Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=82438:56310&catid=1575&Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 01:54:46+00:00

Document:
G.R. No. 199901, October 09, 2013 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GARYZALDY GUZON, Accused-Appellant.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GARYZALDY GUZON, Accused-Appellant.
This is an appeal from the Decision1 dated June 29, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 02890, which affirmed the Decision2 dated June 15, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag City, Branch 13 in Criminal Case No. 11968-13, finding accused-appellant Garyzaldy Guzon (Guzon) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal sale of shabu.
That on or about November 22, 2005 at 3:00 o’clock in the afternoon, in the municipality of San Nicolas, province of Ilocos Norte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell one (1) heat-sealed plastic sachet of methamphetamine hydrochloride otherwise known as “shabu”, a dangerous drug, weighing 0.06 gram to a police asset of PNP San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, who posed as buyer in a buy[-]bust operation without authority to do so.
Upon arraignment, Guzon entered a plea of “not guilty.”5 After pre- trial, trial on the merits ensued.
The Initial Laboratory Report16 and Chemistry Report17 referred to in the pre-trial Order both state that the specimen, weighing 0.06 grams, that was submitted to the crime laboratory for examination contained methamphetamine hydrochloride, otherwise known as shabu.
The defense presented the testimonies of Guzon, his friend Jesus Guira, Jr. (Guira) and brother Edwin Guzon (Edwin).
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Garyzaldy Guzon GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as charged of illegal sale of shabu and is therefore sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of [P]500,000.00.
The contraband subject hereof is hereby confiscated, the same to be disposed of as the law prescribes.
Feeling aggrieved, Guzon appealed to the CA. Notwithstanding the RTC’s findings, he denied the charge against him. He also questioned the credibility of PO2 Tuzon as a witness for the prosecution and the police officers’ non-compliance with the chain of custody rule in handling the confiscated shabu.
On June 29, 2010, the CA rendered its Decision34 denying the appeal. It reasoned that Guzon’s defenses of denial and frame-up are common and could easily be fabricated; they could not prevail over the positive identification of the accused by the police officer who testified for the prosecution.
In affirming Guzon’s conviction, the CA also cited the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty by the police operatives who conducted the buy-bust operation. As to the issue of chain of custody, the CA rejected Guzon’s argument, and maintained that based on the evidence, the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated shabu were preserved.
Guzon seeks his acquittal mainly on the basis of the prosecution’s failure to establish the chain of custody of the subject drug. He argues35 that: (1) the evidence allegedly seized from Guzon could have been planted; it was not immediately marked at the place of seizure; (2) there were no photographs and physical inventory of the confiscated drug; (3) the prosecution failed to offer justification for the absence of photographs and inventory; (4) the asset who acted as the poseur-buyer was not identified; and (5) the prosecution failed to establish that the integrity of the seized item was sufficiently preserved through an unbroken chain of custody.
As Guzon correctly pointed out in his Supplemental Brief, there were several lapses in the law enforcers’ handling of the seized item which, when taken collectively, render the standards of chain of custody seriously breached. In a line of cases, the Court explained that the failure to comply with the indispensable requirement of corpus delicti happens not only when it is missing, but also where there are substantial gaps in the chain of custody of the seized drugs which raise doubts on the authenticity of the evidence presented in court.47 Upon review, the Court has determined that such lapses and doubt mar the instant case.
Here, instead of immediately marking the subject drug upon its confiscation, PO2 Tuzon marked it with his initials “EAT” only upon arrival at the police station.50 While the failure of arresting officers to mark the seized items at the place of arrest does not, by itself, impair the integrity of the chain of custody and render the confiscated items inadmissible in evidence,51 such circumstance, when taken in light of the several other lapses in the chain of custody that attend the present case, forms part of a gross, systematic, or deliberate disregard of the safeguards that are drawn by the law,52 sufficient to create reasonable doubt as to the culpability of the accused.
