Source: https://ohiocrimlawblog.com/page/2/
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 00:22:35+00:00

Document:
In the Great State of Ohio, including the majority of the State’s in the Union, there is an Implied Consent Law in effect. Ohio Revised Code 4511.191 provides that any person operating a motor vehicle on public or private property, shall be deemed to have given consent to a chemical test if arrested for Operating a Vehicle under the Influence (OVI).
A typical scenario as to when R.C. 4511.191 is where an individual is stopped by law enforcement, arrested for suspicion of OVI, and then charged for OVI. At this point, the individual is in the back of the police cruiser thinking of all the ways he/she just screwed up. Now, prior to asking said individual if he/she is willing to submit to a chemical test, the arresting officer must read to the arrested individual the “Advice to OVI Arrestee” on the back of the BMV 2255 Administrative License Suspension pursuant to R.C. 4511.192.
The long and short of the advice is that if a person refuses to submit to a test they are looking at a 1, 2, 3, or 5 year suspension depending on how many prior chemical test refusals the individual had in the past 6 years. The majority of the time, the OVI charge is a first time charge for the individual and that person is looking at a 1 year license suspension for refusing the chemical test.
Now if the person decides to take the chemical test and fails the chemical test, that license suspension range is from 90 days to 3 years. Once again, the driver’s license suspension range depends on the person’s past record over six years. The majority of the time it is a first time failure of a chemical test bringing about a 90 day suspension.
As you can imagine, by the time a person gets to an OVI attorney, it is usually too late with what to do in regards to either taking or refusing a chemical test. But fear not, because Ohio Law does allow an individual to appeal an Administrative License Suspension. Let’s take a look at Toledo v. Ferguson, 2017-Ohio-1394, for some general background on Administrative License Suspensions and how one of the defenses worked to have the Administrative License Suspension vacated.
After the ALS hearing, the trial court denied the ALS appeal. Soon after, Ferguson filed an appeal with the Sixth District Court of Appeals. On appeal, Ferguson argued that because the police officer failed to comply with R.C. 4511.192. The state, however, argued that because only factors of R.C. 4511.197(C) are to be considered for ALS appeals, noncompliance with R.C. 4511.192 does not result in Ferguson’s ALS being vacated.
R.C. 4511.197(C) provides that the scope of an appeal of an ALS for OVI is limited to determining whether one of the conditions is not met.
4) The offender refused to submit or test results show the offender was driving impaired.
Hold on tight, I am about to dive into some more statutory analysis!
4) That the person may appeal the suspension at the initial appearance or during the period of time ending thirty days after that initial appearance.
R.C. 4511.192(D)(1)(d) and (E) require the arresting officer to, within 48 hours of arrest or citation, send a sworn report to the BMV and trial court.
The above notice requirements protect the licensee’s interest in appealing the ALS at his or her initial appearance. State v. Frame, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 2498 (May 24, 1999); Meadows v. Ohio BMV, 71 Ohio Misc.2d 3.
Based on the above, the appellate court found the BMV 2255 was not filed with the court until May 13, 2016, six days after Ferguson was arrested. This, of course, was not within the 48 hours. Thus, the appellate court held that the arresting officer failed to comply with R.C. 4511.192 by not filing the BMV 2255 form in a timely manner.
So what does this mean for Ferguson? Remember, The state argued that because only factors of R.C. 4511.197(C) are to be considered for ALS appeals, noncompliance with R.C. 4511.192 does not result in Ferguson’s ALS being vacated.
In an evidentiary hearing to determine whether to terminate an ALS, the licensee has the burden of showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the actions of the BMV were taken in error. State v. Williams, 2004-Ohio-2453. For the purposes of an ALS hearing, the officer is acting as an agent of the BMV. State v. Henry, 66 Ohio Misc.2d 57. Thus, any action taken by the officer in error can result in the termination of an ALS. Triguba v. Registrar, 1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 2771 (June 27, 1996).
