Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/429/413/
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 08:13:18+00:00

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December 26 intercept order on the ground that failure to name them in the application and order of that date violated § 2518(1)(b)(iv), inter alia, and suppressed as to respondents Merlo and Lauer all evidence derived from both intercept orders on the ground that these two respondents had not been served with an inventory notice as required by § 2518(8)(d). The Court of Appeals affirmed.
1. Section 2518(1)(b)(iv) is not satisfied when the wiretap application identifies only the "principal target" (usually the individual whose phone is monitored) of the interception, but the Government is required to name all individuals who it has probable cause to believe are engaged in the criminal activity under investigation and whose conversations it expects will be intercepted over the target telephone. Neither the language and structure of Title III nor its legislative history supports the interpretation that Congress intended to remove from the identification requirement those suspects whose intercepted communications originated on a telephone other than that listed in the wiretap application. Pp. 429 U. S. 423-428.
2. Under § 2518(8)(d), the Government has a statutory responsibility to inform the issuing judge of the identities of persons whose conversations were overheard in the course of the interception, thus enabling him to decide whether they should be served with notice of the interception. Here the Government did not comply adequately with § 2518(8)(d), since the names of respondents Merlo and Lauer were not included on the purportedly complete list of identifiable persons submitted to the issuing judge. Pp. 429 U. S. 428-432.
3. Although the Government was required under § 2518(1)(b)(iv) to identify respondents Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzacco in the December 26 application, failure to do so under these circumstances did not warrant suppression under § 2518(10)(a)(i), since the identification in an intercept application of all those likely to be overheard in incriminating conversations does not play a "substantive role" with respect to judicial authorization of intercept orders and hence does not impose a limitation on the use of intercept procedures. Pp. 429 U. S. 435-437.
conversations, the intercept being lawful because the application provided sufficient information to enable the judge to determine that the statutory preconditions were satisfied. Pp. 429 U. S. 435-436.
(b) There is nothing in the legislative history to suggest that Congress intended § 2518(1)(b)(iv)'s broad identification requirement to play "a central, or even functional, role in guarding against unwarranted use of wiretapping or electronic surveillance," United States v. Chavez, 416 U. S. 562, 416 U. S. 578. P. 429 U. S. 437.
4. Nor was suppression justified under § 2518(10)(a)(i) with respect to respondents Merlo and Lauer simply because the Government inadvertently omitted their names from the comprehensive list of all identifiable persons whose conversations had been overheard. Pp. 429 U. S. 438-439.
(a) There is nothing in the structure or legislative history of the Act to suggest that incriminating conversations are "unlawfully intercepted" whenever parties to those conversations do not receive discretionary inventory notice under § 2518(8)(d) as a result of the Government's failure to inform the court of their identities. P. 429 U. S. 438.
(b) Here, at the time inventory notice was served on the other identifiable persons, the intercept had been completed and the conversations had been "seized" under a valid intercept order, and the fact that discretionary notice reached 39, rather than 41, identifiable persons does not, in itself, mean that the conversations were unlawfully intercepted. Pp. 429 U. S. 438-439.
513 F.2d 337, reversed and remanded.
POWELL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which STEWART, WHITE, BLACKMUN, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined, in all but Part II-A of which BURGER, C.J., joined, and in Parts I and II of which STEVENS, J., joined. BURGER, C.J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, post, p. 429 U. S. 440. MARSHALL, J., filed an opinion dissenting in part, in which BRENNAN, J., joined, post, p. 429 U. S. 445. STEVENS, J., filed a statement concurring in part and dissenting in part, post, p. 429 U. S. 451.
This case presents issues concerning the construction of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520. Specifically, we must decide whether 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(b)(iv), which requires the Government to include in its wiretap applications "the identity of the person, if known, committing the offense and whose communications are to be intercepted," is satisfied when the Government identifies only the "principal targets" of the intercept. Second, we must decide whether the Government has a statutory responsibility to inform the issuing judge of the identities of persons whose conversations were overheard in the course of the interception, thus enabling him to decide whether they should be served with notice of the interception pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d). And finally, we must determine whether failure to comply fully with these statutory provisions requires suppression of evidence under 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a).
The District Court again authorized interception of gambling-related conversations for a maximum of 15 days.
