Source: https://cbaclelegalconnection.com/2013/10/30/
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 00:51:01+00:00

Document:
Curing the Collywobbles — Part 2: How Strong is Your Reality Distortion Field?
A common source of collywobbles is the “Who are you trying to kid?!” accusation. It comes from that mean and sneaky part of human nature that’s always trying to shame us back into line, and it’s shockingly effective because it just might be true: we might really be delusional or a fraud to think we can pull off something new and different.
Steve Jobs’ Apple colleagues coined the term “reality distortion field” to explain his ability to convince himself and everyone else to believe whatever he wanted. A sense of reality was putty in his hands: he distorted it, shaped it to his vision of what was possible, so that people created what he wanted and bought what he was selling.
Accusations of insanity and arrogance come with the visionary territory. Expect them. Expect them to give you the collywobbles. But then be prepared to move on anyway. Radical departures from status quo are unreasonable and crazy, by definition. We need faith and hope – both of which have their own unreasonable and crazy downsides – to stay with them.
Am I just making all this up? Yes, I am.
Am I crazy? Yes, I am.
Is there anything to be afraid of? Yes, plenty.
Am I going to do it anyway? Yes, I am.
Now can we get on with it?
Kevin Rhodes is a lawyer in private practice who coaches and mentors other lawyers to love their work and their lives. He leads workshops for a variety of audiences, including the CBA’s Solo and Small Firm Section and the Job Search and Career Transitions Support Group. You can email Kevin at kevin@rhodeslaw.com.
The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Ouray Sportswear, LLC v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office on Thursday, October 24, 2013.
Petitioner Ouray Sportswear, LLC (employer) sought review of a final order of the Industrial Claim Appeals Office (Panel). The order was set aside.
In April 2007, Ski Country Imports, Inc. and Ouray Sportswear Wyoming, Inc. (collectively, debtor) filed for bankruptcy. As part of the bankruptcy proceeding, employer, through a related entity called Jalex Holdings, LLC (Jalex), purchased substantially all of debtor’s assets. In May 2007, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado issued an order approving Jalex’s purchase of debtor’s assets. The order expressly provided that the purchase was free and clear of any and all liens, claims, charges, and encumbrances.
In June 2012, a deputy for the Colorado Department of Labor and Employment (Department) issued a liability determination concluding that debtor’s entire unemployment insurance account (which included the unpaid premiums) would transfer to employer because employer was a successor entity to debtor under CRS § 8-76-104(1)(a). The hearing officer affirmed the deputy’ ruling, and the Panel affirmed a hearing officer’s decision that employer is a “successor” entity for unemployment taxation purposes under § 8-76-104(1)(a), because it purchased substantially all of the assets of two businesses.
Employer contended that the Panel erred in affirming the hearing officer’s determination that it is a successor entity under § 8-76-104(1)(a). The bankruptcy court’s order effectively precluded the Department and the Panel from treating employer as a statutory successor entity. Therefore, the Panel’s order holding that employer is a successor entity to debtor under § 8-76-104(l)(a) conflicts with, and is therefore preempted by, the bankruptcy court’s prior order issued pursuant to 11 USC § 363(f). Consequently the Panel’s order was set aside.
On Tuesday, October 29, 2013, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued one published opinion and four unpublished opinions.
On Friday, October 25, 2013, the Colorado State Judicial Branch announced an opening on the Larimer County Court bench, effective December 31, 2013. The vacancy will be created by the resignation of Hon. Christine A. Carney.
Judge Carney was appointed to the Larimer County Court in 1998, after approximately 17 years of practicing law. She received her undergraduate degree from Michigan State University and her J.D. from the University of Colorado. She is currently the Presiding Judge for the Larimer County Court. She hears civil cases with a jurisdictional limit of $15,000 and criminal cases involving traffic matters and misdemeanors.
