Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&amp;view=article&amp;id=50709:gr-171315-2008&amp;catid=1502&amp;Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 09:06:52+00:00

Document:
G.R. No. 171315 - ANTONIO ARBIZO v. SPS. ANTONIO SANTILLAN AND ROSARIO L. SANTILLAN, ETC.
ANTONIO ARBIZO, Petitioner, v. SPS. ANTONIO SANTILLAN and ROSARIO L. SANTILLAN, Respondents.
ANTONIO ARBIZO, Petitioner, v. SPS. JOHN WASSMER and LUZ MARCELO-WASSMER, Respondents.
ANTONIO ARBIZO, Petitioner, v. PACITA MARCELO, Respondent.
For review on certiorari under Rule 451 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure filed by petitioner Antonio Arbizo is the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals dated 31 January 2006. The Court of Appeals ordered petitioner to vacate the properties subject of this case. The assailed Decision reversed and set aside the Decision3 dated 20 February 2004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iba, Zambales, which affirmed in toto the Decision4 dated 18 August 2003 of the 3rd Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Botolan-Cabangan, Cabangan, Zambales, in Civil Cases No. 833, No. 834, No. 835 and No. 836.
The records show that on 27 June 2001, the respondents filed with the MCTC three separate Complaints for Ejectment against the petitioner. Finding similarity in the issues involved, the MCTC jointly heard the three Complaints under the Rules on Summary Procedure.
In their Complaints, the respondents averred that right after they purchased the subject properties in 1998, they immediately enclosed the same with a wooden perimeter fence with barbed wire. Sometime in September 2000, the petitioner, without their knowledge, much less consent, unlawfully occupied the subject properties by removing and destroying the fence they had installed, and later replacing it with his own concrete fence. Despite repeated demands to vacate the subject properties, petitioner vehemently refused to do so. Thus, respondents prayed that the petitioner be ordered to vacate the subject properties, and to pay each of them: (1) the amount of P1,000.00 per month from September 2000 until the subject properties are vacated, as actual damages in the form of reasonable compensation for the use and occupation thereof; (2) the amount of P25,000,00 as attorney's fees plus P800.00 per court appearance; and (3) the amount of P10,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages.
In response, the petitioner countered that the subject lots formed part of the 29,345-square meter property previously owned by his father, Celestino Arbizo, who occupied the same during his lifetime as early as 1921. At the time of his father's death on 11 May 1956, he left the entire property as part of his estate to his forced and compulsory heirs; namely, Maria Facelo Arbizo (the petitioner's mother), Carolina Arbizo-Noceda, Aurora Arbizo-Ecdao, Anacleto Arbizo and Ma. Agrifina Arbizo-Mendigorin (the children of Celestino Arbizo by the first and second marriages).8 Petitioner's wife, Dominga Arbizo, bought the undivided shares of Anacleto Arbizo and Ma. Agrifina Arbizo-Mendigorin in the said property on 15 August 1976 and 16 November 1976, respectively. Since then, petitioner claimed to have been in peaceful, continuous and uninterrupted possession of the 11,230-square meter parcel of land which included the subject properties. By way of counterclaim, the petitioner prayed that the respondents be ordered to pay him the amount of P100,000.00 per court appearance as attorney's fees.
From the evidence on record, it appears that the [herein respondents] obtained their respective title over the lots in the year 1998. If their and their witnesses' word were to be given credit, the [respondents] entered the land when they thereupon enclosed/fenced the same with wooden posts and barbed wire but were removed, destroyed and later replaced by the [herein petitioner] in September, 2000 with concrete fences (sic).
The relocation survey report and sketch plan of the geodetic engineer meantime reveal that the disputed adjoining lots (having an approximate area of 1,200 square meters each) are part of the 11,230 square-meter land (sic) held and occupied by the [petitioner]. Likewise, extant in the technical report and plan are the other recorded improvements consisting of huts belonging to the [petitioner] and found standing inside his occupied property. The Court itself confirmed the existence of these improvements during the ocular inspection of the property.
Equally evident from the documents presented is the fact that the large stretch of land being occupied by the [petitioner] came from his father the late Celestino Arbizo in whose name the tax declaration for the land for the year 1985 was issued. That two (2) of the Arbizo's sibling, Anacleto Arbizo and Agrifina Arbizo-Mendigorin, conveyed and sold their respective 1/5 shares from (sic) the property to Dominga P. Arbizo [petitioner's] wife is doubtlessly established by the two (2) deeds of sale executed by the former in the year 1976. This logically explains why [petitioner] Antonio Arbizo and his wife are as seen in the engineer's documents occupying an approximate area of 11,230 square meters out of the 2.9 hectare-property (sic) tax declared in the name of Celestino Arbizo who at the time of his death appeared to have left five (5) heirs. x x x.
