Source: https://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-supreme-court/441/786.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 17:39:29+00:00

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Upon trial in a Kentucky state court, respondent was convicted of several offenses. The trial court refused to give respondent's requested jury instruction on the presumption of innocence, but did give an instruction to the effect that the jury could return a guilty verdict only if they found beyond a reasonable doubt that respondent had committed the acts charged with the requisite criminal intent. Relying on its understanding of Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478 - where this Court reversed a conviction resulting from a trial in which the judge had refused to give a requested instruction on the presumption of innocence - the Kentucky Supreme Court held that such an instruction is constitutionally required in all criminal trials, and that the failure of a trial judge to give it cannot be harmless error.
The Kentucky Supreme Court erred in interpreting Taylor, supra, as holding that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment absolutely requires that an instruction on the presumption of innocence must be given in every criminal case. The failure to give such an instruction when requested does not in and of itself violate the Constitution. Under Taylor, such a failure must be evaluated in light of the totality of the circumstances - including all the instructions, the arguments of counsel, whether the weight of the evidence was overwhelming, and other relevant factors - to determine whether the defendant received a constitutionally fair trial.
570 S. W. 2d 627, reversed and remanded.
Patrick B. Kimberlin III, Assistant Attorney General of Kentucky, argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Robert F. Stephens, Attorney General.
Terrence R. Fitzgerald argued the cause for respondent. with him on the brief was Paul G. Tobin.
In Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478 (1978), this Court reversed a criminal conviction resulting from a trial in which the judge had refused to give a requested jury instruction on [441 U.S. 786, 787] the presumption of innocence. Relying on its understanding of that decision, the Kentucky Supreme Court in the present case held that such an instruction is constitutionally required in all criminal trials, and that the failure of a trial judge to give it cannot be harmless error. 570 S. W. 2d 627. We granted certiorari to consider whether the Kentucky Supreme Court correctly interpreted our holding in Taylor. 439 U.S. 1067 .
The respondent was charged in three separate indictments with the commission of several armed robberies. At trial, numerous eyewitnesses identified the respondent as the perpetrator. Weapons, stolen money, and other incriminating evidence found in the respondent's automobile were introduced in evidence. The respondent did not take the stand in his own defense. The only evidence on his behalf was given by his wife and sister who offered alibi testimony concerning his whereabouts during the time of the commission of one of the robberies.
The Court observed, for example, that the trial judge's instructions were "Spartan," 436 U.S., at 486 , that the prosecutor improperly referred to the indictment and otherwise [441 U.S. 786, 789] made remarks of dubious propriety, id., at 486-488, and that the evidence against the defendant was weak. Id., at 488. "[T]he combination of the skeletal instructions, the possible harmful inferences from the references to the indictment, and the repeated suggestions that petitioner's status as a defendant tended to establish his guilt created a genuine danger that the jury would convict petitioner on the basis of those extraneous considerations, rather than on the evidence introduced at trial." Id., at 487-488.
It was under these circumstances that the Court held that the failure of the trial court to instruct the jury on the presumption of innocence denied the defendant due process of law. Indeed, the Court's holding was expressly limited to the facts: "We hold that on the facts of this case the trial court's refusal to give petitioner's requested instruction on the presumption of innocence resulted in a violation of his right to a fair trial as guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id., at 490 (emphasis added). This explicitly limited holding, and the Court's detailed discussion of the circumstances of the defendant's trial, belie any intention to create a rule that an instruction on the presumption of innocence is constitutionally required in every case.
In short, the failure to give a requested instruction on the presumption of innocence does not in and of itself violate the Constitution. Under Taylor, such a failure must be evaluated in light of the totality of the circumstances - including all the instructions to the jury, the arguments of counsel, whether the weight of the evidence was overwhelming, and other relevant factors - to determine whether the defendant received a constitutionally fair trial.
The Kentucky Supreme Court thus erred in interpreting Taylor to hold that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment absolutely requires that an instruction on the presumption of innocence must be given in every criminal [441 U.S. 786, 790] case. The court's inquiry should have been directed to a determination of whether the failure to give such an instruction in the present case deprived the respondent of due process of law in light of the totality of the circumstances.
[ Footnote 2 ] The wanton endangerment convictions were reversed on state-law grounds not relevant here.
No principle is more firmly established in our system of criminal justice than the presumption of innocence that is accorded to the defendant in every criminal trial. In In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 , the Court held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of a defendant's guilt. I believe that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment equally requires the presumption that a defendant is innocent until he has been proved guilty.
Almost 85 years ago, the Court said: "The principle that there is a presumption of innocence in favor of the accused is the undoubted law, axiomatic and elementary, and its enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law." Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 . Only three years ago the Court reaffirmed that the presumption of innocence "is a basic component of a fair trial under our system of criminal justice." Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 . See also Cool v. United States, 409 U.S. 100, 104 . And a fair trial, after all, is what the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment above all else guarantees.
[ Footnote 1 ] At least one Member of the Court understood our opinion in Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478 to hold precisely that. See id., at 490 (BRENNAN, J., concurring).

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