Source: http://cabadvantage.com/articles/category/cases-from-bits/c186-volume-17-edition-4-cases/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 13:03:00+00:00

Document:
SO ORDERED on this 16th day of April, 2014.
FN3. Dismissal for lack of prudential standing is made with prejudice. See Harold H. Huggins Realty, Inc. v. FNC, Inc., 634 F.3d 787, 795 n. 2 (5th Cir.2011).
The evidence establishes that Plaintiff assigned the claims arising out of the shipment of her household goods to UNIRISC. In the face of this evidence, Plaintiff fails to offer any argument or rebuttal evidence as to why her assignment to UNIRISC of “any and all claims and recoveries arising out of the shipment” of her household goods does not deprive her of standing to pursue these claims. Instead, she simply alleges she has set out a prima facia case under the Carmack Amendment such that dismissal is inappropriate. See Pl.’s Resp. 2, ECF No. 36. This conclusory statement fails to address the standing issue raised by Atlas and provides no factual basis to question the validity or the effect of the assignment. See Nelson, 406 S.W.3d at 378 (“When an assignor of a cause of action has not retained some right or interest in the cause of action, the assignor is barred from bringing suit.”); see also Hansen, 486 F.Supp.2d at 1346 (“Plaintiff has no standing to pursue the instant action. Once the assignor assigns its rights to pursue a claim against a third party to another, the assignor retains no right to sue the third party. An assignment transfers all rights in the thing assigned.”) (citations omitted). Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff lacks standing to pursue her claims against Atlas.
*3 Atlas bases its standing argument on Plaintiff’s assignment and transfer of her claims arising out of the shipment of her goods to UNIRISC. See Atlas’s Br. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 6–7, ECF No. 28. To determine the effect of an assignment on standing, the Court looks to state law. See Barrett Computer Services, Inc., 884 F.2d at 217 & n. 3 (relying on Texas contract law to determine whether party had standing to sue on a contract). Texas law provides that when a cause of action is assigned, the assignor is precluded from bringing suit. See, e.g., Nelson v. Vernco Construction, Inc ., 406 S.W. 374, 378 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2013, no pet. h.) (citations omitted).
“Every party that comes before a federal court must establish that it has standing to pursue its claims.” Cibolo Waste, Inc. v.. City of San Antonio, 718 F.3d 469, 473 (5th Cir.2013); see also Barrett Computer Services, Inc. v. PDA, Inc., 884 F.2d 214, 218 (5th Cir.1989). “The doctrine of standing asks ‘whether the litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute or of particular issues.’ “ Cibolo Waste, 718 F.3d at 473 (quoting Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11 (2004)). Standing has both constitutional and prudential components. See Procter & Gamble Co. v. Amway Corp., 242 F.3d 539, 560 (5th Cir.2001); see also Cibolo Waste, 718 F.3d at 473 (quoting Elk Grove, 542 U.S. at 11) (stating standing “ ‘contain[s] two strands: Article III standing … and prudential standing’ ”). Constitutional standing requires a plaintiff to establish that she has suffered an injury in fact traceable to the defendant’s actions that will be redressed by a favorable ruling. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). Prudential standing, however, exists “in addition to ‘the immutable requirements of Article III,’ … as an integral part of ‘judicial self-government.’ “ Procter & Gamble, 242 F.3d at 560 (citations omitted); see also Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 1377, 1386 (2014) (noting prudential standing “not derived from Article III and not exhaustively defined”) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The goal of this self-governance is to determine whether the plaintiff ‘is a proper party to invoke judicial resolution of the dispute and the exercise of the court’s remedial power.’ “ Proctor & Gamble, 242 F.3d at 560 (quoting Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 546 n. 8 (1986)). The Supreme Court has observed that prudential standing encompasses “at least three broad principles,” including “the general prohibition on a litigant’s raising another person’s legal rights….” Lexmark Int’l, 134 S.Ct. at 1386; Cibolo Waste, Inc., 718 F.3d at 474 (quoting Elk Grove, 542 U.S. at 12); see also Sprint Commc’ns Co., L.P. v. APCC Servs., Inc., 554 U.S. 269, 290 (2008) (discussing cases where third-parties sought “to assert not their own legal rights, but the legal rights of others”); Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. U.S. ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 773 (2000) (noting “the assignee of a claim has standing to assert the injury in fact suffered by the assignor”).
