Source: http://masscases.com/cases/distapp/2018/2018massappdiv59.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 14:12:55+00:00

Document:
David V. Flaherty for the plaintiff.
William J. Logan for the defendant.
Afzaluddin identifies the first issue on appeal as "whether or not the Appellant is entitled to have her defense to possession heard by a jury regarding her appeal of the original judgment [by the Probate Court] granting the Appellee ownership of the property in question." In essence, Afzaluddin argues that she was entitled to have a jury in the District Court review the Probate Court's judgment against her.
A court will grant summary judgment where there are no genuine issues of material fact and where the record, including the pleadings and affidavits, entitles the moving party to judgment as a matter of law. Cassesso v. Commissioner of Correction, 390 Mass. 419, 422 (1983). The moving party bears the burden of affirmatively demonstrating the absence of a triable issue, and showing that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Pederson v. Time, Inc., 404 Mass. 14, 16-17 (1989). If the moving party establishes the absence of a triable issue, the party opposing the motion must respond and allege specific facts that would establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact in order to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Id. at 17, citing O'Brion, Russell & Co. v. LeMay, 370 Mass. 243, 245 (1976). A party opposing summary judgment "cannot rest on his or her pleadings and mere assertions of disputed facts to defeat the motion for summary judgment." LaLonde v. Eissner, 405 Mass. 207, 209 (1989), citing Community Nat'l Bank v. Dawes, 369 Mass. 550, 554 (1976). Summary judgment motions may be accompanied by affidavits based on personal knowledge that set forth such facts as are admissible in evidence. Mass. R. Civ. P. 56(e). The court, for purposes of summary judgment, will review such facts and all reasonable inferences from those facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Ford Motor Co. v. Barrett, 403 Mass. 240, 242 (1988), citing Coveney v. President of the College of the Holy Cross, 388 Mass. 16, 17 (1983). The grant of summary judgment is reviewed de novo to determine whether, in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the undisputed material facts establish that the moving party is entitled to judgment in its favor as a matter of law. Barron Chiropractic & Rehabilitation, P.C. v. Norfolk & Dedham Group, 469 Mass. 800, 804 (2014), citing Miller v. Cotter, 448 Mass. 671, 676 (2007); Skyhook Wireless, Inc. v. Google Inc., 86 Mass. App. Ct. 611, 618-619 (2014).
"[The occupants'] argument, however, ignores the critical distinction that, in Hodge, the premises had previously been rented to the defendant in a tenancy at will, rent payable monthly in advance. After a number of years, the owners decided to sell the property and served notice to quit on the tenant, who thereafter refused to leave. A summary process action ensued, and on appeal the court held that § 8A defenses are not limited to tenants under a lease or tenants at will, i.e., acknowledged tenants, but can be available to 'occupants,' including tenants at sufferance. Id. at 754. Hodge does not stand for the proposition that § 8A defenses are available where the premises have never been leased or rented, as is the case here. Instead, it stands for the proposition that a person who is entitled to assert defenses under G.L. c. 239, § 8A, does not lose that entitlement by later becoming a tenant at sufferance."
Like the occupant in Gabriel, Afzaluddin has never been a tenant, had a lease, or paid any rent or utilities. Afzaluddin is entitled neither to the protections of G.L. c. 239, § 8A, [Note 7] nor to present such defense to a jury.
The grant of summary judgment to Bhatti and the dismissal of Afzaluddin's counterclaims are affirmed.
[Note 1] There is no reference in the record to Afzaluddin's ownership interest in the property, whether it was exclusively in Bhatti's name, as joint tenants, or as tenants by the entirety. However, as the Probate Court decision orders Afzaluddin to convey to Bhatti all her rights, title, and interest in the property, it is reasonable to infer she had some ownership interest in the subject property.
[Note 2] In the motion for relief from judgment, the Probate Court found, "The Defendant [Afzaluddin] chose not to appear in Court or cooperate in any way. Instead, she and her family members would not vacate the residence that the Plaintiff purchased and paid to maintain. She also refused to cooperate with the Court Clinician who went to her residence to try to perform a mental health evaluation."
[Note 3] There is no mention in the record of Bhatti seeking a finding of contempt in the Probate Court.
[Note 4] The court found that Afzaluddin had sole and exclusive use of the subject property and was a tenant at sufferance.
"An appeal from a final or interlocutory order or decree in equity of a probate court made in the exercise of any jurisdiction in equity shall not suspend or stay proceedings under such order or decree pending the appeal. But the probate court or a justice of the supreme judicial court, in case of such appeal, may stay all proceedings under such order or decree and make necessary or proper orders to protect the rights of persons interested pending the appeal; and any such order of the probate court for a stay of proceedings or for protection of any such rights may be varied or discharged by a justice of the supreme judicial court upon motion, and shall not be otherwise subject to an appeal."
"In any action under this chapter to recover possession of any premises rented or leased for dwelling purposes, brought pursuant to a notice to quit for nonpayment of rent, or where the tenancy has been terminated without fault of the tenant or occupant, the tenant or occupant shall be entitled to raise, by defense or counterclaim, any claim against the plaintiff relating to or arising out of such property, rental, tenancy, or occupancy for breach of warranty, for a breach of any material provision of the rental agreement, or for a violation of any other law."
"Whenever any counterclaim or claim of defense under this section is based on any allegation concerning the condition of the premises or the services or equipment provided therein, the tenant or occupant shall not be entitled to relief under this section unless: (1) the owner or his agents, servants, or employees, or the person to whom the tenant or occupant customarily paid his rent knew of such conditions before the tenant or occupant was in arrears in his rent . . . ."
[Note 7] Even if we were to decide that Afzaluddin could advance such a counterclaim, there is nothing in the record in the summary judgment motion, other than unattested-to assertions, that there was a disputed issue of fact as to the condition of the property. A party opposing summary judgment "cannot rest on his or her pleadings and mere assertions of disputed facts to defeat the motion for summary judgment." LaLonde, supra at 209.

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