The Court has determined that although a physical inventory of the items seized during the buy-bust operation forms part of the case records, the buy-bust team failed to fully comply with the requirements under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 for its preparation and execution. Under the law, the inventory must be made “in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom [the] items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice, and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.” These requirements are reiterated in Section 21, IRR of R.A. No. 9165. Non-compliant with such rules, however, the Certification/Inventory of Seized/Confiscated Items53 in this case only bears the signatures of PO3 Manuel and PO2 Tuzon as apprehending officers. Although the Certification indicates the name of Guzon under the section “With Conformity”, it includes neither his signature nor of any other person who is allowed by law to witness the required inventory. There is also no proof that a copy of the inventory was received by any of the persons enumerated under the law.
Besides these deficiencies in the preparation of the inventory, no photograph of the seized item, which is also required under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, forms part of the case records.
The saving clause in Section 21, IRR of R.A. No. 9165 fails to remedy the lapses and save the prosecution’s case. We have emphasized in People v. Garcia54 that the saving clause applies only where the prosecution recognized the procedural lapses, and thereafter cited justifiable grounds.55 Failure to follow the procedure mandated under R.A. No. 9165 and its IRR must be adequately explained.56 Equally important, the prosecution must establish that the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized item are properly preserved. The prosecution failed in this regard. Taking into account the several rules and requirements that were not followed by the law enforcers, there was an evident disregard on their part of the established legal requirements. Their breach of the chain of custody rule, magnified by the prosecution’s failure to explain the deficiencies during the trial, casts doubt on whether the item claimed to have been sold by Guzon to the police asset was the same item that was brought for examination by the police crime laboratory and eventually presented in court as evidence.
One (1) piece small heat[-]sealed plastic sachet containing white crystalline granules believed to be methamphetamine hydrochloride locally known as “SHABU”, weighing more or less .01 gram including plastic material.
Clearly, the specimen submitted to the police crime laboratory weighed only 0.01 gram, even including the plastic sachet that contained the substance.
The Court is mindful of the stipulations that were entered into by the parties during the pre-trial67 to the effect that: (a) PO3 Domingo received the specimen from PO2 Tuzon and then delivered it to PSI Cayabyab; (b) PSI Cayabyab received the specimen and when she found the specimen to be shabu, she issued her initial and confirmatory reports; and (c) PSI Cayabyab and PO3 Domingo could identify the specimen and the labels appearing thereon. These bare stipulations, however, merely address the matter of the specimen’s transfer from one police officer to the next, without offering any explanation as to the specimen’s condition during the transfers, how each person made sure that the item was not tampered with or substituted, and an indication of the safeguards that were employed to prevent any tampering or substitution. Given the considerable difference between the specimen’s weight upon its seizure and its weight at the time of its examination, with the seized item’s weight being a mere 16% of the examined specimen’s weight, the determination in this case of whether the rationale for the chain of custody rule was duly satisfied necessitated a more intensive inquiry. The prosecution’s failure to do so was fatal to its case. It failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the integrity and evidentiary value of the substance claimed to be seized during the buy-bust operation was preserved. The doubt is resolved in Guzon’s favor, as the Court rules on his acquittal.
Q And Mr. Witness, when you allegedly arrived at the target place, you were at a distance far away from the alleged transaction, is it not?
A More or less twenty (20) meters, sir.
Q And that if any transaction have been (sic) transpired at that time, you did not hear it Mr. Witness?
Q And you did not also see if what was being handed at that time was shabu Mr. Witness?
We agree with the appellant’s contention that the non-presentation of Boy Lim, the alleged poseur-buyer, weakens the prosecution’s evidence. Sgt. Pascua was not privy to the conversation between Lim and the accused. He was merely watching from a distance and he only saw the actions of the two. As pointed out by the appellant, Sgt. Pascua had no personal knowledge of the transaction that transpired between Lim and the appellant. Since appellant insisted that he was forced by Lim to buy the marijuana, it was essential that Lim should have been presented to rebut accused’s testimony.
