Source: https://www.utrechtjournal.org/articles/10.5334/ujiel.di/
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 10:53:14+00:00

Document:
By ratifying the Aarhus Convention in 2005 the EU committed itself to guaranteeing broad access to justice in environmental matters both at the national and the EU level. Yet, in spite of the clear-cut obligations incumbent upon the EU, EU courts have consistently rebuked pleas for a softening of the standing requirements in the context of direct actions against EU acts that might have an impact on the environment and/or public health. In addition, the internal review procedure set out by the 2006 Aarhus Regulation has been interpreted so restrictively by the EU institutions that that its added value in the stride toward better access to courts in environmental matters remains ephemeral at best.
This led the General Court to finding that the Aarhus Regulation, by excluding general EU acts from the scope of internal review, was in breach of Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention. In its recent rulings of 13 January 2015, however, the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) overruled the General Court by holding that the Aarhus Regulation could not be reviewed in light of the Aarhus Convention. With its refusal to use Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention as a reference criterion for the purpose of reviewing the EU’s compliance with the Aarhus Convention’s obligations, the CJEU avoided tackling the unsatisfactory level of judicial protection in environmental cases at the EU level.
This paper argues that the rulings of the CJEU are to be qualified as a significant step backwards for judicial protection in environmental matters at the EU level. It is established that, instead of addressing the current failings of the EU with respect to access to justice in environmental cases, the CJEU’s hands-off approach paves the way for yet another decade of non-compliance by the EU in the realm of access to justice in environmental cases.
Franz Kafka is renowned for depicting his characters trapped in a system of rules and laws that they know very little about. The ambiguous relationship between man and ‘The Law’ is probably best reflected in the parable Before the Law, which is often viewed as the centrepiece of Kafka’s most famous novel The Trial.1 In this story, Joseph K., Kafka’s recurrent protagonist, tries to gain admission to the mysterious and elusive Court. One day, K. has to show an important client from Italy around a cathedral. There the priest reveals himself as a court employee, and he tells K. a story about a ‘man from the country’ who comes to a great door seeking the Law. Before it stands a doorkeeper who is barring the entrance. He tells the man that he cannot go through at the present time. At the end of the conversation, as the ‘man from the country’ is dying, he wonders why, even though everyone seeks the Law, no one else has come in all these years: ‘Everyone strives to reach the Law so how does it happen that for all these years no one but myself ever begged for admittance?’. The doorkeeper replies that since the man is dying, he is going to close the door.
It is only a small step from K.’s frustration about not getting access to the Law to the futile attempts of environmental NGOs and other individuals to gain direct access to the EU courts in environmental matters. Traditionally, such actions are hindered by the prevailing interpretation of the requirement for individual concern, one of the two conditions that need to be fulfilled pursuant to Article 263(4) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) for private entities in order to be able to challenge a legislative or administrative EU act.
Yet the analogy goes further. When questioned by ‘the man from the country’ about the reasons underpinning the limited access to the Law, Kafka’s doorkeeper famously replied that, ‘No one else could even be admitted here, since this gate was only made for you. I am now going to shut it’. In a similar manner, the admissibility threshold put forward by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in its renowned 1963 Plaumann-ruling requires a private party to prove that he or she is in a unique position in relation to the contested administrative or legislative EU act.2 Not surprisingly, this rigid interpretation, which has been consolidated by the EU courts ever since, bars public interest organisations, such as environmental NGOs, from directly challenging EU acts before the EU courts.3 In itself, this would matter little if the possibility to indirectly challenge EU acts through national proceedings – which are subsequently brought before CJEU via the preliminary ruling procedure – would effectively counterbalance this lack of direct access to EU courts in environmental cases. However, even if the EU acts are implemented through national rules, national environmental proceedings often face important obstacles too, such as limited standing at national level and reluctance by the national courts to refer the matter to Luxemburg, turning this detour in an ineffective alternative to direct access to EU courts.
The rulings of the Grand Chamber of 13 January 2015 settle a long-running dispute between environmental NGOs and the European Commission about the effectiveness of the Aarhus Regulation in improving access to justice in environmental matters at the EU level.
For the purpose of this article, the landmark judgments of the CJEU are assessed in the light of the recent international trend towards more environmental democracy and justice. More in particular, this article seeks to elucidate the lack of coherence between the conservative approach used by the CJEU in relation to direct access to justice in environmental cases at the EU level and the more ambitious premises and objectives upon which the Aarhus Convention is grounded. Additional focus is placed on two alternative approaches which, at least according to some observers, might have allowed the CJEU to better align its case law with the shift towards environmental democracy. In the last section, this article reflects on the more fundamental question pertaining to the compatibility of the internal review procedure with the requirements of the Aarhus Convention and, subsequently, examines whether the reluctant stance of the CJEU merits reconsideration in the light of the recent international developments.
In order to fully grasp the arguments that are raised in the recent Aarhus-proceedings before the CJEU, it is necessary to take a step back and briefly examine the relevant case law developments of the past two decades. As such, the stark rise in Aarhus-related legal challenges before EU courts did not occur in a vacuum. It is the direct result of a decade-long but commonly overlooked struggle by environmental NGOs to get direct access to EU courts in environmental matters.
Nevertheless, the EU courts have consistently dismissed pleas for a more progressive reading of the admissibility requirements in the context of environmental litigation ever since. In particular, the EU courts were fearful of a massive influx of direct actions by environmental NGOs, taking into account the relatively high number of legal persons in the EU that have as their object the protection and conservation of the environment. Ultimately the quasi-constitutional status of the jurisprudential definition of ‘individual concern’ prevailed over the pledges for a more open approach for environmental NGOs and concerned individuals.
In light of the above it is thus safe to hold that the Plaumann-test had become the proverbial bête noir of the environmental NGOs in the context of direct actions against EU acts. Alarmed by the reluctance on the part of the EU courts to accommodate direct actions initiated by environmental NGOs, Client Earth decided to refer the matter to the Aarhus Compliance Committee, which was established in 2002 to review compliance by the Contracting Parties to the Aarhus Convention.
In its partial findings and recommendation, the Aarhus Compliance Committee did not assess in detail each and every possible form of challengeable decision-making by EU institutions or each decision rendered by an EU court. However, on a more general note, the Aarhus Compliance Committee held that the consistent application of the Plaumann-test had resulted in no member of the public ever being able to directly challenge a decision or a regulation in environmental cases before the EU courts. The Committee highlighted that, pursuant to Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention, Contracting Parties have to ensure that ‘members of the public have access to administrative or judicial procedures to challenge acts and omissions by private parties and public authorities which contravene provisions of its national law relating to the environment’.
B. A Small Spark of Hope for Environmental Justice?
Despite its strict wording, the Aarhus Compliance Committee was hesitant to issue a clear-cut condemnation of the EU system of legal remedies in environmental cases.31 Apparently, it assumed that the 2006 Aarhus Regulation, if interpreted in an Aarhus-friendly way, would offer ample review options for environmental NGOs. This immediately touches upon one of the major points of contention in the legal proceedings leading up to the rulings of the Grand Chamber of the CJEU of 13 January 2015. For, as alluded above, these lawsuits in essence revolved around the viability of the internal review mechanism that had been set up by the Aarhus Regulation in order to live up to the EU’s commitments under the Aarhus Convention. The exact material scope of this internal review procedure lies at the heart of the debate on access to justice in environmental cases at the EU level.
These suspicions were proven right by the subsequent administrative practice. In the few cases in which a request for internal review of an environmental measure of an EU institution had been submitted, the relevant EU institution rejected it as inadmissible.38 To compound matters even further, the bulk of the requests were dismissed because of the strict interpretation of the notion ‘measure of individual scope’ as laid down by the Aarhus Regulation.39 This raised the question whether the internal review procedure was capable of fully compensating for the detected deficiencies in the system of legal remedies at the EU level in environmental cases.
In the previous years, several environmental NGOs sued the EU institutions over their restrictive stance on the internal review procedure. Accordingly, the EU courts were asked to shed light on the exact material scope of the internal review procedure and, most importantly, its compatibility with Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention.
