Source: https://www.oppblock.org/viewtopic.php?p=1031
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 01:02:56+00:00

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The OPP have been abusing the authority of the Highway Traffic Act (HTA) for many years, namely section 172 that deals with Stunt Driving and Racing. When that piece of legislation came out the OPP set out to set an example for all the municipal police services. The OPP's Commissioner at the time, Julian Fantino, drafted a memo via his media relations team and had it send out to the editors. In that memo the public can clearly see where the OPP manipulated section 172 of the HTA and added their own authority for laying charges of Stunt Driving and/or Racing to anyone caught operating their vehicle 50 km/hr or more over the posted speed limit. That initial action by the Commissioner is continued to this day.
The truth is that section 172 of the HTA provides no such authority for an officer to lay a charge of stunt driving or racing based solely on a person’s operation of their motor vehicle at 50 km/hr over the posted speed limit. The HTA actually stipulates that for anyone travelling in excess of 49 km/hr over the posted speed limit there is no out of court settlement (fine). Such a person has to be given a summons to attend court for speeding if the officer chooses to lay a charge for the full speed he witnessed. Many people have fallen victims of this manipulation of law and abuse of authority by the Ontario Provincial Police that have paved the way for many municipal police services to commit similar abuses of authority.
The Ontario Provincial Police (OPP) is aware of recent court decisions regarding Section 172 of the Highway Traffic Act (HTA), commonly called the “Stunt Driving Law.” But it is so much more than stunt driving. The impact of those who regularly speed or drive recklessly reaches deep into our communities and into all of our lives. Allow me to explain.
Section 172 subjects anyone who is stunt driving, road racing or driving 50 kilometres or more over the posted speed limit to a fine of between $2,000 and $10,000 and/or a six month sentence. At the roadside, the officer administers an immediate seven-day suspension of the offender’s driver’s licence and his/her vehicle is towed and impounded for one week.
Aggressive driving and speeding accounted for 28 percent of fatal motor vehicle collisions investigated by the OPP in 2008. Enforcement of Section 172 has been an important part of the OPP’s Provincial Traffic Safety Program (PTSP) to make Ontario’s roads some of the safest in North America. Since the enactment of Section 172, OPP officers have laid over 11,000 charges.
The PTSP has been an unqualified success and has received international recognition. In October 2009, the International Association of Chiefs of Police recognized the effectiveness of the PTSP, bestowing two awards upon the OPP at its annual conference. The Program uses high police visibility, public education and focussed enforcement to reduce unnecessary injury and death on Ontario highways.
The success of the PTSP – measured in pure statistics – speaks for itself and cannot be refuted by any reasonable person. In 2008, there were 322 deaths on roads patrolled by the OPP compared to 453 in 2007. This represents a reduction of 29 percent or 131 lives saved. The downward trend in lives lost on Ontario highways is continuing in 2009.
Motor vehicle collisions are the leading cause of injury and death from age 3 to 33. It is impossible to calculate the emotional costs of needlessly losing a loved one to a preventable motor vehicle collision. But it is possible to calculate the economic costs and it is a useful exercise to do so.
A 2007 Transport Canada study, using 2004 data, estimated the total social costs – that’s things like traffic delays, health care, tow trucks, police, fire and emergency services, and lost productivity – to be $18 billion annually in Ontario at the time.
Using the fatality and injury costs calculated in the Transport Canada study, the encouraging Ontario statistics from 2008 represent a saving to the Ontario economy of $2.3 billion compared to 2007.
So much of this carnage and the associated financial costs and unintended consequences can be prevented but for the reckless actions of irresponsible drivers. Any police officer will tell you that one of the least anticipated duties of their working lives is to attend the homes of victims to tell family members that their loved one was killed or maimed in a totally preventable collision.
The OPP remains convinced that the presence of highly-visible, engaged traffic officers is one of the most effective methods of mitigating high-risk driving behaviour. Coupled with education and public support, effective law enforcement ultimately leads to a significant reduction in serious injuries and fatalities from collisions.
The OPP will continue to enforce the legislation made available to us to save lives, including the Section 172 legislation. That is what we are mandated to do by those who develop and implement legislation, and we make no apologies for carrying out those duties.