On November 1, 1973, an indictment was returned in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio charging Kotoch, Spaganlo, the five respondents, and 10 other individuals with conspiracy to conduct and conducting a gambling business in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 1955. The five respondents filed motions to suppress evidence derived from the wire interception. After an evidentiary hearing on the motions, the District Court suppressed as to respondents Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzacco all evidence derived from the December 26 intercept order on the ground that failure to identify them by name in the application and order of that date violated 18 U.S.C. §§ 2518(1)(b)(iv) and 2518(4)(a). With respect to Merlo and Lauer, who were not known to the Government until after the December 26 application, the District Court suppressed all evidence derived from both intercept orders on the ground that they had not been served with inventory notice.
We granted certiorari to resolve these issues, which concern the construction of a major federal statute, 424 U.S. 907, and now reverse.
course of an authorized interception. We think neither contention is sound.
"full and complete statement of the facts concerning all previous applications . . . involving any person named in the application as committing, having committed, or being about to commit an offense."
In any event, for our present purposes, it is unnecessary to speculate as to exactly how Congress interpreted Berger and Katz with respect to the identification issue. It is sufficient to note that, in response to those decisions Congress included an identification requirement which, on its face, draws no distinction based on the telephone one uses, and the United States points to no evidence in the legislative history that supports such a distinction. Indeed, the legislative materials apparently contain no use of the term "principal target" or any discussion of a different treatment based on the telephone from which a suspect speaks. [Footnote 17] We therefore conclude that a wiretap application must name an individual if the Government has probable cause to believe that the individual is engaged in the criminal activity under investigation and expects to intercept the individual's conversations over the target telephone.
the application, and indicate whether communications were intercepted. [Footnote 18] Although the statute mandates inventory notice only for persons named in the application or the order, the statute also provides that the judge may order similar notice to other parties to intercepted communications if he concludes that such action is in the interest of justice. [Footnote 19] Observing that this notice provision does not expressly require law enforcement authorities routinely to supply the judge with specific information upon which to exercise his discretion, the United States contends that it would be inappropriate to read such a requirement into the statute, since the judge has the option of asking the law enforcement authorities for whatever information he requires.
parties are not specifically named in the court order. The Berger and Katz decisions established that notice of surveillance is a constitutional requirement of any surveillance statute. It may be that the required notice must be served on all parties to intercepted communications. Since legitimate interests of privacy may make such notice to all parties undesirable, the amendment leaves the final determination to the judge."
have been intercepted. Thus, while precise identification of each party to an intercepted communication is not required, a description of the general class, or classes, which they comprise is essential to enable the judge to determine whether additional information is necessary for a proper evaluation of the interests of the various parties. Furthermore, although the judicial officer has the duty to cause the filing of the inventory [notice], it is abundantly clear that the prosecution has greater access to and familiarity with the intercepted communications. Therefore we feel justified in imposing upon the latter the duty to classify all those whose conversations have been intercepted, and to transmit this information to the judge. Should the judge desire more information regarding these classes in order to exercise his [statutory] § 2518(8)(d) discretion, . . . the government is [also] required to furnish such information as is available to it."
will be before the issuing judge, this policy does not meet the test set out in Chun. Moreover, where, as here, the Government chooses to supply the issuing judge with a list of all identifiable persons rather than a description of the classes into which those persons fall, the list must be complete. Applying these principles, we find that the Government did not comply adequately with § 2518(8)(d), since the names of respondents Merlo and Lauer were not included on the purportedly complete list of identifiable persons submitted to the issuing judge.
"[not] every failure to comply fully with any requirement provided in Title III would render the interception of wire or oral communications 'unlawful.'"
implement the congressional intention to limit the use of intercept procedures to those situations clearly calling for the employment of this extraordinary investigative device."
United States v. Giordano, supra at 416 U. S. 527.
Giordano concerned the provision in Title III requiring that an application for an intercept order be approved by the Attorney General or an Assistant Attorney General specially designated by the Attorney General. Concluding that Congress intended to condition the use of wiretap procedures on the judgment of senior officials in the Department of Justice, the Court required suppression for failure to comply with the approval provision. Chavez concerned the statutory requirement that the application for an intercept order specify the identity of the official authorizing the application. The problem in Chavez was one of misidentification; although the application had in fact been authorized by the Attorney General, the application erroneously identified an Assistant Attorney General as the official authorizing the application. The Court concluded that mere misidentification of the official authorizing the application did not make the application unlawful within the meaning of § 2518(10)(a)(i), since that identification requirement did not play a "substantive role" in the regulatory system. 416 U.S. at 416 U. S. 578.
