Source: https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_cou_us_rule76
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 16:53:08+00:00

Document:
It is the position of the United States that the Geneva [Gas] Protocol of 1925 does not prohibit the use in war of … chemical herbicides … In this connection, however, the United States has unilaterally renounced, as a matter of national policy, certain uses in war of chemical herbicides … The policy and provisions of Executive Order No. 11850 do not, however, prohibit or restrict the use of chemical herbicides … by US armed forces either (1) as retaliation in kind during armed conflict or (2) in situations when the United States is not engaged in armed conflict. Any use in armed conflict of herbicides … however, requires Presidential approval in advance.
The legal effect of this Executive Order is to reflect national policy. It is not intended to interpret the Geneva [Gas] Protocol of 1925 or change the interpretation of the US that the Protocol does not restrain the use of chemical herbicides as such.
United States, Air Force Pamphlet 110-31, International Law – The Conduct of Armed Conflict and Air Operations, US Department of the Air Force, 1976, § 6-4(d).
The United States does not regard the Geneva [Gas] Protocol as forbidding use of … herbicides in armed conflict. However, the United States has, as a matter of national policy, renounced the first use of … herbicides, with certain limited exceptions specified in Executive Order 11850, 8 April 1975. Using … herbicides in armed conflict requires Presidential approval.
The United States considers that use of herbicidal agents in wartime is not prohibited by either the 1925 [Geneva] Gas Protocol or the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention but has formally renounced the first use of herbicides in time of armed conflict except for control of vegetation within U.S. bases and installations or around their immediate defensive perimeters. Use of herbicidal agents during armed conflict requires NCA approval.
United States, The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, NWP 1-14M/MCWP 5-2.1/COMDTPUB P5800.7, issued by the Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and Headquarters, US Marine Corps, and Department of Transportation, US Coast Guard, October 1995 (formerly NWP 9 (Rev. A)/FMFM 1-10, October 1989), § 10.3.3.
Herbicidal agents are gases, liquids, and analogous substances that are designed to defoliate trees, bushes, or shrubs, or to kill long grasses and other vegetation that could shield the movement of enemy forces. The United States considers that use of herbicidal agents in wartime is not prohibited by either the 1925 [Geneva] Gas Protocol or the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention but has formally renounced the first use of herbicides in time of armed conflict except for control of vegetation within U.S. bases and installations or around their immediate defensive perimeters. Use of herbicidal agents during armed conflict requires presidential approval.
United States, The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, NWP 1-14M/MCWP 5-12.1/COMDTPUB P5800.7, issued by the Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and Headquarters, US Marine Corps, and Department of Homeland Security, US Coast Guard, July 2007, § 10.3.3.
Hague Convention IV does not define the phrase “poison or poisoned weapons.” The International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) has noted that “different interpretations exist” as to what this undefined phrase means. See Advisory Opinion No. 95, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226, at 248 (July 8). State practice under the treaty indicates that the proscriptions of “poison or poisoned weapons” did not apply even to chemical gas weapons designed and intended to be lethal, such as shells containing chlorine or mustard gas … Inasmuch as Hague Convention IV’s ban on “poison or poisoned weapons” does not apply to chemical gas weapons designed and intended to kill humans, a fortiori it does not prohibit military use of herbicides designed and intended as defoliants.
Under Sosa Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, US Supreme Court, 2004], the imprecise scope of the Hague Convention IV’s prohibition on the use of “poison or poisoned weapons,” and the uncertainty as to whether that prohibition even applies to lethal chemical weapons designed to kill human beings, is fatal to any claim that the Convention sets forth a sufficiently definite prohibition on military use of herbicides that could be enforced in United States courts.
Hague Convention IV does not provide a basis for recognizing a common law cause of action against defendants for manufacturing and selling herbicides for military use during the Vietnam War. The Convention did not outlaw the use of herbicides in Vietnam.
United States, Eastern States District Court (EDNY), Agent Orange case, Judgment, 28 March 2005, pp. 184–188.
