Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/100335/russell-vs-united-states
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 14:23:58+00:00

Document:
Held: the grand jury indictment required by 2 U.S.C. §194 as a prerequisite to a prosecution for a violation of § 192 must state the question which was under inquiry at the time of the defendant's alleged default or refusal to answer, as found by the grand jury, and the judgment affirming the conviction of each of the petitioners is reversed. Pp. 369 U. S. 751 -772.
(a) The Congress which originally enacted, in 1857, the law which was a predecessor of 2 U.S.C. §192 was expressly aware that pertinency to the subject under inquiry was the basic preliminary question which the federal courts would have to decide in determining whether a violation of the statute had been alleged or proved. Pp. 369 U. S. 756 -758.
(b) Many decisions of this Court arising under 2 U.S.C. § 192 have recognized the crucial importance of determining the issue of pertinency, and the obvious first step in determining whether the questions asked were pertinent to the subject under inquiry is to ascertain what that subject was. Pp. 369 U. S. 758 -760.
(c) While convictions are no longer reversed because of minor and technical deficiencies which did not prejudice the accused, the substantial safeguards to those charged with serious crimes cannot be eradicated under the guise of technical departures from the rules. Pp. 369 U. S. 760 -763.
(d) Omission from the indictments here involved of statements of the subject under inquiry deprived the defendants of one of the significant protections which the guaranty of a grand jury indictment was intended to confer -- i.e., they failed adequately to apprise the defendants of what they must be prepared to meet. Pp. 369 U. S. 763 -768.
(e) These indictments were also insufficient to serve the corollary purpose of enabling the courts to decide whether the facts alleged were sufficient in law to support convictions. Pp. 369 U. S. 768 -769.
(f) The deficiencies in these indictments could not have been cured by bills of particulars, because under 2 U.S.C. § 194, only a grand jury may determine whether a person should be held to answer in a criminal trial for refusing to give testimony pertinent to a question under congressional committee inquiry, and the grand jury itself must necessarily determine what the question under inquiry was. Pp. 369 U. S. 769 -771.
Each of the petitioners was convicted for refusing to answer certain questions when summoned before a congressional subcommittee. [ Footnote 3 ] The cases were separately briefed and argued here, and many issues were presented. We decide each case upon a single ground common to all, and we therefore reach no other questions.
was filed to quash the indictment before trial upon the ground that the indictment failed to state the subject under investigation at the time of the subcommittee's interrogation of the defendant. [ Footnote 5 ] In each case, the motion was denied. In each case, the issue thus raised was preserved on appeal, in the petition for writ of certiorari, and in brief and argument here.
In enacting the criminal statute under which these petitioners were convicted, Congress invoked the aid of the federal judicial system in protecting itself against contumacious conduct. Watkins v. United States, 354 U. S. 178 , 354 U. S. 207 . The obvious consequence, as the Court has repeatedly emphasized, was to confer upon the federal courts the duty to accord a person prosecuted for this statutory offense every safeguard which the law accords in all other federal criminal cases. Sinclair v. United States, 279 U. S. 263 , 279 U. S. 296 -297; Watkins v. United States, supra, at 354 U. S. 208 ; Sacher v. United States, 356 U. S. 576 , 356 U. S. 577 ; Flaxer v. United States, 358 U. S. 147 , 358 U. S. 151 ; Deutch v. United States, 367 U. S. 456 , 367 U. S. 471 .
is one for determination by the court as a matter of law. Id. at 279 U. S. 298 .
In that case, the Court had before it an indictment which set out in specific and lengthy detail the subject under investigation by the Senate Committee which had summoned Sinclair. The Court was thereby enabled to make an enlightened and precise determination that the question he had refused to answer was pertinent to that subject. Id. at 279 U. S. 285 -289, 279 U. S. 296 -298.
to the subject under inquiry is to ascertain what that subject was. See, e.g., Deutch v. United States, supra, at 367 U. S. 469 . Identification of the subject under inquiry is also an essential preliminary to the determination of a host of other issues which typically arise in prosecutions under the statute. In Wilkinson v. United States, supra, for example, the Court pointed out that, in order properly to consider any of the many issues there presented, "the starting point must be to determine the subject matter of the subcommittee's inquiry." 365 U.S. at 365 U. S. 407 .
