Source: https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/350/497
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 04:28:12+00:00

Document:
The Smith Act, as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 2385 which prohibits the knowing advocacy of the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force and violence, supersedes the enforceability of the Pennsylvania Sedition Act, which proscribes the same conduct. Pp. 498-510.
The precise holding of the court, and all that is before us for review, is that the Smith Act of 1940, [n5] as amended in 1948, [n6] which prohibits the knowing advocacy of the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force and violence, supersedes the enforceability of the Pennsylvania Sedition Act, which proscribes the same conduct.
[t]his Court, in considering the validity of state laws in the light of . . . federal laws touching the same subject, has made use of the following expressions: conflicting; contrary to; occupying the field; repugnance; difference; irreconcilability; inconsistency; violation; curtailment, and interference. But none of these expressions provides an infallible constitutional test or an exclusive constitutional yardstick. In the final analysis, there can be no one crystal clear distinctly marked formula.
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67. And see Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230-231. In this case, we think that each of several tests of supersession is met.
[t]he scheme of federal regulation [is] so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it.
It also contains a legislative finding that the Communist Party is a "Communist action organization" within the meaning of the Internal Security Act of 1950, and provides that "knowing" members of the Communist Party are "subject to all the provisions and penalties" of that Act. [n19] It furthermore sets up a new classification of "Communist-infiltrated organizations," [n20] [p504] and provides for the imposition of sanctions against them.
When Congress has taken the particular subject matter in hand, coincidence is as ineffective as opposition, and a state law is not to be declared a help because it attempts to go farther than Congress has seen fit to go.
touch a field in which the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system [must] be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject.
The Attorney General has been requested by me to instruct the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice to take charge of investigative work in matters relating to espionage, sabotage, and violations of the neutrality regulations.
We are not unmindful of the risk of compounding punishments which would be created by finding concurrent state power. In our view of the case, we do not reach the question whether double or multiple punishment for the same overt acts directed against the United States has constitutional sanction. [n30] Without compelling [p510] indication to the contrary, we will not assume that Congress intended to permit the possibility of double punishment. Cf. Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. 1, 31, 75; Jerome v. United States, 318 U.S. 101, 105.
1. Pa. Penal Code § 207, 18 Purdon's Pa.Stat.Ann. § 4207. The text of the statute is set out in an Appendix to this opinion, post, p. 510.
or conduct [intended to] incite or encourage any person to commit any overt act with a view to bringing the Government of this State or of the United States into hatred or contempt.
with intent to defame the . . . government, or either house of the . . . Congress, or the . . . President, or to bring them . . . into contempt or disrepute; or to excite against them . . . the hatred of the good people of the United States. . . .
3. 377 Pa. 58, 104 A.2d 133.
4. 377 Pa. at 69, 104 A.2d at 139.
No question of federal supersession of a state statute was in issue . . . when the Supreme Court upheld the validity of the state statutes in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925), and Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
Nor is a State stripped of its means of self-defense by the suspension of its sedition statute through the entry of the Federal Government upon the field. There are many valid laws on Pennsylvania's statute books adequate for coping effectively with actual or threatened internal civil disturbances. As to the nationwide threat to all citizens, imbedded in the type of conduct interdicted by a sedition act, we are -- all of us -- protected by the Smith Act, and in a manner more efficient and more consistent with the service of our national welfare in all respects.
. . . the State knew the conditions which existed and could have a solicitude for the public peace, and this record justifies it. Gilbert's remarks were made in a public meeting. They were resented by his auditors. There were protesting interruptions, also accusations and threats against him, disorder and intimations of violence. And such is not an uncommon experience. On such occasions, feeling usually runs high, and is impetuous; there is a prompting to violence, and when violence is once yielded to, before it can be quelled, tragedies may be enacted. To preclude such result or a danger of it is a proper exercise of the power of the State.
11. See Appendix, post, p. 511. See also the Voorhis Act, passed in 1940, now codified as 18 U.S.C. § 2386 and the Foreign Agents Registration Act, passed in 1938, 22 U.S.C. § 611 et seq.
12. 50 U.S.C. § 781 et seq.
13. Id. § 782(3), (4).
17. Id. §§ 784, 785, 789, 790.
18. 50 U.S.C. (1955 Supp.) § 841.
