Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&amp;view=article&amp;id=33871:g-r-no-106813-november-25,-1993-ubay-arrastre-v-crescenciano-b-trajano,-et-al&amp;catid=1308&amp;Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 02:59:55+00:00

Document:
UBAY ARRASTRE AND STEVEDORING SERVICES, INC., JESS ALIGADO and ALEXANDER GAVIOLA, Petitioners, v. HON. CRESCENCIANO B. TRAJANO, Undersecretary of Labor and Employment; HON. BARTOLOME C. AMOGUIS, Regional Director, Regional Office VII, Department of Labor and Employment; ROBERTO A. PALERMO, ET AL., * respondents.
Gaviola Law Offices for Petitioner.
Public Attorney’s Office for Private Respondents.
The question raised in this petition is whether Republic Act No. 6715, which took effect on 21 March 1989, applies to cases for illegal dismissal and money claims which were brought before the Office of the Regional Director of the then Ministry of Labor and Employment in 1980.
"A careful consideration of the above-quoted three (3) provisions of the Labor Code leads the Court to reiterate its ruling that the exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide employees’ claims arising from employer-employee relations, exceeding the aggregate amount of P5,000.00 for each employee, is vested in the Labor Arbiter (Article 217(a)(6). This exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter is confirmed by the provisions of Article 129 which excludes from the jurisdiction of the Regional Director or any hearing officer of the Department of Labor the power to hear and decide claims of employees arising from employer-employee relations exceeding the amount of P5,000.00 for each employee.
Considering that, as hereafter shown, the individual claims of the private respondents far exceed P5,000.00, we find no cogent reason why R.A. No. 6715 should not apply to the complaints of the private respondents. We are not unaware of the exceptions to the doctrine that curative statutes are to be given retroactive effect, viz.: the curative statutes must not violate the Constitution; nor must they impair vested rights or the obligations of contracts. 13 Nevertheless, none of the exceptions has been shown to apply in this case.
Let us now unfold the factual and procedural antecedents of this case.
The specific monetary awards to the 25 complainants represent emergency cost of living allowance, 13th month pay bonus, service incentive leave pay, and legal holiday pay.
On 15 February 1991, the petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration 20 based on questions of law, alleged errors in the findings of fact, and lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Regional Director over the claims.
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration of the above order and supplemental motion for reconsideration were denied by Undersecretary Trajano in the Orders of 19 June 1992 and 18 August 1992, respectively. 25 The later order was made final.
In their Comment, the private respondents allege that when the complaints were filed in 1980, R.A. No. 6715 was not in force yet and the Regional Director still had jurisdiction over the complaints. Having acquired jurisdiction over their claims at the inception, such jurisdiction continues until the entire controversy is finally decided. 31 While they concede that R.A. No. 6715 can be considered a curative statute, it cannot be given retroactive effect in the instant case for there is nothing irregular or erroneous in the assumption by the Regional Director of jurisdiction over these cases. Furthermore, at the time R.A. No. 6715 was enacted, the complaints were no longer pending with the Office of the Regional Director but were pending appeal before the Office of the Secretary of the DOLE.
For their part, the public respondents allege in their Comment that although R.A. No. 6715 can be given retroactive effect because it is a curative statute, the principle cannot apply when vested rights would be impaired. 32 They contend that the 18 May 1990 Order of the Undersecretary had become final and executory because of the failure of the petitioners to file a timely motion for reconsideration; however, they make no reference to any date when the said order had supposedly become final. They further allege that the complaints were filed in 1980 and decided in 1982 when the Regional Director still had jurisdiction over the cases, which decision was affirmed by authority of the Secretary only after eight years, or on 18 May 1990, for reasons not attributable to the complainants.
On 3 February 1993, we gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda.
5.	All other claims arising from employer-employee relations, unless expressly excluded by this Code.
We reiterate then that no cogent reason exists why R.A. No. 6715 and the cases of Briad and Servando’s should not apply to the instant petition. Petitioners cannot be said to have been estopped to question the jurisdiction of the Regional Director. They did not seek affirmative relief before the Regional Director or submit their evidence before him. They also raised the issue of jurisdiction before the DOLE in their motion to reconsider the 18 May 1990 Order.
WHEREFORE, being impressed with sufficient merit, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED and the challenged Orders of (1) 22 November 1982 of the Regional Director, Region VII, Cebu City, of the Department of Labor and Employment in BO Cases Nos. 80-237 to 80-242, BO 80-243 to 80-251, and an unnumbered case; (2) 18 May 1990 of Undersecretary Dionisio C. de la Serna; and (3) 7 February 1992, 19 June 1992, and 18 August 1992 of Undersecretary Crescenciano B. Trajano in the said cases, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The said cases are REFERRED to the appropriate Labor Arbiter for proper disposition. The pendency of these cases with the Office of the Regional Director (Region VII) and with the Office of the Secretary, both of the Department of Labor and Employment, and with this Court shall be deemed to have tolled the running of the prescriptive period.
Cruz, Bellosillo and Quiason, JJ., concur.
*	Aside from Roberto A. Palermo, there are 24 other complainants before the Office of the Regional Director, Region VII, DOLE, who are enumerated in the latter’s Order of 22 November 1982 but are not specifically mentioned in the caption of the Petition in this case.
1.	179 SCRA 269 .
2.	174 SCRA 524 .
3.	Citing Garcia v. Martinez, 90 SCRA 331 ; Calderon v. Court of Appeals, 100 SCRA 459 ; Pepsi Cola Bottling Co. v. Martinez, 112 SCRA 578 ; Ebon v. de Guzman, 113 SCRA 52 ; Agusan del Norte Electric Coop., Inc. v. Suarez, 125 SCRA 436 .
4.	181 SCRA 675 [30 January 1990].
5.	182 SCRA 5 [7 February 1990].
6.	184 SCRA 551 [25 April 1990] and 199 SCRA 568 [25 July 1991] re denial of motion for reconsideration.
7.	184 SCRA 664 [26 April 1990].
8.	187 SCRA 358 [12 July 1990].
9.	198 SCRA 156 .
10.	208 SCRA 25 [10 April 1992].
11.	214 SCRA 578 [15 October 1992].
12.	215 SCRA 10 [21 October 1992].
13.	Briad Agro Development Corp. v. De la Cerna, 174 SCRA 524, 532 .
14.	They were the Manager and President, respectively, of UBASCOR.
15.	Annex "E" of Petition; Rollo, 48-54.
18.	Order of 18 May 1990 of DOLE Undersecretary de la Serna, 3; Id., 21.
19.	Annex "A" of Petition; Id., 18-21.
20.	Annex "A-1" of Petition; Rollo, 22-36.
21.	174 SCRA 524 .
22.	Annex "B" of Petition; Rollo, 37-44.
25.	Annexes "C" and "D" of Petition; Rollo, 46-47.
26.	Annex "G" of Petition; Id., 58-59.
29.	Supra., and the amendatory resolution issued in the same case on 9 November 1989, 179 SCRA 269 .
31.	Odin Security Agency v. De la Serna, 182 SCRA 472 .
32.	SSK Parts Corp. v. Camas, supra., citing Development Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 96 SCRA 342 ; Santos v. Duata, 14 SCRA 1041 ; and Briad Agro Development Corp. v. De la Serna, 174 SCRA 524 .
34.	Promulgated on 1 May 1980.
35.	146 SCRA 50 .
36.	174 SCRA 524 .

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