Source: http://la.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20180313_0001019.LA.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 06:20:43+00:00

Document:
FindACase | State ex rel. R.M.
STATE OF LOUISIANA IN THE INTEREST OF R.M.
On November 13, 2015, the state filed a petition alleging that R.M. committed the felony-grade delinquent act of possession with intent to distribute a counterfeit controlled dangerous substance, La.R.S. 14:971.1, when R.M. was 15 years old. On November 23, 2015, R.M. appeared to answer the petition and entered a denial of the allegations. Pursuant to La.Ch.C. art. 877(B), the state had 90 days to commence the adjudication, i.e. until February 21, 2016.
On December 4, 2015, R.M. filed a motion to challenge competency. On December 8, 2015, the juvenile court appointed a panel of doctors to evaluate R.M. The court stayed the proceedings pursuant to La.Ch.C. art. 832 and set a competency hearing for January 27, 2016. The court, on its own motion, reset the hearing date several times after R.M. was arrested on a new charge and to give the doctors additional time to evaluate R.M. The court ultimately held the competency hearing on March 17, 2016, and found R.M. competent to proceed based on the doctors' recommendations.
The juvenile court set the adjudication for April 14, 2016, but continued the hearing until May 4, 2016 because the police officers involved in the case were not served. On May 4, 2016, the parties appeared for the adjudication, and the state made an oral motion to continue because the officers still had not been subpoenaed. In response, R.M. made an oral motion to dismiss the delinquency petition. The trial court granted R.M.'s motion, finding that the competency determination had resulted in unreasonable delay not attributable to any fault of the juvenile.
The state sought supervisory review from the court of appeal, which affirmed the juvenile court's dismissal in a split decision. State in the Interest of R.M., 16-0616 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1/11/17), 208 So.3d 966. The majority found that the 90-day time limit to commence the adjudication was extended by the juvenile court once for good cause shown, and thereafter the state did not request or receive an extension. Therefore, the majority found that the time limit in La.Ch.C. art. 877 was exceeded and the juvenile court did not err by granting R.M.'s motion to dismiss. The majority also found, citing State in the Interest of F.M., 12-1442 (La.App. 4 Cir. 6/5/13), 118 So.3d 1232, writ denied, 13-1623 (La. 2/14/14), 132 So.3d 401, that the state was not relieved of its obligation to seek an extension for good cause under La.Ch.C. art. 877(D) although the proceedings were stayed pursuant to La.Ch.C. art. 832.
R.M. filed a motion to challenge competency fifteen days after he answered the petition. On March 17, 2016, after several continuances on the district court's own motions, the contradictory hearing to determine competency was held. R.M. was found competent to proceed. Given that Article 832 specifically mandates the suspension of proceedings until a determination of competency has been made, I would find that the time limit to commence prosecution did not expire.
State in the interest of R.M., 16-0606, p. 2, 208 So.3d at 970-971 (Ledet, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). We agree with Judge Ledet's analysis.
In State of Louisiana in the Interest of J.M., 13-2573, p. 5 (La. 12/9/14), 156 So.3d 1161, this court emphasized the mandatory nature of the time limits established in La.Ch.C. art. 877 and, absent a showing of good cause by the state, the 90-day period cannot be suspended or interrupted. Moreover, this court stated that "it is incumbent upon the state to make a showing of good cause and obtain an extension before the period has run." State in the Interest of R.D.C., Jr., 93-1865 (La. 2/28/94), 632 So.2d 745, 749 (emphasis in original).
Significantly absent in the record, is evidence that the State requested and received a good cause extension before the time limit ran. See State in the interest of R.D.C., Jr., supra. Although a stay was ordered and presumably in place at the time of the dismissal, it cannot serve as a substitute for requesting and obtaining an extension for good cause. Thus, we cannot find that the trial court abused its broad discretion in dismissing the case for failure to timely prosecute.
State in the interest of F.M., 12-1442, p. 4, 118 So.3d at 1234 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).

References: art. 877
 art. 832
 art. 877
 art. 877
 art. 832
 art. 877