Source: http://md.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20180221_0000267.DMD.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 21:11:02+00:00

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FindACase | CX Reinsurance Co. Ltd. v. Homewood Realty Inc.
CX Reinsurance Co. Ltd. v. Homewood Realty Inc.
HOMEWOOD REALTY INC., ET AL.
Plaintiff CX Reinsurance Company Limited (“CX Re”) has filed suit against defendants Homewood Realty Inc., Stanley Sugarman, Ivy Realty, Inc., Wyman Park Company, and Upshire Company (collectively the “Sugarman Defendants”), seeking rescission of certain commercial general liability insurance policies. Chauncey Liles, Shyliyah Streeter, Keishonne Moore, Prentiss Watson, and Kayla McKnight (collectively the “Intervenor Defendants”) have intervened. Now pending are CX Re's motion for partial summary judgment and Kayla McKnight's Rule 56(d) motion. The parties have fully briefed the issues, and no oral argument is necessary. See Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2016). For the reasons set forth below, McKnight's motion is granted and CX Re's motion is denied without prejudice. CX Re is invited to renew its motion at the close of discovery.
In February 2016, CX Re filed an amended complaint seeking rescission of the policies on the grounds that the Sugarman Defendants' answer to Question to #16 was a material misrepresentation. (ECF No. 15.) The court has since issued, and then amended, a scheduling order. (ECF No. 86; ECF No. 100.) The current scheduling order sets a May 18, 2018, discovery deadline and a July 17, 2018, dispositive pretrial motions deadline. (ECF No. 100.) On September 22, 2017, with discovery ongoing, CX Re filed a motion for summary judgment on Count I of the amended complaint. (ECF No. 87.) Intervenor Defendant Kayla McKnight filed a Rule 56(d) motion, asking the court to defer consideration of the motion for summary judgment until the close of discovery. (ECF No. 94.) Those motions are now pending.
“Rule 56(d) requires that summary judgment be refused where the nonmoving party has not had the opportunity to discover information that is essential to his opposition. The rule is intended as a safeguard against a premature grant of summary judgment.” Tyree v. United States, 642 Fed.Appx. 228, 230 (4th Cir. 2016) (internal citations omitted). Rule 56(d) motions are “broadly favored and should be liberally granted.” McCray v. Maryland Dep't of Transp., Maryland Transit Admin., 741 F.3d 480, 483-84 (4th Cir. 2014) (quoting Greater Balt. Ctr. for Pregnancy Concerns, Inc. v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 721 F.3d 264, 281 (4th Cir. 2013)). “A court should hesitate before denying a Rule 56(d) motion when the nonmovant seeks necessary information possessed only by the movant. But a court may deny a Rule 56(d) motion when the information sought would not by itself create a genuine issue of material fact sufficient for the nonmovant to survive summary judgment.” Pisano v. Stranch, 743 F.3d 927, 931 (4th Cir. 2014) (citing Ingle ex rel. Estate of Ingle v. Yelton, 439 F.3d 191, 195 (4th Cir. 2006)).
The nonmovant must demonstrate that he cannot yet properly oppose a motion for summary judgment by submitting a Rule 56(d) affidavit. Pine Ridge Coal v. Local 8377, 187 F.3d 415, 421 (4th Cir. 1999). “A [Rule 56(d)] affidavit that conclusorily states that discovery is required is insufficient; the affidavit must specify the reasons the party is unable to present the necessary facts and describe with particularity the evidence that the party seeks to obtain.” Radi v. Sebelius, 434 F. App'x 177, 178 (4th Cir. 2011). If the nonmovant successfully shows, through its Rule 56(d) affidavit, that for specified reasons it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition, “the court may: (1) defer considering the motion [for summary judgment] or deny it; (2) allow time to obtain affidavits or declarations or to take discovery; or (3) issue any other appropriate order.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(d).

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