Source: https://www.scribd.com/document/241253118/Baig-Et-Al-v-the-Coca-Cola-Co
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 02:26:02+00:00

Document:
dismisses Count II without prejudice.
is a manufacturer of sparkling beverages and sports drinks. Id. 4, 5.
Unless otherwise stated, the following facts are undisputed.
word naturally because it comes from the nature and the water is the gift of nature. Id.
gas stations located in the greater Chicago area during the summer months. Id. 16, 19.
between 1998 and 2004 were less than $150,000.00. Id. 18.
Baig also sold limited amounts of Naturally Zero water outside of the Chicagoland area.
Hobart, Indiana, selling approximately 12 to 15 cases each time. Pl.s LR 56.1(b)(3)(B) Stmt.
Naturally Zero in Canada. Def.s LR 56.1(a)(3) Stmt. 25; Pl.s LR 56.1(b)(3)(B) Stmt. 25.
spring of 2004. Id. 50.
drink products named Naturally Zero Cola. Id.; Pl.s LR 56.1(b)(3)(B) Stmt. 55.
announcing Naturally Zero water, which was distributed to beverage industry publications.
with Pl.s LR 56.1(b)(3)(B) Stmt. 24.
Naturally Zero business. Id. 52.
Zero water was ever ordered or purchased through the website. Def.s LR 56.1(a)(3) Stmt. 31.
The website domain name is currently for sale. Id. 58.
license to Clarus Canadian, a company in Canada that was bottling the water for Plaintiffs. Id.
34. The amount of Naturally Zero water sold bearing the AKF label was very minimal. Id. 35.
Bluesprings under the sublicense agreement. Id. 36.
2005, Office Action and his application was deemed abandoned on November 15, 2005. Id.
in October 2004. Id. 46. On J une 17, 2009, the Canadian registration was expunged. Id. 47.
marketing or distribution of Plaintiffs Naturally Zero water. Id. 63.
ZERO, which was the first product it sold in the United States that included ZERO in its name.
of marks that include its well-known brand names such as COCA-COLA, SPRITE and FANTA.
there is no genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
4021, 2014 WL 1245264, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 26, 2014).
lack secondary meaning, i.e., they do not become uniquely associated with the original seller.
secondary meaning . . . it could not be a legally protected trademark.); Timelines, Inc. v.
whether it has acquired secondary meaning. Each issue is addressed in turn below.
distinctiveness: (1) generic, (2) descriptive, (3) suggestive, (4) arbitrary, and (5) fanciful.
acquires secondary meaning in the collective consciousness of the relevant community. Id.
(quoting MilMar Shoe Co., Inc. v. Shonac Corp., 75 F.3d 1153, 1157 (7th Cir. 1996).
entitled to trademark protection. Id. (citing Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 76768).
describes the ingredients and qualities of natural spring water, and thus is not protectable.
considered the record, the Court concludes that the mark is descriptive.
and no harmful, artificial ingredients. Id. 13.
characteristic of drink as perceived by consumer. Similarly, in Henris Food Prods. Co., Inc. v.
descriptive because tasty described the quality of, rather than type of, the product at issue.
based on the facts in the record. The Court agrees.
application of judicial estoppel. Jarrad v. CDI Telecomms., Inc., 408 F.3d 905, 914 (7th Cir.
same in both cases. Id. at 915.
was based upon their acquisition of secondary meaning. See infra Section I.B.2; 2d Baber Decl.
trademark. Id. (quoting Gimix, Inc. v. JS&A Grp., Inc., 699 F.2d 901, 907 (7th Cir. 1983)).
*4 (quoting Spex, Inc. v. Joy of Spex, Inc., 847 F. Supp. 567, 576 (N.D. Ill. 1994)).
consumer surveys. Platinum, 149 F.3d at 728 (citing Intl Kennel Club of Chicago, Inc. v.
has not acquired secondary meaning.
distributors, and that they operated a website for their product for at least some period of time.
distributor may have done so. Def.s LR 56.1(a)(3) Stmt. 23-24; Pl.s LR 56.1(b)(3)(B) Stmt.
water has been sold or bottled since 2004. Def.s LR 56.1(a)(3) Stmt. 48-50.
was expunged in 2009. Id. 42, 47.
Las Vegas in 1999 and Plaintiffs now-defunct and infrequently-visited website. Id. 28, 31, 58.
copying. Thus, the Court does not consider these factors as part of its analysis.
to entitle them to a presumption of acquired distinctiveness.
summary judgment. Id. But Plaintiffs cite no case law that supports either of these propositions.
protectable, and their Lanham Act claim necessarily fails.
any actual confusion exists; and (7) the defendant's intent to palm off its goods as those of the plaintiffs.
Count I on the bases outlined above. Spraying Sys. Co. v. Delavan, Inc., 975 F.2d 387, 392 (7th Cir.
where use of the mark has been discontinued with intent not to resume such use. 15 U.S.C.
sufficiently distinctive to warrant prima facie protection as a trademark.)).
agreement between Baig and Robert Corr as evidence of their intent to resume use of the mark.
mark between 2004 and 2010 involved pursuing their infringement claims against Defendant.
abandonment. Silverman v. CBS Inc., 870 F.2d 40, 47-48 (2d Cir. 1989).
on Trademarks and Unfair Competition 17:11 (4th ed.) (a lawsuit against an infringing user . .
. does not substitute for the required use of the mark in the marketplace).
venture to reintroduce NATURALLY ZERO products into the marketplace. Id. Ex. EE; Pls.
v. Howard D. Wolf & Assocs., 955 F.2d 847, 851 (2d Cir. 1992).
grants summary judgment to Defendants with respect to Count I on this independent basis.
2007. Pl.s Resp. Mot. 17-18. Such minimal contact does little to bolster Plaintiffs argument.
has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
over Count II and dismisses it without prejudice.

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