Source: https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_rul_rule100_sectioni
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 01:44:57+00:00

Document:
Charter of the International Military Tribunal for Germany, concluded by the Government of the United States of America, the Provisional Government of the French Republic, the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, acting in the interests of all the United Nations and by their representatives duly authorized thereto, annexed to the London Agreement, London, 8 August 1945, Article 12.
Article 6(3)(c) of the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights provides that everyone charged with a criminal offence has the right “to defend himself in person”.
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Rome, 4 November 1950, as amended by Protocol No. 11, Strasbourg, 11 May 1994, Article 6(3)(c).
Article 14(3)(d) of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides: “Everyone shall be entitled to …be tried in his presence”.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by the UN General Assembly, Res. 2200 A (XXI), 16 December 1966, Article 14(3)(d).
Article 8(2)(d) of the 1969 American Convention on Human Rights provides that during proceedings, every person accused of a criminal offence has “the right …to defend himself personally”.
American Convention on Human Rights, adopted by the OAS Inter-American Specialized Conference on Human Rights, San José, 22 November 1969, also known as Pact of San José, Article 8(2)(d).
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), Geneva, 8 June 1977, Article 75(4)(e). Article 75 was adopted by consensus. CDDH, Official Records, Vol. VI, CDDH/SR.43, 27 May 1977, p. 250.
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), Geneva, 8 June 1977, Article 6(2)(e). Article 6 was adopted by consensus. CDDH, Official Records, Vol. VII, CDDH/SR.50, 3 June 1977, p. 97.
Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted by the UN Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Rome, 17 July 1998, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/9, Article 63(1).
Article 67(1)(d) of the 1998 ICC Statute states that the accused, “subject to article 63, paragraph 2, [shall] be present at the trial”.
Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted by the UN Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Rome, 17 July 1998, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/9, Article 67(1)(d).
Article 17(4)(d) of the 2002 Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone provides: “In the determination of any charge against the accused pursuant to the present Statute, he or she shall be entitled to the following minimum guarantees, in full equality: …to be tried in his or her presence”.
Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, annexed to the 2002 Agreement on the Special Court for Sierra Leone, Freetown, 16 January 2002, annexed to Letter dated 6 March 2002 from the UN Secretary-General to the President of the UN Security Council, UN Doc. S/2002/246, 8 March 2002, p. 29, Article 17(4)(d).
Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, attached to the Agreement between the UN and the Lebanese Republic on the Establishment of a Special Tribunal for Lebanon annexed to UN Security Council Resolution 1757 of 30 May 2007, Article 16(4)(d) and (5).
(c) Has absconded or otherwise cannot be found and all reasonable steps have been taken to secure his or her appearance before the Tribunal and to inform him or her of the charges confirmed by the Pre-Trial Judge.
(c) Whenever the accused refuses or fails to appoint a defence counsel, such counsel has been assigned by the Defence Office of the Tribunal with a view to ensuring full representation of the interests and rights of the accused.
Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, attached to the Agreement between the UN and the Lebanese Republic on the Establishment of a Special Tribunal for Lebanon annexed to UN Security Council Resolution 1757 of 30 May 2007, Article 22.
Article 12(c) of the 1946 IMT Charter (Tokyo) provides that the Tribunal shall “provide for the maintenance of order at the trial and deal summarily with any contumacy, imposing appropriate punishment, including exclusion of any accused or his counsel from some or all further proceedings, but without prejudice to the determination of the charges”.
Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, approved by an Executive Order, General Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Japan, Tokyo, 19 January 1946, amended on 26 April 1946, Article 12(c).
Article 8(e) of the 1991 ILC Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind provides that an individual charged with a crime against the peace and security of mankind has the right “to be tried in his presence”.
Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, adopted by the International Law Commission, reprinted in Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-third session, 29 April–19 July 1991, UN Doc. A/46/10, 1991, Article 8(e).
Article 21(4)(d) of the 1993 ICTY Statute provides that the accused shall be entitled “to be tried in his presence”.
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, adopted by the UN Security Council, Res. 827, 25 May 1993, as amended by Res. 1166, 13 May 1998 and by Res. 1329, 30 November 2000, Article 21(4)(d).
Article 20(4)(d) of the 1994 ICTR Statute provides that the accused shall be entitled “to be tried in his or her presence”.
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan citizens responsible for genocide and other such violations committed in the territory of neighbouring States between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994, adopted by the UN Security Council, Res. 955, 8 November 1994, as amended by Res. 1165, 30 April 1998, and by Res. 1329, 30 November 2000, Article 20(4)(d).
Article 11(1)(e) of the 1996 ILC Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind provides that an individual charged with a crime against the peace and security of mankind has the right “[t]o be tried in his presence”.
Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, adopted by the International Law Commission, reprinted in Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-eighth session, 6 May–26 July 1996, UN Doc. A/51/10, 1996, Article 11(1)(e).
Canada’s LOAC Manual (1999) provides that, in non-international armed conflict, “accused persons have the right to be present at their trial”.
Canada, The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Level, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 1999, p. 17-3, § 29(e).
Canada’s LOAC Manual (2001) states in its chapter on non-international armed conflicts: “As a minimum, accused persons: … e. shall have the right to be present at trial”.
