Source: https://wcc.state.ct.us/crb/1996/2216crb.htm
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 20:14:33+00:00

Document:
Park v. Kye Ja Choi d/b/a KESCO Manpower Co.
KYE JA CHOI d/b/a KESCO MANPOWER CO.
The claimant was represented by Kathleen Nastri, Esq., Carmody & Torrance, P.O. Box 1110, 50 Leavenworth St., Waterbury, CT 06721-1110, who did not appear at oral argument.
The claimant was also represented by George Kramer, Esq., Kramer & Southworth, 920 Farmington Ave., Suite 205 West Hartford, CT 06107, who did not appear at oral argument.
The respondent New York State Insurance Fund was represented by Scott Williams, Esq. and James Moran, Esq., Maher & Williams, 1300 Post Rd., Fairfield, CT 06430.
The respondent employer was represented by John Quinn, Esq., Furniss & Quinn, 248 Hudson St., Hartford, CT 06106.
The Second Injury Fund was represented by Michael Belzer, Esq., Assistant Attorney General, 55 Elm Street, P.O. Box 120, Hartford, CT 06141-0120.
This Petition for Review from the November 16, 1994 Finding and Award of the Commissioner acting for the First District was heard November 17, 1995 before a Compensation Review Board panel consisting of the Commission Chairman Jesse M. Frankl and Commissioners Roberta Smith Tracy and Michael S. Miles.
We will first address the motion to submit additional evidence which was filed by the New York Fund on January 20, 1995 requesting an investigation of “whether there was a policy of insurance in Connecticut” for the employer. In support of the motion, the New York Fund cites pages 5-7 of the November 4, 1994 formal hearing transcript. This transcript section merely indicates that the representative of the Second Injury Fund did not have any information regarding whether the claimant had suffered a compensable injury, and therefore left the claimant to his proof. There is no indication that either the respondent employer or the New York Fund requested a continuance or an investigation regarding the issue of insurance coverage at any time during the formal hearing process. Moreover, the employer has not contended that it had any workers’ compensation insurance other than its policy from the New York Fund.
If any party to an appeal shall allege that additional evidence or testimony is material and that there were good reasons for failure to present it in the proceedings before the commissioner, he shall by written motion request an opportunity to present such evidence or testimony to the compensation review division, indicating in such motion the nature of such evidence or testimony, the basis of the claim of materiality, and the reasons why it was not presented in the proceedings before the commissioner.
It is a party’s burden to recognize and resolve inconsistencies in the evidence at the formal hearing, whether or not those discrepancies seemed significant at the time of the hearing. See Lesczynski v. New Britain Memorial Hospital, 10 Conn. Workers Comp. Rev. Op. 205, 208-9, 1289 CRD-6-91-9 (Dec. 2, 1992). In the instant case, the formal hearing was held on November 4, 1994. The New York Fund has not alleged that evidence regarding whether the employer had any other workers’ compensation insurance policies was unavailable during the formal hearing process, nor does it allege any good reason for the failure to present such evidence. Moreover, the respondents do not contend that the employer had another workers’ compensation insurance policy. Accordingly, we deny the motion to submit additional evidence. See Lange v. J & B Excavating & Paving, 11 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 42, 1249 CRD-3-91-6 (March 18, 1993).
Stickney v. Sunlight Construction Co., 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 364, 366, 1738 CRB-6-93-5 (Aug. 2, 1994) (citations omitted).
In addition, the Supreme Court of Connecticut has stated that the purpose of § 31-343 (formerly § 5406) is “to make certain that an employer shall at all times be in a position to fulfill all his obligations to his employees under the Act.” Witchekowski v. Falls Co., 105 Conn. 737, 739 (1927). Furthermore, the court stated that the trial commissioner may make his award against the insurer, the employer, or both, but that an award against both the employer and the insurer is favored. Id. at 740-41. In the instant case, the trial commissioner’s order against both the employer and its insurer is supported by the language of § 31-343, the court’s opinion in Witchekowski, supra, and the decision of Stickney, supra. Accordingly, we find no error in the trial commissioner’s order against both the employer and its insurer. The legal issue regarding the interpretation of the insurance policy issued by the New York Fund may now be litigated in another forum, such as a federal court, in order to determine whether the Second Injury Fund, pursuant to § 31-355, may recover any amounts it has paid to the claimant due to the failure of the employer and its insurer to pay.
Finally, we will address the contention that it was improper for the trial commissioner to issue a penalty against the employer pursuant to § 31-288(c) for failure to carry workers’ compensation insurance. As explained above, the trial commissioner properly ordered the employer and its insurer to pay the compensable claim by presuming coverage under the existing policy. A penalty for failure to carry insurance pursuant to § 31-288(c) by definition requires a finding of no insurance. In the instant case, the imposition of a penalty for failure to carry insurance conflicts with the statutorily mandated presumption of coverage. We conclude that a penalty pursuant to § 31-288(c) is premature at this time, and should not be issued until and unless another tribunal has interpreted the insurance policy issued by the New York Fund to exclude coverage of the claimant’s Connecticut injury.
We find it is necessary to comment regarding the conduct of the respondents. In the instant case, the parties do not dispute that the claimant sustained a compensable injury during the course of his employment in Connecticut on June 3, 1994. However, it appears3 that the respondents have failed to pay any benefits to the claimant under the Workers’ Compensation Act, including payment of his medical bills. Of concern here is that while the employer, its insurer, and the Second Injury Fund have not disputed compensability, they have each apparently refused to pay benefits for an extended period of time. To delay payments for a compensable claim is unconscionable, as it defeats the humanitarian purpose of the Workers’ Compensation Act.
Moreover, the employer’s decision to obtain a workers’ compensation insurance policy which purports on its face to deny coverage of injuries which occur in Connecticut where the employer sent its employees, including the claimant, to perform the intrinsically dangerous work of asbestos removal, demonstrates a remarkable lack of respect for the laws of this state as well as an indifference to the humanitarian purpose of the Workers’ Compensation Act. See Jimenez v. Montero, 14 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 40, 43, 1826 CRB-4-93-8 (May 4, 1995).
The § 31-288(c) penalty is reversed. In all other respects, the decision of the trial commissioner is affirmed.
Commissioners Roberta Smith Tracy and Michael S. Miles concur.

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 31
 § 5406
 v. 
 § 31
 § 31
 § 31
 § 31
 § 31
 v. 
 § 31