Source: https://www.utrechtjournal.org/articles/10.5334/ujiel.233/
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 11:03:49+00:00

Document:
Researcher, European Technology Law and Human Rights Division, Department of European and Economic Law, University of Groningen (the Netherlands).
States parties to international copyright instruments are required to give effect to their obligations under international copyright law and fulfil their international human rights obligations with respect to striking a balance between the human rights of the authors of intellectual works and human rights of the users of those same works. The High Commissioner of Human Rights has concluded that such balance ‘is one familiar to intellectual property law’. This conclusion assumes that international copyright law is already compliant with international human rights law. However, international copyright law instruments are not clear about how to reach an appropriate balance between these rights and, as a result, different stakeholders in the international copyright community seek and defend varied versions of balance which are not necessarily consistent. Concurrently, international human rights law bodies and scholars have examined the human rights of authors and users of intellectual works through a copyright law lens, missing a chance to articulate a clear human rights principle of balance. A proper human rights balance between authors’ and users’ human rights recognises the limited nature of both sets of human rights, rejects any hierarchy between them, and interprets them in conformity with the notion of the interdependence and indivisibility of human rights.
The High Commissioner’s reliance on the international copyright law’s principle of balance to issue a decree of coexistence between international copyright law and international human rights law is problematic. The principle of balance in international copyright law is not as self-evident as generally perceived. It is ambiguous and is far from being agreed upon as satisfactory within international copyright law, making it a poor candidate to be imported as a viable peacemaker between the two regimes. Second, the High Commissioner has not articulated an independent human rights principle of balance—with clear rules—that can contribute to managing the multifaceted and interrelated tensions resulting from the interplay between authors’ and users’ human rights and which can act as point of reference against which international copyright law can measure its compliance with international human rights norms.
The purpose of this paper is to unfold the complexity surrounding the meaning of balance in international copyright law and present the principle of balance in international human rights law. This should inform a new debate with respect to how to measure the compliance of international copyright law with international human rights law. The paper is divided into five parts: Part II outlines the different human rights approaches to intellectual property law; Part III reveals the ambiguity of the principle of balance in international copyright law; Part IV presents the human rights principle of balance; and Part V is a conclusion.
The coexistence perspective on intellectual property law and human rights assumes that the principle of balance in international copyright law is clear and imports it to manage the tension between authors’ and users’ human rights. However, given the plethora of meanings of the term balance in international copyright law, this perspective overestimates the maturity of the principle of balance in international copyright law and therefore also overestimates its possible role in international human rights law.
To sum up, the premise that there is a degree of compatibility between international intellectual property law and international human rights law, due to the similarity between the balance that both intend to achieve by means of the copyright/exception formula, is problematic because balance in international copyright law is not self-evident. Similarly, international human rights law should shape the norms of international copyright law, not vice versa. Therefore, there is a need to clarify the meaning of balance in international human rights law, in the context of the relationship between authors’ and users’ human rights, before comparing it with balance in international copyright law. The following section addresses this issue.
Philosophers and jurists will always debate the value and fairness of balance and its different forms, yet today it is one of the fashionable terms used by courts to convey legitimacy on the process and outcome of their adjudication on human rights and freedoms.105 In following balance as a methodology or pursuing it as an outcome, courts usually attempt to find normative support in law, whether written or customary. For instance, the ECtHR has described the requirement to strike a balance between the human rights and freedoms of individuals and the collective public interest of the whole community as ‘inherent’ in the ECHR.106 Nonetheless, due to the diverse legal fields in which this concept is utilised, it may refer to different things depending on its application to the specific legal context.107 Therefore, it is important to clarify the meaning of balance with reference to the protection of authors’ and users’ human rights.
The meaning of balance in international human rights law is related to the ordinary dictionary definition.108 As Waldron notes, the metaphor of balance is applied in moral and political discourse ‘when there are things to be said on both sides of an issue, values that pull us in opposite directions’.109 Accordingly, balance first is the equal status that all human rights and freedoms enjoy in international human rights law consequent to their original allocation in their relevant instruments. In this respect, relevance to human dignity is the determinant of what rights or interests are included in the sacred list of human rights. Another important factor is public policy objectives that drafters of international human rights instruments may recognise as limitations on human rights and freedoms.110 As a result, the sum of the rights and freedoms in international human rights law and their limitations is the broad (or initial) balance presumed to have justly been struck in international human rights law.111 Part of this balance, of course, is the rights of authors and users of intellectual works.
General Comment No. 17 explains that determining the content and scope of authors’ and users’ human rights must be by means of balance,117 which comprises its second and third types. Thus, the implementation of these rights must adhere to a set of rules regulating how their content is interpreted in relation to each other and in relation to other human rights.
Moreover, the protection of authors’ human rights to freedom of expression and property are also subject to limitations. Pursuant to Article 19(3) of the ICCPR, authors’ freedom of expression could be subject to limitations prescribed by law that are necessary for the respect of the rights of the others, or for the protection of national security, public order, public health or morals.141 Further, paragraph 2 of Article 17 of the UDHR impliedly allows deprivation of property in certain circumstances by prohibiting the arbitrary deprivation of property.
As implemented in international copyright law, authors’ and users’ human rights are limited. Users’ human rights are limited in relation to copyrighted works for the duration of copyright protection and authors’ human rights are limited by the exceptions and limitations to give some room for users’ human rights. However, to strike a balance between authors’ and users’ human rights under the umbrella of international copyright law it is not enough to establish copyright representing authors’ human rights, on the one hand, and exceptions and limitations representing users’ human rights, on the other hand. The degree of the mutual and reciprocal limitation between these rights greatly matters. It must be reasonable enough to enable both rights to have their due effect without one right defeating the purpose of the other.
