Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&amp;view=article&amp;id=40373:g-r-no-130603-august-15,-2000-people-of-the-phil-v-raul-gallego&amp;catid=1396&amp;Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 22:43:26+00:00

Document:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RAUL GALLEGO, Accused-Appellant.
In a sea of nameless faces, can one’s memory of an encounter or two with a stranger suffice to identify him as the assailant of one’s kin?
"That on or about the 8th day of February 1995 in the municipality of Jordan, Province of Guimaras, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with intent to kill, with evident premeditation (sic) and treachery, taking advantage of night time (sic), armed with a knife did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and stab one Wilfredo Lamata, hitting the said Wilfredo Lamata on the left breast which caused his instantaneous death.
The accused Gallego posed the defense of denial and alibi.
"Q:	You said you saw the accused for the second time at the police station of Jordan?
Q:	What time more or less have you seen him (sic)?
A:	In the Municipal Building around 1:30 in the afternoon of February 9, 1995.
Q:	How did you happen to know that the accused Raul Gallego was in the Municipal Building?
A:	I was notified in my house that the person who stabbed my husband was already caught. So I went to the police station to identify him.
Q:	That person you identified in the police station is the same person you have seen (sic) who stabbed your husband?
Q:	You said that you were informed by the police that the person who stabbed your husband was in their custody. Is that correct?
Q:	Who was that policeman who informed you?
A:	It was not the police. They just sent somebody to notify me at home.
Q:	Was that somebody also a policeman?
Q:	And that same day you went to the police station?
Q:	And, it was in the police station of Jordan?
Q:	And, when you arrived in the police station of Jordan, was it in the morning or in the afternoon of February 9, 1995?
Q:	And you were told upon arrival in the police station by a policeman that the person who stabbed your husband was in the police station?
A:	When I arrived, he said that man was still outside. I identified him but I just kept quiet and when the investigator brought him inside the room and I was also around the room, he was investigated.
Q:	When you arrived in the police station in the afternoon, you of course met some policemen there in the police station?
Q:	And you mentioned that you were informed by the policemen that the person who stabbed your husband was there?
Q:	Nobody at the police station informed you that the man who stabbed your husband was there?
A:	They told me also that the man who stabbed my husband was there, "can (sic) you identify him?"
Q:	Who was that policeman?
A:	I don’t know him, and that man was sitting on the porch.
Q:	And that man sitting on the porch was the only man sitting there aside from the police?
A:	There were some other persons.
Q:	But those other persons were policemen?
Q:	And in the porch of the police station?
Q:	But you did (sic) not remember that policeman who told you about that man who killed your husband?
A:	I cannot remember anymore. I don’t know him.
Q:	But that man whom you saw at the police station was wearing different attire?
"Q:	Did you see Raul Gallego in the Police Station?
A:	When I entered the investigation room, Raul Gallego was inside the prison. Then the policeman told me to set (sic) down to identify the man who stabbed my father "Wilfredo Lamata." When I saw Raul Gallego I felt nervous, I cried, and was afraid.
Q:	At that moment when you saw Raul Gallego you do (sic) not know his name?
Q:	You did not know also that Raul Gallego was imprisoned at that time when you went to the police station?
A:	I went home because I have also a house in Iloilo, I really don’t believed (sic) that my father was already dead. My cousin told me that we will (sic) go to the Police Station because we will (sic) identify that man who stabbed my father.
Q:	So you did not know how Raul Gallego was imprisoned?
Q:	Who was your relative who told you to go to the Police Station?
A:	My cousin Ramon Galve.
Q:	Did Ramon Galve identify the accused Raul Gallego when you went to the Police Station?
Q:	Who was your companion in going to the Police Station?
A:	My relative, that is the son of my cousin.
Q:	So, you do not know why and how Raul Gallego was imprisoned when you went there?
