Source: http://toyosu.com/ura2002.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 22:42:30+00:00

Document:
・"USPTO Fees - FY 2003," UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (Effective October 1, 2002).
・"IPO Summary of USPTO Fee Bill," IPO (July 30, 2002).
・"Commerce Under Secretary for Intellectual Property Rogan To Unveil USPTO Restructuring Proposal" USPTO (June 3, 2002).
・Greg Aharonian, "PATNEWS READER PROVIDES FREE PATENT IMAGE DOWNLOAD TO PDF TOOL." Internet Patent News Service (Nov. 15, 2002).
・"Bush Signs Justice Bill With Intellectual Property Reforms." 64 PTCJ (November 8, 2002).
・TAI E Quarterly No.70 (July 2002).
・Eldred v. Ashcroft, argued, No. 01-618 (U.S. 2002).
・Eldred v. Reno, 345 U.S. App. D.C. 89, 239 F.3d 372 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
・Tony Mauro (American Lawyer Media), "High Court Ponders Copyright Extension Battle." law.com (Oct. 10, 2002).
・Gary Gentile (The Associated Press), "U.S. Supreme Court to Hear Case Challenging Copyright Term Extension Act." law.com (Oct. 8, 2002).
・Andy Sullivan (Reuters), "Mickey Mouse Copyright Case Hits Supreme Court." FindLaw (Oct. 9, 2002).
・Lemelson Medical, Education & Research Foundation v. Symbol Technologies, 277 F.3d 1361, 61 USPQ2d 1515 (Fed. Cir. 2002), review denied, No. 01-1855 (U.S. 2002).
・Simple Technology Inc. v. Dense-Pac Microsystems Inc., No. 01-1787 (U.S. 2002).
・Talbert Fuel Systems Patents Co. v. Unocal Corp., 275 F.3d 1371, 61 USPQ2d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2002), remanded, No. 02-90 (U.S. 2002).
・Infinite Pictures Inc. v. Interactive Pictures Corp., 274 F.3d 1371, 61 USPQ2d 1152 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
・JBL Inc. v. Bose Corp., 274 F.3d 1354, 61 USPQ2d 1216 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
・Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 62 USPQ2d 1705 (U.S. 2002).
・Vulcan Engineering Co. v. FATA Aluminum Inc., 278 F.3d 1366, 61 USPQ2d 1545 (Fed. Cir. 2002), cert. denied, No. 01-1791, No. 01-1647 (U.S. 2002).
・"CONGRESS PASSES IP PROVISIONS!" IPO Daily News (Oct. 4, 2002).
・Jenna Greene (Legal Times), "IP Reforms Likely to Get Bush's OK." law.com (Oct. 14, 2002).
...To date, though, this option, known as an inter partes, has been a complete flop -- it has been used in only three cases.
...Dickinson estimates that it costs about $50,000 for a third party to send in prior art alone. To participate in a re-examination inter partes would run up several hundred thousand dollars in legal fees. But to litigate in U.S. District Court could cost millions.
Still, as Maier points out, re-examination is not going to replace traditional patent litigation. "In a situation where you have a major product and a major market value, cost isn't the main consideration. Winning is," he says. But re-examination may be appropriate when "there's not so much at stake and the risk is lower -- say, in the worst case, you could lose and still go forward with licensing."
New 4-digit fee codes appear in this revised fee schedule. Fee amounts have not been adjusted. The fees subject to reduction for small entities that have established status (37 CFR 1.27) are shown in a separate column. For additional information, please contact the General Information Services Division at (703) 308-4357 or (800) 786-9199.
・"PTO Imposes No COLA Increase in Fees." 64 PTCJ 485 (October 4, 2002).
・Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., No. 95-1066 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
1.　Whether rebuttal of the presumption of surrender, including issues of foreseeability, tangentialness, or reasonable expectations of those skilled in the art, is a question of law or one of fact; and what role a jury should play in determining whether a patent owner can rebut the presumption.
2.　What factors are encompassed by the criteria set forth by the Supreme Court.
3.　If a rebuttal determination requires factual findings, then whether, in this case, remand to the district court is necessary to determine whether Festo can rebut the presumption that any narrowing amendment surrendered the equivalent now asserted, or whether the record as it now stands is sufficient to make those determinations.
4.　If remand to the district court is not necessary, then whether Festo can rebut the presumption that any narrowing amendment surrendered the equivalent now asserted.
・Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 56 USPQ2d 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (en banc), overruled-in-part, 122 S. Ct. 1831, 62 USPQ2d 1705 (2002).
・"Chisum on Festo." Morrison & Foerster LLP.
・"Copyright Extension Act Is Briefed for Supreme Court Case," 64 PTCJ 454 (September 27, 2002).
・Eldred v. Ashcroft, No. 01-618, briefs filed (U.S. 5/20/02 and 8/5/02).
・In re Bogese, No. 01-1354 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
・"PTO Can Reject Patent For Unreasonable Delays by Applicant," 64 PTCJ 434 (September 20, 2002).
・Symbol Technologies Inc. v. Lemelson Medical, 277 F.3d 1361, 61 USPQ2d 1515 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
・"Electronic Submission of Information Disclosure Statements." USPTO, Office of Patent Legal Administration, Pre-OG Notices (signed 20Aug2002) (12Sep2002).
a plurality of output drivers (76) for outputting data onto the external bus in response to a read request, wherein the output drivers (76) output data on the external bus after the number of clock cycles of the external clock transpire and synchronously with respect to the external clock signal.
・"Comment on Japanese Patent Office Draft Examination Guidelines." AIPLA (July 24, 2002).
・Brenda Sandburg (The Recorder), "Closely Watched Hyperlink Patent Case Tossed." law.com (August 23, 2002).
・British Telecommunications Inc. v. Prodigy Communications Corp., Nos.00-9451 (SDNY 2002).
・Greg Aharonian, "Judge dismisses BT's hyperlink lawsuit against Prodigy." Internet Patent News Service (August 22, 2002).
