Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/401/1/
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 08:31:30+00:00

Document:
Petitioner, who had passed the Arizona written bar examination, listed all the organizations to which she belonged since age 16 on the Bar Committee questionnaire, but refused to answer the question (No. 27) whether she had ever been a member of the Communist Party or any organization "that advocates overthrow of the United States Government by force or violence." The committee declined to process her application further or recommend her admission to the bar. The Arizona Supreme Court denied her petition for an order to show cause why she should not be admitted to practice law.
Held: The judgment of the Arizona Supreme Court is reversed and the case is remanded. Pp. 401 U. S. 5-10.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK, joined by MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, and MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL concluded that views and beliefs are immune from bar committee inquisitions designed to lay a foundation for barring an applicant from the practice of law, which is a matter of right for one qualified by learning and moral character. Pp. 401 U. S. 5-8.
(a) A State's power to inquire about a person's beliefs or associations is limited by the First Amendment, which prohibits a State from excluding a person from a profession solely because of membership in a political organization or because of his beliefs. Pp 401 U. S. 5-6.
(b) While Arizona has a legitimate interest in determining whether petitioner's character and professional competence qualify her to practice law, petitioner has supplied the Bar Committee with extensive personal and professional information to assist its determination. Pp. 401 U. S. 6-7.
MR. JUSTICE STEWART concluded that Question 27 is constitutionally infirm under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, as it is not confined to knowing membership in any organization that advocates violent overthrow of the Government, and it is an inquiry into the proscribed area of political beliefs. Pp. 401 U. S. 9-10.
BLACK, J., announced the Court's judgment and delivered an opinion, in which DOUGLAS, BRENNAN, and MARSHALL, JJ., joined. STEWART, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 401 U. S. 9. HARLAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 401 U. S. 34. WHITE, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 401 U. S. 10. BLACKMUN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BURGER, C.J., and HARLAN and WHITE, JJ., joined, post, p. 401 U. S. 11.
violence." [Footnote 5] When she refused to answer this question, the Committee declined to process her application further or recommend her admission to the bar. [Footnote 6] The Arizona Supreme Court then denied her petition for an order to the Committee to show cause why she should not be admitted to practice law. We granted certiorari. 394 U.S. 957.
"law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble. . . ."
"Thus, the Amendment embraces two concepts, -- freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be. Conduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of society."
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 310 U. S. 303-304 (1940).
"This conjunction of liberties is not peculiar to religious activity and institutions alone. The First Amendment gives freedom of mind the same security as freedom of conscience."
"The First Amendment's ban against Congress 'abridging' freedom of speech, the right peaceably to assemble and to petition, and the 'associational freedom' . . . that goes with those rights create a preserve where the views of the individual are made inviolate."
See also Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479, 364 U. S. 485-487 (1960); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U. S. 516 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U. S. 449 (1958).
The First Amendment's protection of association prohibits a State from excluding a person from a profession or punishing him solely because he is a member of a particular political organization or because he holds certain beliefs. United States v. Robel, 389 U. S. 258, 389 U. S. 266 (1967); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U. S. 589, 385 U. S. 607 (1967). Similarly, when a State attempts to make inquiries about a person's beliefs or associations, its power is limited by the First Amendment. Broad and sweeping state inquiries into these protected areas, as Arizona has engaged in here, discourage citizens from exercising rights protected by the Constitution. Shelton v. Tucker, supra; Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Committee, 372 U. S. 539 (1963); Cf. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513 (1958).
to show that the inquiry is necessary to protect a legitimate state interest. Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Committee, supra, at 372 U. S. 546. Of course, Arizona has a legitimate interest in determining whether petitioner has the qualities of character and the professional competence requisite to the practice of law. But, here, petitioner has already supplied the Committee with extensive personal and professional information to assist its determination. By her answers to questions other than No. 25, and her listing of former employers, law school professors, and other references, she has made available to the Committee the information relevant to her fitness to practice law. [Footnote 7] And whatever justification may be offered, a State may not inquire about a man's views or associations solely for the purpose of withholding a right or benefit because of what he believes.
