Source: http://israelsovereigntyinstitute.com/the-british-mandate-defining-the-legality-of-jewish-sovereignty-over-judea-and-samaria-under-international-law/
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 12:56:38+00:00

Document:
The purpose of this report is to present a clear solid historical and legal basis for Israeli sovereignty over the entire area of the Mandate. An objective evaluation of the relevant binding instruments and applicable rules of international law conclusively establishes the legality of Israeli sovereignty over Judea and Samaria, and the right of Jewish settlement therein. These basic legal historical documents speak the truth to all who choose read them.
Beginning in 1917 with the Balfour Declaration, the international community supported the return of the Jewish people to reconstitute their national home in Palestine. The international community committed itself to realizing this goal in a series of binding international documents, culminating in the British Mandate for Palestine with boundaries that included Judea and Samaria (hereafter: the “Palestine Mandate,” “the British Mandate,” or “the Mandate”). The League of Nations charged Britain via the Palestine Mandate as Mandatory, with the duty of facilitating the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine, while safeguarding the civil and religious rights of all of Palestine’s inhabitants. The Mandate for Palestine, “in fact and in law [was] an international agreement having the character of a treaty or convention.” Although the League of Nations was abolished in April 1946, the Palestine Mandate remained in force, as will be discussed below.
No binding international agreement or event altered the inclusion of Judea and Samaria within the borders of the Palestine Mandate, from the time the international community recognized Israel as an independent state in 1948 and as a member of the United Nations in 1949. At that time, this paper will demonstrate, the Mandate terminated upon the realization of its clearly stated purpose: facilitating the return of a sufficient number of Jews to Palestine to create a Jewish National home in their historic homeland with the ability to stand on its own. As detailed in its Declaration of Independence, the State of Israel stands as a Jewish national home, intent upon safeguarding the civil and religious rights of all its citizens, irrespective of race or religion. Truly, this is the nature of the state envisioned by the Principal Allied Powers, the League of Nations, and the international community as set forth in the Mandate for Palestine.
Upon Israel’s recognition as an independent state—which triggered the termination of the Palestine Mandate—the Jewish people, as the Mandate’s beneficiaries, acquired sovereignty over the territory in its entirety. This sovereignty had been held in abeyance during the time of the Mandate, and no legal change had altered the status of the Jordan River as the Mandate’s eastern border. Thus, as will be illustrated, the current legal borders of the modern State of Israel conform to those defined by the Mandate. As a result, sovereignty over the entire area of the Mandate—including Judea and Samaria—accrued to the Jewish people upon Israel’s recognition as an independent state. This conclusion is further confirmed, inter alia, by application of the legal principle uti possidetis juris (“as you possess under the law”), a concept that the International Court of Justice has applied when recognizing historically designated administrative boundaries, subsequent to tracing internationally recognized historical documentation.
Furthermore, although multiple international bodies—including the ICJ—have attempted to apply the Hague and Geneva Conventions to define the status of Judea and Samaria as “belligerently occupied,” such an application is erroneous. Indeed, as will be demonstrated below, the fact that Israel acquired sovereignty rights in this territory upon termination of the British Mandate—and subsequently liberated this territory in the aftermath of the Six-Day War—establishes the irrelevance of the Hague and Geneva Conventions regarding Judea and Samaria. In addition, Israel has never waived sovereignty rights over Judea and Samaria, despite its participation in subsequent peace negotiations regarding the status of this territory. Neither the Oslo Accords nor the 2003 “Road Map for Peace” nor any other negotiations altered the borders of Judea and Samaria that were set down in the Mandate.
Political discussion should be premised upon the knowledge and assertion that Israel retains legal sovereignty over Judea and Samaria, and thus a Jewish presence and Jewish communities in the area are legal according to international law.
The Balfour Declaration has been discounted as a private letter, not constituting a binding act of international law. However, far from being a clandestine promise, the Balfour Declaration was prominently included in multiple international documents, including the 1920 Treaty of Sévres between Turkey and the Allies, which was signed by the Ottoman Sultan (though never ratified). It should also be emphasized that President Woodrow Wilson approved the Balfour Declaration before it was published, and the French and Italian governments also publicly endorsed the declaration.
the Mandatory will be responsible for putting into effect the declaration originally made on November 8, 1917, by the British Government, and adopted by the other Allied Powers, in favour of the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.
Such a position might arise in a Jewish State. The Jews in Palestine might say, you are suffering in Germany; that is your business. Therefore, when you said “a National Home for the Jewish people,” I said it was more than merely a Jewish State for those who are there. As long as there is a Jew who cannot stay where he is, and as long as there is a place in Palestine, a Jewish State will not have the right to prevent him from coming. Therefore, a National Home for the Jewish people is more than a Jewish State.
Article 22 of the League of Nations Covenant defined the Mandate system as a “principle of guardianship over certain undeveloped peoples, [then viewed as] a new and progressive step in international law.” The system served as a compromise between those Allied powers with imperialist aims of annexing the occupied areas of the defeated Central Powers, and those who supported President Wilson’s “demand that the interest of the peoples should be the primary consideration in the settlement.” Article 22 thus states that the European powers’ responsibility forms a “sacred trust of civilization.” The enlightened nations would provide “tutelage” to these less advanced peoples until they could adapt to the “strenuous conditions of the modern world.” Thus, Article 22 introduced “new principles of delegated government” into international law: international Mandates, a novel legal framework, allowed the Allied victors to maintain a presence while guiding the liberated population to self-rule, all under supervision of the League of Nations.
be judged by the law applicable at that time. Arguments which rely on legal developments not accepted at the time—for example, the principle that self-determination is an overriding criterion of statehood, permitting early recognition of self-determination movements, and precluding the statehood of any entity created in violation of self-determination—may therefore be misplaced.
