Source: http://web.mawebcenters.com/mandela/JudgmentFirstCircuit.ivnu
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 04:52:26+00:00

Document:
This cause came on to be heard on appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, and was argued by counsel.
Upon consideration whereof, it is now here ordered, adjudged and decreed as follows: The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appellee, v.
Torruella, Circuit Judge, Coffin, Senior Circuit Judge. and Lipez, Circuit Judge.
Joseph S. Herman, with whom Berman & Dowell was on brief, for appellant.
Denise Jefferson Casper, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom Michael J. Sullivan, United States Attorney, was on brief, for appellee.
Per Curiam. Defendant-appellant Alphonse Mourad was convicted of criminal contempt for violating a court order. He appeals this conviction, claiming that the order was void and that his violation of it was not willful. Because we find that the order was not "transparently invalid, " was in effect on the date of its transgression, and was willfully violated, we affirm the appellant's conviction.
courtrooms," which are located on the eleventh floor of the O'Neill suilding in Boston, Massachusetts.
intention to violate it. Sometime after November 16, 1998, the appellant telephoned Deputy U.S. Marshal Stephen Donaher, telling Donaher that he wanted to be arrested to attract media attention for his case. Then, at the November 30, 1998 hearing before the bankruptcy court, Mourad told the court, "I want to go to prison and stay there and go on a hunger strike today," and "I'm asking you [the court] politely to ask the U.S. Marshal to take me away." On December 8, 1998, the appellant telephoned the pro se clerk of the district court, informing her that he wanted to be taken into custody by the U.S. Marshals. Also in December, 1998, Mourad appeared at the security checkpoint on the eleventh floor of the O'Neill building, where he told the security officers that he wanted to be arrested. One of the security officers persuaded Mourad to leave.
on that day to determine whether another lawsuit that he had fil^Gi.
rKird, the appellant asserts that there was insufficient evidence 66 support the district court's finding that he acted willfully in disobeying the court's order.
This Court reviews a district court's criminal contempt finding for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Winter, 70 F";3d 655, 659 (1st Cir. 1995). Within this context,' 'factual^ findings will be upheld unless there is clear error, but legal questions will be reviewed de novo. ' See id. Keeping these s∧ards in mind, we turn to the appellant's allegations of error.
;court erroneously applied the collateral bar rule to his case. The tiollateral bar rule provides that "a party may not violate an order and raise the issue of its unconstitutionality collaterally as a defense in the criminal contempt proceeding." In re Providence Journal Co. . 820 F.2dl342, 1346 (1st Cir. 1986) ("Providence I") . modified on reh'cr en bane. 820 F.2d 1354 (1987) ("Providence II"). ^"Rather, the appropriate method to challenge a court order is to *petition to have the order vacated or amended." Id. The rationale tS©r this rule is "both to protect the authority of the courts when ;they address close questions and to create a strong incentive for parties to follow the orderly process of law." Id. at 1347. In Jshort, "no man can be judge in his own case." Walker v. City of Birmingham. 388 U.S. 307, 320 (1967) (holding that petitioners, who Deliberately violated injunction without first attempting to dissolve injunction, were properly convicted of criminal contempt) .
410 (1st Cir. 1984) (per curiam) . An injunction in effect "until further order of this Court," Mourad argues, is not narrowly tailored. Moreover, the appellant asserts that the order was clearly invalid because it was issued without notice or a hearing, in disregard of procedural due process requirements.
' Under our precedent, an orde'r should be c'otlsidered" ' transparently invalid only if "the court reviewing the order finds the order to have had [no] pretence to validity at the time it was issued." Providence I. 820 F.2d at 1347. In this case, we cannot say that the order is transparently invalid under either of the appellant's proffered theories.
issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title. No provision of this title . . . shall be construed to preclude the court from, sua sponte, taking any action or making any determination necessary or appropriate to enforce or implement court orders or rules, or to prevent an abuse of process.
still able to make filings and inquiries with the court by mail or telephone. See. e.g. . In re Casse. 198 F.3d 327, 339, 341 (2d Cir. 1999) (upholding power of bankruptcy court under § 105 to prohibit "serial filer" from future filings for extended time periods to safeguard against abuse of the bankruptcy process); In re Volpert, 110 F.3d 494, 500 (7th Cir. 1997) (affirming,, bankruptcy court's power to sanction party under § 105 for "unreasonably and vexatiously" increasing the court's workload). Moreover, "[t]he ability to prevent the type of behavior exhibited in this case is necessary if the bankruptcy courts are to carry out efficiently and effectively the duties assigned to them by Congress" and "to maintain control of their courtrooms and of their dockets." In re Volpert. 110 F.3d at 500, 501.
