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Timestamp: 2019-04-23 19:50:09+00:00

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[14NI] Under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rein. Code Ann. § 74.351, any person who has brought a suit asserting a health care liability claim must, within 120 days of filing the claim, provide an expert report for each physician or health care provider against whom the claim is asserted. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rein. Code Ann. § 74.351(a) (2006). If the claimant does not provide an expert report as required, the trial court must, upon motion by the defendant, dismiss the claim with prejudice. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rein. Code Ann. § 74.351(b).
when he approached her and "yanked her right eye open and slammed the clamp on it, causing intense pain and bruising." When Lee screamed in pain, Boothe threatened to stop the procedure without completing it. Lee states she was afraid to leave the procedure partially performed. When Boothe continued with her other eye he again allegedly used excessive force to open the eye and "slammed" the clamp into place. Lee asserts she was in pain for up to three weeks after the procedure and the operation did not correct her vision to 20/20. Lee informed Boothe's office of her dissatisfaction with the procedure. Boothe's office manager acknowledged the 20/20 guarantee and agreed over the phone to give Lee her money back. Lee alleges, however, that instead of refunding her money, Boothe sent her a form to release all claims against him.
Lee brought this suit [**3] alleging claims for breach of contract, violations of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, assault, and fraud. Approximately five months after Lee filed her original petition, Boothe moved to have her claims dismissed because the claims were for health care liability, and she failed to file an expert report as required by section 74.351 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. Lee acknowledged in her response to the motion that she did not file an expert report but argued her claims were not health care liability claims and, therefore, not subject to the expert report requirement. The trial court granted Boothe's motion to dismiss Lee's claims for violations of the DTPA, assault, and fraud. The court denied the motion with respect to Lee's claim for breach of contract. Lee later moved to have her claim for breach of contract dismissed without prejudice, and the trial court granted Lee's motion. Lee brings this appeal challenging the trial court's order dismissing her claims for DTPA violations, assault, and fraud.
Numerous opinions have been issued by both the Texas Supreme Court and the Texas courts of appeals holding that [HN3] a plaintiff cannot avoid the requirements of chapter 74 and its predecessor legislation by attempting to recast a health care liability claim as a different cause of action through artful pleading. See, e.g., Diversicare Gen. Partner, Inc. v. Rubio, 185 S.W.3d 842, 851 (Tex. 2005); [**5] Murphy v. Russell, 167 S.W.3d 835, 838-39 (Tex. 2005); Earle v. Ratliff, 998 S.W.2d 882, 893 (Tex. 1999); MacGregor Med. Assn v. Campbell, 985 S.W.2d 38, 40 (Tex. 1998); Walden v. Jeffery, 907 S.W.2d 446, 448 (Tex. 1995); Gormley v. Stover, 907 Sff2d 448, 450 (Tex. 1995); Sorokolit v. Rhodes, 889 SW.2d 239, 242 (Tex. 1994); Boothe v. Dixon, 180 S.W.3d 915 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, no pet.); Williams v. Walker, 995 S.W.2d 740, 741 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1999, no pet.). [HN4] Whether a claim is a health care liability claim is a question of law we review de novo. Dixon, 180 S. IV, 3d at 919.
74. See Walden, 907 S.W.2d at 448; Williams, 995 S.W.2d at 74 1.
Lee argues her DTPA claims are not health care liability claims because she is not alleging that Boothe violated a standard of care but that he failed to fulfill the promises and guarantees made in his advertisements. Lee contends her claims are similar to those in Sorokolit v. Rhodes. In Sorokolit, the plaintiff alleged the defendant doctor knowingly breached an express warranty of a particular result and knowingly misrepresented his skills and the results he could achieve. See Sorokolit, 889 S.W.2d at 242. The supreme court held the plaintiffs DTPA claims were not health care liability claims because they did not involve negligence. Id. at 242-43. Since Sorokolit, the supreme court has routinely noted the limited scope of its ruling in that case and emphasized that [HN6] if the underlying nature of the claim is negligence in the rendition of medical services, the plaintiff may not recast his allegations as a DTPA [**7] claim to avoid the statutory restrictions on health care liability claims. See MacGregor, 985 S.W.2d at 40-41.
