Source: http://lawprofessor.org/publications/articles.html&articlename=birth
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 10:43:29+00:00

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This catenate analyzes the damaged recoverable in wrongful birth actions. The focus is on the two types of damages sought in Berman. First, the alleged damages to raise and to education Sharon are examined to show that a denial of these damages was improper. Second, the allowance of damages for emotional and mental distress are analyzed as a proper award. Finally, the potential consequences of awarding damages against negligent doctors are evaluated to show that any hardship on the doctors does not outweigh the liberalization of damages in wrongful birth actions.
The benefits rule has been improperly applied in wrongful birth cases. A benefit conferred on the plaintiff by the defendant's negligent conduct should only offset the defendant's liability if there is a direct and recognizable benefit to the interest to be protected.(52) In Berman, the constitutional right to choose an abortion without interference was the right that was violated. The joys of raising Sharon do not have any relationship to, nor do they mitigate, the denial of the Bermans' constitutional right. The minimization of damages in Berman by weighing the joys and benefits of parenting against the concrete costs of rearing a child directly conflicts with the underlying basis of tort law which is to compensate the victim for damages he or she has suffered.(53) If the benefits of having a child are allowed to be offset against the parents' monetary damages, then the parents are left with an economic and social burden they did not want; and the doctor whose negligence caused the parents' burden is left in a position of having to pay only a portion of the damages his negligence caused. In some cases, the benefits may be found to equal or to exceed the monetary damages with the result that the doctor incurs no liability. Such a method of determining damages does not compensate the parents for their injuries.
A determination of the reasonable costs to raise Sharon can be based on an estimation of the costs of shelter, food, and clothing required to bring up a child. Costs for a minor child to attend private school(54) and future expenses for college may also be recoverable in appropriate cases.(55)Determinations of the costs to raise a child are routinely performed in child support cases, and the same procedure could be utilized in wrongful birth cases. In Rivera v. State,(56) which involved the birth of an unwanted child due to a negligently performed sterilization, the court determined that the economic costs to raise a child were routinely ascertainable. The court said: "Such calculations are made by estate planners, insurance companies, and sometimes by private parties as incident to support proceedings or matrimonial settlements."(57) Rather than following rigid or mathematical formulations to establish costs, the common practice in child support cases is to allow the trial judge discretion to determine the value of these costs in accordance with the economic level to which the family is accustomed.(58) This general practice is followed in child support cases in New Jersey where the trial judge is given the discretion to determine what is reasonable and just support on a case by case basis.(59) This same routine practice could be utilized at the trial level in wrongful birth cases.
Berman found the emotional and mental distress suffered by the Bermans as a result of giving birth to a mongoloid child to be concrete damages that were compensable.(61) In making this determination, the court never discussed, nor did it require, an accompanying physical injury.
The Ohio Supreme Court has held that wrongful birth actions should not be singled out for a limitation of recovery.(71) The court said the right to obtain an abortion has become a constitutionally guaranteed right; therefore, any attempt to limit damages would be an infringement of this right.(72) This court, along with others,(73) has held that damages in a negligence action should not be limited simply because the suit concerns the birth of a child.
The consequences of increased liability may directly affect the expense and availability of certain medical services provided by doctors. Doctors could refuse to perform amniocentesis or to give prenatal advice. Rather than abandon this medical service, however, the medical profession may be willing to pay increased malpractice premiums and then to pass its increased costs to the general public. If this occurred, the Berman court's concern for overburdening the doctor(75)would not be valid since the public at large would, in effect, absorb the liability. Although it might seem unfair for the general public to subsidize medical negligence by an increase in medical bills, it is more unjustifiable to saddle the innocent victims of the negligence with the substantial costs. Such potential consequences are still not adequate reasons to restrict recovery when a woman's constitutional right to obtain an abortion has been infringed.
The Berman decision brings New Jersey up-to-date by its recognizing wrongful birth as a valid cause of action in tort. The decision followed the pattern of other jurisdictions limiting recoverable damages. Berman limited recovery by not recognizing monetary damages for rearing a mongoloid child. Other jurisdictions have limited damages by stating that the joys and benefits of parenthood partially offset or, in some cases, outweigh any recovery.
