Source: http://thetheoryofmediocrity.blogspot.com/2018/12/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 00:22:33+00:00

Document:
The Declaration of Independence, Corfield v. Coryell, and the Civil Rights Act of 1866 were the main elements incorporated into the Constitution via the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868. Also, the natural rights contained in the above-mentioned documents can also be implied through the Ninth Amendment suggesting any rights not included in the Constitution should not be denied or disparaged. All persons are born with natural rights which must be the number one priority of any free government to protect and the only way to successfully achieve this goal is via substantive due process since thousands of natural rights are not outlined in the Constitution. Constitutional Convention member, James Wilson, opposed the Bill of Rights because it was impossible to outline all the natural rights that should be protected and he feared that doing so will disparage the rights not mentioned in the document. This fear brought about the Ninth Amendment, but the amendment has been very rarely used to protect individual natural rights. Therefore, Wilson was right, protecting some rights within the confines of the Constitution has disparaged thousands of rights.
Originally, I thought the first occurrence of substantive due process in American History was in Dred Scott v. Sanford (1857). However, this is not true, the doctrine had existed in English law prior to Constitution and was introduced into Constitutional law very early in our history. In Calder v. Bull (1798) Justice Samuel Chase wrote that the transfer of property from one person to another contradicted natural law and was unconstitutional. The Court reiterated Calder v. Bull in Terret v. Taylor (1815) and Wilkerson v. Leland (1829). In Hoke v. Henderson (1833) the Court held that holding a public office was also private property and it could not be taken away without due process of the law. Dartmouth College v. Woodward (1819) was an interesting case because the State of New Hampshire attempted to cancel the school’s charter to force it to become a public institution. Daniel Webster defended Dartmouth College through substantive due process claiming New Hampshire violated natural law by passing a bill of attainer. The Court ruled in favor of Dartmouth but did not adapt the substantive due process theories of Webster. In the 1852 case Bloomer v. McQuewan the Court adopted the “First Sale Doctrine”. This substantive due process ruling protected people from prosecution for reselling a product they legally purchased without violating copyright or trademark protections. For example, a person can resell a legally purchased book without facing prosecution from the author of the book for copyright violations. In Sharpless v. Mayor of Philadelphia (1853, Pennsylvania case) and Stockton and Visalia Railroad v. City of Stockton (1871, California case) the Courts found it legal for a city to tax its residents with the proceeds going to a private company to finance a railroad project. However, the Supreme Court rejected the rationale in both Stockton and Sharpless in Loan Association v. Topeka (1874). The Court held that redistribution of wealth through taxes violated the Fundamental Natural Rights of individual property rights. Persons ought to have the right to do anything lawful with their own bodies and their possessions without any government interference or restrictions so long as their actions do not violate the rights of others. Although liberals would agree that tax money should not be used to supplement the finances of a private company, they would adamantly disagree with preserving natural rights because they believe property (money) can be taken away from one private citizen and given to other private citizens in the form of welfare. Welfare violates the basic principles of individual natural rights to do as they lawfully please with their property (money).
Substantive due process is a doctrine used by some Supreme Court Justices to protect individual liberties and natural rights that are not mentioned in the Constitution. Before studying Constitutional law, I was adamantly against the use of this doctrine because it allows Justices the freedom to introduce their opinions and biases instead of deciding cases based on the law. For instance, both Dred Scott v. Sanford (1857, protect the slave property of owners) and Roe v. Wade (1973, protecting abortion) used substantive due process but were horribly decided. In Dred Scott Justices protected slave owner’s property rights but never considered the rights of slaves and in Roe the Justices protected the rights of pregnant women but never considered the rights of the unborn. Natural rights should be about protecting the rights of all persons, not just a few at the expense of others. Natural rights should not contradict or conflict with other rights. Because of decisions such as Dred Scott and Roe, I opposed the substantive due process doctrine. But just because errors were made using substantive due process, it does not mean the doctrine is not sound law. After all, the equal protection clause was misinterpreted for decades after Plessy v. Ferguson (1896, separate but equal doctrine), but that does not mean the equal protection clause was not sound law. Keep in mind, substantive due process is not much different than when the Court interprets implied powers. The Court often implies federal legislative powers even when the powers are not enumerated. Therefore, the Court implicitly interprets the Constitution all the time. This can be just as dangerous as the fears substantive due process will input judge’s biases and opinions into laws. For instance, in McCulloch v. Maryland (1819) Justice Marshall wrote the power to incorporate a National Bank could be implied from the Necessary and Proper Clause to carry out the government’s taxing power. Because of this ruling the Commerce Clause has been interpreted to imply the federal government has the power to control all manufacturing and just about anything economic in nature. The Court’s history is filled with hundreds of implied power cases. Finally, it is often argued that originalism and substantive due process cannot be reconciled and this is problematic since I consider myself as an originalist interpreter of the Constitution. However, I believe that originalism and substantive due process can be reconciled through the original intent of the founders for both the Ninth Amendment and or the Privileges and Immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Many will argue incorrectly that the Constitution and henceforth the United States is a democracy. Actually, the Constitution put forth a Republican form of government. While many aspects of the Constitution support democratic ideals but the separation of powers, checks and balances, and federalism doctrines support many non-democratic principles. For instance, the electoral college may prevent presidential candidates with the highest popular vote from winning an election. In the 2016 election this prevented California (the most populous and liberal state) from deciding the outcome of the election. Another example is how all states regardless of population have the same representation in the Senate. Furthermore, many types of bills or procedures require super majorities to pass the House and Senate (not just a democratic majority). The fact the President and the Supreme Court can void democratically passed legislation by Congress is the best example of how separation of powers and our check and balances prevent majorities from having too much power. These are a few of many examples where the design of the Constitution is to limit the power of the democratic majority. The reasons for these security measures are explained best by Madison in Federalist Paper #10 where he highlights the concern over factions (majorities or powerful special interest groups) that will use their power to silence or limit the rights of minority groups. Madison’s fears have come to fruition for a variety of reasons outlined below.
