Source: http://massachusettslandlords.com/haddad-v-hogan-93a/
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 07:04:01+00:00

Document:
LLP were on consolidated brief for appellees.
magistrate judge awarding attorneys’ fees and costs.
shares it had loaned HMG were replaced by HMG’s own shares.
1, 3 (1st Cir. 1997).
conversion. See 26 U.S.C. § 1374(a), (d)(7) (2006); MMC Corp. v.
presumably would have had to pay tax at the corporate level.
because of the transactions themselves.
to a Subchapter S corporation retroactive to January 1, 1999.
HMG’s 1997 tax return by the IRS.
potentially liable for penalties and interest.
balance of the tax in 2000.
failing to make quarterly installment payments in 1999.
verdict so far as it was adverse to HMG.
due on the extension form in March 2000.
Further, the trial judge expanded the damage award.
finding of a “willful or knowing violation” by KASH. Mass. Gen.
standard of review varies with the individual claim of error.
years, but the judge made no finding on the point.
based on this other conduct by KASH.
his explanation because KASH’s attack is itself defective.
at fault for that non-payment (although not to the same degree).
violation, Damon v. Sun Co., Inc., 87 F.3d 1467, 1483-84 (1st Cir.
its tentative tax payment in March 2000 and chose to conserve cash.
see, e.g., Bolton v. Taylor, 367 F.3d 5, 7-8 (1st Cir. 2004).
that this conversation influenced the judge’s Chapter 93A decision.
65, 74-75 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 470 (2008).
interrupt jury deliberations prior to jury verdict); Shears v.
statements from jury cannot be used to alter jury verdict).
extraordinary circumstances not here present).
review denied, 840 N.E.2d 55 (Mass. 2005); see also Kattar v.
Demoulas, 739 N.E.2d 246, 258 (Mass. 2000).
policy choice, cf. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 920A(2) & cmt.
the rate paid, there should be no offset.
made its capital position better (at least in appearance).
432 N.E.2d 467, 473-74 (Mass. 1982).
recalculate damages so these issues need not be pursued.
that KASH did not act negligently prior to this date.
the judge, but neither is a fool-proof proposition. See Troy v.
780 F.2d 1049, 1064-67 (1st Cir. 1985).
clear error by the judge.
A more serious objection to the treble damages exists.
requires a demand letter and section 11 does not, compare Mass.
was a reasonable offer and cuts off treble damages.
decision and so had ample opportunity to raise the objection.
filed. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, § 9(3).
not forfeit this version of its objection.
the-box” transaction and converting to Subchapter S status.
the amount of loss was substantial.
expected to recover more than $20,000 on the combined claims. Cf.
might have been kept open long enough to avoid the tax altogether.
attorneys’ fees award is deferential, see Figueroa-Torres v.
not preside over the trial, e.g., Interface Partners Int’l Ltd. v.
Hananel, 575 F.3d 97, 100-101 & n.6 (1st Cir. 2009).
NASCO, Inc. v. Pub. Storage, Inc., 127 F.3d 148, 153-54 (1st Cir.
also Schaumberg v. Friedmann, 888 N.E.2d 963, 968-69 (Mass. App.
fee is reasonable, e.g., Star Fin. Servs., Inc. v. AASTAR Mortg.
factor,” Homsi v. C. H. Babb Co., 409 N.E.2d 219, 225 (Mass. App.
but this is a judgment call which we decline to second-guess.

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