Source: https://keithhotten.net/criminal-law-ordinances/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 18:33:25+00:00

Document:
Specimen Directions in Jury Trials – a slight misnomer as most of these directions apply equally to the tribunal of fact and law – Judge or Magistrate – in the District Court and Magistrates’ Courts in Hong Kong. However they are fundamentally important in all criminal trials and need to be understood, not least by practitioners, as well as jurors and defendants.
Joint Enterprise – Chan Wing- Siu v The Queen  AC 168 overturned by the Supreme Court (UK) but not in Hong Kong.
R v Jogee  UKSC 8 & Ruddock v The Queen  UKPC 7 – in this landmark judgment the Supreme Court has corrected an ‘error’ at common law that has stood for over 30 years.
“77. The rule in Chan Wing-Siu is often described as “joint enterprise liability”. However, the expression “joint enterprise” is not a legal term of art. As the Court of Appeal observed in R v A  QB 841, para 9, it is used in practice in a variety of situations to include both principals and accessories. As applied to the rule in Chan Wing-Siu, it unfortunately occasions some public misunderstanding. It is understood (erroneously) by some to be a form of guilt by association or of guilt by simple presence without more. It is important to emphasise that guilt of crime by mere association has no proper part in the common law.
However the CFA in HKSAR v Chan Kam Shing FACC 5/2016 firmly rejected following the change of approach adopted by the UK Supreme Court in R v Jogee and R v Ruddock  2 WLR 681. The CFA held that ‘The joint criminal enterprise doctrine based on Chan Wing Siu and the cases following it, endorsed by this Court in Sze Kwan Lung, continues to apply in Hong Kong, operating alongside the traditional accessorial liability principles.’ Per Ribeiro PJ at para 98.
Loss of Time in Unmeritorious Appeals – Practice Direction SL 4 and Chau Ching Kay, Nauthum v HKSAR  1 HKLRD 99 paras 52 – 79.
Li Defan and Anor v HKSAR  1 HKLRD 527; (2002) 5 HKCFAR 320 – when may a judge/jury draw inferences against an accused because they had not given evidence – infringement to right to silence.
One-Third ‘Discount’ HKSAR v Ng Wing Chung CACC 176/2005 – additional discount (c. 10%) on guilty plea (total 40%) for admitting offences that the prosecution would otherwise not have been able to prove.
One Third Discount Reviewed – HKSAR v Ngo Van Nam (CACC 418/2014) and HKSAR v Abdou Maikido Abdoulkarim (CACC 327/2015) see Legal Circular No5 of2016 The issue has arisen in earlier appeals: in HKSAR v Lo Kam Fai  HKEC 593, Yeung and Lunn VPP and Macrae JA all agreed that it is appropriate to consider whether there should be a different approach to sentencing between a Defendant who enters a “timely plea” and a Defendant who enters an “untimely plea”.
Chau Ching Kay, Nauthum v HKSAR  1 HKLRD 99; (2002) 5 HKCFAR 540 – It is settled law that a confession statement may be admitted in evidence if it was made voluntarily in the sense that it has not been obtained from an accused either by fear of prejudice or hope of advantage excited or held out by a person in authority or by oppression. Secretary for Justice v. Lam Tat Ming & another (2000) 3 HKCFAR 168; Ibrahim v. R.  AC 599; DPP v. Ping Lin  AC 574; and R. v. Lam Yip Ying  HKLR 419.
SJ v Lam Tat Ming and Anor  2 HKLRD 431; (2000) 3 HKCFAR 168 – appeal, inter alia, concerns the proper approach to the exercise of this residual discretion in relation to a voluntary confession. Where a law enforcement agency through an undercover operation obtained from a suspect a confession which is held to be voluntary, how should the court approach the exercise of this residual discretion ?
The above case involved an allegation of indecent assault which took place on a plane during its flight from Munich to Hong Kong. The 22-year old Appellant was a fourth-year medical student in a university in Sydney at the material time. During the trial, four letters concerning the good character of the Appellant were produced collectively as defence exhibit D2 without any challenge by the prosecution.
It is not clear from the appeal bundle before the Court in what way those letters had been produced in court. Enquiry made with fiat counsel revealed that the letters were produced under section 65B of the Criminal Procedure Ordinance (“CPO”). However, this issue was not raised during the appeal. Those letters covered not only the general and professional conduct of the Appellant, but also his attitudes and behaviour towards young women as observed by people surrounding him during the previous years.
From time to time counsel for the defence may seek to adduce evidence of the defendant’s good character.
If on a sufficient basis prosecuting counsel agrees to the production of the evidence without calling the witness to give evidence at the trial, the evidence should be properly adduced under section 65B or section 65C of CPO. Facts admitted under section 65C are deemed to be conclusively proved. Whereas evidence tendered under section 65B has the same effect of direct oral evidence being given by the witness, such evidence can be undermined in the usual way and the Court is not bound to accept it.
The Appellant in the present appeal is an Australian with no previous criminal conviction in Hong Kong. At trial, parties agreed that “The defendant has a clear record” by way of an admitted fact under section 65C of CPO. Such an overall admission of a “clear record” should not be made without any factual basis. In the absence of reliable information about a defendant’s criminal record outside Hong Kong, a restrictive admission such as “The defendant has a clear criminal record in Hong Kong” is considered to be more appropriate. It would be a matter for the defence to adduce evidence of lack of criminal record elsewhere by calling evidence.

References: UKSC 
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