Source: https://sandiegobails.com/bail-bonds-glossary/
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 16:53:13+00:00

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For your reference, Bail Concierge Bail Bonds has curated this glossary or terms associated with the Bail Bonds industry and process.
To travel covertly out of the jurisdiction of the courts, or to conceal oneself in order to avoid their process.
1. A partner in crime. 2. A person who knowingly and voluntarily participates with another in a criminal activity.
Black’s calls it “[a] procedural system, such as the Anglo American Legal System, involving active and unhindered parties contesting with each other to put forth a case before an independent decision maker.” According to Michael Asimow, “[t]he central precept of the adversary system is that the sharp clash of proofs presented by opposing lawyers, both zealously representing the interests of their clients, generates the information upon which a neutral and passive decision maker can most justly resolve a dispute.” It is typically contrasted with the inquisitorial system of justice, in which the judge controls most of the pretrial and trial procedures, including framing the issues, supervising criminal investigations and discovery, questioning and cross-examining witnesses, and summarizing evidence. Understanding the adversary system’s importance at bail is critical, for initiation of adversary proceedings triggers certain rights, such as the right to counsel. In practice, judges comfortable operating in a system in which they are to oversee two sides in the adversarial clash of proofs often find that the typical bail hearing is overwhelmingly lopsided, many times operating with no defense counsel, and instead proceeding with defendants who are unprepared to argue issues concerning their pretrial release. The adversary system presupposes somewhat equal adversarial opponents, but bail hearings often lack that equality.
A voluntary declaration of facts written down and sworn to by the declarant before an officer authorized to administer oaths (Black’s). Among other things, affidavits are drafted to obtain search warrants and to document an officer’s probable cause for making a warrantless arrest. In the administration of bail, some persons may be tempted to place a greater emphasis on this sometimes riveting recitation of “facts” and to the charge filed, to the exclusion of other relevant factors used to assess risk of flight and to public safety.
The American Bar Association is the 400,000- plus member national association for the legal profession and those interested in the legal profession. In 1964, the ABA implemented its “Criminal Justice Standards Project,” which has created and updated best practice standards on twenty-three areas in criminal justice. The Third Edition of the ABA’s Standards on Pretrial Release (black letter standards approved in 2002, commentary approved in 2007) are based on empirically sound social science research, as well as on fundamental legal principles, and have been used by courts, legislatures, scholars, and others interested in best practices in the field of pretrial justice.
A criminal proceeding at which the defendant is read the charge or charges and asked to enter a plea. The essence of the arraignment is the act of pleading (e.g., guilty, not guilty, no contest) to the formal charge or charges, and although an arraignment may be continued or postponed, its goal is to obtain the defendant’s plea. The term is sometimes incorrectly used to mean the defendant’s “first appearance” or “initial appearance,” but the arraignment needn’t be the first appearance. As correctly noted in Black’s and other sources, the law GLOSSARY OF TERMS 2 regarding arraignments varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, and is typically explained by court rules or statutes governing those jurisdictions.
In criminal law, bail is the process of releasing a defendant from jail or other governmental custody with conditions set to reasonably assure public safety and court appearance. “Bail” is perhaps one of the most misused terms in the field, primarily because bail has grown from the process of delivering the defendant to someone else, who would personally stand in for the accused if he or she did not appear for court, to presently being largely equated with sums of money. It is now clear that, whatever pure system of “standing in” for a particular defendant to face the consequences of nonappearance in court may have existed in the early Middle Ages, that system was quickly replaced with paying for that non-appearance first with goods (because standardized coin money remained relatively rare in Anglo Saxon Britain until the Eighth and Ninth Centuries) and later money. The encroachment of money into the process of bail has since been unrelenting. And, unfortunately to this day, the terms “money” and “bail” have also been joined in an unholy linguistic alliance.
Garner has correctly noted the multiple definitions of bail that have evolved over time, most of which presuppose some security in the form of money.4 For example, besides being defined as the security agreed upon, bail was also once defined as a person who acts as a surety for a debt, and was often used in sentences such as, “The bail is supposed to have custody of the defendant.”5 However, because much has been learned over the last century about money at bail (including its deleterious effect on the concept of pretrial justice), and because the very purpose of bail has also changed to include notions of public safety in addition to court appearance (preceding a new era of release on non-financial conditions), defining the term “bail” as an amount of money, as many state legislatures, criminal justice practitioners, newspapers, and members of the public do, is flawed. Thus, a new definition of the term is warranted.
Bail as a process of release is the only definition that: (1) effectuates American notions of liberty from even colonial times; (2) acknowledges the rationales for state deviations from more stringent English laws in crafting their constitutions (and the federal government in crafting the Northwest Territory Ordinance of 1787); and (3) naturally follows from various statements equating bail with release from the United States Supreme Court from the late 1800s to 1951 (in Stack v. Boyle, the Supreme Court wrote that, “federal law has unequivocally provided that a person arrested for a non-capital offense shall be admitted to bail. This traditional right to freedom before conviction permits the unhampered preparation of a defense, and serves to prevent the infliction of punishment prior to conviction”)6 and to 1987 (in United States v. Salerno, the Supreme Court wrote that, “In our society liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited exception.”).
Bail as release accords not only with history and the law, but also with scholar’s definitions (in 1927, Beeley defined bail as the release of a person from custody), the federal government’s usage (calling bail a process in at least one document), and use by organizations such as the American Bar Association, which has quoted Black’s Law Dictionary definition of bail as a “process by which a person is released from custody.”8 States with older (and likely outdated) bail statutes often still equate bail with money, but many states with newer provisions, such as Virginia (which defines bail as “the pretrial release of a person from custody upon those terms and conditions specified by order of an appropriate judicial officer”),9 and Colorado (which defines bail as security like a pledge or a promise, which can include release without money),10 have enacted statutory definitions to recognize bail as something more than simply money. Moreover, some states, such as Alaska,11a Florida,11b Connecticut,11c and Wisconsin,11d have constitutions explicitly incorporating the word “release” into their right to bail provisions.
An agreement between the defendant and the court, or between the defendant, the surety (commercial or noncommercial surety), and the court, originally designed primarily to assure the defendant’s appearance in court and later expanded in the federal system and most states to include public safety protections. Bail bonds are sometimes called “appearance bonds,” as all bail bonds are minimally appearance bonds, but that term does not fully reflect the purpose of bail, which is to normally afford release while reasonably assuring court appearance and public safety.
