Source: https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/229/447/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 12:35:03+00:00

Document:
PAUL CHARLTON, as Next Friend of Porter ter Charlton, Appt., v. JAMES J. KELLY, Sheriff of Hudson County, New Jersey, et al.
This is an appeal from a judgment dismissing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, and remanding the petitioner to custody under a warrant for his extradition as a fugitive from the justice of the Kingdom of Italy.
The proceedings for the extradition of the appellant were begun upon a complaint duly made by the Italian vice-consul, charging him wiht the commission of a murder in Italy. A warrant was duly issued by the Hon. John A. Blair, one of the judges of New Jersey, qualified to sit as a committing magistrate in such a proceeding, under § 5270, Revised Statutes (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3591). At the hearing, evidence was produced which satisfied Judge Blair that the appellant was a fugitive from justice, and that he was the person whose return to Italy was desired, and that there was probable cause for holding him for trial upon the charge of murder, committed there. He thereupon committed the appellant, to be held until surrendered under a warrant to be issued by the Secretary of State. A transcript of the evidence and of the findings was duly certified as required by § 5270, Revised Statutes, and a warrant in due form for his surrender was issued by the Secretary of State. Its execution has, up to this time been prevented by the habeas corpus proceedings in the court below and the pendency of this appeal.
One of the crimes specified in the section following is murder.
'Any competent judicial magistrate of either of the two countries shall be authorized, after the exhibition of a certificate signed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Italy or the Secretary of State of the United States, attesting that a requisition has been made by the government of the other country to secure the preliminary arrest of a person condemned for or charged with having therein committed a crime for which, pursuant to this convention, extradition may be granted, and on complaint duly made under oath by a person cognizant of the fact, or by a diplomatic or consular officer of the demanding government, being duly authorized by the latter, and attesting that the aforesaid crime was thus perpetrated, to issue a warrant for the arrest of the person thus inculpated, to the end that he or she may be brought before the said magistrate, so that the evidence of his or her criminality may be heard and considered; and the person thus accused and imprisoned shall from time to time be remanded to prison until a formal demand for his or her extradition shall be made and supported by evidence, as above provided; if, however, the requisition, together with the documents above provided for, shall not be made, as required, by the diplomatic representative of the demanding government, or, in his absence, by a consular officer thereof, within forty days from the date of the arrest of the accused, the prisoner shall be set at liberty.' 24 Stat. at L. 1002.
Messrs. R. Floyd Clarke and William D. Edwards for appellant.
Mr. Pierre P. Garven for appellees.
A writ of habeas corpus cannot be used as a writ of error. If Judge Blair had jurisdiction of the person of the accused and of the subject-matter, and had before him competent legal evidence of the commission of this crime with which the appellant was charged in the complaint, which, according to the law of New Jersey, would justify his apprehension and commitment mitment for trial if the crime had been committed in that state, his decision may not be reviewed on habeas corpus. Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U. S. 270, 278, 46 L. ed. 534, 541, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 484, 12 Am. Crim. Rep. 424; Bryant v. United States, 167 U. S. 104, 42 L. ed. 94, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 744; McNamara v. Henkel, 226 U. S. 520, 57 L. ed. , 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 146.
By a stipulation filed in the case for the purpose of this review, it is agreed that the evidence presented to Judge Blair of the murder with which the accused was charged, and of his criminality, was sufficient to meet the treaty and statutory requirements of the case, and the errors assigned in this court, questioning its legality and competency, as well as those as to the alleged absence of a warrant or deposition upon which such warrant was issued, have been withdrawn. But neither this stipulation, nor the withdrawal of the assignments of error referred to, is to affect any of the matters raised by other objections pointed out in other assignments.
1. That evidence of the insanity of the accused was offered and excluded.
2. That the evidence of a formal demand for the extradition of the accused was not filed until more than forty days after the arrest.
3. That appellant is a citizen of the United States, and that the treaty, in providing for the extradition of 'persons' accused of crime, does not include persons who are citizens or subjects of the nation upon whom the demand is made.
4. That if the word 'person,' as used in the treaty, includes citizens of the asylum country, the treaty, in so far as it covers that subject, has been abrogated by the conduct of Italy in refusing to deliver up its own citizens upon the demand of the United States, and by the enactment of a municipal law, since the treaty, forbidding the extradition of citizens.
