Source: http://pa.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20180126_0001077.EPA.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 11:48:20+00:00

Document:
DAVID R. STRAWBRIDGE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
This action was brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (the “Commissioner”), which denied the application of Nyshiana S. Martin for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 301, et seq. (the “Act”). Presently before the Court is Plaintiff's Brief and Statement of Issues in Support of Request for Review (“Pl. Br.”) (Doc. 9); Defendant's Response to Request for Review of Plaintiff (“Def. Br.”) (Doc. 10); and Plaintiff's Brief in Reply (Doc. 11); together with the record of the proceedings before the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) (Doc. 6). Plaintiff asks the Court to reverse the Commissioner's final decision and remand her case for further administrative proceedings and a new decision. (Pl. Br. at 20-21.) The Commissioner seeks the entry of an order affirming the decision of the ALJ. (Def. Br. at Prop. Order.) For the reasons set out below, we recommend that the Court grant Plaintiff's request for review and remand the matter to the Commissioner for further proceedings.
Martin applied for SSI on November 18, 2011, at the age of 22. (R. 24, 33.) She had graduated from a high school for students with behavioral problems. (R. 49-50.) She had a limited employment history consisting of jobs held for only a few months. She was let go from a fast food position after she had an anxiety attack while working the front counter and passed out. (R. 52.) She was later let go from a hotel housekeeping position when she was overheard talking on a telephone in a room and “going off” about the manager. (R. 51-52.) She alleged disability due to bipolar disorder, depression, intermittent explosive disorder, and irritable bowel syndrome. (R. 82.) She lived with her mother and sister, with whom she often had conflicts.
In his decision dated June 9, 2014, the ALJ explained his finding that Martin was not disabled because she was capable of other jobs so long as the work was routine and repetitive, did not involve detailed instructions, did not involve more than occasional contact with the general public, and did not expose her to excessive pollutants. (R. 29.) The Appeals Council declined Plaintiff's request for review, rendering the ALJ's decision the final decision of the Commissioner. (R. 1-6.) This litigation followed.
This Court must determine whether substantial evidence supports the Commissioner's decision. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 552 (3d Cir. 2005). Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Reefer v. Barnhart, 326 F.3d 376, 379 (3d Cir. 2003). Substantial evidence is “more than a mere scintilla but may be somewhat less than a preponderance of evidence.” Rutherford, 399 F.3d at 552. The factual findings of the Commissioner must be accepted as conclusive, provided they are supported by substantial evidence. Richardson, 402 U.S. at 390 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)); Rutherford, 399 F.3d at 552. The review of legal questions presented by the Commissioner's decision, however, is plenary. Shaudeck v. Commissioner of Social Security Admin., 181 F.3d 429, 431 (3d Cir. 1999).
The issue before the ALJ was whether Martin was disabled within the meaning of the Act between her SSI application date of November 18, 2011 and the June 9, 2014 date of the decision. To resolve this question, the ALJ utilized the five-step sequential evaluation process set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a). At Step One, he found that Martin had not engaged in substantial gainful activity from her application date through the date of decision. (R. 26, Finding No. 1.) At Step Two, he found that Martin suffered from impairments that were “severe” within the meaning of the Regulations. (R. 26, Finding No. 2.) At Step Three, he found that Martin had no impairment or combinations of impairments that met or medically equaled one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 416.920(d), 416.925 and 416.926). (R. 26, Finding No. 3.) Plaintiff does not challenge these findings.
4. After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform medium work as defined in 20 CFR 416.967(c) except: she is restricted to routine and repetitive work not involving detailed instructions; her work should not involve more than occasional contact with the general public nor should it expose her to any excessive pollutants.