Black’s Law Dictionary defines “bond” generally as an obligation or a promise, and “bail bond” as “[a] bond given to the court by a criminal defendant’s surety to guarantee that the defendant will duly appear in court in the GLOSSARY OF TERMS 4 future and, if the defendant is jailed, to obtain the defendant’s release from confinement. The effect of release on bail bond is to transfer custody of the defendant from the officers of the law to the custody of the surety on the bail bond, whose undertaking is to redeliver the defendant to legal custody at the time and place appointed in the bond.” A broader definition, however, correctly takes into account the fact that many defendants are released without third party sureties, and recognizes the dual purpose of bail.
[Compensated] Surety bond – A bail bond company signs a promissory note to the court for the full [money] bail [bond] amount and charges the defendant a fee for the service (usually 10% [or more] of the full [money] bail [bond] amount). If the defendant fails to appear, the bond company is liable to the court for the full [money] bail [bond] amount. Frequently the [money bail] bond company requires collateral from the defendant [or friend or relative of the defendant for the full amount of the bail bond] in addition to the fee.
Deposit bond – The defendant deposits a percentage (usually 10%) of the full [money] bail [bond] amount with the court. The percentage of the [money] bail [bond] is returned after the disposition of the case, but the court often retains a small portion for administrative costs. If the defendant fails to appear in court, he or she is liable to the court for the full [money] bail [bond] amount.
Full cash bond – The defendant posts the full [money] bail [bond] amount in cash with the court. If the defendant makes all court appearances, the cash is returned. If the defendant fails to appear in court, the bond is forfeited.
Release on recognizance (ROR) – The court releases some defendants on a signed agreement that they will appear in court as required … [which] includes citation releases in which arrestees are released pending their first court appearance on a written order issued by law enforcement or jail personnel. [In many jurisdictions, a ROR (also known as “Own Recognizance,” “Personal Recognizance,” or “PR”) bond may also be an unsecured financial bond if it has money attached].
Unsecured bond – The defendant pays no money to the court but is liable for the full amount of [the money] bail [bond] upon failure to appear in court.
Conditional release – Defendants are released under specified conditions. A pretrial services agency usually conducts monitoring or supervision, if ordered for a defendant. In some cases, such as those involving a third-party custodian or drug monitoring and treatment, another agency may be involved in the supervision of the defendant. Conditional release sometimes includes an unsecured bond.14 There is growing recognition that “typing” bail bonds based on a single condition of release – money, such as when labeling a bail bond a “surety bond” or a “cash bond” – is an archaic practice, and thus the better practice (as reflected in the ABA Standards) is to refer either to “release” or “detention,” with release having one or more conditions –financial or non-financial – as limitations on pretrial freedom.
The first major reform of the federal bail system since the Judiciary Act of 1789, which established the federal judiciary. The 1966 Act contained the following provisions: (1) a presumption in favor of releasing non-capital defendants on their own recognizance; (2) conditional pretrial release with conditions imposed to reduce the risk of failure to appear; (3) restrictions on money bail bonds, which the court could impose only if nonfinancial release options were not enough to assure a defendant’s appearance; (4) a deposit money bail bond option, allowing defendants to post a 10% deposit of the money bail bond amount with the court in lieu of the full monetary amount of a surety bond; and (5) review of bail bonds for defendants detained for 24 hours or more.15 After passage of this Act, many states passed similar laws.
Also known as a “bail recovery agent,” “fugitive recovery agent,” and other similar terms, a bounty hunter is one who seeks to capture wanted persons for the reward (bounty) offered for the capture. Taylor v. Taintor, 83 U.S. 366 (1872), is commonly cited as the authority for persons to act as bounty hunters in the administration of bail. Bounty hunters were thought to be an essential ingredient to bail administered through a personal surety system, which placed enormous responsibility on sureties but did not allow them to profit from or be indemnified through the bail transaction. With the advent of the commercial bail system in about 1900, however, the need for the bounty hunter function has grown increasingly dubious. Indeed, given the widespread capability of traditional law enforcement and the tendency for bail bondsmen to collateralize the full amount of bail bonds (thus obviating the need to “track someone down” to avoid payment), there is substantial debate over the continued need for the bounty hunter profession.
From the Latin for “that you take,” a capias is the general name for several types of writs, the common characteristic of which is that they require the officer to take a defendant into custody (Black’s).
The bail clause was lifted with slight changes from the English Bill of Rights Act. In England that clause has never been thought to accord a right to bail in all cases, but merely to provide that bail shall not be excessive in those cases where it is proper to grant bail. When this clause was carried over into our Bill of Rights, nothing was said that indicated any different concept. The Eighth Amendment has not prevented Congress from defining the classes of cases in which bail shall be allowed in this country. Thus in criminal cases bail is not compulsory where the punishment may be death. Indeed, the very language of the Amendment fails to say all arrests must be bailable.
According to Black’s, a citation is (1) a “court ordered writ that commands a person to appear at a certain time and place to do something demanded in the writ; (2) A police issued order to appear before a judge on a given date to defend against a stated charge, such as a traffic violation.” The second definition seems to reflect more common usage. Citation release is a large but often ignored part of pretrial justice, which involves a host of decisions that occur from arrest until case disposition, including whether to release an arrestee with a citation versus taking that person to jail. Despite the fact that pretrial release has not been historically viewed as a police function, through their discretionary decision-making ability to issue citations in lieu of arrests in certain cases, “the police are often in the best position to provide for the speedy release of criminal defendants.”21 Pretrial literature now typically discusses citation release under the topic of “delegated release authority,” which includes release of defendants prior to their first appearance by field officers and jail staff, in addition to pretrial services program staff.
[e]ach law enforcement agency should promulgate regulations designed to increase the use of citations to the greatest degree consistent with public safety. Except when arrest or continued custody is necessary, the regulations should require such inquiry as is practicable into the accused’s place and length of residence, family relationships, references, present and past employment, criminal record, and any other facts relevant to appearance in response to a citation.
Citations are also sometimes called “desk appearance tickets,” and are most used when the risk to public safety and for failure to appear for court are perceived as low.
Generally, collateral is property that is pledged as security against a debt (Black’s). Specifically, collateral in the administration of bail is typically a deposit of money or property to protect a commercial bail bondsman from loss if a defendant fails to appear for court. It can come from the defendant, but often comes from friends and family of the defendant.
