Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/new-jersey/supreme-court/1993/132-n-j-141.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 18:04:33+00:00

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COUNTY OF GLOUCESTER, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, THE GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, THE COMMISSIONER OF NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.
*142 Mary C. Jacobson, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for appellants (Robert J. Del Tufo, Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney; Edward J. Dauber, Executive Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Ms. Jacobson and Catherine M. Brown, Deputy Attorney General, on the briefs).
Eugene P. Chell argued the cause for respondent.
Ronald Kevitz, First Assistant County Counsel, argued the cause for amicus curiae County of Morris (Howard F. Appelt, II, Morris County Counsel, attorney).
Isabel McGinty, Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for amicus curiae Public Defender (Zulima V. Farber, Public Defender, attorney).
The opinion of the Court was delivered by CLIFFORD, Justice.
*143 We granted certification, 130 N.J. 398, 614 A.2d 620 (1992), to determine whether current prison overcrowding constitutes an "emergency" within the meaning of the Disaster Control Act, N.J.S.A. App.A:9-30 to -63. Because the Appellate Division concluded that an "emergency" as contemplated by that Act no longer existed, it invalidated the then-existing Executive Order (No. 52), which had authorized the housing of State prisoners in county jails. 256 N.J. Super. 143, 152-53, 606 A.2d 843 (1992). The Appellate Division directed that its decision become effective one year from April 29, 1992, the date of its decision.
We modify the judgment below only to the extent that this Court's judgment will become effective one year from the date of this decision. As modified, the judgment is affirmed.
On May 29, 1990, Gloucester County filed a complaint in lieu of prerogative writs, seeking to compel the Governor of the State of New Jersey and the Commissioner of the New Jersey Department of Corrections to increase the per diem reimbursement rate for State prisoners housed in the Gloucester County jail. The County of Morris, appearing as amicus curiae, claimed a similar undercompensation for its housing of State prisoners and contended that in fact the problems of overcrowding and undercompensation exist throughout the state. Gloucester County sought as alternative relief the removal from its county jail of all State prisoners in excess of the twenty prisoners that its contract with the State obligated it to house. Similarly, Morris County applied for an order that would compel removal of all State prisoners in excess of the forty required by its contract.
The Appellate Division thus invalidated Executive Order No. 52, which had authorized the housing of State prisoners in county jails. Id. at 152-53, 606 A.2d 843.
Addressing the question of reimbursement, the court held that pursuant to Shapiro v. Fauver, 193 N.J. Super. 237, 473 A.2d 112 (App.Div.), certif. denied sub nom. Shapiro v. Albanese, 97 N.J. 668, 483 A.2d 186 (1984), the Commissioner could exercise his discretion in setting the per diem rate of compensation during the life of the Executive Order. 256 N.J. Super. at 153, 606 A.2d 843. However, the court determined that once the Executive Order and the power to house State prisoners in county jails under the emergency powers has expired, the State will no longer be permitted to pay the counties less than their costs for housing State prisoners. Ibid.
In order to accomplish the purposes of this act, the Governor is empowered to make such orders, rules and regulations as may be necessary adequately to meet the various problems presented by any emergency and from time to time to amend or rescind such orders, rules and regulations, including among others the following subjects: * * * i. On any matter that may be necessary to protect the health, safety and welfare of the people or that will aid in the prevention of loss to and destruction of property. j. Such other matters whatsoever as are or may become necessary in the fair, impartial, stringent and comprehensive administration of this act.
*146 In Worthington, we addressed the precise question before this Court today: whether prison overcrowding constitutes an "emergency" within the meaning of the Disaster Control Act, thereby authorizing the housing of State prisoners in county jails. In Worthington, Atlantic County sought to compel the Corrections Commissioner to accept custody of the State prisoners then housed in its county jail, alleging that the Commissioner's failure to accept such prisoners violated N.J.S.A. 2C:43-10 and N.J.S.A. 30:4-6.
After the action had been initiated, Governor Byrne, invoking his emergency powers pursuant to the Disaster Control Act, issued Executive Order No. 106 on June 19, 1981. In that Order he declared that prison overcrowding had created a "state of emergency * * * in the various State and County penal and correctional facilities." The Order stated that the Department of Corrections was "physically unable to accept from the Sheriffs of the various counties the custody of inmates sentenced" to the Commissioner's custody. Moreover, the Order stated that "these unusual conditions endanger the safety, welfare and resources of the residents of this State, and threaten loss to and destruction of property, and are too large in scope to be handled in their entirety by regular operating services of either counties or the New Jersey Department of Corrections."
