Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=82858:56696&catid=1581&Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 03:56:20+00:00

Document:
G.R. No. 163767, March 10, 2014 - REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, Petitioner, v. ROSARIO DE GUZMAN VDA. DE JOSON, Respondent.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, Petitioner, v. ROSARIO DE GUZMAN VDA. DE JOSON, Respondent.
This case concerns the discharge of the burden of proof by the applicant in proceedings for the registration of land under Section 14 (1) and (2) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree).
Since it has been established that the applicants and her predecessors–in–interest have been in the open, public, continuous, and adverse possession of the said parcel of land in the concept of an owner for more than thirty (30) years, that it, since 1926 up to the present time, applicant therefore is entitled to the registration thereof under the provisions od Act No. 496, in relation to Commonwealth Act No. 141 as amended by Republic Act No. 6236 and other existing laws.
WHEREFORE, confirming the order of general default issued in this case, the Court hereby orders the registration of this parcel of land Lot 2633, Cad 297. Case 5, Paombong Cadastre[)] described in plan Ap–03–001603 (Exhibit D, page 7 of records) and in the technical description (Exhibit F, page 5 of records) in favor of Rosario de Guzman Vda de Joson, of legal age, Filipino, widow and resident of Malolos, Bulacan.
The foregoing documentary and testimonial evidence stood unrebutted and uncontroverted by the oppositor–appellant and they should serve as proof of the paucity of the claim of the applicant–appellee over the subject property.
Upon the other hand, oppositor–appellant, in a lackluster fashion, advanced pro forma theories and arguments in its Opposition which naturally failed to merit any consideration from the court a quo and also from this Court. The indorsement from the Bureau of Forest Development, San Fernando, Pampanga to the effect that the subject area is within the unclassified region of Paombong, Bulacan does not warrant any evidentiary weight since the same had never been formally offered as evidence by the oppositor–appellant. All the other allegations in the Opposition field (sic) by the oppositor–appellant failed to persuade this Court as to the veracity thereof considering that no evidence was ever presented to prove the said allegations.
Such being the case, this Court is not inclined to have the positive proofs of her registrable rights over the subject property adduced by the applicant–appellee be defeated by the bare and unsubstantiated allegations of the oppositor–appellant.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the assailed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO.
Hence, the Republic appeals by petition for review on certiorari.
The appeal is impressed with merit.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provision of existing laws.
Section 14(1) deals with possession and occupation in the concept of an owner while Section 14(2) involves prescription as a mode of acquiring ownership. In Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic,24 the Court set the guidelines concerning land registration proceedings brought under these provisions of the Property Registration Decree in order provide clarity to the application and scope of said provisions.
The respondent sought to have the land registered in her name by alleging that she and her predecessors–in–interest had been in open, peaceful, continuous, uninterrupted and adverse possession of the land in the concept of owner since time immemorial. However, the Republic counters that the land was public land; and that it could not be acquired by prescription. The determination of the issue hinges on whether or not the land was public; if so, whether the respondent satisfactorily proved that the land had already been declared as alienable and disposable land of the public domain; and that she and her predecessors–in–interest had been in open, peaceful, continuous, uninterrupted and adverse possession of the land in the concept of owner since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Under Section 14(1), therefore, the respondent had to prove that: (1) the land formed part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain; and (2) she, by herself or through her predecessors–in–interest, had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land under a bona fide claim of ownership from June 12, 1945, or earlier.27 It is the applicant who carries the burden of proving that the two requisites have been met. Failure to do so warrants the dismissal of the application.
Nonetheless, what is left wanting is the fact that the respondent did not discharge her burden to prove the classification of the land as demanded by the first requisite. She did not present evidence of the land, albeit public, having been declared alienable and disposable by the State. During trial, she testified that the land was not within any military or naval reservation, and Frisco Domingo, her other witness, corroborated her. Although the Republic countered that the verification made by the Bureau of Forest Development showed that the land was within the unclassified region of Paombong, Bulacan as per BF Map LC No. 637 dated March 1, 1927,33 such showing was based on the 1st Indorsement dated July 22, 1977 issued by the Bureau of Forest Development,34 which the CA did not accord any evidentiary weight to for failure of the Republic to formally offer it in evidence. Still, Fiscal Reyes, in the opposition he filed in behalf of the Government, argued that the land was a portion of the Labangan Channel operated by the Pampanga River Control System, and could not be the subject of appropriation or land registration. Thus, the respondent as the applicant remained burdened with proving her compliance with the first requisite.
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the parcel of land described on lot 2633 located at San Isidro, Paombong, Bulacan as shown in the sketch plan surveyed by Geodetic Engineer Carlos G. Reyes falls within the Alienable or Disposable Land Project No. 19 of Paombong, Bulacan per Land Classification Map No. 2934 certified on October 15, 1980.
However, in its resolution of July 31, 2000,37 the CA denied her motion to admit the appellee’s brief, and expunged the appellee’s brief from the records. Seeing another opportunity to make the certification a part of the records, she attached it as Annex A of her comment here.38 Yet, that attempt to insert would not do her any good because only evidence that was offered at the trial could be considered by the Court.
To prove that the land in question formed part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, petitioners relied on the printed words which read: “This survey plan is inside Alienable and Disposable Land Area, Project No. 27–B as per L.C. Map No. 2623, certified by the Bureau of Forestry on January 3, 1968,” appearing on Exhibit “E” (Survey Plan No. Swo–13–000227).
For the original registration of title, the applicant (petitioners in this case) must overcome the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain. Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a private person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable public domain. Indeed, “occupation thereof in the concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title.” To overcome such presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be shown by the applicant. Absent such evidence, the land sought to be registered remains inalienable.
