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Timestamp: 2019-04-18 12:32:53+00:00

Document:
Coram: McLachlin C.J. and Binnie, LeBel, Fish, Charron, Rothstein and Cromwell JJ.
Indexed as: Masterpiece Inc. v. Alavida Lifestyles Inc.
2010: December 8; 2011: May 26.
Present: McLachlin C.J. and Binnie, LeBel, Fish, Charron, Rothstein and Cromwell JJ.
Intellectual property — Trade‑marks — Confusion — Alberta company using unregistered trade‑marks prior to Ontario company’s registration of similar trade‑mark — Alberta company applying to expunge Ontario company’s trade‑mark registration from register of trade‑marks — Whether location where mark used is relevant to confusion analysis — What considerations are applicable in assessment of resemblance between proposed use trade‑mark and existing unregistered trade‑mark — How nature and cost of wares or services affects confusion analysis — Use of expert evidence in confusion analysis — Trade‑marks Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. T‑13, ss. 6 , 16(3) , 17 , 19 , 20 , 21 , 30 , 35 , 40(2) , 57(1) .
Masterpiece Inc. and Alavida Lifestyles Inc. (“Alavida”) are both involved in the retirement residence industry. Since 2001, Masterpiece Inc., operating in Alberta, has used several unregistered trade‑marks, including “Masterpiece the Art of Living”. Alavida, operating in Ontario, entered the market in 2005 and applied to register the trade‑mark “Masterpiece Living” on December 1, 2005 on the basis of a proposed use. Alavida began using this trade‑mark in January 2006. Shortly after Alavida’s application, Masterpiece Inc. also began using “Masterpiece Living” and applied to register it and the word “Masterpiece” as its trade‑marks in 2006. Because of Alavida’s prior application, which was eventually granted, Masterpiece Inc.’s applications were denied. Masterpiece Inc.’s subsequent application to expunge Alavida’s registration was dismissed by the trial judge who concluded that there was no likelihood of confusion between Alavida’s and Masterpiece Inc.’s marks. That decision was upheld on appeal.
This case concerns the basic approach and criteria applicable to the confusion analysis and in particular, whether there was a likelihood of confusion between Alavida’s trade‑mark and Masterpiece Inc.’s trade‑name and trade‑marks pursuant to s. 6 of the Trade‑marks Act . The test is whether, as a matter of first impression, the “casual consumer somewhat in a hurry” who encounters the Alavida trade‑mark, with no more than an imperfect recollection of any one of the Masterpiece Inc. trade‑marks or trade‑name, would be likely to think that Alavida was the same source of retirement residence services as Masterpiece Inc. Section 6(5) sets out the required approach to a confusion analysis. All surrounding circumstances must be considered, including: (a) the inherent distinctiveness of the trade‑marks or trade‑names and extent to which they have become known; (b) the length of time the trade‑marks or trade‑names have been in use; (c) the nature of the wares, services or business; (d) the nature of the trade; and (e) the degree of resemblance between the trade‑marks or trade‑names in appearance or sound or in the ideas suggested by them.
The first issue to be determined is whether the location where a mark is used is relevant when considering the likelihood of confusion between a registered trade‑mark and a prior unregistered one. Generally, pursuant to s. 19 , the owner of a registered trade‑mark is entitled to the exclusive use of that mark throughout Canada. The test for confusion is based upon the hypothetical assumption that the trade‑names and trade‑marks are used “in the same area”, irrespective of whether this is actually the case. In order for the owner of a registered trade‑mark to have exclusive use of the trade‑mark throughout Canada, there cannot be a likelihood of confusion with another trade‑mark anywhere in the country. For this reason, the location where the marks were actually used is not relevant.
