Source: https://www.friscodwilawyer.com/state-does-not-need-to-charge-how-someone-is-intoxicated-in-dwi-cases/
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 19:48:32+00:00

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The new case that came out says they no longer need to do this. Therefore, as someone defending themselves on a DWI charge, you will not know how the State plans to prove you were intoxicated until the trial begins. In reality, though, most cases a good attorney will have an idea. Always mental and physical faculties, and only .08 where breath tests are involved. Where it gets tricky is if someone blows under .08, but the state tries to use "retrograde extrapolation," to prove you were higher at the time of driving.
On State’s Petition for Discretionary Review from the Ninth Court of Appeals Montgomery County.
Joseph Salhab, for Stephen Gregory Barbernell.
Marc Brumberger, for The State of Texas.
KEASLER, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
*1 Stephen Gregory Barbernell was charged with DWI. The court of appeals affirmed the trial judge’s decision to grant Barbernell’s motion to quash due to the State’s failure to allege which definition of “intoxicated” that it intended to prove at trial.FN1 The court reasoned that intoxication is an act or omission and that the definitions of “intoxicated” provide for different means of commission.FN2 Because we hold that the definitions of “intoxicated” do not describe an act or omission, we reverse and vacate the judgment of the court of appeals and remand this case to the trial court.
FN1. Barbernell v. State, 221 S.W.3d 914, 917-18 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 2007).
FN3. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 49.04 (Vernon 2003).
FN4. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 49.01(2)(A)-(B) (Vernon 2003).
FN6. 810 S.W.2d 197 (Tex.Crim.
FN7. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 49.01(2) (previously codified at TEX. REV. CIVIL STAT. art. 6701 l-(a)(2)).
FN9. 152 S.W.3d 125 (Tex.Crim.App.2004).
FN10. See TEX.CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 44.01(a)(1) (Vernon Supp.2005).
FN11. Barbernell, 221 S.W.3d at 916.
FN16. 221 S.W.3d at 918 (Horton, J., concurring).
Before we address this particular issue, we provide a general overview of the law concerning notice and our most recent cases addressing notice in relation to the offense of DWI. And because the State’s ground for review comes to us in light of our decision in Gray, we will also examine Gray’sdiscussion of the DWI statute.
bsp;amend. VI; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 10;Ferguson v. State, 622 S.W.2d 846, 849 (Tex.Crim.App.1981) (opinion on reh’g)); TEX. CONST. art. V, § 12(b); see also Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196, 201 (1948).
FN19. Curry v. State, 30 S.W.3d 394, 398 (Tex.Crim.App.2000) (citing State v. Mays, 967 S.W.2d 404, 406 (Tex.Crim.App.1998)).
FN20. Moff v. State, 154 S.W.3d 599, 601 (Tex.Crim.App.2004); Ferguson, 622 S.W.2d at 849-50.
FN21. TEX.CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 21.21(7).
FN22. TEX.CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 21.03; TEX.CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 21.23.
FN23. TEX.CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 21.11; TEX.CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 21.23.
FN24. Lawrence, 240 S.W.3d at 916 (citing State v. Mays, 967 S.W.2d 404, 406 (Tex.Crim.App.1998)); Curry, 30 S.W.3d at 398 (citingOlurebi v. State, 870 S.W.2d 58, 62 (Tex.Crim.App.1994)); Phillips v. State, 597 S.W.2d 929, 934 (Tex.Crim.App.1980) (citing Parr v. State, 575 S.W.2d 522, 526 (Tex.Crim.App.1978); Boney v. State, 572 S.W.2d 529, 532 (Tex.Crim.App.1978)).
FN25. Geter v. State, 779 S.W.2d 403, 405 (Tex.Crim.App.1989) (citing Thomas v. State, 621 S.W.2d 158, 161 (Tex.Crim.App.1981);May v. State, 618 S.W.2d 333, 341 (Tex.Crim . App.1981)).
FN26. Marrs v. State, 647 S.W.2d 286, 289 (Tex.Crim.App.1983) (citing Thomas, 621 S.W.2d at 162); see also Curry, 30 S.W.3d at 398.
FN27. Curry, 30 S.W.3d at 398.
FN29. Solis v. State, 787 S.W.2d 388, 390 (Tex.Crim.App.1990); Geter, 779 S.W.2d at 405 (citing Ferguson, 622 S.W.2d at 851).
FN31. Saathoff v. State, 891 S.W.2d 264, 266 (Tex.Crim.App.1994) (citing Ferguson, 622 S.W.2d at 851).
FN32. Moff, 154 S.W.3d at 601.
FN33. 747 S.W.2d at 381.
FN38. 810 S.W.2d at 200.
FN42. Id. (citing Garcia, 747 S.W.2d at 381; Solis, 787 S.W.2d at 391).
FN44. 152 S.W.3d at 126.
FN50. Gray, 152 S.W.3d at 131.
FN59. Id. (citing TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(a)(22)).
