Source: http://www.cpg-online.de/2017/11/01/searching-for-the-leak-press-freedom-vs-criminal-prosecution-in-the-jurisprudence-of-the-european-court-of-human-rights/
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 02:15:29+00:00

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This article analyzes the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights in cases of searches and seizures at journalists’ workplaces or homes, following the disclosure of confidential information. It assesses the Court’s arguments when balancing between press freedom as protected by Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, and the interest of the state to protect state secrets. The initial thesis that any search which primarily aims at finding the leak within the state apparatus is unlawful needs to be qualified before the background of the variety of arguments employed by the Court. The article concludes with the formulation of rough guidelines as carved out by the Court’s jurisprudence.
When journalists publish secret information, they regularly face legal consequences. The owner or possessor of the respective data, a private person or, more commonly, the state, might launch proceedings against individual journalists, editors or against the media company. Among the most common responses by state authorities are searches and seizures at the journalists’ workplaces or homes in order to investigate the breach of confidentiality.1 These cases involve delicate legal questions as the journalists can invoke press freedom as guaranteed by national constitutional law, whereas the state claims the necessity to protect certain information against being communicated to the public.
Within Council of Europe (CoE) member states2, national courts need to pay respect not only to domestic constitutional law but also to the obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights (the Convention) as well as to the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR, the Court). The Convention forms the standard that all CoE member states are contractually bound to uphold. The Court exercises its jurisdiction in order to ensure the observance of the engagements undertaken by the states who are parties to the Convention and the protocols thereto (Art. 19 of the Convention). Any person, non-governmental organization or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the contracting states can refer the matter to the Court after having exhausted all domestic remedies (Art. 34, Art. 35 (1)).
In Vereniging Weekblad Bluf! vs. The Netherlands4, the editorial staff of the magazine “Bluf!” had come into possession of a quarterly report by the Dutch internal security service. Before being able to publish any of its content, an investigating judge ordered the applicant association’s premises to be searched and had the entire print run of the respective issue of “Bluf!” seized. The magazine was subsequently withdrawn from circulation by a court order. Criminal charges against the staff were dropped.
Searches and seizures were also conducted in the case of Roemen and Schmit v. Luxembourg5. Mr. Roemen had published an article in the “Lëtzebuerger Journal” making public that a member of the government had been convicted of tax fraud. Mr. Roemen based the article on official documents that he had access to. After the minister had brought criminal charges, Mr. Roemen’s home and workplace were searched. No evidence was found. Subsequently, his lawyer’s office was also searched where the police found a piece of evidence. After initially being charged with “handling information received in breach of professional confidence” by the investigating judge, the investigation was eventually closed.
Similarly, in Ernst and others v. Belgium6, the workplaces of four journalists at the newspapers “De Morgen”, “Le Soir” and “Le Soir Illustré” and at the “R.T.B.F.” TV station were searched. Documents, discs and hard drives were seized. The searches and seizures were part of criminal investigations into constant information leaks at the office of the public prosecution. No criminal charges were brought against the journalists themselves.
In Tillack v. Belgium7, the German magazine “Stern” had published two articles written by Mr. Tillack reporting on allegations by a European civil servant concerning irregularities in the European institutions. The Belgian judicial authorities subsequently opened a criminal investigation against Mr. Tillack suspecting him of having bribed a civil servant at the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) in order to receive internal documents. His home and workplace were searched. Almost all of his working papers and tools were seized and placed under seal (sixteen crates of papers, two boxes of files, two computers, four mobile telephones and a metal cabinet). No inventory of the items seized was drawn up. No criminal charges were brought to court. The allegations against Mr. Tillack turned out to be false rumors.
In Sanoma Uitgevers B.V. v. The Netherlands8, the applicant company intended to publish an article about illegal car races in the upcoming edition of the magazine “Autoweek”. Before the date of publication, police officers and public prosecutors demanded photographic materials be handed over to them and threatened to search the whole of the company’s premises. The editor-in-chief refused and was detained for four hours on the premises. The company finally handed over the material which was seized by the police.
A number of documents were seized in a similar way in the case of Martin and others v. France9. Mr. Martin and other journalists had published a number of articles in the newspaper “Le Midi Libre” quoting from a provisional auditing report alleging that the region of Languedoc-Roussillon had been mismanaged under the presidency of a certain politician. Investigations on the account of a suspected violation of professional secrets led to the offices of “Le Midi Libre” being searched by the police. Documents and hard drive copies were seized. Eventually, no criminal charges against any of the journalists have been brought to court.
