Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=52968:gr-164205-2009&catid=1522&Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 11:48:43+00:00

Document:
OLDARICO S. TRAVEÃ‘O, ROVEL A. GENELSA, RUEL U. VILLARMENTE, ALFREDO A. PANILAGAO, CARMEN P. DANILA, ELIZABETH B. MACALINO, RAMIL P. ALBITO, REYNALDO A. LADRILLO, LUCAS G. TAMAYO, DIOSDADO A. AMORIN, RODINO C. VASQUEZ, GLORIA A. FELICANO, NOLE E. FERMILAN, JOSELITO B. RENDON, CRISTETA D. CAÃ‘A, EVELYN D. ARCENAL and JEORGE M. NONO, Petitioners, v. BOBONGON BANANA GROWERS MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE, TIMOG AGRICULTURAL CORPORATION, DIAMOND FARMS, INC., and DOLE ASIA PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
The Cooperative failed to file a position paper despite due notice, prompting the Labor Arbiter to consider it to have waived its right to adduce evidence in its defense.
Nothing was heard from respondent Dole Asia Philippines.
In finding for petitioners, the Labor Arbiter relied heavily on the following Orders submitted by DFI which were issued in an earlier case filed with the DOLE, viz: (1) Order dated July 11, 1995 of the Director of DOLE Regional Office No. XI declaring the Cooperative as the employer of the 341 workers in the farms of its several members; (2) Order dated December 17, 1997 of the DOLE Secretary affirming the Order dated July 11, 1995 of the Director of DOLE Regional Office No. XI; and (3) Order dated June 23, 1998 of the DOLE Secretary denying the Cooperative's Motion for Reconsideration.
On partial appeal to the NLRC, petitioners questioned the Labor Arbiter's denial of their money claims and the dropping of their complaints against TACOR, DFI, and Dole Asia Philippines.
By Resolution dated July 30, 2003,9 the NLRC sustained the Labor Arbiter's ruling that the employer of petitioners is the Cooperative, there being no showing that the earlier mentioned Orders of the DOLE Secretary had been set aside by a court of competent jurisdiction. It partially granted petitioners' appeal, however, by ordering the Cooperative to pay them their unpaid wages, wage differentials, service incentive leave pay, and 13th month pay. It thus remanded the case to the Labor Arbiter for computation of those awards.
By Resolution dated February 20, 2004,12 the appellate court dismissed petitioners' petition for certiorari on the ground that the accompanying verification and certification against forum shopping was defective, it having been signed by only 19 of the 22 therein named petitioners. Their Motion for Reconsideration having been denied by Resolution of May 13, 2004,13 petitioners lodged the present Petition for Review on Certiorari.
Petitioners posit that the appellate court erred in dismissing their petition on a mere technicality as it should have, at most, dismissed the petition only with respect to the non-signing petitioners.
As respondent Dole Asia Philippines failed to file a comment, the Court, by Resolution of November 29, 2006,17 required it to (1) show cause why it should not be held in contempt for its failure to heed the Court's directive, and (2) file the required comment, within 10 days from notice.
Dole Philippines, Inc. (DPI) promptly filed an Urgent Manifestation18 stating that, among other things, while its division located in Davao City received the Court's Resolution directing Dole Asia Philippines to file a comment on the present petition, DPI did not file a comment as the directive was addressed to "Dole Asia Philippines", an entity which is not registered at the Securities and Exchange Commission.
Upon review of the records, the Court finds that DPI never ever participated in the proceedings despite due notice. Its posturing, therefore, that the court processes it received were addressed to "Dole Asia Philippines," a non-existent entity, does not lie. That DPI is the intended respondent, there is no doubt.
1) A distinction must be made between non-compliance with the requirement on or submission of defective verification, and non-compliance with the requirement on or submission of defective certification against forum shopping.
3) Verification is deemed substantially complied with when one who has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification, and when matters alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct.
4) As to certification against forum shopping, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein, unlike in verification, is generally not curable by its subsequent submission or correction thereof, unless there is a need to relax the Rule on the ground of "substantial compliance" or presence of "special circumstances or compelling reasons."
5) The certification against forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs or petitioners in a case; otherwise, those who did not sign will be dropped as parties to the case. Under reasonable or justifiable circumstances, however, as when all the plaintiffs or petitioners share a common interest and invoke a common cause of action or defense, the signature of only one of them in the certification against forum shopping substantially complies with the Rule.
The foregoing restated pronouncements were lost in the challenged Resolutions of the appellate court. Petitioners' contention that the appellate court should have dismissed the petition only as to the non-signing petitioners or merely dropped them as parties to the case is thus in order.
Instead of remanding the case to the appellate court, however, the Court deems it more practical to decide the substantive issue raised in this petition so as not to further delay the disposition of this case.21 And it thus resolves to deviate as well from the general rule that factual questions are not entertained in Petitions for Review on Certiorari of the appellate court's decisions in order to write finis to this protracted litigation.
The sole issue is whether DFI (with which TACOR had been merged) and DPI should be held solidarily liable with the Cooperative for petitioners' illegal dismissal and money claims.
