Source: https://ordinary-times.com/2014/04/14/sibelius-v-hobby-lobby-stores-inc-et-al-part-i-background-and-standards-of-law/
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 10:12:15+00:00

Document:
A description of the Ordinary Court project may be found here.
Likko, C.J. delivered the opinion of the Ordinary Court as to this Part I.
Petitioner Kathleen Sebelius is the Secretary of Health and Human Services of the United States. She is charged by law with implementation of portions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act and regulations promulgated thereunder, including 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4) and 78 Fed. Reg. 39870, which requires that corporations above a certain size provide medical insurance benefits to their employees that includes coverage for certain contraceptive methods (the “Contraception Mandate”), which are named in the regulations.
Hobby Lobby Stores’ principal business activity is the retail sale of consumer products, specifically crafting and hobby supplies such as paint, yarn, and paper. Mardel’s principal business activity is the retail sale of books and other products with explicitly Christian content.
Respondents cite, and Petitioner does not dispute the existence of, a multiplicity of factual indicia of religious beliefs. Hobby Lobby’s statements of purpose, authored by the Greens, provide that the companies are committed to “Honoring the Lord in all we do by operating the company in a manner consistent with Biblical principles.” The Greens have each signed a “Statement of Faith” and a “Trustee Commitment” which appear to be extra-legal documents but are nevertheless treated by the Greens in the discharge of their duties as directors and officers of Hobby Lobby as binding. Under the direction of the Greens, Hobby Lobby voluntarily does not operate businesses on Sundays, Christmas, or Easter; purchases religiously-themed advertisements on Christmas and Easter; provides access to various kinds of religious guidance and education to their employees; refrains from selling alcohol or alcohol-related products like shot glasses; and provides financial support to Christian charities and missionaries.
Hobby Lobby provides employee health insurance benefits (Hobby Lobby employs over 13,000 people; Mardel employs roughly 500) but do not include coverage for what Respondents consider to be abortifacients. Respondents claim a sincere religious belief that dispensation and use of abortifacients are a form of murder. Further, Respondents claim that four contraceptive methods listed in the Contraception Mandate are abortifacients. (This opinion does not address the veracity of that claim.) And finally, Respondents claim that should they fail to comply with the Contraception Mandate in its current form, or should they discontinue offering health insurance altogether to avoid compliance with the Contraception Mandate, they will be subject to very substantial monetary penalties, which they estimate range from $26,000,000 per year to $475,000,000 per year.
Therefore, Respondents filed suit against Petitioner in September of 2012, in the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma. They alleged that the Contraception Mandate imposed an unreasonable burden on their rights to free exercise of religion and therefore violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (“RFRA”), the First Amendment and specifically the Free Exercise Clause thereof, and the Administrative Procedures Act. All three of these claims are predicated upon functionally the same legal analysis.
RFRA was passed by Congress in response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). RFRA codified the two-step burden-shifting test expounded by the Supreme Court in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). Under this test, the plaintiff must prove two things: first, that the plaintiff has a claim implicating a sincere religious belief, and second, that the government’s action imposes a substantial burden upon that religious belief. If the plaintiff can prove these things, the burden then shifts to the government to show that its actions are both in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest, and that the government’s action is narrowly-tailored to restrict the free exercise of religion in the most minimal manner possible.
The Respondents then appealed to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Tenth Circuit found that Hobby Lobby and Marden were “persons” for RFRA purposes and that they were capable of exercising religion. As to the Greens, the Tenth Circuit directly reversed the District Court’s ruling that the Contraception Mandate imposed only an “indirect and attenuated” burden, and instead found that the proffered justification for the Contraception Mandate, “public health and gender equality” were not “compelling” governmental interests and that the Contraception Mandate was not sufficiently narrowly-tailored so as to minimize the impact on free exercise rights. Thus, the Tenth Circuit reversed the District Court, and enjoined enforcement of the Contraception Mandate on Respondents.
