Source: http://stopforeclosurefraud.com/tag/remic/
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 22:43:14+00:00

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We are pleased to present this guest post by April Charney.
If you are an attorney trying to help people save their homes, you had better be PSA literate or you won’t even begin to scratch the surface of all you can do to save their homes. This is an open letter to all attorneys who aren’t PSA literate but show up in court to protect their client’s homes.
First off, what is a PSA? After the original loans are pooled and sold, a trust hires a servicer to service the loans and make distributions to investors. The agreement between depositor and the trust and the truste and the servicer is called the Pooling and Servicing Agreement (PSA).
(3) A person not in possession of the instrument who is entitled to enforce the instrument pursuant to section 3-309 or section 3-418(d).
A person may be a person entitled to enforce the instrument even though the person is not the owner of the instrument or is in wrongful possession of the instrument.
Although “holder” is not defined in UCC § 3-301, it is defined in § 1-201 for our purposes to mean a person in possession of a negotiable note payable to bearer or to the person in possession of the note.
So we now know who can enforce the obligation to pay a debt evidenced by a negotiable note. We can debate whether a note is negotiable or not, but I won’t make that debate here.
Under § 1-302 persons can agree “otherwise” that where an instrument is transferred for value and the transferee does not become a holder because of lack of indorsement by the transferor, that the transferee is granted a special right to enforce an “unqualified” indorsement by the transferor, but the code does not “create” negotiation until the indorsement is actually made.
So, that section allows a transferee to enforce a note without a qualifying endorsement only when the note is transferred for value.? Then, under § 1-302 (a) the effect of provisions of the UCC may be varied by agreement. This provision includes the right and ability of persons to vary everything described above by agreement.
This is where you MUST get into the PSA. You cannot avoid it. You can get the judges to this point. I did it in an email. Show your judge this post.
If you can’t find the PSA for your case, use the PSA next door that you can find on at www.secinfo.com. The provisions of the PSA that concern transfer of loans (and servicing, good faith and almost everything else) are fairly boilerplate and so PSAs are fairly interchangeable for many purposes. You have to get the PSA and the mortgage loan purchase agreement and the hearsay bogus electronic list of loans before the court. You have to educate your judge about the lack of credibility or effect of the lifeless list of loans as the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act specifically exempts Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities from its application. Also, you have to get your judge to understand that the plaintiff has given up the power to accept the transfer of a note in default and under the conditions presented to the court (out of time, no delivery receipts, etc). Without the PSA you cannot do this.
The PSA also has impact on when or what acts have to occur under the UCC because § 1-302 (c) allows parties to vary the “effect of other provisions” of the UCC by agreement.
Through the PSA, it is clear that the plaintiff cannot take an interest of any kind in the loan by way of an “A to D” assignment of a mortgage and certainly cannot take an interest in the note in this fashion.
Without the PSA and the limitations set up in it “by agreement of the parties”, there is no avoiding the mortgage following the note and where the UCC gives over the power to enforce the note, so goes the power to foreclose on the mortgage.
So, arguing that the Trustee could only sue on the note and not foreclose is not correct analysis without the PSA.? Likewise, you will not defeat the equitable interest “effective as of” assignment arguments without the PSA and the layering of the laws that control these securities (true sales required) and REMIC (no defaulted or nonconforming loans and must be timely bankruptcy remote transfers) and NY trust law and UCC law (as to no ultra vires acts allowed by trustee and no unaffixed allonges, etc.).
The PSA is part of the admissible evidence that the court MUST have under the exacting provisions of the summary judgment rule if the court is to accept any plaintiff affidavit or assignment.
And I am not impressed by the argument “This is clearly something that most foreclosure defense lawyers are not prepared to do.”?Get over that quick or get out of this work! Ask yourself, are you PSA adverse? If your answer is yes, please get out of this line of work. Please.
I am not worried about the minds of the Circuit Court Judges unless and until we provide them with the education they deserve and which is necessary to result in good decisions in these cases.
It is correct that the PSA does not allow the Trustee to foreclose on the Note. But you only get there after looking at the PSA in the context of who has the power to foreclose under applicable law.
It is not correct that the Trustee has the power or right to sue on the note and PSA literacy makes this abundantly clear.
Are you PSA literate? If not, don’t expect your judge to be. But if you want to become literate, a good place to start is by attending Max Gardner’s Mortgage Servicing and Securitization Seminar.
