Source: https://dc.fd.org/motions/appeals/acceptance%20of%20responsibility/kirkland.htm
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 10:38:26+00:00

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I. Whether the district court deprived Mr. xxxxxxxx of a fair trial by improperly challenging his trial testimony and impeaching his credibility, thereby giving the jury the impression that the court believed him to be guilty.
II. Whether the combined effect of the court's instructions expressing that the jury had to resolve all factual and credibility conflicts in order to reach a verdict, establishing a hierarchy between the entrapment defense elements and the elements of the charged offenses, and de-emphasizing an essential factual element of the offenses, deprived Mr. xxxxxxxx of a verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
III. Whether the district court erred in denying Mr. xxxxxxxx a reduction for acceptance of responsibility under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 on the grounds that he relied on an entrapment defense at trial, and in adjusting his offense level upward for obstruction of justice under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, on the grounds that he testified falsely at trial.
The government's case consisted of testimony from two Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA") agents (Ronald xxxxx, who acted in an undercover capacity as a drug purchaser, and Alexander xxxxxxx, who was part of the surveillance team), a DEA chemist, and Mr. xxxxxxxx's sister (xxxxx xxxxxxxx), who was the owner of the car allegedly driven by Mr. xxxxxxxx during the drug transaction.
In this appeal, Mr. xxxxxxxx attacks his conviction and sentence on three grounds. First, by extensively questioning Mr. xxxxxxxx during his trial testimony, the district court gave the jury the impression that it believed the defendant to be guilty. Although a trial judge has the authority to examine witnesses to clarify testimony, the district judge in this case took on the role of an advocate by challenging Mr. xxxxxxxx's testimony and by attempting to impeach his credibility in front of the jury. Moreover, the timing of the court's interrogation exacerbated the prejudice as the court asked most of its questions during the prosecutor's cross-examination, thereby giving the appearance that the court was reinforcing the prosecutor's attack on Mr. xxxxxxxx's credibility. The court's further questioning during Mr. xxxxxxxx's redirect examination undermined defense counsel's efforts to rehabilitate her client's testimony. Under these circumstances, the court's excessive questioning prejudiced the defense and requires a new trial.
Second, the district court's instructional errors diluted the government's burden of proof. By instructing the jurors that they had to determine "what really happened" and who "was telling the truth," the court erroneously placed the emphasis on the jury's duty to resolve factual and credibility disputes rather than its constitutional obligation to determine whether the government proved beyond a reasonable doubt the charges against Mr. xxxxxxxx. The court compounded this error by instructing the jury that the elements of Mr. xxxxxxxx's entrapment defense were "in a way more important" than the essential elements of the charged offenses and that the substance Mr. xxxxxxxx allegedly distributed was "pretty clearly" crack cocaine. The combined effect of the court's instructional errors diluted the government's burden of proof and deprived Mr. xxxxxxxx of a verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Finally, Mr. xxxxxxxx challenges two of the court's sentencing rulings. The court erroneously denied him an acceptance of responsibility reduction because he relied at trial on an entrapment defense. This Court recently held that the district court cannot deny an acceptance of responsibility on the grounds that the defendant raised an entrapment defense without determining whether the particular facts and circumstances warrant a reduction. United States v. Layeni, 90 F.3d 514, 525 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
The district court also erred in increasing Mr. xxxxxxxx's offense level by 2 for obstruction of justice by giving false testimony at trial. Contrary to the court's ruling, Mr. xxxxxxxx did not commit perjury because his allegedly false testimony did not concern a material matter. Given Mr. xxxxxxxx's entrapment defense in which he admitted to distributing drugs, his testimony regarding the details of the drug exchange itself were not intended to substantially affect the jury's verdict. Moreover, the district court erred in finding by clear and convincing evidence that Mr. xxxxxxxx's testimony constituted perjury where the facts and circumstances surrounding the testimony established that, if false at all, the testimony was likely the result of such factors as confusion or lack of memory. Because the court should not have denied an acceptance of responsibility reduction or enhanced Mr. xxxxxxxx's sentence for obstruction of justice, the sentence should be vacated.
