Source: http://texas-opinions.com/09-In-Re-Collins-MD-Lester-Tex-2009-by-ONeill-discovery-mandamus-protective-order-in-med-mal-case-vacated.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 19:10:57+00:00

Document:
to diagnose the condition allowed the cancer to progress from a curable to an incurable stage.
treatment to be withheld from disclosure,” Regian listed only the health care providers’ names.
treatment provided to the plaintiff.
having any ex parte contacts with any of Regian’s non-party treating physicians.
the information might be discovered through ex parte communications in a subsequent lawsuit. Id.
whether the order issued by the trial court amounts to an abuse of discretion.
interactions between health care providers and their patients may raise unique privacy concerns.
and regulations adopted under HIPAA. We begin with a brief overview of each of these provisions.
patients and prohibits their disclosure. We have recognized that the privilege serves two purposes.
First, it encourages the full and open communication that is required for effective treatment. R.K. v.
relies upon the condition as a part of the party’s claim or defense.” Tex. R. Evid. 509(e)(1), (2), (4).
diagnose Kelly’s nasopharyngeal cancer clearly is not subject to the privilege in this lawsuit.
any rule of procedure or evidence, section 74.052 governs. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 74.002.
under HIPAA. Id. § 74.052(c).
costs by simplifying administrative procedures. Arons v. Jutkowitz, 880 N.E.2d 831, 839–40 (N.Y.
governing the disclosure of confidential medical records. Arons, 880 N.E.2d at 840; 42 U.S.C.
of the HIPAA Privacy Rule, at 1, available at http://www.hhs.
HIPAA privacy rules, or if the requirement would undermine HIPAA’s purposes. Id. § 160.202.
health care information may be disclosed if the patient has executed a valid written authorization. Id.
authorization must be consistent with its terms. Id. § 164.508(a)(1).
that is to be disclosed, then the form also does not authorize the release of written medical records.
Code §§ 311.021(2), 311.023(1), (5).
sponsors stated, “[n]othing in this section is intended to change the law of privilege [for a patient].” S.
plaintiff-patient’s health care provider. The Regians’ argument is flawed in at least two respects.
party health care providers. 224 S.W.3d at 803–04. In Mutter v. Wood, 744 S.W.2d 600, 601 (Tex.
because, as explained below, the Regians failed to carry their burden in obtaining a protective order.
obtain information available under a release they provided in accordance with section 74.052(c).
it was not voluntary, as Kelly was required to sign it as a condition of bringing this suit.
164.508. See, e.g., In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., No. MDL 1596, 2004 WL 3520244, at *1 (E.D.N.
2006); Doe v. O’Neil, No. 20042513c, 2006 WL 620669, at *3 (Mass. Super. Ct. Feb. 2, 2006).
under the circumstances presented, we conclude that HIPAA does not preempt section 74.052(c).
remedy by appeal. See In re McAllen Med. Ctr., Inc., 275 S.W.3d 458, 469 (Tex. 2008).
claimant elects to modify or revoke the authorization.
elicited in those contacts. That portion of the trial court’s order is not challenged here.
days. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 74.052(b).

References: v.

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