Source: http://blog.internetcases.com/tag/personal-jurisdiction/
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 17:25:49+00:00

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Case dismissed because federal court in California did not have personal jurisdiction over Illinois resident.
Last year Facebook made us wonder if it had gone off its meds when it filed a trademark infringement lawsuit against Illinois-based Teachbook.com. More than one commentator thought Facebook was being overzealous in its efforts to claim exclusivity in the term “book” for social networking services.
However one contenances the action, the court has shut the cover on the first chapter. The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California (where Facebook is located) held that it lacked personal jursidction over the Illinois defendant. So it dismissed the case.
Teachbook does not register users in California. Thus, even if Teachbook intended to compete with a California company, it intended to compete for users who were not in California. The fact that an essentially passive Internet advertisement may be accessible in the plaintiff’s home state without “something more” is not enough to support personal jurisdiction in a trademark infringement suit brought in the plaintiff’s home state.
So if the fight continues, it won’t take place in Facebook’s back yard.
This entry was posted in Personal Jurisdiction, Trademarks and tagged facebook, Personal Jurisdiction, social media, social networking on May 8, 2011 by Evan Brown (@internetcases).
uBid sued GoDaddy in federal court in Illinois, alleging cybersquatting. uBid claimed that GoDaddy — an Arizona-based company — intended to profit in bad faith by registering on behalf of its customers certain domain names that were similar to uBid’s trademarks. uBid alleged that GoDaddy would set up parked pages at those domains, displaying sponsored links to sites run by uBid’s competitors.
The district court dismissed the case, finding that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over GoDaddy. uBid sought review with the Seventh Circuit. On appeal, the court reversed, holding that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over GoDaddy would not violate due process.
The court held that GoDaddy’s activities in Illinois were not continuous or systematic enough for the exercise of general jurisdiction. But applying the standards set forth in Keeton v. Hustler, the court found that GoDaddy’s efforts to exploit the Illinois marketplace were done so thoroughly, deliberately and successfully that it would not be unfair for GoDaddy to appear in court in Illinois.
After all, in part through its ads at Wrigley Field, the United Center and Joliet Speedway, not to mention the numerous Super Bowl ads seen in Illinois, GoDaddy had acquired hundreds of thousands of customers in the state.
[O]ut-of-state residents may avail themselves of the benefits and protections of doing business in a forum state, but they do so in exchange for submitting to jurisdiction in that state for claims arising from or relating to those activities.
In this case, GoDaddy’s connection with Illinois and uBid’s claims made the relatedness quid pro quo “balanced and reasonable.” GoDaddy’s contacts with Illinois alleged in the complaint and the alleged wrongs committed were so “intimately related” that GoDaddy should not have been surprised to find itself sued in Illinois.
Finally, the court examined the question of whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction would comport with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Again, the court’s finding relied on the thoroughness with which GoDaddy had exploited the Illinois marketplace.
Race car image courtesy Flickr user Jr 88 Rules under this Creative Commons license.
This entry was posted in Personal Jurisdiction and tagged Go Daddy, illinois, international shoe, internet, minimum contacts, Personal Jurisdiction on October 6, 2010 by Evan Brown (@internetcases).
Seventh Circuit declines once again to adopt the Zippo test for personal jurisdiction in internet cases.
The State of Illinois filed a civil suit in federal court in Illinois against a New Mexico-based online cigarette seller. The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The defendant sought review with the Seventh Circuit. On appeal, the court affirmed the denial of the motion, holding that the defendant’s website satisfied the minimum contacts requirement for the exercise of personal jurisdiction.
The mechanics of the website were important in the minimum contacts analysis. The site expressly said that the company would sell to consumers in any state except those in New York. The court interpreted this to relate to the personal jurisdiction question in two ways. First, such a statement implicitly said that the defendant would do business in Illinois. Second, it revealed that the defendant knew that it could be subject to the jurisdiction of out-of-state courts (i.e., New York) and also knew how to prevent such an exercise (by not selling there).
In this analysis, the court expressly declined to adopt the well-known Zippo sliding scale test, which evaluates the interactivity of a website in the personal jurisdiction analysis.
This entry was posted in Litigation, Personal Jurisdiction and tagged Calder v. Jones, minimum contacts, Personal Jurisdiction, zippo on September 15, 2010 by Evan Brown (@internetcases).
Personal jurisdiction cases — even ones that involve the internet — are generally not all that interesting. But the case of CoStar Realty Information, Inc. v. Field is worth noting because of the way the personal jurisdiction analysis was tied to a provision found in online terms of service.
CoStar provides its paying customers with access to a proprietary database via the web. It claimed that certain defendants, who were residents of Texas and Florida, accessed the database using another customer’s password. So CoStar sued these defendants in federal court in Maryland.
These defendants moved to dismiss arguing, among other things, lack of personal jurisdiction. The court denied the motion.
It found that in the four or so years that the defendants accessed the database without authorization, they would have been presented with the online terms of service from time to time. Those terms of service contained a clause which provided that any litigation over use of the database would be conducted in Maryland. The court found that the defendants assented to these terms, and that the forum selection clause was valid and enforceable.
This entry was posted in Contracts, Personal Jurisdiction and tagged costar, Personal Jurisdiction, terms of service on April 9, 2009 by Evan Brown (@internetcases).
Plaintiff sued a California corporation in federal court in Utah. Defendant moved to dismiss, asserting, among other things, lack of personal jurisdiction. The court denied the motion.
