Source: https://dc.fd.org/motions/appeals/evidence/adavis.htm
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 06:50:13+00:00

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*Authorities principally relied upon are marked with an asterisk.
The government argues that the statement against penal interest made by xxxxxxx’s brother (xxxxxxx) that he, and not xxxxxxx, possessed the gun recovered by the police, was inadmissible under Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3) because corroborating circumstances did not clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement. Contrary to the government’s contentions, the circumstances concerning the making of the statement did indicate its trustworthiness as xxxxxxx made the statement to defense counsel and her investigator after counsel had advised him that the statement could subject him to criminal prosecution. These circumstances indicate that xxxxxxx’s confession after being advised of his rights was reliable.
The government also contends that there was no other evidence in the record that corroborated xxxxxxx’s statement. In making this argument, the government fails to recognize that the police testimony indicating that xxxxxxx was in the same location as xxxxxxx when the officers observed the gun corroborates, at least in part, xxxxxxx’s statement that he had the gun. Moreover, the testimony of a defense witness describing xxxxxxx’s movements inside the apartment building was consistent with portions of the police testimony describing the movements of the man with the gun. Viewed in the context of xxxxxxx’s misidentification defense, there was record evidence corroborating xxxxxxx’s statement.
Under the totality of the circumstances concerning the making of the statement and other evidence in the record, there was sufficient corroborating evidence to clearly indicate the trustworthiness of xxxxxxx’s statement. Accordingly, the district court abused its discretion in excluding the statement. Because the exclusion of the statement violated Rule 804(b)(3) and xxxxxxx’s due process right to present a defense, xxxxxxx’s conviction cannot stand.
The government contends that the district court properly excluded a statement made to defense counsel and her investigator by Mr. xxxxxxx’s brother, Ronnie xxxxxxx – indicating that xxxxxxx had the gun later recovered by the police – because the evidence did not clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement, as required by Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3). In arguing that xxxxxxx’s statement lacked sufficient corroboration, the government also questions whether xxxxxxx also failed to satisfy some of Rule 804(b)(3)’s other requirements. (Gov. Br. 10 n.5) . Although the government agrees that xxxxxxx was unavailable to testify and that xxxxxxx’s statement “arguably incriminated him,” the government speculates that xxxxxxx could have faced “significantly less serious” charges than the felon-in-possession charges brought against xxxxxxx in this case, thereby giving xxxxxxx a reason to lie for xxxxxxx. (Id.) The prosecutor did not make this argument in the district court and there is nothing in the record to indicate that the government sought to obtain xxxxxxx’s criminal record, if any, to support an argument that xxxxxxx had a motive to fabricate an admission to help his brother because xxxxxxx faced less serious charges. In any event, the district court found that there was “no question” that xxxxxxx’s statement was against his penal interest (1/6/00 Tr. 21), and the government did not dispute that issue below and apparently does not challenge the court’s finding on appeal.
Moreover, the government suggests that xxxxxxx’s confession that he “had the gun” did not “necessarily exculpate” xxxxxxx because xxxxxxx was with him in the apartment building while xxxxxxx was armed with the gun. (Gov. Br. 10 n.5) Not surprisingly, the government cites no authority for the proposition that xxxxxxx’s mere presence with his brother - - without any evidence of joint possession or aiding and abetting - - was somehow sufficient to support the gun possessory charges against xxxxxxx. In sum, the only real issue on appeal is whether the circumstances concerning the making of xxxxxxx’s statement and the existence of evidence in the record corroborating the statement clearly indicated the statement’s trustworthiness. Because there were sufficient corroborating circumstances, the district court abused its discretion in excluding xxxxxxx’s statement.
The government agrees that under this circuit’s case law, a district court must consider the circumstances surrounding the making of a statement against penal interest, as well as other corroborating evidence in the record, in determining the statement’s admissibility under Rule 804(b)(3). (Gov. Br. 11-13) Moreover, the government acknowledges that the district court in this case focused only on the question of whether there was evidence in the record that corroborated the substance of xxxxxxx’s confession. (Gov. Br. 11) However, the government contends that the court’s failure to consider the circumstances regarding the making of xxxxxxx’s statement was not error because those circumstances did not clearly indicate the statement’s trustworthiness. (Gov. Br. 11-17) The government’s position is not supported by the applicable case law.