Where, as in the Sinclair case, the subject under inquiry has been identified in the indictment, this essential first step has presented no problem. Where, as in the more recent cases, the indictment has not identified the topic under inquiry, the Court has often found it difficult or impossible to ascertain what the subject was. The difficulty of such a determination in the absence of an allegation in the indictment is illustrated by Deutch v. United States, supra. In that case, the members of this Court were in sharp disagreement as to what the subject under subcommittee inquiry had been. Moreover, all of us disagreed with the District Court's theory, and the Court of Appeals had not even ventured a view on the question. 367 U.S. at 367 U. S. 467 . In Watkins v. United States, supra, the Court found it not merely difficult, but actually impossible, to determine what the topic under subcommittee inquiry had been at the time the petitioner had refused to answer the questions addressed to him.
to consider whether an offense under 2 U.S.C. § 192 is an "infamous crime," Duke v. United States, 301 U. S. 492 , since Congress has, from the beginning, explicitly conferred upon those prosecuted under the statute the protection which the Fifth Amendment confers by providing that no one can be prosecuted for this offense except upon an indictment by a grand jury. This specific guaranty, as well as the Fifth Amendment's Due Process, Clause, are therefore both brought to bear here. Of like relevance is the guaranty of the Sixth Amendment that, "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; . . . "
Costello v. United States, 350 U. S. 359 , 350 U. S. 362 . See McClintock, Indictment by a Grand Jury, 26 Minn.L.Rev. 153; Orfield, Criminal Procedure from Arrest to Appeal, 137-140, 144-146.
" Cochran and Sayre v. United States, 157 U. S. 286 , 157 U. S. 290 ; Rosen v. United States, 161 U. S. 29 , 161 U. S. 34 ."
Hagner v. United States, 285 U. S. 427 , 285 U. S. 431 . See Potter v. United States, 155 U. S. 438 , 155 U. S. 445 ; Bartell v. United States, 227 U. S. 427 , 227 U. S. 431 ; Berger v. United States, 295 U. S. 78 , 295 U. S. 82 ; United States v. Debrow, 346 U. S. 374 , 346 U. S. 377 -378.
Without doubt, the second of these preliminary criteria was sufficiently met by the indictments in these cases. Since the indictments set out not only the times and places of the hearings at which the petitioners refused to testify, but also specified the precise questions which they then and there refused to answer, it can hardly be doubted that the petitioners would be fully protected from again being put in jeopardy for the same offense, particularly when it is remembered that they could rely upon other parts of the present record in the event that future proceedings should be taken against them. See McClintock, Indictment by a Grand Jury, 26 Minn.L.Rev. 153, 160; Bartell v. United States, 227 U. S. 427 , 227 U. S. 433 . The vice of these indictments, rather, is that they failed to satisfy the first essential criterion by which the sufficiency of an indictment is to be tested, i.e., that they failed to sufficiently apprise the defendant "of what he must be prepared to meet."
United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542 , 92 U. S. 55 . An indictment not framed to apprise the defendant "with reasonable certainty, of the nature of the accusation against him . . . is defective, although it may follow the language of the statute." United States v. Simmons, 96 U. S. 360 , 96 U. S. 362 .
United States v. Carll, 105 U. S. 611 , 105 U. S. 612 .
The vice which inheres in the failure of an indictment under 2 U.S.C. § 192 to identify the subject under inquiry is thus the violation of the basic principle "that the accused must be apprised by the indictment, with reasonable certainty, of the nature of the accusation against him,. . . ." United States v. Simmons, supra, 96 U. S. 362 . A cryptic form of indictment in cases of this kind requires the defendant to go to trial with the chief issue undefined. It enables his conviction to rest on one point, and the affirmance of the conviction to rest on another. It gives the prosecution free hand on appeal to fill in the gaps of proof by surmise or conjecture. The Court has had occasion before now to condemn just such a practice in a quite different factual setting. Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U. S. 196 , 333 U. S. 201 -202. And the unfairness and uncertainty which have characteristically infected criminal proceedings under this statute which were based upon indictments which failed to specify the subject under inquiry are illustrated by the cases in this Court we have already discussed. The same uncertainty and unfairness are underscored by the records of the cases now before us. A single example will suffice to illustrate the point.
