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Timestamp: 2019-04-18 22:44:12+00:00

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The use of military commissions in the United States has a history as old as the country itself. This history makes it clear that military commissions are tribunals of necessity, appropriately used in circumstances where traditional tribunals are unavailable or inappropriate. The Guantanamo Bay military commissions, however, challenge this history. The purpose of this article is to place the Guantanamo Bay military commissions in a historical context and contrast with their eponymous predecessors. This article reviews the use of military commissions throughout United States history, noting how each prior use of commissions was found to be appropriate or inappropriate depending on the perceived need. This article then highlights how the Guantanamo Bay military commissions are unique when compared to prior military commissions and concludes that the historic need for a trial would be better served if defendants charged with terrorismrelated offenses were tried in traditional federal Article III courts rather than military commissions.
* BA, Tufts University, 2005; JD/LLM (International & Comparative Law), Duke Law School, 2010; Associate, Cohen & Gresser LLP. All views expressed herein are the author's in his individual capacity and should not be attributed to any other organization.
1 Compare, e.g., Edwin Meese III, Guantanamo Bay prison is necessary, CNN.COM, Jan. 11, 2012, (available at https://www.cnn.com/2012/01/11/opinion/meesegitmo/index.html) with Vince Warren, Gitmo: 10 years of injustice and disgrace, CNN.COM, Jan. 11, 2012, (available at https://www.cnn.com/2012/01/10/opinion/warren-close-gitmo/index.html).
used when there was a need for trial, but no alternative forum was deemed appropriate. Moreover, the Guantanamo Bay commissions are not the first ones to stoke significant controversy. Rather, prior uses of commissions have involved interesting if not concerning interactions between the three branches of the federal government. Understanding this history and how the Guantanamo Bay commissions compare to their predecessors and thus how well the commissions satisfy their intended purpose is an important piece of the current debate over the commissions, a debate that is likely to continue for years to come.
The purpose of this article is to provide a review of military commissions throughout American history and to analyze how the current commissions at Guantanamo Bay compare to their eponymous predecessors. Specifically, this article discusses how commissions have traditionally been used in three types of situations: to try violations of the law of war, in territories under martial law, and in response to a need resulting from the lack of alternative civilian or military tribunals. This article further contends that the current commissions are unique in American history and raises questions as to their true necessity.
Part II of this article explores the foundational need in the Anglo-American system for a trial in some form to be held before punishment is inflicted. Part III provides an overview of modern courts-martial and military commissions. Part IV traces the use of military commissions throughout United States history. Part V juxtaposes the current military commissions operating at Guantanamo Bay with the historical use of military commissions. Finally, this article concludes that because federal Article III courts can successfully handle terrorism-related cases, the Guantanamo Bay commissions, in contrast to their historical counterparts, are not necessary to ensure the effective prosecution of certain categories of cases.
2 See SAMUEL NOAH KRAMER, HISTORY BEGINS AT SUMER 56-59 (3d. ed. 1981) (recounting a murder trial from 1850 B.C.E.). Requirements for criminal trials can also be found in the Bible. See, e.g., Deuteronomy 17:8-9 (King James). 3 JAMES Q. WHITMAN, THE ORIGINS OF REASONABLE DOUBT: THEOLOGICAL ROOTS OF THE CRIMINAL TRIAL 13 (2008). 4 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *341 (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1765). 5 Id.; Sanjeev Anand, The Origins, Early History and Evolution of the English Criminal Trial Jury, 43 ALTA. L. REV. 407, 409-15 (2005). 6 Whitman, supra note 4, at 126. 7 Id. at 126-27; Anand, supra note 6, at 415. 8 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *349-50.
9 Whitman, supra note 4, at 138. 10 Anand, supra note 6, at 416. 11 Id. 12 See Whitman, supra note 4, at 150. 13 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 5, at *350.