The second question involves the considerations applicable in the assessment of the resemblance between a proposed use trade‑mark and an existing unregistered trade‑mark. It is the use of a trade‑mark and not registration itself that confers priority of title and the exclusive right to the trade‑mark. Rights are granted to the first user of a trade‑mark in two ways under the Act. First, under s. 16, a party normally gains a priority right to register a trade‑mark when it first uses that trade‑mark. Second, a user is also able to oppose applications, or apply to expunge registrations based on its earlier use of a confusing trade‑mark. Section 16(3) of the Act recognizes the right of a prior user against any application for registration based upon subsequent use. Masterpiece Inc. could apply to expunge Alavida’s trade‑mark pursuant to s. 16(3) of the Act on the grounds of likelihood of confusion between Alavida’s trade‑mark and any of its trade‑marks that had been in use before December 1, 2005. Further, Masterpiece Inc. was entitled to have each of its marks separately compared to Alavida’s “Masterpiece Living”. The trial judge erred in undertaking a single composite analysis, considering resemblance between “Masterpiece Living” and all of Masterpiece Inc.’s trade‑marks and trade‑name generally. Most confusion analyses should commence with an assessment of the resemblance between the marks in issue. The trial judge erred in considering Alavida’s actual use of its mark rather than addressing the entire scope of exclusive rights and potential uses that were granted to Alavida under its registration. His approach did not recognize that Alavida was entitled to use the protected words in any form including a format that closely resembled Masterpiece Inc.’s marks. Here, because Alavida’s proposed trade‑mark is only the words “Masterpiece Living”, the difference or similarity with each of Masterpience Inc.’s trade‑marks and trade‑name must be assessed on the basis of these words alone. The striking or unique aspect of each trade‑mark is the word “Masterpiece”. The idea evoked by each is also the same: high quality retirement lifestyle. Clearly, there is a strong resemblance between “Masterpiece the Art of Living” and “Masterpiece Living”.
A third issue is what effect the nature of the business and cost of the wares or services has in the confusion analysis. Here, the trial judge erred in considering that consumers of expensive goods and services would generally take considerable time to inform themselves about the source of those goods and services to suggest a reduced likelihood of confusion. Confusion must instead be assessed from the perspective of the first impression of the consumer approaching a costly purchase when he or she encounters the trade‑mark. The possibility that careful research could later remedy confusion does not mean that no confusion ever existed or that it would not continue to exist in the minds of consumers who did not carry out that research. The trial judge’s consideration should have been limited to how a consumer, upon encountering the Alavida mark in the marketplace, with an imperfect recollection of the Masterpiece Inc. marks, would have reacted. In circumstances where a strong resemblance suggests a likelihood of confusion, and the other s. 6(5) factors do not point strongly against a likelihood of confusion, cost is unlikely to lead to a different conclusion.
A final issue is the role of expert evidence in the trade‑mark confusion analysis. Generally, an expert should only be permitted to testify if the testimony is likely to be outside the experience and knowledge of the judge. Where the “casual consumer” is not particularly knowledgeable and there is a resemblance between the marks, expert evidence that simply assesses that resemblance will not usually be necessary. Judges should consider the marks at issue, each as a whole, but having regard to the dominant or most striking or unique feature of the trade‑mark, using their own common sense, to determine whether the casual consumer would be likely to be confused when first encountering the trade‑mark. In this case, Alavida’s expert engaged in a discussion of morphology and semantics instead of considering the marks as a whole. He also based his analysis on Alavida’s actual post‑registration use, rather than the full scope of rights granted to Alavida under its registration. Masterpiece Inc.’s survey was similarly unhelpful because it attempted to simulate consumers with an “imperfect recollection” when none was available. For this reason, the survey was not a valid assessment of the relevant question. Judges should be careful to question the necessity and relevance of such evidence, perhaps as part of a case management process, particularly in light of the substantial cost of evidence that may be of little utility.
Considering all the circumstances of the case, and particularly the strong similarity between Alavida’s “Masterpiece Living” and Masterpiece Inc.’s “Masterpiece the Art of Living”, Masterpiece Inc. has proven that the use of Alavida’s trade‑mark in the same area as those of Masterpiece Inc.’s would be likely to lead to the inference that the services associated with Masterpiece Inc.’s trade‑marks were being performed by Alavida. Because Masterpiece Inc.’s use preceded Alavida’s proposed use, Alavida was not entitled under s. 16(3) to registration of its trade‑mark and it should be expunged from the register.
