Source: http://www.torttalk.com/2017/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 13:38:50+00:00

Document:
Some attorneys may have a ­misconception that the Conclusion section of a brief can only be utilized for a one-line statement of the relief requested, i.e., "For the above-stated reasons, it is respectfully requested that the plaintiff's motion to for summary judgment be granted."
The very last sentence of the entire brief should certainly be a respectful request for the granting of the relief requested. However, there is no rule stating that one is precluded from utilizing the Conclusion of a brief as one last great opportunity to encapsulate your client's legal argument in an additional sentence or two or three.
An excellent way to accomplish is to recast your "Question Presented" as a strong final statement that the relief requested should be allowed by the court.
In the case of Carney v. GEICO, No. 2:17-cv-01486 (W.D. Pa. 2017 Mitchell, Mag. J.), a Federal District Magistrate Judge recommended a denial of a Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand a post-Koken matter to state court.
The case involved a suit by the Plaintiff for breach of contract in a UIM claim along with claims of bad faith. The central issue of the case revolved around a minor Plaintiff’s residency. More specifically, if the minor Plaintiff resided with her grandparents, the minor Plaintiff would be able to stack UIM benefits. According to the Defendant carrier, if it was determined that the minor Plaintiff did not reside with her grandparents, stacking would not be available.
The Defendant carrier removed the case to federal court. The Plaintiff responded with a Motion to Remand asserting that this matter was essentially a declaratory judgment action that did not belong in federal court.
In issuing his report and recommendation, the United States Magistrate Judge noted that federal courts routinely resolve issues of state law relating to insurance, including UIM benefits and bad faith claims. As such, the Motion to Remand was denied.
I send thanks to Attorney Joseph Hudock of the Pittsburgh law firm of Summers McDonnell Hudock & Guthrie for bringing this decision to my attention.
Another year of litigation has come to a close. Given that precedent has a way of repeating itself here’s a look back at notable decisions from the past year.
In its decision in the bad faith case of Rancosky v. Washington National Insurance, No. 28 WAP 2016 (Pa. Sept. 28, 2017), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, for the first time, considered the elements of a bad faith claim under 42 Pa.C.S.A. Section 8371.
In Rancosky, the Supreme Court adopted the two-part test enunciated in the case of Terletsky v. v. Prudential Property & Casualty Insurance, 649 A.2d 680 (Pa. Super. 1994), which provides that a plaintiff must present clear and convincing evidence of: that the carrier did not have a reasonable basis for denying benefits under the policy, and that the carrier knew of or recklessly disregarded its lack of a reasonable basis.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court went on to note that evidence of a motive of self-interest or ill will was not a prerequisite for a plaintiff to prevail on a statutory bad faith claim.
The Pennsylvania Superior Court provided its latest take on the Dead Man’s Statute, 42, Pa. C.S.A. 5930, in the case of Davis v. Wright, 2017 Pa. Super. 48 (Pa. Super. Feb. 27, 2017 Shogan, Ott, J.J., Stevens, P.J.E.)(Op. by Stevens, P.J.E.).
In the case of Coughlin v. Massaquoi, No. 32 EAP 2016 (Pa. Sept. 28, 2017), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court declined to adopt a bright-line rule of predicating the admissibility of a person’s blood alcohol content (BAC) on the existence of independent corroborating evidence of intoxication.
The Coughlin case arose out of a motor vehicle versus pedestrian accident.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the admissibility of BAC evidence remains within the trial court’s discretion based upon the general rules of admissibility found in the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence 401-403, and the trial court’s related assessment of whether the evidence establishes the party’s unfitness to act in light of the alleged intoxication.
The use of visually stimulating powerpoint exhibits at trial has become the norm in the digital age.
In the case of W.C. v. Janssen Pharmaceuticals, 2017 Pa. Super. 356 (Pa. Super. Nov. 13, 2017, Panella, Ransom, Fitzgerald, J.J.) (Op. by Panella, J.), the court ruled that allowing counsel to use powerpoint slides as a visual aid during closing argument was not an abuse of discretion by the trial court. This was particularly so given that the court found that the slides did not misrepresent the evidence presented at trial.
