Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/500/20/
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 20:38:19+00:00

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Justia › US Law › US Case Law › US Supreme Court › Volume 500 › Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.
Petitioner Gilmer was required by respondent, his employer, to register as a securities representative with, among others, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). His registration application contained, inter alia, an agreement to arbitrate when required to by NYSE rules. NYSE Rule 347 provides for arbitration of any controversy arising out of a registered representative's employment or termination of employment. Respondent terminated Gilmer's employment at age 62. Thereafter, he filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and brought suit in the District Court, alleging that he had been discharged in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA). Respondent moved to compel arbitration, relying on the agreement in Gilmer's registration application and the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). The court denied the motion, based on Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U. S. 36 -- which held that an employee's suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is not foreclosed by the prior submission of his claim to arbitration under the terms of a collective bargaining agreement -- and because it concluded that Congress intended to protect ADEA claimants from a waiver of the judicial forum. The Court of Appeals reversed.
Held: An ADEA claim can be subjected to compulsory arbitration. Pp. 500 U. S. 24-35.
(a) Statutory claims may be the subject of an arbitration agreement, enforceable pursuant to the FAA. See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U. S. 614. Since the FAA manifests a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration, Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U. S. 1, 460 U. S. 24, and since neither the text nor the legislative history of the ADEA explicitly precludes arbitration, Gilmer is bound by his agreement to arbitrate unless he can show an inherent conflict between arbitration and the ADEA's underlying purposes. Pp. 500 U. S. 24-26.
including antitrust and securities laws and the civil provisions of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), are designed to advance important public policies, but claims under them are appropriate for arbitration. Nor will arbitration undermine the EEOC's role in ADEA enforcement, since an ADEA claimant is free to file an EEOC charge even if he is precluded from instituting suit; since the EEOC has independent authority to investigate age discrimination; since the ADEA does not indicate that Congress intended that the EEOC be involved in all disputes; and since an administrative agency's mere involvement in a statute's enforcement is insufficient to preclude arbitration, see, e.g., Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U. S. 477. Moreover, compulsory arbitration does not improperly deprive claimants of the judicial forum provided for by the ADEA: Congress did not explicitly preclude arbitration or other nonjudicial claims resolutions; the ADEA's flexible approach to claims resolution, which permits the EEOC to pursue informal resolution methods, suggests that out-of-court dispute resolution is consistent with the statutory scheme; and arbitration is consistent with Congress' grant of concurrent jurisdiction over ADEA claims to state and federal courts, since arbitration also advances the objective of allowing claimants a broader right to select the dispute resolution forum. Pp. 500 U. S. 27-29.
ADEA's provision for the possibility of collective action does not mean that individual attempts at conciliation are barred; and since arbitration agreements do not preclude the EEOC itself from seeking class-wide and equitable relief. Pp. 500 U. S. 30-32.
(d) The unequal bargaining power between employers and employees is not a sufficient reason to hold that arbitration agreements are never enforceable in the employment context. Cf. e.g., Rodriguez de Quijas, supra, at 490 U. S. 484. Such a claim is best left for resolution in specific cases. Here, there is no indication that Gilmer, an experienced businessman, was coerced or defrauded into agreeing to the arbitration clause. P. 500 U. S. 32-33.
(e) Gilmer's reliance on Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U. S. 36, and its progeny, is also misplaced. Those cases involved the issue whether arbitration of contract-based claims precluded subsequent judicial resolution of statutory claims, not the enforceability of an agreement to arbitrate statutory claims. The arbitration in those cases occurred in the context of a collective bargaining agreement, and thus there was concern about the tension between collective representation and individual statutory rights that is not applicable in this case. And those cases were not decided under the FAA. Pp. 500 U. S. 33-35.
895 F.2d 195, (CA4 1990) affirmed.
WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., and BLACKMUN, O'CONNOR, SCALIA, KENNEDY, and SOUTER, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which MARSHALL, J., joined, post, p. 500 U. S. 36.
The question presented in this case is whether a claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 81 Stat. 602, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., can be subjected to compulsory arbitration pursuant to an arbitration agreement in a securities registration application. The Court of Appeals held that it could, 895 F.2d 195 (CA4 1990), and we affirm.
