Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/426/572/
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 10:23:01+00:00

Document:
1. The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) to enforce the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pp. 426 U. S. 580-597.
of § § 1343(3) and 1983 and their predecessor statutes, generally had jurisdiction to redress deprivations of constitutional rights by persons acting under color of territorial law. Pp. 426 U. S. 581-586.
(b) The history of the legislation specifically respecting Puerto Rico supports the conclusion that the United States District Court in Puerto Rico prior to Puerto Rico's becoming a Commonwealth in 1952 had the same jurisdiction to enforce § 1983 as that conferred by § 1343(3) and its predecessors on the United States district courts in the several States, and that Congress, by entering into the compact by which Puerto Rico assumed "Commonwealth" status, did not intend to leave the protection of federal right.s exclusively to the local Puerto Rico courts and to repeal by implication the jurisdiction of the United States District Court in Puerto Rico to enforce § 1983. Pp. 426 U. S. 586-595.
(c) While Puerto Rico occupies a unique relationship to the United States, it does not follow that Congress intended to relinquish enforcement of § 1983 by restricting the jurisdiction of the United States District Court in Puerto Rico, cf. District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U. S. 418, and whether Puerto Rico is considered a Territory or a State for purposes of the jurisdictional question is of little consequence, because each is included within § 1983 and, therefore, within § 1343(3). Pp. 426 U. S. 595-597.
2. The District Court correctly determined that abstention was unnecessary, since the federal constitutional claim is not complicated by an unresolved state law question, even though appellees might have sought relief under similar provisions of the Puerto Rico Constitution. Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U. S. 433; Harris County Comm'rs Court v. Moore, 420 U. S. 77. Pp. 426 U. S. 597-598.
3. Puerto Rico's prohibition of an alien's engaging in the private practice of engineering deprives appellees of "rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws," within the meaning of § 1983. Pp. 426 U. S. 599-606.
(a) The question whether it is the Fifth Amendment or the Fourteenth that protects Puerto Rico residents need not be resolved since, irrespective of which Amendment applies, the statutory restriction on the ability of aliens to engage in the otherwise lawful private practice of civil engineering is plainly unconstitutional. If the Fourteenth Amendment applies, the Equal Protection Clause nullifies the statutory exclusion, whereas, if the Fifth Amendment and its Due Process Clause apply, the statute's discrimination is so egregious as to violate due process. Pp. 426 U. S. 599-601.
In re Griffiths, 413 U. S. 717, 413 U. S. 721-722. This burden is not met by any of the following three justifications offered by appellants for the citizenship requirement: (i) to prevent the "uncontrolled" influx of Spanish-speaking aliens in the engineering field in Puerto Rico; (ii) to raise the prevailing low standard of living in Puerto Rico; and (iii) to provide the client of a civil engineer an assurance of financial accountability if a building for which the engineer is responsible collapses. Pp. 426 U. S. 601-606.
BLACKMUN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and BRENNAN, STEWART, WHITE, MARSHALL, and POWELL, JJ., joined. REHNQUIST, J., filed an opinion dissenting in part, post, p. 426 U. S. 606. STEVENS, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
jurisdiction, under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3), [Footnote 1] to entertain a suit based upon 42 U.S.C. § 1983, [Footnote 2] and, if the answer is in the affirmative, the further issue whether Puerto Rico's restriction, by statute, of licenses for civil engineers to United States citizens is constitutional. The first issue, phrased another way, is whether Puerto Rico is a "State," for purposes of § 1343(3), insofar as that statute speaks of deprivation "under color of any State law"; the resolution of that question was reserved in Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U. S. 663, 416 U. S. 677 n. 11 (1974).
In October, 1973, Flores instituted an action in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico against the Board and its individual members. She asserted jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3), [Footnote 4] and alleged that the citizenship requirement was violative of her rights under 42 U.S.C. § § 1981 and 1983. A declaratory judgment and injunctive relief were requested.
In May, 1974, Perez instituted an action against the Board [Footnote 6] in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico. He asserted that the citizenship requirement "is repugnant to the Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments." App. 10. The complaint in all relevant respects was like that filed by Flores, and Perez, too, requested declaratory and injunctive relief, including a full and unconditional license to practice as an engineer in the Commonwealth.
Ltd., 302 U. S. 253, 302 U. S. 258 (1937); District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U. S. 418, 409 U. S. 420 (1973). As is so frequently the case, however, the language is not free of ambiguity, the purposes appear to be diverse and sometimes contradictory, and the circumstances are not fully spread upon the record for our instruction.
several district or circuit courts of the United States." [Footnote 11] Jurisdiction was not independently defined; it was given simply to enforce the substantive rights created by the statute. The two aspects, seemingly, were deemed to coincide.
