Source: http://wcc.dli.mt.gov/P/Petersen_V_Findings.htm
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 06:14:05+00:00

Document:
Summary: Claimant suffers from painful plantar faciitis of both feet. Her treating physician attributed 70% of her condition to her work as a hairdresser and the insurer accepted liability under the Occupational Disease Act. Claimant is precluded from returning to work as a hair dresser and a vocational consultant hired by the insurer prepared a rehabilitation plan calling for claimant to take computer courses which would lead to employment as a clerical office worker. The claimant rejected the plan and demanded 104 weeks of rehabilitation benefits so she could embark on a two-year educational program; however, at trial, she presented neither a rehabilitation plan nor any supporting evidence for one. She also demanded $10,000 pursuant to section 39-72-405, MCA (1997). At trial the insurer agreed to pay her $7,000 but she seeks the additional $3,000.
Held: The claimant is not entitled to rehabilitation benefits as she does not have a plan and there is unrebutted vocational evidence that a two-year program is not appropriate. She is also not entitled to an additional $3,000 under section 39-72-405, MCA, since she failed to provide persuasive evidence of a wage loss and even if there were a wage loss it would be short term and not enough to justify any additional award.
Benefits: Rehabilitation Benefits. Claimant is not entitled to rehabilitation benefits where she has rejected a plan proposed by the insurer's vocational consultant and has not presented any alternative plan. § 39-71-1006, MCA (1997).
Constitutions, Statutes, Regulations and Rules: Montana Code Annotated: 39-71-1006 (1997). Claimant is not entitled to rehabilitation benefits where she has rejected a plan proposed by the insurer's vocational consultant and has not presented any alternative plan. § 39-71-1006, MCA (1997).
Occupational Disease: Indemnity (39-72-405) Awards. Proof of wage loss is a prerequisite to any award under section 39-72-405, MCA (1997).
¶1 The trial in this matter was held in Missoula, Montana, on January 19, 2001. The parties requested and were provided an opportunity to file post-trial memoranda addressing wage loss and apportionment issues. The final memorandum was submitted on March 30, 2001, and the matter was then deemed submitted.
¶2 Exhibits: Exhibits 1 through 8, 10 and 11 were received into evidence without objection. There is no exhibit 9.
¶3 Witnesses and Depositions: Claimant was the only witness testifying at trial. In addition, the parties submitted the depositions of claimant and Dr. Glen J. Jarrett for the Court's consideration.
¶4 Issues Presented: The issues, as set forth in the Pretrial Order, are: "Whether Petitioner is entitled to permanent partial disability benefits and rehabilitation benefits."
¶7 In December 1998, claimant completed cosmetology school and became licensed as a hair stylist, designer, and cosmetologist. At about the same time as her graduation, she went to work in the Hair and Nail Salon at Dillard's Department Store in Missoula. She was initially hired as a receptionist. In that job she answered the telephone and greeted customers. Then, on January 6, 1999, she was hired as a hairdresser at a wage of $7 per hour.
¶8 Dillard's had a dress code for its hairdressers. The code required claimant to "wear coordinated suits or dresses" and "shoes which are traditionally thought of as dress shoes." (Ex. 10 at 1.) She was told by her supervisor that dress shoes meant high heels, therefore claimant wore high heels while working for Dillard's.
¶9 By May 1999, claimant had developed plantar faciitis in both feet, making it difficult for her to stand and walk. She was initially treated for her condition by Dr. Glen J. Jarrett, who is an orthopedic surgeon specializing in foot and ankle surgery. (Ex. 1 at 2.) Dr. Jarrett has continued to follow claimant and ultimately opined that 70% of the claimant's condition is attributable to her work at Dillard's, while 30% is attributable to non-occupational factors. (Id. at 18.) He opined that the claimant's wearing of high heeled shoes was a significant contributor to her condition. (Id.) His opinion, which is unrebutted, is persuasive and I therefore find that claimant's work at Dillard's is 70% responsible for her plantar faciitis.
¶10 At the time claimant developed plantar faciitis, Dillard's was insured by Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company (Liberty). Liberty accepted liability for the condition as an occupational disease.
¶12 Dr. Jarrett took claimant off work in May 1999, and has never approved her return to her time-of-injury job. On December 22, 1999, Dr. Jarrett specifically disapproved a job description for hairdresser at Dillard's.
¶14 At the same time claimant was receiving guidance and assistance from the DPHHS program, Liberty hired its own vocational consultant to evaluate claimant. (Ex. 5 at 2.) Kathy Kleinkopf (Kleinkopf), a Certified Rehabilitation Counselor, was assigned the case. She initially met with claimant on November 18, 1999.
. . . Ms. Petersen is not an appropriate candidate for two-year training. It appears that such a program would simply set her up for failure in a formal academic setting in which she would most likely struggle and have difficulty in competing successfully.
¶21 Claimant's work at the One Stop is not a reliable indicator of what she can earn in the open labor market. She did not seek employment at Dillard's, which pays $7 an hour, or any other regular employment, choosing instead to try to establish her own nail business. While she apparently believed that she could make more working on her own, she did not take into consideration the expense of establishing that business and the time it takes to build up a clientele. I therefore find that her meager earnings are not an accurate indicator of what she can earn in the open labor market, and instead rely upon the earnings information provided by Kleinkopf.
