Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/495/33/
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 08:11:23+00:00

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similarly styled petitions by other parties seeking to intervene, and issued its mandate. One of the would-be intervenors filed with this Court an application for extension of time to file a petition for certiorari 78 days after the issuance of the order denying rehearing and 134 days after the entry of the Court of Appeals' judgment. The application was returned as untimely pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2101(c) --which requires that a civil certiorari petition be filed within 90 days after the entry of the judgment below, and that any application for an extension of time be filed within the original 90-day period -- since, while the filing of a "petition for rehearing" under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 40 tolls the running of the 90-day period, the filing of a "suggestion for rehearing in banc" under Rule 35 does not. On January 10, 1989, the Clerk of the Court of Appeals issued an amended order, recalling the October 14 mandate and entering nunc pro tunc, effective October 14, an order denying the three "petitions for rehearing with suggestions for rehearing en banc." The State filed a petition for certiorari within 90 days of the October 14, 1988, order, which was granted, limited to the question of the property tax increase.
1. The State's certiorari petition was timely filed. The Court of Appeals appears to have interpreted and actually treated the State's papers as including a petition for rehearing before the panel. Had it regarded the State's papers as only a suggestion for rehearing in banc, without a petition for rehearing, it would have, as required by Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 35(c) and 41(a), issued its mandate within 21 days of the entry of the panel's judgment or would have, under Rule 41(a), issued an order extending the time for the issuance of the mandate. Although this Court of Appeals may not on every occasion have observed these technicalities, it cannot be concluded that the court has engaged in a systematic practice of ignoring them. Although a court cannot, post hoc, amend an order to make it appear that it took an action which it never took, the Court of Appeals actually amended its order to reflect the reality of the action taken on October 14, at which time it had entered an order denying the "petitions for rehearing en banc" because this was the manner in which the papers filed with the court had been styled. While the court below, unlike other Courts of Appeals, does not have a published practice of treating all suggestions for rehearing in banc as containing both petitions for rehearing and suggestions for rehearing in banc, this Court will not assume that the court's action in this case is not in accord with its regular practice. Pp. 495 U. S. 45-50.
fact, had the very alternative outlined by the Court of Appeals. Authorizing and directing local government institutions to devise and implement remedies not only protects the function of those institutions but, to the extent possible, also places the responsibility for solutions to the problems of segregation upon those who have themselves created the problems. While a district court should not grant local government carte blanche, local officials should at least have the opportunity to devise their own solutions to such problems. Here, KCMSD was ready, willing, and, but for the operation of state law, able to remedy the deprivation of constitutional rights itself. Pp. 495 U. S. 50-52.
3. The Court of Appeals' modifications of the District Court's order satisfy equitable and constitutional principles governing the District Court's power. Pp. 495 U. S. 52-58.
(a) This Court accepts the Court of Appeals' conclusion that the District Court's remedy was proper. The State's argument that the funding ordered by the District Court violates the principles of equity and comity because the remedial order itself was excessive aims at the scope of the remedy, rather than the manner in which the remedy is to be funded, and thus falls outside this Court's limited grant of certiorari. Pp. 495 U. S. 53.
(b) Under the circumstances of this case, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that KCMSD should be responsible for funding its share of the remedy. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U. S. 267, did not hold that a district court could never set aside state laws preventing local governments from raising funds sufficient to satisfy their constitutional obligations just because those funds could also be obtained from the States. To the contrary, § 1983 is authority enough to require each tortfeasor to pay its share of the cost of a remedy if it can, and apportionment of the cost is part of the District Court's equitable powers. Here, the court believed that the Court of Appeals had ordered it to allocate the costs between the two entities. Had the court chosen, as the State argues, to allow the monetary obligations that KCMSD could not meet to fall on the State rather than interfere with state law to permit KCMSD to meet them, the implementation of the order might have been delayed if the State resisted efforts by KCMSD to obtain contribution. Pp. 495 U. S. 53-54.
(c) The modifications are not invalid under the Tenth Amendment, since that Amendment's reservation of nondelegated powers to the States is not implicated by a federal court judgment enforcing the express prohibitions of unlawful state conduct enacted by the Fourteenth Amendment. P. 495 U. S. 55.
its own taxes. See, e.g., Griffin v. Prince Edward County School Bd., 377 U. S. 218, 377 U. S. 233. The State's argument that federal courts cannot set aside state-imposed limitations on local taxing authority because that requires local governments to do more than exercise the power that is theirs has been rejected, Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 4 Wall. 535, and fails to take account of local governments' obligations, under the Supremacy Clause, to fulfill the requirements that the Constitution imposes on them. Pp. 495 U. S. 55-59.
WHITE, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court with respect to Part II, and the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, III, and IV, in which BRENNAN, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, and STEVENS, JJ., joined. KENNEDY, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., and O'CONNOR and SCALIA, JJ., joined, post, p. 495 U. S. 58.
