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Timestamp: 2019-04-19 03:33:12+00:00

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Officials of the Florida Division of Archives threatened to arrest Mel Fisher, president of Treasure Salvors, and to confiscate the boats and equipment of Treasure Salvors if it commenced salvage operations on the Atocha without a salvage contract from the State. Under this threat of arrest, Treasure Salvors executed a one-year contract with the State that permitted it to conduct underwater salvage operations on the vessel. 4 Similar contracts were executed during each of the three succeeding years.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the District Court as against the United States, but modified its decree. Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. Unidentified Wrecked and Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 569 F.2d 330 (CA5 1978). The United States had argued that the District Court lacked in rem jurisdiction to determine rights of the parties to that portion of the Atocha lying beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the court. The Court of Appeals agreed that the District Court lacked in rem jurisdiction over those portions of the res located outside the district; the court noted that for a court to exercise admiralty in rem jurisdiction the res itself must be brought within the district and seized by the court. Id., at 333. The appellate court held, however, that by intervening in the action and stipulating to the court's admiralty jurisdiction the Government had "waived the usual requirement that the res be present within the territorial jurisdiction of the court and consented to the court's jurisdiction to determine [458 U.S. 670, 678] its interest in the extraterritorial portion of the vessel." Id., at 335. The court concluded that jurisdiction thus existed to determine claims of the United States to those portions of the Atocha lying beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the court, but not claims of other parties who had not appeared and submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. 9 On the merits, the Court of Appeals rejected the statutory and common-law claims advanced by the United States.
There is a well-recognized irony in Ex parte Young; unconstitutional conduct by a state officer may be "state action" for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment yet not attributable to the State for purposes of the Eleventh. Nevertheless, the rule of Ex parte Young is one of the cornerstones of the Court's Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 -664; Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 337 .
The rule of law set forth in United States v. Lee and Tindal v. Wesley was clarified in Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682 . In that case the plaintiff brought suit against a Government official to compel specific performance of a contract. 23 The plaintiff theorized that by withholding delivery of property as required by the contract the agent had exceeded his official authority and could be sued in federal court. The Court in Larson stated that "the action of an officer of the sovereign (be it holding, taking or otherwise legally affecting the plaintiff's property) can be regarded as so `illegal' as to permit a suit for specific relief against the officer as an individual only if it is not within the officer's statutory powers or, if within those powers, only if the powers, or their exercise in a particular case, are constitutionally void." Id., at 701-702. The Court held that the fact that an officer wrongfully withholds property belonging to another does not necessarily establish that he is acting beyond the permissible scope of his official capacity. 24 Since [458 U.S. 670, 689] in Larson it was not alleged that the Government official had exceeded his statutory authority - indeed, the plaintiff had affirmatively contended that the officer had authority to bind the Government on the contract at issue 25 - or that the exercise of such authority was unconstitutional, 26 the Court held that the action was barred by sovereign immunity.
These cases make clear that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar an action against a state official that is based on a theory that the officer acted beyond the scope of his statutory authority or, if within that authority, that such authority is unconstitutional. In such an action, however, the Amendment places a limit on the relief that may be obtained by the plaintiff. If the action is allowed to proceed against the officer only because he acted without proper authority, the judgment may not compel the State to use its funds to compensate the plaintiff for the injury. In Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 , the Court made clear that "a suit by private [458 U.S. 670, 690] parties seeking to impose a liability which must be paid from public funds in the state treasury is barred by the Eleventh Amendment." Id., at 663. See Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459 ; Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S., at 337 . 27 In determining the relief that may be granted if a state officer is found to have acted without valid statutory authority, the question is whether the relief "constitute[s] permissible prospective relief or a `retroactive award which requires the payment of funds from the state treasury.'" Quern v. Jordan, supra, at 346-347.
It is clear that the process at issue was directed only at state officials and not at the State itself or any agency of the State. 30 Neither the fact that the State elected to defend on [458 U.S. 670, 692] behalf of its agents, nor the fact that the District Court purported to adjudicate the rights of the State, deprived the federal court of jurisdiction that had been properly invoked over other parties. See Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 ; n. 20, supra. The process thus is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment as a direct action against the State.
