Source: http://houston-opinions.com/files/1stCoA-2009-Shipley-Brothers-Ltd-v-Republic-National-Bank-by-Jennings-fraud-vs-theft-liaility-act-claim-election-of-remedies-damages-remittitur.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 06:54:17+00:00

Document:
defendants contend that the trial court erred in denying their motion to transfer venue.
installed it on Larson's property.
property without Larson's knowledge or permission.
motion "as to liability" on these claims. (5) The case then proceeded to a jury trial on the remaining claims.
would get back in touch with him.
you don't mind." Larson agreed, believing that he was receiving "same day service" from Southern Energy.
Larson gave "Mike" directions to his property and the combination to the gate to access his property.
instructed Junek to "get [Larson's] home."
he was a Southern Energy representative who was going to Larson's property to look at "warranty work."
and he had not given Junek permission to enter his property to take the home.
Larson returned to his property the following Friday to find that his home had in fact been removed.
down payment, and that Republic was seeking, as damages, $39,000 as the balance of the home price.
"granddaughter cried for two days."
not have the money to pay Shipley.
he, Junek, Lone Star, and Shipley Brothers "made the decision" to take the home from Larson's property.
Larson's home was in fact the missing home for which they had not received payment from Sweet.
pay the Shipley defendants after the sale to Larson was completed.
next day with a work crew and, without Larson's permission, took the home.
that when he went to Larson's home, he had not even seen a copy of Larson's list of warranty issues.
home to a customer and that the customer had in fact paid for it.
home that was ultimately delivered to Larson by Sweet "without notice or the opportunity to be heard,"
Texas Constitution and the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution." See U.S. Const.
amend. XIV, § 1; Tex. Const. art. I, § 19.
privileges or immunities, or in any manner disfranchised, except by the due course of the law of the land."
generally construe the Due Course of Law Clause in the same way as its federal counterpart. Tex.
Workers' Comp. Com'n v. Patient Advocates of Tex., 136 S.W.3d 643, 658 (Tex. 2004) (citing Univ. of Tex.
that addresses due process issues in analyzing the Shipley defendants' constitutional challenge. See id.
for the issuance of a statement of ownership and location.
converts to a security interest in proceeds and cash proceeds.
for that home to the department.
hereinafter as "former section 1201.204").
manufactured home industry that require the surrender of the MCO before funding, there is no problem.
that arose in this case.
without notice or an opportunity to be heard," then they are deprived of their property without due process.
provide clear and marketable title.
[Shipley]: That is right. Its his obligation.
[Larson's counsel]: It is his obligation to, correct?
make that representation of warranty to the public. You know that?
that he is going to provide clear and marketable title?
[Larson's counsel]: And in this case Sweet did everything he was supposed to do except pay you?
We overrule the Shipley defendants' first issue.
entitled to damages for theft or conversion "merely because it [had] a security interest" in the home.
We overrule the Shipley defendants' second issue.
evidence of fraud by Junek, the other [Shipley] defendants would not have derivative liability."
than a scintilla, or (4) the evidence conclusively establishes the opposite of the vital fact. City of Keller v.
(Tex. 2001); Johnson & Higgins of Tex., Inc. v. Kenneco Energy, Inc., 962 S.W.2d 507, 524 (Tex. 1998).
knowledge of their existence or their competing claim to ownership.
stated, "I understand you're having some problems with a Southern Energy home that you purchased."
stating that he would already be in Larson's area looking at "some other issues with some other homes"
Larson had the missing home.
had never seen a list of the issues.
the evidence is legally sufficient to support the jury's fraud findings against all of the Shipley defendants.
part of the events giving rise to the claims occurred in Harris County.
An appellate court reviews a trial court's denial of a motion to transfer venue de novo. Killeen v.
the suit accrued." See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 15.006 (Vernon 2002).
The parties agree that the general permissive venue statute applies. See id. § 15.002 (Vernon 2002).