Constitution, and a defect in standing cannot be waived by the parties. Chapman v.
Servs. Corp., 552 F.3d 965, 971 (9th Cir. 2009).
July 2008. In re New Century TRS Holdings, Inc., 407 B.R. 576, 579-80 (Bankr.
fact that Plaintiff brings this action as “Trustee Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc.
Capital I Inc., with Plaintiff as trustee, entered into a PSA dated January 1, 2007.
Mortgage Loan.” Id. at 41-42.
and Note on which it now seeks to foreclose.
622169, at *3-4 (D. Haw. Feb. 23, 2012) (relying on Velasco v. Sec. Nat’l Mortg.
mortgagor’s] default”). As explained above, Deutsche Bank has failed to do so.
The court therefore GRANTS the Williamses’ Motion to Dismiss.
USDC Judge Seabright in Hawaii exemplars “Securitization Fail” and DISMISSES a foreclosure for “lack of standing”.
“One of the most important decisions for Borrowers Rights in the history of Hawaii has been made with this decision,” remarked Honolulu attorney Gary Dubin. Honorable Judge J. Michael Seabright of the Hawaii United States District Court, today GRANTED the homeowners’ Motion to Dismiss the case filed against them in federal district court by Plaintiff Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as Trustee Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2007-NC1 Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-NC1.
Honorable Judge J. Michael Seabright gets it! And his ORDER was detailed. In the Discussion, Judge Seabright notes an argument that homeowners have being trying to persuade the courts (especially at the lower state levels) to grasp: STANDING and JURISDICTION.
Chain of title – proof of who really owns a house – underpins the entire U.S. system of real estate.
Broken chain of title due to slipshod paperwork was a serious issue uncovered in the nationwide robosigning scandal and again last month in a city report that found San Francisco foreclosure paperwork riddled with errors.
Those revelations draw new attention to title companies, which insure a home’s clear title for both buyers and lenders.
Two parallel real estate bubbles emerged in the United States between 2004 and 2008, one in residential real estate, the other in commercial real estate. The residential real estate bubble has received a great deal of popular, scholarly, and policy attention. The commercial real estate bubble, in contrast, has largely been ignored.
This Article explores the causes of the commercial real estate bubble. It shows that the commercial real estate price bubble was accompanied by a change in the source of commercial real estate financing. Starting in 1998, securitization became an increasingly significant part of commercial real estate financing. The commercial mortgage securitization market underwent a major shift in 2004, however, as the traditional buyers of subordinated commercial real estate debt were outbid by collateralized debt obligations (CDOs). Savvy, sophisticated, experienced commercial mortgage securitization investors were thus replaced by investors who merely wanted “product” to securitize. The result was a noticeable decline in underwriting standards in commercial mortgage backed securities that contributed to the commercial real estate price bubble.
The commercial real estate bubble holds important lessons for understanding the residential real estate bubble. Unlike the residential market, there is almost no government involvement in commercial real estate. The existence of the parallel commercial real estate bubble presents a strong challenge to explanations of the residential bubble that focus on government affordable housing policy, the Community Reinvestment Act, and the role of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Instead, the changes in commercial real estate financing closely mirror changes in the residential real estate financing, which shifted from regulated government-sponsored securitization to unregulated private securitization. This indicates that changes in the securitization market contributed to the problems in both the commercial and residential real estate markets.
Not surprisingly, there’s been some attempts to downplay the significance of the SF City Assessor-Recorder foreclosure audit. The attacks have come in three flavors: questions about the auditors’ own background; questions about the accuracy of the report; and the “who cares, as these are just lousy deadbeats” argument. Even if we acknowledge that there is something to each of these attacks, they don’t take away from the core finding of the report, which is that things are FUBAR in mortgage documentation, and that is going to inevitably result in some honest, but unfortunate homeowners being harmed.
This is an explosive video and the AG’s better listen carefully because titles are in serious jeopardy. Forget the settlement… HOW do they prepare to correct the DEFECTS in YOUR TITLE?
Watch the video and listen to how the “New Lender” is stealing assigning Your Home to themselves… I hope AG Kamala Harris follows up and why haven’t the AG’s conducted these investigations? Truly sad.
58% of conflicts with MERS.
Washington, D.C. – Democratic Leader Nancy Pelosi and Congresswoman Jackie Speier sent a letter today to Attorney General Eric Holder requesting he direct the Justice Department’s Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force to examine whether any violations of Federal law occurred in the processing of foreclosures in San Francisco.
