Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&amp;view=article&amp;id=50092:gr-147961-2007&amp;catid=1496&amp;Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 12:23:49+00:00

Document:
G.R. No. 147961 - FOREVER SECURITY & GENERAL SERVICES v. ROMEO FLORES, ET AL.
FOREVER SECURITY & GENERAL SERVICES, Petitioner, v. ROMEO FLORES and LOPE RALLAMA, Respondents.
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 58253 dated December 11, 2000 and the Resolution2 dated April 24, 2001 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Romeo D. Flores and Lope A. Rallama were employed as security officers of Forever Security and General Services (Forever Security) in 1990 and 1988, respectively. As security officers, they worked for twelve (12) hours everyday including Sundays and holidays. On February 15, 1993, Forever Security dismissed Flores and Rallama on the ground that they abandoned their posts, duties and responsibilities as security guards.3 Hence, they filed Complaints4 for Illegal Dismissal with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), against Forever Security and/or its Executive Vice President Antonio Garin. The case was docketed as NLRC NCR Case No. 00-04-2813-93.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that the dismissal of complainants ROMEO D. FLORES and LOPE A. RALLAMA was illegal and unjustified and ordering respondents FOREVER SECURITY AND GEN. SERVICES, INC. and ANTONIO GARIN to reinstate them to their former positions without loss of seniority rights and other privileges.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is DENIED for lack of merit.
Forthwith, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration34 which was denied in a Resolution35 dated April 24, 2001.
A. FOR NOT HOLDING VALID AND LEGAL THE DISMISSAL OF RESPONDENTS FLORES AND RALLAMA ON THE GROUND OF ABANDONMENT.
B. FOR HOLDING THAT THE ORDER DATED OCTOBER 24, 1995 WAS DULY RECEIVED BY PETITIONER'S COUNSEL, ATTY. MA. CLEOFE JAIME IN THE ORDINARY COURSE OF THE MAIL APPLYING THE PRESUMPTION UNDER RULE 131, SECTION 5 (v), AND FOR HOLDING THE PETITIONER TO HAVE FAILED TO OVERCOME SUCH PRESUMPTION BY SATISFACTORY PROOF.
C. FOR HOLDING FINAL AND EXECUTORY THE DECISION DATED SEPTEMBER 16, 1994 OF LABOR ARBITER ERNESTO DINOPOL.
The petition is without merit on both the procedural and substantive issues.
At the outset, this Court would like to point out that the present case at bench had long become final and executory for failure of petitioner to comply with procedural rules on perfection of appeals to the NLRC.
Article 223. Appeal. - Decisions, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such decisions, awards, or orders. x x x.
SEC 1. Periods of Appeal. - Decisions, awards or orders of the Labor Arbiter and the POEA Administrator shall be final and executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such decisions, awards or orders of the Labor Arbiter x x x.
SEC. 6. Bond. - In case the decision of a Labor Arbiter, POEA Administrator and Regional Director or his duly authorized hearing officer involves a monetary award, an appeal by the employer shall be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Commission or the Supreme Court in an amount equivalent to the monetary award.
As clearly explained by the NLRC, petitioner filed its appeal and paid the appeal fee on April 27, 1995. Instead of posting a cash or surety bond, it filed a motion for extension of time to file appeal or surety bond. Petitioner asked that it be given until May 27, 1995 within which to post the bond. Apparently, petitioner did not make good its promise on the specified date. At the time of the issuance of the NLRC Resolution dated July 31, 1995 dismissing the appeal, no bond was posted. Records reveal that it was only in 1999 when the petitioner posted the bond, long after the finality of the Labor Arbiter's decision.
Indeed, the Court, in a number of cases, has applied substantial compliance of the rules and allowed the appeal to proceed despite the failure of the petitioner company to post the full amount of the bond.
In Rosewood Processing, Inc. v. NLRC,43 the Court considered petitioner's motion to reduce bond as substantial compliance to the procedural requirement of posting of bond. In that case, petitioner filed, together with its memorandum on appeal and notice of appeal, a motion to reduce the appeal bond accompanied by a surety bond for fifty thousand pesos issued by Prudential Guarantee and Assurance, Inc. The rule on substantial compliance was applied because of the willingness to post the bond as well as the clear merits which appeared in the appeal from the labor arbiter's Decision.
