present: (a) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than 3 days; or (b) it is committed by simulating public authority; or (c) any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; or (d) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a public officer.
All elements were sufficiently averred in the complaint-affidavit were sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime may have been committed and petitioner may have committed it. Respondent, an office worker, claimed that she and her friend were taken at gunpoint by two men and forcibly boarded into a vehicle. They were detained for more than 24-hours. Whether or not the accusations would result in a conviction is another matter. It is enough, for purposes of the preliminary investigation that the acts complained of constitute the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention.
The findings of the Investigating Prosecutor rest on lack of prima facie evidence against petitioner. That the kidnapping and serious illegal detention charge is a mere fabrication was based on the Investigating Prosecutor’s observations, as follows: First, no law enforcement agency has investigated the complaint and indorsed the same to the prosecution office for preliminary investigation as is the usual procedure for grave offenses. Second, the other victim, Marcos, did not file a case against petitioner. Third, respondent continued to report to work at the LRTA compound where the supposed mastermind also works. Fourth, there was the unexplained absence of report of the alleged incident to any police or law enforcement agencies which taints the trustworthiness of respondent’s allegations. Fifth, respondents’ theory on the motive for her kidnapping has been shown to be fallacious. Sixth, respondent’s propensity to file a string of cases against petitioner supports the contention that all these are part of her corrupt scheme to extort money from petitioner. And seventh, vital witnesses for the respondent such as the NBI agent assigned to her complaint and her other officemates who could have corroborated her story were not presented.
That the NBI or other prosecutor agencies of the government neglected to act on the petitioner’s complaint can hardly constitute evidence that the incident did not in fact happen, or was merely fabricated or invented to extort money from the private respondent. Instead of faulting the complainants and questioning their motivations, the strong arm of the State might be better off investigating non-feasance in public office.
In any event, the perceived inconsistencies are more imaginary than real, delving as it does on minor, ambiguous and inconsequential matters that may yet be properly addressed in a full-dress court hearing. We thus agree with the petitioner’s assertion on the lack of any legal or factual basis for the public respondent’s refusal to apply the rule that a positive declaration is superior to a negative averment. It is well to recall that the nullity of a resolution may be shown not only by what patently appears on its face, but also by the documentary and the testimonial evidence found in the records of the case, upon which such ruling is based.
Thus, did the Court of Appeals detail why the holding that there is no probable cause to indict petitioner amounted to grave abuse of discretion on the part of the DOJ. Resort by respondent to the extraordinary writ of certiorari and the grant thereof by the Court of Appeals is correct.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The 30 June 2008 Decision and the 18 September 2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 100091, are hereby AFFIRMED.
1 Penned by Associate Justice Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr. with Associate Justices Rebecca De Guia-Salvador and Vicente S.E. Veloso, concurring. Rollo, pp. 16-33.
17Chong v. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 184948, 21 July 2009, 593 SCRA 311, 314-315.
18Baviera v. Prosecutor Paglinawan, 544 Phil. 107, 120-121 (2007).
19Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 180165, 7 April 2009, 584 SCRA 631, 640-641 citing Yu v. Sandiganbayan, 410 Phil. 619, 627 (2001).
20Fenequito v. Vergara, Jr., G.R. No. 172829, 18 July 2012, 677 SCRA 113, 120-121 citing Reyes v. Pearlbank Securities, Inc., G.R. No. 171435, 30 July 2008, 560 SCRA 518, 534-535.
21Sy Tiong Shiou v. Sy Chim, G.R. No. 174168, 30 March 2009, 582 SCRA 517, 530.
22Clay & Feather International, Inc. v. Lichaytoo, G.R. No. 193105, 30 May 2011, 649 SCRA 516, 525-526 citing Andres v. Justice Secretary Cuevas, 499 Phil. 36, 49-50 (2005) and Quiambao v. Hon. Desierto, 481 Phil. 852, 866 (2004).

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