Thus, for many centuries now, the trial has provided a way to resolve questions of guilt and punishment; although it initially served as a means to avoid the religious ramifications of passing judgment over man, it has come to be seen as a bulwark protecting individual liberty. This need exists even when the established trial forum is unavailable (i.e., when there is no federal Article III court), thus creating a need for an alternative forum to address such situations.
14 THE FEDERALIST No. 83, at 521-22 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin F. Wright ed., 1961). 15 See generally, MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES (2016 ed.). 16 Id. at R.C.M. 202.
Military commissions, on the other hand, are tribunals "born of military necessity," whose authority "can derive only from the powers granted jointly to the President and Congress in time of war."18 They have traditionally been ad hoc tribunals turned to when courts-martial or civilian courts were unavailable, but the need for a trial still existed, and would typically dissolve after a specific offense had been addressed. As detailed further below, three different forms of military commissions have been used throughout American history: (1) for crimes committed by civilians where martial law has been declared; (2) in places where, and during times when, civil courts were not open and functioning, including in conquered territory controlled by the military; and (3) for unlawful enemy combatants accused of violating the law of war.
An important feature of the third type of commission is that they historically do not employ the full panoply of procedures found in civilian courts and courts-martial. However, such procedures are not necessary because this type of commission's purpose is "primarily a factfinding one to determine, typically on the battlefield itself, whether the defendant has violated the law of war."19 The facts will be easy to determine because the commission would commence almost immediately after the alleged crime and near the crime scene, thus eliminating the need for a pre-trial discovery process and procedures designed to control the evidence considered.
17 Id. at R.C.M. 201(f)(1)(B). 18 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 590-91 (2006); see also Ex parte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. 243, 249 (1863) (contrasting courts-martial and military commissions in the context of military jurisdiction, explaining that while courtsmartial try cases created by statute, military offenses that fall outside of statute "must be tried and punished under the common law of war" by military commissions). 19 Id. at 596-97.
According to a if not the leading military historian, William Winthrop,20 the common law governing military commissions requires that five conditions be met in order for this type of commission to have jurisdiction: (1) unless authorized by statute, the offense must have been "committed within the field of the command of the convening commander"; (2) unless authorized by statute, the field of command must be in "the theatre of war or a place where military government or martial law may legally be exercised"; (3) "the trial must be had within the theatre of war, military government, or martial law"; (4) the offense "must have been committed within the period of the war or of the exercise of military government or martial law"; and (5) the defendant can only be a member of the enemy's army charged with violating the law of war, individuals of a conquered and occupied territory, individuals in a territory under martial law, or a member of the United States military who, during a time of war, is charged "with crimes or offences not cognizable, or triable, by the criminal courts or under the Articles of war."21 As explained below, Winthrop's criteria can be used as a guide to determine the appropriateness of a military commission trying a violation of the law of war. Historically, each time Winthrop's criteria were satisfied, the commission was uncontroversial; however, when the criteria were not satisfied, the commission proved to be controversial and its legality questioned.
20 See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 19 n.38 (1957) (plurality opinion) (stating that Winthrop is considered by some as the "Blackstone of Military Law"). 21 WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 836-38 (rev. 2d ed. 1920). Winthrop notes that the third condition is not always complied with. Id. at 836. Justice Stevens recognizes an implied sixth condition that must be met for this type of commission to have jurisdiction: the charged offense must be a violation of the law of war. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 597.
It is unclear why Washington chose to subject the two men to Boards of General Officers, since he believed he "retained customary authority for the summary treatment of spies" and sent more than two dozen accused spies to courts-martial.31 With respect to Andr, Washington's September 30, 1780 letter to British General Clinton states only that Washington "determined. . . to refer his case to the examination of a Board of General Officers," even though "Major Andre was taken under such circumstances as would have justified the most summary proceedings against him."32 It is important to note the correlation between the apparent lack of controversy surrounding Washington's treatment of these men, and the fulfillment of Winthrop's criteria.
