Source: https://www.jeremywrichter.com/page/30/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 03:29:17+00:00

Document:
Steve Evans v. W.G. Waldrop – A landlord has not acted unreasonably by refusing to allow the sublease of a commercial property based on the objections of other tenants to the nature of the proposed occupancy.
Steve Evans leased from W.G. Waldrop a piece of commercial property that was part of a shopping center. The five-year lease term began in April 1999. However, in May 2000, Evans stopped paying rent. Eventually, Waldrop sued Evans for breach of the lease agreement, and Evans asserted as a defense that Waldrop had unreasonably withheld consent from Evans to sublease the property to Miller, who wanted to operate an electronic bingo arcade on the property.
The lease between Waldrop and Evans contained a clause that required Waldrop’s written consent for Evans to sublease the property, but further provided that Waldrop could not “unreasonably” withhold his consent. The evidence at trial was that Waldrop had initially provided verbal consent to allow Evans to sublet the property to Miller, but within a couple of days, he had revoked his consent. In the meantime, Evans and Miller entered into a rental agreement, which they dissolved after Waldrop withdrew his consent to subleasing the property for use as a bingo parlor. Waldrop expressed to Evans that he did not want that type of business on the premises.
Following a non-jury trial, the court entered judgment in Waldrop’s favor in the amount of $36,000.00 for unpaid rent. Evans appealed to the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals, in the matter of Steve Evans v. W.G. Waldrop [Ms. 2150342], — So.3d — (Ala.Civ.App. 2016). The issue before the appellate court was whether Waldrop’s withholding of consent to sublet was unreasonable.
Rowley v. City of Mobile, 676 So.2d 316, 318-319 (Ala.Civ.App. 1995).
Whether the landlord acted reasonably is a question for the trier of fact. Homa-Goff Interiors, Inc. v. Cowden, 350 So.2d 1035, 1038 (Ala. 1977). In a statement of somewhat circular reasoning, the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals held in Rowley that a “landlord does not unreasonably withhold consent to an assignment unless the landlord is presented with – and rejects – a prospective assignee who … meets commercially reasonable standards.” 676 So.2d at 319.
The evidence before the court in the subject matter was not sufficient to show that Miller’s proposed business was likely to succeed. In fact, Miller had never operated a business before. Additionally, Waldrop expressed concern about the negative effect of Miller’s bingo arcade on the other businesses in the shopping center. The appellate court has previously found that the nature of a proposed tenant’s occupancy and its compatibility with established tenants are legitimate concerns for the landlord to consider. Rowley, 676 So.2d at 319.
The appellate court found that Evans did not meet the burden of showing that Waldrop acted unreasonably in withholding or revoking consent to allow Miller to sublease the property for the reasons Waldrop gave.
When Do Mileage Expenses Begin to Accrue?
Tracy Page v. Southern Care, Inc. – Where an employer is liable to pay mileage expenses under the Alabama Workers’ Compensation Act, the mileage costs to and from medical providers should be measured from the employee’s home.
In 2008, a judgment was awarded to Tracy Page and against her employer Southern Care, Inc., arising out of a workers’ compensation action, pursuant to the Alabama Workers’ Compensation Act (Ala. Code § 25-5-1 et seq.). Since that time a dispute arose as to the mileage expenses owed to Page for the years 2014 and 2015. Page claimed to be owed expenses of $7,921.80, but the trial court awarded him only $560.51. Upon appeal, he Alabama Court of Civil Appeals published its opinion on the matter on September 16, 2016. Tracy Page v. Southern Care, Inc. [Ms. 2150451], — So.3d — (Ala.Civ.App. 2016).
Under the 2008 judgment, Southern Care remained liable for Page’s future medical expenses, including payment of mileage to and from doctor and pharmacy visits. During 2014 and 2015, Page worked as a traveling nurse and frequently worked out of state. She returned home to Gadsden on the weekends. Her medical providers and pharmacy were located 86.5 miles and 7.5 miles from her home, respectively.
Page claimed the mileage she was owed was for the distances traveled back to her medical providers and pharmacy from her out-of-state work locations, rather than the mileage from her home.
The applicable law is Alabama Code 25-5-77(f), which reads: “The employer shall pay mileage costs to and from medical and rehabilitation providers at the same rate as provided by law for official state travel.” While this code section directs that an employer is responsible for the payment of mileage costs to and from medical providers, it does not state when mileage costs to the provider begin to accrue or from the provider ceases.