In the instant case, the Court of Appeals concluded that both the identification requirement of § 2518(1)(b)(iv) and the notice requirement of § 2518(8)(d) played a "central role" in the statutory framework, and for that reason affirmed the District Court's order suppressing relevant evidence. Although both statutory requirements are undoubtedly important, we do not think that the failure to comply fully with those provisions renders unlawful an intercept order that in all other respects satisfies the statutory requirements.
As to § 2518(1)(b)(iv), the issue is whether the identification in an intercept application of all those likely to be overheard in incriminating conversations plays a "substantive role" with respect to judicial authorization of intercept orders and consequently imposes a limitation on the use of intercept procedures. The statute provides that the issuing judge may approve an intercept application if he determines that normal investigative techniques have failed or are unlikely to succeed and there is probable cause to believe that: (i) an individual is engaged in criminal activity; (ii) particular communications concerning the offense will be obtained through interception; and (iii) the target facilities are being used in connection with the specified criminal activity. §§ 2518(3)(a-d). That determination is based on the "full and complete statement" of relevant facts supplied by law enforcement authorities. If, after evaluating the statutorily enumerated factors in light of the information contained in the application, the judge concludes that the wiretap order should issue, the failure to identify additional persons who are likely to be overheard engaging in incriminating conversations could hardly invalidate an otherwise lawful judicial authorization. The intercept order may issue only if the issuing judge determines that the statutory factors are present, and the failure to name additional targets in no way detracts from the sufficiency of those factors.
and the court would very likely authorize its use."
"[T]he intent of the provision is that the principle of post-use notice will be retained. This provision alone should insure the community that the techniques are reasonably employed. Through its operation, all authorized interceptions must eventually become known at least to the subject. He can then seek appropriate civil redress, for example, under section 2520 . . . if he feels that his privacy has been unlawfully invaded."
S.Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 105 (1968). The floor discussion concerning the amendment adding the provision for discretionary notice merely indicates an intent to provide notice to such additional persons as may be constitutionally required.
The legislative history indicates that post-intercept notice was designed instead to assure the community that the wiretap technique is reasonably employed. But even recognizing that Congress placed considerable emphasis on that aspect of the overall statutory scheme, we do not think that post-intercept notice was intended to serve as an independent restraint on resort to the wiretap procedure.
"strict adherence by the Government to the provisions of Title III would nonetheless be more in keeping with the responsibilities Congress has imposed upon it when authority to engage in wiretapping or electronic surveillance is sought."
416 U.S. at 416 U. S. 580.
"(1) Each application for an order authorizing or approving the interception of a wire or oral communication shall be made in writing upon oath or affirmation to a judge of competent jurisdiction and shall state the applicant's authority to make such application. Each application shall include the following information:"
"(c) a full and complete statement as to whether or not other investigative procedures have been tried and failed or why they reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous;"
The issuing judge is free to require the applicant to furnish additional information. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(2).
The affidavit set forth extensive information indicating that the named individuals were conducting a gambling operation. This information was derived from physical surveillance by agents of the FBI, an examination of telephone company toll records, and the personal observations of six informants, whose past reliability also was detailed in the affidavit.
"(3) Upon such application the judge may enter an ex parte order, as requested or as modified, authorizing or approving interception of wire or oral communications within the territorial jurisdiction of the court in which the judge is sitting, if the judge determines on the basis of the facts submitted by the applicant that -- "
"(a) there is probable cause for belief that an individual is committing, has committed, or is about to commit a particular offense enumerated in section 2516 of this chapter;"
"(b) there is probable cause for belief that particular communications concerning that offense will be obtained through such interception;"
"(c) normal investigative procedures have been tried and have failed or reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous;"
"(d) there is probable cause for belief that the facilities from which, or the place where, the wire or oral communications are to be intercepted are being used, or are about to be used, in connection with the commission of such offense, or are leased to, listed in the name of, or commonly used by such person."
"(4) Each order authorizing or approving the interception of any wire or oral communication shall specify -- "
"(a) the identity of the person, if known, whose communications are to be intercepted;"
"(b) the nature and location of the communications facilities as to which, or the place where, authority to intercept is granted;"
"(c) a particular description of the type of communication sought to be intercepted, and a statement of the particular offense to which it relates;"
"(d) the identity of the agency authorized to intercept the communications, and of the person authorizing the application; and"
"(e) the period of time during which such interception is authorized, including a statement as to whether or not the interception shall automatically terminate when the described communication has been first obtained."
