Source: http://wcc.dli.mt.gov/H/HARDING_J_FFCL.htm
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 14:10:36+00:00

Document:
The trial in this matter was held on July 26, 1995, in Missoula, Montana before Court appointed Hearing Examiner, Clarice V. Beck. Petitioner, John L. Harding, was present and represented by Mr. Howard Toole. Respondent, Wausau Underwriters Insurance Company, was represented by Mr. Kelly M. Wills. The claimant testified on his own behalf. Ernie Hunt, Robert Hunt, Jim Umphries and Bill Whalen testified. Exhibits 1 through 11 were admitted by stipulation of the parties. The depositions of claimant, Mark F. Rotar, M.D. and Randy Keeble were submitted for the Court's consideration. The deposition of Julie Hunt Zembel was admitted over the objection of Mr. Toole.
Issues: Whether the claimant is entitled to permanent partial disability benefits based on physical restrictions resulting from his July 6, 1994 industrial injury, and his entitlement, if any, to rehabilitation benefits, and attorney fees and costs.
1. At the time of trial the claimant was 29 years old. He had obtained his GED and had attended classes at the Salish Kootenai Community College in 1991 and 1992.
2. On or about July 6, 1994, the claimant sustained an industrial injury arising out of and in the course and scope of his employment with Hunt's Timbers. (Uncontested Fact 1.) At the time of the injury the employer was insured by Wausau Underwriters Insurance Company, which accepted liability and has paid various workers' compensation benefits.
6. Two days later, on July 20th, the claimant was seen by Dr. Ferril, an associate of Dr. Genich at the Garden Wall Clinic. He noted that claimant's assessment was "resolving lumbar muscle spasms." The doctor authorized the claimant to return to "light duty," with "no lifting over 15 pounds" and that "[f]ull recovery is anticipated." (Id. at 2.) It was also noted by the doctor that claimant had gone to a chiropractor the previous week.
7. The employer's first report was filled out on July 20, 1994, and signed by the claimant and Ernie Hunt, employer. In this report the employer questioned whether an accident had occurred (Ex. 1 at 2), indicating he had information the claimant's back was sore but it was not work-related. This doubt was resolved in favor of the claimant and the insurer accepted liability.
9. Claimant returned to work and was able to perform his job. Ernie Hunt, employer, testified that he watched the claimant for a period of time when he returned to work to be certain claimant was able to perform the job. Ernie Hunt, the claimant and Leila Roberts, office manager, met sometime in August 1994, at which time the claimant was cautioned not to do lifting beyond his capability. The claimant recalled this meeting, but not the specific caution about lifting beyond his capacity.
14. The claimant did not file a claim for compensation as a result of this incident. The claims adjuster for Wausau, William Whalen, testified that the insurer treated the December incident as an aggravation of the July injury as the claimant had not reached maximum medical improvement when it occurred. The insurer paid medical and compensation benefits.
16. On Tuesday, January 17, 1995, the claimant returned to Dr. Rotar. He had been discharged from physical therapy and given a home exercise program. Dr. Rotar found claimant had reached MMI. Dr. Rotar did not think there was any permanent impairment. Claimant was given a work release for light-duty activities for the coming Monday, with a full release the following week. The doctor encouraged the claimant to consider a different type of work or reeducation.
19. Prior to the injury of July 1994, the claimant suffered an industrial injury to his low-back while working for Logcrafters on May 7, 1991. The insurer for Logcrafters was State Compensation Insurance Fund, which accepted liability and paid workers' compensation benefits.
He still has some stiffness at end points of motion. He is much more flexible and smoother than he has been in the past. I think that he can return to work and will release for work on August the 1st. I think he will need to be somewhat cautious at work. If he can return to a job that is much less heavy lifting involved I think he would be safer. He can lift heavy weights but he needs to do this on a much less frequent basis. I warned him that returning to his previous job may be an invitation to have further problems. I will see him on a PRN basis.
(Ex. 3 at 14.) Dr. Rotar signed a Request for Medical Information form for the State Fund on August 8, 1991, which specifically noted that the claimant can now work "[f]ull time without restrictions." (Ex. 3 at 15.) Claimant did not return to work for Logcrafters.
25. Claimant and the State Fund reached a compromise settlement for the May 7, 1991 injury in January 1992. Medicals and hospital benefits were reserved.
