Source: https://www.goodetrades.com/author/ajothgoldib/
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 23:53:01+00:00

Document:
On October 5th, 2017 FINRA Enforcement filed a complaint (pdf) against Glendale Securities and its employees George Alberto Castillo (CRD No. 1936486), Paul Eric Flesche (CRD No. 3277904), Albert Raymond Laubenstein (CRD No. 303462), Jose Miguel Abadin (CRD No. 1273345), and Huanwei Huang (CRD No. 3268328). On April 5th, 2019 the FINRA Office of Hearing Officers released its Extended Hearing Panel Decision (pdf) regarding the allegations. The OHO decision is a 103-page beast that took me the better part of a day to read. See my highlighted and lightly-annotated copy (pdf). At the time I publish this there is no indication on FINRA’s website that the OHO decision has been appealed. I sent an email to Glendale Securities asking about that and they have not responded yet. I will update this article if they respond or if I learn that the decision is being appealed.
Currently, FINRA BrokerCheck shows that Castillo, Flesche, Abadin, and Huang remain registered with Glendale Securities. The BrokerCheck website indicates that Laubenstein left Glendale Securities after 12/31/2016 and has not worked at any registered broker since leaving Velox Securities on 2/10/2017.
Interestingly, this whole action “arose from a 2015 cycle examination of FINRA member firm Wilson-Davis & Co., Inc. (‘Wilson-Davis’), whose customers traded some of the same securities that Glendale’s customers traded and are the subject of this Complaint” (decision, page 2; all quotes in this article are from the hearing panel decision unless otherwise noted ). I have written previously about Wilson-Davis & Co., including an April 2017 SEC fine for Reg SHO violations and a February 2018 FINRA hearing panel decision (that has been appealed to the FINRA NAC). One important note: while Glendale Securities currently clears through Wilson-Davis, it did not do so during the period of time covered by the FINRA complaint and hearing panel decision.
FINRA’s Department of Enforcement filed a six-cause Complaint against Respondents. Cause one charges Glendale Securities, Inc. (“Glendale” or the “Firm”), acting through its President and head trader George Alberto Castillo (“Castillo”), with manipulating the price of NuGene International, Inc. (“NUGN”), to benefit two Firm customers who owned the stock. For this, Glendale and Castillo are charged with violating Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”), Exchange Act Rule 10b-5 thereunder, and FINRA Rules 2020 and 2010.
Cause two charges Glendale, Paul Eric Flesche (“Flesche”), the Firm’s Chief Compliance Officer (“CCO”), andJose Miguel Abadin (“Abadin”), a registered representative and trader, with reselling unregistered or non-exempt shares of NUGN on behalf of two customers, in violation of Section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933 (“Securities Act”), which is a violation of FINRA Rule 2010. The Complaint alleges that a portion of the NUGN shares the two customers sold were bought from affiliates of the issuer and accordingly could not be re-sold within six months of acquiring them pursuant to the Securities Act and SEC Rule 144.
Cause three charges each of the Respondents with committing anti-money laundering (“AML”) violations of FINRA Rules 3310 and 2010 relating to customer deposits and liquidations of shares of NUGN and two other securities in 2015 and 2016: Broke Out, Inc. (“BRKO”) and Vitaxel Group Limited (“VXEL”). It charges Respondents with failing to establish a reasonable AML system to detect and report suspicious activities associated with Firm customers’ sales of NUGN, BRKO, and VXEL. Cause three also charges the Firm, Flesche, Laubenstein, and Huang with failing to comply with their obligations under the customer identification program (“CIP”) in connection with customers who deposited VXEL shares. Cause three further charges the Firm and Albert Raymond Laubenstein (“Laubenstein”), the Firm’s AML Compliance Officer (“AMLCO”), with AML violations for failing to establish and maintain an adequate due diligence program for customer correspondent accounts introduced to the Firm from 2007 to approximately 2011 by a bank based in Belize (“Belize Bank”). Belize Bank did not disclose the identities of approximately 18 customers who opened accounts at Glendale through the bank.
Cause four charges the Firm, Castillo, Flesche, and Laubenstein with supervisory failures in two distinct areas. It charges that Glendale, Castillo, and Flesche failed to establish and maintain a supervisory system, including written supervisory procedures (“WSPs”), reasonably designed to ensure the Firm’s compliance with Section 5 of the Securities Act for sales of unregistered, non-exempt securities. Cause four further charges the Firm, Flesche, and Laubenstein with failing to reasonably supervise Respondent Huanwei Huang’s (“Huang”) activities, specifically with respect to his Asian customers who deposited and sold BRKO and VXEL shares.
Causes five and six contain allegations only against Huang. Cause five charges Huang with improperly providing nonpublic personal information to third parties about his customers who deposited VXEL in their accounts, in violation of Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) Regulation S-P, which constitutes a violation of FINRA Rule 2010. Cause six charges Huang with communicating about VXEL with a customer and another person in Asia via a cell phone text messaging service not approved by Glendale, in violation of FINRA Rules 4511 and 2010. The Complaint charges that Huang’s use of the unapproved text messaging service prevented Glendale from being able to preserve securities-related communications among its books and records.
As set forth above, the Hearing Panel dismisses causes one and two of the Complaint because Enforcement failed to meet its burden of proof. Enforcement failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Glendale and Castillo violated Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Rule 10b-5 thereunder, and FINRA Rules 2020 and 2010 by manipulating the price of NUGN.
A majority of the Panel also finds that Enforcement failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Glendale, Flesche, and Abadin participated in the unlawful resale by customers RC and JH of NUGN shares, in violation of Section 5 of the Securities Act, which constitutes a violation of FINRA Rule 2010. These charges are therefore also dismissed.
● Censured and fined $125,000 for the AML-related violations of FINRA Rules 3310 and 2010 associated with its customers’ deposit and liquidation of NUGN, BRKO, and VXEL (Cause Three).
● Censured and fined $30,000 jointly and severally with Paul Eric Flesche for failing to reasonably supervise Huanwei Huang, in violation of FINRA Rules 3110 and 2010 (Cause Four).
● This Decision shall serve as a Letter of Caution for the failure to conduct proper due diligence on Belize Bank and its customer accounts, in violation of FINRA Rules 3310 and 2010 (Cause Three).
● Suspended from associating with any FINRA member firm in any capacity for 30 business days and fined $30,000, jointly and severally with Glendale Securities, Inc., for failing to supervise Huanwei Huang, in violation of FINRA Rules 3110 and 2010 (Cause Four).
● Suspended from associating with any FINRA member firm in any capacity for 18 months and fined $20,000 for AML-related violations of FINRA Rules 3310 and 2010 associated with the liquidations of NUGN, BRKO, and VXEL (Cause Three).
● Suspended from associating with any FINRA member firm in any capacity for 15 business days and fined $5,000 for failing to supervise Huang, in violation of FINRA Rules 3110 and 2010 (Cause Four). This suspension will run concurrently with the 18-month suspension imposed for misconduct alleged in cause three.
● For sharing customers’ nonpublic personal information with third parties in violation of Regulation S-P, which is a violation of FINRA Rule 2010, this Decision shall serve as a Letter of Caution (Cause Five).
● Suspended from associating with any FINRA member firm in any capacity for ten business days and fined $5,000 for books and records violations of FINRA Rules 4511 and 2010 associated with engaging in securities-related communications with a customer and a third party via text instead of Firm email (Cause Six).