The combination of the court's extensive interrogation of Mr. xxxxxxxx and its erroneous jury instructions diluting the burden of proof deprived Mr. xxxxxxxx of a fair trial. Moreover, the court's rulings on the acceptance of responsibility and obstruction of justice adjustments were erroneous. Therefore, Mr. xxxxxxxx's conviction and sentence cannot stand.
The propriety of the district court's interrogation of Mr. xxxxxxxx during his trial testimony is reviewed for abuse of discretion. United States v. Liddy, 509 F.2d 428, 439 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (en banc), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 911 (1975). When a trial judge intervenes in the conduct of a trial, this Court "must determine whether the intervention is in pursuit of justice and whether that intervention is consistent with the premises of the limits on intervention." United States v. McCord, 509 F.2d 334, 348 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 930 (1975).
Mr. xxxxxxxx defended against the drug charges brought by the government by raising an entrapment defense. Essentially, xxxxxxxx's theory of defense was that the confidential informant's threat induced xxxxxxxx into participating in the drug transaction. Although the defense called the informant as a hostile witness, Mr. xxxxxxxx presented the entrapment defense almost exclusively through his own testimony. The entire trial lasted only two days and the presentation of the defense took a portion of the second day.
The district court did not question extensively any witness other than Mr. xxxxxxxx. Although the court did not intervene during xxxxxxxx's direct testimony, it asked a total of 24 questions during his cross-examination and redirect testimony. The court conducted 5 separate interrogations of xxxxxxxx occurring within 14 pages of the trial transcript. (9/16/94 Tr. 68, 70, 72, 79, 82) The court's questions challenged xxxxxxxx's testimony, elicited answers generally favorable to the prosecution, derided xxxxxxxx with sarcasm, impeached his credibility, and necessarily gave the jury the impression that the court did not believe xxxxxxxx's testimony. Moreover, by repeatedly interrupting xxxxxxxx's redirect testimony, the court undermined defense counsel's efforts to rehabilitate the defendant.
It is clear that a trial judge has the authority to question witnesses. See, e.g., United States v. Spencer, 25 F.3d 1105, 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (citing FED. R. EVID. 614(b)). However, this Court has drawn a clear line between proper judicial questioning of a witness to clarify testimony, Spencer, 25 F.3d at 1109-10, and a trial judge's overzealous intervention that takes on the role of an advocate rather than an objective participant in the trial proceedings. See United States v. Winstead, 74 F.3d 1313, 1319 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (judge should avoid questioning that extends to advocacy); United States v. Barbour, 420 F.2d 1319, 1320-21 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (judge must remain "a disinterested and objective participant in the proceedings, and . . . hold to a minimum his questioning of witnesses in a jury trial." (internal quotation marks, footnote, and citation omitted)); Jackson v. United States, 329 F.2d 893, 894 (D.C. Cir. 1964) ("a presiding judge can control the trial without participating actively in examination of witnesses.").
Significantly, this Court previously has admonished the district judge in the instant case that excessive questioning of witnesses by the trial court can constitute reversible error. See United States v. Rawlings, 73 F.3d 1145, 1146 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ("we remind the district court that overzealous quizzing by the judge . . . [may cause] a breach of the atmosphere of judicial evenhandedness that should pervade the courtroom.") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); United States v. Norris, 873 F.2d 1519, 1526 (D.C. Cir.) ("we nonetheless feel constrained to once again put forth the admonishment that [p]articularly when the questioning is designed to elicit answers favorable to the prosecution, it is far better for the trial judge to err on the side of [a]bstention from intervention in the case.") (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 835 (1989). Because the trial judge's excessive questioning of Mr. xxxxxxxx crossed the line from neutral umpire to advocate, there is a very real danger that the court's conduct prejudiced the jury against the defendant. Under these circumstances, Mr. xxxxxxxx is entitled to a new trial.
THE COURT: Well, is that your voice on the tape?
THE WITNESS: I can't really tell.
THE COURT: Does it sound like your voice?
THE COURT: It doesn't? Who does it sound like?
THE WITNESS: I don't really know who it sounds like. I know it don't [sic] sound like me.
THE COURT: You were in the car?
THE COURT: But that isn't your voice?
THE WITNESS: It ain't my voice.
THE COURT: It sounds like President Clinton or Marion Barry?
