Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/426/668/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 15:58:54+00:00

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Justia › US Law › US Case Law › US Supreme Court › Volume 426 › City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc.
The Ohio Constitution reserves to the people of each municipality in the State the power of referendum with respect to all questions that the municipality is authorized to control by legislation. Respondent real estate developer applied for a zoning change to permit construction of a high-rise apartment building on land it owned in petitioner Ohio city. While the application was pending, the city charter was amended by popular vote so as to require that any changes in land use agreed to by the City Council be approved by a 55% vote in a referendum. The City Planning Commission recommended, and the City Council approved, the proposed zoning change, but the Commission rejected respondent's further application for "parking and yard" approval for the proposed apartment building on the ground that the Council's rezoning action had not been submitted to a referendum. Respondent then filed suit in state court, seeking a judgment declaring the city charter amendment invalid as an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the people. While the action was pending, the proposed zoning change was defeated in a referendum. The charter amendment was upheld by the trial court and by the Ohio Court of Appeals, but the Ohio Supreme Court reversed, holding that the amendment constituted a delegation of power violative of federal constitutional due process guarantees because the voters were given no standards to guide their decision.
Held: The city charter amendment does not violate the due process rights of a landowner who applies for a zoning change. Pp. 426 U. S. 672-679.
(a) A referendum, which is a means for direct political participation by the people, allowing them what amounts to a veto power over legislative enactments, cannot be characterized as a delegation of power. In establishing legislative bodies, the people can reserve to themselves power to deal directly with matters that might otherwise be assigned to the legislature, and here the power of referendum was specifically reserved to the people under the Ohio Constitution. Pp. 426 U. S. 672-674.
(b) The doctrine that legislative delegation of power to regulatory bodies must be accompanied by discernible standards is inapplicable where, as here, rather than power being delegated, the power exercised is one reserved by the people to themselves. P. 426 U. S. 675.
(c) A referendum result that is arbitrary and capricious, bearing no relation to police power, is open to challenge in state court, where the scope of the available state remedy would be determined as a matter of state law and under the Fourteenth Amendment. Pp. 426 U. S. 676-677.
(d) As a basic instrument of democratic government, the referendum process does not, in itself, violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when applied to a rezoning ordinance. Eubank v. Richmond, 226 U. S. 137; Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U. S. 116, distinguished. Pp. 426 U. S. 677-679.
41 Ohio St.2d 187, 324 N.E.2d 740, reversed and remanded.
BURGER, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which STEWART, WHITE, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. POWELL, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 426 U. S. 680. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN, J., joined, post, p. 426 U. S. 680.
Council approved the Planning Commission's recommendation for reclassification of respondent's property to permit the proposed project. Respondent then applied to the Planning Commission for "parking and yard" approval for the proposed building. The Commission rejected the application on the ground that the City Council's rezoning action had not yet been submitted to the voters for ratification.
town meeting, a tradition which continues to this day in some States as both a practical and symbolic part of our democratic processes. [Footnote 6] The referendum, similarly, is a means for direct political participation, allowing the people the final decision, amounting to a veto power, over enactments of representative bodies. The practice is designed to "give citizens a voice on questions of public policy." James v. Valtierra, supra at 402 U. S. 141.
"The initiative and referendum powers are hereby reserved to the people of each municipality on all questions which such municipalities may now or hereafter be authorized by law to control by legislative action. . . ."
Ohio Const., Art. II, § 1f.
zoning ordinance, from the power to grant relief from unnecessary hardship. [Footnote 8] The former function was found to be legislative in nature. [Footnote 9] Accord, Denney v. Duluth, 295 Minn. 22, 28-29, 202 N.W.2d 892, 895-896 (1972); Smith v. Township of Livingston, 106 N.J.Super. 444, 454, 256 A.2d 85, 90 (1969); Wollen v. Borough of Fort Lee, 27 N.J. 408, 422, 142 A.2d 881, 888-889 (1958); Johnston v. City of Claremont, 49 Cal.2d 826, 835-836, 323 P.2d 71, 76-77 (1958); Dwyer v. City Council, 200 Cal.505, 515, 253 P. 932, 935-936 (1927); Hilltop Realty, Inc. v. City of South Euclid, 110 Ohio App. 535, 164 N.E.2d 180 (1960). Compare Kelley v. John, 162 Neb. 319, 75 N.W.2d 713 (1956), with In re Frank, 183 Neb. 722, 723, 164 N.W.2d 215, 216 (1969).
