Source: http://la.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20180323_0000361.ELA.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 16:53:23+00:00

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Before the Court are two motions: (1) a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) filed by Defendants Sergeant Jeffery Prevost and Lafourche Parish Sheriff Craig Webre (collectively the “Sheriff Defendants”),  and (2) a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) filed by Defendants Castex Lafourche, LP and Glenn M. Plaisance (collectively the “Castex Defendants”). The motions are opposed. For the reasons that follow, the Court grants both motions. As a result, only Plaintiffs' claims for declaratory/injunctive relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02 and Plaintiffs' state law claims remain.
On April 29, 2016, Plaintiff Daryl Carpenter, principal and sole owner of Plaintiff Reel Screamers Guide Service, LLC (“Reel Screamers”) (collectively “Plaintiffs”), was “guiding a family of three on a red fishing trip, ” having departed from Grand Isle, Louisiana and navigated to the Golden Pond through a series of “interconnected natural navigable waterways.” Carpenter “easily navigated [a] 24 foot charter vessel into the Golden Pond, where the crew engaged in fishing with hook and line.” While Carpenter was guiding the family of three, Plaisance, who manages the land upon which Golden Pond is situated, approached Carpenter by boat, advising him that he and his passengers “were trespassing on private property and had to leave.” Carpenter “begrudgingly” left Golden Pond after this encounter.
On June 6, 2016, Carpenter was driving away from his home in Grand Isle, Louisiana when “his lane of travel was cut off to the front by an unidentified Grand Isle policeman in a marked squad car.” Carpenter stopped his vehicle, “at which time the Grand Isle Policeman signaled to a Lafourche Parish Sheriff's vehicle, which pulled up behind Plaintiff's vehicle, blocking him from the rear.” Sergeant Provost and Deputy Drake Duet approached Carpenter and explained that Plaisance “was pursuing a complaint against Plaintiff for trespassing.” Sergeant Provost informed Carpenter “that this would be his ‘first and final official warning, ' [and] that if he [were] found on Mr. Plaisance's property again, he would be arrested.” Carpenter asked Sergeant Provost “the official location of Mr. Plaisance's property, ” to which Sergeant Provost responded by stating Carpenter “would be arrested for trespassing if found on ‘any waters that the State Lands Map did not show as public.'” According to Plaintiffs, this admonishment “served to prevent Plaintiff's lawful use of numerous natural navigable waterways, including but not limited to the Golden Pond” because the State Lands Map's disclaimer reads in part: “This information is intended to serve only as an initial reference for research and does not purport to provide evidence of legal title to property.” As a result, Plaintiffs contend they are unable to determine which waters are public and which are private.
On January 31, 2017, Plaintiffs filed suit against the Sheriff Defendants and Castex Defendants. Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on May 16, 2017. On November 8, 2017, at the Court's direction, Plaintiffs filed a supplemental memorandum referencing the allegations in their amended complaint and clarifying the causes of action being asserted against each Defendant and pointing out the factual allegations supporting each claim.
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a district court may dismiss a complaint, or any part of it, for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted if the plaintiff has not set forth factual allegations in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief. “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'”“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” However, the court does not accept as true legal conclusions or mere conclusory statements,  and “conclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual conclusions will not suffice to prevent a motion to dismiss.” “[T]hreadbare recitals of elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements” or “naked assertion[s] devoid of further factual enhancement” are not sufficient.
The Sheriff Defendants contend Carpenter's § 1983 claims under the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments, insofar as they are based on the threat of future arrest, must be dismissed for lack of standing. Because Carpenter has not been arrested and may continue to fish on other waterways that are public, the Sheriff Defendants contend Carpenter has not suffered a redressable injury-in-fact and his claims are not ripe for adjudication.
In their motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), the Sheriff Defendants argue Carpenter lacks standing to bring any claims based on the threat of future arrest, as Sergeant Prevost's threat does not constitute a concrete injury-in-fact. The Sheriff Defendants point to two cases, Kelly v. Herbst and Blankenship v. Buenger,  in support of their positions. However, neither Kelly nor Blankenship apply to the facts of this case. In both of those cases, the plaintiffs brought pre-enforcement actions challenging the constitutionality of the statutes they believed would be enforced against them.
