Source: http://mdean.tripod.com/immunity.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 10:32:15+00:00

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This paper will review the immunity of law enforcement officers in tort law(19) for their failure to enforce the law, as implemented in Maryland caselaw and statute, and discuss some of its implications in situations involving domestic violence and detaining intoxicated drivers.
The history of the law for centuries proves this to be the case. Actions against the sheriff for a breach of his ministerial duties in the execution of process are to be found in almost every book of reports. But no instance can be found where a civil action has been sustained against him for his default or misbehavior as conservator of the peace, by those who have suffered injury to their property or persons through the violence of mobs, riots, or insurrections.
South v. Maryland, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 396, 402 (1856).
The Cocking court extended, in Maryland, the holding of no liability for failure to enforce the common law duty to keep the peace in South to the failure to enforce a statutory duty.
In 1979, the Court of Appeals upheld a summary judgment in favor of a police officer in a tort action in Bradshaw v. Prince George's County.(41) Two police officers on patrol were summoned to a trash dumpster from which an apparently lifeless child was hanging. The police officers, to preserve the crime scene, did not immediately remove the child from the dumpster.(42) A nurse claimed that the child had been revived by pulmonary resuscitation, but the child was pronounced dead upon arrival at the hospital.(43) In analyzing a claim alleging negligence against the police officers for acts within the scope of their law enforcement function, with no malice alleged, the court found that the immunity from tort actions of Maryland public officials rested on separate grounds than that of the state.(44) Although a county could waive its sovereign immunity, as Prince George's County had in its charter, the court determined that the immunity for public officials lies in that a public purpose is served by protecting public officials when they act in an exercise of their discretion.(45) "Particularly in the case of law enforcement officers, the exercise of discretion may call for 'decisiveness and precipitous action' in response to crises."(46) Thus, even when the exercise of discretion could result in the death of a child, the public policy is served by providing public officials with immunity from torts resulting from the exercise of their discretionary duties.
Ashburn v. Anne Arundel County, 306 Md. 617, 624, 510 A.2d 1078 (1986), quoting Md. Code Ann., Transp. II §16-205.1(b)(2) (1986).
Beginning in the 1980s, Maryland appellate courts have had several cases alleging the failure of law enforcement officers to enforce the law. Generally, Maryland courts have been unwilling to impose any tort liability for discretionary acts to not enforce the law upon the law enforcement officer, instead looking to the holding from Ashburn as providing an immunity for officers for all acts involving discretion.
The Court of Special Appeals did not allow Ashburn's immunity to be applied to the situation in Manders v. Brown.(98) A suit alleged the municipal officers of the City of Crisfield of official misconduct or fraud in the violation of the city code when approving a modification of the Urban Renewal Plan.(99) The defendants, in arguing that under the Court of Appeals analysis of Ashburn, no tort action could be sustained since the alleged breach was of a duty owed to the public,(100) asked the court to apply legislative immunity to all officials when acting in a legislative or administrative capacity. The court, however, noted that the broad Ashburn immunity was not available where the complaint sufficiently alleged the city officers had acted with malice and that they had not acting within their scope of authority.(101) This case, although involving misconduct by elected officials, indicates that courts will not expand the immunity from Ashburn in protecting Maryland law enforcement officers to situations involving deliberate misconduct or to situations outside of normal police duties. In essence, the Court of Special Appeals maintained the limits established in Clea(102) when actions are taken with malice.
The cases defining the scope of the public official immunity that is available to police officers, as described in Boyer, have used various bases for the immunity. For example, in Bradshaw, the immunity was based upon the need of the police to use discretion in the exercise of their duties.(103) While the court in Ashburn noted that the police officer was acting in a discretionary capacity,(104) the case uses terminology and language of the public duty doctrine when describing the failure of the law enforcement officer to detain the driver in terms of a duty owed to the general public and not to a particular person.(105) In Jones, public official immunity was defined as occurring when officials are acting within the scope of their law enforcement capacity.(106) The Boyer court defined this immunity in terms of the need to perform discretionary acts.(107) However, the court in Holson analyzed the immunity to tort liability as dependent on whether a special relationship had been created,(108) a public duty doctrine concept. Overall, it appears that Maryland's public official immunity is the discretionary matter immunity, but judicial confusion exists due to statements in cases regarding law enforcement as a duty owed to the public and not a duty owed to any one citizen.
(1) Except as provided in this Section a public officer is not immune from tort liability.
(2) A public officer acting within the general scope of his authority is immune from tort liability for an act or omission involving the exercise of a judicial or legislative function.
(c) his conduct was not tortious because he was not negligent in the performance of his responsibility.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 895D, Public Officers.
