Source: https://connecticut.lexroll.com/abbott-terrace-health-center-inc-v-parawich-120-conn-app-78-2010/
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 05:59:42+00:00

Document:
Gruendel, Beach and Dupont, Js.
The plaintiff nursing home sought to recover damages from the defendant H and his aunt, the defendant P, alleging claims for, inter alia, breach of contract, promissory estoppel and fraudulent conveyance in connection with P’s failure to pay for care and services she received at the plaintiff nursing home. After the action was commenced, the defendants were defaulted for failure to appear. Following a hearing in damages, the trial court rendered judgment against P only and stated that it did not find H liable. On the plaintiff’s appeal to this court, held that the trial court improperly rendered judgment in favor of H and failed to find him liable in light of the entry of default against him; H’s liability was conclusively established at the time he was defaulted and the only issue before the trial court was the determination of damages, and because the allegations in the counts against H for promissory estoppel and fraudulent conveyance were sufficient to sustain those causes of action, the trial court improperly refused to impose liability and to award the plaintiff damages on those counts, thus necessitating that a new hearing in damages be held.
Action to recover damages for, inter alia, breach of contract, and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Waterbury, where the defendants were defaulted for failure to appear; thereafter, the court, Agati, J., granted in part the plaintiff’s motion for judgment and rendered judgment for the plaintiff as against the defendant Anna Parawich; subsequently, the court denied the plaintiff’s motion to reargue, and the plaintiff appealed to this court. Reversed in part; further proceedings.
Kari L. Olson, with whom, on the brief, was Kevin T. Hansted, for the appellant (plaintiff).
The plaintiff, Abbott Terrace Health Center, Inc., appeals from the judgment of the trial court in favor of the defendant William Hulstrunk, also known as William Hulstruck. The plaintiff maintains that the court, following the entry of default against the defendant, improperly declined to impose liability thereon. We reverse in part the judgment of the trial court.
her for the costs of the care and services provided, and she transferred the moneys on December 13, 2007, knowing that she would incur debt for the costs of care and services provided by the plaintiff and would be billed accordingly. That transfer of Parawich’s assets rendered her unable to meet her financial obligations to the plaintiff. Further, Parawich conveyed those assets without adequate consideration and with the intent to avoid paying for her health care costs. In so doing, Parawich transferred her assets with actual intent to hinder, to delay and to defraud creditors. As her attorney in fact and the recipient of those assets, the defendant acted as a transferee, participant in and beneficiary of Parawich’s fraudulent transfer, causing damages to the plaintiff.
On December 14, 2007, Parawich was admitted to the plaintiff home as a private, self-pay resident to receive twenty-four hour skilled nursing care and services. At all times during her stay, the plaintiff rendered skilled nursing care and services to Parawich. At the same time, the plaintiff did not receive full payment for the costs associated with those services. The principal amount due and owing to the plaintiff for services rendered to Parawich totaled $75,151.77. Despite demand by the plaintiff, Parawich failed to pay for the services provided to her by the plaintiff.
connection with any collection action on Parawich’s account. Parawich breached that agreement, causing damage to the plaintiff.
At the time the agreement was entered into, the defendant, as Parawich’s attorney in fact, represented to the plaintiff that he would comply with the terms of the agreement, including using Parawich’s assets and income to pay the plaintiff and promptly applying for and cooperating with the department of social services (department) to establish Parawich’s medicaid eligibility when her assets neared exhaustion. The defendant made those promises to the plaintiff with the expectation that the plaintiff would rely on them. Relying on the defendant’s promises, the plaintiff rendered care and services to Parawich.
The defendant thereafter failed to respond to the department’s requests for the information required to establish Parawich’s medicaid eligibility. He further failed to use Parawich’s assets and income to pay the plaintiff for the care and services it rendered to Parawich. As a result of the plaintiff’s reliance on the defendant’s promises, the plaintiff rendered care and services to Parawich, the costs for which it was not paid. The plaintiff thus was damaged by its reliance on the defendant’s promises.
The plaintiff commenced the present action against the defendant and Parawich on October 24, 2008. Its complaint, the gist of which we already have recounted, consisted of five counts. Count one alleged breach of contract against Parawich. Count two alleged promissory estoppel against the defendant. The third count, alleging fraudulent conveyance, pertained to both the defendant and Parawich. The fourth and fifth counts, alleging quantum meruit and unjust enrichment, respectively, were directed at Parawich.
Neither the defendant nor Parawich filed an appearance or responded in any manner to the plaintiff’s complaint. Accordingly, the plaintiff on November 24, 2008, filed a motion for default for failure to appear, which was granted on December 9, 2008. The plaintiff then filed a “motion for judgment based upon default,” to which it attached an affidavit of debt and bill of costs. A certificate of closed pleadings was filed on January 12, 2009, at which time the plaintiff claimed the matter for a hearing in damages. At no time did the defendant respond to the plaintiff’s action, never mind file a motion to set aside the default; see Practice Book § 17-42; or provide written notice of a defense to liability. See Practice Book §§ 17-34, 17-35 and 17-37.
to Parawich was $102,815. The plaintiff further filed a military affidavit stating that neither the defendant nor Parawich currently were on active military duty. Finally, the plaintiff filed an affidavit of attorney’s fees and costs, in which attorney Kevin T. Hansted attested to a total of $7523 in attorney’s fees and $936.55 in costs arising from the present litigation.
motion for judgment, which was denied.” From that judgment, the plaintiff appeals.