To answer the issue of when the mileage costs commenced and ceased, it was necessary for the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals to determine legislative intent. The legislature expressed that employers should bear only the “reasonable and fair cost” of medical services. Ex parte Southeast Alabama Med. Ctr., 835 So.2d 1042, 1050 (Ala.Civ.App. 2002). Mileage costs are considered a form of medical expenses, as they are addressed under the medical benefits portion of the Workers’ Compensation Act. See Ala. Admin. Code (Dept. of Labor), Rule 480-5-5-.36.
The appellate court found that Page should only be able to recover “reasonable and fair” mileage costs. It would be unreasonable to require Southern Care to incur the mileage costs of Page’s work-related travel, because the travel was not reasonably necessary for Page to obtain her authorized medical care. The Alabama Court of Civil Appeals upheld the trial court’s determination that Southern Care should only reimburse Page for the travel between her home and her medical provider and pharmacy.
Stated more concisely, under the Alabama Workers’ Compensation Act, specifically Alabama Code § 25-5-77(f), in all cases, mileage expenses to and from medical providers should be measured from the employee’s customary residence.
Kennamer Bros., Inc. v. Ronney Stewart – TTD benefits are owed when an employee produces substantial evidence showing that his on-the-job accident caused his injury, and the amount to be paid is the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury.
Kennamer Brothers, Inc. appealed to the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals, asking it to determine whether its employee Ronney Stewart’s injuries arose from an on-the-job accident and entitled Stewart to temporary-total-disability (“TTD”) benefits, as decided by the trial court, pursuant to the Alabama Workers’ Compensation Act (Alabama Code § 25-5-1 et seq.). Kennamer Bros., Inc. v. Ronney Stewart [Ms. 2150359], — So.3d — (Ala.Civ.App. 2016).
Stewart alleged that on October 25, 2012, while operating in the line and scope of his employment as a truck driver for Kennamer Brothers, the vehicle he was operating overturned, resulting in injuries to Stewart’s head, neck, back, left arm, right arm and shoulder, legs, and body as a whole. The trial court determined at a compensability hearing that Stewart’s torn rotator cuff in his right shoulder was a compensable injury that resulted from the October 25, 2012 accident; it further determined that Stewart was entitled to TTD benefits of $771/week from December 21, 2012 to July 1, 2013, and $788/week from July 1, 2013 to January 28, 2014, when Stewart found another job.
(1) Whether the vehicle crash caused Stewart’s right-shoulder injury.
In order to prove causation arising from an accident, “an employee must produce substantial evidence tending to show that the alleged accident occurred and must establish medical causation by showing that the accident caused or was a contributing cause of the injury.” Pair v. Jack’s Family Rests., Inc., 756 So.2d 678, 681 (Ala.Civ.App. 2000).
Following the accident, Stewart was transported by helicopter to a hospital in Nashville, Tennessee, where he was treated for a head injury. About a week later, he treated at an urgent-care clinic in Boaz, Alabama, where he was referred to a neurosurgeon. Over the course of the next two months, he continued to receive treatment and had pain killers prescribed by doctors.
Stewart testified that he began to notice problems with his right shoulder as he came off the pain medication. He first reported back, neck, and arm symptoms in March 2013. His neurologist ordered an MRI and subsequently determined that Stewart had reached maximum medical improvement (“MMI”) with no impairment. Stewart then requested a panel of doctors, and first saw a panel doctor in August 2013, and was determined to have moderate-to-severe ulnar entrapment in his left arm. In December 2013, Stewart was again found to have reached MMI for his head and left-arm injuries.
Afterward, Stewart began treating with Dr. Janssen, who administered another MRI and diagnosed Stewart with a full-thickness tear in his right-shoulder rotator cuff, which required surgery. Dr. Janssen testified in deposition that Stewart’s October 2012 vehicle crash had caused or contributed to Stewart’s right shoulder symptoms. Dr. Janssen agreed that it would be uncommon for a patient to have a significant delay between the rotator cuff tear and experiencing pain symptoms, but that other injuries could mask his rotator cuff symptoms.
Medical records introduced in the case indicate that Stewart’s first complaints of shoulder pain came approximately five months after the accident. However, the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals has previously held that symptoms that first appear even months after a traumatic event may be properly deemed to be caused by the trauma if no intervening event has occurred and no alternative medical explanation is provided for the appearance of the symptoms. See Fab Arc Steel Supply, Inc. v. Dodd, 168 So.3d 1244 (Ala.Civ.App. 2015). Herein, there was no evidence of any other traumatic event, and the appellate court concluded that the trial court’s determination of medical causation was supported by the evidence.