1. Was evidence of insanity improperly excluded?
It must be conceded that impressive evidence of the insanity of the accused was offered by him and excluded. It is now said that this ruling was erroneous. But if so, this is not a writ of error, and mere errors in the rejection of evidence are not subject to review by a writ of habeas corpus. Benson v. McMahon, 127 U. S. 457, 461, 32 L. ed. 234, 236, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1240; Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U. S. 270, 278, 46 L. ed. 534, 541, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 484, 12 Am. Crim. Rep. 424; McNamara v. Henkel, 226 U. S. 520, 57 L. ed. , 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 146. In the McNamara Case, certain depositions had been received for the prosecution over objection. This court said that there was legal evidence on which to base the action of the commissioner in holding the accused for extradition, irrespective of the depositions objected to.
Judge Blair made the certificate in form and substance in conformity with the statute, and upon the receipt of that, a warrant was duly issued for the surrender of the appellant to the agents of the Italian government.
'Taking this provision of the treaty and that of the Revised Statutes above recited, we are of opinion that the proceeding before the commissioner is not to be regarded as in the nature of a final trial by which the prisoner could be convicted or acquitted of the crime charged against him, but rather of the character of those preliminary examinations which take place every day in this country before an examining or committing magistrate for the purpose of determining whether a case is made out which will justify the holding of the accused, either by imprisonment or under bail, to ultimately answer to an indictment or other proceeding, in which he shall be finally tried upon the charge made against him. The language of the treaty which we have cited, above quoted, explicitly provides that 'the commission of the crime shall be so established as that the laws of the country in which the fugitive or the person so accused shall be found would justify his or her apprehension and commitment for trial if the crime had been there committed.' This prescribes the proceedings in these preliminary examinations as accurately as language can well do it. The act of Congress conferring jurisdiction upon the commissioner, or other examining officer, it may be noted in this connection, says that if he deems the evidence sufficient to sustain the charge under the provisions of the treaty, he shall certify the same, together with a copy of all the testimony, and issue his warrant for the commitment of the person so charged.
There is not and cannot well be any uniform rule determining how far an examining magistrate should hear the witnesses produced by an accused person. The proceeding is not a trial. The issue is confined to the single question of whether the evidence for the state makes a prima facie case of guilt sufficient to make it proper to hold the party for trial. Such committing trials, if they may be called trials in any legal sense, are usually regulated by local statutes. Neither can the courts be expected to bring about uniformity of practice as to the right of such an accused person to have his witnesses examined, since if they are heard, that is the end of the matter, as the ruling cannot be reversed.
We therefore conclude that the examining magistrate did not exceed his authority in excluding evidence of insanity. If the evidence was only for the purpose of showing present insanity by reason of which the accused was not capable of defending the charge of crime, it is an objection which should be taken before or at the time of his trial for the crime, and heard by the court having jurisdiction of the crime. If it was offered to show insanity at the time of the commission of the crime, it was obviously a defense which should be heard at the time of his trial, or by a preliminary hearing in the jurisdiction of the crime, if so provided for by its laws. By the law of New Jersey, insanity as an excuse for crime is a defense, and the burden of making it out is upon the defendant. Graves v. State, 45 N. J. L. 203, 4 Am. Crim. Rep. 386; State v. Maioni, 78 N. J. L. 339, 341, 74 Atl. 526, 20 Ann. Cas. 204; State v. Peacock, 50 N. J. L. 34, 36, 11 Atl. 270. A defendant has no general right to have evidence exonerating him go before a grand jury, and unless the prosecution consents, such witnesses may be excluded. 1 Chitty, Crim. Law, 318; United States v. White, supra; Respublica v. Shaffer, 1 Dall. 236, 1 L. ed. 116; United States v. Palmer, 2 Cranch, C. C. 11, Fed. Cas. No. 15,989; United States v. Terry, 39 Fed. 355, 362.
2. It was next objected that no formal demand for the extradition of the appellant was made within forty days after his arrest, and that he was therefore entitled to be set at liberty. The objection is founded upon the supplemental convention with Italy of 1884, heretofore set out.
