Source: https://patentlyo.com/patent/anticipation
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 18:40:16+00:00

Document:
This is a prior art case. Suffolk’s patent application was filed back in 1996, but it turns out that the invention was described in a 1995 UseNet newsgroup post posted by a college student. The question on appeal is whether that posting counts as prior art under 35 U.S.C. 102(a) (pre-AIA).
Under the statute, a patent is invalid if “(a) the invention was … described in a printed publication … before the invention thereof by the applicant for a patent.” Courts have repeatedly found that online content fits within the definition of printed publication. Rather, the touchstone question is whether the material was sufficiently publicly accessible. Public accessibility looks to the ability of persons who would be interested or skilled in the subject matter to locate the reference using only reasonable diligence. If a reference is sufficiently disseminated at time of original publication then the ability to later locate the reference is irrelevant.
The record indicated that those of ordinary skill in the art were using the UseNet newsgroups in 1995, including Suffolk’s own technical expert.
Although not fully indexed, the UseNet group was structured in a hierarchical manner that would have allowed someone interested in the topic to identify the particular group and read the posts.
The post in question resulted in at least six responses in the week following the publication – indicating that the post was likely sufficiently distributed at publication.
The case was discussed in an earlier Patently-O Posting titled Structuring a Privateering Contract (2012).
Note – although this case was decided under pre-AIA rules, its holding should apply equally to the restructured Section 102 that also identifies “printed publications” as a form of prior art.
This case presents a classic law school hypothetical of an invention that is anticipated but likely not obvious. According to the appellate panel, the prior art fully discloses and enables the invention but also teaches that the proposed invention is impractical and does not work well. As discussed below, however, the anticipation holding itself is somewhat controversial because it is based upon the conclusion that a broad range disclosure found in the prior art ("less than 150 ppm") anticipates the narrower range found in the claims ("less than 50 ppm").
A jury found ClearValue’s patent valid and infringed and the district court denied the defendants motions to set the patent verdict aside. On appeal the Federal Circuit reversed based upon the appellate court's own factual finding that a single prior art reference teaches and enables each element of the asserted patent claim.
Background: The patent at issue is directed to a process for clarifying water using a flocculated suspension of aluminum along with high molecular weight quarternized polymers. The listed inventor, Richard Haase continues to be an owner of the patent and also CEO of ClearValue. Haase has filed more than 50 water purification and energy related patents and is also a graduate of the University of Missouri (ChemE + Mathematics + Economics). The defendant, Pearl River was once ClearValue’s customer but later began making its own version of the patented process. ClearValue and Haase sued for patent infringement and for trade secret violation (for using the process without authority even before he filed for patent protection).
Anticipation versus Obviousness: The appeal focused on anticipation. Pearl River argued that all of the elements of CV's asserted claim were previously disclosed in U.S. Patent No. 4,800,039 (Hassick). The jury found otherwise. As a matter of procedure, a jury's verdict must be supported by "substantial evidence." If not, it must be set aside either by the district court or on appeal. At trial, the defendants had presented their case that Hassick taught each element of the claimed invention while the plaintiffs pointed only to "teaching away" found in patent. Unfortunately for the plaintiffs, "teaching away" is legally irrelevant to the question of anticipation. See Celeritas Techs., Ltd. v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 150 F.3d 1354, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Rather, under 35 U.S.C. § 102 a claim will be anticipated and therefore invalid if a single prior art reference describes "each and every claim limitation and enable[s] one of skill in the art to practice an embodiment of the claimed invention without undue experimentation." Quoting Am. Calcar, Inc. v. Am. Honda Motor Corp., 651 F.3d 1318, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
Genus Species Anticipation: The only gap in the prior art disclosure was that Hassick generally disclosed "low-alkalinity systems (i.e., 150 ppm or less)" and "alkalinity of between 60-70 ppm" while the asserted patent claimed "alkalinity less than or equal to 50 ppm." In its 2006 Atofina decision, the Federal Circuit addressed a similar genus-species situation involving a narrow claimed temperature range and a broader temperature range found in the prior art. Atofina v. Great Lakes Chem. Corp., 441 F.3d 991 (Fed. Cir. 2006). In Atofina, the court held that a broad genus range disclosure in the prior art did not anticipate the narrow species range claimed. There, both the hypothetical “person having skill in the art” (PHOSITA) and the patentee agreed that there was something special or “critical” about the claimed temperature range. The court distinguished this case from Atofina based upon its factual conclusion that “there is no allegation of criticality or any evidence demonstrating any difference across the range.” Based upon the logical analysis that the narrow range is not critically different from the broad range, the Federal Circuit held that the claimed narrow range was fully disclosed by the broad range and therefore is unpatentable.
