Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/388/395/
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 20:29:00+00:00

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Justia › US Law › US Case Law › US Supreme Court › Volume 388 › Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co.
"[a]ny controversy . . . arising out of this agreement, or the breach thereof, shall be settled by arbitration in the City of New York in accordance with the rules . . . of the American Arbitration Association."
"in any . . . contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract;"
another to arbitrate, if satisfied that an arbitration agreement has not been honored and that "the making of the agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply [with the arbitration agreement] is not in issue," shall order arbitration. The District Court granted a motion filed by F & C to stay the action pending arbitration, and the Court of Appeals dismissed Prima's appeal.
1. The contract clearly evidenced a transaction involving interstate commerce, and came within the coverage of the Arbitration Act. P. 388 U. S. 401.
2. In passing upon an application for a stay of arbitration under § 3 of the Act, a federal court may not consider a claim of fraud in the inducement of the contract generally, but "may consider only the issues relating to the making and performance of the agreement to arbitrate." Pp. 388 U. S. 402-404.
3. The Act prescribes the manner in which federal courts are to treat questions relating to arbitration clauses in contracts which involve interstate commerce or admiralty, "subject matter over which Congress plainly has power to legislate." Hence, state rules allocating functions between court and arbitrator do not control. Pp. 388 U. S. 404-405.
4. Since the claim of fraud here relates to inducement of the consulting agreement generally, rather than in the arbitration clause, and there is no evidence that the parties intended to withhold this issue from arbitration, there is no basis for granting a stay under § 3. Pp. 388 U. S. 406-407.
the inducement," under a contract governed by the United States Arbitration Act of 1925, [Footnote 1] where there is no evidence that the contracting parties intended to withhold that issue from arbitration.
"Any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this Agreement, or the breach thereof, shall be settled by arbitration in the City of New York, in accordance with the rules then obtaining of the American Arbitration Association. . . ."
The first payment by Prima Paint to F & C under the consulting agreement was due on September 1, 1965. None was made on that date. Seventeen days later, Prima Paint did pay the appropriate amount, but into escrow. It notified attorneys for F & C that, in various enumerated respects, their client had broken both the consulting agreement and the earlier purchase agreement. Prima Paint's principal contention, so far as presently relevant, was that F & C had fraudulently represented that it was solvent and able to perform its contractual obligations, whereas it was, in fact, insolvent, and intended to file a petition under Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act, 52 Stat. 905, 11 U.S.C. § 701 et seq., shortly after execution of the consulting agreement. Prima Paint noted that such a petition was filed by F & C on October 14, 1964, one week after the contract had been signed. F & C's response, on October 25, was to serve a "notice of intention to arbitrate." On November 12, three days before expiration of its time to answer this "notice," Prima Paint filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, seeking rescission of the consulting agreement on the basis of the alleged fraudulent inducement. [Footnote 2] The complaint asserted that the federal court had diversity jurisdiction.
Contemporaneously with the filing of its complaint, Prima Paint petitioned the District Court for an order enjoining F & C from proceeding with the arbitration. F & C cross-moved to stay the court action pending arbitration. F & C contended that the issue presented -- whether there was fraud in the inducement of the consulting agreement -- was a question for the arbitrators, and not for the District Court. Cross-affidavits were filed on the merits. On behalf of Prima Paint, the charges in the complaint were reiterated. Affiants for F & C attacked the sufficiency of Prima Paint's allegations of fraud, denied that misrepresentations had been made during negotiations, and asserted that Prima Paint had relied exclusively upon delivery of the lists, the promise not to compete, and the availability of Mr. Jelin. They contended that Prima Paint had availed itself of these considerations for nearly a year without claiming "fraud," noting that Prima Paint was in no position to claim ignorance of the bankruptcy proceeding, since it had participated therein in February of 1965. They added that F & C was revested with its assets in March of 1965.
