Source: http://lawspace.stmarytx.edu/item/2010StMULawBestBriefOfSecMao
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 14:49:14+00:00

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Whether the Court considers the totality of the circumstances when determining if a defendant has standing to challenge the search of a rental vehicle. Whether Petitioner had standing to challenge the reasonableness of the government’s actions.
BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT OPINIONS BELOW The opinions of the District and Appeals Courts have not been reported. The opinions appear in the record. PROVISIONS INVOLVED The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution provides: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or thing to be seized. U.S. Const. amend. IV. JURISDICTION The court of appeals entered judgment on November 12, 2008. R. 25. Petitioner filed his petition for writ of certiorari on December 14, 2008. R. 26. This Court granted the petition on March 7, 2009. R. 27. This Court’s jurisdiction rests on 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) (2000). A district court’s fact findings and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from them are reviewed for clear error. Its legal conclusions are reviewed de novo.
protection whereas a highly regulated vehicle conveys a minimal expectation of privacy. See California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 392-393 (1985). Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights, and may not be vicariously asserted. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 134 (1978). Thus, a proponent of Fourth Amendment rights may establish standing to challenge the government’s actions only if his own rights were violated by the search or seizure. Id. at 132. To prove that a proponent’s own rights were violated, the proponent must demonstrate a legitimate expectation of privacy in the property searched. See id. at 143. In other words, he must demonstrate that he personally had an expectation of privacy in the property searched, and that this expectation was reasonable. See id. The legitimate expectation of privacy is often discussed in terms of a subjective and an objective component. See id. A burglar present in a summer cabin during the middle of winter illustrates a subjective expectation of privacy. See id. The burglar is justified in his expectation of privacy. See id. Yet, he is a trespasser because he is present without the permission of the owner. See id. Therefore, his subjective expectation for privacy is not only rejected by property law, but is also rejected by society. See id. It is insufficient for a proponent of Fourth Amendment rights to claim merely a subjective expectation of privacy. See id. He must manifest an objective expectation of privacy as well. See id. Ultimately, a proponent of Fourth Amendment rights must demonstrate a legitimate expectation of privacy supported by concepts of property law or accepted and permitted by society. See id. A person who owns or lawfully possesses a property is likely to have a legitimate expectation of privacy in that property because of his right to exclude. See id. Circuit courts have generally held that a person who owns or leases a vehicle has Fourth Amendment interest.
See United States v. Walker, 237 F.3d 845, 849 (7th Cir. 2001). Accordingly, circuit courts have generally held that an unauthorized driver who neither leased nor owned the vehicle will not have standing to contest the legality of the search. See United States v. Smith, 263 F.3d 571, 586 (6th Cir. 2000). However, circuit courts split when deciding whether an unauthorized driver not on the rental agreement has a legitimate expectation of privacy if an authorized driver grants him permission to drive. See id. The majority view applies a bright-line approach holding that an unauthorized driver does not have standing to challenge the search of a rental vehicle. See, e.g. United States v. Boruff, 909 F.2d 111, 117 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that an unauthorized driver of a rental vehicle was not authorized as a legal operator of the vehicle, therefore does not have standing). These courts affirm that the true owner of a property has the right to exclude all others from that property. See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143. However, a subset of this majority deviates from the property concept and applies a modified bright-line approach. They grant the unauthorized driver standing if that driver can prove that he had permission from the renter of the vehicle. See United States v. Muhammad, 58 F.3d 353, 355 (8th Cir. 1995). The minority view applies a totality of the circumstances approach. These courts claim to follow the Rakas Court’s concurring opinion stating that the Fourth Amendment is not an area of law in which bright-line rules will benefit public interest. See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 156 (Powell, J., concurring). This minority assesses a checklist of factors to determine whether an unauthorized driver has standing. See, e.g., Smith, 263 F.3d at 586. The modified bright-line and the minority approaches have both deviated from the Supreme Court holding that requires the legitimate expectation of privacy to be supported by concepts of property law or understandings permitted by society. See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143.