Reviewing various decisions of this Court and others, the government concludes that “the statements that are often considered the most reliable are those made to lay witnesses shortly after the commission of the crime without any knowledge that the statements may be used later to exculpate anyone else.” (Gov. Br. 13) Although courts do consider these factors in assessing the trustworthiness of Rule 804(b)(3) statements, these factors are not the exclusive ones relied upon by courts and are not necessarily determinative in any particular case. Instead, in determining whether a statement against penal interest is sufficiently trustworthy to be admitted into evidence, courts consider the totality of the particular facts and circumstances surrounding the making of the statement. For example, in United States v. Benveniste, 564 F.2d 335, 339-42 (9th Cir. 1977), the court of appeals held that statements against penal interest made by an individual to the defendant’s investigator should have been admitted under Rule 804(b)(3). See also United States v. Slaughter, 891 F.2d 691, 696-97 (9th Cir. 1989)(reversing district court’s exclusion of statements against penal interest made to defense investigator on two occasions). Similarly, in United States v. Lopez, 777 F.2d 543-54 (10th Cir. 1985), the court of appeals reversed the district court’s refusal to admit a statement against penal interest made to the co-defendant’s attorney. Other courts also have admitted under Rule 804(b)(3) statements that were not made to lay witnesses without knowledge that the statements could be used later to exculpate another suspect. See, e.g., United States v. Price, 134 F.3d 340, 345-48 (6th Cir. 1998)(holding that accomplice’s post-arrest statement against penal interest made to police after Miranda warnings was sufficiently corroborated by circumstances clearly indicating statement’s trustworthiness); United States v. Garcia, 986 F.2d 1135, 1139-41 (7th Cir. 1993)(holding that corroborating circumstances clearly indicated trustworthiness of post-arrest statements against penal interest where statement was made after declarant was advised of Miranda rights and there was no evidence statement was made in order to curry favor with authorities; “[t]he district judge does not need to be completely convinced that exculpatory statements are true prior to their admission. Such a high burden was not intended by the corroboration requirement of 804(b)(3).”); United States v. Arthur, 949 F.2d 211, 216-17 (6th Cir. 1991)(holding that declarant’s post-arrest statement to FBI that he committed bank robbery for which defendant was on trial was admissible under Rule 804(b)(3)); United States v. Thomas, 571 F.2d 285, 289-90 (5th Cir. 1978)(holding that co-defendant’s statement exculpating defendant and made at close of preliminary hearing was admissible statement against penal interest).
xxxxxxx made his statement against penal interest to defense counsel and her investigator. Contrary to the government’s argument, the fact that the statement was made to the defendant’s representatives does not render the statement untrustworthy. Although the statement that was excluded in Edelin was made to a defense investigator, defense counsel was not present at the time. 992 F.2d at 1241-42. In fact, the declarant in Edelin had made a different statement to defense counsel five days before he gave the written exculpatory statement to the investigator. Id. at 1241. Moreover, in contrast to the record in the instant case, there is no indication in the Edelin opinion that the declarant had been advised that his incriminating statement could be used to prosecute him. Defense counsel’s advice to xxxxxxx that his statement could subject him to criminal prosecution (1/6/00 Tr. 15-16) is analogous to the post-Miranda warnings statements found to be trustworthy in Price and Garcia.
that he had a Fifth Amendment privilege, and that if, in fact, he took the witness stand that he would be incriminating himself. He would be subjecting himself to criminal prosecution, that anything he said could be used against him, not only in this case but in his pending matter. Further, that [counsel] thought that the likelihood of that happening was not great, but that he needed to know that it was certainly a possibility.
It is possible [the testimony] could be used against you in your pending case, although I don’t even know what the charges are, so I have no idea whether it could be or not, but it could be.
And it is certainly possible that depending on what testimony you give today, that the government could thereafter choose to prosecute you on the basis of any testimony that you give today.
to xxxxxxx was not deficient and supports the trustworthiness of xxxxxxx’s confession.
The government also attacks the trustworthiness of xxxxxxx’s statement on the basis that his “close familial relationship” with xxxxxxx gave xxxxxxx a motive to lie and because the statement was made, at least in part, in the courthouse. (Gov. Br. 15) Although this Court recognized in Edelin that the relationship between the declarant and the defendant is one factor to consider in assessing the trustworthiness of a statement against penal interest, that factor alone is not determinative and the district court must consider the “totality of circumstances” concerning the trustworthiness of the statement. Wilson, 160 F.3d at 741. For example, in the case cited by the government (Gov. Br. 15), United States v. Noel, 938 F.2d 685, 688-89 (6th Cir. 1991), the district court properly excluded the declarant’s post-arrest statement not only because of the existence of a “relationship” between the declarant and the defendant, but also because the declarant had not repeated her statement since the time of her arrest and because the declarant gave a contrary statement at the time she entered a guilty plea in the case. Moreover, in contrast to the instant case, the district court in Noel had noted that the declarant had a motive to lie to exculpate the defendant, “whom she may have had reason to fear.” Id. at 688-89.
