Source: https://eem.jacksonkelly.com/2011/12/index.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 12:44:28+00:00

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3.2.i. Any other condition, including radiological exposure, which adversely alters the integrity of the waters of the State including wetlands; no significant adverse impact to the chemical, physical, hydrologic, or biological components of aquatic ecosystems shall be allowed.
Historically, the West Virginia Department of Environmental Protection (“WVDEP”) has used a biologic index known as the West Virginia Stream Condition Index (“WVSCI”) as the primary tool for determining whether waterbodies met the narrative standards. The WVSCI is used to compare the numbers, types and proportions of so-called pollution-intolerant aquatic insects (measured at the “family” level) in undisturbed “reference” streams with the populations in disturbed streams. At some point, a difference in scores between a disturbed site and a reference site is considered sufficient to find that a disturbed stream is “impaired” or not meeting the narrative standard.
WVDEP does not have numeric criteria for conductivity, TDS or sulfate. It has also evaluated the correlation between each parameter and WVSCI scores and determined that there is a poor correlation between them. Because of that, WVDEP does not believe it can adopt a reasonable numeric standard on these parameters which would not be greatly over- or under-protective of WVSCI scores.
The Sierra Club, however, claimed in the appeal that when insect populations are evaluated at the “genus” level, rather than the “family” level used in the WVSCI, there are clearer correlations between the insect populations found and the levels of conductivity, TDS and sulfate. It contended that significant impacts to those populations occur at conductivity = 300 μS/cm, and sulfate = 50 mg/l, and argued that these levels should serve as in-stream aquatic life criteria used to impose effluent limits. Without significant dilution or expensive treatment, such as reverse osmosis, however, these standards are generally considered unachievable by most surface mines. The Sierra Club’sexperts suggested that there was not necessarily a causal link between conductivity and TDS on the one hand and insect impacts on the other, but that unspecified individual ions comprising the conductivity and TDS were likely culprits. Its experts also suggested that the WVSCI was not as precise a test as a genus-level insect index and should, therefore, not be used.
The EQB generally agreed and in March 2011 issued an order requiring that WVDEP impose effluent limits on each of the three parameters. Significantly, however, it did not determine or suggest that the threshold numbers advocated by the Sierra Club were appropriate. The EQB also ruled that WVDEP was obligated to impose limits on manganese and selenium, and to do a further analysis whether arsenic limits were necessary.
WVDEP and Patriot Mining appealed the order with respect to conductivity/TDS/sulfate. In an order dated September 20, 2011, the Circuit Court of Kanawha County ruled that the EQB had not adequately explained the legal bases for its order; that WVDEP was entitled to deference in its interpretation of the narrative standards; and that the Board had failed to discuss the role of the WVSCI in measuring compliance with the narrative standard. The Court remanded the matter to the EQB.
On remand, Patriot Mining moved to dissolve the stay, arguing that there was no summarizing requirement to impose limits on conductivity/TDS and sulfate; that the Sierra Club was unlikely to prevail on remand; and that Patriot and its employees would suffer real harm while there would be little impact to the receiving stream, which already had high levels of the three parameters which would not increase appreciably with the new mine. By order of November 10, 2011, the EQB dissolved the stay, but its order did little to provide real help to Patriot.
The Board’s dissolution order determined that on the balance of equities the stay should be dissolved because there was little evidence that the mine would contribute to any substantial impact on the insect population or to the levels of the three parameters in the receiving stream. However, the Board also stated that the Sierra Club was likely to prevail on the merits on remand—a fact which suggests that it may again require WVDEP to impose effluent limits on conductivity/TDS/sulfate that cannot be obtained without techniques so expensive as to destroy the economics of the operation.
EPA has issued new guidance addressing the non-affiliation requirement for the landowner liability protections available under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) for bona fide prospective purchasers (BFPPs) and contiguous property owners (CPOs). The statute provides that landowners seeking to avoid CERCLA liability cannot be “affiliated with” another party who is potentially liable under CERCLA. The new guidance, titled “Enforcement Discretion Guidance regarding the Affiliation Language of CERCLA’s Bona Fide Prospective Purchase and Contiguous Property Owner Liability Protections,” addresses the “affiliated with” language of CERCLA and complements EPA’s previously issued Tenants Guidance. The new guidance should be of interest to owners of contaminated property and entities interested in buying and developing brownfields as well as neighboring landowners.
