Source: https://waitingfortax.com/2019/04/02/the-european-union-parliamentary-sovereignty-bill/comment-page-1/
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 13:23:00+00:00

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Stephen Hammond objected to the public inquiry as a “quasi-judicial process”. He said that was a job for Parliament. He would have supported the proposition otherwise.
EU meeting on 10/4/19. Change date for request if ND to day before (9/4/19) so they can discuss during meeting?
The question isn’t whether he likes it or not but whether more are put off than attracted by it. But, honestly, if they vote against it for that reason we’ll all of us get what only they deserve.
I’d considered that – but if the Bill passes they will know it’s coming anyway. And the longer back you plan from e-day the more difficult it is to get support.
Question re Section 3(2) inquiry and 3(3) referendum – it seems to presuppose that the result of the inquiry is that the favoured model is still Brexit in some form. What if – due to sanity breaking out, passage of time and recognition of the real constraints – the inquiry concludes Remain is the only viable option?
Observation: in the (unlikely) event that the Government revokes A50 of its own volition – that is, not pursuant to section 2(4) – then there would be no duty to hold an inquiry.
Do you not think that there is a strong case for an action before the CJEU brought under whatever article of the TFEU which may be appropriate, to the effect that the EU Council and the EU Commission have failed in their duty to implement the negotiating requirement of article 52(2) insofar as the obligation to conclude a framework agreement is concerned. The Political Statement is of no Treaty value, and art 52(2) in, effect states that the document setting out the post-Brexit relationship has to be of that order.
However, that remains a constitutional issue between the Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom, effectively as from 1918, It therefore falls outside the EU Treaty competence as it is taken as a sine qua non of the application and the methodology of application of the TEU and the TFEU which are subordinated to that constitutional imperative.
It is more thaa arguable that both the United Kingdom and the Irish republic were constitutionally roped into each other in joining the EC in 1972 and then the Lisbon Treaty, which is subject to that constitutional imperative. The fact is that the Good Friday Agreement had to be enacted as a constitutional change for both the United Kingdom and for the Irish Republic of which the Border Poll is but a part. Ireland introduced the concept of an Irish Nation and extended the right of those living in Northern Ireland to take up Irish as well as British Citizenship.
(1) There is a dilemma. The more that a revocation is made acceptable to Leavers (by saying we are continuing with Brexit in some sense) the less acceptable it is to the EU given the sincerity clause in the ECJ judgment. It is not obvious to me that with the “inquiry” and possible further referendum that is proposed our revocation would fall within the terms of the judgment. It would obviously be unfortunate to revoke and then have the revocation treated as void by ECJ on the application of Nigel Farage, say. But you are the lawyer, not me.
It is also not obvious to me that the inquiry would mollify Leave voters (referendum victory, told it would be implemented, both parties at the general election, direction of UK politics for past 3 years, more than half of Leavers want No-deal, &c &c). So I wonder what your further plan is to make a revocation politically acceptable to those who would lose from it?
(2) The EU have said that for an extension they would wish to have a plan. No plan, no extension. The leading candidates for an acceptable plan seem to be a referendum or general election. Given the splits in the two main parties, a general election is pointless as a way or resolving Brexit. That leaves a referendum. Should Clause 1 call for a plan? Should it specify that the referendum is that plan?
Excellent stuff. My only concern is that clause 3 could cause the EU27 to wonder whether the UK would be revoking the Article 50 notification in good faith. One solution could be to strengthen the reference to “majority support”. For example, it could refer to majority support in all the constituent parts of the UK. Or it could refer to majority support among all UK citizens aged 16 or above and all EU27 citizens resident in the UK. That would kill two birds with one stone, since it would also remedy a flaw of the 2016 referendum.
First quick reading gets a thumbs up from me. Will revisit again later when I’ve met my deadlines. Thanks for your hard work!
First, very quick reading gets a thumbs up from me. Will revisit after 5pm (damn deadlines here). Thanks for your hard work!
It doesn’t privilege Remain as the default option. It gives that choice to MPs. That’s exactly what clause 2(3) does.
To waste more public money would be just plain wrong after what’s been wasted with this Brexit filibustering that’s been played out in front of our eyes.
May triggered article 50 to win votes we are 8 working days away and we have no deals in place. It’s abeen shambolic to say the least.
Revoke article 50 or let the people vote on Mays deal not Parliament.
No one has egg on their face bar leave voters 3/4 isn’t bad.
Clause 2(3) offers MPs the chance to choose No Deal, but that is an unattractive option. So it does privilege Remain.
I’m afraid that’s just not right. Clause 2(3) is only operative in a world in which there is no withdrawal agreement and no extension. In that world the only options left are revoke or no deal. And the Bill puts the choice between them to MPs.
