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Of the three policies advanced in various American opinions to explain the restrictive character of the constitutional treason clause, only the second has a clearcut counterpart in the English authorities. The general policy against vagueness in so important a crime, and in favor of free speech and free pursuit of interests generally in the community, was not articulated in the English materials. And the policy of protection of the accused individual against the waves of public passion is an aspect of the treason clause policy which seems to have been brought to the fore by the special rigor of the two-witness requirement in the United States Constitution. Of these three policies, moreover, only the second, which is designed to curb the abuses of political faction, finds clear expression in the discussions attendant upon the framing and ratification of the Constitution. Even the brief comments in the Convention regarding insertion of the two-witness requirement, notably Dr. Franklin's warning of the peculiar "virulence" of treason prosecutions, imply more the peril of political abuse of the offense than the danger of public prejudice.
As was indicated in dealing with the materials pertinent to the framing and ratification of the Constitution, the question of the relevance of English authorities to the construction of the terms borrowed from the Statute of Edward III blurs the lines of the constitutional provision's restrictive policy.11 The words of the treason clause are obviously broad, and the need for interpretation inescapable in the face of the refusal of facts to fit into neat moulds.12 But the constitutional prohibition on creation of new "treasons" limits the courts as well as the Congress.13 And, as the Burr and Cramer cases demonstrate, this requires restraint not only in the adoption of offenses outside the constitutional definition, but also in the determination of what evidence will suffice to make out the elements of the offenses of adherence to enemies or levying of war.14 In both situations the limits set by the Constitution might be evaded if the courts imported the full scope of English decisions interpreting and applying the Statute of Edward III.
(b) The Intent: Limitation of "Levying War"
Perhaps because it is at the heart of the definition of the crime, the intent element in the concept of treason is apt to be discussed, as the most obvious ingredient of the positive case for the prosecution, in rather summary fashion. In fact, however, the expression of the restrictive policy governing the scope of the offense has turned as much on a carefully restrictive definition of the intent as upon the overt act element.
The definition of intent in the court's latter statement would seem to run counter to the logic of the offense and the history behind the restrictive policy which has controlled the evolution of that policy in English and American law. The idea of betrayal of allegiance connotes a specific intent. And, historically, most of the excesses of the English law of treason, prior to the eighteenth century, can be described in terms of a treasonable intent found by inference under the head of compassing the death of the king; men were convicted not on evidence fairly showing that they had planned the king's death and the overthrow of the government, but on the basis of the expression or advocacy of ideas or measures whose "natural" consequences, as deduced by their political foes, might involve harm to the king or the state.26 The evidence is overwhelming that the treason clause of the United States Constitution was intended to limit the scope to be given to the offense of treason; and it is upon that admonition of policy that the courts' opinions have since centered. Moreover, as the treason clause is the product not of theory, but of history, the practical meaning of its restrictive policy should be drawn from history. The most obvious manner in which the Constitution narrows the scope of treason is by omitting any analogue to the crime of compassing the king's death. Since most of the reprobated doctrines of the English law had developed under that head, it makes historical sense to look there for the kinds of doctrine which the framers wished to bar from the American law of treason. There is of course some truth in the observation that the crime of compassing the king's death has no ready analogy in a republic; but, unless a bloodless logic is substituted for living policy, it is clear that the framers rejected the doctrine for other reasons of substance.27 In this light, one historic target of the framers' restrictive policy was the raising of a treasonable intent from inferences drawn at second or third hand under the convenient vagueness of a test of responsibility for the "natural consequences" of actions.
The prosecution is not limited to the accused's direct statements of intention to prove specific intent, however; and obviously a practical compromise must be struck in dealing with a crime which threatens the life of the community. Thus the man who is apprehended as he rows out to sell his foodstuffs to a known hostile frigate is held to have had a treasonable intent, though he pleads that his purpose was merely to make a dollar.31 But the man who joins a "wildcat" strike in a munitions plant in time of war, and then pleads that his purpose was merely to get a raise, will not be held to possess a treasonable intent, though the "natural consequence" of the strike is the interruption of production needed to save the country.32 It is hard to reconcile these positions by any more precise test than one of the proximity of defendant's immediate intention to the forbidden ultimate result of aid and comfort to the enemy.