Executive Order No. 106 authorized the Commissioner to house State prisoners in county jails and to redistribute such prisoners among the counties, and directed the Commissioner to create an "appropriate compensation program for the counties." According to its terms, the Order was a temporary measure to remain in effect for ninety days from the date of execution.
Commissioner Fauver thus asserted Executive Order No. 106 as an affirmative defense to Atlantic County's complaint. On September 4, 1981, a divided panel of the Appellate Division, to which the case had been transferred under Rule 1:1-2, upheld *147 the validity of the Order and the actions taken by the Commissioner as authorized in the Order. See Worthington v. Fauver, 180 N.J. Super. 368, 382, 434 A.2d 1134 (1981). On September 11, 1981, Governor Byrne issued Executive Order No. 108, which extended Executive Order No. 106 until January 20, 1982. Atlantic County appealed as of right to this Court because of the dissent in the Appellate Division.
Our analysis regarding the validity of Executive Order Nos. 106 and 108 was two-pronged: whether the then-existing prison overcrowding constituted an "emergency" within the meaning of the Disaster Control Act, and whether the Governor's exercise of his emergency powers was authorized by the Act. 88 N.J. at 192, 440 A.2d 1128. The latter prong involved two closely-related inquiries: whether the Executive Orders were rationally related to the legislative purpose of protecting the public, and whether the Executive Orders were closely tailored to the magnitude of the emergency. Id. at 197-98, 440 A.2d 1128.
We first considered Atlantic County's contention that the problem of prison overcrowding was not an "emergency" within the meaning of the Act because it was not an "unusual incident." Atlantic County had argued that prison overcrowding was not "unusual" because it had "been recognized as a major problem as early as 1977," and it was not an "incident" because it had not been a "sudden or unforeseen event." Id. at 194, 440 A.2d 1128.
*148 Recognizing that prison overcrowding had reached "dangerous proportions" creating a potentially destructive situation and that only recently had the Legislature become aware of the extent of the overcrowding, we concluded that an "emergency" within the meaning of the Act existed. Id. at 196-97, 440 A.2d 1128.
Lastly, we addressed the statutory validity of Executive Order No. 108, which had extended the original order for approximately an additional four months. As with the original Order we concluded that Executive Order No. 108 was valid.
*149 Emphasizing the limited time spans of the two Executive Orders, we commented that "we do not believe that the Legislature intended the Disaster Control Act to operate as a vehicle for a permanent wholesale takeover by the state of county penal facilities." Id. at 204, 440 A.2d 1128.
Finally, we left for another day the questions of "how often the Governor could renew Executive Order No. 106, or the length of time during which he could continue to exercise these extraordinary powers, before we would conclude that he had exceeded his statutory authority." Id. at 203-04, 440 A.2d 1128.
Almost twelve years after its issuance, Executive Order No. 106, a "temporary" measure to combat prison overcrowding, remains in effect. Sixteen consecutive Executive Orders declaring a continuing "state of emergency" and extending all the previous Executive Orders back to Executive Order No. 106 have been issued under the administrations of Governors Byrne, Kean, and Florio. (Most recently, Governor Florio issued Executive Order No. 80 on January 15, 1993, extending Executive Order No. 52 and all of its predecessors until January 20, 1994, subject to the terms of any judicial order setting an earlier expiration date.) Once again we must determine whether the Governor's declaration of "emergency" pursuant to the Disaster Control Act is valid. Cf. Burlington Food Store, Inc. v. Hoffman, 45 N.J. 214, 220, 212 A.2d 29 (1965) (evaluating whether destructive price wars and unfair trade competition in milk-resale market created an "emergency"); Jamouneau v. Harner, 16 N.J. 500, 515, 109 A.2d 640 (1954) (determining whether acute housing shortage constituted "emergency"), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 904, 75 S. Ct. 580, 99 L. Ed. 1241 (1955); Scatuorchio v. Jersey City Incinerator Auth., 14 N.J. 72, 85-86, 100 A.2d 869 (1953) (determining whether lack of *150 garbage- and refuse-disposal arrangements for Jersey City constituted "emergency").