The new guidance discusses prohibited affiliations identified in CERCLA, the burden of proof, initial considerations in determining whether a disqualifying affiliation exists, two statutory exceptions, and four additional relationships that generally should not be considered to be disqualifying affiliations. EPA emphasizes that the analysis is fact-intensive Affiliation Guidance at 2. The crux of the analysis is whether the relationship was created to avoid CERCLA liability. Id. at 7. If so, the affiliation will disqualify a purchaser of property or owner from BFPP or CPO liability protection.
Affiliations expressly prohibited by CERCLA include: (1) direct or indirect familial relationships; (2) contractual, corporate, or financial relationships; and (3) business reorganizations of a business entity that was potentially liable. Id. at 2-3. The entity seeking the liability protection has the burden of proof to establish the non-affiliation requirement and all of the other elements of the BFPP or CPO defense. Under CERCLA, CPOs may request from EPA a “no action assurance letter” or settlement that provides protection against cost recovery or contribution. BFPPs may seek comfort/status letters, BFPP-doing-work-agreements, or prospective purchaser agreements in limited circumstances. Id. at 3.
The new guidance directs EPA personnel to consider following four issues before exploring whether there is a prohibited affiliation: (1) whether the person seeking liability protection under the BFPP or CPO provisions is otherwise a potentially responsible party (PRP) i.e., an owner/operator at the time of disposal, a transporter, or an arranger for the disposal of hazardous substances; (2) whether the entity is in fact the same entity as a PRP or is potentially liable under other principles of corporate law, such as successor liability; (3) whether a business entity asserting BFPP or CPO status is the result of a reorganization of a liable party through bankruptcy or other corporate restructuring.; and (4) whether the party with whom a person may have an affiliation is actually a PRP at the facility. Id. at 4-5.
Next, the new guidance discusses the two statutory exceptions to contractual, corporate, and financial relationships that do not disqualify a purchaser of property or owner from BFPP or CPO liability protection. The first statutory exception applies only to BFPPs and is for contractual, corporate, or financial relationships that are “created by the instruments by which title to the facility is conveyed or financed.” Deeds, title insurance, agreements with a third-party lender, or other agreement that makes transfer of title possible would fall within this exception. Id. at 6. The second statutory exception applies to bothBFPPs and CPOs and is for contractual, corporate, or financial relationships that are “created by a contract for the sale of goods or services.” EPA states that it will adopt a plain language definition of goods and services and gives a contract for snow removal as an example of a contract for a service that would not be considered to be a disqualifying affiliation. Id. at 6-7.
Additionally, EPA examines “special considerations” in applying the non-affiliation requirement and identifies the following four relationships that “it generally intends not to treat as disqualifying affiliations”: (1) relationships at other properties: (2) post-acquisition relationships; (3) documents that typically accompany title transfer; and (4) tenants seeking to purchase property they lease. Id. at 7.
Relationships at Other Properties: EPA intends to focus on only those affiliations that may be related to the contaminated property or the source property. For example, if the buyer and seller have existing lease agreements at other properties unrelated to the contaminated property, EPA will likely treat the buyer as if it were a BFPP so long as the buyer has complied with all of the other BFPP requirements. Id. at 8-9.
Post-Acquisition Relationships: A BFPP or a CPO that enters into a familial, contractual, corporate, or financial relationship with a PRP after the acquisition of the property will generally not be considered to have a disqualifying affiliation with the PRP. For example, if a buyer acquires a contaminated industrial park from a seller who was an owner during the time of the disposal at the industrial park and the seller later leases a warehouse within the industrial park to the buyer, EPA will generally treat the buyer as a BFPP. Id. at 9.