Sereno, C.J., (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, and Leonen,* JJ., concur.
* Acting member per Special Order No. 1545 (Revised) dated September 16, 2013.
1 Penned by Associate Justice Michael P. Elbinias, with Associate Justices Remedios Salazar-Fernando and Celia C. Librea-Leagogo, concurring; rollo, pp. 2-14.
2 Issued by Presiding Judge Philip G. Salvador; CA rollo, pp. 27-41.
6 TSN, February 28, 2006, pp. 3-6.
7 Id. at 5-6, 8-9.
11 TSN, February 28, 2006, p. 13.
16 CA rollo, p. 54.
18 TSN, September 18, 2006, p. 3.
21 Id. at 8, 10.
26 TSN, August 3, 2006, pp. 3-4.
29 TSN, August 15, 2006, p. 4.
31 TSN, September 7, 2006, p. 4.
36 G.R. No. 180177, April 18, 2012, 670 SCRA 148.
37 Id. at 164-165, citing People v. Obeso, 460 Phil. 625, 641 (2003).
38People v. Lorenzo, G.R. No. 184760, April 23, 2010, 619 SCRA 389, 400, citing People v. Villanueva, 536 Phil. 998, 1004 (2006).
39 G.R. No. 177320, February 22, 2012, 666 SCRA 518.
41People v. Mantalaba, G.R. No. 186227, July 20, 2011, 654 SCRA 188, 199, citing People v. Chua Uy, 384 Phil. 70, 85 (2000).
42People v. Dumaplin, G.R. No. 198051, December 10, 2012, 687 SCRA 631.
43People v. Remigio, G.R. No. 189277, December 5, 2012, 687 SCRA 336.
44People v. Umipang, G.R. No. 190321, April 25, 2012, 671 SCRA 324, 355.
45 576 Phil. 576 (2008).
47People v. Umipang, supra note 44, 355-356; People v. Relato, G.R. No. 173794, January 18, 2012, 663 SCRA 260, 270; People v. Coreche, G.R. No. 182528, August 14, 2009, 596 SCRA 350, 365.
48 G.R. No. 182528, August 14, 2009, 596 SCRA 350.
50 CA rollo, p. 29.
51People v. Umipang, supra note 44, at 351, citing Imson v. People, G.R. No. 193003, July 13, 2011, 653 SCRA 826.
53 CA rollo, p. 52.
54 G.R. No. 173480, February 25, 2009, 580 SCRA 259.
55 Id. at 272, citing People v. Sanchez, G.R. No. 175832, October 15, 2008, 569 SCRA 194.
56People v. Lorenzo, supra note 38, at 404.
66 Id. at 11, 19; emphasis ours.
68People v. Peralta, G.R. No. 173472, February 26, 2010, 613 SCRA 763, 768-769.
69People v. Nandi, G.R. No. 188905, July 13, 2010, 625 SCRA 123, 130, citing People v. Zaida Kamad, G.R. No. 174198, January 19, 2010, 610 SCRA 295, 303.
70 People v. Mendoza, G.R. No. 186387, August 31, 2011, 656 SCRA 616, 628.
71People v. Orteza, 555 Phil. 700, 706 (2007).
72 TSN, May 9, 2006, p. 9.
73 314 Phil. 231 (1995).
74 Id. at 239-240, citing People v. Polizon, G.R. No. 84917, September 18, 1992, 214 SCRA 56 and People v. Yabut, G.R. No. 82263, June 26, 1992, 210 SCRA 394.
75 G.R. No. 76547, July 30, 1990, 188 SCRA 91.
77 See People v. Orteza, supra note 71, at 709, citing People v. Uy, 392 Phil. 773, 786 (2000), People v. Ambrosio, 471 Phil. 241 (2004).

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