A:	I know him he was imprison when he stabbed my father, later I identify that his name is Raul Gallego (sic). But I really know him when I saw him stabbing my father (sic).
Q:	That is what you think that he was there because he stabbed your father?
Q:	That you did not know him in the prison while you were there at that time?
A:	Yes, Sir. That is when Raul Gallego was detained and my mother identify him, and I was the second who identify him as the accused (sic).
Q:	Now you said that Raul Gallego was in prison or detained because he was a suspect according to the police?
Q:	While you were going to the Police Station, you still did not know the name of Raul Gallego?
A:	While I was there, I heard them saying that he is (sic) Raul Gallego but it did not come to (sic) my mind.
Q:	So, while you were on your way to the Jordan Municipal Jail the name of Raul Gallego was already mentioned?
Q:	That is all for the witness.
That man which you said, you later knew as Raul Gallego?
Q:	That person you saw at the jail he was the same person which you saw already identified as Raul Gallego (sic), he was the same Raul Gallego who stabbed your father?
"Extant in our jurisprudence are cases where the distance between the scene of the crime and the alleged whereabouts of the accused is only two (2) kilometers (People v. Lumantas, 28 SCRA 764 ), or three (3) kilometers (People v. Binsol, 100 Phil. 713 ) or even five (5) kilometers (People v. Manabat, 100 Phil. 603 ), and yet it was held that these distances were not too far as to preclude the possibility of the accused’s presence at the locus criminis, even if the sole means of traveling between the two places at that time was only by walking (People v. Aparato, 80 Phil. 199 )"
Having established the guilt of Raul Gallego beyond reasonable doubt, we now come to the aggravating circumstances attending the crime.
With respect to the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation, we find that it cannot be appreciated. There is evident premeditation when the following facts are shown: (1) the time when the accused decided to commit the crime; (2) an overt act showing that the accused clung to his determination to commit the crime; and (3) the lapse of sufficient period of time between the decision and the execution of the crime, to allow the accused to reflect upon the consequences of his act. 56 There is a dearth of evidence, however, with respect to these facts.
Nighttime cannot also be appreciated because although the crime took place at about 7:30 in the evening, the fact alone that the crime was committed at night does not automatically aggravate the crime. Nighttime becomes an aggravating circumstance only when (1) it is specially sought by the offender; (2) the offender takes advantage of it; or (3) it facilitates the commission of the crime by insuring the offender’s immunity from identification or capture. 57 In the case at bar, no evidence suggests that the accused purposely sought the cover of darkness to perpetrate the crime or to conceal his identity as he stabbed Wilfredo in a well-lighted place.
Undeniably, however, the crime was committed in the dwelling of the Lamatas without provocation from the victim, Wilfredo Lamata. Dwelling may be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance when the crime is committed in the dwelling of the offended party and the latter has not given provocation. 58 "He who goes to another’s house to hurt him or do him wrong, is more guilty than he who offends him elsewhere." 59 We have previously ruled that this aggravating circumstance may be appreciated against the accused even if it was not alleged in the information when proved without any objection on his part 60 or even over his objection. 61 This brings us to a thorny issue in the case at bar.
1.	With treachery . . .
By mechanically applying these penal provisions to the case at bar, the appreciation of the aggravating circumstance of dwelling will result in the imposition of no less than the supreme penalty of DEATH upon the accused Gallego. It is worth noting that the aggravating circumstance of dwelling was not alleged in the information. Nor was it mentioned, much less appreciated, in the decision of the trial court convicting the accused Gallego of murder. Neither was it raised as an issue in the Briefs of the parties. It is only now that the issue of dwelling, apparently overlooked from the inception of the case up to its elevation to this Court, has been unearthed. Considering that the accused Gallego was not apprised of the aggravating circumstance of dwelling at any stage of the judicial proceedings and the resulting penalty will be DEATH if dwelling is appreciated, do the previous rulings of the Court that an aggravating circumstance may be appreciated against the accused even if it was not alleged in the information when proved without any objection on his part or even over his objection, apply to the case at bar?
