Source: http://www.courts.ie/Judgments.nsf/09859e7a3f34669680256ef3004a27de/90870229324e38bb80257604003c74c2?OpenDocument
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 08:05:37+00:00

Document:
Murray C.J., Geoghegan J., Fennelly J., Macken J., Finnegan J.
Murray C.J., Geoghegan J., Macken J., Finnegan J.
JUDGMENT of Mr. Justice Fennelly delivered the 31st day of July, 2009.
1.	Where, as in this case, fundamental rights are invoked as a restraint on the exercise of statutory powers, the courts are increasingly called upon to strike a balance. In the present case, the Planning Tribunal wants to investigate a “leak” of confidential information to the Irish Times and is met with a countervailing claim based on confidentiality of journalists’ sources.
2.	The appeal is taken against an Order made by the High Court pursuant to section 4 of the Tribunal of Inquiries (Evidence) (Amendment) Act, 1997 directing a journalist and the editor of that newspaper to answer questions posed by the Tribunal intended to unveil the source of documents published in the Irish Times.
4.	The first-named appellant has been a journalist for over twenty years. He is the Public Affairs Correspondent of the Irish Times. I will refer to him as Mr Keena. The second-named appellant is the editor of The Irish Times. I will refer to her as Ms Kennedy.
5.	On 29th June, 2006, as part of its private investigations the Tribunal wrote to Mr. David McKenna seeking information in relation to certain payments said to have been made to Mr. Bertie Ahern, T.D. The letter asked Mr McKenna for a detailed narrative statement setting out the circumstances in which he had made any such payment. The letter specified a number of the matters to be included in the statement.
The Tribunal regarded this phase of its investigations as private and confidential. It claimed the power to impose an obligation of confidentiality on the recipient of the letter and did not consent to its publication.
7.	On 19th September 2006, Mr. Keena received anonymously an unsolicited copy of the letter from the Tribunal to Mr McKenna. It contained information relating to payments alleged to have been made to An Taoiseach, Bertie Ahern T.D., in 1993 when he was the Minister for Finance.
“A wealthy businessman, David McKenna, has been contacted by the Mahon Tribunal about payments to the Taoiseach, Bertie Ahern.
The Tribunal is investigating a number of payments to Mr. Ahern in or around December, 1993 including cash payments, the Irish Times has learned.
The Tribunal requested a detailed statement from Mr McKenna. He was asked to name the person who requested the payment and his understanding as to why it was required. He was also asked who the payment was given to and whether it was in cash or another form.
It is understood a solicitor who was an associate and personal friend of Mr Ahern's, the late Gerry Brennan, may have played a role in the matters being inquired into. Mr Brennan, a former director of Telecom Éireann, died in 1997.
Mr McKenna, a friend of Mr Ahern's and a known supporter of both him and his party, was estimated to be worth more than €60 million a number of years ago. However, his publicly-listed recruitment firm, Marlborough Recruitment, collapsed in 2002.
Mr McKenna is also a friend and business associate of Des Richardson, the businessman appointed by Mr Ahern in 1993 as full-time fundraiser for Fianna Fáil and who also fundraises for Mr Ahern's constituency operation. The Tribunal was told in private that Mr McKenna was one of the people who made a payment to Mr Ahern.
Special adviser to the Taoiseach Gerry Howlin was not available for comment as he was on leave.
When contacted by The Irish Times the Government press secretary, Mandy Johnston, passed the query on to the Fianna Fáil press officer Olivia Buckley, who said Mr Ahern did not comment on Tribunal matters.
Mr McKenna, when asked about the matter, said: ‘Contact my solicitor.’ His solicitor said he had no comment.
The Mahon Tribunal and Mr Ahern are scheduled to make representations about the matter before the President of the High Court, Mr Justice Joseph Finnegan, next month.
In December 1993, Mr Ahern was Minister for Finance and Fianna Fáil treasurer.
The inquiries into Mr Ahern's finances are understood to have begun after allegations were made about supposed payments to him by property developer Owen O'Callaghan in relation to the Quarryvale development in west Dublin.