"[a]ny controversy between a registered representative and any member or member organization arising out of the employment or termination of employment of such registered representative."
App. to Brief for Respondent 1.
"nothing in the text, legislative history, or underlying purposes of the ADEA indicating a congressional intent to preclude enforcement of arbitration agreements."
"[b]y agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum."
Mitsubishi, supra, 473 U.S. at 473 U. S. 628.
"[h]aving made the bargain to arbitrate, the party should be held to it unless Congress itself has evinced an intention to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue."
Ibid. In this regard, we note that the burden is on Gilmer to show that Congress intended to preclude a waiver of a judicial forum for ADEA claims. See McMahon, 482 U.S. at 482 U. S. 227. If such an intention exists, it will be discoverable in the text of the ADEA, its legislative history, or an "inherent conflict" between arbitration and the ADEA's underlying purposes. See ibid. Throughout such an inquiry, it should be kept in mind that "questions of arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy regard for the federal policy favoring arbitration." Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 460 U. S. 24.
Gilmer concedes that nothing in the text of the ADEA or its legislative history explicitly precludes arbitration.
He argues, however, that compulsory arbitration of ADEA claims pursuant to arbitration agreements would be inconsistent with the statutory framework and purposes of the ADEA. Like the Court of Appeals, we disagree.
"to promote employment of older persons based on their ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment; [and] to help employers and workers find ways of meeting problems arising from the impact of age on employment."
"attempt to eliminate the discriminatory practice or practices alleged, and to effect voluntary compliance with the requirements of this chapter through informal methods of conciliation, conference, and persuasion."
§ 626(b); see also 29 CFR § 1626.15 (1990).
As Gilmer contends, the ADEA is designed not only to address individual grievances, but also to further important social policies. See, e.g., EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U. S. 226, 460 U. S. 231 (1983). We do not perceive any inherent inconsistency between those policies, however, and enforcing agreements to arbitrate age discrimination claims. It is true that arbitration focuses on specific disputes between the parties involved.
The same can be said, however, of judicial resolution of claims. Both of these dispute resolution mechanisms nevertheless also can further broader social purposes. The Sherman Act, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, RICO, and the Securities Act of 1933 all are designed to advance important public policies, but, as noted above, claims under those statutes are appropriate for arbitration.
"[S]o long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate [his or her] statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum, the statute will continue to serve both its remedial and deterrent function."
Mitsubishi, supra, 473 U.S. at 473 U. S. 637.
agency in the enforcement of a statute is not sufficient to preclude arbitration. For example, the Securities Exchange Commission is heavily involved in the enforcement of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Securities Act of 1933, but we have held that claims under both of those statutes may be subject to compulsory arbitration. See McMahon; Rodriguez de Quijas.
Gilmer also argues that compulsory arbitration is improper because it deprives claimants of the judicial forum provided for by the ADEA. Congress, however, did not explicitly preclude arbitration or other nonjudicial resolution of claims, even in its recent amendments to the ADEA.
"[I]f Congress intended the substantive protection afforded [by the ADEA] to include protection against waiver of the right to a judicial forum, that intention will be deducible from text or legislative history."
"like the provision for concurrent jurisdiction, serve to advance the objective of allowing [claimants] a broader right to select the forum for resolving disputes, whether it be judicial or otherwise."
Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 490 U. S. 483.
In arguing that arbitration is inconsistent with the ADEA, Gilmer also raises a host of challenges to the adequacy of arbitration procedures. Initially, we note that, in our recent arbitration cases, we have already rejected most of these arguments as insufficient to preclude arbitration of statutory claims. Such generalized attacks on arbitration "res[t] on suspicion of arbitration as a method of weakening the protections afforded in the substantive law to would-be complainants," and, as such, they are "far out of step with our current strong endorsement of the federal statutes favoring this method of resolving disputes." Rodriguez de Quijas, supra, at 490 U. S. 481. Consequently, we address these arguments only briefly.
"[w]e decline to indulge the presumption that the parties and arbitral body conducting a proceeding will be unable or unwilling to retain competent, conscientious and impartial arbitrators."
