Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&amp;view=article&amp;id=50676:gr-164815-2008&amp;catid=1502&amp;Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 09:10:11+00:00

Document:
SR. INSP. JERRY C. VALEROSO, Petitioner, v. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
THE law looks forward, never backward. Lex prospicit, non respicit. A new law has a prospective, not retroactive, effect.1 However, penal laws that favor a guilty person, who is not a habitual criminal, shall be given retroactive effect.1-a These are the rule, the exception and exception to the exception on effectivity of laws.
Ang batas ay tumitingin sa hinaharap, hindi sa nakaraan. Gayunpaman, ang parusa ng bagong batas ay iiral kung ito ay pabor sa taong nagkasala na hindi pusakal na kriminal.
We apply the exception rather than the rule in this Petition for Review on Certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA), affirming with modification that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Quezon City, finding petitioner liable for illegal possession of a firearm.
One (1) cal. 38 "Charter Arms" revolver bearing Serial No. 52315 with five (5) live ammo. without first having secured the necessary license/permit issued by the proper authorities.
Quezon City, Philippines, July 15, 1996.
With the assistance of his counsel de parte, Atty. Oscar Pagulayan, petitioner pleaded not guilty when arraigned on October 9, 1996.19 Trial on the merits ensued.
SPO2 Disuanco and Deriquito testified for the prosecution in the manner stated above.
Upon the other hand, the defense version was supplied by the combined testimonies of petitioner Sr. Insp. Jerry C. Valeroso, SPO3 Agustin R. Timbol, Jr. and Adrian Yuson.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866 as amended by Republic Act No. 8294 and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period or from 4 years, 2 months and 1 day as minimum to 6 years as maximum and to pay the fine in the amount of Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00).
The gun subject of this case is hereby ordered confiscated in favor of the government. Let the same be put in trust in the hands of the Chief of the PNP.
Petitioner moved to reconsider47 but his motion was denied on August 27, 1998.48 He appealed to the CA.
Verily, the penalty imposed by the trial court upon the accused-appellant is modified to 4 years and 2 months as minimum up to 6 years as maximum.
WHEREFORE, withthe foregoing MODIFICATION as to the penalty, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in all other respects.
His motion for reconsideration50 having been denied through a Resolution dated August 3, 2004,51 petitioner resorted to the present petition under Rule 45.
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERRORS OF LAW IN AFFIRMING THE CONVICTION OF PETITIONER DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERRORS OF FACT AND LAW IN SUSTAINING THE LEGALITY OF THE SEARCH AND THE VALIDITY AND ADMISSIBILITY OF THE EVIDENCE OBTAINED THEREFROM DESPITE THE OVERWHELMING PROOF THAT THE SAME IS THE FRUIT OF THE POISONOUS TREE.
The prosecution was able to discharge its burden.
The Court on several occasions ruled that either the testimony of a representative of, or a certification from, the Philippine National Police (PNP) Firearms and Explosive Office attesting that a person is not a licensee of any firearm would suffice to prove beyond reasonable doubt the second element of possession of illegal firearms.59 The prosecution more than complied when it presented both.
The certification is outside the scope of the hearsay rule.
Sec. 44. Entries in official records. - Entries in official records made in the performance of his official duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specifically enjoined by law, are prima facieevidence of the facts therein stated.
It may be true that the contents of said certification are only prima facie evidence of the facts stated there. However, the failure of petitioner to present controverting evidence makes the presumption unrebutted. Thus, the presumption stands.
Petitioner, however, raises several points which he says entitles him to no less than an acquittal.
The assessment of credibility of witnesses lies with the trial court.
This contention deserves scant consideration.
The trial court found the prosecution version worthy of credence and belief. We find no compelling reason not to accept its observation on this score.
Worth noting is the fact that petitioner is a ranking police officer who not only claims to be highly decorated,65 but have effected a number of successful arrests66 as well. Common sense would dictate that he must necessarily be authorized to carry a gun. We thus agree with the Office of the Solicitor General that framing up petitioner would have been a very risky proposition. Had the arresting officers really intended to cause the damnation of petitioner by framing him up, they could have easily "planted" a more incriminating evidence rather than a gun. That would have made their nefarious scheme easier, assuming that there indeed was one.
The pieces of evidence show that petitioner is not legally authorized to possess the subject firearm and its five (5) ammunition.
