Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/california/supreme-court/3d/1/948.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 12:45:01+00:00

Document:
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. M. A. RANDALL, Defendant and Appellant.
M. A. Randall, in pro. per., James T. Lindsey, under appointment by the Supreme Court, and Josef Dubiel, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, William E. James, Assistant Attorney General, and Michael L. Abrams, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant M. A. Randall was charged by an amended information with one count of grand theft. (Pen. Code, § 487.1.) fn. 1 After [1 Cal. 3d 951] a jury trial he was found guilty as charged and was sentenced to state prison for the term prescribed by law. He appeals from the judgment of conviction.
Defendant contends that his confession to the above charge was obtained in violation of the rules announced in Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 10 A.L.R.3d 974] and that its introduction in evidence over his objection constitutes reversible error. We have concluded that this contention has merit. We reverse the judgment.
Defendant was, hired on September 25, 1967, as a desk clerk at the Alisal Guest Ranch, a resort near Solvang, California. His duties included those usual for such a position: aiding with the check-in and check-out procedures, arranging advance reservations, and collecting the money paid by departing guests. In the course of this employment, he had access to the cash register in the front office as well as to various cash boxes located elsewhere in the office complex. About noon on Sunday, October 1, 1967, defendant left the ranch in an automobile he had rented the previous day and did not return. He departed without speaking to his supervisor or any other member of the ranch staff, collecting the wages due him for the four and one-half days he had worked, or leaving an address to which these wages could be forwarded.
There is some conflict in the evidence as to what transpired during the time from the defendant's arrival at the stationhouse to the interrogation that produced the statement of guilt, the admissibility of which is in issue here. We set forth the two conflicting accounts.
Defendant was questioned further that evening by two other detectives, but Ellson did not see him again until the following morning when he and Kales again questioned him on matters not related to the instant proceedings. After this morning session of questioning, Ellson received a telephone call from the Santa Barbara County sheriff's office and learned for the first time of the warrant which had been issued for defendant in connection with the theft from the Alisal Ranch. That afternoon he and Kales once again questioned defendant and, after a reiteration of the admonitions required by Miranda and defendant's statement that he was willing to waive those rights, obtained his confession to the crime. No record, either stenographic or electronic, was made of this conversation and defendant did not sign a written confession or waiver form. Instead, Officer Ellson testified that he had made longhand notes of the defendant's statements and that a typewritten report was later prepared from these notes. His testimony [1 Cal. 3d 953] on voir dire relating the confession was substantially identical to that given later before the jury: "Mr. Randall stated that he had worked at Alisal Ranch the previous month as a clerk. He stated that one day he was alone at the desk, that he left with about $750.00 of the ranch money and all his luggage."
Defendant testified on voir dire that he had informed one of the arresting officers that he wanted to talk to his attorney during the initial interview conducted immediately after arriving at the substation and that they discontinued the questioning at that point and took him over to the booking room. His account of the events in the booking room corresponds to that of Officer Ellson and, to the extent that it is more fully detailed than that of the officer, is uncontradicted. According to his testimony, he asked the uniformed deputy on duty at the booking desk to look up the correct spelling of Mr. Weiss' name and to place a call to his residence. During the ensuing conversation defendant informed Weiss of his predicament, Weiss advised defendant of his constitutional rights, assured him that he would begin proceedings to secure his release, and stated that he would talk to him later and advise him further at that time. While this discussion (and that with Righter on the subsequent call, see ante, fn. 4) were proceeding, Sergeant Kales was present at the booking desk and listening to them.
Defendant's version of later periods of interrogation differs markedly from that presented by Ellson. Defendant corroborated the fact that three such sessions took place and that the interrogating officers warned him of his rights in substantially the same terms as they had previously done. However, he denied having made the confession and stated that he repeatedly informed the officers he wanted to talk to his attorney and that he never waived his rights to the presence of counsel.