Another case that reached the Court from France involved allegations of systematic doping in the “Cofidis” Tour de France cycling team. Ressiot and others v. France10 concerned searches and seizures at the newspapers “L’Équipe” and “Le Point” which targeted particularly the workplaces of five journalists who had reported about investigations led by the anti-drug authority against members of the cycling team. The articles contained information from the investigation file including telephone tapping transcripts and lists of seized items. Besides the searches at the newspapers’ offices, the homes of two of the journalists were searched, too. Further, the police requested the mobile phone telecommunication data (incoming and outgoing calls) of three journalists from the respective telephone operating companies. The same was ordered for L’Équipe’s telefax line. Moreover, one journalist’s mobile phone was put under surveillance for the duration of one month. In the subsequent criminal trial, all five journalists were acquitted from all charges.
In Nagla v. Latvia11, the producer and reporter of the weekly investigative news programme “De facto”, Ms. Nagla, had reported about probable security flaws in a database maintained by the Latvian state revenue service. She had obtained actual data samples from the database that were downloaded and sent to her by a person referring to himself as “Neo”. A few days later, the police asked her for access to the e-mail correspondence with “Neo”. Ms. Nagla declined to disclose the identity of her source or any information which could lead to its disclosure. Though a person suspected to be “Neo” had subsequently been arrested, the police conducted a search at Ms. Nagla’s home. The seized items included a personal laptop, an external hard drive, a memory card and four flash drives. Ms. Nagla was not charged with any crime.
The case of Stichting Ostade Blade v. The Netherlands12 was a particular case for it was characterized by the search for a letter in which the organization “Earth Liberation Front” claimed the responsibility for a bomb attack in Arnhem. The letter had been sent to the magazine “Ravage”. As the actual letter could not be found, the police took four computers, application forms of new subscribers, address wrappers, a diary, a telephone index, a typewriter, data of contact persons and other editorial materials as well as private data of the editors from the magazine’s premises. Complaints by the publishers of “Ravage” to the courts were not successful.
The recently decided case of Görmüs and others v. Turkey13 dealt with the search at the premises of the weekly newspaper “Nokta”. The newspaper had published an article revealing that the General Staff of the Turkish armed forces had created lists of journalists and non-governmental organisations considered to be either pro or against the armed forces. The lists were the basis for inviting “friendly” journalists and NGOs to military events. The newspaper’s premises were subsequently searched. Though Mr. Görmüs, the newspaper’s director, had handed over the requested material at the beginning of the operation, the officials seized all digital data from 46 professional and private computers.
The factual recounts demonstrate the deep impact of criminal investigations on journalists and media organizations that had published secret information. Though the searches undertaken by public authorities varied in scale, all actions limited the press in the free exercise of its profession. What is more, massive searches and seizures executed in order to discover journalists’ sources may have an additional chilling effect on the future practice of the press. Before this background, the article will now discuss the Court’s assessment of searches and seizures before the background of the state’s interest in secrecy and the public’s right to know. It briefly addresses the scope of protection under Article 10 and the requirements for restrictions as pronounced by the Court, before then concentrating on the Court’s interpretation of what is “necessary in a democratic society”.
This special protection of the press naturally provokes the difficulty to decide who is considered part of the press. According to the traditional notion, “press” refers to periodically published printed works.20 However, over time press freedom’s specific guarantees have been applied to many kinds of media, including TV, radio and internet publications. The increasingly relevant question whether bloggers can invoke the special guarantees of press freedom (such as source protection), has not yet been explicitly addressed by the Court. The answer most likely depends upon criteria indicating whether the blogger operates the blog comparably to a press publication.21 From a functional perspective, the simple criterion should be whether a blog intends to impart information (facts or opinions) to the public. If that is the case, periodical blogs and one-time content uploads should in principle be treated alike as this would reflect the Court’s similar position towards printed works.22 Slightly different questions are posed by portals like “WikiLeaks” that offer access to edited or unedited copies of (confidential) documents. These portals usually do not explain, rate or comment on the individual content. Rather, they largely limit themselves to uploading. However, from the perspective of the public’s right to receive information under Article 10, portals such as “WikiLeaks” functionally deserve a protection similar to the press.23 In particular, the protection of sources is vital for them.
It is apparent that the Court does not strictly separate the scope of protection from the question whether a restriction is justified. Instead, the Court states that it is one of the “general principles” of freedom of expression under the Convention that “the protection afforded by Article 10 of the Convention to journalists is subject to the proviso that they act in good faith”27. The Court thereby seems to mix the scope with possible reasons for a restriction. In that regard, it might be critically asked whether simple domestic laws can actually be enough to limit a freedom’s scope under the Convention. This article is, however, not the place for analyzing the Court’s methodological approach. Rather, it suffices to state that the notions of “good faith” and “responsible journalism” have to be taken into account when deciding whether a state has violated Article 10 or not.
