Source: http://www.mcspotlight.org/case/trial/verdict/wolfson2.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 22:21:34+00:00

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In 1991, McDonald's sued two pro se defendants in England for defamation in relation to, among other things, allegations that McDonald's was culpably responsible for cruel common farming practices. The case took seven years and the appeals still continue. Though McDonald's spent over $16 million on legal representation and had significant legal advantages, it lost major portions of the case, including the issue of animal cruelty. Mr. Wolfson discusses the background and holding of "McLibel" in relation to cruel common farming practices, its unique legal context, and the impact of the holding on animal law in general and state anti-cruelty laws in the United States. In addition, he explores the contradiction that McLibel exposes: the fact that a common farming practice can be found to be cruel in the view of a reasonable person while legal pursuant to an anti-cruelty statute.
The dispute began when a small volunteer organization produced and distributed approximately two thousand pamphlets (consisting of six sides of paper) criticizing McDonald's practices.3 The pamphlet accused McDonald's (and other fast food chains such as Wendy's and KFC) of a variety of horrors, including: exploitation of its workers, manipulation of the minds of children, destruction of the rainforest, production of unhealthful food, and cruelty towards animals.4 McDonald's decided to investigate the organization. Following the investigation, it issued writs for defamation against five individuals from the group, claiming the allegations in the pamphlet were untrue and irreparably harmed its reputation.5 Two of the individuals refused to withdraw the allegations and proceeded to represent themselves for over seven years against the best legal minds money could buy.
On March 31, 1999, the English Appeal Court reversed Mr. Justice Bell on several issues where he had ruled for McDonald's; 12 for example, the court held the defendants were justified in asserting that McDonald's regular customers face a very real risk of heart disease from the diet of high-fat foods.13 The Appeal Court did not dispute the findings of the lower court that McDonald's did not appeal, including Mr. Justice Bell's determination that the defendants were correct when they stated McDonald's was responsible for the large scale mistreatment of certain animals raised for food or food production.
This determination is the subject of this article. How did Mr. Justice Bell reach this finding? What are the consequences of such a judgment? In order to answer these questions, this article provides a brief factual and legal background of McLibel. Next, this article discusses the unique legal context of McLibel in relation to animal law in general. Finally, the holding of the case is examined and certain conclusions are drawn.
Perhaps the most important aspect of the McLibel decision is the contradiction Mr. Justice Bell exposed: many common farming practices in the United States and the United Kingdom are held to be cruel and yet, at the same time, these practices continue because they do not fall within the statutory definition of cruelty. Strangely, laws relating to the cruel treatment of farm animals do not prohibit such animals from being treated in a cruel manner. Cruel practices are specifically allowed that would be illegal if practiced on domestic companion animals.16 Is this ethically and legally consistent?
McDonald's is the largest single user of beef in the world. Its customers consume beef from approximately six percent of the world's cattle and eight percent of British cattle.27 McDonald's is the first or second largest user of chickens in the world (80-120 million a year in America).28 In Britain alone, McDonald's customers consume approximately 180,000 pigs, 332,000 cattle, and over eight million chickens annually.29 In terms of animals raised for food or food production, it is hard to imagine more relevant figures.
Ultimately, however, Steel and Morris were outgunned and overextended. They had the burden of proof, were without the constitutional protections provided in the United States, and had lost their right to a jury in a case where a jury could have been highly sympathetic. As if this was not enough, Steel and Morris were faced with a mass of materials to review without having any legal experience. They had no knowledge of court procedure or how to direct an examination of a witness. They had no money to pay for witnesses or assistants. Although the "McLibel Support Campaign" raised about $48,000 over six years, McDonald's spent that much on legal assistance in just one week.67 Defending themselves took unbelievable amounts of time, resulting in significant stress in their personal lives, leaving little time for anything else.
Finally, Mr. Justice Bell made it clear he was wary of any attempt to evaluate the experiences of animals to determine whether or not they suffered. He noted, "there is a natural tendency to see the experience of animals in human terms which might be quite misleading."73 Furthermore, he believed it was extremely difficult to judge the extent to which an animal feels pain or stress as a result of limitation of movement, the anticipation of events, the recollection of painful events, and the deprivation of normal behavior, particularly if the animal has never experienced anything different and is unaware of a choice.74 Consequently, the defendants had the burden "to prove the balance of probabilities that a practice is cruel . . . more than it has in other parts of the case." 75 This burden was significant given the difficulty in proving the subjective experiences of animals. In fact, throughout the trial, the defendants argued that because such matters were subjective, the opinions in the pamphlet relating to animal cruelty were honest comments. As such, they would not be defamatory statements. This position was rejected by the court.
