Source: https://www.ascecuba.org/asce_proceedings/havana-club-a-case-summary-and-an-analysis-of-selected-legal-issues/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 14:52:06+00:00

Document:
• What legal issues did the district court actually resolve—and which remain open?
• Who owns the Havana Club trademark in the United States?
• What questions under U.S. law still surround the now-infamous § 211 that the court applied in its last decision?
• Does § 211 conflict with U.S. obligations to World Trade Organization members?
• How might Cuba respond to the Havana Club case, and what are the implications for U.S. trademark stability in Cuba?
1. Defendants lacked standing under either constitutional standards or under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA) to challenge OFAC’s licensure of Cubaexport’s transfer of the Havana Club trademark registration to Plaintiffs.23 Under constitutional standards, Defendants (a) did not suffer injury in fact, (b) could not show causation “between the injury [claimed] and the offending conduct,”24 and (c) did not raise a redressable claim.25 Defendants’ standing failed under APA standards because they could not show injury in fact or show that their injury fell “‘within the “zone of interests” sought to be protected by the statutory provision [here, the CACR] whose violation forms the basis for… [the] … complaint.’”26 Because Defendants were not involved with the licensing proceeding and because they did not fall within the “range of foreign policy concerns that make up United States-Cuban relations [i.e., the CACR’s ‘zone of interests’],”27 Defendants lacked APA standing to oppose OFAC’s licensing decision.
3. The APA barred the court’s review of OFAC’s licensing decision because that office’s licensing determinations constitute agency action that is “‘committed to agency discretion by law’”31 and therefore beyond the court’s review.
5. Defendants’ motion to cancel the U.S. trademark registration was denied since Cubaexport, “restored as the owner of the registration,”72 “inevitably had an interest in the outcome of the registration issue.”73 Because Cubaexport was not a party in this suit,74 cancellation would adversely affect that interest without offering Cubaexport an opportunity to be heard.75 Since “all rights to the registration revert[ed] to Cubaexport,” 76 and because Cubaexport was now a necessary party,77 cancellation was denied.
Here, Congress clearly and intentionally enacted § 211 “to repeal rights in marks and trade names derived from treaties”118 where the law’s conditions are met. The court held that because the new law bars “‘assertion of treaty rights … under’” 119 the Lanham Act, and because the Lanham Act “provide[s] the framework for the assertion of all trademark and trade name treaty rights,”120 (including those under the convention), HCI could not assert its trade name infringement claims under either the Inter-American Convention or the Lanham Act. Importantly, however, the court did determine that § 211 did not “prevent HCI from asserting its false designation of origin claim”121 or “abrogate [its] rights to bring an unfair competition claim.”122 Thus, the court left open the possibility of an unfair competition suit, though that was not a claim asserted here.
The question remains: Does Cubaexport or Bacardi own the Havana Club trademark in the United States?145 In her June 1999 Order, Judge Scheindlin made it clear that this case never determined “whether … the Arechabalas owned a valid trademark … at the time”146 they contracted with Bacardi. There are, however, plausible arguments on both sides of the debate.
In the Havana Club context, abandonment could arguably attach to the Arechabala mark. Though the family’s discontinued use of the mark was involuntary due to Cuba’s 1960 expropriation (an important fact which weighs in the Arechabala’s favor in this debate), PTO records do not show that the Arechabalas ever registered “Havana Club” between 1960 and 1974, when Cubaexport first filed for registration. 173 Furthermore, there is no indication in any of Judge Scheindlin’s decisions (including in her recounting of the facts underlying the case) that the family ever used or intended to use the mark for rum or other spirits. The length of time of disuse (here 14 years before Cuba’s filing and over 30 years before the sale to Bacardi); the fact that the family arguably never demonstrated that they used or intended to use the mark other than by selling it to Bacardi; and the fact that they never defended their rights against Cuba’s use creates a plausible legal argument that the Arechabalas had abandoned the mark and therefore had no U.S.-based property to transfer to Bacardi.
Bacardi, however, also has viable arguments in its favor. In the Factual Background section of her third Havana Club decision, Judge Scheindlin states that “Bacardi & Co. owns the ‘Havana Club’ mark for rum in the United States.”174 While this statement of fact is not a legal ruling and therefore does not carry the weight of her earlier decision that Cubaexport again holds the U.S. trademark registration, Judge Scheindlin does state that it is “presumed to be true.”175 Since she was the initial finder of fact in this case, this statement does have some impact.