It follows that searches and seizures do not actually need to be carried out in order to qualify as a restrictive measure. A threat can be enough if a chilling effect on the press, that depends on the trust of its sources, cannot be ruled out. In the eyes of the Court, this is usually the case. Threats of searches and seizures are, therefore, interferences like searches and seizures that have actually been executed.
The legal framework dealing with searches and seizures at journalists’ workplaces or homes can differ materially from country to country. Generally, all CoE member states recognize press freedom as a constitutional right. Its actual significance in the case of criminal investigations, however, also depends on the provisions of criminal procedural law and court jurisprudence. By way of example, the German provisions relating to searches and seizures and their application in cases when journalists are targeted shall be presented here.
According to Section 98 subsection (1), second sentence, of the German Code of Criminal Procedure (Strafprozessordnung, StPO, the Code), seizures in the premises of an editorial office, publishing house, printing works or broadcasting company may be ordered only by the court.38 The same requirement applies to searches.39 However, due to explicit privileges accorded to the press by the Code, an order of searches and seizures is usually unlawful: Seizures of documents, sound, image and data media, illustrations and other images in the custody of media professionals40 or of the editorial office, the publishing house, the printing works or the broadcasting company, shall be inadmissible insofar as they are covered by the right of such persons to refuse to testify (Section 97 subsection (5), first sentence, StPO).
Therefore, as long as members of the press are considered to be witnesses in a particular investigation, there is no legal possibility for searches and seizures at press premises or at the homes of journalists. According to the Code’s mechanism, the limits of searches and seizures concerning journalists as witnesses is determined by the scope of their right to refuse testimony. This scope is wide and covers any information concerning the author or contributor of comments and documents, or concerning any other informant or the information communicated to them in their professional capacity including its content, as well as concerning the content of materials which they have produced themselves and matters which have received their professional attention (Section 53 subsection (1), second sentence, StPO).
However, this carefully designed protection of media professionals collapses as soon as they themselves are considered to be suspects. An act of accusation changes a concerned person’s status from witness to suspect. Criminal suspects cannot claim witness privileges, but rather have the right to remain silent.41 The restrictions described above do not apply anymore42, and the exclusive power of the judge to order searches and seizures is complemented by the prosecutor’s power in exigent circumstances. Furthermore, in case a witness (such as a media professional) is not accused, the restrictions on seizures also do not apply if, for example, certain facts substantiate the strong suspicion that the person entitled to refuse to testify participated in the criminal offence (Section 97 subsection (2), third sentence, StPO).43 It can therefore be seen that any act of incrimination has a significant impact on the position of a journalist with regard to his protection against measures of investigation.
Overall, it can be seen that the German criminal procedural law in conjunction with the jurisprudence of the Federal Constitutional Court provides a high level of protection of the press against searches and seizures. As long as journalists are not themselves the suspects of a crime, it is virtually impossible for state authorities to access journalists’ materials or sources. Furthermore, a criminal suspicion against journalists needs to be based on something else than the mere publication of confidential information. If, however, journalists are actively involved in acquiring official secrets, for example by stealing documents or by bribing or instigating public officials to disclose confidential information, they cannot claim a privileged treatment anymore.
However, when the Court assesses the legality of measures that aim at the protection of confidential information against disclosure, it proclaims to leave the domestic courts a certain margin of appreciation. In the words of the Court, “this power of appreciation is not, however, unlimited but goes hand in hand with European supervision by the Court, whose task it is to give a final ruling on whether a restriction is reconcilable with freedom of expression as protected by Article 10.”57 The (in)famous margin of appreciation doctrine generally still lacks contours. It remains opaque under which exact circumstances the CoE member states are accorded which margin. Though this is not the place to critically assess the doctrine’s conceptual basis,58 the application of the doctrine to cases involving the disclosure of secret information by the press is particularly obscure.
Regarding these cases, the Court justifies applying the doctrine by referring to the lack of a common ground among the contracting states. It has held that the rules aimed at preserving the confidential or secret nature of certain sensitive items of information and at prosecuting acts which run counter to that aim “vary considerably not just in terms of how secrecy is defined and how the sensitive areas to which the rules relate are managed, but also in terms of the practical arrangements and conditions for prosecuting persons who disclose information illegally”59. The Court therefore accords the domestic courts a margin of appreciation in assessing the necessity and scope of an interference because of their “direct, continuous contact with the realities of the country”60.
