Source: https://recreation-law.com/tag/rental/
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 15:58:29+00:00

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To prove gross negligence under Washington State law you have to show intentional or reckless misconduct. Assumption of the risk prevents river tuber for suing for his injuries hitting a strainer.
Washington defines assumption of the risk the same way most other courts do. However, the names they sue to describe assumption of the risk are different in some cases and confusing in others.
Here, assumption of the risk stopped claims both for negligence and gross negligence for this tubing case.
Assumption of the risk is growing again as a defense to different types of claims by plaintiffs. In this case, the plaintiff assumed the risk of his injuries for a tubing accident which barred his negligence claim and his gross negligence claim. The standard of proof needed to prove a claim that cannot be defeated by assumption of the risk in Washington is a much higher level of action on the part of the defendant.
Here the plaintiff failed to plead or allege that level of acts by the defendant.
Washington also uses different names for the types of assumption of the risk that are applied to cases, which can lead to greater confusion.
If you are a defendant, instead of attempting to understand what is or is not assumption of the risk. Spend your time educating your customers, so they know and assume the risk they may be facing.
Defendant: Let’s Go Tubing, Inc., et al.
Plaintiff Claims: presented sufficient evidence of gross negligence because Let’s Go Tubing chose the excursion lo-cation, knew of the existence of a hazard, and failed to warn Pellham of the hazard. He argues that the rental company’s gross negligence supersedes any release of liability and assumption of the risk contained in the form he signed.
Defendant Defenses: that summary judgment was appropriate because Pellham failed to establish a duty, the liability release disposes of the claim, and Pelham’s evidence does not create [**7] a genuine issue as to any fact material to establishing gross negligence.
The plaintiff rented an inner tube from the defendant. The rental included delivery to the put in by the defendant. This is commonly described as a livery operation as compared to a pure rental where the renter takes the inner tube and goes wherever.
Upon arrival, the plaintiff signed a release and rented an inner tube. The plaintiff uses releases in his business, although what type of business was never discussed by the court.
The bus driver for the defendant told most of the tubers that upon entry they should push off to the far side of the river to avoid a tree that had fallen into the river immediately downriver but out of sight of the put in.
The plaintiff did not hear this warning. The plaintiff and four friends tied their inner tubes together. The current was swift and they quickly rounded the bend where they saw the tree across the river. The rental company gave each renter a Frisbee to use as a paddle. Everyone used the Frisbee to paddle away from the tree, but the plaintiff hit the tree. Falling into the river the plaintiff broke his ear drum. He went under the tree and upon resurfacing; he struck a large branch which gave him a whiplash.
The plaintiff swam to shore and ended his tubing trip. The plaintiff eventually underwent a neck fusion surgery.
The defendant was legally not allowed to remove the strainer from the river.
The plaintiff sued the defendant. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, and the plaintiff appealed.
Washington has defined four types of assumption of the risk and has identified them slightly differently than most other states.
Washington law and most other states’ jurisprudence recognize four taxonomies of the assumption of risk doctrine: (1) express, (2) implied primary, (3) implied unreasonable, and (4) implied reasonable.
The first two, Express Assumption of the Risk and Implied Assumption of the Risk are still complete bars to a claim of negligence. The second two, Implied Unreasonable and Implied Reasonable have merged into contributory negligence and simply reduce the plaintiff’s damages.
Washington defines the types of assumption of the risk the same way most other states do.
Express assumption of risk arises when a plaintiff explicitly consents to relieve the defendant of a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff regarding specific known risks.
Implied primary assumption of risk follows from the plaintiff engaging in risky conduct, from which the law implies consent.
Implied unreasonable assumption of risk, by contrast, focuses not so much on the duty and negligence of the defendant as on the further issue of the objective unreasonableness of the plaintiff’s conduct in assuming the risk.
Implied reasonable assumption of risk is roughly the counterpart to implied unreasonable assumption of risk in that the plaintiff assumed a risk but acted reasonably in doing so.
Washington also names Implied Primary Assumption of the Risk as Inherent Peril Assumption of the Risk.
Inherent peril assumption bars a claim resulting from specific known and appreciated risks impliedly assumed often in advance of any negligence of the defendant. Plaintiff’s consent to relieve the defendant of any duty is implied based on the plaintiff’s decision to engage in an activity that involves those known risks. One who participates in sports impliedly assumes the risks inherent in the sport.
One who engages in sports assumes the risks that are inherent in the sport. To the extent a risk inherent in the sport injures a plaintiff, the defendant has no duty and there is no negligence. A defendant simply does not have a duty to protect a sports participant from dangers that are an inherent and normal part of a sport.
For the plaintiff to assume the risk, three elements must be found.
Inherent peril assumption, like express assumption of risk, demands the presence of three elements. The evidence must show (1) the plaintiff possessed full subjective understanding (2) of the presence and nature of the specific risk and (3) voluntarily chose to encounter the risk.
However, that does not require knowledge of the specific issues that caused the injury, just knowledge that the injury could occur. Meaning, if the injured party knows that trees fall into rivers, would be enough. There is no requirement that the injured plaintiff knew that a tree fell into the river.
…Brian Pellham assumed the risks involved in river tubing, including the fallen tree. Pellham may not have precisely and subjectively known how the combination of a swift current, a bend in the river, and a fallen tree would produce his injury. Nevertheless, he knew of the potential of all factors. He may not have known of the location of any fallen tree in the river, but he knew of the potential of a fallen tree somewhere in the river.
However, even if the plaintiff assumed the risks, a plaintiff cannot assume the risk where the defendant unduly enhanced the risk.
While participants in sports are generally held to have impliedly assumed the risks inherent in the sport, such assumption of risk does not preclude a recovery for negligent acts that unduly enhance such risks.
This difference places a burden on the plaintiff, in what he or she has to prove to win their claim and a burden on the courts to define what is an increase in the level of danger.
Courts have struggled to properly distinguish between inherent peril assumption of risk (implied primary assumption of risk), which bars the plaintiff’s claim, and increased danger assumption of risk (implied unreasonable assumption of risk), which simply reduces the plaintiff’s damages.
However, here any negligence upon the part of the defendant did not increase the risk. The negligence occurred prior to the plaintiff entering the water. The danger was the tree in the river which the defendant could not do anything about.
When he noticed the risk, he lacked time to avoid the hazard. Pellham did not voluntarily proceed after knowing of the alleged negligence of Let’s Go Tubing. Any alleged negligence of Let’s Go Tubing occurred before Pellham entered the river. Therefore, increased danger assumption of risk does not apply.
The plaintiff also argued in this complaint, that the actions of the defendant were grossly negligent. Gross negligence in Washington is defined as failure to exercise slight care.
Gross negligence claims survive when a release has been signed. The issue before the court was whether gross negligence claims can be stopped if the plaintiff assumed the risk.
At the same time, gross negligence claims survive a release against liability. A sporting participant’s assumption of inherent risks effectively acts as a release from liability. Since gross negligence claims survive a release, gross negligence maybe should survive inherent peril assumption of risk.
The court then redefined how gross negligence was going to be reviewed in Washington applying an intentional reckless standard as the level required proving gross negligence when a plaintiff assumes the risk.
We join the other jurisdictions in imposing an intentional and reckless standard, rather than a gross negligence standard, when the plaintiff assumes the risks of inherent perils in a sporting or outdoor activity.
There is a difference between gross negligence and reckless misconduct under Washington’s law.
Gross negligence consists of the failure to exercise slight care. Reckless misconduct denotes a more serious level of misconduct than gross negligence. An actor’s conduct is in “reckless disregard” of the safety of another if he or she intentionally does an act or fails to do an act that it is his or her duty to the other to do, knowing or having reason to know of facts that would lead a reasonable person to realize that the actor’s conduct not only creates an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to the other but also involves a high degree of probability that substantial harm will result to him or her.
Because reckless conduct is a higher burden to meet, assumption of the risk becomes a defense that can beat a gross negligence claim in some situations in Washington. The plaintiff never pleaded reckless conduct on the part of the defendant so the plaintiff’s gross negligence claim was also denied.
Brian Pellham does not allege that Let’s Go Tubing engaged in reckless conduct. No evidence supports a conclusion that the inner tube rental company bus driver purposely omitted a warning to Pellham with knowledge that Pellham would suffer substantial harm.
Understanding the different slight subtlest between the various forms of assumption of the risk is difficult. Comparing them between states does nothing but create a confusing group of definitions that cross one another and at best confuse one another.
Better, set up a system to educate your guests or clients on the risks they may encounter. That time spent educating the guests can pay dividends both in keeping you out of court and keeping your guests happy and coming back.
Brian Pellham, Appellant, v. Let’s Go Tubing, Inc., et al., Respondents.
WASHINGTON OFFICIAL REPORTS SUMMARY Nature of Action: A participant in an inner tube float on a river sought damages for personal injury incurred when his tube struck a fallen log. The plaintiff sued the company and its owners who rented him the inner tube and who selected the site where participants entered the river, claiming that the defendants owed him a duty to warn about a fallen log in the river that was hidden from but was near the entry site. The plaintiff also claimed that the defendants violated the Consumer Protection Act.
Nature of Action: A participant in an inner tube float on a river sought damages for personal injury incurred when his tube struck a fallen log. The plaintiff sued the company and its owners who rented him the inner tube and who selected the site where participants entered the river, claiming that the defendants owed him a duty to warn about a fallen log in the river that was hidden from but was near the entry site. The plaintiff also claimed that the defendants violated the Consumer Protection Act.
Superior Court: The Superior Court for Chelan County, No. 13-2-00663-9, Lesley A. Allan, J., on April 14, 2016, entered a summary judgment in favor of the defendants, dismissing all of the plaintiff’s claims.
Court of Appeals: Holding that the defendants did not have a duty to warn the plaintiff about the fallen log because the plaintiff assumed the risk of a fallen log and swift current by voluntarily participating in the activity, the court affirms the judgment.
