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Timestamp: 2019-04-21 12:53:12+00:00

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JOSEPHINE RIZZO vs. MARY CUNNINGHAM & another, executors.
upon such a contract, if made, there could be recovery upon a quantum meruit for the value of services rendered in reliance upon the woman's promise.
There was no merit in a contention that a minor girl, placed by her guardian in the household of an elderly woman, was legally bound to render services and care to the woman and that the girl could not give consideration for the woman's promise to leave her her property if she would render such services.
Testimony by a plaintiff as to the value of personal and household services rendered by him while a minor was admissible; its weight was for the jury.
In an action against an executor upon a quantum meruit for services rendered to the decedent by the plaintiff while a minor, the defendant was not entitled as a matter of law to have considered, "in modification" of the plaintiff's damages, a legacy to her in the decedent's will, where it did not appear that the plaintiff had accepted the legacy or that there was a statement in the will that the legacy was in payment in whole or in part of a debt to the plaintiff.
CONTRACT. Writ in the Superior Court dated June 26, 1933.
A verdict for the plaintiff in the sum of $7,000 was returned before Hurley, J., and he reported the case to this court.
E. B. Cook, (J. N. Esdaile with him,) for the plaintiff.
S. Abrams, (E. L. Lane & H. I. Klarfeld with him,) for the defendants.
charge to the jury, in which case such order shall be made as justice may require; if this court is of the opinion that there was no evidence warranting a verdict for the plaintiff, then judgment is to be entered for the defendants.
to be her companion and to take care of her, and to be a companion for her, and . . . as long as Josephine would do all she wanted and be her companion and do right, she was to take care of Josephine and leave Josephine all she had." Some time in February, 1929, Miss O'Brien said to the plaintiff: "Josephine, I have sold my East Boston property, and I got $22,000 for it. That is more than enough for you and me to live on. Some day when I am gone, if you stick by me and be my companion and continue to live with me, all my money and my house I will leave to you." The plaintiff then told her, "You talk too much about dying, forget it," and said that she would always stay with her and be her companion and they would have good times together. In the fall of 1929 Miss O'Brien said to her next door neighbor, in the plaintiff's presence: "Mrs. Curran, Josephine wants to go to work and I don't want her to go to work, because Josephine is the only thing I have in the world to think of. . . . All of my relatives have gone back on me and I haven't a friend in the world but Josephine, and I have promised Josephine that if she will stay with me and be my companion, that I will give her all my money and my house for being my companion." At that time Josephine said: "Well, Miss O'Brien, I will stay with you always. I will do just as you want me to do."
the plaintiff cared for her. In February, 1931, the plaintiff entered a training school for nurses. Once a week she spent her day off with Miss O'Brien, did the work about the house and occasionally they went to Boston. In the fall of 1931 Miss O'Brien became ill, and the plaintiff returned to the home and remained there until Miss O'Brien died on January 19, 1932. During this interval Miss O'Brien said to the plaintiff: "Jo, I am old now, and I am a sick woman, and you are the only one who has been around here all these years. My relatives and none of my old friends have been around to see me. I don't think I am going to live long and I want to tell you about my property. I have about $15,000 left, and my house, and for taking care of me as you have and if you will stick by me and take care of me until I die, when I die I am going to leave all this money and the house to you"; and the plaintiff replied: "I won't leave you and I am going to stay right here with you and take care of you."
494. In the case of Ellis v . Block, 187 Mass. 408, where one question was whether a contract, and if a contract, what contract, was made in part by word of mouth and in part by correspondence, the court said (at page 412) "it is for the court to deal with the question which is for it in its instructions to the jury, and to leave the whole question under those instructions to the jury." Way v. Greer, 196 Mass. 237, 246, 247. Where the language is ambiguous, preliminary negotiations, the conduct of the parties, and interviews between them after the contract is executed are relevant matters and are admissible in evidence, not to vary or enlarge the agreement, but to define the meaning of the terms the parties employ. Derby Desk Co. v. Conners Brothers Construction Co. 204 Mass. 461, 470, and cases cited. Greene v. Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. 255 Mass. 519, 523, 524. Bachinsky v. Rogers, 273 Mass. 381. This evidence is not received for the purpose of constructing a new contract or varying the old one, Jennings v. Puffer, 203 Mass. 534, 538, but is to enable the judge to understand the subject matter of the agreement as it lay in the minds of the parties and the meaning that they themselves put upon any doubtful or ambiguous terms they may have used, and so to apply their language correctly to the subject matter which was in their contemplation. Way v. Greer, 196 Mass. 237, 246, 247. Garfield & Proctor Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania Coal & Coke Co. 199 Mass. 22, 37. Such evidence is an aid in determining the intention of the parties if the meaning of the words used is doubtful. Smith v. Faulkner, 12 Gray 251, 255. Compare Way v. Greer, 196 Mass. 237, 245, 246.
only agreement, and statements made in confirmation of it." The plaintiff's attorney said that was his position, whereupon the judge quoted from his notes as to the conversation in 1925 between Miss O'Brien and the plaintiff as the agreement upon which the plaintiff relied, and the plaintiff's attorney said "That is right." The judge then inquired: "That is your understanding?" Mr. Klarfeld replied, "That is right," and the judge said: "Well, with that assurance by counsel for the plaintiff you don't need to press your motion."
were admissions by Miss O'Brien, and whether they were in confirmation of the fact that an agreement was made in 1925.
deceased, an acceptance of its terms by the plaintiff, and full performance on the plaintiff's part."
