Source: https://www.calattorneysfees.com/cases_equity/
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 15:57:40+00:00

Document:
Post-Trial Motion Is The Way To Go!
In Brown v. Mortensen, Case No. B281704 (2d Dist., Div. 1 Jan. 3, 2019) (published), the 2/1 DCA decided that no jury trial is available for attorney’s fee requests under the Confidentiality of Medical Information Act (CMIA), Civil Code section 56.35. Rather, a post-trial motion is the way to seek recovery of such fees.
Supplemental Evidence Was Properly Not Considered In The Trial Judge’s Discretion.
If the lower court grants you supplemental briefing, make sure you do so in line within the scope of the supplemental briefing allowed by the trial judge. MetLife Securities, Inc. v. Brandt, Case No. B282949 (2d Dist., Div. 3 Dec. 18, 2018) (unpublished) demonstrates that a motion will be denied where supplemental briefing exceeds what was authorized.
In this particular situation, cross-complainants did prevail, filing a motion to recover attorney’s fees based on a contractual clause which was an indemnity rather than a fees clause and offering no support as to the reasonableness of the lodestar request/counsel’s hourly rates. The lower court’s tentative was to deny on this basis, but it did allow them supplemental briefing to support the amount of the fee request. Cross-complainants fired their counsel and replaced with new counsel which filed large supplemental papers containing new fee entitlement bases and proof to support a $2.3 million fee request. The lower court denied fees altogether, finding the supplemental papers were outside of what it authorized.
The appellate court affirmed. The supplemental papers effectively abandoned reliance on the indemnity provision as a fee predicate, and the lower court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to consider supplemental entitlement arguments not raised earlier and which exceeded the scope of what was discretionarily allowed to be filed in the first place.
Fifth Circuit Sided With Two Other Circuits That Fees Can Be Denied In Unusual Circumstances, With Shocking Nature Of The Request Plus Conspiracy To Manufacture The Claim Solidifying The Fee Denial.
Davis v. Credit Bureau of the South, No. 17-41136 (5th Cir. Nov. 16, 2018) (per curiam) demonstrates how federal courts, even under a statutory scheme where fee recovery is mandatory, can affirm a fee denial where unusual circumstances show it would be unjust to award anything to plaintiff’s attorneys.
What happened in this one was that plaintiff sued defendant on the theory that defendant misrepresented itself as a credit bureau in its attempt to collect on a $107.29 water bill via a collection letter and a subsequent phone call, suing under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). The district judge, based on a magistrate recommendation, found a violation and awarded $1,000 statutory damages, but nothing more.
Plaintiff then sought to recover $130,410, an amount which shocked the district court and resulted in a denial of any fees.
There is a fee-shifting provision under the FDCPA which is codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3) in favor of prevailing plaintiffs. But there is a split in thinking on whether it is mandatory in nature, although worded that way. The Third and Fourth Circuits determined, contrary to other circuits, that a district judge can deny fees in “unusual circumstances,” such as bad faith. The Fifth Circuit followed suit under the facts of this particular case.
Here is what cemented why “unusual circumstances” were present: (1) the case was easily resolved through one Fifth Circuit opinion, such that not a lot of work was justified to get to the ultimate merits result; (2) the request was shockingly excessive in nature, with duplicative and inefficient work being contained in the supporting substantiation; and (3) there was some evidence that plaintiff “conspired” with attorneys to create a claim in order to generate a high fee request. Fee denial affirmed.
Appellate Court Found Unclean Hands Even Though That Ground Was Not Entertained By Lower Court.
Trees, trees, trees! Boy, do they generate disputes between neighbors when views are impacted. The next case is extraordinary because the reviewing court reversed an attorney’s fees award, on its own, based on the equities—too many fees spent on a tree trimming dispute which should have been resolved had the two parties been true neighbors.
