Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/254/325/
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 08:13:56+00:00

Document:
1. The law of Minnesota declaring it a misdemeanor for any person to teach or advocate by any written or printed matter or by oral speech that citizens of the state should not aid or assist the United States in prosecuting or carrying on war with the public enemies of the United States is valid under the federal Constitution. P. 254 U. S. 327.
cooperation by the state with the United States, not in conflict with the federal war power, p. 254 U. S. 328, and also as an exercise of the police power to preserve the peace of the state. P. 254 U. S. 331. Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U. S. 34; Presser v. Illinois, 116 U. S. 252.
3. The right of free speech does not cover false and malicious misrepresentation of the objects and motives of this country in entering upon a war, made in a public speech for the purpose of discouraging the recruiting of troops, while the war is flagrant and armies are being raised. P. 254 U. S. 332.
A statute of Minnesota makes it unlawful "to interfere with or discourage the enlistment of men in the military or naval forces of the United States or of the State of Minnesota."
"Sec. 2. Speaking by Word of Mouth against Enlistment Unlawful. -- It shall be unlawful for any person in any public place, or at any meeting where more than five persons are assembled, to advocate or teach by word of mouth or otherwise that men should not enlist in the military or naval forces of the United States or the State of Minnesota."
for any person to teach or advocate by any written or printed matter whatsoever, or by oral speech, that the citizens of this state should not aid or assist the United States in prosecuting or carrying on war with the public enemies of the United States."
Section 4 defines a citizen to be "any person within the confines of the state," and § 5 declares violations of the act to be gross misdemeanors and punishable by fine and imprisonment.
"We are going over to Europe to make the world safe for democracy, but I tell you we had better make America safe for democracy first. You say, what is the matter with our democracy? I tell you what is the matter with it: have you had anything to say as to who should be President? Have you had anything to say as to who should be Governor of this state? Have you had anything to say as to whether we would go into this war? You know you have not. If this is such a good democracy, for Heaven's sake, why should we not vote on conscription of men? We were stampeded into this war by newspaper rot to pull England's chestnuts out of the fire for her. I tell you if they conscripted wealth like they have conscripted men, this war would not last over forty-eight hours. . . ."
A demurrer to the indictment was overruled, and Gilbert was tried and convicted. The judgment was that he pay a fine of $500 and be imprisoned in the county jail of the County of Goodhue for one year, and pay the costs of the prosecution. The judgment was affirmed by the supreme court of the state.
regarding the subject matter contained in the statute is conferred upon Congress and withheld from the states." (2) And that the statute is obnoxious to the "inherent right of free speech respecting the concerns, activities and interests of the United States of America and its government."
"that the State of Minnesota is not a party to the war now [then] being waged. If it is not engaged in any war, and until it does so engage, legislation such as a belligerent sovereign might enact is beyond its province."
These specific grounds of objection to the statute are attempted to be reinforced by analogy to the power of Congress over interstate commerce to the exclusion of the interference of the states.
The bases of the objections seem to be that plaintiff in error had an accountability as a citizen of the United States different from that which he had as a citizen of the state, and that therefore he was not subject to the power or jurisdiction of the state exercised in the act under review. Manifestly, to support the contention, something more is necessary than the letter of the cited constitutional provisions. The broader proposition must be established that a state has no interest or concern in the United States or its armies or power of protecting them from public enemies.
The latter case is especially pertinent in its sentiment and reasoning. It sustained a statute of Nebraska directed against the debasement of the national flag to trade uses against the contention that the flag, being the national emblem, was subject only to the control of the national power. In sustaining the statute, it was recognized that in a degradation of the flag there is a degradation of all of which it is the symbol -- that is, "the national power and national honor," and what they represent and have in trust. To maintain and reverence these, to "encourage patriotism and love of country among its people," may be affirmed, it was said, to be a duty that rests upon each state, and that "when, by its legislation, the state encourages a feeling of patriotism towards the nation, it necessarily encourages a like feeling towards the state."
the state power, but it has power to regulate the conduct of its citizens and to restrain the exertion of baleful influences against the promptings of patriotic duty to the detriment of the welfare of the nation and state. To do so is not to usurp a national power; it is only to render a service to its people, as Nebraska rendered a service to its people when it inhibited the debasement of the flag.
"the national purposes its own purposes, to the extent of exerting its police power to prevent its own citizens from obstructing the accomplishment of such purposes."
"The act under consideration does not relate to the raising of armies for the national defense, nor to rules and regulations for the government of those under arms. It is simply a local police measure, aimed to suppress a species of seditious speech which the legislature of the state has found objectionable. If the legislature has otherwise power to prohibit utterances of the character of those here complained of, the fact that such suppression has some contributory effect on the federal function of raising armies is quite beside the question."
danger of it is a proper exercise of the power of the state. Presser v. Illinois, 116 U. S. 267.