 Negligence — Assumption of Risk — Sports — River Float — Assumed Risks — Fallen Trees — Swift Current. By voluntarily participating in a float on a wild river, one assumes the inherent risks of fallen trees in the water and a swift current. The assumption of risk may relieve the organizer of the activity of an actionable duty to warn about or to prevent injury from trees in the river.
 Negligence — Assumption of Risk — Sports — Nature of Assumed Risk. Assumption of risk in the context of participating in a sport is in reality the principle of no duty to warn of the hazards of the sport, in which case there can be no breach of duty and no actionable claim for negligence.
 Negligence — Duty — Necessity — In General. A cause of action for negligence will not lie absent the existence of a duty of care.
 Negligence — Assumption of Risk — Effect — Relief From Duty. The tort concept of duty overlaps with the contract and tort principles of assumption of risk. An assumption of risk can sometimes relieve a defendant of a duty.
 Negligence — Duty — Question of Law or Fact — In General. Whether a defendant owed a duty to a plaintiff is a question of law.
 Negligence — Assumption of Risk — Classifications. The term “assumption of risk” expresses several distinct common law theories, derived from different sources, that apply when one is knowingly exposed to a particular risk. The general rubric of assumption of risk does not signify a singular doctrine but, rather, encompasses a cluster of discrete concepts. The law recognizes four taxonomies of assumption of risk: (1) express, (2) implied primary, (3) implied unreasonable, and (4) implied reasonable.
 Negligence — Assumption of Risk — Effect — In General. Express assumption of risk and implied primary assumption of risk operate as complete bars to a plaintiff’s recovery. Implied unreasonable assumption of risk and implied reasonable assumption of risk are merely alternative names for contributory negligence and merely reduce a plaintiff’s recoverable damages based on comparative fault pursuant to RCW 4.22.005 and RCW 4.22.015.
 Negligence — Assumption of Risk — Express Assumption — What Constitutes — In General. Express assumption of risk arises when one explicitly consents to relieve another of a duty regarding specific known risks.
 Negligence — Assumption of Risk — Implied Primary Assumption — What Constitutes — In General. Implied primary assumption of risk follows from one’s engaging in risky conduct, from which the law implies consent.
 Negligence — Assumption of Risk — Implied Unreasonable Assumption — Focus of Inquiry. Implied unreasonable assumption of risk primarily focuses on the objective unreasonableness of one’s conduct in assuming a risk.
 Negligence — Assumption of Risk — Implied Reasonable Assumption — What Constitutes. Implied reasonable assumption of risk is roughly the counterpart to implied unreasonable assumption of risk in that one assumes a risk, but acts reasonably in doing so.
 Negligence — Assumption of Risk — Implied Unreasonable Assumption — Implied Reasonable Assumption — Comparison. The gist of implied reasonable and implied unreasonable assumption of risk is that a defendant performed conduct that increased the risk of an activity or situation beyond the inherent risks thereof and the plaintiff reasonably or unreasonably encountered the increased risk. The categories of implied unreasonable and implied reasonable assumption of risk hold no meaningful distinction since both reduce rather than bar a plaintiff’s recovery.
 Negligence — Assumption of Risk — Inherent Peril — Risk of Activity — Assuming the Dangers. Inherent peril assumption of risk–also known as implied primary assumption of risk–bars a plaintiff’s claim resulting from specific known and appreciated risks impliedly assumed, often in advance of any negligence by the defendant. A plaintiff’s consent to relieve a defendant of any duty is implied based on the plaintiff’s decision to engage in an activity that involves the known risks.
 Negligence — Assumption of Risk — Sports — Implied Assumption. One who participates in a sport impliedly assumes the risks inherent in the sport.
 Negligence — Assumption of Risk — Inherent Peril — Applicability — Sports — In General. Under the theory of inherent peril assumption of risk, a plaintiff assumes the dangers that are inherent in and necessary to a particular activity. To the extent a risk inherent in a sport injures a plaintiff, the defendant has no duty and there is no negligence. A defendant does not have a duty to protect a sports participant from dangers that are an inherent and normal part of the sport.
 Negligence — Assumption of Risk — Inherent Peril — Applicability — Sports — Water Sports. Inherent peril assumption of risk extends to water sports. One who engages in a water sport assumes the reasonably foreseeable risks inherent in the activity. This assumption of risk includes inner tubing on water. Bodies of water often undergo change, and changing conditions in the water do not alter the assumption of risk. There is no duty to warn of the presence of natural transitory conditions in the water.
 Negligence — Assumption of Risk — Inherent Peril — Test. Inherent peril assumption of risk requires evidence that (1) the plaintiff possessed at least an understanding (2) of the presence and nature of the specific risk and (3) voluntarily chose to encounter the risk. In the usual case, a plaintiff’s knowledge and appreciation of a danger is a question of fact, but if it is clear that any person in the plaintiff’s position would have understood the danger, the issue may be decided by a court as a matter of law.
 Negligence — Assumption of Risk — Sports — Negligence Enhancing Assumed Risk. While participants in sports are generally held to have impliedly assumed the risks inherent in the sport, such assumption of risk does not preclude recovery for the negligent acts of others that unduly enhance such risks.
 Negligence — Assumption of Risk — Inherent Peril — Limited Application. Inherent peril assumption of risk is the exception rather than the rule in assumption of risk situations.
 Negligence — Assumption of Risk — Increased Danger — What Constitutes. Increased danger assumption of risk–also known as implied unreasonable assumption of risk and implied reasonable assumption of risk–does not involve a plaintiff’s consent to relieve a defendant of a duty. In this type of assumption of risk, the defendant breached a duty that created a risk of harm, and the plaintiff chose to take that risk. Increased danger assumption of risk involves a plaintiff’s voluntary choice to encounter a risk created by a defendant’s negligence. Increased danger assumption of risk arises when a plaintiff knows of a risk already created by the negligence of the defendant, yet chooses voluntarily to encounter it. In such a case, the plaintiff’s conduct is not truly consensual, but is a form of contributory negligence, in which the negligence consists of making the wrong choice and voluntarily encountering a known unreasonable risk.
 Negligence — Assumption of Risk — Increased Danger — Applicability. Increased danger assumption of risk does not apply in circumstances where the defendant did not create and could not remove the risk and where the plaintiff did not voluntarily take the risk because the plaintiff did not know the precise nature of the risk beforehand and lacked time to avoid the risk once it became apparent.
 Negligence — Assumption of Risk — Inherent Peril — Knowledge of Risk — Warning — Statements in Written Release — Sufficiency. A recitation in a release of liability warning of dangers inherent in an activity can be sufficient to notify a person of the risks of the activity that may give rise to inherent peril assumption of risk where the person chooses to engage in the activity and sustains injury from such dangers.
 Negligence — Assumption of Risk — Inherent Peril — Scope of Defense — Gross Negligence — Intentional or Reckless Conduct. Inherent peril assumption of risk in a sporting or outdoor activity may allow a defendant to avoid liability for gross negligence but not for intentional or reckless conduct. A recklessness standard encourages vigorous participation in recreational activities, while still providing protection from egregious conduct. An actor’s conduct is in “reckless disregard” of the safety of another if the actor intentionally does an act or fails to do an act that it is the actor’s duty to the other to do, knowing or having reason to know of facts that would lead a reasonable person to realize that the actor’s conduct not only creates an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to the other but also involves a high degree of probability that substantial harm will result to the other. Fearing, C.J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous court.
COUNSEL: Richard D. Wall (of Richard D. Wall PS), for appellant.
Kristen Dorrity (of Andrews o Skinner PS), for respondents.
JUDGES: Authored by George Fearing. Concurring: Kevin Korsmo, Laurel Siddoway.
[*403] ¶1 Fearing, C.J. — This appeal asks: does an inner tube rental company owe a duty to warn a renter about a fallen log in a river when the log is hidden from but near the launch site, the river’s current draws the tuber toward the log, the company knows of the fallen log, the company warns other tubers of the log, and the company chooses the launch site? To answer this question, interests such as exhilarating and uninhibited outdoor recreation, retaining the natural environment, and freedom to contract compete with cautious business practices, full disclosure of risks, and compensation for injury. Based on the doctrine of inherent peril assumption of risk, we answer the question in the negative. We affirm the trial court’s summary judgment dismissal of renter Brian Pellham’s suit for personal injury against the tube [**2] rental company, Let’s Go Tubing, Inc.
¶2 Brian Pellham sues for injuries suffered while inner tubing on the Yakima River. Because the trial court dismissed Pellham’s suit on summary judgment, we write the facts in a light favorable to Pellham.
¶3 Melanie Wells invited Brian Pellham and his domestic partner to join her and three others on a leisurely unguided excursion floating the Yakima River. Wells arranged the expedition and reserved equipment and transportation from Let’s Go Tubing, Inc.
Clerk’s Papers at 46. On other occasions, such as a rafting trip, Brian Pellham has signed a waiver. In his business, he employs release forms.
¶5 Let’s Go Tubing launches its customers from the Umtanum site unless the Yakima River level runs low. With low water, the company buses customers to one of two other Yakima River sites, Big Horn or Ringer Loop.
¶6 On July 30, 2011, Let’s Go Tubing’s shuttle bus, because [**4] of a low river level, transported Brian Pellham, his group members, and other customers eight miles upstream [*405] to Ringer Loop. Ringer Loop maintains a public concrete boat ramp and public restroom. The total number of customers on the excursion approached twenty. During transport, Steff Thomas, the Let’s Go Tubing bus driver, told Melanie Wells and a handful of others seated at the front of the bus to push into the middle of the river once they embarked, because a fallen tree obstructed the river immediately downriver but out of sight from the launch site. We do not know the number of customers the driver warned. Thomas did not warn Pellham of the obstructing tree. Nor did anyone else. Someone, possibly Thomas, warned everyone not to leave the river except at designated spots because private owners own most of the riverbank.