§ 22(a); Mo.Rev.Stat. § 137.073.2 (1986). The Hancock Amendment thus prevents KCMSD from obtaining any revenue increase as a result of increases in the assessed valuation of real property. "Proposition C" allocates one cent of every dollar raised by the state sales tax to a schools trust fund, and requires school districts to reduce property taxes by an amount equal to 50% of the previous year's sales tax receipts in the district. Mo.Rev.Stat. § 164.013.1 (Supp.1988). However, the trust fund is allocated according to a formula that does not compensate KCMSD for the amount lost in property tax revenues, and the effect of Proposition C is to divert nearly half of the sales taxes collected in KCMSD to other parts of the State.
of "magnet schools" to promote desegregation. [Footnote 6] Jenkins v. Missouri, 639 F.Supp. at 34-35. A year later, the District Court approved KCMSD's proposal to operate six magnet schools during the 1986-1987 school year. [Footnote 7] The court again faced the problem of funding, for KCMSD's efforts to persuade the voters to approve a tax increase had failed, as had its efforts to seek funds from the Kansas City Council and the state legislature. Again hesitating to impose a tax increase itself, the court continued its injunction against the Proposition C rollback to enable KCMSD to raise an additional $6,500,000. App. 138-142.
who starts the fire has more responsibility for the damages caused than the person who fails to put it out,'" id. at 111a, and that apportionment of damages between the State and KCMSD according to fault was supported by the doctrine of comparative fault in tort, which had been adopted by the Missouri Supreme Court in Gustafson v. Benda, 661 S.W.2d 11 (1983). The District Court then held that the State and KCMSD were 75% and 25% at fault, respectively, and ordered them to share the cost of the desegregation remedy in that proportion. To ensure complete funding of the remedy, the court also held the two tortfeasors jointly and severally liable for the cost of the plan. App. to Pet. for Cert. 113a.
"United States Supreme Court has stated that a tax may be increased if 'necessary to raise funds adequate to . . . operate and maintain without racial discrimination a public school system,'"
million in capital improvement bonds. Id. at 413. A subsequent order directed that the revenues generated by the property tax increase be used to retire the capital improvement bonds. App. to Pet. for Cert. 63a.
Turning to the property tax increase, the Court of Appeals rejected the State's argument that a federal court lacks the judicial power to order a tax increase. The Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court that Griffin v. Prince Edward County School Bd., supra, 377 U.S. at 377 U. S. 233, had established the District Court's authority to order county officials to levy taxes. [Footnote 9] Accepting also the District Court's conclusion that state law prevented KCMSD from raising funds sufficient to implement the desegregation remedy, the Court of Appeals held that such state law limitations must fall to the command of the Constitution. 855 F.2d at 1313.
On December 31, 1988, 78 days after the issuance of the order denying rehearing and 134 days after the entry of the Court of Appeals' judgment, Jackson County presented to this Court an application for extension of time in which to file a petition for certiorari. [Footnote 12] The Clerk of this Court returned the application to Jackson County as untimely. App. 503. According to the Clerk, the 90-day period in which Jackson County could petition for certiorari began to run on August 19, 1988, and expired on November 17, 1988. The Clerk informed Jackson County that, although the timely filing of a "petition for rehearing" with the Court of Appeals tolls the running of the 90-day period, the filing of a "petition for rehearing en banc" does not toll the time.
"This Court's mandate which was issued on October 14, 1988, is hereby recalled."
"There are three (3) petitions for rehearing with suggestions for rehearing en banc pending before the Court. It is hereby ordered that the petitions for rehearing and the petitions for rehearing with suggestions for rehearing en banc are denied."
"This order is entered nunc pro tunc effective October 14, 1988. The Court's mandate shall now issue forthwith."
Id. at 513 (emphasis added).
"[a] timely petition for rehearing . . . operates to suspend the finality of the . . . court's judgment, pending the court's further determination whether the judgment should be modified so as to alter its adjudication of the rights of the parties."
Id. at 317 U. S. 266. To put the matter another way, while the petition for rehearing is pending, there is no "judgment" to be reviewed. Cf. Zimmern v. United States, 298 U. S. 167, 298 U. S. 169 (1936); Leishman v. Associated Wholesale Electric Co., 318 U. S. 203, 318 U. S. 205 (1943).
this case, the State styled its filing as a "Petition for Rehearing En Banc." [Footnote 15] There is technically no provision for the filing of a "Petition for Rehearing En Banc" in the Rules of Appellate Procedure. A party may petition for rehearing before the panel under Rule 40, file a suggestion for a rehearing in banc under Rule 35, or do both, separately or together. The State's filing on its face did not exactly comport with any of these options. If the filing was no more than a suggestion for rehearing in banc, as respondents insist, the petition for certiorari was untimely. But if, as the State argues, its papers qualified for treatment as a petition for rehearing within the meaning of Rule 40 as well as a suggestion for rehearing in banc under Rule 35, the 90-day period for seeking certiorari began on October 14, 1988, and the State's petition for certiorari was timely filed.
papers as only a suggestion for rehearing in banc, without a petition for panel rehearing as well, Rules 35(c) and 41(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure would have required the court to issue its mandate within 21 days of the entry of the panel's judgment. [Footnote 17] The Court of Appeals did not issue the mandate within 21 days of the panel's judgment, but issued it only upon its October 14 order denying the State's petition. Nor did the Court of Appeals issue an order extending the time for the issuance of the mandate as it may do under Rule 41(a).
because, under Rule 41(a), it must do so when a petition for panel rehearing is pending.
more than we do about the meaning of its orders, and we accept its action for what it purports to be.
