Source: https://flsaovertimelaw.com/tag/undocumented-immigrants/
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 00:54:16+00:00

Document:
Following a jury verdict, in favor of the plaintiff-employees, the defendant-employer appealed. As discussed here, the defendant-employer contended that plaintiffs, undocumented (or “illegal”) aliens lacked standing under the FLSA to assert a claim for unpaid wages. Reasoning that unauthorized aliens fit within the definition, scope and purpose of the FLSA, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the jury’s verdict in favor of the workers, and held that undocumented aliens are entitled to the FLSA’s protections regarding work already performed.
The only circuit court to address the question directly, see Patel v. Quality Inn S., 846 F.2d 700 (11th Cir.1988); numerous district courts, including the one in this case; and the Secretary of Labor (Secretary) all agree: employers who unlawfully hire unauthorized aliens must otherwise comply with federal employment laws. The employers’ argument to the contrary rests on a legal theory as flawed today as it was in 1931 when jurors convicted Al Capone of failing to pay taxes on illicit income. As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes explained in United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259, 263, 47 S.Ct. 607, 71 L.Ed. 1037 (1927), there is no “reason why the fact that a business is unlawful should exempt it from paying the taxes that if lawful it would have to pay.” Here, too, there is no “reason why the fact that” the employers unlawfully hired the workers “should exempt” them “from paying the” wages “that if lawful” they “would have to pay.” Id. “Certainly there is no reason for treating” the employers “more leniently.” Rutkin v. United States, 343 U.S. 130, 137, 72 S.Ct. 571, 96 L.Ed. 833 (1952). Like the Eleventh Circuit, we hold that aliens, authorized to work or not, may recover unpaid and underpaid wages under the FLSA. See Patel, 846 F.2d at 706 (“[U]ndocumented workers are ’employees’ within the meaning of the FLSA and … such workers can bring an action under the act for unpaid wages and liquidated damages.”).
Because this case is one of statutory interpretation, our “starting point … is the existing statutory text.” Lamie v. U.S. Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 534, 124 S.Ct. 1023, 157 L.Ed.2d 1024 (2004). As to minimum wages, the text of the FLSA states “[e]very employer shall pay to each of his employees who in any workweek is engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, or is employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, wages at the [minimum wage rate].” 29 U.S.C. § 206(a) (emphasis added). The FLSA’s overtime wage scheme is more complex, but the crux is simple: “[n]o employer shall employ any of his employees … for a workweek longer than forty hours unless such employee receives compensation for his employment in excess of the hours above specified at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which he is employed.” Id. § 207(a)(1).
(e)(1) [With certain statutorily defined exceptions], the term “employee” means any individual employed by an employer.
29 U.S.C. § 203(d), (e)(1), (g) (emphasis added). During debate over the FLSA, then-Senator Hugo Black (who, shortly before his elevation to the Supreme Court, sponsored the bill that ultimately became the FLSA) called the FLSA’s “definition of employee … the broadest definition that has ever been included in any one act.” 81 Cong. Rec. 7656–57 (1937).
Importantly, Congress showed elsewhere in the statute that it “knows how to” limit this broad definition “when it means to,” City of Milwaukee v. Illinois & Michigan, 451 U.S. 304, 329 n. 22, 101 S.Ct. 1784, 68 L.Ed.2d 114 (1981), and it did not do so with respect to unauthorized aliens. See 29 U.S.C. § 203(e). The FLSA contains detailed limitations for certain governmental employees, see id. § 203(e)(2); family members engaged in agricultural work, see id. § 203(e)(3); state, local, and interstate governmental volunteers, see id. § 203(e)(4); and “individuals who volunteer their services solely for humanitarian purposes to private non-profit food banks and who receive from the food banks groceries,” id. § 203(e)(5). Nowhere in this list do we see any indication Congress meant to exclude unauthorized aliens from the FLSA’s broad application to “any individual” whom an employer “suffer[s] or permit[s] to work.” Id. § 203(e)(1), (g).
As the Supreme Court has long emphasized, “where, as here, the statute’s language is plain, ‘the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms.’ ” United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241, 109 S.Ct. 1026, 103 L.Ed.2d 290 (1989) (quoting Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485, 37 S.Ct. 192, 61 L.Ed. 442 (1917)). Because the FLSA by its plain terms protects aliens working without authorization, the employers’ argument must fail unless the employers can point to a different statutory basis for limiting “the broadest definition that has ever been included in any one act,” 81 Cong. Rec. at 7657.
The employers point to the Supreme Court’s decision in Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 122 S.Ct. 1275, 152 L.Ed.2d 271 (2002), for the proposition that the IRCA implicitly amended the FLSA to exclude unauthorized aliens. The employers misread Hoffman, ignore the relevant agency’s reasonable interpretations of the FLSA and the IRCA, and “ascribe to Congress an intent at variance with the purpose[s] of th[e] statute [s],” Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191, 200, 88 S.Ct. 379, 19 L.Ed.2d 407 (1967).
