Source: https://www.justice.gov/crt/case-document/united-states-v-hines-brief-appellee
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 11:15:35+00:00

Document:
The United States agrees with David Hines that oral argument is not necessary in the case. Hines challenges only the substantive reasonableness of his 40-month sentence, which was a substantial downward departure from the applicable United States Sentencing Guidelines range of 63 to 78 months.
The United States believes, however, that this Court’s disposition would benefit from assignment of this case to the same panel as the appeals of the other former Iberia Parish Sheriff’s Office employees who, like Hines, pleaded guilty and are challenging their sentences. And, if the Court decides that argument would be helpful, the United States also believes that this Court’s disposition would benefit from scheduling any oral arguments in these cases for the same sitting because Hines raises purported disparities between his sentence and those of his co-defendants to challenge its substantive reasonableness.
1 “ROA.___” refers to consecutively numbered pages of the Record on Appeal. “Br. ___” refers to page numbers in appellant’s opening brief.
same day. ROA.27. This Court has jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. 3742 and 28 U.S.C. 1291.
Whether the district court’s 40-month sentence, which it reached after departing downward from a 63- to 78-month United States Sentencing Guidelines range, was substantively reasonable in light of the facts of the case and the sentences of other defendants who have engaged in similar conduct.
This case is one of several that resulted from a federal investigation into Iberia Parish Sheriff Louis Ackal and other Iberia Parish Sheriff’s Office (IPSO) employees. The investigation revealed a number of abuses by IPSO officials over a period of more than half a decade. Ultimately, Sheriff Ackal and a number of other supervisors and officers were charged with federal offenses related to these abuses.
2 A total of 12 defendants were charged in connection with the IPSO abuses. Ten (including Hines) pleaded guilty, and one is awaiting trial. Sheriff Ackal was acquitted following a five-day jury trial. ROA.1395-1396. Hines testified at Sheriff Ackal’s trial. ROA.1145-1168.
punish an arrestee, Ray Trosclair, in March of 2014. ROA.108. On the day of the incident, Bret Broussard—a lieutenant in the narcotics unit—called Hines and instructed Hines to report to the sheriff’s office. ROA.1150-1151. Hines, along with a fellow narcotics officer, Byron “Ben” Lassalle, did so and met with Sheriff Ackal, Detective Scott Hotard, and two of Sheriff Ackal’s family members. ROA.1151-1152. Sheriff Ackal told Hines and Lassalle that Trosclair had assaulted one of Ackal’s relatives. ROA.108; ROA.1152-1153. Ackal told Hines and Lassalle to arrest Trosclair and to “[t]ake care of him.” ROA.108; ROA.11521153. Hines knew, based on previous conversations with Ackal, that this meant that Ackal wanted Hines and Lassalle “to use unlawful force to punish [Trosclair] for his assault on [Ackal’s] relative.” ROA.108; ROA.1153. Hines and Lassalle— intending to further Ackal’s unlawful objective—went to find Trosclair. ROA.108.
used “was unjustified and unnecessary” because Trosclair “posed no threat to the Defendant or anyone else at the time of the beating.” ROA.109. All told, Trosclair was beaten for “3 to 4 minutes, despite his not resisting arrest.” ROA.124.
After the incident, Hines filed a false police report to cover up the wrongful assault. ROA.109; ROA.1156-1157. In that report, Hines stated that Trosclair had resisted arrest, which caused the injuries. ROA.1156-1157. Hines now admits, however, that he “fabricat[ed] justifications for the use of force” and that he “faile[d] to describe that he and [Lassalle] beat [Trosclair] without justification.” ROA.109.
Trosclair sustained significant injuries as a result of the assault. Specifically, Trosclair had a “large bruise on the outside portion of his left thigh,” a scratch on the left side of his face, and a “scratched left elbow.” ROA.124. In addition, Trosclair “indicated he had trouble walking for two to three days after the beating.” ROA.124.
federal investigators who were looking into IPSO that Trosclair resisted arrest, which he again used to justify the excessive force. ROA.1162; see also ROA.683684.