The recognition by the United States Supreme Court of a woman's constitutional right to an abortion clearly represents a shift in public policy from prior opposition to abortion. Consequently, courts should not readily reduce compensatory damages in wrongful birth actions simply because the birth of a child is involved. If a doctor negligently performs his job and damages result, he should be fully liable. Otherwise, a doctor may not have an adequate incentive to act in a non-negligent manner.
The limitation of damages in Berman is based on the benefits rule of tort law. The court balanced the joys of parenthood against the monetary costs of raising a mongoloid child. This application of the benefits rule is improper since the interest protected in this case, the right to choose an abortion, is not benefitted by the doctors' negligence. Therefore, the extra monetary costs associated with raising a mongoloid child should be recoverable. The costs of raising a child are routinely determined in child support cases, and a similar determination could be made in wrongful birth cases.
The allowance of mental and emotional distress damages in Berman was a proper award despite the failure to require an accompanying physical injury. Generally, a physical injury is required to validate the mental and emotional injury. In this case, the alleged mental and emotional injury is recognizable and compensable; and therefore, validation is not required.
Increased damages in wrongful birth actions could result in higher medical malpractice premiums which would be passed on to the general public. Although this would mean higher medical costs for everyone, this is preferable to burdening the innocent victims of the doctor's negligence with the substantial economic costs of raising an unwanted child.
Liberalized damages could potentially open the floodgates to wrongful birth litigation although this has not happened in the jurisdictions that have allowed these actions. Even if the floodgates were opened, that is not a valid reason to deny recovery in meritorious cases. Where a woman's constitutional right to obtain an abortion has been infringed by a doctor's negligence, there is a recognizable injury which should be deterred and remedied.
1. . Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979).
3. . Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 424, 404 A.2d 8, 10 (1979).
6. . Id. at 425, 404 A.2d at 10.
8. . Id. At 423, 404 A.2d at 10. The Bermans also brought a wrongful life action on behalf of Sharon which will not be discussed in this casenote. The tort of wrongful life is brought by the parents on behalf of the child to recover damages the child has suffered due to being born as opposed to not being born.
9. . 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979).
10. . Id. At 425, 404 A.2d at 10.
11. . Id. At 430-31, 404 A.2d at 13.
12. . Id. 431, 404 A.2d at 13.
13. Id. At 425, 404 A.2d at 11.
15. . Id. At 31, 227 A.2d at 693.
16. . 80 N.J. at 425, 404 A.2d at 11.
17. . Id. At 426, 404 A.2d. at 11.
18. . Id. At 432, 404 A.2d at 14.
19. . Id. At 434, 404 A.2d at 15.
20. . Id. At 432, 404 A.2d at 14.
21. . 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
22. . 80 N.J. at 431, 404 A.2d at 13.
23. . Id. At 433, 404 A.2d at 14.
24. . W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts § 54, at 328-29 (4th ed. 1971).
25. . See Lemaldi v. De Tomaso of America, Inc., 156 N.J. Super. 441, 383 A.2d 1220 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1978), wherein plaintiff purchased an expensive sports car that never worked properly. The repairs on the car amounted to $4,000. Plaintiff brought suit to recover the $4,000 plus associated mental anguish damages. The court said the mental anguish would be compensable provided an adequate showing of a resulting physical injury was made.
26. . 80 N.J. at 432, 404 A.2d at 14.
27. . 49 N.J. at 24, 227 A.2d at 690.
28. . Id. at 24, 227 A.2d at 690.
29. . Id. at 26, 227 A.2d at 691.
30. . Id. At 29-30, 227 A.2d at 693.
31. . Id. at 30-31, 227 A.2d at 693.
32. . Id. at 31, 227 A.2d at 693.
33. . 410 U.S. at 113.
34. . Id. at 155-56.
35. . 80 N.J. at 432, 404 A.2d at 14.