¶7 At the launch site, Let’s Go Tubing handed each person a Frisbee to use as a paddle. Brian Pellham requested a life jacket, but Steff Thomas ignored him. Fifteen inner tubers entered the river first. Pellham and four others followed in a second group with their tubes tied together. They encountered a swift current. As soon as the flotilla of five rounded the [**5] first bend in the river, they saw a fallen tree extending halfway across the river. Many branches extended from the tree trunk. Each paddled furiously with his or her Frisbee, but the fleet of five inner tubes struck the tree. Brian Pellham held the tree with his left hand and attempted to steer around the tree. The current grabbed the inner tubes and Pellham fell backward into the river. The fall broke Pellham’s eardrum. The current forced Pellham under the tree and the water level. When Pellham resurfaced, his head struck a large branch. He sustained a whiplash injury. His chest also hit the branch.
¶8 Brian Pellham swam to shore and ended his river excursion. Pellham told Steff Thomas of his dangerous encounter, and the driver admitted he knew about the fallen tree but laws prevented Let’s Go Tubing from removing the obstacle.
[*406] ¶9 Brian Pellham later underwent a neck fusion surgery. The accident also caused damage to a low back disk, and the damage creates pain radiating to his left foot.
¶10 Brian Pellham sued Let’s Go Tubing for negligent failure to warn and Consumer Protection Act, chapter 19.86 RCW, violations. Let’s Go Tubing answered the complaint and raised affirmative defenses, including release of liability and [**6] assumption of the risk. The company filed a motion for summary judgment dismissal based on the release and on assumption of risk. In response to the motion, Pellham argued that he did not waive liability because Let’s Go Tubing committed gross negligence. He also argued he did not expressly or impliedly assume the risk of floating into a hazard. Pellham agreed to dismissal of his consumer protection claim. The trial court granted summary dismissal of all of Pellham’s claims.
¶11 On appeal, Brian Pellham contends the trial court erred in dismissing his claim because he presented sufficient evidence of gross negligence because Let’s Go Tubing chose the excursion location, knew of the existence of a hazard, and failed to warn Pellham of the hazard. He argues that the rental company’s gross negligence supersedes any release of liability and assumption of the risk contained in the form he signed. On appeal, he does not argue liability against Let’s Go Tubing for failing to provide a life vest.
 ¶12 Let’s Go Tubing responds that summary judgment was appropriate because Pellham failed to establish a duty, the liability release disposes of the claim, and Pellham’s evidence does not create [**7] a genuine issue as to any fact material to establishing gross negligence. We affirm based on the inherent risks in river tubing. Because of Pellham’s [*407] voluntary participation in the outdoor recreation activity, he assumed the risk of a fallen log and swift current. Conversely, Pellham’s assumption of the risk created no duty for Let’s Go Tubing to warn Pellham of or prevent injury to him from trees in the river. Because we rely on the inherent risks in river tubing, we do not address whether the written agreement signed by Pellham bars his suit.
¶13 Because we hold that Brian Pellham assumed the risk and thereby rendered Let’s Go Tubing dutyless, we do not address whether Pellham created an issue of fact with regard to gross negligence. We conclude that, to avoid application of inherent peril assumption of risk, Pellham needed to show intentional or reckless misconduct of the rental company, and Pellham does not show or argue either.
¶14 We commence with our obligatory recitation of summary judgment principles. [HN1] This court reviews a summary judgment order de novo, engaging in the same inquiry as the trial court. Highline School District No. 401 v. Port of Seattle, 87 Wn.2d 6, 15, 548 P.2d 1085 (1976); Mahoney v. Shinpoch, 107 Wn.2d 679, 683, 732 P.2d 510 (1987). [HN2] Summary judgment is proper if the records on file with the [**8] trial court show “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact” and “the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” CR 56(c). [HN3] This court, like the trial court, construes all evidence and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to Brian Pellham, as the nonmoving party. Barber v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 81 Wn.2d 140, 142, 500 P.2d 88 (1972); Wilson v. Steinbach, 98 Wn.2d 434, 437, 656 P.2d 1030 (1982). [HN4] A court may grant summary judgment if the pleadings, affidavits, and depositions establish that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Lybbert v. Grant County, 141 Wn.2d 29, 34, 1 P.3d 1124 (2000).
¶15 Let’s Go Tubing seeks affirmation of the summary judgment dismissal of Brian Pellham’s claim based on both an absence of duty and Pellham’s assumption of risk. In turn, Pellham argues that, under RAP 2.5(a), the rental company may not assert a lack of duty because the company did not raise this defense before the trial court.
 ¶16 We need not address Brian Pellham’s objection to Let’s Go Tubing’s argument of lack of duty. We base our decision on inherent peril assumption of risk, and the rental company raised the defense of assumption of risk below. Anyway, assumption of risk in this context is equivalent to a lack of duty. [HN5] Assumption of the risk in the sports participant context is in [**9] reality the principle of no duty and hence no breach and no underlying cause of action. Brown v. Stevens Pass, Inc., 97 Wn. App. 519, 523, 984 P.2d 448 (1999); Codd v. Stevens Pass, Inc., 45 Wn. App. 393, 401-02, 725 P.2d 1008 (1986).
[3, 4] ¶17 [HN6] A negligence claim requires the plaintiff to establish (1) the existence of a duty owed, (2) breach of that duty, (3) a resulting injury, and (4) a proximate cause between the breach and the injury. Tincani v. Inland Empire Zoological Society, 124 Wn.2d 121, 127-28, 875 P.2d 621 (1994). Thus, to prevail on his negligence claim, Brian Pellham must establish that Let’s Go Tubing owed him a duty of care. Folsom v. Burger King, 135 Wn.2d 658, 671, 958 P.2d 301 (1998). [HN7] The tort concept of duty overlaps with the contract and tort principles of assumption of risk. As previously mentioned, sometimes assumption of risk relieves the defendant of a duty. Brown v. Stevens Pass, Inc., 97 Wn. App. at 523 (1999); Codd v. Stevens Pass, Inc., 45 Wn. App. at 402 (1986).
 ¶18 [HN8] The threshold determination of whether a duty exists is a question of law. Tincani v. Inland Empire Zoological [*409] Society, 124 Wn.2d at 128; Coleman v. Hoffman, 115 Wn. App. 853, 858, 64 P.3d 65 (2003). We hold that, because of Brian Pellham’s assumption of the risk of fallen trees in the water, Let’s Go Tubing, as a matter of law, had no duty to warn Pellham of the danger or, at the least, the rental company possessed only a restricted duty to not intentionally injure Pellham or engage in reckless misconduct.
 ¶19 We first briefly explore the variegated versions of assumption of risk in order to later analyze the application of inherent peril assumption of risk. [HN9] The term “assumption of the risk” expresses [**10] several distinct common law theories, derived from different sources, which apply when a plaintiff knowingly exposes himself to particular risks. Allen v. Dover Co-Recreational Softball League, 148 N.H. 407, 807 A.2d 1274, 1281 (2002); Francis H. Bohlen, Voluntary Assumption of Risk (pt. 1), 20 Harv. L. Rev. 14, 15-30 (1906); W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 68 (5th ed. 1984). Stated differently, the general rubric of assumption of risk does not signify a singular doctrine but rather encompasses a cluster of discrete concepts. Kirk v. Washington State University, 109 Wn.2d 448, 453, 746 P.2d 285 (1987). Washington law and most other states’ jurisprudence recognize four taxonomies of the assumption of risk doctrine: (1) express, (2) implied primary, (3) implied unreasonable, and (4) implied reasonable. Gregoire v. City of Oak Harbor, 170 Wn.2d 628, 636, 244 P.3d 924 (2010) (plurality opinion); Gleason v. Cohen, 192 Wn. App. 788, 794, 368 P.3d 531 (2016); 16 David K. DeWolf & Keller W. Allen, Washington Practice: Tort Law and Practice § 9:11, at 398-99 (4th ed. 2013).
 ¶20 Before the enactment of comparative negligence and comparative fault statutes, practitioners and courts encountered little reason to distinguish the four versions of assumption of risk because at common law all assumption of the risk completely barred recovery. Scott v. Pacific West Mountain Resort, 119 Wn.2d 484, 496, 834 P.2d 6 (1992). [*410] Today, [HN10] the first two categories of assumption of risk, express assumption and implied primary assumption, on the one hand, continue to operate as a complete bar to a plaintiff’s recovery. Kirk v. Washington State University, 109 Wn.2d at 453-54; Gleason v. Cohen, 192 Wn. App. at 794. On the other hand, implied unreasonable and implied [**11] reasonable assumption meld into contributory negligence and merely reduce the plaintiff’s recoverable damages based on comparative fault pursuant to RCW 4.22.005 and .015. Scott v. Pacific West Mountain Resort, 119 Wn.2d at 497. The last two types are merely alternative names for contributory negligence. Gregoire v. City of Oak Harbor, 170 Wn.2d at 636 (2010). Our decision relies on implied primary assumption, but we will discuss other renderings of assumption of risk in order to sculpt our decision.
[8-11] ¶21 [HN11] Express assumption of risk arises when a plaintiff explicitly consents to relieve the defendant of a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff regarding specific known risks. Gregoire v. City of Oak Harbor, 170 Wn.2d at 636; Kirk v. Washington State University, 109 Wn.2d at 453. [HN12] Implied primary assumption of risk follows from the plaintiff engaging in risky conduct, from which the law implies consent. Kirk v. Washington State University, 109 Wn.2d at 453; Erie v. White, 92 Wn. App. 297, 303, 966 P.2d 342 (1998). [HN13] Implied unreasonable assumption of risk, by contrast, focuses not so much on the duty and negligence of the defendant as on the further issue of the objective unreasonableness of the plaintiff’s conduct in assuming the risk. Kirk v. Washington State University, 109 Wn.2d at 454. [HN14] Implied reasonable assumption of risk is roughly the counterpart to implied unreasonable assumption of risk in that the plaintiff assumed a risk but acted reasonably in doing so. Kirk v. Washington State University, 109 Wn.2d at 454.