We turn to the tax increase imposed by the District Court. The State urges us to hold that the tax increase violated Article III, the Tenth Amendment, and principles of federal/state comity. We find it unnecessary to reach the difficult constitutional issues, for we agree with the State that the tax increase contravened the principles of comity that must govern the exercise of the District Court's equitable discretion in this area.
It is accepted by all the parties, as it was by the courts below, that the imposition of a tax increase by a federal court was an extraordinary event. In assuming for itself the fundamental and delicate power of taxation, the District Court not only intruded on local authority but circumvented it altogether. Before taking such a drastic step, the District Court was obliged to assure itself that no permissible alternative would have accomplished the required task. We have emphasized that, although the "remedial powers of an equity court must be adequate to the task, . . . they are not unlimited," Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U. S. 124, 403 U. S. 161 (1971), and one of the most important considerations governing the exercise of equitable power is a proper respect for the integrity and function of local government institutions. Especially is this true where, as here, those institutions are ready, willing, and -- but for the operation of state law curtailing their powers -- able to remedy the deprivation of constitutional rights themselves.
The District Court believed that it had no alternative to imposing a tax increase. But there was an alternative, the very one outlined by the Court of Appeals: it could have authorized or required KCMSD to levy property taxes at a rate adequate to fund the desegregation remedy, and could have enjoined the operation of state laws that would have prevented KCMSD from exercising this power. 855 F.2d at 1314; see infra at 495 U. S. 52. The difference between the two approaches is far more than a matter of form. Authorizing and directing local government institutions to devise and implement remedies not only protects the function of those institutions but, to the extent possible, also places the responsibility for solutions to the problems of segregation upon those who have themselves created the problems.
"[t]he very complexity of the problems of financing and managing a . . . public school system suggests that 'there will be more than one constitutionally permissible method of solving them,' and that . . . 'the legislature's efforts to tackle the problems' should be entitled to respect."
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1, 411 U. S. 42 (1973) (quoting Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U. S. 535, 406 U. S. 546-547 (1972)). By no means should a district court grant local government carte blanche, cf. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Education, 402 U. S. 1 (1971), but local officials should at least have the opportunity to devise their own solutions to these problems. Cf. Sixty-Seventh Minnesota State Senate v. Beens, 406 U. S. 187 (1972) (per curiam).
The District Court therefore abused its discretion in imposing the tax itself. The Court of Appeals should not have allowed the tax increase to stand, and should have reversed the District Court in this respect. See Langnes v. Green, 282 U. S. 531, 282 U. S. 541-542 (1931).
"[t]he only reason that the court below needed to consider an unprecedented tax increase was the equally unprecedented cost of its remedial programs."
Brief for Petitioners 42. We think this argument aims at the scope of the remedy, rather than the manner in which the remedy is to be funded, and thus falls outside our limited grant of certiorari in this case. As we denied certiorari on the first question presented by the State's petition, which did challenge the scope of the remedial order, we must resist the State's efforts to argue that point now. We accept, without approving or disapproving, the Court of Appeals' conclusion that the District Court's remedy was proper. See Cone v. West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co., 330 U. S. 212, 330 U. S. 215 (1947).
could not meet to fall on the State rather than interfere with state law to permit KCMSD to meet them. [Footnote 19] Under the circumstances of this case, we cannot say it was an abuse of discretion for the District Court to rule that KCMSD should be responsible for funding its share of the remedy. The State strenuously opposed efforts by respondents to make it responsible for the cost of implementing the order, and had secured a reversal of the District Court's earlier decision placing on it all of the cost of substantial portions of the order. See 807 F.2d at 684-685. The District Court declined to require the State to pay for KCMSD's obligations because it believed that the Court of Appeals had ordered it to allocate the costs between the two governmental entities. See 672 F.Supp. at 411. Furthermore, if the District Court had chosen the route now suggested by the State, implementation of the remedial order might have been delayed if the State resisted efforts by KCMSD to obtain contribution.
"[t]he District Court . . . neither attempted to restructure local governmental entities nor . . . mandat[ed] a particular method or structure of state or local financing."
But we did not there state that a District Court could never set aside state laws preventing local governments from raising funds sufficient to satisfy their constitutional obligations just because those funds could also be obtained from the States. To the contrary, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982 ed.), on which respondents' complaint is based, is authority enough to require each tortfeasor to pay its share of the cost of the remedy if it can, and apportionment of the cost is part of the equitable power of the District Court. Cf. Milliken v. Bradley, supra, at 433 U. S. 289-290.
"The Tenth Amendment's reservation of nondelegated powers to the States is not implicated by a federal court judgment enforcing the express prohibitions of unlawful state conduct enacted by the Fourteenth Amendment."