Documents that Typically Accompany Title Transfer: Generally, EPA does not intend to treat indemnification, insurance, and other agreements that are typically created as part of the transfer of title as disqualifying affiliations. Id. at 9. EPA clarifies that it means indemnification agreements that allocate responsibility for cleanup costs between a purchaser and seller and do not relieve a party of its CERCLA liability. The guidance in a footnote distinguishes the indemnification agreement that was at issue in the Ashley II decision. Ashley II of Charleston, LLC v. PCS Nitrogen, Inc., 746 F. Supp. 692 (D.S.C. 2010), motion to certify appeal granted, 2011 WL 5827786 (D.S.C. Nov. 17, 2011). See article titled “Bona Fide Prospective Purchaser Requirements Interpreted by Federal District Court,” posted on the Jackson Kelly PLLC Energy and Environment Monitor on December 29, 2010. EPA describes the agreement in Ashley II as a “liability release agreement” and emphasizes that the purchaser failed to satisfy the “no affiliation” requirement due to a release agreement, in which the purchaser agreed to release the seller as to environmental liability at the site…, and the purchaser’s subsequent efforts to dissuade EPA from taking an enforcement action against the seller.” Id. at 9 n. 17.
Tenants Seeking to Purchase Property They Lease: The non-affiliation analysis in the case of a lease involves examining the potential liability of both the tenant and the landlord. If neither the tenant/purchaser nor the landlord is liable as a PRP, then the lease would not be a prohibited affiliation. If the tenant/purchaser is a PRP, then the tenant/purchaser cannot qualify as a BFPP or CPO. If the landlord is a PRP, then an analysis of the site-specific facts will be required. EPA recommends that before purchasing the property, the tenant contact the appropriate EPA Regional office to resolve the tenant’s liability concerns. The Affiliation Guidance does not change EPA’s previously issued Tenants Guidance. Id. at 10.
(d) there are no practicable alternatives to the project as proposed that would entail less adverse impact on migratory birds.
Existing facilities would have to obtain permits as well, but would have 120 days from adoption of the rules to submit a complete application. They would also be exempt from the provision requiring that practicable alternatives be evaluated.
AES Wind Generation and AES Energy Storage recently announced the commercial operation of AES Laurel Mountain, a wind generation plant comprised of 98 MW of wind generation and 32 MW of integrated battery-based energy storage. The facility is located near Elkins, West Virginia. The project is supplying emissions-free renewable energy and clean, flexible, operating reserve capacity to the PJM Interconnection, the largest power market in the world.
The 32 MW advanced storage project is the largest of its kind. Leveraging advanced battery technology, the storage service provided by AES Energy Storage will help optimize the renewable energy generated. The project provides PJM with regulation service, delivering instantaneous response to grid operator requests for power, helping to match generation and demand. The storage also allows the wind facility to control the ramp rate of its generation, smoothing out fluctuations in minute to minute output. AES Laurel Mountain is among the first wind generators to supply critical operating reserve capacity to help maintain the reliability of the power grid.
AES Laurel Mountain consists of 61 GE 1.6 MW wind turbine generators capable of a combined power generation of 97.6 MW and 32 MW of A123 Systems energy storage devices. The 61 wind turbines are mounted on 80-meter towers deployed along a 13-mile stretch of Laurel Mountain located in Randolph and Barbour counties near Elkins, West Virginia. The facility will supply more than 260,000 MWh of emissions-free, renewable energy each year to the PJM Interconnection.
AES Wind Generation is a wholly owned subsidiary of the AES Corporation. Formed in 2005, AES Wind Generation has 1,900 MW in operation globally, of which nearly 1,400 MW are located throughout the U.S. The Laurel Mountain project is AES Wind Generation’s second wind facility serving the PJM market, following the successful completion of AES Armenia Mountain located in Pennsylvania.
AES Energy Storage, a subsidiary of the AES Corporation, is the owner-operator of advanced storage projects that provide emissions-free capacity to improve the performance and reliability of today’s power grid. Emissions-free capacity is a fast and flexible power system resource, combining patented software, dynamic power control and storage technology.
The AES Corporation is a Fortune 200 global power company, providing energy to 28 countries through a diverse portfolio of distribution businesses as well as thermal and renewable generation facilities.
This article was partially excerpted from publically available information, and was authored by Rick Wilson, Acacia Environmental Group LLC. Any opinions expressed in this article are those solely of the author, and are not intended as legal or professional guidance to any specific readers. For more information on the author see here.
