Source: http://massachusettslandlords.com/norfold-dedham-v-morrison-tenants-can-carry-our-insurance/
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 07:05:09+00:00

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NORFOLK & DEDHAM MUTUAL FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY vs. Ellen MORRISON & others.
January 5, 2010. – April 8, 2010.
Contract, Lease of real estate, Indemnity, Insurance, Illegality. Indemnity. Insurance, Coverage, Insured, Insurer’s obligation to defend, Liability insurance. Landlord and Tenant, Landlord’s liabilities to tenant or one having his rights, Landlord’s liability to third person. Negligence, One owning or controlling real estate. CIVIL ACTION commenced in the Superior Court Department on April 14, 2008. The case was heard by Timothy Q. Feeley, J., on motions for summary judgment. The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct appellate review. Peter G. Hermes (Adam J. Combies & Jeffrey P. Hermes with him) for the defendants. Robert F. Feeney (Jenny I. Tibbetts with him) for the plaintiff. The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: Christopher A. Kenney, David R. Kerrigan, & Brian A. O’Connell for Massachusetts Defense Lawyers Association. John Pagliaro & Martin J. Newhouse for New England Legal Foundation & others. Myles W. McDonough, Anthony J. Antonellis, & Nicholas W. Schieffelin for Frozen Four, LLC. Present: Marshall, C.J., Ireland, Spina, Cowin, Cordy, & Gants, JJ. CORDY, J. The appeal in this declaratory judgment action requires us to determine whether two provisions in a commercial lease violate G.L. c. 186, § 15, a statute which, essentially, voids lease provisions that require tenants to indemnify landlords or exonerate them from liability for their own negligence. One of the provisions (liability provision) provides that as between the tenant and the landlord, the tenant is responsible for all injuries arising out of the use, control, condition, or occupancy of the leased premises, except those resulting from the “sole” negligence of the landlord. The other provision (insurance provision) requires the tenant to purchase general liability insurance for the benefit of the landlord with respect to injuries arising out of the condition of the leased premises or their use by the tenant. We conclude that the liability provision is void in part, and that the insurance provision does not violate the prohibitions in the statute. [FN2] The case comes to us on appeal from the ruling of a Superior Court judge granting summary judgment to the tenant’s insurer, essentially voiding the insurance provision and declaring that the insurer did not have a duty to defend, indemnify, or insure the landlord. The judge declined to void the liability provision, ruling instead that it did not apply because the landlord was solely responsible for the area where the injury occurred, and any negligence would therefore be the “sole” negligence of the landlord. The landlord and its insurer appealed and we granted their application for direct appellate review. We reverse and remand to the Superior Court for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 1. Background. The following are undisputed facts from the summary judgment record.
[FN7] but did not have occasion then to decide the question.
The purpose of the statute is to preclude a landlord from shifting responsibility for its own negligence to its tenants. See, e.g, Young v. Garwacki, supra at 171 (statute prohibits landlord from “exculpat[ing] himself from liability for negligent maintenance of the rented premises”). That purpose is not limited in its applicability to strictly residential leases.
in residential lease provision); G.L. c. 186, § 18 (prohibition on reprisals against residential tenants); G.L. c. 186, § 20 (attorney’s fees in actions involving residential property). Where the Legislature has not done so here, we will not impute such an intent.
c. The liability provision. The liability provision contains two operative clauses. The second clause is a straightforward indemnification provision essentially providing that Shafer will indemnify and hold Cummings harmless from liability for injuries and property damage arising out of the use or condition of the leased premises except for injuries that “directly result from the negligence of LESSOR.” This clause is consistent with the prohibition set forth in § 15 insofar as it does not exculpate or relieve the landlord from liability for injuries caused by the landlord’s own negligence. The first clause of the liability provision is more problematic, and it is this clause on which the judge focused. The clause essentially provides that as between Cummings and Shafer, Shafer shall be “solely responsible” for personal injuries and property damage occurring on the leased premises except for those “resulting from the sole negligence” of Cummings. On its face, this language appears to shift to the tenant responsibility for injuries and damage that might arise from negligent acts for which Cummings may be partially, but not solely, responsible. Cummings has not explained how this language is consistent with the statutory prohibition against shifting “any or all liability” for the landlord’s negligence to the tenant. G.L. c. 186, § 15. In the absence of such of an explanation, we conclude that it is violative of the statute and therefore void. [FN9] In his summary judgment ruling, the judge focused only on this first clause of the liability provision, concluding that he need not rule on its validity because, on the basis of the record before him, the liability-shifting effect of it did not apply. Specifically, the judge ruled that because Morrison’s injury occurred in a common area that Cummings was responsible for maintaining, the injury, if the result of negligence, could not have been the result of “any conceivable negligence” by Shafer. Therefore, the “sole negligence” exception to the first clause removed the negligence claim from the liability provision. We disagree with the judge’s conclusion that at this stage of the proceeding there is no conceivable way that Shafer might have been negligent. Whether Shafer may be negligent in the circumstances of this case will depend on whether she owed a duty of care to her patients as they traversed the common area parking lot to enter her office. While the general rule is that “the party in control of premises owes a duty to a lawful visitor to keep them in reasonably safe condition,” Hopkins v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 11 Mass.App.Ct. 703, 704 (1981), and cases cited, “[m]ore recent cases have deemphasized control as the all-decisive determinant and have focussed the inquiry on whether the defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff.” Id. at 705. A tenant is not “automatically relieved” of a duty, either to warn or to make repairs, even where the landlord retains control of some portion of the common area, if the tenant is aware of the unsafe condition. Id., citing Monterosso v. Gaudette, 8 Mass.App.Ct. 93, 97-98 (1979). As noted, see note 5, supra, the leased premises include an undivided portion of the common area. The questions of duty and breach in these circumstances are most appropriately resolved in the factual context as it develops in the underlying case. We therefore vacate the ruling below that there could not be “any conceivable negligence by Shafer” in this case, but as noted above, conclude that the first clause is void under § 15. d. The insurance provision. The judge ruled that the insurance provision of the lease was void under § 15 because it amounted to the type of indemnification barred by the statute.
