Source: http://bc-injury-law.com/blog/tag/non-pecuniary-damages
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 13:47:44+00:00

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A common focus when assessing non-pecuniary damages deals with looking at recreational activities and how they have been curtailed as a result of physical injuries. Reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Supreme Court, Vernon Registry, addressing this in the context of lingering soft tissue injuries.
In last week’s case (Travelbea v. Henrie) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2008 collision. Fault was admitted by the Defendant focussing the case on an assessment of damages. The court found that the Plaintiff suffered a “mild to moderate soft tissue injury to her neck and upper back“. Her symptoms remained “painful and limiting” at the time of trial and while there was room for further improvement the Court was satisfied that there would still be “residual pain and limitations“.
 From the foregoing I conclude the following. The plaintiff sustained a mild to moderate soft tissue injury to her neck and upper back. Now, some four years after the accident, it remains painful and limiting. I think it more likely than not that if she commits to the focused stretching that Dr. Laidlow recommended she will increase her level of functioning. I think it more likely than not that if she takes the course of medication, whether nortriptyline or Celebrex, that Dr. Travlos recommended, she will experience an even greater improvement in her functionality. She will, however, be left with residual pain and limitations. I think it unlikely she will ever be able to ride a road bicycle for any appreciable period of time. As a result both that training and triathlon racing will remain beyond her ability. She may be able to ride a bicycle that can be operated in a more upright posture. I think it more likely than not that she will be able to swim and run, albeit not at the level or for the distance she did previously. I think it also likely that with this improvement in function she will recover some of her self confidence and some of the depression which seems to have settled over her will lift.
 Taking all of the foregoing into account, and having regard to the non-exhaustive list of factors set out at paragraph 46 in Stapley v. Hejslet, I consider that an award of $50,000 is appropriate in this case. Included in this amount is $3,000 which I have determined is the appropriate compensation for the plaintiff’s lost capacity to perform housekeeping tasks.
The current judicial cap for non-pecuniary damages in Canada for negligently caused injuries rests at just over $342,000. Reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, discussing whether such an assessment was appropriate for a severe traumatic brain injury coupled with multiple orthopaedic injuries.
 Ms. Clost is seeking an award for non-pecuniary damages at the upper limit set by the Supreme Court of Canada. Counsel agreed the upper limit, adjusted for inflation, was $342,500 at time of trial. The defendants submitted that an award of $175,000 to $225,000 would adequately compensate Ms. Clost for the pain, suffering, and loss of enjoyment of life caused by the accident injuries.
 Ms. Clost does not, as did many of the plaintiffs in the cases referred to by plaintiff’s counsel, require constant supervision for her own protection. She continues to enjoy a considerable degree of independence and to exercise control over most aspects of her life. She has returned to living in her own home. She is able to do most activities of daily living without assistance. She is entirely capable of bathing, toileting, dressing and feeding herself. She can walk, she can swim, she can drive, she can use a computer; she can cook, she can bake, she can shop ? for necessities and for enjoyment. She goes out to the library; for lunch and visits with friends. She can still do many household and outdoor chores although there are also some she cannot do or can only do in a modified way or with assistance. She has continued to manage her own finances, taking care of banking and bill-paying on-line, as she did before the accident. She has not demonstrated a propensity to engage in behaviours that make her a danger to herself or others, as was the case with the plaintiffs in Spehar andCoulter.
 I am of the view, however, that Ms. Clost has experienced pain, suffering and loss of enjoyment of life and will continue to experience losses for which she is entitled to very significant compensation and to an award above the range suggested by defendants’ counsel. Having considered the various authorities, I have concluded that the appropriate award for non-pecuniary damages in this case is $300,000.
