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Timestamp: 2019-04-20 16:46:15+00:00

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FindACase | Integra LifeSciences Corp. v. Hyperbranch Medical Technology, Inc.
Integra LifeSciences Corp. v. Hyperbranch Medical Technology, Inc.
HYPERBRANCH MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY, INC., Defendant.
In this action filed by Plaintiffs Integra LifeSciences Corp. ("Integra"), Integra LifeSciences Sales LLC ("Integra Sales"), Confluent Surgical, Inc. ("Confluent") and Incept LLC ("Incept, " and collectively with Integra, Integra Sales and Confluent, "Plaintiffs") against Defendant HyperBranch Medical Technology, Inc. ("Defendant" or "HyperBranch"), Plaintiffs allege infringement of United States Patent Nos. 7, 009, 034 (the '"034 patent"), 7, 332, 566 (the '"566 patent"), 7, 592, 418 (the '"418 patent"), 8, 003, 705 (the '"3705 patent") and 8, 535, 705 (the '"5705 patent") (collectively, the "patents-in-suit" or "asserted patents"). Presently before the Court is HyperBranch's motion for summary judgment of non-infringement of claims 1, 6, 12 and 17 of the '5705 patent (the "Motion"). (D.I. 393) The Court recommends that HyperBranch's Motion be GRANTED.
(ii) the second precursor comprises at least three nucleophilic functional groups; wherein the biodegradable groups of the hydrogel consist of the esters and the hydrogel as placed in situ in the patient is essentially fixlly degradable in a patient in less than about 180 days, and wherein mixing the first and the second synthetic hydrophilic polymer precursors forms crosslinking covalent bonds that are reaction products of the electrophilic and the nucleophilic groups, wherein essentially every ester bond in the hydrogel is separated from other ester bonds in the hydrogel by at least three covalent bonds when the hydrogel is formed.
A grant of summary judgment is appropriate where "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The moving party bears the burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585-86 n.10 (1986). If the moving party meets this burden, the nonmovant must then "come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. at 587 (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). If the nonmoving party fails to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of its case with respect to which it has the burden of proof, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). During this process, the Court will "draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and it may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence." Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000).
However, in order to defeat a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must "do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586-87; see also Podobnik v. U.S. Postal Serv., 409 F.3d 584, 594 (3d Cir. 2005) (party opposing summary judgment "must present more than just bare assertions, conclusory allegations or suspicions to show the existence of a genuine issue") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The "mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986) (emphasis in original): Facts that could alter the outcome are "material, " and a factual dispute is genuine only where "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. at 248. "If the evidence is merely colorable ... or is not significantly probative ... summary judgment may be granted." Id. at 249-50 (internal citations omitted). A party asserting that a fact cannot be-or, alternatively, is-genuinely disputed must support the assertion either by citing to "particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials"; or by "showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)(A) & (B).
The patent infringement analysis consists of two steps. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 976 (Fed. Cir. 1995). First, the court must determine the meaning and scope of the patent claims asserted to be infringed. Id. Claim construction is generally a question of law, although subsidiary fact finding is sometimes necessary. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S.Ct. 831, 837-38 (2015). Second, the trier of fact must compare the properly construed claims to the allegedly infringing device. Markman, 52 F.3d at 976. This second step is a question of fact. ActiveVideo Networks, Inc. v. Verizon Commc'ns, Inc., 694 F.3d 1312, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
"Literal infringement of a claim exists when every limitation recited in the claim is found in the accused device." Kahn v. Gen. Motors Corp., 135 F.3d 1472, 1477 (Fed. Cir. 1998). If any claim limitation is absent from the accused product, there is no literal infringement as a matter of law. Amgen Inc. v. F. Hoffinan-La Roche Ltd, 580 F.3d 1340, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2009). A product that does not literally infringe a patent claim may still infringe under the doctrine of equivalents if the differences between the claimed invention and the accused product are insubstantial. See Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 24, 40 (1997); Virnetx, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 767 F.3d 1308, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
The patent owner has the burden of proving infringement, and must do so by a preponderance of the evidence. SmithKline Diagnostics, Inc. v. Helena Labs. Corp., 859 F.2d 878, 889 (Fed. Cir. 1988). When an accused infringer moves for summary judgment of noninfringement, such relief is only appropriate if, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the patentee, no reasonable jury could find that every limitation recited in the properly construed claim is found in the accused device, either literally or under the doctrine of equivalents. See Chimie v. PPG Indus., Inc., 402 F.3d 1371, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2005); see also Bell Atl. Network Servs., Inc. v. CovadCommc'ns Grp., Inc., 262 F.3d 1258, 1267 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ("[S]ummary judgment is proper only if no reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

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