Should Maryland adopt this section of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, law enforcement officers engaged in the discretionary functions which the Court of Appeals has determined falls within the public official immunity would have the equivalent immunity described in § 895D(3)(a).
One benefit should Maryland courts adopt § 895D is that it would provide all parties with a definitive explanation of the immunity afforded to law enforcement officers, thereby improving the predictability of court rulings and conserving judicial resources by preventing the filing of unnecessary liability suits. Furthermore, the commentary of the provides guidance to courts on the construction and operation of the Restatement (Second) of Torts immunity described in § 895D.(110) In addition, the limited caselaw available from Maryland cases regarding the immunity of law enforcement officers for failure to enforce the law would be augmented to include cases from other states that have also adopted the § 895D formulation of the immunity of public officers.
Maryland plaintiffs have challenged the current application of the public official immunity of state law enforcement officers, using as examples cases from states that have limited their police immunity.(111) Annotations(112) and reference materials(113) are now also available to aid plaintiffs in attacking a defense of public official immunity. As a result of these challenges, examples of courts providing immunity to law enforcement officers for the failure to perform acts that later result in the death or injury of third parties can provide the public with a basis for urging legislative action. Two common situations where police officers have been found, at least in the recent past, to be reluctant in enforcing the law include cases involving domestic violence and the detention of intoxicated drivers.
As in the above discussion regarding the police response to reports of domestic violence, one method of increasing the likelihood of detaining intoxicated drivers would be to remove some of the discretion of the law enforcement officer in encounters with these drivers.(132) For example, although Maryland mandates the arrest of an intoxicated driver, the police officer has some discretion at the start of the encounter as to whether to require the administration of the test needed to determine if the driver is, in fact legally, intoxicated.(133) By creating mandatory duties for the police officer, the immunity provided under Maryland's public official immunity doctrine would no longer be applicable, and courts would have the latitude to apply normal tort liability where the elements of negligence could be proven and the facts demanded it.
In general, there are many benefits in providing Maryland law enforcement officers immunity from liability for discretionary decisions made within the scope of their law enforcement duties. These benefits have been recognized by Maryland courts as including allowing law enforcement officers to make split-second decisions(134) without fear of personal tort liability by a second-guessing jury,(135) not exposing the state and local governments to liability for duties owed to the public at large, and placing an unnecessary burden on the state courts.(136) Yet, when applied to decisions by police officers to not enforce the law in some situation, the immunity of law enforcement officers can result, when actual decisions cause harm to real, innocent persons,(137) in a perception by the public that the state does not protect groups with relatively less political power such as victims of domestic violence,(138) inner-city residents living in high-crime areas, and victims of drunk drivers.(139) As always, when a court grants immunity to a tort action, a wrong has been committed to which there is not redress.
The Court of Appeals should establish the limits of Maryland's public official immunity. Recent cases defining the basis for this immunity have mixed elements of the public duty doctrine and the qualified immunity for discretionary matters. In the alternative, the court could define the public official immunity as the equivalent of the discretionary matter immunity that all states provide government officers or of the immunity defined in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 895.
Lastly, Maryland courts, when determining whether to apply an immunity to a situation in which a police officer's decision to not enforce the law has harmed an innocent third party, must fully explain the basis for any decision to grant this immunity. The court opinions resulting from these situations could serve to educate the public as to the background and sound public policy basis for the immunity provided for discretionary acts of law enforcement officers, and avoid perceptions that would serve neither the courts, the law enforcement community, nor the public.
1. A tort has been defined as a private or civil wrong independent of a contract, and a tortious act as the commission or omission of an act by one, without right, whereby another receives some injury in person, property, or reputation. See Black's Law Dictionary 4th; 74 Am. Jur.2d, Torts § 1.
2. Tort liability is imposed only when the defendant owes a legally recognized duty of care to refrain from acts harmful to or to take action to avoid harm to the plaintiff. See 74 Am. Jur.2d, Torts § 10, 11; Lamb v. Hopkins, 303 Md. 236, 241, 492 A.2d 1297 (1985).
3. Ashburn v. Ann Arundel County, 306 Md. 617, 622, 510 A.2d 1078 (1986). The law typically does not impose a legal duty to take action to avoid harm to others except in certain special relationships. See 74 Am. Jur.2d, Torts § 11.
4. The lack of tort liability can be analyzed as a lack of duty of care by the defendant to the plaintiff in situations where such a duty would normally be imposed or as a defense to the action. Both types will be described in this paper as an immunity to the tort liability.
6. See, e.g., 70 Am. Jur.2d, Sheriffs, Police, and Constables § 94 (the rule throughout the United States is that there is no liability on the part of a law enforcement officer to individuals damaged as a result of an officer's failure to preserve the peace or arrest lawbreakers).
