Source: https://cbaclelegalconnection.com/tag/second-amendment/
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 16:44:12+00:00

Document:
The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People v. Sandoval on Thursday, February 11, 2016.
Police executing a search warrant on Miguel Sandoval’s property after a shooting found a short shotgun in the shed in his backyard. Sandoval was convicted after a bench trial of possessing a dangerous weapon and appealed, arguing the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence of the gun in the trial court, contending the shed was outside the scope of the warrant, and in precluding him from asserting the affirmative defenses of the right to bear arms and self-defense. He also argued the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction.
The court of appeals first evaluated the scope of the search warrant at issue. The warrant authorized the police to enter and search “the person, premises, location and any appurtenances thereto” of Sandoval’s residence. Because the shed in question was in Sandoval’s backyard and very close to the residence, the court found that search of the shed was within the scope of the warrant. The court of appeals affirmed the district court’s denial of Sandoval’s suppression motion based on the search of the shed.
Next, the court evaluated the right to bear arms as enunciated in the Second Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article II, section 13 of the Colorado Constitution. The court noted that the Supreme Court declined to hold that the Second Amendment provided a constitutional right to possess dangerous weapons, and short shotguns were typically used solely by criminals. The court found that there was no constitutional right for Sandoval to possess the short shotgun and therefore it was not available as an affirmative defense.
Finally, the court evaluated Sandoval’s sufficiency claim and found the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction. Although Sandoval never identified the particular short shotgun at issue as his, he admitted there was a short shotgun at his residence, the short shotgun at issue was found at Sandoval’s residence in the shed in the backyard, a key to the shed was found at Sandoval’s residence, and a spent shotgun round that had been fired from the short shotgun at issue was found in Sandoval’s bedroom. The court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support Sandoval’s conviction.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Stonecipher v. Special Agents on Tuesday, July 1, 2014.
Anthony and Melissa Stonecipher were targets of an investigation into their purchases and sales of firearms and explosives. Mrs. Stonecipher had purchased 14 handguns over a period of 10 months, including 12 on a single day, and the federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms began investigating her. The ATF also learned that Mr. Stonecipher was attempting to sell firearms and explosives out of his home. Two special agents went undercover to the Stoneciphers’ home and purchased a firearm and two explosives from Mr. Stonecipher. The ATF determined that Mr. Stonecipher’s sale of the explosives violated 18 U.S.C. § 842(a)(1) because he did not have a federal firearms or explosives license and investigated further into his activity.
In the course of their investigation into Mr. Stonecipher’s activity, Officer Carlos Valles obtained a certified court document showing that Mr. Stonecipher had been convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence in 2007 in Missouri. Valles also obtained a report from the National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS) that indicated Mr. Stonecipher had been denied the right to purchase a handgun because of the conviction, and a report from the National Criminal Information Center (NCIC) noting Mr. Stonecipher’s domestic violence charge. Valles sought legal advice from Assistant U.S. Attorney Ron Jennings regarding whether Mr. Stonecipher was prohibited from possessing firearms due to his domestic violence conviction. After reviewing all the documents, Jennings advised Valles that Mr. Stonecipher was prohibited from possessing firearms. Valles prepared an application and supporting affidavit for a search warrant to search the Stoneciphers’ house. The warrant was signed by a magistrate judge, and the search was executed. Mr. Stonecipher was placed under arrest during the search, after which he repeatedly proclaimed that his First and Second Amendment rights were being violated. Mr. Stonecipher requested to retrieve some papers from his house, one of which was a letter from his Missouri criminal defense attorney that advised Stonecipher that his conviction would not count after he completed his probation. The agents continued their search, and the next day Valles informed Jennings of the letter produced by Mr. Stonecipher. Jennings advised Valles to proceed with the case. Valles prepared a criminal complaint, which Jennings approved, and Valles filed the complaint in federal district court. Five days later, the prosecuting U.S. Attorney moved to dismiss the case upon discovering that the domestic violence charge was not a qualifying conviction.
