Source: https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2016/10/10/sionaidh-douglas-scott-the-great-repeal-bill-constitutional-chaos-and-constitutional-crisis/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 14:42:01+00:00

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Sionaidh Douglas-Scott: The ‘Great Repeal Bill’: Constitutional Chaos and Constitutional Crisis?
On October 2, Theresa May set out plans for a ‘Great Repeal Bill’ to be included in the next Queen’s Speech. There is very little detail currently available, but it appears this Bill is intended to remove the European Communities Act (ECA) 1972 from the statute book following completion of the Brexit negotiations. It would also incorporate current applicable EU law into an Act of Parliament and then allow the government to decide if/when to repeal, amend or retain individual measures in the future, following Brexit.
It seems to be the intention to introduce this Bill into Parliament in 2017, but it will not come into force until after a Withdrawal Agreement is concluded and the UK has actually left the EU. It is not so unusual for Parliament to adopt legislation but specify an implementation date some time in the future. Some (John Redwood, for example) advocated changing UK law by repealing the ECA 1972 and so unilaterally ending the application of EU law in the UK, regardless of any Art 50 TEU negotiations. But if taken prior to (or in the absence of) formal withdrawal from the EU treaties under Art 50 TEU, such actions would clearly violate both EU law and international law, and be very harmful to the UK’s international reputation.
A ‘Great Repeal Bill’ would apparently serve 2 major functions. First, it would repeal the ECA 1972. ‘Its effect will be clear,’ Theresa May told the Conservative party conference in Birmingham. ‘Our laws will be made not in Brussels but in Westminster. The judges interpreting those laws will sit not in Luxembourg but in courts in this country. The authority of EU law in Britain will end.’ Its purpose would be to make the UK legal system ‘sovereign’ and independent of the EU. Crucially, it would remove priority of EU law over national law, thus expunging the doctrine of primacy of EU law, as first specifically enunciated by the European Court of Justice (CJEU) in Costa v ENEL. It would also remove the jurisdiction of the CJEU as far as the UK is concerned.
Second, however, the function of the ‘Great Repeal Bill’ would not be to repeal all EU as it applies in the UK. Quite the reverse. In fact, the purpose would be preserve and carry over into UK law the full body of EU law not already implemented in national law. Otherwise, given the many EU provisions applicable in the UK, there would be a risk of huge gaps in UK law on the date of withdrawal. So the Bill would stipulate something to the effect of, ‘all existing EU law on the date of withdrawal from the EU remains in force’.
(1) The European Communities Act 1972 is repealed.
Note the reference above to ‘secondary legislation’ made under the ECA continuing in force. Section 2(2) ECA at present applies to measures of EU law that are neither directly applicable nor have direct effect, and makes it possible to give effect in national law to such measures by secondary, or delegated, legislation, such as statutory instruments.
However, if the ‘Great Repeal Bill’ were to follow the structure of previous Bills such as Hollobone’s, there would need to be a further clause in the ‘Great Repeal Bill’ to make up for the repeal of section 2(1) ECA. Section 2(1) ECA currently provides that provisions of EU law that are directly applicable or have direct effect, such as EU Regulations or certain articles of the EU Treaties, are automatically ‘without further enactment’ incorporated and binding in national law without the need for a further UK legislation. So, when eg an EU Regulation enters into force, it automatically becomes part of national law, without the need for implementing legislation, as would usually be required for obligations assumed under international law in the UK. Without such a clause, directly applicable treaty provisions or EU regulations, such as those pertaining to equal pay for men and women would be lost. Of course, the ‘Great Repeal Bill’ might just use the simplistic formula mentioned above, that ‘all existing EU law on the date of withdrawal from the EU remains in force’, obviating the need for a ‘belt and braces’ approach distinguishing different types of EU law. However, in the interests of clarity and legal certainty, the elaboration of a ‘belt and braces’ approach is desirable.
However, presumably the ‘Great Repeal Bill’ would not touch EU law which has already become part of UK law due to primary legislation (eg the Consumer Protection Act 1987), which remain in force, although could be repealed by Parliament at some future date.