THE WITNESS: I don't know who it sounds like. I know it don't sound like me.
Although the court's questioning generally concerned a line of inquiry opened by the prosecutor, the judge's intervention was not necessary to alleviate any confusion in xxxxxxxx's testimony. In his cross-examination, the prosecutor clearly had established that xxxxxxxx did not recognize fully his voice on the audiotape and did not recall making certain statements that were on the tape. Thus, xxxxxxxx's testimony on this point was clear and there was no need for the judge's intervention. Moreover, since the tape recording was played for the jury and admitted into evidence, the jury was equipped to make its own decision as to whether it was xxxxxxxx's voice on the tape. More importantly, because xxxxxxxx admitted as part of his entrapment defense that he participated in the drug transaction with the undercover agent and the confidential informant, his recollection of particular conversations with the agent was relatively unimportant to the government's case. In any event, the prosecutor was effectively cross-examining xxxxxxxx on this point and hardly needed any help from the court.
The judge's interrogation was an immediate follow-up of the government's cross-examination concerning xxxxxxxx's voice identification and recollection of statements made on the tape recording. Thus, the court's questioning appeared to be further cross-examination, an appearance that was reinforced by the prosecutorial nature of the questions. After the judge's first line of inquiry, the prosecutor then played another portion of the audiotape and resumed cross-examining xxxxxxxx on the same points covered by the judge's questioning. In this way, the court's second intervention buttressed the prosecutor's cross-examination. Where the prosecutor and trial judge take turns asking essentially the same line of questions that go directly to the defendant's credibility, the jury reasonably can infer that the court agrees with the government that the accused is not telling the truth and, therefore, is guilty of the crime charged. See United States v. Filani, 74 F.3d 378, 387 (2d Cir. 1996) (judge's questioning of defendant deprived him of fair trial where court joined in cross-examination and created "tag team" situation which gave jury "impression of bias").
In addition to the timing of the judge's interventions during the defendant's cross-examination, the court's questions themselves also tended to show incredulity toward xxxxxxxx's testimony. Questions such as, "[w]ho does it sound like?" and "[i]t sounds like President Clinton or Marion Barry?" are examples of the court's apparent disbelief of xxxxxxxx's failure to recognize his voice on the tape and to recollect the taped conversations. The sarcastic nature of the questions only could have reinforced the jury's reasonable perception that the court was looking with disfavor at the defendant's testimony in particular and his entrapment defense in general. See United States v. Wyatt, 442 F.2d 858, 860-61 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (conviction reversed where trial judge's extensive questioning of defendant and alibi witnesses in case where credibility of defendant was particularly important in establishing defense gave jury impression that court believed defendant was guilty).
THE COURT: "Yeah" means you saw it or you didn't see it?
THE WITNESS: He's getting me confused a little bit.
THE COURT: No. Did you have money, $2,700?
THE WITNESS: I didn't have no 2,700.
Although the court's attempt to clarify xxxxxxxx's last answer might have been proper, the judge should not have pursued the line of questioning concerning xxxxxxxx's receipt of $2,700. Because the prosecutor already had questioned xxxxxxxx on this point and xxxxxxxx clearly had testified that he did not count the money and therefore did not know whether he had received that particular amount of money, there was no reason for the court to pursue that line of inquiry. Moreover, the judge's negative response to xxxxxxxx's statement that the prosecutor was confusing him ("No. Did you have money, $2,700?"), is troubling. The jury reasonably could have inferred from the court's response that the judge was defending the prosecutor against xxxxxxxx's accusation that the prosecutor was confusing him. Alternatively, the jury could have interpreted the court's negative response as an expression of disbelief of xxxxxxxx's claim that he was confused, the inference being that the court believed that xxxxxxxx was not confused but was simply lying about the $2,700. Coming from the judge, this suggestion was devastating for "'jurors hold the robed trial judge in great awe and reverence' and 'his lightest word or intimation is received with deference and may prove controlling.'" Barbour, 420 F.2d at 1321-22 (quoting Hawkins v. United States, 310 F.2d 849, 852 (D.C. Cir. 1962), and Starr v. United States, 153 U.S. 614, 626 (1894)).