Centrally, the environmental NGOs contended that, if it would turn out that the strict interpretation of the internal review procedure upheld by the European Commission was indeed compatible with the wording of the Aarhus Regulation, Article 10(1) of the Aarhus Regulation would contravene Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention.
The argumentation raised by the environmental NGOs fell apart in two subclaims. However, from the outset it was evident that the first subclaim, which basically hinged upon the afore-mentioned progressive reading of the Aarhus Regulation upheld by some commentators, had little chance of success.47 Accepting the Commission’s argument, the General Court quickly concluded that the contested measures, of which the internal review had been sought, qualified as a measure of general nature.48 Thus, applying the strict wording of the Aarhus Regulation, no internal review was available for environmental NGOs in the context of such administrative acts.
On a more general note, the General Court concluded that the limitation of the concept of ‘acts’ to ‘administrative acts’ in the sense of Article 2(1)(g) of the Aarhus Regulation was incompatible with Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention. Although the term ‘acts’ in itself is not defined by the Aarhus Convention, the General Court considered the limited scope of the internal review procedure to be in blatant contradiction with the objectives thereof. While recognising that under Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention, the Contracting Parties retained a certain measure of discretion with regard to the definition of the persons who have a right of recourse to administrative or judicial procedure and as to the nature of the procedure (whether administrative or judicial), the General Court ultimately held that the Aarhus Convention does not offer the same discretion as regards the definition of ‘acts’ which are open to challenge.54 Consequently, the General Court annulled both decisions of the European Commission.
3. A Bold Step Forward or Maintaining the Status Quo?
On the surface, the rulings of the General Court appear groundbreaking. And to a large extent they are. For the first time ever, EU judges were willing to assess the viability of EU rules on access to justice at the EU level in the light of the third pillar of the Aarhus Convention. However, even though the progressive rationale underpinning these rulings is remarkable in its own right, some additional caution is warranted.
The following three points are in order to contextualise the decisions of 14 June 2012 and, in addition, to further understand the final outcome of the case before the Grand Chamber of the CJEU.
While Vereniging Milieudefensie did not concern a direct action against a substantive EU act – and it thus remains hard to draw general lessons from it in that regard – it nevertheless marked a significant shift from the earlier approach adopted by the EU courts vis-à-vis the availability of effective national remedies when interpreting the legal standing requirements before their own jurisdictions.58 In its rulings of 14 June 2012, the General Court decided to effectively scrutinise the review options available before the national courts. Therefore the rulings of the General Court are to be tagged as an important step forwards for access to justice in environmental matters at the EU level. They showcased that the General Court would no longer be willing to reject a plea for wider access to justice before EU courts whenever no effective judicial remedies are available at national level.
Second – as to the wider implications of the General Court’s allegedly progressive stance on judicial protection in environmental cases – it needs to be emphasized that the rationale used by the General Court, even if upheld by the CJEU, would not have fundamentally cured all the shortcomings of the EU in the realm of access to justice in environmental cases. At first sight, the latter assumption seems to stand at odds with the progressive discourse that was used by the General Court. As such, the rulings of 14 June 2012 display a remarkable openness on the part of the General Court towards the Aarhus Convention and thus are to be assessed as a providential sign for environmental democracy. For one, it might be maintained that the General Court had finally come to terms with the requirements for access to justice in environmental matters.59 At the same time, some observers, including myself, remained sceptical about the practical added value of the rulings of 14 June 2012 in the strive for more access to courts in environmental cases.60 Admittedly, when measured against the conservative approach towards the Aarhus Convention at the EU level that had prevailed so far, the rulings are to be hailed as a welcome step forwards towards a more encompassing scheme of internal review in environmental matters. Even more so, taking into consideration the landmark decision of the CJEU in Lesoochranárske zoskupenie, in which the CJEU refused to grant direct effect to Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention, the General Court could have easily rejected the plea for using the Aarhus Convention as a ‘benchmark’ or ‘reference criterion’ for the purpose of a legality review of an EU act. By toning down the importance of direct effect as a prerequisite for a legality review of EU implementing measures, the General Court pointed the way to a more viable approach towards environmental justice at the EU level. It is thus clear that the General Court cannot be accused of having a bias against Aarhus. Having said this, it still remains uncertain whether the viewpoints adopted by the General Court would have ensured full compliance with Article 9(3) and (4) of the Aarhus Convention. To some extent, the rulings of the General Court also inadvertently exposed many shortcomings in the EU system of judicial review for environmental matters. In that regard, it is seminal to bear in mind that the General Court only annulled the Commission’s decisions about the inadmissibility of the requests for internal review made under the Aarhus Regulation. In other words, in spite of the yearlong proceedings, no substantial review of the challenged decisions had taken place by June 2012.
Arguably, such findings are hard to reconcile with the requirements for effective and timely judicial protection in environmental cases laid down by Article 9(4) of the Aarhus Convention. In essence, however, these findings point to the inherent vices linked to the overarching characteristics of the internal review mechanism and thus are not to be blamed to the General Court as such.
These observations are not without relevance. Taken together with recurring time delays linked to legal proceedings before EU courts and the other inherent shortcomings of the internal review procedure (see infra), it is thus safe to conclude that the rulings of 14 June 2012 still left a lot of defects of the current EU review scheme unaddressed.
III. The Solomon Judgments of the CJEU of 13 January 2015: Missed Opportunities for Environmental Democracy at the EU level?
While the practical effect of the rulings of the General Court of 14 June 2012 on environmental litigation remained questionable at best, the generous stance towards the Aarhus Convention flared up hopes of a shift towards more environmental democracy at the EU level. By considering the impact of Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention on EU rules, the General Court was believed to have set in motion a process towards more accountability in environmental matters. Still, the modest progress offered by the latter rulings of the General Court was not certain to last. The European Commission, closely followed by the Council and the European Parliament, decided to lodge an appeal against the decisions. Thus the Grand Chamber of the CJEU would have the final say on the compatibility of the Aarhus Regulation with the EU’s international commitments. In this section, the long-awaited rulings in both cases on the 13th of January 2015 are examined more into detail.
The submissions of the EU institutions, which were displeased by the General Court’s more progressive approach towards the Aarhus Convention in the European context, focused on two central issues. First and foremost, the EU institutions portended that the General Court’s rulings were based on an erroneous interpretation of the settled case law of the CJEU on the possibility for individuals to rely on the provision of international agreements with the aim of challenging the validity of a EU act of secondary legislation. As to the merits of the case, it was maintained that the General Court had erred in law by finding that the Parties to the Aarhus Convention enjoy limited discretion in identifying the acts that are subject to an administrative or judicial review pursuant to Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention.
In its rulings of 13 January 2015, the Grand Chamber of the CJEU decided to follow the submissions of the appellants pertaining to the legality review of the Aarhus Regulation in the light of Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention. Returning to the basic legal principles underlying the invocability of provisions of an international agreement, the CJEU set out that provisions of an international agreement can only be relied upon to review an act of EU secondary legislation where the nature and broad logic of that agreement did not preclude it and, additionally, the provisions at issue were, as regards their content, unconditional and sufficiently precise. With reference to its previous ruling in Lesoochranárske zoskupenie, the CJEU held that Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention does not contain any unconditional and sufficiently precise obligation capable of directly regulating the legal position of individuals. By explicitly referring to members of the public who ‘meet the criteria, if any, laid down in (…) national law’, the latter provision is subject, in its implementation or effect, to the adoption of a subsequent measure.65 Consequently, the provision could not be relied upon to review the validity of the Aarhus Regulation.