Giving due consideration to the limited nature of both authors’ and users’ human rights requires reconsideration of the minimum standard of protection principle in international copyright law. For example, the current term of copyright protection in the Berne Convention was added at the Brussels Revision of the Convention (1948) as a minimum right.160 In setting this term, the drafters intended to strike ‘a fair balance between the interests of authors and the need for society to have free access to the cultural heritage which last far longer than those who contributed to it’.161 Admittedly, the underlying logic behind the term of protection in the Berne Convention reflects awareness of users’ human rights. The term-limited protection requires sending to the public domain every work whose protection has expired. Nonetheless, a term of protection that exceeds the author’s lifetime automatically encroaches upon users’ human rights, since in international human rights law authors’ material interests only last for the life of the author.162 Thus, upon the author’s death all and full users’ human rights are supposed to become due, and any extension of protection thereafter is lacking a human rights foundation and must not infringe on users’ human rights.
In addition to the limited nature of authors’ and users’ human rights, another element of the balance between these two sets of human rights is the absence of any hierarchy between them.
In international law, there is a disagreement on whether a hierarchy exists among its norms.176 This disagreement extends to cover the issue of whether a hierarchy exists within international human rights norms.177 Nonetheless, the closest hierarchy debate relevant to balancing authors’ and users’ rights regarding intellectual works concerns the debate on assigning superiority to civil and political rights (CPR) over ESCR. As explained earlier, authors’ moral and material interests and users’ rights to culture, arts and science under Article 15 of the ICESCR and Article 27 of the UDHR are ESCR. At the same time, authors and users can protect the same rights relying on their CPR, such as freedom of expression, by means of the interdependence and indivisibility of human rights’ principles. This means that a tension between authors and users can result from the exercise of human rights that do not have the same nature: for example, ESCR of users versus CPR of authors. For balance to be possible in this case, it is important to reject any attempt to present one of these categories of human rights as superior to the other.
As affirmed by the World Conference on Human Rights, ‘[a]ll human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated. The international community must treat human rights globally in a fair and equal manner, on the same footing, and with the same emphasis.’216 By the same token, neither authors nor users of intellectual works can claim superiority over one another in human rights law by relying on a hierarchy between CPR and ESCR. Also, lawmakers and courts should avoid any hierarchy of this nature when balancing the human rights of authors and users.
Rejecting a hierarchy between human rights, regardless of its basis, would expose a number of points of imbalance in international copyright law. For example, international copyright law incorporates a number of provisions that address users’ human rights, such as the provision excluding news of the day from copyright protection.217 This is a mandatory provision and meant, inter alia, to address users’ human right to freedom of expression,218 a civil and political right. On the other hand, international copyright law addresses the human right to education — an economic, social and cultural right — in an optional provision relating to permitting the utilisation of copyrighted works by way of illustration in teaching activities.219 The mandatory protection of freedom of expression versus the optional protection of the human right to education creates a hierarchy between those human rights that is inconsistent with the requirements of balance in international human rights law. This hierarchy echoes the historical discrimination against ESCR in favour of CPR.
Furthermore, whereas the Berne Convention and the WCT protect moral rights, TRIPS has dropped moral rights from its protection.220 In this regard, TRIPS creates a hierarchy between authors’ economic rights and moral rights. Given the importance of moral rights to the human author’s dignity, and given the trade environment of TRIPS, one can further argue that TRIPS creates a hierarchy between the rights of the human authors and the economic rights of corporations, as a category of rights holders. As Gervais aptly described, by overlooking moral rights, TRIPS ‘split the copyright coin’.221 As a result, it ‘may have weakened the intrinsic equilibrium of copyright and, hence, the “power to convince” that copyright has traditionally enjoyed’.222 Overlooking moral rights in TRIPS has tilted its balance toward the economic interests of copyright holders at the expense of authors’ moral interests.223 Given the declining importance of the Berne Convention as an independent international copyright instrument — outside the scope of its incorporation in TRIPS224 — one may reasonably infer a decline of the status of authors’ moral rights in international copyright law, which is injurious to the relation between this regime and international human rights law. Additionally, to the extent one finds in moral rights a right of users to receive authentic and accurate works, excluding moral rights from protection creates a hierarchy between the economic interests of rights holders and this implicit users’ right.
In Canada, the issue of orphan works is solved by section 77 of the Copyright Act,232 which authorises the Copyright Board to issue non-exclusive licenses to use orphan works.
The rejection of a hierarchy between human rights is consistent with the holistic view of international human rights, which is another important rule of balance.
A holistic approach to statutory interpretation means that courts will interpret a particular provision in a statute in light of ‘the whole statute (or statutes on the same subject) and the objects and policy of the law, as indicated by its various provisions, and give to it such a construction as will carry into execution the will of the Legislature, as thus ascertained, according to its true intent and meaning’.234 This ‘is the most realistic in view of the fact that a legislature passes judgment upon the act as an entity, not giving one portion of the act any greater authority than another’.235 Regarding human rights, this approach will ensure that ‘one right is not privileged at the expense of another’,236 and its applicability to the interpretation of international human rights law is in harmony with the fact that all human rights are equal, interdependent, indivisible, and necessary for the respect of the dignity of human beings.
Reaching a verdict on whether balance in international copyright law is compliant with the balance that international human rights law requires between authors’ and users’ human rights is a work in progress. International copyright law has yet to clarify the meaning and content of balance under its different instruments. Furthermore, the High Commissioner of Human Rights and the CESCR have not distinguished the ambiguous balance in international copyright law from balance in international human rights law. Therefore, international human rights law bodies and jurists should look at authors’ and users’ human rights — and the balance between them — through a human rights lens. A human rights balance between authors’ and users’ human rights means that the implementation and/or adjudication of these human rights must adhere to the following rules: both sets of human rights are reciprocally limited; they do not exist in a hierarchy; and their proper interpretation occurs only in light of the interrelation and indivisibility of all international human rights. Moreover, international copyright law bodies and jurists should carefully consider this human rights framework of balance in any future attempt to clarify the meaning and content of balance in international copyright law or to measure the compliance of the latter’s norms with international human rights law. Unless international copyright law adheres to balance within its meaning in international human rights law, the similarity between the balance that international copyright law claims to create between the different interests under its umbrella and the balance required under international human right law between authors’ and users’ human rights — and between these two sets of human rights and the whole body of human rights — remains one of terminology rather than ideology.
1Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 10 December 1948 UNGA Res 217 A(III) (UDHR).
2International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 3 January 1976) 993 UNTS 3 (ICESCR).
3UDHR, art 27(2); ICESCR, art 15(1)(c).
4UDHR, art 27(1); ICESCR, art 15(1)(a)-(b).
5See World Conference on Human Rights, ‘Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action’ (12 July 1993) UN Doc A/CONF.157/23 (Vienna Declaration), para 5.
[There are views] that seek to portray them as authoritative interpretations of the relevant treaty norms, through others that see them as a de facto equivalent of advisory opinions which are to be treated with seriousness but no more, to highly critical approaches that classify them as broad, unsystematic statements which are not always well founded, and are not deserving of being accorded any particular weight in legal settings. ibid 764.
7Hereinafter, users’ rights in culture, arts and science in article 27(1) of the UDHR and in article 15(1)(a)-(b) of the ICESCR as well as users’ claims to protect these rights under the human rights to freedom of expression and education are collectively referred to as ‘users’ human rights’. For a discussion of the content of users’ human rights, see UNCESCR, ‘General Comment No. 21: Right of Everyone to Take Part in Cultural Life (art. 15, para. 1 (a), of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights)’ (21 December 2009) UN Doc E/C.12/GC/21 (General Comment No. 21).
8General Comment No. 17 (n 6) para 22.
9UN Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) (Sub-Commission), ‘The Impact of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights on Human Rights: Report of the High Commissioner’ (27 June 2001) UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/13 (Report of the High Commissioner), para 11.
12Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (adopted 15 April 1994, entered into force 1 January 1995) 33 ILM 1144, Annex 1C, Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) art 7.
13Report of the High Commissioner (n 9) para 16.
16Jakob Cornides, ‘Human Rights and Intellectual Property-Conflict or Convergence?’ (2004) 7 JWIP 135, 137; Peter K Yu, ‘Intellectual Property and Human Rights in the Nonmultilateral Era’ (2012) 64 Fla L Rev 1045, 1045.
17Laurence R Helfer and Graeme Austin, Human Rights and Intellectual Property: Mapping the Global Interface (CUP 2011) 1.
18WIPO and OHCHR (eds), Intellectual Property and Human Rights: Panel Discussion to Commemorate the 50th Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (WIPO 1999).
19See eg Audrey R Chapman, ‘Approaching Intellectual Property as a Human Right: Obligations Related to Article 15(1)(c)’ (2001) 35 Copyright Bull 4; Laurence R Helfer, ‘Human Rights and Intellectual Property: Conflict or Coexistence?’ (2003–2004) 5 Minn Intell Prop Rev 47; Paul Torremans (ed), Copyright and Human Rights: Freedom of Expression, Intellectual Property, Privacy (KLI 2004); Mpazi Sinjela, Human Rights and Intellectual Property Rights: Tensions and Convergences (Martinus Nijhoff 2007); Peter K Yu, ‘Reconceptualizing Intellectual Property Interests in a Human Rights Framework’ (2007) 40 UC Davis L Rev 1039; Laurence R Helfer, ‘Toward a Human Rights Framework for Intellectual Property’ (2007) 40 UC Davis L Rev 971; Willem Grosheide (ed), Intellectual Property and Human Rights: A Paradox (Edward Elgar 2010); Helfer and Austin (n 17); Yu, ‘Nonmultilateral Era’ (n 16).
20See eg Helfer, ‘Conflict or Coexistence?’ (n 19) 48–49.
21UNCHR (Sub-Commission), ‘Intellectual Property Rights and Human Rights: Sub-Commission on Human Rights Resolution 2000/7’ (17 August 2000) UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/RES/2000/7 (Resolution 2000/7).
24David Weissbrodt and Kell Schoff, ‘Human Rights Approach to Intellectual Property Protection: The Genesis and Application of Sub-Commission Resolution 2000/7’ (2003) 5 Minn Intell Prop Rev 1, 26.
25UNCHR (Sub-Commission), ‘The Realization of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Joint Written Statement- Submitted by Habitat International Coalition and the Lutheran World Federation, non-governmental organisations in special consultative status’ (28 July 2000) UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/NGO/14, 6.
27See eg Commission on Intellectual Property Rights (CIPR), Report of the Commission on Intellectual Property Rights: Integrating Intellectual Property Rights and Development Policy (CIPR 2002) 6 (noting the additional costs that intellectual property protection imposes on developing countries ‘at the expense of the essential prerequisites of life for poor people’); Peter Drahos, ‘The Universality of Intellectual Property Rights: Origins and Developments’ in WIPO and OHCHR (eds), Intellectual Property and Human Rights: Panel Discussion to Commemorate the 50th Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (WIPO 1999) 27 (noting ‘considerable tension between intellectual property rights and the right to development’).
28See eg Peter Straub, ‘Farmers in the IP Wrench––How Patents on Gene-Modified Crops Violate the Right to Food in Developing Countries’ (2006) 29 Hastings Int’l & Comp L Rev 187. See also Michael Blakeney, Intellectual Property Rights and Food Security (CABI 2009) 15 (noting the presence of a tension between intellectual property and the right to food); Annette Kur, Intellectual Property Rights in a Fair World Trade System: Proposals for Reform of TRIPS (Edward Elgar 2011) 285 (arguing that patenting of genetically modified crops could make developing countries more dependent on imported seeds, a situation implying some tension between international patent law and the human right to self-determination).
29See eg UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC), ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health’ (31 March 2009) UN Doc A/HRC/11/12, para 94 (concluding that the impact of TRIPS and bilateralism on medicine availability and pricing has complicated States’ task to respect, protect, and fulfill the human right to health); Philippe Cullet, ‘Patents and Medicines: The Relationship between TRIPS and the Human Right to Health’ (2003) 79 Int’l Aff 139, 160 (concluding that possible conflicts exist between drug patenting and the human right to health and that this conflict ought to be resolved in favour of the human right to health).