On December 7, 2011, Judge Robert Chambers denied Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and ruled that Clean Water Act (“CWA”) citizen suits against three subsidiaries of Patriot Coal Corporation (Apogee Coal Company, LLC, Catenary Coal Company, LLC, and Hobet Mining, LLC) could proceed in spite of ongoing enforcement actions by the West Virginia Department of Environmental Protection (“DEP”). See OVEC v. Patriot Coal, Case 3:11-cv-00115. Pursuant to the CWA, a citizen suit is precluded where the “State has commenced and is diligently prosecuting a civil or criminal action in a court of the United States, or a State to require compliance with the standard, limitation, or order [that the citizen alleges to have been violated].” 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B). Although Judge Chambers found that DEP had commenced an action in West Virginia state court at the time the citizen suits were filed, he found that they lacked diligence.
In addressing the actions against Catenary and Apogee, the Court referenced its decision from September of this year in Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal., Inc. v. Maple Coal Co., 2011 WL 3874576 (S.D.W. Va. 2011). In Maple, the Court examined enforcement actions DEP brought against Maple Coal in Fayette County Circuit Court. There, the Court noted that DEP would have granted Maple’s request to extend its selenium compliance deadline had EPA not objected to the modification. Id. at 23. According to the Court, DEP’s options to diligently prosecute an enforcement action against Maple consisted of either, (1) agreeing with EPA, acting as though the EQB stays had never been granted, and seeking to enforce the selenium limits from April 5, 2010 when they were scheduled to go into effect; or (2) disagreeing with EPA and requesting relief from the Fayette County court akin to that which DEP had initially planned to grant. The Court characterized DEP’s enforcement action as failing to pursue either of these avenues. Rather, according to the Court, DEP filed a vague complaint that sought neither to enforce the permit as is, inclusive of the selenium limits, nor to enforce the draft permit modification, with a compliance deadline of July 2012.
As in Maple, neither enforcement action appears to seek any enforcement whatsoever with regard selenium. Instead, as in Maple, both actions seek vague relief from the Logan and Boone County Circuit Courts that specifically excludes selenium from the request for immediate relief on the grounds that the selenium limitations are subject to the stay orders of the EQB and the Kanawha County Circuit Court. By acquiescing in the Stay Orders, excluding selenium from their claims for civil penalties on the basis of those Orders, and seeking in State Courts the delays already rejected by the Environmental Protection Agency, the WVDEP is not diligently prosecuting Defendants’ selenium violations. Based on their context, timing, and the relief sought, Court FINDS that these actions, like the one at issue in Maple, are not diligent prosecutions.
OVEC v. Patriot, p. 12.
Next, the Court addressed DEP’s Boone County enforcement action against Hobet for four NPDES permits at its mine in Boone County. The Court had previously addressed the diligent prosecution issue as to the same four Hobet permits in OVEC v. Hobet Mining, LLC, 3:08-cv-0088, 2008 WL 5377799 (“Hobet I”). In Hobet I, although the Court found that the DEP’s prosecution was not diligent at the time the citizen suit was filed, it found that the September 5, 2008 consent decree entered by the Boone County Circuit Court mooted the citizen suit in federal court. Id., at 4-5. That consent decree, however, was modified by the parties in December 2009. The Court addressed the impact of the modified consent decree on a separate NPDES permit in Ohio Valley Envtl Coalition v. Hobet Mining, LLC, 723 F. Supp. 2d 886 (S.D. W.Va. 2010) (“Hobet II”). In Hobet II, the Court found that the amended consent decree was more lenient than the original and was, therefore, not a diligent prosecution. Id., at 906-913. In re-examining the modified consent decree in light of the four permits originally at issue in Hobet I and currently at issue in Patriot, the Court again found that the “regulatory climate for violations of selenium limitations is defined by continued extensions and enforcement actions that, rather than enforcing selenium limits, seek to accomplish in state courts the delays already rejected by the Environmental Protection Agency.” Consequently, the Court ruled that DEP’s ongoing enforcement action against Hobet was not diligent.
