Source: https://theallgrouponlinejournal.com/2019/03/15/ontario-court-in-pembridge/?shared=email&msg=fail
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 20:18:47+00:00

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In Pembridge Insurance Company of Canada v Chu, a judge of Ontario’s Superior Court of Justice recently concluded that insurance policies ought to be interpreted differently when multiple insurers are involved. In this problematic decision, the court deviated from the long-standing rule that exclusion clauses should be interpreted “narrowly”. Remarkably, the court began with the assumption that one of the insurance policies must respond to the loss. Based on this assumption, the court decided that different rules of contractual interpretation would apply.
This case is problematic because (i) it conflicts with the well-established rules for policy interpretation; (ii) it suggests that a policy can be interpreted by looking outside the contract to its effect on a non-party; and (iii) the assumption that one policy must indemnify the insured was both irrelevant and an improper consideration on a duty to defend application. Absent appellate guidance, this decision may create confusion and unintended consequences on coverage applications involving multiple insurers.
The case in Pembridge involved allegations that Chu, after a motor vehicle accident, left his vehicle to engage in physical violence and threatening behavior. In a typical “road rage” incident, he allegedly hit the window of another vehicle, while yelling and making other gestures. Because of Chu’s conduct, the underlying plaintiffs alleged that they feared for their lives. Chu was insured under a Pembridge homeowner policy which covered “bodily injury or property damages”. The policy contained an exclusion for claims “arising from the ownership, use or operation of a motorized vehicle…”. Dominion, Chu’s auto insurer, accepted the duty to defend for allegations arising out of the use, ownership or operation of the vehicle. Dominion argued that that the allegations of Chu’s conduct, after he left his vehicle, triggered a duty to defend under the Pembridge policy.
The court began its analysis by correctly articulating the well-settled principles for interpreting insurance policies. The court acknowledged that, generally, coverage terms are to be interpreted broadly and exclusion clauses are to be interpreted narrowly.
In this case, however, regardless of how the exclusion clause is interpreted, one of the insurers will be providing coverage to the insured in relation to the insured’s actions after exiting the vehicle, and the other will not. If I were to interpret the exclusion clause more broadly, this would leave Dominion responsible for following through with the coverage. If I were to interpret the provision more narrowly, this would make Pembridge liable for the conduct.
This was a false premise that gave rise to numerous errors in this decision. Here, the court assumes that only one insurer can respond to a loss, when it is entirely possible that both policies could respond. The error in this analysis was further illustrated when the motion judge concluded in the next paragraph that “between Dominion and Pembridge, in light of the jurisprudence, it is more appropriate for Dominion to provide coverage in this case.” In effect the court concluded that only one policy would respond, and that it was charged with deciding which appeared to be “more appropriate.” The judge misdirected himself on what the issue was and how it should be determined.
But the court in the Pembridge did just that when it began with the false assumption that, no matter the outcome, at least one insurer would have to indemnify Chu for the loss. As discussed in the section below, that false assumption distorted the motion judge’s interpretation of the exclusion clause. As discussed later in this article, the false assumption also caused an improper finding on the ultimate responsibility for indemnity.
The ownership, use, or operation of any motorized vehicles, trailer or watercraft, except those insured in this policy.
On reading this exclusion, the court concluded that Chu’s road rage incident “arose from” the use or operation of a motor vehicle. In reaching that conclusion, the court relied on: (i) s. 239 of the Insurance Act which specifically requires that automobile policies provide coverage for loss or damage caused “directly or indirectly” in operation of a vehicle; and (ii) Amos v Insurance Corp. of British Columbia, which afforded a broad, liberal interpretation of the phrase, “arising from”.
The court found that cases interpreting the Insurance Act and following Amos have “very broadly construed” the phrase “arising from”. In relying on this line of cases, the court specifically observed, but ignored, that the Pembridge policy did not contain the phrase “directly or indirectly”. The court further specifically observed, but ignored, that the line of cases cited by Pembridge arose in the context of interpreting coverage grants rather than coverage exclusions. The motion judge reasoned that because the interpretation analysis was being conducted “as between” insurers, the typical rules of interpretation do not apply.
This approach contradicts well-established Supreme Court of Canada precedent, which has repeatedly affirmed that clauses granting coverage are to be construed broadly and clauses removing coverage are to be construed narrowly. The court offered no reason to deviate from this rule other than its improper conclusion that the Dominion’s policy would respond if the Pembridge policy did not.
It is clear however that Amos is distinguishable from the case at bar on the basis that the relevant provision in that case was a coverage clause, as opposed to an exclusion clause. It is well-established that, in the construction of insurance contracts, coverage provisions should be construed broadly and exclusion clauses narrowly. Amos is of no assistance in this appeal.
By broadly construing the exclusion, the court in Pembridge applied Amos in direct contravention of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Derksen.
In line with Derksen, the Dominion specifically relied on cases dealing with similar exclusions which show that road rage incidents “break the chain of causation” so they are deemed not to arise out of the use or operation of the vehicle. This characterization of road rage incidents has been relied on by the Supreme Court of Canada in Law Union & Rock Insurance Co. v Moore’s Taxi Ltd. and has been reaffirmed by appellate courts. The court ignored these cases, preferring the broader interpretations afforded by the coverage (and not exclusion) analysis in Amos. As a result, the court maintained that Chu’s actions after exiting the vehicle were “incident” to the ownership, use or operation of the vehicle. Accordingly, the court concluded that Pembridge had no duty to defend, and therefore no duty to indemnify.
