Source: http://texas-opinions.com/08-Columbia-Medical-Center-of-Los-Colinas-v-Hogue-Tex-2008-by-Wainwright-HCLC-Med-Mal-gross-negligence-loss-of-inheritance.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 16:25:32+00:00

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spite of the serious risk to Hogue’s health.
Medina, Justice Johnson, and Justice Willett joined, and in Parts II-A, II-C, and II-D of which Justice Hecht and Justice Green joined.
Justice Brister opposed trifurcation of trial and delivered a concurring opinion, in which Justice Medina joined.
part and dissenting in part, in which Justice Hecht joined.
D of which Justice Hecht and Justice Green joined.
Justice Brister filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Medina joined.
in which Justice Hecht joined.
hospital was also grossly negligent in causing Hogue’s death.
damages and reduced the total damages award to under $5 million. 132 S.W.3d 671.
amendments to the Texas Finance Code, concerning interest on judgments, do not govern this case.
Therefore, we reverse the loss of inheritance damages, and affirm the remainder of the judgment.
Hogue to schedule a follow-up appointment for Monday morning before Hogue left town.
did not have a medical history for the patient.
conscious but was in severe respiratory distress, breathing approximately once every second. Dr.
Blomquist recognized that Hogue was seriously ill. While beginning his physical exam of Hogue, Dr.
though in September 1996 Hogue reported a history of a heart murmur during a routine physical exam.
recommended a follow-up with a cardiologist, which never occurred.
from these tests were negative.
Columbia Medical because he was seeing patients at another hospital. During the conversation, Drs.
types of things.” Dr. Blomquist then intubated Hogue and placed him on a ventilator.
By approximately 11:10 a.m., Dr. Blomquist had stabilized Hogue for transfer to the ICU and paged Dr.
agreed to evaluate Hogue after he attended to his patients at other hospitals. He did not specify a time.
records the electrical activity of the heart. Cecil Essentials of Medicine 47, 55 (Thomas E. Andreoli, M.
D. et al. eds., 6th ed. 2004).
something that had been around a long time.
hours after the echo study was completed, Hogue coded, and efforts to resuscitate him failed. Dr.
Lawson arrived at Columbia Medical after Hogue’s transfer to Baylor Irving.
Medical petitioned this Court for review.
consider whether contributory negligence should have been submitted to the jury.
first phase of the trial was not error.
specialized knowledge may be relevant to the ordinary care standard).
damages. IHS Cedars Treatment Ctr., Inc. v. Mason, 143 S.W.3d 794, 798 (Tex. 2004); D. Houston, Inc.
v. Love, 92 S.W.3d 450, 454 (Tex. 2002).
have meant you would have considered obtaining a consultation of a cardiologist?
Q: Would that have meant that you would have considered requesting an echocardiogram?
opinions based on reasonable medical probability. See Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.
conduct that to a reasonable degree of medical certainty would have occurred. See Otis Elevator Co. v.
Medical is insufficient to raise a question of fact on proximate cause.
for that information and that he would not have found that information useful in an initial history.
A: It’s not something that I routinely ask about.
specialist would want to know about of a patient?
liable for the negligence of a physician who is an independent contractor.” Baptist Mem’l Hosp. Sys. v.
Tex. R. App. P. 53.2(f) (“The petition must state concisely all issues or points presented for review.”).
including Columbia Medical’s failure to provide stat echo availability.
784-86 (Tex. 2001); Universal Servs. Co. v. Ung, 904 S.W.2d 638, 641 (Tex. 1995); Transp. Ins. Co. v.
641; Moriel, 879 S.W.2d at 23.
the standard of proof at trial is elevated, the standard of appellate review must likewise be elevated”).
there is clear and convincing evidence.
Diamond Shamrock Ref. Co., L.P. v. Hall, 168 S.W.3d 164, 170 (Tex. 2005) (quoting In re J.F.C., 96 S.
consciously indifferent to, this risk.
Medical’s decision to obtain guaranteed response times for vascular studies from On-Call Specialists.
available, and failed to communicate the limitation on its echo services to the physicians or nursing staff.
tragically manifested in Hogue’s case.
There is considerable other evidence in this case that such a significant delay was not expected.
took to obtain an echo study for Hogue was too long.
transferred to Baylor Irving earlier.
hospital to do so on more than one occasion.
Medical and was not transferred to obtain one.
guaranteed response time option provided in the contract negates proximate causation. We disagree.
guarantee under the terms of the contract, and (2) he could not have gotten there any sooner on that day.
process to transfer” at that point, increasing the opportunity to save Hogue’s life.
the court of appeals’ judgment affirming the award of exemplary damages capped by the MLIIA.
echo capabilities in connection with the emergency medical services it decided to provide.
jury could properly conclude the hospital acted with conscious indifference.
reasonable person to reach a conclusion. See St. Joseph Hosp. v. Wolff, 94 S.W.3d 513, 519-20 (Tex.
review for legal sufficiency only under the charge as submitted to the jury. See Osterberg v. Peca, 12 S.
W.3d 31, 55 (Tex. 2000).
inheritance damages may be recovered in appropriate circumstances.
would have been if the decedent had died a natural death. Yowell, 703 S.W.2d at 633.
financial expert, Dr. Allen Self.
in the future, but we do require at least some evidence of the beneficiary’s health. See Yowell, 703 S.W.
observing her in court is not sufficient.
recoverable, it does not cross the finish line under Yowell and C&H.
used in the analysis must be specific to the decedent. See C&H, 903 S.W.2d at 323; Yowell, 703 S.W.
and he extracted a working expectancy of seventy years old from the work expectancy table. Thus, Dr.
The final issue on appeal is the rate of pre- and postjudgment interest applicable to the judgment.
that are “signed or subject to appeal on or after the effective date of this Act.” § 2(a), 2003 Tex. Gen.
Legislature’s intent’” from the plain and common meaning of the statute. McIntyre v. Ramirez, 109 S.W.
3d 741, 745 (Tex. 2003) (quoting Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. Needham, 82 S.W.3d 314, 318 (Tex. 2002)).
Antonio v. City of Boerne, 111 S.W.3d 22, 29 (Tex. 2003)).
dates. This interpretation is too broad.
appealed,” whether that is a final judgment disposing of all parties and issues or an interlocutory appeal.
Protective & Regulatory Servs. v. Mega Child Care, Inc., 145 S.W.3d 170, 177-79 (Tex. 2004).
Bills 2415 and 4 do not apply. We affirm the court of appeals on this point.
capable of being appealed before the amendments’ effective dates.
nonsuit, or summary judgment, are no longer parties to the suit.
misleading advertising. For the reasons that follow, we need not reach these additional bases.
declined to consider expedited echo services, he lacked the resources to guarantee expedited response times.

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