Indeed, it is only operative in the world where there is no withdrawal agreement and no extension. But as of now, the EU wants the UK to sign a withdrawal agreement and it is happy to consider reasonable requests for an extension, but Parliament is unable to agree what it wants because of its antiquated binary decision-making procedures. It is the lack of an appropriate procedure that prevents Parliament from exercising sovereignty. Hence, my suggestion to use STV. To be extra sure the resulting decision is the least bad, you could require a 2/3 majority. STV will give you that.
I don’t necessarily disagree but that’s a different piece of work for a different Bill – or indeed for Parliament.
Notice given under 2(4) must be unequivocal and unconditional.
Seems to me 3 may conflict with that obligation.
I understand the concern. I am very close to the point – I was the driving force behind the Wightman case – and have thought very carefully about it. I’ve also discussed it with other leading EU lawyers and I believe it is ok.
“withdrawal agreement” means an agreement (whether or not ratified) between the United Kingdom and the EU under Article 50(2) of the Treaty on European Union which sets out the arrangements for the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the EU.
I think this is great stuff – all the following comments are from a legislative drafter, so may seem highly pedantic, but are not intended critically! And I defer to others on points of constitutional and EU law.
s.1(2) and 2(1), not sure one can “extend” a date, perhaps “defer”?
s.3 heading, (3) and (4): no cap. for “Inquiry”?
s.3(2): I find this provision generally rather convoluted; and it’s a neat idea, but is this a possible topic on which an inquiry could realistically reach a view? Should this provision say e.g. “a model….WHICH would be likely to be acceptable…” (my caps. by way of emphasis)? If so does the actual model have to be produced by the Min. to the inquiry, or is it the inquiry’s job to come up with the model? (If there isn’t a model, the provision seems too abstract to be useful.) How is “majority support” to be defined? Could an inquiry really reach a conclusion about the minds of voters?
s.3(3) needs a comma after “model”, and I think “we” should be “the United Kingdom”?!
s.3(4) ought perhaps to refer to 3 months after the notification is given to the European Council under 2(4), rather than the revocation (in case of arguments that the revocation isn’t legal/effective)?
And I believe in most English Acts, the interpretation section is called just that i.e. Interpretation?
In the motion in clause 2(3): “the House approves *the decision* to leave the EU without a WA”.
Are you saying that Parliament has already made such a decision and you want it to be re-confirmed? Or are you just assuming that the Government will have decided to leave with no deal when the time comes?
Either way the definition of “exit day” needs to be changed as lots of other changes occur on that date. I would suggest aligning it with EU law.
(b) by the deletion of subsections (2), (3), (4) and (5).
Self-correction: STV will only guarantee you a majority not a super-majority of MPs, but a majority is enough to pass.
I get the intent of the bill, but I also think the inquiry is not needed.It’s not much of a sop to leavers, and it has a kind of quasi-judicial sound to it, which might frighten them.
Parliament can always re-issue A50 if it wants to go through this again.
I’m assuming that Section 2(3) motion can be won or lost by a single vote? Can Parliament or Government request a second attempt? Section 3(4) gives a clear time frame to start any inquiry – I’d also like to know the date when a new model can be presented in Parliament. Also, I’m assuming this Bill can be re-used under section 5 (but only if we are still in the EU) if that model gets seriously challenged/managed poorly leading to the situation we are seeing today? I don’t know how I feel about that – it may be rational but it feels quite humiliating to continue to ask for further extensions. I would also like a strong caveat that if we revoke Art 50 – then we become a very strong voice in Europe and we start to challenge aspects of the EU ( e.g. racism and homophobia) and the UK becomes (by sovereign Westminster legislation) obliged to implement EU law to protect our resources and social security benefits system.
I want to revoke – but I want to revoke with clear red lines of action.
Neil has a strong point about speed and resolving questions with more than 2 possible answers: at any point where these are required, the Bill needs an STV amendment. (I had expected the indicative voting to use STV because the purpose of the process screams for preferential voting, which would have produced a majority consensus already and we would not be in the fix we’re in now).
Your Bill amends the Parliament Act with a simple motion in just the Commons that carries the force of law by itself? To me, no problem except it needs a dedicated paragraph in the preamble (this Act amends/repeals the following)?
Really helpful – thank you so much. I’ve considered all and adopted many!
Could you explain more slowly, please Philip?
Is there any scope to include “including making both the detail of said model and related impact statements/analyses publicly available” within 3(3)?
Ensuring the public is fully informed would remove many questions over the proposed referendum result.
Replace “remain in the EU” in 3(3) with “stay in the EU”.
Stay has better connotations than remain.
I have an issue with 2(3).
Currently this is for a minister to do.
They must act in accordance with the NI act.
A minister failing to change exit day is exercising a power which probably fails that test.
So is it not safer to give the authority to a minister. rather than have explicit wording.
