Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/974/667/438031/
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 20:03:52+00:00

Document:
Chris J. Mancini, Miami, Fla., for defendant-appellant.
Peter M. Thomson, Peter G. Strasser, Asst. U.S. Attys., and Harry Rosenberg, U.S. Atty., New Orleans, La., for plaintiff-appellee.
In this permitted interlocutory appeal Ricou Deshaw challenges the denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment against him on the grounds that it violates the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
On June 1, 1989, a grand jury sitting in the Southern District of Alabama returned an eighteen count indictment against Deshaw and twenty-two other defendants. Drafted broadly, the indictment charged Deshaw with illegal conduct occurring from 1982 to 1989 "within the Southern District of Alabama, the Northern District of Alabama, the Middle District of Florida, the Southern District of Florida, the Eastern District of Louisiana," several foreign countries and elsewhere.
Deshaw was named in fourteen of the counts. Count two of the indictment charged Deshaw with engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise (CCE) in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 848. Of the seven predicate acts supporting the CCE charge, four involved the importation and possession with intent to distribute marihuana. Counts three and four, the conspiracy counts, charged Deshaw with conspiracy to import cocaine and marihuana, and conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine and marihuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 963 and 846, respectively. The remaining counts charged Deshaw with substantive offenses involving the importation and possession of cocaine as well as weapons violations.
Trial commenced on September 12, 1989 against five of the original twenty-two defendants. On October 17, 1989 the jury returned guilty verdicts for three of the defendants, acquitting Deshaw and one other defendant of all charges.
On July 19, 1990, a grand jury in the Eastern District of Louisiana returned an eleven count indictment against Deshaw and four other defendants for their involvement in the importation of marihuana into "the Eastern District of Louisiana and elsewhere" between May 1985 and April 1987. Count one charged Deshaw and his co-conspirators with the conduct of a racketeering enterprise in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d). The indictment alleged five predicate acts of racketeering, four of which charged Deshaw with violations surrounding the importation and possession of marihuana between May 1985 and January 1986.
Counts two and three, the conspiracy counts, charged Deshaw with engaging in a conspiracy to import 6,000 pounds of marihuana and to possess that marihuana with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 963 and 846, respectively, between May 1985 and January 1986. Counts six through nine charged Deshaw with substantive violations of importation and possession with intent to distribute marihuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a) (1), 952 and 960. Counts ten and eleven, the interstate travel violations, charged Deshaw with travelling between Belize and the Eastern District of Louisiana in aid of racketeering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1952.
The Louisiana enterprise allegedly consisted of about eighteen individuals. The government contends that these individuals would obtain marihuana in Belize and smuggle it into Louisiana by air drops from low altitudes over secluded waterways. A total of about 6,000 pounds of marihuana, 2,000 pounds per drop, was allegedly imported into the New Orleans area on three separate occasions: July, August, and December, 1985.
Deshaw moved to dismiss the Louisiana indictment on grounds that double jeopardy barred prosecution. In essence Deshaw argued that although the Louisiana grand jury drafted its indictment more narrowly--involving only marihuana--it charged the same conduct involved in the Alabama prosecution.
Following a hearing in which the parties submitted briefs to the court and the government presented in camera testimony, the district court denied Deshaw's motion to dismiss the indictment on double jeopardy grounds. Pursuant to Abney v. United States,1 Deshaw timely appealed.
Deshaw contends that in view of his previous prosecution in Alabama, double jeopardy principles prevent his prosecution under the Louisiana indictment. Despite the "uncertain state of the Supreme Court's double jeopardy jurisprudence,"4 there remains a constant: the fifth amendment provides that no one shall "be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."5 Thus, "the double jeopardy clause guarantees that the government, 'with all its resources and power [will] not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense, and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity....' "6 In this case, Deshaw seeks protection from an alleged second prosecution for an offense of which he has already been acquitted.
