Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&amp;view=article&amp;id=50127:gr-159343-2007&amp;catid=1496&amp;Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 04:38:34+00:00

Document:
G.R. No. 159343 - Pedy Caseres, et al. v. Universal Robina Sugar Milling Corp., et al.
PEDY CASERES and ANDITO PAEL, Petitioners, v. UNIVERSAL ROBINA SUGAR MILLING CORPORATION (URSUMCO) and/or RESIDENT MANAGER RENE CABATE, Respondents.
Universal Robina Sugar Milling Corporation (respondent) is a corporation engaged in the cane sugar milling business. Pedy Caseres (petitioner Caseres) started working for respondent in 1989, while Andito Pael (petitioner Pael) in 1993. At the start of their respective employments, they were made to sign a Contract of Employment for Specific Project or Undertaking. Petitioners' contracts were renewed from time to time, until May 1999 when they were informed that their contracts will not be renewed anymore.
Petitioners filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, regularization, incentive leave pay, 13th month pay, damages and attorney's fees.
In a Decision1 dated August 24, 1999, the Labor Arbiter (LA) dismissed the complaint "for not being substantiated with clear and convincing evidence."
The Court finds no cogent reason to depart from their ruling.
ART. 280. Regular and Casual Employees. - The provision of written agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, except where the employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season.
In the case at bar, We note that complainants never bothered to deny that they voluntarily, knowingly and willfully executed the contracts of employment. Neither was there any showing that respondents exercised moral dominance on the complainants, x x x it is clear that the contracts of employment are valid and binding on the complainants.
Petitioner Pedy Caseres first applied with private respondent URSUMCO on January 9, 1989 as a worker assisting the crane operator at the transloading station. Upon application, Caseres was interviewed and made to understand that his employment would be co-terminus with the phase of work to which he would be then assigned, that is until February 5, 1989 and thereafter he would be free to seek employment elsewhere. Caseres agreed and signed the contract of employment for specific project or undertaking. After an absence of more than five (5) months, Caseres re-applied with respondent as a seasonal project worker assisting in the general underchassis reconditioning to transport units on July 17, 1989. Like his first assignment, Caseres was made to understand that his services would be co-terminus with the work to which he would be then assigned that is from July 17, 1989 to July 20, 1989 and that thereafter he is free to seek employment elsewhere to which Caseres agreed and readily signed the contract of employment for specific project or undertaking issued to him. Thereafter Caseres voluntarily signed several other employment contracts for various undertakings with a determinable period. As in the first contract, Caseres' services were co-terminus with the work to which he was assigned, and that thereafter, he was free to seek employment with other sugar millers or elsewhere.
The nature and terms and conditions of employment of petitioner Andito Pael were the same as that of his co-petitioner Caseres.
It must be noted that there were intervals in petitioners' respective employment contracts, and that their work depended on the availability of such contracts or projects. Consequently, the employment of URSUMCO's work force was not permanent but co-terminous with the projects to which the employees were assigned and from whose payrolls they were paid (Palomares v. NLRC, 277 SCRA 439).
The fact that petitioners were constantly re-hired does not ipso facto establish that they became regular employees. Their respective contracts with respondent show that there were intervals in their employment. In petitioner Caseres's case, while his employment lasted from August 1989 to May 1999, the duration of his employment ranged from one day to several months at a time, and such successive employments were not continuous. With regard to petitioner Pael, his employment never lasted for more than a month at a time. These support the conclusion that they were indeed project employees, and since their work depended on the availability of such contracts or projects, necessarily the employment of respondent's work force was not permanent but co-terminous with the projects to which they were assigned and from whose payrolls they were paid. As ruled in Palomares v. National Labor Relations Commission,18 it would be extremely burdensome for their employer to retain them as permanent employees and pay them wages even if there were no projects to work on.
Accordingly, petitioners cannot complain of illegal dismissal inasmuch as the completion of the contract or phase thereof for which they have been engaged automatically terminates their employment.
3 Penned by Associate Justice Portia AliÃ±o-Hormachuelos, with Associate Justices Elvi John S. Asuncion and Edgardo F. Sundiam, concurring; rollo, p. 99.
6 The exceptions are: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion. (Chuayuco Steel Manufacturing Corporation and/or Edwin Chua v. Buklod ng Manggagawa sa Chuayuco Steel Manufacturing Corporation, G.R. No. 167347, January 31, 2007).
7 Hanjin Engineering and Construction Co., Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 165910, April 10, 2006, SCRA 78, 100 .
8 Big AA Manufacturer v. Antonio, G.R. No. 160854, March 3, 2006, 484 SCRA 33, 42.
9 Rockwell Industrial Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 167714, March 6, 2007; Villa v. National Labor Relations Commission, 348 Phil. 116, 140 (1998).
10 Filipinas Pre-Fabricated Building Systems (Filsystems), Inc. v. Puente, G.R. No. 153832, March 18, 2005, 453 SCRA 821, 828.
11 Imbuido v. National Labor Relations Commission, 385 Phil. 999, 1009 (2000).
12 Olongapo Maintenance Services, Inc. v. Chantengco, G.R. No. 156146, June 21, 2007.
18 343 Phil. 213 (1997).
19 Abesco Construction and Development Corporation v. Ramirez, G.R. No. 141168, April 10, 2006, 487 SCRA 9, 14.
20 D.M. Consunji, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 401 Phil. 635, 641 (2000).
21 Fabela v. San Miguel Corporation, G.R. No. 150658, February 9, 2007.

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