The state cannot set forth a statutory scheme to suspend a person’s operating privileges, not follow the scheme, and then claim that since such actions are not one of the four issues allowed in an ALS appeal a municipal or county court has no authority to terminate the ALS. Henry. Thus, the licensee is relieved of the burden of proving that one of the R.C. 4511.197(C) conditions had not been met where the BMV fails to present prima facie proof the officer complied with all mandates of R.C. 4511.192. Langen v. Caltrider, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 3828 (Aug. 20, 1999).
The appellate court found that the record revealed that the BMV failed to present prima facie proof of compliance with R.C. 4511.192. Based on the noncompliance, Ferguson should have been relieved of the burden of proving that one of the R.C. 4511.197(C) conditions had not been met. Thus, Ferguson’s ALS was vacated.
Sometimes it is in the very fine details to get that big win!
When it comes to executing warrants, the police don’t mess around. They want to go through everything and be everywhere to find what they are looking for in a house or building. And a catch all, if you will, on a warrant is the house or building’s surrounding curtilage. Basically anything that is surrounding or attached to the house or building. In State v. Nelms, 2017-Ohio-1446, the Second District Court of Appeals took a look at whether or not a motor vehicle can be curtilage if it is parked at a commercial property.
In Nelms, Dayton Police detectives completed a series of undercover buys at various locations, to include a commercial garage. Based on their undercover buys, the detectives were able to obtain a search warrant of the commercial garage and the surrounding curtilage.
On the date of the execution of the warrant, Nelms and two other occupants pulled up to the commercial garage and went into the building. After the Nelms and the other men went into the building, the Dayton Police detectives executed their search warrant. During the search of the building, one of the detectives ordered the search of Nelms’ vehicle because it was on the property’s surrounding curtilage.
Nelms was arrested and indicted on one count of possession of heroin, one count of possession of cocaine, and one count of possession of marijuana. Nelms moved to have the evidence found during the search of his vehicle suppressed, arguing that the search was beyond the scope of the warrant. The trial court overruled Nelms’ motion and Nelms’ appealed.
Curtilage – the area immediately adjacent to a home which an individual reasonably expects is private – is regarded as part of the home itself for Fourth Amendment purposes. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170. The Fourth Amendment applies to commercial premises, and extends to areas that can be equated with the curtilage of a private home. State v. Trammel, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 17196, 1999 WL 22884 (Jan. 22, 1999). This area can include the grounds surrounding the premises, if the premises fit within the traditional Fourth Amendment analysis, i.e., the area is one in which the owner has a reasonable expectation of privacy. Id.
Surrounding curtilage is used in the warrant simply to describe the area around the building. Id. In search warrants, curtilage has been used to designate the area surrounding a commercial property, whether that area be a parking lot or fenced area. Id.
Although police may be lawfully on the premises with a valid search warrant, the search is limited to those areas which may reasonably contain the items listed in the warrant. State v. Halczyszak, 25 Ohio St.3d 301. Any container found on the premises may be searched if it could contain the object of the search. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798. Ohio appellate courts have recognized that such a warrant (authorizing the search of curtilage) extends to permit search of motor vehicles located within the curtilage of the premises. State v. Ballez, 2010-Ohio-4720. The assumption seems to be that a vehicle should be viewed in the same way as any other personal effects found on the described premises. Id.
Federal circuit courts have held that a premises search warrant also covers a vehicle that appears to be owned or controlled by the premises owner. See United States v. Gottschalk, 915 F.2d 1459; United States v. Patterson, 278 F.3d 315. In cases of warrantless searches on motor vehicles there is no distinction among packages or containers based on ownership. Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295. If there is probable cause to search the vehicle, police may inspect passengers’ belongings found in the car that are capable of concealing the object of the search. Id.
Based on the above, the appellate court found that if there is probable cause to search commercial premises – which is the basis on which a warrant for the premises would issue – a vehicle found on the premises may be searched if police officers have reason to believe that the vehicle is associated with the premises.
With that, the appellate court held that Nelms’ vehicle was covered by the search warrant and upheld the trial court’s ruling.
Tough break for Nelms! But a very interesting argument to say the least!

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