Id. at 433 U. S. 291. "The Fourteenth Amendment . . . was avowedly directed against the power of the States," Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U. S. 1, 491 U. S. 42 (1989) (SCALIA, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), and so permits a federal court to disestablish local government institutions that interfere with its commands. Cf. New York City Bd of Estimate v. Morris, 489 U. S. 688 (1989); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, 377 U. S. 585 (1964).
"require the [County] Supervisors to exercise the power that is theirs to levy taxes to raise funds adequate to reopen, operate, and maintain without racial discrimination a public school system. . . ."
coupons then due. The City defended, based on a state statute that limited its power of taxation, and the Circuit Court refused to mandamus the City. This Court reversed, observing that the statute relied on by the City was passed after the bonds were issued, and holding that, because the City had ample authority to levy taxes to pay its bonds when they were issued, the statute impaired the contractual entitlements of the bondholders contrary to Art. I, § 10, cl. 1 of the Constitution, under which a State may not pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts. The statutory limitation, therefore, could be disregarded, and the City ordered to levy the necessary taxes to pay its bonds.
"if a state-imposed limitation on a school authority's discretion operates to inhibit or obstruct the operation of a unitary school system or impede the disestablishing of a dual school system, it must fall; state policy must give way when it operates to hinder vindication of federal constitutional guarantees."
This litigation has come to us once before, on the collateral issue of attorney's fees. Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U. S. 274 (1989).
As we discuss infra at 495 U. S. 45, 28 U.S.C. § 2101(c) (1982 ed.) requires that a petition for certiorari in a civil case be filed within 90 days after the entry of the judgment sought to be reviewed. Section 2101(c) also permits a Justice of this Court, "for good cause shown," to grant an extension of time for the filing of a petition for certiorari in a civil case for a period not exceeding 60 days. In civil cases, applications for extension of time must be presented during the original 90-day period. This Court's Rule 30.2.
"[I]f a petition for rehearing is timely filed in the lower court by any party in the case, the time for filing the petition for a writ of certiorari . . . runs from the date of the denial of the petition for rehearing or the entry of a subsequent judgment. A suggestion made to a United States court of appeals for a rehearing in banc . . . is not a petition for rehearing within the meaning of this Rule."
The practice does not extend to petitions for rehearing seeking only to correct a formal defect in the judgment or opinion of the lower court. In such cases, of which Pink was one, "no . . . alteration of the rights [is] asked, and the finality of the court's first order [is] never suspended." 317 U.S. at 317 U. S. 266. See also FTC v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Co., 344 U. S. 206 (1952).
"[A] party who desires a hearing or rehearing in banc may 'suggest' the appropriateness of such a hearing. . . . The term 'suggest' was deliberately chosen to make it clear that a party's sole entitlement is to direct the attention of the court to the desirability of in banc consideration. A suggestion is neither a petition nor a motion; consequently, it requires no disposition by the court."
Ward, The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, 28 Federal B.J. 100, 110-111 (1968); see also Moody v. Albemarle Paper Co., 417 U. S. 622, 417 U. S. 625 (1974) (per curiam); Shenker v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 374 U. S. 1, 374 U. S. 5 (1963); Western Pacific R. Corp. v. Western Pacific R. Co., 345 U. S. 247, 345 U. S. 258-259 (1953). Consequently, Rule 35(c) specifically provides that the filing of a suggestion for rehearing in banc, unlike a petition for rehearing, "shall not affect the finality of the judgment of the court of appeals or stay the issuance of the mandate."
"approve a property tax levy rate for 1989 at a later date when financial calculations for the 1989-1990 school year are clear and submit the proposed levy rate to the Court for approval at that time."
The old cases recognized two exceptions to this rule, neither of which is relevant here. First, it was held that federal courts could not, by writ of mandamus, compel state officers to release funds in the state treasury sufficient to satisfy state bond obligations. The Court viewed this attempt to employ the writ of mandamus as a ruse to avoid the Eleventh Amendment's bar against exercising federal jurisdiction over the State. See Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U. S. 711, 107 U. S. 720-721 (1883). This holding has no application to this case, for the Eleventh Amendment does not bar federal courts from imposing on the States the costs of securing prospective compliance with a desegregation order, Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U. S. 267, 433 U. S. 290 (1977), and does not afford local school boards like KCMSD immunity from suit, Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd of Education v. Doyle, 429 U. S. 274, 429 U. S. 280-281 (1977). Second, it was held that the writ of mandamus would not lie to compel the collection of taxes when there was no person against whom the writ could operate. See Meriwether v. Garrett, 102 U. S. 472, 102 U. S. 501 (1880); id. at 102 U. S. 515 (Field, J., concurring in judgment) ("[W]hen the law is gone, and the office of the collector abolished, there is nothing upon which the courts can act"); cf. Wolff v. New Orleans, 103 U. S. 358, 103 U. S. 368 (1880) (distinguishing Meriwether, supra,). This exception also has no application to this case, where there are state and local officials invested with authority to collect and disburse the property tax and where, as matters now stand, the District Court need only prevent those officials from applying state law that would interfere with the willing levy of property taxes by KCMSD.