I appreciate the opportunity to clarify our role in this matter.
Does anyone wonder what the HTA actually states in section 172?
172. (1) No person shall drive a motor vehicle on a highway in a race or contest, while performing a stunt or on a bet or wager. 2007, c. 13, s. 21.
The above excerpt from the HTA can be verified by accessing the act via the Internet.
The truth is that, if the legislation intended to include the operation of a motor vehicle 50 km/hr or more over the posted speed limit then section 128 of the HTA would have to have been revised. The HTA already provided authority for the application of a charge of speeding for anyone caught driving 50 or more above the speed limit through the use of a summons under Part 3 of the Act which restricts a Justice of the Peace to apply a fine, subsequent to conviction of a minimum of $600 to a maximum of $2,500 and or six months in jail. However, the OPP, in laying so many charges of racing and/or stunt driving based solely on speed, served a larger purpose of bringing in the fear of speeding.
I am not supporting speeding rather I am against a Provincial Organization, that is supposed to be setting an example for its Municipal counterparts, manipulating the Highway Traffic Act to bring about immediate results. Though it might be true that speeding has dropped considerably (statistical results might be incorrect), one can wonder how such a (perceived) quick change was brought about? By manipulation of the law, that’s how!
My heart goes out to the many victims of the false charges of Stunt Driving and/or Racing based solely on the fact that they were operating their motor vehicle 50 km/hr over the posted limit. This speed infraction could easily be realized by one operating their motor vehicle on a country highway like Highway 7, for example and they enter one of those small towns that one can travel through at the blink of an eye so to speak. Where it is common for one to travel 10 to 20 km/hr over the posted limit many officers tend to turn a blind eye to such infractions and should such a motorist upon entering a small town fail to drop his speed immediately, for whatever reason, the driver can easily be stopped by the OPP who might have set up a radar trap in town. Such a motorist, if caught, is falsely charged with Stunt Driving and/or Racing and is further victimized with the impoundment of their vehicle. The OPP later walks away looking good because most motorists, rather than contesting these charges that lack clear authority usually plead guilty to the actual section that ought to have been used: Speeding contrary to section 128 of the Highway Traffic Act. Such people thereby nullify their chances of pursuing a civil action against the officer. And that is a shame because it allows the police to continue breaking the actual law they have been sworn to uphold.
Since the job of the police is to uphold the law and not to manipulate it in any way, what the OPP has been actually doing is nothing short of a flagrant abuse of their authority!
Last edited by advocateforjust on Fri Jan 23, 2015 5:31 am, edited 5 times in total.
It has come to our attention that there may still be some confusion about the recent decision regarding section 172 HTA. Please ensure that all detachments are aware that as per Deputy Beechey's direction we are now laying both sections 172 and 128 HTA when the driver is 50 kilometers or more over the posted speed limit. I have attached the Deputy's directive below.
You may be aware of a September 4, 2009 court decision regarding Section 172 of the Highway Traffic Act (HTA) and the ensuing impact on our public safety mandate.
This decision applies only to a single specific case. There is no declaration or order of the Ontario Court of Justice of invalidity in relation to Section 172. The matter is now in the appeal period. We understand that the Crown will be reviewing the court’s decision. Any decision with respect to an appeal will be made by the Crown, following that review.
To ensure flexibility, the Ontario Provincial Police (OPP) will commence charging accused persons under both Section 128 and 172 of the HTA when someone is driving 50 kilometres or more over the posted speed limit. There are no other changes in our operation. Even though we will be laying both charges, we will still be suspending the driver and impounding the vehicle.
Section 172 subjects anyone who is stunt driving, road racing or driving 50 kilometres or more over the posted limit to a fine of between $2,000 and $10,000 and/or a six month sentence. At the roadside, the officer administers an immediate seven-day suspension of the offender’s driver’s licence and his/her vehicle is towed and impounded for one week.
Enforcement of Section 172 has been an important part of the OPP’s Provincial Traffic Safety Program (PTSP). Over 15,000 charges have been laid under Section 172 since enactment in September 2007 until the end of July 2009, and over 10,000 of those charges have been laid by OPP officers.
