Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/100708/construction-laborers-vs-curry
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 04:46:38+00:00

Document:
1. The allegations of the complaint, as well as the findings of the Georgia Supreme Court, made out at least an arguable violation of § 8(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, and the state court had no jurisdiction to issue an injunction or to adjudicate this controversy, which was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board. Pp. 371 U. S. 543 -548.
2. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Georgia was "final," within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1257, and this Court has jurisdiction to review it. Pp. 371 U. S. 548 -552.
appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated. Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541 . Pp. 371 U. S. 548 -549.
(b) The policy of 28 U.S.C. §1257 against piecemeal reviews of state court judgments does not prevent this Court holding that the judgment was final, particularly when postponing review would seriously erode the national labor policy requiring the subject matter of respondents' cause to be heard exclusively by the National Labor Relations Board, not by state courts. Pp. 371 U. S. 549 -550.
(c) Since the Georgia Supreme Court resolved the merits of the issues raised in the course of the hearing on the temporary injunction and left nothing of substance to be decided in the trial court, as petitioner conceded, its judgment was "final" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1257. Pp. 371 U. S. 550 -551.
(d) Montgomery Building Trades Council v. Ledbetter Erection Co., 344 U. S. 178 , does not require a different conclusion. P. 371 U. S. 552 .
"to employ only union labor, or be unable to comply with the terms of his contract . . . such picketing is for an unlawful purpose, and clearly a violation of the provisions of Code Ann.Supp. § 54-804. . . . [ Footnote 3 ]"
National Labor Relations Board. Plumbers Union v. Door County, 359 U. S. 354 , 359 U. S. 359 ; San Diego Council v. Garmon, 359 U. S. 236 , 359 U. S. 244 -245; Hotel Employees Union v. Sax Enterprises, Inc., 358 U. S. 270 ; Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U. S. 468 , 348 U. S. 478 , 348 U. S. 481 ; Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U. S. 485 , 346 U. S. 489 -491. Nor is the jurisdiction of the Georgia courts sustainable, as respondents urge, by reason of the Georgia right to work law and by § 14(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.
Respondents would nevertheless have us dismiss this case as beyond our appellate jurisdiction, since 28 U.S.C. § 1257 limits our authority to the review of final judgments of state courts and since the Georgia Supreme Court authorized the issuance of only a temporary injunction, thus leaving a permanent order still to be issued after further hearings in the trial court. But we believe our power to review this case rests upon solid ground. The federal question raised by petitioner in the Georgia court, and here, is whether the Georgia courts had power to proceed with and determine this controversy. The issue ripe for review is not whether a Georgia court has erroneously decided a matter of federal law in a case admittedly within its jurisdiction (compare Gibbons v. Ogden, 6 Wheat. 448) nor is it the question of whether federal or state law governs a case properly before the Georgia courts. Compare Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U. S. 95 . What we do have here is a judgment of the Georgia court finally and erroneously asserting its jurisdiction to deal with a controversy which is beyond its power, and instead is within the exclusive domain of the National Labor Relations Board.
as a bar to the power of the Georgia courts to issue the injunction. The Georgia courts' denial of this federal claim was held reviewable here although ordinarily the overruling of a demurrer is not a final judgment. This Court looked to the whole record, as we are entitled to do in determining questions of finality, Department of Banking v. Pink, 317 U. S. 264 , 317 U. S. 268 ; Gospel Army v. Los Angeles, 331 U. S. 543 , 547; Richfield Oil Corp. v. State Board of Equalization, 329 U. S. 69 , 329 U. S. 72 , and concluded that, for all practical purposes, the litigation in the Georgia courts was terminated, since the employee freely conceded he had no further defenses to offer in the state courts, relying upon Richfield Oil Corp. v. State Board of Equalization, 329 U. S. 69 .
