Source: https://scocal.stanford.edu/opinion/people-v-superior-court-zamudio-32062
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 18:16:16+00:00

Document:
THE PEOPLE, Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN JOAQUIN COUNTY, Respondent; JOSE FRANCISCO ZAMUDIO, Real Party in Interest.
John D. Phillips, District Attorney, Craig H. Holmes and David Wellenbrock, Chief Deputy District Attorneys, for Petitioner.
Defendant and real party in interest Jose Francisco Zamudio was advised, when pleading no contest in 1992 to the felony of unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle without the owner's consent (Veh. Code, § 10851), that conviction of that offense might have the consequences of his being deported or barred from naturalizing to United States citizenship, but he was not advised the conviction might also result in his being excluded from admission to this country (Pen. Code, § 1016.5, subd. (a)). fn. 1 Upon defendant's motion, the trial court permitted him to withdraw his 1992 plea, vacated the judgment of conviction and reset the matter for trial. (Id., subd. (b).) We conclude that the Court of Appeal, which summarily denied the People's petition for writ relief, thereby contravened the legislative intent underlying section 1016.5. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeal.
On or about August 5, 1992, defendant was arrested and charged with the felony of unlawfully taking or driving a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851) and with receiving stolen property (§ 496). Petitioner filed a complaint in the Municipal Court for the County of San Joaquin, Stockton Judicial District (hereafter the 1992 prosecution).
At defendant's arraignment the next day, the court advised him and others who were appearing: "If any of you are not United States citizens and you [23 Cal.4th 189] are convicted of a misdemeanor or a felony, it could be used to cause your deportation or to prevent your obtaining United States citizenship." fn. 2 The court did not advise defendant that, in the event he were deported or left the country, a conviction might have the further consequence of excluding him from readmission to the United States.
Approximately two weeks later, at the time set for the preliminary hearing, defendant, pursuant to a negotiated settlement, entered a plea of no contest to the vehicle-taking charge, whereupon the court dismissed the charge of receiving stolen property. During the plea colloquy, defendant expressly gave up various constitutional rights, including his right to trial by jury. As to immigration consequences, the court advised defendant: "If you're not a citizen of the United States, a plea of no contest can result in your deportation or in a refusal of naturalization, citizenship or amnesty at a later point in time." The court again failed to advise defendant that a conviction resulting from his plea might also result in his exclusion from admission to the United States. Defendant was sentenced to serve eight months in county jail and placed on five years' probation.
Just under five years later, in May 1997, defendant was arrested and charged in the same court with taking a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851), driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs (Veh. Code, § 23152), and unlawful possession and transportation or sale of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11377, 11379) (hereafter the 1997 prosecution). An order to show cause alleging defendant's violation of probation also was filed.
A settlement was negotiated encompassing both files, with defendant admitting a probation violation in the 1992 prosecution and pleading no contest to possession of a controlled substance and driving under the influence (with a prior) in the 1997 prosecution. The court gave defendant various advisements, including some relating to immigration. fn. 3 The court sentenced him to two years in state prison on the probation violation, reducing the sentence with various credits to 90 days' actual time and granting defendant permission to remain in county jail pending his pregnant wife's giving birth. In consideration of defendant's pleading no contest to [23 Cal.4th 190] possession and driving under the influence (for which he was sentenced to no additional time and placed on informal probation) the remaining counts were dismissed.
At the hearing on the motion, the trial court denied petitioner's request to make an offer of proof and for an evidentiary hearing on the questions whether defendant would have pleaded no contest to vehicle taking in 1992 had he been properly advised, and when defendant acquired actual knowledge of the adverse immigration consequences of his plea.
The court also ruled on the validity of a subpoena duces tecum petitioner had served on the public defender for the contents of certain files relating to defendant. Determining that petitioner had a right to receive only that information in the public defender's files relating to the immigration issues raised by defendant's section 1016.5 motion, the court conducted an in camera review of the files to determine if they contained any such information. After conducting its review, the court ruled the files contained "absolutely nothing" relating to this case other than a showing that federal authorities had placed an immigration hold on defendant in connection with the 1997 prosecution, a fact with which, apparently, all present (including counsel for petitioner and defendant) were already familiar.
As noted, the trial court granted defendant's section 1016.5 motion, vacating his 1992 conviction for taking a vehicle. Quoting People v. Gontiz (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1309, 1316 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 786], the court observed: " 'The statute requires the court to warn the defendant expressly of each of the three distinct possible immigration consequences of his conviction prior to his plea.' I only advised him of two."
[1a] Petitioner first contends the trial court erred in granting defendant relief under section 1016.5 without requiring him to demonstrate he was prejudiced by the incomplete advisement he received at the time of his 1992 plea. Petitioner contends that, in order to prevail on his section 1016.5 motion, defendant must show not only that the trial court failed, at the time of that plea, to advise him as provided by the statute and that there exists, at the time of the motion, more than a remote possibility that his conviction will have one or more of the specified adverse immigration consequences (§ 1016.5, subd. (b)), but also that, properly advised, he would not have pleaded no contest in the first place. For the following reasons, we agree.
Defendant suggests that the Legislature's use of "shall vacate the judgment" in section 1016.5, subdivision (b) renders the statute a per se rule of reversal, incompatible with a construction that requires defendants to demonstrate prejudice. We disagree. While "the word 'shall' in a statute is ordinarily deemed mandatory, and 'may' permissive" (California Correctional Peace Officers Assn. v. State Personnel Bd. (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1133, 1143 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 693, 899 P.2d 79]), "a court may consider the consequences that would follow from a particular construction and will not readily imply an unreasonable legislative purpose" (id. at p. 1147). We conclude that defendant's proffered construction does not accord with the legislative purpose underlying section 1016.5.