Canada, The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Levels, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 13 August 2001, § 1716.2.e.
Mexico’s Army and Air Force Manual (2009), in a section on the 1949 Geneva Convention III, states: “Judicial procedure must be regular, that is, it must include at least the following guarantees: … judgment must be pronounced in the presence of the accused”.
e. judgment must be pronounced in the presence of the accused.
Mexico, Manual de Derecho Internacional Humanitario para el Ejército y la Fuerza Área Mexicanos, Ministry of National Defence, June 2009, § 238(C)(e).
Peru’s IHL Manual (2004) states that a person charged with a criminal offence under international humanitarian law must be provided with certain guarantees, including “trial in the presence of the accused”.
Peru, Manual de Derecho Internacional Humanitario para las Fuerzas Armadas, Resolución Ministerial Nº 1394-2004-DE/CCFFAA/CDIH-FFAA, Lima, 1 December 2004, § 32.n.(5).
Peru, Manual de Derecho Internacional Humanitario y Derechos Humanos para las Fuerzas Armadas, Resolución Ministerial No. 049-2010/DE/VPD, Lima, 21 May 2010, § 33(n)(5), p. 251.
In the case of penal offences relating to the armed conflict, the basic principles of natural justice must be observed … These principles include the following: … anyone charged with an offence shall have the right to be tried in his presence.
(a) Presence required. The accused shall be present at the arraignment, the time of the plea, every stage of the trial including sessions conducted without members (except for certain in camera and ex parte presentations as may be permitted under R.M.C. 701-703 and Mil. Comm. R. Evid. 505), voir dire and challenges of members, the announcement of findings, sentencing proceedings, and post-trial sessions, if any, except as otherwise provided by this rule.
(b) Continued presence not required. The further progress of the trial to and including the return of the findings and, if necessary, determination of a sentence shall not be prevented and the accused shall be considered to have waived the right to be present whenever an accused, after being warned by the military judge that disruptive conduct will cause the accused to be removed from the courtroom, persists in conduct which is such as to justify exclusion from the courtroom. Prior to exclusion of the accused under this section, the military judge shall consider and may, in his sole discretion, implement alternative measures to preserve the decorum of the proceedings and protect the parties and spectators to the trial.
United States, Manual for Military Commissions, published in implementation of the Military Commissions Act of 2006, 10 U.S.C. §§ 948a, et seq., 18 January 2007, Part II, Rule 804(a) and (b), pp. II-65 and II-66.
(a) Presence required. Except for certain in camera and ex parte presentations as may be permitted … , the accused shall be present at the arraignment, the time of the plea, every stage of the trial including sessions conducted without members, voir dire and challenges of members, the announcement of findings, sentencing proceedings, and post-trial sessions, if any, except as otherwise provided by this rule.
(2) to prevent disruption of the proceedings by the accused.
(2) after being warned by the military judge that disruptive conduct will cause the accused to be removed from the courtroom, persists in conduct which is such as to justify exclusion from the courtroom.
An accused who is in military custody or otherwise subject to military control at the time of trial or other proceeding may not properly be absent from the trial or proceeding without securing the permission of the military judge on the record. Prior to exclusion of the accused under this section, the military judge shall consider and may, in the military judge’s sole discretion, implement alternative measures to preserve the decorum of the proceedings and protect the parties and spectators to the trial.
United States, Manual for Military Commissions, published in implementation of Chapter 47A of Title 10, United States Code, as amended by the Military Commissions Act of 2009, 10 U.S.C, §§ 948a, et seq., 27 April 2010, Rule 804, p. II-70.
Note. Numerous pieces of domestic legislation provide for the right of the accused to be tried in their presence.
See, e.g., Georgia, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1998, Article 77(3); Kenya, Constitution, 1992, Article 77; Kyrgyzstan, Criminal Code, 1997, Article 28; Russian Federation, Constitution, 1993, Article 123(2).
Article 5. Suspect and Accused.
7. The police, the Saranwal [prosecutor] and the Court are duty bound to clearly inform the suspect and the accused, [both] before interrogation and at the time of arrest, about his or her … right to be present during searches, line-ups, expert examinations and the trial.
2. The suspect … ha[s] the right to be present during searches, confrontations, line-up procedures and expert examinations as well as during the trial.
1. When it has not been possible to serve the notifications on the accused by any of the forms provided for in article 17 [General Rules for Notifications], because none of the places there indicated are known, the Court shall issue a decree stating that the accused cannot be found, appointing a defence counsel for him.
2. [Subsequently] the notifications shall be served on the defence counsel.
3. Notifications made in this way are valid to all intents and purposes. The accused that cannot be found is [to be] represented by the defence counsel.
Article 47. Trial in Absence of the Summoned Accused.
1. When the notification indicated in article 42 [notification ordered by the Court indicating the date for the commencement of the trial] has been delivered to the accused and he does not appear, the judge [will] appoint a defence counsel for him.
Article 52. Order of the Hearing.
3. The Primary Saranwal, the accused and his defence counsel have the right to be always present.
4. The accused [whose] behaviour disrupts the proceedings can be excluded by the Court for part or all the duration of the hearing. He is, [however, to be] readmitted in the room when the verdict is read out.
