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Timestamp: 2019-04-23 06:49:37+00:00

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Posts categorized "Prop. 64 - Supreme Court"
Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court (Benson), no. S171845 (Cal.). This UCL case was argued in the California Supreme Court on November 3, 2010, which means that the opinion is due by Tuesday, February 1, 2010. Because the Court hands down opinions on Mondays and Thursdays, we can expect the opinion no later than Monday, January 31, 2011 -- assuming former Chief Justice George sends his vote in from Antarctica! In this case, the Supreme Court will be interpreting Prop. 64's "lost money or property" language.
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, no. 09-893 (U.S.). This case was argued in the U.S. Supreme Court on November 9, 2010. The issue is whether the FAA preempts state-law unconscionability principles as applied to no-class-action arbitration clauses in consumer contracts of adhesion, and the continuing vitality of our own Supreme Court's Discover Bank decision could be at stake. The opinion will be filed by the end of the current Term, which means no later than June 27, 2011.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, no. 10-277 (U.S.). The U.S. Supreme Court granted cert. in this case on December 6, 2010, and has scheduled oral argument for March 29, 2010. The opinion will be filed by the end of June 2011, when the current Term ends. The district court granted class certification of certain employment discrimination claims under Rule 23(b)(2), and the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, affirmed in part.
Mazza v. American Honda Motor Co., no. 09-55376 (9th Cir.). In this auto defect case, the district court granted nationwide class certification of UCL and CLRA claims for recovery of economic losses. Mazza v. American Honda Motor Co., 254 F.R.D. 610 (C.D. Cal. 2008). The Ninth Circuit granted a Rule 23(f) petition for permission to appeal, and the case was argued on June 11, 2010. One day after the Supreme Court granted cert. in Dukes, however, the Ninth Circuit issued a sua sponte order deferring submission of the action pending resolution of that case.
Sullivan v. DB Investments, Inc., no. 08-2784 (3d Cir.). In this antitrust case for price-fixing in the diamond industry, the Third Circuit reversed the district court's order granting final approval of a nationwide class action settlement. Sullivan v. DB Investments, Inc., 613 F.3d 134 (3d Cir. 2010). On August 27, 2010, en banc rehearing was granted, and the case has been scheduled for argument on February 23, 2011. On November 10, 2010, the Court ordered supplemental briefing on some broad class-certification-related questions.
Does a plaintiff's allegation that he purchased a product in reliance on the product label's misrepresentation about a characteristic of the product satisfy the requirement for standing under the Unfair Competition Law (Bus. & Prof. Code, section 17200 et seq.) that the plaintiff allege a loss of money or property, or is such a plaintiff unable to allege the required loss of money or property because he obtained the benefit of his bargain by receiving the product in exchange for the payment?
The Court of Appeal opinion, which found no standing under those facts, is here: Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court (Benson), 171 Cal.App.4th 645 (2009) (rev. granted 06/10/09).
I'm planning to attend the argument and will endeavor to provide a report later in the week.
This case will address important questions relating to the proper interpretation of the UCL's post-Prop. 64 standing requirement. Chief Justice George is not recused in this case, which is one factor that distinguishes it from Tobacco II.
After the case is argued on November 3, the opinion will be due in 90 days. That works out to February 1, 2011. However, Chief Justice George's term ends on January 2, 2011. Will the Court expedite decision in the cases on the November calendar? How will it handle the December calendar (scheduled for the week of December 6, 2010)? I don't have an answer to either of these questions.
UPDATE: In response to my questions, the folks from At the Lectern undertook a review of opinions issued after the retirements of other Supreme Court justices. They found that many of the retired justices continued to sign opinions for several months after they departed from the Court. At the Lectern predicts that the Acting Chair of the Judicial Council will assign Chief Justice George as a pro tem justice in all of the cases that he hears through the December calendar. This is a logical prediction and is one solution that had crossed my mind.
The reply brief (at p. 2) cites this blog and this blog post in particular. That's the post where I listed the nine post-Tobacco II decisions handed down to date.
As the reply brief notes, I did say that the opinions were difficult to reconcile, but I did not say it was impossible. And while I appreciate being described to the Supreme Court as a "prominent UCL commentator," I do not support the petition for review in Weinstat.
On February 4, 2010, the Supreme Court denied review in Princess Cruise Lines v. Superior Court (Wang), no. S178842. Here is my original post on the case, which interpreted Tobacco II.
