Source: https://veteranclaims.net/2009/01/27/non-attorney-comments-on-comer-v-peake-fedcir/
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 12:54:35+00:00

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“… , the VA has an “affirmative duty to assist claimants by informing [them] of the benefits available to them and assisting them in developing claims they may have.” See Jaquay, 304 F.3d at 1280. It is only reasonable to expect, therefore, that if the VA is confronted with a claimant who seeks retroactive benefits, it will inform him that he needs to file a CUE motion in order to obtain those benefits. It is troubling that the VA apparently never informed Comer that he needed to file a CUE motion, but then denied his request for retroactive benefits on the ground that he had “not specifically alleged clear and unmistakable error” in the initial RO decision.” This seems as though it might have far reaching implications, especially when taken in the context of other FedCir comments and opinions. The Veterans Court in Akles v. Derwinski addressed VA’s affirmative duty, stating that “… VA has an affirmative duty to assist the veteran in developing his claim by informing him that he may be eligible for benefits under a particular provision.” Akles v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 118 (1991); see also Douglas v. Derwinski, ___ Vet.App. ___ (1992), U.S. Vet. App. No. 90-678, slip op. at 9-10; 38 U.S.C. ù 241(2) (reenacted as ù 7722(c) by Pub. L. No. 102-83, ù 2(a), 105 Stat. 378 (1991)); 38 U.S.C. ù 5107(a) (formerly ù 3007(a)).
Barrett: “The government’s interest in veterans cases is not that it shall win, but rather that justice shall be done, that all veterans so entitled receive the benefits due to them.” Barrett v. Nicholson, 466 F.3d 1038, 1044 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
See also Cf. Barrett v. Nicholson, 466 F.3d 1038, 1044 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (stating that ” ‘the importance of systemic fairness and the appearance of fairness carries great weight'” within the nonadversarial veterans benefits system (quoting Hodge v. West, 155 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
Because we conclude that the court misinterpreted Roberson v. Principi, 251 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2001), when it held that the duty to sympathetically and fully construe a pro se veteran’s filings did not apply to an appeal submitted to the Board of Veterans’ Appeals following a rating determination, we reverse and remand.
The government reads Roberson too narrowly. This is not the first time that it has advanced an overly restrictive interpretation of Roberson, and this will not be the first time its efforts will be rejected. See Andrews v. Nicholson, 421 F.3d 1278, 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“Roberson is not limited to its particular facts and instead . . . requires, with respect to all pro se pleadings, that the VA give a sympathetic reading to the veteran’s filings.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Szemraj, 357 F.3d at 1373 (“But our decision in Roberson is not limited to its particular facts as the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims appears to have suggested here.”); Moody v. Principi, 360 F.3d 1306, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (The VA is required to give a sympathetic reading to a veteran’s filings even where the facts of a particular case do not “coincide” with the facts presented in Roberson).
Although Roberson involved an initial claim submitted to an RO, there is no reason that the rule it articulated should not apply with equal force to a notice of disagreement submitted after an RO’s decision.
In his view, Roberson requires the board to consider whether a TDIU award is warranted whenever a pro se claimant seeks a higher disability rating and submits cogent evidence of unemployability, regardless of whether he states specifically that he is seeking TDIU benefits. We agree.
in proceedings before the board, “the relationship between the veteran and the government is non-adversarial and pro-claimant,” Jaquay v. Principi, 304 F.3d 1276, 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Because of the paternalistic nature of the proceedings, the board, like the RO, is required “to fully and sympathetically develop the veteran’s claim to its optimum before deciding it on the merits.” McGee v. Peake, 511 F.3d 1352, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
In other words, the VA’s duty to read an appeal submission sympathetically to ascertain all potential claims it contains is antecedent to its duty to ensure that an issue has been properly raised on appeal. Cf. Andrews, 421 F.3d at 1283 (“[T]he VA’s duty to sympathetically read a veteran’s pro se CUE motion to discern all potential claims is antecedent to a determination of whether a CUE claim has been pled with specificity.”). Indeed, 38 C.F.R. § 20.202 specifically provides that the board is required to construe an appellant’s arguments “in a liberal manner for purposes of determining whether they raise issues on appeal.” See Robinson v. Peake, 21 Vet. App. 545, 552 (2008) (“[T]he Board is required to consider all issues raised either by the claimant or by the evidence of record. Indeed, by regulation, the Board is required to construe an appellant’s arguments in a liberal manner . . . .” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). A liberal and sympathetic reading of appeal submissions is necessary because a pro se veteran may lack a complete understanding of the subtle differences in various forms of VA disability benefits and of the sometimes arcane terminology used to describe those benefits. See Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 15 (1980) (Pleadings drafted by pro se litigants should be held to a lesser standard than those drafted by lawyers since “[a]n unrepresented litigant should not be punished for his failure to recognize subtle factual or legal deficiencies in his claims.”); Forshey, 284 F.3d at 1357 (“[I]n situations where a party appeared pro se before the lower court, a court of appeals may appropriately be less stringent in requiring that the issue have been raised explicitly below.”).