A future and uncertain event on which the existence or extent of an obligation or liability depends; an uncertain act or event that triggers or negates a duty to render a promised performance (Black’s). In the administration of bail, conditions are requirements that must be met to avoid certain consequences. Pretrial release often hinges on defendants promising to follow certain conditions of release, which are set to further the constitutionally valid purposes for limiting pretrial freedom (i.e., to reasonably assure court appearance and public safety). Among many other delineations in the law, these conditions may be precedent and subsequent. Most bail bond conditions are conditions subsequent – that is, release is obtained, but if the condition occurs (or fails to occur, depending on its wording), it will trigger some consequence, and sometimes bring pretrial freedom to an end. Money at bail is the quintessential, and typically the only condition precedent. Unlike other conditions, some or all of a financial condition often must be paid first in order to initially obtain release.
Primarily used with commercial bail bondsmen, consent of surety refers to a written document from the bondsman agreeing to remain as surety despite good cause for a bail bond to be revoked.
Black’s defines criminal contempt as “[a]n act that obstructs justice or attacks the integrity of the court.” Generally speaking, a court can declare a defendant to be in contempt for any number of disruptive acts that interfere with the administration of justice, including violating a formal court order. Contempt of court may occur directly (committed in the immediate vicinity of the court) or indirectly (committed outside of court).
Also known as a criminal record, it is a compilation of criminal offenses associated with a particular individual. Criminal histories can be powerful documents in the administration of bail, so great caution is urged in compiling and interpreting them.
The accused in a criminal proceeding.
The entrusting – to law enforcement, or in some places, a pretrial services agency or program – of judicial authority to release an arrested person before his or her first court appearance.
According to the National Association of Pretrial Services Agencies’ Performance Standards and Goals for Pretrial Diversion/Intervention, pretrial diversion/intervention is “a voluntary option which provides alternative criminal case processing for a defendant charged with a crime that ideally, upon successful completion of an individualized program plan, results in a dismissal of the charge(s).” The purpose of such a program is to “enhance justice and public safety through addressing the root cause of the arrest provoking behaviors of the defendant, reducing the stigma which accompanies a record of conviction, restoring victims and assisting with the conservation of court and criminal justice resources.”27 The Pretrial Justice Institute’s website contains links to a variety of publications related to this topic.
[p]ending abolition of compensated sureties, jurisdictions should ensure that responsibility for supervision of defendants released on bond posted by a compensated surety lies with the surety. A judicial officer should not direct a pretrial services agency to provide supervision or other services for a defendant released on surety bond. No defendant released under conditions providing for supervision by the pretrial services agency should be required to have bail posted by a compensated surety.
[o]ther provisions of the Standards emphasize that financial bail should be used only if other conditions are insufficient to minimize the risk of nonappearance, and that, if [secured] financial conditions are imposed, the bail amount should be posted with the court under procedures that allow for the return of the amount of the bond if the defendant makes required court appearances. There is no reason to require defendants to support bail bondsmen in order to obtain release (and to pay the bondsman a fee that is not refundable even if they are ultimately cleared of the charges), and the practice of [simultaneously] providing for supervision by the pretrial services agency simply encourages perpetuation of the undesirable practices associated with commercial bail bonding. It also drains supervisory resources from often understaffed and overworked pretrial services agencies, making it more difficult to supervise the defendants for whom they properly have responsibility.
In the administration of bail, due process considerations include fundamental fairness arguments that high money bail bonds lead to defendants being unfairly punished prior to trial, as well as concerns that high money bonds and the resulting detention affects the fairness of a defendant’s trial and the ultimate disposition of the case. When financial conditions of release result in a defendant’s pretrial detention without the type of hearing envisioned by the U.S. Supreme Court in Salerno, a procedural due process claim might also prove successful.
As it relates to the field of bail and pretrial release, it is the release of any prisoner due to an emergency situation, such as (and typically) jail crowding. As a jail’s percentage of pretrial inmates rises, that jail’s overall population can rise above its operational capacity. Because many jurisdictions are uneasy with making policy changes affecting the pretrial population, one sometimes sees jails releasing convicted inmates early, often pursuant to elaborate emergency release schemes designed to comfort the public. At the extreme, emergency releases are a response to a court order to reduce a jail’s population, but some programs are voluntary to remain within agreed-upon caps based on budgetary or other reasons. Emergency releases are relatively rare, but represent a significant and often well-publicized failure to manage a jail’s population.
Refers generally to protecting individuals from laws that treat people unequally pursuant to the right guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution (and similar state provisions). In addition to considerations of due process (which include fundamental fairness arguments that high money bail bonds lead to defendants being unfairly punished before trial, as well as concerns that high money bonds and detention affects the fairness of a defendant’s trial and the ultimate disposition of the case), many scholars have argued that equal protection considerations should serve as an equally compelling basis for fair treatment in the administration of bail, especially when considering the disparate impact of money bail bonds on defendants due only to their level of income.
Over the years, this argument has been bolstered by language from Supreme Court opinions in cases like Griffin v. Illinois, which dealt with a defendant’s ability to purchase a transcript required for appellate review. In that case, Justice Black stated that, “[t]here can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has.”34 Moreover, sitting as circuit justice to decide a prisoner’s release in two cases, Justice Douglas uttered the following dicta frequently cited as support for equal protection analysis: (1) “Can an indigent be denied freedom, where a wealthy man would not, because he does not happen to have enough property to pledge for his freedom?”;35 and (2) “[N]o man should be denied release because of indigence. Instead, under our constitutional system, a man is entitled to be released on ‘personal recognizance’ where other relevant factors make it reasonable to believe that he will comply with the orders of the Court.”36 Overall, despite scholarly arguments to invoke Equal Protection Clause analysis to the issue of bail, the federal courts have not been inclined to do so.
A legal term of art used to describe bail that is unconstitutional pursuant to the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution (or similar state provisions). The Eighth Amendment states that, “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” The Excessive Bail Clause derives from reforms made by the English Parliament in the 1600s to curb the abuse of judges setting impossibly high money bail to thwart the purpose of bail to afford a process of pretrial release. The English Bill of Rights of 1689 first used the phrase, “Excessive bail ought not be required,” which was incorporated into the 1776 Virginia Declaration of rights, and ultimately found its way into the United States and many other state constitutions.