Comment – Whither Obviousness: Interesting notion: The mechanism that the court used to distinguish this case from Atofina are very much akin to obviousness principles — looking essentially for synergy or unexpected results that make the narrow range qualitatively different from the broad range. It seems to me, however, that if these obviousness principles can be used to extend the anticipatory scope of prior art, then other obviousness principles (such as teaching away) should also be relevant.
This case presents a nice fact pattern for a law school examination question on the operation of the novelty rules of 35 U.S.C. § 102. Solvay’s patent covers a method for manufacturing a non-ozone-depleting form of penta-flouro-propane (HFC-245fa) that is primarily used in spray-foam insulation products. Honeywell manufactures and sells over 1,000,000 pounds of the compound each year.
Prior-User Facts: Honeywell (at that time, AlliedSignal), the accused infringer, was in possession of a working model of the invention in the United States (US) prior to Solvay’s invention date. However, Honeywell was not the original inventor. Rather, Honeywell had copied its working model from one created by a Russian agency (in Russia, but under contract with Honeywell). Honeywell engineers continued to work on the project as they moved toward commercialization. However, by the time that Honeywell began to commercially use or publicize the invention, Solvay had already independently invented the method and filed for patent protection.
The question on appeal is whether any of the novelty provisions of Section 102 render Solvay’s patent claims invalid. The two primary statutory candidates are 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) and § 102(g)(2).
A patent claim is invalid under Section 102(a) if the invention was “known or used by others” in the US prior to the patentee’s date of invention. If the statute is construed according to the plain meaning of its terms, then Honeywell wins and the patent is invalid. Several US-based individuals at Honeywell knew of the invention prior to Solvay’s invention date – seemingly satisfying the “known or used by others” in the US requirement of the statute. Unfortunately for Honeywell, courts require that the prior knowledge or use of the invention be somehow public. In this case, Honeywell had kept its work in the US confidential. Therefore, Honeywell’s prior knowledge and use of the invention is insufficient to invalidate the asserted claims under Section 102(a). Many accused infringers (and others) have argued that the law should provide a prior-user defense for situations such as this one. That defense does not exist except for the limited (now severely limited) case of business method patents.
As I mentioned, Section 102(g)(2) creates a prior-inventor defense, not a prior-user defense. The original inventor was the Russian agency operating in Russia. That invention cannot satisfy the elements of the statute because Section 102(g)(2) requires that the prior invention be made in the US. For its part, Honeywell is not a prior inventor because it simply copied the work of the Russian agency. Thus, the patent skates-by Section 102(g)(2) as well.
Not the First Inventor: Honeywell argued strongly that it does not make sense for Solvay to have a patent since it was clearly not the first inventor and, if you follow the chain of title, the prior invention had never been abandoned, suppressed, or concealed. Although seemingly sympathetic to Honeywell’s policy argument, the appellate court decided that it was bound by the statute.
Whether this holding ignores the realities of globalization and outsourcing by modern-day research companies, as Honeywell contended at oral argument, is not the question before us. The question before us is whether, under the undisputed facts, Honeywell qualifies as “another inventor” under 35 U.S.C. § 102(g)(2). Because Honeywell did not itself conceive the RSCAC process of making HFC-245fa, under 35 U.S.C. § 102(g)(2), as this court has construed the statute, it is not “another inventor” of the subject matter claimed in the ‘817 patent.
Although perhaps only shorthand, it is interesting that the court focuses on the question of whether the corporate entity – Honeywell – was the inventor. Although some proposed amendments to the Patent Act would lead toward corporate inventorship, the current law is that all inventors must be real persons.
In October of 2005, a third party (Jemo-Pharm) submitted a request for ex parte re-examination of Natures Remedies patented claim covering an herbal composition of guarana, damiana, and yerbe-mate claimed to cause weight loss. More than one year before Remedies’ filing date, an anticipating composition had been submitted to a Danish regulatory organization as part of a request for approval for clinical testing. (The decision is unclear, but implies that the submission was done by Remedies).
A Danish official provided testimony that the submission was a public record and was open for inspection since its date of submission. Remedies’ expert, however, argued that a Danish trade-secrecy law would have prevented such inspection. The BPAI accepted the open-access line of argument and found the submission invalidating prior art under 35 USC 102(b). The patentee appealed – arguing that the official submission was not sufficiently publicly accessible to be considered 102(b) prior art.
Because [the Danish Official’s] declaration established a prima facie case of public availability, the onus was on Remedies to demonstrate that the [regulatory submission] was not accessible to interested members of the public. Remedies, however, failed to carry its burden.
Under the Danish trade-secrecy law, the regulatory submissions are kept secret when they are of “material importance” to a company’s “economy.” It appears that Remedies could have proven its case but failed to provide evidence to the Board.