・Bowers V. Baystate Technologies, Inc., Nos.01-1108, -1109 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
The Free On-Line Dictionary of Computing (2001), at http://wombat.doc.ic.ac.uk/foldoc/foldoc.cgi?reverse+engineering (last visited Jul. 17, 2002).
・"Federal Circuit Overturns Patent Infringement Verdict and Upholds Contract Prohibiting Reverse Engineering of Software." IPO Daily News.
・Brenda Sandburg (The Recorder), "Fair Use Fears Over Federal Circuit Ruling." law.com (Oct. 8, 2002).
...The amici did not ask the court to reverse its decision but to clarify that in some cases intellectual property law pre-empts shrink-wrap license terms.
"In some circumstances, such as in a trade secret context, a restriction on reverse engineering may be consistent with copyright policy," Lemley wrote. "We are concerned, however, that the panel in this case has gone to the opposite extreme, adopting a blanket rule that such restrictions are never pre-empted."
Baystate attorney Robert Kann, a partner at Boston's Bromberg & Sunstein, said the concern in this case is that "software companies will be able to sue their competitors for following standard industry practice of reverse engineering their product."
Lemley said there was a long legal battle in the 1990s when many computer software companies and hardware manufacturers sought to assure the legality of reverse engineering. In 1992, he said, the 9th Circuit ruled that copyright law allowed the practice, as did subsequent courts.
...Lemley said the Federal Circuit rarely grants petitions, and asking for the other side to respond is akin to the U.S. Supreme Court asking for a response to a cert petition.
・Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1164, 32 USPQ2d 1385, 1397 (1st Cir. 1994).
・Paul Festa, "Will Mozilla get stomped by Godzilla?" ZDNet News (August 14, 2002).
For a trademark registration to remain valid, an Affidavit of Use ("Section 8 Affidavit") must be filed: (1) between the fifth and sixth year following registration, and (2) within the year before the end of every ten-year period after the date of registration.　The registrant may file the affidavit within a grace period of six months after the end of the sixth or tenth year, with payment of an additional fee.
Under §8(a)(1) of the Trademark Act, an affidavit or declaration under §8 of the Act is required during the sixth year after the date of registration for registrations issued under the Act of 1946 on either the Principal Register or the Supplemental Register, or within the six-month grace period after expiration of the sixth year.　This requirement applies to all 1946 Act registrations, including those issued under §44 of the Act.　15 U.S.C. §§1058(a)(1) and 1058(c)(1); 37 C.F.R. §2.160(a)(1)(i).
Under §8(a)(2) of the Act, an affidavit or declaration under §8 is required during the sixth year after the date of publication under §12(c) for registrations issued under the Acts of 1881 and 1905 if the owner claims the benefits of the Act of 1946 under §12(c), or within the six-month grace period after the end of the sixth year.　15 U.S.C. §§1058(a)(2) and 1058(c)(1); 37 C.F.R. §2.160(a)(1)(ii); TMEP §1603.03.
Section 8(a)(3) of the Act requires an affidavit or declaration of continued use or excusable nonuse at the end of each successive ten-year period following the date of registration, or within the six-month grace period after the end of the ten-year period.　This applies to all registrations, including registrations issued under prior Acts.　15 U.S.C. §1058(a)(3).　However, the provisions of §8(a)(3) of the Act, requiring the filing of a §8 affidavit at the end of each successive ten-year period after registration, do not apply to a registration issued or renewed for a twenty-year term until a renewal application is due.　See TMEP §1604.04(b).
Section 15 of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. §1065, provides a procedure by which the exclusive right to use a registered mark in commerce on or in connection with the goods or services covered by the registration can become “incontestable,” if the registrant files an affidavit stating that the mark has been in continuous use in commerce for a period of five years after the date of registration.　Under §33(b) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. §1115(b), if the right to use the mark has become incontestable under §15, then the registration is conclusive evidence of the validity of the registered mark and its registration, of the registrant’s ownership of the mark, and of the registrant’s exclusive right to use the registered mark in commerce, subject to certain defenses and exceptions.　Sections 15 and 33(b) apply only to registrations issued on the Principal Register.
Filing an affidavit of incontestability under §15 of the Trademark Act (§15 affidavit) is optional.　An eligible registrant may choose to claim the benefits of incontestability and file an appropriate affidavit, or may elect to retain the registration without those benefits.　The requirements for maintaining and renewing a federal registration are not affected in either event.
The Office does not “accept” §15 affidavits.　Arman’s Systems, Inc. v. Armand’s Subway, Inc., 215 USPQ 1048, 1050 n.2. (TTAB 1982).　The Post Registration examiner reviews the affidavit to determine whether it is consistent with the requirements of the statute and rules (e.g., whether it is signed, whether it was filed at an appropriate time, and whether the §15 claims are properly set forth).
When a §15 affidavit complies with the requirements of the statute and rules, the Office updates its records to acknowledge receipt of the affidavit and sends a notice of acknowledgment to the owner of the registration.
If the §15 affidavit does not comply with the statute and rules, the Office issues a written action notifying the registrant of any inconsistency or error, but does not require correction.　The Office does not update its records to acknowledge receipt of a noncompliant affidavit.　Submission of another affidavit is optional with the registrant.
A fee is required for each class in the registration to which the §15 affidavit or declaration pertains.　See 37 C.F.R. §§2.6 and 2.167(g).
To expedite processing, the Office prefers that the owner file the §15 affidavit electronically through TEAS, available at http://www.uspto.gov.　See TMEP §1605.02 regarding the form for filing the §15 affidavit.
See TMEP §1605.05 regarding a combined affidavit or declaration under §§8 and 15 of the Act.
See TMEP §1216.02 regarding the effect of “incontestability” in ex parte examination.
A §15 affidavit may not be filed until the federally registered mark has been in continuous use in commerce for at least five consecutive years after the date of registration.　This may be any five-year period after the date of registration for marks registered under the Act of 1946, or after the date of publication under §12(c) for marks registered under the Acts of 1905 and 1881.
The registrant may file the affidavit within one year after the five-year period that is selected.　37 C.F.R. §2.167(f).　The affidavit must be both executed and filed within that one-year period.
