Source: http://mlnappeals.blogspot.com/2013/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 03:51:38+00:00

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In this labor law action, plaintiff Matthews was injured when a metal grate fell on him during his work in an elevator shaft within a building owned by the defendant. The defendant hired Paravini McGovern LLC as the construction manager on the site and subcontracted to plaintiff’s employer to install the elevators and to GC Ironworks (GCI) to install the iron-grate platforms in the elevator shaft.
The Supreme Court denied the plaintiff partial summary judgment on his Labor Law section 240(1) claim and granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the Labor Law section 200 and common-law negligence claims against Pavarini. The Appellate Division, First Department unanimously reversed, granting partial summary judgment to the plaintiff on the Labor Law section 240(1) claim. Despite the fact that GCI was setting up the grates in preparation to weld them, and the grate that injured the plaintiff fell because it had not yet been welded in place, the First Department held that “the grate was part of the work of the construction project in which plaintiff was engaged and was required to be secured “for the purposes of the undertaking.” In fact, the plaintiffs did not need to even show that the falling object, in this case the grate, was in the process of being hoisted or secured in order to prevail under 240(1). Furthermore, the First Department determined the Labor Law section 200 and common law negligence claims were improperly disposed on summary judgment when evidence suggested that Pavarini exercised control over both GCI as well as plaintiff’s employer’s work because they were working in the same elevator shaft in which the alleged unsafe condition arose.
Second Department Declares Police Car Is An "Automobile"
The issue in this case was whether a police vehicle qualified as a “motor vehicle” in an uninsured motorist endorsement. Officer Fitzgerald was a passenger in a police car when he was injured in a two-car accident. The driver of the other car was underinsured. Fitzgerald sought to recover from his fellow officer’s insurance policy. State Farm, the insurer of that policy, contended the police vehicle was not a “motor vehicle” for purposes of the uninsured/underinsured motorist endorsement. The Supreme Court agreed with State Farm, finding that Officer Fitzgerald should be denied coverage as police vehicles were specifically excluded under the definition of “vehicle” in Vehicle and Traffic Law (“VTL”) section 388(2). In so holding, the Supreme Court relied on State Farm v. Amato, where the Court of Appeals decided New York City had no statutory obligation to insure police vehicles.
The Second Department reversed, finding that the appropriate definition of “motor vehicle” is located in VTL section 125, as it is a more general provision that defines terms for the entire VTL. The police vehicle here fell within this definition as it is a “vehicle operated or driven upon a public highway which is propelled by any power other than muscular power” and as it is not specifically excluded. The Court distinguished the Amato case relied on by the Supreme Court by explaining that Amato dealt primarily with the City’s obligation to provide insurance coverage to police officers, while this deals with whether a police officer has coverage under a private insurance plan of the driver. As the legislature has continuously recognized the importance of innocent victims of accidents receiving just compensation, it would go against public policy to decide otherwise.
As of December 1, 2013, the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure ("FRAP") no longer require separate sections in an appellate brief for the "Statement of the Case" and the "Statement of Facts." Going forward, FRAP Rule 28 now requires only a single section "setting out the facts relevant to the issues submitted for review, describing the relevant procedural history, and identifying the rulings presented for review, with appropriate references to the record." This combined section is to be labeled as the "Statement of the Case."
In Devito v. Feliciano, the Court of Appeals has clarified what is considered cumulative testimony when deciding to give a missing witness charge. The Court of Appeals held that testimony is cumulative "only when it is cumulative of testimony or other evidence favoring the party controlling the witness." Thus, the Court rejected the trial court's reasoning that testimony would be "cumulative of the opposing witness's testimony." The Court then granted a new trial because it was unable to conclude that the error was harmless.
