Source: https://mcphersonrane.com/articles/the-talent-agencies-act-does-one-year-really-mean-one-year/
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 20:19:06+00:00

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The Talent Agencies Act: Does One Year Really Mean One Year?
In Styne v. Stevens,5 the same District of the Court of Appeal held that although a lawsuit by a manager revives the one-year limitations period, it is only revived for one year. Thus an artist must commence a Labor Commission proceeding within one year of being put on notice that the manager made a claim against the artist and that he or she violated the Act.
The court first engages in a brief discussion of the general scope of the Act. The court cites both Waisbren v. Peppercorn Productions, Inc.26 and Wachs 12. Carry27 as general authority for the scope of the Act and the type of activity that the Act prohibits.28 Both cases, however, are completely contradictory and were both decided by the same District of the Court of Appeal.
The court therefore reversed the trial court’s order of a new trial, and reinstated the $4,330,370 verdict against Stevens.
This case represents a first step in limiting the scope and effect of the Talent Agencies Act, which, over the years, has been more and more liberally construed and applied. However, given the marked disagreement even within the confines of the Second District, it is not clear that the case will signify a universal rule for defensive use of the Act.
First, it was not at all clear from the facts discussed in this case that the use by Stevens of the Act was exclusively a defensive one. Moreover, it is certainly not clear that Styne did, in fact, violate the Act in the first place. By reversing the trial court, essentially on jurisdictional grounds, the court did not have to make the very difficult decision as to whether or not there was actually a violation.
The decision itself is troublesome from many standpoints. Certainly, on the one hand, it is reasonable to impose a limitation on the amount of time allowed for a defendant to use the Act as a defense. However, most, if not all, claims that are otherwise barred by the statute of limitations may be used as affirmative defenses and offsets. The S tyne case seems to conflict with longstanding law on this issue in other contexts.
Defendant is therefore entitled to prove, as part of his or her defense, that the agreement between Manager and Artist is void because Manager violated the Talent Agencies Act. One could argue, in accordance with Styne, that, if Artist did not file a Petition to Determine Controversy with the Labor Commission within one year of Artist’s becoming aware of the suit and the propriety of this defense, then Manager would be precluded from asserting the violation of the Act as a defense.
If Defendant has no standing to assert the violation with the Labor Commissioner, and he cannot compel Artist to commence such a proceeding on his own, he is effectively deprived of a very important defense if Styne is not limited on its facts. Clearly, if Defendant has no standing to utilize the Labor Commissioner to seek redress for a violation of the Act by Manager, and Styne says that the defense is lost unless Artist files such an action within one year of becoming aware of the suit against Defendant, Defendant’s defense is meaningless.
If management agreements are void and unenforceable when a manager violates the Act69 and a tortious interference defendant can prove that the manager did violate the Act, the agreement with which the defendant allegedly interfered is, in fact, void and unenforceable. In this situation, the courts should not allow the defendant to be held liable for interfering with a contract that essentially does not exist. It would therefore not be a great surprise if Styrze is overruled or otherwise limited on its facts. The California Supreme Court’s recent grant of review70 of the case will no doubt provide guidance on this issue.
1. Cal. Lab. Code § 1700 et seq, (2000). For a detailed discussion of the Act and many of the reported and unreported cases that have been decided by the Labor Commissioner and by California courts. See Edwin F. McPherson, The Talent Agencies Act – A Personal Manager’s Nightmare, LOS ANGELES LAWYER, June 1994; Edwin F. McPherson, The Talent Agencies Act: Time For A Change, 19 HASTINGS COMM/ENT LI. 899 (1997).
2. 71 Cal. App. 4th 1465 (1999).
3. See Moreno V. Park, Labor Commissioner Case No. TAC 9-97, p.4 (1998).
4. Park, 71 Cal. App. 4th at 1469.
5. 78 Cal. App. 4th 17 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000), petition for review granted, 1 P.3d 2 (2000), 2000 Cal. LEXIS 4546.6. Id.
7. Appellant’s Opening Brief at 8, Styne (No. B121208).
14. See Styne, 78 Cal. App. 4th at 20-21.
15. See id. at 20-23.
16. See id. at 21-22.
23. See id. at 22.
26. 41 Cal. App. 4th 246 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995).
27. 13 Cal. App. 4th 616 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
28. See Styne, 78 Cal. App. 4th at 23.
29. See id. (quoting Waisbren, 41 Cal. App. 4th at 261).
31. Id. (quoting Waisbern, 41 Cal. App. 4th at 261).
33. Id.; see also McPherson, The Talent Agencies Act: Time For A Change, supra note 1 (discussing and analyzing the Waisbren and Wachs cases).