Against the backdrop of the latter premises, the Grand Chamber ultimately decided to overrule the General Court’s reasoning. More specifically, it rejected the use of the so-called Fediol- and Nakajima-exceptions as a means to bypass the lack of direct effect of Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention. In its ruling in Fediol, the ECJ held that it would conduct a legality review of an EU act in the light of WTO-law where the EU act at issue referred explicitly to specific provisions of WTO-law, whereas the Nakajima-exception referred to a case of legality review where the EU intended to implement a particular obligation assumed under WTO law. Although the lawsuits filed by the environmental NGOs had no linkages with WTO-law, these ‘exceptions’ been brought up by the General Court in its 2012 rulings in order for it to proceed with the legality review of the Aarhus Regulation in the light of the requirements set out by Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention. However, the CJEU ultimately held that ‘those two exceptions were justified solely by the particularities of the agreements that led to their application’. In addition, in the CJEU’s view, the vague and ambiguous wording of Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention rendered it unsuitable as a reference criterion for the purpose of legality review of EU secondary legislation.
The Nakajima-exception did not fare any better. The CJEU held that it also could not be relied upon in order to justify the review of the Aarhus Regulation in the light of Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention. According to the Grand Chamber, the factual and legal background of Nakajima had to be distinguished from the cases at hand. In Nakajima the dispute centred on an EU implementing act linked to the antidumping system, which was, according to the Grand Chamber, ‘extremely dense in its design and application, in the sense that it provides for measures in respect of undertakings accused of dumping practices’.68 Accordingly, the CJEU concluded that, in sharp contrast to Nakajima, no implementation-scenario had unfolded in the two cases at hand.
As an additional reminder, the CJEU also recalled that Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention leaves too much leeway and discretion to the Contracting Parties when defining the rules for the implementation of administrative or judicial procedures in the context of environmental cases.
B. There Is (Was) No Alternative, or Was There?
With its outright refusal to review the validity of the internal review mechanism in the light of the Aarhus Convention, the CJEU did not have to pronounce itself on the substance of the arguments raised by the environmental NGOs in their original claims. As a consequence of that, the CJEU missed a unique opportunity to pronounce itself on the loopholes in the EU system of judicial protection in environmental cases.
It is thus likely that the shortcomings of the current EU implementing rules as to access to justice in environmental matters will persist through the coming years. In the light of the outcome of the legal proceedings launched against the strict scope of the Aarhus implementations measures, it is very unlikely that the EU institutions will consider a review of the existing Aarhus Regulation any time soon. Therefore the rulings of the CJEU most certainly leave a sour taste in the mouth of the propagators of environmental justice at the EU level. The question now arises whether the CJEU’s approach towards the Aarhus Convention is sound, legally speaking. Was there, in the light of the long-vested case law of the ECJ/CJEU on the invocability of international agreements, no other option left than reasserting the traditional stance that is reflected in its rulings of 13 January 2015? Or, differently put: can the CJEU be accused of throwing out the baby with the bathwater with its steadfast refusal to take into account Article 9(3) as a reference criterion for reviewing the legality of the Aarhus Regulation?
1. Progressive at the National Level, Conservative at the EU level?
Therefore it remains ironic to note that the Lesoochranárske zoskupenie-decision was heavily relied upon by the CJEU in order to block the legality review that had been sought for by the environmental NGOs. For, as such, the ruling of the CJEU in Lesoochranárske zoskupenie exemplified that it was willing to overstep its classical strict case law on direct effect in order to ensure the effectiveness of environmental law at national level. This begs the question of why a similar rationale has not prevailed in a case concerning internal review at the EU level where, as highlighted by the General Court, no sufficient legal remedies are available for environmental NGOs to directly challenge EU acts before the national courts.
In its rulings of 13 January 2015, the CJEU choose to use neither of the two options. In the subsequent analysis both alternative approaches are sketched out and examined more into detail.
However, in order to fully understand the analysis below, a short ‘procedural detour’ is required. For, there might be a more prosaic explanation for the CJEU’s reluctance towards at the alternative approach vis-à-vis the direct effect of Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention proposed by the Advocate General – i.e. the second line of argumentation that is addressed below. In essence, the reasoning of the Advocate General merely seeks to substitute the grounds relating to the analysis of whether Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention may relied upon. In other words, it exclusively touches upon a part of the reasoning of the rulings under appeal without challenging their final result, being the annulment of the contested decisions. While the CJEU did not explicitly elaborate on its reasons for not considering the Advocate General’s alternative take, it might be submitted that it implicitly provided us with some clues by dismissing the cross-appeal that had been launched by two environmental NGOs in its ruling in Vereniging Milieudefensie. Here, the environmental NGOs had argued that, albeit without identifying any specific error of law, the ruling of the General Court was vitiated by its refusal to recognise the direct effect of Article 9(3). Importantly, at least from a procedural point of view, the CJEU decided to dismiss the cross-appeal for not tallying with Articles 169(1) and 178(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the CJEU.79 Along those lines, it might be argued that the CJEU, taking into account its limited competence in appeal, was thus effectively barred from expressing its view on the additional observations that had been presented to it by Advocate General Jääskinen. The Advocate General, in turn, seemed to be of the opinion that, in the light of the conflicting approaches towards the invocability of provisions of international law within the EU legal order, the proceedings did not allow for a final judgement and thus should be referred back to the General Court. Absent any further motivation in this regard, it remains challenging to second-guess the motivation underpinning the CJEU’s apparent unwillingness to assess the alternative route suggested by the Advocate General. At the same time, the CJEU still decided to give a final judgment in the matter, albeit based on its traditional approach towards the direct effect of provisions of an international agreement. By doing so, some might argue the CJEU, aside any procedural issues, also implicitly debunked the new pathway suggested by the Advocate General.
2. A Too Rigid Approach Towards Nakajima?
As has become apparent from the above-presented analysis, the CJEU explicitly refused to apply the Fediol- and Nakajima-exceptions to the cases at hand. Whereas the reasoning of the CJEU might hold ground at first sight, it is not completely immaculate, especially given the undesirable outcome for environmental justice at the EU level.
In retrospect, the recourse to the so-called ‘principle of implementation’,80 as upheld by the General Court in 2012, might have some merits and thus deserves a closer analysis.
In particular, the CJEU pointed out that the factual background of both cases could not be compared to the cases that had led to rulings in Fediol and Nakajima. The simple fact that the GATT and WTO agreements are based on reciprocal and advantageous arrangements appears to hinder the application of the said exceptions outside of the international commercial policy-context.
In itself, the CJEU might have common sense at its side in opting for a restrictive application of the Fediol- and Nakajima-exceptions. However, it remains unclear whether the Court’s take remains convincing when approached from a more broad perspective.
For one thing, the CJEU’s strict reading of the Fediol- and Nakajima-exceptions, if not compensated by a more lenient approach towards direct effect as a precondition for international law to be used as a benchmark for purpose of a legality review of secondary EU measures, could lead to major differences in the level of judicial protection for individuals in cases which relate to the EU’s international obligations. Commentators like Eeckhout submitted that both Fediol and Nakajima reflect some type of compromise which was reached within the ECJ at the time, striking a balance between the lack of direct effect of some international agreements and respect for the EU’s international commitments.83 However, by confining both exceptions exclusively to the realm of the GATT and WTO agreements or, alternatively, by limiting the principle of EU law implementing international rules to scenarios in which the provision at stake explicitly refer to the international provision, the CJEU can be accused of having raised the bar for legality review so high that one might wonder if the exceptions might ever be applied again.84 As rightly held by Pirker, the CJEU’s apparent scrutiny towards the implementation principle renders ‘review scenarios’ almost non-existent.85 Accordingly, the CJEU seems to turn a blind eye to potential non-compliance scenarios that might arise in other domains of international EU policy.
The implications of both rulings are all the more disturbing because, as such, it may not be doubted that the Aarhus Regulation intended to implement the EU’s obligations under the Aarhus Convention. This is, amongst others, illustrated by Article 1(1)(d) of the Aarhus Regulation, which explicitly states that the objective of that Regulation was to contribute to the implementation of the obligations arising under the Aarhus Convention by granting, inter alia, ‘access to justice in environmental matters at European level under the conditions laid down by this Regulation’.