30See eg Peter Drahos, ‘Indigenous Knowledge, Intellectual Property and Biopiracy: Is a Global Biocollecting Society the Answer?’ (2000) 22(6) EIPR 245, 247; James T Gathii, ‘Rights, Patents, Markets and the Global Aids Pandemic’ (2002) 14 Fla J Int’l L 261, 319; Manuela Cameiro da Cunha, ‘International Bodies and Traditional Knowledge’ in Sophia Twarog and Promila Kapoor (eds), Protecting and Promoting Traditional Knowledge: Systems, National Experiences and International Dimensions (UN Publications 2004) 91.
31See eg P Bernt Hugenholtz, ‘Copyright and Freedom of Expression in Europe’ in Rochelle C Dreyfuss, Diane L Zimmerman and Harry First (eds), Expanding the Boundaries of Intellectual Property: Innovation Policy for the KnowledgeSociety (OUP 2001) 343; UNHRC, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression’ (16 May 2011) UN DOC A/HRC/17/27, para 78 (concluding that disconnecting users from accessing the internet on grounds of intellectual property law violations is not a justified restriction on freedom of expression).
32See eg International Symposium on the Information Society, Human Dignity and Human Rights, ‘Statement on Human Rights, Human Dignity and the Information Society’ (2005) 18 RQDI 221, para 26 (stating that international intellectual property law ‘should not prevail over the right to education and knowledge’).
33Report of the High Commissioner (n 9) para 12.
35ibid para 11. See also Estelle Derclaye, ‘Intellectual Property Rights and Human Rights: Coinciding and Cooperating’ in Paul LC Torremans (ed), Intellectual Property and Human Rights: Enhanced Edition of Copyright and Human Rights (KLI 2008) 134 (arguing that intellectual property rights and human rights ‘coexist’, ‘coincide’ and ‘cooperate’).
36Daniel J Gervais, ‘Intellectual Property and Human Rights: Learning to Live Together’ in Paul LC Torremans (ed), Intellectual Property and Human Rights: Enhanced Edition of Copyright and Human Rights (KLI 2008) 3.
38Hans M Haugen, The Right to Food and the TRIPS Agreement: With a Particular Emphasis on Developing Countries’ Measures for Food Production and Distribution (Koninklijke Brill 2007) 376; Lisa P Ramsey, ‘Free Speech and International Obligations to Protect Trademarks’ (2010) 35 Yale J Int’l L 405, 415; Kristen Osenga, ‘Get the Balance Right: Squaring Access with Patent Protection’ (2012) 25 Pac McGeorge Global Bus & Dev LJ 309, 320–321.
39Guido Westkamp, ‘The “Three-Step Test” and Copyright Limitations in Europe: European Copyright Law between Approximation and National Decision Making’ (2008) 56 J Copyright Soc’y USA 1, 37.
40Tom Braegelmann, ‘Copyright Law in and under the Constitution: The Constitutional Scope and Limits to Copyright Law in the United States in Comparison with the Scope and Limits Imposed by Constitutional and European Law on Copyright Law in Germany’ (2009) 27 Cardozo Arts & Ent LJ 99, 101. Notably, Canada has a hybrid copyright system that combines both regimes.
41For a general comparison between the two systems, see Rudolf Monta, ‘The Concept of “Copyright” versus the “Droit D’auteur”’ (1959) 32 S Cal L Rev 177.
42Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (adopted 9 September 1886, entered into force 4 December 1887, revised 24 July 1971) 828 UNTS 221 (Berne Convention).
43L Ray Patterson, ‘What’s Wrong With Eldred? An Essay on Copyright Jurisprudence’ (2003) 10 J Intell Prop L 345, 352.
46WIPO Copyright Treaty (adopted 20 December 1996, entered into force 6 March 2002) 36 ILM 65 (WCT).
47WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (adopted 20 December 1996, entered into force 20 May 2002) 36 ILM 76 (WPPT).
49Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (adopted 3 December 2010, opened for signature 1 May 2011) 50 ILM 243 (ACTA).
51Oxford Dictionary of English (3rd edn) 123.
For a discussion of the Three-Step Test, see Martin Senftleben, Copyright, Limitations and the Three-Step Test: An Analysis of the Three-Step Test in International and EC Copyright Law (KLI 2004).
54Sean J Griffith, ‘Internet Regulation through Architectural Modification: The Property Rule Structure of Code Solutions’ (1999) 112 Harv L Rev 1634, 1652.
55Sayre v Moore (n 53) 362; Théberge v Galerie d’Art du Petit Champlain inc, 2002 SCC 34,  2 SCR 336 . See also Lateef Mtima and Steven D Jamar, ‘Fulfilling the Copyright Social Justice Promise: Digitizing Textual Information’ (2010) 55 NYL Sch L Rev 77, 106 (giving Google Books project as an example of an ‘optimum copyright balance’ between authors and users of intellectual works in the digital environment).
57See eg The Committee on Commerce, ‘Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998’ (105th Congress, 1997–1998) (HR Rep No 105–551(II)) 26 (describing balance as the ‘bedrock’ of intellectual property law in the United States); Théberge (n 55)  (holding that ‘the balance of rights and interests […] lie at the basis of copyright law’); Pamela Samuelson, ‘Does Information Really Have to be Licensed?’ (1998) 41:9 Communications of the ACM 15, 15 (noting that copyright law includes ‘a longstanding tradition’ of establishing balance between copyright holders and the public consumers of copyrighted works).
58Pascal Lamy, ‘Conclusions’ (International Conference on the 10th Anniversary of the WTO TRIPS, Brussels, 24 June 2004).
59WTO, Canada–Term of Patent Protection (Complaint by the United States) (18 September 2000) WT/DS170/AB/R .
60WTO, Canada–Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products (Complaint by the European Communities and their member States) (17 March 2000) WT/DS114/R.