Respondents Glendale, Flesche, Laubenstein, and Huang are ordered to pay the costs of the hearing in the amount of $22,289.23, which includes a $750 administrative fee and the cost of the hearing transcript, $21,539.38. Their responsibility to pay these costs is apportioned as follows: Glendale is ordered to pay $12,289.23; Laubenstein is ordered to pay $5,500; Flesche is ordered to pay $2,500; and Huang is ordered to pay $2,000.
suspension of ten business days shall end at the close of business on Friday, June 14, 2019. Respondent Flesche’s suspension of 30 business days shall end at the close of business on Monday, July 15, 2019.
The names of two of the three companies mentioned in the complaint should be familiar to readers of this blog because I have written about them. I wrote about the mailer promotion of Nugene (NUGN) on May 27, 2015. I also wrote about Broke Out (BRKO) after the SEC suspended trading in it on March 17, 2016.
The circumstances surrounding RC’s purchases of NUGN contained numerous red flags that should have triggered a true “searching inquiry,” as the SEC has instructed.
account solely for the purpose of liquidating its recently acquired NUGN shares. Also, relying on the transfer agent, as Respondents did, is insufficient to discharge a duty of reasonable inquiry.
deposit was reasonable at the time, JH’s and SEI’s deposits should have caused Respondents to reconsider whether RC’s deposit was part of a distribution of the issuer’s securities.
As Glendale, Castillo, and Flesche noted in their Answer, the Firm’s customers predominantly traded in low-priced securities, and accordingly they expect “virtually every one” of their customers to trigger at least one red flag. The Firm’s procedures do not reflect this view.
flags that could be indicative of an unlawful distribution of restricted securities.
I agree wholeheartedly with Hearing Officer Michael J. Dixon: in my opinion Glendale Securities’ procedures were inadequate and the numerous red flags particularly with the deposits and sales of NUGN should have called for a “searching inquiry”.
In my opinion the fine for Glendale is too small to provide a strong incentive for it to change its behavior and to motivate other brokers to do the same. Glendale was fined $125,000 individually, $30,000 jointly with Paul E. Flesche, and ordered to pay costs of $12,289.23. This is less than the firm earned from its commissions on one client’s (RC) sale of NUGN ($193,055; see decision page 27). I believe that at a minimum Glendale should have been forced to forfeit all the commissions it earned from the transactions discussed in the hearing (approximately $260,000; decision page 93).
One interesting thing I learned in researching this article is that Glendale Securities has had a few different clearing firms over the past five years. According to the FINRA BrokerCheck detailed report, Glendale Securities currently clears through Wilson-Davis & Co. and it began that clearing relationship on January 29, 2018 (see page 11). By looking at the Archive.org archived version of Glendale Securities’ website, I found that on September 17, 2013 it cleared through Apex Clearing Corp. As of November 27, 2014 it cleared through Vision Financial Services. Vision Financial changed its policies in 2015 “to prohibit clearing deposits of physical certificates of penny stocks” and Glendale then switched clearing firms again (that quote is from Vision Financial Services recent settlement with the SEC for its failures to file SARs for penny stock share deposits and liquidations). As of August 14, 2015 Glendale cleared through Electronic Transaction Clearing (ETC).
For the reader interested in how people running pump and dumps acquire and then liquidate their shares, FINRA hearing panel decisions are a gold mine of knowledge. The Glendale Securities account holder that made the most money selling Nugene (NUGN) shares is referred to as “RC” in the decision. However, RC is easily de-anonymized because of how RC is described: “RC was incorporated in Nevada on January 29, 2015” (page 22). Later, on page 36, the decision states, “Beginning in March 2015, RC sponsored a promotional campaign that touted NUGN’s cosmetic products and urged investors to buy shares of the company.” Looking back at my blog post about the pump as it was happening, and then zooming in on the disclaimer, reveals RC to be Result Corporation. As shown by the Nevada Secretary of State website, one man — Robert J. Martins — is shown to have been the sole officer of the company. The corporation’s registration was revoked in 2016.
As I wrote on my blog post about the NUGN promotion, the budget listed in the mailer was $2,287,000. The hearing panel decision states, “A disclaimer at the end of the brochure disclosed that RC had paid $4.4 million ‘to marketing vendors to cover all the costs of creating and distributing this Advertisement'” (page 37). The different budget disclosures are not contradictory: promoters will sometimes update their disclaimers during the promotion as they increase their spending.
As for the shares Results Corporation would end up selling, they were purchased on the cheap: “According to the decision, Result Corporation paid $6009 for all its shares of BLMK that then turned into NUGN” (page 23). Result Corporation “bought the shares more than a month before its incorporation in Nevada” (page 23). The decision describes Result Corporation’s sales of NUGN in an odd way, stating that it sold NUGN shares for total proceeds of over $7.3 million, but that includes sales of shares it had bought in May and June 2015 for over $2.5 million. So the net proceeds from selling the shares is better described by the amount Result Corporation wired out of its account, $4,990,595 (page 27). Subtract the $4.4 million for the promotion and the $6009 for the shares and you end up with net profits of $584,586.
However, I believe this vastly understates the total profits from the pump for multiple reasons. First, “According to Enforcement’s investigator, customers at Wilson-Davis purchased most of the NUGN shares that RC sold. Wilson-Davis customers had also deposited shares of NUGN in their accounts” (page 27). Result Corporation had started selling shares of NUGN on February 27, 2015. I did not see anyone post about receiving the NUGN mailer prior to May 15, 2015. While I am certain people received it before that date, I think it likely that the actual promotion didn’t start until at least mid-April. That would mean that whomever was buying the shares from Result Corporation could have been associated with it, in which case their trading profits would have to be counted as well. Later in the decision the accounts at Wilson-Davis are mentioned again: “Enforcement argues that many persons played a part in the manipulation of NUGN—in particular, BS, ND, RC (which paid for a promotion campaign), and persons connected to the issuer, and Wilson-Davis, which made a market in NUGN and represented the buy side of NUGN transactions on February 24, 2015” (page 62). Also, one of the other sellers of NUGN shares mentioned in the hearing panel decision, “BS”, “later transferred his remaining NUGN shares to an account at Wilson-Davis” (page 62). Plus, there are the two other sellers of NUGN that held accounts at Glendale Securities — “JH” (whose NUGN sales proceeds were $812,989) and “SEI” (whose NUGN sales proceeds were $459,467).
So after adding up the profits of the three sellers of NUGN with accounts at Glendale Securities, it looks like about $1.8 million in profits. That is not bad, but there were millions of other free-trading shares outstanding at the time of the promotion held in accounts at other brokers (including Wilson-Davis as mentioned above). A writer on SeekingAlpha estimated that there were approximately 11 million free-trading shares at the time of the Nugene stock promotion. SEI deposited 216,410 shares, JH deposited 1,360,790 shares, and Result Corporation deposited 2,899,878 shares at Glendale Securities. That leaves 6,522,922 shares in the float that could have been controlled by others acting in concert and deposited at other brokers. Assuming an average sale price of $2.50 per share those shares could have resulted in an extra $16.3 million in profits for the people who owned them. That would be an impressive return on a $4.4 million investment in stock promotion.
On March 17, 2016, three days after ECM’s last sale, the SEC announced the suspension of trading in BRKO until March 31, 2016, due to “concerns regarding the accuracy and adequacy of information in the marketplace and potentially manipulative transactions in BRKO’s common stock.” Huang informed ECM about the trading suspension. At the time of the trading halt, ECM had sold 472,782 BRKO shares and therefore still held 837,218 shares of the 1,310,000 shares he had deposited in his Glendale account. On the day of the trading suspension announcement, ECM emailed Huang asking if he would be able to resume liquidating his BRKO shares once the suspension ended or whether he needed to find another broker-dealer to sell the shares.