 I have already reviewed the evidence of Ms. Clost’s numerous serious orthopedic injuries and the details of the injuries to her brain. She was in a coma for a month and only gradually returned to consciousness. She has a gap in her memory of events for some period before and after the accident. She required two major orthopaedic surgeries within the month following the accident to repair numerous fractures. I have concluded she will require at least one and possibly more surgeries in future to fuse the joint in her left foot and ankle; to remove hardware in the ankle and possibly in her wrists as well; and a possible ankle replacement surgery. Her orthopedic injuries caused her considerable pain; and she was essentially confined to a hospital bed and unable to bear weight or to walk for several months. There was a period during which she was unable to use her arms due to injuries to her arms, wrists and hands.
 In total, Ms. Clost was confined to one type of hospital or another for five months following the accident. Her rehabilitation was ongoing at time of trial. She continues to have pain or discomfort in many parts of her body. She has frequent headaches. The most significant and frequent sources of pain are her left foot and ankle; she also has swelling there and the injury disables her from walking or standing for extended periods of time. Although a fusion of the joint may reduce the amount of discomfort she experiences, the medical opinions I accept indicate that she is unlikely to be pain-free. At time of trial she still needed to take strong medications to control her pain and to help her to sleep.
Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry providing some useful comments in an assessment of non-pecuniary damages for a Plaintiff with pre-existing, long-standing chronic pain and disability.
In the recent case (Morgan v. Scott) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2009 collision. The Defendant admitted fault focusing the trial on an assessment of damages. The Plaintiff had a host of pre-existing problems including chronic pain in his neck and low back. He was also on a disability pension as a result of a chronic lung condition.
 The defendant argues that the Accident caused an “exacerbation” of these conditions. As a matter of definition this is true. There are instances, however, where a worsening in a condition gives rise to more than a change in degree. Instead, in real terms, it gives rise to a change in kind.
 I find that this is so for several of Mr. Morgan’s symptoms. I have said that his pain symptoms changed from being recurring in nature, with periodic “flareups” or, as Dr. Caillier described it, of an “on and off” nature, to being enduring in nature and markedly more severe. That reality has dramatically curtailed Mr. Morgan’s ability to follow his exercise regime. That regime, in turn, is vital to his respiratory health and to the management of his chronic pain. It was also one of the few physical activities that Mr. Morgan could participate in and it provided him with a sense of confidence. Further, it is clear to me that it also provided him with pleasure and with a sense of pride.
 There is no question that Mr. Morgan has become further de-conditioned since the Accident. He testified that his respiratory function has worsened. There was no admissible evidence before me that Mr. Morgan’s chances of being accepted onto a list of prospective transplant donees have diminished as a result of the Accident. Nevertheless I consider that I can, in my assessment of Mr. Morgan’s non-pecuniary losses, weigh the anxiety or stress that Mr. Morgan has expressed over his weakened state and its significance for his long term health.
 Based on the findings I have made and on the considerations I have identified, I consider that an appropriate award for Mr. Morgan’s non-pecuniary losses is $100,000. This figure recognizes and accounts for the various positive and negative contingencies which exist as well as the various non-exhaustive factors that are identified in Stapely v. Hejslet, 2006 BCCA 34 at para. 46. I also emphasize that this award recognizes the difficulties that Mr. Morgan laboured under prior to the Accident and does not compensate him for such pre-existing difficulties.
Reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Supreme Court, Nanaimo Registry, assessing damages for injuries sustained from two motor vehicle collisions.
In last week’s case (Parker v. Lemmon) the Plaintiff was injured in two separate crashes, the first occurred in late 2008 the second the following month. Fault was admitted by the Defendants for both collisions. The crashes caused an overlapping indivisible injury and damages were assessed globally.
The Plaintiff’s injuries included a Grade 2 Whiplash Associated Disorder in her upper and lower back long with her neck muscles and ligaments. This injury persisted and caused the Plaintiff a partial disability in her job as a care-aid with restrictions associated with “repetitive reaching and pulling and pushing…as well as the repetitive bending with regards to her lower back“.
