Source: https://bitlaw.com/source/mpep/410.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 10:33:59+00:00

Document:
The first certification has permitted the USPTO to eliminate the separate verification requirement previously contained in several rules for statements of facts by persons who are not registered to practice before the USPTO. As statements submitted to the USPTO by any person are now, by operation of 37 CFR 11.18(b)(1), verified statements, a separate verification requirement is no longer necessary. The USPTO, however, has retained the verification requirement for a statement to be submitted under oath or declaration (37 CFR 1.68 ) in a number of sections (e.g., 37 CFR 1.63, 1.64, 1.130, 1.131, 1.132, 1.495(f), and 5.25 ).
[Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b) and (c)] restate the provisions requiring attorneys and pro se litigants to conduct a reasonable inquiry into the law and facts before signing pleadings, written motions, and other documents, and prescribing sanctions for violations of these obligations. The  revision in part expands the responsibilities of litigants to the court, while providing greater constraints and flexibility in dealing with infractions of the rule. The rule continues to require litigants to "stop-and-think" before initially making legal or factual contentions. It also, however, emphasizes the duty of candor by subjecting litigants to potential sanctions for insisting upon a position after it is no longer tenable and by generally providing protection against sanctions if they withdraw or correct contentions after a potential violation is called to their attention.
The rule applies only to assertions contained in papers filed with or submitted to the court. It does not cover matters arising for the first time during oral presentations to the court, when counsel may make statements that would not have been made if there had been more time for study and reflection. However, a litigant's obligations with respect to the contents of these papers are not measured solely as of the time they are filed with or submitted to the court, but include reaffirming to the court and advocating positions contained in those pleadings and motions after learning that they cease to have any merit. For example, an attorney who during a pretrial conference insists on a claim or defense should be viewed as "presenting to the court" that contention and would be subject to the obligations of [Rule 11(b)] measured as of that time. Similarly, if after a notice of removal is filed, a party urges in federal court the allegations of a pleading filed in state court (whether as claims, defenses, or in disputes regarding removal or remand), it would be viewed as "presenting"-- and hence certifying to the district court under Rule 11--those allegations.
The certification is that there is (or likely will be) "evidentiary support" for the allegation, not that the party will prevail with respect to its contention regarding the fact. That summary judgment is rendered against a party does not necessarily mean, for purposes of this certification, that it had no evidentiary support for its position. On the other hand, if a party has evidence with respect to a contention that would suffice to defeat a motion for summary judgment based thereon, it would have sufficient "evidentiary support" for purposes of Rule 11.
Arguments for extensions, modifications, or reversals of existing law or for creation of new law do not violate [Rule 11(b)(2)] provided they are "nonfrivolous." This establishes an objective standard, intended to eliminate any "empty-head pure-heart" justification for patently frivolous arguments. However, to the extent to which a litigant has researched the issues and found some support for its theories even in minority opinions, in law review articles, or through consultation with other attorneys should certainly be taken into account in determining whether [Rule 11(b)(2)] has been violated. Although arguments for a change in law are not required to be specifically so identified, a contention that is so identified should be viewed with greater tolerance under [Rule 11].
In requiring reasonable inquiry before the filing of any pleading in a civil case in federal district court, Rule 11 demands "an objective determination of whether a sanctioned party's conduct was reasonable under the circumstances." In effect it imposes a negligence standard, for negligence is a failure to use reasonable care. The equation between negligence and failure to conduct a reasonable precomplaint inquiry is... that "the amount of investigation required by Rule 11 depends on both the time available to investigate and on the probability that more investigation will turn up important evidence; the Rule does not require steps that are not cost-justified."
Hays v. Sony Corp. of Am., 847 F.2d 412, 418, 7 USPQ2d 1043, 1048 (7th. Cir. 1988) (citations omitted) (decided prior to the 1993 amendment to Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, but discussing a "reasonable under the circumstances" standard).
37 CFR 1.4(d)(4) and (5) and 11.18 do not require a practitioner to advise the client (or third party) providing information of this certification effect (or the sanctions applicable to noncompliance), or question the client (or third party) when such information or instructions are provided. When a practitioner is submitting information (e.g., a statement of fact) from the applicant or a third party, or relying upon information from the applicant or a third party in his/her arguments, the Office will consider a practitioner's "inquiry reasonable under the circumstances" duty under 37 CFR 11.18 met so long as the practitioner has no knowledge of information that is contrary to the information provided by the applicant or third party or would otherwise indicate that the information provided by the applicant or third party was so provided for the purpose of a violation of 37 CFR 11.18 (e.g., was submitted to cause unnecessary delay).
