Source: https://www.animallaw.info/case/us-v-vance-crooked-arm
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 16:37:58+00:00

Document:
Full Case Name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Douglas VANCE CROOKED ARM, Defendant–Appellant. United States of America, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Kenneth G. Shane, Defendant–Appellant.
Country of Origin: United States Court Name: United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. Primary Citation: 788 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir. 2015) Date of Decision: Monday, June 8, 2015 Judge Name: PER CURIAM Jurisdiction Level: Federal Alternate Citation: 2015 WL 3542707 (9th Cir. 2015) Judges: JOHN T. NOONAN MICHAEL DALY HAWKINS RONALD M. GOULD Attorneys: Brian M. Murphy (argued) and Mark D. Parker, Parker, Heitz & Cosgrove, PLLC, Billings, MT, for Defendant–Appellant Douglas Vance Crooked Arm. Sherry S. Matteucci, Matteucci Law Firm, PLLC, Billings, MT, for Defendant–Appellant Kenneth G. Shane. Leif Johnson (argued), Assistant United States Attorney, Billings, MT, for Plaintiff–Appellee. Docket Num: Nos. 13–30297, 13–30316.
Summary: A grand jury indicted Defendants on multiple counts of, among other things, knowingly and willfully conspiring to kill, transport, offer for sale, and sell migratory birds, including bald and golden eagles, in violation of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA) (Count I) and unlawfully trafficking in migratory bird parts (Count II – IV). On appeal, as at the district court, Defendants argued that the counts to which they pled guilty were improperly charged as felonies because it was only a misdemeanor under the MBTA to sell migratory bird feathers. The court concluded first, that even under Defendants' interpretation of the MBTA, Count I charged a felony; and, second, that in regard to Count II, the allegations stated a misdemeanor only, not a felony. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, as to Count I, but reversed in part as to Count II. The court also vacated the sentence on both Counts, vacated the felony conviction on Count II, and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. On remand, the Defendants were given the option to withdraw their guilty pleas with regard to Count II, or the district court might consider whether to resentence their convictions on that count as misdemeanors.
*1 Following conviction and sentencing upon Defendants–Appellants Douglas “Vance” Crooked Arm's and Kenneth Shane's (collectively Defendants) conditional guilty pleas in this case, Defendants appeal the district court's denial of their pretrial Motion to Dismiss Indictment for Failure to State a Felony Claim. We consider the Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918 (MBTA). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm in part, reverse in part, vacate Defendants' sentences, and remand.
A grand jury indicted Defendants on multiple counts of, among other things, knowingly and willfully conspiring to kill, transport, offer for sale, and sell migratory birds, including bald and golden eagles, in violation of the MBTA, 16 U.S.C. §§ 703(a) and707(b) (Count I) and unlawfully trafficking in migratory bird parts, in violation of 16 U.S.C. §§ 703(a), 707(b) (Counts II–IV). Defendants admitted selling a fan made of eagle feathers to undercover agents of the United States Fish & Wildlife Service (FWS) and, after the district court denied Defendants' motion to dismiss the indictment, entered a conditional guilty plea on Counts I and II.
Seeing two golden eagles flying overhead during a November 2008 meeting with Shane near Garryowen, Montana, one of the undercover agents said to his partner: “There's your tail, Liz.” Shane asked whether the agents were “looking for tails,” and the female agent said she needed an eagle feather fan for her dress. Shane told her that Crooked Arm “has got some made, beaded and everything. He likes to hunt.”Shane said that Crooked Arm caught hawks and eagles by baiting them with deer and elk carcasses.
*2 After Crooked Arm left, Shane told the agents that he and Crooked Arm wanted $1,500 for the golden eagle fan and $800 for the magpie fan. The agents bought the eagle fan, paying Shane $1,500 in cash, and placed an order for a magpie fan. The agents later saw Shane give Crooked Arm a part of the $1,500 the agents paid for the eagle fan.
