Source: https://chestofbooks.com/real-estate/Real-Property-Interests-Law/Interests-subject-to-the-rule-Part-3.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 08:33:31+00:00

Document:
W Va. 193, 85 S. E. 170.
In any jurisdiction in which an interest, if transferable or releas-able, is not within the rule, or the statutory substitute for the rule, an option is not within the rule. Blakeman v. Miller, 136 Cal. 138, 68 Pac. 587; Mineral Land Inv. Co. v. Bishop Iron Co., 134 Minn. 412, L. R. A. 1917 D, 900, 159 N. W. 966.
24a. As to the application of the rule to the case of an option to purchase stock, in so far as this might be susceptible of specific enforcement, see 31 Harv. Law Rev. 660. The applicability of the Rule against Perpetuities to cases involving the creation of an option exercisable at a reReal Property.
- Trusts. In so far as, by reason of the creation of a trust of a limited duration or character, or by reason of the invalidity of the trust sought to be created, there is a resulting trust in favor of the grantor or the testator's heirs,29 such resulting trust is not invalid under the Rule against Perpetuities.30 Even if not a vested interest,31 it being an interest recognized by the law rather than one voluntarily created, its validity is not open to question, irrespective of the remoteness of the right of enjoyment incident thereto.
Mote time is strongly questioned by Professor John R. Rood in 14 Mich. Law Rev. at p. 231, and 23 Case and Comment at p. 835. See also 15 Mich. Law Rev. 526.
25. Woodall v. Clifton, (1905) 2 Ch. 257, per Warrington, J.
26. Hollander v. Central Metal & Supply Co., 109 Md. 131, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1135, 71 Atl. 442; See Blakeman v. Miller, 136 Cal. 138, 68 Pac. 587.
27. Post Sec. 184, note 40.
28. But that there is a distinction between the two cases is asserted by T. Cyprian Williams, Esq. See article 42 Sol. Jour. 628, referred to in Gray, Perpetuities, Sec.
30. Hopkins v. Grimshaw, 165 U. S. 342, 41 L. Ed. 739. See Schlessinger v. Mallard, 70 Cal., 326, 11 Pac. 728; Stone v. Fram-ingham, 109 Mass., 303; Daniel v. Jacoway, Freeman (Miss.), 39; Campbell v. City of Kansas, 102 Mo. 326, 10 L. R. A. 593, 13 S. W. 897; Jenkins v. Jenkins University, 17 Wash. 60, 49 Pac. 247, 50 Pac. 785.
31. It would seem, in view of its analogy to a reversion, to be a vested interest, an equitable estate.
32. Gray, Perpetuities, Sec. 234; 36 Atl. 635, In re Johnston's Estate, 185 Pa. St. 179, 64 Am. St. Rep. 621, 39 Atl. 879; Pulitzer v. Livingston, 89 Me. 359, overruling Slade v. Patten, 68 Me. 380; Phillips v. Harrow, 93 Iowa, 92, 61 N. W. 434; Gambrill v. Gambrill, 122 Md. 563, 89 Atl. 1094, overruling several Maryland cases. See, also ante, note, Sec. 179, note 71a.
34. Davis v. Williams, 85 Tenn. 646, 4 S. W. 8; Siedler v. Syms, 56 N. J. Eq. 275, 38 Atl. 424; Bigelow v. Cady, 171 111. 229, 63 Am. St. Rep. 230, 48 N. E. 974; Hart v. Seymour, 147 111. 598, 35 N. E. 246; Thomas v. Gregg, 76 Md. 169, 24 Atl. 418.
35. The contrary view, stated in the former edition of this book, is presumably erroneous.

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