Source: http://masscases.com/cases/app/3/3massappct76.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 00:15:18+00:00

Document:
JAMES DWYER vs. THE HEARST CORPORATION.
TORT. Writ in the Superior Court dated September 7, 1965.
Following transfer to the Municipal Court of the City of Boston and retransfer to the Superior Court the action was tried before Goldberg, J.
Francis X. Kiley for the defendant.
Joseph W. MacDonald for the plaintiff.
GOODMAN, J. The plaintiff initiated this action in the Superior Court; the declaration is in two counts, one against the defendant The Hearst Corporation (Hearst) and one against DeMarco, an employee of Hearst. Each count alleges that the plaintiff sustained personal injuries as a result of an assault upon him by the employee. The case was transferred to the Municipal Court of the City of Boston (Municipal Court) in accordance with G. L. c. 231, Section 102C, where a trial resulted in findings for the plaintiff against Hearst and against DeMarco, each in the amount of $20,570. Hearst appealed the finding against it to the Appellate Division of the Municipal Court, [Note 1] which ordered that the finding be vacated and that a finding be entered for Hearst on the count against it.
The plaintiff then retransferred the case to the Superior Court, where a jury trial resulted in a verdict against Hearst in the amount of $5,000. Both the plaintiff and Hearst filed bills of exceptions. See Consolo v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Authy. 1 Mass. App. Ct. 338, 339-341 (1973). The plaintiff's amended substitute outline bill of exceptions challenges the exclusion in the Superior Court of the finding against DeMarco by the Municipal Court. Hearst's bill of exceptions raises the issue whether its motion for a directed verdict should have been granted.
2. The defendant's exceptions. The motion for a directed verdict was properly denied. From the evidence as summarized in the bill of exceptions, taking the evidence favorable to the plaintiff, the jury could have found that on the day of the incident DeMarco was employed by the defendant as a truck driver to deliver newspapers. At about 5:00 P. M. he was returning from making deliveries on the North Shore and was driving the truck on Salem Street in the North End. The plaintiff had parked his truck on Salem Street while delivering merchandise and was blocking DeMarco's way. DeMarco (as set out in the bill of exceptions) "swore and cursed at Dwyer, asking him to move his truck; Dwyer replied he'd only be a couple of minutes and bent over to pick up his merchandise, the driver of the other truck [DeMarco] struck him (the plaintiff) on the jaw. . . . After the altercation DeMarco went to gas up, and then back to the office."
committed within the scope of employment, in that they stem from and directly relate to the frustration of the ability to perform on the assignments for which the employee is presently responsible." Indeed, the Hobart case is quite similar on its facts. There, as here, the assault was by an employee truck driver in response to the plaintiff's conduct which delayed refueling a truck. See Howe v. Newmarch, 12 Allen 49, 56 (1866).
The defendant contends that it is not liable because DeMarco was on his way to supper. However, we need not pass on whether this would absolve the defendant in this case. The testimony of DeMarco that he never went home for supper that evening because he spent his supper time in the altercation, even if believed, is merely some indication of his intent which is not dispositive. Miller v. Federated Dept. Stores, Inc. 364 Mass. at 348-349. The jury could weigh it in the light of his testimony that he went to "gas up" after the assault. It was also for the jury to determine the significance to be given the testimony of the defendant's superintendent of delivery that after making deliveries on the North Shore, "DeMarco was given permission to go home for his supper, then gas up his truck and return for another local delivery." The jury, if they believed this at all, could understand it as a description of a general pattern which admitted of variation.
The defendant's bill of exceptions is meager. However, the transcript of the trial was submitted to us in connection with the plaintiff's outline bill of exceptions. Rule 1:22 (4) of the Appeals Court, 1 Mass. App. Ct. 893 (1972). See Goldman v. Mahony, 354 Mass. 705, 711-712 (1968). We are free to examine it in connection with the entire case. See American Discount Corp. v. Kaitz, 348 Mass. 706, 708-709 (1965), citing G. L. c. 231, Section 135 (3d par.), as amended through St. 1941, c. 187; Kennedy v. U-Haul Co. Inc. 360 Mass. 71, 72 (1971).
delivery. The plaintiff also testified that DeMarco told him, "Come on, move your . . . truck" and said that he was in a hurry because he had work to do. The jury could thus rationally have found for the plaintiff.
[Note 1] DeMarco, so far as appears, took no further action at any stage of the proceedings.
[Note 2] Also, the court in its charge stated, without objection: "In the Declaration which you will have there are two counts: Count 1, which is against DeMarco, and a Count 2 against DeMarco's alleged employer, Hearst Publications. Now, Count 1 against DeMarco is not before you. . . . What is before you now is simply Count 2, the action against The Hearst Publications. . . ." We need not decide the exact status of the count against DeMarco.
[Note 3] That statute reads in pertinent part (last par.): "The action shall thereafter be tried in the superior court. The decision of, and the amount of the damages assessed, if any, by a district court shall be prima facie evidence upon such matters as are put in issue by the pleadings, and no other findings of such court shall at any time be admissible as evidence or become part of the pleadings. . . ."
[Note 4] The plaintiff does not argue, and we need not deal with the applicability of the principles governing estoppel and res judicata.

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