On February 10, 2010, the Supreme Court denied review and depublication in Cohen v. DirecTV, no. S177734. Justice Werdegar voted to grant review. Here is my original post on the case, and follow-up posts with some of the briefs.
(1) Can an insured bring a cause of action against its insurer under the unfair competition law (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200) based on allegations that the insurer misrepresents and falsely advertises that it will promptly and properly pay covered claims when it has no intention of doing so? (2) Does Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Companies (1988) 46 Cal.3d 287 bar such an action?
Here is my original post on the case. It has been added to my list of pending Supreme Court cases of interest.
I do not have a copy of the answer to the petition for review, filed on 12/01/09, and would be grateful to anyone who can forward a copy. By my calculations, we can expect an order either granting or denying the petition for review (and the depublication requests), or extending the time to do so, by Wednesday, January 27, 2010.
Close readers of the petition for review may observe its striking similarity to my original blog post on the Cohen decision. They say that imitiation is the sincerest form of flattery, and one of the reasons I write this blog is to share ideas, but please, if you want to copy my language, extend me the courtesy of citing my blog as your source. Thanks!
Here's an appellate practice question for you: When are depublication requests due in this case?
(1) The court may order review within 60 days after the last petition for review is filed. Before the 60-day period or any extension expires, the court may order one or more extensions to a date not later than 90 days after the last petition is filed.
(2) If the court does not rule on the petition within the time allowed by (1), the petition is deemed denied.
Unless it gives itself an extension of time, the Supreme Court's deadline to grant or deny review will be Tuesday, January 5, 2010.
But now look at the Supreme Court's conference calendar for December and January (calendar for 2009 and calendar for 2010). The Court's last conference before January 5 will take place on December 23--which is several days before the probable deadline to file depublication requests in this case. If the Supreme Court has any interest in this case, I expect it will grant itself an extension of time on or before the conference on December 23. It would be prudent for anyone planning to file a depublication request (or, for that matter, a letter in support of review) to do so before that December 23 conference date.
UPDATE: Today, after I posted the above, a new line was added to the docket deeming December 1, 2009 as the filing date of the petition for review. That would mean that the Supreme Court's deadline to grant or deny review would not be until January 30, 2010 (a Saturday). The last conference before January 30 will take place on the preceding Wednesday, January 27, 2010.
Supreme Court dismisses final Tobacco II "grant and hold" case: O'Brien v. Camisasca Automotive Mfg.
(Hyperlink added.) This means that the earlier Court of Appeal opinion stands and binds the parties, but it remains unpublished. Here is my original blog post on the Court of Appeal opinion, and the opinion itself (Second Appellate District, Division Three).
I'm sure the similarity of issues between O'Brien and Kwikset was not lost on the Supreme Court. Both are "Made in the U.S.A." cases that lower courts dismissed for lack of Prop. 64 standing (although the similarities end there). Perhaps the Court felt that leaving the O'Brien opinion unpublished was the best way to manage the development of the case law in this area. O'Brien, of course, was decided long before review was granted in Kwikset, and I'm not sure there is any procedural way to convert O'Brien into a Kwikset "grant and hold" case, which it could easily have become if it had been handed down later.
Interestingly, both O'Brien and Pfizer/Galfano are Second Appellate District, Division Three cases, and two of the panel Justices (Klein and Kitching) are the same. Justice Croskey will join in re-deciding Pfizer/Galfano in a few weeks, whereas Justice Aldrich was the third panelist in O'Brien.
Today, the Supreme Court issued transfer orders in the two Tobacco "grant and hold" cases, Pfizer, Inc. v. Superior Court (Galfano), no. S145775, and McAdams v. Monier, no. S154088. McAdams has been transferred back to the Third Appellate District, and Pfizer is now returned to the Second District, Division Three. Both appellate courts have been directed to vacate their opinions and reconsider in light of Tobacco.
The parties now have a very short period of time to file supplemental briefs under Rule of Court 8.200(b)(1).
UPDATE: There is a third Tobacco "grant and hold" case, O'Brien v. Camisasca Automotive Mfg., no. S163207, in which no transfer order has yet been posted.
08/12/2009 Rehearing denied The petition for rehearing is denied. George, C.J., was recused and did not participate. Baxter, Chin and Corrigan, JJ., are of the opinion the petition should be granted. Eileen C. Moore, Associate Justice, Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, was assigned by the Acting Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
The California Wage and Hour Law Blog for Employees (a new law blog created in January by attorney Steve Pearl) has an interesting post on Amalgamated and Arias. The Complex Litigator also has a detailed post.