From what has been said we think it follows that the conversation upon which the jury was permitted to find an agreement, in the light of what was said thereafter, was not too vague and indefinite to form the basis for a contract, and that the case is distinguishable from Stewart v. Johnson, 252 Mass. 287.
ground that the plaintiff was not in a position to make the contract relied upon. Furthermore, it is to be noted that by the terms of that contract she might be required to render services after reaching her majority.
The defendants excepted to the refusal of the judge to strike out the plaintiff's testimony of her opinion as to the fair market value of her services from September, 1925, to the date of Miss O'Brien's death. On direct examination she gave her opinion. On cross-examination she testified that she did not "know what her services were worth in 1926 per week"; that she did not know what they were worth in 1928 or 1929; and that she had no opinion of the value of her services from February to November, 1931. On redirect examination she testified that she had an opinion of the value of her services for the period from September, 1925, to the date of Miss O'Brien's death, and she gave her opinion.
The plaintiff could testify as to the market value of her services. Harmon v. Old Colony Railroad, 168 Mass. 377, 378, 381. Chandler v. Baker, 191 Mass. 579, 584, 585. Butler v. Butler, 225 Mass. 22, 26. See Copithorne v. Hardy, 173 Mass. 400, 402. The most that can be said of the plaintiff's testimony is that it is an instance of conflicting statements and that it was for the jury to determine to what the testimony amounted. Thibeault v. Poole, 283 Mass. 480, 482-483. Bennett v. Fitzgerald, 284 Mass. 535, 537. Compare Keenan v. E. M. Loew's, Inc. 302 Mass. 309, 311.
The defendants also contend that this testimony should have been struck out for the further reason that the opinion expressed by the plaintiff was broad enough to include all services rendered and was not restricted to services rendered in reliance upon the contract. We think, however, that the fair inference to be drawn from the record is that the plaintiff's testimony related to services rendered under the contract upon which she relied. There was no error in the refusal to strike out this testimony.
jury are as to their fifteenth, sixteenth, and twenty-fifth requests. The fifteenth is: "As a matter of law, if the plaintiff and the defendants' testatrix substituted another contract in February, 1929, for the alleged contract of . . . 1925, then the plaintiff cannot recover in this action for any services rendered in reliance upon the 1925 contract." The sixteenth is: "As a matter of law, if the plaintiff and the defendants' testatrix substituted another contract in September, 1929, for the alleged contract of . . . 1925, then the plaintiff cannot recover in this action for any services rendered in reliance upon the 1925 contract." The twenty-fifth is: "In determining the plaintiff's damage, if any, the jury must consider in modification thereof, any benefit received by the plaintiff from the defendants' testatrix."
you"; and that in the fall of 1929 (which we assume to be the September, 1929, referred to in request No. 16) she said, "some day when I am gone, I will leave you my house and everything I have got." Nevertheless, all the conversations express in the same general terms the same request on the part of Miss O'Brien to the plaintiff. It should be borne in mind that technical language was hardly to be expected from a woman approaching seventy years of age and a child in her teens. Underlying all the conversations is the evident desire on the part of Miss O'Brien that the plaintiff remain with her, continue to be her companion, and do her bidding. In all of them we find the reiteration on the part of the plaintiff that she would. No new performance was asked of the plaintiff and no new offer was made by Miss O'Brien. There is nothing in the attendant circumstances to indicate any waiver of an original contract or the formation of a new one. We think there was no error in the denial of these requests.
testamentary gift is to be regarded as a benefaction and not as payment of the debt. Strong v. Williams, 12 Mass. 390. Smith v. Smith, 1 Allen 129, 130. Parker v. Coburn, 10 Allen 82, 84. Noyes v. Noyes, 224 Mass. 125, 133. Compare Noyes v. Noyes, 233 Mass. 55. Miss O'Brien's will amounted to a repudiation of her promise to the plaintiff, and there is nothing to indicate that her bequest to the plaintiff was intended as a payment, in whole or in part, for the services rendered in reliance upon this promise. The defendants took no exceptions to the charge which of necessity covered the question of damages.
The result is that, in accordance with the terms of the report, which is assented to by all parties, judgment is to be entered for the plaintiff on the verdict.

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