Source: http://cpsr.org/prevsite/conferences/cfp93/kleiman.html/
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 23:16:20+00:00

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The telephone system in the United States is changing rapidly: fiber optic lines are being laid and innovative services are being offered. This paper addresses the response of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to challenges brought against the Bell Telephone Company and the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission for the introduction of caller identification services.
The Court quickly heard full arguments from both sides of the Caller ID suit. On February 7, 1990, the Commonwealth Court ruled that unrestricted Caller ID could not be offered to the public because the service was unconstitutional and illegal in Pennsylvania.9 Bell and the PUC appealed the decision to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. On October 24, 1991, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ("Court") became the highest federal or state court to rule on the arguments of Caller ID and telephone information services. The Court affirmed the decision of the Commonwealth Court and found that the PUC order allowing unrestricted Caller ID in Pennsylvania was illegal.
The question of the constitutionality of Caller ID has been actively debated in academic and legal circles. A seminal article published on the right of privacy and Caller ID by Glenn Chatmas Smith entitled We've Got Your Number! (Is it Constitutional to Give it Out?) was the first article to lay down the constitutional arguments and issues of Caller ID.10 Smith presented a sophisticated analysis of why constitutional privacy protections, normally thought to protect individuals from the invasive actions by the government, could constrain the services offered by the telephone company. He concluded that the actions of a telephone company were so heavily regulated by state public utility commissions that their actions fell with the sphere of "state action."11 Therefore, local telephone companies could be bound by the privacy protections found in federal and state constitutions.
Smith's ideas also drew attention in the courtroom. In its decision on Caller ID, Barasch v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 133 Pa. Commw. 285, 576 A.2d 79 (1990), the Commonwealth Court cited Smith's article with approval and adopted his analysis to show that Caller ID violated the high level of privacy guaranteed to residents of Pennsylvania under the Pennsylvania Constitution. A subsequent law review article labeled the court's constitutional reasoning "the Smith/Barasch rationale." The rationale stood for the proposition that "unrestricted Caller ID invades a legitimate [privacy] interest."
After the extensive attention given to constitutional issues, the legal and telecommunications communities received a surprise on March 18, 1992, when the Pennsylvania Supreme Court refused to review the constitutional issues of Caller ID. The judges affirmed the decision of the Commonwealth Court, but based their decision on statutory authority. The Court refused to review the constitutional arguments raised by the lower court and cited the doctrine of judicial restraint: "our courts should not decide constitutional issues in cases which can properly be decided on non-constitutional grounds."13 Since the Court found that Caller ID violated the Pennsylvania Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Control Act, it affirmed the Commonwealth Court's decision.
Therefore, Judge Pellegrini urged courts to examine Caller ID issues within the framework of existing legislation. He found that the Pennsylvania Wiretap Act was an appropriate statute for the court to apply because it provides a "comprehensive legislative scheme" covering "the entire area of interception of both conversations and electronic communications."19 Applying this statute to the facts of the case, he found that "Caller ID is violative of the Wiretap Act" and that "the PUC's order in this matter constitutes an error of law requiring its reversal."20 Therefore, Judge Pellegrini agreed with the majority that the Caller ID service involves illegal trap and trace activities which violate the privacy protections of the Pennsylvania Wiretap Act.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Commonwealth Court and overturned the PUC's order allowing unrestricted Caller ID to be offered in Pennsylvania. The Court found that Caller ID violates provisions of the Pennsylvania Wiretap Act. Briefs were presented to the Court by two sets of parties. Bell joined with the Pennsylvania PUC to appeal the Commonwealth Court decision (the "Appellants"). The Pennsylvania Coalition Against Domestic Violence joined with the ACLU of Pennsylvania, the Office of Consumer Advocate, and the Consumer Education and Protective Association to ask the Court to affirm the lower court's decision (the "Appellees"). In its opinion, the Court referred extensively to the arguments presented by the parties in their briefs.
The Court noted that all parties to the appeal agreed that Caller ID fit within this trap and trace definition.
Neither the Appellants nor the Appellees contended that Caller ID fell within this normal use/maintenance exception.
The Court agreed and strengthened the reasoning of the Appellees. The judges found that Caller ID involves two traps and that the second trap, performed by the "customer subscriber," violates the trap and trace provisions of the Wiretap Act.31 They also held that the first trap, performed by the telephone company itself, also violates the Wiretap Act when used for the purposes of Caller ID.32 Exemptions of section 5771(b) only allow the telephone company to perform trap and trace functions for specific purposes, such as the detection of "fraudulent, unlawful or abusive use" of telephone services.33 With Caller ID, Bell collects, stores, and uses the originating telephone number for "unlimited purposes."34 This information for unlimited use is obtained without a warrant and violates the Wiretap Act as an improper intrusion into the privacy of individuals.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania refused to rule directly on the constitutional issues of Caller ID or find that the service violated privacy provisions of the Pennsylvania Constitution. However, the Court interpreted the Wiretap Act in light of the strong privacy protections of the Pennsylvania Constitution. It held that the traditional limitations on police interception applied with equal force to the new interceptions offered by commercial information services.