Mitsubishi, supra, 473 U.S. at 473 U. S. 634. In any event, we note that the NYSE arbitration rules, which are applicable to the dispute in this case, provide protections against biased panels. The rules require, for example, that the parties be informed of the employment histories of the arbitrators, and that they be allowed to make further inquiries into the arbitrators' backgrounds. See 2 CCH New York Stock Exchange Guide ¦ 2608, p. 4314 (Rule 608) (1991) (hereinafter 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide). In addition, each party is allowed one peremptory challenge and unlimited challenges for cause. Id. at ¦ 2609 (Rule 609). Moreover, the arbitrators are required to disclose "any circumstances which might preclude [them] from rendering an objective and impartial determination." Id. at ¦ 2610, p. 4315 (Rule 610). The FAA also protects against bias by providing that courts may overturn arbitration decisions "[w]here there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators." 9 U.S.C.
§ 10(b). There has been no showing in this case that those provisions are inadequate to guard against potential bias.
Gilmer also complains that the discovery allowed in arbitration is more limited than in the federal courts, which he contends will make it difficult to prove discrimination. It is unlikely, however, that age discrimination claims require more extensive discovery than other claims that we have found to be arbitrable, such as RICO and antitrust claims. Moreover, there has been no showing in this case that the NYSE discovery provisions, which allow for document production, information requests, depositions, and subpoenas, see 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide ¦ 2619, pp. 4318-4320 (Rule 619); Securities and Exchange Commission Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes By New York Stock Exchange, Inc., Nat. Assn. of Security Dealers, Inc., and the American Stock Exchange, Inc., Relating to the Arbitration Process and the Use of Predispute Arbitration Clauses, 54 Fed.Reg. 21144, 21149-21151 (1989), will prove insufficient to allow ADEA claimants such as Gilmer a fair opportunity to present their claims. Although those procedures might not be as extensive as in the federal courts, by agreeing to arbitrate, a party "trades the procedures and opportunity for review of the courtroom for the simplicity, informality, and expedition of arbitration." Mitsubishi, supra, at 473 U. S. 628. Indeed, an important counterweight to the reduced discovery in NYSE arbitration is that arbitrators are not bound by the rules of evidence. See 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide ¦ 2620, p. 4320 (Rule 620).
"even if the arbitration could not go forward as a class action or class relief could not be granted by the arbitrator, the fact that the [ADEA] provides for the possibility of bringing a collective action does not mean that individual attempts at conciliation were intended to be barred."
Nicholson v. CPC Int'l Inc., 877 F.2d 221, 241 (CA3 1989) (Becker, J., dissenting). Finally, it should be remembered that arbitration agreements will not preclude the EEOC from bringing actions seeking classwide and equitable relief.
his contention that there often will be unequal bargaining power between employers and employees. Mere inequality in bargaining power, however, is not a sufficient reason to hold that arbitration agreements are never enforceable in the employment context. Relationships between securities dealers and investors, for example, may involve unequal bargaining power, but we nevertheless held in Rodriguez de Quijas and McMahon that agreements to arbitrate in that context are enforceable. See 490 U.S. at 490 U. S. 484; 482 U.S. at 482 U. S. 230. As discussed above, the FAA's purpose was to place arbitration agreements on the same footing as other contracts. Thus, arbitration agreements are enforceable "save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 9 U.S.C. § 2.
"Of course, courts should remain attuned to well-supported claims that the agreement to arbitrate resulted from the sort of fraud or overwhelming economic power that would provide grounds 'for the revocation of any contract.'"
Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 473 U. S. 627. There is no indication in this case, however, that Gilmer, an experienced businessman, was coerced or defrauded into agreeing to the arbitration clause in his registration application. As with the claimed procedural inadequacies discussed above, this claim of unequal bargaining power is best left for resolution in specific cases.
In addition to the arguments discussed above, Gilmer vigorously asserts that our decision in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U. S. 36 (1974), and its progeny -- Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 450 U. S. 728 (1981), and McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U. S. 284 (1984) -- preclude arbitration of employment discrimination claims. Gilmer's reliance on these cases, however, is misplaced.
"In submitting his grievance to arbitration, an employee seeks to vindicate his contractual right under a collective bargaining agreement. By contrast, in filing a lawsuit under Title VII, an employee asserts independent statutory rights accorded by Congress. The distinctly separate nature of these contractual and statutory rights is not vitiated merely because both were violated as a result of the same factual occurrence."
