Source: http://masscases.com/cases/land/1976/1976-73962-DECISION.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 10:21:55+00:00

Document:
A petition (Miscellaneous Case No. 72739) was brought by Henry W. Merry, the defendant in each of the present actions, against Anne M. Biggs pursuant to G. L. c. 60, § 80B, to establish his title, allegedly acquired under G. L. c. 60, § 80, to a parcel of land situated on the northeasterly side of Union Street in the Town of Yarmouth, Barnstable County, Massachusetts. In the petition Henry W. Merry alleged that the subject parcel was taken by the Town of Yarmouth, for nonpayment of taxes assessed to Anne M. Biggs, by instrument dated July 11, 1942 and duly recorded in Book 593, Page 524; [Note 2] that pursuant to an affidavit of low value from Henry F. Long, dated July 26, 1944 and duly recorded in Book 616, Page 1, said parcel was conveyed to the Town of Yarmouth by instrument dated August 23, 1944 and duly recorded on the same day in Book 617, Page 199; that the petitioner Henry W. Merry holds title under an instrument from James W. Ellis, dated September 29, 1945 and duly recorded in Book 657, Page 394; and that James W. Ellis took title to the property by virtue of a deed from the Town of Yarmouth dated August 29, 1945 and duly recorded in Book 633, Page 329.
By order of the court a guardian ad litem was appointed for all persons having an interest in said petition. The guardian submitted a report to the court on April 4, 1975. The report questioned whether Anne M. Biggs, the respondent in said petition, ever had any interest in the subject parcel.
The plaintiff in each of these actions, Chester F. Bartlett et als and Beryl G. Holbrook, although not cited by Henry W. Merry in his petition, claimed title adverse to the title of the aforesaid petitioner and filed answers to said petition alleging that the claim of title by Henry W. Merry was based on an invalid taking by the Town of Yarmouth; that any subsequent deeds by said Town of Yarmouth purporting to convey the subject parcel were void; and that Henry W. Merry had no interest in the subject parcel.
The plaintiffs, Chester F. Bartlett et als, subsequently brought an action (Miscellaneous Case No. 73962) alleging that each of the named plaintiffs held title to a respective portion of the subject parcel by a series of mesne conveyances originating from Charles A. Holbrook who became the record owner of said parcel on August 26, 1944 by virtue of a deed given by Edmund W. Eldridge; that the same Edmund W. Eldridge conveyed the said parcel at a later date to Anne M. Biggs against whom the Town of Yarmouth made a taking for nonpayment of taxes by instrument dated July 11, 1942; that all deeds to the parcel subsequent to said taking constitute a cloud on their respective title to the subject parcel. The defendant, Henry W. Merry, filed an answer which substantially restated the allegations of his original petition, to wit: that he received a deed to the subject parcel after said parcel was conveyed to the Town of Yarmouth by a treasurer's deed pursuant to a tax taking; that said town acquired "absolute title" to the parcel after proper recording pursuant to G.L. c. 60, § 80; and that as successor in title to said town his title to the parcel was absolute. After plaintiffs' motions for summary judgment and a directed verdict were denied the court allowed plaintiffs' motion to amend the complaint and to join parties (see note 1 supra for the added plaintiffs whose respective interests in the subject parcel are set out in the Agreed Statement of Facts). The plaintiffs also filed a suggestion of death and motion to substitute Geraldine Devore, as administratrix of the estate of Irene H. Pinard who was one of the original plaintiffs. Said motion was allowed.
Beryl G. Holbrook brought a separate action against Henry W. Merry (Miscellaneous Case No. 75300) seeking to remove a cloud from her title to a portion of the subject parcel, namely, the claim of Henry W. Merry. The complaint, in substance, stated the same allegations as the complaint filed by Chester F. Bartlett et als. Henry W. Merry filed an answer substantially the same as his answer in the action brought by Chester F. Bartlett et als. In her complaint Beryl G. Holbrook also asked the court to assess costs against the defendant, Henry W. Merry, including reasonable attorney's fees.
On June 27, 1975 the plaintiff, Beryl G. Holbrook, filed a motion to consolidate the two actions. This motion was allowed.
