Source: https://www.texasappellatewatch.com/court-rules/
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 21:52:43+00:00

Document:
Can you delegate the briefwriting to your client?
The obvious answer is "no." Although the client can certainly have input into the briefwriting, it is counsel's ultimate responsibility to file a brief that complies with the rules.
So the Court has reminded the Bar that caving to a client's wishes can be perilous. We cannot delegate to the client the responsibility for complying with a court's briefing rules. This, of course, is consistent with ethics rules and standards of conduct, including the Texas Standards for Appellate Conduct.
Sometimes a short memorandum opinion in a small case can teach a big lesson. Experienced civil practitioners know that a trial court has 30 days of plenary power after signing a judgment. That time period can be extended (for up to 105 days after judgment) by filing a motion for new trial or motion to modify the judgment within 30 days after the judgment is signed. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 329b. But what happens if the motion is mistitled? As the Texarkana Court of Appeals recently ruled in $1608 v. State, the substance of the motion will govern over the title.
In this case, the State obtained a default judgment of civil forfeiture against some cash and a car on July 22, 2014. The State apparently changed its mind, and filed a motion for new trial on September 3, 2014, which the trial court granted on the same day. The problem was that the State's motion was untimely and, therefore, did not extend the trial court's 30-day plenary power.
Fortunately for the property owner, however, he had filed motions asking for relief from the default judgment during the 30-day plenary period. The Texarkana Court of Appeals ruled that the property owner's motions had extended the plenary power, because the motions, although not labeled as motions for new trial, requested relief available in a motion for new trial. Construing the motions as motions for new trial, the appellate court held that the trial court still had plenary power when granting the State's motion for new trial.
It's good news for movants that the courts will construe a motion according to its substance, not its title. This is particularly true when it comes to extending the trial court's plenary period.
-- Scott Stolley, Thompson & Knight.
On November 19, the Texas Supreme Court issued an advisory, to inform the Bar, the judiciary, and the public of an order approving the restyled Texas Rules of Evidence. The Court's advisory is reproduced at the bottom of this post. Click here to read the Court's order and view the new rules.
The Court embarked on this rewrite to essentially conform the Texas Rules of Evidence with the Federal Rules of Evidence, which were restyled in 2011. The restyling also modernizes the verbiage and makes the rules more readable and understandable. With only two exceptions, the Court intends that the changes to the rules be nonsubstantive.
The restyled rules will take effect on 4/1/15. In the meantime, persons wishing to comment on the new rules have until 2/28/15 to submit comments to the Court's rules attorney, Martha Newton, at rulescomments@txcourts.gov.
The Texas Supreme Court has adopted revised evidence rules intended essentially to mirror the recently restyled Federal Rules of Evidence and, as with the federal rules, to make them easier to read and use.
The Court’s adoption triggers a comment period that ends February 28, 2015. Final approval of the restyled rules will be effective April 1, 2015.
In its order approving the revised evidence rules, the Court explained that rules numbers did not change, but new formatting includes indented subparagraphs, establishing vertical rather than horizontal lists in the rules for clear presentation. Changes also strike inconsistent, ambiguous, redundant, repetitive or archaic words.
¶ Amendments to Rule 511 align Texas law with Federal Rule of Evidence 502 on waiving privilege by voluntary disclosure.
¶ Amendments to Rule 613 retain the requirement that a witness be given an opportunity to explain or deny (a) a prior inconsistent statement or (b) circumstances or a statement showing bias or interest, but the requirement is no longer part of the foundation that an examining attorney must lay before introducing extrinsic evidence of the statement or its circumstances.
Martha Newton, the Court’s rules attorney who shepherded the project, credited law Professor Steven Goode, a noted evidence expert at the University of Texas, for drafting the rules changes with assistance from the State Bar’s Administration of Rules of Evidence Committee and the Supreme Court Advisory Committee. The combined effort drew seasoned trial lawyers and judges in several drafting and reviewing stages.
The Texas restyling project began after revisions to the federal rules were completed in 2011 and approved by the U.S. Supreme Court. Two federal district judges from Texas, Sidney A. Fitzwater of Dallas and Lee H. Rosenthal of Houston, led U.S. Judicial Conference committees working on the federal rules.
