Source: https://leastdangerousblog.com/2016/08/14/hillary-clintons-hobbs-act-conundrum/
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 11:22:08+00:00

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Recent reports indicate that the FBI is engaged in an ongoing investigation of the Clinton Foundation, with the notoriously-aggressive U.S. Attorney Preet Bharara in the U.S. Attorney’s Office in the Southern District of New York assisting (which, in an interesting twist, appears to be happening contrary to DOJ Main’s desires, suggesting frustration with the appearance of compromise at headquarters following Attorney General Lynch’s airplane rendezvous with Bill Clinton). This news – along with the IRS recently referring a request for an investigation of the Clinton Foundation to its Exempt Organizations Examinations Program at the behest of a congressional inquiry; Vice News Reporter’s Jason Leopold’s ongoing FOIA request battle to obtain some of the once-deleted-but-now-recovered e-mails; and even Clinton-supporter/former Defense Secretary remarking that the Clinton Foundation/State Department connection is “something that, obviously, will continue to be looked at” – adds a new wrinkle in the neverending Clinton saga, one that has not (comparatively) received a lot of media attention before – though this is understandable amidst the fracas about Benghazi dissembling, e-mail deleting, and charges of espionage, among other matters.
The Clintons responding to pretty much any inquiry into their conduct, ever.
The Clinton Foundation accepted millions of dollars from seven foreign governments during Hillary Rodham Clinton’s tenure as secretary of state, including one donation that violated its ethics agreement with the Obama administration . . . . the . . . agreement did not prohibit foreign countries with interests before the U.S. government from giving money to the charity closely linked to the secretary of state.
If you are traveling to some country and you meet with the foreign leadership, and a week later or two weeks later or three weeks later the president travels there and solicits a donation, and they pledge to give at some point in the future, but nobody knows, is there an appearance of a conflict? Could there be an appearance of a conflict?
At the time, Hillary Clinton downplayed concerns and acted like this was a far-fetched scenario. That, of course, impugns her credibility and veracity; but it does not necessarily rise to the level of criminal conduct. And, to be sure, none of this would come as a surprise to any red-blooded Republican, given that criticisms and calls to “Lock Her Up” were embarrassingly prevalent at the Republican National Convention (becoming its “unofficial slogan“).
The 2016 GOP’s answer to both foreign and domestic policy issues, evidently. Unfortunately for them, schadenfreude has its limits.
However, calls to “Lock her up” have, for some time, been coming from rather unlikely sources.
Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion or attempts or conspires so to do . . . shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both.
The Supreme Court has made clear that “the wrongful acceptance of a bribe establishes all the inducement that the statute requires,” with “the coercive element…provided by the public office itself.” Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 266 (1992). “[A]n affirmative act of inducement by a public official, such as a demand, is [not] an element of the offense of extortion ‘under color of official right’ prohibited by the Hobbs Act….” Evans, 504 U.S. at 256. Extortion by a public official under the Hobbs Act is “the rough equivalent of what we would now describe as ‘taking a bribe.'” Id. at 260. “[T]he offense is completed at the time when the public official receives a payment in return for his agreement to perform specific official acts; fulfillment of the quid pro quo is not an element of the offense.” Id. at 268. Even “[t]he receipt of [campaign] contributions is … vulnerable under the [Hobbs] Act as having been taken under color of official right…if the payments are made in return for an explicit promise or undertaking by the official to perform or not to perform an official act.” McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 273 (1991). And “[t]he official and the payor need not state the quid pro quo in express terms, for otherwise the law’s effect could be frustrated by knowing winks and nods.” Evans, 504 U.S. at 274 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Of course, the jurisdictional hook – namely, that the corrupt conduct in question affect commerce – remains an element of the crime that needs to be proven. Nevertheless, “the Hobbs Act‘s interstate commerce requirement has been construed expansively,” which is so because of “the congressional intent that the Act employ the full federal commerce power.” United States v. Blakey, 607 F.2d 779, 782 (7th Cir. 1979). “[T]he effect of the defendant’s activity on interstate commerce need only be slight….” United States v. Villafranca, 260 F.3d 374, 377 (5th Cir. 2001). Conduct need only have “a de minimis effect on interstate commerce to secure federal jurisdiction” under the Hobbs Act. United States v. Collins, 40 F.3d 95, 99 (5th Cir. 1994). “Both direct and indirect effects on interstate commerce may violate” the Hobbs Act. Id.
Id. at 100. This jurisdictional hook, then, is satisfied where money is obtained from an individual who is normally engaged in conduct that could be described as “interstate commerce,” which, following the New Deal, includes most any conduct an individual could engage in. This, then, is a low bar easily met in cases involving large sums of money and major political players.