A 'certificate,' such as was indicated by that convention, was undoubtedly 'exhibited' to the committing magistrate, and was the basis of his action. The other parts of the provision are not clear. What is referred to by the phrase, 'the requisition, together with the documents above provided,' etc., which is required to be made within forty days, or the person set at liberty? The 'certificate' attesting 'that a requisition has been made,' etc., was 'exhibited' to Judge Blair; and we fail to find in this clause of the treaty any requirement that the subsequent 'formal demand' for the extradition shall be filed with magistrate within forty days after the arrest of the accused, or at any other time. The whole of the convention should be read together and in connection with § 5270, Revised Statutes, which is applicable to all treaties. Under § 5270, any one of the judicial officers named therein may, upon complaint, charging one of the crimes named in the treaty, issue his warrant of arrest and hear the evidence of criminality. This done, his duty is, if he deems the evidence sufficient to hold the accused for extradition, to commit him to jail, and to certify his conclusion, with the evidence, to the Secretary of State, who may then, 'upon the requisition of the proper authorities of such foreign government, issue his warrant for the surrender of the accused. Revised Statutes, §§ 5272, 5273. Of course, the effect of the supplementary treaty of 1884, being later than the statutory requirements above referred to, is to supersede the statute in so far as there is a necessary conflict in the carrying out of the extradition obligation between this country and Italy. But, as observed in Grin v. Shine, 187 U. S. 181, 191, 47 L. ed. 130, 136, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 98, 12 Am. Crim. Rep. 366, 'Congress has a perfect right to provide for the extradition of criminals in its own way, with or without a treaty to that effect, and to declare that foreign criminals shall be surrendered upon such proofs of criminality as it may judge sufficient. Castro v. DeUriarte, 16 Fed. 93. This appears to have been the object of § 5270, which is applicable to all foreign governments with which we have treaties of extradition.' This section, by its very terms, applies 'in all cases in which there now exists or hereafter may exist, any treaty or convention for extradition.' Had there been no law of Congress upon the subject, the method of procedure prescribed by the supplementary treaty of 1884 would necessarily have been the proper one, and the committing magistrate could have proceeded only according to the treaty, for that would have been the only law of the land applicable to the case and the only source of his authority.
It was therefore competent for Judge Blair to act upon the complaint made before him independently of any preliminary mandate or certificate, such as was in fact issued and 'exhibited' to him in this case, being plainly authorized so to do by the terms of § 5270. The personal rights of the accused are saved by the provisions of the same section, since he could only have been surrendered upon the warrant of the Secretary of State, based upon the evidence presented upon the hearing, and the conclusion of the sufficiency of the evidence of criminality certified to the Secretary of State, and upon a formal requisition for extradition. Castro v. DeUriarte, 16 Fed. 93, 97: Grin v. Shine, supra.
Construed in the light of the original and supplementary conventions with Italy, and of § 5270, Revised Statutes, we do not find that it was obligatory that the 'formal demand' referred to in the 1884 clause should be proven in the preliminary proceeding within forty days after the arrest. That is a demand made upon the executive authority of the United States by the executive authority of Italy. Its presentation was not necessary to give the examining magistrate jurisdiction. Such a formal demand was in fact made on July 28, 1910, less than forty days after the arrest. That, together with the certificate of the magistrate and the evidence submitted to him, was the authority of law under which the Secretary of State issued his warrant of extradition. Every requirement of the law, whether it appears in the treaty or in the act of Congress, was substantially complied with. This was the construction placed upon the treaty by Mr. Secretary Knox in answer to the same objection made to him before he issued his warrant, and also of Judge Rellstab, who dismissed the petition for a writ of habeas corpus, and from whose decree this appeal comes.
3. By article 1 of the extradition treaty with Italy, the two governments mutually agree to deliver up all persons who, having been convicted of or charged with any of the crimes specified in the following article, committed within the jurisdiction of one of the contracting parties, shall seek an asylum in the other, etc. It is claimed by counsel for the appellant that the word 'persons,' as used in this article, does not include persons who are citizens of the asylum country.
