Source: http://www.amsllp.com/publication/allan-mayefsky-determining-whether-no-fault-law/
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 03:05:01+00:00

Document:
The new no-fault divorce statute (Domestic Relations Law §170(7)) that was put into effect on Oct. 12, 2010, and gives parties the option of obtaining a divorce without alleging fault, has been hailed by litigants, commentators, and matrimonial judges as marking the end of pointless and expensive trials over divorce grounds. Today, to establish grounds, a married person commencing an action for divorce in New York need allege under oath only that the marital relationship “has broken down irretrievably for a period of at least six months.”1 On the surface, DRL §170(7) eliminates the need for trials and presents a simple way for an unhappy spouse to end a marriage without having to present evidence of, inter alia, adultery, cruelty, or abandonment.
In Strack, the wife brought an action for divorce based on the new no-fault ground, alleging in her complaint that, inter alia, her relationship with her husband had “broken down such that it [was] irretrievable,” there was “no emotion in their marriage,” she had “kept largely separate social schedules and vacation schedules” from her husband, and the couple “have not lived as husband and wife.” The husband moved to dismiss the complaint.
In support of this statement, the court pointed out that in enacting DRL §170(7), the Legislature failed to say anything about DRL §173 which provides that “[i]n an action for divorce there is a right to trial by jury of the issues of the grounds for granting the divorce.” Thus, the court concluded that the husband had the right to a trial on the issue of whether his relationship with his wife had broken down irretrievably for a period of at least six months.
Strack raises two interesting questions: First, does a litigant who opposes a DRL §170(7) divorce always have the right to trial? This question was explored in a recent New York Law Journal article by Timothy Tippins.4 Mr. Tippins contends that Justice Muller’s holding was proper and DRL §170(7) “does not express any intent to strip litigants of the opportunity to be heard.” As opposed to being a “no-ground statute” or a “no-trial statute,” DRL §170(7) is a “no-fault statute.” Even if the statute did expressly prohibit trials, Mr. Tippins argues it would not pass constitutional muster. He asserts that due process is not a “legislative gift” but rather a “fundamental right protected by the U.S. Constitution.” Thus, following this line of argument, Mr. Strack should have the right to be heard with respect to his wife’s allegations and to provide evidence to the contrary.
Ultimately the appellate courts may need to weigh in on the dispute between Strack and A.C. as each decision makes compelling arguments. On the one hand, if it was the Legislature’s intent to do away with trials entirely, why is there no mention of DRL §173? Why require a sworn statement that the “marriage has broken down irretrievably for a period of six months” when a statement such as “I want a divorce” would accomplish the same goal? On the other hand, it is difficult to pinpoint exactly what due process principle is at riskthe right to force your spouse to stay in a marriage? And if it was the Legislature’s intent to make DRL §170(7) objectionable, wouldn’t the statute explicitly state that the moving spouse needs to prove an irretrievable breakdown instead of merely requiring a sworn statement?
Beyond the standard of proof, however, courts in other states with similar no-fault statutes have been hesitant to set forth specific circumstances that trial courts could utilize as permissible indices of an irretrievable breakdown of the marriage. Rather, courts examine each case individually and avoid any formulaic recitations of objective factors. As the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine points out: “The term irreconcilable marital differences is one that necessarily lacks precision and should not be circumscribed by a strict definition.”9 Nonetheless, from a survey of various decisions, it is possible to glean some recurring indicators of an irretrievable breakdown.
Despite the existence of these objective factors, however, courts still leave the door open to grant a divorce based on purely subjective evidence. In the words of Justice Falanga: “Marriage is the state’s recognition and approval of a man and woman’s voluntary choice to live with each other, to remain committed to one another and to form a household based upon their own feelings about one another.”14 To proscribe that a couple cannot divorce just because they continue to engage in activities together like cohabitating, sleeping together, or socializing fails to take into account the nuanced and emotional aspect of a marriage. It also invites the type of perjury that DRL §170(7) sought to prevent by forcing the plaintiff to testify to such objective factors when perhaps there were none.
The answer, it seems, if Strack is correct, is to give defendants the right to be heard to make room for the rare case when a defendant does have evidence to rebut a finding of the irretrievable breakdown, but to set the standard of proof at a level low enough that most trials will be relatively quick, inexpensive and drama-free. And this is precisely what Strack has advocated doing.
Thus, although an acceptance of the reasoning in Strack may mean the continuation of grounds trials in New York State, the good news is that DRL §170(7) trials, in the unlikely event they do occur, will be less contrived than the trials of yesterday involving who refused to sleep with whom, lies, betrayal, and adultery. And this, at the end of the day, will make the most practical difference to courts, litigants, and attorneys alike.
2. 2011 NY Slip Op 21033 (Sup. Ct. Essex Cty. Feb. 3, 2011).
4. See Timothy M. Tippins, “No-Fault Divorce and Due Process,” New York Law Journal (March 3, 2011).
5. 2011 NY Slip Op 21113 (Sup. Ct. Nassau Cty. March 28, 2011).
6. See Eversman v. Eversman, 496 A.2d 210, 211 (Conn. App. Ct. 1985).
7. Riley v. Riley, 271 So.2d 181 (Fl. App. 1972).
8. See Eversman, 496 A.2d at 212.
9. See Mattson v. Mattson, 376 A.2d 473 (Me. 1977).
10. See e.g., In re the Matter of Howard W.B. v. Janice H.B., 1995 Del. Fam. Ct. Lexis 2, **5-6 (Del. Fam. Ct. 1995).
11. In re the Matter of Howard W.B., 1995 Del. Fam. Ct. at *6.
12. Id.; see also Abunaw v. Abunaw, 2006 Conn. Super LEXIS 2348 (Super. Ct. 2006).
13. See e.g. Riley, 271 So.2d.
14. A.C., 2011 NY Slip Op. at *24.

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