This article quoted from the contents of the letter of 29th June, 2006 from the Tribunal to Mr. McKenna.
8.	The Tribunal wrote to Ms Kennedy on the day of publication of Mr Keenas’s article stating that it quoted “the content of a letter written to Mr David McKenna by a solicitor acting on behalf of the Tribunal” and asserting that “such communication was confidential to the Tribunal and was expressed to be so.” The Tribunal letter also claimed that the publication of this material was in breach of an injunction granted by the Supreme Court on 7th October, 2005.
“… the circumstances of this matter are straightforward. The Irish Times received an unsolicited and anonymous communication that I considered an important matter in the public interest for this newspaper to verify and publish. The vital issue of public interest which I considered I had a duty to publish was that the Taoiseach, Mr. Ahern, whilst a serving minister was in receipt of certain payments of money. The fact of these payments is a matter that this newspaper has a proper interest in publishing.
Ms Kennedy’s letter also denied that there had been a breach of any court order. That is not an issue in this case.
9.	On 25th September, 2006 the Tribunal made an order, expressed to be made pursuant to its powers under the Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) Acts 1921 to 2004 in particular section 1(i)(b) of the Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) Act 1921 as amended by section 3 Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) (Amendment) Act 1979 requiring Ms Kennedy and Mr Keena to produce to the Tribunal at its offices all documents which comprised the communication received by the Irish Times which led to the publication of the article of 21st September, 2006. The reference to section 3 (which deals with the power of the High Court) of the Act of 1979 should presumably be a reference to section 4. No point has ever been taken in that respect.
10.	By a reply of the same date Ms Kennedy stated that the Irish Times was not in a position to comply with this order as the material sought had been destroyed. She also disputed the right of the Tribunal to make the order. She said that “the production of any such material would run the risk of identifying sources.” It would, she said, “put in jeopardy the primary obligation of every editor and journalist to protect their sources of information.” Finally, she asserted that it was in the public interest that this obligation and right be protected, in the production of a story, which in itself was published in the public interest.
13.	Ms Kennedy, in her written statement, said that it was a matter of legitimate public interest that the Taoiseach of the day had received monies from businessmen while he was Minister for Finance in 1993.” She said that “in making the decision to publish she was conscious of the possibility that the Tribunal could find that the matter was outside its terms of reference and that it might never enter the public domain.” She said that she had instructed Mr Keena to destroy the documents and that she had also destroyed any copies in her own possession.
14.	On the same day the appellants appeared before the Tribunal. They were unable to produce the documents sought by the Tribunal, because they had destroyed them. They declined to answer any questions which in their view would give any assistance in identifying the source of the anonymous communication. Mr Keena, in particular, refused to say whether the version of the letter from the Tribunal which he had seen and which was referred to in the article was an original (with letter heading) or a copy.
15.	The Tribunal considered that the behaviour of Mr Keena and Ms Kennedy amounted to breaches of its orders and of the Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) Acts, 1921 to 2004. It decided to exercise the powers conferred upon it by section 4 of the Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) (Amendment) Act, 1997 and to seek orders from the High Court compelling Ms. Kennedy and Mr. Keena to comply with the Tribunal’s orders.
·	to answer all further questions to which the Tribunal may require answers.
“The key issue of journalism is that people who approach reporters in confidence with information of legitimate public interest, do not subsequently have their identities revealed by the reporters. If this occurs, it serves to make future disclosures less likely, as people would be more wary of coming forward. This makes it less effective journalism. It is also detrimental to the public good."
18.	The proceedings were heard in the High Court by a Divisional Court composed of the Johnson P, Kelly J and O’Neill J. Judgment was delivered on 23rd October 2007. The Court made orders pursuant to section 4 of the Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) (Amendment) Act, 1997 in accordance with the Special Summons. Essentially, the appellants are required to attend before the Tribunal and “to answer all questions to which the Tribunal may require answers in relation to the source and present whereabouts of the documents mentioned in the witness summons” dated 26th September 2006.
