Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/75/377/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 06:20:37+00:00

Document:
1. Restitutio in integrum is the leading maxim as to the measure of damages in cases of libel in admiralty, for injury to vessels, for collision: in other words, where repairs are practicable, the general rule is that the damages shall be sufficient to restore the injured vessel to the condition in which she was at the time the collision occurred. And this rule does not allow deduction, as in insurance cases, for the new materials furnished in the place of the old.
2. Although, if a vessel be sunk by collision in so deep water, or otherwise so sunk, that she cannot be raised and repaired, except at an expense equal to or greater than the sum which she would be worth when repaired, the rule cannot apply, still the mere fact that a vessel is sunk is not, of itself, sufficient to show that the loss is total, nor to justify the master and owner in abandoning her and her cargo.
3. Courts of admiralty cannot properly allow counsel fees to the counsel of a gaining side in admiralty, as an incident to the judgment, beyond the costs and fees allowed by statute. Under the statute now regulating the fees of attorneys, solicitors, and proctors (the statute, namely, of 26th February, 1853, 10 Stat. at Large 161), a docket fee of twenty dollars may be taxed, on a final hearing in admiralty, if the libellant recover fifty dollars, but if he recovers less than fifty dollars, only ten.
The schooner Woolston, with a cargo of coal, and the steamer Baltimore collided in the Potomac on the 16th of December, 1863, and the schooner and her cargo sank. The owners of the schooner accordingly libeled the steamer in the admiralty court of the District. The libel averred that the collision had been caused wholly by the steamer's fault, and that the schooner had sunk in such deep water as to make both her and her cargo a total loss, since the cost of raising either or both would be greater than its or their value.
These allegations, both as to the fault and the total loss, the answer explicitly denied. The testimony as to the question of fault need not be stated, since it appeared that a part of it was given below, was not in the record sent to this Court, and the court therefore did not pass at all upon the merits. On the other matter, the matter of total loss, it rather showed that the water in which the schooner went down was not so deep but that her masts were visible eighteen feet above the water, and that her position, as she lay, was clearly discernible.
No proof was given of the fact of a total loss further than that the vessel sunk.
counsel $500 as a fee. This decree having been affirmed by the Supreme Court in general term, the case was now here on appeal.
Cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, since the passage of the act of the 3d of March, 1803, cannot be brought here for reexamination in any other mode than by appeal, and the provision is "that upon such appeal, a transcript of the libel, answer, depositions, and all other proceedings, of what kind soever in the cause, shall be transmitted to" this Court. Prior to that time, the judgments and decrees of the circuit courts in civil actions and suits in equity, whether brought there by original process or transferred there from the courts of the several states, or from the district courts, could only be removed into this Court for revision by writ of error; and the further provision was that there should be no reversal in this Court for any error in fact, which still continues to be the rule of law in respect to all cases brought here from the circuit courts by writs of error.
Appeals, however, are now allowed to this Court by the amendatory act in all such cases where the matter in dispute, exclusive of costs, exceeds the sum or value of $2,000, and so much of the 19th section of the Judiciary Act as provided for the finding of the facts in the circuit court, and so much of the 20th section of the same act as provided that such cases should be removed into this Court by writs of error, are repealed.
Viewed in the light of the repealing clause in that act, and the requirement that the transcript shall embrace the depositions as well as the pleadings and proceedings in the case, it is evident that Congress intended that this Court shall hear and determine the whole merits of the controversy. Provision in also made by that act that new evidence may be received by this Court, in admiralty and prize causes, which shows to a demonstration that the facts, as well as the law of the case, are open to revision on the appeal.
the Supreme Court shall "hear and determine such appeals," and it is as much the duty of the court to reverse the decree from which the appeal is taken for error of fact, if clearly established, as for error of law.
Appeal was taken in this case from the decree of the Supreme Court of the District affirming the decree of the district court, sitting as a court of admiralty in a cause of collision, civil and maritime.
By the transcript, it appears that the owners of the schooner J. W. Woolston filed a libel in rem against the steamer Baltimore, her engine, machinery, boats, apparel, tackle, and furniture, claiming damages as for a total loss of the schooner and her cargo, consisting of two hundred tons of coal, and also for the loss of the freight on the cargo, and for the loss of the equipment of the schooner.