We note that the defendant bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie claim of double jeopardy.14 If the defendant does so, the burden shifts to the government to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the indictment charges a crime separate from that for which the defendant previously was placed in jeopardy.15 The district court found that Deshaw made the requisite showing, but concluded that the government had met its burden by proving that the Louisiana indictment charges him with conduct for which he has not previously been placed in jeopardy. We, in turn, examine Deshaw's double jeopardy contentions and the offenses charged in the Louisiana and Alabama indictments.
Count one of the Louisiana indictment charges Deshaw with the conduct of a RICO conspiracy from May 1985 to April 1987 in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d). Of the five predicate acts of racketeering charged, one involves conspiracy to import and distribute marihuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 963 and § 846, and three others involve the actual importation of marihuana into Louisiana during 1985. While the Alabama indictment did not charge a RICO violation, it did allege a 21 U.S.C. § 848 CCE charge which listed as predicate offenses the conspiracy to import marihuana, importation of marihuana, and possession of marihuana with intent to distribute. The Alabama indictment also charged § 963 and § 846 conspiracy to import and conspiracy to distribute marihuana counts. Deshaw claims that the Alabama CCE and conspiracy charges bar the subsequent Louisiana RICO charge. We are not so persuaded.
In the context of multiple punishment, we previously have held that a RICO charge is not a lesser included offense to a corresponding CCE charge.16 RICO offenses require "proof of facts and elements not required to be proved under § 848, even though there is a substantial overlap in the proof offered to establish the crimes."17 Thus, as the district court aptly noted, the earlier CCE prosecution does not bar the subsequent RICO prosecution in the case at bar.
In concluding that Congress intended permitting an earlier conviction to serve as a predicate act in a later RICO prosecution, we have noted that RICO's statutory language reflects congressional intent to supplement, rather than supplant, existing crimes and penalties.24 The fact that separate statutes set forth the offenses charged herein, and are intended to deter two different kinds of activity, i.e., conspiracy to engage in racketeering as opposed to conspiracy to violate narcotics laws, indicates that Congress intended RICO conspiracy to be a separate offense from the predicate act of a narcotics conspiracy.25 Further, each provision is unambiguous and authorizes punishment for a violation of its terms.26 We conclude that Congress intended to authorize multiple prosecutions for the drug offenses of conspiracy, under sections 963 and 846, and RICO conspiracy.
Viewing the facts in the record before us against the Marable factors, we are persuaded that the government has failed to prove the existence of separate conspiracies. Rather, we are of the opinion that the Louisiana indictment charges but a smaller part of the larger conspiracy counts charged in the Alabama indictment.
The third factor, the similarities between the statutory offenses charged in the indictments, is obvious. Both indictments charge violations of 21 U.S.C. §§ 963 and 846. The primary difference is that the broad Alabama indictment charged Deshaw with engaging in both a cocaine and marihuana conspiracy, while the narrower Louisiana indictment charges only marihuana.
Under drug conspiracy statutes it is not necessary to plead and prove an overt act.44 Therefore, when considering the fourth factor we look also to the acts defined in the evidence at the trial or at any hearing.45 The government contends, and the district court agreed, that the Alabama case was tried essentially as a cocaine case. The government insists that although the Alabama indictment charged Deshaw with a drug conspiracy specifically described as occurring partially within the Eastern District of Louisiana and involving marihuana, it never intended to prosecute Deshaw for the 1985 marihuana importations into Louisiana. In spite of these assertions however, the government has failed to demonstrate what other marihuana importations, unrelated to the 1985 Louisiana importations, were the subject of the Alabama indictment.46 In fact, during the Alabama trial the government introduced evidence concerning virtually all of the overt acts charged in the Louisiana indictment. Although it is possible that the evidence was introduced for some other reason which would not implicate double jeopardy, the record does not suggest such a reason.47 Further, the conspiracies charged in both indictments employed the same methods for the smuggling of drugs into the United States, i.e., air drops into waterways.
