Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/96519/virginian-railway-co-vs-employees
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 16:50:00+00:00

Document:
(1) That the duty to "treat" with the representative so certified is mandatory. P. 300 U. S. 547 .
(2) The statute does not undertake to compel agreement, and does not preclude the employer from entering into individual contracts directly with individual employees, but it requires the employer to "treat with" the authorized representative of the employees, that is, to meet and confer with their representative, to listen to their complaints, and to make reasonable effort to compose differences. P. 300 U. S. 548 .
(3) The duty is to treat with the authorized representative exclusively. P. 300 U. S. 548 .
(4) The duty is enforceable by injunction. P. 300 U. S. 549 .
3. A court of equity may refuse to act when it cannot give effective relief; but whether a decree should be refused as useless is a matter of judgment addressed to the special circumstances of each case. P. 300 U. S. 550 .
4. In determining whether the duty of a carrier to treat with the authorized representative of its employees is enforceable by mandatory injunction, weight is attached to the judgment of Congress that conference between carriers and employees is a powerful aid to industrial peace; and it will not be assumed that such negotiation will not result in agreement or lead to successful mediation or arbitration. P. 300 U. S. 551 .
5. The peaceable settlement of labor controversies that may seriously impair the ability of an interstate carrier to perform its service to the public is a matter of public concern. P. 300 U. S. 552 .
6. Courts of equity go much farther in furtherance of the public interest than when only private interests are involved. P. 300 U. S. 552 .
7. The fact that, by the Railway Labor Act, Congress has indicated its purpose to make negotiation between carrier and employees obligatory in case of industrial controversy is, in itself, a declaration of public interest and policy. P. 300 U. S. 552 .
8. The power of Congress over interstate commerce extends to such regulations of the relations of rail carriers to their employees as are reasonably calculated to prevent the interruption of interstate commerce by strikes and their attendant disorders. P. 300 U. S. 553 .
9. It was for Congress to choose the means by which its objective of securing the uninterrupted service of interstate railroads was to be secured, and its judgment, expressed in the Railway Labor Act and confirmed by the history of industrial disputes and of railroad labor relations, is not open to review here. P. 300 U. S. 553 .
10. The activities of "back shop" employees engaged on heavy repairs on locomotives and cars withdrawn from service for long periods are held to bear such relation to the interstate activities of the carrier as to be regarded as part of them -- ( Employers' Liability Cases, 207 U. S. 463 distinguished) -- all subject to the power of Congress over interstate commerce. P. 300 U. S. 554 .
11. Although the carrier in this case might have turned over its back shop repair work to independent contractors, its determination to make its own repairs, and the nature of the work done, brought its relations with the back shop employees within the purview of the Railway Labor Act. P. 300 U. S. 557 .
the authorized representative of its employees for the purpose of negotiating a labor dispute do not infringe the rights of the carrier under the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. P. 300 U. S. 557 .
13. In this regard, the Railway could complain only of infringement of its own constitutional immunity, not that of the employees. P. 300 U. S. 558 .
14. Under § 2, Fourth, of the Railway Labor Act, at an election participated in by a majority of the employees entitled to vote, the vote of a majority of the participants determines the choice of representative. P. 300 U. S. 559 .
15. A certificate of the National Mediation Board, certifying, in conformity with the Railway Labor Act, that, as the result of an election, a specified union has been designated to represent a craft of employees, and showing on its face the total number of votes case in favor of each candidate, is not void because it fails to state the total number of eligible voters in the craft, but is prima facie sufficient, and the omitted fact is open to inquiry by the court asked to enforce the command of the statute, § 2, Ninth. P. 300 U. S. 561 .
is not inconsistent with the mandatory injunction in this case. P. 300 U. S. 562 .
17. Specific provisions of a later Act cannot be rendered nugatory by more general provisions of an earlier Act. P. 300 U. S. 563 .
The concurrent findings of fact of the two courts below are not shown to be plainly erroneous or unsupported by evidence. We accordingly accept them as the conclusive basis for decision, Texas & N.O. R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Railway & S.S. Clerks, 281 U. S. 548 , 281 U. S. 558 ; Pick Mfg. Co. v. General Motors Corp., 299 U. S. 3 , 299 U. S. 4 , and address ourselves to the questions of law raised on the record.
