Source: http://www.juricaf.org/arret/CONSEILDELEUROPE-COUREUROPEENNEDESDROITSDELHOMME-19831013-937081
Timestamp: 2016-12-11 14:27:29+00:00

Document:
Type d'affaire : DecisionType de recours : Violation de l'Art. 6-1 ; Préjudice moral - constat de violation suffisant ; Remboursement frais et dépens - procédure nationale ; Remboursement frais et dépens - procédure de la ConventionNumérotation : Numéro d'arrêt : 9370/81Identifiant URN:LEX : urn:lex;coe;cour.europeenne.droits.homme;arret;1983-10-13;9370.81 Parties : Demandeurs : G.Défendeurs : ROYAUME-UNITexte : APPLICATION I REQUÃTE NÂ° 9370/8 1 G . v/the UNITED KINGDOM G . c/ROYAUME-UN I DECISION of 13 October 1983 on the admissibility of the application . DECISION du 13 octobre 1983 sur la recevabilitÃ© de la requÃªte .
Article 6, paragraph 1, of the Convention : When a charge is based solely on the confession of the accused, without the benefit of legal advice, a procedure must exist whereby the admissibiliry of such evidence can be examined. Article 6, paragraph 3 (c), of the Convention : Does this provision guarantee ihe right to legal advice when a suspected person is being questioned by ihe police, but not -vet charged with an ofence ? (Question not decided) . Article 6, paragraphe 1, de la Convention : Larsque !'accusation repose uniquement sur des aveux faits par l'accusÃ© sans avoir pu consulter un avocat, il doit exister une procÃ©dure permettant d'examiner (a valeur de ce moyen de preuve (En 1'espÃ¨ce, procÃ©dure anglaise de Â»voire dire Â») . Article 6, paragraphe 3, litt . c), de la Convendon : Cette disposition garantit-elfe le droit de pouvoir Ãªtre assistÃ© d'un avocat Ã celui qui est entendu par la police comme suspect mais n'est pas encore inculpÃ©? (Question non rÃ©solue) .
(franÃ§ais : voir p . 81 )
The facts as they have been submitted by the applicant, a British citizen born in 1943, who was imprisoned at the time of introducing his application, but has since been released and is living in Blackburn, may be summarised as follows : The applicant was arrested at approximately 16 h(10 on 4 January 1980 in connection with a burglary . The applicant states that he was arrested when he accompanied his girl-friend to a meeting with a police officer, at which she was to be interviewed on an unspecified matter .
On being arrested, the applicant asked his girl-friend to contact his solicitor and ensure that the latter came immediately to Blackburn Central Police Station, to which the applicant was then taken . On arrival at the police station, the applicant was questioned intermittently for a period of six hours- during which he maintains that he repeatedly requested permission to telephone his solicitor, but was told that he would not be allowed to see or speak with a solicitor until he had admitted his involvereenm in the offence in question . He was further told that he would not be granted Sail until he had confessed to the offence, but that if he did so confess, bail would be granted . The applicant maintains that he was manhandled during his questioning . According to evidence,which was given at the applicant's trial and accepted .by the trial judge, the applicant's solicitor sought to see the applicant on three occasions during this period of questioning, but was not permitted to do so . The applicant contends that the police officer questioning him informed the applicant that he proposed to arrest and detain the applicant's girl-friend, who was three months pregnant, unless the applicant signed a confession statement relÃ¢ting to the offence . On hearing this the applicant maintains that he again asked to see his solicitor- but was told that he could only see his solicitor after he had provided a confession statement . The applicant then provided a confession statement, which he signed . The applicant was then formally charged at 22 h 40 with the offence of theft and granted bail : Ten minutes later he was permitted to contact his solicitor . He appeared for trial on 11 r 12 and 13 June 1980, the first day of which was spent in legal submissions on the admissibility of the applicant's confession statement . The judge accepted that the applicant's solicitor had sought to see his client beforethe confession statement had been signed- but had been refused the opportunity to do so by the police . She did not accept, however, that the applicant had requested the police to pertnit him to see his solicitor, in the face of police evidence that the applicant had made no such request . The judge accordingly ruled that the confession statement was admissible in evidence, since the right to demand to see a solicitor during police questioning was personal to the applicant, but she found that he had not exercised this right, and that it could not be exercised on his behalf . The judge also ruled that the applicant's confession had been given voluntarily and not under duress . On the afternoon of 12 June 1980, the judge interrvpted her summing up to the jury, since there was insufficieni time to finish it before the afternoonrecess, and adjourned the applicant's trial until the subsequent day . During this adjourrunent, the applicant's co-defendant, who had pleaded guilty to the offence, appeared .for sentencing . In the applicant's submission, a member of the jury responsible for trying him remained in the court room during part of the sentencing proceedings relating to the applicant's co-defendant, and overheard submissions which, in .the applicant' s
