Source: https://fallgatterlaw.com/legal-pleadings/motion-to-reinstate-pretrial-conditions/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 08:49:29+00:00

Document:
Motion to Reinstate Pretrial Conditions | Fallgatter Catlin & Varon, P.A.
1. After the jury returned its verdict, this Court addressed the parties regarding a possible date for sentencing, indicating a preference for August 22, which was amenable to the parties.
2. Then, this Court, sua sponte, after reaching this determination, stated, “Generally, when people are found guilty, they go into custody. I don’t see a reason that we should do anything different here, so she’s remanded to the custody of the Sheriff’s Office.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 370-71).
a. The Client’s guideline score is non-state prison.
b. The Client has no criminal history.
c. The instant charges are third degree felonies.
d. The Client remained on bond for a significant amount of time (more than three years).
e. The Client has significant ties to the community and has lived in the community for a substantial amount of time.
f. The Client currently maintains a medical practice and has to address patient needs while this case continues to be addressed.
g. The Client would be willing to submit to a curfew and electronic monitoring.
(Tr. Vol. 2 at 371).
4. At no point in time did counsel for the State request revocation of the conditions of pretrial release, that the Client be remanded, indicate they were seeking an incarcerative sentence, or otherwise indicate that the Client should not be permitted to continue on her existing conditions of pretrial release, pending sentencing.
5. Subsequent to counsel for the Client’s argument, this Court stated, “I’ve been burned myself by that before under similar circumstances. I’m not really inclined to do that, so she needs to just see the bailiff.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 371).
6. Clearly, by these comments, the Client was not afforded her right to an individualized judicial determination of her right to bond. The Court is respectfully to reconsider this decision, and reinstate the original conditions of release.
7. The Client has been a practicing physician for 20 years. Indeed, the Client was maintaining an active medical practice at the time of the remand in this case, which left many patients without the medical services of the Client.
8. The Client has no criminal history, other than facing the incredible prosecutorial efforts of her biased prosecutors for the last three years, for which she won no less than three dismissals of cases.
9. The Client has never failed to appear, during those three years and three cases, or this case, and has always honored her bond requirements. Nothing the Client has said or done throughout the course of this ordeal would suggest that she does not have a strong incentive to return to court and vindicate her rights. Indeed, her diligent pleadings clearly reflect her intention of complying with the bond conditions, and litigating her innocence. Moreover, even if valid, the allegations in this case are now over three years old. There is no evidence of any recurrence of this alleged conduct, or any other criminal activity, such that the age of the allegations – standing alone – should have been sufficient for the Court to have afforded the Client the individualized bail determinations to which she was constitutionally entitled.
10. This Court’s sua sponte decision to remand the Client was made of what is, at worst, a first time offender, who is entitled to a PSI. This Court directed the remand without reviewing any PSI or asking for the input or arguments from either party, and thus incorrectly rendered a pre-judgment of the sentence, in a case where State prison is not mandated, where she is a practicing physician with an active practice and clients who need her, where she has dutifully appeared in Court for the last three years, and where she has no prior record.
11. The sentencing guidelines for the two counts, which are Level 4 and Level 3 offenses, are 24.4 points. This 24.4 point score is only 2 points above the 22 point threshold – under which the Client would not be eligible for State prison. Moreover, this 24.4 points is substantially under the 44 point threshold where the Client would theoretically be facing mandatory State prison. Thus, even the sentencing guidelines clearly militated in favor of continuing the long-standing conditions of pretrial release.
12. The sua sponte remand was based on the Court having been “burned” on bond issues, previously, in some entirely unrelated and unidentified case. Thus, the Client did not receive the individualized bond determination to which she was constitutional entitled. Rather, she was remanded because the Court had been “burned” by some other unidentified defendant – notwithstanding the fact the Client had never – in the three years of oppressive litigation – “burned” any State court judges of Hillsborough County as to her conditions of pretrial release.
13. As noted, no motion to revoke bail had been (or has been) filed. Whereas this Court has discretion, for good cause, to order “revocation of bail,” for a defendant who “appears for trial” (just as the Client did), such revocation is only authorized where the Court properly elects to “commit the defendant to the custody of the proper official to abide by the judgment, sentence, and any further order of the court.” Rule 3.131(f), Fla. R. Crim. P. (emphasis added). Here, there was no “judgment” or “sentence” that existed to support the sua sponte “revocation of bail” imposed by the Court, and the Client was certainly not in violation of any other “order of the court.” In short, this unilateral revocation of bail was in contravention of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure and Florida Statutes, thus further demonstrating the Client’s entitlement to reinstatement of her conditions of release.
14. Rule 3.131(b)(1), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure establishes a presumption in favor of release on non-monetary conditions for any person who is granted pretrial release.
15. The purpose of the bail is not to punish an accused nor to detain an accused in custody prior to disposition of the case. The purpose of bail, commensurate with the presumption of innocence, is to insure an accused’s appearance in court. Kelsey v. McMillan, 560 So. 2d 1343 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990); State ex re Crabb v. Carson, 189 So. 2d 376 (Fla. 1st DCA 1966); Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951); Pugh v. Rainwater, 572 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir. 1978).
16. Every person charged with a crime has an absolute right a reasonable bail until a court adjudges that person guilty, unless the state has charged that person with a capital offense punishable by life imprisonment and the State demonstrates that the proof is evident or the presumption is great. Article I, Section 14, Florida Constitution; State v. Arthur, 390 So. 2d 716 (Fla. 1980).
17. An accused has the right to an individualized review of his bail on the facts and circumstances of his situation and alleged offenses. Kelsey v. McMillan, 560 So. 2d 1343 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990); Rawls v. State, 540 So. 2d 946 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989).
WHEREFORE, the premises considered, it is respectfully requested this Court grant the instant motion, and reinstate the Client’s conditions of pretrial release.

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