Source: http://wbja.nic.in/pages/view/129/144-supreme-court-judgments-about-guidelines-for-judiciary
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 00:07:01+00:00

Document:
Art. 227 can only be used by the H.C to ensure that the subordinate courts function the limits of their authority but H.C cannot interfere with the judicial functions of a subordinate judge.
S.C would not pass any order under Article 142 which would amount to supplant the substantive law applicable .
A judge while imposing sentence, should not be swayed away with any kind of sensational aspect and individual oredilections.
The law expects the judiciary to be alert while admitting these kind of accused persons to be at large and therefore, the emphasis is on exercise of discretion judiciously and not in a whimsical manner.
The Appellate Court may not interfere with the finding of the trial court unless the finding recorded by the trial court is erroneous or the trial court ignored the evidence on record.
Once the election process starts, it would not be proper for the Courts to interfere with the election process.
When two judicial minds sitting together could not concur, that difficulty is to be resolved, ideally. if not on common sense, not by a third one, but by a Bench of larger coram.
The jurisdiction vested in the High Court under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, for quashing criminal proceedings, was held to be exercisable in criminal cases having an overwhelming and predominatingly civil flavour, particularly offences arising from commercial, financial,mercantile, civil, partnership, or such like transactions. Or even offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry etc. Or family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal.
Judicial discipline demands that when the decision of a co-ordinate Bench of the same High Court is brought to the notice of the Bench, it is respected and is binding, subject of course, to the right to take a different view or to doubt the correctness of the decision and the permissible course then often is to refer the question or the case to a larger Bench.
A miscarriage of justice that may occur by the acquittal of the guilty is no less than from the conviction of an innocent.
When the wordings of the Statute are clear, no interpretation is required unless there is a requirement of saving the provisions from vice of unconstitutionality or absurdity.
A statute is best interpreted when we know why it was enacted. With this knowledge, the statute must be read, first as a whole and then section by section, clause by clause, phrase by phrase and word by word.
A finding may also be said to be perverse if it is “against the weight of evidence”, or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality. (See Balak Ram v. State of U.P., (1975) 3 SCC 219 , Shailendra Pratap v. State of U.P. , (2003) 1 SCC 761, Budh Singh v. State of U.P., (2006) 9 SCC 731, S. Rama Krishna v. S. Rami Reddy , (2008) 5 SCC 535, Arulvelu v. State, (2009) 10 SCC 206, Ram Singh v. State of H.P., (2010) 2 SCC 445 and Babu v. State of Kerala, (2010) 9 SCC 189).
The principle of ex debito justitiae is founded on a recognition of a debt that the justice delivery system owes to a litigant to correct an error in a judicial dispensation. Its application, by the very nature of things, cannot be made to depend on varying perceptions of legal omissions and commissions but such recognition of the debt which have the potential of opening new vistas of exercise of jurisdiction to relook concluded cases, must rest on surer foundations which have been discerned and expressed in Rupa Ashok Hurra (supra). Frantic cries of injustice founded on perceived erroneous application of law or appreciation of facts will certainly not be enough to extend the frontiers of this jurisdiction.
A Judge should not perceive a situation in a generalised manner. He ought not to wear a pair of spectacles so that he can see what he intends to see. There has to be a set of facts to express an opinion and that too, within the parameters of law.
Four fundamental principles emerge from the decision of this Court in Renu. The first principle is that Article 235 enables the High Court to exercise complete administrative control over the district judiciary which extends to all functionaries attached to those courts, including ministerial staff and employees on the establishment. The purpose of superintendence would be frustrated if the administrative control of the High Court is not to be exercised over the administrative and ministerial staff. However, the Chief Justice of the High Court as a constitutional functionary is subject to the mandate of Articles 14 and 16. No appointment can be made in contravention of statutory rules. Moreover, the rules themselves must be consistent with constitutional principles.
It is trite that Courts, while exercising their power of judicial review over such matters, do not sit as the appellate authority. Decision qua the nature and quantum is the prerogative of the disciplinary authority. It is not the function of the High Court to decide the same. It is only in exceptional circumstances, where it is found that the punishment/penalty awarded by the disciplinary authority/employer is wholly disproportionate, that too to an extent that it shakes the conscience of the Court, that the Court steps in and interferes.
A suo moto exercise of the nature embarked upon by the High Court encroaches upon the domain of the executive. In a democracy based on the rule of law, government is accountable to the legislature and, through it, to the people. The powers under Article 226 are wide – wide enough to reach out to injustice wherever it may originate. These powers have been construed liberally and have been applied expansively where human rights have been violated. But, the notion of injustice is relatable to justice under the law. Justice should not be made to depend upon the individual perception of a decision maker on where a balance or solution should lie. Judges are expected to apply standards which are objective and well defined by law and founded upon constitutional principle. When they do so, judges walk the path on a road well-travelled. When judicial creativity leads judges to roads less travelled, in search of justice, they have yet to remain firmly rooted in law and the Constitution. The distinction between what lies within and what lies outside the power of judicial review is necessary to preserve the sanctity of judicial power. Judicial power is respected and adhered to in a system based on the rule of law precisely for its nuanced and restrained exercise. If these restraints are not maintained the court as an institution would invite a justifiable criticism of encroaching upon a terrain on which it singularly lacks expertise and which is entrusted for governance to the legislative and executive arms of government. Judgments are enforced, above all, because of the belief which society and arms of governance of a democratic society hold in the sanctity of the judicial process. This sanctity is based on institutional prestige. Institutional authority is established over long years, by a steadfast commitment to a calibrated exercise of judicial power. Fear of consequences is one reason why citizens obey the law as well as judicial decisions. But there are far stronger reasons why they do so and the foundation for that must be carefully preserved. That is the rationale for the principle that judicial review is confined to cases where there is a breach of law or of the Constitution.
