Source: https://cbaclelegalconnection.com/tag/qualified-immunity/
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 16:03:19+00:00

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The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued is opinion in T.D. v. Patton on Monday, August 28, 2017.
Ms. Patton is a social worker for the Denver Department of Human Services (DDHS) and was responsible for removing T.D., a minor, from his mother’s home, and recommending T.D. remain in the temporary custody of his father, Duerson. T.D. was removed from Duerson’s home after DDHS made a determination that T.D. had suffered physical and sexual abuse at the hands of his father. This case concerns Ms. Patton’s motion for summary judgment on the grounds that she is entitled to qualified immunity.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that Ms. Patton violated T.D.’s clearly established substantive due process constitutional right to be free of a state official’s creation of danger from a private actor under a danger-creation theory. The court found that Ms. Patton violated T.D.’s substantive due process right by knowingly placing T.D. in a position of danger by recommending that T.D. be placed in Duerson’s custody despite admitted concerns about T.D.’s safety, her knowledge of Duerson’s criminal history and conviction for attempted sexual assault against a minor, and failure to investigate whether Duerson was abusing T.D. despite her awareness of evidence of potential abuse. The court found that Ms. Patton acted recklessly and in conscious disregard of a known and substantial risk that T.D. would suffer serious, immediate, and proximate harm in his father’s home.
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a person acting under color of state law who subjects any citizen of the United States to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution shall be liable to the injured party. However, a defendant in an action may raise a defense of qualified immunity, which shields public officials from damages unless their conduct was unreasonable in light of law. Once a defendant asserts qualified immunity, the plaintiff has the burden to show that the defendant’s actions violated a federal constitutional or statutory right and that the right was clearly established at the time of the defendant’s unlawful conduct.
The court first evaluated whether the facts satisfied T.D.’s claim of danger-creation. The court considered whether Ms. Patton created or increased the danger posed to T.D. The court concluded that Ms. Patton’s actions amounted to a failure to investigate evidence that Duerson was abusing T.D., satisfying the first element. The second element is whether T.D. was a member of a limited and specifically definable group. The court held that because the state removed T.D. from his natural parent and took him into state custody, T.D. fell within a limited and specifically definable group of children.
Third, Ms. Patton’s conduct put T.D. at substantial risk of serious, immediate, and proximate harm. This is evidenced by Ms. Patton withholding relevant information and recommending T.D. be placed with his father, by failing to investigate evidence of potential abuse, and by continuing to recommend T.D. remain with his father.
The court discussed the fourth and fifth elements simultaneously. Ms. Patton acted recklessly and in conscious disregard of a risk (element 4) that was obvious or known (element 5). Ms. Patton knew of Duerson’s criminal history, but deleted those concerns for fear of being fired. She further withheld concerns of T.D.’s safety and concerns, stemming from her professional judgment, that T.D. should be removed from the home. Her intentional exclusion of her knowledge and concerns from her hearing report showed she acted recklessly and in conscious disregard of an obvious or known risk that Duerson posed to T.D.
The last element is satisfied by Ms. Patton’s conscience-shocking conduct. Ms. Patton’s conduct was held to significantly exceed ordinary negligence or permitting unreasonable risk and rose to a degree of outrageousness and a magnitude of potential or actual harm that is truly conscience shocking.
In sum, Ms. Patton’s conduct violated T.D.’s substantive due process right by creating or increasing T.D.’s vulnerability to the danger of private violence by Duerson.
The court found that the law was clearly established at the time of Ms. Patton’s misconduct. The court held that a reasonable official in Ms. Patton’s shoes would have understood that she was violating T.D.’s constitutional right by creating or increasing T.D.’s vulnerability to the danger posed by Duerson.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals AFFIRMED the district court’s DENIAL of summary judgment.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Carabajal v. City of Cheyenne, Wyoming on February 6, 2017.
