Source: https://www.atg.wa.gov/ago-opinions/authority-county-restrict-video-andor-sound-recording-county-meetings
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 22:19:13+00:00

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PUBLIC MEETINGS - OPEN PUBLIC MEETINGS ACT - COUNTIES - RECORDING OFFICIAL PROCEEDINGS - Authority of county to restrict video and/or sound recording of county meetings.
A county does not have authority to ban video or sound recording of a meeting required to be open to the public by the Open Public Meetings Act (RCW 42.30); the county could regulate recording only to the extent necessary to preserve order at the meeting and facilitate public attendance.
A county has authority to ban video or sound recording of any lawful executive session of a public meeting.
If a meeting is not an “open public meeting” as defined in RCW 42.30, but is required to be an open meeting by some other statute, the extent of the county's authority to restrict recording of such a meeting would depend on the language and the intent of the controlling statute.
If a county officer conducts a “private meeting” as may be defined in law, the county has authority to restrict or prohibit the recording of such meetings.
May a county legislative body prohibit an individual from using a video or audio recording device to record a meeting or hearing conducted by county officials? If such recording cannot be prohibited, may the legislative body impose restrictions on the use of such recording devices?
A county is subject to the Open Public Meetings Act which generally requires that meetings of the governing body be open to the public and that no conditions precedent to attendance by the public, except for orderly conduct, may be imposed. Therefore, a county legislative body may not ban the use of recording devices from the open portion of a meeting held pursuant to the Open Public Meetings Act. The county legislative body may impose restrictions on the use of recording devices, but only to the extent necessary to preserve the orderly conduct of the meeting. Executive sessions held pursuant to the Open Public Meetings Act are not open to the public, and the county legislative body may ban the use of recording devices at executive sessions. The county legislative body may ban the use of recording devices at public meetings that are not subject to the Open Public Meetings Act or to some other state statute that limits county authority. A county legislative authority may ban the use of recording devices to record conversations at private meetings not open to the public.
The general rule is that municipal corporations are limited to those powers expressly granted to them by the Legislature and to powers necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the powers expressly granted. Chemical Bank v. WPPSS, 99 Wn.2d 772, 792, 666 P.2d 329 (1983); City of Spokane v. J-R Distributors, Inc., 90 Wn.2d 722, 585 P.2d 784 (1978). At least as to matters of local concern, however, this general rule does to [sic] apply to cities and counties that have adopted charters pursuant to article 11, sections 4 and 10, of the Washington Constitution, respectively, or to cities operating under the Optional Municipal Code, Title 35A RCW. These cities and counties have legislative power akin to that of the state, except that their actions cannot contravene any constitutional provision or legislative enactment. Thus, such a city or county has broad legislative power except when restricted by enactments of the state. King Cy. Coun, [sic] v. Public Disclosure Comm'n, 93 Wn.2d 559, 562-63, 611 P.2d 1227 (1980); Winkenwerder v. Yakima, 52 Wn.2d 617, 622, 328 P.2d 873 (1958); La Mon v. Westport, 22 Wn. App. 215, 217- 18, 588 P.2d 1205 (1978); Chemical Bank v. WPPSS, 99 Wn.2d 772, 792-93, 666 P.2d 329 (1983).
AGO 1991 No. 17 at 2. Thus, state law constitutes a limit on county legislative authority. Your question does not specify a particular type of meeting or hearing so our response is necessarily general and discusses broad categories. The first category is meetings held pursuant to the Open Public Meetings Act, RCW 42.30.
A member of the public shall not be required, as a condition to attendance at a meeting of a governing body, to register his name and other information, to complete a questionnaire, or otherwise to fulfill any condition precedent to his attendance.
(Emphasis added.) These provisions of the Open Public Meetings Act persuade us that a county legislative body may not ban recording devices from open meetings conducted pursuant to that law.