The Ohio Supreme Court further concluded that the amendment to the city charter constituted a "delegation" of power violative of federal constitutional guarantees because the voters were given no standards to guide their decision. Under Eastlake's procedure, the Ohio Supreme Court reasoned, no mechanism existed, nor indeed could exist, to assure that the voters would act rationally in passing upon a proposed zoning change. This meant that "appropriate legislative action [would] be made dependent upon the potentially arbitrary and unreasonable whims of the voting public." 41 Ohio St.2d at 195, 324 N.E.2d at 746. The potential for arbitrariness in the process, the court concluded, violated due process.
"The sovereignty of the people is itself subject to those constitutional limitations which have been duly adopted and remain unrepealed."
Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. at 393 U. S. 392. See also Lucas v. Colorado Gen. Assembly, 377 U. S. 713, 377 U. S. 736-737 (1964); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 319 U. S. 638 (1943).
"A referendum, however, is far more than an expression of ambiguously founded neighborhood preference. It is the city itself legislating through its voters -- an exercise by the voters of their traditional right through direct legislation to override the views of their elected representatives as to what serves the public interest."
Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Organization v. Union City, California, 424 F.2d 291, 294 (1970).
funds for increased public services. . . ."
402 U.S. at 402 U. S. 143 (emphasis added). Mr. Justice Black went on to say that a referendum procedure, such as the one at issue here, is a classic demonstration of "devotion to democracy. . . ." Id. at 402 U. S. 141. As a basic instrument of democratic government, the referendum process does not, in itself, violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when applied to a rezoning ordinance. [Footnote 13] Since the rezoning decision in this case was properly reserved to the people of Eastlake under the Ohio Constitution, the Ohio Supreme Court erred in holding invalid, on federal constitutional grounds, the charter amendment permitting the voters to decide whether the zoned use of respondent's property could be altered.
and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
"That any change to the existing land uses or any change whatsoever to any ordinance . . . cannot be approved unless and until it shall have been submitted to the Planning Commission, for approval or disapproval. That in the event the city council should approve any of the preceding changes, or enactments, whether approved or disapproved by the Planning Commission, it shall not be approved or passed by the declaration of an emergency, and it shall not be effective, but it shall be mandatory that the same be approved by a 55% favorable vote of all votes cast of the qualified electors of the City of Eastlake at the next regular municipal election, if one shall occur not less than sixty (60) or more than one hundred and twenty (120) days after its passage, otherwise at a special election falling on the generally established day of the primary election. . . ."
Respondent also contended that the charter amendment could not apply to its rezoning application, since the application was pending at the time the amendment was adopted. The Court of Common Pleas rejected the argument. Respondent neither appealed this point nor argued it in the Court of Appeals or the Ohio Supreme Court; the issue is therefore not before us.
The Court of Common Pleas, however, invalidated the charter provision requiring assessment of election costs against the affected property owner. In affirming, the Court of Appeals also upheld that portion of the trial court's judgment. No appeal was taken to the Ohio Supreme Court on this issue. The question was, accordingly, not passed on by the State Supreme Court, and is therefore not before us.
Respondent did not challenge the 55% affirmative requirement as such. Instead, respondent contended that any mandatory referendum provision, regardless of the requisite margin for approval, violated due process as applied to its rezoning application.
"The legislative power of the state shall be vested in a General Assembly . . . but the people reserve to themselves the power to propose to the General Assembly laws and amendments to the constitution, and to adopt or reject the same at the polls on a referendum vote. . . ."
Ohio Const., Art. II, § 1.
In Massachusetts, for example, the inhabitants could convene a town meeting for the purpose of regulating nuisances. A. De Wolf, The Town Meeting: A Manual of Massachusetts Law 136 (1890). See generally Bryan, Town Meeting Government Still Supported in Vermont, 61 Nat.Civic R. 348 (1972).
The land use change requested by respondent would likely entail the provision of additional city services, such as schools and police and fire protection. Cf. James v. Valtierra, 402 U. S. 137, 402 U. S. 143 n. 4 (1971). The change would also diminish the land area available for industrial purposes, thereby affecting Eastlake's potential economic development.
"[m]ere diminution of market value or interference with the property owner's personal plans and desires relative to his property is insufficient to invalidate a zoning ordinance or to entitle him to a variance or rezoning."
8 E. McQuillan, Municipal Corporations § 25.44, p. 111 (3d ed., 1965). There is, of course, no contention in this case that the existing zoning classification renders respondent's property valueless or otherwise diminishes its value below the value when respondent acquired it.