This idea is especially crucial in response to those who argue that the Palestine Mandate failed to properly implement President Wilson’s notion of self-determination in regard to Palestine’s Arabs. Indeed, some have argued that proper implementation of Article 22 of the League of Nations Covenant required providing the majority of the inhabitants living in Palestine at the time—i.e. the Arabs—with self-determination. However, such an interpretation flies in the face of the language of the Covenant, the Peel Commission’s elucidations, and the manner in which the Palestine Mandate, along with the other Mandates, were implemented and endorsed by 50 nations. In fact, the Palestine Mandate, as stated above, was specifically designed to fulfill the self-determination of a people – namely, the Jewish people, deemed a homeless nation worthy of international support to return to the land from which they were exiled. Indeed, the Balfour Declaration, which would form the basis of the Palestine Mandate, was viewed as an acme of the concept of self-determination.
the entire civilized world said that while the Arabs were liberated in various territories there was room for the Jews in Palestine. The Jews are connected with this country. We recognize their connexion [sic]. They are coming back. They have a right to come back. They put on only one limitation. We, ourselves, would have put this limitation if it had been put by others: not to displace the population right here…That was the decision.
Moreover, it is patently clear from the language of the Palestine Mandate that the Principal Allied Parties intended to implement self-determination once the Jews constituted a majority in Palestine, with guarantees to protect the Arab minority’s civil and religious rights. If the Allied Parties did not intend for the Jews to eventually constitute a majority in Palestine, there would clearly not have been a need for the multiple repetitions of the obligation of the Jewish majority to protect the civil and religious rights of the “existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine.” Indeed, had the Principal Allied Powers intended to eventually provide self-determination to the Palestinian Arabs, the protective sections would have been written to safeguard a Jewish minority.
Finally, it is worth noting that the Mandate omits the word “political” in describing the protection to be afforded to the “civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine.” This omission was not accidental. As Eugene Rostow explains, the language “reflected that the primary purpose of the Palestine Mandate was the establishment of a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine, not the right of self-determination of the indigenous population.” It should also be noted that the other Mandates contained articles to protect minority rights without intent to grant each minority political self-determination.
it is notable that the Palestine Mandate draws a distinction between the powers and functions of the Mandatory and the powers and functions of the Administration of Palestine. The latter, though controlled by the Mandatory and having as its head a High Commissioner who is the representative of the Mandatory, is nevertheless regarded in the Mandate as a separate authority, the Government of the infant which is under the guardianship of the Mandatory. This is a first step towards recognition of a separate country which will eventually be autonomous.
It is contemplated also that…the responsibility and authority of the mandatory should come to an end when the infant nation has reached a stage at which it may be able to stand alone. The purpose of the Mandate would then be fulfilled, and the minor would be emancipated and recognized by the society as an independent State.
Furthermore, jurists have considered sovereignty of the Mandated territory to be like the res of a trust – that is, it is suspended until the beneficiaries demonstrate the ability to “stand on their own.” Thus, the Mandate system introduced a modified concept of sovereignty, an entirely “new relationship in international law.” The Mandatory power “obtains the guardianship of a people, and not the ownership and dominion of a territory; and the sovereignty is suspended or held in trust” for the eventual benefit of the Mandate’s designated population. The concept of “suspended sovereignty” is a well-rooted concept.
the [traditional] doctrine of sovereignty has no application to this new system [of international Mandates]. Sovereignty over a Mandated Territory is in abeyance; if and when the inhabitants of the Territory obtain recognition as an independent State…sovereignty will revive and rest in the new State. What matters [here] is not where sovereignty lies, but what are the rights and duties of the Mandatory in regard to the area of the territory being administered by it.
Thus, Judge McNair articulates established principles that have developed concerning the nature of sovereignty within the Mandate system. Sovereignty, or the res of the trust, as stated above, is held in abeyance—suspended, or “at rest,” so to speak—in a Mandated territory, residing neither with the people, the Mandatory power, nor the League of Nations. Once the intended goal of a Mandate has been achieved—that is, the designated peoples are deemed able to govern on their own—the Mandate terminates, at which point sovereignty vests in the newly independent state. Thus, upon termination of the Mandate, sovereignty accrues to the government of the designated beneficiaries of the Mandate. This view corresponds to the theory of “‘dormant’ sovereignty,” which at all times lay with the people in Mandated territories, but “was only re-established when the territory became independent.” Accordingly, a territory obtains sovereignty upon its independence and recognition of the international community that the territory is able to stand on its own. In fact, it is this recognition from the international community that triggers termination of the “sacred trust of civilization,” thus giving rise to the new nation’s sovereignty.
The mandates system has been applied to Palestine not merely on account of the inability of its present population to stand alone…but also, and perhaps chiefly, on account of the fact that the people whose connection with Palestine has been recognized is still outside its boundaries. The mandatory Power thus appears not only as a Mandatory…but as a kind of a provisional administrator in the interest of an absent people. In this capacity, the Mandatory has assumed an obligation not towards the actual but the virtual population of Palestine.
This division of Palestine into two parts is often omitted when recounting the history of the territory. This omission obscures from view the extent to which self-determination has already been granted to the Arab population in Palestine, as well as the fact that Palestine has already been divided once. Nonetheless, while it is certainly true that the British government’s decision to eliminate the area east of the Jordan River was a devastating blow for the Zionists, it is also undeniable that the final, amended version of the Mandate for Palestine designated all of the remaining territory west of the Jordan River as the Jewish National Home – including Judea and Samaria.
As a result, some argue that all of the nations who voted for and adopted the Mandate for Palestine in 1922 obligated themselves to facilitate the creation of a Jewish National Home in all of the territory west of the Jordan River. Nathan Feinberg, for instance, argues that this obligation was incumbent even upon those nations who joined the League after 1922, since “from the moment of joining the League, a State becomes bound by all the previous resolutions and decisions adopted by the League.” Thus, for example, the State of Iraq, which joined the League as an independent nation in 1932—and made no reservation regarding the Mandate for Palestine in respect to Article 22—implicitly ratified the Mandate, including its provisions regarding the Jewish National Home.
the League of Nations was the international organization entrusted with the exercise of the supervisory functions of the Mandate. Those functions were an indispensable element of the Mandate. But that does not mean that the mandate’s institution was to collapse with the disappearance of the original supervisory machinery. To the question whether the continuance of a mandate was inseparably linked with the existence of the League, the answer must be that an institution established for the fulfillment of a sacred trust cannot be presumed to lapse before the achievement of its purpose.
