Source: https://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-9th-circuit/1706233.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 17:04:04+00:00

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Plaintiffs are veterans' organizations and individuals who were subjects in these experiments. They filed an individual and class action complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the Department of Defense (“DOD”), the Army, the Central Intelligence Agency (“CIA”), and the Department of Veterans Affairs (“VA”). The class comprises “[a]ll current or former members of the armed forces, who, while serving in the armed forces, were test subjects” in these experimentation programs. Two of Plaintiffs' claims, brought under § 706(1) of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), are at issue in this appeal. Plaintiffs claim, first, that the Army has unlawfully failed to notify test subjects of new medical and scientific information relating to their health as it becomes available. They claim, second, that the Army has unlawfully withheld medical care for diseases or conditions proximately caused by their exposures to chemicals during the experiments.
As relevant to this suit, beginning in 1942 the War Department (as it was then called) approved the use of human subjects in experiments to test the effects of chemical weapons. Some experiments tested the effectiveness of various chemical agents, while others tested the effectiveness of protective clothing and other defenses. By the end of World War II, more than 60,000 service members had served as subjects in the United States' chemical weapons research program.
In the 1950s, DOD initiated a new wave of chemical weapons research and experimentation, focused on “agents perceived to pose greater threats than sulfur mustard or Lewisite,” such as nerve agents and chemicals with “intense psychoactive properties.” These experiments were conducted over the course of about twenty years, from 1955 to 1975. During the course of this research, DOD exposed about 6,700 human subjects to more than 250 different chemical and biological agents.
Beginning in the 1950s, the Army established policies and issued regulations governing the use of human subjects. On February 26, 1953, Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson sent a memorandum (“the Wilson Directive”) to the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. The Wilson Directive set conditions for “the use of human volunteers by the Department of Defense in experimental research in the fields of atomic, biological and/or chemical warfare.” It stated that “[t]he voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential,” and instructed that a volunteer subject “should have sufficient knowledge and comprehension of the elements of the subject matter involved as to enable him to make an understanding and enlightened decision” about participating.
In 1981 and 1986, the Army took two actions relevant to the notification program: it amended one record system and created another. The first system, the Research and Experimental Case Files, as amended in 1981, compiled a database about “[v]olunteers (military members, Federal civilian employees, state prisoners) who participated in Army tests of potential chemical agents and/or antidotes from the early 1950's until the program ended in 1975.” Privacy Act of 1974; Amendment to System Notice, 46 Fed.Reg. 60,639, 60,640 (Dec. 11, 1981). The purposes of the system were “(1) to follow up on individuals who voluntarily participated in Army chemical/biological agent research projects for the purpose of assessing risks/hazards to them, and (2) for retrospective medical/scientific evaluation and future scientific and legal significance.” Id. The second system, the Medical Research Volunteer Registry, newly created in 1986, was designed to maintain “[r]ecords of military members, civilian employees, and non-DOD civilian volunteers participating in current and future research sponsored by the U.S. Army Medical Research and Development Command.” Privacy Act of 1974; New Record System, 51 Fed.Reg. 23,576, 23,577 (June 30, 1986). One of the stated purposes of the second system was “[t]o assure that the U.S. Army Medical Research and Development Command (USAMRDC) can contact individuals who participated in research conducted/sponsored by the Command in order to provide them with newly acquired information, which may have an impact on their health.” Id.
In the decades since the termination of chemical testing on human subjects, Defendants have identified, contacted, and notified some of the former subjects. For example, in 1990 DOD contacted 128 veterans who had participated in World War II mustard gas testing. In 2004, DOD identified 6,387 individuals who had been exposed to mustard gas or other agents during World War II-era experiments. Beginning in March 2005, the VA sent letters to the 319 of those individuals for whom it could find contact information.
We review a district court's summary judgment de novo. Or. Natural Res. Council v. Allen, 476 F.3d 1031, 1036 (9th Cir.2007). A permanent injunction “ ‘involves factual, legal, and discretionary components,” ’ so we “review a decision to grant such relief under several different standards.” Momot v. Mastro, 652 F.3d 982, 986 (9th Cir.2011) (quoting Walters v. Reno, 145 F.3d 1032, 1047 (9th Cir.1998)). We review legal conclusions underlying the summary judgment de novo, factual findings for clear error, and the scope of the injunction for abuse of discretion. Id.
