Source: https://patentlyo.com/patent/injunctions
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 18:19:15+00:00

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House Considering Bill that… Needs Thought (Updated).
I am trying to envision the problems this creates for patents, and happen to be writing a book on Remedies right now.
A court, if this is enacted, cannot restrain enforcement of a statute against a non-party. So, a court could not issue an injunction that did not allow a patent owner to enjoin non-parties, because a statute allows injunctions. (I think I have the double negative right.) So, I *think* it helps patent injunctions? What about in contributory or inducement cases?
This is a very important Federal Circuit decision that firmly eliminates the presumption of irreparable harm in the context of injunctive relief. While laying this issue to rest, however, the court offers an alternative idea: that even post-eBay, courts should (and implicitly must) consider the fundamental nature of patents as property rights when conducting an injunction analysis.
This case involves wiper blade technology. Bosch, the patent holder, sued Pylon for infringement of a set of wiper blade patents. At the trial court level, Bosch prevailed on a jury finding of validity and infringement before requesting entry of a permanent injunction. The district court denied the injunction and Bosch sought interlocutory appeal of the denial while the damages determination was pending.
The presumption of irreparable harm is dead. Much attorney and commentator ink has been spilled over whether the presumption of irreparable harm following judgment of infringement and validity survived eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C. The Federal Circuit's opinion in Bosch v. Pylon should put an end to any further debate. "We take this opportunity to put the question to rest and confirm that eBay jettisoned the presumption of irreparable harm as it applies to determining the appropriateness of injunctive relief." Slip Op. at 10. Although not expressly stated by the court, the unequivocal implication is that this is as true for preliminary injunctions as it is for permanent injunctions.
Long live the requirement that courts acknowledge the fundamental nature of patents as property rights! While affirming the death of the presumption of irreparable harm, Bosch simultaneously suggests an alternative approach that perhaps may turn out not all that different: the importance of recognizing that patents are property rights when performing the injunction analysis.
Although eBay abolishes our general rule that an injunction normally will issue when a patent is found to have been valid and infringed, it does not swing the pendulum in the opposite direction. In other words, even though a successful patent infringement plaintiff can no longer rely on presumptions or other short-cuts to support a request for a permanent injunction, it does not follow that courts should entirely ignore the fundamental nature of patents as property rights granting the owner the right to exclude.
Slip Op. at 11. In other words, "While the patentee’s right to exclude alone cannot justify an injunction, it should not be ignored either." Id.
In the end, however, Bosch makes little use of this new approach, instead focusing on other types of errors committed by the district court. Thus, it remains to be seen whether a failure to consider the "fundamental nature" of patent rights will be grounds for reversal.
Reversal of district court denial of permanent injunction: In reversing the denial of an injunction, the court applies an approach reminiscent of the Supreme Court's own jurisprudence in recent years.
Over the past quarter-century, this court has encountered many cases involving a practicing patentee seeking to permanently enjoin a competitor upon an adjudication of infringement. In deciding these cases, we have developed certain legal standards that inform the four-factor inquiry and, in particular, the question of irreparable harm. While none of these standards alone may justify a general rule or an effectively irrebuttable presumption that an injunction should issue, a proper application of the standards to the facts of this case compels the conclusion that Bosch is entitled to the injunction it seeks. It is in ignoring these standards, and supplanting them with its own, that the district court abused its discretion.
Slip Op. at 12. Under this precedent, the court identifies two related legal errors and an error of judgment; taking the all the factors together, the majority concludes, compels the entry of a permanent injunction. The legal errors consisted of the district court's conclusions that the presence of additional competitors in the market, without more, cuts against a finding of irreparable harm, as did the non-core nature of Bosch's wiper blade business in relation to its business as a whole. "Injuries that affect a “non-core” aspect of a patentee’s business are equally capable of being irreparable as ones that affect more significant operations." Slip Op. at 16. Ultimately, the trial court's error "arises from its conclusion that, if a fact supports the granting of an injunction, its absence likely compels the denial of one. That is not the law, however." Slip Op. at 17.
Dissenting in part, Judge Bryson disagreed with the majority's decision to remand with instructions to enter an injunction. While Judge Bryson would not have affirmed the denial of an injunction, nor would he have expressly reversed, instead preferring to remand the matter back to the district court for further findings of fact and a reweighing of the equities.
