Source: http://massachusettslandlords.com/sullivan/
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 07:07:54+00:00

Document:
In this eviction case, plaintiff seeks possession from defendants for non-payment of rent. No written answer was filed, and the court finds as follows: Plaintiff owns a four-family residential dwelling at 298 School Street Athol, wherein defendants reside as tenants at Apartment #2. The rent is $650.00 due the 1St day of each month. Defendant owe $400.00 toward rent for December 2012, and $650.00 for each of the months of March, April and May 2013, leaving a balance of $2,350.00 in unpaid rent due plaintiff, who terminated the tenancy.
Defendants asserted that they withheld rent because of defects in their apartment in violation of G.L. c. 239, s. 8A. There exists with respect to every residential tenancy, an implied warranty of habitability that the premises are fit for human habitation. A landlord is in breach of the warranty where there exist defects that may materially affect the health or safety of thc occupants. Boston Housing Authority v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184, 199 (1973). A breach of the implied warranty of habitability occurs from the point in time that the landlord knew or should have known of a substantial defect or substantial Sanitary Code violation in the apartment.
habitability. Boston Housing Authority v. Hemingway, supra.
The measure of damages for breach of the implied warranty of habitability is the difference between the fair rental value of the premises free of defects and the fair rental value of the premises during the period that the defective condition existed. Boston Housing Authority v. Hemingway, supra; Haddad v. Gonzalez, 410 Mass. 855, 872 (1991). The court finds that the fair rental value of the premises free of defects is the contract rent of $650.00, and that the fair rental value given said defects is reduced by 30% to $455.00.
Plaintiff knew or should have known about said defective conditions at the inception of the tenancy in September 2012, before defendants were first in arrears in their rent. Accordingly, defendants established a defense to possession under G.L. c. 239, s. 8A. The fair rental value of the premises from September 2012 (taking into account the defective conditions that existed) totals $4,095.00. During that same period of time, defendant paid $3,500.00 in rent to plaintiff. Accordingly, the amount due plaintiff is $595.00 under Section 8A.
As to all other claims asserted by defendants, the evidence presented is insufficient for a finding in defendants’ favor. Accordingly, judgment shall enter for plaintiff on all said claims.
Based upon all the credible testimony and evidence presented at trial in light of the governing law, it is ordered that judgment enter in favor of defendants for possession pursuant to the fifth (5th) paragraph of G.L. c 239, s. 8A, on the condition that within seven (7) days of receipt of this order, defendants deposit with the clerk of this court the sum of $595.00 by bank check or money order made payable to plaintiff. If this deposit is made, the clerk shall immediately release all such funds held by the court to plaintiff. If the deposit is not made as prescribed, judgment shall automatically enter in favor of plaintiff for possession and damages in the amount of $595.00 through May 2013, plus court costs.
In this Summary Process action, plaintiff seeks to recover possession of the premises from defendant for non-payment of rent. Defendant filed a written answer that included an affirmative defense to possession and counterclaims arising from the tenancy, and the court finds as follows: Plaintiff owns a four-family residential dwelling at 94 Woodland Street, Worcester, wherein defendant has resided as a tenant-at-will at Apartment 1L since March 26, 2012. The rent is $800.00 due the first day of each month. Defendant has a history of non-payment or late payment of his rent. He paid $400.00 toward February 2013 rent, and nothing since, leaving a balance of $2,800.00 in unpaid rent due plaintiff through May 2013. On February 6, 2013, plaintiff terminated the tenancy by serving defendant with a legally sufficient fourteen (14) day notice to quit (Exh. 1) for non-payment of rent.
health or safety of the occupants. Boston Housing Authority v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184, 199 (1973). A breach of the implied warranty occurs from the point in time that the landlord knew or should have known of a substantial defect or substantial Sanitary Code violation in the apartment. Section 8A provides that, where a tenancy has been terminated for non-payment of rent, the tenant shall be entitled to raise as a defense or counterclaim “any claim against the plaintiff relating to or arising out of such property, rental, tenancy, or occupancy for breach of warranty….” Where the defense or counterclaim is based upon the condition of the premises or services provided to the premises by the landlord, the tenant is entitled to a defense to possession if the landlord knew or should have known of the conditions before the tenant was first in arrears in his rent, and the landlord does not show that the tenant caused the conditions. The landlord is not entitled to recover possession of the premises if the court finds that the amount of rent due the landlord equals or is less than the amount due the tenant on his counterclaims and defenses.
