Source: http://freedom-school.com/law/contempt-marcel-offeres-this-idea.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 22:51:04+00:00

Document:
Judge just says "You're in contempt of court."
1. "Do/will you charge me with civil or criminal contempt?" Since I have no linkage to the court, such as a contractual relationship like bar membership or a judgment (probation or parole), the judge cannot answer criminal. If he says criminal, I demand the contract between me and the court. Normally, judge will answer civil.
2. "Do/will you charge me with direct or indirect contempt?" Judge now knows I have him and I won't let go, because he can only answer "indirect." Now, I spit the following at him like a machine gun, fast. I don't want his answer. I just want this on the record.
3. "Since you are a party to this action, who will adjudicate this instant action?"
4. "At adjudication, I demand my right to a trial by jury for this action."
5. "Please instruct the bailiff to obtain the name, address, and telephone numbers of everyone in this room that I may call these witnesses in my defense against your treasonous activities, including violation of your oath, in this room today."
6. "I have constitutionally secured liberties which I do not relinquish now or at any other time."
7. "You have constitutional limitations from which I do not release you now or at any other time."
8. "Unless you can in law show nature and cause as well as proper jurisdiction, then I shall hold you personally responsible and liable for any harm that comes to me as a direct or indirect consequence of your actions. Furthermore, I take exception to your command and I reserve my rights."
9. "I have now warned and given you notice." Pause to let the gravity of his situation sink into his mind. "Now what about that contempt charge?"
I had a fun and productive conversation with Marcel Benshadler the other day. He told me to start reading the 5th Edition of Black's Law Dictionary that I just bought on-line. He said to find a word and read the definition till I reach the very first period, and then stop and re-read that definition repeatedly because that is the definition that counts. And he said to look up all other words in the sentence and read their definitions also, and annotate with cross references so I’ll really know them. I figure that’s sound advice from a man with an advanced degree in Constitutional Law and many hours of courtroom drama under his belt.
We discussed the issue of judge high-handedly charging us with “contempt of court.” Marcel gave me his formula for dealing with the contempt charge, and I published it on my mailing list here. During the discussion, Marcel mentioned that the judge in failing to abide by his oath, commits treason, and, "I challenged him to show me the law. He couldn’t at the moment, and I told him I could not find treason of oath or anything like it in 18 U.S.C. "
The judge might say he does not like me citing old cases because they were done under common law, and since 1933 bankruptcy courts operate under special statutory jurisdiction. In that instance cite U.S. v. Will 449 US 200 (1980) which quotes Cohens v. Virginia, 6 U.S. 264 Wheat. (1821) which ruled that whenever a judge acts when he or she does not have jurisdiction to act, the judge is engaged in an act or acts of treason. (See text below).
Now, I hope all of you will carefully read through the following information which I provide for educational purposes. When we face courts, we should always do so with observers on our behalf, armed with instant affidavit forms such as the attached, and ready to have them filled in and notarized, and entered into the case records as evidence. These can form the basis of the criminal complaints we may swear out against the perps posing as officers of the court.
18 U.S.C. § 2384. Seditious conspiracy.
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia .
Every person who, having knowledge that any of the wrongs conspired to be done, and mentioned in section 1985 of this title, are about to be committed, and having power to prevent or aid in preventing the commission of the same, neglects orrefuses so to do, if such wrongful act be committed, shall be liable to the party injured, or his legal representatives, for all damages caused by such wrongful act, which such person by reasonable diligence could have prevented; and such damages may be recovered in an action on the case; and any number of persons guilty of such wrongful neglect or refusal may be joined as defendants in the action; and if the death of any party be caused by any such wrongful act and neglect, the legal representatives of the deceased shall have such action therefor, and may recover not exceeding $5,000 damages therein, for the benefit of the widow of the deceased, if there be one, and if there be no widow, then for the benefit of the next of kin of the deceased. But no action under the provisions of this section shall be sustained which is not commenced within one year after the cause of action has accrued.
