Source: https://cbaclelegalconnection.com/tag/title-insurance/
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 18:45:31+00:00

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Although the legislative session is over, the governor continues to sign bills. This week, he signed one bill on Monday, May 15; four bills on Wednesday, May 17; and 13 bills on Thursday, May 18. To date, he has signed 231 bills and vetoed one bill this legislative session. The bills signed this week are summarized here.
HB 17-1204: “Concerning Juvenile Delinquency Record Expungement, and, in Connection Therewith, Making an Appropriation,” by Rep. Pete Lee and Sen. John Cooke. The bill restricts access to juvenile delinquency records by making certain records public only after a court orders that a child be charged as an adult, consistent with recent changes to the direct file statute, and by eliminating the requirement that the prosecuting attorney notify the school principal of minor offenses.
HB 17-1248: “Concerning the Funding of Colorado Water Conservation Board Projects, and, in Connection Therewith, Making Appropriations,” by Rep. Jeni Arndt and Sens. John Cooke & Jerry Sonnenberg. The bill makes certain appropriations from the Colorado Water Conservation Board (CWCB) construction fund to the CWCB or the Division of Water Resources.
HB 17-1301: “Concerning Protecting Colorado Citizens who are Engaged in an Act that is Protected by the Colorado Constitution from Outside Agencies,” by Rep. Steve Lebsock and Sen. Tim Neville. The bill prohibits a state agency from aiding or assisting a federal agency or agency of another state in arresting a Colorado citizen for committing an act that is a Colorado constitutional right; or violating a Colorado citizen’s Colorado constitutional right.
SB 17-129: “Concerning the Electronic Preservation of a Plat Recorded by a County Clerk and Recorder,” by Sen. Jerry Sonnenberg and Reps. Jon Becker & Jeni Arndt. The bill permits a county clerk and recorder to preserve an original plat in an electronic format. If an electronic filing system is established, then the board of county commissioners is authorized to provide additional funding and space suitable for a county surveyor or any other appropriate local government official to store original mylar, paper, or polyester sheets of subdivision plats and land survey plats.
SB 17-140: “Concerning the Torrens Title Registration System,” by Sen. Jerry Sonnenberg and Reps. Jon Becker & Jeni Arndt. The bill closes the Torrens title registration system to new applications to register land title in this state, effective January 1, 2018.
HB 17-1162: “Concerning Action that can be Taken Against an Individual Based on the Individual’s Failure to Pay for a Traffic Violation, and, in Connection Therewith, Making an Appropriation,” by Rep. Matt Gray and Sen. Bob Gardner. The bill decreases the penalty for driving under restraint to a class A traffic infraction if the basis of the restraint is an outstanding judgment.
HB 17-1201: “Concerning Authorization for Granting a High School Diploma Endorsement in the Combined Disciplines of Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics,” by Rep. James Coleman and Sens. Kevin Priola & Rachel Zenzinger. The bill authorizes a school district, board of cooperative services, district charter high school, or institute charter high school to grant a high school diploma endorsement in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) to students who demonstrate mastery in STEM. To obtain the endorsement, a student must complete the high school graduation requirements at a high level of proficiency, successfully complete 4 STEM courses selected by the local education provider in addition to the high school graduation requirements in these subjects, achieve a minimum score specified in the bill on one of several specified mathematics assessments, and successfully complete a final capstone project.
HB 17-1211: “Concerning Professional Development for Educators Regarding Disciplinary Strategies for Young Students,” by Rep. James Coleman and Sen. Kevin Priola. The bill creates the discipline strategies pilot program to provide money to school districts, boards of cooperative services, and charter schools for professional development for educators in the use of culturally responsive methods of student discipline for students enrolled in preschool through third grade and developmentally appropriate responses to the behavioral issues of students enrolled in preschool through third grade.
HB 17-1214: “Concerning Efforts to Encourage Employee Ownership of the State’s Existing Small Businesses,” by Rep. James Coleman and Sen. Jack Tate. The bill requires the Colorado Office of Economic Development to engage the services of a local nonprofit organization that supports and promotes the employee-owned business model to educate the staff at the office on the forms and merits of employee ownership in order for the office to promote employee ownership as part of its small business assistance center.
HB 17-1227: “Concerning an Extension of Demand-Side Management Goals for Investor-Owned Utilities as Set by the Public Utilities Commission,” by Reps. Faith Winter & Polly Lawrence and Sens. Stephen Fenberg & Kevin Priola. The bill extends programs establishing electricity goals for investor-owned utilities until 2028.
