Source: https://h2o.law.harvard.edu/cases/980
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 02:09:15+00:00

Document:
Susan M. W. NORWICK et al.
(a) As a general principle some state functions are so bound up with the operation of the State as a governmental entity as to permit exclusion from those functions of all persons who have not become part of the process of self-government. Accordingly, a State is required to justify its exclusion of aliens from such governmental positions only "by a showing of some rational relationship between the interest sought to be protected and the limiting classification." Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 296, 98 S.Ct. 1067, 55 L.Ed.2d 287. Pp. 73-74.
(c) Taking into consideration the role of public education and the degree of responsibility and discretion teachers possess in fulfilling that role, it is clear that public school teachers come well within the "governmental function" principle recognized in Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 93 S.Ct. 2842, 37 L.Ed.2d 853, and Foley v. Connelie, supra, and, accordingly, the Constitution requires only that a citizenship requirement applicable to teaching in the public school bear a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest. Pp. 75-80.
Judith A. Gordon, Asst. Atty. Gen. of New York, New York City, for Ambach, et al.
Bruce J. Ennis, Jr., New York City, for Norwick et al.
manifested an intention to apply for citizenship. The Commissioner of Education is authorized to create exemptions from this prohibition, and has done so with respect to aliens who are not yet eligible for citizenship. Unless a teacher obtains certification, he may not work in a public elementary or secondary school in New York.
alien's relationship to this country, and the alien's willingness to substitute some other sign of loyalty to this Nation's political values, such as an oath of allegiance. Id., at 921. We noted probable jurisdiction over the state school officials' appeal, 436 U.S. 902, 98 S.Ct. 2229, 56 L.Ed.2d 340 (1978), and now reverse.
or maintaining an inherently dangerous enterprise, Ohio ex rel. Clarke v. Deckebach, 274 U.S. 392, 47 S.Ct. 630, 71 L.Ed. 1115 (1927), States permissibly could exclude aliens from working on public construction projects, Crane v. New York, 239 U.S. 195, 36 S.Ct. 85, 60 L.Ed. 218 (1915), and, it appears, from engaging in any form of public employment at all, see Truax, supra, 239 U.S., at 40, 36 S.Ct., at 10.
Over time, the Court's decisions gradually have restricted the activities from which States are free to exclude aliens. The first sign that the Court would question the constitutionality of discrimination against aliens even in areas affected with a "public interest" appeared in Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 68 S.Ct. 269, 92 L.Ed. 249 (1948). The Court there held that statutory presumptions designed to discourage evasion of California's ban on alien landholding discriminated against the citizen children of aliens. The same Term, the Court held that the "ownership" a State exercises over fish found in its territorial waters "is inadequate to justify California in excluding any or all aliens who are lawful residents of the State from making a living by fishing in the ocean off its shores while permitting all others to do so." Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 421, 68 S.Ct. 1138, 1144, 92 L.Ed. 1478 (1948). This process of withdrawal from the former doctrine culminated in Graham v. Richardson, supra, which for the first time treated classifications based on alienage as "inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny." 403 U.S., at 372, 91 S.Ct., at 1852. Applying Graham, this Court has held invalid statutes that prevented aliens from entering a State's classified civil service, Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 93 S.Ct. 2842, 37 L.Ed.2d 853 (1973), practicing law, In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 93 S.Ct. 2851, 37 L.Ed.2d 910 (1973), working as an engineer, Examining Board v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 96 S.Ct. 2264, 49 L.Ed.2d 65 (1976), and receiving state educational benefits, Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 97 S.Ct. 2120, 53 L.Ed.2d 63 (1977).
"Such power inheres in the State by virtue of its obligation, already noted above, 'to preserve the basic conception of a political community.' . . . And this power and responsibility of the State applies, not only to the qualifications of voters, but also to persons holding state elective or important nonelective executive, legislative, and judicial positions, for officers who participate directly in the formulation, execution, or review of broad public policy perform functions that go to the heart of representative government." 413 U.S., at 647, 93 S.Ct., at 2850 (citation omitted).
The exclusion of aliens from such governmental positions would not invite as demanding scrutiny from this Court. Id., at 648, 93 S.Ct., at 2842. See also Nyquist v. Mauclet, supra, 432 U.S. at 11, 97 S.Ct. 2120; Perkins v. Smith, 370 F.Supp. 134 (D.C.Md.1974), summarily aff'd, 426 U.S. 913, 96 S.Ct. 2616, 49 L.Ed.2d 368 (1976).
