Source: http://bc-injury-law.com/blog/category/icbc-wage-loss
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 15:50:40+00:00

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Reasons for judgement were published today by the BC Court of Appeal confirming it was not an error in law for a trial judge to rely on male labour market contingencies when assessing damages for an injured female plaintiff.
In today’s case (Gill v. Lai) the Plaintiff was injured in two collisions and proceeded to trial where she was compensated for various losses including future diminished earning capacity. In assessing this loss the trial judge relied on statistical evidence for men. ICBC appealed arguing it was legally wrong to do so for a female plaintiff. The BC Court of Appeal rejected this argument finding that in the circumstances of this case there was no error in relying on male statistics in part because “income statistics may incorporate historic and inequitable gender-based pay differences“.
c) the plaintiff’s parents are in their mid-sixties and are still working.
 I am also reticent to give weight to female labour market contingencies which may have embedded discrimination: see Justice Morellato’s discussion in Jamal v. Kemery-Higgins, 2017 BCSC 213 at paras. 96–99.
 The appellants say there was no evidence of any such embedded discrimination. They say Mr. Benning confirmed statistically females are more likely than males to work on a part-time basis and, the appellants say, “there was no suggestion in the evidence such difference arose because of any issues relating to discrimination”. The appellants argue the only evidence before the judge was female labour market contingencies accurately reflect the real and substantial possibilities for the respondent.
 Experts are frequently asked to estimate the income losses by using gender-specific historical income figures. Such figures may be useful where they can fairly be said to be the most accurate predictor of the lost stream of earnings. However, there is authority for the proposition that the use of female earning statistics may incorporate gender bias into the assessment of damages. There is also authority for taking judicial notice of convergence in gender incomes: Steinebach v. O’Brien, 2011 BCCA 302.
 It is certainly not an error, in my view, for a trial judge to recognize that the use of historical data can reflect such bias and, to the extent, the circumstances giving rise to the bias may be expected to diminish, to view the evidence as conservative.
 I can see no error in the judge’s consideration of the plaintiff’s pre‑injury earning potential.
 In my view, the same can be said of labour market contingencies. It is not an error to recognize gender-based contingencies can incorporate bias. Having said that, we must bear in mind the quantification of damages necessitates an individual approach.
 In the case at bar, the trial judge did not fail to deal with the parties before him. The respondent had borne children, made effective arrangements for childcare, participated on a full-time basis in the labour market, and was motivated to continue to participate full-time. It was certainly open to the trial judge to find she was unlikely to be affected by some of the contingencies reflected in female labour market statistics, and there was a reasonable basis upon which he could conclude the use of statistical evidence of contingencies affecting males in the labour market would result in a realistic prediction of the respondent’s future. I would dismiss this ground of appeal.
Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, holding that used vacation time following an injury is not compensable as lost income in a personal injury lawsuit.
 At the time of the accident the plaintiff was working about 32 hours a week at Oak Hills Woodcraft. He received a base salary of $1,200, plus a car allowance of $150 every two weeks, for a total of $1,350. He took seven days off after the accident; however, he used his vacation time for that time off and continued to receive his regular salary. In 2010 his income was $36,549 which is slightly more than he received in the years before the accident.
 The plaintiff seeks $1,181.25, representing his salary for the seven days that he did not work shortly after the accident when he used his vacation time. The plaintiff argues that by using seven days of his vacation entitlement he gave up something that should be compensated for as past wage loss.
 While the use of days from a bank of sick leave days may entitle a plaintiff to compensation for the loss of past income because the plaintiff may have to pay to replace the sick days, in my view the use of vacation time does not represent lost income. (Roberts v. Earthy, 1995 CarswellBC 1800 (B.C.S.C.)). During that vacation time the plaintiff continued to receive his expected income.
Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, considering whether a Plaintiff’s substantial losses in the stock market could be compensated as part of a personal injury lawsuit. On the facts of the case the Court rejected this claim.
In today’s case (Barta v. DaSilva) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2007 collision caused by the Defendant. The Plaintiff alleged that the collision caused a mild traumatic brain injury and this “destroyed his capacity to earn an income, trading securities on his own account, and has caused him to lose the capital he accumulated and invested in the stock market“.
 By July 31, 2008, a year after the accident, the plaintiff’s portfolio had increased to $2,790,301.95. He had made successful trades in that year increasing his portfolio by almost $921,000. There is no possible inference to be drawn that cognitive impairment had damaged his trading ability during this time period. Then disaster struck. In September 2008 the market “crashed” and the plaintiff testified that he was “hit hard”.
…The plaintiff engaged in risky stock market trading over several years. He developed a level of expertise that permitted him to earn a reasonable income. However his unwise decisions made in 2008, coupled with the stock market collapse, and the judgment in favour of Mr. Palkovics created financial conditions from which he could not recover. In my opinion the effects of the accident did not compromise his ability to trade on the stock market.