3. Assuming positive answers to the first two questions, how that right of the Tribunal is to be balanced against the defendants’ right to freedom of expression as guaranteed in Article 40, section 6,1º.i of the Constitution, and Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights and in particular the public interest in the preservation from disclosure of journalistic sources, as an essential prerequisite of a free press in a democratic society.
“Going hand in hand with this, is the critical importance of a free press as an essential organ in a democratic society. An essential feature of the operation of a free press is the availability of sources of information. Without sources of information journalists will be unable to keep society informed on matters which are or should be of public interest. Thus there is a very great public interest in the cultivation of and protection of journalistic sources of information as an essential feature of a free and effective press. As between the parties in this case there was no dispute whatever concerning these fundamental aspects of the right to freedom of expression as set out in Article 10 of the Convention.
"It need hardly be said, that such a manner of proceeding is anathema to the rule of law and an affront to democratic order. If tolerated it is the surest way to anarchy."
“Thus, the only means the Tribunal has of learning anything about these documents is through the questions which it proposes to put to the defendants. The content of the letter addressed to Mr. McKenna and his reply are of course well known to the Tribunal, therefore nothing is to be revealed in that regard. The only additional information that can be revealed by the defendants is whether or not the version or copy of the letter seen by them had the Tribunal’s letter heading on it or whether it was signed. All that this information would do is to indicate whether or not the copy of the letter furnished to the defendants came from inside the Tribunal or from elsewhere. Insofar as answers to these queries would tend to indicate that the documents furnished to the defendants came from elsewhere, it is clear from the evidence given that Mr. McKenna and his solicitor vehemently deny any role in furnishing these documents to the defendants. Thus, in all probability, having regard to the fact that the documents are now destroyed, the most that can be achieved by way of answers to questions proposed to be asked by the Tribunal of the defendants is to indicate that as a matter of probability the Tribunal was not the source of the leak. Beyond that the source will remain, as of course the source always intended, shrouded in impenetrable mystery with its anonymity safely beyond the reach of forensic inquiry.
“In these circumstances, we are of opinion that because of the destruction of the documents and the consequent deliberate frustration of forensic inquiry thereby brought about, there is little or no risk of the questions proposed to be asked leading to the identification of the source who provided these documents to the defendants. Because of this we are of opinion, therefore, that very slight weight indeed is to be attached to the defendants’ privilege against disclosure of their sources in this case.
(iii)	the [ appellants] to attend before the Tribunal and then to answer all further questions to which the Tribunal may require answers.
29.	The appellants did not contest the power of the Tribunal to make an order pursuant to section 4 of the Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) (Amendment) Act, 1979, as interpreted by this court in Kiberd v. Hamilton, cited above. Mr Donal O’Donnell, Senior Counsel, for the appellant's submitted that Clause J (5) of the Terms of Reference of the Tribunal, being expressed in negative form, did not apply. He also argued that the Tribunal was engaging in a "leak inquiry” which would not assist it in enquiring into matter the subject matter of its Terms of Reference. The appellants argued in their written submissions that the documents at issue are not confidential and the Tribunal did not have any authority to create the confidentiality for which it contends. They relied on Mahon v. Post Publications Limited  3 I.R. 338.
30.	The principal, indeed almost the exclusive, focus of Mr O'Donnell's submissions was a critique of the balance struck by the High Court between the rights of the Tribunal and of the appellants. He said that, by virtue of the provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights Act, 2003, Article 10 of the Convention applied, respectively, to the Tribunal as an "organ of the State" and to the High Court when interpreting either the common law or relevant statutes.
31.	Following a comprehensive survey of the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, he submitted that the balance has almost always been struck by that court in favour of protection of journalists’ sources. Extraordinarily strong countervailing circumstances are required before a journalist can be obliged to disclose sources.
32.	Mr O'Donnell criticised what he called the “fallacious logic" of the High Court judgment. In effect, he said, the judgment requires questions to be asked only in circumstances where they cannot achieve the object of identifying the source. The view of the High Court was that the Tribunal could require questions to be answered for the purpose of exculpating the Tribunal itself and not to enable the actual source to be identified. The High Court, he argued, was, in particular, led into error by reason of its extremely critical views regarding the destruction by the appellants of the documents. For that reason, the High Court had erroneously taken the view that the journalists’ privilege against disclosure had almost no weight.