During the last few years a significant intra-circuit split has developed at the Federal Circuit over the appropriate standard to apply to likelihood of success determinations made in the context of requests for a preliminary injunction. Last week the Federal Circuit declined to take the issue en banc in a move that prolongs the uncertainty but perhaps paves the way for Supreme Court review.
As in other areas of the law, the determination of whether to grant a preliminary injunction requires the applicant to establish four factors: a likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in the applicant's favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest. The judges of the Federal Circuit disagree, however, about the standard for demonstrating a likelihood of success on the merits, as well as whether such a showing is a necessary prerequisite for entry of a preliminary injunction.
Other judges, most vocally Judge Newman, take the view that a defense that does not "lack substantial merit" does not equate with a failure to establish a likelihood of success on the merits, and in any event should not automatically preclude entry of a preliminary injunction. In her dissent in the denial of rehearing en banc in Kimberly-Clark, for example, Judge Newman – joined by Judges O'Malley and Reyna – criticizes the alternate rule as an absurdity. "This standard essentially negates the possibility of grant of a preliminary injunction to preserve the status quo during patent litigation, for in today’s complex patent law it is hard to imagine a case in which a defense that is “not substantially meritless” cannot be devised at the preliminary stage." Dissent at 5-6. In support of her view, Judge Newman points to the disconnect between "lacks substantial merit" and the standard applied by everyone besides the Federal Circuit. "The panel's approach is in conflict with not only the Supreme Court, but with every other circuit." Id. at 6. Nor should a defense that lacks substantial merit automatically preclude entry of a preliminary injunction if the balancing of the four factors necessitates otherwise. See id. at 10-12. Judge O'Malley, writing separately, expressed her strong agreement with the points raised by Judge Newman, as well as concerns about the difficulties faced by district courts in resolving the court's precedent in this area.
Regardless who is correct on the appropriate standard for a preliminary injunction, it is apparent that a sharp split exists within the Federal Circuit that it will be unable to resolve on its own in the near future. The denial of the en banc request suggests two possible outcomes: (1) that success of a preliminary injunction appeal to the Federal Circuit will continue to be heavily panel-dependant for foreseeable future, or (2) that the Supreme Court will intervene in this case or another to resolve the split and restore some predictability to the area of preliminary injunctions.
Contrary to popular opinion, it's still possible to obtain a preliminary injunction in a patent case – it's just very difficult. Astrazeneca v. Apotex provides an example of an affirmed preliminary injunction, and is significant for that reason alone. It also raises some interesting inducement issues relating to intent that I'll discuss in a separate post.
This case revolved around AstraZeneca's budesonide inhalation suspension drug product, which consists of a vial containing a single dose of budesonide suspended in a sterile liquid. The drug is administered by squeezing the entire contents of the vial into a jet neubulizer, then inhaling the resulting mist through a mask attached to the nebulizer. Because budesonide is an inhaled corticosteroid, the FDA requires that the label include a warning instructing patients to "titrate down" to the lowest effective dose of the medication to avoid any adverse effects from excessive use of the medication.
The two patents at issue, Nos. 6,598,603 and 6,899,099, both contain method claims covering the once-daily use of the nebulized dose of a budesonide composition and product claims covering AstraZeneca's drug product kit.
Apotex sought approval to market a generic version of AstraZeneca's drug product. As an ANDA applicant, it was well aware of AstraZeneca's patents, and sought to avoid the once-daily method claims by removing any mention of once-daily dosing from its labels. While it succeeded in part, the FDA nevertheless required Apotex to keep the titration warning language in the generic product's label.
During the preliminary injunction proceedings, Apotex raised two principal arguments in response to the method claims. First, it contended that they were anticipated; second, it contended that its distribution of the generic version of the drug would not induce infringement of AstraZeneca's method claims. The district court rejected Apotex's arguments, and granted a preliminary injunction enjoining Apotex from marketing its product.
Note: The district court agreed with Apotex that the kit claims were invalid. On appeal, the panel affirmed that determination.
Apotex's first anticipation argument, involving a prior art patent, turned on a question of claim construction: whether the term "budesonide composition" encompassed budesonide encapsulated in liposomes (the '603 patent teaches dispersing budesonide in a solvent, either as a solution or a suspension that may include liposomes as an excipient). The majority agreed with AstraZeneca's position, focusing on the discussion contained within the specification and buttressing its conclusions with extrinsic evidence (in this case, expert testimony). Judge Bryson, dissenting on this point, reached the opposite conclusion: the claim term is not limited to budesonide directly dispresed in solvent, and thus the method claims are anticipated.