36. . See Gildner v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 451 F. Supp. 692 (E.D. Pa. 1978)(doctor performed amniocentesis and assured the parents that their child would not be born with Tay-Sachs disease, the child was born with the disease, and the court allowed damages for the medical expenses and the pain and suffering due to the birth of the child); Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978)(consolidation of two cases on appeal) In Becker the doctor failed to warn of the possibility that an abnormal child could be born. Id. at 406, 386 N.E.2d at 808, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 896-97. He also failed to tell the parents of the existence of amniocentesis. Id. at 406, 386 N.E.2d at 808, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 897. As a result, a retarded was born and the parents sought recovery due to the doctor's negligence. Id. at 406, 386 N.E.2d 809, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 897. In Park v. Chessin (the case consolidated with Becker) the doctor negligently advised the parents to have a child despite the chance of birth defect. Id. at 407, 386 N.E.2d at 809, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 897. In both cases the court permitted a cause of action for recovery of the costs of caring for the child. Id. at 415, 386 N.E.2d at 814, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 902-03; Karlson v. Guerinot, 57 App. Div. 2d 73, 394 N.Y.S.2d 933 (N.Y. 1977) (doctor was negligent in not telling the parents of the possibility that their child could be deformed or that amniocentesis could be used, a deformed child was born, a cause of action was allowed to recover for the parents' pain, suffering, and mental anguish subject to an offset for benefits from raising the child); Ziemba v. Sterberg, 45 App. Div. 2d 230, 357 N.Y.S.2d 265 (N.Y. 1974) (doctor was negligent in not telling the mother she was pregnant before she could have an abortion, and consequently a healthy baby was born; the court established a cause of action if the doctor's negligence is established as the proximate cause of the birth, the mother can recover costs of raising the child, the costs of the birth, pain and suffering, and loss of consortium); Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. Sup. Ct. 1975) (doctor failed to diagnose the mother's condition as rubella, and therefore, failed to warn that her disease could cause birth defects, the child was born with birth defects, the court established a cause of action if the mother would have obtained an abortion, and recovery could be had for the amount necessary to treat and care for the physical impairment of the child); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975) (doctor, unaware of the pregnancy, filed to diagnose the mother's condition as rubella, the court permitted a cause of action if the parents could prove the doctor was negligent, they would have aborted the pregnancy and limited damages to the cost difference between raising a normal child and their child who was born with birth defects). But see Howard v. Lecher, 42 N.Y.2d 109, 366 N.E.2d 64, 397 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1977) (doctor did not take a proper genealogical history and did not inform the parents of the possibility that the child could be born with Tay-Sachs disease or of the availability of tests to detect the disease in the fetus, the child died from Tay-Sachs and the parents sued for negligence seeking damages only for their mental and emotional distress which the court held were not recoverable); Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis. 2d 514, 219 N.W.2d 242 (1974) (doctor failed to diagnose pregnancy in time for an abortion, a healthy child was born and the parents sought and were denied damages equal to the costs of raising the child).
37. See note 36 supra.
38. Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 40, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978) (care and treatment costs allowed); Howard v. Lecher, 42 N.Y.2d 109, 366 N.E.2d 109, 366 N.E.2d 64, 397 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1977) (no recovery allowed); Karlson v. Guerinot, 57 App. Div. 2d 73, 394 N.Y.S.2d 933 (N.Y. 1977) (pain and suffering and mental anguish compensable); Ziemba v. Sternberg, 45 App. Div. 2d 230, 357 N.Y.S.2d 265 (N.Y. 1974) (cost to raise healthy child and pain and suffering).
39. Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 40, 386 N.E.2d 807 (1978).
40. See Karlsons v. Guerinot, 57 App. Div. 2d 73, 394 N.Y.S.2d 933 (N.Y. 1977) (the only other case allowing recovery for mental distress).
42. See Coleman v. Garrison, 349 A.2d 8 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1975).
43. See Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Ca. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal Rptr. 463 (1967).
44. 260 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1977).
45. 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971).
46. 80 N.J. at 432, 404 A.2d at 14.
49. See Anonymous v. Hospital, 33 Conn. Supp. 112, 366 A.2d 204 (1976); Coleman v. Garrison, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 91967); Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 91971); Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1977).
50. 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967). See also Stills v. Gratton, 55 Cal. App. 3d 698, 127 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1976) (benefits rule criticized).
51. Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 324, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463, 477 (1967).
52. Id.; Maben v. Rankin, 55 Cal. 2d 139, 10 Cal. Rptr. 353, 358 P.2d 681 (1961).
53. W. Prosser, supra note 24, at §§ 2 & 7, at 7 & 28.
54. Smith v. Smith, 337 F. Supp. 475 (D.V.I. 1972) (a child support proceeding in which the husband was required to pay the expenses for a minor child to attend a private school).
55. Thaler v. Klein, 55 App. Div. 2d 606, 389 N.Y.S.2d 119 (N.Y. 1976) (a child support proceeding in which it was found proper for the husband to pay the full costs of college education for his two daughters).