Revolutionary War). Glazier notes that the commission for Hale was not really a court but merely an advisory panel charged with investigation. Glazier, supra note 29, at 19. 30 Benson J. Lossing, THE TWO SPIES: NATHAN HALE AND JOHN ANDRE 99-100 (1886) (citing the order of Washington and the verdict of the commission). Because Andr was a spy, he would have faced a military commission rather than a court-martial; however, it is interesting to note that the commission also functioned as what would today be called a Combatant Status Review Tribunal. 31 Glazier, supra note 29, at 21-22; see also Robert McConnell Hatch, MAJOR JOHN ANDR: A GALLANT IN SPY'S CLOTHING 259 (Houghton Mifflin Co. 1986) (detailing the fascinating history of the British officer who assisted General Benedict Arnold commit his treason). 32 Letter from George Washington to Henry Clinton (Sept. 30, 1780), reprinted in ANDREANA. CONTAINING THE TRIAL, EXECUTION AND VARIOUS MATTER CONNECTED WITH THE HISTORY OF MAJOR JOHN ANDRE, ADJUTANT GENERAL OF THE BRITISH ARMY IN AMERICA, 29-30 (Horace W. Smith, ed. 1865). 33 5 THE LOUISIANA HISTORICAL QUARTERLY 560 (1922).
the use of the military tribunal was directly tied to a specified necessity, namely, that there was still a threat from the British forces. A committee of the Louisiana Senate that later investigated this incident also specifically focused on whether "the necessity for the continuance of martial law ceased on the 5th day of March, when Louallier was arrested, and the order for a habeas corpus, directed to Gen. Jackson, was issued by Judge Hall."39 Further, because the territory was under martial law, Winthrop's criteria were still satisfied.
Following the incident, the House Committee on Military Affairs investigated Jackson's actions. The Committee's report specifically questioned Jackson's justification for use of a military tribunal given the absence of congressional authorization for the tribunal to hear the charged offenses, the lack of any apparent "exigency," and the fact that the conflict had ended.42 The Committee ultimately submitted a Resolution to the House disapproving the trials.43 Thus, as with prior examples, the appropriateness of a military tribunal again turned on the existence of exigent circumstances. Additionally, a correlation can be seen between the situation's failure to satisfy Winthrop's criteria and the controversy that arose from the military tribunal's use.
The Mexican-American War in 1847 is generally regarded as the first time military commissions both in form and name were used by the United States. As with the prior occurrences, these commissions were created in response to a specific need.
leading the Lower Creeks in carrying on a war against the United States. 1 American State Papers: Military Affairs 731. The charges against Alexander Arbuthnot were "[e]xciting and stirring up the Creek Indians to war against the United States and her citizens . . . [a]cting as a spy, aiding, abetting, and comforting the enemy, and supplying them with the means of war . . . [and e]xciting the Indians to murder and destroy William Hambly and Edmund Doyle, confiscate their property, and causing their arrest with a view to their condemnation to death, and the seizure of their property. . . ." Id. at 734. 41 1 American State Papers: Military Affairs 735. 42 Id. 43 Id.
disciplinary measures. General Scott was aware of the dangers military invasion could bring and the need to avert a guerrilla war sparked in response to "lawless and undisciplined action by American soldiers."44 However, there was no reliable civilian judicial system in the area.45 Moreover, "the Articles of War did not cover crimes committed by the indigenous population against the occupying American forces," and courts-martial, as they existed at the time, could not be used because of their very limited jurisdiction.46 Thus, General Scott felt there was a need to set up a new military tribunal, which he termed a military commission.
44 Fisher, supra note 39, at 12. 45 Id. at 11. 46 Lacey, supra note 24, at 43; Erika Myers, Conquering Peace: Military Commissions As A Lawfare Strategy in the Mexican War, 35 AM. J. CRIM. L. 201, 206 (2008); Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 590-91. 47 Headquarters, U.S. Dep't of Army No. 2 (19 February 1847) [hereinafter Gen. Orders, No. 20]. 48 Id.
