Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/4th/101/1194.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 08:30:55+00:00

Document:
IRV RUBIN et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. CITY OF BURBANK, Defendant and Appellant.
Dennis A. Barlow, City Attorney and Juli C. Scott, Chief Assistant City Attorney, for Defendant and Appellant.
John L. Gordon, Stuart J. Roth, David A. Cortman, Gregory N. Bryl; and American Center for Law and Justice for Mayor Margaret Clark, Zane Han, Gary Clark, Joe Velasquez and Ricardo Quevedo as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant.
Richards, Watson & Gershon, T. Peter Pierce, Amy Greyson and Carrie H. Ahn for 34 California Cities as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant.
Roger Jon Diamond for Plaintiffs and Respondents.
Objecting to an invocation given at a Burbank City Council meeting which ended with an expression of gratitude and love "in the name of Jesus Christ," plaintiffs sought and were granted injunctive and declaratory relief against the City. The trial court ruled that the inclusion of "sectarian prayer" in city council meetings violated the Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution, and it enjoined the City from allowing sectarian prayer at city council meetings. The trial court also ordered the City to "advise anyone conducting a prayer as part of the City Council meeting that sectarian prayers are not permitted." The City has appealed and contends the judgment is "contrary to a firmly established body of constitutional jurisprudence that holds that the practice of legislative invocations which do not proselytize, promote or disparage any single religion" do not violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The City further contends that the court order amounts to unconstitutional censorship and viewpoint discrimination.
Because we conclude the invocation violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution under Marsh v. Chambers (1983) 463 U.S. 783, and the court's order did not constitute censorship or viewpoint discrimination under the Free Speech and Exercise Clauses, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The facts are not disputed. Since 1953 the City of Burbank has had a practice of beginning each city council meeting with an invocation. The invocation is usually given by a member of the Burbank Ministerial Association (BMA), a non-denominational organization of clergy and representatives of other organizations, such as the YMCA, whose members meet for [101 Cal. App. 4th 1198] the purpose of fellowship among the religious leaders of the community. BMA is not entirely Christian, but there are, for example, no Moslem, Buddhist, Hindu or Bahai members in the group.
It was the practice of the BMA to circulate a sign-up sheet among its members for volunteers to give the council invocation. The list of volunteers was provided to the city clerk who placed the name of a volunteer on the agenda. Neither the city council nor the city clerk had any input in determining the subject matter or content of the invocation. Although the members of the BMA agreed among themselves that they would be respectful of their members' various and diverse beliefs, they imposed no restrictions on the content of the invocation.
Plaintiff Roberto Alejandro Gandara, who was raised as a Catholic, was present at an earlier city council meeting at which an invocation was given in which Jesus Christ had not been mentioned.
Rubin and Gandara filed suit for declaratory and injunctive relief, challenging the practice of the City to begin the city council meetings with religious prayers invoking the name of Jesus Christ. After trial, the court found the prayer recited on November 23, 1999 was "sectarian" and violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. The court permanently enjoined the City from "knowingly and intentionally allowing sectarian prayer at City Council meetings." The City was ordered to "advise anyone conducting a prayer as part of the City Council meeting that sectarian prayers are not permitted."
The City contends that the trial court erred, asserting (1) pursuant to Marsh v. Chambers, supra, 463 U.S. 783, legislative invocations do not violate the Establishment Clause, and the content of legislative prayer is not to be scrutinized where it is not used to proselytize, advance or disparage any one religion; (2) the rule of Marsh has not been diluted or abrogated by other Establishment Clause cases; and (3) the regulation of the content of prayer is impermissible viewpoint discrimination.
Legislative invocations do not violate per se the Establishment Clause.
