Source: https://dejure.org/dienste/vernetzung/rechtsprechung?Text=55495/08
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 17:28:32+00:00

Document:
As the Court has noted in previous cases, the difference lies in the degree of factual proof which has to be established (see Jerusalem v. Austria, no. 26958/95, § 43, ECHR 2001-II; Feldek v. Slovakia, no. 29032/95, §§ 73-76, ECHR 2001 VIII; and Genner v. Austria, no. 55495/08, § 38, 12 January 2016).
For these reasons, he was required to display a greater degree of tolerance (for similar reasoning, see, among the most recent authorities, Genner v. Austria, no. 55495/08, § 35, 12 January 2016).
The Court is therefore satisfied that in the particular circumstances of the present case, the imposed sanction cannot be found to have been disproportionately severe (see, mutatis mutandis, Dorota Kania v. Poland (no. 2), no. 44436/13, § 83, 4 October 2016 and Genner v. Austria, no. 55495/08, § 49, 12 January 2016), and cannot be considered to have been capable of having a "chilling", dissuasive effect on the applicant's exercise of his right to freedom of expression.
For these reasons, he was required to display a greater degree of tolerance (see, among the most recent authorities, Genner v. Austria, no. 55495/08, § 35, 12 January 2016).
Therefore, the sanction imposed cannot be found to have been disproportionate (see, mutatis mutandis, Genner v. Austria, no. 55495/08, § 49, 12 January 2016).
It submitted, inter alia, that should the Court find that the pursuit of the "legitimate aim" of protecting the reputation of a deceased person was "necessary in a democratic society", it should do so only in exceptional circumstances, as it had done on previous occasions (see for example Putistin v. Ukraine, no. 16882/03, § 33, 21 November 2013, and, a contrario, Genner v. Austria, no. 55495/08, §§ 44-45, 12 January 2016).

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