That the word 'persons' etymologically includes citizens as well as those who are not can hardly be debatable. The treaty contains no reservation of citizens of the country of asylum. The contention is that an express exclusion of citizens or subjects is not necessary, as by implication from accepted principles of public law, persons who are citizens of the asylum country are excluded from extradition convention unless expressly included. This was the position taken by the Foreign Minister of Italy in a correspondence in 1890 with the Secretary of State of the United States, concerning a demand made by the United States for the extradition of Bevivini and Villella, two subjects of Italy whose extradition was sought, that they might be tried for a crime committed in this country. Their extradition was refused by Italy on account of their Italian nationality. The Foreign Minister of Italy advanced in favor of the Italian position these grounds: (a) That the Italian Penal Code of 1890, in express terms provided that, 'the extradition of a citizen is not permitted;' (b) that a crime committed by an Italian subject in a foreign country was punishable in Italy, and, therefore, there was no ground for saying that unless extradited the crime would go unpunished; and (c) that it has become a recognized principle of public international law that one nation will not deliver its own citizens or subjects upon the demand of another, to be tried for a crime committed in the territory of the latter, unless it has entered into a convention expressly so contracting; and that the United States had itself recognized the principle in many treaties by inserting a clause exempting citizens from extradition. (United States Foreign Relations 1890, p. 555.) Mr. Blaine, then Secretary of State of the United States, protested against the position of the Italian government, and maintained the view that citizens were included among the persons subject to extradition unless expressly excluded. His defense of the position is full and remarkably able. It is to be found in United States Foreign Relations for 1890, pp. 557, 566.
With Great Britain, November 10, 1842, 12 Stat. at L. 572, extended July 12, 1889 26 Stat. at L. 1508, United States Treaties 1910, pp. 650 and 740.
With France, April 13, 1844, id. p. 526 8 Stat. at L. 580.
With Italy, March 23, 1868, id. p. 966 15 Stat. at L. 629.
With Venezuela, August 27, 1860, id. p. 1845 12 Stat. at L. 1143.
With Ecuador, 1872, id. p. 436 18 Stat. at L. 756.
With Dominican Republic, 1867, id. p. 413 15 Stat. at L. 473.
'Art. 7. Neither of the contracting parties shall be bound to deliver up its own citizens or subjects under the stipulations of this convention, but they shall have the power to deliver them up, if, in their discretion, it be deemed proper to do so.' 24 Stat. at. L. 1017.
The conclusion we reach is, that there is no principle of international law by which citizens are excepted out of an agreement to surrender 'persons,' where no such exception is made in the treaty itself. Upon the contrary, the word 'persons' includes all persons when not qualified as it is in some of the treaties between this and other nations. That this country has made such an exception in some of its conventions and not in others demonstrates that the contracting parties were fully aware of the consequences unless there was a clause qualifying the word 'persons.' This interpretation has been consistently upheld by the United States, and enforced under the several treaties which do not exempt citizens. That Italy has not conformed to this view, and the effect of this attitude, will be considered later. But that the United States has always construed its obligation as embracing its citizens is illustrated by the action of the executive branch of the government in this very instance. A construction of a treaty by the political department of the government, while not conclusive upon a court called upon to construe such a treaty in a matter involving personal rights, is nevertheless of much weight.
The effect of yielding to the interpretation urged by Italy would have brought about most serious consequences as to other treaties then in force. One of these was the extradition treaty with Great Britain, made as far back as 1843. Inasmuch as under the law of that country, as of this, crimes committed by their citizens within the jurisdiction of another country were punishable only where the crime was committed, it was important that the Italian interpretation should not be accepted.
4. We come now to the contention that by the refusal of Italy to deliver up fugitives of Italian nationality, the treaty has thereby ceased to be of obligation on the United States. The attitude of Italy is indicated by its Penal Code of 1900, which forbids the extradition of citizens, and by the denial in two or more instances to recognize this obligation of the treaty as extending to its citizens.
'Mr. Secretary of State: By telegram of June 24, last, your Excellency inquired whether, in instituting extradition proceedings in the case of Porter Charlton, who confessed having committed murder at Moltrasio, the King's government intended to depart from the rule, heretofore observed, not to surrender its own subjects, and whether it was to be inferred that Italians guilty of an offense committed on American territory, who should take refuge in Italy, should hereafter be delivered without fail to the American government.
'I now have the honor to inform your Excellency that the King's government cannot depart from the principle established by our law, that our nationals cannot be surrendered to foreign powers. Furthermore, this principle does not conflict with the provisions of the extradition convention. Indeed, it seems logical that so far as parity in the matter of extraditing their respective citizens or subjects is concerned, each party should, in the absence of specific provisions in the convention itself, be guided by the spirit of its own legislation.