was not told at the time what subject the subcommittee was investigating. The prior record of the subcommittee hearings, with which Price may or may not have been familiar, gave a completely confused and inconsistent account of what, if anything, that subject was. Price was put to trial and convicted upon an indictment which did not even purport to inform him in any way of the identity of the topic under subcommittee inquiry. At every stage in the ensuing criminal proceeding, Price was met with a different theory, or by no theory at all, as to what the topic had been. Far from informing Price of the nature of the accusation against him, the indictment instead left the prosecution free to roam at large -- to shift its theory of criminality so as to take advantage of each passing vicissitude of the trial and appeal. Yet Price could be guilty of no criminal offense unless the questions he refused to answer were in fact pertinent to a specific topic under subcommittee inquiry at the time he was interrogated. Sinclair v. United States, 279 U. S. 263 at 279 U. S. 292 .
"to inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a conviction, if one should be had. [ Footnote 15 ]"
here, in the light of the difficulties and uncertainties with which the federal trial and reviewing courts have had to deal in cases arising under 2 U.S.C. § 192, to which reference has already been made. See, e.g., Watkins v. United States, 354 U. S. 178 ; Deutch v. United States, 367 U. S. 456 . Viewed in this context, the rule is designed not alone for the protection of the defendant, but for the benefit of the prosecution, as well, by making it possible for courts called upon to pass on the validity of convictions under the statute to bring an enlightened judgment to that task. Cf. Watkins v. United States, supra.
But it is a settled rule that a bill of particulars cannot save an invalid indictment. See United States v. Norris, 281 U. S. 619 , 281 U. S. 622 ; United States v. Lattimore, 94 U.S.App.D.C. 268, 215 F.2d 847; Babb v. United States, 218 F.2d 538; Steiner v. United States, 229 F.2d 745; United States v. Dierker, 164 F.Supp. 304; 4 Anderson, Wharton's Criminal Law and Procedure, § 1870. When Congress provided that no one could be prosecuted under 2 U.S.C. § 192 except upon an indictment, Congress made the basic decision that only a grand jury could determine whether a person should be held to answer in a criminal trial for refusing to give testimony pertinent to a question under congressional committee inquiry. A grand jury, in order to make that ultimate determination, must necessarily determine what the question under inquiry was. To allow the prosecutor, or the court, to make a subsequent guess as to what was in the minds of the grand jury at the time they returned the indictment would deprive the defendant of a basic protection which the guaranty of the intervention of a grand jury was designed to secure. For a defendant could then be convicted on the basis of facts not found by, and perhaps not even presented to, the grand jury which indicted him. See Orfield, Criminal Procedure from Arrest to Appeal 243.
This underlying principle is reflected by the settled rule in the federal courts that an indictment may not be amended except by resubmission to the grand jury unless the change is merely a matter of form. Ex parte Bain, 121 U. S. 1 ; United States v. Norris, 281 U. S. 619 ; Stirone v. United States, 361 U. S. 212 .
