Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&amp;view=article&amp;id=40398:g-r-no-136806-august-22,-2000-eduardo-a-alarilla-v-sandiganbayan&amp;catid=1396&amp;Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 00:43:07+00:00

Document:
EDUARDO A. ALARILLA, Petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division), Respondent.
On December 1, 1995, the Office of the Ombudsman, acting through the Office of the Special Prosecutor, filed an information 3 with the Sandiganbayan charging petitioner Eduardo A. Alarilla with the crime of grave threats as defined in Article 282 of the Revised Penal Code. On the same day, a second information 4 was filed charging petitioner of having violated section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019. These informations were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 23069 and 23070, respectively.
That on or about October 13, 1982, in Meycauayan, Bulacan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a public officer, being then the Municipal Mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan, committing the crime herein charged in relation to and taking advantage of his official functions, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously level and aim a .45 caliber pistol at and threaten to kill one Simeon G. Legaspi, during a public hearing about the pollution from the operations of the Giant Achievers Enterprises Plastic Factory and after the said complainant rendered a privilege speech critical of the abuses and excesses of the administration of said accused.
In its resolution 8 of January 30, 1997, the Sandiganbayan admitted the amended information.
A perusal of the Amended Information in the instant case readily shows that the felony allegedly committed was "office-related," hence, within the jurisdiction of this court. It is alleged therein that accused mayor committed the crime of grave threats when he levelled and aimed his gun at and threatened to kill private complainant Simeon Legazpi during a public hearing about the pollution which resulted from the operation of Giant Achievers Enterprises Plastic Factory and after said complainant rendered a privileged speech critical of the abuses and excesses of the administration of the accused. As the local chief executive, the health and sanitation problem of the community was one of the accused’s main concern[s]. Thus, Accused was performing his official duty as municipal mayor when he attended said public hearing. It is apparent from the allegations, that, although public office is not an element of the crime of grave threat[s] in abstract, as committed by the accused, there is an intimate connection/relation between the commission of the offense and accused’s performance of his public office.
Moreover, Accused’s violent act was precipitated by complainant’s criticism of his administration as the mayor or chief executive of the municipality, during the latter’s privilege speech. It was his response to private complainant’s attack to his office. If he was not the mayor, he would not have been irritated or angered by whatever private complainant might have said during said privilege speech.
The ruling in Criminal Case No. 23070 relied upon by the accused will not apply in this case, because the offense involved there was [a] [v]iolation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019. It is an essential element of said offense that the act of the accused in causing undue injury to any party including the Government or the giving to any party of unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference was done in the course of the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial function. The ponente, the Hon. Jose S. Balajadia, however, found the said circumstance not obtaining in the said case (Crim. Case No. 23070) because the incident complained of took place after the public hearing when the accused was not anymore performing any of his official administrative functions. The difference lies in the fact that in the case at bar (grave threats), said condition is not a component element. All that the law requires for the crime to be within the jurisdiction of this court is the fact that the felony was committed "in relation to his office" (not during the discharge of his official function).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, and on the further ground that accused’s primary intent in pleading a reinvestigation is the determination of the "office-related" character of the crime, which is now passed upon, his Motion for Reinvestigation is hereby DENIED due course. His Motion for Reconsideration of the Court’s Resolution dated January 30, 1997 is likewise DENIED for lack of merit.
The accused herein is charged with having threatened to kill Simeon Legaspi by pointing a .45 caliber pistol at him. There is evidence on record that the acts were indeed committed. Regardless of whether or not the pistol was cocked, the pointing of a firearm at a person in a hostile manner is an act demonstrating an intent to inflict harm to that person. Whether or not the accused Mayor was in the performance of his proper duties when he pointed the .45 caliber pistol is not a proper issue of jurisdiction for this Court since all illegal acts are never proper acts of one’s public office. What is at evidence is that an ordinary citizen was not in a position to convoke the Sanggunian Bayan nor to preside over the same, much less to interfere with the legislative proceedings of the Municipal Council which, because he as mayor, the accused could and did, even if unlawfully.
Indeed, an illegal act is not an official act; rather the question boils down to whether or not the acts attributed to the accused herein were performed by him in the occasion of either the performance of his duties or of his assertion of his authority to do so. Were the rule to be otherwise, the Sandiganbayan would never have jurisdiction of criminal acts of public officers since these acts would never be the performance of official duties or be official acts, although they might be in the occasion thereof.
