Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/452/314/
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 03:50:12+00:00

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challenges and permanently enjoined enforcement of the challenged provisions.
Held: The Act is not vulnerable to appellees' preenforcement constitutional challenge. Pp. 452 U. S. 321-336.
(a) The provisions in question do not violate the Commerce Clause. The Act was adopted to ensure that production of coal for interstate commerce would not be at the expense of agriculture, the environment, or public health and safety, and to protect mine operators in States adhering to high performance and reclamation standards from disadvantageous competition with operators in States with less rigorous regulatory programs. The challenged provisions advance these legitimate goals, and Congress acted reasonably in adopting the regulatory scheme contained in the Act. Pp. 452 U. S. 321-329.
(b) Nor do the challenged provisions contravene the Tenth Amendment. Such provisions regulate only the activities of surface mine operators who are private individuals and businesses, and do not directly regulate the States as States. P. 452 U. S. 330.
(c) The prime farmland and "approximate original contour" provisions do not violate the equal protection and due process guarantees of the Fifth Amendment. Congress acted rationally in making no allowances for variances from the prime farmland requirements and in allowing variances from the approximate original contour only for steep slope and mountaintop operations. The fact that a particular State has more mining operations under prime farmland and fewer steep slope or mountaintop operations than another State does not establish impermissible discrimination Under the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. And, by invalidating the prime farmland and "approximate original contour" provisions under the rubric of "substantive due process," the District Court essentially acted as a superlegislature, and accordingly exceeded its proper role. Pp. 452 U. S. 331-333.
(d) Sections 510(d)(1), 519(c)(2), 508(a)(2), and 522(a), (c),( d), and (e) do not take private property without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Appellees' taking claims do not focus on any particular properties to which the challenged provisions have been applied. Similarly, the District Court's ruling did not pertain to the taking of a particular piece of property or the denial of a mining permit for specific farmland operations proposed by appellees. The "mere enactment" of the Act did not effect an unconstitutional taking of private property. The prime farmland provisions do not prohibit surface mining but merely regulate the conditions under which such mining may be conducted. Pp. 452 U. S. 333-335.
depriving mine operators of their right to due process is premature, where appellees have not shown that they were ever assessed civil penalties, much less that the statutory prepayment requirement was ever applied to them or caused them any injury. Pp. 452 U. S. 335-336.
501 F.Supp. 452, reversed and remanded.
MARSHALL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and BRENNAN, STEWART, WHITE, BLACKMUN, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ., joined. BURGER, C.J., filed a concurring statement, ante p. 452 U. S. 305. REHNQUIST, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, ante p. 452 U. S. 307.
This appeal, like Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., ante, p. 452 U. S. 264, also decided today, involves a broad constitutional challenge to numerous important provisions of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 91 Stat. 445, 30 U.S.C. § 1201 et seq. (1976 ed., Supp. III) (Surface Mining Act or Act). Many of the specific provisions attacked in this case, however, differ from the "steep slope" provisions that were the primary focus of the challenge in Virginia Surface Mining. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana ruled that the provisions of the Act challenged here are unconstitutional, and permanently enjoined their enforcement. 501 F.Supp. 452 (1980). We noted probable jurisdiction sub nom. Andrus v. Indiana, 449 U.S. 816 (1980), and we now reverse.
"technological capability to restore such mined area, within a reasonable time, to equivalent or higher levels of yield as nonmined prime farmland in the surrounding area under equivalent levels of management. . . ."
"has returned to equivalent levels of yield as nonmined land of the same soil type in the surrounding area under equivalent management practices. [Footnote 2]"
regulatory authority over surface coal mining to establish an administrative procedure for determining whether particular lands are unsuitable for some or all kinds of surface mining. [Footnote 4] Section 522(e), 30 U.S.C. § 1272(e) (1976 ed., Supp. III), proscribes mining activity within 100 feet of roadways and cemeteries or within 300 feet of public buildings, schools, churches, public parks, or occupied dwellings. Finally, the Act's procedures for collecting proposed civil penalties contained in § 518(c), 30 U.S.C. § 1268(c) (1976 ed., Supp. III), are also drawn into question here.
These suits were filed in August, 1978, one by the State of Indiana and several of its officials and the other by the Indiana Coal Association, several coal mine operators, and others. The complaints alleged that the Act contravenes the Commerce Clause, the equal protection and due process guarantees of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the Tenth Amendment, and the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
"are not directed at the alleviation of water or air pollution, to the extent that there are [any] such effects, and are not means reasonably and plainly adapted to [the legitimate end of] removing any substantial and adverse effect on interstate commerce."