The County of San Francisco’s Office of the Assessor-Recorder recently commissioned a report assessing compliance with applicable foreclosure laws by certain entities in the mortgage industry operating in San Francisco.
Below is the full text of the letter.
The Honorable Eric H. Holder, Jr.
We are writing to request that you direct the Justice Department’s Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force to examine whether any violations of Federal law occurred in the processing of foreclosures in San Francisco.
The County of San Francisco’s Office of the Assessor-Recorder recently commissioned a report, which is enclosed, assessing compliance with applicable foreclosure laws by certain entities in the mortgage industry operating in San Francisco. The report, based on a review of a random sample of mortgage loans that entered into foreclosure between January 2009 and October 2011, found that 99 percent of the San Francisco mortgages reviewed showed irregularities in the foreclosure process, and 84 percent showed potential violations of California non-judicial foreclosure laws. In addition, foreclosures involving mortgages that were part of the Mortgage Electronic Registration System (MERS), which are more likely to have been securitized, showed a high rate of conflicting information regarding the actual beneficiary, which raises questions about whether homeowners were denied their due process rights. We find these findings very troubling.
Because the report does not specify the mortgage servicers involved, it is not possible to determine whether affected borrowers can seek remedies under provisions in the multi-state mortgage settlement. However, even if some borrowers can seek redress through the settlement process, or through private rights of action, the irregularities and violations cited in the report convince us that further investigation at the Federal level is warranted to determine whether any violations of Federal civil and criminal laws might have occurred.
The Assessor-Recorder has already referred the report’s findings to California Attorney General, Kamala Harris, for her review. We believe the severity of the report’s conclusions also warrant a thorough review at the Federal level by the Task Force.
We appreciate the hard work of the Obama Administration and the state Attorneys General, including the helpful protections for borrowers secured by California Attorney General Kamala Harris, in achieving a multi-state mortgage settlement. We are hopeful that preserving the ability of the states and the Federal government to continue to pursue actions not covered by the terms of the settlement will ensure that homeowners who experienced losses unfairly, particularly where abusive practices were the cause, will be able to seek a remedy.
Adam Levitin: Why No Investigation?
The robosigning itself and similar lack of internal controls are the small potatoes. There are much more serious things in the SF City Assessor report.
Here’s a bombshell: the San Francisco City Assessor commissioned a serious audit of foreclosure documentation filed in the past few years. The audit examined 400 foreclosures. It found problems with 85% of them, often multiple problems. What’s more, some of the problems are pretty serious as they implicate not only borrowers’ rights, but the integrity of mortgage-backed securities and the property title system.
The San Francisco City Assessor’s audit also serves as a benchmark for evaluating the Federal-State servicing settlement. The San Francisco City Assessor managed to accomplish in a few months what the Federal government and state Attorneys General weren’t able to do in nearly a year and a half with far greater resources at their disposal: perform a credible investigation of foreclosure documentation with serious implications about the securitization process in general. That’s a lot of egg on the face of Shaun Donovan, Eric Holder, Tom Miller, et al. The SF City Assessor report shows that it really wasn’t so hard for a motivated party to undertake a serious investigation. And that raises the question of why the largest consumer fraud settlement in history proceeded with virtually no investigation.
The lack of investigation was the compelling criticism that led the NY and DE AGs to stay out of the settlement for quite a while. I’ve never heard an answer as to why no serious investigation. As the SF City Assessor’s audit shows, the documentation is all a matter of public record. It’s not that hard to do, especially if you have the resources of the federal government. So the resources were there. The capability was there. So why no investigation? The answer has to lie with lack of motivation. Were the Feds and AGs scared of what they would find if they delved too deeply into the issue?
I hope that members of Congress will question the Attorney General and HUD Secretary the next time they show up to testify on the Hill. The issue is also worthy of a GAO or IG examination.
A report this week showing rampant foreclosure abuse in San Francisco reflects similar levels of lender fraud and faulty documentation across the United States, say experts and officials who have done studies in other parts of the country.
The audit of almost 400 foreclosures in San Francisco found that 84 percent of them appeared to be illegal, according to the study released by the California city on Wednesday.
“The audit in San Francisco is the most detailed and comprehensive that has been done – but it’s likely those numbers are comparable nationally,” Diane Thompson, an attorney at the National Consumer Law Center, told Reuters.
Across the country from California, Jeff Thingpen, register of deeds in Guildford County, North Carolina, examined 6,100 mortgage documents last year, from loan notes to foreclosure paperwork.
