Source: https://www.loeb.com/en/insights/publications/2010/01/yeager-v-cingular-wireless-llc-et-al
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 14:19:13+00:00

Document:
Yeager v. Cingular Wireless LLC, et al.
Court denies defendant’s motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s common law and statutory misappropriation of likeness claims, rejecting defendant’s argument that its press release announcing a new service, that included plaintiff’s name, was noncommercial speech entitled to First Amendment protection, and rejecting argument that defendant’s use of plaintiff’s name as a trademark in press release was a nominative fair use.
Yeager filed suit for, among other things, violation of California common law and statutory commercial misappropriation of likeness and false endorsement under the Lanham Act, arising from Cingular’s use of Yeager’s name without his consent.
Cingular moved for summary judgment on the commercial misappropriation claims, arguing that the press release is noncommercial speech entitled to First Amendment protection and that its use of Yeager’s name was incidental. Cingular also moved for summary judgment on the Lanham Act claim, arguing that Yeager presented no evidence of actual confusion caused by its use of Yeager’s name and that its use of Yeager’s name was a nominative fair use. The court denied Cingular’s motion for summary judgment on all of Yeager’s claims.
The court analyzed the law as follows: to state a claim for misappropriation of likeness under California common law, a plaintiff must prove: (1) the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s identity; (2) the appropriation of plaintiff’s name or likeness to defendant’s advantage, commercially or otherwise; (3) lack of consent; and (4) resulting injury. See Downing v. Abercrombie & Fitch, 265 F.3d 994, 1001 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Eastwood v. Superior Court, 149 Cal. App. 3d 409, 417 (1983)).
California Civil Code § 3344(a) provides in relevant part that “[a]ny person who knowingly uses another’s name . . . in any manner . . . for purposes of advertising or selling, or soliciting purchases of . . . goods or services, without such person’s prior consent . . . shall be liable for any damages sustained by the person or persons injured as a result thereof.” According to the court, Section 3344 complements the common law cause of action for commercial misappropriation. A plaintiff making a claim under Section 3344 must allege a knowing use by the defendant as well as a direct connection between the alleged use and the commercial purpose, in addition to proving the elements of the common law cause of action.
California courts recognize that the First Amendment protects some statements from liability. As the court stated, a “court must consider the nature of the precise information conveyed and the context of the communication.” If the speech is classified as commercial speech, it is not actionable “when the plaintiff’s identity is used, without consent, to promote an unrelated product.” Gionfriddo v. Major League Baseball, 94 Cal. App. 4th 400, 413 (2001).
The defendant argued that the press release was noncommercial speech that deserves the full protection of the First Amendment because it does not propose any commercial transactions and does not offer any products or services. The court noted that the boundary between commercial and noncommercial speech has yet to be clearly delineated. “On one end of the spectrum, an advertisement is clearly commercial speech. On the other end of the spectrum is speech that, when viewed as a whole, expresses editorial comment on matters of interest to the public. Informational publications that refer to or promote a specific product, but are not mere proposals to engage in commercial transactions, present a closer question regarding the appropriate classification of the type of speech” (citations omitted).
The court also rejected the defendant’s argument that its use of plaintiff’s name was an incidental use. The court explained that whether the use of a plaintiff’s name or likeness falls within the incidental use exception to liability “is determined by the role that the use of the plaintiff’s name or likeness plays in the main purpose and subject of the work at issue.” See Preston v. Martin Bregman Prods., Inc., 765 F. Supp. 116, 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). Generally, “a plaintiff’s name is not appropriated by mere mention of it.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652C, comment d. A claim is also not actionable when a plaintiff’s likeness is appropriated because “it is published for purposes other than taking advantage of his reputation, prestige, or other value associated with him.” Id.
The court then turned to Yeager’s Lanham Act claim for false endorsement. A false endorsement claim is actionable under the Lanham Act if such claim is based on the unauthorized use of a uniquely distinguishing characteristic of a celebrity’s identity that is likely to confuse consumers as to the plaintiff’s sponsorship or approval of the product. Defendant contended that plaintiff’s claim fails as a matter of law because (1) plaintiff cannot demonstrate triable issues of fact regarding actual confusion because the press release did not contain any express endorsement; and (2) the nominative fair use doctrine supports summary judgment.
The court denied summary judgment for defendant on the Lanham Act claim because the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence regarding likelihood of confusion to withstand summary judgment. “While there is little relationship between plaintiff’s mark and the cellular services in emergency situations and scant specific evidence regarding actual confusion, the court cannot find that defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law at this stage in the litigation.” The court also rejected the defendant’s argument that its use was a nominative fair use, stating that nominative fair use is a defense in a class of cases “where the use of the trademark does not attempt to capitalize on consumer confusion or to appropriate the cachet of one product for a different one.” New Kids On The Block v. New Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308 (9th Cir. 1992). To establish a nominative fair use defense, a defendant must prove: (1) the product or service in question must be one not readily identifiable without use of the trademark; (2) only so much of the mark or marks may be used as is reasonably necessary to identify the product or service; and (3) the user must do nothing that would, in conjunction with the mark, suggest sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark holder.

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