Source: http://thecomplexlitigator.com/?category=Class+Actions%3A+Ascertainability
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 08:12:26+00:00

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This appeal presents these significant issues: (1) Have plaintiffs established standing to pursue a UCL claim by demonstrating they "suffered injury in fact and . . . lost money or property as a result of the unfair competition" (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17204); (2) does the privacy protection of Civil Code section 1747.08 cover the use of a business credit card; (3) does such protection extend to a cardholder who uses a personal credit card regardless of whether such use is "primarily" or "occasionally" for business purposes; and (4) is class certification foreclosed by the unreasonableness of ascertaining class membership?
Slip op., at 2. The Court of Appeal answered "no" to the first two questions, but reversed the trial court on the third when the Court concluded that a personal credit card was protected under the SBCCA, regardless of how often it was used for business purposes. Having ruled as it did on the third issue, the Court then remanded for reconsideration of the ascertainability question, since the trial court's orginal ruling turned on the need to evaluate the frequency with which a credit card was used for business purposes.
The Court relied upon Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 4th 310 (2011) when it concluded that violation of SBCCA, alone, was insufficient to establish the requisite injury under the UCL.
June 13, 2011 slip op., at 1.
The purpose of the ascertainability requirement in class actions is to ensure that it is possible to give adequate notice to class members and to determine after the litigation has concluded who is barred from relitigating the resolved issues. The ascertainability requirement can be satisfied either by defining a class in objective terms such that a review of the defendant's records or if the class definition would "allow a member of that group to identify himself or herself as having a right to recover based on the description." Bartold v. Glendale Federal Bank, 81 Cal. App. 4th 816, 828 (2000); and see Ghazaryan v. Diva Limousine, Ltd., 169 Cal. App. 4th 1524, 1533 (2008). In Sevidal v. Target Corporation (October 29, 2010), the Court of Appeal (Fourth Appellate District, Division One) affirmed a trial court order denying certification on the ground that the class was hopelessly unascertainable.
Sevidal sued Target after he purchased through Target's website some clothing items misidentified as made in the United States. Sevidal specifically argued that, under the California Supreme Court's recent opinion, In re Tobacco II Cases, 46 Cal. 4th 298 (2009) (Tobacco II), "the class could be certified on his unfair competition claim even if most of the proposed class members never relied on the 'Made in USA' designation in deciding to make their online purchases." Slip op., at 2. The trial court did not take issue with this contention. Instead, the trial court found the class definition to be significantly overbroad and the class itself to be unascertainable.
In the proceedings below, Sevidal made clear that only those who purchased an item when the country of origin was misidentified are part of the proposed class. But he also defined the proposed class to include consumers who purchased an item from Target.com without selecting the " 'Additional Info' " icon, and thus who were never exposed to the country-of-origin information. These consumers would, by definition, have no way of knowing whether he or she purchased an item when it was misidentified, and thus would have no way of knowing whether he or she is a member of the class. And these individuals (those who would have no way of knowing he or she was a class member) represent a significant portion of the overall proposed class. Target's statistical evidence shows that approximately 80 percent of the proposed class falls within this category — individuals who purchased an item without viewing the country-of-origin information.
Although class certification should not be denied on overbreadth grounds when the class definition is only slightly overinclusive (ibid.; see Aguiar, supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at p. 136), in this case the overbreadth is significant. The unrefuted evidence showed that approximately 80 percent of the online purchasers did not select the " 'Additional Info' " icon and were never exposed to the alleged misrepresentation.
Slip op., at 20. A useful observation for both plaintiffs and defendants; slight overbreadth will not defeat certification, but overbreadth of this magnitude will support a denial of certification.
The Court went on to reject Sevidal's attempt to extend by analogy the evidentiary presumptions that can be imposed for failure to follow Labor Code record-keeping requirements. The Court observed that Target had no statutory or contractual obligations to maintain records about who selected which links on its site.