Changes to Rule 902(10), approved August 19, 2014, included restyling changes. The Court’s order does not make further changes to that rule.
Lower Word Limits for Briefs?
A proposed change to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure would lower the word limit for principal appellate briefs from 14,000 to 12,500 words and for reply briefs from 7,000 to 6,250 words (hat tip to Emil Kiehne at the New Mexico Appellate Blog). The comment to the proposed rule explains that the 14,000 word limit was based on the prior 50-page limit with an assumption of 280 words per page, but that no one seems to know where that word-per-page number came from. The committee now believes it was an error and proposes a new rule based on 250 words per page.
This should be of interest to Texas lawyers for two reasons. First (obviously), this will impact those who practice regularly in federal court.
So, what do you think? Will lower limits in federal court crimp your style or are 12,500 words plenty? Also, if the federal courts adopt a lower word limit, should Texas courts consider a lower limit, as well? Let's hear it in the comments.
Also, if you want to make an official comment on the proposed amendments to the federal rules, click here for information about how to do so. The deadline for comments is February 17, 2015.
Yesterday, I posted about a change in the amended rules that eliminates the extra three days to respond to documents served by fax. The amended rules also provide two new methods for service, but these methods each have a wrinkle that the rules do not address.
First, the rules (TRCP 21a(a)(2) and TRAP 9.5(b)) will now permit service by "commercial delivery service." This change brings the Texas rules in line with the federal rules, which have long permitted service by FedEx and UPS. The rules make service complete when the document is deposited with the service provider. The wrinkle is that the rules do not provide the recipient any additional time to respond after receiving the document. Although the document might be delivered the next day, it could take several days. It seems that the rules should provide additional time for a response, as they do when service is by mail.
Second, TRCP 21a(a)(2) and TRAP 9.5(b) will be amended to permit service by email. This is a welcome update to the rules, especially since many documents served "by fax" are now really served by an email desktop fax service. The wrinkle is that there is a gap in the amended rules. TRCP 21a(b) and TRAP 9.5(c) address when service is "complete." And although the rules address when service is complete by mail, by fax, and by commercial delivery service, they do not provide when service by email is complete. Analogizing to service by fax, it would seem that delivery would be complete upon receipt. The biggest issue will be proof of service. Regardless, it would be good practice to request delivery receipts and read receipts and to keep a copy of the sent email.
It will be interesting to see if these issues are addressed in future amendments.
You may have heard that the Texas Supreme Court has promulgated final amendments to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure and Rules of Appellate Procedure related to mandatory electronic filing. The amendments go into effect on January 1, 2014. But you may not know that the amendments contain some other key changes. One amendment in particular will change the way we calculate response deadlines.
It has long been the rule that service by mail or fax gives the recipient an additional 3 days on any deadline to respond. So, if the other side serves discovery requests by fax, you can calendar the response date for 33 days after service (30 days in the discovery rules plus 3 days beause of service by fax). But effective January 1, service by fax will no longer grant three extra days. The Court has amended Rule 4 and Rule 21a to limit the three extra days to service by mail.
So, be sure to update your docketing procedures effective January 1.
Click here to see the Court's order and all of the amendments that go in effect on January 1.
We thought our readers would want to know about a notice posted on the Texas Supreme Court website, stating that the 2013 version of the Texas rules, published by West Publishing, is incorrect. Specifically, the rules book does not accurately reflect the rules that the Supreme Court promulgated for expedited actions and dismissals of baseless lawsuits. The Court's notice is reproduced below, with a link to the correct rules.
• amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure 47 and 190.
The Texas Rules of Civil Procedure published in West's 2013 Texas Rules of Court, Volume I, do not reflect the revisions made to the rules following public comment that were included in the Court's final approval order. West has been contacted, and corrections are forthcoming. Please click on this link to view the final version of the rules as approved by the Supreme Court: http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/MiscDocket/13/13902200.pdf.
In its weekly orders (4/19/13), the Texas Supreme Court issued two opinions, granted review in four cases, and issued new rules of procedure for justice courts. Click here to read the weekly order list. If you want to read the new rules for justice courts, click here.