The power of initiative or referendum may be reserved or conferred "with respect to any matter, legislative or administrative, within the realm of local affairs. . . ." 5 E. McQuillan, Municipal Corporations § 16.54, p. 208 (3d ed., 1969). However, the Ohio Supreme Court concluded that only land use changes granted by the City Council when acting in a legislative capacity were subject to the referendum process. Under the court's binding interpretation of state law, a property owner seeking relief from unnecessary hardship occasioned by zoning restrictions would not be subject to Eastlake's referendum procedure. For example, if unforeseeable future changes give rise to hardship on the owner, the holding of the Ohio Supreme Court provides avenues of administrative relief not subject to the referendum process.
The Ohio Supreme Court's analysis of the requirements for standards flowing from the Fourteenth Amendment also sweeps too broadly. Except as a legislative history informs an analysis of legislative action, there is no more advance assurance that a legislative body will act by conscientiously applying consistent standards than there is with respect to voters. For example, there is no certainty that the City Council in this case would act on the basis of "standards" explicit or otherwise in Eastlake's comprehensive zoning ordinance. Nor is there any assurance that townspeople assembling in a town meeting, as the people of Eastlake could do, Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U. S. 385, 393 U. S. 392 (1969), will act according to consistent standards. The critical constitutional inquiry, rather, is whether the zoning restriction produces arbitrary or capricious results.
The Supreme Court of Ohio rested its decision solely on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See 41 Ohio St.2d 187, 196, 324 N.E.2d 740, 746 (1975). The only questions presented to this Court in the petition for certiorari concern the validity of that due process holding. Pet. for Cert. 2. Accordingly, we confine ourselves to considering whether due process is denied by the challenged charter amendment.
"[The ordinance in Eubank] left the establishment of the building line untouched until the lot owners should act, and then . . . gave to it the effect of law. The ordinance in the case at bar absolutely prohibits the erection of any billboards . . . , but permits this prohibition to be modified with the consent of the persons who are to be most affected by such modification."
242 U.S. at 242 U. S. 531. Since the property owners could simply waive an otherwise applicable legislative limitation, the Court in Cusack determined that the provision did not delegate legislative power at all. Ibid.
The fears expressed in dissent rest on the proposition that the procedure at issue here is "fundamentally unfair" to landowners; this fails to take into account the mechanisms for relief potentially available to property owners whose desired land use changes are rejected by the voters. First, if hardship is occasioned by zoning restrictions, administrative relief is potentially available. Indeed, the very purpose of "variances" allowed by zoning officials is to avoid "practical difficulties and unnecessary hardship." 8 E. McQuillan, Municipal Corporations § 25.159, p. 511 (3d ed.1965). As we noted, supra at 426 U. S. 677, remedies remain available under the Ohio Supreme Court's holding and provide a means to challenge unreasonable or arbitrary action. Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365 (1926).
There can be no doubt as to the propriety and legality of submitting generally applicable legislative questions, including zoning provisions, to a popular referendum. But here, the only issue concerned the status of a single small parcel owned by a single "person." This procedure, affording no realistic opportunity for the affected person to be heard, even by the electorate, is fundamentally unfair. The "spot" referendum technique appears to open disquieting opportunities for local government bodies to bypass normal protective procedures for resolving issues affecting individual rights.
A zoning code is unlike other legislation affecting the use of property. The deprivation caused by a zoning code is customarily qualified by recognizing the property owner's right to apply for an amendment or variance to accommodate his individual needs. The expectancy that particular changes consistent with the basic zoning plan will be allowed frequently and on their merits is a normal incident of property ownership. When the governing body offers the owner the opportunity to seek such a change -- whether that opportunity is denominated a privilege or a right -- it is affording protection to the owner's interest in making legitimate use of his property.
my opinion that the opportunity to apply for an amendment is an aspect of property ownership protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
legislature; in the latter situation, state courts have not hesitated to correct manifest injustice.
"Ordinances laying down general policies without regard to a specific piece of property are usually an exercise of legislative authority, are subject to limited review, and may only be attacked upon constitutional grounds for an arbitrary abuse of authority. On the other hand, a determination whether the permissible use of a specific piece of property should be changed is usually an exercise of judicial authority, and its propriety is subject to an altogether different test."