In addition to the December 26 application requesting an extension of the initial intercept order, the Government also filed on that date a separate application seeking authorization to monitor a third telephone discovered at the same North Olmstead address. Both applications were accompanied by another affidavit setting forth the results of the initial monitoring, the manner in which the third telephone was discovered, the facts. indicating that the newly discovered telephone was being used to conduct a gambling business, and reasons why continued interception was necessary. A copy of the affidavit filed on November 28 was also attached to the December 26 applications. For the sake of clarity, the two applications filed on December 26 will be treated as a single application.
The United States conceded in the Court of Appeals that respondents Donovan and Robbins were "known" within the meaning of the statute at the time of the December 26 application, but challenged as clearly erroneous the District Court's finding that respondent Buzzacco was "known" at that time. The Court of Appeals upheld the District Court's finding, and the United States has not sought review of that disposition. Thus, for our purposes, all three respondents were "known" on December 26.
An inventory notice must be served within a designated period of time upon "the persons named in the order or the application." 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d). The inventory must give notice of the entry of the intercept order or application, state the disposition of the application, and indicate whether communications were or were not intercepted. Ibid. Upon the filing of a motion, the judge has discretion to make available the intercepted communications, the applications, and the orders. Ibid.
Title III also authorizes the District Court to cause an inventory notice to be served on "other parties to intercepted communications" if the judge determines that such notice is in the interest of justice. Ibid. Those other parties may also be given access to the intercepted communications, the applications, and the orders. Ibid.
The Government filed its appeal from the District Court's order suppressing evidence under 18 U.S.C. § 3731, and there has been no trial on the charges with respect to the respondents.
"(10)(a) Any aggrieved person in any trial, hearing, or proceeding in or before any court, department, officer, agency, regulatory body, or other authority of the United States, a State, or a political subdivision thereof, may move to suppress the contents of any intercepted wire or oral communication, or evidence derived therefrom, on the grounds that -- "
Every Court of Appeals that has considered the issue has concluded that an individual whose conversations probably will be intercepted by a wiretap must be identified in the wiretap application if the law enforcement authorities have probable cause to believe the individual is committing the offense for which the wiretap is sought. United States v. Chiarizio, 525 F.2d 289, 292 (CA2 1975); United States v. Bernstein, 509 F.2d 996 (CA4 1975), cert. pending, No. 74-1486; United States v. Doolittle, 507 F.2d 1368 (CA5), aff'd, en banc, 518 F.2d 500 (1975), cert. pending, Nos. 75-500, 75-509, 75-513; United States v. Civella, 533 F.2d 1395 (CA8 1976), cert. pending, Nos. 75-1813, 76-169; United States v. Russo, 527 F.2d 1051, 1056 (CA10 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 906 (1976). See also United States v. Moore, 168 U.S.App.D.C. 227, 235-236, 513 F.2d 485, 493-494 (1975) (interpreting D.C.Code § 23-547(a)(2)(D), which is almost identical to the provision at issue here).
A number of these courts have concluded, and respondents Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzacco argue, that our decision in United States v. Kahn, 415 U. S. 143 (1974), resolved this identification issue. See United States v. Chiarizio, supra; United States v. Moore, supra. Although there is language in Kahn suggesting that wiretap applications must identify all such individuals, the identification question presented here was not before us in Kahn. The question in that case was whether a wiretap application had to identify a known user of the target telephone whose complicity in the criminal activity under investigation was not known at the time of the application. Kahn is a relevant, though not controlling, precedent.
The United States does not suggest that regardless of the factual circumstances a wiretap application must identify only a single individual. To the contrary, it concedes that, if two or more persons are using the target telephone "equally" to commit the offense, and thus are "equally"targets of the investigation, "all must be named." Brief for United States 18 n. 13.
"The critical distinction . . . is [one] between the users of the telephone that is being monitored on the one hand, and all other persons throughout the world who may converse from unmonitored phones on the other hand."
Tr. of Oral Arg. 13.