Nevertheless, a minority of jurisdictions depart from the bright-line approach by urging the adoption of a totality of the circumstances view in determining standing for an unauthorized driver. See Smith, 263 F.3d at 571. It suggests a checklist of factors to apply in reviewing the facts in light of the surrounding circumstances. See id. The Sixth Circuit Court refers to the Rakas Court’s concurring opinion stating that search and seizure is not an area of the law in which any bright-line rule would preserve both Fourth Amendment rights and the public interest. See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 156 (Powell, J., concurring).
unauthorized driver does not have the basic requisites necessary for standing, therefore, totality of the circumstances need not be considered when concluding that an unauthorized driver does not have Fourth Amendment standing to challenge a search. See id. Though an unauthorized driver may develop a subjective expectation of privacy in a rental vehicle, he is unable to acquire a legitimate expectation of privacy from the permission of an authorized driver. See id. Therefore, the modified-bright-line approach should not be applied. See id. The bright-line approach recognizes that an unauthorized driver without the permission from the rental company does not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the vehicle. See id. Since an unauthorized driver’s interest in the rental vehicle is not based on property law or societal customs, he does not have the requisites necessary to achieve a legitimate expectation of privacy. See id. Without a legitimate expectation of privacy, an unauthorized driver fails to establish standing. See id. In an area of where individuals already have a weak expectation of privacy, a bright-line approach will support the government’s interest through a readily administrable rule. See id. Therefore, the bright-line rule will affirm that an unauthorized driver of a rental vehicle will not have standing to challenge the government’s actions. See id.
used to rent the vehicle was a joint account and Riggins was the primary card holder. R. 20. He had personal effects throughout the car and had been using the car, and therefore, he claims that this proves joint ownership of the property. R. 20. Here, his subjective expectation of privacy in the vehicle is not enough. See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143. He must also demonstrate that his expectation of privacy is one in which society is willing to accept and is validated by referencing concepts of property law. See id.
Even though Riggins is the primary card holder of the credit card that his wife used to rent the vehicle, the rental company did not give Riggins permission to have control over the car. See Boruff, 909 F.2d at 117. Riggins never communicated with the rental company regarding the rental. R. 19, 20. Since the company was unaware of his unauthorized control over its property, Riggins does not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the rental vehicle. See Boruff, 909 F.2d at 117. Riggins may argue that the violation of the rental agreement does not destroy his standing. Here, the rental company lawfully owns the car and has the right to exclude all others. See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143. The owner had granted permission for usage to the authorized driver, Riggins’ wife. R. 19. The rental company did not permit Riggins’ wife to transfer control of the vehicle to a third party. See Boruff, 909 F.2d at 117. Though Riggins received permission from his wife, she did not have the legal authority to give him permission to have control over the vehicle. See id. Under concepts of property law, Riggins has no legal or legitimate possessory control over the property. See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143. Riggins’ expectation of privacy remains subjective. See id.
U.S. at 561. Therefore, he does not have a privacy expectation supported by understandings of society. Since Riggins does not have an expectation of privacy that is supported by concepts of property law or is permitted by societal understandings, he does not have standing to challenge the reasonableness of the government’s actions. See id. CONCLUSION The Respondent respectfully prays that this Court will not consider the totality of the circumstances when deciding if an unauthorized driver of a rental vehicle has Fourth Amendment standing to challenge a government search. Since an unauthorized driver does not have a legitimate expectation of privacy that references concepts of property law or understandings that are accepted by society, he does not have standing. Riggins is an unauthorized driver, and does not have a legitimate expectation of privacy that references concepts of property law or understandings that are accepted by society. Therefore, Riggins does not have standing to challenge the government’s actions. For these reasons, Respondent prays this Court affirm the decision of the court below. PRAYER For these reasons, Respondent prays this Court affirm the decision of the court below.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE Counsel for Respondent certifies that this brief has been prepared and served on all opposing counsel in compliance with the Rules of the Freshman Moot Court Competition.
Shari Mao, “Best Brief Contest Winner: Tim Riggins v. United States of America 09-9100 Brief for Respondent Winner of the 2010 Best Brief Contest at St. Mary's University School of Law,” St. Mary's Law Digital Repository, accessed April 24, 2019, http://lawspace.stmarytx.edu/item/2010StMULawBestBriefOfSecMao.

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