In 1808, in United States v. Hoxie,35 Livingston, Circuit Justice, in effect directed a verdict on the basis that the conveying of a raft of logs to Canada, in violation of the Embargo and with armed opposition to the troops seeking to enforce it, was not shown to be more than a particular violation of law for profit, and hence was, for lack of the requisite intent, not treason. Emphasizing the agreement of men learned in the law upon "the exceptions, which have been so cautiously interwoven into" the doctrines regarding levying of war, "for the very purpose of preventing their extension to cases of this kind," he noted that it may sometimes be hard to distinguish between treason and some other offenses involving opposition to authority.
Reported decisions indicate but one attempt since the Civil War to use the charge of treason by levying war. This has not been for lack of occasions on which, at least under the seventeenth and eighteenth-century English authorities, sufficient overt acts might have been shown. Consider the railroad strike riots of 1877, the Haymarket affair of 1886, Coxey's Army, and the Pullman strike in 1894.44 But, as a matter of practical construction, the crime of treason by levying war has been restricted here, and perhaps in England, to the offense described by the literal meaning of the words: a direct effort to overthrow the government, or wholly to supplant its authority in some part or all of its territory.45 In terms of doctrine, this amounts to limiting the scope of the crime by insistence upon the showing of a carefully defined intention.
That it is the intent and not the act element which limits the scope of the crime is plain from the notable instances where the most flagrant overt acts in defiance of law were not charged as treason. The same emphasis upon intention is also seen on the one occasion in which a broader use of the charge of levying war was attempted. Following the Homestead Riot of 1892, several of the strike leaders were indicted for levying war against the state of Pennsylvania, after the grand jury had been charged by the Chief Justice of the state, that a mere mob, collected upon the impulse of the moment, without any definite object beyond the gratification of its sudden passions, does not commit treason, although it destroys property and takes human life.
Charges to the jury in cases of adhering, as well as in those of levying war, have carefully instructed that, though the mere fact of mixed motives will not negative guilt, the defendant must have in mind more than the purpose of aiding the individual with whom he deals, as an individual; he must know, or have reason to know, that he is dealing with an agent of the enemy.55 Though the Supreme Court in the Cramer case declared that treasonable intent may be established by the familiar formula of assuming that the "natural consequences" of action were intended,56 the Court's failure to link this vague test with the implications of the historic policy restrictive of the scope of "treason," elsewhere so strongly recognized in its opinion, creates some ambiguity. However, the "natural consequences" from which intent is inferred are those foreseeable by "one standing in his circumstances and possessing his knowledge,"57 and this qualification is flexible enough to permit reconciliation of the "natural consequences" formula with the requirement, implicit in previous cases, that a specific intent must be shown.
(c) The Act: Limitation of "Adhering to the Enemy"
Anthony Cramer, German by birth, became a resident of the United States in 1925, and was naturalized in 1936. Since 1929 he had been an intimate friend of Werner Thiel, whom he knew to be a frankly avowed adherent of the German Nazi movement. Cramer, like Thiel, was a member, and for a time an officer, of the organization which preceded the Bund. Before Pearl Harbor, Cramer openly opposed the entry of this country into the war and expressed strong sympathy with Germany in its fight with other European powers. After Pearl Harbor he refused to work on war materials and expressed concern about being drafted into the Army of the United States and "misused" for purposes of "world conquest."
Thiel had returned to Germany in 1941, as Cramer knew, to help that country. In June, 1942, Thiel and seven other German soldiers, armed with explosives with which to destroy the American aluminum industry, were landed on the eastern coast of the United States by submarine. Cramer had not anticipated Thiel's return as a saboteur; but in response to a cryptic message, he met Thiel. The two had a meal in a public restaurant, and on the following evening met again at the same place, together with Kerling, leader of Thiel's saboteur unit. Both meetings were observed by two or more agents of the FBI, who were trailing the saboteurs; but the agents overheard none of the conversations, nor did they observe any actions except Cramer's dining and talking earnestly with the others. From statements later made by Cramer to Thiel's fiancee, his admissions to FBI agents after his arrest, and especially from his admissions on the witness stand, it appeared that as a result of the first meeting, Cramer had reason to, and did, believe that Thiel was in the United States on a mission for the German government. Cramer, however, denied any belief that Thiel's mission was sabotage, but admitted to a belief that Thiel was here to spread rumors and incite unrest. Cramer also had agreed to, and did, write Thiel's fiancee to come to New York for the purpose of meeting Thiel. At the first meeting there had been talk that Cramer should take Thiel's money belt, containing, according to Cramer, about $3600. Cramer was to put the bulk of this money in his safe deposit box, keeping some handy for Thiel's convenience and taking $200 of the money in payment of an old debt owed him by Thiel. By Cramer's own admission the money belt was transferred at the second meeting, and Cramer put in his safe deposit box all the money, except some which he kept in his room to meet Thiel's requests.