7. Kelly Mahon Tullier, Note, Governmental Liability for Negligent Failure to Detain Drunk Drivers, 77 Cornell L. Rev. 873, 875 (1992).
8. Timothy B. Richards, Tenth Circuit Survey -- Torts Survey: Governmental Liability, 72 Denv. U.L. Rev. 821, 822 (1995).
11. George Bermann, Integrating Governmental and Officer Tort Liability, 77 Colum. L. Rev. 1175, 1178 (1977).
17. Bermann at 1178. The issue of immunity for public officers is considered by some to be controversial. See, e.g., Shelly K. Speir, Comment, The Public Duty Doctrine and Municipal Liability for Negligent Administration of Zoning Codes, 20 Seattle U.L. Rev. 803 (1997) (urging abolishment and use of normal tort analysis, notes several states have done so); Richards at 823-4 (some courts and states have abolished public officer immunity, finding that limiting governmental liability is inequitable and a hardship to victims).
18. Maryland lacks an implementing statute similar to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that provides for qualified immunities to public officers that violate the constitutional rights of citizens. See Stephen J. Shapiro, Suits Against State Officials for Damages for Violations of Constitutional Rights: Comparing Maryland and Federal Law, 23 U. Balt. L. Rev. 423, 425-6 (1994).
19. For an analysis of public official liability for violations of constitutional rights in Maryland, see Shapiro, supra.
20. South v. Maryland, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 396 (1856).
21. Tullier at 886, Richards at 822.
33. Cocking v. Wade, 87 Md. 529 (1898).
37. Id. at 537-8, 542, and 544.
38. Id. at 540, 543-4.
41. Bradshaw v. Prince George's County, 284 Md. 294, 396 A.2d 255 (1979).
47. Ashburn, 306 Md. 617, 510 A.2d 1078 (1986).
51. Id. at 624, quoting Md. Code Ann., Transp. II § 16-205.1(b)(2) (1986).
56. Id. at 628-9. The Court of Appeals did not refer to this as the public duty doctrine, and did not cite any Maryland cases is support of this proposition.
57. Id. at 629-30, quoting Morgan v. District of Columbia, 468 A.2d 1306 (D.C. 1983).
61. Id. at 635, quoting Morgan at 1314.
64. See, e.g., Mary B. Baker et al., Developments in Maryland Law, 1986-87, 47 Md. L. Rev. 975-80 (1988) (Ashburn is indication that Maryland courts will limit the scope of liability in alcohol-related liability tort cases, no other application of its holding is contemplated).
65. Lamb v. Hopkins, 303 Md. 236, 492 A.2d 1297 (1985).
Whenever any court shall suspend the sentence of any person convicted of crime, and shall direct such person, to continue, for a certain time, or until otherwise ordered, under the supervision of the [Probation] Division, it shall be the duty of the said Division to supervise, when so requested by said court, the conduct of such person and to ascertain and report to said court whether or not the conditions of such probation or suspension of sentence are being faithfully complied with by such person.
70. Clea v. Mayor of Baltimore, 312 Md. 662, 673, 541 A.2d 1303 (1988).
72. Piechowicz v. United States, 685 F. Supp. 486, n.33 (D. Md.), aff'd, 885 F.2d 1207 (4th Cir. 1989).
73. Jones v. Maryland-National Capital Park & Planning Comm'n, 82 Md. App. 314, 571 A.2d 859 (1990).
77. The court was referring to the Court of Special Appeals opinion in Boyer v. State, 80 Md. App. 101, 560 A.2d 48 (1989), later upheld on appeal to the Court of Appeals as discussed below.
80. Willow Tree Learning Ctr., Inc., v. Prince George's County, 85 Md. App. 508, 584 A.2d 157 (1991).
82. Boyer v. State, 323 Md. 558, 594 A.2d 121 (1991).
87. Phillip M. Pickus, Note, Torts--Government Immunity--Police Officer Pursuing Suspect Owes Duty of Care to Third Parties Injured by the Fleeing Suspect; Injured Plaintiff Can Recover From State and Political Subdivisions if Officer was Negligent in Commencing and Maintaining Pursuit. Boyer v. State, 323 Md. 558, 594 A.2d 121 (1991), 21 U. Balt. L. Rev. 363 (1992).
88. Boyer at 578-81. For an evaluation of Boyer decision regarding the immunity provided under the State Torts Act for state drivers of emergency motor vehicles, see Pickus, supra, at 376-9.
