Source: http://www.lexvivo.com/2014/06/
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 15:10:56+00:00

Document:
In the dual cases of Riley v. California and United States v. Wurie, the United States Supreme Court considerably curbed governmental rights to abridge the privacy of the contents of mobile phones. In both cases, police arrested suspects allegedly engaged in criminal activities, then seized their mobile phones. Rather than tagging and bagging the phones, the police searched their digital contents, in both cases revealing information valuable to prosecute the defendants. However, the Supremes found that these mobile phone searches violated the defendants' privacy rights.
Indeed, a cell phone search would typically expose to the government far more than the most exhaustive search of a house: A phone not only contains in digital form many sensitive records previously found in the home; it also contains a broad array of private information never found in a home in any form—unless the phone is.
Even in isolation, Riley v. California signals a marked strengthening of privacy rights for individuals in a particularly crucial technological context where people spend an increasing part of their waking lives. Add in the recent judicial decisions in the European Court of Justice (Google Inc. v. Mario Costeja González) and the Supreme Court of Canada (Regina v. Spencer (2014 SCC 43)), and the tide appears to be turning away from the data panopticon many dread and towards the enhanced digital privacy they crave.
disclos[ing] a scheme for mitigating “settlement risk,” i.e.,the risk that only one party to an agreed-upon financial exchange will satisfy its obligation. In particular, the patent claims are designed to facilitate the exchange of financial obligations between two parties by using a computer system as a third-party intermediary. The patents in suit claim (1) a method for exchangingfinancial obligations, (2) a computer system configured to carry out the method for exchanging obligations, and (3) a computer-readable medium containing program code for performing the method of exchanging obligations.
who operate a global network that facilitates currency transactions, filed suit against petitioner, arguing that the patent claims at issue are invalid, unenforceable, or not infringed. Petitioner counterclaimed, alleging infringement. After Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, was decided, the District Court held that all of the claims were ineligible for patent protection under 35 U.S.C. §101 because they are directed to an abstract idea. The en banc Federal Circuit affirmed.
the system claims are no different from the method claims in substance. The method claims recite the abstract idea implemented on a generic computer; the system claims recite a handful of generic computer components configured to implement the same idea.
Claims involving computer-readable media were also held unpatentable.
A concurrence by Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, suggested that claims merely to methods of doing business do not qualify as patentable under the "process" category of 35 U.S.C. §101, and cited the proposition that "processes for organizing human activity" are similarly unpatentable.
The Alice Corporation v. CLS Bank International et al. decision marks the latest in a remarkable series of patent law cases considered by the Supreme Court. One result is an apparent narrowing of patent subject matter especially relevant to inventions involving algorithms, computer implementation, naturally-occurring chemicals, and medical diagnostic methods. Determining the precise boundaries of patentability remains devilishly challenging, but the recent trend in Supreme Court's patent jurisprudence appears to head towards a relatively more restrictive view of patent-eligiblity.
In The Sign of Four, Sherlock Holmes declares "I am the last and highest court of appeal in detection." For at least today, June 16, 2014, Judge Richard Posner (United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit) is the the last and highest court of appeal in copyright term for Sherlock Holmes. Judge Posner, writing for a unanimous panel in Klinger v. Conan Doyle Estate, set most of the stories Sir Arthur Conan Doyle wrote about his famous detective free from further encumbrance by copyright.
copyright on a “complex” character in a story, such as Sherlock Holmes or Dr. Watson, whose full complexity is not revealed until a later story, remains under copyright until the later story falls into the public domain...[T]he fact that early stories in which Holmes or Watson appeared are already in the public domain does not permit their less than fully “complexified” characters in the early stories to be copied even though the stories themselves are in the public domain.
Posner strongly disagreed, even going to far as to suggest that "the estate's appeal borders on the quixotic." The result is that most of Sherlock Holmes' stories now sit firmly in the public domain, alongside Cervantes Saavedra's adjectivally-cited hero, Don Quixote, awaiting republication, derivation, and all manner of creative uses. Meanwhile, the Conan Doyle estate is left with the realization that it has been tilting at literary windmills.
Two federal statutes directly regulate food labeling in the United States. In essence, the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act ("FCDA") prohibits misbranding of food, which can include false or misleading ingredient labeling (21 U. S. C. §§331 and 343), while the Lanham Act creates a private cause of action for unfair competition, such as false advertising (15 U. S. C. §1125). On June 12, 2014, the Supreme Court unanimously (sans Justice Breyer) decided POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Company, a case about whether or not the labeling provisions of the FCDA precluded PM Wonderful from suing Coca-Coca for false advertising under the Lanham Act.
Petitioner POM Wonderful LLC, which produces, markets, and sells, inter alia, a pomegranate-blueberry juice blend, filed a Lanham Act suit against respondent Coca-Cola Company, alleging that the name, label, marketing, and advertising of one of Coca-Cola’s juice blends mislead consumers into believing the product consists predominantly of pomegranate and blueberry juice when it in fact consists predominantly of less expensive apple and grape juices, and that the ensuing confusion causes POM to lose sales.
Coca-Cola’s Minute Maid Division makes a juice blend sold with a label that, in describing the contents, displays the words “pomegranate blueberry” with far more prominence than other words on the label that show the juice to be a blend of five juices. In truth, the Coca-Cola product contains but 0.3% pomegranate juice and 0.2% blueberry juice.
The ruling that POM’s Lanham Act cause of action is precluded by the FDCA was incorrect. There is no statutory text or established interpretive principle to support the contention that the FDCA precludes Lanham Act suits like the one brought by POM in this case. Nothing in the text, history, or structure of the FDCA or the Lanham Act shows the congressional purpose or design to forbid these suits. Quite to the contrary, the FDCA and the Lanham Act complement each other in the federal regulation of misleading food and beverage labels. Competitors, in their own interest, may bring Lanham Act claims like POM’s that challenge food and beverage labels that are regulated by the FDCA.
The Supremes have now clarified that food labeling can be policed by two separate actors at the federal level. Naturally, the Food and Drug Administration may continue to play a dominant role in enforcing labeling requirements of the FDCA. However, private firms may also enforce sound labeling practices by bringing suits in federal courts to combat inaccurate or misleading food labeling by competitors.
There is considerable irony in POM Wonderful's victory in the Supreme Court. The company is currently embroiled in litigation with the Federal Trade Commission over whether or not POM Wonderful impermissibly exaggerated the health benefits of its products.

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