Source: http://www.torttalk.com/2018/05/
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 08:52:30+00:00

Document:
In an Order handed down yesterday (May 31, 2018), the Pennsylvania Superior Court vacated its previous decision in the case of Berg v. Nationwide and granted re-argument on the issues presented.
The Superior Court's most recent decision prior to this one erased a $21 million dollar bad faith award in favor of the Plaintiff. Now that decision has been erased.
Continuing updates will be provided on this case.
In her recent decision in the case of Ford v. Leal, No. 3471-CV-2016 (C.P. Monroe Co. Mar. 15, 2018 Harlacher Sibum, J.), Judge Jennifer Harlacher Sibum of the Monroe County Court of Common Pleas sustained the Defendants’ Preliminary Objections and dismissed a Plaintiff’s Complaint in an automobile accident case due to lack of In Personam jurisdiction over the Defendants.
According to the Opinion, the Plaintiffs were involved in a motor vehicle accident on the New York Thruway in Rockland County, New York.
The Plaintiff filed suit in Monroe County, Pennsylvania and the Defendants filed Preliminary Objections under Pa.R.C.P. 1028(a)(1) asserting lack of jurisdiction of the Defendants.
More specifically, the Defendants asserted that the court did not have any personal jurisdiction over the Defendants. The Defendants asserted that they did not reside or own real property in Pennsylvania, that the subject accident did not occur in Pennsylvania, that the Defendants were not served in Pennsylvania, and that the courts of Pennsylvania lack general jurisdiction and specific personal jurisdiction under the Pennsylvania Long Arm Statute over the Defendants.
Judge Harlacher Sibum noted that, according to well-established Pennsylvania case law, an alleged out-of-state automobile accident alone is not enough for a Pennsylvania court to establish personal jurisdiction over a Defendant under the Long Arm Statute, even when the Plaintiff alleges a lasting injury that continues while the Plaintiff resides in Pennsylvania. See Op. 4 citing with “See” signal DeFay v. McMeekin, 508 A.2d 324 (Pa. Super. 1986) [other citations omitted].
On the basis of this law, the court found that the Monroe County Court of Common Pleas did not specific personal jurisdiction over the Defendants under Pennsylvania’s Long Arm Statute and, as such, the Complaint was dismissed.
According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff filed a medical malpractice action alleging negligent prescription and monitoring of anti-coagulation therapy that allegedly caused a right occipital hemorrhage which required emergency treatment and allegedly resulted in permanent harm.
The Plaintiff sued, among others, a Defendant hospital on claims for vicarious liability and corporate negligence.
The Defendant hospital filed a Motion for Summary Judgment seeking to dismiss these claims on the grounds that the Plaintiff did not produce expert opinion testimony on the issues pertinent to those claims.
According to the Opinion, the Plaintiff did produce an expert report containing opinions from a hematology expert only as to the alleged negligence of the Co-Defendant hematologist. The court also noted that the Plaintiff’s expert did not criticize the care provided by any hospital personnel. It was further indicated that the Plaintiff’s previously stipulated that the Co-Defendant hematologist was not an actual or ostensible agent for whom the hospital could be found vicariously liable. Nor was there any opinion in the hematologist’s expert report asserting any institutional negligence against the hospital.
Consequently, based upon the record before it, the court found that the Plaintiff’s case lacked sufficient expert opinion evidence to establish a prima facie claim for vicarious liability or corporate negligence on the part of the Defendant hospital. As such, the hospital’s Motion for Summary Judgment was granted.
In the case of Steudler v. Keating, No. 8795 - CV - 2013 (C.P. Monroe Co. March 20, 2018 Williamson, J.), Judge David J. Williamson ruled that Plaintiffs were not entitled to a new trial based upon the jury’s failure to find causation even though it found the Defendant driver negligent in an auto accident case.
The court ruled in this fashion after finding that it was possible for the jury to determine that the Defendant was negligent but that his negligence was not the factual cause of a fatal accident.
According to the Opinion, the Plaintiffs, Erika Steudler and Victor Resto, were walking along a road in Monroe County when Resto was struck by a motor vehicle driven by the Defendant.