Thus, after the League’s termination, the Palestine Mandate continued to exist in the form in which it was originally conceived and with its original purpose unaltered.
Thus, the Palestine Mandate created an international status, “valid in rem,” designating the borders of the Mandate territory as the national home of the Jewish people, while guaranteeing the rights of the non-Jewish population, intended to be a protected minority within the Jewish state. This status survived the demise of the League of Nations.
Both the Security Council and the United Kingdom refused to enforce the partition plan, and various alternative scheme were mooted.
As a result, Resolution 181 was never formally implemented.
Although some posit that Israel’s acceptance into the United Nations was conditional upon its acceptance of Resolution 181, this argument is baseless.
Although the relevant Jewish organization did accept the partition Resolution when it was first adopted, the Resolution was not accepted by the Arab states involved. Instead war broke out leading to a cease-fire on quite different boundaries. Israel was not admitted to the United Nations on the basis of a division of territory which in any way reflected the partition resolution. Moreover, the Charter makes no provision for ‘conditional admission’.
Second, it must be emphasized that the partition of the area was merely one aspect of the lengthy, elaborate, and multi-point Resolution 181. In fact, the resolution was entitled “Plan of Partition With Economic Union” – the assumption being that any proposed division was premised upon extensive economic cooperation and peaceful co-existence. It is simply infeasible to insist that the spirit of this proposal could possibly be consistent with a declaration of war by the Arabs. Indeed, those who voted for Resolution 181 viewed it as a single, comprehensive, and non-severable proposal. As US Ambassador to the UN Warren Austin told the Security Council in March 1948, “the plan proposed by the General Assembly is an integral plan which cannot succeed unless each of its parts can be carried out.“ Similarly, it should be noted that the United States’ subsequent recognition of Israel’s independence in May 1948 was explicitly not based upon the borders recommended in Resolution 181.
Thus, in light of the Resolution’s non-binding nature, together with the Arabs’ war against the Jewish communities in Palestine, it is blatant error to deem Resolution 181 operable or even valid at any point in time.
By 14 May 1948 the Assembly itself had, in effect, abandoned the partitition plan as a whole.
Indeed, claiming that a Mandate is extinguished merely because the administrator chooses to abandon her assignment is as fallacious as insisting that a trust terminates due to the removal of the trustee. As Eugene Rostow notes, “a trust never terminates when a trustee dies, resigns, embezzles the trust property, or is dismissed. The authority responsible for the trust appoints a new trustee, or otherwise arranges for the fulfillment of its purpose.” Thus, Rostow posits that in the case of the British Mandate, Britain’s decision to relinquish its role as Mandatory power did not affect the existence or essence of those rights. Moreover, the Mandatory power never possessed the authority to terminate the Mandate, any more than a trustee assigned with administrating the res would have authority to terminate the trust or affect the legal rights of the beneficiaries.
At midnight of May 15, 1948, the State of Israel declared its independence – and five Arab armies immediately invaded. In the midst of this war, Jordan seized control of Judea and Samaria. The fighting ended following a series of Armistice agreements, which contained explicit provisions that there would be no international ramifications or political conclusions drawn from these lines. Jordan proceeded to annex Judea and Samaria, the legality of which was recognized only by Britain and Pakistan. Jordan subsequently renamed the territory the “West Bank,” due to its geographical location on the west bank of the Jordan River.
In accordance with the “well-recognized” concept of ex injuria jus non oritur—that is, illegal acts cannot produce legal rights—Jordan’s illegal annexation of Judea and Samaria cannot be said to have affected the territory’s legal status. As a result, neither Jordan’s illegal annexation of Judea and Samaria, Britain’s withdrawal as Mandatory nor the Armistice Agreements affected the legal status of the Mandated territory west of the Jordan River.
Thus, the British Mandate terminated—and the Jewish people received sovereignty in Palestine in accordance with the terms of the Mandate—the moment that the State of Israel received recognition as an independent state. This recognition certainly occurred on May 11, 1949, when the United Nations decided that “Israel is a peace-loving State” and voted to admit Israel as a full member. As there was no amendment or alteration of the Mandate before its termination, the agreement and trust terminated in accordance with its terms when Israel declared independence and was so recognized.
Moreover, the UN Charter clearly assumes that a Mandate terminates upon international recognition of a territory’s independence. Although the League of Nations never transferred authority over the Mandates to the United Nations, Chapter XII of the UN Charter outlines a parallel concept of “Trusteeships,” designed to succeed the League of Nations Mandates. According to Article 78 of the Charter, “the trusteeship system shall not apply to territories which have become Members of the United Nations.” This clearly indicates that “sovereignty and tutelage are mutually exclusive,” and UN recognition of a Mandated territory’s independence automatically terminates the Mandate. In the ICJ’s 1978 Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Judgment, Judge Salah Tarazi expands on this position, and also notes that France and Britain’s recognition of Syria’s independence terminated its Mandate in 1941.
by becoming independent, a new State acquires sovereignty with the territorial base and boundaries left to it by the colonial power [i.e. in this case, the former Mandatory]. This is part of the ordinary operation of the machinery of State succession. International law – and consequently the principle of uti possidetis – applies to the new State (as a State) not with retroactive effect, but immediately and from that moment onwards. It applies to the State as it is, i.e., to the “photograph” of the territorial situation then existing. The principle of uti possidetis freezes the territorial title; it stops the clock, but does not put back the hands.
Thus, the ICJ insists that application of this principle has the effect of freezing the borders of the designated area based on the borders that existed at the time of the State’s independence – what it describes as the “photograph of the territory” at the critical date. As a result, since the territory of Judea and Samaria was never legally severed from the Mandate at any time before international recognition of Israel’s independence, the so-called “photograph” includes Judea and Samaria within the borders of Palestine. It must, therefore, be that Israel’s modern eastern border is the Jordan River.
