Source: http://lawspace.stmarytx.edu/item/2011StMULawBestBriefOfSecEllis
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 14:05:04+00:00

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I. Whether the fourth amendment protection against excessive force extends beyond initial seizure. If the Court were to apply a rule of continuing seizure to the fourth amendment protection against excessive force, to what point beyond the initial seizure should that protection extend?
____________________ IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES OCTOBER TERM 2010 _______________ No. 09-9100 _____________ BEAU RADLEY Petitioner, v. FAIR COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT and ARTHUR GOODE, Respondents. __________________________________ ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTEENTH CIRCUIT __________________________________ BRIEF FOR RESPONDENTS __________________________________ OPINIONS BELOW __________________________________ The opinions of the District and Appeals Courts have not been reported. The opinions appear in the record.
JURISDICTION The court of appeals entered judgment on March 15, 2010. (R. at 16). Petitioner filed his petition for writ of certiorari on May 15, 2010. Id. at 17. This Court granted the petition on October 7, 2010. Id. at 18. This Court’s jurisdiction rests on 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) (2000). A district court’s fact findings and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from them are reviewed for clear error. Its legal conclusions are reviewed de novo.
14–16. Radley filed a petition for certiorari with the United States Supreme Court. Id. at 17. This Court has granted certiorari to determine first, whether fourth amendment protection against excessive force extends beyond the initial seizure; and second, how far beyond the initial seizure that protection should extend if continuing seizure is implemented as a judicial directive. Id. at 18. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT I The fourth amendment protection against excessive force should extend no further than initial seizure. This Court has declined to extend that protection in the past, and there is no reason to do so here. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989). Radley’s circumstances during the alleged use of excessive force were too far removed from his initial seizure. This Court has also interpreted seizure narrowly and literally. Under those interpretations, seizure is not an ongoing event that occurs throughout the criminal judicial process; it is a single act. California v. Hodari, 499 U.S. 621, 225 (1991) (citing Thompson v. Whitman, 85 U.S. 457, 470 (1873)). Either physical contact by law enforcement or a voluntary submission to a show of force is required for the act to constitute a seizure. See Hodari, 499 U.S. at 624. Additionally, this Court has refused to extend other fourth amendment protections to arrestees being detained, which is evidence of how fourth amendment protection against excessive force should be applied. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 558 (1979). Finally, various circuit courts have followed Supreme Court precedent and likewise refused to extend fourth amendment protection beyond the point of initial seizure. See, e.g., Cottrell v. Caldwell, 85 F.3d 1480, 1490 (11th Cir. 1996); Wilkins v. May, 872 F.2d 190, 195 (7th Cir. 1989). Radley’s appropriate legal recourse is the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, not the Fourth Amendment.
I. FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTION SHOULD BE AFFORDED ONLY UNTIL THE INITIAL SEIZURE IS COMPLETE.
confined has no choice to yield. See Id. at 626. Additionally, to clarify the meaning of “physical force,” this Court emphasized that merely chasing or cornering the defendant did not constitute seizure. Id. at 626–627. The requirement of physical force to produce a seizure was not met until the officers actually tackled the citizen to the ground, indicating that a seizure necessitates application of literal, physical force through bodily contact if the citizen has not yielded to a display of authority. Id. at 629. It thus follows from this Court’s literal interpretation that a law enforcement officer would be required to continually apply physical, bodily force to the subject throughout the duration of confinement in order to reconcile continuing seizure with the definition set out in Hodari. This would be extraordinarily impractical, and because it is also impossible for an arrestee to yield during confinement as previously discussed, post-booking detention in Radley’s case cannot meet the criteria for seizure established by this Court. Finally, in effect rejecting the proposal that seizure is continuous, this Court narrowly interpreted seizure in Hodari as being one act in the criminal judicial process, limited in time and space. See Id. at 625. According to the Hodari opinion, the Fourth Amendment does not purport to invent a concept of “continuing arrest.” Id. Rather, a seizure is one single act, not a continuous fact. Hodari, 495 U.S. at 625 (citing Thompson v. Whitman, 85 U.S. 457, 470 (1873)). Once again, the circumstances of Radley’s detention after his arrest do not adequately correspond to this Court’s established understanding of seizure. Radley had already been seized, and therefore his fourth amendment protection had expired when the alleged excessive force occurred. He should bring his claim under the Fourteenth Amendment.