Moreover, the corroborated declarations of [petitioner's] witnesses (one of whom [Jesus Paredes] is 81 years old and a long-time friend of [petitioner's] father convincingly prove that [petitioner] has already been occupying the Arbizo property including the controverted [three] parcels of land much long before the [respondents] bought, registered, and fenced them in the year 1998. Proof that the [petitioner] has preferred possession is the testimony of Conrado Santos, [respondents'] own witness, to the effect that said [petitioner] was at the area and that the laborers even took their refreshment at the nearby resthouse of the Arbizo's during their fencing of [respondents'] properties. On this point, [petitioner's] possession becomes even more superior if the span of years that his father and predecessor-in-interest had held the property were to be tacked to his own possession.
The records of the case reveal that prior to 1998, the possession of the subject lots was undoubtedly in the hands of the [herein petitioner]. To substantiate his allegation that he had prior possession of the subject lots, the [petitioner] adduced in evidence Tax Declaration No. 16-0032 which was issued in 1985, and the two (2) deeds of sale in 1976 executed in favor of his wife, Dominga Arbizo, by Anacleto Arbizo and Agrifina Arbizo-Mendigorin. In addition, the [petitioner] presented the affidavits of his witnesses, Jesus Paredes and Rosario Corpuz, both stating therein that he remained in possession of the subject lots even up to the present time. However, We find that these pieces of evidence do not successfully debunk the claim of the [herein respondents] that they were able to wrest physical possession of the subject lots in 1998 when they installed a fence enclosing the same. Furthermore, the fact that the MCTC found [petitioner's] several huts standing on the subject lots during the ocular inspection does not necessarily establish that the [petitioner] had been in peaceful, continuous and uninterrupted possession of the subject lots. As the records disclose, the ocular inspection was conducted in 2003 which was approximately three (3) years after the unlawful intrusion by the [petitioner]. Hence, We cannot readily conclude that the huts were already there when the [respondents] took actual possession of the subject lots in 1998 as these huts could be easily constructed.
The pertinent point of inquiry is whether or not private respondents have a valid ground to evict petitioner from the subject properties.
SECTION 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. ' Subject to the provisions of the next succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person may at any time within (1) one year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession, together with damages and costs.
In forcible entry, one is deprived of physical possession of land or building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. In unlawful detainer, one unlawfully withholds possession thereof after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or implied. In forcible entry, the possession is illegal from the beginning and the basic inquiry centers on who has the prior possession de facto. In unlawful detainer, the possession was originally lawful but became unlawful by the expiration or termination of the right to possess, hence the issue of rightful possession is decisive for, in such action, the defendant is in actual possession and the plaintiff's cause of action is the termination of the defendant's right to continue in possession.
The Court of Appeals, in its assailed Decision, found that (1) respondents had prior physical possession of the subject properties, and (2) they were deprived thereof by petitioner by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth.
We agree in the conclusion of the Court of Appeals.
On the issue of who has prior possession, respondents' prior physical possession of the subject properties and deprivation thereof are clear from the allegation that they are the owners of the subject properties which petitioner forcibly entered, of which they were unlawfully turned out of possession and for which they pray to be restored in possession.
1. Kaming dalawa ng aking anak na si Edmund Santos ay inupahan nina Atty. at Mrs. Reynaldo Dantes upang magbakod sa lupang nabili ng kanilang mga kamag anak at kaibigan sa Brgy. San Isidro, Cabangan, Zambales.
2. Binakuran namin ang lupang nasasakupan ng apat na titulo.
3. Ang ginamit naming pambakod ay kawayan, boho, posteng kahoy at barbed wire.
4. Nang kami y kasalukuyang nagbabakod nakamasid si Antonio Arbizo. Sa katunayan sa Resthouse pa ni Tony Arbizo kami kumain ng aming meryenda sa tabi ng nasabing lupa.
5. Nang kami ay kasalukuyang nagbabakod, wala namang nagbawal o tumanggi sa aming ginagawa at maayos at mapayapa naming nabakuran ang lupang nasasakupan ng apat na titulo.