Huang and ECM did not communicate with each other for two months. On May 23, 2016, Huang emailed ECM, stating that Glendale had determined that ECM needed to close his account and that he could transfer his assets to another broker-dealer. Huang and Glendale never heard from ECM again. ECM effectively abandoned the BRKO shares left in the account.
This matter concerns the failure by VFM, a registered broker-dealer, to file Suspicious Activity Reports (“SAR” or “SARs”) for voluminous suspicious activity relating to the deposit and sale of low-priced securities from at least August 2013 through December 2014 (the “Relevant Period”). In late 2012, VFM expanded its business of clearing equity securities by entering into clearing arrangements with several new introducing brokers. During the Relevant Period, VFM cleared millions of shares of transactions in low-priced securities on behalf of certain customers of certain of its new introducing brokers. These trades included instances in which newly introduced customer accounts exhibited a suspicious pattern in which the customer deposited a physical certificate for a substantial amount of a thinly-traded low-priced stock, systematically sold the shares into the market shortly thereafter, and then wired out the sale proceeds from its accounts. In some instances, the same customer engaged in this pattern with respect to multiple securities.
Despite clearing these suspicious transactions and other related red flags, VFM did not file timely SARs related to relevant activities by at least 100 of these accounts when it knew, suspected, or had reason to suspect that these transactions involved the use of VFM to facilitate fraudulent activity, or had no business or apparent lawful purpose.
6. Between April 2014 and May 2014, Customer A engaged in three instances of suspicious deposit-sale-wire activity involving two different low-priced securities that generated sales proceeds of more than $1.1 million. Customer A deposited a physical certificate for 600,000 shares of a certain low-priced security (“Security A1”) and liquidated the entire amount on the same day that the deposit cleared with proceeds from the transaction wired out within three days. Customer A also deposited a physical certificate for 1,500,000 shares of a second-low priced security issuer (“Security A2”) and liquidated the entire amount by the day after the deposit cleared and wired out nearly all of the proceeds within a week of clearance. Customer A subsequently deposited a physical certificate for another 1,500,000 shares of Security A2 and systematically liquidated the entire amount within one week of the clearing date and again wired out nearly all of the proceeds within one week of liquidation. There was no other activity in this account during the Relevant Period. VFM did not file a SAR with respect any of the above-described activity in Customer A’s account.
7. Between November 2013 and April 2014, Customer B engaged in several instances of suspicious deposit-sale-wire activity, including activity in at least two different low-priced securities that generated sale proceeds of approximately $1.8 million. Customer B deposited a physical certificate for 200,000 shares of a certain low-priced security (“Security B1”) and liquidated the entire amount within two days of clearance, with nearly all of the proceeds from the transaction wired out within a week of the liquidation. Customer B subsequently deposited a physical certificate for another 200,000 shares of Security B1 and liquidated the entire amount within three days of clearance, with proceeds wired out within a week of the liquidation. Customer B then made a third deposit of 200,000 shares of Security B1, began liquidating the shares, and wired out proceeds as blocks of sales occurred.
8. Customer B also deposited a physical certificate for 160,000 shares of a different low-priced security (“Security B2”), and later deposited a second physical certificate for an additional 80,000 shares of Security B2. Customer B proceeded to systematically liquidate the deposited shares and wired out proceeds of the sales as blocks of sales occurred.
9. In October 2014, shortly after VFM received a regulatory inquiry concerning the Customer B account, VFM informed the introducing broker of the Customer B account that the account had to be transferred “out of Vision ASAP” because of negative information concerning an individual associated with the account. The account subsequently sold previously-deposited penny stock positions of more than 650,000 shares and wired out proceeds exceeding $200,000 from VFM.
10. VFM did not file a SAR with respect any of the above-described activity in Customer B’s account. The Commission later brought charges against Customer B for violations of the antifraud provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Exchange Act by engaging in market manipulation of Security B1 during the Relevant Period.
11. Between January 2014 and October 2014, Customer C engaged in several instances of suspicious deposit-sale-wire activity, including activity in at least two different low-priced securities that generated sales proceeds of more than $490,000. Customer C deposited a physical certificate for 4 million shares of a certain low-priced security (“Security C1”), and began systematically liquidating the shares and wiring out proceeds as blocks of sales occurred. The entire deposit was liquidated in less than one month from clearance. Customer C then repeated this process with the deposit of another physical certificate for 2 million shares of Security C1, and systematically liquidated the entire deposit within approximately one month of clearance while wiring out proceeds as blocks of sales occurred. Customer C also deposited a physical certificate for 100,000 shares of a different low-priced security (“Security C2”), and immediately began systematically liquidating the shares, and wired out the proceeds the day after the liquidation was complete. Customer C then deposited another physical certificate for an additional 100,000 shares of Security C2, liquidated the entire deposit on the day that it cleared, and wired out proceeds shortly thereafter. VFM did not file a SAR with respect to any of the above-described activity in Customer C’s account.
Total proceeds from these deposits and sales of penny stock shares were over $50 million.
The order states that Vision Financial “failed to timely file SARs concerning any of at least 250 instances of the deposit-sale-wire pattern and failed to file any SAR at all pertaining to 88 of these accounts.” Given 250 SARs that were not filed and a total fine of $625,000, that works out to a fine of $2,500 per SAR that should have been but was not filed.
This action is but one of many recent actions in which the SEC has fined brokers for failing to file SARs or filing inadequate SARs regarding suspecious penny stock deposits and liquidations. In September 2018 the SEC settled with COR Clearing for failing to file SARs; COR was fined $800,000 and it agreed to almost completely stop accepting new shares of penny stocks for deposit. In July 2018 the SEC settled with ICBCFS and Chardan Capital, primarily for failures to file SARs regarding suspicious deposits and liquidations of penny stock shares. ICBCFS was fined $860,000 and Chardan was fined $1,000,000. A year ago in April 2018 the SEC fined Aegis Capital $750,000 for failures to file SARs regarding deposits and liquidations of shares of penny stocks.
On March 8th, 2019 SEC Chairman Jay Clayton and SEC Director of Division of Trading and Markets gave a talk at Fordham University. A transcript of their talk was posted online. While they touched multiple topics, their comments about penny stocks may herald significant changes. I quote their remarks and give my take below.
A particular focus of mine is Rule 15c2-11. This rule was designed to ensure that broker-dealers have sufficient information to understand and evaluate securities that trade off-exchange, or “OTC”, prior to publishing a quotation and also be in a position to provide this information to investors. At the Roundtable, however, panelists noted circumstances where the current operation of this rule may result in retail investors having little or no relevant information about a company. I am concerned that these circumstances are an example of how uneven the information playing field can be for retail investors in this sector. I am particularly troubled by what I see — again said bluntly — as Rule 15c2-11 providing a significant exception to our disclosure rules for companies that (1) have not provided any recent information or (2) have conducted a reverse merger — e.g., a larger private company merging into a smaller or “shell” public company — and the post-merger company has no relevant public information available.
I have asked our Division of Trading and Markets staff to prepare promptly a recommendation to the Commission to update our rules to address these information issues, which experience tells us can be fertile ground for fraud and may be unnecessary to facilitate capital formation.
I also have a heightened level of concern for very low priced stocks known as penny stocks. These stocks, traded in the over-the-counter market, seem to have a special gravitational pull for fraudsters looking to take advantage of retail investors hoping for outsized returns. So I have also asked staff to review the sales practice requirements relating to penny stocks within Exchange Act Rule 15g-9 and the definition of “penny stock” within Exchange Act Rule 3a51-1. Again, I am sure that more can be done to help prevent fraud and manipulation in penny stocks.