Applying the rational-basis standard, we held last Term that New York could exclude aliens from the ranks of its police force. Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 98 S.Ct. 1067, 55 L.Ed.2d 287 (1978). Because the police function fulfilled "a most fundamental obligation of government to its constituency" and by necessity cloaked policemen with substantial discretionary powers, we view the police force as being one of those appropriately defined classes of positions for which a citizenship requirement could be imposed. Id., at 297, 98 S.Ct., at 1071. Accordingly, the State was required to justify its classification only "by a showing of some rational relationship between the interest sought to be protected and the limiting classification." Id., at 296, 98 S.Ct., at 1070.
The rule for governmental functions, which is an exception to the general standard applicable to classifications based on alienage, rests on important principles inherent in the Constitution. The distinction between citizens and aliens, though ordinarily irrelevant to private activity, is fundamental to the definition and government of a State. The Constitution itself refers to the distinction no less than 11 times, see Sugarman v. Dougall, supra, 413 U.S. at 651-652, 93 S.Ct. at 2862 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting), indicating that the status of citizenship was meant to have significance in the structure of our government. The assumption of that status, whether by birth or naturalization, denotes an association with the polity which, in a democratic republic, exercises the powers of governance. See Foley v. Connelie, supra, 435 U.S., at 295, 98 S.Ct., at 1070. The form of this association is important: an oath of allegiance or similar ceremony cannot substitute for the unequivocal legal bond citizenship represents. It is because of this special significance of citizenship that governmental entities, when exercising the functions of government, have wider latitude in limiting the participation of noncitizens.
go[es] to the heart of representative government." Sugarman v. Dougall, supra, 413 U.S., at 647, 93 S.Ct., at 2850.
both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our democratic society. It is required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment." Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493, 74 S.Ct. 686, 691, 98 L.Ed. 873 (1954).
son & K. Prewitt, Political So cialization 146-167 (1969); R. Hess & J. Torney, The Development of Political Attitudes in Children 114, 158-171, 217-220 (1967); V. Key, Public Opinion and American Democracy 323-343 (1961).
perceptions and values. Thus, through both the presentation of course materials and the example he sets, a teacher has an opportunity to influence the attitudes of students toward government, the political process, and a citizen's social responsibilities. This influence is crucial to the continued good health of a democracy.
help fulfill the broader function of the public school system. Teachers, regardless of their specialty, may be called upon to teach other subjects, including those expressly dedicated to political and social subjects. More importantly, a State properly may regard all teachers as having an obligation to promote civic virtues and understanding in their classes, regardless of the subject taught. Certainly a State also may take account of a teacher's function as an example for students, which exists independently of particular classroom subjects. In light of the foregoing considerations, we think it clear that public school teachers come well within the "governmental function" principle recognized in Sugarman and Foley. Accordingly, the Constitution requires only that a citizenship requirement applicable to teaching in the public schools bear a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest. See Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314, 96 S.Ct. 2562, 2567, 49 L.Ed.2d 520 (1976).
of primary duty and loyalty. They have rejected the open invitation extended to qualify for eligibility to teach by applying for citizenship in this country. The people of New York, acting through their elected representatives, have made a judgment that citizenship should be a qualification for teaching the young of the State in the public schools, and § 3001(3) furthers that judgment.
requirement of citizenship upon a person before that person may earn his living in a specified occupation. These New York statutes, for the most part, have their origin in the frantic and overreactive days of the First World War when attitudes of parochialism and fear of the foreigner were the order of the day. This time we are concerned with the right to teach in the public schools of the State, at the elementary and secondary levels, and with the citizenship requirement that N.Y.Educ.Law § 3001(3) (McKinney 1970), quoted by the Court, ante, at 70 n. 1, imposes.
a relevant qualification for fulfilling " 'important nonelective executive, legislative, and judicial positions' held by 'officers who participate directly in the formulation, execution, or review of broad public policy.' " Id., at 296, 98 S.Ct., at 1070, quoting Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 647, 93 S.Ct. 2842, 2850, 37 L.Ed.2d 853 (1973). For such positions, a State need show only some rational relationship between the interest sought to be protected and the limiting classification. Police, it then was felt, were clothed with authority to exercise an almost infinite variety of discretionary powers that could seriously affect members of the public. 435 U.S., at 297, 98 S.Ct., at 1071. They thus fell within the category of important officers who participate directly in the execution of "broad public policy." The Court was persuaded that citizenship bore a rational relationship to the special demands of police positions, and that a State therefore could constitutionally confine that public responsibility to citizens of the United States. Id., at 300, 98 S.Ct., at 1073. The propriety of making citizenship a qualification for a narrowly defined class of positions was also recognized, in passing, in Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S., at 647, 93 S.Ct., at 2850, and in Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 11, 97 S.Ct. 2120, 2126, 53 L.Ed.2d 63 (1977).