In a series of cases under the regime of Rep. Act No. 7659, the Court did not appreciate the aggravating circumstance of dwelling which would have increased the imposable penalty to death when such circumstance was not alleged in the information. 67 In People v. Gaspar, Et Al., 68 the Court found that apart from treachery, dwelling also attended the killing of the victim. Despite this finding and the absence of any mitigating circumstance, the Court nonetheless did not appreciate dwelling and imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua and not the greater penalty of death. 69 Hence, in the case at bar, considering that the aggravating circumstance of dwelling was not alleged in the information, we cannot appreciate it and raise the penalty imposed upon Raul Gallego from reclusion perpetua to death.
Anent the damages awarded to the heirs of the victim, there is sufficient evidence to warrant the award of P50,000.00 as moral damages. 70 Actual damages cannot, however, be awarded for lack of evidence to support the prosecution’s claim.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the impugned decision is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that accused-appellant Raul Gallego is hereby adjudged to pay the heirs of the victim in the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages. Costs against Accused-Appellant.
2.	TSN, Avelyn C. Lamata, October 24,1995, p. 8.
4.	Id., pp. 7-9; TSN, Lina L. Echavez, November 21, 1995, pp. 3-4.
5.	TSN, Lucia Lamata, June 30, 1995, pp. 5-6.
6.	TSN, Lina L. Echavez, November 21,1995, pp. 4-7, 12.
7.	TSN, Lucia Lamata, June 30, 1995, p. 6.
8.	Id., p. 20; TSN, Lina L. Echavez, November 21,1995, p. 7.
9.	Id., Lucia Lamata, pp. 6-8, 20, 24; Id., Lina L. Echavez, pp. 8, 11.
10.	Supra note 7, pp. 8, 13, 26-27.
11.	Supra note 2, p. 11; TSN, Lina L. Echavez, supra, pp. 8, 18; TSN, Lucia Lamata, supra, pp. 25-26.
14.	TSN, Lina Echavez, supra, p. 13.
15.	TSN, Dr. Edgardo Jabasa, July 18, 1995, pp. 3-10.
16.	TSN, Lucia Lamata, supra, pp. 17, 27-30.
17.	Id., p. 15; Original Records, pp. 6-7; Exhibit "A" .
18.	TSN, Lina L. Echavez, supra, pp. 13-16.
19.	Id., pp. 9-10; Original Records, pp. 8-9; Exhibit "E" .
20.	TSN, Avelyn C. Lamata, supra, pp. 16-21.
21.	Id., pp. 12-13; Original Records, pp. 15-16; Exhibit "D" .
22.	TSN, Lina L. Echavez, supra, p. 9.
24.	TSN, Francisco Mesa, February 20, 1996, pp. 13-14.
27.	Id., pp. 21-23, 35-37.
28.	TSN, Lorio Gallego, March 14, 1997, pp. 3-5.
29.	Id., pp. 15, 19-22.
30.	TSN, Reynaldo Gallego, May 21, 1996, pp. 9-10.
33.	TSN, Lydia Tanaleon, May 21, 1996, p. 13.
35.	TSN, Raul Gallego, May 30, 1996, pp. 2-3.
38.	Id., pp. 6-9; 36-40; 42-44.
39.	Sec. 3(m), Rule 131, Revised Rules of Court.
40.	249 SCRA 54 (1995), p. 95, citing Neil v. Briggers, 409 US 188 (1973); Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 US 98 (1977); Del Carmen, (Criminal Procedure, Law and Practice, 3rd Edition, p. 346. See also People v. Verzosa, Et Al., 294 SCRA 466 (1998), citing People v. Teehankee, Jr., supra.