The salvage contracts might well provide a basis for a claim to the property by Treasure Salvors; for the contracts did purport to transfer a portion of the artifacts from the State to Treasure Salvors in compensation for the latter's services. Treasure Salvors does claim a right to ownership, but based entirely on the fact that it was the finder of abandoned property and therefore entitled to the property independently of [458 U.S. 670, 695] the contracts. 32 Thus neither party's rights to ownership is affected in any way by the salvage contracts; whether the contracts are valid or not, they provide no authority for the refusal of state officials to surrender possession of the artifacts.
[ Footnote 1 ] The two respondents in this action, Treasure Salvors, Inc., and Armada Research Corp., were organized by the same parties. Throughout these proceedings they have been treated as a single entity referred to as "Treasure Salvors."
[ Footnote 2 ] The story of the Atocha and its discovery is recounted in Lyon, The Trouble with Treasure, 149 National Geographic 787 (1976).
[ Footnote 3 ] The statute since has been amended in a manner not relevant to this case.
[ Footnote 4 ] The District Court found that the contract was entered into as a result of the "coercive acts of the Division of Archives in threatening arrest and confiscation." Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. Unidentified Wrecked and Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 459 F. Supp. 507, 522 (SD Fla. 1978). The State admits that if Treasure Salvors had salvaged without a contract arrests would have been made. Tr. of Oral Arg. 9.
[ Footnote 5 ] In its exceptions to the Special Master's Report, the State contended that the Master should have recognized that the boundaries of the State extended to the boundaries defined in the State's 1868 Constitution, rather than to the limits specified in the Submerged Lands Act of 1953. See 420 U.S., at 532 . This Court considered that exception and held that the Master had properly rejected the State's argument. Id., at 533.
[ Footnote 6 ] This area is on the Continental Shelf of the United States, in international waters. Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 408 F. Supp. 907, 909 (SD Fla. 1976).
[ Footnote 7 ] The United States asserted a right of ownership under several federal statutes and the common-law doctrine of "sovereign prerogative." The State of Florida did not intervene at this time. It had notice of the litigation, however, and both assisted the United States in the lawsuit and entered into preliminary negotiations with the United States Department of the Interior regarding disposition of the Atocha's treasure in the event the Federal Government prevailed. See 621 F.2d 1340, 1343-1344 (CA5 1980).
[ Footnote 8 ] The court explained: "General principles of maritime and international law dictate that an abandonment constitutes a repudiation of ownership, and that a party taking possession under salvage operations may be considered a finder under the doctrine of `animus revertendi,' i. e., the owner has no intention of returning. Ownership in the vessel would then vest in the finder by operation of law." 408 F. Supp., at 909 (citation omitted).
[ Footnote 9 ] The court stated: "[T]he district court properly adjudicated title to all those objects within its territorial jurisdiction and to those objects without its territory as between plaintiffs and the United States. In affirming the district court, we do not approve that portion of its order which may be construed as a holding that plaintiffs have exclusive title to, and the right to immediate and sole possession of, the vessel and cargo as to other claimants, if any there be, who are not parties or privies to this litigation." 569 F.2d, at 335-336 (footnote omitted).
[ Footnote 10 ] The warrant provided: "WARRANT FOR ARREST IN REM "THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA "TO: THE MARSHAL OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA "GREETING: "WHEREAS, on the 18th day of July, 1975, Treasure Salvors, Inc., a corporation and Armada Research Corporation, a corporation, filed a [458 U.S. 670, 679] Complaint under Rule 9(h) against the Unidentified Wrecked and Abandoned Sailing Vessel, her tackle, armament, apparel and cargo located with 2500 yards of a [sic] at coordinates 24ø 31.5' North Latitude and 82ø 20' West Longitude, said sailing vessel believed to be the NUESTRA SENORA DE ATOCHA for the reasons in said Complaint, and "WHEREAS, in November of 1975 Notice of said claim was published in a newspaper of general circulation within the District, and "WHEREAS, the State of Florida nor any of its agencies, agents, or employees, did appear in this cause to defend or prosecute any claim that they might have to any portions of said vessel that were in their possession, custody, care or control. "NOW, THEREFORE, you are hereby commanded to take into your possession the portions of said vessel which have been in the possession or are in the possession of L. Ross Morrell and/or James McBeth, or under their custody, care or control and to bring said portions of said vessel within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court and transfer possession of same to the substitute custodian appointed in this action." App. 40-42.