Defendant correctly observes that section 1016.5, subdivision (b) expressly details only one proof requirement relating to the consequences of a court's failure to give the advisements required by section 1016.5, subdivision (a), i.e., that the defendant show that conviction of the offense to which he pleaded guilty or nolo contendere actually "may have" one or more of the specified adverse immigration consequences. On the other hand, section 1016.5 contains no express reference to prejudice and thus is silent on the question whether such a requirement may be inferred.
Article VI, section 13 provides, in its entirety: "No judgment shall be set aside, or new trial granted, in any cause, on the ground of misdirection of the [23 Cal.4th 195] jury, or of the improper admission or rejection of evidence, or for any error as to any matter of pleading, or for any error as to any matter of procedure, unless, after an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence, the court shall be of the opinion that the error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice."
Defendant contends petitioner is precluded from relying on article VI, section 13 for the first time on appeal, not having invoked that constitutional provision in the trial court. Petitioner acknowledges having explicitly invoked article VI, section 13 for the first time in the Court of Appeal, but argues the invocation was not a change in legal theory, but rather, mere elucidation of one aspect of its trial court theory that section 1016.5 is subject to equitable defenses.
We need not determine whether petitioner's first express references to article VI, section 13 in fact echo earlier themes. Defendant's own authority on the "theory of trial" doctrine notes its application is "discretionary with the reviewing court" and, in any event, subject to an exception for appellate reliance on a new theory "where the issue is one of law alone." (9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1997) Appeal, § 406, p. 457; see also id., § 407, p. 459.) The exception applies here, as petitioner's theory indeed raises a purely legal issue, i.e., whether our construing section 1016.5 not to require a demonstration of prejudice might implicate article VI, section 13.
Substantively, defendant argues article VI, section 13 does not apply to a vacation of judgment under section 1016.5. As defendant points out, we long have recognized that "[t]he amendment by which [former article VI, section 41/2, predecessor to article VI, section 13] was added to the constitution was not 'designed to repeal or abrogate the guarantees accorded persons accused of crime by other parts of the same constitution, or to overthrow all statutory [23 Cal.4th 196] rules of procedure and evidence in criminal cases.' " (People v. Hall (1926) 199 Cal. 451, 458 [249 P. 859], quoting People v. O'Bryan (1913) 165 Cal. 55, 65, 66 [130 P. 1042] [holding "final test" of "miscarriage of justice" is "the opinion of the appellate court upon the result of the error," not whether error is constitutional].) From the first, defendant notes, in considering article VI, section 13 (and former art. VI, § 41/2) we have recognized "[i]t is an essential part of justice that the question of guilt or innocence shall be determined by an orderly legal procedure, in which the substantial rights belonging to defendants shall be respected." (People v. O'Bryan, supra, at p. 65.) The court's error in misadvising him, defendant argues, so compromised his substantial right to make an informed plea that it cannot be considered merely "error as to any matter of procedure" within the meaning of the constitutional provision.
Petitioner concedes that article VI, section 13 does not encompass misadvisement under section 1016.5 as a "misdirection of the jury," an "improper admission or rejection of evidence" or an "error as to any matter of pleading." Petitioner insists, however, that article VI, section 13 does encompass a trial court's failure to deliver full section 1016.5 advisements as an "error as to any matter of procedure" because the law regards as procedural all " 'those legal rules which direct the course of proceedings' " (People v. Williamson (1933) 134 Cal.App. 775, 781 [26 P.2d 681]) without conferring substantive rights.
As noted, People v. Williamson, cited by both parties, calls procedural " 'those legal rules which direct the course of proceedings to bring parties into court, and the course of the court after they are brought in.' " (People v. [23 Cal.4th 197] Williamson, supra, 134 Cal.App. at pp. 781-782, quoting Kring v. Missouri (1882) 107 U.S. 221 [2 S.Ct. 443, 27 L.Ed. 506].) [1c] On its face, section 1016.5's requirement that courts "administer [specified immigration advisements] on the record to the defendant" (§ 1016.5, subd. (a)) before accepting a guilty or nolo contendere plea would seem to be such a rule.
Of course, the precise legal rule at issue—that criminal defendants preparing to plead guilty or no contest be given specified immigration advisements—is not primarily of judicial origin. Section 1016.5 confers important rights our Legislature accorded in "fairness to ... accused individuals" (§ 1016.5, subd. (d)). But section 1016.5 rights are not substantive in the sense of flowing from " 'the prerogative of the legislature to declare what ... acts shall be unlawful' " (Gantt v. Sentry Insurance (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1083, 1093, fn. 6 [4 Cal.Rptr.2d 874, 824 P.2d 680], overruled on another point in Green v. Ralee Engineering Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 66, 80, fn. 6 [78 Cal.Rptr.2d 16, 960 P.2d 1046]). With all appropriate deference, we cannot derive, merely from the Legislature's reference to "fairness" in section 1016.5, subdivision (d), an intent that the procedural safeguards mandated thereby be regarded as "essential element[s] of a fair trial or due process" (People v. Sarazzawski (1945) 27 Cal.2d 7, 11 [161 P.2d 934]) so as to insulate any error in providing them from analysis, under article VI, section 13, as "error as to any matter of procedure."