26. Claimant suffered another incident involving his back sometime before August 3, 1993. He went to see Dr. Rotar on the 3rd, reporting that after moving boxes he had awakened so stiff and sore that he could hardly sit. Dr. Rotar noted, "I have seen John in the past for this type of problem and he does get an acute spasm in his lumbar spine." (Rotar Dep. Ex. 1.) At the time of this incident the claimant was working at Hunt's Timbers and was given an off work slip to take to his employer. He was advised to return in a few days unless he was doing better. Claimant did not keep the subsequent appointment.
27. Dr. Rotar is and has been the claimant's primary treating physician since his injury in 1991. Dr. Rotar was deposed for the purposes of this trial.
To answer your question directly I don't think that Mr. Harding's current problems are more probably than not the result of a natural progression of his pre-existing injury. I feel that Mr. Harding had injured his back in the past with a soft tissue injury. I think this problem resolved a number of months if not years ago and there's nothing in his history to indicate that this has been an ongoing problem. I think his most recent problems have been related to the nature of his most recent job.
Well, I can recall somewhat my conversation with John at that time and he described to me what he did at Hunt's Lumber and it was pretty heavy work, and it made - and he had done it for a long period of time and been pain-free. But as I mentioned earlier, he's not a heavily muscled young man. He's a pretty skinny whip of a guy, and it was my feeling that he had injured himself by doing that type of heavy work over a long period of time, and I didn't really think that - a big part of it was because of the nature of this current injury  and the asymptomatic time that had occurred in between, and I didn't think it was related to his previous job [at Logcrafters] - or his previous injuries.
33. In October 1991, the claimant applied for certification by the Subsequent Injury Fund. The application form which he filled in contained the following description of his restrictions and limitations which were the result of his impairment, "cannot lift heavy amounts, have trouble standing to [sic] long, and back pain when bending or sitting to [sic] much." (Ex. 10 at 2.) There was no approval of this application. In any event, the claimant in 1993 did take a heavy-duty job at Hunt's Timbers and successfully worked for a year.
34. As previously noted, following the 1991 injury the claimant did not return to work for Logcrafters. He attended college for approximately one year and worked in various jobs in Montana and Washington until being employed by Hunt's Timbers on July 6, 1993. The work at Hunt's Timbers is heavy-duty work and the claimant worked without any work-related injuries until July 6, 1994.
a. The testimony and medical notes of Dr. Rotar support the conclusion that following the 1991 injury the claimant was released to return to work without restriction. While acknowledging concern about the claimant's time of injury job, the doctor signed a work release which was without restriction and further indicated the claimant was capable of lifting up to 100 pounds on an occasional basis.
c. The claimant was able to do the work at the Hunt's Timbers sawmill successfully for a year before the injury on July 6, 1994.
36. The claimant was able to return to work within a two week period following the 1994 injury, however, the doctor did not determine that he had reached maximum medical improvement until January 17, 1995. The claims adjuster testified that the insurer did not consider the claimant to be maximally healed at the time of the December 1994 incident.
37. Employer, Ernie Hunt, whom I find to be credible, testified that based on his personal experience with a bad back, it is possible to do the work at the sawmill if an individual takes care of himself. His concern for his employees was genuine and his expectation that a person with a bad back could work at the mill if he took proper precautions was convincing.
38. Claimant testified that he experiences back pain and his back hurts. He has difficulty sitting for long periods of time and is unable to bend over and lift as much as prior to the July 6, 1994 injury.
39. The insurer presented evidence in an attempt to show that the claimant was not credible and exaggerated his symptoms subsequent to his 1994 injury. In particular the insurer argues that following the hiring of his attorney the claimant's report of symptoms increased. The difficulty with this assertion lies in the fact that much of the testimony regarding the claimant's demeanor and suspicion of "faking" was relative to incidents prior to the hiring of his attorney. Further the claimant has a medically determined problem with his low-back. In October of 1994, Dr. Rotar restricted the amount of lifting the claimant can do. This is a new limitation placed on the claimant.