The practice of law is not a matter of grace, but of right for one who is qualified by his learning and his moral character. See Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, supra, and Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333 (1867). This record is wholly barren of one word, sentence, or paragraph that tends to show this lady is not morally and professionally fit to serve honorably and well as a member of the legal profession. It was error not to process her application and not to admit her to the Arizona Bar. The judgment of the Arizona Supreme Court is reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
The other is No. 18, In re Stolar, post, p. 401 U. S. 23. See also No. 49, Law Students Civil Rights Research Council v. Wadmond, post, p. 401 U. S. 154.
See, e.g., Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U. S. 485 (1952); Beilan v. Board of Education, 357 U. S. 399 (1958); Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U. S. 11 (1966); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U. S. 589 (1967); United States v. Robel, 389 U. S. 258 (1967).
See the cases cited in n 2, supra. See also Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479 (1960); American Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U. S. 382, 339 U. S. 445 (1950) (BLACK, J., dissenting); cf. Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U. S. 516 (1960); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513 (1958); Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U. S. 399 (1961); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U. S. 449 (1958); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U. S. 444 (1969).
Response of the Committee on Examinations and Admission to Order to Show Cause. App. 4.
"Assume an answer including an organization by name such as 'The Sons and Daughters of I Will Arise.' This could truly be a Christian group with religious objectives. But also it could be an organization devoted to the objectives of Lenin, Stalin or any other deceased person whose teachings and objectives were not conducive to the continued security and welfare of our government and way of life."
"Unless we are to conclude that one who truly and sincerely believes in the overthrow of the United States Government by force and violence is also qualified to practice law in our Arizona courts, then an answer to this question is indeed appropriate. The Committee again emphasizes that a mere answer of 'yes' would not lead to an automatic rejection of the application. It would lead to an investigation and interrogation as to whether or not the applicant presently entertains the view that a violent overthrow of the United States Government is something to be sought after. If the answer to this inquiry was 'yes.' then indeed we would reject the application and recommend against admission."
(Emphasis added.) Memorandum in Support of Response to Petition for Order to Show Cause, App. 5.
The Court has held that, under some circumstances, simple inquiry into present or past Communist Party membership of an applicant for admission to the Bar is not, as such, unconstitutional. Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U. S. 36; In re Anastaplo, 366 U. S. 82.
Question 27, however, goes further, and asks applicants whether they have ever belonged to any organization "that advocates overthrow of the United States Government by force or violence." Our decisions have made clear that such inquiry must be confined to knowing membership to satisfy the First and Fourteenth Amendments. See, e.g., United States v. Robel, 389 U. S. 258, 389 U. S. 265-266; Law Students Civil Rights Research Council v. Wadmond, post, p. 401 U. S. 154, at 401 U. S. 165. It follows from these decisions that mere membership in an organization can never, by itself, be sufficient ground for a State's imposition of civil disabilities or criminal punishment. Such membership can be quite different from knowing membership in an organization advocating the overthrow of the Government by force or violence, on the part of one sharing the specific intent to further the organization's illegal goals. See Scales v. United States, 367 U. S. 203, 367 U. S. 228-230; Law Students Civil Rights Research Council v. Wadmond, supra.
401 U. S. 162-163. Yet the First and Fourteenth Amendments bar a State from acting against any person merely because of his beliefs. E.g., West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 319 U. S. 642; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 310 U. S. 303-304. Cf. Carrington v. Rash, 380 U. S. 89, 380 U. S. 94.
activities of any group or to be without comprehension that advising lawless conduct is incompatible with professional standards, the State should be able to deny admission to the Bar.
As MR. JUSTICE BLACK's opinions hasten to assure us, a State may assure itself of an applicant's "qualities of character" and educational qualifications. Accordingly, it would be entitled to make an assessment of his "honesty," and refuse to license him if firmly convinced by his responses or other record evidence that he would not conform to the standards of integrity expected of the members of the Bar. Neither should it be required to admit to practice a person who believes in violent conduct to achieve social, political, or other ends, and who is currently and actively supporting such activities or who expects to do so in the course of advising clients in his professional role. I thus see no constitutional basis for forbidding the asking of perfectly relevant questions designed to ascertain whether an applicant considers it the proper role of the lawyer, as practitioner, to advise and advocate violence as a means for settling disputes or achieving social or political ends. I therefore dissent from the judgments in both of these cases.
"under some circumstances, simple inquiry into present or past Communist Party membership of an applicant for admission to the Bar is not, as such, unconstitutional."