2. The accused and his defence counsel have the right to be present.
Article 81. Cases of Revision.
f. When the sentence was adopted at the end of a process conducted without informing the accused by regular notifications or not giving him the possibility to appear so [as] to deprive him of the right of defence or when a real impediment for appearing was not known or disregarded by the Court.
Afghanistan, Interim Criminal Procedure Code, 2004, Articles 5(7), 38(2), 46(1)–(3), 47(1), 52(3) and (4), 53(2) and 81(1)(f).
Article 33. Notification of the decision.
3. If the issues discussed during trial harms the child psychologically, the court can continue the hearing in the absence of the child, provided that the summary of the trial is later communicated to him [or] her.
Article 34. Attending the hearing.
1. The child … may attend the hearings.
Afghanistan, Juvenile Code, 2005, Articles 33(3) and 34(1).
The military prosecutor is required and the accused and his defense counsel have the right to be always present; however, should the accused’s behavior disrupt the proceedings, he can be excluded by the military judge for part or all of the duration of the trial. He will be readmitted to the trial when the verdict is read out.
Article 23. Presence of Defence Counsel.
(3) … [T]he accused ha[s] the right to be present during searches, [the] interrogation of witnesses, the collection of physical evidence and [the] examination by expert witness.
Article 34. Presence of the Accused at Trial.
The accused is required, as long as his presence is deemed necessary, to attend the trial.
Article 39. Good Order of the Trial.
(3) The … accused … ha[s] the right to be present [during] the judicial sessions, however, in case the accused … disturb[s] the order of the trial, the chief panel judge is authorized … [to] exclude the person who disturbed the trial from part of the trial. In this case, [with regard] to the [proceedings that] have been executed in the absence of the accused … , [the latter] will be [provided with] information of the proceedings after their next appearance.
Article 49. Stay of Execution and Appeals in the Case of the Accused’s Absence.
(1) [The] [e]xecution of the Basic Court’s decision [first instance judgement] may be stayed in case of the absence of the accused until … the accused or his defence counsel submits an appeal application.
In this case, the beginning of the appeal period for the accused starts from [the point in time when he is] presen[t] and [when the] notification is delivered to him.
(4) [I]n case[s where] … the physical attendance of [the] accused is known [to be] non-essential in [the] appeal proceeding[s], the military appeal court can proceed [with] the case in his [or] her absence when hav[ing] appointed a defence counsel for the accused, on condition that the appeal application is presented by the convict or his [or] her defence counsel to the primary court or military appeal court.
Afghanistan, Military Criminal Procedure Code, 2010, Articles 23(3), 34, 39(3), 49(1) and 53(4).
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Criminal Procedure Code, 2003, Article 246(1).
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Criminal Procedure Code, 2003, Article 247.
d. to be tried in their own presence.
(8) the request for extradition is made by the Requesting State on the basis of a judgment rendered by default, unless the Requesting State undertakes that the person sought has the opportunity to have the case retried under conditions of his presence.
China, Extradition Law, 2000, Article 8(8).
If the defendant sent or brought before the military jurisdictions for an offence could not be seized or, after having been seized, has escaped, or if, regularly summoned, he does not appear, the judgement, as far as it concerns him, is rendered in absentia.
If the judgement has not been personally served, an objection can be received until the expiration of the limitation period of the penalty. If the convicted person presents himself or if he is arrested before the penalty has expired by limitation, he is without delay notified of the judgement.
The notification, under penalty of nullity, includes the note that he can, within five days in time of peace and within 24 hours in time of war, lodge an objection against the judgement by declaration either at the time of its notification, or to the registry of the closest military jurisdiction, and that, after expiration of that time limit without objection having been lodged, the judgement will become definitive at the expiration of the time limits for demurring.
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Military Judiciary Code, 2002, Articles 326 and 331.
Guatemala, Law on the Protection of Childhood and Adolescence, 2003, Article 155.
D. To be tried in his presence.
Iraq, Law of the Supreme Iraqi Criminal Tribunal, 2005, Article 19(4)(D).
Ireland’s Geneva Conventions Act (1962), as amended in 1998, provides that any “minor breach” of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, including violations of Article 123 of the Geneva Convention IV, and of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, including violations of Article 75(4)(e), as well as any “contravention” of the 1977 Additional Protocol II, including violations of Article 6(2)(e), are punishable offences.
(A) Every person tried before a military court shall be entitled to be present during the whole trial so long as he conducts himself properly.
(B) If the accused does not conduct himself properly the court may, at its own discretion, order his removal from the courtroom and continue the proceedings in his absence, provided that it makes provisions for informing the accused of what has occurred during the trial, and gives the accused the opportunity to defend himself.
(C) The court may, as it deems fit, permit the accused to be absent from the court during the whole or any part of a trial on such terms as it may set.
Israel, Order concerning Security Provisions, 1970, Section 35.
(a) Every defendant shall have the right to be present during all of the trial proceedings, as long as he conducts himself appropriately.
(b) If a defendant conducts himself improperly, the court may, at its discretion, order his removal from the courtroom and continue the trial proceedings without him present, on the condition that he is updated regarding the content of the trial proceedings, and is given an opportunity to defend himself.
(c) The military court may allow the defendant to be outside the courtroom during the entire trial or part of it, if it sees fit to do so, under the conditions it determines.
