Source: http://www.legacylawyers.com/news/2016/10/all-trusts-all-the-time-implied-resulting-and-constructive-trust-claims/
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 18:16:50+00:00

Document:
The concept of who actually owns an asset arises frequently in the areas of both family and estate law. Families often transfer ownership to real estate and other assets without considering the legal consequences of the transfer. The transfer of an asset may be from one spouse to another, from a parent to a child, or even just the promise of a transfer in the future, leading to a course of conduct on the part of the person believing they will be a future owner. Whether the issue of ownership arises upon the dissolution of a marriage, or a marriage like relationship, or the death of a parent, the concept of who is the true beneficial owner of the asset in question depends upon fundamental equitable principles.
This paper examines the equitable principles that apply when issues arise as to the true legal, and beneficial, owner of an asset — including whether a gift was truly intended and effected, the effects of the presumption of advancement and the presumption of resulting trust, and whether an asset is actually held in trust for the beneficial owner.
II. Was a Gift Intended?
Courts look to the intention of the donor at the time of transfer to determine if a gift was actually intended. The court must assess the reliability of the evidence of intention, guarding against self-serving evidence that tends to reflect a change in intention.  The actual intention of the donor at the time the gift is effected is frequently a contentious issue.
Problems of intention often arise when someone dies and it is discovered that the deceased’s assets were held in joint tenancy. When an asset is owned in joint tenancy, upon death the surviving joint tenant or tenants have the right of survivorship. An asset owned in joint tenancy passes immediately upon death, and does not form part of the estate of the deceased joint tenant.
A mere transfer of legal title into joint tenancy does not definitively indicate the transferor’s intention.  The courts will look at the intention of the transferor at the time of transfer to determine whether or not the transferor had the requisite intent to make a gift. The court may also consider the transferor’s subsequent actions, to the extent that those actions are relevant to the transferor’s intention at the time of the transfer.
 The legal principles applicable when considering a gratuitous transfer into joint tenancy are not in dispute. The basic question is whether the transferor intended to make a gift, or whether the transferee holds the property transferred on a resulting trust.
 Pecore v. Pecore, 2007 SCC 17, is the leading case.
 As in other civil cases, regardless of the legal burden, both sides to the dispute will normally bring evidence to support their position. The trial judge will commence his or her inquiry with the applicable presumption and will weigh all of the evidence in an attempt to ascertain, on a balance of probabilities, the transferor’s actual intention. Thus, as discussed by Sopinka et al, in The Law of Evidence in Canada, at p. 116, the presumption will only determine the result where there is insufficient evidence to rebut it on a balance of probabilities.
be contemporaneous, or nearly so to the transaction: Pecore, at para. 56.
5 Pecore at para 46 (Pecore).
intention.” See Pecore, at para. 59.
R.S.B.C. 1996, c.253, and the Land Title Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 250, Part 12.
complete an incomplete gift, and a mere promise to make a gift is unenforceable.
See Kooner v. Kooner (1979), 100 D.L.R. (3d) 76 (B.C.S.C.), at pp. 79 – 80.
of intention is scant, can swing the result one way or another.
6 McKendry at para 129.
7 McKendry at paras 137-140.
8 See Cowper-Smith v Morgan, 2016 BCCA 200.
9 VJF v SKW, 2016 BCCA 186 at para 50 [VJF BCCA].
these presumptions take on significant importance in the litigation.
gifts between spouses became a significant issue because of the new concept of excluded property.
11 Waters at p 415.
Presumption of Advancement and Property division under the Family Law Act” (August 2016) at p 8.
13 Pecore; McKendry at paras 109-111.
in any of paragraphs (a) to (f).
demonstrating that the property is excluded property.
code and that on marriage breakdown the FLA regime displaced common law and equitable rules.
The other held that the common law and equitable principles continued to apply under the FLA.
mingled with property held by the other spouse. The implications of this are farreaching.
