Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=82680:56497&catid=1580&Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 01:48:06+00:00

Document:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. JAVIER MORILLA Y AVELLANO, Accused–Appellant.
Before us is an appeal filed by accused–appellant Javier Morilla y Avellano (Morilla) from the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals which affirmed his conviction and that of his co–accused Ronnie Mitra y Tena (Mayor Mitra) by the trial court, sentencing them2 to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P10,000,000.00 each.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Ronnie Mitra y Tena and Javier Morilla y Avellana GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged. Accordingly, both accused are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P10,000,000.00 each. Accused Willie Yang y Yao and Ruel Dequilla y Regodan are hereby ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt and are ordered immediately released from custody unless held for some other lawful cause.
The trial court dismissed the arguments of Mayor Mitra that he was without any knowledge of the contents of the sacks and that he was merely requested to transport them to Manila on board his Starex van. He explained that he only accommodated the request of a certain Ben Tan because the latter bought his fishing boat. It likewise dismissed the defense of ambulance driver Morilla of lack of knowledge of the illegality of the contents. Morilla insisted that he thought that he was just transporting wooden tiles and electronic spare parts together with Dequilla. The other passenger of the ambulance, Yang, in his defense, did not bother to inquire about the contents of the vehicle as he was merely an accommodated passenger of the ambulance.
We affirm the ruling but modify the penalty imposed.
The finding of conspiracy by both courts is correct.
Morilla argues that the mere act of driving the ambulance on the date he was apprehended is not sufficient to prove that he was part of a syndicated group involved in the illegal transportation of dangerous drugs.
In conspiracy, it need not be shown that the parties actually came together and agreed in express terms to enter into and pursue a common design. The assent of the minds may be and, from the secrecy of the crime, usually inferred from proof of facts and circumstances which, taken together, indicate that they are parts of some complete whole.22 In this case, the totality of the factual circumstances leads to a conclusion that Morilla conspired with Mayor Mitra in a common desire to transport the dangerous drugs. Both vehicles loaded with several sacks of dangerous drugs, were on convoy from Quezon to Manila. Mayor Mitra was able to drive through the checkpoint set up by the police operatives. When it was Morilla’s turn to pass through the checkpoint, he was requested to open the rear door for a routinary check. Noticing white granules scattered on the floor, the police officers requested Morilla to open the sacks. If indeed he was not involved in conspiracy with Mayor Mitra, he would not have told the police officers that he was with the mayor.
His insistence that he was without any knowledge of the contents of the sacks and he just obeyed the instruction of his immediate superior Mayor Mitra in driving the said vehicle likewise bears no merit.
In a similar case of People v. Libnao,25 this Court upheld the conviction for illegal transportation of marijuana of Libnao and Nunga, who were caught carrying a bag full of marijuana leaves when they were flagged down on board a passing tricycle at a checkpoint.
However, we modify the penalty imposed by the trial court as affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Originally, under Section 15 of Republic Act No. 6425,26 the penalty for illegal transportation of methamphetamine hydrochloride was imprisonment ranging from six years and one day to twelve years and a fine ranging from six thousand to twelve thousand pesos. Pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1683,27 the penalty was amended to life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from twenty to thirty thousand pesos. The penalty was further amended in Republic Act No. 7659,28 where the penalty was changed to reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos.
As to the penalties imposed by the trial court and as affirmed by the appellate court, we find the same in accord with law and jurisprudence. It should be recalled that at the time of the commission of the crime on September 6, 1991, Section 15 of R.A. No. 6425 was already amended by Presidential Decree No. 1683. The decree provided that for violation of said Section 15, the penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from P20,000.00 to P30,000.00 shall be imposed. Subsequently, however, R.A. No. 7659 further introduced new amendments to Section 15, Article III and Section 20, Article IV of R.A. No. 6425, as amended. Under the new amendments, the penalty prescribed in Section 15 was changed from “life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from P20,000.00 to P30,000.00” to “reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from P500,000.00 to P10 million.” On the other hand, Section 17 of R.A. No. 7659 amended Section 20, Article IV of R.A. No. 6425 in that the new penalty provided by the amendatory law shall be applied depending on the quantity of the dangerous drugs involved.