As to the timing of xxxxxxx’s statement, the record does not indicate when it was made but, as the government notes (Gov. Br. 15), defense counsel represented that “[p]art of the statement” was made in the courthouse. (1/6/00 Tr. 10) Citing Edelin, where the statement to the defense investigator was made on the day of trial, the government suggests that the timing of xxxxxxx’s statement casts further doubt on its trustworthiness. (Gov. Br. 15-16) In contrast to the record in Edelin, xxxxxxx’s counsel indicated that she had spoken to xxxxxxx on “several occasions.” (1/5/00 Tr. 151) Since xxxxxxx was at the courthouse and was prepared to testify for the defense, it is reasonable to infer that he had made his incriminating statement that exculpated xxxxxxx to defense counsel prior to the day of trial. Moreover, unlike the declarant’s statement against penal interest in Edelin, xxxxxxx’s statement was made after he was warned that he could be prosecuted.
The government’s speculation that xxxxxxx did not fully understand his rights before the court explained them to him is not supported by the record. The court’s advice of rights occurred after xxxxxxx had consulted with his own lawyer and had been warned by xxxxxxx’s counsel. In fact, the district court confirmed at the beginning of its colloquy with xxxxxxx that his attorney had discussed with him “the meaning of his Fifth Amendment right not to testify[.]” (1/5/00 Tr. 154) After xxxxxxx indicated that he had discussed the matter with his lawyer, the court stated that it “would like to repeat for [him] some of what [his] attorney had undoubtedly told [him]. (Id.) Moreover, as discussed above (p. 7, supra), xxxxxxx’s attorney gave xxxxxxx essentially the same warnings that the court gave him. Thus, there is nothing in the record to indicate that xxxxxxx did not fully understand his rights before the court repeated the Fifth Amendment warnings. Instead, it is more likely that xxxxxxx changed his mind and decided not to testify based upon the consistent advice of rights from xxxxxxx’s counsel, xxxxxxx’s own lawyer, and the district judge. In light of this record, xxxxxxx’s decision not to testify does not in any way undermine the trustworthiness of his statement against penal interest. The totality of the circumstances surrounding the making of that statement clearly indicate that it was sufficiently trustworthy to be admitted under Rule 804(b)(3). Therefore, the district court erred in excluding xxxxxxx’s statement.
§ 804.06[c], at 804-62(2000)(“Evidence that the declarant was near the scene and had some motive or background connecting him with the crime should be sufficient corroboration” for admission of statement against penal interest). It is true that two officers identified xxxxxxx as the man with the gun but xxxxxxx presented a misidentification defense. Therefore, evidence in the record establishing that the declarant of the statement against penal interest was the person with xxxxxxx when the police made their identification corroborates a necessary element of the declarant’s statement - - that he was with xxxxxxx in the place where the police saw the person with the gun.
The government attacks defense witness Goodwin’s testimony that she could see the entire third floor and window but did not see either xxxxxxx or xxxxxxx with a gun and did not see the gun lying on the floor. (Gov. Br. 18) Since Goodwin was looking through the peep-hole in her apartment door, it is reasonable to believe that she would not have seen xxxxxxx with the gun as she testified that xxxxxxx was crouched down as he came up the stairs and she was mainly focused on xxxxxxx, who was standing in front of her door. (1/5/00 Tr. 160, 169, 171) Similarly, Goodwin’s inability to see the gun lying on the floor beneath one of the third-floor windows does not discredit her entire testimony. Even if she was able to see any person who was on the third floor, it is certainly credible that she still would not have been able to see the gun lying on the floor. At a minimum, the government’s arguments do not constitute a sufficient basis to reject Goodwin’s testimony concerning her observations of xxxxxxx and xxxxxxx inside the apartment building.
xxxxxxx does not dispute the government’s point that the police testimony identifying xxxxxxx as the man with the gun directly contradicts xxxxxxx’s exculpatory statement. (Gov. Br. 18) However, viewed in the context of xxxxxxx’s misidentification defense, portions of the police testimony concerning the movements of the man with the gun are consistent with portions of Goodwin’s testimony concerning the movements of the other man inside the building with xxxxxxx. Thus, at least a portion of the record evidence -- albeit only when viewed in the context of xxxxxxx’s misidentification defense -- corroborates xxxxxxx’s statement that he possessed the gun.