Under 37 C.F.R. §1.6(a)(4), an affidavit filed electronically through TEAS is considered to have been filed on the date the Office receives the transmission, regardless of whether that date is a Saturday, Sunday, or Federal holiday within the District of Columbia.　See TMEP §301 for more information about electronic filing.
If the affidavit is filed on paper, the owner may use certificate of mailing or certificate of facsimile transmission procedures to avoid lateness. See TMEP §§305.02 and 306.05.
See TMEP §1605.05 regarding a combined affidavit under §§8 and 15 of the Act.
Under 37 C.F.R. §2.168(a), the affidavit or declaration filed under §15 of the Act may be combined with the affidavit or declaration required by §8 of the Act, if the combined affidavit or declaration meets the requirements of both §§8 and 15.
・Alan Cohen, "The Squishy Patent," law.com (August 8, 2002).
・SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Excel Pharmaceuticals Inc., No. 2:02CV51 (E.D. Va. 8/02/02).
・"Amendment Listing Specific Compound Barred Equivalents for Generic." 64 Pat.TM&Copyright J. 382 (August 23, 2002).
・"Rogan Says Plan Will Lower PTO Costs By Half Billion Over Five Years" 64 PTCJ 125 (June 7, 2002).
・"Draft Fee Bill and Strategic Plan Draw Cool Response at House Hearing," 64 PTCJ 296 (July 26, 2002).
・New Railhead Mfg. Co. v. Vermeer Mfg. Co. & Earth Tool Co., Nos.02-1028 (Fed.Cir. 2002).
the bit body being mounted with a plurality of substantially forward-facing end studs extending from a front face of the bit body.
・Greg Aharonian, "20020809 LyonLyon to fold; CAFC rules on provisional patents." Internet Patent News Service (August 9, 2002).
...One of the possible advantages that remains to be explored is whether a claims-like generic definition in a provisional application may be used to avoid a Festo-based prosecution history estoppel if the ultimate continuation application based on the provisional has original claims narrower in scope.
・Greg Aharonian, "20020815 COMMENTS ON A RECENT PATNEWS STORY ON PROVISIONALS PATENTS." Internet Patent News Service (August 15, 2002).
・"JPEG Patent Quarrel: First Comprehensive Analysis by the Experts." Algo Vision LuraTech GmbH News (August 27, 2002).
・"JPEG Patentstreit - Was ist dran an den Forderungen von Forgent Networks?" Algo Vision LuraTech GmbH News (27. August 2002).
・Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., Nos-01-1230 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
...We have also previously considered the written description requirement as applied to certain biotechnology patents, in which a gene material has been defined only by a statement of function or result, and have held that such a statement alone did not adequately describe the claimed invention.　Eli Lilly, 119 F.3d at 1568, 43 USPQ2d at 1406.　In Eli Lilly, we concluded that a claim to a microorganism containing a human insulin cDNA was not adequately described by a statement that the invention included human insulin cDNA.　Id. at 1567, 43 USPQ2d at 1405.　The recitation of the term human insulin cDNA conveyed no distinguishing information about the identity of the claimed DNA sequence, such as its relevant structural or physical characteristics.　Id.　We stated that an adequate written description of genetic material "'requires a precise definition, such as by structure, formula, chemical name, or physical properties,' not a mere wish or plan for obtaining the claimed chemical invention," and that none of those descriptions appeared in that patent.　Id. at 1566, 43 USPQ2d at 1404 (quoting Fiers, 984 F.2d at 1171, 25 USPQ2d at 1606).　The specification in the Eli Lilly case thus did not show that the inventors had possession of human insulin cDNA.
It is not correct, however, that all functional descriptions of genetic material fail to meet the written description requirement.　The PTO has issued Guidelines governing its internal practice for addressing that issue.　The Guidelines, like the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure ("MPEP"), are not binding on this court, but may be given judicial notice to the extent they do not conflict with the statute.　See Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1180 n.10, 33 USPQ2d 1823, 1828 n.10 (Fed. Cir. 1995).　In its Guidelines, the PTO has determined that the written description requirement can be met by "show[ing] that an invention is complete by disclosure of sufficiently detailed, relevant identifying characteristics . . . i.e., complete or partial structure, other physical and/or chemical properties, functional characteristics when coupled with a known or disclosed correlation between function and structure, or some combination of such characteristics."　Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. at 1106 (emphasis added).　For example, the PTO would find compliance with § 112,　1, for a claim to an "isolated antibody capable of binding to antigen X," notwithstanding the functional definition of the antibody, in light of "the well defined structural characteristics for the five classes of antibody, the functional characteristics of antibody binding, and the fact that the antibody technology is well developed and mature."　Synopsis of Application of Written Description Guidelines, at 60, available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/patents/guides.htm ("Application of Guidelines").　Thus, under the Guidelines, the written description requirement would be met for all of the claims of the '659 patent if the functional characteristic of preferential binding to N. gonorrhoeae over N. meningitidis were coupled with a disclosed correlation between that function and a structure that is sufficiently known or disclosed.　We are persuaded by the Guidelines on this point and adopt the PTO's applicable standard for determining compliance with the written description requirement.
Applying those principles, we first inquire whether Enzo's deposits of the claimed nucleotide sequences of claims 4 and 6 may constitute an adequate description of those sequences.　Secondly, we will consider whether the description requirement is met for all of the claims on the basis of the functional ability of the claimed nucleotide sequences to hybridize to strains of N. gonorrhoeae that are accessible by deposit.
As to the first question, Enzo asserts that the claimed sequences are inherently described by reference to deposits of three sequences that are within the scope of its claims.　Whether reference to a deposit of a nucleotide sequence may adequately describe that sequence is an issue of first impression in this court.　In light of the history of biological deposits for patent purposes, the goals of the patent law, and the practical difficulties of describing unique biological materials in a written description, we hold that reference in the specification to a deposit in a public depository, which makes its contents accessible to the public when it is not otherwise available in written form,　constitutes an adequate description of the deposited material sufficient to comply with the written description requirement of § 112,　1.
The practice of depositing biological material arose primarily to satisfy the enablement requirement of § 112,　1.