Finally, Lee argues the trial court erred in dismissing her fraud claim because the claim has nothing to do with Boothe's rendition of medical services. Lee's fraud claim is based on Boothe's alleged misrepresentation that he would correct her vision to 20/20 or the procedure was free. The fact that Lee alleges Boothe made this misrepresentation knowingly does not affect the underlying nature of the claim. See Dixon, 180 S. If. 3d at 920. To show that Boothe violated his guarantee, Lee must provide expert testimony to show that he failed to correct her vision. Her claim, therefore, centers on the medical treatment provided by Boothe and the quality of that care. Again, the essence of Lee's claim is negligence in the rendition of health care. See Walden, 907 S.W.2d at 448. The trial court did not err in dismissing Lee's fraud claim for failure to file an expert [**9] report.
and treatment. The patient's claim of misrepresentations regarding the release was intertwined with the doctor's rendition of medical services. With respect to the deceptive trade practices claim, the doctor did not make specific statements that could establish a knowing Misrepresentation or breach of an express warranty regarding the results of treatment.
[HN I] Former Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rein. Code Ann. § 74.351(a) provides that a healthcare liability claimant must file an expert report and curriculum vitae within 120 days after filing the claim. If a required expert report has not been served by the 120-day deadline, on proper motion by the defendant the trial court shall dismiss the action with prejudice and award reasonable attorney's fees and court costs incurred by the defendant. § 74.351(b).
[HNl] The version of section 74.351(a) that applies to this case provided that a healthcare liability claimant must file an expert report and curriculum vitae within 120 days after filing the claim. Act of June 2, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 205, § 10.01, 2003 Tex. Gen, Laws 847, 975, amended by Act of May 18, 2005, 79th Leg., R.S., ch. 635, § 1, 2005 Tex. Gen. Laws 1590 (current version at TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.351(a) (Vernon Supp. 2005). If a required expert report has not been served by the 120-day deadline, on proper motion by the defendant the trial court "shall" dismiss the action with prejudice and award reasonable attorney's fees and court costs incurred by the defendant. TEX. CIV PRAC. & REM. CODEANN. § 74.351(b) [**8] .
To prove that Boothe's diagnoses and treatment were to Dixon's detriment, Dixon would have to provide proof of his medical condition before and after the laser surgeries and in relation to custom abrasion. Dixon must also prove Boothe undertook a mode or form of treatment that a reasonable and prudent member of the medical profession would not undertake under the same or similar circumstances and rely on expert medical testimony. See Gomez, 55 S.W3d at 735 (concluding allegations of "knowing" misrepresentation [**12] regarding necessity of hysterectomy a health care liability claim). Dixon's claim that Boothe's misrepresentations regarding the release were improper is an inseparable part of Boothe's rendition of medical services because Dixon's claim rests on alleged misrepresentations [*920] regarding medical care and treatment. See Parker v. CCS/Meadow Pines, Inc., 166 S. W 3 509, 513 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2005, no pet.) (concluding allegations of improper restraint related to course of care or treatment a health care liability claim); Williams v. Walker, 995 S. W 2 740, 741-42 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1999, no pet) (concluding allegations of assault and battery regarding use of medical procedure without patient's consent a health care liability claim).
requirements of chapter 74 because Boothe knowingly made a false statement about Dixon's condition. Dixon contends that this representation constitutes fraud pursuant to Shannon v. Law-Yore, 950 S.W.2d 429 (Tex. App. -Fort Worth 1997, pet. denied) . [** 13] In Shannon, the plaintiff alleged specific fraudulent conduct in connection with keeping him hospitalized, including deceiving him into rescinding requests for release, creating false records, misrepresenting that insurance would not cover his medical bills if he were released against medical advice, and misrepresenting his condition to others. Id. at 432-34. The plaintiff did not allege negligence in his treatment or medical malpractice. Id. at 437. However, [HN7] an allegation that a misrepresentation is made "knowingly" is not determinative when analyzing the underlying nature of a claim. See Savage v. Psychiatric Inst. of Bedford, Inc., 965 S.W.2d 745, 752 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1998, pet. denied). Here, the underlying nature of the claim is whether Dixon would be a candidate for custom abrasion after two laser surgeries, which is a question of medical condition, diagnosis, and treatment. See id Consequently, Shannon is distinguishable.