The issue presented in Marsh, as stated by Chief Justice Burger writing on behalf of the majority, was "whether the Nebraska Legislature's practice of [101 Cal. App. 4th 1200] opening each legislative day with a prayer by a chaplain paid by the State violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment." (Marsh, supra, 463 U.S. at p. 784.) In Marsh, a member of the Nebraska Legislature sought to enjoin this practice claiming that it violated the Establishment Clause. The District Court "held that the Establishment Clause was not breached by the prayers, but was violated by paying the chaplain from public funds." (Id. at p. 785.) On appeal, the Eighth Circuit applied the three-part test established by the court in Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971) 403 U.S. 602. The Lemon test set forth a standard for evaluating statutory violations of the Establishment Clause finding no violation if the following were proven: "First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion.'" (Id. at pp. 612-613, citations omitted.) fn. 5 The Eighth Circuit held that the Nebraska policy violated all three elements of the test, and prohibited the state from continuing its established practice. Certiorari was granted by the Supreme Court.
The trial court's review was not an unconstitutional extension of Marsh.
 The City, in defending its practice of opening the city council meetings with prayer, contends the trial court misapplied the Marsh test and created its own legal standard "which has no precedential base" and is "contrary to established law." The City asserts the invocations did not serve the purpose of proselytizing, advancing or disparaging any one religion and therefore did not violate the Establishment Clause. Based on that view, the City argues the trial court violated the explicit holding in Marsh when it evaluated and parsed the content of the prayer given as the council's invocation on November 23, 1999, improperly focusing on the content of the very last sentence of the prayer that referred to "Jesus Christ" and basing its determination that the prayer was sectarian on that reference alone.
The City and amici in support of the City's position contend that under Marsh the appropriate test involves an examination of the proselytizing or disparaging content of the prayer, rather than a determination of the [101 Cal. App. 4th 1202] "sectarian" nature of an individual prayer. They argue that the Marsh court's mention in footnote 14 of the removal of all references to Christ in the Nebraska prayer is merely dicta in an anecdotal footnote, and this factor is never substantively addressed in the opinion. Thus, the City argues that the trial court's apparent reliance on footnote 14 was misplaced and that the trial court "created its own legal standard which has no precedential support and is in fact contrary to the law."
Respondents contend that the prayer in Marsh survived constitutional scrutiny because any reference to Jesus Christ had been removed and that Marsh supports the decision of the trial court here.
Amici Margaret Clark et al. argue that as long as the invocation was not used to advance the Christian faith or disparage other faiths, the prayer passed constitutional muster under Marsh.
It is clear that the factual predicate upon which the Supreme Court ruled in Marsh was a legislative invocation from which all references to a particular religion have been purposely excised. We therefore agree with respondents that the trial court's decision was correct under Marsh.
The reference to "Jesus Christ" in the invocation violated the Establishment Clause.
We review the invocation at issue in light of the foregoing considerations. The expression of gratitude and love "in the name of Jesus Christ" was an [101 Cal. App. 4th 1204] explicit invocation of a particular religious belief. By directing the prayer to "Our Father in Heaven . . . in the name of Jesus Christ" the invocation conveyed the message that the Burbank City Council was a Christian body, and from this it could be inferred that the council was advancing a religious belief.
The City argues that because only about 20 percent of the volunteers providing the legislative prayer mentioned Jesus Christ in the invocation, it is clear that the prayer opportunity was not being exploited to advance or disparage any one faith or belief. This argument promotes a test that unless a certain incidence of unconstitutional prayer is proven, it cannot be established that one religious belief or faith is being proselytized or advanced over another. We disagree. Rather, we interpret Marsh to mean that any legislative prayer that proselytizes or advances one religious belief or faith, or disparages any other, violates the Establishment Clause.
We therefore conclude that, in accordance with the holding in Marsh, the invocation offered to Jesus Christ violated the Establishment Clause because it conveyed the message that Christianity was being advanced over other religions. The trial court was correct in its finding.
The prohibition against "sectarian prayer" is within the mandate of Marsh.
City contends that imposing a standard prohibiting "sectarian prayer" is beyond the mandate of Marsh, and, indeed, that sectarian prayer in the context of a legislative invocation is constitutionally permitted. City argues that the trial court's review exceeded the only criteria imposed by Marsh to assess whether the "prayer opportunity has been exploited" for the purposes of proselytizing, advancing, or disparaging any one belief or faith. (Marsh, supra, 463 U.S. at p. 795.) We disagree.
