Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/454/139/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 00:24:26+00:00

Document:
Section 102(2)(C) of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) requires all federal agencies, "to the fullest extent possible," to include an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) in proposals for major federal actions significantly affecting the environment, and also requires the EIS to be made available to the public, subject to the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). With respect to the construction in Hawaii of new ammunition and weapons storage facilities containing magazines capable of storing nuclear weapons, the Navy prepared an Environmental Impact Assessment, which concluded that the new facilities would have no significant environmental impact, and therefore no EIS was prepared. Because the information is classified for national security reasons, the Navy's regulations forbid it either to admit or to deny that nuclear weapons are actually stored at the now-completed facilities. Before construction of the facilities was completed, respondents brought an action in Federal District Court seeking an injunction against the building of the facilities until an EIS had been filed. The District Court held that, in view of, inter alia, the Navy's own regulations, the Navy had complied with NEPA "to the fullest extent possible" within the meaning of 102(2)(C). The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that § 102(2)(C) requires the Navy to prepare and release to the public a "Hypothetical Environmental Impact Statement" with regard to a facility capable of storing nuclear weapons.
Held: The Court of Appeals erred in requiring the Navy to prepare and release to the public a "Hypothetical Environmental Impact Statement." Pp. 454 U. S. 143-147.
(a) In inventing such a statement, the Court of Appeals departed from Congress' express intent manifested by the explicit language in § 102(2)(C) providing that public disclosure of an EIS should be governed by the FOIA. Here, Exemption 1 of the FOIA, which exempts from disclosure classified material dealing with national security, such as information relating to the storage of nuclear weapons, is applicable. Pp. 454 U. S. 143-145.
(b) Moreover, by requiring such a statement, the Court of Appeals required the production of a document that would not exist save for what that court thought to be NEPA's disclosure requirements. If the Navy would not be required by the FOIA to release an EIS were one already prepared, it is obviously not required to prepare a "hypothetical" EIS nowhere mentioned in NEPA. P. 454 U. S. 145.
(c) The Navy is not required to prepare an EIS simply because the facilities in question are "nuclear capable," but rather it is the proposal to store nuclear weapons at those facilities that would trigger the obligation to prepare an EIS. Here, it has not been and cannot be established whether the Navy had made such a proposal. P. 454 U. S. 146.
REHNQUIST, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and WHITE, MARSHALL, POWELL, STEVENS, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. BLACKMUN, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which BRENNAN, J., joined, post, p. 454 U. S. 147.
of a facility capable of storing nuclear weapons. Catholic Action of Hawaii/Peace Education Project v. Brown, 643 F.2d 569, 572 (1980). Because we conclude that the "Hypothetical Environmental Impact Statement" is a creature of judicial cloth, not legislative cloth, and that it is not mandated by any of the statutory or regulatory provisions upon which the Court of Appeals relied, we reverse its decision.
and transportation of nuclear weapons, but does not refer to any specific site or storage facility. It concludes that no significant hazards to the environment are present.
In March, 1978, respondents brought this action seeking an injunction against the building of the new facilities at West Loch until an EIS had been filed. Their principal complaint was that the Navy's EIA had ignored the enhanced risk of a nuclear accident resulting from West Loch's proximity to three nearby air facilities, the effects of such an accident on the population and environment of Hawaii, and the effects of radiation from the storage of nuclear weapons in a populated area. The United States District Court for the District of Hawaii concluded that the "construction and use of the storage facilities at West Loch is a major federal action" within the meaning of § 102(2)(C). 468 F.Supp.190, 193 (1979). But given certain national security provisions of the Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2011 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. IV), and the Navy's own regulations concerning nuclear weapons, the District Court concluded that petitioners had complied with NEPA "to the fullest extent possible." 468 F.Supp. at 193. We find it unnecessary to reach the question posed by the District Court's reliance on the security provisions of the Atomic Energy Act, [Footnote 3] since respondents have made no showing in this case that the Navy has failed to comply, or even need comply, with NEPA's requirements regarding the preparation and public disclosure of an EIS.