"Zoning decisions may be either administrative or legislative, depending upon the nature of the act. But, whatever their nature or the importance of their categorization for other purposes, zoning decisions which deal with an amendment of the code or reclassification of land thereunder must be arrived at fairly. The process by which they are made, subsequent to the adoption of a comprehensive plan and a zoning code, is basically adjudicatory."
policy may permeate a zoning amendment, the decision has a far greater impact on one group of citizens than on the public generally."
of the law falls squarely within the purpose of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
government. McGautha v. California (1971), 402 U. S. 183, 402 U. S. 256, 402 U. S. 270. The Eastlake charter provision ignored these concepts and blatantly delegated legislative authority, with no assurance that the result reached thereby would be reasonable or rational. For these reasons, the provision clearly violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."
41 Ohio St.2d 187, 196, 324 N.E.2d 740, 746 (1975) (footnote omitted).
"There can be little doubt of the true purpose of Eastlake's charter provision -- it is to obstruct change in land use by rendering such change so burdensome as to be prohibitive. The charter provision was apparently adopted specifically, to prevent multifamily housing, and indeed was adopted while Forest City's application for rezoning to permit a multifamily housing project was pending before the City Planning Commission and City Council. The restrictive purpose of the provision is crudely apparent on its face. Any zoning change, regardless of how minor, and regardless of its approval by the Planning Commission and the City Council, must be approved by a city-wide referendum. The proposed change must receive, rather than a simple majority, at least a 55 percent affirmative vote. Finally, the owner of the property affected is required to pay the cost of the election, although the provision gives no hint as to exactly which costs would be billed to a property owner."
"There is no subtlety to this; it is simply an attempt to render change difficult and expensive under the guise of popular democracy. "
"Even stripped of its harsher provisions, the charter provision poses serious problems. A mandatory, city-wide referendum which applies to any zoning change must, of necessity, submit decisions that affect one person's use of his property to thousands of voters with no interest whatever in that property. We need only imagine the adoption of this same provision in a city such as Cleveland. By such a provision, rezoning for a corner gasoline station would require the approval of hundreds of thousands of voters, most of them living miles away, and few of them with the slightest interest in the matter. This would be government by caprice, and would seriously dilute the right of private ownership of property. The law recognizes that the use a person makes of his property must inevitably affect his neighbors and, in some cases, the surrounding community. These real interests are entitled to be balanced against the rights of a property owner; but a law which requires a property owner, who proposes a wholly benign use of his property, to obtain the assent of thousands of persons with no such interest, goes beyond any reasonable public purpose."
Id. at 199-200, 324 N.E.2d at 748-749.
In this case, the Ohio Supreme Court characterized the Council's approval of respondent's proposal as "legislative." I think many state courts would have characterized it as "administrative." The courts thus may well differ in their selection of the label to apply to this action, but I find substantial agreement among state tribunals on the proposition that requiring a citywide referendum for approval of a particular proposal like this is manifestly unreasonable. Surely that is my view.
dispute resolved on the merits by reference to articulable rules. If a dispute involves only the conflicting rights of private litigants, it is elementary that the decisionmaker must be impartial and qualified to understand and to apply the controlling rules.
a fair opportunity to have his claim determined on its merits.
I therefore conclude that the Ohio Supreme Court correctly held that Art. VIII, § 3, of the Eastlake charter violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and that its Judgment should be affirmed.
The Fourteenth Amendment provides: "No State shall . . . deprive any person of . . property, without due process of law. . . ." U.S.Const., Amdt. 14, § 1.
The Ohio Supreme Court opinion is reported at 41 Ohio St.2d 187, 324 N.E.2d 74 (1975).
"Zoning maps are constantly being changed, for various reasons; and the question is, under what circumstances are such changes justified? . . . The problem is then to develop criteria for distinguishing valid from invalid zoning changes. . . ."
1 N. Williams, American Land Planning Law 6 (1974).
"Legally, all zoning enabling acts contemplate the possibility of dezoning, the power to amend zoning ordinances serving that purpose. The provisions do not show on their face whether they are intended to remedy particular errors or hardships, or whether they contemplate readjustments called for by the changing character of neighborhoods; undoubtedly, however, they may be made available for either purpose."
Freund, Some Inadequately Discussed Problems of the Law of City Planning and Zoning, 24 Ill.L.Rev. 135, 145 (1929).
"For most communities, zoning as long range planning based on generalized legislative facts without regard to the individual facts has proved to be a theoretician's dream, soon dissolved in a series of zoning map amendments, exceptions and variances -- reflecting, generally, decisions made on individual grounds -- brought about by unanticipated and often unforeseeable events: social and political changes, ecological necessity, location and availability of roads and utilities, economic facts (especially costs of construction and financing), governmental needs, and, as important as any, market and consumer choice."