3. Conclusion. For the reasons stated, we vacate the judgment and remand the case to the Superior Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. So ordered.
FN1. Cummings Properties, LLC, OneBeacon Insurance Group, and Beverly Shafer.
FN2. We acknowledge the amicus briefs of (1) Frozen Four, LLC, on behalf of Norfolk & Dedham Mutual Fire Insurance Company (Norfolk); (2) the Massachusetts Defense Lawyers Association; and (3) New England Legal Foundation, NAIOP Massachusetts, and the Real Estate Bar Association for Massachusetts on behalf of Cummings and OneBeacon.
FN3. The lawsuit also included claims against OneBeacon and Norfolk for violating G.L. c. 93A, and G.L. c. 176D, in their handling of the claim of Ellen Morrison (Morrison).
FN4. Norfolk also sought a declaration that the business owners policy issued to Dr. Shafer, on which Cummings is listed as an additional insured, did not afford coverage for the events alleged in Morrison’s complaint. The judge did not reach this question; nor do we. It may properly be considered on remand.
FN6. By the terms of OneBeacon’s policy with Cummings, its coverage was intended as excess insurance.
FN7. When enacted, G.L. c. 186, § 15, applied to leases entered into after its effective date of October 1, 1945. St.1945, c. 445, § 2. In a decision rendered after that date, but relating to commercial leases in effect prior to it, we had no reservation concerning indemnification provisions of the type now voided by the statute, noting that the “statute does not apply to leases entered into before its effective date.” R.H. Macy & Co. v. Fall River, 323 Mass. 624, 627 (1949).
FN8. Our prior cases, recognizing a distinction between residential and commercial leases with respect to the application of common-law rules, do not suggest a different result. See, e.g., Humphrey v. Byron, 447 Mass. 322, 326-327 (2006) (collecting cases).
clause, which allocates responsibility between the landlord and tenant, was intended to be either a waiver of the tenant’s right on behalf of its insurer to subrogation, or an exculpatory clause by which the tenant agrees not to make a claim against the landlord. Because the question is not before us, we do not express an opinion as to whether lease provisions incorporating either of those forms would violate § 15.
FN10. A review of the legislative history of G.L. c. 149, § 29C (§ 29C), a statute that similarly voids provisions in construction contracts requiring a subcontractor to indemnify a general contractor for injuries not caused by the subcontractor, tends further support to our conclusion that G.L. c. 186, § 15, was not intended to bar insurance provisions like the one present here. When § 29C was enacted, in addition to prohibiting indemnification, it also specifically prohibited subcontractors from agreeing to insure or name as an insured a general contractor for any negligence of the general contractor. St.1984, c. 484, § 43.
deemed to be aware of prior existing ones). Eight months after its enactment, § 29C was rewritten to remove the language barring insurance agreements. St.1985, c. 228, § 3.
FN11. In this case, the insurance provision of the lease required that Dr. Shafer purchase liability insurance protecting both herself and Cummings in the event of an injury, and that Cummings be added as an additional insured on her policy. This distinguishes it from those cases in which there is an indemnification provision in a contract, and the indemnitor is required to procure insurance to insure his indemnification obligation. In such a circumstance, courts have held that if the indemnification obligation is void, the attendant insurance obligation may also be void. See, e.g., Transcontinental Ins. Co. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 278 Ill.App.3d 357, 362-368 (1996), citing GTE N., Inc. v. Henkels & McCoy, Inc., 245 Ill.App.3d 322, 325-328 (1993) (distinguishing agreements to purchase insurance for another from agreements to insure one’s obligation to indemnify another party for that party’s negligence).
FN12. Our decision is consistent with decisions in New York, a State that has a similar statute prohibiting lease provisions requiring tenants to indemnify landlords for their own negligence. See Great N. Ins. Co. v.
Interior Constr. Corp., 7 N.Y.3d 412, 419 (2006) (“Where, as here, a lessor and lessee freely enter into an indemnification agreement whereby they use insurance to allocate the risk of liability to third parties between themselves, [the statute] does not prohibit indemnity”); Kinney v. G.W. Lisk Co., 76 N.Y.2d 215, 218 (1990) (per curiam) (“By its terms, the statute addresses only agreements to indemnify or hold harmless. It makes no reference to agreements to purchase or maintain insurance …”).

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