Source: https://litigation.consusgroup.com/2017/09/09/pjt-whacks-securities-troll-barrett-v-pjt-partners-inc-et-al/
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 06:49:54+00:00

Document:
Caspersen’s fraud and for making allegedly misleading statements regarding PJT’s internal controls and strong client relationships. Barrett also asserts a claim against Taubman and Meates for the same disclosure violations in their capacity as “control persons” pursuant to Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a).
The Defendants – except for Caspersen, who has not appeared in these proceedings – moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. They contend that Barrett has not plausibly alleged a material false or misleading statement, and, that even if he had, he has not alleged that PJT, Taubman, or Meates acted with the requisite scienter. For the reasons given below, the Court agrees with Defendants in all respects. The Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED.
Complaint, in 2015, Park Hill accounted for at least 28.5% of PJT’s overall revenue. Am. Compl. ¶ 103. Caspersen was hired by Park Hill in January 2013. Am. Compl. ¶ 24. Caspersen was one of 14 partners at Park Hill (and one of 31 at PJT) as of June 30, 2015, and a “managing principal.” Am. Compl. ¶¶ 20, 25. At the time he was hired, Park Hill touted Caspersen’s expertise in a press release. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 26-28.
August 2014, Caspersen marketed to friends, family members, and professional contacts phony investment opportunities that appeared to be Park Hill deals. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 41-45. Caspersen repurposed documents from Park Hill to give these investments a veneer of legitimacy, created fake email accounts to give the appearance that well-respected investors were interested in the opportunities, and created fake websites. Am. Compl. ¶ 46. Separately, Caspersen also defrauded Park Hill and PJT. In September 2015, Caspersen sent an $8.13 million invoice to a Park Hill client requesting that payment be wired to an account he controlled personally, but which appeared to be a PJT account. Am. Compl. ¶ 34. About a month later, Caspersen used the same trick to divert a $762,267 fee from another Park Hill client. Am. Compl. ¶ 38. Caspersen transferred those funds to PJT one to two months later, in November 2015, after PJT billing staff inquired about the missing payments. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 36-38. According to the Complaint, “PJT did not ask the client[s] why the payment had been delayed or check to see whether the wire transfer had come from an account that actually belonged to the client[s].” Am. Compl. ¶ 39. Caspersen used the stolen funds to make highly speculative trades in stock options through a private brokerage account. Am. Compl. ¶ 53.
A Park Hill client reported Caspersen’s suspicious behavior to Park Hill in March 2016. Am. Compl. ¶ 59. An investigation by PJT’s attorneys quickly uncovered Caspersen’s fraud, which they promptly reported to the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York. Am. Compl. ¶ 60. Caspersen was arrested, charged with securities fraud, and fired.
Am. Compl. ¶ 61. PJT disclosed Caspersen’s firing in a press release on March 28, 2016. Am.
Compl. ¶ 63. That day, PJT shares closed down $2.81, or 10.62%. Am. Compl. ¶ 64. PJT subsequently booked an $8.9 million charge in connection with the fraud. Am. Compl. ¶ 75.
Certifications”), Am. Compl. ¶¶ 90-92; and statements in PJT’s “Code of Business Conduct and Ethics” (the “Code of Conduct”), which emphasize integrity and PJT’s internal compliance policies, Am. Compl. ¶¶ 94-98.
Specifically, Barrett alleges the following statements were false: A PJT “Information Statement” that said it had “trusted client relationships,” Am. Compl. ¶ 83; a February 11, 2016, statement by Taubman touting Park Hill’s “deep long-standing investor relationships,” Am. Compl. ¶ 84; statements in PJT’s 2015 Form 10-K, which emphasized PJT’s “strong client relationships” and Park Hill’s “long-standing relationships” and identified among PJT’s core values “prioritizing our client[s’] interests, . . . [and] developing our long-term relationships,” Am. Compl. ¶¶ 85-86; and statements on Park Hill’s website that “along with our rigorous engagement model and global relationships, our breadth enables us to customize high-quality solutions for the needs of our clients” and that Park Hill provided “top-tier global distribution capabilities through [Park Hill’s] senior relationships across the limited partner arena,” Am.