Another recurring issue in civil litigation matters is the extent to which cellphone use by a defendant during the course of an accident can support a claim for punitive damages.
In a detailed order issued by Judge Kimberly J. McFadden of the Northampton County Court of Common Pleas in the case of Figueroa v. Ferraira, No. C-48-CV-2017-833 (C.P. Northampton Co. June 8, 2017, McFadden, J.), the court allowed a claim punitive damages to proceed beyond the preliminary objections stage in a case where the Plaintiff alleged that the defendant rear-ended the plaintiff’s vehicle at a red light at an excessive rate of speed and while texting.
The attorney-client privilege and the attorney work product doctrine were both reviewd in the case of BouSamra v. Excela Health, 2017 Pa. Super. 66 (Pa. Super. March 13, 2017, Bowes, Stabile, Musmanno, J.J.) (Op. by Bowes, J.). The Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the granting of a motion to compel the production of a memorandum prepared by counsel for the defendant that was shared with an outside public relations firm.
The court found that the attorney-client privilege for that memorandum was waived when the client shared the Memorandum with the outside public relations firm. It was noted that the public relations firm was not a part of the team offering legal advice.
In its opinion, the Pennsylvania Superior Court stated that the waiver doctrine analysis is essentially the same for both the attorney-client privilege and the work product privilege.
In the case of Vetter v. Miller, 2017 Pa. Super. 64 (Pa. Super. March 10, 2017) (Ransom, J., Ford Elliot, P.J.E., Stephens, P.J.E.) (Op. by Ransom, J.), the court affirmed the trial court’s decision that a plaintiff’s insomnia did not amount to a serious impairment of a body function for a limited tort the plaintiff under the facts presented.
For example, the court noted that, while evidence of a conviction of driving while intoxicated may be admissible if supported by ample evidence of intoxication, a guilty plea of driving with a suspended license was only a summary offense that should not have been admitted in the court below.
In post-Koken cases involving bad faith claims, there is still no appellate guidance on severance or bifurcation and stay orders relative to the bad faith claims. There is a split of authority among the trial courts, but the federal courts seem to be trending toward denying motions to sever and stay bad faith claims.
As this year comes to an end, there are also important rule changes and potential important decisions to anticipate in 2018.
One decision to keep an eye out for would be the one in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court case of Gallagher v. Geico Indemnity, No. 87 WAL 2017 (Pa. Aug. 8, 2017). The court is expected to address issues pertaining to the validity of household exclusions and stacking issues with respect to automobile insurance policies.
In the case of Nicolaou v. Martin, No. 58 MAL 2017 (Pa. Aug. 18, 2017), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court issued an order agreeing to hear the appeal of a woman whose case against medical providers over an alleged misdiagnosis of her Lyme disease was dismissed partly because of Facebook posts indicated that she knew that she was suffering from the disease for years before filing the suit.
A split Pennsylvania Superior Court panel previously ruled in this case that the plaintiff’s claims were barred by the two-year statute of limitations.
Civil litigators should also be aware that the Public Access Policy of the Unified Judicial System of Pennsylvania is about to go into effect and that they may face sanctions if they do not comply with the mandates of this new policy pertaining to the filing of documents with the court.
By way of background, with the Pennsylvania state court systems gradually moving over into the digital age, the Administrative Office of Pennsylvania Courts (AOPC) has taken steps to address the need to protect individuals from identity theft and from disclosure of private information.
Effective Jan. 8, 2018, the Public Access Policy of the Unified Judicial System of Pennsylvania will require attorneys to file a certification, with every document filed with the court, that confirms that sensitive, private, and confidential information has been redacted from the document.
Also, if confidential information is contained within the court filing, or in documents attached to the court filing, other certification documents will have to be filed as well. More information on this new policy may be found on the AOPC’s website or at a number of CLE courses being held around the commonwealth.