We hold that an employee who, on behalf of himself and other employees, sues an employer under the unfair competition law (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq.) for Labor Code violations must satisfy class action requirements, but that those requirements need not be met when an employee‘s representative action against an employer is seeking civil penalties under the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (Lab. Code, § 2698 et seq.).
Arias, slip op. at 1.
This case presents two issues. First, may a plaintiff labor union that has not suffered actual injury under the unfair competition law, and that is not an "aggrieved employee" under the Labor Code Private Attorney General Act of 2004, nevertheless bring a representative action under those laws (1) as the assignee of employees who have suffered an actual injury and who are aggrieved employees, or (2) as an association whose members have suffered actual injury and are aggrieved employees? The answer is "no." Second, must a representative action under the unfair competition law be brought as a class action? The answer is "yes," for the reasons stated in the companion case of Arias v. Superior Court (June 29, 2009, S155965) ___ Cal.4th ___.
Amalgamated, slip op. at 2 (emphasis in original).
This morning the Supreme Court announced that on Monday at 10:00 a.m., it will be handing down its decisions in the Arias and Amalgamated cases, which were argued in early April. These cases address, among other issues, whether formal class certification is required in PAGA and UCL actions (post-Prop. 64) in which relief is sought on behalf of others. Amalgamated may also address whether associational standing survived Prop. 64.
Today, the Supreme Court granted itself an extension of time (through August 14) to grant or deny the petition for rehearing in Tobacco (docket).
Yesterday, the Supreme Court denied review and depublication in the Troyk case (docket). Justices Baxter, Chin and Corrigan voted to grant review. An article (subscription) by Mike McKee in yesterday's Recorder discussed this case in more detail.
Today's Recorder has an article (subscription) about yesterday's grant of review in Kwisket.
Today, the Supreme Court granted review (unanimously) in another significant Prop. 64 case, Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court, no. S171845. The Court of Appeal opinion is no longer citable as precedent. My original post on Kwikset is here. Thanks to the blog reader who emailed with this development.
On Tuesday, June 2, 2009, a petition for rehearing was filed in In re Tobacco Cases II, no. S147345. The answer will be due on Wednesday, June 10, and the Supreme Court's ruling can be expected by June 17 (unless the court grants itself an extension of time).
Additionally, on Monday, June 1, a substitution of attorneys was filed, substituting Reed Smith in place of Loeb & Loeb as counsel for one of the defendants. According to the Daily Journal, Loeb & Loeb represents Chief Justice George in connection with his estate planning, which is why he was recused from hearing the case. Justice Eileen Moore of the Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, sat in his stead.
A rehearing petition was also filed, and denied, recently in Meyer v. Sprint Spectrum, no. S153846. In that case, the Supreme Court granted itself an extension of time before denying the petition.
So, what does it all mean? It means that, although the named class representatives must meet the standing requirements (which, in UCL "fraudulent" prong cases, includes a showing of "reliance"), for the unnamed class members, the showing required now is exactly the same as what it was pre-Prop. 64. That, after all, is what the Supreme Court held in Mervyn’s. Individualized proof of deception, reliance and injury are not required. After Tobacco, class certification of a UCL claim now should be as easy (or difficult, as the case may be) as it was before Prop. 64.
On review, we address two questions: First, who in a UCL class action must comply with Proposition 64’s standing requirements, the class representatives or all unnamed class members, in order for the class action to proceed? We conclude that standing requirements are applicable only to the class representatives, and not all absent class members. Second, what is the causation requirement for purposes of establishing standing under the UCL, and in particular what is the meaning of the phrase “as a result of” in section 17204? We conclude that a class representative proceeding on a claim of misrepresentation as the basis of his or her UCL action must demonstrate actual reliance on the allegedly deceptive or misleading statements, in accordance with well-settled principles regarding the element of reliance in ordinary fraud actions. Those same principles, however, do not require the class representative to plead or prove an unrealistic degree of specificity that the plaintiff relied on particular advertisements or statements when the unfair practice is a fraudulent advertising campaign. Accordingly, we reverse the order of decertification to the extent it was based upon the conclusion that all class members were required to demonstrate Proposition 64 standing, and remand for further proceedings regarding whether the class representatives in this case have, or can demonstrate, standing.
Slip op. at 2-3. I hope to have more on the opinion later.