Larson had obtained title to the home, the Shipley defendants took his home without his permission.
and Republic in Harris County were fraudulent.
transferred to Larson. Based upon this evidence, the trial court denied the motion to transfer venue.
fraud that induced the payment by Larson and Republic."
undone because [they] did not [ultimately] take a judgment against Sweet for fraud."
supporting venue in the county where judgment was rendered. See Chiriboga, 96 S.W.3d at 677-78.
defendants and away from Sweet.
substantial part of events giving rise to the claims of Republic and Larson. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.
defendants because all of the claims arose out of the same series of transactions or occurrences. See id.
We overrule the Shipley defendants' seventh issue.
substantially remit" the award of exemplary damages.
Shipley defendants acted in bad-faith in removing Larson's home.
Transp. Ins. Co. v. Moriel, 879 S.W.2d 10, 30 (Tex. 1994)).
filed, we must reverse the trial court's judgment. Id.
home. The Shipley defendants agreed that Larson was a purchaser in good faith.
offensiveness of the Shipley defendants' conduct is extreme.
Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568, 116 S. Ct. 1589, 1595 (1996); SAS & Assocs., Inc. v. Home Mktg.
that could be imposed for similar misconduct. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. at 574-75, 116 S. Ct.
at 1599; Tony Gullo, 212 S.W.3d at 308.
The first guidepost, the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's misconduct, is the most important.
whether the harm was the result of intentional malice, trickery, deceit, or mere accident. State Farm Mut.
U.S. at 419, 123 S. Ct. at 1521 (citing Gore, 517 U.S. at 576-77, 116 S. Ct. at 1599)).
entered Larson's home without his permission-- conduct that involves a significant danger and risk.
some of the other factors suggests that the amount of the exemplary damages awarded is excessive.
Brothers. "The ratio of actual to exemplary damages alone is not determinative of excessiveness." Id.
the amount of compensatory damages might be close to the line of constitutional impropriety." Id.
individual with the compensatory damages awarded against that individual." Huynh v. Phung, No.
01-04-00267-CV, 2007 WL 495023, at *13 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 16, 2007, no pet.) (mem.
defendants to the amount of actual damages awarded against the Shipley defendants jointly and severally.
Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. § 17.47(c)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2008).
evidence, was so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust.
defendants' fourth issue in part and overrule it in part.
is no evidence or jury finding to support an award of separate attorney's fees to Republic only."
separate blanks, because there was no evidence that would enable the jury to make that determination.
Larson elected a remedy that bars him from recovering attorney's fees.
(Tex. 1997)); see also K-2, Inc. v. Fresh Coat, Inc., 253 S.W.3d 386, 396 (Tex. App.--Beaumont 2008, pet.
time evidence of attorneys' fees is presented or at the time of the charge, the error is waived." Holmes v.
the judgment of the trial court and remand for a new trial.
Justice Bland, concurring and dissenting.
1. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 134.001-005 (Vernon 2005).
(current version at Tex. Occ. Code Ann. § 1201.204 (Vernon Supp. 2008)).
3. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; Tex. Const. art. I, § 19.
4. Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. § 17.41-.63 (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2008).
court granted both Republic and Larson summary judgment as to liability on these claims.
that they did not represent each other.
terms of which are unclear at best.
Larson. Act of May 26, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 338, 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws 1471, 1477 (amended 2007).
Theft Liability Act did not present the risk of a double recovery.
conversion and Larson could not recover under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act.
wrongfully converted proceeds from the sale to Larson.
was at work in Harris County. The Shipley defendants dispute that there is such evidence in the record.
directly address the Shipley defendants' evidentiary dispute.
against Sweet," which they describe as an "absent and insolvent defendant."
17. In support of their argument that venue was not destroyed, Larson and Republic cite McIntosh v.
protecting the defendant against fraud or inaccuracy at the pleading stage." 894 S.W.2d 60, 64 (Tex.
relied upon by the trial court in making its venue ruling.
S.W.2d 812, 819 (Tex. 1997).

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