Bound on a voyage from Philadelphia to the port of Washington, the schooner, when the collision occurred, was coming up the River Potomac towards her port of destination. Though cloudy, the night was not very dark, and the schooner had a light at her bow, under the jib-boom, and she had two good lookouts properly stationed in the forward part of the vessel. She was steering west-northwest with all her sails set, and was proceeding safely on her voyage up the river under a good breeze when the lookouts described the steamer heading in a southeasterly direction and coming down the river, and the charge in the libel is that the steamer, when she was not more than three hundred yards from the schooner, suddenly changed her course, came down on the schooner and struck her near midships, and caused her to sink in the deepest part of the channel. Due vigilance, it is alleged, was practiced by the schooner to prevent the collision, and that it was occasioned solely by the gross negligence and culpable mismanagement of the steamer.
of the collision is correctly described in the libel, but they allege that the proper course of the schooner in coming up the river was northwest by west half west; that instead of pursuing that course, she was heading, when first seen by the steamer, diagonally across the river; that the bell of the steamer was immediately rung and her engine stopped, but that it was too late to avoid the collision; that the collision was wholly occasioned by the fault and carelessness of those in charge of the schooner in attempting to cross the bows of the steamer instead of keeping their course, as they were bound to do by the well known rules of navigation.
I. Testimony was taken on both sides, but the Court is not inclined to decide the merits of the controversy, as the clear inference from the certificate of the clerk is that the whole testimony taken in the district court is not contained in the copy of the record transmitted to this Court. Although the record in that behalf is apparently defective and incomplete, still the Court deems it proper to determine some of the questions presented for decision, as otherwise it may hereafter become necessary to send the case back a second time.
Directions were given to the commissioner to whom the cause was referred, in the decretal order, to take proof of the value of the schooner, her cargo, furniture, and fixtures, at the time she collided with the steamer, and also to inquire into the damage which thereby accrued to the libellants, and the cost of the suit, including an allowance for fees to the counsel of the libellants, and to report the same to the court.
Agreeably to those directions the commissioner heard the parties and reported that the libellants were entitled to recover $5,000 for the actual value of the schooner at the time she was sunk, $1,521.96 for the value of the cargo, $200 for the value of the furniture and fixtures, $450 for the loss of freight, and $100 for profits on the cargo, together with costs of suit, including $500 as an allowance for fees to the counsel of the libellants.
of the commissioner, setting forth thereto three objections: (1) that the finding as to the value of the vessel is erroneous; (2) that the allowance of counsel fees is unauthorized; (3) that the allowance for profits on the cargo is incorrect. Both parties were heard, and the court sustained the third exception, but overruled the first and second, and confirmed the report, striking out the $100 for profits on the cargo.
II. Suppose the libellants are entitled to recover, still the claimants insist that the rule of damages adopted by the district court is erroneous.
Evidence, however, that the injured vessel is sunk is not of itself sufficient to show that the loss was total, nor is it sufficient to justify the master and owner in abandoning the vessel or the cargo unless it appears that the circumstances were such that the vessel could not be raised and saved, or that the cost of raising and repairing her would exceed or equal her value after the repairs were made.
Justice as well as sound policy forbids that the owner of a vessel sunk by collision should be allowed to recover the full value of the vessel and cargo except in cases where the entire property is lost by the disaster, which is not true in a case where, by reasonable exertions, the vessel may be raised and the cargo saved by the use of such nautical skill as the owners of vessels usually employ in such emergencies. Owners of vessels seeking redress in such cases must be prepared to show not only that those in charge of the other vessel were in fault, but that no negligence on their part has increased or aggravated the injury. Damages are awarded in such cases for the injury done to the vessel and cargo by a wrongful act, but if the party suffering the injury to his property will not employ any reasonable measures to stop the progress of the damage, but willfully and obstinately, or through gross negligence, suffers the damage to augment, it is his own folly, and the law will not afford him any redress for such part of the damage as proceeded directly from his own culpable default.
III. Due exception was also taken to that part of the report of the commissioner in which he allowed to the libellants the sum of five hundred dollars for counsel fees, but the district court overruled the exception and confirmed the report.
