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Timestamp: 2019-04-23 02:20:20+00:00

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Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v.
(MPRSA), the court refused to allow respondents to proceed with such claims independently of the provisions of the Act, which authorize private citizens (defined as "persons having an interest which is or may be adversely affected") to sue for injunctions to enforce the Acts, because respondents had failed to give the notice to the Environmental Protection Agency, the States, and any alleged violators required for such citizen suits. The Court of Appeals reversed. With respect to the FWPCA and MPRSA, the court held that failure to comply with the notice provisions did not preclude suits under the Acts in addition to the authorized citizen suits. The court construed the citizen suit provisions as intended to create a limited cause of action for "private attorneys general" ("non-injured" plaintiffs), as opposed to "injured" plaintiffs such as respondents, who have an alternative basis for suit under the saving clauses in the Acts preserving any right which any person may have under "any statute or common law" to enforce any standard or limitation or to seek any other relief. The court then concluded that respondents had an implied statutory right of action. With respect to the federal common law nuisance claims, the court rejected the District Court's conclusion that private parties may not bring such claims.
1. There is no implied right of action under the FWPCA and MPRSA. Pp. 453 U. S. 11-21.
(a) In view of the elaborate provisions in both Acts authorizing enforcement suits by government officials and private citizens, it cannot be assumed that Congress intended to authorize by implication additional judicial remedies for private citizens suing under the Acts. In the absence of strong indicia of a contrary congressional intent, it must be concluded that Congress provided precisely the remedies it considered appropriate. Pp. 453 U. S. 13-15.
(b) The saving clauses are ambiguous as to Congress' intent to "preserve" remedies under the Acts. It is doubtful that the phrase "any statute" in those clauses includes the very statute in which the phrase is contained. Since it is clear that the citizen suit provisions apply only to persons who can claim some sort of injury, there is no reason to infer the existence of a separate cause of action for "injured," as opposed to "non-injured" plaintiffs, as the Court of Appeals did. Pp. 453 U. S. 15-17.
intended the limitations imposed on citizen suits to apply to all private suits under the Acts. P. 453 U. S. 17.
(d) The existence of the express remedies in both Acts demonstrates that Congress intended to supplant any remedy that otherwise might be available to respondents under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976 ed., Supp. III) for violation of the Acts by any municipalities and sewerage boards among petitioners. Pp. 453 U. S. 19-21.
2. The Federal common law of nuisance has been fully preempted in the area of water pollution by the FWPCA, Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U. S. 304, and, to the extent ocean waters not covered by the FWPCA are involved, by the MPRSA. Pp. 453 U. S. 21-22.
616 F.2d 1222, vacated and remanded.
POWELL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and BRENNAN, STEWART, WHITE, MARSHALL, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, in which BLACKMUN, J., joined, post, p. 453 U. S. 22.
In these cases, involving alleged damage to fishing grounds caused by discharges and ocean dumping of sewage and other waste, we are faced with questions concerning the availability of a damages remedy, based either on federal common law or on the provisions of two Acts -- the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA), 86 Stat. 816, as amended, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. III), and the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972 (MPRSA), 86 Stat. 1052, as amended, 33 U.S.C. § 1401 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. III).
"any right which any person (or class of persons) may have under any statute or common law to seek enforcement of any effluent standard or limitation or to seek any other relief."
"Congress intended to permit the federal courts to entertain a private cause of action implied from the terms of the [FWPCA], preserved by the savings clause of the Act, on behalf of individuals or groups of individuals who have been or will be injured by pollution in violation of its terms."
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act was first enacted in 1948. Act of June 30, 1948, 62 Stat. 1155. It emphasized state enforcement of water quality standards. When this legislation proved ineffective, Congress passed the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub.L. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq. The Amendments shifted the emphasis to "direct restrictions on discharges," EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Resources Control Board, 426 U. S. 200, 426 U. S. 204 (1976), and made it "unlawful for any person to discharge a pollutant without obtaining a permit and complying with its terms," id. at 426 U. S. 205. [Footnote 18] While still allowing for state administration and enforcement under federally approved state plans, §§ 402(b), (c), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1342(b), (c), the Amendments created various federal minimum effluent standards, §§ 301-307, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311-1317.