See, e.g., Transcript of Roundtable on Regulatory Approaches to Combatting Retail Fraud (September 26, 2108), at 99 (Yvonne Huber, FINRA) (“I think under certain circumstances, piggyback eligibility should be taken away, such as in the reverse merger scenario, where there has been a completely different — a complete shift in the business line of a company, a complete change in ownership, a complete change in officers and directors. That’s essentially a new company and it probably doesn’t make sense in that space to allow piggybacking to continue.”), available at https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/equity-market-structure-roundtables/retail-fraud-round-roundtable-092618-transcript.pdf.
A “piggyback qualified” security is one that meets the frequency-of-quotation requirement described in SEC Rule 15c2-11(f)(3). The frequency-of-quotation test or “piggyback” exception is based on whether a broker/dealer has itself published quotations in the security in the applicable interdealer quotation system on at least 12 business days during the preceding 30 calendar days, with not more than four consecutive business days without quotations. Once this criteria has been satisfied, authorized participants may register on-line in a security. As long as the security remains piggyback qualified, any participant may quote the security without a Form 211 submission.
Basically, as long as one broker-dealer is posting quotations (making a market) in an OTC stock, all other brokers / market-makers can post quotes without having to file Form 211. The Form 211 is what is filed prior to the first broker making a market and requires a broker to essentially vouch for the company and the accuracy of its financials. Forcing companies to get a broker to vouch for them after doing a reverse merger would make it a lot harder for scammers running pump and dumps because they often will reverse-merge a private company into a public shell prior to a promotion. See Form 211 (pdf).
First, following up on Rule 15c2-11, this Rule currently requires a broker-dealer, among other things, to review certain issuer information and have a reasonable basis for believing such information is accurate in all material respects and from a reliable source, before the broker-dealer initiates quotations for an OTC security.
The Rule, however, provides an exception from the information and review requirements for continuous quotations, known as the “piggyback exception.” Once a security becomes “piggyback eligible,” it can be quoted indefinitely in an interdealer quotation system without further review by any broker-dealer, provided there is not a break in quotations of more than four successive business days.
As Chairman Clayton noted, panelists at the Roundtable identified circumstances where the current operation of the piggyback exception may result in retail investors having little or no relevant information about a company. I anticipate that the Division of Trading and Markets staff will present a recommendation to the Commission to update Rule 15c2-11 in the near future.
Finally, another potential gap in current protection for retail investors relates to transfer agents. Transfer agents who provide services to issuers of restricted and control securities generally are responsible for processing requests from selling shareholders to remove restrictive legends in connection with the intended resale of these securities by their owners. If a transfer agent improperly or inappropriately removes a legend, it could facilitate an illegal public distribution of securities that could harm investors.
This is a topic that was discussed in the Commission’s 2015 Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Concept Release on Transfer Agents, and was also the subject of a panel discussion at last year’s Roundtable. At the Roundtable, panelists discussed their current practices with respect to the removal of restrictive legends, and noted that there was an absence of specific Commission rules that govern those practices. They also identified and discussed some potential regulatory responses to fill that gap. I anticipate that the Division of Trading and Markets staff will present a recommendation to the Commission to update the transfer agent rules, including considering a rule that would specify transfer agent obligations with respect to the tracking and removal of restrictive legends.
Judging from Director Redfearn’s comments, it is likely that the SEC will also tighten the rules on transfer agents removing restrictive legends from shares. This will create another point of friction making it harder for insiders running pump and dump scams to get their shares cleared to sell.
Disclosure: I am short NHEL. Even if I weren’t short, I would still advise against the stock. I am actively looking to increase my short position.
I have traded hundreds if not thousands of pump and dumps and blogged about many of them here over the last 12 years. While big email pumps and snail mail pumps are far rarer than they were 5 years ago, the pace of boiler-room pumps does not seem to me to have decreased. See my blog posts on recent boiler room pumps from October 2018, June 2018, and November 2017.
The Shell Risk designation indicates that a company displays characteristics common to Shell Companies. This designation is made at OTC Markets’ sole and absolute discretion based on an analysis of the company’s annual financial data and may differ from issuers’ self-reported shell classifications in their own public filings.
a boiler-room as undergoing stock promotion (NHEL currently lacks that flag) or ‘caveat emptor’ (NHEL also lacks that flag). That being said, once OTCMarkets becomes aware of a boiler-room pump I believe they are more likely to give it the ‘caveat emptor’ tag than they would be to give a stock undergoing email promotion a ‘caveat emptor’ tag. In the past, boiler-room pumps have dumped right after receiving the caveat emptor tag. For example, OLMM was given the ‘caveat emptor’ tag on march 8, 2018 and the next day it gapped down from $1.34 to $1.19 and ended that day at about $0.4103. Comerton Corp (COCM) received the ‘caveat emptor’ designation from OTCMarkets on June 5th, 2018. The next day it gapped down from $0.97 to $0.91 and closed at $0.83. Two days later it closed at $0.31.
With an average daily volume of over 300,000 shares over the month NHEL has already done better than most boiler-room pumps.
Besides the ongoing boiler-room pump & dump, NHEL has more fun awaiting investors: a toxic financing deal with GHS Investment LLC (see S-1 registration statement for details). GHS will get shares for a nice 20% discount to the “lowest traded price of the Company Common Stock during the ten (10) consecutive trading days prior to the date the Drawdown Notice was submitted” (quote from S-1). Of course by the time the company can start to make use of this financing arrangement the stock will likely be 90% below where it currently trades.
I use Tradelog to track my trades for accounting and tax purposes. I have used it for probably a decade now and for the most part I have been very happy with it. However, when looking at my trades for last year I found some discrepancies in one of my accounts between the Tradelog data (which can be directly imported from the trade data statements generated by almost all brokers) and the broker’s 1099-B. But unlike most errors, which are rare and large (for example, a broker reporting the same trade twice or accounting for a share exchange in a weird way), I noticed lots of little errors — many trades were off by just a dollar or two. In the grand scheme of things the differences didn’t make a big difference (about $50 total), but I still wanted to fix the errors and understand why they were happening.
I looked at the CSV spreadsheet that I had downloaded from my broker’s website with all the 2018 trades; I had imported my trades to Tradelog directly from this CSV file. The stock prices on all the trades matched so I then looked at the commissions in the CSV file and Tradelog. There I found that on some of my trades, high ECN rebates had been larger than my commissions, leading to a negative commission on the trades. Every single trade with a negative commission was imported into Tradelog as having a positive commission with the same absolute value. So if the commission was ($1.25) then it became $1.25 in Tradelog.
This boggles my mind. I had to go back through my data file and edit around 50 different trades to correct the data (at least Tradelog does allow negative commissions although it complains each time you enter one).
I should mention that this problem is not going to affect most traders — you have to trade a lot to get a low enough commission rate that your ECN rebates can be larger than your commissions. But for those of us who do trade that much even small errors can take a lot of time to find and fix.
To fix this Tradelog should allow users the ability to allow the program to import trades with negative commissions (this could be done via a checkbox while keeping the same default behavior). Frequent traders such as myself have enough trouble with brokers often giving incorrect 1099s — we should not have to deal with accounting software that doesn’t import negative numbers.
1. During the period November 2011 through December 2015 (the “Relevant Period”), TriPoint Global Equities, LLC (“TriPoint” or the “Firm”) engaged in the penny stock business, effecting transactions for customers whose primary trading activity involved the deposit and prompt liquidation of low-priced securities (also known as “penny stocks” or “microcap stocks”). Nonetheless, throughout the Relevant Period, TriPoint, through AntiMoney Laundering (“AML”) Compliance Officer (“AMLCO”) and Chief Compliance Officer (“CCO”) Michael Boswell (“Boswell”), and Head of Trading (“Head Trader”) Andrew Kramer (“Kramer”), failed to establish and implement AML policies and procedures reasonably 3 designed to detect and report suspicious activity, including AML red flags, in connection with the Firm’s penny stock business.