In this way, if leaving with no deal is found to be in contravention of the ‘withdrawal act’ that decision has been made by a minister under the powers they have under that act, and they retain that specific responsibility.
See copy as a tweet for images which give the precise words in the withdrawal act I am referring to.
A minister failing to change exit day is ecercising a power which probably fails that test.
Your section 3 is written so that were it enacted we might fall into the same trap as now.. ie the proposed enquiry dreams up an unworkable solution that the EU would find impossible to agree. Thus.. would be likely to be acceptable to the European Union and could reasonably be expected to have majority support in the United Kingdom………necessary arrangements for the holding of a referendum on the question whether the United Kingdom should leave the EU and negotiate that model or remain in the EU. Could place us in the exact same place as today. I suggest it’s made clear that the EU confirms that such a proposal would be acceptable. BEFORE we have any referendum on it.
As ever, excellent work.How can this be modified to protect Gibraltar? UKGov has thrown the Gibraltarians under a bus, despite the 98% remain vote.
Just some thought on times and dates. Apologies if this is too much nit-picking.
12th April – Friday – Commons may not be sitting – time for notification to be delivered to EU Council.
I wonder if there is scope for ambiguity or willful misunderstanding of the definition of the relevant day. As it stands, the UK leaves the EU at midnight CEST on the 12th. But does that mean the UK leaves the EU last thing on the 12th or first thing on the 13th – in CEST terms. A perverse interpretation might just (somehow) make the relevant day the 13th. If the commons sat on the 12th then there is potentially scope for the process to happen 24 hours later then intended and for the notification to be late.
Also, I assume the term “day” in the definition of “relevant day” does not mean a house of commons sitting day, as it is not capitalised? Might it be better not to define “Day” at all and just use HoC sitting day in full?
Should “relevant day” be capitalised – to show it is defined?
Thank you for drafting this, Jolyon.
Like ajusher, and for the same reasons, I would like to see something in 3(3) that ensures that the details of the model, and particularly the impact assessments, are made public well before a referendum.
2. Re enforcement: if HMG does not act given time is short what is the enforcement mechanism? (Mandamus order?) . That will take time – can anyone think of substitute enforcement mechanism eg provide for a power for another person to either seek extension and / or revoke? (As we know this PM will litigate even pretty hopeless cases and always the clock is ticking).
3. If there is any arguement about whether conditions are met for triggering 1(1) or 2(1) who decides? I can see there could be room to argue about a fudge around extension dates for 2(1) for example less so on ratification in 1(1) but who knows…and again little time to litigate. Can we say HoC can decide this by laying a motion? Or another third party? Or could we add that the condition is triggered where there is any reason to doubt there has been a valid extension agreed for example?
4. I would apply the bill to the Crown for avoidance of doubt. (Yes I know it is directed at HMG but still).
5. Do we want to be tied to sitting days in the House? Given the continuing duty clause might a crisis arise over recess if the conditions are trigged then there may and need to be a recall of the house but they won’t bectrigged if they turn on sitting days.
It might be a good idea to have 1 (2) specify that it must be an extension beyond the European Elections.
This may serve to narrow its support but without it I think we arrive at a no-deal vs May’s deal scenario and no 2nd referendum.
Is there any reason why TM could not serve notice of revocation of Art 50, but make the coming into effect of that notice contingent upon the Commons NOT voting in favour of the withdrawal agreement by a particular date? MPs would then face a simple binary choice, accept the negotiated withdrawal agreement or remain, which would focus their minds on the fundamentals.
The House has made it very clear that no deal is unacceptable. The EU will not reopen negotiations on the withdrawal agreement. Revoking Article 50 is the fail safe option; the UK could conceivably serve a further Art 50 notice, but it cannot easily rejoin the EU if it crashes out.
I am not a constitutional lawyer, but it strikes me that revoking Art 50 differs significantly from invoking it. Revoking does not impact existing rights, which was the fundamental reason why the Supreme Court decided in Miller that Parliamentary approval was needed to serve notice of withdrawal. Surely, therefore, revoking Article 50 remains a prerogative power?
I can’t see the EU challenging the constitutionality of a notice served under prerogative power, neither can I see the EU rejecting it; to do so would effectively be saying that the PM of the UK was not acting in good faith. Ultimately it would take a decision of the ECJ to decide that a notice to revoke was not given in good faith, and I can’t I see anyone from the UK easily getting a referral from either the Supreme Court or the Inner House; we all know how difficult this is in the face of Government opposition.
The enquiry should have an end date. Also, the Withdrawal Act has already been used to repeal some legislation (SI 2018/808) which should be reversed.
Thanks. Have taken your first in. Very grateful.
There’s a balance to be struck between what might be politically acceptable at this stage and what might be desirable at a later stage.

References: CJEU 
 art 52
 Art 50
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