In Hoffman, the Supreme Court held that unauthorized aliens may not receive backpay after being terminated for engaging in union activities protected by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169. See Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 151–52, 122 S.Ct. 1275. The issue in Hoffman was not, as the employers seem to think, whether the NLRA’s broad definitions of “employer” and “employee,” see 29 U.S.C. § 152, excluded unauthorized aliens from all protection by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). See Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 142–43, 122 S.Ct. 1275. Rather, the question in Hoffman was whether the NLRB’s remedial power extended far enough to “allow it to award backpay to an illegal alien for years of work not performed.” Id. at 149, 122 S.Ct. 1275 (emphasis added). Far from concluding the NLRA did not protect unauthorized aliens for work actually performed, the Hoffman court—after considering Congress’s intervening enactment of the IRCA—reaffirmed its earlier holding in Sure–Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 104 S.Ct. 2803, 81 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984), that the NLRA applies to the actual employment of unauthorized aliens. See Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 151–52, 122 S.Ct. 1275;Sure–Tan, 467 U.S. at 893–94, 104 S.Ct. 2803.
[A]n order requiring an employer to pay his undocumented workers the minimum wages prescribed by the [FLSA] for labor actually and already performed…. does not … condone that violation or continue it. It merely ensures that the employer does not take advantage of the violation by availing himself of the benefit of undocumented workers’ past labor without paying for it in accordance with minimum FLSA standards.
Id. at 243. Interpreting an analogous definition of “employee” in Agri Processor, the D.C. Circuit found “absolutely no evidence that in passing IRCA Congress intended to repeal the NLRA to the extent its definition of ’employee’ include[d] undocumented aliens.” Agri Processor, 514 F.3d at 5.
Shortly after our court heard argument in this case, the Eleventh Circuit reaffirmed its decision in Patel “that undocumented aliens may recover their unpaid wages under the FLSA.” Lamonica v. Safe Hurricane Shutters, Inc., 711 F.3d 1299, 1306 (11th Cir.2013). Rejecting arguments similar to those advanced by the employers here, the Eleventh Circuit concluded “the IRCA does not express Congress’s clear and manifest intent to exclude undocumented aliens from the protection of the FLSA.” Id. at 1308.
As the Secretary explains, there is no conflict between the FLSA and the IRCA. Both statutes work in tandem to discourage employers from hiring unauthorized workers by “assur[ing] that the wages and employment of lawful residents are not adversely affected by the competition of illegal alien employees who are not subject to the standard terms of employment,” Sure–Tan, 467 U.S. at 893, 104 S.Ct. 2803.
The Department of Labor’s position that the FLSA applies to aliens without employment authorization is longstanding and consistent. In 1942, just four years after the FLSA’s passage, the Department of Labor’s “Wage and Hour Administrator opined that alien prisoners of war were covered by the [FLSA] and therefore were entitled to be paid the minimum wage.” Patel, 846 F.2d at 703. Since then, in case after case, the Department of Labor has taken the same position it takes here.
In the Secretary’s amicus brief filed in this case, the Secretary explains that applying the FLSA to unauthorized aliens “is essential to achieving the purposes of the FLSA to protect workers from substandard working conditions, to reduce unfair competition for law-abiding employers, and to spread work and thereby reduce unemployment by requiring employers to pay overtime compensation.” Given the Department’s decades-long consistency and the Secretary’s “specialized experience and broader investigations and information” in these matters, we think the Secretary’s position is persuasive and merits Skidmore deference—to the extent there is any statutory ambiguity. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139, 65 S.Ct. 161, 89 L.Ed. 124 (1944); see also Godinez–Arroyo v. Mukasey, 540 F.3d 848, 850 (8th Cir.2008).
We agree with the Secretary’s position, independent of any deference to the Department of Labor’s expertise, because Congress’s purposes in enacting the FLSA and the IRCA are in harmony. The IRCA unambiguously prohibits hiring unauthorized aliens, and the FLSA unambiguously requires that any unauthorized aliens—hired in violation of federal immigration law—be paid minimum and overtime wages. The IRCA and FLSA together promote dignified employment conditions for those working in this country, regardless of immigration status, while firmly discouraging the employment of individuals who lack work authorization. “If an employer realizes that there will be no advantage under the” FLSA “in preferring [unauthorized] aliens to legal resident workers, any incentive to hire such … aliens is correspondingly lessened.” Sure–Tan, 467 U.S. at 893, 104 S.Ct. 2803. Exempting unauthorized aliens from the FLSA would frustrate the purposes of the IRCA, for unauthorized workers’ “acceptance … of jobs on substandard terms as to wages and working conditions can seriously depress wage scales and working conditions of citizens and legally admitted aliens.” De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 356–57, 96 S.Ct. 933, 47 L.Ed.2d 43 (1976).
Holding employers who violate federal immigration law and federal employment law liable for both violations advances the purpose of federal immigration policy by “offset[ting] what is perhaps the most attractive feature of [unauthorized] workers—their willingness to work for less than the minimum wage.” Patel, 846 F.2d at 704. For this reason, prohibiting employers from hiring unauthorized aliens is in harmony with requiring employers—including those who break immigration laws by hiring unauthorized workers—to provide fair working conditions and wages. Both (1) the legislative history of the IRCA, which we reference “for those who find legislative history useful,” United States v. Tinklenberg, 563 U.S. ––––, ––––, 131 S.Ct. 2007, 2015, 179 L.Ed.2d 1080 (2011), and (2) “our steadfast canons of statutory construction,” United States v. Johnson, 703 F.3d 464, 468 (8th Cir.2013), confirm this point.
not intend that any provision of [the IRCA] would limit the powers of State or Federal labor standards agencies such as … the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor … to remedy unfair practices committed against undocumented employees for exercising their rights before such agencies or for engaging in activities protected by these agencies. To do otherwise would be counter-productive of our intent to limit the hiring of undocumented employees and the depressing effect on working conditions caused by their employment.