[ Footnote 11 ] The State also asserted: "A contract was entered into between Armada Research Corporation and the State of Florida on December 3, 1974 and was for a good and valid consideration. The contract alone determined the rights and obligations of the contracting parties and was in no way affected by [the decision of this Court in] United States v. Florida. This contract was fully executed and performed prior to the United States v. Florida [sic]." Id., at 44. In response to the State's assertion that the contracts determined the rights of the contracting parties, Treasure Salvors filed a supplemental complaint in federal court. Record 369. The complaint sought a declaratory judgment that the contracts between Treasure Salvors and the State were void.
[ Footnote 12 ] The court also held that, in light of the State's claim that it had a contractual right to 25% of the res, "the State of Florida has waived the general requirement that the res be within the territorial jurisdiction of the court and, further, has consented to the court's jurisdiction over its interest in any portions of the vessel." App. 59.
[ Footnote 13 ] The Court of Appeals then dissolved the emergency stay. Id., at 65. The court ordered: "The United States Marshal may execute the warrant of arrest and upon doing so shall forthwith deliver custody of all of the items in question to a custodian who will take possession of them in situ and shall place them under lock or seal at their present location and hold them secure." Id., at 68. The appellate court denied a motion for reconsideration that had contended that the District Court lacked jurisdiction. "The question of the jurisdiction of the District Court for the Southern District of Florida is for that court to determine in the first instance on the basis of such record as may be developed in that court." Id., at 69. To expedite the litigation, Treasure Salvors agreed to permit the State to serve as substitute custodian. The warrant was executed and, with the State serving as custodian, the artifacts came into the control of the United States Marshal.
[ Footnote 14 ] The court asserted several grounds in support of this decision. Essentially, the court held: "There is no Eleventh Amendment bar to the mere arrest of articles of salvage unless the state is the owner. If the state is not the owner, the court may proceed." 459 F. Supp., at 527. The court concluded that ownership is thus a "jurisdictional" fact and, citing United States v. Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258 , noted that "[i]t is axiomatic that the federal courts have jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction." 459 F. Supp., at 527. The court held that no Eleventh Amendment bar existed because "[t]his Court finds as fact that the Division of Archives is not and never was the rightful owner of the articles of salvage from the ship Atocha that were seized by the ancillary warrant of arrest and which have been improperly removed and held by the Division of Archives; that the Division of Archives is not the owner of any right or interest in such property based upon the purported and invalid contract with Treasure Salvors; and that the Division of Archives was wrongfully withholding a portion of the res of the Atocha over which this Court was properly exercising in rem jurisdiction." Ibid. On the basis of its memorandum, the court "ORDERED and ADJUDGED and DECREED that Treasure Salvors, Inc. and Armada Research Corp. have full right and title to articles arrested and that they are entitled to possession and that the United States [458 U.S. 670, 682] Marshal, who has possession and control of such articles, shall deliver them to Treasure Salvors, Inc. and Armada Research Corp." App. 85. Pursuant to this order, Treasure Salvors eventually received - under certain restrictions - the artifacts that the State held as custodian for the court. Record 554.
[ Footnote 15 ] The court noted that this result was particularly compelling in admiralty in rem actions. The court reasoned that, since federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over such actions, if the mere assertion of ownership by a State were sufficient to invoke the Amendment, petitioners such as Treasure Salvors would be stranded without a forum in which to litigate their claim. 621 F.2d, at 1346, n. 19.
[ Footnote 16 ] The court neither affirmed nor reversed the District Court's holding that Florida was in privity with the United States and therefore bound by the earlier decision of the Court of Appeals. Id., at 1344, n. 17.
[ Footnote 17 ] The Eleventh Amendment provides: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." Although the Amendment does not literally apply to actions brought against a State by its own citizens, the Amendment long has been held to govern such actions. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 . See Employees v. Missouri Public Health Dept., 411 U.S. 279, 280 ; Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662 . Nor does the Amendment literally apply to proceedings in admiralty. Again, however, the Court has found it to govern certain admiralty actions. See In re New York, 256 U.S. 490, 500 .
[ Footnote 18 ] The fact that the State appeared and offered defenses on the merits does not foreclose consideration of the Eleventh Amendment issue; "the Eleventh Amendment defense sufficiently partakes of the nature of a jurisdictional bar" that it may be raised at any point of the proceedings. Edelman v. Jordan, supra, at 678; see Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 467 ("The Eleventh Amendment declares a policy [458 U.S. 670, 684] and sets forth an explicit limitation of federal judicial power of such compelling force that this Court will consider the issue arising under this Amendment in this case even though urged for the first time in this Court").
