Source: https://www.serverlinks.com/ny-decisions-of-interest/fl-service-met-due-diligence-obtaining-jurisdiction-based-on-dmv-address-in-ny/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 12:25:12+00:00

Document:
Ghee v. Washington Mutual Bank F.A.
In this action for alleged personal injuries sustained by plaintiff as a result of sexual harassment, employment discrimination, and assault, defendant Rodriguez moves for an order pursuant to CPLR Rule 3211 (a) (8) dismissing the complaint against her for failure of the plaintiff to have jurisdiction over her person. According to the complaint [exhibit A of motion], plaintiff started working at a Manhattan branch of Washington Mutual Bank in April 2004. Defendant Rodriguez was plaintiff’s supervisor. The summons and complaint, both dated January 24, 2005, were filed with the Kings County Clerk on January 26, 2005, and affidavits of service were filed on February 16 and 24, 2005.
In her March 10, 2005-affidavit, Sylvia Patterson, mother of defendant Rodriguez [exhibit C of motion], states that she resides at 301 Van Siclen Avenue, Brooklyn, New York 11207, and that on January 24, 2005 (same dates as the summons and complaint) her daughter permanently moved to Florida. Further, on February 4, 2005, a process server visited her home and left her with papers for her daughter, despite her daughter moving to Florida eleven days earlier.
Attached as an exhibit to plaintiff’s affirmation in opposition is a New York State Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) March 31, 2005-record showing that defendant Rodriguez still resides at 301 Van Siclen Avenue, 66 days after she claimed to have moved to Florida.
Another exhibit attached to plaintiff’s affirmation in opposition is an April 12, 2005-affidavit of service by Carlos Aguirre, a Miami-Dade County process server. Mr. Aguirre states that he served the summons and complaint in the instant action by affixing one copy to the door of defendant Rodriguez’s apartment at 1250 Northeast 125th Street, North Miami, FL 33161 at 7:21 A.M. on April 9, 2005, a Saturday. He then completed service by mailing a copy of the summons and complaint to Ms. Rodriguez via first-class United State mail in an envelope marked “PERSONAL & CONFIDENTIAL,” without indicating on the envelope that it was a legal action. Mr. Aguirre states that this was the third attempt at personal service, with earlier attempts on April 7, 2005, a Thursday, at 1:10 P.M., and April 8, 2005, a Friday, at 9:05 P.M.
Defendant Rodriguez’s motion to dismiss for failure to have jurisdiction over her person must be denied for a variety of reasons. Her alleged “affidavit” challenging service in New York is inadmissible and a nullity. Next, her failure to notify DMV of her move to Florida within ten days of her move precludes any challenge to service at her Brooklyn address. Last, even if her affidavit is valid and she can challenge service at 301 Van Siclen Avenue, Brooklyn, the Florida service met the “due diligence” requirements of CPLR §308 (4).
CPLR §2308 (a) states that “an oath or affirmation may be administered by any person authorized to take acknowledgments of deeds by the real property law.” Notaries Public fall under this statute. Defendant Rodriguez’s affidavit fails to have the required information, pursuant to Executive Law §137, as to the authority of the alleged notary public who signed the jurat. Therefore, the affidavit is not admissible.
A party who fails to comply with this provision [VTL §505 (5)] is estopped from challenging the propriety of service which is made to the former address (see, Sherrill v. Pettiford, 172 AD 512 [2d Dept 1991]; Lavery v. Lopez, 131 AD2d 820 [2d Dept 1987]). Here, the record indicates that the appellant failed to change his address as required by the Vehicle and Traffic Law and he is, therefore, estopped from contesting the validity of service to his former address (see, Melton v. Brotman Foot Care Group, 198 AD2d 481 [2d Dept 1993]).
In defendant’s memorandum of law in further support of her motion to dismiss, defendant argues that Burke applies only to motor vehicle accidents. Nothing could be further than the truth. Burke was a personal injury action in which defendant allegedly threw a chair which struck plaintiff. The Appellate Division, Second Department, has consistently estopped defendants who have failed to comply with VTL §505 (5) from challenging service made at their alleged former address. See Anello v. Barry, 149 AD2d 640 (1989); McCleaver v. VanFossen, 276 AD2d 603 (2000); O’Garro v. Brown, 288 AD2d 279 (2001); Choudhry v. Edwards, 300 AD2d 529 (2002); Kandov v. Gondal, 11 AD3d 516 (2004); Labozzetta v. Fabbro, 22 AD3d 644 (2005).
[n]otice and an opportunity to be heard are, of course, high among the traditional elements of fair procedure included in the concept of due process . . . CPLR 308, for example, provides for a hierarchy of alternative means of service, in which the primary place is given to the delivery of process to the defendant in person. Due process is not, however, a mechanical formula or a rigid set of rules. Increasingly in modern jurisprudence, the term has come to represent a realistic and reasonable evaluation of the respective interests of plaintiffs, defendants and the state under the circumstances of the particular case.
Thus, the substituted service on defendant Rodriguez, in Florida, on April 9, 2005, complied with the statutory requirements of CPLR §308 (4) for “due diligence.” The plaintiff properly served defendant Rodriguez within 120 days of the filing of the summons and complaint, pursuant to CPLR §306 (b). Therefore, in the instant action, the Court has personal jurisdiction of defendant Rodriguez.
ORDERED, that the motion of defendant Rodriguez for an order, pursuant to CPLR Rule 3211 (a) (8), dismissing the complaint against her for failure of the plaintiff to have jurisdiction over her person, is denied.

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