HB 17-1246: “Concerning Implementation of the STEMI Task Force Recommendations Relating to Reporting Confirmed Heart Attack Incidents in the State,” by Rep. Tracy Kraft-Tharp and Sens. Leroy Garcia & Jack Tate. The bill implements recommendations of the STEMI task force regarding hospital reporting of heart attacks.
HB 17-1266: “Concerning Allowing Persons who were Convicted of Misdemeanors for Marijuana-Related Behaviors that are No Longer Illegal to Petition for the Sealing of Criminal Records Relating to Such Convictions,” by Reps. Edie Hooten & Jovan Melton and Sens. Vicki Marble & Stephen Fenberg. The bill allows persons who were convicted of misdemeanors for the use or possession of marijuana to petition for the sealing of criminal records relating to such convictions if their behavior would not have been a criminal offense if the behavior had occurred on or after December 10, 2012.
HB 17-1354: “Concerning the Collection of Delinquent Taxes on Certain Mobile Homes,” by Rep. KC Becker and Sens. Kevin Priola & John Kefalas. The bill makes the process to enforce the collection of delinquent taxes on mobile or manufactured homes that are not affixed to the ground permissive, and therefore gives the county treasurer more flexibility to enter into partial payment agreements with the owners of such mobile or manufactured homes. The bill authorizes the county treasurer to declare tax liens on mobile or manufactured homes that are not affixed to the ground as county-held to address title deficiencies in conjunction with the collection of taxes.
SB 17-132: “Concerning Enactment of the ‘Revised Uniform Law on Notarial Acts’ as Amended,” by Sen. Bob Gardner and Reps. Jovan Melton & Cole Wist. The bill enacts the Revised Uniform Law on Notarial Acts, and creates a working group to study and make recommendations by December 1, 2017, regarding electronic remote notarization. The Secretary of State must promulgate rules regarding electronic remote notarization, after which notaries may perform a notarial act by electronic remote notarization in compliance with the rules.
SB 17-193: “Concerning the Establishment of the ‘Center for Research into Substance Use Disorder Prevention, Treatment, and Recovery Support Strategies’ at the University of Colorado Health Sciences Center, and, in Connection Therewith, Making an Appropriation,” by Sens. Kevin Lundberg & Cheri Jahn and Reps. Bob Rankin & Brittany Pettersen. The bill establishes the Center for Research into Substance Use Disorder Prevention, Treatment, and Recovery Support Strategies at the University of Colorado Health Sciences Center.
SB 17-207: “Concerning Strengthening Colorado’s Statewide Response to Behavioral Health Crises, and, in Connection Therewith, Making an Appropriation,” by Sens. John Cooke & Daniel Kagan and Reps. Lang Sias & Joseph Salazar. The bill clarifies the intent of the General Assembly for establishing a coordinated behavioral health crisis response system. The crisis system is intended to be a comprehensive, appropriate, and preferred response to behavioral health crises in Colorado. By clarifying the role of the crisis system and making necessary enhancements, the bill puts systems in place to help Colorado end the use of jails and correctional facilities as placement options for individuals placed on emergency mental health holds if they have not also been charged with a crime and enhances the ability of emergency departments to serve individuals who are experiencing a behavioral health crisis.
SB 17-297: “Concerning Revising Higher Education Performance Requirements,” by Sen. Kent Lambert and Rep. Millie Hamner. The bill repeals a performance-based funding plan for institutions of higher education that was included in the master plan for Colorado postsecondary education. The performance-based funding plan was not implemented.
SB 17-305: “Concerning Modifications to Select Statutory Provisions Affecting Primary Elections Enacted by Voters at the 2016 Statewide General Election to Facilitate the Effective Implementation of the State’s Election Laws, and, in Connection Therewith, Making an Appropriation,” by Sens. Stephen Fenberg & Kevin Lundberg and Reps. Patrick Neville & Mike Foote. At the 2016 general election, the voters of the state approved 2 initiated measures affecting primary elections: Proposition 107, which restored a presidential primary election, and Proposition 108, which allows participation by unaffiliated voters in primary elections. The bill makes several modifications to some of the statutory provisions that were affected by Propositions 107 and 108 for the purpose of facilitating the effective implementation of the state’s election laws.
