Source: https://caselaw.findlaw.com/ca-supreme-court/1743258.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 13:41:14+00:00

Document:
The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Alexis Alejandro FUENTES, Defendant and Respondent.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Holly D. Wilkens, Steven T. Oetting, Lise Jacobson and Kristen Kinnaird Chenelia, Deputy Attorneys General; Tony Rackauckas, District Attorney, and David R. Gallivan, Deputy District Attorney, for Plaintiff and Appellant. Frank Ospino, Public Defender, Jean Wilkinson, Chief Deputy Public Defender, Mark S. Brown, Assistant Public Defender, and Miles David Jessup, Deputy Public Defender, for Defendant and Respondent.
The issue presented here is whether a trial court has the discretion under Penal Code 1 section 1385, subdivision (a) (section 1385(a)) to dismiss a sentencing enhancement allegation for a gang-related offense (§ 186.22, subdivision (b)(1) (section 186.22(b)(1))), or if the court is limited to its authority under section 186.22, subdivision (g) (section 186.22(g)), which provides that “[n]otwithstanding any other law, the court may strike the additional punishment for the enhancements provided in this section.” In other words, by enacting section 186.22(g), did the Legislature eliminate a trial court's section 1385(a) discretion to dismiss or strike entirely a section 186.22(b)(1) gang enhancement?
For reasons that follow, we conclude that a trial court has the discretion to strike the gang enhancement altogether under section 1385(a).
On May 2, 2013, after an off-the-record conference in chambers, the trial court indicated the following: if defendant pleaded guilty to counts 1 and 2, the court would dismiss the gang enhancement allegation (§ 186.22(b)(1)), pursuant to its discretion under section 1385(a). The prosecutor, however, objected to the indicated sentence, arguing that the court lacked discretion to dismiss the enhancement and that its authority was limited to striking the additional punishment under section 186.22(g). Defendant moved to dismiss the gang enhancement allegation under section 1385(a).
As part of the agreement in which defendant pleaded guilty to the charges, he offered the following statements as a basis for his plea: “[O]n 3–14–13, I willfully took a car with the intent to deprive the owner of it and without consent of the owner. I was also in possession of such vehicle.” Over the District Attorney's objection, the trial court accepted the defense invitation to dismiss the gang enhancement allegation under section 1385(a). The court orally stated its reasons for dismissing the enhancement allegation; however, those reasons are not reflected in the court minutes. The trial court pronounced judgment and placed defendant on three years' probation with additional terms and conditions.
The District Attorney appealed. He argued that the phrase “[n]otwithstanding any other law” in section 186.22(g) shows the Legislature intended that section to replace or supplant the court's general authority under section 1385(a) to strike or dismiss gang allegations. For that reason, the trial court had the authority to strike the additional punishment for the enhancement, but not the enhancement itself. Disagreeing with a decision from a different division within its district (People v. Campos (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 438), the Court of Appeal here stated that the “[n]otwithstanding any other law” phrase supports the District Attorney's interpretation only if section 186.22(g) is “contrary to, in conflict with, or inconsistent” with section 1385(a). It concluded section 186.22(g) was not. Therefore, under section 1385(a), the trial court had the discretion to dismiss the gang enhancement allegation altogether, and it was not limited to striking the additional punishment for the enhancement under section 186.22(g).
Because the trial court failed to state its “reasons for the dismissal ․ in an order entered upon the minutes,” as section 1385(a) mandated at the time (see Stats.2000, ch. 689, § 3, p. 4558), the Court of Appeal remanded the case to the trial court to allow it to do so. (See People v. Bonnetta (2009) 46 Cal.4th 143, 151 [§ 1385's “mandatory requirement” for court's written minute order].)2 It affirmed the trial court's judgment in all other respects.
We granted the District Attorney's petition for review.
Since its inception nearly three decades ago, the STEP Act has provided trial courts with the discretion to “strike the additional punishment for the enhancements provided in” section 186.22. (§ 186 .22, former subd. (b)(4) [now § 186.22(g) ]; Stats.1988, ch. 1242, § 1, pp. 4127–4130.) After several amendments,3 section 186.22(g) currently provides in full: “Notwithstanding any other law, the court may strike the additional punishment for the enhancements provided in this section or refuse to impose the minimum jail sentence for misdemeanors in an unusual case where the interests of justice would best be served, if the court specifies on the record and enters into the minutes the circumstances indicating that the interests of justice would best be served by that disposition.” (Italics added.) Under section 186.22(g), a trial court's discretion is limited to striking any additional punishment for an enhancement provided in section 186.22(b)(1), and to refusing to impose a minimum jail sentence for section 186.22(d), in “the interests of justice.” It does not authorize striking the enhancement itself.
In 1988, defendant maintains, section 1385 did not specifically allow a trial court to dismiss only the punishment for an enhancement; that express authority came over a decade later with the Legislature's enactment of section 1385(c)(1). (Stats.2000, ch. 689, § 3, pp. 4558–4559.) Thus, when enacted, section 186.22(g) (originally codified as § 186.22, subd. (d)), “complemented, rather than displaced, section 1385(a) by granting the trial court such additional power.” The People, however, describe this reasoning as based on a “technicality” and one that is “illusory,” and maintain a conflict did exist between section 1385 and section 186.22 in 1988. Notwithstanding the subsequent enactment of section 1385(c)(1), the People counter that section 1385(a), at all times relevant here, also included the discretion to strike just the punishment of an enhancement. That discretion was also set out in former section 1170.1(h) with respect to certain enumerated enhancements, until it was repealed in 1997. We briefly recount the relevant history below.
We affirm the Court of Appeal's judgment and remand the matter with directions to affirm the trial court's judgment.
FN1. All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise noted.. FN1. All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise noted.
4. As noted above (see ante, at p. 3, fn. 2), section 1385(a) no longer requires that the court's reasons be set out in the minutes in all cases.
6. As discussed further below (see post, at pp. 10–11), former section 1170.1(h) was repealed in 1997.
WE CONCUR: CANTIL–SAKAUYE, C. J., WERDEGAR, CORRIGAN, LIU, CUÉLLAR, and KRUGER, JJ.

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