H.R.Rep. No. 99–682(II), at 1 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5757, 5758 (emphasis added). When Congress passed the IRCA, at least the authors of this report expected the FLSA would continue to protect unauthorized aliens from substandard working conditions and wages.
Second, § 111(d) of the IRCA “authorized to be appropriated, … such sums as may be necessary to the Department of Labor for enforcement activities of the Wage and Hour Division … in order to deter the employment of unauthorized aliens and remove the economic incentive for employers to exploit and use such aliens.” Pub.L. No. 99–603, § 111(d), 100 Stat. 3359, 3381 (1986). Presuming, as the employers do, that the IRCA impliedly exempts unauthorized aliens from the protections of the FLSA would render this section “mere surplusage,” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803). No “sums” would “be necessary” to enforce the FLSA as to unauthorized aliens if the FLSA did not apply to their employment. § 111(d), 100 Stat. at 3381. A reading that turns an entire subsection into a meaningless aside “is inadmissible, unless the words require it.” Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 174. The IRCA’s words do not require it, so “the presumption against surplusage [is] decisive.” Johnson, 703 F.3d at 468.
Click Lucas v. Jerusalem Cafe, LLC to read the entire opinion. Click DOL Amicus Brief to read the Secretary of Labor’s Amicus Curiae Brief, submitted in support of the Plaintiffs-Appellees.
Anyone who has ever moved for or opposed a motion for conditional certification (i.e. a “Stage 1” motion) of a collective action is likely familiar with the common defense tactic whereby a defendant asserts that the named plaintiff and members of the putative class are not similarly situated. Typically a defendant argues that individualized issues pertaining to the claims of the named plaintiff(s) (and members within the putative class) render the case ill-suited for class/collective treatment. As discussed below, three recent decisions discuss three separate issues related to this analysis. In the first, a court held that a pro se plaintiff could not adequately serve the interests of the putative class and denied conditional certification. However, in the second and third cases discussed below, the courts rejected the defendants’ contentions that: (1) an undocumented (“illegal”) immigrant was ill-suited to serve as a representative plaintiff; and (2) issues regarding whether specific putative class members signed binding arbitration agreements relating to the issues raised by the named-plaintiff were not properly raised at stage 1.
The issue of whether a pro se plaintiff can sue on behalf of other members in a collective action is one of adequacy of representation. Determining adequate representation is typically based on a two-part inquiry: “First, the named representatives must appear able to prosecute the action vigorously through qualified counsel, and second, the representatives must not have antagonistic or conflicting interests with the unnamed members of the class.” Lerwill v. Inflight Motion Pictures, Inc., 582 F.2d 507, 512 (9th Cir.1978). Courts have generally concluded that a pro se plaintiff cannot pursue claims on behalf of others in a representative capacity. See Simon v. Hartford Life, Inc., 546 F.3d 661, 664 (9th Cir.2008); see also Johns v. County of San Diego, 114 F.3d 874, 876 (9th Cir.1997) (“While a non-attorney may appear pro se on his ow n behalf, he has no authority to appear as an attorney for others than himself.”); C.E. Pope Equity Trust v. United States, 818 F.2d 696, 697 (9th Cir.1987) (holding that a pro se litigant may not appear as an attorney for others). Here, because Koch is a pro se litigant, he cannot pursue claims on behalf of other CHS employees in a representative capacity.
The rule holds true for pro se plaintiffs seeking to bring collective action suits under the F LSA. Morgovsky v. AdBrite, Inc. ., No. C10–05143–SBA, 2012 WL 1595105 *4 (N.D.Cal. May 4, 2012) (denying pro se plaintiff’s motion to bring a collective action under the FLSA and dismissing collective action claims); Spivey v. Sprint/United Mgt. Co., No. 04–2285–JWL, 2004 WL 3048840 (D.Kan. Dec.30, 2004) (holding that a claim under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) cannot be brought by a pro se plaintiff).
Accordingly, the Court agrees with CHS that Koch, because he proceeds in the litigation pro se, cannot represent the class members on whose behalf he purports to bring suit. Therefore, proceeding with the litigation as a collective action is not permitted pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). The motion will be denied.
Click Koch v. CHS Inc. to read the entire Memorandum Decision and Order.
Torres v. Cache Cache, Ltd.
