Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/295/1/
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 10:57:04+00:00

Document:
1. An Executive Order setting aside a nonnavigable lake on the public domain as a bird reservation was within the authority of the President, though made before the effective date of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act of July 3, 1918. P. 295 U. S. 10.
2. Title to land within the meander line of a nonnavigable lake on the public domain did not pass to the State as an incident to ownership of abutting uplands granted by the United States as school land, where, prior to approval of the survey of the uplands, the lake had been set aside by Executive Order as a federal reservation. P. 295 U. S. 9.
3. Acceptance by a other lands in lieu of lands within the meander line of a nonnavigable lake adjacent to uplands granted it as school lands held a practical construction of the boundary and a relinquishment of a claim to title within the meander. P. 295 U. S. 10.
4. In a suit by the United States against a State to quiet title to the bed of a lake on which the State owns part of the uplands bordering the meander line, the owners of other parts of the uplands in like situation are not necessary parties, and their rights will not be affected by the decree. P. 295 U. S. 12.
5. Upon the admission of a State to the Union, the title of the United States to lands underlying navigable waters within the State passes to it, as incident to the transfer to the local sovereignty, and is subject only to the paramount power of the United States to control such waters for purposes of navigation in interstate and foreign commerce. P. 295 U. S. 14.
6. But if the waters are not navigable in fact, the title of the United States to land underlying them remains unaffected by the creation of the new State. P. 295 U. S. 14.
7. In determining whether title to lands underlying waters passed to the State in virtue of its admission to statehood, the question whether the waters were navigable or nonnavigable is a federal question, which is to be determined according to the laws and usages applied by the federal courts, even though the waters are not capable of use for navigation in interstate or foreign commerce. P. 295 U. S. 14.
8. The test of navigability is whether the body of water in question, in its natural and ordinary condition, is susceptible of use for navigation in the customary modes of trade and travel over water, and has capacity for general and common usefulness for trade and commerce. P. 295 U. S. 15.
Upon the evidence in this case, Malheur, Mud, and Harney Lakes, and connecting waters in Oregon, are adjudged to have been nonnavigable at the time of admission of the State and since. Pp. 295 U. S. 8, 295 U. S. 16 et seq.
9. Previous recognition of the nonnavigable character of a lake on the public domain, by the Secretary of the Interior and by the state courts, is significant in determining the question. P. 295 U. S. 23.
10. A bill to quiet title may not be defeated by showing that the plaintiff's interest, otherwise sufficient to support the bill, may be subject to possibly superior rights in third persons not parties to the suit. It is enough that the interest asserted by the plaintiff in possession of land is superior to that of those who are parties defendant. P. 295 U. S. 24.
11. A possession under color and claim of title which is sufficient to preclude the claimant from trying the title in ejectment is an adequate basis for a suit in equity to remove clouds created by assertions of an inferior title by another. P. 295 U. S. 25.
12. The United States has complete control, free from restriction or limitation by the States, over the disposition of title to its lands; the construction of its grants is a federal question, and involves the consideration of state questions only insofar as it may be determined as a matter of federal law that the United States had impliedly adopted and assented to a state rule of construction as applicable to its conveyance. P. 295 U. S. 27.
bed of a nonnavigable lake, nor upon the interest in the bed that may have passed to others as incidents of grants of the United States conveying abutting uplands. Pp. 295 U. S. 26, 295 U. S. 28.
Original suit brought by the United States against the State of Oregon to quiet title to unsurveyed land within a meander line purporting to mark the boundaries of lands underlying three lakes, and waters connecting them, in that State. For decree, see post, p. 295 U. S. 701.
that the common law rule, applied by this Court in Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U. S. 371, that a conveyance of land bounded upon the waters of a nonnavigable lake carries by implications to the center of the lake, does not obtain in Oregon, especially in the case of lakes of the size of Malheur and Harney. It insists that grants by the United States of lands within the State, like those of a private individual, are to be construed in accordance with state law, and that, by the common and statute law of Oregon, a conveyance of the uplands bordering on a nonnavigable lake, by the owner of the lake bed to any grantee, vests title to the bed in the State. Other questions of minor importance will be considered as it is found necessary to deal with them in the course of the opinion.
Bird Treaty Act, approved July 3, 1918, c. 128, 40 Stat. 755, we conclude that the master's determination was correct. See United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U. S. 459, 236 U. S. 469-475; United States v. Morrison, 240 U. S. 192, 240 U. S. 210; see also the Act for the Protection of Game Birds of June 28, 1906, c. 3565, 34 Stat. 536.