 ¶22 We confront difficulty in distinguishing among at least three of the four categories because of the [**12] nondescript identifiers and near homophonic labels of some classifications. Therefore, we recommend that the Supreme [*411] Court rechristen the categories as express assumption, inherent peril assumption of risk, and increased danger assumption of risk. [HN15] The gist of implied reasonable and implied unreasonable assumption of risk is that the defendant performed conduct that increased the risk of an activity or situation beyond the risks inherent in the activity or situation and the plaintiff reasonably or unreasonably encountered this increased risk. The traditional categories of implied unreasonable and implied reasonable assumption of risk hold no meaningful distinction since both reduce rather than bar the plaintiff’s recovery, and so we urge combining the two concepts into increased danger assumption of risk. We hereafter use these new terms.
[13, 14] ¶23 We now focus on inherent peril assumption of risk. [HN16] Inherent peril assumption bars a claim resulting from specific known and appreciated risks impliedly assumed often in advance of any negligence of the defendant. Scott v. Pacific West Mountain Resort, 119 Wn.2d at 497 (1992); Boyce v. West, 71 Wn. App. 657, 666-67, 862 P.2d 592 (1993). Plaintiff’s consent to relieve the defendant of any duty is implied based on the plaintiff’s decision [**13] to engage in an activity that involves those known risks. Egan v. Cauble, 92 Wn. App. 372, 376, 966 P.2d 362 (1998); Gleason v. Cohen, 192 Wn. App. at 797 (2016). [HN17] One who participates in sports impliedly assumes the risks inherent in the sport. Scott v. Pacific West Mountain Resort, 119 Wn.2d at 498; Boyce v. West, 71 Wn. App. at 667.
 ¶24 [HN18] Whether inherent peril assumption of risk applies depends on whether the plaintiff was injured by an inherent risk of an activity. Gleason v. Cohen, 192 Wn. App. at 797. The plaintiff assumes the dangers that are inherent in and necessary to a particular activity. Tincani v. Inland Empire Zoological Society, 124 Wn.2d at 144 (1994); Scott v. Pacific West Mountain Resort, 119 Wn.2d at 500-01; Gleason [*412] v. Cohen, 192 Wn. App. at 797; Lascheid v. City of Kennewick, 137 Wn. App. 633, 641-42, 154 P.3d 307 (2007); Taylor v. Baseball Club of Seattle, LP, 132 Wn. App. 32, 37-39, 130 P.3d 835 (2006); Dorr v. Big Creek Wood Products, Inc., 84 Wn. App. 420, 427, 927 P.2d 1148 (1996).
¶25 [HN19] The classic example of inherent peril assumption involves participation in sports when a participant knows that the risk of injury is a natural part of such participation. Gleason v. Cohen, 192 Wn. App. at 798. One who engages in sports assumes the risks that are inherent in the sport. Scott v. Pacific West Mountain Resort, 119 Wn.2d at 498; Gleason v. Cohen, 192 Wn. App. at 798. To the extent a risk inherent in the sport injures a plaintiff, the defendant has no duty and there is no negligence. Scott v. Pacific West Mountain Resort, 119 Wn.2d at 498; Gleason v. Cohen, 192 Wn. App. at 798. A defendant simply does not have a duty to protect a sports participant from dangers that are an inherent and normal part of a sport. Scott v. Pacific West Mountain Resort, 119 Wn.2d at 498; Gleason v. Cohen, 192 Wn. App. at 798.
 ¶26 [HN20] Inherent peril assumption extends to water sports. One who engages in water sports assumes the reasonably foreseeable risks inherent in the activity. DeWick v. Village of Penn Yan, 275 A.D.2d 1011, 713 N.Y.S.2d 592, 594 (2000). This assumption of risk includes inner tubing on water and canoe rentals. Record v. Reason, 73 Cal. App. 4th 472, 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 547 (1999); Ferrari v. Bob’s Canoe Rental, Inc., 143 A.D.3d 937, 39 N.Y.S.3d 522 (2016). Bodies of water often undergo change, and changing conditions in the water [**14] do not alter the assumption of risk. DeWick v. Village of Penn Yan, 713 N.Y.S.2d at 594. There is no duty to warn of the presence of natural transitory conditions. DeWick v. Village of Penn Yan, 713 N.Y.S.2d at 594.
¶27 DeWick v. Village of Penn Yan, 275 A.D.2d 1011 is illustrative of the application of inherent peril assumption in the context of water. Trina Kerrick and Daniel DeWick [*413] drowned in Keuka Lake on June 19, 1995. Kerrick allegedly gained access to the lake from the beach at Indian Pines Park, which was owned by defendant Village of Penn Yan. While wading in the water, she stepped from a sandbar where the lake bottom drops off and became caught in an undertow or current. DeWick drowned trying to save her. Neither could swim. The accident occurred on a hot day, four days before the beach officially opened for the season. The plaintiffs alleged that the village failed to warn specifically about the dangers of the drop-off and swift current. The court summarily dismissed the suit. The risk of reaching a drop-off was a reasonably foreseeable risk inherent in wading into a lake.
 ¶28 [HN21] Inherent peril assumption, like express assumption of risk, demands the presence of three elements. The evidence must show (1) the plaintiff possessed full subjective understanding (2) of the presence and nature of the specific risk and (3) voluntarily [**15] chose to encounter the risk. Kirk v. Washington State University, 109 Wn.2d at 453 (1987). The participant must know that the risk is present, and he or she must further understand its nature; his or her choice to incur it must be free and voluntary. Brown v. Stevens Pass, Inc., 97 Wn. App. at 523. In the usual case, his or her knowledge and appreciation of the danger will be a question for the jury; but where it is clear that any person in his or her position must have understood the danger, the issue may be decided by the court. Brown v. Stevens Pass, Inc., 97 Wn. App. at 523; Keeton et al., supra, § 68, at 489.
¶29 [HN22] The rule of both express and inherent peril assumption of risk requires a finding that the plaintiff had full subjective understanding of the presence and nature of the specific risk. Kirk v. Washington State University, 109 Wn.2d at 453. Depending on how specific the risk must be, this statement of the rule taken literally would abrogate the rule of inherent peril assumption because one rarely, if ever, anticipates the full particulars of an accident producing injury. One can never predict all of the variables that [*414] combine to cause an accident and injury. Also, the doctrine might not apply in wrongful death cases, because the judge or jury will lack evidence of the subjective understanding of the decedent. Washington courts’ applications of the rule suggest, however, that the plaintiff need only know [**16] the general nature of the risk. One case example is Boyce v. West, 71 Wn. App. 657 (1993).
¶30 In Boyce v. West, a mother brought a suit against a college and its scuba diving instructor after the death of her son, who died during a scuba diving accident while engaging in the college course. The mother claimed the instructor negligently taught and supervised her son. The son, Peter Boyce, signed a document acknowledging the possibility of death from scuba diving and assuming all risks in connection with the course, whether foreseen or unforeseen. This court affirmed summary judgment dismissal of the claims against the school and the instructor. The court reasoned that negligent instruction and supervision are risks associated with being a student in a scuba diving course and were encompassed by the broad language of the contract. Although Peter may not have specifically considered the possibility of instructor negligence when he signed the release, this lack of consideration did not invalidate his express assumption of all risks associated with his participation in the course. [HN23] Knowledge of a particular risk is unnecessary when the plaintiff, by express agreement, assumes all risks.
¶31 Boyce v. West entails express assumption of [**17] risk, but [HN24] the same rule of subjective knowledge of risk applies to both express assumption and inherent peril assumption. Based on Boyce v. West and cases involving water sports, we hold that Brian Pellham assumed the risks involved in river tubing, including the fallen tree. Pellham may not have precisely and subjectively known how the combination of a swift current, a bend in the river, and a fallen tree would produce his injury. Nevertheless, he knew of the potential of all factors. He may not have known of the location of any [*415] fallen tree in the river, but he knew of the potential of a fallen tree somewhere in the river. He had more reason to know of the dangers that caused his injury when he started his excursion than Peter Boyce had reason to know of the risks that led to his death when Boyce signed his college course form. In the setting of inherent peril assumption, New York courts have ruled that, [HN25] if the participant fully comprehends the risks of the activity or if those risks are obvious or reasonably foreseeable, he or she has consented to those risks and the defendant has performed its duty. Ferrari v. Bob’s Canoe Rental, Inc., 143 A.D.3d at 938 (2016); Turcotte v. Fell, 68 N.Y.2d 432, 439, 502 N.E.2d 964, 510 N.Y.S.2d 49 (1986).
 ¶32 [HN26] While participants in sports are generally held to have impliedly assumed the risks [**18] inherent in the sport, such assumption of risk does not preclude a recovery for negligent acts that unduly enhance such risks. Scott v. Pacific West Mountain Resort, 119 Wn.2d at 501; Gleason v. Cohen, 192 Wn. App. at 798. This principle leads us to a discussion of increased danger assumption.
 ¶33 [HN27] Courts have struggled to properly distinguish between inherent peril assumption of risk (implied primary assumption of risk), which bars the plaintiff’s claim, and increased danger assumption of risk (implied unreasonable assumption of risk), which simply reduces the plaintiff’s damages. Barrett v. Lowe’s Home Centers, Inc., 179 Wn. App. 1, 6, 324 P.3d 688 (2013). This court warned long ago that courts must carefully draw the line between these two types of assumption of risk. Gleason v. Cohen, 192 Wn. App. at 795; Dorr v. Big Creek Wood Products, Inc., 84 Wn. App. at 425-26 (1996). A rigorous application of inherent peril assumption of risk could undermine the purpose of comparative negligence. Kirk v. Washington State University, 109 Wn.2d at 455-56. Significantly, [HN28] inherent peril assumption is the exception rather than the rule in assumption of risk situations.