Requiring the council to advise prayer participants that sectarian prayers are not permitted does not amount to unconstitutional censorship or viewpoint discrimination.
[3a] The city contends that by ordering the City to advise those who volunteer to give the council invocation that sectarian prayers are not permitted, the City is placed in the position of censoring the speech of those who seek to address the city council. City further contends that by "restricting those whose prayer traditions and beliefs require them to pray in the name of Jesus Christ, while allowing others to pray in a manner consistent with their beliefs" the trial court engaged in discrimination based on viewpoint or ideology, in violation of the speaker's right to freedom of speech under the First Amendment. City relies on Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn. (1983) 460 U.S. 37, fn. 9 Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Ed. Fund (1985) 473 U.S. 788, and Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of VA. (1995) 515 U.S. 819 fn. 10 to support its contention.
City correctly points out that "[t]he government must abstain from regulating speech when the specific motivating ideology or the opinion or [101 Cal. App. 4th 1206] perspective of the speaker is the rationale for the restriction." (Rosenberger, supra, 515 U.S. at p. 829.) But this does not create carte blanche for the speaker.
In light of the fact that the legislative invocation given at the Burbank City Council meeting took place on government property, was authorized by the long standing policy of the city council, was part of the official agenda of the council meeting, and was for the purpose of calling for spiritual assistance in the work of the legislative body, we are satisfied that it was not "private speech." As in Santa Fe and Cole, an objective observer familiar with the City's policy and implementation would likely perceive that the invocation carried the City's seal of approval. As such those who provide legislative invocations at the Burbank City Council meetings are subject to the requirement that the prayers should comport with the First Amendment.
The judgment of the trial court fully comports with Marsh v. Chambers, supra, 463 U.S. 783, and is affirmed. Respondents are awarded costs of appeal.
Nott, Acting P. J., and Ashmann-Gerst, J., concurred.
FN 1. The entire text of the invocation was as follows: "Our Father in Heaven, we are grateful to assemble this evening in the capacity of the City Council meeting. We wish to thank thee and express our gratitude for the blessings that we receive each day. We especially are mindful of this week and the Thanksgiving Day to come on which people all over our nation will be expressing gratitude and love unto thee for thy bounteous blessings. [¶] We feel privileged to be part of this community. We are grateful for those who have stepped forward and have been elected to lead this community. Will thou bless them and give them insight and wisdom and those of the city staff who assist and direct the affairs of the city. [¶] Heavenly Father we are grateful for the youth of this community for they are the future and we ask a blessing upon those who teach and lead the youth that they may inspire them to be their best. [¶] We are grateful heavenly Father for all that thou has poured out on us and we express our gratitude and our love in the name of Jesus Christ. Amen."
FN 2. Amici in support of the City express concern about the effect the trial court's decision will have on their own cities' practice of prayers at council meetings, and that they too will be forced to end the practice of allowing "sectarian" prayers at their council meetings.
FN 3. The Council for Secular Humanism takes the position that no branch of government should favor religion over non-belief.
FN 4. Respondents, while otherwise taking the position that Marsh should be overruled, concede that for the purposes of this case Marsh is controlling.
FN 5. For application of this standard, see, e.g., Committee for Public Education v. Regan (1980) 444 U.S. 646, 653; Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist (1973) 413 U.S. 756, 772-773; Hunt v. McNair (1973) 413 U.S. 734, 741.
FN 6. Webster's 10th Collegiate Dictionary (2001) page 1053.
FN 7. Webster's 10th Collegiate Dictionary, supra, page 1053.
FN 11. Amicus Thirty-Four California Cities presents an argument in their brief that the terms of the trial court's injunction are ambiguous and therefore unenforceable. This issue was never raised by the parties before the trial court nor discussed by the parties on appeal. While we recognize that this court may consider new issues raised by an amicus on appeal (see Fisher v. City of Berkeley (1984) 37 Cal. 3d 644, 709-713), we decline to do so here. We note that City has not referred to this issue in its reply brief.

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