(Emphasis added.) RCW 9.73.030(1)(b) does not apply because conversations at an open meeting conducted pursuant to the Open Public Meetings Act are not private. In fact, the law requires the conversations to be public. Thus, if a member of the public used a small hand-held tape recorder to secretly tape an open meeting conducted pursuant to the Open Public Meetings Act, the individual would not be violating RCW 9.73.030(1).
In the court's judgment, a determination that the Act requires the Committee to allow members of the press and public to tape record its meetings follows inexorably from the policy set forth at R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-46-1, previously quoted.
Belcher, 569 F. Supp. at 382; see alsoNevens v. City of Chino, 233 Cal. App. 2d 775, 44 Cal. Rptr. 50 (1965); Mitchell v. Board of Educ. of the Garden City Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 A.D.2d 924, 493 N.Y.S.2d 826 *regional reporter? (1985); Sudol v. Borough of North Arlington, 348 A.2d 216 (N.J. Super. 1975).
In addition to these decisions we have found Attorney General's Opinions from other states that reach the same conclusion. See Op. Att'y Gen. 96-OMD-143 (Ky. 1996) ; 13 Op. Att'y Gen. 196 (Okla. 1981) ; Op. Att'y Gen. 24 (S.C. 1988) ; 66 Op. Att'y Gen. 318 (Wis. 1977) ; Op. Att'y Gen. 87 (Fla. 1991) .
The memorandum accompanying your letter suggests several rationales for banning recording devices from open meetings conducted under the Open Public Meetings Act. We have considered these justifications and do not find them persuasive. First, it might be argued that a ban on recording devices does not prohibit a person from attending the meeting but only from recording the meeting. We are not persuaded by this argument. If a person attending a meeting began to use a small hand held tape recorder in defiance of the ban, the governing body would have to enforce its prohibition. This could be done by confiscating the recorder or, if the person refused to surrender the device, by ejecting the person from the meeting. In effect, a ban on recording devices is a condition on attendance at the meeting: A person may only attend if he or she agrees not to record the meeting. Assuming the use of the recording device is not disruptive, the law prohibits the imposition of this requirement as a condition of attendance at the open meeting.
[K]eeping of an official record of the meeting by the Committee does not mean that unofficial records cannot and should not be kept. There is no evidence that informal records could or would be confused with official ones, and common sense argues strongly to the contrary. Moreover, the official records here in question—the Committee minutes—are summary in nature and do not, in any way, constitute a complete report of the proceedings. Thus, unofficial records may well be invaluable if the public is to taste the full flavor of the proceedings.
Belcher, 569 F. Supp. at 383 (footnote omitted).
While preserving public participation in certain facets of the Committee's meetings is an important consideration, defendants' assertion has no factual support on the record and is belied by common sense. If an individual is willing to stand up and talk in the sometimes volatile setting of a thronged public meeting, at which members of the press are customarily present, that person has little to fear (and much to gain) from the presence of a tape recorder. In any event, the argument, even if it has some marginal value, will not be allowed to defeat the salutary ends which are served by allowing Committee meetings to be taped, at least without convincing evidence to support the proposition.
Belcher, 569 F. Supp. at 383.
In the event that any meeting is interrupted by a group or groups of persons so as to render the orderly conduct of such meeting unfeasible and order cannot be restored by the removal of individuals who are interrupting the meeting . . . .
Orderly conduct is the only condition that may be imposed on one attending an open public meeting. Applying this principle to your question we conclude that the use of recording devices may be restricted only to the extent that it is necessary to ensure that the open public meeting is not disrupted.
This conclusion is consistent with the court decisions and Attorney General's Opinions that have addressed this issue. See Belcher, 569 F. Supp. at 384 ; 13 Op. Att'y Gen. 196 (Okla. 1981) ; Op. Att'y Gen. 96-OMD-143 (Ky. 1996) .
We do not, in this opinion, undertake to set out a list of permissible restrictions. This would be a function of a number of factors including the size of the meeting room and the kind of recording device being used. One might reasonably require that a large video camera be placed in a particular part of the room so it does not interfere with public access to the meeting. Other kinds of restrictions such as requiring a person to tape the entire meeting and provide a copy of the tape to the governing body would not be permissible. This is because these restrictions are not related to preserving the orderly conduct of the meeting.