Finally, in an apparent attempt to distinguish Plaintiff from other proposed collective action members, Defendants note his status as an illegal immigrant and involvement in other similar FLSA lawsuits. Neither of these issues, however, is likely to provide Defendants with a valid defense that is unique to Plaintiff. First, there are a number of cases finding that evidence of immigration status has no relevance in an FLSA action. See e.g. Reyes v. Snowcap Creamery, Inc., 2012 WL 4888476 at *2 (D.Colo. Oct.15, 2012) (recognizing that “weight of authority clearly holds that a plaintiff’s immigration status is irrelevant in an FLSA action” and citing supporting authority). It is also questionable whether Defendants will be able to introduce evidence of other lawsuits involving Plaintiff. See Van Deelen v. Johnson, 2008 WL 4683022 at *2 (D.Kan. Oct.22, 2008) (evidence of plaintiff’s prior lawsuits cannot be admitted for purpose of proving that plaintiff is litigious but may be admissible for other purposes).
Click Torres v. Cache Cache, Ltd. to read the entire Order.
Hernandez v. Immortal Rise, Inc.
Next, defendants argue that the proposed class should be limited to cashiers and those who had not signed arbitration agreements, excluding grocery packers and delivery workers, whom defendants never employed, and employees subject to arbitration agreements. However, these are issues of fact that should be determined during discovery rather than at this preliminary stage. See D’Antuono v. C & G of Groton, Inc., No. 11–cv–33, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135402, at *12–13 (D.Conn. Nov. 23, 2011) (holding that the enforceability of arbitration agreements should not be determined during conditional class certification); Lujan v. Cabana Mgmt., No. 10–cv–755, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9542, at *23–24, 2011 WL 317984 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 1, 2011) (quoting Realite v. Ark Rests. Corp., 7 F.Supp.2d 303, 307 (S.D.N.Y.1998)) (holding that defendants’ contention that its restaurants constituted separate entities raised a contested issue of fact, and was therefore not a basis for denying conditional class certification). Thus, Judge Bloom correctly found that the proposed class should not be limited as defendants propose.
Click Hernandez v. Immortal Rise, Inc. to read the entire Order.
Enriquez v. Cherry Hill Market Corp.
This case was before the court on the plaintiff’s motion for conditional certification. As discussed here, it is of interest, because of the language the court approved with regard to the Notice to be sent to the class. Specifically, among other things, the court ruled that a warning to potential opt-ins that they may have to participate in the case was unduly chilling and further held that it was appropriate to notify putative class members that their immigration status is irrelevant to their right to recover under the FLSA.
Click Enriquez v. Cherry Hill Market Corp. to read the entire Memorandum and Order.
Solis v. Cindy’s Total Care, Inc.
This case, brought by the Secretary of Labor, was before the court on the Secretary’s Motion in Limine to exclude any reference to plaintiffs’ immigration status at trial, due to irrelevance. The underlying case concerned nails techs who worked at defendant’s nail salon, presumably at least some of whom were undocumented workers. The court agreed with the Secretary that such information was irrelevant to the issues at bar- namely whether defendant had failed to properly compensate plaintiffs for their previous overtime work.
“In this case, an employee’s immigration status, or national origin, is clearly irrelevant to a claim for back pay for overtime wages under the FLSA. By its terms, the FLSA applies to “any individual” employed by an employer, as the term “employer” is defined by the Act. 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1). The Act contains no exception or exclusion for persons who are not U.S. citizens or who are in this country illegally.
For this reason, the courts to consider this issue have uniformly held that any person, regardless of his or her immigration status, who is employed by an employer, may pursue an action under the Act for work actually performed. See, e.g., Corona v. Adriatic Italian Restaurant & Pizzeria, 2010 WL 675702, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.23, 2010) (citing Patel v. Quality Inn South, 846 F.2d 700, 702 (11th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1011, 109 S.Ct. 1120, 103 L.Ed.2d 182 (1989)). Indeed, cases have held that employees’ immigration status or national origin is not even a suitable area for pretrial discovery. See, e . g., Liu v. Donna Karan Int’l, Inc., 207 F.Supp.2d 191, 192 (S.D.N.Y.2002) ( “plaintiff-workers’ immigration status in cases seeking unpaid wages brought under the FLSA” held “undiscoverable”); Renfigo v. Erevos Enter. Inc., 2007 WL 894376, *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.20, 2008) (plaintiff’s “immigration status and authority to work is a collateral issue” and not discoverable).
In its answer, Cindy’s asserted that employees’ immigration status might be relevant in an action seeking to recover “future wages.” There is no occasion to address that issue here. The Secretary has stated clearly that that the monetary relief she seeks to obtain on behalf of Cindy’s employees in this case is exclusively retrospective, in the form of back wages owed to current or former employees as a result of Cindy’s alleged failure to pay them overtime wages for the overtime hours that they worked.
Click Solis v. Cindy’s Total Care, Inc. to read the entire Opinion and Order.
Jin-Ming Lin v. Chinatown Restaurant Corp.
This case was before the court on the parties cross-motions to compel discovery. It appears that, as often occurs, the defendant was all too happy to employ plaintiff, an undocumented immigrant, prior to plaintiff’s filing of his FLSA case. However, once the FLSA case was filed, the employer sought to fight the FLSA claim on the basis of plaintiff’s immigration status. As discussed here, the court denied defendant’s motion to compel discovery of plaintiff’s immigration status. Apparently this was an issue of first impression in the First Circuit, as the court noted that no prior court within the First Circuit had decided this hot-button issue. While the court reached the same conclusion as most- that such information was irrelevant, because FLSA rights are absolute, regardless of immigration status- it noted that it’s reasoning was divergent from the majority of courts.