Applied: Mattel, Inc. v. 3894207 Canada Inc., 2006 SCC 22,  1 S.C.R. 772; Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin v. Boutiques Cliquot Ltée, 2006 SCC 23,  1 S.C.R. 824; Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33,  2 S.C.R. 235; Hollis v. Dow Corning Corp.,  4 S.C.R. 634; considered: R. v. Mohan,  2 S.C.R. 9; Ultravite Laboratories Ltd. v. Whitehall Laboratories Ltd.,  S.C.R. 734; esure Insurance Ltd. v. Direct Line Insurance plc, 2008 EWCA Civ 842,  R.P.C. 34; General Electric Co. v. The General Electric Co. Ltd.,  All E.R. 507; referred to: Partlo v. Todd (1888), 17 S.C.R. 196; Benson & Hedges (Canada) Ltd. v. St. Regis Tobacco Corp.,  S.C.R. 192; Leaf Confections Ltd. v. Maple Leaf Gardens Ltd. (1986), 12 C.P.R. (3d) 511, aff’d (1988), 19 C.P.R. (3d) 331; Mr. Submarine Ltd. v. Amandista Investments Ltd.,  3 F.C. 91; Conde Nast Publications Inc. v. Union des éditions modernes (1979), 46 C.P.R. (2d) 183; General Motors Corp. v. Bellows,  S.C.R. 678.
Trade-marks Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. T-13, ss. 2 , 4 , 6 , 16(1) , (3) , 17 , 18 , 19 , 20 , 21 , 30 , 35 , 40 , 57(1) .
Gill, Kelly, and R. Scott Jolliffe. Fox on Canadian Law of Trade‑marks and Unfair Competition, 4th ed. Toronto: Carswell, 2002 (loose-leaf updated 2006, release 2).
Hughes, Roger T., and Toni Polson Ashton. Hughes on Trade Marks, 2nd ed. Markham, Ont.: LexisNexis, 2005 (loose‑leaf updated 2010, release 22).
Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles, 5th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, “resemblance”.
Vaver, David. Intellectual Property Law: Copyright, Patents, Trade‑marks, 2nd ed. Toronto, Ont.: Irwin Law, 2011.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Federal Court of Appeal (Sexton, Layden‑Stevenson and Trudel, JJ.A.), 2009 FCA 290,  4 F.C.R. 243, 397 N.R. 180, 78 C.P.R. (4th) 243, 312 D.L.R. (4th) 532,  F.C.J. No. 1263 (QL), 2009 CarswellNat 3122, affirming a decision of O’Reilly J., 2008 FC 1412, 338 F.T.R. 168, 72 C.P.R. (4th) 160,  F.C.J. No. 1826 (QL), 2008 CarswellNat 4970. Appeal allowed.
W. Clarke Hunter, Q.C., Kelly Gill and Brandon Potter, for the appellant.
 Trade-marks in Canada are an important tool to assist consumers and businesses. In the marketplace, a business marks its wares or services as an indication of provenance. This allows consumers to know, when they are considering a purchase, who stands behind those goods or services. In this way, trade-marks provide a “shortcut to get consumers to where they want to go”, per Binnie J. in Mattel, Inc. v. 3894207 Canada Inc., 2006 SCC 22,  1 S.C.R. 772, at para. 21. Where the trade-marks of different businesses are similar, a consumer may be unable to discern which company stands behind the wares or services. Confusion between trade-marks impairs the objective of providing consumers with a reliable indication of the expected source of wares or services. This case provides this Court with the opportunity of reviewing the basic approach and criteria applicable to a confusion analysis between competing trade-marks under the Trade-marks Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. T-13 (“Act ”).
 The question in this case is whether the trade-mark “Masterpiece Living”, proposed and subsequently registered by Alavida Lifestyles Inc. (“Alavida”), a company entering the retirement residence industry in Ontario, was then confusing with the unregistered trade-marks or trade-name previously used by another company, Masterpiece Inc., in the retirement residence industry in Alberta.
 The trial judge found that Masterpiece Inc. had shown “some use” of the trade-name “Masterpiece” and related marks including the word “Masterpiece” prior to Alavida’s application (at para. 19 (emphasis in original)), although he found the use was rather sporadic. He then considered whether there was a likelihood of confusion, under s. 6(5) of the Act , between Alavida’s trade-mark and these prior marks on the date of filing of Alavida’s application for registration.