To summarize, a county legislative body may not prohibit the use of recording devices in the open portion of a meeting held pursuant to the Open Public Meetings Act, but may impose restrictions to the extent necessary to ensure the orderly conduct of the meeting.
The type of meeting next considered is an executive session held pursuant to Open Public Meetings Act. Although RCW 42.30.030 requires meetings to be open to the public, RCW 42.30.110(1) provides that “[n]othing contained in this chapter may be construed to prevent a governing body from holding an executive session during a regular or special meeting”. (Emphasis added.) A governing body may only hold executive sessions on certain topics such as the acquisition of real estate. RCW 42.30.110(1)(b). The question is whether a county legislative body can prohibit the tape recording of executive sessions. In our judgment, the answer to this question is yes.
(Emphasis added.) Since the public is excluded from executive sessions, there is no right to tape record those sessions. The discussions at executive sessions are intended to be private. The conclusion is reinforced by RCW 42.32.030, which governs minutes taken at meetings. RCW 42.32.030 provides: “The minutes of all regular and special meetings except executive sessions of such boards, commissions, agencies or authorities shall be promptly recorded and such records shall be open to public inspection.” (Emphasis added.) Thus, minutes of regular and special meetings must be taken and available for public inspections. This is not true of executive sessions.
There is no similar provision relating to the recordation of executive sessions. We interpret the legislature's silence on this matter to mean that each public body should have the prerogative to allow or prohibit the use of tape recorders at closed meetings.
Dean, 414 So. 2d at 866; see also Zamora v. Edgewood Independent Sch. Dist., 592 S.W.2d 649, 650 (Tex. 1979) ; 66 Op. Att'y Gen. 318 (Wis. 1977) .
The second part of your inquiry focuses on whether a faculty member may be prohibited from taping such departmental faculty meetings. Assuming, as an initial matter, that the FOIA is inapplicable to such meetings based on the foregoing discussion, the issue becomes whether another state statute guarantees the right to record such a meeting. I am unaware of any such statute. Applicable regulations of the University may address the issue, however, and should therefore be consulted as well. The University Handbook, for example, indicates that each college and school faculty shall make its own rules of procedure, provided that they not be in conflict with the rules and regulations of the Campus Faculty (Handbook, at 30). While there appears to be no similar provision in the Handbook with regard to departmental faculties, such a regulation may support the proposition that a particular departmental faculty can decide for itself whether to permit recording of its own meetings.
Op. Att'y Gen. No. 92-241 (Ark. 1992). Thus, we conclude that the county legislative body may ban the use of recording devices in private meetings of county officials.
We trust the foregoing opinion will be of assistance to you.
 “There may well be reasonable restrictions which could lawfully be imposed, e.g., those designed (i) to preserve the orderly conduct of a meeting by controlling noise levels, spatial requirements and the like . . .”.
 For example, at the state level RCW 34.05.449(5) requires adjudicative hearings to be open to public observation even though RCW 42.30.140(2) provides that meetings of quasi-judicial bodies related to quasi-judicial matters are excluded from the Open Public Meetings Act.
 We caution that the county's authority to ban recording devices must be exercised carefully. If the meeting is open to the public based on a state statute other than the Open Public Meetings Act, the county legislative body's authority would be limited by that state statute. As with the Open Public Meetings Act, the county legislative body could not prohibit recording devices if the state statute provided otherwise. Moreover, the county's authority to ban recording devices may be subject to constitutional limitation. See, e.g., Blackstone v. Alabama, 30 F.3d 117 (11th Cir. 1994); Thompson v. City of Clio, 765 F. Supp. 1066, 1070 (M.D. Ala. 1991); CBS, Inc., v. Lieberman, 439 F. Supp. 862, 865-66 (N.D. Ill. 1976).
 We do not, in this opinion, undertake to explain when a particular meeting is a private meeting.

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