33.	Mr Michael Collins, Senior Counsel, for the Tribunal, accepted the link between the fundamental right of freedom of expression, guaranteed by Article 10 of the Convention, the privilege of journalists with regard to their sources and the need to recognise the "chilling effect" of an order for disclosure of sources. He referred to the trust and confidence which exists between the journalist and the source but argued that this is significantly weakened and the privilege would be entitled to very slight weight when the source is anonymous.
Mr Collins laid particular emphasis on the right of Tribunals generally to carry on preliminary investigations in private and to protect the confidentiality of persons cooperating with it in its private phase. The Tribunal has a legitimate interest, in Convention terms, in seeking to identify the source of a leak of confidential information.
Mr Collins referred to case-law in the United States, in particular the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Branzburg v Hayes, discussed later, declining First Amendment protection to journalists refusing to give evidence before a grand jury.
34.	The appellants do not seriously contest the power of the Tribunal to inquire into the unauthorised disclosure of its confidential information. The decision of this Court in Kiberd v Hamilton, cited above is conclusive on the point. It concerned an inquiry by Mr Justice Hamilton as Chairman and sole member of the Tribunals of Inquiry into the Beef Processing Industry into an unauthorised disclosure and publication in a newspaper of information confidential to the Tribunal. The newspaper contested the power of the Tribunal. Blayney J delivered the unanimous judgment of this Court. In reliance on the judgment of this Court in State (Lynch) v Cooney  I.R. 337, he held that what had to be considered was, "firstly, whether the Tribunal’s opinion that the making of the order was necessary for the purpose of its functions was bona fide held, secondly, whether that opinion was supported by the facts, and finally, whether it can be said of it that it was not unreasonable.” The learned judge rejected the challenge to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, noted that it was not contested that its opinion was bona fide held, and concluded that there were grounds to support the view of the Tribunal which was not unreasonable.
35.	It is notable that the central issue of concern for the Tribunal in that case was the fear that, if people invited to cooperate with the Tribunal believed that information furnished confidentially by them would appear in the press, there was a real danger that witnesses would be dissuaded from coming forward with material relevant to the Tribunal’s inquiry. Kiberd v Hamilton, therefore, constitutes sufficient authority for the proposition that the Tribunal has power to investigate unauthorised disclosure of its confidential information. However, I am also satisfied that the High Court was correct to hold that Clause J (5) of the Terms of Reference of the Tribunal adopted by Resolution of Dáil Éireann passed on 17th November, 2004 confirmed the existence of that power.
It is not necessary to consider the English case of Norwich Pharmacal v Customs and Excise Commissioners  AC 133, which was discussed by counsel for the appellants at the hearing of the appeal, although that case and a number of cases which followed confirm the existence of a power in the courts to order disclosure of confidential information which has come into the possession even of innocent parties.
38.	I am satisfied that these concerns are legitimate. The information communicated to Mr McKenna was highly confidential and sensitive. The Tribunal was not only entitled but bound to make every effort to keep it so. It was, of course, quite clear to every person reading the Tribunal’s letter to Mr McKenna that it was and was expressed to be entirely private and confidential.
39.	The High Court was, in my view, perfectly correct to uphold the power of the Tribunal to conduct an inquiry into the source of the unauthorised disclosure and to hold that the documents were confidential.
40.	The appeal, therefore, turns entirely on the third point, namely on the balance struck by the High Court between the power of the Tribunal to investigate and the right of the appellants to refuse to disclose any information about their sources.
41.	I have postponed to this point reference to the Convention and the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights. Both have, of course, been considered in great detail by the High Court in its judgment and have been argued by both parties to the appeal. Those decisions are relevant to the outcome of the present proceedings because of the effect that has been given to the Convention in Irish law.
The definition of an “organ of State” in section 1 includes “a tribunal………which is established by law or through which any of the legislative, executive or judicial powers of the State are exercised.” The Tribunal undoubtedly comes within that definition.
and a court shall, when interpreting and applying the Convention provisions, take due account of the principles laid down by those declarations, decisions, advisory opinions, opinions and judgments.