view, were prejudicial to the applicant's case . When the presence of thejuryman was noticed he was ushered from the court . On 13 June 1980 the jury found the applicant guilty and he was sentenced to 18 months' imprisonment . The applicant sought leave to appeal against conviction and sentence from a single judge on the grounds that the trial judge had improperly admitted the evidence relating to his confession statement, had refused to permit an adjournment of the trial to allow the applicant's girl-friend, whom he had subsequently married and who had given birth by caesarean section on 3 June 1980, to appear as a witness and that there was an irregularity with the presence of the juryman during the sentencing of the applicant's co-accused . A single judge refused the applicant leave to appeal against conviction or sentence on 20 September 1980- but the applicant renewed his application to the Full Court . on substantially similar grounds, which refused his application in turn on 25 November 1980 . On 15 December 1980 the applicant petitioned the Secretary of State, requesting him to re-open his case, but his petition was refused on 29 January 1981 . The applicant also initiated a complaint against the police officer responsible for his case, but on 24 July 1981 the applicant was informed by the Director of Public Prosecutions that there was insufficient evidence to justify the institution of criminal proceedings . The complaint was referred to the Police Complaints Board, who on 27 August 1981 notified the applicant that they accepted the decision not to pursue disciplinary charges .
THE LAW (Extract ) 4 . The applicant complains that while being questioned by the police- between his arrest at approximately 16 h 00 on 4 January 1980 and approxintately 22 h 40 on that day . he was denied the full right of defence, because he did not have access to his solicitor . The applicant invokes Article 6, para . 3 (c) of the Convention which provides : "Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights :
(c) to defend hiniself in person or through legal assistÃ¢nce of his choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require :
During the period in question, when the applicant did not have contact with his lawyer, he had not been chxrged under domestic law . The question therefore arises whether this period was covered by guarantees of Anicle 6, para . 3 (c) of the Convention, which apply to "everyone charged with a criminal offence" . The respondent Goverrunent have contended that the guarantees of Article 6, para . 3 of the Convention must be considered as aspects of the guarantee of a fair trial, provided by Article 6, para . I . In consequence they should only apply from the moment that it is clear that a trial will take place, which is the moment when the applicant is actually charged or informed that he will be prosecuted . The applicant has contended that such an approach would be inconsistent with the system of protection afforded by Articles 5 and 6 of the Convention taken together, and that in any event the applicant was told on his arrest that hÃ© was to be charged . , However the Commission is not called upon to resolve this question in the present case since it is clear that this aspect of the present application is in any event inadmissible . It appears that the applicant asked his girl-friend to contact his solicitor whe n he was arrested and ask his solicitor to go to Blackbum Central Police Station, to which the applicant was taken . The trial judge accepted that the solicitorcame to the police Station and asked to see the applicant on three occasions, finally being granted access to him after the applicant had made a confession statement and had beÃ©n charged with burglary . However the trial judge did not accept that the applicant had asked to see hi s solicitor himself during the period in question and held that this right, recognised by the Judges' Rules, could only be exercised in person . Consequently the evidence which the applicant provided during the period in question was admitted at his trial . Paragraph (c) of the Preamble to the Judges' Rules issued in 1978 provides expressly that : "These Rules do not affect the principles : (c) . . . that every person at any state of an investigation should be able to communicate and consult privately with a solicitor . This is so even if he is in custody, provided that in such a case no unreasonable delay or hindrance is caused to the processes of investigation or the administratioqof justice by his doing so ; It appears therefore that the right now claimed by the applicant before the Commission is expressly guaranteed by English law . Furthermore the applicant was able to challenge the alleged interference with his enjoyment of his right at his trial, by challenging the voluntariness of the confession statement he made while not advised by a solicitor . This challenge gave rise to the "voire dire" proceedings, in whic h
