Source: https://wcc.state.ct.us/crb/2011/5598crb.htm
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 02:35:33+00:00

Document:
The claimant was represented by Thomas E. Farver, Esq., Farver & Hefferman, 2858 Old Dixwell Avenue, Hamden, CT 06518.
The respondent was represented by Kenneth H. Kennedy, Jr., Esq., Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General, 55 Elm Street, P.O. Box 120, Hartford, CT 06141.
This Petition for Review from the September 21, 2010 Finding and Dismissal of the Commissioner acting for the Third District was heard April 1, 2011 before a Compensation Review Board panel consisting of the Commission Chairman John A. Mastropietro and Commissioners Christine L. Engel and Ernie R. Walker.
JOHN A. MASTROPIETRO, CHAIRMAN. The claimant in this matter has appealed from a Finding and Dismissal which determined he was not entitled to reinstatement to his prior post by virtue of § 5-142(a) C.G.S.1 We find the trial commissioner reached an appropriate decision herein based on the applicable statute. Therefore, we affirm the trial commissioner and dismiss this appeal.
The trial commissioner reached the following findings at the conclusion of the formal hearing. She found that on June 10, 2005 the claimant was employed as a Judicial Marshal II by the Connecticut Judicial Department, and on that date he was injured while transporting prisoners. An assault by a prisoner led to the claimant sustaining injuries to his left and right knees. As a result of his injuries, the claimant underwent multiple knee surgeries, was deemed to be temporarily total disabled and elected benefits pursuant to § 5-142(a) for total incapacity.
The respondent accepted the claim and has paid all applicable benefits. The claimant asserts he received temporary total disability benefits until such time as he notified his employer that he was released to full duty, without restrictions, effective February 10, 2009. The trial commissioner took administrative notice of a Form 36 filed by the respondent on January 8, 2008, and approved pursuant to an informal hearing that was held on March 28, 2008. The Form 36 found the claimant had a sedentary work capacity, based upon the opinion of Dr. Carl Nissen, the claimant’s treating physician. The Form 36 changed the claimant’s status from temporary total disability to temporary partial disability and had an effective date of January 8, 2008.
The parties dispute whether the claimant should now be returned to the state payroll. The claimant states that as he had been receiving benefits under § 5-142(a) C.G.S., he was to be placed on an inactive payroll status, and could not be terminated from his position until after the initial two hundred sixty weeks of his total incapacity. The respondent’s position is that the claimant was separated from state service in good standing as of March 31, 2008 pursuant to § 5-244 C.G.S. and the job protection the claimant would receive under § 5-142(a) C.G.S. is inapplicable as the claimant was not totally incapacitated when he left state service. The respondent further argues there is no statutory authority empowering a workers’ compensation commissioner to reinstate the claimant to his previous position, and therefore, the Commission lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this remedy.
Based on this record the trial commissioner concluded that the claimant was separated from state service in good standing on March 31, 2008. On that date the claimant was not totally disabled and had a sedentary work capacity. The trial commissioner further determined that she did not accept the claimant’s position that his status under § 5-142 C.G.S. required the respondent to restore him to full-time employment and to full wage benefits related thereto as of February 10, 2009. The trial commissioner further concluded that the respondent was correct in their position that § 5-142(a) was inapplicable to an employee who had already been separated from state service; and that the statute did not empower the Commission to reinstate the claimant to his prior position. In reaching this conclusion the trial commissioner relied on precedent in Discuillo v. Stone & Webster, 242 Conn. 570 (1997) that the Commission is a body that acts within statutorily limited powers. As a result, the trial commissioner dismissed the claimant’s claim.
The claimant filed a Motion to Correct, seeking to add findings supportive of being ordered to be reinstated to the state payroll. The trial commissioner denied these corrections in their entirety. The claimant has proceeded with this appeal. His position that § 5-142(a) C.G.S. acts to preclude the claimant from being terminated from state service for a five year period subsequent to becoming temporarily totally disabled from a work-related injury. As the claimant views it, once he became “totally incapacitated” there was “no statutory provision” to terminate him from state employment for the entire five year period delineated under § 5-142 (a) C.G.S. Claimant’s Brief, p. 8.
We find this is a case purely of statutory interpretation as the precedent cited in the claimant’s brief (Nelson v. State, 99 Conn. App. 808 (2007) and Gray v. State/Fairfield Hills Hospital, 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 279, 1476 CRB-4-92-8 (June 7, 1994)) deal with determinations as to whether a claimant’s injuries were due to “special hazards” in their employment. This issue is not being litigated in this matter. In construing the applicable statute we are bound to apply the terms of § 1-2z C.G.S. which limits us to the “plain meaning” of the statute. First Union Natl. v. Hi Ho Mall Shopping, 273 Conn. 287, 291 (2005). In so construing the “plain meaning” of § 5-142(a) C.G.S., we also believe the context of our precedent governing “total incapacity” must be considered when adjudicating matters brought before our Commission.