But the Tobacco II court did not state or suggest there are no substantive limits on absent class members seeking restitution when a defendant has engaged in an alleged unlawful or unfair business practice. Instead, the court recognized that under the UCL's statutory language, a person is entitled to restitution for money or property "which may have been acquired" by means of the unfair or unlawful practice. (§ 17203, italics added; see Tobacco II, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 320.) Although this standard focuses on the defendant's conduct and is substantially less stringent than a reliance or "but for" causation test, it is not meaningless. To conclude otherwise would violate the statutory interpretation principle that every word in a statute must be given operative effect. Even after the Tobacco II decision, the UCL and FAL still require some connection between the defendant's alleged improper conduct and the unnamed class members who seek restitutionary relief.
Slip op., 25. Analyzing the post-Tobacco II cases, the Court concluded that undisputed evidence showed that most of the defined class never viewed the country-of-origin information. Unlike Weinstat v. Dentsply Internat., Inc., 180 Cal. App. 4th 1213 (2010), there were no direct communications to every class member. Unlike In re Steroid Hormone Product Cases, 181 Cal. App. 4th 145 (2010), there was no illegal conduct (inclusion of undisclosed controlled substances) to supply the means for unlawful acquisition of money from the class. In essence, the Court concluded that, as to the majority of the defined class, Target didn't do anything wrong (again, the key issue being that, at many times, the Target website may was displaying the correct information - but most people didn't look at it in either case).
While the Court appears to favor the "conservative" line of post-Tobacco II cases (or, as some might say, the reactionary revolt line), the Court doesn't embroil itself too deeply into the post-Tobacco II cases, attempting as much as possible to harmonize the two lines of cases with each other and the record before it. In this case, the Court's task is much easier as a result of the unique factual record.
After weeks in the doldrums, a California Court of Appeal finally got around to issuing an opinion related to class actions. Unfortunately, it isn't very exciting. In Faulkinbury v. Boyd & Associates, Inc. (June 24, 2010), the Court of Appeal (Fourth Appellate District, Division Three) reviewed an order denying class certification of meal period, rest break and overtime (regular rate calculation) claims.
Slip op., at 7. The majority of the opinion simply confirms that, in the face of evidence apparently in conflict, the determination of which evidence to credit is left to the trial court.
The Court did reverse the trial court as to the overtime claim. The Court found that the issue of whether certain payments should be included in the calculation of the regular rate is an issue well-suited to class-wide determination.
Battle Royale: Latest round of lower court versus Supreme Court found in Cohen v. DIRECTV, Inc.
The more time I spend reviewing decisions in the complex litigation/class action arena, the more I am convinced that the lower Courts of California are, in many instances, at odds with the California Supreme Court. The most recent decision to suggest this schism is Cohen v. DIRECTV, Inc. (October 28, 2009) from the Court of Appeal (Second Appellate District, Division Eight). Cohen is the most recent California appellate court Opinion to comment on the treatment of UCL claims by In re Tobacco II Cases, 46 Cal.4th 298 (2009), the prior two decisions being Kaldenbach v. Mutual of Omaha Life Insurance Company, et al. (October 26, 2009) (discussed on this blog here) and Morgan, et al. v. AT&T Wireless Services, Inc. (September 23, 2009) (discussed on this blog here). Cohen affirmed a trial court's denial of class certification of CLRA and UCL claims, but its analysis runs head first into Tobacco II and other Supreme Court decisions. The UCL Practitioner has an extensive post analyzing Cohen against Tobacco II. I will comment on the Cohen holding, but I also want to offer some thoughts as to why this divergence between California's highest court and the other courts throughout the state might be happening.
Since some of my comments depend upon the subject matter of Cohen, I begin by providing some background about the claims in that matter. Cohen concerns an allegation that DIRECTV advertised that the channels in its HD Package were broadcast in the 1080i HD standard (an interlaced resolution of 1920x1080 pixels), at 19.4 Mbps, but later compressed each HD channel down to 6.6 Mbps. The 19.4 and 6.6 figures refer to the volume of data being transmitted each second, expressed as Megabits per second. So, expressed another way, the Cohen action complained that the quality of the video broadcast on HD channels was degraded by an increase in the amount of data compression. By way of background, the raw data rate for uncompressed HD video in the 1080i format can be well in excess of 100 Mbps, depending on frame rate and color information. This "raw" video is then compressed. In fact, it must be compressed - there is no practical system in place to deliver 100 Mbps to your television right now. The older mpeg-2 compression codec, or newer codecs, like H.264, compress the "raw" HD video into something smaller, using complex formulas that reduce the data used to transmit the images. The goal of compression is to obtain the best video-quality-to-size compromise. In the DIRECTV case, 19.4 Mbps is compressed video that would look very good, but "degradation" artifacts would still be visible on a good HD television (some "smearing" on fast action or a blocky, pixelated appearance in areas of solid color, blacks in particular). 6.6 Mbps is very compressed 1080i HD content; it is compressed to one third the size of the already compressed 19.4 Mbps feed. You would see more compression artifacts on a good/larger HD television.