Cramer, after indictment for treason by adhering to the enemy and giving him aid and comfort, was tried, found guilty, and sentenced to 45 years imprisonment and a $10,000 fine. The overt acts submitted to the jury, and considered subsequently by the Supreme Court, were that Cramer "did meet with" Thiel, and with Thiel and Kerling, "enemies of the United States," and "did confer, treat, and counsel with" Thiel and Kerling "for a period of time for the purpose of giving and with intent to give aid and comfort to said enemies...."58 The conviction was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Certiorari was granted, and after argument at the October Term, 1943, the Supreme Court invited reargument addressed both to the meaning of "treason" under the Constitutional definition, and the sufficiency thereunder of the proof in Cramer's case. The case was reargued November 6, 1944, and on April 23, 1945, the conviction was reversed in a five to four decision. Mr. Justice Jackson spoke for a majority including Justices Roberts, Frankfurter, Murphy, and Rutledge. The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas was concurred in by the Chief Justice, and Justices Black and Reed.
Even assuming that a benefit must be shown to have been actually conferred on the enemy, the Court's application of its rule seems unreasonably narrow. Cramer's second meeting with Thiel afforded the essential opportunity to transfer Thiel's money. In the "setting" of Thiel's mission and circumstances this was obviously in itself an aid to him, if, as the Court found, the safekeeping of his money was an aid.76 If this is insufficient, why should the mere act of receipt of the money by Cramer be enough? Why should it not be necessary to present as the overt act Cramer's deposit of the funds in his safe-deposit box, or his first subsequent disbursement to Thiel? To make sense in its own terms the majority opinion requires some further rationalization in terms of proximate cause, which, however, it does not offer.
The majority opinion in Cramer v. United States advances no justification in history or authority for its apparent insistence that, to make out an overt act, "actual" aid be given. As a matter of policy such a ruling does not necessarily follow, as the Court seems to believe, from the announced function of the overt act: to ensure "that mere mental attitudes or expressions should not be treason."88 The law of attempts is nothing more or less than a standard to achieve this same objective in the general criminal law, and it has there proved a workable device.89 As soon as one requires the showing of some act reasonably advanced in execution of the criminal intention the danger of prosecuting men for their thoughts alone has been met. It might, of course, be a defensible position to decide that "treason" is a crime so intrinsically open to abuse that it should be abolished. But, if the crime of treason is to be retained, it should be recognized that its value is at least as much in prevention as in punishment. To wait for aid to be "actually" given the enemy risks stultification: the treason may be successful to the point at which there will no longer be a sovereign to punish it.
Actually, the majority opinion has only conceded a truism. Consistent with all this it might still be held that, insofar as acts of the defendant are relied on as the basis for inferring intent, any and all such acts must be proved by the testimony of two witnesses. This would not be to require proof of intent by "direct" testimony of two witnesses.
The majority, it is true, purported to reject the more extreme argument of the defendant, that the overt act must in itself "manifest" the treasonable intention. This contention is contrary to the long settled doctrine that the intent and the act are distinct elements of the crime, and "would place on the overt act the whole burden of establishing a complete treason."96 Moreover, the demand that an act, in itself and apart from extrinsic evidence, evidence the intention with which it is done, or the effect which it may or does produce, rests on an unsound conception of the meaning, for these purposes, of the term "act." The law treats a physical movement as an act only if it is willed. Thus behind every jural act there is, ex hypothesi, some purpose, for it would seem psychologically impossible to will a movement without some purpose. Some acts, as, for example, the tying of a shoelace, may conceivably have a purpose (as distinguished, perhaps, from the more remote question of motive), which in all normal cases may be inferred from observation of the acts alone. This is not a theoretical matter, but is true simply because some acts are capable of serving a narrower range of human satisfactions or designs than others. But, when one is dealing with ends as broad as the subverting of a government by domestic disturbance or by aid to its enemies, the range of acts which may fit such purposes is as broad as the possible economic, political, social, racial, sectional, or class factors which affect the health or existence of a community. The acts which can serve to advance purposes of such range may, conversely, be acts which might in another context serve innocent purposes in economic, political, social, racial, sectional, or class dealings. Indeed, so varied is the character of the conduct which may serve the broad purposes penalized by the treason clause, that even the man whose purpose seems to be merely the obvious and undivided one of tying a shoelace may be conveying military intelligence to an observer according to a prearranged code. If thus in theory no act has a meaning in itself, in the sense of a significance which can be grasped by observation of the act alone, so in practice one understands the meaning of acts only insofar as he knows other facts in context with the acts.97 This is particularly likely to be true in dealing with the kind of purposes penalized by the treason clause, since they may be served by manifold acts which can also serve many other purposes. Thus, in prior cases, acts have been found treasonable which on their face were "innocent"98 and acts appearing on their face to be treasonable have been found innocent99 Indeed, if acts could have meaning in themselves, it is difficult to see why, after the centuries of experience represented by the criminal law, it was found necessary or desirable to develop the concept of intent as a separate element of crimes.