・[vacated] Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 285 F.3d 1013, 62 USPQ2d 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
・Netscape Communications Corp. v. Konrad, Nos.01-1455 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
...We look to the totality of the circumstances when evaluating whether there has been a public use within the meaning of section 102(b).　Sinskey v. Pharmacia Ophthalmics Inc., 982 F.2d 494, 498, 25 USPQ2d 1290, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 1992).　The totality of the circumstances is considered in conjunction with the policies underlying the public use bar.　Tone Bros., Inc. v. Sysco Corp., 28 F.3d 1192, 1198, 31 USPQ2d 1321, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 1994).　The circumstances may include: the nature of the activity that occurred in public; the public access to and knowledge of the public use; whether there was any confidentiality obligation imposed on persons who observed the use; whether persons other than the inventor performed the testing; the number of tests; the length of the test period in relation to tests of similar devices; and whether the inventor received payment for the testing.　See Allied Colloids, 64 F.3d at 1574, 35 USPQ2d at 1842; Baker Oil Tools, Inc. v. Geo Vann, Inc., 828 F.2d 1558, 1564, 4 USPQ2d 1210, 1214 (Fed. Cir. 1987); In re Brigance, 792 F.2d 1103, 1107-08, 229 USPQ 988, 991 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Hycor Corp. v. Schlueter Co., 740 F.2d 1529, 1535, 222 USPQ 553, 557 (Fed. Cir. 1984); TP Labs., Inc., 724 F.2d at 971-72, 220 USPQ at 582.　There may be additional factors in a particular case relevant to the public nature of the use or any asserted experimental aspect.　On summary judgment, once Netscape presented facts sufficient to establish a prima facie case of public use, it fell to Konrad to come forward with some evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact to the contrary.　Sinskey, 982 F.2d at 498, 25 USPQ2d at 1293; Petrolite Corp., 96 F.3d at 1425, 40 USPQ2d at 1203.
・Brenda Sandburg (The Recorder), "Netscape, Microsoft Team Up in Internet Suit." law.com (April 2, 2002).
...Verhoeven's second Internet case may prove more difficult. To date Intouch has successfully enforced its patent on a method of previewing pre-recorded music samples online. Intouch sued six companies, including Amazon.com, Listen.com Inc., Liquid Audio Inc. and Entertaindom, a defunct unit of AOL Time Warner. Verhoeven's client, Entertaindom, is the only defendant that has not settled with Intouch.
・"EU Database Directive Invoked to Support Order Barring 'Deep Linking' to News Sites," From Electronic Commerce & Law Report (July 17, 2002).
・Danish Newspaper Publishers' Association v. Newsbooster.com ApS, docket number unavailable (Den. Fogedret 7/5/02).
・Telcomm Technical Services Inc. v. Siemens Rolm Communications Inc., No. 00-1579 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
・Holmes Group Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Systems Inc., 62 USPQ2d 1801 (U.S. 2002).
・"CAFC Transfers to Eleventh Circuit Antitrust Case with Patent Counterclaims" 64 PTCJ 214 (July 12, 2002).
・Eric W. Pfeiffer, "Setting Patent Traps: A 66-year-old tycoon is set to make $2 billion on 46 patents." Forbes.com (June 24, 2002).
・Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure (TMEP) Third Edition, Revision 1 (June 2002).
・"Orita Doctrine Does Not Prohibit Reissue of Broader Genus Claims." 64 PTCJ 175 (June 21, 2002).
・In re Doyle, No. 01-1439 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
A reissue applicant's failure to timely file a divisional application is not considered to be error causing a patent granted on elected claims to be partially inoperative by reason of claiming less than the applicant had a right to claim. Thus, such error is not correctable by reissue of the original patent under 35 U.S.C. 251.　In re Watkinson, 900 F.2d 230, 14 USPQ2d 1407 (Fed. Cir. 1990); In re Orita, 550 F.2d 1277, 1280, 193 USPQ 145, 148 (CCPA 1977). See also In re Mead, 581 F. 2d 251, 198 USPQ 412 (CCPA 1978). Likewise, if the original patent specification or the prosecution history of the original patent shows an intent not to claim the newly presented invention, that invention cannot be added by reissue. In these situations, the reissue claims should be rejected under 35 U.S.C. 251 for lack of defect in the original patent and lack of error in obtaining the original patent. See also MPEP 1412.01.
・"USPTO ANNOUNCES SWEEPING STRATEGIC PLAN." IPO Daily News (JUNE 4, 2002).
・"Patent Office Seeks To Speed Applications: Director Cites Backlog; Union Assails Plan." Washington Post; Page A15 (June 4, 2002).
...Under Rogan's plan, the agency would no longer conduct the initial search. Patent applicants could have that done by outside vendors that would be certified by the Patent and Trademark Office. The agency would also accept searches conducted by agencies in certain other countries, yet to be determined.
・The Recorder, "PTO Announces Outsourcing Proposal." law.com (June 5, 2002).
・Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc., Nos. 01-408 (U.S. 2002).
Where a complaint seeks declaratory judgment of non-infringement of trade dress and an injunction against such accusations, but does not assert a patent law claim, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals cannot assert jurisdiction over the case, although the answer contains a patent law counterclaim.
See Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y. U. L.Rev. 1, 2530, 54 (1989) (evaluating criticism that the Federal Circuit demonstrates a greater pro-patent bias than regional circuits).
・The Recorder, "U.S. Supreme Court Limits Reach of Federal Circuit." law.com (June 6, 2002).
・"Supreme Court Holds That Federal Circuit Does Not Have Jurisdiction Over Case in Which The Patent Issue is Raised in a Counterclaim." IPO Daily News (June 5, 2002).
・"Patent Counterclaim May Not Create Federal Circuit Appellate Jurisdiction." 64 Pat.TM&Copyright J. (June 7, 2002).
....The likely result of this case will be patent rulings from regional circuit courts which will follow Federal Circuit precedent, although there appears to be no legal requirement for them to do so.
・Pioneer Magnetics, Inc. v. Micro Linear Corp., U.S., No. 00-1765, 238 F.3d 1341, 57 USPQ2d 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1/23/01).