 In conducting the confusion analysis under s. 6(5) of the Act , he found that the word “Masterpiece” in association with retirement residences or services was somewhat inherently distinctive (para. 41), but that there had been no acquired distinctiveness through use in any of Masterpiece Inc.’s marks on the relevant date (para. 42). On the issue of the resemblance between the marks, the trial judge accepted observations made by one of Alavida’s experts that Alavida’s post-registration use of its marks differed from Masterpiece Inc.’s use of its marks, both in design and in the focus of the advertisements. He found that although there was “obviously a degree of resemblance” as between the two companies’ marks, these differences in use served to reduce the likelihood of confusion (para. 46). He also observed that the choice of retirement residence was an important and expensive decision. As a result, consumers could be expected to research their decisions carefully, which would also reduce the likelihood of confusion.
1. Is the location where a mark is used relevant when considering the likelihood of confusion between an applied for or registered trade-mark and a prior unregistered trade-mark or trade-name?
3. When considering the “nature of the trade” under s. 6(5) of the Act , what effect does the nature and cost of the wares or services have on the confusion analysis?
A. Is the Location Where a Mark Is Used Relevant When Considering the Likelihood of Confusion Between an Applied for or Registered Trade-Mark and a Prior Unregistered Trade-Mark or Trade-Name?
19. Subject to sections 21 , 32 and 67 , the registration of a trade-mark in respect of any wares or services, unless shown to be invalid, gives to the owner of the trade-mark the exclusive right to the use throughout Canada of the trade-mark in respect of those wares or services.
6. (1) For the purposes of this Act , a trade-mark or trade-name is confusing with another trade-mark or trade-name if the use of the first mentioned trade-mark or trade-name would cause confusion with the last mentioned trade-mark or trade-name in the manner and circumstances described in this section.
Section 6(3) deals with trade-mark confusion with a trade-name and 6(4) with trade-name confusion with a trade-mark. In subsections (2), (3) and (4), the same formula is used “if the use of both . . . in the same area would be likely to lead to the inference”.
 It is immediately apparent from these words, “if the use of both . . . in the same area”, that the test for confusion is based upon the hypothetical assumption that both trade-names and trade-marks are used “in the same area”, irrespective of whether this is actually the case. As a result, geographical separation in the use of otherwise confusingly similar trade-names and trade-marks does not play a role in this hypothetical test. This must be the case, because, pursuant to s. 19 , subject to exceptions not relevant here, registration gives the owner the exclusive right to the use of the trade-mark throughout Canada.
It is not the registration that makes the party proprietor of a trade-mark; he must be proprietor before he can register . . . .
 That principle established under Canada’s early trade-mark legislation continues under the present Act . Rights arising from use have been incorporated into the Act by granting rights to the first user of a trade-mark in two ways. First, under s. 16 , a party normally gains a priority right to register a trade-mark when it first uses that trade-mark. Second, a user is also able to oppose applications or apply to expunge registrations based on its earlier use of a confusing trade-mark. This explains why an unregistered trade-mark of Masterpiece Inc. can be the basis of a challenge to Alavida’s subsequent registration application. Section 16(3) of the Act recognizes the right of a prior user against any application for registration based upon subsequent use. Section 17(1) preserves that right, subject to certain limitations that are of no relevance here, where the trade-mark has been registered.
 It should also be explained why Alavida’s application for a proposed trade-mark on December 1, 2005, would preclude Masterpiece Inc.’s subsequent trade-mark applications based on actual use. As noted above, at common law, trade-mark protection only arose from actual use. However, under the current Trade-marks Act , the opportunity was created for an applicant to claim priority as of the date the applicant files for a proposed but yet unused trade-mark. Registration will, however, not occur unless the applicant subsequently provides a declaration demonstrating that the proposed trade-mark was actually used within the time specified in s. 40(2) of the Act .
 The question at the centre of this case is whether there was confusion between Alavida’s and Masterpiece Inc.’s trade-marks or trade-name in terms of s. 6 of the Act . In my respectful opinion, the learned trial judge erred in law when conducting the confusion analysis, and thereby erred in his conclusion that Masterpiece Inc. had not established confusion between its trade-name and trade-marks and Alavida’s now registered trade-mark.
