Source: http://www.childrenslegalrightsjournal.com/childrenslegalrightsjournal/volume_38_issue_2?pg=34
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 07:54:41+00:00

Document:
Unsurprisingly, in response to the low standard for impartiality adopted by the federal court jurisprudence that will be discussed below, the majority of states do not adequately safeguard impartiality in the disciplinary process. 123 A few education codes show signs of hope because of their allowance or affirmative requirement of the use of independent hearing officers in long-term discipline cases, but most states leave the question of who adjudicates at disciplinary hearings up to local boards of education. There is a caveat, though, that a local board, and possibly county court, will be available to review an appeal, albeit with high deference to the factual record. 124 Such practices often leave the trier of fact role to those administrators who have served the discipline recommendation in the first place, which is problematic for the many reasons demonstrated above.125 State legislation must be more robust in protecting impartiality and model legislation and existing practices employing thicker protections show that this goal is not unreasonable.
116 See e.g., LA. STAT. ANN. § 17:416(A)(3)(c) (2017) (providing for student appeal to hearing before parish superintendent).
117 See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 121A.47, subd. 6; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-843(F)(2)(a) (2017).
118 See, e.g., Gonzales, 435 F. Supp. at 465 (noting the district superintendent’s presence at the school board’s closed deliberations despite not being permitted to serve an adjudicatory role).
119 See, e.g., Heyne v. Metro. Nashville Pub. Schs., 655 F.3d 556, 568 (6th Cir. 2011) (finding principal who imposed ten-day suspension was racially biased and thus impartial); Riggan v. Midland Indep. Sch. Dist., 86 F. Supp. 2d 647, 663 (W.D. Tex. 2000) (holding that the building-level administrator’s position as the personal target of a student so biased the administrator that it should have disqualified him from making a suspension recommendation to the board). 120 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-751.6(b) (2004); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 302A-1134(a) (2014).
121 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-751.6(b) (2004).
122 See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 302A-1134(a) (2014).
123 See infra Part III.
124 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-33-108(2)–(3) (2013); King v. Beaufort Cty. Bd. of Educ., 704 S.E.2d 259, 260 (N.C. 2010).
125 See, e.g., J.M. v. Webster Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 534 S.E.2d 50, 58 (W. Va. 2000) (“If the principal does proceed, at this ‘principal’s informal hearing,’ the principal is to make a determination by principal determination as to whether or not the student violated the statute. Thus, the principal becomes the finder of fact at this stage in the process.”) (citing W. VA. CODE § 18A-5-1a(a)) (providing for determination of violation by principal subject to review by county board of education).

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