United States v. County of Macon, 99 U. S. 582 (1879), held that mandamus would not lie to force a local government to levy taxes in excess of the limits contained in a statute in effect at the time the City incurred its bonded indebtedness, for the explicit limitation on the taxing power became part of the contract, the bondholders had notice of the limitation and were deemed to have consented to it, and hence no contractual remedy was unconstitutionally impaired by observing the statute. County of Macon has little relevance to the present case, for KCMSD's obligation to fund the desegregation remedy arises from its operation of a segregated school system in violation of the Constitution, not from a contract between KCMSD and respondents.
fundamental precepts for the democratic control of public institutions. I cannot acquiesce in the majority's statements on this point, and, should there arise an actual dispute over the collection of taxes as here contemplated in a case that is not, like this one, premature, we should not confirm the outcome of premises adopted with so little constitutional justification. The Court's statements, in my view, cannot be seen as necessary for its judgment, or as precedent for the future, and I cannot join Parts III and IV of the Court's opinion.
often used to encourage voluntary movement of students within the district in a pattern that aids desegregation.
"every senior high school, every middle school, and approximately one-half of the elementary schools in the KCMSD will become magnet schools by the school year 1991-92."
"long-term goal of this Court's remedial order is to make available to all KCMSD students educational opportunities equal to or greater than those presently available in the average Kansas City, Missouri metropolitan suburban school district."
visual attractiveness sought by the Court, as it would result in floor coverings with unsightly sections of mismatched carpeting and tile, and individual walls possessing different shades of paint."
"The remedies ordered go far beyond anything previously seen in a school desegregation case. The sheer immensity of the programs encompassed by the district court's order -- the large number of magnet schools and the quantity of capital renovations and new construction -- are concededly without parallel in any other school district in the country."
School Dist. v. Evans, 447 U.S. 916 (1980). The Sixth Circuit, in a somewhat different context, has recognized the severe intrusion caused by federal court interference in state and local financing. Kelley v. Metropolitan County Bd. of Education of Nashville and Davidson County, Tenn., 836 F.2d 986 (1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1206 (1988).
For reasons explained below, I agree with the Court that the Eighth Circuit's judgment affirming the District Court's direct levy of a property tax must be reversed. I cannot agree, however, that we "stand on different ground when we review the modifications to the District Court's order made by the Court of Appeals," ante at 495 U. S. 52. At the outset, it must be noted that the Court of Appeals made no "modifications" to the District Court's order. Rather, it affirmed "the actions that the court has taken to this point." 855 F.2d at 1314. It is true that the Court of Appeals went on "to consider the procedures which the district court should use in the future." Ibid. (emphasis added). But the Court of Appeals' entire discussion of "a preferable method for future funding," ibid., can be considered no more than dictum, the court itself having already upheld the District Court's actions to date. No other order of the District Court was before the Court of Appeals.
Appeals "did not require the District Court to reverse the tax increase that it had imposed for prior fiscal years," it "required the District Court to use the less obtrusive procedures beginning with the fiscal year commencing after the remand." Ante at 495 U. S. 52-53, n. 18. But no such distinction is found in the Court of Appeals' opinion. Rather, the court "affirm[ed] the actions that the [district] court has taken to this point," which included the District Court's October 27, 1987, order increasing property taxes in the KCMSD through the end of fiscal year 1991-1992. The District Court's January 3, 1989 order does not support, but refutes, the Court's characterization. The District Court rejected a request by the KCMSD to increase the property tax rate using the method endorsed by the Eighth Circuit from $4.00 to $4.23 per $100 of assessed valuation. The District Court reasoned that an increase in 1988 property taxes would be difficult to administer and cause resentment among taxpayers, and that an increase in 1989 property taxes would be premature because it was not yet known whether an increase would be necessary to fund expenditures. App. 511-512. In rejecting the KCMSD's request, the District Court left in effect the $4.00 rate it had established in its October 27, 1987, order.
"[p]roperty taxes and other local taxes may not be increased above the limitations specified herein without direct voter approval as provided by this constitution."
place in the KCMSD without a federal court order. It makes no difference that the KCMSD stands "ready, willing, and . . . able" to impose a tax not authorized by state law. Ante at 495 U. S. 51. Whatever taxing power the KCMSD may exercise outside the boundaries of state law would derive from the federal court. The Court never confronts the judicial authority to issue an order for this purpose. Absent a change in state law, the tax is imposed by federal authority under a federal decree. The question is whether a district court possesses a power to tax under federal law, either directly or through delegation to the KCMSD.
"[t]he judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish."
"The judiciary . . . has no influence over either the sword or the purse, no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the society, and can take no active resolution whatever."
"The effect of the Court's remand was to direct the District Court to decree a valid tax for the invalid one which the State had attempted to exact. The District Court has no power so to decree. Federal courts may not assess or levy taxes. Only the appropriate taxing officials of Grant County may assess and levy taxes on these leaseholds, and the federal courts may determine, within their jurisdiction, only whether the tax levied by those officials is or is not a valid one."