Although one might say that the purpose of Congress was evident, the method chosen to implement this aim was curious and, indeed, somewhat confusing. In the 1874 codification, only the substantive portion (the predecessor of today's § 1983) of § 1 of the 1871 Act was redesignated as § 1979. [Footnote 13] It became separated from the jurisdictional portion (the predecessor of today's § 1343(3)) which appeared as § 563 Twelfth and § 629 Sixteenth (concerning, respectively, the district courts and the circuit courts) of the Revised Statutes. But the words "or Territory" appeared only in § 1979; they did not appear in §§ 563 and 629.
"The [federal] district court . . . shall have, in addition to the ordinary jurisdiction of district courts of the United States, jurisdiction of all cases cognizant in the circuit courts of the United States. [Footnote 18]"
laws] of the United States not locally inapplicable," 31 Stat. 80, [Footnote 22] and Rev.Stat. § 1979, providing remedies for deprivation of rights guaranteed by the Constitution and laws of the United States by persons acting under color of territorial law was at least potentially "applicable."
supported the Court's conclusion. 409 U.S. at 409 U. S. 432.
The Court, however, thus far has declined to say whether it is the Fifth Amendment or the Fourteenth which provides the protection. [Footnote 32] Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 416 U. S. 668-669, n. 5. Once again, we need not resolve that precise question, because, irrespective of which Amendment applies, the statutory restriction on the ability of aliens to engage in the otherwise lawful private practice of civil engineering is plainly unconstitutional. If the Fourteenth Amendment is applicable, the Equal Protection Clause nullifies the statutory exclusion. If, on the other hand, it is the Fifth Amendment and its Due Process Clause that apply, the statute's discrimination is so egregious that it falls within the rule of Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U. S. 497, 347 U. S. 499 (1954). [Footnote 33] See also Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U. S. 163, 377 U. S. 168 (1964).
In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. at 413 U. S. 721-722 (footnotes omitted). These principles are applicable to the Puerto Rico statute now under consideration.
The underpinnings of the Court's constitutional decisions defining the circumstances under which state and local governments may favor citizens of this country by denying lawfully admitted aliens equal rights and opportunities have been two. The first, based squarely on the concepts embodied in the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, recognizes that "[a]liens as a class are a prime example of a discrete and insular' minority . . . for whom . . . heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate." Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. at 403 U. S. 372. See also San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1, 411 U. S. 29 (1973); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. at 413 U. S. 642. The second, grounded in the Supremacy Clause, Const., Art. VI, cl. 2, and in the naturalization power, Art. I, § 8, cl. 4, recognizes the Federal Government's primary responsibility in the field of immigration and naturalization. See, e.g., Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52, 312 U. S. 66 (1941); Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33, 239 U. S. 42 (1915). See also Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. at 403 U. S. 378; Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U. S. 410, 334 U. S. 419 (1948).
Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. at 239 U. S. 41 (citations omitted). It is true that, in Truax, the Court drew a distinction between discrimination against aliens in private lawful occupations and discrimination against them where, it might be said, the State has a special interest in affording protection to its own citizens. Id. at 239 U. S. 39-40. That distinction, however, is no longer so sharp as it then was. Recently, the Court has taken a more restrictive view of the powers of a State to discriminate against noncitizens with respect to public employment, compare Crane v. New York, 239 U. S. 195 (1915), aff'g People v. Crane, 214 N.Y. 154, 108 N.E. 427, and Heim v. McCall, 239 U. S. 175 (1915), with Sugarman v. Dougall, supra; and with respect to the distribution of public funds and the allocation of public resources, compare McCready v. Virginia, 94 U. S. 391 (1877), and Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U. S. 138 (1914), with Graham v. Richardson, supra, and Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, supra.
Finally, the asserted purpose to assure responsibility for negligent workmanship sweeps too broadly. United States citizenship is not a guarantee that a civil engineer will continue to reside in Puerto Rico, or even in the United States, and it bears no particular or rational relationship to skill, competence, or financial responsibility. See Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. at 413 U. S. 645; In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. at 413 U. S. 724. Puerto Rico has available to it other ample tools to achieve the goal of an engineer's financial responsibility without indiscriminately prohibiting the private practice of civil engineering by a class of otherwise qualified professionals.
* Together with Examining Board of Engineers, Architects and Surveyors et al. v. Perez-Nogueiro, also on appeal from the same court (see this Court's Rule 15(3)).
Using this approach, the Court has held (a) that the statutes of Puerto Rico are not "State" statutes for the purpose of our appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(2), Fornaris v. Ridge Tool Co., 400 U. S. 41, 400 U. S. 42 n. 1 (1970), but (b) that the statutes of Puerto Rico are "State" statutes for the purpose of the three-judge court provision of 28 U.S.C. § 2281, Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U. S. 663, 416 U. S. 669-676 (1974). The first decision was based upon the Court's practice to construe narrowly statutes authorizing appeals, and Congress' failure to provide a statute, parallel to 28 U.S.C. § 1258, authorizing appeals from the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico under the same circumstances as appeals from the highest courts of the States. The second decision recognized the greater autonomy afforded Puerto Rico with its assumption of commonwealth status in the early 1950's. Inclusion of the statutes of Puerto Rico within 28 U.S.C. § 2281 served the purpose "of insulating a sovereign State's laws from interference by a single judge." 416 U.S. at 416 U. S. 671. See also Andres v. United States, 333 U. S. 740, 333 U. S. 745 (1948); Puerto Rico v. Shell Co. (P.R.), Ltd., 302 U. S. 253, 302 U. S. 257-259 (1937); and Domenech v. National City Bank, 294 U. S. 199, 294 U. S. 204-205 (1935).
