Source: http://fcpaprofessor.com/category/oil-for-food-enforcement-action/
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 16:34:09+00:00

Document:
The FCPA issue was a minor component of the Second Circuit’s decision in the long-running civil RICO case in which Iraq sought recovery from a long list of defendants for their “alleged conspiracy with Iraq’s then-president Saddam Hussein and Iraq’s ministries to corrupt and plunder the Oil-for-Food Program, an international humanitarian program administered by the United Nations during the final years of Hussein’s rule.” As to the primary RICO claim, the Second Circuit affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the claim on the grounds that, among other things, the plaintiff was in pari delicto with defendants.
Notwithstanding the fact that previous FCPA enforcement actions concerning the Oil for Food Program were largely books and records and internal controls cases only because the alleged bribe payments went to the government, not a particular foreign official as required under the anti-bribery provisions, and notwithstanding the fact that Iraq was a unique plaintiff to say the least, it nevertheless brought FCPA claims against the defendants on the theory that the FCPA allowed for a private right of action.
As to this issue, the Second Circuit stated – in full – as follows.
“The Amended Complaint alleged that the surcharges and kickbacks paid by the Vendor and Oil Purchasing Defendants violated the antibribery provisions of the FCPA. The Republic contends that the district court should have recognized an implied private right of action for violations of those provisions despite a consistent line of cases holding to the contrary. The Republic is particularly critical of Lamb v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 915 F.2d 1024 (6th Cir. 1990) (“Lamb”), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1086 (1991), the leading case declining to recognize such a cause of action. The Republic argues that Lamb erred in its analysis of the legislative history of the FCPA and that that history suggests that the reason Congress did not expressly provide for a private right of action was to avoid creating a “negative inference” that would dissuade judicial recognition of implied private rights of action under other provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, to which the FCPA was an amendment. We are unpersuaded.
First, is the plaintiff one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted, . . . –that is, does the statute create a federal right in favor of the plaintiff? Second, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one? . . . . Third, is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff? Id. at 78 (emphasis in Cort v. Ash) (internal quotation marks omitted). In our analysis, we are mindful that “the Supreme Court has come to view the implication of private remedies in regulatory statutes with increasing disfavor.” Hallwood Realty Partners, L.P. v. Gotham Partners, L.P., 286 F.3d 613, 618 (2d Cir. 2002).
The antibribery provisions of the FCPA prohibit certain entities and persons from, inter alia, corruptly making payments to foreign officials for the purpose of influencing official action in order to obtain business. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a), 78dd-2(a), 78dd-3(a). The text of the statute contains no explicit provision for a private right of action, although it does provide for civil and criminal penalties, see id. §§ 78dd-2(g), 78dd-3(e), 78ff(c), and permits the Attorney General to seek injunctive relief, see id. §§ 78dd-2(d), 78dd-3(d). Because “[t]he express provision of one method of enforcing a substantive rule suggests that Congress intended to preclude others,” Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 290, the structure of the statute, by focusing on public enforcement, tends to indicate the absence of a private remedy.
The Cort v. Ash factors also do not support recognition of a private right. The statute’s prohibitions focus on the regulated entities; the FCPA contains no language expressing solicitude for those who might be victimized by acts of bribery, or for any particular class of persons. “Statutes that focus on the person regulated rather than the individuals protected create no implication of an intent to confer rights on a particular class of persons.” Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 289 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Nor does the legislative history of the FCPA demonstrate an intention on the part of Congress to create a private right of action. As discussed in Lamb, 915 F.2d at 1029, a bill introduced by Senator Church in the 94th Congress included an express right of action for competitors of those who bribed foreign officials, see S. 3379, 94th Cong. § 10, 122 Cong. Rec. 12,605, 12,607 (1976); that provision, however, was deleted by a committee of the Senate, see S. Rep. No. 94-1031, at 13 (1976).
First, the House committee’s statement was not repeated (and no endorsement of its substance was in any way suggested) in the reports of either the Senate committee considering the FCPA or the conference committee that reconciled the views of the House and Senate to produce the language of the FCPA as it was ultimately enacted. See S. Rep. No. 95-114 (1977); H.R. Rep. 95-831 (1977). Indeed, in the debate on the conference committee report, one conferee stated that the question of whether “courts will recognize [an] implied private right of action . . . . was not considered in the Senate or during the conference, and thus [it] cannot be said that any intent is expressed at all on this issue.” 123 Cong. Rec. 38,601, 38,602 (1977) (statement of Sen. Tower) (emphasis added).