More importantly, perhaps, § 211 may effectively hamstring Cubaexport’s trademark rights in the United States. Though Cubaexport is the holder of record for the Havana Club trademark registration, § 211 (discussed later in greater detail) would prevent all U.S. courts from recognizing or enforcing Cubaexport’s mark if the Cuban company were to file for infringement. That raises the question: What value do Cuban trademarks that fall under § 211 have if they are unenforceable in U.S. courts? It would appear that such trademarks are valid only until defended or challenged in court.
It is also not certain that the Arechabalas abandoned the mark, and in fact no judge has yet so found. Abandonment is an affirmative defense; therefore, Cubaexport or one of the Plaintiffs in the Havana Club case would have to raise and prove abandonment should Bacardi or the Arechabalas sue for infringement.
Other case law arguably supports a finding that the Arechabalas did not abandon the Havana Club mark. First, even one instance of a mark’s good faith use by the owner during a period of lessened use can suffice to rebut an abandonment claim.181 Even disuse for an extended period will not strip an owner of his rights if there was no intent to abandon.182 Furthermore, evidence of abandonment can be overcome when unusual circumstances explain and excuse nonuse.183 In the Arechabalas’ case, one could argue that forcible expropriation and subsequent lack of capital to resume business would excuse the mark’s nonuse.
Unlike the Cuban cigar-producing families or their successors-in-interest, who established cigar companies outside of Cuba under world-famous trademarks such as Partagás and H. Upmann (registered and/or used outside Cuba and untouched by Cuban expropriation), the Arechabalas never regrouped to commercially exploit the Havana Club mark. In fact, they and Bacardi never made substantial use of the mark, did not enter the trademark fray until the 1990s, and failed to defend their rights until the Havana Club Plaintiffs filed suit. Use, after all, is the primary benchmark for the creation of trademark rights. As Judge Scheindlin stated, quoting a circuit court decision, “‘the right to exclusive use of a trademark derives from its appropriation and use in the marketplace.’”187 Ultimately, however, only a court or other finder of fact can resolve these abandonment issues here. Until then, we can only raise and the analyze the relevant legal arguments.
In response to Havana Club International’s assertion “that § 211 does not require the abrogation of treaty rights in circumstances where the original owner of the trademark or trade name has abandoned its rights in the mark,”194 Judge Scheindlin held that “[t]he statute does not require continuous use or provide a defense of abandonment.”195 Whether the judge was correct, however, is debatable. Since, as Judge Scheindlin admits, “there is no official legislative history surrounding the enactment of § 211”196 and there is no other case law applying this statute, we are limited to the law’s plain meaning.
However, there is a legitimate question as to whether the law’s wording alone suffices to decisively conclude that Congress meant to foreclose the abandonment defense. If Congress did intend to bar the abandonment argument, then the law arguably grants original Cuban trademark owners or their successorsin- interest a perpetual blocking right against others’ use of relevant trademarks, trade names, and commercial names.197 Such a right might run counter to settled U.S. (and possibly international) trademark law by attaching a permanent property right to trademarks, trade names, and commercial names that are, by law and by their nature, impermanent. Trademarks, even those that have been expropriated, are not tangible, real property such as land—or such as money or artwork stolen by the Nazis.198 The property rights they involve depend on use and are therefore perishable and transcient. A legally abandoned trademark no longer belongs to the original owner. If anything, it passes into the public domain.199 As morally repugnant as forcible expropriation is, § 211 will doubtless raise eyebrows if it is deemed to create a fixed property right in marks that have gone unused and undefended for decades.
Concluding that Congress had not “‘expressly prescribed’ the [law’s] proper reach,”216 the Supreme Court then considered whether the statute in question “would have retroactive effects inconsistent with the usual rule that legislation is deemed to be prospective.” 217 Such an inquiry, the Court stated, “demands a common sense, functional judgment about ‘whether the new provision attaches new legal consequences to events completed before its enactment.’” 218 Furthermore, “[t]his judgment should be informed and guided by ‘familiar considerations of fair notice, reasonable reliance, and settled expectations.’”219 In this case, the Court found that the law did have a retroactive effect on settled expectations and that such effect was impermissible without a clear expression of congressional intent to apply the law retroactively.220 Without such clear expression, then, prospectivity is the default rule,221 and retroactivity is impermissible.
