Source: http://fl.bna.com/fl/19980901/3131997.htm
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 14:51:30+00:00

Document:
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, WALSH, HOLLAND, HARTNETT and BERGER, Justices, constituting the Court en banc.
ON APPEAL FROM FAMILY COURT: AFFIRMED.
Francine R. Solomon, Esquire, Wilmington, Delaware, for Appellant.
Thomas Grant, Smyrna, Delaware (pro se).
David H. Williams, Esquire (argued), Paul P. Rooney, Esquire, Morris, James, Hitchens & Williams, Wilmington, Delaware, Amici Curiae.
In this appeal we consider whether the Family Court, pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act,2 has continuing subject matter jurisdiction over the custody of a minor child, although the child and her mother have left Delaware.
Respondent-Below, appellant, the Mother, contends that the Delaware Family Court no longer has continuing jurisdiction to consider the custody of her minor child because she and the child have made Connecticut their home state for almost three years and have registered in Connecticut the Delaware Family Court's 1995 Modification of Custody Decree. Alternatively, Mother contends that the Family Court should have deferred its jurisdiction to Connecticut as the more convenient forum.
Because the Petitioner-Below, Appellee, the Father, continues to reside in Delaware and continues to exercise his right of visitation with his child in Delaware, we hold that the Delaware Family Court has exclusive continuing jurisdiction over the parties and the proceedings under the Uniform Act. Additionally, we find that the Family Court's ruling that Delaware was not an inconvenient forum for the parties to adjudicate the issue of visitation was proper. We, therefore, AFFIRM the Family Court.
The procedural facts are not in dispute. They, unfortunately, illustrate how a simple issue of custody and visitation as to the minor child of the parties can be made unduly complex. Upon their divorce in 1991, Father and Mother agreed to joint custody of the child, whereby the Mother would be the primary residential parent and the Father would have visitation rights. The Family Court approved this arrangement and entered an initial custody and visitation order by stipulation on December 14, 1992.
In April 1994 Mother remarried and in December of 1994 she filed an emergency request in the Delaware Family Court to modify the initial custody decree to permit her to remove the child to Connecticut. She additionally sought sole custody of the child. Father, in response, also requested sole custody contending that residential placement in Delaware would be in the child's best interest. On June 24, 1994, after a hearing on the parties' cross motions for modification of the original custody order, the Family Court issued a temporary order which continued the parties' joint custody arrangement, but permitted the child to be relocated to Connecticut. The primary physical placement of the child remained with the Mother, and Father was granted liberal visitation rights. This arrangement became permanent on March 24, 1995 when the Family Court, on review of its temporary order, entered an order continuing the previous custody and visitation arrangement (the Delaware Modification Decree).
On January 12, 1996, Mother registered the Delaware Modification Decree in the Connecticut Superior Court. Shortly thereafter Mother petitioned the Delaware Family Court to dismiss the Delaware proceedings for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction on the grounds that Mother and Child had been residing in Connecticut since June, 1994, and the Delaware Modification Decree was now registered in Connecticut. A hearing was scheduled in Delaware on this petition, along with other pending petitions between the parties, but both Mother and her Delaware counsel failed to appear. The Family Court, therefore, did not consider the merits of the petition.
In October, 1996, Mother's Connecticut counsel wrote to the Delaware Family Court requesting that the court's file be transferred to Connecticut stating that Connecticut had become the home state of the proceedings between the parties. In response, the Family Court stated that no decision had been made to defer to the Connecticut Court. Mother's Connecticut counsel then wrote a letter to the Connecticut Court asking it to direct the Delaware Family Court to transfer the case file to Connecticut. On November 6, 1996, the Connecticut Superior Court issued an order accepting jurisdiction of the case, and subsequently wrote to the Delaware Family Court requesting the case file. Within a week, Mother petitioned the Connecticut Court to modify the visitation provision of the Delaware Modification Decree. After receiving notice of the hearing in the Connecticut Court, Father entered his appearance in that court, allegedly to prevent a default judgment. The parties then proceeded to a mediation conference, where both parties agreed to modify the visitation provisions of the Delaware Modification Decree. On December 18, 1996, the Connecticut court entered a decree approving the agreement (Connecticut Modification Decree) and forwarded a copy of it to the Delaware Family Court. In response, the Delaware Family Court, in a January 12, 1997 letter, made it clear that it had declined to defer its continuing jurisdiction over the matter to the State of Connecticut and, without any application pending in Delaware, declined to make a more substantive ruling on the jurisdictional issue.