"The question must be pertinent to the subject matter, and that will have to be decided by the courts of justice on the indictment. [ Footnote 19 ]"
The question was presented but not reached in Sacher v. United States, 356 U. S. 576 , where the conviction was reversed on other grounds. The question was also raised in the petition for certiorari in Braden v. United States, 365 U. S. 431 , but was abandoned when the case was briefed and argued on the merits. Although the question was decided by the lower court in Barenblatt v. United States, 100 U.S.App.D.C. 13, 240 F.2d 875, it was not raised in this Court, 360 U. S. 360 U.S. 109.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has passed on the question, holding that the indictment need not set forth the subject under committee inquiry. See Barenblatt v. United States, 100 U.S.App.D.C. 13, 240 F.2d 875; Sacher v. United States, 102 U.S.App.D.C. 264, 252 F.2d 828. Indictments returned in that circuit, of course, reflect this rule. See cases cited in MR. JUSTICE HARLAN's dissenting opinion, post, p. 369 U. S. 782 , n. 2. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit sustained an indictment under 2 U.S.C. § 192 which did not set forth the subject under inquiry in United States v. Josephson, 165 F.2d 82. However, Josephson appears to have been substantially limited by the same court in United States v. Lamont, 236 F.2d 312, and indictments under 2 U.S.C. § 192 currently being returned in the Second Circuit do, in fact, set forth the subject under inquiry. See the unreported indictments in United States v. Yarus (D.C.S.D.N.Y.) No. C 152-239 (the opinion acquitting defendant Yarus is reported at 198 F.Supp. 425); United States v. Turoff (D.C.W.D.N.Y.) No. 7539-C (the opinion of the Court of Appeals reversing defendant Turoff's conviction is reported at 291 F.2d 864).
11 Stat. 155-156. The statute, now 2 U.S.C. §§ 192-194, was enacted to supplement the established contempt power of Congress itself. Jurney v. MacCracken, 294 U. S. 125 , 294 U. S. 151 . The specific background of the statute's adoption is sketched in Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. at 354 U. S. 207 , n. 45. See Cong.Globe, 34th Cong., 3d Sess. 405. See also id. at 403-413, 426-433, 434-445. Except for a basic change in the immunity provisions in 1862, 12 Stat. 333, the legislation has continued substantially unchanged to the present time, with only a slight modification in language in R.S. §§ 102 and 104. The only other amendment in the substantive provisions was made in 1938, 52 Stat. 942, so as to make the statute applicable to joint committees. The provision requiring grand jury indictment has been amended twice since 1857. The original legislation provided for certification only to the United States Attorney for the District of Columbia. In 1936, an amendment was made to permit certification to any United States Attorney, 49 Stat. 2041. In 1938, the provision was amended to bring it into accord with the joint committee amendment of the substantive provisions of the law.
In the Watkins case, the Court's primary concern was not whether pertinency had had been proved at the criminal trial, but whether the petitioner had been apprised of the pertinency of the questions at the time he had been called upon to answer them. These two issues are, of course, quite different. See Deutch v. United States, 367 U.S. at 367 U. S. 467 -468. But identification of the subject under inquiry is essential to the determination of either issue. See Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. at 360 U. S. 123 -125.
Rosen v. United States, 161 U. S. 29 , heavily relied upon in the dissenting opinion, is inapposite. In that case, the Court held that an indictment charging the mailing of obscene material did not need to specify the particular portions of the publication which were allegedly obscene. As pointed out in Bartell v. United States, 227 U. S. 427 , 227 U. S. 431 , the rule established in Rosen was always regarded as a "well recognized exception" to usual indictment rules, applicable only to "the pleading of printed or written matter which is alleged to be too obscene or indecent to be spread upon the records of the court." Under Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476 , 354 U. S. 488 -489, the issue dealt with in Rosen would presumably no longer arise.
See also Smith v. United States, 360 U. S. 1 , 360 U. S. 13 (dissenting opinion); Comment, 35 Mich.L.Rev. 456.
160 U.S. at 160 U. S. 325 -326. (Emphasis added.) This has been equally true of other perjury indictments sustained by the Court. See Hendricks v. United States, 223 U. S. 178 ; United States v. Debrow, 346 U. S. 374 (the indictment in Debrow is set forth in the opinion of the Court of Appeals, 203 F.2d 699, 702, n. 1).
See p. 369 U. S. 757 , supra.
"A metropolitan newspaper in America today is more than a mirror to the happenings of the day. It is a moulder of public opinion; capable of leading crusades; capable of introducing new ideas; capable of propagating truth or propaganda as it wills. By its very nature, whether it would abdicate of not, a newspaper maintains a position of leadership and responsibility in this cold war that is vital to our national security. Other industries (atomic energy, defense, et cetera ) may be more vital, but this fact does not impair the vital role of our press."
under § 192. This continued frustration of the Congress in the use of the judicial process to punish those who are contemptuous of its committees indicates to me that the time may have come for Congress to revert to "its original practice of utilizing the coercive sanction of contempt proceedings at the bar of the House [affected]." Id. at 354 U. S. 206 . Perhaps some simplified method may be found to handle such matters without consuming too much of the time of the full House involved. True, a recalcitrant witness would have to be released at the date of adjournment, but at least contumacious conduct would then receive some punishment. The dignity of the legislative process deserves at least that much sanction.
