Source: https://californiainsurancedefense.wordpress.com/tag/moradi/
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 02:59:19+00:00

Document:
California experimented with allowing third-party claimants to sue insurers for insurance bad faith in the landmark case of Royal Globe. The decision was decried by the Insurance Bar and commentators throughout the United States. They found that, among other problems, it created uncertainty when an insurer would be liable for such “third party” bad faith, i.e., before the insured was determined liable to the claimant?
Royal Globe authorized a private right action to recover damages for an insurer’s violation of the California Department of Insurance’s insurance regulations, codified in the California Code of Regulations. The portion of these regulations dealing with good faith claims handling were based on California Insurance Code, § 790 et seq., styled the “Unfair Insurances Practices Act” or “UIPA.” Based on these statutes, the California Insurance Commissioner adopted a series of regulations styled “good faith claims practices,” which the California Insurance Commissioner may still enforce against insurers issuing policies to California insureds.
Years after Royal Globe, the California Supreme Court expressly overruled Royal Globe in Moradi–Shalal v. Fireman’s Fund Insurance Companies (1988) 46 Cal.3d 287, at 292, by holding that that there was no private right of action to recover damages for violations of the California Department of Insurance’s regulations.
Subsequent California appellate court decisions thereafter repeatedly held that there was no private right action for violations of the California Department of Insurance’s insurance regulations. Appellate courts expansively applied this bar to even first party claims though factually Royal Globe and Moradi-Shalal involved third party claims. And, though not considered in Moradi-Shalal, appellate courts have barred claims under California’s broad Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), codified at Business & Professions Code, § 1700, et seq., when a private right of action was based on Insurance Commissioner regulations.
In the last few years, however, courts have carefully examined the holding in Moradi-Shalal and determined that it did not outright bar claims against insurers based on regulatory violations. Similarly, the Ninth Circuit has also limited the holding of Moradi-Shalal as barring only private damage claims against insurer for regulatory violations.
To summarize the problem, though appellate courts have applied Moradi-Shalal to first party cases, the California Supreme Court never has decided this. Also, Moradi-Shalal did not decide or discuss whether a plaintiff has a private right of action for restitution or injunctive relief under California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”) [Business and Professions Code, § 17200 et seq.]. In the last few years, the Supreme Court has applied § 17200 broadly because the remedies are more limited, that is the return or money or property that defendant obtained from the plaintiff and injunctive relief versus compensation from the harm sustained from an alleged regulatory violation. Finally, Moradi-Shalal never discussed whether a private right of action under California’s UCL exists for insurance regulatory violations other than claims handling or for express statutory violations of the California Insurance Code.
Presently, two cases are pending before the California Supreme Court addressing these issues raised above; namely, Zhang v. Superior Court (2009) and Hughes vs. Progressive (2011). Both opinions are presently unpublished and not citable as authority until the California Supreme Court decides these cases.
In Hughes, the appellate court found that the plaintiff stated a private cause of action under the UCL for alleged statutory violations of Insurance Code, § 758.5, which prohibits insureds from being required to use a specific auto repair facility designated by the insurer and from suggesting the use of a specified auto repair facility without telling the insured in writing that the insured may select another repair facility. Though § 758.5 was not part of the UIPA, it authorizes the Insurance Commissions to enforce its provisions along with the UIPA.
In Zhang, the appellate court allowed allowed a UCL false advertising claim against an insurer for allegedly falsely representing that the insurer would properly and promptly pay claims though it allegedly had no intention of doing so.
The above cases are important to insurers doing business in California in that these companion decisions are likely to change the landscape for what insurers may be sued for in California. There is a good chance for a modest expansion of Moradi-Shalal—especially since the California Legislature narrowed the standing requirements for UCL claimants to only those persons directly affected, and because of the limited remedies a UCL plaintiff may recover.
Restitution would ordinarily be a return of the insured’s premium for successful fraudulent advertising plaintiff under Zhang. A Hughes plaintiff, may be entitled to recover whatever the insured pay to the company designated/recommended repair facility and possibly the return of the insured’s insurance premiums. These remedies are far less drastic than the Royal Globe remedy allowing claims for money damages, including all detriment and losses the insured suffered, plus emotional distress, and other damages. On the other hand, Supreme Court would be within its rights to take an expansive of Moradi-Shalal and eliminate claims based on statutory or regulatory violations, other than common law claims for insurance bad faith.
The lesson? It’s a safer and better practice to do what the California Insurance Code requires and to follow the the California Insurance Commissioner’s regulations. It’s also a good idea to have insurer-related advertising run by experienced lawyers familiar with insurance bad faith to avoid potential problems. Regardless whether a “separate” cause of action exists, experienced insurance bad faith counsel will use the Insurance Code and Insurance Regulations to establish the floor of good faith insurer conduct in insurance bad faith actions, making an ounce of prevention worth a pound of cure in this evolving area of law.

References: § 790
 v. 
 § 1700
 § 17200
 § 17200
 v. 
 § 758
 § 758