 It is impossible not to have sympathy with Mr. Barta’s disastrous losses on the stock market but the evidence does not satisfy me that he has proven that the defendant’s negligence caused them.
Although damages for past loss of income can be assessed even if a Plaintiff does not accurately report income to Revenue Canada, the figures reported on tax filings have a high evidentiary value in Court. This was demonstrated in reasons for judgement released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry.
 It is also clear that the plaintiff earned very little income during his 2001 to 2004 taxation years. The plaintiff did not report any income for his 2001, 2002 and 2003 taxation years and for 2004 only $12,796 in taxable capital gains was reported. In sum, his tax returns for the years prior to the accident show very little income. I note that in 2007 the plaintiff reported $22,500 in employment income.
 There was evidence that the plaintiff during the years prior to the July 5, 2005 accident did not appear to be in financial difficulties and was able to provide for his wife and two sons. The Court will not impute income to the plaintiff for these years. He filed tax returns which he would have certified to be correct (the Income Tax Act, RSC, 1985, c. 1(5th supp.) also provides significant penalties for a false tax return). As many people do, he may have kept his financial affairs to himself. The imputation of income would be tantamount to finding possibly gross negligence or tax evasion which is unwarranted, especially having regard to the fact that the plaintiff is not able to testify to explain matters and defend his reputation.
 In Hoy v. Williams, 2014 BCSC 234, Justice Kent set forth the test to determine whether an award for past income loss should be made.
 Compensation for past loss of earning capacity is to be based on what the plaintiff would have, not could have, earned but for the injury that was sustained: Rowe v. Bobell Express Ltd., 2005 BCCA 141 at para. 30; M.B. v. British Columbia, 2003 SCC 53 at para. 49. The burden of proof of actual past events is a balance of probabilities. An assessment of loss of both past and future earning capacity involves consideration of hypothetical events. The plaintiff is not required to prove these hypothetical events on a balance of probabilities. The future or hypothetical possibility will be taken into consideration as long as it is a real and substantial possibility and not mere speculation: Athey v. Leonati at para. 27; Morlan v. Barrett, 2012 BCCA 66 at para. 38.
 As stated previously, I have found that the July 5, 2005 accident did not aggravate the plaintiff’s pre-existing physical injuries but that it did cause a personality change and cognitive difficulties.
 The plaintiff has not provided sufficient evidence that “by reason of his [psychological] injuries, [he was] unable to do many things that, but for his injuries, he could have done to earn income” (Rowe v. Bobell Express Ltd., 2005 BCCA 141, at para. 34) or would have earned income.
 The Court, therefore, dismisses the plaintiff’s claim for an award for past wage loss.
The BC Court of Appeal published reasons for judgement today confirming that it is entirely appropriate for an economist to rely on statistical census data in discussing average earnings.
In today’s case (Smith v. Fremlin) the Plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle collision. She was a recent law school graduate who just started her career. The collision caused injuries which limited her capacity to work. At trial the Court relied on an economists report which discussed average earnings for legal professionals in helping assess the Plaintiff’s diminished earning capacity. The Defendant objected arguing the report relied on inadmissible hearsay, namely statistical census data.
 The appellants say the Wickson report ought not to have been admitted into evidence at trial. They do not object to the qualification of Mr. Wickson as an expert but say his report is defective and inadmissible in two respects. First, it is said to be based upon evidence that is hearsay. Second, it is said to be irrelevant because it measures the income earning capacity of a group to which Ms. Smith does not belong.
 … Proponents of expert opinions cannot be expected to prove independently the truth of what the experts were taught by others during their education, training, and experience or the truth of second-hand information of a type customarily and reasonably relied upon by experts in the field. Accordingly, the degree to which an expert opinion is based on hearsay evidence is a matter to be considered in assessing the weight to be given the opinion: R. v. Wilband,  S.C.R. 14 at 21,  2 C.C.C. 6; R. v. Lavallee,  1 S.C.R. 852 at 896, 899-900, 55 C.C.C. (3d) 97.
 The second objection, that the Wickson report is inadmissible, as “wholly or largely irrelevant to the Plaintiff’s circumstances,” is equally unfounded. The appellants say the weight of the evidence at trial supported the conclusion that Ms. Smith would likely work within a limited range of the occupations open to a qualified lawyer. They say it was not helpful to receive and not appropriate for the court to rely upon a report describing the earning potential of all female lawyers in British Columbia (rather than, for instance, female lawyers in British Columbia practicing environmental or Aboriginal law in a not-for-profit setting).
 This objection should be considered in light of the generally accepted approach to assessment of claims for loss of income earning capacity, which is, first, to set the parameters of the claim by referring to statistical evidence with respect to the class of individuals to which the plaintiff belongs, and then to adjust the resulting preliminary measure of damages to take into account contingencies that are particular to the plaintiff.