Unfortunately, Henry VIII clauses are becoming a too familiar part of UK legislation generally. Yet such a measure would be a profoundly unparliamentary and undemocratic way to repeal or amend former EU law, and hardly a means for Parliament to ‘take back control,’ given that Parliament has a fairly minimal role in secondary legislation and no power to make amendments. The use of Henry VIII clauses to repeal EU law is particularly repugnant, given that EU law has created vast networks of rights and obligations, whose subject matter – eg social policy, discrimination law, or fundamental rights – covers many matters central to individual liberty, and their repeal or amendment, even by means of primary legislation, would be highly controversial.
There are further questions too. The statement on the Department for Exiting the EU webpage also states that ‘It will also ensure that the Government can establish new domestic regimes in areas where regulation and licensing is currently done at an EU level, and amendments are required to ensure the law operates effectively at a domestic level.’ This rather underestimates the nature of the task. Many EU laws make references to EU agencies and institutions setting standards or performing functions in relation to EU law. What will their role be if EU law is ‘patriated’? For example, the European Medicines Agency (EMA) is an EU agency for the evaluation of medicinal products, with a function rather similar to aspects of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration Agency. It is based in London (and will have to relocate on Brexit, with British job losses) and has overseen EU-wide drug approvals since 1995. Post Brexit, would the UK continue to accept decisions by a relocated EMA until a new British equivalent had been set up, which could take several years? If there were a British equivalent, there would also have to be arrangements for mutual recognition of UK and EU agency decisions, otherwise applicants would face extra costs of going through two agencies. This may sound technical, but such matters will arise with literally hundreds of EU provisions, requiring thought, time, expertise and cost before the law will be workable. More generally, any EU provisions translated into UK law relating to trade or co-operation with the EU (eg transfer of prisoners serving sentence in EU prisons, or recognition and enforcement of judgments) will only be workable if the EU and UK reach an agreement on the matter. Would this be a matter for Withdrawal Negotiations under Article 50? And what happens if agreement is not reached? Thus, there will be many rule of law (in the sense of ensuring a law that is clear, foreseeable and coherent) issues raised by the ‘Great Repeal Bill’.
A further matter concerns the role of the CJEU post Brexit. On the one hand, the ‘Great Repeal Bill’ will have stipulated that the UK no longer recognises its jurisdiction. That was an essential part of ‘taking back control’. On the other hand, not recognising CJEU jurisprudence will render EU-derived UK law static, and of limited utility when it concerns trans-border matters (eg criminal law matters, such as EU arrest warrants, where the UK is likely to want to continue co-operation with the EU). So although CJEU decisions may be of ‘persuasive’ authority only post-Brexit, UK courts may find it practical to reach similar conclusions to the CJEU for a time to come. Another question mark for ‘Taking back control’.
However, one of the most immediate problems that the ‘Great Repeal Bill’ is likely to face arises with respect to devolved matters. The aim of the Bill is to convert EU law into national law. However, a good part of EU law relates to competences that have been devolved – for example in the case of Scotland, devolved competences include: agriculture, fishing within Scottish waters, public procurement, environmental law. If the ‘Great Repeal Bill’ translates EU law on matters that have been devolved into UK law this would amount to legislation on devolved areas. Under s 28(7) Scotland Act 1998, the UK Parliament, as a sovereign legislature, retains the power to make or unmake any law for Scotland whatever. However, under the ‘Sewel convention,’ legislative consent of the Scottish Parliament would be needed when Westminster legislation touches on devolved matters. In the June referendum, in the case of Scotland, 62% of those voting, voted to remain in the EU and the Scottish government has stated its opposition to ‘Scotland being taken out of the EU against its will’, so consent may well not be forthcoming.
As the term suggests, the ‘Sewel Convention,’ as a constitutional convention, takes the form of a political as opposed to a legally binding undertaking. However, s. 2 Scotland Act 2016 Scotland Act 2016 inserts a new subsection (8) into s. 28 Scotland Act 1998, giving statutory recognition to the Convention in the following form: ‘But it is recognised that the Parliament of the United Kingdom will not normally legislate with regard to devolved matters without the consent of the Scottish Parliament.’ This renders its status as a ‘mere’ convention somewhat less clear. At the very least, it may be argued that the express inclusion of the Sewel convention in the Scotland Act 2016 makes it impossible to ignore politically. To be sure, the provision is that Westminster will not ‘normally’ invade devolved competences without their consent, and much has been made of this. But if ‘normally’ simply means the UK Government’s stipulated interpretation of the term, then the provision is pointless. Legislative consent motions only make sense if they go beyond trifling and commonplace issues.