The Office of the Special Prosecutor filed its Comment 19 on April 22, 1999. On May 18, 1999, petitioner filed a motion to resolve 20 his application for a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction in order to enjoin the Sandiganbayan from further proceeding with the case, which prayer he reiterated in a subsequent motion 21 filed with this Court on July 22, 1999. On September 6, 1999, the Court denied petitioner’s July 22, 1999 motion for lack of merit. 22 Petitioner filed a Reply 23 on December 6, 1999. The prosecution and the defense then filed their respective Memorandums on March 16, 2000 24 and on March 30, 2000, 25 respectively, after which the case was deemed submitted for decision.
I.	WHETHER OR NOT THE FIRST DIVISION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DENYING PETITIONER’S DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE.
When there is no showing of such grave abuse, certiorari is not the proper remedy. 31 Rather, the appropriate recourse from an order denying a demurrer to evidence is for the court to proceed with the trial, after which the accused may file an appeal from the judgment of the lower court rendered after such trial. 32 In the present case, we are not prepared to rule that the Sandiganbayan has gravely abused its discretion when it denied petitioner’s demurrer to evidence. Public respondent found that the prosecution’s evidence satisfactorily established the elements of the crime charged. Correspondingly, there is nothing in the records of this case nor in the pleadings of petitioner that would show otherwise.
b.	Other offenses or felonies committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation to their office.
The jurisdiction of a court is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. 39 In the case at bar, the amended information contained allegations that the accused, petitioner herein, took advantage of his official functions as municipal mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan when he committed the crime of grave threats as defined in Article 282 of the Revised Penal Code against complainant Simeon G. Legaspi, a municipal councilor. The Office of the Special Prosecutor charged petitioner with aiming a gun at and threatening to kill Legaspi during a public hearing, after the latter had rendered a privilege speech critical of petitioner’s administration. Clearly, based on such allegations, the crime charged is intimately connected with the discharge of petitioner’s official functions. This was elaborated upon by public respondent in its April 25, 1997 resolution wherein it held that the "accused was performing his official duty as municipal mayor when he attended said public hearing" and that "accused’s violent act was precipitated by complainant’s criticism of his administration as the mayor or chief executive of the municipality, during the latter’s privilege speech. It was his response to private complainant’s attack to his office. If he was not the mayor, he would not have been irritated or angered by whatever private complainant might have said during said privilege speech." Thus, based on the allegations in the information, the Sandiganbayan correctly assumed jurisdiction over the case.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED.
1.	The assailed resolutions were issued by the First Division composed of Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena and Justices Catalino R. Castañeda, Jr. and German G. Lee, Jr. However, by the time the December 17, 1998 Resolution was issued, Justice Lee, Jr. was replaced by Justice Gregory S. Ong.
3.	Records, vol. II, 2-A-2-B.
7.	Records, vol. 1, 100-101.
13.	Records, vol. I, 307-424.
15.	Ibid., vol. II, 6-18.
29.	Tan v. Court of Appeals, 283 SCRA 18 (1997). See also Antonio v. Court of Appeals, 273 SCRA 328 (1998); People v. Mercado, 159 SCRA 453, 459 (1988).
30.	Gamboa v. Cruz, 162 SCRA 642 (1988).
31.	Morales v. Court of Appeals, 283 SCRA 211 (1997).
32.	Cruz v. People, 144 SCRA 677 (1986), citing People v. Court of Appeals, 119 SCRA 162 (1982); Joseph v. Villaluz, 89 SCRA 324 (1979); People v. Romero, 22 Phil 565.
34.	People v. Cawaling, 293 SCRA 267 (1998); Azarcon v. Sandiganbayan, 268 SCRA 747 (1997); People v. Velasco, 252 SCRA 135 (1996), citing People v. Mariano, 71 SCRA 600 (1976) and People v. Paderna, 22 SCRA 273 (1968).
35.	Entitled "AN ACT TO STRENGTHEN THE FUNCTIONAL AND STRUCTURAL ORGANIZATION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN, AMENDING FOR THAT PURPOSE PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1606, AS AMENDED. Approved on March 30, 1995.
36.	Azarcon v. Sandiganbayan, supra.
37.	People v. Cawaling, supra.
38.	242 SCRA 88 (1995).
39.	People v. Cawaling, supra, citing Lim v. Court of Appeals, 251 SCRA 408 (1995); Tamano v. Ortiz, 291 SCRA 584 (1998); Chico v. Court of Appeals, 284 SCRA 33 (1998); Cunanan v. Arceo, supra.

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