(b) where the subject matter of a patent is a process, to prevent third parties not having the owner’s consent from the act of using the process and from the acts of: using, offering for sale, selling, or importing for these purposes at least the product obtained directly by that process.
Patent owners shall also have the right to assign, or transfer by succession, the patent and to conclude licensing contracts.
62Canada–Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products (n 60) [7.26].
65See eg Alan Story, ‘Burn Berne: Why the Leading International Copyright Convention Must Be Repealed’ (2003) 40 Hous L Rev 763, 767.
66See eg William M Landes and Richard A Posner, ‘An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law’ (1989) 18 J Legal Stud 325, 326 (arguing that striking the correct balance between the incentive given to authors to produce (and disseminate) intellectual works and the value of affording access to these works is the core problem in copyright law); Pascal Lamy, ‘Speech’ (International Conference on the 10th Anniversary of the WTO TRIPS, Brussels, 24 June 2004) (arguing that achieving balance is the core of international copyright policy); Graeme Dinwoodie, ‘The WIPO Copyright Treaty: A Transition to the Future of International Copyright Lawmaking?’ (2010) 57 Case W Res L Rev 751, 757–758 (arguing that ‘balance is a more complex organism than we might expect or might assume’).
67Daniel Gervais, ‘Fair Use, Fair Dealing, Fair Principles: Efforts To Conceptualize Exceptions and Limitations To Copyright’ (2010) 57 J Copyright Soc’y USA 499, 503.
70See eg 17 USC § 107 (2012).
71See eg Ruth Okediji, ‘Toward an International Fair Use doctrine’ (2000) 39 Colum J Transnat’l L 75, 82.
72Jane C Ginsburg, ‘“European Copyright Code” - Back to First Principles (with Some Additional Detail)’ (2011) 58 J Copyright Soc’y USA 265, 267.
74<http://www.copyrightcode.eu/index.php?websiteid=3> accessed 6 July 2015.
75Ginsburg, ‘European Copyright Code’ (n 72) 266.
76Generally, intellectual property maximalists, such as the United States, European Union (EU) and Japan, call for longer, wider and stronger protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights. They argue that strong copyright stimulates creativity and innovation and thus generates economic growth. And, they are not supportive of access to knowledge initiatives. For further discussion of the maximalists’ agenda see Debora Halbert, ‘The Politics of IP Maximalism’ (2011) 3 WIPOJ 81. See also James Boyle, ‘Enclosing the Genome: What the Squabbles over Genetic Patents Could Teach Us’ in Kieff F Scott (ed), Perspectives on Properties of the Human Genome Project (Academic Press 2003) 107–108 (referring to ‘maximalists’ as ‘high protectionists’ and, on the other hand, to ‘minimalists’ as the ones concerned with the public domain).
77See eg Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR), ‘ACTA Fact Sheet and Guide to Public Draft Text’ (October 2010) <http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/fact-sheets/2010/acta-fact-sheet-and-guide-public-draft-text> accessed 6 July 2015 (stating that ACTA’s section on the enforcement of copyright in the digital environment includes a section that establishes a ‘balanced framework that addresses the challenge of copyright piracy on digital networks while preserving fundamental principles such as freedom of expression, fair process and privacy’).
78For a discussion of A2K and its movement see generally the collection of articles in Gaëlle Krikorian and Amy Kapczynski (eds), Access to Knowledge in the Age of Intellectual Property (Zone Books 2010).
79See eg Yochai Benkler, ‘Free as the Air to the Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain’ 74 (1999) NYU L Rev 354; James Boyle, ‘The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public Domain’ (2003) 66 LCP 33; Peter K Yu, ‘The International Enclosure Movement’ (2007) 82 Ind LJ 827.
80See eg WIPO, ‘Proposal by Argentina and Brazil for the Establishment of a Development Agenda for WIPO’ (27 August 2004) WO/GA/31/11. Twelve countries—Group of Friends of Development—supported the proposal of Argentina and Brazil. Those are: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Iran, Kenya, Peru, South Africa, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Uruguay & Venezuela. See WIPO, ‘Proposal to Establish a Development Agenda for WIPO: An Elaboration of Issues Raised in Document WO/GA/31/11’ (6 April 2005) IIM/1/4. See also ‘Proposal for Treaty of Access to Knowledge’ (10 May 2005) Knowledge Ecology International <http://www.keionline.org/content/view/235/1> accessed 6 July 2015.
81WTO (Council for TRIPS), ‘Minutes of Meeting’ (8–9 June 2010) IP/C/M/63, para 256.
83UNCHR, (Drafting Committee) ‘International Bill of Rights: Revised Suggestions Submitted by the Representative of France for Articles of the International Declaration of Rights’ (1947) UN Doc E/CN.4/AC.1/W.2/Rev.2 (1947) art 38.
84Jacques L Havet quoted in UNCESCR, ‘Drafting History of the Article 15(1)(c) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Background Paper submitted by Maria Green’ (9 October 2000) UN Doc E/C.12/2000/15, para 21.
86Johannes Morsink, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Origins, Drafting, and Intent (UPP 1999) 221.
87Campos Ortiz quoted in Morsink (n 86) 221.
89Representative of Uruguay quoted in Green (n 84) para 35.
91General Comment No. 17 (n 6) para 13.
See also International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR) art 17 (codifying article 12 of the UDHR).
93Report of the High Commissioner (n 9) paras 11–12.
95Eg Gervais, ‘Intellectual Property and Human Rights’ (n 36) 19, 22.
96Green (n 84) para 2.
97General Comment No. 17 (n 6) paras 4, 35; General Comment No. 21 (n 7) paras 1–2.
98Palomo Sánchez and Others v Spain (2012) 54 EHRR 24, paras 54–55 (stating that national courts are ‘in a better position than an international court’ to strike balance under the umbrella of article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), subject to the supervision of the European Court of Human Right (ECtHR)).
99Paul W Kahn, ‘The Court, the Community and the Judicial Balance: The Jurisprudence of Justice Powell’ (1987) 97 Yale LJ 1.