Whatever the rule which the majority intended by its vacillating language in the Cramer case, its opinion developed neither arguments of policy nor evidence from history to support any of the functions which it may be construed to have assigned to the two-witness requirement. Certainly there is no sound basis in English or American history to require that the overt act be such as to evidence the intent.114 And, since it was apparent in the English authorities even before Lord Preston's Case115 that actual conferring of aid upon the enemy was not necessary to make out a case of treason, no support can be found in that quarter, even by analogy, for a requirement that the overt act demonstrate the giving of aid. Moreover, even if the current of previous American doctrine is departed from, and it is assumed that accomplished aid and comfort must be shown, the Court advances no evidence that the framers intended the two-witness requirement to apply here. The Constitution in its terms requires only the testimony of two witnesses to an "act," not to the effect of that act.
2. Id. at 26; cf. 2 Stephen, A History of the Criminal Law of England (1883) 251, 283.
3. 325 U. S. 1, 27 (1945). No previous opinion had spelled out precisely what form the general restrictive policy should take.
4. See Chase, C. J., in Case of Fries, 9 Fed. Cas. No. 5127, at 930 (C. C. D. Pa. 1800) (second trial); Nelson, C. J., Charge to Grand Jury, 30 Fed. Cas. No. 18,271, at 1035 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1861); Stephan v. United States, 133 F. (2d) 87, 90 (C. C. A. 6th, 1943), cert. denied, 318 U. S. 781 (1943).
See also the argument of Sitgreaves, for the prosecution, and Ewing and Lewis for the defense, in the first trial of Fries, 9 Fed. Cas. No. 5126, at 847-48, 887, 895-96 (C. C. D. Pa. 1799); argument of William Pinkney, for the defense, in United States v. Hodges, 26 Fed. Cas. 332, No. 15,374 (C. C. D. Md. 1815).
5. 4 Cranch 75, 125-26 (U. S. 1807). Cf. Livingston, C. J., in charge to the jury in United States v. Hoxie, 26 Fed. Cas. No. 15,407, at 398, 402, 403 (C. C. D. Vt. 1808). See also Cramer v. United States, 325 U. S. 1, 27 (1945).
Mr. Justice Curtis, in charging the grand jury, found the Statute of Edward III to have been "enacted ... mainly for the purpose of restraining the power of the crown to oppress the subject by arbitrary constructions of the law of treason." 30 Fed. Cas. No. 18,269, at 1025 (C. C. D. Mass. 1851). Cf. Field, C. J., in charge to jury in United States v. Greathouse, 26 Fed. Cas. No. 15,254, at 21 (C. C. N. D. Cal. 1863); Nelson, C. J., Charge to Grand Jury, 30 Fed. Cas. No. 18,271, at 1035 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1861); Leavitt, D. J., Charge to Grand Jury, 30 Fed. Cas. No. 18,272, at 1036 (C. C. S. D. Ohio, 1861).