The court found that it had specific personal jurisdiction over defendant. Plaintiff provided evidence that defendant ran a number of highly interactive websites, including at least two online stores. Defendant provided visitors with a shopping cart feature that allowed them to select multiple products for purchase. Visitors to defendants’ sites could purchase items over the website using Google checkout or a number of major credit cards. Defendant offered to sell products into Utah through its multiple internet stores. In short, defendant purposefully used its website to reach a large number of potential buyers, including those in Utah, and benefited from that exposure.
This entry was posted in Personal Jurisdiction and tagged Personal Jurisdiction on September 18, 2008 by Evan Brown (@internetcases).
Hansing moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, and the court granted the motion. Boschetto sought review with the Ninth Circuit. On appeal, the court affirmed.
The question was whether this single transaction – enabled by eBay – constituted minimum contacts between Hansing and California to satisfy constitutional due process. A threshold question in that analysis was whether Hansing had purposely availed himself of the privileges of conducting activities in California, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.
The court answered the purposeful availment question in the negative. The single transaction did not create any ongoing obligations in California, nor did it result in substantial business being conducted by Hansing there. On this point, the court nodded to the oft-cited Burger King v. Rudzewicz case for its holding that a contract alone does not automatically establish minimum contacts in the plaintiff’s home forum. 471 U.S. at 478.
What makes this case worth noting (in light of the fact that personal jurisdiction cases can be pretty dull) is the court’s rejection of Boschetto’s argument that the eBay component of the deal defined the analysis. Boschetto had argued that the eBay listing would have been viewed by anyone in California, thus that functionality supported an exercise of personal jurisdiction.
But “the issue [was] not whether the court [had] personal jurisdiction over the intermediary eBay but whether it [had] personal jurisdiction over an individual who conducted business over eBay.” The court noted that in other Internet-related personal jurisdiction cases, like Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414 (9th Cir. 1997) and the famous case of Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, 952 F.Supp. 1119 (W.D.Pa. 1997), the interactive nature of the websites had jurisdictional significance because they permitted the defendants to maintain ongoing contact with the forum.
An isolated sale on eBay, however, is different in nature. In this case, the court found that the eBay aspect was “a distraction from the core issue.” The use of eBay was to facilitate a one time contract that created no substantial connection with or ongoing obligations in the forum state.
This is not to say that the use of eBay could never give rise to personal jurisdiction outside a defendant’s home forum. A number of cases have so held. See, e.g., Dedvukaj v. Maloney. The court noted that where eBay is used as a means for establishing regular business with a remote forum, the traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice might provide for the exercise of personal jurisdiction. But this was not one of those cases.
This entry was posted in Personal Jurisdiction and tagged eBay, Personal Jurisdiction on August 22, 2008 by Evan Brown (@internetcases).
In the case of Dedvukaj v. Maloney, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan has held that it can exercise personal jurisdiction over a New York eBay seller accused of breach of contract, fraud and misrepresentation in connection with an auction that went sour.
Plaintiff Maloney, a Michigan resident, won two eBay auctions for paintings from defendant Dedvukaj, a seller based in Syracuse, New York. The auctions advertised the paintings as being originals, and the defendant apparently verified the authenticity of the paintings over the phone. After the auctions closed, the plaintiff sought to collect the art works, but the defendant never shipped them. (There appears to be a dispute over whether the defendant was selling original paintings or copies.) The plaintiff refused a refund and demanded either the original paintings or their fair market value.
The plaintiff filed a lawsuit in his home state of Michigan alleging breach of contract, fraud and misrepresentation. The defendant moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, or alternatively to transfer venue to the Northern District of New York.
The defendant argued that the Michigan court did not have personal jurisdiction over him because he sold items through eBay, and bids are “random” and “fortuitous,” as sellers cannot control who bids on a given item. The defendant also argued that because he did not target or specifically market his auctions to Michigan residents, his contacts were too attenuated for the court to find personal jurisdiction.
The court first looked to whether the Michigan long arm statute would support the exercise of personal jurisdiction. It held that by communicating with the Michigan plaintiff by telephone and e-mail, accepting the winning bids, and confirming shipping charges to Michigan, the defendant transacted business in Michigan. Because the dispute arose out of that business transaction, the defendant satisfied the requirements of the long arm statute.
The court next looked to whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction would pass muster under a constitutional due process analysis. It discussed a number of analogous cases, eventually holding that the defendant’s auction clearly supported personal jurisdiction in Michigan through purposeful availment.
For example, in First Tennessee Nat. Corp. v. Horizon Nat. Bank a court found personal jurisdiction existed where the defendant’s website stated the bank could lend in “[all] 50 States.” 225 F.Supp.2d 816, 820-21. In another case, a court found purposeful availment where a website stated it would do business “for any parent in any state,” specifically including Michigan. Neogen Corp. v. Neo Gen Screening, Inc., 282 F.3d 883, 891 (2002).
Using these cases as precedent, the court noted that the defendant’s auction listing stated he would ship anywhere in the United States. Additionally, defendant listed a toll-free telephone number and e-mail address in the auction. In part because the defendant did not limit buyers from Michigan from participating in his auction, and because he displayed a willingness to communicate with buyers from any state, the court found that the defendant had purposefully availed himself to the benefits of conducting business in Michigan.
Some other factors the court considered in finding purposeful availment: the number of e-mails and phone calls between the plaintiff and the defendant, the intentional and misleading nature of the communications between the parties, and the defendant’s acceptance of payment from Michigan.
This entry was posted in Personal Jurisdiction and tagged Personal Jurisdiction on September 22, 2006 by Greg Smith.

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