Although the appellant does not specifically dispute the bankruptcy court's general authority under § 105, he claims that the order is transparently invalid because its denial of access to the court "apparently was effective in perpetuity." Section 105, however, does not limit the bankruptcy court's authority to issue orders with a set expiration date. See 11 U.S.C. § 105(a). As long as the order is narrowly tailored to curb the litigant's abuse of process, as this order arguably was, it cannot be transparently invalid. See Castro, 775 F.2d at 408-10.
it did not deny him meaningful access to the court. Therefore, due process protections, such as notice and a hearing, were never triggered.
Neither rationale advanced by the appellant convinces us that the bankruptcy court's order had no "pretence to validity." Providence I, 820 F.2d at 1347. As a result, the district court correctly applied the collateral bar rule to prevent Mourad from attacking the order's validity.
Mourad's second challenge to his contempt conviction is that the order had expired by the time he allegedly violated it. As this presents primarily a legal question, we review the appellant's claim de novo. See Winter. 70 F.3d at 659.
this date, Mourad contends that, with the exception of those two matters, the bankruptcy court was relieved of jurisdiction over the case. As a result, the appellant asserts that the order, which did not relate to the excepted matters, was no longer in effect when he entered the eleventh floor of the O'Neill building on May 12, 1999.
accord In re Lemco Gypsum, Inc., 910 F.2d 784, 788 (llth Cir. 1990).
still in effect at the time of the appellant's entry onto the eleventh floor.
specificity. See United States v. Michaud, 928 F.2d 13, 15 (1st Cir. 1991) (per curiam) . Mourad essentially argues that the district court erred in finding the willfulness element satisfied because there was no evidence of Mourad's intent on May 12, 1999 to violate the order, particularly since he claims he was unaware on that day of whether the order was still in effect. We review the district court's factual findings for clear error. See Winter. 70 F.3d at 659.
The requirement of willfulness contemplates knowledge that one is violating a court order. See United States v. Marouardo, 149 F.3d 36, 43 n.4 (1st Cir. 1998); United States v. Themv-Kotronakis. 140 F.3d 858, 864 (10th Cir. 1998) (defining willfulness as a "volitional act" committed with knowledge or awareness that it is wrongful) . In this case, there was ample evidence to support the district court's finding of willfulness.
inkruptcy court hearing on November 30, 1998, the appellant :ated, "I want to go to prison and stay there and go on a hunger ;rike today." He then indicated his wish to be arrested:, "I'm sking you politely to ask the U.S. Marshal to take me away." sputy U.S. Marshal Donaher provided the court with an affidavit, mating that when the appellant arrived on the. eleventh,, floor' of ie O'Neill building on May 12, 1999, he "inform[ed] them that he lew he was not supposed to be present in the Bankruptcy Court," id then told Donaher, while showing him a copy of Chief Judge snner's order, that "he was there to be arrested." In addition, t the hearing before the district court after his arrest, the ppellant stated, "My whole purpose today is to protest Judge enner's action," and that he wanted to stay in jail on a hunger trike to attract national attention. Based on the district ourt' s decision to credit this and other evidence, we find no lear error in its finding that the appellant intentionally and illfully violated Chief Judge Kenner's order. III.
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the appellant's 'riminal contempt conviction for violation of the bankruptcy *ourt's order.
defendant shall pay the following total criminal monetary penalties in accordance with the schedule of payments set iheet 5, Part B.
e fine includes costs of incarceration and/or supervision in the amount of $ __________.
lefendant shall pay interest on any fine of more than $2,500, unless the fine is paid in full before the fifteenth day late of judgment, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3612(ft. All of the payment options on Sheet 5, Part B may be subject to for default and delinquency pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3612(g).
defendant shall make restitution to the following payees in the amounts listed below.
s defendant makes a partial payment, each payee shall receive an approximately proportional payment unless otherwise in the priority order or percentage payment column below.
(For Offenses Committed On or After November 1,1987) Case Number: 1:99CR10200-001 Paul V. Kelly, Esq.
jed nolo contendere to count(s) i was accepted by the court.
found guilty on count(s) _^ a plea of not guilty.
lefendant is sentenced as provided in pages 2 through _3^ tencing Reform Act of 1984.
«t(s)	(is)(are) dismissed on the motion of the United States.
FURTHER ORDERED that the defendant shall notify the United States Attorney for this district within 30 days of e of name, residence, or mailing address until all fines, restitution, costs, and special assessments imposed by this we fully paid.
over a period of ____ year(s) to commence ____ day(s) after the date of this judgment.
.hall be paid immediately or according to a court ordered repayment schedule.
s to be continued to be paid until the full amount has been paid.
idant shall notify the United States Attorney for this district within 30 days of any change of mailing or residence iat occurs while any portion of the fine remains unpaid.
defendant shall pay the cost of prosecution.

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