Source: http://adversity.net/Maryland/42_4_Court_Ruling_Dea_versus_WSSC.htm
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 15:58:38+00:00

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In this decision, the Fourth Circuit found that District Judge Deborah Chasanow was in error regarding a number of her determinations. The Court found that "the record allows no other conclusion" than that the WSSC retaliated against Dea.
STEPHANIE W. DEA and ROGER M. H.
for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt.
Deborah K. Chasanow, District Judge.
for the Western District of Virginia, sitting by designation.
wrote the opinion, in which Judge Wilson joined.
panel. 28 U.S.C. § 46(d).
rison, SHAWE & ROSENTHAL, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
ON BRIEF: Mary Chlopecki, LAW OFFICE OF DOUGLAS C.
COMMISSION, Laurel, Maryland, for Appellee.
to serve of about 1 million, the Commission's service is big business.
employee superior in rank to Dea.
though that candidate was not the best qualified for the job.
Miss Lucci to the Division Head position.
action, and (3) that there was a causal link between the two. Beall v.
Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148 (2000)).
and on the nature of that conduct.
ment practice he opposed in fact violated Title VII. See Ross v.
Communications Satellite Corp., 759 F.2d 355, 357 n.1 (4th Cir.
ment practice he opposed was violative of Title VII. See Biggie v.
there was no objectively reasonable belief that it violated Title VII).
Human Resources, each testified at trial.
Supreme Court's decision in City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S.
that he made "any statements" about such employment procedure.
tailored' to correct and remove the effects of past discrimination."
cies are out-of-date in light of recent Supreme Court decisions . . . ."
that Dea lacked a good faith belief to be clearly erroneous.
protected opposition activity and unprotected, disruptive behavior.
which is what he did in this instance.
because she was female was protected opposition activity).
evidence at trial -- and reasonably believed them to violate Title VII.
policies by making a final hiring decision that contradicted them.
would "check [the recommendation] out with the General Manager,"
who would most likely disapprove the recommendation.
being sued by a non-minority employee who was denied a position.
that they complied with Title VII.
authority to the Commission's affirmative action policies.
disciplinary sanctions may be imposed simply on"disloyal"
EEOC v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 720 F.2d 1008, 1014 (9th Cir.
tute an adverse employment action).
was fired after bringing a lawsuit).
sion's explanation for his transfer is pretextual.
argument on appeal or the district court's conclusion on this point.
transfer Dea because of the "potential for another conflict between Dr.
not do his job, as Profilet put it, which was to select Miss Lucci . . . ."
protected by the Opposition Clause of Title VII.
Division Head vacancy with a minority applicant.
delay in making a recommendation for the Division Head position.
was the reason for the transfer is pretextual.
approve the transfer, which was recommended by Profilet.
mative action nor lateness were the reasons testified to by Hocevar.
not probative." In Rowe v. The Marley Co., 233 F.3d 825 (4th Cir.
problem on which this case is based.
based discrimination and thus that damages were not warranted).
first be made to the district court on remand.
Dea originally sued the Commission both for injunctive relief, with regard to an earlier disciplinary warning, and monetary damages, associated with his eventual involuntary transfer. During the pendency of his appeal, however, Dea died and his estate was substituted as the appellant pursuant to Fed. R. App. Proc. 43.
Thus, as claims for such injunctive relief do not generally survive the death of the plaintiff, see Fariss v. Lynchburg Foundry, 769 F.2d 958, 964 n.8 (4th Cir. 1985), Dea on appeal asserts only a claim for money damages.
nor is an employer required to hire a less qualified person in preference to one better qualified, providing the qualifications used to make such relative judgements realistically measure the personal ability to do the job in question.