First, many Supreme Court justices practice the use of judicial restraint to uphold questionable legislation. This process “under enforces the Constitution” because Justices believe Congress and States are acting in good faith and give them the benefit of the doubt. Secondly, the Supreme Court does not enforce natural rights within the Bill of Rights equally. For example, for political and commercial free speech the Court uses different levels of scrutiny to render decisions. What’s worse, government power to control, for instance, economic rights are absolute and often conflict with individual liberties. For example, in United States v. Carolene Products (1938), the Court outlines in Footnote Four of the case decision, a few minor exceptions where the Court may restrict a federal or state law which violates the rights of individuals. But Footnote Four fails to mention hundreds of other instances where a law may violate the rights of individuals. Hence, many laws violating the rights of individuals will be held Constitutional using a rational basis test proposed in Carolene Products. In fact, the decision in Carolene Products denied the company the right to sell their “filled milk” products across state lines. Brandies briefs for the case contained false information claiming filled milk products were far less healthy than milk. In essence, the milk lobby squashed their competition with the help of Congress since filled milk was cheaper than milk. This was not only prejudicial; their evidence was proven to be wrong: Filled milk products were healthier for humans than real milk. Regardless, no lawful company should have its rights violated at the expense of another company. Thirdly, the Supreme Court upholds laws and statutes (even if they violate the rights of individuals) because they support what the majority or a powerful special interest group want (like the Carolene Products example above). Consider how majority rule and judicial restraint kept slavery alive for nearly 100 years after our independence with rulings such as upholding the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 in Prigg v. Pennsylvania and Jones v. VanZandt even though Congress has no enumerated power to legislate over the issue of slavery (the Fugitive Slave Clause is in Article 4, which is a compact between the states, it is not an enumerated power for Congress). Moreover, majority rule and judicial restraint led to some of the worst decisions in our history: Plessy v. Ferguson (1896, separate but equal doctrine), Buck v. Bell (1927, compulsory sterilization), and Korematsu v. United States (1943, the interment of a race of people). Even more recent decisions such as Quinn v. Nevada (2003) and New Orleans v. Dukes (1976) show the effects of majority rule and the power of special interest groups. In Quinn, the Court upheld a procedure by the Nevada legislature to remove a two / thirds majority within its Constitution to pass a budget and in Dukes the Court held a New Orleans law removing all but one company for vending machines was constitutional. In Kelo v. New London (2005) the Court held the taking of private property for private reasons was Constitutional if the result is to better the community. This means nobody’s property is secure from government intrusion and confiscation if a majority in the community feel it is necessary. In Grutter v. Bollinger (1997) the Court has held raced based standards for law school admissions to be Constitutional. In other words, if a majority of persons feel that social justice in the form of reverse discrimination is justified to make up for previous racial discriminatory acts against African-Americans, then it is legal. Let me be clear, no discrimination is justified in the Constitution. Just because a majority of Americans or a special interest group hold a certain belief, it does not make it right.
