Source: https://www.ptab.us/2015/05/
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 07:50:34+00:00

Document:
An amendment to correct an obvious error does not constitute new matter where one skilled in the art would not only recognize the existence of the error in the specification but would also recognize the appropriate correction. In re Oda, 443 F.2d 1200 (CCPA 1971).
Thus the language is properly construed to functionally limit the shape point rather than merely describe an intended use. Cf. Vizio, Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 605 F.3d 1330, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ("[T]he 'for decoding' language ... is properly construed as a limitation, and not merely a statement of purpose or intended use for the invention, because 'decoding' is the essence or a fundamental characteristic of the claimed invention.").
otherwise broad claim language.” Howmedica Osteonics Corp. v. Wright Med. Tech., Inc., 540 F.3d 1337, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (declining to impute a limitation into a disputed claim term in the absence of a clear requirement in the specification, even where “every disclosure of [the disputed term] in the specification shows [the alleged limitation]”); see also Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“[W]e have expressly rejected the contention that if a patent describes only a single embodiment, the claims of the patent must be construed as being limited to that embodiment.”).
We have considered the Declaration, but do not find it persuasive of establishing patentability of the appealed subject matter. Although factual evidence is preferable to opinion testimony, such testimony is entitled to consideration and some weight so long as the opinion is not on the ultimate legal conclusion at issue. While an opinion as to a legal conclusion is not entitled to any weight, the underlying basis for the opinion may be persuasive. In re Chilowsky, 306 F.2d 908, 916 (CCPA 1962) (expert opinion that an application meets the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112 is not entitled to any weight; however, facts supporting a basis for deciding that the specification complies with 35 U.S.C. § 112 are entitled to some weight); In re Lindell, 385 F.2d 453, 456 (CCPA 1967). On this record, Declarant has not directed us to persuasive evidence sufficient to establish that a person of ordinary skill in the art would not have recognized the suitability of using Murakami’s process for graphitizing a SAM as exemplified in Eck.
We find the Examiner’s reasoning to be sufficient to support the finding that Moody I inherently teaches “determining a number” of email messages, as claimed. Although a finding of inherency in the context of obviousness must meet a “high standard,” PAR Pharmaceutical, Inc. v. TWI Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 773 F.3d 1186, 1195 (Fed. Cir. 2014), the Examiner has satisfied it here, as “the limitation at issue necessarily must be present,” id. at 1196.
Because of the Examiner's repeated reliance on the word "implied" in the Final Office Action, and based upon our review of the record, we are persuaded the Liu application, at best, may render obvious some portions of the necessary support. However, under 112, first paragraph (written description), "[a] description which renders obvious the invention for which an earlier filing date is sought is not sufficient." Lockwood, 107 F.3d at 1572. (Emphasis added).
Given the language used, the "such that" clause is reasonably interpreted to identify the resulting condition (enabling the mobile units/device to perform an intended function of combining with multicast content) that occurs when the multicast data is transmitted, as positively recited in claims 44 and 69. Thus, the "such that" clause at issue is akin to a "whereby" clause that merely states the result of transmitting the multicast data. Our reviewing court has conluded that "[a] 'whereby' clause that merely states the result of the limitations in the claim adds nothing to the patentability or substance of the claim." Texas Instruments, Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 988 F.2d 1165, 1172 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (citation ommitted). Further, our reviewing court guides: "[a]n intended use or purpose usually will not limit the scope of the claim because such statements usually do no more than define a context in which the invention operates." Boehringer Ingelheim Vetmedica, Inc. v. Schering-Plough Corp., 320 F.3d 1339, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Thus, giving the claims their broadest reasonable interpretation, we find the claims merely require "transmitting" from a satellite multicast data to mobile units/device.

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