Second, although the legislative history contains additional references to the desirability of a private right of action, they do not provide any clear indication of congressional intent to create one. See generally Siegel, The Implication Doctrine and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 1085, 1105-12 (1979) (canvassing the legislative history in detail and finding “no conclusive evidence of congressional intent to grant private actions”).
Third, we note that this case illustrates the wisdom of Lamb, which avoids the question of what class of parties the FCPA was designed to protect. Although we agree that the statute was “primarily designed to protect the integrity of American foreign policy and domestic markets,” Lamb, 915 F.3d at 1029, one might argue that it is principally the foreign governments whose processes might be corrupted. The Republic’s claim highlights the obvious problem with the latter concern here: The foreign government supposedly to be “protect[ed]” by the FCPA was the entity that demanded the bribes in the first place.
Prior to Lamb, the Fifth Circuit addressed a private right of action, albeit in dicta, in McLean v. Int’l Harvester Co., 817 F.2d 1214 (5th Cir. 1987). The court stated: “we find it inappropriate to imply a private cause of action from the statute. The statute on its face shows no congressional intent to create a private action. Moreover, no legislative history exists referring to such an intent.” This last sentence is obviously false given the legislative history discussed in the recent Second Circuit opinion.
In short, the three appellate court decisions that address an FCPA private right of action are either: (1) based on a false premise (McLean); (2) based on a false premise at the time (Lamb); or (3) involved a unique and odd plaintiff.
An FCPA private right of action does warrant further consideration.
At the very least, this much should be undisputed: if there was an FCPA private right of action, there would be substantially more case law of precedent concerning the FCPA’s provisions than currently exists and that, I submit, would be a good thing.
Contrary to the Second Circuit’s statement, courts have inferred private rights of action in several provisions of the ’34 Act (see e.g., J.I. Case v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964)) and the FCPA is after all part of the ’34 Act. Moreover, several of the Cort v. Ash factors for implying a private of right would seem to be met in the FCPA context. Among the reasons Congress passed the FCPA was to level the playing field given how the discovered foreign corporate payments distorted free and fair competition. Moreover, the SEC itself has said on numerous occasions that FCPA enforcement is central to its mission of investor protection. An FCPA private right of action would further seem to be consistent with the underlying premise of the FCPA which is to reduce foreign bribery. Finally, “regulation of bribery directed at foreign officials cannot be characterized as a matter traditionally relegated to state control,” as even the Lamb court recognized.
As highlighted in prior posts here, here and here, for several years U.S. Representative Ed Perlmutter (D-CO) consistently introduced the “Foreign Business Bribery Prohibition Act” which would have provided for a limited private right of action under the FCPA. The bills never made it out of committee.
Holder called on all nations “to ratify – and to fully implement – the UN Convention Against Corruption.” (See here).
With its approximately twenty corporate enforcement actions connected to the U.N. Iraq Oil for Food Program, the U.S. is clearly the leader in collecting corporate fines connected to this scandal plagued, defunct program.
The U.K. however has clearly emerged as the leader in holding individuals (not just corporations) to account for illegal behavior in connection with the program.
Last week, the U.K. Serious Fraud Office announced (here) that Mark Jessop admitted to breaking U.N. sanctions during the Oil For Food Program by making illegal payments to Saddam Hussein’s government. The release states that Jessop was sentenced to 24 weeks’ imprisonment. According to the release, Jessop was ordered to pay £150,000 to the Development Fund for Iraq and pay prosecution costs of £25,000. Jessop sold medical goods to Iraq, initially as an employee of a British surgical instruments company, but later through his own companies – JJ Bureau Ltd and Opthalmedex Ltd, of which he was sole director.
For other recent U.K. Oil for Food sentences, see here for the prior post.
Remember Section 1504 of the Dodd-Frank Act? (See here for the prior post).
The Huffington Post reports (here) that the April 15th deadline for the SEC to issue final implementing regulations has passed. According to the SEC (see here) the new target date for final implementing rules is between August and December.
I guess this is what happens when an ill-conceived, poorly drafted law is inserted into a massive piece of legislation as a miscellaneous provision at the last moment without any meaningful debate or analysis.
Last week, the World Bank released (here) a “Declaration of Agreed Principles for Effective Global Enforcement to Counter Corruption.” See here for the press release.
The release also notes that the World Bank’s Integrity office’s (“INT”) FY10 results include “117 investigations in FY10, with 45 debarments of firms and individuals for engaging in wrongdoing.” For INT’s FY2010 Annual Report, see here.