Under the first prong of a court's constitutional standing analysis, a plaintiff must show that he “‘has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury' as the result of the challenged official conduct and the injury or threat of injury [is] both ‘real and immediate, ' not ‘conjectural or hypothetical.'” In a suit challenging the constitutionality of a statute pre-enforcement, a plaintiff must prove his future harm is “real and immediate” by demonstrating that (1) he has a concrete plan to violate the law in question; (2) he has received a real threat of imminent prosecution from the state; and (3) that the statute at issue has previously been enforced. Such an analysis, however, applies only when a plaintiff sues for prospective relief by way of an injunction or declaratory judgment.
In this case, Plaintiffs seek prospective relief in the form of (1) “a declaration of the boundary between the public bed of the Golden Pond and other similarly situated navigable waters at issue in this litigation and the private property of CASTEX”; or, in the alternative, (2) “a declaration of their Federal and Louisiana State law rights to navigate, conduct commercial fishing operations, and otherwise engage in interstate maritime commerce upon the Golden Pond and other similarly situated navigable waters at issue in this litigation of which CASTEX asserts ownership.” The declaratory judgments they seek are not based on the alleged threat of arrest or the constitutionality of any statute they believe might be enforced against them. As a result, neither Kelly nor Blankenship apply. Instead, the requirements for standing on Plaintiffs' § 1983 claims are that they sufficiently allege that (1) they have suffered a concrete and particularized injury-in-fact; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to Defendants' conduct; and (3) a favorable judgment from this Court is likely to redress the alleged injury. Plaintiffs have satisfied these requirements and have standing to bring their § 1983 claims.
Plaintiffs' § 1983 claims against the Sheriff Defendants stem from alleged violations of Plaintiffs' Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights based on (a) Carpenter's June 6, 2016 encounter with Sergeant Prevost, Deputy Duet, and “an unidentified Grand Isle Policeman, ” during which Carpenter's “ingress and egress” was “physically blocked”; (b) Sergeant Prevost's statements that deprived Plaintiffs of their right to go on public lands, thereby restraining their ability to earn a living; (c) Sheriff Webre's failure to respond to Plaintiffs' letters; and (d) “the actions and inactions of Sheriff Craig Webre in other similar cases and matters, ” which Plaintiffs contend “evidence a custom, culture, and practice within the Lafourche Parish Sheriff's Department of discrimination against commercial fishermen in favor of landowners and water bottoms claimants.” Plaintiffs bring their § 1983 claims against the Sheriff Defendants in their official and individual capacities.
With respect to Plaintiffs' § 1983 claims against Sergeant Prevost in his official capacity, it is well settled that a suit against a municipal official in his or her official capacity is simply another way of alleging municipal liability. Louisiana grants no capacity to be sued to any parish sheriff's office. The Sheriff in his official capacity is the appropriate governmental entity responsible for any violations committed by his office. When, as in this case, the Sheriff is a defendant in the litigation, claims against specific deputies in their official capacities are redundant, and it is appropriate to dismiss them. As a result, the Court dismisses Plaintiffs' claims against Sergeant Prevost in his official capacity.
Plaintiffs allege Sergeant Prevost violated their Fifth Amendment right to due process and Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Sergeant Prevost contends he is entitled to qualified immunity as to each of these claims.
Carpenter alleges Sergeant Prevost violated his Fifth Amendment right to due process when he “physically blocked” Carpenter's “pathway, ingress and egress” and “curtly responded” that Carpenter would be considered trespassing “if found on ‘any waters that the State Lands Map did not show as public'” after Carpenter “inquired as to the official location of Mr. Plaisance's property” on June 6, 2016.
The Fifth Amendment's “Due Process Clause provides that certain substantive rights-life, liberty, and property-cannot be deprived except pursuant to constitutionally adequate procedures.” This constitutional provision, on its own, is enforceable only against the Federal Government. Thus, the Court assumes Carpenter asserts his due process claim through the Fourteenth Amendment.
Carpenter's first due process allegation is that Sergeant Prevost's blocking his movement on June 6, 2016 violated Carpenter's constitutionally protected liberty interest to be free from unreasonable seizures. “[W]here a particular Amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against a particular sort of government behavior, ” in this case the Fourth Amendment, “that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of substantive due process, must be the guide for analyzing these claims.” Because in this case Carpenter's substantive due process claim with respect to this conduct fully overlaps with his Fourth Amendment unreasonable seizure claim, his due process claim based on this conduct must be dismissed.
