Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=82519:56402&catid=1576&Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 15:48:25+00:00

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G.R. No. 193839, November 27, 2013 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JAVIER CAÑAVERAS, Accused-Appellant.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JAVIER CAÑAVERAS, Accused-Appellant.
This is an appeal from the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming the Partial Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Camarines Sur, Branch 30 (RTC), finding appellant guilty of the crime of murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
On 25 September 2006, the RTC promulgated a Partial Decision44 finding appellant guilty of the crime of murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the inherent accessories provided by law.45 Appellant was also ordered to pay Claro’s heirs the amounts of P50,000 as civil indemnity, P50,000 as moral damages and P25,000 as temperate damages.
On appeal to the CA, appellant argued that the RTC erred in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder.47 Furthermore, even assuming that he committed the act complained of, it was error to appreciate the qualifying circumstances. Thus, he could only be found guilty of the crime of homicide.
Also, appellant pointed out that there was a brownout during the incident, making it highly unlikely for the witnesses to have allegedly seen him commit the crime. According to him, the claim that Matea trained her flashlight on his face, enabling her to identify him, was not in accord with the common experience of persons witnessing a deplorable crime.50 Knowing that he had been identified, appellant could have killed her as well.
On 21 June 2010, the CA rendered a Decision57 affirming in toto that of the RTC. The CA ruled that the alleged inconsistency regarding the moment when appellant went out of the house referred only to a collateral matter and did not deviate from the fact that he had been identified as the assailant.58 The brownout did not negate the positive identification of appellant, since Teresita testified that her house and that of Oriel were lit by kerosene lamps. That Matea boldly shone her flashlight on appellant’s face did not make her any less credible as a witness.59 On the contrary, it only showed her presence of mind and courage in the face of a startling and frightful experience.
Hence, this appeal, with the parties adopting their respective arguments in their briefs filed before the CA.
Whether treachery or taking advantage of superior strength attended the commission of the crime.
We partially grant the appeal.
We affirm the findings of the RTC and the CA that appellant indeed struck Claro with a beer bottle, leading to the victim’s untimely death. Taken together, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses clearly point to appellant as the assailant.
First, contrary to the contention of appellant that the three unidentified persons were not his companions, Oriel positively declared having received appellant together with the three other persons at his home. Furthermore, Oriel testified that after Claro had asked about “Judas” for the second time, appellant and the three others went after Claro outside.
Second, Matea saw appellant hit Claro on the head with a beer bottle after the three unidentified persons had finished punching the victim. We dismiss the improper imputations on Matea’s credibility based on the argument that it is not in accord with common human experience for one to shine a light on the face of a person who has just committed a crime. The CA was correct in holding that her actuation meant nothing more than that she exhibited courage and presence of mind, knowing that she might be able to help, as indeed she did, in bringing the perpetrators to justice.
Third, Teresita heard one of appellant’s companions say, “You should have shoot [sic] him” while they were going back to Oriel’s house. Alvin even saw appellant at Oriel’s house after Oriel revealed that appellant had struck Claro.
These declarations of the witnesses show a complete picture of what happened before, during, and after the attack on Claro by appellant. We take note that Oriel is a relative by affinity and close friend of appellant. Despite some effort on his part to “hide some material facts,” as noted by the RTC,62 he still provided enough evidence pointing to appellant as the assailant.
In this case, the complaint and the affidavits of the witnesses were executed with the assistance of a private lawyer. Appellant cannot rely on the police blotters as a comprehensive record of the investigation conducted by the police. While the blotters were silent as to his involvement in the crime, the complaint and the affidavits of the witnesses named him as the perpetrator.
However, while we entertain no doubt that appellant killed Claro, we find that treachery was improperly appreciated by the CA.
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof that tend directly and especially to ensure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense that the offended party might make.66 Treachery is appreciated as a qualifying circumstance when the following elements are shown: a) the malefactor employed means, method, or manner of execution affording the person attacked no opportunity for self-defense or retaliation; and b) the means, method, or manner of execution was deliberately or consciously adopted by the offender.
In this case, there was no time for appellant and his companions to plan and agree to deliberately adopt a particular means to kill Claro. The first query of Claro was regarded as innocent enough and was given no attention. It was the second query that was considered impertinent, and witnesses testified that appellant and his companions went after Claro immediately after it was uttered. Even the choice of weapon, a beer bottle readily available and within grabbing range at the table as appellant followed outside, shows that the intent to harm came about spontaneously.
We also find that the RTC erred in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of taking advantage of superior strength.
In this case, the unidentified companions of appellant punched Claro first. He was already about to escape when he was struck by appellant on the head with a beer bottle. Thus, the attack mounted by the unidentified persons had already ceased when appellant took over. Also, the fact that Claro would have been able to escape showed that the initial attack was not that overwhelming, considering that there were three of them attacking. Clearly, there was no blatant disparity in strength between Claro, on the one hand, and appellant and his companions on the other.
In the light of the foregoing, the crime committed was homicide, not murder. Under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty imposed for the crime of homicide is reclusion temporal. Considering that no aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the crime, the penalty shall be imposed in its medium period.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is PARTIALLY GRANTED. We find appellant GUILTY of the crime of HOMICIDE. He is hereby SENTENCED to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum and ORDERED to pay the heirs of Claro Sales the amounts of P50,000 as civil indemnity, P50,000 as moral damages, and P25,000 as temperate damages, at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the finality of this Decision until these damages are fully paid.
1Rollo, pp. 2-16. The Decision dated 21 June 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) Eleventh Division in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02532 was penned by Associate Justice Hakim S. Abdulwahid, with Associate Justices Ricardo R. Rosario and Samuel H. Gaerlan concurring.
2 CA rollo, pp. 17-29; in Criminal Case No. T-1358 dated 12 September 2006.
4 CA rollo, p. 19.
26 Id at 73 and 77.
44 Id. at 503-515. The case was archived insofar as the three unidentified persons (John Doe, Peter Doe and Richard Doe) were concerned, subject to its reactivation as soon as they are identified and the court acquires jurisdiction over their persons.
47 CA rollo, pp. 84-99.
66 REVISED PENAL CODE, Art. 14(16).
67People v. Recepcion, 440 Phil. 227 (2002).
69People v. Abut, 449 Phil. 522 (2003).
70People v. Santillana, 367 Phil. 373 (1999).
71People v. Teriapil, G.R. No. 191361, 2 March 2011, 644 SCRA 491.
72People v. Tigle, 465 Phil. 368 (2004).
73People v. Badajos, 464 Phil. 762 (2004).
74People v. Aliben, 446 Phil. 349 (2003).
77People v. CAFGU Baltar, Jr., 401 Phil. 1 (2000).
78Pron v. People, G.R. No. 199017, 10 April 2013; Zalameda v. People, G.R. No. 203259, 7 January 2013; People v. Concillado, G.R. No. 181204, 28 November 2011, 661 SCRA 363.

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