The 1925 Geneva [Gas] Protocol entered into force for the United States on April 10, 1975.
The 1925 Geneva Protocol prohibits “the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all analogous liquids, material or devices.” 26 U.S.T. at 575. This proscription – whether based on the protocol or the customary international law that hypothetically could have developed from it – did not prohibit military use of herbicides at the time of the Vietnam War.
As leading scholars have pointed out, the 1925 Geneva Protocol’s prohibition on use of “asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases” and “analogous liquids, materials or devices” leaves “considerable room for divergent interpretations.” DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR 155 (Adam Roberts & Richard Guelff, eds., 3d ed. 2004 reprint).
The 1925 Geneva Protocol has given rise to a customary international legal prohibition on first use of lethal gas weapons, such as those used during World War I. Anderson Decl. [Decl. of Professor Kenneth Howard Anderson, Jr., Nov. 2, 2004] ¶ 39. At the time of the Vietnam War, however, this prohibition was, for the United States – a non-party – merely a rule predicated on reciprocity, not on customary international law. See Reisman Op. [Op. of W. Michael Reisman Submitted in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Nov. 1, 2004] at 35–36. It did not, in any event, encompass military use of herbicides. See Anderson Decl. ¶ 49. There is “no indication that the 1925 [Geneva] Protocol was designed to encompass herbicides.” See Reisman Op. at 34.
The numerous reservations made by many nations in acceding to the treaty demonstrate that the Protocol’s prohibitions, whatever their precise scope, were not compelled by customary international law. Reisman Op. at 35–37. As of the time of the Vietnam War, nineteen ratifying states considered themselves bound only in relation to other ratifying states, and declared that they would not be bound if any enemy state failed to respect the prohibition. Id. at 35–36. Thus, whatever the scope of the norm that ultimately developed post-1975 from the 1925 Geneva Protocol, during the Vietnam War it applied only to first use of proscribed gases as a matter of reciprocity, not international legal obligation. Id.
The 1925 Geneva Protocol provision was designed to outlaw poison gases such as mustard gas used in World War I. It cannot be interpreted to encompass the use of herbicides which were not then a known weapon and were far different in their purpose and effect. The gases outlawed in 1925 had an almost immediate disabling effect on those exposed and were intended to disable or kill human beings. In contrast, herbicides were designed to strip plants of leaves or kill them.
United States, Eastern States District Court (EDNY), Agent Orange case, Judgment, 28 March 2005, pp. 188–193.
The four 1949 Geneva Conventions address a host of humanitarian concerns arising during war, such as the treatment of children, women, the sick and wounded; the protection of hospitals; evacuations of civilian populations; the treatment of refugees; the protection of relief agencies; and prevention of forced labor. None of these provisions address the type of weapons that may be used in warfare, let alone military use of herbicides.
United States, Eastern States District Court (EDNY), Agent Orange case, Judgment, 28 March 2005, p. 195.
Plaintiffs rely upon a 1969 resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nation. [G.A. Res. 2603-A, U.N. GAOR, 24th Session, 16 December 1969: “Question of Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons”] It condemned the use of herbicides in Vietnam.
General Assembly Resolution 2603-A does not provide a basis for plaintiffs’ causes of action. The General Assembly is not a law-making body, and – with narrow, defined exceptions not relevant here – is granted only recommendatory powers by the United Nations Charter.
This General Assembly resolution did not constitute a statement of applicable international law, nor was it binding on the United States. But cf. BASIC DOCUMENTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1 (Ian Brownlie, ed., 3d ed. 1998 reprint) (“The [United Nations], and especially the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council, has given impetus to the development of standards concerning human rights.”). It is the Security Council, not the General Assembly, that holds whatever powers the United Nations has to make decisions that are binding on the United States. The General Assembly’s resolution on a subject such as the present one is, while important as an indication of the developing international law, precatory only. See, e.g., U.N. CHARTER arts. 9–22.