There remains the matter of Montgomery Building & Construction Trades Council v. Ledbetter Erection Co., Inc., 344 U. S. 178 , where the court applied the salutary and longstanding rule that decisions upon interlocutory injunctions are not final judgments. Ledbetter, of course, was decided before Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U. S. 485 , and subsequent preemption cases [ Footnote 9 ] in this Court, and at a time when the respective jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board and the state courts was a much mooted issue. Moreover, the Alabama court did not pass upon the merits of the injunction claim, the union there had withdrawn an answer which controverted important allegations of the complaint, and it was not at all clear that there was nothing left to be litigated in the Alabama trial court. This Court apparently preferred to avoid deciding this important matter of federal and state relationships where the decision below did not have all of the traditional badges of finality. Cf. Republic Natural Gas Co. v. Oklahoma, 334 U. S. 62 . In any event, however, to the extent that Ledbetter may be said to prohibit our review of a final and erroneous assertion of jurisdiction by a state court to issue a temporary injunction in a labor dispute, when a substantial claim is made that the jurisdiction of the state court is preempted by federal law and by the exclusive power of the National Labor Relations Board, we decline to follow it.
" Compelling persons to join, or refrain from joining, labor organization, or to strike or refrain from striking. -- It shall be unlawful for any person, acting alone or in concert with one or more other persons to compel or attempt to compel any person to join or refrain from joining any labor organization, or to strike or refrain from striking against his will, by any threatened or actual interference with his person, immediate family, or physical property, or by any threatened or actual interference with the pursuit of lawful employment by such person, or by his immediate family."
" Unlawfully preventing laborers, etc., from performing duties. -- Any person or persons, who, by threats, violence, intimidation, or other unlawful means, shall prevent or attempt to prevent any person or persons from engaging in, remaining in, or performing the business, labor, or duties of any lawful employment or occupation, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor."
See also Meat Cutters Local 427 v. Fairlawn Meats, Inc., 353 U. S. 20 , 353 U. S. 23 ; Radio Union v. Labor Board, 347 U. S. 17 , 347 U. S. 40 -42, 347 U. S. 52 -53; Labor Board v. Local Union No. 55, 218 F.2d 226, 232 (10th Cir.).
and directed attention to the question of whether or not the judgment of the Nebraska court was a final one. 326 U.S. at 326 U. S. 123 .
This, of course, was consistent with, and followed, older cases recognizing a judgment as final even though an accounting was still to take place. Forgay v. Conrad, 6 How. 201; Carondelet Canal & Navigation Co. v. Louisiana, 233 U. S. 362 .
See cases cited in text, ante, p. 371 U. S. 550 .
E.g., San Diego Council v. Garmon, 359 U. S. 236 , and cases cited in text, ante, p. 371 U. S. 547 .
At least until today, none of this Court's decisions could be interpreted to suggest that a state court's determination as to state versus federal jurisdiction could, without more, be considered a final judgment subject to our review when further proceedings on the merits were still pending. Indeed, Montgomery Building & Construction Trades Council v. Ledbetter Erection Co., Inc., 344 U. S. 178 , held expressly to the contrary, despite the fact that the determination of jurisdiction had been coupled, as in the present case, with the issuance of a temporary injunction. In Ledbetter, as here, it was claimed that the temporary injunction might well have the practical effect of mooting the underlying dispute, thereby aborting any review of the jurisdictional issue.
In any event, there is no need to strain these precedents to the breaking point, since as the Court itself recognizes (p. 371 U. S. 550 ), "There is another entirely adequate reason for sustaining our authority to review in this case." During oral argument before the Court, petitioner conceded that, in any proceedings on the issuance of a permanent injunction, it would have nothing left to litigate. In other words, the state courts having decided that they had jurisdiction and that the picketing was for an unlawful purpose, the petitioner would have nothing further to offer on these or any other issues, and the issuance of a permanent injunction would follow as a matter of course.
It being clear that the entire case must stand or fall on the federal claim now presented, the case is squarely governed by Pope v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 345 U. S. 379 . Since what remains to be done is only a formality, the judgment sought to be reviewed is final in every significant sense. No such showing was made in Ledbetter, supra, and the case is readily distinguishable on this ground. No doubts should be cast on the vitality of Ledbetter; still less should it be overruled.
* My views in this area are more fully set forth in the dissenting opinion I have filed in Mercantile National Bank v. Langdeau, post, p. 371 U. S. 572 .

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