The test to be applied is a matter of first impression in the mind of a casual consumer somewhat in a hurry who sees the [mark], at a time when he or she has no more than an imperfect recollection of the [prior] trade-marks, and does not pause to give the matter any detailed consideration or scrutiny, nor to examine closely the similarities and differences between the marks.
Binnie J. referred with approval to the words of Pigeon J. in Benson & Hedges (Canada) Ltd. v. St. Regis Tobacco Corp.,  S.C.R. 192, at p. 202, to contrast with what is not to be done — a careful examination of competing marks or a side by side comparison.
 Some of the s. 6(5) factors that guide the confusion analysis will be the same for each of the trade-marks and trade-name in this case. For example, all of the evidence suggests that Masterpiece Inc. only engaged in the retirement residence industry and used all of its marks in relation to that industry. In others, each mark will have to be considered separately. For example, because the Masterpiece Inc. trade-marks are different in content from one another, and are different from the trade-name, it will be necessary to consider the similarity of Alavida’s proposed trade-mark, “Masterpiece Living”, to each of the trade-marks and trade-name for which Masterpiece Inc. has established use.
 However, under ss. 16(3) (a) and (c) of the Act , Masterpiece Inc. was entitled to assert, and have considered, any of the marks or trade-name that it had used prior to December 1, 2005, as a basis to challenge Alavida’s application for registration. In my opinion, the trial judge erred in not conducting the separate analysis required by the Act . Some of the expert evidence which treated Masterpiece Inc.’s trade-marks and trade-name as a whole instead of one by one (see, e.g., paras. 21-23 and 36), may have contributed to this error.
 In applying the s. 6(5) factors to the question of confusion, the trial judge conducted his analysis in the order of the criteria set forth in s. 6(5) , concluding with a consideration of the resemblance between the marks. While it is no error of law to do so, the degree of resemblance, although the last factor listed in s. 6(5) , is the statutory factor that is often likely to have the greatest effect on the confusion analysis (K. Gill and R. S. Jolliffe, Fox on Canadian Law of Trade-marks and Unfair Competition (4th ed. (loose-leaf)), at p. 8-54; R. T. Hughes and T. P. Ashton, Hughes on Trade Marks (2nd ed. (loose-leaf)), at §74, p. 939). As Professor Vaver points out, if the marks or names do not resemble one another, it is unlikely that even a strong finding on the remaining factors would lead to a likelihood of confusion. The other factors become significant only once the marks are found to be identical or very similar (Vaver, at p. 532). As a result, it has been suggested that a consideration of resemblance is where most confusion analyses should start (ibid.).
 Alavida’s registration process began on December 1, 2005, with an application based on proposed use. At s. 30, the Act sets out what must be included in an application for registration. When submitting the application, an applicant is required to provide a formulation of its trade-mark in addition to various other pieces of information. The trade-mark on an application may simply be a word mark, or it may be a design, or it may be a word mark and design (for example, see the marks in Leaf Confections Ltd. v. Maple Leaf Gardens Ltd. (1986), 12 C.P.R. (3d) 511 (F.C.T.D.), aff’d (1988), 19 C.P.R. (3d) 331 (F.C.A.)). The application may identify the mark as being used only with particular colours: Trade-marks Regulations, SOR/96-195. An application may also contain disclaimers, or an applicant may be required by the Registrar to include disclaimers, to limit the scope of trade-mark rights: s. 35 of the Act .
 When engaging in a confusion analysis, it is important to keep in mind that the exclusive rights granted by the Act refer to a registered trade-mark (ss. 19 , 20 and 21 ). Where a court is called upon to decide if there is a likelihood of confusion between that registered trade-mark and any registered or previously used unregistered trade-marks, the analysis should address the proposed trade-mark for which the registration was ultimately obtained.
 Resemblance is defined as the quality of being either like or similar; see Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles (5th ed. 2002), at p. 2544, under the definition of “resemblance”. The term “degree of resemblance” in s. 6(5) (e) of the Act implies that likelihood of confusion does not arise solely from identical trade-marks. “[D]egree of resemblance” recognizes that marks with some differences may still result in likely confusion.
C. When Considering the “Nature of the Trade” Under Section 6(5) of the Act , What Effect Does the Nature and Cost of the Wares or Services Have on the Confusion Analysis?