In the context of Mr. xxxxxxxx's entrapment defense in which he admitted that he gave the drugs to Agent xxxxxxx in exchange for money, the court's questioning concerning the exact amount of money was unnecessary. Once again, the court appears to be challenging xxxxxxxx's testimony rather than attempting to elucidate it. By pursuing this line of questioning, the trial judge failed to heed this Court's admonition that if more than one or two questions are involved, the judge should call both attorneys to the bench and suggest what questions should be asked. United States v. Green, 429 F.2d 754, 760 (D.C. Cir. 1970). By asking xxxxxxxx about the amount of money he received in the drug transaction after xxxxxxxx clearly had testified that he did not count the money, the judge apparently failed to consider the possibility that xxxxxxxx's answers could give "undue eminence to matters otherwise irrelevant to the offenses with which the [defendant] was charged." Wyatt, 442 F.2d at 860. Moreover, because the court's questioning again immediately followed-up the government's cross-examination on the same point, the judge implicitly, if not explicitly, appeared to have endorsed the government's view of xxxxxxxx's credibility. Taken in conjunction with the court's interrogation concerning xxxxxxxx's voice on the tape recording, this additional intervention constituted a breach of the trial judge's impartiality and likely damaged the defendant's credibility in the jury's eyes.
THE WITNESS: Before the incident took place.
THE COURT: It was before that?
THE WITNESS: He didn't ask me that same question.
THE COURT: He didn't ask you that question?
THE WITNESS: Nope, not that I know of.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: I was referring to the threat.
THE COURT: He can answer for himself.
The judge's attempted impeachment of xxxxxxxx took on the aspect of advocacy rather than impartiality. See Blunt v. United States, 244 F.2d 355, 365-66 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (conviction reversed where trial court took on role of prosecutor by extensive interrogation of defense witnesses and improper comments). Impeachment of a defendant is the job of the prosecutor and not the court. If the trial court considered xxxxxxxx's testimony to be inconsistent with the answers he gave on cross-examination, the court should have left it to the prosecutor on recross-examination to impeach the defendant. See Jackson, 329 F.2d at 894 ("the interrogation of witnesses is ordinarily best left to counsel, who presumably have an intimate familiarity with the case.") The court's improper impeachment of xxxxxxxx quite likely gave the jury an impression that the judge and the prosecutor were working toward the common goal of convicting the defendant.
THE COURT: Why did you throw the cup out of the window?
THE WITNESS: I didn't throw nothing out the window anyway.
THE COURT: You didn't throw a cup out of the window?
THE COURT: You had the cup, though?
THE COURT: What did you do with the cup?
THE WITNESS: I was drinking.
THE COURT: And then what?
The court's questions concerning the cup were unnecessary because xxxxxxxx's cross-examination testimony that he had a cup with him during the drug transaction but that the drugs were in his pocket and not in the cup (9/16/94 Tr. 55-57), needed no clarification by the court. Although xxxxxxxx's testimony on this point clearly contradicted xxxxxxx's version, it was the jury's province to resolve that contradiction. Moreover, because xxxxxxxx relied on an entrapment defense and admitted that he distributed the drugs, the question of whether he carried the drugs in the cup or in his pocket was immaterial. Through its repeated interruption of xxxxxxxx's redirect testimony, the court effectively undermined defense counsel's efforts to rehabilitate the defendant and prejudiced the defense.
If Mr. xxxxxxxx was to have any chance of prevailing on the strength of his entrapment defense, he had to persuade the jury of his own credibility and the believability of his testimony. By challenging that testimony in an aggressive and prosecutorial manner, the trial judge thwarted the defense efforts. Under these circumstances, the standard instructions that it was for the jury to find the facts and determine credibility and that nothing the court did was to give the jury any indication as to how it should make its decision (9/16/94 Tr. 118, 121-22), could not have mitigated adequately the harm caused by the court's vigorous and extensive interrogation. See Quercia v. United States, 53 S. Ct. 698, 700 (1953) (trial court's repudiation of defendant's testimony was not cured by instruction that judge's opinion of evidence was not binding on jury); Blunt v. United States, 244 F.2d at 366 (judge's improper interrogation of defense witnesses not cured by standard instruction that it was for jury to find facts and was not bound by court's comments). Because the district court's prejudicial questioning denied Mr. xxxxxxxx the fair trial to which he is entitled, his conviction must be reversed.