34. Styne, 78 Cal. App. 4th at 24.
35. See id. (citing REO Broad. Consultants V. Martin, 69 Cal. App. 4th 489, 494-95 (1999) (fn. omitted, original italics)); see also Buchwald V. Superior Court, 254 Cal. App. 2d 347 (1967); Garson V. Division of Labor Law Enforcement, 33 Cal. App. 2d 861 (1949); Humes V. MarGil Ventures, Inc., 174 Cal. App. 3d 486, 494-95 (1985); ABC Acceptance V. Delby, 150 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 826, 828 (1957).
36. Respondent’s Brief at 10-12, Styne (No. B121208).
37. Appellant’s Opening Brief at 18, Styne (No. B121208).
40. Respondent’s Brief at 11, Styne (No. B121208).
42. See Waisbren, 41 Cal. App. 4th at 250.
44. See id. at 251-63.
45. Appellant’s Reply Brief at 4, Styne (No. B121208), (citing South Coast Regional Com. V. Gordon, 18 Cal. 3d 832 (1977); People V. Coit Ranch, Inc., 204 Cal. App. 2d 52 (1962); Abelleira V. District Court of Appeal, 17 Cal. 2d 280, 293 (1941); Sampsell V. Superior Court, 32 Cal. 2d 763, 773 (1948); People v. West Publishing Co., 35 Cal. 2d 80 (1950); People V. Sonleitner, 185 Cal. App. 2d 350 (1960); People V. Keith Railway Equip. Co., 70 Cal. App. 2d 339 (1945).
47. See Styne, 78 Cal. App. 4th at 25 (noting that there was no such proceeding filed; nevertheless, the Waisbren court had no trouble adjudicating the Talent Agencies Act issues).
50. Appellant’s Opening Brief, at 23, Styne (No. B121208), (citing Jenner V. Wallach, Labor Commission Case No. TAC 44-95 (1996), at 2; Anita Baker Bridgeforth V. BNB Associates, Labor Commission Case No. TAC 12-96 (1996), at 7).
51. Id. at 24 (citing Cal. Lab. Code § 1700.44(c)).
52. Respondent’s Brief, at 15.
54. Labor Commission Case No. TAC 66-92 (1995), at 5-7.
55. Labor Commission Case No. TAC 52-92 (1994), at 7.
57. Id. at 16 (citing Estate of Cover, 188 Cal. 133, 140 (1922); 4 CAL. PROC., ACTIONS 423 (Witkin 1997).
58. Id. (citing Kallen V. Delug, 157 Cal. App. 3d 940, 948 (1984)).
59. Id. (citing LaFortune v. Ebie, 26 Cal. App. 72, 75 (1972)).
60. Id. (citing Lewis & Queen v. N.M. Ball Sons, 48 Cal. 2dr141, 148 (1957)).
61. Styne Opening Brief at 26 (No. B121208).
62. Styne, 78 Cal. App. 4th at 26.
68. The Labor Commissioner has indicated that he would dismiss any petitions brought by anyone other than the artist or a licensed agent, on the ground that no other party, including a defendant in a tortious interference case, has standing to assert a violation of the Act with the Labor Commission.
69. See, e.g., Wood V. Krepps, 168 Cal. 382, 386 (1914) (“a contract made by an unlicensed person in violation of the statute . . . is void”) See also, Buchwald v. Superior Court, 254 Cal. App. 2d 347, 351 (1967) (“a contract between an unlicensed [agent] and an artist is void.
70. See 1 P.3d 2 (2000), 2000 Cal. LEXIS 4546.
65. Id. Notwithstanding this ruling and the overwhelming authority indicating that the Labor Commission has exclusive original jurisdiction over such matters, the trend in the Los Angeles Superior Court is to deny motions to stay the Superior Court action. Once the request for stay is denied by the Superior Court, the Labor Commissioner generally refuses to proceed.
66. See also Edwin F. McPherson, Offensive Interference – Recent Developments in Tortious Interference Law, Los Angeles Lawyer, Feb. 2000, at 24 (discussing the state of the law of tortious interference in California).
67. See Knott V. McDonald’s Corp., 147 F.3d 1065, 1068 (9th Cir. 1998); PMC, Inc. v. Saban Entertainment, Inc., 45 Cal. App. 4th 579, 597 (1996).68. The Labor Commissioner has indicated that he would dismiss any petitions brought by anyone other than the artist or a licensed agent, on the ground that no other party, including a defendant in a tortious interference case, has standing to assert a violation of the Act with the Labor Commission.

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