Israel, Order regarding Security Provisions (Judea and Samaria), 2009, Article 114.
Provided further that the Special Court will proceed with the trial after taking the necessary steps to appoint an advocate to defend the accused person who is not before the Court.
Explanation – An accused who is tried in his absence under sub-section (10) shall be deemed not to have admitted the commission of any offence for which he has been charged.
(11) The advocate appointed under the second proviso to sub-section (10) shall be a person selected by Anti-Terrorism Court for the purpose and he shall be engaged at the expense of the Government.
(11-A) Nothing contained in sub-section (10) or (11) shall be construed to deny the accused the right to consult or be defended by a legal practitioner of his own choice.
Provided that the Anti-Terrorism Court may exercise its powers under this sub-section in a case in which a person as aforesaid appears before it after the expiration of the said period and satisfies it that he could not appear within the said period by reason of circumstances beyond his control.
Pakistan, Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, Section 19(10)–(12).
(c) To be present and defend in person and by counsel at every stage of the proceedings, from arraignment to promulgation of the judgment. The accused may, however, waive his presence at the trial pursuant to the stipulations set forth in his bail, unless his presence is specifically ordered by the court for purposes of identification. The absence of the accused without justifiable cause at the trial of which he had notice shall be considered a waiver of his right to be present thereat. When an accused under custody escapes, he shall be deemed to have waived his right to be present on all subsequent trial dates until custody over him is regained. Upon motion, the accused may be allowed to defend himself in person when it sufficiently appears to the court that he can properly protect his rights without the assistance of counsel.
Philippines, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, 2000, Rule 115, Section 1(c).
c) To be present at every stage of the proceedings, from arraignment to promulgation of judgment. The juvenile may, however, waive his presence at the trial pursuant to the stipulations set forth in his bail, unless his presence at the trial is specifically ordered by the court for purposes of identification. The absence of the juvenile without justifiable cause at the trial of which he had notice shall be considered a waiver of his right to be present thereat. When the juvenile under custody escapes, he shall be deemed to have waived his right to be present in all subsequent hearings until custody over him is regained.
Philippines, Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law, 2002, Section 26(c).
7° the accused shall have the right to be tried in his or her presence.
8º the right to be tried in his [or] her presence.
Rwanda, Organic Law concerning Transfer of Cases to the Republic of Rwanda from the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and from Other States, 2007, as amended in 2009, Article 13(8º).
Sierra Leone, Constitution, 1991, Sections 23(5)(c) and (10) and 29(2) and (5).
Whenever any prisoner is required to appear before any court, to give evidence, or for any other purpose, it shall be lawful for such court in its discretion, if it considers the presence of such prisoner necessary for the ends of justice, by an order in writing to direct the Superintendent of the prison, where such prisoner shall be imprisoned, to produce such prisoner before such court, and such Superintendent shall in the absence of good and sufficient cause to the contrary, cause such prisoner to be produced in compliance with such order.
Sri Lanka, Prisons Ordinance, 1878, as amended to 2005, Article 96.
This article applies to persons deprived of their liberty under Sri Lanka’s Emergency Regulations (2005) pursuant to section 19 of these regulations.
(4) The trial of any person before the High Court under this regulation may commence or continue in the absence of such person if the Court is satisfied that he is [evading] arrest or absconding or feigning illness.
Sri Lanka, Emergency Regulations, 2005, as amended to 5 August 2008, Sections 62(1) and (4).
(iii) by reason of his conduct in court is obstructing or impeding the progress of the inquiry, the Magistrate may, if satisfied of these facts, commence and proceed or continue with the inquiry in the absence of the accused.
(b) An attorney-at-Law may appear for such absent accused.
(c) The inquiry shall proceed as far as is practicable in accordance with the provisions of this Act except that the provisions of section 416 of the Code of Criminal Procedure Act, No. 15 of 1979 [regarding the Court’s power where an accused has absconded to examine and record depositions of prosecution witnesses to be used in a trial upon arrest of the accused] shall not apply to the depositions recorded where there is a trial on indictment in the High Court, whether the accused is present in the High Court or not.
Sri Lanka, Code of Criminal Procedure (Special Provisions) Act, 2007, Article 6(11).
1. An accused is fit to plead if he or she is physically or mentally capable of understanding the proceedings.
2. In the event of temporary unfitness to plead, procedural acts that cannot be delayed shall be carried out in the presence of the defence.
3. If the accused remains unfit to plead, the criminal proceedings shall be suspended or abandoned.
Switzerland, Criminal Procedure Code, 2007, as amended to 2012, Article 114 (1)–(3).
“(2) be made a part of the record.
“(c) DELIBERATION OR VOTE OF MEMBERS.—When the members of a military commission under this chapter deliberate or vote, only the members may be present.
“(2) to prevent disruption of the proceedings by the accused.
United States, Military Commissions Act, 2006, Public Law 109-366, Chapter 47A of Title 10 of the United States Code, 17 October 2006, pp. 120 Stat. 2602, 2611 and 2612, §§ 948b(a) and 949d(b), (c) and (e).
“(B) To be present at all sessions of the military commission (other than those for deliberations or voting), except when excluded under section 949d of this title.
