Source: https://openjurist.org/6/f1d/217
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 08:11:08+00:00

Document:
parties to these suits for want of jurisdiction of the court over them, the demurrers must be sustained and the bills dismissed without prejudice. Ordered accordingly.
DORMITZEB and others 'l1. ILLINOIS & ST. LoursBRIDGB COMPANY and others.
A circuit court has no jurisdiction of a civil action between or- , dinary parties, either originally or by removal, if any of the necessary to the controversy on opposite sides are citizens of the same state.
A corporation is a necessary party to a Buit for collecting moneys due for unpaid assessments of its stock, or for capital once paid in, but afterwards improperly divided.
A circuit court cannot attach the property of an absent defendant, unless he is an inhabitant of the district where the suit is brought.[ED.
607; Spear v. Grant, 16 Mass. 9; Wood v. Dummer, 3 Mason, 308; Davenport v. DOW8, 18 Wall. 626; Lyman v. Bonney, 101 Mass. 562; Dee1fteld v. Nims, 110 Mass. 115; Mann v. Pentz, 8 N. Y.422. The three cases cited by the plaintiff were all decided under a code which expressly makes it discretionaty with the judge to order notice to the principal defendant or not. The only possible question, therefore, was of the constitutionality of the statute. Gibson v. Haggerty, 37 N. Y. 555; Bishop v. Garcia, 14 Abb. Pro (N. S.) 70; Lynch v. Johnson, 48 N. Y. 27. The case of Hatch v. Dana, 101 U. S. 205, did not turn upon this point. It appears that the corporation was made a party and afterwards dropped; but no question was raised about it. The corporation may have made no issue with the plaintiff, or all parties may have agreed to the dismissal. The question argued and decided was whether all stockholders must be parties. I cannot see how it is possible, consistently with the decisions and the uniform practice, to decide this case in the absence of the corporation. If it had been actually dissolved, the case might be different. There are allegations which come as near to that as truth will permit, I suppose: that it has ceased to do business; that its bridge has been sold under a foreclosure; and that it is defunct "to all intents and purposes." I do not understand this to mean that it is no longer capable of suing and being sued, but that it is dead for all useful purposes as a bridge-owner. If it remains subject to process, the facts alleged appear to be immateria-I. I infer, from the facts whioh are stated, that it is se liable at present. Demurrer sustained.
ST. LOUIS v. THE KNAPP, STOUT & CO. COMPANY.
A court of equity will not enjoin the erection of a runaway for logs, upon the ground that it will divert th'1 course of a navigahle river, unless it appears that the threatened structure will be a nuisance per 8e.
A structure in the channel of a river will not nece88arily be held subject to abatement as a nuisance. Pennsylvania v. Wheeling Bridge 00. ]3 How. 1i18.
It seems to be well settled· that a bill in equity to enjoin or abate 8 public nuisance must be filed by one who has sustained, or is in danger of sustaining, special damages.-[Eo.

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