Source: https://www.cheluslaw.com/2018/01/03/summing-up-january-2018/
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 16:49:33+00:00

Document:
In Porcha v. Binette, (4th Dept. 2017), the plaintiff commenced an action for injuries she sustained as a result of a motor vehicle accident. The defendants served plaintiff’s counsel with a notice for an Independent Medical Examination, which was later performed by Dr. Hubert F. Riegler, M.D. Dr. Riegler was employed by non-party Legal Med.
After receiving notice that defendants intended to call Dr. Riegler as an expert, plaintiff served a judicial subpoena duces tecum on Legal Med as well as the defendants’ insurer seeking various documents. Relevant to the appeal, paragraph two of the subpoena sought the production of “all billing and payment records related to examinations performed by Dr. Riegler on behalf of all insurance companies and attorneys” for the five-year period preceding the instant action.
This decision opens the door to allow defendants to subpoena similar records from Plaintiff’s treating physicians that may have testified on behalf of former clients of the plaintiff’s counsel.
In Baker v Lisconish, (4th Dept. 2017), a 3-2 decision, the plaintiff commenced a negligence action for injuries she sustained when she was struck by the vehicle operated by defendant John Lisconish. Defendant Santo Heating and Air Conditioning, Inc. was the owner of the vehicle and employed Lisconish. The trial court denied plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability, but granted Santo’s motion for summary judgment finding, as a matter of law, that Santo was not liable under a theory of respondent superior for Lisconish’s negligence and that Lisconish was not a permissive user of the vehicle at issue.
The facts were undisputed that at the time of the accident Lisconish was on his way to his girlfriend’s home after receiving permission from his employer to leave work for the day. On the way to her home, Lisconish purchased beer and stopped at multiple bars to drink alcohol. Therefore, the Fourth Department agreed that Lisconish was not acting within the scope of his employment and respondent superior liability was not applicable.
In this case, Lisconish contradicted Santo’s allegation that he did not have permission to use the vehicle for non-work related purposes. The majority of the Court “declined to ascribe dispositive significance to a written policy regarding non-work-related usage of its vehicles that Santo allegedly distributed to its employees.” The Fourth Department held that Lisconish’s own testimony created a question of fact in that he testified that despite the adoption of this written policy it was his understanding he continued to have permission to use Santo’s vehicle for non-work-related purposes.
As a result, the Fourth Department denied Santo’s motion for summary judgment as the issue of Lisconish’s permissive use must be resolved at trial.
In Flowers v. Harborcenter Development, LLC, (4th Dept. 2017), the plaintiff was injured while attempting to move a bundle of steel rebar from one location to another. The steel rebar bundle was attached to a steel hook, which was then attached to a main crane hook. In transporting the rebar, the plaintiff was guiding the bundle from the ground while communicating with the crane operator when the bundle fell and struck plaintiff’s head.
As a result, the plaintiff moved for partial summary judgment on the issue of Labor Law §240(1) and the defendants cross-moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. The trial court granted the plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment and granted the defendants’ cross-motion in part, but denied those parts which sought dismissal of plaintiff’s Labor Law §240(1) claim and Labor Law §241(6) cause of action premised upon a violation of Industrial Code §23-6.1(d) and §23-8.1(f)(6).
The Appellate Division rejected the defendants’ argument that the plaintiff was the sole proximate cause of his injury because the defendants failed to present “some evidence that the device furnished was adequate and properly placed…” The undisputed facts revealed that the plaintiff was not alone in preparing the rebar for transport and that his conduct, at best, raised an issue of comparative negligence, which is not a viable defense under Labor Law §240(1).
The Fourth Department, however, agreed with defendants that plaintiff’s Labor Law §241(6) cause of action premised upon a violation of Industrial Code 23-6.1(d) should have been dismissed since that provision “cannot serve as the basis for Labor Law §241(6) liability because the [tower] crane used by…plaintiff is specifically exempt from the mandate” of the statute.
Therefore, the Fourth Department affirmed the trial court’s granting of plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of Labor Law §240(1), but modified the order to the extent it granted the defendants’ cross-motion for summary judgment dismissing the Labor Law §241(6) cause of action premised upon Industrial Code 23-6.1(d).
In Harris v. Campbell, (4th Dept. 2017), the plaintiffs commenced a personal injury action due to the injuries sustained by Monica Harris as a result of being rear-ended by the defendant. At the conclusion of trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of defendant by determining that Ms. Harris did not sustain a serious injury. The trial court denied plaintiff’s motion to set aside the verdict premised upon juror misconduct and against the weight of the evidence.
Plaintiffs alleged that the Supreme Court made erroneous rulings throughout the trial which lead the jury to its determination that Ms. Harris did not sustain a serious injury. The Fourth Department, however, concluded that the trial court properly limited the testimony of one of plaintiff’s treating physicians. During the trial, one of plaintiff’s treating physicians, who also received a Ph.D. in biomechanical engineering, testified that he relies upon his biomechanical engineering background in his medical practice. However, plaintiff’s counsel did not serve an expert disclosure for this physician pursuant to CPLR 3101(d)(1).
Plaintiffs further argued on appeal that the trial court improperly admitted into evidence photographs of the plaintiff’s and defendant’s vehicles. With respect to the issue of photographs of defendant’s vehicle same was raised for the first time on appeal not properly before the Appellate Division. As it relates to the plaintiff’s vehicle, “photographs showing no damage to a plaintiff’s vehicle are admissible to impeach a plaintiff’s credibility on the issue whether the accident caused the alleged injuries.” Moreover, the Fourth Department held that “even when liability is not at issue, proof as to the happening of an accident is probative and admissible as it describes the force of an impact or other incident that would help in determining the nature or extent of injuries and this relate to the question of damages.” Therefore, the Appellate Division concluded that the trial court did not err in admitting the photographs of plaintiff’s vehicle.
As a result, the Fourth Department affirmed the trial court’s denial of plaintiffs’ motion to set aside the jury verdict based on juror misconduct and as against the weight of the evidence.
Prepared by Nicholas M. Hriczko, Esq. and Thomas Kawalec, Esq.

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