Source: https://abkveteranslaw.com/blog?category=Veterans+Law
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 16:47:55+00:00

Document:
HELD: Blue Water Navy veterans who served in the “12 nautical mile territorial sea” of the Republic of Vietnam are entitled to the presumption of herbicide exposure and service connection under 38 U.S.C. § 1116.
SUMMARY: Mr. Procopio served aboard the USS Intrepid from 1964 to 1967, during which time the ship was deployed in the offshore waters of the Republic of Vietnam. In 2006 and 2007, he sought service connection for diabetes and prostate cancer, which the Regional Office denied in 2009. The Board affirmed the denial, as did the CAVC, relying on Haas v. Peake, 525 F.3d 1168 (Fed. Cir. 2008). In Haas, the Federal Circuit had held that the language in 38 U.S.C. § 1116, “served in the Republic of Vietnam,” was ambiguous and thus deferred to VA’s “reasonable interpretation” that required “duty or visitation on the landmass” of Vietnam or in the inland waterways in order to be entitled to the presumption of service connection for certain herbicide-related conditions. Haas, 525 F.3d at 1184, 1195.
Mr. Procopio appealed to the Federal Circuit and the Court asked the parties to address (1) whether the phrase “served in the Republic of Vietnam” includes “service in the offshore waters within the legally recognized territorial limits of the Republic of Vietnam” and (2) what role, if any, does the “pro-claimant canon” of interpretation of veterans’ statutes play in this analysis.
The Federal Circuit, en banc, reviewed the history of the Agent Orange Act of 1991 and VA’s implementing regulations, and assessed VA’s interpretation of the statutory language under the analysis set forth in Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). Chevron directs courts to first assess “whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.” If so, the court is to “give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.” If the statutory language is ambiguous, step two of the Chevron analysis requires courts to determine “whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute” – and, if the agency’s interpretation is “reasonable,” Chevron requires courts to defer to that reasonable interpretation.
Because the Court determined at Chevron step one that Congress’s intent was clear, it did not reach step two. The Court thus overruled Haas and held that veterans who served in the 12 nautical mile territorial sea of the “Republic of Vietnam” are entitled to the presumption of service connection under 38 U.S.C. § 1116.
NOTE: On November 2, 2018, docket no. 17-1679, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Gray v. Wilkie, to address whether the Federal Circuit has jurisdiction to review VA’s interpretation of its own regulation when VA issues that interpretive rule in its adjudication manual. The manual provision in question is the one that excludes deep water harbors from its definition of “inland waterways.” On February 1, 2019, the Solicitor General submitted a memorandum to the Supreme Court “suggesting that this case may become moot” in light of Procopio. The memorandum notes that “the Solicitor General has not yet determined whether to file a petition for a writ of certiorari in Procopio” and, therefore, the Gray case is not yet moot – nor is it likely to become moot before the February 25, 2019 oral argument. However, the Solicitor General stated that the case may become moot after oral argument but before a decision is issued.
HELD: Attorney challenging VA’s policy to provide draft rating decisions to VSOs, but not attorneys, has direct standing and third-party standing to bring the challenge, and the appropriate remedy is to order the Secretary to issue a decision on his request for access to draft rating decisions.
SUMMARY: Mr. Rosinski, veterans’ attorney, petitioned the Court for a writ of mandamus to compel VA to provide him with the same access to preliminary draft rating decisions that VA makes available to VSOs. This is the second petition filed on this issue. The Court dismissed the first one for lack of standing.
The Court now determined that Mr. Rosinski has direct standing to have the Court hear his petition because (1) he has a statutory right under 38 U.S.C. § 5904(a) to represent clients throughout the VA claims process and the Secretary’s policy violates that right; (2) the Secretary is required under 38 U.S.C. § 5701(b) to disclosed “files, records, reports, and other papers and documents” to the “duly authorized agent or representative of a claimant”; and (3) “the Secretary’s policy results in both tangible and intangible harm” to the petitioner.
HELD: Timely Notice of Appeal filed after the veteran’s death was not valid with respect to the substituted party, but the eligible substitute may amend the NOA to name her as the appellant and ask the Court to relate the amended NOA back to the date the original NOA was filed so as to make it timely.
