Source: http://vealelaw.com/category/spoliation-of-evidence/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 03:58:43+00:00

Document:
Spoliation of evidence in the context of an ICBC injury claim refers to the destruction, mutilation, alteration, or concealment of any evidence.
In Alsaeedi v. Lally, the Plaintiff was a pedestrian who alleged she was injured when struck by the Defendant as she walked in the crosswalk. The Defendant denied hitting the Plaintiff, claiming that she fell while running outside the crosswalk. The Plaintiff brought an ICBC claim for damages for pain and suffering, as well as various other types of damages, however the Court heard the liability component of the claim in advance of the trial on damages. The Court would eventually rule that the Defendant was not negligent. At the scene of the accident, the Plaintiff had gathered several business cards from witnesses, however the Plaintiff would be the only witness to testify during her case. ICBC’S lawyer had also raised the issue of spoliation of evidence, maintaining that the Plaintiff had destroyed, lost, or concealed evidence related to the claim made against the Defendant, with such evidence being the business cards collected at the time of the accident by the Plaintiff. However, the Plaintiff never called any of these witnesses to testify on her behalf. The Court ruled that it was not necessary to address the issue of spoliation of evidence, as one of the people whose business card was collected by the Plaintiff did in fact testify, but for the Defendant.
 The issue of spoliation raised by the defence was discussed in the Supreme Court of Canada in St. Louis v. The Queen 1896 CanLII 65 (SCC), 1896, 25 SCR 649 and stands for the proposition that spoliation raises a rebuttable evidentiary presumption that misplaced or destroyed evidence would have been unfavourable evidence to the spoliator’s case, ie. in this case, the plaintiff. The defence also referred the court to decisions of British Columbia courts on the issue of spoliation which have accepted the principle of a rebuttable presumption but conflict as to whether the presumption is triggered automatically if evidence is lost or destroyed or whether the other party must establish additional elements or evidence supporting the loss or destruction of the evidence.
 In this case, it is uncontroverted that the defendant did obtain a business card at the scene of the accident from Mr. Bennett, that Mr. Bennett was interviewed in connection with this incident by Mr. Cringle, who believed he had been retained by plaintiff’s counsel regarding an accident at the intersection in question in this case. Mr. Bennett was served with a subpoena by the defence and his evidence relating to the incident has been accepted by me and was contrary to the interests of the plaintiff. As a result, it is not necessary for me to analyze the facts and law relating to spoliation since one of the witnesses whose evidence the plaintiff may have attempted to exclude has in fact testified.
In Chow-Hidasi v. Hidasi, a husband and wife were traveling in the same vehicle, with the husband driving. The husband, going at a high rate of speed, lost control of the vehicle, eventually striking a meridian. The Plaintiff wife was injured, and consequently brought an ICBC claim for damages for pain and suffering. At trial, the Plaintiff’s claim was dismissed, as the Court found no negligence on the part of the Defendant, and that mechanical failure may have contributed to the single vehicle accident. An issue arose as to the destruction of the car before it could be inspected for a mechanical failure. The Plaintiff submitted that the car was prematurely destroyed and, as such, an adverse inference should be drawn by the Court that no mechanical failure took place. The Court of Appeal, in a 2-1 ruling, dismissed the Plaintiff’s appeal. The Court also discussed the law of spoliation of evidence.
 Finally, I turn to the plaintiff’s argument that ICBC’s (apparent) destruction of the Jeep “effectively destroyed” her ability to challenge the theory of mechanical failure, and that the court below should therefore have inferred that an examination of the vehicle would have shown no mechanical failure. The plaintiff makes this argument on the basis of the Court’s inherent jurisdiction to ensure the fairness of the trial process. She also says the trial judge erred in failing to recognize that ICBC, rather than the plaintiff personally, was the “real party in interest”, such that the vehicle was destroyed by a person who was in effect the defendant in this litigation.
 On the present state of the law, it is clear that spoliation requires intentional conduct: see St. Louis v. Canada (1896), 25 S.C.R. 649; McDougall v. Black & Decker Canada Inc., 2008 ABCA 353 at para. 29; Endean v. Canadian Red Cross Society (1998) 157 D.L.R. (4th) 465 (B.C.C.A.); Dawes v. Jajcaj, 1999 BCCA 237 at para. 68; and the discussion in Holland v. Marshall, 2008 BCCA 468 at paras. 70-2. (I understand ‘intentional’ to mean ‘with the knowledge that the evidence would be required for litigation purposes’.) As stated in McDougall v. Black & Decker, “When the destruction is not intentional, it is not possible to draw the inference that the evidence would tell against the person who has destroyed it.” (Para. 24).
 In my view, neither the state of the law nor the evidence as presented in this case could support the drawing of an adverse inference that an examination would have shown no mechanical failure in the brakes or steering wheel of the Jeep. Like all litigants, the plaintiff was required to prove her case on the evidence available to her at the time of trial. I would therefore dismiss this ground of appeal.

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