Source: https://leb.fbi.gov/articles/legal-digest/legal-digest-searches-of-motor-vehicles-incident-to-arrest-in-a-post-gant-world
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 10:12:30+00:00

Document:
By Kenneth A. Myers, J.D.
On April 21, 2009, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Arizona v. Gant,1 in which the Court announced new, narrow rules as to when law enforcement officers properly may search the passenger compartment of a motor vehicle incident to the arrest of one of its occupants. For approximately 28 years prior to Gant, police relied upon the apparent holdings of other U.S. Supreme Court decisions,2 as well as the holdings of other state and federal precedent, to provide broad justification3 for searches following the lawful arrest of any occupant, or recent occupant, of a motor vehicle.
However, in Gant, the Court limited this Fourth Amendment search authority to two circumstances: “police may search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s arrest only if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of the arrest.”4 This article examines how lower courts have interpreted the two-part holding of Gant and provide law enforcement officers guidance in conducting future searches of motor vehicles incident to arrest in a post-Gant world.
Special Agent Myers is a legal instructor at the FBI Academy.
From these decisions, it is clear that the first prong of the Gant test involves “case-by-case, fact specific decision making”46 by law enforcement as there no longer is any bright-line rule. The first prong of the test hinges on access and requires officers to articulate facts demonstrating that there is a real or reasonable possibility that the defendant can access the passenger compartment to obtain a weapon or destroy evidence at the time of the search. When an arrestee has been handcuffed and secured in a police vehicle, the justification for a subsequent search incident to arrest of the passenger compartment of the arrestee’s vehicle no longer is present under the first prong of the test. However, when the arrestee has been handcuffed but not yet secured in a police vehicle, there is case law in support of permitting the search of the passenger compartment of the arrestee’s vehicle incident to arrest for weapons and evidence as long as the arrestee still is within reaching distance of the vehicle. This is not to recommend that officers keep recently arrested subjects near their vehicles so that such searches may be justified as officer safety remains of paramount importance.
The key to understanding the second prong of the Gant test is to define “reasonable to believe.” In Gant, the police arrested the defendant for driving with a suspended license.53 The Court found the subsequent search incident to arrest of the defendant’s vehicle to be unreasonable as it was not likely that the police would discover offense-related evidence during the search.54 The Court explained that “[i]n many cases, as when a recent occupant is arrested for a traffic violation, there will be no reasonable basis to believe the vehicle contains relevant evidence...[b]ut in others, including Belton and Thornton, the offense of the arrest will supply a basis for searching the passenger compartment of an arrestee’s vehicle and any containers therein.”55 Of note, both Belton56 and Thorton57 involved arrests for drug offenses.
The majority in Gant did not provide further explanation or guidance as to the second prong of the test. As stated by Justice Alito in his dissenting opinion, this “creates a host of uncertainties.”58 Not surprisingly, lower courts have struggled with the language of this part of the test and have come up with myriad interpretations.
In United States v. Vinton,63 the D.C. Court of Appeals presumed that “‘the reasonable to believe’ standard probably is akin to the ‘reasonable suspicion’ standard required to justify a Terry64 search.”65 In applying the standard to the facts of the case, the court justified the search of a locked briefcase found in the passenger compartment of a defendant’s vehicle after he was arrested for the unlawful possession of a weapon and the officer had discovered other weapons in the vehicle during a protective search of the passenger compartment.
While the U.S. Supreme Court has limited the ability of law enforcement to search the passenger compartment of a motor vehicle incident to the arrest of a recent occupant of that vehicle, it certainly has not eliminated this viable search warrant exception. However, officers applying this exception must be familiar with the wording and meaning of the Court’s two-part test articulated in Gant. It also must be remembered that facts satisfying either prong of the test will result in a reasonable search incident to arrest.
Under the first prong, the defendant still must have a real possibility of access to the vehicle at the time of the search for this part of the test to be satisfied. This has become a fact-specific, case-by-case determination for the officer to make at the scene of the arrest. Factors in this analysis include whether or not the subject is handcuffed, or secured in a police vehicle, the proximity of the subject to the vehicle to be searched, and subject-to-officer ratio.
If the arrestee no longer has access to the passenger compartment of the vehicle, the officer must determine if it is reasonable to believe that evidence of the offense of the arrest is located in the passenger compartment of the vehicle to be searched. Courts have differed in their interpretation of this second prong of the test, and, until the Supreme Court specifically addresses this issue, it is incumbent on law enforcement officers to learn and follow the precedent of their respective jurisdictions. The two most common interpretations of the second prong of the test are the reasonable suspicion standard and the nature-of-the-offense test.
1 556 U.S. ——, 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009).
2 In New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460, 101 S. Ct. 2860, 2864 (1981), the U.S. Supreme Court held that “when a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automobile.” In Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 124 S. Ct. 2127 (2004), the Court extended the holding of Belton to allow for the lawful search of the passenger compartment of a motor vehicle following the arrest of a recent occupant of that vehicle.