Indeed, the contrary conclusion is suggested by the fact that identification of an individual in an application for an intercept order triggers other statutory provisions. First, § 2518(1)(e) requires an intercept application to disclose all previous applications "involving any of the same persons . . . specified in the application." To the extent that Congress thought it necessary to provide the issuing judge with such information, there is no indication of congressional intent to require provision of such information only if a suspect operated from one end of a telephone line. Second, § 2518(8)(d) mandates that an inventory notice be served upon "the persons named in the order or the application." As with § 2518(1)(e), the congressional purpose would not be served by limiting that notice on the basis of the telephone from which one speaks.
"identif[ies] the person whose constitutionally protected area is to be invaded, rather than 'particularly describing' the communications, conversations, or discussions to be seized."
Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. at 388 U. S. 59.
That Congress may have so understood the constitutional requirement is also suggested by the portion of the Senate Report dealing with that provision of S. 917 that required the intercept order to "specify the identity, if known, of the individual whose communications are to be intercepted." The Senate Report merely cites West v. Cabell, 153 U. S. 78 (1894), which concerns the need for proper identification of the subject of an arrest warrant. S.Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 102 (1968). To the extent that Congress may have considered West to apply to wiretap orders, we have no reason to believe that Congress considered its applicability to extend only to those suspects using the target telephone.
At least one Senator read the identification requirement in S. 917 to parallel the identification requirement contained in the statute at issue in Berger v. New York: "Specificity is required as to the person or persons whose communications will be intercepted." 114 Cong.Rec. 14763 (1968) (remarks of Sen. Percy).
The inventory notice must be served within a reasonable time, but not later than 90 days after the date the application for an intercept order was filed. On an ex parte showing of good cause, service of the inventory may be postponed.
In addition to these provisions for mandatory and discretionary inventory notice, the Government is required to supply the issuing judge with recordings of the intercepted conversations, which are to be sealed according to his directions. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(a). These notice and return provisions satisfy constitutional requirements. See Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 389 U. S. 355-356, and n. 16 (1967); Berger v. New York, supra at 388 U. S. 60.
"A, a businessman, talks with his customers, and the latter are served with papers showing that A is being bugged. . . . [T]he damage to confidence in A and to A's reputation in general may damage A unjustly. In this case, it would seem that the customers should not be served with the inventory."
"Perhaps the approach of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which suggested that, rather than submitting specific names, we should submit categories of persons who had been overheard, is a better policy, would be more helpful to the district court in exercising its discretion, and we would have no objection to following any reasonable policy that the district courts determine would be useful to them in this area."
Tr. of Oral Arg. 6-7.
The availability of the suppression remedy for these statutory, as opposed to constitutional, violations, see nn. 15 and | 15 and S. 413fn19|>19, supra, turns on the provisions of Title III, rather than the judicially fashioned exclusionary rule aimed at deterring violations of Fourth Amendment rights. United States v. Giordano, 416 U. S. 505, 416 U. S. 524 (1974).
The concurring opinion of THE CHIEF JUSTICE contends that respondents Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzacco lack standing even to seek suppression. Post at 429 U. S. 440-441. This contention rests on the ground that Congress rejected an amendment proposed by Senators Long and Hart that would have added a fourth ground justifying suppression -- namely, that the person against whom the Government sought to introduce the evidence was not named in the court order. Since these three respondents would have been entitled to suppression under the rejected amendment, the concurring opinion concludes they cannot seek suppression here.
"The [Long and Hart] amendment is designed to limit the scope of electronic surveillance, but it accomplishes this purpose in an artificial manner. So long as a court order is validly obtained, evidence obtained under the order should be admissible against any person, not merely against the person named in the order."
114 Cong.Rec. 14718 (1968) (emphasis added). Here, respondents Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzacco challenge the validity of the court order, and nothing in either Congress' rejection of the proposed amendment or the Justice Department's comment thereon suggests that § 2518(10)(a)(i) is unavailable to persons who might have had a remedy under a provision not enacted by Congress.
There is no suggestion in this case that the Government agents knowingly failed to identify respondents Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzacco for the purpose of keeping relevant information from the District Court that might have prompted the court to conclude that probable cause was lacking. If such a showing had been made, we would have a different case. Nor is there any suggestion that, as a result of the failure to name these three respondents, they were denied the mandatory inventory notice supplied to persons named in the application. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d). Respondents Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzacco were among the 37 persons served with the initial inventory.