The court noted that the accident occurred at night on a country back road with no street lighting. Neither Plaintiff was carrying a flashlight at the time of the accident.
Plaintiff Steudler did not see the accident but felt Resto brush against her the darkness when he was thrown in the air.
Steudler filed a lawsuit against the Defendant seeking emotional damages due to witnessing the accident while Resto’s estate filed a wrongful death claim.
As noted, the matters proceeded to trial where the jury found the Defendant negligent but also found that his actions were not the factual cause of the Plaintiffs’ injuries.
In the post-trial motions, the Plaintiffs asserted that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence and shocking to one’s sense of justice. The Plaintiffs argued that, because the jury found that the Defendant was negligent, the jury should have found that he was also the factual cause of their injuries since it was undisputed that Resto died from the accident.
The court ruled that a verdict is not against the weight of the evidence simply because the evidence at trial was conflicting or that a reasonable fact-finder could have decided the case in favor of either party.
The trial court distinguished this case from the line of cases which suggest that when a Defendant is found negligent and both parties admit that there was some injury, then the Defendant must be found to have caused at least some portion of the injuries alleged. Here, the court noted that the most distinguishable factor between that line of cases and this case was the issue of the Plaintiffs’ contributory negligence. The court noted that, in the line of cases cited the Plaintiffs, the Defendants had admitted negligence and there was no difference in opinion that the Defendants’ negligence had caused those accidents, which cause some personal injury.
In the Steudler matter, the Defendant never admitted negligence and there were claims of contributory negligence pursued. The defense argued that the sole cause of the accident was the Plaintiffs’ own acts or omissions. It was the Defendant’s defense that he operated his vehicle within the posted speed limit, stayed within his lane of travel, and never saw the Plaintiffs prior to the impact.
The court also noted that the parties presented experts with different opinions on the theory of the cause of the accident in this matter.
In the end, the court found that the jury’s verdict in this matter could have been based upon the jury’s belief that Resto was in the roadway, together with Steudler, and that, if he was not, he may not have been struck and killed.
As such, the court denied the Plaintiff’s request for a new trial under the case presented.
Source: “Digest of Recent Opinions” Pennsylvania Law Weekly (April 10, 2018).
In the case of Corvin v. Tihansky, No. 2018 Pa. Super. 91 (Pa. Super. April 20, 2018 Bender, P.J.E., Shogan, J., Strassburger, J.) (Op. by Shogan, J.), the Superior Court affirmed a trial court’s denial of a Plaintiff’s request for a new trial or a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) after the jury found that the defendant driver’s negligence in a rear-end accident was not a factual cause of any harm.
According to the Opinion, the court ruled in this fashion after finding that the Plaintiff waived his JNOV issue where the Plaintiff’s counsel failed to move for a directed verdict, and where the Plaintiff’s counsel withdrew his request for a binding jury instruction.
The court additionally noted that the jury's verdict may have been supported by the fact that the Plaintiff’s allegedly concealed of his pre-accident chiropractor visits from his own physicians which presented the jury with an issue of credibility.
The court also noted that one of the Defendant’s experts also offered an opinion that the Plaintiff had not been injured in the subject accident.
The Superior Court found that there was no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s refusal to substitute its judgment for that of the jury with respect to the Plaintiff's request for a new trial.
Source: “Digest of Recent Cases.” Pennsylvania Law Weekly (May 8, 2018).
In the recent Northampton County Court of Common Pleas decision of Nolen v. Esken, No. C-48-CV-2018-0385 (C.P. North. Co. March 28, 2018 Beltrami, J.), the court overruled a Defendant’s Preliminary Objections to allegations of recklessness contained in a Plaintiff’s motor vehicle accident Complaint.
According to the Opinion, in their Complaint, the Plaintiffs alleged recklessness on the grounds that the Defendant was speeding at the time of the accident, ran a red light, and collided with the Plaintiff’s vehicle.
In Preliminary Objections, the Defendant moved to strike the allegations of recklessness and other related terms from the Plaintiffs’ Complaint, arguing that the Complaint failed to set forth facts to support such allegations. The Defendant asserted this objection under Pa.R.C.P. 1028(a)(2), which allows for Preliminary Objections on the grounds of inclusion of impertinent matter in a Complaint.