Exoneration generally is the removal of a responsibility. In the administration of bail and the pretrial process, it is a term of art referring to one being released from liability on a bail bond upon the successful satisfaction of all conditions of the bond, upon payment of a forfeiture of the bond, or upon the occurrence of any other statutorily enumerated justification, such as the death of the defendant, the surrender of the defendant into custody before the forfeiture process is complete, or deficiencies in the process affecting a surety’s liability.
The phrase typically used when a defendant or witness under subpoena does not show up for a scheduled court appearance. It is understood to carry with it some penalty for the failure, such as the issuance of a bench warrant. It has sometimes been defined as a “willful” absence from a court appointment, but research and experience has shown that FTAs needn’t be willful to nonetheless occur.
A serious crime usually punishable by imprisonment for more than one year or by death (Black’s). Also called “major” or “serious” crimes. What is and is not considered a felony (and whether it is even called a felony) differs among jurisdictions, and the lines of demarcation between less-serious felonies and more-serious misdemeanors are often blurred, so reference to each state’s sometimes complex criminal code is necessary to determine the precise definition. When reporting crime statistics, many entities (including the Federal Bureau of Investigation) categorize offenses using other classifications, such as “violent” and “property” offenses.
Habeas corpus derives from the famous 1676 English case of an individual known only as Jenkes, who was held for two months on a charge that, pursuant to statute, required admittance to bail. Jenkes’ case, and cases like it, ultimately led to Parliament’s passage of the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, which established procedures to prevent long delays before a bail hearing was held. The United States explicitly incorporated the right of habeas corpus into the Constitution in Article 1, Section 9, which reads, “[t]he privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require it.” The first Judiciary Act provided habeas corpus for federal prisoners, and in 1867 Congress expanded the process to allow federal courts to grant writs of habeas corpus in all cases, including state cases, where any person may be restrained in violation of the Constitution or U.S. law or treaty. Each state typically also has its own habeas right and procedure, which is often incorporated into an overall postconviction remedy provision.
Like “bail,” habeas corpus is a process, implicating a unique legal procedure and body of legal precedent.
The principal investigative arm of the United States Department of Homeland Security, created in 2003 by merging parts of the United States Customs Service and the Immigration and Naturalization Service. In some jurisdictions, ICE places immigration holds on defendants that can affect their perceived risk and thus their pretrial status.
According to Black’s, it is the act or process of confining someone. By most estimates, the United States has the highest number of inmates and the highest incarceration rate in the world, with China (number of inmates) and Russia (incarceration rate) coming in second.
Also known at the local level as the jail population, the incarcerated population is the number persons held in one or more detention facilities. Jail population dynamics are important to understand when dealing with policies and procedures that affect that population, such as those surrounding bail and pretrial release. A typical jail is akin to a water barrel, which has an overall amount of liquid based on how much water is put into it, and how long that water stays inside the barrel until it is let out. Like the water barrel, the average daily jail population is determined by bookings (inflow) and length of stay (outflow). Thus, in addition to variations in bookings, various jail subpopulations can drive the average daily population based on their lengths of stay, and these lengths of stay, in turn, are affected by local policies and procedures. As it pertains to bail and pretrial release, the Bureau of Justice Statistics reports that jail populations peaked in 2008, but have been declining since then. Nevertheless, approximately two thirds of the inmates housed in our nation’s jails are pretrial detainees, and the use of secured money at bail has increased the lengths of stay of pretrial inmates.
The notion underlying a risk-based administration of bail that each defendant poses his or her own risk, which can be assessed using professional standards and research. It presupposes that the fixing of bail in a blanket fashion not taking into consideration those individual risk characteristics is flawed and possibly illegal. The notion was first articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1951), when the Court wrote that “[t]o infer from the fact of indictment alone a need for bail in an unusually high amount is an arbitrary act,” and “[s]ince the function of bail is limited, the fixing of bail for any individual defendant must be based upon standards relevant to the purpose of assuring the presence of that defendant. The traditional standards as expressed in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure are to be applied in each case to each defendant.” The particular standards referred to in Stack included the nature and circumstances of the offense, the weight of the evidence, the financial ability of the defendant, and his or her character. Most states have similar standards in their bail statutes, thus statutorily mandating an individualized bail setting.
A term of art in the field of bail and pretrial release that often sums up a number of variables typically related to risk to court appearance and public safety. The phrase has sometimes been used as a label for a third constitutionally valid purpose for limiting pretrial freedom beyond court appearance and public safety, but often the phrase is either used without definition or has been further defined as relating to either court appearance or public safety. For example, the American Bar Association states that the purpose of the pretrial release decision includes “maintaining the integrity of the judicial process by securing defendants for trial.”46 Other jurisdictions use the phrase when describing the threat of intimidating or harassing witnesses, arguably clear risks to public safety.
The phrase “ensure the integrity of the judicial process” was used in United States v. Salerno,47 but only in a passing reference to the argument on appeal. Reviewing the court of appeals ruling, however, sheds some light on that argument. The principle contention at the court of appeals level was that the Bail Reform Act of 1984 violated due process because it permitted pretrial detention of defendants when their release would pose a danger to the community or any person.48 As the appeals court noted, this contention was different from what it considered to be the clearly established law that detention was proper to prevent flight or threats to the safety of those solely within the judicial process, such as witnesses or jurors. The appeals court found the idea of potential risk to the broader community “repugnant” to due process and, had the Supreme Court not reversed, the distinction between those in the judicial process and those outside of it might have remained. However, by upholding the Bail Reform Act’s preventive detention provisions, the Supreme Court forever expanded the notion of public safety to encompass consideration of all potential victims, whether in or out of the judicial process. Today, use of the phrase typically begs further definition so as to clarify whether judicial integrity means specifically court appearance or public safety, more general compliance with all court-ordered conditions of one’s bail bond, or some other relevant factor.
A jail is a building designated and used to temporarily confine persons who are sentenced to minor crimes or who do not obtain release during the pretrial period, typically operated by local jurisdictions. As Black’s notes, it is a place of confinement that is somewhat more than a police station, and less than a prison. Jail is pronounced the same as “gaol,” the British variant, which is traced to the Latin term for “cage.” Because jails are seen as somewhat temporary, they often do not have the sort of long-term rehabilitation programs afforded in many prisons.