No one suggests that the failure to identify in a wiretap application individuals who are "unknown" within the meaning of the statute, see United States v. Kahn, 415 U. S. 143 (1974), requires suppression of intercepted conversations to which those individuals were parties. Though recognizing that the failure to identify such an "unknown" individual does not make unlawful an otherwise valid intercept order, respondents Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzacco suggest that the opposite is true with respect to the failure to identify in a wiretap application individuals who are "known" within the meaning of the statute. Counsel for these respondents suggested at oral argument that this difference in result is justified by analogy to warrantless searches or arrests. Tr. of Oral Arg. 40. Although law enforcement officials can often take action without a warrant when they have been unable to foresee the circumstances that eventually confronted them, they still must obtain a search or arrest warrant when their prior knowledge is sufficient to establish probable cause, and it is suggested that the same principle applies here. The major flaw in that reasoning is that this case does not concern warrantless action. Here, the omission on the part of law enforcement authorities was not a failure to seek prior judicial authorization, but a failure to identify every individual who could be expected to be overheard engaging in incriminating conversations. That the complete absence of prior judicial authorization would make an intercept unlawful has no bearing on the lawfulness of an intercept order that fails to identify every target.
Even if we assume that Congress thought that a broad identification requirement was constitutionally mandated, it does not follow that Congress imposed statutory suppression under §§ 2515 and 2518(10)(a)(i) as a sanction for noncompliance. In limiting use of the intercept procedure to "the most precise and discriminate circumstances," S.Rep. No. 107, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 102 (1968), Congress required law enforcement authorities to convince a district court that probable cause existed to believe that a specific person was committing a specific offense using a specific telephone. This requirement was satisfied here when the application set forth sufficient information to indicate that the primary targets were conducting a gambling business over four particular telephones. Nothing in the legislative history indicates that Congress intended to declare an otherwise constitutional intercept order "unlawful" under § 2518(10)(a)(i) -- resulting in suppression under § 2515 -- for failure to name additional targets.
Counsel for respondents Merlo and Lauer conceded at oral argument that the failure to name those respondents in the proposed inventory order was not intentional, Tr. of Oral Arg. 32, and we are therefore not called upon to decide whether suppression would be an available remedy if the Government knowingly sought to prevent the District Court from serving inventory notice on particular parties. Nor does this case present an opportunity to comment upon the suggestion, recognized by the United States, Brief 49 n. 40, that suppression might be required if the agents knew before the interception that no inventory would be served.
Moreover, respondents Merlo and Lauer were not prejudiced by their failure to receive post-intercept notice under either of the District Court's inventory orders. As noted earlier, the Government made available to all defendants the intercept orders, applications, and related papers. See n 7, supra. And in response to pretrial discovery motions, the Government produced transcripts of the intercepted conversations.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
I concur in the Court's judgment and in all except 429 U. S. I cannot agree, however, with the Court's construction of the identification provisions of § 2518(1)(b)(iv), since I believe the application for surveillance in this case complied with statutory requirements. However, the precise reach of the identification requirement is irrelevant, because respondents are foreclosed from seeking suppression in any event.
"The amendment would permit intercepted communications to be used in evidence only against the persons named in the court order, not against other persons."
Ibid. (Emphasis supplied.) Consistent with the Justice Department's recommendation, the Senate rejected the result which respondents now seek.
Even if the legislative history were silent with respect to suppression, however, I would nonetheless take issue with the Court's analysis of the identification requirement. In my view, Congress required no more than that a wiretap application identify by name the primary user of the monitored facility.
"[A] bill as controversial as this . . . requires close attention to the dotting of every 'i' and the crossing of every 't'. . . ."
was carefully add in the wake of Berger v. New York, 388 U. S. 41 (1967). That case involved the constitutionality of a New York statute requiring the naming of "the person or persons whose communications . . . are to be overheard." That very different statute plainly put Congress on notice that an identification provision could call, as did New York's, for the naming of multiple parties. Indeed, while requiring only the identification of "the person" whose communications are to be intercepted, Congress anticipated the obvious fact that interceptions effected pursuant to a single application and order could potentially affect a large number of persons. Standing to object to intercepted communications is conferred upon "[a]ny aggrieved person. . . ." § 2518(10)(a). In addition, a civil damages remedy is conferred upon "[a]ny person" whose communications are unlawfully intercepted or used in violation of the statute. Thus, in fashioning highly specific requirements with respect to wiretap applications, Congress failed to employ language found in other parts of the same statute and so carefully written into the state statute at issue in the Berger case.
might reasonably contain into a command as to what it must contain.
