Source: https://casetext.com/case/united-states-v-hymas-4
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 08:21:43+00:00

Document:
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Aaron Michael HYMAS, Defendant–Appellant. United States of America, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Tiffany Kim Hymas, Defendant–Appellant.
Marcus R. Mumford (argued), Mumford PC, Salt Lake City, UT, for Defendants–Appellants. Syrena C. Hargrove (argued) and Wendy J. Olson, Assistant United States Attorneys, Boise, ID, for Plaintiff–Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Idaho, Edward J. Lodge, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. 1:12–cr–00045–EJL–1, D.C. No. 1:12–cr–00045–EJL–2.
Aaron and Tiffany Hymas were each convicted, pursuant to plea agreements, of one count of wire fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1343. Aaron appeals his sentence of 24 months' imprisonment, contending that facts found by the district court in sentencing should have been subject to the clear and convincing standard of proof rather than the preponderance of the evidence standard that the district court applied, because of the disproportionate impact of those facts on the sentence that was imposed. We agree, in part, vacate that sentence, and remand to the district court for further proceedings. Both defendants also appeal the district court's orders requiring restitution. We affirm those orders.
To avoid confusion we refer to the defendants individually by their first names.
District courts generally use the “preponderance of the evidence standard of proof when finding facts at sentencing, such as the amount of loss caused by a fraud.” United States v. Treadwell, 593 F.3d 990, 1000 (9th Cir.2010). The higher clear and convincing standard may apply, however, “when a sentencing factor has an extremely disproportionate effect on the sentence relative to the offense of conviction.” United States v. Mezas de Jesus, 217 F.3d 638, 642 (9th Cir.2000) (citing United States v. Restrepo, 946 F.2d 654, 659 (9th Cir.1991) (en banc)); see also Treadwell, 593 F.3d at 1000. Particularly “where a severe sentencing enhancement is imposed on the basis of uncharged or acquitted conduct, due process may require clear and convincing evidence of that conduct.” Treadwell, 593 F.3d at 1000.
Our precedents “have not been a model of clarity in deciding what analytical framework to employ when determining whether a disproportionate effect on sentencing may require the application of a heightened standard of proof.” United States v. Berger, 587 F.3d 1038, 1048 (9th Cir.2009). We have indicated that, “where the sentencing enhancements are based on ... the offense of conviction,” the preponderance of the evidence standard is sufficient. Id. (citing United States v. Harrison–Philpot, 978 F.2d 1520, 1524 (9th Cir.1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted). We have also held that “there is no bright-line rule for the disproportionate impact test;” instead, the court examines the “totality of the circumstances” using six factors first articulated in United States v. Valensia, 222 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir.2000) (“ Valensia factors”). Berger, 587 F.3d at 1048 (citing United States v. Jordan, 256 F.3d 922, 928 (9th Cir.2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Our opinion in Valensia was vacated and remanded by the Supreme Court, see United States v. Valensia, 532 U.S. 901, 121 S.Ct. 1222, 149 L.Ed.2d 133 (2001), but we have continued to use the factors articulated in the decision.
The fifth and sixth factors arguably favor use of the clear and convincing standard. The number of offense levels added under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 for a loss of more than $120,000 but not more than $200,000 was 10. In pleading guilty, Aaron did not acknowledge any particular loss amount, and that loss enhancement was over 4 levels. Similarly, the length of the Guidelines sentencing range based on that loss amount more than doubled the length of sentence authorized by the initial Guidelines range if no loss had been attributed to the transaction. Aaron argues that these two factors alone were sufficient to require the use of the heightened standard.
The district court in this case concluded that the appropriate standard of proof was preponderance of evidence based upon a line of cases that applied that lower standard when determining the extent of losses from a conspiracy. The decisions cited by the district court— Treadwell, 593 F.3d at 1001; Berger, 587 F.3d at 1048–49; and United States v. Armstead, 552 F.3d 769, 777 (9th Cir.2008)—hold that where losses are based on the extent of a criminal conspiracy, those losses need not be proven by clear and convincing evidence because the defendants had the opportunity at trial to challenge evidence of the extent of the fraud conspiracy.
Similarly, the district court might have imposed the same sentence even if it had calculated a lower loss figure under the clear and convincing standard and, as a result, a lower sentencing Guidelines range, but that possible outcome is too uncertain for us to rely upon it. It is also inconsistent with our normal approach to sentencing. “[T]he district court must correctly calculate the recommended Guidelines sentence and use that recommendation as the ‘starting point and initial benchmark.’ ” United States v. Munoz–Camarena, 631 F.3d 1028, 1030 (9th Cir.2011) (per curiam) (quoting Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 108, 128 S.Ct. 558, 169 L.Ed.2d 481 (2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted). We cannot say on this record that the failure to calculate the correct recommended Guidelines sentence was harmless error because the district court's analysis for the extent of the variance was not based on the correct range. Id. at 1030–31. Accordingly, we vacate Aaron Hymas's sentence and remand the matter to the district court. On remand, the court should apply the clear and convincing standard in calculating losses attributable to the other loans.
Aaron also argues that the district court erred by using the amount realized from deficiency sales to calculate the losses from the loans. We conclude that the district court correctly calculated the losses by taking the principal amount of the loan and subtracting any credits from the subsequent sale of the property. See United States v. Morris, 744 F.3d 1373 (9th Cir.2014). Similarly, the district court did not err by considering the losses submitted by successor lenders who had purchased the loans. The losses to those lenders are considered reasonably foreseeable pecuniary harm because the lenders purchased the loans “without an awareness of [their] true value due to ... fraud.” United States v. Yeung, 672 F.3d 594, 603 (9th Cir.2012), overruled on other grounds by Robers v. United States, 572 U.S. ––––, 134 S.Ct. 1854, 188 L.Ed.2d 885 (2014). Although Yeung examined proximate cause in the context of the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3663A, we see no reason why its reasoning would not apply to determine losses in the sentencing context.
The court reviews de novo the legality of a restitution order, including the district court's valuation method. Yeung, 672 F.3d at 600. Factual findings supporting an order of restitution are reviewed for clear error. United States v. Chao Fan Xu, 706 F.3d 965, 993 (9th Cir.2013).
Tiffany did not file objections to the PSR. The failure to object might otherwise call for review under the “plain error” standard. We need not consider that possibility, however, because we conclude that the district court did not err at all. For a similar reason, we reject Tiffany's argument alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, discussed below at 17–18.
The Mandatory Victims Restitution Act requires that defendants be ordered to pay restitution to any victim “directly and proximately harmed as a result of the commission of an offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(2). The district court properly determined that Aaron owed $1,520,296.77 and Tiffany owed $667,505.42 in restitution.
The standard of proof for restitution proceedings is preponderance of the evidence, as opposed to the standard of clear and convincing evidence required for a sentencing enhancement with a disproportionate impact. 18 U.S.C. § 3664(e).
The Hymases also argue that the loan servicers listed in the PSR did not themselves suffer losses. This argument was not presented to the trial court, and it cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. See United States v. Napier, 463 F.3d 1040, 1045–46 (9th Cir.2006). Although we may consider newly-raised issues that are “purely legal,” this argument is not purely legal because it requires fact-finding as to the terms between the servicing entities and the successor holders of the loan.

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