Source: http://supreme.nolo.com/us/523/511/case.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 01:54:01+00:00

Document:
At petitioners' trial under 21 U. S. C. §§841 and 846 for "conspir[ing]" to "possess with intent to ... distribute [mixtures containing two] controlled substance[s]," namely, cocaine and cocaine base (i. e., "crack"), the jury was instructed that the Government must prove that the conspiracy involved measurable amounts of "cocaine or cocaine base." (Emphasis added.) The jury returned a general verdict of guilty, and the District Judge imposed sentences based on his finding that each petitioner's illegal conduct involved both cocaine and crack. Petitioners argued (for the first time) in the Seventh Circuit that their sentences were unlawful insofar as they were based upon crack, because the word "or" in the jury instruction meant that the judge must assume that the conspiracy involved only cocaine, which is treated more leniently than crack by United States Sentencing Guidelines § 2Dlo1(c). However, the court held that the judge need not assume that only cocaine was involved, pointing out that, because the Guidelines require the sentencing judge, not the jury, to determine both the kind and the amount of the drugs at issue in a drug conspiracy, the jury's belief about which drugs were involved-cocaine, crack, or both-was beside the point.
have had to determine the total amount of drugs, whether they consisted of cocaine, crack, or both, and the total amount of each-regardless of whether he believed that petitioners' crack-related conduct was part of the "offense of conviction" or "part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan." The Guidelines sentencing range--on either belief-is identical. Petitioners' statutory and constitutional claims could make a difference if they could argue that their sentences exceeded the statutory maximum for a cocaine-only conspiracy, or that their crack-related activities did not constitute part of the "same course of conduct," etc., but the record indicates that such arguments could not succeed. Their argument, made for the first time on appeal, that the judge might have made different factual findings had he known that the law required him to assume the jury had found a cocaine-only conspiracy is unpersuasive. pp. 513-516.
Steven Shobat, by appointment of the Court, 522 U. S. 993, argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Carleton K. Montgomery, David Zlotnick, Mark D. DeBofsky, by appointment of the Court, 522 U. S. 1013, Robert Handelsman, by appointment of the Court, 522 U. S. 1013, J. Michael McGuinness, by appointment of the Court, 522 U. S. 965, and Donald Sullivan, by appointment of the Court, 522 U. S. 1043.
*Jeffrey J. Pokorak, David Porter, and Kyle O'Dowd filed a brieffor the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. as amici curiae.
mixtures containing" two controlled substances, namely, "cocaine ... and cocaine base" (i. e., "crack"). App. 6. The District Judge instructed the jury that "the government must prove that the conspiracy ... involved measurable amounts of cocaine or cocaine base." App. 16 (emphasis added). The jury returned a general verdict of guilty. And the judge imposed sentences based on his finding that each petitioner's illegal conduct had involved both cocaine and crack.
Petitioners argued (for the first time) in the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit that the judge's sentences were unlawful insofar as they were based upon crack. They said that the word "or" in the judge's instruction (permitting a guilty verdict if the conspiracy involved either cocaine or crack) meant that the judge must assume that the conspiracy involved only cocaine, which drug, they added, the Sentencing Guidelines treat more leniently than crack. See United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual § 2D1.1(c) (Nov. 1994) (drug table) (USSG). The Court of Appeals, however, held that the judge need not assume that only cocaine was involved. 105 F.3d 1179 (1997). It pointed out that the Sentencing Guidelines require the sentencing judge, not the jury, to determine both the kind and the amount of the drugs at issue in a drug conspiracy. Id., at 1180. And it reasoned that the jury's belief about which drugs were involved-cocaine, crack, or both-was therefore beside the point. Id., at 1181. In light of a potential conflict among the Circuits on this question, see, e. g., United States v. Bounds, 985 F.2d 188, 194-195 (CA5 1993); United States v. Pace, 981 F.2d 1123 (CAlO 1992); United States v. Owens, 904 F.2d 411 (CA8 1990), we granted certiorari.
amount and the kind of "controlled substances" for which a defendant should be held accountable-and then to impose a sentence that varies depending upon amount and kind. See United States v. Watts, 519 U. S. 148 (1997) (per curiam) (judge may consider drug charge of which offender has been acquitted by jury in determining Guidelines sentence); Witte v. United States, 515 U. S. 389 (1995) (judge may impose higher Guidelines sentence on offender convicted of possessing marijuana based on judge's finding that offender also engaged in uncharged cocaine conspiracy). Consequently, regardless of the jury's actual, or assumed, beliefs about the conspiracy, the Guidelines nonetheless require the judge to determine whether the "controlled substances" at issue-and how much of those substances-consisted of cocaine, crack, or both. And that is what the judge did in this case.
scheme or plan." The Guidelines sentencing range-on either belief-is identical.
Of course, petitioners' statutory and constitutional claims would make a difference if it were possible to argue, say, that the sentences imposed exceeded the maximum that the statutes permit for a cocaine-only conspiracy. That is because a maximum sentence set by statute trumps a higher sentence set forth in the Guidelines. USSG § 5G1.1. But, as the Government points out, the sentences imposed here were within the statutory limits applicable to a cocaine-only conspiracy, given the quantities of that drug attributed to each petitioner. Brief for United States 15-16, and nn. 6-7; see 21 U. S. C. §§841(b)(1)-(3); App. 42-47, 72-82, 107-112, 136-141, 163-169 (cocaine attributed to each petitioner). Cf. United States v. Orozca-Prada, 732 F.2d 1076, 1083-1084 (CA2 1984) (court may not sentence defendant under statutory penalties for cocaine conspiracy when jury may have found only marijuana conspiracy). Petitioners' statutory and constitutional claims also could have made a difference had it been possible to argue that their crack-related activities did not constitute part of the "same course of conduct or common scheme or plan." Then, of course, the crack (had it not been part of the "offense of conviction") would not have been part of the sentence-related "relevant conduct" at all. But petitioners have not made this argument, and, after reviewing the record (which shows a series of interrelated drug transactions involving both cocaine and crack), we do not see how any such claim could succeed.
ment for the first time in the Court of Appeals. Thus, petitioners did not explain to the sentencing judge how their "jury-found-only-cocaine" assumption could have made a difference to the judge's own findings, nor did they explain how this assumption (given the judge's findings) should lead to greater leniency. Moreover, our own review of the record indicates that the judge's Guidelines-based factfinding, while resting upon the evidence before the jury, did not depend on any particular assumption about the type of conspiracy the jury found. Nor is there any indication that the assumption petitioners urge (a cocaine-only conspiracy) would likely have made a difference in respect to discretionary leniency.
For these reasons, we need not, and we do not, consider the merits of petitioners' statutory and constitutional claims.

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