91. Id. at 591. Some of the aggravating circumstances suggested by the court include whether there was a violation of department policies or regulations, failure to turn on warning devices, and extremely high speeds in congested areas. The instruction provided by the Maryland Court of Appeals here may become moot later this year since the Supreme Court has agreed this term to consider the liability of police for injuries to third parties caused during high-speed chases in its review of Lewis v. Sacramento County, (9th Cir. 1996) (reversal of trial court's grant of summary judgment to police officer defendant given under doctrine of qualified immunity). See <http://www.ljx.com/ LJXfiles/supreme/lewis.html> for the text of 9th circuit decision.
92. Sheridan v. United States, 773 F. Supp. 786 (D. Md. 1991), on remand to evaluate state tort claims, 487 U.S. 392 (1988).
94. Holson v. State, 99 Md. App. 411, 637 A.2d 871 (1994).
98. Manders v. Brown, 101 Md. App. 191, 643 A.2d 931 (1994).
102. See Clea at 673.
106. Jones at 331, 336.
109. This would avoid issues regarding whether Maryland uses the public interest doctrine immunity or discretionary immunity since the Restatement (Second) of Torts is a statement of the law, and not an analysis of its origins.
110. For example, Restatement (Second) of Torts § 895D, comment f, provide seven factors to be used by a court in determining whether the law enforcement officer is acting within a discretionary function.
111. See Ashburn at 634 (suggesting the court follow Irwin v. Town of Ware, 467 N.E.2d 1292 (Mass. 1984) (police liable for failure to detain drunk driver)); Jones at 328 (same).
112. See, e.g., Alexander C. Black, Annotation, Liability of Municipal Corporation or Other Governmental Entity for Injury or Death Caused by Action or Inaction of Off-Duty Police Officer, 36 A.L.R.5th 1; Joseph T. Bockrath, Annotation, Liability of Municipality or Other Governmental Unit for Failure to Provide Police Protection, 46 A.L.R.3d 1084; Allan L. Schwartz, Annotation, Liability of United States Under Federal Tort Claims Act for Injuries Resulting From Failure to Provide Police Protection, 22 A.L.R. Fed. 903; Robert A. Shapiro, Annotation, Personal Liability of Policeman, Sheriff, or Similar Peace Officer or His Bond, for Injury Suffered as a Result of Failure to Enforce Law or Arrest Lawbreaker, 41 A.L.R.3d 700; and Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Liability for Failure of Police Response to Emergency Call, 39 A.L.R.4th 691.
113. See, e.g., Proof of Equal Protection Violation by Municipal Police Department in Failing to Protect Victims of Domestic Violence, 28 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 1; Negligent Failure to Detain Intoxicated Motorist, 1 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 545; and Inadequate Response to Emergency Telephone Call, 2 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 583.
115. Sue Ellen Schuerman, Note, Establishing a Tort Duty for Police Failure to Respond to Domestic Violence, 34 Ariz. L. Rev. 355 (1992).
116. See, e.g., Statement of L. Tracy Brown, Chairperson of Baltimore City Mayor's Domestic Violence Coordinating Committee, Regarding Senate Bill 434 -- Domestic Violence - Warrantless Arrest -- As Prepared for a Hearing Before the Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee on March 5, 1986 (retained in Senate Bill 434 legislative history file).
118. Id. See also Catherine F. Klein & Leslye E. Orloff, Providing Legal Protection for Battered Women: An Analysis of State Statutes and Caselaw, 21 Hofstra L. Rev. 801, note 26 (1993).
119. Laws of Maryland, 1986, chapter 668; Senate Bill 434.
(ii) A report to the police was made within 48 hours of the alleged incident.
Md. Code Ann., Art. 27 § 594B(d) (1996).
121. Md. Code Ann., Art. 27 § 798(b) (Supp. 1997).
123. Md. Code Ann., Art. 27 § 798(c) (Supp. 1997); Courts & Jud. Proc. § 5-610.
124. Klein & Orloff, at 1152.
125. Schuerman at 359; Klein & Orloff at 1149.
126. Klein & Orloff at 1149-53.
127. Cal. Penal Code § 13701 (West Supp. 1998).
129. Nearing v. Weaver, 670 P.2d 137 (Or. 1983); Schuerman at 369-71.
130. Schuerman at 360, notes 38 and 39.
131. See, e.g., Boyer at 577-8.
133. Id. at 902-3, and note 179 (citing the former version of Md. Code Ann., Transp. II § 16-205.2(a) as an example of a state statute which gives police officers discretion to give alcohol tests).
137. See, e.g., Boyer (both parents killed).
139. Consider, for example, those third party victims killed in Ashburn or Boyer, or the five-month-old rendered a quadriplegic in Lamb.
141. See, e.g., Willow Tree Learning Ctr., Inc.
© copyright 1998-9 Michael A. Dean. My thanks to the people at the Tripod Network of Lykos for providing this space. Initially posted on April 8, 1998, last revised on May 29, 1999. Send your comments to deanlaw@hotmail.com.

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