Apotex's also argued that a prior art British advertisement for AstraZeneca's product describing it as a twice-daily product anticipated the patents. The majority again agreed with AstraZeneca that this reference did not anticipate the once-daily method claims, both because it did not disclose once daily dosing and because it was not enabled with respect to that type of dosing. (Obviousness was apparently not in dispute, as at the time of the earlier reference no one recognized that the product could be administered once per day and still be effective). Judge Bryson again disagreed, reading the prior art advertisement to suggest the administration of the drug once a day.
In challenging the district court's finding of inducement of infringement, Apotex focused on the subject of intent, arguing that its instructions did not demonstrate intent to cause the users of its product to engage in once-daily dosing and that it lacked specific intent to cause infringement of Apotex's patent. The Federal Circuit rejected these arguments, affirming the district court's conclusion that the downward-titration instructions would necessarily result in some users engaging in once-daily dosing and noting that Apotex was well aware of the infringement problems raised by once-daily dosing, yet chose to proceed nonetheless.
For a patentee to establish that it is likely to succeed on the merits, it “must demonstrate that it will likely prove infringement of one or more claims of the patents-in-suit, and that at least one of those same allegedly infringed claims will also likely withstand the validity challenges presented by the accused infringer.” Ama-zon.com, 239 F.3d at 1351. When reviewing the grant of a preliminary injunction, this court “views the matter in light of the burdens and presumptions that will inhere at trial.” Titan Tire Corp., 566 F.3d at 1376 (citation omitted). A preliminary injunction should not issue if an alleged infringer raises a substantial question regarding either infringement or validity, i.e., the alleged infringer asserts an infringement or invalidity defense that the patentee has not shown lacks substantial merit. Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 108 F.3d 1361, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
The Presumption of Irreparable Harm?
[T]he district court relied on . . . the old presumption that harm from patent infringement was irreparable, [and consequently that] the burden was on the defendant to demonstrate that the potential harm from not granting a preliminary injunction was finite, calculable, and compensable. This is no longer the law, as these cases all pre-dated the Supreme Court’s decision in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 392-94 (2006), in which the presumption of irreparable harm, based just on proof of infringement, was discarded. The burden is now on the patentee to demonstrate that its potential losses cannot be compensated by monetary damages.
In two prior cases, the Federal Circuit refused to consider this same question — instead deciding the cases on other grounds. In Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm, Inc., 543 F.3d 683 (Fed. Cir. 2008), the court indicated that “[i]t remains an open question whether there remains a rebuttable presumption of irreparable harm following eBay.” Likewise, in Amado v. Microsoft Corp., 517 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2008), the court refused to consider the question. Incidentally, the court in AMS could have also avoided the issue because the lack of irreparable harm was one of two alternate justifications for its judgment. (The court also held that the patentee had not shown a sufficient likelihood of success on the merits.). Both the Broadcom and Amado opinions were written by Judge Linn. (The Broadcom panel included Judges Linn, Friedman, and Prost while the Amado panel included Judges Bryson, Clevenger, and Linn). District court cases have been decided both ways, although the predominant approach is to deny the presumption and instead force the patentee to provide evidence of irreparable harm.
The AMS decision could be isolated as a preliminary injunction decision using the policy grounds that preliminary relief should require a higher standard of proof. However, the court’s reliance on eBay (a permanent injunction case) suggests such isolation is incorrect. Another potential distinguishing feature is the AMS’s statement that “the presumption of irreparable harm, based just on proof of infringement, was discarded.” Permanent injunctive relief is typically based on ongoing infringement (not just infringement) and typically include a judgment that the patent is valid (not invalid) and enforceable (not unenforceable). Of course, those features were also present in the eBay decision that serves as the Federal Circuit’s source of law.
Of course, the AMS case does not serve as precedent and future panels (and lower courts) are still free to fill-in-the-blank left by eBay.
On August 11, 2009, Judge Davis (E.D.Tex.) issued his final order in the i4i v. Microsoft patent litigation. That final order gives Microsoft 60 days to stop selling, using, or supporting infringing versions of MS Word. By my calendar, the injunction becomes effective October 10, 2009. I4i’s patent covers xml capabilities of the MS Word that were implemented in Office ’03 and ’07. At this point, it is unclear how difficult it would be for Microsoft to eliminate the adjudged infringing capability from its products.
