Source: http://masscases.com/cases/distapp/2015/2015massappdiv115.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 15:05:36+00:00

Document:
Present: Hand, P.J., Welch & Finigan, JJ.
Kevin G. McIntyre for the plaintiff.
Timothy F. Duffy for the defendant.
-party losses caused by personal injury and property damage and that he also obtain and maintain insurance coverage, in a form and amount acceptable to [D&D], for any environmental hazard, accident, or release of any oil, gasoline or other environmental hazard. The terms of the lease required Borgeson to name both himself and the lessor, D&D, as insured parties to the required insurance coverage, and explicitly provided that [a]ll insurance required hereunder shall be written by insurance carriers qualified to do business and in good standing in Massachusetts and approved by [D&D], which approval shall not be unreasonably withheld. [Note 2] Additionally, Borgeson was required to deliver to D&D copies of the required insurance policies as of the date of the lease and fifteen days before the expiration of each policy.
The lease called for D&D to provide written notice of default to Borgeson, and allowed thirty days to cure any default identified in such a notice.
-pocket costs it alleged that it incurred in obtaining environmental hazard insurance that Borgeson should have obtained, per the lease, but did not.
The case was tried, jury waived, on July 25, 2013. The judge ruled for D&D, finding that Borgeson had wilfully and deliberately breached the lease by failing to maintain continuously the required insurance coverage, and in failing to provide proof of insurance to D&D as required by the lease terms. Finding Borgesons breach to be significant, the court ordered that D&D have possession of the property and awarded monetary damages to compensate D&D for its payment of certain insurance costs that it incurred during the term of the lease.
At trial, the parties disputed the existence of the coverage required under the insurance provision of the lease, whether Borgeson had provided D&D with the opportunity to approve the coverage he purportedly obtained, and whether Borgeson provided notice of the coverage to D&D as the lease required him to do. With respect to the insurance requirements, the evidence, even in the best light for Borgeson, showed that Borgeson failed to follow the letter of the lease with regard to any coverage he actually obtained.
a position weakened by his concession that the lease did not require D&D to make such a demand.
to obtain and maintain insurance for the property, and to name D&D as an additional insured on the required coverage, the evidence amply supported a finding that he did not do so. Specifically, the evidence of liability coverage shows that D&D was not named as an insured on any general liability policy in effect between the date of the lease and May 3, 2013. None of the environmental hazard insurance covered D&D, and what environmental hazard coverage there was for the period after October 7, 2012 was issued only in the name of Borgeson Automotive, Inc., and not to Borgeson, individually.
-580 (1993), we conclude that Borgeson has failed to carry this burden. We review the trial judges factual findings for clear error. Mass. R. Civ. P. 52(c). A finding is clearly erroneous when there is no evidence to support it, or when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. Guardianship of Clyde, 44 Mass. App. Ct. 767, 774 (1998). If the trial judge makes one of several possible choices of what facts are supported by the evidence, the judges choice is not clearly erroneous. W. Oliver Tripp Co. v. American Hoechst Corp., 34 Mass. App. Ct. 744, 751 (1993).
As we outline above, the evidence at trial strongly supported the courts finding that Borgeson failed to maintain the required liability or environmental hazard coverage for the period from the inception of the lease to the time suit was filed. [Note 10] Likewise, Borgesons evidence of having provided D&D with the opportunity to review and approve any of the required coverage that he did obtain, and of having provided copies of the policies, was thin, at best, and was directly contradicted by Sundells testimony that Borgeson did not provide D&D with those opportunities to review, or with copies of the policies. Lastly, it is uncontested that the coverage he obtained consistently failed to name D&D as an additional insured, as agreed in the lease terms. The judges findings that Borgeson defaulted on the lease terms were entirely consistent with the evidence presented at the trial.
Next, Borgeson argues that the trial judge erred in admitting into evidence copies of two checks that Sundell identified as her payments for environmental hazard coverage at the property for which Borgeson should have been responsible. On appeal, Borgeson argues that the court should have declined to accept these checks into evidence based on application of the best evidence rule. Borgeson did not, however, preserve this objection at trial: Borgesons objection at that point was on the grounds that the checks themselves did not clearly identify the policy number to which they related or the address of the property for which they were used to purchase insurance coverage. An objection not raised at trial may not be argued for the first time on appeal. See, e.g., Carey v. New England Organ Bank, 446 Mass. 270, 285 (2006) (issue not raised or argued below may not be argued for first time on appeal).