The government erroneously contends that “this case is essentially on all fours with Edelin.” (Gov. Br. 19) Although there are factual similarities in the two cases, there are two critical distinctions. First, in contrast to the statement in Edelin that was given to a defense investigator apparently without any advice of rights, xxxxxxx’s statement was given to defense counsel and her investigator after counsel warned xxxxxxx that his statement could subject him to prosecution. Second, while none of the defense witnesses in Edelin corroborated the declarant’s statement exculpating the defendant, 996 F.2d at 1242, there was testimony in this case that at least partially corroborated xxxxxxx’s statement that he had the gun. The police testimony established that xxxxxxx was inside the building with xxxxxxx when the officers observed the man with a gun and Goodwin testified that she observed xxxxxxx on the third floor and did not see him with a gun. Her testimony also established that the movements of the other person inside the building, later identified to be xxxxxxx, were consistent with those of the man who, according to police testimony, was holding a gun. This evidence corroborated xxxxxxx’s statement. In light of these essential factual distinctions, Edelin does not control this case.
In arguing that any error by the district court in excluding xxxxxxx’s statement was harmless, the government questions whether the constitutional harmless-error standard applies. (Gov. Br. 20) In his opening brief, xxxxxxx relied primarily upon the Supreme Court’s decision in Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973), in arguing that the district court’s exclusion of xxxxxxx’s statement denied xxxxxxx a fair opportunity to present his misidentification defense. (Def. Br. 12-14, 20-22) In Chambers, the Court recognized the principle that “[t]he right of an accused in a criminal trial to due process is, in essence, the right to a fair opportunity to defend against the State’s accusations.” 410 U.S. at 302. The Chambers Court considered as factors in determining whether a defendant’s due process rights require the admission of a particular item of evidence the extent to which the evidence is “critical” in the context of the case, the extent to which the evidence “tend[s] to exculpate” the defendant, and finally, whether the evidence bears “persuasive assurances of trustworthiness [.]” Id. at 297, 302. See also United States v. Delgado, 903 F.2d 1495, 1500 (11th Cir. 1990)(recognizing that important factors in determining whether exclusion of Rule 804(b)(3) statement violates due process is degree to which statement exculpates defendant and reliability of statement).
In this case, the exclusion of xxxxxxx’s statement violated Rule 804(b)(3) and deprived xxxxxxx of crucial evidence in support of his misidentification defense. xxxxxxx’s statement that he had the gun directly exculpated xxxxxxx. Moreover, for the reasons set forth in xxxxxxx’s opening brief and the preceding section of this brief, the excluded statement was sufficiently trustworthy to be admissible under Rule 804(b)(3) and as a matter of due process. Because the district court’s ruling violated Rule 804(b)(3) and affected xxxxxxx’s due process right to a fair opportunity to defend himself against the government’s evidence, the constitutional harmless-error standard applies. See United States v. Wilson, 160 F.2d at 741 n.8 (applying constitutional harmless-error standard to admission against the defendant of statement against penal interest under Rule 804(b)(3)); United States v. Mitchell, 49 F.3d 769, 777-78 (D.C. Cir. 1995)(applying constitutional harmless-error standard to alleged error in admitting against defendant certain Western Union money transfer records under business records and co-conspirator statement exceptions to hearsay rule); United States v. Benveniste 564 F.2d at 341-42 (holding that the court’s error in refusing to permit defense investigator to testify as to declarant’s statements against penal interest that exculpated defendant violated Rule 804(b)(3) and defendant’s due process rights).