The line between desirable freedom of discussion and political action and "treason" is put at the point where men "pass from words to ... criminal acts of resistance to law" by Sprague, D. J., Charge to Grand Jury Regarding Mob Resistance to Execution of the Fugitive Slave Law, 30 Fed. Cas. No. 18,263, at 1016 (D. Mass. 1851); cf. Leavitt, D. J., Charge to the Grand Jury, loc. cit. supra at 1037. Compare also the decision of the Attorney General not to prosecute the leaders of the Pittsburgh meeting of September 7, 1791, though the resolutions there adopted criticizing government policy and petitioning Congress and the state legislature were a significant step in the unrest which culminated in the "Whiskey Rebellion." (Note) 26 Fed. Cas. 499, 501, 503 (1795). See also Brandeis, J., dissenting in Schaefer v. United States, 251 U. S. 466, 482, at 493 (1920); Mayer, D. J., in charge to jury in United States v. Fricke, 259 Fed. 673, 677 (S. D. N. Y. 1919); cf. Haywood v. United States, 268 Fed. 795, 799-800 (C. C. A. 7th, 1920), cert. denied, 256 U. S. 689 (1921) (conspiracy).
The thread of insistence on a policy, in the interest of individual security and free give-and-take in community life, against vagueness in the definition of the crime, comes up to the present in the charge to the jury in United States v. Stephan, 50 F. Supp. 738, 740, n. 1 (E. D. Mich. 1943). See Stephan v. United States, 133 F. (2d) 87, 99 (C. C.A. 6th, 1943), cert. denied, 318 U. S. 781 (1943).
6. 325 U. S. 1, 27 (1945).
7. United States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. No. 14,692a, at 13 (C. C. D. Va. 1807). See also Livingston, C. J., in charge to the jury in the United States v. Hoxie, 26 Fed. Cas. No. 15,407, at 397-98 (C.C.D. Vt. 1808). This comment takes on particular emphasis because the charge as a whole so clearly reflects Livmgston's sensitivity to the impeachment proceedings against Chase, J., for his "strong ' expositions of the law of levying of war in the trial of Fries and his ardent expositions of the Alien and Sedition Laws to juries Indeed, after discounting the fervor of advocacy, it is still significant of a prevailing attitude toward the policy of the treason clause that, in his answer to the impeachment charges brought against him, Mr Justice Chase reasoned from the historic danger of abuse of treason prosecutions in political faction to justify his refusal to permit defense counsel in the trial of Fries to parade before the jury the excesses of the earlier English treason cases See answer of Chase, J., to impeachment charges, (Note) 9 Fed. Cas. 934, at 938 (1800), cf. argument of defense counsel in United States v. Hanway, 26 Fed. Cas. No. 15,299, at 117 (C.C. E.D. Pa. 1851) In his charge to the jury in the Fries case, 9 Fed. Cas. No. 5,127, at 930 (C.C.D.Pa. 1800), Chase had, however, confined himself to brief, opening praise for the constitutional definition and proof requirements The argument based on the excesses of English treason trials, which he prevented Lewis and Dallas from making to the jury, seems to have been directed essentially to enlisting the jury's sympathies for the policy of curbing factional use of "treason" prosecutions See, e.g., argument of Dallas on the first trial of Fries, 9 Fed. Cas. No. 5,126, at 878, 883, 879-81 (C.C.D. Pa. 1800), and the argument of Lewis, id. at 897-99.
8 4 Cranch 75, 125 (U.S. 1807), cf. Leavitt, D. J., Charge to Grand Jury, 30 Fed. Cas. No. 18,272, at 1038 (C.C. S.D. Ohio 1861) See Cramer v. United States, 325 U. S. 1, 47 (1945).
The suggestion made in Ex Parte Bollman has been adopted in several cases which, however, create some ambiguity by linking the protection against public passion primarily to the two-witness provision See Sprague, D. J., Charges to Grand Jury, 30 Fed. Cas. Nos. 18,273, at 1039, 18,274, at 1042 (D Mass 1861, 1863) Mingling, as it does, a substantive (overt act) and an evidentiary (two witnesses) safeguard, the objects of this provision are themselves somewhat ambiguous, but the cases stress more the danger of convicting the "wrong man" than of expanding unduly the concept of "treason ' Thus in United States v. Haupt, 136 F. (2d) 661, 671 (C.C.A. 7th, 1943), rev'g, 47 F. Supp. 832 (N D Ill. 1942), 47 F. Supp. 836 (N D Ill. 1942), the court declared that the charge of treason presents special dangers of unfair trials in a time of national crisis, and it linked this warning with a ruling that the trial court had abused its discretion in denying motions for severance of the trials of the several defendants after the admission of much highly prejudicial evidence which did not relate to all of the defendants Significantly, the Circuit Court of Appeals cited the Bollman case in connection with its warning See also Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 236-37 (1940), where the Court lists the two-witness requirement of the treason clause among the constitutional provisions inserted "as assurance against ancient evils." On the other hand, the charge to the jury in United States v. Fricke, 259 Fed. 673, 677 (S.D.N.Y. 1919), relates the danger of injustice through public passion both to the hazards of undue expansion of the scope of "treason" and of conviction of the wrong man.