General Scott's military commissions proved uncontroversial: "[a]pparently, the only one to `object to the legality of the court and deny the authority of Gen. Scott to constitute it' was an accused murderer charged before a commission, who understandably wanted to be sent home."54 Significantly, there is a notable correlation between the lack of controversy and the fulfillment of Winthrop's criteria: the military commissions set up by General Scott were operating during a declared state of martial law in response to an expected need resulting from the lack of reliable courts or other tribunals. All five of Winthrop's criteria were satisfied.
49 Myers, supra note 47, at 216-19. 50 Headquarters, U.S. Dep't of Army, Gen. Orders No. 372 (12 December 1847) [hereinafter Gen. Order No. 372]. 51 Myers, supra note 47, at 229. 52 Id. at 231-32. 53 Id. at 233 (noting no records of any councils of war exist today). 54 Id. at 225-26 (quoting Letter from J.H. Forster to Col. Hunt (May 2, 1848), National Archives, Record Group 94, Records of the Adjutant General's Office, Letters Received Mar. 13, 1848-July 3, 1848).
The heaviest use of military commissions was during the Civil War,55 when approximately 2,000 cases were tried.56 Commissions were viewed as necessary due to the "then very limited jurisdiction of courts-martial" and the exigencies of the war.57 During this time, "the terms `council of war' and `military commission' merged to form the . . . meaning of military commission"58 that held until the Military Commissions Act. Despite the enormous number of tribunals that took place during the Civil War, only a few cases are prevalent among historical literature. These few cases demonstrate how military commissions have always been tribunals of necessity.
First, in 1861, Major General John C. Frmont declared martial law in Missouri after he decided that circumstances were "sufficiently urgent."59 Hybrid military commissions were set up to deal with a wide range of crimes, including "destruction of railroad ties, tracks, railroad cars, and telegraph lines," all of which fell within the broad category of the "laws of war."60 Although civilian courts were still operating, Major General Henry Halleck, the Commander of Union forces in the West, deemed them to be "very generally unreliable," leaving no choice but to use a military court.61 Moreover, General Halleck concluded that the Articles of War "were inadequate for administering justice during the rebellion,"62 necessitating an alternative form of tribunal.
55 Fisher, supra note 39, at 16. 56 Detlev F. Vagts, Military Commissions: The Forgotten Reconstruction Chapter, 23 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 231, 239 (2008). 57 Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 590-91. 58 Lacey, supra note 24, at 43. 59 Fisher, supra note 39, at 18. 60 Id. (citing  2 THE WAR OF THE REBELLION: A COMPILATION OF THE OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES 282-89, 402-05, 407). 61 Id. at 19 (citing  2 THE WAR OF THE REBELLION: A COMPILATION OF THE OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES 247). 62 Lacey, supra note 24, at 43.
Part of Attorney General Speed's analysis deals with the state of the city of Washington at the time of the assassination. To him, the city was still very much at war: ". . . a civil war was flagrant, the city of Washington was defended by fortifications regularly and constantly manned, the principle police of the city was by federal soldiers. . . [and] [m]artial law had been declared in the District of Columbia. . . ."66 Thus, once again, the use of a military commission was justified on a finding that the crime at issue was a violation of the law of war and that the geographic region was not secure. These findings also show that Winthrop's criteria were (mostly) satisfied.
63 8 Comp. Messages & Papers Pres. 3532 (New York, Bureau of Nat'l Literature 1897). 64 11 Op. Atty Gen. 297, 316 (1865). 65 Id. at 317. 66 Id.