Although petitioner is correct in his submission that public officers like policemen are accorded presumption of regularity in the performance of their official duties,68 it is only a presumption; it may be overthrown by evidence to the contrary. The prosecution was able to rebut the presumption when it proved that the issuance to petitioner of the Memorandum Receipt was anything but regular.
SPO3 Timbol, Jr. testified that he issued the Memorandum Receipt to petitioner based on the verbal instruction of his immediate superior, Col. Moreno.69 However, a reading of Timbol's testimony on cross-examination70 would reveal that there was an unusual facility by which said receipt was issued to petitioner. Its issuance utterly lacked the usual necessary bureaucratic constraints. Clearly, it was issued to petitioner under questionable circumstances.
Failure to offer an unlicensed firearm as evidence is not fatal provided there is competent testimony as to its existence.
We note that petitioner contradicted himself when he argued for the validity of the Memorandum Receipt and, at the same time, for the exclusion in evidence of the subject firearm and its ammunition. Petitioner's act may result to an absurd situation where the Memorandum Receipt is declared valid, while the subject firearm and its ammunition which are supposedly covered by the Memorandum Receipt are excluded as evidence. That would have made the Memorandum Receipt useless.
In any case, petitioner's contention has no leg to stand on.
Contrary to petitioner's claim, the subject firearm73 and its five (5) live ammunition74 were offered in evidence by the prosecution.75 Even assuming arguendo that they were not offered, petitioner's stance must still fail. The existence of an unlicensed firearm may be established by testimony, even without its presentation at trial. In People v. Orehuela,76 the non-presentation of the pistol did not prevent the conviction of the accused.
We hasten to add that there may also be conviction where an unlicensed firearm is presented during trial but through inadvertence, negligence, or fortuitous event (for example, if it is lost), it is not offered in evidence, as long as there is competent testimony as to its existence.
Petitioner was charged with the crime of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition under the first paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, as amended. It provides that "[t]he penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any firearm, part of firearm, ammunition or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition."
Although an additional fine of P15,000.00 is imposed by R.A. No. 8294, the same is still advantageous to the accused, considering that the imprisonment is lowered to prision correccional in its maximum period84 from reclusion temporalin its maximum period to reclusion perpetua85 under P.D. No. 1866.
As to the subject firearm and its five (5) live ammunition, their proper disposition should be made under Article 45 of the Revised Penal Code89 which provides, among others, that the proceeds and instruments or tools of the crime shall be confiscated and forfeited in favor of the government.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 4, 2004 is AFFIRMED in full.
1 New Civil Code, Art. 4.
1-a Revised Penal Code, Art. 22 provides: Retroactive effect of penal laws. - Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect in so far as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same.
3 TSN, November 6, 1996, pp. 4-5, 9.
5 TSN, November 6, 1996, pp. 4, 7, 9.
7 Id. at 3. INP is now Philippine National Police (PNP).
10 TSN, November 6, 1996, pp. 14-15; TSN, December 11, 1996, p. 10.
12 Exhibits "E-1" to "E-5."
13 TSN, November 6, 1996, p. 6.
14 TSN, December 11, 1996, p. 21.
This is to certify that [the] Revolver, Charter Arms, Cal. 38 with serial number 52315 is registered to RAUL PALENCIA SALVATIERA of Sampaloc, Manila, acquired thru transfer f[ro]m Wilburn Irwin Lucasan per index card d[a]t[e]d 10 December 1990.
This certification is issued for whatever legal purpose it may serve.
16 TSN, December 11, 1996, pp. 19-20.
17 Entitled "An Act Codifying the Laws on Illegal/Unlawful Possession, Manufacture, Dealing in, Acquisition or Disposition of Firearms, Ammunition or Explosives or Instruments Used in the Manufacture of Firearms, Ammunition or Explosives, and Imposing Stiffer Penalties for Certain Violations Thereof, and for Relevant Purposes." This law was issued by President Ferdinand E. Marcos on June 29, 1983. See ZuÃ±o, Sr. v. Dizon, A.M. No. RTJ-91-752, June 23, 1993, 223 SCRA 584, 598.
