Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&amp;view=article&amp;id=40431:g-r-nos-129964-65-august-29,-2000-people-of-the-phil-v-carlos-meneque&amp;catid=1396&amp;Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 12:08:51+00:00

Document:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CARLOS MENEQUE y MONTON, Accused-Appellant.
That on or about the 6th day of March 1991, in the Municipality of Don Salvador Benedicto, Province of Negros Occidental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with M-14 rifle, with evident premeditation and treachery, with intent to kill, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot one MARIO AGUILAR y BAVIERA, thereby inflicting upon him multiple injuries which caused his death.
That on or about the 6th day of March 1991, in the Municipality of Don Salvador Benedicto, Province of Negros Occidental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with M-14 rifle, with evident premeditation and treachery, with intent to kill, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot one RICARDO CABARANG y ORTIZ, thereby inflicting upon him "Gunshot wounds" which caused his death.
Upon arraignment, Accused pleaded not guilty to the two counts of murder. Thus, trial ensued.
John Dulaca’s testimony was substantially corroborated by Johnny Alimon and Ernesto Gonzales.
We cannot give credence to accused-appellant’s version of events. Apart from his own self-serving statements, Accused-appellant’s testimony is uncorroborated by independent and competent evidence. 38 We agree with the trial court that the testimony of Rogelio de Jose, the only other witness for the defense, was weak and untenable. On direct examination, de Jose claimed that he witnessed the fighting between accused-appellant and some men inside the store which accused-appellant had entered. However, on cross-examination, de Jose admitted that he could not see inside the store. 39 De Jose’s contradictory statements impair his credibility.
Moreover, Accused-appellant’s testimony is intrinsically doubtful. He claims that he was assaulted by the group of Aguilar whose members were supposedly armed. However, despite their alleged superiority in strength and number, Accused-appellant, surprisingly, did not sustain any wounds; no member of Aguilar’s group had used their firearms against Accused-Appellant. Rather, it was Cabarang and Aguilar who ended up getting killed by, if the version of accused-appellant is to be believed, the haphazard firing by accused-appellant of his M-14 rifle as he was running away from Noel Benedicto’s house. It is well-settled that the nature and number of wounds inflicted by the accused are considered important indicia which disprove a plea of self-defense. 40 Given the circumstance obtaining in the present case, it is difficult, if not impossible to conclude that accused-appellant was the unwitting and defenseless victim of a murderous aggression by the group of Aguilar.
It is firmly established doctrine that absent any showing that it has overlooked, misapprehended, or misapplied some facts of weight and substance which, if properly considered, would have altered the result of the case, the trial court’s assessment of the credibility of the witnesses must be sustained by the appellate court. 41 Since the trial court had the distinct opportunity of directly observing the demeanor of the witness, it is therefore in a better position to ascertain whether or not he or she is telling the truth. 42 Based on our own critical study of the records of this case, we find that the trial court was justified in upholding the testimony of the prosecution witnesses as being worthy of full faith and credence. The defense has not proven that the prosecution witnesses were moved by improper motives, thus, it must be presumed that they were not so moved. 43 On the contrary, we find that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were clear and straightforward and coincided on all material points.
WHEREFORE, the January 29, 1997 Decision of Branch 44 of the Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against Accused-Appellant.
2.	TSN, October 3, 1995, 4-5.
4.	Dulaca identified accused-appellant in court. Ibid., 26-27.
12.	Alimon identified accused-appellant in court. TSN, November 14, 1995, 9-10.
18.	Gonzales identified accused-appellant in court. Gonzales knew accused-appellant because he was their supervisor in the CAFGU. TSN, October 3, 1995, 50-52.
22.	TSN, October 14, 1996, 4-5.
26.	TSN, December 9, 1996, 4-5.
33.	People v. De la Cruz, 291 SCRA 164 (1998); People v. Timblor, 285 SCRA 64 (1998).
34.	People v. Peña, 291 SCRA 606 (1998); People v. Mendoza, 284 SCRA 705 (1998).
35.	People v. Cario, 288 SCRA 404 (1998); People v. Timblor, supra.
36.	People v. Noay, 296 SCRA 292 (1998).
38.	People v. De la Cruz, supra.
39.	TSN, December 9, 1996, 5-7, 12-13.
40.	People v. Umadhay, 293 SCRA 545 (1998); People v. Cañete, 287 SCRA 490 (1998).
41.	People v. Atop, 286 SCRA 157 (1998); People v. Viovicente, 286 SCRA 1 (1998).
42.	People v. Albao, 287 SCRA 129 (1998); People v. Obello, 284 SCRA 79 (1998).
43.	People v. Mendoza, supra.
44.	People v. Gungon, 287 SCRA 618 (1998).
45.	People v. Cortes, 286 SCRA 295 (1998).
46.	People v. Sumalpong, 284 SCRA 464 (1998).
47.	People v. Toling, 62 SCRA 17 (1975), citing People v. Salazar, 105 Phil. 1058 (1959); People v. Mortero, 108 Phil. 31 (1960); People v. Remollino, 109 Phil. 607 (1960).
48.	Revised Penal Code, art. 64.
49.	People v. Solis, 291 SCRA 529 (1998).
50.	People v. Oliano, 287 SCRA 158 (1998).

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