C. This Court has refused to extend other fourth amendment protections to arrestees who are being detained. Declining to extend fourth amendment protection against excessive force would be in step with this Court’s earlier refusal to extend other fourth amendment protections to pretrial detainees. In Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 556–57 (1979), this Court held that requiring pretrial detainees to remain outside while their cells were searched by security personnel did not violate the fourth amendment guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure, because that guarantee does not extend to detainees being held in a detention facility where safety and security are paramount. The Bell opinion likewise refused to grant the fourth amendment right to be secure in one’s person to pretrial detainees who were subjected to invasive body cavity searches; such privacy rights of detainees were again secondary to the goal of assuring the safety and security of other persons in the facility. Id. at 558. Perhaps most importantly, the Bell Court held that any of the above searches could be conducted without probable cause, another protection guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 560. Detention facilities, the Court explained, are unique places fraught with serious security threats. Id. at 559. The Bell Court emphasized that under ordinary circumstances not involving pretrial detainees, any of the above searches would certainly be unreasonable; however, in the setting of a detention facility, the increased risks warrant a finding that increased deprivation of fourth amendment protection is reasonable. See Id. at 555–58. If this Court was willing to subject pretrial detainees in Bell to blind cell searches and body cavity searches, and if this Court was willing to do away with the fourth amendment requirement of probable cause for those searches, then it should likewise acknowledge that fourth amendment protection against excessive force should not extend to Radley’s detention after he was already booked.
be consistent with the Graham ruling. It affirmed that in light of Graham, where this Court refused to adopt continuing seizure, the Fourth Amendment should govern claims of excessive force during arrests, and due process should govern any similar claims subsequent to arrest. Id. The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have also rejected the concept of continuing seizure. In Brothers v. Klevenhagen, the Fifth Circuit made clear its position that the Fourth Amendment provides no constitutional basis for adjudicating claims of excessive force arising after the incident of arrest is completed, and that the Due Process Clause should apply to pretrial detainees. Brothers v. Klevenhagen, 28 F.3d 452, 455–56 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing Valencia v. Wiggins, 981 F.2d 1440, 1443–45 (5th Cir. 1993)). In defining the term “pretrial detainee,” the court opined that after an individual is arrested, and certainly after he or she is transferred to a jail cell, that individual should be considered a pretrial detainee. Id. at 457. In Cottrell v. Caldwell, 85 F.3d 1480, 1490 (11th Cir. 1996), the Eleventh Circuit avoided this ambiguity altogether, stating that claims involving the mistreatment of pretrial detainees or arrestees are properly made under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. The court in Cottrell also reiterated that Fourth Amendment protection against excessive force applies only to the circumstances and events relating to an arrest, and to the force used in making that arrest. See Id. at 1492. The Fourth Circuit most recently rejected continuing seizure, though it had grappled with the issue since the late 1980’s. The Fourth Circuit’s opinion in Cooper v. Dyke, 814 F.2d 941, 949 (4th Cir. 1987), concluded that even if there has been no judicial determination of grounds for detention, including a hearing to assess probable cause or set bail, deprivations of liberty not rising to the level of punishment still violate the Fourteenth Amendment rather than the Fourth Amendment. Three years later, U.S. v. Cobb, 905 F.2d 784, 788 (4th Cir. 1990), established that a pre-trial detainee is one lawfully arrested and held prior to any formal adjudication of guilt.