The Complaint alleges that the SOX Certification and Code of Conduct were materially misleading because they could lead a reasonable investor to believe PJT had adopted controls “capable of providing reasonable assurance” that PJT’s ethics and compliance policies were being followed, when, in fact, internal controls at PJT were “so utterly inadequate that Caspersen was able to perpetrate a criminal scheme that misappropriated nearly $9 million of Park Hill’s clients’ fee payments and defrauded investors of almost $40 million.” Am. Compl. ¶ 98.
The SOX certification contains the following allegedly misleading statements by Taubman and Meates: that they had “evaluated the effectiveness of [PJT’s] disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report [their] conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures,” and that “based on [their] most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting,” PJT had disclosed to its auditors, “all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting” and “any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in [PJT’s] internal control over financial reporting.” Am. Compl. ¶ 92. The Code of Conduct states that the Code is “designed to ensure that all directors, officers, and employees of [PJT] not only conduct themselves lawfully at all times but also maintain the highest ethical standards in every aspect of their dealings” and that PJT takes the Code “very seriously.” Am. Compl. ¶ 95.
permit Caspersen to invoice his clients directly without oversight from the PJT billing department. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 104, 107. According to the Complaint, permitting him to do so violated the corporate compliance principle of “segregation of duties,” which entails a system of checks and balances to prevent one individual from gaining “excessive system access.” Am. Compl. ¶ 105. Additionally, PJT is alleged not to have adequately monitored Caspersen’s corporate email account and personal brokerage accounts. Am. Compl. ¶ 109. Had it done so, according to Barrett, it would have been aware of Caspersen’s communications with victims of his scheme and his large, speculative positions in stock options. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 109-10. PJT also allegedly disregarded the fact that on two occasions Caspersen’s clients paid their invoices one or two months late and that the funds were paid from accounts controlled by Caspersen. Am. Compl. ¶ 116. Finally, the fact that PJT’s outside counsel was able to discover the fraud within a day of beginning its investigation suggests that the fraud was easily uncovered and would have been found sooner by an effective compliance program. Am. Compl. ¶ 115.
PJT, Meates, and Taubman moved to dismiss the Complaint on November 4, 2016. (Dkt.
Enters., Ltd., 751 F.3d 64, 70 (2d Cir. 2014) (citation omitted).
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b–5 make it “unlawful for any person . . . [t]o make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading . . . .” 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b–5(b). To state a claim under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b– 5, a plaintiff must allege that “in connection with the purchase or sale of securities, the defendant made material misstatements or omissions of material fact, with scienter, and that the plaintiff’s reliance on the defendant’s actions caused injury to the plaintiff.” Slayton v. Am. Exp. Co., 604 F.3d 758, 765 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing Ganino v. Citizens Utils. Co., 228 F.3d 154, 161 (2d Cir. 2000)). There are six elements of such a claim: “a plaintiff must prove (1) a material misrepresentation or omission by the defendant; (2) scienter; (3) a connection between the misrepresentation or omission and the purchase or sale of a security; (4) reliance upon the misrepresentation or omission; (5) economic loss; and (6) loss causation.” Pac. Inv. Mgmt. Co.
v. Mayer Brown LLP, 603 F.3d 144, 151 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Stoneridge Inv. Partners v.
551 U.S. 308, 324 (2007).
*15 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2014) (quoting Woodward v. Raymond James Fin., Inc., 732 F. Supp. 2d 425, 433 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)). The Complaint fails on both scores – Barrett has not alleged a false statement by the Defendants, and many of the statements he has identified are immaterial puffery.
that the company was “dedicate[ed] to client service” and relied on “independence of thought and objective advice,” 501 F. Supp. 2d 452, 475 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); see also Lopez v. Ctpartners Exec. Search Inc., 173 F. Supp. 3d 12, 28 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (explaining that “broad statements about a ‘strong’ culture that is ‘results orient[ed],’ and that the Company is committed to ‘transparency’ in the marketplace” are not actionable).