Nevertheless, it is highly advisable for a practitioner to advise a client or third party that any information so provided must be reliable and not misleading. The submission by an applicant of misleading or inaccurate statements of facts during the prosecution of applications for patent has resulted in the patents issuing on such applications being held unenforceable. See, e.g., Refac Int'l Ltd. v. Lotus Development Corp., 81 F.3d 1576, 38 USPQ2d 1665 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Paragon Podiatry Laboratory, Inc. v. KLM Laboratories, Inc., 984 F.2d 1182, 25 USPQ2d 1561 (Fed. Cir 1993); Rohm & Haas Co. v. Crystal Chem. Co., 722 F.2d 1556, 200 USPQ 289 (Fed. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 851 (1984); Ott v. Goodpasture, 40 USPQ2d 1831 (D.N. Tex. 1996); Herman v. William Brooks Shoe Co., 39 USPQ2d 1773 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Golden Valley Microwave Food Inc. v. Weaver Popcorn Co., 837 F. Supp. 1444, 24 USPQ2d 1801 (N.D. Ind. 1992), aff'd, 11 F.3d 1072 (Fed. Cir. 1993)(table), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1128 (1994). Likewise, false statements by a practitioner in a paper submitted to the Office during the prosecution of an application for patent have resulted in the patent issuing on such application also being held unenforceable. See General Electro Music Corp. v. Samick Music Corp., 19 F.3d 1405, 30 USPQ2d 1149 (Fed. Cir. 1994)(false statement in a petition to make an application special constitutes inequitable conduct, and renders the patent issuing on such application unenforceable).
An applicant has no duty to conduct a prior art search as a prerequisite to filing an application for patent. See Nordberg, Inc. v. Telsmith, Inc., 82 F.3d 394, 397, 38 USPQ2d 1593, 1595-96 (Fed. Cir. 1996); FMC Corp. v. Hennessy Indus., Inc., 836 F.2d 521, 526 n.6, 5 USPQ2d 1272, 1275-76 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 1987); FMC Corp. v. Manitowoc Co., 835 F.2d 1411, 1415, 5 USPQ2d 1112, 1115 (Fed. Cir. 1987); American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1362, 220 USPQ 763, 772 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 821, 224 USPQ 520 (1984). Thus, the "inquiry reasonable under the circumstances" requirement of 37 CFR 11.18 does not create any new duty on the part of an applicant for patent to conduct a prior art search. See MPEP § 609; cf. Judin v. United States, 110 F.3d 780, 42 USPQ2d 1300 (Fed. Cir 1997)(the failure to obtain and examine the accused infringing device prior to bringing a civil action for infringement violates the 1983 version of Fed. R. Civ. P. 11). The "inquiry reasonable under the circumstances" requirement of 37 CFR 11.18, however, will require an inquiry into the underlying facts and circumstances when a practitioner provides conclusive statements to the Office (e.g., a statement that the entire delay in filing the required reply from the due date for the reply until the filing of a grantable petition pursuant to 37 CFR 1.137(a) was unintentional).
Where the circumstances of an application or other proceeding warrant a determination of whether there has been a violation of 37 CFR 11.18(b), the file or the application or other proceeding will be forwarded to the Office of Enrollment and Discipline (OED) for a determination of whether there has been a violation of 37 CFR 11.18(b). In the event that OED determines that a provision of 37 CFR 11.18(b) has been violated, the USPTO Director will determine what (if any) sanction(s) under 37 CFR 11.18(c) is to be imposed in the application or other proceeding. In addition, if OED determines that a provision of 37 CFR 11.18(b) has been violated by a practitioner, OED will determine whether such practitioner is to be subject to disciplinary action (see 37 CFR 1.4(d)(4) and 11.18(d) ). That is, OED will provide a determination of whether there has been a violation of 37 CFR 11.18(b), and if such violation is by a practitioner, whether such practitioner is to be subject to disciplinary action; however, OED will not be responsible for imposing sanctions under 37 CFR 11.18(c) in an application or other proceeding.
37 CFR 11.18(d) provides that any practitioner violating the provisions of this section may also be subject to disciplinary action. 37 CFR 11.18(d) (and the corresponding provision of 37 CFR 1.4(d)(4) ) clarifies that a practitioner may be subject to disciplinary action in lieu of, or in addition to, the sanctions set forth in 37 CFR 11.18(c) for violations of 37 CFR 11.18.

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 609
 v.