40. I have reached these conclusions based on my observation of the claimant at the time of the hearing and his testimony stating that he is experiencing a difference in his ability to work since the 1994 injury. While I am not persuaded that the claimant was always candid in his responses regarding what he could recall about specific instances which occurred over the past four years, I do find that he is truthful in describing what his limitations are at this time and that those symptoms are more severe today than they were following the 1991 injury. The insurer's attempt to discredit the claimant by enumerating several discrepancies in the claimant's testimony does not persuade me that the claimant is a fraud and lying about his current condition. In listening to the claimant testify I was struck by his hesitancy and the caution by which he answered the questions. The tone of a hearing is adversarial and it is not surprising that the demeanor of the claimant would be cautious. However, I did not come away with the impression that the claimant was incredible when describing his present condition. Likewise, as mentioned, I believed the testimony of the Hunts, who testified on behalf of the insurer. I think they fairly reported what they saw and how they felt about the circumstances surrounding this claim. It became obvious that there was a misunderstanding on the part of the employers as to what the claimant was contending regarding the filing of claims for compensation. Their focus was primarily on the incident in December, which was not a new injury but a continuation of the July incident. However, the claimant did go to the doctor following that incident and the medical reports are consistent with the description of what happened to him. As testified to by Mr. Whalen, the claimant had not reached maximum healing in December even though he had returned to work, and the insurer treated the episode as an aggravation paying benefits under the July claim. It is an uncontested fact that the July injury was accepted as compensable.
41. Throughout the hearing it was necessary to clarify for the witnesses which episode was being discussed. When reading the claimant's deposition and comparing it to the testimony at trial it is clear there are times when an answer to a question was not referencing the correct date of injury. This confusion, while not an explanation for the claimant's hesitancy, lends some understanding to it.
42. The insurer raised a legitimate question regarding the relationship of the claimant's present condition to his industrial accident. It relied on the letter written by Dr. Rotar stating that the claimant had reached "pre-injury status." Its decision to deny benefits was not unreasonable.
1. The statutes in effect on the date of injury must be applied in determining benefits. Buckman v. Montana Deaconess Hospital, 224 Mont. 318, 321, 730 P.2d 380 (1986). Claimant was injured on July 6, 1994, thus the 1993 version of the Workers' Compensation Act applies.
2. Claimant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he is entitled to further compensation. Ricks v. Teslow consolidated, 162 Mont. 469, 512 P.2d 1304 (1973); Dumont v. Wicken Bros. Construction Co., 183 Mont. 190, 598 P.2d 1099 (1979). The claimant has carried his burden of proof.
The claimant contends he is entitled to permanent partial disability benefits based on physical restrictions resulting from his July 6, 1994 injury, pursuant to section 39-71-703, MCA (1993).
Claimant argues that he is entitled to this determination due to the restrictions placed on him as a result of the July 1994 injury. The insurer argues that the claimant's restrictions are the same as those which were placed on the claimant following his 1991 injury and that the claimant has reached his "pre-injury status." The insurer correctly points out that the claimant must satisfy the definition of permanent partial disability, § 39-71-116(18), MCA (1993), which requires a showing of physical restrictions as a result of the injury in order to be entitled to permanent partial or rehabilitation benefits.
The sections of an act must be construed together so that all sections are given effect, if possible. Dale v. Trade 258 Mont. 349, 351, 854 P.2d 552 (1993); § 1-2-101, MCA. Since the legislature has defined permanent partial disability for purposes of the Workers' Compensation Act, that definition must be followed and applied. The Court cannot omit specific terms of a statute. Section 1-2-101, MCA states "In the construction of a statute, the office of the judge is simply to ascertain and declare what is in terms or in substance contained therein, not to insert what has been omitted or to omit what has been inserted."
Thus, to be eligible for the permanent partial disability benefits prescribed in section 39-71-703, MCA, claimant must first meet the two prong test set out in 39-71-116(14), MCA (1991). Since the prongs are in the conjunctive, both must be met. The burden of persuasion, by a preponderance of the evidence, lies with the claimant. Dumont. v. Wicken Bros. Construction Co., 183 Mont. 190, 598 P.2d 1099 (1979).
The first prong of the test requires the existence of a "medically determined restriction as a result of an injury," § 39-71-116 (15)(a), MCA (1991). The subsection does not qualify "medically determined restriction", and the Court will not write in a qualification. Russette v. State Compensation Insurance Fund, 51 St.Rptr. 414, 415 (1994). Thus, any medically determined restriction will meet this criteria.
The second prong of the test requires an ability "to return to work in some capacity but the physical restriction impairs the worker's ability to work." § 39-71-116 (15)(b), MCA. Since the claimant is working he has satisfied the return to work element. The sole remaining issue is whether his physical restriction impairs his "ability to work."