In August 2012, plaintiff was made aware of an infestation of mice at the premises. Twenty glue traps were placed inside the apartment, some of which trapped mice. The mice population expanded in the colder months of December 2012, and January 2013. On or about February 27, 2013, an exterminator treated the apartment. No further complaints of mice were made to plaintiff since.
410 Mass. 855, 872 (1991). The court finds that the fair rental value of the premises free of defects is the contract rent of $800.00, and that the fair rental value given the mouse infestation has been reduced by 10% to $720.00.
Since plaintiff knew about the defective condition before defendant was in arrears in his rent, defendant has established his defense to possession under G.L. c. 239, s. 8A. The fair rental value of the premises from August 2012 (taking into account the rent abatement due defendant because of the mouse infestation that existed from August 2012 through February 2013) totals $7,440.00. During that same period of time, defendant paid plaintiff $5,200.00 in rent, leaving a total balance of $2,240.00 in unpaid rent due plaintiff under Section 8A.
Defendant also asserted counterclaims pursuant to state and federal fair housing laws, alleging that plaintiff made verbal statements relative to the rental of housing that indicated a preference, limitation or discrimination in violation of defendant’s rights under G.L. c. 151B, s. 4 (7B) and 42 U.S.C. s. 3604(c).
A person with HIV is disabled under fair housing laws.
Unbeknownst to plaintiff at the inception of the tenancy, Defendant is HIV positive.
Due to his HIV positive status, defendant is eligible for case management services through AIDS Project Worcester (“APW”), a non-profit agency located in Worcester. Defendant’s case manager is Carla Rodriguez. In an effort to determine defendant’s eligibility for assistance with utility bills, Ms. Rodriguez mailed a form to plaintiff in June 2012 to verify defendant’s tenancy.
the help of APW. Plaintiff made it clear that he was not interested in collecting any rent payments from defendant or anyone else on defendant’s behalf. Plaintiff made direct reference to defendant’s HIV status, and made it abundantly clear that he simply wanted defendant out of the apartment.
Plaintiff’s statements, together with his refusal to accept the rent payments offered by APW, and pursue the eviction of defendant, clearly indicate a discriminatory preference in violation of state and federal law, entitling defendant to $10,000.00 in compensatory damages. Plaintiff’s discriminatory conduct was intentional and willful, entitling defendant to treble damages ($30,000.00) under G.L. c. 93A, plus a reasonable attorney fee. The court declines to award defendant additional punitive damages in this case. The court finds that, on the credible evidence, defendant is not entitled to an award of monetary damages for emotional distress.
Based upon all the credible testimony and evidence presented at trial in light of the governing law, it is ordered that judgment enter for defendant for possession, plus monetary damages in the amount of $27,760.00 ($30,000.00 due defendant pursuant to G.L. c. 151B, s. 4(7B), and 42 U.S.C. 3604 (c), and G.L. c. 93A, plus $560.00 due defendant pursuant to G.L. c. 239, s. 8A, minus $2,800.00 in unpaid rent due plaintiff) through May 2013, plus defendant’s attorney fee, the reasonableness of which shall be determined by the court after hearing.
In this eviction case, plaintiff seeks possession from defendant for non-payment of rent. No written answer was filed, and the court finds as follows: Plaintiff owns 44 Cohasse Street, Southbridge, wherein defendant resides as a tenant subject to a lease (Exh. 1) at Apartment #2-B. The rent is $500.00 due the 5′ day of each month. Defendant paid $410.00 toward rent for October 2012, and nothing since, leaving a balance of $2,090.00 in unpaid rent due plaintiff, who terminated the tenancy (Exh. 2).
defective conditions therein. Said defects were corrected in January 2013. The court finds that the conditions cited in said inspection report, none of which were caused by defendant constituted a breach of defendant’s quiet enjoyment of the premises, entitling defendant to monetary damages of three times the monthly rent ($1,500.00), leaving a balance of $590.00 in unpaid rent due plaintiff under G.L. c. 186, s. 14.
