Source: https://case-law.vlex.com/vid/927-2d-1137-d-632093533
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 16:16:04+00:00

Document:
Party Name: William RICHARDSON, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee.
Donald L. Dworsky, for appellant.
David C. Woll, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney, with whom Roscoe C. Howard, United States Attorney at the time the brief was filed, John R. Fisher, Assistant United States Attorney at the time the brief was filed, and John J. Manning, Assistant United States Attorney, were on the brief for appellee.
Before WASHINGTON, [*] Chief Judge, and RUIZ and GLICKMAN, Associate Judges.
This appeal presents us with the task of interpreting the trial court's authority to impose split sentences and supervised release within the context of the determinate sentencing regime adopted by the Council of the District of Columbia in 2000, the Truth in Sentencing Amendment Act of 1998, D.C. Law 12-165, D.C.Code § 24-403.01(2001), pursuant to congressional direction in the National Capital Revitalization and Self Government Improvement Act of 1997. We hold that the law does not permit concurrent terms of probation and supervised release and that, when imposing a split sentence, the trial court must suspend the term of supervised release in its entirety. We therefore remand the case so that the trial court can restructure appellant's sentence in accordance with this opinion.
After appellant pled guilty to one count of escape in violation of D.C.Code§ 22-2601 (2001), the trial court imposed a sentence of three years of incarceration, with all but one year suspended, to be followed by two years of supervised probation, and three years of mandated supervised release, with the periods of probation and supervised release to run concurrently. During the sentencing hearing, appellant asked the trial court to suspend the term of supervised release given that the sentence already included a term of probation. In support of his request, appellant asserted that concurrent terms of probation and supervised release could lead to conflict between the court (which supervises probation) and the U.S. Parole Commission (which supervises D.C. offenders on supervised release pursuant to D.C.Code § 24-403.01(b)(6)).  In addition, appellant suggested that if supervised release was not suspended, he could serve more time in prison than the sentencing court intended, because he could be subject to revocation of supervised release by the Parole Commission as well as revocation of probation by the court. The trial court was of the view that it did not have authority to suspend the period of supervised release required by statute, and that probation was not in lieu of the mandatory term of supervised release. As a result, the trial court concluded that pursuant to D.C.Code § 24-403.01(b)(5), it was required to sentence appellant to concurrent terms of supervised release and probation.
We begin with the plain language of the statute, see Peoples Drug Stores, Inc. v. District of Columbia, 470 A.2d 751, 753 (D.C.1983), but if we find individual sections to be capable of more than one reading, our task is to search for an interpretation that makes sense of the statute and related laws as a whole. See Carey v. Crane Serv. Co., 457 A.2d 1102, 1108 (D.C.1983). Lastly, we turn to legislative history to ensure that our interpretation is consistent with legislative intent. See Peoples Drug Stores, Inc., 470 A.2d at 754.
A. The D.C. Truth In Sentencing Act.
(referring to 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b)).

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