Given all of these constraints, it is remarkable that Steel and Morris achieved a positive judgment. That Mr. Justice Bell found so many common farming practices cruel, and McDonald's responsible for such practices, reinforces and validates the ultimate judgment. Even under one-sided circumstances, McDonald's was unable to show such practices were not cruel.
McLibel's unique legal posture allowed the court to rule on issues relating to the treatment of farm animals that rarely, if ever, are subject to judicial scrutiny. Historically, courts determine whether a common farming practice is cruel solely in the context of the application and interpretation of criminal anti-cruelty statutes. McLibel, however, was founded in the civil tort of defamation. No court had ever examined the cruel treatment of farm animals in this legal context.
The legal posture of McLibel allowed a simple question to be posed to the court that had never before been addressed. In a typical prosecution for cruelty in relation to a common farming practice, the court must determine whether the particular practice violates the statutory definition of cruelty. By contrast, in McLibel, Mr. Justice Bell was asked to determine whether, according to a reasonable person, a common farming practice was cruel. As McLibel demonstrates, the answers to these two questions are not necessarily the same.
In addition, because McLibel was grounded in the tort of defamation, the court was able to examine evidence and rule on farming practices that would normally not reach the court. The legal posture of defamation allowed the defendants to avoid the multiple hurdles, obstacles, and barriers that face anyone who argues a cruel common farming practice violates a criminal anti-cruelty statute.
Similarly, if the prosecution was initiated in one of thirty states that exempt some (or in the case of twenty-five of these states, all) "customary" or "normal" farming practices from the legal definition of animal cruelty within that state, the court would dismiss the prosecution since the battery cage is a customary or normal farming practice.78 If the prosecution was initiated in one of the remaining states where anti-cruelty statutes generally forbid "unnecessary" or "unjustifiable" cruelty, the judge might dismiss the prosecution if she determined the battery cage was "necessary" or "justifiable" as a matter of law. If the prosecution were to come in front of a jury, it would most likely be comprised of individuals from a farming district. The jury would be required to find that the use of the battery cage, a staple of the modern intensive farming process, fell within the definition of cruelty set forth by the statute before the individual could be found guilty of a criminal offense.
McLibel, however, avoided all of these legal obstacles because the legal context was the civil tort of defamation. McDonald's claimed it had been defamed when Steel and Morris asserted that many common farming practices, including the battery cage, were cruel and that McDonald's was responsible for such cruelty.85 McDonald's argued such statements were untrue and defamatory because they lowered McDonald's in the estimation of right thinking members of society or affected McDonald's adversely in the estimation of reasonable people.86 If these statements were true, however, the defendants had an absolute defense to the tort of defamation. Consequently, it was necessary for Mr. Justice Bell to examine and evaluate a host of evidence to determine whether the battery cage and other common farming practices were cruel. Due to the unique nature of McLibel, the case presented a legal first. To determine the validity of the defamation defense, the court did not have to determine whether a common farming practice fell within the statutory definition of cruelty, but whether these practices were cruel in the view of a reasonable person. In addition, the defendants had to prove their case on the balance of probabilities rather than beyond a reasonable doubt.
If Steel and Morris had made the same statements in the United States, McDonald's would probably not have initiated the lawsuit. As discussed above, in England, the law presumes defamatory statements are false until the contrary is proven by the defendant; whereas, in the United States, the plaintiff has the burden of proving the defamatory statements are false.87 McDonald's, in all likelihood, would have been unwilling to assume this burden. More importantly, in the United States, the First Amendment to the Constitution would have provided Steel and Morris free speech protection. Since McDonald's is a "public figure," Steel and Morris could have asserted the defense that they believed their statements were true at the time they were made.88 Steel and Morris would almost certainly have prevailed on this defense.
These were not the facts, however. Steel and Morris were English and the statements were made in England. Therefore, McDonald's presumed the law to be in its favor. As a result, a single judge was presented with a massive amount of evidence relating to common farming practices. He was asked to determine whether such practices were cruel in the context of defamation; not whether they were illegal. It took a fact pattern this unusual and two unbelievably courageous individuals to place these issues before a court.
McDonald's asserted these statements were untrue and defamatory.
