Source: https://www.massachusettsinjurylawyer-blog.com/
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 06:38:01+00:00

Document:
On November 16, 2017, in Suffolk County Superior Court, a jury of twelve returned a verdict of not guilty in favor of Attorney Benjamin Duggan’s client. Attorney Duggan’s client was charged with, among other things, illegally possessing a firearm and ammunition. Due to certain sentencing enhancements, Attorney Duggan’s client was facing a minimum mandatory state prison sentence of 15 years. Attorney Duggan’s client had been held pending trial for over a year. Following the jury’s verdict, he walked out the front door of the courthouse a free man.
Issues in the case included a motion to suppress certain items seized pursuant to a search warrant, the legal elements of actual and constructive possession, and various forensic testing including DNA and fingerprints. The jury’s verdict followed extensive testimony and evidence.
If you have been charged with a crime, contact the attorneys at the KJC Law Firm. Let our experience secure you the best possible results.
Massachusetts is often considered an immigrant-friendly state, but according to the General Laws, only citizens of the United States can obtain admission to the Massachusetts Bar. The three statutes governing admission are G.L. c. 221, §§ 37, 38A, and 39. Section 37 and 39 both specifically require applicants to be citizens of the United States to petition for admission. Section 38A allows non-citizens to petition for admission, but directs the Board of Bar Examiners to not recommend admission until the applicant demonstrates that they have become a citizen of the United States. All three statutes are unconstitutional.
In Application of Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973), the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that a state cannot prohibit bar admission based solely on the non-citizenship of a lawful permanent resident. Lower courts have clarified the limited scope of the holding. Soon after Griffiths was issued, the Supreme Courts of Wyoming and Washington invalidated similar rules that barred lawful permanent residents from applying for admission. See Mansfield v. State Board of Law Examiners, 601 P.2d 174 (Wyo. 1979); Nielsen v. Washington State Bar Association, 585 P.2d 1191 (Wash. 1978) (en banc). The Sixth Circuit, on the other hand has noted that while a state can no longer require that a bar applicant be a citizen, “Citizenship continues, however, to be a requirement for admission by motion.” Bashir v. Supreme Court of Ohio, 652 F.2d 641, 642 (6th Cir. 1981) (per curiam). Recently, a number of other courts have considered whether the state can prohibit a visa-holding applicant or an undocumented applicant from being admitted to the bar.
In LeClerc v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405 (5th Cir. 2005), the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a Louisiana rule requiring that every applicant to the bar be a citizen of the United States or a “resident alien” thereof. The Fifth Circuit held that “nonimmigrant aliens,” meaning those who hold a visa instead of a green card, are not suspect class and therefore legislation classifying them are subject only to rational basis review. See id. at 418-19. The Fifth Circuit held the exclusion constitutionally permissible because the classification was rationally related to the state’s interest in assuring “continuity and accountability in legal representation.” See id. at 421.
In Rass Corporation v. The Travelers Companies, Inc., 2015-P-0358 (Mass. App. Ct. 2016), the Massachusetts Appeals Court reviewed a case brought by a sauce company, Rass, against its insurance carrier, Travelers, for breach of contractual duties to defend, indemnify, and settle an underlying action brought against Rass. The underlying action alleged Rass committed the torts of trade disparagement, misappropriation of trade secrets, and defamation. Rass’s insurance policy only provided coverage for the trade disparagement and defamation claims. It was uncontested on appeal that misappropriation of trade secrets was not covered under the policy, and therefore, Travelers had no duty to contribute or indemnify Rass for whatever portion of damages arose out of that claim.
Before trial in the underlying action, Rass’s attorney recommended a settlement range of $100,000 to $150,000 to settle all claims. During negotiations, Travelers offered to contribute $20,000 to the settlement on the condition that Rass waive its right to seek indemnification. Rass rejected the offer and settled the case for $175,000 without any contribution from Travelers. Rass then filed a complaint in Superior Court alleging Travelers had breached its contract and committed unfair and deceptive acts under chapter 93A.
When a partial-coverage lawsuit proceeds to a final judgment, the trial judge or jury determine the portion of damages allocated for each claim. The insurance company then must indemnify in the amount for each covered claim, while the defendant is left to pay the damages that arise from uncovered claims. Because Rass settled before going to trial, the Superior Court had determine Traveler’s obligation to indemnify by inquiring “how the parties to the settlement viewed the relative merits of the plaintiff’s claims at the time of the settlement and whether, if the insured settled without the carrier’s approval, the settlement amount was reasonable.” Windt, INSURANCE CLAIMS & DISPUTES § 6:31 (6th ed. 2013). Here, the Superior Court found that $140,000 of the $175,000 settlement arose from the covered claims. The Superior Court further found that Travelers had breached its contractual duties by failing to contribute $140,000 to the settlement and concluded that that failure constituted an unfair and unreasonable act in violation of chapter 93A. The Appeals Court affirmed the entirety of the trial court’s judgment, including the apportionment of settlement funds to the covered claim and the finding of a 93A violation.
When a person commits a crime and causes property to be damaged, destroyed, or lost, the issue of restitution may become relevant. Restitution comes into play when, as part of his punishment for the crime he committed, a defendant is ordered to pay the former owner of the property that he damaged or destroyed the value of that property. A problem can arise, however, when the defendant is too poor to be able to repay the former owner in full.
The problem is that, if a person who is ordered to pay restitution fails to pay it, he may be jailed as a result of that failure, and a poor person is far more likely than a person of means to have trouble paying restitution. Is it not unfair – and unjust – to jail someone simply because he is too poor to pay restitution, when a wealthier person would be allowed to remain free?
It is routine that people who have been charged with a crime give relevant evidence to their attorneys so that they can obtain legal advice regarding that evidence. After all, without being able to take possession of such items, attorneys would have a difficult time advising clients their cases.
This was what happened when disgraced former Patriot’s star, Aaron Hernandez, gave a cellphone to his attorneys. Since then, a judge has decided that there is probable cause to believe that the data on the cellphone would provide evidence about a July 16, 2012 drive-by shooting in Boston’s South End that killed Daniel de Abreu and Safiro Furtado, and about the intimidation of a witness to that shooting. Hernandez has been indicated for the drive-by shooting, has been indicted for intimidating the witness by shooting him in the head (the witness lived), and has been convicted of the June 17, 2013 murder of Odin Lloyd.
Ever since March, 2014, the government has been trying to get its hands of the phone. It first attempted to get the phone by asking a judge to approve a subpoena for the phone. That attempt failed when, in January, 2015, the Supreme Judicial Court (“SJC”) concluded that the attorney-client privilege protected the defendant against the use of a subpoena to compel production of the cellphone.
The Massachusetts Wage Act imposes severe penalties on “unscrupulous “employers and entitles prevailing plaintiffs to reasonable attorney’s fees which must be approved by a Superior Court judge. In awarding attorney’s fees, the judge is allowed to consider the experience and skill of the attorneys, the results obtained at trial, and the effectiveness, or lack thereof, of their performance at trial. The judge is required to reduce the award so as not to allow for duplicative billing, and to ensure that the hourly rate awarded to each attorney is fair and reasonable. In this case, the judge wrote a glowing review of attorneys Cook, Wilton, and Martin when awarding what we believe to be one of the largest awards, if not the largest award, ever in a single-plaintiff Wage Act case.
Every employer and employee in Massachusetts should be aware of the “Wage Act,” also known as the Weekly Wage Law (c. 149, sec. 148 et seq.). The purpose of the Wage Act is to ensure that employees are promptly paid by their employers. The law includes harsh penalties for employers who fail to comply.

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 6