Petitioner timely appealed to the Supreme Court, which granted certiorari.
Importantly, the Supreme Court determined in Employment Division v. Smith, supra at 879, that the Free Exercise Clause “does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a valid and neutral law of general applicability.” This remains the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause to this day. RFRA is a statute, not an amendment to the Constitution.
It is a “fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.” Davis v. Michigan Dept. of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989). A court must therefore interpret the statute “as a symmetrical and coherent regulatory scheme,” Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 569 (1995), and “fit, if possible, all parts into an harmonious whole,” FTC v. Mandel Brothers, Inc., 359 U.S. 385, 389 (1959). Similarly, the meaning of one statute may be affected by other Acts, particularly where Congress has spoken subsequently and more specifically to the topic at hand. See United States v. Estate of Romani, 523 U.S. 517, 530–531 (1998). In addition, we must be guided to a degree by common sense as to the manner in which Congress is likely to delegate a policy decision of such economic and political magnitude to an administrative agency. Cf. MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 512 U.S. 218, 231, (1994). FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000). Thus, courts are guided to seek reconciliation and harmonization of the Contraception Mandate with RFRA to the maximum extent possible, and only to find a conflict when it absolutely cannot be avoided.
Likko, C.J., was joined in this part I of the opinion of the Ordinary Court by Thompson, J., Kowal, J., Togut, J., and Dave, J..
In return, they are asked to conform to several aspects of public policy. If they want to assert religious rights, they can become a sole proprietorship.
This is a good write up of mock Supreme Court opinion. I will have more to say substantively when the substance is addressed.
Okay, the clouds have rolled in, and with it, the obligatory drop in my cognitive abilities. So I need some plain English here.
The third portion of the opinion (after the C) these are the precedents shaping the decision?
I have a question about the previous SCOTUS decision on PPACA that springs from Gustafson v. Alloyd.
The overall regulatory goal of ACA was universal coverage — no free riders on the system, because free riders ultimately drive costs up. ACA included a mandate that all states expand Medicaid expansion to include people otherwise unable to purchase insurance, the the court overruled this; yet it seems to have upset the applecart with regards to Gustafson v. Alloyd.
My understanding is that they are both privately owned; meaning shares are not publicly traded on a registered exchange, but a closely held company can issue (and sell) shares of stock that cannot be sold, shareholders of a privately held company can sell their shares in a private sale.
This makes total sense, but what happens if they cannot avoid finding a conflict?
In Canada’s tradition (IIRC), there is the principle of Supremacy of Parliament (or something like that). It means that if a law is passed that contradicts a previous law, the new law is upheld and the old law is, essentially, null and void (roughly speaking). It’s just common sense, of course. A new session of Parliament can’t be held hostage by the laws of a previous session of Parliament; that wouldn’t actually be democracy.
So in this case, HL is claiming that the ACA (or the “contraception mandate” part of the ACA) violates the RFRA. But if it does, so what? The RFRA is just another piece of legislation passed by a previous congress/administration, is it not? Can’t a new congress/administration enact new laws? Would they have to make a little asterisk at the end of the ACA saying, “this law also modifies the RFRA such that the RFRA is totes cool with the contraception mandate”?
1. RFRA is just legislation that was passed and signed into law, correct? By that I mean, it’s not a constitutional amendment and it doesn’t carry any special weight that other laws don’t possess.
3. The Greens allege that the ACA (the contraception mandate part) violates the RFRA, correct?
4. If both the ACA and the RFRA are “just” legislation (not constitutional amendments or any special type of legislation), why would the RFRA overrule the ACA?
As mentioned, I’m used to the Canadian system where more recent legislation is assumed to overrule older legislation when there’s a conflict. To me, this is logical, since (theoretically) the legislators know what they’re doing and know that the new legislation they’re passing alters established legislation.
As you know now, I would find they do not conflict at all.

References: § 300
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.