The PTSP has been an unqualified success. The Program uses high police visibility, public education and focussed enforcement to reduce unnecessary injury and death on Ontario highways. In 2008, there were 322 deaths on roads patrolled by the OPP compared to 451 in 2007. This represents a reduction of 29 percent or 129 lives saved. The downward trend in lives lost on Ontario highways is continuing in 2009.
Since the Ontario government brought in the so called “racing law” (HTA s. 172) thousands of Ontario drivers have been charged, most for the simple act of driving more than 50 km/h over the speed limit (an action which is referred to as “performing a stunt” under the Statute and Regulations). In fact the police and the Crown have taken the position that anyone driving more than 50 km/h over the limit is guilty of stunt driving under the Highway Traffic Act. But in taking this position they have violated the intent of the Ontario Legislature.
It is a generally accepted tenet of law that words which appear in a statute are to be assumed to have been put there for a reason. When the government passed s. 172 and its attendant regulations they chose not to remove s.128(14)(d) of the Act which states the penalties for speeding more than 50 km/h over the limit. Thus we have a statute which indicates there is an offence of speeding more than 50 km/h over the limit as well as the offence of racing or performing a stunt. This shows that it was apparently not the government’s intention that all 50 km/h speeding offences be treated as stunts. The police and the Crown have exceeded their authority in choosing to ignore the speeding offence and to charge all persons under the racing section.
It is unfortunate that the regulations related to the racing law are not particularly well drafted; well to be fair they are some of the worst drafted regulations I’ve seen. And so there is nothing on the face of the definition of stunt driving to give guidance to cops or Crown attorneys as to what the circumstance are that would make a racing charge appropriate rather than a simple speeding charge. But this should not be the problem of the defendant. It should be incumbent upon the Crown to seek clarification from the government about the circumstances where a s. 172 charge (racing) is appropriate rather than a s.128 charge (speeding), and until they get that clarification they should charge all defendants with speeding rather than racing.
In the alternative, if we were to attempt to glean the intent of the legislature from the existing legislation, we should look to the definition of a “race” in the regulations. The regulations provide for the possibility of a single vehicle race, where a person drives a vehicle at a rate of speed which is a marked departure from the lawful rate of speed, and goes on to state that ““marked departure from the lawful rate of speed” means a rate of speed that may limit the ability of a driver of a motor vehicle to prudently adjust to changing circumstances on the highway. O. Reg. 455/07, s. 2 (2).” Given the seriousness of the charge and the penalties, this definition is more appropriate as it requires the Crown to prove an actual dangerous act rather than a simple breach of the rules.
So in closing I’d suggest that until the definitions of stunt driving are clarified, the Crown should be limited to prosecuting speeders either with simple speeding charges or with single vehicle racing charges. And I’d suggest that anyone defending a stunt driving under the racing section bring this argument forward as part of their defence. Finally I would add that this defence may not beat the charge entirely. An accused could still be found guilty of speeding over 50 km/h as an included offence and that still would be a 6 point penalty, but the fines would be less and they wouldn’t have that s.172 conviction on their record for their insurance company to see.
The content for this post comes from research I did in preparing a defence to a stunt driving charge. The crown offered to reduce the charge to speeding moments before trial so I didn’t have the opportunity to test the above defence in court. My expectation going in was that I would probably have to get to the appeal level in order for this defence to gain traction, and further that if I had been successful at the provincial court trial level, the Crown would almost certainly have appealed as it would really have cut the legs out from under this whole stunt driving racket they’re running currently.
If any reader tries or has tried this defence, successfully or not, I’d be interested in reading your comments on the experience.
The regulation says “rate of speed” and one could not ask for better evidence that it is, indeed, badly drafted. Speed is a rate, i.e., the distance traveled in a unit of time. What they really meant by saying “high rate of speed” is simply that the vehicle must be moving very fast, but somehow, they must have thought that saying “high rate of speed” sounds “sexier”. This, of course, is rather inaccurate. Typically, when educated people say “rate of something”, they usually mean the time rate of change. In calculus, it is d/dt of something, i.e. the time derivative. So when one says “rate of speed”, one is actually saying ds/dt, where s is the speed. This is an acceleration! So really, transposing “speed” into the “rate of speed” is not only non-economical in terms of words to say, it is also total incorrect.