Although the rules under the UCL may or may not be different following our Supreme Court's recent decision in In re Tobacco II Cases (2009) 46 Cal.4th 298 (Tobacco II), an issue which we address below, we do not understand the UCL to authorize an award for injunctive relief and/or restitution on behalf of a consumer who was never exposed in any way to an allegedly wrongful business practice.
Viewed from the other direction, Tobacco II held that, for purposes of standing in context of the class certification issue in a “false advertising” case involving the UCL, the class members need not be assessed for the element of reliance. Or, in other words, class certification may not be defeated on the ground of lack of standing upon a showing that class members did not rely on false advertising. In short, Tobacco II essentially ruled that, for purposes of standing, as long as a single plaintiff is able to establish that he or she relied on a defendant‟s false advertising, a multitude of class members will also have standing, regardless of whether any of those class members have in any way relied upon the defendant's allegedly improper conduct.
Slip op. at 15. Notice the interesting language used by the Cohen Court: "Tobacco II essentially ruled...." One can say that the Supreme Court "did" or "did not" rule a certain way. But saying that it "essentially" ruled a certain way is problematic for everyone. This suggests an outcome that is implied by Tobacco II, but not stated. To sort that out, we have to compare Cohen to Tobacco II and determine what Tobacco II does and does not say.
Returning to Cohen, the Court was more direct when it stated its intention to disregard Tobacco II as offering a controlling decision for the case before it: "In the contextual setting presented by Cohen's present case, we find Tobacco II to be irrelevant because the issue of 'standing' simply is not the same thing as the issue of 'commonality.'" Slip op., at 15. The Court continued: "In short, the trial court's concerns that the UCL and the CLRA claims alleged by Cohen and the other class members would involve factual questions associated with their reliance on DIRECTV's alleged false representations was a proper criterion for the court's consideration when examining 'commonality' in the context of the subscribers'motion for class certification, even after Tobacco II." Slip op., at 16. Thus, the Cohen Court devised an analysis that permits circumvention of Tobacco II, holding that a trial court can't use classwide reliance issues for a "standing" challenge, but can use those same issues to bar certification. I posit that what we have here is most likely either a reverse engineered holding or a generally negative reaction to Tobacco II. The limited analysis of reliance issues as they pertain to the UCL was devised to support the desired outcome. The alternative is that the Cohen Court didn't examine Tobacco II carefully, and I find that less likely than the notion that the panel simply does not agree with the Tobacco II analysis or doesn't like the claims in the case.
Tobacco II, 46 Cal. 4th at 310-311. One can almost excuse the Cohen Court's narrow construction of Tobacco II as a "standing" decision. After all, the paragraph above does talk quite a bit about standing. But this overlooks the fact that causation is entangled with standing, and, for the named plaintiff, showing reliance is the method by which that plaintiff shows standing under a UCL claim asserting a "fraudulent" prong (likely to deceive) standard. What Cohen ignores is the fact that, according to Tobacco II, the causation showing (in this instance, a reliance showing) is not an element of a UCL claim, except that, after Proposition 64, the named plaintiff must make that showing. In fact, the next page of Tobacco II removes any doubt that pre-Proposition 64 decisions construing the UCL remain viable: "'[T]o state a claim under either the UCL or the false advertising law, based on false advertising or promotional practices, "it is necessary only to show that 'members of the public are likely to be "deceived." ' " ' (Kasky v. Nike, Inc. (2002) 27 Cal.4th 939, 951, 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 296, 45 P.3d 243.)" Tobacco II, 46 Cal. 4th at 312.
