Source: http://bc-injury-law.com/blog/tag/madam-justice-hyslop
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 16:28:03+00:00

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Reasons for judgement were released today addressing fault for a collision involving a vehicle conducting a U-turn.
In today’s case (Longford v. Tempesta) the Plaintiff was operating a scooter and was travelling behind the Defendant’s vehicle. The Defendant “put on his brakes aggressively” and the Plaintiff then stopped. The Defendant then “went to the right parking lane and stopped, aggressively applying his brakes again, and then hesitated.“. The Plaintiff then proceeded to pass the Defendant who then commenced a U-turn and the vehicles collided.
 I find that the plaintiff could not have anticipated that the defendant, after briefly stopping, would then turn in front of her. Nor do I find that she had enough time to observe the defendant’s actions and avoid the accident.
14. The Plaintiff in her statement seems to have assumed that the Defendant had missed his turn, was driving erratically and ought to have anticipated some other erratic move from the Defendant and driven accordingly.
15. Further, the physical evidence of where the collision took place is more consistent with the Defendant’s version of events than the Plaintiff’s. Impact occurred very near the centre of the road when the Defendant’s vehicle had almost left the west bound lane. This would mean for the Plaintiff’s version to be correct the Defendant would had to have started from a complete stop accelerated through a turn and almost completed it before the Plaintiff arrived at the impact site.
 This does not coincide with the defendant’s evidence that he was three quarters of the way in his driveway, having crossed the eastbound lane.
 In Tucker (Public Trustee of) v. Asleson (1993), 78 B.C.L.R. (2d) 173 (C.A.) at 195-6, Madam Justice Southin noted that drivers are entitled to assume that other drivers will obey the rules of the road, and are required to anticipate, in other drivers, “only those follies which according to the teachings of experience commonly occur”. By implication, and as explained in Walker v. Brownlee,  2 D.L.R. 450 at 461 from which Southin J.A. quoted, a driver may bear liability if he or she became aware of another driver’s disregard of the law, or by the exercise of reasonable care should have become aware, and unreasonably failed to avoid the accident that followed from that disregard.
 When the defendant stopped aggressively in front of the plaintiff, she slowed down and was able to stop. I find there was no erratic driving on the part of the defendant such that she could anticipate that the defendant would perform a U-turn in front of her.
 I conclude that the defendant stopped as he realized that he had overshot the driveway to his workplace. I find he then went to the right, stopped again as to park, intending to go into the driveway and, in doing so, crossed the path of the plaintiff on her scooter. At no time did the defendant observe the scooter and he should have. I find that the plaintiff has met the burden of proof and that the defendant was negligent when he turned from where he was parked and into the path of the plaintiff driving her scooter. The defendant is 100% responsible for the accident. The defendant’s actions were negligent.
It should go without saying that stealing and burning your own vehicle with a view to making an insurance claim is not a good idea.
Reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, dealing with a vehicle theft/fire claim. In last week’s case (Singh v. ICBC ) the Plaintiff purchased a 2007 E-350 Mercedes. On October 24, 2009 the vehicle was found some 15 minutes from the Plaintiff’s home and “had just been ignited with fire” with flames “shooting ten to twenty feet in the air.” The luxury vehicle was rendered a total loss.
The Plaintiff made a claim to ICBC to recover damages for loss of the vehicle but they were suspicious of the circumstances and denied the claim. The Plaintiff sued for damages seeking over $94,000 in replacement cost coverage.
In denying the claim the Court found that the Plaintiff “made a key set available to someone so the Mercedes could be driven to the scene of the fire” and further that the Plaintiff conspired in the destruction of the vehicle with Madam Justice Hyslop finding that “he knew in advance what would happen to the Mercedes“.
 Constable Gibo stated that Mr. Singh was not surprised or did not express shock that the Mercedes was on fire, nor did he ask for any details as to the event. He did not care. I find that is because he knew in advance what would happen to the Mercedes.
 I do not accept that the Mercedes was stolen. Mr. Singh’s evidence was that when he purchased the Mercedes he received two sets of keys to operate it. He claims that he mislaid one set of keys, but was very clear that the keys were not lost or stolen. He refused to say when one set of keys was mislaid.
 Expert evidence is before the court that categorically states that Mr. Singh’s Mercedes could not be driven without the keys. The opinion of Mr. Seroogy is that in order to produce a new key, it requires the proper equipment and people with extensive training and experience “in multiple electronic disciplines”. Mr. Seroogy said that the process is delicate and time consuming and could not have been performed within the timeframe between when the Mercedes was last seen and the time when it was found burning. I accept this evidence.
 Mr. Crowe found that there was damage to the right side of the Mercedes. I find that this was intended to cover up the fact that the Mercedes was driven to the site of the fire with a key.
 I find that the Mercedes was driven to the scene of the fire using the keys. The Mercedes was then set on fire.
 The fact that it is unknown who participated in the theft and the destruction of the Mercedes by fire, is of no consequence.
 In his testimony, Mr. Singh completely resiles from his pleadings in which he alleges theft. Mr. Singh repeatedly testified that he was not claiming the Mercedes was stolen, but rather that it was burned. Nothing in his pleadings mentions that the Mercedes was burned.