Reconstruction saw the continued use of military commissions throughout the southern states. Consistent with history, the resort to commissions continued to be justified on a perceived need for them. For example, in the summer of 1865, General Thomas Ruger had three civilians arrested for assaulting a freedman. Ruger refused to turn the men over to civilian courts, saying that "the restraining influence of prompt trial and punishment of offenders, particularly those guilty of homicide, by military commissions is the only adequate remedy for the existing evils."67 In other words, General Ruger perceived a need for a tribunal which could administer justice in a far swifter manner than a civilian court.
67 Vagts, supra note 57, at 242. 68 H.R. Rep. No. 39-23 at 3. 69 Id. at 35-36. 70 Id. at 3. It is not clear how many men were on trial for the murders one witness identified six people but there is no mention of anyone being acquitted by the commission. Id. at 2-3.
71 Murder of Union Soldiers Before the Select Comm. to Investigate the Charges for Murder of Union Soldiers in South Carolina, 39th Cong. (1867) (testimony of Major General Daniel E. Sickles) ("Sickles Testimony") printed in H.R. Rep. No. 39-23 at 10. 72 See United States v. Commandant of Fort Delaware, 25 F. Cas. 590, 590 (D. Del. 1866). 73 See id. 74 Id. at 590-91. It is not clear whether Judge Hall or General Sickles was correct about the operational status of the federal civil court at the relevant time. Although South Carolina Provisional Governor Perry reappointed all judicial officers who would swear allegiance to the United States in his proclamation of July 20, 1865, thus technically re-opening the federal civilian court, it is not clear that the court was able to conduct any significant operations due to the destruction that General Sherman and Union troops had inflicted on the state during its conquest. See Warren Moise, REBELLION IN THE TEMPLE OF JUSTICE: THE FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS IN SOUTH CAROLINA DURING THE WAR BETWEEN THE STATES 119-22 (iUniverse, Inc. 2003). A WestLaw search of cases from the South Carolina federal district court returns no opinions prior to January 1, 1868. Thus, it is possible that both men were correct. 75 Commandant of Fort Delaware, 25 F. Cas. at 590. 76 Id. at 590-91.
explaining that "Mexico was a foreign country, conquered, its language and institutions unknown; South Carolina, a state of the Union rescued from rebellion, its laws and institutions restored."77 In sum, both sides of this case relied on necessity to reach their conclusions about the appropriateness of using a military commission: General Sickles believed that the commission was necessary to provide a trial because there were no civilian courts available, while Judge Hall found the commission to be unnecessary since the civilian court was operating.
77 Id. at 591. 78 In re Egan, 8 F. Cas. 367, 368 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1866). 79 Id. 80 Andrew Johnson, Message of the President of the United States regarding Violations of the Civil Rights Bill, S. Exec. Doc. No. 39-29, at 29 (1867) (Memoranda from Brevet Maj. Gen. J. M. Schofield to Maj. Gen. O. O. Howard); General Schofield also conceded that he was using the incident as a test case to find "the best practical way" to hand "the important questions involved." Id. at 20 (Letter to Maj. Gen. O. O. Howard from Brevet Maj. Gen. J. M. Schofield dated Dec. 8, 1866).
81 Id. at 30 (Message from E. D. Townsend to Gen. Schofield dated Dec. 21, 1866). 82 Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866). Because Indiana was not under martial law at time of the case, Milligan's tribunal would be a military commission under today's definition as well. 83 Id. at 109. 84 Fisher, supra note 39, at 24 (citing Milligan, 71 U.S. at 117).
The Supreme Court never ruled on the constitutionality of this statute. However, these examples show that the propriety of the use of military commissions was always tied to a perceived need, and whether such a need existed determined whether the commission's use was proper.
85 Milligan, 71 U.S. at 127. 86 Id. at 122. 87 Vagts, supra note 57, at 244-45. 88 Id. (quoting Act to Provide for the More Efficient Government of the Rebel States, ch. 153, 14 Stat. 428, Preamble (1867)). The Act divides the South into five districts and places a general officer in charge of each district. 89 Act to Provide for the More Efficient Government of the Rebel States, ch. 153, 14 Stat. 428, Preamble (1867).