"Instrument of Taking dated July 11, 1942 recorded in Book 593, Page 524 with the Barnstable County Registry of Deeds. A copy of that instrument is annexed as Exhibit E.
Certificate relative to tax title dated July 26, 1944 recorded with the Barnstable County Registry of Deeds in Book 616, Page 1. A copy of that instrument is annexed as Exhibit F.
Treasurer's Deed to the Town of Yarmouth dated August 23, 1944 recorded with the Barnstable County Registry of Deeds in Book 617, Page 199. A copy of that instrument is annexed as Exhibit G."
28. and that all parties asserting ownership interests in the subject property are represented by counsel.
On all the evidence the court rules that the plaintiffs Chester A. Bartlett et als, as well as the added plaintiffs and the plaintiff Beryl G. Holbrook, hold their respective interests in the subject property free from the claims of the defendant Henry W. Merry.
The defendant's claim of title to the subject property is based upon the taking made by the Town of Yarmouth for nonpayment of taxes assessed to Anne M. Biggs, the treasurer's deed to the town pursuant to G.L. c.60, §§ 79 and 80, the deed from the town to James W. Ellis, and finally the deed from Ellis to the defendant. The court rules that the assessment and the subsequent taking by the town against Anne M. Biggs was invalid since at the time of the assessment, taking; and sale she held no interest in the subject property under quitclaim deed from Edmund W. Eldridge. Further, the subsequent deed to the town was void since it was based on an invalid taking. The town had no interest to convey to the defendant's predecessor in title. Therefore, the defendant acquired no interest in the subject parcel.
A quitclaim deed conveys only whatever title or interest that a grantor may have in the land at the time of the conveyance. At the time of the conveyance to Anne M. Biggs, Edmund W. Eldridge no longer had any interest to convey in the subject parcel since he had previously conveyed the same land to Charles A. Holbrook by a warrant deed which was duly recorded. By operation of the recording system all parties interested herein had constructive notice that Charles A. Holbrook was the record titleholder and that Anne M. Biggs had no title or interest in the subject property.
Pursuant to G.L. c. 59, § 11 taxes are to be assessed, in the town in which the real estate is located, "to the person who is the owner on January first, and the person appearing of record, in the records of the county ...." Alternatively, the statute provides that the taxing authority may, under some circumstances assess the person in possession. In construing this provision the Court has held that strict compliance is mandatory and that failure to comply will invalidate a sale of the property for nonpayment of the taxes as assessed. Charland v. Trustees of the Home for Aged Women, 204 Mass. 563 , 569 (1910). If the assessment is not levied on the person who is the owner or is in possession then the tax is void. J. L. Hammett Co. v. Alfred Peats Co. 217 Mass. 520 , 522 (1914). Therefore, the sale and conveyance for nonpayment of taxes assessed to one who is neither the owner or in possession is invalid and can pass no title to the purchaser. Desmond v. Babbitt, 117 Mass. 233 , 234 (1875). Under G.L. c. 59, § 11 the taxing authority may assess the record owner of the property. It may also assess a party in possession. The Supreme Judicial Court, in construing the statutory provision, has ruled that the taxing authority may also assess the true owner. Boston v. Quincy Market Cold Storage Co., 312 Mass. 638 , 646-47 (1942). In the instant case, the town did not assess the true owner when it assessed Anne M. Biggs since, for reasons stated above, she held no legal title in the subject property. There is no evidence that Anne M. Biggs was ever in possession of the property and she could not, therefore, be properly assessed under this theory. In addition Anne M. Biggs was not the record owner since examination of the record chain of title to the subject parcel indicates that she took a deed from a grantor who had already conveyed his interest in the real estate. The term "person appearing of record" cannot be construed to mean that assessment may be based on any instrument recorded in the chain of title even though said instrument has no legal effect. Such a construction would do great violence to the entire concept of the recording system. Cf. Conners v. Lowell, 209 Mass. 111 , 122-23 (1911). Proper examination of the record title to the subject parcel would indicate that, at the time of the assessment to Anne M. Biggs in 1940, Charles A. Holbrook was the record owner. The town had constructive notice of this fact. In 1940 the town also assessed Charles A. Holbrook, the true owner and record owner for the same property. [Note 3] The town continued to assess said Charles A. Holbrook and his successors in title in succeeding years. The taxes as assessed were timely paid in each of the succeeding years by Charles A. Holbrook and his successors in title. Clearly the town cannot properly assess two parties for the same parcel and make a taking against one who has no interest in the property when the true owner pays the taxes as assessed. Since Anne M. Biggs was not the true owner or record owner and since there is no evidence which shows that she was ever in possession of the property the assessment was invalid.
