Source: https://connecticut.lexroll.com/137-east-aurora-v-zoning-commission-no-cv98-0146592s-dec-11-2000/
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 02:43:10+00:00

Document:
137 EAST AURORA, LLC and CONTRACTORS SUPPLY OF WATERBURY, LLC v. ZONING COMMISSION OF THE CITY OF WATERBURY.
The plaintiffs, 137 East Aurora, LLC and Contractors Supply of Waterbury, LLC, have appealed from a decision of the defendant, the City of Waterbury Zoning Commission, approving a one-year moratorium prohibiting the bureau of inspections from accepting or acting upon building permit applications relating to construction in industrial zones.
General Statutes § 8-8 governs appeals taken. from the decisions of CT Page 15302 a zoning commission to the Superior Court. “A statutory right to appeal may be taken advantage of only by strict compliance with the statutory provisions by which it is created.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)Bridgeport Bowl-O-Rama, Inc. v. Zoning Board, 195 Conn. 276, 283, 487 A.2d 559 (1985). “Failure to comply strictly with the provisions of § 8-8(b) renders the appeal subject to dismissal.” Spicer v. Zoning Commission, 212 Conn. 375, 378, 562 A.2d 21 (1989).
The record reflects that the plaintiff applied for a building permit to build an asphalt plant on their property located at 157 and 173 East Aurora Street in Waterbury. (Appeal-Complaint, ¶ 7.) The plaintiffs further allege that they have been aggrieved by the approval of the amended moratorium because, as the owners of real property, they were in possession of a certificate of zoning compliance and were applicants for a building permit for the asphalt plant. (Appeal-Complaint, ¶¶ 13, 14.). Further, the building permit reflects that the plaintiffs are the owners of the subject parcel. (ROR, Application: Item 1.)Finally, plaintiffs provided proof of ownership of the property at the hearing. Plaintiffs have therefore proven that they are statutorily aggrieved.
On June 2, 1998, this appeal was commenced by service of process on the chairman of the Waterbury zoning commission and upon the city clerk of the city of Waterbury. Therefore the court finds that this appeal was commenced in a timely fashion by service of process upon the proper parties.
“The trial court may not substitute its judgment for the wide and liberal discretion vested in the local authority when acting within its prescribed legislative powers.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)Frito-Lay, Inc. v. Plan Zoning Commission, 206 Conn. 554, 572-73, 538 A.2d 1039 (1988).”In adopting or amending zoning regulations, the commission acts in a legislative capacity.” Arnold Bernhard Co. v.Planning Zoning Commission, 194 Conn. 152, 164, 479 A.2d 801 (1984). “Acting in such legislative capacity, the local board is free to amend its regulations whenever time, experience, and responsible planning for contemporary or future conditions reasonably indicate the need for a change.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
The issue as to whether the expiration of a moratorium deprives the court of a live controversy was addressed by our Supreme Court in Harlowv. Planning Zoning Commission, 194 Conn. 187, 479 A.2d 808 (1984). In Harlow, the court held that the expiration of a moratorium did not render the action moot because if it was found that the moratorium at issue was held to be inapplicable to the plaintiffs’ site plan application, the plaintiffs “had a right to have their application considered on its merits apart from the moratorium.” Id., 192.
Similarly, in Arnold Bernhard Co. v. Planning Zoning Commission, supra, 194 Conn. 152, the court held that “[a] judgment invalidating . . . [a] moratorium would therefore entitle the plaintiff to have its application considered in accordance with the zoning regulations that were in effect when the decision should have been made.” Id., 158-59. The court then affirmed the trial court’s decision that “the case was not CT Page 15305 moot.” Id., 159.
The plaintiffs’ claim in this action presents this court with a live controversy. If this court should determine that the moratorium is inapplicable to the plaintiffs’ building permit application pursuant to General Statutes § 8-2h, the plaintiffs would have been entitled to the consideration of their application by the city pursuant to the zoning regulations in effect at the time the application was filed.