Assuming that plain words of a statute might have to bow, in some circumstances, to compelling legislative history to the contrary, nothing of that kind is found here. As the Court observes, the earlier bills introduced in the Senate contained no identification provision at all. After Berger and Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347 (1967), were decided, the requirement was added in what was plainly an abundance of caution. For this Court in Berger flatly discounted any value in New York's broad identification requirement.
"It is true that the statute requires the naming of 'the person or persons whose communications, conversations or discussions are to be overheard or recorded. . . .' But this does no more than identify the person whose constitutionally protected area is to be invaded, rather than 'particularly describing' the communications, conversations, or discussions to be seized."
"'The Fourth Amendment requires a warrant to describe only 'the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized,' not the persons from whom things will be seized.'"
express legislative purpose of "reflect[ing] the constitutional commands of particularization.'" Ante at 429 U. S. 427. Under those circumstances, it ill serves this Court to speculate that our coequal branch of Government, despite the clear teaching of the Constitution, incorrectly surmised "that the Constitution [may have] required the naming . . . of all suspects, rather than just the primary user." Ibid. In any event, if our own decisions have created confusion in the Congress, which is not surprising, nothing is gained by perpetuating that confusion in the face of Congress' clear intent to comply with this Court's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment.
In short, the Court has redrafted a statute passed by Congress to make it identical to a statutory provision found valueless by this Court a few years ago in the Berger case. This undertaking, unfortunately, is not entirely without consequence, notwithstanding the Court's refusal to approve suppression of the evidence here. Among other things, federal officers are potentially subject to a civil damages action, with compensatory damages of not less than $1,000, plus punitive damages, plus reasonable attorneys' fees. [Footnote 2/2] Nor is this federal remedy exclusive. State-provided damages remedies are not preempted. S.Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 107 (1968). Damages awards aside, the Court's opinion -- albeit in dictum -- hints that suppression may indeed be in the offing if an intentional "violation" is shown. Finally, district judges will now be put to the task, at least in some cases, of determining whether probable cause exists with respect to each person listed in the application. § 2518(3)(d). Judges may well wonder why such burdens are imposed upon them for a gain which the Court found illusory in the Berger case.
I would therefore interpret this statute to mean just what it says and no more. Wisely or not, Congress decided, consistent with Fourth Amendment strictures, to. require only the identification of "the person" whose conversations are to be intercepted. Since Congress demonstrably knew how to use other language when it so chose, I would take Congress at its word and not try to "improve" on its draftsmanship.
"(iv) That he was not the subject of such application, authorization, or extension thereof."
It is true that the proposal did not speak directly to instances, such as here, where persons arguably should have been named in the application and order, but were not. But respondents, as unnamed persons, would plainly have had a suppression remedy if the amendment had passed.
18 U.S.C. § 2520. Since a court order will necessarily reflect the officers' "violation," it is not entirely certain that reliance upon a court order will provide a sufficient defense to a civil damages action.
MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, with whom MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN joins, dissenting in part.
The Court today holds that an application for a warrant to authorize a wiretap under Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 25102520, must name all individuals who the Government has probable cause to believe are committing the offense being investigated and will be overheard. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(b)(iv). It also holds that the Government must provide sufficient information to the issuing judge to allow him to exercise the discretion provided by 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d). I fully agree with both of these holdings. The Court concludes, however, that, if the Government violates these statutory commands, it is nevertheless free to use the intercepted communications as evidence in a criminal proceeding. I cannot agree.
"the courts to pick and choose among various statutory provisions, suppressing evidence only when they determine that a provision is 'substantive,' 'central,' or 'directly and substantially' related to the congressional scheme."
in Giordano and Chavez and reaffirmed by the Court today, ante at 429 U. S. 433-434, the evidence at issue here should be suppressed.
"the fact that identification of an individual in an application for an intercept order triggers other statutory provisions. First, § 2518(1)(e) requires an intercept application to disclose all previous applications 'involving any of the same persons . . . specified in the application.' . . . Second, § 2518(8)(d) mandates that an inventory notice be served upon 'the persons named in the order or the application.'"