and teacher); Examining Board v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 96 S.Ct. 2264, 49 L.Ed.2d 65 (1976) (the practice of civil engineering). See also Nyquist v. Mauclet, supra (New York statute barring certain resident aliens from state financial assistance for higher education).
Indeed, the Court has held more than once that state classifications based on alienage are "inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny." Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372, 91 S.Ct. 1848, 1852, 29 L.Ed.2d 534 (1971). See Examining Board v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S., at 601-602, 96 S.Ct., at 2280-2281; In re Griffiths, 413 U.S., at 721, 93 S.Ct., at 2854; Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S., at 642, 93 S.Ct., at 2847; Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S., at 7, 97 S.Ct., at 2124. And "[a]lienage classifications by a State that do not withstand this stringent examination cannot stand." Ibid.
over 12 years. Each is married to a United States citizen. Each currently meets all the requirements, other than citizenship, that New York has specified for certification as a public school teacher. Tr. of Oral Arg. 4. Each is willing, if required, to subscribe to an oath to support the Constitutions of the United States and of New York. Each lives in an American community, must obey its laws, and must pay all of the taxes citizens are obligated to pay. Appellees, however, have hesitated to give up their respective British and Finnish citizenships, just as lawyer Fre Le Poole Griffiths, the subject of In re Griffiths, supra, hesitated to renounce her Netherlands citizenship, although married to a citizen of the United States and a resident of Connecticut.
our society rests. After then observing that teachers play a critical part in all this, the Court holds that New York's citizenship requirement is constitutional because it bears a rational relationship to the State's interest in furthering these educational goals.
tempted rationalization of this fact, ante, at 81-82 n. 15, hardly extinguishes the influence school board members, including these otherwise "disqualified" resident aliens, possess in school administration, in the selection of faculty, and in the approval of textbooks and instructional materials.
Second, the New York statute is all-inclusive in its disqualifying provisions: "No person shall be employed or authorized to teach in the public schools of the state who is . . . [n]ot a citizen." It sweeps indiscriminately. It is "neither narrowly confined nor precise in its application," nor limited to the accomplishment of substantial state interests. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S., at 643, 93 S.Ct., at 2848. See Note, Aliens' Right to Teach: Political Socialization and the Public Schools, 85 Yale L.J. 90, 109-111 (1975).
accomplish the desired result. An artificial citizenship bar is not a rational way. It is, instead, a stultifying provision. The route to "diverse and conflicting elements" and their being "brought together on a broad but common ground," which the Court so emphasizes, ante, at 77, is hardly to be achieved by disregarding some of the diverse elements that are available, competent, and contributory to the richness of our society and of the education it could provide.
"Lawyers do indeed occupy professional positions of responsibility and influence that impose on them duties correlative with their vital right of access to the courts. Moreover, by virtue of their professional aptitudes and natural interests, lawyers have been leaders in government throughout the history of our country." 413 U.S., at 729, 93 S.Ct., at 2858.
District Court expressed it well and forcefully when it observed that New York's exclusion "seems repugnant to the very heritage the State is seeking to inculcate." Norwick v. Nyquist, 417 F.Supp. 913, 922 (SDNY 1976).
"3. Not a citizen. The provisions of this subdivision shall not apply, however, to an alien teacher now or hereafter employed, provided such teacher shall make due application to become a citizen and thereafter within the time prescribed by law shall become a citizen. The provisions of this subdivision shall not apply after July first, nineteen hundred sixty-seven, to an alien teacher employed pursuant to regulations adopted by the commissioner of education permitting such employment." N.Y.Educ.Law § 3001(3) (McKinney 1970).
"Citizenship. A teacher who is not a citizen of the United States or who has not declared intention of becoming a citizen may be issued a provisional certificate providing such teacher has the appropriate educational qualifications as defined in the regulations and (1) possesses skills or competencies not readily available among teachers holding citizenship, or (2) is unable to declare intention of becoming a citizen for valid statutory reasons." 8 N.Y.C.R.R. § 80.2(i) (1978).
