Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=83235:57234&catid=1585&Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 20:45:15+00:00

Document:
ROMEO R. ARAULLO, Petitioner, v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, HON. MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ, HON. GERARDO C. NOGRALES, HON. ROMEO L. GO, HON. PERLITA B. VELASCO, HON. ARDEN S. ANNI, ATTY. FILOMEMO B. BALBIN, ATTY. ERNESTO P. TABAO AND ATTY. ROBERTO F. DE LEON, Respondents.
This resolves the Petition for Certiorari1 filed by petitioner Romeo R. Araullo (Araullo) to assail an undated Resolution2 issued by the Office of the Ombudsman dismissing his criminal complaint docketed as OMB-C-C-09-0410-H.
[Araullo] alleged that [LA Anni] is guilty of issuing an unjust interlocutory order for granting the motion to quash filed by Club Filipino despite the fact that his counsel was not furnished with a copy of the said motion. [LA Anni] ordered the quashal of the writ of execution without conducting any hearing which was tantamount to a denial of [Araullo’s] right to due process.
The order of [LA Anni] was issued hastily and purposely to delay the execution of the judgment in the labor case which was decided in [Araullo’s] favor.
The act of [LA Anni] in ordering the quashal of the writ of execution and lifting the notice of garnishment and thereafter inhibiting himself from taking further cognizance of the case were done in order to give undue advantage and benefit to Club Filipino whose President and counsel were fraternal brothers of [LA Anni].
The belated appearance of [Atty. Balbin] also as counsel of Club Filipino at the stage of execution of the labor judgment was considered highly irregular by [Araullo] who submits that Atty. Balbin was hired only to influence the decision of the public respondents as he was the former Executive Assistant IV of retired NLRC Chairman Roy Señeres.
[Araullo] averred that [LA] Anni and the lawyers of Club Filipino conspired together to delay the implementation of the decision of the court in the labor case. Thus, he also sued [Atty. De Leon], [Atty. Tabao] and [Atty. Balbin] for graft and corruption and held them responsible for the issuance of an unjust interlocutory order.
Araullo’s charges were dismissed by the Office of the Ombudsman via the now assailed resolution18 issued by Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer I Romualdo V. Francisco and approved by then Ombudsman Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez. It reasoned that the deferral in the execution of the judgment in favor of Araullo could not be attributed to the respondents in the criminal complaint.19 The presumption that the respondents regularly performed their official duty was not overcome by sufficient evidence. The LA’s and NLRC’s rulings were rendered pursuant to the Rules of Procedure of the NLRC. This finding then barred a prosecution for violation of Article 206 of the RPC. For the claim of violation of R.A. No. 3019, the Office of the Ombudsman also found no probable cause given Araullo’s failure to establish that the respondents to his complaint gave undue advantage to Club Filipino, or that they acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross and inexcusable negligence.
Feeling aggrieved, Araullo filed this petition for certiorari to assail the Office of the Ombudsman’s dismissal of his criminal complaint.
Upon review, the Court has determined that the Office of the Ombudsman did not commit grave abuse of discretion. Explained clearly in the assailed resolution were the grounds that supported its finding of lack of probable cause, and which then justified the dismissal of the criminal complaints filed by Araullo.
Probable cause is defined as such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed, and that the persons being charged are probably guilty thereof.23 “[It] can only find support in facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonable mind to believe that the person being charged warrants a prosecution.”24 To establish probable cause, Araullo, being the complainant, then should have proved the elements of the crimes alleged to have been committed. In addition, there should have been a clear showing of the respective participation of the respondents, to at least support a ruling that would call for their further prosecution.
Sec. 4. Computation during execution. – Where further computation of the award in the decision, resolution or order is necessary during the course of the execution proceedings, no writ of execution shall be issued until after the computation has been approved by the [LA] in an order issued after the parties have been duly notified and heard on the matter.
There is no doubt that [LA] Anni’s July 29, 2008 Writ of Execution was procedurally irregular, as it pre-empted the NLRC Rules which require that where further computation of the award in the decision is necessary during the course of the execution proceedings, no Writ of Execution shall be issued until after the computation has been approved by the [LA] in an order issued after the parties have been duly notified and heard on the matter. When the writ was issued, there was as yet no order approving the computation made by the NLRC Computation and Examination Unit, and there was a pending and unresolved Motion to Recompute filed by Club Filipino. A cursory examination of the motion reveals that it raised valid issues that required determination in order to arrive at a just resolution, so that none of the parties would be unjustly enriched. For example, it appears that petitioner owed Club Filipino a substantial amount of money which the latter sought to deduct from the judgment award by way of compensation; if this is true, then the necessary adjustment in the award may be made to allow Club Filipino to recover what petitioner owes it, to the extent allowable by law.
On the part of the respondent Commissioners, the Court detects no irregularity in their actions either. While petitioner accuses them of gross misconduct for improperly affirming, through their October 29, 2008 Resolution, [LA] Anni’s order quashing the Writ of Execution, the Court believes otherwise; they acted pursuant to the NLRC Rules, and averted further mistake and damage by affirming the quashing of an otherwise improvident writ.
Clearly, the Office of the Ombudsman committed no grave abuse of discretion in finding no probable cause for violation of Article 206 against the respondents labor officials. Without a finding of probable cause against these labor officials, the dismissal of the charge against Atty. Balbin, Atty. Tabao and Atty. De Leon, being private individuals who did not appear to conspire with their co-respondents for the commission of a criminal offense, was also warranted.
Araullo failed to prove that the respondents were impelled to act by any of such motives. The records instead indicate that the labor officials only wanted to satisfy the demands of law and their procedural rules.
20 G.R. No. 192334, June 13, 2012, 672 SCRA 500.
22Angeles v. Gutierrez, G.R. Nos. 189161 & 189173, March 21, 2012, 668 SCRA 803, 818, citing Roquero v. Chancellor of UP-Manila, G.R. No. 181851, March 9, 2010, 614 SCRA 723, 729-730.
23Tan, Jr. v. Matsuura, G.R. No. 179003, January 9, 2013, 688 SCRA 263, 278-279.
25 Article 206. Unjust Interlocutory Order. – Any judge who shall knowingly render an unjust interlocutory order or decree shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period and suspension; but if he shall have acted by reason of inexcusable negligence or ignorance and the interlocutory order or decree be manifestly unjust, the penalty shall be suspension.
26 G.R. No. 194169, December 4, 2013.
28Belongilot v. Cua, G.R. No. 160933, November 24, 2010, 636 SCRA 34, 48, citing Collantes v. Hon. Marcelo, 556 Phil. 794, 804 (2007).
29D. M. Wenceslao and Associates, Inc. v. City of Parañaque, G.R. No. 170728, August 31, 2011, 656 SCRA 369, 380; People v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 187409, November 16, 2011, 660 SCRA 323, 329.
30 G.R. No. 171671, June 18, 2012, 673 SCRA 470.

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