41.	TSN, Lucia Lamata, supra, pp. 27-30.
42.	TSN, Lina Echavez, supra, pp. 13-16.
43.	People v. Verzosa, Et Al., 294 SCRA 466 (1998), citing People v. Reception, 198 SCRA 670 (1991). See also People v. Barrientos, 285 SCRA 221 (1998), citing People v. Reception, supra.
44.	People v. Teehankee, Jr., supra, citing People v. Campa, 230 SCRA 431 (1994) and People v. Apawan, 235 SCRA 355 (1994).
45.	People v. Bundang, 272 SCRA 641 (1997).
46.	Original Records, p. 7.
47.	Id. pp. 7, 9.
48.	People v. Quinciano Rendoque, Sr., Et Al., G.R. No. 106282, January 20, 2000, citing People v. Ebrada, 296 SCRA 353, 365 (1998); People v. Ilao 296 SCRA 658, 669 (1998).
49.	People v. Rojas, G.R. No. 125292, April 12, 2000, citing People v. Cortes, G.R. No. 129693, January 24, 2000.
50.	People v. Monieva, G.R. No. 123912, June 8, 2000, citing People v. Maguad, 287 SCRA 535 (1998).
51.	G.R. No. 130666, January 31, 2000, citing People v. Floro, G.R. No. 120641, October 7, 1999, citing People v. Payot, 308 SCRA 43 (1999).
52.	People v. Aquino, G.R. No. 128887, January 20, 2000, citing People v. Hubilla, 252 SCRA 471, 481 (1996); People v. Realin, 301 SCRA 495 (1999).
53.	TSN, Dr. Edgardo Jabasa, supra, pp. 8-9.
54.	People v. Chavez, 278 SCRA 230 (1997), citing People v. Saliling, 249 SCRA 185 (1995) and People v. Abapo, 239 SCRA 469 (1996). See also People v. Ronquillo, Et Al., 247 SCRA 793 (1995), citing People v. Abapo, supra.
55.	See People v. Quinciano Rendoque, Sr., Et Al., supra, citing People v. Gutierrez, Jr., 302 SCRA 643 (1999).
56.	People v. Virtucio, Jr., G.R. No. 130667, February 22, 2000, citing People v. Armando Sarabia, G.R. No. 106102, October 29, 1999.
57.	People v. de la Cruz, 291 SCRA 164 (1998), citing People v. Cayabyab, G.R No. 123073, June 19, 1997. See also People v. Amamangpang, 291 SCRA 268 (1998).
58.	People v. Feliciano, Et Al., 256 SCRA 706 (1996), citing Article 14, number 3, Revised Penal Code.
59.	People v. Quinao, Et Al., 269 SCRA 495 (1997), citing Viada, 5th Ed., Vol. II, pp. 323-324, cited in Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Twelfth Edition, Vol. I, p. 336.
60.	People v. Estares, 282 SCRA 524 (1997).
61.	People v. Ramos, 296 SCRA 559 (1998), citing People v. Ang, Et Al., 139 SCRA 115 (1985).
62.	An Act to Impose Death Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes.
63.	251 SCRA 136 (1995).
64.	People v. Rios G.R. No. 132631, June 19, 2000 - 65.	See People v. Godoy, 250 SCRA 686 (1995).
66.	People v. Alicando, 251 SCRA 293 (1995).
67.	People v. De Guzman, 289 SCRA 470 (1998); People v. Naguita, Et Al., G.R. No. 130091, August 30, 1999; People v. Magno, Et Al., G.R. No. 134535, January 19, 2000; People v. Enolva, G.R. No. 131633-34, January 25, 2000.
68.	G.R. No. 131479, November 19, 1999.
1	When in the commission of the deed there is present only one aggravating circumstance, the greater penalty shall be applied.
4.	When both mitigating and aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the act the court shall reasonably allow them to offset one another in consideration of their number and importance, for the purpose of applying the penalty in accordance with the preceding rules, according to the result of such compensation.
70.	TSN, Lucia Lamata, supra, p. 15.

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