Source: https://www.martenlaw.com/newsletter/20130325-stormwater-discharges-logging-roads
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 00:08:42+00:00

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As discussed in previous editions of this newsletter, see Ninth Circuit Reissues Opinion Requiring NPDES Permits for Stormwater Discharges from Logging Roads, NEDC involved two state-owned logging roads that timber companies use and maintain for logging activities. NEDC brought a CWA citizen suit alleging that sediment discharges in stormwater from these roads require NPDES permits. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of that lawsuit and issued three key holdings.
First, it held that the Silvicultural Rule does not and cannot, consistent with the CWA, exempt runoff that is collected from logging roads and discharged from ditches or culverts to jurisdictional waters. Without expressly invalidating the Silvicultural Rule, the Ninth Circuit interpreted the Rule in a manner that effectively negated its utility as a safe harbor for parties like the defendants. Second, the Ninth Circuit held that discharges from logging roads fall within the scope of the Phase I regulations as stormwater discharges that are “associated with industrial activity” under CWA § 402(p) and EPA’s regulations, such that an NPDES permit is necessary. Finally, the Ninth Circuit held that it properly exercised jurisdiction over the case, determining that the plaintiff did not run afoul of the time limitations for challenging EPA regulations since the court merely addressed EPA’s interpretation of its rule that was first raised in an amicus brief before the court.
In the wake of the Ninth Circuit decision, stakeholders moved in parallel, somewhat conflicting tracks to unwind—or at least blunt the impact of—the decision in NEDC. Congress initially developed momentum toward an amendment to the CWA, implementing a temporary moratorium on implementation of NEDC. See Opposition Mounts To Ninth Circuit Ruling Requiring NPDES Permit For Stormwater Runoff From Forest Roads. But by the time that moratorium expired on September 30, 2012, the bills moving through Congress had stalled.
In May 2012, while briefing for petitions for certiorari was ongoing, the White House endeavored to effectively overrule the Ninth Circuit’s decision through the regulatory process. EPA released a notice of intent to promulgate rulemaking to revise the Phase I stormwater regulations by specifying that stormwater discharges from logging roads are not stormwater discharges “associated with industrial activity.” EPA made clear in its amicus brief at the certiorari petition stage that it intended this rulemaking to obviate the need for Supreme Court review.
By the time the Court heard oral argument, 22 amici had submitted briefs, the vast majority of which supported the petitioners. A summary of the briefing from the petitioners, respondents, and many of the amici is available in a previous edition of this newsletter. Supreme Court Preview: The 2012/2013 Docket: Georgia-Pacific West v. Northwest Environmental Defense Center.
Generally, the majority of the briefs underscored the petitioners’ arguments that: (1) the Ninth Circuit failed to defer properly to EPA’s determination that NPDES permits were not required, both because logging roads are not “point sources” and because logging roads are not “associated with industrial activity”; and (2) the lower courts did not have jurisdiction over the lawsuit, because the suit should have been viewed as a direct challenge to the Silvicultural Rule and the Phase I stormwater rule in an enforcement proceeding, the time for which is long passed under the CWA’s 120 day statute of limitations. Several amici also pointed out the importance and efficacy of local best management practices to address the environmental impacts of runoff from logging roads and the financial and practical burden that imposing NPDES requirements could have on those that own, use, and regulate logging roads.
The late arrival of EPA’s final rule perplexed and clearly frustrated the Supreme Court during oral argument. Chief Justice Roberts chided the Deputy Solicitor General for blindsiding the Court with the final rule instead of letting the Court know in early November that the rule had been submitted to the Office of Management and Budget for final approval. The Justices focused the majority of their questions on what the Court’s proper role should be in the wake of the EPA rule, particularly given that the petitioners could still face penalties, attorney’s fees, and potential injunctive relief for past activities that are now consistent with CWA regulations.
To assist the Court’s determination of whether and to what degree the Court should address the merits of the cert petitions, the parties submitted supplemental briefing in January 2013 that was limited to the impact of EPA’s rule on the case. The respondent argued that the Court should either dismiss the case as improvidently granted, thereby allowing the lower courts to grapple with the impact of the EPA rule, or, in the alternative, affirm the Ninth Circuit. The respondent argued that it retained prospective relief, because the new rule did not categorically exempt all logging roads from the NPDES program, and retroactive relief, because a valid claim existed for past violations notwithstanding the new rule. Decker and EPA urged the Court to determine that the issue of whether the Ninth Circuit failed to defer to EPA’s interpretation of its prior rule was moot in light of the new Industrial Stormwater Rule, but disagreed regarding whether the Court should nonetheless address the Ninth Circuit’s statutory interpretation of “point source” in this context. While Decker believed that the Court could yet resolve that issue, EPA urged the Court to allow lower courts to address it during review of EPA’s new rule. Georgia-Pacific West, Inc. and other members of the timber industry argued that the new EPA rule did not moot the case and that, even if the Court declined to address the merits, it should nevertheless vacate and remand the Ninth Circuit’s decision.
