Source: https://www.lawgazette.co.uk/law/appeal-court-rejects-apparent-bias-claim-over-judges-private-meeting/5065280.article
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 20:28:26+00:00

Document:
A trial judge was right not to recuse himself from a dispute over building work despite meeting one party’s advocate in private and discussing elements of the case, the Court of Appeal has ruled.
The appellant in Bubbles & Wine Ltd v Lusha argued that Deputy District Judge Wallis had shown apparent bias by inviting counsel Rahul Varma to his room at the end of a day’s hearing - predominantly to thank Varma and his chambers for hosting the judge’s daughter on a mini-pupillage the previous year.
But Wallis finished this private conversation, which initially raised no objection from any party, by asking Varma to pass on to opposing counsel that Lusha’s claim had several evidential gaps and the Bubbles counterclaim seemed weak. The parties were due to submit closing statements following the hearing.
Wallis then emailed Niraj Modha, representing Bubbles, repeating his comments on the counterclaim but omitting what he had said about the claim. He subsequently found in favour of Lusha.
In the appeal judgment, Lord Justice Leggatt was heavily critical of the judge’s conduct, saying he had been ‘wrong-headed’ and his communication was ‘inept’.
But he insisted the fair-minded and informed observer would dismiss any real possibility that the judge was biased. Wallis’s daughter's mini pupillage could not give rise to bias, said Leggatt, while there was no material uncertainty about any of the exchanges between parties, even those held in private.
Leggatt said it was ‘perfectly proper’ for the judge to express preliminary views about the strength or weakness of each party’s case during proceedings, and he accepted Wallis was trying to assist both parties even if he had been ‘misguided’ in his approach.
The issue was further complicated by Wallis offering in writing to recuse himself if it was felt his impartiality had been compromised. In the event, he opted not to - despite a request for him to do so from Bubbles - and he awarded Lusha almost £24,000 for unpaid building work.
Leggatt said the recusal offer ‘was bound to create a sense of grievance to open the door for a re-trial in that way, only for it then to be shut again in the litigant’s face’.
While this error showed a lack of due forethought, it did not suggest a possibility that he was biased, added Leggatt.
The Bubbles appeal was dismissed.
The problem with the court of appeal judgement is that it could be interpreted as you say, i.e. the court of appeal felt that was an appearance of bias but didn't want to make this finding (although they severely criticised the judge) to avoid the cost of another hearing (although considerations of the cost of a rehearing are not relevant, and the court of appeal themselves rightly criticised the judge for suggesting otherwise). Another possible interpretation that some people will make, rightly or wrongly, is that the court of appeal felt that there was the appearance of bias but didn't want to make a finding of such to avoid acknowledging the possibility of the appearance of bias. Neither of these cases are in my view satisfactory or commensurate with justice being seen to be done, as any conclusion other than that there was the appearance of bias is hard to accept. The problem with the judgement as it stands is that the decision made is not, in my mind, a logical conclusion of the narrative.
Indeed I do Scruff. Enough to know that 'the ones you hear saying" denotes plural not possessive. What is the the thing being possessed ?
Sorry. I dont understand this comment. What are you on about ?
"......but reckoned that the decision was very likely the right one; and that the amounts involved were such that allowing the appeal and having a fresh trial would be a peculiarly harsh outcome for both sides, as a new trial would likely reach the same conclusion, but at twice the cost. ..."
My impression from reading the decision is that the court thought the trial judge very foolish (and accordingly gave him a dressing down) but reckoned that the decision was very likely the right one; and that the amounts involved were such that allowing the appeal and having a fresh trial would be a peculiarly harsh outcome for both sides, as a new trial would likely reach the same conclusion, but at twice the cost.
Being clever folk, the appeal judges were able to dress up the decision as one of principle, rather than pragmatism. As the discussion in these pages shows, the decision on the principle is not as clean as it might be, but in practical terms surely the right decision was reached? I doubt the case adds anything much to jurisprudence on bias and apparent bias, these being rather fact specific questions.
Surpisingly, the CA's decision contains no reference to the Guide to Judicial Conduct (2016 edition), which deals with bias (and the relevant authorities) in some detail.