At the outset, Mr. Justice Bell recognized that McDonald's could be held culpably responsible for the acts of some of its suppliers.120 This was a limited conclusion because Mr. Justice Bell would not accept the defendants' proposition that "since [McDonald's is a] large, powerful and wealthy corporation [it] must be able, if [it chooses], to check, monitor and govern practices relating to the rearing and slaughter of animals for [its] food products" and, therefore, should be held culpably responsible for the acts of all of its suppliers.121 He did, however, hold it was proven that McDonald's was capable of using its considerable influence to prohibit practices by its immediate suppliers of meat and eggs that are carefully chosen and designated (in the case of chickens in the United Kingdom and the United States). Additionally, McDonald's could influence a limited number of rearing and slaughtering sub-suppliers whom the immediate supplier could reasonably supervise and whose practices could be modified by McDonald's insistence (in the case of McDonald's pig suppliers in the United Kingdom).122 Consequently, McDonald's could prevent the cruel treatment of animals by insisting these suppliers not engage in cruel farming practices. For example, if the battery cage was determined to be cruel, McDonald's could demand these suppliers not use the device.
To determine whether the allegations in the pamphlet were proven, the court had to define what constituted "cruelty." The question was not a simple one and Mr. Justice Bell struggled between the conflicting "agribusiness" and "animal protection advocate" viewpoints. Considering its potential impact on the entire livestock industry, Mr. Justice Bell's discussion of this subject has important legal ramifications in both the United Kingdom and the United States.
Finally, McDonald's argued a practice is cruel when it contravenes government or other official guidelines, recommendations, or codes; any practice which complies with these is not cruel.136 Mr. Justice Bell disagreed, recognizing a farming practice can be cruel, within the ordinary meaning of the word, even if it is legal. According to the court, while laws and government regulations are useful measures of animal welfare, neither is determinative of what is, or is not, a cruel practice.137 This is a significant determination.
Ultimately, Mr. Justice Bell stated he would be the "judge" of whether a particular farming practice is cruel. To assist his determination, he formulated a test relying heavily on one of McDonald's expert witness, Dr. Neville Gregory.138 Dr. Gregory focused on the "number of animals involved, . . . the intensity of suffering and the duration of suffering."139 Mr. Justice Bell used his own judgment to "decide whether a practice is deliberate and whether it causes sufficiently intensive suffering for a sufficient duration of time to be justly described as cruel."140 Even though this standard is subjective, it is undoubtedly preferable to the Customary Approach because it provides considerably more objectivity in determining what is a cruel practice. Most importantly, this determination is made by a judge, a more objective third party, rather than the farming industry.
Finally, the court found the pre-stun electric shocks (electric shocks given before the bird receives the shock which renders them immobile) suffered by broilers on the slaughter line in the United Kingdom was cruel.181 McDonald's own witness, Dr. Gregory, stated the killing methods for the birds did not comply with governmental codes of practice.182 There are no federal codes of practice in the United States for the killing of poultry, and any state protection is generally ineffective or not enforced.
In conclusion, although Mr. Justice Bell held that a number of the common farming practices presented to him were not cruel (teeth clipping, castration, ringing noses, tail docking, and the use of electric goads if done properly),184 he indicted a whole host of customary farming practices as cruel, holding McDonald's culpably responsible for those practices. It should also be recognized that the defendants produced limited amounts of evidence and were heavily outmatched. Steel and Morris undoubtedly faced many additional disadvantages because of their lack of a legal background. One can only speculate how the case would have been decided if the defendants had the same resources as the plaintiffs.
Third, Mr. Justice Bell concluded that many cruel farming practices could be altered at minimum cost. With respect to the chicken industry, "no doubt some changes would raise the cost of chicken products, but there was no evidence that the cost would be increased significantly."189 This conclusion will undoubtedly be strongly disputed by the agribusiness industry.
Any evaluation of McLibel must first recognize what McLibel is not. The case had no direct legal consequence other than proving certain assertions in the pamphlet were true or false. Mr. Justice Bell's opinion did not prohibit any of the common farming practices he determined to be cruel from continuing. The case merely involved a tort claim by McDonald's against Steel and Morris. McDonald's, and many other entities, may still conduct these practices despite the McLibel holding, because these practices are legal in both the United Kingdom and the United States.
