Source: https://www.calattorneysfees.com/2015/04/index.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 22:42:12+00:00

Document:
Matter Reversed and Remanded to Determine Value of Attorney’s Lien in Trust.
Novak v. Kay, Case No. B256889 (2d Dist., Div. 5 Apr. 28, 2015) (published) involved an attorney with broad contractual attorney’s fees language in a retainer letter with a client who died but who was determined to be a pretermitted spouse having an interest with a separate trust with assets. The lower court denied the attorney’s effort to enforce the lien through a probate petition, based on the theory that attorney did not timely file a creditor’s claim against deceased client’s estate. The appellate court reversed, determining that an equitable lienholder like attorney did not have to file a creditor’s claim or initiate an independent action to foreclose the lien under Probate Code section 9391. It also remanded the matter so that the probate court could determine the value of lawyer’s interest in the trust.
BLOG UNDERVIEW—This case is must reading for counsel inserting attorney lien provisions in retention agreements because it quotes the broad contractual charging lien language which was honored on appeal.
Defendant Did Prevail, And Both Objective/Subjective Prongs Of Fee-Shifting Statute Were Satisfied.
A lower court awarded a defendant sued by a trade secret misappropriation plaintiff $180,817.50 in fees after plaintiff dismissed a suit hinged on the claim that the defense was improperly hiring away touchtone technology specialists from plaintiff. Plaintiff had dismissed the suit after losing a TRO, sensing it was going to lose on the merits.
The appellate court affirmed in Cypress Semiconductor Corp. v. Maxim Integrated Products, Inc., Case No. H038555 (6th Dist. Apr. 28, 2015) (published). Defendant did prevail on a practical level by abandoning an action that was designed to “cow” other competitors into not soliciting potential employee candidates from plaintiff, but only after it had a fear it would lose. Plaintiff’s case was objectively specious because the defense had a right to solicit and there was an absence of evidence of misappropriation, with the theory advanced by plaintiff akin to the inevitable disclosure theory rejected in other California appellate decisions. The subjective element was met even though there was no express finding of bad faith. The appellate court rejected the proposition that a subjective belief in the merits by plaintiff defeated the “improper purpose” shown by plaintiff’s efforts to muscle competitors only soliciting qualified employees as they were entitled to do. This subjective element was further confirmed by plaintiff’s vague specification of the trade secrets at issue (required under CUSTA) and its evasive discovery responses.
Trial Judge Improperly Cut Stipulated Fees By Almost 50%.
In Leeman v. Adams Extract & Spice, LLC, Case No. 142321 (1st Dist., Div. 4 Apr. 28, 2015) (unpublished), the parties reached a settlement agreement in a case arising under Proposition 65, which does allow recovery for attorney’s fees by a successful party under CCP § 1021.5. The case involved allegations that defendant used a carcinogenic chemical in certain food extracts, flavorings, etc. without adequate Proposition 65 warnings. Although incurring fees around $102,000, the parties stipulated plaintiff’s attorneys would receive $72,500 under the settlement. However, the lower court reduced the stipulated fees by about half to $35,839.67.
Plaintiff did successfully appeal the fee cut. The lower court could not add to or modify the consent judgment pursuant to the settlement unless it set aside the whole settlement—following dictates of CCP § 664.6 and Proposition 65 settlement statutory provisions. (7-Eleven Owners for Fair Franchising cv. Southland Corp., 85 Cal.App.4th 1135, 1164 (2000); Health & Safety Code, § 25249.7(f)(4).) It could approve the settlement, but could not modify the fee award downward. So, the matter was remanded for an “all or nothing” approval or denial of the entire settlement.
Court of Appeals Overturns Its Prior Adoption Of Hindsight, “Material Benefit” Standard In Pro-Snax.
In Barron & Newburger, P.C. v. Texas Skyline, Limited, No. 13-50075 (5th Cir. April 9, 2015) (published), a bankruptcy judge allowed only about $20,000 of a $130,000 fee compensation request by Chapter 11 bankruptcy counsel under 11 U.S.C. § 330, which allows compensation for “services necessary to the administration of, or beneficial at the time at which the service was rendered toward the completion of, a [Chapter 11] case.” The bankruptcy judge followed a hindsight-based “material benefit” standard requiring a tangible, identifiable benefit set by the Fifth Circuit earlier in In re Pro-Snax Distributors, Inc., 157 F.3d 414 (5th Cir. 1998).