Judgment shall enter in favor of plaintiff for possession and unpaid rent damages of $590.00 through February 2013, plus court costs.
In this eviction case, plaintiff seeks possession of the premises from defendants for nonpayment of rent. No written answer was filed, and the court finds as follows: Plaintiff owns 64-66 Stockton Street, Worcester, wherein defendants have resided as tenants for approximately seven years. The rent is $900.00 due on the first day of each month. Defendants paid no rent since March 2013, leaving a balance of $1,800.00 in unpaid rent due plaintiff, who terminated the tenancy.
Defendants asserted a defense to possession and counter claims under the provisions of G.L. c. 239, s 8A, alleging that plaintiff breached the implied warranty of habitability. There exists with respect to every residential tenancy, an implied warranty of habitability that the premises are fit for human habitation. A landlord is in breach of the warranty where there exist defects that may materially affect the health or safety of the occupants. Boston Housing Authority v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184, 199 (1973). A breach of the implied warranty of habitability occurs from the point in time that the landlord knew or should have known of a substantial defect or substantial Sanitary Code violation in the apartment.
which were caused by defendants, in the aggregate constituted a breach of the implied warranty of habitability. Boston Housing Authority v. Hemingway, supra. The measure of damages for breach of the implied warranty of habitability is the difference between the fair rental value of the premises free of defects and the fair rental value of the premises during the period that the defective condition existed. Boston Housing Authority v. Hemingway, supra; Haddad v. Gonzalez, 410 Mass. 855, 872 (1991). The court finds that the fair rental value of the premises free of defects is the contract rent amount of $900.00, and that the fair rental value of the premises given the existence of said defective conditions was reduced by 20% to $720.00.
Plaintiff knew or should have known about said defective conditions in March 2013, before defendants were first in arrears in their rent. Accordingly, defendants established a defense to possession under G.L. c. 239, s. 8A. The fair rental value of the premises from March 1, 2013 (taking into account the defective conditions cited) is $2,160.00. During that time, defendants paid $900.00 in rent, leaving a balance of $1,260.00 in unpaid rent due plaintiff in accordance with Section 8A.
Based upon all the credible testimony and evidence presented at trial and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in light of the governing law, it is ordered that judgment enter for defendants for possession pursuant to the fifth (5th) paragraph of G.L. c 239, s. 8A, on the condition that within seven (7) days of receipt of this order, defendants deposit with the clerk of this court the sum of $1,260.00 by bank check or money order made payable to plaintiff. If this deposit is made, the clerk shall immediately release all such funds held by the court to plaintiff. If the deposit is not made as prescribed, judgment shall automatically enter in favor of plaintiff for possession and unpaid rent damages in the amount of $1,260.00 through May 2013, plus court costs.
This is a summary process action in which plaintiff is seeking to recover possession of the premises from defendant for non-payment of rent. Defendant filed a written answer, and the court finds as follows: Plaintiff is the property manager for the premises at 19-21 Lancaster Street, Worcester, wherein defendant resides as a tenant-at-will at Apartment #2L. The rent is $600.00 due the first day of each month. Defendants paid no rent for December 2012, January 2013, or February 2013, leaving a balance of $1,800.00 in unpaid rent due plaintiff, who terminated the tenancy.
Defendant asserted a defense to possession under the provisions of G.L. c. 239, s. 8A, claiming plaintiff breached the implied warranty of habitability. There exists with respect to every residential tenancy, an implied warranty of habitability that the premises are fit for human habitation. A landlord is in breach of the warranty where there exist defects that may materially affect the health or safety of the occupants. Boston Housing Authority v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184, 199 (1973). A breach of the implied warranty of habitability occurs from the point in time that the landlord knew or should have known of a substantial defect or substantial Sanitary Code violation in the apartment.
Sanitary Code violations therein. The court finds that said defective conditions as cited in Exhibit A, none of which were caused by defendant, in the aggregate constituted a breach of the implied warranty of habitability. Boston Housing Authority v. Hemingway, supra. Said conditions did not rise to the level of a breach of quiet enjoyment under G.L. c. 186, s. 14. The measure of damages for the breach of warranty is the difference between the fair rental value of the premises free of defects and the fair rental value of the premises during the period that the defective conditions existed. Boston Housing Authority v. Hemingway, supra; Haddad v. Gonzalez, 410 Mass. 855, 872 (1991). The court finds that the fair rental value of the premises free of defects is the contract rent of $600.00, and that the fair rental value of the premises during the period of time that said defects existed shall be reduced by one-third to $400.00.
