Source: http://masscases.com/cases/sjc/425/425mass718.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 10:12:46+00:00

Document:
COMMONWEALTH vs. EARL G.W. MARTIN.
INDICTMENTS found and returned in the Superior Court Department on January 19, 1994.
The cases were tried before William H. Welch, J.
We need not recite the evidence in great detail. The jurors could have found that on December 14, 1993, the defendant chased the victim, his former companion, down a public street and onto the stairs of a church. After a brief struggle, the defendant grabbed the victim by her hair and forced her down onto the church steps. The defendant told the victim that she had to "pay her dues." He removed a knife from his pocket and slashed the victim's face three times, thereby scarring her.
1. Waiver of right to counsel. On the first day of trial, defense counsel informed the judge that the defendant wished to represent himself, with the assistance of advisory counsel. After engaging in a colloquy with the defendant, the judge allowed the defendant's motion to proceed pro se and ordered defense counsel to serve as standby counsel. The defendant now claims that the colloquy was insufficient to establish that his decision to exercise his right to self-representation was made knowingly and intelligently, and therefore his waiver of counsel was constitutionally ineffective. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975); Commonwealth v. Conefrey, 410 Mass. 1 , 10-11 (1991).
'particular piece of information that is essential to an effective waiver of counsel.' Maynard v. Meachum, 545 F.2d 273, 279 (1st Cir. 1976).... The focus of our review is the defendant's subjective understanding of his decision and its consequences. See Commonwealth v. Lee, 394 Mass. 209 , 216-217 (1985). We must be confident that the defendant was 'adequately aware of the seriousness of the charges, the magnitude of his undertaking, the availability of advisory counsel, and the disadvantages of self-representation.' Commonwealth v. Jackson, 376 Mass. 790 , 795 (1978)." Commonwealth v. Barnes, 399 Mass. 385 , 390-391 (1987).
The judge explained the nature of the charges and the necessary elements of proof for conviction, indicating to the defendant that self-representation required an understanding of these "involved" legal concepts. The defendant responded that he had considered the issue for six months before ultimately deciding to represent himself. The defendant was aware that there are technical rules governing the conduct of a trial and that he would be expected to comply with them. See Commonwealth v. Lee, 394 Mass. 209 , 216 (1985). He said that he understood that he faced serious charges and was risking the imposition of substantial prison sentences if he represented himself poorly. See Barnes, supra at 391.
notwithstanding the obvious truth that the average defendant lacks the skill necessary to protect oneself in a criminal proceeding, because it is the defendant who must suffer the personal consequences of a conviction. See Commonwealth v. Jackson, 419 Mass. 716 , 719 (1995), and cases cited; Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution; art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.
"It is the defendant, therefore, who must be free personally to decide whether in his particular case counsel is to his advantage. And although he may conduct his own defense ultimately to his own detriment, his choice must be honored out of 'that respect for the individual which is the lifeblood of the law.' " Faretta, supra at 834, quoting Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 350-351 (Brennan, J., concurring). Thus, "even in cases where the accused is harming himself by insisting on conducting his own defense, respect for individual autonomy requires that he be allowed to go to jail under his own banner if he so desires and if he makes the choice 'with eyes open.' " Commonwealth v. Mott, 2 Mass. App. Ct. 47 , 52 (1974), quoting United States ex rel. Maldonado v. Denno, 348 F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir. 1965).
2. Lesser included offense. The parties agree that both convictions were based on a single act, for which the defendant was convicted of assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon and mayhem. "In determining whether, on the basis of a single act, a defendant may be prosecuted and punished for two statutory or common law crimes, the long-prevailing test in this Commonwealth is whether each crime requires proof of an additional fact that the other does not.... If so, neither crime is a lesser-included offense of the other, and convictions on both are deemed to have been authorized by the Legislature and hence not duplicitous." (Citations omitted.) Commonwealth v. Jones, 382 Mass. 387 , 393 (1981). The Commonwealth argues that, because the crimes at issue each require proof of a different intent element, neither is a lesser included offense, and therefore the convictions and sentences imposed on each should stand. We do not agree.
maim or disfigure, assaults another person with a dangerous weapon, substance or chemical, and by such assault disfigures, cripples or inflicts serious or permanent physical injury upon such person." As the Commonwealth correctly points out, mayhem requires evidence of a specific intent to maim or disfigure, whereas assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon requires proof of "only general intent to do the act causing injury." Commonwealth v. Appleby, 380 Mass. 296 , 307 (1980). However, by necessary implication, a person who has the specific intent to maim or disfigure also must have the general intent to do the act causing injury. The former necessarily includes the latter, and no additional fact is necessary to prove the general intent required for conviction of assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon. Compare Ariel A. v. Commonwealth, 420 Mass. 281 , 285 (1995) (describing murder in the second degree as a lesser included offense of murder in the first degree).
tion of duplicative convictions is to vacate both the conviction and sentence on the lesser included offense, and to affirm the conviction on the more serious offense." Commonwealth v. Mello, 420 Mass. 375 , 398 (1995); Jones, supra at 394-395.
Accordingly, the case is remanded to the Superior Court. The conviction and sentence on the charge of assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon shall be vacated, and the indictment on that charge dismissed. The conviction of violating a protective order is remanded to the Superior Court for sentencing unless the defendant consents to its being placed on file. See note 1, supra. In light of the fact that the judge imposed a consecutive sentence on the assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon, the mayhem conviction is remanded for reconsideration and, in the judge's discretion, resentencing.
[Note 1] The defendant also was convicted on one indictment charging violation of a court protective order. That conviction was placed on file. The record does not indicate that the defendant affirmatively consented to the filing of the conviction. We consider all the defendant's convictions on the issues raised. However, the conviction placed on file also is remanded to the Superior Court for sentencing unless the defendant consents to its being placed on file. See Commonwealth v. Lawson, ante 528, 529 n.1 (1997), Commonwealth v. Paniaqua, 413 Mass. 796 , 797 n.1 (1992); Commonwealth v. Delgado, 367 Mass. 432 , 438 (1975).
[Note 2] We note that the defendant did have representation by counsel in the pretrial proceedings and benefitted from the continued presence and active assistance of that same counsel, in an advisory capacity, at the trial itself.
[Note 3] The first portion of G. L. c. 265, s. 14, provides for a conviction of mayhem for "[w]hoever, with malicious intent to maim or disfigure, cuts out or maims the tongue, puts out or destroys an eye, cuts or tears off an ear, cuts, slits or mutilates the nose or lip, or cuts off or disables a limb or member, of another person. .
The two portions of the mayhem statute "represent distinctive and independent bases of liability." Commonwealth v. Hogan, 7 Mass. App. Ct. 236 , 246 n.11, 247-248, S.C., 379 Mass. 190 (1979) (concluding that assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon is not a lesser included offense of the first branch of the mayhem statute). See Commonwealth v. Farrell, 322 Mass. 606 , 618-619 (1948).
[Note 4] Although s. 14 uses only the term "assault," the statute also requires that the assault result in physical injury. Thus, it is implicit that mayhem requires proof of a battery as well.

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