In Skelly-Hand v. Lizardi, the Third Department affirmed a $2 million award for pain and suffering for an Erb’s palsy injury. In affirming the order, the Third Department criticized the lack of details in the cases the defendants cited, noting “Many of the decisions involving brachial plexus birth injuries upon which defendant relies in arguing for a reduction of the award are unhelpful as they fail to indicate the severity of the underlying injury.” The court also pointed out that some of the cases the defendant cited “describe the injury as mild,” whereas the court described the injury in this case as "severe.'"
Particularizing the injury, the Court stated that the child, age 16 at the time of trial: (1) has severely limited use of her arms and shoulders; (2) cannot perform tasks requiring the use of her two hands without extreme difficulty; (3) underwent extensive and often painful or uncomfortable medical treatments; (4) had five surgeries; (5) required lengthy periods of wearing braces, splints or casts on her injured arm; (6) wore a back brace to treat scoliosis syringomyelia, a condition causally related to her brachial plexus injury; (7) suffered social adjustment and self-confidence issues due to her injuries; (8) has diminished strength, balance and coordination; and (9) needs assistance with basic activities of daily living such as bathing, grooming, and dressing.
Certified Question: Does a Vehicle and Traffic Law Indemnity/Contribution Claim Trump the "Exclusivity" Provision in the Workers’ Compensation Law?
In Hallock v. Koubek, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals has certified a question to the New York Court of Appeals involving the exclusivity of the Workers’ Compensation remedy and the Vehicle and Traffic Law.
The plaintiff was injured as a passenger in a car driven by a co-worker as they returned from a business conference. The plaintiff could not pursue a claim against the driver of the vehicle in which he was injured because the Workers’ Compensation Law generally bars claims against an employer and co-workers. Notably, though, the vehicle was owned by the co-worker’s spouse.
The plaintiff did bring claims against the driver and owner of the second vehicle involved in the collision. Those defendants then brought a third-party claim against the owner of the first vehicle for indemnity and contribution. The third-party claim was based on a Vehicle and Traffic Law provision that imposes statutory liability against an owner for the negligence of a driver permitted to use the vehicle.
The third-party defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that the Workers’ Compensation provision that barred claims against his spouse also inured to his benefit as the vehicle’s owner. The defendants countered that the Vehicle and Traffic Law controlled, making the owner potentially liable even if the driver could not be sued.
In certifying this case to the Court of Appeals, the Second Circuit noted two lines of cases that made it unclear how the Court of Appeals would rule. One line of cases suggested that the Workers’ Compensation exclusivity provision controls, precluding a contribution action against the vehicle’s owner. In those cases, the prohibition on liability against the driver meant there was no derivative liability under the Vehicle and Traffic Law.
In another line of cases were two decisions that suggested an outcome was less than certain. The Second Circuit pointed to a recent trial-level decision, which it found to be on all fours with the case at hand, that allowed a third-party contribution claim against the vehicle’s owner. The other decision came from the Court of Appeals and it allowed a Vehicle and Traffic Law claim against a vehicle’s owner when the driver had diplomatic immunity from suit. In the case involving diplomatic immunity, the Court of Appeals distinguished its prior and potentially conflicting Workers’ Compensation holdings. Given these divergent cases, the Second Circuit decided it was necessary to seek guidance from the Court of Appeals.
In this medical malpractice case, the plaintiff is seeking damages allegedly suffered by her infant during childbirth. Plaintiff appealed from an order of the Supreme Court that denied thirty-seven of their fifty-six discovery requests.
The Fourth Department determined that the Supreme Court improperly denied eight discovery requests. The Fourth Department then modified the order to allow discovery of some of the requests immediately and requiring a hearing before the Supreme Court for others. The defendant claimed three requests were unduly burdensome to produce, namely: a protocol entitled “Circulating Vaginal Delivery,” materials laying out criteria for determining whether neonatal encephalopathy occurred, and material with referral protocols for infants. After determining that all three were “material and necessary,” the Court stated production was mandated as it was not unduly burdensome to the defendant.