Hines now admits that he lied to investigators. ROA.1162.
Hines waived indictment and was charged via bill of information on March 7, 2016. ROA.7-9. That same day, he pleaded guilty to one felony count of violating 18 U.S.C. 242, which prohibits willful deprivation of constitutional rights under color of law. ROA.96-103. As part of his guilty plea, Hines acknowledged that the maximum sentence for his conviction was ten years. ROA.104. Hines also stipulated to a factual basis for the plea. ROA.107-110.
The United States Probation Office then prepared a presentence investigation report (PSR). ROA.117-135. The PSR calculated Hines’s total offense level as 26, which, combined with his lack of criminal history, led to an advisory range of 63 to 78 months under the United States Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines or U.S.S.G.). ROA.126-127; ROA.133.
co-defendant Byron Benjamin Lassalle’s testimony regarding Ackal’s role in ordering the beating of Trosclair.” ROA.139. Hines submitted a sentencing memorandum seeking a below-Guidelines sentence and various letters in support. ROA.142-169.
many other defendants were implicated, took “place before Mr. Hines was involved.” ROA.93.
After adopting the findings of the PSR and acknowledging the United States’ Section 5K1.1 motion, the district court sentenced Hines to a 40-month term of incarceration “[p]ursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act and after consideration of all the factors of 3553(a)” and Hines’s “personal characteristics or involvement.” ROA.93-94. The court entered its judgment and written statement of reasons on April 6, 2017; there, the court stated that the applicable Guidelines range was 63 to 78 months but that it departed downward to the 40-month sentence because of the United States’ Section 5K1.1 motion. ROA.113-114; see also ROA.22-26. Hines timely appealed that same day. ROA.27.
Hines’s 40-month, within-Guidelines sentence was substantively reasonable and did not create any unwarranted disparity.
conduct, sentenced Hines to 40 months because he beat a compliant arrestee who was not resisting; falsified a report regarding the incident; lied about the incident to federal investigators; and admitted to engaging in five to six other excessive force incidents. A 40-month sentence for this extensive wrongdoing was well within the district court’s discretion.
There are also no unwarranted sentencing disparities. Hines compares his sentence to those of his co-defendants. This, however, ignores the applicable legal standard, which requires him to compare his sentence to nationwide sentences for similar conduct. Conducting the proper inquiry reveals that a 40-month sentence for beating an arrestee without justification and trying to cover it up is well within the range of reasonable sentences. Even if this Court compares Hines’s sentence to that of his co-defendants, there is no unwarranted disparity. Specifically, Hines’s comparison of his sentence to that of Robert Burns fails because Burns pleaded guilty only to a misdemeanor offense, while Hines pleaded guilty to a felony. Hines’s comparison of his sentence to that of Jason Comeaux, who also received a 40-month sentence, fails as well because Comeaux’s cooperation with the United States’ investigation was more extensive than Hines’s. The district court was within its discretion to balance culpability and cooperation and to conclude that the same sentence for Hines and Comeaux was appropriate.
This Court reviews Hines’s “sentence for substantive reasonableness under an abuse-of-discretion standard of review.” United States v. Duhon, 541 F.3d 391, 399 (5th Cir. 2008). “Appellate review is highly deferential as the sentencing judge is in a superior position to find facts and judge their import under § 3553(a) with respect to a particular defendant.” United States v. Campos-Maldonado, 531 F.3d 337, 339 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 935 (2008). “When, in its discretion, a court imposes a sentence falling within a properly calculated guideline range, such a sentence is presumptively reasonable.” United States v. Medina-Argueta, 454 F.3d 479, 481 (5th Cir. 2006); United States v. Simpson, 796 F.3d 548, 557 (5th Cir. 2015) (“We presume sentences within or below the calculated guidelines range are reasonable.”), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 920 (2016).
sentenced Hines to 40 months after departing downward from that range in light of the United States’ motion under Guidelines Section 5K1.1.3 ROA.94; ROA.113116.
in balancing sentencing factors.” United States v. Cooks, 589 F.3d 173, 186 (5th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 559 U.S. 1024 (2010).