Where the plaintiff or petitioner recovers less than five hundred dollars or the libellant, upon his own appeal, recovers less than three hundred dollars, he shall not be allowed, but, at the discretion of the court, may be adjudged to pay costs. Appeals from the decrees of the district court to the circuit court were allowed by that act, where the matter in dispute exceeded, exclusive of costs, the sum or value of three hundred dollars, and the final judgments rendered in the district courts might be reexamined in the circuit court on writ of error, where the matter in dispute exceeded, exclusive of costs, the sum or value of fifty dollars, and a similar provision is made for the reexamination by this Court of the final judgments and decrees of the circuit courts where the matter in dispute, exclusive of costs, exceeds the sum or value of two thousand dollars.
Even while it remained in force, it did not authorize such an allowance in a case like the present, as cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction in the district courts were expressly excepted from the operation of the provision. Ordinary costs in admiralty suits were doubtless taxed under that act as if it was in force long after it had expired, but it never furnished any authority to charge counsel fees in the district courts; but if it did, and if it had not expired, it would be repealed by the present law.
Fees and costs, allowed to the officers therein named, are now regulated by the Act of the 26th of February, 1853, which provides in its 1st section that in lieu of the compensation now allowed by law to attorneys, solicitors, proctors, district attorneys, clerks, marshals, witnesses, jurors, commissioners, and printers, the following and no other compensation shall be allowed.
"Attorneys, solicitors, and proctors may charge their clients reasonably for their services, in addition to the taxable costs, but nothing can be taxed as cost against the opposite party, as an incident to the judgment, for their services except the costs and fees therein described and enumerated. [Footnote 25] They may tax a docket fee of twenty dollars on a final hearing in admiralty, if the libellant recovers fifty dollars, but if he recovers less than fifty dollars, the docket fee of the proctor shall be but ten dollars. [Footnote 26] "
Reference is made to two cases where counsel fees were allowed, but it is a sufficient answer to those cases to say that they were decided before the act of Congress under consideration was passed. They do not, therefore, furnish the rule of decision in the case before the Court.
1 Stat. at Large 84; 2 id. 244.
9 Stat. at Large 635; The Niagara, 21 How. 26.
1 Parsons on Shipping 538; Maude & Pollock on Shipping, 411; The Ann Caroline, 2 Wall. 538; Tindall v. Bell, 11 Meeson & Welsby 232.
Williamson v. Barrett, 13 How. 110; The Gazelle, 2 W. Robinson 281; Sedgwick on Damages (4th ed) 541; MacLachlan on Shipping, 285.
The Clyde, Swabey 24; The Pactolus, ib., 174; The Catharine, 17 How. 170.
The Clyde, Swabey 23; 1 Parsons on Shipping 542; The Granite State, 3 Wall. 310; The Ann Caroline, 2 Wall. 538; The Rebecca, Bl. & H. 847; The New Jersey, Olcott 444.
Williamson v. Barrett, 13 How. 110; Sturgis v. Clough, 1 Wall. 272.
The Flying-Fish, B. & Lush. 443; S.C., 3 Moore Privy Council (N.S.) 86; The Lotus, Holt, R. 183; The Lena, ib., 213.
Miller v. Mariner's Church, 7 Me. 51; Loker v. Damon, 17 Pickering 284; Thompson v. Shattuck, 2 Metcalf 615; Sedgwick on Damages (4th ed) 105.
The Columbus, 3 W. Robinson 158; The Eugenie, 1 Lushington 139; Lowndes on Collision 148.
Hathaway v. Roach, 2 Woodbury & Minott 63; 2 Tidd's Practice 945, The Christina, 8 Jurist 321; Conklin's Treatise 426; Laws of the United States Courts 255.
1 Stat. at Large 93.
Crosby v. Folger, 1 Sumner 514; Brown v. Stearns, 13 Mass. 536.
Ibid., 276; Hathaway v. Roach, 2 Woodbury & Minott 68; Hovey v. Stevens, 3 id. 17.
Whipple v. Cotton, 3 Story 84.
1 Stat. at Large 332.
1 Stat. at Large 453.
10 Stat. at Large 161.
The Sloop Canton, 21 Law Reporter 473; The Liverpool Packet, 2 Sprague 37; The Conestoga, 2 Wall. Jr. 116.

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