Source: https://govlawweb.typepad.com/government_liability_upda/public_employment/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 00:46:31+00:00

Document:
In Yee v. Superior Court (Thrivent Financial for Lutherans), published January 8, 2019, the First District Court of Appeal, Division 2 issued a writ directing the trial court to grant a motion for judgment on the pleadings. The State Controller's Office initiated an audit of the real party insurance company's records. The insurance company and Controller's Office filed cross-litigation concerning the audit. The Controller filed a motion to compel production of records from the insurer sought under discovery. The court granted the motion, allegedly after the Controller's counsel assured the court that the the information obtained in discovery would not be used to conduct the audit. The Controller allegedly then used the records produced to pursue the audit. The litigation was eventually dismissed by order of an appellate court. The insurer then sued the Controller's office for abuse of process, alleging that Controller's Office employees used the discovery information to conduct the audit, in violation of court order and protective order.
The appellate court ruled that the lawsuit was barred by Government Code section 815. Section 815 bars nonstatutory causes of action against public entities. The central issue was whether the Controller's Office could be held vicariously liable under Government Code section 815.2, subdivision (a). Section 815.2 provides for public entity respondeat superior liability for the acts or omissions of employees, but only if the act or omission would have given rise to a cause of action against the employee. Under the facts of the case, no Controller's Office employee could be held liable for abuse of process. The abuse was using the records in the audit. Only the State Controller's Office, not its individual employees, had the power to perform the audit.
In City of San Diego v. Superior Court (Hoover), published December 19, 2018, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, Division 1 issued a writ vacating a trial court order disqualifying a city attorney's office from defending the city in an employment lawsuit. The real party in interest, a police detective, sued the city, her employer, alleging harassment and retaliation. While that suit was pending, the attorney representing her in that lawsuit filed another suit against the city for another client, alleging the city failed to properly investigate a sexual assault and then covered the suit up. An Internet news service referred to a police report that the service had obtained. Internal Affairs investigated to determine if and how the news service had obtained a confidential police report. IA interviewed the detective to see if she was the source of the leak. She was warned failure to answer could be treated as insubordination, punishable by termination. She admitted accessing the report. She was asked about her communications with her attorney. Her union representative objected based on attorney-client privilege. The detective started answering. The rep again objected and advised the officer not to answer. The investigators stopped asking about the communications. Later that day, one of the investigators contacted the detective and told her the city attorney's office had concluded the privilege did not preclude questions about the detective's communications with her attorney as they related to the leaked police report. She was ordered to return for a follow-up interview in eight days. The attorney learned of the interviews, and threatened to move to disqualify the city attorney if the city asked the detective about their communications. At the follow-up interview, the detective had an attorney provided by the police officers' association, and an attorney from the city attorney's office was present. The detective said she learned of the second lawsuit from her attorney's group text message, and then called him on the teslphone about a different issue. She admitted printing out the police report regarding the second case out of curiosity, and stated she then shredded it. The investigators pressed the detective for details of what information the detective's attorney provided during their phone conversation. The deputy city attorney asked whether the second case's allegations were encompassed in the detective's case. After the interview, the trial court granted the motion to disqualify the city attorney in the detective's harassment and retaliation action, on the grounds that the IA interview violated the attorney-client privilege and Rule 2-100 of the Professional Rules of Conduct, barring a lawyer from contacting a litigant known to be represented by counsel.
The appellate court agreed with the trial court that forcing the detective to divulge the contents of her conversation with her attorney violated the attorney-client privilege. While the contents of the group text were not confidential communications and were not privileged, the detective's subsequent phone conversation with her attorney was protected. The city erred by failing to apply ex parte to the court in the detective's lawsuit for a determination of whether the communications were protected by attorney-client privilege before resuming the interview and forcing the detective to speak about the attorney-client communications. The appellate court also agreed that the Rules of Professional Conduct precluded the deputy city attorney from directly questioning the detective during the interview about matters concerning her lawsuit, without her attorney present and without that attorney's consent. The deputy should have confined his participation in the meeting to advising the investigators. But the appellate court, after reviewing the sealed transcript of the interview, concluded there was no reasonable likelihood that the misconduct would give the city an unfair advantage in the detective's suit. Since attorney disqualification must be prophylactic rather than punitive, and disqualifying an entire city attorney's office should be done with caution, the disqualification order was reversed.
