Source: https://whitecollarcrimenews.com/2010/04/03/understanding-willful-blindness/
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 11:48:03+00:00

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Posted by jefhenninger in Articles.
If the Government is investigating your client for money laundering, they may mention that your client is guilty via “willful blindness”. Unlike most crimes which require a specific mental intent, money laundering via willful blindness will ensnare defendants who simply turned a blind eye to the crime. As a result, your client may have a hard time understanding how he did anything wrong.
The line between innocence and guilt due to willful blindness can be rather thin and a careful examination of all of the surrounding facts and circumstances will help you make a proper determination. Of course, early attorney involvement and cooperation with the Government may prevent prosecution even if the facts tend to show guilt. A good example of willful blindness is found in the case of U.S. v. Flores, 454 F.3d 149, 156 (3d Cir. 2006.
nominal president of those companies. He also established several business checking accounts for each of the corporations at different banks, signed myriad blank checks drawn on those accounts, and authorized numerous wire-transfers from the accounts to various foreign and domestic recipients.
deceived Flores into believing that he was a legitimate businessman and that Flores was Altamirano’s unknowing victim and not his co-conspirator.
his relationships with the banks. In April 1999, Altamirano learned that Hernandez had been stealing from him. Altamirano thus decided to return the books to Flores, who agreed to open and oversee bank accounts for the corporations in exchange for the $2,000 weekly salary that Hernandez had received. Flores was paid the $2,000 each week in cash.
in and out of the accounts and between accounts. Individual deposits were always less than $10,000, but on any given day the aggregate amount deposited in any account could exceed $10,000.
requested they speak with the bank manager, Thomas Grippa.
working with Citibank and Chase, where he had personal contacts.
companies that bore no apparent relationship to the import/export of fruit, flowers, and fish from Ecuador. According to Rivera, he received neither an explanation nor copies of invoices in response to his requests.
To prove conspiracy to commit money laundering, the Government was required to show, inter alia, that Flores consorted with others in a money laundering scheme, knowing that the property involved in a financial transaction represent[ed] the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity [and] conduct[ed] or attempt[ed] to conduct such a financial transaction which in fact involves the proceeds of specified unlawful activity. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1). It is undisputed that the financial transactions Flores conducted on behalf of Altamirano “in fact involve[d] the proceeds of specified unlawful activity,” to wit, narcotics trafficking. Thus, the only question is whether the Government produced evidence that Flores knew of or was willfully blind to the fact that the funds originated in some form of unlawful activity, sufficient to obtain a conviction under § 1956(h). See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(1) (stating that it is sufficient if “the person knew the property involved in the transaction represented proceeds from some form, though not necessarily which form, of activity that constitutes a felony under State, Federal, or foreign law”) (emphasis added). Accordingly, the defense’s argument that the Government needed to prove that Flores knew of, or was willfully blind to, the fact that the funds originated in drug trafficking is off point.
a monetary transaction in criminally derived property of a value greater than $10,000 and is derived from specified unlawful activity. 18 U.S.C. § 1957(a). Again, because the monetary transactions that Flores conducted on behalf of Altamirano were “derived from specified unlawful activity,” the only question is whether the Government produced sufficient evidence that Flores knew that the monetary transactions represented the proceeds of criminally derived property. For the same reasons provided above, the defense’s argument—that the Government needed to prove that Flores knew of, or was willfully blind to, the fact that the funds originated in drug trafficking to obtain a money laundering conviction—fails. See 18 U.S.C. § 1957(c) (“[T]he Government is not required to prove that the defendant knew that the offense from which the criminally derived property was derived was specified unlawful activity.”).
Our remaining task is to determine whether there is substantial evidence in the record, viewed in the light most favorable to the Government, that Flores knew that the property involved in the financial transactions represented the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity and/or criminally derived property. Knowledge may be demonstrated by showing that a defendant either had actual knowledge or “deliberately closed his eyes to what otherwise would have been obvious to him concerning the fact in question.” United States v. Stewart, 185 F.3d 112, 126 (3d Cir. 1999). The Government establishes willful blindness by proving that a defendant “was objectively aware of the high probability of the fact in question,” Brodie, 403 F.3d at 148 (citation omitted), and “could have recognized the likelihood of [illicit acts] yet deliberately avoided learning the true facts.” Stewart, 185 F.3d at 126.
laundering”; (5) Flores’ accountant, Rivera, testified that he had sought invoices documenting the source of the funds but never received the documentation he requested; and (6) Rivera also questioned Flores about why the funds were being sent to foreign companies with no apparent relationship to the Ecuadorian fruit, fish or flower trade.
meeting with Republic National, and instead opened accounts at other banks, stating that he needed the $2,000 per week he was being paid in cash to oversee the bank accounts. Thus, the jury could have inferred that Flores was motivated to avoid learning the truth because the money laundering operation was profitable to him. See Brodie, 403 F.3d at 158.

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