The ground rules for testing the sufficiency of an indictment are twofold: (1) does the indictment adequately inform the defendant of the nature of the charge he will have to meet; (2) if the defendant is convicted, and later prosecuted again, will a court, under what has been charged, be able to determine the extent to which the defense of double jeopardy is available? United States v. Debrow, 346 U. S. 374 .
The rule was "designed to eliminate technicalities," and is "to be construed to secure simplicity in procedure." Debrow at 346 U. S. 376 .
v. Josephson, 165 F.2d 82; [ Footnote 2/4 ] United States v. Lamont, 236 F.2d 312. [ Footnote 2/5 ] And so, quite evidently, is the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Braden v. United States, 272 F.2d 653. [ Footnote 2/6 ] No Court of Appeals has held otherwise.
It is first argued that an allegation of "pertinency" in the statutory terms will not do, because that element is at "the very core of criminality" under § 192. This is said to follow from what "our cases have uniformly held." Ante, p. 369 U. S. 764 . I do not so understand the cases on which the Court relies. It will suffice to examine the three cases from which quotations have been culled. Ante, pp. 369 U. S. 765 -766.
"According to the view we take of these counts, the question is not whether it is enough, in general, to describe a statutory offence in the language of the statute, but whether the offence has here been described at all. "
United States v. Simmons, 96 U. S. 360 , was concerned with an indictment involving illegal distilling. Revised Statutes § 3266 made it an offense to distill spirits on premises where vinegar "is" manufactured. One count of the indictment charged the defendant with causing equipment on premises where vinegar "was" manufactured to be used for distilling. This count was dismissed for its failure (1) to identify the person who had so used the equipment or to allege that his identity was unknown to the grand jurors; and (2) to allege that the distilling and manufacture of vinegar were coincidental, as required by the statute. [ Footnote 2/8 ] What is more significant from the standpoint of the present cases is that, in sustaining another count of the indictment charging the defendant with engaging in the business of distilling "with the intent to defraud the United States of the tax" on the spirits (R.S. § 3281), the Court held that it was not necessary to allege "the particular means by which the United States was to be defrauded of the tax." Id. at 96 U. S. 364 .
United States v. Carll, 105 U. S. 611 , held no more than that an indictment charging forgery was insufficient for failure to allege scienter, which, though not expressly required by the statute, the Court found to be a necessary element of the crime. Hence, a charge in the statutory language would not suffice. Section 192, of course, contains no such gap in its provisions. What the Court now requires of these indictments under § 192 involves not the supplying of a missing element of the crime, but the addition of the particulars of an element already clearly alleged.
v. United States, 227 U. S. 427 , 227 U. S. 433 -434. [ Footnote 2/11 ] I think there can be no doubt about the matter after Rule 7(c).
The Court says that its holding is needed to prevent the Government from switching on appeal, to the prejudice of the defendants, to a different theory of pertinency from that on which the conviction may have rested. Ante, pp. 369 U. S. 766 -768. There are several good answers to this.
To the extent that this fear relates to the subject under investigation, the Government cannot, of course, travel outside the confines of the trial record, of which the defendant has full knowledge. If what is meant is that the Government may not modify on appeal its "trial" view of the "connective reasoning" ( supra, p. 369 U. S. 784 , note 6) relied on to establish the germaneness of the questions asked to the subject matter of the inquiry, surely it would be free to do so, this aspect of pertinency being simply a matter of law, Sinclair v. United States, 279 U. S. 263 , 279 U. S. 299 . Moreover the Court does not find these indictments deficient because they failed to allege the "connective reasoning."