Pennsylvania Federation v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 267 U. S. 203 , 267 U. S. 216 .
and certification by the Mediation Board, and commanded the carrier to treat with the representative so certified. That the command was limited in its application to the case of intervention and certification by the Mediation Board indicates not that its words are precatory, but only that Congress hit at the evil "where experience shows it to be most felt." Keokee Consol. Coke Co. v. Taylor, 234 U. S. 224 , 234 U. S. 227 .
There is no want of capacity in the court to direct complete performance of the entire obligation; both the negative duties not to maintain a company union and not to negotiate with any representative of the employees other than respondent and the affirmative duty to treat with respondent. Full performance of both is commanded by the decree in terms which leave in no uncertainty the requisites of performance. In compelling compliance with either duty, it does far less than has been done in compelling the discharge of a contractual or statutory obligation calling for a construction or engineering enterprise, New Orleans, M. & T. Ry. Co. v. Mississippi, 112 U. S. 12 ; Wheeling Traction Co. v. Board of Commissioners, 248 F. 205; see Gas Securities Co. v. Antero & Lost Park Reservoir Co., 259 F. 423, 433; Board of Commissioners v. A. V. Wills & Sons, 236 F. 362, 380; Jones v. Parker, 163 Mass. 564, 40 N.E. 1044, or in granting specific performance of a contract for the joint use of a railroad bridge and terminals, Joy v. St. Louis, 138 U. S. 1 ; Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. Co., 163 U. S. 564 ; cf. Prospect Park & Coney Island R. Co. v. Coney Island & Brooklyn R. Co., 144 N.Y. 152, 39 N.E. 17, 26 L.R.A. 610. Whether an obligation has been discharged, and whether action taken or omitted is in good faith or reasonable, are everyday subjects of inquiry by courts in framing and enforcing their decrees.
It is true that a court of equity may refuse to give any relief when it is apparent that that which it can give will not be effective or of benefit to the plaintiff. Equity will not decree the execution of a partnership agreement, since it cannot compel the parties to remain partners, see Hyer v. Richmond Traction Co., 168 U. S. 471 , 168 U. S. 482 , or compel one to enter into performance of a contract of personal service which it cannot adequately control, Rutland Marble Co.
v. Ripley, 10 Wall. 339, 77 U. S. 358 ; Karrick v. Hannaman, 168 U. S. 328 , 168 U. S. 336 ; Tobey v. Bristol, Fed.Cas. No. 14,065; Weeks v. Pratt, 43 F.2d 53, 57; Railway Labor Act, § 2, Tenth. But the extent to which equity will go to give relief where there is no adequate remedy at law is not a matter of fixed rule. It rests, rather, in the sound discretion of the court. Willard v. Tayloe, 8 Wall. 557, 75 U. S. 565 ; Joy v. St. Louis, supra, 138 U. S. 47 ; Morrison v. Work, 266 U. S. 481 , 266 U. S. 490 ; Curran v. Holyoke Water Power Co., 116 Mass. 90, 92. Whether the decree will prove so useless as to lead a court to refuse to give it is a matter of judgment to be exercised with reference to the special circumstances of each case, rather than to general rules, which, at most, are but guides to the exercise of discretion. It is a familiar rule that a court may exercise its equity powers, or equivalent mandamus powers, United States ex rel. Greathouse v. Dern, 289 U. S. 352 , 289 U. S. 359 , to compel courts, boards, or officers to act in a matter with respect to which they may have jurisdiction or authority, although the court will not assume to control or guide the exercise of their authority, Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Humboldt S.S. Co., 224 U. S. 474 ; Louisville Cement Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 246 U. S. 638 ; see Work v. United States ex rel. Rives, 267 U. S. 175 , 267 U. S. 184 ; Wilbur v. United States ex rel. Kadrie, 281 U. S. 206 , 281 U. S. 218 .
Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U. S. 109 , 264 U. S. 119 , 264 U. S. 121 ; Marine Transit Corp. v. Dreyfus, 284 U. S. 263 , 284 U. S. 278 .
to the end sought, and hence are within the congressional power. See Railway Clerks case, supra, 281 U. S. 570 ; Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton R. Co., 295 U. S. 330 , 295 U. S. 369 .
The activities in which these employees are engaged have such a relation to the other confessedly interstate activities of the petitioner that they are to be regarded as a part of them. All, taken together, fall within the power of Congress over interstate commerce. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 221 U. S. 612 , 221 U. S. 619 ; cf. Pedersen v. Delaware, Lackawanna & Western R. Co., 229 U. S. 146 , 229 U. S. 151 . Both courts below have found that interruption by strikes of the back shop employees, if more than temporary, would seriously cripple petitioner's interstate transportation. The relation of the back shop to transportation is such that a strike of petitioner's employees there, quite apart from the likelihood of its spreading to the operating department, would subject petitioner to the danger, substantial, though possibly indefinable in its extent, of interruption of the transportation service. The cause is not remote from the effect. The relation between than is not tenuous. The effect on commerce cannot be regarded as negligible. See United States v. Railway Employees' Department of American Federation of Labor, 290 F. 978, 981, holding participation of back shop employees in the nationwide railroad shopmen's strike of 1922 to constitute an interference with interstate commerce. As the regulation here in question is shown to be an appropriate means of avoiding that danger, it is within the power of Congress.
The Employers' Liability Cases, 207 U. S. 463 , 207 U. S. 498 , which mentioned railroad repair shops as a subject beyond the power to regulate commerce, are not controlling here. Whatever else may be said of that pronouncement, it is obvious that the commerce power is as much dependent upon the type of regulation as its subject matter. It is enough for present purposes that experience has shown that the failure to settle, by peaceful means, the grievances of railroad employees with respect to rates of pay, rules or working conditions, is far more likely to hinder interstate commerce than the failure to compensate workers who have suffered injury in the course of their employment.
Even though Congress, in the choice of means to effect a permissible regulation of commerce, must conform to due process, Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton R. Co., supra, 295 U. S. 347 ; Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. Co. v. United States, 284 U. S. 80 , 284 U. S. 97 ; see Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U. S. 555 , 295 U. S. 589 , it is evident that where, as here, the means chosen are appropriate to the permissible end, there is little scope for the operation of the due process clause. The railroad can complain only of the infringement of its own constitutional immunity, not that of its employees. Erie R. Co. v. Williams, 233 U. S. 685 , 233 U. S. 697 ; Jeffrey Mfg. Co. v. Blagg, 235 U. S. 571 , 235 U. S. 576 ; Rail & River Coal Co. v. Yaple, 236 U. S. 338 , 236 U. S. 349 ; cf. Hawkins v. Bleakly, 243 U. S. 210 , 243 U. S. 214 . And the Fifth Amendment, like the Fourteenth, see West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, decided this day, ante, is not a guarantee of untrammeled freedom of action and of contract. In the exercise of its power to regulate commerce, Congress can subject both to restraints not shown to be unreasonable. Such are the restraints of the Safety Appliance Act, Johnson v. Southern Pac. Co., 196 U. S. 1 ; of the act imposing a wage scale on rail carriers; Wilson v. New, supra; of the Railroad Employers' Liability Act, Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U. S. 1 ; of the act fixing maximum hours of service for railroad employees whose duties control or affect the movement of trains, Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, supra; of the act prohibiting the prepayment of seamen's wages, Patterson v. Bark Eudora, 190 U. S. 169 .
judged in the light of the conditions which have occasioned the exercise of governmental power. If the compulsory settlement of some differences, by arbitration, may be within the limits of due process, see Hardware Dealers Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Glidden Co., 284 U. S. 151 , it seems plain that the command of the statute to negotiate for the settlement of labor disputes, given in the appropriate exercise of the commerce power, cannot be said to be so arbitrary or unreasonable as to infringe due process.