United States, Military Commissions Act, 2009, § 949a(b)(2)(B).
United States, Military Commissions Act, 2009, § 949d(d).
Venezuela, Penal Procedure Code, 2009, Article 125(12); see also Article 332.
Venezuela’s Penal Procedure Code (2012), which is applicable to the prosecution of war crimes, states: “The trial will take place with the uninterrupted presence of the judge and the parties”.
Venezuela, Penal Procedure Code, 2012, Article 315; see also Explanatory Notes p. 5.
(3) Every person who is charged with a criminal offence … except with his own consent, the trial shall not take place in his absence.
Zimbabwe, Constitution, 1979, as amended to 2009, Sections 18(3) and 26(7).
Zimbabwe, Constitution, 2013, Sections 69(1), 70(1)(g), 86(2)(b) and (3)(e), and 87(1) and (4).
[I]t can be seen that it is possible to remove the accused from the courtroom if the accused persists in disruptive conduct after being warned by the Presiding Judge and that the proceedings may continue during this period if the accused is represented by counsel. Thus, the conclusion of the first instance panel that the mere fact that the accused is not physically present in the courtroom does not automatically mean that the trial cannot continue is additionally supported. And above all, it was noted that the purpose of the constant improper conduct of the accused was obviously to prevent continuation of the proceedings and delay it, as correctly concluded by the first instance panel. Considering the alternative measure which could be applied in the concrete case, that is, forceful bringing of the accused to the courtroom in spite of his will, regardless of the threats to appear in his underwear, as proposed by the Defense Attorney … in his appeal, the first instance panel concluded correctly that such treatment would represent the inhumane treatment of the accused, undermining the physical integrity of the accused and authority and the dignity of the Court.
Groundless is the appellate argument of the defence counsel noting that the main trial was held without the presence of the person whose presence was necessary pursuant to the law … In order to … protect [certain] witnesses …, the [first-instance] Panel rendered the decision to remove the Accused from the courtroom during the testimony of [these] witnesses. At the same time, the first-instance Panel decided to allow the Accused to follow their testimonies using technical means for transferring the image and sound in order to be able, following the direct examination, to consult his defence counsel concerning the cross examination. Contrary to the appellate arguments, the principle of the ban on trial in absentia was not violated by such conduct, nor was the Accused prevented from observing the trial and taking part in the main trial … [A]lthough the mentioned rights of the Accused were partially limited it was done in accordance with the statutory limitations and the ruling provided that the Accused follow the course of the main trial adequately, without violating his right to a defence.
[T]he universal jurisdiction clause, based on the presence in France of the supposed perpetrator of an offence which is likely to fall within the provisions of the New York Convention [1984 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment] … is strict and cannot be extended to the situation where the interested person has domicile or residence in France but where the condition of physical presence of this person at the commencement of the proceedings is not satisfied.
France, Court of Cassation (Criminal Chamber), “Disappeared of the Beach” case, Judgment, 9 April 2008, p. 9.
Nothing in the record before us demonstrates that it would be impracticable to apply court-martial rules in this case. There is no suggestion, for example, of any logistical difficulty in securing properly sworn and authenticated evidence or in applying the usual principles of relevance and admissibility. Assuming arguendo that the reasons articulated in the President’s Article 36(a) determination ought to be considered in evaluating the impracticability of applying court-martial rules, the only reason offered in support of that determination is the danger posed by international terrorism. Without for one moment underestimating that danger, it is not evident to us why it should require, in the case of Hamdan’s trial, any variance from the rules that govern courts-martial.
United States, Supreme Court, Hamdan case, Judgment, Part VI C, 29 June 2006.
Venezuela, Supreme Tribunal of Justice, Ballestas case, Judgment, 10 December 2001, p. 2.
Article 75 of Protocol I will be applied insofar as sub-paragraph (e) of paragraph 4 is not incompatible with legislation providing that any defendant, who causes a disturbance at the trial or whose presence is likely to impede the questioning of another defendant or the hearing of a witness or expert witness, may be removed from the courtroom.
Austria, Reservations made upon ratification of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, 13 August 1982, § 3(a).
Article 6, paragraph 2, sub-paragraph (e) of Protocol II will be applied insofar as it is not incompatible with legislation providing that any defendant, who causes a disturbance at the trial or whose presence is likely to impede the questioning of another defendant or the hearing of a witness or expert witness, may be removed from the courtroom.
Austria, Reservations made upon ratification of the 1977 Additional Protocol II, 13 August 1982, § 6.
In 2006, in its fifth periodic report to the Human Rights Committee, Chile stated: “According to the new Code [of Criminal Procedure], accused persons have the following rights: … not to be tried in absentia, without prejudice to situations where an accused person is in default”.
Chile, Fifth periodic report to the Human Rights Committee, 5 July 2006, UN Doc. CCPR/C/CHL/5, submitted 7 February 2006, § 149; see also § 215.
- To be tried in his or her presence if he or she is accessible to the court.
Article 74, paragraph 4, subparagraph (e) of Additional Protocol I will be applied in such manner that it is for the court to decide whether an accused person held in custody may appear in person at the hearing before the court of review.
Germany, Declarations made upon ratification of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, 14 February 1991, § 8.