The concrete repercussions of invoking the margin of appreciation doctrine remain therefore unclear: On the one hand, the fact that press freedom is concerned leads to a limited margin of appreciation. On the other hand, the fact that the press publishes confidential information grants the domestic courts a wider margin of appreciation. Consequently, in cases concerning disclosures of confidential information by the press, references by the Court to the margin of appreciation doctrine do not seem to be actually operationalized. In practice, it can be observed that the Court might name the doctrine among the principles that need to be applied to the facts of the case. When it comes to the actual weighing of interests, however, the Court exercises its jurisdiction apparently without constraints. Neither does the Court clearly state which exact questions it leaves to be answered by the domestic courts, nor does it limit itself to merely controlling whether there was an “obvious” violation. It therefore seems to amount to a mere payment of lip service when the Court, after thoroughly balancing an extensive number of interests and arguments, comes to the conclusion that “the domestic authorities did not overstep their margin of appreciation”63. It might be concluded that references by the Court to the margin of appreciation doctrine should primarily accommodate the member states’ concern regarding the Court’s subsidiary role as laid down in Articles 1, 13 and 35.64 Concrete repercussions that could influence the outcome of the case are at least not visible in the Court’s judgments.
When it comes to systematizing the Court’s jurisprudence on searches and seizures in cases of disclosures of secret information, it needs to be observed that the Court usually discusses a number of arguments without clearly categorizing them. Rather, the Court takes into account various factors that together form the basis of its decision. However, having in mind the German Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence presented earlier, it shall be examined whether the Court recognizes at least one “red line”: that searches and seizures, which exclusively or primarily serve the purpose of identifying a source, constitute, in every case, a violation of press freedom. Subsequently, various other arguments employed by the Court will be discussed.
Targeting sources: A “red line” never to be crossed?
Thus, it can be seen that an “overriding requirement” justifying the search for the source, is, at least in theory, still conceivable. Similar evidence can be taken from the Roemen case. There, the Court found that the Government had “entirely failed to show that the domestic authorities would not have been able to ascertain whether [there were crimes committed] without searching the applicant’s home and workplace.”78 This means that the search of Mr. Roemen’s home and workplace was not the least severe measure. The public authorities should have launched a thorough internal investigation first. However, in case these alternative measures had all failed, searches and seizures at a journalist’s home and workplace were not a total taboo.
From this material, it can be seen that searches and seizures which exclusively or primarily target a journalist’s source do not constitute a “red line” in the jurisprudence of the Court. Rather, the Court appreciates this fact in the context of asking whether a particular operation was actually “necessary”: State authorities must choose the least severe means (e.g. internal investigations) and may only resort to searches and seizures at press premises if all other measures have been conducted to no avail. The initial thesis drawn from the example of the German Constitutional Court holding that such operations inherently violate press freedom needs, therefore, to be qualified: Targeting sources by searching journalists’ workplaces or homes may be one argument in finding a violation of Article 10, but it is not, in itself, the decisive one. Rather, the Court assesses whether such operation was actually necessary.
In six of the ten cases analyzed for this article, the Court found that the particular searches and seizures were not only unnecessary but even excessive and intimidating. Systematically, these cases can be treated under the question whether an interference constituted the least severe means. However, as will be shown, the Court found them to have a particularly deep impact on the protection of journalistic sources.
According to the facts of the case, the Dutch police forces searched the editorial office of the bi-weekly magazine “Ravage”. The day before, the magazine’s editors had issued a press release in which they announced the upcoming issue of the magazine, to be released the following day, which would include the letter of the “Earth Liberation Front” (ELF) claiming responsibility for a bomb attack. The search was carried out in the context of criminal investigations against the perpetrators of three bomb attacks that had occurred in Arnhem.
In this passage, it appears that the Court had made up his mind already and that it was not willing to depart from that route. As the sender of the letter was not considered a source, the argument that the searches might possibly not have been the least severe means is declared irrelevant. In other words, just because the protection of journalistic sources was of reduced importance in the given case, the Court did not apply a full-scale proportionality test anymore. It did not determine whether the searches and seizures were actually necessary. This is questionable from a methodological point of view and should be criticized. In any event, the case of Stichting demonstrates how the outcome of a case may depend on the question whether a provider of material is considered a source or not. This needs to be born in mind when assessing claims under Article 10.
When dealing with press reports disclosing secret information, the Court normally assesses whether the respective article has contributed to the discussion of a topic of public interest. If this is the case, an interference “cannot be compatible with Article 10 of the Convention unless it is justified by an overriding requirement in the public interest.”98 Hence, the threshold for justification is lifted to a higher level: Searches and seizures must not only be the least severe means, rather, the underlying public interest in the protection of confidential information must also clearly outweigh the public’s right to know. In this regard, the Court apparently employs a balancing test in order to assess a given measure’s proportionality in the narrow sense. In this balancing exercise, the Court also takes into account whether the impugned information can (still) legitimately be considered confidential and whether the journalists acted in good faith.
