Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/365/43/
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 02:24:09+00:00

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Held: the provision requiring submission of motion pictures for examination or censorship prior to their public exhibition is not void on its face as violative of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, and the judgment of dismissal is affirmed. Pp. 365 U. S. 44-50.
(b) Petitioner's narrow attack on the ordinance does not require that any consideration be given to the validity of the standards set out therein, since they are not challenged and are not before this Court. Pp. 365 U. S. 46-47.
(c) It has never been held that liberty of speech is absolute, or that all prior restraints on speech are invalid. Pp. 365 U. S. 47-49.
(d) Although motion pictures are included within the free speech and free press guaranties of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, there is no absolute freedom to exhibit publicly, at least once, every kind of motion picture. Pp. 365 U. S. 46, 365 U. S. 49-50.
the production of the film at the office of the commissioner for examination, is invalid as a previous restraint on freedom of speech. In Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U. S. 495, 343 U. S. 502 (1952), we held that motion pictures are included "within the free speech and free press guaranty of the First and Fourteenth Amendments." Admittedly, the challenged section of the ordinance imposes a previous restraint, and the broad justiciable issue is therefore present as to whether the ambit of constitutional protection includes complete and absolute freedom to exhibit, at least once, any and every kind of motion picture. It is that question alone which we decide. We have concluded that § 155-4 of Chicago's ordinance requiring the submission of films prior to their public exhibition is not, on the grounds set forth, void on its face.
Petitioner's narrow attack upon the ordinance does not require that any consideration be given to the validity of the standards set out therein. They are not challenged, and are not before us. Prior motion picture censorship cases which reached this Court involved questions of standards. [Footnote 3] The films had all been submitted to the authorities, and permits for their exhibition were refused because of their content. Obviously, whether a particular statute is "clearly drawn," or "vague," or "indefinite," or whether a clear standard is in fact met by a film are different questions involving other constitutional challenges to be tested by considerations not here involved.
here, we added that "The phrase prior restraint' is not a self-wielding sword. Nor can it serve as a talismanic test." Even as recently as our last Term, we again observed the principle, albeit in an allied area, that the State possesses some measure of power "to prevent the distribution of obscene matter." Smith v. California, 361 U. S. 147, 361 U. S. 155 (1959).
attack does not warrant, nor could it justify on the record here, our saying that -- aside from any consideration of the other "exceptional cases" mentioned in our decisions -- the State is stripped of all constitutional power to prevent, in the most effective fashion, the utterance of this class of speech. It is not for this Court to limit the State in its selection of the remedy it deems most effective to cope with such a problem, absent, of course, a showing of unreasonable strictures on individual liberty resulting from its application in particular circumstances. Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, supra, at 354 U. S. 441. We, of course, are not holding that city officials may be granted the power to prevent the showing of any motion picture they deem unworthy of a license. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, supra, at 343 U. S. 504-505.
Id. at 283 U. S. 716. The dissenters in Near sought to uphold the Minnesota statute, struck down by the Court, on the ground that the statute did "not authorize administrative control in advance such as was formerly exercised by the licensers and censors. . . ." Id. at 283 U. S. 735. Thus, three decades ago, the Constitution's abhorrence of licensing or censorship was first clearly articulated by this Court.
Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U. S. 233, 297 U. S. 245-246.
Id. at 308 U. S. 164.
Id. at 310 U. S. 306.
The vice of censorship through licensing and, more generally, the particular evil of previous restraint on the right of free speech, have many times been recognized when this Court has carefully distinguished between laws establishing sundry systems of previous restraint on the right of free speech and penal laws imposing subsequent punishment on utterances and activities not within the ambit of the First Amendment's protection. See Near v. Minnesota, supra, at pp. 283 U. S. 718-719; Schneider v. New Jersey, supra, at p. 308 U. S. 164; Cantwell v. Connecticut, supra, at p. 310 U. S. 306; Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U. S. 268, 340 U. S. 282 (concurring opinion); Kunz v. New York, 340 U. S. 290, 340 U. S. 294-295.
Near v. Minnesota, supra, at p. 283 U. S. 715; Grosjean v. American Press Co., supra, at p. 297 U. S. 248. The objection has been that Blackstone's definition is too narrow; it had been generally conceded that the protection of the First Amendment extends at least to the interdiction of licensing and censorship and to the previous restraint of free speech. Near v. Minnesota, supra, at p. 283 U. S. 715; Grosjean v. American Press Co., supra, at p. 297 U. S. 246; Chafee, Free Speech in the United States, 18.
that the question presented in this case is not whether a motion picture exhibitor has a constitutionally protected, "complete and absolute freedom to exhibit at least once, any and every kind of motion picture." Ante, p. 365 U. S. 46. Surely, the Court is not bound by the petitioner's conception of the issue or by the more extreme positions that petitioner may have argued at one time in the case. The question here presented is whether the City of Chicago -- or, for that matter, any city, any State or the Federal Government -- may require all motion picture exhibitors to submit all films to a police chief, mayor or other administrative official, for licensing and censorship prior to public exhibition within the jurisdiction.