[ Footnote 19 ] But see Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 ("Congress may, in determining what is `appropriate legislation' for the purpose of enforcing the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, provide for private suits against States or state officials which are constitutionally impermissible in other contexts"); see also Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 ; Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122 .
[ Footnote 20 ] Thus, in Alabama v. Pugh, our holding that the State of Alabama and the Alabama Board of Corrections should have been dismissed as parties did not affect the substance of the relief granted against a number of Alabama officials responsible for the administration of its prison system.
[ Footnote 21 ] In Lee, the plaintiff brought an action in ejectment in federal court to recover the Virginia estate of General Robert E. Lee. The estate had been acquired by the United States for nonpayment of taxes, although the taxes in fact had been tendered by a third party. Once in possession, the Government had established a federal military installation and a national cemetery on the property. The plaintiff brought suit against the governmental custodians of the estate, who pleaded the sovereign immunity of the United States as a defense. This Court upheld a trial court judgment in favor of the plaintiff, on the ground that the defendants' possession of the estate was unlawful. The Court held that a suit against the federal officers under such circumstances was not a suit against the sovereign. Although Lee involved the sovereign immunity of the United States, the Court in Tindal stated that "it cannot be doubted that the question whether a particular suit is one against the State, within the meaning of the Constitution, must depend upon the same principles that determine whether a particular suit is one against the United States." 167 U.S., at 213 .
[ Footnote 22 ] The Court continued: "Any other view leads to this result: That if a State, by its officers, acting under a void statute, should seize for public use the property of a citizen, without making or securing just compensation for him, and thus violate the constitutional provision declaring that no State shall deprive any person of property without due process of law, Chicago, Burlington &c. Railroad v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 236 , 241, the citizen is remediless so long as the State, by its agents, chooses to hold his property; for, according to the contention of the defendants, if such agents are sued as individuals, wrongfully in possession, they can bring about the dismissal of the suit by simply informing the court of the official character in which they hold the property thus illegally appropriated." Id., at 222.
[ Footnote 23 ] The plaintiff had contracted to purchase surplus coal from the War Assets Administration; the Administrator of that agency had withheld delivery and entered a new contract to sell the coal on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to perform a condition precedent to delivery. The plaintiff contended that title to the coal had passed at the time the contract was made, so that the Administrator was wrongfully withholding property that belonged to him.
[ Footnote 24 ] The Court stated: "The mere allegation that the officer, acting officially, wrongfully holds property to which the plaintiff has title does not meet [the requirement that the action to be restrained or directed is not action of the sovereign]. True, it establishes a wrong to the plaintiff. But it does not establish that [458 U.S. 670, 689] the officer, in committing that wrong, is not exercising the powers delegated to him by the sovereign. If he is exercising such powers, the action is the sovereign's and a suit to enjoin it may not be brought unless the sovereign has consented." 337 U.S., at 693 . The Court explicitly rejected the argument that "the commission of a tort cannot be authorized by the sovereign." Ibid.; see also id., at 695.
[ Footnote 25 ] The Court found that the Administrator "was empowered by the sovereign to administer a general sales program encompassing the negotiation of contracts, the shipment of goods and the receipt of payment." Id., at 692. "A normal concomitant of such powers, as a matter of general agency law, is the power to refuse delivery when, in the agent's view, delivery is not called for under a contract and the power to sell goods which the agent believes are still his principal's to sell." Ibid. The Court also noted that the "very basis of the respondent's action is that the Administrator was an officer of the Government, validly appointed to administer its sales program and therefore authorized to enter, through his subordinates, into a binding contract concerning the sale of the Government's coal." Id., at 703.
[ Footnote 26 ] The Court held that there could be no claim that the Administrator's actions constituted an unconstitutional taking of property without compensation because the plaintiff had a remedy, in a suit for breach of contract, in the Court of Claims. Id., at 703, n. 27.