In the case of Bluf!, the Court had little difficulty in weighing the concerned interests as it held that the impugned security service’s quarterly report was not confidential anymore. The document in question was six years old at the time of the seizure. Further, the Court noted, “it was of a fairly general nature, the head of the security service having himself admitted that in 1987 the various items of information, taken separately, were no longer State secrets (…). Moreover, the report was marked simply “Confidential”, which represents a low degree of secrecy.” Finally, the publishers reprinted a large number of copies and sold them in the crowded streets of Amsterdam. “That being so, the protection of the information as a State secret was no longer justified and the withdrawal of issue no. 267 of Bluf! no longer appeared necessary to achieve the legitimate aim pursued.”99 Accordingly, the Court found the searches and seizures at the editorial offices in violation of Article 10.
Unsurprisingly, the Court also found that the topics on which Mr. Ressiot and his colleagues had reported on – doping in professional sports, in this case cycling, as well as issues of public health connected to this affair – were of a “very important” public interest. The articles, therefore, responded to an increasing public demand for information about the practices of doping in sports and issues of public health. The public had “a legitimate interest in being informed as well as in informing itself about the investigation [into doping allegations concerning the “Cofidis” cycling team].”103 Though the articles contained information from the prosecutor’s investigation file including telephone tapping transcripts and lists of seized items, the public’s right to know, in conjunction with the excessive character of the searches and seizures, outweighed the grounds of secrecy attached to an ongoing criminal investigation.
In Nagla, Ms. Nagla had reported about probable security flaws in a database maintained by the Latvian state revenue service. The Court noted that the subject-matter on which she had reported “made a twofold contribution to a public debate. It was primarily aimed at keeping the public informed about the salaries paid in the public sector at a time of economic crisis, when a variety of austerity measures had been introduced. It is not insignificant that, around the same time, legislative amendments were being drafted to make information concerning salaries in public institutions available to the general public (…). In addition, the applicant’s broadcast also exposed security flaws in the database of the State Revenue Service, which had been discovered by her source.”104 Before this background and under the impression of the disproportionate seizures, the state authority’s operation was not justified by an “overriding requirement”.
The Court also held that the journalists had reported in an objective manner, without any intention to obtain personal gains, and that there was no evidence that they held any personal grudge against the military services concerned.109 Thus, they had acted in good faith.
From these accounts, it can be deduced that reports on topics of public interest enjoy a high level of protection. Though the public’s right to know still needs to be balanced with possible grounds for secrecy, only overriding requirements on the side of the state or an individual may justify an interference with press freedom.110 An existing public interest therefore reinforces the arguments for holding particular searches and seizures in violation of the Convention.
The analysis of the Court’s jurisprudence relating to searches and seizures in cases where journalists had published confidential material enables the formulation of rough guidelines for the assessment of future cases. First of all, when it comes to searches and seizures that have an impact on the protection of journalistic sources, the Court demands mechanisms for review by a judge or other independent and impartial decision-making body. Second, searches that primarily or exclusively aim at disclosing the identity of the source are not by itself prohibited. However, this fact may serve as a strong argument that there was a violation of Article 10. Third, any intimidation of journalists by excessive interferences will very likely result in a violation. Fourth, if a provider of information is not considered a “source”, the level of protection as regards press freedom is significantly lowered. And fifth, reports on matters of public interests enjoy a high level of protection. A matter is of particular public interest if it reveals mismanagement or other debatable behavior on the part of the state.