The Labor Code and its Implementing Rules empower the Labor Arbiter to be the trier of facts in labor cases.22 Much reliance is thus placed on the Arbiter's findings of fact, having had the opportunity to discuss with the parties and their witnesses the factual matters of the case during the conciliation phase.23 Just the same, a review of the records of the present case does not warrant a conclusion different from the Arbiter's, as affirmed by the NLRC, that the Cooperative is the employer of petitioners.
To be sure, the matter of whether the Cooperative is an independent contractor or a labor-only contractor may not be used to predicate a ruling in this case. Job contracting or subcontracting refers to an arrangement whereby a principal agrees to farm out with a contractor or subcontractor the performance of a specific job, work or service within a definite or predetermined period, regardless of whether such job, work or service is to be performed or completed within or outside the premises of the principal.24 The present case does not involve such an arrangement.
DFI did not farm out to the Cooperative the performance of a specific job, work, or service. Instead, it entered into a Banana Production and Purchase Agreement25 (Contract) with the Cooperative, under which the Cooperative would handle and fund the production of bananas and operation of the plantation covering lands owned by its members in consideration of DFI's commitment to provide financial and technical assistance as needed, including the supply of information and equipment in growing, packing, and shipping bananas. The Cooperative would hire its own workers and pay their wages and benefits, and sell exclusively to DFI all export quality bananas produced that meet the specifications agreed upon.
To the Court, the Contract between the Cooperative and DFI, far from being a job contracting arrangement, is in essence a business partnership that partakes of the nature of a joint venture.26 The rules on job contracting are, therefore, inapposite. The Court may not alter the intention of the contracting parties as gleaned from their stipulations without violating the autonomy of contracts principle under Article 1306 of the Civil Code which gives the contracting parties the utmost liberality and freedom to establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good custom, public order or public policy.
There is nothing in the records which indicates the presence of any of the foregoing elements of an employer-employee relationship.
The absence of the first requisite, which refers to selection and engagement, is shown by DFI's total lack of knowledge on who actually were engaged by the Cooperative to work in the banana plantation. This is borne out by the Contract between the Cooperative and DFI, under which the Cooperative was to hire its own workers. As TACOR had been merged with DFI, and DPI is merely alleged to have previously owned TACOR, this applies to them as well. Petitioners failed to prove the contrary. No employment contract whatsoever was submitted to substantiate how petitioners were hired and by whom.
As to the third requisite, which refers to the power of dismissal, and the fourth requisite, which refers to the power of control, both were retained by the Cooperative. Again, the Contract stipulated that the Cooperative was to be responsible for the proper conduct and general welfare of its members and workers in the plantation.
The crucial element of control refers to the authority of the employer to control the employee not only with regard to the result of the work to be done, but also to the means and methods by which the work is to be accomplished.30 While it suffices that the power of control exists, albeit not actually exercised, there must be some evidence of such power. In the present case, petitioners did not present any.
There being no employer-employee relationship between petitioners and the Cooperative's co-respondents, the latter are not solidarily liable with the Cooperative for petitioners' illegal dismissal and money claims.
While the Court commiserates with petitioners on their loss of employment, especially now that the Cooperative is no longer a going concern, it cannot simply, by default, hold the Cooperative's co-respondents liable for their claims without any factual and legal justification therefor. The social justice policy of labor laws and the Constitution is not meant to be oppressive of capital.
En passant, petitioners are not precluded from pursuing any available remedies against the former members of the defunct Cooperative as their individual circumstances may warrant.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
* Additional member vice Justice Arturo D. Brion, due to prior participation in the Court of Appeals.
1 Vide Position Papers of Petitioners, NLRC records, Vol. I, pp. 37-54; 67-86.
4 Id. at 38, 68.
9 NLRC records, Vol. II, pp. 89-93.
11 CA rollo, pp. 2-24.
12 Penned by Associate Justice Eloy R. Bello, Jr., with the concurrence of Associate Justice Amelita G. Tolentino and then Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, now Associate Justice of this Court, Arturo D. Brion; CA rollo, pp. 174-175.
14 Vide Petition, rollo, pp. 12-44.
15 Vide Comment of DFI, id. at 231-235.
20 G.R. No. 180986, December 10, 2008.
21 Vide Chan v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 147065, March 14, 2008, 548 SCRA 337, 351-352.
22 Manaya v. Alabang Country Club, Incorporated, G.R. No. 168988, June 19, 2007, 525 SCRA 140, 159.
23 Salazar v. Phil. Duplicators, Inc., G.R. No. 154628, December 6, 2006, 510 SCRA 288, 305.
24 Vide Acevedo v. Advanstar Company, Inc., G.R. No. 157656, November 11, 2005, 474 SCRA 656, 667.
25 NLRC records, Vol. I, pp. 162-183.
27 De los Santos v. National Labor Relations Commission, 423 Phil. 1020, 1029 (2001).
28 Vide NLRC records, Vol. I, p. 169.
30 Almeda v. Asahi Glass Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 177785, September 3, 2008, 564 SCRA 115, 127-128.

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