・(unpublished) Insituform Technologies v. CAT Contracting, et al., U.S. No. 00-1946, (Fed. Cir. 3/26/01).
・(unpublished) Senior Technologies, Inc. v. R.F. Technologies, Inc., U.S. No. 01-35, (Fed. Cir. 3/12/01).
・Creo Products Inc. v. Dainippon Screen, et al., U.S. No. 01-269 (Fed. Cir. 5/14/01).
・Semitool, Inc. v. Novellus Systems, Inc., U.S. No. 01-423 (Fed. Cir. 6/8/01).
・Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Space Systems/Loral, Inc., U.S. No. 01-506, 249 F.3d 1314, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d 1671 (Fed. Cir. 4/30/01).
・AccuSCAN, Inc. v. Xerox Corp., U.S. No. 01-541 (Fed. Cir. 5/31/01).
・PTI Techologies, Inc. v. Pall Corp. Techn., Inc., U.S. No. 01-677, 259 F.3d 1383, U.S.P.2d 1763), (Fed. Cir. 8/7/01).
・Mycogen Plant Science, et al. v. Monsanto Company, U.S. No. 01-740, 252 F.3d 1306, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d 1891 (Fed. Cir. 5/30/01).
・"Supreme Court Remands Cases in Light of Festo." 64 Pat.TM&Copyright J. 135 (June 7, 2002).
The chicken faces the risk of a claim that it's really a duck, but the guy with the duck patent has to prove that he never could have imagined a chicken.
I do not see it as a rebuke.　Because Federal Circuit cases rarely involve a conflict between circuits, the Supreme Court has little reason to take a case where it expects to agree with the Federal Circuit, and there inherently will be a high reversal rate.
・Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., et al., No. 00-1543 (U.S. 2001).
Held: Prosecution history estoppel may apply to any claim amendment made to satisfy the Patent Act's requirements, not just to amendments made to avoid the prior art, but estoppel need not bar suit against every equivalent to the amended claim element.
...We agree with the Court of Appeals that a narrowing amendment made to satisfy any requirement of the Patent Act may give rise to an estoppel.
Petitioner contends that amendments made to comply with 112 concern the form of the application and not the subject matter of the invention... In these cases, petitioner argues, the applicant has no intention of surrendering subject matter and should not be estopped from challenging equivalent devices. While this may be true in some cases, petitioners argument conflates the patentees reason for making the amendment with the impact the amendment has on the subject matter.
Estoppel arises when an amendment is made to secure the patent and the amendment narrows the patents scope. If a 112 amendment is truly cosmetic, then it would not narrow the patents scope or raise an estoppel. On the other hand, if a 112 amendment is necessary and narrows the patents scope even if only for the purpose of better description estoppel may apply. A patentee who narrows a claim as a condition for obtaining a patent disavows his claim to the broader subject matter, whether the amendment was made to avoid the prior art or to comply with 112. We must regard the patentee as having conceded an inability to claim the broader subject matter or at least as having abandoned his right to appeal a rejection. In either case estoppel may apply.
...Each time the Court has considered the doctrine of equivalents, it has acknowledged this uncertainty as the price of ensuring the appropriate incentives for innovation, and it has affirmed the doctrine over dissents that urged a more certain rule.
...The equivalent may have been unforeseeable at the time of the application; the rationale underlying the amendment may bear no more than a tangential relation to the equivalent in question; or there may be some other reason suggesting that the patentee could not reasonably be expected to have described the insubstantial substitute in question.
In those cases the patentee can overcome the presumption that prosecution history estoppel bars a finding of equivalence. This presumption is not, then, just the complete bar by another name.
Rather, it reflects the fact that the interpretation of the patent must begin with its literal claims, and the prosecution history is relevant to construing those claims.
When the patentee has chosen to narrow a claim, courts may presume the amended text was composed with awareness of this rule and that the territory surrendered is not an equivalent of the territory claimed.
In those instances, however, the patentee still might rebut the presumption that estoppel bars a claim of equivalence.
The patentee must show that at the time of the amendment one skilled in the art could not reasonably be expected to have drafted a claim that would have literally encompassed the alleged equivalent.
・Tony Mauro (American Lawyer Media), "U.S. Supreme Court Vacates 'Festo' Decision:High court rules claim amendments don't preclude application of doctrine of equivalents." Law.com (May 29, 2002).
・"Supreme Court Disagrees With Federal Circuit's 'Complete Bar' Rule for Patent Doctrine of Equivalents." IPO Daily News (May 29, 2002).
・"Patent Equivalents Infringement Not Completely Barred for Amended Claims." 64 Pat.TM&Copyright J. 98 (May 31, 2002).
・Ernest Schaal, "THE PATENT CRIB SHEET: Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co." (May 31, 2002).
・"Patent Protections Upheld By Supreme Court." FindLaw Top Headlines (May 28, 2002).
・"ABA IP Section OKs Resolution For First-to-File Patent System." 64 PTCJ 222 (July 12, 2002).
・Universal City Studios Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001).
・"Free Speech: California High Court to Consider Whether Constitution Protects Web Posting of DeCSS," Computer Technology Law Report Volume: 03 Number: 05 (March 01, 2002).
・"THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1998, U.S. Copyright Office Summary." U.S. Copyright Office (December 1998).
・Abbott Laboratories v. Dey L.P., No. 01-1374 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
・"Prosecution History of Initial Patent Does Not Apply to Later Improvement." 64 Pat.TM&Copyright J. (May 03, 2002).
・"Court Denies Lemelson Petition for Rehearing En Banc." IPO daily News (April 4, 2002).
・Symbol Tech., Inc., et al.,v. Lemelson Med., Educ. & Research Found., Ltd. P'ship, 277 F.3d 1361, 61 USPQ2d 1515 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
・Johnson & Johnston Assocs. v. R.E. Serv. Co., Nos. 99-1076, -1179, -1180, 2002 WL 466547 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (en banc) (per curiam).