Not so sure this is really up to the MERSCORP and MERS directors to approve this because this involves certain laws and also involving trusts etc…? Exactly how long ago did these loans close? How about the now DEFUNCT lenders?
Since they made up their own Law, they can change the Law when ever they want?
Changes and clarifications to Rule 8 of the Rules of Membership (“Rules”) have been approved by the MERSCORP and MERS Boards of Directors and are effective as of July 22, 2011.
As I have written, when we peel back the layers of the real estate “onion” what we find is layer after layer of fraud. From the mortgage brokers to the appraisers and lenders, from the securitizers to the ratings agencies and accountants, from the trustees to the servicers, and from MERS (Mortgage Electronic Registry System) through to the foreclosures, what we find is a massive criminal conspiracy—probably the worst in human history. I realize that is a harsh claim but I cannot find any other words that fit.
In the old days, we used to hang horse thieves. The justification was that a man’s horse was necessary to his way of life, and in some cases, to his very survival. There can be little doubt that a home is equally important to maintenance of a middle class living standard today for most Americans. There is almost no calamity worse than loss of one’s home. It is the main asset that most Americans hold—essential to the educational success of one’s children, and to a comfortable retirement of our citizens. Americans typically borrow against their home equity to put their kids through college, to ease the financial distress caused by unexpected health care expenses, and to finance other large expenditures. The accumulated equity in the home is the only significant source of wealth for the vast majority of Americans. The home is necessary to one’s continuing connection to the neighborhood, school district, and network of friends. Theft of one’s house today is certainly equivalent to theft of a horse 150 years ago.
2 minor corrections: 1. There are now 66 Million mortgages in MERS 2. The First Edition of MERS Recommended Foreclosure Procedures was actually written in 1998. To see the First Ed. from 1998 go here towards the bottom.
In part one of this series I showed that MERS recommended that mortgage servicers retain the “wet ink” notes that borrowers signed. These notes are required in 45 states to foreclose on a home. Not only does the foreclosing party need to physically hold the note, but the note must be properly endorsed and transferred every time a mortgage is sold. A clear chain of title must be demonstrated to make the note valid. This is to protect borrowers from fraud — no one can manufacture a note, claim to be a creditor, and then take a homeowner’s property. And this is especially important when mortgages are securitized and bought and sold a dozen times — if there is no clear chain of title, the borrower can never be sure who is really the creditor.
But, in fact, the notes were never transferred, there is no clear chain of paperwork, and in many cases the notes have “disappeared” so that when the servicers or MERS tries to foreclose, they must file “lost note affidavits” claiming rightful ownership even though they do not have evidence. They have also been caught using “robo-signers” to forge documents — and sometimes they have foreclosed on the wrong properties and even seized homes on which there was no mortgage. That is precisely why the law requires proper transfers of the note. Without that, the mortgage is a fraud and foreclosure is fraudulent.
By itself, all of this is a horrific scandal, involving up to 65 million mortgages — the number of mortgages registered at MERS, most of which presumably were subjected to MERS’s guidelines and extremely sloppy record-keeping. But like Shrek’s onion, it is much more complicated than that — with layer after layer of fraud piled on fraud. There are many angles to be explored, most of them too complex and arcane to be pursued in a short column. Here, in part two, I will discuss the implications for the securities that bundled the fraudulent mortgages registered at MERS. Not only did MERS defraud the counties out of their recording fees and the homeowners out of their homes, but it also helped to perpetrate securities fraud and federal tax fraud. Fortunately for the investors in these securities, the securitization process was fatally flawed, meaning that they can return to the issuing banks and demand their money back. But that implies, of course, that the banksters are hopelessly insolvent — on the hook for hundreds of billions of dollars.
In two recent pieces I harped on the problems at MERS, the Mortgage Electronic Registration System. (“Support Representative Kaptur’s Bill: Time To Shut Down Mers And To Restore The Rule Of Law” and “Shut Down MERS“). Briefly, MERS purportedly offers an alternative to paperwork, maintaining an electronic record of mortgages that are usually packaged into mortgage backed securities (MBSs). When mortgages go delinquent, MERS helps mortgage servicers foreclose on homes.
