Source: http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/45222
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 16:17:24+00:00

Document:
ANTONIO NEPOMUCENO, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
Before us is a petition for review filed by Antonio Nepomuceno, seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision  dated July 6, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 26671. The assailed decision had affirmed with modification the Decision  dated July 24, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 85, Lipa City, Batangas, convicting petitioner of estafa as defined and penalized under Article 315 1(b)  of the Revised Penal Code.
That on or about the 22nd day of October, 1994 at Lipa City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being [then] employed as manager of Lipa Lending Investor, Inc. and as such has the duty to manage and administer the funds of the said corporation, with grave abuse of confidence reposed upon him by the officers of the aforesaid corporation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously misapply, misappropriate and convert to his own personal use and benefit the amount of One Hundred Eighty Thousand (P180,000.00) Pesos belonging to Lipa Lending Investor, Inc. by making it appear that the said amount was part of the change or overpayment due to a certain Rommel Villanueva, a borrower of Lipa Lending Investor, Inc., when in truth and in fact as he very well knew he was not authorized to receive the same and despite demands to return the said amount accused failed and refused to do so, to the damage and prejudice of Lipa Lending Investor, Inc. in the aforesaid amount of P180,000.00, Philippine currency.
During arraignment on January 13, 1997, Nepomuceno pleaded not guilty.  Thereafter, trial ensued.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Antonio Nepomuceno guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Estafa defined and penalized under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, and hereby sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from Six (6) years and One (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to Twelve (12) years and One (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum. Furthermore, accused is ordered to restitute to Lipa Lending Investor, Inc. the amount of P180,000.00 with legal rate of interest computed from the date of institution of this case until the same is paid in full. Costs de officio.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the trial court convicting accused-appellant Antonio Nepomuceno for estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code is AFFIRMED with the modification that the sentence he shall suffer is an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal.
[WHETHER OR NOT] THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING PETITIONER OF THE OFFENSE OF ESTAFA DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE AMOUNT OF P180,000.00 NO LONGER BELONGED TO LIPA LENDING INVESTOR, INC. BUT TO ROMMEL VILLANUEVA. THERE WAS THEREFORE NO DAMAGE CAUSED TO THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT, WHICH IS ONE OF THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE.
[WHETHER OR NOT] THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT DEMAND IS AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF THE OFFENSE OF ESTAFA COMMITTED THROUGH ABUSE OF CONFIDENCE; AND THAT THERE WAS NO SUCH DEMAND MADE IN THE INSTANT CASE.
Simply, the issues are: (1) Was petitioner guilty of estafa? and (2) Is demand necessary to convict for estafa?
Petitioner, in his Memorandum filed on February 28, 2006, argues that damage as an element of estafa is lacking in this case because the amount of P180,000 did not belong to Lipa Lending but to Rommel Villanueva, and there was therefore no harm done to Lipa Lending when Villanueva gave the amount of P180,000 to him. Accordingly, he did not receive the amount of P180,000 in trust, on commission, for administration or any other circumstance involving the duty to make delivery of or return the same to Lipa Lending. Petitioner also argues that the element of demand in estafa was not present since the prosecution did not present evidence that demand was made to him to account for the amount of P180,000.
On the other hand, respondent, thru the Office of the Solicitor General, in its Memorandum filed on May 11, 2006, contends that the issues raised by petitioner are factual issues which are not proper in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; that contrary to petitioner’s contention, the amount of P180,000 belonged to Lipa Lending and not to Rommel Villanueva since the amount was directly received by petitioner from Lipa Lending by way of a company check payable to petitioner himself;and that the absence of demand does not bar petitioner’s conviction for estafa as held in the case of Salazar v. People.
The elements of estafa under Article 315 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code are as follows: (1) that money, goods, or other personal properties are received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return, the same; (2) that there is a misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender or denial on his part of such receipt; (3) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and, (4) that there is a demand made by the offended party on the offender.
Is the element of damage or prejudice present in this case? There is no denying that Nepomuceno received P1,100,000 from Villanueva. He claims, however, that there is no due date for Villanueva’s loan and that the latter only allotted P245,000 as payment, with the rest of the amount to be distributed among Villanueva, Magaling, and the petitioner himself.
