Source: https://www.naag.org/publications/naagazette/volume-7-number-8/court-decision-affirms-states-role-in-regulating-and-banning-flavored-tobacco-product-sales.php
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 04:46:03+00:00

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You can still get a 32-ounce cherry soda in New York City but not a cherry-flavored cigar. In a decision handed down earlier this year, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld New York Cityï¿½s ordinance banning the sale of flavored tobacco products. This decision provides the first federal appellate interpretation of the scope of a state or local governmentï¿½s power to regulate tobacco product sales in light of the federal preemption provisions found in the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, 21 U.S.C.A. §387 et seq. (ï¿½Tobacco Control Actï¿½ or ï¿½Actï¿½). It also affirms the stateï¿½s historical exercise of its police powers to regulate tobacco products sold within its borders to protect the health of its citizens from the harm caused by smoking.
On June 22, 2009, President Obama signed the Tobacco Control Act into law. The Act gives the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) the authority to regulate the manufacture, distribution, and marketing of tobacco products to protect the public health. See 21 U.S.C. § 387 et seq. Tobacco products include cigarettes, cigars, roll-your-own, smokeless tobacco, and the like. Id. at 387a(b). The Act recognizes that nearly all new smokers will start using before they are 18 years old (the minimum legal age to buy tobacco products in most states), that they will become addicted before they have the maturity to understand the risks, and that a significant percentage of them will ultimately die prematurely from tobacco-related illnesses. Pub. L. No. 111-31, Div. A, § 2. At the same time, the Act recognizes that tobacco products, though inherently harmful, are legal for use by adults and that users are addicted to them. Id.
In balancing these conflicting considerations, the Act seeks to protect public health by, among other things, banning ï¿½characterizingï¿½ flavors (except tobacco and menthol) in cigarettes, prohibiting advertising claims of ï¿½reduced harmï¿½ without pre-authorization by the FDA, and requiring graphic warning labels on tobacco product packaging, but, at the same time, the Act prohibits the FDA from banning outright all tobacco product sales and from reducing nicotine levels to zero. 21 U.S.C. § 387g(a)(1)(A), 387k, 387g(d)(3); 21 U.S.C. § 1333(d).
Acknowledging the public health risks of flavored cigars and flavored smokeless products, the New York City Council passed an ordinance in 2009 banning the sale of nearly all flavored tobacco products within the city, except in tobacco bars (of which there are only eight). 17 N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 17-701. The ban does not apply to menthol, mint, or wintergreen flavoring but bans the sale of all other flavored, non-cigarette, tobacco products such as cigars, little cigars, and chewing tobacco and other smokeless products. Id. 17-713(b).
In response, U.S. Smokeless Tobacco Manufacturing Co. and U.S. Smokeless Tobacco Brands, Inc., who make chewing tobacco under brand names like Copenhagen, Skoal and Husky, sued New York City to enjoin the ordinance insofar as it applies to smokeless tobacco products. The plaintiff companies are owned by Altria Group, parent of Philip Morris USA, the largest cigarette manufacturer in the United States.
On Dec. 28, 2009, plaintiffs filed suit in U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. In their complaint, they argued that the Tobacco Control Act preempts New York Cityï¿½s authority to enact a flavoring ban. Plaintiffsï¿½ position starts with the premise that the Act gives the federal government exclusive authority to set manufacturing standards for tobacco products. They assert that banning flavorings is a de facto manufacturing standard because it prohibits the sale of tobacco products made in certain wayï¿½i.e., with flavorings. They further reason that the Act allows for flavorings in non-cigarette products; therefore, the ordinance sets a manufacturing standard stricter than federal law and is, for that reason, preempted.
On March 23, 2010, Federal District Court Judge Colleen McMahon denied Plaintiffsï¿½ motion for a preliminary injunction and on Nov. 15, 2011, granted summary judgment in favor of New York City. In both opinions, Judge McMahon found that the Tobacco Control Act gives the federal government the exclusive power to regulate the manufacture and/or fabrication of tobacco products while reserving to the states their historical power to regulate the sale and distribution of such products more stringently than the federal floor. The court further found that the Cityï¿½s ordinance did not constitute a ï¿½manufacturing standardï¿½ because the Act provides numerous examples of such standards and nearly all of them relate to the actual production of the product at the factory and the ingredients and other component parts that make up the productï¿½not the downstream sale of the finished good.