Plaintiff urges the court to vacate the decision pursuant to Sentence Four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and remand it for further proceedings and a new determination due to three alleged legal deficiencies in the ALJ's decision. She first contends that the ALJ failed to properly evaluate one of her severe impairments - poly-substance abuse - in accordance with SSR 13-2p and applicable regulations. (Pl. Br. at 5.) She next contends that the ALJ failed to properly consider and assess opinion evidence that supported her claim. (Pl. Br. at 10.) Finally, she asserts that the reasons articulated by the ALJ for his credibility determination were not supported by the record. (Pl. Br. at 17.) While we will touch upon her first argument concerning consideration of her drug and alcohol abuse, we find remand principally warranted based upon her second argument, as we agree that the ALJ's reconciliation of conflicting opinion evidence concerning her mental functioning is not supported by the record. We do not find it necessary to address at any length Plaintiff's concerns about how GAF scores assigned to her should have been taken as medical opinions. Finally, in light of our assessment that a new hearing is necessary, we do not undertake a review of the ALJ's credibility determination, which will need to be assessed anew on remand in light of the anticipated re-evaluation of the record as a whole.
As part of his assessment at Step Two as to whether Martin suffered from a severe impairment, the ALJ identified “poly-substance abuse” as one of Plaintiff's severe impairments. Plaintiff contends that this finding obligated the ALJ to embark upon an analysis described in SSR 13-2p and that his failure to do so renders his decision unsupportable. As we explain below, Plaintiff misinterprets the requirements of this ruling. We find no error in the ALJ's failure to apply it here.
When we adjudicate a claim for disability … [that] include[s] evidence from acceptable medical sources … establishing that DAA is a medically determinable impairment(s) (MDI) and we determine that a claimant is disabled considering all of the claimant's medically determinable impairments (MDIs), we must then determine whether the claimant would continue to be disabled if he or she stopped using drugs or alcohol; that is, we will determine whether DAA is “material” to the finding that the claimant is disabled.
2. SSR 13-2p does not apply to Petitioner because the ALJ did not find her to be disabled.
The premise of Plaintiff's argument, however, is mistaken. As is clear from the text of the ruling, the adjudicator does not analyze whether a Substance Use Disorder is material to a claimant's disability unless and until he determines that the claimant is disabled by her various impairments. Here the ALJ made a finding that Plaintiff was not disabled. See R. 35, Finding No. 10 (“The claimant has not been under a disability….”). In light of this negative finding, SSR 13-2p recognizes that the ALJ is not to determine DAA materiality and that the decision must be a denial. See SSR 13-2p, 2013 WL 621536, *5.
Despite the Commissioner's argument to this effect, Plaintiff continued to insist in her reply brief that, “having found poly-substance abuse to have been a severe impairment, the ALJ was then required to determine if Martin was disabled considering all of her impairments” by following the DAA Evaluation Process described in SSR 13-2p rather than the normal 5 step sequential evaluation. See Pl. Reply at 1-2. Nothing in the text of the ruling suggests that the DAA evaluation was to supplant the normal sequential evaluation process. Rather, we find the ruling sufficiently clear that the DAA evaluation process is the process by which the adjudicator determines the materiality of DAA to the claimant's disability once disability is established. See, e.g., SSR 13-2p, 2013 WL 621536 at *4 (Question 5: “How do we determine materiality?”). Moreover, the ruling still speaks of the claimant's “burden of proving disability throughout the sequential evaluation process, ” and references the “appl[ication of] the steps of the sequential evaluation a second time to determine whether the claimant would be disabled if he or she were not using drugs or alcohol[.]” Id. at *4. The ALJ here applied the sequential evaluation process and, at Step Five, determined that Plaintiff was not disabled. There was no requirement under SSR 13-2p that he do anything further vis-à-vis Plaintiff's poly-substance abuse impairment. Therefore, we find no error in this aspect of the ALJ's decision.
We will address the ALJ's evaluation of the favorable opinions in the order in which they were rendered. As we set out, we conclude that the ALJ's decision cannot be said to be supported by substantial evidence in its rationale for weighing Dr. Lane's February 2012 opinion. A similarly-flawed reading of the record also contributed to his determination that Ms. Horlacher's May 2014 opinion was due only limited weight.
1. The ALJ erred in giving “restricted weight” to the RFC opinion from Thomas W. Lane, Ph.D., the consultative examiner.

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