Source: https://familylaw.typepad.com/virginiafamilylawappeals/domestic_violence/
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 05:49:46+00:00

Document:
Jennings v. Commonwealth (Frank) No. 1625-15-1, Oct. 18, 2016; Norfolk Cir. Ct. (Lannetti) J. Barry McCracken, APD, for appellant; Benjamin H. Katz, AAG, for appellee. VLW 016-7-245(UP), 6 pp.
The defendant and the victim had a child together. He entered the woman’s home at 3:30 a.m. by forcing the air conditioner out of the bedroom window, and went into the daughter’s bedroom. At the time he entered the house, defendant knew the woman had terminated their relationship and had banned him from the house. It is reasonable to infer he knew that the children and their mother would be asleep and any invasion would be frightening and disruptive to the quiet enjoyment of her property. The woman had the right to enjoy the serenity of her home. A rational fact finder could conclude that defendant, who was estranged from the mother and who had recently assaulted her, would be aware that his late-night, surreptitious invasion into the woman’s unlit home would cause her and her children to be fearful and would interfere with her privacy and peaceful enjoyment of her home. Taking into account the history of the relationship between defendant and the woman, as well as his threatening actions following his entry, the evidence was sufficient to uphold his conviction under Va. Code § 18.2-121. The Court of Appeals affirms defendant’s conviction of unlawful entry upon the property of another, for entering his ex-girlfriend’s home, despite defendant’s claim that the evidence did not prove he intended to interfere with the woman’s right to use the property.
expressed exaggerated laughter and gestured to her in a threatening manner. He made the sign of a pistol with his hand and then pulled an imaginary trigger. The judge took judicial notice of the fact that, due to the size of the shopping center, the appellant would have been within 1,000 feet of Ellis’ location anywhere in that lot.
The father claimed there were inconsistencies in the mother's testimony. The Court does not say what they allegedly were, nor refute this accusation; it says that inconsistencies in the winning side's testimony do not matter on appeal. They "go to the weight," not the witness's competency, and the trial judge has the discretion to weigh credibility and accept only the testimony that tends to the conclusion he or she reaches, even if testimony from that same witness contradicts it.
Not remembering the date, and not proving it, does not matter if time is not an element of the crime. Time was an element, to the extent that the offense was only a crime if it happened while the protective order was in effect, but that much was proven by the date given ni the agreed-on Statement of Facts.
The Court found a Statement of Facts acceptable though it was not signed by the trial court judge. It was agreed on by both sides, and stamped with the judge's initials, the word "Seen", and the date of its filing. "In the case of an agreed-upon statement of facts, initials of the trial court are sufficient to comply with the Rules," the Court declares. It notes that initials are allowed to constitute a signature in the Uniform Commercial Code, Black's, Virginia estates law and other contexts. (Citing Pilcher v. Pilcher, 117 Va. 356, 366-67, 84 S.E. 667, 670-71 (1915)). The initials in this case were made "with the intention of authenticating," and they did so. The "Seen" indicates that the judge has reviewed it, which serves the rule's purpose of ensuring an accurate, complete statement of the facts and procedural history.
Also, Rule 5A:8 says only that the judge MAY sign the Statement, not must, and if he believed it was not accurate, he could have done as the Rule provided, and made changes to it.
The federal 4th Circuit Court of Appeals offers guidance on what exactly is a "domestic violence" misdemeanor conviction which makes it illegal to possess firearms under 18 U.S. Code §921(a)(33)(A) and §922(g)(9), in U.S. v. Vinson (7/21/15). The decision turns on the the fact that common-law assault in North Carolina can include several forms, including what is more commonly called assault & battery, and whether what he was convicted of was a charge which "categorically" would always constitute domestic violence. The Circuit court adopt's the government's "modified categorical approach" which establishes that in Vinson's case, the conviction was for domestic violence. It cites the charging document which makes clear that the victim was the defendant's wife, and the conviction judgment which states the exact acts that constituted assault in this case. A dissenting judge says that the majority is essentially taking a very wide crime that includes things that are and are not domestic violence, and claiming that it is functionally divisible into separate crimes, merely because that the charging and convicting documents in this case describe acts that qualify as domestic battery.
Leaving child with mother, who was likely to leave too, was child neglect - Va. Ct. App.
A father's conviction for "contributing to the delinquency of a minor" -- a misleading shorthand term for Virginia Code §18.2-371, which also includes child neglect -- was upheld by the Virginia Court of Appeals based on his lack of credibility and his own statements indicating that he thought the mother might leave a hotel room, too, when he left first during a "volatile situation" with the mother. At least in the Va. Lawyers Weekly summary of the case, it is not debated, but rather is assumed, that if he left under those circumstances, he violated the statute. Their two-year-old was later found wandering around the hotel early in the morning wearing only a diaper.
This decision makes things very hard for parents who decide to leave the premises to prevent an imminent domestic violence situation, unless they are able to take their children with them. Which may increase the likelihood of violence in such a situation.
Virginia's legislative session recently wrapped up, with three new domestic violence bills enacted. Here are the legislature's official summaries, with links to the bills' full texts and other information.
HB 1033 Protective orders, permanent; provides circuit court jurisdiction to hear petitions to modify, dissolve, or extend a permanent protective order if the circuit court issued the order. The bill requires the court, when a protective order is issued, to enter and transfer identifying information to the Virginia Criminal Information Network (VCIN) system. Effective July 1, 2013, any circuit court clerk who does not use the Statewide Case Management System operated and maintained by the Executive Secretary of the Supreme Court shall provide protective orders directly to the Virginia Criminal Information Network. This bill is identical to SB 445.