With respect to Plaintiffsï¿½ position that the flavoring ban is a backdoor manufacturing standard, the Second Circuit declined to read the manufacturing standard language in the Preemption Clause so broadly. The court characterized Plaintiffsï¿½ position as ï¿½collap[sing] the distinction between sales and product regulationsï¿½ and refused to adopt such an interpretation because it would make the language of the Preservation Clause, allowing states to ï¿½enact . . . and enforce any . . . measure . . . prohibiting the sale . . . of tobacco products,ï¿½ superfluous. It further clarified that an impermissible manufacturing standardï¿½one subject to federal preemptionï¿½must be something more than an ï¿½incentive or motivatorï¿½; it ï¿½must require manufacturers to alter the construction, components, ingredients, additives, constituents. . . and properties of their products.ï¿½ Here, the court found that New York Cityï¿½s ordinance simply did not direct manufacturers about which ingredients they could use in their products. Instead, its enforcement turned on whether the final product ï¿½imparts a distinguishable taste or aromaï¿½ or is marketed as having a flavor, regardless of its actual additives or other ingredients.
The court concluded that New York Cityï¿½s flavor ban was not preempted under the Tobacco Control Act and, equally important, interpreted the Act as preserving ï¿½for the states a robust role in regulating, and even banning, sales of tobacco productsï¿½ through a broad reading of the Saving Clause and a narrow reading of the Preemption Clause.
 In September 2012, the New York City Board of Health voted to adopt the ï¿½Portion Cup Rule,ï¿½ which amended Article 81 of the NYC Health Code to prohibit New York City restaurants, movie theatres, stadiums, push carts, and other eateries from serving sugary drinks in sizes larger than 16 ounces. The purpose behind the ï¿½soda banï¿½ was to address rising obesity rates among New York City residents. However, a New York state trial court and, later, the New York Appellate Division struck down the ban as unconstitutional. They found that in promulgating the regulation, the NYC Department of Health, an executive branch agency, exceeded its delegated authority to protect the public health and impermissibly intruded on the policy matters reserved for the legislative branch. Matter of New York Statewide Coalition of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. New York City Dept. of Health & Mental Hygiene, 2013 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 5423, 2013 NY Slip Op 5505 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep't July 30, 2013), affï¿½g 2013 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1216, 2013 NY Slip Op 30609(U) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 11, 2013).
 U.S. Smokeless Tobacco Mfg. Co. LLC v. City of New York, 708 F.3d 428 (2nd Cir. 2013).
 A characterizing flavor is essentially any constituent or additive that gives the cigarette or its smoke a flavor other than tobacco or menthol, such as strawberry, grape, orange, clove, cinnamon, pineapple, vanilla, coconut, licorice, cocoa, chocolate, cherry, or coffee.
 Ann Bloom, ï¿½The Rise of Cigars and Cigar-Smoking Harms,ï¿½ Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids, March 7, 2013, (ï¿½between 2000 and 2012 cigarette consumption declined by 34.1 percent while cigar consumption increased by 124 percentï¿½) citing U.S. Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau, Tobacco Statistics.
 American Cancer Society, "Who Smokes Cigars," last revised Jan. 17, 2013, http://www.cancer.org/cancer/cancercauses/tobaccocancer/cigarsmoking/cigar-smoking-who-smokes-cigars.
 Id.; and Sabrinia Tavernise, ï¿½In All Favors, Cigars Draw in Young Smokers,ï¿½ The New York Times, Aug. 17, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/18/health/in-all-flavors-cigars-draw-in-young-smokers.
 U.S. Smokeless Tobacco Mfg. Co. LLC v. City of New York, 703 F. Supp. 2d 329 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (denying preliminary injunction).
 U.S. Smokeless Tobacco Mfg. Co. LLC v. City of New York, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133018 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (granting summary judgment in favor of New York City).
 Id. at *11 (referring to the theory that a sales ban equates to a manufacturing standard as ï¿½speciousï¿½).
 U.S. Smokeless Tobacco Mfg. Co. LLC, 708 F.3d at 431.

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