The trial court, in this case, imposed on petitioner the penalty of reclusion perpetua under R.A. No. 7659 rather than life imprisonment ratiocinating that R.A. No. 7659 could be given retroactive application, it being more favorable to the petitioner in view of its having a less stricter punishment.
1 Penned by Associate Justice Mariflor P. Punzalan Castillo with Associate Justices Rosmari D. Carandang and Ramon M. Bato, Jr., concurring. Rollo, pp. 2–24.
2 From the Records of the case, no appeal was timely made by the other accused, Mayor Mitra.
3 Records, Vol. I, p. 2.
4 In a Letter dated 23 October 2001, Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuño of the Department of Justice requested then Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, through Court Administrator (now Associate Justice of this Court) Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. for a transfer of venue of the case from Real, Quezon to any Regional Trial Court in Metro Manila, preferably in Quezon City, due to the large quantity of the confiscated drugs and difficulty on the part of the Government to prosecute the case in Quezon from Metro Manila. (Records, pp. 49–50). The said request was granted by this Court in a Resolution dated 6 March 2002. (Id. at 97).
5 Republic Act No. 6425 or The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. – Art. III, Section 15. Sale, Administration, Dispension, Delivery, Transportation and Distribution of Regulated Drugs. The penalty of imprisonment ranging from six years and one day to twelve years and a fine ranging from six thousand to twelve thousand pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, dispense, deliver, transport or distribute any regulated drug. In case of a practitioner, the maximum of the penalty herein prescribed and the additional penalty of the revocation of his license to practice his profession shall be imposed.
6 CA rollo, pp. 66–67.
15 Supplemental Brief. Id. at 52–53.
16 Rule 115, Section 1(b). – To be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
17 Supplemental Brief. Rollo, pp. 53–54.
Failure to move to quash or to allege any ground therefor. — The failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or information, either because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of any objections except those based on the grounds provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (g), and (i) of section 3 of this Rule.
19Figueroa v. People, 580 Phil. 58, 73–74 (2008).
20 Revised Penal Code, Article 8.
21Ho Wai Pang v. People, G.R. No. 176229, 19 October 2011, 659 SCRA 624, 637 citing People v. Miranda, G.R. No. 92369, 10 August 1994, 235 SCRA 202, 214.
22 Id. citing People v. Ponce, 395 Phil. 563, 572 (2000); People v. Mateo, Jr., 258–A Phil. 886, 904 (1989).
23People v. Baludda, 376 Phil. 614, 626 (1999).
24People v. Del Mundo, 418 Phil. 740, 754–755 (2001).
25 443 Phil. 506 (2003).
27 Presidential Decree No. 1683. – Amending Certain Sections of Republic Act No. 6425, As Amended, Otherwise Known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 and for Other Purposes.
Section 15. Sale, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Transportation and Distribution of Regulated Drugs. — The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from twenty to thirty thousand pesos shall be imposed upon any persons who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, dispense, deliver, transport or distribute any regulated drug. If the victim of the offense is a minor, or should a regulated drug involved in any offense under this Section be the proximate cause of the death of a victim thereof, the maximum penalty herein provided shall be imposed.
28 An Act To Impose The Death Penalty On Certain Heinous Crimes, Amending For That Purpose The Revised Penal Laws, As Amended, Other Special Penal Laws, And For Other Purposes.
Section 15. Sale, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Transportation and Distribution of Regulated Drugs. – The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, dispense, deliver, transport or distribute any regulated drug.
Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary, if the victim of the offense is a minor, or should a regulated drug involved in any offense under this Section be the proximate cause of the death of a victim thereof, the maximum penalty herein provided shall be imposed.
29 Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 6–A–92, 21 June 1993 Re: The Correct Application of the Penalties of Reclusion Perpetua and Life Imprisonment; Potenciano v. Reynoso, 449 Phil. 396, 409 (2003).

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