Microsoft has already filed a motion with the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit demanding an emergency stay pending appeal. The Federal Circuit clerk immediately denied Microsoft’s motion for an “administrative stay.” Instead, a merits panel will consider the emergency motion at oral arguments calendared for a special session September 23, 2009. Microsoft’s brief-on-point is due August 25; i4i’s opposition is due September 8; and any reply is due September 14. If the Federal Circuit makes a decision quickly, Microsoft may have time to appeal directly to the Supreme Court for a midnight stay of execution.
The jurisprudence on stays pending appeal is somewhat lacking – largely because these cases are – by definition – decided in a rush and courts often do not have time to fully explain their decisions. Based on the lower court decision, Microsoft’s best arguments for a stay will be based on a combination of (1) its argument on claim construction; (2) the irreparable harm to Microsoft and its customers that would flow from the injunction; and (3) the relatively small amount of irreparable harm that i4i will feel during the few months while the appeal is pending.
Patent Reform on this Issue: In 2006, patent reform legislation introduced in Congress would have added an automatic stay of permanent injunctions after a showing that “the stay would not result in irreparable harm to the owner of the patent and that the balance of hardships from the stay does not favor the owner of the patent.” Patents Depend on Quality Act of 2006, H.R. 5096, 109th Cong. §8 (2006) (proposing to amend 35 U.S.C. 283).
Don Dunner (Finnegan) is representing i4i on appeal; Matthew Powers (Weil) appears to continue to lead the team for Microsoft.
Prior Patently-O post on District Court Order.
The Michigan-based district court found that Saint-Gobain’s refrigerator shelves infringe Gemtron’s patent No. 6,679,573 and awarded a permanent injunction against further infringement. The shelves were unique – primarily because the glass panel shelf securly snaps into its plastic frame rather than being held by adhesives. The claims required the plastic fram to be “relatively resiliant” so that the glass could snap into place.
There is no discussion in the specification of any purpose for or value of the “relatively resilient” structural characteristic …, other than to facilitate assembly of the shelf. This indicates that the end edge portions of the frame have the claimed structural characteristic—“relatively resilient”—if they are able to deflect at the time the shelf is assembled, to “snap-secure” the glass panel within the frame.
Note: The permanent injunction was affirmed without comment.
Titan (the patentee) and Goodyear (the exclusive licensee) combined to sue Case for infringement of its tractor tire design patent. (Des. Pat. No. D. 360,862). The district court rejected Goodyear’s motion for preliminary injunctive relief – finding that the evidence indicated that the patent claim was probably obvious. On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed.
Standard for Preliminary Relief: In order to obtain the “extraordinary” relief of a preliminary injunction to stop infringement before a final judgment, the a patentee must prove that “(1) it is likely to succeed on the merits, (2) it is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of a preliminary relief, (3) the balance of equities tips in its favor, and (4) an injunction is in the public interest.” The likelihood of success requires proof that the patentee “will likely prove infringement, and that it will likely withstand [validity] challenges, if any.” When a defendant challenges a patent’s validity, the district court must weigh the evidence (both for and against) to determine whether the challenge “raises a substantial question” of validity.
The trial court’s decision on preliminary injunctive relief is reviewed for abuse of discretion.
Ordinarily, design patent obviousness analysis begins with a primary reference with design characteristics that “are basically the same as the claimed design.” Secondary references are then combined so long as the secondary references are “so related [to the primary reference] that the appearance of certain ornamental features in one would suggest the application of those features to the other.” Here, the lower court did not use the language of “primary and secondary references”, but the Federal Circuit found that the lower court’s obvious analysis was sufficient to for its denial of preliminary relief.
“[W]e cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in concluding that Titan was unlikely to withstand Case’s challenge to the validity of the ’862 patent on obviousness grounds.
The court explicitly avoided indicating whether obviousness analysis for design patents should be modified to conform to either KSR or Egyptian Goddess.
Both Ecolab and FMC sell chemical mixtures used by beef and poultry factories to help protect raw meat from “pathogens, such as E. coli and salmonella.” Both parties hold patents on their mixtures, and in litigation each asserted infringement against the other. A jury awarded both parties damages for infringement. However, the district court refused to issue permanent injunctive relief. On appeal, the Federal Circuit invalidated Ecolab’s claims and then focused on whether the district court erred in refusing to grant an injunction to stop Ecolab from infringing.
