Source: http://masscases.com/cases/app/50/50massappct346.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 17:51:27+00:00

Document:
Present: JACOBS, RAPOZA, & GELINAS, JJ.
CIVIL ACTION commenced in the Superior Court Department on October 11, 1996.
The case was heard by Thomas E. Connolly, J.
Gregory F Galvin for the plaintiff.
George E. Lane, Jr, for the defendant.
"The amount of blasting on site is too extensive. The length of time to complete the blasting, the number of trucks used to haul the blast material, associated noise and dust will be detrimental to the neighborhood."
We vacate the judgment. We also vacate the board's decision insofar as it is based upon this ground.
Procedural background. The plaintiff sought review of the board's decision in the Superior Court pursuant to G. L. c. 41, s. 81BB. That review was conducted on the basis of the parties' joint statement of agreed facts, which was submitted with a request that the court, "in lieu of a trial," render a decision based on those facts [Note 2]. The joint statement presented the issue to be determined as "[w]hether blasting, for which . . . the issuance of a permit rests with the discretion of the local fire department may be a factor in a local planning board's decision to deny approval to a definitive subdivision plan." The only facts in the submissions to the court bearing on that issue were that the board "expressed concerns relative to the amount of blasting that would have to take place in order for the applicant to complete the subdivision. From start to finish, it was estimated that twelve (12) to eighteen (18) months of blasting would have to occur."
inhabitants of the Town of Weymouth by regulating the laying out and construction of ways in subdivisions . . . insuring sanitary conditions in the subdivision . . . the powers of the Planning Board shall be exercised with due regard for . . . reducing danger of life and limb in the operation of motor vehicles . . . securing safety in the case of fire, flood, panic and other emergencies . . . securing adequate provision for water, sewage, drainage . . . and other requirements where necessary in a subdivision. Rules and Regulations Governing the Subdivision of Land, Weymouth, Massachusetts: s. 1.1 Purposes."
Relying exclusively on that provision, he concluded: "It is clear that the extensive blasting required to remove approximately 80,000 cubic yards of rock over a twelve to eighteen month period is a valid factor for the Board to consider in protecting the 'safety, convenience and welfare of the inhabitants of the Town of Weymouth.'"
Discussion. "A planning board exceeds its authority if requirements are imposed beyond those established by the rules and regulations." Beale v. Planning Bd. of Rockland, 423 Mass. 690 , 696 (1996), and cases cited. "A planning board's subdivision rules and regulations thus define the standards that owners must meet . . . as well as the grounds upon which a planning board may disapprove a plan [Note 3]. Ibid. Those rules and regulations must be "comprehensive, reasonably definite, and carefully drafted, so that owners may know in advance what is or may be required of them and what standards and procedures will be applied to them." Castle Estates, Inc. v. Park and Planning Bd. of Medfield, 344 Mass. at 334.
The purpose section of the town of Weymouth subdivision rules and regulations mirrors the purpose provision of the subdivision control law as set out in G. L. c. 41, s. 81M. Clearly contemplated by a subsequent section of that statute, s. 81Q, is the adoption of comprehensive rules and regulations that are faithful to the fulfillment of that purpose, broadly stated as "protecting the safety, convenience and welfare of the inhabitants of the cities and towns [Note 4]." G.L.c. 41, s. 81M.
such regulation. It would defeat the established objective of permitting owners to "know in advance what is or may be required of them and what standards and procedures will be applied to them," Castle Estates, Inc. v. Park and Planning Bd. of Medfield, 344 Mass. at 334, if a planning board were permitted to base its disapproval of a subdivision plan exclusively upon the "safety, convenience, and welfare" provision of the purpose clause of its regulations.
rejected merely "because the board feels general public considerations make such action desirable." Pieper v. Planning Bd of Southborough, 340 Mass. 157 , 163-164 (1959). A planning board does not have a roving commission. "The only purposes recognized [by s. 81M] are to provide suitable ways for access furnished with appropriate municipal utilities, and to secure sanitary conditions." 1953 House Doc. 2249, at 54, the report of the special commission on planning and zoning. Daley Constr Co. v. Planning Bd. of Randolph, 340 Mass. 149 , 153 (1959). Bobrowski, Massachusetts Land Use & Planning Law s. 14.2 (1993).