Katz v. Puda, Case No. D071644 (4th Dist., Div. 1 Aug. 24, 2018) (unpublished) was a dispute between neighbors, where there was no homeowner association, about obstruction of view by untrimmed trees. There was a recorded Declaration of Restrictions (DOR) requiring the trimming of trees, but the neighbors could not reach a resolution and submitted the dispute to a three-day bench trial, where the lower court found the DOR unenforceable and awarded the prevailing neighbor $42,542.50 in attorney’s fees.
The Fourth District, Division 1, on appeal, affirmed the lower court’s denial of tree trimming relief, but on a different ground because it did believe that the DOR was sufficiently clear as to be enforceable. However, it found that the whole dispute was such that both sides were guilty of unclean hands. The dispute should not have escalated to the point of consuming three days of a trial court’s time and attorney’s fees of over $40,000 by one side, with the potential for ongoing enforcement litigation in the courts. That resulted in the wholesale reversal of the fee award—with the appellate court obviously peeved by both parties’ failure to act in a neighborly manner.
BLOG OBSERVATION—The “winning” appellate attorney as far as obtaining a reversal of the fee award was Barry A. Ross, an Orange County-based attorney who does a lot of HOA work and who is an acquaintance of co-contributor Marc. Congratulations, Barry.
This Was Tantamount To Making Improper Additional Findings Of Fact To Earlier Decision.
In a tutorial on the proper use of a motion to vacate judgment under CCP § 663a, Master Plumbing and Sewer, Inc. v. Fountaine West Condominium Owners Assn., Case No. A143711 (1st Dist., Div. 2 May 3, 2018) (unpublished) shows what can and cannot be done. In this case, the trial judge issued a detailed Statement of Decision indicating there was a factual basis for a fee award to the prevailing party based upon clauses in some invoices. However, in response to an opposition crafted through the vehicle of a motion to vacate judgment later, the trial judge changed his mind and excised the attorney’s fees entitlement ruling. The 1/2 DCA found that this was reversal error, reinstating the original judgment (complete with the fee entitlement decision). The reason? A section 663a motion does not allow a trial judge to change any finding of fact. A trial judge can find that an incorrect legal conclusion or erroneous judgment was reached, but can only do so based on the facts already found to exist. The lower court effectively made additional findings of fact, something which cannot be done under section 663a.
In Pari Delicto Exception Sustained the Fee Recovery.
What happened in Assadian v. Parsi, Case No. G054037 (4th Dist., Div. 3 Dec. 14, 2017) (unpublished) is that a business consultant, who apparently practiced law in an unauthorized manner, did not prevail on contract and other claims against his clients. Just to make the suffering more severe, consultant plaintiff was socked with $346,993.39 in attorney’s fees based on a fees clause in the consultant agreement based on losing the contract claims against his former clients.
Knockout punch. Sugar Ray Robinson v. Bobo Olson. 1956. Library of Congress.
On appeal, plaintiff basically said “unfair,” because you cannot award fees where the underlying contract is illegal, which happens to be the general rule under California law. However, as with most things in life, there are exceptions. One is the “in pari delicto” exception, which does allow recovery where both parties are not equally blameworthy. Well, that one showed why fee recovery was not inequitable against consultant plaintiff, because here his activities resulted in the contract being found illegal.
Acting Presiding Justice Moore authored the 3-0 panel decision.
Galindo v. Polakoff, Case No. D071555 (4th Dist., Div. 1 Nov. 29, 2017) (Unpublished)—Equity/Offsets.
R.W.L. Enterprises v. Oldcastle, Inc., Case No. D070189 (4th Dist., Div. 1 Nov. 29, 2017) —Equity/Contractual Integration.
This second case really came down to whether a subsequent credit application, entered into about nine years later (with a potential attorney’s fees clause), should be interpreted as integrated (or, in essence, incorporated by reference) into an earlier contract. The trial judge bought into the integration argument, awarding $180,120 to a party successfully defending a breach of contract claim. This result got reversed as a matter of law. There was too much of a temporal gap to allow for an integration analysis, whether under Civil Code section 1717 or the UCC. There is a great discussion for practitioners on the “battle of the forms” issue and the extent to which Boyd v. Oscar Fisher Co., 210 Cal.App.3d 368 (1989) should apply under the circumstances (or is still good law on certain aspects of its reasoning).