1 A number of disclosures by the press resulted in criminal investigations by other means (e.g. telephone wiretapping), criminal convictions, civil injunctions, court orders to reveal sources, or detention, see ECtHR, Observer and Guardian v. U.K., Plenary session judgment of 26.11.1991, 13585/88; Goodwin v. U.K., Grand Chamber judgment of 27.03.1996, 17488/90; Fressoz and Roire v. France, Grand Chamber judgment of 21.01.1999, 29183/95; Editions Plon v. France, Chamber judgment of 18.05.2004, 58148/00; Tourancheau and July v. France, Chamber judgment of 24.11.2005, 53886/00; Nordisk Film & TV A.S. v. Denmark, Chamber decision of 08.12.2005, 40485/02; Dammann v. Switzerland, Chamber judgment of 25.04.2006, 77551/01; Leempoel & S.A. Ed. Cine Revue v. Belgium, Chamber judgment of 09.11.2006, 64772/01; Radio Twist A.S. v. Slovakia, Chamber judgment of 19.12.2006, 62202/00; Dupuis and others v. France, Chamber judgment of 07.06.2007, 1914/02; Voskuil v. The Netherlands, Chamber judgment of 22.11.2007, 64752/01; Stoll v. Switzerland, Grand Chamber judgment of 10.12.2007, 69698/01; Campos Damaso v. Portugal, Chamber judgment of 24.04.2008, 17107/05; Financial Times Ltd. and others v. U.K., Chamber judgment of 15.12.2009, 821/03; Laranjeira Marques da Silva v. Portugal, Chamber judgment of 19.01.2010, 16983/06; Pinto Coelho v. Portugal, Chamber judgment of 28.06.2011, 28439/08; Seckerson v. U.K. and Times Newspapers Ltd. v. U.K., Chamber decision of 24.01.2012, 32844/10 and 33510/10; Telegraaf Media and others v. The Netherlands, Chamber judgment of 22.11.2012, 39315/06; Keena and Kennedy v. Ireland, Chamber decision of 30.09.2014, 29804/10; Bedat v. Switzerland, Grand Chamber judgment of 29.03.2016, 56925/08.
2 The Council of Europe currently consists of 47 member states. Within geographical Europe, only Belarus and the Kosovo are not CoE member states, see http://www.coe.int/en/web/portal/47-members-states.
3 No violation was found in ECtHR, Stichting Ostade Blade v. The Netherlands, infra note 12.
4 ECtHR, Chamber judgment of 09.02.1995, 16616/90.
5 ECtHR, Chamber judgment of 25.02.2003, 51772/99.
6 ECtHR, Chamber judgment of 15.07.2003, 33400/96.
7 ECtHR, Chamber judgment of 27.11.2007, 20477/05.
8 ECtHR, Grand Chamber judgment of 14.09.2010, 38224/03.
9 ECtHR, Chamber judgment, 12.04.2012, 30002/08.
10 ECtHR, Chamber judgment of 28.06.2012, 15054/07 and 15066/07.
11 ECtHR, Chamber judgment of 16.07.2013, 73469/07.
12 ECtHR, Chamber decision of 27.05.2014, 8406/06.
13 ECtHR, Chamber judgment of 19.01.2016, 49085/07.
14 ECtHR, Dupuis and others v. France, supra note 1, para. 40.
15 ECtHR, Observer and Guardian v. United Kingdom, supra note 1, para. 59 (b); Bergens Tidende and others v. Norway, ECtHR 26132/95, Chamber, para. 49.
16 ECtHR, Observer and Guardian v. United Kingdom, supra note 1, para. 59 (b).
17 C. Mensching in: Karpenstein/Mayer, EMRK Kommentar (ECHR commentary), 2nd ed. 2015, Art. 10, para. 15.
18 ECtHR, Tillack v. Belgium, supra note 7, para. 65.
19 ECtHR, Goodwin v. United Kingdom, supra note 1, para. 39; Voskuil v. The Netherlands, supra note 1, para. 65; ECtHR, Nordisk Film & TV A.S. v. Denmark, supra note 1, page 10: “one of the cornerstones”.
20 C. Mensching, supra note 17, para. 14.
21 See, from the perspective of German constitutional law, Kujath, Der Laienjournalismus im Internet als Teil der Medienöffentlichkeit im Strafverfahren (Lay internet journalism as a part of media publicity in criminal proceedings), 2011, Chapter 1, C. III.
22 ECtHR, Ekin Association v. France, Chamber judgment of 17.07.2001, 39288/98, paras. 56-57; C. Mensching, supra note 17, para. 14.
23 See, from a U.S. perspective, the powerful arguments from Y. Benkler, A Free Irresponsible Press: Wikileaks and the Battle Over the Soul of the Networked Fourth Estate, 46 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review 311 (2011), pp. 356-363; critical W. Schmale, M. Tinnefeld, Öffentlichkeit, Geheimhaltung und Privatheit – Sichtweisen im Raum der europäischen Geschichte und in Cyberia (Publicity, secrecy and privacy – Perspectives from European history and ‘cyberia’), Multimedia und Recht 2011, pp. 786-791.