A public official appointed or elected to hear and decide legal matters in court (Black’s). The term is often used interchangeably with “court,” as in “I hope that the court will decide this matter soon.” There are numerous types of judges, from county and district to military and “senior visiting,” so one should attempt always to further clarify the title. The term is frequently misused to describe those on supreme courts, who are typically instead called “justices.” In some jurisdictions the title is important when determining the authority to grant or fix bail.
Broader than the term “judge,” judicial officers include judges and magistrates, as well as other officers of the court as defined locally or in state or federal bail statutes. In some jurisdictions the title is important when determining the authority to grant or fix bail.
Least restrictive conditions is a concept related to excessive bail, as evidenced by the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in Salerno, which explained that conditions of bail must be set at a level designed to assure a constitutionally valid purpose for limiting pretrial freedom “and no more.” The phrase “least restrictive conditions” is a term of art expressly contained in the federal and District of Columbia statutes, the American Bar Association best-practice standards on pretrial release, and other state statutes based on those Standards (or a reading of Salerno). Moreover, the phrase is implicit through similar language from various state high court cases articulating, for example, that bail may only be met by means that are “the least onerous” or that impose the “least possible hardship” on the accused.
This Standard’s presumption that defendants should be released under the least restrictive conditions necessary to provide reasonable assurance they will not flee or present a danger is tied closely to the presumption favoring release generally. It has been codified in the Federal Bail Reform Act and the District of Columbia release and pretrial detention statute, as well as in the laws and court rules of a number of states. The presumption constitutes a policy judgment that restrictions on a defendant’s freedom before trial should be limited to situations where restrictions are clearly needed, and should be tailored to the circumstances of the individual case. Additionally, the presumption reflects a practical recognition that unnecessary detention imposes financial burdens on the community as well as on the defendant.
The least restrictive principle is foundational, and is expressly reiterated throughout the ABA Standards when, for example, those Standards recommend citation release or summonses versus arrest. Moreover, the Standard’s overall scheme creating a presumption of release on recognizance, followed by release on nonfinancial conditions, and finally release on financial conditions is directly tied to this foundational premise. Indeed, the principle of least restrictive conditions transcends the Standards and flows from even more basic understandings of criminal justice, which begins with presumptions of innocence and freedom, and which correctly imposes increasing burdens on the government to incrementally restrict one’s liberty.
A judicial officer, often with limited jurisdictional power, who possesses whatever authority that is given to him or her through appointment or law. In some jurisdictions the title is important when determining the authority to grant or fix bail.
One of the best known social science studies of bail, and the first to explore alternatives to release on secured financial conditions (money bail bonds). It was conducted by the Vera Foundation (now the Vera Institute of Justice) and the New York University Law School beginning in October of 1961. It was designed “to provide information to the court about a defendant’s ties to the community and thereby hope that the court would release the defendant without requiring a bail bond [i.e., release on the defendant’s own recognizance].”50 The project was a focal point of discussion at the National Conference on Bail and Criminal Justice in 1964, and generally in the bail reform movement of the 1960s.
A shorthand term used primarily for describing bail or a bail bond using secured financial conditions. The two central issues concerning money bail are: (1) unnecessary incarceration of defendants who cannot afford to pay; and (2) the use of secured financial conditions to protect public safety, a notion with no empirical support and no legal basis in the more enlightened states’ statutes.
The “traditional” money or financial bail system, which includes any system of the administration of bail that is over-reliant on money. Some of its hallmarks include monetary bail bond schedules, overuse of secured bonds, a reliance on commercial sureties (forprofit bail bondsmen), financial conditions set to protect the public from future criminal conduct, and financial conditions set without consideration of the defendant’s ability to pay, or without consideration of non-financial conditions that would likely reduce risk.
NAPSA is the national professional association for the pretrial release and pretrial diversion fields. Like the ABA’s Standards, the NAPSA’s Standards on Pretrial Release serve as best practice standards in the field.53 In many areas, the NAPSA Standards compliment (and sometimes mirror) the ABA Standards, but they also provide important detailed guidance on best practices for operating pretrial services agencies or programs.
For 175 years, the right to bail has not been a right to release, it has been a right merely to put up money for release, and 1964 can hardly be described as the year in which the defects in the bail system were discovered.
In criminal law, it is an accused person’s formal response to a criminal charge (e.g., “guilty,” “not guilty,” “no contest”) (Black’s).
Release from jail, prison, or other confinement after actually serving part of a sentence (Black’s).
A negotiated agreement between a prosecutor and a criminal defendant whereby the defendant typically pleads guilty to a lesser offense, or to one of multiple charges, in exchange for some concession by the prosecutor, such as an agreement to a more lenient sentence or a dismissal of other charges. It is also called a “plea agreement.” There is a significant, but extremely sensitive issue in the administration of bail concerning whether a defendant’s pretrial status has the effect of “coercing” a plea, typically by providing the defendant with a Hobson’s choice (a take it or leave it option) of pleading guilty in order to be released from confinement. Given the large percentage of cases ending with guilty pleas, research is needed to shed further light on this issue.
A criminal hearing to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to prosecute an accused person. If sufficient evidence exists, the case proceeds to the next phase. Also called a preliminary examination, a probable cause hearing, or a bindover hearing (Black’s).
A legal inference of assumption that a fact exists, based on the known or proven existence of some other fact or group of facts. Most presumptions are rules of evidence calling for a certain result in a given case unless the adversely affected party overcomes it with other evidence. A presumption shifts the burden of production or persuasion to the opposing party, who can then attempt to overcome the presumption (Black’s). Concerning bail and pretrial release, the term is often used in “presumption of innocence” (see below), a “presumption of release” (tied philosophically to the presumption of innocence, and included in both the ABA’s Criminal Justice Standards on Pretrial Release and NAPSA’s Standards on Pretrial Release), a more specific “presumption of release on recognizance” (a principle flowing from the Standards’ recommendations to use least restrictive conditions of release), and sometimes a “presumption toward confinement” found in some preventive detention statutes.
A period of time referring to the phase of a criminal defendant’s case beginning at arrest and ending at final disposition. The term is often misused to refer to a pretrial services agency or program, or to pretrial services supervision.
Pretrial conditional release refers to any form of release in which the defendant is required to comply with specific conditions set by the court, which can be financial, nonfinancial, or both.