Thus the amount of an award for non-pecuniary damage should not depend alone upon the seriousness of the injury but upon its ability to ameliorate the condition of the victim considering his or her particular situation. It therefore will not follow that in considering what part of the maximum should be awarded the gravity of the injury alone will be determinative. An appreciation of the individual’s loss is the key and the “need for solace will not necessarily correlate with the seriousness of the injury” (Cooper-Stephenson and Saunders, Personal Injury Damages in Canada(1981), at p. 373). In dealing with an award of this nature it will be impossible to develop a “tariff”. An award will vary in each case “to meet the specific circumstances of the individual case” (Thornton at p. 284 of S.C.R.).
 In Fata, the injuries were found to be such that they would not have prevented a return to full-time employment, although with discomfort. Some of the sequelae were resolved at the time of trial, although there was some lingering shoulder pain that would likely not resolve. The Court awarded $45,000 non-pecuniary damages. The factual circumstances are not in all respects similar to the case at bar, but in my view the award in Fata most appropriately approximates what is appropriate here. I note in that case the Court found that the plaintiff could have returned to work but chose not to. In this case the plaintiff did return to her former employment, which her specialist physician opined she could, but she ultimately chose to discontinue that employment and is considering retraining.
 In my opinion the appropriate award for non-pecuniary damages in this case is $45,000.
Reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Court of Appeal setting aside a jury verdict and ordering a new trial in a motor vehicle collision injury claim. The Court found that the Jury’s award for non-pecuniary damages (money for pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life) was “almost derisory” and not compatible with the other awards made.
In last week’s case (Evans v. Metcalfe) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2006 collision. The Plaintiff sought substantial damages. A jury was not receptive to much of the Plaintiff’s claim and awarded a fraction of the sought damages. The awards included $6,000 in special damages, $10,300 for past loss of income and $1,000 for non-pecuniary damages. The trial judge found these awards to be “shockingly unreasonable”.
 In the present case, there was a body of medical evidence that did not depend on the veracity or reliability of the appellant plaintiff or her primary treating physician that was supportive of the thesis that she continued to suffer from the sequelae of the April 2006 accident throughout 2006 into the early months of 2007. As I earlier noted, the quantum of the awards made by the jury under the heads of past income loss and special damages are reasonably susceptible of the interpretation that the jury made a factual decision that the effects of the accident did persist for about nine months post-accident.
 In my respectful opinion, these findings of the jury as reflected in their pecuniary awards make the award for non-pecuniary damages very anomalous. It is not impossible that the jury may have taken a quite censorious view of the appellant because of her economic circumstances or because of her conduct in importuning the physician to give her a note in aid of possible financial advantage. These would not be judicious reasons for denying her an appropriate award of non-pecuniary damages. As I observed, there was a body of credible evidence that would support an award under this head significantly greater than the amount awarded at trial. While there can be considerable variance in awards made under this head as the cases cited to us demonstrate, this award seems almost derisory.
 Generally this Court must be very restrained in any interference with a jury disposition as a consistent body of precedent makes plain. However, I have been persuaded that this is one of those rare cases where the interests of justice make intervention appropriate. The degree of anomaly in the respective awards, coupled with a very real possibility of the triers of fact taking an unduly severe view of the appellant’s conduct unrelated to her physical condition persuade me that the award made by the jury for non-pecuniary damages cannot stand.
 We were invited by counsel for the appellant to either fix awards under various heads ourselves, or refer the matter to the trial judge for assessment. The latter course does not commend itself to me for two reasons: the judge has previously expressed certain fairly strong preliminary views and it is of course the right of the defendant respondent to choose the forum of a jury if so minded. As to the possible remedy of this Court adjusting upward awards made by the jury, this is very much dependent on factual issues, including particularly issues of credibility. Historically this Court has been properly reluctant to engage in factual determinations in this class of matter. In my view, the only appropriate resolution of this case is to set aside the order made at trial and order a new trial and I would so order.
