Source: http://houston-courts-and-cases.blogspot.com/2015/04/first-court-of-appeals-passes-judgment.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 19:44:39+00:00

Document:
In October 2011, Fariha Ashfaq petitioned for divorce from Mohammad Ashfaq in a Harris County district court. With his answer, Mohammad proffered a Pakistani divorce decree and sought dismissal of the divorce action for want of jurisdiction based on the parties’ earlier divorce in Pakistan. After a bench trial, the trial court ruled that the Pakistani divorce was valid, dismissed the divorce action for want of jurisdiction, and treated the remainder of Fariha’s pleading as a post-divorce petition for division of assets, upon which it entered a judgment dividing the parties’ assets.
Fariha appeals, contending that the trial court erred in dismissing her petition for divorce because: (1) Texas courts have sole jurisdiction over the parties’ divorce; (2) the Pakistani divorce should not be recognized in the United States as a valid divorce; and (3) Mohammad failed to comply with Pakistani law in procuring the divorce. She does not contest the division of assets. Finding no error, we affirm.
Fariha and Mohammad were married in Pakistan in December 2007. After the marriage, Mohammad spent a few months with Fariha in Pakistan, then returned to his home in Fort Worth. Fariha remained in Pakistan until June 2009, when she was granted a visa to join Mohammad and traveled to the United States. Fariha and Mohammad then lived together in Fort Worth as husband and wife.
The union was not a happy one. In November 2009, Fariha and Mohammad went to Pakistan to attend a family wedding. Once they arrived, Mohammad had Fariha’s parents take Fariha to their home.
Fariha and Mohammad disagree about what happened after the separation. Mohammad testified that eight days later, he announced to Fariha his intent to divorce her, then informed the Chairman of the Union Council that he had divorced his wife. Mohammad had a divorce decree prepared and sent to Fariha’s parents’ home, where her brother received it. Fariha denied that Mohammad gave her timely notice of the divorce, but admitted to having received the divorce papers on November 23, before the divorce was final. Mohammad returned to the United States in late November 2009. He went again to Pakistan in September 2010 to marry another woman, who has since been admitted entry into the United States and lives with him in Fort Worth.
Fariha returned to the United States in April 2010. She has resided in Houston ever since and did not have any contact with Mohammad before filing the divorce petition.
At trial, Mohammad adduced evidence of the Pakistani divorce laws through an expert in Pakistani family law who was licensed to practice in Pakistan. The expert witness testified about the procedural requirements for divorce in Pakistan.
1. He provides a copy of the divorce deed to the wife.
divorce deed, that he has divorced his wife.
3. The Chairman shall supply a notice for reconciliation to the wife.
the purpose of bringing about reconciliation between the parties.
divorce shall become final after 90 days of such a notice.
6. The Chairman will issue a divorce certificate.
Ordinance and opined that his divorce from Fariha is valid.
comity is a matter of discretion. Acain v. Int’l Plant Servs., LLC, 449 S.W.3d 655, 659 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. filed); see Reading & Bates Constr. Co. v. Baker Energy Res. Corp., 976 S.W.2d 702, 714–15 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. denied). We therefore review the trial court’s ruling for an abuse of discretion. See Acain, 449 S.W.3d at 659.
Generally, a trial court abuses its discretion if it acts arbitrarily, unreasonably, or without regard to guiding legal principles. Id. (citing Wagner & Brown, Ltd. v. Sheppard, 282 S.W.3d 419, 428–29 (Tex. 2008)). Recognition of a foreign judgment in the absence of due process constitutes an abuse of discretion. “[D]ue process requires that no other jurisdiction shall give effect, even as a matter of comity, to a judgment elsewhere acquired without due process.” Griffin v. Griffin, 327 U.S. 220, 228, 66 S. Ct. 556, 560 (1946), quoted in In re E.H., 450 S.W.3d 166, 172 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist. 2014, pet. filed); see also Litvaitis v. Litvaitis, 295 A.2d 519, 522 (Conn. 1972) (“A decree of divorce will not be recognized by comity where it was obtained by a procedure which denies due process of law in the real sense of the term . . . or where the foreign court lacked jurisdiction.”).
proceedings. In a bench trial, the trial court determines the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. Zenner v. Lone Star Striping & Paving, L.L.C., 371 S.W.3d 311, 314 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, pet. denied); see also City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 819 (Tex. 2005). In resolving factual disputes, the trial court may believe one witness and disbelieve others, and it may resolve any inconsistencies in a witness’s testimony. Zenner, 371 S.W.3d at 314; McGalliard v. Kuhlmann, 722 S.W.2d 694, 697 (Tex. 1986).
In making credibility determinations, the factfinder “cannot ignore undisputed testimony that is clear, positive, direct, otherwise credible, free from contradictions and inconsistencies, and could have been readily controverted.” City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 820. The factfinder thus is not “free to believe testimony that is conclusively negated by undisputed facts.” Id. In matters involving factual disputes, however, a trial court does not abuse its discretion “if it bases its decision on conflicting evidence and some evidence supports its decision.” See Unifund CCR Partners v. Villa, 299 S.W.3d 92, 97 (Tex. 2009) (citing In re Barber, 982 S.W.2d 364, 366 (Tex. 1998)).
long as the parties have not relinquished their Pakistani citizenship when the divorce occurred, regardless of whether they live in another country, “whether permanently or for a fixed time.” It is undisputed that Fariha is a Pakistani citizen, and Mohammad testified that he has dual U.S. and Pakistani citizenship. Fariha did not present any controverting evidence. We hold that the trial court did not err in concluding that the Pakistani Union Council had jurisdiction over the divorce proceeding between Mohammad and Fariha.
divorce law is invalid because it denies due process and is fundamentally unfair.
the imposition of criminal penalties for failure to comply with those requirements.
conclusion that the procedure prescribed by the Ordinance satisfied due process.
See Unifund CCR Partners, 299 S.W.3d at 97.
Embassy and performing talaq in writing without any advance notice to his wife.
regarding the division of marital property, which is not involved in this appeal.
the husband’s abandonment, polygamy, imprisonment, or mistreatment.
Western Liberalism in Islamic Garb, 34 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 553, 562 (2011).
recognizing the Pakistani divorce as valid as a matter of comity.
Mohammad failed to comply with the legal requirements for procuring it.
became final November 15, 2009.
maher payment equates to acceptance of the divorce.
We hold that the trial court acted within its discretion in dismissing the divorce action for lack of jurisdiction. We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.

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