"....Where I think the court of appeal erred is that after considering the allegations of apparent bias and rightly criticising the judge, they then strayed into whether the judge was actually biased. But the question was whether the bias was apparent, not actual, and the two concepts are different. .."
Possibly. My view is that I agree that they should not have gone further and queried the actual bias but that this is actually the test. Once the level of bias has been identified as real suspicion, then that is tantamount to say actually it was there if addressed at the time, BUT the judgement should not be further investigated for reasons that there will then be a second trial / hearing.
Therefore though the test is retrospective 'constructive' bias on balance of probabilities, actual findings of it will be rare (for example specific passages of favour in an original judgement).
In my opinion the court of appeal misapplied the test.
The judgement states that the maxim that justice must not only be done but be seen to be done from Sussex Justices is still important, and then applies the test in Porter v Magill. This test asks whether the fair-minded and informed observer, after considering the facts leading to the allegation of apparent bias, would consider that there is a possibility that the judge was biased. In this case, where the judge's daughter served a mini-pupillage for one side and given the private meetings and subsequent communications, the answer must be yes. I can't see how it could be otherwise.
Where I think the court of appeal erred is that after considering the allegations of apparent bias and rightly criticising the judge, they then strayed into whether the judge was actually biased. But the question was whether the bias was apparent, not actual, and the two concepts are different. So while the narrative of the judgement indicated apparent bias, the conclusion flowing from that narrative didn't address the question asked of the court of appeal. So, in this case I think most people will feel that justice wasn't seen to be done as things stand. One has to look at the allegations of apparent bias separately from the facts of the underlying case - it doesn't matter if a different judge would have reached the same decisions, what matters is that this judge was accused of having the appearance of bias (he even offered to recuse himself).
In terms of the situation you found yourself in, these are of course not situations where there is likely to be the same chance of apparent bias being inferred by the reasonable person, and I think there is some subjectivity as to the best course of action. I would say that a fair minded and informed person is unlikely to believe that a judge sitting with acquaintances to whom he has provided references or given career advice has the appearance of bias, although this is perhaps less likely if the judge had a close friendship or had employed or been instrumental in securing a position for someone. Broadly speaking, its best to consider how any conflict of interest looks and whether it could lead to a fair accusation of appearance of bias.
The case in point shows that if an offer is made to recuse oneself, it is best to do so if requested, and the judgement also shows that cost or putting off of work shouldn't be a factor in deciding on recusal related to apparent bias.
Are you sure (no disrespect), that then the test is had a Judge / Chair considered the question when sitting then the officious bystander would have said that of course there was bias?
That seems to me to say you are retrospectively imputing bias like one would retrospectively impute knowledge in crime at the tine of an offence (knowledge was de facto 'there')?
Thanks, yes, in practice the difference between imputed and actual bias is fine in terms of the legal approach, although imputed bias doesn't always need to be applied retrospectively, so can exist in situations even when there is no actual bias.
I think I would agree with you on pecuniary interest not being the sole indicator, but if you are going to impute retrospective Bias then I should say you are in essence saying it was always there had one looked so there was actual bias but retrospectively speaking.
Interesting observation that you make though.
I'd say imputed relates more to circumstances where the likelihood of bias is such that no judge could be assumed to be impartial in the circumstances, normally but not exclusively where there is a pecuniary interest. It isn't quite the same as actual bias, and it is possible for there to be a situation where there is imputed bias but no suggestion of actual bias.
There is nothing that I can see on the history of Bias in 'The Constitutional History of Modern Britain Since 1485 (Keir) or an explanation of 'Dimes' and thus the early stages of its development as a concept. Also nothing in 'Judicial Politics Since 1920 )Griffiths).
I think you are right though about Sussex Justices as it would seem that apart from actual pecuniary interest (Dimes type situations), the test was to then real likelihood but this was then replaced by real suspicion (splitting hairs?). Surely though real suspicion is very nearly if not retrospective imputed 'Actual' Bias?
Have you read this Judicial Review Journal Article on it, (Bias After Dallaglio (1996))? I confess I haven't though it would be interesting.
My understanding is that the current modern approach on 'Apparent' 'Bias' is from Porter, Magill v Porter 2001 UKHL 67 (2002 2 AC 357), and may go as far as perceived bias, but in view of LIP's around and the resources of the Courts, this has been curtailed since so that only in effect 'Actual;' 'Bias' will do (perhaps so far as closed minded closed eyed 'Apparent' Bias tantamount on retrospection to the same or similar degree)? .
