Source: https://advocatemmmohan.com/2016/09/page/2/
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 05:13:44+00:00

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promotion= the appellant had fulfilled the necessary criteria prescribed in Rule 10.= First, it is an admitted case that the appellant being an in service candidate, his case for promotion from the post of Silt Observer/Analyst to the next promotional post of “Research Assistant Grade B” was required to be considered as an in service candidate as provided in Rule 10. Second, it was again an admitted case that the appellant was working as a Silt Observer/Analyst and in addition to the duties assigned to this post, he was also performing the duties of Research Assistant Grade B as per the directives of the office. Third, the appellant had admittedly fulfilled the eligibility criteria and qualification prescribed in Rule 10 (1)(b)(i) and (2) as also the qualifications prescribed for appointment to the post in question for direct recruits. Fourth, the competent authorities had also recommended the case of the promotion of the appellant certifying that the appellant is fit for promotion. Fifth, the appellant worked on the promotional post and performed the duties assigned to the promotional post from 14.12.2001 till 10.12.2002. Sixth, since the Government, despite merging the Grade C post in Grade-B post, did not amend the Rules and on the other hand continued with the un-amended Rules for filling the vacancies including vacancies by promotion, hence, the case of the appellant had to be considered in the light of the requirement of the Rules. In other words, it was necessary for the State to have made appropriate amendments in the Rules after merger of one post into another, but so long as this exercise was not done by the State, the employees, who had otherwise fulfilled the requirement prescribed in the existing Rules for consideration of their cases for promotion, they could not be denied the benefits flowing from the Rules and lastly, in the absence of any adverse entries or/and record of the appellant and further in the absence of any allegation made against the appellant for suppressing any material information, we do not find any justification on the part of the State to have recalled the promotional order of the appellant on the basis of some complaints said to have been made by someone after a long lapse of time which also had no factual or/and legal foundation. we do not agree with the view taken by the High Court and accordingly allow the appeal and set aside the impugned order of the High Court and, in consequence, allow the writ petition filed by the appellant (writ petitioner) and set aside the order dated 10.12.2002 (Annexure P-9) impugned in the writ petition. As a consequence, the appellant is restored to the promotional post of Research Assistance Grade B. If the appellant has discharged the duties of Research Assistant Grade B after the cancellation of his promotional order for any reason in addition to his duties assigned during the period in question then he would be entitled to claim the salary of the promotional post from the date of cancellation order after adjusting his salary, which he has received as Silt Observer during such period.
REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL No. 2127 OF 2009 Raminder Singh …….Appellant(s) VERSUS State of Punjab & Anr. ……Respondent(s) J U D G M E N T Abhay Manohar Sapre, J. 1) This appeal is filed against the final judgment and order dated 31.10.2008 passed by the High… Read More promotion= the appellant had fulfilled the necessary criteria prescribed in Rule 10.= First, it is an admitted case that the appellant being an in service candidate, his case for promotion from the post of Silt Observer/Analyst to the next promotional post of “Research Assistant Grade B” was required to be considered as an in service candidate as provided in Rule 10. Second, it was again an admitted case that the appellant was working as a Silt Observer/Analyst and in addition to the duties assigned to this post, he was also performing the duties of Research Assistant Grade B as per the directives of the office. Third, the appellant had admittedly fulfilled the eligibility criteria and qualification prescribed in Rule 10 (1)(b)(i) and (2) as also the qualifications prescribed for appointment to the post in question for direct recruits. Fourth, the competent authorities had also recommended the case of the promotion of the appellant certifying that the appellant is fit for promotion. Fifth, the appellant worked on the promotional post and performed the duties assigned to the promotional post from 14.12.2001 till 10.12.2002. Sixth, since the Government, despite merging the Grade C post in Grade-B post, did not amend the Rules and on the other hand continued with the un-amended Rules for filling the vacancies including vacancies by promotion, hence, the case of the appellant had to be considered in the light of the requirement of the Rules. In other words, it was necessary for the State to have made appropriate amendments in the Rules after merger of one post into another, but so long as this exercise was not done by the State, the employees, who had otherwise fulfilled the requirement prescribed in the existing Rules for consideration of their cases for promotion, they could not be denied the benefits flowing from the Rules and lastly, in the absence of any adverse entries or/and record of the appellant and further in the absence of any allegation made against the appellant for suppressing any material information, we do not find any justification on the part of the State to have recalled the promotional order of the appellant on the basis of some complaints said to have been made by someone after a long lapse of time which also had no factual or/and legal foundation. we do not agree with the view taken by the High Court and accordingly allow the appeal and set aside the impugned order of the High Court and, in consequence, allow the writ petition filed by the appellant (writ petitioner) and set aside the order dated 10.12.2002 (Annexure P-9) impugned in the writ petition. As a consequence, the appellant is restored to the promotional post of Research Assistance Grade B. If the appellant has discharged the duties of Research Assistant Grade B after the cancellation of his promotional order for any reason in addition to his duties assigned during the period in question then he would be entitled to claim the salary of the promotional post from the date of cancellation order after adjusting his salary, which he has received as Silt Observer during such period.
