Source: https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/307/325
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 12:20:56+00:00

Document:
The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, asserting that plaintiff was not a citizen of the United States by virtue of the Naturalization Convention and Protocol of 1869 (proclaimed in 1872) between the United States and Sweden ( 17 Stat. 809) and the Swedish Nationality Law, and Section 2 of the Act of Congress of March 2, 1907, 8 U.S.C. 17, 8 U.S.C.A. § 17. The District Court overruled the motion as to the Secretary of Labor and the Commissioner of Immigration and entered a decree declaring that the plaintiff is a native citizen of the United States but directing that the complaint be dismissed as to the Secretary of State because of his official discretion in the issue of passports. On cross appeals, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decree, 69 App.D.C. 175, 99 F.2d 408. Certiorari was granted, December 5, 1938, 305 U.S. 591, 59 S.Ct. 245, 83 L.Ed. -.
First.On her birth in New York, the plaintiff became a citizen of the United States. Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27; Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1, U.S.C.A.Const.; United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 18 S.Ct. 456, 42 L.Ed. 890. In a comprehensive review of the principles and authorities governing the decision in that casethat a child born here of alien parentage becomes a citizen of the United Statesthe Court adverted to the 'inherent right of every independent nation to determine for itself, and according to its own constitution and laws, what classes of persons shall be entitled to its citizenship.' United States v. Wong Kim Ark, supra, 169 U.S. page 668, 18 S.Ct. page 164, 42 L.Ed. 890. As municipal law determines how citizenship may be acquired, it follows that persons may have a dual nationality. 1 And the mere fact that the plaintiff may have acquired Swedish citizenship by virtue of the operation of Swedish law, on the resumption of that citizenship by her parents, does not compel the conclusion that she has lost her own citizenship acquired under our law. As at birth she became a citizen of the United States, at citizenship must be deemed to continue unless she has been deprived of it through the operation of a treaty or congressional enactment or by her voluntary action in conformity with applicable legal principles.
'He lost no time when he attained the age of majority, in declaring that he claimed the United States as his country and that he considered himself a citizen of the United States. He appears to have adhered to this choice ever since and now declares it to be his intention to return to this country and reside here permanently. His father's political status (whether a citizen of the United States or a Danish subject) has no legal or otherwise material effect on the younger Ps' rights of citizenship'.
We have quoted liberally from these rulingsand many others might be citedin view of the contention now urged by the petitioners in resisting Miss Elg's claim to citizenship. We think that they leave no doubt of the controlling principle long recognized by this Government. That principle, while administratively applied, cannot properly be regarded as a departmental creation independently of the law. It was deemed to be a necessary consequence of the constitutional provisions by which persons born within the United States and subject to its jurisdiction become citizens of the United States. To cause a loss of that citizenship in the absence of treaty or statute having that effect, there must be voluntary action and such action cannot be attributed to an infant whose removal to another country is beyond his control and who during minority is incapable of a binding choice.
Petitioners stress the American doctrine relating to expatriation. By the Act of July 27, 1868, 8 Congress declared that 'the right of expatriation is a natural and inherent right of all people'. Expatriation is the voluntary renunciation or abandonment of nationality and allegiance. 9 It has no application to the removal from this country of a native citizen during minority. In such a case the voluntary action which is of the essence of the right of expatriation is lacking. That right is fittingly recognized where a child born here, who may be, or may become, subject to a dual nationality, elects on attaining majority citizenship in the country to which he has been removed. But there is no basis for invoking the doctrine of expatriation where native citizen who is removed to his parents' country of origin during minority returns here on his majority and elects to remain and to maintain his American citizenship. Instead of being inconsistent with the right of expatriation, the principle which permits that election conserves and applies it.
There were provisions, similar to those in the treaty with Sweden in the naturalization treaty with Denmark of 1872, 19 but Secretary Evarts evidently did not regard those provisions as inconsistent with the claim, which he sustained, of one born here of Danish parentage who was taken abroad by his parents but insisted upon his American citizenship when he arrived at his majority. 20 These rulings, following closely upon the negotiation of these naturalization treaties, show beyond question that the treaties were not regarded as abrogating the right of election for which respondent here contends.