'The Italian law does not consent to the extradition of nationals, but the Italian courts are competent to try, on the request of a foreign government, their nationals who may have committed offenses on that government's territory.
'Contrariwise, the laws of the United States, by not permitting local tribunals to try American citizens for offenses committed abroad, seem to admit of their being extradited. Otherwise an offender would, under the egis of the law itself, escape the punishment he deserves.
'Mr. Secretary of State: Referring to previous communications, and in accordance with the provisions of article 5 of the extradition convention of March 23, 1868, I have the honor to lay before your Excellency a formal request for the extradition of Porter Charlton, who has confessed the crime of murder committed on the person of his own wife at Moltrasio, Como, which crime is specified in article 2, § 1, of the said convention.
'Your Excellency has already been so good as to forward to me, in note No. 864 of June 28 last, the preliminary certificate of arrest provided by article 2 of the additional convention of June 11, 1884, with a view to the provisional arrest of the abovenamed accused.
'In support of this request, I have the honor to transmit herewith to your Excellency the record of proceedings conducted by the court of Como in the case of the aforesaid murder. The papers are regularly vised by the Embassy of the United States at Rome.
'Excellency: In compliance with the request made by your Embassy in its note of July 28 last, and in pursuance of existing treaty stipulations between the United States and Italy, I have the honor to inclose a warrant of surrender in the case of Porter Charlton, charged with murder, committed within the jurisdiction of the Kingdom of Italy, and examined and committed for surrender by the Honorable John A. Blair, judge of the court of common pleas in and for the county of Hudson, in the state of New Jersey.
First. That crimes committed by an American in a foreign country were not justiciable in the United States, and must therefore go unpunished unless the accused be delivered to the country wherein the crime was committed for trial.
Second. Such was not the case with Italy, since, under the laws of Italy, crimes committed by its subjects in foreign lands were justiciable in Italy.
This adherence to a view of the obligation of the treaty as not requiring one country to surrender its nationals while it did the other presented a situation in which the United States might do either of two things; namely, abandon its own interpretation of the word 'persons' as including citizens, or adhere to its own interpretation and surrender the appellant, although the obligation had, as to nationals, ceased to be reciprocal. The United States could not yield its own interpretation of the treaty, since that would have had the most serious consequence on five other treaties in which the word 'persons' had been used in its ordinary meaning, as including all persons, and, therefore, not exempting citizens. If the attitude of Italy was, as contended, a violation of the obligation of the treaty, which, in international law, would have justified the United States in denouncing the treaty as no longer obligatory, it did not automatically have that effect. If the United States elected not to declare its abrogation, or come to a rupture, the treaty would remain in force. It was only voidable, not void; and if the United States should prefer, it might waive any breach which, in its judgment, had occurred, and conform to its own obligation as if there had been no such breach. 1 Kent, Com. p. 175.
'The question is now for the first time presented as to whether or not the United States is under obligation under treaty to surrender to Italy for trial and punishment citizens of the United States fugitive from the justice of Italy, notwithstanding the interpretation placed upon the treaty by Italy with reference to Italian subjects. In this connection it should be observed that the United States, although as stated above, consistently contending that the Italian interpretation was not the proper one, has not treated the Italian practice as a breach of the treaty obligation necessarily requiring abrogation, has not abrogated the treaty, or taken any step looking thereto, and has, on the contrary, constantly regarded the treaty as in full force and effect, and has answered the obligations imposed thereby, and has invoked the rights therein granted. It should, moreover, be observed that even though the action of the Italian government be regarded as a breach of the treaty, the treaty is binding until abrogated, and therefore the treaty not having been abrogated, its provisions are operative against us.
The Executive Department having thus elected to waive any right to free itself from the obligation to deliver up its own citizens, it is the plain duty of this court to recognize the obligation to surrender the appellant as one imposed by the treaty at the supreme law of the land, and as affording authority for the warrant of extradition.
U. S. Comp. St. 1901, pp. 3595, 3596.

References: v. 
 § 5270
 § 5270
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 5270
 § 5270
 v. 
 v. 
 § 5270
 § 5270
 v. 
 v. 
 § 5270
 § 1