For a complete list of the governor’s 2017 legislative actions, click here.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued its opinion in BV Jordanelle, LLC v. Old Republic National Title Insurance Co. on Tuesday, July 26, 2016.
In 2008, BV loaned $6.3 million to PWJ Holdings, which owned the Aspens Property in Wasatch, Utah. In exchange for the loan, BV received a mortgage for one parcel in the Aspens Property, and obtained a title insurance policy through Old Republic. PWJ defaulted on the loan, and BV foreclosed on the property in 2009, acquiring title to the property at a trustee’s sale. The property was located in an improvement district, but PWJ did not pay the assessments for the improvement district, and the district initiated foreclosure proceedings in 2010. BV sued the district in state court, seeking to stop the foreclosure and retain title, but the court issued a decree in 2012 allowing the district to complete the foreclosure. Because Utah law holds that improvement district liens are superior to all other liens, the improvement district obtained title to the insured property, extinguishing BV’s interest.
BV did not learn about the improvement district’s lien until 2010, after it had acquired title to the property. When it learned of the lien, BV sought compensation from Old Republic under the title insurance policy, but Old Republic denied coverage. BV sued Old Republic, contending Old Republic had breached the insurance policy by refusing to compensate it for the loss of the property and by failing to defend BV in the state court litigation with the improvement district. The district court granted judgment on the pleadings to Old Republic, concluding that the policy did not entitle BV to recovery for loss of the property or defense in the state court suit. BV appealed.
The Tenth Circuit applied Utah law in affirming the district court. BV contended it was entitled to coverage based on six different covered risks: loss caused by a defect in title, loss by encroachments that affect title, loss caused by unmarketable title, loss caused by enforcement of subdivision regulations, loss caused by a governmental taking, and loss caused by the imposition of a statutory lien for services, labor, or material used in construction. The Tenth Circuit found that none of the covered risks applied.
The Tenth Circuit specifically found that a Utah Supreme Court opinion precluded BV’s claims regarding the defect in title, as that case held the defect must be present at the time of acquisition of the property. BV argued that because the improvement district was contemplated before it acquired the property, the defect was present, but the Tenth Circuit disagreed. The Tenth Circuit also rejected BV’s claims due to loss caused by encroachment, noting those claims were not raised in BV’s complaint. Similarly, the Tenth Circuit refused to consider BV’s claim for loss caused by unmarketable title because it was not raised in district court. The Tenth Circuit disposed of the remaining claims by finding that the improvement district’s notice to enforce a subdivision regulation was not in effect at the time BV acquired title, any governmental taking would have happened after BV acquired title, and the improvement district’s lien was not for any services, labor, or materials used in construction.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Fidelity National Title Insurance Co. v. Woody Creek Ventures, LLC on Tuesday, July 26, 2016.
Woody Creek acquired two parcels of land in Pitkin County and purchased two title insurance policies from Fidelity, insuring, among other things, access and marketability of title. The two parcels were separated by a tract of land owned by the Bureau of Land Management, but Woody Creek assumed it could access the more remote parcel via a roadway crossing the BLM’s tract. It subdivided the parcels and sought prospective buyers. When a prospective buyer expressed concern about access to the remote lot, Woody Creek discovered that it had no legal right of access.
Woody Creek submitted a claim to Fidelity under the title insurance policies, and Fidelity retained counsel on Woody Creek’s behalf. Counsel ultimately negotiated the purchase of a 30-year revocable right-of-way grant from the BLM to allow Woody Creek access to the remote parcel. Woody Creek maintained that it suffered a covered loss because the lack of permanent access significantly diminished the value of the remote parcel. Fidelity filed an action for declaratory judgment that Woody Creek was not entitled to coverage for its alleged losses because the right-of-way cured the access issue. Woody Creek counterclaimed for declaratory judgment on the existence of coverage, breach of contract, and bad faith breach of insurance contract. The parties filed cross-motions for partial summary judgment on the coverage issues.
After a hearing, the district court granted Fidelity’s motion and denied Woody Creek’s. The court concluded that the 30-year right-of-way fell within the plain meaning of “access” and left the question of whether Fidelity may be required to pay for future loss of access for another day. The court concluded that the possibility of future litigation did not render the title unmarketable, and rejected Woody Creek’s bad faith claims as a matter of law. Woody Creek appealed.