9 Cf. Chafee, Free Speech in the United States (1942) 51-60.
10 See United States v. Fricke, 259 Fed. 673, 677 (S.D.N.Y. 1919), United States v. Haupt, 136 F. (2d) 661, 671 (C.C.A. 7th, 1943).
11 See p. 140 supra.
12 See Peters, D.J., in charge to jury in Case of Fries, 9 Fed. Cas. No. 5,126, at 909 (C.C.D.Pa. 1799) (first trial), Livmgston, C.J., in charge to jury in United States v. Hoxie, 26 Fed. Cas. No. 15,407, at 398 (C.C. D. Vt. 1808).
13 See Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 24 (1945), Ex parte Bollman, 4 Cranch 75, 127 (U.S. 1807), United States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. No. 14,692a, at 13 (C.C. D. Va. 1807).
14 See Cramer v. United States 325 U.S. 1, 35 (1945) (majority opinion), 59 (dissenting opinion), United States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. Nos 14,692a, at 13, 14,693, at 159 (C.C. D. Va. 1807).
15 See Nelson, D.J., Charge to Grand Jury, 30 Fed. Cas. No. 18,271, at 1035 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1861), argument of Lewis, for the defense, in Case of Fries, 9 Fed. Cas. No. 5,126, at 897 (C.C.D.Pa. 1799) (first trial) Chase, C.J., refused, in the second trial of Fries, to permit defense counsel to present to the jury a picture of the extreme constructions given to the Statute of Edward III by English judges Defense counsel then withdrew from the case Subsequently, in response to a request by President Adams, Dallas and Lewis sent to the President a memorandum of the argument which they had proposed to make at the second trial. This included the statement that "as the spirit of the constitution is opposed to implied powers, and constructive expositions, we are bound to take the plain manifest meaning of the words of the definition, independent of any glossary which the English courts, or writers, may have affixed to the words of the English statute." Id at 948.
Probably mindful of the fact that the impeachment of Chase rested in part on his refusal to let counsel argue this point, Livingston, C. J., noted the issue, in United States v. Hoxie, 26 Fed. Cas. No. 15,407, at 398 (C.C. D. Vt. 1808), but cautiously avoided it Because he found that no treason had been committed in that case, even within the definitions of the English authorities, he found it unnecessary to decide whether they had any binding effect, or to "discuss a question which has been much agitated — whether, by the use of these terms, it was intended to adopt the technical meaning which they had already received in England, or whether, considering treason as a new offence against a newly created government, the constitution on this point was to be interpreted by itself, without reference to, or with the aid of any common law decisions whatever?"
16 See e.g., Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 18 (1945), Iredell, C.J., and Peters, D. J., in charges to the jury in Case of Fries, 9 Fed. Cas. No. 5,126, at 909, 912 (C.C.D.Pa. 1799), Marshall, C.J., in direction to the jury in United States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. No. 14,693, at 159-60 (C.C. D. Va. 1807), Kane, D.J., Charge to Grand Jury, 30 Fed. Cas. No. 18,276, at 1048 (C.C. E. D.Pa. 1851), Curtis, C.J., Charge to Grand Jury, 30 Fed. Cas. No. 18,269, at 1025 (C.C. D Mass 1851), Cadwalader, D.J., in United States v. Greiner, 26 Fed. Cas. No. 15,262 at 38 (E.D.Pa. 1861), Field, C.J., in charge to jury in United States v. Greathouse, 26 Fed. Cas. No. 15,254, at 21 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1863), Sprague, D.J., Charge to Grand Jury, 30 Fed. Cas. No. 18,273, at 1039 (D. Mass. 1861), United States v. Cramer, 137 F. (2d) 888, 894 (C.C.A. 2d, 1943) cf. Druecker v. Salomon, 21 Wis. 621, 626 (1867).
