Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=81082:gr-170498-2013&catid=1566&Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 22:31:39+00:00

Document:
METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY, Petitioner, v.ABSOLUTE MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, Respondent.
We resolve petitioner Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company's (Metro bank's) petition for review on certiorari1 seeking the reversal of the decision2 dated August 25, 2005 and the resolution3 dated November 17, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 86336. The assailed decision affirmed the order4 dated May 7, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 80. The RTC had denied the admission of Metrobank's Fourth-Party Complaint5 against the Estate of Jose L. Chua for being a money claim that falls under Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court; the claim should have been filed in the pending judicial settlement of Chuas estate before the RTC of Pasay City. The CA affirmed the RTCs order based on the same ground.
In its answer with counterclaims and third-party complaint,11 AMC averred that it had no knowledge of Chuas transactions with SHCI and it did not receive any money from the latter. AMC also asked the RTC to hold Metrobank liable for the subject checks in case it is adjudged liable to SHCI.
Metrobank, Chua then gave the assurance that the arrangement for the handling of the checks carried AMCs consent. Chua also submitted documents showing his position and interest in AMC. These documents, as well as AMCs admission in its answer that it allowed Chua to manage AMC with a relative free hand, show that it knew of Chuas arrangement with Metrobank. Further, Chuas records show that the proceeds of the checks were remitted to AMC which cannot therefore now claim that it did not receive these proceeds.
Metrobank also raised the defense of estoppel. According to Metrobank, AMC had knowledge of its arrangements with Chua for several years. Despite this arrangement, AMC did not object to nor did it call the attention of Metrobank about Chuas alleged lack of authority to deposit the checks in Ayala Lumber and Hardwares account. At this point, AMC is already estopped from questioning Chuas authority to deposit these checks in Ayala Lumber and Hardwares account.
Lastly, Metrobank asserted that AMC gave Chua unbridled control in managing AMCs affairs. This measure of control amounted to gross negligence that was the proximate cause of the loss that AMC must now bear.
Subsequently, Metrobank filed a motion for leave to admit fourth-party complaint24 against Chuas estate. It alleged that Chuas estate should reimburse Metrobank in case it would be held liable in the third-party complaint filed against it by AMC.
In an order25 dated May 7, 2004, the RTC denied Metrobanks motion. It likewise denied Metrobanks motion for reconsideration in an order26 dated July 7, 2004.
The RTC categorized Metrobanks allegation in the fourth-party complaint as a "cobro de lo indebido"27 a kind of quasi-contract that mandates recovery of what has been improperly paid. Quasi-contracts fall within the concept of implied contracts that must be included in the claims required to be filed with the judicial settlement of the deceaseds estate under Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court. As such claim, it should have been filed in Special Proceedings No. 99-0023, not before the RTC as a fourth-party complaint. The RTC, acting in the exercise of its general jurisdiction, does not have the authority to adjudicate the fourth-party complaint. As a trial court hearing an ordinary action, it cannot resolve matters pertaining to special proceedings because the latter is subject to specific rules.
Metrobank responded to the RTC ruling by filing a petition for certiorari28 under Rule 65 before the CA.
The CA affirmed the RTCs ruling that Metrobanks fourth-party complaint should have been filed in Special Proceedings No. 99-0023.29 According to the CA, the relief that Metrobank prayed for was based on a quasi-contract and was a money claim categorized as an implied contract that should be filed under Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court.
In its present petition for review on certiorari,30 Metrobank asserts that it should be allowed to file a fourth-party complaint against Chuas estate in the proceedings before the RTC; its fourth-party complaint was filed merely to enforce its right to be reimbursed by Chuas estate in case Metrobank is held liable to AMC. Hence, Section 11, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court should apply.
AMC, in its comment,31 maintains the line that the CA and the RTC rulings should be followed, i.e., that Metrobanks claim is a quasi-contract that should be filed as a claim under Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court.
According to AMC, the petitions annexes are mostly Metrobanks pleadings and court issuances. It did not append all relevant AMC pleadings before the RTC and the CA. For this reason, the petition should have been dismissed outright.
2) Whether Metrobanks fourth-party complaint against Chuas estate should be allowed.
We disagree with AMCs position.
In F.A.T. Kee Computer Systems, Inc. v. Online Networks International, Inc.,34 Online Networks International, Inc. similarly assailed F.A.T. Kee Computer Systems, Inc.s failure to attach the transcript of stenographic notes (TSN) of the RTC proceedings, and claimed this omission to be a violation of Section 4, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court that warranted the petitions dismissal. The Court held that the defect was not fatal, as the TSN of the proceedings before the RTC forms part of the records of the case. Thus, there was no incurable omission that warranted the outright dismissal of the petition.