The district court several committed instructional errors in charging the jury in this case. First, by casting the jury's ultimate determination of whether to convict or acquit Mr. xxxxxxxx in terms of which witnesses -- the prosecution or the defense -- the jury believed were "telling the truth" (9/16/94 Tr. 121), the court diluted the constitutional requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The court compounded this error by instructing the jury that the elements of Mr. xxxxxxxx's entrapment defense were "in a way more important" than the essential elements of the charged offenses. (9/16/94 Tr. 127) This instruction was prejudicial in that it reasonably could have confused the jury as to whether the government had to prove all of the elements of the charged offenses beyond a reasonable doubt in light of the fact that Mr. xxxxxxxx raised an entrapment defense. Taken in conjunction with the first instructional error, this instruction further diluted the government's burden of proof. Finally the court improperly de-emphasized an essential factual element of the charged offenses by instructing it that the substance Mr. xxxxxxxx allegedly distributed was "pretty clearly" crack cocaine. (9/16/94 Tr. 125-26) Because the cumulative effect of the challenged instructions was to confuse and mislead the jury as to the government's burden of proof, Mr. xxxxxxxx' conviction must be reversed.
Because defense counsel failed to object to the challenged instructions, this Court reviews them under the plain error standard, which requires a determination of (1) whether there is unwaived legal error, (2) whether the error is "plain" or "obvious" under current law, and (3) whether the error was prejudicial. United States v. Merlos, 8 F.3d 48, 50 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (citing United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732-36, 113 S. Ct. 1770, 1777-78 (1993)), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1635 (1994). To the extent that the district court's erroneous instructions diluted the reasonable doubt standard, this Court need not inquire into the prejudice prong of the plain error test. See United States v. Rawlings, 73 F.3d 1145, 1148 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Merlos, 8 F.3d at 50-51.
Now, from lots of things I have said, there is the question of credibility, belief, who is to be believed. In many, many trials that we have heard -- that I have heard -- there is a conflict between some witnesses and other witnesses, and somebody has to decide who is telling the truth; that is you, the jury.
(9/16/94 Tr. 121) (emphasis added).
Equally important, the jurors were not, as the court erroneously instructed, required to decide whom to believe and what actually occurred. They had to determine only whether the Government proved what it alleged had happened beyond a reasonable doubt. The court's emphasis on resolving the factual dispute was plainly inconsistent with its otherwise adequate burden of proof and reasonable doubt instructions.
Id. at 1148-49. The Court concluded that the combined effect of the improper credibility instruction and erroneous instruction on the elements of the charged offenses constituted reversible error. Id. at 1149.
The Rawlings decision controls this case. The erroneous portions of the instructions to Mr. xxxxxxxx's jury virtually were the same as those struck down by the Rawlings court. As in Rawlings, the judge here instructed the jury that it was required to decide "what really happened" and "who [was] telling the truth." (9/16/94 Tr. 118, 121) Also as in Rawlings, the testimony in this case "was not a typical courtroom swearing contest." 73 F.3d at 1149. In fact, the evidence below in this case was less disputed than the testimony in Rawlings.
As part of his entrapment defense, Mr. xxxxxxxx admitted that he participated in the drug transaction with the undercover agent. (9/16/94 Tr. 49-53, 56-57, 80) Therefore, the real dispute was whether Mr. xxxxxxxx intended to distribute the drugs to the undercover agent or whether the informant entrapped xxxxxxxx into committing the drug offenses. Because the government had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that xxxxxxxx intended to distribute the drugs and that he was predisposed to do so, notwithstanding any inducement by the informant, the jury could have concluded that even though the defense evidence was arguably less believable than that of the prosecution, xxxxxxxx's testimony -- combined with the testimony of hostile witness xxxxxx, the informant, -- left the jury with a reasonable doubt as to guilt. In fact, the jury could have believed all of the government witnesses and still have returned a verdict of not guilty if it found that the informant had induced xxxxxxxx into committing the offenses and that the government had failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that xxxxxxxx was predisposed to distribute the drugs. Thus, as in Rawlings, the court's instructions requiring the jury to decide whom to believe or what actually occurred averted the jurors' attention from their real task, which was to determine whether the prosecution proved the charged offenses beyond a reasonable doubt. See also United States v. Oquendo, 490 F.2d 161, 164-66 (5th Cir. 1974) (district court committed reversible error by charging jury that ultimate decision in case depended upon credibility choice between informant and defendant on issue of entrapment).
