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Timestamp: 2019-04-19 21:24:16+00:00

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Justia › US Law › Case Law › California Case Law › Cal. 3d › Volume 24 › Aceves v. Regal Pale Brewing Co.
Aceves v. Regal Pale Brewing Co.
Boccardo, Blum, Lull, Niland & Bell, Edward J. Niland and Stanley A. Ibler, Jr., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Shovlin & Lahde, Shovlin & Babin, James P. Shovlin and Norbert C. Babin for Defendants and Appellants.
James J. Vonk, George S. Bjornsen and Walter G. Watson for Intervener and Respondent.
Plaintiff Enrique Aceves brought this action for damages for personal injuries sustained while working for Arons Building Wrecking Company (Arons) on the job of demolition of brewery buildings owned by defendants Regal Pale Brewing Company, Maier Brewing Company and General Brewing Company. State Compensation Insurance [24 Cal. 3d 507] Fund, the carrier for Arons, filed a complaint in intervention for reimbursement of the sum of $1,679.30 paid in workers' compensation benefits to Aceves. The jury returned a general verdict in favor of plaintiff Aceves for $22,140. In response to special interrogatories the jury found that there was contributory negligence on the part of plaintiff and that the proportion of such negligence to the total negligence proximately causing the accident was 5 percent, that the proportion of chargeable negligence on the part of plaintiff's employer was 75 percent, and that the proportion chargeable to defendants was 20 percent.
After a further hearing on the issue of the application of comparative negligence principles to the verdict, the court rendered its judgment that defendants were liable for 20 percent of the total verdict, amounting to $4,428, and that plaintiff in intervention's claim was to be reduced by 75 percent to the amount of $419.18. Plaintiff's recovery was therefore set at $4,008.18 ($4,428 less $419.82). Since plaintiff's recovery was less than the jurisdictional amount for superior court, the court in its discretion allowed plaintiff 20 percent of his costs and plaintiff in intervention 25 percent of its costs pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1032, subdivision (d).
[1a] Plaintiff appeals from the judgment, contesting only the propriety of the court's reduction of his recovery by the proportionate amount attributable to his employer's negligence. [2a] Defendants cross-appeal, arguing that the evidence is insufficient to support the judgment and that certain instructions were erroneous.
 In resolving the issue of the sufficiency of the evidence, we are bound by established rules of appellate review to view all factual matters in the light most favorable to the prevailing party. (Nestle v. City of Santa Monica (1972) 6 Cal. 3d 920, 925 [101 Cal. Rptr. 568, 496 P.2d 480]; In re Marriage of Mix (1975) 14 Cal. 3d 604, 614 [122 Cal. Rptr. 79, 536 P.2d 479].) Accordingly, all conflicts are resolved in plaintiff's favor in the following summary of the evidence regarding the accident.
[2b] On February 7, 1973, plaintiff was sent by his union to work as a laborer for Arons, which had contracted with defendants to demolish brewery buildings in San Francisco. Plaintiff's foreman called him to assist in attempting to dislodge a steel panel weighing about 500 pounds that blocked removal of a door on the street level of the building. Plaintiff and the foreman pushed on the panel from the inside while, unbeknown to them, a bulldozer pushed on the door from the outside. In this struggle [24 Cal. 3d 508] of man versus machine, man lost; the door gave way, the panel fell and struck plaintiff on the shoulder, throwing him into a large pile of broken beer bottles.
The contract between defendants and Arons did not provide for any special precautions to be taken by Arons during the course of the demolition. All equipment and labor was to be furnished by Arons; defendants exercised no control over the project.
Plaintiff presented evidence that demolition operations are an inherently dangerous activity which require a number of special precautions to prevent the risk of injury to the workers from falling materials. Because of the special hazards presented by demolition operations, customary safety standards require that heavy equipment such as a bulldozer not be operated in an area where workers are working without a flagman or other warning device and that the work be carefully coordinated so that one worker does not do something that endangers another. Evidence was also presented that on a demolition job of this size it would be normal custom and practice for the owner of the property to have an inspector on the job.
