Source: https://www.scribd.com/document/321205501/US-EX-REL-UBL-v-IIF-Data-Solutions-650-F-3d-445-4th-Cir-2011
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 09:30:10+00:00

Document:
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ex rel.
LLP, Washington, D.C., for Amicus Supporting Appellant.
thereafter determined that the action was "clearly frivolous"
are at the center of this case.
of the pricing information provided to GSA by the prospective vendors is thus critical to the MAS process.
not commit the government to buying the product.
individual agencies may, or may not, exercise.
(1st Cir. 1992) (citations omitted).
the Air Force, and (2) the several States." 10 U.S.C.A.
needed within the discussions of the issues raised by Ubl.
refusing to enforce the settlement agreement.
cooperate in good faith to effectuate changes to this Agreement that will be satisfactory to the Government." J.A. 436.
relators unilateral settlement of FCA claims, absent the governments consent, once a suit has been filed.").
Relators Motion to Enforce Settlement, Exhibit 3.
Exhibit 4. In an email two days later, the government reiterated its position that it "d[id] not consent to the current proposed settlement." Defendants Opposition, Exhibit 5.
agreement that all parties can agree to . . . .
Defendants Opposition, Exhibit 5 (emphasis added).
January 2009 settlement offer. See J.A. 395a-c.
2008 Agreement between [Ubl] and Defendants.
into a binding, enforceable agreement.
thus made the May 6 Agreement fully enforceable.
v. Armistead Homes Corp., 907 F.2d 1447, 1453 (4th Cir.
would be inclined to fashion a federal common-law rule"
Sav. Bank, FSB v. United States, 503 F.3d 1234, 1245 (Fed.
agreement. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts 59, illus.
is that the government did not approve the May 6 Agreement.
condition can no longer occur.").
Ubls motion to enforce the May 6 Agreement.
his motion to exclude the evidence. We find no error.
A defendant may be held liable under the FCA for "knowingly" making or presenting a false claim, 31 U.S.C.A.
as the government-knowledge defense or inference.
as part of its analysis of the government-knowledge inference).
and irrational." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
at 1269, while the verdict form asked whether IIF had knowingly made a materially false statement to "the Government"
challenged evidence therefore would have been harmless.
not required and that the jury was as capable as Fox of comparing the qualifications of the IIF employees to the requirements of the labor categories.
abuse of discretion. See General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S.
F.3d 194, 200 (4th Cir. 2001).
employees met the requirements of a given labor category.
exclusion of Foxs testimony as unhelpful to the jury. Cf.
Foxs anticipated testimony, the issue is not preserved for appeal. See Fed.
identified or qualified as an expert witness. We disagree.
897 F.2d 703, 706 (4th Cir. 1990).
would have been inconsistent with her deposition testimony.
tract. At her deposition, however, Raine denied having knowledge of the nature of Trimbles activities.
hearsay) for excluding the challenged portions of her testimony.
States v. Amedeo, 370 F.3d 1305, 1316 (11th Cir. 2004).
error in the exclusion of evidence harmless because "essentially the same evidence was introduced from other sources").
ruling on the motion in limine. Again we disagree.
exclusion of evidence related to the decision not to intervene.
no argument supporting this claim, we do not consider it.").
by awarding attorneys fees to IIF.
3730(d)(4) for abuse of discretion. See United States ex rel.
Vuyyuru v. Jadhav, 555 F.3d 337, 356 (4th Cir. 2009).
fee award must not be overturned unless it is clearly wrong."
The FCA does not define "clearly frivolous, clearly vexatious, or brought primarily for purposes of harassment."
which Ubl should have carefully reevaluated his claims." J.A. 1952.
valid argument to modify present law."); United States ex rel.
Grynberg v. Praxair, Inc., 389 F.3d 1038, 1058 (10th Cir.
that it is groundless or without foundation." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
which a prevailing FCA defendant is entitled to a fee award.
if the jury did not find Ubl himself to be at all credible.
this evidence to conclude that IIF violated the FCA.
to support a verdict in his favor, we are constrained to conclude that the district court was clearly wrong when it concluded that Ubls claims had no reasonable chance of success.
See Vuyyuru, 555 F.3d at 356. We therefore reverse the district courts order awarding attorneys fees to IIF.

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