Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/232/619/
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 16:16:42+00:00

Document:
The essential fact that raises change of abode to change of domicil is the absence of any intention to live elsewhere.
An ambiguous meaning will not be attributed to a phrase used in an agreed statement of facts on the assumption that the parties were by a quibble trying to get the better of each other, and so held that "an indefinite time," as applied to an intent to reside, referred to in such a statement, meant that no end to such time was then contemplated.
Where one changes his abode with no intention of returning to the former abode, the motive is immaterial so far as change creates a citizenship enabling the party to sue in the federal courts.
One's domicil is the technically preeminent headquarters that every person is compelled to have in order that his rights and duties that have attached to it by the law may be determined.
The identity of husband and wife is a fiction now vanishing.
In this country, a wife who has justifiably left her husband may acquire a different domicil from his not only for the purpose of obtaining a divorce from him, Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U. S. 562, but for other purposes, including that of bringing an action for damages against persons other than her husband.
Quaere whether the same is the law in England.
The facts, which involve the question whether a married woman may,under certain conditions, acquire a domicil different from that of her husband, are stated in the opinion.
"with the intention of making her home in that state for an indefinite time in order that she might institute this suit against the defendant in the United States court,"
plaintiff got a verdict for $35,000, and thereupon the case was taken to the circuit court of appeals, from which the certified question comes.
On these facts, the question certified is divided into two by the argument: first, whether, if able so to do, the plaintiff had changed her domicil from West Virginia to Virginia in fact; and, second, supposing that she had changed it so far as to have enabled her to proceed against her husband in Virginia had she been so minded, whether for other purposes her domicil did not remain that of her husband until the divorce was obtained, which was after the beginning of the present suit. Premising that, if the plaintiff was domiciled in Virginia when this suit was begun, she was a citizen of that state within the meaning of the Constitution, Art. III, § 2, and the Judicial Code of March 3, 1911, c. 231, 36 Stat. 1087, Gassies v. Ballon, 6 Pet. 761; Boyd v. Nebraska, 143 U. S. 135, 143 U. S. 161; Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162, we will take these questions up in turn.
meaning to the words "for an indefinite time" in that statement would be to assume that the parties were trying to get the better of each other by a quibble. We must take them to mean: for a time to which the plaintiff did not then contemplate an end. If that is their meaning, the motive for the change was immaterial, for, subject to the second question to be discussed, the plaintiff had a right to select her domicil for any reason that seemed good to her. With possible irrelevant exceptions, the motive has a bearing only when there is an issue open on the intent. Cheever v. Wilson, 9 Wall. 108, 123, 19 L. ed. 604, 608; Dickerman v. Northern Trust Co. 176 U. S. 181, 176 U. S. 191-192. With that established as agreed, there is no doubt that it was sufficient to work the change. Mitchell v. United States, 21 Wall. 350, 88 U. S. 352; Dicey, Conflict of Laws, 2d ed. 108, 113, 114.
show, and the change that is good as against her husband ought to be good as against all. In the later decisions, the right to change and the effect of the change are laid down in absolute terms. Gordon v. Yost, 140 F. 79; Watertown v. Greaves, 112 F. 183; Shute v. Sargent, 67 N.H. 305; Buchholz v. Buchholz, 63 Wash. 213. See Haddock v. Haddock, supra; 62 U. S. Barber, 21 How. 582, 62 U. S. 588, 62 U. S. 597-598. We see no reason why the wife who justifiably has left her husband should not have the same choice of domicil for an action for damages that she has against her husband for a divorce.
We answer the question, Yes.

References: v. 
 § 2
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.