1972, Pub.L. 9532, 86 Stat. 1052, sought to create comprehensive federal regulation of the dumping of materials into ocean waters near the United States coastline. Section 101(a) of the Act requires a permit for any dumping into ocean waters, when the material is transported from the United States or on an American vessel or aircraft. 33 U.S.C. § 1411(a). [Footnote 19] In addition, it requires a permit for the dumping of material transported from outside the United States into the territorial seas or in the zone extending 12 miles from the coastline, "to the extent that it may affect the territorial sea or the territory of the United States." § 1411(b).
It is unnecessary to discuss at length the principles set out in recent decisions concerning the recurring question whether Congress intended to create a private right of action under a federal statute without saying so explicitly. [Footnote 21] The key to the inquiry is the intent of the Legislature. Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U. S. 630, 451 U. S. 639 (1981); California v. Sierra Club, 451 U. S. 287, 451 U. S. 293 (1981); Universities Research Assn v. Coutu, 450 U. S. 754, 450 U. S. 770 (1981); Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U. S. 11, 444 U. S. 15 (1979); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U. S. 560, 442 U. S. 568 (1979). We look first, of course, to the statutory language, particularly to the provisions made therein for enforcement and relief. Then we review the legislative history and other traditional aids of statutory interpretation to determine congressional intent.
These enforcement mechanisms, most of which have their counterpart under the MPRSA, [Footnote 24] are supplemented by the express citizen suit provisions in § 505(a) of the FWPCA, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a), and § 105(g) of the MPRSA. 33 U.S.C. § 1415(g). See nn. 9 11 supra. These citizen suit provisions authorize private persons to sue for injunctions to enforce these statutes. [Footnote 25] Plaintiffs invoking these provisions first must comply with specified procedures -- which respondents here ignored -- including in most cases 60 days' prior notice to potential defendants.
of reading others into it."
444 U.S. at 444 U. S. 19. See also Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, supra, at 442 U. S. 571-574. In the absence of strong indicia of a contrary congressional intent, we are compelled to conclude that Congress provided precisely the remedies it considered appropriate.
"A private party who is injured by the alleged violation, as these plaintiffs allege they were, has an alternate basis for suit under section 505(e), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e), and the general federal question jurisdiction of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. § 1331(1976). Section 505(e) is a savings clause that preserves all rights to enforce the Act or seek relief against the Administrator. Coupled with the general federal question jurisdiction, it permits this suit to be brought by these parties."
"shall restrict any right which any person . . . may have under any statute or common law to seek enforcement of any effluent standard or limitation or to seek any other relief."
It is doubtful that the phrase "any statute"
of potential plaintiffs necessarily includes both plaintiffs seeking to enforce these statutes as private attorneys general, whose injuries are "noneconomic" and probably noncompensable, and persons, like respondents, who assert that they have suffered tangible economic injuries because of statutory violations.
Finally, the Court of Appeals failed to take account of the rest of the enforcement scheme expressly provided by Congress -- including the opportunity for "any interested person" to seek judicial review of a number of EPA actions within 90 days, § 509(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b). See supra at 453 U. S. 13-14.
The Court of Appeals also applied its reasoning to the MPRSA. But, here again, we are persuaded that Congress evidenced no intent to authorize by implication private remedies under these Acts apart from the expressly authorized citizen suits. The relevant provisions in the MPRSA are in many respects almost identical to those of the FWPCA. 33 U.S.C. § 1415(g). Although they do not expressly limit citizen suits to those who have suffered some injury from a violation of the Act, we are not persuaded by this fact alone that Congress affirmatively intended to imply the existence of a parallel private remedy, after setting out expressly the manner in which private citizens can seek to enjoin violations.
Thus, both the structure of the Acts and their legislative history lead us to conclude that Congress intended that private remedies in addition to those expressly provided should not be implied. [Footnote 28] Where, as here, Congress has made clear that implied private actions are not contemplated, the courts are not authorized to ignore this legislative judgment.
Although the parties have not suggested it, there remains a possible alternative source of express congressional authorization of private suits under these Acts. Last Term, in Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U. S. 1 (1980), the Court construed 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as authorizing suits to redress violations by state officials of rights created by federal statutes. Accordingly, it could be argued that respondents may sue the municipalities and sewerage boards among the petitioners [Footnote 29] under the FWPCA and MPRSA by virtue of a right of action created by § 1983.
