Source: http://www.717madisonplace.com/?m=201501
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 05:20:00+00:00

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What would Chief Justice Marshall say?
It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule.
Chief Justice John Marshall for the Court, Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
Justice Breyer for the Court, Mayo Collaborative v. Prometheus Labs., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 566 U.S. 10, 182 L. Ed. 2d 321 (2012)(emphasis in the original).
In any event, we need not labor to delimit the precise contours of the “abstract ideas” category in this case. It is enough to recognize that there is no meaningful distinction between the concept of risk hedging in Bilski and the concept of intermediated settlement at issue here. Both are squarely within the realm of “abstract ideas” as we have used that term.
Justice Thomas for the Court, Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Intern., 134 S. Ct. 2347, 573 U.S., 189 L. Ed. 2d 296 (2014).
Insofar as there are differences, those differences concern not the nature of the service that Aereo provides so much as the technological manner in which it provides the service. We conclude that those differences are not adequate to place Aereo’s activities outside the scope of the Act.
Justice Breyer for the Court, American Broadcasting v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 573 U.S., 189 L. Ed. 2d 476 (2014).
Here’s a link to the new USPTO patent eligibility examples, if you were looking for them: [Link].
Here is another §101 opinion by Judge Pfaelzer, from the case of Enfish v. Microsoft: [Enfish].
If you are feeling beaten down by all the §101 cases finding inventions patent-ineligible, you might find Judge Pfaelzer’s opinion in Cal. Inst. of Tech. v. Hughes Communs., Inc. refreshing.
I couldn’t find a copy of the opinion on the internet; so, you can view it [here].
1) An oldie, but a goodie: The IP Man movie poster.
Was your Valentine an amicus in Mayo v. Prometheus? Celebrate the Supreme Court and the clarity that it has brought to 35 U.S.C. §101.
We reject Brooks Furniture for another reason: It is so demanding that it would appear to render § 285 largely superfluous. We have long recognized a common-law exception to the general “American rule” against fee-shifting — an exception, “inherent” in the “power [of] the courts” that applies for “`willful disobedience of a court order'” or “when the losing party has `acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons….'” Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society,421 U.S. 240, 258-259, 95 S.Ct. 1612, 44 L.Ed.2d 141 (1975). We have twice declined to construe fee-shifting provisions narrowly on the basis that doing so would render them superfluous, given the background exception to the American rule, seeChristiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 419, 98 S.Ct. 694, 54 L.Ed.2d 648 (1978); Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402, n. 4, 88 S.Ct. 964, 19 L.Ed.2d 1263 (1968) (per curiam), and we again decline to do so here.
Something to keep in mind the next time you are considering whether Alice v. CLS Bank renders 35 U.S.C. §103 largely superfluous for certain types of inventions.
As our cases have noted in the past, we are hesitant to adopt an interpretation of a congressional enactment which renders superfluous another portion of that same law.
Id. (citing Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U. S. 134, 142 (1985); FEC v.National Conservative Political Action Committee, 470 U. S. 480, 486 (1985); Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U. S. 189, 197 (1985); United States v. Generix Drug Corp., 460 U. S. 453, 458-459 (1983); Dickerson v. New Banner Institute, 460 U. S. 103, 118 (1983)).
A conclusion that business methods are not patentable in any circumstances would render § 273 meaningless. This would violate the canon against interpreting any statutory provision in a manner that would render another provision superfluous. See Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. ___, ___, 129 S.Ct. 1558, 1566, 173 L.Ed.2d 443 (2009). This principle, of course, applies to interpreting any two provisions in the U.S.Code, even when Congress enacted the provisions at different times. See, e.g., Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U.S. 496, 529-530, 59 S.Ct. 954, 83 L.Ed. 1423 (1939) (opinion of Stone, J.). This established rule of statutory interpretation cannot be overcome by judicial speculation as to the subjective intent of various legislators in enacting the subsequent provision. Finally, while § 273 appears to leave open the possibility of some business method patents, it does not suggest broad patentability of such claimed inventions.
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