2. Further, during the Relevant Period, Respondents TriPoint, Boswell, and Kramer failed to reasonably identify and address red flags of potentially suspicious activities presented by Customer EM’s deposits and liquidations of penny stocks. By virtue of this conduct, Respondents TriPoint, Boswell and Kramer violated FINRA Rules 3310(a) and 2010.
3. In addition, during the Relevant Period, TriPoint failed to comply with the registration requirements of Section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933 (the “Securities Act”) by engaging in the unlawful re-sales of approximately 16,907,900 shares of restricted securities of two penny stock issuers into the public market on behalf of Customer EM, in violation of FINRA Rule 2010.
4. Further, TriPoint failed to establish and maintain a supervisory system, including written supervisory procedures (“WSPs”), reasonably designed to achieve compliance with the registration requirements of Section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933 (the “Securities Act”) for the re-sales of restricted securities, in violation of NASD Rule 3010(a) and FINRA Rule 2010 for conduct prior to December 1, 2014 and in violation of FINRA Rule 3110(a) and FINRA Rule 2010 for conduct on or after December 1, 2014.
32. In or about March 2015, Customer EM opened an account with TriPoint. 33. At all times, TriPoint, Boswell, and Kramer were aware that Customer EM’s business was the liquidation of low-priced securities obtained through convertible note investments. By contrast to a traditional convertible debt arrangement, in which the conversion formula is fixed, the conversion ratio for Customer EM’s transactions was based on fluctuating market prices to determine the number of shares of common stock to be issued. This market price-based conversion formula protected Customer EM against price declines. However, a market pricebased conversion formula can lead to dramatic stock price reductions and corresponding negative effects on both the issuer and its shareholders. Accordingly, as the SEC has explained, these types of convertible debt financing arrangements have colloquially been referred to as “toxic” or “death spiral” convertibles.
34. Eight of the issuers whose stock was deposited and liquidated by Customer EM through TriPoint presented red flags signaling potentially suspicious activity for penny stock companies. These red flags included several that the Firm’s AML Plan (and FIN RA’s Small 11 Firm Template) identified, such as limited or no revenues, large net losses and accumulated deficits, and material changes in business lines, names, and structures. In addition, although each of the issuers was an SEC reporting company, several failed to make the appropriate SEC disclosures or were delinquent in their regulatory filings. As discussed further herein, one company’s CEO had been the subject of a California State Court Desist and Refrain order relating to re-sales of another penny stock issuer of which he was an owner. Several of the issuers also released numerous press releases around the time of Customer EM’s deposits and liquidations. Publicly available information, including the issuers’ own SEC filings and a website that published newsletters and maintained message boards focused on microcap stocks, pointed to risks surrounding several of the issuers’ securities. Customer EM’s liquidations of the penny stocks amounted to a significant percentage of the TMV of these securities. At times, Customer EM’s liquidations represented over 90° o of the TMV. This information was readily available in public filings made by the issuers to the SEC and on the interne.
Per the company’s Brokercheck report, it currently clears through FolioFN Investments Inc. The settlement does not mention TriPoint having changed clearing firms so I think it likely that it cleared through FolioFN Investments at the time of the events covered by the settlement (November 2011 through December 2015, the “Relevant Period”).
Other recent FINRA actions against brokers involved in the penny stock business include the FINRA complaint against Lek Securities in November 2018 and the FINRA fine of ICBCFS (Industrial and Commercial Bank of China Financial Services LLC) in July 2018. Recent SEC actions against brokers involved in penny stocks include settlements with ICBCFS and Chardan Capital Markets in July 2018, the SEC settlement with COR Clearing in September 2018 that forced it to stop accepting penny stock deposits, and the February 2019 lawsuit against Spartan Securities Group.
A good chunk of the money I make comes from day-trading. The most important thing when considering a day-trade is that fundamentals almost don’t matter — what matters is supply and demand for the stock. If you can identify situations where demand will drop throughout the day or supply will increase, or both, you will be able to profit from short-selling. Conversely, if you can identify decreasing supply or increasing demand, you can profit from buying.
Perhaps one of the most predictable sources of increased supply of stock is the company issuing shares through an already-existing ‘at-the-market’ offering, commonly known as an ATM. Now it is one thing to identify a situation where a company has an outstanding ATM facility and the company needs cash (as can be known by looking at the balance sheet and cash flow statement). That is certainly useful and many traders do that. But wouldn’t it be even better to spend the time to follow such situations prospectively and then identify how often and how much those ATMs were actually used?
This is what I am spending time and effort on right now: whenever I see a stock gapping up on news that I might want to short because the news isn’t really that great, I look for outstanding ATMs. Regardless of whether I trade the stock or not, I make a note to look back at the SEC filings in the future to see if the company actually did sell shares through the ATM on that and following days. By doing this I will get a better sense of how reliably companies will use their ATMs in these situations and this will help me better evaluate the risks of shorting these stocks.
The first stock I made a note to look back at was Arca Biopharma (ABIO). This makes for a perfect example because the company put out a 10-K soon after having a big spike on February 20, 2019, and the stock had very low volume prior to that spike. So let’s take a look. Below is the daily candlestick chart of ABIO for the year up until today.
Having identified the stock as worthy of interest and having an ATM on February 20th, we can now look at the filings to see if it used that ATM. On February 27nd, the company filed its 10-K for the year ended December 31st. On the first page we find this: “As of February 22, 2019, the Registrant had 18,355,111 shares of common stock outstanding.” The balance sheet lists 13,924,058 shares outstanding as of December 31st, 2018. So from January 1st to February 22nd, 201 ABIO issued 4.43 million shares, increasing the share count by 31.8%. Next we go to the section entitled “(7) Equity Financings and Warrants” — I knew to go there because I searched the document for “at the market” (if that doesn’t work search “at-the-market”. Unfortunately, that just describes the ATM usage for 2017 and 2018 — I want more recent issuance so I go to the “subsequent event(s)” section.
In January 2019, the Company amended the Sales Agreement to increase the maximum aggregate value of shares which it may issue and sell from time to time under the Sales Agreement by approximately $2.5 million, from $10.2 million to $12.7 million. Subsequent to December 31, 2018, the Company sold an aggregate of 4,431,053 shares of its Common Stock pursuant to the terms of the Sales Agreement, as amended, for aggregate gross proceeds of approximately $2.5 million. Net proceeds received in the period were approximately $2.4 million, after deducting initial expenses for executing the “at the market offering” and commissions paid to the placement agent. As of February 22, 2019, the Company has sold all shares available under its current prospectus to the Company’s registration statement on Form S-3 (No. 333-217450).
On February 20th, the stock opened at $0.90, hit a high of $0.97, and closed at the low of $0.508. Below is an intraday 5-minute candlestick chart of ABIO from that day. Note that the volume-weighted average price (VWAP) was $0.704 at the end of the day. The next day the VWAP was $0.487. So it is likely that the company sold a large number of shares over both days. The volume on February 20th was 25.94 million shares, and it was 7.14 million shares the next day. Over those two days the company likely sold 4.43 million shares, 13.4% of the total trading volume those days. It is important to look at the total trading volume like this and not just the increase in shares outstanding because if the number of shares sold by the company is small relative to the trading volume it is still possible for the stock to spike big. But here, with 13.4% of the volume being sales by the company through the ATM, that was not possible and it was all but inevitable that the stock would drop as it did.