"....but imputed bias, which relates more closely to the appearance of bias than to actual bias. ..."
I should have thought that imputed bias like imputed knowledge is retrospective actual bias or actual knowledge.
I may be wrong here though? Could anyone elucidate?
One point to note is the claimant was unrepresented: it appeared by one of its directors. That may go some way towards explaining the CA's unfortunate decision, which will in future have to be explained away as depending on its own particular facts.
This is from the judgment.
“The law on apparent bias.
1.	The legal test for apparent bias is very well established. Mr Faure reminded us of the famous statements of Lord Hewart CJ in R v Sussex Justices ex parte McCarthy  1 KB 256 at 259 that "it is not merely of some importance but is of fundamental importance that justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done" and that "[n]othing is to be done which creates even a suspicion that there has been an improper interference with the course of justice."These principles remain as salutary and important as ever, but the way in which they are to be applied has been made more precise by the modern authorities. These establish that the test for apparent bias involves a two stage process. The court must first ascertain all the circumstances which have a bearing on the suggestion that the judge was biased. It must then ask whether those circumstances would lead a fair-minded and informed observer to conclude that there was a real possibility that the judge was biased: see Porter v Magill  UKHL 67;  2 AC 357, paras 102-103. Bias means a prejudice against one party or its case for reasons unconnected with the legal or factual merits of the case: see Flaherty v National Greyhound Racing Club Ltd  EWCA Civ 1117, para 28; Secretary of State for the Home Department v AF (No2)  EWCA Civ 117;  1 WLR 2528, para 53.
(1) The fair-minded and informed observer is not unduly sensitive or suspicious, but neither is he or she complacent: Lawal v Northern Spirit Ltd  UKHL 35;  ICR 856, para 14 (Lord Steyn).
(2) The facts and context are critical, with each case turning on "an intense focus on the essential facts of the case": Helow v Secretary of State for the Home Department  UKHL 62;  1 WLR 2416, para 2 (Lord Hope).
(3) If the test of apparent bias is satisfied, the judge is automatically disqualified from hearing the case and considerations of inconvenience, cost and delay are irrelevant: Man O' War Station Ltd v Auckland City Council (formerly Waiheke County Council)  UKPC 28, para 11 (Lord Steyn).
My impression is that but for the judge’s crass behaviour the complainant could not complain about the result. So there was no realistic appeal on the judgment and prejudice could not be proved. Most - if not all - of the relevant facts were known and not in issue.
barristers (from a local bar) who regularly appeared. Some were deputydistrict judges or recorders. As such they sometimes sat along side me.
I’d given some references or suggested they apply for a judicial job.
involved, or at least told out of town advocates the position? If I had and there was an objection, should I have stood down? If so, a lot of work would have been put off!
There was no suggestion of actual bias in the Dimes case. A pecuniary interest is not actual bias, but imputed bias, which relates more closely to the appearance of bias than to actual bias.
In the case in point, it could be argued that the judge's daughter having undertaken a mini-pupillage for one side could be regarded as giving rise to imputed bias, but this fact and the judge's conduct and communications with the other side could certainly be argued (as they were) to give the appearance of bias, which must also be avoided for justice to be seen to be done.
I think the LC had shares. That is a pecuniary interest in the outcome. Whilst I conceded, the allegation of actual bias was not the reason for overturning the decision, if the Judge is dealing with the Company and has a pecuniary interest in the outcome, that is actual bias.
I'm assuming you're referring to 'Dimes v Proprietors of Grand Junction Canal & others' (1852). This case was actually concerned with the appearance of bias, not with actual bias. Lord Campbell said: 'This will be a lesson to all inferior tribunals to take care not only that in their decrees they are not influenced by their personal interest, but to avoid the appearance of labouring under such an influence'.
It is the case that a judge holding a substantial shareholding in one party could give the appearance of bias and is undesirable. So is a judge being involved in a case where his daughter has done a mini-pupillage for one side and where one party is invited to private meetings where the case is discussed and where the judge's communication to the other side doesn't include some of what was discussed at the meeting.