In this case, the district court did not explicitly consider any of the eBay factors. “That is an abuse of discretion.” In this instance, the Federal Circuit refused to consider whether – based on the fact at hand – an injunction would be proper. Rather, on remand the district court must consider whether relief is warranted based on a consideration of the four listed factors.
Altana’s Patent No. 4,758,579 claims the proton pump inhibitor pantoprazole – the active ingredient the anti-ulcer drug Protonix®. Of course, PPI’s were known before Altana’s patent and even one of Altana’s own prior patents discusses a “compound 12” that is structurally similar to those claimed in the ‘579 patent.
This appeal stems from the New Jersey district court’s denial of Altana’s motion for a preliminary injunction. The lower court found that the patentee had failed to prove two critical prerequisites of equitable preliminary relief: (1) a likelihood of success on the merits and (2) irreparable harm.
the injunction’s favorable impact on the public interest.
Although the ultimate grant or denial of preliminary relief is within the “sound discretion of the district court,” failure to abide by these four factors would be reversible error. Orders to grant or deny a preliminary injunction are immediately appealable.
Moreover, to the extent Altana suggests that the prior art must point to only a single lead compound for further development efforts, that restrictive view of the lead compound test would present a rigid test similar to the teaching-suggestion-motivation test that the Supreme Court explicitly rejected in KSR.
Here, the appellate panel found “ample evidence” that a chemist would have chosen “compound 12” as a natural choice for further PPI research. The particular modification of compound 12 was then suggested in articles by Sachs and Bryson who were researching properties of effective PPIs.
Considering this evidence as a whole, the Federal Circuit found it sufficient to raise a substantial question of obviousness.
Irreparable Harm: The district court could not find any irreparable harm of allowing infringement during the course of the litigation. Often, money damages are seen as insufficient when the defendant does not have cash-on-hand. Here, however, Teva and Sun both have plenty. The court also found that Altana almost certainly has a business plan to deal with the launch of generics. During the litigation, Nycomed purchased Altana — seemingly in the lower court’s view, that purchase also indicates that money damages are adequate (since a price can be placed on the company & its patent rights).
Perhaps most harmful to Altana was that the lower court found the patentee’s statements of harms “exaggerated” and lacking “credibility.” A court sitting in equity righty places a dim light on activities suggestive of unclean hands.
Judge Newman wrote a short concurring opinion.
Although the evidence presented to the district court does not, in my view, establish invalidity of the patent on the pharmaceutical product pantoprazole, see, Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 429 (2006) (“the burdens at the preliminary injunction stage track the burdens at trial.”) at this preliminary stage deference is warranted to the district court’s weighing of the conflicting expert opinions interpreting the evidence. On this basis, I concur in sustaining this discretionary action.
Until such time as Congress creates a new form of compulsory licensing, future-damage awards and continuing royalties can only be granted in lieu of a final injunction by consent of the parties.
In non-patent cases, such as accidental death, courts regularly calculate future damages – such as earning capacity. However, in those cases, the award is based on a past tort. In patent cases, prospective damages are based upon future infringing actions.
Looking historically, Gómez-Arostegui could not find a single instance prior to 1789 where the Chancery “awarded a continuing royalty in lieu of a final injunction in infringement cases.” In cases where no injunction was granted, the court did “nothing at all” about ongoing infringement.
Injunctive Relief: I re-read Michelle Lee’s (Google) statement about the need for patent reform. One issue that jumped-out this time: No mention of injunctions. Money is still at stake, but Google appears confident that it won’t face a shut-down even if it loses a patent case. In that sense, Google is lucky that it is being sued by non-practicing entities who as a de facto rule don’t get injunctive relief against infringers who have a major market share.
Benefit of Trade Secrets: Avoid Charges of Infringement. In some senses, google is very public. Yet, its actual operation is quite secretive. One benefit of that type of operation is that it helps avoid charges of patent infringement. If patentee’s can’t tell how you operate, it makes it much more difficult to assert charges of infringement.
Warranties and Copyright: My colleague Marc Roark has an interesting new paper: Limitation of Sales Warranties as an Alternative to Intellectual Property Rights: An Empirical Analysis of Iphone Warranties’ Deterrent Impact on Consumers.
The BPAI Watchdog: http://bpaiwatchdog.blogspot.com/. So far, Leigh Martinson is focusing on the BPAI’s application of Bilski.