Case law is replete with fact patterns sustaining Hobbs Act convictions. A few examples will suffice to illustrate what this looks like in practice.
In Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 266 (1992), the defendant, “an elected member of the Board of Commissioners of DeKalb County, Georgia,” id. at 257, was the recipient of a $7,000 payment intended to secure the his “assistance in an effort to rezone a 25-acre tract of land for high-density residential use.” Id. The jury convicted the defendant of violating the Hobbs Act upon finding that he “accepted the cash knowing that it was intended to ensure that he would vote in favor of the rezoning application and that he would try to persuade his fellow commissioners to do likewise.” Id. Even though the defendant “did not initiate the transaction, his acceptance of the bribe constituted an implicit promise to use his official position to serve the interests of the bribegiver.” Id. His conviction was sustained on appeal all the way up to the Supreme Court, which affirmed the jury instructions which stated that “if a public official…accepts money in exchange for [a] specific requested exercise of his or her official power, such a demand or acceptance does constitute a violation of the Hobbs Act regardless of whether the payment is made in the form of a campaign contribution.” Id. at 258.
In United States v. Ganim, 510 F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 2007) (Sotomayor, J.), the former mayor of Bridgeport, Connecticut, appealed from (among other things) a Hobbs Act extortion conviction. Id. at 136. The charges stemmed from the fact that he had obtained “cash, meals, clothing, wine and other gifts” from close associates who essentially functioned as his middlemen, obtaining money and payments from entities seeking to curry favor with, or obtain contracts from, the mayor. Id. at 140. Ganim claimed that he had only obtained these goods from his associates “out of friendship or legitimate lobbying activity.” Id. “He denied receiving any gifts in exchange for official acts, denied entering any fee-sharing agreement with [his associates], denied being ‘partners’ with them…, and claimed that he acted only in the best interest of the City.” Id. Despite these averments, then-Judge Sotomayor affirmed the conviction, noting that the Hobbs Act criminalized “a government official’s receipt of a benefit in exchange for an act he has performed, or promised to perform, in the exercise of his official authority.” Id. at 141. Quoting Evans, 504 U.S. at 268, she noted that, in order to prove Hobbs Act extortion, “the government ‘need only show that a public official has obtained a payment to which he was not entitled, knowing that the payment was made in return for official acts.'” Ganim, 510 F.3d at 143. The jury instruction given by the district court in the case, which was affirmed by Judge Sotomayor, detailed further that “the government must prove that the defendant obtained a payment to which he was not entitled by use of his office, knowing that the payment was made in return for official acts rather than being given voluntarily or unrelated to the defendant’s official position. The defendant need not have initiated the payments, but he must have known that the payment was made in exchange for a specific exercise of the defendant’s official powers.” Id. at 144. Irrelevant to the Hobbs Act inquiry was “whether the defendant could or did actually perform the service, or whether he actually had a duty to do so.” Id. “[S]o long as the jury finds that an official accepted gifts in exchange for a promise to perform official acts for the giver, it need not find that the specific act to be performed was identified at the time of the promise, nor need it link each specific benefit to a single official act.” Id. at 147. Judge Sotomayor went on to note that “[w]hile it frequently will be true that particular bribes or extorted payments are linked at the time of the corrupt agreement to particular official acts, that will not always be the case—for example, because the opportunity to undertake the requested act has not arisen, or because the payment is one of a series to ensure an ongoing commitment to perform acts to further the payor’s interests.” Id. No more-precise quid pro quo showing is required under the Hobbs Act because, if it were, it “could subvert the ends of justice” and “legalize some of the most pervasive and entrenched corruption, and cannot be what Congress intended.” Id.
More recently, former New York State Assemblyman Sheldon Silver was convicted of public corruption late last year. One of the charges brought against him which he was ultimately convicted of was Hobbs Act extortion. The conduct in question which proved sufficient to support a conviction thereunder was his sending state grant money to a doctor who then referred patients to a law firm where Silver was Of Counsel, receiving proceeds of the fees obtained from those patients. This sort of quid pro quo, you-scratch-my-back-and-I’ll-scratch-yours, was successfully prosecuted as a form of extortion under color of official right in violation of the Hobbs Act. Important to note is that the aforementioned Preet Bharara spearheaded this prosecution effort.