3 Accepting the United States’ recommendation under Section 5K1.1 in full would have led to a 27- to 33-month sentencing range. ROA.140. The district court, however, did not fully accept that recommendation and instead departed downward to a 40-month sentence, which was within its discretion. See United States v. Cooper, 274 F.3d 230, 248 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that a “district court has almost complete discretion to determine the extent of a departure under § 5K1.1”); see also United States v. Hargrett, 156 F.3d 447, 450 n.1 (2d Cir.) (“A downward departure based on Section 5K1.1 does not require the district judge to pick a new offense level and a particular sentence within the range set for that level; rather, the court may simply pick a sentence of so many months without mention of an offense level.”), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1048 (1998). A sentence that results from a downward departure under a provision of the Guidelines such as Section 5K1.1 is considered a within-Guidelines sentence. See United States v. Tzep-Mejia, 461 F.3d 522, 525 (5th Cir. 2006).
other defendants. Specifically, he seems to suggest (Br. 27-30) that the court should have given him a lower sentence because he was not involved in the beatings in Iberia Parish Jail’s chapel that occurred on April 29, 2011. But the district court heard five days of testimony regarding the chapel abuses and Hines’s wrongdoing at the trial of co-defendant Sheriff Ackal; the court was therefore well aware that Hines participated in a later and different offense than the majority of the other defendants. See ROA.92-93 (United States’ counsel’s statement that the 2011 chapel beatings occurred “before Mr. Hines was involved”). Both sets of offenses were extensively discussed at the Ackal trial, and Hines’s particular offense conduct was described at length in the PSR (ROA.123-124), the factual findings of which the district court adopted (ROA.93). Though the chapel abuses were grotesque (and led to substantial sentences for those involved), that does not diminish the seriousness of Hines’s offenses. Hines admitted to beating a compliant, non-resisting arrestee despite knowing that it was unlawful. ROA.108109.
He also admitted to falsifying a report about the incident (ROA.109; ROA.1156-1157), lying about it to federal officers investigating IPSO abuses (ROA.1162), and engaging in a half dozen other excessive-force violations (ROA.1165). For this extensive misconduct, a 40-month sentence was reasonable and within the district court’s discretion.
Instead of citing authority to support his arguments, Hines repeatedly misstates the record. For example, Hines states (Br. 30) that he “was truthful with the FBI, from the very start” and contrasts (Br. 28) his conduct with that of the other defendants by stating that “[a]ll of the other defendants lied about the misconduct.” But Hines’s own admission that he lied to federal investigators who were looking into IPSO abuses contradicts these assertions. ROA.1162. Hines also contrasts (Br. 27) his conduct with officers who “connived a scheme of false statements to hide the truth,” even though he and Lassalle worked together to cover up the use of excessive force against Trosclair by lying to federal investigators. ROA.683-684; ROA.1162. Hines finally suggests (Br. 33) that there is a “complete absence” of criminal history in his record and that therefore there is an “unusually low risk of recidivism.” While it is true that Hines has never been arrested or convicted (and the Guidelines range accounted for that (ROA.126127)), he admitted to a half dozen excessive-force violations before the Trosclair beating. ROA.1164-1165.
(…continued) not clear whether the district court believed the Guidelines were mandatory); United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179 (11th Cir. 2008) (reversing a probationary sentence on the United States’ appeal for being too low and substantively unreasonable where the Guidelines range was 97 to 120 months); United States v. Simon, 964 F.2d 1082 (11th Cir. 1992) (no challenge to sentence), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1033 (1993).
Hines’s remaining arguments fare no better. He contends (Br. 34-36) that the district court had “an incorrect understanding of the factual basis” of his guilty plea because the court started the hearing by asking whether this case was the one where the victim was innocent of any crime. ROA.89. Hines gets this backwards. The court’s statement demonstrates that it understood the point that Hines repeatedly makes in his brief: that the factual basis for Hines’s conviction, assaulting an arrestee, was different from the factual bases of the other defendants’ convictions, assaulting individuals who were in jail, a point that counsel for the United States also made at the sentencing hearing.5 ROA.92-93. Indeed, Hines’s suggestion (Br. 36) that the court confused him and Wade Bergeron is puzzling because Bergeron received a longer sentence than Hines. ROA.1318. There is no evidence that the court was confused, and there is no basis to conclude that any confusion prejudiced Hines.