Individual Parties Were Only Secondarily Linked To LLC Members.
That conclusion held up on appeal. The reason was that although one party was the trustee of a Trust LLC member and another party was the custodian of another LLC member, these parties were sued individually, not in representative capacities, which meant they were not LLC members subject to fee exposure.
Demand/Offer Consideration Not Limited To First Exchange Battle And Amount Of Compensation Actually Fixed Can Be The Beacon For Litigation Expense Decision In Bifurcated Trial—Bottom Line Is That Exchanges On Continued Trial Date Geared To Final Compensation Fix Can Be Used For Litigation Expense Determination In Bifurcated Trial Context.
People ex rel. CALTRANS v. Hansen’s Truck Stop, Inc., Case No. A133252 (1st Dist., Div. 4 Apr. 24, 2015) (published) is a very important addition to the jurisprudence under the eminent domain CCP § 1250.410 litigation expense scheme by which property owners can obtain attorney’s fees and court costs for winning the battle in these generally hard-fought cases.
First, the facts. This was a bifurcated “trial,” with phase one being whether property owner had a right to pursue damages for access impairment/goodwill loss and with phase two being what amount should be awarded in compensation for these components. As can be expected, various procedural things occurred in these complicated proceedings. Property owner initially demanded $5 million, with the State initially offering $784,000—with the trial judge determining that property owner had entitlement to pursue damages, but the amount of compensation to be fixed in phase two. Then, in phase two, property owner sent an amended demand for $2.99 million, but the State sticking to its original $784,000 offer. The jury came in at $2.5 million in favor of property owner, 85% of the amended $ 2.99 million demand. However, the trial court denied litigation expenses under the eminent domain scheme, based on the notion that they could not be justified via the initial $5 million demand by property owner.
Second, the law. The appellate court reversed based on its interpretation that the trial judge should have some flexibility in gauging statutory exchanges, especially where these issues are bifurcated, trifurcated, or even subject to more procedurally based nuances. The demand/offer sequence can be calibrated to the continued trial dates, that was the initial ruling on appeal. However, the critical question focused on what happens in a bifurcated trial as far as demand/offer—particularly the statutory language of “trial on issues relating to compensation” for CCP § 1250.410 purposes—does it run from the damages entitlement phase (phase one) or the compensation fixing phase (phase two). Phase two won out, with the appellate court making an analogy to CCP § 998 multiple offers and with a note to the Legislature to maybe make the result more clear given less than clear language in section 1250.410.
End result: Litigation expense denial reversed, with the trial judge given flexibility to gauge demand/offers, in bifurcated proceedings, at a much later point in time than when the first demands/offers were made.
Case Illustrates the Potency of CCP § 998 Offer.
Lots of press coverage was had on Ms. Ellen Pao’s gender discrimination suit against venture capital firm Kleiner Perkins Caufield & Byers. She lost a jury verdict. However, that is hardly the end of the saga.
Apparently, much earlier, the defense had sent a CCP § 998 offer to settle the case for $964,502, an amount based on the projected costs of the case. Ms. Pao did not accept the offer such that she faces potential liability for defense expert witness fees, attorney’s fees, and court costs.
However, the defense—based on the leverage from the 998 offer—has offered to not ask for any fees, costs or expenses from Ms. Pao if she agrees to drop any further actions in the case (such as post-trial motions and an appeal) such that the litigation is entirely over. Quite an interesting offer, but one that is tethered to the powerful leverage resulting from a properly-structured 998 offer.
Trivial Pursuit: “One of the stranger points brought up in testimony was how Ms. Pao, before she was married, had dated a colleague for six months without ever realizing he was still living with his wife.” NY Times, March 27, 2015.
Also, Fee Award Was Fairly Modest.
Plaintiff lost a SLAPP motion to the defense, which gave rise to the mandatory fee-shifting attorney’s fees statutory provision codified in Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16(c)(1). The trial court granted defendant $7,122.50 in fees and $806 in costs.