"that the First Amendment, while prohibiting legislation against free speech as such, cannot and obviously was not intended to give immunity to every possible use of language."
the statute of Minnesota, and a direct assertion in spite of the prohibition of the statute that one can, by speech, teach or advocate that the citizens of the state should not aid or assist "the United States in prosecuting or carrying on war with the public enemies of the United States," and be protected by the Constitution of the United States.
The same conditions existed as in the cited cases -- that is, a condition of war and its emergency existed, and there was explicit limitation to § 3 in the charge of the trial court to the jury. The court read §§ 2 and 3 of the statute to the jury, and said: "I take it from the reading of the whole indictment that it is prosecuted under § 3, which I have just read to you."
This was known to Gilbert, for he was informed in affairs and the operations of the government, and every word that he uttered in denunciation of the war was false, was deliberate misrepresentation of the motives which impelled it and the objects for which it was prosecuted. He could have had no purpose other than that of which he was charged. It would be a travesty on the constitutional privilege he invokes to assign him its protection.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE, being of the opinion that the subject matter is within the exclusive legislative power of Congress, when exerted, and that the action of Congress has occupied the whole field, therefore dissents.
"It is true that the federal government alone has power to declare war, but, having done so, the government and people of Minnesota became bound to defend and support the national government. While the states of the nation are sovereign in a certain field, they are also members of the family of states constituting the national organization."
Words of President Wilson in his war message to Congress, April 2, 1917.
Joseph Gilbert, manager of the organization department of the Nonpartisan League, was sentenced to fine and imprisonment for speaking on August 18, 1917 at a public meeting of the league, words held to be prohibited by c. 463 of the laws of Minnesota, approved April 20, 1917. Gilbert was a citizen of the United States and apparently of a state other than Minnesota. He claimed seasonably that the statute violated rights guaranteed to him by the federal Constitution. This claim has been denied; and, in my opinion, erroneously.
The Minnesota statute was enacted during the World War, but it is not a war measure. The statute is said to have been enacted by the state under its police power to preserve the peace, but it is in fact an act to prevent teaching that the abolition of war is possible. Unlike the federal Espionage Act of June 15, 1917, c. 30, 40 Stat. 217, 219, it applies equally whether the United States is at peace or at war. It abridges freedom of speech and of the press not in a particular emergency, in order to avert a clear and present danger, but under all circumstances. The restriction imposed relates to the teaching of the doctrine of pacifism, and the legislature in effect proscribes it for all time. The statute does not in terms prohibit the teaching of the doctrine. Its prohibition is more specific, and is directed against the teaching of certain applications of it. This specification operates, as will be seen, rather to extend than to limit the scope of the prohibition.
of conscience, or of conviction, and teach son or daughter the doctrine of pacifism. If they do, any police officer may summarily arrest them.
That such a law is inconsistent with the conceptions of liberty hitherto prevailing seems clear. But it is said that the guaranty against abridging freedom of speech contained in the First Amendment of the federal Constitution applies only to federal action; that the legislation here complained of is that of a state; that the validity of the statute has been sustained by its highest court as a police measure; that the matter is one of state concern, and that consequently this Court cannot interfere. But the matter is not one merely of state concern. The state law affects directly the functions of the federal government. It affects rights, privileges, and immunities of one who is a citizen of the United States, and it deprives him of an important part of his liberty. These are rights which are guaranteed protection by the federal Constitution, and they are invaded by the statute in question.
the limitations and obligations which the service imposes, and in the face of efforts to discourage their doing so. [Footnote 2/1] It might conclude that the most effective army would be one composed exclusively of men who are firmly convinced that war is sometimes necessary if honor is to be preserved, and also that the particular war in which they are engaged in a just one. Congress, legislating for a people justly proud of liberties theretofore enjoyed and suspicious or resentful of any interference with them, might conclude that even in times of great danger, the most effective means of securing support from the great body of citizens is to accord to all full freedom to criticize the acts and administration of their country, although such freedom may be used by a few, to urge upon their fellow citizens not to aid the government in carrying on a war, which reason or faith tells them is wrong, and will therefore bring misery upon their country.
"the right of the people to assemble for the purpose of petitioning Congress for a redress of grievance or for anything else connected with the powers or duties of the national government"
would be a right totally without substance. See United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542, 92 U. S. 552; The Slaughterhouse Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 83 U. S. 79. Full and free exercise of this right by the citizen is ordinarily also his duty, for its exercise is more important to the nation than it is to himself. Like the course of the heavenly bodies, harmony in national life is a resultant of the struggle between contending forces. In frank expression of conflicting opinion lies the greatest promise of wisdom in governmental action, and in suppression lies ordinarily the greatest peril. There are times when those charged with the responsibility of government, faced with clear and present danger, may conclude that suppression of divergent opinion is imperative because the emergency does not permit reliance upon the lower conquest of error by truth. And, in such emergencies, the power to suppress exists. But the responsibility for the maintenance of the army and navy, for the conduct of war, and for the preservation of government, both state and federal, from "malice domestic and foreign levy" rests upon Congress. It is true that the states have the power of self-preservation inherent in any government to suppress insurrection and repel invasion, and to that end they may maintain such a force of militia as Congress may prescribe and arm. Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. 1. But the duty of preserving the state governments falls ultimately upon the federal government. Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1, 48 U. S. 77; The Prize Cases, 2 Black 635, 67 U. S. 668; Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 700, 74 U. S. 727. And the superior responsibility carries with it the superior right. The states act only under the express direction of Congress. See National Defense Act, June 3, 1916, c. 134, 39 Stat.