Lawrence Co. decision, a claim of fraud in the inducement of the contract generally -- as opposed to the arbitration clause itself -- is for the arbitrators, and not for the courts, and that this rule -- one of "national substantive law" -- governs even in the face of a contrary state rule. [Footnote 3] We agree, albeit for somewhat different reasons, and we affirm the decision below.
"in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract. [Footnote 4]"
goes to the "making" of the agreement to arbitrate -- the federal court may proceed to adjudicate it. [Footnote 12] But the statutory language does not permit the federal court to consider claims of fraud in the inducement of the contract generally. Section 4 does not expressly relate to situations like the present in which a stay is sought of a federal action in order that arbitration may proceed. But it is inconceivable that Congress intended the rule to differ depending upon which party to the arbitration agreement first invokes the assistance of a federal court. We hold, therefore, that, in passing upon a § 3 application for a stay while the parties arbitrate, a federal court may consider only issues relating to the making and performance of the agreement to arbitrate. In so concluding, we not only honor the plain meaning of the statute, but also the unmistakably clear congressional purpose that the arbitration procedure, when selected by the parties to a contract, be speedy, and not subject to delay and obstruction in the courts.
There remains the question whether such a rule is constitutionally permissible. The point is made that, whatever the nature of the contract involved here, this case is in federal court solely by reason of diversity of citizenship, and that, since the decision in Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64 (1938), federal courts are bound in diversity cases to follow state rules of decision in matters which are "substantive", rather than "procedural,"
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN: In joining the Court's opinion, I desire to note that I would also affirm the judgment below on the basis of Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402 (C.A.2d Cir.1959), cert. granted, 362 U.S. 909, dismissed under Rule 60, 364 U.S. 801 (1960).
"fraudulently induced to accelerate the execution and closing date of the [consulting] agreement herein, from October 21, 1964 to October 7, 1964. . . ."
Whether a party seeking rescission of a contract on the ground of fraudulent inducement may in New York obtain judicial resolution of his claim is not entirely clear. Compare Exercycle Corp. v. Maratta, 9 N.Y.2d 329, 334, 174 N.E.2d 463, 465 (1961), and Amerotron Corp. v. Maxwell Shapiro Woolen Co., 3 App.Div.2d 899, 162 N.Y.S.2d 214 (1957), aff'd, 4 N.Y.2d 722, 148 N.E.2d 319 (1958), with Fabrex Corp. v. Winard Sales Co., 23 Misc.2d 26, 200 N.Y.S.2d 278 (1960). In light of our disposition of this case, we need not decide the status of the issue under New York law.
The meaning of "maritime transaction" and "commerce" is set forth in § 1 of the Act.
See infra at 388 U. S. 403-404.
"[t]he control over interstate commerce [one of the bases for the legislation] reaches not only the actual physical interstate shipment of goods, but also contracts relating to interstate commerce."
H.R.Rep. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1924). We note, too, that were the dissent's curious narrowing of the Statute correct, there would have been no necessity for Congress to have amended the statute to exclude certain kinds of employment contracts. See § 1. In any event, the anomaly urged upon us in dissent is manifested by the present case. It would be remarkable to say that a contract for the purchase of a single can of paint may evidence a transaction in interstate commerce, but that an agreement relating to the facilitation of the purchase of an entire interstate paint business and its reestablishment and operation in another State is not.
In addition to Robert Lawrence Co., supra, see In re Kinoshita & Co., 287 F.2d 951 (C.A.2d Cir.1961). With respect to claims other than fraud in the inducement, the court has followed a similar process of analysis. See, e.g., Metro Industrial Painting Corp. v. Terminal Constr. Co., 287 F.2d 382 (C.A.2d Cir.1961) (dispute over performance); El Hoss Engineer. & Transport Co. v. American Ind. Oil Co., 289 F.2d 346 (C.A.2d Cir.1961) (where, however, the court found an intent not to submit the issue in question to arbitration).
These cases and others are discussed in a recent Note, Commercial Arbitration in Federal Courts, 20 Vand.L.Rev. 607, 622-625 (1967).