This interpretation is further reinforced by the refusal of the Arab side to agree on different borders, which would have been the only effective method of changing the internationally recognized borders defined by the League of Nations when attempting to divide the Mandate into two parts. Indeed, as explained above, had the Arab population agreed upon the proposed UN partition in 1947, those borders would have been valid under international law. Absent an agreement at the definitive time, however, the internationally recognized borders remain those defined by the Mandate.
Furthermore, as stated above, Jordan’s illegal annexation of Judea and Samaria after Israel’s acceptance into the United Nations did not affect the legal borders of the Mandate or Israel’s rights that accrued over this territory. The fact that Israel was forcibly prevented from exercising its sovereignty in this territory due to Jordan’s illegal military presence did not extinguish or affect the Jewish people’s rights. Thus, the Palestine Mandate, an “international agreement having the character of a treaty or convention” endorsed by the international community, provided the facilitation of Jewish sovereignty within the territory designated in the Mandate.
On June 5, 1967, Israel launched a war of self-defense against the Egyptian army, triggering what would become known as the Six-Day War. In the midst of this war, the Israeli army liberated Judea and Samaria from Jordan’s illegal rule. Recognizing the delicate and political nature of Israeli administration of these territories—and in anticipation of a possible and imminent peace agreement—Israel refrained from exercising its legal sovereignty over Judea and Samaria. Instead, the government decided to de facto apply the “humanitarian provisions” of the international conventions designed for belligerent occupation of foreign territory: the 1907 Hague Regulations and the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention. Moreover, as per Article 43 of the Hague Regulations, the government chose to leave in place most of the (primarily Ottoman and Jordanian) civil law that was in effect at the time.
Furthermore, the argument that these regulations apply de jure is invalid. Israel received sovereignty rights in these areas due to the termination of the British Mandate. Thus, the idea that Israel’s presence in these territories constitutes a “belligerent occupation” is baseless. An objective reading of the text of these conventions, along with the historical context in which they were conceived, firmly dispels this notion.
Second, the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention does not apply to all situations in which a military seizes territory it did not previously control. According to Article 2 of the Convention, regarding “occupation,” the Convention only applies to “cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance.” Since, in 1967, Judea and Samaria rightfully belonged to Israel, and Jordan controlled the territory illegally, it cannot be said that Israel’s current presence in Judea and Samaria constitutes an occupation “of the territory of a High Contracting Party.” This applies all the more so after 1994, when Jordan relinquished any claim over Judea and Samaria in its peace treaty with Israel.
Finally, it should be noted that even if the Fourth Geneva Convention did apply de jure, it cannot be said that Article 49(6), which is commonly cited as the basis for the illegality of Israeli settlements, prohibits this kind of activity. Under Article 49(6), “the Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies.” The strong implication of this language—affirmed by the International Committee of the Red Cross—is that this Article only prohibits forcible transfer of a population into an occupied territory. Because Israel has never coercively forced its citizens to settle in Judea and Samaria, and the residents of these towns have chosen to move there voluntarily, Article 49 is completely irrelevant in the extant case. Moreover, as the administrating power, Israel has the right under international law to use the land and enjoy the usufruct of land that is not privately owned.
Thus, international conventions regarding “belligerent occupation” have no relevance to the territory of Judea and Samaria. The fact that Israel has decided to de facto apply the humanitarian provisions of certain international conventions does not mean that Israel has acknowledged that they apply de jure. Nor does the fact that Israel has thus far decided only to exercise its sovereignty in certain areas of Judea and Samaria mean that Israel has forfeited its legitimate right to apply sovereignty within the entirety of its legal borders. Israel’s attempts to reach a negotiated settlement regarding Palestinian claims to parts of Yehuda and Shomron do not constitute Israeli relinquishment of sovereignty, which continues to be derived from the Mandate, uninterrupted by any other valid legal claim.
The British Mandate for Palestine terminated over sixty years ago. However, this basic document—first set forth and agreed upon by the Principal Allied Powers in 1922—established the modern-day legal status of Judea and Samaria, and remains crucial. In fact, the purpose of the Mandate has been fully executed and realized. Israel has become a Jewish homeland, civil and religious rights of the non-Jewish minority are protected, and access to the holy places in Jerusalem is guaranteed to all religions.
The Mandate for Palestine, a binding international treaty “in fact and in law,” designated Palestine as the intended national home of the Jewish people, and recognized the territory of “Palestine” as including the area of Judea and Samaria. No valid treaty, document, or resolution altered this reality. UN Resolution 181, which proposed a Partition of the territory, was nullified and voided by Arab aggression and refusal to accept the existence of a Jewish state in Palestine. Thus, upon termination of the Mandate in 1949, the Jewish people received sovereignty—the res of the Mandate-trust—over this territory. No subsequent agreement or resolution repudiated Israeli sovereignty over the area defined by the Mandate, which continues to dictate the existence of Israeli sovereignty over Judea and Samaria.
Some modern legal pundits rely on the faulty assumption that Israel was admitted “conditionally” into the United Nations upon its acceptance of Resolution 181. Their premise is that Israel remains bound by its agreement to Resolution 181 despite the fact that the Arabs did not consent. Such an argument is simply baffling, since, as discussed above, Resolution 181 was merely a non-binding recommendation, and it became invalid and void upon the clear rejection of its terms by the other party involved. Nonetheless, in recent years, reliance upon the validity of Resolution 181 has become crucial to the Arab assertion.
Other commentators insist that the Palestine Mandate was void since it contradicted the self-determination principle of Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. Yet that assertion ignores the clear language of Article 22, which, as detailed above, allows for self-determination to be granted in the fashion outlined in the Palestine Mandate – i.e. to a homeless “virtual population” not yet residing in the territory in substantial numbers, but attached to that territory through strong historical and spiritual ties. Moreover, as shown above, this interpretation was accepted by the international community – and was incorporated into the Treaty of Versailles and the other World War I international peace treaties. These commentators disingenuously interpret Article 22 without considering the Palestine Mandate, which clearly detailed the goal of creating a Jewish homeland with a Jewish majority.