The Court does not even have before it an attempt by the city to restrain the exhibition of an allegedly "obscene" film, see Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476. Nor does the city contend that it is seeking to prohibit the showing of a film which will impair the "security of the community life" because it acts as an incitement to "violence and the overthrow by force of orderly government." See Near v. Minnesota, supra, at p. 283 U. S. 716. The problem before us is not whether the city may forbid the exhibition of a motion picture, which, by its very showing, might in some way "inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace." See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568, 315 U. S. 572.
A remarkable parallel to the censorship plan now before the Court, although one less offensive to the First Amendment, is found in the Near case itself. The Minnesota statute there under attack did not require that all publications be approved before distribution. That statute only provided that a person may be enjoined by a court from publishing a newspaper which was "malicious, scandalous and defamatory." Id. at 283 U. S. 702. The injunction in that case was issued only after Near had allegedly published nine such newspapers. The statute permitted issuance of an injunction only on proof that, within the prior three months, such an offensive newspaper had already been published. Near was not prevented "from operating a newspaper in harmony with the public welfare." Ibid. If the state court found that Near's subsequent publication conformed to this standard, Near would not have been held in contempt. But the Court there found that this system of censorship by a state court, used only after it had already been determined that the publisher had previously violated the standard, had to fall before the First and the Fourteenth Amendments. It would seem that, a fortiori, the present system must also fall.
The case of Grosjean v. American Press Co., supra, provides another forceful illustration. The Court held there that a license tax of two percent on the gross receipts from advertising of newspapers and periodicals having a circulation of over 20,000 a week was a form of prior restraint, and therefore invalid. Certainly this would seem much less an infringement on the liberties of speech and press protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments than the classic system of censorship we now have before us. It was held in Grosjean that the imposition of the tax would curtail the amount of revenue realized from advertising, and therefore operate as a restraint on publication. The license tax in Grosjean is analogous to the license fee in the case at bar, a fee to which petitioner raises no objection. It was also held in Grosjean that the tax had a "direct tendency . . . to restrict circulation," id. at 297 U. S. 244-245 (emphasis added), because it was imposed only on publications with a weekly circulation of 20,000 or more; that, "if it were increased to a high degree . . . , it might well result in destroying both advertising and circulation." Id. at 297 U. S. 245. (Emphasis added.) These were the evils calling for reversal in Grosjean. I should think that these evils are of minor import in comparison to the evils consequent to the licensing system which the Court here approves.
Id. at 307 U. S. 516. May anything less be said of Chicago's movie censorship plan?
Id. at 308 U. S. 163-164. I believe that the licensing plan at bar is fatally defective because of this precise objection.
Does the Court today wish to distinguish between the protection accorded to religion by the First and Fourteenth Amendments and the protection accorded to speech by those same provisions? I cannot perceive the distinction between this case and Cantwell. Chicago says that it faces a problem -- obscene and incendious films. Connecticut faced the problem of fraudulent solicitation. Constitutionally, is there a difference? See also Largent v. Texas, 318 U. S. 418.
Id. at 340 U. S. 293. The Chicago censorship and licensing plan is effectively no different. The only meaningful distinction between Kunz and the case at bar appears to be in the disposition of them by the Court.
Id. at 355 U. S. 321. In Staub, the ordinance required a permit for solicitation; in the case decided today, the ordinance requires a permit for the exhibition of movies. If this is a valid distinction, it has not been so revealed. In Staub, the permit was to be granted on the basis of certain indefinite standards; in the case decided today, nothing different may be said.
"Id. at 283 U. S. 716. In the light of the First Amendment's history and of the Near decision, the State has a heavy burden to demonstrate that the limitation challenged here presents such an exceptional case."
Id. at 343 U. S. 503-504. Here, once more, the Court recognized that the First Amendment's rejection of prior censorship through licensing and previous restraint is an inherent and basic principle of freedom of speech and press. Now the Court strays from that principle; it strikes down that tenet without requiring any demonstration that this is an "exceptional case," whatever that might be, and without any indication that Chicago has sustained the "heavy burden" which was supposed to have been placed upon it. Clearly, this is neither an exceptional case nor has Chicago sustained any burden.
"obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, indecent, or disgusting . . . or immoral. . . ." Id. at 354 U. S. 438. The Chicago objective is to capture much more. The Kingsley statute required the existence of some cause to believe that the publication was obscene before the publication was put on trial. The Chicago ordinance requires no such showing.