Moreover, the only question at this stage is whether the underlying nature of each of Dixon's claims is a health care liability claim; this is a threshold requirement, not a recovery requirement. [**14] See Murphy v. Russell, 167 S.W.3d 835, 838, 48 Tex. Sup. Ct. J 943 (Tex. 2005) (per curiam). Consequently, Dixon's reliance on cases regarding the submission of issues of fraud and informed consent in medical malpractice cases is misplaced. See Gaut v. Quast, 510 S.W.2d 90, 17 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 308 (Tex. 1974) (per curiam); Crundwell v. Becker, 981 S.W.2d 880 (Tex. App.-Houston (1st Dist.] 1998, pet denied); Melissinos v. Phamanivong, 823 S.W. 2d 339 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1991, writ denied).
future procedure that was never performed; in any event, they [**15] were not the [HN8] specific statements necessary to establish a knowing misrepresentation or breach of an express warranty regarding the results of treatment. See Mulligan v. Beverly Enters.-Tex., 954 S.W.2d 881, 884 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no pet) (contrasting representations as to guaranteeing a particular result to representations as to providing care and service).
Finally, Dixon contends that any medical malpractice claim is the basis of his damages, not his claims in this suit. However, there are no separate damages pleaded as [*921] between a fraudulent inducement claim and other claims. Moreover, proof of the economic value of the claims released requires proof of those claims, that is, whether Boothe's medical and treatment of Dixon met the applicable standard of care.
We conclude that all Dixon's claims meet the statutory definition of a "health care liability claim" and are thus subject to the expert report requirement of section 74.351(b), and we reject all Dixon's arguments to the contrary. Accordingly, we resolve Boothe's issue in his favor. Because of our resolution of Boothe's argument regarding section 74.351(b), we need [* * 16] not address his argument regarding section 74.004. Because Dixon failed to file an expert report as required by section 74.351(b), we reverse the trial court's order denying motion to dismiss and motion for summary judgment and render judgment in Boothe's favor dismissing Dixon's claims with prejudice.
In his motion to dismiss and motion for summary judgment and in his prayer in his brief on appeal, Boothe requested attorney's fees and costs of court, which are mandatory under the statute when a claimant fails to file an expert report in a health care liability claim. See TEX. CIV PRAC. & REM CODE ANN. § 74.351(b)(1). Accordingly, we remand this suit solely for a determination of attorney's fees and costs of court incurred by Boothe.
COUNSEL: For RELATOR: Stephen F. Fink, Anthony J. Campiti, THOMPSON & KNIGHT, L.L.P., Dallas, TX.; Bryan P. Neal, THOMPSON & KNIGHT, P.C.
For RESPONDENT: Judge, 116th JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, Dallas, TX.
For REAL PARTIES: Kenneth H. Molberg, WILSON, WILLIAMS, & MOLBERG, P.C., Dallas, TX.
1. Respondent received all notice required by law. All jurisdictional requirements have been satisfied. Respondent waives any defect in notice and any further right to notice or hearing under the Act or the Rules of the Board.
2. Respondent currently holds Texas Medical License No. F-9221. Respondent was originally issued this license to practice medicine in Texas on August 23, 1981. Respondent is also licensed to practice in the state of California.
3. Respondent is primarily engaged in the practice of ophthalmology and is board certified in this specialty by the American Board of ophthalmology, a member board of the American Board of Medical Specialties.
4. Respondent is 54 years of age.
5. Respondent has previously been the subject of one disciplinary action by the Board which resulted in an Agreed Order entered on August 26, 2005, providing for an administrative penalty of $500 based on findings that Respondent failed to release medical records to a patient within 15 business days of receipt of the patient's request. As a result of Respondent's compliance, the Agreed Order was terminated on October 4, 2005.
6. Section 164.5 of the Medical Board Rules requires that a recording of every advertisement communicated by electronic media, and a copy of every advertisement communicated by print media and a copy of any other form of advertisement shall be retained by the licensee for a period of two years from the last date of broadcast or publication and be made available for review upon request by the Board or its designee.
7. Respondent was unable to obtain and produce copies of every advertisement communicated over the previous two years from the last date of broadcast or publication by print, electronic media or any other form of advertisement.
8. After the initiation of the investigation by the Board in this matter,. Respondent terminated his business relationship with an independent advertising agency to whom he delegated the responsibility of maintaining records of Respondent's advertisements during the period of time set forth in the preceding paragraph.
9. Respondent has cooperated in the investigation of the allegations related to this Administrative Agreed Order. Respondent's cooperation, through consent to this Administrative Agreed Order, pursuant to the provisions of Section 164.002 of the Act, will save money and resources for the State of Texas. To avoid further investigation, hearings, and the expense and inconvenience of litigation, Respondent agrees to the entry of this Administrative Agreed, Order and to comply with its terms and conditions.