The issue of legislative consent suggests that constitutional problems lie ahead. Appearing on the BBC’s Sunday Politics Scotland on October 2, Michael Russell, the Scottish government minister with responsibility for Brexit negotiations with the UK, said: ‘A piece of legislation such as Theresa May is now promising, this great repeal act, will require the approval of the Scottish parliament. A legislative consent motion will be required.’ However Theresa May told the conservative conference that she ‘would not be held to ransom by any of the devolved administrations’, and ‘divisive nationalists’ she accused of trying to break up the UK. Scottish Secretary David Mundell told BBC Radio Scotland: ‘I haven’t seen the evidence that would suggest that a legislative consent motion is required by the Scottish Parliament.’ So there is clearly a difference of opinion. However, for the reasons outlined above, contra Mundell, it is suggested that a ‘Great Repeal Bill’ would involve legislation over devolved matters, thus indicating the need for a legislative consent motion.
So clearly, there are very considerable implications for Devolution. What would happen if Westminster ignored constitutional practice and enacted the ‘Great Repeal Bill’ without the consent of the Scottish Parliament? There exist precedents in which the Welsh Assembly has refused consent to UK legislation, but in which the UK Government pressed on regardless, and the Welsh Assembly also enacted its own legislation. The Welsh legislation was challenged in the UK Supreme Court (being a non sovereign legislature this is possible) and in the 2014 case, In re Agricultural Sector (Wales) Bill the Welsh legislation was upheld. A direct challenge to a ‘Great Repeal Act’ (brought by the Scottish Government or an interested party perhaps) would be unlikely to succeed due to the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, as such an Act would of course be primary legislation. Article IX of the Bill of Rights Act operates to prevent proceedings in Parliament from being questioned in the courts. In Pickin v British Railways Board ( AC 765) it was held that an Act of Parliament must be accepted as conclusively valid by the courts, even if there is some evidence that it was brought about by deception. However, suppose the Scottish Parliament legislated its own ’Great Continuation Act’, affirming the continuation in Scottish law of all areas previously a matter of EU law that fell within its devolved competence? What constitutional objection could there be to the Scottish Parliament legislating within its own devolved competences? At the very least, that could protect such matters from the risk of actions described in the Page report.
Otherwise, perhaps the most extreme consequence would be if a UK Brexit, and disregard of the need for legislative consent, were to trigger a second Scottish Independence Referendum. Whatever happens, these are interesting times for the British Constitution.
Very thought provoking. A couple of points.
1. There are two routes to get a medicine authorised in the EU. One is through EMA using the centralised procedure, the other is through a national regulator (in the UK, it is MHRA) using the decentralised mutual recognition procedure. As much of what EMA does reflects MHRA practices (as probably preeminent within the EU), MHRA will be able to take on the regulatory burden. However, upon exit, MHRA would cease to be the competent authority for e.g. post-marketing surveillance / pharmacovigilance, i.e. product safety, so relevant firms need to have duplicate systems. Generally, they are familiar with the different country requirements for product dossiers, but some things that are costly will be duplicated at likely little value to them or patients. It is also worth reflecting that the jobs lost by EMA leaving the UK will also include a large ecosystem of legal and regulatory advisors who will find the UK rather too small to warrant a presence in the UK, so companies will move their regulatory staff as well.
