Source: http://www.claimsmagdigital.com/claims/february_2014?pg=35
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 00:17:58+00:00

Document:
decision, Reott v. Asia Trend, 21 noted that defendants generally have the burden of proving affirmative defenses. Quoting the Restatement Second, 22 that court wrote, “The Restatement continues that assumption of the risk is only relevant ‘where there would otherwise be a breach of some duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff. It is then a defense, which relieves the defendant of the liability to which he would otherwise be subject. The burden of proof is therefore upon the defendant.’” 23 Under this reasoning, because assumption of the risk is an affirmative defense, the defendant has the burden of proof.
defense similar to highly reckless conduct.
the burden of proof on that position.
A recent Seventh Circuit opinion determined that the defendant was not entitled to summary judgment on the defense of misuse. 24 The instructions and warnings stressed that pins must always be used with support stands. The plaintiffs did not use the pins. Consequently a semi-truck trailer fell onto the two mechanics who were working on the trailer.
The court held that dismissal was not appropriate based on a misuse defense, one aspect of comparative fault under Indiana law, because use of the support stands without the pin was reasonably foreseeable and because the fact finder usually allocates fault. The court discussed another of its opinions involving a decedent who had used a tire jack to prop up his car for an oil change on an uneven surface. The Indiana Supreme Court upheld the ruling that no reasonable jury could find the decedent to have been less than 50 percent at fault, possibly indicating that characterizing a plaintiff’s fault as misuse may make it harder for a defendant to win an MSJ.
1 See Reott v. Asia Trend, Inc., 55 A.3d 1088, 1095 (Pa. 2012).
2 For brevity, “comparative fault” is used interchangeably with “comparative negligence” in this article.
6Discussed in Dehring v. Keystone, 2013 WL 3879619, 6 (E.D. Mich.).
7 Spowal v. ITW, 2013 WL 1871267, 3 (W.D. Pa.). 8 Restatement Third, Sec. 17, comments a and c. 9 Id.
10 Allen v. C & H, 2013 WL 4506233, 4 (W.D. La.).
11 Nemmers v. Ford, 686 F.3d 486, 489 (C.A. 8 Iowa 2012).
12 Patterson v. Long, 321 Ga.App. 157, 160-161, 741 S.E.2d 242, 247 (2013).
13 Johnson v. American Honda, 2012 WL 1027588, 16-18 ( D.Mont. 2012).
14 Schwartz v. Hasbro, 2012 WL 1414094, 11-12 (N.J.Super.A.D.); see also McGarrigle v. Mercury, 838 F.Supp.2d 282, 294-295 (D.N.J. 2011) and McGee v. Stihl, 2011 WL 6130417, 9 (D.N.J.).
15 Sadler v. Advanced, 2013 WL 1636374, 3 (W.D. Ky.).
16 2013 WL 5442903, 2 (Ill. App. 1 Dist. 2013).
17 901 F.Supp.2d 834, 842 (N.D. Tex. 2012).
18Under Maine law, comparative fault “does not apply to strict liability claims where the plaintiff’s only alleged negligence is failure to discover the defect in the product or to guard against the possibility of its existence.” Hinton v. Outboard, 2012 WL 260033, 2-4 (D. Me.).
19 Restatement Third at Section 17, Comment d. 20 Id.
21 55 A.3d 1088, 1095 (Pa. 2012).
22 The Restatement Third does not address allocations of the burden of proof, leaving that issue to local laws. See Sec. 17.
23 Reott, 55 A.3d at 1096.
24 Weigle v. SPX, 2013 WL 4767365, 12-13 (7th Cir.).
25 O’Neal v. Bumbo, 2013 WL 4083281, 7-8 (S.D. Tex.).
Andy Rowlett is a member at Howell & Fisher, PLLC. His civil litigation practice encompasses commercial litigation, insurance subrogation and recovery, insurance defense, insurance coverage analysis and litigation, and appellate work. Rowlett may be reached at arowlett@howell-fisher.com.

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