In previous statements (see here for instance) U.K. officials have said that it would be wrong to assume that the U.K. was ignoring bribery issues prior to passage of the Bribery Act.
Case(s) in point – the recent enforcement actions announced by the Serious Fraud Office against MK Kellogg Ltd. and Mabey & Johnson directors.
This SFO enforcement action has been expected for some time, as noted in this previous post from October 2009.
MKWL was the entity that originally formed the TSKJ consortium the focus of the Bonny Island bribery scandal. See this post for current enforcement statistics as to KBR/Halliburton, Technip, and Snamprogetti / ENI.
As noted in the SFO release, the court order against MKWL was pursuant to the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. What is the Proceeds of Crime Act? See this piece from John Rupp (Covington & Burling).
In July 2009, the SFO brought an enforcement action against Mabey & Johnson Ltd. (a U.K. company that designs and manufacturers steel bridges). The conduct at issue involved allegations (that the company voluntarily disclosed) that it sought to influence decision-makers in public contracts in Jamaica and Ghana between 1993 and 2001. The prosecution also involved breaches of United Nations sanctions in connection with the Iraq Oil for Food program.
It was the first ever prosecution against a U.K. company for overseas corruption. See here and here for the prior post.
According to the release, at the time of the offense, Forsyth was the Managing Director of Mabey & Johnson and Mabey was the Sales Director. The release notes that Richard Gledhill, a Sales Manager for contracts in Iraq, previously pleaded guilty. According to the release, all individuals are to be sentenced on February 23rd.
The U.S. has prosecuted numerous companies in connection with Iraqi Oil-For-Food fraud. See here for such allegations in the ABB matter, here for such allegations in the Innospec matter, here for such allegations in the General Electric matter.
However, these prosecutions have generally been corporate only prosecutions with few related enforcement actions against individuals.
In just its single Mabey & Johnson prosecution, the SFO would appear to have prosecuted more individuals than the U.S. has in its approximately 15 Iraqi Oil for Food corporate enforcement actions combined.
In March 2010, Innospec Inc. was charged on both sides of the Atlantic in a joint DOJ / SEC / U.K. Serious Fraud Office enforcement action. (See here and here).
In August 2010, the SEC charged David Turner, the Business Director of Innospec’s TEL Group, and Ousama Naaman, the company’s agent, for their role in the bribery scheme. (See here). Naaman was also charged by the DOJ, pleaded guilty, and awaits sentencing. (See here).
Yesterday, in the first FCPA enforcement action of the year, the SEC charged Paul Jennings, Innospec’s former CFO and CEO, for his involvement in the bribery scheme. (See here). Jennings resigned from Innospec in March 2009 (see here).
Jennings name is now included on a rather short list of high-ranking executives of public companies (or affiliates) recently charged by the SEC in an FCPA enforcement action. In July 2009, Douglas Faggioli (the current President and CEO) and Craig Huff (the former CFO) of Nature’s Sunshine Products were charged (see here); in September 2008, Albert Jackson Stanley (the former CEO of Kellogg Brown & Root Inc.) was charged (see here); in December 2007, Robert Philip (the former Chairman/CEO of Schnitzer Steel was charged (see here); and in September 2007, Monty Fu (the former Chairman of Syncor International Corp. was charged (see here).
The facts of the underlying bribery scheme in the Jennings enforcement action are detailed in the prior posts linked above and this post details the allegations in the SEC’s complaint (here) regarding Jennings knowledge and involvement in the scheme.
According to the SEC, “beginning in 2005, Jennings, along with other members of Innospec’s management, approved bribery payments to officials at the Iraqi Ministry of Oil in order to sell TEL to Iraq. The complaint alleges that Innospec, with the approval of Jennings, used Naaman as its agent in Iraq to make improper payments and the complaint alleges that Jennings was copied on certain e-mails between Naaman and Turner discussing the bribery scheme. The complaint further alleges that Jennings approved certain payments to Naaman to facilitate the bribery scheme including certain payments Jennings approved “while in the United States.” Many of the SEC’s allegations as to the Iraqi conduct are phrased as Jennings had “general knowledge” or that Jennings was “generally aware” of the conduct at issue.
As to Jennings false certifications, the complaint alleges as follows.
As noted in the SEC release, without admitting or denying the SEC’s allegations, Jennings agreed to disgorge $116,092 plus prejudgment interest of $12,945 and pay a civil penalty of $100,000. The SEC stated that the figures take into consideration Jennings’s cooperation in this matter.

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