[ Footnote 27 ] This principle is not absolute. As noted, n. 19, supra, Congress may authorize a suit against a State - pursuant to 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment - that would entail the payment of public funds from the state treasury. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 ; Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 . Moreover, a prospective decree that has an "ancillary effect" on the state treasury "is a permissible and often an inevitable consequence of the principle announced in Ex parte Young." Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S., at 668 ; see also Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 288 . Finally, "[w]hile it is clear that the doctrine of Ex parte Young is of no aid to a plaintiff seeking damages from the public treasury . . . damages against individual defendants are a permissible remedy in some circumstances notwithstanding the fact that they hold public office." Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 238 .
[ Footnote 28 ] The motion identified L. Ross Morrell as the Director of the Division of Archives and James McBeth as the Bureau Chief of the Historical Museum of the Division of Archives. App. 15.
[ Footnote 29 ] As noted, the State immediately filed a motion to quash the warrant. Id., at 43. Although that effort failed, the State asserted an Eleventh Amendment defense in its attempt to defeat a transfer of the property - and thus ultimate execution of the warrant - to Treasure Salvors. Record 422.
[ Footnote 30 ] As noted, n. 11, supra, Treasure Salvors filed a supplemental complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that its contracts with the State [458 U.S. 670, 692] were void. This action might be characterized as an action against the State itself. The District Court emphasized, however, that "the warrant was not issued in response to Treasure Salvors' Supplemental Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Other Relief which was filed April 17, 1978." 459 F. Supp., at 526 (emphasis in original). The order to show cause entered by the District Court was addressed directly to the State of Florida. See App. 63. That order was issued, however, only after the State itself had filed a motion to quash the warrant. Id., at 43 ("COMES NOW, the State of Florida, by and through the undersigned counsel, and moves this Court to set aside and quash the warrant for arrest in rem issued against the State of Florida at the request of Plaintiffs herein . . ."). The order to show cause did not alter the fact that the process resisted by the State on Eleventh Amendment grounds was directed only at state officials.
[ Footnote 31 ] In this Court the State has asserted that the issue on the merits involves a determination of the validity of the contracts. See post, at 712, n. 9. But the State has not identified any language in the contracts that provides even a colorable basis for a claim that the State has an ownership interest in the artifacts.
[ Footnote 32 ] This case is thus unlike Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682 , in which the plaintiff asserted a right to the property pursuant to the very contract that it contended the Government official had breached without authority. Treasure Salvors claims ownership of the res on the ground that the property was abandoned by the former owner, and discovered by Treasure Salvors, on the Continental Shelf of the United States in international waters. See n. 8, supra.
[ Footnote 33 ] In this Court the State has advanced the argument that its boundaries for purposes of rightful ownership of sunken ships extend further than its boundaries for purposes of ownership of mineral resources. This argument was not raised in the petition for certiorari, is foreclosed by our prior determination of the State's boundaries, see n. 5, supra, and is refuted by the State's own conduct in this case. The State has never attempted to claim ownership of the property that Treasure Salvors has continued to recover since the expiration of the contracts. Given the State's vigorous [458 U.S. 670, 696] defense of the relatively few artifacts at issue in this case, it is difficult to imagine that the State idly would permit Treasure Salvors to pirate other treasure that rightfully belonged to the State.
[ Footnote 34 ] The fact that the contracts were executed on the basis of a mistaken understanding concerning the ownership of the Atocha cannot, of course, provide Florida with a colorable claim of ownership. For if the mistake had not occurred, it would have been apparent from the outset that Treasure Salvors had no reason to enter into a contract with Florida or any other stranger to the transaction. The State of Florida has never contended that it would benefit from a reformation of the contracts; Treasure Salvors' position does not depend on any change in the terms of the contracts. The Eleventh Amendment analysis in this case does not require any consideration of the doctrine of mistake.
[ Footnote 35 ] Although the State in this case relies only on the disputed contracts - and not on any statutory provision - we note that Fla. Stat. 267.061(2)(a) (1981) provides generally that it is the responsibility of the Division of Archives to "[l]ocate, acquire, protect, preserve, and promote the location, acquisition, and preservation of historic sites and properties, buildings, artifacts, treasure trove, and objects of antiquity which have scientific or historical value or are of interest to the public, including, but not limited to, monuments, memorials, fossil deposits, Indian habitations, ceremonial sites, abandoned settlements, caves, sunken or abandoned ships, or any part thereof." Surely this section does not authorize state officials, however, to seize and hold historical artifacts at will wherever they are found.
