Source: http://masscases.com/cases/sjc/301/301mass559.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 12:27:00+00:00

Document:
WILFRED BIRNBAUM vs. THEODORE PAMOUKIS & another.
In a suit in equity under G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 214, Section 3 (10), to reach and apply the obligation of the insurer under the extraterritorial coverage of a motor vehicle liability policy, any defence which would be available to the insurer against the insured was equally available against the plaintiff.
In a suit in equity wherein there was no report by the judge of "the material facts found by him" under G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 214, Section 23, nor report of the evidence, but the judge voluntarily made certain brief findings which did not purport to be a full report of all facts upon which the final decree was based, the entry of that decree imported a finding of every fact essential to sustain it and within the scope of the pleadings, so far as not inconsistent with the findings specifically made.
A voluntary finding by a judge, who heard a suit in equity, of certain facts only, which does not amount to a full report of all the facts upon which a final decree entered by his order rests, is not for all purposes equivalent to the complete report of "the material facts" contemplated by G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 214, Section 23.
Findings that the insured in a motor vehicle liability policy failed to "coperate" in the defence of an action against him as required by the policy and that the insurer had not waived and was not estopped to rely on such failure were not inconsistent with certain specified findings respecting the conduct of the insured and the attorney for the insurer in connection with such action.
BILL IN EQUITY, filed in the Superior Court with a writ of summons and attachment dated May 10, 1937.
The suit was heard by Burns, J., by whose order there was entered a final decree dismissing the bill as against the defendant Preferred Accident Insurance Company of New York and ordering the defendant Pamoukis to pay a specified sum of money to the plaintiff. The plaintiff appealed.
J. I. Robinson & C. D. Sloan, for the plaintiff, submitted a brief.
E. H. Wright, for the defendant Preferred Accident Insurance Company of New York.
QUA, J. The plaintiff has secured a judgment against the defendant Pamoukis for bodily injuries received in an accident in the State of Connecticut resulting from the operation by that defendant of an automobile upon which the defendant Preferred Accident Insurance Company of New York, hereinafter called the company, had issued a policy of liability insurance. This suit is brought under G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 175, Section 113, and G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 214, Section 3 (10), to reach and apply the alleged obligation of the company to Pamoukis in satisfaction of the plaintiff's judgment.
if any exists, arose under the extraterritorial coverage of the policy and not under the Massachusetts compulsory insurance provisions, any defence which would be available to the company against Pamoukis is equally available against the plaintiff. Sleeper v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. 283 Mass. 511, 512. Phillips v. Stone, 297 Mass. 341. The defence upon which the company relies is that Pamoukis violated a provision of the policy requiring him to coperate with the company in the defence of the original action, in that he failed to appear upon request to testify in his own behalf at a hearing before an auditor appointed in that action.
Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bagg, 292 Mass. 125, 127. See Commissioner of Banks v. Cosmopolitan Trust Co. 249 Mass. 144, 147; Berman v. Coakley, 257 Mass. 159, 162; Romanausky v. Skutulas, 258 Mass. 190, 192; Karas v. Karas, 288 Mass. 460, 462; Rosemont v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 301 Mass. 139, 141. This case is to be distinguished from cases where the judge has made a report of "the material facts" under the statute or has otherwise indicated that the facts stated by him are all the facts which entered into his decree. In such cases there is no room for any implication of further findings. Topor v. Topor, 287 Mass. 473, 476. Goldston v. Randolph, 293 Mass. 253, 255.
In the case of Cohen v. Nagle, 190 Mass. 4, at page 5, the statement was made, and it has occasionally been repeated, that a report of facts voluntarily made by the trial judge has the same effect as a report of "the material facts" under the statute. See, for example, Lindsey v. Bird, 193 Mass. 200, 201; Howe v. Howe, 199 Mass. 598, 601; Smith v. Smith, 222 Mass. 102, 103; Taylor v. Jones, 242 Mass. 210, 216; Berman v. Coakley, 257 Mass. 159, 161; and Edwards v. Cockburn, 264 Mass. 112, 115. This statement cannot be understood to mean that a voluntary finding of certain facts only which may not amount to a full report of all the facts upon which the decree rests is for all purposes equivalent to the complete report of "the material facts" contemplated by the statute. In the cases just cited the precise question here presented was not before the court. The distinction between findings which are complete and those which are incomplete seems to have been in the mind of the court in Romanausky v. Skutulas, 258 Mass. 190, at page 192, and Goldston v. Randolph, 293 Mass. 253, at page 255.
A few days before the auditor's hearing, at the request of one Mr. Wright, who was acting as attorney for the company, another attorney who had acted for Pamoukis told the latter when the hearing was to be held and to see Mr. Wright, and Pamoukis said he would be at Mr. Wright's office on the morning of the hearing. When Pamoukis did not appear at the office Mr. Wright, still expecting him to be present at the hearing, represented him there without asking for a continuance. Pamoukis did not appear at any time during the hearing. The auditor filed his report January 4, 1937. On January 8 Mr. Wright wrote to Pamoukis disclaiming liability and informing Pamoukis that Mr. Wright had "filed insistence on jury trial and reservation of right to introduce further evidence" without prejudice to the right of the company to assert its defence under the policy. On March 1 Mr. Wright filed his disappearance. Pamoukis had notice of this, but did nothing and was defaulted about March 19, 1937.
399. Phillips v. Stone, 297 Mass. 341. On the contrary the findings are consistent with a conclusion based upon them and upon the unreported evidence that the failure of the insured to keep his promise placed the company in a position where it did not know that the insured would not appear at the auditor's hearing in time to testify in his own behalf and consequently where it could not safely abandon the defence until the hearing had been completed. This distinguishes the case from Daly v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp. Ltd. 269 Mass. 1 (see especially page 4), and Barbeau v. Koljanen, 299 Mass. 329.

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