Accordingly, we vacate the judgment insofar as it is based upon the first reason in the board's decision and remand the case to the Superior Court for a determination of the status of the board's second reason for denial (see note 1, supra). Unless it is finally determined that the plaintiff has waived judicial review of the second reason for denial, or unless the issue relating to that reason was reserved for later determination, the matter is to be remanded by the Superior Court to the board for further action on the plaintiffs definitive subdivision plan.
[Note 1] The second ground for rejection was stated as: "The detention basin is too big. The basin extends across too many lots, (3) three, takes up too much of the lot area on each of the lots and the sides are too high." In its complaint, the plaintiff set forth both grounds of rejection followed by a general allegation that the board exceeded its authority in denying the subdivision plan. The judge, in his decision, noted both grounds for disapproval but did not address the second ground in the course of affirming the board's decision. The plaintiff's brief alludes to the second ground only to argue that it could have addressed the board's concerns if it had been allowed to do so and that, in any event, neither the town's engineering office nor board of health objected to the detention basin. The board, in its brief, addressed only the blasting issue. On this record, we are unsure whether the issue respecting the board's second ground for denial was waived or reserved for later determination in the Superior Court or whether the parties have reached a settlement on the matter.
[Note 2] By further agreement made in open court, the parties submitted the subdivision plans that had been filed with the board and the affidavits of an engineer and a member of the board.
[Note 3] A planning board also has authority (not here at issue) to reject a plan if the proposed subdivision plan violates zoning requirements. See G. L. c. 41, s.s. 81M & 81Q; Beale v. Planning Bd. of Rockland, supra at 695-696.
[Note 4] General Laws c. 41, s. 81Q, provides in pertinent part that "a planning board shall adopt . . . rules and regulations ... [that] set forth the requirements of the board . . . which requirements shall be established in such manner as to carry out the purposes of the subdivision control law as set forth in section eighty-one M."
[Note 5] Our record does not contain the permit alluded to by the judge and the parties as having been issued by the town fire department, nor does it indicate the basis or procedure for its issuance other than references during hearings before the planning board to the fire department's being bound by new regulations that require a public hearing. We note that the State Board of Fire Prevention Regulations has promulgated comprehensive provisions regarding blasting and the use of explosives under authority of G.L. c. 148, s. 9. See 527 Code Mass. Regs. s.s. 13 et seq. (1996). Under G. L. c. 148, s. 10A, and 527 Code Mass. Regs. s. 13.04(11) (1996), a town or city fire chief may issue a blasting permit ("Use and Handling" permit) consistent with rules and guidelines within those regulations. In Worcester Sand & Gravel Co. v. Board of Fire Prevention Regulations, 400 Mass. 464 , 466 (1987), the court observed that the Board of Fire Prevention Regulations "itself has long interpreted the statute as granting it exclusive and plenary jurisdiction to regulate all aspects of blasting in the Commonwealth. The board's consistent, long-standing interpretation of its own authority is entitled to a large degree of deference."
If a fire chief's authority over blasting is likewise exclusive, there is analogous authority indicating that a planning board may not limit or prohibit blasting for which the fire chief has issued a permit. See Sullivan v. Planning Bd. of Acton, 38 Mass. App. Ct. 918 , 919-921 (1995). We need not address whether certain construction events incidental to blasting, such as the hauling away of blast materials and abatement of noise and dust, are within the regulatory jurisdiction of other municipal authorities.
[Note 6] The record does not indicate whether the planned blasting was related to the "laying out and construction of ways" in the subdivision and neither the judge nor the board relied on that quoted portion of the purpose clause in their decisions.

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