6 Id. at 1719. A detailed account of the facts of Gant and an in-depth review of the legal precedent leading up to the decision have been the subject of a previous Law Enforcement Bulletin article and will not be repeated herein. See Richard G. Schott, “The Supreme Court Reexamines Search Incident to Lawful Arrest,” FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, July 2009. Additionally, the retroactive application of Gant, whether police may rely on a “good faith” exception to the exclusionary rule for pre-Gant searches, and the extension of Gant beyond the motor vehicle context all are beyond the scope of this article.
7 Gant at 1716 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)).
9 Id.; Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392, 34 S. Ct. 341 (1914).
10 395 U.S. 752, 763, 89 S. Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969).
11 Gant at 1716; United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 230-234, 94 S. Ct. 467 (1973); and Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763, 89 S. Ct. 2034 (1969).
12 Gant at 1714 (citing Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763, 89 S. Ct. 2034 (1969)).
13 453 U.S. 454, 101 S. Ct. 2860 (1981).
14 Gant at 1715; and New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460, 101 S. Ct. 2860, 2864 (1981).
15 Gant at 1717-1718, 1724.
17 Id. (“police may search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s arrest only if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of the arrest [emphasis added]). See also United States v. Davis, 569 F.3d 813, 816-817 (C.A. 8 2009); Commonwealth v. Elliott, 322 S.W.3d 106, 110 (Ky. App. 2010); and Brown v. State, 24 So.3d 671, 678, 34 Fla. L. Weekly D2593 (DC App. Fla. 2009).
19 395 U.S. 752, 89 S. Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969).
22 Id. at 1719, 1723.
23 See, for example, United States v. Lopez, 567 F. 3d 755, 757-758 (C.A. 6 2009); United States v. Ruckes, 586 F.3d 713 (C.A. 9 2009) (no authority for search incident to arrest but justified under inventory exception); People v. Chamberlain, 229 P.3d 1054, 1055 (Colo. 2010); United States v. Megginson, 340 Fed.Appx. 856, 857 (C.A. 4 2009); State v. Johnson, —-N.C.App.—-, 693 S.E. 2d 711,717 (2010); United States v. Majette, 326 Fed.Appx. 211, 213 (C.A. 4 2009) (unpublished); United States v. Kelley, 2011 WL 201477 (S.D. Texas 2011); and United States v. Reagan, 713 F.Supp2d 724, 727 (E.D. Tenn. 2010).
24 569 F. 3d 813 (C.A. 8 2009).
25 Id. at 817. See also United States v. Goodwin-Bey, 584 F.3d 1117, (C.A. 8 2009), cert. denied ___U.S.___, 130 S. Ct. 1563, 176 L.Ed 2d 148 (2010) (permitting search of passenger compartment of motor vehicle incident to the arrest of one of the passengers due to safety concern based on earlier report of a weapon in the vehicle and presence of three remaining passengers outside of the vehicle. The three passengers had been patted down, but were not restrained or otherwise secured); and United States v. Salamasina, 615 F.3d 925 (C.A. 8 2010) (search of passenger compartment of vehicle permitted incident to the arrest of driver on drug charges, even though at time of search he was handcuffed and moved to a location next to the patrol car and away from the vehicle. Defendant’s fiancee and two minor children still had access to the vehicle, and the fiancee repeatedly entered and exited the vehicle to tend to her children and spoke in a foreign language to the arrestee despite the officer’s instructions not to do so).
26 Gant at 1714 (“we hold that Belton does not authorize a vehicle search incident to a recent occupant’s arrest after the arrestee has been secured and cannot access the interior of the vehicle”).
27 Id. at 1719 (“the Chimel rationale authorizes police to search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s arrest only when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search”).
30 —-S.E.2d—-, 2010 WL 4243134 (Ga. App. 2010).
31 Id. at p. 6.
36 616 F.3d 315 (C.A. 3 2010), cert. denied 131 S. Ct. 841 (2010).
40 Id. (citing United States v. Sanders, 994 F.2d 200, 209 (C.A. 5 1993)). See also United States v. Perdoma, 621 F.3d 745, 753 (C.A. 8 2010) (without expressly holding that Gant applied to nonmotor vehicle situations, the Court reasoned that the fact that the defendant had been handcuffed and restrained by police in a bus terminal at the time of his arrest did not mean that he clearly was outside of reaching distance of his nearby bag at the time of the search).
41 682 S.E.2d 416 (N.C. App. 2009).
44 2009 WL 4282111 (E.D. Cal. 2009).
45 Id. at p. 5.
46 Gant at 1729 (2009) (Alito, J., dissenting).
48 United States v. Davis, 569 F.3d 813, 816-817 (C.A. 8 2009); and Commonwealth v. Elliott, 322 S.W.3d 106, 110 (Ky. App. 2010).
49 556 U.S. ——, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1719 (2009).
50 Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 124 S. Ct. 2127 (2004) (the U.S. Supreme Court extended the holding of Belton to allow for the lawful search of the passenger compartment of a motor vehicle following the arrest of a recent occupant of that vehicle).