Notably, toward the end of the decision, the court briefly acknowledged that an intentional act exclusion might also apply in this case. Although the court did not conduct the analysis, it is noteworthy that, given the underlying facts as pleaded, it is possible – but unclear, without a full factual record – that such an exclusion might apply. That analysis would be guided by the Supreme Court’s ruling in Non-Marine Underwriters, Lloyd;s London v. Scalera, which dealt with intentional act exclusions and the intent to cause harm.
Much of the analysis in Pembridge decision is centred upon the court’s assumption that at least one insurer would ultimately be required to indemnify the insured. Because of this assumption, and given its ruling in favour of Pembridge, the court improperly went on to definitively rule on the Dominion’s duty to indemnify. This ruling was inappropriate on a duty to defend application.
I am finding that as between Pembridge and Dominion, Dominion will be required to provide the requisite coverage. Dennis Chu’s actions after exiting the vehicle is now deemed to be incident to the ownership, use or operation of a vehicle. This finding should not be revisited by the trial judge.
This finding contradicts well-established precedent that the duty to indemnify should not generally be determined on a duty to defend application. To find there is no duty to defend, a court must find there is not even a “mere possibility” of coverage under the policy. Therefore, the sole question on the application is whether the Court can conclusively rule out the “mere possibility” that an insurer might have to provide indemnity based solely on the pleadings. Where there is no “mere possibility” of coverage, it is appropriate to rule on the duty to indemnify. But where the duty to defend exists or is assumed – as was the case with Dominion – it is inappropriate to make a definitive finding on indemnity.
The policy reasons for this are clear and compelling. In most cases, the duty to indemnify will turn on the ultimate findings of fact at trial and the basis upon which liability is imposed on the insured. Without the benefit of a trial, the court is not in a position to make a finding that the insurer has a legal obligation to indemnify because the indemnity claim has not yet crystalized.
The decision in Pembridge is clearly problematic. The conclusion that an insurance policy ought to be interpreted differently because another insurance policy might respond is simply wrong.
The critical error in Pembridge occurred when the court assumed that only one insurer could, and must, provide coverage. That assumption gave rise to all of the other errors in this case. Because the court assumes there will be coverage for Chu, no matter the outcome, it wrongly concluded that the normal rules of policy interpretation do not apply. Absent the proper rules of interpretation, the court makes a ruling that Pembridge has no duty to defend. Based on the initial error that there must be coverage, no matter the outcome, the court goes further and decides that the Dominion must be responsible and imposes a duty to indemnify.
The court’s initial assumption creates a false choice between insurers. In deciding that only one insurer can respond to the loss, the court narrows the scope of coverage that might otherwise be available. It is always possible to have two insurance policies that provide different coverage, but both cover the losses. In that case, the insured may very well have the benefit of additional limits of coverage, which would be lost by using the approach adopted in Pembridge.
The decision in Pembridge runs contrary to basic rules of contractual interpretation and conflicts with well-established precedent. If followed, this case could lead to commercially unreasonable results and could result in eroding the benefits of coverage available to an insured. It is our view that the decision was in error and should be treated as wrongly decided, as it directly contradicts prior decisions of both the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Canada.
 Pembridge Insurance Company of Canada v Chu, 2019 ONSC 1359, [Pembridge].
 Family Insurance Corp v. Lombard Canada Ltd., 2002 SCC 48 [Family Insurance Corp.].
 TD General Insurance Company v. Intact Insurance Company, 2019 ONCA 5.
 Amos v Insurance Corp. of British Columbia,  3 SCR 405 at para 24 [Amos].
 Reid Crowther & Partners Ltd. V Simcoe & Erie General Insurance Co.,  1SCR 252 at para 37; Amos v Insurance Corp. of British Columbia  3 SCR 405 at para 19; Progressive Homes Ltd. V Lombard General Insurance Co. of Canada at para 24.
 Derksen v. 539938 Ontario Ltd., 2001 SCC 72 [Derksen].
 Pembridge at para 42. See also, Trench v. Erskine (2006), 244 N.S.R. (2d) 55.
 Law Union & Rock Insurance Co. v Moore’s Taxi Ltd.,  SCR 80 at para 11.
 Aetna Insurance Co. v Canadian Surety Co.,  114 DLR (4th) 537 at para 70.
 Nichols v. American Home Assurance Co.,  1 S.C.R. 801 (S.C.C.).
Lawrence G. Theall is the founding partner of Theall Group LLP. He practices commercial litigation, insurance and product liability (including class proceedings), and has appeared before all levels of the Ontario and Federal courts, as well as the superior courts of Manitoba and Alberta. He is honoured to have been selected as a Lexpert Ranked Lawyer for Product liability and selected by his peers for Best Lawyers 2017 for Insurance, as well as in Expert Guides in the areas of Litigation, Product Liability, Insurance and Reinsurance. He is an editor for the Insurance chapter to be published in Bullen & Leake & Jacob’s 3rd Edition of Canadian Precedents of Pleadings in 2017 and a co-author of the annually updated loose-leaf text, Product Liability: Canadian Law and Practice (Canada Law Book).

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