Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/74/506/
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 02:26:45+00:00

Document:
The Constitution gives the Supreme Court its appellate jurisdiction, but Congress also has the power to make exceptions to it.
The Civil War Reconstruction Acts of the 1860s subjected many states of the former Confederacy to military government. McCardle, a Mississippi newspaper editor, filed for a writ of habeas corpus when he was taken into military custody for having allegedly published libelous and incendiary articles. Under the federal law that formed the basis of his petition, federal courts were allowed to grant habeas corpus to individuals who had been detained for violations of constitutional rights. It provided that the Supreme Court could hear appeals of these proceedings. After McCardle was denied habeas corpus by the lower court, the Supreme Court ruled that it had jurisdiction to hear the case on the merits.
One year later, Congress passed a second law that repealed parts of the first law and removed jurisdiction from the Supreme Court in these appeals, past or present.
The Constitution provides direct authority for the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, rather than any legislative action. However, the Constitution provides this authority subject to exceptions and regulations by Congress. The new law creates an express exception to appellate jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases, repealing the initial law. This has the same effect as though the previous law had never existed, except as to past and closed cases. Since the court's jurisdiction has been clearly removed, the case must be dismissed because it lacks the authority to render a judgment under a repealed law.
However, the law and this decision affect only habeas corpus appeals from circuit courts that were brought under the repealed law.
It is important to note that this decision concerned only the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over habeas corpus matters, rather than its original jurisdiction over habeas corpus matters brought directly to it.
1. The appellate jurisdiction of this court is conferred by the Constitution, and not derived from acts of Congress, but is conferred "with such exceptions, and under such regulations, as Congress may make," and, therefore, acts of Congress affirming such jurisdiction have always been construed as excepting from it all cases not expressly described and provided for.
2. When, therefore, Congress enacts that this court shall have appellate jurisdiction over final decisions of the Circuit Courts in certain cases, the act operates as a negation or exception of such jurisdiction in other cases, and the repeal of the act necessarily negatives jurisdiction under it of these cases also.
3. The repeal of such an act, pending an appeal provided for by it, is not an exercise of judicial power by the legislature, no matter whether the repeal takes effect before or after argument of the appeal.
court any cases but appeals under the act of 1867. It does not affect the appellate jurisdiction which was previously exercised in cases of habeas corpus.
"§ 1. The judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish."
"§ 2. The judicial power shall extend to all cases in law or equity arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States,"
"The Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such exceptions, and under such regulations, as the Congress shall make."
With these constitutional provisions in existence, Congress, on the 5th February, 1867, by "An act to amend an act to establish the judicial courts of the United States, approved September 24, 1789," provided that the several courts of the United States, and the several justices and judges of such courts, within their respective jurisdiction, in addition to the authority already conferred by law, should have power to grant writs of habeas corpus in all cases where any person may be restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the Constitution, or of any treaty or law of the United States. And that, from the final decision of any judge, justice, or court inferior to the Circuit Court, appeal might be taken to the Circuit Court of the United States for the district in which the cause was heard, and from the judgment of the said Circuit Court to the Supreme Court of the United States.
This statute being in force, one McCardle, alleging unlawful restraint by military force, preferred a petition in the court below, for the writ of habeas corpus.
The writ was issued, and a return was made by the military commander admitting the restraint, but denying that it was unlawful.
It appeared that the petitioner was not in the military service of the United States, but was held in custody by military authority for trial before a military commission upon charges founded upon the publication of articles alleged to be incendiary and libelous, in a newspaper of which he was editor. The custody was alleged to be under the authority of certain acts of Congress.
Upon the hearing, the petitioner was remanded to the military custody, but, upon his prayer, an appeal was allowed him to this court, and upon filing the usual appeal bond, for costs, he was admitted to bail upon recognizance, with sureties conditioned for his future appearance in the Circuit Court, to abide by and perform the final judgment of this court. The appeal was taken under the above-mentioned act of February 5, 1867.
"And be it further enacted, That so much of the act approved February 5, 1867, entitled 'An act to amend an act to establish the judicial courts of the United States, approved September 24, 1789,' as authorized an appeal from the judgment of the Circuit Court to the Supreme Court of the United States, or the exercise of any such jurisdiction by said Supreme Court, on appeals which have been, or may hereafter be taken, be, and the same is hereby repealed. "
The attention of the court was directed to this statute at the last term, but counsel having expressed a desire to be heard in argument upon its effect, and the Chief Justice being detained from his place here by his duties in the Court of Impeachment, the cause was continued under advisement. Argument was now heard upon the effect of the repealing act.
The first question necessarily is that of jurisdiction, for if the act of March, 1868, takes away the jurisdiction defined by the act of February, 1867, it is useless, if not improper, to enter into any discussion of other questions.
by the Constitution. But it is conferred "with such exceptions and under such regulations as Congress shall make."
"its jurisdiction, and this affirmative description has been understood to imply a negation of the exercise of such appellate power as is not comprehended within it."
appellate jurisdiction. It is made in terms. The provision of the act of 1867 affirming the appellate jurisdiction of this court in cases of habeas corpus is expressly repealed. It is hardly possible to imagine a plainer instance of positive exception.
We are not at liberty to inquire into the motives of the legislature. We can only examine into its power under the Constitution, and the power to make exceptions to the appellate jurisdiction of this court is given by express words.
What, then, is the effect of the repealing act upon the case before us? We cannot doubt as to this. Without jurisdiction, the court cannot proceed at all in any cause. Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and, when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause. And this is not less clear upon authority than upon principle.
On the other hand, the general rule, supported by the best elementary writers, [Footnote 5] is that, "when an act of the legislature is repealed, it must be considered, except as to transactions past and closed, as if it never existed." And the effect of repealing acts upon suits under acts repealed has been determined by the adjudications of this court. The subject was fully considered in Norris v. Crecker, [Footnote 6] and more recently in Insurance Company v. Ritchie. [Footnote 7] In both of these cases, it was held that no judgment could be rendered in a suit after the repeal of the act under which it was brought and prosecuted.
It is quite clear, therefore, that this court cannot proceed to pronounce judgment in this case, for it has no longer jurisdiction of the appeal, and judicial duty is not less fitly performed by declining ungranted jurisdiction than in exercising firmly that which the Constitution and the laws confer.
See Ex parte McCardle, 6 Wallace 318.
Act of March 27, 1868, 15 Stat. at Large 44.
10 U. S. 6 Cranch 312; Wiscart v. Dauchy, 3 Dallas 321.
Lanier v. Gallatas, 13 Louisiana Annual 175; De Chastellux v. Fairchild, 15 Pennsylvania State 18; The State v. Fleming, 7 Humphreys 152; Lewis v. Webb, 3 Greenleaf 326.
54 U. S. 13 Howard 429.
72 U. S. 5 Wallace 541.
Ex parte McCardle, 6 Wallace 324.

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