Source: https://www.classactionprofessor.com/blog/certification/page/2/
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 12:37:59+00:00

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Finding the requirements of FRCP 23(a) and 23(b)(3) met, United States District Judge for the Northern District of Illinois James B. Zagel granted plaintiff's motion for class certification in a case regarding IOMC's handling of escrow accounts. Fournigault v. Independence One Mortgage Corp. (Feb. 21).- A.S.
On March 4, 2006, in Schwarm v. Craighead, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8791 (E.D. Ca. 2006), Judge William B. Shubb certified the class in this action alleging that a debt collections company 1) violated the due process rights of those from which it attempted to recover fees, 2) fraudulently misrepresented itself, and 3) failed to comply with the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act. After initally finding that it had supplemental jurisdictions over the state law claims, the court held that the plaintiff met the numerosity, commonality, and typicality requirements of FRCP 23(a). The court found that since defendants intended to rely upon the a California law to defend itself across the claims, the commonality element was met. Moreover, it rejected defendant's claim that the typicality element was absent because the letters sent to plaintiff and absent class members were not identical, holding that precise symmetry is not required to establish typicality. The court further held that plaintiff's financial history did not bar her from serving as an adequate class representative, and that the class could be properly certified under either 23(b)(2) or (3). - L.C.
On March 1, 2006, Lousiana appellate court Judge John Saunders affirmed a lower court's class certification in a tort case where students, teachers, staff, and visitors at a high school claim injuries from exposure to the product Armor-Flex used during a roofing project. Rapp v. Iberia Parish Sch. Board, 2006 La. App. LEXIS 434 (La. App. Ct. 2006). The defense argued that the trial court erred in certifying the class. The court disagreed, holding that: the class consisted of numerous individuals with plausible claims, satisfying the numerosity requirement; liability was a central issue and common to all parties (even though the parties suffered differying levels of injuries), satisfying the commonality requirement; and the claims of the class representatives and the remainder of the proposed class all arose from the same chemical exposure, meeting the typicality requirement. - L.C.
This is a typical "mass tort" case, although the mass-ness of the tort was confined to a single building. Nonetheless, the key question at certification was commonality (and hence predominance). The Louisiana court here took a liberal approach, holding that questions concerning the defendant's liability were common and predominant. Such rulings are essential if mass tort cases are to be litigated collectively. - W.B.R.
A class of NY prison inmates with Hepatitis C allege, among other things, that the State failed to provide medical treatment for their disease until they completed a substance abuse program in violation of the Eighth Amendment and disability discrimination statutes. Hilton v. Wright, 2006 WL 459202 (N.D.N.Y.). On February 27, 2006, Judge David N. Hurd found that the plaintiffs satisfied the certification requirements of Rule 23(a) and that the challenged prison policies generally affected all class members, satisfying the requirement of Rule 23(b)(2). The court alternatively found that certification was proper under Rule 23(b)(1)(A) or Rule 23(b)(1)(B). - A.L.
On February 15, 2006, In Thorn v. Jefferson Pilot Life Insurance, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's rejection of class action certification to a group of African American plaintiffs in this Section 1981 and 1982 case against a life insurance company for charging race-based dual rates. Judge Karen Williams found that because the defendant presented statute of limitations issues that had to be addressed on an individual basis, the class claims did not predominate over the individual claims as required for certification under 23(b)(3). The court noted that the Fifth Circuit had held otherwise in a similar case last year, In re Monumental Life Ins. Co., 365 F.3d 408 (5th Cir. 2004), but distinguished those facts from the case at bar. The court also affirmed the district court's ruling that plaintiff's claim for equitable restitution was not susceptible to class-wide determination and rejected plaintiff's argument that certification was appropriate under 23(b)(2) because equitable relief predominated, holding that certification under that provision was improper where the predominant relief sought was not declaratory or injunctive in nature, even if equitable. Judge Michael wrote a strong dissent, arguing that without class certification the defendant would never be held accountable if it discriminated against 1.4 million African Americans. -L.C.
Plaintiffs asked the court to convert their class certification into a limited fund class, pursuant to Rule 23(b)(1)(B), which aggregates claims against a fund that is insufficient to satisfy all claims and would prevent absent class members receiving notice and opting out. Klein v. O'Neal, Inc., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5436 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 13, 2006). Judge Sidney A. Fitzwater determined that for a class to be a limited fund class, the case must have the characteristics that the Supreme Court defined in Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999). Because there was no showing that the case had the most distinctive characteristic - that the aggregated claims exceed the funds available to pay them - the court refused to convert the class into a limited fund class. - A.L.
On Feb. 7, in Gonzeles v. Arrow Financial Services LLC, United States District Judge for the Southern District of California John Houston certified a class in litigation alleging that defendant sent form collection letters violating the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and California's Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. Rejecting defendant's argument, the court held that the legislative history of a 1999 amendment to the Rosenthal Act "demonstrates the legislature intended to allow class actions for violations of the Rosenthal Act." After finding the class satisfied FRCP 23(a) and 23(b), the court certified the class.- A.S.
In Williams v. Boeing Co., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27481, the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington granted partial summary judgment on November 4 as to the named plaintiffs' individual compensation discrimination claims, finding that there was no evidence these particular plaintiffs had been discriminated against and hence concluding that they lacked standing to pursue their compensation claims. Having found that the named plaintiffs did not have viable claims, the Court ruled that they logically could not have "typical" claims and that they could not therefore represent the class. The remaining class action allegations - concerning promotions, not compensation - will nonetheless proceed to trial in December.
In Thomas Murray v. New Cingular Wireless Services Inc., U.S. District Judge for the Northern District of Illinois Ruben Castillo certified a class of plaintiffs in a lawsuit accusing AT&T Wireless of unlawfully pulling the credit reports of more than 700,000 Illinois residents. The Judge found that the named plaintiffs met all FRCP 23 requirements, in particular rejecting arguments that plaintiff was not adequate because of recurrent memory loss. Finding this loss not as serious as defendants purported, the Judge held that it was not important that plaintiff know as much about the case as attorneys. "Understanding the minutia of a case is not a prerequisite to being a class representative," Judge Castillo wrote. The judge also rejected the argument, adopted by U.S. District Judge for the Northern District of Illinois Samuel Der- Yeghiayan in Murray v. GMAC Mortgage Corp., that plaintiff was disqualified as a "professional plaintiff." Judge Castillo wrote, 'While the Murrays have participated in numerous class actions, we have no evidence of any improper actions by Mr. Murray or his attorneys." - A.S.
On November 15, 2005 U.S. District Court Judge J. Shea granted plaintiffs’ motion for class certification against the Department of Social Health Services under FRE 23(a) and 23(b)(2). 2005 WL 3050388. The complaint alleges the DSHS demanded entry into day care services and demanded copies of business and personal records without advising the day care operator of the right to refuse consent to search or to contact an attorney. In certifying the class, the court rejected defendant’s argument that a showing of “necessity” of class certification is required by Rule 23. - J.J.

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