24 ECtHR, Dupuis and others v. France, supra note 1, para. 46.
25 See the references in ECtHR, Pentikäinen v. Finland, Grand Chamber judgment of 20.10.2015, 11882/10, para. 90.
26 ECtHR, Bédat v. Switzerland, supra note 1, para. 50.
27 ECtHR, Stoll v. Switzerland, supra note 1, para. 103.
28 ECtHR, Ekin Association v. France, supra note 22, para. 44.
29 ECtHR, Sanoma Uitgevers B.V. v. The Netherlands, supra 8, para. 83.
30 ECtHR, Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, Plenary judgment of 06.11.1980, 6538/74, para. 49.
31 ECtHR, Sanoma Uitgevers B.V. v. The Netherlands, supra note 8, para. 90.
32 ECtHR, Telegraaf Media Nederland Landelijke Media B.V. and others v. The Netherlands, supra note 1, para. 98.
33 ECtHR, Sanoma Uitgevers B.V. v. The Netherlands, supra note 8, paras. 96-99.
34 ECtHR, Sanoma Uitgevers B.V. v. The Netherlands, supra note 8, paras. 90, 93.
35 ECtHR, Nagla v. Latvia, supra note 11, paras. 98, 100.
36 ECtHR, Sanoma Uitgevers B.V. v. The Netherlands, supra note 8, para. 18.
38 This provision does not apply to a journalist’s home. In this regard, the prosecutor’s office retains the power to order searches and seizures in exigent circumstances.
39 Federal Court of Justice, Investigating Judge, decision of 13.01.1999, 2 Bfs 71-93-2 StB 14-98, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1999, p. 2053.
40 Section 53 subsection (1), first sentence, number 5, StPO, defines media professionals as “individuals who are or have been professionally involved in the preparation, production or dissemination of periodically printed matter, radio broadcasts, film documentaries or in the information and communication services involved in instruction or in the formation of opinion”.
41 L. Schuldt, Geheimnisverrat – Die Beteiligung von Journalisten an der Verletzung von Dienstgeheimnissen (The Criminal Liability of Journalists Regarding the Disclosure of Official Secrets), 2011, p. 62.
42 Federal Court of Justice, judgment of 03.12.1991, 1 StR 120/90, BGHSt 38, 144, pp. 146-147.
43 For the inconsistencies of this regulation, however regarding a previous version of the law, see L. Schuldt, supra note 41, p. 64.
44 For a critical discussion of journalists’ criminal liability of aiding and abetting in these cases, see L. Schuldt, supra note 41, pp. 208-236.
45 See the evidence in L. Schuldt, supra note 41, pp. 37-51.
46 Federal Constitutional Court, judgment of 05.08.1966, 1 BvR 586/62, 610/63, 512/64, BVerfGE 20, 162.
47 Idem, judgment of 27.02.2007, 1 BvR 538/06, 2045/06, BVerfGE 117, 244.
48 Ibid., first “Leitsatz” (guiding principle).
49 Since 2012, Section 353b subsection (3a) reads: Acts of aiding by a person listed under section 53(1) first sentence, number 5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure shall not be deemed unlawful if they are restricted to the receipt, processing or publication of the secret or of the object or the message in respect of which a special duty of secrecy exists.
50 ECtHR, Telegraaf Media Nederland Landelijke Media B.V. and others v. The Netherlands, supra note 1, para. 124.
52 ECtHR, Stoll v. Switzerland, supra note 1, para. 102.
53 ECtHR, Telegraaf Media Nederland Landelijke Media B.V. and others v. The Netherlands, supra note 1, para. 123.
54 ECtHR, Görmüs and others v. Turkey, supra note 13, para. 52.
55 ECtHR, Goodwin v. United Kingdom, supra note 1, para. 39; Voskuil v. The Netherlands, supra note 1, para. 65.
56 ECtHR, Stoll v. Switzerland, supra note 1, para. 110; Görmüs and others v. Turkey, supra note 13, para. 48.
57 ECtHR, Telegraaf Media Nederland Landelijke Media B.V. and others v. The Netherlands, supra note 1, para. 123.
58 See in this regard Letsas, A Theory of interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights, 2007, pp. 80 et seq. and 120 et seq.; U. Prepeluh, Die Entwicklung der Margin of Appreciation-Doktrin im Hinblick auf die Pressefreiheit (The development of the margin of appreciation doctrine with regard to press freedom), ZaöRV 2001, 771, p. 831.
59 ECtHR, Stoll v. Switzerland, supra note 1, para. 107.
60 ECtHR, Bédat v. Switzerland, supra note 1, para. 54.
61 ECtHR, Editions Plon v. France, supra note 1, para. 44; Stoll v. Switzerland, supra note 1, para. 105.
62 ECtHR, Stoll v. Switzerland, supra note 1, para. 106.
63 See, for instance, ECtHR, Stoll v. Switzerland, supra note 1, para. 162.
64 Additional Protocol No. 15 amending the Convention by, inter alia, introducing a reference to the principle of subsidiarity and the margin of appreciation doctrine has not yet entered into force. The text of Protocol No. 15 can be found here: http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Protocol_15_ENG.pdf.