FN2. Plaintiff alleges in her Second Amended Complaint that she received almost $8,000 of the approximately $22,000 owed to her by Cartus from this loss, but her response provides no factual bases to support this assertion. She provides no argument or evidence to contradict the evidence Atlas presents in support of its motion which demonstrates Plaintiff settled and assigned her claims to UNIRISC.
When reviewing the evidence on a motion for summary judgment, the court must decide all reasonable doubts and inferences in the light most favorable to the non-movant. See Walker v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 853 F.2d 355, 358 (5th Cir.1988). The court cannot make a credibility determination in light of conflicting evidence or competing inferences. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. As long as there appears to be some support for the disputed allegations such that “reasonable minds could differ as to the import of the evidence,” the motion for summary judgment must be denied. Id. at 250.
Plaintiff brings this lawsuit to recover what she asserts is the total loss not covered by the UNIRISC payments. See Pl.’s 2d Am. Compl. ¶¶ 12, 17, ECF No. 12. Plaintiff originally asserted various state law claims in Texas state court. Atlas, however, removed this lawsuit to this Court and Plaintiff filed an amended complaint asserting a claim for recovery based on the damage to and loss of her household goods under the Carmack Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act. See Pl.’s 2d Am. Compl. ¶¶ 4, 13, 15, ECF. No. 12 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 14706); see also Wise Recycling, LLC v. M2 Logistics, 943 F.Supp.2d 700, 703 (N.D.Tex.2013) (Solis, J.) (“Under Carmack Amendment jurisprudence, the complete preemption doctrine applies to cases for common carrier liability, and common law and state-law claims such as negligence and breach of contract are preempted.”) (citations omitted); Hansen v. Wheaton Van Lines, Inc., 486 F.Supp.2d 1339,1343–44 (S.D.Fla.2006) (“The law is well established that the remedies available under the Carmack Amendment preempt all state, common and statutory law regarding the liability of an interstate common carrier for claims arising out of shipments within the purview of said statute.”) (citations omitted). To recover under the Carmack Amendment, Plaintiff must show she delivered her household goods to an interstate common carrier in good condition, the goods arrived in damaged condition, and resulted in specified damages. See Man Roland, Inc. v. Kreitz Motor Express, Inc., 438 F.3d 476, 479 (5th Cir.2006); Fine Foliage of Fla. v. Bowman Transp., Inc., 901 F.2d 1034, 1037 (11th Cir.1990); Wise Recycling, 943 F.Supp.2d at 703. Atlas contends it is entitled to judgement as a matter of law because Plaintiff lacks standing to pursue her claims and is estopped from pursuing this lawsuit.
FN1. Other than whether Plaintiff agreed to fully and finally settle her claim with UNIRISC for $7,935, the facts in this section are undisputed.
Vic H. Henry, Jeanette Drescher Green, Henry Oddo Austin & Fletcher, Dallas, TX, Jo–Christy Texas Brown, Law Office of Jc Brown PC, Austin, TX, for Defendants.
Dwain Downing, Law Office of Dwain Downing, Arlington, TX, for Plaintiff.
Signed April 16, 2014.Civil Action No. 4:13–cv–571–O.