SUMMARY: On October 3, 2017, the Court received a timely NOA of a June 22, 2017 Board decision. Shortly afterwards, the attorneys who filed the NOA notified the Court that the veteran had passed away and filed a motion to substitute his surviving spouse. The Court then discovered that the veteran had passed away in August 2017 – after the Board’s decision, but before the NOA had been filed. Because “a dead person may not appeal a Board decision,” the Court found that the NOA was “defective,” but still allowed the surviving spouse to file an amended NOA and to relate that NOA back to the date of the original filing.
HELD: In order to rebut the presumption of soundness, 38 U.S.C. § 1111 has always required VA to prove that a condition both pre-existed and was not aggravated by service. However, that is not how VA interpreted the statute prior to 2003 – and the Court declined to retroactively apply the correct statutory interpretation, as set forth in Wagner v. Principi, 370 F.3d 1089 (Fed. Cir. 2004), to an appeal alleging CUE in a pre-2003 final decision.
SUMMARY: Kevin George was diagnosed with schizophrenia in service. A Medical Board report found that the condition pre-existed and was aggravated by service, but a Physical Evaluation Board found that the pre-existing condition was not aggravated by service. He filed a claim for service connection a few months after discharge and was denied in 1976. The Board denied the claim in 1977.
On appeal at the CAVC, the Court outlined the relevant law. The Court first noted that the presumption of soundness statute in 1977 (and today) allowed the Secretary to rebut only by showing of clear and unmistakable evidence of bothpre-existence andlack of aggravation. However, VA’s implementing regulation in 1977, 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(b), only required clear and unmistakable evidence that the condition pre-existed service. VA invalidated the regulation in 2003. Wagner was decided in 2004.
The Court then discussed the Federal Circuit’s decision in Wagner and its subsequent holding in Jordan v. Nicholson, 401 F.3d 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2005). In Jordan, the Court applied the DAV rule to Wagner, holding that “CUE does not arise from a new regulatory interpretation of a statute.” In other words, even though Wagner explained that the presumption of soundness statute has always meant that it can only be rebutted with clear and unmistakable evidence of both pre-existence and a lack of aggravation, a claimant could not raise a CUE challenge to a final decision based on the invalidation of VA’s implementing regulation that only required a showing of pre-existence to rebut.
Finally, the Court discussed the Patrick line of primarily nonprecedential cases that addressed Wagner, Jordan, and retroactivity in a CUE case. In Patrick, as in the present appeal, the claimant argued CUE in a prior final decision based on the incorrect application of the presumption of soundness. The CAVC affirmed the Board’s denial and the Federal Circuit remanded for the Court to consider the application of Wagner, which had recently been decided at that time.
On remand, the CAVC again affirmed the Board’s denial, citing Jordan for holding that Wagner’s “new” interpretation of the presumption of soundness did not retroactively apply in a CUE case. Mrs. Patrick again appealed, and, in Patrick III, also a nonprecedential decision, the Federal Circuit explained that Jordan dealt with “whether a change in the regulatory interpretation of a statute had retroactive effect on CUE [motions], not whether [its] interpretation of the statute in Wagner had retroactive effect on CUE [motions].” The Federal Circuit described the Jordan holding as limited, stating that “[u]nlike changes in regulations and statutes, which are prospective, [the Court’s] interpretation of a statute is retrospective in that it explains what the statute has meant since the date of enactment.” In other words, “Wagner did not change the law but explained what [section] 1111 has always meant.” The Federal Circuit remanded the matter back to the CAVC to determine whether VA rebutted the presumption of soundness with clear and unmistakable evidence of a lack of aggravation. The CAVC vacated the Board’s decision, and the attorney filed an application for EAJA fees.
The Court further found that even if Wagner applied retroactively, Mr. George’s CUE allegation would fail because he did not prove that the 2016 Board erred in determining that the 1977 Board’s errors did not manifestly change the outcome of its decision. The Court thus affirmed the 2016 Board’s decision.
HELD: Surviving spouse of veteran whose death was service connected under 38 U.S.C. § 1151 and who is thus entitled to DIC benefits is not entitled to home loan guaranty benefits under Ch. 37.
SUMMARY: Surviving spouse was granted dependency and indemnity compensation (DIC) after her husband’s death was deemed service connected under 38 U.S.C. § 1151. She sought and obtained a certificate of eligibility (COE) for a VA home loan in 2007, but never entered into a loan agreement. In 2013, she again requested an eligibility determination for a loan guaranty and was informed that she was not eligible and that the 2007 COE was issue in error.
