Source: https://secondcircuit.lexroll.com/national-labor-rel-bd-v-serv-trade-c-191-f-2d-65-2nd-cir-1951/
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 06:42:46+00:00

Document:
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD v. SERVICE TRADE CHAUFFEURS, SALESMEN HELPERS, LOCAL 145 et al.
No. 46, Docket 21713.United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.Argued December 13, 1950.
A. Norman Somers, Asst. Gen. Counsel, Robert N. Denham, Gen. Counsel, David P. Findling, Associate Gen. Counsel, Dominick L. Manoli, and Albert M. Dreyer, Attorneys, National Labor Relations Board, all of Washington, D.C., for petitioner.
Gordon, Fitzgerald Riley, William S. Gordon, Jr., and Mary C. Fitzgerald, all of Hartford, Conn., for respondents.
The facts are stated in the intermediate report of the trial examiner. This report, and the Board’s decision and order, are reported in 85 N.L.R.B. 1037. The Board seeks enforcement of its decision and order as to Local 145.
(b) that the picketing here amounted to no more than the expression of opinion which is protected by § 8(c) of the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(c).
The Supreme Court has recently pointed out that § 8(b)(4) does not outlaw a traditional primary strike. The Court said: “The limitation of the complaint to an incident in the geographically restricted area near the mill is significant, although not necessarily conclusive. The picketing was directed at the Kaplan [primary] employees and at their employer in a manner traditional in labor disputes. Clearly, that, in itself, was not proscribed by § 8(b)(4). Insofar as the union’s efforts were directed beyond that and toward the employees of anyone other than Kaplan, there is no suggestion that the union sought concerted conduct by such other employees. Such efforts also fall short of the proscriptions in § 8(b)(4). * * * A union’s inducements or encouragements reaching individual employees of neutral employers only as they happen to approach the picketed place of business generally are not aimed at concerted, as distinguished from individual, conduct by such employees. Generally, therefore, such actions do not come within the proscription of § 8(b)(4), * * *.” N.L.R.B. v. International Rice Milling Co., 341 U.S. 665, 671, 71 S.Ct. 961, 964. We take this to mean that a union may lawfully inflict harm on a neutral employer, without violating § 8(b)(4), so long as the harm is merely incidental to a traditionally lawful primary strike, conducted at the place where the primary employer does business.
injured, would be virtually to deprive the union of a powerful weapon which Congress meant to preserve.
As those criteria had not yet been formulated when the Board decided the instant case, the Board did not here apply them or make findings pertinent thereto, and accordingly we are now in no position adequately to review its decision. We therefore remand the case to the Board (except as otherwise noted in point 4 of this opinion). The Board should receive further material evidence, if available, which will aid it in making its further findings and its determination.
If this picketing met the criteria announced in the Sailor’s Union case, then it was not unlawful because employees of the secondary employers, or employees of other employers, due to their habitual unwillingness to cross picket lines, refused to do so, for such effects are within the realm of the “incidental.” Nor, if otherwise lawful, was the picketing unlawful because it induced or encouraged concerted conduct, not of the neutral employers’ employees, but of their customers, since the prohibition of § 8(b)(4) does not extend to such solicitation of customers.
4. The Union clearly violated the Act in picketing the Read warehouse. For no trucks operated by the primary employer were present at the warehouse, nor were any of its employees there engaged in the primary employer’s business. The Board’s findings, amply supported by the evidence, make it plain that, by this picketing, the Union induced Read’s warehouse employees to engage in a concerted refusal in the course of their employment to perform their customary services — i.e., to quit work — and that they did quit, in part at least, because they were so induced by this picketing. The Board was also clearly right in concluding that the objects of the Union’s inducement were those proscribed by (A) and (B) of § 8(b)(4) — namely, to force Read to cease doing business with the primary employer and to force the primary employer to recognize the Union as the representative of its employees, although the Union had not been certified as such a representative. To that extent, therefore, the Board’s decision was correct and will now be enforced.
Enforcement granted in part; otherwise the case is remanded for proceedings in conformity with this opinion.
 N.L.R.B. v. Denver Building Council, 341 U.S. 675, 683-685, 71 S.Ct. 943; International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. N.L.R.B., 341 U.S. 694, 699, 71 S.Ct. 954; Local 74, United Brotherhood of Carpenters’ Union v. N.L.R.B., 341 U.S. 707, 712, 71 S.Ct. 966.
 International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. N.L.R.B., 341 U.S. 694, 700-705, 71 S.Ct. 954; Local 74, United Brotherhood of Carpenters’ Union v. N.L.R.B., 341 U.S. 707, 712-713, 71 S. Ct. 966; N.L.R.B. v. Denver Building Council, 341 U.S. 675, 690-691, 71 S.Ct. 943.
 Cf. N.L.R.B. v. Denver Building Council, 341 U.S. 675, 692, 71 S.Ct. 943.
 29 U.S.C.A. § 163: “Right to strike preserved.
 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(b)(4)(A), (B).
 International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local No. 807 (Schultz Refrigerated Service, Inc.), 87 N.L.R.B. 502; International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local 807 (Sterling Beverages, Inc.), 90 N.L.R.B. No. 75; Sailors’ Union of the Pacific (Moore Dry Dock Co.), 92 N.L.R.B. No. 93.

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