“An insurer’s actions are not vexatious and unreasonable if ‘(1) there is a bona fide dispute concerning the scope and application of insurance coverage; (2) the insurer asserts a legitimate policy defense; (3) the claim presents a genuine legal or factual issue regarding coverage; or (4) the insurer takes a reasonable legal position on an unsettled issue of law.’ ” TKK USA, Inc. v. Safety Nat. Cas. Corp., 727 F.3d 782, 793 (7th Cir.2013) (quoting Citizens First Nat. Bank of Princeton v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 200 F.3d 1102, 1110 (7th Cir.2000)). Lexington’s arguments can be characterized by the first of the Seventh Circuit’s examples, in that Lexington disputes “the scope and application of insurance coverage,” TKK, 727 F.3d at 793, with reference to an express exclusion in the Policy. Holding that such an argument is unreasonable would unreasonably chill insurance companies’ willingness to defend against claims they believe are not covered by the express terms of a policy. Moreover, Lexington’s decision to pay certain claims under the Policy arising out of the same theft that caused the Lithographix loss is not evidence that Lexington acted unreasonably, as Champion would have it. Neither of those two claims (for toys and apparel) could plausibly have fallen into the “documents” exclusion, and Champion does not argue that there was any other Policy exclusion potentially applicable to either claim, which Lexington ignored. Rather, Lexington’s argument that the “documents” exclusion applies to the annual reports, but not the other two claims, tends to show that Lexington made a reasoned determination that the Policy only covered two of the three claims. Therefore, Champion’s motion for fees and costs is denied.
*4 Lexington argues that only the costs of the “materials which comprise” the replacement cargo are covered, whereas the costs “relate[d] to services required for the preparation” of the replacement cargo are not covered. See R. 23 at 10. Notably, Lexington does not cite any provision of the Policy in making this argument. The Policy clearly states that Lexington will cover the “replacement cost” of the loss. R. 26–1 at 15. Lithographix’s representative explained how the costs itemized in the $178,986 invoice were necessary to replace the annual reports. Thus, Lexington must pay Champion the $178,986.
Notably, in the Sentry Insurance case Lexington relies on, the papers at issue were “computer printout sheets” containing “information” the owner intended to sell to its customers. 1997 Wisc.App. LEXIS 148, at *2. Thus, the documents at issue in Sentry Insurance had a value beyond the paper and ink and time necessary to create them, making them “valuable papers” rather than mere “papers.” Id. Here, by contrast, Lexington does not contend that the annual reports were in any way unique; in fact, the record shows that they were easily reproduced. Moreover, the inclusion of “valuable papers”–including “documents”–in the same exclusion provision of the Policy as “currency,” “money,” and “works of art” also shows that the intent of the Policy is to exclude unique or irreplaceable items, as opposed to mass-produced documents. If Lexington’s interpretation of “documents” is correct, any mass-produced paper with writing on it–for instance textbooks–would fall into the exclusion. This would not be reasonable. There is nothing irreplaceable about mass-produced textbooks. They merely have to be reprinted from the original manuscript. Therefore, the annual reports are not “documents” for purposes of the Policy, and they are not excluded from the Policy’s coverage.
Lexington argues in response that the annual reports must be “valuable,” otherwise “ ‘no liability claim could be made because the owner of the documents would not have sustained a loss.’ ” R. 23 at 9 (quoting Sentry Ins. v. Jim Pointek Trucking, 1997 Wisc.App. LEXIS 148, at *7 (3d Dist. Feb. 18, 1997)). This argument, of course, conflates the common use of the word “value” with its specific application in the Policy’s term “valuable papers.” As Lexington points out, all the cargo that Champion ships has some commercial value, otherwise Champion would not require insurance. By excluding “valuable papers,” however, the Policy clearly carves out a certain category of “papers”–and by extension, “documents”–that have value beyond their commercial or replacement value, and hence are “valuable” for purposes of the Policy.
*3 Yet, the Policy does not leave the term “document” to the broad dictionary definition as Lexington would have it. Although the Policy does not include an express definition of the term “document,” the Policy exclusion at issue here includes the following: “passports, tickets, documents, manuscripts, records or other valuable papers.” R. 26 ¶ 34. This language from the Policy functions to categorize and define “documents” as a type of “valuable papers,” and thus, “documents” should be interpreted to comport with the other examples of “valuable papers” provided by the Policy. See Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S.Ct. 2156, 2171 n.19 (2012) ( “The canon of ejusdem generis limits general terms [that] follow specific ones to matters similar to those specified.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Documents,” as that word is used in the Policy, are limited to “valuable papers” similar to “passports, tickets, manuscripts and records.” Based on these examples, it is clear that “valuable papers” are kinds of “papers” that are unique and potentially irreplaceable, and have some value beyond their mere material production value. It is true that in our digital age, original hard-copy papers have lost much of their unique value, as another copy from the digital “original” can often times be easily reproduced. But the examples of “valuable papers” provided by the Policy in this case clearly show that “documents” is not meant to include just any “writing conveying information,” as Lexington suggests with reference to the dictionary; rather, a paper writing that is unique and has value beyond the paper it is printed on.
