Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/4th/53/43.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 00:14:59+00:00

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JOHN E. WOLFGRAM et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. WELLS FARGO BANK et al., Defendants and Respondents.
Kurt M. Simmons, in pro. per., for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Sawamura, Nishimi & Chu and Lyle R. Nishimi for Defendants and Respondents.
The trial court declared plaintiff John E. Wolfgram a vexatious litigant. He failed to post the required security and his action was dismissed. He and a purported coplaintiff, Attorney Kurt M. Simmons, appeal. In the published portion of the opinion we reject certain novel constitutional challenges to the vexatious litigant statute. We shall affirm.
The court (Halpin, J.) granted the motion and ordered Wolfgram to post $15,000 as security, and to obtain permission before filing new lawsuits in [53 Cal. App. 4th 48] propria persona. Wolfgram did not post security and Wells Fargo moved to dismiss. In response, Wolfgram moved to substitute his present attorney, Simmons, as a plaintiff, claiming that he had transferred the property to Simmons, who wanted to pursue the quiet title cause of action. The court (Perasso, J.) denied the motion to substitute Simmons as a party and dismissed the complaint.
A. The Impetus for the Vexatious Litigant Statute.
" 'Litigation' means any civil action or proceeding ... in any state or federal court." (§ 391, subd. (a).) One type of "vexatious litigant" is a person who in a seven-year period "has commenced, prosecuted, or maintained in propria persona at least five litigations other than in a small claims court that have been (i) finally determined adversely to the person or (ii) unjustifiably permitted to remain pending at least two years[.]" (§ 391, subd. (b)(1).) Others are persons who repeatedly sue on the same cause of action (id., subd. (b)(2)), engage in frivolous tactics (id., subd. (b)(3)), or who have been declared vexatious (id., subd. (b)(4)).
Wolfgram urges that an unsuccessful, colorable (i.e., nonfrivolous) action against the government should not "count" as one of the underlying actions supporting a finding of vexatiousness, lest his right to petition the government be infringed. He further contends the requirement that he submit to [53 Cal. App. 4th 50] a "prefiling order" before commencing future suits is unconstitutional because it is an unlawful "prior restraint" and violates due process.
To the extent Wells Fargo even addresses Wolfgram's contentions, it relies on cases which have rejected other constitutional challenges to the statute. Such mode of argument mirrors the declaration by the Fifth District Court of Appeal that "The vexatious litigant statutes are constitutional. (In re Whitaker (1992) 6 Cal. App. 4th 54, 56 ....)" (Childs v. PaineWebber Incorporated (1994) 29 Cal. App. 4th 982, 993 [35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 93].) We are unaware of any doctrine which insulates a statute from one constitutional attack, simply because it has survived a different constitutional attack. Wells Fargo also points to the unremarkable rule that "A state may set the terms on which it will permit litigations in its courts." (Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp. (1949) 337 U.S. 541, 552 [69 S. Ct. 1221, 1228, 93 L. Ed. 1528, 1539]; see Taliaferro v. Hoogs (1965) 236 Cal. App. 2d 521, 525-526 [46 Cal. Rptr. 147].) The generality quoted is of little utility. No case cited has measured the constitutionality of the statutes against the claims Wolfgram asserts. We do so now.
To place Wolfgram's contentions in perspective, we first outline the right of persons to sue, to "petition" for redress of grievances. In California law, there is an unusual distinction drawn between suits between persons and suits against the government. This distinction lends support to Wolfgram's contention that his suits against the government should not "count." However, because the "right" to petition was never absolute and because sufficient safeguards are contained within the statute, it does not impermissibly "chill" litigants.
B. The Constitutional Right to Petition.
 The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in part: "Congress shall make no law ... abridging ... the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress [53 Cal. App. 4th 52] of grievances." Despite the explicit reference to "Congress," the First Amendment, including specifically the right to petition, is "incorporated" against the states by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment. (Hague v. C.I.O. (1939) 307 U.S. 496, 512-513 [59 S. Ct. 954, 963, 83 L. Ed. 1423, 1435].) Cases construing the California analog frequently rely on federal court interpretations of the First Amendment.
With this overview of the law regarding petition rights, we now turn to Wolfgram's contentions.
C. The Right to Petition and the Vexatious Litigant Statute.
[4a] The cases extending Bozek, supra, 31 Cal. App. 3d 527 in California do not elaborate on Bozek's elevation of petitions against the government to a place of special status. As stated, we are constrained to accept that that is the law in California. (See fn. 6, ante.) Wolfgram extracts from Bozek and the "sham" line of cases the rule that any liability predicated on the proper (i.e., nonfrivolous) exercise of the right to petition against the government is forbidden. If and only if a petition against the government meets the standards of a "sham" or frivolous suit can any penalty be exacted. Wolfgram then likens the vexatious litigant declaration to such a penalty. Since the underlying lawsuits need not themselves be frivolous, even if brought against the government, there is an impermissible "chill." fn. 7 We disagree.