It may appear as if Congress and State laws are more responsible for upholding civil rights than the Court, but that is not entirely true. Congress passed the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 even though it had no authority to do so. In Loving v. Virginia (1967) the Court correctly invalidated any state statutes which banned interracial marriages. In United States v. Lovett (1946) the Court held that an amendment attached to an appropriations bill in 1943 was unconstitutional because it violated the Bill of Attainer Clause. In this amendment, Congress withheld payment to certain government officials because they did not like their opinions. The Supreme Court ruling reinstated their pay, but the damage had been done because they had lost their jobs. In the famous Jencks v. United States (1957) case, the Court held that defendants were entitled to access of government files pertaining to their case. This time Congress acted with the Jencks Act to limit information a defendant may obtain (especially files with classified and national security information). Many would argue that Baker v. Carr (1964), Griswold v. Connecticut (1967), Eisenstadt v. Baird (1972), Roe v. Wade (1973), UC Berkley v. Bakke (1978), Grutter v. Bollinger (2003), Lawrence v. Texas (2003), Romer v. Evans (2007), and Obergefell v. Hodges (2015) are critical civil rights cases where the Court sided with individual rights. However, in all these cases the Court has gone over the top to invent protected groups, legalize reverse discrimination, and invent fictitious fundamental rights. The Court is trying to make up for past injustices by stomping on the Constitution. For instance, many will argue that some of the above cases violate the religious rights of tens of millions of Americans. Baker v. Carr violates the rights of rural farmers at the expense of urban dwellers. Bakke and Bollinger institute reverse discrimination practices as Constitutional. Inventing or creating rights for one at the expense of another is never the answer and it violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
Of course, there are cases where both Congress and the Court were complicit in violating the rights of citizens: Schenck v. United States (1917, free speech), Buck v. Bell (1927, sterilization), and Korematsu v. United States (1943, internment) to name a few of most egregious cases. In Red Lion Broadcasting Company v. FCC (1969), the Court upheld the FCC’s “Fairness Doctrine” requiring equal time for points of view on the radio violating the First Amendment rights of broadcast stations. The Court’s ruling in Miami Herald v. Tornillo (1974) contradicted the Fairness Doctrine by holding newspapers did not have to provide equal time to editorial opinions. By 1987, the FCC finally abolished the Fairness Doctrine realizing it was unconstitutional and a violation of the First Amendment. Article I, Section 9, Clause 7 states “A regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time.” Up until WWII, the government had done a fairly good job of being transparent about its expenditures with the American public. However, that changed, especially for intelligence departments. For example, the Central Intelligence Act (CIA) of 1949 made unvouchered and covert funding possible. The law was challenged several times for violating the Statement and Account Clause, but in United States v. Richardson (1974), the Court held Richardson had no standing to file suit. The Court said that since Richardson did not know how the money was being spent he had no standing. But that is a Catch 22. How could Richardson know how the money is being spent if Congress refused to adhere to the Statement and Account Clause and publish how the money is being spent? The Court also ruled that Richardson faced no injury because of the CIA statute, he therefore had no standing. But again, without knowing how the money was being spent it was impossible to say if Richardson faced injury from the CIA statute. The Court side-stepped the issue and protected Congress’s violation of the Statement and Account Clause by letting them withhold information from the public.
Standing to sue is the most popular of several legal scenarios where the Court may forgo deciding a case. Other scenarios include mootness, ripeness, and political questions. For someone to have standing to sue there must be a real injury or threatened injuries from allegations. In Frothingham v. Mellon (1923) the Court denied a taxpayer citizen the right to sue the federal government over appropriations to states for maternal and infant care (the claim was it violated the Tenth Amendment). The Court reasoned since the taxpayer’s contribution to the programs were minute and infinitesimal he faced no injury. Compare Frothingham to how the Court ruled in Wickard v. Filburn in 1941 where a farmer was denied the right to grow extra wheat on his farm to feed his family. The Court said even though the amount of wheat was small, it nevertheless impacted interstate commerce. In other words, government rights in Wickard and Frothingham were more important than individual rights. In Flast v. Cohen (1968) the Court incorrectly interprets the Establishment Clause to allow citizens the right to sue the Federal government to deny public funding for religious education. Flast is an outlier, because in Valley Forge College v. Americans United (1982) the Court held citizens could not sue the Federal Government for allowing federal property to go to a Christian college. In Allen v. Wright (1984) the Court held citizens have no standing to sue a government agency based on influences that agency may have on third parties. Yet, the Court routinely interferes over state matters that may affect a third party religious cause. In FEC v. Akins (1998) the Court held citizens could sue if a violation of federal law neglected them access to information. In Akins, unlike Richardson, the Court allowed citizens to sue the FEC to obtain campaign finance information. An interesting third circuit court ruling in New Jersey Physicians v. Obama (2011) found New Jersey physicians failed to show any injury to sue the President over the Affordable Care Act (ObamaCare). However, in Obergefell v. Hodges (2015, gay marriage case), none of the plaintiffs faced an injury: they were not fined or imprisoned but the Court did not see it that way. The liberal sect of the Court was eager to make a Landmark political statement and legislate from the bench.

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