Military commissions were not widely used during the time between Reconstruction and World War II.90 During World War I, military commissions were not used to prosecute war crimes committed within American territory.91 There are, however, two items of note from this period that reflect the link between military commissions and the necessity for a trial mechanism.
90 Fisher, supra note 39, at 32. 91 Jennifer Elsea, Cong. Research Serv., RL31191, Terrorism and the Law of War: Trying Terrorists as War Criminals before Military Commissions 21 (2001). 92 The 1806 Articles of War were mostly copied from the 1776 Articles of War, which were copied from the British Articles of War from 1765. Many of the British Articles could be traced back to the code of Gustavus Adolphus. Revision of the Articles of War Before the Subcomm. on Mil. Affairs of the United States Senate, 64th Cong. 27-28 (1916) (Statement of Brig. Gen. Enoch H. Crowder, United States Army, Judge Advocate General of the Army) [hereinafter Crowder Testimony]. 93 Fisher, supra note 39, at 33; Crowder Testimony, supra note 93, at 27-28 ("The revision now before you [the Committee] was submitted by me to the Secretary of War . . . The pending bill . . . is substantially identical with that bill . . . "). 94 Crowder Testimony, supra note 93, at 40-41. 95 Opinion of Hon. Thomas Watt Gregory, Att'y Gen, "Trial of Spies by Military Tribunals," 31 Op. Att'y Gen. 356, 357 (1918). 96 Id.
commission could try an alleged spy who had never been on any military installation or battlefield, and who was arrested in a place operating under normal civilian law with functioning civilian courts.
97 Id. at 358. Note how the rule concerning spies is the same as the one applied during the Colonial Era to the cases of Hale and Andr: spies are considered unlawful combatants and are to be punished with death. 98 Id. at 361-62. 99 Id.
World War II brought with it a resurgence of military commissions and additional examples of commissions falling into two historic groups: commissions for violations of the law of war, and commissions to replace civilian courts where those courts were not operating.
100 The following year the new Attorney General, A. Mitchell Palmer, was provided with different facts of the case, leading him to author a second opinion concluding that Waberski had been acting as a spy and thus could be tried by military commission under Article of War 82. 40 Op. Att'y Gen. 561 (1942) (1919). 101 Wigall Green, The Military Commission, 42 AM. J. INT'L L. 832, 833 (1948). 102 Fisher, supra note 39, at 52-53. 103 In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 25 (1946). 104 Id. at 27 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
on the lack of necessity for a commission to hear this charge when civil courts were capable of doing so.
In the United States, military commissions were held in Hawaii following the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941. On December 7, 1941, Governor J. B. Poindexter declared martial law, suspended the writ of habeas corpus, and transferred control of the territory to the military until the danger of invasion was over. The Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department established two types of military tribunals one for cases with sentences up to five years in prison and a fine of up to $5,000, and another for more severe sentences up to capital punishment.105 Two commission decisions were appealed to the Supreme Court and demonstrate the necessity requirement. In one case, Harry White was convicted of embezzlement; in the second, Lloyd C. Duncan was convicted of assaulting two Marine Corps sentries. District courts granted writs of habeas corpus for both men. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, noting that "martial rule was in effect and the civil courts were disabled from functioning."106 The Supreme Court, though, disagreed, and held that "since the courts were open and able to function, the military trials of the petitioners were in violation of the Constitution."107 In his dissent, Justice Harold Burton focused on the fact that a very real threat still existed in the territory: "In this case Hawaii was not only in the theater of operations, it was under fire."108 Thus, these cases again show the importance of necessity to military commissions.
This time also saw what is likely one of the most controversial uses of military commissions in American history. The case known as the Nazi Saboteur or the Quirin Case has a troubling background and exemplifies what can happen when commissions are used without a genuine need.