In Havana Club, Judge Scheindlin seems correct in concluding that § 211 does not prescribe or indicate an intended temporal reach. The law as written does not contain express language regarding Congress’ intent to apply the law retroactively, and § 211 has no legislative history upon which to base a contrary result. Furthermore, even if, on appeal, Defendants were to assert that the “‘any assertion of [trademark, trade name, or commercial name] rights’”222 language signaled Congress’ retroactive intent, the Court of Appeals could easily look to Martin v. Hadix to disagree.
The Havana Club decisions have sparked news reports that Bacardi and the Arechabalas will pursue their trademark claims in Spain,229 that Cuba may create its own version of Coca-Cola,230 that Cuba may start a trade war with the United States,231 and that the European Union will dispute § 211 before the World Trade Organization.232 To understand what Cuba’s legitimate options are in response to Judge Scheindlin’s holdings and to avoid alarmist predictions about U.S. trademark protection in Cuba, it is necessary to briefly review applicable Cuban and international trademark norms and explore how § 211 might violate the United States’ World Trade Organization (“WTO”) obligations. Only then can we speculate as to the viability of U.S. trademarks registered in Cuba.
Such results are perceived by to be unlikely, however. 256 Cuba relies heavily on foreign investment and over time has welcomed visits by U.S. business people exploring post-embargo opportunities. Though we can only speculate as to what Cuba’s response would be to a finding that § 211 violates our international obligations, Cuba hardly appears ready to sacrifice future U.S. private investment. However, Cuba is no stranger to government expropriations, and trademark registrations remain vulnerable in a country balancing communism and capitalist experimentation. While foreign intellectual property’s safety in Cuba cannot be guaranteed, in the end, Cuba’s gradual incorporation of economic reforms and a predicted post-Castro return to a free-market economy raise the hope that Cuba will preserve trademark protection as a foundation upon which foreign investors can build.
1. Cubaexport’s official name is Empresa Cubana Exportadora de Alimentos y Productos Varios; see Havana Club Holding, S.A. and Havana Club Int’l, S.A. v. Galleon, S.A., Bacardi-Martini U.S.A., Inc., Gallo Wine Distribs., Inc., G.W.D. Holdings, Inc. and Premier Wine and Spirits, 1998 WL 150983, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 1998) [hereinafter Havana Club III].
2. Havana Club Holding, S.A. and Havana Club Int’l, S.A. v. Galleon S.A., Bacardi-Martini USA, Inc., Gallo Wine Distribs., Inc., G.W.D. Holdings, Inc. and Premier Wine and Spirits, 961 F. Supp. 498 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) [hereinafter Havana Club I].
3. Juan O. Tamayo, Cuban Rum War in Spanish Court, MIAMI HERALD, June 24, 1999, [hereinafter Tamayo, Cuban Rum War).
4. See Havana Club Holding, S.A. and Havana Club Int’l, S.A. v. Galleon S.A., Bacardi-Martini U.S.A., Inc., Gallo Wine Distribs., Inc., G.W.D. Holdings, Inc. and Premier Wine and Spirits, 1999 WL 219906, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 1999) [hereinafter Havana Club IV] (José Arechabala, S.A., a Cuban corporation, was “[t]he original producer of Cuban rum under the trademark ‘Havana Club.’”).
5. David I. Oyama, EU to Challenge U.S. over Dispute of Pernod, Bacardi, WALL ST. J., June 14, 1999, at A12 [hereinafter Oyama].
6. Cuba Warns of Trade War in US Trademark Dispute, J. COM., May 25, 1999, at 3A [hereinafter Cuba Warns of Trade War].
7. Juan O. Tamayo, Fidel Threat: We’ll Make Our Own Coke, MIAMI HERALD, May 11, 1999,[hereinafter Tamayo, Fidel Threat].
8. Havana Club IV, supra note 4, at *3.
11. Havana Club Holding, S.A. and Havana Club Int’l, S.A. v. Galleon S.A., Bacardi-Martini USA, Inc., Gallo Wine Distribs., Inc., G.W.D. Holdings, Inc. and Premier Wine and Spirits, 974 F. Supp. 302, 305 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) [hereinafter Havana Club II] (citations omitted).