*3 On April 16, 2013, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the indictment for failure to state a felony claim. Defendants argued, in essence, that the indictment alleged facts sufficient to support a misdemeanor charge of trafficking in migratory bird parts in violation of 16 U.S.C. § 707(a), but that were insufficient to support a felony charge of trafficking in migratory birds in violation of16 U.S.C. § 707(b).
1We review de novo a district court's decision “whether to dismiss a charge in an indictment based on its interpretation of a federal statute.”United States v. Olander, 572 F.3d 764, 766 (9th Cir.2009). Similarly, we review de novo questions of statutory interpretation. See United States v. Thompson, 728 F.3d 1011, 1015 (9th Cir.2013). We normally give deference “to an executive department's construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer” when the statute is ambiguous.Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984).
We begin with an overview of the MBTA. Congress passed the MBTA in 1918 to protect migratory birds, “or any part, nest, or egg of any such bird,” included in the terms of a 1916 treaty between the United States and Great Britain, which was acting on behalf of Canada. See MBTA, ch. 128, § 2, 40 Stat. 755, 755 (1918), now codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 703–712.3The treaty stated that migratory birds in North America were “in danger of extermination through lack of adequate protection,” and called for “insuring the preservation of such migratory birds” by saving them from “indiscriminate slaughter.” Convention for the Protection of Migratory Birds, U.S.-Gr. Brit., Aug. 16, 1916, 39 Stat. 1702, 1702. And it banned the sale, or attempted sale, of “migratory nongame birds” or their eggs without exception. Id. arts. II, VII.
16 U.S.C. § 703(a) (emphasis added). FWS, which administers the MBTA, defines “migratory bird[s]” to include bald eagles, golden eagles, magpies, and many species of hawk. See50 C.F.R. § 10.13. FWS regulations also state that a “[m]igratory bird” for MBTA purposes means any species listed in § 10.13, “including any part, nest, or egg of any such bird, or any product” consisting “in whole or part, of any such bird or any part, nest, or egg thereof.”Id.§ 10.12.
The punishment scheme for violations of the MBTA has changed over time. Originally, all violations were misdemeanors. SeeMBTA, ch. 128, § 6, 40 Stat. 755, 756 (1918). In 1960, however, Congress amended the MBTA to make it a felony (1) to “take by any manner whatsoever any migratory bird with intent to sell, offer to sell, barter or offer to barter such bird,” or (2) to “sell, offer for sale, barter or offer to barter, any migratory bird.”Act of Sept. 8, 1960, Pub.L. No. 86–732, 74 Stat. 866, 866. Congress again amended the MBTA in 1986, this time to add a scienter requirement to the felony provision of § 707. See Emergency Wetlands Resources Act of 1986 § 501, Pub.L. No. 99–645, 100 Stat. 3582, 3590.
Count I formally charges Defendants with a conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 371,4 which makes it a crime for “two or more persons” to, among other things, conspire to “commit any offense against the United States ... and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy.”18 U.S.C. § 371. Section 371 generally felonizes conspiratorial conduct committed under that provision. However, § 371 further states that if the offense, “the commission of which is the object of the conspiracy, is a misdemeanor only, the punishment for such conspiracy shall not exceed the maximum punishment provided for such misdemeanor.”Id .
Second, the fact of conviction for two felonies, rather than one felony and one misdemeanor, has collateral consequences for Defendants. If either is convicted of any other federal offense in the future, his advisory sentencing guidelines range would be affected by criminal history, and that is affected by whether he pled guilty to one felony or two. In general, the greater the criminal history category in which one fits, the greater will be the applicable advisory guidelines sentencing range. We have said: “In this day of federal sentencing guidelines based on prior criminal histories [and] federal career criminal statutes” the presumption that “collateral consequences” flow from a criminal conviction is irrebuttable. Chacon v. Wood, 36 F.3d 1459, 1463 (9th Cir.1994)overruled on other grounds by statute,28 U.S.C. § 2253(c).
*6 Having determined that Count I charged a felony, we still must address whether Count II charged a felony. That question is not moot and will affect both whether Defendants are entitled to a resentencing as a result of our appellate decision and whether their criminal histories thereafter will reflect one or two felonies arising from the offenses to which they pled guilty in this case.