Id. at 461. We find both of the District Court's rationales untenable.
or that there is no reasonable connection between the regulatory means selected and the asserted ends. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., ante at 452 U. S. 276; Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U. S. 294, 379 U. S. 303-304 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U. S. 241, 379 U. S. 258, 379 U. S. 262 (1964). We are not convinced that the District Court had reliable grounds to reach either conclusion in this case.
"The Committee heard testimony from citizens and local officials of Illinois and Indiana requesting that special attention be given in the bill to the protection of prime agricultural lands. Working with officials of the Soil Conservation Service, the Committee added a number of provisions to H.R. 2 designed to insure the proper reconstruction of soil strata within those areas classified as prime agricultural lands."
"Whatever amounts to more or less constant practice, and threatens to obstruct or unduly to burden the freedom of interstate commerce is within the regulatory power of Congress under the commerce clause, and it is primarily for Congress to consider and decide the fact of danger and meet it. This court will certainly not substitute its judgment for that of Congress unless the relation of the subject to interstate commerce and its effect upon it are clearly nonexistent."
significant environmental damage can result. In addition, unreclaimed or improperly reclaimed surface coal mines pose a continuing threat to the environment, and at times are a danger to public health and safety, public or private property."
"[a]dvanced submission of mining and reclamation plans to a responsible government agency having authority to grant or deny approval to engage in mining, based upon the information in the plans and the requirements of the regulations."
House Hearings, pt. 2, at 86. These requirements obviously enable the regulatory authority to ascertain, before mining begins, whether the prospective mine operator has given adequate consideration to the postmining fate of the land, and whether the operator possesses the technological capability to restore the land in the manner proposed.
"[s]egregation and preservation of topsoils during, or preceding, mining operations . . . [in order] to provide soil conditions conducive to rapid revegetation after mining. . . ."
House Hearings, pt. 2, at 86. Section 522(e)'s prohibition against mining near churches, schools, parks, public buildings, and occupied dwellings is plainly directed toward ensuring that surface coal mining does not endanger life and property in coal mining communities.
"displacement or regulation of the management structure and operation of the traditional governmental function of the States in the area of land use control and planning. . . ."
501 F.Supp. at 468. The District Court ruled that the real purpose and effect of the Act is land use regulation, which, in the court's view, is a traditional state governmental function. The court below, like the District Court in Virginia Surface Mining, relied for its Tenth Amendment analysis on this Court's decision in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U. S. 833 (1976).
"irrational, arbitrary and capricious requirements in situations where they are not reasonably necessary to achieve a particular postmining use. . . ."
"the varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that [a court] can only conclude that the legislature's actions were irrational."
This is a heavy burden, and appellees have not carried it.
"Nor does the Commerce Clause impose requirements of geographic uniformity. . . . Congress may devise . . . a national policy with due regard for the varying and fluctuating interests of different regions."
slope areas of the country which does not exist in the flatter terrain areas of the Midwest. Similarly, Congress presumably concluded that allowing variances from the prime farmland provisions would undermine the effort to preserve the productivity of such lands. In our view, Congress acted rationally in drawing these distinctions, and the fact that a particular State has more of one kind of mining operation than another does not establish impermissible discrimination under the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Furthermore, by invalidating the challenged provisions of the Act under the rubric of "substantive due process," the District Court essentially acted as a superlegislature, passing on the wisdom of congressional policy determinations. In so doing, the court exceeded its proper role. See New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U. S. 297, 427 U. S. 303 (1976); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U. S. 726, 372 U. S. 730 (1963).
"it is technologically impossible to reclaim prime farmland in a post-mining period so that equal or higher levels of yield under high levels of management practice can be achieved."
501 F.Supp. at 470. The court also ruled that the requirement in § 522 of a procedure for designating areas unsuitable for mining operations, as well as § 522(e)'s proscription of mining on certain lands and near particular structures, takes private property without just compensation.
an unconstitutional taking of private property. For the reasons discussed more fully in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining, & Reclamation Assn., Inc., ante at 452 U. S. 294-237, we conclude that this question must be answered in the negative.
them any injury. As in Virginia Surface Mining, we hold that appellees' challenge to these provisions is premature.
Our review of the questions presented by this case leads us to the same conclusion that we reached in Virginia Surface Mining. The Surface Mining Act is not vulnerable to appellees' preenforcement constitutional challenge. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the District Court and remand the case to that court with instructions to dissolve the injunction entered against the Secretary, and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
"the term 'prime farmland' shall have the same meaning as that previously prescribed by the Secretary of Agriculture on the basis of such factors as moisture availability, temperature regime, chemical balance, permeability, surface layer composition, susceptibility to flooding, and erosion characteristics, and which historically have been used for intensive agricultural purposes, and as published in the Federal Register."