Is it only proper to exclude patents covering computer programs as such when explicitly claimed as a “computer program”?
Can a technical effect be non-physical? Is it sufficient if the physical entity is an unspecified computer?
Does the activity of programming a computer necessarily involve technical considerations?
Input on the European questions are due by the end of April. http://www.epo.org/topics/news/2009/20090219.html.
Application for the job of PTO Director (by Prof Morris) http://www.stanford.edu/~rjmorris/pto.htm. I maintain that it is possible to find an excellent nominee who is not a patent attorney. However, any nominee who does not have extensive experience with the patent prosecution process will face an uphill credibility battle from day one.
In 2004, Acumed sued Stryker for infringing a patent covering an orthopedic nail used in reconstructing humerus fractures. After a jury verdict of infringement, the district court ordered a permanent injunction. That pre-eBay ruling was subsequently vacated by the Federal Circuit because the lower court did not specifically consider the traditional four-factor test for injunctive relief. On remand, the district court again granted the permanent injunction. That permanent injunction is affirmed here on appeal.
Irreparable Harm and Lack of Remedy at Law: The first two factors of (1) irreparable harm caused by continued infringement and (2) inadequate remedies available at law almost entirely overlap. The court easily considered those factors together.
The Jury found the infringement “willful.” That fact was not discussed in the eBay analysis.
This case follows the conventional wisdom that the courts will continue to grant permanent injunctions against competitors who infringe.
Preliminary injunctions decisions are blessed with their own four-factor equitable test. I like to think of the test as having two required elements (likelihood of success on the merits and potential irreparable harm) and two optional factors (balance of the equities and public interest). A preliminary injunction (PI) will only issue when (1) the first two elements are demonstrated by the patentee and (2) the combined result of all four elements/factors weighs in favor of a PI.
The district court granted a preliminary injunction to Abbott to stop Sandoz from making or selling a generic version of its extended release clarithromycin antibiotic. In 75 pages of split opinion, the Federal Circuit affirmed with Judge Newman writing the majority opinion; Senior Judge Archer signing-on except for the two juicy parts: I and VI; and Judge Gajarsa in vigorous dissent.
The dispute revolves around the meaning of the required PI element of ‘likelihood of success on the merits.’ To win on this element, the patentee typically needs to provide evidence of infringement of at least one valid claim. Often this element turns on the defendant’s rebuttal proof of invalidity. Here, the defendant provided some evidence of potential invalidity, but not conclusive evidence. Thus, while the defendant did raise a substantial question of the vulnerability of the patent, it did not provide any clear and convincing evidence of invalidity.
Judge Gajarsa argued that Federal Circuit precedent requires a PI be denied when substantial questions of validity are raised. This standard is exemplified in the Federal Circuit’s recent Erico decision – which found the threshold “substantial question” met by evidence which simply “cast[s] doubt on the validity” of the asserted claims.
On the other side, Judge Newman argues that a patentee may still be likely to succeed on the merits even when vulnerabilities and substantial invalidity questions are raised by the defense.
Both sides are well supported by conflicting precedent, and this case may well be a good vehicle for an en banc discussion of preliminary injunctive relief.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed the permanent injunction against Qualcomm – finding that the district court acted within its equitable discretion and properly followed the injunctive relief guidelines set forth by the Supreme Court in eBay v. MercExchange (2006).
Although recognizing the importance of its eventual decision, the Federal Circuit again refrained from determining whether a finding that a patent has been infringed should serve as presumptive evidence of irreparable harm.
Irreparable Harm: The patentee Broadcom is a non-practicing entity in the sense that it does not make or sell the invention claimed in the asserted patents. The patentee does, however, compete indirectly with Qualcomm by making an alternative chipset. Here, the Federal Circuit agreed that eBay does not allow a general rule that would prevent a non-practicing from obtaining injunctive relief and that in this Broadcom had been able to show the potential for irreparable harm.
Hardships and Public Interest: The district court created the injunction order with a “sunset provision.” Under the plan, Qualcomm may continue infringing for twenty-months while paying a compulsory license rate. At the end of those twenty months, the company will be enjoined from further infringement. The delayed nature of the injunction consequently removed any notion that the a balance of hardships or the public interest would favor the adjudged infringer because it gives plenty of time to redesign and redeploy to customers without any interruption of service.

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