Source: https://openjurist.org/441/us/322
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 16:26:05+00:00

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* The few simple words of the Commerce Clause—"The Congress shall have Power . . . To regulate Commerce . . . among the several States . . . "—reflected a central concern of the Framers that was an immediate reason for calling the Constitutional Convention: the conviction that in order to succeed, the new Union would have to avoid the tendencies toward economic Balkanization that had plagued relations among the Colonies and later among the States under the Articles of Confederation. See H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 533-534, 69 S.Ct. 657, 662-663, 93 L.Ed. 865 (1949). The Commerce Clause has accordingly been interpreted by this Court not only as an authorization for congressional action, but also, even in the absence of a conflicting federal statute, as a restriction on permissible state regulation.2 The cases defining the scope of permissible state regulation in areas of congressional silence reflect an often controversial evolution of rules to accommodate federal and state interests.3 Geer v. Connecticut was decided relatively early in that evolutionary process. We hold that time has revealed the error of the early resolution reached in that case, and accordingly Geer is today overruled.
"The statute of Oklahoma recognizes [gas] to be a subject of intrastate commerce, but seeks to prohibit it from being the subject of interstate commerce, and this is the purpose of its conservation. . . . If the States have such power a singular situation might result. Pennsylvania might keep its coal, the Northwest its timber, the mining States their minerals. And why may not the products of the field be brought within the principle? Thus enlarged, or without that enlargement, its influence on interstate commerce need not be pointed out. To what consequences does such power tend? If one State has it, all States have it; embargo may be retaliated by embargo, and commerce will be halted at state lines. And yet we have said that 'in matters of foreign and interstate commerce there are no state lines.' In such commerce, instead of the States, a new power appears and a new welfare, a welfare which transcends that of any State. But rather let us say it is constituted of the welfare of all of the States and that of each State is made the greater by a division of its resources, natural and created, with every other State, and those of every other State with it. This was the purpose, as it is the result, of the interstate commerce clause of the Constitution of the United States. If there is to be a turning backward it must be done by the authority of another instrumentality than a court." 221 U.S., at 255-256, 31 S.Ct., at 571.
Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1, 49 S.Ct. 1, 73 L.Ed. 147 (1928), undermined Geer even more directly. A Louisiana statute forbade the transportation beyond the State of shrimp taken in Louisiana waters until the heads and shells had been removed.10 The statute clearly relied on the Geer state-control-of-ownership rationale.11 Anyone lawfully taking shrimp from Louisiana waters was granted "a qualified interest which may be sold within the State." Only after the head and shell had been removed within the State did the taker or possessor acquire "title and the right to sell and ship the same 'beyond the limit[s] of the State, without restriction or reservation.' " 278 U.S., at 8, 49 S.Ct., at 3.
Ignoring the niceties of "title" to the shrimp and concentrating instead on the purposes and effects of the statute, Foster-Fountain Packing struck down the statute as economic protectionism abhorrent to the Commerce Clause. The analysis resembled that employed in the natural gas cases, which were cited with approval, id., at 10-11, 13, 49 S.Ct., at 3-4, 5.12 Geer was distinguished on the ground that there "[n]o part of the game was permitted by the statute to become an article of interstate commerce." 278 U.S., at 12, 49 S.Ct., at 4.13 Limiting Geer to cases involving complete embargoes on interstate commerce in a wild animal created the anomalous result that the most burdensome laws enjoyed the most protection from Commerce Clause attack.
The case before us is the first in modern times to present facts essentially on all fours with Geer.16 We now conclude that challenges under the Commerce Clause to state regulations of wild animals should be considered according to the same general rule applied to state regulations of other natural resources, and therefore expressly overrule Geer. We thus bring our analytical framework into conformity with practical realities. Overruling Geer also eliminates the anomaly, created by the decisions distinguishing Geer, that statutes imposing the most extreme burdens on interstate commerce (essentially total embargoes) were the most immune from challenge. At the same time, the general rule we adopt in this case makes ample allowance for preserving, in ways not inconsistent with the Commerce Clause, the legitimate state concerns for conservation and protection of wild animals underlying the 19th-century legal fiction of state ownership.