Moreover, on a more fundamental level, the CJEU’s implicit premise is not without flaws. While it is certainly true that the context of WTO related cases is to be distinguished from environmental cases, the sharp dichotomy between both policy spheres does not appear wholly justified. Critics might advance that most international environmental agreements are the result of hard and difficult negotiations. Not surprisingly, given the major impact the adoption of stricter environmental rules might have on national economic policies, many provisions of international environmental agreements remain vague and lack precise and unconditional wording. Under the CJEU’s rigid approach, however, such conventions could almost never be used as a yardstick for the purpose of the legality review of the EU’s implementing measures. Thus it is worth pondering whether the distinct treatment of multilateral environmental agreements will not give way to even more non-compliance scenarios in the specific realm of international environmental policy.
All in all, the rulings of 13 January 2015 mask the unwillingness on the part of the CJEU to expose acts of EU institutions to legality review in the light of international law. They are thus characteristic of a more reluctant stance to reviewing EU secondary acts in the light of international obligations incumbent on the EU. It might be feared that, absent any threat of legality review by EU courts, EU institutions will feel virtually immunised from legal challenges when implementing international obligations. Henceforth, an important leverage for the observance of international law falls away within the EU legal framework.
3. A More Promising Pathway?
Besides the implementation principle, the CJEU was presented with another, possibly even more appealing, option to take into consideration Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention in its assessment of the internal review procedure set out by the Aarhus Regulation. This ‘novel’ approach was provided to it by Advocate General Jääskinen in its Opinion of 8 May 2014 in Vereniging Milieudefensie. As is demonstrated below, the alternative road to legality review suggested by the Advocate General would have allowed the CJEU to carry out the legality review without having to take recourse to the Fediol and Nakajima-case law. Arguably, it provides a more elegant method to uphold the bedrock principles of its earlier case law without necessarily having to dismiss the use of the Aarhus Convention as yardstick for the purpose of reviewing the material scope of the internal review procedure.
However, since the presented approach would not lead to an alternative outcome of the proceedings but exclusively challenges a part of the reasoning of the rulings of 14 June 2012 of the General Court, the CJEU might have implicitly assumed that assessing the viability of this alternative approach did not fall within its competence on appeal. As alluded to above, one might deduce this from the treatment of the cross-appeal that had been launched by the environmental NGOs in Vereniging Milieuedefensie. Others might read in the CJEU’s referral to its traditional case law with regard to direct effect a more compelling rejection of the alternative approach advocated for by Advocate General Jääskinen. Be that as it may, below, it is further examined whether, irrespective of procedural arguments, an alternative approach to direct effect could have led to a more desirable outcome for the afore-mentioned proceedings, especially in view of the objectives of the Aarhus Convention.
In order to fully grasp the essence of the rationale submitted by the Advocate General, a quick tour through the extensive body of case law of the EU courts on the legal effects of provisions of international law is required.
In his Opinion of 8 May 2014 the Advocate General reasoned that, in order to avoid creating an area free of judicial review, the lack of direct effect of a provision of an international agreement should not rule out an examination of an EU act in the light of the former, provided that the characteristics of the said convention in question do not preclude this.94 For a provision of international law to serve as a yardstick for the purpose of legality review, it must necessarily include sufficiently clear, intelligible and precise elements. However, most importantly, the Advocate General underlined that such a provision does not need an exhaustive rule, allowing that such a provision may be also mixed in nature. Whenever it would remain possible to isolate parts of the content of that provision that satisfy that requirement, it must be possible to use it in the specific context of a legality review.95 In other words, the mere fact that a provision of international law affords the Contracting Parties significant discretion in certain regards does not preclude that the same provision of international law also contains precise and unconditional rules.
This ultimately led to the conclusion that, having regard to its objective and its broad logic, Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention is in part a sufficiently clear rule that is capable of serving as the basis of a legality review of the Aarhus Regulation.97 In comparison with the Nakajima-approach used by the General Court, the solution offered by the Advocate General has the unmistaken advantage of being better in line with existing case law of the CJEU in relation to provisions of EU environmental law, such as the EIA Directive (see supra).
In itself, the Advocate General’s take – especially in comparison with the reliance on the Fediol- and Nakajima-exceptions by the General Court – would offer a more satisfactory solution for the detected loopholes to which the traditional case law of the CJEU on the legal effects of international conventions in the EU legal order has led. For, whereas the more widespread application of the implementation-approach would arguably lead to more guarantees in the context of the international obligations incumbent on the EU, it does not present a long-term fix to the perennial issues in this regard. For instance, it might not allow for a legality review in cases where the EU act did not explicitly refer to an international agreement. In retrospect, it would have been interesting to hear the CJEU’s view in this respect, especially given the fact that the lowering down of the direct effect-requirement in the context of a legality review might constitute a more comprehensive solution for the Aarhus-related shortcomings at the EU level in the long run.
The alternative take of the Advocate General seems plausible. In order to be used as a yardstick for the purpose of a legality review of an EU act, a provision of international law does not necessarily need to be exhaustive. As long as a provision of international law at least in part contains sufficient precise and unequivocal wordings and sets forth a clear outcome, it would in most instances be able to serve as a reference criterion for the purpose of a legality review. In addition, the Advocate General’s stance, if applied on a more general scale, also might also help fostering the effectiveness of international environmental agreements within the EU legal order. Under this approach, individuals and environmental NGOs will now be able to hold EU institutions more easily accountable for the non-observance of the EU’s international commitments before national courts.
As rightly pointed out by Advocate General Jääskinen, however, the automatic and unreserved application of the traditional case law of the CJEU in relation to the legal effects of international agreements would, in conjunction with the CJEU’s earlier decision in Lesoochranárske zoskupenie, result in the CJEU ruling out any substantial judicial review of the EU’s compliance with its obligations under the Aarhus Convention as far as access to justice at the EU level is concerned.
Therefore it remains regrettable that the General Court had not applied a similar rationale in its decisions of 14 June 2012, which in turn would have forced the CJEU to explicitly treat the additional arguments raised by the Advocate General. Still, with its explicit reference to the Intertanko-rationale, the CJEU ultimately underlined that the CJEU was more preoccupied with preserving its traditional approach towards the legal effects of international agreements than guaranteeing sufficient access to justice in environmental cases at the EU level.
IV. The Unfortunate Legacy of the Rulings of 13 January 2015: No Distance Left to Run?
A. Practice What You Preach?
With its obstinate refusal to review the internal review procedure in the light of the Aarhus Convention, the CJEU has made itself vulnerable to many critiques. It might be tempting to label the CJEU’s stance as outdated in the light of the international and EU developments towards environmental democracy. Roger, for one, has accused the CJEU of having missed an important opportunity for assessing the adequacy of the EU system of legal remedies in the light of the Aarhus Convention.100 While some might credit the CJEU for sticking to its well-established traditional jurisprudence on the direct effect of provisions of international law in the EU legal order, it can be expected that many will criticise the CJEU for having opted for a rather legalistic approach to the Aarhus-related claims. Instead of moving forward on the path set out by the Aarhus Convention, the rulings of the CJEU could be tagged as a significant step backwards for the protection of judicial protection in environmental cases. Critics of the CJEU might argue that the lack of direct effect of Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention provided the CJEU with a convenient excuse to reject a plea for reconsideration of its well-vested approach towards access to justice in environmental matters. Others might detect a certain ambivalence in the CJEU’s refusal to apply the implementation principle outside the scope of WTO and portend that it missed the momentum for reshaping judicial review in the context of environmental cases.
Either way, as a result of the CJEU’s hands off-approach, the compatibility of the Aarhus Regulation with the EU’s international obligations, will probably not be reconsidered by the EU institutions any time soon. This implies that the internal review procedure will only remain accessible in the context of individual acts, leaving the bulk of the EU decisions and measures in the environmental sphere outside the material scope of the Aarhus Regulation. Having explicitly overturned the rulings of the General Court, the CJEU thus took away all remaining hope for substantial enhancement of the position of environmental NGOs in the near or distant future.
In a certain way, the rulings of 13 January 2015 also stand in sharp contrast to the CJEU’s recent progressive stance on access to justice before national courts.