Plaintiff’s appeal in Darling v. Pentecost, Case No. E059958 (4th Dist., Div. 2 Apr. 22, 2015) (unpublished) was unsuccessful in obtaining any relief from this order.
The main argument on appeal was that the lower court erred by not considering her financial resources in rendering the award. The appellate court disagreed for several reasons. First, nothing in the mandatory SLAPP statute provided for a consideration of this factor, in contrast to discretionary fee awards in the civil rights area where this is a relevant consideration. “Plaintiff has not cited, and we have not discovered, any authority requiring California courts to consider the unsuccessful plaintiff’s financial status in making an award of attorney fees and costs to a prevailing defendant under the anti-SLAPP statute.” (Slip Opn., p. 10.) Second, plaintiff never provided any evidence of her financial status at any level of the proceedings, with representations not satisfying what she needed to do even if this was a consideration. Third, the absence of a reporter’s transcript made it impossible to determine if the financial consideration was weighed, although the competing consideration to compensate the winning SLAPP litigant was an even more compelling concern.
A Reader Comments On Our Post About Willow Bend v. City of Holtville.
Above: Neideffer Camp, Holtville, Imperial Valley. Dorothea Lange, photographer. Spring 1937. Library of Congress.
I've just come across your blog. I'm writing to thank you for your efforts. The blog is as entertaining as it is useful.
Also, as the lawyer for the appellants in the above-referenced case, I want to let you know I think your analysis of that case in your post dated August 23, 2014 missed the mark.
You say the question in that case was "whether the lower court denial of fees was proper as to cross-defendants, some of whom only prevailed on some MRL-oriented claims and one of whom was dismissed from the entire cross-complaint." The statement, that "some of [the cross-defendants] only prevailed on some MRL oriented claims" suggests the reason denial of fees was reversed as to only one of the three cross-defendants is that the other two did not prevail on at least one MRL-oriented claim. But that's not true. There were two MRL causes of action in the cross-complaint, and both were asserted against and dismissed as to all three cross-defendants.
The appellate court affirmed denial of the motion as to two of the cross-defendants, not because they did not prevail on an MRL-oriented claim, but because they did not prevail on non-MRL claims, namely: the causes of action they had asserted against the City which were dismissed when the trial court granted the City';s motion for summary judgment. The court reversed denial of the fee motion as to cross-defendant Barton Properties, Inc. because it was not a plaintiff; it was a party only because the City named it as a cross-defendant. According to the Court of Appeal, Barton was entitled to a fee award because it prevailed on every cause of action in which it was a party, and the other two cross-defendants were not entitled to a fee award because they were parties to causes of action in which they did not prevail.
That brings into focus the holding of the case: where a plaintiff joins an MRL cause of action with a non-MRL cause of action and dismisses the MRL cause of action prior to trial, whether the defendant qualifies as a prevailing party under the MRL fee statute depends on the outcome of the non-MRL cause of action.
That holding makes no sense. The MRL fee statute awards fees to the prevailing party, and it defines "prevailing party" to include the defendant where the plaintiff dismisses prior to trial. I can think of very good reasons for such a rule. For example, it helps weed out unmeritorious claims [a plaintiff has to think twice before asserting an MRL claim because if it finds out prior to trial that the claim lacks merit, dismissal will result in a fee award to the defendant]. But that purpose is impaired if the defendant's right to a fee award depends on the outcome of an unrelated claim with which the MRL causes of action happens to have been joined.
Moreover, this decision conflicts with two other cases. In Aleman v. Air Touch Cellular (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 495, the court rejected an interpretation of a Labor Code fee provision under which the right to a fee award would depend on whether two unrelated claims were asserted in separate actions or in one action. And, in Graciano v. Robinson Ford Sales (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 140 -- decided by the same court [4th District, Div. 1 (albeit a different panel)] as Willow Bend -- the court reversed a trial court that awarded the prevailing party fees under the Consumer Legal Remedies Act and Auto Financing Sales Act but reduced the amount because the plaintiff did not prevail on other causes of action. The court said, "The relevant inquiry ... was simply whether ... [plaintiff] was the prevailing party with respect to her causes of action under the CLRA and ASFA, under which she sought attorney's fees." Here, the relevant inquiry should have been only whether the three cross-defendants prevailed on the MRL causes of action.