Daniel E. Cummins is a partner and civil litigator with the Scranton law firm of Foley Comerford & Cummins. His civil litigation blog, Tort Talk, can be viewed at www.TortTalk.com. Attorney Cummins also provides Mediation Services at www.CumminsMediationServices.com. Contact him at dancummins@comcast.net.
In the case of Cole v. Camelback Mountain Ski Resort, No. 3:16-CV-1959 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 16, 2017 Mariani, J.), the court granted a Motion to Dismiss in a downhill skiing injury case.
In so ruling, Judge Mariani noted that a ski resort owes no duty of care to a skier for any in inherent risk of downhill skiing. The court noted that accidentally striking an object while skiing down a slope is an inherent of downhill skiing. The exact nature of the objects struck is not material.
The court also noted that the fact that the ski resort added padding to the object that the Plaintiff struck did not give rise to liability for a negligent undertaking. To rule otherwise would deter voluntary safety efforts on the part of a ski resort.
HOPING THAT 2018 BRINGS YOU ALL THE BEST THAT LIFE HAS TO OFFER.
- There was no intentional destruction of relevant documents to justify a finding of spoliation.
- A human factors expert is not qualified to testify about accident reconstruction.
- Prior drunk driving tickets were excluded as unduly prejudicial where alcohol had nothing to do with the accident in question. However, other driving tickets were admissible as relevant to the negligent hiring claim.
- Defendant’s expert testimony concerning the effect of Plaintiff’s blood alcohol content, although not supported by other exigent evidence, was found to be sufficiently thorough to be admissible.
- Since the Plaintiff was seeking to recover for permanent injuries, evidence of prior drug abuse was found to be relevant on the issue of life expectancy.
- Evidence of the Plaintiff’s cell phone use and texting was sufficiently close to the accident as to be admissible.
- Plaintiff’s traffic citations with respect to the accident were found to be admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence.
- Where the Plaintiff is claiming injuries that are the same as he claimed in a prior dissimilar accident, the prior accident is admissible as relevant to the issue of causation of those injuries without regard to the similarity of the facts of the separate accidents.
In the case of Reeves v. The Travelers Company, No. 16-6448 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 30, 2017 Baylson, J.), the court upheld a carrier's regular use exclusion and entered summary judgment on a plaintiff's bad faith claims.
At the time of the accident, the plaintiff was a passenger in a truck owned by his employer while the truck was en route from a work meeting to a work site.
The plaintiff admitted in discovery that he drove or rode in his employer's vehicles on 90 percent of his workdays. The court rejected the plaintiff's argument that he only used 3 of the employer's 17 vehicles and his argument that his work duties were performed outside of the vehicle.
The court noted that the regular use exclusion has been held to apply to both passengers and drivers. The court also referenced cases where the regular use exclusion was still applied despite the fact that an employee's work duties were performed outside of a vehicle.
The court additionally found no basis for a bad faith claim after finding that the carrier investigated and denied the claim based upon a reasonable reading of the policy.
Source: "Digest of Recent Opinions." Pennsylvania Law Weekly (Nov. 21, 2017).
Here is a LINK to a complimentary copy of the 62 page Tort Talk 2017 Civil Litigation Update booklet that I created for use at the recent Lackawanna Bench Bar Conference as well as the Luzerne County Bench Bar Conference.
The Tort Talk 2017 Civil Litigation Update was created from the Tort Talk posts pertaining to notable decisions handed down over the past year or so and is offered here free of charge for the readers of Tort Talk.
To the extent you may have a desire to pay it forward as they say, I would politely propose considering a small donation to the charity of your choice, your local Pro Bono Office, or perhaps to the Children's Advocacy Center in Scranton which is a private non-profitable charitable organization whose mission is to provide excellence in the assessment and treatment in child abuse and neglect case. The Children's Advocacy Center is located at 1710 Mulberry Street, Scranton, PA 18510. Here is a LINK to their website. Just a thought.
Thanks for reading Tort Talk and for providing me with notable cases to highlight on Tort Talk. All is much appreciated.