On this appeal we accept that version of events which is most favorable to the People, to the extent that it is supported by the record. Thus, we must accept the testimony of Officer Ellson insofar as it is incompatible with that of the defendant and confine our review beyond such testimony to facts which are uncontradicted by the People. (People v. Sanchez (1969) 70 Cal. 2d 562, 570-573 [75 Cal. Rptr. 642, 451 P.2d 74], petition for cert. dismissed, 394 U.S. 1025 [23 L. Ed. 2d 743, 89 S. Ct. 1646] (whether confession coerced or not); People v. Johnson (1969) 70 Cal. 2d 469, 473, 476-478 [74 Cal. Rptr. 889, 450 P.2d 265] (whether waiver of rights under Escobedo v. Illinois (1964) 378 U.S. 478 [12 L. Ed. 2d 977, 84 S. Ct. 1758] was knowing and voluntary or not); People v. Stoner (1967) 65 Cal. 2d 595, 598 [55 Cal. Rptr. 897, 422 P.2d 585] (whether confession was product of illegal search or not); People v. Trout (1960) 54 Cal. 2d 576, 583 [6 Cal. Rptr. 759, 354 P.2d 231, 80 A.L.R.2d 1418] (whether confession was voluntary or not).) Viewed by this standard the admission of the confession was error.
To strictly limit the manner in which a suspect may assert the privilege, or to demand that it be invoked with unmistakable clarity (resolving any ambiguity against the defendant) would subvert Miranda's prophylactic intent. Moreover, it would benefit, if anyone, only the experienced criminal who, while most adept at learning effective methods of coping with the police, is least likely to find incarceration and police interrogation unnerving. Conversely, it would operate most severely on the ignorant and unsophisticated suspect who is most susceptible to the compulsion arising from the tactics of custodial interrogation and consequently most in need of the protections outlined by Miranda.
The People contend that defendant's telephone call to his attorney should not be considered tantamount to the request for an attorney in Ireland or the refusal to sign a waiver in Fioritto. They argue that such a phone call made by a suspect from a police station, after the suspect has been arrested and while he is being booked, in no way signifies his desire not to talk to police or to have his attorney present during any interrogation. Accordingly, they assert that since defendant did not invoke the privilege, there was no necessity for the suspension of police questioning. Thus, the People [1 Cal. 3d 956] argue, the subsequent confession was, as the trial court found, the product of a knowing and voluntary waiver of defendants Miranda rights. Alternatively, the People suggest that even if the phone call is considered an invocation of the privilege, this should not prevent a later voluntary waiver which occurred in the instant case. Neither position is tenable.
In any event, we are not disposed to assume as a general matter that a telephone conversation with an attorney such as occurred in the case at hand is not a manifestation of a suspect's intention to assert his privilege. We were unwilling to make such an assumption in the analogous situation in Ireland and no persuasive reason suggests a different course here. fn. 9  The People have the burden of demonstrating that a questioned confession meets the constitutional tests of admissibility. (See People v. Davis (1967) 66 Cal. 2d 175, 180 [57 Cal. Rptr. 130, 424 P.2d 682]; People v. Charles (1967) 66 Cal. 2d 330, 340-341 [57 Cal. Rptr. 745, 425 P.2d 545].)  When, as appears here, the suspect to the knowledge of the police completes a call to his attorney, the People--if they contend that the fact of such a call should not be considered an invocation of the privilege--must affirmatively demonstrate that the suspect was not thereby indicating a desire to remain silent until he had obtained the full advice of his counsel.
 We hold that, in the absence of evidence compelling a contrary interpretation, a telephone call to an attorney must be construed to indicate that the suspect desires to invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege. Miranda teaches that the processes of custodial interrogation must cease at that point. Since they did not in this case, the statement elicited by the subsequent questioning was inadmissible.
Traynor, C. J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., and Mosk, J., concurred.
I dissent. I would affirm the judgment for the reasons expressed by Mr. Justice Fleming in the opinion prepared by him for the Court of Appeal, Second District, Division Two (People v. Randall, 2 Crim.. 15517, filed August 15, 1969, certified for nonpublication).
The majority opinion answers this question in the affirmative rendering inadmissible statements given by defendant during a subsequent custodial interrogation at a separate time and by different officers at which, after again bring fully informed of his rights, defendant expressed the desire to waive them and made the objected-to statements. In addition to Miranda the majority rely on this court's decisions in People v. Ireland, 70 Cal. 2d 522 [75 Cal. Rptr. 188, 450 P.2d 580], and People v. Fioritto, 68 Cal. 2d 714 [68 Cal. Rptr. 817, 441 P.2d 625]. I submit that these decisions do not impel the ruling of the majority in this case and that it is an unwarranted extension of the Miranda holding.