100Ronald Dworkin, ‘The Threat to Patriotism’ (2002) 49(3) New York Rev of Books 44.
102Jeremy Waldron, ‘Fake Incommensurability: A Response to Professor Schauer’ (1994) 45 Hastings LJ 813, 817.
103Richard A Posner, Not a Suicide Pact: The Constitution in a Time of National Emergency (OUP 2006) 148.
105T Alexander Aleinikoff, ‘Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing’ (1987) 96 Yale LJ 943; Stavros Tsakyrakis, ‘Proportionality: An Assault on Human Rights?’ (2009) 7(3) ICON 468, 468.
106Soering v United Kingdom (1989) 11 EHRR 439, para 89. See also Alastair Mowbray, ‘A Study of the Principle of Fair Balance in the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights’ (2010) 10 HRL Rev 289 (discussing the origins and applications of the principle of fair balance in Europe).
107See Jacco Bomhoff, ‘Balancing, the Global and the Local: Judicial Balancing as a Problematic Topic in Comparative (Constitutional) Law’ (2008) 31 Hastings Int’l & Comp L Rev 555; Jacco Bomhoff, ‘Genealogies of Balancing as Discourse’ (2010) 4 Law and Ethics of Human Rights 109, 109.
108See definitions (n 51) and (n 52).
109Jeremy Waldron, ‘Security and Liberty: the Image of Balance’ (2003) 11 J. Political Philos. 191, 192.
111Maria Foscarinis, ‘Homelessness and Human Rights: Towards an Integrated Strategy’ (2000) 19 St Louis U Pub L Rev 327, 345; UN General Assembly (GA), ‘Report of the Secretary-General on Strengthening of the Rule of Law’ (1 October 2004) 59th Session (2004) UN Doc A/59/402, para 25; Aeyal M Gross, ‘Human Proportions: Are Human Rights the Emperor’s New Clothes of the International Law of Occupation?’ (2007) 18 EJIL 1,1.
112Stephen J Toope, ‘Cultural Diversity and Human Rights’ (1997) 42 McGill LJ 169, 178.
113General Comment No. 17 (n 6) para 35.
114The Honourable Justice Frank Iacobucci, ‘“Reconciling Rights”: The Supreme Court of Canada’s Approach to Competing Charter Rights’ (2003) 20 Sup Ct L Rev (2d) 137, 140.
117General Comment No. 17 (n 6) paras 22, 35, 39(e).
118Helfer, ‘A Human Rights Framework’ (n 19) 996.
123Yu, ‘Reconceptualizing Intellectual Property’ (n 19) at 1043.
131These rules are analogous to the principles of interpretation that the Supreme Court of Canada applies on the human rights and freedoms of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11, s 2(b). For a discussion of these rules under Canadian law, see Ontario Human Rights Commission, Policy on Competing Human Rights (Ontario Human Rights Commission 2012); The Honourable Justice Iacobucci (n 114) 139–140.
132UDHR art 29. See similarly, ICESCR art 4.
133UDHR art 29; ICESCR art 4.
137General Comment No. 17 (n 6) para 22.
138ICESCR art 4; General Comment No. 17 (n 6) para 22.
139ICESCR art 4; General Comment No. 17 (n 6) para 23.
140General Comment No. 17 (n 6) para 24.
142General Comment No. 21 (n 7) para 19.
145UNCESCR, ‘General Comment No. 13: The Right to Education (Art. 13 of the Covenant)’ (8 December 1999) UN Doc E/C.12/1999/10 (General Comment No. 13), para 42.
147ICCPR art 7: (‘[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. In particular, no one shall be subjected without his free consent to medical or scientific experimentation’). See also ICCPR art 4(2).
148Saadi v Italy 49 EHRR 30.
150General Comment No. 17 (n 6) para 35.
152WIPO, Guide to Berne for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (Paris Act, 1971) (WIPO 1978) 33 (describing the provisions of the Berne Convention as the ‘[c]onventional minima’).
153Berne Convention arts 5(1), (3); Jane C Ginsburg, ‘International Copyright: From a “Bundle” of National Copyright Laws to a Supranational Code?’ (2000) 47 J Copyright Soc’y USA 265, 270.
156ibid arts 6bis 8, 9, 11, 11bis, 11ter, 12, 14, 14bis, 14ter.
162The general rule in international human rights law is that the dead do not have human rights, because such rights are associated with the dignity of a living human being. Adam Rosenblatt, ‘International Forensic Investigations and the Human Rights of the Dead’ (2010) 32 Hum Rts Q 922, 942.
163WIPO (n 152) 46 (noting that blanket licensing makes the length of copyright of little relevance to authors).
164General Comment No. 17 (n 6) para 16.
165Kenneth Arrow, ‘The Interaction of Corporate Market Allocation Processes and Entrepreneurial Activity’ in Richard H Day, Gunnar Eliasson, Clas Wihlborg (eds), The Markets for Innovation, Ownership and Control (North-Holland 1993) 370.
166William M Landes and Richard A Posner, The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law (HUP 2003) 74.
167WIPO (n 152) 46 (stating that ‘[m]ost countries have felt it fair and right that the average lifetime of an author and his direct descendants should be covered, ie, three generations’).
168Eg Directive 2006/116/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on the Term of Protection of Copyright and Certain Related Rights  OJ L 372/12, art 1.1.
169Brief of George A Akerlof and colleagues as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners in Eldred v Ashcroft, 537 US 186 (2003) (No 01–618) 2.
170See eg The Constitution Act 1867(UK), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, s 52. (1), reprinted in RSC 1985, App II, No 5: (‘[t]he Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada, and any law that is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force or effect’). Accord Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996, s 3; US Const art VI, cl 2; Constitution of Japan 1946, art 98. See also Theodor Meron, ‘On a Hierarchy of International Human Rights’ (1986) 80 AJIL 1, 3 (noting the existence of a normative hierarchy amongst legal rules in national legal systems and the supremacy of the constitution). Accord Jutta Limbach, ‘The Concept of the Supremacy of the Constitution’ (2001) 64 Mod L Rev 1, 1; Dinah Shelton, ‘Normative Hierarchy in International Law’ (2006) 100 AJIL 291, 291.