Actual bias and the appearance of bias are indeed two separate concepts, although as we can see, the two can be confused. They may overlap and one may lead to the other, but they are both to be avoided. Justice must not only be done, but be seen to be done.
Of course it is important to avoid the appearance of bias ..."
Don't read any Legal History or try to distinguish to two concepts though.
Stuart: the Divisional Court was renamed the Administrative Court some years ago now. It is part of the High Court which was created ivy the authority of the Queen in Parliament - the last Queen, in the reforms of 1873. Renaming is not the creation of a new court.
Administrative courts did I hear you say?
Halsbury's Laws of England/ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (VOLUME 1(1) (2001 REISSUE))/1. INTRODUCTION/(1) SCOPE AND NATURE OF THE SUBJECT/1. Scope.
FACT - There is NO authority for administrative courts in this country and no Act can be passed to legitimise them because of the constitutional restraints placed upon her Majesty at Her coronation.
The collection of revenue by such means is extortion, and extortion has been found reprehensible since ancient times. Separation of powers Today, in the year 2011, we find for example, that in the council tax regulations, the billing authority, the prosecuting authority and the enforcement authority are all vested in the same body. The same bodies even purport to issue their own legal documents, by tacit agreement with the Courts. In our system of Common Law, the rule of law demands that we have a separation of powers. Today, the powers are not separated. The executive is not a distinct, free-standing leg of the tripod. The executive now emerges directly from within the elected Chamber of the legislature where previously it emanated directly from the Monarch. That leads to constitutional confusion because the executive has seized and misuses Parliament's democratic credentials for its own, destructive, purposes. Fortunately, we have something to which we can turn to preserve our ancient laws and freedoms. We have the Oath that Her Majesty The Queen took at her coronation by which she is solemnly bound and from which no one in England, Wales and Scotland has released her. At Her Coronation the Queen swore to govern us, according to [our] respective laws and custom's. Certainly, among our reputed customs, is precisely that invaluable and widely admired tripartite division of the powers. The judiciary is part and parcel of our customary system of internal sovereignty the Queen in Parliament. It is one of the three separate but symbiotic powers, and it is a capricious and self-serving contention that it should not have the power to preserve the authority of the legislature over the executive. It is a constitutional principle that the assent of the Queen & Parliament is prerequisite to the establishment of a Court which can operate a system of administrative law in Her Majesty's Courts in England. This was confirmed by Lord Denning during the debates on the European Communities Amendment Bill, HL Deb 08 October 1986 vol 480 cc246-95 246 at 250: There is our judicial system deriving from the Crown as the source and fountain of justice. No court can be set up in England, no court can exist in England, except by the authority of the Queen and Parliament. That has been so ever since the Bill of Rights!
You Boy's certainly need to do your homework! May I suggest you start with Vattel's Law of Nations, ( Never heard of it I hear you say???) that no Judge can override! That should give you all an excellent foundation to start from if we're talking law and the actual restoration of it that is! Rather than the present legal sophistry, administrative shenanigans!
If it's not lawful then it certainly isn't legal!!!! If there's any part of that you don't 'GET', kindly put it on a postage stamp.
Bruce and Scruff settling their beef was far more interesting that this decision.
Of course it is important to avoid the appearance of bias, paragraph 1 of the judgement even says that this is the question on appeal in this case.
Justice not only needs to be done, but to de seen to be done.
What would be crazy would be to not aim to avoid the appearance of bias.
Oh dear oh dear oh dear Bruce. This is Some other commentator's (with the apostrophe as its to denote possession), comment I cut and pasted.
Tell me do you do any drafting?
"....it is important to look not just at actual bias, but also, and this is where judges sometimes don't get it, at the appearance of bias. ..."
No it is most certainly not. That is the wrong test and would completely let all the crazies out to play.
I think the issue here is that for justice to be seen to be done, it is important to look not just at actual bias, but also, and this is where judges sometimes don't get it, at the appearance of bias.
The fundamental question here is 'would the fact of the judge's daughter being offered a mini-pupillage by one side and his subsequent actions give the appearance of bias to a fair-minded and objective person?'. The answer must, I think, be yes.