A General Assembly resolution, even though it is not binding, Flores, 343 F.3d at 166–67, may provide some evidence of customary international law when it is unanimous (or nearly so) and reflective of actual state practice. General Assembly Resolution 2603-A was neither near unanimous nor a reflection of practice. The resolution was adopted by a vote of 80-3, with thirty-six countries abstaining … By abstaining, approximately one-third of the nations addressing the question in effect refused to recognize the existence of a treaty or customary international legal prohibition on military use of herbicides. Anderson Decl. ¶ 57. It is possible, of course, that, apart from the merits, the abstainers had political reasons for not contesting the position of the United States, but, nevertheless, their failure to support the resolution drains it even of precatory force.
The General Assembly was not expressing generally accepted international law in its 1969 resolution on use of herbicides. Major military powers and more than forty other nations either opposed the resolution or abstained. It cannot be viewed as a statement of consensus.
United States, Eastern States District Court (EDNY), Agent Orange case, Judgment, 28 March 2005, pp. 197–203.
The United States signed Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflict (Protocol I), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Dec. 7, 1978), on December 12, 1977, but never ratified it … While it might be interpreted to apply to future use of herbicides in the way they were used in Vietnam, it had no application prior to 1975.
It was not until after the conclusion of the Vietnam War that Protocol I articulated for the first time an obligation to take care in warfare “to protect the natural environment against widespread, long-term and severe damages.” Id. The explicit recognition only in the late 1970s that this was a new obligation (one which the United States has yet to acknowledge) adds some weight to the conclusion that military use of herbicides did not violate customary international law during the Vietnam War. Anderson Decl. ¶¶ 62–63. Treatise writers remain uncertain whether, even today, customary international law prohibits military use of herbicides when arguably appropriate as an aspect of proportional military force protection. Id. ¶ 60.
United States, Eastern States District Court (EDNY), Agent Orange case, Judgment, 28 March 2005, pp. 207–208.
No executive or legislative action prior to 1975 showed an understanding of international law that would support plaintiffs’ position. Despite the fact that Congress and the President were fully advised of a substantial belief that the herbicide spraying in Vietnam was a violation of international law, they acted on their view that it was not a violation at the time.
United States, Eastern States District Court (EDNY), Agent Orange case, Judgment, 28 March 2005, pp. 212–14.
Plaintiffs’ reliance upon the trials at Nuremberg is inapposite for the same reasons. As the District Court correctly noted, the individuals who were found guilty in those criminal proceedings were found to have supplied poisonous Zyklon B gas in World War II concentration camps when “the accused knew that the gas was to be used for the purpose of killing human beings.” … Because Agent Orange was “not used as [a] means of directly attacking enemy troops,” it was not prohibited by Article 23(e)’s proscription of the calculated use of lethal substances against human beings and its use is distinguishable from the context in which Zyklon B gas was used in World War II.
United States, US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Agent Orange case, Judgment, 22 February 2008, pp. 23–24 and 26–30.
In 1966, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, the United States stated that it supported the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol, even though it had not ratified it, but that the use of herbicides in Viet Nam was neither covered by the Protocol, nor against accepted norms of behaviour.
United States, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/SR.1452, 14 November 1966, p. 158.
In a subsequent debate, the United States repeated its opposition to the view that herbicides were included in the scope of the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol.
United States, Statement before the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/PV.1484, 5 December 1966, p. 4.
Since chemical herbicides, unknown at the time the [1925 Geneva Gas Protocol] was negotiated, were not prohibited by that instrument, it is unwarranted for the General Assembly now to engage in lawmaking by attempting to extend the Geneva Protocol to include herbicides.
United States, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/PV.1717, 10 December 1969, § 47.
The United States renounces, as a matter of national policy, first use of herbicides in war except use, under regulations applicable to their domestic use, for control of vegetation within U.S. bases and installations or around their immediate defensive perimeters.