20 TSN, February 19, 1997, pp. 19-21.
24 Id. at 3, 6.
25 TSN, March 17, 1997, p. 5.
32 TSN, March 17, 1997, pp. 22-26.
35 TSN, June 4, 1996, pp. 2-6.
36 TSN, August 4, 1997, p. 7.
53 Padilla v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121917, March 12, 1997, 269 SCRA 402; Mallari v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 110569, December 19, 1996, 265 SCRA 456; People v. Damaso, G.R. No. 93516, August 12, 1992, 212 SCRA 547.
54 TSN, November 6, 1996, pp. 4, 7, 9.
55 TSN, August 4, 1997, p. 12.
56 TSN, March 17, 1997, pp. 14-15, 19.
57 TSN, December 11, 1996, p. 21.
59 People v. Taan, G.R. No. 169432, October 30, 2006, 506 SCRA 219; Ungsod v. People, G.R. No. 158904, December 16, 2005, 478 SCRA 282; People v. Lazaro, G.R. No. 112090, October 26, 1999, 317 SCRA 435, citing Padilla v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121917, March 12, 1997, 269 SCRA 402; Rosales v. Court of Appeals, G.R. NOS. 106229-30, March 15, 1996, 255 SCRA 123; People v. Orehuela, G.R. NOS. 108780-81, April 29, 1994, 232 SCRA 82. See also Mallari v. Court of Appeals, supra note 53; People v. Solayao, G.R. No. 119220, September 20, 1996, 262 SCRA 255.
60 Rules of Court, Rule 130, Sec. 36.
Personal presence at trial. Another objection early asserted and repeated of late is the want of opportunity, in respect to the out-of-court declarant, for observation of his demeanor, with the light that this may shed on his credibility, that would be afforded if he were a witness on the stand.
The solemnity of the occasion and possibility of public disgrace can scarcely fail to impress the witness, and falsehood no doubt becomes more difficult if the person against whom directed is present.
62 Rollo, pp. 8, 136.
63 433 Phil. 343 (2002), citing People v. Sanchez, G.R. NOS. 121039-45, January 25, 1999, 302 SCRA 21; People v. Librando, 390 Phil. 543 (2000); People v. Deleverio, G.R. NOS. 118937-38, April 24, 1998, 289 SCRA 547; People v. Zaballero, G.R. No. 100935, June 30, 1997, 274 SCRA 627.
64 People v. Rivera, id. at 352.
66 TSN, March 17, 1997, p. 25.
67 Rollo, pp. 11-12, 138.
68 Gutang v. People, 390 Phil. 805, 817-818 (2000), citing People v. William, G.R. No. 93712, June 15, 1992, 209 SCRA 808; People v. Rumeral, G.R. No. 86320, August 5, 1991, 200 SCRA 194. See also Rules of Court, Rule 131, Sec. 3(m).
69 TSN, June 4, 1997, pp. 3-6.
A. Because our office has also authorized us to issue.
A: It is our Commanding Officer, Sir.
A: What I know is that the Commanding Officer is authorized to [issue] firearm that will be issued to a PNP Officer but I do not know who gave the authority to our officer.
A: That firearm was not in my custody.
A: Yes, Sir, I m only a RSO since November 1993.
71 Rollo, pp. 11, 137-138.
72 Sec. 34. Offer of evidence. - The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.
74 Exhibits "E-1" to "E-5."
75 TSN, February 19, 1997, p. 14.
76 G.R. NOS. 108780-81, April 29, 1994, 232 SCRA 82, 95-96.
77 G.R. No. 128148, February 16, 2004, 423 SCRA 34. See also People v. Taan, supra note 59; People v. Taguba, 396 Phil. 366 (2000).
78 TSN, November 6, 1996, pp. 4, 7, 9.
79 TSN, August 4, 1997, p. 12.
80 TSN, March 17, 1997, pp. 14-15, 19.
81 People v. Lazaro, supra note 59.
6. Deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty.
83 People v. Moran, 44 Phil. 387, 408 (1923), citing Fiore, Irretroactividad e Interpretacion de las Leyes.
Maximum : 3 years, 6 months 21 days to 4 years and 2 months.
87 343 Phil. 297 (1997).
88 G.R. No. 168728, August 2, 2007.
89 Art. 45. Confiscation and forfeiture of the proceeds or instruments of the crime. - Every penalty imposed for the commission of a felony shall carry with it the forfeiture of the proceeds of the crime and the instruments or tools with which it was committed.

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