Source: https://wcc.state.ct.us/crb/2018/5959crb.htm
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 01:57:01+00:00

Document:
Cariello v. Home Health Care Services, Inc.
The claimant was represented by Christopher L. Morano, Esq., Law Offices of Christopher L. Morano, P.O. Box 200, Essex, CT 06426.
The respondents were represented by Michael V. Vocalina, Esq., Cotter, Cotter & Mullins, L.L.C., 6515 Main Street, Second Floor, Suite 10, Trumbull, CT 06611.
JOHN A. MASTROPIETRO, CHAIRMAN. The respondents have petitioned for review from the August 15, 2014 Finding and Award of Preclusion [hereinafter “Preclusion Order”] by David W. Schoolcraft, the Commissioner acting for the Eighth District. The trial commissioner concluded that because the respondents failed to respond to the claimant’s notice of claim within the statutory twentyeight day period pursuant to General Statutes § 31-294c (b), they were precluded from interposing a defense to the claim.2 The respondents have appealed the Preclusion Order, not on the grounds that the claimant’s notice was ineffective or they did respond in some fashion to the notice, but because it was inappropriate for the commissioner to order preclusion in the absence of medical evidence supportive of the claim. We find this argument devoid of merit given that it is clearly inconsistent with our Supreme Court’s analysis in Harpaz v. Laidlaw Transit, Inc., 286 Conn. 102 (2008) and Donahue v. Veridiem, Inc., 291 Conn. 537 (2009). In addition, the relief sought by the respondents, i.e., a remand to the trial commissioner in order to determine whether competent medical evidence supports a claim for benefits, is already encompassed in ¶ IV of the Preclusion Order. We therefore affirm the trial commissioner’s decision to grant the claimant’s motion to preclude.
The following facts are pertinent to our consideration of this matter. The claimant, a home health care worker, alleges that she sustained injuries which necessitated knee replacement surgery. She filed a Form 30C with the Workers’ Compensation Commission [hereinafter “Commission”] on December 19, 2011 which described her injury, identified her employer and her place of employment, and asserted that she had sustained a repetitive trauma injury in “12/28-31, 2010 – Jan & Feb 2011.” Findings, ¶ 8; Claimant’s Exhibit D. The claimant did not have access to a photocopy machine but testified that she made a handwritten copy of the Form 30C and mailed it to the respondents via certified mail. The respondents received and signed for a certified mailing from the claimant on December 19, 2011. The respondents neither filed a Form 43 contesting the claim nor advanced any payments to the claimant. On February 23, 2012, the claimant filed a motion to preclude.
At the formal hearing to consider the motion for preclusion, the trial commissioner found that although the copy of the Form 30C filed with the respondents was not a verbatim copy of the notice filed with the Commission, the form contained substantively the same information. See Findings, ¶ 17, and Conclusion, ¶ F. The respondents asserted that the date of injury on the Form 30C was too vague to warrant preclusion. The trial commissioner rejected this argument on the basis that the claim was for a repetitive trauma injury and the respondents were aware of the claimant’s last date of exposure. The trial commissioner found no prejudice to the respondents and also found that the substance of the Form 30C was sufficient to have enabled the respondents to investigate and respond to the claim. Given that the respondents failed to file a Form 43 or take some other appropriate action within twenty-eight days of the claim being filed, the trial commissioner granted the motion to preclude. In ¶ IV of the Preclusion Order, he directed the parties to proceed to a formal hearing if the respondents chose not to commence payment of benefits, at which point the claimant would be left to her proof regarding compensability, extent of disability and her entitlement to benefits.
The respondents filed a motion to correct seeking to redraft the orders issued in the Preclusion Order, contending that “[t]he Supreme Court’s rationale in deciding [Harpaz, supra, and Donahue, supra] needs to be revisited and overturned as it deprives the employer/insurer of procedural due process rights.” September 3, 2014 Respondents’ Motion to Correct, ¶ 4. This motion was denied in its entirety, and the respondents have pursued this appeal. The respondents’ argument is straightforward; they believe that preclusion cannot be granted unless the claimant presents a prima facie case, including medical evidence, to the commissioner. They further contend that Harpaz does not relieve a claimant of the obligation to prove a claim with probative evidence before being awarded benefits.
