Source: https://www.defenselitigationinsider.com/2016/12/
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 13:00:50+00:00

Document:
The United States Supreme Court’s decision in Daimler A.G. v. Bauman, 571 U.S. __, 134 S.Ct. 746 (2014), has played a significant role this year in cases pending in Delaware and Rhode Island. Most recently, the California Supreme Court has weighed in, changing what we thought we knew about personal jurisdiction, at least in California.
In Daimler, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a court can exercise general jurisdiction (whereby a state court asserts jurisdiction over a defendant on claims unrelated to the defendant’s activities in the forum state) only when the defendant can be said to be “at home” in the forum – the paradigm being the state in which it is incorporated or has its principal place of business. The California Supreme Court has now found a way to turn that decision on its head. It held in Bristol-Meyers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 377 P.3d 874 (Cal. 2016) that plaintiffs from outside California whose claims do not arise out of anything involving California can sue a non-California defendant in a California court.
Bristol-Myers argued, pursuant to Daimler, that it was not subject to personal jurisdiction in the California courts for the suits of 592 non-California plaintiffs. First of all, it argued that it was not subject to specific personal jurisdiction because none of the 592 lawsuits by non-California plaintiffs arose out of anything plaintiff or defendant did in California. Moreover, it argued that it was not subject to general personal jurisdiction because it was not “at home” in California, based on the fact that it was neither headquartered nor incorporated in California.
The California Supreme Court agreed that there was no basis for the exercise of general jurisdiction, but instead found that a “new wave” specific jurisdiction existed because Bristol-Myers engaged in “nationwide marketing, promotion and distribution [that] created a substantial nexus between the non-resident plaintiffs’ claims and the company’s contacts in California . . . .” And, according to the Bristol-Meyers court, the more wide-ranging the defendant’s forum contacts, the more readily a “connection” between the defendant’s forum contacts and the claims by the non-resident plaintiffs can be found.
This decision of the California Supreme Court appears to basically moot the Daimler decision and may make any company that does business nationally subject to personal jurisdiction in California. Bristol-Meyers has filed a writ of certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court, so this decision may have a short shelf life. For the time being, however, companies should be prepared to litigate in California, as the Bristol-Meyers decision is likely to factor into plaintiffs’ decision when choosing a forum in which to litigate.
The Delaware Supreme Court reversed the dismissal of a derivative suit for failure to make demand, finding that the complaint alleged particularized facts sufficient to create a reasonable doubt as to the disinterestedness and independence of a majority of directors, in Sandys v. Pincus, No. 157, 2016 (Del. Dec. 5, 2016). In Sandys, the plaintiff alleged that some top managers and directors at Zynga, Inc. were given an exemption to Zynga’s rule preventing sales by insiders until three days after an earnings announcement.
Because Zynga’s board of directors had nine members, the Court examined whether the complaint had excused a demand as to at least five directors. Two of the directors (Reid Hoffman, and the controlling stockholder and former CEO, Mark Pincus) had participated in the trades and were considered interested in the transaction. Another director, Don Mattrick, had been named as the new CEO, and was therefore deemed interested because the corporation’s controlling stockholder was interested in the transaction. The Court concluded that the complaint alleged reasonable doubt as to the disinterestedness of another three directors (adding up to six of the nine directors).
Careful consideration of the language used in an insurance policy, or any contract for that matter, is extremely important. A food services company, Meyer Natural Foods LLC (“Meyer”), found that out the hard way in a recent case filed in the U.S.D.C for the District of Nebraska. Exclusionary language in an insurance policy precluded Meyer from recovering its $1.4 million of damages related to the loss of a beef order due to contamination from a pathogen. Meyer had contracted with a beef supplier, Greater Omaha Packing (“Greater Omaha”) to purchase certain beef products. As part of their contract, Meyer required Greater Omaha to obtain an insurance policy to protect the value of the beef that was to be shipped, which they did through the Defendant in this case, Liberty Mutual. One of the beef shipments Greater Omaha made to Meyer, unfortunately, contained E. coli, which resulted in the destruction of the entire shipment valued at $1.4 million dollars.
In an effort to recover that loss, Meyer turned to the Liberty Mutual insurance policy, which was purchased by Greater Omaha pursuant to their agreement. However, there were certain exclusions in the policy, which may not have been considered by Meyer and/or Greater Omaha, and this language is the reason that U.S. District Judge John M. Gerrard dismissed Meyer’s suit against Liberty Mutual. The language in question? An exclusion of coverage for “loss attributable to . . . contamination”. Meyer’s main argument was that the policy exclusion did not specifically refer to E. coli, and that the word contamination is ambiguous, such that E. coli cannot be included therein. But that argument was unsuccessful, as the court simply relied primarily on the plain meaning of the word contaminate, “to render unfit for use by the introduction of unwholesome or undesirable elements.” In doing so, the court determined that E. coli clearly fits within this definition.