The Bill of Rights was provided as a barrier, to protect the individual against arbitrary exactions of ... legislatures, (and) courts ... it is the primary distinction between democratic and totalitarian way. Re Stoller, Supreme Court of Florida, en banc, 36 So.2d 443, 445 (1948).
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 at 818 (1982).
The Supreme Court emphasized that a reasonably competent public official should know the law governing his conduct and ruled that victims can hold almost all public administrators personally liable for conduct that violates clearly established ... “constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known".
Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) – The Supreme Court, reversing its Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) ruling, declared that local governmental bodies have no sovereign immunity from civil litigation initiated by the injured party, according to Civil Rights Act of 1871 (42 U.S.C. §1983).
(a) Monroe v. Pape departed from prior practice insofar as it completely immunized municipalities from suit under 1983. Moreover, since the reasoning of Monroe does not allow a distinction to be drawn between municipalities and school boards, this Court's many cases holding school boards liable in 1983 actions are inconsistent with Monroe , especially as the principle of that case was extended to suits for injunctive relief in City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507 . Pp. 695-696.
Owen v. City of Independence, 445 US 622 (1980) - Municipalities have responsibility for constitutional and federal statutory violations, and the injured has the right to recover attorney’s fees from the defendant government.
After the City Council of respondent city moved that reports of an investigation of the city police department be released to the news media and turned over to the prosecutor for presentation to the grand jury and that the City Manager take appropriate action against the persons involved in the wrongful activities brought out in the investigative reports, the City Manager discharged petitioner from his position as Chief of Police. No reason was given for the dismissal and petitioner received only a written notice stating that the dismissal was made pursuant to a specified provision of the city charter. Subsequently, petitioner brought suit in Federal District Court under 42 U.S.C. §1983 against the city, the respondent City Manager, and the respondent members of the City Council in their official capacities, alleging that he was discharged without notice of reasons and without a hearing in violation of his constitutional rights to procedural and substantive due process, and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The District Court, after a bench trial, entered judgment for respondents. The Court of Appeals ultimately affirmed, holding that although the city had violated petitioner's rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, nevertheless all the respondents, including the city, were entitled to qualified immunity from liability based on the good faith of the city officials involved.
A municipality has no immunity from liability under 1983 flowing from its constitutional violations and may not assert the good faith of its officers as a defense to such liability. Pp. 635-658.
(b) Where an immunity was well established at common law and where its rationale was compatible with the purposes of 1983, the statute has been construed to incorporate that immunity. But there is no tradition of immunity for municipal corporations, and neither history nor policy supports a construction of 1983 that would justify the qualified immunity accorded respondent city by the Court of Appeals. Pp. 637-644.
(c) The application and rationale underlying both the doctrine whereby a municipality was held immune from tort liability with respect to its "governmental" functions but not for its "proprietary" functions, and the doctrine whereby a municipality was immunized for its "discretionary" or "legislative" activities but not for those which were "ministerial" in nature, demonstrate that neither of these common-law doctrines could have been intended to limit a municipality's liability under 1983. The principle of sovereign immunity from which a municipality's immunity for "governmental" functions derives cannot serve as the basis for the qualified privilege respondent city claims under 1983, since sovereign immunity insulates a municipality from unconsented suits altogether, the presence or absence of good faith being irrelevant, and since the municipality's "governmental" immunity is abrogated by the sovereign's enactment of a statute such as 1983 making it amenable to suit. And the doctrine granting a municipality immunity for "discretionary" functions, which doctrine merely prevented courts from substituting their own judgment on matters within the lawful discretion of the municipality, cannot serve as the foundation for a good-faith immunity under 1983, since a municipality has no "discretion" to violate the Federal Constitution. Pp. 644-650.
(d) Rejection of a construction of 1983 that would accord municipalities a qualified immunity for their good-faith constitutional violations is compelled both by the purpose of 1983 to provide protection to those persons wronged by the abuse of governmental authority and to deter future constitutional violations, and by considerations of public policy. In view of the qualified immunity enjoyed by most government officials, many victims of municipal malfeasance would be left remediless if the city were also allowed to assert a good-faith defense. The concerns that justified decisions conferring qualified immunities on various government officials - the injustice, particularly in the absence of bad faith, of subjecting the official to liability, and the danger that the threat of such liability would deter the official's willingness to execute his office effectively - are less compelling, if not wholly inapplicable, when the liability of the municipal entity is at issue. Pp. 650-656.