In Callender v. Reflexite Corp., 137 Conn. App. 324 (2012), cert. granted, 307 Conn. 915 (2012), appeal withdrawn, S.C. 19040 (September 27, 2013), our Appellate Court articulated a two-step process for deciding a motion to preclude. A claimant must establish: (1) that “the notice of claim is adequate on its face” such that the respondent was properly noticed regarding a workers’ compensation claim pursuant to Chapter 568; and (2) the respondent failed to respond in accordance with the provisions of the statute. Id., 338. A claimant must also establish that, on the basis of the allegations within the Form 30C, the Commission has subject matter jurisdiction over the claim. See Volta v. United Parcel Service, 5612 CRB-7-10-12 (January 31, 2012).4 It is well-settled that the conclusive presumption of compensability for failing to present a timely disclaimer is binding on the employer. However, “[h]ad the legislature intended not to allow the commissioner to probe the plaintiff’s proof, it readily could have stated that the compensability of the injury shall be conclusively presumed, rather than that the employer is conclusively presumed to have accepted the compensability of the claim.” Donahue, supra, 553.
We also note that had the Supreme Court intended to require a claimant to present prima facie proof of a claim prior to obtaining preclusion, the Donahue court would not have envisioned a circumstance in which the trial commissioner would be called upon to act in a proactive manner if he or she were not persuaded by the claimant’s evidence subsequent to granting preclusion.5 Id., 553-554. It is clear that Donahue creates a twostep protocol. First, the trial commissioner must determine if the respondent is precluded from contesting whether the claimant sustained a compensable injury. Second, after being granted preclusion, the claimant must present evidence to the trial commissioner justifying an award of benefits. In the present matter, we are satisfied that the Preclusion Order comports with the court’s analysis in Donahue and, therefore, do not find meritorious the respondents’ argument that reversible error occurred.
In addition, we are not persuaded that this appeal was jurisdictionally appropriate. It is well-settled that General Statutes § 31-301(a) allows us to consider appeals from certain interlocutory rulings prior to the adjudication of the merits of a case, and we have frequently considered appeals concerning the granting or denial of a motion to preclude.6 However, cases such as Richardson v. Bic Corporation, 4953 CRB-3-05-6 (September 7, 2006), speak to our desire for judicial economy and our interest in the expeditious resolution of disputes.
As our Appellate Court made clear in Gorelick v. Montanaro, 94 Conn. App. 14 (2006), interlocutory appeals are appropriate when the ruling being appealed either “terminates a separate and distinct proceeding; or ... so concludes the rights of the parties that further proceedings cannot affect them.” Id., 32, citing State v. Curcio, 191 Conn. 27, 31 (1983). Had the respondents appealed the Preclusion Order on the basis that the claimant’s notice was jurisdictionally defective or the respondents had actually complied with the provisions of General Statues § 31-294c, this tribunal would have been presented with a ripe dispute worthy of adjudication. The respondents did not challenge the decision to grant preclusion based on the established legal standard; instead, they sought a remand of the matter so the claimant could present additional evidence. We find this demand for relief superfluous. The trial commissioner has already determined that the claimant needs to present a prima facie case in order to obtain benefits. See Preclusion Order, ¶ IV. We fail to see how a remand of this matter would somehow achieve a result which differs from allowing the trial commissioner to rule on the merits of the claim.
In Quinones v. RW Thompson Company, Inc., 5792 CRB-1-12-10 (January 16, 2014), and Bailey v. Stripling Auto Sales, Inc., 4516 CRB-2-02-4 (May 8, 2003), this tribunal made it clear that in situations in which a party would not sustain irreparable harm if a case were to be heard on the merits, an interlocutory appeal should not be brought to the Compensation Review Board. In the present matter, if the trial commissioner determines that the claimant cannot prove she sustained a compensable injury, the respondents’ concerns will be moot. If the commissioner determines otherwise and the respondents find legal error in that decision, they can appeal the award at that time. See Geraldino, supra; Wikander v. Asbury Automotive Group/David McDavid Acura, 137 Conn. App. 665, 668 n.2 (2012). At present, however, the appeal is unripe for adjudication.
There is no error; the August 15, 2014 Finding and Award of Preclusion by David W. Schoolcraft, the Commissioner acting for the Eighth District, is accordingly affirmed.

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