The booklets enjoined from distribution in Kingsley were concededly obscene. [Footnote 2/5] There is no indication that this is true of the moving picture here. This was treated as a particularly crucial distinction. Thus, the Court has suggested that, in times of national emergency, the Government might impose a prior restraint upon "the publication of the sailing dates of transports or the number and location of troops." Near v. Minnesota, supra, p. 283 U. S. 716; cf. 71 U. S. 4 Wall. 2. But surely this is not to suggest that the Government might require that all newspapers be submitted to a censor in order to assist it in preventing such information from reaching print. Yet, in this case, the Court gives its blessing to the censorship of all motion pictures in order to prevent the exhibition of those it feels to be constitutionally unprotected.
It would seem idle to suppose that the Court today is unaware of the evils of the censor's basic authority, of the mischief of the system against which so many great men have waged stubborn and often precarious warfare for centuries, see Grosjean v. American Press Co., supra, at 297 U. S. 247, of the scheme that impedes all communication by hanging threateningly over creative thought. [Footnote 2/6] But the Court dismisses all of this simply by opining that "the phrase prior restraint' is not a self-wielding sword. Nor can it serve as a talismanic test." Ante, p. 365 U. S. 49. I must insist that "a pragmatic assessment of its operation,"
Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, supra, at p. 354 U. S. 442, lucidly portrays that the system that the Court sanctions today is inherently bad. One need not disagree with the Court that Chicago has chosen the most effective means of suppressing obscenity. Censorship has been so recognized for centuries. But this is not to say that the Chicago plan, the old, abhorrent English system of censorship through licensing, is a permissible form of prohibiting unprotected speech. The inquiry, as stated by the Court but never resolved, is whether this form of prohibition results in "unreasonable strictures on individual liberty," ante, p. 365 U. S. 50; [Footnote 2/7] whether licensing, as a prerequisite to exhibition, is barred by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
community standards is a vital flaw. [Footnote 2/9] See Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, supra, at pp. 354 U. S. 447-448 (dissenting opinion).
The threat of these penalties, intelligently applied, will ordinarily be sufficient to deter the exhibition of obscenity. However, if the exhibitor believes that his film is constitutionally protected, he will show the film, and, if prosecuted under criminal statute, will have ready that defense. The perniciousness of a system of censorship is that the exhibitor's belief that his film is constitutionally protected is irrelevant. Once the censor has made his estimation that the film is "bad" and has refused to issue a permit, there is ordinarily no defense to a prosecution [Footnote 2/10] for showing the film without a license. [Footnote 2/11] Thus, the film is not shown, perhaps not for years, and sometimes not ever. Simply a talismanic test or self-wielding sword? I think not.
of speech and press, and the public, which benefits from the shielding of that liberty, are, in effect at the mercy of the censor's whim. This powerful tendency to restrict the free dissemination of ideas calls for reversal. See Grosjean v. American Press Co., supra, at 297 U. S. 245.
In Smith, we pointed out that, although a "strict liability penal ordinance" which does not require scienter may be valid when applied to the distributors of food or drugs, it is invalid when applied to booksellers, distributors of ideas. Id. at 361 U. S. 152-153.
For the particularly provocative statements made by Kunz, see the dissent of Mr. Justice Jackson. Id. at 340 U. S. 296-297.
"Whatever might be said of a scheme of advance censorship directed against all possibly obscene writings, the case before us concerns a regulatory measure of far narrower impact, of a kind neither entailing the grave dangers of general censorship nor productive of the abuses which gave rise to the constitutional guarantees. (Cf. Pound, Equitable Relief Against Defamation and Injuries to Personality, 29 Harv.L.Rev. 640, 650-51.)"
Id. at 361 U. S. 150-151. See Shelton v. Tucker, supra. Forty-six of our States currently see fit to rely on traditional criminal punishment for the protection of their citizens.
My view that censorship of movies is unconstitutional because it is a prior restraint and violative of the First Amendment has been expressed on prior occasions. Superior Films, Inc. v. Department of Education, 346 U. S. 587, 346 U. S. 588-589 (concurring opinion); Kingsley International Pictures Corp. v. Regents. 360 U. S. 684, 360 U. S. 697 (concurring opinion).
barbs of political satire. [Footnote 3/2] But the concern with political satire shifted to a concern with atheism and with sexual morality -- the last being the concern evident in Chicago's system now before us.
Yet, as long as the First Amendment survives, the censor, no matter how respectable his cause, cannot have the support of government. It is not for government to pick and choose according to the standards of any religious, political, or philosophical group. It is not permissible, as I read the Constitution, for government to release one movie and refuse to release another because of an official's concept of the prevailing need or the public good. The Court in Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697, 283 U. S. 713, said that the "chief purpose" of the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of press was "to prevent previous restraints upon publication."

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