Turning to the remainder of the indictment, it is undisputed that Counts II through IV charge criminal conduct. SeeAndrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 60, 100 S.Ct. 318, 62 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979) (“[16 U.S.C. § 703] is naturally read as forbidding transactions in all bird parts, including those that compose pre-existing artifacts.”). As with Count I, the question is whether the charged conduct amounts to a misdemeanor under § 707(a) or a felony under § 707(b). This turns on whether the sale of a fan made of migratory bird feathers constitutes the sale of a “migratory bird.” We conclude that it does not.
As with all issues of statutory interpretation, we begin with the text of the MBTA. Nw. Forest Res. Council v. Glickman, 82 F.3d 825, 830–31 (9th Cir.1996). We examine not only § 707(b), but also the MBTA as a whole, which consists of ten sections codified at 16 U .S.C. §§ 703 through 712, and its purpose. Abramski v. United States, ––– U.S. ––––, 134 S.Ct. 2259, 2267, 189 L.Ed.2d 262 (2014); Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341, 117 S.Ct. 843, 136 L.Ed.2d 808 (1997) (court considers “the language itself, the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole”). We may consider legislative history if the statute is ambiguous or if “the legislative history clearly indicates that Congress meant something other than what it said.”Carson Harbor Vill., Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., 270 F.3d 863, 877 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc) (quoting Perlman v. Catapult Entm't, Inc., 165 F.3d 747, 753 (9th Cir.1999)).
“Migratory birds,” as the phrase is used in the MBTA, “are those defined as such by the treaty between the United States and Great Britain” and other relevant treaties. Id. § 715j (defining “migratory bird” for purposes of the Migratory Bird Conservation Act and MBTA). The relevant treaties generally define “migratory birds” with reference to particular species of birds, e .g., ducks, cranes, herons. See Convention for the Protection of Migratory Birds, U.S.-Gr. Brit., art. I, Aug. 16, 1916, 39 Stat. 1702. Consistent with the definition contained in § 715j and the relevant treaties, the common definition of the term “bird” is “any of a class (Aves) of warm-blooded vertebrates distinguished by having the body more or less completely covered with feathers and the forelimbs modified as wings.”MERRIAM–WEBSTER: DICTIONARY,available at http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/bird. Except in the limited context of cookery, in which the term “bird” may refer more specifically to a piece of meat, the term “bird” refers to a member of the species rather than a part of the individual animal. Id.
[I]t shall be unlawful ... [to] take, capture, kill, attempt to take, capture, or kill, possess, offer for sale, sell, offer to barter, barter, offer to purchase, purchase ...any migratory bird, any part, nest, or egg of any such bird, or any product... which consists, or is composed in whole or part, of any such bird or any part, nest, or egg thereof.16 U.S.C. § 703(a) (emphasis added).
[T]he Secretary of the Interior is authorized and directed ... to determine when, to what extent, if at all, and by what means, it is compatible with the terms of the conventions to allow hunting, taking, capture, killing, possession, sale, purchase, shipment, transportation, carriage, or export of any such bird, or any part, nest, or egg thereof....Id. § 704(a) (emphasis added).
It shall be unlawful to ship, transport, or carry ... from one State, Territory, or district to or through [another] ...any bird, or any part, nest, or egg thereof.... It shall be unlawful to import any bird, or any part, nest, or egg thereof, captured, killed, taken, shipped, transported, or carried at any time contrary to the laws ... of Canada....Id. § 705 (emphasis added).
All birds, or parts, nests, or eggs thereof, captured, killed, taken, sold or offered for sale, bartered or offered for barter, purchased, shipped, transported, carried, imported, exported, or possessed contrary to the provisions of this subchapter ... shall, when found, be seized....Id. § 706 (emphasis added).
Whoever, in violation of this subchapter, shall knowingly—(1) take by any manner whatsoever any migratory bird with intent to sell, offer to sell, barter or offer to barter such bird, or (2) sell, offer for sale, barter or offer to barter, any migratory bird shall be guilty of a felony....Id. § 707(b) (emphasis added).