I agree with the plurality that the Eleventh Amendment prohibited neither an execution of the warrant nor a transfer to respondents of the artifacts at issue in this case. See ante, at 699 and this page. My rationale for this conclusion differs from the plurality's, however. Both respondents are corporations organized under the laws of the State of Florida. Thus this suit is not "commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of another State." U.S. Const., Amdt. 11 (emphasis added). The plurality asserts that this constitutional provision "long has been held to govern" "actions brought against a State by its own citizens." Ante, at 683, n. 17 (emphasis added), citing Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). I have long taken the view that Hans did not rely upon the Eleventh Amendment, and that that Amendment does not bar federal court suits against a [458 U.S. 670, 701] State when brought by its own citizens. See Employees v. Missouri Public Health Dept., 411 U.S. 279, 309 -322 (1973) (dissenting opinion); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 687 (1974) (dissenting opinion). I adhere to this view, and I therefore believe that the Eleventh Amendment is wholly inapplicable in the present case. * To this extent, I am in agreement with the plurality's disposition.
[ Footnote * ] For this reason, I cannot agree with footnote 17 of the plurality's opinion. To the extent, however, that the plurality concludes that the judgment of the Court of Appeals should be affirmed because the State of Florida does not have even a colorable claim to the artifacts, I agree with its opinion.
The Court of Appeals, like the District Court, thought that the jurisdictional issue raised by the State merged with a determination on the merits of the validity of the State's claim to the property. The appellate court believed that it had "jurisdiction to decide jurisdiction" and could therefore determine who owned the artifacts in order to ascertain whether the suit was, in fact, an action against the State. [458 U.S. 670, 703] By holding that "[t]he court did not have power . . . to adjudicate the State's interest in the property without the State's consent," ante, at 682, the Court properly rejects this novel conception of the Eleventh Amendment. * The appellate court's approach to the jurisdictional issue is not consistent with our prior cases; it incorrectly assumes that a federal court may adjudicate a State's right to ownership of specific property within the possession of state officials without the State's consent. The approach is unsatisfactory because, as Judge Rubin noted in dissent, it "is equivalent to asserting that suits against a state are permitted by the eleventh amendment if the result is that the state loses." 621 F.2d 1340, 1351 (CA5 1980). Although disagreeing with the Court of Appeals' Eleventh Amendment holding, the plurality nevertheless proceeds to conclude that the "State does not have even a colorable claim to the artifacts pursuant to [its] contracts" with respondents, ante, at 694, and that the state officials "have [no] colorable claim to possession of the artifacts." Ante, at 697. This for all practical purposes adjudicates the State's title, thus repeating the Eleventh Amendment error of the Court of Appeals.
Treasure Salvors' subsequent request for an arrest warrant was predicated on this decision. 1 The warrant was to [458 U.S. 670, 705] issue because it had already been decided that Treasure Salvors had "sole title and right to possession of the Defendant vessel." App. 13. Notwithstanding the Court of Appeals' limitation of its opinion to artifacts within the District Court's jurisdiction and to rights in the treasure asserted by the United States, Treasure Salvors sought enforcement of the judgment against the State of Florida. It did so on grounds that this Court's decision in United States v. Florida, 420 U.S. 521 (1975), removed Florida's right to the artifacts, and that Florida was privy to and bound by Treasure Salvors I.
I find the inescapable conclusion to be that this suit, as filed, litigated, and decided, was an action to determine the title of the State of Florida to the artifacts. 2 A suit of this type is at the heart of the Eleventh Amendment immunity.
The plurality's reading of In re New York (II) is that an action "otherwise barred as an in personam action against the State - cannot be maintained through seizure of property owned by the State." Ante, at 699. 3 Nothing in the language of Justice Pitney's opinion supports this interpretation. Moreover, the libel brought before the Court in that case was a true in rem action; an action in admiralty to recover damages caused by a ship is a classic in rem action, although [458 U.S. 670, 708] after the owners of the vessel are identified the libel often will be amended to include an in personam claim as well. G. Gilmore & C. Black, Law of Admiralty 498 (2d ed. 1975) (Gilmore & Black). Therefore, In re New York (II) is as "true" an in rem action as the instant case.