The government argues that any error in excluding xxxxxxx’s statement was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the government’s case against xxxxxxx was “simple and straightforward” and because xxxxxxx’s misidentification defense was “weak.” (Gov. Br. 20-22) In discussing the evidence presented by the prosecution, the government fails to address the serious inconsistencies in the police testimony. While Officer Rosario saw two men standing inside the building, one of whom he identified as xxxxxxx (1/5/00 Tr. 63-64), Officer Dyson saw only one person, whom he identified as xxxxxxx (id. at 32-33, 40). Moreover, Rosario testified that the man was holding a gun down with two hands gripping the handle (id. 63), while Dyson testified that the man held a gun “in his hand” as he walked down the stairs (id. at 32). Finally, although Dyson testified that the man with the gun “bent over and looked out the window ... turned around and ran back up the stairs”(id. 32-54), Rosario did not testify that the man looked out the window toward the police or ran back up the stairs. In fact, Rosario testified that the man with the gun ran down the stairs. (Id. at 65) Thus, the police testimony concerning the facts surrounding the officers’ identification of xxxxxxx was contradictory and conflicting on several critical points. Since the government failed to present any additional evidence to corroborate the police testimony, the government’s case against Mr. xxxxxxx was not nearly as strong as the government suggests. Given that the government’s evidence consisted almost exclusively of uncorroborated and inconsistent eyewitness testimony, the exclusion of xxxxxxx’s confession - - which directly supported xxxxxxx’s misidentification defense - - was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
The government argues that the admission of xxxxxxx’s statement would not have contributed to xxxxxxx’s misidentification defense. (Gov. Br. 21-22) In support of this argument, the government erroneously claims that xxxxxxx’s statement did not “clearly exculpate xxxxxxx because the statement that xxxxxxx ‘had a gun’ does not indicate at what point in time xxxxxxx possessed the gun, whether or not appellant knew about the gun, or why xxxxxxx and appellant were together at approximately 1:45 a.m., armed with a gun in an apartment building in which neither of them lived.” (Gov. Br. 21-22) The government’s contention is without support. To begin with, xxxxxxx’s statement was not that he had a gun but that he had the gun. (1/5/00 Tr. 152) Moreover, the clear inference of xxxxxxx’s statement was that he, and not xxxxxxx, had the gun when the police observed them inside the apartment building. Thus, contrary to the government’s assertion, xxxxxxx’s statement directly exculpated xxxxxxx. Finally, evidence that xxxxxxx knew xxxxxxx had the gun or was present when xxxxxxx was armed is not sufficient to prove that xxxxxxx constructively possessed the gun. See United States v. Pardo, 636 F.2d 535, 549 (D.C. Cir. 1980)(“There must be some action, some word, or some conduct that links the individual to the [contraband] and indicates that he had some stake in [it], some power over [it].”). In short, contrary to the government's assertion, xxxxxxx’s statement would have significantly strengthened xxxxxxx’s misidentification defense.
The government also contends that xxxxxxx’s statement would have been substantially impeached by xxxxxxx’s relationship with xxxxxxx and the fact that xxxxxxx did not tell the police that he had the gun when the police stopped him or at the time of xxxxxxx’s arrest. (Gov. Br. 22) These arguments go to the weight the jury would have given to the statement and not to the statement’s admissibility. Certainly, if the district court had admitted xxxxxxx’s statement, the prosecutor would have been free to argue to the jury that the statement was not credible. In response, the defense could have rebutted the charges of bias and fabrication by pointing to the circumstances that corroborated xxxxxxx’s statement. Ultimately, the jury could have considered the credibility of the statement in weighing xxxxxxx’s misidentification defense. If the jury believed xxxxxxx’s statement, or if the statement merely raised a reasonable doubt in one juror’s mind, the admission of the statement could have affected the jury’s verdict. Under these circumstances, whether this Court applies the constitutional harmless-error standard or the nonconstitutional harmless-error standard , the district court’s error in excluding xxxxxxx’s statement potentially affected the verdict and therefore cannot be deemed harmless. See United States v. Smith, 77 F.3d 511, 515 n.1(D.C. Cir. 1996)(indicating that harmless-error analysis requires appellate court to refrain from evaluating overall weight of evidence and instead to determine potential effect error had on jury)(citing O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 437-38 (1995)).
brief, his conviction should be reversed and a new trial ordered.
I hereby certify that the foregoing Reply Brief for Appellant, xxxxxxx D. xxxxxxx, contains 5208 words and does not exceed the word limitation of Circuit Rule 32 and Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7).
I hereby certify that on February 16, 2001, two copies of the foregoing Reply Brief for Appellant, xxxxxxx D. xxxxxxx, were served by first-class mail, postage prepaid, on Assistant United States Attorneys John R. Fisher and Mary B.
McCord, Appellate Division, 555 Fourth Street, N.W., Room 8104, Washington, D.C. 20001.

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