Source: https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/232/548
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 06:20:59+00:00

Document:
The town naturally grew along the railroad, and the right of way, so far as not occupied by the tracks, was and still is used for the ordinary purposes of a street, without objection by plaintiff in error or its predecessors in title. In laying out the town, this right of way was designated as a street 130 feet wide; the portion lying east of the tracks being designated as East Center street, the portion on the west of the tracks as West Center street. Cross streets were laid out, designated successively (commencing at the north) as Holly, Beech, Vine, Oak, Ash, Mulberry, Walnut, Chestnut, Spruce, Pine, and Elm streets. East and West Center streets have become the principal business streets of the town and the portion between Ash and Sprucefour blocksis the heart of the city.
Plaintiff in error began this action against the city of Goldsboro in the superior court of Wayne county, seeking to restrain the enforcement of the ordinances. A temporary restraining order was granted. At the hearing, the objection to the enforcement of § 1 was abandoned by plaintiff; as to the other sections the court vacated the restraining order. Upon appeal, the supreme court of North Carolina affirmed the judgment. 155 N. C. 356, 71 S. E. 514. The present writ of error under § 709, Rev. Stat., U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 575 (Judicial Code, § 237 36 Stat. at L. 1156, chap. 231, U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1911, p. 227), is based upon the insistence, made in the state courts and there overruled, that the ordinances impair the obligation of the contract contained in the charter of the company, in contravention of § 10 of art. 1, of the Federal Constitution, and deprive the company of its property without due process of law, in contravention of the 14th Amendment.
It is very properly conceded that the company may be required to limit the speed of its trains, and to have flagmen precede them to warn persons of their approach; and that the company may be required to change its grade at the street crossings. In New York & N. E. R. Co. v. Bristol, 151 U. S. 556, 567, 38 L. ed. 269, 272, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 437, this court sustained a Connecticut statute directed to the extinction of grade crossings as a menace to public safety, and compelling this to be done at the expense of the companies, although the grade crossings had been long before established under legislative authority. In Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226, 251, 41 L. ed. 979, 989, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 581, it was held that when the city opened a new street across the railroad it was not bound to take and pay for the fee in the land, but only to make compensation to the extent that the value of the company's right to use the land for railroad purposes was diminished by opening the street across it; and that the company was not entitled to have its compensation increased because of the fact that in order to safeguard the crossing it would thereafter be obliged to construct gates, and a tower for operating them, plank the crossing, fill in between the rails, and incur certain annual expenses for depreciation, maintenance, employment of gatemen, etc. To the same effect are Wabash R. Co. v. Defiance, 167 U. S. 88, 97, 42 L. ed. 87, 91, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 748; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Nebraska, 170 U. S. 57, 75, 42 L. ed. 948, 954, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 513; Northern P. R. Co. v. Minnesota, 208 U. S. 583, 597, 52 L. ed. 630, 636, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 341; Cincinnati, I. & W. R. Co. v. Connersville, 218 U. S. 336, 343, 54 L. ed. 1060, 1064, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 93, 20 Ann. Cas. 1206; Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Minneapolis, decided this day 232 U. S. 430, 58 L. ed. , 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 400. And see Grand Trunk Western R. Co. v. South Bend, 227 U. S. 544, 554, 57 L. ed. 633, 639, 44 L.R.A.(N.S.) 405, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 303.
ST. LOUIS POSTER ADVERTISING CO. v. CITY OF ST. LOUIS et al. (two cases).
LAKE ERIE & W. R. CO. v. STATE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION OF ILLINOIS ex rel. CAMERON.
DURHAM PUBLIC SERVICE CO. v. CITY OF DURHAM.
OKLAHOMA ANTURAL GAS CO. v. RUSSELL et al. OKLAHOMA GAS & ELECTRIC CO. et al. v. CORPORATION COMMISSION OF OKLAHOMA.

References: § 1
 § 709
 § 237
 § 10
 art. 1
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