doctrine of contemporanea exposition is applied as an admissible aid to its construction. The doctrine is based upon the precept that the words used in a statutory provision must be understood in the same way in which they are usually understood in ordinary common parlance by the people in the area and business. (See : G.P. Singh’s Principles of Statutory Interpretation, 13th Edition-2012 at page 344). It has been held in Rohitash Kumar and others v. Om Prakash Sharma and others that the said doctrine has to be applied with caution and the Rule must give way when the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous. On a careful scrutiny of the language employed in paragraph 3 of the notification dated 21.01.2000, it is difficult to hold that the said notification is ambiguous or susceptible to two views of interpretations. The language being plain and clear, it does not admit of two different interpretations.= In this regard, we may state that the circular dated 15.04.1994 was ambiguous and, therefore, as long as it was in operation and applicable possibly doctrine of contemporanea exposition could be taken aid of for its applicability. It is absolutely clear that the benefit and advantage was given under the circular and not under the notification dated 07.03.1994, which was lucid and couched in different terms. The circular having been withdrawn, the contention of contemporanea exposition does not commend acceptation and has to be repelled and we do so. We hold that it would certainly not apply to the notification dated 21.01.2000.
THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.102 OF 2010 J.K. Lakshmi Cement Ltd. … Appellant Versus Commercial Tax Officer, Pali …Respondent WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6136 OF 2013 J U D G M E N T Dipak Misra, J. Civil Appeal No. 102 of 2010 The appellant is a Public Limited… Read More doctrine of contemporanea exposition is applied as an admissible aid to its construction. The doctrine is based upon the precept that the words used in a statutory provision must be understood in the same way in which they are usually understood in ordinary common parlance by the people in the area and business. (See : G.P. Singh’s Principles of Statutory Interpretation, 13th Edition-2012 at page 344). It has been held in Rohitash Kumar and others v. Om Prakash Sharma and others that the said doctrine has to be applied with caution and the Rule must give way when the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous. On a careful scrutiny of the language employed in paragraph 3 of the notification dated 21.01.2000, it is difficult to hold that the said notification is ambiguous or susceptible to two views of interpretations. The language being plain and clear, it does not admit of two different interpretations.= In this regard, we may state that the circular dated 15.04.1994 was ambiguous and, therefore, as long as it was in operation and applicable possibly doctrine of contemporanea exposition could be taken aid of for its applicability. It is absolutely clear that the benefit and advantage was given under the circular and not under the notification dated 07.03.1994, which was lucid and couched in different terms. The circular having been withdrawn, the contention of contemporanea exposition does not commend acceptation and has to be repelled and we do so. We hold that it would certainly not apply to the notification dated 21.01.2000.