As previously discussed, frequent doctor visits in and of themselves add no value to a personal injury claim. Seeing a doctor simply to ‘paper’ a personal injury claim really does nothing to add to the amount of compensation a claimant is entitled to receive not to mention that it creates a costly and unnecessary burden on the medical system. Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, demonstrating that medical visits to address ‘inconsequential‘ matters with a view to assisting a personal injury claim are frowned upon.
In this week’s case (Hough v. Wyatt) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2009 collision. He sued seeking over $350,000 in damages. The Court largely rejected the Plaintiff’s claim finding that while the collision did cause some injuries these were little more than a ‘minor degree‘ of aggravation of pre-existing injuries. Non-Pecuniary damages of $15,000 were assessed.
 Dr. Waiz’s evidence is unsatisfactory on many levels, not the least of which his manner in which he managed Mr. Hough’s care with increasing doses of narcotics. His records are unreliable. He blames computer programs and computer generated forms. He has been willing to fill out reports to benefit Mr. Hough, for example, claiming all Mr. Hough’s drugs were WCB-related so Mr. Hough could be compensated, and claiming a wrist fracture was a WCB injury due to ongoing weakness and pain in his right leg. This is the same broken wrist that Mr. Hough now claims was caused by the accident for the same reason. Where it has suited Mr. Hough, Dr. Waiz has reported to WCB Mr. Hough is unable to work in any capacity. Now he was reporting to this court that, because of the accident, Mr. Hough cannot work. The concern is he is parroting what Mr. Hough wants him to say.
While it is true that serious injuries warrant higher damage awards than minor injuries and that serious injuries typically result in more medical appointments, the mere number of doctor’s visits in and of themselves do not assist in valuing a personal injury claim. You can click here for a short discussion addressing the factors Court’s often consider when assessing non-pecuniary damages (money for pain and suffering) in a BC personal injury lawsuit.
As previously discussed damages for non-pecuniary loss (pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life) are best thought of in ranges. The same injury can be valued differently by individual trial judges and for this reason its important to get a sense of the low end and high end of appropriate compensation for your injury when considering settlement. The best way to do this is to review as many cases as possible dealing with similar injuries.
Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, New Westminster Registry, discussing non-pecuniary damages for a modest soft tissue injury of nine months duration.
 Bearing in mind that Mr. Thomson’s continuing symptoms were not sufficiently serious to require further medical attention, I find that the link Dr. Fyfe makes between his work duties and the presence of symptoms in the areas described is plausible, particularly in light of what she identified as the difficulties Mr. Thomson endured when undertaking strenuous duties during the earlier stages of his recovery. I find that although Mr. Thomson’s symptoms diminished to such an extent as to no longer require him to seek ongoing medical treatment and engage in physiotherapy, those symptoms persisted in one form or another until the end of August 2008.
Most of my injuries had improved quite a bit before I returned to work on March 10, 2008. I remember that the pain in the left shoulder, left arm and between the shoulder blades were still lingering when I returned to work. I had periodic neck pain which was aggravated by work, as my job involved a lot of looking up.
 I think this candid description weighs substantially in favour of Mr. Thomson’s credibility and distinguishes him from those plaintiffs who maintain that their physiological problems continue undiminished for very lengthy periods, well past what objective medical or other evidence can possibly support.
 In all the circumstances, I think that the duration of Mr. Thomson’s most serious symptoms and the limited extent to which they interfered with his pre-collision lifestyle calls for a lower award than those awarded in the cases he relies on. However I have no concerns on the evidence that Mr. Thomson may have exaggerated his symptoms, so I think that a substantially higher award than the nominal ones in the cases Mr. Hunt relies on is warranted.
 I, accordingly, award Mr. Thomson $20,000 for non-pecuniary damages.
If you’re looking for other recent soft tissue injury damages assessments by BC Courts feel free to access my archived posts on this topic (fairly comprehensive from 2008-present). Another great resource is Canlii, a free Canadian legal case-law database.

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