 In his Claim File Report (by telephone), Mr. Singh claimed that the Mercedes was stolen. No mention was made of it being burned. In his statement of November 4, 2009, he refers to the fire. In his Proof of Loss, he swears that the cause of his loss was by “burned”. However, whether it was stolen or not, it could not be at the location of the fire without being driven there with the use of one of the sets of keys issued to Mr. Singh when he purchased the Mercedes.
In addition to dismissing the claim the Court ordered that the Plaintiff pay the Defendant’s costs which I would ballpark at $20,000 – $30,000. So, the end result is no vehicle, no insurance payout and a significant debt to ICBC.
While passengers can be found contributorily negligent for riding in the box of a pick-up truck such a finding will depend on the circumstances. Reasons for judgment were released this week by the BC Supreme Court addressing this.
In this week’s case (Tataryn v. Browne) 14 temporary farm workers were being transported from a rural farm to downtown Kamloops. Many of the workers were unrestrained in the box of the pick up truck. The motorist drove negligently leaving the road tumbling down an embankment rolling over several times before coming to a stop.
 I think it is obvious that the purpose of the box of the pickup is to carry cargo and not people….
6) The workers were poor. Most were homeless, on social assistance, and addicted to drugs or alcohol, or both. One plaintiff had a mental health condition for which he was medicated….
296] Annie controlled the workers’ transportation and she called the shots.
 The workers were poor, homeless, and sick. They were told by Annie if they did not get in the truck they would have to walk home. Walking home was not an option. It was 15 kilometres to the NLM. It was dark. It was cold. There were no sidewalks, and no public transportation. Some, if not all of the workers, were not properly clothed and Mr. Moore needed his medication.
 By necessity, the workers had no option but to be passengers in the truck without seatbelts, either in the cab or the box of the pickup truck.
 These thirteen men and one woman were facing conditions more severe than those facing the plaintiffs in Iannone, Bissky, Massey and Fraser.
 Based on the circumstances facing each of these workers, I conclude that not one of them was contributorily negligent.
Adding to this site’s archived case summaries addressing C5/6 disc injuries, reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Kamloops Registry, addressing such an injury.
 I have concluded, based on all of the medical evidence and the evidence of Ms. Levens, that as a result of the accident Ms. Levens suffered a herniated disk as seen in the MRI ordered by Dr. Singh in 2011.
 I also conclude that Ms. Levens, due to her pre-existing condition, was more susceptible to a disk herniation as a result of the degenerative changes in her cervical spine.
 At the time of the accident, Ms. Levens was 65 years old and at the time of the trial was age 69. Her most significant injury is the disc herniation in her neck. The pain has been severe. The myofascial pain and arthritis in her back would have been ongoing and not related to the accident. The motor vehicle accident caused increased pain which landed her in the hospital.
 She is disabled as she does not always have a full ROM in her neck. She has been unable to engage in some of her recreational and sporting activities that she engaged in prior to the accident.
 I award the plaintiff $48,000.00 in non-pecuniary damages.
Adding to this site’s BC soft tissue injury caselaw database, reasons for judgement were released recently by the BC Supreme Court, Kamloops Registry, assessing damages for a lingering Grade II soft tissue injury.
 I award the plaintiff $40,000.00 in non-pecuniary damages. In doing so, I take into consideration the difficulties the plaintiff suffered in pursuing his farming activities.
While this is certainly not a new legal development (you can click here to access my archived posts addressing this topic) reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, confirming yet again that a verbal agreement can create a binding injury claim settlement and that refusing to sign the appropriate closing documents does not create an escape route for a litigant that regrets their decision.
In this week’s case (Robertson v. Whistler (Resort Municipality)) the Plaintiff was injured when she fell in a shower owned by the Defendant. She was 8 years old at the time. She started a lawsuit when she was 20. In the course of the lawsuit the Defendant made a global settlement offer of $1,400. The Plaintiff, in a phone conversation with the Defendant’s lawyer stated that she “wished to accept the $1,400 offer“.
The Plaintiff later refused to sign an agreed to Consent Dismissal Order. The Plaintiff testified that “until she signed the offer and signed the order, there was no settlement“. Madam Justice Hyslop disagreed and dismissed the lawsuit finding there was a binding settlement. In addition the Court awarded the Defendant costs from the date of the settlement onward (which could result in the Plaintiff owing the Defendant money).
 Contract law applies to settlement agreements provided no contractual grounds to set aside the contract exist. Example: mutual mistake, lack of capacity, duress or fraud: Robertson v. Walwyn Stodgell Cochrane Murray Ltd.,  4 W.W.R. 283, 24 B.C.L.R. (2d) 385.
 I conclude that on December 16, 2010, the plaintiff entered into a binding settlement agreement. This action is dismissed with costs awarded to the defendant upon the basis that the sum of $1,400.00 due to the plaintiff will be set-off against the defendant’s assessed costs. Costs will be assessed under Appendix B, Scale B of the Supreme Court Civil Rules.

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