12. Id. at 305-306 (citations omitted).
13. Havana Club IV, supra note 4, at *3 (citations omitted).
15. The Office of Foreign Assets Control, a division of the U.S. Department of the Treasury.
16. Havana Club II, supra note 11, at 306 (citations omitted).
17. Havana Club IV, supra note 4, at *4 (citations omitted).
18. Havana Club I, supra note 2, at 499.
19. Id.; Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Trade-Mark Act), 15 U.S.C.A. § 1051 (1946) [hereinafter Lanham Act].
20. Havana Club I, supra note 2, at 499.
25. Id. at 503-504 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
26. Id. at 504 (quoting Air Courier Conference of American v. American Postal Workers Union AFL-CIO, 498 U.S. 517, 523 (1991)).
28. Havana Club I, supra note 2, at 503.
29. Id. at 504 (quoting Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 242 (1984) (quoting Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 589 (1952))).
31. Id. at 505 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2)).
32. Havana Club II, supra note 11, at 306.
36. Havana Club II, supra note 11, at 304.
39. Id. at 308 (citing General Inter-American Convention for Trade Mark and Commercial Protection, Feb. 20, 1929, ch. II, art. 11, 46 Stat. 2907, 2922-2924, T.S. 833, 124 L.N.T.S. 357, 2 Bevans 751 [hereinafter Inter-American Convention]).
43. Trading with the Enemy Act, 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 1 (1917).
44. Havana Club II, supra note 11, at 310.
45. The first new claim sought relief under Chapter IV of the Inter-American Convention, while the second asserted rights under Chapter III. Because Plaintiffs did not adequately assert Chapter IV claims in documents filed with the court, the judge denied Plaintiffs permission to assert a Chapter IV claim (Havana Club II, supra note 11, at 312, n.10).
46. Havana Club II, supra note 11, at 312.
49. Id. (quoting 31 C.F.R. § 515.527(a)).
52. Id. (Judge Scheindlin quotes OFAC director Richard Newcomb: “‘[T]he general license allows only for the registration and renewal of intellectual property; § 515.527 does not convey … the authority to assign the registrant’s interest in a … trademark registered in the United States to another person.’”).
53. Id. (quoting Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984)).
55. Havana Club II, supra note 11, at 315.
56. Id. at 307 (citing Inter-American Convention, supra note 39, at ch. I, art. 1, 46 Stat. 2907, 2912).
57. Id. at 308 (citing Inter-American Convention, supra note 39, at ch. II, art. 11, 46 Stat. 2907, 2922-2924).
58. Id. (quoting Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 18 (1957)) (other citations omitted).
59. Id. at 309 (citing Posadas v. National City Bank of New York, 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936)).
62. Id. (quoting Pollnow v. Glennon, 757 F.2d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1985)).
66. Havana Club II, supra note 11, at 310 (quoting 31 C.F.R. § 515.201(b)(1)).
68. Id. (quoting 31 C.F.R. § 515.201(b)(1)).
79. Havana Club II, supra note 11, at 314-315.
80. Id. at 314 (quoting 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 9.13 (3d ed. 1997)).
82. Id. (quoting Lang v. Retirement Living Publishing Co., 949 F.2d 576, 579-580 (2d Cir. 1991)).
88. Havana Club III, supra note 1, at *1.
89. Havana Club III, supra note 1, at *1.
94. Id. (quoting Stetson v. Howard D. Wolf & Assocs., 955 F.2d 847, 850 (2d Cir. 1992) (citing Silverman v. CBS, Inc., 870 F.2d 40, 48 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 907 (1989))).
100. Havana Club III, supra note 1, at *5 (quoting Shondel v. McDermott, 775 F.2d 859, 868 (7th Cir. 1985)).
102. Id.; Judge Scheindlin granted Plaintiffs’ motion to deny two of Defendants’ unclean hands allegations. Those denied allegations asserted that Plaintiffs willfully violated civil and criminal laws in trying to ensure ownership of the Havana Club trademark and that Plaintiffs’ use of the mark’s design was meant to confuse consumers as to the parties’ respective products.