Each of the liberty interests articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court emphasizes the right to remain in a public place. This right plainly does not extend to private property. In this case, Carpenter does not make a procedural due process claim that he was removed from a public place without due process; rather he makes a substantive due process claim stemming from his being told he may not trespass on lands marked as private on the State Lands Map. At base, Carpenter's complaint is that, because of the State Lands Map's disclaimer, it is possible that some areas marked as “private” are actually “public” and, therefore, Sergeant Prevost's warning deprived Carpenter of his constitutionally protected liberty interest to travel to a public place.
At minimum, Carpenter must allege facts sufficient for the Court to infer Sergeant Prevost acted with deliberate indifference to the potential effects of his conduct on Carpenter's constitutional rights. In this case, Carpenter alleges the Sheriff Defendants violated his right to substantive due process when Sergeant Prevost told Carpenter not to trespass on lands marked as private on the State Lands Map. The Court finds Sergeant Prevost did not act with deliberate indifference when he informed Carpenter that he would be considered trespassing if found on private lands, as his alleged conduct does not “shock the conscience, ” is not “brutal and offensive to human dignity, ” and is not “among the ‘most egregious official conduct.'” At best, Sergeant Prevost's actions evidence a “lack of due care, ” which is not sufficient to state a due process claim.Carpenter's Fourteenth Amendment due process claim based on this conduct is dismissed.
There are exceptions to the general rule that an officer must first have “an objectively reasonable suspicion that some sort of illegal activity . . . occurred, or is about to occur, before stopping the vehicle.” As the U.S. Supreme Court in Illinois v. Lidster explained, the suspicionless stop of an automobile does not require a court to apply a “rule of automatic unconstitutionality, ” as “the fact that such stops lacks individualized suspicion cannot by itself determine the constitutional outcome.” In the context of checkpoints, for example, “brief, suspicionless seizures at highway checkpoints for the purposes of combating drunk driving and intercepting illegal immigrants” do not violate the Fourth Amendment.
The legality of a suspicionless seizure depends on whether the seizure is premised on specific “highway safety interests [or] the general interest in crime control.” In Michigan State Police Department v. Sitz,  the U.S. Supreme Court held that because the checkpoint in question “was clearly aimed at reducing the immediate hazard posed by the presence of drunk drivers on the highways, and there was an obvious connection between the imperative of highway safety and the law enforcement practice at issue, ” the Michigan Highway Patrol's custom of conducting suspicionless stops on the highway did not violate the Constitution. In contrast, in Delaware v. Prouse the Court invalidated “a discretionary, suspicionless stop for a spot check of a motorist's driver's license and vehicle registration” because officers enforcing the stop had “standardless and unconstrained discretion” to carryout the program. In Prouse, the Government offered “the apprehension of stolen motor vehicles” as an alternative explanation for the practice being necessary. In rejecting this argument, the Court noted the “interest in controlling automobile thefts is not distinguishable from the general interest in crime control.”Accordingly, a “general interest in crime control” cannot justify a suspicionless stop.
Court has defined the severity of the subjective intrusion on individual liberty as measured by the amount of concern and fright that is generated on the part of lawful travelers.” Unlike Faulkner and Sitz, the stop was not part of a regulated checkpoint, which “is inherently of a less frightful nature than an ordinary seizure, such as a roving-patrol stop.” Moreover, the stop was not a part of a systematic plan put in place by the police department. Like the plaintiffs in Prouse, Carpenter was “subject to . . . the unfettered discretion of officers in the field.” The Court finds the practice of stopping a vehicle to provide its passenger with a no-trespass warning is plainly more akin to serving a “general interest in crime control, ” than specific “highway safety interests.” As a result, the Court finds Carpenter's Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure was violated in this case.
whether it is an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to stop an automobile, being driven on a public highway, for the purpose of checking the driving license of the operator and the registration of the car, where there is neither probable cause to believe nor reasonable suspicion that the car is being driven contrary to the laws governing the operation of motor vehicles or that either the car or any of its occupants is subject to seizure or detention in connection with the violation of any other applicable law.
Bearing in mind the particularized nature of the way in which the Court framed the issue in Prouse, in this case the Court must determine whether it is clearly established that stopping an automobile for the sole and singular purpose of disseminating information to its passengers is an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.
