Source: http://divorcelawyerma.com/case-law/casey-v-casey.php
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 12:43:43+00:00

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Shortly afterwards, Congress responded with the Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act (USFSPA), 10 U.S.C. � 1408 (1982). Section 1408 became effective in February, 1983, and applies to payments to military retirees after June 25, 1981, the day prior to the Supreme Court's decision in McCarty v. McCarty, supra. [Note 11] Adkins v. Rumsfeld, 464 F.3d 456, 460-461 (4th Cir. 2006), cert. denied sub nom. Adkins v. Gates, 551 U.S. 1130 (2007).
The USFSPA "unambiguously leaves to the states the choice of whether to treat disposable retired pay earned for service during marriage as divisible property." [Note 12] Id. at 461. After the enactment of � 1408, "[i]t appears that nearly every state has elected to treat military retired pay as divisible marital property. See generally State-by-State Analysis of Divisibility of Military Retired Pay, 2002 Army Law. 42." Id. at 462.
b. Massachusetts law. The Massachusetts Child Support Guidelines specifically indicate that "veterans' benefits," "military pay, allowances and allotments," and "pensions" may be considered as income when calculating an award. Massachusetts Child Support Guidelines I-A(9), I-A(10), I-A(14) (2009). On the other hand, G. L. c. 208, � 34, amended by St.
However, "[c]onsiderable as the trial judge's discretion may be in weighing these factors [under � 34], it is not unbounded . . . . It is the duty of the reviewing court to consider whether the apportionment of assets flows rationally from the judge's findings under � 34." Denninger v. Denninger, 34 Mass. App. Ct. 429 , 430-431 (1993). Here, viewing the financial award as a whole, including the treatment of the husband's military pension as a stream of income, combined with the failure to award any alimony, [Note 13] and the errors made in attributing income to the wife and in establishing the child support award (discussed further below), we conclude that the combination resulted in an inequitable award to the wife. Under all the circumstances, the judge's financial disposition leaves the parties in significantly disparate circumstances. The husband "is virtually guaranteed continued enjoyment of the secure, comfortable marital lifestyle." Sampson v. Sampson, 62 Mass. App. Ct. 366 , 370 (2004). The wife has no such guarantee. See Goldman v. Goldman, 28 Mass. App. Ct. 603 , 611 (1990) ("Absent good reason, in a long term marriage, there is no justification for the life-style of one spouse to go down while the other remains high"). See also Kehoe v. Kehoe, 31 Mass. App. Ct. 958 , 959-960 (1992).
The wife again points to the husband's financial statement and argues that he failed to include in his income the $29 per week that he receives as veteran's disability pay. "[T]the Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act, 10 U.S.C. � 1408 (2000), which provides for the divisibility of military retirement pensions, does not permit State courts 'to treat as property divisible upon divorce military retirement pay that has been waived to receive veterans' disability benefits.' " Krapf v. Krapf, 439 Mass. 97 , 108 (2003), quoting from Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581, 595 (1985).
provisions of Federal law governing veteran's disability benefits did not conflict with the enforcement of State child support awards even where disability benefits represented the veteran's sole source of income and would necessarily be used to pay child support. Ibid. See Krapf v. Krapf, 439 Mass. at 108 n.11 ("The Federal act does permit courts to order alimony payments from VA disability benefits. See 10 U.S.C. � 1408[a][B][ii]"). It was error, therefore, for the husband to fail to include the disability payment amount in his financial statement listing his income.
4. Conclusion. We vacate so much of the judgment as fails to include the husband's military pension as an asset for division. Under the circumstances of this case, findings are needed to support a new order as to the percentage of the pension that the wife is entitled to, as a divisible marital asset. [Note 18] See 10 U.S.C. � 1408(e)(1). We also vacate the order for child support.
[Note 12] USFSPA also provides that in order for a State to exercise jurisdiction over the service member's pension rights, the State must be the member's domicile or the member must consent to jurisdiction of the court. See 10 U.S.C. � 1408(c)(4); McMahon v. McMahon, 31 Mass. App. Ct. 504 , 505 (1991). Here, although the husband was likely domiciled in Florida during the divorce proceedings, through his pleadings and participation in the litigation, he consented to jurisdiction of the Massachusetts court.

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