The latter approach is best demonstrated by Wells v. Campbell, and the trial judgment in VJF v.
upon the appropriate interpretation of the FLA.
time of the payments that was important.
been and continued to be an excluded asset under the Family Law Act.
14 Remmem v Remmem, 2014 BCSC 1552 [Remmem].
15 PG v DG, 2015 BCSC 1454 [PG].
16 PG at para 75.
17 Wells v Campbell, 2015 BCSC 3; VJF v SKW, 2015 BCSC 593 [VJF (SC)].
spouses” and eliminates common law and equitable principles relating to property.
and unreservedly directed that the West 33rd property be transferred to Ms. W.
and ‘derived’ no property from that disposition.
way. The spouses are presumptively entitled to equal shares as tenants in common.
comparison of the fairness of its provisions with those of the FRA.
property (or its value) is intended.
advancement continues to assist where evidence of the transferor’s actual intent is not clear.
effectively, if retaining ownership is important, the transferor can keep the asset in their name alone.
other partner, without evidence to the contrary, it is presumed to be a gift and the exclusion is lost.
made contributions to that property during the marriage.
principles of unjust enrichment, which is addressed in more detail below.
gain an interest in property that may otherwise be excluded.
V. If a Gift Was Not Intended, Is the Asset Held in Trust?
18 VJF BCCA at para 78.
19 Waters at p 140.
of trust which may be advanced.
A. When Should an Implied Trust Be Plead?
An implied trust infers or implies a trust relationship as a result of specific circumstances.
B. When Should a Resulting Trust Be Plead?
determining the often unclear intentions of transferors.
20 Waters at p 140.
21 Pecore at para 20.
22 Waters at p 395.
23 Waters at p 478.
24 Pecore; Madsen Estate v Saylor, 2007 SCC 18.
Kimberly-Anne Kuntz (CLE: Estate Litigation Basics for Lawyers, 2008).
resulting trust for the transferor.26 This is a rebuttable presumption.
property to their minor children.
26 McKendry at paras 110-112.
27 Schultz v Landry, 2007 BCSC 994 at para 18.
28 Wong v Chong Estate, 2016 BCSC 953 at para 77 [Wong].
29 Wong at para 77.
30 Murdoch v Murdoch,  SCR 423 at p 438; Rathwell v Rathwell,  2 SCR 436 at pp 452-453.
31 Kerr v Baranow, 2011 SCC 10 at paras 24-25 [Kerr].
32 Waters at p 464.
33 Waters at p 465.
relevant to the intention of a transferor at the time of the transfer can also be considered.
assist in determining the intentions of the individual transferring the property).
34 Waters at p 464.
35 Bergen v Bergen, 2013 BCCA 492 [Bergen].
See also Waters (4th ed.) at 440.
C. When Should a Constructive Trust Be Plead?
(c) a lack of juristic reason for the unjust enrichment.
36 Waters at p 419.
37 Pecore at para 30.
38 Pecore at para 41.
39 See Peter v Beblow,  1 SCR 980.
40 Waters at p 478.
sanction seem to me to be quite artificial.
which would result if the person having the property were permitted to retain it.
41 Murdoch v Murdoch,  SCR 423 at p 436 [Murdoch].
42 Murdoch at p 436.
43 Murdoch at p 446.
sometimes fulfill his contractual obligations and drive a school bus.
succeed: Peter Kieweit Sons’ Co. of Canada v. Easking Construction Ltd. at pp.
368-9; see also Restatement of the Law of Restitution, (1936), s. 160.
44 Murdoch at pp 454-455.
45 Murdoch at p 455.
46 Rathwell v Rathwell,  2 SCR 436 [Rathwell].
47 Rathwell at p 449.
constructive trust applied. The woman received a half interest in the properties.