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the presiding judge examined the circumstances of the applicant's detention and heard evidence as to whether he had sought to see his solicitor . Having he ar d this evidence, the trial judge held that the applicant had not asked to see his solicitor during this period and the Commission finds no basis upon which to doubt this finding, which the applicant has not substantially challenged before the Commission . The assessment of the evidence is supported by the fact that the confession statement, which the applicant signed . was prefaced by the confirmation, attested by the applicant in person, in the following terms : "1 (the applicant) wish to make a statement . I want somebody to write down what I say . 1 have been told that I need not say anything unless I wish to do so and that whatever I say may be given in evidence . " In these circumstances, bearing in mind the protection afforded to the applicant by domestic law, the Commission concludes that this aspect of the applicant's complaint is unsubstantiated and manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27, para . 2 of the Convention . 5 . The Commission must also examine the applicant's complaint of denial of access to his solicitor in the context of his ultimate trial, the faimess of which is guaranteed by Article 6 . para . I of the Convention . In particular the Commission must consider whether the evidence obtained against the applicant during his questioning in the absence of his solicitor was fairly admitted to his trial and fairly evaluated . The Commission notes first that the applicant had the right to remain silent under English law, but that he in fact made a confession statement to the police, under alleged duress . At the applicant's subsequent trial this statement was the sole evidence against him and it was therefore essential evidence in the prosecution case . It follows that any substantial complaint relating to the propriety of such evidence would be highly relevant to the fairness of the applicant's trial . It is undisputed that when the applicant made his confession statement he was not advised by a solicitor and had been questioned by the police without contact with other persons . The Commission notes that there is no suggestion that the applicant's questioning by the police, or his separation from other persons . was intended to disorientate the applicant or had any purpose other than the investigation of a suspected criminal offence . Nevertheless, where the sole evidence against an accused is acquired in circumstances where he is not provided with access to independent legal advice, and where the accused later denies the propriety of that evidence, the guarantee of a fair trial contained in Article 6, para . I of the Convention requires a procedure whereby the validity of the evidence and its fitness for inclusion in the trial must be examined .
In this connection the Commission recalls that, although there are differing practices as to the availability of access to legal advice for persons arrested, but not yet charged with a criminal offence, in the various member states of the Council of Europe, and, as to the sufficiency of a confession as evidence for a conviction, the European systems of criminal law all incorporate various safeguards, either controlling the manner of obtaining evidence, or for assessing its subsequent probative value at the trial, where a defendant makes a substantial allegation of its impropriety . In the present case the applicant contended at his trial that his confession statement had not been made voluntarily . In particular, he alleged that he had been denied access to his solicitor and that he had been threatened by the investigating policeman . At the applicant's trial, the evidence in question was examined by the judge in the absence of jury so that the judge could examine the nature of the evidence . In this trial within a trial, or "voire dire", evidence was presented to the judge by the arresting police officer, the applicant's solicitor and the applicant in person . Having heard these persons, who would give the relevant evidence before the jury, if it was ruled admissible, the judge, who would conduct the trial before the jury, had to rule upon whether or not the evidence was admissible . The burden of proof that the confession was voluntary was on the prosecution, and as a matter of law a confession would only be admissible if it was established that it was made voluntarily . ln examining the questionof the voluntariness of the confession, the judge had also to consider the provisions'of the Judges' Rules relating to the conduct of questioning after arrest and prior to the placing of a criminal charge . Although a breach of these Rules would not automatically result in the evidence in question being mled inadmissible, it would have . required the judge to exercise a discretion as to its admissibility . . After hearing the evidence in question in the "voire dire" procedure, the Judg e ruled that the applicant's confession statement had been given voluntarily and that the Judges' Rules had not been infringed during his questioning . This .decision was not decisive for the outcome of the applicant's trial, however, since the Judge's ruling extended only to the admissibility of the evidence, the probative value of which remained for the jury to evaluate when the witnesses were examined and crossexamined before them . ' . . In these circumstances- the Commission finds that the system of guarantees for evaluating the admissibility of challenged evidence, the probative value of which was subsequently and separately examined by a ju ry , was such as to provide the applicant, who was represented by counsel throughout the proceedings, with a fair trial within the meaning of Article 6, para . I of the Convention . It follows that this pa rt of the applicant's complaint is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27, para . 2 of the Convention .
