Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/151/626/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 10:27:10+00:00

Document:
Where, in an action on a contract, a counterclaim to the amount of $10,000 is interposed by the defendant, and judgment is given for plaintiff for less than $5,000, this Court has jurisdiction to review that judgment when brought here by defendant below.
of his contract or the buyer may declare it paid in full, the proper remedy of the seller, after delivery of the machine and refusal of the buyer to accept it, is an action on the contract to recover the contract price, and not an action for breach of the contract by refusal to accept the machine.
The requirement that an assignment of error based upon the admission or rejection of evidence must, in the case of a deposition excluded in whole or in part, state the full substance of the evidence so admitted or rejected, does not apply where the witness testifies in person and where the question propounded to him is not only proper in form, but is so framed as to clearly admit of an answer favorable to the claim or defense of the party producing him.
When the court in such case does not require the party in whose behalf the question is put to state the facts proposed to be proved by the answer, the rejection of the answer will be deemed error or not according as the question, upon its face, if proper in form, may or may not clearly admit of an answer favorable to the party in whose behalf it is propounded.
When objection is made to a question to a witness as incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial, and the objection is sustained, the court may or may not, within its discretion, require the party in whose behalf the question is put to state the facts proposed to be proved by the answer.
This was an action in contract. Judgment for plaintiff to which defendant sued out this writ of error. The case is stated in the opinion.
against Russell & Co. in the sum of $10,000. The verdict and judgment were in favor of the plaintiff, and for the sum of $4,450. That sum, and the amount sued for in the counterclaim, are in dispute upon this writ of error. This Court therefore has jurisdiction.
"steamed up ready to run; the balance in six and twelve months, with interest at the rate of seven percent per annum from time of erection in Lincoln; providing that, with proper and careful management, said engines, boilers, and pumps are hereby guarantied to work, and that said engines do give the amount of horse power as herein specified, and to be as economical of fuel and as durable as a Corliss noncondensing engine."
said Buckstaff and Utt. It is hereby agreed that Russell & Co. shall ship said machinery not later than July 15, 1888."
"All boilers tested to 150 pounds hydraulic pressure; workmanship and material guarantied to be first class; plans for setting boilers to be furnished without expense to purchaser."
"We guaranty the above engine to be well made, of first-class material, and in operation to work as economically as any similar engine in the market."
A third is a proposal for another right-hand automatic cut-off engine, accompanied by a similar guaranty.
In the first count of the petition it was alleged that all the machinery covered by the contract was delivered by the plaintiff to the defendants in strict accordance with its terms; that the defendants were to pay for it the sum of $4,950, one-third in cash when the machinery was steamed up ready to run, one-third in six months, and the remaining one-third in twelve months, with interest at the rate of seven percent per annum from the time of the erection of said machinery; that all of the machinery had been delivered, was set up, put in operation, and commenced running on the 9th day of October, 1888 at which time one-third of the $4,950 became due; that another one-third became due on the 9th day of April, 1889; that neither of those amounts, nor any part thereof, have been paid by the defendants, and that they have refused and neglected to pay the same or any part thereof, although often requested so to do. The second count was for piping and other machinery, of the value of $392.86, and the third for granted bars, of the value of $450, alleged to have been sold and delivered by Russell & Co. to the defendants. By a supplemental petition, the plaintiff enlarged its claim so as to embrace the last installment of the $4,950 for which the contract stipulated.
At the trial below, the defendants objected to the introduction of any evidence in support of the first count of the petition on the ground that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. This objection was overruled, and to that ruling the defendants excepted.
In support of this exception, it is said that if it had been alleged, or indeed proven, that the plaintiffs did not "use fair and honorable means to satisfy themselves," before payment was due, that the machinery was "working to their entire satisfaction," or that the refusal to accept was fraudulent, still no action could have been properly maintained for the sale and delivery of the property, because at all events there would have been no acceptance, and, in its absence, the contract would have remained executory. Consequently, it is argued, the only action maintainable, if any, would have been one to recover damages for fraudulently refusing to accept the machinery and articles furnished. The counsel for the defendants refer to numerous cases which, it is insisted, sustain the construction of the contract upon which this exception is founded. It may be well to refer to some of those cases.