It should also be noted that the Act of 1907 in Sections 5 and 6, 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 8, 6, 26 has specific reference to children born without the United States of alien parents but says nothing as to the loss of citizenship by minor children born in the United States.
When, precisely, there occurred a change in the departmental attitude is not clear. 28 It seems to have resulted in a conflict with the opinion of the Solicitor of the Department of Labor in the case of Ingrid Therese Tobiassen, and the Secretary of Labor because of that conflict requested the opinion of the Attorney General, which was given on June 16, 1932. 29 It appeared that Miss Tobiassen, aged 20, was born in New York in 1911; that her father, a native of Norway, became a citizen of the United States by naturalization in 1912; that in 1919 Miss Tobiassen was taken by her parents to Norway where the latter had since resided; that at the age of 18 she returned to the United States and took up her permanent residence in New Jersey. The question arose when she asked for a return permit to visit her parents. The Department of State refused to issue a passport on the ground that Miss Tobiassen had acquired Norwegian nationality and had ceased to be an American citizen. The Attorney General's opinion approved that action.
His opinion quoted the provisions of the treaty with Sweden and Norway of 1869 30 and referred to the Norwegian Nationality Law of August 8, 1924, and to the provisions of the Act of Congress of March 2, 1907. The opinion noted that the claim that Miss Tobiassen had ceased to be an American citizen did 'not rest upon the terms of the Naturalization Treaty with Norway, but upon a law of that country, as a result of the renunciation by her father, a native of Norway, of his American citizenship, and the resumption of his Norwegian nationality in pursuance of the terms of that treaty'. The law of Norway was deemed to be analogous to our statutes 'by virtue of which foreign-born minor children of persons naturalized in the United States are declared to be citizens of this country'; and hence the conclusion that Miss Tobiassen having acquired Norwegian nationality had in consequence ceased to be an American citizen was said to be correct.
Nor do we think that recent private acts of Congress 32 for the relief of native citizens who have been the subject of administrative action denying their rights of citizenship, can be regarded as the equivalent of an Act of Congress providing that persons in the situation of the respondent here have lost the American citizenship which they acquired at birth and have since duly elected to retain. No such statute has been enacted.
Fifth.The cross petition of Miss Elg, upon which certiorari was granted in No. 455, is addressed to the part of the decree below which dismissed the bill of complaint as against the Secretary of State. The dismissal was upon the ground that the court would not undertake by mandamus to compel the issuance of a passport or control by means of a declaratory judgment the discretion of the Secretary of State. But the Secretary of State, according to the allegation of the bill of complaint, had refused to issue a passport to Miss Elg 'solely on the ground that she had lost her native born American citizenship.' The court below, properly recognizing the existence of an actual controversy with the defendants (Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 57 S.Ct. 461, 81 L.Ed. 617, 108 A.L.R. 1000), declared Miss Elg 'to be a natural born citizen of the United States' (99 F.2d 414) and we think that the decree should include the Secretary of State as well as the other defendants. The decree in that sense would in no way interfere with the exercise of the Secretary's discretion with respect to the issue of a passport but would simply preclude the denial of a passport on the sole ground that Miss Elg had lost her American citizenship.
15 Stat. 223, 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1315.
While the nationality law of Sweden is not to be regarded as controlling unless the treaty makes it sowhich we have found is not the caseit may be observed that it is not clear that the law of Sweden would operate so as to preclude recognition that respondent is a citizen of the United States. See the Swedish law of 7 May, 1909, Art. 8. That, however, is a question of foreign law which we find it unnecessary to attempt to determine.
34 Stat. 1228, 8 U.S.C. 17, 8 U.S.C.A. § 17.
SAVORGNAN v. UNITED STATES et al.
Rockwell KENT and Walter Briehl, Petitioners, v. John Foster DULLES, Secretary of State.
John S. SERVICE, Petitioner, v. John Foster DULLES et al.

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