 Certification by the Commissioner of Education is not required of teachers at state institutions of higher education and the citizenship restriction accordingly does not apply to them. Brief for Appellants 13 n. *.
 At the time of her application Norwick had not yet met the postgraduate educational requirements for a permanent certificate and accordingly applied only for a temporary certificate, which also is governed by § 3001(3). She since has obtained the necessary graduate degree for full certification. Dachinger previously had obtained a temporary certificate, which had lapsed at the time of her 1975 application. The record does not indicate whether Dachinger previously had declared an intent to obtain citizenship or had obtained the temporary certificate because of some applicable exception to the citizenship requirement.
 That the significance of citizenship has constitutional dimensions also has been recognized by several of our decisions. In Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 78 S.Ct. 590, 2 L.Ed.2d 630 (1958), a plurality of the Court held that the expatriation of an American citizen constituted cruel and unusual punishment for the crime of desertion in time of war. In Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 87 S.Ct. 1660, 18 L.Ed.2d 757 (1967), the Court held that the Constitution forbade Congress from depriving a person of his citizenship against his will for any reason.
"Lawyers do indeed occupy professional positions of responsibility and influence that impose on them duties correlative with their vital right of access to the courts. Moreover, by virtue of their professional aptitudes and natural interests, lawyers have been leaders in government throughout the history of our country. Yet, they are not officials of government by virtue of being lawyers." 413 U.S., at 729, 93 S.Ct., at 2858.
 As San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez recognized, there is no inconsistency between our recognition of the vital significance of public education and our holding that access to education is not guaranteed by the Constitution. 411 U.S., at 30-35, 93 S.Ct., at 1295-1297.
 Although the findings of scholars who have written on the subject are not conclusive, they generally reinforce the common-sense judgment, and the experience of most of us, that a teacher exerts considerable influence over the development of fundamental social attitudes in students, including those attitudes which in the broadest sense of the term may be viewed as political. See, e. g., R. Dawson & K. Prewitt, Political Socialization 158-167 (1969); R. Hess & J. Torney, The Development of Political Attitudes in Children 162-163, 217-218 (1967). Cf. Note, Aliens' Right to Teach: Political Socialization and the Public Schools, 85 Yale L.J. 90, 99-104 (1975).
 Appellees contend that restriction of an alien's freedom to teach in public schools is contrary to principles of diversity of thought and academic freedom embodied in the First Amendment. See also id., at 106-109. We think that the attempt to draw an analogy between choice of citizenship and political expression or freedom of association is wide of the mark, as the argument would bar any effort by the State to promote particular values and attitudes toward government. Section 3001(3) does not inhibit appellees from expressing freely their political or social views or from associating with whomever they please. Cf. Givhan v. Western Line Consol. School Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 415-416, 99 S.Ct. 693, 696-697, 58 L.Ed.2d 619 (1979); Mt. Healthy City School Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 97 S.Ct. 568, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977); Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968). Nor are appellees discouraged from joining with others to advance particular political ends. Cf. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 81 S.Ct. 247, 5 L.Ed.2d 231 (1960). The only asserted liberty of appellees withheld by the New York statute is the opportunity to teach in the State's schools so long as they elect not to become citizens of this country. This is not a liberty that is accorded constitutional protection.
 In New York, for example, all certified teachers, including those in the secondary schools, are required to be available for up to five hours of teaching a week in subjects outside their specialty. 8 N.Y.C.R.R. § 80.2(c) (1978).
 As our cases have emphasized resident aliens pay taxes, serve in the Armed Forces, and have made significant contributions to our country in private and public endeavors. See In re Griffiths, 413 U.S., at 722, 93 S.Ct., at 2855; Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S., at 645, 93 S.Ct., at 2849; Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376, 91 S.Ct. 1848, 1854, 29 L.Ed.2d 534 (1971). No doubt many of them, and we do not exclude appellees, would make excellent public school teachers. But the legislature, having in mind the importance of education to state and local governments, see Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493, 74 S.Ct. 686, 691, 98 L.Ed. 873 (1954), may determine eligibility for the key position in discharging that function on the assumption that generally persons who are citizens, or who have not declined the opportunity to seek United States citizenship, are better qualified than are those who have elected to remain aliens. We note in this connection that regulations promulgated pursuant to § 3001(3) do provide for situations where a particular alien's special qualifications as a teacher outweigh the policy primarily served by the statute. See 8 N.Y.C.R.R. § 80.2(i)(1) (1978). The appellants inform us, however, that the authority conferred by this regulation has not been exercised. Brief for Appellants 7 n. *.