The Regalian doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the State. The applicant for land registration has the burden of overcoming the presumption of State ownership by establishing through incontrovertible evidence that the land sought to be registered is alienable or disposable based on a positive act of the government. We held in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc. that a CENRO certification is insufficient to prove the alienable and disposable character of the land sought to be registered. The applicant must also show sufficient proof that the DENR Secretary has approved the land classification and released the land in question as alienable and disposable.
Thus, the present rule is that an application for original registration must be accompanied by (1) a CENRO or PENRO Certification; and (2) a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records.
We noted in Naguit that it should be distinguished from Bracewell v. Court of Appeals since in the latter, the application for registration had been filed before the land was declared alienable or disposable. The dissent though pronounces Bracewell as the better rule between the two. Yet two years after Bracewell, its ponente, the esteemed Justice Consuelo Ynares–Santiago, penned the ruling in Republic v. Ceniza, which involved a claim of possession that extended back to 1927 over a public domain land that was declared alienable and disposable only in 1980. Ceniza cited Bracewell, quoted extensively from it, and following the mindset of the dissent, the attempt at registration in Ceniza should have failed. Not so.
To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute.
Thus, while the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that mere possession of public land for the period required by law would entitle its occupant to a confirmation of imperfect title, it did not err in ruling in favor of private respondents as far as the first requirement in Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is concerned, for they were able to overcome the burden of proving the alienability of the land subject of their application.
On the other hand, under Section 14(2), ownership of private lands acquired through prescription may be registered in the owner’s name. Did the respondent then acquire the land through prescription considering that her possession and occupation of the land by her and her predecessors–in–interest could be traced back to as early as in 1926, and that the nature of their possession and occupation was that of a bona fide claim of ownership for over 30 years?
It is clear that property of public dominion, which generally includes property belonging to the State, cannot be the object of prescription or, indeed, be subject of the commerce of man. Lands of the public domain, whether declared alienable and disposable or not, are property of public dominion and thus insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.
Let us now explore the effects under the Civil Code of a declaration by the President or any duly authorized government officer of alienability and disposability of lands of the public domain. Would such lands so declared alienable and disposable be converted, under the Civil Code, from property of the public dominion into patrimonial property? After all, by connotative definition, alienable and disposable lands may be the object of the commerce of man; Article 1113 provides that all things within the commerce of man are susceptible to prescription; and the same provision further provides that patrimonial property of the State may be acquired by prescription.
Nonetheless, Article 422 of the Civil Code states that “[p]roperty of public dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State.” It is this provision that controls how public dominion property may be converted into patrimonial property susceptible to acquisition by prescription. After all, Article 420 (2) makes clear that those property “which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth” are public dominion property. For as long as the property belongs to the State, although already classified as alienable or disposable, it remains property of the public dominion if when it is “intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth”.
Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the public dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2), and thus incapable of acquisition by prescription. It is only when such alienable and disposable lands are expressly declared by the State to be no longer intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription can begin to run. Such declaration shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by law.
It is comprehensible with ease that this reading of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree limits its scope and reach and thus affects the registrability even of lands already declared alienable and disposable to the detriment of the bona fide possessors or occupants claiming title to the lands. Yet this interpretation is in accord with the Regalian doctrine and its concomitant assumption that all lands owned by the State, although declared alienable or disposable, remain as such and ought to be used only by the Government.
Should public domain lands become patrimonial because they are declared as such in a duly enacted law or duly promulgated proclamation that they are no longer intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth, would the period of possession prior to the conversion of such public dominion into patrimonial be reckoned in counting the prescriptive period in favor of the possessors? We rule in the negative.
In other words, the period of possession prior to the reclassification of the land, no matter how long, was irrelevant because prescription did not operate against the State before then.
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on January 30, 2004; DISMISSES the application for land registration of respondent Rosario de Guzman Vda. De Joson respecting Lot 2633, Cad–297 with a total area of 12,342 square meters, more or less, situated in San Isidro, Paombong, Bulacan; and DIRECTS the respondent to pay the costs of suit.
1Rollo, pp. 29–36, penned by Associate Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr. (later Presiding Justice), with Associate Justice Buenaventura J. Guerrero (retired/deceased) and Associate Justice Regalado E. Maambong (retired/deceased) concurring.
4 Folder of Exhibits, p. 1, Exhibit “A”.
8 Folder of Exhibits, p. 5, “Exhibit “E”.
9 Id. at 7–8, Exhibit “G”.
11 Id. at 10, Exhibit “I”.
14 Supra note 3, at 8.
24 G.R. No. 179987, April 29, 2009, 587 SCRA 172.
25 G.R. No. 168184, June 22, 2009, 590 SCRA 423.
27Republic v. Dela Paz, G.R. No. 171631, November 15, 2010, 634 SCRA 610, 619, citing Mistica v. Republic, G.R. No. 165141, September 11, 2009, 599 SCRA 401, 408.
28 Folder of exhibits, pp. 7–8, Exhibit “G”.
29 Id. at 9, Exhibit “H”.
30 Id. at 10, Exhibit “I”.
31 Supra note 2, at 52.
32 Supra note 1, at 36.
35 CA Rollo, pp. 49–58.
37 CA Rollo, pp. 69–70.
39 G.R. No. 134308, December 14, 2000, 348 SCRA 128.
41 G.R. No. 154953, June 26, 2008, 555 SCRA 477.
43 G.R. No. 162322, March 14, 2012, 668 SCRA 158.
45 Supra note 24, at 195–196.

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