43.	The combined effect of these provisions for the purposes of the present case is that the relevant sections of the Tribunals of Inquiry legislation must be interpreted in “a manner compatible with the State’s obligations under the Convention provisions.” For that purpose, the court must take judicial notice of the Convention provisions themselves and of the various documents mentioned in section 4 of the Act of 2003. Foremost among those are the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights. The requirement that the Court take judicial notice of the Convention and of the various documents referred to means that they can be relied upon by the Court without special proof. The Court must, in addition, as the concluding words of the provision make clear, “take due account” of the principles laid down in those judgments. This is not the same as saying that they constitute binding precedents.
44.	Although no issue arises in the present case of conflict between the Convention provisions and the Constitution, it is important to recall that, in the event of such a conflict, it is the Constitution which must prevail. Both the High Court and this Court on appeal have been concerned with the effect that is to be given in Irish law to the provisions of the Tribunals of Inquiry Acts and the orders made by the Tribunal. It is to state the obvious that a distinction must be made between this exercise of jurisdiction and that performed by the Court at Strasbourg exercising jurisdiction in international law, potentially leading to decisions binding on the State.
47.	The appellants cited from a large number of judgments of the European Court of Human Rights dealing with restrictions or penalties imposed by Member States claiming reliance on Article 10.2. Amongst these decisions were Lingens v. Austria (1986) 87 EHRR 329 Castells v. Spain, (1992) 14 EHRR 445 Fressoz and Roire v. France, (1999) 31 EHRR 28 Tromso v. Norway, (1999) 29 EHRR 12 Radio Twist AS v. Slovakia, (Unreported, European Court of Human Rights, 19 December 2006).
These judgments emphasise not merely the fundamental right to freedom of expression but, in the case of the press, its indispensable contribution to the functioning of a democratic society.
“39. The adjective ‘necessary’, within the meaning of Article 10.2, implies the existence of a ‘pressing social need’. The Contracting States have a certain margin of appreciation in assessing whether such a need exists, but it goes hand in hand with a European supervision, embracing both the legislation and the decisions applying it, even those given by an independent court. The Court is therefore empowered to give the final ruling on whether a ‘restriction’ or ‘penalty’ is reconcilable with freedom of expression as protected by Article 10.
40.	In exercising its supervisory jurisdiction, the Court cannot confine itself to considering the impugned court decisions in isolation; it must look at them in the light of the case as a whole, including the articles held against the applicant and the context in which they were written. The Court must determine whether the interference at issue was ‘proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued’ and whether the reasons adduced by the Austrian courts to justify it are ‘relevant and sufficient’.
41.	In this connection, the Court has to recall that freedom of expression, as secured in paragraph 1 of Article 10, constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society and one of the basic conditions for its progress and for each individual’s self-fulfilment. Subject to paragraph 2, it is applicable not only to ‘information’ or ‘ideas’ that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb. Such are the demands of that pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness without which there is no ‘democratic society’.
These principles are of particular importance as far as the press is concerned. Whilst the press must not overstep the bounds set, inter alia, for the ‘protection of the reputation of others’, it is nevertheless incumbent on it to impart information and ideas on political issues just as on those in other areas of public interest. Not only does the press have the task of imparting such information and ideas: the public also has a right to receive them. In this connection, the Court cannot accept the opinion, expressed in the judgment of the Vienna Court of Appeal, to the effect that the task of the press was to impart information, the interpretation of which had to be left primarily to the reader.
42.	Freedom of the press furthermore affords the public one of the best means of discovering and forming an opinion of the ideas and attitudes of political leaders. More generally, freedom of political debate is at the very core of the concept of a democratic society which prevails throughout the Convention.
48.	The European Court has been at pains to emphasise that the right to freedom of expression is not unlimited. It usually states, as in the above passage, that the press must not "overstep certain bounds.” The court has said that "Article 10 does not…… guarantee a wholly unrestricted freedom of expression even with respect to press coverage of matters of serious public concern.” For example, it may be necessary, depending on the circumstances, to balance an individual's right to private and family life guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention. Member States have a "certain margin of appreciation in assessing whether” there is a need for a restriction.