The words "by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth" include every situation or condition under which one person can wrongfully enter upon real property and exclude another, who has had prior possession therefrom. If a trespasser enters upon land in open daylight, under the very eyes of the person already clothed with lawful possession, but without the consent of the latter, and there plants himself and excludes such prior possessor from the property, the action of forcible entry and detainer can unquestionably be maintained, even though no force is used by the trespasser other than such as is necessarily implied from the mere acts of planting himself on the ground and excluding the other party.
All told, after due consideration of the evidence presented by the parties in this case and the applicable jurisprudence, we hold that the Court of Appeals correctly found respondents to have a superior right of possession over the subject properties.
We emphasize that our disquisition in this case is provisional and only to the extent necessary to determine who between the parties has the better right of possession.24 In an appropriate proceeding before the court having jurisdiction, petitioner may still have the sale of the subject property to respondents annulled, and the latter's title cancelled if petitioner's case is truly meritorious.
Additionally, it must also be remembered that the subject property is registered under the Torrens System in the names of the respondents whose title to the property is presumed legal and cannot be collaterally attacked, less so in an action for forcible entry.
In passing, it must be stressed that the jurisdiction of Supreme Court in cases brought before it from the Court of Appeals via Rule 45, as in this case, is limited to reviewing errors or questions of law. Where factual matters are involved, it is well-settled that a question of fact is to be determined by the evidence to support the particular contention. As found by the Court of Appeals, the evidence adduced on this score are in respondents' favor. Whether such conclusion of the Court of Appeals was supported by the evidence presented before it is also factual in nature. It is the burden of the party seeking review of a decision of the Court of Appeals or other lower tribunals to distinctly set forth in his Petition for Review, not only the existence of questions of law fairly and logically arising therefrom, but also questions substantial enough to merit consideration, or show that there are special and important reasons warranting the review that he seeks. If these are not shown prima facie in his petition, this Court will be justified in summarily spurning the petition as lacking in merit.
Nonetheless, the exception is not applied unqualifiedly. In Bank of Commerce v. Serrano,26 we held that this Court does not, of itself, automatically delve into the record of a case to determine the facts anew where there is disagreement between the findings of fact by the trial court and by the Court of Appeals. When the disagreement is merely on the probative value of the evidence, i.e., which is more credible of two versions, we limit our review to only ascertaining if the findings of the Court of Appeals are supported by the records. So long as the findings of the appellate court are consistent with and not palpably contrary to the evidence on record, we shall decline to make a review on the probative value of such evidence. The findings of fact of the Court of Appeals, and not those of the trial court, will be considered final and conclusive, even in this Court. In this case, we find no cogent reason to disturb the foregoing factual findings of the Court of Appeals holding respondents entitled to the possession of the subject properties.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 31 January 2006 in CA-G.R. SP No. 86456 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
1 Appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court.
2 Penned by Associate Justice Jose C. Reyes, Jr. with Associate Justices Eliezer R. De Los Santos and Arturo G. Tayag, concurring. Rollo, pp. 19-32.
3 CA rollo, pp. 25-29.
8 Except for those enumerated, the records do not state the names of the other heirs of petitioner's father, Celestino Arbizo.
9 CA rollo, p. 24.
15 Arambulo v. Gungab, G.R. No. 156581, 30 September 2005, 471 SCRA 640, 648-649.
16 Buduhan v. Pakurao, G.R. No. 168237, 22 February 2006, 483 SCRA 116, 122.
17 Fige v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107951, 30 June 1994, 233 SCRA 586, 590.
18 Lao v. Lao, G.R. No. 149599, 16 May 2005, 458 SCRA 539, 546.
19 Pajuyo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 146364, 3 June 2004, 430 SCRA 492, 510.
20 CA rollo, p. 65.
21 MontaÃ±ez v. Mendoza, 441 Phil. 47, 58-59 (2002).
22 Buduhan v. Pakurao, supra note 16.
23 G.R. No. 152992, 28 July 2005, 464 SCRA 384, 389-400; BaÃ±es v. Lutheran Church in the Philippines, G.R. No. 142308, 15 November 2005, 475 SCRA 13, 34-35.
24 Umpoc v. Mercado, G.R. No. 158166, 21 January 2005, 449 SCRA 220, 238.
25 Ortega v. Valmonte, G.R. No. 157451, 16 December 2005, 478 SCRA 247, 256.
26 G.R. No. 151895, 16 February 2005, 451 SCRA 484, 492.

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