It is appropriate to reach the question of the applicability of Maine v. Thiboutot to this setting despite the failure of respondents to raise it here or below. This litigation began long before that decision. Moreover, if controlling, this argument would obviate the need to consider whether Congress intended to authorize private suits to enforce these particular federal statutes. The claim brought here arguably falls within the scope of Maine v. Thiboutot because it involves a suit by a private party claiming that a federal statute has been violated under color of state law, causing an injury. The Court, however, has recognized two exceptions to the application of § 1983 to statutory violations. In Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1 (1981), we remanded certain claims for a determination (i) whether Congress had foreclosed private enforcement of that statute in the enactment itself, and (ii) whether the statute at issue there was the kind that created enforceable "rights" under § 1983. Id. at 451 U. S. 8. In the present cases, because we find that Congress foreclosed a § 1983 remedy under these Acts, we need not reach the second question, whether these Acts created "rights, privileges, or immunities" within the meaning of § 1983.
"a state official is alleged to have violated a federal statute which provides its own comprehensive enforcement scheme, the requirements of that enforcement procedure may not be bypassed by bringing suit directly under § 1983. [Footnote 30]"
Water Control Board, 501 F.Supp. 821(ED Va.1980) (rejecting a 1983 action under the FWPCA against the Chairman of a State Water Board, with reasoning based on the comprehensiveness of the remedies provided and the federalism concerns raised). We therefore conclude that the existence of these express remedies demonstrates not only that Congress intended to foreclose implied private actions, but also that it intended to supplant any remedy that otherwise would be available under § 1983. Cf. Carlson v. Green, 446 U. S. 14, 446 U. S. 23 (1980).
that the federal common law of nuisance in the area of water pollution is entirely preempted by the more comprehensive scope of the FWPCA, which was completely revised soon after the decision in Illinois v. Milwaukee. See Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U. S. 304 (1981).
We therefore must dismiss the federal common law claims, because their underlying legal basis is now preempted by statute. As discussed above, we also dismiss the claims under the MPRSA and the FWPCA, because respondents lack a right of action under these statutes. We vacate the judgment below with respect to these two claims, and remand for further proceedings.
* Together with No. 79-1754, Joint Meeting of Essex and Union Counties v. National Sea Clammers Association, et al.; No. 79-1760, City of New York et al. v. National Sea Clammers Association, et al; and No. 80-12, Environmental Protection Agency et al. v. National Sea Clammers Association, et al., also on certiorari to the same court.
The New York defendants were the New York Department of Environmental Conservation; Ogden R. Reid, individually and as Commissioner of that Department; the City of New York; Abraham Beame, Mayor of New York City; the West Long Beach Sewer District; the County of Westchester Department of Environmental Facilities; the city of Long Beach; and the city of Glen Cove.
The New Jersey defendants were the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection; David J. Bardin, individually and as Commissioner of that Department; the Bergen County Sewer Authority; the Joint Meeting of Essex and Union Counties; the Passaic Valley Sewerage Commissioners; the Middlesex County Sewerage Authority; the Linden-Roselle Sewerage Authority; and the Middletown Sewerage Authority.
The federal defendants were the Environmental Protection Agency; Russell E. Train, individually and as EPA Administrator; the Army Corps of Engineers; and Martin R. Hoffman, individually and as Secretary of the Army.
"covered an area of the Atlantic Ocean ranging from approximately the southwest portion of Long Island, New York to a point approximately due east of Cape May, New Jersey, and extending from a few miles offshore to more than 20 miles out to sea,"
"this massive algal bloom died, its residuals settled on the ocean floor, creating a condition of anoxia, or oxygen deficiency, in and about the water near the ocean's floor. This condition resulted in the death and destruction of an enormous amount of marine life, particularly with respect to the shellfish and other ocean bottom dwellers and other marine life unable to escape the blighted area."
Complaint ¦ 39, App. 26a.
Respondents based claims on the FWPCA; the MPRSA; federal common law; § 13 of the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. § 407; the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq.; New York and New Jersey environmental statutes; the Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution; 46 U.S.C. § 740; the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346 (b), 2671 et seq.; and state tort law.
The court previously had dismissed claims against the New York and New Jersey environmental protection agencies and their directors. These defendants are not among the petitioners in this Court.
The court's judgment with respect to the pendent state law claims was without prejudice.
"(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, any citizen may commence a civil action on his own behalf -- "
"(1) against any person (including (i) the United States, and (ii) any other governmental instrumentality or agency to the extent permitted by the eleventh amendment to the Constitution) who is alleged to be in violation of (A) an effluent standard or limitation under this chapter or (B) an order issued by the Administrator or a State with respect to such a standard or limitation, or"
"(2) against the Administrator where there is alleged a failure of the Administrator to perform any act or duty under this chapter which is not discretionary with the Administrator."