We cannot give credence to Nepomuceno’s claims. As manager of Lipa Lending, it was his duty to see to it that the latter’s clients pay their loans. There was no justification for the petitioner to cause the preparation of three checks because the Statement of Account  of Villanueva shows Villanueva had an outstanding obligation to Lipa Lending as of October 24, 1994 amounting to P938,526, thereby negating the contention of the petitioner that Villanueva had a claim against the corporation due to overpayment. The petitioner, during cross-examination, admitted he appropriated the P180,000 for his own use  and claimed that the P180,000 given to him was his commission from Villanueva.  Moreover, the promissory note executed between Lipa Lending and Villanueva did not intend a loan payable in installments. For while said document is a standard form with blanks for the provisions of installment of the loan, the parties only wrote down the amount of the loan and the due date of its payment. If their intention was really to settle the loan on installment, they would have clearly provided the terms thereof. Thus, there is no basis to believe otherwise that the entire amount of the loan became due and demandable on the date agreed upon, which is October 14, 1994.  It is thus clear that Nepomuceno caused the preparation of the checks in his name and gave himself money due to the company he works for, to the prejudice and damage of said company.
Given the circumstances on record, we find Nepomuceno’s acts inexcusable and his testimony unconvincing. His grounds involve factual issues already passed upon twice below and are inappropriate in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, which allows only questions of law to be raised.
Factual findings and conclusions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are entitled to great weight and respect, and will not be disturbed on review by us, in the absence of any clear showing that the lower courts overlooked certain facts or circumstances which would substantially affect the disposition of the case. The jurisdiction of this Court over cases elevated from the Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing errors of law ascribed to the Court of Appeals. The factual findings of the appellate court generally are conclusive, and carry even more weight when said court affirms the findings of the trial court, absent any showing that the findings are totally devoid of support in the record or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute grave abuse of discretion.
In this case, the amount misappropriated is P180,000.
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of the penalty shall be “that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed” under the Revised Penal Code, and the minimum shall be “within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed” for the offense. The penalty next lower should be based on the penalty prescribed by the Code for the offense, without first considering any modifying circumstance attendant to the commission of the crime. The determination of the minimum penalty is left by law to the sound discretion of the court and it can be anywhere within the range of the penalty next lower without any reference to the periods into which it might be subdivided. The modifying circumstances are considered only in the imposition of the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence.
Hence, the minimum term of the indeterminate penalty should be anywhere within six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months.
in consonance with Article 65, in relation to Article 64, of the Revised Penal Code.
Accordingly, the maximum penalty should be within six (6) years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days to eight (8) years, plus one (1) year for each additional P10,000.  With fifteen (15) years in excess of the maximum of eight (8) years, Nepomuceno’s maximum penalty stands at twenty-three (23) years. Nevertheless, the penalty cannot exceed twenty (20) years.
Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly imposed on Nepomuceno the penalty of imprisonment ranging from four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 26671 promulgated on July 6, 2004 affirming with modification the Decision dated July 24, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 85, Lipa City, Batangas, is AFFIRMED.
 Rollo, pp. 31-41. Penned by Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo, with Associate Justices Romeo A. Brawner and Magdangal M. De Leon concurring.
 Records, pp. 239-246. Penned by Judge Avelino G. Demetria.
 Id. at 38, 40, 42.
 G.R. No. 149472, October 15, 2002, 391 SCRA 162.
 Libuit v. People, G.R. No. 154363, September 13, 2005, 469 SCRA 610, 616.
 TSN, January 25, 1999, p. 28.
 Libuit v. People, supra note 20, at 618.
 Tubb v. People and Court of Appeals, 101 Phil. 114, 119 (1957).
 Salazar v. People, supra note 19, at 174, citing United States v. Ramirez, 9 Phil. 67, 70 (1907).
 G.R. Nos. 118950-54, February 6, 1997, 267 SCRA 581.
 Perez v. People, G.R. No. 150443, January 20, 2006, 479 SCRA 209, 223.

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