All guns, traps, nets and other equipment ... used by any person when engaged in pursuing, hunting, taking, trapping, ensnaring, capturing, killing or attempting to take, capture, or kill any migratory bird in violation of this subchapter with the intent to offer for sale, or sell or offer for barter, or barter such bird... may be seized....Id. § 707(c) (emphasis added).
*8 Interpreting the phrases “migratory birds” and “parts, nests, or eggs thereof” as having distinct meanings comports with other fundamental canons of statutory construction. Indeed, Congress demonstrated time and again that it knew how to specify when a provision of the MBTA applies to “migratory birds”; to “parts, nests, or eggs” of migratory birds; to products consisting of migratory bird parts; or to all three categories. Yet, Congress omitted all language relating to “parts, nests, or eggs” of migratory birds and products from Section § 707(b), making it a felony only to “take ...any migratory bird with intent to sell ... or sell, offer for sale, barter or offer to barter, any migratory bird....“ 16 U.S.C. § 707(b) (emphasis added). Under the longstanding canon expressio unius est exclusio alterius, we presume that the exclusion of the phrases “parts, nests, or eggs thereof” and “products ... consisting ... of parts, nests, or eggs thereof” from § 707(b) was intentional. Loughrin, 134 S.Ct. at 2390; Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 163–64, 110 S.Ct. 997, 108 L.Ed.2d 132 (1990) (where Congress included unambiguous language to cover preemployment payments in two sections of statute, absence of comparable language in third section indicated that Congress did not intend for that section to apply to preemployment payments).
Adhering to the expressio unius canon and interpreting the phrases to have separate meanings further ensures that all words and phrases in the statute have effect. See Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 314, 129 S.Ct. 1558, 173 L.Ed.2d 443 (2009) (“[A] statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant.”(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
The Government's interpretation, on the other hand, renders the language “parts, nests, or eggs thereof” superfluous, not only in one instance but in four different provisions of the MBTA—a result that our rules of statutory interpretation strongly disfavor.See United States v. Thum, 749 F.3d 1143, 1147 (9th Cir.2014) (rejecting broad interpretation of statutory term where interpretation would effectively “leave no work to be done” by preceding phrase); United States v. Wenner, 351 F.3d 969, 974–75 (9th Cir.2003) (declining to interpret “crime of violence” as including all burglaries because doing so would render separate enhancement for “burglary of a dwelling” mere surplusage).
We recognize, however, that our inquiry does not end at the plain meaning of the statute if giving effect to the plain meaning would lead to an absurd result or would be contrary to the clearly expressed intent of Congress.Avendano–Ramirez v. Ashcroft, 365 F.3d 813, 816 (9th Cir.2004) (citing Or. Natural Res. Council, Inc. v. Kantor, 99 F.3d 334, 339 (9th Cir.1996)). The Government argues that the purpose of the MBTA is to make all commercialization of migratory birds a felony, such that the term “migratory bird” in § 707(b) must be interpreted to include all migratory bird parts and products made from the same.
*9 Most of the cases upon which the Government relies merely state an undisputed principle: It is a crime under the MBTA to traffic in migratory birds, their parts, or products derived from migratory birds or their parts. To the extent those cases suggest that the sale of migratory bird parts or products is a felony, they do so in unexplained dicta. For example, in United States v. Mackie, 681 F.2d 1121 (9th Cir.1982), we considered whether the government must prosecute crimes involving the sale of eagles and eagle parts under the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act (“BGEPA”) rather than the MBTA. Id. at 1122. We stated, “The MBTA, 16 U.S.C. ss 703, 707(b), and the BGEPA, 16 U.S.C. s 668(a), prohibit offering to sell or selling eagles or parts of eagles.”Id. Although we cited to § 707(b), we did not consider or discuss whether the sale of eagle parts alone constituted a misdemeanor or a felony.
