Source: http://masscases.com/cases/sjc/294/294mass105.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 22:10:33+00:00

Document:
ANNA V. DOYLE vs. JACK GOLDBERG.
Evidence that a registrant of an automobile lived with his father in Boston five months of a year, taught in the Boston schools and voted there, did not as a matter of law render unwarranted a finding that his principal residence within the provisions of G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 90, s. 2, was in Weymouth, where he lived and garaged his automobile seven months of the year from April until November; and a ruling, that registration from Weymouth was valid, was proper.
The owner of a motor vehicle was not as a matter of law guilty of bad faith if, in determining in which of two municipalities, where he resided at different periods of a year, he should register his motor vehicle, he chose the one having the lower rate of insurance.
An application for registration of a motor vehicle under G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 90, s. 2, made in October and truly stating the applicant's principal residence, was not invalid because it did not take effect until the following January 1 and, by his established habit of life, on January 1 and until April his physical residence was in a municipality different from that stated in the application.
TORT. Writ in the Municipal Court of the Brighton District of the City of Boston dated April 12, 104.
The action was heard by Connelly, J., who found for the plaintiff in the sum of $606.60. A report to the Appellate Division for the Northern District was ordered dismissed. The defendant appealed.
B. Potter, for the plaintiff.
dar year 1934 in October, 1933, and received them in November, 1933, and that in October, 1933, she was living in Weymouth. The father of the plaintiff testified that the house at North Weymouth was his summer home and that his daughters lived there with him.
The trial judge found that the plaintiff lived and garaged her automobile "more than seven months in each year at 41 Ocean Avenue, North Weymouth" and that that was her "principal residence." It has not been argued that there is any distinction between Weymouth and North Weymouth so far as concerns the merits of the case. The court takes judicial notice that North Weymouth is not a town but is a part of the town of Weymouth. These findings are supported by the evidence and must be accepted as true. Jones v. Clark, 272 Mass. 146, 149. Bresnick v. Heath, 292 Mass. 293, 296. Kennedy Bros. Inc. v. Bird, 287 Mass. 477, 484. The trial judge ruled upon these facts that the "automobile of the plaintiff having been registered from 41 Ocean Avenue, North Weymouth, which was the place where the plaintiff lived more than seven months in each year, was not an outlaw on the highway on February 12, 1934."
It is required that an application for registration of an automobile shall contain "a statement of the name, place of residence and address of the applicant." G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 90, s. 2. The statutes contain no definition of the words "place of residence" as thus used; do not in terms require a statement of the domicil of the applicant and make no reference to the word "domicil." One object of this legislative scheme for registration of automobiles is that there may be upon the public records an easy means of identification of the automobile and its owner. Nash v. Lang, 268 Mass. 407, 409. Topf v. Holland, 288 Mass. 552. Ricker v. Boston Elevated Railway, 290 Mass. 111. Brodmerkle v. Gorolsky, 293 Mass. 517.
House, Inc. 277 Mass. 440, 444, S. C. 289 Mass. 561, 566, is not to the contrary. In that case no question of two permanent residences as a habit of life was involved but simply a question of change of domicil with its consequent change of residence. The good faith of the plaintiff is not in issue. That is presumed in the absence,of proof to the contrary. Dondis v. Lash, 277 Mass. 477, 485. Janevesian v. Esa, 274 Mass. 231, 233. A finding that the desire of the plaintiff was to secure a lower rate of automobile insurance, if warranted by the facts, was not bad faith in the circumstances disclosed.
in the application and the certificate of registration were true when applied to her established habits of life. It is not necessary to determine what her rights might be if, on or after January 1, she ceased to have the residence in Weymouth. Questions of that nature can be decided if and when they arise. Fairbanks v. Kemp, 226 Mass. 75. Doubtless, if a change of residence before January 1 is contemplated, that must be reflected in the application whenever made out. But that situation is not disclosed on this record.
It is not necessary to examine one by one the defendant's requests for rulings which were denied. It is enough to say that, on the facts revealed, there is no reversible error. The testimony of the plaintiff to which objection was made was rightly admitted.

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