This case arose out of an instance involving the Plaintiffs, Mathew Carabajal and his son, V.M.C., being pulled over by several officers, including Officer Thornton and Officer Sutton. On September 19, 2011, Mr. Carabajal was driving a vehicle containing his infant son, V.M.C., and two others. A police vehicle with its lights and sirens activated followed him, but he continued to drive for approximately six blocks, obeying the speed limit. After Mr. Carabajal pulled over, Officer Thornton, one of two officers who later arrived at the scene, stood in front of the vehicle, while a police vehicle was positioned behind Mr. Carabajal’s vehicle and two other vehicles were parked in front of Mr. Carabajal’s. Officer Thornton shouted at Mr. Carabajal, “Don’t start the car or I’ll shoot.” Mr. Carabajal’s vehicle began to move forward and, after three seconds, Officer Thornton fired two rounds from his shotgun at Mr. Carabajal, injuring him. The car then stopped and Officers Thornton and Sutton removed Mr. Carabajal from the vehicle. Mr. Carabajal fell to the ground and Officers Sutton and Thornton slowly dragged Mr. Carabajal out of the vehicle.
Plaintiffs sued the City of Cheyenne, Wyoming, its police department, and four officers, including Officers Thornton and Sutton, in their individual capacities. The district court dismissed V.M.C.’s claim that he was unlawfully seized when Officer Thornton shot into the vehicle he was an occupant in. The district court granted summary judgment on Mr. Carabajal’s excessive force claims, finding that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity. The district court also held that the complaint did not plead a negligence claim against the City based on the alleged hiring of Officer Thornton, due to a lack of evidentiary support.
The Tenth Circuit first addressed Mr. Carabajal’s challenge of the district court’s grant of qualified immunity on his excessive force claims. In this case, the events were captured on video, and the Tenth Circuit states that it relied on that evidence. The Tenth Circuit articulated the two-part analysis required when a defendant asserts qualified immunity. First, the plaintiff must allege facts to demonstrate that a violation of a constitutional right occurred. Second, if that demonstration is made, the court must determine whether the right at issue was “clearly established” at the time of the incident. The plaintiff must show both of these factors.
Mr. Carabajal alleged that Officers Thornton and Sutton violated his Fourth Amendment rights through the use of excessive force. The Fourth Amendment protects individuals against “unreasonable searches and seizures.” A “seizure” must have occurred and the plaintiff must prove that is was “unreasonable.” Mr. Carabajal made two claims of excessive force.
Mr. Carabajal’s first excessive force claim regarded Officer Thornton’s shooting of Mr. Carabajal. The district court held that the use of force in this case was reasonable. The Tenth Circuit agreed. The Tenth Circuit cited the facts that Mr. Carabajal had eluded police for several blocks, was ordered not to start the vehicle, and that Mr. Carabajal appeared to deliberately drive his vehicle in Officer Thornton’s direction. Additionally, because of the positions of the three police vehicles, in those close quarters, the Tenth Circuit held that a reasonable officer could conclude that his life was in danger and employ deadly force to stop the vehicle. It was reasonable for Officer Thornton to have perceived that Mr. Carabajal’s driving was deliberate. Therefore, Officer Thornton’s conduct was reasonable.
Next, the Tenth Circuit held that, even if Officer Thornton’s conduct was excessive under the Forth Amendment, it was not clearly established that his conduct was unlawful at the time of the shooting. The Tenth Circuit addresses a circuit split regarding the issue and a lack of Supreme Court precedent to hold that the unlawfulness of Officer Thornton’s conduct was not clearly established.
Therefore, the Tenth Circuit held that qualified immunity was warranted regarding Mr. Carabajal’s first excessive force claim.
Mr. Carabajal’s second excessive force claim regarded Officers Thornton and Sutton’s removal of Mr. Carabajal from the vehicle after he was shot. The Tenth Circuit held that the video evidence revealed that the officers did not use an unreasonable amount of force, nor was it unreasonable to remove Mr. Carabajal from the vehicle under those circumstances. When Mr. Carabajal was removed, the officers were aware that he had been non-compliant with police instructions at least twice. Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit held that Mr. Carabajal did not demonstrate a violation of a constitutional right and that Officers Thornton and Sutton were entitled to qualified immunity regarding Mr. Carabajal’s second excessive force claim.