50.	One of the public interests recognised by Article 10.2 as potentially justifying a restriction on the exercise of freedom of expression is “preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence.” It is cases concerning this precise issue that are the most relevant to the present appeal. Two cases deserve careful consideration.
In the case of Fressoz and Roire, cited above, the applicants were a publisher and a journalist with the French satirical newspaper, Le Canard enchaîné. During a period of industrial unrest involving the motor-car manufacturer, Peugeot, the applicants published an article including details of the personal notices of assessment to tax of the chairman and managing director of the company. The second applicant said that the documents had been sent anonymously in an envelope addressed to him by name. The applicants were prosecuted and ultimately convicted by a Paris court of an offence of handling these documents which had been obtained through a breach of professional confidence by an unidentified tax official. They were fined 10,000 and 5,000FF respectively and ordered to pay the managing director 1FF for non-pecuniary damage and 10,000FF for costs.
The court went on to explain, at paragraph 53, that it “must …determine whether the objective of protecting fiscal confidentiality, which in itself is legitimate, constituted a relevant and sufficient justification for the interference."
It should be noted that the European Court did not doubt that there was a “pressing social need” for restraint of publication of the information.
However, the matter is not as clear as might appear at first sight. The decision was by a 5 to 4 majority. Powell J, though part of the majority, stressed, at page 709, “the limited nature of the Court’s holding.” He argued for recognition of the constitutional rights of journalists “with respect to the gathering of news or in safeguarding their sources.” Moreover, later cases have suggested that Branzburg v Hayes is authority only in the case of a summons to testify before a grand jury. A number of recent high-profile cases in the federal courts show that journalists cannot claim any general privilege against disclosure when required to testify before a grand jury investigating the possible commission of criminal offences.
54.	Mr Collins referred us to a comprehensive article by Randall D. Eliason entitled "Leakers, Bloggers and Fourth Estate Inmates: the Misguided pursuit of a reporter's privilege." 2006. 24 Cardozo Arts & Ent. LJ 385. That article shows that multiple distinctions need to be borne in mind between, for example: constitutional and common law; criminal and civil law; statute and judge-made law; state and federal law. Many states have laws protecting journalists’ privilege. It is protected, for example, in the Constitution of the State of California.
55.	There is no federal legislative protection of journalists’ sources. Moreover, it seems fair to say that the existence of a journalistic privilege of nondisclosure is highly contested in the federal courts and that, at the very least, it is certainly not regarded, where it is recognised, as absolute. The author, Mr Eliason, is himself highly critical "of a profession whose members believe that their professional obligations require them to break the law." He observes of journalists "claiming the right to decide for themselves how best to protect an institution: the free press." The American courts display a notable reluctance to allow to journalists a form of immunity from the obligation incumbent on all other citizens to obey the law, in particular, to give evidence when summoned and generally to participate in the judicial process. The federal courts have shown themselves willing, in the very recent past, to imprison journalists for contempt of court for refusal to give evidence before a grand jury, where a source would be revealed.
56.	As already stated, it is clear that the High Court was perfectly correct to hold that the Tribunal had the power, pursuant to section 4 of the Act of 1979, to conduct an inquiry into the source of the unauthorized disclosure of information communicated during its private investigative phase. It is equally clear that the information communicated by the Tribunal in its letter of 29th June 2006 to Mr McKenna had the character of confidential information. The Tribunal had the right and was under a duty to protect confidential information communicated to it and by it during its private investigative phase. The Tribunal is right to investigate unauthorised disclosure of such information and the courts must support its efforts.
57.	It is also clear, on the other hand, and has never been disputed on the part of the Tribunal, that the information in question, relating, as it did, to allegations of the payment of monies to an important political figure, was a matter of public interest, which a newspaper would, in the ordinary way be entitled to print.