Throckmorton v. Soria, Case No. A144748 (1st Dist., Div. 2 Nov. 29, 2017) (Unpublished)—Appealability.
The third decision is a case where—alas!—the appellant failed to appeal from a separately appealable fee order and failed to provide motion papers/fee hearing reporter’s transcript. The appeal was doomed for two independent reasons—failure to appeal a separate appealable order and failure to provide an adequate record.
2437 Piedmont Avenue, LLC v. Schwartz, Case No. A150274 (1st Dist., Div. 2 Nov. 29, 2017) (Unpublished)—Fee Clause Interpretation.
This last one is where an owner/landlord sued for fraud, but dismissed its action, with tenant then moving for attorney’s fees under a lease fees clause. The trial court denied the fee request, which was sustained on review. The problem was that the tort claims were not brought to “enforce” the lease such that the narrow fees clause language did not provide a basis for fee entitlement.
Result No Different Even If Classic Attorney’s Fees Lien Involved.
All Intervening Procedural Steps Were Validated, But Appellate Court Did Not Award Defendant Costs On Appeal.
In Morschauser v. Continental Capital, LLC, Case No. E062278 (4th Dist., Div. 2 Dec. 12, 2016) (unpublished), a defendant corporation successfully obtained summary judgment against plaintiff and then moved to recover $133,644.50 in attorney’s fees and costs from losing plaintiff. Plaintiff did not oppose, but filed a request for continuance by noting that defendant was a suspended corporation and could not proceed. The trial judge granted the attorney’s fee request in full, triggering an appeal by plaintiff.
The fee order was affirmed. On its own motion, the appellate court addressed this incapacity by offering respondent/defendant one of three options: (1) present proof it was not suspended; (2) present proof a certificate of revivor had been filed; or (3) file a declaration detailing when a certificate of revivor was going to be filed and why it had not been filed already. Defendant winning the fee award chose option 3 and, a little over three months later, submitted a copy of the certificate showing defendant was no longer suspended/was in good standing. Obtaining the certificate of revivor had the legal effect of validating the prior procedural steps along the way as far as the defense fee award and appeal efforts were concerned.
However, because defendant only took revival steps after plaintiff’s briefing on appeal was completed and in response to the appellate court’s inquiry on incapacity options, the 4/2 DCA panel refused to award routine costs of appeal to defendant, although observing this did not impact its ability to seek appellate fees on other fee entitlement bases.
Oh, Brother! -- Case Illustrates Equitable Principles Are Front And Center In Partition Disputes.
Partition disputes are equitable, with a broad fee-shifting statute in the form of Code of Civil Procedure section 874.040 allowing a trial court broad discretion to equitably apportion fees and costs among the parties to the partition action.
In Cummings v. Cummings, Case Nos. H040710 and H041308 (6th Dist. Nov. 23, 2016) (unpublished) (separate decisions), four siblings were involved in a family trust partition action involving a Los Altos Hills property. One brother out of the four siblings opposed a partition for sale of the property and apparently was not amenable to seek viable options to avoid conflict. Eventually, brother lost in the partition actions, prompting the other siblings to seek recoupment of fees and costs after the trial court ordered a partition by sale.
Brother did not fare any better in Case No. H041308, where his sisters obtained a further fee award of $51,323.56 for other work after the partition by sale order occurred.
Greyhound Bus sign, S. Carolina. Oct. 29, 2007. Carol M. Highsmith, photographer. Library of Congress.
BLOG HAT TIP—The winning attorney was Stuart R. Chandler, aka “Mr. Fresno”. Co-contributor Mike knows Mr. Chandler well, he graduated from the same high school class (Bullard High, Fresno) and he/Mike studied for the bar together in Fresno during the summer of 1979. Congratulations, Stuart!