I argued that MERS was created to run multiple frauds, a topic I will discuss in more detail in part two of this series. However, one of the big puzzles of the ongoing foreclosure crisis concerns the whereabouts of the “wet ink notes” — the IOUs signed by borrowers. In foreclosure cases across the nation, the banks have been filing “lost note affidavits”, certifying that they cannot find the notes that are required to prove that they have the right to take away someone’s home. In some cases, the notes miraculously appear, seemingly out of nowhere, and in others “Burger King kids” have been manufacturing them for robo-signers. By law, the notes are supposed to be at REMIC trustees, held against the MBSs sold on to investors — and must be presented to foreclose.
The real mystery is why these trustees cannot produce the notes. I think we have finally found the smoking gun. An interested reader alerted me to MERS’s instruction manual, “MERS Recommended Foreclosure Procedures — State by State”, originally written in 1999, updated in 2002 and available on MERS’s website (accessed by clicking on: Recommended Foreclosure Procedures).
(5) The term securities-related transaction shall mean a purpose, sale or pledge of investment securities, or a custodial arrangement for investment securities.
(iv) Counterfeit or reasonably believed to be counterfeit.
(ii) Corporate predecessor(s) and successor(s).
(ii) A transfer agent claims or believes was destroyed in any manner other than by the transfer agent’s own certificate destruction procedures as provided in Sec. 240.17Ad-19.
(3) A reporting institution whose business activities, within the last six months, did not involve the handling of securities certificates.
(i) Every reporting institution shall report to the Commission or its designee, and to a registered transfer agent for the issue, the discovery of the theft or loss of any securities certificates where there is substantial basis for believing that criminal activity was involved. Such report shall be made within one business day of the discovery and, if the certificate numbers of the securities cannot be ascertained at that time, they shall be reported as soon thereafter as possible.
(ii) Every reporting institution shall promptly report to the Federal Bureau of Investigation upon the discovery of the theft or loss of any securities certificate where there is substantial basis for believing that criminal activity was involved.
(i) Securities certificates lost, missing, or stolen while in transit to customers, transfer agents, banks, brokers or dealers shall be reported by the delivering institution by the later of two business days after notice of non-receipt or as soon after such notice as the certificate numbers of the securities can be ascertained.
(ii) Where a shipment of retired securities certificates is in transit between any transfer agents, banks, brokers, dealers, or other reporting institutions, with no affiliation existing between such entities, and the delivering institution fails to receive notice of receipt or non-receipt of the certificates, the delivering institution shall act to determine the facts. In the event of non-delivery where the certificates are not recovered by the delivering institution, the delivering institution shall report the certificates as lost, stolen, or missing to the Commission or its designee within a reasonable time under the circumstances but in any event within twenty business days from the date of shipment.
(iii) Securities certificates considered lost or missing as a result of securities counts or verifications required by rule, regulation or otherwise (e.g., dividend record date verification made as a result of firm policy or internal audit function report) shall be reported by the later of ten business days after completion of such securities count or verification or as soon after such count or verification as the certificate numbers of the securities can be ascertained.
(D) Where delivery of securities certificates is made by mail or via draft, if payment is not received within ten business days, the delivering institution shall confirm with the receiving institution the failure to receive such delivery; if confirmation shows non-receipt, the delivering institution shall report within two business days of such confirmation.
(3) Counterfeit securities. Every reporting institution shall report the discovery of any counterfeit securities certificate to the Commission or its designee, to a registered transfer agent for the issue, and to the Federal Bureau of Investigation within one business day of such discovery.
(4) Transfer agent reporting obligations. Every transfer agent shall make the reports required above only if it receives notification of the loss, theft or counterfeiting from a non-reporting institution or if it receives notification other than on a Form X-17F-1A or if the certificate was in its possession at the time of the loss.
(5) Recovery. Every reporting institution that originally reported a lost, missing or stolen securities certificate pursuant to this Section shall report recovery of that securities certificate to the Commission or its designee and to a registered transfer agent for the issue within one business day of such recovery or finding. Every reporting institution that originally made a report in which criminality was indicated also shall notify the Federal Bureau of Investigation that the securities certificate has been recovered.
(7) Forms. Reporting institutions shall make all reports to the Commission or its designee and to a registered transfer agent for the issue pursuant to this section on Form X-17F-1A. Reporting institutions shall make reports to the Federal Bureau of Investigation pursuant to this Section on Form X-17F-1A, unless the reporting institution is a member of the Federal Reserve System or a bank whose deposits are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, in which case reports may be made on the form required by the institution’s appropriate regulatory agency for reports to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(v) The securities certificate is received directly from a drop which is affiliated with a reporting institution for the purposes of receiving or delivering certificates on behalf of the reporting institution.