 Appellees argue that the State cannot rationally exclude aliens from teaching positions and yet permit them to vote for and sit on certain local school boards. We note, first, that the State's legislature has not expressly endorsed this policy. Rather, appellants as an administrative matter have interpreted the statute governing New York City's unique community school boards, N.Y.Educ.Law § 2590-c(4) (McKinney Supp.1978-1979), to permit aliens who are the parents of public school students to participate in these boards. See App. 27, 29. We also may assume, without having to decide, that there is a rational basis for a distinction between teachers and board members based on their respective responsibilities. Although possessing substantial responsibility for the administration of the schools, board members teach no classes, and rarely if ever are known or identified by the students.
 One of the appellees in Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 97 S.Ct. 2120, 53 L.Ed.2d 63 (1977), submitted a list of the New York statutes that required citizenship, or a declaration of intent to become a citizen, for no fewer than 37 occupations. Brief for Appellee Mauclet, O.T.1976, No. 76-208, pp. 19-22, nn. 8-44, inclusive. Some of those statutes have been legislatively repealed or modified, or judicially invalidated. Others are still in effect. Among the latter are those relating to the occupations of inspector, certified shorthand reporter, funeral director, masseur, physical therapist, and animal technician.
 "To be sure, the course of decisions protecting the employment rights of resident aliens has not been an unswerving one." In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 720, 93 S.Ct. 2851, 2854, 37 L.Ed.2d 910 (1973).
 See In re Griffiths, 413 U.S., at 726 n. 18, 93 S.Ct., at 2857 n. 18.
 One, of course, can agree with this observation. One may concede, also, that public schools are an " 'assimilative force' by which diverse and conflicting elements in our society are brought together on a broad but common ground," ante, at 77, and that the inculcation of fundamental values by our public schools is necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system.
"Connecticut has wide freedom to gauge on a case-by-case basis the fitness of an applicant to practice law. Connecticut can, and does, require appropriate training and familiarity with Connecticut law. Apart from such tests of competence, it requires a new lawyer to take both an 'attorney's oath' to perform his functions faithfully and honestly and a 'commissioner's oath' to 'support the constitution of the United States, and the constitution of the state of Connecticut.' Appellant has indicated her willingness and ability to subscribe to the substance of both oaths, and Connecticut may quite properly conduct a character investigation to insure in any given case 'that an applicant is not one who "swears to an oath pro forma while declaring or manifesting his disagreement with or indifference to the oath." Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116, 132, 87 S.Ct. 339, 347, 17 L.Ed.2d 235.' Law Students Research Council v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. , at 164, 91 S.Ct. 720, at 727, 27 L.Ed.2d 749. Moreover, once admitted to the bar, lawyers are subject to continuing scrutiny by the organized bar and the courts. In addition to discipline for unprofessional conduct, the range of post-admission sanctions extends from judgments for contempt to criminal prosecutions and disbarment. In sum, the Committee simply has not established that it must exclude all aliens from the practice of law in order to vindicate its undoubted interest in high professional standards." 413 U.S., at 725-727, 93 S.Ct., at 2857 (footnotes omitted).
 See also Stockton v. Ford, 11 How. 232, 247, 13 L.Ed. 676 (1851); Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 514-515, 67 S.Ct. 385, 395, 91 L.Ed. 451 (1947) (concurring opinion); Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 247, 77 S.Ct. 752, 760, 1 L.Ed.2d 796 (1957) (concurring opinion); In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622, 668, 79 S.Ct. 1376, 1399, 3 L.Ed.2d 1473 (1959) (dissenting opinion); J. Story, Miscellaneous Writings, Value and Importance of Legal Studies 503-549 (W. Story ed. 1972); Stone, The Public Influence of the Bar, 48 Harv.L.Rev. 1 (1934); W. Brennan, The Responsibilities of the Legal Profession, Address before the Law School of Harvard University (1967); A. de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 321-331 (Schocken ed. 1961); J. Rogers, The Lawyer in American Public Life, in Morrison Foundation Lectures 41, 61 (1940).
"Yet, they are not officials of government by virtue of being lawyers. Nor does the status of holding a license to practice law place one so close to the core of the political process as to make him a formulator of government policy." 413 U.S., at 729, 93 S.Ct., at 2858.

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