Id. at 365 U. S. 752.
"rights are protected in the only way that they can be in a complex society, by their power, immediate or remote, over those who make the rule."
Bi-Metallic Co. v. Colorado State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U. S. 441, 239 U. S. 445 (1915). The citizens who are taxed are given notice and a hearing through their representatives, whose power is a direct manifestation of the citizens' consent. A true exercise of judicial power provides due process of another sort. Where money is extracted from parties by a court's judgment, the adjudication itself provides the notice and opportunity to be heard that due process demands before a citizen may be deprived of property.
the legislature, even an administrative agency to which the legislature has delegated taxing authority, due process requires notice to the citizens to be taxed and some opportunity to be heard. See, e.g., Londoner v. Denver, 210 U. S. 373, 210 U. S. 385-386 (1908). The citizens whose tax bills would have been doubled under the District Court's direct tax order would not have had these protections. The taxes were imposed by a District Court that was not "representative" in any sense, and the individual citizens of the KCMSD whose property (they later learned) was at stake were neither served with process nor heard in court. The method of taxation endorsed by today's dicta suffers the same flaw, for a district court order that overrides the citizens' state law protection against taxation without referendum approval can in no sense provide representational due process. No one suggests the KCMSD taxpayers are parties.
"[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives. . . ."
(Emphasis added.) The list of legislative powers in Article I, § 8, cl. 1 begins with the statement that "[t]he Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes. . . . " As we have said, "[t]axation is a legislative function, and Congress . . . is the sole organ for levying taxes." National Cable Television Assn. Inc. v. United States, 415 U. S. 336, 415 U. S. 340 (1974) (citing Article I, § 8, cl. 1).
judicial power. And the important effects of the taxation order discussed here raise additional federalism concerns that counsel against the Court's analysis.
"neither attempted to restructure local governmental entities nor to mandate a particular method or structure of state or local financing."
433 U.S. at 433 U. S. 291. No such assurances emerge from today's decision, which endorses federal court intrusion into these precise matters. Our statement in a case decided more than 100 years ago should apply here.
"This power to impose burdens and raise money is the highest attribute of sovereignty, and is exercised, first, to raise money for public purposes only; and, second, by the power of legislative authority only. It is a power that has not been extended to the judiciary. Especially is it beyond the power of the Federal judiciary to assume the place of a State in the exercise of this authority at once so delicate and so important."
Rees v. City of Watertown, 19 Wall. 107, 86 U. S. 116-117 (1874).
which can be taken from them at the Will of others, who cannot know what Taxes such people can bear, or the easiest Mode of raising them; and who are not under that Restraint, which is the greatest Security against a burthensome Taxation, when the Representatives themselves must be affected by every tax imposed on the People."
which to guide or review them. On this questionable basis, the Court today would give authority for decisions that affect the life plans of local citizens, the revenue available for competing public needs, and the health of the local economy.
The function of hiring and supervising a staff for what is essentially a political function has other complications. As part of its remedial order, for example, the District Court ordered the hiring of a "public information specialist," at a cost of $30,000. The purpose of the position was to "solicit community support and involvement" in the District Court's desegregation plan. See id. at 191a. This type of order raises a substantial question whether a district court may extract taxes from citizens who have no right of representation and then use the funds for expression with which the citizens may disagree. Cf. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Education, 431 U. S. 209 (1977).
power that is theirs to levy taxes to raise funds adequate to reopen, operate, and maintain without racial discrimination a public school system."
Id. at 377 U. S. 233 (emphasis added). There is no occasion in this case to discuss the full implications of Griffin's observation, for it has no application here. Griffin endorsed the power of a federal court to order the local authority to exercise existing authority to tax.
This case does not involve an order to a local government with plenary taxing power to impose a tax, or an order directed at one whose taxing power has been limited by a state law enacted in order to thwart a federal court order. An order of this type would find support in the Griffin dicta, and present a closer question than the one before us. Yet that order might implicate as well the "perversion of the normal legislative process" that we have found troubling in other contexts. See Spallone v. United States, 493 U. S. 265, 493 U. S. 280 (1990). A legislative vote taken under judicial compulsion blurs lines of accountability by making it appear that a decision was reached by elected representatives when the reality is otherwise. For this reason, it is difficult to see the difference between an order to tax and direct judicial imposition of a tax.
rights or confer new powers. All we can do is to bring existing powers into operation").