Article 6, paragraph 2, subparagraph (e) of Additional Protocol II will be applied in such manner that it is for the court to decide whether an accused person held in custody may appear in person at the hearing before the court of review.
Germany, Declarations made upon ratification of the 1977 Additional Protocol II, 14 February 1991, § 8.
Article 75 will be applied in Ireland insofar as paragraph 4(e) is not incompatible with the power enabling a judge, in exceptional circumstances, to order the removal of an accused from the court who causes a disturbance at the trial.
Ireland, Declarations and reservations made upon ratification of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, 19 May 1999, § 13.
Article 6 will be applied in Ireland insofar as paragraph 2(e) is not incompatible with the power enabling a judge, in exceptional circumstances, to order the removal of an accused from the court who causes a disturbance at the trial.
Ireland, Declarations and reservations made upon ratification of the 1977 Additional Protocol II, 19 May 1999, § 2.
Paragraph 4(e) is not incompatible with legislation under which any accused who causes a disturbance in court or whose presence could impede the questioning of another accused, a witness or expert may be excluded from the courtroom.
Liechtenstein, Reservations made upon ratification of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, 10 August 1989, § 1(a).
Article 6, paragraph 2(e), of Protocol II will be implemented provided that it is not incompatible with legislation under which any accused who causes a disturbance in court or whose presence could impede the questioning of another accused or of a witness or expert may be excluded from the court room.
Liechtenstein, Reservations made upon ratification of the 1977 Additional Protocol II, 10 August 1989, § 2.
Sub-paragraph (e) of paragraph 4 is not incompatible with legislation providing that any defendant, who causes a disturbance at the trial or whose presence is likely to impede the questioning of another defendant or the hearing or another witness or expert witness, may be removed from the courtroom.
Malta, Reservations made upon accession to the 1977 Additional Protocols I and II, 17 April 1989, § 1(a).
paragraph 2, sub-paragraph (e) of Protocol II will be applied insofar as it is not incompatible with legislation providing that any defendant, who causes a disturbance at the trial or whose presence is likely to impede the questioning of another defendant or the hearing of a witness or expert witness, may be removed from the courtroom.
Malta, Reservations made upon accession to the 1977 Additional Protocols I and II, 17 April 1989, § 2.
Nepal, Declaration of commitment on the implementation of human rights and international humanitarian law, 26 March 2004, § 5.
Somalia has not ratified AP II [1977 Additional Protocol II] and it is therefore not directly applicable to Somalia as a matter of treaty law. The Government is aware that many provisions of AP II represent customary IHL rules and therefore apply to the situation in Somalia. Such provisions include … Article 6 providing the rule on penal prosecutions due to the fact that these norms are reflected in Common Article 3 of the  Geneva Conventions.
(d) Verdicts delivered by military and single-judge courts in absentia may be contested within a period of five days commencing on the day following the date of communicating the verdict. Except in specified cases, all such verdicts are subject to appeal (articles 15, 79 and 80 of the Military Penal and Criminal Procedure Code). In all cases, including exceptions specified by the law, article 81 of the Code authorizes the Minister of Defence to appeal judgements before the Court of Cassation. Article 15, paragraph 4, stipulates that sentences of capital punishment are excluded from these exceptions and they may be appealed before the Court of Cassation in all cases.
Syrian Arab Republic, Third periodic report to the Human Rights Committee, 19 October 2004, UN Doc. CCPR/C/SYR/2004/3, submitted 5 July 2004, § 212.
5. Urges States to guarantee that all persons brought to trial before courts or tribunals under their authority have the right to be tried in their presence and to defend themselves in person or through legal assistance of their own choosing.
UN Commission on Human Rights, Res. 2003/39, 23 April 2003, preamble and § 5, voting record: 31-1-21.
4. Urges States to guarantee that all persons brought to trial before courts or tribunals under their authority have the right to be tried in their presence, to defend themselves in person or through legal assistance of their own choosing and to have all the guarantees necessary for the defence.
UN Commission on Human Rights, Res. 2004/32, 19 April 2004, preamble and § 4, adopted without a vote.
5. Urges States to guarantee that all persons brought to trial before courts or tribunals under their authority have the right to be tried in their presence, to defend themselves in person or through legal assistance of their own choosing and to have all the guarantees necessary for the defence.
UN Commission on Human Rights, Res. 2005/30, 19 April 2005, preamble and § 5, voting record: 52-0-1.
The Rapporteur of the Third Committee at the CDDH noted in relation to Article 75(4)(e) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I that “it was understood that persistent misconduct by a defendant could justify his banishment from the courtroom”.
CDDH, Official Records, Vol. XV, CDDH/407/Rev.1, 10 June 1977, p. 462, § 48.
96. The Appeals Chamber recalls that, pursuant to Article 20(4)(d) of the [1994 ICTR] Statute, the accused is entitled to be present at trial. The Appeals Chamber notes that this article is modeled on Article 14(3)(d) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) and to a very large extent reproduces it. The right of any accused to be tried in his or her presence is, moreover, fully provided for in regional human rights regimes. The question is whether a trial can be held in the absence of the accused where he refuses to attend the proceedings.
