Source: http://nm.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20101014_0001480.DNM.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 20:51:13+00:00

Document:
THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Defendant City of Albuquerque's ("the City's") Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence of Other Supposed Allegations of Improper Conduct Against Michael Padilla [Doc. 80], filed September 13, 2010. The Court, having considered the motion, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, and otherwise being fully advised, finds that the Motion shall be granted in part and denied in part.
To prevail on her hostile work environment claim at trial, Lopez must demonstrate that she was subjected to a sexually hostile work environment by Padilla for which the City may be liable. Harsco Corp. v. Renner, 475 F.3d 1179, 1186 (10th Cir. 2007). The City is vicariously liable for a hostile work environment created by Padilla if Lopez proves that Padilla had supervisory authority over her, and that the affirmative defense recognized by the United States Supreme Court in Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998) and Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998) does not apply. Wright-Simmons v. City of Oklahoma City, 155 F.3d 1264, 1270 (10th Cir. 1998). Alternatively, the City may be liable, under a negligence standard, if Lopez proves that the City knew or should have known about the hostile work environment to which Lopez was subject and failed to respond in a timely and appropriate manner. Id. Under the latter theory of liability, the City may face liability for the hostile work environment regardless of whether Padilla was Lopez's supervisor, co-worker, or a third-party at the time. CITE.
In its motion in limine, the City seeks the exclusion of evidence of allegations of workplace misconduct by Padilla. More specifically, it seeks to exclude 1) testimony or other evidence regarding the alleged sexual harassment of employees at Padilla's prior places of employment, including the testimony of Claudia Rodriguez Guzman and Monica Rios; 2) the report and testimony of the City's private investigator, Robert Casey; 3) . . .
The Court will exclude, under Federal Rule of Evidence 403, testimony or evidence related to allegations of sexual harassment made against Padilla at his prior places of employment, including GE Consumer Finance and MCIT Telecommunications unless Lopez can establish that the City knew of such allegations prior to the filing of the internal complaint by Lopez and other women on March 7, 2007.
Because the alleged incidents of prior sexual harassment occurred outside of Padilla's employment with the City, they are not relevant to establish the environment in which Lopez and other women worked with Padilla at the City. See Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d. 1406, 1415 (10th Cir. 1987) (concluding that incidents of sexual harassment involving employees other than the plaintiff are relevant in establishing the general work atmosphere, but apparently limiting the inquiry to harassment of those "working alongside" the plaintiff). Moreover, it is clear that it would be improper for Lopez to present evidence of alleged sexual harassment by Padilla at his prior places of employment in order to establish that Padilla sexually harassed her at the 911 Center. See Fed. R. Evid. 404(b).
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), evidence of prior bad acts may be admissible for purposes other than proving character of a person, such as proof of motive, intent, and knowledge. Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). Lopez argues that evidence of sexual harassment allegations against Padilla at his prior places of employment is relevant to demonstrate 1) notice to the City, and 2) discriminatory intent or motivation. Both of these purposes are permissible under 404(b). However, the inquiry does not end with the purpose of the evidence.
Evidence of prior bad acts, even if offered for a proper purpose, is admissible only if 1) it is relevant under Fed. R. Evid. 401; 2) the probative value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice under Fed. R. Evid. 403; and 3) the district court, upon request, instructs the jury to consider the evidence only for the purpose for which it was admitted. Wilson v. Muckala, 303 F.3d 1207, 1217 (10th Cir. 2002).
Next, Lopez argues that evidence of sexual harassment by Padilla at prior places of employment is also relevant to show discriminatory intent or motivation. Lopez emphasizes that the City denies that Padilla's conduct was sexual or discriminatory. Proof of motive or intent is a proper purpose for the evidence of prior sexual harassment. See Fed. R. Evid. 404(b); Wilson, 303 F.3d at 1217. Nevertheless, in this case, evidence of sexual harassment by Padilla at prior places of employment must be excluded, though it may be offered by Lopez for a proper purpose, because its probative value is substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice.

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.