Section 706(1) of the APA provides that a court “shall compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(1). A court can compel agency action under this section only if there is “a specific, unequivocal command” placed on the agency to take a “discrete agency action,” and the agency has failed to take that action. Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance (SUWA ), 542 U.S. 55, 63–64 (2004) (citation omitted). The agency action must be pursuant to a legal obligation “so clearly set forth that it could traditionally have been enforced through a writ of mandamus.” Hells Canyon Pres. Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 593 F.3d 923, 932 (9th Cir.2010). Plaintiffs argue that AR 70–25 imposes unequivocal commands on the Army to provide former test subjects with current information about their health, and to provide medical care for diseases caused by the experiments. We agree.
We conclude that Chapter 3–2(h) of AR 70–25 (“subsection (h)”), as promulgated in 1988 and 1990, requires the Army to provide former test subjects with “newly acquired information” regarding their health as that information becomes available. We agree with the district court that this “duty to warn” applies not only to future human subjects, but also to test subjects who participated in experiments predating the regulation. We hold, further, that the district court did not abuse its discretion in issuing an injunction enforcing this duty.
Our reading is also consistent with the amending and creating of databases in 1981 and 1986. As we describe above, in 1981 the Army amended a database that included members of the military who had previously volunteered for human testing in order “to follow up on individuals who voluntarily participated in Army chemical/biological agent research projects for the purpose of assessing risks/hazards to them.” Privacy Act of 1974; Amendment to System Notice, 46 Fed.Reg. 60,639, 60,640 (Dec. 11, 1981). Then, in 1986, the Army created a new database that included members of the military “participating in current and future research” in order to “contact individuals who participated” in such research in order to provide them with “newly acquired information, which may have an impact on their health.” Privacy Act of 1974; New Record System, 51 Fed.Reg. 23,576, 23,577 (June 30, 1986). The Army clearly anticipated using these databases to provide ongoing medical health information to the volunteers who had participated in the Army's chemical and biological research experiments before 1988.
Despite the foregoing, Defendants contend that subsection (h) applies only to human subjects upon whom experiments were performed after 1988. They contend that subsection (h) is ambiguous and that under Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997), we must defer to the interpretation that the Army has proposed during this litigation. We find no ambiguity in the text of subsection (h). But even if subsection (h) were ambiguous, Auer deference is inappropriate.
Under Auer, “[a]n administrative rule may receive substantial deference if it interprets the issuing agency's own ambiguous regulation.” Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 255 (2006). Auer deference is not warranted in all circumstances. Deference is not warranted “when there is reason to suspect that the agency's interpretation ‘does not reflect the agency's fair and considered judgment on the matter in question.” ’ Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S.Ct. 2156, 2166 (2012) (quoting Auer, 519 U.S. at 462). “This might occur when ․ it appears that the interpretation is nothing more than a ‘convenient litigating position,” ’ id. (quoting Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hospital, 488 U.S. 204, 213 (1988)), or a “ ‘post hoc rationalizatio[n]’ advanced by an agency seeking to defend past agency action against attack,” id. (quoting Auer, 519 U.S. at 462) (emphasis and alteration in original).
The precise efforts Defendants must take to identify human subjects in past experiments, and the precise content of the notice to those subjects who have been identified, necessarily entail some discretionary judgment. But discretion in the manner in which the Defendants' duty may be carried out does not mean that the Defendants do not have a duty to perform a “discrete action” within the meaning of § 706(a) and SUWA. See SUWA, 542 U.S. at 65 (“[W]hen an agency is compelled by law to act ․ but the manner of its action is left to the agency's discretion, a court can compel the agency to act, but has no power to specify what the action must be.”); Firebaugh Canal Co. v. United States, 203 F.3d 568, 578 (9th Cir.2000) (“Although the district court can compel the Department of Interior to provide drainage service as mandated by the San Luis Act, the district court cannot eliminate agency discretion as to how it satisfies the drainage requirement.”).
The Army argues that the district court's injunction is improper in its scope and duration. We disagree.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in entering this injunction. It expressly preserves the Army's ability to act “in its discretion” to develop the appropriate policies in order to carry out that duty. It does not prescribe particular policies that the Army should follow. It does not even specify the means by which the Army must give that notice. In this respect, the injunction does not amount to programmatic oversight or “judicial entanglement in abstract policy disagreements which courts lack both expertise and information to solve.” SUWA, 542 U.S. at 66. The injunction simply directs the Army to fulfill its duty under subsection (h).