"in instituting an action under Title VII, the employee is not seeking review of the arbitrator's decision. Rather, he is asserting a statutory right independent of the arbitration process."
Barrentine and McDonald similarly involved the issue whether arbitration under a collective bargaining agreement precluded a subsequent statutory claim. In holding that the statutory claims there were not precluded, we noted, as in Gardner-Denver, the difference between contractual rights under a collective bargaining agreement and individual statutory rights, the potential disparity in interests between a union and an employee, and the limited authority and power of labor arbitrators.
There are several important distinctions between the Gardner-Denver line of cases and the case before us. First, those cases did not involve the issue of the enforceability of an agreement to arbitrate statutory claims. Rather, they involved the quite different issue whether arbitration of contract-based claims precluded subsequent judicial resolution of statutory claims. Since the employees there had not agreed to arbitrate their statutory claims, and the labor arbitrators were not authorized to resolve such claims, the arbitration in those cases understandably was held not to preclude subsequent statutory actions. Second, because the arbitration in those cases occurred in the context of a collective bargaining agreement, the claimants there were represented by their unions in the arbitration proceedings. An important concern therefore was the tension between collective representation and individual statutory rights, a concern not applicable to the present case. Finally, those cases were not decided under the FAA, which, as discussed above, reflects a "liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements." Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 473 U. S. 625. Therefore, those cases provide no basis for refusing to enforce Gilmer's agreement to arbitrate his ADEA claim.
1. Compare the decision below with Nicholson v. CPC Int'l Inc., 877 F.2d 221 (CA3 1989).
9 U.S.C. § 1. Several amici curiae in support of Gilmer argue that that section excludes from the coverage of the FAA all "contracts of employment." Gilmer, however, did not raise the issue in the courts below, it was not addressed there, and it was not among the questions presented in the petition for certiorari. In any event, it would be inappropriate to address the scope of the § 1 exclusion, because the arbitration clause being enforced here is not contained in a contract of employment. The FAA requires that the arbitration clause being enforced be in writing. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 2, 3. The record before us does not show, and the parties do not contend, that Gilmer's employment agreement with Interstate contained a written arbitration clause. Rather, the arbitration clause at issue is in Gilmer's securities registration application, which is a contract with the securities exchanges, not with Interstate. The lower courts addressing the issue uniformly have concluded that the exclusionary clause in § 1 of the FAA is inapplicable to arbitration clauses contained in such registration applications. See, e.g., Dickstein v. DuPont, 443 F.2d 783 (CA1 1971); Malison v. Prudential Bache Securities, Inc., 654 F.Supp. 101, 104 (WDNC 1987); Legg, Mason & Co. v. Mackall & Coe, Inc., 351 F.Supp. 1367 (DC 1972); Tonetti v. Shirley, 219 Cal.Rptr. 616, 618, 173 Cal.App.3d 1144 (1985); see also Stokes v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 523 F.2d 433, 436 (CA6 1975). We implicitly assumed as much in Perry v. Thomas, 482 U. S. 483 (1987), where we held that the FAA required a former employee of a securities firm to arbitrate his statutory wage claim against his former employer, pursuant to an arbitration clause in his registration application. Unlike the dissent, see post at 500 U. S. 38-41, we choose to follow the plain language of the FAA and the weight of authority, and we therefore hold that § 1's exclusionary clause does not apply to Gilmer's arbitration agreement. Consequently, we leave for another day the issue raised by amici curiae.
In the recently enacted Older Workers Benefit Protection Act, Pub.L. 101-433, 104 Stat. 978, Congress amended the ADEA to provide that "[a]n individual may not waive any right or claim under this Act unless the waiver is knowing and voluntary." See § 201. Congress also specified certain conditions that must be met in order for a waiver to be knowing and voluntary. Ibid.
"although judicial scrutiny of arbitration awards necessarily is limited, such review is sufficient to ensure that arbitrators comply with the requirements of the statute"
at issue. Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U. S. 220, 482 U. S. 232 (1987).