406 F. Supp. 2d at 450. Additionally, group pleading does not apply to documents such as the Park Hill and PJT websites, which are not the sort of documents typically drafted or reviewed by senior corporate officers. See DeAngelis v. Corzine, 17 F. Supp. 3d 270, 281 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
fraud while employed by PJT does not render PJT’s statements that its long-term relationships and strong reputation were keys to its success false or misleading. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 85-87.
Braskem S.A. Sec. Litig., 2017 WL 1216592, at *14 (quoting City of Pontiac Policemen’s and Firemen’s Retirement Sys. v. UBS AG, 752 F.3d 173, 183 (2d Cir. 2014)). Both parties cite to the Avon Products case and it provides an instructive example of the difference between statements in a code of conduct that are non-actionable puffery and promises that might be material statements of fact. In Avon Products, Judge Gardephe rejected as immaterial puffery statements in a code of conduct that Avon employees were “strictly prohibited” from paying bribes and that the business “continues to adhere to the highest standards of integrity, ethical conduct and good corporate citizenship.” Avon Prods., Inc., 2014 WL 4832321, at *14. On the other hand, Judge Gardephe considered statements that Avon had “a comprehensive and welldocumented set of internal controls that provides reasonable assurance that its financial transactions are recorded accurately and completely, and its assets are safeguarded,” to be a statement of fact because it was a sufficiently specific guarantee of “concrete steps” Avon had taken to comply. Id. at *16; see also In re Goldman Sachs Grp, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 10-CV-3461 (PAC), 2014 WL 2815571, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. June 23, 2014) (statements that Goldman Sachs had in place “extensive procedures and controls that are designed to . . . address conflicts of interest” are actionable).
Code very seriously.” Am. Compl ¶ 95. By their terms, these are aspirational statements – the Code is “designed” to ensure compliance and PJT takes the Code of Conduct seriously. Barrett has not identified any statement in the Code of Conduct that is a specific factual representation that PJT has in place any particular internal control that, in fact, it does not have. Instead, Plaintiff appears to be proceeding on the premise that because Caspersen did bad things while employed by PJT, its statements regarding the existence of its internal controls that are designed and intended to prevent fraud are per se false. That is simply not the case.
alleges that the SOX Certifications are false, or at least misleading, because a reasonable investor would infer from them that PJT had adequate internal controls, which, in light of Caspersen’s fraud, cannot be true.
Putting aside the fact that a company with good internal controls can have rogue employees who circumvent those controls, the Complaint does not allege with particularity how the SOX Certifications are false. The SOX Certifications cited in the Complaint relate to whether Taubman and Meates evaluated and properly disclosed PJT’s internal controls over financial reporting to the company’s auditors and board of directors. See Am. Compl. ¶ 92. These certifications do not relate to whether PJT’s controls were followed by Caspersen or whether PJT’s controls were effective. See In re PetroChina Co. Sec. Litig., 120 F. Supp. 3d 340, 358-59 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (concluding that the same SOX certifications were not false when plaintiff did not allege any facts suggesting that the certifying defendants did not, in fact, evaluate the company’s internal controls and did not, in fact, report any issues to the firm’s board and auditors); In re Gentiva Sec. Litig., 932 F. Supp. 2d 352, 370-71 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (same).
The Complaint does not allege: that Taubman and Meates failed to evaluate the effectiveness of PJT’s controls; that there were any undisclosed changes in PJT’s internal controls over financial reporting; that Taubman or Meates were aware of a deficiency or material weakness in PJT’s internal controls over financial reporting that was not reported to PJT’s auditors and board; or that Caspersen was an employee with a “significant role in [PJT’s] internal control over financial reporting.”7 Am. Compl. ¶ 92.
Even if Barrett alleged a material false statement, the Complaint would still be inadequate because it fails to allege plausibly that the Defendants acted with scienter.8 The PSLRA requires plaintiffs to allege a “strong inference” of scienter with the particularity required by Rule 9(b). 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2)(A). The Supreme Court has defined “scienter” as “a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.” Tellabs, Inc, 551 U.S. at 319 (quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193-94 (1976)). In order to determine whether the plaintiff’s evidence gives rise to a “strong” inference of scienter, the Court must “take into account plausible opposing inferences” and consider “plausible, nonculpable explanations for the defendant’s conduct, as well as inferences favoring the plaintiff.” Id. at 323-24. The inference “must be more than merely ‘reasonable’ or ‘permissible’—it must be cogent and compelling, thus strong in light of other explanations.” Id. at 324.