The Third Circuit considered the same due process issue in United States v. Engler, 806 F.2d 425 (3rd Cir.1986). There, the court explained that the MBTA “presents two factual scenarios for imposing strict liability on those who hunt migratory birds—if the actor hunts for pleasure, it is a misdemeanor; if for commercial purposes it is a felony.”Id. at 431. The court noted in its recitation of facts that the defendant was found guilty of trafficking in migratory birds and migratory bird parts in violation of § 703(a) and § 707(b), but it did not discuss whether the sale of migratory bird parts was properly charged as a felony. Id. at 427.
The only reported case to directly address the issue before us is an out-of-circuit district court decision, United States v. St. Pierre, 578 F.Supp. 1424 (D.S.D.1983).St. Pierre held that the sale of an invitation stick containing migratory bird feathers constituted a felony. Id. at 1426. Relying on legislative history, the court reasoned that “[i]t is the commercialization in migratory game birds, of whatever nature, that Congress addressed with the 1960 amendment.”Id. at 1427. Accordingly, the court determined that the “term ‘migratory bird’ in § 707(b) includes a whole bird as well as any part thereof.”Id. The court explained that any other interpretation would lead to the absurd result of allowing an individual who kills 100 migratory birds to escape felony punishment by simply dismembering the birds. Id.
*10 We disagree. Treating the sale of a fan containing migratory bird feathers as a misdemeanor does not lead to an absurd result under the MBTA. Individuals who kill or take migratory birds with the intent to sell the birds have committed a felony regardless of whether or how they subsequently sell the migratory birds. Individuals who sell migratory birds also commit a felony under the MBTA. Individuals who sell exclusively feathers of a migratory bird or a product containing migratory bird feathers have also committed a crime under the MBTA, albeit punishable as a misdemeanor that is subject to a $15,000 fine and six-month prison term. And, individuals who purchase a migratory bird or migratory bird parts have also committed a crime under the MBTA, again punishable as a misdemeanor. 16 U.S.C. §§ 703(a), 707. Thus, the MBTA still protects against the commercialization and destruction of migratory birds in all regards.
The purpose of the1960 amendment, as indicated by the statutory text and House and Senate Committee Reports, was to increase available penalties for those who engage in the killing of migratory birds for sale, not necessarily those engaged in the sale of migratory bird parts or products. H.R.REP. NO. 86–1787, at 1 (1960) (“The purpose of this bill is to authorize more severe penalties for persons who engage in the killing of migratory birds for sale.”); S.REP. NO. 86–1779, at 1 (“The basic need for this legislation is the necessity to better protect our migratory birds ... This bill would authorize more severe penalties for these market hunters....”).
So that, if he is fined $500, and he takes 100 birds a day, that is about 2 days' work or 2½ days' work to pay the fine?
Hearing attendees expressed doubt, however, about the effectiveness of the amendment to actually deter market hunters for two reasons. First, courts often were not imposing the maximum available penalties under the existing statute. Id. at 5, 7 (statement of Alton Lennon, Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation). Second, the amendment applied equally to market hunters and sport hunters that might mistakenly exceed the scope of their hunting permits. Id. at 19–20 (statements of Rep. Lennon and Daniel H. Janzen, Dir. Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife). In response to these concerns, a new bill was drafted, which included the felony punishment provision that eventually became § 707(b).H.R.REP. NO. 86–1787, at 2(explaining progression of proposed legislation to increase penalties under MBTA).
The revised bill made the taking of migratory birds with the intent to sell, the sale of migratory birds, and the purchase of migratory birds felonies. Id. Reports indicate that the revised bill was intended to authorize penalties for market hunters that are more severe than those applicable to sport hunters. Id. Prior to enactment, Congress modified the bill so that the purchase of migratory birds remained a misdemeanor, indicating that the bill did not target all commerce in migratory birds. S.REP. NO.86–1779, at 2. Indeed, when proposing the final amendment, the Senate Committee Report explained, “[W]e are not convinced that every purchaser of migratory birds should be exposed to such a heavy penalty.”Id.