 ¶34 [HN29] Increased danger assumption of risk does not involve a plaintiff’s consent to relieve the defendant of a [*416] duty. Gleason v. Cohen, 192 Wn. App. at 796. In this type of assumption of risk, the defendant breached a duty that created a risk of harm, and the plaintiff chose to take that risk. Gleason v. Cohen, 192 Wn. App. at 796. Specifically, increased danger assumption involves the plaintiff’s voluntary choice to encounter a risk created [**19] by the defendant’s negligence. Scott v. Pacific West Mountain Resort, 119 Wn.2d at 499; Gleason v. Cohen, 192 Wn. App. at 796. Increased danger assumption of risk arises when the plaintiff knows of a risk already created by the negligence of the defendant, yet chooses voluntarily to encounter it. Scott v. Pacific West Mountain Resort, 119 Wn.2d at 499 (1992); Gleason v. Cohen, 192 Wn. App. at 798. In such a case, a plaintiff’s conduct is not truly consensual but is a form of contributory negligence, in which the negligence consists of making the wrong choice and voluntarily encountering a known unreasonable risk. Gleason v. Cohen, 192 Wn. App. at 796.
¶35 Dorr v. Big Creek Wood Products, Inc., 84 Wn. App. 420, 927 P.2d 1148 (1996) presents a good illustration of increased danger assumption of risk. Michael Dorr entered a forest where his friend John Knecht cut trees. Dorr knew of the phenomenon of “widow-makers,” large limbs caught in surrounding trees after a tree is felled. Nevertheless, after Knecht cut a tree, Knecht waved Dorr forward to meet him. As Dorr proceeded, a large limb fell on him. This court affirmed a verdict favoring Dorr. Although Dorr in general assumed the risk of “widow-makers,” Knecht’s misleading directions led to implied unreasonable or secondary assumption of risk. The jury could still find and did find Dorr comparatively at fault for proceeding with the knowledge of “widow-makers,” but Dorr’s fault would be compared with Knecht’s fault. The negligence of Knecht [**20] arose after Dorr entered the forest.
 ¶36 Brian Pellham alleges that Let’s Go Tubing was negligent by reason of sending him and others on inner tubes in fast moving water with a downed tree in the middle [*417] of the water without warning to the tuber. Let’s Go Tubing did not create the risk and could not remove the risk. Although Pellham knew of the risks of logs and current, Pellham did not know of the precise risk when he first encountered it. When he noticed the risk, he lacked time to avoid the hazard. Pellham did not voluntarily proceed after knowing of the alleged negligence of Let’s Go Tubing. Any alleged negligence of Let’s Go Tubing occurred before Pellham entered the river. Therefore, increased danger assumption of risk does not apply.
¶37 Let’s Go Tubing performed no act that created the swift current or felled the log into the water. [HN30] The cases that decline application of inherent peril assumption involve a positive act of the defendant, such as the implanting of a post or snow shack adjacent to a ski run. Scott v. Pacific West Mountain Resort, 119 Wn.2d 484 (1992); Brown v. Stevens Pass, Inc., 97 Wn. App. at 521 (1999).
¶38 One might argue that Let’s Go Tubing’s failure to warn increased the risk attended to the fallen log in the Yakima River. [HN31] A defendant may be held liable when a reasonable person would customarily [**21] instruct a plaintiff in respect to the dangers inherent in an activity. Allen v. Dover Co-Recreational Softball League, 807 A.2d at 1288. Thus, a defendant may be held liable if the plaintiff alleges that a reasonable person would customarily warn, advise, inform, and instruct regarding the risk of injury to participants and the manner in which such risks could be minimized and their failure to do so caused the plaintiff’s injuries. Allen v. Dover Co-Recreational Softball League, 807 A.2d at 1288. Brian Pellham presents no evidence that those who rent out watercrafts customarily warn of fallen natural objects in the water.
 ¶39 The document signed by Brian Pellham contained terms in addition to releasing Let’s Go Tubing from liability. In the instrument, Pellham also recognized that the hazards of river tubing included the existence of rocks, logs, plants, and variations in water depth and speed of [*418] current. Pellham agreed to assume full responsibility for all risks involved in river tubing, including serious injuries and death resulting from the hazards. Although we do not base our holding on express assumption of risk, we note that the release’s recitation of dangers warned Pellham of the inherent perils attended to inner tubing and those dangers that led to Pellham’s injuries.
¶40 Brian Pellham argues that the waiver [**22] form he signed does not bar a claim for gross negligence. The parties, in turn, devote much argument to the issue of whether Pellham creates a question of fact as to gross negligence. Since we do not rely on express assumption of risk, we need not directly address this argument. Instead, we must ask and answer whether a tuber may overcome the defense of inherent peril assumption of risk by showing gross negligence by the inner tube rental company.
¶41 [HN32] When inherent peril assumption of risk applies, the plaintiff’s consent negates any duty the defendant would have otherwise owed to the plaintiff. Scott v. Pacific West Mountain Resort, 119 Wn.2d at 498 (1992); Gleason v. Cohen, 192 Wn. App. at 798 (2016). Based on this premise of inherent peril assumption, the defendant should avoid liability for gross negligence. Gross negligence constitutes the failure to exercise slight care. Nist v. Tudor, 67 Wn.2d 322, 331, 407 P.2d 798 (1965). The lack of duty resulting from inherent peril assumption should extend to an absence of any obligation to exercise slight care.
¶43 No Washington case directly holds that a claim for gross negligence survives the plaintiff’s express assumption [*419] of risk. Nevertheless, in at least two decisions, Washington courts assumed that a gross negligence cause of action endured. Boyce v. West, 71 Wn. App. 657 (1993); Blide v. Rainier Mountaineering, Inc., 30 Wn. App. 571, 636 P.2d 492 (1981). In Boyce v. West, the surviving mother failed to present evidence of gross negligence. In Blide v. Rainier Mountaineering, Inc., an injured climber did not argue gross negligence. Other jurisdictions have held that express assumption of risk does not bar a claim for gross negligence since public policy does not allow one to exonerate oneself from gross negligence. Coomer v. Kansas City Royals Baseball Corp., 437 S.W.3d 184, 193 n.3 (Mo. 2014); Kerns v. Hoppe, 128 Nev. 910, 381 P.3d 630 (2012); Perez v. McConkey, 872 S.W.2d 897, 904 (Tenn. 1994).
¶44 [HN34] Since express assumption of risk and inherent peril assumption of risk both result in the bar of the plaintiff’s claim and arise from the plaintiff’s voluntary assumption of risk, one might argue that a gross negligence claim should survive assumption of risk by inherent peril if it survives express assumption of risk. Nevertheless, the two varieties of assumption of risk promote different interests and raise disparate concerns. A signed assumption of all risks could be the result of unequal bargaining power and apply to activities that involve little, or no, risks. The bargaining [**24] power with regard to inherent peril assumption is immaterial. Assumption follows from hazards the plaintiff voluntarily assumes because of the thrill and enjoyment of an activity.
 ¶45 We find no foreign decisions in which the court holds that a cause of action for gross negligence survives the application of inherent peril assumption of risk in the context of sports or outdoor recreation. Instead, other courts addressing the question consistently [HN35] limit the liability of the defendant, when inherent peril assumption applies, to intentional or reckless conduct of the defendant. Ellis v. Greater Cleveland R.T.A., 2014-Ohio-5549, 25 N.E.3d 503, 507 (Ct. App.); Custodi v. Town of Amherst, 20 N.Y.3d 83, [*420] 980 N.E.2d 933, 957 N.Y.S.2d 268 (2012); Cole v. Boy Scouts of America, 397 S.C. 247, 725 S.E.2d 476, 478 (2011); Pfenning v. Lineman, 947 N.E.2d 392, 404 (Ind. 2011); Yoneda v. Tom, 110 Haw. 367, 133 P.3d 796, 808 (2006); Peart v. Ferro, 119 Cal. App. 4th 60, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 885, 898 (2004); Allen v. Dover Co-Recreational Softball League, 807 A.2d at 1281 (2002); Behar v. Fox, 249 Mich. App. 314, 642 N.W.2d 426, 428 (2001); Estes v. Tripson, 188 Ariz. 93, 932 P.2d 1364, 1365 (Ct. App. 1997); Savino v. Robertson, 273 Ill. App. 3d 811, 652 N.E.2d 1240, 1245, 210 Ill. Dec. 264 (1995); King v. Kayak Manufacturing Corp., 182 W. Va. 276, 387 S.E.2d 511, 518 (1989). A recklessness standard encourages vigorous participation in recreational activities, while still providing protection from egregious conduct. Behar v. Fox, 642 N.W.2d at 428 (2001). We join the other jurisdictions in imposing an intentional and reckless standard, rather than a gross negligence standard, when the plaintiff assumes the risks of inherent perils in a sporting or outdoor activity.
¶46 [HN36] Gross negligence consists of the failure to exercise slight care. Nist v. Tudor, 67 Wn.2d at 331 (1965). Reckless misconduct denotes a more serious level of misconduct than gross negligence. An actor’s conduct is in “reckless disregard” of the safety of another if he or she intentionally [**25] does an act or fails to do an act that it is his or her duty to the other to do, knowing or having reason to know of facts that would lead a reasonable person to realize that the actor’s conduct not only creates an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to the other but also involves a high degree of probability that substantial harm will result to him or her. Adkisson v. City of Seattle, 42 Wn.2d 676, 685, 258 P.2d 461 (1953); Brown v. Department of Social & Health Services, 190 Wn. App. 572, 590, 360 P.3d 875 (2015). Brian Pellham does not allege that Let’s Go Tubing engaged in reckless conduct. No evidence supports a conclusion that the inner tube rental company bus driver purposely omitted a warning to Pellham with knowledge that Pellham would suffer substantial harm.
¶47 We affirm the trial court’s summary judgment dismissal of Brian Pellham’s suit against Let’s Go Tubing.
Korsmo and Siddoway, JJ., concur.
Wilberto Melendez, Plaintiff, v. Happy Trails and Riding Center, Inc., Defendant.