Common Benefit Analysis Led To Recovery Of Fees By One Tenant In Common.
Although the facts are quite interesting from a partition perspective, Villicana v. Lindsay, Case No. G052709 (4th Dist., Div. 3 Oct. 13, 2016) (unpublished) stands for the proposition that a trial judge has authority to award attorney’s fees to one tenant in common in a partition case where an incidental accounting led to a “common benefit” resolution of the partition action in the overall sense. This is allowable under CCP § 874.040 and Regalado v. Regalado, 198 Cal.App.2d 549, 551 (1961), with one tenant in common getting allocable “common benefit” fees in a 3-0 opinion authored by Presiding Justice O’Leary.
Equities Were Weighted, Favoring No Offset Of Fee Award.
Crasnick v. Marquez and Diaz, Case No. BV 031459 (L.A. Superior Court Appellate Div. May 24, 2016 (published) (3-0 decision authored by Judge Ricciardulli), transmitted to 2d Dist. for consideration of transfer, No. B272469 involved an interesting judgment offset situation. There, a tenant in an unlawful detainer action in one court obtained a summary judgment and later attorney’s fees of $6,245 against a non-prevailing landlord where the lease had a fees clause. Tenant had earlier in the representation granted tenant’s attorney (from Public Counsel because tenant was indigent) a contractual lien on any fee recovery. Down the line, landlord obtained two separate judgments against prior winning tenant and another tenant in a subsequent unlawful detainer action and a small claims action, totaling $6,377.42. Landlord moved to offset the fee award against the judgments he later obtained, a motion denied by the superior court and affirmed on appeal by the Appellate Division.
Whether to offset judgments, especially one involving a contractual attorney fee lien, involves weighing the equities under a multi-factored test set forth in Brienza v. Tepper, 35 Cal.App.4th 1839 (1995). Although some factors weighed for and against landlord, the public policy factor tipped heavily against him: indigent tenants would not obtain needed legal representation if an attorney could not count on obtaining a potential future fee recovery based upon a contractual lien. The offset denial was affirmed.
BLOG UPDATE AND HAT TIP—We checked the Second District website and have seen no disposition on the transmittal by the Appellate Division for transfer consideration. We give a HAT TIP to Kevin Hermansen of BASTA, Inc., a non-profit organization which represented the tenants in the superior court proceedings leading to the Appellate Division decision, for sharing this opinion with us.
Plaintiff Only Recovered $2,229, And CCP § 473 Relief Did Not Resonate.
We have to say that in pro per plaintiffs need to beware when confronted with CCP § 998 offers—even though our courts are open to all, in pro per representation is fraught with perils, as Jones v. Pierce, Case No. A139665 (1st Dist., Div. 2 June 30, 2015) (unpublished) illustrates.
In this one, plaintiff sued for negligence arising from a vehicle accident, but rejected a $7,500 998 offer from defendant. However, plaintiff only recovered $2,229 after a jury trial. The trial judge awarded 998 fee-shifting costs of $33,198.06, after plaintiff failed to timely move to tax costs but making a request for mercy under CCP § 473.
An attorney working on medical malpractice cases felt cheated when it received no “bonus” compensation after the cases settled well after his termination from the handling law firm. Unfortunately for him, he lost his bonus claims after years of litigation.
Due process, due process, that concept drove the striking of an attorney’s fees award in a civil harassment proceeding context.
In Bridges v. Smith, Case No. C074704 (3d Dist. Feb. 23, 2015) (unpublished), plaintiffs were granted a 5-year civil harassment restraining order to stop defendant’s alleged harassment of them under CCP § 527.6, along with costs. The judge making these rulings retired, and the new judge confirmed his rulings but also granted plaintiffs $5,050 in fees under the civil harassment fee-shifting statute.