The issue of whether the moratorium, as approved by the defendant, applies retroactively to the plaintiffs’ building permit application depends upon whether zoning moratoriums fall within the purview of General Statutes § 8-2h(b). Section 8-2h(b) prohibits newly adopted zoning regulations from applying retroactively to any application for a building permit or a certificate of occupancy filed prior to such adoption.
The court was unable to find any cases that directly addressed whether zoning moratoriums fall under the authority of § 8-2h(b). In addressing this issue, therefore, this court must determine whether a zoning moratorium should be considered to be the same as a zoning regulation” so as to bring it within the scope of § 8-2h(b).
While not expressly authorized by statute, zoning moratoriums were deemed permissible under General Statutes § 8-2 in Arnold BernhardCo. v. Planning Zoning Commission, supra, 194 Conn. 152. In that case, the court recognized that § 8-2 “delegates broad authority to municipalities to enact local zoning regulations.” Id., 159. The court also compared the purpose and effect of zoning moratoriums to “interim” or “stop-gap” zoning regulations, “which seek to impose temporary controls on development pending the adoption or amendment of a comprehensive zoning plan.” Id., 161. The court then acknowledged that “[i]n adopting or amending zoning regulations, the commission acts in a legislative capacity.” Id., 164. The court concluded that zoning moratoriums fall within the purview of § 8-2 provided that such moratoriums are limited in time and in scope. Id., 163-65.
While decided prior to the enactment of § 8-2h, the court in Harlowv. Planning Zoning Commission, supra, 194 Conn. 187, held that a zoning moratorium, duly approved by the town of Westport, did not apply retroactively to a site plan approval application. Id., 194. In so holding, the court in Harlow looked to the plain language of the moratorium and noted that “it would have been simple enough for it to have stated expressly that the regulation was to apply to pending as well as to future applications.” Id. The court concluded that “[i]n the absence of such express language, the interpretation of the regulation is governed by the general presumption that legislation is intended to operate prospectively.” Id.
The moratorium in this action specifically provided that “[n]o application to commence construction, alteration or addition of any building, or excavation for any building, structure or use identified by . . . [Section] 2.35, Industrial of the Waterbury Zoning Ordinance . . .will be accepted or acted upon by the Bureau of Inspections.” (Emphasis added.) (ROR, Notices and Agendas: Items 3, 4.) This language does not expressly state that the moratorium would be applied retroactively to include any applications filed prior to its approval. However, the phrase “or acted upon” creates some ambiguity.
Accordingly, § 8-2h(b) is controlling and the moratorium at issue does not apply retroactively. The plaintiffs’ building permit application should be considered by the city pursuant to the zoning regulations in effect at the time of the filing and not the moratorium that was approved subsequent to the filing of the plaintiffs’ application.
In light of the fact that it has already been established that the moratorium does not apply to the plaintiffs’ application, a finding by this court that the moratorium was unlawfully enacted would not afford the plaintiffs any additional relief. Plaintiffs conceded this point at oral argument. Additionally, the court finds based on the record that plaintiffs were present at the public hearing and were aware that an amendment was being considered and therefore had an opportunity to address this issue before the moratorium was approved. Finally, “[I]t is implicit in such a procedure that changes in the original proposal may ensue as a result of the views expressed at the hearing. . . .Notice of a hearing is not required to contain an accurate forecast of the precise action which will be taken upon the subject matter referred to in the notice.” Neuger v. Zoning Board of the City of Stamford, 145 Conn. 625, 630 (1958). For these reasons, the court will not vacate the moratorium.
The court sustains the plaintiffs’ appeal in part. Consistent with Plaintiffs’ prayer for relief, the court directs the Commission to confirm that the plaintiffs’ application was not subject to the approved moratorium. The court does not, however, reverse the action of the Commission with respect to the approval of the moratorium and does not vacate the approval of the moratorium.
 The defendants have not challenged that plaintiffs have been aggrieved and therefore that plaintiffs have standing to bring this action.

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