Source: https://openjurist.org/359/us/171
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 20:27:44+00:00

Document:
Mr. Francis W. McInerny, Washington, D.C., for the petitioner.
Mr. Robert D. McIlwaine, III, Richmond, Va., for the respondent.
'Between Bluefield, Va., Bluefield, W. Va., and points and places within five miles of Bluefield, W. Va.
Petitioner's metho of operation is uncontradicted in the record. It maintains its headquarters in Bluefield, West Virginia, and terminal points in Virginia at Bristol and Roanoke. Its main activity is the movement of freight of less-than-truckload shipments. In order to gather the shipments and, by combining them, make up a full truck load it operates 'peddler runs' from its Virginia terminals which serve as pick ups for freight in the vicinity. All of the traffic is directed through the Bluefield, West Virginia, terminal. About three percent of the traffic consists of shipments destined from one Virginia point to another while the remainder is directed from points within to those outside that State. The freight gathered by the 'peddler runs' is combined at a terminal and placed in an 'over the road' tractor trailer unit and carried to Bluefield, West Virginia. There it is broken down and combined with other shipments received from all of the other runs of petitioner. That part destined to points in and around Bluefield is delivered locally through 'peddler runs' operated from that terminal. The remainder is sorted out for forwarding to the terminal nearest its destination and is 'filed out' by 'over the road' operation. Upon arrival at the latter terminal it is delivered by 'peddler runs' to its local destination.
The Commonwealth's criminal case is bottomed on shipments the origin and final destination of which are in Virginia. While it stipulated that all of these shipments were routed through Bluefield, West Virginia, and were, therefore, on their face interstate shipments,3 Virginia takes the position that they were clearly intrastate in character because had they been moved over direct routes none would ever have left the Commonwealth. It contends that petitioner's circuitous and unnecessarily long routes were a mere subterfuge to escope intrastate regulation and evade its jurisdiction. Aside from the testimony of highway officers as to the actual shipments, none of which is disputed, the Commonwealth's evidence consisted solely of maps substantiating its position that petitioner's routes were circuitous and often long, sometimes exceeding twice the shortest possible route. However, it offered no direct evidence of bad faith on the part of petitioner in moving its traffic through Bluefield, West Virginia.
On the other hand, petitioner offered the testimony of its manager and others as to the bona fides of its operation. It proved that it and its predecessor-operator had been carrying on its business in Virginia in a similar manner for many years and that it enjoyed certificates from the Interstate Commerce Commission authorizing its operations. Petitioner admits that some of its routes are circuitous but claims this is because of its method of gathering less-than-truckload shipments regardless of final destination and routing them through its 'gateway' terminal at Bluefield where they are assorted according to final destination. It stands uncontradicted that its operation is not only practical, efficient and profitable, but also that the creation of this 'flow of traffic' is a timesaver to the shipper since there is less time lost waiting for the making up of a full truckload. It also claims a unique service for less-than-truckload shipments of central Virginians who ship commodities to southwest Virginia and Kentucky and who otherwise would suffer long delays on deliveries or would be obliged to ship by special truck at higher rates. While these considerations are not controlling, they throw light on petitioner's claim of bona fides.
It appears clear that interpretations of federal certificates of this character should be made in the first instance by the authority issuing the certificate and upon whom the Congress has placed the responsibility of action. The Commission has long taken this position. Compare Atlantic Freight Lines, Inc., v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, 163 Pa.Super. 215, 60 A.2d 589, with Atlantic Freight Lines, Inc.—Petition for Declaratory Order, 51 M.C.C. 175. The wisdom of such a practice is highlighted by the facts of this case. Between the close of the hearing, and the announcement of the Virginia Commission's decision, Service petitioned the I.C.C. for a declaratory order interpreting its certificate. The Commonwealth, although it had notice of the I.C.C. proceeding, elected not to participate. After the Virginia Commission had found petitioner to be operating in intrastate commerce and fined it for such operation, the I.C.C. issued an opinion, 71 M.C.C. 304, in which it construed petitioner's certificate as authorizing Virginia-to-Virginia traffic routed through Bluefield, West Virginia.4 This was but a reaffirmation of its prior interpretation of the certificate. 59 M.C.C. 803, supra. Such conflicts can best be avoided if the interpretation of I.C.C. certificates is left to the Interstate Commerce Commission.
'When the (Missouri) Commission revoked the permit, the Interstate Commerce Commission had not acted upon appellant's application under the Federal Motor Carrier Act and meanwhile the authority of the state body to take appropriate action under the state law to enforce reasonable regulations of traffic upon the state highways had not been superseded.' 306 U.S. at page 273, 59 S.Ct. at page 534.
Eichholz followed naturally from the holding of the Court in Welch Co. v. State of New Hampshire, 1939, 306 U.S. 79, 59 S.Ct. 438, 83 L.Ed. 500, that the enactment of the Motor Carrier Act did not, without more, supersede all reasonable state regulation, the latter continuing in effect until the Interstate Commerce Commission acted on the same subject matter. That it has admittedly done here.
Finally, the Commonwealth is not helpless to act. If it believes that petitioner's operation is not bona fide interstate but is merely a subterfuge to escape its jurisdiction, it can avail itself of the remedy Congress has provided in the Act. Section 204(c), supra, note 2, authorizes the filing of a 'complaint in writing to the Commission by any * * * State board * * * (that) any * * * carrier * * *' has abused its certificate. See also Castle v. Hayes Freight Lines, supra. Thus the possibility of a multitude of interpretations of the same federal certificate by several States will be avoided and a uniform administration of the Act achieved.
(c) 'Upon complaint in writing to the Commission by any person, State board, organization, or body politic, or upon its own initiative without complaint, the Commission may investigate whether any motor carrier or broker has failed to comply with any provision of this chapter, or with any requirement established pursuant thereto. If the Commission, after notice and hearing, finds upon any such investigation that the motor carrier or broker has failed to comply with any such provision or requirement, the Commission shall issue an appropriate order to compel the carrier or broker to comply therewith. Whenever the Commission is of opinion that any complaint does not state reasonable grounds for investigation and action on its part, it may dismiss such complaint.' 49 U.S.C. § 304(c), 49 U.S.C.A. § 304(c).
49 U.S.C. § 303(a)(10), 49 U.S.C.A. § 303(a)(10), defines 'interstate commerce' as including 'commerce * * * between places in the same State through another State, * * *.' 49 Stat. 544.
'In the absence of any showing that petitioner's use of its authorized route is a subterfuge to avoid State regulation, or other than a logical and normal operation through the carrier's headquarters, we are of the opinion that petitioner's operations, in the manner described, constitute bona fide transportation in interstate commerce.
'We find that the operations described between points in Virginia through Bluefield, W. Va., are bona fide operations in interstate commerce within the authority granted to petitioner in certificate No. MC—30471.' Service Storage & Transfer Co., Inc. Petition for Declaratory Order, 71 M.C.C. 304, 306.

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