Source: http://masscases.com/cases/sjc/324/324mass398.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 19:55:44+00:00

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WALTER DOUGLAS vs. STUART B. WHITTAKER.
Statement by RONAN, J., as to the nature of an opening to the jury by the plaintiff's counsel, and as to ordering a verdict for the defendant upon the opening.
Evidence, that, while a pedestrian was standing on a public way observing a fire, the operator of an automobile, without any necessity from traffic conditions or otherwise and without any warning to the pedestrian, stopped the automobile so close behind him that, when he "made an involuntary movement to turn around," he "fell over" the automobile and injured himself, and that the operator admitted to the pedestrian fault in failing to give any signal, would have warranted findings that the operator was negligent and that such negligence was a proximate cause of the pedestrian's injuries.
TORT. Writ in the Superior Court dated July 23, 1946. The action was tried before Burns, J.
S. Stern, for the plaintiff.
A. E. LoPresti, for the defendant.
verdict for the defendant after the opening statement of the plaintiff's counsel.
In the instant case, an opening which would disclose that the plaintiff intended to introduce evidence which would show negligence upon the part of the defendant and resulting damage to the plaintiff would be sufficient, unless something in the opening, if introduced in evidence, would establish, as matter of law, contributory negligence of the plaintiff. No such thing appears in the opening in question. Neither is there any contention that the opening did not show that the damage resulted from the contact with the defendant's automobile. The only question then that could possibly arise is whether, assuming the facts stated to be true, there is enough to make the defendant's negligence a question of fact. Duff v. Webster, 315 Mass. 102, 103. Kelly v. Railway Express Agency, Inc. 315 Mass. 301, 302. Mazzaferro v. Dupuis, 321 Mass. 718, 719.
The case as outlined in the opening appears to be one where the plaintiff, a ship's carpenter, was standing upon a public way observing a fire when the defendant approached in his automobile and stopped it without giving any warning of its presence to the plaintiff and so close to him that, when he "made an involuntary movement to turn around," he "fell over" the automobile and injured himself. [Note p401-1] It further appeared in the opening that the defendant told the plaintiff that the defendant did not give any signal because he thought it would scare the plaintiff and that the defendant was at fault in failing to give any signal.
if he endeavored to step backward or turn around he would come in contact with the automobile. The fact that the plaintiff when injured was making "an involuntary movement to turn around" would not necessarily bar recovery because the nature of the act which caused such "an involuntary movement," Towle v. Morin, 295 Mass. 583, 585; Wright v. Carlson, 312 Mass. 584, 589, as described in the opening, might be found to be an innocent cause, or an intervening or a concurrent cause which would not prevent a jury from finding that, if the defendant was negligent, such negligence was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury. Morrison v. Medaglia, 287 Mass. 46. Farewell v. Interstate Busses Corp. 307 Mass. 553.
This brings us to the question whether the defendant's conduct, as described in the opening, could be found to be negligent. One who places an obstacle in the path of another who is rightfully upon that path may be liable for injuries caused by tripping over the obstacle. Suppose another traveller came along the public way, stopped to watch the fire, and while standing there put a bundle on the ground behind and so close to the plaintiff that the latter as he turned around fell over it. Could it be ruled that this traveller was not negligent? In the case at bar, the statement that the plaintiff fell over the automobile, when considered with the fact that the plaintiff was complaining of an injury to his shin, may properly be construed to mean that he fell over some part of the automobile which projected a distance above the ground sufficiently high to come in contact with a man's shin. We think a jury could find that the defendant was negligent. Morris v. Whipple, 183 Mass. 27. Smith v. Edison Electric Illuminating Co. 198 Mass. 330. McGrath v. American Express Co. 219 Mass. 314. Tenney v. Reed, 262 Mass. 335. Bennett v. Cohen, 310 Mass. 714. Chase v. Marchant, 315 Mass. 684. Oliphant v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co. 262 N. Y. 460. Gulliver v. Blauvelt, 14 App. Div. (N. Y.) 523.
[Note p400-1] Stevens v. Nichols, 155 Mass. 472, 474. Hey v. Prime, 197 Mass. 474, 475. Berry v. Newton & Boston Street Railway, 209 Mass. 100. Lee v. Blodget, 214 Mass. 374, 377. Murphy v. Boston & Maine Railroad, 216 Mass. 178. Farnham v. Lenox Motor Car Co. 229 Mass. 478, 482. Energy Electric Co., petitioner, 262 Mass. 534, 538. Salem v. Batchelder, 267 Mass. 381. First National Bank v. Groves, 269 Mass. 161, 165. Kolas v. LaRochelle, 270 Mass. 49, 53. Meeney v. Doyle, 276 Mass. 218, 221. Gray v. Boston, 277 Mass. 166, 167. Williams v. Whitinsville Savings Bank, 283 Mass. 297, 300. Massachusetts Hospital Life Ins. Co. v. Nesson, 286 Mass. 216, 218. Poorvu v. Weisberg, 286 Mass. 526. Sandler v. Green, 287 Mass. 404, 406. Mulvaney v. Worcester, 293 Mass. 32, 33. Cahalane v. Dennery, 298 Mass. 34, 35. Sluskonis v. Boston & Maine Railroad, 299 Mass. 413. Rosenblum v. Economy Grocery Stores Corp. 300 Mass. 264. Deltufo v. Morganelli, 302 Mass. 604. Schleifer v. Worcester North Savings Institution, 306 Mass. 226. Farewell v. Interstate Busses Corp. 307 Mass. 553. Lawless v. Trustees of New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad, 310 Mass. 211. Shapiro v. Segal, 316 Mass. 556. Waugh v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. 317 Mass. 230. Grace v. Jordan Marsh Co. 317 Mass. 632. Passler v. Mowbray, 318 Mass. 231. Carbone v. Trustees of New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad, 320 Mass. 710. Allen v. National Peanut Corp. 321 Mass. 665. Hentz v. Toppin, 322 Mass. 333. Chalfen v. Kraft, ante, 1.
[Note p401-1] Statements in the opening were that the plaintiff "fell over the car" of the defendant "and cut his leg . . . had a cut on his leg, his left leg . . . . It was a skinned shin." -- REPORTER.

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