The Constitution as I understood it, IS/WAS the Law. And ever since Roadside trials have been “granted / added” to police powers, one has to wonder where this dangerous violation of our rights (in full decay) is headed. I wholeheartedly agree with Mr. Wilsons’ view which simply CAN NOT BE ignored on the face of normal logic and reasoning. S.172 needs to be abandoned not just for the obvious reasons, but for the very fact of the ambiguous nature of CONFLICTING HTA definitions (128 vs 172)! Relying on the police and/or Crown to interpret and administer s.172 as they see fit essentially removed the role of the JP and allowed everyone else to be open to Charter violation et al!
Ontario’s stunt / “racing” laws are the strictest of any rich democracy. Convicted stunters and simple speeders are now exposed to jail provisions within the sentencing phase. When convicted, the MTO driving record remains put on registries ready for viewing by any insurance agent looking to impose the secondary punishment – High insurance premiums. Rates that almost guarantee facility type insurance for years. Effectively making driving un-affordable.
Which makes it all the more important to ask whether Ontario’s approach to speeding is the right one. In fact it is s. 172 “stunt driving” law that has grown self-defeatingly harsh. It has been driven by a ratchet effect thanks to political appeasement. Individual politicians have great latitude to propose new laws. Stricter curbs on speeding or racing win votes. And to sound severe, such curbs must be stronger than the laws in place, which in turn were proposed by politicians who wished to appear tough themselves. Few politicians dare to vote against such laws, because if they do, the potential for attack ads practically write themselves.
Some prosecutors are now stretching the definition of “Stunt driving” to include anyone that simply meets any facet of the act itself, including speeding over 50 km/hr. How dangerous are these speeders anyways? MTO’s Stats don’t reflect the dangers, and no one has yet to prove statistically the effects of s. 172 on road safety. A review of some of the available stats in Ontario found that more than two thirds of those charged with s. 172 posed little risk. Most were merely speeding and not performing any other of requirements of stunting for the purpose of a race, etc.
hundreds of dollars later. These are real people with real life situations, does this mean they should be exposed to such severity of punishment and possible jail terms?
Punishment fit the “crime” ?
There are three main arguments that can or should be made to remove s. 172 from the act. First and foremost, it is unfair to impose harsh penalties for small offences like speeding. Lets face it, this is the only thing that is in question for most offenders. The strict vs. absolute liability question gets so convoluted that its impossible to make sense of it, or even what kind defense strategy should be utilized which is why up to now most have failed. Second, Ontario’s racing laws often punish not only the offender, but also amputates his/her rights as mentioned earlier. Third, harsh HTA laws often places pressure on police or crown by having so many petty speeding offenders to sort through and makes it hard if not impossible to distinguish the truly dangerous ones from simple speeding. The net result is treating everyone charged under this act the same. Instead of lumping all alleged racing offenders together on the same list, the province should re-draft the poorly written legislation to include more distinctions and remove the harsh jail provision all together!
It may take some time to undo this act. However, practical and just the case for reform, we must overcome political cowardice and agendas so that at the end of the day sensible speeding laws are enacted rather than vengeful ones.
A colleague directed me to the full text of the Brown decision. Two further noteworthy quotes from JP Cuthbertson include “In my opinion, the similarities between s. 128 HTA and s. 3.7 of O. Reg. 455/07 extend only to their wording. They are in different Parts of the HTA, they have significantly different penalties and consequences, with s. 3.7 including the possibility of imprisonment and/or probation.” and “It is not the similarities that make s. 128 and s. 3.7 of O. Reg. 455/07 the same rather it is their differences that make them unique and separate offences. In my view, the legislators intended to establish an offence separate from s. 128″.
So JP Cuthbertson supports the position that there are two applicable offences under the Act. What remains undetermined to date, that we know of, is a ruling which makes clear the specific circumstances under which each section applies.