Respondents, Lionel and Joline Thiboutot, are married and have eight children, three of whom are Lionel's by a previous marriage. The Maine Department of Human Services notified Lionel that, in computing the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) benefits to which he was entitled for the three children exclusively his, it would no longer make allowance for the money spent to support the other five children, even though Lionel is legally obligated to support them. Respondents, challenging the State's interpretation of 42 U.S.C. 602 (a) (7), exhausted their state administrative remedies and then sought judicial review of the administrative action in the State Superior Court. By amended complaint, respondents also claimed relief under 1983 for themselves and others similarly situated. The Superior Court's judgment enjoined petitioners from enforcing the challenged rule and ordered them to adopt new regulations, to notify class members of the new regulations, and to pay the correct amounts retroactively to respondents and prospectively to eligible class members. 2 The court, however, denied respondents' motion for attorney's fees. The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 405 A. 2d 230 (1979), concluded that respondents [448 U.S. 1, 4] had no entitlement to attorney's fees under state law, but were eligible for attorney's fees pursuant to the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 2641, 42 U.S.C. §1988. 3 We granted certiorari. 444 U.S. 1042(1980). We affirm.
1. Title 42 U.S.C. 1983 - which provides that anyone who, under color of state statute, regulation, or custom deprives another of any rights, privileges, or immunities "secured by the Constitution and laws" shall be liable to the injured party - encompasses claims based on purely statutory violations of federal law, such as respondents' state-court claim that petitioners had deprived them of welfare benefits to which they were entitled under the federal Social Security Act. Given that Congress attached no modifiers to the phrase "and laws," the plain language of the statute embraces respondents' claim, and even were the language ambiguous this Court's earlier decisions, including cases involving Social Security Act claims, explicitly or implicitly suggest that the 1983 remedy broadly encompasses violations of federal statutory as well as constitutional law. Cf., e.g., Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 ; Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 ; Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 . Pp. 4-8.
2. In view of its plain language and legislative history, the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. 1988 - which provides that attorney's fees may be awarded to the prevailing party (other than the United States) in "any action . . . to enforce" a provision of 1983, inter alia, and which makes no exception for statutory 1983 actions - authorizes the award of attorney's fees in such actions. [448 U.S. 1, 2] Moreover, it follows from the legislative history and from the Supremacy Clause that the fee provision is part of the 1983 remedy whether the action is brought in a federal court or, as was the instant action, in a state court. Pp. 8-11.
In the present cases, we are not obliged to reason from the probable to the actual, and pass upon the validity of the ordinances complained of, as tried merely by the opportunities which their terms afford, of unequal and unjust discrimination in their administration; for the cases present the ordinances in actual operation, and the facts shown establish an administration directed so exclusively against a particular class of persons as to warrant and require the conclusion that, whatever may have been the intent of the ordinances as adopted, they are applied by the public authorities charged with their administration, and thus representing the state itself, with a mind so unequal and oppressive as to amount to a practical denial by the state of that equal protection of the laws which is secured to the petitioners, as to all other persons, by the broad and benign provisions of the fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States. Though the law itself be fair on its face, and impartial in appearance, yet, if it is applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and an unequal [118 U.S. 356, 374] hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the constitution. This principle of interpretation has been sanctioned by this court in Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U.S. 259 ; Chy Luny v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275 ; Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 ; Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 ; and Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U.S. 703 ; S. C. 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 730.