For more on dilution, I recommend following AuspexResearch on Twitter. He is the one who got me to start looking at this stuff a couple years ago. Read a few of his Twitlonger posts.
WESTMINSTER, Colo., Feb. 20, 2019 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — ARCA biopharma, Inc. (ABIO), a biopharmaceutical company applying a precision medicine approach to developing genetically-targeted therapies for cardiovascular diseases, today announced that it has reached agreement with the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regarding a Special Protocol Assessment (SPA) on the design of a pivotal Phase 3 clinical trial, PRECISION-AF, to assess the safety and efficacy of GencaroTM (bucindolol hydrochloride) as a genetically-targeted treatment for atrial fibrillation (AF) in patients with a specific type of heart failure (HF). The target population for the planned Phase 3 clinical trial, partially identified by precision therapeutic phenotyping, currently has no FDA approved drug therapies. This SPA provides agreement that the Phase 3 protocol design, clinical endpoints, trial population and statistical analyses adequately address objectives that, if met, would support a regulatory submission seeking approval of Gencaro for the prevention of AF recurrence in a genotype-defined HF population.
The only drug therapy for AF approved against an active comparator.
The SPA process is designed to facilitate review and approval of drugs by allowing FDA to evaluate the proposed design and size of specific clinical trials that are intended to form the primary demonstration of a drug product’s efficacy and safety. FDA ultimately assesses whether the protocol design and planned analysis of the trial are acceptable to support regulatory approval of the product candidate for the indication studied. An SPA agreement can potentially reduce the regulatory risk of bringing a drug to market.
In accordance with the Company’s SPA agreement with FDA, PRECISION-AF is designed as a single, adequate and well-controlled Phase 3 clinical trial that may be sufficient to support an New Drug Application (NDA) submission for an AF indication if the objectives of the trial are achieved consistent with the requirements of the SPA. The trial is designed as a double-blind, active-controlled, multicenter, international study comparing Gencaro with Toprol-XL (metoprolol succinate) for the prevention of AF recurrence or all-cause mortality (ACM) in HFmrEF patients. HFmrEF is defined as HF with a left ventricular ejection fraction (LVEF) ≥ 40% and < 50%, which constituted approximately half of the enrolled population in the Phase 2 GENETIC-AF trial. PRECISION-AF is designed to enroll approximately 400 patients who have: HFmrEF, a recent AF event, and the genotype which responds most favorably to Gencaro. The primary endpoint of the trial will be time to first event of atrial fibrillation/atrial flutter (AF/AFL) or ACM during the 26-week Follow-up Period. In the recently completed GENETIC-AF trial, Gencaro showed a 58% treatment benefit compared to Toprol-XL in reducing AF recurrence in the HFmrEF population targeted for Phase 3 (hazard ratio = 0.42; 95% CI: 0.21, 0.86; p = 0.017). With 400 patients (200 per arm) the trial will have 90% power at a p-value of 0.01 to detect a 45% treatment benefit for Gencaro compared to Toprol-XL. Subject to securing additional financing, ARCA anticipates initiating PRECISION-AF in the fourth quarter of 2019.
An SPA is an agreement with the FDA that the proposed trial protocol design, clinical endpoints and statistical analyses are acceptable to support regulatory approval. For further information regarding the SPA process, please visit the FDA website, www.fda.gov. A SPA agreement is not a guarantee of approval, and there are no assurances that the design of, or data collected from, the planned Gencaro clinical trial (PRECISION-AF) will be adequate to obtain the requisite regulatory approvals for the marketing of Gencaro.
AF, the most common sustained cardiac arrhythmia, is a serious disorder in which the normally regular and coordinated contraction pattern of the heart’s two small upper chambers, or the atria, becomes irregular, rapid and uncoordinated. AF can cause distressing symptoms that significantly impact quality of life and can also bring potentially serious medical consequences, including increasing the risk of stroke and serious cardiovascular complications. AF is considered an epidemic cardiovascular disease and a major public health burden. In 2015, there were approximately 5.2 million patients who had been diagnosed with AF in the United States. It is estimated that AF costs the U.S. economy about $6.0 billion annually.
ARCA biopharma is dedicated to developing genetically-targeted therapies for cardiovascular diseases through a precision medicine approach to drug development. ARCA’s lead product candidate, GencaroTM (bucindolol hydrochloride), is an investigational, pharmacologically unique beta-blocker and mild vasodilator being developed for the potential treatment of atrial fibrillation in heart failure patients with mid-range ejection fraction. ARCA has identified common genetic variations that it believes predict individual patient response to Gencaro, giving it the potential to be the first genetically-targeted AF prevention treatment. The Gencaro development program has been granted Fast Track designation by FDA. ARCA is also developing AB171, a thiol-substituted isosorbide mononitrate, as a potential genetically-targeted treatment for heart failure and peripheral arterial disease (PAD). For more information, please visit www.arcabio.com.
This press release contains “forward-looking statements” for purposes of the safe harbor provided by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. These statements include, but are not limited to, potential future development plans for Gencaro, ARCA’s ability to complete any Phase 3 clinical trial, the likelihood for PRECISION-AF results to satisfy the requirements of the SPA, ARCA’s ability to raise sufficient capital to fund the PRECSION-AF trial and its other operations, the expected features and characteristics of Gencaro, including the potential for genetic variations to predict individual patient response to Gencaro, Gencaro’s potential to treat AF and/or HFmrEF, future treatment options for patients with AF and/or HFmrEF, and the potential for Gencaro to be the first genetically-targeted AF prevention treatment. Such statements are based on management’s current expectations and involve risks and uncertainties. Actual results and performance could differ materially from those projected in the forward-looking statements as a result of many factors, including, without limitation, the risks and uncertainties associated with: ARCA’s financial resources and whether they will be sufficient to meet its business objectives and operational requirements; ARCA may not be able to raise sufficient capital on acceptable terms, or at all, to continue development of Gencaro or to otherwise continue operations in the future; an FDA SPA agreement does not guarantee approval of Gencaro or any other particular outcome from regulatory review; results of earlier clinical trials may not be confirmed in future trials; the protection and market exclusivity provided by ARCA’s intellectual property; risks related to the drug discovery and the regulatory approval process; and, the impact of competitive products and technological changes. These and other factors are identified and described in more detail in ARCA’s filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission, including without limitation ARCA’s annual report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2017, and subsequent filings. ARCA disclaims any intent or obligation to update these forward-looking statements.
I have previously written about the SEC and criminal cases against Jay Fung, Anthony J. Thompson Jr., and Eric Van Nguyen for stock promotions run back in 2010 and 2011. Just last month Thompson was sentenced to 1 year in jail following his guilty plea. The SEC case continues against Thompson and on February 15, 2019 the SEC filed a motion for partial summary judgment against Thompson, using the criminal plea as evidence.
Thompson was sentenced on 1/4/2019 and it appears from the New York State court information website screen capture shown below that he is to report to jail on March 28th, 2019 (at the sentencing hearing the day for him to report to jail was given as 1/31/2019). The criminal case is 03853-2014 in Manhattan Supreme Court.
THE COURT: Ms. Fritz, your client entered into a plea agreement. Did he enter into a plea agreement in which he agreed to make a certain amount of payment within a certain amount of time?
THE COURT: Has he made one payment? Has he paid even one dollar?
THE COURT: Is your client living in a shelter?
THE COURT: Okay, I don’t accept the proposition that your client has not been able to make a single payment in the period of one year, so to the extent you are arguing he’s literally unable to make any payment I do not accept that.