In addition, McLibel is an interesting example of how social mores, in relation to animals, are beginning to change. In Europe, farm animals are now more likely to be regarded as deserving of more humane treatment. This is demonstrated by the recent amendment to the Treaty Establishing the European Community whereby farm animals are now referred to as sentient beings.206 Certainly, the attitude of the general public in the United Kingdom is very different from the United States, allowing the issue of cruelty to farm animals to increasingly be given serious consideration.207 Thus, the McLibel judgment is a reflection of a social environment more inclined towards reforming the farming industry than that of the United States.
The opinion might also have a large socio-political impact because of the publicity surrounding the trial. For the first time, an objective court closely examined the farming industry and found it wanting. Further, many classic agribusiness arguments were rejected. While it is hard to predict the ramifications of the McLibel opinion, the English newspaper The Guardian has stated the opinion prompted immediate calls for McDonald's to cease selling chickens that are cruelly treated and "may haunt the British fast food industry."208 It is possible that the judgment contributed to the European Union's recent decision to prohibit the battery cage. Others, however, have noted that the judgment does not appear to have impacted McDonald's trade or reputation.209 Legal and economic consequences could also flow from this case, especially in light of the court's finding that McDonald's food can lead to heart disease.210 Undoubtedly, the impact of this case would have been greater had either of the courts held McDonald's responsible for causing food poisoning or cancer.
In October 1997, McDonald's also informed Spira and Peter Singer it would work with Dr. Grandin to develop an animal welfare auditing system that would be integrated into McDonald's food safety audits.216 McDonald's promised to implement some of the more simple and practical steps to improve the treatment of animals by the end of 1998, focus on more complex long-term goals, and prepare procedures for working with suppliers to ensure these changes take place.217 Significant improvements in McDonald's animal welfare policies were to have occurred by the end of 1998. At this time, however, McDonald's does not appear to have taken noticeable steps in the United States. There is some evidence that McDonald's Restaurant Limited in the United Kingdom has been more responsive to the concerns of animal protection activists.
The case should prompt the general public and shareholders to hold large corporations such as McDonald's responsible for cruel farming practices. McDonald's has the ability to instigate more humane farming practices among many of its suppliers and sub-suppliers. In Mr. Justice Bell's opinion, certain humane farming practices can be introduced at a low economic cost. At the very least, the public and McDonald's shareholders should be aware that McDonald's has, in the past, misrepresented the conditions in which animals used for its products are raised. Furthermore, McDonald's has taken no responsibility whatsoever for the inhumane treatment of such animals.
Additionally, Mr. Justice Bell proffered a preferable, although still somewhat subjective, alternative to the completely subjective Customary Approach. A common farming practice is cruel if a judicial body (not the farming industry) determines it is deliberate and causes sufficiently intense suffering for a sufficient duration of time.221 The proper application of this standard, both in the United States and Europe, could prohibit numerous cruel common farming practices; for example, the veal crate.
McLibel is also indicative of a general and disturbing trend: agribusiness' desire to prevent any public debate about its products. This is further demonstrated by the proliferation of arguably unconstitutional state agricultural disparagement statutes in the United States, providing a cause of action for agricultural producers for "damages from disparaging statements or dissemination of false information about the safety of the consumption of food products."222 McLibel and these statutes illustrate agribusiness' attempt to use the law to insulate itself from public criticism.
Ultimately, the dual recognition by a court that many common farming practices are cruel and that a large corporation such as McDonald's is culpably responsible for such cruelty is groundbreaking. Steel and Morris achieved much in the face of enormous odds. No court had ever examined common farming practices in such detail and determined that so many common farming practices are cruel. No court had ever held a corporation such as McDonald's, which does not directly inflict the suffering on the animals, culpable for such cruelty. Mr. Justice Bell's opinion, which is one of the first attempts by a court to investigate and evaluate common farming techniques, has crucial precedential value. Furthermore, while the opinion can be criticized for not going far enough in recognizing a number of cruel common farming practices, Mr. Justice Bell's commentary resonates with common sense, a quality often lacking in legal opinions dealing with animal issues.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, McLibel leaves many unanswered questions. It is without dispute that countless common farming practices are cruel within the ordinary meaning of the word. Why do laws relating to farm animals in the United States and the United Kingdom allow such cruel common farming practices to continue? Why are such practices, which would be prohibited if applied to companion animals, legally sanctioned? Are the public in both the United States and the United Kingdom aware that a farming practice can be found by a court to be both cruel and lawful? Do citizens know any "common farming practice" is generally presumed to not be cruel under the law no matter how horrific, even when non-cruel farming alternatives exist, some of which present the farmer with no significant increase in costs?