51 Gant at 1714, 1719.
56 453 U.S. 454, 456, 101 S. Ct. 2860, 2864 (1981).
57 541 U.S. 615, 618, 124 S. Ct. 2127 (2004).
58 See Megginson v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1982 (2009) and Grooms v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1981 (2009) (dissenting opinions of Justice Alito in two matters before the Court that were remanded for further consideration in light of Arizona v. Gant).
59 See, for example, United States v. Vinton, 594 F.3d 14, 25 (DC Cir. 2010), cert. denied 131 S. Ct. 93 (2010); United States v. Polanco, —-F.3d.—-, 2011 WL 420747 at * 4 (C.A. 1 2011); People v. Chamberlain, 229 P.3d 1054, 1057 (Colo. 2010); United States v. Leak, 2010 WL 1418227 (W.D.N.C. 2010); Powell v. Commonwealth, 57 Va. App. 329, 339, 701 S.E. 2d 831 (Va. App. 2010); Idaho v. Cantrell 233 P.3d 178, 183 (Idaho App. 2010); but, see United States v. Grote, 629 F.Supp 2d 1201, 1203 (E.D. Wash.2009) (reasonable to believe equates to probable cause).
60 State v. Gamboa, 2010 WL 2773359 (Ariz. App. Div. 1 2010) (unreported).
62 Megginson v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1982 (2009).
63 594 F.3d 14 (D.C.Cir. 2010), cert. denied 131 S. Ct. 93 (2010).
64 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).
65 594 F.3d 14, 25 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. denied 131 S. Ct. 93 (2010).
66 229 P.3d 1054 (Colo. 2010).
67 Id. at 1057. See also People v. Perez, 231 P.3d 957 (Colo. 2010); United States v. Reagan, 713 F.Supp.2d 724, 733 (E.D. Tenn. 2010) (reasonable-to-believe standard is based on common sense factors and the totality of the circumstances that evidence of the offense of the arrest is in the passenger compartment of the vehicle, in other words “particularized and articulable reasons”); State v. Mbacke, —-S.E.2d—-, 2011 WL 13814 (N.C. App. 2011) (“we interpret the Supreme Court’s holding in Gant to require an officer to suspect the presence of more direct evidence of the crime of arrest than...highly indirect circumstantial evidence...).
68 229 P.3d 1054, 1056-1057 (Colo. 2010).
70 Gant at 1714, 1719.
71 532 U.S. 318, 324, 121 S. Ct. 1536, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001).
73 525 U.S. 113, 118, 119 S. Ct. 484, 142 L.Ed.2d 492 (1998).
74 New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460, 101 S. Ct. 2860, 2864 (1981).
75 Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 124 S. Ct. 2127 (2004).
76 Gant at 1714, 1719.
78 Brown v. State, 24 So.3d 671, 678, 34 Fla. L. Weekly D2593 (D.C. App. Fla. 2009), review denied 39 So.3d 1264 (2010); endnote 79.
79 United States v. Lopez, 567 F. 3d 755, 758 (C.A. 6 2009) (reckless driving); United States v. Brunick, 374 FedAppx. 714, 716, 2010 WL 1041369 (C.A. 9 2010) (driving under suspended license); United States v. Ruckes, 586 F.3d 713,718 (C.A. 9 2009) (driving under suspended license); United States v. Bronner, 2009 WL 1748533 (D. Minn.2009) (driving under revoked license); and United States v. Holmes, 2009 WL 1748533 (D. Minn.2009) (unreported) (driving under revoked license).
81 United States v. Wright, 374 Fed.Appx. 386, 391, 210 WL 1500520 (C.A.4 2010); United States v. Brown, 2009 WL 2346668 (S.D. Ind. 2009); United States v. Page, 679 F.Supp.2d 648 (E.D. Va. 2009); and United States v. Conerly, 2010 WL 4723434 (E.D. Mi.2010).
82 People v. Osborne, 175 Cal.App.4th 1052, 1065, 96 Ca.Rptr.3d 696 (Cal.App.Dist.1 Div.4 2009).
83 Commonwealth v. Elliott, 322 S.W.3d 106, 110 (Ky. App. 2010); Idaho v. Cantrell, 233 P.3d 178, 183 (Idaho App. 2010); but see United States v. Reagan, 713 F.Supp.2d 724, 733 (E.D. Tenn. 2010) (DUI arrest alone, without particularized and articulable reason to believe evidence of DUI is contained in vehicle at time of search does not satisfy reasonable-to-believe standard).
84 United States v. Owen, 2009 WL 2857959 (S.D. Miss., South. Div. 2009).
85 Gant at 1714, 1725 (Scalia, J., concurring); and Deemer v. State, —-P.3d.—-, 2010 WL 5187698 (Alaska App. 2010).
87 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
88 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966); Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 103 S. Ct. 3469, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983); and Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 110 S. Ct. 1093, 108 L.Ed.2d 276 (1990).
89 United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 820-821, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982); United States v. Polanco, —-F.3d.—-, 2011 WL 420747 at * 3 (Co. 1 2011).
90 South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976).

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