He’s apparently the victim of a divorce being attacked by teams of lawyers that are being motivated by believing it was bitterness. He couldn’t get a job because he was so humiliated and harmed emotionally by what was happening, all the while again while he’s living off this trust that’s supporting his lifestyle. And again, as illuminated or as discussed in our memo, our belief that that trust was funded by proceeds of the fraud.
THE COURT: Mr. Thompson, I appreciate your words and I particularly appreciate your taking responsibility for the harm that you caused to the people who invested money in securities which were not what they purported to be and I think that it’s exceedingly important. I appreciate that because I think it’s critical for you to acknowledge that you stole money from people by your own free will. That you are a person who has been given many, many advantages that most people who come through this courthouse have not been given educationally, professionally, family-wise. You have been given tremendous opportunities and yet you and presumably your codefendants, even though I don’t know anything much about their cases, engaged in a scheme that was motivated by greed and a lack of consideration for the people who were going to be harmed by what you did.
I believed that the plea agreement you entered into was incredibly generous. I think that the plea agreements in this case were incredibly generous given the crimes that took place, which had tremendous financial consequences for many people and, as I said, were motivated by greed and a lack of consideration for what would happen to the person on the other side. I am of course sympathetic to the fact that it will be a tremendous hardship for your children if you go to jail and for you. And putting people in jail, despite my position, is my least favorite thing that I do at my job because it’s terrible for everybody’s family and every person to have to go to jail, but the fact is that you were given an incredibly reasonable, generous plea offer by the People. And there are — I understand that you’ve come upon financial hardship, but the fact that through this time there hasn’t been any effort to make any payments toward the goal to me speaks volumes about your motivation and your belief that you would get away with it.
So, I’m terribly sorry for your children that you will be absent from their lives for a period of time, however that is something that happens to anybody who commits a crime and is caught and has to answer for it. I have already told you that the — your lawyer that I will permit you to surrender yourself for sentence. The sentence of the Court on this case is going to be one year in jail on each count. The sentences will run concurrent with one another and you can let me know what’s a good date for your client to step in.
The SEC and FINRA crackdown on brokers, transfer agents, and other ‘gatekeepers’ in the microcap markets continues with a new SEC lawsuit filed February 21st, 2019 in the US District Court for the Middle District of Florida. The case is US Securities and Exchange Commission v. Spartan Securities Group, Ltd et al (8:19-cv-00448). See the docket. The very detailed complaint (pdf) can be found on CourtListener. See also the SEC litigation release for a good summary.
Spartan Securities Group Ltd is a broker and market maker (OTC market maker ID: MICA). Read their FINRA BrokerCheck report. Spartan’s sole clearing firm according to its BrokerCheck report (PDF copy) is Cor Clearing. Cor was forced to stop accepting penny stocks for deposit and sale as part of its settlement with the SEC in October 2018.
Also included as defendants of this lawsuit are Island Capital Management LLC (dba Island Stock Transfer), which is under common ownership with Spartan Securities; Carl E. Dilley; Micah J. Eldred; and David D. Lopez. Dilley, Eldred, and Lopez “were common owners of the parent of both Spartan Securities and Island Stock Transfer, and principals of both Spartan Securities and Island Stock Transfer,” according to the complaint.
3. This action involves Defendants’ roles in one or two separate fraudulent schemes from approximately December 2009 through August 2014 to manufacture at least 19 public companies for sale fundamentally premised on a deceptive public float of purportedly “free-trading” securities: 14 by Alvin Mirman and Sheldon Rose (the “Mirman/Rose Companies,” identified in paragraph 30 below) and five by Michael Daniels, Andy Fan, and Diane Harrison (the “Daniels Companies,” identified in paragraph 102 below).
4. The fraudulent schemes depended on misrepresentations and omissions to, among others, the Commission, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”), and the Depository Trust Company (“DTC”) that the Mirman/Rose and Daniels Companies were legitimate small businesses with independent management and shareholders. In reality, both the management and shareholders were nothing more than nominees for control persons who always intended merely to sell all the securities of the companies privately in bulk for their own benefit. The essential value of these securities (each bulk sale realized proceeds of hundreds of thousands of dollars) was their false designation as “free-trading” with the ability to be sold immediately on the public market. If the truth had been known to the public, the securities would have been restricted from such sales and would have had little value.
5. Dilley and Eldred knew or were reckless in not knowing from the onset that the Mirman/Rose Companies and Daniels Companies, respectively, were pursuing their stated plans under false pretenses and instead being packaged for sale as public vehicles, and that the shareholders were mere nominees for the control persons. Nonetheless, Defendants took critical steps to advance the frauds.
6. Dilley schemed with Mirman and Rose, and Eldred schemed with Daniels, Fan and Harrison, to defraud the public that the Mirman/Rose Companies and Daniels Companies were operating businesses with independent management and shareholders, rather than undisclosed “blank check” companies (sometimes referred to as “shells” or “vehicles”) for sale. In furtherance of the Mirman/Rose scheme, Dilley signed false Form 211 applications submitted to FINRA, contributed to false DTC applications, found potential shell buyers, signed an escrow agreement and false attestation letters for shell buyers, and effectuated the bulk transfer of the entire deceptive public float of Mirman/Rose Companies to shell buyers. Eldred similarly schemed with Daniels, Fan and Harrison by filing false Forms 211 with FINRA, signing false securities deposit forms and executing trades in Spartan Securities’ proprietary account, all in support of the manufacture of undisclosed public vehicles – one of which Eldred expressly proposed to acquire himself while its Form 211 was pending.
7. A necessary step in both fraudulent schemes was for the issuer’s stock to be eligible for public quotation, which requires a broker-dealer to file a Form 211 application with FINRA to demonstrate compliance with Rule 15c2-11 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”). FINRA typically raises specific concerns or seeks further information from the broker-dealer in one or more deficiency letters before clearing the application. Meanwhile, transfer agents perform a number of roles for issuers pertaining to their securities and shareholders, including recording changes of ownership, maintaining the issuer’s security holder records, canceling and issuing certificates, and resolving problems arising from lost, destroyed or stolen certificates.
8. Spartan Securities and Island Stock Transfer acted in tandem to provide these various services which were critical to the Mirman/Rose and Daniels/Fan/Harrison shell factories. For example, Spartan Securities filed the Form 211 application with FINRA in order for the securities of these 19 issuers to be publicly quoted. Spartan Securities, Dilley, and Eldred made materially false statements and omissions to FINRA regarding the purpose, management and shareholders of the Mirman/Rose Companies and Daniels Companies. Spartan Securities and its principals also had information that undermined any reasonable basis that the information required by Rule 15c2-11 was materially accurate and from a reliable source. Spartan Securities then initiated unpriced quotations for all the Mirman/Rose Companies and Daniels Companies (except PurpleReal) upon FINRA’s clearance of the Form 211.
I wrote back in April 2018 in my blog post about the criminal charges against another OTC market maker and microcap broker, Delaney Equity Group, “the fact that the forms 211 are mentioned is a big deal for OTC Markets in my opinion– this could scare off market makers from filing these forms for any sketchy company in the future.” That is even more true now and I believe that this lawsuit against Spartan Securities Group will scare all other OTC market makers into doing much more due diligence before filing forms 211. This should result in fewer fraudulent shells being listed to trade.