In the instant case defendant (1) in no manner indicated to, the police that he desired to see an attorney before speaking; and (2) gave no indication to them that he did not wish to be interrogated. Before the commencement of each separate interrogation the police scrupulously gave defendant the full Miranda warning, asked him if he understood his rights and if he was willing to give up these rights and talk with the officers. In each instance he indicated he understood his rights and was willing to talk to the officers. This case is therefore clearly distinguishable from a Miranda-type interrogation during which a defendant indicates that he desires to consult his attorney before he answers any questions or that he desires to have his attorney present during such questioning.
In People v. Ireland, supra, 70 Cal. 2d 522, during the process of interrogation upon his arrest defendant was asked whether he had anything to say and his response was "Call my parents for my attorney," but this request was not complied with and our court held that since the defendant had indicated he wanted an attorney the interrogation should have terminated until an attorney was present.
People v. Fioritto, supra, 68 Cal. 2d 714, likewise is clearly distinguishable from the instant case. There, after defendant was brought into the police station he was advised of his Miranda rights and was asked to sign a waiver. Defendant refused. Immediately thereafter he was confronted [1 Cal. 3d 960] with two accomplices who had confessed, whereupon he subsequently waived his rights and confessed to the crime. This court ruled that in refusing to sign the waiver defendant in effect indicated that he wished to remain silent and that under the application of Miranda the interrogation should have terminated immediately.
It is also worthy of note that this defendant was not without knowledge and experience in dealing with police. He had previously been convicted of a felony and was subsequently charged and admitted the prior conviction. The trial judge heard the testimony of both the police officers and the defendant and was convinced that there was no impropriety, and for the reasons indicated I believe the conviction of the defendant should be affirmed.
FN 1. Unless otherwise indicated, all section references hereafter are to the Penal Code.
FN 2. There is some uncertainty as to the exact amount of cash which was missing. The amended information charged defendant with the theft of $769.
FN 3. Ellson testified that an invitation to make these calls is extended to all arrested persons as a standard procedure of the Los Angeles County Sheriffs Department. It is intended to comply with Penal Code section 851.5 which provides, in relevant part: "Any person arrested has, immediately after he is booked, and except where physically impossible, no later than three hours after his arrest, the right to make, at his own expense, in the presence of a public officer or employee, at least two telephone calls from the police station or other place where he is booked, one completed to the person called, who may be his attorney, employer, or a relative, the other completed to a bail bondsman." The usual method in which this is accomplished is for the person being booked to inform the officer who is conducting the booking whom he wants to call. The officer will then dial the number and, when the connection is completed, hand the receiver to the caller.
FN 4. Ellson testified that since he was occupied with other matters at the time, he did not know to whom defendant placed the two calls or the content of the conversations. He did know, however, that defendant had made two calls, since the numbers were entered on the booking sheet. From subsequent investigation he had discovered that one call was placed to Carol Righter, an astrologer, and the other to Harry Weiss, an attorney. Ellson testified that "as a Sergeant in the Sheriff's Department [in Los Angeles]" he recognized "the name Weiss as being a prominent defense attorney in Southern California."
FN 10. The fact that Officer Ellson may not have known of the placing of the call will not excuse his subsequent questioning. As we said in Ireland, supra;. "The fact that a failure of communication within the police department might have been at fault can have no effect upon our decision. Our concern lies with the fact that, for whatever reason, custodial interrogative processes did not cease upon assertion of the privilege." (70 Cal.2d at p. 536, fn. 12.)	To hold otherwise would open the door to evasions by the police.	(See People v. Milton (1969) 270 Cal. App. 2d 408, 415 [75 Cal. Rptr. 803].) Of course, the police must be aware that defendant has called his attorney for the obligation to respect the assertion of the privilege to arise. Here, from the testimony of Officer Ellson and from the uncontradicted testimony of the defendant it is clear that at least two members of the sheriff's department knew that the call had been placed to defendant's attorney, one of whom participated in the subsequent interrogations.
FN 1. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 [16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 10 A.L.R.3d 974].

References: v. 
 § 487
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.