FN61. 784 S.W.2d 369 (Tex.Crim.App.1990).
FN62. Gray, 152 S.W.3d at 132.
FN63. Ex parte Luna, 784 S.W.2d at 371.
FN64. Gray, 152 S.W.3d at 132.
Reiterating the arguments it made before the trial judge and the court of appeals, the State contends that by explicitly disavowing Garcia’sreasoning in Gray, we necessarily undermined Carter’s holding that the State is required to allege the definition of “intoxicated” that it intends to rely on at trial. The State asserts that a person’s state of intoxication is not an act or omission; instead, it is the defendant’s condition and a circumstance that accompanies the defendant’s act of operating a motor vehicle. In response, Barbernell argues that our decision in Carter is sound and has not been undermined by Gray. Citing Carter as controlling precedent, Barbernell asserts that the court of appeals was correct in affirming the trial judge’s ruling.
At the outset, we must make clear that our discussion about the elements of DWI in Gray had no impact on Garcia’s holding concerning the adequacy of notice. We expressly made this point at the end of our opinion in Gray when responding to the State’s request that we overrule Garcia’snotice holding: “Reaching out to address the validity of Garcia’s notice holding would be dicta. And we have rejected this argument before. We decline to consider it today.” FN70 Consequently, contrary to the State’s argument, Gray’s discussion of the elements of DWI and renunciation ofGarcia’s statement that the type of intoxicant is an additional element of the offense, while authoritative with respect to the elements of DWI, does not directly control the pleading notice issue before us.
FN70. 152 S.W.3d at 134 (majority opinion), 136 (Cochran, J., dissenting).
on at trial. With these principles in mind, we find that it is necessary to revisit our analysis inCarter.
FN71. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(22).
*6 A careful review of our decision in Carter reveals that the Court’s analysis was incorrect. First, although the Court, consistent with Gray, began by citing the elements of DWI as those set out in Article 6701 l-1(b) of the Texas Revised Civil Statutes, now codified in Section 49.04(a), Texas Penal Code, the Court ultimately held that by virtue of the definitions of the element “intoxicated,” that there two separate DWI offenses-“loss of faculties” and “per se.” The Court reached this conclusion based on its determination that the definitions of “intoxicated” permit the offense of DWI to be proven in two ways. Our reevaluation of this analysis exposes a serious defect in the Court’s reasoning: After identifying the elements of DWI, the Court neglected to ask whether the definitions of “intoxicated” concern an act or omission so as to create more than one manner and means of committing an offense. Instead, without explanation, the Court decided that the two definitions of “intoxicated” each constitute separate acts or forbidden conduct. In doing so, the Court failed to reconcile this conclusion with its previous statement that the definitions of “intoxicated” involve only matters of proof. Then, expanding on its faulty determination, the Carter Court held that, because the two types of forbidden conduct involve “fundamentally different natures” and “different behaviors,” a charging instrument must allege the definition of “intoxicated” that the State will seek to prove at trial.
FN72. DIX & DAWSON, 41 TEXAS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 20.314 (2nd ed.2001).
Having determined that Carter’s holding evolved from a flawed analysis, we now reevaluate the notice issue according to the dictates of our precedent. With the understanding that “intoxicated” is an element of DWI FN74 and that Section 49.01(2) sets out two definitions for “intoxicated,” we ask whether the definitions of “intoxicated” concern an act or omission and create two different manners and means of committing DWI. Our recent examination of the definitions of “intoxicated” in Bagheri v. StateFN75 leads us to conclude that the answer to this question is “no.” Echoing the sentiments of Professors Dix and Dawson, in Bagheri, we held that the definitions “set forth alternative means by which the State may proveintoxication, rather than alternate means of committing the offense.” FN76 We then explained, “The conduct proscribed by the Penal Code is the act of driving while in a state of intoxication. That does not change whether the State uses the per se definition or the impairment definition to prove the offense.” FN77 These statements make clear that the definitions of “intoxicated” are purely evidentiary matters; therefore, they do not need to be alleged in a charging instrument to provide a defendant with sufficient notice. As a result, we overrule Carter’s holding that the State must allege the definition of “intoxicated” that it intends to rely on at trial in the charging instrument to provide adequate notice. A charging instrument that pleads the offense of DWI provides adequate notice when it sets out the elements of the offense as provided in Section 49.04.
FN74. Gray, 152 S.W.3d at 131.
FN76. Id. at 762 (emphasis in original).
*7 Thus, in this case, the information, though it did not allege either definition of “intoxicated,” provided Barbernell with adequate notice, and the court of appeals erred to conclude otherwise.
After reevaluating our analysis in Carter, we hold that the definitions of “intoxicated” in Section 49.01(2) are evidentiary and therefore do not need to be alleged in a charging instrument. Therefore, a trial court should not quash a DWI information charging a defendant with DWI due to the State’s failure to allege the definition of “intoxicated” that it intends to prove at trial. The judgment of the court of appeals is reversed and vacated, and the cause is remanded to the trial court.

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