Source: http://gill.faculty.unlv.edu/blog/
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 11:06:54+00:00

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Blog – Rebecca D. Gill, Ph.D.
Like Nevada, many states rely very heavily on sales tax income to fund government services. In the olden days, states required businesses within their borders to remit a percentage of their sales as taxes to the state government. These taxes, of course, are passed along to the customer, who often sees them added on to total purchase prices on their sales receipts.
When the vendor of the product lives out of state, this poses a big problem for the state government. As of the Court’s decision in Quill Corp. v. North Dakota (1992), states have been stymied in their attempts to force vendors to collect and remit these taxes. In-state consumers are still required to pay the taxes, of course. But it is incredibly difficult to enforce this kind of requirement when the state has no idea how much money any particular individual rightly owes.
Enter Direct Marketing Association v. Brohl. The Supreme Court has just granted certiorari in this case, which deals with Colorado’s attempt to get around the restrictions in Quill. The SCOTUSblog page for the case lays out some of the details. Although the Court of late has denied certiorari on direct tax remission law challenges, the Court’s willingness to hear this case is an important development.
Paper Topic #24: Are the case facts in Brohl different enough from those in Quill to mandate a different finding? Given the holding in Quill, coupled with the changing nature of the internet economy, is it likely that the Court will feel pressure to adopt a new strategy here? If Congress stepped in to force remote retailers to remit state sales taxes, would that change the calculus in Quill?
Suggested Reading: Haile, A. J., Gamage, D., & Shanske, D. (2013). A Potential Game Changer in E-Commerce Taxation. State Tax Notes, 67(10).
In the United States, the federal code prohibits “female genital mutilation” procedures on minors. A Michigan doctor and several parents were charged with violating this law in US v. Nagarwala. Recently, a district court judge struck down this law. This article from the Detroit Free Press provides additional details. In short, the judge found that Congress did not have the power to ban these procedures.
Although women’s rights activists were stunned by the ruling, this article from Reason.com (a libertarian publication) argues that the decision is correct, given the Supreme Court’s existing jurisprudence about the breadth of the Commerce Clause. What do you make of this case? How might the Supreme Court rule in this instance? Is there a way that Congress could institute such a ban using some other provision in the Constitution? Or is this something that must be left to the states to incorporate into their own criminal codes?
As you will no doubt recall, the Supreme Court in NFIB v. Sebelius (2012) held that Congress did not have the power under the Commerce Clause to uphold the individual mandate to purchase health insurance coverage. The conservatives on the Court joined in this assessment. However, the Court also decided additional major questions in this case: one about taxing and the other about spending.
Chief Justice Roberts joined with the liberal members of the Court in upholding the individual mandate as a tax. However, the Court struck down the expansion of the Medicaid program as a violation of the spending power. The Court held that this expansion was unconstitutional, even though it did not literally “force” the states to participate in the expansion.
This is a curious line-up of holdings. In two of the three major questions, the Court struck down exercises of congressional power (under both the Commerce Clause and the General Welfare Clause). The only part that was upheld was perhaps the least controversial argument (under the Taxation Clause).
Some commentators argue that this is one of the more important, if underpublicized, parts of the Court’s decision in Sebelius. For example, read Johnathan Adler’s piece over at SCOTUSblog. What does he think the implications are for the balance of power between the federal government and the states? Take special note of Adler’s point about how this might impact the Clean Air Act.
Adler delves into this issue more deeply in this post on the Property and Environmental Research Center website. Read the article. How might the Court’s decision in Sebelius encourage states to challenge the Clean Air Act’s conditional grants? Does it go beyond the impact of South Dakota v. Dole (1987)? What alternative measures could the federal government take to try to increase compliance among states?
Paper Topic #23: How might the Court’s decision in Sebelius encourage states to challenge the Clean Air Act’s conditional grants? Does it go beyond the impact of South Dakota v. Dole (1987)? What alternative measures could the federal government take to try to increase compliance among states?
Suggested Reading: Baake, D. (2012). Federalism in the Air: Is the Clean Air Act’s “My Way or No Highway” Provision Constitutional After NFIB v. Sebelius?. Harvard Environmental Law Review Online, 1.
Late in the Obama administration, a very interesting separation of powers issue developed out of the saga over the chemical weapons attack in Syria. The issue arose after President Obama asserted his authority to conduct military action in Syria without congressional approval, but decided to seek such approval anyway.
There’s an update to this, of course. President Trump has also launched military strikes against Syria, also without any updates to the original AUMF. Earlier this year, a new Senate resolution was initiated that would limit President Trump’s war powers. Learn more about that here.