Steel and Morris should be held in awe. To have fought (and continue to fight) this long battle alone, against a billion dollar entity with the risk they would suffer disastrous personal consequences, is astounding. The fact that Steel and Morris faced the best legal minds in England with no resources or experience, and walked away with significant legal victories, is not only a testament to Steel and Morris, but also to the validity of opinions they hold. It was their belief that many common farming practices are cruel and that McDonald's could have altered such practices if they wished. They were proven right.
Steel and Morris are not yet finished. Following a partially successful appeal, where they again represented themselves pro se, they announced their plan to appeal the remaining adverse portions of the case to the House of Lords, Britain's highest court, and if need be, to the European Court of Human Rights.223 Not satisfied with a one-front battle, the two filed a lawsuit in September 1998 against the London police, accusing them of improperly colluding with McDonalds to invade their privacy.224 This time, however, they hired an attorney.
*	Associate, Milbank, Tweed, Hadley and McCloy, New York, New York; Member of the Committee on Legal Issues Pertaining to Animals, The Association of the Bar of the City of New York; J.D. 1993, Harlan Fiske Stone Scholar, Columbia University School of Law; author of Beyond the Law: Agribusiness and the Systemic Abuse of Animals Raised for Food or Food Production, 2 Animal L. 123 (1996). Mr. Wolfson also studied at the College of Law, London, England. Thanks to Gene Bauston, Jennifer Cramer, Karen Davis, Todd Davis, Joyce D'Silva, Robert Garner, Dr. Louise A. S. Murray, Mike Radford, Peter Singer, Peter Stevenson, Mariann Sullivan, John Vidal, and Steven Wise. Particular thanks to Helen Steel for her time and input, and to her and Dave Morris for, among many other things, their tenacity. Final thanks to the late Henry Spira who provided invaluable support and insight and who will be greatly missed.
1Sir Rodger Bell graduated from Oxford University and joined the bar at age 24. He was promoted from recorder to High Court Judge in 1993. McLibel was his first defamation case. See Mr. Justice Rodger Bell Biography, (visited Apr. 29, 1999) http://www.mcspotlight.org/people/biogs/bell.html; see also John Vidal, McLibel: Burger Culture on Trial 9-10 (1997).
2 John Vidal, Empire of Burgers, The Guardian, June 27, 1997 (visited Apr. 29, 1999) http://www.mcspotlight.org/media/press/guardian_20jun97.html; Robert Barr, Activists Speak in McLibel Case, AP Online, Jan. 12, 1999, available in WESTLAW, AllNewsPlus database, Associated Press.
3 What's Wrong with McDonalds? (visited Mar. 23, 1999) http://www.mcspotlight.org/case/pretrial/factsheet.html.
4 Id. See Appendix A for the text of the pamphlet.
5Vidal, supra note 2, at 75.
6 Jenni McManus, Small Fries Take on Big Macs, The Independent Business Weekly, June 27, 1997 (visited Apr. 29, 1999) http://www.mcspotlight.org/media/press/indbuswkly_27jun97.html; see also McDonald's Win is Hollow Victory, Marketing Week, June 26, 1997 at 5; Howard Sounes, Kick in the McNuggets, Scottish Daily Record, June 20, 1997 (visited Apr. 29, 1999) <http://www.mcspotlight.org/media/press/sdrecord_20jun97.html >.
7 Chief Justice Bell, Summary of the Judgment, Introduction, June 19, 1997 (Eng. C.A.) (last visited Apr. 29, 1999) http://www.mcspotlight.org/case/trial/verdict/summary.html [hereinafter Summary of the Judgment].
9 McLibel Support Campaign, McLibel Appeal Begins 12th January, Press Release, Jan. 6, 1999 (last visited Apr. 29, 1999) http://www.mcspotlight.org/media/press/msc_6jan99.html [hereinafter McLibel Support Campaign Press Release #1].
11McLibel Support Campaign Press Release #1, supra note 9.
12Terence Shaw, McDonald's Pair Win Partial Victory, Daily Telegraph (London), Apr. 1, 1999, at 18.
13Bruce Stanley, McDonald's Stung by Win in Libel Appeal, The Record, Apr. 1, 1999, at B1.