As far as it goes, we do not find the reasoning of Gontiz entirely unpersuasive. But Gontiz did not consider whether section 1016.5 should be construed in order to avoid state constitutional infirmities, and "cases are not authority for propositions not considered." (People v. Gilbert (1969) 1 Cal.3d 475, 482, fn. 7 [82 Cal.Rptr. 724, 462 P.2d 580].) Obviously, the principle of construction invoked by the Gontiz court—that a criminal statute's "ambiguity must be resolved in favor of the defendant" (Gontiz, supra, 58 Cal.App.4th at p. 1318)—cannot take precedence over paramount constitutional considerations.
Ultimately, we need not decide whether defendant's state statutory right to receive specified immigration advisements is "constitutionally qualified by the duty of California appellate courts to examine 'the entire cause' when any ['error as to any matter of procedure'] is alleged and to affirm the judgment absent a 'miscarriage of justice' " (People v. Wims (1995) 10 Cal.4th 293, 310 [41 Cal.Rptr.2d 241, 895 P.2d 77] [bracketed text quoting art. VI, § 13 added]), as defendant fails to adduce any authority suggesting the Legislature, when enacting section 1016.5, intended to depart from the normal rules, consonant with that constitutional provision, governing withdrawal of a plea for misadvisement regarding collateral consequences. Defendant does not dispute that immigration consequences, generally, are considered "collateral" consequences of a criminal conviction. (Gontiz, supra, 58 Cal.App.4th at p. 1311; see also People v. Limones (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 338, 344 [284 Cal.Rptr. 418].) As defendant's own authority acknowledges, "[n]ormally a motion to vacate a plea based on misadvisement or omission of a collateral consequence requires the defendant to demonstrate that he would not have entered into the plea had he known of the consequence." (Gontiz, supra, at p. 1311, citing People v. Walker, supra, 54 Cal.3d at pp. 1022-1023.) We see no indication that the Legislature intended section 1016.5 to operate as an exception.
,[1d] On the other hand, for the entire period of section 1016.5's existence (and before), the Legislature has provided that no mistake or error [23 Cal.4th 199] in a proceeding mandated by the Penal Code renders the proceeding invalid, absent prejudice to the defendant's substantial rights. (§ 1404.) Thus, section 1404 provides that: "Neither a departure from the form or mode prescribed by this Code in respect to any pleading or proceeding, nor an error or mistake therein, renders it invalid, unless it has actually prejudiced the defendant, or tended to his prejudice, in respect to a substantial right."
Although the order of the trial court must therefore be reversed, for the guidance of the trial court on remand we turn now to discussion of petitioner's other claims of error.
In granting defendant's motion, the trial court impliedly found that defendant had shown that conviction of the offense to which he pleaded nolo contendere "may have the consequences for [him] of deportation, exclusion from admission to the United States, or denial of naturalization pursuant to the laws of the United States" (§ 1016.5, subd. (b)). (Watts v. Crawford (1995) 10 Cal.4th 743, 762, fn. 15 [42 Cal.Rptr.2d 81, 896 P.2d 807].) Petitioner contends that, at the hearing on the motion, the court improperly denied its request for a further evidentiary hearing on whether defendant faces such consequences and, if so, when defendant acquired knowledge that he faces them.
Neither in its written opposition nor at the hearing on the motion did petitioner dispute that defendant, in fact, faces potential adverse immigration consequences. fn. 9 Moreover, it was petitioner who drew the court's attention to the fact the 1997 probation report on this case stated defendant "would be deported." Nevertheless, petitioner now contends the court should have permitted live testimony and cross-examination on whether and when defendant faced, and knew he faced, immigration risks.
For the foregoing reasons, we decline to burden trial courts with a requirement that they conduct live evidentiary hearings on all section 1016.5 motions. The trial court did not err in this regard.
Petitioner next contends that, to the extent it is based on the Yun Declaration, the trial court's implied factual finding that defendant actually faces adverse immigration consequences from his 1992 plea is insufficiently supported. Petitioner asserts the Yun Declaration is "nearly entirely conclusory and devoid of facts." Citing People v. Williams (1973) 30 Cal.App.3d [23 Cal.4th 202] 502, 510 [106 Cal.Rptr. 324], petitioner argues the Yun Declaration is not competent evidence because it is inadmissible hearsay.
Section 1016.5 itself is silent about what constitutes a sufficient showing under its subdivision (b). The only decisions directly to address the question simply recognize that, while section 1016.5, subdivision (b) "implies the need to show more than just a remote possibility of deportation, exclusion, or denial of naturalization" (People v. Shaw, supra, 64 Cal.App.4th at p. 499), " 'where there is a sufficient showing on the record from the words of the court itself' " (ibid., quoting People v. Guzman, supra, 116 Cal.App. at p. 192), the defendant must be given an opportunity to withdraw his plea.
 Ultimately, we need not pass on the admissibility of the Yun Declaration because the record before the trial court contained more than sufficient support, apart from that declaration, for the court's implied finding that defendant's conviction based on his 1992 plea might, as of the time the court was considering defendant's motion, actually have the consequences for him of deportation, exclusion from admission to the United States, or denial of naturalization (§ 1016.5, subd. (b)).
As discussed, both in its written opposition to defendant's motion and at the hearing, petitioner impliedly conceded defendant faced "immigration problems." The trial court, moreover, possessed the record of defendant's criminal history, including his 1997 conviction, which, as a matter of law, in combination with his earlier convictions, put defendant at risk of adverse immigration consequences, including exclusion from admission to the United States for having committed crimes of moral turpitude. (8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(B); id., § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I); see Matter of Serna (1992) 20 I. & N. Dec. 579 [1992 WL 301779]; Matter of M. (1948) 3 I. & N. Dec. 272 [23 Cal.4th 203] [1948 WL 6270].) The record also reveals that the trial court possessed documentary evidence that a border patrol hold had been placed on defendant by federal immigration authorities.
