Source: http://legalarium.com/ttabquotes/ResJudicata.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 14:33:06+00:00

Document:
Discussion of the doctrine of res judicata.
As our primary reviewing court said recently, under the doctrine of res judicata, "a judgment on the merits in a prior suit bars a second suit involving the same parties or their privies based on the same cause of action. Over the years, the doctrine has come to incorporate common law concepts of merger and bar, and will thus also bar a second suit raising claims based on the same set of transactional facts. Accordingly, a second suit will be barred by claim preclusion if: (1) there is identity of parties (or their privies); (2) there has been an earlier final judgment on the merits of a claim; and (3) the second claim is based on the same set of transactional facts as the first." Jet, Inc. v. Sewage Aeration Systems, 223 F.3d 1360, 55 USPQ2d 1854, 1856 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Res judicata based on prior oppositions may fail if the marks at issue in those proceedings were different than the mark at issue.
Second, applicant's res judicata argument based on prior Opposition Nos. 91160344 and 91160957 fails because the marks at issue in those proceedings were different than the mark at issue here. Chromalloy American Corp. v. Kenneth Gordon (New Orleans) Ltd., 736 F.2d 694, 698, 222 USPQ 187, 190 (Fed. Cir. 1984) ("The claim against LADY GORDON is simply not the same claim as one against GORDON OF NEW ORLEANS."); Institut National Des Appellations d'Origine v. Brown-Forman Corp., 47 USPQ2d 1875, 1894 ("applicant's MIST AND COGNAC mark … is a different mark … from CANADIAN MIST AND COGNAC …").
Where prior adjudications involve materially different mark(s), they cannot bar opposer's claims in an opposition.
Because they involved a materially different mark, the prior adjudications cannot bar opposer's claims in this opposition.
Claim preclusion refers to the effect of foreclosing any litigation of matters that never have been litigated, because of a determination that they should have been advanced in an earlier suit.
In fact, given the factual allegations in the prior opposition, specifically, petitioner's alleged prior use and ownership of the BASMA marks, that respondent was petitioner's distributor and aware of petitioner's allegedly superior rights, and that respondent alleged use of the mark in the Registration for goods similar or related to those offered by petitioner, petitioner could (and should) have asserted each of these claims in the earlier case. Id. ("The abandonment theory clearly could have been brought in the original proceeding because Vitaline had access to the affidavit and related specimens" when it filed its fraud counterclaim); see also, Nasalok Coating Corp. v. Nylok Corp., 522 F.2d 1320, 86 USPQ2d 1369, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ("Claim preclusion refers to 'the effect of foreclosing any litigation of matters that never have been litigated, because of a determination that they should have been advanced in an earlier suit.'") (citations omitted); Horphag, 220 F.3d 1325, 55 USPQ2d at 1494-95 ("To the extent that the cancellation petition expands on the false declaration allegations made in the opposition, the differences between the two pleadings are not sufficient to differentiate the claims for res judicata purposes, particularly since there was nothing in the cancellation petition that could not have been alleged in the opposition.").
Case Finding: The claim adjudicated in the court case is not the same claim as the one presented in this opposition proceeding, i.e., priority of use and likelihood of confusion.
Clearly, the claim adjudicated in the court case under the ACPA is not the same claim as the one presented in this opposition proceeding, i.e., priority of use and likelihood of confusion.
Petitioner cannot avoid the application of claim preclusion by merely bringing additional claims in this proceeding based on the same transactional facts as the prior opposition.
Petitioner cannot avoid the application of claim preclusion by merely bringing additional claims in this proceeding based on the same transactional facts as the prior opposition. Vitaline Corp. v. General Mills Inc., 891 F.2d 273, 13 USPQ2d 1172, 1173 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
Under the doctrine of res judicata or claim preclusion, a judgment on the merits in a prior suit bars a second suit involving the same parties or their privies based on the same cause of action.
Under the doctrine of res judicata or claim preclusion, "a judgment on the merits in a prior suit bars a second suit involving the same parties or their privies based on the same cause of action." Jet, Inc. v. Sewage Aeration Systems, 223 F.3d 1360, 55 USPQ2d 1854, 1856 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (quoting Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 n. 5 (1979)).
Where the circuit court held that the use of the phrase violated a party's right of publicity, the TTAB holds such a ruling equivalent to a ruling under Section 2(a) within the context of a res judicata analysis.
Accordingly, inasmuch as the Sixth Circuit held that the use of the phrase "HERE'S JOHNNY" violated John W. Carson's right of publicity, the Board holds such a ruling equivalent to a ruling under Section 2(a) of the Trademark Act within the context of our res judicata analysis.