The Secretary of Agriculture's definition is found at 7 CFR pt. 657 (1980), and is incorporated into the Secretary of the Interior's regulations implementing the Act by 30 CFR § 701.5 (1980). The Secretary published regulations defining "prime farmland" for purposes of the Act's interim phase. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia remanded the regulations to the Secretary for reconsideration on grounds not pertinent here. See In re Surface Mining Regulation Litigation, 456 F.Supp. 1301, 1312 (1978), rev'd in part on other grounds, 201 U.S.App.D.C. 360, 627 F.2d 1346 (1980). The Secretary has published proposed new regulations defining "prime farmland" for purposes of the interim program. See 44 Fed.Reg. 33625 (1979).
Under § 509 of the Act, 30 U.S.C. § 1259 (1976 ed., Supp. III), no mining permits may be issued until the operator has filed a performance bond with the appropriate regulatory authority.
Section 515(b)(3) describes the "approximate original contour" requirement applicable generally to surface mining operations. Appellees in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., ante p. 452 U. S. 264, challenged the "approximate original contour" provision in § 515(d) of the Act, which is applicable only to surface mining operations on steep slopes.
The progress of the States in submitting proposed permanent regulatory programs under § 503 of the Act and the Secretary's response to those submissions is described in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., ante at 452 U. S. 272, n. 7. The proposed program submitted by Indiana was approved in part and disapproved in part. See 45 Fed.Reg. 78482 (1980).
On July 2, 1980, JUSTICE STEVENS stayed the District Court s judgment pending final disposition of this appeal.
"the productivity of land prior to mining, including appropriate classification as prime farm lands, as well as the average yield of food, fiber, forage, or wood products from such lands obtained under high levels of management;"
"has the technological capability to restore such mined area, within a reasonable time, to equivalent or higher levels of yield as non-mined prime farmland in the surrounding area under equivalent levels of management, and can meet the soil reconstruction standards in Section 515(b)(7). . . . ;"
"until soil productivity for prime farm lands has returned to equivalent levels of yield as nonmined land of the same soil type in the surrounding area under equivalent management practices. . . ."
The Interagency Report was submitted to the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs in April, 1977, one month after the Committee completed hearings on the proposed surface mining legislation. See 501 F Supp. 452, 459 (SD Ind.1980).
The court noted that it would take 166 years for surface mining to disturb 1% of the total prime farmland in the country. The court also noted that, in 1977, the Government's Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service paid farmers not to grow crops on 5,900,000 acres, which is 200 times the prime farmland acreage disturbed annually by surface mining. With respect to Indiana, the court pointed out that only 40,000 acres of prime farmland are projected to be disturbed by surface mining in Indiana in the next 20 years, and that this figure amounts to 0.003% of the total prime farmland in Indiana. Id. at 459-460. In addition, the court noted that, in 1977, the Government paid Indiana farmers not to farm 369,153 acres, nearly 1,000% more land than would be affected by surface mining in Indiana in the next 20 years. Id. at 460.
(6) §§ 515(b)(19), (20), 30 U.S.C. §§ 1265(b)(19), (20) (1976 ed., Supp. III), requiring maintenance of revegetation of mined lands for a 5- or 10-year period after completion of mining (invalidated to the extent that they may incorporate a requirement of compliance with a postmining land use plan approved by the regulatory authority).
As explained in the Report of the House Committee, Congress followed the recommendation of the Interagency Report, and rejected a Carter administration proposal for a 5-year moratorium on surface mining on prime farmlands. The Committee explained that Soil Conservation Service officials testified that mined prime farmland could be restored to its original productivity levels through compliance with the prime farmland provisions now contained in the Act. H.R.Rep. No. 95-218, pp. 184-185 (1977).
In any event, the District Court's "finding" that only an insignificant amount of interstate commerce is affected by surface mining on prime farmland is questionable. The court noted that the 21,800 acres of prime farmland disturbed annually by surface mining would have produced about 0.04% of the Nation's total corn production in the 1976-1977 crop year. See 501 F.Supp. at 459. Although this percentage may seem small, it is worth remembering that corn production for grain in that year was 6.4 billion bushels, worth some $12.9 billion. See United States Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Statistics 30 (1979). Therefore, the 0.04% of corn production would have had an approximate value of $5.16 million which surely is not an insignificant amount of commerce.
See Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977: Hearings on S. 7 before the Subcommittee on Public Lands and Resources of the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 775-811 (1977) (Senate Hearings).
See Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977: Hearings on H.R. 2 before the Subcommittee on Energy and the Environment of the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 4, pp. 16-31, 792, 159-172, 235-260 (1977) (House Hearings).
Contrary to the District Court's conclusion, it is irrelevant that the Federal Government has in the past paid farmers to refrain from growing crops on certain lands. Such subsidies serve independent goals related to the pricing of agricultural commodities. More important, the affected lands are kept out of production only temporarily, whereas Congress found that unregulated surface mining can be expected to cause long-term or irreversible soil damage.
Even if the District Court was correct in assuming that the Act's sole purpose is controlling air and water pollution that may be caused by surface mining, the court's conclusion that the challenged provisions bear no relation to achievement of this goal would nonetheless be questionable. Along with other provisions of the Act addressing these problems, the provisions at issue contribute to this end. The "approximate original contour" and topsoil replacement requirements, for example, are designed to prevent erosion and sedimentation, and thus help preserve water quality. These requirements were among the remedial measures specifically recommended to the House Committee by the United States Army Corps of Engineers for the prevention of further adverse surface mining effects on the Nation's water resources. See House Hearings, pt. 2, at 86.
A representative of the United States Army Corps of Engineers testified at the 1977 House hearings that a National Strip Mine Study prepared by the Corps found that more than 4,400,000 acres of land in the United States have already been disturbed by surface mining, and that 1,900,000 of those acres have not been reclaimed. He further testified that, according to the study, the annual rate of land disturbance by surface mining was 153,000 acres in 1964, and 207,000 acres in 1974. House Hearings, pt. 2, at 69, 83, 90-95. See also S.Rep. No. 95-128, p. 50 (1977).
Appellees contend that a number of the specific provisions challenged in this case cannot be shown to be related to the congressional goal of preventing adverse effects on interstate commerce. This claim, even if correct, is beside the point. A complex regulatory program such as established by the Act can survive a Commerce Clause challenge without a showing that every single facet of the program is independently and directly related to a valid congressional goal. It is enough that the challenged provisions are an integral part of the regulatory program, and that the regulatory scheme, when considered as a whole, satisfies this test. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U. S. 241, 379 U. S. 262 (1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U. S. 294, 379 U. S. 303-304 (1964). Cf. Perez v. United States, 402 U. S. 146, 402 U. S. 154-156 (1971); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U. S. 111, 317 U. S. 127-128 (1942); United States v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100, 312 U. S. 123 (1941).
We also do not share the view of the District Court that the Surface Mining Act is a land use measure after the fashion of the zoning ordinances typically enacted by state and local governments. The prime farmland and other provisions at issue in this case are concerned with regulating the conditions and effects of surface coal mining. Any restrictions on land use that may be imposed by the Act are temporary and incidental to these primary purposes. The Act imposes no restrictions on post-reclamation use of mined lands.
The District Court did find that one of appellee coal companies owns subsurface rights to coal on prime farmland which it "intends to mine . . . in the immediate future." 501 F.Supp. at 470. But even under the District Court's takings analysis, this particular plaintiff's claim is not ripe for judicial determination. For the court held that the Act effects a taking only where it would require a mine operator to demonstrate that it had the capability to restore mined prime farmland to "equal or higher levels of yield under high levels of management." Ibid. (emphasis added). The court specifically found that mined prime farmland can be restored to the productivity of unmined land under what it described as "basic levels of management." Ibid. (emphasis added). Since the plaintiff involved did not allege that it was required to demonstrate a capacity to restore the prime farmland to yields under "high levels of management," there could be no basis for the District Court's conclusion that the mine operator's property has been taken by the Act.
The District Court found that "[p]laintiffs coal companies own and/or have rights to and presently intend to mine lands subject to § 522(e)(4) and/or(5)." Id. at 460. However, in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., ante at 452 U. S. 296, n. 37, we held that the "mere enactment" of § 522(e) did not effect an unconstitutional taking of the lands to which its restrictions apply. We rely on our discussion in Virginia Surface Mining to dispose of the pertinent claims here We also hold that here, as in Virginia Surface Mining, the District Court erred in ruling on the validity of §§ 522(a), (c), and (d). These provisions, which require procedures for designating areas unsuitable for mining, do not come into effect until the permanent phase of the program, and they have not been applied to appellees or any other landowners in Indiana. In these circumstances, there is no justiciable case or controversy concerning these sections of the Act. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., ante at 452 U. S. 294, n. 36.

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