Source: http://ny.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20180330_0000628.ENY.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 10:30:42+00:00

Document:
TIME WARNER CABLE NEW YORK CITY LLC, Defendant.
DORA L. IRIZARRY Chief Judge.
Under Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, pleadings must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Pleadings are to give the defendant “fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 346 (2005) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)), overruled in part on other grounds by Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)). “[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual allegations, ' but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.'” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
Under Rule 12(b)(6), a defendant may move, in lieu of an answer, for dismissal of a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” To resolve such a motion, courts “must accept as true all [factual] allegations contained in a complaint, ” but need not accept “legal conclusions.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. For this reason, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice” to insulate a claim against dismissal. Id. “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
In order to establish a prima facie case for employment discrimination under Title VII, Plaintiff must show that: (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he was qualified for the position he held; (3) he suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) the adverse action took place under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination. Holcomb v. Iona College, 521 F.3d 130, 138 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing Feingold v. New York, 366 F.3d 138, 152 (2d Cir. 2004)).
To survive a motion to dismiss on a claim for retaliation under Title VII, Plaintiff must allege that: (1) he participated in a protected activity; (2) Defendant knew of his participation; (3) he was subject to an adverse employment action; and (4) there was a causal connection between the participation in the protected activity and the adverse employment action. Moy v. Perez, 2017 WL 4534777 at *1 (2d Cir. Oct. 11, 2017) (citing Hicks v. Baines, 593 F.3d 159, 164 (2d Cir. 2010)). Retaliation must be a “but for” cause of the adverse employment action. Id. (citing Vega v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist., 801 F.3d 72, 90 (2d Cir. 2015)).
Second, Defendant argues that Plaintiff's allegations are insufficient. (Def.'s Mot. at 16-17.) Plaintiff does not allege that he applied for the specialist positions, only that he “expressed interest, ” which is insufficient for a failure to promote claim. (Id.) Moreover, Plaintiff fails to name or identify the national origins of those employees who received the positions, and, therefore, fails to plead an “inference of discriminatory intent.” (Id. at 17.) Defendant asserts that Plaintiff does not state a claim of pay discrimination as he does not allege facts that the differences in pay between Jamaican and non-Jamaican employees were motivated by discriminatory animus. (Id.) Finally, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff fails to plead any direct evidence of a retaliatory animus. Defendant contends that the time between Plaintiff's complaints to his supervisors, made in 2010 and 2012, and the termination, in 2013, are too far removed to suggest an inference of discrimination.

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