As is widely known, the CJEU has recently revealed itself as a big proponent of wide access to justice for environmental NGOs at national level, both in the context of the provisions on access to justice regarding the second pillar of Aarhus, which have been explicitly implemented in EU law and as regards general environmental law enforcement, as provided for by Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention.101 For instance, as portrayed by its decision in Lesoochranárske zoskupenie, the CJEU did certainly not shy away from urging national courts to reconsider their traditional strict approach towards standing for environmental NGOs in its case law.
It is thus clear that, when reviewing access to justice in environmental cases at national level, the CJEU does not feel hindered by well-vested national procedural rules or case law. In the light of the consistent stream of seemingly progressive case law from Luxemburg on access to justice at national level, the CJEU’s conservative approach towards access to justice at the EU level is thus even more puzzling. It is hard to reconcile with the strict scrutiny it applies when assessing national procedural laws in the context of environmental litigation. As noted by among others Roger, the recent rulings of the CJEU indeed lay bare the two different standards for access to justice at the EU and national levels.106 It can be concluded that while national courts are increasingly forced by the CJEU to relinquish their well-vested traditional approaches to standing for environmental NGOs, the CJEU itself seems unwilling to reconsider its well-entrenched Plaumann-doctrine for direct actions.
It goes without saying that the CJEU’s reasoning is subject to practice-what-you-preach criticism. However, against the backdrop of the CJEU’s previous case law in relation to access to justice at the EU level, the outcome of the above-examined cases can hardly be called surprising. In line with its earlier case law, in which the CJEU consistently dismissed pleas for a more lenient interpretation of the standing requirements before the EU courts, the CJEU again referred to the dual-track nature of the so-called ‘complete system of judicial protection’ upon which the EU legal order is based.
The reliance on the dual-track nature of the system of legal remedies is understandable in itself, especially when taking into account the entry into force of Article 19(1) of the TEU. This provision intended to strengthen legal protection in the field covered by EU law before national courts. It can therefore be maintained that the coherence of the judicial system of the EU does indeed not rest solely on having direct access to EU courts, but rather on the interlocking system of jurisdiction of EU courts and national courts.108 Yet, while the national courts have a crucial role to play in filling gaps in the system of judicial protection, they will not be able to provide an all-encompassing solution to the loopholes that are present at the EU level, where still a lot of barriers prevent environmental NGOs and individuals from having broad access to justice in conformity with the requirements set out in Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention. Moreover, the preliminary ruling procedure under EU law is not available as a matter of right since it is up to the national courts to refer a question relating to the legality of a contested EU act to the CJEU. Thus national court proceedings therefore will not serve as a panacea for all ills.
In this respect, it remains useful to recall that, as alluded to above, the General Court had already rejected recourse to national proceedings as justification for the limited scope of the internal review procedure in its 2012 rulings, as no national measure appeared to be available to question before national courts.109 Interestingly, the Aarhus Compliance Committee also reached a similar conclusion in its above-discussed findings and recommendations of April 2011.110 Whereas the Aarhus Compliance Committee recognised the system of judicial review in the national courts of the Member States and the request for a preliminary ruling as significant elements for ensuring consistent and proper implementation of EU law in the Member States, it pointed out that indirect legality review through national courts cannot be a basis for generally denying members of the public access to the EU courts to challenge decisions, acts and omissions by EU institutions and bodies.111 This appears all the more relevant since the draft directive on access to justice in environmental cases has not entered into force as EU law. Such considerations, however, have not been withheld on appeal by the CJEU in its rulings of 13 January 2015.
Given the importance of the latter arguments in the rulings of 13 January 2015, some important additional elements are to be raised here.
First, within the so-called dual-track approach, the possibility of challenging decisions of the European institutions would depend entirely on the legal protection afforded by the national courts. As illustrated by recent studies, the implementation of Article 9(3) and (4) of the Aarhus Convention can be tagged as ‘diverging, random and inconsistent’.112 Second, the preliminary proceedings often last several years during which, in order to safeguard the effectiveness of the legality review before the CJEU, the national proceedings would have to be suspended, coupled with very strict conditions for interim relief, at least as far as legal challenges to EU acts.113 The large delays and costs that are involved in such proceedings make them disadvantageous in many instances.114 Third, an exclusive reliance on national proceedings increases the risk of fait accompli-scenarios, which, in turn, goes against the effectiveness-requirements set out by Article 9(4) of the Aarhus Convention.
While the continuous development of the CJEU’s case law with respect to judicial protection before national courts must certainly be welcomed as a positive evolution, it may not be used as scapegoat for denying modifications to the existing case law on access to EU courts for environmental NGOs and the wider public.
In addition, although not explicitly alluded to by the CJEU, the CJEU might have implicitly taken into consideration the modifications on the provisions on direct access for annulment by natural or legal persons in its rulings of 13 January 2015.
Indeed, Article 263(4) of the TFEU now allows ‘Any natural or legal person (…) (to) institute proceedings against an act addressed to that person or which is of direct and individual concern to them, and against a regulatory act which is of direct concern to them and does not entail implementing measures’. However, due to the lack of a clear definition of the notion of ‘regulatory act’ in the Lisbon Treaty, the exact meaning remained until recently the subject of a lively debate amongst scholars.118 Jans even explicitly referred to the decision of the European Commission that was at stake in Greenpeace, stating that, in any event, this decision could not be qualified as a ‘regulatory act’.119 Other commentators assumed that the widening up of the admissibility conditions by the Lisbon Treaty could have a positive impact on the access to the EU courts by the public in the environmental sector.120 That said, in its recent Inuit Tapiriit Kanatimi-decision, the General Court, after having carried out a literal, historical and teleological interpretation of the latter provision,121 held that ‘regulatory acts’ must be understood as covering all acts of general application apart from legislative acts.122 In October 2013 this view was confirmed by the CJEU.123 In Microban the General Court accepted that a decision that was adopted by the Commission in the exercise of its implementing powers, could be qualified as a ‘regulatory act’.124 Notwithstanding the low expectations of some commentators, the recent case law on Article 263(4) of the TFEU thus seems capable of lessening the burden of admissibility for annulment actions, at least to a certain extent.
B. Beyond the Aarhus Regulation?
The above-featured analysis evinces that the rationale underpinning the CJEU’s stance on access to justice in environmental cases contains some major flaws, especially taking into account the limited evidence so far that the detour via the national courts is effectively capable of bridging the major loopholes in the system of judicial protection present at the EU level for direct environmental actions. Likewise, the recent case law reinforces the view that the CJEU is not willing to put its well-settled Plaumann-approach up for debate. Neither does it seem prepared to let it go its traditional ‘dual-track interpretation’ of the EU system of legal remedies.
Faced with the highly conservative approach of the EU courts concerning admissibility requirements, an obvious solution would be an amendment of the TFEU in order to allow for a better access to justice in environmental cases at the EU level. However, as already held by other commentators, it is impossible to envisage that the Member States would be prepared to initiate an intergovernmental conference only to consider an amendment to Article 263(4) of the TFEU any time soon.126 In fact, with the adoption of the Aarhus Regulation the EU legislator wanted to circumvent the impossibility to amend ex Article 230(4) of the TEC merely to allow a more broad access to justice in environmental cases.
Having said this, it remains at best doubtful if another outcome of the proceedings – for instance a scenario in which the CJEU would have upheld the view of the General Court – would have significantly bettered the position of the environmental NGOs before the EU courts. Even more so, it might be portended that the General Court, with its exclusive reliance on the implementation principle, barred the CJEU from assessing the direct effect of Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention from a different viewpoint.
First, the internal review procedure merely allows environmental NGOs to request the EU bodies and institutions to reconsider the contested acts. In contrast to other administrative review procedures, such as the review by the European Ombudsman, an internal review does not offer a review track that can be qualified as impartial, adequate and fair. Obviously, EU institutions and bodies will not be very keen on frequently reviewing their own acts, which are often the result of hard and long negotiations and political compromises. This is also illustrated by the above-analysed administrative practice of the internal review to date. So far not a single EU act has been reconsidered by the EU institutions under the internal review procedure.