awarded punishment of death under Section 302 IPC, RI for life and a fine of Rs.1,000/- with default stipulation for offence under Section 364 IPC, RI for seven years with similar fine for offence under Section 363 IPC, RI for seven years with similar fine for offence under Section 376(2)(f)/511 IPC and RI for seven years with similar fine for offence under Section 201 IPC. = “rarest of rare” case so as to confirm the death sentence of the appellant. The death penalty is therefore not confirmed. The question as to what would be the appropriate period out of imprisonment for the whole natural life that the appellant must spend in prison is not an easy one to be answered. As per submissions of learned counsel for the appellant in total an actual period of 20 years behind the bars would serve the ends of justice in the present case. Contra, learned State counsel has argued for whole of natural life. Rajendra Pralhadrao Wasnik v. State of Maharashtra and Shankar Kisanrao Khade v. State of Maharashtra catalogue the relevant factors which should be looked for and examined for awarding or confirming death sentence. He highlighted factors such as brutality, helplessness of the victim, unprovoked and pre-meditated attack as well as societal concern in respect of a particular brutal or heinous crime. According to him the facts of the case showed brutality, helplessness of the victim as well as unprovoked and pre-meditated design to assault. Learned counsel for the State also referred to some other cases where death penalty had been confirmed by this Court on the basis of peculiar facts of those cases. Since there are large number of judgments either confirming death sentence or commuting the same into life imprisonment, rendered on the basis of peculiar facts of those cases, it would not be of any real help to consider those judgments for deciding the issue as to whether in the facts of the present case death sentence should be confirmed or commuted. The occurrence is of the year 2011 when the appellant was said to be about 27 years old. Considering the fact that the deceased, a helpless child fell victim of the crime of lust at the hands of the appellant and there may be probabilities of such crime being repeated in case the appellant is allowed to come out of the prison on completing usual period of imprisonment for life which is taken to be 14 years for certain purposes, we are of the view that the appellant should be inflicted with imprisonment for life with a further direction that he shall not be released from prison till he completes actual period of 25 years of imprisonment. With this modification in the sentence, the appeals of the appellant are dismissed.
REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 292-293 OF 2014 Tattu Lodhi @ Pancham Lodhi …..Appellant Versus State of Madhya Pradesh …..Respondent J U D G M E N T SHIVA KIRTI SINGH, J. The appellant, charge-sheeted for offences under Section 366(A), 363, 364, 376(2)(f)/511 and 201 of the… Read More awarded punishment of death under Section 302 IPC, RI for life and a fine of Rs.1,000/- with default stipulation for offence under Section 364 IPC, RI for seven years with similar fine for offence under Section 363 IPC, RI for seven years with similar fine for offence under Section 376(2)(f)/511 IPC and RI for seven years with similar fine for offence under Section 201 IPC. = “rarest of rare” case so as to confirm the death sentence of the appellant. The death penalty is therefore not confirmed. The question as to what would be the appropriate period out of imprisonment for the whole natural life that the appellant must spend in prison is not an easy one to be answered. As per submissions of learned counsel for the appellant in total an actual period of 20 years behind the bars would serve the ends of justice in the present case. Contra, learned State counsel has argued for whole of natural life. Rajendra Pralhadrao Wasnik v. State of Maharashtra and Shankar Kisanrao Khade v. State of Maharashtra catalogue the relevant factors which should be looked for and examined for awarding or confirming death sentence. He highlighted factors such as brutality, helplessness of the victim, unprovoked and pre-meditated attack as well as societal concern in respect of a particular brutal or heinous crime. According to him the facts of the case showed brutality, helplessness of the victim as well as unprovoked and pre-meditated design to assault. Learned counsel for the State also referred to some other cases where death penalty had been confirmed by this Court on the basis of peculiar facts of those cases. Since there are large number of judgments either confirming death sentence or commuting the same into life imprisonment, rendered on the basis of peculiar facts of those cases, it would not be of any real help to consider those judgments for deciding the issue as to whether in the facts of the present case death sentence should be confirmed or commuted. The occurrence is of the year 2011 when the appellant was said to be about 27 years old. Considering the fact that the deceased, a helpless child fell victim of the crime of lust at the hands of the appellant and there may be probabilities of such crime being repeated in case the appellant is allowed to come out of the prison on completing usual period of imprisonment for life which is taken to be 14 years for certain purposes, we are of the view that the appellant should be inflicted with imprisonment for life with a further direction that he shall not be released from prison till he completes actual period of 25 years of imprisonment. With this modification in the sentence, the appeals of the appellant are dismissed.