On February 10, 1997, Mother filed a motion for contempt in Connecticut seeking to enforce the 1996 Connecticut Modification Decree. A hearing was scheduled for March 11, 1997. Father immediately moved in the Connecticut Court to dismiss the proceeding for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On March 14, 1997, the Connecticut Court formally requested the Delaware Family Court to defer jurisdiction to Connecticut and outlined the parties connections to both Delaware and Connecticut.
Meanwhile in Delaware, on February 24, 1997, Father filed an emergency petition seeking a ruling that Delaware had continuing and exclusive jurisdiction over the custody and visitation proceedings. The Family Court summarily dismissed the petition on February 27, 1997. On March 10, Father filed a rule to show cause motion seeking to enforce the 1995 Delaware Modification Decree. As a result, the Family Court, recognizing that two modification decrees existed, one in Delaware and one in Connecticut, sua sponte reopened the petition for a ruling on jurisdiction and, after responses and briefing from both parties, on July 2, 1997 ruled that it retained continuing jurisdiction and declined to defer its jurisdiction to Connecticut.
Mother now appeals that Order.
Father filed an answer pro se in this appeal. On November 25, 1997, this Court appointed David H. Williams, Esquire, and Paul P. Rooney, Esquire, amici curiae, who also filed a brief in this matter. This Court gratefully acknowledges the pro bono participation of the amici. Their service is in the highest tradition of the Delaware Bar.
Mother first contends that Father should be estopped from raising the issue of whether the Delaware Family Court has continuing jurisdiction over the matter because he voluntarily appeared in the Connecticut action and agreed to modify the Delaware Modification Decree. It is, however, well-established Delaware law that parties cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction upon a court.4 We, therefore, find Mother's argument to be without merit.
(9) Make uniform the law of those states which enact child custody jurisdiction legislation.
[T]he continuing jurisdiction of the prior court is exclusive. Other states do not have jurisdiction to modify the decree. They must respect and defer to the prior state's continuing jurisdiction. Section 14 is the key provision which carries out the Act's two objectives of (1) preventing the harm done to children by shifting them from state to state to relitigate custody, and (2) preventing jurisdictional conflict between the states after a custody decree has been rendered . . ..
Like a majority of courts, we find Professor Bodenheimer's reading of the Uniform Act and the Federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act persuasive. We, therefore, adopt the majority rule and hold that the Delaware Family Court has exclusive continuing jurisdiction over its 1995 Modification Decree as long as the child, one of the child's parents, or a person acting as the child's parent continues to reside in Delaware, and the child continues to have some contact with the State of Delaware, such as visitation in state.
(a) A court which has jurisdiction under this chapter to make an initial or modification decree may decline to exercise its jurisdiction any time before making a decree, if it finds that it is an inconvenient forum to make a custody determination under the circumstances of the case and that a court of another state is more appropriate forum.
(b) A finding of forum non conveniens may be made upon the court's own motion or upon motion of a party or guardian ad litem or other representative of the child.
(5) If the exercise of jurisdiction by a court of this State would contravene any of the purposes stated in §1901 of this title.
(d) Before determining whether to decline or retain jurisdiction, the court may communicate with a court of another state and exchange information pertinent to the assumption of jurisdiction by either court with a view to assuring that jurisdiction will be exercised by the more appropriate court and that a forum will be available to the parties.
In applying this Section, the Delaware Family Court, after considering that Connecticut had been the child's "home state" for about three years, and that the child's primary medical care, schooling, and extracurricular activities all occurred in Connecticut, nevertheless found that it was in the child's best interest for the Delaware Family Court to continue to retain its jurisdiction.
. . . . the minor child's ties with the State of Delaware remain significant. For the first five years of this eight-year old's life she resided in Delaware. The natural father continues to live in Delaware. The minor child's maternal grandparents and several cousins also live in Delaware. It appears that the only blood relative the child has contact with in Connecticut is the natural mother. Furthermore, the child attends a Methodist church and a summer camp in Delaware during visitations. While these connections to Delaware are important, perhaps what is equally important and further justifies Delaware retaining jurisdiction, is the long history of the child custody/visitation proceedings in this case and the record of those proceedings in the Delaware Family Court.
The judgment of the Family Court, finding that it retains exclusive continuing subject matter jurisdiction over the custody and visitation rights of the child, and that Delaware is not an inconvenient forum to litigate, is AFFIRMED.
1 Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 7(c), the names of the parties in the caption are pseudonyms selected by this Court.
2 13 Del. C., Chapter 19.
