Source: https://www.johndaylegal.com/63-14-statute-of-repose.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 14:48:35+00:00

Document:
§63.14 Statute of Repose | Nashville Injury Lawyers The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.
The Case: Penley v. Honda Motor Co., 31 S.W.3d 181 (Tenn. 2000).
The Basic Facts: Plaintiff was the rider of an all-terrain vehicle (ATV) that flipped over when Plaintiff was riding it on a trail. Plaintiff was severely injured and brought a products liability action against Defendant manufacturer.
"[Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-28-103]. Limitation of actions - Exceptions.
(a) Any action against a manufacturer or seller of a product for injury to person or property caused by its defective or unreasonably dangerous condition must be brought within the period fixed by [sections] 28‑3‑104, 28‑3‑105, 28‑3‑202 and 47‑2‑725, but notwithstanding any exceptions to these provisions it must be brought within six (6) years of the date of injury, in any event, the action must be brought within ten (10) years from the date on which the product was first purchased for use or consumption, or within one (1) year after the expiration of the anticipated life of the product, whichever is the shorter, except in the case of injury to minors whose action must be brought within a period of one (1) year after attaining the age of majority, whichever occurs sooner.
(b) The foregoing limitation of actions shall not apply to any action resulting from exposure to asbestos or to the human implantation of silicone gel breast implants.
(c)(1) Any action against a manufacturer or seller for injury to a person caused by a silicone gel breast implant must be brought within a period not to exceed twenty‑five (25) years from the date such product was implanted; provided, that such action must be brought within four (4) years from the date the plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 29‑28‑103(a)-(c)(1) (1980 & Supp. 1999) (emphasis added)." 31 S.W.3d at 184.
"Statutes of repose operate differently than statutes of limitation, primarily because statutes of repose typically begin to run with the happening of some event unrelated to the traditional accrual of the plaintiff's cause of action." Id.
If the person entitled to commence an action is, at the time the cause of action accrued, either within the age of eighteen (18) years, or of unsound mind, such person, or his representatives and privies, as the case may be, may commence the action, after the removal of such disability, within the time of limitation for the particular cause of action, unless it exceed three (3) years, and in that case within three (3) years from the removal of such disability."
"We hold that the ten-year statute of repose in Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-28-103(a) is not tolled during any period of the plaintiff's mental incompetency. The language of section 29-28-103(a) admits of no exception other than those expressly listed, the policies underlying the products liability statute of repose are not furthered by an implied exception for mental incompetency, and the legal disability statute does not operate to toll an otherwise applicable statute of repose." Id. at 189.
Other Sources of Note: Calaway ex rel. Calaway v. Schucker, 193 S.W.3d 509 (Tenn. 2005) (holding that the three-year statute of repose under TCA § 29-26-116 for medical malpractice actions is not tolled during a plaintiff's minority).
Recent Cases: Maino v. Southern Co., Inc. , 253 S.W.3d 646 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007) (holding that the savings statute applies to save a products liability action where the statute of repose expired during one-year savings period after a non-suit).

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