Unquestionably, since Executive Order No. 106 was issued in 1981, inmate overcrowding has continued to be a pervasive problem throughout the State-prison and county-jail systems. As the Appellate Division pointed out, 256 N.J. Super. at 147, 606 A.2d 843, the total number of State prisoners increased approximately three-fold from 7,637 in June 1981 to 23,111 in July 1991. During that same period the number of State prisoners housed in county jails grew from 470 to 3,430, causing the county jails to operate at an average of 167% of capacity (using March 1990 figures), while State prison facilities operated at a projected 1991 average of 108.6% of capacity. Ibid.; see County of Monmouth v. Department of Corrections, 236 N.J. Super. 523, 566 A.2d 543 (App.Div. 1989); Morales v. County of Hudson, 236 N.J. Super. 406, 566 A.2d 191 (App.Div. 1989); Governor's Management Review Commission, Corrections in New Jersey: Choosing the Future (Oct. 19, 1990); Joint Appropriations Committee, Analysis of the New Jersey Fiscal Year 1990-1991 Budget for the Department of Corrections (Spring 1990); Harold A. Ackerman, The New Jersey Jail Crisis: The Judicial Experience, 44 Rutgers L.Rev. 135, 136-38, 150-63 (1991) [hereinafter Ackerman]. However, we can no longer say, as we did in Worthington, that current prison overcrowding constitutes an "emergency" within the meaning of the Disaster Control Act.
The determination of whether an "emergency" exists requires a fact-specific analysis. See Deal Gardens, Inc. v. Board of Trustees, 48 N.J. 492, 500, 226 A.2d 607 (1967). There is no temporal rule of thumb for determining when an "emergency" ceases to exist. Rather, courts should consider the passage of time, see Hutton Park Gardens v. Town Council of W. Orange, 68 N.J. 543, 566-67, 350 A.2d 1 (1975); Cappture Realty Corp. v. Board of Adjustment, 126 N.J. Super. 200, 213, 313 A.2d 624 (Law Div. 1973), aff'd, 133 N.J. Super. 216, 221, 336 *151 A.2d 30 (App.Div. 1975), and other factors such as the extent to which the problem is within the government's control, see Worthington, supra, 88 N.J. at 195, 440 A.2d 1128; Scatuorchio, supra, 14 N.J. at 85-86, 100 A.2d 869, and the extent to which remedial efforts have been undertaken.
Despite the good-faith efforts thus far undertaken, however, the overcrowding problem has not been brought under control. The long-term problem of prison overcrowding calls for an executive and legislative solution rather than an executive order under the Disaster Control Act. See Worthington, supra, 88 N.J. at 203, 440 A.2d 1128. The Legislature is of course free to address the problem by declaring a continuing "emergency," and explicitly conferring on the Governor the authority to deal with it by Executive Order other than under the Disaster Control Act in its current form, see, e.g., Burlington Food Store, Inc., supra, 45 N.J. at 220-22, 212 A.2d 29 (finding continuing "emergency" pursuant to Milk Regulation Act of 1941, L. 1941, c. 274, thereby upholding order by Director of Office of Milk Industry, Department of Agriculture), or by enacting a statute providing for the "permanent centralization of power to allocate state prisoners among county facilities," Worthington, supra, 88 N.J. at 203, 440 A.2d 1128, should it find that means an appropriate way to administer the penal system. But, as in Worthington, we remain unwilling "to infer such a legislative intent from mere legislative inaction in the face of the continued exercise of emergency power by the Governor." Ibid.
On the issue of reimbursement we are in agreement with the reasoning of Shapiro, supra, 193 N.J. Super. 237, 473 A.2d 112. So long as the "emergency" persists, the Commissioner is authorized to implement a per diem reimbursement rate that does not necessarily reflect the actual costs incurred by the counties. Of course, when the "emergency" ceases, so will the Commissioner's authority to set a discretionary rate for per diem reimbursement. Presumably the other branches will come to grips with the fiscal problem directly or confer on the *153 Commissioner the authority to address that problem, particularly the reimbursement rate.
The Appellate Division declared that the State may no longer characterize the overcrowded conditions in the State's prisons as an "emergency" under the Disaster Control Act. 256 N.J. Super. at 152-53, 606 A.2d 843. Recognizing, however, that its action "[could] not be expected to cause an immediate change in a complex and expensive system of county and State correctional facilities," id. at 152, 606 A.2d 843, and that "[s]ome considerable period of time for compliance must be given," ibid., the court below made its judgment effective as of one year from the date of its decision. For the same reason we will allow one year from today's date for compliance.
The judgment below is modified only in respect of its effective date, and, as modified, affirmed.
For modification and affirmance Chief Justice WILENTZ and Justices HANDLER, CLIFFORD, POLLOCK, O'HERN, GARIBALDI and STEIN 7.

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