Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/91945/miedreich-vs-lauenstein
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 04:18:03+00:00

Document:
Although the record is meager of attempts to raise it, if the state court holds that a federal question is made before it, according to its practice, and proceeds to determine it, this Court regards the question as duly made.
as binding the findings of fact made by the highest court of the state from which the case come.
This Court has always recognized the difficulty of satisfactorily defining the term "due process of law" in general terms applicable to all cases and the desirability of judicial determination in each case as the question arises. Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97 .
Law, in its regular course of administration through courts of justice, is due process, and, when secured by the law of the state, the constitutional requirement is satisfied. Leeper v. Texas, 139 U. S. 462 .
In the absence of fraud or collusion, where the original party did all that the law required in the issue and attempt to serve process, but the sheriff made a false return to the effect that service had been made, the state court, in the absence of direct attack upon the return, in acting thereon as though it were true and holding that the sole remedy was an action against the sheriff for a false return, did not deny the party due process of law within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.
One damaged by reason of a false return of the sheriff as to service of process, and who is given a remedy against the sheriff, is not denied due process of law by the enforcement of the judgment based on such false return because the amount of the sheriff's bond is less than the amount of his loss.
The facts, which involve the validity under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of a judgment based on a false return of service made by a sheriff, are stated in the opinion.
The plaintiff in error, by complaint filed in the Superior Court of Vanderburgh County, State of Indiana, sought to vacate a judgment of foreclosure rendered by that court in a prior case, and to be permitted to redeem the property therein involved, and prays for other relief, and, judgment having been entered in favor of the defendant in error, which was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Indiana (172 Ind. 140), this writ of error was sued out.
a resident of Gibson County, and that she was not summoned in such action, had no knowledge of its pendency, and did not waive service or enter her appearance therein. It was further alleged that the plaintiff in error was not amenable to the jurisdiction of the Sheriff of Vanderburgh County, but that, although she was not served with process, he made a false return of a pretended summons, by which the court was wrongfully imposed upon, and, being so advised at the instance of attorneys for the predecessor of defendant in error, the court appointed a guardian ad litem for her, who answered in the suit, and that a decree was rendered, her property sold, and bid in by the predecessor of the defendant in error. The demurrer of the defendant in error to this paragraph, thus construed, was sustained by the lower court, and its decision affirmed by the supreme court. Other paragraphs of the complaint alleged fraud on the part of the predecessor of the defendant in error and her attorneys. The lower court found against this charge, and the supreme court, after stating that there was legal evidence to support the finding, refused to disturb it.
"both parties have treated this suit as one arising under the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution, and as presenting the questions of due process of law and rights guaranteed by article 1, § 21, of the state constitution,"
and disposes of them against the contention of the plaintiff in error. There is no repudiation of the position of both parties that questions were raised under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and we think the court may be fairly taken to have regarded such questions as duly before it for consideration. Where a state court holds that a federal question is made before it, according to its practice, and proceeds to determine it, this Court will regard the question as duly made. San Jose Land & Water Co. v. San Jose Ranch Co., 189 U. S. 177 , 189 U. S. 179 -180; Haire v. Rice, 204 U. S. 291 , 204 U. S. 299 ; Chambers v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 207 U. S. 142 , 207 U. S. 148 ; Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Sowers, 213 U. S. 55 , 213 U. S. 62 .
support the conclusion upon the federal question that gives this Court the right of review. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. Albers Commission Co., 223 U. S. 573 , 223 U. S. 591 ; Creswill v. Knights of Pythias, 225 U. S. 246 , 225 U. S. 261 ; Southern Pacific Co. v. Schuyler, 227 U. S. 601 , 227 U. S. 611 ; Portland Ry. Co. v. Oregon R. Comm'n, 229 U. S. 397 , 229 U. S. 411 -412.
or thing said to mislead the sheriff, is it an imposition or fraud upon the court to present such summons and return and obtain a judgment upon it, and is it a charge of fraud or imposition upon the court to allege that the court was wrongfully imposed upon by such false return, and was thus falsely advised? The whole allegations must be taken together, and the scope and theory of the paragraph, as we construe it, is that the court was misled by a false return of the sheriff. The court had a right to rely and act upon the return. It imports verity to the court. The sheriff assumes the responsibility, in taking the office, of seeing to it that he does make the right service. Nichols v. Nichols (1884), 96 Ind. 433; State ex Rel. Robinson v. Leach (1858), 10 Ind. 308; State ex Rel. Chapman v. Lines (1853), 4 Ind. 351."
"If this were not true, no litigant could ever know when his rights were adjudicated and set at rest, and, to the end that the party may be made whole, an action for a false return will lie. Splahn v. Gillespie (1874), 48 Ind. 397; Rowell v. Klein (1873), 44 Ind. 290."
"If it be said that the amount of bond a sheriff is required to give might not cover the damage in any or every case, it is sufficient to say that that is a legislative matter, and not a judicial one."
The question, then, is does the ruling predicated upon the principles thus stated, made in the state court wherein the party has been duly heard, amount to a denial of due process of law within the meaning of the federal Constitution?
safeguards for the protection of individual rights as those maxims prescribe for the class of cases to which the one in question belongs,"
"Law, in its regular course of administration through courts of justice, is due process, and, when secured by the law of the state, the constitutional requirement is satisfied."
This language was quoted with approval in Iowa Central Ry. Co. v. Iowa, 160 U. S. 389 , 160 U. S. 393 .
Indiana points out, there would be no protection to parties who have relied upon judicial proceedings importing verity, upon the faith of which rights have been adjudicated and value parted with. In a case of this character, the law must have in view not only the rights of the defendant who has been a victim of a false return on the part of the sheriff, but of persons who have relied upon the regularity of the return of officials necessarily trusted by law with the responsibility of advising the court as to the performance of such duties as are here involved. Were the law otherwise, titles might be attacked many years after they were acquired where the party had been guilty of no fraud and had acted upon the faith of judicial proceedings apparently perfect in every respect.
This has been the rule of law applied to a similar situation in the courts of other states. Gregory v. Ford, 14 Cal. 138; Stites v. Knapp, Ga.Dec. pt. 2, p. 36; Taylor v. Lewis, 25 Ky. 400; Gardner v. Jenkins, 14 Md. 58; Smoot v. Judd, 184 Mo. 508; Johnson v. Jones, 2 Neb. 126; Wardsboro v. Whitingham, 45 Vt. 450; Preston v. Kindrick, 94 Va. 760. And see in this connection Walker v. Robbins, 14 How. 584, 55 U. S. 585 ; Knox County v. Harshman, 133 U. S. 152 , 133 U. S. 156 .
Without the necessity of deciding more in the present case, it is enough to say that the decision of the Supreme Court of Indiana, made under the circumstances detailed, did not, in our opinion, deprive the plaintiff in error of due process of law within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.

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