14 Chief Justice Bell, Verdict Section 8, The Rearing and Slaughtering of Animals, (visited Apr. 29, 1999) http://www.mcspotlight.org/case/trial/verdict/verdict_jud2c.htm> [hereinafter Opinion].
15 David J. Wolfson, Beyond the Law: Agribusiness and the Systemic Abuse of Animals Raised for Food or Food Production, 2 Animal L. 123, 135 (1996).
16vSee, e.g., Or. Rev. Stat. § 167.310(c) (1997) (stating requirements of food, shelter, cleanliness, temperature, exercise, and space provided for in the animal neglect statute do not apply to livestock and poultry).
17Vidal, supra note 2, at v.
22Vidal, supra note 2, at 54.
23Id. at 31. The judgment incorrectly states that McDonald's is incorporated in Iowa; however, it is incorporated in Delaware, and its principal office is in Illinois. Telephone interview with David J. Wolfson (June 1, 1999).
25 Vidal, supra note 2, at 47.
26 For purposes of brevity, the term "McDonald's" will be used when discussing both plaintiffs.
27 McLibel: Two Worlds Collide (1997).
28Id.; see also Vidal, supra note 2, at 183.
29Vidal, supra note 2, at 183.
30 Id. at 51. See Appendix A for the text of the pamphlet.
33Id. at 67. In his judgment, Mr. Justice Bell held Morris participated in the production of the pamphlet, although the precise part he played could not be identified. Similarly, in the view of the court, Morris encouraged the campaign against McDonald's. Mr. Justice Bell also held Steel was responsible for the disputed statements because she participated in the group's activities, shared in its aims, and as such "jointly with others caused, procured, authorized, concurred in and approved all publications of the leaflet . . . in England and Wales." Summary of the Judgment, supra note 7, at 5.
34 What's Wrong with McDonalds?, supra note 3.
35 Vidal, supra note 2, at 68-69.
36 Telephone interview with David J. Wolfson (June 15, 1999).
37Vidal, supra note 2, at 68-69.
38 Id. at 69-72, 194.
42 Vidal, supra note 2, at 74.
46 In a defamation case in the United Kingdom, the plaintiff simply has to prove a defendant published a defamatory accusation about the plaintiff. This accusation is a statement, either of fact or opinion, which lowers the plaintiff in the estimation of right-thinking people, or exposes them to hatred, ridicule, or contempt. The burden then shifts to the defendant to prove, on the balance of probabilities, that it was true or was published as an honest comment or on the basis of true facts, or was "privileged in law." Geoffrey Robertson QC, Freedom, The Individual and the Law 319 (1993).
47 New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 292 (1964).
48Summary of the Judgment, supra note 7, at 8.
49 Vidal, supra note 2, at 75.
52 Summary of the Judgment, supra note 7, at 27, 313.
53 Vidal, supra note 2, at 75.
58 Vidal, supra note 2, at 178; see also McLibel Support Campaign Press Release #1, supra note 9.
59 Vidal, supra note 2, at 88.
63"To Our Customers: Why McDonald's is Going to Court" (visited Mar. 23, 1999) http://www.mcspotlight.org/case/pretrial/factsheet_reply.html.
65 Vidal, supra note 2, at 97.
where a person (including a company) is the subject of an attack upon his character or conduct, the law permits him to answer that attack to anyone who has an interest in receiving, or a duty to receive his reply, and any defamatory statements about the attacker contained in his reply to that attack are privileged and immune from a successful claim for libel, subject to certain qualification, one of which is that the privilege is lost if the reply is made with actual or express malice, that is with a sole or dominant motive which is improper.
Summary of the Judgment, supra note 7, at 25. In the opinion of the court, McDonald's could claim the qualified privilege because McDonald's dominant motive in making the statements in its pamphlet was not bad faith. Id. It is also unclear to what extent, if any, Mr. Justice Bell actually required McDonald's to prove that the statements made in the original pamphlet were lies.
67 Vidal, supra note 2, at 176.
68 Opinion, supra note 14, at 11 (noting "the defendants had been refused permission to inspect any of the farms or plants where animals have been reared or slaughtered for the Second Plaintiff's meat products").
70Id. at 12. Of course, it could be argued that there was "less dispute" about what "went on" because the defendants were denied access to the evidence, and, consequently, could not effectively challenge what actually occurred on a farm.
76 Wolfson, supra note 15, at 127-28.
77 S.C. Code Ann. § 47-1-40(c) (Law Co-op. 1987); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:102.1 (8est 1996).