"The court shall hear the parties, and upon being satisfied that the making of the agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply therewith is not in issue, the court shall make an order directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms of the agreement. . . . If the making of the arbitration agreement or the failure, neglect, or refusal to perform the same be in issue, the court shall proceed summarily to the trial thereof."
This position is consistent both with the decision in Moseley v. Electronic Facilities, 374 U. S. 167, 374 U. S. 171, 374 U. S. 172 (1963), and with the statutory scheme. As the "saving clause" in § 2 indicates, the purpose of Congress in 1925 was to make arbitration agreements as enforceable as other contracts, but not more so. To immunize an arbitration agreement from judicial challenge on the ground of fraud in the inducement would be to elevate it over other forms of contract -- a situation inconsistent with the "saving clause."
It is true that the Arbitration Act was passed 13 years before this Court's decision in Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, supra, brought to an end the regime of Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1 (1842), and that, at the time of enactment, Congress had reason to believe that it still had power to create federal rules to govern questions of "general law" arising in simple diversity cases -- at least, absent any state statute to the contrary. If Congress relied at all on this "oft-challenged" power, see Erie R. Co., 304 U.S. at 304 U. S. 69, it was only supplementary to the admiralty and commerce powers, which formed the principal bases of the legislation. Indeed, Congressman Graham, the bill's sponsor in the House, told his colleagues that it "only affects contracts relating to interstate subjects and contracts in admiralty." 65 Cong.Rec.1931 (1924). The Senate Report on this legislation similarly indicated that the bill "[relates] to maritime transactions and to contracts in interstate and foreign commerce." S.Rep. No. 536, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1924).
"follows the lines of the New York arbitration law, applying it to the fields wherein there is Federal jurisdiction. These fields are in admiralty and in foreign and interstate commerce."
"[F]irst . . . to get a State statute, and then to get a Federal law to cover interstate and foreign commerce and admiralty, and, third, to get a treaty with foreign countries."
Joint Hearings, supra, at 16 (emphasis added). See also Joint Hearings, supra, at 27-28 (statement of Mr. Alexander Rose). Mr. Cohen did submit a brief to the Subcommittee urging a jurisdictional base broader than the commerce and admiralty powers, Joint Hearings, supra, at 37-38, but there is no indication in the statute or in the legislative history that this invitation to go beyond those powers was accepted, and his own testimony took a much narrower tack.
reasonable and fair reading of that Act's language and history shows that both Congress and the framers of the Act were at great pains to emphasize that nonlawyers designated to adjust and arbitrate factual controversies arising out of valid contracts would not trespass upon the courts' prerogative to decide the legal question of whether any legal contract exists upon which to base an arbitration.
Second Circuit's decision in Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402, cert. granted, 362 U.S. 909, dismissed, 364 U.S. 801, held that, as a matter of "national substantive law," the arbitration clause in the contract is "separable" from the rest of the contract, and that allegations that go to the validity of the contract in general, as opposed to the arbitration clause in particular, are to be decided by the arbitrator, not the court.
under New York law from the rest of the contract), [Footnote 2/4] the Court necessarily holds that federal law determines whether certain allegations put the making of the arbitration agreement in issue. And the Court approves the Second Circuit's fashioning of a federal separability rule which overrides state law to the contrary. The Court thus holds that the Arbitration Act, designed to provide merely a procedural remedy which would not interfere with state substantive law, authorizes federal courts to fashion a federal rule to make arbitration clauses "separable" and valid. And the Court approves a rule which is not only contrary to state law, but contrary to the intention of the parties and to accepted principles of contract law -- a rule which indeed elevates arbitration provisions above all other contractual provisions. As the Court recognizes, that result was clearly not intended by Congress. Finally, the Court summarily disposes of the problem raised by Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, recognized as a serious constitutional problem in Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U. S. 198, by insufficiently supported assertions that it is "clear beyond dispute" that Congress based the Arbitration Act on its power to regulate commerce, and that, "[i]f Congress relied at all on" its power to create federal law for diversity cases, such reliance "was only supplementary."