108. Havana Club III, supra note 1, at *1.
109. Havana Club IV, supra note 4, at *1.
110. Havana Club IV, supra note 4, at *1.
113. Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 211, 112 Stat. 2681, *2681-__ (1998).
114. Havana Club IV, supra note 4, at *4.
115. Id. (quoting Reid v. Covert, supra note 58, at 18).
116. Id. (quoting Posadas v. National City Bank of New York, supra note 59, at 503).
117. Id. (citing Posadas v. National City Bank of New York, supra note 59, at 503).
119. Id. at *4 (quoting Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, supra note 113, at § 211(b)).
120. Havana Club IV, supra note 4, at *6.
125. Id. at *7-*8; Abandonment and impermissible retroactivity, addressed later in this paper, are issues that will probably arise on appeal.
131. Havana Club IV, supra note 4, at *10.
140. Order of the U.S. District Court, 1, 1 (June 25, 1999) (quoting Havana Club IV, supra note 4, at *3).
145. See Pamela S. Falk, Visions of Embargo Falling Spark U.S.-Cuba IP Battles, NAT’L L. J., April 6, 1998, at B7 for a solid analysis of the rum and cigar brand disputes between the United States and Cuba [hereinafter Falk, Visions of Embargo].
146. Order of the U.S. District Court, supra note 141, at 2.
147. Havana Club II, supra note 11.
148. See Id. at 305-310.
150. Havana Club II, supra note 11, at 306.
151. See Id. at 305-310.
154. Telephone Interview with David C. Reihner, Esq., Trademark Examining Attorney, U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (May 1999); Telephone Interview with Lynne Beresford, Office of Legislative and International Affairs, U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (July 6, 1999).
156. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office registration records are available at www.uspto.gov.
158. Telephone Interview with Lynne Beresford, supra note 155.
160. This question was never resolved by the district court; see Order of the U.S. District Court, supra note 141, at 2 (“This Court had no reason to decide—and did not decide—whether or not the Arechabalas owned a valid trademark in the Havana Club name at the time they entered into an agreement with Bacardi & Co. This Court made no finding on this issue one way or the other.”).
161. Lanham Act, supra note 19, at § 1051.
162. Id. at § 1127(2)(1); see also Id. at § 1115(b)(2), which establishes abandonment as a legal defense.
163. See General Cigar Co., Inc. v. G.D.M. Inc., 988 F. Supp. 647, 657-658 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) for a particularly helpful summary of abandonment principles.
164. Stetson v. Howard D. Wolf & Associates , supra note 94, at 850 (citing Silverman v. CBS Inc., supra note 94, at 45 (citing Saratoga Vichy Spring Co. v. Lehman, 625 F.2d 1037, 1043 (2d Cir.1980))).
165. Sheila’s Shine Products, Inc. v. Sheila Shine, Inc., 486 F.2d 114 (5th Cir. 1973).
166. Oklahoma Beverage Co. v. Dr. Pepper Love Bottling Co. (of Muskogee), 565 F.2d 629, 194 (10th Cir. 1977); Sheila’s Shine Products, Inc. v. Sheila Shine, Inc., supra note 166.
167. Gold Seal Associates v. Gold Seal Associates, 56 F.2d 452 (S.D.N.Y. 1932).
168. Rome Mach. & Foundry Co. v. Davis Foundry & Mach. Works, 135 Ga. 17, 68 S.E. 800 (1910); Rosenburg v. Freemont Undertaking Co., 63 Wash. 52, 114 P. 886 (1911); W.A. Gaines & Co. v. E. Whyte Grocery, Fruit & Wine Co., 107 Mo. App. 507, 81 S.W. 648 (Mo. Ct. App. 1904).
169. Beech-Nut Packing Co. v. P. Lorillard Co., 273 U.S. 629 (1927).
170. Saratoga Vichy Spring Co., Inc. v. Lehman, 491 F. Supp. 141, 155 (N.D.N.Y. 1979), aff’d, Saratoga Vichy Spring Co. v. Lehman, supra note 165 (citing Menendez v. Saks & Co., 485 F.2d 1355, 1377 (2d Cir. 1973), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc., v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976); Garcia v. Montecrispi Cigar Co., 409 F.2d 14 (5th Cir. 1969)).