“The government’s interest in veterans cases is not that it shall win, but rather that justice shall be done, that all veterans so entitled receive the benefits due to them.” Barrett v. Nicholson, 466 F.3d 1038, 1044 (Fed. Cir. 2006); see also Jaquay, 304 F.3d at 1280 (“Congress has created a paternalistic veterans’ benefits system to care for those who served their country in uniform.”).
The DAV was created by congressional charter “to advance the interests . . . of all wounded, injured, and disabled American veterans” and “to cooperate with the Department of Veterans Affairs . . . [in] advancing the condition, health, and interests of . . . disabled veterans.” 36 U.S.C. § 50302 (emphasis added). Since the function of aides from the DAV is to cooperate with the VA in obtaining benefits for disabled veterans, their role is fundamentally different from attorneys who represent clients in adversarial proceedings. See Stanley v. Principi, 283 F.3d 1350, 1355-56 (Fed. Cir 2002) (noting that lawyers had been historically excluded from board proceedings in order to keep the system informal and non-adversarial).
We also reject the government’s contention that the board had no duty to construe Comer’s appeal sympathetically because he had assistance from an aide from a veterans’ service organization. Although we have held that the duty to construe a veteran’s filings sympathetically does not necessarily apply when a veteran is represented by an attorney, Andrews, 421 F.3d at 1283, the assistance provided by the DAV aide is not the equivalent of legal representation.
CUE claims “must be pled with specificity,” Johnston v. Nicholson, 421 F.3d 1285, 1287 (Fed. Cir. 2005), and must assert, based upon the evidence of record at the time of the original decision, an error that is “outcome determinative.” Cook v. Principi, 318 F.3d 1334, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (en banc).
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 2008-7013 LEROY COMER, Claimant-Appellant, v. JAMES B. PEAKE, M.D., Secretary of Veterans Affairs, Respondent-Appellee. Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims in 05-1462, Judge Robert N. Davis. ______________________ DECIDED: January 16, 2009 _______________________ Before MAYER, LOURIE, and GAJARSA, Circuit Judges. MAYER, Circuit Judge.
Leroy Comer appeals the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims which held that he had not properly raised the issue of whether he was entitled to an earlier effective date for total disability based on individual unemployability (“TDIU”) benefits. See Comer v. Nicholoson, No. 05-1462, 2007 U.S. App. Vet. Claims LEXIS 1083 (Vet. App. July 6, 2007) (“2007 Veterans Court Decision”). Because we conclude that the court misinterpreted Roberson v. Principi, 251 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2001), when it held that the duty to sympathetically and fully construe a pro se veteran’s filings did not apply to an appeal submitted to the Board of Veterans’ Appeals following a rating determination, we reverse and remand.
alleged clear and unmistakable error” in the earlier rating decision. In re Comer, No. 03-17742, slip op. at 23 (B.V.A. Feb. 16, 2005) (“2005 Board Decision”). Comer, now represented by counsel, appealed to the Veterans Court. The court held that it had no jurisdiction to consider the issue of whether Comer should have been granted TDIU benefits prior to May 5, 2004, because he had not specifically raised that issue in his notice of disagreement with the board decision. See 2007 Veterans Court Decision, slip op. at 4. The court also rejected his argument that the VA had failed to comply with its notice obligations under 38 U.S.C. § 5103(a), concluding that the VA had provided Comer with notice of “what evidence [the] VA [was] responsible for obtaining and what [Comer] could do to assist in the process.” 2007 Veterans Court Decision, slip op. at 6 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Comer timely appealed both issues to this court. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 38 U.S.C. § 7292.
This court has authority to review decisions of the Veterans Court regarding the “validity of any statute or regulation or any interpretation thereof” and to “interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, to the extent presented and necessary to a decision.” 38 U.S.C. § 7292(c); Flores v. Nicholson, 476 F.3d 1379, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2007). We review the interpretation of statutory provisions without deference. Stanley v. Principi, 283 F.3d 1350, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Howard v. Gober, 220 F.3d 1341, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2000). “In cases where the material facts are not in dispute and the adoption of a particular legal standard would dictate the outcome of a veteran’s claim, we treat the application of law to undisputed fact as a question of law.” Conley v.