(TRADUCTION) EN FAI T Les faits - tels qu'ils ont Ã©tÃ© exposÃ©s par le requÃ©rant, ressortissant britannique nÃ© en 1943 - dÃ©tenu au moment du dÃ©pAt de sa requÃ¨te . mais libÃ©rÃ© depuis lors et habitant Blackburn - peuvent se rÃ©sumer comme suit . Le requÃ©rant fut arrÃªtÃ© aux environs de 16 heures le 4 janvier 1980 Ã l'occasion d'un cambriolage . Il affirme que l'arrestation a eu lieu alors qu'il accompagnait son amie Ã un entretien avec un officier de police qui devait l'interroger sur une question qu'il n'a pas prÃ©cisÃ©e . Au moment de son arrestation, le requÃ©rant a priÃ© son amie de prÃ©venir son avocat et de veiller Ã ce que ce demier se rende immÃ©diatement au commissariat central de Blackburn oÃ¹ le requÃ©rant a Ã©tÃ© amenÃ© . A son arrivÃ©e au commissariat, le requÃ©rant fut interrogÃ© de maniÃ¨re intermittente pendant six heures . Il soutient avoir demandÃ© Ã plusieurs reprises pendant cette pÃ©riode l'autorisation de tÃ©lÃ©phoner Ã son avocat mais il lui fut rÃ©pondu qu'il ne serait autorisÃ© Ã voir l'avocat ou Ã lui parler que lorsqu'il aurait reconnu avoir participÃ© au dÃ©lit en question . Il lui fut indiquÃ© en outre qu'il ne pourrait obtenir sa mise en libertÃ© sous caution que s'il passait aux aveux, sinon cette libÃ©ration ne serait pas accordÃ©e . Le requÃ©rant affirme avoir Ã©tÃ© brUtalisÃ© pendant l'interrogatoire . Selon des tÃ©ntoignages fournis lors du procÃ¨s du requÃ©rant et admis par le juge, l'avocat a cherchÃ© Ã voir son client Ã trois reprises pendant la pÃ©riode d'interrogatoire mais n'y a pas Ã©tÃ© autorisÃ© . Le requÃ©rant prÃ©tend que l'officier de police qui l'interrogeait l'a informÃ© qu'il se proposait d'arrÃ©ter et d'incarcÃ©rer son amie, enceinte de trois mois, s'il ne signait pas les aveux concernant l'infraction . En entendant cela, le requÃ©rant aurait, dit-il, Ã nouveau demandÃ© Ã voir son avocat mais se serait entendu rÃ©pondre qu'il ne pourrait le voir qu'aprÃ¨s Ã¨tre passÃ© aux aveux . Le requÃ©rant fit alors des aveux qu'il signa A 22 h 40 . il fut officiellement inculpÃ© de vol, admis au bÃ©nÃ©fice de la libertÃ© sous caution et reÃ§ut dix minutes plus tard l'autorisation de prendre contact avec son avocat . Il fut traduit en justice les 11, 12 et 13 juin 1980 et le premierjour du procÃ¨s fut consacrÃ© Ã un dÃ©bat juridique sur la recevabilitÃ© des aveux du requÃ©rant . Le juge admit que l'avocat du requÃ©rant avait cherchÃ© Ã voir son client avant la signature des aveux mais que la police lui avait refusÃ© l'entretien . Cependant, le juge ne considÃ©ra pas comme Ã©tabli que le requÃ©rant avait demandÃ© Ã la police l'autorisation de voir son avocat, la police soutenant le contraire . Le juge dÃ©cida en consÃ©quence que les aveux Ã©taient recevables comme moyen de preuve, puisque le droit d'exiger de voir un avocat pendant l'interrogatoire de police est un droit personnel au requÃ©rant, qu e