The first lesson to take away from this case? Always read and understand the insurance policy that will be covering a potential loss of your property. No matter where you are on the food chain, you must be aware of all provisions of the insurance covering your property. In this instance, Meyer did not obtain the insurance policy directly, but rather Greater Omaha did as part of their contract. This case is a cautionary tale for obtaining insurance coverage of your property through a third-party. In cases where a third-party obtains coverage, you still must read the policy, and understand the implications of its various exclusions.
For the first time since 1997, the United States Supreme Court explored the requirements for proving a federal securities fraud claim based on insider trading, in Salman v. United States (Dec. 6, 2016). The Salman opinion confirms that a factfinder may infer a personal benefit to a tipper from a gift of confidential information to a trading relative or friend, without the added requirement of “proof of a meaningful relationship” that had been imposed by the Second Circuit in United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2015). Salman thus resolves a circuit split that had developed between the Second and Ninth Circuits.
Historically, individuals have been found to have engaged in securities fraud under “classical” theory or “misappropriation” theory. Under classical theory, corporate “insiders” (directors, officers, and others deemed to hold a temporary fiduciary status) either trade on inside information or tip the information to someone who does. Dirks v. S.E.C., 463 U.S. 646 (1983). Under misappropriation theory, the person trading or tipping inside information need not owe fiduciary duties generally to a corporation and its stockholders, but must violate some relationship of trust and confidence through which she received the information. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 650-52 (1997). In both cases, then, the person engaging in insider trading has committed an act of deception by violating a relationship of trust and confidence. Also, in both cases, the actionable deception is to the source of information and not to the other party to the trade or the general trading public, even though the latter may be injured by the trader’s conduct. See id. The Supreme Court has not read the federal securities laws as establishing “a general duty between all participants in market transactions to forgo actions based on material, nonpublic information.” Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 233 (1980).
In the 2015 Newman case, the Second Circuit further limited the ability of the government to bring insider trading cases. The court acknowledged that language in the Supreme Court’s Dirks opinion could be read as permitting a factfinder to infer that a tipper received a personal benefit by providing confidential information to a trading relative or friend, but added that such an inference “is impermissible in the absence of proof of a meaningfully close personal relationship that generates an exchange that is objective, consequential, and represents at least a potential gain of a pecuniary or similarly valuable nature.” Newman, 773 F.3d at 452. The Newman opinion called into question hard-won victories by the federal government against insider trading defendants in the Southern District of New York.
On November 22, 2016, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court issued a 4-2 Opinion in Rost v. Ford Motor Co., No. 56 EAP 2014, 2016 Pa. LEXIS 2638 (Pa. Nov. 22, 2016), in which the court purported to uphold and expand upon prior asbestos causation decisions set forth in Gregg v. V-J Auto Parts, Co., 596 A.2d 274 (Pa. 2007), and Betz v. Pneumo Abex, LLC, 44 A.3d 27 (Pa. 2010). However, when juxtaposed against the dissents of Chief Justice Saylor—the author of both Gregg and Betz—and Justice Baer, it becomes evident that the majority opinion creates an additional obstacle for defendants (particularly low-dose defendants) on the path toward exculpation.
In the opinion, the majority upholds a plaintiff’s verdict against Ford Motor Company for a plaintiff, Mr. Rost, who alleged he had experienced direct occupational bystander exposure to asbestos from Ford products while working as a “gofer” in an automotive repair garage over a three month time period. Ford challenged the verdict on two grounds: i) the plaintiff’s expert, Dr. Frank’s, causation opinion was impermissibly before the jury when the opinion amounted to an “each and every breath” opinion (which the court explicitly rejected in both Gregg and Betz) and, with respect to substantial factor causation, Dr. Frank’s opinion failed to take into account plaintiff’s other industrial occupational exposure during which Mr. Rost was exposed to asbestos “at pretty high levels” over at least a ten year period; and ii) the trial court erred in consolidating Mr. Rost’s case with other non-related mesothelioma cases.
Dr. Frank testified generally that mesothelioma is a dose-response disease wherein as the dose increases, the likelihood of developing the disease increases. He also testified that it is scientifically impossible to identify a particular exposure that caused the plaintiff’s disease where there were four sources of exposure, but that the causative agent was a series of exposures. Mr. Frank asserted that all documented exposures should be considered as contributing to the plaintiff’s development of disease, and concluded that it is not possible to quantify how much asbestos initiates the disease process and that it also varies according to individual susceptibility. After testifying to those opinions generally, Dr. Frank testified using a hypothetical that exposure to Ford products specifically was a substantial contributing factor to the plaintiff developing mesothelioma. Dr. Frank asserted “if [the three month exposure to Ford products] would have been [Mr. Rost’s] only exposure, I would be sitting here saying that that was the cause of his disease. Given that he had other exposures, it was all contributory.” Rost, No. 56 EAP 2014, 2016 Pa. LEXIS 2638, at *13.

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