(2) Whether the trial court properly determined Stewart’s TTD benefits.
The appellate court again referred to its decision in Fab Arc, wherein it recognized that as a general rule, TTD benefits are not payable if, before MMI is reached, the injured employee is able to work and earn his pre-injury wages, but is prevented from working for reasons unrelated to his workplace injury. Fab Arc, 168 So.3d at 1259.
Kennamer Brothers terminated its employment relationship with Kennamer on February 4, 2013, citing that it was unable to procure liability insurance on him resulting from the subject accident. Conflicting testimony regarding Stewart’s inability to find work after the accident suggested alternatively that Stewart’s past criminal history may have contributed, that he was unable to obtain DOT-required medical certification, and/or that the work-restrictions he had been placed under in August 2013 by his panel doctor resulted in his inability to find work. The appellate court determined that Stewart had provided evidence showing a causal link between his injury and his diminished earning capacity during the 14-month specified period.
But Kennamer Brothers argues that the TTD award was in violation of Alabama Code § 25-5-68, which provides that the maximum compensation payable under the Workers’ Compensation Act is 100% of the average weekly wage of the state as determined by the Alabama Department of Labor, but also that the maximum benefits in effect on the date of the accident which results in the injury are applicable for the full period during which TTD benefits are payable. As such, Kennamer Brothers contends that Stewart’s TTD benefits should have remained at $771/week throughout the course of the award, rather than being increased to $788/week in July 2013. The appellate court agreed, and reversed and remanded accordingly.
Ex parte Dr. Barbara Johnson – When a minor child is not a party to a custody dispute, his psychiatric records are privileged and not subject to an exception.
The Alabama Court of Civil Appeals has decided the matter of Ex parte Dr. Barbara Johnson [Ms. 2150835], — So.3d — (Ala.Civ.App. 2016), in which Dr. Barbara Johnson petitioned the appellate court for a writ of mandamus whereby Dr. Johnson sought to be precluded from producing psychotherapy treatment and evaluation records of a minor child. Ordinarily, appellate courts will not review discovery orders via mandamus petition, but the court applies an exception where privilege has been disregarded. See Ex parte T.O., 898 So.2d 706, 710 (Ala. 2004).
While Alabama Rule of Evidence 503(d) recognizes a privilege exception that allows psychiatry records to be produced in child-custody cases, that exception only applies when the mental status of a party is in question. There is no privilege under this rule for relevant communications offered in a child custody case in which the mental state of a party is clearly an issue and a proper resolution of the custody question requires disclosure.” Ala. R. Evid. 503(d). In the underlying case, the mental status of the minor child, who had been treated by Dr. Johnson, was in question, and the minor child was not a party to the case. Therefore, there was no exception to the privilege, and Dr. Johnson’s psychiatric records were not discoverable.
McCullough v. Allstate Property and Casualty Insurance Company: When a motion for summary judgment is not amended to address claims alleged after filing of the summary judgment motion, a ruling granting summary judgment is a non-final judgment.
In McCullough v. Allstate Property and Casualty Insurance Company [Ms. 2150459], — So.3d — (Ala.Civ.App. 2016), Jerry McCullough appealed from a summary judgment entered by the trial court in favor of Allstate. Allstate’s motion sought summary judgment in its favor on all claims contained in McCullough’s Complaint, including breach of contract, bad faith, violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq., fraud, defamation, harassment, and invasion of privacy. Allstate’s summary judgment motion was based on its assertion that McCullough’s claims arose out of a matter that had already been adjudicated in federal court, and ultimately settled. Thereafter McCullough filed a motion for declaratory judgment action asking the court to make a determination as to whether McCullough’s claims in the matter at issue were subject to the prior settlement agreement. The trial court heard oral arguments and granted Allstate’s motion for summary judgment. McCullough appealed.
The Alabama Court of Civil Appeals determined that before it could respond to McCullough’s appeal, it must first determine whether in this instance the summary judgment ruling was a final judgment that would support an appeal. Under Alabama law, a party cannot appeal a non-final judgment. See Robinson v. Computer Servicenters, Inc., 360 So.2d 299 (Ala. 1978). A non-final judgment has been generally defined as a ruling that disposes of fewer than all claims or relates to fewer than all parties in an action. Wilson v. Wilson, 736 So.2d 633, 634 (Ala.Civ.App. 1999); see also Ala. R. Civ. Proc. 54(b).