In this case, Johnston's '50 patent specifically limited the claims to "a sheet of aluminum" and "the aluminum sheet." The specification of the '50 patent, however, reads: "While aluminum is currently the preferred material for the substrate, other metals, such as stainless steel or nickel alloys may be used." Col. 5, ll. 5-10. Having disclosed without claiming the steel substrates, Johnston cannot now invoke the doctrine of equivalents to extend its aluminum limitation to encompass steel. Thus, Johnston cannot assert the doctrine of equivalents to cover the disclosed but unclaimed steel substrate. To the extent that YMB Magnex conflicts with this holding, this en banc court now overrules that case.
A patentee who inadvertently fails to claim disclosed subject matter, however, is not left without remedy. Within two years from the grant of the original patent, a patentee may file a reissue application and attempt to enlarge the scope of the original claims to include the disclosed but previously unclaimed subject matter. 35 U.S.C. § 251 (2000). In addition, a patentee can file a separate application claiming the disclosed subject matter under 35 U.S.C. §120 (2000) (allowing filing as a continuation application if filed before all applications in the chain issue). Notably, Johnston took advantage of the latter of the two options by filing two continuation applications that literally claim the relevant subject matter.
　This court respectfully disagrees with the statement in the dissent that: "There was no claim to manganese silicate."　As earlier explained, composition claims 24 and 26 comprising "silicates" and "metallic silicates" were broad enough to encompass manganese silicate.　Therefore, our holding today is in no way in conflict with Graver Tank.　Nor does this court agree that intent plays any role in the Maxwell rule.　To the contrary, one of the advantages of the Maxwell rule is that it is a purely objective test.　The patentee's subjective intent is irrelevant to determining whether unclaimed subject matter has been disclosed and therefore dedicated to the public.
　These applications issued as U.S. Patent Nos. 5,725,937 (the '37 patent) and 5,674,596 (the '96 patent) on March 10, 1998 and October 7, 1997, respectively.　Claims 3 and 6 of the '96 patent claim "a metal substrate sheet," while independent claims of the '37 patent claim "a sheet of stainless steel."
This reconciling principle is simple: the doctrine of equivalents does not capture subject matter that the patent drafter reasonably could have foreseen during the application process and included in the claims. This principle enhances the notice function of claims by making them the sole definition of invention scope in all foreseeable circumstances. This principle also protects patentees against copyists who employ insubstantial variations to expropriate the claimed invention in some unforeseeable circumstances.
While aluminum is currently the preferred material for the substrate, other metals, such as stainless steel or nickel alloys, may be used. In some instances . . .polypropelene [sic] can be used.
one surface of each of the copper sheet and the aluminum sheet being essentially uncontaminated and engageable with each other at an interface, a band of flexible adhesive joining the uncontaminated surfaces of the sheets together at their borders and defining a substantially uncontaminated central zone inwardly of the edges of the sheets and unjoined at the interface.
050 patent, Claim 1, col. 8, ll. 47-60 (emphasis supplied).
Claim 2 defines a similar laminate having sheets of copper foil adhered to both sides of the aluminum sheet.
・Maxwell v. J. Baker Inc., 86 F.3d 1098, 39 USPQ2d 1001 (Fed.Cir. 6/11/1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1244 (1997).
In addition, the specification suggests that the fastening tab, as an alternative to placing it between the inner and outer soles, may be "stitched into a lining seam of the shoes at the sides or back of the shoes [emphasis added]." Col. 2, ll. 42-43. Accordingly, Maxwell must have contemplated that the tab be separate from the shoe's lining seam in order for the tab to be stitched into the lining. Thus, the court properly construed the claims to require the fastening tab to be a separate piece from the counter pocket lining or other inside shoe lining.
In Unique Concepts, Inc. v. Brown, 939 F.2d 1558, 19 USPQ2d 1500 (Fed. Cir. 1991), we reiterated the well-established rule that "subject matter disclosed but not claimed in a patent application is dedicated to the public." 939 F.2d at 1562-63, 19 USPQ2d at 1504. See also Miller v. Bridgeport Brass Co., 104 U.S. 350, 352 (1881) ("[T]he claim of a specific device or combination, and an omission to claim other devices or combinations apparent on the face of the patent, are, in law, a dedication to the public of that which is not claimed."). We have frequently applied this rule to prohibit a finding of literal infringement when an accused infringer practices disclosed but unclaimed subject matter. E.g., Environmental Instruments, Inc. v. Sutron Corp., 877 F.2d 1561, 1564, 11 USPQ2d 1132, 1134 (Fed. Cir. 1989). This rule, however, applies equally to prevent a finding of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.
A patentee may not narrowly claim his invention and then, in the course of an infringement suit, argue that the doctrine of equivalents should permit a finding of infringement because the specification discloses the equivalents. Such a result would merely encourage a patent applicant to present a broad disclosure in the specification of the application and file narrow claims, avoiding examination of broader claims that the applicant could have filed consistent with the specification. See Genentech, Inc. v. Wellcome Found. Ltd., 29 F.3d 1555, 1564, 31 USPQ2d 1161, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 1994) ("An applicant should not be able deliberately to narrow the scope of examination to avoid during prosecution scrutiny by the PTO of subject matter . . . and then, obtain in court, either literally or under the doctrine of equivalents, a scope of protection which encompasses that subject matter."); International Visual Corp. v. Crown Metal Mfg. Co., 991 F.2d 768, 775, 26 USPQ2d 1588, 1593 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (doctrine of equivalents should not extend to disclosed, but unexamined, subject matter) (Lourie, J., concurring). This is clearly contrary to 35 U.S.C. §112, which requires that a patent applicant "particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention." 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994). It is also contrary to our system of patent examination, in which a patent is granted following careful examination of that which an applicant claims as her invention. Thus, we agree with J. Baker that subject matter disclosed in the specification, but not claimed, is dedicated to the public.
Of course, within two years from the grant of the original patent, a patentee may seek reissuance of the patent and attempt to enlarge the scope of the claims to include the disclosed but previously unclaimed subject matter. 35 U.S.C. §251 (1994).
...a patentee cannot narrowly claim an invention to avoid prosecution scrutiny by the PTO, and then, after patent issuance, use the doctrine of equivalents to establish infringement because the specification discloses equivalents.