"The district courts shall have jurisdiction, without regard to the amount in controversy or the citizenship of the parties, to enforce such an effluent standard or limitation, or such an order, or to order the Administrator to perform such act or duty, as the case may be, and to apply any appropriate civil penalties under section 1319(d) of this title."
"(b) No action may be commenced -- "
"(1) under subsection (a)(1) of this section -- "
"(A) prior to sixty days after the plaintiff has given notice of the alleged violation (i) to the Administrator, (ii) to the State in which the alleged violation occurs, and (iii) to any alleged violator of the standard, limitation, or order, or"
"(B) if the Administrator or State has commenced and is diligently prosecuting a civil or criminal action in a court of the United States, or a State to require compliance with the standard, limitation, or order, but in any such action in a court of the United States any citizen may intervene as a matter of right."
"(2) under subsection (a)(2) of this section prior to sixty days after the plaintiff has given notice of such action to the Administrator,"
"except that such action may be brought immediately after such notification in the case of an action under this section respecting a violation of sections 1316 and 1317(a) of this title. Notice under this subsection shall be given in such manner as the Administrator shall prescribe by regulation."
The Administrator may intervene in any citizen suit. § 505(c)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(c)(2).
See n 27, infra (legislative history emphasizing the limited forms of relief available under the Act).
In this opinion, we refer to sections of the original FWPCA, added in the 1972 Amendments, with parallel citations to the United States Code.
"(g)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection any person may commence a civil suit on his own behalf to enjoin any person, including the United States and any other governmental instrumentality or agency (to the extent permitted by the eleventh amendment to the Constitution), who is alleged to be in violation of any prohibition, limitation, criterion, or permit established or issued by or under this subchapter. The district courts shall have jurisdiction, without regard to the amount in controversy or the citizenship of the parties, to enforce such prohibition, limitation, criterion, or permit, as the case may be."
"(2) No action may be commenced -- "
"(A) prior to sixty days after notice of the violation has been given to the Administrator or to the Secretary, and to any alleged violator of the prohibition, limitation, criterion, or permit; or"
"(B) if the Attorney General has commenced and is diligently prosecuting a civil action in a court of the United States to require compliance with the prohibition, limitation, criterion, or permit; or"
"(C) if the Administrator has commenced action to impose a penalty pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, or if the Administrator, or the Secretary, has initiated permit revocation or suspension proceedings under subsection (f) of this section; or"
"(D) if the United States has commenced and is diligently prosecuting a criminal action in a court of the United States or a State to redress a violation of this subchapter."
33 U.S.C. §§ 1415(g)(1), (2).
The United States may intervene in any citizen suit brought under the Act. 33 U.S.C. § 1415(g)(3)(B).
"The injunctive relief provided by this subsection shall not restrict any right which any person (or class of persons) may have under any statute or common law to seek enforcement of any standard or limitation or to seek any other relief (including relief against the Administrator, the Secretary, or a State agency)."
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671 et seq.; N.Y.Gen.Mun.Law §§ 5e, 5i (McKinney 1977 and Supp.1980-1981); N.J.Stat.Ann. § 59:1-1 et seq. (West Supp.1981-1982). The District Court noted that respondents had given timely notice to one defendant -- New York City.
The petitions for certiorari in this Court raised questions concerning the applicability of state Tort Claims Acts and the Eleventh Amendment to tort suits in federal court. These questions are not, however, within the scope of the questions on which review was granted.
Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U. S. 11 (1979); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U. S. 560 (1979); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677 (1979); Cort v. Ash, 422 U. S. 66 (1975).
"Having so held, we reject the federal government defendants' sovereign immunity argument. The 1976 amendments to section 1331 of title 28 make clear that sovereign immunity has been waived in all suits by plaintiffs seeking injunctive relief against federal agencies or officers. Whether damages can be recovered from the federal government is a separate question to which the Federal Tort Claims Act speaks."
616 F.2d at 1231 (footnote omitted). This passage suggests that, as a general matter, the court had concluded that the statutory rights of action it was recognizing included damages relief. An additional indication is the fact that, by the time of the Court of Appeals decision, any relief other than damages could not have been too important to respondents. The algal bloom about which respondents complain died in 1976. The Court of Appeals decision was not handed down until 1980. Under the MPRSA, 33 U.S.C. § 1412a (a) (1976 ed., Supp. III), the EPA is required to end all ocean dumping of sewage sludge by December 31, 1981.