The appellate court determined that the new judge could not enter a judgment with the additional fee recovery—after all, the retired judge didn’t do it and due process was a “stickler” dictating the result in defendant’s favor.
Reciprocity Required Under Section 1717, Given Unfairness of Other Result.
In Trejo v. Arriaga, Case No. D064410 (4th Dist., Div. 1 Jan. 21, 2015) (unpublished), plaintiff 50/50 shareholder in a closely-held corporation lost an amended shareholder derivative lawsuit against defendant 50/50 shareholder. Defendant nonsuited plaintiff based on a failure to prove damages. Defendant then sought to recover fees under a lease agreement with a fees clause, garnering $55,608 in attorney’s fees under Civil Code section 1717.
The appellate court affirmed. Plaintiff contested that he could be individually liable for fees in a derivative action, but California decisions have allowed such recovery under the “substantial benefit doctrine” based on principles of equity. (Brusso v. Running Springs Country Club, Inc., 228 Cal.App.3d 92, 99-100, 111 (1991).) Given that plaintiff initiated the derivative lawsuit with presumed knowledge of the risk that he might be liable under the lease provisions if he lost, the reviewing court found it would be inequitable to prevent defendant for being able to recover attorney’s fees.
Also, CCP § 473 Motion to Vacate Denial Order Was Timely, But Mandatory Relief Not Available And Discretionary Relief Properly Denied For Lack Of Diligence.
Grinberg v. Kalili, Case No. B245899 (2d Dist., Div. 4 Sept. 10, 2014) (unpublished) originated as a dispute over the suitability of a $158,000 Ferrari, with the plaintiff losing and then being exposed as a defendant, in tandem with his attorney as a co-defendant, in a malicious prosecution suit by the Ferrari prevailing litigant. Defendants in the malicious prosecution successfully SLAPPed malicious prosecution plaintiff, obtaining a judgment for costs and for ______ in fees which was served on October 29, 2011. Later, one of the winning SLAPP defendants (the former suing Ferrari plaintiff) requested $55,615 in mandatory SLAPP fees, but the lower court only awarded $43,237.50 on an unopposed motion at a March 20, 2012 hearing, which order was entered on May 8, 2012. Then, about five months after the fee hearing, the attorney’s fees loser moved to vacate the fee order under CCP § 473. The lower court denied that motion on November 9, 2012, with loser appealing all orders/judgments “under CCP § 904.1(a)(3)-(13)” on December 19, 2012.
The SLAPP merits appeal was untimely—it was one year too late, with the motion to vacate not extending the time for an appeal.
Because the fee loser did timely appeal the motion to vacate under § 473, that did extend the time to appeal the fee order itself. However, CRC 8.108 has an important “earliest date” trigger—30 days after notice of entry of the motion to vacate order (something not at play, because no notice of entry was given) or 90 days after the motion to vacate was filed or 180 days after entry of the fee order. That last segment rendered fee loser’s appeal of the fee order untimely, because 180 days from the entry of the fee order expired on November 4, 2012 such that the December 19, 2012 appeal was too late.
That took the reviewing court to the timely appeal of the denial of the motion to vacate the fee order under § 473. Fee loser’s attorney tried to “fall on the sword,” but the appellate court found mandatory relief was not available because the denial order was not a default or a default judgment. (Vandermoon v. Sanwong, 142 Cal.App.4th 315, 321 (2006).) As far as discretionary relief was at issue, the lower court found that fee loser’s attorney did not adequately explain why five months elapsed from the date of the fee hearing to the date of the filing of the motion to vacate—put another way, no adequate diligence was shown on why relief was not sought earlier. Bottom line, $43,237.50 fee order remained intact.
Implied Contractual and Equitable Indemnity Theories Cannot Undermine American Rule.