We conclude that defendant, in moving to vacate his 1992 conviction under section 1016.5, showed that, at the time of the motion, he faced "more than just a remote possibility of deportation, exclusion, or denial of naturalization" (People v. Shaw, supra, 64 Cal.App.4th at p. 499). Therefore, the trial court's implied finding that "conviction of the offense to which defendant pleaded ... nolo contendere may have the consequences for the defendant" specified in the statute (§ 1016.5, subd. (b)) was adequately supported.
Petitioner next contends the trial court should have denied defendant's section 1016.5 motion on the ground he delayed, without excuse, in bringing it. As petitioner has emphasized, however, no record evidence pinpoints when defendant first knew that he risked actual "exclusion from admission to the United States" (§ 1016.5, subd. (b)). Defendant takes the position that precisely when he acquired such knowledge is irrelevant under the statute.
The authority petitioner cites, People v. Castaneda, supra, 37 Cal.App.4th 1612, stands at most for the proposition that a postjudgment motion to [23 Cal.4th 204] change a plea must be made with "reasonable diligence" (id. at p. 1619). Absent evidence that defendant long ago had cause to question the accuracy of the trial court's 1992 immigration advisements, to hold he should have objected to them earlier would be unfair. This conclusion accords with the plain language of section 1016.5, which contains no time bar.
To the extent petitioner relies on the affirmative defense of laches or its equivalent, the burden is petitioner's to prove the facts comprising that defense. (Evid. Code, § 500; see also Miller v. Eisenhower Medical Center (1980) 27 Cal.3d 614, 624 [166 Cal.Rptr. 826, 614 P.2d 258].) Petitioner states there is "no indication as to when defendant became aware of possible immigration problems," suggesting only that "presumably he knew in 1990" because he received some immigration advisements that year, in another case. We see no significance for present purposes in defendant's having received some immigration advisements in 1990. The mandated advisement refers to "the offense for which you have been charged" (§ 1016.5, subd. (a)) and no other. Defendant cannot in 1990 have been advised—adequately or otherwise—about the possible consequences of a no contest plea he would enter in 1992 to criminal charges brought against him that same year.
Petitioner notes also that defendant, when pleading in 1992, was advised about some of the adverse immigration consequences his plea might have, specifically, that his conviction "could be used" to cause his deportation or prevent his obtaining United States citizenship. But advising a defendant that a no contest plea may in the abstract have immigration consequences, cannot be taken as placing him on notice that, owing to his particular circumstances, he faces an actual risk of suffering such. Were it so, the second of section 1016.5, subdivision (b)'s express required showings, i.e., that the conviction "may have the consequences" specified, would be superfluous. Put another way, that relief under section 1016.5 is predicated upon a defendant's demonstrating his conviction "may have" one or more of the specified consequences implies that such a motion is timely if brought within a reasonable time after the conviction actually "may have" such consequences.
A similar level of concern on defendant's part in the period following the 1992 prosecution would not have been as well founded. Deportation can be [23 Cal.4th 205] instituted only "upon the order of the Attorney General" (8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)) of the United States, who retains discretion not to institute such proceedings. (See United States v. Santelises (2d Cir. 1973) 476 F.2d 787, 790, citing prior statute.) The trial court's examination of the public defender's files in the 1992 case revealed no immigration hold or other relevant federal activity such as was found in the 1997 files.
Moreover, the record reveals that in 1992 defendant stood convicted, cumulatively, of at most one misdemeanor violation of Vehicle Code section 10851 (in 1990) fn. 11 and one felony violation of the same statute (in 1992), receiving for the latter a sentence of five years' probation and eight months in jail. While it is possible defendant was at that point technically subject to deportation or exclusion for being "convicted of two or more crimes involving moral turpitude" (former 8 U.S.C.A. § 1251(a)(2)(A)(ii) (Westlaw Historical U.S.C.A. 1992) [deportation]; see also 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) [inadmissibility or exclusion]), that in 1992 defendant faced more than a remote possibility of adverse immigration consequences seems unlikely.
In view of his family's presence here (and the United States citizenship status of any of his children born in this country), defendant understandably [23 Cal.4th 207] may have viewed exclusion, about which he was not advised, rather than deportation or denial of naturalization, as the most serious for him among section 1016.5's specified immigration consequences; indeed, perhaps as the only one that could affect his calculations regarding the advisability of pleading no contest to the 1992 vehicle-taking charges. Defendant was warned about deportation, but, as noted, deportation does not necessarily preclude legal reentry. And, partly because he was not accurately advised in 1992, defendant reasonably may not have been aware, until the immigration hold revealed in the 1997 case file, that one consequence of the 1992 conviction could be to place him at risk, especially if other convictions followed, of being excluded from readmission.
Shortly after he was convicted in the 1997 prosecution, on March 10, 1998, defendant moved to vacate both the 1992 and 1997 pleas. For the reasons stated, petitioner fails to persuade us defendant delayed unreasonably in bringing his section 1016.5 motion. Accordingly, we cannot conclude the trial court erred in failing to deny the motion on timeliness grounds.
 Petitioner contends that the trial court erred in failing to deny defendant's section 1016.5 motion on the ground the immigration advisements defendant received in the 1992 prosecution were in substantial compliance with the statute.
