Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=83687:57903&catid=1587&Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 04:50:07+00:00

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MA. GRACIA HAO AND DANNY HAO, Petitioners, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
Relying on Ngo and Gracia’s assurances, Dy initially invested in State Resources the approximate amount of Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00). This initial investment earned the promised interests, leading Dy, at the urging of Gracia, to increase his investment to almost One Hundred Million Pesos (P100,000,000.00). Dy increased his investments through several checks he issued in the name of State Resources.9 In return, Gracia also issued several checks to Dy representing his earnings for his investment. Gracia issued checks in the total amount of One Hundred Fourteen Million, Two Hundred Eighty Six Thousand, Eighty Six Pesos and Fourteen Centavos (P114,286,086.14). All these checks10 were subsequently dishonored when Dy deposited them.
Dy sought the assistance of Ngo for the recovery of the amount of the dishonored checks. Ngo promised assistance, but after a few months, Dy found out that Ngo already resigned from Asiatrust Bank and could no longer be located. Hence, he confronted Gracia regarding the dishonored checks. He eventually learned that Gracia invested his money in the construction and realty business of Gracia’s husband, Danny Hao (Danny). Despite their promises to pay, the petitioners never returned Dy’s money.
On the basis of Dy’s complaint12 and supplemental affidavit,13 the public prosecutor filed an information14 for syndicated estafa against the petitioners and their six co-accused. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 03-219952 and was raffled to respondent RTC of Manila, Branch 40.
In its February 26, 2004 order, the trial court denied the petitioners’ twin motions.16 The petitioners moved for reconsideration but the trial court also denied this in its July 26, 2004 order.
Consequently, the petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the CA.
The CA affirmed the denial of the petitioners’ motion to defer arraignment and motion to lift warrant of arrest.
The petitioners submit that an examination of Dy’s affidavits shows inconsistencies in his cited factual circumstances. These inconsistencies, according to the petitioners, negate the existence of probable cause against them for the crime charged.
We note that the present petition questions the CA’s decision and resolution on the petition for certiorari the petitioners filed with that court. At the CA, the petitioners imputed grave abuse of discretion against the trial court for the denial of their twin motions to defer arraignment and to lift warrant of arrest.
This situation is similar to the procedural issue we addressed in the case of Montoya v. Transmed Manila Corporation25 where we faced the question of how to review a Rule 45 petition before us, a CA decision made under Rule 65. We clarified in this cited case the kind of review that this Court should undertake given the distinctions between the two remedies. In Rule 45, we consider the correctness of the decision made by an inferior court. In contrast, a Rule 65 review focuses on jurisdictional errors.
As in Montoya, we need to scrutinize the CA decision in the same context that the petition for certiorari it ruled upon was presented to it. Thus, we need to examine the CA decision from the prism of whether it correctly determined the presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court and not on the basis of whether the trial court’s denial of petitioners’ motions was strictly legally correct. In question form, the question to ask is: did the CA correctly determine whether the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners’ motions to defer arraignment and lift warrant of arrest?
Under the Constitution26 and the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,27 a judge is mandated to personally determine the existence of probable cause after his personal evaluation of the prosecutor’s resolution and the supporting evidence for the crime charged. These provisions command the judge to refrain from making a mindless acquiescence to the prosecutor’s findings and to conduct his own examination of the facts and circumstances presented by both parties.
Under this situation, we conclude that Judge Marquez did not arbitrarily issue the warrants of arrest against the petitioners. As stated by him, the warrants were only issued after his personal evaluation of the factual circumstances that led him to believe that there was probable cause to apprehend the petitioners for their commission of a criminal offense.
In a criminal prosecution, probable cause is determined at two stages. The first is at the executive level, where determination is made by the prosecutor during the preliminary investigation, before the filing of the criminal information. The second is at the judicial level, undertaken by the judge before the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
In the case at hand, the question before us relates to the judicial determination of probable cause. In order to properly resolve if the CA erred in affirming the trial court’s issuance of the warrants of arrest against the petitioners, it is necessary to scrutinize the crime of estafa, whether committed as a simple offense or through a syndicate.
As Dy alleged in his complaint-affidavit, Ngo and Gracia induced him to invest with State Resources and promised him a higher rate of return.32 Because of his good business relationship with Ngo and relying on Gracia’s attractive financial representations, Dy initially invested the approximate amount of P10,000,000.00.
These cited factual circumstances show the elements of estafa by means of deceit. The petitioners induced Dy to invest in State Resources promising higher returns. But unknown to Dy, what occurred was merely a ruse to secure his money to be used in Danny’s construction and realty business. The petitioners’ deceit became more blatant when they admitted in their petition that as early as August 1995, State Resources had already been dissolved.37 This admission strengthens the conclusion that the petitioners misrepresented facts regarding themselves and State Resources in order to persuade Dy to part with his money for investment with an inexistent corporation.
Thus, had it not been for the petitioners’ false representations and promises, Dy would not have placed his money in State Resources, to his damage. These allegations cannot but lead us to the conclusion that probable cause existed as basis to arrest the petitioners for the crime of estafa by means of deceit.
We now address the issue of whether estafa in this case was committed through a syndicate.
The factual circumstances of the present case show that the first and second elements of syndicated estafa are present; there is probable cause for violation of Article 315(2)(a) of the RPC against the petitioners. Moreover, in Dy’s supplemental complaint-affidavit, he alleged that the fraud perpetrated against him was committed, not only by Ngo and the petitioners, but also by the other officers and directors of State Resources. The number of the accused who allegedly participated in defrauding Dy exceeded five, thus satisfying the requirement for the existence of a syndicate.