 This Court has affirmed that consumers in the market for expensive goods may be less likely to be confused when they encounter a trade-mark, but the test is still one of “first impression”. In his reasons, the trial judge used the importance and cost of expensive goods and services to change the likelihood of confusion test from one of first impression of a trade-mark to a test of consumers being “unlikely to make choices based on first impressions”. This approach is not consistent with the test for confusion under s. 6(5) which has been consistently endorsed by this Court, most recently in Veuve Clicquot.
When buying a car or a refrigerator, more care will naturally be taken than when buying a doll or a mid-priced meal . . . .
 It is not relevant that, as the trial judge found, consumers are “unlikely to make choices based on first impressions” or that they “will generally take considerable time to inform themselves about the source of expensive goods and services” (para. 43). Both of these — subsequent research or consequent purchase — occur after the consumer encounters a mark in the marketplace.
 However, considering a trade-mark as a whole does not mean that a dominant component in a mark which would affect the overall impression of an average consumer should be ignored: see esure Insurance Ltd. v. Direct Line Insurance plc, 2008 EWCA Civ 842,  R.P.C. 34, at para. 45, per Arden L.J. This is because, while the consumer looks at the mark as a whole, some aspect of the mark may be particularly striking. That will be because that aspect is the most distinctive part of the whole trade-mark. In this case, contrary to the view of the expert, the most distinctive and dominant component of the marks in issue is in all cases the word “Masterpiece” because it provides the content and punch of the trade-mark. The word “Living” is bland by comparison.
 Another difficulty with this expert evidence is that it compared Masterpiece Inc.’s marks with Alavida’s trade-mark in the format and font in which it was used by Alavida subsequent to December 1, 2005. The expert did not, as was necessary in this case, consider any other presentation available to Alavida in accordance with its trade-mark registration. For example, as discussed above, nothing would preclude Alavida from using the same format and font as Masterpiece Inc. and giving prominence to the word “Masterpiece” in the same manner as Masterpiece Inc. This may have been what led the trial judge into the same error in concluding that the subsequent use by Alavida of its trade-mark was sufficiently different from Masterpiece Inc.’s trade-marks and trade-name that it would reduce the likelihood of confusion.
. . . the question whether such buyers would be likely to be deceived or confused by the use of the trade mark is a ‘jury question’. By that I mean that if the issue had now, as formerly, to be tried by a jury, who as members of the general public would themselves be potential buyers of the goods, they would be required not only to consider any evidence of other members of the public which had been adduced but also to use their own common sense and to consider whether they would themselves be likely to be deceived or confused.
Firstly, given that the critical issue of confusion of any kind is to be assessed from the viewpoint of the average consumer, it is difficult to see what is gained from the evidence of an expert as to his own opinion where the tribunal is in a position to form its own view. That is not to say that there may not be a role for an expert where the markets in question are ones with which judges are unfamiliar . . . .
 Surveys, on the other hand, have the potential to provide empirical evidence which demonstrates consumer reactions in the marketplace — exactly the question that the trial judge is addressing in a confusion case. This evidence is not something which would be generally known to a trial judge, and thus unlike some other expert evidence, it would not run afoul of the second Mohan requirement that the evidence be necessary. However, the use of survey evidence should still be applied with caution.
 In this case, the problem is somewhat different. Unlike Mattel, Masterpiece Inc. had not yet established a presence in the community in which it operated. Thus, there were no casual or average consumers with “imperfect recollection” of Masterpiece Inc.’s marks to test. As a result, the survey was based on a series of questions that attempted to establish a proxy for “imperfect recollection”, and only thereafter test how such customers would react when exposed to the second mark. This is not asking questions “in the right way, in the right circumstances” to elicit evidence of how those with an imperfect recollection of Masterpiece Inc.’s marks would react to Alavida’s proposed mark. For a survey to be valid, it seems elementary that there must be some consumers who could have an imperfect recollection of the first mark. Simulating an “imperfect recollection” through a series of lead-up questions to consumers will rarely be seen as reliable and valid.
It is well established that appellate courts have the jurisdiction to make a fresh assessment of the evidence on the record where they deem such an assessment to be in the interests of justice and feasible on a practical level . . . .