"when engine and hose are accepted; balance in equal payments: first on or before six months; second on or before eighteen months, with interest at six percent from date of acceptance,"
it was held that the contract, fairly construed, did not provide for the payment for the engine and machinery until they were tried and accepted; that under its terms the property remained in the vendor until acceptance and after trial of it, the village never becoming the owner of it, and that the remedy of the plaintiff, if any, would be a suit for a breach of the contract and refusal to accept on the part of the defendant.
"In this case, the plaintiff undertook to make a bust which should be satisfactory to the defendant. The case shows that she was not satisfied with it. The plaintiff has not yet, then, fulfilled his contract. It is not enough to say that she ought to be satisfied with it, and that her dissatisfaction is unreasonable. She, and not the court, is entitled to judge of that. The contract was not to make one that she ought to be satisfied with, but to make one that she would be satisfied with. Nor is it sufficient to say that the bust was the very best thing of the kind that possibly could be produced. Such an article might not be satisfactory to the defendant, while one of inferior workmanship might be entirely satisfactory. A contract to produce a bust perfect in every respect, and one with which the defendant ought to be satisfied, is one thing, and undertaking to make on with which she will be satisfied is quite another thing. The former can only be determined by experts or those whose education and habits of life qualify them to judge of such matters. The latter can only be determined by the defendant herself. It may have been unwise in the plaintiff to make such a contract, but, having made it, he is bound to it."
the defendant to decide himself whether the articles furnished are to his satisfaction. Although the compensation of the plaintiff for valuable service and materials may thus be dependent upon the caprice of another who unreasonably refuses to accept the articles manufactured, yet he cannot be relieved from the contract into which he has voluntarily entered."
Among many other cases of the same class are Singerly v. Thayer, 108 Penn.St. 291; Goodrich v. Van Nortwich, 43 Ill. 445; McCarren v. McNulty, 7 Gray 139; Cole v. Common Council of Homer, 53 Mich. 438; Gibson v. Cranage, 39 Mich. 49; Krum v. Mersher, 116 Penn.St. 17; Ellis v. Mortimer, 4 Bos. & Pul. (1 N.R.) 257.
in the defense of the action, and need not have been made the subject of specific allegations in the petition. It was not necessary to allege in the petition that the engine, boilers, and pumps were ascertained by the defendants to work to their entire satisfaction. It was sufficient to allege the delivery of the articles and the expiration of the time limited in the contract for the payments.
In respect to the guaranty of the plaintiff that the engines, boilers, and pumps would work and that the engines would furnish the stipulated amount of horsepower and be as economical of fuel and as durable as a Corliss noncondensing engine, it need only be said that those were also matters to be alleged and proved by defendants in support of their counterclaim.
For these reasons, we are of opinion that the court properly overruled the motion of defendants to exclude all evidence in support of the first count of the petition.
would be required with the use of boilers, engines, and machinery of the kind, power, effectiveness, and economy specified in the contract; that the defendants entered into the contract in the expressed confidence, assurance, and belief that the plaintiff would furnish for use in their mill boilers, engines, and machinery of the kind, quality, power, and description in the contract set forth, yet the plaintiff, in pretended compliance with the contract, furnished and erected in said mill three boilers of a capacity not exceeding sixty-five horsepower each, and one engine of one hundred and twenty-five and one of fifty horsepower, and that said engines and boilers have at all times, and still do, consume, in the performance of the work of which they are capable, not less than fifty percent more fuel than would be consumed in the performance of the same work by a noncondensing Corliss engine, and that plaintiff furnished with said boilers and engines defective and insufficient grates, fixtures, and appliance therefor, so that the same were for a long time less capable and effective than they would otherwise have been.
the plaintiff has at all times neglected and still wholly neglects and refuses to comply, and that, by reason of the premises, of the wasteful consumption of fuel and lack of power, said boilers, engines, and machinery and the consequent loss of time and labor, and the diminution in quantity, and deterioration in quality, of the output of said mill resulting from the noncompliance by plaintiff with the contract in the respects and particulars set forth, and in the purchase and supplying new granted bars and heater fittings and fixtures for such boilers and engines, the defendants have been damaged in the sum of $10,000. An account of the moneys so alleged to have been paid was annexed to the counterclaim.
