Source: https://westhamptonlawyer.wordpress.com/2011/12/01/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 14:46:22+00:00

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“Spousal maintenance (sometimes called alimony) is money an ex-spouse may be required to pay the other spouse after they get divorced. When spousal maintenance is ordered by the court, it is usually for a limited time. You may be able to get maintenance if you really need it and your ex-spouse can afford to pay it.
Miranda warning — SAY “I want a Legal Aid Lawyer or I want a lawyer/ Attorney” —AND don’t engage in a conversation or answer any questions.
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The Miranda warning (also referred to as Miranda rights) is a warning that is required to be given by police in the United States to criminal suspects in police custody (or in a custodial interrogation) before they are interrogated to inform them about their constitutional rights. In Miranda v. Arizona, the Supreme Court of the United States held that an elicited incriminating statement by a suspect will not constitute admissible evidence unless the suspect was informed of the right to decline to make self-incriminatory statements and the right to legal counsel (hence the so-called “Miranda rights”), and makes a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver of those rights.[Note 1] The Miranda warning is not a condition of detention, but rather a safeguard against self-incrimination; as a result, if law enforcement officials decline to offer a Miranda warning to an individual in their custody, they may still interrogate that person and act upon the knowledge gained, but may not use that person’s statements to incriminate him or her in a criminal trial.
Under the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Berghuis v. Thompkins suspects retain their 5th Amendment right to remain silent, however, if a suspect waives this right and interrogation begins, the right to halt further interrogation by the police must be exercised explicitly, by revoking the prior waiver of this 5th Amendment right.
SAY “I want a Legal Aid Lawyer or I want a lawyer/ Attorney” —AND KEEP YOUR MOUTH SHUT” and invoke your right to counsel.
Pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), a suspect has the right to counsel during a custodial interrogation. The People have a heavy burden of establishing that a defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel (Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475; People v. Ramos, 40 NY2d 610 ). The right to counsel attaches when a suspect in custody unequivocally requests an attorney (People v. Cunningham, 49 NY2d 203 ). Once a defendant requests the assistance of an attorney, the police are obligated to “scrupulously honor that request” and cease questioning (People v. Stroh, 48 NY2d 1000,1001 ; see also Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474-75). Any further questioning by police in the absence of an attorney is unlawful (see Stroh, 48 NY2d at 1001; People v. Jones, 21 AD3d 429 [2d Dept. 2005]). Upon the invocation of counsel, “any purported waiver of that right obtained in the absence of counsel is ineffective” (see People v. Glover, 87 NY2d 838, 839 ; see also People v. Esposito, 68 NY2d 961 ; Cunningham, 49 NY2d at 210 [uncounseled waiver of constitutional right not deemed voluntary if made after right to counsel invoked]).
In order for a suspect to invoke the right to counsel under Miranda, his invocation must be unequivocal. When a defendant’s request is ambiguous or equivocal, the right to counsel does not attach (see People v. Hicks, 69 NY2d 969 ; People v. D’Eredita, 302 AD3d 925 [4th Dept. 2003]; People v. Pinkney, 48 AD3d [2d Dept. 2008]; People v. Ashraf, 186 AD2d 1057 [4th Dept. 1992] [all holding that defendant’s inquiry as to whether he should get attorney not unequivocal request]). There must be, at minimum, some statement that can be reasonably construed as a request for an attorney (McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171 ). “Whether a particular request is or is not unequivocal is a mixed question of law and fact that must be determined with reference to the circumstances surrounding the request including the defendant’s demeanor, manner of expression and the particular words found to have been used by the defendant” (Glover, 87 NY2d at 839; see also Jones, 21 AD3d at 429).
In People v. Dehmler, 188 AD2d 1056 (4th Dept. 1992), also cited by the People, the court found that defendant’s inquiry, “Can I call a lawyer?” did not constitute an unequivocal intention to retain counsel.
“I have counsel[attorney],” during the administration of Miranda rights. The court held that defendant’s statement did not constitute an invocation of the right to counsel.
“Generally, the nature and degree of the penalty to be imposed pursuant to CPLR 3126 against a party who refuses to comply with court-ordered discovery is a matter within the discretion of the court. A determination to impose sanctions for conduct which frustrates the disclosure scheme of the CPLR should not be disturbed absent an improvident exercise of discretion” (Duncan v Hebb, 47 AD3d 871, 871 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see Savin v Brooklyn Mar. Park Dev. Corp., 61 AD3d 954). Although actions should be resolved on the merits whenever possible, where the conduct of the resisting party is shown to be willful and contumacious, the striking of a pleading is warranted (see Brown v Astoria Fed. Sav., 51 AD3d 961, 962; Martin v City of New York, 46 AD3d 635; Maiorino v City of New York, 39 AD3d 601). Willful and contumacious conduct may be inferred from a party’s repeated failure to comply with court-ordered discovery, coupled with inadequate explanations for the failures to comply (see Matone v Sycamore Realty Corp., 87 AD3d 1113; Duncan v Hebb, 47 AD3d at 871; Maiorino v City of New York, 39 AD3d at 602).

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