We conclude that subsection (k), as promulgated in 1988 and 1990, requires the Army to provide former test subjects with medical care for any injuries or diseases that were proximately caused by Army experiments in which they participated. The fact that the VA provides medical care to some former test subjects, for reasons independent of AR 7025, does not relieve the Army of its duty under that subsection.
The text of subsection (k) compels the conclusion that the Army must provide care to former test subjects. It provides that “[v]olunteers are authorized all necessary medical care” for any injuries or diseases that are the proximate result of their participation in Army experiments. The key to a proper understanding of subsection (k) is the word “authorized.” The natural reading of the word “authorized” is that the volunteers are entitled to receive the “necessary medical care” specified in the subsection. To take a familiar example, when a collective bargaining agreement says that an employee is authorized a certain amount of sick leave, the employee is entitled to that leave. She must show that she is actually sick—just as test subjects must show they suffer from diseases that are a proximate result of their participation in government experiments—but if she can do so, she is entitled to take time off for sick leave. The meaning of “authorized” is no different here.
The background of AR 70–25 is consistent with the natural reading of “authorized.” The current version of subsection (k) was promulgated in 1988. But this was not the first time that the Army pledged to provide medical care. In the 1962 and 1974 versions of AR 70–25, the Army stated that “[a]ll apparatus and instruments necessary to deal with likely emergency situations will be available,” that “[r]equired medical treatment and hospitalization will be provided for all casualties,” and that “[a] physician approved by The Surgeon General [of the Army] will be responsible for the medical care of volunteers.” In stating that medical treatment and hospitalization “will be provided,” the Army undertook to provide that care. There is no evidence in the record that the Army intended to restrict volunteers' access to medical care when, in the 1988 version of AR 70–25, it replaced that language with subsection (k). If the Army intended to go back on its pledge to provide medical care, it would hardly have done so by providing that “volunteers are authorized” to receive medical care.
In its brief, the government accepts that subsection (k) requires the Army to provide necessary medical care for injuries or diseases that are the proximate result of volunteers' participation in Army experiments. But the Army reads a temporal limitation into the Army's obligation to provide medical care. That is, the Army believes it must provide medical care to volunteers only for the duration of their participation in experiments. If the Army is right that the conceded obligation in subsection (k) contains such a temporal limitation, Plaintiffs' claim to ongoing medical care must fail. However, if the Army is wrong on this point, it has effectively conceded that it has a duty to provide ongoing medical care to Plaintiffs.
The government argues in its brief that “the early versions of AR 70–25 make clear that the only medical care contemplated under that regulation was care during the pendency of the relevant testing program itself. Nothing in any of the later versions of AR 70–25 expands the limited scope of medical care available beyond the period that an individual is participating in a specific experiment.” We do not agree. We see nothing in the text of the current version of AR 70–25, or its predecessor versions, to support a conclusion that the Army's duty to provide medical care ends as soon as the experiment ends. The Army's argument is inconsistent with the plain text of subsection (k), which states, “Volunteers are authorized all necessary medical care for injury or disease that is a proximate result of their participation in research.” Nothing in this language states or even suggests a temporal restriction on volunteers' entitlement to receive medical care. Not only is the Army's argument inconsistent with the text, but it also makes little sense. If the Army is right, volunteers were entitled to medical care if they became sick during the actual experiment, but not if they fell sick as a result of the experiment the day after it ended.
In sum, we agree with the government that subsection (k) requires the Army to provide medical care to all of those authorized to receive it. We simply disagree as to the period during which the care must be provided. The temporal limitation for which the government argues cannot be found in the text of subsection (k). Instead, the text compels the conclusion that the only limitation is causal. We hold, as did the district court, that “AR 70–25 entitles [Plaintiffs] to medical care for disabilities, injuries or illnesses caused by their participation in government experiments,” not only during the course of the experiment but also after the experiment has ended.
In Forest Guardians v. Babbitt, 174 F.3d 1178 (10th Cir.1999), the Tenth Circuit held that once a failure to act has been established under § 706(1), the reviewing court must compel the agency to act. Id. at 1187. The Tenth Circuit recognized that while a court generally has discretion to deny injunctive relief to remedy a statutory violation, “Congress may ‘restrict [ ] the court's jurisdiction in equity’ by making injunctive relief mandatory for a violation.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Weinberger v. Romero–Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 313 (1982)). The Tenth Circuit held that “when a statute uses the word ‘shall,” ’ as § 706(1) does, “Congress has imposed a mandatory duty upon the subject of the command.” Id. We agree with the Tenth Circuit that § 706(1) requires a reviewing court to issue injunctive relief whenever it finds that an agency action has been unlawfully withheld. Id.