Finally, the last Marable factor directs that we examine locale. The Alabama indictment charges conspiracies alleged to have occurred within the Southern and Northern Districts of Alabama, the Middle District of Florida, the Eastern District of Louisiana, and elsewhere within the United States, Canada, Colombia, Mexico and Belize. The more narrowly drafted Louisiana indictment alleges that the conspiracies primarily occurred in the Eastern District of Louisiana and Belize. Thus, the location element also indicates that the conspiracy counts of the Louisiana indictment charge but a smaller portion of the larger conspiracy.
We echo the Supreme Court in Felix: "While the scope of a conspiracy is rarely clear-cut, we must conclude that the evidence in the record tends to show ... a single, continuing conspiracy...."48 The government has failed to prove the existence of separate agreements. Even were we to agree with the district court and its finding that two conspiracies existed, we would be led to the same conclusion--that double jeopardy principles bar counts two and three of the Louisiana indictment. For under the circumstances of this case, it is evident that Deshaw was prosecuted in the Alabama trial for the same offense, i.e., the agreement to import and distribute marihuana in Louisiana, the offense with which the government now charges him.
We are cognizant that a mere overlap in proof between two prosecutions does not establish a double jeopardy violation,49 but that the facts of this case present something more. Deshaw was called to the bar in Alabama to defend himself against charges alleging that he conspired to import and distribute cocaine and marihuana within, among other places, the Eastern District of Louisiana. During trial, detailed evidence regarding the three drops of marihuana into Louisiana during 1985 was submitted for the jury's consideration. Then, in his final charge to the jury the district judge in Alabama instructed the jurors that Deshaw was being charged in the two conspiracy counts for importation and possession with intent to distribute cocaine and marihuana. We harbor no doubt that counts two and three of the present indictment should be dismissed.
The Louisiana indictment also charges Deshaw with two interstate travel in aid of racketeering (ITAR) violations. Again, although there were no ITAR violations charged in the Alabama indictment, an ITAR violation was charged as an overt act to the Alabama conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine and marihuana. The overt acts charged in a conspiracy count may also be charged as substantive offenses, for the agreement to do the act is distinct from the act itself.52 We conclude that the substantive marihuana counts and the ITAR counts are not barred by double jeopardy principles.
In his final double jeopardy contention, Deshaw argues that the district court judge erred in allowing the government to make an in camera presentation of testimony and evidence during the double jeopardy evidentiary hearing. Deshaw claims that the in camera presentation deprived him of the opportunity to fully present his case thus rendering the hearing fundamentally unfair.
We have recognized that an in camera proffer of evidence by the government is permitted where a defendant has made a prima facie claim of double jeopardy.53 For although the government may not be required to reveal any materials or information not otherwise available for discovery, it might opt to submit such material to the trial judge for an in camera inspection.54 Our review of the record persuades that the district judge did not abuse his discretion by allowing the government to make an in camera presentation in this case.
With the exception of counts two and three, the conspiracy counts, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. Deshaw's motion to dismiss the conspiracy charges on grounds of double jeopardy should have been granted and the matter is REMANDED for entry of an appropriate order dismissing those counts.
5 U.S. Const. Amend. V.
In the Alabama case, the government alleged that Lynn principally directed and administered the criminal organization while Deshaw managed the organization and served as a pilot. In addition to arranging the refueling stops in Belize for aircraft en route from Colombia to the United States, Pou was a source of supply for drugs in Belize.
Although the Louisiana indictment alleges that Lynn and Deshaw were "recruited into the Enterprise" based on their expertise in drug smuggling, the indictment also charges that Lynn coordinated the activities of the enterprise while Deshaw acted as a pilot and provided assistance as needed. Pou again was the source of supply for the marihuana in Belize.

References: § 848
 § 1962
 § 1952
 v. 
 § 1962
 § 963
 § 846
 § 848
 § 963
 § 846
 § 848
 V.