(1) In order to bring a class action under Unfair Competition Law (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq.), as amended by Proposition 64 (Gen. Elec. (Nov. 2, 2004)), must every member of the proposed class have suffered “injury in fact,” or is it sufficient that the class representative comply with that requirement? (2) In a class action based on a manufacturer’s alleged misrepresentation of a product, must every member of the class have actually relied on the manufacturer’s representations?
My report on the oral argument, which took place in early March, is available at this link.
According to the Supreme Court's oral argument calendar notice, Justice Eileen C. Moore of the Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, will be sitting in place of Chief Justice George in In re Tobacco II Cases, no. S147345.
Truck Insurance says that R & B lacks standing, under Business and Professions Code section 17204, to maintain the unfair competition cause of action because it has not alleged that it has “lost money or property as a result of unfair ... competition.” With this assertion, we certainly disagree. R & B alleges that it paid premiums for illusory coverage and it had to make payment on a lemon law claim that it would not have had to pay had the Truck Insurance policy said what it was represented to say. This is an allegation of loss caused by the purported misrepresentations concerning the scope of coverage. The standing requirement is met.
Next, Truck emphasizes that R & B cannot seek injunctive relief on behalf of the general public unless it meets the requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 382, with reference to class actions. “Code of Civil Procedure section 382 authorizes class actions ‘when the question is one of common or general interest, of many persons, or when the parties are numerous, and it is impracticable to bring them all before the court....’ The party seeking certification has the burden to establish the existence of both an ascertainable class and a well-defined community of interest among class members. [Citation.] The ‘community of interest’ requirement embodies three factors: (1) predominant common questions of law or fact; (2) class representatives with claims or defenses typical of the class; and (3) class representatives who can adequately represent the class. [Citation.]” (Sav-on Drug Stores, Inc. v. Superior Court (2004) 34 Cal.4th 319, 326, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 906, 96 P.3d 194.) Truck Insurance states that R & B may only seek class action injunctive relief if it can demonstrate compliance with these requirements. However, Truck Insurance does not assert that R & B cannot do so.
Id. at 360-61. (Here is my original blog post on R&B.) The argument in Tobacco will take place on Tuesday, March 3, 2009 at 9:00 a.m. in San Francisco.
(1) In order to bring a class action under Unfair Competition Law (Bus. & Prof. Code, section 17200 et seq.), as amended by Proposition 64 (Gen. Elec. (Nov. 2, 2004)), must every member of the proposed class have suffered "injury in fact," or is it sufficient that the class representative comply with that requirement? (2) In a class action based on a manufacturer's alleged misrepresentation of a product, must every member of the class have actually relied on the manufacturer's representations?
Some of the briefs are collected at these links. I'm planning to attend the argument and provide a report here on March 4th.
UPDATE: In other, almost as exciting news, the Supreme Court set oral argument in the Marriage Cases as well. That argument will take place on Thursday, March 5, 2009 at 9:00 a.m. in San Francisco, and it will be broadcast live at The California Channel, which means a webcast will also be available. I don't yet know if the Tobacco argument will also be on The California Channel.
Big business interests are now attempting to convert a shield, which protects against extortionate lawsuits, into a sword to eliminate valid ones. To do so, they seek to expand Proposition 64 to make it a tool to suppress valid consumer class actions brought under the Unfair Competition Law and False Advertising Law. They contend that Proposition 64 bars these class actions unless all potential class members show reliance on the deceptive act at issue. Consumer lawyers counter that only the named plaintiffs (the class representatives) need to do this.
The lower courts are divided, which has led to a high-stakes showdown soon to be decided by the state Supreme Court.
The article goes on to summarize the many reasons why the Supreme Court should continue to permit a classwide presumption of reliance under Vasquez. The article discusses the facts of two of the "grant and hold" cases, Pfizer v. Superior Court (Galfano), no. S145775, and McAdams v. Monier, no. S154088, but not the lead case, In re Tobacco II Cases, no. S147345.
No activity has occurred in In re Tobacco since August, when Justice Kennard was appointed Acting Chief Justice for the case, in place of Chief Justice George, who has been recused. The briefing was completed in December 2007.
Supreme Court issues "grant and hold" order in Prop. 64 "injury in fact" case: O'Brien v. Camisasca Automotive Mfg., Inc.
Petition for Review GRANTED. Further action in this matter is deferred pending consideration and disposition of related issues in In re Tobacco II Cases, S147345, and Meyer v. Sprint Spectrum, LP, S153846 (see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.512(d)(2)), or pending further order of the court. Submission of additional briefing, pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.520(a) is deferred pending further order of the court.