The Tenth Circuit first addressed Woody Creek’s argument that Fidelity’s purchase of a 30-year right-of-way did not cure the access issue because the right-of-way was revocable and temporary. Fidelity argued that although the title insurance policy guaranteed access, it did not guarantee unrestricted, unregulated, or permanent access. The Tenth Circuit construed the phrase “right of access” and determined that permanent, unrestricted access was not contemplated by the phrase. The Tenth Circuit decided that the Colorado Supreme Court would have construed the phrase “right of access” to include the 30-year right-of-way obtained by Fidelity.
The Tenth Circuit next considered whether the lack of permanent access supported Woody Creek’s claim for unmarketability of title, and concluded it did not. Woody Creek cited a treatise on title insurance law for the proposition that lack of access makes title unmarketable. Fidelity disagreed and suggested that Colorado case law supported its position that even complete lack of access does not render title unmarketable. The Tenth Circuit evaluated the cases and affirmed the district court’s decision, noting the distinction between economic marketability and marketability of title. The Tenth Circuit noted that a parcel of land could be worth no money but have clear title.
Editor’s note: This is Part 19 of a series of posts in which Denver-area real estate attorney Frederick Skillern provides summaries of case law pertinent to real estate practitioners (click here for previous posts). These updates originally appeared as materials for the 32nd Annual Real Estate Symposium in July 2014.
Rule against perpetuities; options; reformation of option agreement under the USRAP, C.R.S. 15-11-106; common law rule does not void commercial option contract.
This is an important case that addresses much of the change in the law of the rule against perpetuities over the last 25 years. As the case came to Colorado Supreme Court the issue was twofold. First, the court accepted certiorari to examine whether the statutory right to reform a commercial contract under the Colorado version of the statutory rule against perpetuities is unconstitutional because it requires a court to reform a vested contract – in this case the right to declare one’s contract void under the common law rule against perpetuities. Second, the court sought to address as a matter of statutory interpretation whether the right of reformation only applied to what the statute refers to as “donative” transfers of property, as opposed to a commercial contract such as an option to purchase mineral rights.
The supreme court changed to focus of the case and addresses in its decision a different question, thereby avoiding the questions upon which certiorari was granted. It holds instead that the interest in question – a twenty-five year option to purchase mineral rights – does not violate the common law rule against perpetuities. As such, there is no need to resort to the reformation procedure provided in the statute.
Pursuant to the 1983 amendment, Equity’s right to exercise the option would not expire until 11:59 p.m. on February 1, 2008. Importantly, the parties agreed that “ARCO shall retain the sole and exclusive right to cancel this Option at any time during its term,” with the exception that Equity was granted a right of first refusal if ARCO received an offer from another party to buy its interest in the Boies Block.
Equity exercised the option shortly before the deadline. ARCO claimed that the option was void under the common law rule against perpetuities. The trial court, in a decision affirmed by the court of appeals, agreed but applied the reformation provision in CRS § 15-11-1106(2) to add a “savings clause” in the manner outlined in the statute.
The result here is to put off for another day the constitutional validity of the reformation provision of the USRAP. The court instead finds that the common law has changed sufficiently to determine, consistent with past cases of the Colorado Supreme Court, that the purpose of the common law rule is not served by applying the “21 years after the death of lives in being test” to an arms-length transaction between sophisticated oil companies. More particularly, the court holds, in a well developed decision that explores the recent development of case law in considerable depth, the fact that the option right was revocable at will by ARCO demonstrates that the option was not preventing development of the land. For that reason, the underlying the policy of the common law rule would not be served by voiding the option simply because its term extended longer than 21 years.
The Real Estate Section of the CBA submitted an amicus brief in support of the lower court’s ruling and in support of the right to reform real estate contracts found to violate the rule. This is motivated in part by the obvious liability risks confronting lawyers who may unwittingly accompany their clients into the “RAP trap.” The risk areas center around long term options, rights of first refusal, and other rights or interests contained in deeds or leases that may “walk or talk” like an executory interest or a right of reversion. As a practice point, it is important in dealing with such interests to keep the USRAP in mind, as it treats “donative transactions” differently than commercial transactions.
Editor’s note: This is Part 18 of a series of posts in which Denver-area real estate attorney Frederick Skillern provides summaries of case law pertinent to real estate practitioners (click here for previous posts). These updates originally appeared as materials for the 32nd Annual Real Estate Symposium in July 2014.
First Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co.