​Dalton v. Francis, Case No. H033247 (6th Dist. June 26, 2014) (unpublished) involved a buyer lawsuit against seller and dual real estate agents for nondisclosures in connection with a residential sale regarding a dilapidated septic system. The problem was that seller and individual brokers negligently passed on information about the housebeing connected to a public sewer, but with the infirmities originating from broker conduct. Eventually, buyers won the suit and won contractual attorney’s fees of $262,909.50 against sellers. (The corporate brokerage business went bankrupt, so individual brokers were still involved.) However, the lower court also found that the buyers could get total reimbursement from individual brokers for buyers’ fee exposure to sellers based on an implied indemnity theory (likely, implied contractual indemnity). Later, the trial judge determined that seller recapture defense costs in the buyer lawsuit from individual brokers based on the tort of another doctrine.
​Sellers appealed, getting some relief on appeal.
​The lower court’s determination that the $262,909.50 pro-buyers fee award could not be "passed" through by sellers for reimbursement from the individual brokers. The reasons: (1) implied contractual indemnity--individual brokers were not parties to the listing agreement with sellers (only the bankrupt brokerage business was a party); and (2)equitable indemnity—although brokers were jointly and severally liable with sellers as far as buyers’ damages, this theory could not be used to create a new attorney fee exposure basis under the American Rule, or else the appellate court would be creating a new exception through judicial fiat.
​Finally, individual brokers balked at some nonstatutory costs claimed by sellers under the tort of another doctrine. However, the appellate court determined they were proper "damages," in line with what the trial judge found.
Lower Court Did Not Err In Directing That $1,000 Penalty Be Paid By Party Requesting Default Relief to Superior Court Instead.
​In Sanai v. Pfeiffer, Case No. B246349 (2d Dist., Div. 4 June 26, 2014) (unpublished), an in pro per attorney sued an ex-client defendant for $149,240 in legal fees. However, the defense filed a notice of vexatious litigation and requested a dismissal, erroneously relying on a prior vexatious litigant order which had been stayed by the Court of Appeal earlier. Attorney kept filing requests for entry of default, which ex-client opposed through ex parte applications—with the lower court eventually granting the default request but simultaneously granting ex-client’s request for relief from default based on surprise pursuant to the discretionary provisions of CCP § 473(b)—hinged on the idea that the adverse party might think the vexatious litigant order was alive and well (especially given the party was represented by counsel who did not advice otherwise).
​Then, attorney filed a motion for compensatory legal fees, costs, and sanctions under section 473(b)-(c). Attorney should $39,000 in legal fees, $2,840.50 in out of pocket costs, and $1,000 in sanctions from both ex-client’s counsel. Attorney and ex-client reached a settlement calling for payments over time on the agreed settlement amount for the fee receivable but that attorney could continue proceed against ex-client’s attorney. The lower court held that attorney was entitled to recover costs in the amount of $440.50 and ordered ex-client’s attorney to pay $1,000 to the superior court, but denied the $31,000 fee request. Attorney filed a dismissal with prejudice pursuant to the settlement agreement with ex-client. Attorney appealed the denial of fees and sanctions against ex-client’s attorney.
​The lower court’s rulings were affirmed on appeal. First, the voluntary dismissal did not retard appeal of fee/sanctions order because the dismissal was done to expedite an appeal. (Stewart v. Colonial Western Agency, Inc., 87 Cal.App.4th 1006, 1012 (2001);Goldbaum v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 191 Cal.App.4th 703, 708 (2011).) Next, the $31,000 fee denial was no abuse of discretion because, under analogous cases, the Tropeprohibition should also apply under CCP § 473’s discretionary provisions barring an in pro per attorney from recovering legal fees as sanctions. (Cf. Musaelian v. Adams, 45 Cal.4th 512, 519 (2009) [CCP § 128.7 case].) Last, ordering the $1,000 penalty paid by ex-client’s attorney to the superior court, rather than counsel, was no error given the wide range of relief available to the trial judge under section 473.
No Public Policy Concerns Militate Against Honoring Parties’ Settlement.