We agree with Wolfgram that the authorities canvassed teach that any impairment of the right to petition, including any penalty exacted after the fact, must be narrowly drawn. But here there is no direct "penalty" exacted as a result of Wolfgram's five losing suits. Instead, they inform us that the suer has repeatedly lost many meritless (albeit colorable) suits while acting in propria persona, which, when combined with the fact that he has filed another (sixth) suit which has been found to lack merit, support the reasonable inference that the suer has been using the court system inappropriately and will continue to do so.
As a matter of common experience even many meritorious suits fail, due to the vagaries of the trial process if nothing else. Many more colorable suits fail, either due to pretrial disposition or failure to persuade the trier of fact. Yet, loss of five suits in but seven years is remarkable. Most people never sue anybody. While that does not lessen any person's right to sue to correct real or perceived injustices, it does suggest that the inference to be drawn from the statute is, despite Wolfgram's contrary view, relatively narrow: Only those citizens who decline to hire lawyers, lose five suits in seven years, then undertake a sixth suit which lacks merit, will be labeled vexatious.
In sum, the vexatious litigant statute does not impermissibly "chill" the right to petition and does not "penalize" the filing of unsuccessful, colorable suits.
 Wolfgram contends the "prefiling" order constitutes an unlawful prior restraint on his right to petition and violates due process. We disagree.
The prefiling order component of the vexatious litigant statute is a necessary method of curbing those for whom litigation has become a game. Wolfgram has not established that a partial restriction on the ability to file suit has ever been held to be a "prior restraint" requiring a showing of clear and present danger and concomitant procedural safeguards. (See Tribe, American Constitutional Law (2d ed. 1988) §§ 12.34-12.36, pp. 1039-1054.) To the extent it keeps vexatious litigants from clogging courts, it is closer to "licensing or permit systems which are administered pursuant to narrowly drawn, reasonable and definite standards" which represent "government's only practical means of managing competing uses of public facilities[.]" (Id. at p. 1051.) When a vexatious litigant knocks on the courthouse door with a colorable claim, he may enter.
Sparks, Acting P. J., and Nicholson, J., concurred.
FN 1. The Reporter of Decisions is directed to publish this opinion with the exception of parts IV. and V.
FN *. Retired judge of the Shasta Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
FN . Retired judge of the San Francisco Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
FN 2. Wells Fargo relied on two other pleadings. One was an application to file a petition without paying fees, which was denied, but it appears the petition was filed. The other matter appears to be a motion denied for lack of a pending case. Both of these "suits," if these filings can be so characterized, were against government officials. Wells Fargo also included a copy of a State Bar Court decision. Because Wolfgram was the respondent in that case its inclusion in the motion appears to be an ad hominem attack against him.
FN 5. Blackstone distinguished the right of redress in the courts from the right to petition king or parliament. (1 Blackstone, Commentaries, supra, 141-143.) The former invokes the judicial power of government to redress a wrong committed by another, the latter is a prayer to redress a wrong committed by the government.
FN 8. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 bars a second ("successive") habeas corpus application repeating a claim made in an earlier application and bars an application raising a new claim unless the applicant seeks relief based on a retroactive change in the law, or new facts not previously discoverable which would demonstrate a claim of constitutional error of sufficient magnitude to undermine the result at trial. A person seeking to file such an application in federal district court must obtain permission from a federal court of appeals. If, as Wolfgram maintains, there can be no limitation on the exercise of the right to petition against the government, this so-called "gatekeeper" provision would violate the First Amendment. Yet, Felker upholds the statutory "gatekeeper" mechanism. (518 U.S. at p. ___ [116 S.Ct. at p. 2341, 135 L.Ed.2d at p. 838].) Although the First Amendment was not mentioned in that case, it is unlikely that, if the petition clause means what Wolfgram claims it means, the court would miss the issue.
FN 9. Language in Muller v. Tanner (1969) 2 Cal. App. 3d 445, 453 [82 Cal. Rptr. 738] that "It may be assumed that the trial court will recognize that success breeds success when it is proper to do so" does not mean a trial court has discretion to review the soundness of the underlying suits, only that the trial court does consider the merits of the suit in which the litigant is claimed to be vexatious.
FN 10. Wolfgram's suggestion that the statute thus discriminates against those who are unable to afford to hire a lawyer was not headed as an argument in the opening brief and is unaccompanied by analysis or authority.
Wolfgram also states the statutory scheme "sets up a form of 'attainder' whereby appellant is deprived of his civil rights in perpetuum," but, for lack of argument heading or analysis, the point is waived.
FN *. See footnote 1, ante, page 43.

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