Source: https://njmel.org/mel-safety-institute/resource-center/public-property/public-property-decisions/
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 04:21:21+00:00

Document:
Yanko v Fane (1976) | Common law sidewalk immunity does not apply to commercial property owners.
Freitag v. Morris County (1981) | Unimproved property immunity exists for both natural and “artificial” hazards, i.e. rocks along a toboggan run that had been placed there sometime in the past.
Shore v. Harrison Housing Authority (1986) | Housing authority not immunized for injuries that occur due to criminal acts while its police officer was “goofing off”.
McCarthy v. Verona (2001) | Summary judgement upheld because no reasonable jury can find that a concrete sidewalk with a rise of one and a quarter inch at a joint with another slab creates a substantial risk of injury under NJSA 59:4-1.
Pallister v. Spotswood First Aid Squad (2002) | Volunteer First Aid squads and their volunteers are protected by NJSA 2A:53-13 and 13.1 (Volunteer Fire Company immunity) even if the squad id not apart of a fire company.
Lodato v. Evesham (2006) | NJSA 40:64-14 does not immunize an advisory shade tree Committee (as opposed to a shade tree commission—see Petrocelli v. Sayreville (1997)) or the town. Further, an ordinance that requires residential property owners to repair sidewalks dos not overcome the common law sidewalk immunity enjoyed by residential property owners.
Sopko v. Logan Twp (2007) | Unlike a private adjoining landowner, a public entity has no duty to inspect or trim the hedges when they happen to lie in its right of way.
Charney v. Wildwood (2010): Imperfections in boardwalk surfaces are commonplace, and the failure to remedy every small defect in a boardwalk cannot be deemed palpably unreasonable. Accordingly, the court finds a reasonable fact finder could not resolve the palpable unreasonableness question in favor of plaintiff.
Murray v. Plainfield Rescue Squad (2010): The legislature provided immunity to (1) volunteer rescue squads and their members (NJSA 2A:53A-13 and 13.1, i.e. Volunteer Fire Company Immunity), (2) non volunteer rescue squads and their members rendering advanced life support services (NJSA 26:2k-14) and members of non volunteer rescue squads rendering intermediate life support services (NJSA 26:2K-29) but not to the non volunteer rescue squad itself rendering intermediate life support services.
Bezerra v. DeLorenzo (2012) | Under the Tort Claim Act, the immunity standard is different for employees as opposed to the public entity. Generally, an employee is entitled to immunity unless the employee’s conduct “was outside the scope of employment or constituted a crime, actual malice, actual fraud, actual malice or willful misconduct”.
Plumhoff v. Rickard (2014) | Officer was justified using deadly force to terminate a high speed chase.
Lambert v. Travelers (2016) | not withstanding the auto no fault law, when an employee is injured in an auto accident, the employee may sue a third party and the WC insurer has subrogation rights to the recovery.
Jones v. Morey’s Pier (2017) | When a defendant does not serve a timely notice of claim on a public entity, and is not granted leave to file a late notice, the statute bars that defendant’s cross-claim or third-party claim for contribution and common law indemnification against the public entity.

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