Holding a defendant in secure detention before trial on criminal charges either because release was denied or because the established bail bond could not be posted (Black’s). As the definition implies, pretrial detention can be intended or unintended, and thus judges should be purposeful when setting bail bonds so that they realize their intention that the defendant either be released or remain detained.
Although the term “outcomes” can reflect whatever is measured (e.g., pretrial detention/ release outcomes, adjudication and sentencing outcomes), it is typically used to refer to results tied to the two constitutionally valid purposes for limiting pretrial freedom – court appearance and public safety. A third outcome, compliance with all other bail bond conditions, may also be measured.
The method by which a pretrial services program/agency or individual identifies and categorizes risks of pretrial misconduct presented by a particular defendant based upon the information gathered before the bail hearing. The risk assessment can be either subjective or objective. Subjective assessments are based on an evaluation of the defendant by the interviewer, who draws on his or her prior experience to assess release appropriateness. Objective assessments are based on procedures and conclusions supported by research and national organizations, such as the National Association of Pretrial Services Agencies and the American Bar Association, through their published standards.
While widely varying, a pretrial services agency or program is generally known as any organization created ideally to perform the three primary pretrial agency or program functions of: (1) collecting and analyzing defendant information for use by the court in assessing risk; (2) making recommendations to the court concerning bail bond conditions of release to address risk; and (3) monitoring and supervising defendants who are released from secure custody during the pretrial phase of their cases in order to manage their risk. For a number of reasons, having a single entity provide these functions is likely the ideal, and is superior to separating the functions and having them performed by other, existing criminal justice entities.
Pretrial detention designed to prevent either flight or danger to the community. The laws of many states and the federal system allow the court to detain defendants in certain carefully defined categories of cases either based on the defendant’s most serious charge or when no condition or combination of conditions of pretrial release can reasonably assure court appearance or public safety. When drafted properly, these laws include substantial due process elements, such as those reviewed and approved by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Salerno.66 It is correctly argued that such detention should be used sparingly, for while the Supreme Court in Salerno upheld the federal preventive detention provisions of the Bail Reform Act of 1984, it also uttered the memorable statement, “In our society, liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited exception.”67 In that opinion, the Court specifically emphasized that the “extensive safeguards” embedded in the Bail Reform Act and the “careful delineation of the circumstances under which detention will be permitted” were crucial to repelling the constitutional challenges. Nevertheless, some federal districts have reported pretrial detention rates as high as 70-80%, indicating potential overuse of the statutory provisions, and a trend contrary to the Court’s warning to ensure that detention remain an exception.68 Moreover, in many cases across this country bail bonds are often set in unaffordable, if not excessive amounts, leading to preventive detention without any of the procedural safeguards envisioned by the Court in Salerno.
According to Webster’s Dictionary, a prison is generally a place of confinement, and specifically an institution (as one under state jurisdiction) for confinement of persons convicted of serious crimes. One should not expect to find any pretrial inmates housed in a state prison; however, defendants facing federal charges are sometimes held in federal prisons, and some states actually call their jails “prisons.” Private prisons exist in the United States, which are run by private corporations whose services and beds are contracted out by state governments or the Federal Bureau of Prisons.
A reasonable ground to suspect that a person has committed or is committing a crime or that a place contains specific items connected with a crime (Black’s). Probable cause generally refers to having more evidence for than against. It is a term of art in criminal procedure referring to the requirement that arrests be based on probable cause. Probable cause to arrest is present when “at that moment the facts and circumstances within [the officers’] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the [person] had committed or was committing an offense.”69 In County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 (1991), the Supreme Court ruled that suspects who are arrested without a warrant must be given a probable cause hearing within 48 hours.
A court imposed criminal sentence that, subject to stated conditions, releases a convicted person into the community instead of sending him or her to jail or prison (Black’s). Though similarities exist between probation and pretrial release (indeed, sometimes pretrial services are delivered by a jurisdiction’s probation office), the crucial difference is that probation is a sentence of punishment imposed upon conviction, and thus has entirely A PUBLICATION OF THE PRETRIAL JUSTICE INSTITUTE 23 different legal purposes than those underlying the bail process. There exists an unfortunate irony that many criminal defendants will spend the entire pretrial phase of their case in secured confinement, only to be released back into the community after conviction by being sentenced to probation.
A legal officer who represents the government in criminal proceedings (although there is such a thing as a private prosecutor, it is rare). They are known by different names, including district attorney, county attorney, commonwealth attorney, municipal attorney, state’s attorney, prosecuting attorney, etc. Prosecutors in the federal system are known as United States Attorneys and Assistant United States Attorneys, or “AUSA’s” for short.
Often used interchangeably, but in some states defined differently, both terms refer to court orders prohibiting or restricting a person from engaging in delineated conduct. They can be mandated statutorily for all cases, or discretionary for particular cases, such as domestic violence.
The second constitutionally valid purpose for limiting pretrial freedom, along with assuring court appearance, typically measured by new arrests or new charges, but sometimes, and more appropriately, expressed in the negative from these measurements (e.g., the “no new arrest or charge rate”). The term is also somewhat overused by some public officials as an undefined and unmeasured, and thus unassailable rationale for defending certain policies and practices.
Generally, an obligation by which a person promises to perform some act or observe some condition, such as to appear when called, to pay a debt, or to keep the peace. According to Black’s, a recognizance most commonly takes the form of a bail bond that guarantees an un-jailed criminal defendant’s return for a court date.
Verbal or written suggestions to the court regarding the conditions of release or detention appropriate for the case at hand.
When granted by federal or state law, it is the right to release from jail or other government custody through the bail process. Technically, it is typically the “right to non-excessive bail,” which goes to the reasonableness of the conditions placed on any particular defendant’s release. The United States Constitution does not have an explicit right to bail clause, but that right is contained in the federal statute. Many states have right to bail clauses, even if that right has been limited for certain cases.
The legal structure of the right to bail differs among the states. Nine states, like the federal system, have no right to bail articulated in their constitutions. Approximately twenty one states have “traditional” and fairly broad right to bail provisions, which were modeled after Pennsylvania’s law of 1682. The remaining states have amended their constitutions to allow for preventive detention in various ways.
Collateral given or pledged to guarantee fulfillment of an obligation (Black’s). Implied is the forfeiture of this collateral if the obligation is not met.
