Source: http://texas-opinions.com/08-TxDOT-v-York-Jimmy-Don-Tex-2008-PC-TTCA-special-premises-defect-loose-gravel-on-road.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 15:57:05+00:00

Document:
holding that the loose gravel is a special defect and affirming the trial court’s judgment.
234 S.W.3d at 218. We reverse.
as a matter of law, and therefore, reverse the court of appeals’ judgment and remand to the trial court.
deep. The cause of the presence of the excess loose gravel is disputed.
gravel is a special defect and affirming the trial court’s judgment. 234 S.W.3d at 218. We reverse.
statute. Gen. Servs. Comm’n v. Little-Tex Insulation Co., Inc., 39 S.W.3d 591, 594 (Tex. 2001); Tex.
resolve ambiguities by retaining immunity.” Wichita Falls State Hosp., 106 S.W.3d at 697.
involves a premise defect under section (a), a licensee standard applies. Tex. Civ Prac. & Rem.
special defect under section (b), a more lenient invitee standard applies. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.
defect or special defect is a question of law, which we review de novo. Payne, 838 S.W.2d at 238.
defects of the same kind or class as [excavations or obstructions].” County of Harris v. Eaton, 573 S.
obstructions.’”). We have recognized some characteristics of this class that should be considered.
See Eaton, 573 S.W.2d at 179 (“the size of the dangerous condition”); see also City of Dallas v.
(“an unexpected and unusual danger to ordinary users of roadways”).
gravel does not form a hole in the road or physically block the road like an obstruction or excavation.
of “unexpected and unusual danger to ordinary users of roadways” as does this class. Payne, 838 S.
a roadway was not a special defect).
in all other respects. See id. Thus, our holding would be the same under the amended statute.
judgment against TxDOT for $250,000. Asserting three issues, TxDOT appeals. We will affirm.
asphalt and gravel); those applications were approximately 6½ feet wide and 18 to 20 feet long.
lacked knowledge of the dangerous condition.
private person owes to a licensee on private property, unless the claimant pays for the use of the premises.
malfunction of traffic signs, signals, or warning devices as is required by Section 101.060.
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 101.022 (Vernon Supp. 2006)).
A governmental unit may be subject to premises liability for either ordinary premise defects or special defects.
Dep’t of Highways & Pub. Transp. v. Payne, 838 S.W.2d 235, 237 (Tex. 1992); Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v.
Fontenot, 151 S.W.3d 753, 760-61 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2004, pet. denied); Corbin v. City of Keller, 1 S.W.
t of Highways & Pub. Transp. v. Kitchen, 867 S.W.2d 784, 786 (Tex. 1993) (per curiam) (quoting Payne, 838 S.
W.2d at 238); see also Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 101.022(b) (Vernon Supp. 2006); Fontenot, 151 S.
W.3d at 761; Corbin, 1 S.W.3d at 746.
person owes to a licensee on private property, unless the claimant pays for the use of the premises.” Tex. Civ.
Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 101.022(a) (Vernon Supp. 2006); Payne, 838 S.W.2d at 237; Fontenot, 151 S.W.
at 237; Fontenot, 151 S.W.3d at 760-61; Corbin, 1 S.W.3d at 747.
Thompson v. City of Corsicana Housing Auth., 57 S.W.3d 547, 553 (Tex. App.—Waco 2001, no pet.).
interpretation and thus an issue of law for the court to decide.” Payne, 838 S.W.2d at 238; Fontenot, 151 S.W.
3d at 761; accord R.R. Street & Co. v. Pilgrim Enters., Inc., 166 S.W.3d 232, 240 (Tex. 2005); Corbin, 1 S.W.
Stewart v. City of Corsicana, 211 S.W.3d 844, 848-49 (Tex. App.—Waco 2006, pet. filed) (footnote omitted).
question of law—is de novo. See State v. Rodriguez, 985 S.W.2d 83, 85 (Tex. 1999); State Dep’t of Transp. v.
O’Malley, 28 S.W.3d 652, 655 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2000, pet. denied).
(quoting Payne, 838 S.W.2d at 238, and citing County of Harris v. Eaton, 573 S.W.2d 177, 179 (Tex. 1978)).
statute. City of Grapevine v. Roberts, 946 S.W.2d 841, 843 (Tex. 1997).
reason was a flaw in the asphalt’s chemical composition. There was no signage warning of loose gravel.
gravel, also fishtailed. Also on that day, JoAnn Langford slid on the gravel and spun around, facing the ditch.
slick or round like a marble and that there was only one layer, it would “make you slip” when walking on it.
Moore also observed recent skid marks that indicated other vehicles had lost control at the same scene.
concluded York lost control because of loose gravel and her failure to control her speed on the loose gravel.
Cameron v. Brown, 80 S.W.3d 549, 556 (Tex. 2002); see also Hall v. Sonic Drive-In of Angleton, Inc., 177 S.W.
condition poses an unreasonable risk of harm is generally fact specific.”).
whole, “rises to a level that would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to differ in their conclusions.” Id.
with a 70 m.p.h. speed limit does not pose an unreasonable risk of harm, we reject that argument on its face.
TxDOT’s motion for JNOV. We overrule the first issue.
v. Highland Park, Inc., 565 S.W.2d 512, 521 (Tex. 1978), the no-duty doctrine as to invitees was abolished.
invitee, the no-duty doctrine is inapplicable, and we overrule issue two.
lost control, and Langford’s car spun around, facing the ditch on the other side of the road.
thus modify the judgment to reflect a postjudgment interest rate of 8%. As modified, the judgment is affirmed.
immunity is waived by the terms of the Texas Tort Claims Act (TTCA). See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann.
would, were it a private person, be liable to the claimant according to Texas law.” Id. § 101.021(2).
unusual about a wet road being slippery. See State Dep’t of Highways v. Kitchen, 867 S.W.2d 784, 786 (Tex.
unusual); cf. State Dep’t of Transp. v. O’Malley, 28 S.W.3d 652, 656 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2000, pet.
extraordinarily slippery, and it would thus be unexpected or unusual.
unexpectedly and physically impaired Wollesen’s ability to travel on the road.”).

References: v. 
 v. 
 v.

 § 101
 v. 
 v.

 v. 
 v. 
 § 101
 § 101
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.

 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 

v. 
 § 101
 v. 
 v.