whether the High Court was justified in directing stay of the disciplinary proceedings initiated by the appellant-Bank against the respondent until the closure of recording of prosecution evidence in the criminal case instituted against the respondent, based on the same facts? = Clause 4 of the Settlement= On the plain language of Clause 4, in our opinion, it is not a stipulation to prohibit the institution and continuation of disciplinary proceedings, much less indefinitely merely because of the pendency of criminal case against the delinquent employee. On the other hand, it is an enabling provision permitting the institution or continuation of disciplinary proceedings, if the employee is not put on trial by the prosecution within one year from the commission of the offence or the prosecution fails to proceed against him for want of any material. Pendency of criminal trial for around 10 years, by no means, can be said to be a reasonable time frame to withhold the disciplinary proceedings. We are fortified in taking this view on the principle underlying the former part of the same clause, which envisages that if the Authority which has to start the prosecution refuses (read fails) to do so within one year from the commission of the offence, the departmental action can proceed under the provisions as set out in Clauses 11 and 12 of the Settlement.Accordingly, we exercise discretion in favour of the respondent of staying the ongoing disciplinary proceedings until the closure of recording of evidence of prosecution witnesses cited in the criminal trial, as directed by the Division Bench of the High Court and do not consider it fit to vacate that arrangement straightway. Instead, in our opinion, interests of justice would be sufficiently served by directing the criminal case pending against the respondent to be decided expeditiously but not later than one year from the date of this order. The Trial Court shall take effective steps to ensure that the witnesses are served, appear and are examined on day-to-day basis. In case any adjournment becomes inevitable, it should not be for more than a fortnight when necessary. If the trial is not completed within one year from the date of this order, despite the steps which the Trial Court has been directed to take the disciplinary proceedings against the respondent shall be resumed by the enquiry officer concerned. The protection given to the respondent of keeping the disciplinary proceedings in abeyance shall then stand vacated forthwith upon expiring of the period of one year from the date of this order.
Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.4715 of 2011 State Bank of India & Ors. …..Appellants Vs. Neelam Nag ……Respondent J U D G M E N T A.M.KHANWILKAR, J. The short question involved in this appeal is: whether the High Court was justified in directing stay of the… Read More whether the High Court was justified in directing stay of the disciplinary proceedings initiated by the appellant-Bank against the respondent until the closure of recording of prosecution evidence in the criminal case instituted against the respondent, based on the same facts? = Clause 4 of the Settlement= On the plain language of Clause 4, in our opinion, it is not a stipulation to prohibit the institution and continuation of disciplinary proceedings, much less indefinitely merely because of the pendency of criminal case against the delinquent employee. On the other hand, it is an enabling provision permitting the institution or continuation of disciplinary proceedings, if the employee is not put on trial by the prosecution within one year from the commission of the offence or the prosecution fails to proceed against him for want of any material. Pendency of criminal trial for around 10 years, by no means, can be said to be a reasonable time frame to withhold the disciplinary proceedings. We are fortified in taking this view on the principle underlying the former part of the same clause, which envisages that if the Authority which has to start the prosecution refuses (read fails) to do so within one year from the commission of the offence, the departmental action can proceed under the provisions as set out in Clauses 11 and 12 of the Settlement.Accordingly, we exercise discretion in favour of the respondent of staying the ongoing disciplinary proceedings until the closure of recording of evidence of prosecution witnesses cited in the criminal trial, as directed by the Division Bench of the High Court and do not consider it fit to vacate that arrangement straightway. Instead, in our opinion, interests of justice would be sufficiently served by directing the criminal case pending against the respondent to be decided expeditiously but not later than one year from the date of this order. The Trial Court shall take effective steps to ensure that the witnesses are served, appear and are examined on day-to-day basis. In case any adjournment becomes inevitable, it should not be for more than a fortnight when necessary. If the trial is not completed within one year from the date of this order, despite the steps which the Trial Court has been directed to take the disciplinary proceedings against the respondent shall be resumed by the enquiry officer concerned. The protection given to the respondent of keeping the disciplinary proceedings in abeyance shall then stand vacated forthwith upon expiring of the period of one year from the date of this order.