Finally, the case is known for language both in the majority opinion as well as Justice Jackson’s memorable concurring opinion, emphasizing the importance of individualized bail determinations that are tailored to each defendant.
the vast majority [of jurisdictions], either expressly or implicitly, understand the word ‘sureties’ in the phrase ‘sufficient sureties,’ to encompass a variety of bond forms, including cash. See State v. Briggs, supra, 666 N.W.2d at 583 (“the framers did not intend to favor one particular method of surety-commercial bonding-by inclusion of the sufficient sureties clause”); State v. Brooks, supra, 604 N.W.2d at 353 (the word “sureties” “encompasses a broad array of methods to provide adequate assurance that an accused will appear as the court requires”); see also Ex parte Singleton, supra, 902 So.2d at 135 (quoting State v. Briggs, supra, 666 N.W.2d at 581-83: “[w]e are also confident that the framers did not intend to favor one particular method of surety”); People ex rel. Gendron v. Ingram, 34 Ill.2d 623, 217 N.E.2d 803, 806 (1966) (“the alternative methods of bail provided in [the statutes] do not violate the constitutional provision that all persons shall be bailable by ‘sufficient sureties” ’); Burton v. Tomlinson, 19 Or.App. 247, 527 P.2d 123, 126 (1974) (“Nowhere does it say that lawful release of a defendant may be accomplished only through the medium of sureties.”); cf. Rendel v. Mummert, supra, 474 P.2d at 828; State ex rel. Jones v. Hendon, 66 Ohio St.3d 115, 609 N.E.2d 541, 543 (1993); but see State v. Golden, supra, 546 So.2d at 503 (limiting the “sufficient sureties” clause to commercial sureties).
Because the history of the phrase in each of the respective constitutions is similar, we are persuaded by the near uniformity of these opinions on this question. We also find particularly informative the exhaustive historical analysis done by the Iowa Supreme Court in Briggs. Specifically, that court noted that the several state constitutions that included “sufficient sureties” upon which the Iowa provision was patterned were drafted before commercial sureties even emerged as a popular bond form. Similarly, the court pointed to historical data indicating that personal, monetary, and property sureties were all more well-known ways to secure a bond when the Iowa Constitution was enacted. State v. Briggs, supra, 666 N.W.2d at 583; cf. People v. Mellor, 2 Colo. 705, (1875) (cash bond imposed by trial court).
Furthermore, in Colorado, as in most jurisdictions, the primary purpose of bail is to assure the presence of the accused at trial. See People v. Sanders, 185 Colo. 153, 156, 522 P.2d 735, 736 (1974) (such a purpose “should be met by means which impose the least possible hardship upon the accused”); see also Reynolds v. United States, 80 S.Ct. 30, 32, 4 L.Ed.2d 46 (1959). Interpreting the word ‘sureties’ broadly to encompass multiple bond forms satisfies this purpose. When bail may be secured by a court in a variety of ways, the court’s ability to assure the presence of the accused at trial is strengthened. See Rendel v. Mummert, supra, 474 P.2d at 828 (“‘sufficient sureties’ mean, at a minimum, that there is reasonable assurance to the court that if the accused is admitted to bail, he will return as ordered until the charge is fully determined”).
Historically, sureties were always people, and government officials attained sufficiency by “stacking’ sureties – that is, by using multiple persons to take collective responsibility for the defendant pretrial.
A notice requiring a person to appear in court as a juror or witness; a writ directing a sheriff or other proper officer to notify a defendant to appear in court on a day named (Black’s). In the administration of bail, there is a significant issue concerning what criteria should govern a judge’s decision to issue summonses in lieu of arrest warrants.
A condition of release that requires that another person or program be responsible for assuring the defendant’s appearance and compliance with all other bond conditions. Typically, the defendant signs a bail bond and agrees to remain in the custody of a third party. The third party, in turn, agrees to supervise the defendant and report any violation of the conditions of release to the court. Other conditions may also be imposed.
A writ directing or authorizing someone to do an act, especially directing a law enforcement officer to make an arrest, a search, or a seizure (Black’s). An arrest warrant typically refers to the warrant issued upon probable cause to arrest and bring a person to court. The term “bench warrant” is often used for any warrant issued from the bench, but more specifically for those warrants issued for the arrest of a person who has been held in contempt, who has failed to appear, or has disobeyed a subpoena.
A court’s written order, in the name of a state or other competent legal authority, commanding the addressee to do or refrain from doing a specified act. There are numerous types of writs, including, technically, a capias or arrest warrant, and the Great Writ of habeas corpus.
1. Bryan A. Garner, A Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage (Oxford Univ. Press, 3rd ed. 1995), at 96 [hereinafter Garner].
2. Black’s Law Dictionary (West Pub. Co., 9th ed. 2009).
3. Asimow, Popular Culture and the Adversary System, 40 Loy. L. A. L. Rev. 653 (2007).
4. Garner, supra note 1, at 96. According to Garner, as a noun, people use the term bail to mean (1) a person who acts as a surety for a debt, (2) thesecurity or guarantee agreed upon, and (3) the release on surety of a person in custody.
5. Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, 8th ed., Vol. 1, at 153 (1858).
6. 342 U.S. at 4 (internal citation omitted) (emphasis added).
7. 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987).
8. Frequently Asked Questions About Pretrial Release Decision Making (ABA 2012).
9. Va. Code. § 19.2-119 (2013).
10. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-1-104 (2013).
11a. Alaska Const. art. I, § 11. 11b. Florida Const. art. I, § 14. 11c. Conn. Const. art. 1, § 8. 11d. Wis. Const. art. 1, § 8.
12. Of course, there are other ways that defendants can be released from pretrial confinement, such as through an emergency release procedure in response to a court order placing limits on a jail’s population.
13. Cohen & Reaves, Felony Defendants in Large Urban Counties, 2006, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Bur. of Justice Stats. (May 2010), at 17, found at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/ pub/pdf/fdluc06.pdf.
15. See Evie Lotze, John Clark, D. Alan Henry, & Jolanta Juszkiewicz, The Pretrial Services Reference Book, Pretrial Servs. Res. Ctr. (Dec. 1999), at 5. The Act was codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-3151.
16. 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (b).