One cannot seriously make these arguments if one reads the relevant documents. It is absurd that a Mandate culminating in statehood would not be recognized in accordance with its terms and the geographical borders defined therein. In the case of the Palestine Mandate, including Judea and Samaria within Israel’s modern-day sovereign borders also aligns with the principle of uti possidetis juris – which, as discussed above, bases the borders of newly sovereign states on their previous administrative boundaries. The modern borders of Israel can only be defined by the “photograph” of the borders of the Palestine Mandate – which include, inter alia, Judea and Samaria. It is for this very reason that the Hague and Geneva Conventions do not apply to Israel’s presence in these territories, as a state clearly cannot “belligerently occupy” land over which it has legal sovereignty.
Thus, the pervasive belief that Israeli settlements are illegal under international law is at variance with the simplest and most logical reading of the documents which constitute the jurisprudence upon which international law has traditionally been construed.
1. The proper name for these territories deserves a brief discussion. “Judea and Samaria” denote the Biblical names of the area commonly referred to today as the “West Bank.” These names have historically been used to describe the region that Jordan illegally held from 1949-1967. Both the Palestine Mandate and the United Nations employed the terms “Judea and Samaria” to depict this geographic region – for example, United Nations General Assembly Resolution 181 utilizes these terms in Part II(A). After conquering this territory in 1949, Jordan renamed this area the “West Bank,” since the territory lies on the west bank of the Jordan River. The term “West Bank” thus implies a connection to Jordanian sovereignty, despite the fact that Jordan never acquired lawful sovereignty over the area. See, e.g. “Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,” Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, Paragraph 73.
2.Many begin with the 1947 passage of United Nations General Assembly Resolution 181 – see, for example, “Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,” Paragraph 71. 1947 is often used as the starting point of recounting the history to promote the argument that Jewish immigration to Israel was only permitted in light of sympathy to Holocaust victims. Such a view ignores the prior decades of documented public international support for reconstituting the Jewish home in Palestine, due to a historic right that long preceded the Holocaust. The Holocaust may have confirmed the need for a homeland for a homeless and persecuted minority, but, as discussed below, the modern notion of a Jewish homeland has been endorsed since at least 1917 with the Balfour Declaration. The subsequent Paris Peace Conference of 1919 gave “official and public consideration to the re-establishment of the Jewish people in their national homeland.” Nathan Feinberg, Some Problems of the Palestine Mandate (Tel Aviv: Shoshani’s Printing, 1936), 14.
As documented further in this paper, a multitude of binding international documents continued to portray explicit recognition of the Jewish people’s connection to Palestine. In April 1920, for example, the British newspaper of record heralded the San Remo Conference as “an event that will be celebrated in all Jewish centres [sic] with great joy” and a date that “will perhaps become a Jewish national holiday” in its announcement that “the Wandering Jews,” after 20 centuries, will begin to re-establish their “ancient homeland.” “Zionist Rejoicings. British Mandate for Palestine Welcomed,” The Times, 26 April 1920.
3.The Peel Commission proceeded to recount the history of the Jewish people from Biblical times in great detail, basing their right of return to Palestine on this connection, which had remained the center of their spiritual lives since their dispersion. “Palestine Royal Commission Report: Presented by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to Parliament by Command of His Majesty” (London: His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1937), 14-17. (Hereafter: “The Peel Commission Report”).
4. “South West Africa Cases (Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa), Preliminary Objections,” Judgment of 21 December 1962, I.C.J. Reports 1962, 319, 330.
5. As will be discussed within, no subsequent agreement contains language or intent to constitute the forfeiture of Israeli sovereignty over Judea and Samaria, including Resolution 242, the Oslo Accords or the Road Map. Thus, Israeli sovereignty over these areas remains valid. It should also be noted that historically various plans to partition the area, including the Peel Commission Report in 1936 and the Woodhead Commission in 1938, were ultimately abandoned without altering the border. See Bell, p.676.
6.The other mandates similarly terminated in accordance with the borders defined by the relevant mandates.
8. See, for example, Article XXXI(6) of the 1995 Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip: “Neither Party shall be deemed, by virtue of having entered into this Agreement, to have renounced or waived any of its existing rights, claims or positions.” “Israeli and Palestinian Authority: Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip (September 28, 1995),” in The Israel-Arab Reader, ed. Walter Laqueur and Barry Rubin, 7th Edition (New York: Penguin Group, 2008), 520. Israel has included similar clauses in every document it has signed over the course of negotiations on Judea and Samaria until the present day.
9. The Peel Commission Report delineates this extensive history on p. 14-17.
10. The Balfour Declaration was the first official document issued by a government in hundreds of years that explicitly recognized a Jewish connection to Palestine. Prior significant recognition, such as the British offer of a Jewish homeland in Uganda in 1903, signified recognition of a Jewish nationality, but did not have the widespread international credibility and support afforded by the era beginning with 1917. Notably, Napoleon Bonaparte recognized a Jewish connection to Palestine in 1799, in his “Letter to the Jewish Nation from the French Commander-in-Chief Bonaparte.” Cited in Simon Sebag Montefiore, Jerusalem: The Biography (New York: Random House, 2012), 331.
11. The Peel Commission Report, 18.
12. Balfour Declaration, 1917,” The Avalon Project: Yale Law School. Accessed online: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/balfour.asp.
13. See, for example, John Quigley, The Statehood of Palestine (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 13-14.
14. In the Treaty of Sévres, Turkey relinquished ownership of most of the territories of the former Ottoman Empire—including Palestine—to the League of Nations. However, the Treaty was not formally ratified due to a revolution led by Kamal Ataturk, for reasons unrelated to the Mandates. Ataturk, however, did negotiate the Lausanne Treaty in 1923, which was signed and ratified. See “Treaty of Peace Between the Allied and Powers and Turkey,” American Journal of International Law 15:3 (July 1921): 179-181. Article 26 of the Lausanne Treaty acknowledged the new territorial boundaries and included recognition of the other Peace treaties, each of which included the Covenant of the League of Nations. Thus, although the Lausanne Treaty did not explicitly mention Palestine, it is clear that Palestine was included with the other relevant Mandates. In other words, although the Treaty did not specify “in whose favor the [Turkey’s] renunciation [of sovereignty] was made, it was presumably contemplating the States then in occupation.” L. Oppenheim, International Law, A Treatise (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1928), 203.