“Nonetheless, while I find the reasoning advanced by other courts in holding that illegal aliens may recover for unpaid wages under the FLSA to be insufficient, I come to the same ultimate conclusion for a different reason that has not, so far as I know, yet been relied on. Awards for back pay under the NLRA, at issue in Hoffman, are discretionary. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (Courts may order “reinstatement of employees with or without back pay ….”); see also NLRB v. Harding Glass Co., 500 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir.2007) (NLRB has “broad remedial powers” under 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) including “discretion both to determine that back pay is appropriate … and to compute the back pay amount.”). As Hoffman recognized, agencies are required to exercise their discretion in light of other federal policies. 535 U.S. at 146 (“In devising remedies for unfair labor practices, the Board is obliged to take into account [other] equally important Congressional objective[s].”) (internal quotation omitted). This basic tenet of administrative law is what first prompted the Court in Hoffman to look at federal immigration policy as a limit on the NLRB’s authority and discretion to award back pay in the circumstances. See id. at 143-44.
In contrast, awards for unpaid wages under the FLSA are not discretionary, but rather a matter of statutory entitlement when the necessary factual predicate has been established. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (“Any employer who violates the [minimum wage or overtime provisions of the FLSA] shall be liable to the employee or employees affected in the amount of their unpaid minimum wages, or their unpaid overtime compensation.”) (emphasis added). Courts do not have discretion to deny the award of FLSA damages when they have been proved. Adjudication of an FLSA cause of action does not call upon the court to make a discretionary policy- or interest-balancing assessment. See Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Redefining the Rights of Undocumented Workers, 58 Am. U.L.Rev. 1361, 1389 (2009) (remarking that the nondiscretionary nature of back pay under the FLSA “leaves no room for any type of Hoffman-inspired balancing between federal labor and immigration objectives”).
Of course, the tension between policies underlying the FLSA, on the one hand, and the IRCA, on the other, continues to exist. In Hoffman, the Court was able to find a resolution by giving priority to the statutory policy of the IRCA over the administrative discretion of the NLRB. That resolution is not possible where both poles of the conflict are statutory directives. A court entertaining an FLSA suit lacks the authority or discretion to resolve the tension. If a plaintiff makes out an FLSA case, he is entitled to an FLSA remedy, any obstruction or interference with immigration policy notwithstanding. As Judge Walker of the Second Circuit noted, after that circuit tackled a particularly confounding case of conflict preemption under Hoffman, “judges are especially ill-suited to divining the unexpressed will of Congress when it comes to hot-button and ever-shifting issues like immigration policy.” Madeira, 469 F.3d at 254 (Walker, C.J., concurring). Any remedy for an incompatibility between federal labor and immigration policies will have to come from Congress, not the lower courts.
Click Jin-Ming Lin v. Chinatown Restaurant Corp. to read the entire decision.
This case was before the Court on the parties’ cross motions for summary judgment on a variety of issues. As discussed here, the Defendants asserted that the Plaintiff, an undocumented immigrant, was not entitled to recover unpaid overtime wages and/or liquidated damages under the FLSA, because he fraudulently obtained his job by providing false documents to the Defendants. The Court roundly rejected this assertion, ruling that neither Plaintiff’s immigration status nor how he obtained his job had any impact on his FLSA claims.
“Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s submission of false documents at the time of his employment precludes any recovery of overtime pay. Defendants point to the declaration of immigration attorney Jason Marachi, who reviewed the documents that Plaintiff submitted to Defendants at the time of his employment, performed an independent investigation, and concluded that Plaintiff submitted false work authorization documents to his employer and was not working legally in the United States while he worked for Defendants. See generally Marachi Decl. Plaintiff has not raised any factual dispute on this issue, but disagrees that his recovery of damages is affected.
Thus, as presented to this court, this case does not involve a situation where undocumented workers submitted false work authorization documents to a prospective employer. (See e.g., Ulloa v. Al’s All Tree Service, Inc. (Dist.Ct.2003) 2 Misc.3d 262, 768 N.Y.S.2d 556, 558 [“The Court also notes in passing that, if there had been proof in this case that the Plaintiff had obtained his employment by tendering false documents (activity that is explicitly unlawful under IRCA), Hoffman would require that the wage claim [for unpaid wages] be disallowed in its entirety.”].) However, the issue of whether Hoffman requires that a wage claim be denied if an employee submitted false authorization documents is not before this court.
However, Reyes expressly did not reach the issue raised by Defendants, and therefore is of little help to them. Hoffman Plastic Components, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board, 535 U.S. 137 (2002), cited by Reyes, foreclosed an award of backpay under the National Labor Relations Act to a worker who had submitted false documents to his employer because the Court found that an award of backpay “for years of work not performed, for wages that could not lawfully have been earned, and for a job obtained in the first instance by criminal fraud” would run counter to immigration policy. Id. at 149, 151. Hoffman did not involve a case such as this, where Plaintiff claims to have already performed the work in question and seeks payment for that work, and so it is also not directly on point.
