Source: https://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-6th-circuit/1749999.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 20:48:01+00:00

Document:
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RASHID L. CARTER; CHANDA E. WILSON, Defendants-Appellants.
BEFORE: NORRIS, McKEAGUE, and WHITE, Circuit Judges.
This is a heroin conspiracy case that included multiple defendants. Defendant Rashid Carter appeals the district court's denial of his pre-trial motion to suppress evidence. Defendant Chanda Wilson appeals her 37-month within Guideline sentence. We affirm the judgment in Carter's case. We vacate Wilson's sentence and remand for resentencing under amended U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2.
On January 9, 2015, the district court held a suppression hearing. (R. 392, PageID# 2572.) The following factual background comes from testimony given at that hearing.
Laughlin initiated a traffic stop. (Id., PageID# 2600, 2632.) Mr. Carter was driving the car, and a woman named Jasmine Sanders was in the passenger seat. Griffith approached the passenger side of the car and told the occupants that they had been seen speeding in a fifty mile per hour zone. (Id., PageID # 2600-01.) Mr. Carter responded that he thought he was going fifty-five miles per hour. Griffith testified that Ms. Sanders' hands were shaking, she was breathing heavily, and she appeared more nervous than someone would in a routine traffic stop. (Id., PageID# 2601-02.) Griffith also reported that she “smelled the immediate odor of raw marijuana coming from within the vehicle.” (Id.) After smelling the marijuana, Griffith asked Mr. Carter and Ms. Sanders to get out of the car.
The traffic stop and search were recorded on an OSHP cruiser camera.
On February 5, 2015, Ms. Wilson pleaded guilty to all three counts with which she was charged. (R. 301, PageID# 1750.) She did not enter into a plea agreement.
On appeal, Mr. Carter challenges the district court's order denying his motion to suppress. For her part, Ms. Wilson appeals her sentence. Specifically she challenges (1) the district court's finding that she was not a minor participant; (2) the drug quantity calculation; and (3) the reasonableness of her sentence.
When considering the denial of a motion to suppress evidence, we review the district court's findings of fact for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo. United States v. Gross, 550 F.3d 578, 582 (6th Cir. 2008). A factual finding is clearly erroneous when the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. United States v. Smith, 594 F.3d 530, 535 (6th Cir. 2010). “In reviewing the district court's findings of fact, we consider evidence in the light most favorable to the government.” United States v. Hill, 195 F.3d 258, 264 (6th Cir. 1999).
We review a district court's sentencing guideline calculation de novo, United States v. Wendlandt, 714 F.3d 388, 393 (6th Cir. 2013), and the reasonableness of a sentence for abuse of discretion, Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007).
The district court concluded that “[b]ased on Laughlin's observation of the laser device's reading and both officers' observations of the speed at which they paced [Mr.] Carter's vehicle, probable cause existed for Griffith and Laughlin to stop [Mr.] Carter.” (R. 181, PageID# 718.) The district court also relied on Mr. Carter's admission to speeding. (Id., PageID# 720.) Mr. Carter challenges each of these findings, arguing that the district court improperly found probable cause existed to conduct the traffic stop based on the fact he was speeding. We disagree and affirm the district court.
All of the issues presented by Mr. Carter “are issues of fact, which will be overruled only if the district court's findings were clearly erroneous.” United States v. Ivy, 165 F.3d 397, 401 (6th Cir. 1998) (citing United States v. Rose, 889 F.2d 1490, 1494 (6th Cir. 1989)). “[S]o long as the officer has probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred or was occurring, the resulting stop is not unlawful.” United States v. Freeman, 209 F.3d 464, 466 (6th Cir. 2000) (quoting United States v. Ferguson, 8 F.3d 385, 391 (6th Cir. 1993)). Driving over the speed limit is a traffic violation and provides an officer with probable cause to stop a vehicle. See United States v. Wellman, 185 F.3d 651, 655–56 (6th Cir. 1999).