We turn then to the question whether the burden imposed on interstate commerce in wild game by § 4-115(B) is permissible under the general rule articulated in our precedents governing other types of commerce. See, e. g., Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S., at 142, 90 S.Ct., at 847, quoted, supra, at 331. Under that general rule, we must inquire (1) whether the challenged statute regulates evenhandedly with only "incidental" effects on interstate commerce, or discriminates against interstate commerce either on its face or in practical effect; (2) whether the statute serves a legitimate local purpose; and, if so, (3) whether alternative means could promote this local purpose as well without discriminating against interstate commerce. The burden to show discrimination rests on the party challenging the validity of the statute, but "[w]hen discrimination against commerce . . . is demonstrated, the burden falls on the State to justify it both in terms of the local benefits flowing from the statute and the unavailability of nondiscriminatory alternatives adequate to preserve the local interests at stake." Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 353, 97 S.Ct. 2434, 2446, 53 L.Ed.2d 383 (1977). Furthermore, when considering the purpose of a challenged statute, this Court is not bound by "[t]he name, description or characterization given it by the legislature or the courts of the State," but will determine for itself the practical impact of the law. Lacoste v. Louisiana Dept. of Conservation, 263 U.S. 545, 550, 44 S.Ct. 186, 188, 68 L.Ed. 437 (1924); see Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S., at 10, 49 S.Ct., at 3; Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., supra.
Section 4-115(B) on its face discriminates against interstate commerce. It forbids the transportation of natural minnows out of the State for purposes of sale, and thus "overtly blocks the flow of interstate commerce at [the] State's borders." Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S., at 624, 98 S.Ct., at 2535. Such facial discrimination by itself may be a fatal defect, regardless of the State's purpose, because "the evil of protectionism can reside in legislative means as well as legislative ends." Id., 437 U.S., at 626, 98 S.Ct., at 2537.17 At a minimum such facial discrimination invokes the strictest scrutiny of any purported legitimate local purpose and of the absence of nondiscriminatory alternatives.
This Court's seeming preoccupation in recent years with laws relating to wildlife must, I suspect, appear curious to casual observers of this institution.1 It is no more curious, however, than this Court's recent pronouncements on the validity of Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 16 S.Ct. 600, 40 L.Ed. 793 (1896). For less than one year ago we unreservedly reaffirmed the principles announced in Geer. Baldwin v. Montana Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371, 386, 98 S.Ct. 1852, 1861, 56 L.Ed.2d 354 (1978). Today, the Court overrules that decision. Because I disagree with the Court's overruling of Geer and holding that Oklahoma's law relating to the sale of minnows violates the Commerce Clause, I dissent.
The Court in Geer expressed the view derived from Roman law that the wild fish and game located within the territorial limits of a State are the common property of its citizens and that the State, as a kind of trustee, may exercise this common "ownership" for the benefit of its citizens. 161 U.S., at 529, 16 S.Ct., at 604. Admittedly, a State does not "own" the wild creatures within its borders in any conventional sense of the word.5 Baldwin v. Montana Fish & Game Comm'n, supra, 436 U.S., at 386, 98 S.Ct., at 1861; Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc., 431 U.S. 265, 284, 97 S.Ct. 1740, 1751, 52 L.Ed.2d 304 (1977); Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 401-402, 68 S.Ct. 1156, 1164-1165, 92 L.Ed. 1460 (1948); Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434, 40 S.Ct. 382, 383, 64 L.Ed. 641 (1920). But the concept expressed by the "ownership" doctrine is not obsolete. Baldwin v. Montana Fish & Game Comm'n, supra, 436 U.S., at 392, 98 S.Ct., at 1864 (BURGER, C. J., concurring). This Court long has recognized that the ownership language of Geer and similar cases is simply a shorthand way of describing a State's substantial interest in preserving and regulating the exploitation of the fish and game and other natural resources within its boundaries for the benefit of its citizens. 436 U.S., at 386, 98 S.Ct., at 1861; Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc., supra, 431 U.S., at 284, 97 S.Ct., at 1751; Toomer v. Witsell, supra, 334 U.S., at 402, 68 S.Ct., at 1165.