The Court cites a single case, Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 4 Wall. 535 (1867), for the proposition that a federal court may set aside state taxation limits that interfere with the remedy sought by the district court. But the Court does not heed Von Hoffman's holding. There a municipality had authorized a tax levy in support of a specific bond obligation, but later limited the taxation authority in a way that impaired the bond obligation. The Court held the subsequent limitation itself unconstitutional, a violation of the Contracts Clause. Once the limitation was held invalid, the original specific grant of authority remained. There is no allegation here, nor could there be, that the neutral tax limitations imposed by the people of Missouri are unconstitutional. Compare Tr. of Oral Arg. 41 ("nothing in the record to suggest" that tax limitation was intended to frustrate desegregation) with Griffin, 377 U.S. at 377 U. S. 221 (state constitution amended as part of state and school district plan to resist desegregation). The majority appears to concede that the Missouri tax law does not violate a specific provision of the Constitution, stating instead that state laws may be disregarded on the basis of a vague "reason based in the Constitution." Ante at 495 U. S. 57. But this broad suggestion does not follow from the holding in Von Hoffman.
in order to fund a state bond obligation); Board of Commissioners of Knox County v. Aspinwall, 24 How. 376 (1861) (state statute gave tax officials authority to levy the tax needed to satisfy a bond obligation and explicitly required them to do so; mandamus was proper to compel performance of this "plain duty" under state law). These common law mandamus decisions do not purport to involve the Federal Constitution or remedial powers.
A second set of cases, including the Von Hoffman case relied upon by the Court, invalidates on Contracts Clause grounds statutory limitations on taxation power passed subsequent to grants of tax authority in support of bond obligations. See Louisiana ex rel. Hubert v. Mayor and Council Of New Orleans, 215 U. S. 170 (1909) (state law authorized municipal tax in support of bond obligation; subsequent legislation removing the authority is invalid under Contracts Clause, and mandamus will lie against municipal official to collect the tax); Graham v. Folsom, 200 U. S. 248 (1906) (where state municipality enters into a bond obligation based on delegated state power to collect a tax, State may not by subsequent abolition of the municipality remove the taxing power; such an act is itself invalid as a violation of the Contracts Clause); Wolff v. New Orleans, 103 U. S. 358 (1880) (same). These cases, like Von Hoffman, are inapposite because there is no colorable argument that the provision of the Missouri Constitution limiting property tax assessments itself violates the Federal Constitution.
had resigned their office, no one remained on whom the mandamus could operate). In Heine, the Court held that it had no equitable power to impose a tax in order to prevent the plaintiff's right from going without a remedy.
"The power we are here asked to exercise is the very delicate one of taxation. This power belongs in this country to the legislative sovereignty, State or National. . . . It certainly is not vested, as in the exercise of an original jurisdiction, in any Federal court. It is unreasonable to suppose that the legislature would ever select a Federal court for that purpose. It is not only not one of the inherent powers of the court to levy and collect taxes, but it is an invasion by the judiciary of the Federal government of the legislative functions of the State government. It is a most extraordinary request, and a compliance with it would involve consequences no less out of the way of judicial procedure, the end of which no wisdom can foresee."
Id. at 86 U. S. 660-661. Other cases state more broadly that, absent state authority for a tax levy, the exercise of which may be compelled by mandamus, the federal court is without power to impose any tax. See Meriwether v. Garrett, 102 U. S. 472 (1880) (where State repealed municipal charter, federal court had no authority to impose taxes, which may be collected only under authority from the legislature); id. at 102 U. S. 515 (Field, J., concurring in judgment) ("The levying of taxes is not a judicial act. It has no elements of one"); United States v. County of Macon, 99 U. S. 582 (1879) (no authority to compel a levy higher than state law allowed outside situation where a subsequent limitation violated Contracts Clause); Rees v. City of Watertown, 19 Wall. 107 (1874) (holding mandamus unavailable where officials have resigned, and that tax limitation in effect when bond obligation was undertaken may not be exceeded by court order).
With all respect, it is this third group of cases that applies. The majority would limit these authorities to a narrow "exceptio[n]"
for cases where local officers resigned. Ante at 495 U. S. 56, n. 20. This is not an accurate description. Rather, the cases show that, where a limitation on the local authority's taxing power is not a subsequent enactment itself in violation of the Contracts Clause, a federal court is without power to order a tax levy that goes beyond the authority granted by state law. The Court states that the KCMSD was "invested with authority to collect and disburse the property tax." Ibid. Invested by whom? It is plain that the KCMSD had no such power under state law. That being so, the authority to levy a higher tax would have to come from the federal court. The very cases cited by the majority show that a federal court has no such authority.
nor the record support this view. In fact, the taxation power is sought here on behalf of a remedial order unlike any before seen.
It cannot be contended that interdistrict comparability, which was the ultimate goal of the District Court's orders, is itself a constitutional command. We have long since determined that "unequal expenditures between children who happen to reside in different districts" do not violate the Equal Protection Clause. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1, 411 U. S. 54-55 (1973). The District Court in this case found, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, that there was no interdistrict constitutional violation that would support mandatory interdistrict relief. See Jenkins v. Missouri, 807 F.2d 657 (CA8 1986). Instead, the District Court's conclusion that desegregation might be easier if more nonminority students could be attracted into the KCMSD was used as the hook on which to hang numerous policy choices about improving the quality of education in general within the KCMSD. The State's complaint that this suit represents the attempt of a school district that could not obtain public support for increased spending to enlist the District Court to finance its educational policy cannot be dismissed out of hand. The plaintiffs and KCMSD might well be seen as parties that have "joined forces apparently for the purpose of extracting funds from the state treasury." Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. at 433 U. S. 293 (Powell, J., concurring in judgment).