Peake, 543 F.3d 1301, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2008); see Groves v. Peake, 524 F.3d 1306, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2008). I. Comer first argues that the Veterans Court misconstrued Roberson, 251 F.3d at 1380-84, when it held that it had no jurisdiction to consider the issue of whether he was entitled to an earlier effective date for TDIU benefits because he had not explicitly raised that issue before the board. In his view, Roberson requires the board to consider whether a TDIU award is warranted whenever a pro se claimant seeks a higher disability rating and submits cogent evidence of unemployability, regardless of whether he states specifically that he is seeking TDIU benefits. We agree. In Roberson, a veteran, who had had significant employment difficulties, filed a pro se claim seeking disability benefits, but did not specify that he was seeking a TDIU award. 251 F.3d at 1380. The RO awarded him a 70 percent disability rating for PTSD, but did not consider whether he also might be entitled to a TDIU award, which would entitle him to a 100 percent disability rating. See 38 C.F.R. § 4.16 (“Total disability ratings for compensation may be assigned, where the schedular rating is less than total, when the disabled person is, in the judgment of the rating agency, unable to secure or follow a substantially gainful occupation as a result of service-connected disabilities.”). Roberson later sought to reopen his claim, asserting that the RO decision contained clear and unmistakable error (“CUE”) because the RO had failed to consider his entitlement to TDIU benefits. The Veterans Court rejected this argument, concluding that he had no right to TDIU benefits because he had not specifically requested them in his initial claim.
1 The Veterans Court has long held that an informal claim for an increased rating will be construed as a claim for the highest rating possible. See, e.g., Norris v. West, 12 Vet. App. 413, 419-20 (1999). Thus, as the board correctly acknowledged, Comer’s appeal of the RO’s rating determination was required to be construed “as an appeal for the maximum benefit allowable by law or regulation.” 2005 Board Decision, slip op. at 2.
order to keep the system informal and non-adversarial). To hold that a veteran forfeits his right to have his claims read sympathetically if he seeks assistance from a veterans’ service organization would be to discourage veterans from seeking the much-needed assistance that those organizations provide.
claims they may have.” See Jaquay, 304 F.3d at 1280. It is only reasonable to expect, therefore, that if the VA is confronted with a claimant who seeks retroactive benefits, it will inform him that he needs to file a CUE motion in order to obtain those benefits. It is troubling that the VA apparently never informed Comer that he needed to file a CUE motion, but then denied his request for retroactive benefits on the ground that he had “not specifically alleged clear and unmistakable error” in the initial RO decision. See 2005 Board Decision, slip op. at 23. We decline, however, to resolve the issue of whether the VA had a duty, under section 5103(a), to notify Comer that he could only obtain retroactive benefits by filing a CUE motion because we conclude that even if the VA had such a duty, failure to fulfill it does not rise to reversible error.
4 In Sanders, this court held that a violation of the VA’s section 5103(a) notice obligations is presumptively prejudicial, but we also held that the VA can rebut the presumption. 487 F.3d at 891. 4 Another reason we decline to resolve the question of whether the VA had a duty to notify Comer that he could only obtain retroactive benefits by filing a CUE motion is that this issue was not addressed by either the Veterans Court or the board. “[I]t is the general rule . . . that a federal appellate court does not consider an issue not passed upon below.” Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120 (1976); see also Boggs v. West, 188 F.3d 1335, 1337-38 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (refusing to resolve an issue on appeal where the Veterans Court did not “make reference to or decide [the] issue.”). Indeed, even assuming arguendo that the VA had a duty to inform Comer about the availability of a CUE motion, the VA has had no opportunity to make factual determinations regarding whether Comer was, in fact, provided with notice that he needed to file a CUE motion to obtain retroactive benefits, or whether he otherwise had actual knowledge regarding the need to file such a motion. See Sanders v. Nicholson, 487 F.3d 881, 889 (Fed. Cir. 2007), cert. granted, Peake v. Sanders, 128 S. Ct. 2935 (2008) (Even when section 5103(a) notice is defective, the VA can show that the error was not prejudicial by demonstrating “that any defect in notice was cured by actual knowledge on the part of the claimant.”); see also Mayfield v. Nicholson, 444 F.3d 1328, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (The question of whether a particular notice satisfies the notice requirements of section 5103(a) is “a substantially factual determination of the type that should be made by the agency in the first instance.”).
earlier filings would presumably entitle him to expedited consideration of his claim. See 38 U.S.C. § 7112 (providing for the expedited treatment of claims remanded by the Veterans Court).
Accordingly, the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

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