15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(B). Barrett’s theory appears to be that this certification was false because PJT’s policies were inadequate to ensure that assets were accessed only with authorization because Caspersen was permitted to invoice clients without oversight from the billing department and Caspersen used that permission to send invoices with doctored wire instructions, temporarily diverting approximately $9 million in fee payments from PJT to himself. See Opp’n at 13. These allegations are not included in the Complaint (let alone with the required particularity). Accordingly, the Court expresses no opinion as to whether these allegations would plausibly allege a false or misleading statement.
8 For purposes of analysis, the Court assumes, as do the parties, that Barrett plausibly alleges a false statement regarding PJT’s internal controls.
Co., 820 F.2d 46, 50 (2d Cir. 1987)).
Caspersen was undoubtedly aware of the flaws in PJT’s internal controls because he exploited them. As the Complaint alleges, he took advantage of his authority to invoice clients to divert temporarily approximately $9 million in client fees from PJT. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 73, 98. Whether Caspersen’s scienter can be imputed to PJT depends on whether he was a sufficiently senior officer at the company, see Thomas v. Shiloh Indus., No. 15-CV-7449 (KMW), 2017 WL 2937620, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 2017), and whether the “adverse-interest” exception applies because Caspersen was not acting for the benefit of PJT, see Kirschner v. KPMG LLP, 15 N.Y.3d 446, 467 (2010).
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (imputing knowledge of unit heads who spoke directly to the market).
The Sixth Circuit has explained that courts should strike a balance between an overly narrow approach that would permit a corporation to “evade liability through tacit encouragement” and an overly broad rule that would hold corporations liable for the knowledge of low-level employees with no role in corporate decision-making or public disclosure. See In re Omnicare, Inc. Sec. Litig., 769 F.3d 455, 475-76 (6th Cir. 2014).
4; see also Am. Compl. ¶ 87. Unlike the executive in L-3, however, Caspersen was not a C-suite level employee at the Park Hill unit. According to the Complaint, Caspersen was one of 14 partners at Park Hill and 31 partners at PJT generally. Although the Complaint does not describe PJT’s organizational chart, it is not alleged that Caspersen was a part of Park Hill’s senior management, which included a CEO and CFO, or that he reported directly to senior management at PJT. Thus, Caspersen’s role in the company weighs against imputing his knowledge to PJT. The determinative question is whether Caspersen was involved in formulating PJT’s internal controls or its disclosure of those policies to the market, not whether he was involved in defrauding PJT and its clients or whether he was a rainmaker for the firm. The Complaint does not allege that Caspersen had any role in crafting the internal controls and compliance policies at issue in this case or in PJT’s public reporting.
about the adequacy of its internal controls. According to Barrett, PJT benefited from this fraud, as demonstrated by the fact that PJT’s stock declined once the fraud was revealed.
v. Wang, the CEO of a registered issuer used straw holders secretly to sell shares that were subject to a lock-up agreement. When the illicit sales were disclosed, shareholders brought a Section 10(b) claim based on statements by the CEO touting the lock-up agreement as tangible evidence of his confidence in the company. See 989 F. Supp. 2d 264, 268, 275 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). Judge Engelmayer concluded that the CEO’s intent at the time he spoke to the market was attributable to the company because the statements were made for the benefit of the corporation, even if the CEO’s underlying fraud benefitted only himself. Id. at 277. The fact patterns in In re PetroChina Co. Sec. Litig. and In re Petrobras Sec. Litig. are similar, although in those cases it appears that the issuer also benefited from the underlying fraud. See In re PetroChina Co., Ltd. Sec. Litig., 120 F. Supp. 3d 340, 362 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (adverse interest exception does not apply to CEO’s failure to disclose corporate corruption); In re Petrobras Sec. Litig., 116 F. Supp. 3d at 382 (adverse interest exception does not apply to failure to disclose that financial results were inflated by bribery scheme).