Two of the eight improperly denied discovery requests involved national standards on fetal monitoring that the Court determined could be used to aid in establishing negligence. Despite the fact that these records may be publicly available, the Court held that fact does not “preclude production of those records from a party” if the party possesses them. The Court remitted the matter to the Supreme Court to determine whether defendants have the documents at issue. The defendants claimed that they did not possess two other items, including discovery on cesarean sections and intrapartum and antepartum suctioning. As such, the Fourth Department remitted these issues to be determined at a hearing as well.
The eight discovery request at issue involved the hospital’s “unredacted policies and procedures.” During proceedings on the initial discovery order, the hospital claimed privilege as to certain information. A court-appointed Referee agreed that privileged material would be exempt from discovery, but the extent of the privilege was undetermined. Consequently, the Court directed the Supreme Court to review the information in chambers to determine what part of the “procedures and protocols” was indeed privileged.
In this medical malpractice action, the jury returned a verdict against defendant Crouse Hospital, but in favor of defendant Dr. Caputo. The jury found Dr. Caputo negligent, but that his negligence was not a “substantial factor” in causing plaintiffs injuries. Plaintiff and Defendant Crouse Hospital appealed the jury’s verdict.
The Fourth Department affirmed, explaining that the jury’s finding would be reversed “only when [negligence and proximate cause] issues are so inextricably interwoven as to make it logically impossible to find negligence without also finding proximate cause.” Since, here, there was a “reasonable view” of the evidence that there was negligence without proximate cause, the verdict should stand.
Judge Fahey dissented in part, agreeing with the majority against setting aside the verdict as to Dr. Caputo, but disagreeing on modifying the verdict against Crouse Hospital. He explained that the only reason this allegedly surfaced was because the jury foreperson approached plaintiff’s counsel at a chance encounter at a basketball game about one month after the verdict. In addition, Judge Fahey stated that unless circumstances are extraordinary, “juror affidavits may not be used to attack a jury verdict.” In his view, this was not an exceptional circumstance as it was not a “ministerial error,” such as a foreperson entering the percentages of fault on the wrong line. Instead, it was a “jury’s mistaken impression” about how damages are awarded.
In Wilk v. James, a medical malpractice case previously discussed on this blog, a decedent’s estate sued a hospital and treating doctors because they allegedly failed to diagnose an aortic dissection. Decedent contacted his treating urologist on February 16, 2004 after he was diagnosed with kidney stones the previous day. This doctor eventually referred him to the hospital based on his poor urinary retention. Decedent failed to make a follow up appointment with the doctor after being told to do so, and two days later he was rushed to the hospital for emergency surgery because of a spinal epidural hematoma. Decedent then had an additional surgery based on a re-accumulated clot and died two weeks later. The death certificate listed cerebral infarct with herniation, aortic dissection and spinal cord infarct hematoma as conditions contributing to death. This appeal dealt solely with summary judgment motions filed by the defendant doctors. The Supreme Court denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment, but the Fourth Department has now reversed.
The Fourth Department determined that defendants met their initial burden by establishing “the absence of any departure from good and accepted medical practice [and] that any departure was not the proximate cause of [decedent]’s alleged injuries.” This shifted the burden to the plaintiff to “raise triable issues of fact” through a physician’s affidavit. The affidavit plaintiff’s expert submitted opined that defendants should have ordered a CT scan of the abdomen and pelvis on February 16, 2004 based on observance of the prior day’s CT scan which showed an enlarged kidney and could have led to a reasonable differential diagnosis of an acute infarct of the left kidney. Plaintiff’s expert then concluded that based on this new CT scan, an aortic dissection diagnosis likely would have been made.
The Fourth Department determined that plaintiff expert’s assertion that defendant doctors were negligent “in failing to order a diagnostic test to rule out a urological condition that decedent did not have because that test may incidentally have revealed an underlying and unsuspected cardiothoracic condition” was “simply too attenuated to raise an issue of fact with respect to causation.” In other words, the decision to not perform a test that may have only incidentally revealed a condition that was not being tested for is insufficient to establish a medical malpractice claim. Thus, granting summary judgment to the defendants was appropriate and the Supreme Court was reversed.