Kropf v. Cit of Sterling Heights, 391 Mich. 139, 168, 215 N.W.2d 179, 191-192 (1974).
"Zoning is a means by which a governmental body can plan for the future -- it may not be used as a means to deny the future." National Land & Investment Co. v. Easttown Township Bd. of Adjustment, 419 Pa. 504, 528, 215 A.2d 597, 610 (1965).
"the standardless delegation of power to a limited group of property owners . . . is not to be equated with decisionmaking by the people through the referendum process."
Ante at 426 U. S. 678. Whether or not that is a sufficient distinction of those cases insofar as they deal with the adequacy of the city's procedure, the distinction does not undermine their support for the proposition that the city's procedure must afford the property owner due process.
"Although our early decisions viewed the enactment of rezoning ordinances as a legislative function, the more recent decisions have held such activity to be a quasi-judicial function and reviewable under Rule 106(a)(4). In so doing, we have distinguished between the adjudicative process involved in enacting a rezoning ordinance and the legislative process involved in passing the general zoning ordinance. This distinction was concisely drawn by the Supreme Court of Washington in Fleming v. Tacoma, 81 Wash.2d 292, 502 P.2d 327 (1972)."
Snyder v. City of Lakewood, ___ Colo. ___, 542 P.2d 371, 373-374 (1975) (footnotes omitted).
"The freedom from accountability of the municipal governing body may be tolerable in those cases where the legislature is engaged in legislating, but it makes no sense where the legislature is dispensing or refusing to dispense special grants. When the local legislature acts to pass general laws applicable generally, it is performing its traditional role, and it is entitled to be free from those strictures we place upon an agency that is charged with granting or denying special privileges to particular persons. When the municipal legislature crosses over into the role of hearing and passing on individual petitions in adversary proceedings, it should be required to meet the same procedural standards we expect from a traditional administrative agency."
R. Babcock, The Zoning Game 158 (1966). Compare this comment with the practice of another "zoning man." See United States v. Staszcuk, 517 F.2d 53, 56 (CA7 1975).
"That any change to the existing land uses or any change whatsoever to any ordinance, or the enactment of any ordinance referring to other regulations controlling the development of land and the selling or leasing or rental of parkways, playgrounds, or other city lands or real property, or for the widening, narrowing, relocating, vacating, or changing the use of any public street, avenue, boulevard, or alley cannot be approved unless and until it shall have been submitted to the Planning Commission, for approval or disapproval. That in the event the city council should approve any of the preceding changes, or enactments, whether . . . approved or disapproved by the Planning Commission it shall not be approved or passed by the declaration of an emergency, and it shall not be effective, but it shall be mandatory that the same be approved by a 55% favorable vote of all votes cast of the qualified electors of the City of Eastlake at the next regular municipal election, if one shall occur not less than sixty (60) or more than one hundred and twenty (120) days after its passage, otherwise at a special election falling on the generally established day of the primary election. Said issue shall be submitted to the electors of the City only after approval of a change of an existing land use by the Council for an applicant, and the applicant agrees to assume all costs of the election and post bond with the city Auditor in an amount estimated by the County Auditor or the Board of Elections proportionate with any other issues that may be on the ballot at the same time. The applicant shall further agree to authorize the City Auditor to advertise, and assume the obligations to pay, for a notice of the posted bond and the requested land use change in a newspaper of general circulation, whose circulation is either the largest, or second to the largest within the limits of the City for two consecutive times, with at least two weeks between notices and a third notice one week prior to the election. Should the land use request not be affirmed by a 55% favorable vote it cannot be presented again for one full year and a new request must be made at that time."
Both the City Planning Commission and the City Council expressly approved the proposal.
"change would also diminish the land area available for industrial purposes, thereby affecting Eastlake's potential economic development."
If that speculation were accurate, it is surprising that the Planning Commission and the Council approved the change.
Indeed, the city never even tried to enforce that requirement; for when respondent refused to post the bond to cover the cost, the city went ahead and held the election anyway.
"But, in restricting individual rights by exercise of the police power, neither a municipal corporation nor the state legislature itself can deprive an individual of property rights by a plebiscite of neighbors or for their benefit. . . ."
Benner v. Tribbitt, 190 Md 6, 20, 57 A.2d 346, 353 (1948).
