Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/930/936/151647/
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 20:48:56+00:00

Document:
Petition for Review of Orders of the Drug Enforcement administration.
Thomas C. Collier, Jr., with whom Steven K. Davidson and Amy W. Lustig were on the brief, for petitioner Alliance for Cannabis Therapeutics in 90-1019.
Kevin B. Zeese was on the brief, for petitioner The Nat. Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws in 90-1020.
Charlotte J. Mapes, Atty., Dept. of Justice, with whom Margaret A. Grove, Atty., Dept. of Justice, and Stephen E. Stone, Associate Chief Counsel, Dept. of Justice, were on the brief, for respondent in 90-1019 and 90-1020. Madeline R. Shirley, Atty., Dept. of Justice, also entered an appearance, for respondent.
Before SILBERMAN, BUCKLEY, and HENDERSON, Circuit Judges.
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge SILBERMAN.
This is a petition for review of a final order of the Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). The order maintains the classification of marijuana as a narcotic drug under Schedule I of the Controlled Substances Act, see 21 U.S.C. §§ 811-812. Petitioners, Alliance for Cannabis Therapeutics (ACT) and National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws (NORML), who claim that marijuana should be reclassified in Schedule II, argue that the DEA Administrator's decision rests on an improper application of the statutory standards and an incorrect determination that petitioners failed to meet them. We think that the Administrator's interpretation of the statute was in the main acceptable, but he appears to have relied on several factors that are unreasonable because logically impossible to satisfy; therefore, we remand.
(A) The drug or other substance has a high potential for abuse.
(B) The drug or other substance has no currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United States.
(C) There is a lack of accepted safety for use of the drug or other substance under medical supervision.
21 U.S.C. § 812(b) (1).
The Act contains a somewhat different set of criteria for Schedule II:(A) The drug or other substance has a high potential for abuse.
(B) The drug or other substance has a currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United States or a currently accepted medical use with severe restrictions.
(C) Abuse of the drug or other substance may lead to severe psychological or physical dependence.
21 U.S.C. § 812(b) (2).
As is apparent, one salient concept distinguishing the two schedules is whether a drug has "no currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United States." This case turns on the appropriate definition and application of that phrase.
The Administrator is guided by a set of statutory factors in making a classification decision as to which schedule is appropriate. See 21 U.S.C. § 811. And two of those factors bear on the Administrator's definition of generally accepted medical use--the "scientific evidence of [the drug's] pharmacological effect, if known" and "the state of current scientific knowledge regarding the drug or other substance." 21 U.S.C. § 811(c) (2), (3).
Petitioners argued below that marijuana has medical uses for the treatment of cancer, glaucoma, and other diseases and therefore it cannot properly be maintained in Schedule I. The ALJ agreed with petitioners and found, based on testimony of a number of physicians and patients, that a "respectable minority" of American physicians accept those uses, which was sufficient, according to the ALJ, to say that marijuana had a currently accepted medical use. The Administrator rejected the ALJ's recommendation, however, determining that the phrase "currently accepted medical use" required a greater showing than that a minority--even a respectable minority--of physicians accept the usefulness of a given drug.
(8) Recognition and use of the substance by a substantial segment of the medical practitioners in the United States.
The Administrator, in his opinion in this proceeding, reaffirmed this eight factor test. See 54 Fed.Reg. 53,783. He stated that "these characteristics rely heavily on verifiable scientific data and acceptance by the medical community," which he thought went "hand in hand" because " [m]ost physicians ... rely on scientific data in formulating their opinions regarding the safety and effectiveness of a drug...." 54 Fed.Reg. 53,783 (1988).
Most important to the Administrator was his conclusion that "the chemistry, toxicology, and pharmacology of marijuana is not established" and its effectiveness has not been documented in humans with scientifically-designed clinical trials (such as double-blind studies where neither the patient nor the observer knows who received the placebo and who received the actual substance). Id. at 53,784. Therefore, " [t]he vast majority of physicians do not accept marijuana as having a medical use" and it is "not recognized as medicine in generally accepted pharmacopoeia, medical references, journals, or textbooks." Id. The Administrator exercised with a vengeance his prerogative under Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477, 71 S. Ct. 456, 459, 95 L. Ed. 456 (1951), to reject the ALJ's recommended decision, labelling the ALJ's standard for "currently accepted medical use" as use by a "respectable minority" of physicians as "preposterous."2 54 Fed.Reg. 53,784.
The petitioners renew their argument that the Administrator unreasonably rejected the evidence they presented (largely anecdotal) that a number of physicians believe marijuana is medically useful and, instead, improperly predicated his determination on the absence of demonstrated scientific evidence that the drug is medically useful and safe. The difficulty we find in petitioners' argument is that neither the statute nor its legislative history precisely defines the term "currently accepted medical use"; therefore, we are obliged to defer to the Administrator's interpretation of that phrase if reasonable. See NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, 484 U.S. 112, 123, 108 S. Ct. 413, 420, 98 L. Ed. 2d 429 (1987); Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-45, 104 S. Ct. 2778, 2781-83, 81 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1984). And since Congress required the Administrator, in making scheduling determinations with respect to any drug, to consider the "scientific evidence of [the drug's] pharmacological effect" and the "state of current scientific knowledge regarding the drug," 21 U.S.C. § 811(c) (2), (3), we do not see how it can be thought an unreasonable application of the statutory phrase to emphasize the lack of exact scientific knowledge as to the chemical effects of the drug's elements. Perhaps if virtually all doctors in the United States were vociferous in their espousal of marijuana for medical treatment--notwithstanding scientific uncertainties--the Administrator's position would be more vulnerable. But that is not the case; the ALJ's finding (not contested by the petitioners) is only that a "respectable minority" take that position. The determination as to how much weight to place on scientific uncertainties as opposed to anecdotal evidence in applying the statutory phrase "currently accepted medical uses," then, is very much a policy judgment which we have no authority to challenge. See generally Chevron. We certainly have no grounds, on this record, to dispute the Administrator's premise that without much more complete scientific data American physicians will not "accept" marijuana.
To be sure, the Administrator did not explicitly rely on factors (4) and (8) in the analytical portion of his opinion (he did say "marijuana is not recognized as a medicine in generally accepted pharmacopeia, medical references, and textbooks," indicating his reliance on factor (5)). But since he did reaffirm the eight criteria's applicability to this case, we simply cannot be certain what role, if any, factors (4) and (8) played in his decision. Under our governing cases, we must remand for the requisite explanation. See MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC, 917 F.2d 30, 39-40 (D.C. Cir. 1990); City of Vernon v. FERC, 845 F.2d 1042, 1046-49 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
For the foregoing reasons, the case is remanded.

References: § 812
 § 812
 § 811
 § 811
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 811
 v. 
 v.