"include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed statement"
(CEQ), and the public, subject to the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 52 (1976 ed. and Supp. V).
"The thrust of § 102(2)(C) is . . . that environmental concerns be integrated into the very process of agency decisionmaking. The 'detailed statement' it requires is the outward sign that environmental values and consequences have been considered during the planning stage of agency actions."
Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U. S. 347, 442 U. S. 350 (1979). Section 102(2)(C) thus serves twin aims. The first is to inject environmental considerations into the federal agency's decisionmaking process by requiring the agency to prepare an EIS. The second aim is to inform the public that the agency has considered environmental concerns in its decisionmaking process. Through the disclosure of an EIS, the public is made aware that the agency has taken environmental considerations into account. Public disclosure of the EIS is expressly governed by FOIA. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C).
of the storage of nuclear weapons at West Loch without revealing specific information regarding the number and type of nuclear weapons to be stored at the facility. 643 F.2d at 572. The EIS could hypothesize, but not concede, that the facility will be used for the purpose for which it has been made capable. Ibid. But in inventing the "Hypothetical Environmental Impact Statement," the Court of Appeals departed from the express intent of Congress manifested by the explicit language in § 102(2)(C). That language provides that public disclosure of the EIS shall be governed by FOIA. As we concluded in EPA v. Mink, 410 U. S. 73, 410 U. S. 80 (1973), FOIA was intended by Congress to balance the public's need for access to official information with the Government's need for confidentiality. Of the nine exemptions in Subsection (b) of FOIA, we think two are relevant in determining whether the Navy must release an EIS. Exemption 3, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3), which authorizes the withholding of documents "specifically exempted from disclosure by statute," arguably exempts the publication of an EIS under the Atomic Energy Act. But we find it unnecessary to decide this question, because, to us, it is clear that Exemption 1, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1), is applicable.
Exemption 1, and therefore is exempt from the public disclosure requirements of NEPA.
"does not compel agencies to write opinions in cases in which they would not otherwise be required to do so. It only requires disclosure of certain documents which the law requires the agency to prepare or which the agency has decided for its own reasons to create."
See Forsham v. Harris, 445 U. S. 169, 445 U. S. 185-186 (1980); Kissinger v. Reporters Committee, 445 U. S. 136, 445 U. S. 152 (1980). It follows that, if the Navy would not be required by FOIA to release an EIS were one already prepared, it is obviously not required to prepare a "hypothetical" EIS nowhere mentioned in NEPA.
nuclear weapons are stored at West Loch is classified information exempt from disclosure to the public under Exemption 1.
If the Navy proposes to store nuclear weapons at West Loch, the Department of Defense's regulations [Footnote 7] can fairly be read to require that an EIS be prepared solely for internal purposes, even though such a document cannot be disclosed to the public. The Navy must consider environmental consequences in its decisionmaking process, even if it is unable to meet NEPA's public disclosure goals by virtue of FOIA Exemption 1.
It does not follow, however, that the Navy is required to prepare an EIS in this case. The Navy is not required to prepare an EIS regarding the hazards of storing nuclear weapons at West Loch simply because the facility is "nuclear capable." As we held in Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U. S. 390, 427 U. S. 405-406 (1976), an EIS need not be prepared simply because a project is contemplated, but only when the project is proposed. To say that the West Loch facility is "nuclear capable" is to say little more than that the Navy has contemplated the possibility that nuclear weapons, of whatever variety, may at some time be stored here. It is the proposal to store nuclear weapons at West Loch that triggers the Navy's obligation to prepare an EIS. Due to national security reasons, however, the Navy can neither admit nor deny that it proposes to store nuclear weapons at West Loch. In this case, therefore, it has not been and cannot be established that the Navy has proposed the only action that would require the preparation of an EIS dealing with the environmental consequences of nuclear weapons storage at West Loch.
justice, the trial of which would inevitably lead to the disclosure of matters which the law itself regards as confidential, and respecting which it will not allow the confidence to be violated."