Redbook at p. 82. See also United States v. Gonzalez-Balderas, 11 F.3d 1218, 1223 (5th Cir.) (instruction that jury's sole interest is to "seek the truth from the evidence in this case" would be error if used in explaining concept of proof beyond a reasonable doubt; suggesting that trial courts may wish to delete it from their instructions altogether), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2138, (1994); United States v. Pine, 609 F.2d 106, 108 (3d Cir. 1979) (instruction that "[t]he basic question is whether the Government's witnesses are telling the truth or whether the defendants and their witnesses are telling the truth" improperly diluted government's burden); United States v. Stanfield, 521 F.2d 1122, 1125-26 (9th Cir. 1975) (conviction reversed where court's opening remarks "put the issue in terms of which set of facts the jury would believe and overemphasized that the jury would be required from the two theories of the case 'which is right and which is wrong.'"); United States v. Williams, 473 F.2d 507, 511 (5th Cir. 1973) (reversing where court's instructions "erroneously narrowed the credibility issue to an all or nothing proposition").
This Court's decision in United States v. Spencer, 25 F.3d 1105, 1110 (D.C. Cir. 1994), is not to the contrary. In that case, the instruction given by the same district judge as in this case to the effect that the jury must decide which side was lying merely repeated the point that the parties themselves had argued to the jury. Moreover, the issue raised and decided in Spencer was whether the court's instruction shifted the burden of proof to the defendant and not whether the instruction had diluted the government's burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt -- the issue raised here by Mr. xxxxxxxx and decided by the Rawlings court. Given the clear inconsistencies in the testimony and the defense's repeated argument that the police were lying, combined with the defendant's failure to object, the Spencer court held that the instruction there did not constitute plain error. Id. at 1110.
As in Rawlings, the district court's standard instructions in this case on burden of proof and reasonable doubt cannot save the instructions as a whole. The fact that instructions are accurate in part does not render the instructions as a whole constitutional if it is "reasonably likely" that the jury relied to some degree on the faulty portion of the instructions. Merlos, 984 F.2d at 1242 (citing Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 (1991)). The instructions requiring Mr. xxxxxxxx's jury to find the historical truth were so fundamentally inconsistent with the actual standard of proof that the jury could not possibly reconcile the court's confusing instructions. See Rawlings, 73 F.3d at 1149 (court's misleading instructions require reversal under plain error standard despite "its otherwise adequate burden of proof and reasonable doubt instructions"); United States v. Rhone, 864 F.2d 832, 837 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (reversing where "[a]t the very least, the instruction confused the jury on the very central issue of intent"); United States v. Alston, 551 F.2d 315, 319 (D.C. Cir. 1976) ("although the district court properly reminded the jury on several occasions of the Government's burden of proof, we are unwilling to presume that the ambiguity created by [other misleading instructions] was thus dissipated"). The jury in this case was especially likely to be drawn to the court's faulty instructions, which because of their "nonlegal character might have been more easily comprehended and remembered than the standard instruction." United States v. Pinkney, 551 F.2d 1241, 1245 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
The instructional error in this case was "plain" or "obvious" in that the faulty instructions were clearly inconsistent with the standard of proof that has been settled law since In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (Due Process Clause requires government to prove beyond reasonable doubt every element of charged offenses). Moreover, the Rawlings court held that the similar instructions in that case rose to the level of plain error and the trial there took place some 14 months before Mr. xxxxxxxx's trial. Finally, this Court has made clear that prejudice is presumed where the standard of proof has been distorted. Rawlings, 73 F.3d at 1148 n.3. For these reasons, the district court's erroneous instructions diluting the government's burden of proof constitute plain error and require a new trial.