l'intÃ©ressÃ© ne l'avait pas exercÃ© et que personne ne pouvait le faire Ã sa place . Le juge dÃ©clara Ã©galement que les aveux du requÃ©rant avaient Ã©tÃ© fournis spontanÃ©ment et non sous la contrainte . Dans l'aprÃ¨s-midi du 12 juin 1980, le juge interrompit son rÃ©sumÃ© Ã l'intention du jury car il ne restait pas suffisamment de temps pour le terminer avant la suspension du soir et ajourna le procÃ¨s au lendemain . Pendant cet ajoumement, le coaccusÃ© du requÃ©rant, qui avait plaidÃ© coupable, comparut pour le dÃ©bat sur la peine . Selon le requÃ©rant, un membre du jury devant se prononcer sur soncas demeura dans la salle d'audience pendant une partie de la procÃ©dure concernant le coaccusÃ© et entendit des plaidoiries qui, selon le requÃ©rant, lui Ã©taient dÃ©favorables . Lorsque la prÃ©sence du jurÃ© fut remarquÃ©Ã© . il fut expulsÃ© de la salle .
. Le 13juin 1980, le jury dÃ©clara le requÃ©rant coupable et le condamna Ã 18 mois de prison . Le requÃ©rant demanda l'autorisation de faire appel de cette condamnation en invoquant les moyens suivants : a) le juge de premiÃ¨re instance s'Ã©tait prononcÃ© Ã tort pour .la recevabilitÃ© des aveux comme moyen de preuve ; b) le juge avait refusÃ© d'ajoumer le procÃ¨s pour permettre Ã l'amie du requÃ©rant - devenue sa femme entre temps et qui avait accouchÃ© par cÃ©sarienne le 3 juin 1980 - de comparaitre comme tÃ©moin et c) la prÃ©sence du jurÃ© pendant les dÃ©bats relatifs Ã la peine du coaccusÃ© Ã©tait irrÃ©guliÃ©re . L'autorisation de faire appel de la condamnation ou de la peine fut refusÃ©e pa r un juge unique le 20 septembre 1980, mais le requÃ©rant renouvela sa demande devant la cour plÃ©niÃ¨re, en invoquant pour l'essentiel des moyens analogues, et se vit Ã nouveau refuser sa demande le 25 novembre 1980 . Le 15 dÃ©cembre 1980, il s'adressa au Ministre pour lui demander de rouvrir son dossier mais sa demande fut rejetÃ©e le 29 janvier 1981 .Le requÃ©rant porta plainte Ã©galement contre l'officier de police responsable de l'affaire, mais fut informÃ© par le parquet le 24 juillet 1981 que les preuves Ã©taient insuffisantes pour justifier l'ouverture de poursuites pÃ©nales . La plainte fut renvoyÃ©e Ã la commission des dolÃ©ances Ã la police qui, le 27 ao0t 1981, informa le requÃ©rant qu'elle se rangeait Ã la dÃ©cision de ne pas engager une action disciplinaire
. EN DROIT (Extrait ) Le requÃ©rant se plaint de ce que, pendant son interrogatoire par la police, soit le 4 janvier 1980 entre 16-heures environ (moment de son arrestation) et 22 h 40 environ, il s'est vu refuser la jouissance plÃ©niÃ¨re de son droit Ã la dÃ©fense puisqu'i l
n'a pas eu accÃ¨s Ã son avocat . Il invoque Ã cet Ã©gard l'article 6, par . 3 c) de la Convention, ainsi libellÃ© : Â«Tout accusÃ© a droit notamment Ã :