Finally addressing the matter of continuing seizure in Riley v. Dorton, the Fourth Circuit decided that a pretrial detainee, who was slapped and threatened more than two hours after his arrest, was not subject to an investigatory stop, arrest, or other act of seizure at the time of the alleged excessive force. Riley v. Dorton, 115 F.3d 1159, 1161 (4th Cir. 1997) (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 387 (1989)). Using the Graham precedent in conjunction with its prior rulings in Cooper and Cobb, the Fourth Circuit held that fourth amendment protection against excessive force does not extend to pretrial detainees or to arrestees, and that the Fourth Amendment does not necessitate or even suggest a doctrine of continuing seizure be constructed by the courts. See Riley, 115 F.3d at 1162. In sum, the precedents of this Court are clear, and multiple circuit courts have followed those precedents in refusing to unnecessarily expand the scope of the Fourth Amendment. This Court should adhere to its own jurisprudence, as well as to the constitutional principles it has disseminated among the lower courts, and again refuse to extend fourth amendment protection against excessive force beyond the initial seizure.
II. EVEN IF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTS BEYOND THE INITIAL SEIZURE, IT SHOULD EXTEND, AT A MAXIMUM, ONLY AS FAR AS THE BOOKING PHASE.
to extend other fourth amendment protections past the initial seizure, and it should likewise refuse to extend the protection against excessive force. However, if this Court chooses to recognize a continuing seizure doctrine, the doctrine should be subject to the limitations of an arresting officer rule or a location standard. Even if both of these limitations prove problematic, the booking phase is the furthest point to which continuing seizure should extend. Allowing it to continue past booking would create an ambiguous standard resulting in severe procedural uncertainties among the states. While a majority of circuit courts that have addressed this issue have recognized a continuing seizure doctrine, this Court should view the split among the circuits in a different light. The proper line to be drawn between minority and majority is not a line between those circuits that recognize continuing seizure and those that do not. Rather, the critical divide is between the circuits that have extended continuing seizure beyond booking and those that have not. Regardless of how many actually recognize the doctrine, a majority of circuits have not extended continuing seizure past booking. Therefore, the most prudent course of action would be for this Court to reject any continuation of fourth amendment protection beyond the initial seizure, thereby avoiding an unnecessary expansion of the Constitution. If, however, this Court does choose to implement a rule allowing fourth amendment protection to extend past the initial seizure, that extension should terminate once the arrestee is booked. In either case, the appropriate avenue for Radley’s claim is the Fourteenth Amendment. As this Court aptly stated in California v. Hodari, 499 U.S. 621, 627 (1991), it is not desirable, even as a matter of policy, to expand the Fourth Amendment beyond its text and beyond the traditional meaning of arrest. The same holds true in the present case.
PRAYER For these reasons, Respondents pray this Court affirm the decision of the court below.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE Counsel for Respondents certifies that this brief has been prepared and served on all opposing counsel in compliance with the Rules of the Freshman Moot Court Competition.
(a) Nonadversary Probable Cause Determination (1) Defendant in Custody. In all cases in which the defendant is in custody, a nonadversary probable cause determination shall be held before a judge within 48 hours from the time of the defendant's arrest; provided, however, that this proceeding shall not be required when a probable cause determination has been previously made by a judge and an arrest warrant issued for the specific offense for which the defendant is charged. The judge after a showing of extraordinary circumstance may continue the proceeding for not more than 24 hours beyond the 48-hour period. The judge, after a showing that an extraordinary circumstance still exists, may continue the proceeding for not more than 24 additional hours following the expiration of the initial 24-hour continuance. This determination shall be made if the necessary proof is available at the time of the first appearance as required under rule 3.130, but the holding of this determination at that time shall not affect the fact that it is a nonadversary proceeding.
(a) Except as otherwise provided by this article, in each case enumerated in this Code, the person making the arrest or the person having custody of the person arrested shall take the person arrested or have him taken without unnecessary delay, but not later than 48 hours after the person is arrested, before the magistrate who may have ordered the arrest, before some magistrate of the county where the arrest was made without an order, or, to provide more expeditiously to the person arrested the warnings described by Article 15.17 of this Code, before a magistrate in any other county of this state. The magistrate shall immediately perform the duties described in Article 15.17 of this Code.
John Ellis, “Best Brief Contest Winner: Beau Radley v. Fair County Police Department and Arthur Goode 09-9100 Brief for Respondents,” St. Mary's Law Digital Repository, accessed April 24, 2019, http://lawspace.stmarytx.edu/item/2011StMULawBestBriefOfSecEllis.

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