This Court has held that the identity of a controlled substance is an element of drug offenses, such as distribution of cocaine base. United States v. Michael, 10 F.3d 838, 839, 842 (D.C. Cir. 1993). Thus, it was for the jury, not the court to decide whether the substance distributed by Mr. xxxxxxxx was cocaine base, as charged in the indictment. By instructing the jury that it was "pretty clear" that the substance was cocaine base (9/16/94 Tr. 125), the court appeared to de-emphasize this element, just as it had purported to establish a hierarchy among the elements in Rawlings. See 73 F.3d at 1148-49. Because all elements require proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the Rawlings court held that the instruction given there was erroneous. Id. at 1149.
The judge's remark that the elements of the entrapment defense were "more important" than the elements of the charged offenses is analogous to the erroneous charge in Rawlings which implied that there was a hierarchy among the elements. Because a defendant who raises an entrapment defense also can deny one or more elements of the crime, an entrapment defense does not obviate the government's burden to prove all of the elements of the charged offenses beyond a reasonable doubt. See Matthews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 61 (1988) (defendant entitled to entrapment instruction even if he denies elements of crime). Although Mr. xxxxxxxx did not deny vigorously any particular elements of the offenses, and admitted that the requisite acts occurred, the government nevertheless had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he had the requisite intent, as well as all of the other elements of the charged offenses. The court's instruction that the entrapment defense was "more important" and that there wasn't "much contest" about the essential elements of the offenses likely misled the jury concerning the government's burden of proving each element of the offenses beyond a reasonable doubt.
When viewed together, the erroneous instructions create a reasonable likelihood that the jury was confused about the applicable standard of proof. The combined effect of the erroneous instructions was to dilute the government's burden of proof and to deprive Mr. xxxxxxxx of a verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. For these reasons, Mr. xxxxxxxx's conviction must be reversed.
In reviewing challenges to a district court's application of the Sentencing Guidelines, this Court reviews purely legal questions de novo; factual findings are reviewed for clear error; and due deference is given to the district court's application of the guidelines to the facts. United States v. Kim, 23 F.3d 513, 517 (D.C. Cir. 1994). In this case, the question of whether reliance on an entrapment defense precludes a reduction for acceptance of responsibility is a legal question, while the issue concerning the upward adjustment for obstruction of justice for perjury is a question of the application of the guidelines to the facts.
MS. HENDERSON: The presentence report writer did (DEFENSE COUNSEL) not give [the defendant] the two points for acceptance of responsibility.
THE COURT: He said he was entrapped.
THE COURT: Wait a minute. I don't regard that as acceptance of responsibility.
MS. HENDERSON: Your Honor, I don't think that because a person legitimately claims a legitimate defense, that in claiming that, that he somehow is not accepting responsibility for what he did. My understanding of what he said was he explained why he did it. He didn't say he didn't do it. He said, I did it. That's accepting responsibility. That's a knowing act of what he did.
He only explained to the court why he did it. I don't think that going forward with a legitimate defense is an indication indicating that he does not accept responsibility.
Joining several other circuits that have decided this issue, this Court recently held that reliance on an entrapment defense does not automatically bar a defendant from receiving an acceptance of responsibility reduction. United States v. Layeni,90 F.3d 514, 525 (D.C. Cir. 1996). See also United States v. Davis, 36 F.3d 1424, 1435-36 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Corral-Ibarra, 25 F.3d 430, 439-440 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v. Fleener, 900 F.2d 914, 918-19 (6th Cir. 1990). Under Layeni and the other cited authorities, the district court cannot deny an acceptance of responsibility reduction on the grounds that the defendant raised an entrapment defense without determining whether the particular facts and circumstances warrant a reduction.
In Layeni, this Court upheld the district court's denial of the reduction because the sentencing judge "properly used Layeni's entrapment argument to find that he had not accepted responsibility." 90 F.3d at 525. In contrast, the district court in the instant case rejected out-of-hand the reduction of acceptance of responsibility on the grounds that Mr. xxxxxxxx raised an entrapment defense at trial. Therefore, the court's denial of the reduction was erroneous and Mr. xxxxxxxx's sentence should be vacated and remanded for resentencing.