・YBM Magnex Inc. v. ITC, 145 F3d 1317, 46 USPQ2d 1843 (Fed. Cir. 5/27/1998).
・Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 336 U.S. 271 (1949).
・Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 605 (1950).
・"En Banc Court Says Patent Owner Cannot Use Doctrine of Equivalents to Protect Disclosed But Unclaimed Subject Matter," IPO Daily News (April 1, 2002).
・Richard Hung, "No Coverage for Disclosed But Unclaimed Subject Matter under the Doctrine of Equivalents," Morrison & Foerster LLP (March 29, 2002).
・Brenda Sandburg (The Recorder), "Ruling Is 'Nail in Coffin' of Doctrine of Equivalents," law.com (April 3, 2002).
・"Doctrine of Equivalents Does Not Cover Disclosed but Unclaimed Matter." 63 Pat. TM & Copyright J. 480 (April 5, 2002).
37 CFR 1.83 Content of drawing.
(a) The drawing in a nonprovisional application must show every feature of the invention specified in the claims. However, conventional features disclosed in the description and claims, where their detailed illustration is not essential for a proper understanding of the invention, should be illustrated in the drawing in the form of a graphical drawing symbol or a labeled representation (e.g., a labeled rectangular box).
Form Paragraph 6.36 should be used to require illustration.
The drawings are objected to under　37 CFR 1.83(a).　The drawings must show every feature of the invention specified in the claims.　Therefore, the　 must be shown or the feature(s) canceled from the claim(s).　No new matter should be entered.
・British Telecommunications PLC v. Prodigy Communications Corp., No. 00-9451 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
・Brenda Sandburg (The Recorder), "Defining Ruling Issued in Hyperlink Patent Case." law.com (March 14, 2002).
・"'Central Computer' Found Key to Patent In Case Against Prodigy Over Hyperlinking." 63 Pat. TM & Copyright J. 488 (April 5, 2002).
・Eric Auchard, "NY Judge Narrows Terms in BT Internet Patent Case," reuters.com(March 15, 2002).
・Victoria Slind-Flor (IP Worldwide), "The 'Markman' Prophecies -Six years after the U.S. Supreme Court altered the patent system, the worst fears of lawyers have come to pass." law.com (March 13, 2002).
...Even so, some practitioners say that they suspect that the Federal Circuit is more likely to give deference to Markman determinations made by well-known judges in districts where a large number of patent cases are tried. "If a case comes from Delaware, it's more likely to be affirmed than if it's from South Podunk," says professor Paul Janicke of the University of Houston Law Center, who tracks Federal Circuit decisions for his Web site, patstats.org.
・"Scope of Obviousness Prior Art Under &sect;103(c) Is Debated at Hearing." 63 Pat.TM&Copyright J. (March 22, 2002).
・OddzOn Products Inc. v. Just Toys Inc., 122 F3d 1396, 43 USPQ2d 1641 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
...The Federal Circuit does not announce its panels until the morning of the oral argument, and judges are chosen randomly.
・"Top patent firms" Intellectual Property Today, Vol.9, No.3 (March, 2002).
・Anthony Lin (New York Law Journal) "Meet The Patent Prospectors: Salvaging patents from bankrupt e-commerce and high-tech companies can be lucrative, if risky, business," law.com (February 26, 2002).
..."At the boutiques, the top people are very good," he said, "but they hog all the good work, so the associates and junior partners don't get enough good experience."
But Marshall said he doubted big-firm general litigators could easily handle major IP cases, and he noted that arrogance had cost some in the courtroom.
"I always liked seeing a general practice firm on the other side," he said. "They didn't know what they didn't know."
・Eldred v. Ashcroft, No. 01-618, cert. granted (U.S. 2/19/02).
・Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 57 USPQ2d 1842 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
"promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries."
・Edward Samuels (The National Law Journal), "In Step With the World.", law.com (March 7, 2002).
・"Supreme Court Grants Review in Challenge Of Federal Copyright Term Extension Statute." Computer Technology Law Report,Volume: 03 Number: 05 (March 01, 2002).
...The patents filed by SightSound and granted in 1992 give the company control over a technique for "electronic sales and distribution of digital audio or video signals," specifically over a "telecommunications line."
・Jim Fitzgerald (The Associated Press), "British Company Claims Patent on Hyperlinks." law.com (February 12, 2002).
・Alex Chartove, "CAFC says Lemelson Patents Could Be Unenforceable." The CAFC Study Forum (January 25, 2002).
争点：Whether, as a matter of law, the equitable doctrine of laches may be applied to bar enforcement of patent claims that issued after an unreasonable and unexplained delay in prosecution even though the applicant complied with pertinent statutes and rules.
・Woodbridge v. United States, 263 U.S. 50 (1923).
・Webster Electric Co. v. Splitdorf Electrical Co., 264 U.S. 463 (1924).
・Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2000), vacated as moot, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
"Possible implications of Webster Electric outside the interference context were dispelled by the Supreme Court in Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. Ferdinand Gutmann Co."
→We find no support for this view.
Lemelson asserts that by passing these two sections, especially allowing the continuation practice, Congress abrogated the defense of prosecution laches.
→But the legislative history and commentary from the authors of the 1952 Act suggest no such intent...the defense of prosecution laches and the continuation practice coexisted.
・Thomas G. Eshweiler, Ford v. Lemelson and Continuing Application Laches Revisited, 79 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc'y 457 (1997).
Although the merits of the asserted "prosecution laches" are not before us, we take note of the declaratory plaintiffs' continuing reference to "submarine" patents.　The limited record provided to us shows that Lemelson's original patents, filed in 1954 and 1956, issued in 1962 and 1963, and thus expired in 1979 and 1980.　The record also shows that ten divisional patents were subject to terminal disclaimers, one of which has a life of only one year and another of four years.　The record shows that other patents are continuations-in-part.　Both sides outline their positions: the plaintiffs allege that Lemelson has unfairly enlarged the scope of his original patents and is unreasonably threatening suit, while Lemelson answers that his first patents issued long ago and are expired, that any later claims not patentably distinct are subject to attack on the established grounds of invalidity or terminal disclaimer, and that all of his filings complied with the statute.