The Stoneciphers brought a civil rights action against Valles and five other ATF agents involved in the search. The defendants moved to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds, and the district court granted the motion, finding that the agents reasonably concluded on facts available that they had probable cause to search the house and arrest Mr. Stonecipher. The Stoneciphers contended that the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity because they lacked probable cause. The Stoneciphers also alleged that Valles’ warrant application was a reckless disregard of the truth, contending that he knew or should have known that the Missouri suspended sentence was not a conviction for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). The Tenth Circuit disagreed, noting that the documents on which Officer Valles relied were confusing and could be interpreted by an objectively reasonable officer as supportive of the warrant and complaint. The Tenth Circuit also examined the conduct of Officer Valles, particularly that he independently consulted AUSA Jennings, and determined that Officer Valles’ conduct was reasonable and supported dismissal on qualified immunity grounds.
The Stoneciphers also alleged that once they produced the letter from the Missouri criminal defense attorney, the officers should have stopped their search. However, the Tenth Circuit noted that the officers had no duty to credit the suspect’s explanation if they independently believed they still had reasonable probable cause to conduct the search. There was no way for the officers to verify the authenticity of the letter in the middle of the search, and Valles informed Jennings of the letter and its contents the next day. Upon evaluation of the Stoneciphers’ malicious prosecution claims, the Tenth Circuit similarly upheld the actions of Officer Valles, noting that nothing supported that his behavior was malicious. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal because the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity.
The Tenth Circuit published its opinion in Peterson v. Martinez on Friday, February 22, 2013.
Gray Peterson, a resident of Washington, applied for a concealed handgun license (“CHL”) from the ex officio sheriff of Denver, Colorado. Pursuant to state law, Colorado sheriffs may issue CHLs only to state residents. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-12-203(1)(a). Peterson’s application was accordingly denied, prompting Peterson to file suit against the Denver sheriff and Colorado’s executive director of the Department of Public Safety. Peterson claimed that Colorado’s policy with respect to non-resident CHL applicants violated the Second Amendment and the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV of the United States Constitution.
The district court concluded that the executive director of the Department of Public Safety was entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity because he had no connection to the enforcement of the challenged statute. The Tenth Circuit agreed with that conclusion. Colorado law requires “each sheriff to implement and administer” the CHL licensing scheme. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-12-201(3). Because sheriffs are responsible for administering the state’s CHL regime—not the executive director of the Department of Public Safety—Peterson’s claims against the latter do not fall within the Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity.
With respect to Peterson’s claims against the Denver sheriff, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the carrying of concealed firearms is not protected by the Second Amendment after applying intermediate scrutiny. The majority of the 19th-century courts to consider the question held that prohibitions on carrying concealed weapons were lawful under the Second Amendment or state analogues. In light of our nation’s extensive practice of restricting citizens’ freedom to carry firearms in a concealed manner, the Tenth Circuit held that this prohibition did not fall within the scope of the Second Amendment’s protections. In other words, the Second Amendment does not provide the right to carry a concealed firearm. Additionally, it is virtually impossible to evaluate a non-resident CHL applicant’s background thoroughly enough to determine that the applicant, if granted a CHL, will not be a danger to himself or the community.
The Tenth Circuit reached the same conclusion with respect to Peterson’s claim that the residency requirement violated his right to travel and violated his rights under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the U.S. Constitution. As the Supreme Court explained in Supreme Court of Virginia v. Friedman, 487 U.S. 59 (1988), “it is only with respect to those ‘privileges’ and ‘immunities’ bearing on the vitality of the Nation as a single entity that a State must accord residents and nonresidents equal treatment.” Id. at 64-65 . Because the concealed carrying of firearms has been prohibited for much of our history, the Tenth Circuit concluded that this activity failed the Friedman test. In sum, the Tenth Circuit held that carrying a concealed weapon is not a privilege or immunity protected under Article IV.

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