This is a case where the more one reads, the worse things look. There are several facts which on their own give the appearance of bias, but taken together give an overwhelming appearance of such. The mini-pupillage is a conflict of interest, the personal meetings in chambers part-way through the trial give the appearance of bias, and the meeting discussion went far beyond the social meeting it was originally made out to be when the case was discussed. The other side made it clear they would have preferred this not to have happened when they found out. This meeting and the communication thereafter are, far from being of no consequence, key to the appearance of bias. The judge emailed the other party, but neglected to mention information which had been discussed about the claimant's case. When it was put to him that this information had discussed, he said he didn't remember discussing it before, at a later date, recalling that he did discuss it. He then offered to recuse himself if invited to do so, but when so asked, refused. To argue that none of this could be seen as having the appearance of bias is a difficult task. The sequence of events reads like something which would happen in a country where there is an undeveloped legal system or a poor rule of law.
You are correct to criticise the judge's behaviour, which has been toe curling and I think the criticism of his conduct in the judgement was fair, but I don't feel the court of appeal goes far enough, and by not finding that an appearance of bias was created they rightly or wrongly give the impression of not wanting to acknowledge the possibility that a judge could appear biased. Most people commenting or voting on this site seem to believe that there was an appearance of bias, and I think the wider public would feel so even more strongly. Unfortunately the decision by the court of appeal was a bad one.
I hope that this decision doesn't turn out to be final, as it doesn't sit comfortably that the final word from the courts on this case is that there could be no appearance of bias to a fair-minded and objective person, when this seems obviously not to be the case.
None of this equates to a dislike of judges. But any harm done to the reputation of judges from this case is a result of this DDJ's antics and of the court of appeal decision, not from criticisms of the decision.
".....Its time this Private Judicial cartel was taken to trading standards and the Public standards committee, and exposed for it's insider shenanigans to covertly fleece it's victims that have gone on far too long!
The one's you hear saying "I don't know what you're talking about" are the exact one's that are implicated and culpable of taking turns to drive the gravy train. ..."
Copied and pasted for your delectation Scruff, second paragraph. I'm not vindictive and will accept your apology. Do you have the integrity or will you crawl away ? And in answer to your question therein no it isn't i don't ever post anonymously: i'm too confident for that.
"....I don't have time to pander to your illiteracy Scruff if you can't even read your own posts. Sorry. 13.51. .."
I am sure that it would help your Legal Practice massively though Bruce if you knew that apostrophes can be used for abbreviation and possession. We were taught that at 13, were you?
Ok Bruce. I thought illiteracy was being unable to read (twice) the blog I made and copied for you, but here you go, who am I to know?
I don't have time to pander to your illiteracy Scruff if you can't even read your own posts. Sorry. 13.51.
Ah, Bruce. Now that is more of an interesting point (I assume you aren't joking). Where did I say that?
I was using the possessive apostrophe if so the possession of one ....?
Can you cut and paste please?
Why are you using an apostrophe in "one's" to denote a plural Scruff ? The case for the prosecution rests since I have work to do. You ?
Or possibly, in both cases sensible litigants would realise there was no bias. If one lost a high value Commercial case one would appeal on the merits of the decision. That is if the result had been incorrect on the law.
So if the decision had been incorrect on the Law it would have been Appeal-able under CPR 52.3 (6) (a) (possibly (b), would it not?
"....I believe the phrase you first used was "incorrect on law" which is incorrect in grammar .."
I believe the phrase you first used was "incorrect on law" which is incorrect in grammar.
".....@Anon 16 March 2018 08:57 GMT ... May I suggest you start with Vattel's Law of Nations..... "
May I suggest I dont. I think its admirable that you have such a profound knowledge of it though.
Its time this Private Judicial cartel was taken to trading standards and the Public standards committee, and exposed for it's insider shenanigans to covertly fleece it's victims that have gone on far too long!
The one's you hear saying "I don't know what you're talking about" are the exact one's that are implicated and culpable of taking turns to drive the gravy train.
Everyone is very well aware of the insider scam, and enough is enough, and it looks like a few of the fee-loading passengers may be getting off at the next station shortly before they hit the buffers coming their way!
Since when can a judge be a judge in their own case? Conflict of interest or did I miss a bit?
This is a perfect example whereby there should be a public trail by jury!!!!!