Though it is clear that the Clinton Foundation has resisted transparency and oversight, and Hillary Clinton has violated her own stated pledges, such conduct does not necessarily rise to the level of criminality. The ultimate question is whether any donations made to the Clinton Foundation (particularly from domestic donors, as the presumption against extraterritoriality may limit application of the Hobbs Act with respect to foreign donors) were made pursuant to an arrangement or understanding with Secretary Clinton (or a Clinton agent) that the donation was made in order to obtain favorable treatment by the State Department or Secretary Clinton. That would establish the quid pro quo which “is the essence of the offense.” Evans, 504 U.S. at 278 (Kennedy, J., concurring). A few actions that raised eyebrows at the time they occurred could constitute Hobbs Act extortion upon further investigation.
It’s a shame, at least in this case, that the statute of limitations on Hobbs Act violations is five years. See 18 U.S.C. 3282(a). Though this could be overcome if the “millions of dollars [showered] on the Clintons in the decade and a half following the scandal” – coming from Rich’s “business partners, lawyers, advisers and friends” – could be shown to have a connection to the pardon.
Early in Secretary Clinton’s tenure, longtime Clinton supporter Rajiv Fernando “was placed on a sensitive government intelligence advisory board even though he had no obvious experience in the field.” This was after he “lobbied then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s office for a seat on” the International Security Advisory Board, “telling one of her closest aides that if appointed he would make Clinton ‘look good.'” He also has given at least $1 million to the Clinton Foundation. Unsuspiciously, Fernando resigned less than a week after his controversial appointment became a focus of inquiries. Even the Clinton sycophants over at Media Matters are having a tough time spinning this one, trying to dress up the appointment as legitimate. Hence the resignation, the “professional State Department staff” questioning his “awkward selection for the group,” the “scrambling behind the scenes to explain” the appointment, and Fernando’s refusal to comment when approached at the DNC while he was serving as a Clinton superdelegate, amirite? It’s a hard sell when even other close Clinton allies don’t buy that spin.
To add insult to injury, Clinton recently attended a campaign fundraiser at Fernando’s home.
In addition to the appearance of quid pro quo with a major fundraiser, we also have a clear lack of transparency, Clinton loyalists going to great lengths to protect her, questions over access to sensitive government information, and, of course, Hillary’s private email account.
Yes, the “appearance of quid pro quo” – i.e., that thing that Kennedy called the “essence” of Hobbs Act extortion. “[K]knowing winks and nods” should not be so blatantly allowed to frustrate the purposes of anti-corruption statutes. Conspiracy is a chargeable offense for a reason. While Slate concludes that “while tapping Fernando was highly questionable, it wasn’t illegal,” they ignore the fact that – if done pursuant to a payment made with the understanding that it was to lead to the bestowal of favors such as this – it quite possibly violated the Hobbs Act.
Disconcertingly, the Foundation failed to disclose these donations while the approval was being mulled over. Worse yet, key players such as Michael McFaul – the Ambassador to Russia during the latter part of Clinton’s tenure as Secretary – were unaware of this transaction until asked about it after the fact (seriously?!). The Foundation’s response when asked by the Times about all this: no comment.
Laureate [Education] hired former President Bill Clinton as “honorary chancellor,” paying him $16.5 million over five years. The Baltimore-based company, which operates for-profit universities in 28 countries, also donated between $1 million and $5 million to the Clinton Foundation, according to the foundation’s web site.
I have issues with Hillary Clinton — and I don’t really mean the emails. Her family’s financial decisions with their foundation are questionable and raise potential ethical problems as she steps into the most powerful role in the world. Her inaccessibility to the press is troubling. And looking back on the 1990s, it seems like she made decisions that protected her own power and standing at the expense of others.
Needless to say, I find “potential ethical problems” and “troubling” to be soft-peddling rhetoric intended to justify the conclusion to endorse Clinton, particularly in light of the available data. It is language that suggests the endorser either did not sufficiently research the individual in question (doubtful in this specific case), or that they legitimately believe those “ethical problems” are simply not problematic enough. I disagree. And a federal prosecutor might as well, provided communications (perhaps deleted ones?) made by or on behalf of Clinton evince the requisite intent.
If Comey’s recommendation against an indictment under the Espionage Act turns out to be merely a prelude to more serious charges being brought against Clinton or her close allies in relation to Clinton Foundation activity, he will have managed to drastically reshape the political landscape while putting his own name and reputation beyond reproach (after all, according to Nancy Pelosi after the non-indictment recommendation, Comey is a “great man” whom we are “very privileged” to have at the helm of the FBI). We’ll see if this happens in time for it to make a difference; but, in any case, if charges are ultimately forthcoming, I suspect the Hobbs Act might be among their number.

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