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Timestamp: 2019-04-23 02:50:25+00:00

Document:
CITY OF NORTHPORT, et al., Defendants.
L. SCOTT COOGLER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Before the Court is Defendants', City of Northport (“City”) and Scott Collins (“Collins”) (collectively “Defendants”), Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 42.) Likewise before the Court are Defendants' Motion to Admit Evidence (doc. 40), Motion for the Court to Take Judicial Notice (doc. 41), Motion to Strike Exhibit K (doc. 60), and Plaintiff Robert W. Green's (“Plaintiff”) Motion to Strike (doc. 52). This case caps what has been a lengthy dispute between Plaintiff and Defendants concerning Plaintiff's former employment as Chief of Police of the City of Northport. Following allegations of racial discrimination by Plaintiff against Defendants and exhaustion of administrative remedies, Plaintiff instituted suit in the Northern District of Alabama in the case styled Green v. City of Northport (“Green I”), 7:11-cv-2354-SLB, 2014 WL 1338108 (N.D. Ala. Mar. 31, 2014). This action is related to, and arises from issues addressed in Green I. Specifically, Plaintiff claims that Defendants retaliated against him for filing his EEOC charges and later instituting Green I; Defendants later escalated such retaliation, created a hostile work environment, and constructively discharged Plaintiff in 2012.
Defendants deny that any of their actions were done in retaliation for Plaintiff's litigation activities in Green I. They instead point to a slew of complaints by various city officials and employees about Plaintiff's management style and the atmosphere he created in the City Police Department. Defendants state that they determined it was necessary for the safety of city officials and employees to audit the City Police Department and place Plaintiff on paid administrative leave. After receiving the results of the audit, which were negative towards Plaintiff, Defendants determined that Plaintiff should be allowed to resign, or alternatively terminated from his position. Following a meeting between the parties on May 29, 2012, Plaintiff resigned his position and then filed the administrative charges with the EEOC that eventually led to this suit. As set out in further detail below, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is due to be granted.
At the end of 2008, Swann became the City Engineer, and on December 15, 2008, Scott Collins became employed as City Administrator. (Doc. 46 Ex. B Collins Depo. at 136.) As City Administrator, Collins was responsible for nine departments within the City: police, fire, IT, public works, utilities, HR, planning, legal, and retail development. As part of his duties, Collins worked closely with Plaintiff. At all times relevant to the instant lawsuit, Plaintiff reported to Collins. Collins had authority to discipline all city employees, including department heads; however, Collins needed approval from the City Council to terminate a department head.
Plaintiff filed an EEOC charge against the City of Northport on May 14, 2009 and later filed an Amended EEOC charge against the City on June 2, 2009. Plaintiff continued to do his job as Police Chief; however, he testified that he felt he was being subjected to hostile working conditions because of Collins's discrimination and retaliation. For example, on December 16, 2009, Collins stormed into Plaintiff's office, slammed the door behind him, and screamed at Plaintiff. On December 21, 2009, Plaintiff sent a letter to the City Council which outlined Collins's violation of the anti-harassment policy and his alleged unprofessional conduct based on that incident. Collins was not disciplined for that incident.
After investigating Plaintiff's two charges, the EEOC issued a dismissal and Notice of Right to Sue on April 1, 2011. On June 29, 2011, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama alleging race discrimination and retaliation against the City of Northport and Collins, Green I. Plaintiff remained Police Chief until his voluntary resignation on May 31, 2012.
While Plaintiff testified that he and Collins had a “strained and rocky relationship, ” Plaintiff admitted that he and Collins routinely spoke, met, discussed department needs and purchases, and deferred to one another in the time period from 2011-2012. One example of such deference occurred in an October 21, 2011 e-mail exchange with the City Council and Plaintiff. In that e-mail, Collins indicated that a pumper truck, requested by the Fire Department, was too expensive and recommended getting a less expensive ladder truck. In the same email, Collins asked Plaintiff for his input concerning the number of police vehicles the department needed. Plaintiff testified that he believed he got all the police vehicles he requested in 2011, although Collins ordered vehicles that were different from the ones Plaintiff and the police department preferred.