171Dagenais v Canadian Broadcasting Corp  3 SCR 835, 877, 120 DLR (4th) 12.
172Gosselin v Québec (Procureur général), 2005 SCC 15  1 SCR 238 .
173Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v US, 491 US 617, 628 (1989).
174Valley Forge Christian College v Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc, 454 US 464, 484 (1982). Accord District of Columbia v Heller, 554 US 570, 634 (2008). See also Tom Stacy and Kim Dayton, ‘Rethinking Harmless Constitutional Error’ (1988) 88 Colum L Rev 79, 90 (noting that the United States Constitution does not establish a hierarchy amongst its values).
175Gregory S Alexander, The Global Debate over Constitutional Property: Lessons for American Takings Jurisprudence (U Chicago Press 2006) 110. See also Loammi Blaaus-Wolf and Joachim Wolf, ‘A Comparison between German and South African Limitation Provisions’ (1996) 113 SALJ 267, 282–283 (discussing the German jurisprudence and scholarship on the issue).
176Stephen Gardbaum, ‘Human Rights as International Constitutional Rights’ (2008) 19 EJIL 749, 754.
177See eg Meron (n 170) 22 (arguing that in international human rights law there ‘is no accepted system by which higher rights can be identified and their content determined’, and warning that a liberal invocation of a hierarchy of norms in international human rights could ‘adversely affect the credibility of human rights as a legal discipline.’); Dinah Shelton, ‘Hierarchy of Norms and Human Rights: of Trumps and Winners’ (2002) 65 Sask L Rev 301, 310 (arguing that a hierarchy of international human rights has several bases in international human rights instruments).
178Makau Mutua, ‘Standard Setting in Human Rights: Critique and Prognosis’ (2007) 29 Hum Rts Q 547, 615; Henry J Steiner, Philip Alston and Ryan Goodman, International Human Rights in Context: Law, Politics, Morals (3rd edn, OUP 2008) 271.This occurred between 1949 and 1966.
179Barbara Stark, ‘Urban Despair and Nietzsche’s “Eternal Return:” From the Municipal Rhetoric of Economic Justice to the International Law of Economic Rights’ (1995) 28 Vand J Transnat’l L 185, 220.
180Philip Alston, ‘Economic and Social Rights’ (1994) 26 Stud Transnat’l Legal Pol’y 137, 142; Stark (n 179) 220; Mutua (n 178) 616; Steiner, Alston and Goodman (n 178) 264.
181Asbjørn Eide, ‘Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as Human Rights’ in Asbjørn Eide, Catarina Krause and Allan Rosas (eds), Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: A Textbook (Nijhoff 1995) 22–23; Steiner, Alston and Goodman (n 178) 272.
182Mutua (n 178) 616; Steiner, Alston and Goodman (n 178) 272. See also E W Vierdag, ‘The Legal Nature of the Rights Granted by the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (1978) 9 NYIL 69, 92–93 (rejecting the characterization of ESCR as human rights as that would make courts deal with political questions and thus violate the separation of powers doctrine).
185Stark (n 179) 220; Steiner, Alston and Goodman (n 178) 272.
187UNCESCR, ‘Statement to the World Conference on Human Rights on Behalf of The Committee on Economic, Social And Cultural Rights’ (7 December 1992) UN Doc E/1993/22, Annex III, para 5; Jack Donnelly, ‘Human Rights at the United Nations, 1955–1985: The Question of Bias’ (1988) 32 Intl Stud Q 275, 277–296; Alston, ‘Economic and Social Rights’ (n 180) 148–149; Dinah Shelton, ‘International Human Rights Law: Principled, Double, or Absent Standards?’ (2007) 25 Law & Ineq 467, 497; Steiner, Alston and Goodman (n 178) 264.
188Stephen P Marks, ‘The Past and Future of the Separation of Human Rights into Categories’ (2009) 24 MDJIL 209, 243.
189UNCESCR, ‘General Comment No. 3: The Nature of States Parties’ Obligations (Art. 2, Para. 1, of the Covenant)’ (14 December 1990) UN Doc E/1991/23 (General Comment No. 3), para 1.
191ibid para 10; International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), ‘Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (26 January 1997) <http://www.refworld.org/docid/48abd5730.html> accessed 6 July 2015 (Maastricht Guidelines), para 9.
192General Comment No. 3 (n 189) para 10.
193ibid. Cf Maastricht Guidelines (n 191) para 10: (‘resource scarcity does not relieve States of certain minimum obligations in respect of the implementation of economic, social and cultural rights’). Accord UNCHR, Note verbale dated 86/12/05 from the Permanent Mission of the Netherlands to the United Nations Office at Geneva addressed to the Centre for Human Rights’ (8 January 1987) UN Doc E/CN.4/1987/17 (Limburg Principles), paras 25–28. For further discussion of the nature of States’ obligations under the ICESCR see Magdalena Sepúlveda Carmona, The Nature of the Obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Intersentia 2003).
194Dinah Shelton, ‘Challenges to the Future of Civil and Political Rights’ (1998) 55 Wash & Lee L Rev 669, 673–674; Alston, ‘Economic and Social Rights’ (n 180) 139, 153–154.
195Alston, ‘Economic and Social Rights’ (n 180) 139.
199Philip Alston, ‘U.S. Ratification of the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: The Need for an Entirely New Strategy’ (1990) 84 AJIL 365, 375–376.
200See eg Constitution of India 1949; Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996; Constitution of Kenya 2010; Constitution of the Republic of Uganda 1995; Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil 1988; Constitution of the Argentine Nation 1853; Constitution of the Republic of Korea 1948; The 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia 1945.