171. Merriam-Webster, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 35 F.3d 65, 74 (2d Cir. 1994) (“mark unprotected when discontinued for over 20 years and no plans existed for use in reasonably foreseeable future” (citing Silverman v. CBS, Inc., supra note 94, at 47; Oklahoma Beverage Co. v. Dr. Pepper Love Bottling Co. (of Muskogee), supra note 167; Wallace & Co. v. Repetti, Inc., 266 F. 307 (2d Cir. 1920), cert. denied, 254 U.S. 639 (1920).
172. Saxlehner v. Eisner & Mendelson Co., 179 U.S. 19 (1900); Uncas Mfg. Co. v. Clark & Coombs Co., 200 F. Supp. 831 (D.C.R.I. 1962), aff’d, 309 F.2d 818 (1st Cir. 1962); Wallace & Co. v. Repetti, Inc., supra note 172.
173. Telephone Interview with Lynne Beresford, supra note 155.
174. Havana Club III, supra note 1, at *1.
176. Havana Club IV, supra note 4, at *3.
177. Telephone Interview with William Golden, Esq., attorney for Defendants, Kelley Drye & Warren LLP (July 6, 1999).
178. Cuban Cigar Brands N. V. v. Upmann Intern., Inc. , 457 F. Supp. 1090, 1101 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (“As our Court of Appeals has held, the fact that plaintiff was intervened by the Cuban government and thus prevented from exporting H. Upmanns to this country until recently does not constitute an abandonment of the mark.” (citing Menendez v. Faber, Coe & Gregg, Inc., 345 F. Supp. 527 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff’d sub nom. Menendez v. Saks & Co., supra note 171, cert. denied, 425 U.S. 991 (1976))); F. Palicio y Compania, S. A. v. Brush, 256 F. Supp. 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), aff’d, 375 F.2d 1011 (2d Cir. 1967 ), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 830 (1967).
179. see F. Palicio y Compania, S. A. v. Brush, supra note 179, at 487 (“‘[W]hen property confiscated is within the United States at the time of the attempted confiscation, our courts will give effect to acts of state ’only if they are consistent with the policy and law of the United States’’ (quoting Republic of Iraq v. First Nat’l City Bank, 353 F.2d 47, 51 (2d Cir. 1965) (quoting RESTATEMENT, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 46 (1962)))); see Id. at 488 (“[O]ur courts will not give ’extraterritorial effect’ to a confiscatory decree of a foreign state, even where directed against its own nationals.”); see Id. at 491 (citing Roger & Gallet v. Janmarie, Inc., 245 F.2d 505 (1957)) (“[T]rademarks registered in this country are generally deemed to have a local identity—and situs—apart from the foreign manufacturer.”); see Id. at 491-492 (citing A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel, 260 U.S. 689 (1923); Watson v. E. Leitz, Inc., 254 F.2d 777 (D.C. Cir. 1958); Hoffman-LaRoche Chemical Works v. Morganstern & Co., 281 F. 923 (2d Cir. 1922), cert. denied, 260 U.S. 729 (1922)) (“There is other authority for the view that United States trademarks of goods produced abroad may have a separate legal existence apart from the foreign manufacturer.”); see Id. at 492 (citing Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 638-641 (2d Cir. 1956)) (“[T]rademark rights in this country cannot be affected by the decisions of foreign courts.”).
180. Id. at 493; see Menendez v. Saks & Co., supra note 171, at 1377; see Gold Seal Associates v. Gold Seal Associates, supra note 168.
181. Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 434 F.2d 794 (9th Cir. 1970).
182. Corkran, Hill & Co. v. A.H. Kuhlemann Co., 136 Md. 525, 111 A. 471 (1920).
183. Saratoga Vichy Spring Co., Inc. v. Lehman, supra note 171.
184. Wallace & Co. v. Repetti, Inc., supra note 172 (Original owners permitted mark’s use, while in the Havana Club case, we cannot say the Arechabalas affirmatively permitted Cuba’s use of the mark.).
185. Levering Coffee Co. v. Merchants Coffee Co., 39 App. D.C. 151 (D.C. Cir. 1912); see Blackwell v. Dibrell, 3 F. Cas. 549 (C.C.E.D. Va.1878) (No. 1475) (Eight years’ disuse meant forfeiture of rights to mark during period of disuse.).
