Source: http://masscases.com/cases/sjc/349/349mass484.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 19:14:56+00:00

Document:
PETITION for a writ of error filed in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk on April 6, 1964.
Wilbur G. Hollingsworth for the petitioner.
Warren K. Kaplan, Assistant Attorney General, for the Commonwealth.
SPALDING, J. This is a petition for a writ of error to set aside judgments in four criminal cases. The Commonwealth in its answer denied the allegations of the petition and asked that the judgments be affirmed for the reason that there was no error of law apparent on the record.
counsel for indigent defendants except in capital cases. See Allen v. Commonwealth, 324 Mass. 558 . Rule 10 of the General Rules was not adopted until June 13, 1958, more than six years after the trial under consideration. Had the court offered to appoint counsel for the petitioner, I have no doubt that he would have availed himself of the privilege.
"The petitioner is now 44 years of age; at the time of the trial he was aged 32. He has had little education, never having gone beyond the fifth grade in school. From the fact, according to his testimony, that he had been in court at various times on 15 criminal charges, in all of which he pleaded guilty, I infer that he was not wholly unfamiliar with court proceedings, if that is material.
"Apart from the failure of the court to apprise the petitioner of his right to counsel, and to appoint counsel, I am not satisfied that the trial itself was unfair. He was permitted to participate in his defence and to argue to the jury after the evidence was completed. A confession of a codefendant implicating the petitioner was introduced in evidence but the petitioner concedes that the judge instructed the jury that the confession was not to be treated as evidence against him. He contends, however, that the confession was the only evidence . . . that implicated him in any way but that despite this fact the judge submitted the cases to the jury. While I am in no position to make a finding as to the petitioner's guilt or innocence -- and in a proceeding of this sort I do not believe this issue to be material -- I cannot accept his version that the judge submitted the cases to the jury solely on the basis of a confession which he had ruled was not admissible against the petitioner."
it be given retrospective effect. Because of the importance of the subject, I reserve and report the case for consideration of the full court on the question whether, on the foregoing facts, Gideon v. Wainwright is to be given retrospective effect and, whether it is or is not to be given such effect, what disposition should be made with respect to the four challenged judgments."
The Federal courts have uniformly construed the Gideon decision as having retrospective application. Striker v. Pancher, 317 F. 2d 780 (6th Cir.). United States ex rel. Craig v. Myers, Superintendent, 329 F. 2d 856 (3d Cir.), affirming United States ex rel. Craig v. Myers, Superintendent, 220 F. Supp. 762 (E. D. Pa.). United States ex rel. Durocher v. LaVallee, Warden, 330 F. 2d 303 (2d Cir.), cert. den. sub nom. LaVallee, Warden, v. Durocher, 377 U.S. 998. Palumbo v. New Jersey, 334 F. 2d 524, 528-532 (3d Cir.). State courts have likewise so held. In re Palmer, 371 Mich. 656. State v. Johnson, 43 N. J. 572, 581-585. We know of only two courts that have ever held the contrary. Commonwealth ex rel. Craig v. Banmiller, 410 Pa. 584. Arthur v. People, 155 Colo. 188. But the Pennsylvania decision was overruled in Commonwealth ex rel. McCray v. Rundle, 415 Pa. 65, 68, and Commonwealth ex rel. O'Lock v. Rundle, 415 Pa. 515, 520. The Colorado case was reversed in Arthur v. Colorado, 380 U.S. 250 (per curiam).
That this view prevails is not surprising in light of the fact that Gideon v. Wainwright, supra, was a decision which was actually applied retrospectively in that very case. That case came to the Supreme Court of the United States on a writ of certiorari from the denial of post conviction remedies by which Gideon sought to attack collaterally the judgment against him. There is, moreover, not the slightest indication in the opinion that the decision is only to operate prospectively. See Doughty v. Maxwell, Warden, 376 U.S. 202 (per curiam), reversing Doughty v. Sachs, Warden, 175 Ohio St. 46, which also involved a post conviction attack.
matter have been dispelled in the recent case of Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618. There the question was whether the exclusionary rule of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, was retrospective. The court held that since pre-Mapp convictions necessarily involve police conduct prior to that decision the deterrent purpose of the Mapp exclusionary rule would not be served by applying it retrospectively. The opinion of the court, however, distinguished the Gideon situation where the principle applied relates to "the fairness of the trial -- the very integrity of the fact-finding process." Linkletter v. Walker, supra, 639. [Note p488-1] In footnote 20 in the Linkletter case the court said, "In Gideon v. Wainwright . . . we recognized a fundamental fact that a layman, no matter how intelligent, could not possibly further his claims of innocence, and violation of previously declared rights adequately. Because of this the judgment lacked reliability."
We conclude that the Gideon rule is to be applied retrospectively. Even if the position of the Supreme Court of the United States were not so clear, we would still reach this result. A trial in which a defendant is not represented by counsel lacks that fundamental fairness we regard as essential to a conviction. That the petitioner, as the single justice found, did not request counsel is of no consequence. The findings establish that he was not advised of his right to counsel and there is nothing in the record which would indicate that this right was waived. Doughty v. Maxwell, Warden, 376 U.S. 202. United States ex rel. Durocher v. LaVallee, Warden, 330 F. 2d 303 (2d Cir. en banc). Commonwealth ex rel. O'Lock v. Rundle, 415 Pa. 515, 520-521. See Carnley v. Cochran, Corrections Dir. 369 U.S. 506. The judgments lack reliability and this is just as true whether the defendant was convicted before or after the decision in the Gideon case.
Cases remanded to Superior Court.
[Note p485-1] In the proceedings on this petition for a writ of error the petitioner was represented by Mr. Wilbur G. Hollingsworth of the Massachusetts Defenders Committee, pursuant to an appointment by a Justice of this court.
[Note p488-1] This distinction and its rationale were anticipated in United States ex rel. Durocher v. LaVallee, Warden, 330 F. 2d 303, 310, n. 3.

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