102. The fact that there is no prohibition on holding a trial in the absence of the accused if he refuses to attend emerges clearly from the practice deriving from international human rights instruments, as established prior to 23 October 2000, date of the first day of hearing in the present case. In particular, the Human Rights Committee had already held in 1983 that the provisions of Article 14 of the ICCPR do not prohibit proceedings in the accused’s absence when, for example, “the accused person, although informed of the proceedings sufficiently in advance, declines to exercise his right to be present”.
103. In C v. Italy, the European Commission of Human Rights recognized the possibility for an accused to waive his right to be present at trial. This possibility was subsequently recognized by the European Court of Human Rights.
104. Moreover, the Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa provide that “[t]he accused may voluntarily waive the right to appear at a hearing, but such a waiver shall be established in an unequivocal manner and preferably in writing”.
105. The Appeals Chamber further notes that, even though the Rules of the ICTY do not contain a rule corresponding to Rule 82 bis, the jurisprudence of the ICTY recognizes that the right to be present at trial can be waived explicitly.
106. Lastly, although its adoption occurred after 23 October 2000, the Appeals Chamber takes the view that Rule 60(A)(i) and (B) of the Rules of the Special Court for Sierra Leone sheds light on the aforementioned international practice in that it provides that an accused cannot be tried in his absence unless he has made his initial appearance, has been afforded the right to appear at his own trial, but refuses to do so.
107. It clearly emerges from the aforementioned concurring instruments and jurisprudence that, however firmly the right of the accused to be tried in his presence may be established in international law, that did not, on 23 October 2000, preclude the beneficiary of such right from refusing to exercise it. Insofar as it is the accused himself who chooses not to exercise his right to be present, such waiver cannot be assimilated to a violation by a judicial forum of the right of the accused to be present at trial. Such right is clearly aimed at protecting the accused from any outside interference which would prevent him from effectively participating in his own trial; it cannot be violated when the accused has voluntarily chosen to waive it.
108. According to the European Court of Human Rights, such a waiver must be given of the accused’s free will, with knowledge of the nature of the proceedings against him and of the date of the trial; it must be unequivocal and must not run counter to any important public interest. The Human Rights Committee also allows such a waiver provided that it is in the interest of the sound administration of justice, that the accused has been informed beforehand of the proceedings against him, as well as of the date and place of the trial, and that he has been notified that his attendance is required.
109. Pursuant to the foregoing case-law, the Appeals Chamber concludes that waiver by an accused of his right to be present at trial must be free and unequivocal (though it can be express or tacit) and done with full knowledge. In this latter respect, the Appeals Chamber finds that the accused must have had prior notification as to the place and date of the trial, as well as of the charges against him or her. The accused must also be informed of his/her right to be present at trial and be informed that his or her presence is required at trial. The Appeals Chamber finds further that, where an accused who is in the custody of the Tribunal decides voluntarily not to be present at trial, it is in the interests of justice to assign him or her Counsel in order, in particular, to guarantee the effective exercise of the other rights enshrined in Article 20 of the Statute. Moreover, Rule 82 bis of the Rules [of Procedure and Evidence], which allows the Trial Chamber to adjust the proceedings where an accused has refused beforehand to be present during his or her trial, also imposes such conditions.
ICTR, Nahimana case, Judgment on Appeal, 28 November 2007, §§ 96, 100 and 102–109.
Article 14, paragraph 3 (d) contains three distinct guarantees. First, the provision requires that accused persons are entitled to be present during their trial. Proceedings in the absence of the accused may in some circumstances be permissible in the interest of the proper administration of justice, i.e. when accused persons, although informed of the proceedings sufficiently in advance, decline to exercise their right to be present. Consequently, such trials are only compatible with article 14, paragraph 3 (d) if the necessary steps are taken to summon accused persons in a timely manner and to inform them beforehand about the date and place of their trial and to request their attendance.
Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 32 [Article 14: Right to Equality before Courts and Tribunals and to a Fair Trial], 23 August 2007, § 36.
14.1 … According to article 14 (3) of the [1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights], everyone is entitled to be tried in his presence and to defend himself in person or through legal assistance. This provision and other requirements of due process enshrined in article 14 cannot be construed as invariably rendering proceedings in absentia inadmissible irrespective of the reasons for the accused person’s absence. Indeed, proceedings in absentia are in some circumstances (for instance, when the accused person, although informed of the proceedings sufficiently in advance, declines to exercise his right to be present) permissible in the interest of the proper administration of justice. Nevertheless, the effective exercise of the rights under article 14 presupposes that the necessary steps should be taken to inform the accused beforehand about the proceedings against him (art. 14 (3) (a)). Judgement in absentia requires that, notwithstanding the absence of the accused, all due notification has been made to inform him of the date and place of his trial and to request his attendance. Otherwise, the accused, in particular, is not given adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence (art. 14 (3) (b)), cannot defend himself through legal assistance of his own choosing (art. 14 (3) (d)) nor does he have the opportunity to examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf (art. 14 (3) (e)).