On June 24, 2011, Plaintiff requested copies of psychological reports for all department employees. (Doc. 44 Ex. A Green Depo. at 106.) In his e-mail to the Northport City Council President, Plaintiff stated that he had “an officer who is about to go off the deep end” and that “[t]he officer in question is capable of showing up at a City Council meeting and shooting up the council chambers.” (Id.) Plaintiff also explained in the e-mail that he had access to officers' psychological reports for many years, but that Collins had stopped providing him with the reports. Collins testified that the threat of an officer shooting up City Hall concerned him and that Plaintiff's statement was “alarming.” Collins attempted to discuss the matter with Plaintiff verbally and further attempted to schedule two meetings with Plaintiff, but never received a response. Collins did not document these attempts, nor did he discipline Plaintiff for not meeting with him. (Doc. 46 Ex. B Collins Depo. at 243-44.) Collins later sent Plaintiff a follow-up e-mail three months later requesting to meet regarding the office safety issue.
On November 1, 2011, Collins received a complaint from IT Director Michael Ramm (“Ramm”), another department head, that Plaintiff had been threatening and disrespectful towards him in an e-mail exchange. Ramm and Plaintiff had corresponded regarding the location of new computers for the police department, and they did not agree on where the computers would be placed. Plaintiff sent Ramm an e-mail on November 1, 2011 insisting that Ramm follow Plaintiff's plan for the computers, telling Ramm that he (Plaintiff) “was trying to be civil about this matter” and warning Ramm “don't make waves.” Collins testified that Ramm was offended by Plaintiff's e-mail. After receiving Ramm's complaint, Collins forwarded the information to Rodger Fisher, then-Human Resources Director. On November 9, 2011, after Fisher responded to Collins, Collins issued a written warning to Plaintiff concerning the November 1, 2011 email. In the warning, Collins instructed Plaintiff that he was to be professional and respectful to all city employees, including in instances of disagreement. Plaintiff refused to sign the warning, but was not penalized in any way for his refusal to sign it.
After his resignation Plaintiff filed two EEOC charges against the City of Northport. Then on July 18, 2012, seventeen days after his resignation was effective, Plaintiff filed EEOC charge No. 420-2012-02762. (Doc. 45 Ex. A Green Depo. at Ex. 7.) On August 17, 2012, Plaintiff filed an Amended EEOC charge. (Id. at Ex. 8.) Green I was dismissed on March 31, 2014, and Plaintiff filed the complaint in the instant case on October 22, 2015.
A motion for summary judgement is appropriate when “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A fact is “material” if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); see also Ave. CLO Fund, Ltd. v. Bank of Am., N.A., 723 F.3d 1287, 1294 (11th Cir. 2013). A genuine dispute as to a material fact exists “if the nonmoving party has produced evidence such that a reasonable factfinder could return a verdict in its favor.” Greenberg v. BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc., 498 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Waddell v. Valley Forge Dental Assocs., 276 F.3d 1275, 1279 (11th Cir. 2001)). The trial judge should not weigh the evidence but must simply determine whether there are any genuine issues to be resolved at trial. Anderson, 447 U.S. at 249.
In considering a motion for summary judgment, trial courts must give deference to the non-moving party by “view[ing] the materials presented and all factual inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Animal Legal Def. Fund v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 789 F.3d 1206, 1213-14 (11th Cir. 2015) (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970)). However, “unsubstantiated assertions alone are not enough to withstand a motion for summary judgment.” Rollins v. TechSouth, Inc., 833 F.2d 1525, 1529 (11th Cir. 1987). Conclusory allegations and “mere scintilla of evidence in support of the nonmoving party will not suffice to overcome a motion for summary judgment.” Melton v. Abston, 841 F.3d 1207, 1220 (11th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (quoting Young v. City of Palm Bay, Fla., 358 F.3d 859, 860 (11th Cir. 2004)). “[T]he moving party has the burden of either negating an essential element of the nonmoving party's case or showing that there is no evidence to prove a fact necessary to the nonmoving party's case.” McGee v. Sentinel Offender Servs., LLC, 719 F.3d 1236, 1242 (11th Cir. 2013). Although the trial courts must use caution when granting motions for summary judgment, “summary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986).

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