Source: http://masscases.com/cases/sjc/379/379mass205.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 00:28:09+00:00

Document:
CIVIL ACTION commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk on April 25, 1977.
John F. Hurley, Assistant Attorney General, for the plaintiffs.
Warren H. Pyle for Emma Y. Lawrence.
Timothy J. Lane, Jr., Special Assistant Attorney General, for the Municipal Court of the City of Boston.
LIACOS, J. The Commissioner of Revenue and the Commissioners of the Civil Service Commission brought a complaint in the nature of certiorari under G. L. c. 249, Section 4, as appearing in St. 1973, c. 1114, Section 289, seeking to quash a decision of a judge of the Municipal Court of the City of Boston regarding the discharge of defendant Emma Y. Lawrence from her position as a clerk in the Department of Corporations and Taxation (appointing authority). The complaint alleges a judge of the Municipal Court erroneously reversed the determination of the Civil Service Commission (commission) that Lawrence had been discharged for just cause by the appointing authority. A single justice of this court reserved and reported the case, without decision, for the determination of the full court.
office decorum, thereby impairing the orderly operation of the office; and substandard work performance.
The commission rejected the hearing officer's recommendation and affirmed the appointing authority's decision to terminate Lawrence's employment.
Lawrence then filed a petition for judicial review of the commission's decision in the Municipal Court of the City of Boston, pursuant to G. L. c. 31, Section 45. [Note 5] A judge of that court heard oral arguments from the parties on January 8, 1977. After reviewing the transcript of the evidence before the hearing officer, the judge ruled that the commission's action in affirming the appointing authority's discharge of Lawrence was not supported by substantial evidence. On March 11, 1977, the judge entered a judgment reversing the decision of the commission and ordered the reinstatement of Lawrence to her former position without loss of compensation.
of Civil Serv. v. Municipal Court of the City of Boston, supra at 86.
The essential nature of a proceeding initiated under Section 45 is to provide for judicial review and not judicial retrial. Commissioners of Civil Serv. v. Municipal Court of the City of Boston, 369 Mass. 84 , 87 (1975). See also Commissioners of Civil Serv. v. Municipal Court of the City of Boston, 359 Mass. 211 , 214 (1971); Sullivan v. Municipal Court of the Roxbury Dist., 322 Mass. 566 (1948).
Court of the City of Boston, 359 Mass. 760 (1971), where the Commissioners' rejection of the hearing officer's conclusions was likewise upheld.
The commission may reject the conclusions of the hearing officer with respect to guilt or innocence on certain charges as well as the hearing officer's recommendation as to disposition, and may rest its own decision on the subsidiary findings, as long as its decision can be justified on the basis of the accepted findings. The judge below stated: "[I]f the hearing officer was able only to find sufficient credible evidence to sustain four of the forty-seven allegations [Note 7] of misconduct that caused the appointing authority to discharge the petitioner, we can hardly say that the action of the Civil Service Commission was justified and that it was done upon adequate reasons, sufficiently supported by credible evidence, Sullivan v. Municipal court of the Roxbury District, supra, at p. 573. Further, if we add to this the Commission's rejection of findings 8, 22, 33 and 40, it would appear that the members of the Commission found that none of the 47 allegations were sustained."
may base its decision on the subsidiary findings of the hearing officer, while at the same time rejecting her conclusions and recommendation as to disposition. Applying the correct standard of review to the commission's decision, we conclude that it was not "unsupported by substantial evidence." G. L. c. 31, Section 45. There was ample evidence in the subsidiary findings of the hearing officer which were accepted by the commission to justify the discharge of Lawrence. We therefore remand the case to the county court, where a judgment is to be entered setting aside the decision of the judge of the Municipal Court and directing that the decision of the Civil Service Commission be affirmed.
[Note 1] Statute 1978, c. 514, established the Department of Revenue, which is the statutory successor to the Department of Corporations and Taxation. The public official responsible for this department is now known as the Commissioner of Revenue. G. L. c. 14, Section 2, as appearing in St. 1978, c. 514, Section 5.
[Note 2] The Municipal Court of the City of Boston.
[Note 3] Chapter 31 was recently rewritten. See St. 1978, c. 393. The provision for a hearing before the commission remains in c. 31, Section 43. Certain other provisions contained in the former c. 31, Section 43, are now contained in c. 31, Sections 41 and 42. Reference in this opinion will be to the former version of c. 31, Section 43, which was in effect at the time of the hearings before the appointing authority and the commission. The substance of the current version of the statute does not differ from that of the earlier statute.
