Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/240/34/
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 08:40:27+00:00

Document:
The Carmack Amendment of June 29, 1906, extends to failure to transport with reasonable dispatch, and under it there can be a recovery from the initial carrier for loss, damage, or injury for such failure although on the line of the connecting carrier.
A subsequent legislative interpretation of a statute is entitled to great weight.
A condition of the tariff filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission that the carrier was not bound to transport on a particular train or vessel to arrive at a particular market or otherwise than with reasonable dispatch does not relieve the carrier from liability under the Carmack Amendment for not delivering with reasonable dispatch, although the delay may have been on line of connecting carrier.
In this case, the state court did not deny to the carrier any federal right in charging that the liability for unreasonable delay in delivering a carload of berries was the amount of the decline in value due to the delay at the place of destination without stating the limitation in the filed tariff that the damages should not exceed the value at the time and place of shipment, the amount awarded being less than such value.
The facts, which involve the construction and application of the Carmack Amendment to damages for delay, are stated in the opinion.
On May 26, 1910, the Peninsula Produce Exchange of Maryland delivered to the New York, Philadelphia, & Norfolk Railroad Company at Marion, Maryland, a carload of strawberries for transportation to New York city. The conditions of the transportation were set forth in the bill of lading issued by the railroad company. The property was delivered at destination some hours later than the customary time of arrival, and this action was brought to recover damages for the failure to transport and deliver with reasonable dispatch. Judgment in favor of the shipper was affirmed by the Court of Appeals of Maryland. 122 Md. 215.
"the questions involved are two --"
"1. Does the Carmack amendment impose on the 'initial carrier' liability for delay occurring on the line of its connection without physical damage to the property?"
"2. Was the plaintiff entitled to recover because its shipment failed to arrive in time for the market of May 28th, when the regulations under which the shipment moved were published in tariffs duly on file with the Interstate Commerce Commission, and specifically provided:"
"No carrier is bound to transport said property by any particular train or vessel, or in time for any particular market, or otherwise than with reasonable dispatch, unless by specific agreement indorsed hereon?"
carrier (the defendant) was raised by an unsuccessful demurrer to the declaration, and both questions were presented by prayers for instructions which were denied.
"that any common carrier . . . receiving property for transportation from a point in one state to a point in another state shall issue a receipt or bill of lading therefor and shall be liable to the lawful holder thereof for any loss, damage, or injury to such property caused by it or by any common carrier . . . to which such property may be delivered or over whose line or lines such property may pass, and no contract, receipt, rule, or regulation shall exempt such common carrier . . . from the liability hereby imposed."
"as a condition of continuing in that traffic, to obligate themselves to carry to the point of destination, using the lines of connecting carriers as their own agencies,"
"the subject of the liability of the carrier under a bill of lading which he must issue. . . . The duty to issue a bill of lading and the liability thereby assumed are covered in full, and though there is no reference to the effect upon state regulation, it is evident that Congress intended to adopt a uniform rule and relieve such contracts from the diverse regulation to which they had been theretofore subject."
Id., p. 226 U. S. 506.
"on whose line the loss, damage, or injury shall have been sustained the amount of such loss, damage, or injury as it may be required to pay to the owners of such property,"
"that no suit brought in any state court of competent jurisdiction against a railroad company . . . to recover damages for delay, loss of, or injury to property received for transportation by such common carrier under section twenty of the Act to regulate commerce . . . shall be removed to any court of the United States where the matter in controversy does not exceed, exclusive of interest and costs, the sum or value of $3,000."
v. Mayor, 5 Cranch 1, 9 U. S. 7-8; United States v. Freeman, 3 How. 556, 44 U. S. 564-565; Cope v. Cope, 137 U. S. 682, 137 U. S. 688.
"too late for the market of the day on which they would have arrived if they had been forwarded and transported with such care, diligence, and exertion, and that the plaintiff thereby sustained loss, then their verdict should be for the plaintiff."
action was "the failure to carry with reasonable dispatch, and the loss of marketability is mentioned as the element of damage." That is, the reference to the market said to have been lost was merely for the purpose of calculating damages which were sought solely because of lack of reasonable diligence, and not upon the allegation of any added duty with respect to a particular train or market. The stipulation invoked does not attempt to limit the duty of the carrier to transport with reasonable dispatch, and we are not called upon to consider its effect in any other aspect.
"the amount of any loss or damage for which any carrier is liable shall be computed on the basis of the value of the property (being the bona fide invoice price, if any, to the consignee, including the freight charges, if prepaid) at the place and time of shipment under this bill of lading, unless a lower value has been represented in writing by the shipper or has been agreed upon or is determined by the classification or tariffs upon which the rate is based, in any of which events such lower value shall be the maximum amount to govern such computation, whether or not such loss or damage occurs from negligence."
"It may be judicially assumed that their value at the time and place of shipment was at least equal to the two cents per quart which the jury allowed as damages, and, in the view we have taken of the case, no just purpose would be served in reversing the judgment and subjecting the parties to the expense of a new trial."
That is to say, upon the facts as the state court found them to be, the agreed maximum of liability as stipulated was not exceeded.
We cannot say, in the light of the evidence, that the state court denied to the plaintiff in error any federal right in holding as it did with respect to the amount of the value of the berries at the time and place of shipment, and in this view we are unable to conclude that, in disposing of the federal questions, there was any error which would require or justify a reversal.
* The language of the Carmack Amendment has been construed in various decisions by state courts as embracing damages for delay. Ft. Smith R. Co. v. Awbrey, 39 Okl. 270; Southern Pacific Co. v. Lyon, 107 Miss. 777; Pecos Railway Co. v. Cox, 150 S.W. 265; Norfolk Exchange v. Norfolk Southern R. Co., 116 Va. 466. Contra, Byers v. Southern Express Co., 165 N.C. 542.

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