Again, thanks for your efforts. It's a great contribution to the development of the law.
Various Technical and Due Process Argument Rejected.
In Faton v. Ahmedo, Case No. D066119 (4th Dist., Div. 1 Apr. 22, 2015) (unpublished), the man in a domestic violence restraining order battle with a lady he dated for a period of time eventually lost the DVRO proceeding and then was ordered to pay attorney’s fees of $5,000 out of a requested $12,655 under Family Code section 6344(a), which states: “After notice and a hearing the court may issue an order for payment of attorney’s fees and costs of the prevailing party.” The order was made after consideration of the lady’s request in a post-DVRO fee proceeding, even though the lady did not check a request for fees in the initial Judicial Council DVRO forms.
Appellant’s numerous challenges to the fee award did not succeed on review.
Next up, appellant argued that section 6344 does not permit an attorney’s fees request to be made after the conclusion of the DVRO evidentiary hearing won by respondent. However, the appellate court could find nothing in the DVRO statutory scheme intended to deprive a lower court of jurisdiction to award fees even though the request was not made in the initial standard court forms.
Given that appellant did have an opportunity to contest the fee request at a separate hearing, the due process argument did not gain traction on appeal.
Finally, the reduction in requested fees by over $7,500 showed that the fee order was reasonable.
A lot of press was generated on the sexual harassment trial involving plaintiff Alexandra Marchuk against Faruqi & Faruqi, LLP, a securities boutique business. She eventually won a small verdict, and then moved to recover $1.4 million in attorney’s fees and costs. On April 20, 2015, the New York federal court district judge ruled that this request was “patently unreasonable,” awarding plaintiff instead slightly less than $223,000 in fees and costs stemming from the mixed verdict in the harassment case.
However, On Remand, Fee Claimant Can Try For Them Under Another Statute.
If a defendant loses a SLAPP motion, fees can only be assessed against a defendant (and not defense counsel) if findings are made that the motion was frivolous/bad faith under CCP § 128.5 (which used to be dead, but has made a temporary reappearance). The trial court did assess $3,500 fees against a SLAPP losing defendant and defense counsel after determining defendant brought the motion rather than await a plaintiff’s consummation of her communicated intent to dismiss a harassment petition (which plaintiff did do). The lower court orally did make the necessary 128.5 findings.
However, the appellate court in London v. Glasser, Case No. B257657 (2d Dist., Div. 5 Apr. 15, 2015) (unpublished) determined that the fee award under the SLAPP statute (CCP § 425.16(c)(1)) was not compliant because CCP § 128.5 required written findings, something missing from the minute order. Also, the SLAPP fee award could not be made against defense counsel under Moore v. Kaufman, 189 Cal.App.4th 604, 615 (2010).
Nonetheless, plaintiff had hope—on remand, she could seek fees as a sanction under a harassment fee-shifting statute, CCP § 527.6(r)—since she moved under it, but the trial judge only made the award under the SLAPP statute.
We Now Have A Firm Split—2/2 And 6th DCAs Are At Odds With 4/3 DCA In This Area.
Fault line. Aerial view of the San Andreas Fault. Carol M. Highsmith, photographer. 2013. Library of Congress.
DisputeSuite.com, LLC v. Scoreinc.com, Case No. B248694 (2d Dist., Div. 2 April 14, 2015) (published) may be destined for California Supreme Court review, because we read it as a concrete split of opinion by different intermediate courts of appeal.
What happened here is that defendants obtained a dismissal of a California case pursuant to a Florida forum-selection clause based on a motion to quash service. They then moved for contractual attorney’s fees based on a fees clause (to the tune of $84,640), only to be rebuffed by the trial judge.