Plaintiff first knew about the defective conditions in December 2012, before defendant was first in arrears in the rent. Accordingly, defendant established a defense to possession under G.L. c. 239, s. 8A. The fair rental value of the premises from December 2012 (taking into account the defective conditions) totals $1,200.00. During that same period of time, defendant paid no rent to plaintiff, leaving a balance of $1,200.00 in unpaid rent due plaintiff under Section 8A.
The court finds that plaintiff terminated the tenancy solely because of defendant’s failure to pay his rent. Plaintiff’s conduct did not constitute an act of retaliation. As to the alleged lockout from the basement, the court finds that although plaintiff locked the basement door due to unauthorized storage of trash by tenants, and suspected tampering with the heating system, defendant was never denied access to that area of the premises, and may still gain access to the basement area provided such access is requested, and provided further that defendant be accompanied to the basement by plaintiff or plaintiff’s agent. Accordingly, defendant is not entitled to relief under G.L. c. 186, s. 14.
As to all other claims asserted by defendant, the court finds that defendant’s testimony is not credible, and that the credible evidence presented does not support a finding in defendant’s favor. Accordingly, judgment shall enter in favor of plaintiff on all said claims.
inferences drawn therefrom in light of the governing law, it is ordered that judgment enter in favor of defendant for possession pursuant to the fifth (5th) paragraph of G.L. c 239, s. 8A, on the condition that within seven (7) days of receipt of this order, defendant deposits with the Clerk of this court the sum of $1,200.00 by bank check or money order made payable to plaintiff. If this deposit is made, the Clerk shall immediately release all such funds held by the court to plaintiff. If the deposit is not made as prescribed, judgment shall automatically enter for plaintiff for possession and damages in the amount of $1,200.00 through February 2013, plus court costs.
In this eviction case, plaintiff seeks possession from defendants for non-payment of rent. No written answer was filed, and the court finds as follows: Plaintiff owns 171 Woodland Avenue, Gardner, wherein defendants have resided as tenants-at-will since August 2009. Plaintiff testified that no written tenancy agreement exists, and no such written agreement was introduced at trial. The rent is $725.00 due the first day of each month. Defendants paid $60.00 toward October 2013 rent, and nothing since, leaving a balance of $1,390.00 in unpaid rent due plaintiff, who terminated the tenancy.
G.L. c. 186, s. 14 provides that any landlord who “directly or indirectly interferes with the quiet enjoyment of any residential premises” shall be liable for “actual or consequential damages or three (3) month’s rent, whichever is greater. The statute imposes liability where the landlord’s conduct causes a serious interference with tenant’s quiet enjoyment of the premises. A serious interference is an act or omission that impairs the character and value of the leased premises. Doe v. New Bedford Housing Authority, 417 Mass. 273, 284-285 (1994); Lowery v. Robinson, 13 Mass. App. Ct. 982 (1982).
utilities. The responsibility to pay utilities was transferred to defendants without a written agreement, in violation of G.L. c.186, s. 14. The absence of such a written agreement constituted a serious impairment of the character and value of the rented premises, entitling defendants to monetary damages equal to three times the monthly rent ($2,175.00) plus a reasonable attorney fee. G.L. c. 186, s. 14. Plaintiffs breach of quiet enjoyment further constituted a violation of the Consumer Protection statute, entitling defendants to minimum statutory damages of $25.00 plus a reasonable attorney fee. G.L. c. 93A. Given that no attorney appeared for defendants, no attorney fee shall be awarded.
Based upon all the credible testimony and evidence presented at trial and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in light of the governing law, it is ordered that judgment enter in favor of defendants for possession, and monetary damages in the amount of $810.00, ($2,175.00 due defendants under G.L. C. 186, s. 14, plus minimum statutory damages due defendants under G.L. c. 93A, minus unpaid rent damages of $1,390.00 due plaintiff through November 2013).

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