Adair v. United States, 208 U. S. 161 , and Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U. S. 1 , have no present application. The provisions of the Railway Labor Act invoked here neither compel the employer to enter into any agreement nor preclude it from entering into any contract with individual employees. They do not "interfere with the normal exercise of the right of the carrier to select its employees or to discharge them." See the Railway Clerks case, supra, 281 U. S. 571 .
Petitioner construes this section as requiring that a representative be selected by the votes of a majority of eligible voters. It is to be noted that the words of the section confer the right of determination upon a majority of those eligible to vote, but is silent as to the manner in which that right shall be exercised. Election laws providing for approval of a proposal by a specified majority of an electorate have been generally construed as a requiring only the consent of the specified majority of those participating in the election. Carroll County v. Smith, 111 U. S. 556 ; Douglass v. Pike County, 101 U. S. 677 ; Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. County Court of Davidson County, 1 Sneed.(Tenn.) 637; Montgomery County Fiscal Court v. Trimble, 104 Ky. 629, 47 S.W. 773. Those who do not participate "are presumed to assent to the expressed will of the majority of those voting." Cass County v. Johnston, 95 U. S. 360 , 95 U. S. 369 , and see Carroll County v. Smith, supra.
set out. See Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388 ; United States v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & P.R. Co., 294 U. S. 499 ; Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 295 U. S. 193 .
The practice contended for is undoubtedly desirable, but it is not required by the present statute or by the authorities upon which petitioner relies. The National Mediation Board makes no order. The command which the decree of the court enforces is that of the statute, not of the Board. Its certificate that the Federation is the authorized representative of the employees is the ultimate finding of fact prerequisite to enforcement by the courts of the command of the statute. There is no contention that this finding is conclusive in the absence of a finding of the basic facts on which it rests -- that is to say, the number of eligible voters, the number participating in the election, and the choice of the majority of those who participate. Whether the certification, if made as to those facts, is conclusive it is unnecessary now to determine. But we think it plain that, if the Board omits to certify any of them, the omitted fact is open to inquiry by the court asked to enforce the command of the statute. See Dismuke v. United States, 297 U. S. 167 , 297 U. S. 171 -173. Such inquiry was made by the trial court which found the number of eligible voters, and thus established the correctness of the Board's ultimate conclusion. The certificate which conformed to the statutory requirement, was prima facie sufficient, and was not shown to be invalid for want of the requisite supporting facts.
It suffices to say that the Norris-LaGuardia Act can affect the present decree only so far as its provisions are found not to conflict with those of § 2, Ninth, of the Railway Labor Act, authorizing the relief which has been granted. Such provisions cannot be rendered nugatory by the earlier and more general provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. See the Railway Clerks case, supra, 281 U. S. 571 ; cf. Callahan v. United States, 285 U. S. 515 , 285 U. S. 518 ; Walla Walla v. Walla Walla Water Co., 172 U. S. 1 , 172 U. S. 22 ; International Alliance v. Rex Theatre Corp., 73 F.2d 92, 93.
"The purpose of the bill is . . . [ inter alia ] to outlaw the attempt that has been made in numerous instances by employers who control alleged labor unions, and thereby to use a slang phrase, to 'gum up the works'. . . . We have had 8 years of operation of this act, and we have prevented any strikes. But strikes have been threatened because of the defects which have been found in this bill."
"When the majority of a craft or class has (either by secret ballot or otherwise) selected a representative, the carrier cannot make with anyone other than the representative a collective contract ( i.e., a contract which sets rates of pay, rules, or working conditions), whether the contract covers the class as a whole or a part thereof. Neither the statute nor the decree prevents the carrier from refusing to make a collective contract and hiring individuals on whatever terms the carrier may by unilateral action determine. In hirings of that sort, the individual does not deal in a representative capacity with the carrier, and the hiring does not set general rates of pay, rules, or working conditions. Of course, as a matter of voluntary action, not as a result of the statute or the decree, the carrier may contract with the duly designated representative to hire individuals only on the terms of a collective understanding between the carrier and the representative; but any such agreement would be entirely voluntary on the carrier's part, and would in no sense be compelled."

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