In Bacilio v. City of Los Angeles, published October 25, 2018, the Second District Court of Appeal, Division 2 affirmed a trial court decision on an administrative mandamus petition. In August 2011, a witness accused two police officers of misconduct that could give rise to both criminal and administrative liability. Internal Affairs investigated the matter, and in June 2013 the investigator presented his findings to the District Attorney's office. In August 2013, a deputy DA interviewed the complaining witness, and afterward commented that she was not going to file against the officers and that it was okay to administratively interview the officers. In October 2013, the DA's office sent Internal Affairs a charge worksheet officially declining to file charges against the officers. In September 2014, the LAPD notified the petitioner officer that Internal Affairs was seeking an official reprimand against him, and in November 2014 it brought administrative charges against him. One of the charges against him was sustained, upheld in an administrative hearing, and upheld by the trial court. The officer contended that the charge was time-barred because the department did not notify him of the potential discipline within the one-year limitations period of Government Code section 3304, subdivision (d)(2)(A), part of the Peace Officer's Bill of Rights.
The appellate court ruled that the notice was timely. Section 3304 tolls the one-year period during the time that a criminal investigation or prosecution is pending against any officer involved in the matter. The court interpreted this tolling period to run until there is a final determination whether to prosecute. The court affirmed, as supported by substantial evidence, the trial court's determination that there was no final determination until the DA provided the worksheet, despite the DDA's earlier statement that charges would not be filed.
In Barone v. City of Springfield, published September 5, 2018, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part a defense summary judgment in this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 lawsuit. A police department community service officer served as community liaison to the city's minority communities. Members of the Latino community complained to her of racial profiling. The officer became the subject of internal affairs investigations. After the investigations began, the officer spoke at a community event, in uniform. The department paid her to be present, and her presence on behalf of the police department was advertised. At the event, she answered a question from the audience about increasing racial profiling complaints by stating she had heard such complaints. A week later, the police chief placed her on administrative leave for alleged untruthfulness in the two internal affairs investigations. The department eventually informed her she had to sign a "last chance agreement" to keep her job. The agreement barred her from saying or writing anything negative about the city, the department, or the department's officers. It permitted her to report complaints involving discrimination or profiling by the department. She refused to sign the agreement, and was terminated. She sued the department for First Amendment retaliation and imposing an unlawful prior restraint.
The 9th Circuit agreed with the district court that the defendants were entitled to summary judgment on the First Amendment retaliation claim. Under the facts, the plaintiff spoke in her capacity as a public employee when she spoke at the community event. Her speech was therefore not protected by the First Amendment. The 9th Circuit reversed the district court's conclusion that the last chance agreement was not an unlawful prior restraint. Applying the Pickering standards for limitations on public employee speech, a restriction on criticizing the city, the department, or the department's officers was overbroad, since it covered both speech as an employee and speech as a private citizen. The speech involved a subject of public interest. The burden shifted to the defendants to justify the restriction. The department's interests in protecting the department from disrepute and preventing employee misconduct did not justify the broad restrictions.
In Estill v. County of Shasta, published July 31, 2018, the Third District Court of Appeal reversed an order granting new trial after the trial court granted the defendant county summary judgment. The plaintiff, a jail employee, was the subject of an internal affairs investigation in 2009. In September 2009, the sheriff's office served the plaintiff with a notice of charges in support of proposed termination. She was then mistakenly denied entry into the jail based on the belief she had been fired. She realized jail staff had improperly received information about her, and complained. Throughout 2009, she received information that others were inappropriately discussing her investigation. She heard rumors about the parentage of her son. She was terminated effective January 2010, and her administrative appeal denied in September 2010. During the first half of 2010, she heard more comments about her son and heard that people unconnected to the investigation were talking about her case. In February 2012, she presented the county with a claim for damages. The claim alleged that information about the investigation had been leaked, that gossip and rumors had been spread, that a hostile environment was created, and that the plaintiff was harassed. The claim alleged that the incident occurred in September 2009, but that the plaintiff "first became aware" of the incident in September 2011. The County responded with a denial on the merits under Government Code section 913. It did not send a Government Code section 911.3 notice that the claim was untimely. The plaintiff sued under various causes of action that required a claim. During her deposition, the defendants learned that she was aware of the alleged wrongdoing as early as 2009. It moved for summary judgment. The trial court initially granted summary judgment because the plaintiff failed to present a timely claim. It then granted new trial, concluding triable issues of fact existed on whether the defendants had waived the claim-timeliness defense under section 911.3 by not sending a notice the claim was untimely.