R. 26–1 at 69. Lexington’s brief, however, clarifies that, if the Court should find that the annual reports are not excluded from coverage under the Policy, it only seeks to avoid payment of the costs for “bindery,” “alterations,” and “travel expenses/client fees.” See R. 23 at 10. The parties agree that the Lithographix claim does not include any claim resulting from any “delay, loss of market, loss of use or interruption of business which may have resulted from this loss.” R. 26 ¶ 40. Lexington, however, contends that the charges for “bindery,” “alterations,” and “travel expenses/client fees” are “consequential losses” excluded from coverage under the Policy. R. 23 at 9–10.
(A) DELAY, LOSS OF MARKET, LOSS OF USE, INTERRUPTION OF BUSINESS, OR ANY OTHER INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL LOSS OF ANY KIND, HOWEVER CAUSED.
The Policy also provides that the “value of covered property at the time of the ‘loss’ will be its Actual Cash Value (defined as replacement cost less depreciation and obsolescence).” R. 26–1 at 15. The Policy further provides that “[i]n the event of ‘loss’ [Lexington] will pay … [t]he shippers cost of repairing or replacing the Covered Property.” Id.
FN2. Champion does not dispute that this section is applicable to this motion. The parties agree that none of the other exclusion categories listed in section 3(C) are at issue. R. 26 ¶¶ 35–37.
*2 R. 26–1 at 68.FN2 Lexington contends that the annual reports are “documents,” and thus are excluded from the Policy’s coverage. R. 26 ¶¶ 33–34.
3. PROPERTY EXCLUDED THIS POLICY DOES NOT COVER.
FN1. Champion provided this service through agreements with Champion’s agent, AP Express, who arranged for the delivery with another carrier, LNN Transport. R. 26 ¶¶ 20–21. The fact that Champion subcontracted its services is not an issue on this motion.
In or around March 2011, Champion entered into an agreement to arrange to ship cargo for Lithographix. Id. ¶¶ 11–13.FN1 The cargo consisted of 69,120 Annual Reports for the Exelon Corporation for the year 2010. Id. ¶ 16. Champion also shipped toys and apparel for two other clients in the same shipment with the annual reports. Id. ¶¶ 11, 14–15. The cargo was stolen while in transit. Id. ¶ 22. The theft was reported on March 18, 2011. Id. ¶ 23. Lithographix submitted a “Damage Claim Form” to Champion dated April 28, 2011 that claimed the cost of the annual reports was $178,986. Id. ¶ 29–30. Champion paid $178,986 to Lithographix, id. ¶ 42, based on an invoice from Lithographix that itemized the cost of replacing the annual reports as follows: $39,434.50 for paper; $53,277.85 for printing; $33,858.75 for bindery; $17,884.30 for materials; $6,150 for alterations; and $28,380.60 for “travel expenses/client fees.” See R. 26–2 at 8–9. Kurt Novak, a sales representative for Lithographix who is familiar with the annual reports at issue here, testified that the cost described as “alterations” was incurred because a different kind of paper had to be used for the replacement reports, see R. 26–2 at 20:20–22:7, 25:7–26:5, and the cost described as “travel expenses/client fees” was incurred to pay the design firm that worked on the project. See R. 26–2 at 26:20–29:4. Champion then submitted the Lithographix claim to Lexington, along with claims from the other two companies whose cargo was also stolen. R. 26 ¶¶ 26, 28, 31.
Lexington Insurance Company, Defendant.v. Champion Transportation Services, Inc., d/b/a Champion Logistics Group, Plaintiff,United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division.

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