Under this guiding principle, we do not see Metrobanks omission to be a fatal one that should warrant the petitions outright dismissal. To be sure, the omission to submit the adverse partys pleadings in a petition before the Court is not a commendable practice as it may lead to an unduly biased narration of facts and arguments that masks the real issues before the Court. Such skewed presentation could lead to the waste of the Courts time in sifting through the maze of the parties narrations of facts and arguments and is a danger the Rules of Court seeks to avoid.
Our examination of Metrobanks petition shows that it contains AMCs opposition to its motion to admit fourth-party complaint among its annexes. The rest of the pleadings have been subsequently submitted as attachments in Metrobanks Reply. A reading of these pleadings shows that their arguments are the same as those stated in the orders of the trial court and the Court of Appeals. Thus, even if Metrobanks petition did not contain some of AMCs pleadings, the Court still had the benefit of a clear narration of facts and arguments according to both parties perspectives. In this broader view, the mischief that the Rules of Court seeks to avoid has not really been present. If at all, the omission is not a grievous one that the spirit of liberality cannot address.
The main issue poses to us two essential points that must be addressed. First, are quasi-contracts included in claims that should be filed pursuant to Rule 86, Section 5 of the Rules of Court? Second, if so, is Metrobanks claim against the Estate of Jose Chua based on a quasi-contract?
In Maclan v. Garcia,39 Gabriel Maclan filed a civil case to recover from Ruben Garcia the necessary expenses he spent as possessor of a piece of land. Garcia acquired the land as an heir of its previous owner. He set up the defense that this claim should have been filed in the special proceedings to settle the estate of his predecessor. Maclan, on the other hand, contended that his claim arises from law and not from contract, express or implied. Thus, it need not be filed in the settlement of the estate of Garcias predecessor, as mandated by Section 5, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court (now Section 5, Rule 86).
In its fourth-party complaint, Metrobank claims that Chuas estate should reimburse it if it becomes liable on the checks that it deposited to Ayala Lumber and Hardwares account upon Chuas instructions.
This fulfills the requisites of solutio indebiti. First, Metrobank acted in a manner akin to a mistake when it deposited the AMC checks to Ayala Lumber and Hardwares account; because of Chuas control over AMCs operations, Metrobank assumed that the checks payable to AMC could be deposited to Ayala Lumber and Hardwares account. Second, Ayala Lumber and Hardware had no right to demand and receive the checks that were deposited to its account; despite Chuas control over AMC and Ayala Lumber and Hardware, the two entities are distinct, and checks exclusively and expressly payable to one cannot be deposited in the account of the other. This disjunct created an obligation on the part of Ayala Lumber and Hardware, through its sole proprietor, Chua, to return the amount of these checks to Metrobank.
The Court notes, however, that its description of Metrobanks fourth-party complaint as a claimclosely analogous to solutio indebiti is only to determine the validity of the lower courts orders denying it. It is not an adjudication determining the liability of Chuas estate against Metrobank. The appropriate trial court should still determine whether Metrobank has a lawful claim against Chuas estate based on quasi-contract.
In sum, on all counts in the considerations material to the issues posed, the resolution points to the affirmation of the assailed CA decision and resolution. Metrobank's claim in its fourth-party complaint against Chua's estate is based on quasi-contract. It is also a contingent claim that depends on another event. Both belong to the category of claims against a deceased person that should be filed under Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Comi and, as such, should have been so filed in Special Proceedings No. 99-0023.
AFFIRMED. Costs against Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company.
2 Id. at 24-32. Penned by Associate Justice Fernanda Lampas Peralta, and concurred in by Associate Justices Ruben T. Reyes (now a retired member of this Court) and Josefina Guevara-Salonga.
4 Id. at 121-123. Penned by Judge Agustin S. Dizon.
15 Order dated May 23, 2001; id. at 68-70.
16 Order dated June 4, 2002; id. at 78.
29 Supra notes 2 and 3.
34 G.R. No. 171238, February 2, 2011, 641 SCRA 390.
38 F.A.T. Kee Computer Systems, Inc. v. Online Networks International, Inc., supra note 34, at 401-402.
39 97 Phil. 119 (1955).
40 38 Phil. 182, 189-194 (1918).
41 Maclan v. Garcia, supra note 39, at 123-124.
42 Cruz v. J.M. Tuason Company, Inc., 167 Phil. 261, 276-277 (1977).
43 See CIVIL CODE, Articles 2144, 2154, 2164-2175.
46 Andres v. Manufacturers Hanover & Trust Corporation, G.R. No. 82670, September 15, 1989, 177 SCRA 618, 622, citing Velez v. Balzarza, 73 Phil. 630 (1942); and City of Cebu v. Piccio, 110 Phil. 558, 563 (1960).
47 Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97995, January 21, 1993, 217 SCRA 347, 355.

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