Section 1. The Secretary of Defense shall take all necessary measures to ensure that the use by the Armed Forces of the United States of any … chemical herbicides in war is prohibited unless such use has Presidential approval, in advance.
The Report on US Practice states that the possibility of environmental damage caused by the use of herbicides during the Vietnam War was not a major issue in the Kennedy administration.
Report on US Practice, 1997, Chapter 4.4.
On the other hand, one commentator notes that environmental concerns played a significant role in President Nixon’s decision to end the herbicidal programme.
William A. Buckingham, Operation Ranch Hand: The Air Force and Herbicides in Southeast Asia, 1961–1971, Office of Air Force History, US Air Force, Washington, 1982, pp. 138–140, 163 and 174–175.
United States, Department of the Navy, Deputy Assistant Judge Advocate General, International and Operational Law Division, Legal Review of Oleoresin Capsicum (OC) Pepper Spray, 19 May 1998, § 6(c) and footnote 27, p. 12.
The primary source of the alleged prohibition on the use of chemical herbicides in combat is the 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (“1925 Geneva Protocol” or “Protocol”) … The Protocol, however, was not ratified by the United States until 1975, and thus was not binding upon the United States at the time of the Vietnam War. Because the Protocol “is evidence of the customary law norm,” John Norton Moore, Ratification of the Geneva Protocol on Gas and Bacteriological Warfare: A Legal and Political Analysis, 58 Va. L. Rev. 419, 450 (1972), however, and because discussion of the issue most often revolved around interpretation of the Protocol, we focus on the disputed scope of the Protocol to demonstrate the absence of any customary international law norm prohibiting the use of chemical herbicides in combat.
The United States consistently took this position publicly as well. In 1966, the United States Ambassador to the United Nations, James M. Nabrit, Jr., stated to the General Assembly that the 1925 Geneva Protocol does not apply to herbicides. See Moore, 58 Va. L. Rev. at 444–45, citing United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (“ACDA”), 1966 Documents on Disarmament (“1966 Documents on Disarmament”) at 800-01. See also 1966 Documents on Disarmament at 742r 43 (statement to same effect by William C. Foster, ACDA). Indeed, in that same year, notwithstanding the United States’ use of herbicides in Vietnam, but consistent with the United States’ position that the Protocol does not prohibit such use, the United States co-sponsored and voted for a General Assembly resolution calling for “strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the Geneva Protocol.” G.A. Res. 2162(B) (1966), reprinted in 1966 Documents on Disarmament 798–99, quoted in Moore, 58 Va. L. Rev. at 444.
On November 25, 1969 President Nixon announced that he would resubmit the Protocol to the Senate for ratification. In making this announcement the President again reiterated the Administration’s position that the Protocol did not apply to chemical herbicides. See 1969 House Hearings at 176–77, 181–83 (Statement of Mr. Pickering). This position was reiterated again when the Protocol was officially transmitted to the Senate for ratification on August 19, 1970. See Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous, or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare: Message from the President (“President’s Message”), S. Exec. J, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., at vi. In the Letter of Submittal attached to the President’s Message, Secretary of State Rogers expressly stated that “[i]t is the United States’ understanding of the Protocol that it did not prohibit the use in war of… chemical herbicides.” Id.
The Executive consistently reiterated this view throughout the Senate’s consideration of the Protocol, and it was this very issue that delayed ratification for an additional five years. Thus, during hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1971, Administration officials repeatedly asserted that the Protocol does not cover chemical herbicides. See The Geneva Protocol of 1925: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 92nd Cong. (“1971 Senate Hearings”) at 5–7, 27, 30, 37–38 (Testimony of Secretary of State Rogers), 304–05 (Testimony of G. Warren Nutter, Department of Defense) (1972). Indeed, the Secretary of State indicated that President Nixon would likely reject ratification if the Senate conditioned its advice and consent on an interpretation of the Protocol that covered herbicides. Id. at 37–38.
