Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&amp;view=article&amp;id=40358:g-r-no-137329-august-9,-2000-rogelio-m-torayno-sr-,-et-al-v-comelec,-et-al&amp;catid=1396&amp;Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 18:19:24+00:00

Document:
ROGELIO M. TORAYNO SR., GENEROSO ELIGAN and JACQUELINE M. SERINO, Petitioners, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and VICENTE Y. EMANO, Respondents.
Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to set aside the January 18, 1999 Resolution 1 of the Commission on Elections (Comelec) en banc in SPA No. 98-298, which upheld the July 14, 1998 Resolution 2 of the Comelec First Division. The assailed Resolutions ruled that Private Respondent Vicente Y. Emano possessed the minimum period of residence to be eligible to vote in Cagayan de Oro City, as well as be voted mayor thereof.
The pertinent facts of the case, as culled from the records, are as follows.
On June 14, 1997, while still the governor of Misamis Oriental, Emano executed a Voter Registration Record in Cagayan de Oro City (geographically located in the Province of Misamis Oriental), a highly urbanized city, in which he claimed 20 years of residence. On March 25, 1998, he filed his Certificate of Candidacy for mayor of the city, stating therein that his residence for the preceding two years and five months was at 1409 San Jose Street, Capistrano Subdivision, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City.
Among those who ran for the mayorship of the city in 1998, along with Emano, was Erasmo B. Damasing, counsel of herein petitioners. On May 15, 1998, Petitioners Rogelio M. Torayno Sr., Generoso Q. Eligan and Jacqueline M. Serino, all residents of Cagayan de Oro City, filed a Petition before the Comelec, docketed as SPA No. 98-298, in which they sought the disqualification of Emano as mayoral candidate, on the ground that he had allegedly failed to meet the one-year residence requirement. Prior to the resolution of their Petition, the Comelec proclaimed private respondent as the duly elected city mayor. Thus, on May 29, 1998, petitioners filed another Petition before the Comelec, this time for quo warranto, 3 in which they sought (1) the annulment of the election of private respondent; and (2) the proclamation of Erasmo B. Damasing, who had garnered the next highest number of votes, as the duly elected mayor of the city.
Hence, this recourse 5 before this Court.
precluded him from acquiring a bona fide domicile of choice for at least one (1) year in Cagayan de Oro City prior to the May 11, 1998 elections, as to disqualify him for being a candidate for city mayor of said City.
Petitioners are seeking the resolution of essentially two questions: (1) whether private respondent had duly established his residence in Cagayan de Oro City at least one year prior to the May 11, 1998 elections to qualify him to run for the mayorship thereof; and (2) if not, whether Erasmo Damasing, the candidate who had received the second highest number of votes, should be proclaimed mayor of the city.
Although not raised by the parties, the legal standing of the petitioners was deliberated upon by the Court. We note that petitioners pray, among others, for judgment "declaring Atty. Erasmo B. Damasing as entitled to be proclaimed winner as mayor in the May 11, 1998 elections in Cagayan de Oro City." 8 And yet, Damasing is not a party to the instant "Petition for Certiorari pursuant to Rule[s] 64 and 65" brought before us.
Petitioners argue that private respondent maintains his domicile in Tagoloan, Misamis Oriental, not in Cagayan de Oro City, as allegedly shown by the following facts: (1) he had run and won as governor of the province of Misamis Oriental for three consecutive terms immediately preceding the 1998 elections; (2) in the pleadings he filed in connection with an election protest against him relating to the 1995 election, he had stated that he was a resident of Tagoloan, Misamis Oriental; (3) he had fully exercised the powers and prerogatives of governor until he filed his Certificate of Candidacy for mayor on March 25, 1998.
Petitioners claim that in discharging his duties as provincial governor, private respondent remained a resident of the province. They aver that residence is a continuing qualification that an elective official must possess throughout his term. Thus, private respondent could not have changed his residence to Cagayan de Oro City while he was still governor of Misamis Oriental.
Private respondent, on the other hand, alleges that he actually and physically resided in Cagayan de Oro City while serving as provincial governor for three consecutive terms, since the seat of the provincial government was located at the heart of that city. 13 He also avers that one’s choice of domicile is a matter of intention, and it is the person concerned who would be in the best position to make a choice. In this case, Emano decided to adopt Cagayan de Oro City as his place of residence after the May 1995 elections. In fact, in January 1997, he secured his Community Tax Certificate at the City Treasurer’s Office, stating therein that he was a resident of 1409 San Jose Street, Capistrano Subdivision, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City. During the general registration of voters in June 1997, he registered in one of the precincts of Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City. This meant that, at the time, Emano had been a voter of the city for the minimum period required by law. No one has ever challenged this fact before any tribunal.
Private respondent contends further that his transfer of legal residence did not ipso facto divest him of his position as provincial governor. First, there is no law that prevents an elected official from transferring residence while in office. Second, an elective official’s transfer of residence does not prevent the performance of that official’s duties, especially in private respondent’s case in which the seat of government became his adopted place of residence. Third, as ruled in Frivaldo v. Comelec, 14 the loss of any of the required qualifications for election merely renders the official’s title or right to office open to challenge. In Emano’s case, no one challenged his right to the Office of Provincial Governor when he transferred his residence to Cagayan de Oro City. Naturally, he continued to discharge his functions as such, until he filed his candidacy for mayor in March 1998.