It is well settled in the Commonwealth that a tax taking that includes land that the party assessed does not own is invalid and void. Holcombe v. Hopkins, 314 Mass. 113 , 115 (1943); Desmond v. Babbitt, 117 Mass. 233 , 234 (1875). A tax upon real property is essentially a pecuniary burden upon the owner of said property. A lien upon said realty is merely a type of security, created by statute, of which the taxing authority may avail itself if the tax, as properly assessed, is not paid. The lien is, therefore, upon the land. Collector of Taxes v. Revere Building. Inc., 276 Mass. 576 , 578-79 (1931). The taxing authority cannot have a lien on property where the defaulting party has no legal interest in that property, particularly if the true owner pays the taxes assessed against the same property. Thus, if the town has no lien it cannot acquire a tax title to that property. Worcester v. Bennett, 310 Mass. 400 , 401 (1941). See Morse v. Revere, 248 Mass. 569 , 570-71 (1924).
In summary, if the assessment by a tax collector is not levied on the person who is either the owner (record or actual) or in possession of the land, then the tax as assessed is void. Therefore, the collector cannot include in a tax taking and sale any property which the assessed person did not own or occupy since the town has acquired no lien on the property. Anne M. Biggs was not the owner nor did she occupy the land. Therefore, the assessment and subsequent taking were void.
After the taking of the subject property, the Town of Yarmouth took the procedural steps set forth in G.L. c.60, § 79. However, since there were no bids at the public auction the town became the purchaser. Pursuant to G.L. c.60, § 80 the treasurer executed a deed to the town which was recorded within the statutory period. By the terms of said section "the title of the town to land conveyed thereby shall be absolute upon the recording of said deed in the proper registry...." The defendant argues that this statutory language operates to make his title absolute since it is derived from this treasurer's deed to the town, which was properly recorded. However, the court rules that such a construction of § 80 is incorrect. The statutory language which deals with "absolute title" is based on the presumption that there has been a valid assessment and a valid taking. See Bartevian v. Cullen, 369 Mass. 819 , (1976) (Mass. Adv. Sh.  593, 595); Johnson v. McMahon, 344 Mass. 348 , 356 (1962). The intent of G.L. c.60, §§ 79 and 80 is to provide a final method of foreclosing rights of redemption. This intent cannot be extended to mean that a municipality can acquire absolute title to a parcel where there has been an invalid assessment and taking and where the record owners of the parcel have no notice of the proceedings and no opportunity to challenge them. Such a construction would not be consistent with the theory of a recording system and more importantly would not be compatible with even a restrictive theory of constitutional due process. See McHale v. Treworgy, 325 Mass. 381 , 385 (1950). Therefore, the town did not acquire absolute title to the subject property by recording the treasurer's deed. In fact it acquired no title at all. When the town purported to convey the property to James W. Ellis by quitclaim deed it, in fact, had no interest to convey. James W. Ellis was not a bona fide purchaser without notice since he had constructive notice of the adverse interests of the plaintiffs as shown in the record chain of title. This is also true in the case of the defendant, Henry W. Merry. Therefore, the defendant has acquired no interest in the subject property.
As indicated by the facts the town continued to assess two individual chains of owners after the taking and the subsequent sale to James W. Ellis for the same property until 1960 when it recognized the error. It is unreasonable to suggest that the record owner or owners of property who properly pay taxes, as assessed, should be allowed to lose that property by virtue of a tax taking against one who has no legal interest in the property. Clearly, under these facts, the true owners had no notice of these proceedings. For reasons enunciated, such an assessment, taking and sale are not valid under any decisional or statutory law in this Commonwealth.