The SEC complaint (pdf) goes into a lot of detail of how Spartan and its principals allegedly failed to do much due diligence before filing form 211 for different shell companies. There are 14 charges against the companies and individuals that are defendants of this lawsuit, although not every charge is against every defendant. The SEC is seeking a permanent injunction against all defendants from violating securities laws, disgorgement of all alleged “ill-gotten gains”, additional “civil money penalties”, and a penny stock bar against Spartan Securities, Dilley, Eldred, and Lopez (but not Island Stock Transfer).
CLEARWATER, FL / ACCESSWIRE / February 21, 2019 / Spartan Securities Group, Ltd. (”Spartan”) and its affiliated company, Island Capital Management, LLC, doing business as Island Stock Transfer (”Island”), are disappointed in the decision by the U.S. Securities Exchange Commission (”SEC”) to file this Complaint.
Spartan, Island, and their principals vehemently deny any wrongdoing and look forward to taking this case to trial. Contrary to what is alleged and/or insinuated in the Complaint, neither Spartan nor Island (nor any of their employees) were involved in the creation or operation of any of the 19 named companies listed in the Complaint. Those 19 companies – which it is important to note represent a miniscule fraction of the thousands of legitimate issuers that Spartan and Island have worked closely with over the years – were, unbeknownst to Spartan and Island, operated by alleged fraudsters.
According to the SEC, those fraudsters went to great lengths to make everyone – including Spartan and Island, as well as the SEC itself – believe that they were real businesses with actual operations.
In fact, before Spartan or Island provided any services to any of these 19 companies, each company prepared and filed a registration statement with the SEC. In turn, each registration statement was declared effective by the SEC. The representations the companies made to the SEC in support of their respective registration statements – i.e., the representations on which the SEC relied and which it accepted – were the same those companies made to Spartan and Island, and the same ones on which Spartan and Island relied. In short, Spartan and Island – just like the SEC – were victims of the fraud that these individuals behind these 19 companies were committing, and not, as the Complaint alleges, themselves perpetrators of any fraud.
Spartan and Island appreciate all of the expressions and offers of support already provided by a multitude of our friends and colleagues, including law firms, other financial institutions and issuer clients alike. We have always strived to create and maintain a stellar reputation for service in our industry, and will continue to do so.
Spartan and Island wish to reassure their clients that this litigation will not affect the services our 500+ issuer clients have come to expect and our services will continue with the same great staff that our clients have come to appreciate.
The complaint also mentions people who were allegedly involved in the creation and sale of the shell companies that are at issue in this lawsuit. Some of them have previously been sued by the SEC for the actions at the heart of the complaint, as listed in the quote below.
18. Alvin Mirman, of Sarasota, Florida, was the undisclosed control person of Changing Technologies, Inc. (“Changing Technologies”) and an undisclosed control person, along with Rose, of On the Move Systems Corp. (“On the Move”), Rainbow Coral Corp. (“Rainbow Coral”), First Titan Corp. (“First Titan”), Neutra Corp. (“Neutra”), Aristocrat Group Corp. (“Aristocrat”), First Social Networx Corp. (“First Social”), Global Group Enterprises Corp. (“Global Group”), E-Waste Corp. (“E-Waste”) and First Independence Corp. (“First Independence”). Mirman was a defendant in SEC v. McKelvey et al., Case No. 15-cv80496 (S.D. Fla. 2015), in which the Court entered, by consent, a judgment of permanent injunction, officer and director bar and penny stock bar against Mirman. On August 19, 2016, Mirman pled guilty to a one-count Information charging him with conspiracy to commit securities fraud. U.S. v. Mirman et al., Case No. 16-cr-20572 (S.D. Fla.). Both the Commission and criminal actions included his misconduct in connection with the Mirman/Rose Companies. In 2007, without admitting or denying wrongdoing, Mirman consented to being barred by FINRA from association with any FINRA member.
19. Sheldon Rose, of Sarasota, Florida, was the undisclosed control person of Kids Germ Defense Corp. (“Kids Germ”), Obscene Jeans Corp. (“Obscene Jeans”), Envoy Group Corp. (“Envoy”) and First Xeris Corp. (“First Xeris”) and an undisclosed control person, along with Mirman, of On the Move, Rainbow Coral, First Titan, Neutra, Aristocrat, First Social, Global Group, E-Waste and First Independence. The Commission entered, by consent, a cease-and-desist order, officer and director bar and penny stock bar against Rose. In re Sheldon Rose et al., Exch. Act Rel. No. 78894 (Sept. 21, 2016). The Commission later ordered Rose to pay disgorgement and prejudgment interest in the amount of $2,973,916.18. In re Sheldon Rose, Exch. Act Rel. No. 80301 (Mar. 23, 2017). On November 9, 2016, Rose pled guilty to a one-count Information charging him with conspiracy to commit securities fraud. U.S. v. Kass et al., Case No. 16-cr-20706 (S.D. Fla.). Both the Commission and criminal actions included his misconduct in connection with the Mirman/Rose Companies.
20. Michael Daniels, of Palmetto, Florida, was the undisclosed control person of Dinello Restaurant Ventures, Inc., n/k/a AF Ocean Investment Management Co. (“Dinello/AF Ocean”), President, Chief Executive Officer, Chief Financial Officer, Treasurer and Chairman of the Board of Court Document Services, Inc., n/k/a ChinAmerica Andy Movie Entertainment Media Co. (“Court/ChinAmerica”), Principal Executive Officer, Secretary, Treasurer, Chairman of the Board and Chief Financial Officer of Quality Wallbeds, Inc., n/k/a Sichuan Leaders Petrochemical Co. (“Wallbeds/Sichuan”), Secretary, Chief Financial Officer, Treasurer, Director, and Chairman of the Board of Top to Bottom Pressure Washing, Inc., n/k/a Ibex Advanced Mortgage Technology Co. (“TTB/Ibex”), and undisclosed control person of PurpleReal.com Corp. (“PurpleReal”). On April 25, 2018, the Commission filed a Complaint against Daniels related to his conduct in connection with the Daniels Companies. SEC v. Harrison, et al., No. 8:18-cv-01003 (M.D. Fla.).
21. Diane Harrison, of Palmetto, Florida, was the Chief Financial Officer, Secretary, Treasurer and Director of Dinello/AF Ocean, Treasurer, Principal Accounting Officer and Director of Wallbeds/Sichuan, Director and Secretary of TTB/Ibex, and President, Director, and Chairman of the Board of PurpleReal. Harrison, an attorney, is the owner of the law firm Harrison Law, PA, which is based in Florida. Harrison, who is Daniels’ wife, is a defendant in the SEC v. Harrison case based on her conduct with respect to the Mirman/Rose Companies and the Daniels Companies.
22. Andy Fan, of Las Vegas, Nevada, was the President, Treasurer, Chief Executive Officer, Chief Financial Officer and Director of Dinello/AF Ocean and Court/ChinAmerica, and was the President and Director of Wallbeds/Sichuan and TTB/Ibex. The Commission entered, by consent, a cease-and-desist order, officer and director bar and penny stock bar against Fan, and ordered him to pay a civil money penalty of $140,000. In re Andy Z. Fan, Securities Act Rel. No. 10487 (Apr. 25, 2018). The Commission’s action related to Fan’s conduct with respect to certain of the Daniels Companies.
For a good overview of previous shell factory lawsuits by the SEC and criminal prosecutions of the same actions, see this article by the excellent pseudonymous penny stock researcher nodummy. That article lists all the companies and individuals involved.
I previously wrote about at least one of the companies involved in this case, Aristocrat Group (ASCC).
2019-2-22: Updated to include Spartan Securities Group press release and my opinion thereof.
2019-3-7: Typo corrected (“Thee” changed to “There”).
2019-3-24: Paragraph on my opinion of the strength of the case against Spartan deleted.

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