3 In its ruling the Family Court noted the rather unusual fashion this case was presented to it and pointed out that the better procedure would have been for the Mother to have petitioned the Delaware Family Court to relinquish jurisdiction to Connecticut. Because two modification decrees currently exist, the issue of whether Connecticut or Delaware has jurisdiction is paramount to the Family Court resolving this case and ruling on the contempt motion. If Delaware has jurisdiction, the Connecticut modification order would be invalid and the Delaware Family Court, not having lost jurisdiction nor declined jurisdiction, would be able to enforce its March 24, 1995 Modification Decree upon the parties. Such a holding, however, would not foreclose Mother from petitioning the Family Court to modify its March 24, 1995 Modification Decree to embrace the parties previously agreed modifications entered in Connecticut. Because the jurisdictional issue presented to us is dispositive of the Family Court's ability to enforce its March 24, 1995 Modification Decree, an opinion by this Court is not advisory. Stearn v. Koch, Del. Supr., 628 A.2d 44, 46 (1993); See Stroud v. Milliken Enterprises, Del. Supr., 552 A.2d 476, 479 (1989); Mitchell v. Board of Adjustment, Del. Supr., 706 A.2d 1027, 1030 (1998) (citations omitted).
4 El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Transamerican Natural Gas Corp., Del. Supr., 669 A.2d 36, 39 (1995) (quoting Timmons v. Cropper, Del. Ch., 172 A.2d 757, 760 (1961)); Bruno v. Western Pacific R.R. Co., Del. Ch., 498 A.2d 171, 172 (1985) (citations omitted), aff'd, Del. Supr., 508 A.2d 72 (1986); Shockley, Del. Fam., 611 A.2d at 514 (citing Bruno); see also Sadloski v. Town of Manchester, Conn. Supr., 634 A.2d 888, 891 (1993) (citation omitted).
5 Yost v. Johnson, Del. Supr., 591 A.2d 178, 181 (1991) (citations omitted); State in Interest of D.S.K., 792 P.2d at 123 (citation omitted).
6 The Uniform Act has now been adopted by every state and the District of Columbia. Annotation, 83 ALR4th 742, 748 §2[a] (1991) (citation omitted).
8 13 Del. C. §1901.
9 13 Del. C. §1903.
11 Annotation, 83 ALR4th 742, 748 §2[a] (1991).
13 Annotation, 83 ALR4th 742, 748 §2[a] (1991).
14 Yurgel v. Yurgel, Fla. Supr., 572 So.2d 1327, 1329 (1990) (citing Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174 (1988)).
17 13 Del. C. §1914.
18 13 Del. C. §1914; Conn. General Statutes §466-104.
19 Trader, 630 A.2d at 637 (citing State in Interest of D.S.K., Utah App., 792 P.2d 118, 124 (1990) (quoting Bodenheimer, Interest Custody: Initial Jurisdiction and Continuing Jurisdiction Under the UCCJA, 14 Fam.L.Q. 203, 214-15 (1981), quoted in Kumar v. Superior Court, Cal. Supr., 652 P.2d 1003, 1007 (1982) (emphasis in original)).
20 Bodenheimer, Interstate Custody: Initial Jurisdiction and Continuing Jurisdiction Under the UCCJA, 14 Fam.L.Q. 203, 216-17 (1981).
22 In re Marriage of Greenlaw v. Smith, Wash. Supr., 869 P.2d 1024, 1031 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 935 (1994), reh'g denied, 513 U.S. 1066 (1994)(collecting cases).
23 Del. Supr., 630 A.2d 634 (1993).
25 In the Interest of Shockley, Del. Fam., 611 A.2d 508 (1992).
30 Id. at 513 (quoting Kumar v. Superior Court, 652 P.2d 1003, 1009 (1982)).
32 Dennis v. Dennis, N.D. Supr., 387 N.W.2d 234, 235 (1986) (citations omitted); In re Marriage of Greenlaw v. Smith, Wash. Supr., 869 P.2d 1024, 1034 (1994) (citations omitted).
33 Levitt v. Bouvier, Del. Supr., 287, A.2d 671, 673 (1973).
34 13 Del. C. §1907.
36 Matthews v. Riley, Vt. Supr., 649 A.2d 231, 241 (1994) (affirming trial court's finding that it was not an inconvenient forum when significant evidence regarding child's relationship with father and visitation could be found in Vermont and the order to be enforced was issued in Vermont, despite child's residence for several years in Rhode Island); Trent v. Trent, Utah Supr., 735 P.2d 382, 383 (1987) (finding no abuse of discretion when children and mother resided in another state, the issue presented was one of visitation, and mother made no showing of prejudice).

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