Source: http://nj.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20150505_0000986.DNJ.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 16:29:37+00:00

Document:
MADELINE COX ARLEO, District Judge.
Plaintiff Sonny Desposito, a prisoner currently confined at Federal Correctional Institution, Miami, Florida, seeks to bring this action in forma pauperis Based on his affidavit of indigence, the Court will grant Plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) and order the Clerk of the Court to file the complaint.
At this time, the Court must review the Amended Complaint, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A to determine whether it should be dismissed as frivolous or malicious, for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or because it seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. For the reasons set forth below, the Court concludes that the Amended Complaint should be dismissed in part, and Plaintiff will be granted leave to file another amended complaint to cure the deficiencies described herein.
Plaintiff filed the instant Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1983 on March 14, 2014, and his signed Complaint is dated February 18, 2014. (No. 1 at 60.) On August 8, 2014, Plaintiff filed a 60-page Amended Complaint naming 28 individuals and entities as Defendants in the instant action. The Amended Complaint offers a stream of consciousness account of numerous alleged wrongs perpetrated against Plaintiff by various state actors and private parties over a period of ten years. The gravamen of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, however, appears to be that the named Defendants conspired to arrest, imprison, charge, and prosecute Plaintiff for a robbery that occurred on April 20, 2008 and for which he was ultimately acquitted in March 2012 following a jury trial. Plaintiff contends that he was framed for the 2008 robbery and that the named individual Defendants in the Bergen County Prosecutor's Office, the Westwood Police Department, and the Bergen County Sheriffs Department fabricated evidence against him, created an impermissibly suggestive photo array, and coerced witnesses to identify him as the perpetrator of the robbery. Plaintiff further contends that the State's key witnesses, the judge that presided over his trial, and his both his retained and court-appointed attorneys also participated in the conspiracy to wrongly convict him of the 2008 robbery.
Plaintiff additionally alleges that "[t]wo unknown Berger [sic] County sheriffs threatened [his] life [on] 3-14-12 in the Hackensack Superior Court House in N.J." (See Am. Compl. at 53.) This threat allegedly occurred on the first day of his trial on the robbery charges. (See id. at 26.) Plaintiff contends that the sheriffs allegedly told him if he did not "plead guilty, we are going to kill you in the cell." ( Id. ) Plaintiff further alleges that one of the sheriffs told Plaintiff "not to voice constitutional issues." Id. at 53.
Plaintiff has also sued the Defendant Joshua T. Buckner, his attorney that represented him in pretrial proceedings, for telling Plaintiff's family in 2008 that Plaintiff was guilty of the 2008 robbery, for refusing to file various motions on Plaintiff's behalf, for depleting Plaintiff's $12, 000 retainer, and seeking to withdrawal from the case before trial. (Am. Compl. at 58.) Plaintiff alleges that Buckner participated in the conspiracy to convict him of the 2008 robbery by telling Plaintiff that needed to cut off his dreadlocks, which was the very feature that allegedly distinguished Plaintiff from actual perpetrator and the feature that Plaintiff believed proved his innocence. ( Id. at 33.) Plaintiff has also sued Buckner's firm, Sunshine, Atkin, Minassian, Tafuri & D'Amato, P.A., alleging that the named partners are responsible for the conduct of Buckner. ( Id. at 56).
On November 6, 2014, Plaintiff wrote to the Court "requesting] the Court to issue default Judgment against all Defendants" because Defendants failed to respond to the summons issued by the Court on August 7, 2014. (No. 9.) In his application, Plaintiff does not indicate whether he served the summons on any of the Defendants.
Entry of default and default judgment are governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55. Entry of default judgment is a two-step process. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(a), (b). A party seeking to obtain a default judgment must first request that the Clerk of the Court "enter... the default" of the party that has not answered the pleading or "otherwise defend[ed], " within the time required by the rules or as extended by court order. Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(a). After a default is entered against a party, the court may, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(b)(2), enter a default judgment against a party who has failed to plead or otherwise defend. See Limehouse v. Delaware, 144 F.Appx. 921, 923 (3d Cir. 2005) ("[T]he District Court properly denied the motion because Limehouse failed to obtain entry of default prior to seeking a default judgment.").
Even where a Plaintiff seeks entry of default prior to seeking default judgment, the entry of default will be set aside when the Complaint has not been properly served. See Gold Kist, Inc. v. Laurinburg Oil Co., 756 F.2d 14, 19 (3d Cir. 1985); GrandEntm't Group, Ltd. v. Star Media Sales, Inc., 988 F.2d 476, 493 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that a default will be set aside if it was not properly entered). Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4, the Clerk of the Court must issue a summons as to the defendant and the plaintiff must then serve the summons with a copy of the complaint on the defendant. Plaintiff's bear the burden of proving sufficient service of process, and when a plaintiff fails to properly serve a defendant with a summons and a complaint in accordance with Rule 4, a default cannot stand and must be vacated. See Grand Entm't Group, 988 F.2d 476 at 493; In re Forrest, 403 F.Appx. 768 (3d Cir.2010) (district court is not required to order the United States Marshals Service to serve a complaint filed by an inmate proceeding in forma pauperis under Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(c)(3) until it had first screened the case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A).
Here, the Court construes Plaintiff's application as a motion for default judgment and denies that motion because he did not first seek entry of default and has not indicated that he effected service on any of the Defendants.
The Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), Pub.L. No. 104-134, §§ 801-810, 110 Stat. 1321-66 to 1321-77 (April 26, 1996), requires a district court to review a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner is proceeding in forma pauperis or seeks redress against a governmental employee or entity. The Court is required to identify cognizable claims and to sua sponte dismiss any claim that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A. This action is subject to sua sponte screening for dismissal under both 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A.
"The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)." Schreane v. Seana, 506 F.Appx. 120, 122 (3d Cir.2012) (per curiam) (citing Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir.2000)); Mitchell v. Beard, 492 F.Appx. 230, 232 (3d Cir.2012) (per curiam) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1)); Courteau v. United States, 287 F.Appx. 159, 162 (3d Cir.2008) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)).
Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), the court must "accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief." Fleisher v. Standard Ins. Co., 679 F.3d 116, 120 (3d Cir.2012). The complaint must contain "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. Allegations that are no more than legal conclusions are not entitled to the same assumption of truth. Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 365 (3d Cir.2012). To determine if a complaint meets the pleading standard, the Court must strip away conclusory statements and "look for well-pled factual allegations, assume their veracity, and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement of relief." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). "The plausibility standard is not akin to a probability requirement, ' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
A complaint filed by a pro se litigant is to be liberally construed and held to a less stringent standard than formal complaints drafted by a lawyer. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). Nevertheless, "pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim." Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 10-4710, 2013 WL 57895 at *4 (3d Cir. Jan. 7, 2013).

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