In response to a request from Senator Fulbright during the course of the 1971 Senate Hearings, the General Counsel of the Department of Defense set forth the Department’s view that neither “the rules of customary international law,” the 1925 Geneva Protocol, nor the Hague Regulations governing land warfare prohibited the use of “anti-plant chemicals for defoliation or the destruction of crops,” provided that the use against crops met certain other criteria, discussed below. Letter from J. Fred Buzhardt, General Counsel for the Department of Defense to J.W. Fulbright, Chairman, Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations (“Buzhardt Letter”), April 5, 1971, reprinted in 1971 Senate Hearings at 315–17, quoted in Moore. 58 Va. L. Rev. at 444-45.
The administration reiterated its position that the 1925 Geneva Protocol does not apply to herbicides during hearings before the House of Representatives in the spring of 1974. See U.S. Chemical Warfare Policy: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments, House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 93rd Cong. (“1974 House Hearings”) at 150 (Statement of Amos Jordan), Moreover, the testimony made clear that “the current interpretation [of the Protocol] was approved by the President” himself. Id. at 206 (Testimony of Len Sloss, Deputy Director, Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State).
Finally, in late 1974, President Ford announced that, “with a view to achieving Senate advice and consent to ratification” of the Protocol, he was prepared “in reaffirming the current U.S. understanding of the scope of the Protocol” as not covering herbicides, to renounce, as a matter of “national policy,” the first use of herbicides in war, except for use in limited circumstances. See Prohibition of Chemical and Biological Weapons: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 93rd Cong. (“1974 Senate Hearings”) at 12 (1974) (Statement of Fred C. Ickle, Director, ACDA). See also id. at 27. On December 16, 1974, the Senate unanimously voted its consent to ratification.120 Cong. Rec. 40,067–68 (Dec. 16, 1974). On January 22, 1975, President Ford signed the instrument of ratification of the Protocol, and it was deposited with France and entered into force with respect to the United States on April 10, 1975. See 26 U.S.T. 571 (1975). Two days earlier, on April 8, 1975, President Ford issued Executive Order 11850 renouncing, as a matter of national policy, the first use of herbicides in war, except in certain limited circumstances.
United States, Department of Justice, Statement of Interest of the United States submitted to the US District Court for the Eastern District of New York, In re: Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation (The Vietnam Association for Victims of Agent Orange/Dioxin, et al. v. Dow Chemical Company, et al), 12 January 2005, pp. 4–9.
[T]he United States consistently has taken the position that neither the Geneva Protocol nor any other rule of international law prohibited the use of chemical herbicides in war. And while certain Senators disagreed with this position – either as a matter of policy or interpretation – it was (and is) the President’s views that reflected (and continue to reflect) the official views of the United States. This consistent rejection by the United States of any rule of international law prohibiting the use of chemical herbicides in war by itself demonstrates that any norm of international law that might have existed at the time had “less … acceptance among civilized nations than the historical paradigms” discussed in Sosa [Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, US Supreme Court, 2004], 124 S. Ct. at 2765. Cf United States v. Yousef. 327 F.3d 56, 92 n.25 (2d Cir. 2003) (“it is highly unlikely that a purported principle of customary international law in direct conflict with the recognized practices and customs of the United States … could be deemed to qualify as a bonafide customary international law principle”); Flores. 343 F.3d at 164.
Not only did the United States take a consistent position that the Protocol did not apply to chemical herbicides, but there was also no international consensus on this issue. In their Amended Complaint, plaintiffs allege that the use of herbicides “was considered by most of the international community to be a violation of international law and a war crime,” and cite United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2603-A (1969) as support for this contention. Am. Compl., ¶ 75-76. Notably, Resolution 2603-A declared “as contrary to the generally recognized rules of international law, as embodied in the [1925 Geneva Protocol], the use in international armed conflict of: (a) [a]ny chemical agents of warfare … which might be employed because of their direct toxic effects on man, animals, or plants.” (emphasis added). G.A. Res. 2603A, 24 U.N. GAOR Supp. 30, at 16, U.N. Doc. A/7630 (1969). The resolution was thus directly targeted at the question of the applicability of the principles of the 1925 Geneva Protocol to chemical herbicides. The vote on the Resolution, however, demonstrates the lack of any international consensus with respect to the applicability of the Protocol to chemical herbicides.