In the case at bar, the Comelec found that private respondent and his family had actually been residing in Capistrano Subdivision, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City, in a house he had bought in 1973. Furthermore, during the three terms (1988-1998) that he was governor of Misamis Oriental, he physically lived in that city, where the seat of the provincial government was located In June 1997, he also registered as voter of the same city. Based on our ruling in Mamba-Perez, these facts indubitably prove that Vicente Y. Emano was a resident of Cagayan de Oro City for a period of time sufficient to qualify him to run for public office therein. Moreover, the Comelec did not find any bad faith on the part of Emano in his choice of residence.
Undeniably, Cagayan de Oro City was once an integral part of Misamis Oriental and remains a geographical part of the province. Not only is it at the center of the province; more important, it is itself the seat of the provincial government. As a consequence, the provincial officials who carry out their functions in the city cannot avoid residing therein; much less, getting acquainted with its concerns and interests. Vicente Y. Emano, having been the governor of Misamis Oriental for three terms and consequently residing in Cagayan de Oro City within that period, could not be said to be a stranger or newcomer to the city in the last year of his third term, when he decided to adopt it as his permanent place of residence.
Similarly in the instant case, private respondent was actually and physically residing in Cagayan de Oro City while discharging his duties as governor of Misamis Oriental. He owned a house in the city and resided there together with his family. He even paid his 1998 community tax and registered as a voter therein. To all intents and purposes of the Constitution and the law, he is a resident of Cagayan de Oro City and eligible to run for mayor thereof.
To petitioners’ argument that Emano could not have continued to qualify as provincial governor if he was indeed a resident of Cagayan de Oro City, we respond that the issue before this Court is whether Emano’s residence in the city qualifies him to run for and be elected as mayor, not whether he could have continued sitting as governor of the province. There was no challenge to his eligibility to continue running the province; hence, this Court cannot make any pronouncement on such issue. Considerations of due process prevent us from adjudging matters not properly brought to us. On the basis, however, of the facts proven before the Comelec, we hold that he has satisfied the residence qualification required by law for the mayorship of the city.
In other words, the actual, physical and personal presence of herein private respondent in Cagayan de Oro City is substantial enough to show his intention to fulfill the duties of mayor and for the voters to evaluate his qualifications for the mayorship. Petitioners’ very legalistic, academic and technical approach to the residence requirement does not satisfy this simple, practical and common-sense rationale for the residence requirement.
In sum, we hold that Respondent Comelec cannot be faulted with abuse, much less grave abuse, of discretion in upholding private respondent’s election.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED and the assailed Comelec Resolutions AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
1.	Rollo, pp. 47-51; signed by Comms. Luzviminda G. Tancangco (officer-in-charge), Manolo B. Gorospe, Julio F. Desamito, Teresita Dy-Liacco Flores and Japal M. Guiani.
2.	Ibid., pp. 52-55; signed by Comms. Manolo B. Gorospe (presiding commissioner) and Teresita Dy-Liacco Flores.
3.	Docketed as EPC No. 98-62.
5.	This case was deemed submitted for resolution upon this Court’s receipt of private respondent’s Memorandum on April 26, 2000.
6.	Rollo, pp. 264 et seq.
7.	Petitioners’ Memorandum, pp. 9-10, signed by Attys. Ruben E. Agpalo and Renato B. Damasing.
8.	Petition, p. 38; rollo, p. 41.
9. § §2, 3 & 5, Rule 66, Rules of Court.
10. §2, Rule 25, Comelec Rules of Procedure, in rel. to §78, Omnibus Election Code, as amended.
11. §253, Omnibus Election Code, as amended.
12.	The Court desisted from further discussing whether Congress could constitutionally and by law change procedures in mandamus or disqualification proceedings, since such constitutional issue had not specifically been raised.
14.	174 SCRA 245, June 23, 1989.
15.	248 SCRA 300, September 18,1995.
16.	Signed by Atty. Jose P. Balbuena.
17.	Rollo pp. 185-190; this pleading was signed by Solicitor General Ricardo P. Galvez, Asst. Sol. Gen. Cecilio O. Estoesta and Sol. Zenaida Hernandez Perez.
19.	Romualdez-Marcos v. Comelec, 248 SCRA 300, 313, September 18, 1995 per Kapunan, J., citing Gallego v. Vera, 73 Phil 453, 459, November 24, 1941.
20.	Aquino v. Comelec, 248 SCRA 400, 420-21, September 18, 1995, per Kapunan, J.
22.	GR No. 133944, October 28, 1999, per Mendoza, J.
24.	To be exact, 29,273. See private respondent’s Memorandum, p. 18. This claim was not disputed by petitioners.
25.	Garay v. Comelec, 261 SCRA 222, 234, August 28, 1996.
27.	311 SCRA 215, 222, July 27, 1999, per Romero, J. See also Punzalan v. Comelec, 289 SCRA 702, 720, April 27, 1998.
28.	Frivaldo v. Comelec, 257 SCRA 727, 771-772, June 28, 1996, per Panganiban, J.

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