The judge told me during another private meeting in chambers that you felt that the appearance of bias didn't matter. What a shame the public don't feel the same way we both mused - life would be so much easier!
But I am unconcerned. We are all humans. I know the Judge. You know the Judge. The Bar know the Judge. His ex instructing solicitors knew the Judge.
It will all come down to the Law and argument raised on the day. But Bubbles didn’t understand that. Even though they may have erroneously believed that there was the appearance of bias and not the actual risk of bias.
It isn’t the perception of bias. It is the risk of actual bias.
Yes, the judge told me about your dinners during one of our private chats in chambers. He assured me that it was all above board and that there would be no bearing whatsoever on the outcome of the case. We then discussed the possibility of more mini-pupillages for his family members. Don't worry though, I'll have him send you an email suggesting you appeal if you're unhappy about the outcome of the case.
Just imagine what fuel would have been added to the fire had the other side been a LiP, already burdened by a sense of injustice and suspicion that all lawyers and the judicial system are against them. It is the perception of bias here that is the issue, not whether there was actual bias. The judicial handbook is right in the caveat it lays down about judicial conduct, and an appeal decision that effectively ignores it in this way is a really bad decision.
James. I cant work out if you are being serious. How can any lawyer speaking to another in a social environment not comment on current Law, Practice, cases before therm or wherever?
I really cant see where the complaint by 'Bubbles', was either going or even likely to go.
Either you are home on the Law or not unless there was a very fine discretion (like in the Admin Court - and even then, outside that esteemed forum, Judges have for example mused that Pannick for example has been a master (not Most Excellent Master?), at arguing unarguable points of Law). The thought is probably not confined and are you really saying no Judges should talk to their opponents, to their friends, their Bar Colleagues, their old instructing Solicitors, Chambers Clerk.... etc .. etc ... Where do you draw the line?
Exactly. More is the point how did the news get out?
I won my case yesterday. Imagine my surprise when it turned out that all the judge's children had done mini-pupillages for me. How we laughed over dinner! During the case, the judge invited me into his chambers where we could discuss the case in peace, out of the way of the other side. I take exception to even the suggestion of an appearance of bias here. And so does the court of appeal. ..."
I know. As your opponent, I was even even more furious as I had dined with the Judge himself / herself regularly at the Inns of Court as a student (and the Circuit Mess only the night before), and I thought the case was a done deal.
I know. As your opponent, I was even even more furious as I had dined with the Judge himself / herself regularly at the Inns of Court as a student (and the Circuit Mess), and I thought the case was a done deal.
Is my legal analysis that poor?
I won my case yesterday. Imagine my surprise when it turned out that all the judge's children had done mini-pupillages for me. How we laughed over dinner! During the case, the judge invited me into his chambers where we could discuss the case in peace, out of the way of the other side. I take exception to even the suggestion of an appearance of bias here. And so does the court of appeal.
This decision seems quite right. Unhappy losers trying to clutch at straws. So what if the judge had a conversation with one advocate and expressed a view about the case having heard the evidence! So what that the precious daughter was undertaking unpaid work experience.
Bruce. I think you will find that something is incorrect on a consideration of the Law. A Judges summing up whether biased or not (or apparently only having the appearance of bias as test so far as some on here are concerned), may be incorrect in Law.
Have a look at your Uneeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee work book.
I lost a case yesterday in Court. There was an appearance of bias as I didn't like it.
Whoever writes "Scruff" after expressing an opinion - please stop it.
We have seen it on numerous occasions, it is annoying now. Just stop.
It's not a question of whether there was bias: it's a question of whether there was an appearance of bias.
"Incorrect on the Law" ? How articulate. I can see why you are anonymous "Scruff"
The "pragmatic" explanation seems to be that (a) if it happens in a low value case in Central London County Court, it's OK (Bubbles v Lusha), but if it happens in a high value commercial case, it's not OK (Almazeedi v Penner).
A very, very poor decision.
I found this case disturbing on reading the full report yesterday. The judge is roundly criticised for his conduct in speaking to counsel for one party on his own and the events that followed. The basis of that criticism must be that it gives rise to the appearance of bias - that is what is being criticised. But, it is then said, it doesn't. That does not follow and the decision is wrong on the face of it.
