Source: http://halakhah.com/babakamma/babakamma_56.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 07:51:24+00:00

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But are there no more cases [of the same category]? Is there not the case of a man who does work with the Water of Purification10 or with the [Red] Heifer of Purification,10 where he is similarly exempt according to the judgments of Man but liable according to the judgments of Heaven?11 Again, is there not the case of one who placed deadly poison before the animal of a neighbour, where he is exempt from the judgments of Man but liable according to the judgments of Heaven?12 So also is there not the case of one who entrusts fire to a deaf-mute, an idiot or a minor [and damage results], where he is exempt from the judgments of Man but liable according to the judgments of Heaven?13 Again, is there not the case of the man who gives his fellow a fright, where he is similarly exempt from the judgments of Man but liable according to the judgments of Heaven?14 And finally is there not the case of the man who, when his pitcher has broken on public ground, does not remove the potsherds, who, when his camel falls does not raise it, where R. Meir indeed makes him liable for any damage resulting therefrom, but the Sages hold that he is exempt from the judgments of Man though liable according to the judgments of Heaven?15 — Yes, there are surely many more cases [to come under the same category], but these four cases were particularly necessary to be stated by him,16 as otherwise you might have thought that even according to the judgments of Heaven there should not be any liability. It was therefore indicated to us [that this is not so]. In the case of breaking down a fence in front of a neighbour's animal you might have said that since the wall was in any case bound to come down, what offence was committed, and that even according to the judgments of Heaven there should be no liability. It was therefore indicated to us [that this is not so]. In the case of bending over a neighbour's standing corn in front of a fire you might also have said that the defendant could argue, 'How could I know that an unusual wind would come?' and that consequently even according to the judgments of Heaven he should not be liable; it was therefore indicated to us [that this is not the case]. So also according to R. Ashi who said that the reference is to 'covering', you might have said that [the defendant could contend], 'I surely intended to cover and thus protect your property,17 and that even according to the judgments of Heaven he should not be liable. It was therefore indicated to us [that this is not so]. In the case of hiring false witnesses you might also have said that the offender should be entitled to plead, 'Where the words of the Master18 are contradicted by words of a disciple,19 whose words should be followed?'20 and that even according to the judgments of Heaven he should not be liable. It was therefore indicated to us [that this is not so]. In the case where one knows evidence in favour of another and does not testify on his behalf, you might also have said that [the offender could argue], 'Who can say for certain that even had I gone and testified on his behalf, the other party would have admitted [the claim], and would not perhaps have sworn falsely [against my evidence]?'21 and that even according to the judgments of Heaven he should not be liable. It was therefore indicated to us [that this is not the case].
IF THE WALL BROKE DOWN AT NIGHT OR IF ROBBERS BROKE IN etc., Rabbah said: This22 is so only where the animal undermined the wall. What then of the case where it did not undermine the wall?23 Would there then be liability? Under what circumstances? If it be assumed that the wall was sound, why then even where it did not undermine it23 should there be liability? What else could the defendant have done? But if, on the other hand, the wall was shaky, why even in the case where the animal undermined it should there be exemption? Is not this a case where there is negligence24 at the beginning but [damage results from] accident25 at the end? Your view is correct enough on the assumption26 that where there is negligence at the beginning [and damage results through] accident at the end there is exemption, but if we take the view26 that where there is negligence at the beginning though [damage results from] accident at the end there is liability, what can be said? — This ruling of the Mishnah therefore refers to a sound wall and even to a case where it did not undermine the wall.27 For the statement of Rabbah was made with reference to [the ruling in] the concluding clause, IF THE OWNER HAD LEFT THEM IN A SUNNY PLACE OR HANDED THEM OVER TO THE CARE OF A DEAF-MUTE, AN IDIOT OR A MINOR AND THEY GOT AWAY AND DID DAMAGE, HE WOULD BE LIABLE. Rabbah thereupon said: This would be so even where it undermined the wall. For there would be no doubt that [this would be so] where it did not undermine the wall28 as there was negligence throughout, but even where it did undermine the wall,29 the ruling30 would also hold good. You might have said [in that case, that where it undermined the wall]29 it should be regarded as a case of negligence at the beginning but accident at the end.31 It was therefore indicated to us32 that [it is regarded as a case of] negligence throughout, the reason being that the plaintiff might say, 'You should surely have realised that since you left it in a sunny place, it will use every possible device for the purpose of getting out.
And should in any case have been pulled down.
By the expression 'bending over'.