Plaintiff argues that regardless of whether he presented false documents and was working illegally, he is entitled to recover his earned wages. Plaintiff notes that the cases interpreting Hoffman have not applied it to bar recovery of wages already earned. See, e.g., Singh v. Jutla & C.D. & R’s Oil, Inc., 214 F .Supp.2d 1056, 1061 (N.D.Cal.2002) (Breyer, J.) (quoting Flores v.. Albertsons, Inc., 2002 WL 1163623 (C.D.Cal.2002) (“Hoffman does not establish that an award of unpaid wages to undocumented workers for work actually performed runs counter to IRCA.”); Opp. at 19 (citing cases).
The case cited in Reyes, Ulloa v. Al’s All Tree Service, Inc., 768 N.Y.S.2d 556, 558 (Dist.Ct.2003), does not mandate a contrary result. Ulloa is New York small claims court decision where the Court limited an undocumented worker’s recovery of unpaid wages to the minimum wage, and then noted “in passing that, if there had been proof in this case that the Plaintiff had obtained his employment by tendering false documents (activity that is explicitly unlawful under IRCA), Hoffman would require that the wage claim [for unpaid wages] be disallowed in its entirety.” No case has followed this portion of Ulloa, or otherwise affirmatively held than an undocumented worker is precluded from recovering wages for work already performed simply because he submitted false documents at the time of employment. Indeed, a higher New York court has expressly rejected Ulloa ‘s dicta, and instead held that: “If federal courts ban discovery on immigration status in unpaid wages cases, the use of fraudulent documents on immigration status to gain employment in unpaid wages cases is likewise irrelevant. The only crucial issue is whether the undocumented worker performed services for which the worker deserves compensation. If so, public policy requires payment so that employers do not intentionally hire undocumented workers for the express purpose of citing the workers’ undocumented status or their use of fraudulent documents as a way to avoid payment of wages.” Pineda v. Kel-Tech Const., Inc., 832 N.Y.S.2d 386, 396 (N.Y.Sup.2007).
At oral argument, Defendants contended that, even if Plaintiff’s employment status does not require that all of his claims be disallowed, Hoffman precludes an award of liquidated damages under the FLSA. Defendants’ argument appears to be that FLSA liquidated damages are akin to the backpay for work not performed due to wrongful termination at issue in Hoffman, in that they go beyond simply compensating for past work, and therefore federal immigration policy makes this remedy unavailable to Plaintiff because it would reward violation of immigration laws while punishing the employer. There is no case expressly addressing the issue of whether FLSA liquidated damages are available to a plaintiff who presented false documents to his employer. While a close question, and one that pits important governmental policies relating to labor and immigration against each other, the Court’s interpretation of the statute and the caselaw runs counter to Defendants’ position.
First, the plain language of the FLSA mandates liquidated damages in an amount equal to the unpaid wages unless the employer “shows to the satisfaction of the court that the act or omission giving rise to such action was in good faith and that he had reasonable grounds for believing that his act or omission was not a violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended,” in which case “the court may, in its sound discretion, award no liquidated damages or award any amount thereof …” 29 U.S.C. § 260. “Under 29 U.S.C. § 260, the employer has the burden of establishing subjective and objective good faith in its violation of the FLSA.” Local 246 Utility Workers Union of America v. Southern California Edison Co., 83 F.3d 292, 297-298 (9th Cir.1996). Thus, the plain language of the FLSA’s liquidated damages provision focuses exclusively on the employer’s conduct, not the employee’s conduct. There is nothing in the language of the statute that allows the Court to take Plaintiff’s misconduct into account in determining whether to award liquidated damages. To the contrary, the imposition of liquidated damages is mandatory unless the employer establishes its own good faith.
Second, under the FLSA, “liquidated damages represent compensation, and not a penalty. Double damages are the norm, single damages the exception.” Local 246 Util. Workers Union v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 83 F.3d 292, 297 (9th Cir.1996); see also Overnight Motor Transp. Co. v. Missel, 316 U.S. 572, 584 (1942) (liquidated damages compensate for damages too obscure and difficult of proof), superceded by statute on other grounds; Herman v. RSR Sec. Services Ltd., 172 F.3d 132, 142 (2d Cir.1999) (“Liquidated damages are not a penalty exacted by the law, but rather compensation to the employee occasioned by the delay in receiving wages due caused by the employer’s violation of the FLSA”). Congress provided for liquidated damages because it recognized that those protected by federal wage and hour laws would have the most difficulty maintaining a minimum standard of living without receiving minimum and overtime wages and thus “that double payment must be made in the event of delay in order to insure restoration of the worker to that minimum standard of well-being.” See Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 707 (1945).
Following Hoffman, “[c]ourts have distinguished between awards of post-termination back pay for work not actually performed and awards of unpaid wages pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act (‘FLSA’).” Zeng Liu v. Donna Karan Intern., Inc., 207 F.Supp.2d 191, 192 (S.D.N.Y.2002); see also Widjaja v. Kang Yue USA Corp., 2010 WL 2132068, *1 (E.D.N.Y.2010). In Flores v. Amigon, 233 F.Supp.2d 462 (E.D.N.Y.2002), the court held that Hoffman did not apply to FLSA cases in which workers sought pay for work actually performed, and that, “enforcing the FLSA’s provisions requiring employers to pay proper wages to undocumented aliens when the work has been performed actually furthers the goal of the IRCA” because if the FLSA did not apply to undocumented aliens, employers would have a greater incentive to hire illegal aliens with the knowledge that they could not be sued for violating minimum wage requirements. While the interest in deterring employers from knowingly hiring undocumented workers in order to avoid lawsuits for wage violations does not apply when an employee uses false documents to successfully deceive an unknowing employer who attempted to comply with immigration law, the interest in deterrence does apply when the employer had reason to suspect or knew that the employee was not authorized to work in the United States but hired him anyway, colluding in the use of false documents. The record here is silent as to whether Defendants were successfully deceived as to Plaintiff’s authorization to work or instead knew or suspected that his documents were falsified.