In considering matters as to whether a claimant is totally disabled, “[w]e have consistently held it is the claimant’s burden to establish total disability” see Dengler v. Special Attention Health Services, Inc., 62 Conn. App. 440, 454 (2001); Damon v. VNS of CT/Masonicare, 5413 CRB-4-08-12 (December 15, 2009); Hernandez v. American Truck Rental, 5083 CRB-7-06-4 (April 19, 2007) and Gombas v. Custom Ai. Systems, Inc., 4996 CRB-4-05-9 (September 20, 2006). This determination is a factual matter where we must uphold the trial commissioner’s decision unless it is “clearly erroneous” Franklin v. State/Department of Mental Health & Addiction Services, 5224 CRB-8-07-4 (April 11, 2008).
We followed this reasoning in Kennedy v. State/Department of Correction, 5238 CRB-1-07-6 (June 26, 2008), which was a case involving § 5-142(a) C.G.S. benefits. In Kennedy we determined that the evidence presented before the trial commissioner did not justify the award of total disability benefits, as during the period in question the claimant performed some work and had been adjudged to have a work capacity. As a result, we concluded the trial commissioner’s award of total disability benefits was “clearly erroneous.” Since we concluded in Kennedy the language of § 5-142(a) C.G.S. tracked the holding in Osterlund v. State, 135 Conn. 498 (1949), we remanded the matter to ascertain if the claimant was entitled to another form of benefit other than total disability benefits.
Our reading of the plain meaning of § 5-142(a) C.G.S. is that the General Assembly intended to provide a more generous level of benefits to hazardous duty personnel both in terms of amount (100% salary for the first five years; 50% thereafter) and duration (no specific time limitation) recognizing the nature of these jobs. See Johnson v. State, 67 Conn. App. 330, 344 (2001) and Lucarelli v. State, 16 Conn. App. 65, 69 (1988). We further find these benefits are to be provided to the claimant “so long as he remains disabled.” The claimant’s interpretation of this statute would suggest that once a hazardous duty officer became totally disabled in the line of duty, he or she would be entitled to full salary for five years thereafter irrespective of their recovery and work capacity. This interpretation of statute is clearly inconsistent with binding precedent applying § 1-2z C.G.S., such as Southern New England Telephone Co. v. Cashman, 283 Conn. 644 (2007) “[w]hen more than one construction [of a statute] is possible, we adopt the one that renders the enactment effective and workable and reject any that might lead to unreasonable or bizarre results.” Id., 652-653. As the Appellate Court pointed out in Lucarelli, supra, the statute at issue was enacted so as “to provide enhanced benefits by way of disability compensation.” Id., 69. In the absence of a “disability” we cannot find an entitlement to compensation.
In the present matter, the trial commissioner found that the claimant’s treating physician opined the claimant had a work capacity and this opinion was the basis of the respondent’s Form 36 filed on January 8, 2008. See Finding, ¶ 4 and Conclusion, ¶ C. We find the evidential record from Dr. Nissen’s report supports the trial commissioner’s findings on this issue and therefore, we must affirm her factual conclusions. Franklin, supra. The trial commissioner found the claimant was no longer “totally disabled.” In the absence of total disability, § 5-142(a) C.G.S. was no longer applicable to the claimant’s circumstances. Therefore, we affirm the trial commissioner’s conclusions in Conclusions, ¶¶ C and D.
We address briefly the claimant’s appeal as to whether the trial commissioner erroneously concluded she lacked the authority to reinstate the claimant to the state payroll. The claimant cites no precedent for his provision that the trial commissioner had such authority besides noting the General Assembly has enacted § 31-290a C.G.S. to penalize retaliatory firings.4 We believe this statute constitutes the exclusive remedy available to this Commission to force an employer to reinstate an employee. Had the General Assembly intended to include this remedy within the ambit of § 5-142(a) C.G.S., we believe they would have specifically authorized such a remedy. In the absence of such statutory authority, we believe the trial commissioner appropriately relied on Disciullo, supra, in concluding the remedy of reinstatement was unavailable under these circumstances.
We find no error and affirm the Finding and Dismissal. This appeal is dismissed.
Sec. 31-290a. Discharge or discrimination prohibited. Right of action. (a) No employer who is subject to the provisions of this chapter shall discharge, or cause to be discharged, or in any manner discriminate against any employee because the employee has filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits or otherwise exercised the rights afforded to him pursuant to the provisions of this chapter.

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