78 Wolfson, supra note 15, at 135. The states that exempt all customary or normal farming practices are: Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming. Id.
unless an organization like Farm Sanctuary is permitted to challenge the [Department of Food & Agriculture's] rulemaking authority, the ritualistic slaughter regulation will be immune from judicial review . . . . As one court has observed: "Where (a statute) is expressly motivated by considerations of humaneness toward animals, who are uniquely incapable of defending their own interests in court, it strikes us as eminently logical to allow groups specifically concerned with animal welfare to invoke the aid of the courts in enforcing the statute."
Id. at 503 (quoting Animal Welfare Inst. v. Kreps, 561 F.2d 1002, 1007 (D.C. Cir. 1977)). The California Court of Appeals held that "pursuant to government code §11350(a), '[a]ny interested person may obtain a judicial declaration as to the validity of any regulation . . . [t]he department does not dispute that Farm Sanctuary is an "interested person" within the meaning of this statute.'" Id. at 501.
80626 F. Supp. 278 (D. Mass. 1986). ALDF argued that the veal crate was a cruel farming practice; consequently, because such information might influence a consumer to not purchase veal., a veal producer was in violation of the Massachusetts consumer protection statute if they failed to disclose the cruel practice to consumers.
83 Wolfson, supra note 15, at 125-26.
84 See, e.g. Mike Radford, Justice of the Peace, at 686. In fact, the battery cage is expressly permitted pursuant to The Welfare of Livestock Regulations, 1994.
85 Summary of the Judgment, supra note 7, at 8.
86Opinion, supra note 14, at 4.
87New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 292 (1964).
89Summary of the Judgment, supra note 7, at 9, 12, 18.
94Stephen Howard & Cathy Gordon, UK: Heart Disease Risk in McDonald's Burgers, Judges Rule, AP Newsfeed, Apr. 1, 1999, available in LEXIS, News Library, Allnews File.
95 Id. (quoting the Appeal Court transcript for the McDonald's v. Steel case).
96 McLibel Support Campaign, Press Release (Apr. 1, 1999) (quoting the Appeals Court transcript for the McDonald's v. Steel case) (on file with author).
97Howard & Gordon, supra note 94.
98 Summary of the Judgment, supra note 7, at 27.
101 Stanley, supra note 13, at B1.
102 What's Wrong with McDonalds?, supra note 3; see also Appendix A.
103 Opinion, supra note 14, at 1.
105Vidal, supra note 2, at 182.
106 Opinion, supra note 14, at 2.
110d.; see also Vidal, supra note 2, at 182.
111Opinion, supra note 14, at 3.
112 See generally Vidal, supra note 2.
113 Vidal, supra note 2, at 184.
114 Opinion, supra note 14, at 3 (emphasis added).
119 Opinion, supra note 14, at 5.
123 Opinion, supra note 14, at 8.
127 Vidal, supra note 2, at 183.
128 Opinion, supra note 14, at 5.
130 Wolfson, supra note 15, at 135.
132Id. at 135, 138. These seven states are Connecticut, Idaho, Iowa, Michigan, New Jersey, North Carolina, and Wyoming. Id.
133 Opinion, supra note 14, at 5.
135Wolfson, supra note 15, at 138.
138 Id. Dr. Neville Gregory is the Senior Research Fellow in the Division of Food Animal Sciences at the School of Veterinary Medicine of Bristol University; Advisor to the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, the Council of Europe and the World Society for the Protection of Animals. Opinion, supra note 14, at 5.
143 Opinion, supra note 14, at 34.
148 Opinion, supra note 14, at 21.
149 Id. (quoting testimony of Dr. Gomez Gonzales).
150 Id. at 44. These sows are placed in a narrow metal barred stall in which the sow can only stand up or lie down and cannot turn around, with no access to open air and sunshine and without freedom of movement. Id.
152 Wolfson, supra note 15, at 141; see also Robert Garner, Political Animals: Animal Protection Politics in Britain and the United States 139 (1998).
157 Opinion, supra note 14, at 47.
162 Humane Slaughter Act of 1958, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1906 (1994). The statute states that "in the case of cattle, calves, horses, mules, sheep, swine, and other livestock, all animals are [to be] rendered insensible to pain by a single blow or gunshot or an electrical, chemical or other means that is rapid and effective." Id. § 1902. The definition of "other livestock" does not include chickens. 9 C.F.R. § 301.2 (qq) (1998); see also Gail A. Eisnitz, A Pandora's Box of Pathogens, in Slaughterhouse 155, 166 (1997) (discussing the Humane Slaughter Act).
