Source: http://www.wisconsinappeals.net/on-point-by-the-wisconsin-state-public-defender/ardonis-greer-v-david-h-schwarz-2011ap2188-district-2-101012/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 05:47:51+00:00

Document:
¶20 Consistent with Wis. Stat. § 973.09(5), Wis. Admin. Code § DOC 328.17(2), and our decisions in Rodriguez and Stefanovic, we conclude that because Greer’s court-ordered three-year term of probation on Count 3 had not expired at the time the DOC commenced revocation proceedings, the DOC retained jurisdiction over Greer despite its issuance of the discharge certificate.
Greer remained within the nominal term of probation when he committed a new offense, which led to discovery of the discharge error. (Greer had roughly 3 months to go before the term of probation would have expired, ¶¶3-4.) And had he fallen outside the nominal term? If the idea is that DOC never lost jurisdiction, then the term of probation must have kept running, thus would have simply expired when it was supposed to, as opposed to being tolled somehow – or so you’d think, though that issue is neither presented by the case nor discussed by the court. That idea leads to a tangent: what about when a prisoner is erroneously released? Somewhat exotic, but it does happen, and there is compelling authority that in that instance, the prisoner gets credit against his sentence for time spent on release, see Tyler v. Houston, 273 Neb. 100, 728 N.W.2d 549 (2007) (detailed discussion of principle “that a prisoner is entitled to credit against his or her sentence for time spent erroneously at liberty due to the State’s negligence,” including reference to Dunne v. Keohane, 14 F.3d 335 (7th Cir. 1994), for the following idea: “The government is not permitted to play cat and mouse with the prisoner, delaying indefinitely the expiation of his or her debt to society and reintegration into the free community.”). Also see State v. Dentici, 2002 WI App 77, ¶1, 251 Wis. 2d 436, 643 N.W.2d 180, for idea that “a person who is absent from jail through no fault of his own is entitled to sentence credit.” None of which does Greer any good in this particular context, for the simple reason that a probationer isn’t entitled to “street time” credit against his sentence, State v. Aderhold, 91 Wis. 2d 306, 284 N.W.2d 108. But you’d think that the erroneous-release doctrine is portable, in the sense that the term of probation continues running, same as a sentence would, where the person has been erroneously discharged from supervision.
Certiorari review (here, of Division of Hearing and Appeals decision to revoke probation) is limited to well-known inquiries: “(1) whether the Division stayed within its jurisdiction; (2) whether it acted according to law; (3) whether its action was arbitrary, oppressive or unreasonable and represented its will, not its judgment; and (4) whether the evidence was such that it might reasonably make the decision it made,” ¶6. The court’s conclusion that DOC didn’t lose jurisdiction more or less determines the outcome, though the court’s succeeding discussion goes beyond mere detail.
¶26 In addition, we may impute to Greer knowledge that he may not violate the law while on probation. See G.G.D. v. State, 97 Wis. 2d 1, 10, 12-13, 292 N.W.2d 853 (1980); see also Rodriguez, 133 Wis. 2d at 52 (“A petitioner cannot seriously contend that a probationer can violate the criminal laws of this state without affecting his or her probationary status ….”). Because Greer knew or should have known he was on probation when he committed his new felony offense and knew he could not violate the criminal laws while on probation, his due process rights were not violated by the DOC’s revocation of his probation based on the new criminal violation.
Law-abiding behavior, then, is so fundamental to supervision that revocation may be premised on imputed knowledge. Individually-tailored conditions surely raise knottier problems, as the court implies, footnote 6 (declining to reach question whether revocation could be premised on alcohol ban). And knottier still, if DOC ever wants to revoke a probationer for “absconding” (leaving the state or just failing to report to an agent) after issuing a discharge certificate. Does that last possibility strike you as unfair, not to say absurd? The reporting requirement is no less fundamental to supervision than law-abiding behavior, and if the one is (un)fair, so too is the other.
With all due respect, the Court appears to have overlooked a fundamental principle of due process that one may not be punished for doing that which a government official with apparent authority has advised is not subject to punishment. See, e.g., United States v. Pa. Indus. Chem. Corp. (PICCO), 411 U.S. 655 (1973); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965); Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423 (1959) (due process violated where state prosecutes someone for doing what state agent said was permitted).
Here, it appears that the responsible state agency advised Greer that he was no longer subject to probation and, as a matter of due process, Greer was entitled to rely upon that assurance. He could not constitutionally be required, in light of Picco, Cox, and Raley, to make an independent determination that the DOC was wrong.
Of course, due process only prevents the imposition of punishment for the alleged probation violation. The state remains free to prosecute him for the new crime, and to impose punishment if it gets a conviction.

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