A second suit is barred by res judicata or claim preclusion if (1) the parties (or their privies) are identical; (2) there has been an earlier final judgment on the merits of a claim; and (3) the second claim is based on the same set of transactional facts as the first.
A second suit is barred by res judicata or claim preclusion if (1) the parties (or their privies) are identical; (2) there has been an earlier final judgment on the merits of a claim; and (3) the second claim is based on the same set of transactional facts as the first. Jet, Inc. v. Sewage American Systems, 223 F.3d 1360, 55 USPQ2d 1854, 1856 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
For claim preclusion based on a judgment in which the claim was not litigated, there must be (1) an identity of the parties or their privies, (2) a final judgment on the merits of the prior claim, and (3) the second claim must be based on the same transactional facts as the first and should have been litigated in the prior case.
"For claim preclusion based on a judgment in which the claim was not litigated, there must be (1) an identity of the parties or their privies, (2) a final judgment on the merits of the prior claim, and (3) the second claim must be based on the same transactional facts as the first and should have been litigated in the prior case." Sharp Kabushiki Kaisha v. Thinksharp, Inc., 448 F.3d 1368, 79 USPQ2d 1376, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
Even default judgments for failure to answer, or dismissals for failure to prosecute, where there has been no decision on the merits, can act as a bar under the doctrine of claim preclusion.
Petitioner argues, however, that the purpose of the show cause order issued in the prior opposition pursuant to Trademark Rule 2.128(a)(3) was "to save the Board the burden of determining a case on the merits," citing TBMP § 536. However, as noted above, even default judgments for failure to answer, or dismissals for failure to prosecute, where there has been no decision "on the merits," can act as a bar under the doctrine of claim preclusion. Horphag Research, 220 F.3d at 1325, 55 USPQ2d at 1492.
With respect to res judicata, the founder and CEO of corporation may be considered in privity with corporation.
In view thereof, privity exists between applicant in this proceeding and the defendant in the prior civil action and prior Board proceeding for res judicata purposes. See e.g., Kraeger v. General Electric Co., 497 F.2d 468, 472 (2d. Cir. 1974) (The president and sole shareholder of a corporation was bound by the corporation's defeat in an action that he effectively controlled); and Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 27 USPQ2d 1046, 1049 (D.N.H. 1992)(founder and CEO of corporation in privity with corporation).
Under the doctrine of claim preclusion, the entry of a final judgment on the merits of a claim in a proceeding serves to preclude the relitigation of the same claim in a subsequent proceeding between the parties or their privies, even in those cases where prior judgment was the result of a default or consent.
Under the doctrine of claim preclusion (res judicata), the entry of a final judgment "on the merits" of a claim (i.e., cause of action) in a proceeding serves to preclude the relitigation of the same claim in a subsequent proceeding between the parties or their privies, even in those cases where prior judgment was the result of a default or consent. See Lawlor v. National Screen Service Corp., 349 U.S. 322, 75 S.Ct. 865, 99 L.Ed. 1122 (1955); and Chromalloy American Corp. v. Kenneth Gordon, Ltd., 736 F.2d 694, 222 USPQ 187 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
Under the doctrine of res judicata, the entry of a final judgment on the merits of a claim in a proceeding serves to preclude the relitigation of the same claim in a subsequent proceeding between the parties or their privies, even in those cases where the prior judgment was the result of a default or consent.
Under the doctrine of res judicata (or claim preclusion), the entry of a final judgment "on the merits" of a claim (i.e., cause of action) in a proceeding serves to preclude the relitigation of the same claim in a subsequent proceeding between the parties or their privies, even in those cases where the prior judgment was the result of a default or consent. See Lawlor v. National Screen Service Corp., 349 U.S. 322 (1955); Chromalloy American Corp. v. Kenneth Gordon, Ltd., 736 F.2d 694, 222 USPQ 187 (Fed. Cir. 1984); and Flowers Industries, Inc. v. Interstate Brands Corp., 5 USPQ2d 1580 (TTAB 1987).
The TTAB's order dismissing a notice of opposition may be a final judgment on the merits.
While petitioner claims that the Board did not reach "the substantive merits" of the prior opposition proceeding, the Board's February 12, 2008 order dismissed petitioner's notice of opposition with prejudice, and entered judgment against petitioner. For claim preclusion purposes, the Board's order is a final judgment on the merits. International Nutrition Co. v. Horphag Research, Ltd., 220 F.2d 1325, 55 USPQ2d 1492, 1494 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ("default judgments can give rise to res judicata . INC therefore cannot avoid the bar of res judicata on the ground that [its predecessor-in-interest's previous] opposition was abandoned and dismissed for failure to prosecute").