In the view we take of the issues which are decisive of the present controversy between the United States and Oregon, it is unnecessary to determine the rights in the disputed area of the owners, other than Oregon, of uplands bordering on the meander line boundary, whether their claims are based upon reliction or the acquisition of an interest as an incident to the grants by the United States of uplands bordering the meander line. Nor is it necessary to determine whether any part of the meander line is correct upon which the lands of such upland owners border. As they are not parties, their rights cannot be affected by any decree to be entered in the present suit. Priest v. Las Vegas, 232 U. S. 604. Adjudication of their rights, as will be later pointed out, is not prerequisite to maintenance of the present suit or to entry of an appropriate decree.
Dominion over navigable waters and property in the soil under them are so identified with the sovereign power of Government that a presumption against their separation from sovereignty must be indulged, in construing either grants by the sovereign of the lands to be held in private ownership or transfer of sovereignty itself. See Massachusetts v. New York, 271 U. S. 65, 271 U. S. 89. For that reason, upon the admission of a State to the Union, the title of the United States to lands underlying navigable waters within the State passes to it, as incident to the transfer to the State of local sovereignty, and is subject only to the paramount power of the United States to control such waters for purposes of navigation in interstate and foreign commerce. But, if the waters are not navigable in fact, the title of the United States to land underlying them remains unaffected by the creation of the new State. See United States v. Utah, supra, 283 U. S. 75; Oklahoma v. Texas, supra, 258 U. S. 583, 258 U. S. 591. Since the effect upon the title to such lands is the result of federal action in admitting a State to the Union, the question whether the waters within the State under which the lands lie are navigable or nonnavigable is a federal, not a local, one. It is therefore to be determined according to the law and usages recognized and applied in the federal courts, even though, as in the present case, the waters are not capable of use for navigation in interstate or foreign commerce. United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U. S. 49, 270 U. S. 55-56; United States v. Utah, supra, 283 U. S. 75; Brewer-Elliott Oil & Gas Co. v. United States, 260 U. S. 77, 260 U. S. 87.
It is not denied that this finding embodies the appropriate tests of navigability as laid down by the decisions of this Court. See United States v. Holt State Bank, supra, 270 U. S. 56; United States v. Utah, supra, 283 U. S. 76; Brewer-Elliott Oil & Gas Co. v. United States, supra, 260 U. S. 86; Oklahoma v. Texas, supra, 258 U. S. 586; Economy Light & Power Co. v. United States, 256 U. S. 113, 256 U. S. 123; United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U. S. 690, 174 U. S. 698; The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. 557, 77 U. S. 563. The only attack upon it is that it is not adequately supported by the evidence.
between three and four feet in depth. [Footnote 2] The areas which would be covered by water of depth sufficient to float boats are shown not to be continuous enough to afford channels or waterways capable of use in navigation. At a surface elevation of 4,093 feet, the water is so shallow for long distances from the meander line as to preclude passage over it by boats, and, with the water reduced to lower levels by seasonal evaporation, the same area becomes mud or dry land. With a reduction of only one foot in water surface elevation, approximately 11,716 acres otherwise covered by water become mud or dry land, and other marked changes in the distribution of depths are produced. With the reduction in water surface attending the usual dry season of the summer, much of the area is made up of small lakes or ponds, separated by mud or dry land.
The evidence, taken as a whole, clearly establishes the flat topography of the disputed area, the shallow water without defined banks, ice-bound from three to four months of the year, the separation of areas covered by water of sufficient depth to float boats, the presence of tules and other forms of water vegetation, a dry season every year, and frequent dry years during which Mud and Harney Lakes are almost entirely without water and Lake Malheur is reduced to a relatively few acres of disconnected ponds surrounded by mud. These conditions preclude the use for navigation of the area in question, in its natural and ordinary condition, according to the customary modes of trade or travel over water, and establish an absence of that capacity for general and common usefulness for purposes of trade and commerce which is essential to navigability. See United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., supra, 174 U. S. 698. At most, the evidence shows such an occasional use of boats, sporadic and ineffective, as has been observed, on lakes, streams, or ponds large enough to float a boat, but which nevertheless were held to lack navigable capacity. See United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., supra, 174 U. S. 699; The Montello, 20 Wall. 430, 87 U. S. 442; Leovy v. United States, 177 U. S. 621, 177 U. S. 627, 177 U. S. 633; North American Dredging Co. v. Mintzer, 245 F. 297; Toledo Liberal Shooting Co. v. Erie Shooting Club, supra, 682; Harrison v. Fite, 148 F. 781, 786.
a swamp or marsh," and again as a "vast marsh or tule swamp with comparatively little open water." The Oregon Supreme Court, in cases involving the correctness of the present or previous meander lines, has repeatedly recognized that Lake Malheur is nonnavigable. See French Glenn Live Stock Co. v. Springer, 35 Or. 312, 323, 58 P. 102; 185 U. S. 185 U.S. 47, 185 U. S. 53; Cawlfield v. Smyth, 69 Or. 41, 42, 138 P. 227; Bailey v. Malheur & H.L. Irrigation Co., 36 Or. 54, 55, 57 P. 910; In re Rights to Use of Waters of Silvies River, 115 Or. 27, 34, 237 P. 322.