Unlike the backpay for hours not worked at issue in Hoffman, here the liquidated damages are a form of compensation for time worked that cannot otherwise be calculated. See also Singh v. Jutla & C.D. & R’s Oil, Inc., 214 F.Supp.2d 1056 (N.D Cal.2002) (Breyer, J.) (stating that Hoffman did not address remedies of compensatory and punitive damages, and holding that undocumented employee could proceed with FLSA retaliation claim); Galdames v. N & D Investment Corp., 2008 WL 4372889 (S.D.Fla. Sept. 24, 2008) (finding that Hoffman did not overrule previous rule that an “undocumented worked may bring claims for unpaid wages and liquidated damages” for work already performed); Renteria v. Italia Foods, Inc., 2003 WL 21995190, *5-6 (N.D.Ill.2003) (striking FLSA backpay and frontpay claims in light of Hoffman /IRCA, but allowing claim for compensatory damages).
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Widjaja v. Kang Yue USA Corp.
This case was before the Court, in part, on defendants motion to compel discovery of plaintiffs’ immigration status. Joining the majority of Courts to have ruled on such motions, the Court denied defendants’ Motion.
Defendants asserted two reasons to discover the immigration status of the plaintiffs for two reasons. First, they claimed the plaintiffs’ status in this country was relevant to plaintiffs’ credibility, arguing that if plaintiffs entered the country illegally then they are more likely to make false claims regarding hours worked. Second, defendants argued that if it is discovered that plaintiffs are illegal immigrants, then they would not be entitled to back pay for future loss of earnings since they would not be permitted to work under the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (“IRCA”). See Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 122 S.Ct. 1275, 152 L.Ed.2d 271 (2002) (holding that the IRCA prevents the NLRB from awarding backpay to an illegal alien for work not performed).
“Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows discovery of all relevant non-privileged matters. Fed.R.Civ.P. 26. A plaintiff’s immigration status is not normally discoverable. Rengifo v. Erevos Enterprises, Inc., No. 06 CV 4266, 2007 WL 894376 at *1 (S.D.N.Y. March 20, 2007). “[D]iscovery of such information would have an intimidating effect on an employee’s willingness to assert his workplace rights.” Id.
The Court rejects plaintiffs’ first argument that plaintiffs’ immigration status is relevant to their credibility. “While it is true that credibility is always at issue, that does not by itself warrant unlimited inquiry into the subject of immigration status….” Id. at *3. “[T]he opportunity to test the credibility of a party … does not outweigh the chilling effect that disclosure of immigration status has on employees seeking to enforce their rights.” Id. See also E.E.O.C. v. First Wireless Group, Inc., No. 03 CV 4490, 2007 WL 586720 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 2007) (finding immigration status not relevant to credibility); Avila-Blue v. Casa De Cambio Delgado Inc., 236 F.R.D. 190 (S.D.N.Y.2006) (same).
Bailon v. Seok AM No. 1 Corp.
This case was before the court on plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss and motion for protective order. The issues presented turned largely around the question of whether the immigration status of plaintiffs/employees is at all relevant to the claims those employees filed against their defendant/employer under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FSLA”) 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 and the Washington Minimum Wage Act (“MWA”) RCW 49.48.010 et. seq. Defendants sought to pursue discovery against plaintiffs arguing that their alleged status as illegal aliens prevents them from pursuing claims for unfair employment practices. The Court concluded that the plaintiffs’ immigration status is irrelevant to any valid claim or defense and that public policy prohibits defendants from pursuing such discovery. Additionally, the Court held that an FLSA Plaintiff may not properly be the subject of a counterclaim for indemnity based on actions taken as Defendants’ supervisory employee.
The Court framed the issues before it as follows: (1) Whether alleged undocumented-worker immigration status provides a defense or counterclaim in an FLSA/MWA case for work already performed; (2) Whether FLSA/MWA defendants have a right to seek indemnity or contribution from third parties such as co-workers or joint employers; and (3) Whether FLSA/MWA claims are subject to personal defenses such as waiver, estoppel, unclean hands, laches, “independent intervening conduct of” third party, failure to mitigate damages, “equal[ ] or exceed[ing] fault of plaintiffs,” proximate cause of third party, failure to pay taxes, or a public policy punitive damages defense.