First, Mr. Carter challenges the reliability of the laser because Griffith did not remember the exact date that the laser had been calibrated before the traffic stop. But, as the district court noted, Ohio courts have recognized the reliability of readings taken from the LTI 20-20. See, e.g., State v. Starks, 964 N.E.2d 1058, 1060 (Ohio Ct. App. 2011) (“This court has previously recognized that a trial court may take judicial notice of the scientific reliability of the LTI 20-20 laser device.”); City of Columbus v. Dawson, No. 99AP-589, 2000 WL 271766, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 14, 2000) (observing that the LTI 20-20 has been recognized as scientifically reliable in other Ohio appellate courts, but declining to take judicial notice of those decisions because “the fact that a court has taken judicial notice in one jurisdiction cannot serve as the basis for taking judicial notice in another jurisdiction”); State v. Dawson, No. CA98-04-021, 1998 WL 883802, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 21, 1998) (“[W]e find that the trial court did not err by taking judicial notice as to the accuracy and dependability of the LTI 20-20 laser device ․”). The district court also relied on Laughlin's testimony to find that the laser was used and working properly. Thus, we do not have a definite and firm conviction that a mistake was committed when the district court relied on the laser.
Next, Mr. Carter challenges the district court's reliance on the testimony of Griffith and Laughlin to determine that they paced the car and observed it speeding. Mr. Carter argues that the camera footage reveals that the officers never paced the car and definitely did not pace the car for one quarter of a mile. But, the camera footage is not as clear as Mr. Carter alleges. It was raining on the day of the traffic stop and it is uncertain, based on the video, how long the officers could actually see the car. Mr. Carter argues that the officers never paced, or traveled at the same speed, as his car. But the footage reveals what appears to be at least some pacing. The district court did not commit clear error in determining that the officers paced Mr. Carter's car.
Mr. Carter lastly contends that he did not admit to speeding because he only said that he “thought” he was speeding. But the traffic camera video reveals that Griffith asked Mr. Carter if he knew he was speeding, and he responded, “Yeah ․ I thought, I was going 55.” Based on the camera footage, the district court did not clearly err in finding that Mr. Carter admitted to speeding.
Mr. Carter challenges the district court's finding that probable cause existed to search the vehicle based on the smell of marijuana. Mr. Carter does not challenge any conclusions of law, but instead questions the district court's finding that the officers actually smelled marijuana. Mr. Carter notes that Griffith smelled raw marijuana, tobacco smoke, and air fresheners, while Laughlin only smelled raw marijuana. Mr. Carter contends that this inconsistency leads to the conclusion that the raw marijuana smell was fabricated. Mr. Carter further asserts that because the officers never affirmatively mention the marijuana smell on the traffic camera video, that they fabricated the smell.
The district court, however, disagreed with Mr. Carter and found the officers' testimony credible. (R. 181 PageID# 721-22.) “The district court's credibility finding carries considerable weight.” Ivy, 165 F.3d at 401-02. “Findings of fact anchored in credibility assessment are generally not subject to reversal upon appellate review.” United States v. Taylor, 956 F.2d 572, 576 (6th Cir. 1992). Indeed, ‘ “[w]here there are two permissible views of the evidence, the fact finder's choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.” ’ Id. (quoting United States v. Rose, 889 F.2d 1490, 1494 (6th Cir. 1989) (emphasis in original)).
When viewed in the light most favorable to the government, this testimony demonstrates the district court did not err in finding the existence of probable cause for the stop and the subsequent search.
Ms. Wilson argues that the court erred by failing to apply U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 to her sentence, an application that would have reduced her base offense level by at least two levels due to her role as a minor participant in the conspiracy. She asserts that her role in the conspiracy was substantially less than others because she made no profit for her participation, had no prior involvement in drugs, and only tried to help her cousin, Mr. Carter, by making phone calls, which she now acknowledges was a poor decision.
In the context of mitigating role adjustments, “a district court's factual findings are reviewed for clear error while its legal conclusions are reviewed de novo.” United States v. Roberts, 223 F.3d 377, 380 (6th Cir. 2000). The defendant “bears the burden of proving a mitigating role in the offense by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id. at 379.