Notwithstanding that section 1016.5 expressly provides that, under specified circumstances, "the court shall administer the following advisement" (§ 1016.5, subd. (a)) and then details a specific, tripartite, form of advisement (ibid.), some Courts of Appeal have held that "[t]he exact language of the advisement is not crucial" (People v. Limones, supra, 233 Cal.App.3d at p. 345 [dictum]; People v. Soriano (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 1470, 1475 [240 Cal.Rptr. 328, 65 A.L.R.4th 705] [dictum]; People v. Barocio (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 99, 105 [264 Cal.Rptr. 573] [without analysis, citing People v. Soriano, supra]). The issue here, however, is not whether the advisements defendant received were sufficiently exact. Rather, defendant complains because, at the critical juncture, the mandated advisement respecting possible "exclusion from admission to the United States" (§ 1016.5, subd. (a)) was entirely omitted.
Nevertheless, if defendant's circumstances at the time of his 1992 plea did not, in fact, allow for the possibility of his subsequent exclusion from the United States in the event he were deported, the advisements he received concerning deportation and naturalization would have been in substantial compliance with the requirements of section 1016.5, in that they would have informed defendant of the only consequences pertinent to his situation. Because the record does not disclose whether defendant would have been eligible for readmission, we are unable to conclude that the trial court erred in failing to deny defendant's motion on grounds of substantial compliance.
Finally, petitioner argues that any harm caused by the trial court's 1992 misadvisements was corrected when defendant, in the course of the 1997 prosecution, signed an accurate plea and waiver form stating he had violated his 1992 probation. Without authority, petitioner asserts that the 1997 form "corrects, nunc pro tunc," any error in the original advisements.
Petitioner's retroactive-correction theory cannot be reconciled with section 1016.5 itself. It was the intent of the Legislature in enacting section 1016.5 to promote fairness to criminally accused noncitizens "by requiring in such cases that acceptance of a guilty plea or plea of nolo contendere be preceded by an appropriate warning of the special consequences for such a defendant which may result from the plea." (§ 1016.5, subd. (d), italics added.) This purpose logically cannot be served and, in fact, would be thwarted, by a rule permitting after-the-fact warnings. Such a rule also [23 Cal.4th 209] would undermine the Legislature's expressed intention "that the court in such cases shall grant the defendant a reasonable amount of time to negotiate with the prosecuting agency in the event the defendant or the defendant's counsel was unaware of the possibility of deportation, exclusion from admission to the United States, or denial of naturalization as a result of conviction." (Ibid.) Obviously, advisements at the time of a subsequent probation violation would not afford a defendant an opportunity to negotiate the terms of his original conviction.
Most fundamentally, as discussed, our Legislature expressly sought to address in section 1016.5 the problem of a defendant's entering a plea of guilty or nolo contendere without knowing about its potential adverse immigration consequences. (§ 1016.5, subd. (d).) The evil targeted, thus, is not simply a defendant's lack of knowledge, but his or her lack of knowledge at a specified critical juncture. Such an evil cannot be corrected by provision of the required information after the critical juncture has passed. (Cf. In re Martinez (1959) 52 Cal.2d 808, 814 [345 P.2d 449] [advisement of right to counsel meant to ensure defendant is aware "at the time he pleads guilty"].) To conclude otherwise would undermine any prophylactic effect the statute might have.
Hence, the trial court did not err in rejecting petitioner's theory of subsequent correction of the partial advisements.
Since we have concluded that the trial court erred in failing to require that defendant demonstrate prejudice in connection with his section 1016.5 motion (see ante, at pp. 192-200), we must address defendant's contention that we should affirm the decision of the Court of Appeal because the record before us demonstrates he was, indeed, prejudiced by the trial court's failure to deliver complete section 1016.5 advisements. Defendant asserts he would not in 1992 have pleaded no contest to vehicle theft had the court fully advised him of the plea's potential immigration consequences, including the possibility of his being excluded from admission to the United States. As defendant points out, a deported alien who cannot return "loses his job, his friends, his home, and maybe even his children, who must choose between their [parent] and their native country" (Galvan v. Press (1954) 347 U.S. 522, 533 [74 S.Ct. 737, 744, 98 L.Ed. 911] (dis. opn. of Black, J.)).
Petitioner maintains the record does not demonstrate defendant was prejudiced, because defendant may have had actual knowledge of the relevant immigration consequences when, in 1992, he entered the plea at issue. To that extent, petitioner argues, defendant cannot now claim he would have [23 Cal.4th 210] pleaded differently if he had been advised differently. As previously discussed, the trial court, in ruling on defendant's 1016.5 motion, did not consider evidence relating to the state of defendant's knowledge at the time he entered his plea. Petitioner asserts there was a "very strong prosecution case" on the vehicle-taking and receiving stolen property charges and notes defendant received a sentence of probation and eight months in jail. According to petitioner, on such facts it "seems virtually assured" that defendant would have pleaded no contest even if he had been properly advised.
We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeal denying the petition for a writ of mandate/prohibition and remand the cause with directions [23 Cal.4th 211] to that court to conduct further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
George, C. J., Baxter, J., Chin, J., and Brown, J., concurred.
Unlike the majority, I do not find any requirement in the Penal Code that a noncitizen convicted criminal seeking to vacate the judgment under Penal Code section 1016.5 (section 1016.5) must show that he or she would have proceeded to trial if he or she had known about the possible immigration and nationality consequences of pleading guilty or no contest. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
On its face, the foregoing language does not admit of any exceptions. It is mandatory, qualified only by the requirement that the defendant show that he or she faces the possibility of one of the adverse consequences.