201Eg Slaight communications inc v Davidson  1 SCR 1038, 1056–1057; 59 DLR (4th) 416; Irwin Toy Ltd. v Quebec (Attorney General)  1 SCR 927, 1003–1004; 58 DLR (4th) 577.
202Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s 7: (‘[e]veryone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.’).
203UNCESCR, ‘Responses to the Supplementary Questions Emitted by the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (E/C.12/Q/CAN/1) on Canada’s third report on the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (E/1994/104/Add17)’ (November 1998) (Responses), para 53. For a fuller discussion of the status of ESCR in Canada, see Martha Jackman and Bruce Porter, ‘Socio-Economic Rights Under the Canadian Charter’ in Malcolm Langford (ed), Social Rights Jurisprudence Emerging Trends in International and Comparative Law (CUP 2009).
205UNCESCROR, 1998, 57th Mtg, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.31 (1998), para 5.
206UNCESCR, ‘General Comment No. 9: The Domestic Application of the Covenant’ (3 December 1998) E/C.12/1998/24, para 1 (General Comment No. 9).
208See Philip Alston, ‘Making Space for New Human Rights: The Case of the Right to Development’ (1988) 1 Harv Hum Rts YB 3, 35.
211Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (adopted 10 December 2008, entered into force 5 May 2013, UNGA Res. 63/117) (Optional Protocol to the ICESCR).
212Beth A Simmons, ‘Should States Ratify Protocol? Process and Consequences of the Optional Protocol of the ICESCR’ (2009) 27 Nordic J of Hum Rts 64.
213Optional Protocol to the ICESCR art 2.
214See eg European Social Charter (Revised); Additional Protocol to the European Social Charter providing for a System of Collective Complaints; Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Protocol of San Salvador) (entered into force 16 November 1999) OAS Treaty Series No 69 (1988) reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System OEA/Ser L V/II.82 Doc 6 Rev 1 at 67 (1992).
215For a comparative collection of ESCR case law, see International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), Courts and the Legal Enforcement of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Comparative Experiences of Justiciability (ICJ 2008).
216Vienna Declaration (n 5) para 5.
218Daniel J Gervais, ‘Making Copyright Whole: A Principled Approach to Copyright Exceptions and Limitations’ (2008) 5:1&2 UOLTJ 1, 10 (noting that news reporting exceptions and political discussion provisions are the only exceptions that came with the Berne Convention’s first text and remained part of it throughout its revisions and, thus, arguing that ‘there is a sense in the Berne Convention that certain public interest considerations related to information and the press trump exclusive copyright rights’).
219Berne Convention arts 10(2), 10(3).
221Daniel J Gervais, ‘A Canadian Copyright Narrative’ (2009) 21 IPJ 269, 304–305.
223Monica Kilian, ‘A Hollow Victory for the Common Law? TRIPs and the Moral Rights Exclusion’ (2003) 2 J Marshall Rev Intell Prop L 321, 336.
224Sam Ricketson, ‘The Future of the Traditional Intellectual Property Conventions in the Brave New World of Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights’ (1995) 26 Int’l Rev of Indus Prop & Copyright L 872, 898.
225Berne Convention art 5(2); TRIPS art 9(1); WCT art 3.
226‘Orphan works’ is ‘a term used to describe the situation where the owner of a copyrighted work cannot be identified and located by someone who wishes to make use of the work in a manner that requires permission of the copyright owner.’ United States Copyright Office, Report on Orphan Works: A Report of the Register of Copyrights (LC 2006) 1.
227Neil Netanel, Copyright’s Paradox (OUP 2008) 200.
228US Copyright Office (n 226) 43.
230Paul Goldstein and Jane Ginsburg, ‘Comments on ‘Orphan Works’ Inquiry’ (Federal Register, 26 January 2005 <www.copyright.gov/orphan/comments/OW0519-Goldstein-Ginsburg.pdf> accessed 6 July 2015.
231US Copyright Office (n 226) 127.
232Copyright Act 1985, s 77.
233Directive 2012/28/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on Certain Permitted Uses of Orphan Works  OJ L299/5.
234Brown v Duchesne, 60 US 183,194 (1856). Accord Kokoszka v Belford, 417 US 642, 650 (1974).
235Norman J Singer, JG Sutherland and JD Shambie Singer, Sutherland on Statutes and Statutory Construction, vol 2A (7th edn, Thomson/West 2008) 282. See also Ronald Dworkin, Freedom’s Law: The Moral Reading of the American Constitution (HUP 1996) 80.
236Trinity Western University v British Columbia College of Teachers, 2001 SCC 31  1 SCR 772 .
237General Comment No. 17 (n 6) para 35.
240The Declaration on the Right to Development defines this right as ‘a comprehensive economic, social, cultural and political process, which aims at the constant improvement of the well-being of the entire population and of all individuals […]’ and proclaims it as an ‘an inalienable human right […]’. Declaration on the Right to Development, UNGA Res 41/128 (4 December 1986).
241Daniel J Gervais, The TRIPS Agreement: Drafting History and Analysis (3rd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2008) 158.
243Margaret Chon, ‘Intellectual Property and the Development Divide’ (2006) 27 Cardozo L Rev 2821, 2823.
247ibid; Rochelle C Dreyfuss, ‘TRIPS-Round II: Should Users Strike Back?’ (2004) 71 U Chicago L Rev 21, 21(arguing that negotiating TRIPS as an international trade matter with the goal of removing (reducing) trade barriers as an absolute mechanism of achieving international welfare resulted in TRIPS overlooking the importance of balancing the private rights of right holders against the general public interest of access to knowledge.).
248Canada—Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products (n 59) para 101.
249Chon (n 243) 2843 (attributing the weakness of the development provisions in TRIPS to their hortatory language and their location outside the bundle of the rights and obligations); Peter K Yu, ‘The Objectives and Principles of the TRIPS Agreement’ (2009) 46(4) Hous L Rev 979, 1031 (arguing that it is unlikely that a country will rely on article 7 to initiate a WTO settlement procedure since it is a ‘should’ provision).

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