Source: http://il.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20180405_0000752.NIL.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 15:06:59+00:00

Document:
THOMAS J. DART, SHERIFF OF COOK COUNTY ILLINOIS, THE COOK COUNTY MERIT BOARD; JAMES P. NANNY, CHAIRMAN; VINCENT T. WINTERS, BOARDMEMBER; PATRICK BRADY, BOARDMEMBER; GRAY MATEO-HARRIS, KIM R. WIDUP, BOARDMEMBER; BYRON T. BRAZIER, BOARDMEMBER; JENNIFER E. BAE, BOARDMEMBER and JOHN J. DALICANDRO, BOARDMEMBER, Defendants.
AMY J. ST. EVE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE.
Defendant Thomas J. Dart, Sheriff of Cook County, Illinois, has moved to dismiss Counts II, III, and IV of the Amended Complaint. (R. 11.) For the following reasons, the Court grants in part and denies in part Sheriff Dart's motion.
The Amended Complaint alleges that Sheriff Dart and certain administrative offices filed a string of pretextual disciplinary complaints against Plaintiff Brian Gallagher to push him out of his position as Cook County Court Services Deputy Sheriff for having taken work time off as a result of his medical disability.
Based on these events, Gallagher asserts four causes of action. First, he petitions for review of the Merit Board's February 7, 2016 decision. Second, Gallagher claims a violation of the ADA, in that Sheriff Dart discriminated against him on the basis of his disability. Third, he asserts a claim under the FMLA, alleging that Sheriff Dart retaliated against him in filing the complaint and ultimately causing his termination because he exercised his right under the FMLA to take time off. Fourth, Gallagher claims that Sheriff Dart violated the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA) by failing to notify him that he could continue to receive health insurance for up to 18 months after his termination.
“A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) challenges the viability of a complaint by arguing that it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” Camasta v. Jos. A. Bank Clothiers, Inc., 761 F.3d 732, 736 (7th Cir. 2014); see also Hill v. Serv. Emp. Int'l Union, 850 F.3d 861, 863 (7th Cir. 2017). Under Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint must include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) challenge, a “complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Courts, of course, accept all well-pleaded facts as true and draw reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. See, e.g., Forgue v. City of Chicago, 873 F.3d 962, 966 (7th Cir. 2017). After “excising the allegations not entitled to the presumption” of truth, courts “determine whether the remaining factual allegations plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.” McCauley v. City of Chicago, 671 F.3d 611, 616 (7th Cir. 2011).
Sheriff Dart challenges the sufficiency of Counts II, III, and IV on various grounds. The Court addresses those arguments in turn.

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