For which there is no liability according to the view of the Rabbis (v. infra p. 357), and by his act he caused the owner of the corn the loss of all claim to compensation.
I.e., to obtain money really not due to him.
Which he obtained by false pretenses and by the evidence of the false witnesses whom he hired.
I.e. to pay him money not due to him, and it so happened that the neighbour to whom the money was paid could not be made to give back the money he obtained by the false evidence.
Why then state it here?
Whose evidence would merely entail the imposition of an oath upon the defendant, v. Shebu 40a.
Thus disqualifying it from being used for the purpose of purification, Par. IV, 4.
Git. 53a, and infra 98a.
But not to cause you the loss of compensation.
Expressed in the Divine Law.
Surely the word of the former. The witnesses should therefore be exclusively responsible, as they should not have followed the advice of a man in contradiction to the words of the Law. The law of agency could on this account not apply in matters of transgression; cf. Kid. 42b and supra p. 294.
Since one witness could not make the defendant liable for money payment but only for an oath.
Which fell down of itself.
To leave an animal behind a shaky wall which could not withstand a normal wind.
Viz., that the animal broke through it.
V. p. 327, n. 6.
But managed to escape through the door.
V. p. 327, n. 8.
V. p. 324, n. 4.
Is this not obvious, seeing that as soon as they took it out it was placed under their charge in all respects?1 The ruling was necessary to meet the case where they merely stood in front of it2 [thus blocking any other way for it while leaving open that leading to the corn]. This is on the lines of the statement made by Rabbah on behalf of R. Mattena who said it on behalf of Rab: If a man placed the animal of one person near the standing corn of another, he is liable.3 'Placed', [you say]? Is this not obvious? — The ruling was necessary to meet the case where he merely stood in front of it [blocking thus any other way for it while leaving open that leading to the corn]. Said Abaye to R. Joseph: Did you not explain to us that [the ruling of Rab referred to a case where] the animal was [not actually placed but only] beaten [with a stick and thus driven to the corn]? In the case of robbers also, [the ruling in the Mishnah similarly refers to a case where] they had only beaten it. IF HE HANDED THEM OVER TO THE CARE OF A SHEPHERD, THE SHEPHERD WOULD ENTER INTO ALL THE RESPONSIBILITIES INSTEAD OF HIM. I would here ask: 'Instead of whom?' If you say, instead of the owner of the animal, have we not already learnt elsewhere: 'If an owner hands over his cattle to an unpaid bailee or to a borrower, to a paid bailee or to a hirer, each of them would enter into the responsibilities of the owner'?4 It must therefore mean, instead of a bailee,5 and the first bailee would be exempt altogether. Would this not be a refutation of Raba? For did Raba not say: One bailee handing over his charge to another bailee becomes liable for all consequences?6 — Raba might reply that 'he handed it over to a shepherd' means [the shepherd handed it over] to his apprentice, as it is indeed the custom of the shepherd to hand over his sheep to [the care of] his apprentice. Some say that since the text says, HE HANDED THEM OVER TO THE CARE OF A SHEPHERD and does not say 'he handed them over to another person,'it could from this be proved that the meaning of 'HE HANDED THEM OVER TO THE CARE OF A SHEPHERD' is that the shepherd handed [them] over to his apprentice, as it is indeed the custom of the shepherd to hand over [various things] to [the care of] his apprentice, whereas if [he handed it over] to another person this would not be so. May we say that this supports the view of Raba? For did Raba not say: One bailee handing over his charge to another bailee becomes liable for all consequences?6 — It may however be said that this is no support. For the text perhaps merely mentioned the usual case, though the same ruling would apply [to a case where it was handed over] to another person altogether.
V. p. 325, n. 7.
In which case the sheep did not come into the possession of the robbers.
Though the animal which did the damage is not his.
I.e. where the sheep has already been in the hands of a bailee who later transferred it to a shepherd. By declaring the shepherd to be liable it is implied that the bailee will become released from his previous obligations.
Even for accidents, as he had no right to hand over his charge to another person without the consent of the owner, v. supra 11b.
And which he will have to return to the owner.
To whom the law of Ex. XXII, 6-8 applies, and who is thus exempt where the article was stolen or lost.
Who is subject to Ex. XXII, 9-12 and who is therefore liable to pay where the article was stolen or lost.
As while a person is occupied with the performance of one commandment he is not under an obligation to perform at the same time another commandment; cf. Suk. 25a.
Of looking after the lost article which he found.
Who after receiving the consideration is similarly under an obligation to guard.

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