The most recent revision to § 707 occurred in 1998. In part, that amendment increased the available fine for misdemeanor violations from $500 to $15,000. 16 U.S.C. § 707(a); H.R. REP. NO . 105–542, at 2 (1998). When outlining the background and need for the 1998 amendments, the House of Representatives Committee Report discussed the meaning of “migratory bird”: “What is a migratory bird? Under the Convention, the term ‘migratory bird’ means all wild species of ducks, geese, brants, coots, gallinules, rails, snipes, woodcocks, crows, and mourning and white-winged doves.”Id. at 2. Like the 1986 report, the 1998 report does not elaborate on the scope of § 707(b).
*12 At best, the legislative history is inconclusive. It is clear that the sponsors of the 1960 amendment were concerned with deterring market hunters, and proponents of the amendment discussed the sale of birds as a whole rather than migratory bird parts or related products. And, by removing the purchase of migratory birds from the scope of § 707(b), Congress indicated that it did not intend to punish all commercial acts involving migratory birds as felonies.7 Consequently, the 1960 legislative history, which is entitled to the greatest weight, does not provide “convincing” evidence that the term “migratory birds” also means “parts, nests, or eggs thereof” and related products. Church of Scientology of Cal. v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 612 F.2d 417, 422 (9th Cir.1979). The 1986 Senate Committee Report interpreted § 707(b) as applying to the sale of bird parts, which supports the Government's position here. Yet, the 1998 House Committee Report interpreted “migratory birds” to mean specific species of birds, which supports our interpretation of the statute's plain meaning. As post-enactment legislative history, however, the 1986 and 1998 reports are not entitled to great weight.Nw. Forest Res. Council, 82 F.3d at 836.
Finally, to the extent that ambiguity did exist, the rule of lenity would support our conclusion. See Burrage v. United States, ––– U.S. ––––, 134 S.Ct. 881, 891, 187 L.Ed.2d 715 (2014) (“Especially in the interpretation of a criminal statute subject to the rule of lenity, we cannot give the text a meaning that is different from its ordinary, accepted meaning, and that disfavors the defendant.”(internal citation omitted)); United States v. Corbin Farm Serv., 578 F.2d 259, 260 (9th Cir.1978)(adopting opinion of district court applying rule of lenity to determine that single act resulting in death of multiple migratory birds constituted single violation of MBTA).
*13 Our holding reaches only the facts and issue before us, whether the sale of a fan containing migratory bird feathers constitutes the sale of a “migratory bird” within the meaning of § 707(b). Considering the plain language of the MBTA and being mindful of the criminal application of the statute, we conclude that Counts II through IV of the indictment charge misdemeanors rather than felonies. The district court should have granted Defendants' motion with regard to those counts.
Count I charged a felony. Count II charged a misdemeanor. The district court should have denied the motion to dismiss, as it did, with regard to Count I. But the district court should have granted the motion to dismiss with regard to Count II. Accordingly, on this appeal pursuant to the conditional guilty plea, we affirm in part, as to Count I, but reverse in part as to Count II. We also vacate the sentence on both Counts, vacate the felony conviction on Count II, and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. On remand, the Defendants are given the option to withdraw their guilty pleas with regard to Count II,Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(a)(2), or the district court may consider whether to resentence their convictions on that count as misdemeanors.
[FN 1] This portion of the statement of facts, which describes the government's criminal investigation, is based on the government's Offer of Proof and the sources cited. Because the case was not tried after Defendants' conditional guilty pleas were accepted, there are no findings of fact, only the district court's independent determination that a factual basis for the conditional guilty pleas existed. SeeFed.R.Crim.P. 11(b)(3).
[FN 2] Defendants did not admit to all facts alleged in the Offer of Proof but conceded that they “conspired to sell and actually sold” a golden eagle fan “made with migratory bird parts.” Their argument on appeal is the legal contention that what they did was misdemeanor and not felony conduct.
