Source: https://www.povertylaw.org/clearinghouse/fpmd/chapter8/section3
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 04:50:30+00:00

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Most Section 1983 claims for damages involve suits against government employees who have violated the Constitution, statutes, or their employer’s own stated policies. The boundaries of such claims are discussed in this subchapter.
Even a single decision made by the "final policy making authority," such as the governing body of a local government or one having the power to decide finally on its behalf, can constitute a "policy" under Section 1983.10 However, "the scope of § 1983 liability does not permit such liability to be imposed merely on evidence of the wrongful action of a single city employee not authorized to make city policy.”11 Therefore, it is critical to identify who is a final policy maker for purposes of imposing liability under Section 1983 on a local government pursuant to an official policy.
Often, however, the problem is with not the “policy” of the agency, but that agency employees are ignorant of the policy. In some narrow circumstances, the agency’s failure to train its employees to comply with agency policy can lead to liability if, as a result of employee ignorance or inadequate training, a plaintiff is deprived of federal rights.
1. Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services , 436 U.S. 658, 690-92 (1978).
2. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980) (municipality liable for damages flowing from constitutional violations that it caused through the execution of its policy or custom).
3. Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1359 (2011).
4. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691-92. See also Los Angeles County v. Humphries, 131 S. Ct. 447, 452 (2010) (custom or policy requirement applies to suits for prospective relief as well as claims for damages).
7. See Burgess v. Fisher, 735 F.3d 462, 478 (6th Cir. 2013) ("A plaintiff can make a showing of an illegal policy or custom by demonstrating one of the following: (1) the existence of an illegal official policy or legislative enactment; (2) that an official with final decision making authority ratified illegal actions; (3) the existence of a policy of inadequate training or supervision; or (4) the existence of a custom or tolerance or acquiescence of federal rights violations.").
8. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691.
10. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 694-95. See also Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480 (1986). "Policy making" is defined as "a deliberate choice to follow a course of action . . . from among various alternatives." Id. at 483.
11. City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 833 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring).
12. Jett v. Dallas Independent School District, 491 U.S. 701, 737 (1989).
13. Moreover, inaction on the part of the final policymaker (such as a failure to overrule a decision made by a subordinate) has been found to be an insufficient delegation of decision-making authority. Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1348 (9th Cir. 1992). A final policymaker must make an affirmative or deliberate choice from among various alternatives and must approve a subordinate's decision and the basis for it before ratification of a subordinate's decision will be deemed to have occurred. Id.
14. Jett, 491 U.S. 701.
17. Compare Surplus Store and Exchange v. City of Delphi, 928 F.2d 788 (7th Cir. 1991) (no Monell liability possible where the alleged policy was to require police officer to enforce state law) with Cooper v. Dillon, 403 F.3d 1208 (11th Cir. 2005) (Police chief had final policymaking authority for City, and "it was his deliberate decision to enforce the statute that ultimately deprived Cooper of constitutional rights and therefore triggered municipal liability.").
18. Compare McMillian v. Monroe County, 520 US. 781 (1997) (affirmed decision of 11th Circuit that county sheriff in Alabama as matter of state law is not final policymaker for county in areas of law enforcement) with Abusaid v. Hillsborough County Board of County Commissioners, 405 F.3d 1298, 1304 (11th Cir. 2005) (in law enforcement capacity of enforcing county ordinance, Florida sheriff acts for county and is not arm of state as matter of state law).
19. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332. 337 (1979) (Since Congress did not intend Section 1983 to apply to states, Eleventh Amendment bars suit for damages). State officials sued in their official capacities for damages are similarly immune. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 26 (1991).
20. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 (1989). In her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor wrote that a plaintiff must prove the need for training in one of two ways. "First, a municipality could fail to train its employees concerning a clear constitutional duty implicated in recurrent situations that a particular employee is certain to face. . . . Second, . . . municipal liability for failure to train may be proper where it can be shown that policy-makers were aware of, and acquiesced in, a pattern of constitutional violations involving the exercise of police discretion. In such cases, the need for training may not be obvious from the outset, but a pattern of constitutional violations could put the municipality on notice that its officers confront the particular constitutional requirements." Id. at 396-97. In Board of Commissioners v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (1997), Justice O'Connor's majority opinion reiterated that liability could not be based on a single incident without effectively undermining the Morrell rule barring governmental respondeat superior liability.
21. City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 390. The Court gave as an example "the need to train officers in the constitutional limitations on the use of deadly force" because the need is "'so obvious,' that failure to do so could properly be characterized as 'deliberate indifference' to constitutional rights." Id. at 390 n.10. The Court explained that police who often violate constitutional rights make the need for training obvious to city officials who must be "deliberately indifferent" to the need. Id.
22. Connick v. Thompson, 131 S.Ct. 1350 (2011).
23. Id. at 1365 (internal citations omitted).
24. See, e.g., Russo v. City of Cincinnati, 953 F.2d 1036 (6th Cir. 1992) (genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether inadequate training in subduing mentally disturbed person rose to level of deliberate indifference).
25. See, e.g., Chew v. Gates, 27 F.3d 1432, 1445 (9th. Cir. 1994) (Jury could find municipal liability based on inadequate training in canine unit "[w]here the city equips its police officers with potentially dangerous animals, and evidence is adduced that those animals inflict injury in a significant percentage of the cases in which they are used[;] a failure to adopt a departmental policy governing their use, or to implement rules or regulations regarding the constitutional limits of that use, evidences a 'deliberate indifference' to constitutional rights.").
26. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
29. Id. at 651-52 (quoting Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172 (1961) (other citations omitted)).
30. City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Incorporated, 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981) (punitive damages not available in Section 1983 suit against municipality challenging violations of constitutional rights caused by city's revocation of permits for music festival).
31. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983).
32. City of Newport, 453 U.S. at 266-67.
33. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) ("The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials 'from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.'") (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). Because "qualified immunity" is immunity from suit, rather than immunity from liability, questions about whether immunity attaches must be resolved at the earliest possible stage of the litigation. Id. at 213-32.
34. Owen, 445 U.S. at 657.
35. Even if the entity is being sued as a result of a custom, policy, or practice, tactical reasons or pleading rules may require that the individual employee be named as the defendant, rather than the agency itself. For example, a sheriff's office may not be a legal entity with the capacity to be sued under a particular state's laws. Dean v. Barber, 951 F.2d 1210, 1215 (11th Cir. 1992) ("Under Alabama law, a county sheriff's department lacks the capacity to be sued."). In such cases, the sheriff would have to be sued in the sheriff's official capacity, assuming the sheriff is not an arm of the state. See id. at 1215 n.5 (suit against sheriff in official capacity barred because sheriff is employee of state of Alabama). But see Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 n.14 (1985) (no longer need to bring official capacity suits against local government officials because local government units can be sued directly).
36. Graham, 473 U.S. at 165-66 (quoting Monell , 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55). To establish personal liability, "it is enough to show that the official, acting under color of state law, caused the deprivation of a federal right." Id. at 166. By contrast, an official capacity suit requires proof that a policy or custom of the governmental entity was the moving force behind the violation of federal law. Id.
37. Hafer, 502 U.S. 21.
39. Graham, 473 U.S. at 166. A government entity may indemnify the government employee for personal liability under Section 1983, but the conditions under which a government entity assumes the risk of doing so can vary.

References: § 1983
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