Second, actions brought before EU courts pursuant to Article 12 of the Aarhus Regulation only concern the written reply of the EU institution and thus not relate to the underlying administrative act. Admittedly, an eventual finding that a written reply is vitiated by an error of law will inevitably reflect back on the legality of the underlying decisions. In addition, environmental NGOs might also request an examination of the substance of matter by means of a plea of illegality. This being the case, it still remains doubtful whether such indirect legality review would suffice in the light of the Aarhus Convention. In fact, the possibilities to pursue an effective substantial legal review of an EU act are further compounded by the important time delays that come into play when the internal review procedure is followed up by a subsequent legal challenge before court. To illustrate this point further, one merely has to measure up the length of the proceedings that led to the rulings of the CJEU in Vereniging Milieudefensie. All in all, it took a staggering six years for the EU courts to pronounce themselves on the merits of the case, which did not even relate to a ‘substantial’ written reply. Some of the actions had in the meantime already lost their purpose since they related to decisions that already expired in 2012. Absent any effective access to injunctive relief before EU courts in such cases and taking into consideration the consistent prevalence of the Plaumann-test for direct legal challenges of EU acts, it remains hard to submit that the requirements set out by Article 9(4) of the Aarhus Convention will be observed whenever a more encompassing internal review procedure will be established.
Third, it must be reiterated that the personal scope of the Aarhus Regulation does not comply with Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention as natural persons have been left out of the personal scope of the internal review procedure.
Thus the harsh criticism on the rulings of the CJEU needs to be adjusted in some ways. In contrast to what has been upheld by some commentators, a different outcome of the lawsuit before the CJEU would not necessarily have led to an ‘easy fix’ for the inadequacy of the EU’s system of legal remedies. In fact, it might be portended that even when the CJEU would have upheld the rulings of the General Court the battle for a better access to justice in environmental cases would be far from over. Absent any more effective means of administrative review procedure, the EU would still fall short in complying with its obligations under Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention. Internal review procedures, even with a more broad material scope, are ill equipped to implement the requirements set out by the Aarhus Convention as regards access to justice. It must indeed be expected that requests for internal review will hardly ever urge the competent EU institution to reconsider its original decision.
From all the foregoing it can be concluded that the pursuit of a better access to justice in environmental cases at the EU level has given rise to a scenario with distinct Kafkaesque features, in which procedural arguments have so far in succeeded in blocking access to EU courts for environmental NGOs and the wider public. After a decade of fruitless efforts to gain direct access to the EU courts in order to challenge EU acts, environmental civil society associations had hoped that the Aarhus Regulation might do away with the persistent obstructions for environmental litigation at the EU level.
However, the woes of the environmental NGOs are far from over. As has become evident from the above-conducted analysis, this hope proved to be false. Instead of being a catalyst for more environmental justice at the EU level, the rulings of the CJEU of 13 January 2015 have taken away any prospect of tangible progress for the coming years. Just as Kafka’s doorkeeper kept ‘the man from the country’ waiting for years before finally closing down the gate he was guarding, the CJEU re-closed the door that had been cautiously opened by the rulings of the General Court of 14 June 2012 and reaffirmed the restrictive interpretation of the internal review procedure. With its refusal to use the Aarhus Convention as a reference criterion for the purpose of reviewing the legality of the Aarhus Regulation, the CJEU quashed all expectations on the part of those who believed that the EU judges would finally be found prepared to call time upon its restrictive and, according to many, outdated Plaumann-approach in environmental cases.
Strikingly reminiscent of Kafka’s doorkeeper, the CJEU decided to disregard Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention, this in spite of the explicit reference to the latter provision in the Aarhus Regulation. The indirect result thereof is that it confined the relevance of the Aarhus Regulation to decisions that are capable of affecting the interests of the addressees of those decisions, thereby excluding administrative review for the major bulk of the EU acts in the environmental sphere.
Although the rulings of the CJEU can be framed in its long-standing case law on the invocability of provisions of international agreements, they remain disappointing on many levels. Not only do the rulings create the impression of a court that is unprepared to apply the same rigour it is demanding from national courts with regard to standing requirements in environmental cases, they also underscore the unwillingness of the CJEU to rethink its much-criticised approach towards the Aarhus Convention. The outcome of the appeal is all the more disturbing since the CJEU had before it two alternative approaches which might have allowed it to carry out a legality review of the Aarhus Regulation without moving too far away from its traditional case law on the legal effects of international agreements in the EU legal order. Admittedly, some might submit that part of the blame needs be attributed to the General Court which, through its exclusive reliance on the implementation principle, undeliberately barred the CJEU from assessing the direct effect of Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention in a more broad perspective. That said, the CJEU’s repudiation of the Aarhus Convention still stands in sharp contrast to the explicit commitment on the part of the EU legislator to implement Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention by the internal review procedure. Whereas some might argue that the recent progressive case law of the CJEU as regards access to justice at the national level partly offsets its restrictive case law in relation to direct actions against EU acts, this article amply revealed that preliminary ruling procedures before national courts – if available – are incapable of completely remedying the loopholes in legal review at the EU level in the context of environmental cases. It is submitted that enhanced protection for national courts should rather be seen as a complement for the review-options available at the EU level than as a justification for the EU courts to uphold their well-established Plaumann-test in the context of direct challenges to EU acts. Along those lines, the recent rulings of the CJEU serve as a stark reminder of the sharp inconsistency that is currently present in the case law at the EU level.
However, there might be a silver lining to this dark cloud hanging over public interest litigation at the EU level. In spite of the ample criticism to which the rulings of the CJEU will undoubtedly lead, they still have the benefit of clarity. It may serve as a wake up-call for the EU legislator. Indeed, the decisions of the General Court of 14 June 2012, while arguably more progressive in relation to the Aarhus Convention, would have brought about only limited changes to the precarious position of environmental NGOs before the EU courts. Even if the rulings had been confirmed by the CJEU on appeal, they would leave the other obvious deficiencies that are attached to the internal review procedure unaddressed.
However, most fundamentally, pursuant to Article 216 of the TFEU the EU courts themselves are bound by the international agreements that are concluded by the EU. As was pointed out by the Aarhus Compliance Committee in 2011, the relevant provisions of the TFEU are drafted in such a way that they can be interpreted in line with the standards enshrined in the Aarhus Convention. Rather than sticking to an essentially flawed and outdated internal review procedure, a reconsideration of the quasi-constitutional status of the Plaumann-doctrine by the EU courts probably constitutes the most comprehensive solution to the decade-long stand-off between the environmental NGOs and the EU judges. In the light of the disappointing outcome of the first string of cases in relation to the internal review procedure, the CJEU should reconsider its vehement rejection of the Aarhus Convention in relation to direct actions against EU acts. Embracing the logic underpinning the third pillar of the Aarhus Convention would mean a great leap forward in the pursuit of the rule of law in environmental cases at the EU level. Sooner or later the CJEU will have to cross the Rubicon and come to terms with the Aarhus Convention. A future non-compliance finding by the Aarhus Compliance Committee might serve as an additional trigger.
1Franz Kafka, The Trial (first published 1925, Penguin Modern Classics 2009).
2Case 25/62 Plaumann & Co. v Commission of the European Economic Community  ECR 95.
3Case T-585/93 Stichting Greenpeace Council (Greenpeace International) v Commission  ECR II-2205; Case C-321/95 P Stichting Greenpeace Council and Others v Commission  ECR I-1651. See more extensively Nicole Gérard, ‘Access to the European Court of Justice: A Lost Opportunity’ (1998) 10(2) JEL 331; Diana L Torrens, ‘Locus Standi of Environmental Associations under EC Law – Greenpeace – A Missed Opportunity for the CJEU’ (1999) 8(3) RECIEL 336. For a more recent critical assessment of this case law, see Charles Poncelet, ‘Access to Justice in Environmental Matters – Does the European Union Comply with its Obligations?’ (2012) 24(2) JEL 287.
4Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, done at Aarhus, Denmark, 25 July 1998 (Aarhus Convention)  2161 UNTS 447; 38 ILM 517.