U.S. 220, 194 U. S. 223-234. It is enough that the interest asserted by the plaintiff in possession of land is superior to that of those who are parties defendant. Before Oregon was admitted to statehood, the United States is shown to have acquired title which it has never in terms conveyed away. Its possession and claim of title have ever since continued. The Executive Order setting aside the area in question as a bird reservation was an assertion of title and possession. Following the order, as the master found, the United States, through representatives of the Department of Agriculture, particularly a resident protector or warden, has taken active control of all the lands within the meander line. In the exercise of that control, it has excluded hunters, erected posts marking the limits of the reservation, posted notices advising all persons of the existence of the reservation, and warning them to refrain from hunting on it. This possession of the United States, under color and claim of title, is not shown to have been disputed or interfered with. As it is sufficient to preclude any action at law in the nature of ejectment, it is an adequate basis for relief in equity to remove the cloud created by the assertion of any inferior title of the State. Wehrman v. Conklin, 155 U. S. 314, 155 U. S. 325; Allen v. Hanks, 136 U. S. 300, 136 U. S. 311; see Sharon v. Tucker, 144 U. S. 533, 144 U. S. 543-548; Lancaster v. Kathleen Oil Co., 241 U. S. 551, 241 U. S. 555. There is no course of legal procedure by which a title to land can be adjudicated as good against all the world. It is therefore unnecessary to determine whether the rule of Hardin v. Jordan, supra, applies to grants of upland fronting on Lake Malheur and Harney Lake, or what interests, if any, have been acquired in the disputed area by any of the upland owners other than Oregon. The United States is entitled to relief so far as it is able to show that Oregon is without any right or title on the basis of which it would be entitled to disturb the possession of the United States.
This was the effect of the decisions in Hardin v. Jordan, supra, Mitchell v. Smale, 140 U. S. 406, and Kean v. Calumet Canal & Imp. Co., 190 U. S. 452, in which conveyances bounded upon the waters of a nonnavigable lake were, when construed in accordance with local law, held impliedly to convey to the middle of the lake.
The rule that title to lands underlying navigable waters presumptively passes to the State upon admission to the Union has already been noted. Massachusetts v. New York, supra, 271 U. S. 89; see Scott v. Lattig, supra, 227 U. S. 242-243. But in no case has this Court held that a State could deprive the United States of its title to land under nonnavigable waters without its consent, or that a grant of uplands to private individuals, which does not in terms or by implication include the adjacent land under water, nevertheless operates to pass it to the State. Whether, on any theory, such a result could be upheld was a question expressly reserved in Hardin v. Shedd, 190 U. S. 508, 190 U. S. 519; Whitaker v. McBride, 179 U. S. 510, 179 U. S. 515; Marshall Dental Mfg. Co. v. Iowa, 226 U. S. 460, 226 U. S. 462. In none of these cases were the parties necessary for the determination of that question before the Court.
any limitation or restriction on that control. Wilcox v. Jackson, 13 Pet. 498, 38 U. S. 516-517; Gibson v. Chouteau, 13 Wall. 92, 80 U. S. 99; see Brewer-Elliott Oil & Gas Co. v. United States, supra, 260 U. S. 88; United States v. Utah, supra, 283 U. S. 75. The construction of grants by the United States is a federal, not a state, question, Packer v. Bird, 137 U. S. 661, 137 U. S. 669-670; French-Glenn Live Stock Co. v. Springer, 185 U. S. 47, 185 U. S. 54; Chapman & Dewey Lumber Co. v. St. Francis Levee District, 232 U. S. 186, 232 U. S. 196, and involves the consideration of state questions only insofar as it may be determined as a matter of federal law that the United States has impliedly adopted and assented to a State rule of construction as applicable to its conveyances. See Oklahoma v. Texas, supra, 258 U. S. 594-595; Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U. S. 389, 243 U. S. 404. In construing a conveyance by the United States of land within a State, the settled and reasonable rule of construction of the State affords an obvious guide in determining what impliedly passes to the grantee as an incident to land expressly granted. But no such question is presented here, for there is no basis for implying any intention to convey title to the State.
every grant of the United States involved in the present case. The case is not one of the reasonable construction of grants of the United States, but the attempted forfeiture to the State by legislative fiat of lands which, so far as they have not passed to the individual upland proprietors, remain the property of the United States. Such action by the State can no more affect the title of the United States than can the similar legislative pronouncements that streams within a State are navigable which this Court has found to be nonnavigable. See Oklahoma v. Texas, supra; United States v. Utah, supra, 283 U. S. 75; United States v. Holt State Bank, supra, 270 U. S. 55-56.

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