On appeal, the Court reviewed the relevant statutory provisions and determined that she was not eligible under the plain language or the legislative history of 38 U.S.C. § 1151 or Ch. 37. The Court also determined that the “incontestability” provision of 38 U.S.C. § 3721 applies to the relationship between the government and lending institutions – not between the government and those who are eligible for a loan guaranty. Finally, the Court addressed the appellant’s arguments regarding the Court’s ability to provide relief based on its equitable powers. The Court acknowledged that while it has equitable authority, “that authority is constrained by the jurisdiction Congress conferred on the Court.” The Court discussed the four equitable principles argued by the appellant – injunctive relief, equitable estoppel, laches, and waiver – and determined that none were available in this case as a form of relief.
The Supreme Court added Kisor v. Wilkie to its docket.
The Court will limit its review to the first question in the petition - whether the Court should overrule Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997) and Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945), with respect to deferring to VA’s interpretation of its own ambiguous regulations.
HELD: The M21-1 provision that excludes all Vietnamese bays and harbors from the definition of “inland waterways,” for purposes of presumptive exposure to herbicides, is not binding on the Board – and while the Board can rely on this M21-1 provision as a factor in its analysis, it “must independently review the matter the M21-1 addresses” and explain its reliance on the provision.
SUMMARY: Patrick Overton appealed the denial of service connection for diabetes and ischemic heart disease, asserting that he was exposed to herbicides while serving aboard the USS Providencein Da Nang Harbor in 1967. The Board denied the claims based on VA’s Adjudication Procedures Manual(M21-1) that excluded all bays and harbors from the definition of “inland waterways.” *3.
At the Court, Mr. Overton argued that he is entitled to the presumption of service connection based on herbicide exposure and that the Board failed to analyze the possibility of his exposure. *4. He argued that the Board is required to determine whether it was at least as likely as not that there were levels of herbicides in Da Nang Harbor “sufficient to justify the herbicide exposure presumption, not whether it is probable that he was exposed to herbicides.” *5. The Secretary argued that the Board properly applied the law.
The Court discussed the legal history surrounding VA’s distinction between “blue water” and “brown water” and its definition of “inland waterways” for purposes of presuming exposure to herbicides. *6-7. The Court summarized this history as follows: (1) VA can “draw reasonable lines demarcating inland versus offshore waterways when considering whether a veteran is entitled to the presumption of herbicide exposure” (Haas v. Peake, 525 F.3d 1168 (Fed. Cir. 2008)); (2) VA must do so “in a reasoned, nonarbitrary manner focused on the likelihood of herbicide exposure” (Gray v. McDonald, 27 Vet.App. 313 (2015)); and (3) “the Board is not bound by M21-1 provisions” (Gray v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs, 875 F.3d 1102 (Fed. Cir. 2017)). *7.
Turning to Mr. Overton’s appeal, the Court found that the Board provided no more than a description of the holdings in Haasand Gray“to support its conclusion that Da Nang Harbor is not brown water warranting presumptive herbicide exposure.” *8. The Court found that the Board’s terse reference to the “new guidance” of the M21-1 provision was error because the Board is not bound by the M21-1 – and for it to simply “cite an M21-1 provision without further analysis … would effectively convert the M21-1 into substantive rules as a practical matter without providing a means to challenge such rules under the [Administrative Procedure Act].” *8. The Court added that the Board’s citation to the M21-1 as the sole support for its conclusion – that Da Nang Harbor is blue water – is inconsistent with the statutory requirement that the Board adequately explain its decisions.
The Court recognized that the M21-1 provision is relevant to issues on appeal – and that the Board cannot ignore this relevant provision. However, the Court held that the Board cannot “simply rely on an M21-1 provision … without first independently reviewing the matter” and explaining “why it finds the M21-1 an accurate guideline for its decision.” The Court rephrased its holding: “[T]he Board is required to discuss any relevant provisions contained in the M21-1 as part of its duty to provide adequate reasons or bases, but because it is not bound by those provisions, it must make its own determination before it chooses to rely on an M21-1 provision as a factor to support its decision.” *8. The Court remanded for the Board to explain its reliance on the M21-1 provision. *9.
The Court further noted that the purpose of the regulation that established the herbicide presumption was “to compensate veterans based on the probability or likelihood of exposure to herbicides.” On remand, the Court directed the Board to “explain why its determination of entitlement to presumptive service connection is based on a likely herbicide exposure and achieves the purpose behind the regulation.” *9.