Paper Topic #13: How much power does the President have to go around the wishes of Congress in the war on Terror? How much power does the President still have to deal with issues of fighting ISIS and dealing with the enemy combatants from the various campaigns in the war on terror? Does the Court’s recent jurisprudence on the separation of powers issue in foreign policy give us any hints?
Suggested Reading: Vladeck, S.I. 2011. “The Supreme Court, the War on Terrorism, and the Separation of Powers. Human Right Magazine 38(1).
More details can be found in this National Journal article.
The Court’s decision in MBZ v. Clinton (2012) did little to clear up the dispute between the executive branch and the legislative branch; however, it did assert the power of the judiciary to decide the dispute. Read Lyle Denniston’s astute commentary on the Court’s decision.
Paper Topic #12: As Lyle points out, the question remains as to whether Congress has the power to legislate about how a birthplace is listed on a passport. How will the lower courts answer this question? Is § 214(d) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act constitutional? What implications will the decision have for striking a balance in this foreign policy separation of powers game?
Suggested Reading: Hand, A. (2012). Forbidden Territory or Well-Defined Boundaries-MBZV Clinton and the Overzealous Application of the Political Question Doctrine. Duke J. Const. L. & Pub. Pol’y Sidebar, 7, 61.
In a 5-4 decision, the Court held that the Act violated the separation of powers doctrine. This is because it gave broad powers to the PCAOB (an entity of the executive branch) while simultaneously keeping the President from appointing or removing the members of the PCAOB. Read this CS Monitor article decribing the separation of powers issue in Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB.
As a 2012 article in Compliance Week explains, the most recent attempt at financial sector regulation, known as “Dodd-Frank”, is facing a similar legal challenge. The suit’s main points are that the CFPB was established with too much independence—that Congress cannot set the CFPB budget (its funding is determined as a total portion of the Federal Reserve’s budget); that the president cannot remove the CFPB director except in special circumstances; and that the courts must give CFPB decisions extra deference.
“As a whole, Dodd-Frank aggregates the power of all three branches of government in one unelected, unsupervised and unaccountable bureaucrat,” said former White House Counsel C. Boyden Gray, attorney for the plaintiffs and founder of Boyden Gray & Associates.
Part of the problem with Dodd-Frank, according to its critics, is that it violates the nondelegation doctrine in much the same way that Sarbanes-Oxley did. Read this short analysis by Professor Bainbridge.
The case State National Bank of Big Spring v. Mnuchin is currently at the U.S. Supreme Court awaiting a decision on a petition for a writ of certiorari. Here is a summary of the case and links to relevant court documents from the perspective of one of the challengers of Dodd-Frank, the Competitive Enterprise Institute.
Topic #11: Given what we know about the Supreme Court’s separation of powers and nondelegation jurisprudence, will these independent agency provisions from Dodd-Frank survive judicial review? Is it even possible for the Congress to develop a mechanism for creating truly independent watchdog groups?
Hills Jr, R. M. (2013). Exorcising McCulloch: The Conflict-Ridden History of American Banking Nationalism and Dodd-Frank Preemption.
Steinmeyer, D. J. (2014). Does State National Bank of Big Spring v Geithner Stand a Fighting Chance. Chi.-Kent L. Rev., 89, 471.
State National Bank of Big Spring v. Lew (2015) [No. 13-5247, D.C. Circuit].
As you might imagine, this controversy has made its way to the courts. The case is Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, US House of Representatives v. Holder. The district court judge denied a motion to dismiss the case. Read this story from Politico summarizing the judge’s reaction to the administration’s arguments. Most recently, the Judge has allowed the Department of Justice more time to show why these particular documents should be subject to the “deliberative process” privilege (or, executive privilege to keep secret the deliberative process the DOJ went through in regards to this program). The current situation is summed up nicely in this article Daniel Wilson, which you should read.
Paper Topic #10: Given what we know from previous cases like U.S. v. Nixon (1974), will this claim of executive privilege hold up? Does it matter that the president himself has (as far as we can tell) very little to do these documents, personally?
Suggested Reading: Klukowski, Kenneth A. 2011. “Making Executive Privilege Work: A Multi-Factor Test in an Age of Czars and Congressional Oversight. Cleveland State Law Review, 59:31.
PS. In the midst of the case, the Attorney General moved to certify a question in the case to the Court of Appeals.
The use of the power dates back to the early days of the republic. This made a great deal of sense, of course, because legislative sessions were shorter and more infrequent than they are now. In addition, communications and travel were much more difficult. Together, this meant that, in the absence of the recess appointment power, important positions could be left empty for long periods of time.
