Source: http://masscases.com/cases/app/54/54massappct49.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 01:41:06+00:00

Document:
COMMONWEALTH vs. EUSTACIO D. ALCALA.
Present: JACOBS, DREBEN, & GELINAS, JJ.
Controlled Substances. Constitutional Law, Admissions and confessions, Waiver of constitutional rights. Evidence, Admissions and confessions.
INDICTMENTS found and returned in the Superior Court Department on December 10, 1998.
The cases were heard by Francis R. Fecteau, J.
JACOBS, J. The defendant appeals from his convictions, after a bench trial in the Superior Court, of conspiracy to traffic in marijuana, G. L. c. 94C, § 40, and trafficking in marijuana in an amount more than one hundred and less than two thousand pounds, G. L. c. 94C, § 32E(a)(2). We affirm.
Factual background. A Massachusetts State trooper, working undercover as a United Parcel Service (UPS) driver, delivered four large boxes with a return address in Phoenix, Arizona, to Prestige Auto Detailing (Prestige) in Leominster. A number of State, local, and Federal officers were nearby, and an anticipatory search warrant had been obtained as part of a controlled delivery. [Note 1] The boxes contained a total of approximately 219 pounds of marijuana.
and asked to pick up a man at the Town Crier Motel in Westminster, the defendant responded that he was busy that day. However, he agreed after his friend told him that he would be paid $200. The man the defendant met at the motel told him his name was Juan and indicated he had to go to the Prestige location to pick up packages. The defendant could not remember the name of the friend who called, claiming he was paged from far away, maybe California or Arizona. He did not know where he was to go with the packages, possibly back to the hotel.
were delivered, [Note 3] support an inference of guilty knowledge of the contents of the boxes. Commonwealth v. Carrion, 407 Mass. 263 , 276 (1990) ("False statements made to the police are a standard example of admissible evidence on consciousness of guilt"). Commonwealth v. LePore, 40 Mass. App. Ct. 543 , 549 (1996) ("Indeed, his implausible reason . . . could be read as evidence of consciousness of guilt").
of the hearing, the judge stated that, because no issue had been raised as to the many factors related to confinement or coercion, he would assume the defendant was in custody for the purpose of his decision. He concluded that he believed a "full recitation of [the defendant's] Miranda warnings [was] given"; that the defendant understood and voluntarily waived his rights; and that the statement, therefore, was admissible.
Contrary to assuming that the defendant was in custody when he was interrogated, as did the judge, we independently address the issue. [Note 6] "Miranda warnings are only necessary where one is the subject of 'custody and official interrogation.' " Commonwealth v. Larkin, 429 Mass. 426 , 432 (1999), quoting from Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 297 (1990). "Whether a suspect was subject to custodial interrogation is a question of Federal constitutional law. [Citations omitted]. The defendant bears the burden of proving custody." Commonwealth v. Larkin, supra. "Once the defendant, who had the burden of going forward, had shown that the police had elicited statements from the defendant while he was in custody, there arose 'a heavy burden . . . on the government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to . . . counsel.' " Commonwealth v. Howard, 4 Mass. App. Ct. 476 , 479 (1976), quoting from Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966).
custodial interrogation has been produced. Although some ten to fifteen local, State, and Federal police and other officers were in the general vicinity, and perhaps six or seven "converge[d]" on the three men at the building, no more than two officers were with the defendant when he was interrogated. There is no indication where the questioning took place, other than it occurred at the Prestige site, or how much time elapsed before the defendant signed a document setting forth the questions put to him and his responses. There is no evidence that the defendant was under arrest or was confined or handcuffed at the time of the interrogation or that the circumstances of the questioning were intimidating. The trooper testified that he spoke to the defendant in English, and had no problem understanding the defendant, who responded in English and was not reluctant to talk. The questions themselves, fairly read, are not accusatory or aggressive, and the defendant's answers generally were in brief narrative form. Compare Commonwealth v. Borodine, 371 Mass. 1 , 4-5 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1049 (1977).
[Note 1] The boxes first came to the attention of local police at a UPS terminal in Louisville, Kentucky. Following a determination that the boxes contained marijuana, arrangements were made to fly them to Massachusetts State police who organized the controlled delivery.
[Note 2] The officer who made these observations was nearby with a video camera and taped the delivery only up to this point because the camera's battery failed. The tape was viewed in court, and the officer provided some narrative, which is transcribed in the record. Our viewing of the tape indicates that it does not contain any significant information beyond what is reflected in the transcript.
[Note 3] In announcing his decision, the judge stated he found the defendant's statement "incredible," and that the statement was evidence of consciousness of guilt or a "consciousness of the contents."
[Note 4] Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
[Note 5] Ordinarily the admissibility of a statement is to be determined in a pretrial hearing. Here, the defendant had filed a motion to suppress, and a hearing had been held by another judge who denied the motion. However, the defendant's statement was not at issue in that hearing. Our record does not contain the memorandum filed by that judge, but we have a transcript of that hearing, which appears to have involved only the validity of search warrants issued in Kentucky and Massachusetts and issues related to police examination of the boxes.
[Note 6] The defendant asserts the Commonwealth's argument concerning custody is made for the first time on appeal. We disagree. Although the argument is brief, the prosecutor stated to the judge that "[t]here is nothing that indicates that the environment was a police setting, where there was a number of officers around who are armed, where the defendant was out of his element. . . . [N]othing that was said nor the conditions did anything to overbear this defendant's ability to exercise his rights. . . ."
[Note 7] The defendant concedes that under "comparable facts" in these two recent cases we have ruled that the failure to introduce the card was not fatal. See Commonwealth v. Mitchell, supra at 181 (inconsequential that during voir dire officer could not recall exact rights read to defendant in view of testimony that he read the rights from a Miranda card, and the defendant specifically indicated he understood his rights); Commonwealth v. Rendon-Alvarez, supra at 141 (not error for judge to conclude defendant was properly warned although officer could not recall all the warnings, where defendant had been given card to read at roadside and later warnings were read to defendant from such a card). See also Commonwealth v. Preston, 359 Mass. 368 , 372 & n.2 (1971) (affirming judge's finding that Miranda warnings given based on officer's testimony and that defendant was shown a card). The present case is unlike Commonwealth v. Ayala, 29 Mass. App. Ct. 592 , 598 (1990), and Commonwealth v. Coplin, 34 Mass. App. Ct. 478 , 481-483 (1993), where one of the four warnings was omitted.
While it is good practice to introduce Miranda cards in evidence, see Commonwealth v. Lewis, 374 Mass. 203 , 204-205 (1978), it has not been held, in the cases cited to us, that the failure to do so undermines a judicial finding, based on all the evidence, that Miranda warnings had been given. Such findings have support in the fact that "Miranda has become embedded in routine police practice to the point where the warnings have become part of our national culture." Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 444 (2000).
[Note 8] The defendant, in additional arguments (raised for the first time in this appeal, and, therefore, not considered by us), notes that the rulings of Mitchell and Rendon-Alvarez did not consider the best evidence rule, complains that a police officer's testimony is incompetent evidence of what is actually on a Miranda card, and argues the best evidence rule as further justification for requiring the introduction of the card in evidence.

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