Source: http://in.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20180322_0000380.NIN.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 22:19:51+00:00

Document:
Thomas Edgar Sparks, a prisoner without a lawyer, filed a habeas corpus petition to challenge his conviction and sentence for drug trafficking under Cause No. 89D02-9602-CF-8. Following a guilty plea, on October 28, 1996, the Wayne Superior Court sentenced Sparks to fifty years of incarceration. Sparks argues he is entitled to habeas relief because: (1) he was improperly sentenced as a habitual offender; (2) he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his appointed counsel was not licensed to practice law in the State of Indiana; (3) the prosecution suborned perjured testimony during a hearing at the post-conviction relief stage on November 4, 2003; and (4) the trial court violated his rights under the Equal Protection Clause by refusing to allow Sparks to withdraw his guilty plea and by issuing a maximum sentence.
The respondent argues that only 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) applies to Sparks' claims. To the respondent's point, nothing in the petition suggests that State action impeded him from filing a habeas corpus petition sooner or that Spark's claims are based on a newly recognized constitutional right. However, because Sparks has asserted a claim based on the post-conviction proceedings, the court will also consider whether 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D) applies. “[W]hether the timeliness of § 2254 claims should be evaluated based on a single statute of limitations that applies to a § 2254 petition in its entirety or, on the other hand, whether individual claims in a petition must be evaluated for timeliness on a claim-by-claim basis” remains an open issue. Steele v. Lemke, 2014 WL 148742, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 14, 2014); Taylor v. Michael, 724 F.3d 806, 810 n.3 (7th Cir. 2013). For purposes of this opinion, the court will apply the approach most favorable to Sparks and evaluate the petition in its entirety. Under this approach, “every claim should be considered timely if any claim is timely.” Taylor, 724 F.3d at 810 n.3.
On direct appeal, the Indiana Supreme Court denied Sparks' petition to transfer on September 14, 2000. ECF at 18-2 at 4. Therefore, Sparks' conviction became final for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) when the time for petitioning the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of certiorari expired on December 13, 2000. See U.S. Sup. Ct. R. 13(1) (petition for writs of certiorari must filed within 90 days after entry of judgment); Jimenez v. Quarterman, 555 U.S. 113, 119 (2009) (when a state prisoner does not petition the Supreme Court of the United States on direct appeal, his conviction becomes final when the time for filing a petition expires). For purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D), the operative date is November 4, 2003, the date when Sparks became aware of the factual predicate for his claim of prosecutorial misconduct at a post-conviction relief hearing. Because this date is later than date the conviction became final, the federal limitations period began to run on November 4, 2003. The federal limitations period was tolled until November 12, 2004, when the Court of Appeals of Indiana affirmed the denial of Spark's petition for post-conviction relief. ECF 18-3 at 2. The federal limitations period thus expired one year later on November 12, 2005. Sparks filed his federal habeas petition on May 1, 2017. ECF 1. Accordingly, because Sparks filed the petition more than eleven years too late, the petition is untimely.
Sparks argues that his habeas petition is timely because he has given the State courts multiple opportunities to address his conviction and sentence. Though Sparks later attempted to file successive petitions for post-conviction relief, these petitions did not restart the federal limitations period, nor did it “open a new window for federal collateral review.” De Jesus v. Acevedo, 567 F.3d 941, 943 (7th Cir. 2009). Further, under Indiana law, petitioners are required to obtain authorization from the State courts to file a successive petition. Matheney v. State, 834 N.E.2d 658, 661 (Ind. 2005). The Court of Appeals of Indiana denied Sparks' requests for authorization. ECF 18-1 at 26-37. Significantly, unauthorized successive petitions are not “properly filed” under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) and thus do not toll the limitations period. Powell v. Davis, 415 F.3d 722, 726 (7th Cir. 2005). Moreover, even if the pendency of Sparks' post-2004 State court filings tolled the federal limitations period, the habeas petition would still be untimely.
Sparks also argues that his appointed counsel failed to preserve his claims for federal habeas review. Though this argument may be a response to the respondent's procedural bar argument, the court will consider whether appointed counsel's performance excuses the untimely nature of his petition and construe this argument as a request for equitable tolling. “[A] petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling only if he shows (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely filing.” Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010). For diligence, federal habeas petitioners must show reasonable diligence in pursuing their rights throughout the federal limitations period and until the date the habeas petition is filed. Carpenter v. Douma, 840 F.3d 867, 870 (7th Cir. 2016).

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