The Court in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U. S. 36 (1974), also expressed the view that arbitration was inferior to the judicial process for resolving statutory claims. Id. at 415 U. S. 57-58. That "mistrust of the arbitral process," however, has been undermined by our recent arbitration decisions. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 482 U. S. 231-232.
"[W]e are well past the time when judicial suspicion of the desirability of arbitration and of the competence of arbitral tribunals inhibited the development of arbitration as an alternative means of dispute resolution."
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U. S. 614, 473 U. S. 626-627 (1985).
9 U.S.C. § 1. The Court today, in holding that the FAA compels enforcement of arbitration clauses even when claims of age discrimination are at issue, skirts the antecedent question of whether the coverage of the Act even extends to arbitration clauses contained in employment contracts, regardless of the subject matter of the claim at issue. In my opinion, arbitration clauses contained in employment agreements are specifically exempt from coverage of the FAA, and, for that reason, respondent Interstate/Johnson Lane Corporation cannot, pursuant to the FAA, compel petitioner to submit his claims arising under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., to binding arbitration.
Petitioner did not, as the majority correctly notes, ante at 500 U. S. 25, n. 2, raise the issue of the applicability of the FAA to employment contracts at any stage of the proceedings below. Nor did petitioner raise the coverage issue in his petition for writ of certiorari before this Court. It was amici who first raised the argument in their briefs in support of petitioner prior to oral argument of the case. See Brief for American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations as Amicus Curiae; Brief for American Association of Retired Persons as Amicus Curiae; Brief for Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law as Amicus Curiae 17-18.
question is so clearly antecedent to disposition of this case. On a number of occasions, this Court has considered issues waived by the parties below and in the petition for certiorari because the issues were so integral to decision of the case that they could be considered "fairly subsumed" by the actual questions presented. See, e.g., Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288, 489 U. S. 300 (1989) ("The question of retroactivity with regard to petitioner's fair cross-section claim has been raised only in an amicus brief. Nevertheless, that question is not foreign to the parties, who have addressed retroactivity with respect to petitioner's Batson claim. Moreover, our sua sponte consideration of retroactivity is far from novel" (citations omitted)); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79, 476 U. S. 84-85, n. 4 (1986) (notwithstanding petitioner's seemingly deliberate failure to raise the equal protection issue, "[w]e agree with the State that resolution of petitioner's claim properly turns on application of equal protection principles, and express no view on the merits of any of petitioner's Sixth Amendment arguments"); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643, 367 U. S. 646, n. 3 (1961) ("Although appellant chose to urge what may have appeared to be the surer ground for favorable disposition, and did not insist that Wolf [v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25 (1949)] be overruled, the amicus curiae, who was also permitted to participate in the oral argument, did urge the Court to overrule Wolf."). See also R. Stern, E. Gressman, & S. Shapiro, Supreme Court Practice § 6.26 (6th ed.1986) (describing rule concerning need for presenting questions below and in petition for certiorari, and deviations from rule).
"since respondent did not even mention [Wainwright v.] Sykes, [433 U.S. 72], or cause-and-prejudice in its brief or at oral argument, much less request the Court to adopt this standard."
Id. at 499 U. S. 522-523 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting).
In my opinion, the considerations in favor of reaching an issue not presented below or in the petition for certiorari are more compelling in this case than in the cited cases. Here the issue of the applicability of the FAA to employment contracts was adequately briefed and raised by the amici in support of petitioner. More important, however, is that respondent and its amici had full opportunity to brief and argue the same issue in opposition. See Brief for Respondent 42-50; Brief for Securities Industry Association, Inc. as Amicus Curiae 18-20; Brief for Equal Employment Advisory Council et al. as Amici Curiae 14-16. Moreover, the Court amply raised the issue with the parties at oral argument, at which both sides were on notice and fully prepared to argue the merits of the question. Finally, as in Arcadia, the issue whether the FAA even covers employment disputes is clearly "antecedent . . . and ultimately dispositive" of the question whether courts and respondent may rely on the FAA to compel petitioner to submit his ADEA claims to arbitration.
"it would be inappropriate to address the scope of the § 1 exclusion, because the arbitration clause being enforced here is not contained in a contract of employment. . . . Rather, the arbitration clause at issue is in Gilmer's securities registration application, which is a contract with the securities exchanges, not with Interstate."
opinion, the Court too narrowly construes the scope of the exclusion contained in § 1 of the FAA.