Judge Fahey dissented, arguing that the majority’s position was inconsistent with its decision on the prior appeal. Click here for our post describing the prior appeal. The majority responded that “this appeal involved different defendants who had different obligations with respect to the decedent.” In addition, they countered that the instant appeal presented evidence that was not raised on the prior appeal.
Giambrone v. Kings Harbor Multicare Ctr.
In this medical malpractice action, Mr. Giambrone alleges that he developed a sacral wound after he underwent surgery at Westchester Square Hospital. Following surgery, he then underwent rehabilitation at defendant Kings Harbor, where his wound allegedly progressed to a Stage IV decubitus ulcer. Mr. Giambrone commenced this action against Kings Harbor in August 2009, at which time his wife was not named as a party. In December 2010, Mr. Giambrone commenced a separate medical malpractice action against Westchester Square, in which his wife was named as a plaintiff and asserted a derivative claim for loss of consortium and spousal services. About seven weeks after the statute of limitations expired in the Kings Harbor action, he moved to amend the Kings Harbor complaint under CPLR 3025(b) to assert his wife’s derivative action. The Supreme Court granted the motion.
On March 21, 2013, the First Department affirmed adopting the Third Department’s position in Anderson v. Carney that the Supreme Court should be permitted to exercise the same discretion it has when considering whether to allow the addition of a plaintiff’s derivative cause of action. The Second and Fourth Departments, however, have taken an opposing view. They have held that "a spouse’s derivative claim cannot be added to a complaint through the relation back provision of CPLR 203(f)."
The First Department has now granted leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals, where the Court of Appeals will have an opportunity to resolve this conflict between the Departments.
In this medical malpractice action, Dr. Sundaresan moved for summary judgment on the basis that he lacked a duty of care to the plaintiff. In particular, he claimed that one phone conversation with a doctor at another hospital in reference to the plaintiff did not give rise to a physician-patient relationship. In opposition, the plaintiff claimed that since the two doctors discussed his transfer to defendant’s hospital, his condition, and agreed to perform surgery together on the plaintiff during the course of the phone call, Dr. Sundaresean owed him a duty of care.
The First Department agreed, holding that the Supreme Court properly denied summary judgment to Dr. Sundaresan, since there was a triable issue of fact regarding whether or not a duty of care arose. The Court found “a jury could reasonably infer that both doctors expressly contemplated treating plaintiff as part of the surgical team managing his care.” However, it dismissed the cause of action against Dr. Sundaresan that alleged lack of informed consent, because it was the other doctor who obtained the plaintiff’s consent in this case.
In March, we made two brief posts about oral arguments in two significant U.S. Supreme Court cases, one considering the Defense of Marriage Act and the other considering California's Proposition 8. This morning, the U.S. Supreme Court issued decisions in both cases. In United States v. Windsor, the Court held key provisions of the Defense of Marriage Act unconstitutional. In Hollingsworth v. Perry, the Court dismissed due to a lack of jurisdiction over the appeal. For the same reasons that the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction, the Court also held that the Ninth Circuit lacked jurisdiction as well. The effect of those actions in Hollingsworth is to allow the District Court's decision stand. The District Court had struck down Proposition 8.
In this medical malpractice action, plaintiff alleges the defendant doctor negligently performed laparoscopic surgery on her. During the non-party pathologist’s deposition, there was a verbal altercation between plaintiff’s counsel and respondent pathologist’s counsel. The plaintiff moved to preclude the nonparty pathologist’s counsel from the rest of the deposition. The Supreme Court required the pathologist to finish her deposition and permitted the pathologist’s counsel to be involved in the deposition as provided by 22 NYCR § 221.2 and 221.3.