interesting question as to the applicability of the 1997 Amendment to Section 28 of the Contract Act, 1872. = In H.P. State Forest Co. Ltd. v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., (2009) 2 SCC 252, this Court had to decide whether clause 6(ii) of an insurance policy was hit by the unamended Section 28. This clause reads as follows:- “6(ii) In no case whatsoever shall the Company be liable for any loss or damage after the expiration of 12 months from the happening of the loss or damage unless the claim is the subject of pending action or arbitration: it being expressly agreed and declared that if the Company shall declaim liability for any claim hereunder and such claim shall not within 12 calendar months from the date of the disclaimer have been made the subject- matter of a suit in a court of law then the claim shall for all purposes be deemed to have been abandoned and shall not thereafter be recoverable hereunder.” After a copious reference to Food Corporation and S.G. Nayak’s case, this Court held that such clauses would not be hit by Section 28.Considering that the respondents’ first argument has been accepted by us, we do not think it necessary to go into the finer details of the second argument and as to whether the aforesaid clauses in the bank guarantee would be hit by Section 28(b) after the 1997 amendment. It may only be noticed, in passing, that Parliament has to a large extent redressed any grievance that may arise qua bank guarantees in particular, by adding an exception (iii) by an amendment made to Section 28 in 2012 with effect from 18.1.2013. Since we are not directly concerned with this amendment, suffice it to say that stipulations like the present would pass muster after 2013 if the specified period is not less than one year from the date of occurring or non-occurring of a specified event for extinguishment or discharge of a party from liability. The appeals are, therefore, dismissed with no order as to costs.
REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NOS.9087-9089 of 2016 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (CIVIL) NOS.16166-16168 OF 2011) UNION OF INDIA & ANR. …APPELLANTS VERSUS M/S INDUSIND BANK LTD. & ANR. …RESPONDENTS J U D G M E N T R.F. Nariman, J. 1. Leave granted. 2. The present appeals… Read More interesting question as to the applicability of the 1997 Amendment to Section 28 of the Contract Act, 1872. = In H.P. State Forest Co. Ltd. v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., (2009) 2 SCC 252, this Court had to decide whether clause 6(ii) of an insurance policy was hit by the unamended Section 28. This clause reads as follows:- “6(ii) In no case whatsoever shall the Company be liable for any loss or damage after the expiration of 12 months from the happening of the loss or damage unless the claim is the subject of pending action or arbitration: it being expressly agreed and declared that if the Company shall declaim liability for any claim hereunder and such claim shall not within 12 calendar months from the date of the disclaimer have been made the subject- matter of a suit in a court of law then the claim shall for all purposes be deemed to have been abandoned and shall not thereafter be recoverable hereunder.” After a copious reference to Food Corporation and S.G. Nayak’s case, this Court held that such clauses would not be hit by Section 28.Considering that the respondents’ first argument has been accepted by us, we do not think it necessary to go into the finer details of the second argument and as to whether the aforesaid clauses in the bank guarantee would be hit by Section 28(b) after the 1997 amendment. It may only be noticed, in passing, that Parliament has to a large extent redressed any grievance that may arise qua bank guarantees in particular, by adding an exception (iii) by an amendment made to Section 28 in 2012 with effect from 18.1.2013. Since we are not directly concerned with this amendment, suffice it to say that stipulations like the present would pass muster after 2013 if the specified period is not less than one year from the date of occurring or non-occurring of a specified event for extinguishment or discharge of a party from liability. The appeals are, therefore, dismissed with no order as to costs.

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