105 Fisher, supra note 39, at 47. 106 Ex parte Duncan, 146 F.2d 576, 581 (9th Cir. 1944). 107 Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 328 (1946). 108 Id. at 344 (Burton, J., dissenting).
109 Id. 110 Id. 111 Id.; Brief of Legal Scholars and Historians as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 3-4, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (Sept. 7, 2005) (No. 05184) (hereinafter Brief of Legal Scholars). 112 Fisher, supra note 39, at 37-38. 113 Id. at 38 (quoting RG 153, Records of the Office of the Judge Advocate General (Army), Court-Martial Case Files, CM 3341178, 1942 German Saboteur Case, National Archives, College Park, Md., at 991). 114 Fisher, supra note 39, at 37. 115 Brief of Legal Scholars, supra note 112, at 5.
116 Fisher, supra note 39, at 39. The meetings between the attorneys and Justices took place at the home of Justice Black and the farm of Justice Roberts, while other Justices were called on the phone. 117 Id. at 39-41. 118 Id. 119 Brief of Legal Scholars, supra note 112, at 10. 120 Id. 121 Fisher, supra note 39, at 40. 122 Brief of Legal Scholars, supra note 112, at 8-9.
commissions, the Guantanamo Bay commissions fall squarely into the third category: to punish violations of the law of war. In this way, the commissions are not entirely without precedent, as they serve the same purpose as the military commissions used by George Washington during the Revolutionary War, General Scott in Mexico (with his Council of War), and the Quirin Commission ordered by President Roosevelt. However, the Guantanamo Bay commissions are also quite different from these prior examples in important ways.
who are not awaiting trial because they have been deemed to be active enemy combatants who still present a threat to the United States. Whether these individuals should continue to be held, or where they should be held, is beyond the scope of this article. 130 Military Order--Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 37 WCPD 1665, 66 Fed. Reg. 57833 (Nov. 13, 2001). 131 The MCA was amended by the Military Commissions Act of 2009. 132 Fisher, supra note 39, at 11-12. 133 Id. 134 H.R. Rep. No. 39-23, at 10. 135 Quirin, 317 U.S. at 27 (referencing Articles 12, 15, 38, 46, 81, and 82).
Congress essentially made prior law of war military commissions Article II courts, created through the President as Commander in Chief. After the MCA, though, the Guantanamo Bay commissions are essentially Article I courts, placing them in the same family as federal bankruptcy courts.
Third, the permanency of the Guantanamo Bay commissions makes them unique. Prior law of war commissions were ad hoc tribunals and lasted only for a brief period. Indeed, the Supreme Court's decision in Quirin was issued less than two months after the defendants were arrested. In contrast, the Guantanamo Bay commissions are run through the Office of Military Commissions, a firmly established office within the Department of Defense that even has its own official seal. Commissions have now been occurring for nearly two decades, with some individual cases lasting for many years. The Guantanamo commissions are now the longest-running law of war commissions in American history.
136 Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-84, 948(d), 123 Stat. 2576 (2009) [hereinafter MCA]. 137 Stephen I. Vladeck, The Long Reach of Guantnamo Bay Military Commissions, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2017, (available at https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/04/opinion/the-long-reach-of-guantanamobay-military-commissions.html).
138 Sarah Grant, Abatement in Al-Nashiri is Reversed, LAWFARE, Oct. 15, 2018, (available at https://www.lawfareblog.com/abatement-al-nashiri-reversed) ("[w]hen precisely proceedings will resume, however, remains unknown"). 139 MCA at 949a(a). 140 See, e.g., Manual for Military Commissions United States 2016 Revised Edition (2016).
will end, or even if the conflict can be considered an actual war to which the laws of war apply. Thus, it is difficult to determine whether Winthrop's fourth criterion is met. Finally, the defendants in the Guantanamo commissions are not members of a foreign army. Rather, their alleged offenses were committed under the flag of a non-state entity. Hence, Winthrop's fifth criterion is not met.