The fact that the judge's daughter was undergoing a mini-pupillage in counsels' chambers was agreed and cannot be said to give rise to any appearance of bias as a result. The judge then invited counsel into chambers for a private discussion on a personal matter, agreed, but then he went beyond that, which is not acceptable, whether or not it occurs elsewhere, or "all the time".
It seems likely that the substantive case had its problems, but if we are to have a judiciary and legal system that commands respect, "pragmatic" approach notwithstanding.
Just because something "happens all the time" makes it neither legal nor appropriate.
What does a DDJ have to do in light of this to be found to be apparently biased ? No one accused him of actual bias.
Does he have to apply boot polish to his face and sing "Swanee River" ?
It happens all the time James. I dont know what planet you are on.
Back in the day Paul the sorts of conduct you refer to were not permitted and I believe are still not permitted according to reasonable standards of judicial behaviour if it involves meeting with one counsel in the absence of the other. Judges were very particular not to allow this to occur.
Richard Whitehurst is not always right but here he is I am afraid. Just because a Judge goes to a private meeting or any Barrister or Solicitor sees them before or during the course of proceedings does not raise even a rebuttable presumption of bias.
In many Provincial Courts I have been at Judges regularly meet after work with Counsel and those instructing them (yes even at the pub/club). I have even known one case where a mate of mine had a Barrister they 'instructed' ask a Judge for their advice on a Criminal Appeal from the Mags they knew they were likely to sit on.
Are you saying all this is biased behaviour?
Are the Appeal Courts not busy enough already with LIP's ?
Please read the judgment. It’s not very long.
The mini pupillage was disclosed before the trial began. No objection was taken, which does not surprise me.
There was similarly no objection to the social meeting with one side which was raised in court before it took place.
What was said then and communicated afterwards was not in issue.
It seems that any appeal that the judge got it wrong was not going to succeed.
The judge was very silly and did himself no favours afterwards - I could put it much stronger - and has received a very severe kicking . If you don’t like judges I suggest that you read it. His career may not survive it and his promotion prospects will be affected - as they should be.
All that said, it does not mean that bias is made out in law. That too is carefully spelt out in the judgment.
What on earth possessed the DDJ to invite counsel for one party on his own for a private chat in a part heard trial? The appearance of bias is clear. The CA reached a pragmatic conclusion. I would be surprised if the DDJ’s judicial career could continue.
I don't disagree with anything said here - especially not 'apparent -v- actual bias' and recusing oneself if asked to do so on proper grounds. But presumably Mr Varma, having been told that his clients' claim had evidential gaps, took appropriate steps to fill them. Taking the pragmatic view, therefore: is it really in anyone's financial interest to set aside a judgement and incur the costs of a full rehearing if the end result is likely to be the same?
Is Mr Wallis still a DDJ?
The subtext of the decision is that, because there was no actual bias, there was no apparent bias. That's why the wrong result has been arrived at. Where there is apparent bias, it cannot be rebutted by showing an absence of actual bias.
Sadly, because this was a low value matter, it's difficult to imagine that the mistake will ever get to be corrected by the Supreme Court.
This stinks to high heaven. Judge should have recused himself on the basis of the mini-pupillage alone, never mind the cuddly chat!
Anon 12.43 - I couldn't agree more with your last sentence.
I got that quote from Leggatt LJ on his chambers. We're old pals, you know.
So judge takes one party into his chambers to discuss the case, but not the other. The party he takes in has provided the judge's daughter with a mini-pupillage. The judge emails the other party, omitting some of the details which were discussed. The judge offers in writing to recuse himself if it felt his impartiality is compromised, but fails to do so when asked.
How on earth can this not be seen to give the appearance of bias?
This decision needs to be looked at again - it looks awful and greatly undermines public confidence in the judiciary.
April Fool's Day has come early.
How can anyone think that having a cosy chat with one of the advocates does not give rise to an appearance of bias?
I'm struggling to understand why being "inept" and "wrong-headed" should not also be grounds for recusal. Surely ineptitude and wrong-headedness are equally as injurious to perceptions of fairness as bias.

References: UKHL 
 UKHL 
 EWCA 
 EWCA 
 UKHL 
 UKHL 
 UKPC