In her prayer for relief plaintiff Beryl G. Holbrook has asked the court to allow an award of costs, including attorney's fees, against the defendant, Henry W. Merry. The court rules that under principles established in M.F. Roach v. Provincetown, 355 Mass. 731 , 732 (1969) this is not a proper case for an award of attorney's fees.
1. Plaintiffs Chester F. Bartlett and Mary A. Bartlett, George F. Cassell, Jr. and Dorothy J. Cassell, Joseph J. Celi and Rose M. Celi, Earle L. Clarke, Jr. and Josephine G. Clarke, Peter F. Curley and Patricia A. Curley, John B. Davidson and Barbara A. Davidson, Anastasia M. Driscoll, Louis F. Mace and Marion E. Mace, William G. Maykel and Helen Maykel, George A. Mathieu, Edmund C. Mossey and Irene S. Mossey, Robert O. Murphy and L. Gail Murphy, Donald Nute and Marion Nute, Francis M. O'Neill and Julia F. O'Neill, Geraldine Devore as administratrix of the estate of Irene Pinard, Mary E. Wood, Elizabeth J. Wright, Agnes L. Schnare, Sara Zilbach, Thomas F. Neal and Katherine M. Neal, Ottis P. Creel and Phyllis A. Creel, Bernard R. Kelly, Hyannis Cooperative Bank, Suffolk Franklin Savings Bank, Bass River Savings Bank of South Yarmouth, First National Bank of Yarmouth, Colonial Federal Savings and Loan Association of Quincy, Bass River Savings Bank, Brockton Savings Bank of Brockton and Security Federal Savings and Loan Association of Brockton each holds their respective interest in the subject parcel under deed or mortgage, as set forth herein free from any claims of the defendant, Henry W. Merry.
2. The defendant, Henry W. Merry, has no legal or equitable interest in said property and all deeds and instruments in his claimed chain of title, starting with the deed of Edmund W. Eldridge to Anne M. Biggs, are void and have no legal effect since all the grantors in said chain had no legal or equitable interest in the subject parcel to convey.
3. The petition of Henry W. Merry in Miscellaneous Case No. 72739, brought pursuant to G.L. c. 60, § 80B, is dismissed.
[Note 1] The original plaintiffs are Chester F. Bartlett and Mary A. Bartlett, George F. Cassell, Jr. and Dorothy J. Cassell, Joseph J. Celi and Rose M. Celi, Earle L. Clarke, Jr. and Josephine G. Clarke, Peter F. Curley and Patricia A. Curley, John B. Davidson and Barbara A. Davidson, Anastasia M. Driscoll, Louis F. Mace and Marion E. Mace, William G. Maykel and Helen Maykel, George A. Mathieu, Edmund C. Mossey and Irene S. Mossey, Robert O. Murphy and L. Gail Murphy, Donald Nute and Marion Nute, Francis M. O'Neill and Julia F. O'Neill, Irene Pinard, Francis X. Sullivan and Marion S. Sullivan, Herbert W. Wood and Mary E. Wood, Elizabeth J. Wright and Agnes L. Schnare and Sara Zilbach all of Yarmouth, Massachusetts. The interests of each of these parties is set forth in the Agreed Statement of Facts. Added plaintiffs, allowed by motion, are Thomas F. Neal and Katherine M. Neal, Ottis P. Creel and Phyllis A. Creel, Bernard R. Kelly, Hyannis Cooperative Bank, Suffolk Franklin Savings Bank, Bass River Savings Bank of South Yarmouth, First National Bank of Yarmouth, Colonial Federal Savings and Loan Association of Quincy, Bass River Savings Bank, Brockton Savings Bank of Brockton, Security Federal Savings and Loan Association of Brockton. Geraldine Devore was substituted by motion as plaintiff, as administratrix of the estate of Irene Pinard.
[Note 2] All instruments referred to herein as recorded are recorded in the Barnstable County Registry of Deeds unless otherwise noted.
[Note 3] Inexplicably the Town of Yarmouth only assessed Anne M. Biggs for 10 acres in 1940 rather than the amount of acreage that Edmund W. Eldridge purported to convey to her. This fact, however, is not significant in the determination.

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