The Alabama Court of Civil Appeals found that McCullough’s motion for declaratory judgment was effectively an amended complaint. Allstate asked the trial court to deny the declaratory judgment motion but did not supplement or amend its summary judgment motion to include the denial request. Therefore, when the trial court granted summary judgment in Allstate’s favor, it did not dispose of the claim for declaratory judgment, which remained pending, resulting in a non-final judgment that did not support an appeal. See Baugus v. City of Florence, 968 So.3d 529, 531 (Ala. 2007).
My newest article “Considering the Scaly Side of ‘Beyond Compliance'” has been published in the September 2016 edition of The CLM Alliance’s Claims Management magazine. The article addresses trucking-industry-related concerns arising out of a proposed eighth category, “Beyond Compliance,” to the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration’s CSA (Compliance, Safety, and Accountability) program. The full article can be read at CLM’s website, here.
Beyond Compliance, the proposed eighth BASIC, is to be a voluntary program that would require motor carriers to apply to the FMCSA for involvement, and upon admission would credit motor carriers for deploying operators and vehicles with safety-enhancing technology or programs. Specifically, eligible motor carriers should: (1) install advanced safety equipment; (2) use enhanced driver fitness measures; (3) adopt fleet safety management tools, technologies, and programs; or (4) satisfy other standards determined appropriate by the FMCSA.
Despite the FMCSA’s best intentions in its proposed integration of the Beyond Compliance program into the existing CSA framework, in an effort to credit motor carriers for voluntarily incorporating safer equipment and programs, the program’s most significant unintended consequence may be to adversely affect motor carriers who are unable to participate, and secondarily, to create a heightened floor for compliance that hinders insurance providers and litigators in defending motor carriers and commercial drivers.
Ordinarily, in Alabama, a passenger in an automobile being driven by another person cannot be liable for contributory negligence, and ordinarily, you will be unable to impute any of the driver’s negligent acts to the passenger. For example, Dan Driver is driving and Pam Passenger is occupying Dan’s car in front of a truck being driven by Tom Tortfeasor. Dan quickly slams on his brakes without warning and for no apparent reason. Dan and Pam’s vehicle is struck by Tom. Dan and Pam claim injuries and file a lawsuit against Tom.
Tom might be able to assert the affirmative defense of contributory negligence against Dan, alleging that Dan contributed to the accident and his injuries were caused by his own actions, and Dan is therefore barred from recovering on his claims. Ordinarily, Tom would not be able to assert the same defense of contributory negligence against Pam, as long as she is just a passenger. See Johnson v. Battles, 52 So.2d 702, 707 (Ala. 1951). However, there are some circumstances that would allow Tom to impute Dan’s actions to Pam and raise the affirmative defense of contributory negligence against Pam and attempt to preclude her from recovering for her injuries as well.
In order for Tom to impute Dan’s conduct to Pam, Pam must have a right to control, manage, or direct Dan’s vehicle. Under Alabama law, the imputation of negligence of the driver to the passenger requires that the passenger “must have some right to a voice in the control, management or direction of the vehicle.” Johnson, 52 So.2d at 707; see also Barnett v. Norfolk Southern Ry. Co., 671 So.2d 718 (Ala.Civ.App. 1995). Even if Pam is a passenger at her own request, the burden is not met to allow Tom to impute Dan’s conduct to her; the law requires more than that. See Battles, 52 So.2d at 707. More specifically, Pam must have a right to direct and govern Dan’s movements and conduct, in order for his conduct to be imputed against her. See Carlton v. Alabama Dairy Queen, Inc., 529 So.2d 921, 923 (Ala. 1988).
Additionally, if Dan is Pam’s employee or otherwise in a subordinate position to Pam, Tom may be able to impute Dan’s conduct to Pam. Crescent Motor Co. v. Stone, 101 So. 49, 50 (Ala. 1924). If Pam owns the vehicle Dan (her employee) is driving, there is a presumption that Dan is the agent of Pam and is acting within the scope of his employment. See Durbin v. B.W. Capps & Son, Inc., 522 So.2d 766, 767 (Ala. 1988).
In summary, a defendant will not normally be able to impute the conduct of a driver to a passenger so as to find the passenger liable for contributory negligence and bar the passenger from recovering on her claims. But where (1) the driver is the employee of the passenger and/or (2) the passenger has a right to voice in control, management, or the direction of the vehicle, a defendant may be able to impute the driver’s conduct against the passenger.

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