In each of these cases the individual defendant who knew the truth made false statements to the market that benefited the issuer, albeit temporarily. None involved an agent like Caspersen, who made no statements to the market, see infra n.4, and whose alleged fraud on the market is his failure to disclose the fraud he was committing to the employer that he was defrauding. The Court is hard-pressed to see how PJT benefited from Caspersen concealing from PJT the fact that he was defrauding PJT and its clients. The New York case law upon which Stream SICAV relies does not contemplate a scenario in which the maker of the statement and the bad actor are separate. See generally Teamsters Local 445 Freight Div. Pension Fund v.
Dynex Capital, Inc., 531 F.3d 190, 195-96 (2d Cir. 2008) (scienter may be alleged against an entity even though the speaker is not alleged to have acted with scienter). The New York Court of Appeals has focused on “[t]he crucial distinction  between conduct that defrauds the corporation [which implicates the adverse interest exception] and conduct that defrauds others for the corporation’s benefit [which does not].” Kirschner, 15 N.Y.3d at 467 (emphasis added). Here Caspersen’s conduct defrauded PJT and third parties for his personal benefit – not for the benefit of PJT. Moreover, extending the reasoning in Stream SICAV to instances in which an agent makes no statements to the market directly would make the adverse-interest exception a dead letter in securities cases involving fraud against the company because an employee’s failure to disclose his own wrongdoing will almost always indirectly affect the company’s public disclosures.
553 F.3d at 199). “Where plaintiffs contend defendants had access to contrary facts, they must specifically identify the reports or statements containing this information.” Novak, 216 F.3d at 309.
309; see also In re Lihua Int’l, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 14-CV-5037 (RA), 2016 WL 1312104, at *15-16 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2016).
The fact that Taubman and Meates had a duty to review PJT’s internal controls is not a substitute for specific allegations that the individual defendants were provided with information that demonstrated the inadequacy of PJT’s internal controls. See L-3 Commc’ns Holdings, Inc., 2016 WL 1629325, at *10.
18% of corporate revenue had been repudiated. 2013 WL 6233561, at *26. By comparison, the Court cannot assume that senior officers at PJT would necessarily be aware of the details of billing and compliance practices at a single unit of the company.
concealed the account from the company. Finally, the fact that two invoices from Caspersen’s clients were paid one or two months late because of his misconduct (and again, assuming that Taubman and Meates were aware of this fact) is not, absent more, strong circumstantial evidence that Taubman and Meates ignored evidence that PJT’s internal controls were inadequate. Given the relative brevity of the delay, a number of competing inferences are possible. Taken together or separately, none of the circumstantial evidence of inadequate controls and “red flags” alleged in the Complaint supports a cogent inference of scienter.
PJT, it states a Section 20(a) claim.”). Accordingly, because the Court has concluded that the Complaint does not plausibly allege a Section 10(b) claim, Barrett’s Section 20(a) claim must also be dismissed.
Barrett requested leave to amend in the event the Court granted PJT’s motion to dismiss. “Leave may be denied ‘for good reason, including futility, bad faith, undue delay, or undue prejudice to the opposing party.'” TechnoMarine SA v. Giftports, Inc., 758 F.3d 493, 505 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting McCarthy v. Dun & Bradstreet Corp., 482 F.3d 184, 200 (2d Cir. 2007) (additional citations omitted)). Although Barrett did not attach a proposed second amended complaint, his opposition brief identifies additional facts about Caspersen’s fraud and a revised theory of how PJT’s SOX Certifications were false. See Opp’n at 8 n.3, 13. The Court is skeptical that Barrett can cure the fundamental flaws in the Complaint as currently drafted, but will nevertheless grant Barrett leave to move to file a second amended complaint.
The Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Barrett’s motion for leave to amend is due by September 29, 2017. The motion must include his proposed Second Amended Complaint, red-lined against the Amended Complaint. The Clerk of the Court is respectfully directed to close the open motion at docket entry 33.

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