The Oklahoma law at issue in this case serves the special interest of the State, as representative of its citizens, in preserving and regulating exploitation of free-swimming minnows found within its waters. "[T]he law serve[s] to protect against the depletion of minnows in Oklahoma's natural streams through commercial exportation." 572 P.2d 573, 575 (Okla.Crim.App.1977). Oklahoma's statutory scheme may not be the most artfully designed to accomplish its purpose.8 But the range of regulations that a State may adopt under these circumstances is extremely broad, particularly where, as here, the burden on interstate commerce is, at most, minimal. See Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc., 431 U.S., at 288, 97 S.Ct., at 1753 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Lacoste v. Louisiana Dept. of Conservation, supra, 263 U.S., at 552, 44 S.Ct., at 188; cf. Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S., at 391, 98 S.Ct., at 1864; Kleppe v. New Mexico, supra, 426 U.S., at 545, 96 S.Ct., at 2294.
Section 4-115(B) is part of the Oklahoma Wildlife Conservation Code. Another provision of that Code requires that persons have a minnow dealer's license before they can lawfully seine or trap minnows within the State—except for their own use as bait—§ 4-116 (Supp. 1978), but no limit is imposed on the number of minnows a licensed dealer may take from state waters. Nor is there any regulation except § 4-115(B) concerning the disposition of lawfully acquired minnows; they may be sold within Oklahoma to any person and for any purpose, and may be taken out of the State for any purpose except sale.
See, e. g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 9 Wheat. 1, 209, 6 L.Ed. 23 (1824); Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. 245, 2 Pet. 245, 7 L.Ed. 412 (1829); Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. 299, 12 How. 299, 13 L.Ed. 996 (1852); Port Richmond & Bergen Point Ferry Co. v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, 234 U.S. 317, 34 S.Ct. 821, 58 L.Ed. 1330 (1914); Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34, 47 S.Ct. 267, 71 L.Ed. 524 (1927); Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 63 S.Ct. 307, 87 L.Ed. 315 (1943); Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivian, 325 U.S. 761, 65 S.Ct. 1515, 89 L.Ed. 1915 (1945); H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, supra; Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 90 S.Ct. 844, 25 L.Ed.2d 174 (1970). See generally, F. Frankfurter, The Commerce Clause Under Marshall, Taney and Waite (1937); Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State Power, 27 Va.L.Rev. 1 (1940); Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State Power—Revised Version, 47 Colum.L.Rev. 547 (1947).
The inconsistency between the result in this case and that in Geer was not overlooked by the dissenting Justices. See Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S., at 601, 43 S.Ct., at 666 (Holmes, J., dissenting). Significantly, our Brother REHNQUIST relies on this dissent in his discussion of the "alternative basis" of Geer —the "preservation of a valuable natural resource" rationale. See n. 6, supra; post, at 340-341, n. 3. The Court opinion in Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, like that in West, expressly rejected this argument along with the "no interstate commerce" rationale. 262 U.S., at 599-600, 43 S.Ct., at 666.
Given the primacy of the local interest here, in the absence of conflicting federal regulation I would require one challenging a state conservation law on Commerce Clause grounds to establish a far greater burden on interstate commerce than is shown in this case. See infra, at 344-345. See also Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 350, 97 S.Ct. 2434, 2445, 53 L.Ed.2d 383 (1977): "[O]ur opinions have long recognized that, 'in the absence of conflicting legislation by Congress, there is a residuum of power in the state to make laws governing matters of local concern which nevertheless in some measure affect interstate commerce or even, to some extent, regulate it' "; H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 567, 69 S.Ct. 657, 670, 93 L.Ed. 865 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("Behind the distinction between 'substantial' and 'incidental' burdens upon interstate commerce is a recognition that, in the absence of federal regulation, it is sometimes—of course not always—of greater importance that local interests be protected than that interstate commerce be not touched."

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