The plaintiff, in reply, denies that the machinery, etc., furnished by it under the contract were defective, and charges that their inefficiency, if they became inefficient, was due entirely to the unskillful and incompetent management of the defendants, their agents and servants. While it denies that the defendants were the owners of "all" the capital stock of the Lincoln Paper Manufacturing Company, it does not deny that the machinery, etc., were purchased to be used in the mill of that company.
"(1) What conversation did you have with him, if any, about the purpose for which the machine must be used, and the necessity for steam capacity in the boilers?"
"(2) You may state in what your damages consisted, and the amount, in consequence of the defective construction, and the failure of this machinery to perform its labor, and the labor required of it by the terms of the contract, from the time of its erection up to the first day of March."
"(3) You may state what damage you sustained in consequence of the failure of this machinery to do the work at the paper mill."
"(4) You may state what loss you suffered in consequence of the defective construction and failure in the machinery."
what particular did you and the defendant Buckstaff sustain loss by reason of the defects in the construction and the failure of this machinery?"
Each of these questions was objected to upon the ground that it was incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial. No one of them was objected to upon the ground that it was a leading question.
In the case of Shauer v. Alterton, ante, 151 U. S. 607, just decided, it was held to be the settled construction of the twenty-first rule of this Court that an assignment of error based upon the exclusion of an answer to a particular question in the deposition of a witness would be disregarded here unless the record sets forth the answer or its full substance. Packet Company v. Clough, 20 Wall. 528, 87 U. S. 542; Railroad Co. v. Smith, 21 Wall. 255, 88 U. S. 262; Thompson v. First National Bank of Toledo, 111 U. S. 529, 111 U. S. 535-536. Our rule, thus construed, is one to which parties can easily conform. Having access to the deposition containing the answer of the witness to the interrogatory, parties, as well as the trial court, are informed of the precise nature of the evidence offered. The requirement that an assignment of error based upon the admission or rejection of evidence must, in the case of a deposition excluded in whole or in part, state the full substance of the evidence so admitted or rejected, means that the record must show in appropriate form the nature of such evidence in order that this Court may determine whether or not error has been committed to the prejudice of the party bringing the case here for review.
open court, and in the presence of the witness, would often be the means of leading or instructing him as to the answer desired by the party calling him. If the question is in proper form and clearly admits of an answer relevant to the issues and favorable to the party on whose side the witness is called, it will be error to exclude it. Of course, the court, in its discretion, or on motion, may require the party in whose behalf the question is put to state the facts proposed to be proved by the answer. But if that be not done, the rejection of the answer will be deemed error or not according as the question, upon its face, if proper in form, may or may not clearly admit of an answer favorable to the party in whose behalf it is propounded.
Tested by these views, the court below erred in not permitting the defendant Utt to answer the above questions. Each one of them was relevant to the counterclaim, and each admitted of an answer that tended to support it.
half to three hours, it takes from four to four and a half to get it in proper shape."
To this question the plaintiff objected, and moved to strike out the answer as incompetent and irrelevant. The objection and motion were sustained by the court, and the defendants excepted. As we are informed by the bill of exceptions what were the facts intended to be elicited by the question, and which, after being detailed, were excluded from the jury, it is competent for this Court to inquire whether those facts were competent under the issues in the case and whether the defendants were prejudiced by their exclusion from the jury; but, as the judgment below must be reversed for the errors already stated, we deem it unnecessary at this time to express any opinion as to the competency of this evidence. We adopt this course because it is not entirely clear that the matters referred to by the defendant Utt in his answer to this question had any connection in fact with the counterclaim, or that they referred to any defects in the machinery covered by the written guaranty of Russell & Co. This difficulty may be removed at the next trial of the case.
In the brief of counsel for Russell & Co., there is some discussion as to the measure of damages in the event it was found that the defendants were entitled to recover upon their counterclaim. No question of that kind arises upon this writ of error. The only questions now presented for determination are those to which we have referred.

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