Attorney argument, however, cannot take the place of record evidence. See In re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Johnston v. IVAC Corp., 885 F.2d 1574, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1989). Here, the evidence of record does not establish that Remedies intended to keep the formulation of the Medi-Tab capsule confidential until after the study had been completed and a patent application had been filed.
102(b) looks at prior art that was “described in a printed publication” more than one year prior to the date of application for the US patent. Implicit within ‘publication’ is a notion that the material is publicly accessible. Notably, however, there is generally no need to prove that the material was actually accessed. Thus, in this case, there is no discussion of whether the regulatory submission was ever seen by anyone.
Reexam No. 90/007,785 (look it up in PAIR).
In some ways, this case is simply an extension of the Pivonka v. Axelrod case where the Federal Circuit held that the applicant has waived arguments by failing to present them at the Board of Patent Appeals.
While Bilski requires that process claims recite machine or transformation limitations that “impose meaningful limits on the claim’s scope,” such limitations need not themselves be new or nonobvious. In other words, “meaningful limits” is not to be equated with “nonobvious limits,” and the “meaningful limits” requirement may be satisfied – insofar as Section 101 patent-eligibility is concerned – by machine or transformation limitations which, standing alone, are old or obvious. Once Section 101 patent-eligibility is found to be present, novelty and nonobviousness of the claim as a whole may be satisfied by a novel and nonobvious algorithm in combination with the structural machine or transformation recitations.
This difference is seen in the Federal Circuit’s discussion of Abele.
As Chief Judge Michel points out in Bilski, in Abele the CCPA found a broad method claim reciting only data manipulation steps (calculating the difference between two values and displaying the value of the difference) to be patent-ineligible, but found a dependent claim adding only that the data is “X-ray attenuation data produced in a two dimensional field by a computed tomography scanner” to be patent-eligible, because the data represented physical and tangible objects.
BPAI: Under §102(e), Provisional Application Considered Prior Art as of its Filing Date.
This holding is in tension with the controlling precedent of In re Wertheim, 646 F.2d 527 (CCPA 1981). In Wertheim, the CCPA held that for a continuation-in-part application, the parent’s filing date may serve as a §102(e) date, but only if the parent contains full §§120 and 112 support for the disclosure.
In this case the Examiner found that the Narayanan provisional application fully supported the eventual publication – and thus that the 102(e) date for narayanan was the filing date of the provisional. The applicant was unable to disprove these findings and the BPAI affirmed the rejection.
Perhaps the most important portion of this case relates to the notion that novelty and nonobviousness are separate and distinct inquiries. And, that a patent may be found anticipated yet nonobvious.
On summary judgment, the district court Cohesive’s HPLC patent might be obvious, but certainly was not anticipated. Water appealed — arguing that the judgment was logically incorrect if anticipation truly is the “epitome of obviousness.” On appeal, however, the Federal Circuit confirmed that novelty and obviousness are separate and distinct — one does not necessarily follow the other.
“While it is commonly understood that prior art references that anticipate a claim will usually render that claim obvious, it is not necessarily true that a verdict of nonobviousness forecloses anticipation. The tests for anticipation and obviousness are different.
The court suggested two circumstances where an anticipated claim might still be nonobvious. First, secondary considerations of nonobviousness may exist that are not relevant in an anticipation claim. Second, although inherent elements apply in an anticipation, inherency is generally not applicable to nonobviousness.
Anticipation still gets to a jury even when the defense has a credible obviousness argument.
In some ways, the ‘common sense’ approach of KSR encourages this decision. While anticipation may still be a formal construct, obviousness should focus on what really would have been obvious at the time of the invention.
Professor Ochoa (Santa Clara) reminded me about the European rule that does not allow “secret” prior art to be used in obviousness (inventive step) analysis. If the US so modified its rules, perhaps the distinction between obviousness and anticipation would begin to ring true.
CSIRO is a nonpractising patent holder. It is also an arm of the Australian government. After winning an infringement suit against Buffalo Tech, CSIRO was awarded permanent injunctive relief to protect its spread spectrum WLAN technology.
On appeal, more than a half-dozen amici filed briefs arguing for and against injunctive relief in this situation. On appeal, however, the Federal Circuit vacated the infringement holding – leaving the discussion of injunctive relief for another day. The vacatur came from the district court’s pre-KSR strict requirement for a motivation to combine references.
Here, CSIRO changed its claim limitation from “frequencies in excess of 10 GHz” to simply “radio frequencies.” On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed the lower court’s factual finding that the amendment did not impermissibly add new matter. (No clear error). In particular, neither party suggested a technical distinction between handling lower frequencies. Further, the court found that the original specification was not limited to frequencies in excess of 10 GHz.
On remand, the lower court will reevaluate obviousness.

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