Source: http://ne.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20180802_0003158.DNE.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 23:09:54+00:00

Document:
STATE OF NEBRASKA and JAY D. POPPE, State Trooper, Defendants.
Plaintiff, Arthur James Griffin, Jr., a pretrial detainee at the Lancaster County Jail in Lincoln, Nebraska, filed his Complaint (Filing 1) on July 5, 2018, and was granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis on July 12, 2018 (Filing 9). The court now conducts an initial review of Plaintiff's Complaint to determine whether summary dismissal is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A.
Plaintiff brings this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action seeking to recover damages from the State of Nebraska and a State Trooper, Jay D. Poppe. Plaintiff claims he was falsely arrested and imprisoned for trespassing on April 23, 2018. In support of this claim, he alleges “No Trespassing was not posted” on the property (Filing 1 at p. 5).
Plaintiff does not specify whether he sues Defendant Poppe in his individual or official capacity. Where a plaintiff does not specify the capacity in which a defendant is sued, it is presumed that a defendant is sued in his official capacity only. See, e.g., Johnson v. Outboard Marine Corp., 172 F.3d 531, 535 (8th Cir. 1999) (stating that “in order to sue a public official in his or her individual capacity, a plaintiff must expressly and unambiguously state so in the pleadings, otherwise, it will be assumed that the defendant is sued only in his or her official capacity.”). A claim against an individual in his official capacity is in reality a claim against the entity that employs the official. See Parrish v. Luckie, 963 F.2d 201, 203 n. 1 (8th Cir. 1992) (“Suits against persons in their official capacity are just another method of filing suit against the entity.... A plaintiff seeking damages in an official-capacity suit is seeking a judgment against the entity.”) Because Defendant Poppe is employed by the State of Nebraska, no official capacity-suit for damages can be maintained.
Although Defendant Poppe would not be immune from suit in his individual capacity, such an action may be barred by the rule that in order “to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254.” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994). “A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983.” Id. at 87. “Thus, when a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.” Id.

References: § 1983
 v. 
 v. 
 § 1983
 § 2254
 v. 
 § 1983
 § 1983