The 2/2 DCA affirmed the fee denial order. The key issue for the appellate panel was whether a final resolution of the contractual claims was reached under Civil Code section 1717. Following the Sixth District decision in Estate of Drummond, 149 Cal.App.4th 46, 51 (2007), the DisputeSuite.com panel agreed only an interim victory was obtained until the merits were resolved in Florida. Although not coming out and expressly saying, the court disagreed with the contrary analysis of the Fourth District, Division 3 in Profit Concepts Management, Inc. v. Griffith, 162 Cal.App.4th 950, 956 (2008) [see our May 11, 2008 post] and PNEC Corp. v. Meyer, 190 Cal.App.4th 66, 73 (2010) [see our November 18, 2010 post]—finding a relocation of an active contract dispute from one forum to another was not the equivalent of a final resolution of the contract claims such that a fee recovery was premature.
Study Will Be Published In Upcoming 2015 Edition of Columbia Law Review.
4. The lodestar “cross-check” on the percentage of recovery methodology accomplished little or nothing, with a pure percentage of fund approach dominating (with the authors suggesting the lodestar check may be a waste of time).
The authors do propose a solution to the whole fee recovery process: class counsel should upfront negotiate a fee agreement that should be reviewed and then blessed or not blessed by the district court (an ex ante approach).
Creditor's Action Was Not Truly Independent Suit, But Continuation Of Postjudgment Enforcement Efforts Obstructed By Third Party Holding Judgment Debtor Funds.
Inequitable circumstances often dictate results in appellate cases, although the decision in ABC Money Transactions, Inc., Case No. G048363 (4th Dist., Div. 3 April 10, 2015) (unpublished) was hardly a stretch under the governing law.
There, attorney third party held some settlement proceeds of a judgment debtor in his trust account. After judgment creditor was allowed to levy on that account, attorney appealed the postjudgment levy order, which was eventually affirmed in an earlier appeal. However, before the prior affirmance came down, judgment creditor filed a creditor's suit against attorney to obtain payment of the trust-held funds to judgment creditor. Following a bench trial, the lower court ordered the requested relief and also awarded attorney's fees pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 701.020(c).
The appellate court affirmed in a 3-0 decision authored by Justice Fybel.
Under section 701.020(c), a third party in a trial judge's discretion can be ordered to pay costs and reasonable attorney's fees to a judgment creditor in establishing liability for failure to deliver property to a levying officer. In this case, attorney filed a notice of appeal from the prior levy order such that judgment creditor was faced with a difficult decision to wait until the appeal was resolved or file a creditor's suit to preserve the trust funds before they were dissipated. The legal issue coalesced into a consideration of whether this was a true independent creditor's suit (no fees allowed, per Ilshin Investment Co., Ltd. v. Buena Vista Home Entertainment, Inc., 195 Cal.App.4th 612, 629 (2011)) or a mere continuation of the earlier action in which a levy order was being pursued (fees allowed, per section 701.020(c)). In this one, fees were allowable, especially where the third party's conduct along the way showed evinced a inferable strategy to prevent the release of funds to judgment creditor. Affirmed.
No Material Modifications in Amended Opinion.
On March 6, 2015, we posted on C.W. v. Capistrano Unified School District, No. 12-57315 (9th Cir. Mar. 2, 2015) (published), which dealt with an attorney’s fees award in favor of school district and against plaintiff under various civil rights-oriented schemes, namely, IDEA, ADA, Rehabilitation Act, and § 1983. Plaintiff did well to appeal in connection with the fee recovery, although there was a partial concurrence/partial dissent. We can now report that, on April 9, 2015, the Ninth Circuit issued an amended opinion (with no material changes) and denied a rehearing request.
Transactional and Top 15 Firms Did Even Better.
The results of Citi Private Bank’s “Full Year 2014 Legal Industry Results,” based on a sampling of 179 U.S. firms (78 in the Am Law 100, 47 in the Am Law Second Hundred firms, and 54 in the niche/boutique firm category), show the following trends for 2014 versus 2013: revenue went up 4.5%, net income increased 6%, profits-per-equity partner rose 5.7%, and gross demand increased 1.9%. Actually, firms in the Am Law 50 saw profits-per-equity partner go up even more, by 7.2%. And there is even more: transactional firms (especially M&A based firms) did better; top 15 firms did better; and global firms beat national firms.
Joint Offer by Plaintiffs, Unapportioned as to Three Defendants, Was Valid.