186. Wallace & Co. v. Repetti, Inc., supra note 172.
187. Havana Club III, supra note 1, at *6 (quoting La Societe Anonyme des Parfums Le Galion v. Jean Patou, Inc., 495 F.2d 1265, 1271 (2d Cir. 1974)).
188. Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, supra note 113.
189. Havana Club IV, supra note 4, at *4-*8.
190. Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, supra note 113, at § 211(a)(1), reprinted in Havana Club IV, supra note 4, at *4.
191. Id. at § 211(a)(2), reprinted in Havana Club IV, supra note 4, at *4.
192. Id., reprinted in Havana Club IV, supra note 4, at *4.
193. Id. at § 211(b), reprinted in Havana Club IV, supra note 4, at *4.
194. Havana Club IV, supra note 4, at *7.
196. Id. at *4, n.5.
197. Telephone Interview with Charles Sims, Esq., attorney for Plaintiffs, Proskauer Rose LLP (July 7, 1999).
198. Contra Tom Carter, Court Ruling Stirs Battle over What Goes in Cuba Libre, WASH. TIMES, June 17, 1999, at A16 [hereinafter Carter] (“‘How is this different from the rights of Jews whose property was confiscated by the Nazis?’ said Doug Gibson, attorney for Bacardi Ltd.”).
199. General Cigar Co., Inc. v. G.D.M. Inc., supra note 164, at 658 (“A determination that a mark has been abandoned defeats the alleged owner’s claim of priority: Once abandoned, the mark reverts back to the public domain whereupon it may be appropriated by anyone who adopts the mark for his or her own use.”); see Du Pont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Products Co., 6 F. Supp. 859, 881 (E.D.N.Y. 1934) (“The law is well settled that a fanciful word which has become a trade-mark cannot pass into the public domain unless it is abandoned by its owner …” (citations omitted)), modified, 85 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 601 (1936); see also Defiance Button Machine Co. v. C & C Metal Products Corp., 759 F.2d 1053 (2d Cir. 1985) (“[I]f the owner expressly abandons his mark, such as by cancelling it, or discontinues using it with the intent not to resume use, others are no longer restrained from using it since it ceases to be associated in the public’s mind with the owner’s goods or services.” (citing Manhattan Industries, Inc. v. Sweater Bee by Banff, Ltd., 627 F.2d 628, 630 (2d Cir. 1980))).
200. Telephone Interview with Charles Sims, Esq., supra note 198; a July 6, 1999, telephone conversation with the clerk of the court for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit revealed that Plaintiffs have filed a Notice of Appeal, though no briefing calendar had yet been established.
201. Havana Club IV, supra note 4, at *7.
202. Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244 (1994).
203. Havana Club IV, supra note 4, at *7.
204. Havana Club IV, supra note 4, at *7.
206. Martin v. Hadix, 119 S.Ct. 1998 (1999).
208. Id. (quoting Landgraf v. USI Film Products, supra note 203, at 280).
209. Id. (citing Landgraf v. USI Film Products, supra note 203, at 280).
210. Id. (citing Landgraf v. USI Film Products, supra note 203, at 280; Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer, 520 U.S. 939, 946 (1997)).
211. Id. at 2004 (quoting Landgraf v. USI Film Products, supra note 203, at 280).
212. Id. (quoting Landgraf v. USI Film Products, supra note 203, at 263, 280).
216. Martin v. Hadix, supra note 207, at 2006 (quoting Landgraf v. USI Film Products, supra note 203, at 280).
218. Id. (quoting Landgraf v. USI Film Products, supra note 203, at 270).
219. Id. (quoting Landgraf v. USI Film Products, supra note 203, at 270).
221. Landgraf v. USI Film Products, supra note 203, at 272 (“[P]rospectivity remains the appropriate default rule. Because it accords with widely held intuitions about how statutes ordinarily operate, a presumption against retroactivity will generally coincide with legislative and public expectations. Requiring clear intent assures that Congress itself has affirmatively considered the potential unfairness of retroactive application and determined that it is an acceptable price.”).
222. Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, supra note 113, at § 211(a)(2), (b), reprinted in Havana Club IV, supra note 4, at *4 (emphasis added).