65 ECtHR, Roemen and Schmit v. Luxembourg, supra note 5, para. 52.
66 ECtHR, Ernst and others v. Belgium, supra note 6, paras. 100, 103.
67 ECtHR, Tillack v. Belgium, supra note 7, para. 63.
68 ECtHR, Martin and others v. France, supra note 9, para. 85.
69 ECtHR, Ressiot and others v. France, supra note 10, para. 122.
70 ECtHR, Nagla v. Latvia, supra note 11, paras. 82, 95.
71 ECtHR, Görmüs and others v. Turkey, supra note 13, para. 57.
72 ECtHR, Roemen and Schmit v. Luxembourg, supra note 5, para. 57; similarly, in Ernst and others v. Belgium, supra note 6, para. 103; Ressiot and others v. France, supra note 10, para. 125; Nagla v. Latvia, supra note 11, para. 95; Görmüs and others v. Turkey, supra note 13, para. 57.
73 See, for instance, ECtHR, Sanoma Uitgevers B.V. v. The Netherlands, supra note 8, para. 67.
74 Note: Not necessarily as a violation; see the following paragraphs.
75 ECtHR, Stichting Ostade Blade v. The Netherlands, supra note 12, para. 72: When responding to the applicant foundation’s complaint “that the search destroyed the confidentiality of information entrusted to the magazine’s editors”, the Court, in a quite lapidary fashion, held that “nothing is known about this information, nor has the applicant foundation suggested that it, its informants and contributors or its readership suffered as a result.” However, in that case, the persons who had sent the letter were not considered “sources” in the sense of Article 10, see below “Source or not?”.
76 ECtHR, Roemen and Schmit v. Luxembourg, supra note 5, para. 52; Martin and others v. France, supra note 9, para. 85; Ressiot and others v. France, supra note 10, para. 123.
77 ECtHR, Tillack v. Belgium, supra note 7, para. 63.
78 ECtHR, Roemen and Schmit v. Luxembourg, supra note 5, para. 56.
79 ECtHR, Ernst and others v. Belgium, supra note 6, para. 102.
80 ECtHR, Martin and others v. France, supra note 9, para. 86.
81 ECtHR, Ressiot and others v. France, supra note 10, paras. 122, 125.
82 ECtHR, Nagla v. Latvia, supra note 11, paras. 95, 100-101.
83 ECtHR, Görmüs and others v. Turkey, supra note 13, para. 58.
84 ECtHR, Ernst and others v. Belgium, supra note 6, para. 101 (author’s translation from the French original).
85 ECtHR, Tillack v. Belgium, supra note 7, para. 66.
87 ECtHR, Sanoma Uitgevers B.V. v. The Netherlands, supra note 8, para. 70.
88 ECtHR, Ressiot and others v. France, supra note 10, para. 125 (author’s translation from the French original).
89 ECtHR, Nagla v. Latvia, supra note 11, para. 95.
91 ECtHR, Görmüs and others v. Turkey, supra note 13, paras. 59, 73 (author’s translation from the French original).
92 ECtHR, Görmüs and others v. Turkey, supra note 13, para. 74 (author’s translation from the French original).
93 Stichting is the only case among the cases analyzed for this article in which the Court did not find a violation of Article 10.
94 ECtHR, Stichting Ostade Blade v. The Netherlands, supra note 12, para. 62.
98 ECtHR, Fressoz and Roire v. France, supra note 1, para. 51; Roemen and Schmit v. Luxembourg, supra note 5, para. 54.
99 ECtHR, Vereniging Weekblad Bluf! vs. The Netherlands, supra note 4, paras. 41-45.
100 ECtHR, Roemen and Schmit v. Luxembourg, supra note 5, para. 54.
101 ECtHR, Martin and others v. France, supra note 9, para. 79 (author’s translation from the French original).
103 ECtHR, Ressiot and others v. France, supra note 10, paras. 114-116 (author’s translation from the French original).
104 ECtHR, Nagla v. Latvia, supra note 11, para. 97.
105 ECtHR, Görmüs and others v. Turkey, supra note 13, para. 37.
107 Ibid., para. 62 (author’s translation from the French original).
108 Ibid., para. 63 (author’s translation from the French original).
110 With regard to ongoing criminal investigations, the presumption of innocence can be a strong argument against disclosures; see, for instance, ECtHR, Bedat v. Switzerland, supra note 1; further, Tourancheau and July v. France, supra note 1; Campos Damaso v. Portugal, supra note 1; Laranjeira Marques da Silva v. Portugal, supra note 1; Pinto Coelho v. Portugal, supra note 1; Ressiot and others v. France, supra note 10.

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