14.2 The Committee acknowledges that there must be certain limits to the efforts which can duly be expected of the responsible authorities of establishing contact with the accused. With regard to the present communication, however, those limits need not be specified. The State party has not challenged the author’s contention that he had known of the trials only through press reports after they had taken place. It is true that both judgements state explicitly that summonses to appear had been issued by the clerk of the court. However, no indication is given of any steps actually taken by the State party in order to transmit the summonses to the author, whose address in Belgium is correctly reproduced in the judgement of 17 August 1977 and which was therefore known to the judicial authorities. The fact that, according to the judgement in the second trial of March 1978, the summons had been issued only three days before the beginning of the hearings before the court, confirms the Committee in its conclusion that the State party failed to make sufficient efforts with a view to informing the author about the impending court proceedings, thus enabling him to prepare his defence. In the view of the Committee, therefore, the State party has not respected D. Monguya Mbenge’s rights under article 14 (3) (a), (b), (d) and (e) of the Covenant.
Human Rights Committee, Daniel Monguya Mbenge v. Zaire, Views, 25 March 1983, §§ 14.1–14.2.
… The Committee considers that the author was entitled to oral proceedings before the Court of Appeal. As the State party itself concedes, only this procedure would have enabled the Court to proceed with the reevaluation of all the evidence submitted by the parties, and to determine whether the procedural flaw had indeed affected the verdict of the District Court. In the light of the above, the Committee concludes that there has been a violation of article 14, paragraph 1 [of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights].
Human Rights Committee, Karttunen v. Finland, Views, 23 October 1992, § 7.3.
The Committee observes that when a defendant is not given an opportunity equal to that of the State party in the adjudication of a hearing bearing on the determination of a criminal charge, the principles of fairness and equality are engaged. It is for the State party to show that any procedural inequality was based on reasonable and objective grounds, not entailing actual disadvantage or other unfairness to the author. In the present case, the State party has offered no reason, nor does the file reveal any plausible reason, why it would be permissible to have counsel for the State take part in the hearing in the absence of the unrepresented defendant, or why an unrepresented defendant in detention should be treated more unfavourably than unrepresented defendant not in detention who can participate in the proceedings. Accordingly, the Committee concludes that a violation of the guarantee of equality before the courts in article 14, paragraph 1, [of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights] occurred in the circumstances of the case.
Human Rights Committee, Dudko v. Australia, Views, 29 August 2007, § 7.4.
In its judgment in the Colozza case in 1985, the European Court of Human Rights held that the conduct of a criminal trial without the presence of the accused was incompatible with Article 6 of the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights and that in cases where a person was convicted in absentia, there must be an opportunity for that person to reopen the trial.
European Court of Human Rights, Colozza case, Judgment, 12 February 1985, § 29.
The European Court of Human Rights held that a hearing in absentia was permitted if the State had acted diligently, but unsuccessfully, to give the accused effective notice of the hearing.
European Court of Human Rights, Colozza case, Judgment, 12 February 1985, § 28; see also F. C. B. v. Italy case, Judgment, 28 August 1991, § 33.
In several cases, the European Court of Human Rights decided that the right to be present included appeal proceedings if the issues considered were not purely those of law, but included issues of fact or sentencing.
See, e.g., European Court of Human Rights, Ekbatani v. Sweden, Judgment, 26 May 1988, § 31; Kremzow v. Austria, Judgment, 21 September 1993, §§ 59 and 67.
To fulfil its task of disseminating IHL, the ICRC has delegates around the world teaching armed and security forces that: “The conviction must be pronounced by an impartial and regularly constituted court respecting the generally recognized principles of regular judicial procedure, which include …trial in the presence of the accused”.
Frédéric de Mulinen, Handbook on the Law of War for Armed Forces, ICRC, Geneva, 1987, § 202(e).
The ICRC Commentary on the Additional Protocols states that Article 75(4)(e) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I “does not exclude sentencing a defendant in his absence if the law of the State permits judgement in absentia”.
Yves Sandoz et al. (eds.), Commentary on the Additional Protocols, ICRC, Geneva, 1987, § 3109.
In some countries the discussions of the judges of the court are public and take place before the defendant; in other countries the discussion is held in camera, and only the verdict is made public. Finally, there are countries where the court’s decision is communicated to the defendant by the clerk of the court in the absence of the judges. This sub-paragraph does not prohibit any such practices: the important thing is that the defendant is present at the sessions where the prosecution puts its case, when oral arguments are heard, etc. In addition, the defendant must be able to hear the witnesses and experts, to ask questions himself and to make his objections or propose corrections.
Yves Sandoz et al. (eds.), Commentary on the Additional Protocols, ICRC, Geneva, 1987,7break; § 3110.
Turku Declaration of Minimum Humanitarian Standards, adopted by an expert meeting convened by the Institute for Human Rights, Åbo Akademi University, Turku/Åbo, 30 November–2 December 1990, Article 9(d), IRRC, No. 282, 1991, p. 334.

References: § 29
 § 1716
 § 238
 § 32
 § 33
 § 949
 § 949
 § 3
 § 6
 § 149
 § 215
 § 8
 § 8
 § 13
 § 2
 § 1
 § 2
 § 1
 § 2
 § 5
 § 212
 § 5
 § 4
 § 5
 § 48
 v. 
 § 36
 v. 
 v. 
 § 7
 v. 
 § 7
 § 29
 § 28
 v. 
 § 33
 v. 
 § 31
 v. 
 § 202
 § 3109
 § 3110