The Court's review of the case law reveals that only a single district court in this circuit has held that a police officer's stopping a motorist “for the sole and singular purpose of delivering a no trespass warning to him” violates the Fourth Amendment.However, without more than one district court opinion, which the Court notes is not “controlling, ” a person's right to be free from police officers' stopping his or her automobile for the purpose of disseminating information to its passengers is not clearly established. With no controlling authority “specifically prohibit[ing] the defendants conduct, ” no “clearly established law [has] put the constitutionality of [Sergeant Prevost's] actions beyond debate.” Thus, Sergeant Prevost is entitled to qualified immunity, and Plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment claims against Sergeant Prevost in his individual capacity must be dismissed.
Plaintiffs do not base their Monell claim on the Lafourche Parish Sheriff's Office's violations of other commercial fishermen's rights, other than to allege “other similar cases and matters” demonstrate such discrimination. Moreover, Plaintiffs do not allege a sufficient number of similar violations of their own rights to demonstrate the underlying constitutional violation,  if any, is widespread. “Where prior incidents are used to prove a pattern, they ‘must have occurred for so long or so frequently that the course of conduct warrants the attribution to the governing body of knowledge that the objectionable conduct is the expected, accepted practice of city employees.'” Because Plaintiffs have failed to establish a pattern or practice of discrimination, they have failed to state a claim for municipal liability upon which the Court may grant relief, and these claims must be dismissed.
Because Plaintiffs do not allege they are members of a protected class, they apparently make a “class of one” equal protection claim. In Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, the Supreme Court held that the Equal Protection Clause can give rise to a cause of action on behalf of a ‘class of one, ' even when the plaintiff does not allege membership in a protected class or group. To state a class of one equal protection claim, a plaintiff must offer a comparator he contends is similarly situated, but treated more favorably for no rational purpose. In this case, Plaintiffs have made no allegation that the Lafourche Parish Sheriff's Office treated them differently than others who are similarly situated.Accordingly, this claim is dismissed.
With respect to Plaintiffs' § 1983 claim against Sheriff Webre in his individual capacity based on Sergeant Prevost's June 6, 2016 traffic stop, Plaintiffs have not alleged Sheriff Webre had any direct, personal involvement with respect to the seizure. As a result, the Court dismisses Plaintiffs' claims against Sheriff Webre in his individual capacity.
Plaintiffs allege the Sheriff Defendants' conduct demonstrates a “collaborative effort between PLAISANCE, SGT. PREVOST, SHERIFF WEBRE, and by extension, CASTEX, to restrain Plaintiffs' interstate trade in violation of the Anti-Trust laws, ”specifically 15 U.S.C. § 1 (the “Sherman Act”).
To satisfy the first element, that the defendants conspired to restrain the plaintiff's trade, Plaintiffs must show “that the defendants engaged in concerted action, defined as having ‘a conscious commitment to a common scheme designed to achieve an unlawful objective.'”Concerted action may be shown by either direct or circumstantial evidence. Direct evidence explicitly refers to an understanding between the alleged conspirators, while circumstantial evidence requires additional inferences to support a conspiracy claim. Independent parallel conduct, or even conduct among competitors that is consciously parallel, does not alone establish the contract, combination, or conspiracy required by § 1.
The Sheriff Defendants and the Castex Defendants' individual acts and the circumstantial evidence Plaintiffs offer to demonstrate their concerted efforts do not support an inference that the parties conspired to restrain Plaintiffs' trade. Parallel conduct, without more, is not enough to state a Sherman Act § 1 conspiracy claim. Thus, Plaintiffs have failed to sufficiently allege the first element in a Sherman Act conspiracy claim that Defendants made “a conscious commitment to a common scheme designed” to restrain Plaintiffs' trade.
Even assuming Plaintiffs did sufficiently allege the Sheriff Defendants “conspired” to restrain Plaintiffs' trade, Plaintiffs also must sufficiently allege that the conspiracy had the effect of restraining interstate trade. Plaintiffs allege no facts to substantiate their assertion that they are engaged in interstate trade of any kind, or how the alleged restraint had any effect on commerce. Plaintiffs make only the bare assertion that the Sheriff Defendants “restrain[ed] [their] interstate trade.” Plaintiffs have provided no factual support for their allegation that the alleged conspiracy had the effect of restraining Plaintiffs' interstate trade or that the Sheriff Defendants' actions operated to restrain commercial competition in some substantial way.