In Montoya v. Mayfield, Case No. B255995 (2d Dist., Div. 4 April 6, 2015) (unpublished), plaintiffs were involved in a serious accident with a truck driven by defendant employee, who was doing so in the course and scope of his employment by defendant employer, who in turn leased the truck from defendant leasing company GSL. Plaintiffs sent a joint, unallocated CCP § 998 offer to all three defendants for $1 million, which was rejected. Eventually, one plaintiff won $1,082,200 and another $294,767.65 from a jury. The trial judge then denied the defense motion to strike plaintiffs’ request for recovery of expert witness fees based on section 998 cost shifting.
Plaintiffs kept their expert witness fee award in the subsequent defense appeal.
The defense first argued that the joint offer by plaintiffs was invalid. However, the section 998 offer fell within an exception where a joint offer can be valid if any one plaintiff—here, the one winning almost $1.1 million—obtained a greater amount than the unallocated $1 million offer.
The defense next contended that the offer was infirm because it was unapportioned with respect to the three defendants (i.e., the employee, the employer, and the truck leasing company GSL)—even though GSL was not an appellant on appeal. Plaintiffs responded that an unapportioned offer is not invalid if defendants are jointly and severally liable. The linchpin of the contrary defense argument was Burch v. Children’s Hosp. of Orange County Thrift Stores, Inc., 109 Cal.App.4th 537 (2003), which parsed through some Vehicle Code provisions and concluded that a truck owner like GSL was statutorily limited on exposure such that it was not jointly and severally liable. However, the 2/4 DCA panel concluded that Burch did not consider the impact of Vehicle Code section 17153 which made GSL only a guarantor such that the liability of the primary defendants was not truly different in nature. Furthermore, plaintiffs alleged only a single act of negligence against all defendants, such that there was not any varying exposure as contrasted to a situation where negligent supervision was alleged.
Current Section 218.5, Requiring Bad Faith By Employee, Not Retroactive Before January 1, 2014.
In Quiles v. Koji’s Japan Inc., Case No. G049238 (4th Dist., Div. 3 April 3, 2015) (unpublished), employee in an employment case, involving multiple claims including meal breaks, added LLC defendant on an alter ego theory. Eventually, LLC defendant demurred and obtained a dismissal with prejudice from the case. Defendant was then awarded $1,000 (out of a requested $10,176) in attorney’s fees and $3,257.10 in routine costs as against employee, triggering an appeal.
Nothing changed on appeal, in a 3-0 panel decision authored by Justice Fybel.
On the attorney’s fees issue, the principal issue was whether an amendment to former Labor Code section 218.5, with the amendment being effective January 1, 2014, changed the result of allowing recovery to employer for prevailing under the former statutory provision. The appellate court concluded “no,” based on an analysis of the legislative amendment, which going forward required bad faith but did not require this for the case in question. With respect to routine costs, plaintiff failed to rebut the presumptive prima facie validity of the costs memorandum submitted by the defense and did not provide an adequate record to establish an abuse of discretion.
State Department’s Interpretation of Statutory Scheme Rejected.
Although Aguilera v. Loma Linda University Medical Center, Case No. D066701 (4th Dist., Div. 1 April 2, 2015) (published) is a very practice-bound, technical decision, we still report on all areas of attorney’s fees.
Aguilera held that Welfare and Institutions Code section 14124.76’s formula, not other constructs, governed what the California Department of Health Care Services had to credit as far as a Medi-Cal injured party’s attorney’s fees and costs in reaching a settlement when it came to reducing the Department’s lien against the injured party’s settlement. Injured party only wanted the reduction allowed under section 14124.76, while Department wanted much more under other theories. The appellate court went with 14124.76.
Court Rejects Simple “Clerical” Versus “Judicial” Correction Distinction.
Ellis v. Ellis, Case No, B248860 (2d Dist., Div. 4 April 2, 2015) (published) is a decision of interest to appellate practitioners and family law practitioners as far as when to appeal from certain judgments (including ones involving attorney’s fees), especially when they are modified or corrected.
In a word, Ellis determined that there must be a “substantial modification” of a prior judgment in order to restart the time for perfecting an appeal. It rejected the reasoning of other courts that simply labeling a change as “judicial” versus “clerical” would determine whether “substantial modification” was effectuated.