163 Eisnitz, supra note 162, at 194.
164 Id. at 121, 144.
167 Id. at 33-34, 51.
168 Id. at 16, 51.
170Opinion, supra note 14, at 16.
175 Opinion, supra note 14, at 15-16. Chickens are also culled by carbon dioxide in the United States. Karen Davis, Prison Chickens, Powdered Eggs: An Inside Look at the Poultry Industry 122 (1996).
180. Opinion, supra note 14, at 27-28.
184Id. at 39, 40, 42.
185Agriculture Committee, First Rep., H.C., No. 406-1, Animal Welfare in Poultry, Pig and Veal Calf Product 37 (1981) (stating "[i]n principal we disapprove of a degree of confinement of an animal which necessarily frustrates most of the major activities which make up its natural behavior").
186Opinion, supra note 14, at 7.
188See Wolfson, supra note 15, at 146.
189Opinion, supra note 14, at 31.
191 Vidal, supra note 2, at 183.
192 Opinion, supra note 14, at 11.
197 Opinion, supra note 14, at 8; see also Peter Singer, Ethics into Action: Henry Spira and the Animal Rights Movement 171 (1998).
198 Opinion, supra note 14, at 9.
199 Singer, supra note 197, at 171.
200 Id. "The resolution . . . asked shareholders to vote for a recommendation asking the Board of Directors to endorse the following principles and encourage the company's suppliers to take all reasonable steps to comply with them: (1) Least Restrictive Alternative(animals should be housed, fed, and transported in a practical manner least restrictive of their physical and behavioral needs. (2) Individual Veterinary Care(animals should be afforded individual veterinary care when needed. (3) Humane Slaughter( methods used should be designed to produce a quick and humane death." Id. at 168-69.
203 Wolfson, supra note 15, at 141-42.
204 Stephen Castle, EU Votes to End Battery Hen Farming in 12 Years, The Independent, June 16, 1999, at 5; see also Wolfson, supra note 15, at 140-44.
205 Opinion, supra note 14, at 4. Positive change is certainly possible. See Singer, supra note 197, at 175-76. Singer discusses a humane alternative to confinement for sows developed by Osborne Industries, a corporation in Kansas. This alternative allows the sows to roam freely, but through the use of bar codes and scanners, prevents a dominant sow from consuming too much food. The confinement of sows is a "crude" response to this problem. This new system is already in commercial operation in the United States. Singer also discusses "gas stunning" for chickens. Id.
206 Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing the European Communities, and Certain Related Acts, Nov. 10, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 1, at art. C (entitled the "Protocol on Improved Protection and Respect for the Welfare of Animals" and including "Desiring to ensure improved protection and respect for the welfare of animals as sentient beings" as one of its goals) (last visited Apr. 30, 1999) http://ue.eu.int/Amsterdam/en/treaty/treaty.htm (not yet in force); see also Treaty of Rome Consolidated and the Treaty of Maastricht, Declaration on the Protection of Animals, Feb. 7, 1992, at art. III(24) (visited Apr. 30, 1999) http://europa.eu.int/en/record/mt/title1.html.
207 Garner, supra note 152, at 139.
208 John Vidal & Alex Bellos, David & Goliath 315-Day Libel Case Leaves Burger Giant Tainted, The Guardian. June 20, 1997 (visited Apr. 29, 1999) http://www.mcspotlight.org/media/press/guardian_20jun97.html.
209 Vidal, supra note 2, at 176; telephone interview with David J. Wolfson (June 15, 1999).
211 Singer, supra note 197, at 172.
216 Singer, supra note 197, at 176.
218 Opinion, supra note 14, at 5.
[w]hat amounts to necessity or good reason for inflicting suffering upon animals protected by the statute is hardly capable of statutory definition—each case in which the question arises must depend on a variety of circumstances; the amount of pain caused, the intensity and duration of suffering, and the object sought to be obtained, must, however, always be essential elements for consideration.
222 David J. Bederman, Food Libel: Litigating Scientific Uncertainty in a Constitutional Twilight Zone, 10 DePaul Bus. L.J. 191, 196 (1998). Professor Bederman effectively demonstrates the unconstitutionality of these statutes.
223 Shaw, supra note 12, at 18.
224 McLibel Support Campaign Press Release #1, supra note 9.

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