Source: http://mn.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20180123_0000078.DMN.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 18:49:06+00:00

Document:
Mark Schiltz and Lisa Erlandson, in their individual capacities, and Houston County, Defendants.
This matter is before the Court on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. For the following reasons, the Motion is granted.
On October 17, 2013, a Minnesota State Trooper arrested Plaintiff Ryan Pik after a traffic stop near La Crescent, Minnesota. Because Pik had an outstanding warrant for his arrest in Wisconsin, the trooper transported Pik to the Houston County Law Enforcement Center. Pik remained in jail until October 30, when he was transported to Wisconsin.
Pik instituted this lawsuit in state court, and Defendants removed it to federal court in early September. Pik's Complaint raises three counts: a § 1983 claim for deliberate indifference as to Schiltz and Erlandson, a failure-to-train claim against the County, and a Monell claim against the County. In his memorandum in opposition to Defendants' Motion, Pik concedes that Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on his claims against the County and his claim regarding failure to receive mental health care or medication. (Pl.'s Opp'n Mem. (Docket No. 29) at 2.) Thus, the only claim remaining is his claim for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs as to Schiltz and Erlandson.
To establish a claim of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Pik must show both “an objectively serious medical need” and “that the defendant actually knew of, but deliberately disregarded, such need.” Vaughn v. Gray, 557 F.3d 904, 908 (8th Cir. 2009). In addition, because the jail officials here are state actors, Pik must overcome their qualified immunity defense. To do this, he must show that “the facts, viewed in the light most favorable to [him], demonstrate the deprivation of a constitutional or statutory right” and that “the right was clearly established at the time of the deprivation.” Howard v. Kansas City Police Dep't, 570 F.3d 984, 988 (8th Cir. 2009). Pik asserts a claim for deliberate indifference for failing to allow him to see a physician and for intentional delay in treatment.
An objectively serious medical need is one that is either supported by a physician's diagnosis or is “so obvious that even a layperson would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention.” Bailey v. Feltmann, 810 F.3d 589, 594 (8th Cir. 2016). “Establishing the subjective component of a deliberate indifference claim requires showing ‘a mental state akin to criminal recklessness' and neither negligence nor gross negligence are sufficient.” Ryan v. Armstrong, 850 F.3d 419, 425 (8th Cir. 2017) (quoting Thompson v. King, 730 F.3d 742, 746-47 (8th Cir. 2013)).
Pik contends that, because the nurse admitted that swelling could be a sign of a fracture and also admitted that a fracture of the fifth metacarpal would require a physician's attention, he has adequately established a genuine issue of fact as to whether injury was “so obvious that even a layperson would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention.” Bailey, 810 F.3d at 594. But Pik misses a necessary step: merely because swelling can be a symptom of a fracture does not mean that every detainee with a swollen hand must be transported to the doctor. Rather, the question here is whether Pik's injury was so objectively serious that Schiltz and Erlandson knew or should have known that he needed to see a physician. The only evidence is that both Schiltz and Erlandson examined Pik and did not believe that his injury was serious. Pik's self-serving testimony regarding his requests to see a physician notwithstanding, he cannot establish any genuine issue of material fact as to whether his medical need was so serious or obvious that it was criminally reckless for Defendants to fail to transport him to a doctor.

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