Source: https://casetext.com/case/thomas-v-nypd-1
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 18:14:49+00:00

Document:
ROODY THOMAS, Plaintiff, v. N.Y.P.D.; DOC N.Y.C.; Rikers Island (C95/C73); Correction Officers, Defendants.
To sustain a claim brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Thomas must show that the defendants (a) acted under color of state law (b) to deprive him of a constitutional right. Bryant v. Maffucci, 923 F.2d 979, 982 (2d Cir. 1991). Here, Thomas alleges that he was assaulted by correction officers, including Captain William, Badge #820, that resulted in injuries that required hospitalization. Plaintiff names two city agencies and "Correction Officers."
The complaint cannot proceed against the NYPD or the DOC, including Rikers Island. Section 396 of the Charter provides that "[a]ll actions and proceedings for the recovery of penalties for the violation of any law shall be brought in the name of the city of New York and not in that of any agency, except where otherwise provided by law." N.Y. City Charter § 396 (2009), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/charter/downloads/pdf/citycharter2009.pdf. This provision has been construed to mean that New York City departments and agencies, as distinct from the City itself, cannot be sued. Ximines v. George Wingate High Sch., 516 F.3d 156, 160 (2d Cir. 2008); Jenkins v. City of New York, 478 F.3d 76, 93 n.19 (2d Cir. 2007) (NYPD not a suable entity); Adams v. Galletta, 966 F.Supp.210, 212 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (DOC not a suable entity). Because Thomas cannot name these city agencies as defendants, the complaint is dismissed as to the NYPD, the DOC and Rikers Island for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b); 1915(e)(2)(B).
However, I grant leave to amend the Complaint within 30 days to add New York City as a Defendant and to allege facts, if any, that establish liability against a municipality. For liability to attach against a municipality under section 1983, a plaintiff must establish the existence of an officially adopted custom or policy that caused him injury, or a causal connection between that policy or custom and the violation of a constitutional right. See Monell v. Dep't. of Soc. Serv. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978).
Plaintiff does not provide the date or dates of the events described. He alleges that he "spoke to Internal Affairs in 2008." The statute of limitations for a § 1983 action arising in New York is three years. Shomo v. City of New York, 579 F.3d 176, 181 (2d Cir. 2009); Eagleston v. Guido, 41 F.3d 865, 871 (2d Cir. 1994), and, in most cases, a cause of action under § 1983 accrues "when the plaintiff knows of or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of his action," Pearl v. City of Long Beach, 296 F.3d 76, 80 (2d Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, Thomas does not provide the date of the alleged assault that caused his injuries, but if the claim arose in 2008, his complaint is time-barred since it was filed on December 27, 2012, after the three-year statute of limitations had elapsed sometime in 2011.
However, the statute of limitations period can be equitably tolled if Thomas can show that extraordinary circumstances prevented him from timely filing the complaint and that he acted with reasonable diligence throughout the period he seeks to toll. See Walker v. Jastremski, 430 F.3d 560, 564 (2d Cir. 2005); Covington v. New York City Police Dep't, 471 F. App'x. 28, 29 (2d Cir. 2012).
Before dismissing the complaint as time-barred, however, I am obligated to provide Thomas with an opportunity to be heard on whether the complaint is time-barred and, if so, whether there are any facts to support equitable tolling of the statute of limitations period. Abbas, 480 F.3d at 640. Therefore, in his amended complaint, Thomas must do his best to identify the date or time period of the assault and, if applicable, to describe any facts to show that he is entitled to equitable tolling of the three-year statute of limitations period. Specifically, if he was incapacitated for any length of time during the tolling period, he should identify those facts in his amended complaint. See Canales v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 755, 759 (2d Cir. 1991) (discussing how mental impairment can be relevant to the equitable tolling inquiry).
The complaint, filed in forma pauperis, is dismissed as to the New York City Police Department, the New York City Department of Correction and Rikers Island (C-95/C73) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). However, I grant Thomas leave to file an amended complaint within 30 days from the entry of this order as set forth above. All proceedings shall be stayed for 30 days or until Thomas files an amended complaint. If Thomas elects to file an amended complaint, that submission should be captioned "AMENDED COMPLAINT" and bear the same docket number as this order, 12-CV-6327 (JG) (LB).
The amended complaint shall replace the original complaint and shall be reviewed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. If Thomas fails to file an amended complaint within 30 days from the entry of this order, judgment shall enter dismissing this action in its entirety for the reasons set forth herein. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. I certify pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this Order would not be taken in good faith and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).

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