(2) Form of inquiry. Inquiries shall be made in such manner as prescribed by the Commission or its designee.
(3) A reporting institution shall make required inquiries by the end of the fifth business day after a securities certificate comes into its possession or keeping, provided that such inquiries shall be made before the certificate is sold, used as collateral, or sent to another reporting institution.
(e) Permissive reports and inquiries. Every reporting insitution may report to or inquire of the Commission or its designee with respect to any securities certificate not otherwise required by this section to be the subject of a report or inquiry. The Commission on written request or upon its own motion may permit reports to and inquiries of the system by any other person or entity upon such terms and conditions as it deems appropriate and necessary in the public interest and for the protection of investors.
(5) Any securities issue for which neither record nor beneficial owners can obtain a negotiable securities certificates.
(g) Recordkeeping. Every reporting institution shall maintain and preserve in an easily accessible place for three years copies of all Forms X-17F-1A filed pursuant to this section, all agreements between reporting institutions regarding registration or other aspects of this section, and all confirmations or other information received from the Commission or its designee as a result of inquiry.
The FSOC is tasked with ensuring the financial stability of the United States, which includes identifying and addressing possible systemic risks. There is a well-documented wave of foreclosure fraud sweeping the country that presents such a risk. Bank of America and JP Morgan Chase have both suspended foreclosures in 23 states where that fraud could be uncovered and stopped by the courts. Connecticut has suspended foreclosures.
I write to encourage the FSOC to appoint an emergency task force on foreclosure fraud as a potential systemic risk. I am also writing to ask the members of the FSOC to use their regulatory authority to impose a foreclosure moratorium on all mortgages originated and securitized between 2005-2008, until this task force is able to understand and mitigate the systemic risk posed by the foreclosure fraud crisis.
So far, banks are claiming that the many forged documents uncovered by courts and attorneys represent a simple ‘technical problem’ with foreclosure processes. This is not true. What is happening is fraud to cover up fraud.
The mortgage lending boom saw the proliferation of predatory lending and mortgage fraud, what the FBI called at the time ‘an epidemic of mortgage fraud.’ Much of this was lender-induced.
When lenders – many of whom are now out of business – originally lent money to borrowers, they often did so knowing that the terms of the loans could not possibly be honored. They sought fees, not repayment. These lenders put people in predatory loans, they induced massive amounts of fraud, and Wall Street banks misrepresented these loans to investors when they moved through the securitization chain. They were stealing money from investors, and from homeowners.
Obviously these originators and servicers didn’t keep good records of who owed what to whom because the point was never about getting paid back, it was about moving as much loan volume as possible as quickly and as cheaply as possible. The banks didn’t keep good records, and there is good reason to believe in many if not virtually all cases during this period, failed to transfer the notes, which is the borrower IOUs in accordance with the requirements of their own pooling and servicing agreements. As a result, the notes may be put out of eligibility for the trust under New York law, which governs these securitizations. Potential cures for the note may, according to certain legal experts, be contrary to IRS rules governing REMICs. As a result, loan servicers and trusts simply lack standing to foreclose. The remedy has been foreclosure fraud, including the widespread fabrication of documents.
There are now trillions of dollars of securitizations of these loans in the hands of investors. The trusts holding these loans are in a legal gray area, as the mortgage titles were never officially transferred to the trusts. The result of this is foreclosure fraud on a massive scale, including foreclosures on people without mortgages or who are on time with their payments.
The liability here for the major banks is potentially enormous, and can lead to a systemic risk. Fortunately, the Dodd-Frank financial reform legislation includes a resolution process for these banks. More importantly, these foreclosures are devastating neighborhoods, families, and cities all over the country. Each foreclosure costs tens of thousands of dollars to a municipality, lowers property values, and makes bank failures more likely.
I appreciate your willingness to assess possible systemic risks to the country, and would again encourage you to suspend foreclosures until this problem is understood and its ramifications dealt with.
THIS IS A GREAT LETTER FROM THE SENIOR COUNSEL AT THE OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY REGARDING FEDERAL PREEMPTION BY THE TRUSTEE OF A MORTGAGE BACKED SECURITY TRUST. THEY ARE NOT PREEMPTIVE BASED ON THE OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY AS THEY ARE NOT IN THE FUNCTION OF A LENDER. THIS IS EXCELLENT.

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