The law is unconstitutional for several reasons. Section 172(5) requires an officer to have reasonable and probable grounds. This proves a hearing is required before punishment can be imposed. Reasonable and probable grounds bear a standard of proof and onus of proof. Thus, when an accused is charged, it is neither proven nor presumed that the accused has committed an offence, but there are reasonable grounds for believing that this has occurred. The laying of charges in the legal process does not involve a determination of guilt, thus, the presumption of innocence under s. 11(d) as a principle of fundamental justice under s. 7 of the Charter still applies and sanctions cannot be imposed until a determination of guilt has been entered. The burden is on the government and the standard of proof is beyond reasonable doubt. The governments burden can only be discharged by a trier of fact in a court proceeding. But no proceeding is provided violating ss. 7 and 11(d) of the charter. The principles of fundamental justice under s. 7 incorporate due process and natural justice. S. 172 violate both of them as no hearing is provided. As no hearing is provided s. 172 also violates s. 11(d), the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty according to the law.
The charter is part of the constitution and the constitution is the supreme law of Canada. Section 172 is not justified or saved by s. 1 of the Charter.Moreover, s. 128(14)(d) directly conflicts with s. 172. Section 128 provides for a fine of $9.75 per kms over the speed limit when the driver is doing more than 50 kms over the speed limit. There is no licence suspension, vehicle impoundment, prison term etc. Section 172 provides for a minimum $2000 fine, maximum $10,000 fine, seven day licence suspension, up to two year suspension upon conviction, seven day vehicle impoundment, and six month prison term. It is a universal principle that when two provisions conflict the one that is most favourable to the accused must be adopted.Most critically, offences in Canada were classified 30 years ago. Offences are either mens rea, absolute or strict liability offences. R. v. City of Sault Ste. Marie,  2 S.C.R. 1299S. 172 is an absolute liability offence. Twenty-three years ago, the Supreme Court of Canada determined that absolute liability offences that contain terms of imprisonment are unconstitutional as they violate s. 7 of the charter. The term of imprisonment does not have to be mandatory, it may be optional, as s. 172 provides. B.C. Motor Vehicle Act,  2 S.C.R. 486 Thus, in accordance with s. 52 of the Constitution Act 1982 s. 172 is of no force and effect. In other words, it's not a valid law.
Critically, the Province might wish to claim it was unaware of B.C. Motor Vehicle Act,  2 S.C.R. 486 until now but that is simple untrue. The Attorney General of Ontario intervened in R. v. Kanda, 2008 ONCA 22 and is well aware of the offence classifications and that a term of imprisonment is not permissible when attached to an absolute offence, which s. 172 is. More than 8,000 people to date have be charged under s. 172 and up to 8,000 vehicles impounded, thus up to 24,000 criminal offences of thefts, mischeif and fraud have been committed by agents of the Province. More importantly, the Attorney General argued in the case that the triggering words “no person shall,” evince a clear intention to create an absolute liability offence. The court determined otherwise stating it is a strict liability offence. The court also cited the B.C. Motor Vehicle Act case. Therefore, the Attorney General has been aware since January, 2008 that s. 172 is unconstitutional and of no force or effect yet the Province continues to illegally charge citizens and impound vehicles. In order to be reasonable, seizures and impoundments must be authorized by law. Here, impoundment is not reasonable or authorized by a valid law. The reason for this requirement is clear: under both the Charter and the common law, agents of the state can only enter onto or confiscate someone’s property when the law specifically permits them to do so. Otherwise, they are constrained by the same rules regarding theft as everyone else. R. v. Caslake,  1 S.C.R. 51 Therefore, the police are not operating under any valid law when they impound a vehicle and are not operating in the execution of any valid power or duty. What they are doing is stealing cars under s. 322 of the Criminal Code, committing mischief under s. 430, and fraud under s. 380.
