Source: https://www.ptab.us/2014/04/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 10:28:34+00:00

Document:
That is, the doctrine of claim differentiation creates a presumption that claim 9 does not contain the limitation of claim 22, as “’the presence of a dependent claim that adds a particular limitation raised a presumption that the limitation in question is not found in the independent claim.’” Bancorp Serv. V. Sun Life Assurance Co., 687 F.3d 1266, 1275 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). See also Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 910 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (the doctrine of claim differentiation is at its strongest where Appellant wants to read a feature from a dependent claim into a term in an independent claim). The doctrine of claim differentiation therefore means that “material handling vehicle” in claim 9 is not limited to, and does not include, the fork lift, lift truck, flat bed, or pallet truck recited in claim 22.
Inherent components of elements recited have antecedent basis in the recitation of the components themselves. For example, retailers inherently sell goods, a number of sales inherently have an average value, goods or service inherently have values, and a number of purchases inherently have an amount. See Bose Corp. v. JBL, Inc., 274 F.3d 1354, 1359, 61 USPQ2d 1216, 1218-19 (Fed. Cir 2001) (holding that recitation of "an ellipse" provided antecedent basis for "an ellipse having a major diameter" because "[t]here can be no dispute that mathematically an inherent characteristic of an ellipse is a major diameter"); see also MPEP 2173.05(e).
The Examiner also stated that the combination of Minegishi and Ripma is proper and, in support, listed every one of the seven exemplary rationales (A)-(G) that may support a conclusion of prima facie obviousness as set forth in Manual of Patent Examining Prodecure (MPEP) 2143(I). However, this section states "[a]ny rationale employed must provide a link between the factual findings and the legal conclusion of obviousness." Id.2 here the Examiner did not provide such a link for any one of the rationales (A)-(G), but merely listed the rationales. See Id.
2 This section also states "[i]t is important for Office personnel to recognize that when they do choose to formulate an obviousness rejection using one of the rationales suggested by the Supreme Court in KSR and discussed herein, they are to adhere to the guidance provided regarding the necessary factual findings. It remains Office policy that appropriate factual findings are required in order to apply the enumerated rationales properly."
Accordingly we agree with Applicant that the Exminer did not establish a prima facie case of obviousness for Claim 15.
of reexamination may encompass those issues that raise a substantial new question of patentability, whether proposed by the requester or the Director, but, unless it is raised by the Director on his own initiative, it only includes issues of patentability raised in the request under § 311 that the Director has determined raise such an issue.
Belkin, 696 F.3d 1379, 1382-83 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
See In re Steele, 305 F.2d 859, 862 (CCPA 1962) (A prior art rejection cannot be sustained if the hypothetical person of ordinary skill in the art would have to make speculative assumptions concerning the meaning of claim language).
Indeed, as the Examiner points out, the term “substantially” coupled with the term “encloses” plainly “means: ‘not completely enclosed.”’ Ans. 11. See, e.g., York Prods., Inc. v. Central Tractor Farm & Family Ctr., 99 F.3d 1568, 1572-73 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“In this case, the patent discloses no novel use of claim words. Ordinarily, therefore, ‘substantially’ means ‘considerable in . . . extent,’ American Heritage Dictionary Second College Edition 1213 (2d ed. 1982), or ‘largely but not wholly that which is specified,’ Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 1176 (9th ed. 1983).”).
In order for a reference to be reasonably pertinent to the problem, it must "logically have commended itself to an inventor's attention in considering his problem." In re ICON Health and Fitness, Inc., 496 F.3d 1374, 1379-80 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
All words in a claim must be considered in judging the obviousness of the claimed subject matter. See In re Wilson, 424 F.2d 1382, 1385 (CCPA 1970).
Moreover, Appellant has not demonstrated the Examiner’s proffered combination of references would have been “uniquely challenging or difficult for one of ordinary skill in the art.” See Leapfrog Enters., Inc. v.
To the extent that Appellant advances a “teaching away” argument (“Gomes points away from the invention of locating IP information for the user. Gomes would have eliminated documents to speed up search, which is not the objective of the present invention.” (App. Br. 8)), “[a] finding that two inventions were designed to resolve different problems . . . is insufficient to demonstrate that one invention teaches away from another.” Nat'l Steel Car, Ltd. v. Canadian Pac. Ry., Ltd., 357 F.3d 1319, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2004). A reference does not teach away if it merely expresses a general preference for an alternative invention from amongst options available to the ordinarily skilled artisan, and the reference does not discredit or discourage investigation into the invention claimed. In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
Appellants have not demonstrated the Examiner’s rationale is erroneous or why a person of ordinary skill in the art would not have reached the conclusions reached by the Examiner. See DyStar Textilfarben GmbH & Co. Deutschland KG v. C.H. Patrick Co., 464 F.3d 1356, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“[T]he proper question is whether the ordinary artisan possesses knowledge and skills rendering him capable of combining the prior art references.”).

References: V. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 311
 v. 
 v.

 v. 
 v.