The court also held that respondents had offered allegations sufficient to make out a claim of maritime tort, cognizable under admiralty jurisdiction. 616 F.2d at 1236. It did not decide whether the Federal Tort Claims Act, with its various procedural requirements, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671 et seq., applies to any of respondents' federal law claims against federal defendants, 616 F.2d at 1237, although it did hold that the Act precluded a "money damage recovery against federal agencies based on state law," id. at 1236.
See n 3, supra. Petitioners in Nos. 79-1711, 79-1754, and 80-12 also named the remaining petitioners as respondents, based on cross-claims filed in the District Court.
We therefore need not discuss the question whether the federal common law of nuisance could ever be the basis of a suit for damages by a private party.
The Act applies to discharges of pollutants from any source into navigable waters, including the "territorial seas," 33 U.S.C. §§ 1362(7), (12), and applies as well to discharges from sources "other than a vessel or other floating craft" into the "contiguous zone" and the high seas, §§ 1362(9), (10), (12). See S.Rep. No. 92-414, p. 75 (1971).
These permits are issued by the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, 33 U.S.C. § 1412, except in the case of dredged materials, which may be dumped under a permit issued by the Secretary of the Army, § 1413.
The Court of Appeals did state that the saving clause in § 505 (e) of the FWPCA "provides an independent remedy for injured parties unburdened by the notice requirements of section 505(b)." 616 F.2d at 1227. But the court did not conclude that the saving clause is itself an express authorization of private damages suits. Instead, it held that the saving clause acted to preserve any existing right to enforce the Act, in addition to the explicit, citizen suit remedy in § 505(b). The court went on to apply an implied-right-of-action analysis before concluding that a private suit for damages is among the preexisting remedies preserved by the saving clause.
In recent years, the question has arisen with increased frequency. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. at 441 U. S. 741-742 (POWELL, J., dissenting).
The Administrator is authorized to give the States an opportunity to take action before doing so himself. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)(1).
This review must be sought within 90 days. The review provisions of § 509 are open to "[a]ny person," S.Rep. No. 92-414, p. 85 (1971), and thus provide an additional procedure to "private attorneys general" seeking to enforce the Act, supplementing the citizen suits authorized in § 505. See W. Rodgers, Environmental Law 87-88 (1977).
The MPRSA provides for assessment of civil penalties by the Administrator, 33 U.S.C. § 1415(a), criminal penalties, § 1415(b), suits for injunctive relief by the Attorney General, § 1415(d), and permit suspensions or revocations, § 1415(f).
Under the FWPCA, civil penalties, payable to the Government, also may be ordered by the court. § 505(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a).
S.Rep. No. 92-414, p. 81(1971)(emphasis added). See also S.Rep. No. 92-451, pp. 23-24 (1971) (Report on the MPRSA) (the citizen suit provision does not restrict or supersede "any other right to legal action which is afforded the potential litigant in any other statute or the common law").
It might be argued that the phrase "any effluent standard or limitation" in § 505(e) necessarily is a reference to the terms of the FWPCA. We, however, are unpersuaded that Congress necessarily intended this meaning. The phrase also could refer to state statutory limitations, or to "effluent limitations" imposed as a result of court decrees under the common law of nuisance.
"It has been argued, however, that conferring additional rights on the citizen may burden the courts unduly. I would argue that the citizen suit provision of S. 4358 has been carefully drafted to prevent this consequence from arising. First of all, it should be noted that the bill makes no provision for damages to the individual. It therefore provides no incentives to suit other than to protect the health and welfare of those suing and others similarly situated. It will be the rare, rather than the ordinary, person, I suspect, who, with no hope of financial gain and the very real prospect of financial loss, will initiate court action under this bill."
"Senate bill 3201 provides damages and a remedy for recovery of fines and restitution, and other monetary damages. The pending bill is limited to seek [sic] abatement of violation of standards established administratively under the act, and expressly excludes damage actions."
Id. at 33102. He placed in the Record a staff memorandum stating that the availability of damages "would encourage frivolous or harassing suits against industries and government agencies." Id. at 33103. See also City of Highland Park v. Train, 519 F.2d 681, 690-691 (CA7 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 927 (1976).
See generally City of Evansville v. Kentucky Liquid Recycling, Inc., 604 F.2d 1008 (CA7 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1025 (1980).