Finally, a viable Sherman Act claim requires a plaintiff to sufficiently allege trade was restrained in the “relevant market.” In defining the relevant market, district courts look to “the area of effective competition.” This is the area “in which the seller operates and to which buyers can practicably turn for supplies.” In addition, the proposed market must “correspond to the commercial realities of the industry and be economically significant.” These “commercial realities” include “size, cumbersomeness, and other characteristics of the relevant product” along with “regulatory constraints impeding the free flow of competing goods into an area, [such as] perishability of products, and transportation barriers.” In this case, Plaintiffs have made no allegations identifying a relevant market. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have failed to sufficiently allege any of the three elements necessary to an actionable Sherman Act claim under § 1, and Plaintiffs' Sherman Act claims against the Sheriff Defendants must be dismissed.
Plaintiffs frame their maritime tort claims against the Sheriff Defendants as based on the fact that “To date, Plaintiffs have received no response from . . . SHERIFF WEBRE” regarding the correspondence Carpenter directed to Sheriff Webre “in an effort to ascertain the parameters of SGT. PREVOST's admonition and threats of arrest.”Plaintiffs do not allege any of their interactions with the Sheriff Defendants took place on navigable waters. Because the jurisdictional prerequisite of these claims is absent, namely that the alleged intentional or negligent tort ocurred on navigable waters, the Court has no jurisdiction over the maritime tort or negligence claim against the Sheriff Defendants, and these claims must be dismissed.
Plaintiffs contend the maritime tort-which they describe as being impermissibly excluded from fishing on public land-occurred on Golden Pond. In their complaint, Plaintiffs allege they accessed Golden Pond on a “vessel [that] ¶ 24 [feet] in length and powered by a 225 [horsepower] outboard motor” through a series of “interconnected natural navigable waterways, ” which connect Golden Pond to the Gulf Mexico. Thus, Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged Golden Pond is an “interstate water[body] that [is] navigable in fact.”Accordingly, Golden Pond meets the definition of “navigable waters” for the purposes of maritime jurisdiction. Further, chartered fishing tours, which by nature take place on water, bear a significant relationship to traditional maritime activity. Accordingly, with respect to Plaintiffs' maritime tort claims against the Castex Defendants, the Court finds Plaintiffs have sufficiently pleaded facts to establish this Court's admiralty jurisdiction.
Having established the Court's maritime jurisdiction, to survive the motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs' amended complaint must state a claim that is plausible on its face, supported by factual allegations that would entitle them to relief. In this case, Plaintiffs allege the Castex Defendants tortiously interfered with Plaintiffs' right to fish on waters open to the public. Plaintiffs assert their right to fish on public waters exists in the Louisiana Constitution, which provides that the freedom to hunt, fish, and trap wildlife is a valued natural heritage that will be forever preserved. They also find support in the Louisiana Civil Code, which provides that everyone has the right to fish in the State's waters. Plaintiffs' cause of action in tort rests on two alternative theories: (1) that the bed of Golden Pond is owned by the State of Louisiana and held in public trust and (2) that Golden Pond is encumbered by a federal navigational servitude.
In response, the Castex Defendants argue the Fifth Circuit's 1993 and 1995 rulings in Dardar v. Lafourche Realty Co., Inc. preclude Plaintiffs' claims. In Dardar, commercial fishermen sued the Lafourche Realty Company, which at the time owned Golden Pond, seeking the right to use the system of navigable waters on the Lafourche Realty property. “The State of Louisiana intervened, asserting a right of public use of the waters and claiming title to the water bodies and over twelve thousand acres of land under the waters.” Ultimately, in two separate opinions, the Fifth Circuit determined the property at issue in Dardar is not owned by the State, is not subject to the public trust, and is not encumbered by a navigational servitude. It is undisputed that Golden Pond is situated within the boundaries of the property at issue in Dardar.
The preclusive effect of a prior judgment is defined by claim preclusion and issue preclusion, which are collectively referred to as “res judicata.” Issue preclusion, or “collateral estoppel, ” bars “‘successive litigation of an issue of fact or law actually litigated and resolved in a valid court determination essential to the prior judgment, ' even if the issue recurs in the context of a different claim.” Issue preclusion is intended to protect parties from multiple lawsuits, to avoid the possibility of inconsistent decisions, and to conserve judicial resources.
Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure generally require an affirmative defense, including one based in res judicata, be pleaded in the defendant's answer, a claim may also be dismissed on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion if a successful affirmative defense appears clearly on the face of the pleadings. Thus, the court may dismiss a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) if it appears from the face of the complaint that the claim is barred by res judicata.A litigant who was not a party to the prior suit cannot be said to have “had a ‘full and fair opportunity to litigate' the claims and issues settled” in the prior lawsuit,  and therefore, issue preclusion generally cannot be applied against him. There are, however, six exceptions to the rule against nonparty preclusion, as articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Taylor v. Sturgell.