At oral argument, the Secretary urged the Court to defer to his M21-1 interpretation under Auer v. Robins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997). The Court declined to address this argument, as the Secretary did not raise it in his brief, but instead raised it for the first time at oral argument. *9-10.
The Court also declined the address Mr. Overton’s arguments regarding service connection on a direct basis because that theory might be connected to the issue of presumptive exposure. *11.
Veteran Melba Saunders served in the U.S. Army from 1987 to 1994. She had no knee problems prior to service. Her service medical records show treatment for “knee pain.” Her separation examination report notes a history of swollen knee.
In 1994, the RO denied her claim for service connection for her knees because she failed to appear for an examination. She did not appeal that decision and it became final. In 2008, she requested reopening, and RO denied service connection for her bilateral knees because it found no evidence of treatment. She appealed and was afforded a C&P examination. The examiner diagnosed “subjective bilateral knee pain” – and concluded that this condition is “at least as likely as not” related to service.
The RO asked the examiner for clarification, noting that “pain” is not a diagnosis. The examiner replied that there is no pathology to render a diagnosis – and that his theory is based on the chronology of events. The RO again denied service connection, and Ms. Saunders appealed to the Board.
The Board denied her claim, stating that “pain alone is not a disability,” and citing Sanchez-Benitez. Ms. Saunders appealed to the Court – and the CAVC affirmed the Board’s denial.
The veteran appealed to Federal Circuit, which overruled Sanchez-Benitez and held that (1) pain can constitute a disability under 38 U.S.C. § 1110; (2) the word “disability” in the statute refers to functional impairment; and (2) pain alone may be a functional impairment.
The Federal Circuit examined the plain language of the statute, noting that 38 U.S.C. § 1110 provides for compensation for “a disability resulting from personal injury suffered or disease contracted in line of duty,” but “does not expressly define what constitutes a ‘disability.’” The Court noted that the parties did not dispute that “‘disability’ refers to a functional impairment, rather than the underlying cause of the impairment.” And the Court found that VA’s rating schedule reflected this meaning, noting that the percentages in the rating schedule represent “the average impairment in earning capacity” (citing 38 C.F.R. § 4.1), and that “[t]he basis of disability evaluations is the ability of the body as a whole…to function under the ordinary conditions of daily life including employment” (38 C.F.R. § 4.10).
The Court also considered Congressional intent in drafting VA benefits statutes, finding that “the legislative history of veterans compensation highlights Congress’s consistent intent that there should be a distinction between a disability and its cause” – adding that Congress defined “disability” for Ch. 17 purposes, but not for compensation benefits.
To support this second part of its holding, the Federal Circuit noted several references to “pain” throughout VA’s rating schedule, citing §§ 4.10, 4.40, 4.45, 4.56, 4.66, 4.67. The Court added that “a physician’s failure to provide a diagnosis for the immediate cause of a veteran’s pain does not indicate that the pain cannot be a functional impairment that affects a veteran’s earning capacity.” To clarify its holding, the Court stated: “We do not hold that a veteran could demonstrate service connection simply by asserting subjective pain—to establish a disability the veteran’s pain must amount to a functional impairment,” adding that “[t]o establish the presence of a disability, a veteran will need to show that her pain reaches the level of a functional impairment of earning capacity.” The Court remanded this matter to the CAVC with instructions to remand to the Board to make specific factual findings in the first instance.
SUMMARY: The Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) requires an application for attorney fees to be filed “within 30 days of final judgment in the action.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B). Mr. Bly’s attorney filed his EAJA application with the CAVC 31 days after the Court issued its order granting the parties’ joint motion for remand. The Court, relying on three of its own rules of practice and procedure, denied the application because it was one day late. These rules state that (1) an EAJA application must be made “not later than 30 days after the Court’s judgment becomes final”; (2) when the Court remands a case on the parties’ consent, judgment is effective the date of the Court order when that order states that it constitutes the mandate of the Court; (3) mandate is when the Court’s judgment becomes final; and (4) mandate is generally 60 days after judgment, unless it is “part of an order on consent … remanding a case” or “the Court directs otherwise.” See Rules 39(a), 36(b)(1)(B)(i), 41(a) and (b).
The Federal Circuit reversed the CAVC’s decision based on the EAJA’s definition of “final judgment” as a “judgment that is final and not appealable, and includes an order of settlement.” Mr. Bly argued that his EAJA application was timely because the “Court’s judgment was not yet ‘final and not appealable’ until 60 days after the date of the remand order.
