Source: http://wisconsinlawreview.org/limelight-v-akamai-limiting-induced-infringement/
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 08:33:04+00:00

Document:
In Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Technologies, Inc.,1 the Supreme Court addressed the relationship between direct infringement under § 271(a) 2 of the Patent Act and induced infringement under § 271(b). 3 The Court held that a defendant could be liable for inducing infringement of a patented process only if a single party would have been liable for performing all of the steps constituting direct infringement. In this short article, I provide the background to the opinion, discuss the ruling, and offer four lessons.
The Supreme Court’s Akamai decision offers (at least) four lessons, which address: (1) the text of the Patent Act, (2) the Supreme Court’s treatment of the Federal Circuit, (3) the question of direct infringement, and (4) policy issues presented by congressional action.
Fourth, Congress could adjust the framework for liability based on policy considerations. 63 The Supreme Court recognized the “concern” that “a would-be infringer” could “evade liability by dividing performance of a method patent’s steps” with someone else it did not direct or control. 64 A vendor, for example, could tell subscribers how to perform a process’s remaining steps without being “contractually or otherwise obligated to do so.” 65 Legislation could make it harder for infringement to slip through the cracks.
In short, in Akamai, the Supreme Court continued its long line of Federal Circuit reversals, finding that the text and structure of the Patent Act limit induced infringement to settings in which there has been direct infringement. Any next steps will be more nuanced, as this straightforward conclusion is subject to further developments at the Federal Circuit or in Congress.
134 S. Ct. 2111 (2014).
35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012) (“[W]hoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention . . . infringes the patent.”).
§ 271(b) (“Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer.”).
532 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
Akamai, 134 S. Ct. at 2116.
Id. at 2116–17 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1) (2012).
Akamai, 134 S. Ct. at 2118.
35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012).
692 F.3d 1301, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Linn, J., dissenting), rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 2111 (2014).
Akamai, 134 S. Ct. at 2116 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Akamai, 134 S. Ct. at 2115.
Akamai, 134 S. Ct. 2111.
KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007).
Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120 (2014).
eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007).
Akamai, 134 S. Ct. at 2117.
Ryan Davis, Full Fed. Circ. Must Weigh Joint Infringement, Akamai Says, Law 360 (June 16, 2014, 5:50 PM), www.law360.com/articles/548404.
Another avenue for modification would lie in the Federal Circuit’s reexamination of the Muniauction rule.
Akamai, 134 S. Ct. at 2120.
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 7, Akamai, 134 S. Ct. 2111 (No. 12-786).
Brief for Amicus Curiae International Business Machines Corp. Supporting Neither Party at 19, Akamai, 134 S. Ct. 2111 (No. 12-786).
Brief for Petitioner at 43, Akamai, 134 S. Ct. 2111 (No. 12-786).
Reinecke, supra note 50, at 1252.
BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
Mark A. Lemley et al., Divided Infringement Claims, 33 AIPLA Q.J. 255, 272 (2005); see id. at 272–75 (providing examples).
* Distinguished Professor, Rutgers School of Law. Copyright © 2014 Michael A. Carrier.

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