Relevant to the case at bar is Taylor's third exception, the “adequate representation” exception. Pursuant to this exception, “a nonparty may be bound by a judgment because she was ‘adequately represented by someone with the same interests who [wa]s a party' to the suit.” For the adequate representation exception to apply in this case, the Court must find (1) Plaintiffs' interest and the interest of the State of Louisiana in Dardar are aligned, and (2) the State of Louisiana was acting in a representative capacity in the Dardar litigation.
The issues at stake in this case and the issues at stake in the Dardar litigation are identical. In this case, as in Dardar, the underlying issue is whether the waters of Golden Pond are accessible to the public. As in Dardar, answering this question depends on whether (1) the bed of Golden Pond is owned by the State of Louisiana and held in public trust for the use of the people of Louisiana; or (2) Golden Pond is encumbered by a federal navigational servitude.
Plaintiffs first argue Golden Pond is accessible to the public, as it is subject to the public trust doctrine. In support of this claim, Plaintiffs, like the State of Louisiana in Dardar, argue “Whether the area in question was navigable in 1812 is of no moment to the issues before this Court in 201.” Plaintiffs are mistaken.
As the Fifth Circuit in Dardar I explained, “Louisiana, upon attaining statehood [in 1812], received ownership of all navigable waters within its borders and all tide waters and the lands under them from the United States in public trust.” The Fifth Circuit noted, however, that non-navigable waters such as “swamplands subject to overflow” could be conveyed from the State to private owners. Ultimately, the Fifth Circuit held that, “[p]ursuant to the Swamp Land Grant Acts of 1849 and 1850, ” “[t]he State conveyed the water bottoms [at issue in this case] by various transfers to [Castex's] ancestors-in-title between 1861 and 1901.” The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's “finding that no natural navigable water bodies existed on the property in 1812” and therefore rejected the State's contention that the water bottoms at issue in Dardar were owned by the State and, therefore, subject to the public trust.
1) Kuapa Pond in its natural state could not have been navigated and was not comparable to the major natural bodies of water to which the servitude had earlier been applied; 2) the pond was private property under Hawaiian law; 3) the pond had been converted to a navigable body of water by the petitioners through the investment of private funds; and 4) the Corps had earlier consented to the conversion.
The record clearly reflects that all of the remaining waterways at issue are privately owned and that their owners exclude others from entry. The record also reflects that the waterbodies presently navigable were not navigable in their natural state. Finally, the improvements making these bodies navigable were accomplished with private funds after receipt of approval from the Army Corps of Engineers.
It appears from the face of the complaint that Plaintiffs' maritime tort/negligence claims are barred by collateral estoppel. The Court finds the issues of whether Golden Pond is accessible to the public because its bed is subject to the public trust doctrine and whether its waters are encumbered by a federal navigational servitude are identical to the issues before the Fifth Circuit in the Dardar litigation. Moreover, these issues were actually litigated in Dardar, and the Fifth Circuit's determination of those issues was a critical and necessary part of its judgment. As a result, Plaintiffs are precluded from bringing their maritime tort claims based on the theory that they were wrongfully excluded from a waterbody situated on a waterbed owned by the State and held in public trust or that the waters of Golden Pond are accessible to the public by virtue of being encumbered by a navigational servitude. Bound by the Fifth Circuit's factual findings in Dardar, dismissal of Plaintiffs' claims against the Castex Defendants is warranted by reason of res judicata. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' maritime tort and negligence claims against the Castex Defendants must be dismissed.
Plaintiffs argue that Plaisance acted under color of state law when he told Plaintiffs to leave Golden Pond and subsequently notified the police of Plaintiffs' alleged trespass. This argument implies that the Sheriff's Department's role in issuing trespass warnings and threatening arrest subjects a private citizen who reports a trespass to § 1983 liability. “This bootstrap argument goes beyond that envisioned by the ‘joint activity' test . . . . Neither ‘private defendants' misuse of a valid state statute' nor ‘[p]olice reliance in making an arrest on information given by a private party' renders a private party a state actor.” Thus, the Court finds Plaisance was not acting the under color of state law when he told Plaintiffs to leave what Plaisance believed to be private property, nor was he acting as a state actor when he informed the Sheriff's Department of Plaintiffs' alleged trespass.

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