Totten v. United States, 92 U. S. 105, 92 U. S. 107 (1876). See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U. S. 1 (1953). We confront a similar situation in the instant case.
42 U.S.C. §§ 2014(y), 2161, 2162, 2271.
Executive Order No. 12065 superseded Executive Order No. 11652, 3 CFR 678 (1971-1975 Comp.), which in turn superseded Executive Order No. 10501, 3 CFR 979 (1949-1953 Comp.). Our decision in EPA v. Mink, 410 U. S. 73 (1973), rested on an application of Executive Order No. 10501. 410 U.S. at 410 U. S. 81, and n. 7, 410 U. S. 84, and n. 9.
"include in every recommendation or report on . . . major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed [environmental impact] statement."
42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (emphasis added). No exception is made for a confidential or classified proposal. Similarly, regulations promulgated by the Council on Environmental Quality provide simply that "environmental impact statements which address classified proposals may be safeguarded and restricted from public dissemination," 40 CFR § 1507.3(c) (1981); the regulations do not -- and could not, consistently with the statute -- suggest that classified proposals are exempt from NEPA's EIS requirement.
"The primary purpose of an environmental impact statement is to serve as an action-forcing device to insure that the policies and goals defined in [NEPA] are infused into the ongoing programs and actions of the Federal Government. . . . An environmental impact statement is more than a disclosure document. It shall be used by Federal officials in conjunction with other relevant material to plan actions and make decisions."
in cases such as the one before us, the EIS "serve practically as an important contribution to the decisionmaking process." § 1502.5.
"[w]hen feasible, [EIS's] shall be organized in such a manner that classified portions are included as annexes so that the unclassified portions can be made available to the public,"
46 Fed.Reg. 22892, 22894 (1981); further, the CEQ agrees that EIS's may be organized in such a way "that the unclassified portions can be made available to the public," 40 CFR § 1507.3(c) (1981). In a given case, then, the military must determine whether the information at issue, consistent with the dictates of the relevant Executive Orders, can be released. That principle is applicable in this and in every other case involving classified military material; I must assume that the Court does not hold differently.
argued that publishing a hypothetical EIS would itself disclose confidential material, and would therefore run afoul of the FOIA's first exemption. And, in any event, as the Court properly notes, ante at 454 U. S. 146, the respondents have yet to establish that any EIS need be prepared for the West Loch project. That is enough to dispose of the question of a hypothetical EIS.
* The Court properly notees that Sears held that the FOIA "does not compel agencies to write opinions in cases in which they would not otherwise be required to do so.'" Ante at 454 U. S. 145, quoting 421 U.S. at 421 U. S. 161-162. The Court goes on to suggest that the Court of Appeals' analysis runs afoul of Sears, because that court "required [the Navy] to prepare a `hypothetical' EIS nowhere mentioned in NEPA." Ante at 454 U. S. 145. But the Court of Appeals did not explicitly require the preparation of a series of hypothetical documents; instead, it stated that "factual information . . . [used in the EIS] can be based on a series of hypotheses," Catholic Action of Hawaii/Peace Education Project v. Brown, 643 F.2d 569, 572 (CA9 1980) (emphasis added), thus authorizing the Navy to prepare advisory studies as a "smokescreen" if it wished to do so.
It could be argued that the Court of Appeals' analysis violates the holding of Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U. S. 390, 427 U. S. 405-406 (1976), where this Court concluded that an EIS need be prepared only when a project is actually proposed; in seeming contradiction of that holding, the Court of Appeals stated that an EIS must be developed "[i]f nuclear storage is a potential choice." 643 F.2d at 571 (emphasis added). But it is less clear to me that the strictures of Sears are relevant here, and I would not reach the question.

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