Source: http://pa.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20110909_0000681.WPA.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 16:27:27+00:00

Document:
The opinion of the court was delivered by: Conti, District Judge.
Pending before the court is a motion to decertify the conditionally certified collective action (ECF No. 1608). The motion was filed by defendant Alderwoods Group ("Alderwoods" or "defendant") on January 31, 2011. Plaintiffs Deborah Prise and Heather Rady (together with opt-in plaintiffs, "plaintiffs"), on behalf of themselves and all employees similarly situated, moved to conditionally certify a collective action pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Defendant asserts the conditionally certified class is ripe for decertification because, after years of litigation and extensive discovery, plaintiffs, who number in excess of seven hundred, did not meet their burden under the FLSA to demonstrate they are similarly situated. Because plaintiffs did not satisfy their burden to show they are similarly situated, the motion to decertify will be granted.
On January 31, 2011, defendant filed the motion for decertification of the conditionally certified collective action. On June 13, 2011, the court held oral argument on the decertification motion and other outstanding miscellaneous motions. The court permitted the parties to conduct a one-hour supplemental deposition of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(6) witness Ron Collins ("Collins"), an Alderwoods‟ vice president of operations for the Northeast United States and Canada from 1999 to 2006 (Def.‟s Reply (ECF No. 1616), Ex. I ¶ 2.), and requested supplemental briefing concerning the overlapping legal standards, if any, between class action certification under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and collective action certification under § 216(b). The parties filed their supplemental briefing with the court and the decertification motion is ripe for consideration.
Alderwoods is a national corporation engaged in the funeral home business. (Am. Compl. at 2.) Generally, the 721 opt-in plaintiffs are nonexempt employees or former employees of Alderwoods who allege they were suffered or permitted to work by Alderwoods and not paid their regular or statutorily required rate of pay for all hours worked. (Id. at 3; Def.‟s Mot. at 4.) Sample plaintiffs are representative of Alderwoods‟ national presence, hailing from states such as Pennsylvania, Georgia, California, Oklahoma, Louisiana, Alaska, Kansas, Texas, Arizona, Indiana and Washington.
[t]ime spent in work for public or charitable purposes at the employer‟s request, or under his direction or control or while the employee is required to be on the premises, is working time. However, time spent voluntarily in such activities outside of the employee‟s normal working hours is not hours worked.
29 C.F.R. § 785.44; see Falcon v. Starbucks Corp., 580 F. Supp. 2d 528, 540 (S.D. Tex. 2008) (triable issue existed concerning whether plaintiffs performed required or voluntary community work under 29 C.F.R. § 785.44). Plaintiffs contend that, at a minimum, Alderwoods requested employees to perform public or charitable work, and its failure to compensate employees for that work violated the FLSA.
Second, plaintiffs argue that Alderwoods‟ mandatory community leadership program ("CLP") emphasized and supported employee involvement in community activities. (See generally Pls.‟ App. Exs. 17-22.) Third, plaintiffs rely upon, inter alia, the deposition testimony of sample plaintiffs and Collins to support their position that Alderwoods required nonexempt hourly employees to perform community work after-hours and failed to compensate them for that work.
Alderwoods argues that sample plaintiffs‟ testimony differed substantially on whether they were required to do community work, the type of community work performed, time reporting and compensation practices related to community work and the relief they seek.
Plaintiffs allege Alderwoods maintained a corporate-wide policy of suffering or permitting employees to perform various duties while on-call, but not compensating employees for all the time they spent performing on-call work. Plaintiffs assert that opt-in testimony reflected a corporate-wide policy of not recording and compensating employees for work performed while on-call. Specifically, plaintiffs separate their claims for on-call pay into three subgroups: piecework, continuous workday, and phone calls.
Plaintiffs allege Alderwoods maintained a corporate-wide policy requiring approval for overtime, but refused to pay for all overtime worked despite suffering or permitting overtime work. Plaintiffs cite 29 C.F.R. § 785.13 for the proposition that Alderwoods was responsible for preventing employees from performing overtime, and in many instances it failed to do so and did not properly compensate those employees. "An employer who has knowledge that an employee is working and who does not desire the work to be done, has a duty to make every effort to prevent its performance." Chao v. Gotham Registry, Inc., 514 F.3d 280, 288 (2d Cir. 2008). The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit emphasized in Chao that "[t]his duty arises even where the employer has not requested overtime be performed or does not desire the employee to work, or where the employee fails to report his overtime hours." Id.; see Camesi v. University of Pittsburgh Med. Ctr., No. 09-85, 2009 WL 1361265, at *4 (W.D. Pa. May 14, 2009) (the law is clear that it is the employer‟s responsibility to ensure compensation for work suffered or permitted).
Plaintiffs direct the court to several memoranda and other documents for the proposition that it was Alderwoods‟ corporate-wide policy that overtime would be uncompensated if the employee did not obtain preapproval. (See Pls.‟ App., Ex. 54.)*fn9 Plaintiffs also rely upon sample plaintiffs‟ testimony to support their position that employees were affected by this corporate- wide policy and, therefore, the collective class is similarly situated for purposes of collective action certification.

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