A person is having their vehicle stolen and the police are allowing a third party to place a lien on your property. You cannot get your stolen property back unless you pay money, which is fraud. If you are subject to an impoundment you are empowered under s. 494 of the Criminal Code to arrest the police office on the spot the second he acts to impound your vehicle. Section 19 of the Criminal Code articulates that Ignorance of the law is no excuse and the police cannot blame the government for any wrong doing an officer commits. A police officer's duty and powers are articulated under s. 42 of the Police Service Act. Section 42(3) of the Police Service Act states; Powers and duties of common law constable (3) A police officer has the powers and duties ascribed to a constable at common law. At common law, these duties include “the preservation of the peace, the prevention of crime, and the protection of life and property.” Dedman v. The Queen,  2 S.C.R. 2.The common law is no more immune from Charter scrutiny than is statute law, as the Supreme Court has repeatedly held, see RWDSU v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd.,  2 S.C.R. 573; B.C.G.E.U. v. British Columbia (Attorney General),  2 S.C.R. 214; R. v. Swain,  1 S.C.R. 933; R. v. Daviault,  3 S.C.R. 63, and R. v. Stone,  2 S.C.R. 290.Common law is made up of decisions of the court.
The police officer are required to be aware of all decisions, as they are governed by them. Thus, as the court determined 23 years ago that absolute liability offences that contain terms of imprisonment are unconstitutional, the police officer who steals a car commits 3 criminal offence per incident. You can also sue the officer for breach of duty of care for are damages you incur. Hill v. Hamilton Wentworth Regional Police Services Board, 2007 SCC 41 Moreover, Section 50(1) of the Police Service Act expressly states; Liability for torts 50(1) The board or the Crown in right of Ontario, as the case may be, is liable in respect of torts committed by members of the police force in the course of their employment.The failure of a public officer to perform a statutory duty also constitutes misfeasance in a public office. Police Services Act s. 41(1) imposes on all Chiefs and Commissioners a freestanding statutory obligation to ensure that the members of the force carry out their duties in accordance with the provisions of the Police Services Act and the needs of the community. This includes an obligation to ensure that members of the police force do not injure members of the public through misconduct in the exercise of police functions. The public complaints process allows the public to complain in respect of the conduct of a police officer. What an accused seeks, though, is not the opportunity to file a complaint that might result in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions, but, rather, compensation for the damage they have suffered as a consequence of the Chief and/or Commissioners inadequate supervision and misfeasance in office. The public complaint process is no alternative to liability in negligence. A plaintiff cannot sue government for a policy decision. However, enforcement of that policy is an operational decision which gives rise to a duty of care. Odhauji Estate v. Yoodhouse 120031 3 S.C.R ,263. Section 1 of the Police Service Act articulates the principles Police are to respect and follow. The drivers whose vehicles are stolen by the police are victims of crime. They are being dumped at the side of the road when their vehicle is stolen and they are being smeared in the media when the police release their names and/or allow video of their car or the person themselves to be aired.
The Province and the police operate under colour of law, but the law is not colour blind and no one is exempt from the law. R. v. Mann,  3 S.C.R.59, 2004 SCC 52. One of the most fundamental responsibilities of a government is to ensure the security of its citizens. In a constitutional democracy, governments must act accountably and in conformity with the Constitution and the rights and liberties it guarantees. It is one of the proud accomplishments of the common law that everybody is subject to the ordinary law of the land regardless of public prominence or governmental status. As was explained in Reference re Secession of Quebec,  2 S.C.R. 217, at p. 240, the rule of law is one of the “fundamental and organizing principles of the Constitution”, and at p. 258, it was further emphasized that a crucial element of the rule of law is that “[t]here is ... one law for all.” Thus, a provincial Premier is held to have no immunity against a claim in damages when he caused injury to a private citizen. The following sections of the Highway Traffic Act are also unconstitutional. Section 107(1), (2), (3), (4), (11) and (13). Section 107(15) states;…”or to imprisonment for a term of not more than six months, or to both.” Section 112 (3).…“or to imprisonment for a term of not more than three months, or to both” Section 171(4).…”or to imprisonment for a term of not more than six months, or to both.” Section 172.1(3).…”or to imprisonment for a term of not more than six months, or to both.” Section 175(17).…” or to imprisonment for a term of not more than six months, or to both.” Section 177(4).…” or to imprisonment for a term of not more than six months, or to both.” Section 190(8).…”or to imprisonment for a term of not more than six months, or to both.” Section 200(2).…”or to imprisonment for a term of not more than six months, or to both.

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