Title Insurance; Exclusion 3(a) matters “created, suffered, assumed or agreed to by the insured claimant”; closing handled by insured lender; ambiguous; no need to “foreclose first” if deed of trust defective; subrogation to rights of insured lender to sue on note; attorney fees and the American Rule.
Bank commits to make a loan, and gets a commitment for a loan policy of title insurance. The commitment reflects that title is not in borrower, and contains a requirement that a deed be recorded vesting title in borrower before issuance of a new policy. Bank closes the loan in house and does not get a vesting deed. According to the trial court’s findings, the bank assumed the title company issuing the commitment (but not handling the closing) would get and record the deed. The title company assumed the bank would do that. It is not apparent from the decision whether title was searched prior to closing or issuance of a policy.
The borrower defaults on the loan, and files a title claim in the amount of the debt. A separate action is filed by the bank against the borrower, which had not gone to judgment by the time of trial in this action. The trial court enters judgment against the title insurer for the full amount of the balance due on the loan, together with attorney fees incurred by the lender in bringing the action. On appeal, the court affirms the judgment for the full amount of the debt but reverses the award of attorney fees.
The court follows the holding in Sims v. Sperry, 835 P.2d 565 (Colo. App. 1992), that Exclusion 3(a), which excludes coverage for matters “created, suffered, assumed or agreed to” is ambiguous, and that the title insurer must prove that the lender “made a conscious and deliberate act intended to bring about the conflicting claim” in order to successfully resort to this exclusion from coverage. Id. at 570. Like many legal rules stated by courts, this rule itself may overstate the meaning of the court’s ruling in Sims, since if a title company relies on the “agreed to” portion of 3(a), which would seem to mean that the encumbrance, if you will, was “intended.” In any event, the court here held that each party thought the other would satisfy the “requirement,” and the court held that the lender was only negligent in not complying with the requirement. The trial court’s refusal to apply this defense was supported by the record, and the judgment is upheld on liability.
As to damages, the court held that the insurance company could be held liable for the full amount of the indebtedness owed to the insured, as the deed of trust is invalid. The court held that the trial court correctly did not require the lender to attempt foreclosure of the deed of trust under Policy Condition and Limitation 8(b), holding that the limitation does not apply where “it is conceded that the insured’s title is defective. It did not require that this action be stayed pending the outcome of the banks suit on the note – any recovery would reduce the damage claim of the insured lender – because upon payment of judgment in this action, the insurer would be subrogated to the bank’s right to proceed against its borrower.
Perhaps the most significant ruling in this case is the court’s reversal of the insured bank’s claim for its attorney fees incurred in suing the title insurer. It explicitly disapproves of the holding in an earlier case, Hedgecock v. Stewart Title Guaranty Company, 676 P.2d 1208, 1210-11 (Colo. App. 1983), relying to a large extent on the holding of our supreme court in Allstate v. Huizar, 52 P.3d 816, 820-21 (Colo. 2002) (the creation of a new exception to the American Rule is best left to the legislature). In the absence of a contractual or other statutory provision for recovery of attorney fees, no recovery.
Editor’s note: This is Part 17 of a series of posts in which Denver-area real estate attorney Frederick Skillern provides summaries of case law pertinent to real estate practitioners (click here for previous posts). These updates originally appeared as materials for the 32nd Annual Real Estate Symposium in July 2014.
Spurious lien statute; phony lien against judge.
Lest anyone be confused about why the legislature passed the spurious lien statute in 1998, we give you the case of Denver District Judge Egelhoff. In 2008, the judge sentenced Taylor to prison on a felony conviction. After he was sentenced, Taylor began mailing the judge various documents, claiming that Judge Egelhoff was indebted to him. The judge understandably did not respond. Taylor filed suit, claiming that the judge’s failure to respond created liability to Taylor under a terrific doctrine called the “commercial affidavit process.” Robin Hood could not have done better.
Taylor contends that the “commercial affidavit process” permits an individual to send an affidavit to a purported debtor, claiming the recipient owes the sender a debt, and if the recipient does not specifically rebut the alleged debt, he is deemed to have agreed to the debt and its collection by any means. At our social gathering tonight, perhaps someone can advise us from whence this legal doctrine derives. According to Taylor, a recipient’s silence results in a “self-executing contract,” binding the recipient to pay the amount of the alleged debt. Thus, Taylor argues that, because the judge did not respond to his affidavit, his honor “agreed” that the five hundred million dollar debt was valid.