Never in the history of the United States has the military used (on its own or on the order of the President) a military commission to try violations of the law of war where the commission likely does not meet all five of Winthrop's criteria. While the most controversial of commissions, such as the Quirin commission, have failed to meet one or two of Winthrop's criteria, only the Guantanamo Bay military commissions fail to meet all five.
In short, the Guantanamo Bay military commissions are unprecedented, and in reality have far more in common with a federal bankruptcy court than any other military commission in American history.
141 Though not directly on point, Blackstone recognized the inappropriateness of martial law when civilian tribunals are available, writing that "it ought not to be permitted in time of peace, when the king's courts are open for all persons to receive justice according to the laws of the land." 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *400. 142 Human Rights First, Federal Courts Continue to Take Lead in Counterterrorism Prosecutions, Feb. 14, 2018, (available at https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/resource/federal-courts-continue-take-leadcounterterrorism-prosecutions); see also Laura K. Donohue, Terrorism Trials in Article III Courts, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 105, 105-06 (2015) (reporting even higher numbers). 143 Press Release, United States Dep't of Justice, Air Force Veteran Sentenced To 35 Years In Prison For Attempting To Join ISIS And Obstruction Of Justice, May 31, 2017, (available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-edny/pr/air-force-veteransentenced-35-years-prison-attempting-join-isis-and-obstruction). 144 See United States v. Damache, No. 11-CR-00420-PBT (E.D. Pa. July 28, 2011) (Indictment); Rebecca R. Ruiz, Adam Goldman & Matt Apuzzo, Terror Suspect is Brought to the U.S. as Trump's Stance Shifts, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2017, at A1.
The capability of the federal Article III courts stands in stark contrast to the track record of the Guantanamo Bay military commissions. Since 2001, only eight convictions have been secured in Guantanamo Bay; only one has been upheld on appeal.146 In addition to unresolved questions of constitutionality147 and the continuing creations of new controversies,148 it seems that the one thing the Guantanamo Bay military commissions have not been able to provide is precisely what military commissions are designed for: swift justice.
Thus, if the last seventeen years have shown anything, it is that not only do the federal Article III courts undercut any assertion of necessity in favor of the Guantanamo Bay commissions, but in fact that they are the far better choice for terrorism-related cases.
145 See, e.g., William Finnegan, Taking Down Terrorists in Court, THE NEW YORKER (May 15, 2017) (profiling then-Assistant United States Attorney Zainab Ahmad, who has successfully prosecuted more than a dozen international terrorism cases) (available at https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/05/15/taking-downterrorists-in-court). 146 Scott R. Anderson, Something is Rotten with the State of the Military Commissions, LAWFARE, Mar. 2, 2018, (https://lawfareblog.com/something-rottenstate-military-commissions); Laura King, Trump's Guantanamo Bay order may be largely symbolic, but it renews debate, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2018) (available at http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-guantanamo-background-20180131story.html). 147 See, e.g., Bahlul v. United States, 840 F.3d 757 (D.C. Cir. 2016), reh'g denied (Nov. 28, 2016), cert. denied sub nom. al, 138 S. Ct. 313 (2017) (discussing constitutionality of military commissions' statutorily conferred jurisdiction over offenses that are not violations of the law of war). 148 See, e.g., Carol Rosenberg, Now we know why defense attorneys quit the USS Cole case. They found a microphone., MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 8, 2018, (available at http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nationworld/world/americas/guantanamo/article203916094.html).
because an established civilian court or court-martial is unavailable, commissions have been appropriately used. The current conflict with international terrorism, however, does not present such a need. Rather than providing an ad hoc forum for swift battlefield justice, the Guantanamo Bay commissions are slow and full of procedural requirements. In fact, and notwithstanding what they were originally intended to be, today they are nothing more than controversial and inefficient Article I courts created for a single purpose that, after seventeen years, they have been unable to fulfill.
149 See Human Rights First, supra note 143.

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