The appellate court concluded that the undisputed facts established that the claim was untimely, and that the plaintiff was equitably estopped from arguing that the defendants waived the claim's untimeliness. Under the delayed-discovery doctrine, the plaintiff's cause of action accrued when she became aware that information from her IA investigation was leaked and being discussed by people at the sheriff's department and other agencies, she had a strong suspicion about the source of the leak, and she was aware people were making allegedly defamatory statements about her and her son. It was undisputed that she learned of these facts and her cause of action accrued no later than July 2010. Ignorance of the identifies of the alleged wrongdoers did not affect accrual, because the defendant's identity is not an element of her cause of action. She had suspicion that someone had done something wrong to her. Because her claim was untimely, she could not maintain a claim for damages against the defendants unless she was exempt or excused from complying with the claim requirements. The plaintiff's argument that the defendants waived the late-claim defense because the section 911.3 notice was not sent failed, because she was equitably estopped from making that argument. She represented that she did not become aware of the alleged wrongdoing until September 2011, and omitted from the claim the facts showing she became aware earlier. The county was not aware of the true facts concerning her knowledge, and relied on her representation in not sending an untimely-claim notice. Where, as here, the facts are undisputed, estoppel is a question of law. Just as a public entity may be estopped from asserting noncompliance with the Government Claims Act when its agents prevented or deterred a claimant from complying, a claimant may be estopped from invoking the section 911.3 waiver provision where the entity's failure to notify the claimant the claim is untimely is induced by the claimant's representation on the form. The county did not forfeit the estoppel argument by failing to plead estoppel in its answer as an affirmative defense. A party is excused from pleading estoppel where the party is unaware at the time it prepares the pleading that the defense may rest on estoppel. The plaintiff's argument that the county misled her by not giving her notice of late-claim relief procedures fails because even if it had given notice, she would not have been able to pursue those procedures: more than a year had passed since accrual.
In Krolikowski v. San Diego City Employees' Retirement System, published June 14, 2018, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, Division 1 affirmed judgment after a bench trial in favor of the defendant retirement system. Decades after the plaintiffs, retired city employees, began drawing pensions, SDCERS determined that it had calculated the pensions incorrectly, and was overpaying the plaintiffs. SDCERS informed the plaintiffs they would have to pay back the excess amounts, and that their payments henceforth would be reduced to the correct amounts. Both plaintiffs pursue administrative appeals. The plaintiffs sued SDCERS for conversion, breach of fiduciary duty, declaratory relief, and writs of ordinary mandamus (Code of Civil Procedure section 1085). The trial court sustained demurrers on the tort causes of action, and then ruled for SDCERS on the remaining causes of action.
The appellate court affirmed the judgment on the tort causes of action on the ground of statutory immunity. The decisions to recover the overages were policy-level exercises of discretion that were protected by the discretionary immunity, Government Code section 820.2. SDCERS was therefore entitled to the immunity under Government Code section 815.2, subdivision (b) (vicarious liability of public entity subject to any immunity that protects the employees for whose acts or omissions the entity is liable). The court rejected the argument that the torts were not subject to immunity because they were based on provisions of the state constitution. Since the state constitution did not create the conversion or fiduciary duty causes of action the plaintiffs asserted, the claims were based on common law, and thus subject to the Government Code immunities. The court further held that the evidence in the case supported the trial court's ruling that no writ relief was appropriate, and that SDCERS was not equitably estopped from seeking the repayments.
