Source: https://kansas.lexroll.com/luttrell-v-united-telephone-system-inc-9-kan-app-2d-620-1984/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 02:41:18+00:00

Document:
MARVIN G. LUTTRELL, Appellant, v. UNITED TELEPHONE SYSTEM, INC., Appellee.
Opinion filed July 19, 1984 Affirmed 236 Kan. 710, 695 P.2d 1279 (1985).
TORTS — Defamation — Action against Corporation by Employee for Remarks Made by Coemployees in the Scope of Their Employment. Remarks made in the course and scope of employment by one corporate employee and communicated to a second corporate employee concerning the job performance of a third employee constitute publication for the purposes of a defamation action against the corporate employer.
Appeal from Johnson District Court; PHILLIP L. WOODWORTH, judge. Opinion filed July 19, 1984. Reversed and remanded.
Richard M. Smith, of Smith Winter-Smith, of Mound City, for appellant.
Enochs, Chartered, of Overland Park, for appellee.
Before FOTH, C.J., PARKS and SWINEHART, JJ.
Plaintiff Marvin G. Luttrell appeals the dismissal of his defamation action against the defendant, United Telephone System, Inc.
Plaintiff alleges in his petition that several managerial employees of defendant maliciously communicated defamatory remarks about him between themselves while acting within the scope of their employment. Particularly, he alleges that on or about April 6 or 7 of 1982, Mr. R.H. Baranek, an employee of defendant, stated to Mr. R.L. Flint, plaintiff’s supervisor, that plaintiff was illegally taping telephone conversations on April 1 and that Baranek had requested him to stop but plaintiff persisted in this illegal activity the rest of the afternoon despite the direct order given him to stop by his supervisor. He further alleged that the communication of the same defamatory information was made by Mr. Flint to Mr. T.V. Tregenza and by Mr. Tregenza to Mr. W. Soble, all while acting within the scope of their employment. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to K.S.A. 60-212(b)(6) on the grounds that intracorporate communications did not constitute “publication.” The trial court sustained the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
to a third person (Schulze v. Coykendall, 218 Kan. 653, 657, 545 P.2d 392 ) which result in harm to the reputation of the person defamed. Gobin v. Globe Publishing Co., 232 Kan. 1, 6, 649 P.2d 1239 (1982) (Gobin III). A corporation may be liable for the defamatory utterances of its agent which are made while acting within the scope of his authority. Bourn v. State Bank, 116 Kan. 231, 235, 226 P. 769 (1924).
In this case, the defendant argued and the district court agreed that there can be no communication to a third person, or “publication,” when the defamatory words are exchanged by agents of a single corporate defendant. This issue of first impression is more precisely whether interoffice communications between supervisory employees of a corporation, acting within the scope and course of their employment, regarding the work of another employee of the corporation, constitute publication to a third person sufficient for a defamation action.
publication with privilege. Prosser, Law of Torts § 113, p. 767 n. 70 (4th ed. 1971).
Undeniably, the district court’s holding in this case is not without support or technical appeal; however, we believe it ignores the nature of the civil injury sought to be protected in a defamation action. Damage to one’s reputation is the essence and gravamen of an action for defamation. It is reputation which is defamed, reputation which is injured, reputation which is protected by the laws of libel and slander. Gobin III, 232 Kan. at 6. Certainly, damage to one’s reputation within a corporate community may be just as devastating as that effected by defamation spread to the outside. Thus, the injury caused by intra-corporate defamation should not be disregarded simply because the corporation can be sued as an individual entity.
the Court held that a letter written by an employee of the Kansas State University library concerning the conduct of another employee and transmitted to the second employee’s superior was qualifiedly privileged. Dobbyn, 2 Kan. App. 2d at 361. As a result, the plaintiff was required to prove that the defendants acted with knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth before the privilege could be overcome. See also Scarpelli v. Jones, 229 Kan. 210, 216, 626 P.2d 785 (1981).
which the plaintiff would have to bear. We see no reason for greater freedom from liability for defamation to be accorded the corporate employer than that already available to all employers through the qualified privilege.
We conclude that remarks communicated by one corporate employee to another concerning the job performance of a third employee are publication for the purposes of a defamation action against the employer. Since the dismissal motion was granted in this case prior to the commencement of any discovery, we make no findings concerning the possible application of qualified privilege to the communications alleged.
The dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings.

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