On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly found the defendant not liable in light of the entry of default in its favor. At the outset, we note that this claim involves the interpretation and application of our rules of practice, which “presents a question of law over which this court’s review is plenary.” State v. One or More Persons over Whom the Court’s Jurisdiction Has Not Yet Been Invoked, 107 Conn. App. 760, 764, 946 A.2d 896, cert. denied, 289 Conn. 912, 957 A.2d 880 (2008). On our plenary review, we agree with the plaintiff that the court improperly rendered judgment in favor of the defendant.
84 Conn. App. 175, 178, 852 A.2d 847, cert. denied, 271 Conn. 942, 861 A.2d 515 (2004). Accordingly, “the entry of default against the defendant commands the rendering of judgment in favor of the plaintiff.” Peterson v. Woldeyohannes, 111 Conn. App. 784, 791, 961 A.2d 475 (2008). Following the entry of a default, all that remains is for the plaintiff to prove the amount of damages to which it is entitled. DeBlasio v. Aetna Life Casualty Co., supra, 186 Conn. 401. At a minimum, the plaintiff in such instances is entitled to nominal damages. See id. Cardona v. Valentin, 160 Conn. 18, 26, 273 A.2d 697 (1970).
As a consequence of the default, the defendant was bound by the material factual allegations set forth in the plaintiff’s complaint Whitaker v. Taylor, 99 Conn. App. 719, 727, 916 A.2d 834 (2007). We thus must examine those allegations to ascertain whether, as the plaintiff argues, they are sufficient on their face to establish a valid claim for the relief requested. Id.; see also Richey v. Main Street Stafford, LLC, supra, 110 Conn. App. 220. As the interpretation of pleadings is always a question of law for the court; Grimes v Housing Authority, 242 Conn. 236, 249, 698 A.2d 302 (1997); our review is plenary.
The plaintiff’s complaint contains two causes of action directed toward the defendant: promissory estoppel and fraudulent conveyance. We examine each in turn.
believe that certain facts exist and to act on that belief; and the other party must change its position in reliance on those facts, thereby incurring some injury.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)Chotkowski v. State, 240 Conn. 246, 268, 690 A.2d 368 (1997); Torringford Farms Assn., Inc. v. Torrington, 75 Conn. App. 570, 576 n. 8, 816 A.2d 736, cert. denied, 263 Conn. 924, 823 A.2d 1217 (2003). Paragraphs twelve through eighteen of the second count allege as follows. At the time the agreement was entered into, “[the defendant] represented to [the plaintiff] that he would comply with the terms of the agreement, including using Parawich’s assets and income to pay [the plaintiff] and promptly applying for and cooperating with [the department] to establish [Parawich’s] [m]edicaid eligibility when her assets neared exhaustion. [The defendant] made those promises to [the plaintiff] with the expectation that [the plaintiff] would rely on them. Relying on [the defendant’s] promises, [the plaintiff] rendered care and services to Parawich. [The defendant thereafter] failed to promptly respond to [the department’s] requests for the information required to establish Parawich’s [m]edicaid eligibility. [The defendant] failed to use Parawich’s assets and income to pay [the plaintiff] for the care and services it rendered to Parawich. As a result of [the plaintiff’s] reliance on [the defendant’s] promises, [the plaintiff] rendered care and services to Parawich, the costs for which it has not been paid. [The plaintiff] has been damaged by its reliance on [the defendant’s] promises.” We conclude that those allegations satisfy the threshold legal test to sustain a cause of action for promissory estoppel against the defendant. The court improperly refused to impose liability and to award the plaintiff damages on that count.
the court improperly refused to impose liability and to award the plaintiff damages on that count as well.
In light of the foregoing, the court’s judgment in favor of the defendant is untenable. A default entered on December 9, 2008, after which the plaintiff claimed the matter for a hearing in damages on January 12, 2009. The material allegations of the plaintiff’s complaint set forth two valid claims for the relief requested. As such, the defendant’s liability to the plaintiff conclusively was established at that time, and the only issue before the court was the determination of damages. See Bank of New York v National Funding, 97 Conn. App. 133, 138, 902 A.2d 1073, cert. denied, 280 Conn. 925, 908 A.2d 1087 (2006), cert. denied sub nom Reyad v. Bank of New York, 549 U.S. 1265, 127 S. Ct. 1493, 167 L. Ed. 2d 229 (2007). We therefore conclude that the court improperly rendered judgment in favor of the defendant.
84 Conn. App. 178-79. The sole issue before the court is the proper determination of damages. Whitaker v. Taylor, supra, 99 Conn. App. 726. The plaintiff shall be permitted to present any relevant evidence at that hearing, including the exhibits introduced at the prejudgment remedy hearing.
The judgment is reversed only as to Hulstrunk and the case is remanded for a hearing in damages as to him only consistent with this opinion. The judgment is affirmed in all other respects.
 Also named as a defendant was Hulstrunk’s aunt, Anna Parawich. She died subsequent to the conclusion of proceedings before the trial court but before oral argument transpired in this court. By order dated November 18, 2009, this court stated that it had received notice that Parawich had died on August 1, 2009, but had not received notice of the substitution of a proper personal representative of her estate pursuant to General Statutes § 52-599. Consistent with General Statutes §§ 52-599 and 52-600, we ordered that oral argument proceed on December 8, 2009, without prejudice to the filing with this court of a motion to substitute the personal representative of the estate of Parawich on or before January 8, 2010. No such motion followed.
The present appeal concerns only the court’s judgment in favor of Hulstrunk. We therefore refer in this opinion to Hulstrunk as the defendant and to Parawich by name.
 The defendant has not filed an appearance or appellate brief in this appeal. Furthermore, he did not appear for oral argument thereon.
 The record does not indicate whether the court referred the matter to the state’s attorney for possible criminal investigation.

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