2. Social security schemes and free movement of persons are covered by Directive 1408/71 plus lots of ECJ rulings and various amendments. The UK has devolved healthcare so the competent authorities for this directive are the devolved administrations. There is no competent UK authority for healthcare as the Department of Health in London is for England. It may take some time for people to understand the implications of the loss of free movement in this respect, but patients in the UK do benefit from it. The EHIC system (which along with A1/S1 will go) enables access to care in other EU states with the NHS covering the costs; however, with exit, UK citizens will need to buy expensive and broadly useless medical travel insurance, which excludes existing conditions, something EHIC doesn’t do, as well as the Directive prohibiting expensive subrogation. The Scots have already costed the healthcare implications and may take a dim view of any sort of “Great” legislation repudiating and diminishing rights. However, this is still not widely salient as individuals have yet to feel directly the consequenes.
Article 50 is designed to protect the EU not the UK so they get to decide what counts as an acceptable exit. That means the only way out of the rabbit hole is a unilateral repudiation of the treaties by the UK. Indeed, it may be more accurate to characterise Brexit as a type of secession. I find this intereseting given that fundamental rights are in question, as they were when the US Government opposed the secessionist states leading to the US Civil War.
Reference “second Scottish Independence Referendum”.
This legal and constitutional point was confirmed by the Secretary of State Alistair Carmichael on 20th January 2014.
The referendum was a survey of opinion.
No authority was transferred into the referendum by the Scotland Act 1998 (Modification of Schedule 5) Order 2014 only the power to hold and set up logistics was authorised.
This neglects the possibility of repeal of provisions for referendums provided for by the European Union Act 2011 (see schedule 1 for a possible Article 50(3) referendum).
The treaty and legislative changes together allow the EU law to be enshrined: it follows the constitution has been changed as demonstrably law making has been devolved here & in the EU context.
We cannot break away within the rules….
Am I alone in finding it difficult to understand the rationale for a “Great Repeal Bill”?
To use a bit of shorthand, Section 2 (1) of the ECA provides that “rights……..from time to time created or arising under the Treaties, and…..remedies…..provided for by or under the Treaties” are available and effective in UK Law. Section 2 (2) authorises implementation by secondary legislation, although we must assume that this cannot override the rights etc. created and enforceable under S 2 (1). Section 3 (1) provides for determination in UK law accordance with the principles laid down by, and relevant decisions of the CJEU, “if not referred to the European Court”.
Article 50 (3) provides for the Treaties to cease to apply to a withdrawing state at the date an agreement on terms of future relationships comes into force, or after two years (unless that period is extended).
All “EU rights” to the date of withdrawal are therefore established and enforceable in UK law, and the U.K. Courts are able to (and already do) enforce them, having regard to the extant decisions of, and principles observed by, the CJEU. The secondary legislation is not limited by the applicability of the Treaties after the effective date of withdrawal. No further rights etc. accrue from the date of withdrawal. The CJEU is effectively “emasculated” (if that term can be forgiven) at the date of withdrawal, as its remedies are available only in relation to Member States.
Any rights, remedies etc. which have arisen under the ECA, and are extant at the date of withdrawal can be augmented, withdrawn, or altered subsequently by UK legislative processes.
I struggle to find anything to be added by a Great Repeal Act, unless it is to clarify and amplify the above. Can anyone help?
Most EU law is incorporated into UK law by way of statutory instrument and SI’s normally lapse when their main act is repealed. In order to prevent that happening when the European Communities Act is repealed all SI under it need to be kept in force. Also there are some EU directives which are followed in UK law without having been formally adopted so once again there is a need for a specific Act to keep them in force to ensure legal stability.
Does the Bill of Rights Act (1689) of the then English Parliament now apply fully to all matters of Scottish Legislation passed by the UK Parliament? What is the status of the Claim of Right Act (1689) of the then Scottish Parliament? Is it the case that the Bill of Rights now applies throughout the UK, but the Claim of Right still applies only to Scotland?
Reblogged this on fatcat62's Blog.
This entry was posted on October 10, 2016 by Constitutional Law Group in Constitutional reform, Devolution, Europe, European Union, Scotland, UK government, UK Parliament, Wales and tagged Article 50 TEU, Brexit, continuance clauses, Court of Justice of the European Union, devolved matters, direct effect, European Communities Act 1972, Great Repeal Bill, Henry VIII clauses, In re Agricultural Sector (Wales) Bill, legislative consent, Scotland Act 2016, secondary legislation, Sewel Convention.

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