The Tenth Circuit next addressed V.M.C.’s claim that he was unlawfully seized by Officer Thornton when he shot into the vehicle that V.M.C. occupied. The Tenth Circuit held that even if V.M.C. did plead a plausible unreasonable seizure claim, Officer Thornton would have been entitled to qualified immunity because the law does not clearly establish whether firing a weapon into a car constitutes a Fourth Amendment seizure.
Finally, the Tenth Circuit addressed the district court’s dismissal of the Plaintiffs’ negligent hiring claim against the City. A plaintiff must show that the City was reckless or negligent in its employment of improper persons in work that posed a risk of harm to others, for the City to be liable. Here, the City engaged in an extensive investigation into Officer Thornton that demonstrated he qualified under Wyoming standards for employment as a police officer. The Plaintiffs presented no evidence that the City was on notice that Officer Thornton was likely to use unnecessary or excessive force against a member of the public. Thus, the Tenth Circuit held that the City owed no legal duty to protect Plaintiffs as they alleged.
The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in Martinez v. Estate of Bleck on Monday, September 12, 2016.
Colorado Governmental Immunity Act—Interlocutory Appeal—Sovereign Immunity—Willful and Wanton Conduct.
Bleck was injured when Officer Jeffrey Martinez’s firearm discharged during an attempt to subdue Bleck. Bleck filed a state law battery claim against Martinez, and Martinez filed a motion to dismiss, claiming immunity under the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (CGIA). The trial court found that Bleck had adequately pleaded willful and wanton conduct by Martinez and thus denied Martinez’s motion. Martinez then filed an interlocutory appeal with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals held that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal because Martinez was only entitled to qualified immunity, which is not appealable on an interlocutory basis, not sovereign immunity, which is. The Supreme Court reversed and concluded that whether a public employee’s conduct is willful and wanton under the CGIA implicates sovereign immunity. Thus, the plain language of the CGIA affords Martinez a right to an interlocutory appeal. The Court further held that the trial court erred in (1) not deciding the issue of whether Martinez’s conduct was willful and wanton, and (2) using a negligence standard to define willful and wanton. Accordingly, the Court remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Maresca v. Bernalillo County on Thursday, October 22, 2015.
Stephen Maresca, a former police officer, and his family were returning from a family hike when they were pulled over by Bernalillo County Sheriff’s Deputies J. Fuentes, G. Grundhoffer, and four other officers. Officer Fuentes, who had completed her training as a new officer approximately two months earlier, initiated the stop. Mr. Maresca waved to Officers Fuentes and Grundhoffer as he drove by, and Officer Fuentes randomly decided to follow the Marescas’ truck—a red 2004 Ford F-150 pickup. She attempted to type their license plate number into her onboard computer, but got a digit wrong and received a message that the vehicle, a maroon 2009 Chevrolet four-door sedan, had been stolen.
Without double-checking the license plate number or verifying that the information on her screen matched the Marescas’ vehicle, she initiated a “felony stop.” She called the Marescas actual license plate number into dispatch, stating that the vehicle was stolen, but did not wait for dispatch to verify the information before initiating the felony stop. As a result of this call, other officers were dispatched to assist. For the felony stop, she and Officer Grundhoffer, who was following her in a different vehicle, stood behind the open doors of their vehicles with weapons drawn and shouted orders at the Marescas. She ordered Mr. Maresca to turn off the truck, throw his keys out of the window, exit the truck with his hands in the air, lift his shirt above his waistband so she could check for weapons, and lay on the highway on his stomach. She repeated this procedure with Mrs. Maresca. The Marescas complied fully with Officer Fuentes’ commands. While they were laying on the ground, Mrs. Maresca informed the officers that there were children and a dog in the truck. Mr. Maresca also told them that there had to be a mistake and to check everything again. The officers ignored the Marescas.