Nevertheless, I recognize that "our obligation is to construe the statute as a whole." (People v. Rayford (1994) 9 Cal.4th 1, 21 [36 Cal.Rptr.2d 317, 884 P.2d 1369].) Therefore, I agree that an individual in Jose Francisco Zamudio's position must also show that he or she did not know about the adverse immigration and nationality consequences of his plea. I reach this conclusion because subdivision (d) of section 1016.5 provides: "The Legislature finds and declares that in many instances involving an individual who is not a citizen of the United States charged with an offense punishable as a crime under state law, a plea of guilty or nolo contendere is entered without the [23 Cal.4th 212] defendant knowing that a conviction of such offense is grounds for deportation, exclusion from admission to the United States, or denial of naturalization pursuant to the laws of the United States. Therefore, it is the intent of the Legislature ... to promote fairness to such accused individuals by requiring [compliance with section 1016.5]."
But the majority engraft another requirement onto section 1016.5, concluding that the convicted criminal must also show that he or she would not have pleaded guilty or no contest. I disagree.
There is nothing in the language of section 1016.5 that may be read to impose such a requirement. The majority do not state otherwise. Rather, they find authority for it in Penal Code section 1404 (section 1404).
Section 1404 provides: "Neither a departure from the form or mode prescribed by this Code in respect to any pleading or proceeding, nor an error or mistake therein, renders it invalid, unless it has actually prejudiced the defendant, or tended to his prejudice, in respect to a substantial right."
In the case of section 1016.5, however, the Legislature has specified that it does implicate a substantial right when a noncitizen defendant who does not know about the possible consequences pleads guilty or no contest without being advised of the possibility of deportation, later exclusion, or bar to naturalization. Section 1404, therefore, is without effect on section 1016.5.
For the foregoing reasons, and on the basis of the record before us, I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeal summarily denying the writ petition.
On July 12, 2000, the opinion was modified to read as printed above.
­FN 1. Undesignated section references are to the Penal Code.
­FN 2. The record below, consistent with "the intent of the Legislature that at the time of the plea no defendant shall be required to disclose his or her legal status to the court" (§ 1016.5, subd. (d)), does not reveal defendant's precise immigration status. As will appear, however, the record reveals that defendant, on whom federal authorities have placed an immigration hold, is not a citizen of the United States.
­FN 3. The trial court denied defendant's motion to vacate his pleas in the 1997 prosecution, and neither party sought review of that denial. Thus, the adequacy of the advisements delivered in the 1997 prosecution is not before us.
­FN 4. In addition to the 1992 felony conviction, in 1990 defendant suffered a misdemeanor conviction for violation of Vehicle Code section 10851.
­FN 5. More specifically, the Yun Declaration states: "Mr. Zamudio faces the possibility of adverse immigration consequences as a result of his convictions for violations [of] Health and Safety Code section 11377 and Vehicle Code sections 10851 and 23152. Indeed, he is subject to, inter alia, deportation as a result of (1) the conviction for the narcotics offense, (2) convictions for multiple offenses involving moral turpitude (both the vehicle theft and the narcotics offenses are deemed to be offenses involving moral turpitude for purposes of the immigration law), and/or (3) the conviction for the drunk driving offense, since he has a prior drunk driving conviction."
­FN 6. Almost a year after we granted review, defendant filed a "Motion to Dismiss," suggesting that, as petitioner could have appealed the trial court's order vacating the judgment of conviction, writ review is not available. Even were defendant technically correct that petitioner may be denied writ relief on appealability grounds, he would have articulated at best an argument supporting the result he actually obtained in the Court of Appeal, not an argument suggesting we improvidently granted review of that decision. We granted review because it appeared "necessary to secure uniformity of decision or the settlement of important questions of law" (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 29(a)), and nothing in defendant's dismissal motion undermines that determination. Accordingly, defendant's motion to dismiss is denied.
­FN 7. Section 1016.5, subdivision (d) provides, in its entirety: "The Legislature finds and declares that in many instances involving an individual who is not a citizen of the United States charged with an offense punishable as a crime under state law, a plea of guilty or nolo contendere is entered without the defendant knowing that a conviction of such offense is grounds for deportation, exclusion from admission to the United States, or denial of naturalization pursuant to the laws of the United States. Therefore, it is the intent of the Legislature in enacting this section to promote fairness to such accused individuals by requiring in such cases that acceptance of a guilty plea or plea of nolo contendere be preceded by an appropriate warning of the special consequences for such a defendant which may result from the plea. It is also the intent of the Legislature that the court in such cases shall grant the defendant a reasonable amount of time to negotiate with the prosecuting agency in the event the defendant or the defendant's counsel was unaware of the possibility of deportation, exclusion from admission to the United States, or denial of naturalization as a result of conviction. It is further the intent of the Legislature that at the time of the plea no defendant shall be required to disclose his or her legal status to the court."
­FN 8. To the extent People v. Gontiz, supra, 58 Cal.App.4th 1309, People v. Guzman (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 186 [172 Cal.Rptr. 34], and People v. Borja (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 758 [178 Cal.Rptr. 287] are inconsistent with this conclusion, they are disapproved.
­FN 9. Petitioner asserted the Yun Declaration was vague and conclusory, but not by way of disputing Attorney Yun's conclusion that defendant faces potential adverse immigration consequences. Petitioner argued, rather, that defendant was dilatory in filing his motion.