However, the third element of the crime is patently lacking. The funds fraudulently solicited by the corporation must come from the general public. In the present case, no evidence was presented to show that aside from Dy, the petitioners, through State Resources, also sought investments from other people. Dy had no co-complainants alleging that they were also deceived to entrust their money to State Resources. The general public element was not complied with. Thus, no syndicated estafa allegedly took place, only simple estafa by means of deceit.
Despite this conclusion, we still hold that the CA did not err in affirming the trial court’s denial of the petitioners’ motion to lift warrant of arrest.
A warrant of arrest should be issued if the judge after personal evaluation of the facts and circumstances is convinced that probable cause exists that an offense was committed.
There are two kinds of determination of probable cause: executive and judicial. The executive determination of probable cause is one made during preliminary investigation. It is a function that properly pertains to the public prosecutor who is given a broad discretion to determine whether probable cause exists and to charge those whom he believes to have committed the crime as defined by law and thus should be held for trial. Otherwise stated, such official has the quasi-judicial authority to determine whether or not a criminal case must be filed in court. Whether or not that function has been correctly discharged by the public prosecutor, i.e., whether or not he has made a correct ascertainment of the existence of probable cause in a case, is a matter that the trial court itself does not and may not be compelled to pass upon.
With our conclusion that probable cause existed for the crime of simple estafa and that the petitioners have probably committed it, it follows that the issuance of the warrants of arrest against the petitioners remains to be valid and proper. To allow them to go scot-free would defeat rather than promote the purpose of a warrant of arrest, which is to put the accused in the court’s custody to avoid his flight from the clutches of justice.
Under this legal situation, only a formal amendment of the filed information under Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court46 is necessary; the warrants of arrest issued against the petitioners should not be nullified since probable cause exists for simple estafa.
Under Section 11(c), Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, an arraignment may be suspended if there is a petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor pending at either the DOJ, or the Office of the President. However, such period of suspension should not exceed sixty (60) days counted from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office.
As the petitioners alleged, they filed a petition for review with the DOJ on November 21, 2003. Since this petition had not been resolved yet, they claimed that their arraignment should be suspended indefinitely.
As the trial court found in its February 26, 2004 order, the DOJ’s delay in resolving the petitioners’ petition for review had already exceeded 60 days. Since the suspension of the petitioners’ arraignment was already beyond the period allowed by the Rules, the petitioners’ motion to suspend completely lacks any legal basis.
As a final note, we observe that the resolution of this case had long been delayed because of the petitioners’ refusal to submit to the trial court’s jurisdiction and their erroneous invocation of the Rules in their favor. As there is probable cause for the petitioners’ commission of a crime, their arrest and arraignment should now ensue so that this case may properly proceed to trial, where the merits of both the parties’ evidence and allegations may be weighed.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DENY the petition and AFFIRM WITH MODIFICATION the February 28, 2006 decision and June 13, 2008 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 86289. We hereby order that petitioners Ma. Gracia Hao and Danny Hao be charged for simple estafa under Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended and be arraigned for this charge. The warrants of arrest issued stand.
* Designated as Acting Member in lieu of Associate Justice Jose C. Mendoza, per Special Order No. 1767 dated August 27, 2014.
2 Penned by Associate Justice Amelita G. Tolentino, and concurred in by Associate Justices Portia Aliño Hormachuelos and Vicente S.E. Veloso; id. at 45-59.
7 Increasing the Penalty for Certain Forms of Swindling or Estafa.
25 G.R. No. 183329, August 27, 2009, 597 SCRA 334.
26 Article III, Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
27 Rule 112, Section 5. When warrant of arrest may issue. — (a) By the Regional Trial Court. — Within ten (10) days from the filing of the complaint or information, the judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order if the accused has already been arrested pursuant to a warrant issued by the judge who conducted the preliminary investigation or when the complaint or information was filed pursuant to section 6 of this Rule. In case of doubt on the existence of probable cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five (5) days from notice and the issue must be resolved by the court within thirty (30) days from the filing of the complaint or information.
28People v. Hon. Dela Torre-Yadao, G.R. Nos. 162144-54, November 13, 2012, 685 SCRA 264, 287.
29 People v. CA, Cerbo and Cerbo, G.R. No. 126005, January 21, 1999, 301 SCRA 475, 486.
31 RCL Feeders Pte., Ltd. v. Hon. Perez, 487 Phil. 211, 220-221 (2004).
38Galvez and Guy v. Hon. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 187919, 187979, 188030, April 25, 2012, 671 SCRA 222, 232.
39 Section 1. Any person or persons who shall commit estafa or other forms of swindling as defined in Article 315 and 316 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall be punished by life imprisonment to death if the swindling (estafa) is committed by a syndicate consisting of five or more persons formed with the intention of carrying out the unlawful or illegal act, transaction, enterprise or scheme, and the defraudation results in the misappropriation of money contributed by stockholders, or members of rural banks, cooperative, "samahang nayon(s)", or farmers association, or of funds solicited by corporations/associations from the general public.
40 People v. Balasa, 356 Phil. 362, 395-396 (1998).
41Allado v. Diokno, G.R. No. 113630, May 5, 1994, 232 SCRA 192, 199-200.
42Mendoza v. People, G.R. No. 197293, April 21, 2014.
43 G.R. No. 171188, June 19, 2009, 590 SCRA 95.
45 Ssgt. Pacoy v. Hon. Cajigal, 560 Phil. 598, 609 (2007).
46 Section 14. Amendment or substitution. — A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.
47 G.R. No. 192898, January 31, 2011, 641 SCRA 214.

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