Source: http://www.accountingevidence.com/blog/2013/01/confiscation-lifting-the-veil-of-incorporation/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 02:52:18+00:00

Document:
Too often prosecutors do not appear to understand the issues surrounding lifting or piercing the veil of incorporation in confiscation cases. Some will treat a limited company as entirely separate from the defendant and therefore untouchable and of no relevance to the confiscation proceedings. Whilst others will ignore the fact of incorporation and treat all income and assets of a limited company as automatically those of the defendant, whatever the circumstances. Neither approach is correct.
When can the veil of incorporation be pierced?
It follows that where, for example, a defendant has been convicted of a crime carried out through a company with which he is connected (perhaps as a shareholder, or director) then the benefit of that crime, which in the first instance has been obtained by the company, may properly be regarded as having been obtained by the defendant for confiscation purposes.
But equally where a convicted defendant is connected with a company but there is no allegation of dishonesty or illegality in relation to that company, then the veil of incorporation cannot be pierced. Take the example of a defendant convicted of a drug trafficking offence who earns his living by a legitimate manufacturing business which he owns and which is incorporated as a limited company. In the absence of anything untoward relating to the company the income of the company is not income of the defendant and so, for example, the criminal lifestyle assumptions cannot be applied to the deposits into the company bank account.
Where the corporate veil can properly be pierced or lifted the effect is that, for the purposes of calculating the defendant’s benefit, the receipts, expenditures and assets of the company are treated as if they were receipts, expenditures and assets of the defendant personally. A benefit of criminal conduct which has been obtained by a company can then be regarded as a benefit which has been obtained by the defendant personally.
An obvious example of this was the leading case of R v May  UKHL 28 in which companies with which the defendant was connected obtained the benefit of VAT fraud and this was treated as the benefit of the defendant himself in confiscation.
This can be particularly important in cases in which the ‘criminal lifestyle’ assumptions of s10 Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (and corresponding provisions in earlier legislation) apply. In relation to benefit, once the corporate veil is pierced, the whole of the value of the company’s receipts, expenditures and assets can be ascribed to the defendant personally (irrespective of his actual shareholding in the company). So it is not the case that, for example, if Jim holds 60% of the shares of XYZ Ltd his deemed receipts will be limited to only 60% of the receipts obtained by that company – his receipts will be regarded as 100% of the receipts obtained by the company. It follows that Jim’s assumed benefit under the criminal lifestyle assumptions can also be 100% of those receipts.
In practice the prosecutor will often decide to apply the criminal lifestyle assumption to the receipts of the company, but not go so far as to apply the s10 assumptions to the company’s expenditure or assets.
The effect on the defendant’s available amount is less clear cut. It could be argued that, where the veil of incorporation can properly be pierced, the assets held in the company’s name should be treated as if they were held personally by the defendant. The effect of that could be to disregard the implications of any shares in the company being held by anyone other than the defendant and to disregard any unsecured and non-preferential liabilities of the company, following the logic of s9(1)(a) PoCA 2002.
The decision of the Court of Appeal some years ago in R v Omar  EWCA Crim 2320 appears to suggest such an approach might be open to the courts. However in that case the Crown Court judge had, in the event, calculated the defendant’s available amount in accordance with the legal ownership of the properties in the company’s Balance Sheet (which were registered either in the sole name of the defendant or in the joint names of the defendant and his wife). The Crown Court judge did not accept a defence argument that, notwithstanding the apparent legal ownership, the properties should be treated as company assets. The Court of Appeal upheld that decision of the Crown Court. So, in the author’s view, Omar does not demonstrate that assets which are held by a company can be treated as if they were held by the defendant personally for the purpose of calculating the defendant’s available amount.
There have been cases in which restraint orders have been applied to assets held by a company with which the defendant is connected. A leading case in this area is HM Customs & Excise v Hare & Others  EWCA Civ 1351,  2 All ER 391. However, in the author’s view, there is an important difference between concluding that such assets ought properly to be subject to a restraint order, and might even be sold, and concluding that such assets ought properly to be treated as wholly belonging to the defendant for the purpose of valuing his available amount without reference to the company’s liabilities and the interests of other shareholders.
Where the corporate veil is not lifted the defendant’s available amount will include the value of the shares which he holds in the company. That value will reflect the company’s assets and its liabilities (both secured and unsecured and both preferential and non-preferential) and will also reflect the proportion of the total issued share capital of the company which is held by the defendant. That approach to the valuation of the defendant’s assets is consistent with s79(3) PoCA 2002. In the author’s view this is the better approach when calculating a defendant’s available amount even where the corporate veil has been pierced for the purpose of calculating the defendant’s benefit.
However each case needs to be examined closely based on its own particular facts.
In relation to benefit it is conceivable that a situation might arise in which money (or other assets) might be obtained by the defendant and then introduced by him into his (legitimate) company. In that case the money (or asset) would, in truth, initially have belonged to the defendant and the introduction into the company would, in reality, be a loan or gift to the company by the defendant. (The money or asset would not truly be ‘income’ of the company.) In that situation the initial obtaining by the defendant himself would be the crucial factor and would result in the money (or asset) being capable of being treated as, or being assumed to be, a benefit of his for confiscation purposes.
Similarly, in relation to the defendant’s available amount, money (or an asset) initially held and owned by the defendant which is then transferred by him to his (legitimate) company would not reduce his available amount. Either the transfer to the company would create a loan balance due to the defendant (which would form part of his available amount) or the transfer would be a gift which again could form part of his available amount, under s9(1)(b) PoCA 2002.
A grey area remains where a defendant asserts that a company which he controls is a legitimate business but the prosecutor asserts that, on the contrary, the company is, or has been, engaged in some criminality (separate from the criminality of which the defendant has been convicted) – but that criminality has not been the subject of any prosecution. In such a case it is the author’s view that the prosecutor who seeks to rely on unprosecuted criminal conduct as a basis for piercing or lifting the veil of incorporation would be under an obligation to prove that unprosecuted criminal conduct to the court dealing with the confiscation – and prove it to the criminal standard. This is because, in the author’s view, the position would be akin to that considered by the House of Lords in R v Briggs-Price  UKHL 19. The prosecutor would not simply be relying on the application of the statutory assumptions – he would be seeking to extend the ambit of the statutory assumptions in reliance upon the unprosecuted criminal conduct. No such case appears yet to have come before the appeal courts.
Since writing this my attention has been drawn to a recent matrimonial law case, Petrodel Resources Ltd & Others v Prest & Others  EWCA Civ 1395, which underlines the impregnability of the corporate veil where there has been no finding of impropriety or dishonesty in relation to the affairs of the company (even where the interests of justice would otherwise point to the desirability of lifting of the corporate veil) and also to the Chancery case, VTB Capital Plc v Nutritek International Corp & Others  EWCA Civ 808 (court of Appeal judgment) and  UKSC 5 (Supreme Court judgment), which deals extensively with issues connected with piercing the corporate veil.
It must be remembered however that neither of these cases were heard in the criminal courts and that the issues in those cases were being considered in the context of the civil law of equity, family and contract law. It appears more than likely that the issue of piercing the corporate veil will be before the UK Supreme Court again in the not too distant future, in one context or another.
thank you so much it has been use full to me but l need a bit clarification on the case law of Salomon Vs Salomon limited company and clearly highlight the facts and conclusion made by the house Lords. thank you.

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