Pendant la pÃ©riode oÃ¹ le requÃ©rant n'a pas pu entrer en contact avec son avocat, il n'Ã©tait pas inculpÃ© au regard du droit inteme . La question se pose donc de savoir si les garanties de l'article 6, par . 3 c), qui bÃ©nÃ©ficient Ã .tout accusÃ©-, s'appliquent Ã cette pÃ©riode . Le Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur a soutenu que les garanties posÃ©es Ã l'article 6, par . 3, de la Convention doivent Ã©tre considÃ©rÃ©es comme des Ã©lÃ©ments de la garantie d'Ã©quitÃ© du procÃ¨s, prÃ©vue Ã l'article 6, par . I . Elles doivent dÃ¨s lors s'appliquer Ã partir du moment oÃ¹ il est clair qu'un procÃ¨s aura lieu, c'est-Ã -dire le moment oÃ¹ le requÃ©rant est effectivement inculpÃ© ou informÃ© qu'il va faire l'objet de poursuites . Le requÃ©rant a soutenu, de son cÃ´tÃ©, qu'une telle approche serait incompatible avec le systÃ¨me de protection offert par les articles 5 et 6 de la Convention lus conjointement et que, d'ailleurs au moment de son arrestation, le requÃ©rant a Ã©tÃ© informÃ© qu'il serait inculpÃ© . La Commission n'est cependant pas appelÃ©e Ã trancher la question en l'espÃ¨ce car il est Ã©vident que cet aspect de la requÃªte est irrecevable, quoi qu'il en soit . II apparait en effet que le requÃ©rant a demandÃ© Ã son amie, au moment de son arrestation, de contacter son avocat pour le prier de se rendre au commissariat de police de Blackburn, oÃ¹ il a Ã©tÃ© amenÃ© . Le juge de premier instance a admis que l'avocat s'Ã©tait effectivement rendu au commissariat de police et avait demandÃ© par trois fois Ã voir son client, qu'on lui avait finalement accordÃ© ce droit aprÃ¨s que le requÃ©rant eut signÃ© ses aveux et eut Ã©tÃ© inculpÃ© du chef de cambriolage . Cependant, lejuge n'a pas admis que le requÃ©rant ait demandÃ© lui-mÃ¨me Ã voir son avocat pendant la pÃ©riode en question et a dÃ©clarÃ© que ce droit, reconnu par le RÃ¨glement Ã l'usage des magistrats, ne peut Ãªtre exercÃ© que par l'intÃ©ressÃ© lui-mÃ¨me . En consÃ©quence, les dÃ©clarations faites par le requÃ©rant durant la pÃ©riode en question pouvaient Ã©tre prise en considÃ©ration Ã son procÃ¨s .
Le paragraphe c) du prÃ©ambule du RÃ¨glement Ã l'usage des magistrats, Ã©dictÃ© en 1978, stipule expressÃ©ment que : - le prÃ©sent RÃ¨glement n'affecte pas les principes selon lesquel s c) . : . toute personne doit Ãªtre en mesure, Ã n'importe quel stade de l'enquÃ¨te, de s'entretenir sans tÃ©moin avec un avocat pour le consulter . Il en est ainsi mÃªme si l'intÃ©ressÃ© est sous garde Ã vue, Ã condition cependant que cette consultation ne retarde ni n'entrave de maniÃ©re dÃ©raisonnable le dÃ©roulement de l'enquÃªte ou l'administration de la justice ; Il apparait dÃ¨s lors que le droit revendiquÃ© par le requÃ©rant devant la Commission est expressÃ©ment garanti par le droit anglais . En outre, le requÃ©rant a pu contester l'atteinte allÃ©guÃ©e Ã la jouissance de ce droit au moment de son procÃ¨s, en niant le caractÃ¨re spontanÃ© des aveux qu'il avait faits sans Ãªtre conseillÃ© par un avocat . Cette contestation a donnÃ© lieu Ã une procÃ©dure prÃ©judicielle ( Â« voire direâ¢) dans laquelle le juge prÃ©sident a examinÃ© les conditions de la dÃ©tention du requÃ©rant et recueilli des tÃ©moignages sur le point de savoir si l'intÃ©ressÃ© avait ou non cherchÃ© Ã voir son avocat . AprÃ¨s avoir entendu ces tÃ©moignages, le juge de premiÃ¨re instance a dÃ©clarÃ© que le requÃ©tant n'avait pas demandÃ© Ã voirson avocat pendant cette pÃ©riode et la Commission ne voit aucune raison de