The decision in Patriot is yet another in a line of recent opinions demonstrating a willingness of West Virginia’s federal district courts to ignore DEP State Court enforcement actions in favor of allowing environmental groups to bring CWA citizen suits in federal court. Any company entering into a consent decree with the State, who also has potential exposure to a citizen suit in federal court, should be aware of this trend.
The Jewish Journal of Greater L.A.
12/08/2011: Why are climate change sceptics rising in number?
Farrell-Cooper Mining Company, a small mining company in Oklahoma, has sued the U.S. Office of Surface Mining (“OSM”) challenging the issuance of two 10-day notices (“TDN”) to the state involving two of Farrell-Cooper’s state-issued coal mining permits. TDNs are the mechanism by which OSM can initiate oversight over conditions existing on sites permitted by states with OSM-approved programs under the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (“SMCRA”).
SMCRA allows OSM to take direct enforcement action against mine operators in primacy states for violations of performance standards or permit conditions, but only after a state fails to respond “appropriately” to a TDN advising it that OSM believes a violation exists. See 30 U.S.C. §1271(c). In the event a state does not respond appropriately (by taking enforcement action or explaining why no violation exists), the OSM “shall” inspect “the . . . mining operation at which the alleged violation is occurring. . . .” 30 U.S.C. §1271(a)(1). If, as a result of the inspection, OSM finds a violation, it shall issue either a cessation order (if there is imminent harm) or a notice of violation (“NOV”) “to the permittee” fixing a time for abatement of the violation. 30 U.S.C. §1271(a)(2) & (3). Historically, because the statute speaks to “inspections” of “mining operations” and issuance of NOVs “to the permittees,” OSM has generally limited the application of this section of the statute to “on the ground” violations of performance standards. It generally has not used this authority to oversee individual state permit decisions. In fact, when an OSM field office attempted to use its TDN authority to review a state permit decision in West Virginia, former Assistant Interior Secretary Rebecca Watson intervened and informed complaining citizens that OSM did not possess the authority to veto state permit decisions.
In June 2009, however, the Interior Department signed a memorandum of understanding with USEPA and the Corps of Engineers which committed OSM to determine how it could “more effectively conduct oversight of state permitting . . . activities” under SMCRA—polite language for requiring OSM to rescind the Watson letter. By memo of November 15, 2010, OSM Director Pizarchik rejected the rationale of the Watson letter and advised his staff that OSM would henceforth use its TDN oversight authority with respect to “alleged violations of permitting requirements” in addition to violations of performance standards. That memo was subsequently embodied in a draft policy document.
The Farrell-Cooper situation involves a dispute over approximate original contour (“AOC”), where the state-issued permits allowed the company to create last cut lakes at two of its mines. According to the complaint, OSM and the state of Oklahoma formed a team to investigate the legislative history of AOC, and the team issued a report in 1997 approving such techniques. However, in 2010, OSM issued a draft oversight report on AOC and found that the state had not properly implemented its approved program by failing to require mines to be reclaimed to AOC.
In January 2011, OSM issued two TDNs to Oklahoma attacking the Farrell-Cooper permits and reclamation plans for its mines. Farrell-Cooper has since received a notice of violation (“NOV”) from OSM. The complaint will almost certainly be met with the standard governmental defenses that : 1) a TDN is not a final agency action; 2) the operator must exhaust its administrative remedies in appealing the NOVs; and 3) that this is not an attack on the permit, but rather of a failure to meet on-the-ground performance standards.
In a December 6, 2011 address at Duke University, EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson announced that final regulations requiring power plants to limit toxic air emissions will be issued in the next few days.
Jackson noted that more than 40% of the nation’s coal-fired power plants do not currently use pollution controls to limit emissions.
She stated that the rule would obligate coal-fired power plants to obtain “maximum achievable control technology” in order to reduce emissions of air pollutants such as mercury and/or acid gases. She also noted that the rule would be the first regulation limiting the amount of mercury and other air pollutants released from power plants.
The White House is still reviewing the rule, but the EPA is under a court-imposed deadline to issue the final version of the rule by December 16.
This article was authored by Douglas J. Crouse, Jackson Kelly PLLC. For more information on the author see here.
12/02/2011: Climate change is real, but what's the cause?

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