5Council Decision 2005/370/EC of 17 February 2005 on the conclusion on behalf of the European Community, of the Convention on access to information, public participation in decision-making and access to justice in environmental matters  OJ L124/1.
6See Jeremy Wates, ‘The Aarhus Convention: a Driving Force for Environmental Democracy’ (2005) 2(1) JEEPL 3, 4.
7Council Regulation (EC) No 1367/2006 of 6 September 2006 on the application of the provisions of the Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters to Community institutions and bodies  OJ L 264/13 (Aarhus Regulation).
8Teall Crossen and Veronique Niessen, ‘NGO Standing in the European Court of Justice - Does the Aarhus Regulation Open the Door?’ (2008) 16(3) RECIEL 332, 333.
9Jan H Jans and Gertjan Harryvan, ‘Internal Review of EU Environmental Measures. It’s True: Baron Van Munchausen Doesn’t Exist! Some Remarks on the Application of the So-Called Aarhus Regulation’ (2010) 3(2) Rev Eur & Ad L 53.
10Case T-396/09 Stichting Natuur en Milieu and Pesticide Action Network Europe v Commission (CFI, 14 June 2012).
11Case T-338/08 Vereniging Milieudefensie and Stichting Stop Luchtverontreiniging Utrecht v Commission (CFI, 14 June 2012).
12Joined cases C-404/12 P and C-405/12 P Council and Others v Stichting Natuur en Milieu and Milieu and Pesticide Action Network Europe (CJEU, 13 January 2015); Joined cases C-401/12 P and C-403/12 P Council and Others v Vereniging Milieudefensie and Stichting Stop Luchtverontreiniging Utrecht (CJEU, 13 January 2015).
13Stichting Greenpeace Council (Greenpeace International) (n 3) para. 38.
15Stichting Greenpeace Council and Others (n 3).
17Case T-219/95 R Marie-Thérèse Danielsson, Pierre Largenteau and Edwin Haoa v Commission of the European Communities  ECR II-3051, para 77.
18Stichting Greenpeace Council and Others (n 3).
19Case C-294/83 Parti écologiste ‘Les Verts’ v European Parliament  ECR 1339, para 23.
20Angela Ward, Judicial Review and the Rights of Private Parties in EC Law (Oxford University Press 2008) 154.
21Case T-177/01 Jégo Quéré v Commission  ECR I-5137, para 49.
22Case C-50/00 P Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v Council of the European Union  ECR I-6677.
23Case C-263/02 P Commission v Jégo Quéré  ECR I-3425.
24Case T-94/04 European Environmental Bureau (EEB) and Others v Commission of the European Communities  ECR II-4419; Joined Cases T-236/04 and T-241/04 European Environmental Bureau (EEB) and Stichting Natuur en Milieu v Commission of the European Communities  ECR II-4945.
25Case T-91/07 WWF-UK Ltd v Council of the European Union  ECR II-00081, paras 81–82; Case C-355/08 P WWF-UK Ltd v Council of the European Union  ECR I-00073.
26Case T-37/04 Região autónoma dos Açores v Council of the European Union  ECR II-00103, para 93. The view of the CFI was also upheld by the ECJ in appeal: Case C-444/08 P Região autónoma dos Açores v Council of the European Union  ECR I-00200.
28Communication ACCC/C/2008/32 [Part I] [European Union].
29Communication ACCC/C/2006/18 [Denmark], ECE/MP.PP/2008/5/Add.4, paras. 31, 35 and 41.
30ACCC European Union (n 28) para 93.
32See more extensively Marc Pallemaerts, ‘Compliance by the European Community with its Obligations on Access to Justice as a Party to the Aarhus Convention’ (2009) IEEP Report, 26–27 <http://www.ieePeu/assets/422/aarhus_report.pdf> accessed 15 March 2015.
33Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council of the application of the provisions of the Århus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters to EC Institutions and Bodies, COM (2003) 622 final.
35Aarhus Regulation (n 7), art. 12.
36Common Position (EC) No 31/2005 adopted by the Council on 18 July 2005  OJ C 264E/18.
37Pål Wennerås, The Enforcement of EC Environmental Law (Oxford Studies in European Law 2007) 234; Jan H Jans, ‘Did Baron von Munchausen ever Visit Aarhus? Some Critical Remarks on the Proposal for a Regulation on the Application of the Provisions of the Aarhus Convention to EC Institutions and Bodies’ in Richard Macrory (ed), Reflections on 30 Years of EU Environmental Law: A High Level of Protection? (Europa Law Publishing 2005) 484.
38Reply of the Commission services to Justice & Environment of 26 May 2008 <http://ec.europa.eu/environment/aarhus/pdf/title_iv/Reply%20to%20J_E.pdf> accessed 15 March 2015; Reply of the Commission services to Justice & Environment of 6 July 2010 <http://ec.europa.eu/environment/aarhus/pdf/requests/9_reply%20.pdf> accessed 15 March 2015. For a more thorough overview, see: Jans and Harryvan (n 9).
39See Hendrik Schoukens, ‘Access to Justice in Environmental Matters on the EU Level After the Judgements of the General Court of 14 June 2012: Between Hope and Denial’ (2014) Nordic Envtl LJ, 18 <http://nordiskmiljoratt.se/haften/NMT%252c%2022%20aug%20(2).pdf> accessed 15 March 2015.
40Commission Regulation (EC) No 149/2008 of 29 January 2008 amending Regulation (EC) No 396/2005 of the European Parliament and the Council by establishing Annexes II, III and IV setting maximum residues levels for products covered by Annex I thereto  OJ L 58/1.
41Council Regulation (EC) No 396/2005 of 23 February 2005 on maximum residue levels of pesticides in or on food and feed of plant and animal origin and amending Council Directive 91/414/EEC  OJ L 70/1.
43Directive 2008/50/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2008 on ambient air quality and cleaner air for Europe  OJ L 152/1.
44Reply of the Commission services of 1 July 2008 to Stichting Natuur en Milieu and Pesticide Action Network <http://ec.europa.eu/environment/aarhus/pdf/title_iv/Reply%20to%20SNMpdf> and <http://ec.europa.eu/environment/aarhus/pdf/title_iv/Reply%20to%20PAN.pdf> accessed 15 March 2015; Reply of the Commission services of 28 July 2009 to Vereniging Milieudefensie en Stichting Stop Luchtverontreiniging Utrecht <http://ec.europa.eu/environment/aarhus/pdf/requests/8_reply.pdf> accessed 15 March 2015.
47Stichting Natuur en Milieu (n 10) para 29; Vereniging Milieudefensie (n 11) para 26.
48Stichting Natuur en Milieu (n 10) para 42.
49Stichting Natuur en Milieu (n 10) para 52; Vereniging Milieudefensie (n 11) para 52.
50Case C-69/89 Nakajima All Precision Co. Ltd v Council of the European Communities  ECR I-2069, para 31.
51Case C-240/09 Lesoochranárske zoskupenie VLK v Ministerstvo životného prostredia Slovenskej republiky  ECR I-01255. See Mariolina Eliantonio, ‘Case C-240/09, Lesoochranárske zoskupenie VLK v. Ministerstvo životného prostredia Slovenskej republiky, Judgment of the Court of Justice (Grand Chamber) of 8 March 2011’ (2012) 49(2) CML Rev 767; Jan H Jans, ‘Who is the Referee? Access to Justice in a Globalised Legal Order: A Case Analysis of CJEU Judgment C-240/09 Lesoochranárske Zoskupenie of 8 March 2011’ (2011) 4(1) Rev Eur Ad L 85.
52Stichting Natuur en Milieu (n 10) paras 57–58; Vereniging Milieudefensie (n 11) paras 57–58.
53Stichting Natuur en Milieu (n 10) paras 62–69.
54Stichting Natuur en Milieu (n 10) para 77; Vereniging Milieudefensie (n 11) para 66.
55Vereniging Milieudefensie (n 11) para 76.
56See Tim Corthaut and Frédéric Vanneste, ‘Waves between Strasbourg and Luxemburg: The Right of Access to a Court to Contest the Validity of Legislative or Administrative Measures’ (2006) 25(1) YB Eur L 475.
