Source: http://ga.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20180119_0000119.NGA.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 18:51:19+00:00

Document:
LINDA T. WALKER CHIEF JUDGE.
Movant is a federal prisoner who, pro se, challenges under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 his judgment of conviction. (Doc. 291.)  Respondent filed a brief opposing the motion, (doc. 301), and Movant filed a reply, (doc. 305). Movant also filed a motion for leave to expand the record with unidentified affidavits. (Doc. 307.) For the reasons discussed below, the undersigned denies the motion to expand the record and recommends that the § 2255 motion and a certificate of appealability be denied.
[Movant] was tried before a jury, convicted, and sentenced to 137 months in prison. The facts of the case were fairly simple. As found by the jury, [Movant], along with his co-conspirator, Tchaka Shields, exploited two women with whom [Movant] was romantically involved, to make straw purchases of firearms in the Atlanta area. [Those women were Casita Q. Washington and Erron Denise Love.] Movant could not legitimately make these purchases, as he was a convicted felon, having previously been convicted of conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine and of being a felon in possession of a firearm.
The evidence indicated that [Movant] and his co-conspirator [Shields] purchased these guns in order to sell them in the Boston area, which they did. Based on this conduct, [Movant] was convicted of causing false representations as to the true purchaser of firearms to be recorded in a federal firearms transaction record, as well as being a felon in possession of these firearms. [Movant's] three co-defendants pled guilty reasonably quickly after the filing of the indictment. [Movant], however, remained a fugitive for eight months, and his proceedings began thereafter.
Stewart raised two issues on appeal. United States v. Cartman, 607 Fed.Appx. 888, 889 (11th Cir. 2015). Those issues were that Movant was improperly denied the right to represent himself at trial, in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and that his sentence was unreasonable because of the disparity between his sentence and Shields' sentence. Id. The Court of Appeals rejected both arguments, finding that Movant "did not validly waive his right to counsel, " the Court "did not err in denying [Movant] the right to self-representation, " and Movant's prison sentence "was substantively reasonable" despite being 100 months greater than Shields' sentence. Id. at 890-91.
17. Movant's pretrial confinement in administrative segregation at the federal prison in Atlanta was illegal and constituted cruel and unusual punishment (Doc. 291-1 at 32-37).
Respondent contends that all those claims, except three, are procedurally defaulted because Movant did not raise them on direct appeal. (Doc. 301.) As noted above, Movant contends that he raised the claims in the appellate brief he personally filed and that any procedural default is excused by Stewart's unjustified failure to raise the claims in the appellate brief he filed.
To prevail on a § 2255 motion, the movant must demonstrate that: (1) the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States; (2) the Court was without jurisdiction to impose such a sentence; (3) the sentence exceeded the maximum sentence authorized by law; or (4) the sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack. 28 U.S.C. § 2255. A sentence is subject to collateral attack when there is a fundamental defect that results in a complete miscarriage of justice. United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 185 (1979). "To obtain collateral relief, a [movant] must clear a significantly higher hurdle than would exist on direct appeal." United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 166 (1982).
"Generally, if a challenge to a conviction or sentence is not made on direct appeal, it will be procedurally barred in a  § 2255 challenge" unless the movant shows "both cause for his default as well as demonstrating actual prejudice suffered as a result of the alleged error." Black v. United States, 373 F.3d 1140, 1142 (11th Cir. 2004). "[T]o show cause for procedural default, [a § 2255 movant] must show that some objective factor external to the defense prevented [him] ... from raising his claims on direct appeal and that this factor cannot be fairly [attributed] to [his] own conduct." Lynn v. United States, 365 F.3d 1225, 1235 (11th Cir. 2004). "Actual prejudice" requires a movant to show that the alleged error "worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions." Reece v. United States, 119 F.3d 1462, 1467 (11th Cir. 1997). Ineffective assistance of counsel may constitute cause for a procedural default, but "[n]ot just any deficiency in counsel's performance will do[.] ... [T]he assistance must have been so ineffective as to violate the Federal Constitution." Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 451 (2000).
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a§ 2255 movant must show that his counsel's performance was deficient such that it was below objectively reasonable standards, and that the deficient performance prejudiced the movant. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 692 (1984). As for the first prong of the test, a court should be "highly deferential" in scrutinizing counsel's performance, id. at 689, and "must indulge the strong presumption that counsel's performance was reasonable and that counsel made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment, " Chandler v. United States, 218 F.3d 1305, 1314 (11th Cir. 2000). To establish deficient performance, a movant must establish that no objectively competent lawyer would have taken the action that his lawyer took or would have failed to take the action he contends the lawyer should have taken. Id. at 1315.

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