While the TTAB's dismissal of the prior opposition would not be sufficient for issue preclusion purposes, it is a final judgment on the merits for purposes of claim preclusion.
The language in Section 536 of the TBMP upon which petitioner relies merely relates to the Board's preference to dispose of cases which have settled, or in which the plaintiff has lost interest, without "the burden of determining a case on the merits." While the Board's dismissal of the prior opposition would not be sufficient for issue preclusion purposes, it is a final judgment on the merits for purposes of claim preclusion. Young Engineers, Inc. v. U.S. International Trade Commission, 721 F.2d 1305, 219 USPQ 1142, 1151 (Fed. Cir. 1983) ("issue preclusion operates only as to issues actually litigated, whereas claim preclusion may operate between the parties simply by virtue of the final judgment").
A person who is not a party of an action but who controls or substantially participates in the control of the presentation on behalf of a party is bound by the determination of issues decided as though he were a party.
As to whether there is privity between the defendant in the prior actions and applicant, although Mr. Braxton was not a party to the prior civil action or prior Board proceeding, the basis for applying preclusion against him and applicant herein rests on his being the president and sole owner of the defendant in the prior actions. Section 39 of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments (1982) states the applicable black-letter law: "A person who is not a party of an action but who controls or substantially participates in the control of the presentation on behalf of a party is bound by the determination of issues decided as though he were a party." See also 18A C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Fed. Prac. & Proc. Juris. § 4451 (2nd ed. 2009).
Caution is warranted in the application of preclusion by the PTO, for the purposes of trademark procedures include protecting both the consuming public and the purveyors. Thus, the circumstances for preclusion must be certain to every intent.
Petitioner's assertion that the merits of this proceeding should be considered because of "the grave allegations of this case," does not persuade us of a different result. We recognize that "[c]aution is warranted in the application of preclusion by the PTO, for the purposes of trademark procedures include protecting both the consuming public and the purveyors. . [thus], the circumstances for preclusion 'must be certain to every intent'." Mayer/Berkshire Corp. v. Berkshire Fashions Inc., 424 F.3d 1229, 76 USPQ2d 1310, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (quoting Russell v. Place, 94 US (4 Otto) 606, 610 (1878)) (involving a federal court infringement action followed by a Board proceeding, and the presentation of "sufficient evidence" of "materially changed marketing practices" after conclusion of the federal case).
Discussion of Vitaline case where the TTAB entered summary judgment in favor of General Mills on the fraud counterclaim; Vitaline then filed a subsequent petition to cancel the same registration based on abandonment, and the court affirmed the Board's summary judgment in General Mills's favor on the ground of claim preclusion.
In Vitaline, General Mills petitioned to cancel Vitaline's registration, and Vitaline counterclaimed to cancel one of General Mills's registrations based on fraud, relying on General Mills's "Sections 8 and 15 affidavit and related specimens" to support its fraud counterclaim. The Board entered summary judgment in favor of General Mills on the fraud counterclaim. Vitaline then filed a subsequent petition to cancel the same registration based on abandonment, and our primary reviewing court affirmed the Board's summary judgment in General Mills's favor on the ground of claim preclusion. It held that "Vitaline's theories of abandonment and fraud are not only based upon the same transactional facts - use of the mark on product containers in connection with certain wording, but rely on the very same proof - the affidavit and specimens." Id., 13 USPQ2d at 1174.
Case Finding: The parties in this proceeding and the parties in the prior civil action and prior Board proceeding are legally equivalent.
We find that the parties in this proceeding and the parties in the prior civil action and prior Board proceeding are legally equivalent. While John W. Carson brought the prior civil action and Board proceeding in his individual capacity while he was alive, his right to publicity survived his death. Indeed, the jurisdiction of the court which issued the permanent injunction and where applicant's business is located recognizes a common law post-mortem right to publicity. See Herman Miller, Inc. v. Palazetti Imports and Exports, Inc., 270 F.3d at 326 ("The district court did not err in recognizing a post-mortem right of publicity under Michigan common law"). Moreover, the jurisdiction where Mr. Carson lived at the time of his death, i.e., the state of California, has a statutory postmortem right of publicity. See Cal. Civ. Code § 3344.1(b). Further, the record demonstrates that such right of publicity was properly assigned to the current opposer in this proceeding. See Witzer Decl. ¶¶ 3-7 and attached exhibits. Accordingly, privity exists between the plaintiff in the prior actions and the opposer in this proceeding.

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 536
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 4451
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 3344