57Unión de Pequeños Agricultores (n 22).
58See eg Região autónoma dos Açores (n 26).
59See eg Communication ACCC/C/2005/11 [Belgium], ECE/MPPP/C.1/2006/4/Add.2 (28 July), para 31.
60Schoukens (n 39) 29; see in similar vein Anaïs Berthier, ‘A First Success in the Long Run for Better Access to Justice in the EU: The Scope of the Administrative Review Procedure Provided Under Regulation 1167/2006 Invalidated by the General Court’ (2012) ELNI Review 92, 96.
61Stichting Natuur en Milieu (n 10) para 80; Vereniging Milieudefensie (n 11) para 72.
62Região autónoma dos Açores (n 27).
63See also Case T-396/03 R Arizona Chemical BV and Others v Commission of the European Communities  ECR II-205, para 67.
64Vereniging Milieudefensie (n 11) para 18.
65Council and Others v Stichting Natuur en Milieu (n 12) para 48; Council and Others v Vereniging Milieudefensie (n 12) para 55.
66Case C-70/87 Fédération de l’industrie de l’huilerie de la CEE (Fediol) v Commission of the European Communities  ECR 1781.
67Council and Others v Stichting Natuur en Milieu (n 12) para 51; Council and Others v Vereniging Milieudefensie (n 12) para 58.
68Council and Others v Stichting Natuur en Milieu (n 12) para 52; Council and Others v Vereniging Milieudefensie (n 12) para 59.
69Council and Others v Stichting Natuur en Milieu (n 12) para 54; Council and Others v Vereniging Milieudefensie (n 12) para 61.
70Case C-121/06 P FIAMM and Others v Council and Commission  ECR I-6513, para 110.
71Case C-308/06 The Queen, on the application of International Association of Independent Tanker Owners (Intertanko) and Others v Secretary of State for Transport  ECR I-04057, para 45.
72See, amongst others, Case C-17/81 Pabst & Richarz v Hauptzollamt Oldenburg  ECR 1331, para 25–27.
73Case C-213/03 Syndicat professionnel coordination des pêcheurs de l’étang de Berre v EDF  ECR I-7357.
74Lesoochranárske zoskupenie (n 51) para 46.
76See Martin Hedeman-Robinson, ‘EU Implementation of the Aarhus Convention’s Third Pillar: Back to the Future over Access to Environmental Justice? – Part 1’ (2014) 23(3) Eur E & Envtl L Rev 102, 111; Jean-François Brakeland, ‘Access to Justice in Environmental Matters – Developments at EU level’ (2014) 5 Gyoseiho-kenkyu <http://greenaccess.law.osaka-u.ac.jp/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/arten-brakelandup.pdf> accessed 15 March 2015.
77The ECJ has equally confirmed the application of the principle of consistent interpretation in the context of international agreements. See Case C-61/94 Commission v Germany  ECR I-3989, para 10.
78See Piet Eeckhout, EU External Relations Law (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2011) 297.
79Council and Others v Vereniging Milieudefensie (n 12) paras 32–34.
80Nakajima (n 50) paras 31–32.
82Joined cases C-401/12 P, C-402/12 P and C-403/12 P Council and Others v Vereniging Milieudefensie and Stichting Stop Luchtverontreiniging Utrecht , Opinion of AG Jääskinen paras 52–57.
84Benedikt Pirker, ‘Cases C-401 to 403/12 and C-404 to 405/12: No Legality Review in the Light of the Aarhus Convention’ (European Law Blog, 29 January 2015) <http://europeanlawblog.eu/?p=2674> accessed 15 March 2015.
87Case C-377/98 Netherlands v European Parliament and Council  ECR I-7079, paras 52–55.
88Case C-366/10 Air Transport Association of America and Others v Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change  ECR I-13755, para 110.
89Council and Others v Vereniging Milieudefensie, Opinion AG Jääskinen (n 82) para 65.
91Case C-72/95 Aannemersbedrijf P.K. Kraaijeveld BV e.a. v Gedeputeerde Staten van Zuid-Holland  ECR I-5403.
92Case C-435/97 World Wildlife Fund (WWF) and Others v Autonome Provinz Bozen and Others  ECR I-5613.
93See eg Wennerås (n 37) 18; Koen Lenaerts and José A Gutiérrez-Fons, ‘The General System of EU Environmental Law Enforcement’ (2011) 30(1) YB Eur L 3, 27.
94Council and Others v Vereniging Milieudefensie, Opinion AG Jääskinen (n 82) para 78.
99See also Schoukens (n 39) 23–26.
100See eg Apolline JC Roger, ‘A Lost Opportunity for Improving Access to Justice in Environmental Matters: The CJEU on the Invocability of the Aarhus Convention’ (EU Law Analysis, 15 February 2015) <http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.be/2015/02/a-lost-opportunity-for-improving-access.htm> accessed 15 March 2015.
101See more extensively Martin Hedeman-Robinson, ‘EU Implementation of the Aarhus Convention’s Third Pillar: Back to the Future over Access to Environmental Justice? – Part 2’ (2014) 23(4) Eur E & Envtl L Rev 151–160.
102Case C-115/09 Bund für Umwelt und Naturschutz Deutschland, Landesverband Nordrhein-Westfalen eV v Bezirksregierung Arnsberg  ECR I-03673, para 46.
103Case C-128/09 Antoine Boxus and Willy Roua, Case C-129/09 Guido Durlet and Others, Case C-130/09 Paul Fastrez and Henriette Fastrez, Case C-131/09 Philippe Daras, C-134/09 and C-135/09 Association des riverains et habitants des communes proches de l’aéroport BSCA (Brussels South Charleroi Airport) (ARACh), Case C-134/09 Bernard Page and Case C-135/09 Léon L’Hoir and Nadine Dartois v Région wallonne  ECR I-09711.
104Case C-182/10 Marie-Noëlle Solvay and Others v Région wallonne (CJEU, 16 February 2012).
105Antoine Boxus and Willy Roua (n 103) para 54; Marie-Noëlle Solvay and Others (n 104) para 50.
107Council and Others v Stichting Natuur en Milieu (n 12) para 53; Council and Others v Vereniging Milieudefensie (n 12) para 60.
109Vereniging Milieudefensie (n 11) para 76.
110ACCC European Union (n 28) para 89.
112See Jan Darpö, ‘Effective Justice? Synthesis Report of the Study on the Implementation of Articles 9.3 and 9.4 of the Aarhus Convention in the Member States of the European Union’ (2013) <http://ec.europa.eu/environment/aarhus/access_studies.htm> accessed 15 March 2015.
114See also Eliantonio (n 51) 789.
115Schoukens (n 39) 37–39. See in similar vein Roger (n 100).
116Council and Others v Vereniging Milieudefensie, Opinion AG Jääskinen (n 82) para 120.
118See eg René Barents, ‘The Court of Justice after the Treaty of Lisbon’ (2010) 47(3) CML Rev 709.
120See, amongst others, Brakeland (n 76) 3.
121Case T-18/10 Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v Parliament and Council  ECR II-75.
123Case C-583/11 P Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v European Parliament and Council of the European Union (CJEU, 3 October 2013) para 60.
124Case T-262/10 Microban International Ltd and Microban (Europe) Ltd v European Commission  ECR II-07697, para 22.
126Marc Pallemaerts, ‘Access to Environmental Justice at EU Level: Has the ‘Aarhus Regulation’ Improved the Situation’ in Marc Pallemaerts (ed), The Aarhus Convention at Ten – Interactions and Tensions between Conventional International Law and EU Environmental Law (Europa Law Publishing 2011) 312.
129Council and Others v Vereniging Milieudefensie, Opinion AG Jääskinen (n 82) para 129.
131Jonas Ebbesson, ‘Impact of the Aarhus Convention and European Union Law’ in Marc Pallemaerts (ed), The Aarhus Convention at Ten – Interactions and Tensions between Conventional International Law and EU Environmental Law (Europa Law Publishing 2011) 264.

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