In Your Bus Lines v. NLRC,44 this Court excused the appellant for its failure to post the bond because it relied on the notice of the decision which, while stating the requirements for perfecting an appeal, did not mention that a bond must be filed.
Also, in Blancaflor v. NLRC,45 it was noted that the failure of the appellant to post a bond was in part due to the failure of the Labor Arbiter to state the exact amount of back wages and separation pay due; thus, no basis existed for the computation of the amount of the bond to be filed.
Further, in UERM-Memorial Medical Center v. NLRC,46 the appellant-employer was allowed to post a property bond in lieu of a cash or surety bond. In that case, the judgment involved more than P17M and its precipitate execution could adversely affect the existence of the employer medical center. It also appeared that the real property bond was worth more than P102M, hence, the posting of a real property bond was sufficient compliance with the requirements of Art. 223.
In the instant case, petitioner has not by any overt act shown substantial compliance or exhibited intent to comply therewith in view of its absolute failure to post a bond during the pendency of the appeal. There is likewise no satisfactory showing of the existence of meritorious grounds, allowed by law and jurisprudence to justify a departure from the effect of non-compliance. Therefore, guided by the above doctrines, the Court is left with no alternative but to state that the failure of petitioner to post the requisite appeal bond resulted in the non-perfection of its appeal, and consequently, the finality of the Labor Arbiter's decision.
Considering the foregoing, the issues raised by petitioner deserve scant consideration. However, if only to satisfy petitioner and erase doubts on the validity of the Labor Arbiter's decision, the Court will deal with the issues raised herein.
The acting postmaster of the Makati Post Office certified that the registered mail was sent to the address of petitioner's counsel and was accordingly received in said office. Said certification was based on the registry receipt and the record of the post office duly accomplished in the ordinary course of business. The postmaster certified not only as to the sending of the registered mail but also as to the name of the carrier of the mail; the receipt thereof by the recipient at the correct address; and the name of the person who received it.48 Notwithstanding the certification, petitioner merely offered an allegation of non-receipt. It is a legal presumption, based on wisdom and experience, that official duty has been regularly performed; that the proceedings of a judicial (and quasi-judicial) tribunal are regular and valid, and that judicial (quasi-judicial) acts and duties have been and will be duly and properly performed.49 The burden of proving the irregularity in official conduct, if any, is on the part of petitioner who in this case clearly failed to discharge the same. Considering the sufficiency of the postmaster's certification, the CA did not err in applying the presumption of receipt in the ordinary course of mail.
Now, on the validity of respondents' dismissal on the ground of abandonment.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated December 11, 2000 and its Resolution dated April 24, 2001 are AFFIRMED.
4 Records, pp. 20-22, 23-29.
11 Id. at 36-38, 39-47.
39 Promulgated on August 31, 1990, the Rules applicable at that time.
40 Stolt-Nielsen Marine Services, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 147623, December 13, 2005, 477 SCRA 516; Philippine Scout Veterans Security and Investigation Agency v. Pascua, G.R. No. 154002, August 19, 2005, 467 SCRA 441; Ong v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 152494, September 22, 2004, 438 SCRA 668.
41 Stolt-Nielsen Marine Services, Inc. v. NLRC, supra.
42 Balagtas Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 159268, October 27, 2006.
43 352 Phil. 1013 (1998).
44 G.R. No. 93381, September 28, 1990, 190 SCRA 160.
45 G.R. No. 101013, February 2, 1993, 218 SCRA 366.
46 336 Phil. 66 (1997).
47 Ciudad Fernandina v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 166594, July 20, 2006, 495 SCRA 807.
49 Masagana Concrete Products v. NLRC, 372 Phil. 459 (1999).
50 Remington Industrial Sales Crporation v. Castaneda, G.R. NOS. 169295-96, November 20, 2006.
51 Victory Liner, Inc. v. Race, G.R. No. 164820, March 28, 2007; Remington Industrial Sales Corporation v. Castaneda, Id.; Micro Sales Operation Network v. NLRC, G.R. No. 155279, October 11, 2005, 472 SCRA 328.

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