These petitioners appear to fall within the category of municipal governmental entities suable as "persons" under our decision in Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U. S. 658 (1978).
See also Meyerson v. Arizona, 507 F.Supp. 859, 864 (Ariz.1981) ("[T]he remedial provision of § 1983 cannot be used to circumvent the remedial provisions of the Revenue Sharing Act").
JUSTICE STEVENS, in dissent, finds contrary indications of congressional intent in the saving clauses -- § 505(e) of the FWPCA, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e), and § 105(g)(5) of the MPRSA, 33 U.S.C. § 1415(g)(5). The language of these clauses, see nn. 10 11 supra, does not, however, support the view that Congress expressly preserved § 1983 remedies for violations of these statutes. As noted supra at 453 U. S. 15-16, there is little reason to believe that Congress intended to do this when it made reference in § 505(e) to "any right which any person . . . may have under any statute or common law or to seek . . . any other relief." The legislative history makes clear Congress' intent to allow further enforcement of anti-pollution standards arising under other statutes or state common law. See n 26, supra. A suit for damages asserting a substantive violation of the FWPCA or the MPRSA is far different, even if the remedy asserted is based on the separate right of action created in § 1983. We are convinced that the saving clauses do not refer at all to a suit for redress of a violation of these statutes -- regardless of the source of the right of action asserted.
Even if this were not the correct interpretation of the saving clauses, we recently held that the saving clause in the FWPCA relates only to the effect of the accompanying citizen suit provision. Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U. S. 304, 451 U. S. 329 (1981) (the section "means only that the provision of [a citizen] suit does not revoke other remedies"). The parallel provision of the MPRSA is equally limited. 33 U.S.C. § 1415(g) (5) ("The injunctive relief provided by this subsection shall not restrict any right which any person . . . may have under any statute or common law") (emphasis added). We therefore are not persuaded that the saving clauses limit the effect of the overall remedial schemes provided expressly in the Acts. In sum, we think it clear that those express remedies preclude suits for damages under § 1983, and that the saving clauses do not require a contrary conclusion.
In so holding, we also note that, contrary to JUSTICE STEVENS' argument, post at 453 U. S. 27-28, n. 11, we do not suggest that the burden is on a plaintiff to demonstrate congressional intent to preserve § 1983 remedies.
Indeed, as noted in n 14, supra, the ocean dumping of sewage sludge must end altogether by December 31, 1981. To the extent that Congress allowed some continued dumping of sludge prior to that date, this represents a considered judgment that it made sense to allow entities like petitioners to adjust to the coming change.
JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE BLACKMUN joins, concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part.
quality of the work product of Congress, and the sheer bulk of new federal legislation, has been more and more reluctant to open the courthouse door to the injured citizen. In 1975, in Cort v. Ash, 422 U. S. 66, the Court cut back on the simple common law presumption by fashioning a four-factor formula that led to the denial of relief in that case. [Footnote 2/8] Although multifactor balancing tests generally tend to produce negative answers, more recently some Members of the Court have been inclined to deny relief with little more than a perfunctory nod to the Cort v. Ash factors. See, e.g., California v. Sierra Club, 451 U. S. 287, 451 U. S. 302 (REHNQUIST, J., concurring in judgment). The touchstone now is congressional intent. See ante at 453 U. S. 13. Because legislative history is unlikely to reveal affirmative evidence of a congressional intent to authorize a specific procedure that the statute itself fails to mention, [Footnote 2/9] that touchstone will further restrict the availability of private remedies.
history and tradition. More importantly, I believe that the Court's appraisal of the intent expressed by Congress in the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 (Clean Water Act), 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. III), and the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972 (MPRSA), 33 U.S.C. § 1401 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. III), with respect to the availability of private remedies under other federal statutes or the federal common law is palpably wrong.
we must assume that, apart from these two statutes, the dumping operations of petitioners would constitute a common law nuisance for which respondents would have a federal remedy. The net effect of the Court's analysis of the legislative intent is therefore a conclusion that Congress, by enacting the Clean Water Act and the MPRSA, deliberately deprived respondents of effective federal remedies that would otherwise have been available to them. In my judgment, the language of both statutes, as well as their legislative history, belies this improbable conclusion.
not at all hard to believe that Congress intended to preserve, or, more precisely, did not intend to withdraw, the § 1983 remedy because Congress made this intention explicit in the language of both statutes and in the relevant legislative history.
express remedies in the Clean Water Act and the MPRSA to be exclusive.