[T]he language of section 17203 with respect to those entitled to restitution-“to restore to any person in interest any money or property, real or personal, which may have been acquired ” (italics added) by means of the unfair practice-is patently less stringent than the standing requirement for the class representative-“any person who has suffered injury in fact and has lost money or property as a result of the unfair competition.” (§ 17204, italics added.) This language, construed in light of the “concern that wrongdoers not retain the benefits of their misconduct” (Fletcher v. Security Pacific National Bank, supra, 23 Cal.3d 442, 452, 153 Cal.Rptr. 28, 591 P.2d 51) has led courts repeatedly and consistently to hold that relief under the UCL is available without individualized proof of deception, reliance and injury. (E.g., Bank of the West v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1254, 1267, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 538, 833 P.2d 545; Committee on Children's Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp., supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 211, 197 Cal.Rptr. 783, 673 P.2d 660.) Accordingly, to hold that the absent class members on whose behalf a private UCL action is prosecuted must show on an individualized basis that they have “lost money or property as a result of the unfair competition” (§ 17204) would conflict with the language in section 17203 authorizing broader relief-the “may have been acquired” language-and implicitly overrule a fundamental holding in our previous decisions, including Fletcher, Bank of the West and Committee on Children's Television.
Tobacco II, 46 Cal.4th at 320, n. 14. This suggests that, in some circumstances, the quantum of a restitution order might ultimately depend upon a showing of injury by class members. Since reliance on an unfair practice can act as a surrogate of sorts for injury (under the the right facts and right species of UCL claim), this may explain why the belief persists that reliance is an unstated element of a UCL claim. It's either that, or a petulant refusal to understand that the UCL's fraudulent prong has nothing to do with common law fraud.
Tobacco II has already been circumvented by two of three California Courts of Appeal to apply it. The important question is why? Options include, at least, a desire not to reverse a trial court, a dislike of the holding of Tobacco II, a dislike of the theory of the case, or a general resistance to class actions (or some amalgam of those options).
The first option exists as an element of all appeals. Courts of Appeal begin their analysis with a presumption that the trial court will be affirmed. I cannot conclude that this is the primary factor in the Cohen Court's dismissive analysis.
The second option is certainly possible. The Cohen Court sounded almost disdainful of Tobacco II when it said, "In the contextual setting presented by Cohen's present case, we find Tobacco II to be irrelevant...." Slip op., at 15. I find this option to be a plausible explanation.
The third option is also possible. I do not find it a stretch to imagine the initial judicial reaction being something akin to, "Megawho per second? You're kidding, right?" When that happens, I think it is human nature to look for reasons not to facilitate the case or claim. If my comments offend any judicial sensibilities, I apologize for that. But we must recognize every participant in the judicial system -- clerk, judge, lawyer -- are human beings, with all of our prejudices and predispositions. I also find this option to be a plausible explanation.
The fourth option is also possible. When the various Districts and Divisions are examined over time, I have little doubt that some find panels find great utility in the class action device, while others find them abusive. Again, this has more to do with the predisposition of the observer than anything else, as it is as easy to find a class action of great social utility as it is to find one of questionable or zero worth. It's also worth noting that the second of my proposed options can be a subset of this fourth option. In other words, discomfiture about the Tobacco II opinion can be motivated either by that particular opinion or by an overall judicial fatigue regarding class actions generally.
I do not want to suggest that I know which of my theories, if any, explains Cohen. I suspect that some combination of class action fatigue and specific resistance to the claims in this particular case are at work here, but that is speculative on my part. However, I am certain that a growing rift exists between the Supreme Court's view of major legal questions and the views held by trial and intermediate appellate courts. As I am doubtful that anything can be done about this issue other than to raise awareness and hope for the best from our courts, I do not believe it is an issue that will resolve itself any time soon.
It is my intention to write more about the nature of this judicial divide here or elsewhere.
In re Tobacco II Cases hasn't been out long, but its significance is already hard to deny. Morgan, et al. v. AT&T Wireless Services, Inc. (September 23, 2009) was the first published opinion by a California Court of Appeal to apply In re Tobacco II Cases. See blog post. In Kaldenbach v. Mutual of Omaha Life Insurance Company, et al. (October 26, 2009), the Court of Appeal (Fourth Appellate District, Division Three) had occasion to discuss In re Tobacco II Cases in the context of an appeal of the denial of class certification in a "vanishing premiums" action.