­FN 11. The record contains a "Guilty Plea Waiver Form (Misdemeanor)" signed by defendant, recording his no contest plea in April 1990 to a misdemeanor charge of violating Vehicle Code section 10851. The waiver form includes a paragraph, initialed by defendant, which states that the resulting conviction "could result in deportation or exclusion from admission to this country or denial of naturalization or amnesty." The adequacy of these advisements was not challenged below and is not before us. Defendant's 1990 conviction is relevant, however, insofar as the immigration risks defendant actually faced at any given time depended on his cumulative criminal record at that time.
­FN 1. The majority also discuss, in what I perceive to be a dictum, article VI, section 13 of the California Constitution. Contrary to anything that may be said or implied in parts of that discussion, I believe that the constitutional provision bars only a reviewing court from reversing a judgment when there has been no prejudicial error. (Mitchell v. Gonzales (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1041, 1054 [1 Cal.Rptr.2d 913, 819 P.2d 872]; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 834-836 [299 P.2d 243]; Herbert v. Lankershim (1937) 9 Cal.2d 409, 476-477 [71 P.2d 220]; Copley v. Putter (1949) 93 Cal.App.2d 453, 456 [207 P.2d 876].) "[T]he final test is the 'opinion' of the reviewing court." (People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d 818, 835.) I have found no authority for the suggestion that the constitutional provision prevents the Legislature from imposing a particular remedy for a particular trial court error.
Moreover, even if article VI, section 13 did apply to legislated remedies, I am not persuaded that the error is procedural in nature and hence covered by the provision.
Petition for review after the Court of Appeal denied a petition for writ of mandate or prohibition. This case concerns whether a non-citizen, whose guilty plea was not accompanied by the full advice on possible immigration consequences required by Penal Code section 1016.5, is entitled to withdraw that plea without a showing of prejudice.
Real party in Interest to file Its' brief on the merits. asking to October 5, 1999. Separate motion to Dismiss filed.
RPI's answer brief/merits to & Including 10/14/99. no further Extensions will be Granted.
Aty Victor Haltom - RPI's brief will be filed on 10/14/99 in Sac and Faxed to S.F.
San Joaquin County Dist. Atty dated 10/22/99, with A Separate brief entitled "Supplemental corrected Exhibit "M".
San Joaquin County Dist. Atty dated 10/22/99 - Jury Trial has been Stayed Pending Review.
w/directions for CA to issue a writ instructing the trial court to conduct further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. Majority Opinion by Werdegar, J. -- joined by George C.J., Baxter, Chin & Brown JJ. Dissenting Opinion by Mosk, J. -- joined by Kennard, J.
The finality of this court's opinion in the above-entitled cause is hereby extended to and including 7/12/00, or pending further order of the court.
Defendant Jose Francisco Zamudio was arrested and charged in August 1992 with the felony of unlawfully taking or driving a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851) and with receiving stolen property (Penal Code, § 496). Defendant entered a plea of no contest to the vehicle-taking charge, and the court dismissed the charge of receiving stolen property. The court advised defendant twice—once at his arraignment and a second time when he pleaded no contest—that if he is not a United States citizen, the conviction resulting from his plea could be used to cause his deportation or to prevent him from obtaining United States citizenship. The court failed to advise him, however, that if he was deported or left the country, a conviction resulting from his plea might also result in his exclusion from admission to the United States. Defendant was sentenced to eight months in county jail and placed on five years’ probation.
In May 1997, defendant was arrested and charged with taking a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851), driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs (Veh. Code, § 23152), and unlawful possession and transportation or sale of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11377, 11379). A settlement was negotiated, and defendant admitted to a probation violation in the 1992 prosecution and entered a plea of no contest to driving under the influence (with a prior) and to possession of a controlled substance in the 1997 prosecution. The court gave defendant various advisements, some relating to immigration, and sentenced him to two years in state prison on the probation violation. In consideration of his plea, the remaining counts were dropped.
The federal authorities placed an immigration hold on defendant in connection with the 1997 prosecution.
In March 1998, defendant filed a section 1016.5 motion seeking to vacate his plea in the 1992 prosecution, alleging that he had been improperly advised about the possible immigration consequences of his plea. In support of his claim, defendant submitted his immigration attorney’s sworn declaration that his cumulative criminal convictions, including his conviction under Vehicle Code section 10851, created the possibility he would face immigration consequences.
The trail court denied petitioner’s request to make an offer of proof and for an evidentiary hearing on the questions whether defendant would have pleaded no contest in 1992 had he been properly advised on all the immigration consequences, and when defendant acquired actual knowledge of the adverse immigration consequence of his plea.
The trial court granted defendant’s motion, permitting him to withdraw his 1992 plea, and vacated the judgment of conviction and reset the matter for trail.
The Court of Appeal summarily denied petitioner’s application for writ relief, and the Supreme Court granted review.
Does a noncitizen defendant seeking relief under section 1016.5 need to demonstrate he was prejudiced by the court’s incomplete advisement of the specified immigration consequences?
Yes. In order to prevail on a section 1016.5 motion, a defendant must show not only that the trail court failed at the time of his plea to advise him of the specified adverse immigration consequences, and that there exists, at the time of the motion, more than a remote possibility that his conviction will have one or more of those specified consequences, but also that, properly advised, he would not have pleaded guilty or no contest in the first place.
The trial court erred in granting defendant relief under section 1016.5 because it failed to consider whether defendant was prejudiced by the court’s incomplete advisement.