In an opinion written by Justice Kennedy, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s decision, largely following the short cut that the United States set out in its amicus brief. The Court did not address whether the discharges at issue were from “point sources” under the CWA and the Silvicultural Rule, instead holding that the stormwater discharges were not “associated with industrial activity,” and therefore did not fall within the Phase I stormwater regulations. In doing so, the Court did not reach the scope or validity of the new EPA rule, instead extending deference to EPA’s interpretation that its prior Industrial Stormwater Rule did not cover the discharges at issue.
The Court began its opinion by dispensing with two procedural issues: (1) whether the new EPA rule mooted the cert petitions; and (2) whether the lower courts properly exercised jurisdiction over the case. On the first point, the Court concluded that the petitions were not moot, because the Court retained the ability to grant effectual relief over a live controversy “regarding whether petitioners may be held liable for unlawful discharges under the earlier version of the Industrial Stormwater Rule.” The Court also acknowledged that NEDC purported to have potential claims under the new rule, but that, nonetheless, even the past rule might afford NEDC with the opportunity to pursue penalties, attorney fees, and injunctive relief for past discharges.
On the second issue, the Court sided with the respondents, concluding that the Ninth Circuit “was correct to rule that the exclusive jurisdiction mandate” in CWA section 1369(b) did not apply, because it “does not bar a district court from entertaining a citizen suit under § 1365 when the suit is against an alleged violator and seeks to enforce an obligation imposed by the Act or its regulations.” According to the Court, NEDC’s claim did not challenge an existing rule; it sought enforcement under a permissible reading of a rule.
The Court viewed NEDC’s second argument as “more plausible”—that EPA’s prior Industrial Stormwater Rule unambiguously required permits for the discharges at issue by requiring permits for stormwater discharges from “immediate access roads … used or traveled by carriers of raw materials” for particular categories of industries. The Court evaluated each party’s interpretation of whether “logging” qualifies as a “category of industry” subject to the provision.
Having concluded that the Phase I regulations are subject to multiple interpretations, the Court cited the “well established” rule that “an agency’s interpretation need not be the only possible reading of a regulation—or even the best one—to prevail. When an agency interprets its own regulation, the Court, as a general rule, defers to it unless that interpretation is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.” In no doubt aided by information in multiple amicus briefs, the Court observed that EPA’s interpretation of its rule—and its treatment of logging road runoff—”exists against a background of state regulation with respect to stormwater runoff from logging roads,” such as Oregon’s “extensive effort to develop a comprehensive set of best practices to manage stormwater runoff from logging roads.” As a result, EPA could have determined, based on its “broad discretion” that the CWA affords to EPA “in the realm of stormwater runoff,” that “further federal regulation in this area would be duplicative or counterproductive.” The Court concluded that the prior version of EPA’s Industrial Stormwater Rule, “as permissibly construed by the agency, exempts discharges of channeled stormwater runoff from logging roads from the NPDES permitting scheme,” and declined to address whether the conveyances at issue constitute point sources.
For more information regarding this article, please contact any member of Marten Law’s Water Quality practice group.
 See Supreme Court Clarifies Definition of “Discharge” under CWA.
 No. 11-338, 2013 WL 1131708 (U.S. Mar. 20, 2013). A separate petition, Georgia-Pacific West v. NEDC, 11-347, was consolidated with Decker, both of which sought review of the Ninth Circuit’s decision in NEDC v. Brown, 640 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2011).
 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1342.
 77 Fed. Reg. 30473 (May 23, 2012).
 See Supreme Court to Review Ninth Circuit Decision Requiring Stormwater Permits for Runoff from Logging Roads.
 77 Fed. Reg. 53834 (Sept. 4, 2012).
 77 Fed. Reg. 72970 (Dec. 7, 2012).
 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, 14 (Sept. 4, 2012).
 Supplemental Brief for Respondent (Jan. 22, 2013), available here.
 Decker, 2013 WL 1131708 at 8.
 Justice Breyer took no part in the case.
 Decker, 2013 WL 1131708 at *9 (citation omitted).
 Id. (citing 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(b)(14).
 Id. at *10 (citation omitted).
 Id. (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(b)(14)).
 Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted).
 Id. at *11 (internal quotations and citation omitted).
 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

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