 Nothing in this registration limits Alavida to the “up-market”. Its registration would entitle it to use its trade-mark in the exact same market as that serviced by Masterpiece Inc. For the purpose of a confusion analysis, the services provided by the parties are essentially the same — retirement residence services. There is no justification for subdividing between “up-market” and “middle-market”. Consideration of the nature of the services involved, in my view, enhances the likelihood of confusion for the casual consumer.
 As for acquired distinctiveness, the trial judge found that at the time the application was made, neither Masterpiece Inc. nor any of its trade-marks were particularly well known. While the evidence presented by Masterpiece Inc. was sufficient to establish that there had been use of its trade-name and trade-marks, including “Masterpiece the Art of Living”, for the purposes of the Act , it did not rise to the level of demonstrating any acquired distinctiveness. I agree with the trial judge.
 Despite the fact that the trial judge noted the rejection of Masterpiece Inc.’s applications at the outset of his reasons, there is no indication that this evidence was taken into account in his confusion analysis. It is true that the trial judge was not conducting an appeal or judicial review of the reasonableness of the decision of the Registrar, owed no deference to the Registrar’s decision and was certainly not bound by it. However, as a relevant surrounding circumstance under s. 6(5), I am of the opinion that the trial judge should have acknowledged the Registrar’s finding, which was diametrically opposite to his conclusion, in weighing the evidence before him. The Registrar’s decision supports a finding of likelihood of confusion between Alavida’s trade-mark and Masterpiece Inc.’s trade-name, and thus the “Masterpiece the Art of Living” trade-mark.
 Because Masterpiece Inc.’s use preceded Alavida’s proposed use, Alavida was not entitled under s. 16(3) to registration of its trade-mark. As a result, Alavida was not “the person entitled to secure the registration” of its trade-mark under s. 18(1) and this ground of invalidity has been made out. I would therefore allow the appeal with costs here and below and, pursuant to s. 57(1) of the Trade-marks Act , I would order the Registrar to expunge this registration from the register of trade-marks.
17. (1) No application for registration of a trade-mark that has been advertised in accordance with section 37 shall be refused and no registration of a trade-mark shall be expunged or amended or held invalid on the ground of any previous use or making known of a confusing trade-mark or trade-name by a person other than the applicant for that registration or his predecessor in title, except at the instance of that other person or his successor in title, and the burden lies on that other person or his successor to establish that he had not abandoned the confusing trade-mark or trade-name at the date of advertisement of the applicant’s application.
and subject to section 17 , it is invalid if the applicant for registration was not the person entitled to secure the registration.
21. (1) Where, in any proceedings respecting a registered trade-mark the registration of which is entitled to the protection of subsection 17(2), it is made to appear to the Federal Court that one of the parties to the proceedings, other than the registered owner of the trade-mark, had in good faith used a confusing trade-mark or trade-name in Canada before the date of filing of the application for that registration, and the Court considers that it is not contrary to the public interest that the continued use of the confusing trade-mark or trade-name should be permitted in a defined territorial area concurrently with the use of the registered trade-mark, the Court may, subject to such terms as it deems just, order that the other party may continue to use the confusing trade-mark or trade-name within that area with an adequate specified distinction from the registered trade-mark.
35. The Registrar may require an applicant for registration of a trade-mark to disclaim the right to the exclusive use apart from the trade-mark of such portion of the trade-mark as is not independently registrable, but the disclaimer does not prejudice or affect the applicant’s rights then existing or thereafter arising in the disclaimed matter, nor does the disclaimer prejudice or affect the applicant’s right to registration on a subsequent application if the disclaimed matter has then become distinctive of the applicant’s wares or services.
57. (1) The Federal Court has exclusive original jurisdiction, on the application of the Registrar or of any person interested, to order that any entry in the register be struck out or amended on the ground that at the date of the application the entry as it appears on the register does not accurately express or define the existing rights of the person appearing to be the registered owner of the mark.
Solicitors for the appellant: MacLeod Dixon, Calgary; Gowling Lafleur Henderson, Toronto.
Solicitors for the respondent: MBM Intellectual Property Law, Ottawa.
Solicitors for the intervener: Bereskin & Parr, Toronto.

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