HB 971 Barrier crimes; adds extortion and felony violations of protective orders to statute. Adds the following crimes to various barrier crimes statutes: abduction, extortion, and felony violations of protective orders. People who have been convicted of or are the subject of pending charges of one of those crimes will not be able to work in a licensed nursing home, home care organization, or hospice and cannot work, volunteer, or provide services on a regular basis at a children's residential facility that is regulated or operated by the Department of Behavioral Health and Developmental Services, certain structured residential programs for juveniles, or children's residential facilities regulated or operated by the Department of Social Services, Education, or Military Affairs. Persons convicted of such crimes cannot be approved by a child-placing agency as adoptive or foster parents and cannot be adult foster care home providers or providers of home-based adult services. In addition, they cannot work at certain schools, assisted living facilities, adult day care centers, child welfare agencies, or family day homes.
SB 300 Protective orders; various changes to provisions governing those issued by court; juveniles; venue. Makes various changes to the provisions governing protective orders issued by a juvenile and domestic relations district court, including (i) clarifying that only violations related to trespass, criminal offenses, acts of abuse, or prohibited contacts are Class 1 misdemeanors; (ii) clarifying that juvenile and domestic relations district courts have jurisdiction over all protective orders that involve juveniles, whether as the alleged victim or as respondent; and (iii) allowing judges to prohibit contact between the respondent and the allegedly abused person or that person's family.
PARENTAL RIGHTS TERMINATION – ABUSE AND NEGLECT – PRIOR REMOVAL AS ELEMENT – DRUG USE ENDANGERING CHILDREN – ATTEMPTED COVER-UP OF ABUSE. The mother in the Farrell v. Warren County DSS case had a separate appeal, and the charges and some issues did in fact differ. Mother’s termination was based on a history of drug abuse and a prior removal of the children from the parental home. While the mother certainly neglected too, the finding in the father’s case, that the father abused and neglected, was based on the twins being placed in danger of death, disfigurement or impairment of bodily or mental functions by their parents. The abuse and neglect of the other child, who was found to have been subjected to major blunt force trauma in father’s case, supported, along with the previous removal, the termination as to the twins. The Court of Appeals says it was proper. It could not be reasonably disputed that the mother’s drug use created the unsafe environment for all three kids that had led to the original removal, and it had never been corrected after that. The mother also neglected the single child’s medical needs and created an unsafe environment for all three in that she had grossly ignored the pediatrician’s expression of concern about the malnutrition and weight loss of the single child, and only brought him back to the doctor when the abuse incident, which caused the child to be hospitalized for a week, dictated it. Mother also hid the fact, though she certainly was aware of it, that the child abused by the father incurred intentional physical injury by him. She concealed information from that child’s doctors at the hospital, declaring falsely that she did not know how he had sustained his brain injuries, and that she had never hit or shaken him and could not believe that the father could have done it. This is all sufficient under §16.1-228(1), in the opinion of the trial court, the Court of Appeals, and prior decisions of the Court of Appeals. Concurring, Judge Petty differs only in that he does not think the majority needed to be as voluminous or as careful as they were.
EVIDENCE – SELF-SERVING VIDEO OF PARENT-CHILD INTERACTION – DEFENSE AGAINST ABUSE ALLEGATIONS – FEE AWARDS AGAINST ABUSE-ALLEGING PARENT. The Court of Appeals rulings in the appeal of a Fairfax custody case would all be fairly interesting and instructive if it were not for the many Rule 5A:18 rulings in the disposition of this appeal. However, a couple of the remaining appellate rulings are worth summarizing for readers. This unpublished case, Jaouni v. Salah, 26 VLW 988 (1/24/12), turned upon denial of a protective order to the mother against her divorced husband, who had visitation rights. The mother had gone to the juvenile court for a protective order alleging that the father physically abused the 8-year-old daughter during visitation, beating her and touching her private parts, which he vehemently denied. And although there had been evaluations by a licensed clinical psychologist of both parents in a separate case, and the trial court allowed this psychologist testimony on the abuse issue, even though the witness was never qualified in this case as an expert. The psychologist testified that the daughter “overly identified with the mother and took responsibility for her happiness.” At the end of the trial in Circuit Court, the judge denied the protective order, ordered the mother to pay $14,000 of father’s attorney’s fees, and denied reconsideration. The Court states that the mother’s objection to the non-expert-qualified psychiatrist’s testimony came too late since it was near the end of the testimony. Moreover, the trial court did not abuse its discretion, it was held, in admitting it. Apparently, the mother’s objection to the psychologist testifying on the daughter’s credibility was overruled, and the appellate court does not interfere with that. The denial of the protective order was well within the trial judge’s discretion, and it certainly appeared that the mother failed to meet her burden of proving the alleged abuse. As for admitting the father’s prepared-for-litigation video tape, it was within the judge’s discretion, as it was relevant and admissible. As for its being self-serving, etc., is concerned, that was harmless since the court well knew that it had been prepared for litigation. The trial court had expressed concern over the mother’s “posturing the daughter for litigation,” and the fee award under §16.1-279.1(E) was not an abuse of discretion. However, the Court of Appeals did remand for an evaluation of the mother’s ability to pay fees, as required by §16.1-278.19.

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