Source: http://fl.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20180111_0000525.NFL.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 11:08:19+00:00

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This matter is before the Court on ECF No. 120, Defendant Scott Teitelbaum, MD's Motion for Summary Judgment, and ECF No. 122, Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. Both parties have filed responses to the motions for summary judgment and a reply, if any. (ECF Nos. 146, 159, 162.) The motions are, therefore, ripe for review. For the reasons explained below, the undersigned recommends that Defendant's motion for summary judgment be granted and Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment be denied.
The filings and evidence provided in support thereof encompass events spanning from 2010 to present. Because the only remaining claims against Dr. Teitelbaum involve Dr. Paylan's visits to the Florida Recovery Center in July and August of 2011, the relevant evidence is summarized as follows.
Dr. Paylan currently meets DSM-IV criteria for opioid abuse and may meet criteria for dependence as well but her guarded attitude during her evaluation today in conjunction with her lack of willingness to allow contact with collateral sources of information make it impossible to provide a definitive assessment at this time.
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), the entry of summary judgment is appropriate when the Court is satisfied that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” In applying this standard, the Court must examine the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with any affidavits and other evidence in the record “in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Samples on Behalf of Samples v. Atlanta, 846 F.2d 1328, 1330 (11th Cir. 1988).
As the Supreme Court held in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986), the moving party bears the initial burden of establishing the nonexistence of a triable issue of fact. If the movant is successful on this score, the burden of production shifts to the non-moving party who must then come forward with “sufficient evidence of every element that he or she must prove.” Rollins v. Techsouth, 833 F.2d 1525, 1528 (11th Cir. 1987).
The non-moving party may not simply rest on the pleadings, but must use affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories, or other admissible evidence to demonstrate that a material fact issue remains to be tried. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986); Castleberry v. Goldome Credit Corp., 408 F.3d 773, 785-86 (11th Cir. 2005).
In civil actions filed by inmates, federal courts must distinguish between evidence of disputed facts and disputed matters of professional judgment. In respect to the latter, our inferences must accord deference to the views of prison authorities. Unless a prisoner can point to sufficient evidence regarding such issues of judgment to allow him to prevail on the merits, he cannot prevail at the summary judgement stage.
Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 530 (2006). Conclusory allegations based on subjective beliefs are insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact. See, e.g., Waddell v. Valley Forge Dental Assocs., Inc., 276 F.3d 1275, 1279 (11th Cir. 2001).
The Court must view the evidence and inferences drawn from the underlying facts in the light most favorable to the non-movant. Earley v. Champion Int'l Corp., 907 F.2d 1077, 1080 (11th Cir. 1990). But, “when opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Morton v. Kirkwood, 707 F.3d 1276, 1284 (11th Cir. 2013) (internal quotations and citations omitted); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986) (stating that to defeat summary judgment “there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff”). “The nonmovant need not be given the benefit of every inference but only of every reasonable inference.” Brown v. City of Clewiston, 848 F.2d 1534, 1540 n. 12 (11th Cir.1988) (“The summary judgment standard requires that we resolve all reasonable doubts in favor of the non-moving party, but it does not require us to resolve all doubts in such a manner.”).
For the reasons discussed below, the undersigned finds that Dr. Teitelbaum's motion for summary judgment is due to be granted and Dr. Paylan's motion for summary judgment is due to be denied.
A. Dr. Teitelbaum acted under color of state law and, therefore, may be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if he violated Dr. Paylan's federal or constitutional rights.

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