The grounds of similarity between the cases are clear: in both cases in rem libels were filed and process by arrest was requested; in both suits the State by its Attorney General responded and indicated to the District Court that the property to be arrested was in the possession and ownership of the State, and therefore immune from seizure and attachment. In both cases, the District Court overruled the suggestion and awarded process in rem, authorizing the arrest of the res. When the seizure of the Queen City finally reached this forum, the Court stated that the property was exempt from seizure by admiralty process in rem. 4 The plurality's distinction aside, the cases can be distinguished on but a single relevant point: the fact that ownership of the res is contested here. That, of course, is the grounds on which the Court of [458 U.S. 670, 709] Appeals decided the case - a resolution which the plurality apparently rejects.
The plurality's second argument is that the "State does not have even a colorable claim to the artifacts pursuant to these contracts." Ante, at 694. I disagree with this conclusion. The wording of the contract is reasonably interpretable as providing for a division of the recovered treasure. The intention of the parties upon the making of the contract, of course, governs the interpretation of the instrument. If United States v. Florida, supra, had placed the Atocha within Florida waters, it could not reasonably be argued that the contract did not constitute a valid basis for the State's [458 U.S. 670, 713] claim to 25% of the artifacts. Both Treasure Salvors and the State entered into the contracts on the assumption that the Atocha rested in Florida waters. As it happened, the Florida decision upset that mutual assumption. This does not, however, inexorably mean that the contracts are so invalid as to render possession of the artifacts ultra vires. 10 Admiralty law may provide that such a mistake is not grounds for rescission of fully performed contracts in these circumstances. 11 The plurality's contention that the language of the contracts does not purport to transfer artifacts from Treasure Salvors to the State utterly ignores the concept of mistake. The notion of mistake would be read out of contract law if courts expected a contract, written under mistaken assumptions, to read as if the mistake had not occurred.
[ Footnote * ] I therefore concur in the judgment of the Court only insofar as it reverses the Court of Appeals' determination of the State's ownership of the artifacts. On this point, all Members of the Court, except JUSTICE BRENNAN, are in agreement.
[ Footnote 1 ] "[T]he plaintiffs . . . pursuant to the Final Judgment rendered by this Court February 19, 1976 and the Appellate Opinion rendered by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit No. 76-2151, March [458 U.S. 670, 705] 13, 1978, move this Court for an Order commanding the United States Marshal to arrest and take custody of those portions of the Plaintiff's vessel now being held by L. Ross Morrell or James McBeth or being held under their custody, care or control." App. 11.
[ Footnote 2 ] The fact that the District Court did not issue its arrest warrant in response to Treasure Salvors' amended complaint is of little significance. It is the complaint which defines the nature of an action, and once accepted, an amended complaint replaces the original. Moreover, the adjudication of title either reflects that the ownership claim followed from the original complaint or constituted action upon the amended complaint.
[ Footnote 3 ] The plurality confuses the matter further by treating the cases as bearing on the question of whether a burden is imposed on the state treasury. The In re New York cases pertain instead to the initial issue of whether the action is against the State.
[ Footnote 4 ] In re New York (II) was decided on straight sovereign immunity grounds: "[T]he record - aside from whether a suit in admiralty brought by private parties through process in rem against property owned by a State is not in effect a suit against the State, barred by the general principle applied in Ex parte New York, No. 1, No. 25, Original - presents the question whether the proceeding can be based upon the seizure of property owned by a State and used and employed solely for its governmental uses and purposes." The Court went on to decide the vessel was immune from admiralty process, based upon "the law of nations" and "general grounds of comity and policy." 256 U.S., at 510 . In re New York (II)'s resolution on sovereign immunity grounds has several implications. First, as with other sovereign immunity decisions, it is direct support for determining what constitutes a suit against the State. Ante, at 686, n. 21. Cf. Tindal v. Wesley, 167 U.S. 204, 213 (1897). Second, it undercuts the plurality's analysis that the case merely stops roundabout circumvention of In re New York (I) through "first attaching property that belonged to the State and then proceeding in rem." Ante, at 699. As the above quoted passage indicates, the In re New York (II) Court did not need to go so far in order to find the suit barred.
