Source: http://ks.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20180521_0000747.DKS.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 02:33:19+00:00

Document:
Plaintiff seeks review of a decision of the Acting Commissioner of Social Security (hereinafter Commissioner) denying Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) pursuant to sections 216(i) and 223 of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i) and 423 (hereinafter the Act). Finding no error, the court ORDERS that judgment shall be entered pursuant to the fourth sentence of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) AFFIRMING the Commissioner's final decision.
Plaintiff argues that the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) erred in evaluating her subjective statements. She seeks remand for further administrative proceedings.
The court considers the issue as presented in Plaintiff's Brief and finds no error in the ALJ's decision.
Plaintiff's sole claim of error is that “[t]he ALJ's analysis of Ms. Barlow's subjective statements was legally flawed and not supported by substantial evidence.” (Pl. Br. 11) (bolding omitted). She argues that although the ALJ's evaluation of her subjective statements “certainly touched on several of the relevant factors” provided by case law and the regulations, “nothing [in the decision] actually constituted a legally sufficient explanation, supported by substantial evidence, indicating why the evidence as applied to those factors supported discounting [Plaintiff's] allegations regarding her physical impairments during the period at issue.” Id. at 14 (citing Kepler v. Chater, 68 F.3d 387, 390-91 (10th Cir. 1995)). Plaintiff then explains her view of the evidence and how it supports a finding that her allegations were credible. Id. at 15-17.
The Commissioner argues that the ALJ's evaluation of Plaintiff's subjective symptoms was in accordance with the regulations and is supported by substantial evidence. She argues that assessment of symptom allegations by ALJs “warrant particular deference” because of their institutional advantage in such assessments. (Comm'r Br. 6-7) (quoting White, 287 F.3d at 910). Finally, she explains how, in her view, the record evidence supports the ALJ's determination, id. at 8-13, and argues that even if Plaintiff's testimony is given greater weight, as the ALJ found she has not shown symptoms of disabling severity lasting twelve or more consecutive months as required for a finding of disability. (Comm'r Br. 12).
The court's review of an ALJ's credibility determinations is deferential. They are generally treated as binding on review. Talley v. Sullivan, 908 F.2d 585, 587 (10th Cir. 1990); Broadbent v. Harris, 698 F.2d 407, 413 (10th Cir. 1983). “Credibility determinations are peculiarly the province of the finder of fact” and will not be overturned when supported by substantial evidence. Wilson, 602 F.3d at 1144; accord Hackett, 395 F.3d at 1173. Therefore, in reviewing the ALJ's credibility determinations, the court will usually defer to the ALJ on matters involving witness credibility. Glass v. Shalala, 43 F.3d 1392, 1395 (10th Cir. 1994). “However, ‘[f]indings as to credibility should be closely and affirmatively linked to substantial evidence and not just a conclusion in the guise of findings.'” Wilson, 602 F.3d at 1144 (quoting Huston v. Bowen, 838 F.2d 1125, 1133 (10th Cir. 1988)); Hackett, 395 F.3d at 1173 (same).

References: § 405
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