According to an article in today's Legal Intelligencer by Max Mitchell, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court issued an Order on November 29, 2017 agreeing to hear an appeal in the case of Feleccia v. Lackawanna College, No. 359 MAL 2017 (Pa. 2017), which involved the issue of what standards colleges have to adhere to in order to meet their duty of care towards student-athletes engaged in college sports.
The Feleccia case arose out injuries to two college students at a pre-season football practice.
At the trial court level in Lackawanna County, Judge James A. Gibbons ruled on a motion for summary judgment that waivers of liability executed by the athletes barred their recovery. The trial court also ruled that the student-athletes had assumed the risk of their own injuries in playing college football. Here is a LINK to the Tort Talk post on the trial court decision.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted that the more specific issues presented by the case involved whether colleges are required to have medical personnel on hand at athletic events, and whether clauses releasing the school from any and all liability is enforceable.
The Supreme Court's Order granting the appeal and stating the issue can be viewed HERE.
Source: "Justices Take Up Case on Colleges' Duty of Care to Student-Athletes," by Max Mitchell of the Legal Intelligencer (Dec. 5, 2017).
In the case of Shiflett v. Lehigh Valley Health Network, Inc., 2017 Pa. Super. 354 (Pa. Super. Nov. 9, 2017 Solano, Scogan, and Platt, J.J.) (Op. by Solano, J.), the court upheld a liability verdict in favor of a Plaintiff in a medical malpractice case but sent the case back for a new trial on certain issues of damages.
In its decision, the court noted that the Plaintiffs were improperly allowed to amend their Complaint to assert a new cause of action after the statute of limitations had expired.
The Superior Court found that the new theory was based on a different time period and different facts that were not at issue in the original Complaint.
In this regard, the Superior Court noted that vague, generalized negligence allegations could not establish a relation back to the original Complaint, particularly where, as here, the Defendants properly filed Preliminary Objections to those allegations.
The Superior court sent the case back to the trial court for a new trial on damages as the general verdict on damages that was entered in the first trial could not be separated into amounts that were related to the proper time periods not barred by the statute of limitations. The court noted that the new trial would be limited to damages because the error on the time barred claims did not affect the liability issues on the other claims.
The below article written by my associate attorney, Stephen T. Kopko, and myself appeared in the November 16, 2017 edition of the Pennsylvania Law Weekly. It is republished here with permission.
Recent news stories have emphasized the emerging trend of transportation network companies, such as Uber and Lyft, around the world. These types of ride-sharing companies are continuing to develop across the commonwealth of Pennsylvania as well.
This increasing use of transportation network companies by the public led the Pennsylvania General Assembly to pass legislation last to regulate such businesses. Of note are the statutory requirements for insurance coverages mandated for transportation network companies, such as Uber and Lyft, and their drivers.
Senate Bill 984 was signed by Gov. Tom Wolf on Nov. 4, 2016. This law relates to the operation of ride-sharing companies in the commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Under this bill, certain sections of Pennsylvania statutes were amended to include provisions and regulations related to these ride-sharing companies.
The new law defines what a transportation network company is and identifies the relevant driver(s) included under the ambit of the statute. This new law also outlines a list of qualifications and standards that the company must meet before being permitted to operate in the commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
The new law also outlines the insurance coverage that either the driver of a ride-sharing vehicle must possess, or that the transportation network company must provide, to cover both the driver of the vehicle and any passengers that may use the service.
The “financial responsibility requirements” and the “Insurance requirements” mandated under this new law can be found at both 66 Pa.C.S.A. Section 2603.1 and at 53 Pa.C.S.A. Section 57A07. The language of each statute is essentially identical.
The new legislation then breaks down different scenarios and identifies what insurance mandates apply to each situation. These scenarios include where the driver of the vehicle does not have passengers and is logged into the transportation network company network (presumably applying to the situation where the driver is on the way to pick up a fare), and where the driver of the vehicle does have passengers.