223. Havana Club IV, supra note 4, at *7 (quoting Landgraf v. USI Film Products, supra note 203, at 273).
227. Landgraf v. USI Film Products, supra note 203, at 280.
228. Telephone Interview with Charles Sims, Esq., supra note 198 (indicating that Plaintiffs would probably appeal Judge Scheindlin’s conclusions regarding § 211’s retroactivity.).
229. Tamayo, Cuban Rum War, supra note 3.
230. Carter, supra note 199; Tamayo, Fidel Threat, supra note 7.
231. Cuba Warns of Trade War, supra note 6.
232. Oyama, supra note 5.
233. Decree-Law No. 68 on Inventions, Scientific Discoveries, Industrial Models, Trademarks and Denominations of Origin (May 14, 1983); see Falk, Visions of Embargo, supra note 145; see the U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council’s Web site (www.cubatrade.org) for helpful information.
234. Falk, Visions of Embargo, supra note 145; U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council Web site, www.cubatrade.org, supra note 234.
235. Carter, supra note 199; see Falk, Visions of Embargo, supra note 145 (“Hundreds of U.S. companies have registered marks and copyrights in Cuba.”); see U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council Web site, www.cubatrade.org, supra note 234, for a list of U.S. companies and their Cuba-registered marks.
236. Inter-American Convention, supra note 39; U.S. DEP’T ST., TREATIES IN FORCE: A LIST OF TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES IN FORCE ON JANUARY 1, 1999, 1, 391 (1999) [hereinafter TREATIES IN FORCE).
237. Convention Establishing the World Trade Organization, 21 U.S.T. 1749, T.I.A.S. No. 6932, 828 U.N.T.S. 3, July 14, 1967; TREATIES IN FORCE, supra note 237, at 393.
238. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, T.I.A.S. No. ____, 33 I.L.M. 81, April 15, 1994 [hereinafter TRIPS]; TREATIES IN FORCE, supra note 237, at 467-468; see also World Trade Organization Web site, www.wto.org.
239. Havana Club II, supra note 11, at 307 (citing Inter-American Convention, supra note 39, at ch. I, art. 1, 46 Stat. 2907, 2912).
240. Id. at 308 (citing Inter-American Convention, supra note 39, at ch. II, art. 11, 46 Stat. 2907, 2922-2924).
241. TRIPS, supra note 239, at pt. I, art. 3, 1.
242. Id. at pt. I, art. 4.
243. Id. at pt. II, § 2, art. 16, 1-2.
244. See Havana Club IV, supra note 4, at *4-*6.
245. Application of case law principles governing when a later-in-time statute supercedes treaty obligations could reasonably lead a judge to conclude that § 211 overrides TRIPS to the extent the two conflict. Such a finding would not, however, “relieve the United States of its international obligation [under TRIPS] or of the consequences of a violation of that obligation.” (RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 115(1)(b) (1986)) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)].
246. Telephone interview with Lynne Beresford, supra note 155 (Ms. Beresford speculated that § 211 is arguably in sync with both TRIPS and the Inter-American Convention.).
247. Arguments that § 211 does not violate TRIPS have been omitted since, in the Havana Club context, they would involve abandonment issues which are discussed earlier in this paper.
248. TRIPS, supra note 239, at pt. I, art. 3(1).
249. Id. at pt. II, § 2, art. 20.
252. Id. at pt. II, § 2, arts. 22-23.
253. Id. at pt. III, § 1, art. 41(1).
254. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 246, at § 335(2)(b) (Note, however, that this section is based on the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, to which the United States is not a party. It is unclear, therefore, if this provision would apply.).
255. Juan O. Tamayo, Castro Threatens to Fake U.S. Brands, ORANGE COUNTY REGISTER, May 11, 1999, at C05 (“‘As far as Cuba is concerned, Bacardi is faking Havana Club, so they would be merely retaliating,’ said Pamela Falk, professor of international trade and business law at the City University of New York.”).
256. Carter, supra note 199 (“U.S. analysts familiar with Cuba say … Cuba is unlikely to begin violating U.S. trademarks…. ‘Cuba does not want to get on the bad side of U.S. business,’ said John Kavulich, of the U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council.”).

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