166; Selective Service Act, May 18, 1917, c. 15, 40 Stat. 76. The fact that they may stimulate and encourage recruiting, just as they may stimulate and encourage interstate commerce, Monongahela Nav. Co. v. United States, 148 U. S. 312, 148 U. S. 329, does not give them the power by police regulations or otherwise to exceed the authority expressly granted to them by the federal government. See Kurtz v. Moffitt, 115 U. S. 487; Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 16 Pet. 539. Congress, being charged with responsibility for those functions of government, must determine whether a paramount interest of the nation demands that free discussion in relation to them should be curtailed. No state may trench upon its province.
free to advise his fellows not to enter the army or the navy as he was free to recommend their enlistment. The government had exacted from American citizens no service except the prompt payment of taxes. Although war had been declared, such was still the policy, and the law of the United States when Minnesota enacted the statute here in question.
"In the State of Minnesota, because of what was claimed to be either inadequate federal law or inadequate federal administration, state laws of a sweeping character were passed and enforced with severity. Whether justified or not in adopting this policy of repression, the result of its adoption increased discontent, and the most serious cases of alleged interference with civil liberty were reported to the federal government from that state. [Footnote 2/5]"
"not upon any consideration of degree, but upon the entire absence of power on the part of the states to touch the instrumentalities of the United States."
"when the United States has exercised its exclusive powers . . . so far as to take possession of the field, the states no more can supplement its requirements than they can annul them."
to have put into that category. Compare Schaefer v. United States, 251 U. S. 466, 251 U. S. 494, note.
As the Minnesota statute is, in my opinion, invalid because it interferes with federal functions and with the right of a citizen of the United States to discuss them, I see no occasion to consider whether it violates also the Fourteenth Amendment. But I have difficulty in believing that the liberty guaranteed by the Constitution, which has been held to protect against state denial the right of an employer to discriminate against a workman because he is a member of a trade union, Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U. S. 1, the right of a business man to conduct a private employment agency, Adams v. Tanner, 244 U. S. 590, or to contract outside the state for insurance of his property, Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578, 165 U. S. 589, although the legislature deems it inimical to the public welfare, does not include liberty to teach, either in the privacy of the home or publicly, the doctrine of pacifism, so long, at least, as Congress has not declared that the public safety demands its suppression. I cannot believe that the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment includes only liberty to acquire and to enjoy property.
See General John A. Logan, "The Volunteer Soldier of America," pp. 89-91; Col. F. N. Maude in the Contemporary Review v. 189, p. 37.
Act of March 3, 1863, c. 75, 12 Stat. 731.
Recruiting officers were required to explain to every man before he signed the enlistment paper the nature of the service, the length of the term, the amount of pay, clothing, rations, and other allowances to which a soldier is entitled by law, and to read and explain to the applicant many of the articles of war before administering to him the oath of enlistment. U.S. Army Regulations, 1913, paragraphs 854, 856.
"All progress and success rests fundamentally on truth. Hence, never resort to indirection or misrepresentation or suppression of part of the facts in order to push a wavering case over the line. Recruits signed up on misrepresented facts or partial information do not make good soldiers. They resent being fooled just as you would, and will never yield their full value to a government whose agents obtained their services in a way not fully square. Therefore, tell your prospect anything he wants to know about the army. If the real facts are not strong enough to win him, you don't want him anyway."
Recruiters Handbook, United States Army, p. 16.
"The general policy of the Attorney General (Mr. Gregory) toward free speech has been well understood and adhered to by his subordinates with a good deal of consistency. From the outset, recognizing that free expression of public opinion is the life of the nation, we have endeavored to impress on our subordinates the necessity of keeping within the limits of policy established by Congress and bearing in mind at all times the constitutional guaranties. Repeatedly their attention has been called to the fact that expression of private or public opinion relating to matters of governmental policy or of political character must not be confused with willful attempts to interfere with our conduct of the war. At all times we have had before us the dangers which follow attempts to restrain public discussion; and, so far as instructions issued by the Attorney General have been concerned, they have consistently and at all times emphasized this general policy."
John Lord O'Brian, "Civil Liberty in War Time," Report of New York state Bar Assn., vol. 42, p. 308.
Report of New York Bar Assn., vol. 42, p. 296.

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