"[a] written provision in . . . a contract . . . involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract."
"[i]f any suit . . . be brought . . . upon any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such arbitration, the court . . . upon being satisfied that the issue involved in such suit . . . is referable to arbitration under such an agreement, shall . . . stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been had. . . . [Footnote 2/5]"
"The court has got to hear and determine whether there is an agreement of arbitration, undoubtedly, and it is open to all defenses, equitable and legal, that would have existed at law. . . . [Footnote 2/6]"
"If he should attack it on the ground of fraud, to rescind the whole thin, . . . I presume that it merely [is] a question of whether he did make the arbitration agreement or not, . . . and then he would possibly set up that he was misled about the contract and entered into it by mistake. . . . [Footnote 2/8]"
of the parties, the entire contract was made. That is precisely the issue that a general allegation of fraud in the inducement raises: Prima contended that it would not have executed any contract, including the arbitration clause, if it were not for the fraudulent representations of F & C. Prima's agreement to an arbitration clause in a contract obtained by fraud was no more "voluntary" than an insured's or employee's agreement to an arbitration clause in a contract obtained by superior bargaining power.
do arbitrators. [Footnote 2/15] On the other hand, where a party seeks to rescind a contract and his allegation of fraud in the inducement is true, an arbitrator's speedy remedy of this wrong should never result in resumption of performance under the contract. And if the contract were not procured by fraud, the court, under the summary trial procedures provided by the Act, may determine with little delay that arbitration must proceed. The only advantage of submitting the issue of fraud to arbitration is for the arbitrators. Their compensation corresponds to the volume of arbitration they perform. If they determine that a contract is void because of fraud, there is nothing further for them to arbitrate. I think it raises serious questions of due process to submit to an arbitrator an issue which will determine his compensation. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U. S. 510.
Act, passed 13 years prior to Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, could be constitutionally applied in a diversity case even though its application would require the federal court to enforce an agreement to arbitrate which the state court across the street would not enforce. Bernhardt's holding that arbitration is "outcome determinative," 350 U.S. at 350 U. S. 203, and its recognition that there would be unconstitutional discrimination if an arbitration agreement were enforceable in federal court but not in the state court, id. at 350 U. S. 204, posed a choice of two alternatives for Judge Medina. If he held that the Arbitration Act rested solely on Congress' power, widely recognized in 1925 but negated in Erie, to prescribe general federal law applicable in diversity cases, he would be compelled to hold the Act unconstitutional as applied to diversity cases under Erie and Bernhardt. [Footnote 2/16] If he held that the Act rested on Congress' power to enact substantive law governing interstate commerce, then the Erie-Bernhardt problem would be avoided, and the application of the Act to diversity cases involving commerce could be saved.
"The statute establishes a procedure in the Federal courts. . . . It rests upon the constitutional provision by which Congress is authorized to establish and control inferior Federal courts. So far as congressional acts relate to the procedure in the Federal courts, they are clearly within the congressional power. [Footnote 2/19]"
the jurisdiction and duties of the Federal courts. [Footnote 2/20]"
65 Cong.Rec.1931 (1924). (Emphasis added.) Finally, there are clear indications in the legislative history that the Act was not intended to make arbitration agreements enforceable in state courts [Footnote 2/23] or to provide an independent federal question basis for jurisdiction in federal courts apart from diversity jurisdiction. [Footnote 2/24] The absence of both of these effects -- which normally follow from legislation of federal substantive law -- seems to militate against the view that Congress was creating a body of federal substantive law.
"encompasses questions of interpretation and construction as well as questions of validity, revocability and enforceability of arbitration agreements affecting interstate commerce or maritime affairs."
of the Federal courts. It is no infringement upon the right of each State to decide for itself what contracts shall or shall not exist under its laws. To be sure, whether or not a contract exists is a question of the substantive law of the jurisdiction wherein the contract was made."