¶22 That information shows that claimant is employable both as a nail technician and as an apparel sewing machine operator. The latter position pays $6.25 entry level wage at Sun Mountain Sports in Missoula and pays up to $7.50 an hour for more experienced workers. (Ex. 5 at 52, 81.) As to the nail technician job, Kleinkopf identified 13 jobs at 4 different establishments in Missoula, with 6 openings (apparently during the prior year) and entry wages between $280.00 ($7.00/hour) and $600.00 ($15.00/hour) per week. She further notes that nail technicians are required to pay booth rental. However, Kleinkopf's prior contact with Dillard's, indicates that if hired claimant would be on salary of $7.00 an hour for 6 months "during which time she could establish a regular clientele" and that thereafter she could expect to make $8.00 to $10.00 per hour. (Id. at 52.) Lacking any vocational evidence whatsoever from claimant concerning either of the positions, I am unpersuaded that claimant suffered a wage loss. Moreover, even if she did, any wage loss would be short, not long-term. The information furnished for nail technicians indicates that earnings increase as they establish a regular clientele. The information for Sun Mountain indicates that as sewing machine operators gain experience their wages increase to and exceed the $7.00 an hour claimant was earning at the time of her occupational disease.
¶23 The claimant's occupational disease is governed by the 1997 version of the Occupational Disease Act (ODA) since that was the version in effect at the time her disease began and was diagnosed. Buckman v. Montana Deaconess Hospital, 224 Mont. 318, 321, 730 P.2d 380, 382 (1986).
¶24 Claimant bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that she is entitled to the benefits she seeks. Ricks v. Teslow Consolidated, 162 Mont. 469, 512 P.2d 1304 (1973); Dumont v. Wicken Bros. Construction Co., 183 Mont. 190, 598 P.2d 1099 (1979).
¶26 As set forth in subsection (c), the statute requires a plan that is agreed to by the claimant and insurer. Where the claimant and insurer disagree or cannot agree on a plan, the disagreement becomes a dispute within the jurisdiction of the Workers' Compensation Court, which will then determine whether the plan proposed by claimant is reasonable. Leastman v. Liberty Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 1999 MTWCC 2 at ¶ 62 (citing §§ 39-71-2401(1), -2905, MCA); and see Reeves v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 275 Mont. 152, 161, 911 P.2d 839, 844 (Nelson, J., specially concurring).
¶27 In this case, claimant has failed not only to present vocational evidence in support of a proposed plan, she has presented no plan at all. The Court fails to understand how claimant's attorney could allow her to reject the plan proposed by both the DPHHS counselor and Kathy Kleinkopf and then fail to offer even the most rudimentary plan in support of his assertion that the Court should award 104 weeks of benefits. The request for rehabilitation benefits is denied.
39-72-405. General limitations on payment of compensation.
(2) When an employee in employment on or after January 1, 1959, because the employee has an occupational disease incurred in and caused by the employment that is not yet disabling, is discharged or transferred from the employment in which the employee is engaged or when the employee ceases employment and it is in fact, as determined by the medical panel, inadvisable for the employee on account of a nondisabling occupational disease to continue in employment and the employee suffers wage loss by reason of the discharge, transfer, or cessation, compensation may be paid, not exceeding $10,000, by an agreement between the insurer and the claimant. If the parties fail to reach an agreement, the mediation procedures in Title 39, chapter 71, part 24, must be followed.
¶29 At trial Liberty agreed to pay $7,000 without prejudice to claimant arguing for $10,000, but also without conceding that claimant has a wage loss. At the parties' requests, the Court permitted post-trial briefing as to whether it can and should order payment of an additional $3,000. In her post-trial brief claimant argues two things: first, that the Court wrongly decided Baumgartner v. Liberty Northwest Ins. Co., WCC No. 9611-7642 (April 14, 1997) and, second, that apportionment is unconstitutional in any event. Liberty responds that claimant failed to establish a wage loss and is therefore not entitled to anything more than what it voluntarily agreed to pay. Liberty's argument is persuasive and dispositive, therefore I do not reach claimant's arguments.
¶30 Section 39-72-405, MCA (1997), which is quoted in paragraph 27 requires proof of wage loss: Claimant has failed to carry her burden of persuasion as to wage loss. Moreover, even if I were persuaded that there was a wage loss, I have found that such loss would be short term. In light of that fact, even if I were to make an award without consideration of non-occupational factors it would not be more than $7,000.
¶31 Claimant is entitled to costs but only with respect to the section 39-72-405, MCA, issue. That matter did go to trial and at the close of trial the insurer agreed to pay the $7,000, so I deem her as prevailing on that issue.
¶32 Pursuant to Liberty's agreement, made in open Court at the close of trial, Liberty shall pay claimant $7,000 if it has not already done so. The claimant is not entitled to any additional amount under section 39-72-405, MCA, or to rehabilitation benefits.
¶33 Claimant is entitled to costs with respect to her claim under section 39-72-405, MCA (1997), only. She shall submit her memorandum of costs in accordance with the Court's rules.
¶34 This JUDGMENT is certified as final for purposes of appeal.
¶35 Any party to this dispute may have 20 days in which to request a rehearing from these Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment.
DATED in Helena, Montana, this 28th day of August, 2001.

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