To constitute obstruction of justice under § 3C1.1, false testimony must meet the definition of perjury under the federal criminal perjury statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1621. United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87 (1993). Thus, perjury is defined as "giv[ing] false testimony concerning a material matter with the willful intent to provide false testimony, rather than as a result of confusion, mistake or faulty memory." Id. at 94 (emphasis added). This definition recognizes that in some instances a defendant may give inaccurate testimony as the result of confusion, mistake, or faulty memory. Id. at 95. Moreover, the sentencing judge should evaluate the defendant's testimony "in a light most favorable to the defendant." § 3C1.1 Application Note 1.
In the instant case, the court's perjury enhancement was erroneous for two reasons. First, Mr. xxxxxxxx did not commit perjury because his purportedly false testimony regarding the money exchange, voice identification, and the styrofoam cup did not concern a material matter "designed to substantially affect the outcome of the case . . .." Dunnigan, 507 U.S. at 95. In this regard, the commentary to § 3C1.1 provides that a "material" statement is one which, "if believed, would tend to influence or affect the issue on determination." § 3C1.1, Commentary (Note 3). See United States v. Sobin, 56 F.3d 1423, 1428-29 (D.C. Cir.) (false identification of fixed residence at bond hearing is material false declaration supporting § 3C1.1 enhancement), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 348 (1995); United States v. Smaw, 993 F.2d 902, 904 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (noting definition of materiality in Guidelines Commentary).
In light of Mr. xxxxxxxx's entrapment defense, his testimony regarding the exchange of money, the identification of his voice on the tape, and the styrofoam cup could not have been intended to substantially affect the jury's verdict and therefore did not concern a material matter. Because Mr. xxxxxxxx admitted that he distributed the drugs as charged in the indictment, his somewhat equivocal testimony regarding certain aspects of the transaction itself could not have affected the outcome of his trial. Whether Mr. xxxxxxxx handled the money exchanged for the drugs, recognized his voice on the tape, or carried the drugs in a styrofoam cup were irrelevant to his guilt or innocence because he admitted to committing the requisite acts constituting the charged offenses. If the court had found that xxxxxxxx's testimony concerning his inducement or predisposition to commit the offenses was false, that false testimony would have concerned a material matter and formed a proper basis for a perjury enhancement. Compare United States v. Tracy, 36 F.3d 199, 202 (1st Cir.) (perjury enhancement upheld where district court found defendant who raised entrapment defense had lied about informant's threats that induced defendant to commit crime), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 609 (1994). However, xxxxxxxx's allegedly false testimony did not amount to perjury because the matters articulated by the sentencing court were not material under § 3C1.1. Therefore, the district court erred in enhancing Mr. xxxxxxxx's sentence under that provision.
Taking xxxxxxxx's testimony as a whole, it is clear that his testimony concerning these matters, if false at all, was likely the result of "confusion, mistake or faulty memory." xxxxxxxx admitted to receiving the money during the drug exchange, "think[ing]" that it was his voice on the tape, and possessing the styrofoam cup during the drug transaction. xxxxxxxx clearly had difficulty recalling the details of the transaction itself. He also became confused by some of the prosecutor's questions on cross-examination. Under these circumstances, the court erred in concluding by clear and convincing evidence that xxxxxxxx's testimony was perjurious. Because the court should not have enhanced Mr. xxxxxxxx's sentence under § 3C1.1, the sentence should be vacated and the case remanded for resentencing.
For the foregoing reasons, Mr. xxxxxxxx's conviction should be reversed and his case remanded for a new trial. Failing that, Mr. xxxxxxxx's sentence should be vacated and his case remanded for resentencing.
D. C. Circuit Rule 28(d).
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on September 11, 1996, I have served by hand two copies of the foregoing Brief for Appellant Keith xxxxxxxx and one copy of the accompanying Appendix on John R. Fisher, Chief, Appellate Section, Criminal Division, United States Attorney's Office, 555 4th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20001.
1. "A." refers to the appendix filed with this brief. Certain portions of the record not included in the appendix are cited in this brief. These include trial transcript excerpts (e.g., "9/14/94 Tr. ") and trial exhibits (e.g., "Gov. Ex. ") .
2. Mr. xxxxxxxx's PSR is filed under seal as part of the appendix in this case.

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