 The trial judge should have considered the possibility that the respondent might not have realized his professional goals or might have changed his goals. Qualifying as a lawyer opens up a number of career possibilities. It is reasonable to assume that the respondent would have remained in the profession. But he might not have developed the professional skills to achieve above-average earnings. He might have decided that he did not want to make the personal sacrifices often required to compete professionally at that level. Other interests, of which he had many before his head injury, or future family commitments, might have persuaded him to alter his goals. He might have chosen other disciplines within the profession with lower remuneration, such as prosecuting, working in the civil litigation departments of the federal or provincial government, or becoming in-house counsel in the private sector. It is well known that in the legal profession interests change and there is great mobility. In addition, there are many above-average lawyers with below-average incomes.
 As well, the possibility that the respondent might have earned more money than predicted should be considered, although we consider that the chance of this happening was relatively low given the evidence of the small numbers of lawyers in Vancouver who have achieved outstanding financial success. This award is intended to cover the respondent’s working life to age 70, a period of approximately 36 years from the date of trial. Many things can change during such a long period of time and present-day assumptions are far from immutable.
 Evidence of the earnings of the class of workers to which the plaintiff belongs is clearly relevant to the assessment of a loss of earning capacity. At some point, the evidence may be so general or vague as to be of little assistance but, in my view, that cannot be said of the statistical evidence used in this case. Evidence of the lifetime earning capacity of female lawyers in British Columbia, according to Mr. Wickson’s testimony in cross-examination, was the most specific data available. No further breakdown of incomes of female lawyers in this province by areas of practice is available. The Wickson report therefore was the best available evidence of what has been recognized as the starting point of the assessment of the loss of income earning capacity. It was properly admitted by the judge.
When Courts in BC assess damages for future ‘diminished earning capacity‘ no deduction is to be made for income taxes to be paid on those funds. Although this is not a new legal development, it is nice when Courts summarize the law in a concise statement as was done in reasons released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vernon Registry.
 The burden of proof is whether there is a real and substantial possibility that the plaintiff will suffer a future loss of income. Ms. Kelly has met that burden. Ms. Kelly seeks $16,000.00 as a loss of wages while she pursues the program recommended by Dr. Brownlee. This future loss of income is based on Ms. Kelly’s annual income of $60,000.00 and benefits roughly estimated at $500.00 per month. Ms. Kelly will need to take three months off to attend this program; this is the basis of the loss.
 The defendants did not dispute these numbers, but disputed whether it should be a net amount as opposed to a gross amount.
 I order that the plaintiff be awarded $16,000.00 for future loss of income.
Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vernon Registry, tacking an interesting problem, the assessment of damages for a lifetime of disability for a Plaintiff who has yet to enter the workforce.
In today’s case (Hermanson v. Durkee) the Plaintiff was involved in a motor vehicle collision and sustained a “severe traumatic brain injury“. The injury rendered the Plaintiff competitively unemployable. He was 18 at the time and had just graduated high school and had yet to enter the workforce. He “did not excel academically” and “it became apparently that post-secondary education was not likely or realistic“.
The Court had to grapple with what the Plaintiff’s lifetime earnings would have been. The Plaintiff argued that he would have likely worked in the trades in Alberta’s lucrative oil industry and had lifetime earnings between $2.8 and $3.3 million. The Defendant argued that his earnings would be more in line with the statistical average for high school graduates and suggested an earning capacity of just over $1 million.
 In my view, both positions go too far in their respective directions.
 It is my conclusion that Mr. Hermanson would have likely pursued a trade in the higher earnings spectrum of those that the economists have concluded he could have done pre-accident.
 In considering the evidence of the individual earnings levels as presented by witnesses for the plaintiff, significant caution must be exercised. Neither economist was asked specifically why they did not consider specific earnings levels of specific individuals, but in circumstances such as these, there is a strong argument to be made that statistics which, by necessity, blend high income earners, such as those presented by the plaintiff, with those who have not achieved such earnings is a more reasonable approach. Not all of the witnesses who were called had indicated that it was their intention to stay in their high earnings positions in Northern Alberta, and it seems logical that many, including possibly Mr. Hermanson had he gone to the oil industry at all, would feel the same. On the other hand, one must recognize that Mr. Hermanson is part of a social group, many of whom had elected, at least in their early years of employment, to pursue such jobs.
 In my view, such evidence is merely a consideration in assessing the value of the lost capital asset. There is certainly a substantial possibility that Mr. Hermanson would have, at least in the short term, pursued such work. It is difficult to measure the likelihood of that and even more difficult to determine how long he might have stayed in such a position.