Some may view the Caller ID decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court as very narrow. The Court closely examined the language of the Pennsylvania Wiretap Act, and it interpreted the Act in light of the Pennsylvania Constitution and its privacy protections. Pennsylvania's consent rules are among the strictest in the country. Federal laws and the laws of many states require only "one party consent:" as long as one party to the telephone conversation grants permission to the recording and monitoring of the call, no warrant or court order is required.38 Pennsylvania is joined by eight other states in its requirement of two party consent. California, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland, Montana, and Washington share the requirement that all parties to a conversation must consent before it can be recorded or transmitted without a warrant.39 Within these states, the Barasch decision can serve as a persuasive precedent when similar issues of Caller ID services arise.
The Pennsylvania decision may also be an important precedent in states with different consent rules, and telephone companies should not anticipate a "green light" for the introduction of information services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court and the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania have provided courts in other states with an analytical approach to commercial communication services and existing interception laws. Both courts broadly interpreted the Pennsylvania Wiretap Act. They found that it included new types of technology: types of trap and traces devices invented long after the Legislature passed the statute. They also found that its limits apply to new groups of actors: commercial information service vendors and telephone providers, in addition to the already regulated law enforcement and police. The courts expressed a willingness to closely examine the details of a new technology, to look beyond general descriptions into actual functioning and operation. This level of inquiry, conducted when an important value such as privacy is in question, provides an important model for other courts.
Finally, the example of judicial restraint is important. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court chose not to lay down any absolute constitutional bars to Caller ID. It worked within the framework of the Wiretap Act, interpreted in light of the Pennsylvania Constitution, to reach its decision. Therefore, the Court left to the Pennsylvania Legislature the primary responsibility and power to determine the balance between individual privacy on the telephone system and the commercial interests wanting to offer telephone information services. These thoughtful decisions provide insight into the types of questions likely to be presented before many state and federal courts in the future, and a model for weighing and closely examining the nature of the problem and the branches of government best able to render the decision.
3 The regional operating companies appealed their ban from information services. In a 1991 decision, Judge Greene "with considerable reluctance," lifted the information services restriction because of new guidelines by the Court of Appeals. United States v. Western Electric Co., 767 F.Supp. 308, 327 (D.D.C. 1991). This paper deals with the forces in operation between 1984 and 1991 which led to the creation of Caller ID.
6 Id. 7 Id. at *1. Blocking is the main privacy protection envisioned for the Caller ID system. Throughout this paper, the term "unrestricted Caller ID" and "unblocked Caller ID" refers to the PUC's plan for Caller ID which had no voluntary Caller ID blocking for the general public.
8 Pennsylvania Coalition Against Domestic Violence v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 130 Pa. Commw. 418, 568 A.2d 726 (1989) aff'd sub nom Barasch v. Bell Tel. Co., 529 Pa. 523, 605 A.2d 1198 (1992).
9 Barasch v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 133 Pa. Commw. 285, 576 A.2d 79 (1990) aff'd sub nom Barasch v. Bell Tel. Co., 529 Pa. 523, 605 A.2d 1198 (1992). [Hereinafter Barasch v. PUC].
10 37 UCLA L. Rev. 145 (1989).
12 See, e.g., Note, Informational Privacy and Property Rights: Caller ID and the Barasch Court, 13 Geo. Mason U.L. Rev. 447, 461 (1990); Steven P. Oates, Caller ID: Privacy Protector or Privacy Invader?, 1992 U. Ill. L. Rev. 21 (1992); Riley K. Temple and Michael Regan, Recent Developments Relating to Caller ID, 18 W. St. Univ. L. Rev. 549 (1991).
13 Barasch v. Bell Tel. Co., 529 Pa. 523, 605 A.2d 1198 (1992). [Hereinafter Barasch v. Bell].
14 Barasch v. PUC, 576 A.2d 79 at 95 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1990) (Pellegrini, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
21 Barasch v. Bell, 605 A.2d at 1203.
22 Joint Brief of Appellees at 13, Barasch v. Bell Tel. Co., 529 Pa. 523, 605 A.2d 1198 (1992). [Hereinafter Appellee Brief].
23 Barasch v. Bell, 605 A.2d at 1201.
24 18 Pa. Const. Stat. Ann. section 5771(a).
26 18 Pa. Const. Stat. Ann. section 5771(b)(1).
27 18 Pa. Const. Stat. Ann. section 5771(b)(2).
28 Appellee Brief, 605 A.2d at 1202.
30 Appellee Brief at 15.
32 Barasch v. Bell, 605 A.2d at 1202.
33 Appellee Brief at 15.
36 Appellee Brief at 16.
37 Barasch v. Bell, 605 A.2d at 1202.
38 Note, Informational Privacy and Property Rights: Caller ID and the Barasch Court, 13 Geo. Mason U.L. Rev. 447, 461 (1990).

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