Clause Was Broad, No Apportionment Necessary For Jointly Represented Co-Defendant, And Awarded Fees Were Reasonable.
In Ocean View Resort Partnership v. Solanki, Case No. G048728 (4th Dist., Div. 3 April 2, 2015) (unpublished), plaintiff landlord lost a conventional lawsuit (not unlawful detainer) against defendant tenant based on certain tort claims, with the trial judge later awarding $46,206 in attorney’s fees under a lease contractual fees clause and $2,185.88 in routine costs in favor of the defense and against plaintiff landlord, including defense costs for one of landlord’s employees. That prompted an appeal by landlord.
The trial judge’s awards were affirmed on appeal, in a 3-0 decision authored by Justice Moore.
The problem here was that the unsuccessful tort claims were “on the contract” under Civil Code section 1717, meaning the fees expended on these claims were also recoverable. Although complaining that fees expended for landlord’s employee were not allowable, the appellate court found no apportionment was needed because landlord’s theory was that liability between the two defendants was interrelated. (Hill v. Affirmed Housing Group, 226 Cal.App.4th 1192, 1197 (2014).) With respect to amount of fees awarded, no real argument was presented to reverse what was awarded below.
Same Result From Decision Surveyed in Our January 28, 2015 Post.
On January 28, 2015, we posted on Rio School District, a Second District, Division 6 decision where a substantial attorney’s fees award was remanded for redetermination after the appellate court determined that an unclean hands defense was legally not cognizable under Public Contract Code section 7107. However, the appellate court subsequently granted rehearing. However, on April 1, 2015, the same appellate court issued its decision on rehearing in East West Bank v. Rio School District, Case No. B238618 (2d Dist., Div. 6; author: Gilbert, P.J.), reaching the same result as before on the fee issue in a published portion of the opinion.
SO THAT'S WHERE EGGS COME FROM, AND HOWARD THURSTON, PROFESSIONAL MAGICIAN, PULLS AN EASTER EGG FROM THE MOUTH OF BUZZIE DALL AT THE WHITE HOUSE EGG ROLLING FESTIVALS. THE GROUP, FROM THE LEFT: JANE THURSTON, DAUGHTER OF THE MAGICIAN; SISTIE DALL AND BUZZIE, GRANDCHILDREN OF THE PRESIDENT; MR. THURSTON; AND MRS. ROOSEVELT. 1934.
Prior Unpublished Decision Affirmed Denial Of 1021.5 Fees For Failure To Make Proper Informal Settlement Efforts.
In our March 11, 2015 post, we discussed Carian v. Dept. of Fish & Wildlife, Case No. D066683 (4th Dist., Div. 1), which originally issued as an unpublished decision on March 9, 2015. It affirmed a trial judge’s denial of a CCP § 1021.5 fee request based on the fact petitioner did not make informal settlement efforts with the right governmental agency. We can now report that, on April 2, 2015, this decision has been certified for publication.
Language Of Disbursement Clause Was Crucial In A De Novo Appellate Review Situation.
At our home page sidebar under “Indemnity,” we have posted many times--and you can gather our posts--on whether language in contractual indemnification clauses gives rise to contractual attorney’s fees recovery. Rideau v. Stewart Title Co. of California, Inc., Case No. D06575 (4th Dist., Div. 1 Apr. 1, 2015) (unpublished) contains a nice discussion of the cases on this subject, ultimately concluding that the language and structure of an escrow disbursement instruction applied to a third-party indemnity situation, not allowing recovery for a first party recovery (in this case, plaintiff putative condo owners in Mexico losing their $240,000 deposit, ultimately prevailing against the title company for failure to follow disbursement instructions, but losing the argument that fee recovery was allowable in a first party scenario). The result in this case was tethered to the specific syntax of the contractual disbursement clause at issue, but did follow the logic of Baldwin Builders v. Coast Plastering Corp., 125 Cal.App.4th 1339 (2005) in significant respects. The appellate court particularly focused on parsing the language in one disbursement clause to show that there was a dichotomy between third party and first party claims—with the fees element only applicable to third party claims.

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