Source: https://appellate.typepad.com/appellate/evidence/
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 18:13:12+00:00

Document:
US v. Lnu, Nos. 07-1780, 07-2020 (10/10/08). This is a social security card fraud case. The defendant was convicted under 42 U.S.C. § 408(a)(6). However, the underlying question revolves around whether the cops could search a storage locker that he had not made payments upon. The First focuses on the fact that the owner of the self-storage place had a lien on the property under state law.
The First says that some parts of the closing argument were not misconduct because, on the facts, they were supported by the evidence. Likewise, the defendant claims that he was denied his right to testify but testimony from his lawyer says that he was so adequately informed.
US v. Jackson, No. 07-2510 (10/8/08). This is strange. Judge Dyk of the Federal Circuit sides with a defendant. Usually when he is sitting by designation he rubber-stamps the District Court, sending someone to jail for a long time. Anyway, let’s take a look at what is so bad.
It is a Miranda case. The District Court found that the defendant was in custody, but not interrogated.
The cops did that silly cop thing they do to lay people: they hint at leniency. No true American believes that crap. During the course of this conversation at an apartment, the defendant said he might know where a gun was (as it wasn’t in the apartment), but he would need a couple of hours to find it. The cop said he wasn’t free to leave. Then they officers obtained “consent” to search the place from someone else. Two guns were found, including one that the defendant “volunteered” was in a box of “Fruity Pebbles.” Judge Dyk says that the question isn’t whether the defendant responds to a particular question but whether “The entire course of conduct of the officers must be examined to determine whether the statement was in response to unlawful questioning under Miranda.” Judge Dyk seems to indicate that the silly cop-talk regarding possible leniency speaks to whether this is interrogation or not.
At the end, the First says that the actual guns need not be supressed.
US v. Vasquez, No. 07-2796 (10/8/08). This is really strange. The First seems not be taking any of this appeal seriously, and is almost mocking of the defense. Apparently the defendant is making an argument that something should be suppressed. So, the First says that there was enough evidence that something shouldn’t be suppressed. Whatever. The opinion ends with this silly line, “Defense counsel on appeal is entitled to search the record for such unpreserved claims and call such claims to our attention, but they do not in this instance warrant separate discussion.” The trick, you see, is to make sure that you have a big name making the arugments.
Farley v. Bissonnette, No. 08-1094 (10/8/08) denies a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The first issue was whether "the trial judge's instruction to the jury that the prosecution 'does not have the burden of proving that no one else may have committed the murder' [was] an error that was contrary to clearly established Supreme Court precedent as stated in In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970)." The First concludes “Thus, where the defense attempts to cast the blame on someone other than the defendant, it is not unusual for the court to remind the jury that the government's burden is to show that the defendant is guilty--not that the other person whom the defendant seeks to blame is innocent.” But really, we all know what is going on: the trial court thinks that the defendant is guilty and wants to make sure the defendant goes away.
The second issue is whether "the state court's decision that the trial judge's limitation of the petitioner's cross-examination of Ronald James, though error, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt [was] an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent, namely, Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986)." The First seems to just say that it was okay that this was considered harmless error. Whatever.

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