Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/3d/81/929.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 00:57:06+00:00

Document:
DONALD J., Plaintiff and Appellant, v. EVNA M., Defendant and Respondent.
Doty, Quinlan, Kershaw & Fanucchi, Bert C. Hoffman, Jr., and Edward L. Fanucchi for Plaintiff and Appellant.
The principal issues presented by this case are: (1) a man's right to bring an action for the purpose of obtaining a judicial determination that he is the natural father of a child born out of wedlock, and (2) the nature and extent of the rights possessed by a natural father of a child born out of wedlock to require that child to change its surname from that of its natural mother to that of its natural father, against the objection of the natural mother.
We recount the factual background of this litigation. Defendant Evna M. (hereafter referred to as defendant mother) gave birth to a female child on November 2, 1971, whom she named Shalene M. fn. 1 Three years later on November 24, 1974, plaintiff herein, Donald J., commenced a declaratory relief action pursuant to former section 231 of the Civil Code fn. 2 to have himself declared the father of this child. In the complaint in that action plaintiff alleged that he and defendant mother never had been married to each other, that he was the natural father of Shalene, that at all times he had claimed to be the child's natural father and that he had done all things necessary to legitimate the child. By accompanying declaration, plaintiff stated that he had cohabited with defendant mother both prior and subsequent to the birth of the child, that he had visited the child regularly since her birth, that he had accepted the child into his family and that he had supported the child.
On March 9, 1976, plaintiff caused to be filed an order to show cause in which he sought clarification of his visitation rights. Embodied in this order to show cause was a request by plaintiff to have the court enter a judgment (1) determining that plaintiff is the natural father of Shalene, (2) directing that Shalene use plaintiff's surname and (3) ordering the correction of the birth certificate of the child. These three issues appended to the order to show cause form the subject matter of the instant case.
Defendant mother contested all of plaintiff's requests. After a hearing at which no testimony was presented, an order was filed on April 15, 1976, in which the court resolved the dispute concerning the visitation rights and dismissed the causes of action for a determination of paternity and for a correction of the birth certificate on the ground that these two causes of action were not properly before the court. The court then allowed plaintiff time to file points and authorities with regard to the cause of action seeking to require Shalene to change her surname to that of plaintiff.
On July 9, 1976, a minute order was entered which provided: "It is Ordered that the plaintiff's request for order requiring the use of his name by the minor child is denied. Use of name cannot be prohibited unless fraud involved." Plaintiff then appealed from this minute order. Thereafter, a formal written judgment was entered denying plaintiff's request that Shalene be required to change her surname to that of plaintiff; the judgment made no mention of the court's earlier dismissal of the causes of action for a determination of paternity and for a correction of the birth certificate.
At the outset we are confronted by several procedural matters.
[3a] Turning to the merits of this appeal we initially conclude that the trial court erred in dismissing plaintiff's cause of action for a determination that he is the natural father of the child Shalene.
If plaintiff is not the natural father of Shalene his right to object to that child's use of a surname generally would be limited to those situations where, for a fraudulent purpose, the child was using a surname that was detrimental to the interests of plaintiff. (See Weathers v. Superior Court (1976) 54 Cal. App. 3d 286, 288-289 [126 Cal. Rptr. 547]; In re Weingand (1964) 231 Cal. App. 2d 289, 293-294 [41 Cal. Rptr. 778]; In re Useldinger (1939) 35 Cal. App. 2d 723, 727 [96 P.2d 958]; 65 C.J.S. (1966) Names, § 11(1), pp. 25-26; see also Montandon v. Montandon (1966) 242 Cal. App. 2d 886, 888-889 [52 Cal. Rptr. 43]; 57 Am.Jur.2d (1971) Name, § 10, p. 282.) On the other hand, if plaintiff can establish that he is the natural father of Shalene he would have more legal rights to control the child's use of a surname than if he were not the natural father of the child. We now proceed to discuss the exact nature and extent of these rights.
There is nothing to suggest that this custom is not prevalent in California. In fact, in several California cases where the mother of a child born in lawful wedlock tried to change her child's surname from that of the child's natural father to that of her second husband the appellate courts recognized that the father of a child born in lawful wedlock has a primary right or protectible interest in having his child bear his surname in accordance with the usual custom of succession to paternal surname. (In re Trower (1968) 260 Cal. App. 2d 75, 77 [66 Cal. Rptr. 873]; In re Worms (1967) 252 Cal. App. 2d 130, 134-135 [60 Cal. Rptr. 88]; Montandon v. Montandon, supra, 242 Cal. App. 2d 886, 890-891; In re Larson (1947) 81 Cal. App. 2d 258, 262 [183 P.2d 688].)  Thus, absent a statute to the contrary, it would appear that the common law of this state is that a father of a child born in lawful wedlock has a primary right or protectible interest in having that child bear his surname while the mother of a child [81 Cal. App. 3d 937] born out of wedlock has a primary right or protectible interest in that child bearing her surname.
The error in dismissing the paternity cause of action also permeates the determination against plaintiff on the change of surname issue, necessitating a reversal of that determination. As previously pointed out, the trial court, in resolving the change of surname issue adversely to plaintiff, did not apply the legal standard to be used in a case where a natural parent is seeking to change his or her child's surname against the objection of the child's other natural parent. If plaintiff is successful in proving that he is the natural father of Shalene he is entitled to have the change of surname issue redetermined in light of the appropriate standard (cf. Tomei v. Henning (1967) 67 Cal. 2d 319, 324 [62 Cal. Rptr. 9, 431 P.2d 633]); we therefore reverse the decision on the change of surname issue for that purpose (cf. In re Marriage of Van Sickle, supra, 68 Cal. App. 3d 728, 743).
It is ordered that the judgment dated August 24, 1977, be and it is hereby amended to read as follows: "It is ordered, adjudged and decreed that defendant Evna M. have judgment of dismissal against plaintiff Donald J. on the cause of action for a determination that plaintiff Donald J. is the natural father of Shalene M. and on the cause of action for a correction of the birth certificate of Shalene M.; it is further ordered, adjudged and decreed that defendant Evna M. have judgment against plaintiff Donald J. on the cause of action for a change of Shalene M.'s surname to that of plaintiff Donald J."
As amended, that portion of the judgment dismissing plaintiff's cause of action for a determination that he is the natural father of Shaleme M. and that portion of the judgment determining in favor defendant and against plaintiff the cause of action for a change of Shalene M.'s surname to that of plaintiff are reversed; in all other respects the judgment is affirmed. Plaintiff shall recover his costs on appeal.
Brown (G. A.), P. J., and Franson, J.;, concurred.
FN 1. When Shalene was born defendant mother's surname was M., and this is the surname she gave Shalene. Sometime thereafter, but prior to the commencement of this action, defendant mother took on the hyphenated surname of M. ...; however, there was no change of Shalene's surname.
FN 5. When plaintiff's cause of action for a determination that he is the natural of Shalene is tried on the merits plaintiff may attempt in a plea of res judicata to assert offensively the stipulation that he is the natural father of Shalene which appears in the order in the declaratory relief action. At this time we express no opinion as to the effect of that order or as to the propriety of such a plea.

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