In O'Brien, the Court of Appeal (Fourth Second Appellate District, Division Three) affirmed summary judgment in the defendant's favor, holding that the plaintiff lacked standing to assert UCL or CLRA claims because he did not suffer injury in fact as a result of the defendant's alleged misconduct. The suit challenged the defendant's purported mislabeling of its products as "Made in the U.S.A." O'Brien v. Camisasca Automotive Manufacturing, Inc., 161 Cal.App.4th 388 (2008). My original blog post on O'Brien is at this link.
My list of pending Supreme Court cases involving UCL and/or class action issues has been updated.
Yesterday, the Supreme Court issued a "grant and hold" order in McAdams v. Monier, no. S154088. Briefing is deferred pending resolution of In re Tobacco II Cases, no. S147345. The Court of Appeal's opinion, McAdams v. Monier, Inc., 151 Cal.App.4th 667 (2007), is no longer citable. Here is my original post on the review petition in this case, and here is my post on the Court of Appeal's opinion.
Supreme Court extends time to grant or deny review in McAdams v. Monier, Inc.
On Friday, August 24, 2007, the Supreme Court gave itself until October 3, 2007 to grant or deny review in McAdams v. Monier, Inc., no. S154088. If it hadn't, it would have had to grant or deny review during next week's conference. Thanks to the blog reader who emailed me with the tip. Here is my original post on the pending review petition in this case, in which the Court of Appeal reversed an order denying class certification of UCL and CLRA claims.
Petition for review filed: McAdams v. Monier, Inc.
On July 5, 2007, a petition for review was filed in McAdams v. Monier, Inc., no. S154088. The petition challenges the Court of Appeal's reversal of a trial court order denying certification of UCL and CLRA claims in a non-disclosure case. McAdams v. Monier, Inc., 151 Cal.App.4th 667 (2007). My original blog post on McAdams is here.
All of the letters argue that, at a minimum, the Supreme Court should issue a "grant and hold" order pending resolution of In re Tobacco Cases II and Pfizer. They also argue that California law forecloses any possibility of establishing predominance through a classwide presumption of reliance in either a CLRA or a UCL case. But the doctrine of presumed reliance in a fraud-type claim has been well established since Vasquez v. Superior Court, 4 Cal.3d 800 (1971), and no later case has repudiated the doctrine, particularly in a case (like McAdams) that rests on the defendant's failure to disclose material information known to it about the product it was selling. None of the case authorities cited in the letters supports the notion that presumed reliance no longer exists in California jurisprudence in cases involving such facts (which is what the letters basically say). Mirkin v. Wasserman, 5 Cal.4th 1083 (1993), on which the letters rely, was not an omissions case, but instead involved the "fraud on the market" theory, which would have rested on a presumption of reliance by persons who may never have heard the defendants' affirmative misprepresentations at all. The Court refused to adopt the "fraud on the market" theory, but expressly reaffirmed that "actual reliance can be proved on a class-wide basis when each class member has read or heard the same misrepresentations." Id. at 1095. Similarly, "to prove reliance on an omission[, o]ne need only prove that, had the omitted information been disclosed, one would have been aware of it and behaved differently." Id. at 1093. Under Vasquez, this proof can be made on a classwide basis if the same material information was withheld from each class member. Nothing in Mirkin is to the contrary.
Unless the Court gives itself an extension of time, it has until approximately September 4, 2007 to grant or deny review. Therefore, we can expect some action during either today's conference or next week's.
UPDATE: The Supreme Court took no action on this case during its conference on Wednesday, August 22, 2007, so we will have to wait until next week. Also, thanks to the reader who emailed me to point out that the link to the VeriSign amicus letter was broken. The link has now been fixed.
Yesterday, the Supreme Court granted review in Meyer v. Sprint Spectrum, no. S153846. In that case, the Court of Appeal (Fourth Appellate District, Division Three) said that Prop. 64 created a "two-part, statutory standing test," and held that the plaintiffs lacked Prop. 64 standing to challenge unconscionable provisions in their cellular telephone contracts because the defendant had not enforced or threatened to enforce the provisions against them. The Court also held that the plaintiffs' CLRA claim failed. Meyer v. Sprint Spectrum L.P., 150 Cal.App.4th 1136 (2007). My original post on the Meyer decision is available at this link.
This case was decided the day before the State Bar's UCL conference in Los Angeles, at which I spoke on May 18, 2007. Those of you who attended may recall that a copy was handed out to all attendees.

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