15. The Peel Commission Report, 22. Similarly, President Truman approved of the Balfour Declaration, “explaining that it was in keeping with former President Woodrow Wilson’s principle of ‘self-determination.'” “The Recognition of the State of Israel,” Harry S. Truman Library and Museum. Accessed online: http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/israel/large/index.php.
17. The Peel Commission Report, 37 (emphasis added). In addition, with regard to the interpretation of the phrase “Jewish National Home,” the Commission noted that “Lord Robert Cecil in 1917, Sir Herbert Samuel in 1919, and Mr. Winston Churchill in 1920 spoke or wrote in terms that could only mean that they contemplated the eventual establishment of a Jewish State [in Palestine],” and that “leading British newspapers were equally explicit in their comments on the [Balfour] Declaration.” The Peel Commission Report, 25.
18. “United Nations Special Committee on Palestine, Report of the General Assembly, Volume III, Annex A: Oral Evidence Presented at Public Meeting,” A/364/Add.2 PV.19, 7 July 1947. Accessed online: http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/06728C052629426085256E8B007092DF. Emphasis added.
19. Interestingly, despite the prominent role of Woodrow Wilson in the establishment of the League of Nations, the United States never became a member.
20. Woodrow Wilson, “President Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points,” The Avalon Project: Yale Law School. Accessed online: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/wilson14.asp.
21. Malcolm Shaw, International Law: Sixth Edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 251. The concept of self-determination also served as a “guiding instrument in the peace treaties of 1919-1923…whatever else may be said about these treaties, there can hardly be any doubt that they have given to the [principle of self-determination] a much wider application than any previous treaty.” Jacob Stoyanovsky, The Mandate for Palestine: A Contribution to the Theory and Practice of International Mandates (London: Hyperion Press, 1976), 51.
The Avalon Project: Yale Law School. Accessed online: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/palmanda.asp.
23.The Peel Commission Report, 38-39. Emphasis in the original.
25. Norman Bentwich, The Mandates System (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1930), 2.
26. Article 22, “The Covenant of the League of Nations, Including Amendments Adopted to December 1924,” The Avalon Project: Yale Law School. Accessed online: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/leagcov.asp.
27. Bentwich, 2. Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations delineated three different categories of Mandates, determined primarily by the level of development of the population. The more developed the population, the less involvement would be necessary by the assigned Mandatory power and the shorter the road to sovereignty and independence. The first category—so-called “Class A” Mandates—applied to “certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire.” These territories “have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized,” on condition of “administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone.” The second category—so-called “Class B” Mandates—applied to “other peoples, especially those of Central Africa.” These communities were at a less developed stage, requiring the Mandatory to “administer the territory under conditions which will guarantee freedom of conscience and religion, subject only to,” inter alia, “the maintenance of public order and morals.” Finally, the third category—so-called “Class C” Mandates—due to the small size of their population or their “remoteness from the centres of civilization,” were to be “administered under the laws of the Mandatory as integral portions of its territory,” subject to certain safeguards.
However, despite these three classifications, it should be noted that Article 22 also states that a Mandate might not necessarily fit neatly into one of the designated categories. According to paragraph 3, “the character of the mandate must differ according to the stage of the development of the people, the geographical situation of the territory, its economic condition and other similar circumstances.” Thus, each Mandate was crafted to conform with the unique circumstances of the territory – lending support to the notion that the Palestine Mandate was not strictly an “A,” “B,” or “C” Mandate, but rather sui generis.
28. James Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law (Oxford: University Press, 2006), 427.
29. For example, the Arab delegates to the Peel Commission argued that the Palestine Mandate violated the Covenant precisely because it was not “in accordance” with Article 22 – and in particular, paragraph 4, which discusses the “A” Mandates. However, Article 22 clearly allows for the creation of a Mandate that is sui generis, as described in paragraph 3 of Article 22, and does not necessarily fall into either the “A,” “B,” or “C” designation.
As to the claim, argued before us by Arab witnesses, that the Palestine Mandate violates Article 22 of the Covenant because it is not in accordance with paragraph 4 thereof, we would point out (a) that the provisional recognition of ‘certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire’ as independent nations is permissive; the words are ‘can be provisionally recognised,’ not ‘will’ or ‘shall’: (b) that the penultimate paragraph of Article 22 prescribes that the degree of authority to be exercised by the Mandatory shall be defined, at need, by the Council of the League: (c) that the acceptance by the Allied Powers and the United States of the policy of the Balfour Declaration made it clear from the beginning that Palestine would have to be treated differently from Syria and ‘Iraq, and that this difference of treatment was confirmed by the Supreme Council in the Treaty of Sévres and by the Council of the League in sanctioning the Mandate.
This analysis leads to the inevitable conclusion that Palestine, unlike Syria/Lebanon and Iraq, was not strictly a “Class A” Mandate, and it was clearly not the intent of the Allied Powers or the international community to require provisional recognition of the non-Jewish majority in Palestine at the time. The Peel Commission Report, 38.
30.The Peel Commission Report, 26.
33. Eugene Rostow, “The Perils of Positivism,” Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law 2 (Spring 1992): 236.
34. See, for example, Article 6 and Article 8 of the Mandate for Syria and Lebanon.
35. Article 22, “The Covenant of the League of Nations, Including Amendments Adopted to December 1924.” Emphasis added.
38. Bentwich, 26. Emphasis added.
41. Bentwich, 18. Emphasis added.
42. “International Status of South-West Africa,” Advisory Opinion: I.C.J. Reports 1950, 128, 150.
43. Nele Matz, “Civilization and the Mandate System Under the League of Nations as Origin of Trusteeship,” Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 9 (2005): 71.