Before discussing the opinion, a definition is in order. “Generally speaking, so called ‘[v]anishing premium policies are paid dividends which in some instances can be sufficient to cause the premium to “offset” whereby dividend values are used to pay the premium. In such an instance, the cash premium “vanishes” and is no longer due from the insured.’” Keyes v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 194 F.R.D. 253, 254, n. 1 (S.D. Miss. 2000), quoting Phillips v. New England Mut. Life Ins. Co., 36 F.Supp.2d 345, 347 (S.D. Miss. 1998).) In other words, the theory is that a larger sum is paid into a policy for a few years, and then the investment of those funds should generate a dividend that is sufficient to pay the premium thereafter.
The trial court denied the motion for class certification. It concluded Kaldenbach had not demonstrated numerosity other than his assertion that over 4,000 policies were sold. Kaldenbach had not shown ascertainability as there was no evidence as to how it could be shown which of the policyholders had received illustrations during the sales presentation.
The court also found Kaldenbach had not established commonality. Kaldenbach primarily relied upon uniformity in Mutual‟s sales materials, training, and illustrations, but there was no evidence linking those common tools to what was actually said or demonstrated in any individual sales transaction. The training materials and methods were not uniform throughout the class period. None of the allegedly scripted or memorized sales materials covered the alleged misrepresentations. And there was no evidence that uniform training or sales materials were used with each putative class member. There was no evidence all independent agents were required to take the offered training, took the offered training, had the same training, or used the same training or materials in their sales presentations. In fact “[t]here was evidence that the agents were free to ignore the training and written manuals.” Mutual‟s agents were independent contractors over whom Mutual had little or no control. Meyerson testified he did not follow his training or manuals in making the presentation to Kaldenbach. Kaldenbach had argued commonality could be found based solely on the use of illustrations, but Kaldenbach testified he never looked at the entire illustration, he only looked at the part of the illustration that showed the premium could vanish in four years because that was what Kaldenbach wanted.
Finally, the court listed the individualized issues that predominated and which could not be proven on a class-wide basis including: (1) did the agent take Mutual‟s training and read Mutual‟s manuals; (2) did the agent always use the training and materials; (3) what materials, disclosures, representations, and explanations were given to any given purchaser; (4) was an illustration used; (5) what information was input into the illustration; (6) did the purchaser rely on representations made in the sales presentation; (7) what were the customer‟s individual needs; (8) when did each class member‟s cause of action accrue; and (9) did the individual class member‟s policy lapse, and if so, why?
Slip op., at 11-13. After describing the valuable benefits of class actions, and noting that the reasoning of the Trial Court is scrutinized when reviewing an order denying certification, the Court of Appeal observed: "We may not reverse, however, simply because some of the court's reasoning was faulty, so long as any of the stated reasons are sufficient to justify the order. (Caro v. Procter & Gamble Co. (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 644, 655-656 (Caro).)" Slip op., at 14-15.
As the Court of Appeal turned to the merits, it began its discussion by cataloging a number of federal court decisions where class certification was denied on the same theory. Parenthetically, the placement of this discussion suggests that the conclusions of those federal cases persuaded the Court of Appeal to affirm the Trial Court.
There were myriad other individualized issues the court found to predominate including whether any given agent took Mutual's training, read its manuals, and routinely followed the training and materials; and what materials, disclosures, representations, and explanations were given to any given purchaser. These individualized issues go not to the injury suffered by a purchaser, but to whether there was in fact an unfair business practice by Mutual. Neither In re Tobacco II Cases, supra, 46 Cal.4th 298, nor Massachusetts Mutual, supra, 97 Cal.App.4th 1282, compel a different result.
[B]oth In re Tobacco II Cases and Massachusetts Mutual involved identical misrepresentations and/or nondisclosures by the defendants made to the entire class. In re Tobacco II Cases targeted the tobacco industries' deceptive advertisements and statements disseminated to the public about the health effects of tobacco use. Massachusetts Mutual concerned the insurer's failure to disclose to policy purchasers and its agents its plan to decrease its discretionary dividend. In other words, there was no issue about defendants' uniform business practices giving rise to the UCL claim.