COUNSEL: [*1] For Wilberto Melendez, Plaintiff, Counterclaim Defendant: Robin A. Feeney, LEAD ATTORNEY, FINE & STAUD LLP, PHILADELPHIA, PA.
For Happy Trails and Riding Center, Incorporated, Defendant, Counterclaim Plaintiff: Dennis M. Marconi, Barnaba & Marconi, LLP, Trenton, NJ.
On September 30, 2014, Plaintiff, Wilberto Melendez, filled a one count Complaint with this Court against Defendant, Happy Trails and Riding Center, lnc.1 (Doc. 1). The Complaint alleges that Plaintiff suffered injury as a result of Defendant’s negligence in its operation of a business which rented horses and equipment to the public for recreational horseback riding. After the conclusion of fact discovery, Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 19) and supporting brief (Doc. 20) on October 29, 2015. Plaintiff filed a Brief in Opposition (Doc. 22) and Defendant filed a Reply. (Doc. 23). Oral argument on the matter was held on April 4, 2016.
The motion is now ripe for decision. For the reasons set forth below the Court will deny Defendant’s motion in its entirety.
IN CONDERATION [sic] FOR BEING PERMITTED TO UTILIZE THE FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT [*3] OF HAPPY TRAILS RIDING STABLES AND TO ENGAGE IN HORSEBACK RIDING, AND ALL RELATED ACTIVITIES.
1. I understand and acknowledge that the activity I am voluntarily engage [sic] in as a participant and/or [sic] bears certain know [sic] risk [sic] and unanticipated risks which could result in jury, [sic] death, illness, or disease, physical or mental, or damage to myself, to my property, or to spectators or other third parties. I understand and acknowledge those risk [sic] may result in personal claims against “HAPPY TRAILS STABLES” or claims against me by spectators or other third parties.
1. [sic] The nature of the activity itself, including the possible risks to you the rider.
A. The animal may be startled by unforeseen or unexpected noises from other animals, people, vehicles, activities and as a result you the rider may be hurt or injured should the animal react to said noises or activity, by running, bucking, rolling, or kicking, etc.
B. That you as the rider realizes [sic] that the animal is reacting to your physical instructions, conduct, and verbal instructions and commands, and therefore, the animal will respond in accordance with your reactions or commands. However, there are [*4] times when the animal may be confused or distracted during course [sic] of your instructions and/or commands.
C. You the rider understands [sic] that an animal may kick or bite you the rider, or you the pedestrian, and that other animals which may be on tour, could kick or bite you the rider and/or pedestrian.
D. You the rider are aware that physical conditions of the trails may cause injury or risk to you, should these physical conditions such as low tree limbs, bushes, or other type of natural growth come in contact with animal [sic] or yourself.
2. I hereby release and discharge Happy Trails Stables, instructors, trail guides, stable managers, employees, owners of the horses and related equipment and land utilized for Happy Trails Stables activities, hereinafter referred to as the “Released Parties,” from any and all claims, demands, or cause of action that I, or any of my heirs, successors or assigns, [sic] may hereafter have for injuries and/or damages arising out of my participation in Happy Trails activities, including but not limited to, loses caused by negligence of the released parties.
3. I further agree that I, my heirs, successors, or assigns, [sic] will not sue or make claim [*5] against the Released Parties for damage or other loses sustained as a result of my participation in Happy Trails activities.
4. I understand and acknowledge that Happy Trails activities have inherent dangers that no amount of cares, [sic] caution, instruction, or expertise can eliminate and I expressly and voluntarily assume all risk of personal injury or death sustained while participating in “Happy Trails Stables” activities weather [sic] or not caused by negligence of the Released Parties ….
6. I hereby expressly recognize that this Agreement and Release of Liability is a contract pursuant to which I have released any and all claims against the Released Parties resulting from my participation in Happy Trails activities including any claims caused by negligence of the Released Parties. I also assume the risk of the equine activities pursuant to the [sic] Pennsylvania law.
(Id. at ¶¶ 5, 11; Doc. 20-7) (emphasis original). An employee of Happy Trails informed Plaintiff that Plaintiff must sign the agreement in order to go horseback riding. (Doc. 20, 5). Plaintiff signed the agreement. (Id. at ¶ 8). In addition to the agreement, there were signs posted inside the office, outside [*6] the office, and by the stable which read “You assume the risk of equine activities pursuant to Pennsylvania Law.” (See id. at ¶¶ 12-15; Doc. 20-8).
After completing the agreement, Plaintiff waited while a Happy Trails employee saddled up a horse. (Doc. 20, ¶ 17). Plaintiff then mounted the horse and participated in a guided group horseback ride for the next forty-five minutes without incident. (Id. at ¶¶ 19, 21). On several occasions during the ride, Plaintiff requested permission from the guide to gallop the horse. (Id. at ¶¶ 22, 23). Plaintiff was told it was too dangerous to do on the trail. (Id.). At the end of the ride, one of the guides brought Plaintiff away from the group so that Plaintiff could canter the horse. (Id. at ¶ 26). Plaintiff then put the horse into a gallop and, while rounding a turn, a stirrup broke and Plaintiff fell from the animal. (id. at ¶¶ 27-29).
Plaintiff maintains that the stirrup Defendant provided him was faulty or defective and that this was the cause of his fall. (Doc. 22 at 1). Plaintiff further maintains that this fall resulted in fractured ribs and pneumothorax. (Id. at 3).
Through summary adjudication, the court may dispose of those [*7] claims that do not present a “genuine dispute as to any material fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “As to materiality, ….[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986).
The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue as to any material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986). Once such a showing has been made, the non-moving party must offer specific facts contradicting those averred by the movant to establish a genuine issue of material fact. Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 888, 110 S. Ct. 3177, 111 L. Ed. 2d 695 (1990). Therefore, the non-moving party may not oppose summary judgment simply on the basis of the pleadings, or on conclusory statements that a factual issue exists. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. “A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by citing to particular parts of materials in the record…or showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A)-(B). In evaluating whether summary judgment should be granted, “[t]he court need consider only the cited materials, but it may consider other materials in the record.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3). “Inferences [*8] should be drawn in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and where the non-moving party’s evidence contradicts the movant’s, then the non-movant’s must be taken as true.” Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1363 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied 507 U.S. 912, 113 S. Ct. 1262, 122 L. Ed. 2d 659 (1993).
Plaintiffs complaint alleges that Defendant was negligent in providing broken or defective equipment–the stirrup–to Plaintiff, which directly resulted in his injury. (Doc. 1, ¶ 20). Defendant puts forth two arguments that it maintains are separate and independent grounds for summary judgment. First, Defendant argues that the agreement that Plaintiff signed prior to the horseback ride insulates Defendant from liability under these facts. (Doc. 20 at 9). Second, Defendant argues that, pursuant to 4 P.S. §§ 601-606 (hereinafter “Equine Activities Immunity Act,” “EAIA,” or “the Act”), Happy Trails is immune from liability as a provider of equine activities. (Id.).
1) the contract language must be construed strictly, since exculpatory language is not favored by the law; 2) the contract must state the intention of the parties with the greatest particularity, beyond doubt by express stipulation, and no inference from words of general import can establish the intent of the parties; 3) the language of the contract must be construed, in cases of ambiguity, against the party seeking immunity from liability; and 4) the burden of establishing immunity is upon the party invoking protection under the clause.
Tayar v. Camelback Ski Corp., 616 Pa. 385, 47 A.3d 1190, 1196 (Pa. 2012) (quoting Topp Copy Prods., 626 A.2d at 99). Further, exculpatory clauses may not immunize a party for intentional or reckless behavior. Id. at 1202-03.
Defendant contends that the agreement Plaintiff signed is valid, enforceable, and encompasses broken equipment. (Doc. 20 at 13-16). Therefore, Defendant argues, Plaintiffs negligence [*11] claim is barred and Happy Trails is entitled to summary judgment. (Id. at 16).
Plaintiff does not appear to argue that the agreement is not valid on its face. Nor should he, considering that the agreement easily satisfies the validity requirements under Chepkevich. First, the agreement does not violate any public policy of Pennsylvania. In light of the Equine Activities Immunity Act–discussed in the next section–and similar statutes addressing other recreational activities, it is the policy of the state to encourage participation in those activities, despite their inherent danger, and assign the risk of loss to those who choose to participate in them. Cf. Chepkevich, 2 A.3d at 1191 (finding that, in light of a statute that preserves the assumption of risk defense in the context of downhill skiing, it is “the clear policy of this Commonwealth . . .to encourage the sport and to place the risks of skiing squarely on the skier.”). Further, Pennsylvania courts have held as valid similar exculpatory agreements in the context of a variety of other inherently dangerous recreational activities. See, e.g., id. (downhill skiing); Wang v. Whitetail Mountain Resort, 2007 PA Super 283, 933 A.2d 110, 113-14 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007) (snow tubing); Valeo v. Pocono Int’l Raceway, Inc., 347 Pa. Super. 230, 500 A.2d 492, 492-93 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (auto racing); Nissley v. Candytown Motorcycle Club, Inc., 2006 PA Super 349, 913 A.2d 887, 889-91(Pa. Super. Ct. 2006) (motorcycle riding).
Second, the agreement was between two private [*12] parties, Happy Trails and Mr. Melendez, concerning the purely private matter of renting a horse for recreational purposes. Finally, this is not a contract of adhesion. See Chepkevich, 2 A.3d at 1190-91 (“The signer I is under no compulsion, economic or otherwise, to participate, much less to sign the exculpatory agreement, because it does not relate to essential services, but merely governs a voluntary recreational activity.”). Thus, the agreement is facially valid.
Turning to enforceability, Plaintiff contends that Defendant has failed to meet its burden to show either that defective equipment is an inherent risk of horseback riding, or that the language of the agreement shows that Plaintiff expressly assumed the risk of defective equipment. (Doc. 22 at 11). Plaintiff points out that the agreement does not enumerate defective equipment as a risk. (Id.). Further, Plaintiff argues that a broken stirrup is not an inherent risk of horseback riding as demonstrated by the testimony of both Happy Trails’ owner and a Happy Trails’ employee who both stated they had never seen a stirrup break before. (Id. at 12-13). Thus, Plaintiff argues, because the risk was not foreseeable and was not expressly in the agreement, Plaintiff could [*13] not appreciate the risk and could therefore not assume it. (Id. at 13).