56. See note 41 supra, 94 Misc. 2d 157, 404 N.Y.S.2d 950 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1978).
57. Id. at 161, 404 N.Y.S.2d at 953.
58. Phillips v. Phillips, 344 So. 2d, (Ala. Civ. App. 1977); Ducote v. Ducote, 339 So. 2d 835 (La. 1976); Mathews v. Mathews, 42 Ill. App. 3d 1049, 356 N.E.2d 1083 (1976).
59. Gordon v. Gordon, 147 N.J. Super. 585, 371 A.2d 791 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977).
60. Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 66 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975). In both Jacobs and Dumer the doctor's negligence denied the mother an opportunity to obtain an abortion and a child was born with berth defects. The courts found that public policy did not bar recovery of the extra costs to raise these children and to treat their handicaps.
61. 80 N.J. at 433, 404 A.2d at 14.
62. See W. Prosser, supra note 24, But see Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 441 P.2d 912 (1968) (the minority trend of allowing recovery of mental distress damages without a showing of an accompanying physical injury).
63. See W. Prosser, supra note 24, at 329-30.
65. 80 N.J. at 438-39, 404 A.2d at 17-18 (Handler, J., concurring).
66. Zahorian v. Russell Pitt Real Estate Agency, 62 N.J. 399, 309 A.2d 754 (1973) (single, young woman after being denied an apartment rental due to her age and marital status became extremely upset necessitating several visits to her doctor, the court allowed her damages for her emotional upset in a suit claiming violation of the woman's civil rights); Falzone v. Busch, 45 N.J. 559, 214 A.2d 12 (1965) (plaintiff sought damages resulting from fright when a car passed close to plaintiff and made her fearful of being hit, the court allowed recovery in this case for bodily injury or sickness proximately resulting from the fright); Muniz v. United Hosps. Medical Center Presbyterian Hosp., 153 N.J. Super. 79, 370 A.2d 76 (Super Ct. App. Div. 1977) (parents suffered emotional and mental distress as a consequence of the method used to tell the mother of the death of her baby and the failure to locate the baby or confirm its death for three weeks, although unclear, this case seems to follow these general rule that a physical injury must result from the emotional upset to allow recovery); Lemaldi v. DeTomaso of America, Inc. 156 N.J. Super. 441, 383 A.2d 1220 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1978). See also note 25 supra and accompanying test; W. Prosser, supra note 24, § 54, at 327-35. The general rule is that mental distress damages are not recoverable alone. A physical injury must accompany the mental distress so that it is clear that the mental distress claim is not fraudulent.
67. Betancourt v. Gaylor, 136 N.J. Super. 69, 344 A.2d 336 (N.J. Super. Law Div. 1975); Karlsons v. Guerinot, 57 App. Div. 2d 73, 394 N.Y.S.2d 933 (N.Y. 1977). See also text accompanying notes 36 & 41 supra.
68. Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis. 2d 513, 219 N.W.2d 242 (1974) (court held that if allowance of recovery would open the floodgates, public policy allowed a denial of recovery).
69. Currently, of all the jurisdictions that allow wrongful birth actions, New York has the most reported cases. To date only seven cases have been reported. Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978); Howard v. Lecher, 42 N.Y.2d 109, 366 N.E.2d 64, 397 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1977); Karlsons v. Guerinot, 57 App. Div. 2d 73, 394 N.Y.S.2d 933 (N.Y. 1977); Ziemba v. Sternberg, 45 App. Div. 2d 230, 357 N.Y.S.2d 265 (N.Y. 1974); Clegg v. Chase, 89 Misc. 2d 510, 391 N.Y.S.2d 966 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977); Rivera v. State, 94 Misc. 2d 157, 404 N.Y.S.2d 950 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1978).
70. Falzone v. Busch, 45 N.J. 559, 214 A.2d 12 (1965).
71. Bowman v. Davis, 48 Ohio St. 2d 41, 356 N.E.2d 496 (1976).
72. Id. at 46, 356 N.E.2d at 499.
73. Ziemba v. Sternberg, 45 App. Div. 2d 230, 357 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1974); Rivera v. State, 94 Misc. 2d 157, 404 N.Y.S.2d 950 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1978).
74. Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1963); 80 N.J. at 436-37, 404 A.2d at 16 (Handler, J., concurring).
75. Id. at 432, 404 A.2d at 14.

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