To determine whether section 1016.5 requires a showing of prejudice, the court first looked at the legislative intent underlying the statute. Section 1016.5, subdivision (d) contains an express statement of the legislative intent. This subdivision states that the Legislature was concerned about the fact that many noncitizens charged with crimes were entering pleas of guilty or no contest without knowing that a conviction could result in serious immigration consequences. Therefore, the Legislature enacted section 1016.5 “to promote fairness to such accused individuals by requiring in such cases that acceptance of a guilty plea or plea of nolo contendere be preceded by an appropriate warning of the special consequences for such a defendant which may result from the plea.” (§ 1016.5, subd. (d).) The court stated that some Courts of Appeals have taken this subdivision to mean that the Legislature intended that the defendant demonstrate prejudice in order to get relief.
The first source it examined was Article VI, section 13 of the California Constitution. This provision provides that no judgment shall be vacated for any error as to “any matter of procedure” unless the court decides that the error complained of has resulted in a “miscarriage of justice.” Petitioner argued that a construction of section 1016.5 that does not require defendants to demonstrate prejudice would call into question the statute’s constitutionality, and the court agreed. The court stated that it seemed plausible that a criminal defendant’s right under section 1016.5 to receive from the court specified immigration advisements is a “matter of procedure.” It also rejected defendant’s notion that defendant’s rights under section 1016.5 are by their nature so important that any deprivation must be regarded as a miscarriage of justice. In addition, the court explained how immigration consequences are generally considered “collateral consequences,” and normally a motion to vacate a plea based on misadvisement or omission of a collateral consequence requires the defendant to demonstrate prejudice. The court saw no indication that the Legislature intended section 1016.5 to operate as an exception.
The second source the court examined was section 1404 of the Penal Code. Section 1404, which was enacted before section 1016.5, provides that no mistake or error in a proceeding mandated by the Penal Code renders the proceeding invalid unless it has actually prejudiced the defendant in respect to a substantial right. The court stated that it does not presume that when a Legislature enacts a statute it intends to overthrow long-established principles of law unless such intention is clearly expressed or implied. The court declared that there was no indication that the Legislature enacted section 1016.5 as an exception to section 1404.
(1) The court held that the trail court did not abuse its discretion in denying a further evidentiary hearing on whether defendant faced any of the immigration consequences as a result of his conviction, and if so, when defendant acquired knowledge that he faced those risks. It had not been previously disputed that defendant faced potential adverse immigration consequences as a result of his plea. It is also not required for trial courts to hold live evidentiary hearings on section 1016.5 motions.
(2) The court held that the record before the trial court contained sufficient support for the trial court’s implied factual finding that defendant, at the time of the motion, faced more than just a remote possibility of deportation, exclusion, or denial of naturalization as a result of his conviction based on his 1992 plea.
(3) The court held that the trial court was not required to deny defendant’s section 1016.5 motion as untimely. The court found that defendant did not unreasonably delay brining the motion. In 1992, the chance that defendant faced more than a remote possibility of adverse immigration consequences seemed unlikely. However, in 1997, he stood convicted of multiple criminal offenses and as a consequence was at risk both for deportation and exclusion from readmission. Also, defendant reasonably may not have been aware, until the immigration hold was revealed in his 1997 case file, that one consequence of his 1992 conviction could be to place him at risk, especially if other convictions follow, of being excluded for readmission.
(4) The court held that the trial court did not err in finding that that the immigration advisements the defendant received in 1992 were not in substantial compliance with the statute.
(5) The court held that the trial court did not err in rejecting petitioner’s theory of subsequent correction of the partial advisements.
(6) The court held that the question of whether or not defendant was prejudiced by the trial court’s incomplete advisements is a factual question to be determined by the trial court. The trail court must decide whether it is reasonably probably the defendant would not have pleaded guilty if properly advised.
Justice Mosk did not agree with the majority that section 1016.5 requires a showing of prejudice before a defendant can get relief.
He examined the text of the statute and claimed that the language is clear in stating that if a court fails to give the specified immigration advisements, then the court shall vacate the judgment and permit the defendant to withdraw his plea. The only requirement for the defendant is to show that he faces the possibility of one of the adverse consequences.
Justice Mosk also concluded that due to section 10165, subdivision (d), the defendant must also show that he did not know about one or more of the adverse immigration consequences of his plea. It was the intent of the Legislature to protect noncitizens against unknowingly exposing themselves to adverse consequences by entering pleas, so if a defendant already knew about each enumerated consequence, then failing to advise him of the consequences is harmless error.
Justice Mosk therefore found nothing in the language of section 1016.5 that may be read to impose a requirement that a defendant show that he would have not have pleaded guilty or no contest if he had received the proper immigration advisements.
He also held that section 1404 is without effect on section 1016.5 because section 1404 requires that the error prejudice the defendant in respect to a substantial right, and the Legislature has specified that a substantial right is not implicated when a noncitizen defendant, who does not know about the possible immigration consequences, pleads guilty or no contest.
Lastly, he rejected the majority’s belief that an immigration consequence is a collateral matter in a criminal proceeding. He emphasized the severity of deportation, exclusion, or loss of the opportunity to obtain U.S. citizenship and the importance of warning defendants of all three consequences.
The decision of the Court of Appeal denying petitioner’s application for writ relief is reversed, and the case is remanded with directions to the court to conduct further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
SCOCAL, People v. Superior Court (Zamudio) , 23 Cal. 4th 183, 999 P.2d 686, 96 Cal. Rptr. 2d 463 available at: (https://scocal.stanford.edu/opinion/people-v-superior-court-zamudio-32062) (last visited Sunday April 21, 2019).

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