"Neither is it true that such a statute, declaring arbitration agreements to be valid, is the source of their existence as a matter of substantive law. . . ."
Cohen & Dayton, The New Federal Arbitration Law, 12 Va.L.Rev. 265, 276-277. All this indicates that the § 4 inquiry of whether the making of the arbitration agreement is in issue is to be determined by reference to state law, not federal law formulated by judges for the purpose of promoting arbitration.
"Whether a number of promises constitute one contract [and are non-separable] or more than one is to be determined by inquiring"
"whether the parties assented to all the promises as a single whole, so that there would have been no bargain whatever, if any promise or set of promises were struck out."
applicable in state courts would give rise to "forum shopping" and an unconstitutional discrimination that both Erie and Bernhardt were designed to eliminate. These problems are greatly reduced if the Act is limited, as it should be, to its proper scope: the mere enforcement in federal courts of valid arbitration agreements.
The Court's summary treatment of these issues has made it necessary for me to express my views at length. The plain purpose of the Act as written by Congress was this, and no more: Congress wanted federal courts to enforce contracts to arbitrate, and plainly said so in the Act. But Congress also plainly said that whether a contract containing an arbitration clause can be rescinded on the ground of fraud is to be decided by the courts, and not by the arbitrators. Prima here challenged in the courts the validity of its alleged contract with F & C as a whole, not in fragments. If there has never been any valid contract, then there is not now and never has been anything to arbitrate. If Prima's allegations are true, the sum total of what the Court does here is to force Prima to arbitrate a contract which is void and unenforceable before arbitrators who are given the power to make final legal determinations of their own jurisdiction, not even subject to effective review by the highest court in the land. That is not what Congress said Prima must do. It seems to be what the Court thinks would promote the policy of arbitration. I am completely unable to agree to this new version of the Arbitration Act, a version which its own creator in Robert Lawrence practically admitted was judicial legislation. Congress might possibly have enacted such a version into law had it been able to foresee subsequent legal events, but I do not think this Court should do so.
"unless the party served applies to stay the arbitration within ten days after such service he shall thereafter be precluded from objecting that a valid agreement was not made. . . ."
The principal support for the Act came from trade associations dealing in groceries and other perishables and from commercial and mercantile groups in the major trading centers. 50 A.B.A.Rep. 357 (1925). Practically all who testified in support of the bill before the Senate subcommittee in 1923 explained that the bill was designed to cover contracts between people in different States who produced, shipped, bought, or sold commodities. Hearing on S. 4213 and S. 4214 before the Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 67th Cong., 4th Sess., 3, 7, 9, 10 (1923). The same views were expressed in the 1924 hearings. When Senator Sterling suggested, "What you have in mind is that this proposed legislation relates to contracts arising in interstate commerce," Mr. Bernheimer, a chief exponent of the bill, replied: "Yes; entirely. The farmer who will sell his carload of potatoes, from Wyoming, to a dealer in the State of New Jersey, for instance." Joint Hearings on S. 1005 and H.R. 646 before the Subcommittees of the Committees on the Judiciary, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 7. See also id. at 27.
In some Acts, Congress uses broad language and defines commerce to include even that which "affects" commerce. Federal Employers' Liability Act, 35 Stat. 65, § 1, as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 51; National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 450, § 2, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 152(7). In other instances, Congress has chosen more restrictive language. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 1062, § 6, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 206. Prior to this case, this Court has always made careful inquiry to assure itself that it is applying a statute with the coverage that Congress intended, so that the meaning in that statute of "commerce" will be neither expanded nor contracted. The Arbitration Act is an example of carefully limited language. It covers only those contracts "involving commerce," and nowhere is there a suggestion that it is meant to extend to contracts "affecting commerce." The Act not only uses narrow language, but also is completely without any declaration of some national interest to be served or some nationwide comprehensive scheme of regulation to be created, and this absence suggests that Congress did not intend to exert its full power over commerce.