The Federal Circuit noted that the courts of appeals have taken two different approaches to the issue of finality for EAJA purposes. Under the “uniform” approach, the time to file an EAJA application “would run from the expiration of the time for appeal, without consideration of whether the particular final judgment would have or could have been appealed.” The “functional” approach, on the other hand, requires a “case by case exploration of whether an appeal could have been taken by either party.” The Federal Circuit had previously “adopted the uniform rule for voluntary dismissals, ‘at least where the order of dismissal does not specifically prohibit appeal’” – and saw no reason to depart from that approach in the context of “consent judgments,” as in this case. The Court thus held that the “consent judgment here became ‘not appealable’ 60 days after the entry of the remand order” – and, therefore, Mr. Bly’s EAJA application was timely.
The Secretary had also argued that the CAVC order granting the parties’ joint motion for remand was “an order of settlement” and, therefore, a final judgment under the EAJA. The Federal Circuit rejected this argument because the order granted the motion to remand did not resolve the underlying service-connection dispute. The appeal would go back to the Board – and may even return to the Court – so the Federal Circuit did not this fit within the plain meaning of “settlement.” The Federal Circuit remanded this matter to the CAVC to consider the merits of the EAJA application.
SUMMARY: Veteran is service connected for PTSD, rated 70%. He appealed for a higher rating – and his appeal was certified to the Board in June 2015. The Board denied a higher rating based on the veteran’s GAF scores –even though it acknowledged that the DSM-5 applied to claims certified to the Board after August 4, 2014, and that this edition of the DSM had eliminated the use of GAF scores.
HELD: Whether an attorney’s submission should be treated as a medical opinion depends on several factors, including (1) the text of the submission, (2) the identification of the author as attorney or medical professional, (3) the indicators of legal advocacy/argument in the submission, and (4) the presence of a medical opinion with supporting rationale.
The Court outlined several factors that should be considered in making this assessment, including whether the author of the submission identified himself/herself as a medical professional, whether the content of the submission indicated that it was legal argument, and whether the content of the submission indicated that it was a medical opinion. Because Mr. Anaise did not identify himself as acting in the capacity of a medical professional, and because the submission contained indications of legal argument and no indication that it was a medical opinion (i.e., there was no language, such as “in my medical opinion”), the Court determined that the Board did not err by failing to treat this submission as a medical opinion.
The Court also ordered oral argument for the parties to address the ethical issue of an attorney representative serving as an expert witness in a case. Because the Court held that Mr. Anaise’s “brief” was not a medical opinion, it found there was no violation of Rule 3.7 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.
HELD: Attorney lacks standing to challenge VA policy limiting access to preliminary VA rating decisions to VSOs.
SUMMARY: VA has a policy that allows VSOs access to preliminary rating decisions before they are promulgated, which enables VSOs to identify any clear errors before the decisions are issued. VA limits this access to VSOs and does not provide attorneys who represent veterans with access to these preliminary decisions. An attorney challenged this policy as impeding his ability to provide competent representation, violating his rights as an accredited representative, and denying his clients fair process.
The Court held that the attorney lacked standing to challenge this policy because he did not establish that he suffered an injury (economic harm) as a result of the policy or demonstrate that the policy preventing him from representing his clients. Because the attorney lacked standing and did not show that he had asserted “a claim typical of a class,” the Court further denied the attorney’s motion for aggregate action.
HELD: Because the Court is statutorily precluded from reviewing VA’s rating schedule, the Court lacks jurisdiction to consider whether obesity should be considered a disability under the rating schedule.
SUMMARY: Mr. Marcelino was denied service connection for obesity because the Board stated that this condition was not a disability for purposes of service connection and VA compensation.
ADVOCACY NOTE: VA’s Office of the General Counsel issued a Precedent opinion in January 2017 that recognized that while obesity is not a disability for purposes of secondary SC under 38 C.F.R. § 3.310, it can be an “intermediate step” between a service-connected disability and a current disability that may be service connected on a secondary basis. VAOGCPREC 1-2017.
In 1973, the RO granted service connection for skin, back, and residuals of a right ring finger fracture. The RO referred to Mr. Foreman’s entrance and separation examinations, but mentioned no other conditions.