Applicants for the vacancy must be qualified electors of Larimer County and must have been admitted to practice law in Colorado for five years. Application forms may be obtained from the ex officio chair of the nominating commission, Justice Gregory Hobbs, or may be downloaded from the State Judicial website. The original signed application and an identical PDF must be filed with the ex officio chair no later than 4 p.m. on November 18. Anyone wishing to nominate another person for the vacancy must submit the nomination no later than 4 p.m. on November 12. The nominating commission will meet on December 6, 2013, to select nominees.
Contact information for members of the nominating commission may be found on the State Judicial website.
The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in A.S. v. People on Monday, October 28, 2013.
Statutory Construction—“May” Versus “Shall”—Juvenile Justice—Aggravated Juvenile Offender—CRS §19-2-601—Suspended Sentence of Commitment to Department of Human Services—Probation.
The Supreme Court held that CRS §19-2-601(5)(a)(I)(A) grants a court discretion, in sentencing an aggravated juvenile offender, to suspend a commitment to the Department of Human Services on a condition of successful completion of probation for an offense that would not constitute a class 1 or class 2 felony if committed by an adult. The Court reversed the court of appeals’ decision, concluding that the Colorado Legislature used the term “may” in §19-2-601(5)(a)(I)(A) according to the term’s traditional, permissive meaning.
The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People v. Medrano-Bustamante on Thursday, October 24, 2013.
Driving Under the Influence—Vehicle Homicide—Vehicular Assault—Leaving the Scene of an Accident—Lesser Included Offense—Testimony—Opinion Evidence—Expert Testimony—Hearsay.
Defendant appealed the judgment of conviction entered on jury verdicts involving multiple charges. The judgment and sentence were affirmed in part and vacated in part, and the case was remanded.
Defendant, Jose Medrano-Frias (Frias), and 15-year-old A.S. were involved in a single-car accident that injured Frias and resulted in the death of A.S. Defendant was charged with driving under the influence (DUI), vehicular homicide–DUI, vehicular assault–DUI, and two counts of leaving the scene of an accident. At trial, the identity of the driver was contested—defendant argued that A.S. was driving at the time of the accident. The jury convicted defendant as charged.
Defendant contended that the convictions based on two counts of leaving the scene of an accident, one for Frias and one for A.S., were multiplicitous. Because the unit of prosecution is the number of accident scenes and not the number of victims, defendant’s two convictions for leaving the scene of a single accident violate his right to be free from double jeopardy.
The Court of Appeals therefore ruled that the two convictions related to leaving the scene of an accident—one involving serious bodily injury and the other involving death—should be merged into one, and thus remanded to the trial court on this issue. The Court then vacated the imposed sentence regarding conviction for leaving the scene of an accident involving serious bodily injury.
The Court ordered that the mittimus be corrected based on its rulings. The judgment regarding all other issues in this case was affirmed.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals published its opinion in Velasco v. Holder on Tuesday, October 29, 2013.
Arturo Velasco petitioned for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissing his appeal from an order of the immigration judge (IJ) that denied his application for cancellation of removal under § 240A of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1229b.
Velasco, a native and citizen of Mexico, entered the United States illegally in 1989. The government first commenced deportation proceedings against him in March 1997. He applied for suspension-of-deportation relief under former § 244(a) of the INA, was granted that relief, and was issued a lawful-permanent-resident card in September 1998.
In 2007 Velasco pleaded guilty to two counts of possession of a controlled substance, causing the Department of Homeland Security to initiate removal proceedings against him in 2009. He then applied for discretionary cancellation-of-removal relief for permanent residents under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a). The IJ denied relief; on appeal the BIA also denied relief, although on different grounds.
The Tenth Circuit denied Velasco’s petition for review. Because Velasco had been granted suspension of deportation during prior deportation proceedings, he was ineligible for cancellation of removal according to the plain language of § 1229b(c)(6).
On Monday, October 28, 2013, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued one published opinion and one unpublished opinion.

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