Source: http://www.houston-opinions.com/files/14thCoA-2010-Alattar-v-Ganim-by-Hedges-statute-of-frauds-bars-recovery-real-estate.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 12:18:11+00:00

Document:
and render judgment that appellee Ganim take nothing.
claim for appellant’s alleged breach of an agreement to purchase real property on behalf of a partnership.
Trustee.” The trust’s name and beneficiaries are not identified.
1. Partnership will be 50 – 50% of all profits between John Ganim and Farouk Alattar.
s double or more price than we bought it for to avoid misunderstandings. . . .
5. Both partners have the right, after any sale, to pull 50% of the proceeds . . . .
10. Both partners could use any part of the property at anytime [sic] until property is sold.
13. This partnership will not be valid if the Bank does not accept either one’s credit application.
to the partnership, or property purchased or to be purchased by or for the partnership.
further changes . . . . Once it is all approved, please sign the documents and return them to me for filing . .
$1,000,000. Exhibit B is labeled “Assets to be Contributed by General Partner,” but is otherwise blank.
as “the proposed limited partnership agreement,” were not the same as the terms in the Letter of Intent.
s attorney that Alattar would not proceed with the partnership.
trust, specific performance, attorneys’ fees, and costs.
Trustee.” As with the Purchase Agreement, the Deed does not identify the trust’s name or beneficiaries.
frauds. Ganim responds that the statute of frauds does not apply, or alternatively, that it is satisfied.
presents a question of law. Vt. Info. Processing, Inc. v. Mont. Beverage Corp., 227 S.W.3d 846, 852 (Tex.
App.—El Paso 2007, no pet.). Questions of law are subject to de novo review. In re Humphreys, 880 S.W.
2d 402, 404 (Tex. 1994).
applicability of the statute of frauds).
statute’s requirements have been satisfied.
the six documents do not meet the requirements of the statute of frauds.
earlier ones. See, e.g., Morrow v. Shotwell, 477 S.W.2d 538, 539 (Tex. 1972); Owen v. Hendricks, 433 S.
contents. The connection must be apparent from a comparison of the writings themselves.” Douglass v.
requirements. To illustrate why this is so, it is helpful to examine them in chronological order.
documents were not yet in existence, the Purchase Agreement does not incorporate them by reference.
the name or beneficiaries of the trust Alattar represented.
describes is not the same as the three-member partnership that Alattar and Ganim actually entered.
signed by Alattar or his authorized representative refers to it or adopts it.
beneficiary, the Unsigned Letter, or the Cover Letter.
whom Alattar purchased the Property.
of Adams v. Abbott, 151 Tex. 601, 254 S.W.2d 78 (1952) and Jones v. Smith, 231 S.W.2d 1003 (Tex. Civ.
that permits the identification of property in a written memorandum to be clarified using extrinsic evidence.
145 Tex. at 605, 200 S.W.2d at 988 (quoting Fulton v. Robinson, 55 Tex. 401 (1881)); accord, Pickett v.
setting forth the essential terms of the agreement Ganim alleged. See Flameout Design & Fabrication, Inc.
statute of frauds, it is unenforceable.
Panel consists of Chief Justice Hedges and Justices Anderson and Boyce.
documents by name, and in chronological order.
resulted from malice or fraud, but chose to award no exemplary damages.
he expended in reliance on the six-document agreement.
in response to a jury question, it allowed the jury to rehear.
 We further note that in his live pleadings, Ganim requested specific performance.
the Alattar-Ganim partnership was a beneficiary.
 Because Alattar’s first issue is dispositive, we do not reach his remaining issues.

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