5 Though the status of the victims has no legal bearing, the court’s questions regarding the victim’s status demonstrates that the court was aware of the unique factual circumstances of Hines’s case, which was the only case that did not involve assaults of inmates at the Iberia Parish jail.
“the victim’s wrongful conduct contributed significantly to provoking the offense behavior.” U.S.S.G. § 5K2.10. Hines’s offense behavior (striking Trosclair) occurred when Trosclair was “restrained and compliant” and “posed no threat” to anyone, as Hines admits. ROA.109.
Hines contends (Br. 30-31) that there is an unreasonable sentencing disparity between his sentence and those of his co-defendants.
require the district court to avoid sentencing disparities between co-defendants who might not be similarly situated.” Ibid. (emphasis added). “It is well settled that an appellant cannot challenge his sentence based solely on the lesser sentence given to his co-defendants.” United States v. McKinney, 53 F.3d 664, 678 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 901 (1995). Moreover, “concern about unwarranted disparities is at a minimum when a sentence is within the Guidelines range.” United States v. Willingham, 497 F.3d 541, 545 (5th Cir. 2007).
(2011); United States v. Bailey, 405 F.3d 102 (1st Cir. 2005) (41-month sentence for a corrections officer who kneed an inmate, filed a false report about it, and lied about the incident). This ends the inquiry.
(ROA.551-580). The district court was within its discretion to take into account the legal and factual differences between Burns and Hines.
Hines also compares (Br. 30-31) himself to Jason Comeaux. The district court sentenced Comeaux to 40 months, the same sentence Hines received. ROA.1337-1338. Though Comeaux’s abuses as an IPSO officer were quantitatively and qualitatively worse than Hines’s, Comeaux provided much more assistance to the United States in uncovering the IPSO abuses. Specifically, while Hines’s cooperation provided “important corroboration” of Ben Lassalle’s account of the Trosclair beating (ROA.139), Comeaux’s cooperation was more extensive, and, as the United States represented to the district court, that cooperation was pivotal to the investigation. The district court heard testimony from both Hines and Comeaux at Sheriff Ackal’s trial, and the court had before it the United States’ assessment of their cooperation in two separate motions under Section 5K1.1. The court’s conclusion that after balancing culpability and cooperation, Hines and Comeaux deserved the same sentence was within its discretion. See Guillermo Balleza, 613 F.3d at 435 (“[S]entence disparities between co-defendants * * * who received departures for substantial assistance are not unwarranted disparities.”); Duhon, 541 F.3d at 397 (noting that differing levels of assistance is a relevant factor in considering sentencing disparities).
Hines’s remaining disparity argument relies on a misstatement of the record. Specifically, Hines suggests (Br. 31-32) that his sentence should have been lower because unlike his co-defendants (whose conduct was “unlawful ab initio”), his conduct “beg[an] as lawful conduct and crosse[d] the thin blue line.” Hines’s premise is flawed. His arrest of Trosclair did not inadvertently escalate into a use of excessive force. To the contrary, as he has admitted, Hines intended to use excessive force against Trosclair before he even arrived to make the arrest. ROA.108 (admission that Hines knew Ackal wanted him to use unlawful force and that he went to arrest Trosclair intending to further this unlawful objective). Hines, no less than the co-defendants to whom he compares himself, intended to use excessive force and did so.
This Court should affirm the district court’s judgment and 40-month sentence.
I certify that on August 21, 2017, I electronically filed the foregoing BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES AS APPELLEE with the Clerk of the Court for the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit by using the appellate CM/ECF system. All participants in this case are registered CM/ECF users, and service will be accomplished by the appellate CM/ECF system.

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