21. It is worth observing that, in Hines, this Court held a Pennsylvania statute providing for alien registration was superseded by Title III of the same Act of which the commonly called Smith Act was Title I. Title II amended certain statutes dealing with the exclusion and deportation of aliens. The provisions of Title I involve a field of no less dominant federal interest than Titles II and III, in which Congress manifestly did not desire concurrent state action.
22. 50 U.S.C. § 781(15).
23. United States v. Mesarosh [Nelson], 116 F.Supp. 345, aff'd, 223 F.2d 449, cert. granted, 350 U.S. 922.
24. 377 Pa. at 76, 104 A.2d at 142.
25. The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1939 Volume, pp. 478-479 (1941).
27. 377 Pa. at 74-75, 104 A.2d at 141.
Neither the holding of office nor membership in any Communist organization by any person shall constitute per se a violation of subsection (a) or subsection (c) of this section or of any other criminal statute. The fact of the registration of any person under section 787 or section 788 of this title as an officer or member of any Communist organization shall not be received in evidence against such person in any prosecution for any alleged violation of subsection (a) or subsection (c) of this section or for any alleged violation of any other criminal statute.
29. Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485, 490-491.
30. But see Grant, The Lanza Rule of Successive Prosecutions, 32 Col.L.Rev. 1309.
Congress has not, in any of its statutes relating to sedition, specifically barred the exercise of state power to punish the same Acts under state law. And we read the majority opinion to assume for this case that, absent federal legislation, there is no constitutional bar to punishment of sedition against the United States by both a State and the Nation. [n1] The majority limits to the federal [p513] courts the power to try charges of sedition against the Federal Government.
First, the Court relies upon the pervasivness of the anti-subversive legislation embodied in the Smith Act of 1940, 18 U.S.C. § 2385 the Internal Security Act of 1950, 64 Stat. 987, and the Communist Control Act of 1954, 68 Stat. 775. It asserts that these Acts, in the aggregate, mean that Congress has occupied the "field of sedition" to the exclusion of the States. The "occupation of the field" argument has been developed by this Court for the Commerce Clause and legislation thereunder to prevent partitioning of this country by locally erected trade barriers. In those cases, this Court has ruled that state legislation is superseded when it conflicts with the comprehensive regulatory scheme and purpose of a federal plan. Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148. The two cases cited by the Court to support its argument that the broad treatment of any subject within the federal power bars supplemental action by States are of this nature. In our view, neither case is apposite to the Smith Act. The Varnville case dealt with general regulation of interstate commerce making the originating carrier liable to the holder of its interstate bill of lading for damage caused by a common carrier of property. This Court held that the section through the federal commerce power superseded a state right of action against a nonoriginating carrier for damages and a penalty for injury occurring on another line. The pertinent section, 34 Stat. 595, § 7, expressed a controlling federal policy for this commerce. The Rice case dealt with regulations of warehouses. We barred state action in that area because the Act declared that the authority it conferred "shall be exclusive with respect to all persons securing a license" under the Act. 331 U.S. at 224 and 233.
To interfere with the penal laws of a State where they . . . have for their sole object the internal government of the country is a very serious measure which Congress cannot be supposed to adopt lightly or inconsiderately. . . . It would be taken deliberately, and the intention would be clearly and unequivocally expressed.
An army, of course, can only be raised and directed by Congress, in neither has the State power, but it has power to regulate the conduct of its citizens and to restrain the exertion of baleful influences against the promptings of patriotic duty to the detriment of the welfare of the Nation and State. To do so is not to usurp a National power; it is only to render a service to its people. . . .
That declaration springs from the federal character of our Nation. It recognizes the fact that maintenance of order and fairness rests primarily with the States. The section was first enacted in 1825, and has appeared successively in the federal criminal laws since that time. [n11] This Court has interpreted the section to mean that States may provide concurrent legislation in the absence of explicit congressional intent to the contrary. Sexton v. California, 189 U.S. 319, 324-325. The majority's position in this case [p520] cannot be reconciled with that clear authorization of Congress.
1. No problem of double punishment exists in this case. See the Court's opinion, p. 499, and its last paragraph, p. 509. See United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382; The Federalist, No. 32. Cf. Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. 1, statement at p. 22 with that at pp. 44-45.
2. Hunt, Federal Supremacy and State Anti-Subversive Legislation, 53 Mich.L.Rev. 407, 427-428; Note, 55 Col.L.Rev. 83, 90.
3. Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325, 328-333; Reid v. Colorado, 187 U.S. 137, 148; Sinnot v. Davenport, 22 How. 227, 243; Fox v. Ohio, 5 How. 410, 432-435.
4. Forty-two States, along with Alaska and Hawaii, now have laws which penalize the advocacy of violent overthrow of the federal or state governments. Digest of the Public Record of Communism in the United States (Fund for the Republic, 1955) 266-306. In hearings before the House Judiciary Committee on the proposed Smith Act, both witnesses and members of the Committee made references to existing state sedition laws. Hearings before Subcommittee No. 3, Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, on H.R. 5138, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 7, 69, 83-85. Similar comment was heard in the congressional debates. 84 Cong.Rec. 10452. In fact, the Smith Act was patterned on the New York Criminal Anarchy Statute. Commonwealth v. Nelson, 377 Pa. 58, 86, 104 A.2d 133, 147. The original text of the Smith Act is set out in the hearings before Subcommittee No. 3, supra, p. 1, and the New York Act may be read in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 654-655. Further evidence of congressional notice of state legislation may be found since the passage of the Smith Act. S.Rep. No. 1358, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., p. 9; H.R.Rep. No. 2980, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., p. 2; H.R.Rep. No.1950, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 25-46 (Un-American Activities Committee). See 67 Harv.L.Rev. 1419, 1420; 40 Cornell L.Rev. 130, 133.
In the Hines case, a federal system of alien registration was held to supersede a state system of registration. But there, we were dealing with a problem which had an impact on the general field of foreign relations. The delicacy of the issues which were posed alone raised grave questions as to the propriety of allowing a state system of regulation to function alongside of a federal system. In that field, any "concurrent state power that may exist is restricted to the narrowest of limits." P. 68. Therefore, we were more ready to conclude that a federal Act in a field that touched international relations superseded state regulation than we were in those cases where a State was exercising its historic powers over such traditionally local matters as public safety and order and the use of streets and highways.
The Davidowitz case is distinguishable on other grounds. Alien registration is not directly related to control of undesirable conduct; consequently there is no imperative problem of local law enforcement. 102 Pa.L.Rev. at 1091. There is also considerable legislative history behind the Alien Registration Act which suggests that Congress was trying to avoid overburdening of aliens; some features of the conflicting state law had been expressly rejected by Congress. 312 U.S. at 71-73. See 39 Minn.L.Rev. 213. It should be noted also that the coincidence between the state and federal laws in the Davidowitz case was so great that no real purpose was served by the state law. 34 Boston U.L.Rev. 514, 517-518.
6. Such efforts may be punishable crimes. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 508-510.
that the exclusion principle is to be more strictly applied when the Congress acts in a field wherein the constitutional grant of power to the federal government is exclusive, as in its right to protect interstate commerce and to control international relations.
Congress has the exclusive power to legislate concerning the Army and the Navy of the United States, and to determine, among other things, the conditions of enlistment. . . .
. . . The States act only under the express direction of Congress. . . .
. . . As exclusive power over enlistments in the Army and the Navy of the United States and the responsibility for the conduct of war is vested by the Federal Constitution in Congress, legislation by State on this subject is necessarily void unless authorized by Congress. . . . Here, Congress not only had exclusive power to act on the subject; it had exercised that power directly by the Espionage Law before Gilbert spoke the words for which he was sentenced. . . . The States may not punish treason against the United States . . . although indirectly acts of treason may affect them vitally. No more may they arrogate to themselves authority to punish the teaching of pacifism which the legislature of Minnesota appears to have put into that category.
9. See note 4, supra.
. . . the Attorney General of the United States recently informed the attorneys general of the several states . . . that a full measure of federal-state cooperation would be in the public interest. See New York Times, Sept. 15, 1955, p. 19.
11. 4 Stat. 115, 122-123; 18 U.S.C.A. § 3231 (Historical and Revision Notes).
WHITE MOUNTAIN APACHE TRIBE et al., Petitioners, v. Robert M. BRACKER et al.
Paul M. SWEEZY, Appellant, v. STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE by Louis C. WYMAN, Attorney General.
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK Petitioner, v. Joseph C. O'NEILL.
UNITED STATES of America, Petitioner, v. William J. BROSNAN et al. BANK OF AMERICA NATIONAL TRUST AND SAVINGS ASSOCIATION, a National Banking Association, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES of America.

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 § 3231
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