"reiterated unequivocally his disbelief in violent overthrow, and stated that he had never knowingly been a member of any organization which advocated such action,"
"clear that the Fourteenth Amendment's protection against arbitrary state action does not forbid a State from denying admission to a bar applicant so long as he refuses to provide unprivileged answers to questions having a substantial relevance to his qualifications,"
"We likewise regard as untenable petitioner's contentions that the questions as to Communist Party membership were made irrelevant either by the fact that bare, innocent membership is not a ground of disqualification or by petitioner's willingness to answer such ultimate questions as whether he himself believed in violent overthrow or knowingly belonged to an organization advocating violent overthrow,"
for membership in a profession in whose hands so largely lies the safekeeping of this country's legal and political institutions. . . ."
"[W]e regard the State's interest in having lawyers who are devoted to the law in its broadest sense, including not only its substantive provisions but also its procedures for orderly change, as clearly sufficient to outweigh the minimal effect upon free association occasioned by compulsory disclosure in the circumstances here presented,"
"We have also held in Konigsberg that the State's interest in enforcing such a rule as applied to refusals to answer questions about membership in the Communist Party outweighs any deterrent effect upon freedom of speech and association, and hence that such state action does not offend the Fourteenth Amendment."
(Footnote omitted.) 366 U.S. at 366 U. S. 89.
Petitioner Baird, however, attacked the integrity of these cases before the Arizona court, and again attacks their integrity here, and claims that, although perhaps distinguishable, the cases "warrant . . . delimiting, and perhaps even overruling in light of the trend since 1961." In my view, Mrs. Baird has now had striking success in her overruling endeavor, despite the seeming recognition of the two cases in the opinion of the plurality for reversal (hereafter plurality) and the separate concurrence's definite bow in their direction.
The applicant bases this refusal (a) on the fact that, in her answer to a preceding inquiry, the 25th, she listed the organizations of which she had been a member since age 16, and (b) on the asserted legal propositions that to compel her to answer is to deny her First Amendment rights of freedom of belief and freedom of association, her Fifth Amendment right not to incriminate herself, and her Fourteenth Amendment right to due process.
concern with the Party and with forceful and violent overthrow of the Government.
This is reminiscent of the obstructionist tactics condemned in Konigsberg and Anastaplo.
inconsistency of position, for the two questions are related. Furthermore, the questions are not duplicative. By her refusal to answer Question 27, she would place on the Arizona Committee on Examinations and Admissions [Footnote 2/3] and on the Supreme Court of Arizona the burden of determining which of the organizations she listed, if any, was an arm of the Communist Party or advocated forceful or violent overthrow of the Government. That, however, is not the task of the Committee or of the Arizona Supreme Court. It is Sara Baird's task. It is a truism, I think, that the Communist endeavor works beneath the surface, as well as in the open, and that high-sounding names have been the front and the verbal shield for something very different from what the name imports.
5. It has been said that the burden is on the applicant. Application of Courtney, 83 Ariz. 231, 233, 319 P.2d 991, 993 (1957). But a most minimal burden it is. Had she answered "None" to Question 27, that would have been the end of the matter in the absence of obvious prevarication. If she were in doubt, the answer "None to my knowledge" would have accomplished the same result. She chose neither answer. She chose, instead, to remain silent and less than candid.
"In effect this young lady was asked by the State to make a guess as to whether any organization to which she ever belonged 'advocates overthrow of the United States Government by force or violence.'"
It falls far short of guesswork. Mrs. Baird either knew the answer or she did not know it. If she knew, she coupled her knowledge with an attempt to conceal. If she did not know, she had only to state her lack of knowledge. This was no "guess," and, absent the intent to deceive, it certainly was no guess fraught with the risks of perjury.
plurality opinion's footnote 8 is from the body of the Memorandum; my reading of that material, however, indicates only that further inquiry is then in order. I do not share the opinion's interpretation of that material as being directed to mere belief. The key words are whether "violent overthrow . . . is something to be sought after." That is an inquiry into willingness to participate in violence.
Application of Klahr, 102 Ariz. at 531, 433 P.2d at 979. See also Application of Levine, 97 Ariz. 88, 991, 397 P.2d 205, 206-207 (1964), and Application of Burke, 87 Ariz. 336, 339, 351 P.2d 169, 172 (1960).