A district court may apply U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 to reduce a defendant's base offense level if the defendant's role in the offense was “substantially less” than other perpetrators. § 3B1.2 cmt. N.3(A). “In determining whether to award the defendant a reduction for a mitigating role in the offense, the district court must consider the portion of the relevant conduct of the conspiracy that was attributable to the defendant for purposes of determining his base offense level.” United States v. Nunnally, 5 F. App'x 438, 440 (6th Cir. 2001).
U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 cmt. n.3(C) (2015).
Amendment 794 took effect on November 1, 2015, after defendant was sentenced and after the principal briefs were filed in this appeal. Counsel for defendant called it to our attention in a supplementary authority letter filed July 24, 2016.
We must first determine whether Amendment 794 applies retroactively. “[C]larifications of the guidelines have retroactive application while substantive changes do not.” United States v. Monus, 356 F.3d 714, 718 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing United States v. Williams, 940 F.2d 176, 182 n.4 (6th Cir. 1991)). When deciding whether an amendment is clarifying or substantive, we consider these factors: “(1) how the Sentencing Commission characterized the amendment; (2) whether the amendment changes the language of the guideline itself or changes only the commentary for the guideline; and (3) whether the amendment resolves an ambiguity in the original wording of the guideline.” Id. (quoting United States v. Hartz, 296 F.3d 595, 599 (7th Cir. 2002)).
Regarding the second factor, the language of U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 did not change; only the commentary changed. The remaining two factors are also met: the Sentencing Commision characterized Amendment 794 as providing “additional guidance to sentencing courts” and addressed a circuit conflict. U.S.S.G. App. C. Amend. 794. The Ninth Circuit has concluded that Amendment 794 is clarifying and therefore retroactive. United States v. Quintero-Layva, 823 F.3d 519, 523 (9th Cir. 2016). We agree with that decision and adopt its reasoning.
Because the district court did not have the benefit of amended U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 at sentencing, we vacate Ms. Wilson's sentence and remand for resentencing in light of Amendment 794.
Ms. Wilson challenges the district court's decision to sentence her based on a drug quantity of between 400 and 700 grams of heroin because Mr. Carter was only caught with roughly 250 grams of heroin.
The argument is not well taken. A district court's factual finding of drug quantity is reviewed for clear error. United States v. Jeross, 521 F.3d 562, 570 (6th Cir. 2008).
The district court did not err because its drug-quantity calculation was based on a preponderance of the evidence. Where the exact amount of drugs cannot be determined, “an estimate will suffice, but ․ a preponderance of the evidence must support the estimate.” Jeross, 521 F.3d at 570 (quoting United States v. Walton, 908 F.2d 1289, 1302 (6th Cir. 1990)). In making its estimate, the court must “conclude that the defendant is more likely than not actually responsible for a quantity greater than or equal to the quantity for which the defendant is being held responsible.” Id. Here, the district court found that telephone calls between Ms. Wilson and Mr. Carter indicated that Mr. Carter intended to purchase the same amount of heroin as he did last time—roughly 250 grams. Indeed, in the conversations discussing those two trips, Ms. Wilson herself explicitly referenced “250.” (R. 394, PageID# 2724.) From this information, the district court found that Ms. Wilson was involved in trafficking between 400 and 700 grams of heroin. Accordingly, the district court did not err in calculating the drug quantity.
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the judgment of the district court with respect to Mr. Carter. We vacate Ms. Wilson's sentence and remand for the district court to resentence her with the benefit of amended U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2.
1. Pacing occurs when law enforcement follows and maintains a constant distance from a target vehicle in order to determine its speed.
2. Mr. Carter also argues that Ms. Sanders did not consent to the pat-down performed by Griffith. But, the video reveals that Ms. Sanders did in fact consent. Moreover, Griffith had the right to pat down Ms. Sanders under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), after smelling the marijuana. Most importantly, however, this pat-down has nothing to do with the search of the car because Laughlin testified to searching the car because of the marijuana smell not because of the baggie of marijuana Griffith recovered.

References: v. 
 § 3
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 3
 v. 
 § 3
 § 3
 v. 
 § 3
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 3
 v. 
 § 3
 v. 
 v. 
 § 3
 v.