In Newland v. County of Los Angeles, published June 18, 2018, the Second District Court of Appeal, Division 5 reversed denial of a defense motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict in an auto accident case. The driver was a county public defender who worked in the Norwalk courthouse, and commuted from Long Beach. He needed his personal vehicle for work from time to time, when trying cases in branch courts, meeting clients in jail, and inspecting crime scenes. On days when he needed his car, he brought it. When he did not, and public transit was available, he took it. On the day of the accident, he did not need his car for work. Convenient public transit was not available from his home in Long Beach. Driving from the courthouse home at the end of the day, he was involved in the subject accident. The jury found that the driver was driving in the scope of his duty, and awarded damages against the employer county.
The court reversed the finding that he was driving in the scope of his duties, because no evidence supported it. Generally an employee is not acting within the scope of his duties when driving his personal vehicle to and from work. The exceptions are where the employee is using his personal vehicle for work purposes, and where the employee's use of his personal vehicle provides his employer with a benefit. Here, while the driver occasionally used his personal vehicle for work purposes, he did not have to do so that day. He did not have any emergency situations that required him to have a vehicle available. There was no evidence that he was required to drive to and from work on the day of the accident for work purposes. Driving to and from work was not driving within the scope of his employment.
The court split on whether the case should be remanded to determine whether the driver's use of his vehicle benefited the county. The majority ruled no remand was necessary. There was no evidence that the county received a benefit from the driver's use of his car to drive to and from work on a day when he did not need his vehicle available for work purposes. A dissenting justice opined that the benefit issue should go to the jury.
In Pike v. Hester, published June 6, 2018, a divided panel of the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff in a 42 U.S.C. section 1983 lawsuit arising out of a dog search of the plaintiff's office. The plaintiff, a county employee and football coach, had an acrimonious relationship with the defendant, a sheriff's sergeant. The defendant allegedly received information that there was drug activity at the city recreation center where the plaintiff had an office. The defendant pulled over the county director of public works--the plaintiff's boss--and asked the director if he would care if the defendant searched the center. The director testified he responded that if the defendant needed to search the center, he should call the director and the director would let him in. The defendant testified that the director gave him unconditional permission to enter the center. The defendant, off-duty and in civilian clothes, then led a night-time search of the center. As part of the search, the defendant unlocked the door to the plaintiff's office, entered with a k-9 officer and the officer's dog, and conducted a dog-sniff search of the office. After further acrimony between the parties, the plaintiff sought a temporary restraining order in a Nevada justice court. After a one-day trial, the court issued the TRO. The court found that the defendant did not have lawful authority to search the plaintiff's office, and that it could not conclude on the record before it that the defendant had probable cause for the search. The court stated it could not conclude the search was lawful under the Fourth Amendment. The plaintiff then sued the defendant in federal court. The district court granted the plaintiff summary judgment against the defendant. The district court ruled that the TRO hearing's result had issue preclusive effect as to the lack of authority for the search, but not on violation of the Fourth Amendment. The district court nevertheless ruled that the search violated the Fourth Amendment, and that the defendant was not entitled to qualified immunity.
The 9th Circuit majority affirmed, but on a different ground: It concluded that the TRO ruling did have issue preclusive effect. By ruling that the search was conducted without a warrant and without lawful authority, the justice court necessarily ruled that the search violated the Fourth Amendment. The issue-preclusion standards under Nevada law were met. The majority further ruled that the defendant was not entitled to qualified immunity. At the time of the search, it was clearly established that government employees enjoyed a reasonable expectation of privacy in their offices, and that dog-sniff searches were subject to Fourth Amendment protection.
One judge dissented. He opined that the decision should not have issue-preclusive effect, because the justice court hearing was conducted informally, the parties did not have the same incentive to litigate as in a suit for damages, the plaintiff expressly declined to argue the Fourth Amendment was violated in the hearing, and the plaintiff did not argue issue preclusion in the federal action. Further, the Fourth Amendment issue turned on a disputed issue of fact: The scope of permission the plaintiff's boss gave the defendant.

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