"The determination of a petition for a variance cannot be determined by a poll of the sentiment of the neighborhood."
Town of Homecroft v. Macbeth, 238 Ind. 57, 62-63, 148 N.E.2d 563, 566 (1958).
"It is also not a proper exercise of such authority to base their decision [on a rezoning] merely on 'strenuous objections of residents of the Town,' as [the Board] does in reason (3). Such remonstrances may be heard and taken into consideration, but they may not be permitted to control the board's decision. Heffernan v. Zoning Board, 50 R.I. 26, 144 A. 674. A poll of the neighborhood to weigh the conflicting wishes of the residents or landowners in the vicinity is not the purpose of the hearing."
Kent v. Zoning Board of Town of Barrington, 74 R.I. 89, 92, 58 A.2d 623, 624 (1948).
"Rather, the comprehensive plan is the essence of zoning. Without it, there can be no rational allocation of land use. It is the insurance that the public welfare is being served and that zoning does not become nothing more than just a Gallup poll."
(Emphasis added.) Udell v. Haas, 21 N.Y.2d 463, 469, 235 N.E.2d 897, 900-901 (1968).
"While the referendum provision of the statute has not heretofore been construed by this court, we believe that the reasonable and proper construction of the statute supports the position of the plaintiff to the effect that the referendum-election provision applies only to a comprehensive type of zoning ordinance, and does not apply to an altering or amending ordinance."
Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co. v. Nadasdy, 247 Minn. 159, 165, 76 N.W.2d 670, 675 (1956).
"The issue is whether an amendment to a city zoning ordinance changing the zoning of particular property is subject to a referendary vote of the electors of the city."
"We hold that such a change in zoning is not subject to referendum. The right of referendum extends only to legislative acts. A change in the zoning of particular property, although in form (amendment of a zoning ordinance) and in traditional analysis thought to be legislative action, is, in substance, an administrative, not legislative, act."
West v. City of Portage, 392 Mich. 458, 460-461, 221 N.W.2d 303, 304 (1974).
"An ordinance changing the classification of property from residential to business use after the adoption of a comprehensive zoning plan is an administrative or executive matter, and not subject to referendum laws applicable to municipalities."
Kelley v. John, 162 Neb. 319, 75 N.W.2d 713, 714 (1956) (syllabus by the court).
"The City of Washington Terrace has in effect a master zoning plan ordinance. Subsequent to its adoption, the City Council passed an ordinance changing the classification of certain property from residential to commercial use. . . ."
"The ordinance in question was passed after the requested change had been studied and recommended by the planning commission and after a public hearing had been held. The determinative question is whether or not the action of the City Council was administrative or legislative. If the former, it is not subject to referendum. We so hold, based upon logic and prior decisions of this court. If each change in a zoning classification were to be submitted to a vote of the city electors, any master plan would be rendered inoperative. Such changes are administrative acts implementing the comprehensive plan and adjusting it to current conditions."
(Emphasis added.) Bird v. Sorenson, 16 Utah 2d 1-2, 394 P.2d 808 (1964).
James v. Valtierra, 402 U. S. 137, sustained the "use of referendums to give citizens a voice on questions of public policy." Id. at 402 U. S. 141. The approval of a publicly financed housing project, which might "lead to large expenditures of local governmental funds for increased public services and to lower tax revenues," id. at 402 U. S. 143, raises policy questions not involved in a zoning change for a private property owner. That case presented no due process or other procedural issue.
The final footnote in the Court's opinion identifies two reasons why the referendum procedure is not fundamentally unfair. Both reasons are consistent with my assumption that there is virtually no possibility that an individual property owner could be expected to have his application for a proposed land use change decided on the merits.
The first of the Court's reasons is that, if "hardship" is shown, "administrative relief is potentially available"; that "potential" relief, however, applies only to some undefined class of claims that does not include this respondent's. A procedure in one case does not become constitutionally sufficient because some other procedure might be available in some other case.
The second of the Court's reasons is that there is a judicial remedy available if the zoning ordinance is so arbitrary that it is invalid on substantive due process grounds. This reason is also inapplicable to this case. There is no claim that the city's zoning plan is arbitrary or unconstitutional, even as applied to respondent's parcel. But if there is a constitutional right to fundamental fairness in the procedure applicable to an ordinary request for an amendment to the zoning applicable to an individual parcel, that right is not vindicated by the opportunity to make a substantive due process attack on the ordinance itself.

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