17. Id. § 3142 (e).
19. 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
21. Wayne H. Thomas, Jr., Bail Reform in America (Univ. CA Press 1976) [hereinafter Thomas] at 200.
22. American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice (3rd ed.) Pretrial Release (2007) [hereinafter ABA Standards] Std. 10-1.3, at 41. The term “minor offenses” is used rather than “misdemeanors” because the latter term is often defined differently among jurisdictions across the United States. Generally, according to the commentary to Standard 10-1.3, “‘minor offenses’ are the equivalent to lower-level misdemeanors. However, when the alleged offense involves danger or weapons – as, for example, is often the case in domestic violence misdemeanors – the Standard allows jurisdictions to determine that the offense is not ‘minor,’ regardless of its statutory designation.” Id.
23. Id. Std. 10-2.1, at 63.
25. Id. Std. 10-2.2, at 65.
26. Id. Std. 10-2.3, at 69.
27. See Performance Standards and Goals for Pretrial Diversion/Intervention (2008) athttp://www.napsa.org/publications/diversion_intervention_standards_2008.pdf.
29. Standards on Pretrial Release (3rd ed.), Nat’l Assoc. of Pretrial Servs. Agencies (Oct. 2004), Std. 1.4 (g) (commentary) at 16 [hereinafter NAPSA Standards].
30. Id. (commentary) at 19.
31. ABA Standards, supra note 22, Std. 10-1.4 (f) (commentary), at 45.
32. 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987).
33. See, e.g. Soland, Constitutional Law – Equal Protection – Imposing Money Bail, 46 Tenn. L. Rev. 203 (1978).
34. 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956).
35. Bandy v. United States, 81 S. Ct. 197, 198 (1960).
36. Bandy v. United States, 82 S. Ct. 11, 13 (1961).
37. 481 U.S. 739, 754 (1987).
38. Galen v. County of Los Angeles, 477 F.3d 652, 660 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal citations omitted).
39. 342 U.S. 1, 5 (1951).
40. See, e.g., United States v. Polouizzi, 697 F. Supp. 2d 381, 388 (E.D.N.Y 2010) (“The excess can be reflected in monetary terms or in other limitations on defendant’s freedom such as curfews, house arrests, limits on employment, or electronic monitoring.”).
41. 554 U.S. 191, 195 (2008).
42. Compare, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-4-112 (forfeiture procedure for compensated sureties) with Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-4-109 (forfeiture procedure for all other bonds).
43. Garner, A Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage (Oxford Univ. Press 1987) at 263.
44. Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286 290-91 (1969).
45. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 546 n. 16 (1982) (J. Stevens, dissenting) (internal quotations omitted).
46. ABA Standards, supra note 22, Std. 10-1.1.
47. 481 U.S. 739, 753 (1987).
48. See United States v. Salerno, 794 F.2d 64 (2d Cir. 1986) rev’d, 481 U.S. 739, 753 (1987).
49. Marie VanNostrand, PhD., Legal and Evidence Based-Practices: Applications of Legal Principles, Laws and Research to the Field of Pretrial Services (Nat’l Inst. Corr. and the Crime and Justice Inst., April 2007) at 12.
50. Thomas, supra note 21, at 4.
51. 342 U.S. 1 (1951).
53 P.3d 416 (2002); Pelekai v. White, 861 P.2d 1205 (1993); Demmith v. Wisc. Jud. Conf., 480 N.W. 2d. 502 (Wisc. 1992). 53. NAPSA Standards, supra note 29.
54. National Conference on Bail and Criminal Justice, Proceedings and Interim Report (Washington, D.C. Apr. 1965), at XIV.
56. Corley v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1558, 1570 (2009) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
57. See In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 362-64 (1970) (“The [reasonable doubt] standard provides concrete substance for the presumption of innocence – that bedrock axiomatic and elementary principle whose enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law.”).
58. 156 U.S. 432, 460, 453 (1895).
59. 441 U.S. 520, 533 (1979).
61. 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951).
62. 481 U.S. 739, 762-63 (1987).
63. See Transcript: Justice Matters – Interview with Tim Murray Regarding Pre-Trial Justice and the Crucial Role Reentry Programs Play in the Justice System, at http://www.pretrial.org/Docs/Documents/Transcripts_Justice_ Matters_508.pdf.
64. Marie VanNostrand, Pretrial Justice – Afforded to Few, Denied to Many, at http:// www.luminosity-solutions.com/publications/ PretrialJusticeAffordedtoFewDeniedtoMany. pdf.
65. ABA Standards, supra note 22, Std. 10-1.1, at 36.
66. 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
68. See e.g., Marie VanNostrand, Alternatives to Pretrial Detention: Southern District of Iowa – A Case Study (June 2010) (in which that district undertook system improvements to use “alternatives to detention when appropriate to increase pretrial release rates while assuring court appearance and public safety”).
69. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964).
70. NAPSA Standards, supra note 29, Std. 2.2 (d), at 27.
71. Id. Std. 2.2 (d) (commentary), at 30 (footnote omitted).
72. ABA Standards, supra note 22, Std. 10-4.3 (c), at 92.
73. Id. (commentary), at 96 (footnotes omitted).
74. See Douglas L. Colbert, Ray Paternoster, and Shawn Bushway, Do Attorneys Really Matter? The Empirical and Legal Case for the Right to Counsel at Bail, 32 Cardozo L. Rev. 1719 (2002). It is noted that, at the time of the study, the court used the services of a neutral pretrial services representative, who made a recommendation regarding a bail bond.
76. 342 U.S. 1, 4 (internal citation omitted) (emphasis added).
77. Id. at 7-8 (concurring opinion).
78. 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987).
79. Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 554 U.S. 191, 198 (2008) (internal quotation omitted).
82. 481 U.S. at 754-55.
83. Id. at 755. 84. 342 U.S. at 5 (internal citation omitted).
85. In addition to granting a right to bail, at the time of the decision Rule 46 also required the bail bond to be set to “insure the presence of the defendant, having regard to the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, the weight of the evidence against him, the financial ability of the defendant to give bail and the character of the defendant.” 342 U.S. at 6 n. 3.
86. 342 U.S. at 4 (internal citations omitted).
87. See Marcus, The Making of the ABA Criminal Justice Standards, 23 Crim. Just. No. 4 (Winter 2009).
88. June Carbone, Seeing Through the Emperor’s New Clothes: Rediscovery of Basic Principles in the Administration of Bail, 34 Syracuse L. Rev. 517 (1983) at 531 (quoting 5 American Charters 3061, F. Thorpe ed. 1909) (footnotes omitted).
90. Fullerton v. County Court, 124 P.3d 866, 870 (Colo. App. 2005).

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