Addressing Plaintiffs’ Motion to Dismiss Defendants’ Affirmative Defenses first, the Court stated, “After carefully reviewing the case law and the facts as alleged by the parties, it appears that plaintiffs’ immigration status is irrelevant to any issue in this case. While the Supreme Court ruled that immigration status bars recover for future wages, see Hofman Plastics Compounds v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 149, 122 S.Ct. 1275, 152 L.Ed.2d 271 (2002), if the wage claim involves damages for past work performed, then the immigration status of the plaintiff is irrelevant. See Rivera v. Nibco, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1063-69 (9th Cir.1004) (discussing Hoffman, Title VII claims for back wages are not barred because of employee’s immigration status).
The 1972 law that revamped Washington’s workers’ compensation system is explicit: All workers must have coverage. Both employers and workers contribute to the insurance fund. The Department of Labor and Industries is responsible for protecting worker safety, ensuring that all workers be paid at least the minimum wage and providing workers with medical care and wage replacement when an injury or an occupational disease prevents them from doing their job. The agency has and will continue to do all that without regard to the worker’s immigration status. Exhibit 2 to Schmitt Decl. (Statement by Gary Moore, Director of the Department of Labor & Industries, May 21, 2002) Doc. # 11.
Next the Court turned to the question of whether an FLSA Plaintiff may ever be required to indemnify Defendants for actions committed as a supervisor under Defendants’ employ. Answering this question in the negative, the Court stated, “The Court is unaware of any case in the Ninth Circuit regarding whether an individual supervisor may be held liable for contribution or indemnity to another defendant who may be liable for violations of the FLSA. But several other courts of appeals in other circuits have rejected claims seeking indemnity or contribution under those circumstances. See LeCompte v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 780 F.2d 1260, 1264 (5th Cir.1986) (affirming dismissal of employer’s counterclaim against supervisory personnel for indemnity of plaintiffs’ claims under FLSA, and stating, “No cause of action for indemnity by an employer against its employees who violate the Act appears in the statute, nor in forty years of its existence has the Act been construed to incorporate such a theory”; Lyle v. Food Lion, 954 F.2d 984, 987 (4th Cir.1992) (affirming dismissal of employer’s counterclaim and third-party complaint for indemnity against plaintiff-supervisor for plaintiffs’ FLSA claims); Martin v. Gingerbread House, Inc., 977 F.2d 1405, 1408 (10th Cir.1992) (holding employer’s third-party complaint seeking indemnity from employee for alleged FLSA violations was preempted); Herman v. RSR Sec. Services Ltd., 172 F.3d 132, 144 (2d Cir.1999) (affirming dismissal of corporation chairman’s claims for contribution and indemnification against his co-owner and corporation’s manager and vice president).
The Court is persuaded that it should dismiss defendants’ counterclaim seeking indemnity or contribution in this case. To rule otherwise would frustrate Congress’ purpose in enacting the FLSA, since an employer who believed that any violation of the statute’s overtime or minimum wage provisions could be recovered from its employees would have a diminished incentive to comply with the statute. LeCompte, 780 F.2d at 1264.
Defendants argue they are entitled to assert their contribution and indemnity claim(s) based on state law, citing RCW 49.52.050, 49.52.070, Morgan v. Kingen, 166 Wash.2d 526, 210 P.3d 995 (2009), and Ellerman v. Centerpoint Prepress, 143 Wash.2d 514, 22 P.3d 795 (2001). Defendants’ argument misses the mark. This authority stands for the proposition that plaintiffs may have a claim against an individual supervisor, but does not stand for the proposition that another defendant who may be liable for wage claims has a contribution or indemnity claim against someone similarly situated.
Furthermore, the FLSA’s preclusion of contribution and indemnity claims preempts state law. “Creation of a state-law-based indemnity remedy on behalf of employers would not serve the congressional purpose of creating and maintaining minimum standards of employment throughout the national economy.” LeCompte, 780 F.2d at 1264.
Last, the Court granted Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Protective Order regarding discovery sought concerning their immigration status.
Before the Court were: (1) the motion of the defendants, Omar Hamdan, Fatmah Hamdan, Alberta, Inc., FHH Properties, LLC, and Alberta Management, LLC, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(e), for a more definite statement; and (2) the motion of the plaintiffs, Angela Mericia Baca and Abigail Analqueto, for a protective order limiting inquiries with in terrorem effect. The motions were related. The defendants’ sought an order requiring the plaintiffs to provide Social Security numbers and addresses. The plaintiffs sought a protective order barring the defendants from inquiring into this information. The Court granted Plaintiffs’ Motion and denied Defendants’.
The Court, in granting Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Protective Order and denying Defendants’ Motion discussed the 5th Circuit case In re Reyes, 814 F.2d 168,170 (5th Cir.1987) paraphrasing, “[t]here is much stronger justification in this case [for a writ of mandamus] where there is no possible relevance and the discovery could place in jeopardy unrelated personal status matters.” Id. at 170-71. “Inasmuch as the protections provided by the FLSA apply to undocumented aliens, the plaintiffs’ immigration status, Social Security numbers and addresses are not relevant. In Agusiegbe v. Petroleum Associates of Lafayette, 486 So.2d, 314 (La.App. 3rd 1986), the defendant contended that the plaintiff falsely represented himself to be employable as a U.S. citizen. The court held that the LWPA applied to all employees, regardless of their nationality. Id. at 316. The information sought by defendants is not relevant to plaintiffs’ LWPA claims.

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