The Fourth Department reversed holding that “counsel for a nonparty witness does not have a right to object during or otherwise to participate in a pretrial deposition.” The Court found that the Supreme Court erred in relying on 22 NYCR § 221.2 and 221.3, which allows an attorney of a nonparty to interrupt a deposition in specified circumstances. The Fourth Department found that CPLR 3113 (c) is also applicable, as it provides depositions should commence “as permitted in the trial of actions in open court,” and it is well established that counsel for nonparty witnesses are not able to object or participate during trial. Further, the Court pointed out that if there was a conflict between CPLR 3113 (c) and 22 NYCR § 221.2 and 221.3, the statute controls over the regulation. While no participation by the nonparty’s counsel should be permitted, the court stated the nonparty had the right to seek a protective order if necessary.
Two members of the Fourth Department dissented. They argued that there was no conflict. According to the dissent, the rules were adopted twenty-three years after CPLR 3113 (c) came into existence, and as such, would not have been adopted if in direct conflict with the already existing statute. In addition, the dissent cited to a Second Department case (Horowitz) in which the court took into account objections made by a nonparty’s counsel in the deposition context.
The Fourth Department granted leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals on June 7, 2013.
In a rare move, the New York Court of Appeals has requested the participation of Amicus Curiae after granting leave to appeal in Clemente Bros. Contracting Corp. v. Hafner-Milazzo. Underlying the appeal is New York’s Uniform Commercial Code and a bank’s liability to a customer when the bank pays a check on a forged signature. The plaintiff’s claims stem from Capital One Bank’s payments on checks that were allegedly forged by the plaintiff’s former employee. One of the issues to be heard involves an agreement between the bank and its customer to shorten the statutory time to make a claim from one-year to fourteen days.
On June 6th, the Court of Appeals issued its decision in Wild v. Catholic Health Sys., a case we previously reported on here involving a challenge to the loss of chance doctrine and charge. Unfortunately, however, the Court found that the defendants had failed to preserve the argument that a "loss of a chance" charge should not be given on the ground that New York does not recognize that doctrine. The Court instead found that the defendants had merely preserved the argument that the facts did not support a "loss of a chance" charge, an argument that the defendants did not make in the Court of Appeals. Having found that the "loss of a chance" language in the charge was not at issue, the Court took the defendants' challenge to the charge to be the argument that the lower court misstated the plaintiff's burden of proof. The Court held that, putting the "loss of a chance" language aside, the charge did not improperly decrease the plaintiff's burden of proof because it required the jury to find that the defendants' acts or omissions were a substantial factor in causing the injury and instructed the jury that the plaintiff must prove her case by a preponderance of the evidence.
Because the Court found the "loss of a chance" issue unpreserved, medical malpractice practitioners are left where they were before leave was granted in this case. Defense attorneys should be careful to object to a plaintiff's request for a "loss of a chance" charge both because the facts and expert testimony do not support the charge, if that is the case, and because "loss of a chance" has not explicitly been recognized by the New York Court of Appeals. Practitioners should argue that the "loss of a chance" concept lowers the plaintiff's burden of proof and would permit plaintiffs to have a recovery when it is not more likely than not that the alleged malpractice was the cause of the injuries sued upon. See T. O'Shaughnessy, Loss of a Chance: Finally Back in the Court of Appeals (N.Y.L.J. 7/16/12). In addition, they can argue that if the judge is inclined to give a "loss of a chance" charge, the plaintiff should only be able to recover damages reflective of the amount of chance actually lost. For example, if the jury finds that the plaintiff had a 40 percent chance of a cure in the absence of malpractice, the court would later multiply that percentage by the total damages awarded to determine the verdict amount against the defendant. This approach, referred to as the "proportional" approach to the "loss of a chance" problem, has been adopted by about 20 states (id.).
The jury found that a design defect caused the plaintiff's injuries, and the Appellate Division, Fourth Department affirmed. The Fourth Department noted that there was sufficient evidence that the protruding bolt was an entanglement hazard and that there were design alternatives that would reduce or eliminate the hazard at only a nominal increase in cost. The court also rejected defense arguments that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence or that there was insufficient evidence of causation.

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