44. Stoyanovsky, 41-42, emphasis added. Later, Stoyanovsky cites Bentwich in stating that “the peculiar nature of the Palestine mandate [is that] the mandatory is to administer that country not simply on behalf of the population which is there, but with a view to help the people who desire to come there…There is no parallel in history to a State undertaking a task of this kind, not on behalf of its own subjects, but as a trustee for the conscience of the civilized world…It undertakes the continual and gradual realization of an ideal.” Ibid.
47. Feith illustrates the significance of how obscuring this history skews the view of an observer in this conflict by bringing the analogy of an event that occurred in his home. Once, after he bought a pie for his children, one of his sons ate the pie almost in its entirety. When his second son was later eating the small remaining piece, the first son suddenly demanded half. Had his father not been privy to the fact that the first son had already eaten the lion’s share of the pie, he would have felt it just to force his second son to divide the remaining piece. Knowing, however, that the pie had already been divided once, with his first son eating almost the entire pie, he saw the situation differently. So, too, understanding that Palestine has already been divided once, to facilitate an additional Arab state, changes one’s perspective of “fair division” in Israel. Douglas Feith, “The League of Nations Mandate for Palestine,” in Edward M. Siegel, ed., Israel’s Legitimacy in Law and History (New York: Center for Near East Policy Research, 1993): 14-15.
50. The Peel Commission Report, 31.
51. Cited in Howard Grief, The Legal Foundation and Borders of Israel Under International Law (New York: Mazo Publishers, 2008): 199.
52. Importantly, sovereignty over the Mandates, which did not reside in the League of Nations, was never transferred to the United Nations. “Little now is heard of the theory that sovereignty over the mandated territories resided in the League of Nations in view of the fact that the League of Nations has disappeared without any direct transfer of its mandates responsibilities or sovereignty to others, and certainly without any suggestion that the League was transferring title to the mandated territories to the United Nations.” Francis Sayre, “Legal Problems Arising from the United Nations Trusteeship System,” The American Journal of International Law 42:2 (April 1948): 271.
53. ”Legal Consequences For States Of The Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970),” Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1971, 16, Paragraph 55. Emphasis added.
54. “International Status of South-West Africa,” 157.
57. In a statement on behalf of the Jewish Agency on October 2, 1947 to the United Nations Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestine Question, Dr. Abba Hillel Silver endorsed the Partition Plan, as proposed by the United Nations’ Special Committee on Palestine’s report of August 31, 1947. However, he added the following caveat: “If [our] offer of peace and friendship were not welcomed in the same spirit [by the Arab states, including the proposed Arab state of Palestine], the Jews would defend their rights to the end. In Palestine there had been built a nation [i.e. the Jewish people] which demanded its independence, and would not allow itself to be dislodged or deprived of its national status. It could not go, and it would not go, beyond the enormous sacrifice which had been asked of it.” Cited in Grief, 154-155.
59. See Grief, 150-173. In addition, it is worth noting that Resolution 181 created a United Nations Palestine Commission, which was designed to assist in implementing the Partition Plan. According to the Commission’s minutes from its first meeting on January 29, 1948, although the Jewish Agency for Palestine willingly accepted the Commission’s invitation to participate, the UN Secretary-General received the following telegraphic response from the Arab Higher Committee [errors and capital letters in original]: “ARAB HIGHER COMMITTEE IS DETERMINED PERSIST IN REJECTION PARTITION AND IN REFUSAL RECOGNIZE UNO [United Nations Organization] RESOLUTION AND ANYTHING DERIVING THEREFROM. FOR THESE REASONS IT IS UNABLE ACCEPT INVITATION.” United Nations Palestine Commission, “First Monthly Progress Report to the Security Council,” A/AC.21/7, 29 January 1948.
60. James Crawford, “The Creation of the State of Palestine: Too Much Too Soon?” European Journal of International Law 1 (1990): 312-313. Emphasis added.
61. For example, in its 1988 “Declaration of Independence,” the Palestine National Council claimed that Palestinian Arabs were “depriv[ed] of the right to self-determination, follow[ing] UN General Assembly Resolution 181 (1947), which partitioned Palestine into two states, one Arab, one Jewish, yet it is this resolution that still provides those conditions of international legitimacy that ensure the right of the Palestinian Arab people to sovereignty.” “Palestine National Council: Declaration of Independence (November 15, 1988),” in The Israel-Arab Reader, 355.
62. Article 10 states that “the General Assembly may discuss any questions or any matters within the scope of the present Charter…and, except as provided in Article 12, may make recommendations to the Members of the United Nations or to the Security Council or to both on any such questions or matters.” Article 14 states that “subject to the provisions of Article 12, the General Assembly may recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation, regardless of origin, which it deems likely to impair the general welfare or friendly relations among nations, including situations resulting from a violation of the provisions of the present Charter setting forth the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.” “Charter of the United Nations,” UN.org. Accessed online: https://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter4.shtml.
63. “[The General Assembly] requests that (a) The Security Council take the necessary measures as provided for in the plan for its implementation.” A/RES/181(II), 29 November 1947.
64. Julius Stone, Israel and Palestine: Assault on the Law of Nations (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981): 101. See also Grief, 157.
It is also interesting to note that the partition suggested in Resolution 181 was not recognized in the 1949 armistice agreement with Lebanon, which deferred to the Palestine Mandate-Lebanon border, further attesting to the fact that 181 was not recognized even at that time. See Lebanese-Israeli General Armistice Agreement, Isr.–Leb., March 23, 1949, U.N. Doc. S/1296/Rev. 1. Cited by Bell, p.680. In fact, none of the armistice agreements referred to the lines proposed in Resolution 181.
68. “Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970),” Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1971, 16, Paragraph 91.
71. Eli Hertz, “UN Resolution 181 – The Partition Plan,” Myths and Facts. Accessed online: http://www.mythsandfacts.org/article_view.asp?articleID=135.
terminating the Mandate. Furthermore, Britain abstained from voting for Resolution 181, which purported to “terminate” the Mandate “as soon as possible.” United Nations General Assembly Resolution 181(II), “Future Government of Palestine,” A/RES/181(II), 29 November 1947.