Original "arising under" jurisdiction was vested in the federal courts by the Act of Feb. 13, 1801, § 11, 2 Stat. 92, but was repealed a year later by the Act of Mar. 8, 1802, § 1, 2 Stat. 132. There was nothing further along this line until the Act of Mar. 3, 1875. See District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U. S. 418, 409 U. S. 427 n. 20 (1973).
This establishment of two separate systems of courts stands in contrast to other territorial legislation where only one system of courts, including district courts and a supreme court, was established and given the jurisdiction vested in United States courts. See Rev.Stat. § § 1864-1869, 1910 (1874). See also Palmore v. United States, 411 U. S. 389, 411 U. S. 402-403 (1973).
In Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 244 (1901), which presented this Court with its first opportunity to review the constitutionality of the Foraker Act, Mr. Justice Brown referred to Rev.Stat. § 1891 in his opinion, but attached no significance to it. 182 U.S. at 182 U. S. 257. In contrast, the Court in Dorr v. United States, 195 U. S. 138, 195 U. S. 143 (1904), relied on the 1902 Act's express exclusion of § 1891 in holding that the Constitution, except insofar as required by its own terms, did not extend to the Philippines.
Section 2 of the Jones Act, 39 Stat. 951, left only two major exceptions: the right, under the Fifth Amendment, not to "be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury," and the right, under the Sixth and Seventh Amendments, to a jury trial. See Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U. S. 298, 258 U. S. 306 (1922); S.Rep. No. 1779, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1950); H.R.Rep. No. 2275, 81st Cong., 2d Sess.,2 (1950).
"Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U. S. 530, 370 U. S. 546 (1962). . . . Thus, although the Constitution vested control over the Territories in the Congress, its practical control was both 'confused and ineffective,' making the problem of enforcement of civil rights in the Territories more similar to the problem as it existed in the States than in the District of Columbia."
District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. at 409 U. S. 430-431 (footnotes omitted).
The division of opinion in the Congress over how, and to what extent, the Constitution applied to Puerto Rico was reflected in the Court's opinions in Downes. Mr. Justice Brown believed that the question was whether Congress had extended the Constitution to Puerto Rico; Mr. Justice White, with whom Justices McKenna and Shiras joined, propounded the theory of incorporated and unincorporated Territories; and Mr. Justice Gray was of the opinion that the question was essentially a political one to be left to the political branches of government. The Chief Justice, with whom Justices Harlan, Brewer, and Peckham joined, dissented on the ground that the Constitution applied to Puerto Rico ex proprio vigore. Mr. Justice White's approach in Downes v. Bidwell was eventually adopted by a unanimous Court in Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. at 258 U. S. 312-313.
347 U.S. at 347 U. S. 499.
The Fifth Amendment, of course, applies to Congress, and, had this statute been enacted by Congress, it would be subject to the strictures of the Fifth Amendment. But, just as certainly, it was not enacted by Congress, but by the Legislature of Puerto Rico. I could perhaps understand in this regard a theory that, under the Foraker Act, which reserved to Congress the right to annul laws of the Puerto Rican Legislature with which it disagreed, see ante at 426 U. S. 586 n. 16, that legislature should be treated as the delegate of Congress equally subject to the strictures of the Fifth Amendment. But any such theory would, of course, face very substantial obstacles in view of the fact that Congress subsequently provided, in the Organic Act of 1917, a bill of rights giving Puerto Ricans "nearly all the personal guarantees found in the United States Constitution." Ante at 426 U. S. 591 (emphasis supplied).
rights; it would have been quite impossible for it to endow its delegate with more power to disregard individual liberties than it itself may possess. I would thus find it extremely difficult to see how constitutional limitations upon the power of Congress may be thought to apply ex proprio vigore to the power of the Puerto Rican Legislature. Moreover, following the passage of the Act of July 3, 1950, and Puerto Rico's acceptance of Commonwealth status, see ante at 426 U. S. 593-594, I would have thought that the only restrictions upon the elected Legislature of Puerto Rico were those embodied in the Constitution enacted as a condition of assuming that status or directly imposed by Congress by statute.
If the answers to these questions were dispositive of my vote in this case, I would feel compelled to explore them in much more detail than does the Court today. But even if I were to conclude that one part of the Court's either/or assumption was correct, I could not agree with the result which it believes is compelled by that assumption. I do not agree either that the statute in question violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, for the reasons stated in my dissent in Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U. S. 634, 413 U. S. 649 (1973), or that, if the statute were subject to the limitations of the Fifth Amendment, it is infirm by reason of their application. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, ante, p. 426 U. S. 117 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting). I would therefore reverse the decision of the District Court.

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