As plaintiffs correctly note, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 2603-A by a vote of 80 to 3, with 36 abstentions. Am. Compl., ¶ 76; see Moore, 58 Va. L. Rev. at 445. As an initial matter, “since almost one third of the states that voted either voted against the resolution or abstained, the vote is perhaps another indication that the customary law concerning … herbicides [was] unclear.” Id at 451. See also 1971 Senate Hearings at 388: cf. Flores. 343 F.3d at 162–63 (“a treaty will only constitute sufficient proof of a norm of customary international law if an overwhelming majority of States have ratified the treaty, and those States uniformly and consistently act in accordance with its principles”) (emphasis in original). Moreover, the identity of the states voting against the resolution or abstaining belies the contention that the vote demonstrates widespread acceptance of the norm among “civilized nations.” Cf id at 163 (“The evidentiary weight to be afforded to a given treaty varies greatly depending on (i) how many, and which, States have ratified the treaty, and (ii) the degree to which those States actually implemented and abide by [its] principles”). The United States, Austria and Portugal voted against the Resolution. The abstaining states included “most of the NATO members and many major or significant military powers, such as … France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Belgium, Canada and Nationalist China,” states “whose views would be particularly important in shaping a norm of customary international law.” Moore, 58 Va. L. Rev. at 451. See also id at 463 (“Since less than half of the states [then] party to the Protocol expressed by their vote approval of a broad interpretation prohibiting … herbicides, and since more than one-third of the parties to the Protocol abstained, the resolution should not be deemed a conclusive interpretation of the Protocol.”); Flores, 343 F.3d at 163; Baxter & Buergenthal, 64 Am. J. Int’l L. at 854 n.7; 1971 Senate Hearings at 5 (Statement of Secretary of State William P. Rogers); 1969 House Hearings at 182 (Statement of Mr. Pickering).
Flores. 343 F.3d at 165. See also id. at 165–67.
Finally, even if the Court determined that a norm of international law prohibiting the use of chemical herbicides existed at the time in question, such a norm would not be binding upon the United States as a matter of international law. It is a well-established principle of international law that a dissenting state, which indicates dissent while a customary international law rule is in the process of development, is not bound by that rule. See Siderman de Blake v. Argentina. 965 F.2d 699, 715 (9th Cir. 1992); Restatement (Third) Foreign Relations § 102, cmt. d; Jonathan I. Chamey, The Persistent Objector Rule and the Development of Customary International Law, 56 Brit. Y.B. Int’l L. 1, 2–3 (1985). Here, the United States’ persistent and consistent public pronouncements that customary international law did not prohibit the use of chemical herbicides qualify it as a persistent objector under international law, and thus not bound by any rule that might have developed.
In light of the consistent position of the United States that the 1925 Geneva Protocol does not apply to the use of chemical herbicides and the lack of any international consensus that the Protocol did so apply, plaintiffs cannot demonstrate that the use of chemical herbicides by the United States violated a norm of such widespread acceptance by the international community as to approach the acceptance of the prohibitions against violations of safe conduct, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy in the late 18th century. Pursuant to Sosa, therefore, this Court should not recognize a federal common law cause of action based on the such conduct.
United States, Department of Justice, Statement of Interest of the United States submitted to the US District Court for the Eastern District of New York, In re: Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation (The Vietnam Association for Victims of Agent Orange/Dioxin, et al. v. Dow Chemical Company, et al), 12 January 2005, pp. 28–32.

References: § 6
 § 10
 § 10
 v. 
 § 47
 § 6
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 102
 v.