"The bar has not enjoyed prerogatives; it has been entrusted with anxious responsibilities. . . . From a profession charged with such responsibilities there must be exacted those qualities of truth-speaking, of a high sense of honor, of granite discretion, of the strictest observance of fiduciary responsibility, that have, throughout the centuries, been compendiously described as 'moral character.'"
"History overwhelmingly establishes that many youths like the petitioner were drawn by the mirage of communism during the depression era, only to have their eyes later opened to reality. Such experiences no doubt may disclose a woolly mind or naive notions regarding the problems of society. But facts of history that we would be arbitrary in rejecting bar the presumption, let alone an irrebuttable presumption, that response to foolish, baseless hopes regarding the betterment of society made those who had entertained them but who later undoubtedly came to their senses and their sense of responsibility 'questionable characters.'"
Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U. S. 232, 353 U. S. 247, 251 (1957) (concurring opinion).
10. An attorney, we sometimes tend to forget, is an officer of the court. Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. at 71 U. S. 378. Perhaps we read too much into that phrase. But there is a distinct element of fact and of history in it. We have seen, of late, an overabundance of courtroom spectacle brought about by attorneys -- frequently those who, being unlicensed in the particular State, are nevertheless permitted, by the court's indulgence, to appear for clients in a given case -- who give indications of ignoring their responsibility to the courts and to the judicial process. Question 27 bears upon this facet of an applicant's character.
limit is marked by the relevant, by the excesses of unreasonableness and of harassment, and by the otherwise constitutionally forbidden. It should not be marked at an arbitrary point where the applicant, for reasons of convenience or assumed self-protection or contrariness, decides that enough is enough.
As stated above, on this record, I would affirm the judgment of the Supreme Court of Arizona.
See 102 Ariz. XXIV, XXIX, and XXXVII, for the pertinent provisions of Rule 28(c) in effect at the time Mrs. Baird submitted her application. The rule was amended, effective August 1, 1970, in ways not relevant here. See 106 Ariz. XXXI.
The majority, of course, obviously would hold that Question 25 also was impermissible. In re Stolar, post, p. 401 U. S. 23. Mrs. Baird, however, appears to have had no hesitancy in answering that inquiry.
See Arizona Supreme Court Rule 28(c).
"The Committee would again emphasize that it has formed no judgment as to whether or not Sara Baird should or should not be recommended for admission to the Bar of this State to this Court."
"The Committee would again emphasize to this Court that, if the answer to question No. 27 is 'yes,' the Committee will then endeavor to ascertain if Sara Baird does adhere to the view that the overthrow of the Government of this State and of the United States by force and violence would be a desirable objective, and that she would expect to actively support such views. If this is the conclusion reached by the Committee, it will undoubtedly refuse to recommend Sara Baird for admission to the Bar of the State of Arizona. Should the conclusion be that her membership is of a nominal character and that she does not participate and adhere to the views that a violent overthrow of our government is desirable, then the Committee would have no legal basis for refusing to recommend her for admission to practice law under the decisions of the United States Supreme Court. . . ."
"The Committee, contrary to the repeated assertions and insinuations to the contrary in Petitioner's Brief, has also made it abundantly clear that, regardless of the political beliefs and views of Sara Baird, it is only if she is found to actively believe in the notion and espouses an activist role in implementing the notion that our government be destroyed by force and violence that a favorable recommendation will be refused her by the Committee. . . ."
"The Committee has not and cannot in good conscience certify to the Arizona Supreme Court that Sara Baird has the character and moral fitness to practice law if she does actively support and advocate the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force and violence."
"The issue is simple. 'Is one who believes in and who is willing to work to undermine and destroy the Government of the United States qualified to be admitted to the practice of law?'"
"The Committee would again emphasize to this Court that, if the answer to question No. 27 is 'yes,' the Committee will then endeavor to ascertain if Sara Baird does adhere to the view that the overthrow of the Government of this State and of the United States by force and violence would be a desirable objective, and that she would expect to actively support such views. If this is the conclusion reached by the Committee, it will undoubtedly refuse to recommend Sara Baird for admission to the Bar of the State of Arizona. Should the conclusion be that her membership is of a nominal character, and that she does not participate and adhere to the views that a violent overthrow of our government is desirable, then the Committee would have no legal basis for refusing to recommend her for admission to practice law. . . ."

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