mettre en doÃ»te cette conclusion, que le requÃ©rant n'a pas d'ailleurs sÃ©rieusement contestÃ©e devant elle . ' Cette apprÃ©ciation des faits est corroborÃ©e par la dÃ©claration figurant en tÃªte des aveux signÃ©s par le requÃ©rant et certifiÃ©e par lui en personne dans les termes suivants : -Je (le requÃ©rant) dÃ©sire faire une dÃ©claration et souhaite que quelqu'un mette par Ã©crit ce que jevais dire . J'ai Ã©tÃ© informÃ© que je ne suis pas tenu de dire quoi que ce soit si je ne le dÃ©sire pas et que tout ce que je dirai pourra Ãªtre retenu contre moi . Â» Dans ces conditions, vu la protection offerte au requÃ©rant par le droit inteme, la Commission estime que cet aspect du grief du requÃ©rant n'est pas Ã©tayÃ© et qu'il est manifestement mal fondÃ© au sens de l'article 27, par . 2 de la Convention . 5 . La Commission doit Ã©galement examiner le grief selon lequel le requÃ©rant se serait vu refuser l'accÃ¨s Ã son avocat dans le contexte de sonprocÃ¨s, dont l'article 6, par . I de la Convention lui garantit le caraaÃ©re Ã©quitable . La Commission doit notamment examiner si les preuves Ã charge du requÃ©rant , obtenues pendant son interrogatoire en l'absence de son avocat, ont Ã©tÃ© Ã juste titre recevables au procÃ¨s et ont fait l'objet d'une apprÃ©ciation correcte . La Commission relÃ¨ve tout d'abord que le requÃ©rant avait, au regard du droit anglais, le droit de conserver le silence mais qu'il a en rÃ©alitÃ© signÃ© des aveux Ã lÃ¢ police, prÃ©tendument sous la contrainte . Lors de son procÃ¨s, cette dÃ©claration d'aveux Ã©tait l'unique preuve Ã charge et constituait donc l'Ã©lÃ©ment essentiel d e
l'accusation . DÃ¨s lors, tout grief fondÃ© concernant le point de savoir s'il fallait ou non accueillir cette preuve serait hautement peninent pourjuger de l'Ã©quitÃ© du procÃ¨s du requÃ©rant . Il n'est pas contestÃ© que lorsque le requÃ©rant a signÃ© ses aveux, il n'avait pas Ã©tÃ© conseillÃ© par un avocat et avait Ã©tÃ© interrogÃ© par la police sans entrer en contact avec des tiers . La Commission relÃ©ve qu'il n'est pas allÃ©guÃ© que l'interrogatoire du requÃ©rant par la police et son isolement aient eu pour but de le dÃ©sorienter ou un objectif autre que l'enquÃªte menÃ©e sur une infraction pÃ©nale prÃ©sumÃ©e . NÃ©anmoins, lorsque l'unique preuve contre un accusÃ© est obtenue dans des conditions oÃ¹ l'intÃ©ressÃ© ne peut pas bÃ©nÃ©ficier d'un avis juridique indÃ©pendant et lorsque l'accusÃ© nie ensuite la valeur de cette preuve, la garantie d'Ã©quitÃ© du procÃ¨s figurant Ã l'ariicle 6 . par . I de la Convention exige une procÃ©dure permettant d'examiner si la preuve est valable et s'il convient d'en tenir compte dans le procÃ¨s . A cet Ã©gard, la Commission rappelle que les Etats membres du Conseil de l'Europe ont certes des pratiques diverses quant Ã la possibilitÃ© de consulter un avocat, s'agissant d'une personne arrÃªtÃ©e mais non encore inculpÃ©e d'une infraction pÃ©nale- ainsi que quant au caractÃ¨re suffisant de l'aveu comme preuve pour justifier une condamnation . Cependant, les systÃ¨mes europÃ©ens