Source: http://myattorneyusa.com/leocal-v-ashcroft-narrowing-the-scope-of-crime-of-violence
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 02:48:14+00:00

Document:
Leocal v. Ashcroft: Narrowing the Scope of "Crime of Violence"
In 2004, the Supreme Court held unanimously in Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (2004) [PDF version], that a state DUI offense which (1) does not have a mens rea (state of mind) component; or which (2) requires only a showing of negligence in the operation of a vehicle is not a “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. 16. This holding was made in the context of an appeal by a lawful permanent resident who had been ordered deported based upon his DUI conviction being considered an immigration aggravated felony under section 101(a)(43)(F) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), which requires that the crime be a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. 16. In this article, we will look at the facts of Leocal v. Ashcroft, the Supreme Court's decision, and its broader implication for aliens with certain criminal convictions.
Josue Leocal (the petitioner), was a lawful permanent resident (LPR) who was convicted in 2000 under Florida law of driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) and causing serious bodily injury.1 The petitioner pled guilty to both counts and was sentenced to two and a half years in prison.
The INS claimed that the DUI conviction was a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. 16, and therefore rendered the petitioner deportable under section 237(a) of the INA.
In a unanimous decision authored by then-Chief Justice William Rehnquist, the Supreme Court held that the Florida DUI offense was not a crime of violence, and therefore not an immigration aggravated felony as defined by INA 101(a)(43)(F).
The offense that the petitioner was convicted of made it a third-degree felony for a person to operate a vehicle while under the influence and, “by reason of such operation, caus[e] … [s]erious bodily injury to another.”4 The Court noted that the Florida statute required proof of causation of injury, but did not require proof of any particular mental state. Furthermore, many state DUI offenses were similar in these respects to the Florida offense, meaning that the opinion would have broad applicability. The Court then moved to determine whether the Florida DUI offense qualified as a crime of violence under either 18 U.S.C. 16(a) or (b).
18 U.S.C. 16(a) states that an offense qualifies as a “crime of violence” if it has “as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another.” Because the conviction in question clearly did not include the “attempted use” or “threatened use” of physical force, the decision focused on whether the conviction required the “use” of force against another person.
The petitioner argued that “use” of physical force requires an intentional act. The Government argued that “use” of physical force does not incorporate a mens rea component, and that Leocal's DUI conviction necessarily includes the use of physical force.
The Court stated in its decision that both the petitioner's and the Government's arguments with regard to the meaning of “use” of physical force were too narrow. Instead, the Supreme Court opted to construe the term in its context in the provision as a whole. The Court noted that the key term was “use … of physical force against the person or property of another.” (Emphasis taken from the decision.) Citing its decision in Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995) [PDF version], which adjudicated the meaning of “use” in a similar context, the Court stated that “'use' requires active employment.” As an example, the decision suggested that it would be unnatural to say that a person could actively employ physical force against another person by accident.
The Court stated that the most natural way of reading the term “use” of physical force in the context of the statute was that it required “a higher degree of intent than negligent or merely accidental conduct.” Accordingly, the Court held that the DUI offense was not a crime of violence under section 16(a).
The decision stated that it “must give the language in section 16(b) an identical construction [to section 16(a)], requiring a higher mens rea than the merely accidental or negligent conduct in a DUI offense.” Furthermore, it added that in no “ordinary or natural” sense can one say that a person risks having to “use” physical force against another person while driving under the influence and causing injury.
The decision Court that the Immigration and Nationality Act itself contained further evidence that the petitioner's DUI offense was not a crime of violence.
any crime of reckless driving or of driving while intoxicated or under the influence of alcohol or of prohibited substances if such crime involves personal injury to another.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(h).
The Supreme Court held 9-0 that the Florida DUI conviction was not for a crime of violence, and remanded the case back to the Eleventh Circuit for further proceedings consistent with the decision in Leocal v. Ashcroft.
In the decision, the Court noted that the case did not present the question of whether a state or federal offense that requires proof of the reckless use of force against a person or property of another qualifies as a crime of violence. This is because the Florida statute and many similar DUI statutes do not require any particular mental state for a conviction.
An alien who is charged with deportability for any reason should consult immediately with an experienced immigration attorney in criminal immigration matters. If the alien is charged with deportability under section 101(a)(43)(F) of the INA, an experienced immigration attorney will be able to assess the charges and, by relying on the statutes, regulations, and case-law such as Leocal v. Ashcroft, in order to determine whether there are plausible grounds for rebutting the charges in the specific case.
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has taken over the functions of the former INS.
Using the segment of the statute copied in the decision.
The decision also noted in footnote 6 that Congress had incorporated 18 U.S.C. § 16 as an aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(F) on November 29, 1990 [Immigration Act of 1990, § 501, 104 stat. 5048 (Nov. 29, 1990)]. Just over nine months earlier, Congress enacted INA § 101(h) with its incorporation of 18 U.S.C. § 16 along with the separate provision covering DUI offenses [FRAA §131, 104 Stat. 31 (Feb. 16, 1990)]. The decision stated that the proximity of these events supports its construction of 18 U.S.C. 16.
Kurzban, Ira J. Kurzban's Immigration Law Sourcebook: A Comprehensive Outline and Reference Tool. 14th ed. Washington D.C.: AILA Publications, 2014. 231-32, Print. Treatises & Primers.

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