・Bott v. Four Star Corp., 1988 WL 54107 (Fed. Cir. May 26, 1988).
・Ricoh Co. v. Nashua Corp., 1999 WL 88969 (Fed. Cir. Feb 18, 1999).
・Symbol Tech., Inc., et al.,v. Lemelson Med., Educ. & Research Found., Ltd. P'ship, 99-CV-0397 (D. Nev. Mar. 21, 2000).
・"Landmark Federal Circuit Opinion Says Lemelson Patents Could Be Unenforceable for Unreasonable Delay in USPTO." IPO Daily News (January 25, 2002).
...Why would companies settle if they didn't believe--and most don't--that Lemelson's patents were valid? Beyond the obvious desire to avoid costly litigation, they found themselves trapped in the web of patent claims that Lemelson had woven during his life. Lemelson's machine-vision claims, for example, number in the hundreds and are spread among 16 different patents. Knock out one claim, and dozens more would rise to take its place....And yet for all the talk about the iron-clad nature of his patents--and the money they've generated--a crucial question has been obscured: Did Jerome Lemelson ever actually invent the products that generated such riches? When it comes to bar-code technology--just as with machine vision--the answer is clear (though, naturally, Lemelson's expert disagrees). "His patents have nothing to do with bar codes as they are commonly used," says George Laurer, the (unchallenged) inventor of the universal product code. "That is so far out in left field, it makes me sick." Last year Laurer was asked to testify on behalf of Lemelson; he not only declined but also offered to testify free on behalf of any company sued by Lemelson.
Which is why it is all the more fitting that corporate America's last stand against the Lemelson litigation machine is being waged by the very companies that he and Hosier never sued: the makers of bar-code equipment and machine-vision technology.
Their leader is a man named Robert Shillman, the co-founder of Cognex,...Shillman is a passionate man. Ask him about Lemelson, and he starts bouncing up and down in his chair, his white hair providing a vivid contrast to the florid red that soon flushes his face. "I take it personally," Shillman says. "It's a tax on every consumer in America.... What was produced by this man that is worth a billion dollars?" Shillman was outraged that his customers were being asked to pay a license on a product that was developed completely independently of Lemelson's ideas. It wasn't just a theoretical issue either. Customers had begun to approach Cognex, asking to be reimbursed for the money they'd paid to Lemelson.
In the fall of 1998, Cognex sued the for-profit Lemelson foundation. To Hosier, this was a mystifying step--he couldn't fathom why the company would insert itself into litigation that, in his view, did not concern them. But for Shillman, it has become a matter of principle. He's not looking for money; he has a much grander dream. He wants Lemelson's patents invalidated. As he sees it, he is carrying on this battle on behalf of his customers. Soon seven manufacturers of bar-code equipment reached a conclusion similar to Cognex's: They were also going to stand up to the Lemelson foundation and sue on behalf of their customers. The two cases have been combined.
Like Ford before them, Cognex and the bar-code companies have accused Lemelson of excessive delay--and a judge has ruled against them. But this time the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals is permitting an unusual mid-case appeal. The two sides have submitted briefs and a hearing is expected sometime later this year. Meanwhile, the rest of the Cognex case is moving forward simultaneously. Here, too, a crucial hearing is anticipated this year: The judge will rule on the scope of the Lemelson patents. The remaining Lemelson litigation has been stayed in anticipation of these decisions.
Despite all the litigation, no court has ever made a substantive ruling on the validity of Lemelson's machine-vision and bar-code patents. It's likely that the Lemelson machine-vision and bar-code patents will rise or fall based on what happens in the Cognex suit. If Cognex wins the mid-case appeal--or wins a favorable ruling on the scope of the patents--the Lemelson patent-licensing program will effectively be dead. If Lemelson prevails, however, his patents will have the imprimatur of a court, and the 400 companies still in litigation with him will have to contemplate settlement.
Hosier says he isn't worried. Despite the $1.5 billion generated so far, he has no plans to wrap up the litigation. Besides, even if Cognex is able to deal a deathblow to the bar-code and machine-vision patents, it may not be enough to slay the hydra-headed monster. According to Hosier, there are still a few dozen patents that will be issuing in the next few years. He plans to enforce them.
・Lemelson v. General Mills Inc., 23 USPQ2d 1284 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
"Jerome Lemelson turned an obscure 'submarine patent' into $1 billion-plus in royalties. The sub just took a hit." Forbes Magazine (May 13, 2002).
・Greg Aharonian, "PDF TRANSCRIPT OF SUPREME COURT HEARING ON FESTO." Internet Patent News Service (Jan. 21, 2002).
・Shannon P. Duffy (The Legal Intelligencer), "Victoria's Secret Must Drop 'Miracle Bra' Mark on Swimsuits," law.com (January 16, 2002).
・Toyota v. Salvador Cobian, WIPO Case No. DMX2001-0006 (December 20, 2001).
・David McGuire, "Domain Dispute Mechanism Works Well - Study." Newsbytes (January 11, 2002).
・Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.,No. 00-1543, oral arguments (U.S. 2002).
・Greg Aharonian, "Did Honeywell settle because of Festo's strength?" Internet Patent News Service (Dec. 29. 2001).
・Litton Sys., Inc. v. Honeywell Inc., 238 F.3d 1376, 1380 (Fed. Cir.), petition for cert. pending, No. 00-1617 (filed Apr. 23, 2001).
・Turbocare Div. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 264 F.3d 1111, 60 USPQ2d 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
・Bose Corp. v. JBL Inc., No. 01-1054 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
・Interactive Pictures Corp. v. Infinite Pictures Inc., No. 01-1029 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
・Pickholtz v. Rainbow Techs., Inc., 125 F. Supp. 2d 1156, 1161 (N.D. Cal. 2000) ("the court must consider whether the amendments 'narrowed the literal scope of the claim'").
Copyright (C) Yasushi Toyosu, 2001-2003. All rights reserved.

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