This section, unlike § 4, is expressly applicable to situations, like the present one, where a defendant in a case already pending in federal court moves for a stay of the lawsuit. In finding an "explicit answer" in a provision "not expressly" applicable, the Court almost completely ignores the language of § 3 and the proviso to § 2, a section which Bernhardt held to "define the field in which Congress was legislating." 350 U.S. at 350 U. S. 201.
"The one constitutional provision we have got is that you have a right of trial by jury. But you can waive that. And you can do that in advance. Ah, but the question whether you waive it or not depends on whether that is your signature to the paper, or whether you authorized that signature, or whether the paper is a valid paper or not, whether it was delivered properly. So there is a question there which you have not waived the right of trial by jury on."
Joint Hearings, supra, at 17. It seems quite clear to me that Mr. Cohen was referring to a jury trial of allegations challenging the validity of the entire contract.
Senate Hearing, supra, at 9-11. See also Joint Hearings, supra, at 15.
Cohen & Dayton, The New Federal Arbitration Law, 12 Va.L.Rev. 265, 281 (1926).
See, e.g., Senate Hearing, supra, at 3.
"It [arbitration] is not a proper remedy for . . . questions with which the arbitrators have no particular experience and which are better left to the determination of skilled judges with a background of legal experience and established systems of law."
Cohen & Dayton, supra, at 281.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter chose this alternative in his concurring opinion in Bernhardt, 350 U.S. at 350 U. S. 208, and even the Court there suggested that its pre-Erie decision in Shanferoke Coal & Supply Corp. v. Westchester Service Corp., 293 U. S. 449, which applied the Act to an interstate contract in a diversity case, might be decided differently under the Bernhardt holding that arbitration is outcome determinative, 350 U.S. at 350 U. S. 202.
For an analysis of these alternatives, see generally Symposium, Arbitration and the Courts, 58 Nw.U.L.Rev. 466 (1963); Note, 69 Yale L.J. 847 (1960).
"The purpose of this bill is to make valid and enforceable agreements for arbitration contained in contracts involving interstate commerce . . . or which may be the subject of litigation in the Federal courts."
"The Federal courts are given jurisdiction to enforce such agreements whenever, under the Judicial Code, they would have had jurisdiction. . . . Where the basis of jurisdiction is diversity of citizenship, the dispute must involve $3000 as in suits at law."
"[t]hat if the basis of jurisdiction be diversity of citizenship . . . the district court . . . shall have jurisdiction . . . hereunder notwithstanding the amount in controversy is unascertained. . . ."
Though that provision was deleted by the Senate, the omission was not intended substantially to alter the law. 66 Cong.Rec. 3004 (1925).
Committee on Commerce, Trade & Commercial Law, supra, 11 A.B.A.J. at 154.
"So what we have done . . . [in New York] is that we have . . . made it a part of our judicial machinery. That is what we have done. But it cannot be done under our constitutional form of government and cover the great fields of commerce until you gentlemen do it, in the exercise of your power to confer jurisdiction on the Federal courts. The theory on which you do this is that you have the right to tell the Federal courts how to proceed."
The legislative history which the Court recites to support its assertion that Congress relied principally on its power over commerce consists mainly of statements that the Act was designed to cover only contracts in commerce, and that is certainly true. But merely because the Act was designed to enforce arbitration agreements only in contracts in commerce does not mean that Congress was primarily relying on its power over commerce in supplying that remedy of enforceability.
"Nor can it be said that the Congress of the United States, directing its own courts . . . , would infringe upon the provinces or prerogatives of the States. . . . [T]he question of the enforcement relates to the law of remedies, and not to substantive law. The rule must be changed for the jurisdiction in which the agreement is sought to be enforced. . . . There is no disposition therefore by means of the Federal bludgeon to force an individual State into an unwilling submission to arbitration enforcement."
S.Rep. No. 536, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1924); Joint Hearings, supra, at 38.
H.R.Rep. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (1924).
"This is a declaration of national law equally applicable in state or federal courts." 271 F.2d at 407.

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