59.	The key issue in the appeal is, therefore, whether the High Court was correct in deciding to make its order of 9th November 2007 which requires the appellants to appear before the Tribunal and to answer questions in relation to the source and present whereabouts of the documents which Mr Keena had received anonymously. The answer to that question depends on whether the High Court was correct in the way in which it balanced the right and interest of the Tribunal in seeking to uncover the source of the unauthorised disclosure and the interests of the appellants in protecting their source.
60.	Following an extensive examination of the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, the High Court expressed the view that the exercise of deciding between competing interests “in a democratic society based on the rule of law is reserved to courts established by law for that purpose.” That, it seems to me, is a correct and unexceptionable principle. I have summarised, as did the High Court, the judgments of the European Court concerning the balance which the courts must strike between the right to freedom of expression, on the one hand, and the interests recognised in article 10.2 of the Convention, on the other. That court accords a margin of appreciation to the Contracting States, and their courts, when they decide those matters. It does not propose that these matters can be decided other than by courts. The High Court correctly said that the appellants had “cast themselves as the adjudicators of the proper balance to be struck between the rights and interests of concerned.” The courts cannot and should not abdicate their responsibility to decide when a journalist is obliged to disclose his or her source. The unilateral decision of a journalist to destroy evidence with intent to deprive the courts of jurisdiction is, as the High Court has held, designed to subvert the rule of law. The Courts cannot shirk their duty to penalise journalists who refuse to answer questions legitimately and lawfully put to them.
61.	Careful consideration needs, of course, to be given to the Goodwin case. The court must “take due account” of the principles it lays down. At this point, I raise the question as to whether it can truly be said to be in accord with the interests of a democratic society based on the rule of law that journalists, as a unique class, have the right to decide for themselves to withhold information from any and every public institution or court regardless of the existence of a compelling need, for example, for the production of evidence of the commission of a serious crime. While the present case does not concern information about the commission of serious criminal offences, it cannot be doubted that such a case could arise. Who would decide whether the journalist’s source had to be protected? There can be only one answer. In the event of conflict, whether in a civil or criminal context, the courts must adjudicate and decide, while allowing all due respect to the principle of journalistic privilege. No citizen has the right to claim immunity from the processes of the law.
65.	If the “leaked” document was not headed and thus, as a matter of probability, came from a Tribunal source, that might possibly assist the Tribunal in its endeavour to identify the source. At the same time, a number of other hypotheses cannot be excluded. One must recall that the person “leaking” the document would, in all probability, have wished to disguise the source. Thus, by the use of a photocopying machine, the heading might be removed from an original letter. Equally, an original might have been photocopied prior to its despatch from the Tribunal.
66.	On the contrary hypothesis that it did not come from a Tribunal source, but was, as the High Court expressed it “shrouded in impenetrable mystery,” it clearly would not be possible to justify the making of the order.
67.	If the apparent anonymity of the source weakens the appellants’ case for resisting the order, it must correspondingly weaken the Tribunal’s case for obtaining it. If, as was the case in Goodwin, the source was a person known to the journalist, it could, at the least, be argued that there was some concrete benefit to be obtained from the making of the order. Where the source is anonymous, the benefit is speculative at best. Mr Collins submitted, on behalf of the Tribunal, that the relationship of trust and confidence between the journalist and the source which is the basis of the journalist’s privilege was absent where the source was anonymous. There has been some discussion in the United States of theories of privilege: is it there to protect the source or the journalist? I do not find any such notion in the European case-law, which seems to proceed on a functional theory: is there a pressing social need for the imposition of the restriction?
68.	Looking at the High Court judgment as a whole, I have come to the conclusion that the great weight which it attached to the reprehensible conduct of the appellants in destroying documents led it to adopt an erroneous approach to the balancing exercise.
69.	According to the reasoning of the European Court in Goodwin, an order compelling the appellants to answer questions for the purpose of identifying their source could only be “justified by an overriding requirement in the public interest.” Once the High Court had devalued the journalistic privilege so severely, the balance was clearly not properly struck. On the other side, I find it very difficult to discern any sufficiently clear benefit to the Tribunal from any answers to the questions they wish to pose to justify the making of the order.
70.	I would, therefore, allow the appeal and substitute an order dismissing the Tribunal’s application.

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