3. Section 164.0025 of the Act and Board Rule 187.14 authorize the Board to resolve and make a disposition of this matter through an Administrative Agreed Order.
4. Section 164.002(d) of the Act provides that this Administrative Agreed Order is a settlement agreement under the Texas Rules of Evidence for purposes of civil litigation.
1. Respondent shall pay an administrative penalty in the amount of $1000 within 90 days of the date of the entry of this Order. The administrative penalty shall be paid in a single payment by cashier's check or money order payable to the Texas Medical Board and shall be submitted to the Director of Enforcement for the Board for routing so as to be remitted to the Comptroller of Texas for deposit in the general revenue fund. Respondent's failure to pay the administrative penalty as ordered shall constitute grounds for further disciplinary action by the Board, and may result in a referral by the Executive Director of the Board for collection by the Office of the Attorney General.
2. Respondent shall comply with all the provisions of the Act and other statutes regulating the Respondent's practice.
3. Respondent shall inform the Board in writing of any change of Respondent's mailing or practice address within 10 days of the address change. This information shall be submitted to the Permits Department and the Director of Enforcement for the Board. Failure to provide such information in a timely manner shall constitute a basis for disciplinary action by the Board against Respondent pursuant to the Act.
4. This Order shall automatically terminate upon the payment of the administrative penalty by Respondent as outlined in Ordering Paragraph No. 1.
1. Respondent received all notice required by law. All jurisdictional requirements have been satisfied. Respondent waives any defect in notice and any further right to notice or hearing under TEX. Occ. CODE ANN, Title 3, Subtitle B (Vernon 2004) (the Act) or the Rules of the Board.
2. Respondent currently holds Texas Medical License No, F-9221, Respondent was originally issued this license to practice medicine in Texas on August 23, 1981 Respondent is not licensed to practice in any other state.
3. Respondent is primarily engaged in the practice of ophthalmology. Respondent is board certified in this specialty by the American Board of Medical Specialties.
4. Respondent is 52 years of age.
5. Respondent has not previously been the subject of disciplinary action by the Board.
6. Respondent performed Lasik eye surgery on J.T. in 2001 and 2002. On December 3, 2004, J.T. requested copies of his medical records from the Respondent and paid a fee of $25.00 for the records. The record could not be immediately located. On January 8, 2005, J.T. was verbally informed that his records could not be located. On February 4, 2005, the records were found and released to J.T.
7. Respondent has cooperated in the investigation of the allegations related to this Agreed Order. Respondent's cooperation, through consent to this Agreed Order, pursuant to the provisions of Section 164.002 the Act, will save money and resources for the State of Texas. To avoid further investigation, hearings, and the expense and inconvenience of litigation, Respondent agrees to the entry of this Agreed Order and to comply with its terms and conditions.
2. Section 164.051(a)(3) of the Act authorizes the Board to take disciplinary action against Respondent based on Respondent's violation of a rule adopted under this Act. Respondent failed to comply with Section 165.2 of the Rules of the Board, which provides the requirements for timely and appropriate release of medical records and the documentation requirements regarding medical records that may be withheld.
3. Section 164.001 of the Act authorizes the Board to impose a range of disciplinary actions against a person for violation of the Act or a Board rule. Such sanctions include: revocation, suspension, probation, public reprimand, limitation or restriction on practice, counseling or treatment, required educational or counseling programs, monitored practice, public service, and an administrative penalty.
4. Section 164,002(a) of the Act authorizes the Board to resolve and make a disposition of this matter through an Agreed Order.
5. Section 164.002(d) of the Act provides that this Agreed Order is a settlement agreement under the Texas Rules of Evidence for purposes of civil litigation.
1. Respondent shall pay an administrative penalty in the amount of $500 within 60 days of the entry of this Order. The administrative penalty shall be paid in a single payment by cashier's check or money order payable to the Texas State Board of Medical Examiners and shall be submitted to the Director of Compliance for the Board for routing so as to be remitted to the Comptroller of Texas for deposit in the general revenue fund. Respondent's failure to pay the administrative penalty as ordered shall constitute grounds for further disciplinary action by the Board, and may result in a referral by the Executive Director of the Board for collection by the Office of the Attorney General.
2. Respondent shall be permitted to delegate prescriptive authority to a physician assistant and advanced practice nurse. Respondent shall be permitted to supervise physician assistant, advanced practice nurse, or surgical assistant.
3. Upon payment of the Administrative penalty the Order will automatically terminate.
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