Plaintiffs argument essentially states that the second element from Tayar –that “the contract must state the intention of the parties with the greatest particularity, beyond doubt by express stipulation, and no inference from words of general import can establish the intent of the parties”–is not met in this case because the agreement did not specifically enumerate the risk of defective equipment. Pennsylvania courts, however, have rejected this argument before. See Chepkevich, 2 A.3d at 1193-94.
Skiing, Snowboarding, and Snowblading, including the use of lifts, is a dangerous sport with inherent and other risks which include but are not limited to [certain enumerated risks]…. I agree to accept all these risks and agree not to sue Hidden Valley [*14] Resort or their employees if injured while using their facilities regardless of any negligence on their part.
Id. at 1176. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court first rejected Chepkevich’s argument that she did not assume the specific risk that caused her injury and instead found that a fall from a ski lift was an inherent risk in the sport of skiing. Id. at 1188. Therefore, the Court found that the suit was barred by the Skier’s Responsibility Act, 42 PA. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 7102(c), which preserves the common law assumption of the risk defense in the context of downhill skiing. Chepkevich, 2 A.3d at 1187-88.
Turning to an alternative ground for summary judgment–the release–the Chepkevich Court held that the term “negligence” did not require any definition or illustration to be given effect. Id. at 1193. Indeed, reversing the court below on that point, the Court found “no reason to require the drafters of exculpatory releases to provide definitions and context for commonly used terms such as ‘negligence.”‘ Id. The Court then found that the plain language of the release encompassed Chepkevich’s claim for negligence and therefore barred the claim. Id. at 1194-95. Because the Court had already found that the risk involved was inherent, the Court found it unnecessary to address the merits of Chepkevich’s [*15] final argument “that the Release exempted Hidden Valley from liability only when its negligence gave rise to a risk otherwise inherent to the sport of skiing.” Id. at 1193-94.
Concerning the case at hand, while this Court agrees with Plaintiff that the provision of defective equipment is not an inherent risk in the sport of horseback riding, this point is not dispositive. As one Pennsylvania court explained, “the assumption of the risk doctrine bars a plaintiff from recovering in tort for risks inherent to a certain activity. In contrast, the explicit, broad, and valid language of the exculpatory clause bars all claims, regardless of whether they arise from an inherent risk.” Nissley, 913 A.2d at 892 (footnote and internal citations omitted). Thus, as long as the language of the exculpatory agreement applies, any inherent risk analysis is superfluous. The fact that the court in Chepkevich found it unnecessary to its holding to address the plaintiffs argument that non-inherent risks cannot be released in exculpatory agreements does not affect this analysis. As that court saw no need to overturn the language in Nissley, this Court sees no reason not to follow it.
As for enforceability of the agreement, in the realm of recreational [*16] activities, Pennsylvania has upheld expansive language in exculpatory agreements. See, e.g., Nissley, 913 A.2d at 890-91 (upholding motor cycle club’s exculpatory agreement in a negligence action when the release stated that plaintiff “hereby give[s] up all my rights to sue or make claim”); Zimmer v. Mitchell & Ness, 385 A.2d 437, 440 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978), aff’d per curiam, 416 A.2d 1010 (1980) (upholding ski rental shop’s exculpatory agreement in a negligence action when the release stated that skier released defendant from “any liability”); Valeo, 500 A.2d at 492-93 (upholding race track’s exculpatory agreement in a negligence action where race car driver signed an agreement releasing “defendants ‘from all liability …for all loss or damage'”).
2 This Court notes that there is some language in Chepkevich that seems to support Plaintiffs argument. As an aside, the Chepkevich Court states that “the risk [in this case] was not so unexpected, or brought about in so strange a manner, as to justify placing this injury beyond the reach of the plain language of the Release.” Chepkevich, 2 A.3d at 1194. Plaintiff has pointed out that a broken stirrup is a very uncommon, and therefore unexpected, occurrence. (Doc. 22 at 12-13). Nevertheless, because Chepkevich does not give any standards for what type of risks fall beyond the realm of the plain language of an exculpatory agreement, this Court must turn to other cases. This Court finds [*18] Zimmer v. Mitchell and Ness instructive.
In Zimmer, a skier, Joseph Zimmer, sued a ski rental company after the bindings on the skis he rented failed to release as they were supposed to during a fall, causing him substantial injury. Zimmer, 385 A.2d at 438. Zimmer argued that the rental company was negligent in renting him skis without testing and fitting the bindings. Id. at 440. The court granted the ski rental company’s motion for summary judgment based on an exculpatory agreement that Zimmer signed when he rented the skis that released the rental company “from any liability for damage and injury to myself or to any person or property resulting from the use of this equipment.” Id.
Thus, while the specific issue of a broken stirrup may be very uncommon, Pennsylvania courts have enforced exculpatory agreements in the case of a released party negligently providing the releasing party with defective or broken equipment.
3 At oral argument, Plaintiff advanced a slightly different argument. Plaintiff argued, in effect, that because paragraph one of the agreement enumerates risks associated with horseback riding, the rest of the agreement is limited to those enumerated lists. This argument was also advanced in Chepkevich. See Chepkevich, 2 A.3d at 1194. There, the court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that “by enumerating risks inherent to downhill skiing and then requiring the skier to accept those risks, the Release only bars suits that arise out of the listed risks.” Id. The court found that the release, which stated that skiing “is a dangerous sport with inherent and other risks,” was not limited to the enumerated the risks, but clearly included “other risks.” Here, as in Chepkevich, Plaintiff’s argument [*20] fails on textual grounds. It is true that the agreement, in paragraph one, lists some risks inherent to horseback riding. However, in paragraph two and six, the agreement states that Plaintiff relinquishes “any and all claims.” There is no limiting language in paragraph two or six that would indicate that Plaintiff was only relinquishing claims arising out of the enumerated risks in paragraph one.
Plaintiff finally argues that Defendant’s conduct amounts to recklessness and exculpatory agreements cannot immunize reckless conduct. (Doc. 22 at 14); see Tayar, 47 A.3d at 1202-03. Defendant concedes that the agreement only releases it from suits for negligence, not recklessness, and counters that its “conduct at most amounts to ordinary negligence.” (Doc. 23 at 10). “Recklessness is distinguishable from negligence on the basis that recklessness requires conscious action or inaction which creates a substantial risk of harm to others, whereas negligence suggests unconscious inadvertence.” Tayar, 47 A.3d at 1200.
The actor’s conduct is in reckless disregard of the safety of another if he does an act or intentionally fails to do an act which it is his duty to the other to do, knowing or having reason to know of facts which would lead a reasonable [*21] man to realize, not only that his conduct creates an unreasonable risk of physical harm to another, but also that such risk is substantially greater than that which is necessary to make his conduct negligent.
Id. at 1200-01 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 500).
Defendant’s bare assertion that its actions do not rise to the level of recklessness does not satisfy its burden to show that there is no genuine dispute as to a material fact. The record shows that Happy Trails provided a saddle for Plaintiffs ride, that a stirrup on that saddle broke during the ride, and that Plaintiff fell from a horse when the stirrup broke. (Doc. 22-5 at 35-36, 39-40). It was the responsibility of Happy Trails, not the customer, to inspect the equipment, but no records of inspections or repairs were kept, nor was the Happy Trails’ owner able to say if any inspection of the specific stirrup occurred on the day of the accident. (Id. at 13, 53-55, 58, 60). Happy Trails’ owner testified that he bought used saddles on the internet and also from individuals who walk into his business. (Id. at 18). He was unable to say where he procured the saddle in question, how long he had had it, or how old it was. (Id. at 18-19, 58, 60). Additionally, Happy Trails’ owner displayed a somewhat cavalier attitude towards [*22] safety, asserting that customers assume all risks associated with the activity, including equipment breaking, staff failing to put equipment on the horses correctly, and even staff failing to provide basic equipment like stirrups or a bridal. (Id. at 32-33). Viewing the record in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, a question of fact therefore remains as to whether Defendant’s action rose to the level of recklessness.
Defendant goes on to argue that Plaintiff failed to plead recklessness and that if “recklessness is the standard to apply in this case, plaintiffs compliant must be dismissed with prejudice.” (Doc. 23 at 10). This argument, however, runs counter to the holding in Archibald v. Kemble, 2009 PA Super 79, 971 A.2d 513 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2009).
d. failing to understand and learn the rules, prohibition and limitation on any checking prior to participating in the non-checking league and game.
Id. at 516. First determining that Archibald would only be able to recover if he showed that Kemble acted recklessly, the Court went on to hold that recklessness “may be averred generally.” Id. at 517, 519. Thus, “merely determining the degree of care is recklessness does not give rise to a separate tort that must have been pled within the applicable statute of limitations.” Id. at 519. Instead, “Archibalds’ cause of action was…subsumed within the negligence count pled in their Complaint.” Id.; see also M.U. v. Downingtown High Sch. E., 103 F. Supp. 3d 612, 629 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (construing a separately pleaded recklessness claim “simply as a mechanism to recover punitive damages under [the] negligence claim” because “[t]here is no cause of action for recklessness under Pennsylvania law” and “recklessness is a heightened standard of care required to potentially recover punitive damages”).
Consequently, under Archibald, the fact that Plaintiff did not specifically plead recklessness in his Complaint is not fatal to his claim. In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleged that, among other things, [*24] Defendant “provid[ed] equipment or tack that defendant knew or should have known was faulty.” This statement encompasses the allegation that Defendant recklessly provided Plaintiff with defective or faulty equipment. The fact that Plaintiffs Complaint does not contain the word “reckless” is immaterial.