Under the statutory language found at 53 Pa.C.S.A. 57a07(b) or 66 Pa.C.S.A. Section 2603.1(a)(2), where an Lyft or Uber driver is logged onto the digital network and is able to receive transportation requests but is not yet actually engaged in a prearranged ride, that driver must be covered by a policy providing bodily injury liability coverage of $50,000 per person/$100,000 per accident, along with $25,000 in property damage coverage. The insurance policy covering this scenario is also required to offer first party medical benefits coverage of at least $5,000 for the driver and $25,000 for any pedestrians injured.
Under the separate scenario where a Lyft or Uber driver has been engaged in a prearranged ride and does have a passenger in the vehicle, the statutory language found at 53. Pa.C.S.A. 57a07(c) and 66 Pa.C.S.A. Section 2603.1(a)(3) requires that the applicable liability policy contain coverage of at least $500,000 for death, bodily injury and property damages claims. The policy must also provide for first party medical benefits coverage of at least $5,000 for the driver and $25,000 for any passengers or pedestrians injured.
These coverages, separate from the driver’s inapplicable personal automobile insurance coverage, may be secured or supplied either by the driver of the car, the transportation network company, or any combination of the two, see 53 Pa.C.S.A 57a07 (d); 66 Pa.C.S.A. Section 2603.1(a)(2)(iii); 66 Pa.C.S.A. Section 2603.1(a)(3)(iii).
One issue that has arisen with companies such as Uber and Lyft is the extent to which an insurance carrier providing personal automobile insurance coverage to a person who chooses to use a personal vehicle in a ride-sharing business capacity may deny coverage under that policy.
As such, the statutory framework confirms that a Lyft or Uber driver’s separate personal automobile insurance coverage typically will not come into play if the driver is involved in an accident resulting in personal injuries or property damages.
This Pennsylvania law specifically provides that carriers that write personal automobile insurance in the commonwealth may exclude coverage, including liability coverage, property damage coverage, along with UM/UIM benefits and first party medical benefits coverage, for accidents involving an Uber or Lyft driver involved in an accident that occurs while its insured driver is logged into the transportation network company’s network and seeking customers or is engaged in a prearranged ride with a customer. See 53 Pa.C.S.A 57a07 (l) and 66 Pa.C.S.A. Section 2603.1(a)(2). The law also upholds the right of a carrier who has excluded coverage to also assert that it has no duty to defend any claims arising out of an accident involving a Lyft or Uber vehicle as well.
Accordingly, the right of personal automobile insurance carriers to deny coverage in cases involving accidents arising out of the use of personal vehicles for transportation network companies has been upheld in the regulatory scheme passed by the Pennsylvania Legislature.
The law does otherwise also confirm that nothing in its provisions prevents a personal automobile insurance carrier from providing coverage for drivers engaged in Uber or Lyft activities should the carrier wish to sell that type of coverage.
As a protective measure for the public at large, the law additionally imposes duties upon the transportation network company to ensure that the mandated insurance coverage is in place prior to allowing a driver to drive for the company.
The statutes also otherwise provide that where the insurance that may have been secured by a driver for Uber or Lyft rides has lapsed or is inadequate, then the insurance coverage maintained by the transportation network company shall provide the coverage required by this law and the transportation network company’s carrier would have the duty to defend the claim.
In other notable provisions under the statute, it is provided that a transportation network company or a driver may not request or require a passenger to sign a waiver of potential liability for personal injury or property damage claims.
Nor can the transportation network company require any of its drivers to sign any waivers for potential liability for personal injury or property damage claims as a condition for entering into a lease agreement, see 53 Pa.C.S.A. Section 57A07(m).
It is noted that, as of this time, there has been no case law handed down interpreting this statute since it was passed almost a year ago in November 2016. However, it can be anticipated that, as the use of Uber and Lyft continues to rise in Pennsylvania, insurance coverage decisions are likely to be generated in the unfortunate situation of an accident involving such a ride-sharing vehicle.
Daniel E. Cummins is a partner and civil litigator with the Scranton law firm of Foley Comerford & Cummins. His civil litigation blog, Tort Talk, can be viewed at www.TortTalk.com. Cummins also provides Mediation Services at Cummins Mediation Services.
Stephen T. Kopko is an associate with the firm who focuses on the defense of auto accident and premises liability matters.

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