Source: https://strasbourgobservers.com/2010/12/08/jak%CF%8Cbski-v-poland-is-the-court-opening-the-door-to-reasonable-accommodation/
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 00:15:29+00:00

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HomeJakόbski v. Poland: Is the Court opening the door to reasonable accommodation?
Jakόbski v. Poland: Is the Court opening the door to reasonable accommodation?
In a previous post, I said I would give the European Court of Human Rights a standing ovation the day it adopted a more open stance in freedom of religion cases. The time has come for such ovation. And the opportunity has been provided by what may well be a landmark decision: Jakόbski v. Poland. In this post, Lourdes and I discuss the causes for celebration.
Mr. Jakόbski, currently detained in a Polish prison, submits that he is a Buddhist. This is the reason why on several occasions he asked to be served meat-free meals to be able to follow the religious dietary rules required by Mahayana Buddhism. The prison authorities provided him with a ‘PK diet’ – which is a diet that contains no pork – but did not provide him with a complete meat-free diet. The applicant complained about a violation of his freedom of religion.
In a first argument, the government contests that a meat-free diet is a religious prescription required by Buddhism stating that the Buddhist school to which the applicant adhered to only encourages vegetarianism but does not prescribe it. The Court refers to previous case law where it already considered that dietary rules can be considered a direct expression of beliefs in the sense of art. 9 of the Convention. (Cha’are Shalom Ve Tsedek v. France, §§ 73-74) However, contrary to the State’s argument and in light of the principle that “the State’s duty of neutrality and impartiality (…) is incompatible with any power on the State’s part to assess the legitimacy of religious beliefs”, the Court does not enter into the discussion of whether or not vegetarianism is really a religious dietary prescription. The Court simply states that “without deciding whether such decisions are taken in every case to fulfil(sic) a religious duty… in the present case the Court considers that the applicant’s decision to adhere to a vegetarian diet can be regarded as motivated or inspired by a religion and was not unreasonable” and that it thus falls within the scope of article 9.
The Court has always stated in the past that not every act motivated by religion or belief is protected by the Convention. In some cases this principle led to theological interpretations by the Court (e.g. in X v. UK  the Commission was not convinced that attending Friday prayers in the mosque was required by Islam and in Kosteski v. FYROM  the Court was not persuaded that celebrating a religious holiday was a manifestation of belief as the applicant in that case did not substantiate his belief). In Jakόbski, the Court does the right thing: it refrains from judging on the content of religious prescriptions (contrary to e.g. Dahlab v. Switzerland  where the Court found the wearing of the headscarf by a Muslim woman difficult to reconcile with a message of tolerance). The neutral way in which the Court deals with the religious part in Jakóbski , taking into account the personal conviction of the applicant, is how it should always be.
The Polish government’s arguments clearly echo the “undue hardship” defense (**) usually advanced by respondents before the Canadian Supreme Court against the duty to accommodate. In fact, to justify the refusal to accommodate the applicant’s request, the Polish government invoked: 1) the “excessive burden” this would represent to the prison’s kitchen staff and 2) the “extra costs” of hygiene requirements. In the Canadian Supreme Court’s case law, a request for accommodation may be rejected if it leads to “undue hardship.” Disproportionate costs and an impediment to the organization’s functioning are some of the forms undue hardship may take.
Jakóbski is definitely a great case. It deserves a standing ovation not only for adopting a more sensitive and accommodating approach towards religious minorities’ particular concerns but also for being more consistent with the idea of neutrality that the Court normally advocates. If the Court adopts the principles laid out in this case in future cases concerning accommodation claims, this would lead to a huge improvement of the case law regarding minorities. So, hopefully, Jakóbski will also represent a positive turn in the accommodation of minorities’ specific needs more generally.

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