Certainly the risk that someone may be hurt if precautions are not taken to assure that no one is standing behind a wall that is being knocked over is a "special, recognizable danger arising out of" demolition work. (Rest.2d Torts, § 413, com. b.) Indeed, one of the specific illustrations given in the Restatement as an example of work involving a peculiar risk of harm involves the demolition of a building (Rest.2d Torts, § 413, com. c.), and prior California authorities are in accord. (See, e.g., [24 Cal. 3d 511] Elder v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. (1977) 66 Cal. App. 3d 650, 659 [136 Cal. Rptr. 203]; Widman v. Rossmoor Sanitation, Inc., supra, 19 Cal.App.3d at p. 746; Van Arsdale v. Hollinger, supra, 68 Cal.2d at p. 252.) Since there is evidence that the contractor failed to take special precautions to avoid the special risk involved, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the verdict against defendants under the peculiar risk doctrine.
 Defendants also argue for reversal on the ground that the trial court erred in two of the instructions it gave to the jury. One such error occurred when, in giving certain further instructions to the jury, the court read the entire text of BAJI No. 8.30 rather than the modified version that had been agreed upon and given earlier. fn. 3 We fail to see how this inadvertent error could have been prejudicial to defendants, for the full text of BAJI No. 8.30 merely added the converse of the rule stated in the modified version that had been given earlier at defendants' request.
[1b] Finally, we reach plaintiff's contention that the trial court erred in its application of comparative negligence principles to the verdict. It is now clear from American Motorcycle Assn. v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal. 3d 578, 590 [146 Cal. Rptr. 182, 578 P.2d 899], and Associated Construction & Engineering Co. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1978) 22 Cal. 3d 829, 842-843, footnote 9 [150 Cal. Rptr. 888, 587 P.2d 684], that plaintiff's recovery should not have been reduced by the proportionate amount attributable to his employer's negligence. As explained in our recent decision in Associated Construction, the proper method of computing plaintiff's recovery is to first subtract from the total award the proportionate amount attributable to plaintiff's negligence ($22,140 minus $1,107 equals $21,033) and then to subtract the proportionate amount attributable to the employer's negligence up to the amount of the workers' compensation benefits paid ($21,033 minus $1,679.30 equals $19,353.70). fn. 4 (22 Cal.3d at p. 842.) Since Arons' percentage share of responsibility for plaintiff's recovery is greater than the compensation benefits it paid, its carrier's claim for reimbursement should be denied. (Ibid.) Thus, plaintiff Aceves should recover $19,353.70 in damages and the total amount of his costs, $2,366.30. Plaintiff in intervention, State Compensation Insurance Fund, should recover nothing. Accordingly, the [24 Cal. 3d 513] judgment is modified to provide that plaintiff is awarded $19,353.70 as damages and $2,366.30 in costs, and that plaintiff in intervention is awarded nothing. As so modified, the judgment is affirmed. Plaintiff is entitled to interest on the total award at the rate of 7 percent per annum from the date of entry of judgment, October 7, 1975. (Snapp v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. (1964) 60 Cal. 2d 816 [36 Cal. Rptr. 612, 388 P.2d 884]; Stockton Theatres, Inc. v. Palermo (1961) 55 Cal. 2d 439 [11 Cal. Rptr. 580, 360 P.2d 76].) Plaintiff shall recover his costs on appeal from defendants. State Compensation Insurance Fund and defendants shall bear their own costs.
FN 2. We use the term "peculiar risk" because that is the terminology used in the Restatement Second of Torts and in our prior cases. We note, however, that the term "special risk" might be a more apt description of the doctrine.
FN 3. The court originally gave the modified text of BAJI No. 8.30 at defendants' request as follows: "Now, where the contractor has taken complete control of the premises where the accident occurred and the owner has retained no control of the premises, then the owner owes no duty of care to the employees of the contractor to avoid exposing such employees to an unreasonable risk of harm." In subsequent instructions to the jury, however, the court inadvertently gave the full text of BAJI No. 8.30 as follows: "Now, an owner of premises who employs a contractor to perform work thereon, but who remains in control of the premises where the work is being done, owes to the employees a duty to exercise ordinary care in the management of such premises in order to avoid exposing such employees to an unreasonable risk of harm. If, however, the contractor has taken complete control of the premises where the accident occurred and the owner has retained no control of that part of the premises, then the owner owes no such duty of care to the employees of the contractor."

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