"is not intended [to] be an act referring to labor disputes, at all. It is purely an act to give the merchants the right or the privilege of sitting down and agreeing with each other as to what their damages are, if they want to do it. Now that is all there is in this."
"The trouble about the matter is that a great many of these contracts that are entered into are really not [voluntary] things at all. Take an insurance policy; there is a blank in it. You can take that or you can leave it. The agent has no power at all to decide it. Either you can make that contract or you can not make any contract. It is the same with a good many contracts of employment. A man says, 'These are our terms. All right, take it or leave it.' Well, there is nothing for the man to do except to sign it; and then be surrenders his right to have his case tried by the court, and has to have it tried before a tribunal in which he has no confidence at all."
Given that the FAA specifically was intended to exclude arbitration agreements between employees and employers, I see no reason to limit this exclusion from coverage to arbitration clauses contained in agreements entitled "Contract of Employment." In this case, the parties conceded at oral argument that Gilmer had no "contract of employment" as such with respondent. Gilmer was, however, required as a condition of his employment to become a registered representative of several stock exchanges, including the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). Just because his agreement to arbitrate any "dispute, claim or controversy" with his employer that arose out of the employment relationship was contained in his application for registration before the NYSE, rather than in a specific contract of employment with his employer, I do not think that Gilmer can be compelled pursuant to the FAA to arbitrate his employment-related dispute. Rather, in my opinion the exclusion in § 1 should be interpreted to cover any agreements by the employee to arbitrate disputes with the employer arising out of the employment relationship, particularly where such agreements to arbitrate are conditions of employment.
"rejection, though not explicit, of the availability of the Federal Arbitration Act to enforce arbitration clauses in collective bargaining agreements in the silent treatment given that Act by the Court's opinion. If an Act that authorizes the federal courts to enforce arbitration provisions in contracts generally, but specifically denies authority to decree that remedy for 'contracts of employment,' were available, the Court would hardly spin such power out of the empty darkness of § 301. I would make this rejection explicit, recognizing that, when Congress passed legislation to enable arbitration agreements to be enforced by the federal courts, it saw fit to exclude this remedy with respect to labor contracts."
Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 353 U. S. 466 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
"Plainly, it would not comport with the congressional objectives behind a statute seeking to enforce civil rights protected by Title VII to allow the very forces that had practiced discrimination to contract away the right to enforce civil rights in the courts. For federal courts to defer to arbitral decisions reached by the same combination of forces that had long perpetuated invidious discrimination would have made the foxes guardians of the chickens."
Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 450 U. S. 728, 450 U. S. 750 (1981) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). In my opinion, the same concerns expressed by Chief Justice Burger with regard to compulsory arbitration of Title VII claims may be said of claims arising under the ADEA. The Court's holding today clearly eviscerates the important role played by an independent judiciary in eradicating employment discrimination.
"has effectively rewritten the statute", [Footnote 2/1] and abandoned its earlier view that statutory claims were not appropriate subjects for arbitration. See Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U. S. 614, 473 U. S. 646-651 (1985) (STEVENS, J., dissenting). Although I remain persuaded that it erred in doing so, [Footnote 2/2] the Court has also put to one side any concern about the inequality of bargaining power between an entire industry, on the one hand, and an individual customer or employee, on the other. See ante at 500 U. S. 32-33. Until today, however, the Court has not read § 2 of the FAA as broadly encompassing disputes arising out of the employment relationship. I believe this additional extension of the FAA is erroneous. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
See Perry v. Thomas, 482 U. S. 483, 482 U. S. 493 (1987) (STEVENS, J., dissenting); id. at 482 U. S. 494 (O'CONNOR, J., dissenting); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U. S. 1, 465 U. S. 36 (1984) (O'CONNOR, J., dissenting) ("[T]oday's exercise in judicial revisionism goes too far").
See Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U. S. 220, 482 U. S. 252-253 (1987) (BLACKMUN, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 482 U. S. 268 (STEVENS, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U. S. 477, 490 U. S. 486 (1989) (STEVENS, J., dissenting).

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