[Note 4] In the six rejected findings, numbers 8, 22, 33, 39, 40 and 41, the hearing officer made statements to the effect that the department had or had not satisfied its burden of proof or that Lawrence was or was not guilty with regard to certain instances of alleged misconduct contained in the specifications. With respect to many of the findings of the hearing officer, it is not clear whether such findings reflect the hearing officer's assessment of the credibility of the witnesses or her application of various rules of law to the evidence presented. We note that the effectiveness of a court on review is seriously impaired where the hearing officer fails to make clearly distinguishable those findings which are based on the credibility of witnesses and those findings which are conclusions based on application of the law to subsidiary findings. The hearing officer's role in the legal process is an important one, and the drafting of findings must be undertaken with care and precision.
In response to the commission's suggestion in its brief that "[t]he hearings officer's report indicates that she erroneously believed that the appointing authority was required to present two witnesses as to any charge which the employee denied," we note that such corroboration is not required. However, we need not reach the question whether her report reflects this erroneous belief in light of our disposition of this matter.
[Note 5] As previously indicated, c. 31 was recently rewritten. St. 1978, c. 393. The provisions for judicial review of the commission's decision are now set forth in G. L. c. 31, Section 44. References in this opinion are to the statutory provisions of c. 31 as they existed at the time of the hearings before the commission and Municipal Court.
[Note 6] See note 4, supra. General Laws c. 31, Section 45, as appearing in St. 1970, c. 711, in pertinent part reads as follows: "The review shall be conducted by the court and shall be confined to the record, except that in cases of alleged irregularities in procedure before the commission, not shown in the record, testimony thereon may be taken in the court.
The court may affirm the decision of the commission if it finds that the decision was justified or remand the matter for further proceedings before the commission; or the court may set aside and reverse the decision of the commission if it determines that such decision is -- (a) in violation of constitutional provisions; or (b) in excess of the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the commission; or (c) based upon an error of law; or (d) made upon unlawful procedure; or (e) unsupported by substantial evidence; or (f) arbitrary or capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law."
[Note 7] We share the judge's apparent concern over the lack of any evidence presented to the hearing officer on many of these forty-seven specifications. While the commission contends that the department was under no obligation to present evidence as to every incident referred to in the specifications and the purpose of listing the forty-seven allegations was "to provide the employee with notice of all the potential factual issues which might be raised in the hearing," we do not condone the practice of "throwing in the kitchen sink" in response to a motion for specifications. Such a practice clutters the record and causes the real issues to be unnecessarily obscured.
[Note 8] "33. On the basis of the above findings, I find that Ms. Lawrence was guilty of the eighth and twelfth acts, specifically having arguments in the office with Ms. Ruby" (emphasis in original).
[Note 9] "27. I find that as to the eighth act -- Argument, on September 25, 1974, testimony was offered by Fay Ruby concerning an argument she had in the office that day with Ms. Lawrence [emphasis in original].
"28. In find that Ms. Lawrence did not offer testimony as to that argument.
"29. I find that as to the twelfth act -- Name calling, yelling, argument, on September 19, 1974, testimony was offered by Fay Ruby concerning an argument with Ms. Lawrence [emphasis in original].
"30. In find that Ms. Lawrence did not offer testimony as to that argument."
It is apparent that the commission's rejection of the "conclusion" in finding no. 33 (see note 8, supra) relates to the statement that Lawrence was "guilty." It is also clear that the hearing officer based her "conclusion" on the findings in numbers 27-30, however inartfully phrased, that the incidents described therein had occurred.
[Note 10] "22. I therefore find that Ms. Lawrence was guilty of the second and fifth alleged acts of insubordination."
[Note 11] "13. As to the second charge of insubordination contained in the specifications, I find that Ms. Lawrence did refuse to comply with the request of Harold Greene, Chief of the Bureau of Excise, to enter his office on October 18, 1975 [emphasis in original]".
"14. I find that although Ms. Lawrence testified as to the alleged conduct of Mr. Greene several months prior to this incident, she did not file any formal complaint with respect to this incident, and that Mr. Greene, her supervisor, did have the right to request her presence in his office."
"21. As to the fifth act of insubordination, refusing to work, I find that uncontradicted testimony was offered by Mr. Duros to the effect that Ms. Lawrence did leave the office when she was informed by Mr. Duros on September 5, 1974, that she was being transferred to Motor Carrier tax work" (emphasis in original).
[Note 12] In mentioning the possible conclusions that could be drawn from the accepted subsidiary findings, we note that the State Administrative Procedure Act, G. L. c. 30A, is inapplicable to Civil Service Commission proceedings. G. L. c. 30A, Section 1 (2). See School Comm. of Salem v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 348 Mass. 696 , 697-698 (1965). Therefore, the commission is not required by statute to support its decision with a statement of reasons. See G. L. c. 30A, Section 11 (8).

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