The panel of the court of appeals, seemingly lacking any sense of humor, goes on for several pages as to why this procedure does not form a contract between judge and convict. An opportunity was missed. It is interesting that this case was selected for publication, when many other real estate cases of considerable substance are passed over.
Bankruptcy; lis pendens; preferential transfer.
Ute Mesa Lot 1, LLC (Ute Mesa) borrowed $12 million from United Western Bank to finance the construction of a home in Aspen. The deed of trust incorrectly named the property’s owner, so the deed of trust was ineffective in giving the Bank a lien on the property. Later, the Bank filed suit to reform the deed of trust and give it a first priority lien on the property. The Bank then recorded a notice of lis pendens with the county real property records. Two months later, Ute Mesa filed for bankruptcy and sought to avoid the lis pendens as a preferential transfer. The bankruptcy court and district court dismissed Ute Mesa’s claim. Ute Mesa appealed, arguing that the lis pendens would prevent a bona fide purchaser from acquiring an interest in the property superior to the Bank’s. Therefore, it was a “transfer of an interest in property” and an avoidable preferential transfer.
The Tenth Circuit holds that a lis pendens is merely a notice and does not constitute a lien, despite the fact that under Colorado law, a lis pendens renders title unmarketable. The lis pendens is not a transfer, so it was not subject to the bankruptcy provision allowing a debtor-in-possession to avoid a transfer of an interest in property that occurs within ninety days before the filing of the bankruptcy petition. The judgment is affirmed.
The following bill was discussed as the only action item taken up at the meeting on Friday, March 20. Other bills of interest from that agenda are tracked and updated below.
The LPC voted to oppose this bill because Laches is an important equitable defense. Colorado has a long history with the Doctrine of Laches and this bill upsets that balance. We understand the specific nature of the concern addressed in the bill, but the approach to a solution was overbroad. Therefore we voted to oppose HB 1272.
The Legislative Policy Committee voted to oppose this bill to maintain a consistent position with the CBA’s position on previous legislation (HB13-1136 which the CBA supported). SB 69 would have reversed the effect of that bill.
The LPC voted to support the Juvenile Law Section’s recommendation to support this bill. There was a great deal of discussion. The bill allows for Juveniles who were previously convicted to petition for resentencing. The bill takes into consideration many factors for both victims and offenders.
Bills that the LPC is monitoring, watching or working on can be found at this link on Priority Bill Track.
This past week was a slower week for Bar priority bills. A number of bills we are watching and working on have not been scheduled for hearings or debate. We are constantly watching to ensure we are represented and up to date on bills the LPC has taken action on, and expect that this section will be more full after the “Long bill” (the state budget) is passed over the next two weeks.
We successfully amended this bill per the Real Estate Sections requirements, working in conjunction with the Denver Public Trustee and Representative McCann.
This bill was Postponed Indefinitely by the House Committee on Public Health Care and Human Services.
The bill prohibits a private educational lender, as defined in the bill, from offering gifts to a covered educational institution, as defined in the bill, including public and private institutions of higher education, in exchange for any advantage or consideration related to loan activities or from engaging in revenue sharing. Further, the bill prohibits persons employed at covered educational institutions from receiving anything of value from private educational lenders. The bill makes it unlawful for a private educational lender to impose a fee or penalty on a borrower for early repayment or prepayment of a private education loan and requires a lender to disclose any agreements made with a card issuer or creditor for purposes of marketing a credit card. The bill requires private educational lenders to disclose information to a potential borrower or borrower both at the time of application for a private education loan and at the time of consummation of the loan.
The required disclosures are described in the bill and include, among other disclosures, the interest rate for the loan and adjustments to the rate, potential finance charges and penalties, payment options, an estimate of the total amount for repayment at the interest rate, the possibility of qualifying for federal loans, the terms and conditions of the loan, and that the borrower may cancel the loan, without penalty, within three business days after the date on which the loan is consummated.
The bill creates the title insurance commission (commission). The bill establishes the powers, duties, and functions of the commission and provides for the appointment of the members of the commission. With the exception of rate regulation and licensing, which will continue to be done by the insurance commissioner, the commission participates in the regulation of the title insurance business in Colorado by concurring in rules of the insurance commissioner, proposing rules for approval by the insurance commissioner, and reviewing and concurring in disciplinary actions related to the regulation of the title insurance business. The commission is scheduled to sunset Sept. 1, 2025, subject to continuation after a sunset review as provided by law.

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