But here there is no such uniformity. Although Kaldenbach claimed Mutual's presentations relating to ALPs were uniform, it utilized standardized training methods, materials, and scripts to which agents were required to adhere, the evidence showed the opposite. Mutual's policies were sold by independent agents, and during the class period, they were not required to attend training or utilize any given sales materials. Agents were not required to adhere to a scripted sales presentation. Indeed Meyerson, who sold Kaldenbach his policy, testified at his deposition he did not use a scripted sales presentation or any training materials in making the sale to Kaldenbach.
Slip op., at 22. If nothing else, analyses like this will encourage sales policies that state vague guidelines and some variation in sales approaches to eliminate uniformity of representations to consumers. In any event, Kaldenbach's argument that he was entitled to an "inference of injury" for his fraud claim met with a similar fate, as the Court of Appeal noted that the inference is only available where the misrepresentations are uniform.
The Court of Appeal ignored the balance of the Trial Court's Order, concluding that the predominance of individualized issues was a sufficient ground for denying class certification. A complicated set of facts coupled with a seemingly conservative Court of Appeal made this outcome all but a formality.
In Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc., 168 Cal. App. 4th 116 (2008), the Court of Appeal (First Appellate District, Division Three) set aside a settlement and permitted an objector to obtain discovery to assess whether the settlement was "fair, reasonable and adequate." See blog post. However, the objector in Cho v. Seagate Technology Holdings, Inc. (Klausner, Objector) (September 15, 2009) did not achieve similar results, despite appealing to the very same First Appellate District, Divsion Three.
For disc drives purchased before January 1, 2006, class members could choose either a cash payment equal to 5 percent of the net purchase price, or the Seagate Software Suite (the Software) that would allow users to perform enhanced computer and disc management functions. The estimated average cash benefit payable per hard drive was $7, and the Software had an estimated retail value of approximately $40. For disc drives purchased after January 1, 2006, when the packaging included more precise disclosures added by Seagate, class members were entitled to receive the Software.
The trial court overruled Klausner’s objections. The order approving settlement states: “Mr. Klausner’s objection to the term authorized retailers or distributors, the limitation of claims to purchases from authorized retailers or distributors, and his related claims that the class is impermissibly narrowed, that plaintiff’s counsel have not adequately represented the class and the plaintiff is an inadequate class representative are overruled. The court finds that it is appropriate to limit the class to purchasers from authorized retailers or distributors. . . . The Court received no information that any class member, other than Mr. Klausner, was confused by the term authorized retailer or distributor. In that regard, neither the Agreement nor the form of notice caused any prejudice to the Plaintiff Settlement Class.” Klausner was granted leave to file his additional objections, which were overruled, but his request to undertake discovery was denied.
There is no evidence that the parties to the settlement were intentionally deceptive or that they tried to mislead the court in seeking approval. We will not indulge Klausner’s suggestion that approval be reversed on the basis of misconduct by counsel.
A class definition that is ambiguous presents a problem of class ascertainability that “ ‘goes to the heart of the question of class certification, which requires a class definition that is “precise, objective and presently ascertainable.” ’ ” (Global Minerals & Metals Corp. v. Superior Court (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 836, 858.) In the absence of an ascertainable class, “ ‘it is not possible to give adequate notice to class members or to determine after the litigation has concluded who is barred from relitigating.’ ” (Ibid.) The goal in defining the class is to use terminology that will convey sufficient meaning to enable persons hearing it to determine whether they are members of the class plaintiff wishes to represent.
We have no disagreement with the parties’ objective and no quarrel with the trial court’s finding that exclusion of “those who purchased outside of Seagate’s authorized retail channels” is “rationally based on legitimate considerations.” The problem is that a fair reading of the class definition and the notice has the potential to lead some of those who purchased within Seagate’s authorized retail channels to conclude they are not members of the class.
Slip op., at 13. The Court of Appeal then clarified that the defect in the Notice was not fatal to the settlement and vacated the trial court's Order approving the settlement so that a revised Notice could issue to the class.
The final issue, Klausner's request for discovery, was quickly rejected by the Court of Appeal. The Court noted that objectors are not entitled to discovery unless some evidence of collusion existed. Because Klausner presented no evidence to the trial court, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's decision to deny discovery rights to the objector.

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