33 U.S.C. § 1415(g) (5). Respondents' right to proceed under § 1983 in light of these statutory provisions could have been made more plain only had Congress substituted the citation "42 U.S.C. § 1983" for the words "any statute" in the saving clauses.
law action for pollution damages."
S.Rep. No. 92-414, p. 81 (1971). See also H.R.Rep. No. 92-911, p. 134 (1972). And the corresponding Report on the MPRSA similarly states that the authorization of citizen suits shall not restrict or supersede "any other right to legal action which is afforded the potential litigant in any other statute or the common law." S.Rep. No. 9251, pp. 23-24 (1971). See also H.R.Rep. No. 92-361, p. 23 (1971).
The words "any other law" in the former Report and "any other statute" in the latter surely encompass 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976 ed., Supp. III), as do the words "any statute" in the saving clauses themselves. It therefore seems little short of remarkable that unambiguous expressions of legislative intent such as these can be read to express a purpose to withdraw the express statutory remedy provided by § 1983.
In my judgment, the Court has failed to uncover "a clear congressional mandate" [Footnote 2/13] to withdraw the § 1983 remedy otherwise available to the respondents. Moreover, the statutory language and the legislative history reveal the exact opposite: a clear congressional mandate to preserve all existing remedies, including a private right of action under § 1983. I therefore respectfully dissent from this portion of the Court's decision.
"Compliance with requirements under this Act would not be a defense to a common law action for pollution damages."
S.Rep. No. 92-414 at 81.
answered by looking to the language of the statute itself." Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677, 441 U. S. 689.
The language of neither the Clean Water Act nor the MPRSA defines any such special class. Both the substantive provisions of these statutes and the breadth of their authorizations of citizen suits indicate that they were "enacted for the protection of the general public." Cannon, supra, at 441 U. S. 690. [Footnote 2/16] Thus, even under the more liberal approach to implied rights of action represented by Rigsby and its antecedents, respondents cannot invoke implied private remedies under these statutes. See generally California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. at 451 U. S. 294-296.
The conclusion required by the statutory language is fortified by the legislative history on which the Court relies. I agree that the legislative deliberations about civil remedies under the Clean Air Act, see ante at 453 U. S. 17-18, n. 27, illuminate the meaning of the Clean Water Act and the MPRSA -- since these statutes were enacted only a short time later and had similar environmental objective -- and that those deliberations reveal a conscious congressional choice not to authorize a new statutory damages remedy. Accordingly, I agree with the conclusion reached by the Court in 453 U. S. but I respectfully dissent from the remainder of its judgment.
Indeed, in recent Terms, a significant portion of our docket has been occupied by cases presenting this question with respect to a variety of federal statutes. See, e.g., California v. Sierra Club, 451 U. S. 287; Universities Research Assn. v. Coutu, 450 U. S. 754; Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U. S. 11; Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U. S. 560; Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677. Cf. Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U. S. 630; Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers, 451 U. S. 77.
241 U.S. at 241 U. S. 39-40. As the Rigsby Court noted, the presumption was firmly established at common law, see California v. Sierra Club, supra, at 451 U. S. 299-300 (STEVENS, J., concurring), and it had been recognized on numerous prior occasions by this Court. See, e.g., 5 U. S. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 5 U. S. 163 ("[I]t is a general and indisputable rule that, where there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy by suit, or action at law, whenever that right is invaded'"); Kendall v. United States, 12 Pet. 524, 37 U. S. 623 ("[T]he power to enforce the performance of the act must rest somewhere, or it will present a case which has often been said to involve a monstrous absurdity in a well organized government, that there should be no remedy, although a clear and undeniable right should be shown to exist"); Pollard v. Bailey, 20 Wall. 520, 87 U. S. 527 ("A general liability created by statute without a remedy may be enforced by an appropriate common law action"); Hayes v. Michigan Central R. Co., 111 U. S. 228, 111 U. S. 240 ("[E]ach person specially injured by the breach of the obligation is entitled to his individual compensation, and to an action for its recovery"); De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 1, 182 U. S. 176-177 ("If there be an admitted wrong, the courts will look far to supply an adequate remedy").
See Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388, 403 U. S. 402 (concurring in judgment) ("[I]n suits for damages based on violations of federal statutes lacking any express authorization of a damage remedy, this Court has authorized such relief where, in its view, damages are necessary to effectuate the congressional policy underpinning the substantive provisions of the statute").