The court noted that, under Pennsylvania law, to be impertinent, the allegations must be immaterial to the proof of the cause of the action. The court also noted that, only where an allegation is wholly irrelevant to the action and cannot influence the result will such allegations be deemed to be impertinent. The court also noted that the right of a trial court to strike impertinent matters should be sparingly exercise under Pennsylvania law and utilized only when a party can show prejudice. See Op. at 2.
Judge Beltrami ruled that, given that the Plaintiffs were not seeking punitive damages, and given that the Plaintiffs stated reason for pleading “recklessness” and other related terms under the law of the Krivijanski holding, such allegations in this matter could indeed serve to influence the case and were, therefore, not impertinent.
The court also felt that the Defendants would not be prejudice by the allegations given that the Plaintiff had not claimed punitive damages.
I send thanks to Attorney Ed Shaughnessy of Shaughnessy Law Office in Easton, Pennsylvania for bringing this case to my attention.
Commentary: Defense litigators should beware of allowing allegations of recklessness to stand without challenge, even where Plaintiff asserts that they are not claiming punitive damages, as such allegations may leave the door open for the Plaintiff to amend the Complaint later in the litigation to then include punitive damages. Apparently, this potential prospect was not argued or considered in this particular case.
In his recent decision in the case of Brozzetti v. Liz, No. 3621-Civil-2017 (C.P. Monroe Co. Mar. 9, 2018 Williamson, J.), Judge David J. Williamson of the Monroe County Court of Common Pleas granted certain Defendants’ Petition to Open a Default Judgment.
According to the Opinion, this case arose out of a motor vehicle accident. The Plaintiff filed suit against an alleged DUI Defendant driver and various entities under a Dram Shop Act action.
The Opinion notes that the Complaint was served on the Dram Shop Defendants and, due to their failure to respond, a default judgment was eventually entered against those Defendants.
In ruling on the Petition to Open the Default Judgment, the court noted that such a judgment may be opened by the court when the petitioning party can show that they have (1) promptly filed a Petition to Open a Default Judgment, (2) provided a reasonable excuse or explanation for failing to file a responsive pleading, and (3) pleaded a meritorious defense to the allegations contained in the Complaint. See Op. at p. 4 [citations omitted].
In this matter, the issue of prompt filing and the excuse for not having filed a responsive pleading were noted by the court to be closely intertwined.
The Dram Shop Defendants asserted that, when they were served with the Complaint, the documents were provided to their long time insurance agent, and the Dram Shop Defendants were assured that the matter was being handled.
However, it appears that the agent never provided the information to the insurance carrier and other evidence was provided to show that the insurance agent had sold his business, and may have spent time in hospital during the time in question, and may have otherwise lost his ability to operate as a licensed insurance agent.
The court confirmed that the record indicated that once the problems were discovered, prompt steps were taken by the Defendant to secure counsel and to have a Petition to Open the Default Judgment filed.
Judge Williamson compared the facts before him as being similar to those cases where the courts have excused the neglect of counsel that results in the entry of default judgment through no fault of the defendants themselves. Judge Williamson felt that the same could be said in terms of reliance upon a representation by the insurance agent that the claim and the matter were being handled.
Overall, Judge Williamson felt that the Dram Shop Defendants had acted in a timely manner once they became aware that no insurance claim had been transmitted by their insurance agent. The court noted that, thereafter, in a span of approximately only 17 days, a claim was then opened, an attorney was assigned, that attorney reviewed the file and entered his appearance, and filed the Petition to Open and an Answer to the Complaint.
Under these circumstances, the court felt that the Dram Shop Defendants had provided a reasonable excuse for their failure to file a responsive pleading, i.e., that they were unaware that their insurance agent had failed to transmit the claim to the carrier for a defense in light of the agent's assurances otherwise.
On the final element, the court found that the Dram Shop Defendants had presented meritorious defenses to the claims provided.
Based upon the above, the court found that the Defendants had met their burden in support of their Petition to Open the Default Judgment.
Anyone wishing to review this Opinion online may click this LINK.

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