de droit pÃ©nal ont tous prÃ©vu diverses protections, soit pour contrÃ´ler les modalitÃ©s d'obtention de la preuve, soit pour en apprÃ©cier ultÃ©rieurement la valeur probante lors du procÃ¨s si l'accusÃ© conteste sÃ©rieusement celle-ci . En l'espÃ¨ce, le requÃ©rant a soutenu lors de son procÃ¨s que ses aveux n'avaient pas Ã©tÃ© spontanÃ©s . Il a allÃ©guÃ© notamment qu'il s'Ã©tait vu refuser la possibilitÃ© de prendre contact avec son avocat et avait Ã©tÃ© menacÃ© par le policier enquÃªteur . Lors du procÃ¨s, le juge a examinÃ© ce moyen de preuve en l'absence du jury : il a donc pu en examiner la nature . Dans cette procÃ©dure incidente au cours du procÃ¨s, ou examen prÃ©judiciel (-voire dire-), des moyens de preuve ont Ã©tÃ© soumis au juge par le policier qui a procÃ©dÃ© Ã l'arrestation, par l'avocat du requÃ©rant et par le requÃ©rant lui-mÃ¨me . AprÃ¨s avoir entendu ces personnes qui auraient Ã faire devant le jury les dÃ©clarations y affÃ©rentes si elles Ã©taient jugÃ©es recevables, le juge qui dirigeait la procÃ©dure devant le jury a dÃ» dÃ©cider de leur recevabilitÃ© . C'est Ã l'accusation qu'incombait la charge de prouver que les aveux Ã©taient spomanÃ©s et, juridiquement . l'aveu n'est recevable que s'il est Ã©tabli qu'il a Ã©tÃ© fait spontanÃ©ment . En examinant la spontanÃ©itÃ© des aveux, le juge a dÃ¹ avoir Ã©gard aux dispositions du â¢RÃ¨glement Ã l'usage des ntagistrats- concernant la maniÃ©re de conduire l'interrogatoire aprÃ©s arrestation et avant inculpation . Bien qu'une infraction Ã ce RÃ¨glement ne conduise pas automatiquement Ã rejeter la preuve en question comme irrecevable- elle eÃ»t obligÃ© le juge Ã user de son pouvoir d'apprÃ©ciation quant Ã la recevabilitÃ© de l'aveu .
AprÃ¨s avoir entendu ces dÃ©clarations dans la procÃ©dure prÃ©judicielle, le juge a dÃ©cidÃ© que les aveux avaient Ã©tÃ© fournis spontanÃ©ment par le requÃ©rant et que l'interrogatoire n'avait pas enfreint le RÃ¨glement Ã l'usage des magistrats . Cette dÃ©cision prÃ©judicielle n'Ã©tait cependant pas dÃ©terminante pour l'issue du procÃ¨s, puisqu'elle ne concernait que la recevabilitÃ© de la preuve, donflajury devait apprÃ©cier le poids aprÃ¨s interrogatoire et contre-interrogatoire des tÃ©moins en sa prÃ©sence . Dans ces conditions, la Commission estime que le systÃ©me de garanties prÃ©vu pour apprÃ©cier la recevabilitÃ© de la preuve contestÃ©e, dont un jury a Ã©valuÃ© ensuite et sÃ©parÃ©ment le poids, Ã©tait de nature Ã foumir au requÃ©rant, que son avocat a reprÃ©sentÃ© tout au long du procÃ¨s, un procÃ s Ã©quitable au sens de l'anicle 6, par . 1 de la Convention . 11 s'ensuit que le grief formulÃ© par le requÃ©rant est, sur ce point, manifÃ©stemen t mal fondÃ©, au sens de l'article 27, par . 2 de la Convention .
- 86 -Origine de la décision Pays : Conseil de l'EuropeJuridiction : Cour européenne des droits de l'hommeFormation : Cour (chambre)Date de la décision : 13/10/1983Fonds documentaire : HUDOC Haut de page

References: l'article 6
 l'article 6
 l'article 6
 l'article 6
 l'article 27
 l'article 6
 l'article 27