Ante at 429 U. S. 425 n. 14 (emphasis added).
names would affect a judge who must decide whether to issue a warrant. The Court reasons that, once the judge has concluded that the specific requirements of § 2518(3) [Footnote 3/1] have been met, the presence of additional names in the warrant application could not change his decision. Ante at 429 U. S. 435-436. Failure to provide those names is, therefore, insignificant.
The Court's reasoning is doubly flawed. First, a judge is not required to issue a warrant if the prerequisites of § 2518(3) are satisfied; he may do so. Once he determines that the § 2518(3) requirements have been met, he still must decide whether the invasion of privacy by the proposed wiretap is justified under the circumstances. [Footnote 3/2] Second, what is at issue here is more than a simple list of names. Section 2518(1)(e) requires that the Government disclose to the court the history of all prior applications to intercept the communications of anyone named in a warrant application.
It is true, as the Court notes, ante at 429 U. S. 436 n. 23, [Footnote 3/5] that there is no allegation in this case that, had the District Court been informed that the Government expected to overhear respondents Donovan, Buzzacco, and Robbins discussing illegal gambling activities, it would not have issued a warrant. But that fact is irrelevant to an analysis of the role of the naming requirement in the regulatory system established by Congress. In Giordano, the Court rejected the argument that the Attorney General's failure to authorize the application for a warrant could be disregarded because the Attorney General had later ratified the application, thus demonstrating that he would have approved it originally. 416 U.S. at 416 U. S. 523-524, n. 12. The important consideration was whether the requirement of high-level authorization was designed to play an important role, not whether it would have mattered in the particular case. The same analysis should be used here.
Thus, I conclude that the naming requirement recognized by the majority does play a "substantive role" in the system designed by Congress to limit the use of electronic surveillance. Failure to comply with that requirement, therefore, should lead to suppression on the ground that "the communication was unlawfully intercepted." 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a)(i).
The Court's discussion of the consequences of the Government's failure to comply with the notice provision of § 2518(8)(d) parallels its discussion of the naming requirement, and is similarly flawed. The Court does recognize that the notice provision was designed to assure the community that the wiretap technique is reasonably employed and that "Congress placed considerable emphasis on that aspect of the overall statutory scheme." Ante at 429 U. S. 439. But because notice occurs after the intercept is completed, and because notice is not itself "an independent restraint on resort to the wiretap procedure," the Court concludes that failure to notify does not render an interception "unlawful" under § 2518(10)(a)(i). Ante at 429 U. S. 439.
"Injunctive relief, with its attendant discovery proceedings, is not intended to be available. . . . It is expected that civil suits, if any, will instead grow out of the filing of inventories under section 2518(8)(d)."
S.Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 107 (1968). See also id. at 105.
The Court's conclusion that the notice provision is not central dismantles this carefully designed congressional structure.
The Court's opinion implies that, if the violations of Title III considered here had been intentional, the result would be different. Ante at 429 U. S. 436 n. 23, 429 U. S. 439 n. 26. This must be so, for surely this Court would not tolerate the Government's intentional disregard of duties imposed on it by Congress. I also assume that, if the Government fails to establish procedures which offer reasonable assurance that it will strictly adhere to the statutory requirements, see ante at 429 U. S. 439-440, resulting failures to comply will be recognized as intentional. There is, therefore, reason to hope that the Court's admonition that the Government should obey the law will have some effect in the future.
requirements in the statutory scheme created by Congress. I respectfully dissent from the Court's failure to do so.
"Upon such application the judge may enter an ex parte order . . . if the judge determines on the basis of the facts submitted by the applicant that -- "
The information which the applicant is required to provide to the district court by §§ 2518(1)(d)-(f) would be superfluous if the decision whether to issue a warrant depended only on the findings specified in § 2518(3).
Cf. United States v. Bellosi, 163 U.S.App.D.C. 273, 501 F.2d 833 (1974).
Thus, this case is unlike United States v. Chavez. There, the Court concluded that the misidentification of the authorizing official as an Assistant Attorney General when the Attorney General had actually authorized the warrant application could not have affected the judge's decision to issue the warrant. 416 U.S. at 416 U. S. 572.
The Court actually states only that there is no suggestion that the failure to name respondents kept from the judge information "that might have prompted the court to conclude that probable cause was lacking." As I have shown, that formulation understates the District Court's role.
See 429 U. S. infra.
For the reasons stated in Parts I and II of MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL's opinion, I respectfully dissent from Parts III and IV of the Court's opinion. I join Parts I and II of the Court's opinion.

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