Source: https://www.isba.org/barnews/supremecourtquicktakes?page=14
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 10:45:08+00:00

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Our panel of leading appellate attorneys review Friday's Illinois Supreme Court opinions in in civil cases Illinois Department of Healthcare and Family Services v. Wiszowaty, First American Bank v. Henry, Thompson v. Gordon, Uldrych v. VHS of Illinois, and criminal cases People v. Alsup, People v. Kitch, People v. Gonzalez, People v. Williams, People v. King, People v. Garcia and People v. Lindsay.
By Kerry J. Bryson, Office of the State Appellate Defender Defendant, on trial for sexual offenses against his then 3-year-old daughter, sought to introduce the testimony of an expert witness concerning the credibility of hearsay statements made by the daughter. The trial court barred the expert testimony, and a divided appellate court reversed.
Our panel of leading appellate attorneys review Thursday's Illinois Supreme Court opinions in State Building Venture v. O'Donnell, In re the commitment of Hernandez, People v. Zimmerman, People v. Amigon, People v. Alexander, People v. Jocko and People v. Carrera.
Our panel of leading appellate attorneys review today's Supreme Court opinions in JP Morgan Chase Bank v. Earth Foods, Ready v. United/Goedecke Services, Wright Development Group v. Walsh, In re Estate of Wilson, People v. Close, People v. Johnson and People v. Thompson.
By Jean M. Prendergast, Schuyler, Roche & Crisham, P.C Today, in Vancura v. Katris, the Illinois Supreme Court unanimously reversed a trial court’s ruling that Kinko’s, Inc. (“Kinko’s”) bore liability for an employee’s decision to notarize plaintiff’s signature, which caused the loss of plaintiff’s interest in a mortgage note. It was undisputed that plaintiff never signed the document at issue. Plaintiff posited three theories: (1) violation of Section 7-102 of the Illinois Notary Public Act (“Act”) (5 ILCS 312/7-102 (West 1996)); (2) negligent training; and (3) negligent supervision. Interestingly, the Court disagreed with the appellate court’s determination that Kinko’s forfeited review of the common law claims by failing to provide adequate legal support. Instead, while the Court found certain of Kinko’s cited cases unpersuasive, it nevertheless found the citations and argument sufficient to satisfy Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(7). In contrast, the Court ruled that plaintiff violated Rule 341(h)(7), and thus, forfeited his right to review of the appellate court’s judgment against him on his claim for violation of the Act. The Court next examined the common law claims and held that Section 7-102 of the Act was intended to modify the common law. Thus, the common law duty of employers of notaries extends only as far as the Act; the employer has a duty not to consent to the official misconduct of its employees. Plaintiff never argued that Kinko’s had any knowledge of its employee’s misconduct.
A panel of leading appellate lawyers reflect on today's Illinois Supreme Court opinions in civil cases West American Insurance v. Yorkville National Bank, Hurlbert v. Charles, Hubble v. Bi-State Development Agency, K. Miller Contruction Company Inc. v. McGinnis and Irwin Industrial Tool Co. v. The Department of Revenue and criminal cases People v. Miller and People v. Clendenin.
By Jean M. Prendergast, Schuyler, Roche & Crisham, P.C Today, in a 5-2 decision, the Illinois Supreme Court in Krywin v. The Chicago Transit Authority, held that a common carrier’s duty to provide passengers with a safe place to alight must yield to the natural accumulation rule. Under that rule, a landowner has no duty to remove natural accumulations of ice, snow or water. The plaintiff-passenger had fallen as she exited a train onto a slippery CTA platform. The court affirmed the appellate court and reversed the passenger’s nearly $400,000 verdict. The court also held that the CTA had no duty to identify a safer place to exit the train. The court reasoned that the passenger failed to meet her burden to prove the feasibility of requiring the CTA to discharge all passengers safely during inclement conditions. The court took judicial notice of the magnitude of the CTA’s operations and observed that “it would be impractical to place a burden on the CTA to evaluate its train platforms” every time a train enters a station. Justice Freeman, joined by Justice Kilbride, dissented, pointing out that the majority’s holding disregarded the Local Government and Governmental Employees’ Tort Immunity Act (“Act”), which codified the natural accumulation rule, but also specifically excluded the CTA from the Act’s protection. In addition, the dissent maintained that the majority decision is inconsistent with the court’s prior adoption of the principles stated in Section 343 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which recognized that landowners are in a superior position to protect their invitees.
By Kerry J. Bryson, Office of the State Appellate Defender These consolidated cases involved a constitutional challenge to Section 6-206(a)(43) of the Illinois Vehicle Code, the statutory provision which requires suspension of driving privileges for 90 days for any person receiving court supervision for unlawful consumption of alcohol under 21 years of age. The circuit court held that the statute, as applied, violated due process because a vehicle was not involved in the commission of the offense. The Supreme Court disagreed. The purpose of 6-206(a)(43) is to "promote the safe and legal operation and ownership of motor vehicles." Suspension of driving privileges bears a rational relationship to that purpose because "young people who have a driver's license and consume alcohol illegally may also drive after consuming alcohol regardless of whether a motor vehicle is involved." And, the suspension of driving privileges is a reasonable method of furthering the public interest in safe and legal operation of motor vehicles, despite the absence of a vehicle or any plan to drive. So, for persons under 21, it doesn't matter if a vehicle is involved in the commission of the offense of unlawful consumption of alcohol. It doesn't even matter if a person under 21 who commits the offense of unlawful consumption of alcohol contemplates driving or not.
By Tim Eaton, Shefsky & Froelich Ltd. With the increasing number of foreclosure actions on residential homes, the high court addressed a question that has been to date answered by the lower courts inconsistently -- that is whether a lender must name a personal representative for a deceased borrower in a mortgage foreclosure proceeding. The trial court found that a foreclosure proceeding was a quasi-in-rem proceeding requiring the mortgagee (borrower) to be a party, or if the borrower is deceased, a personal representative must be named in the action. The lender argued the proceeding was against the property only (in-rem), so no borrower was necessary. The appellate court agreed with the lender. The Supreme Court acknowledged that Illinois courts have ruled inconsistently in how these proceedings have been classified. But it resolved the issue in favor of the borrower since it found the object of the foreclosure is to enforce an obligation created by a contract between the lender and borrower, and therefore the borrower, or personal representative, becomes a necessary party. According to the parties’ briefs below, the resolution of this question will govern “literally thousands of current and future cases.” What is noteworthy about this appeal, is that there was no party bringing the appeal to the Supreme Court. The PLA was filed by an amicus, CVLS, a legal services group that represents indigent borrowers in foreclosure proceedings. Nevertheless, the high court allowed the petition and made no mention of the standing of the amicus in the opinion even though the issue had been raised earlier in prior motion practice.

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