(1974) (invalidating interdistrict remedial plan). District Courts can and must take needed steps to eliminate racial discrimination and ensure the operation of unitary school systems. But it is discrimination, not the ineptitude of educators or the indifference of the public, that is the evil to be remedied. An initial finding of discrimination cannot be used as the basis for a wholesale shift of authority over day-to-day school operations from parents, teachers, and elected officials to an unaccountable district judge whose province is law, not education.
Perhaps it is good educational policy to provide a school district with the items included in the KCMSD capital improvement plan, for example: high schools in which every classroom will have air conditioning, an alarm system, and 15 microcomputers; a 2,000-square-foot planetarium; greenhouses and vivariums; a 25-acre farm with an air-conditioned meeting room for 104 people; a Model United Nations wired for language translation; broadcast capable radio and television studios with an editing and animation lab; a temperature controlled art gallery; movie editing and screening rooms; a 3,500-square-foot dust-free diesel mechanics room; 1,875-square-foot elementary school animal rooms for use in a Zoo Project; swimming pools; and numerous other facilities. But these items are a part of legitimate political debate over educational policy and spending priorities, not the Constitution's command of racial equality. Indeed, it may be that a mere 12-acre petting farm, or other corresponding reductions in court-ordered spending, might satisfy constitutional requirements while preserving scarce public funds for legislative allocation to other public needs, such as paving streets, feeding the poor, building prisons, or housing the homeless. Perhaps the KCMSD's Classical Greek theme schools emphasizing forensics and self-government will provide exemplary training in participatory democracy. But if today's dicta become law, such lessons will be of little use to students who grow up to become taxpayers in the KCMSD.
I am required in light of our limited grant of certiorari to assume that the remedy chosen by the District Court was a permissible exercise of its remedial discretion. But it is misleading to suggest that a failure to fund this particular remedy would leave constitutional rights without a remedy. In fact, the District Court acknowledged in its very first remedial order that the development of a remedy in this case would involve "a choice among a wide range of possibilities." App. to Pet. for Cert. 153a. Its observation was consistent with our cases concerning the scope of equitable remedies, which have recognized that "equity has been characterized by a practical flexibility in shaping its remedies." Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U. S. 294, 349 U. S. 300 (1955).
Any argument that the remedy chosen by the District Court was the only one possible is in fact unsupportable in light of our previous cases. We have approved desegregation orders using assignment changes and some ancillary education programs to ensure the operation of a unitary school system for the district's children. See, e.g., Columbus Bd. of Education v. Penick, 443 U. S. 449 (1979); Dayton Bd of Education v. Brinkman, 433 U. S. 406 (1977). To suggest that a constitutional violation will go unremedied if a district does not, through capital improvements or other means, turn every school into a magnet school, and the entire district into a magnet district, is to suggest that the remedies approved in our past cases should have been disapproved as insufficient to deal with the violations. The truth of the matter is that the remedies in those cases were permissible choices among the many that might be adopted by a district court.
considered, and this Court need never have addressed the question, unless there has been a finding that, without the particular remedy at issue, the constitutional violation will go unremedied. By this I do not mean that the remedy is, as we assume this one was, within the broad discretion of the district court. Rather, as a prerequisite to considering a taxation order, I would require a finding that any remedy less costly than the one at issue would so plainly leave the violation unremedied that its implementation would itself be an abuse of discretion. There is no showing in this record that, faced with the revenue shortfall, the District Court gave due consideration to the possibility that another remedy among the "wide range of possibilities" would have addressed the constitutional violations without giving rise to a funding crisis.
an abstract question. Our jurisdiction is limited to particular Cases and Controversies. U.S. Const., Art. III, § 2, cl. 1. The only question this Court has authority to address is whether a judicial tax was appropriate in this case. Moreover, the petition for certiorari in this case included the contention that the District Court should not have considered the power to tax before considering whether its choice of remedy was the only possible way to achieve desegregation as a part of its argument on Question 2, which the Court granted. Pet. for Cert. 27. Far from being an improper invitation to go outside the question presented, attention to the extraordinary remedy here is the Court's duty. This would be a far more prudent course than recharacterizing the case in an attempt to reach premature decision on an important question. If the Court is to take upon itself the power to tax, respect for its own integrity demands that the power be exercised in support of true constitutional principle, not "suburban comparability" and "visual attractiveness."
This case is a stark illustration of the ever-present question whether ends justify means. Few ends are more important than enforcing the guarantee of equal educational opportunity for our Nation's children. But rules of taxation that override state political strictures not themselves subject to any constitutional infirmity raise serious questions of federal authority, questions compounded by the odd posture of a case in which the Court assumes the validity of a novel conception of desegregation remedies we never before have approved. The historical record of voluntary compliance with the decree of Brown v. Board of Education is not a proud chapter in our constitutional history, and the judges of the District Courts and Courts of Appeals have been courageous and skillful in implementing its mandate. But courage and skill must be exercised with due regard for the proper and historic role of the courts.
"Justice is the end of government. It is the end of civil society. It ever has been, and ever will be pursued, until it be obtained, or until liberty be lost in the pursuit."

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