In GMAC Mortgage v. Sandoval, Case No. E059111 (4th Dist., Div. 2 Apr. 8, 2014) (unpublished), lenders won a declaratory relief action with respect to lien priority and were awarded attorney’s fees of $21,284.25 based on a trust deed fees clause. Defendants appealed only the postjudgment fee order, but later reached a post-appeal filing settlement stipulation with plaintiffs through which only the fee order (not merits judgment) would be vacated, if the appellate court agreed.
It did. Although the appeal could not be dismissed, the appellate court did agree to reverse the fee award based on the parties’ settlement—finding that the policy favoring settlement was fostered while there was no prejudice to the adverse parties/erosion of public trust. (Code Civ. Proc., § 128(a).) The merits judgment remained in place, but the fee award was reversed.
Otherwise, 5 Nonappealing Parties Would Get Stuck With Substantial Fee Exposure Even Though Some Appealing Parties Might Win On Remand.
Appellate courts are comprised of justices, who not only follow the law but attempt to reach a fair result based on the circumstances. Adams v. MHC Colony Park Ltd. Partnership, Case No. F062160 (5th Dist. Mar. 10, 2014) (partially published on rehearing; fee discussion unpublished) illustrates this in the context of substantial fee exposure to nonappealing parties even though the underlying judgment had been reversed and would have to go back for remanded proceedings.
Mobile Home by Ford Motor Company. 1924.
What happened was that 66 plaintiffs of a mobilehome park, after suing owner for failure to maintain the park’s physical improvements and common facilities, either suffered nonsuits or an adverse jury verdict (after a 43-day jury trial). The lower court then assessed $1.975 million in attorney’s fees and costs against the losing plaintiffs. Of this plaintiff constituency, 5 did not appeal. Upon review, the appellate court reversed the judgment. However, that left the lingering question of what to do about the fee award against the 5 nonappealing plaintiffs.
The appellate court decided that the reversal of the judgment had to extend to all portions with respect to the 5 nonappealing parties. Although the general rule is that an unappealed judgment is final unless appealed, there is an exception allowing for an entire reversal of a judgment if the portions reversed are so interwoven with the remainder of the judgment. This exception was invoked here, because otherwise 5 people might be stuck jointly and severally with a large fee exposure even though some of the remaining appealing plaintiffs might ultimately succeed on remand. Unfairness was the theme in this one.
Given Compensatory Award Was Close to Unlimited Jurisdiction Limit, Fee Award Was No Abuse of Discretion.
Coast Rehabilitation Services, Inc. v. Gray Duffy, LLP, Case No. B245940 (2d Dist., Div. 6 Dec. 4, 2013) (unpublished) involved an unlimited civil case where plaintiff won a compensatory award of $22,162.55 (inclusive of prejudgment interest), and the trial court later awarded fees of $14,504.50.
The fee award was affirmed on appeal. Because the compensatory award was close to the $25,000 jurisdictional limit, the lower court did not abuse its discretion by awarding $14,504.50 in fees.
As Far As Awarding Fees, Orange County Default Fee Schedule Suggested in Remand Look If Entered Judgment Significantly Reduced In the “Redo”.
The Fourth District, Division 3 has published several decisions in the unlawful penalty area involving leases with certain penalties and judgment stipulations having an increased penal amount feature over/above any agreed-upon settlement amounts. The next unpublished decision shows that this division has their collective eyes on this issue.
In Hermanson v. Patterson, Case No. G047401 (4th Dist., Div. 3 Sept. 6, 2013) (unpublished), the trial judge entered a $50,660.75 judgment even though the circumstances demonstrated that judgment debtor’s full performance might have resulted in a judgment of only $19,423.78 under a settlement structured through a held stipulation for judgment arrangement. The trial judge also added another $3,391.25 in attorney’s fees and costs as apparently allowed under the stipulation upon default.
Acting Presiding Justice Bedsworth, on behalf of a 3-0 panel, reversed the judgment and remanded with further directions to the trial judge.

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