Initially, we reject an interpretation of the "ability to work" language as referring only to a claimant's ability to work in the job to which the claimant returns, or is able to return. The section contains no such qualification, and the Court may not insert one. Russette, 51 St.Rptr. at 415. Moreover, inserting such a requirement would lead to an absurd construction, for example in a case where a heavy laborer with high wages is disabled from returning to his previous occupation but is able to work at minimum wage as a convenience store clerk without physical difficulty. If the focus is solely on the claimant's ability to work at the job to which the claimant ultimately returns, or is capable of returning, then such a worker would not be entitled to permanent partial disability benefits despite an obvious disability and wage loss. A statute should be interpreted to achieve, not defeat, the purpose for which it was enacted, Maney v. State, 255 Mont. 270, 274, 842 P.2d 704 (1992), and to avoid absurd results whenever a reasonable construction can avoid it, Darby Spar Ltd. v. Department of Revenue, 217 Mont. 376, 379, 705 P.2d 111 (1985). We therefore decline to write in or infer any requirement that a claimant's "ability to work" be considered only with regard to his post-injury job or labor market. We construe the term in its usual and broad sense as meaning the ability to work in the worker's normal, pre-injury labor market.
In this case, the physical restriction impaired claimant's ability to work. "'Impaired' means to make worse, to lessen the power, to weaken, to enfeeble, to deteriorate." Mieyr v. Federal Surety Co. v Davenport, 94 Mont. 508, 520-1, 23 P.2d 959 (1933).
As in Williams the claimant in this case has satisfied the two prong test of the definition of permanent partial disability. While Dr. Rotar's testimony and reports leave room for interpretation as to what is specifically meant by the term "pre-injury status," limiting the claimant to 50 pounds of lifting and a gradual reintroduction to the workplace clearly distinguish the claimant's present limitations from those placed on the claimant following the 1991 injury. In 1991 Dr. Rotar released the claimant to work without restriction and in his testimony he indicated that his approval of the job analyses in 1991 did not infer that the claimant was limited to the weights and limitations within those job analyses. Also, he did tell the vocational consultant that claimant could lift up to 100 pounds occasionally. This satisfies the first prong of the test. The second prong is satisfied by testimony that while claimant returned to work for Hunt's Timbers, his restrictions were such that he had difficulty doing certain jobs which he had previously been capable of performing.
The question becomes whether this disability is the result of the injury which occurred on July 6, 1994. The Court finds that the medical evidence as well as a consideration of all of the evidence, see Plainbull v. Transamerican Ins. Co., 264 Mont. 120, 125, 870 P.2d 76, 80 (1994), establishes that the claimant's July 6, 1994 industrial accident permanently worsened his low-back condition. Prior to the July 1994 injury, the claimant had worked for one year at Hunt's Timbers in a heavy labor position. He was able to do his job until the July 6th injury. Between 1991 and 1994 he had suffered low-back pain on a number of occasions, which resulted in his seeking medical attention, but there is no evidence to contradict the testimony of the claimant showing he returned to work each time. Even though follow-up appointments were scheduled, the claimant did not seek continued care following these episodes. There is no medical opinion to refute Dr. Rotar's conclusions that the 1994 injury was a new and different injury, nor that while the claimant had returned to his "pre-injury status" he was now restricted to lifting no more than 50 pounds occasionally.
3. Claimant is capable of performing medium-duty labor activity and is therefor entitled to a permanent partial disability award of 15%.
4. Claimant did not present evidence concerning rehabilitation benefits and his request for rehabilitation benefits is denied. Claimant petitioned for and only presented evidence regarding his entitlement to benefits as a result of his physical restrictions. Therefore, no consideration is given to the other factors in section 39-71-703, MCA (1993).
5. As found in Finding of Fact 39, the insurer's denial of benefits was not unreasonable. Since a finding of unreasonableness is a prerequisite to an award of both a penalty and attorney fees, sections 39-71-611 and -2907, MCA, claimant is entitled to neither.
6. Since claimant is the prevailing party he is entitled to costs in an amount to be determined by the Court.
1. Claimant is entitled to a permanent partial disability award of 15% on account of his July 6, 1994, industrial injury.
2. Claimant's request for rehabilitation benefits is denied.
3. Claimant is not entitled to an award for attorney fees or a penalty.
4. Claimant is entitled to costs in an amount to be determined by the Court.
5. This JUDGMENT is certified as final for purposes of appeal pursuant to ARM 24.5.348.
6. Any party to this dispute may have 20 days in which to request a rehearing from these Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment.
DATED in Helena, Montana, this 27th day of September, 1995.
1. The definition of permanent partial disability is now found in section 39-71-116 (18), MCA (1993). The definition, however, remains unchanged.

References: V. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 39
 v. 
 § 1
 v. 
 § 39
 v. 
 § 39
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.