Beyond these considerations, a defendant has ample means for protecting himself in this regard. By objecting at the committee hearing to the pertinency of any question asked him, he may "freeze" this issue, since the Government's case on this score must then stand or fall on the pertinency explanation given by the committee in response to such an objection. Deutch v. United States, 367 U. S. 456 , 367 U. S. 472 -473 (dissenting opinion); cf. Watkins v. United States, supra, at 354 U. S. 214 -215; Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U. S. 109 , 360 U. S. 123 -125. If he has failed to make a pertinency objection at the committee hearing, thereby leaving the issue "at large" for the trial ( Deutch, ibid. ), he may still seek a particularization through a bill of particulars. Cf. United States v. Kamin, 136 F.Supp. 791, 795 n. 4.
It should be noted that no pertinency objection was made by any of these petitioners at the committee hearings. Further, no motions for a bill of particulars were made in No. 12, Price, to which the Court especially addresses itself ( ante, pp. 369 U. S. 766 -768), or in No. 8, Russell, No. 10, Whitman, and No. 11, Liveright. In No. 9, Shelton, and No. 128, Gojack, such motions were made. However, no appeal was taken from the denial of the motion in Gojack, and in Shelton, the sufficiency of the particulars furnished by the Government was not questioned either by a motion for a further bill or on appeal.
Referring to certain language in the Cruikshank case, supra, the Court suggests that the present holding is supported by a further "important corollary purpose" which an indictment is intended to serve: to make "it possible for courts called upon to pass on the validity of convictions under the statute to bring an enlightened judgment to that task." Ante, pp. 369 U. S. 768 -769.
But whether or not the Government has established its case on "pertinency" is something that must be determined on the record made at the trial, not upon the allegations of the indictment. There is no such thing as a motion for summary judgment in a criminal case. While appellate courts might be spared some of the tedium of going through these § 192 records were the allegations of indictments to spell out the "pertinency" facts, the Court elsewhere in its opinion recognizes that the issue at hand can hardly be judged in terms of whether fuller indictments "would simplify the courts' task." Ante, p. 369 U. S. 760 .
the court has jurisdiction has been alleged. Cf. McClintock, Indictment by a Grand Jury, 26 Minn.L.Rev. 153, 159-160 (1942); Orfield, Criminal Procedure from Arrest to Appeal, 222-226, 227, n. 107. [ Footnote 2/12 ] Certainly the allegations of these indictments meet such requirements.
This proposition is also certainly unsound on principle. In the last analysis, it would mean that a prosecutor could not safely introduce or advocate at a trial evidence or theories, however relevant to the crime charged in the indictment, which he had not presented to the grand jury. Such cases as Ex parte Bain, 121 U. S. 1 ; United States v.
On the merits, these convictions are, of course, squarely ruled against the petitioners by principles discussed in our recent decisions in the Barenblatt, Wilkinson, and Braden [ Footnote 2/15 ] cases, as was all but acknowledged at the bar.
That case was concerned with the "connective reasoning" aspect of "pertinency," Watkins v. United States, 354 U. S. 178 , 354 U. S. 214 -215, rather than the "subject under inquiry" aspect; but it is not perceived how this can be thought to make a difference in principle.
This is not the first opportunity the Court has had to consider the matter. Ante, p. 369 U. S. 754 , note. 7.
160 U.S. at 160 U. S. 325 .
The Court suggests that Bartell and Rosen v. United States ( infra, p. 369 U. S. 792 ) are inapposite because of the special rule of pleading applicable in "obscenity" cases. Ante, p. 369 U. S. 765 . However, considering that the "apprisal" requisite of an indictment arises from constitutional requirements, this factor far from lessening the weight of these two cases adds to their authority.
The other cases and commentaries referred to by the Court in Note 15 ante, pp. 369 U. S. 768 -769, indicate nothing different.
It seems clear that the Court proceeded on the premise that the "isolated excerpt" rule of Regina v. Hicklin,  L.R. 3 Q.B. 360, recently rejected in Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476 , 354 U. S. 488 -489, in favor of the "whole book" rule, obtained, for the Court relied on United States v. Bennett, 24 Fed.Cas. p. 1093, 16 Blatchford 338, where the "excerpt" test was applied.

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