[ Footnote 5 ] Under English law, no warrant for arrest will issue against any vessel in the actual service of a recognized foreign government. Significantly, this is so even if the suit itself is not barred. See, e. g., The Messicano, 32 T. L. R. 519 (1916). Where plaintiff sues in rem for possession "the writ will be dismissed, if a foreign recognized government claims the right to possession and is in the actual possession of the vessel, regardless of whether possession was rightfully or wrongfully obtained." Riesenfeld, Sovereign Immunity of Foreign Vessels in Anglo-American Law: The Evolution of a Legal Doctrine, 25 Minn. L. Rev. 1, 25 (1940). In The Parlement Belge, 5 P. D. 197, 220 (1880), the "leading authority" in England, it was held that "[i]f the remedy sought by an action in rem against public property is, as we think it is, an indirect mode of exercising the authority of the Court against the owner of the property, then the attempt to exercise such an authority is an attempt inconsistent with the independence and equality of the state which is represented by such owner." Moreover, after a ship was declared by the foreign sovereign "to be in his possession as sovereign and to be a public vessel of the state," it was "very difficult to say that any Court can inquire by contentious testimony whether that declaration is or is not correct." Id., at 219.
[ Footnote 6 ] For early cases, see United States v. Peters, 3 Dall. 121 (1795); The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 7 Cranch 116 (1812); L'Invincible, 1 Wheat. 238 (1816); The Santissima Trinidad, 7 Wheat. 283 (1822). In The Siren, 7 Wall. 152 (1869), the Court allowed a claim against the proceeds of the vessel when sold, but stressed that no claim could be enforced while the Government owned the vessel. In The Western Maid, 257 U.S. 419 (1922), the Court, per Justice Holmes, went further and refused to allow a claim against a Government-owned vessel as enforceable either during Government ownership or thereafter. Shortly thereafter, sovereign immunity was expanded to embrace ships engaged solely in commerce. Berizzi Bros. Co. v. S.S. Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562 (1926).
[ Footnote 7 ] See Gilmore & Black 606-613. Only when a vessel is not in the sovereign's possession, is there controversy over the proper means by which the foreign government may assert its ownership. See Compania Espanola de Navegacion Maritima v. The Navemar, 303 U.S. 68 (1938).
[ Footnote 8 ] "In Larson . . . this Court held that the actions of a federal official in withholding the delivery of goods pursuant to his interpretation of a disputed provision of a contract constituted at most a tortious deprivation of property. . . . Actions of the Government official pursuant to legitimate contractual authority were neither ultra vires nor unconstitutional." Ante, at 693.
[ Footnote 9 ] "At issue in the present case is both a contract and property right of the State of Florida to the artifacts previously in its possession . . . ." Brief for Petitioner 32; "The issue on the merits was whether the State had property rights to artifacts in its Archives - that is, whether the contract to which the state was a party was valid." Id., at 60. "The State of Florida has not claimed a lien on the artifacts; it has claimed ownership - through fully executed contracts." Reply Brief for Petitioner 16-17. "The contract alone determined the rights and obligations of the contracting parties and was in no way affected by United States v. Florida." State's Motion to Quash Warrant for Arrest in Rem, App. 44.
[ Footnote 10 ] The plurality also suggests that the contracts "were predicated entirely on a state statute that on its face is inapplicable in this case." Ante, at 696. This no more than restates the plurality's characterization of the contracts. But it does highlight that the contracts' validity is called into question only by a mistaken assumption of law - the statute's "inapplica[bility]" after United States v. Florida, 420 U.S. 531 (1975).
[ Footnote 11 ] The inherent uncertainty in contracts for salvage has led admiralty courts to find few reasons that would justify reformation of a contract. See The Elfrida, 172 U.S. 186, 196 (1898) ("We do not think that a salvage contract should be sustained as an exception to the general rule, but rather that it should, prima facie, be enforced, and that it belongs to the defendant to establish the exception"). Gilmore & Black 582 ("Whether the gamble turns well or badly for the salvor, the `no cure no pay' contract is everywhere recognized as enforceable, absent such invalidating causes as fraud and duress").
[ Footnote 12 ] The plurality's attempt to distinguish Larson is puzzling. It notes that while the plaintiff in Larson asserted a right to the property pursuant to the very contract it contended the Government official had breached, here Treasure Salvors claims ownership on grounds entirely independent of the contracts. This is a distinction without meaning: it is the State's claim to the property which is significant; the basis for Treasure Salvors' claim is quite beside the point. The relevant comparison is that the federal official in Larson was arguably without authority to enter a contract to sell coal that he had already sold just as the State was arguably without authority to enter a contract respecting salvage on lands outside its waters.

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