Borgeson next appeals the courts unsolicited award of attorneys fees. In its written findings, the trial court awarded damages of $2,097.00, plus filing costs and attorney fees. According to the docket, judgment entered on August 29, 2013; D&Ds counsel filed an affidavit of attorneys fees on September 9, 2013; the defendant opposed the motion; and, on June 6, 2014, the trial court ordered attorneys fees for D&D in the amount of $14,437.50. [Note 11] While, as Borgeson points out, at trial D&D did not specifically argue the issue of attorneys fees, the parties lease, which was a trial exhibit, clearly provided for D&Ds recovery of any expenditures . . . including, but not limited to, reasonable attorneys fees . . . in instituting, prosecuting or defending any action or proceeding occasioned by Borgesons default on a lease provision. D&Ds failure to argue the issue of attorneys fees was not fatal, as it was within the courts discretion to reopen the evidence after judgment, as it did, to allow D&D to submit its affidavit of attorneys fees and to allow Borgeson to oppose that evidence. The decision to permit a plaintiff to reopen his case to offer additional evidence is one well within the sound discretion of the trial judge. Jones v. Vappi Co. & Inc., 28 Mass. App. Ct. 77, 83 (1989); Cambridge Hous. Auth. v. Wedge, 2000 Mass. App. Div. 235, 236. Dew v. Laufauci, 2001 Mass. App. Div. 95, 96. See Weber v. Coast to Coast Med., Inc., 83 Mass. App. Ct. 478, 481 (2013) (same), citing Jones, supra. The court did not err in awarding attorneys fees in this case.
Lastly, we address Borgesons argument that the court erred by failing to consolidate this action with a separate action in which Borgeson apparently brought suit for what would, in the context of a residential eviction, be counterclaims. Borgeson overlooks the fact that no motion to consolidate was ever made in this case. To the extent that such a motion was raised in another action, any remedy Borgeson has would be in that case.
For the foregoing reasons, we find no error in the trial courts rulings in this case. The judgment is affirmed.
[Note 1] Borgeson operated the business as Borgesons Automotive Inc. Borgeson signed the lease in his individual capacity.
-qualified insurance carriers, (2) stating that the policies be approved by the lessor, and (3) specifying that the policies name D&D as additional insureds does not apply to the environmental hazard coverage called for in the last paragraph of the insurance provision.
[Note 3] D&D also alleged that Borgeson failed to maintain the fire protection devices in good order and that he did not maintain certain metal curbing around the gas pump islands. As these claimed defaults were not identified by the trial judge as bases for his ruling, we do not discuss them here.
[Note 4] At trial, Borgeson introduced a letter from his attorney to D&Ds counsel in response to D&Ds notice of default. The letter, however, is not part of the record here.
[Note 5] It appears from the trial transcript that the policies themselves may also have been introduced into evidence, although they are not part of our record. In any event, there was no evidence that the policies were provided to D&D or to its counsel until immediately before trial in 2013.
[Note 6] The evidence did include a payment coupon for a Travelers Insurance policy for the period from April 4, 2012 through April 4, 2013; the coupon, however, did not specify the coverage to which it applied. Further, the coupon identified the insured as Borgesons Automotive Inc., 20 Central Street, South Easton, Massachusetts. That address is not the address of the property at issue here; in fact, Borgeson did not testify that the coupon related to any insurance for the property. There was no evidence of the type of insurance to which the payment coupon related; the policy number on the coupon does not correspond to any other exhibits introduced at trial. There was no evidence that the premium set out on the coupon was paid. Borgeson testified that he was unable to obtain copies of this policy from his insurance agent.
[Note 7] Further, as the letter references D&D Realty Trust v. Borgeson, but predates the eviction action here, we conclude that the letter related to concerns of some other action between the parties, and cannot say that it had anything to do with the dispute before us here.
[Note 8] The letter is not a part of our record.
[Note 9] Over D&Ds objection, Borgeson had Sundell read from letters between counsel for D&D and Borgeson, indicating that since Borgesons Automotive purchased pollution coverage on October 7, 2010, Borgeson or his attorney had forwarded copies of the storage tank pollution policy to D&Ds insurance agent. The letter was not admitted into evidence.
[Note 10] At trial, Borgeson testified that while he purchased environmental hazard insurance for the policy period from October 7, 2012 through October 7, 2013, knowing that the insurer did not issue policies in Massachusetts, he did so because no such coverage was available through a Massachusetts insurer. The court was free to assess the credibility of Borgesons testimony, including not only the courts assessment of Borgesons truthfulness, but also the courts determination of whether Borgeson had any reliable way of knowing whether such coverage was, in fact, available. Based on Borgesons consistent testimony that he relied on various insurance agents to obtain the policies that he requested, and to provide them to D&D or its insurance agent, the court would have been on firm ground in rejecting as unpersuasive Borgesons testimony that he, personally, knew that the required insurance was not available from a Massachusetts insurer.
[Note 11] On that same date, June 6, 2014, the court ordered the appeal bond in the case to be increased by the amount of the fee award from the original damages award of $2,097.00. Borgeson appealed the increased bond to the Appellate Division, which affirmed the initial bond amount of $2,097.00 and reduced the subsequent bond increase from $14,437.50 to $7,225.00, for a total bond of $9,322.00. That amount was presumably posted by Borgeson in the trial court, as the appeal of the judgment was ultimately transmitted to this Division in December, 2014.

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