In sum, because the agreement that Plaintiff signed is only enforceable to immunize Defendant for its negligence, and not for its recklessness, and because there is a genuine dispute as to the material fact of whether Defendant acted recklessly in this case, the Court finds that the agreement is not a sufficient basis for summary judgment.
Defendant next points to the Equine Activities Immunity Act, 4 P.S. §§ 601-606, as an alternative, independent basis for summary judgment. The EAIA limits the liability of certain providers of equine activities if specific requirements are met. Defendant argues that, as a provider of a qualifying equine activity who has complied with the EAIA’s statutory requirements, it is entitled to immunity from suit. (Doc. 20 at 10-11). Plaintiff counters that Defendant’s negligent provision of defective or faulty equipment puts the suit outside of the EAIA’s [*25] protections. (Doc. 22 at 4).
The issue of whether a covered entity is immunized from liability under the EAIA for providing defective or faulty equipment is a question of first impression. As such, this Court must engage in statutory interpretation. For this Court to interpret state law, it “must determine how the highest court of the State would decide an issue.” Baker ex rel. Thomas v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 249, 118 S. Ct. 657, 139 L. Ed. 2d 580 (1998). Pennsylvania interprets statutes according to the Statutory Construction Act of 1972, 1 Pa.Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 1501-1991. “When interpreting statutory language, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is guided by the ‘plain meaning’ rule of construction.” Hofkin v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 81 F.3d 365, 371 (3d Cir. 1996) (citing Commonwealth v. Stanley, 498 Pa. 326, 446 A.2d 583, 587 (Pa. 1982)). “The object of all interpretation and construction of statutes is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General Assembly. Every statute shall be construed, if possible, to give effect to all its provisions.” 1 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1921(a). “When the words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.” Id. at § 1921(b).
The EAIA provides immunity for “an individual, group, club or business entity that sponsors, organizes, conducts or provides the facilities for an equine activity” including “[r]ecreational rides or drives which involve riding or other activity [*26] involving the use of an equine.” 4 P.S. §§ 601, 602(b)(6). The EAIA, however, only provides immunity where signs of at least a certain size are “conspicuously posted on the premises…in two or more locations, which states the following: You assume the risk of equine activities pursuant to Pennsylvania law.” Id. at § 603. For covered entities in compliance with the signs requirement, “liability for negligence shall only be barred where the doctrine of knowing voluntary assumption of risk is proven with respect to damages due to injuries or death to an adult participant resulting from equine activities.” Id. at § 602(a). Finally, the Act is clear that “[t]he immunity provided for by this act shall be narrowly construed.” Id. at § 606.
Plaintiff does not argue that Defendant, as a provider of recreational horseback riding activities, is not a covered entity under the statute. Additionally, Plaintiff does not argue that Defendant did not have the appropriate signs as prescribed under the EAIA. Plaintiffs sole argument is that the Act does not bar actions for the negligent provision of faulty or defective equipment. (Doc. 22 at 6). Stated otherwise, Plaintiff argues that because he did not know he might be given defective or faulty [*27] equipment, he could not knowingly assume the risk of such. Defendant counters that “[o]nce plaintiff entered the stables property and took part in recreational horse riding, he assumed the risk of harm associated with such activities.” (Doc. 20 at 11).
The EAIA states that “liability for negligence shall only be barred where the doctrine of knowing voluntary assumption of risk is proven.” 4 P.S. § 602(a). The Act, therefore, appears to preserve the common law assumption of risk doctrine in the context of equine activities. In delineating the contours of this doctrine, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has looked to the Restatement Second of Torts. See Hughes v. Seven Springs Farm, Inc., 563 Pa. 501, 762 A.2d 339, 341-42 (Pa. 2000). The Restatement outlines four varieties of the doctrine, the first two of which are of interest in this case. See Restatement (second) of Torts § 496A cmt. c. The first, express assumption of risk occurs when lithe plaintiff has given his express consent to relieve the defendant of an obligation to exercise care for his protection, and agrees to take his chances as to injury from a known or possible risk.” Id. (emphasis added). This is the type of assumption of risk examined above in respect to the agreement signed by Plaintiff. The second, implied assumption of risk, occurs when lithe plaintiff has [*28] entered voluntarily into some relation with the defendant which he knows to involve the risk, and so is regarded as tacitly or impliedly agreeing to relieve the defendant of responsibility, and to take his own chances.” Id. (emphasis added).
It is self-evident that a person “cannot be found to have implicitly assumed a risk of which he had no knowledge.” Rutter v. Ne. Beaver Cty. Sch. Dist., 496 Pa. 590, 437 A.2d 1198, 1204 (Pa. 1981) (plurality opinion). As such, lithe defense of assumption of the risk requires that the defendant show that the plaintiff was subjectively aware of the facts which created the danger and…must have appreciated the danger itself and the nature, character and extent which made it unreasonable.”‘ Berman v. Radnor Rolls, Inc., 374 Pa. Super. 118, 542 A.2d 525, 532 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (alteration in original) (quoting Crance v. Sohanic, 344 Pa. Super. 526, 496 A.2d 1230, 1232 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985)); See also Restatement (second) of Torts § 496D.4 Thus, for a defendant to prevail on a summary judgment motion based on the assumption of risk defense, it must be “beyond question that the plaintiff voluntarily and knowingly proceeded in the face of an obvious and dangerous condition.” Barrett v. Fredavid Builders, Inc., 454 Pa. Super. 162, 685 A.2d 129, 131 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (citing Struble v. Valley Forge Military Acad., 445 Pa. Super. 224, 665 A.2d 4 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995)). Finally, “[t]he mere fact one engages in activity that has some inherent danger does not mean that one cannot recover from a negligent party when injury is subsequently sustained.” Bullman v. Giuntoli, 2000 PA Super 284, 761 A.2d 566, 572 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000).
4 Of course, a plaintiff’s own assertion about whether he knew of and understood [*29] the risk is not conclusive.
There are some risks as to which no adult will be believed if he says that he did not know or understand them. Thus an adult who knowingly comes in contact with a fire will not be believed if he says that he was unaware of the risk that he might be burned by it; and the same is true of such risks as those of drowning in water or falling from a height, in the absence of any special circumstances which may conceal or appear to minimize the danger.
Restatement (Second) of Torts §496D cmt. d.
In short, to preclude Plaintiffs negligence action under the EAIA, Defendant must show that Plaintiff knew that the equipment he was provided with might break and voluntarily continued with the horseback ride in spite of that knowledge. Only then can Plaintiff be said to knowingly assume the risk. Defendant, however, has made no such showing. Defendant has failed to point to anything in the record to show that Plaintiff decided to use the equipment with the knowledge that the stirrup or any other equipment Plaintiff was provided with might break. Nor is this a case where the risk is so obvious that the knowledge could be inferred. The owner of Happy Trails testified that, in the approximately ten years he operated [*30] the stable, he never remembered a single stirrup breaking. (Doc. 20-3 at 20-21). Given that it is not a common occurrence, it strains credibility to argue that a recreational participant would know that being provided broken equipment was likely.
5 At oral argument, counsel for the Defendant conceded that, even under the broad interpretation of the Act that Defendant argued for, the Act would not immunize a covered entity for acts of recklessness or gross negligence. As this Court has already found that there is a genuine dispute as to the material fact of whether the Defendant acted recklessly, this provides an alternative ground for the finding that the Act does not provide immunity under these facts.
For the reasons stated above, the Court will deny Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 19). A separate Order follows.
1. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 19) is DENIED.
2. A telephone scheduling conference will be held on Wednesday, October 5, 2016, at 4:00 p.m. Counsel for Plaintiff is responsible for arranging the call to (570) 207-5750, and all parties should be ready to proceed before the undersigned is contacted.
She also argued the weaker one should prevail if one had too.
The plaintiff rented an ultralight from the defendant. For the rental, she signed two different releases. During take-off, the ultralight engine failed, and she crashed into a stack of bailed hail. The plaintiff sued.
The defendant argued the releases should be enforced, and the lawsuit dismissed. The plaintiff argued the language in the less inclusive release was the only one that should be applied. The defendant asked for the case to be dismissed. The trial court denied both motions. The parties then petitioned the appellate court to intervene and resolve the issue. The appellate court ordered the trial court to decide the issue. The trial court ruled dual releases voided each other, and neither could be used. Defendant then appealed the trial court ruling.
This also explains why the heading is the defendant at the trial court level being listed as the plaintiff at the appellate level. The defendant is the trial court. The plaintiffs are listed as the real parties in interest.
The plaintiff argued that the case of Conservatorship of Link, (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 138, 205 Cal.Rptr. 513, should control because it had similar facts. Two releases were signed by the plaintiff. The first to enter the race track and the second release was signed to enter the pit area. The court threw out one of the releases because the print was in five-and-one-half-point type, too small to be read. The exculpatory language was hidden and convoluted.
Here the court found the two releases were both written correctly to meet California law on releases.
Neither the “Waiver and Release From Liability and Indemnity Agreement” (Appen. A) nor the “Aircraft Rental and Student Instruction Agreement and Release From Liability” (Appen. B) signed by plaintiff suffers from any of the defects relied upon by the Link court to void the exculpatory language found on the sign-in sheet considered in that case.
The court directed the trial court to set aside its order for the plaintiff. The defendant did not win outright though. The appellate court held that the defendant had asked for additional relief that it could not grant, because the trial court had not ruled on those issues.
As more and more operations use releases, this is going to become a common occurrence. A church group requires people going on a trip to sign a release. The raft company the church group goes to, asks the people to sign a release. If someone is injured, then you could be facing this same argument.
About the only way to deal with this situation is to work in advance and make sure that your documents either solely identify you as the person to be released or both parties make sure their releases do not conflict.
If you can, identify one release that is the best and use it.
If you are using two releases; Stop. Either figure out a way to combine the documents or make sure that one document does not eliminate the other or both documents.
There may be language you can use in your release to make sure it is superior to any other release or contract. However, if both releases have the language, then you are back in the same quandary.

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