[FN 3] The MBTA later incorporated elements of similar bilateral treaties between the United States and Mexico, Japan, and the Soviet Union. See16 U.S.C. § 703(a). Pertinent here, eagles, which were not originally covered under the MBTA, became protected by the statute in 1972. See United States v. Mackie, 681 F.2d 1121, 1123 (9th Cir.1982) ( “Obviously, eagles are protected by the MBTA.”).
[FN 4] The MBTA does not define a separate conspiracy offense. Here, Count I charges a conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 371, which the Supreme Court and our court have called the “general conspiracy statute.” United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10, 14, 115 S.Ct. 382, 130 L.Ed.2d 225 (1994); United States v. Garcia–Santana, 774 F.3d 528, 535 (9th Cir.2014).
[FN 5] In their supplemental briefing to this court after oral argument, Defendants raised for the first time a challenge to the adequacy of their guilty pleas with regard to Count I. Defendants never moved in the district court to withdraw their guilty pleas. Normally, we will not consider an issue first raised on appeal and not presented to the district court. Bennett Evan Cooper, Federal Appellate Practice: Ninth Circuit § 19:2 (2014–2015 ed.); see, e .g., Vision Air Flight Serv. v. M/V Nat'l Pride, 155 F.3d 1165, 1168 (9th Cir.1998) (issue not presented to or decided by district court, and as to which no factual record had been developed, would not be considered on appeal);Slaven v. Am. Trading Transp. Co., 146 F.3d 1066, 1069 (9th Cir.1998) (appellate court will not consider issues not properly raised before district court). Also, Defendants did not contend in their opening brief before us that their pleas were inadequate in factual basis or in understanding. The sole issue raised in their opening brief questioned whether the sale of a “family heirloom fan (containing a few feathers)” was a felony. Because no challenge to the guilty pleas was raised in the opening brief, we consider any such challenge to be waived. Cooper, Federal Appellate Practice, supra, at § 19:8; see, e.g., Stanford Ranch, Inc. v. Md. Cas. Co., 89 F.3d 618, 628 n. 5 (9th Cir.1996); Dilley v. Gunn, 64 F.3d 1365, 1367 (9th Cir.1995) (issues not raised in the opening brief usually are deemed waived). Moreover, the record before us does not permit a conclusion that Defendants' pleas were not knowing and voluntary and without adequate factual basis. We express no opinion about whether on a different factual showing, presented with a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, Defendants might have any basis to withdraw their pleas, avoid the plea agreements, and gain vacatur of their convictions and sentences.
[FN 7] The Government relies heavily on the portion of the 1960 amendment's legislative history providing that the increase in penalties was “a more effective means of dealing with market hunters and with others who commercialize in migratory game birds.”The Government suggests that the reference to “others who commercialize in migratory game birds” is a clear indication that Congress intended the 1960 amendment to apply to the sale of migratory bird parts. Yet, the quoted statement was not made by a member of Congress. Instead, it was made by the Department of the Interior in a report to the House Committee expressing the Department's support for the 1960 amendment. See, e.g.,S.REP. NO. 86–1849, at 2 (providing copy of agency report). As such, we do not find it particularly probative on the issue of Congress' intent.
[FN 8] The Government asks us to defer to the FWS interpretation of “[m]igratory bird,” which defines the term as “any [listed] bird ... including any part, nest, or egg of such bird, or any product, whether or not manufactured, which consists or is composed in whole or part, of any such bird or any part, nest, or egg thereof.”50 C.F.R. § 10.12. Because application of the “traditional tools of statutory interpretation” yields a clear meaning, deference to FWS's definition under the rule of Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1997), is not warranted in this case. Id. at 843 n. 9, 104 S.Ct. 2778; I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 320 n. 45, 121 S.Ct. 2271, 150 L.Ed.2d 347 (2001) (finding Chevron inapplicable because no ambiguity remained after applying traditional rule that statute which is ambiguous with respect to retroactive application is construed to be unambiguously prospective). In other circumstances, however, where ambiguity persists, further evaluation of Chevron deference rather than application of the rule of lenity may be appropriate.Pacheco–Camacho v. Hood, 272 F.3d 1266, 1271–72 (9th Cir.2001).

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