Source: https://www.tdcaa.com/journal/a-compendium-of-bite-size-legal-tips/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 00:16:33+00:00

Document:
Refresher on Restitution, Part 2: When it is discovered on appeal that there is an error in the trial court’s restitution order, should the appellate court delete the order or remand the case for a restitution hearing?
1 See Sauceda v. State, 309 S.W.3d 767, 779 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2010, pet. ref’d); Alexander v. State, 301 S.W.3d 361 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, no pet.); see also Burt v. State, 445 S.W.3d 752, 756-57 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (explaining that restitution is a form of punishment for the convicted defendant, among other purposes, and that the defendant is entitled to have all of the terms of his sentence and punishment orally pronounced to him at trial).
2 Burt, 445 S.W.3d at 758.
3 See Burt, 445 S.W.3d at 757-58.
4 Burt, 445 S.W.3d at 758-61 (parenthetical in original).
5 See e.g., Tex. Health & Safety Code §481.112(e); Tex. Health & Safety Code §481.112(f); Tex. Health & Safety Code §481.117(e); Tex. Health & Safety Code §481.121(b)(6).
6 See Ibarra v. State, 177 S.W.3d 282, 284 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.); Scott v. State, 988 S.W.2d 947, 948 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.).
7 See Lavigne v. State, 803 S.W.2d 302, 303 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (affirming that the sentence of a defendant for a violation of the Controlled Substances Act could be properly enhanced under §12.42(d) of the Texas Penal Code); Gutierrez v. State, 628 S.W.2d 57, 61 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (“Convictions obtained under the Controlled Substances Act may be enhanced under the Texas Penal Code.”) (citing Young v. State, 552 S.W.2d 441 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977)).
8 See Blackman v. State, 414 S.W.3d 757, 761 n.7 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (“The parties seemed to operate under the assumption that the law would absolutely prohibit any inquiry during voir dire into what specific verdict, if any, the prospective jurors had actually reached in the course of their prior jury service. We note that while it may be within a trial court’s discretion to prohibit such a question, in the interest of placing reasonable limitations upon the length of voir dire, there is no absolute legal impediment to posing it”) (citing Redd v. State, 578 S.W.2d 129, 130-31 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979); see also Espinoza v. State, 653 S.W.2d 446, 450 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1982) (noting that a trial court does not abuse its discretion by prohibiting a “what verdict” question in voir dire, but “no statute or case law prohibits the question from being asked”), aff’d, 669 S.W.2d 736 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984).
9 See Adams v. State, 969 S.W.2d 106 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1998, no pet.) (holding that the DWI videotape was not protected by the work-product or attorney-client privileges, and rejecting the defendant’s “notion that information which is tendered as a result of court ordered or statutorily mandated discovery can be converted into privileged information, though it has not been altered since tendered, enhanced by fruits of an attorney’s labor since tendering, or added to with communicative actions after tendering….”); c.f. Mayberry v. State, No. 04-13-00382-CR, 2014 WL 4230143, at *1-3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Jan. 1, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (concluding that, when the defense subpoenaed the parole records of a potential witness, and the parole officer later could not locate those records to provide to the State in response to the State’s subpoena duces tecum, the trial court did not err by granting the State’s motion to order the defendant’s attorney to turn the parole records over to the court, observing that “[the potential witness’s] parole records were not transformed into protected work product merely because [the defendant’s] counsel acquired them through subpoena.”).

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 §481
 §481
 §481
 §481
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 §12
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.