The meaning of that part of the plan is perfectly plain. It is directly contrary to the affirmative action enforced by Hocevar that a qualified minority applicant should receive a vacant job although better qualified applicants were at hand. No justification for the departure from the literal wording of the plan was offered at trial in the district court nor is it offered now. In view of that, even questioning that Dea had a good faith belief that he was protesting a violation of law is itself doubtful, at best, and on this record is not justified. A simple recognition of this provision of the plan at the outset of the trial would have vastly shortened this proceeding with the resulting laborious, lengthy and painstaking McDonnell Douglas analysis. As the case has turned out, to affirm the judgment of the district court it would be necessary to base such affirmance almost entirely on the fact that the district court believed that Dea, and Profilet, and probably Haddad, were not truthful, which position the record does not support.
Hocevar's policy was that if a qualified minority (a term that in WSSC parlance included women) was available for a high level position that person should be selected.
Dea correctly argues that he can prevail either by showing that he held a reasonable, good faith belief that the Commission's affirmative action policy violated Title VII or that the policy did, in fact, violate Title VII. Because we find the district court's conclusion that Dea lacked a reasonable good faith belief to be clearly erroneous, we do not reach the legality of the Commission's affirmative action policy.
At trial, the Commission objected to this testimony on the grounds of attorney-client privilege. The district court overruled the Commission's objection and admitted the testimony under seal. Because the Commission has not appealed this evidentiary ruling, we do not need to address the applicability of attorney-client privilege to this testimony and appropriately may treat Dea's testimony regarding the meeting as part of the record on appeal. We find, however, that there is no basis to maintain this aspect of the record under seal on appeal and accordingly order the seal removed.
An example of such unprotected activity can be found in Laughlin v. Metro. Washington Airports Auth., 149 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 1998). Without authorization, Karen Laughlin removed relevant, confidential documents from her supervisor's desk, copied and replaced them without his knowledge and sent them to a former co-worker to aid in that former co-worker's pursuit of a discrimination complaint. Laughlin, 149 F.3d at 256. Upon learning of this breach of trust, MWAA fired Laughlin. Laughlin, 149 F.3d at 256.
On balance, we held that "MWAA's strong interest in protecting sensitive records outweigh[ed] Laughlin's interest" and thus "Laughlin, as a matter of law, did not engage in protected oppositional activity . . . ." Laughlin, 149 F.3d at 260.
Such lack of opposition to the ranking of Dea is understandable. When the vacancy opened up, a list of seven applicants was sent to Dea through Profilet, by William Key, a senior personnel specialist. The Commission does not claim that Dea had anything to do with making up this list of seven. Dea interviewed all seven, making extensive notes on each, all of which are a part of the record. Following these interviews, he then prepared a short list of three and re-interviewed them. He found one Dave Coe to be the best qualified and James Shabelski and Dominic Tiburzi to be second and third. Miss Lucci was ranked fourth by Dea.
Coe was not only the senior of the seven, having been employed by the Authority for some 20 years, he was rated as superior by the personnel department, with the others rated fully satisfactory. A detailed item-by-item score sheet, with points awarded from 1 to 20, was prepared by Dea considering some nine characteristics which Dea considered related to the job and were: technical competence, managerial capability, experience, leadership/administration, initiative/resourcefulness, communication skills, judgement, cooperation, and team building.
Coe scored a total of 88, while Miss Lucci scored 69. Tiburzi scored 77 and Shabelski scored 75. Not one of these figures for any applicant has been contested by the Commission by way of evidence, although the Commission's brief takes issue with Dea's work. The district court made no finding in this respect.
Pretext is not quite the correct word to use, but it is the best we can do in view of its use in the cases. By definition, the word means "a purpose or motive alleged or an appearance assumed in order to cloak the real intention or state of affairs." Webster's New Int'l Dictionary 1797 (3d Ed. 1971). Thus, the word may have less than wholesome overtones.
Neither Hocevar nor Profilet, however, gave lateness as the reason for Dea's transfer, and the Commission did not take that position in the district court, as we demonstrate. The district court's opinion giving lateness as the reason is sought to be justified in the brief filed here by the Commission, but that reason was not presented by the Commission to the district court.
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