See J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U. S. 426, 377 U. S. 433 ("[I]t is the duty of the courts to be alert to provide such remedies as are necessary to make effective the congressional purpose").
See Montana-Dakota Utilities Co. v. Northwestern Public Service Co., 341 U. S. 246, 341 U. S. 261(dissenting opinion) ("If civil liability is appropriate to effectuate the purposes of a statute, courts are not denied this traditional remedy because it is not specifically authorized").
See Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F.Supp. 512, 513-514 (ED Pa.1946) ("The disregard of the command of a statute is a wrongful act and a tort. . . . [T]he right to recover damages arising by reason of violation of a statute . . . is so fundamental and so deeply ingrained in the law that, where it is not expressly denied, the intention to withhold it should appear very clearly and plainly").
Although the federal courts do not possess the full common law powers of their state counterparts, see, e.g., Northwest Airlines, Inc., supra, at 451 U. S. 95, the cases cited in n. 2, supra, nonetheless indicate that the fashioning of remedies for wrongs has traditionally been a part of the business of the federal courts.
"In determining whether a private remedy is implicit in a statute not expressly providing one, several factors are relevant. First, is the plaintiff 'one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted,' -- that is, does the statute create a federal right in favor of the plaintiff? Second, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one? Third, is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff? And finally, is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically the concern of the States, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law?"
422 U.S. at 422 U. S. 78 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
See Cannon, supra, at 441 U. S. 694; Northwest Airlines, Inc., supra, at 451 U. S. 94.
"Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress."
This is more than merely a semantic dispute. As the Court formulates the inquiry, the burden is placed on the § 1983 plaintiff to show an explicit or implicit congressional intention that violations of the substantive statute at issue be redressed in private § 1983 actions. The correct formulation, however, places the burden on the defendant to show that Congress intended to foreclose access to the § 1983 remedy as a means of enforcing the substantive statute. Because the § 1983 plaintiff is invoking an express private remedy that is, on its face, applicable anytime a violation of a federal statute is alleged, see Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U. S. 1, 448 U. S. 4, the burden is properly placed on the defendant to show that Congress, in enacting the particular substantive statute at issue, intended an exception to the general rule of § 1983. A defendant may carry this burden by identifying express statutory language or legislative history revealing Congress' intent to foreclose the § 1983 remedy, or by establishing that Congress intended that the remedies provided in the substantive statute itself be exclusive. See Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1, 451 U. S. 28.
"The question before us is whether the phrase 'and laws,' as used in § 1983, means what it says, or whether it should be limited to some subset of laws. Given that Congress attached no modifiers to the phrase, the plain language of the statute undoubtedly embraces respondents' claim that petitioners violated the Social Security Act."
Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 448 U. S. 4.
Carlson v. Green, 446 U. S. 14, 446 U. S. 23.
I recognize, of course, that, under the preemption rationale of Milwaukee v. Illinois, a defendant's compliance or noncompliance with the requirements of the Clean Water Act or the MPRSA is technically irrelevant. However, I point out that the petitioners in these cases allegedly failed to comply with the requirements of the statutes merely to emphasize the anomalous nature of the Court's holdings today and in Milwaukee, particularly in light of the statutory language and legislative history discussed in the text.
"The plain language of the savings clause of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1365(e), indicates Congress' intent to preserve all common law remedies, and the legislative history makes clear that Congress understood that the federal common law would be preserved as well."
Brief for Federal Petitioners 37. In support of this conclusion, the Solicitor General cites a statement in the legislative history by Congressman Dingell, one of the cosponsors of the Clean Water Act in the House, specifically referring to nuisance litigation under the federal common law. See 118 Cong.Rec. 33757 (1972), 1 Legislative History of the Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 (Committee Print compiled for the Senate Committee on Public Works by the Library of Congress), Ser. 93-1, p. 252 (1973). In his statement, Congressman Dingell cited H.R.Rep. No. 92-1401, pp. 31-33 (1972), which quoted with approval from Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U. S. 91, and discussed two federal common law nuisance actions then being pursued by the Department of Justice against alleged polluters. See also Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. at 451 U. S. 343-344 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting).
"The objective of this chapter is to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters."
"The Congress declares that it is the policy of the United States to regulate the dumping of all types of materials into ocean waters and to prevent or strictly limit the dumping into ocean waters of any material which would adversely affect human health, welfare, or amenities, or the marine environment, ecological systems, or economic potentialities."

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