The district court concluded that the Army is required under subsection (k) to provide necessary medical care on an ongoing basis, but held that an injunction was unnecessary, given the availability of medical care from the VA. The court explained that it would “not enjoin one government agency to provide health care when another agency has been congressionally mandated to do so.” Notably, however, the district court did not hold that the availability of medical care from the VA rendered Plaintiffs' request for an injunction moot. Nor do Defendants argue to us that the availability of medical care from the VA renders the Plaintiffs' request moot. We can readily see why they do not make such an argument, for there is nothing in the record upon which to base a conclusion that the medical care available from the VA would be equal in scope and quality to the medical care that Plaintiffs claim is owed to them by the Army. Indeed, the government admitted in the district court that it does not provide medical care to former test subjects “in the absence of those [former subjects] being retirees of the military, medical retirees, reservists or active duty military.” In the absence of mootness, we cannot agree that the Army's duty to provide care is excused by the availability of medical care from another government agency, even if that care that would overlap to some degree and in some manner with the care that the Army is required to provide.
We hold that Chapter 3–2(h) of AR 70–25 imposes a duty on the Army to provide all former test subjects with newly acquired information that may affect their well-being, and that this duty is judicially enforceable under § 706(1). We hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in entering its injunction to enforce that duty. We hold, further, that the district court was right to find that Chapter 3–1(k) imposes a duty to provide medical care. The district court did not, however, have the power to decline to compel care on the ground that another agency was providing similar care to some former test subjects. We therefore vacate the district court's summary judgment for the government on this claim and remand to the district court.
“Section 706(1) of the APA ․ serves important interests, but [it] does not give us license to ‘compel agency action’ whenever the agency is withholding or delaying an action we think it should take.” Hells Canyon Pres. Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 593 F.3d 923, 932 (9th Cir.2010). Rather, our authority to “compel agency action” is “carefully circumscribed to situations where an agency has ignored a specific ․ command,” id., that is located in a federal statute or “agency regulation[ ] that ha[s] the force of law,” Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance (SUWA), 542 U.S. 55, 65 (2004). Moreover, the “purportedly withheld action must not only be ‘discrete,” ’ Hells Canyon, 593 F.3d at 932, meaning that it must be a “precise, definite act,” SUWA, 542 U .S. at 63, “but also ‘legally required,” ’ 593 F.3d at 932, meaning that the text of the statute or regulation contains an “unequivocal command” about which an official has “no discretion whatever,” 542 U.S. at 63 (internal quotation marks omitted), such that the duty “could traditionally have been enforced through a writ of mandamus.” Hells Canyon, 593 F.3d at 932.
Because our inquiry under section 706(1) is necessarily limited to whether the text of the relevant Army regulations states a specific, unequivocal command to take discrete agency action, I cannot join the majority's perusal of “internal agency discussions in the years leading up to the 1988 and 1990 revisions of [AR 70–25],” nor its discussion of the Army's creation of volunteer databases in 1981 and 1986. The majority includes these historical observations because it believes they support our reading of AR 70–25. They do, of course, but that is irrelevant. Our job is to determine only whether a statute or regulation itself objectively creates a mandatory duty. As we have previously held, it is inappropriate “for us to divine a ‘specific, unequivocal command,’ from an amalgamation of disputed statutory provisions and legislative history coupled with the [agency's] own earlier interpretation.” Our Children's Earth Found., 527 F.3d at 851, quoting SUWA, 542 U.S. at 63. To be sure, the majority does not rely exclusively-or even chiefly-on non-textual sources in concluding that the Army has an unequivocal duty to warn. But by including a discussion of regulatory history and historical facts in support of its textual analysis, the majority improperly suggests that these extra-textual sources and observations have some bearing on whether we are authorized to compel unlawfully withheld agency action under section 706(1). I write separately to dispel any doubt: they do not. I thus join in the result but not that part of the majority's analysis.
The majority derives no legitimate support for its position from examining the now-defunct 1962 and 1974 versions of AR 70–25. For the reasons stated in Part I of my separate opinion, this history is simply irrelevant to the textual analysis the Supreme Court requires us to undertake when analyzing a section 706(1) claim. SUWA, 542 U.S. at 63.

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