48 Rathwell at pp 454-455.
49 Rathwell at p 461.
50 Rathwell at p 456.
51 Pettkus v Becker,  2 SCR 834 [Pettkus].
52 Peter v Beblow,  1 SCR 980 [Peter].
53 Peter at p 1080.
sense and a desire to achieve a fair result for both parties.
transferred into his name. She moved into his house where they lived for the rest of the relationship.
sent back to trial, but it was found that a Joint Family Venture existed.
has been extended to unmarried couples, this obviates the need for some constructive trust claims.
54 Peter at pp 1023-1024.
55 Wilson v Fotsch, 2010 BCCA 226.
56 Kerr v Baranow, 2011 SCC 10.
57 Waters at p 495.
(3), that may lead to significant unfairness.
[objectives of spousal support] have not been met.
improvement, operation or management of excluded property.
As recently noted by the Court in Walburger v Lindsay, 2015 BCSC 341, many of the factors in s.
under the FLA and in situations involving family members other than spouses.
various trust concepts discussed in this paper, as well as other equitable doctrines.
Hopffgarten (“Dietrich”) and Kim that he would eventually inherit their farm.
When Kim passed away in 2011, her will (of 1998) left the family farm to a neighbour, Ms. Rommel.
proprietary estoppel, or alternatively, based on unjust enrichment or an express or implied trust.
enrichment and an express or implied trust were not addressed.
circumstances, would not do justice between the parties.
58 Walburger v Lindsay, 2015 BCSC 341 at paras 93-95.
59 Sabey v Rommel, 2014 BCCA 360 at para 9 [Sabey].
60 Sabey at para 19.
expenses and some of the father’s debts.
mortgage, tax, utility, debt, and household payments. Both parties appealed.
beneficial entitlements to the home — everything else fell outside the scope of the parties’ claims.
juristic reason for the enrichment: Kerr v. Baranow, 2011 SCC 10 at para. 32.
concerned the parties’ contributions to the Richmond property.
acquisition, preservation and maintenance of the Richmond home.
benefit and detriment that has ever passed between the parties.
cautionary tale for legal counsel asked to provided independent legal advice.
provided that upon her death, the home and the investments became Gloria’s property “absolutely”.
independent legal advice as a result of the lawyer’s concern about the possibility of future litigation.
Declaration of Trust. At her death, the deceased’s estate has no significant assets.
estoppel entitled Max to purchase Gloria’s one-third interest in the home.
61 Suen v Suen, 2016 BCCA 107 at para 54.
62 Cowper-Smith v Morgan, 2016 BCCA 200 at para 3 [Cowper-Smith].
what she was doing. See Stewart v. McLean, 2010 BCSC 64 at para. 97.
could achieve her objective with less risk to her.
63 Cowper-Smith at para 64.
influence was not rebutted, and that Gloria held the assets on resulting trust for the estate.
sufficient to rebut the presumption of resulting trust.
question of whether the adult child later severed the joint tenancy.
proceeds and used them to purchase real property and investments for herself and her husband.
mutually treated as constituting a tenancy in common”.
would have been entitled to all of the proceeds as the surviving joint tenant.
actions can give rise to a resulting trust.
(3) Parties behave in a manner consistent with their intent after the transfer of title.
information as possible, to properly advise clients, and to plead the applicable legal framework.
creditors. I think that it belongs to her.
complications that arise when such a gift is neither truly intended nor effected.
 Whereas acceptance is generally straightforward, delivery can be a contentious issue. The delivery requirement provides for tangible proof of the gift. In certain cases delivery can be effected by constructive delivery, where a tangible item allowing access to the gift (such as a key to a house, or a passbook to a bank account) are delivered instead of the actual gift.
 Bakken Estate v Bakken, 2014 BCSC 1540 at para 74, citing Pecore v Pecore, 2007 SCC 17 at para 59 [Pecore].
 For an interesting academic discussion of gifts see Kimberley A. Whaley, “Attacking and Defending Gifts”, 35 Estates Trusts & Pensions Journal, No. 3 at p 269.
 See McKendry v McKendry, 2015 BCSC 2433 [McKendry] (appeal scheduled to be heard at the BC Court of Appeal on November 4, 2016).

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