It is well settled that the first appellate court shall state the points for determination, the decision thereon and the reasons for decision. However, it is equally well settled that mere omission to frame point/points for determination does not vitiate the judgment of the first appellate court provided that the first appellate court records its reasons based on evidence adduced by both the parties.
The power to punish for contempt vested in a Court of Record under Article 215 does not, however, extend to punishing for the contempt of a superior court. Such a power has never been recognised as an attribute of a court of record nor has the same been specifically conferred upon the High Courts under Article 215. A priori if the power to punish under Article 215 is limited to the contempt of the High Court or courts subordinate to the High Court as appears to us to be the position, there was no way the High Court could justify invoking that power to punish for the contempt of a superior court. That is particularly so when the superior court’s power to punish for its contempt has been in no uncertain terms recognised by Article 129 of the Constitution.
The High Court has rightly pointed out the well settled principle of law that “the court cannot interpret the statute the way they have developed the common law ‘which in a constitutional sense means judicially developed equity'. In abrogating or modifying a rule of the common law the court exercises the same power of creation that built up the common law through its existence by the judges of the past. The court can exercise no such power in respect of statue, therefore, in the task of interpreting and applying a statue, Judges have to be conscious that in the end the statue is the master not the servant of the judgment and no judge has a choice between implementing it and disobeying it.” What, therefore, follows is that the court cannot interpret the law in such a manner so as to read into the Act an inherent power of condoning the delay by invoking Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 so as to supplement the provisions of the VAT Act which excludes the operation of Section 5 by necessary implications.
The case at hand constrains us to say that a trial Judge should remember that he has immense responsibility as he has a lawful duty to record the evidence in the prescribed manner keeping in mind the command postulated in Section 309 of the CrPC and pronounce the judgment as provided under the Code. A Judge in charge of the trial has to be extremely diligent so that no dent is created in the trial and in its eventual conclusion. Mistakes made or errors committed are to be rectified by the appellate court in exercise of “error jurisdiction”. That is a different matter. But, when a situation like the present one crops up, it causes agony, an unbearable one, to the cause of justice and hits like a lightning in a cloudless sky. It hurts the justice dispensation system and no one, and we mean no one, has any right to do so. The High Court by rectifying the grave error has acted in furtherance of the cause of justice. The accused persons might have felt delighted in acquittal and affected by the order of rehearing, but they should bear in mind that they are not the lone receivers of justice. There are victims of the crime. Law serves both and justice looks at them equally. It does not tolerate that the grievance of the victim should be comatosed in this manner.
As would be overwhelmingly pellucid from hereinabove, though words in a statute must, to start with, be extended their ordinary meanings, but if the literal construction thereof results in anomaly or absurdity, the courts must seek to find out the underlying intention of the legislature and in the said pursuit, can within permissible limits strain the language so as to avoid such unintended mischief.
We may also add that the law is well settled that superior courts while exercising their power of judicial review must act with restraint while dealing with contractual matters. A Three Judge Bench of this Court in Tata Cellular vs. Union of India held that (i) there should be judicial restraint in review of administrative action; (ii) the court should not act like court of appeal; it cannot review the decision but can only review the decision making process (iii) the court does not usually have the necessary expertise to correct such technical decisions.; (iv) the employer must have play in the joints i.e., necessary freedom to take administrative decisions within certain boundaries.
Directions made by Apex Court for Speeding up disposal of cases.
One cannot ignore the problem faced by a husband if proceedings are transferred on account of genuine difficulties faced by the wife. The husband may find it difficult to contest proceedings at a place which is convenient to the wife. Thus, transfer is not always a solution acceptable to both the parties. It may be appropriate that available technology of video conferencing is used where both the parties have equal difficulty and there is no place which is convenient to both the parties. We understand that in every district in the country video conferencing is now available. In any case, wherever such facility is available, it ought to be fully utilized and all the High Courts ought to issue appropriate administrative instructions to regulate the use of video conferencing for certain category of cases. Matrimonial cases where one of the parties resides outside court’s jurisdiction is one of such categories. Wherever one or both the parties make a request for use of video conference, proceedings may be conducted on video conferencing, obviating the needs of the party to appear in person. In several cases, this Court has directed recording of evidence by video conferencing.
In this regard, we may usefully refer to a passage from Kalabharati Advertising v. Hemant Vimalnath Narichania and others20, wherein it has been ruled that the maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit, which means that the act of the court shall prejudice no one, becomes applicable when a situation is projected where the court is under an obligation to undo the wrong done to a party by the act of the court. In a case, where any undeserved or unfair advantage has been gained by a party invoking the jurisdiction of the court, and the same requires to be neutralized, the said maxim is to be made applicable.
It is a settled principle of law that the High Court has jurisdiction to hear the second appeal only on the substantial question of law framed under Section 100(5) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as “the Code”). Equally well settled principle of law is that the High Court has no jurisdiction to decide the appeal on the question which is not framed as required under Section 100(4) of the Code.

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.