74. Eugene Rostow, “Historical Approach to the Issue of Legality of Jewish Settlement Activity,” The New Republic, April 23, 1990.
boundary; I know of a situation frozen by an Armistice Agreement.” Yehuda Blum, “The Missing Reversioner: Reflections on the Status of Judea and Samaria”, 3 Isr. L. Rev. 279 1968, .291 citing U.N. Doc. S/PV. 1345 of May 31, 1967, p. 47.
78. See “Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,” 254.
79.Some legal scholars claim that the Mandate for Palestine remains in force to this day in certain parts of the territory. According to Rostow, for example, the Mandate continues to be operative in Judea and Samaria, as they are territories “which have not yet been allocated either to Israel or to Jordan or become an independent state.” Thus, according to Rostow, Jews can rely on the provisions of the Mandate—under, inter alia, Article 6 granting Jewish rights to close settlement on the land—to build Israeli settlements in Judea and Samaria. See Rostow, “Historical Approach to the Issue of Legality of Jewish Settlement Activity.” However, to claim that the Mandate continues to exist on only part of its original territory makes little sense, since, as explained below, the general consensus of the Permanent Mandates Commission was the Mandate was created as one indivisible unit, which could either be emancipated entirely or not at all.
80. See Section III, supra.
81. “International Status of South-West Africa,” 150.
Michigan Law Review 49:8 (June 1951): 1206.
83. As early as 1935, Quincy Wright had suggested that “it is possible that a mandate might cease through recognition of the independence of the mandated community, admission of the community to the League, or amendment of Article 22 of the Covenant, without the Council’s consent.” Quincy Wright, “The Effect of Withdrawal For the League Upon a Mandate,” British Yearbook of International Law 16 (1935): 104-113. Wright further develops this thesis in Mandates Under the League of Nations (Chicago: Praeger, 1930).
84. “Syria Sets Precedent for Quiet Termination of Palestine Mandate, Diplomats Believe,” Jewish Telegraphic Agency, November 3, 1941. Accessed online: http://www.jta.org/1941/11/03/archive/syria-sets-precedent-for-quiet-termination-of-palestine-mandate-diplomats-believe#ixzz2ivrtA8dF.
85. Richard Young, “Recent American Policy Concerning the Capitulations in the States of the Middle East,” The American Journal of International Law 42:2 (April 1948): 420. Emphasis added.
86. Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law, 579.
87. Termination of the British Mandate for Palestine, The International Law Quarterly 2(1), Spring 1948. 58.
89. Norman Bentwich and Andrew Martin, A Commentary on the Charter of the United Nations (Leeds: Knight & Forster, Ltd., 1951): 151.
90. “Aegean Sea Continental Shelf,” Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1978, 3, 58-59.
91. Luther Harris Evans, “The General Principles Governing the Termination of a Mandate,” The American Journal of International Law 26:4 (October 1932): 744.
92. Enver Hasani, “Uti Possidetis Juris: From Rome to Kosovo,” Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 27:2 (2003), 85.
See also the comments of Professor Avraham Bell cited in Glick, 174-175. See also Avraham Bell and Eugene Kontorovich, “Palestine, Uti Possidetis Juris and the Borders of Israel”, Northwestern Public Law Research Paper No. 16-04 (2016).
93. Frontier Dispute,” Paragraph 30. Emphasis added.
94. “Indeed,” Shaw argues, “once defined in a treaty, an international frontier achieves permanence so that even if the treaty itself were to cease to be in force, the continuance of the boundary would be unaffected, and may only be changed with the consent of the states directly concerned.” Shaw, 528-529.
95. To be sure, the Old City of Jerusalem, which had special status under Articles 13 and 14 of the British Mandate, may be a separate legal matter than the rest of the former Mandated territory. Since the focus of this thesis is the legal status of Judea and Samaria, however, Jerusalem is beyond the scope of our investigation.
96. “South West Africa Cases (Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa), Preliminary Objections,” 330.
97. Egypt had committed multiple acts of war and threats against Israel. See, in general, Michael Oren, Six Days of War (New York: Presidio Press, 2003), 127-169.
98. Meir Shamgar, “The Observance of International Law in the Administered Territories,” in The Progression of International Law: Four Decades of the Israel Yearbook on Human Rights, ed. Yoram Dinstein and Fania Domb (The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2011), 433.
99. See Allan Gerson, Israel, the West Bank, and International Law (New York: Routledge, 1978), 113.
100. “Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,” Paragraph 90.
Beit Sourik Village Council v The Government of Israel et al., 48(5) PD, p.807, 2004. However, the Israeli Supreme Court’s interpretation of international law is not binding on the Israeli government.
103. Kretzmer, The Role of Domestic Courts in Treaty Enforcement, 203.
104. David M. Phillips, “The Illegal Settlements Myth,” Commentary Magazine, December 1, 2009.
107.The language of Article 43 of the Hague Convention similarly demonstrates that this Convention does not apply to Judea and Samaria. Article 43 states that “the authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety.” Because the “legitimate power” in this case is, in fact, the very country that has seized the territory—namely, Israel—a simple reading of this Article leads to the undeniable conclusion that the Convention cannot apply to the present case.
109.See Article 3(a), “Israel and Jordan: Peace Treaty (October 26, 1994),” in The Israel-Arab Reader, 479.
110. See, inter alia, paragraph 16, United Nations Human Rights Council, “Report of the independent international fact-finding mission to investigate the implications of the Israeli settlements on the civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights of the Palestinian people throughout the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem,” A/HRC/22/63, 7 February 2013.
113.See Alan Baker, “Israel’s rights in the Territories under International Law”, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, September 7, 2016. Accessed online: http://jcpa.org/israels-rights-territories-international-law/.
115.Israel has never demonstrated that the borders set forth in the Mandate changed either prior to or subsequent to statehood.
“… For the most part, there is insufficient evidence to show any transfer of territorial sovereignty or acquiescence in the creation of new de jure borders. The potential exception to this general rule is the Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip in 2005, which might be seen as an abandonment. “ Bell, p.50.
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