Of course, this process has, like most things, become more politicized over time. Presdients who were unable to get their nominees confirmed by a hostile Senate would often use the recess appointment as a way to circumvent the Senate’s “advice and consent” role. But the Senate learned to fight back against this. In the waning years of George W. Bush’s final term, Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid regularly held pro forma sessions during any breaks in order to prevent Bush from using his recess appointment power. Something similar happened during the winter break between 2011 and 2012, when the Republican-controlled House of Representatives declined to assent to a recess. Instead, both the House and the Senate held pro forma sessions, this time preventing President Obama from making appointments.
This did not stop Obama from making appointments to the controversial Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and the National Labor Relations Board. On the advice of White House Counsel, the President argued that pro forma sessions were an unconstitutional attempt to block the use of an explicit power given to the executive by the Constitution. The NLRB appointment was challeneged in court, and the Supreme Court heard the case in NLRB v. Noel Canning et al. (2014). For a Plain English summary of the case, read this SCOTUSblog article.
Paper Topic #9: What is the impact of the Court’s recess appointment ruling on the balance of power between Congress and the President when it comes to administrative law? Was the Court just cleaning up the mess that came from years of politicizing the recess appointment power?
Suggested Reading: Corley, Pam. 2006. “Avoiding Advice and Consent: Recess Appointments and Presidential Power.” Presidential Studies Quarterly, 36(4): 670-680.
#8: Faithfully Fire the Unfaithful?
Since before the beginning of the Trump presidency, the FBI has been investigation whether and how the Russian government interfered in the 2016 election. For some background, make sure to read this timeline from factcheck.org. Part of the task of this investigation is to determine whether there was collusion between the Russian government and the Trump campaign.
Early on, Attorney General Jeff Sessions recused himself from the investigation. For the purposes of this investigation, then, Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein became the point person. Soon after, Rosenstein appointed Robert Mueller as special counsel to carry out the investigation, which as of this writing is still ongoing.
In late September of 2018, the New York Times reported that Rod Rosenstein had acted in ways that contradicted President Trump’s wishes. In the aftermath of this report, the question of whether President Trump could (or should) fire Rosenstein or force him to resign. If Rosenstein is ousted, the person to take his place is likely to be Solicitor General Noel Francisco. Read this article from Slate that explains Francisco’s take on the executive’s power to remove government officials.
“… he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully excecuted.” (Art. I § 3).
“Before he enter on the Execution of his Office, he shall take the following Oath or Affirmation:—’I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States, and will to the best of my Ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States.'” (Art. I, §1).
One of the key powers of the president is contained in the appointments clause. Here, the president is given the power to nominate people for appointment for certain government positions, including positions in the executive branch. This is important, of course, because the leaders of the major bureaucratic entities in the executive branch are the key to the president’s ability to faithfully execute the law.
However, in the context of the “Russia investigation,” these questions take on some important new meaning. Because Rosenstein oversees the special counsel’s investigation, replacing him with a “Trump loyalist” could shut down the investigation completely, or at least hinder its progress substantially. This article from vox.com helps to explain the ways in which the Justice Department and the Muller investigation are linked.
Paper Topic #8: In this current situation, does President Trump have the authority to fire Rosenstein (or force him to resign)? What does the existing case law say, and how might this situation be significantly different from the case facts at play in the prior cases?
Suggested Reading: Breker-Cooper, Steven. 1992. “The Appointments Clause and the Removal Power: Theory and Seance.” Tennessee Law Review 60:841-904.
The Court’s decision in South Carolina v. Katzenbach (1966) lays out the case for why Congress has broad amendment enforcing powers under the 15th Amendment. In this case, the Court relies on arguments dating back to the Marshall Court. Specifically, the Court held that the word “necessary” in the Supremacy Clause should be read rather broadly, so as to encompass legislation rationally in service of reaching a permissible legislative goal.
The Court in Katzenbach also noted that “exceptional conditions can justify legislative measures not otherwise appropriate.” This qualification was probably intended to emphasize the pervasiveness of voting rights restrictions based on race. This qualification was invoked by the Roberts Court in Shelby Co. v. Holder (2013). Read the excerpt of the majority opinion in the content area of WebCampus (in the “Online Readings” folder).
Although the Supreme Court struck down the reauthorization of the original formula, it did leave room for Congress to develop a new, more modern formula. Congress tried to do this, getting support from a surprising figure. But the efforts failed, and the 2016 federal elections were the first in decades to be conducted without these protections.
Paper Topic #7: In your view, how does the majority opinion treat the amendment enforcing power of Congress? How does the Court go about explaining its holding that the preclearance formula, which was held to be constitution in the 1960s, is no longer constitutionally permissible? What is the status of the amendment enforcing power of Congress in the wake of Shelby Co.?
Recommended Reading: Katz, Ellen D. 2014. “Dismissing Deterrence.” Harvard Law Review, 127(6): 248-52.
Voting Discrimination Still Exists, So How Did Chief Justice Roberts Unravel the VRA?

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