1. Christus Health Gulf Coast v. Aetna, Inc. -- This case involves the Prompt Payment Statute, which requires prompt payment of certain claims made by healthcare providers. The Court held that the statute does not apply when the plaintiff has no contractual privity with the HMO.
2. Granado v. Meza -- The Court held that there was some evidence of a child-support arrearage, but no evidence to support the amount found.
Click here to access the opinions.
1. In re Continental Tire The Americas, LLC -- The overarching issue in this mandamus proceeding involves discovery orders that allegedly do not provide adequate protection for trade secrets that the defendant is required to disclose under the orders.
2. Crosstex Energy Servs., L.P. v. Pro Plus, Inc. -- This case involves the trial court's failure to dismiss the case when, contrary to Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 150.002, a petition filed against a licensed engineer is not accompanied by a supporting affidavit from an engineer. There are issues about interlocutory appellate jurisdiction and about the defendant's alleged waiver of the right to seek dismissal.
3. Colorado v. Tyco Valves & Controls, L.P. -- This case involves severance payments sought by former employees at a manufacturing plant. There are issues about ERISA preemption of the severance claims, enforceability of oral severance agreements, and whether the company that bought the plant was a "successor" of the employer.
4. Gotham Ins. Co. v. Warren E&P, Inc. -- In this case, an insurer seeks restitution of money it paid based on misrepresentations by the insured. There are issues about whether law-of-the-case and the holding in Frank's Casing bar the restitution claim.
A Legislative Fix for Appellate Delays?
Delays in resolving appeals are frustrating, but a bill filed this legislative session to set mandatory deadlines for deciding appeals looks like it would create more problems than it would solve.
One of the first questions clients often ask me about new appeals is "how long will it take to get a decision?" And while I can talk about averages, I always have to emphasize that each case is different and that there really is no way to know how long it will take. I once had an appeal where we waited almost two years after argument before we got the four-page unanimous opinion.
Apparently attempting to address these types of delay, a member of the Texas House of Representatives has filed HB 3032. The bill would require the Supreme Court to adopt rules requiring all appeals to be decided within one year of perfection and all interlocutory appeals to be decided with three months of perfection. If the case is not decided within those time frames, the bill would require that the judgment of the lower court be summarily affirmed.
It seems to me that the bill's approach to the issue raises more problems that it solves. First, the very notion of directing that the appeal must be decided within a defined time period seems to raise some separation of powers issues. Second, even if such time periods are appropriate, having them run from the time of perfection seems problematic because there are several events between perfection and submission that affect timing and are not in the control of the parties or the court of appeals, such as the preparation and filing of the record. Third, the three-month deadline for interlocutory appeals is not even close to reasonable, given deadlines in the rules for briefing. Fourth, the automatic affirmance provision seems to implicate due process, due course of law, and perhaps open courts concerns.
The bill has been referred to the Judiciary and Civil Jurisprudence Committee, but has not been scheduled for a hearing.
I would be interested to see if any of you have any thoughts on the issue. Is HB 3032 a solution looking for a problem? Are there better ways to address the court of appeals' backlog (such as providing funding for additional staff)? Let's hear it in the comments.
Texas Rule of Evidence 103(a)(1) provides that an objection to the admission of evidence must state the "specific ground of objection." This requirement can sometimes trip up otherwise careful counsel. A recent case from the Austin Court of Appeals highlights this potential trap. Smith v. East, No. 03-11-00800-CV, 2013 WL 692456 (Tex. App.--Austin Feb. 22, 2013, no pet. h.).
The appellant complained on appeal about the admission of certain "provocative" photographs. On appeal, the appellant relied on Texas Rule of Evidence 403 to argue that any probative value of the evidence was outweighed by the potential for unfair prejudice. But in the trial court, the appellant had only objected on the basis of relevance, i.e. that the photographs had no probative value. The court of appeals held that nothing in the objection alerted the trial court that the appellant was also relying on Rule 403. Therefore, the court found that the 403 objection was waived.
Thus, under this opinion, merely arguing that evidence has no probative value is not sufficient to preserve a 403 objection. If you think that evidence is both irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial, be sure to mention both relevance and Rule 403. Without the reference to Rule 403 or unfair prejudice, you run a risk that the court of appeals will decide that the objection is not sufficiently specific.

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