Between 2004 and 2008, Mr. Foreman received treatment at VA for post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).In 2008, he filed a claim for service connection for PTSD. In July 2010, while his claim was pending, VA amended 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f) to ease the evidentiary burden on veterans with claims for service connection based on fear of hostile military or terrorist activity. During a C&P examination, Mr. Foreman reported that he was attached to a graves registration in Vietnam and “was exposed to dismembered bodies multiple times over several months.” He reported his belief that he could have been injured and that he felt “horrified.” The examiner determined that he did not have PTSD because he did not have “fear of hostile military or terrorist activity.” The RO denied Mr. Foreman’s claim because he did not have a PTSD diagnosis – even though the RO noted record evidence of prior treatment for PTSD.
Mr. Foreman appealed and underwent another C&P examination. This examiner diagnosed PTSD, noting the veteran’s traumatic experiences. The RO granted service connection for PTSD, effective March 2011, the date of the most recent C&P examination.
Mr. Foreman appealed to the Board, and the Board granted an effective date of July 13, 2010, the date of the “liberalizing” change to 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f). Mr. Foreman appealed to the Veterans Court, arguing that he is entitled to a 1972 effective date because his submission at that time was an informal claim and the 2010 change to § 3.304(f) was “procedural,” so he was not limited to the July 2010 effective date.
The Court agreed that the § 3.304(f) amendment was procedural and did not preclude an effective date earlier than July 2010. In general, the effective date for any award of benefits is the date VA receives the claim. 38 C.F.R. § 3.400. For claims granted based on change in law (or a “liberalizing” rule), the effective date cannot be earlier than the effective date of the change in law. 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.400(p), 3.114.
The Court declined to assign a September 2008 effective date (as requested by VA) –because Mr. Foreman was asking for an effective date earlier than 2008. The Court reversed the portion of the Board’s decision that denied an effective date earlier than July 2010, and remanded for the Board to determine the appropriate effective date.
HELD: The Board cannot “make its own findings on of the facts of line of duty and willful misconduct,” particularly when there are relevant service records before it.
SUMMARY: Marvin Crediford served in the U.S. Coast Guard from August 1983 to August 1985 and January 1990 to March 1991. In January 1985, he was in a car accident after he had been drinking. Several hours after he had stopped drinking, his blood alcohol level was measured as .12 percent. He was charged with driving under the influence.
In 2004, Mr. Crediford filed a claim for disability compensation. The RO denied the claim because his injuries were the result of willful misconduct and not incurred in the line of duty. The RO stated that the veteran’s service records did not contain a line-of-duty determination. The RO noted the December 1985 memorandum – but not the April 1985 decision.
The Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims affirmed the Board’s decision, finding that the Board provided adequate reasons for bases for its finding that his Mr. Crediford’s injury was the result of willful misconduct. Neither the Board nor the Court resolved the discrepancy between the April and November 1985 findings regarding willful misconduct.
The Court found that neither the Board nor the Court resolved the conflict between the April 1985 decision and the November 1985 document, and held that “the Board erred in simply making its own findings on the question of willful misconduct when there were service department findings before it.” The Court added that the Coast Guard’s “determinations, made in 1985 when the accident occurred, must be addressed” and that “[i]t was error for the Board to make its own findings of the facts of line of duty and willful misconduct.” The Court remanded for further proceedings to address the question of application of 38 C.F.R. § 3.1(m)-(n).
HELD: Petition for writ of mandamus based on unreasonable delay in scheduling a Board hearing is mooted by the actual scheduling of the hearing – and does not fall within the exception to mootness if the claimant does not have a “reasonable expectation” that he will be subjected to the same action again.
SUMMARY: Elon Ebanks appealed an RO denial of an increased rating and requested a Board hearing in December 2014. Nearly two years later, in September 2016, he petitioned the Veterans Court for a writ of mandamus to compel the Board to schedule the hearing. The Court denied the petition, and Mr. Ebanks appealed that decision to the Federal Circuit.
This exception applies when “(1) ‘the challenged action [is] in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to the cessation or expiration,’ and (2) ‘there [is] a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party [will] be subject to the same action again.” Mr. Ebanks asserted that even if he prevailed at the Board, the usual relief was to remand to the RO, which would result in further adjudication. He expected that he would likely ask for a new hearing and would again be subjected to unreasonable delay. The government disputed that argument.
The Court stated that even if the case were not moot, granting Mr. Ebanks’ petition “may result in no more than line-jumping without resolving the underlying problem of overall delay.” The Court added that the issue of delay “seems best addressed in the class-action context,” noting that it had “recently approved the use of collective actions in the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims,” citing Monk v. Shulkin, 855 F.3d 1312, 1318-22 (Fed. Cir. 2017).

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