The present cases, as shown by the facts disclosed in the record, are within this class. It appears that both petitioners have complied with every requisite deemed by the law, or by the public officers charged with its administration, necessary for the protection of neighboring property from fire, or as a precaution against injury to the public health. No reason whatever, except the will of the supervisors, is assigned why they should not be permitted to carry on, in the accustomed manner, their harmless and useful occupation, on which they depend for a livelihood; and while this consent of the supervisors is withheld from them, and from 200 others who have also petitioned, all of whom happen to be Chinese subjects, 80 others, not Chinese subjects, are permitted to carry on the same business under similar conditions. The fact of this discrimination is admitted. No reason for it is shown, and the conclusion cannot be resisted that no reason for it exists except hostility to the race and nationality to which the petitioners belong, and which, in the eye of the law, is not justified. The discrimination is therefore illegal, and the public administration which enforces it is a denial of the equal protection of the laws, and a violation of the fourteenth amendment of the constitution. The imprisonment of the petitioners is therefore illegal, and they must be discharged. To this end the judgment of the supreme court of California in the Case of Yick Wo, and that of the circuit court of the United States for the district of California in the Case of Wo Lee, are severally reversed, and the cases remanded, each to the proper court, with directions to discharge the petitioners from custody and imprisonment.
2. Title 28 U.S.C. 455 - which requires a federal judge to disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned or where he has a financial interest in the subject matter in controversy or is a party to the proceeding - by reason of the Rule of [449 U.S. 200, 201] Necessity does not operate to disqualify all federal judges, including the Justices of this Court, from deciding the issues presented by these cases. Where, under the circumstances of these cases, all Article III judges have an interest in the outcome so that it was not possible to assign a substitute district judge or for the Chief Justice to remit the appeal, as he is authorized to do by statute, to a division of the Court of Appeals with judges who are not subject to the disqualification provisions of 455, the common-law Rule of Necessity, under which a judge, even though he has an interest in the case, has a duty to hear and decide the case if it cannot otherwise be heard, prevails over the disqualification standards of 455. Far from promoting 455's purpose of reaching disqualification of an individual judge when there is another to whom the case may be assigned, failure to apply the Rule of Necessity in these cases would have a contrary effect by denying some litigants their right to a forum. And the public might be denied resolution of the crucial matter involved if first the District Judge and now all the Justices of this Court were to ignore the mandate of the Rule of Necessity and decline to answer the questions presented. Pp. 211-217.
[Footnote 19] In another, not unrelated context, Chief Justice Marshall's exposition in Cohens v. Virginia , 6 Wheat. 264 (1821), could well have been the explanation of the Rule of Necessity; he wrote that a court "must take jurisdiction if it should. The judiciary cannot, as the legislature may, avoid a measure because it approaches the confines of the constitution. We cannot pass it by, because it is doubtful. With whatever doubts, with whatever difficulties, a case may be attended, we must decide it, if it be brought before us. We have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would be treason to the constitution. Questions may occur which we would gladly avoid; but we cannot avoid them." Id. , at 404.
“Take the case of a local officer who persists in enforcing a type of ordinance which the Court has held invalid as violative of the guarantees of free speech or freedom of worship. Or a local official continues to select juries in manner which flies in the teeth of decisions of the Court. If those acts are done willfully, how can the officer possibly claim that he had no fair warning that his acts were prohibited by the statute? He violates the statute not merely because he has a bad purpose but because he acts in defiance of announced rules of law. He who defies a [325 U.S. 91, 105] decision interpreting the Constitution knows precisely what he is doing. If sane, he hardly may be heard to say that he knew not what he did. Of course, willful conduct cannot make definite that which is undefined. But willful violators of constitutional requirements, which have been defined, certainly are in no position to say that they had no adequate advance notice that they would be visited with punishment. When they act willfully in the sense in which we use the word, they act in open defiance or in reckless disregard of a constitutional requirement which has been made specific and definite. When they are convicted for so acting, they are not punished for violating an unknowable something.” Screws v US 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
“To afford protection to the officer or person making the arrest, the authority must be strictly pursued; and no unreasonable delay in procuring a proper warrant for the prisoner’s detention can be excused or tolerated. Any other rule would leave the power open to great abuse and oppression.
NOTICE: Marcel Benshadler, Bob Hurt and other presented entities are not affiliated with Freedom School.

References: v. 
 v. 
 § 2384
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 §1983
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 §1983
 §1988
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.