Source: https://www.sccourts.org/opinions/indexSCPub.cfm?year=2009&month=6
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 06:56:07+00:00

Document:
In this case, arising out of an auto accident, the Court affirmed the trial court's refusal to apply Ontario law, reversed the trial judge's ruling refusing to grant a new trial absolute as to damages, and remanded.
The Court affirmed as modified the court of appeals' decision upholding the trial court's decision to admit witness intimidation evidence.
This is an attorney disciplinary matter involving nine complaints against Kernard Edward Redmond.
This is an opinion publicly reprimanding a lawyer.
In this case, the Court reversed the circuit court's determination that Respondents are entitled to recoup sales tax payments.
Petitioners asked this Court for declaratory relief and a writ of mandamus. This Court granted the Petitioners’ requested relief.
Appellants filed suit against Respondents asserting several causes of action stemming from Hilton Head Regional Medical Center’s (HHRMC) administration of hundreds of unauthorized therapeutic cardiac catheterizations. The trial court dismissed Appellants’ complaint in its entirety. We affirm.
Raymond Bovain, Jr. brought this declaratory judgment action, arguing the truck driver involved in an accident with his late wife was subject the higher insurance requirements of a motor carrier under South Carolina law.
In this case, we granted a writ of certiorari to review the court of appeals’ decision reversing an order of the family court which granted primary custody of the parties’ children to Mother and awarded her child support and attorney’s fees. We affirm the court of appeals decision, yet vacate a sentence of the opinion below.
This medical malpractice case turns on whether the six-year statute of repose in section 15-3-545(A) of the South Carolina Code (2005) applies to causes of action arising under the Tort Claims Act. We hold that it does and affirm.
In this case, the circuit court denied Appellants’ motion to enforce arbitration on the grounds that the designated arbitrator had become unavailable and that the unavailability voided the arbitration agreement. This Court affirmed the circuit court.
This is a disciplinary opinion in which the Court definitely suspended a lawyer.
26670 - In the Matter of Marvin Lee Robertson, Jr.
This is a disciplinary opinion in which the Court disbarred a lawyer.
The Court upheld petitioner's capital sentence.
In this case, we granted the State's petition for a writ of certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals in State v. Smith, 372 S.C. 404, 642 S.E.2d 627 (Ct. App. 2007). We vacate the opinion of the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner argues that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of his escape, and the Court of Appeals erred in finding this issue unpreserved.
In this workers’ compensation case, claimant Lawrence Brayboy made material misrepresentations on his employment application. Workers’ compensation benefits were awarded, and the circuit court affirmed. Because the issue of Brayboy’s employment status is jurisdictional, the Court makes findings based on its view of the preponderance of the evidence. We find the employer, Workforce, established the three-factor test in Cooper v. McDevitt & Street Co., 260 S.C. 463, 468, 196 S.E.2d 833, 835 (1973), and reverse.
We affirm Appellant's conviction for "Taking of Hostages by an Inmate," finding the applicable code section, S.C. Code Ann. § 24-13-450, is not unconstitutionally vague.
In this judicial disciplinary case, respondent Magistrate Judge Patrick Sullivan admits altering a court order and a letter from the Commission on Continuing Legal Education and Specialization. The record supports the recommendation of the Commission on Judicial Conduct, and we retroactively suspend respondent.
Petitioner pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter. The PCR court denied relief, but this Court reversed that order and granted PCR.
We granted a writ of certiorari to review the denial of Andre Rosemond’s application for capital post-conviction relief (PCR). Rosemond argues the PCR court erred in denying relief primarily due to a complete lack of mitigation evidence in the sentencing phase. We agree and affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for a new sentencing hearing.
In this case, the Court affirms the master-in-equity’s decision and holds that S.C. Code Ann. § 5-31-640 (2004) is unconstitutional and that S.C. Code Ann. § 5-31-620 (2004) is also unconstitutional because it is so inextricably intertwined with § 5-31-640, and thus, in the absence of these provisions, various provisions of the Home Rule Act give the municipality the authority the sell the municipal water and sewer system.

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