 The defence argued that the plaintiff might have retired early like his mother. While that is a possibility, such a decision would logically flow from a relatively high earnings stream and/or prudent savings habits to enable such a decision. It is not reasonable for the defence to say that the plaintiff would have both been a low earner with limited motivation and retired early.
 In my view, the appropriate assessment of the plaintiff’s pre-injury earnings capacity is $1,800,000.
Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, New Westminster Registry, making an interesting award with respect to past wage loss covered by a sick leave plan.
“Please find enclosed the completed Certificate of Earnings form for [the plaintiff]. I am also attaching a copy of the subrogation agreement from the Collective Agreement for The City Firefighters’ Union, Local 256.
The gross pay lost up to May 30, 2008 due to [the Accident] is $20,365.56. Please be aware that his sick claim is still ongoing so this figure is not a final amount.
When a settlement has been reached, please forward to my attention the total amount of earnings lost due to this accident, plus any interest attributed to those earnings, payable to the City of New Westminster. This will allow us to credit Mr. Bulpitt’s sick plan and return any gratuity hours that he lost due to the accident.
a) An employee may use sick leave credits for time lost through accidental injuries PROVIDED THAT prior to making a claim or commencing an action for damages against a third party in respect of such injuries, he shall notify the Employer of such claim and enable the Employer the opportunity to be represented in all proceedings or settlement discussions relating to the claim. Any such claim shall include a claim for loss of wages including pre- and post- judgement interest, and to the extent that recovery is made, such amount will be reimbursed to the Employer. The Employer will reimburse the employee, fifty percent (50%) of the cost of the legal fees certified by the employee’s legal counsel as being attributed to providing the wage/benefit loss claim.
 Regardless, it is my view that the June 6, 2008 letter and the excerpted portion of the Collective Agreement is evidence that the plaintiff’s sick leave benefits were not as they would have been but for the Accident. Clearly, there was a benefit plan that had been negotiated by the City and the firefighters’ union the terms of which were contained in the Collective Agreement. Further, this letter is evidence of what it will take to restore the plaintiff’s sick leave plan to its pre-Accident status.
 In all cases, the court retains residual power to grant appropriate relief through its inherent jurisdiction: Anderson v. Buydens,  B.C.J. No. 2675 at para.16 (S.C.). In this case, a miscarriage of justice would result if the plaintiff was awarded nothing for past wage loss because he received benefits from his employer yet the employer was able to “claw back” those same benefits by way of a right of subrogation. I am satisfied that there ought to be a provisional award for past wage loss in this case. The plaintiff is entitled to full indemnity from the defendants in respect of any amount to which the plaintiff is or becomes obligated to re-pay to the City of New Westminster in respect of benefits he received as a result of the Accident.
Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Court of Appeal stripping a Plaintiff of modest damages awarded for diminished earning capacity.
In today’s case (Kim v. Morier) the Plaintiff was injured in a collision and sued for damages. Despite her injuries she was able to work 12-15 hour days as a floor plan technician. She had no lost income by the time of trial. Her injuries lingered and were expected to indefinitely though the “degree of disability would be mild, that her level of disability is “fairly small” “.
 On appeal, the defendant submits that the Court erred in making an award under this head in the absence of a finding of a “real and substantial possibility” that Ms. Kim’s earnings in future would be impaired. The defendant relies in particular on Roberts v. Kidd (1998), 52 B.C.L.R. (3d) (C.A.), where Mr. Justice Hollinrake for the majority noted that it is not sufficient for an award under this head for the plaintiff to testify as to a loss of confidence or ability to project herself without showing a “functional” element. (Mr. Justice Lambert dissented on this point.) In the result in Roberts, this Court set aside the award for diminished income and incapacity.
But the language in question there was used in the context of appellate review and, with respect, it cannot be transposed to an original analysis at the trial level. The claimant bears the onus to prove at trial a substantial possibility of a future event leading to an income loss, and the court must then award compensation on an estimation of the chance that the event will occur: Parypa v. Wickware, 1998 BCCA 88, 169 D.L.R. (4th) 661¶ 65.
This is not a heavy onus, but it must be met for a pecuniary award to be justified.
 In my view, the trial judge here did err in equating the loss of capital asset here with the plaintiff’s own perception. As the cases demonstrate, that is not enough. The plaintiff must show that it is a realistic possibility she will be less able to compete in the marketplace – with economic consequences, not merely psychological ones. In my view as well, the trial judge’s statement made after the award was pronounced, that Ms. Kim “may” be less capable of maintaining her disciplined approach to work also fell short. As we suggested to counsel this morning, the word “may” is essentially speculative and does not equate to a finding of a real possibility.
 Mr. Carta said all that could be said in support of the award, but I agree with the defendants that as a matter of principle the findings here did not support an award for loss of earning capacity.
 I would allow the appeal and set aside the award under this head. I would also order that the parties bear their own costs, given that this appeal was brought as a matter of principle.

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