Source: http://mo.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20180306_0000313.MO.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 10:06:41+00:00

Document:
RONALD PARTEE AND BYRON FOX, Respondents.
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri The Honorable Sandra Midkiff, Judge.
Appellants George Fuller and Clara Fuller (collectively the "Fullers" and "George" and "Clara, " respectively) appeal the judgment of the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri. Fullers filed a petition against Ronald Partee ("Partee") and Byron Fox ("Fox") which alleged breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and legal malpractice. Partee and Fox filed a motion to dismiss the action, which was granted by the trial court. The Fullers raise six points on appeal alleging error. We find that the circuit court erred in dismissing George's claim for breach of contract against Partee. We reverse and remand for further proceedings on this point. In all other respects we affirm.
George Fuller is currently incarcerated for murder and other related charges. He was convicted following a jury trial in 1990 and is serving a prison term of life without the possibility of parole. George's conviction was affirmed on direct appeal as were his pro se motions for post-conviction relief. State v. Fuller, 837 S.W.2d 304 (Mo. App. W.D. 1992); see Fuller v. State, 485 S.W.3d 768 (Mo. App. W.D. 2016). On December 12, 2010, George contracted with Partee for Partee to represent George in his appeal from the denial of his motion to reopen his Rule 29.15 proceeding. Pursuant to the terms of the contract, Partee specifically agreed to perform certain services including: (a) prepare and file appellate brief; (b) oral argument; and (c) reply brief "if we decide that one was necessary." George's sister, Clara, delivered to Partee the agreed upon attorney fee of $6, 000 and Partee filed an Appellant's Brief appealing the motion court's judgment denying the motion to reopen his Rule 29.15 proceeding. The Fullers allege that once Partee received payment of the $6, 000 retainer fee, he ceased communication with them.
This Court docketed the case for "no argument" and sent a letter to Partee instructing him that he had ten days within which to request the case be moved to the oral argument docket. Partee sent a letter to George acknowledging that George's case had been placed on the "no argument" docket and stated he would make inquiries as to why argument had not been scheduled. The Fullers attempted to contact Partee to instruct him that he could and should request oral argument. Partee did not timely request oral argument nor did he discuss this decision with George. This Court ultimately affirmed the judgment of the motion court. Fuller v. State, 361 S.W.3d 22 (Mo. App. W.D. 2011).
Following this court's decision on George's appeal, the Fullers brought suit against Partee. Ultimately, the Fullers jointly filed an Amended Petition asserting claims against Partee and Fox for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and legal malpractice. Both Partee and Fox filed separate Motions to Dismiss. The circuit court granted both motions. The Fullers appeal raising six claims of error.
"We review de novo the grant of a motion to dismiss, examining the pleadings to determine whether they invoke principles of substantive law." Weems v. Montgomery, 126 S.W.3d 479, 483 (Mo. App. W.D. 2004); Lynch v. Lynch, 260 S.W.3d 834, 836 (Mo. banc 2008).
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action is solely a test of the adequacy of the plaintiff's petition. It assumes that all the plaintiff's averments are true, and liberally grants to plaintiff all reasonable inferences therefrom. No attempt is made to weigh any facts alleged as to whether they are credible or persuasive. Instead, the petition is reviewed in an almost academic manner, to determine if the facts alleged meet the elements of a recognized cause of action, or a cause that might be adopted in that case.
Prenger v. Boat Store, Inc., 453 S.W.3d 381, 384-85 (Mo. App. S.D. 2015) (quoting Bosch v. St. Louis Healthcare Network, 41 S.W.3d 462, 463-64 (Mo. banc 2001). "The pleadings are liberally construed and all alleged facts are accepted as true and construed in a light most favorable to the pleader." Weems, 126 S.W.3d at 483 (quoting Koger v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., 28 S.W.3d 405, 410 (Mo. App. W.D. 2000)).

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