The officers ordered the boys out of the car the same way as Mr. and Mrs. Maresca, and ordered 9-year-old M.M. to exit the vehicle and lift her shirt. The evidence is disputed whether they forced her to lay on her stomach or sternly told her to stay at the side. After all the Marescas were out of the truck, the dog became upset and jumped out of the vehicle, running into the highway. Mr. Maresca called the dog and the officers allowed him to hold onto her. Two more deputies arrived and one began directing traffic around the “felony stop.” Two additional deputies arrived next, and the Marescas presented disputed evidence that one of them pointed his gun directly at 14-year-old C.M.’s head, leading C.M. to freak out and start crying to his mom that they were going to kill him. There was also disputed evidence that an officer stood over Mrs. Maresca with his gun cocked in a sideways gangster-style hold. Mrs. Maresca began to panic, and the children and Mrs. Maresca were all crying.
Finally, between seven and fifteen minutes after initiating the stop, Officer Fuentes returned to her vehicle and re-ran the Marescas’ plate, at which point she discovered her error. Fuentes asked one of the other deputies whether she was going to get into trouble. The deputy told her to uncuff the Marescas, let them return to their vehicle, and call a sergeant. Sergeant Bartholf explained to the Marescas that Fuentes was a new officer. The parties dispute whether he ever apologized. Mrs. Maresca asked Officer Quintana why he thought it necessary to point his gun at her when she was already laying on the ground, at which point Quintana smiled and walked away.
The Marescas filed suit in New Mexico state court, alleging the officers violated their 42 U.S.C. § 1983 rights to be free from unlawful arrest and excessive force. The Marescas also asserted state law claims against the officers for assault, false imprisonment, battery, and negligence, and asserted claims against Bernalillo County for negligent training. Defendants removed the case to the U.S. District Court for the District of New Mexico. The Marescas filed a motion for summary judgment on their federal claims, and the defendants moved for summary judgment on all claims. The district court denied the Marescas’ motion, granted defendants’ motion, and dismissed the Marescas’ state law claims without prejudice. The Marescas appealed.
The Tenth Circuit analyzed qualified immunity and found it inapplicable to Officer Fuentes. The Marescas argued Officer Fuentes violated their Fourth Amendment rights by arresting them without probable cause and by using excessive force. The officers argued that they did not arrest the Marescas, but the Tenth Circuit disagreed, finding the duration of the stop, the use of firearms, and rough treatment to which they subjected the Marescas indicated that the stop was an arrest. The Tenth Circuit further concluded the arrest was not supported by probable cause because the officers lacked an objectively reasonable basis to believe the truck was stolen. The Tenth Circuit noted that the sole basis for the arrest was Officer Fuentes’ “mistaken and unreasonable belief” that the truck was stolen. The Tenth Circuit clarified that it was not holding that a mere typing error deprives officers of a reasonable basis to effect an arrest, but rather based the holding in this case on all the facts taken together. However, in this case, the undisputed facts established that Fuentes violated the Marescas’ Fourth Amendment rights. The Tenth Circuit held that Officer Fuentes was not entitled to qualified immunity, and in fact that the Marescas were entitled to summary judgment against Officer Fuentes.
Turning to Officer Grundhoffer’s role, the Tenth Circuit concluded it was reasonable for him to rely on the information he was given by Officer Fuentes in assisting with the felony stop. The Tenth Circuit found no evidence that Officer Grundhoffer’s conduct was in bad faith or unreasonable under the circumstances. It therefore upheld qualified immunity as to Officer Grundhoffer.
Turning to the excessive force claim, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the Marescas were entitled to have their claims evaluated by a jury. The Tenth Circuit reiterated that although it granted summary judgment to the Marescas on their Fourth Amendment claims against Officer Fuentes, there were still questions of fact regarding whether the officers used force that was unreasonable under the circumstances. The Tenth Circuit reminded the officers that the use of force must be justified under the circumstances, especially when directed at children as it was here. The Tenth Circuit also found that the Marescas presented evidence of more than de minimus injury.
The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Officer Fuentes based on qualified immunity, and also reversed the court’s denial of summary judgment to the Marescas as related to Officer Fuentes. It remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment as to Officer Grundhoffer’s qualified immunity. On the excessive force claims, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the denial of summary judgment to the Marescas and remanded for further proceedings.

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