17 9 Fed. Cas. No. 5,126, at 909 (C.C.D.Pa. 1799), cf. the exchange between the prosecutor and Chase, J., in the second trial of Fries, 9 Fed. Cas. No. 5,127, at 927 (C.C.D.Pa. 1800) See also the answer filed by Chase, J., to his impeachment, (Note) 9 Fed. Cas. 934, at 938 (1800).
18 9 Fed. Cas. No. 5,126, at 912 (C.C.D.Pa. 1799), see, also, Peters, D.J., id. at 909, Grier, J., in United States v. Hanway, 26 Fed. Cas. No. 15,299, at 127 (C.C. E.D.Pa. 1851) Though he does not make clear how far he would carry his strong condemnation of the incorporation of English judicial constructions of the words of Edward III's Statute into the constitutional definition, Tucker would probably agree substantially with the soundness of thus distinguishing the earlier and later English decisions as guides to policy See 5 Blackstone's Commentaries with Notes of Reference, to the Constitution and Laws of the Federal Government of the United States and of the Commonwealth of Virginia (Ed Tucker 1803) 85, n. 18, App Note "B," pp. 13, 40-41, 46.
19 See notes 7, 15, 17 supra. The views of Chase, J., on the exclusion of English precedents antedating 1688 are set forth in great detail in his answer to the impeachment charges filed against him The impeachment did not rest on objections to these doctrines, but on the Justice's action in preventing counsel from arguing them to the jury See 11 American State Trials (Lawson ed. 1919) 197, 241, 242, 316, 345, 351.
20 325 U.S. 1, 47 (1945).
21 See Appendix, I, pp. 260-265 infra.
22 However, the materials surrounding the framing and ratification of the Constitution tend to center the emphasis on the dangers of abuse of treason prosecutions in political strife See p. 141 supra.
23 325 U.S. 1, 31 (1945).
24 Ibid. This statement comes after, but does not necessarily follow from, the obvious point made by the opinion that intention can generally be proved only by inference from conduct This is true, but does not rule out the proof of specific intent by such inference, the standard of proof is simply more precise and exacting Note also, as bearing out the implication of the quotation above, the assertion in the majority opinion that statutory crimes forbidding specific acts are safer than reliance on "treason," because "the trial thereof may be focused upon defendant's specific intent to do those particular acts thus eliminating the accusation of treachery and of general intent to betray which have such passion-rousing potentialities." Id at 45.
25 See, eg, Miller, Criminal Law (1934) 502 Even apart from its inconsistency with the history of the American law of treason, this proposition seems contrary to the familiar doctrine that a specific intent is necessary in crimes of the nature of an attempt See Keedy, Ignorance and Mistake in the Criminal Law (1908) 22 Harv. L. Rev. 75, 89, Sayre, Criminal Attempts (1928) 41 Harv. L. Rev. 821, 822, 841, Skilton, The Mental Element in A Criminal Attempt (1937) 3 Univ. of Pitt. L. Rev. 181, 182, Turner, Attempts to Commit Crimes (1934) 5 Camb. L. J. 230, 235, cf. Harno, Intent in Criminal Conspiracy (1941) 89 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 624, 636, 637.
26 See 8 Holdsworth, History of English Law (1937) 327 ff.
27 But see Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 20 (1945) Cf. p. 87 supra.
28 See, e.g., United States v. Hoxie, 26 Fed. Cas. No. 15,407, at 398 (C.C. D. Vt. 1808), United States v. Stephan, 50 F. Supp. 738, 744 (E.D. Mich. 1943) (trial court charge) John Brown's defense to the charge of treason by levying war against the state of Virginia was, in part, that he had no intent further than "to free slaves." See The Trial of John Brown, 6 American State Trials (Lawson ed. 1916) 700, 801, 802. There was evidence, however, that Brown had envisioned his effort to help the slaves as possibly involving the creation of a separate commonwealth, and, although he seems to have raided Harper's Ferry with no well thought-out plan for the steps to follow, his intent seems plainly to have embraced such overturning of existing institutions as might be necessary "to free slaves." See Warren, John Brown (1929) 350, 384, Villard, John Brown (Rev. ed. 1943) 427.
29 Thus the profit motive does not excuse the selling of provisions to the enemy Hanauer v. Doane, 12 Wall 342 (U.S. 1871), Carlisle v. United States, 16 Wall 147 (U.S. 1873), Sprott v. United States, 20 Wall 459 (U.S. 1874), United States v. Lee, 26 Fed. Cas. 907, No. 15,584 (C.C. D.C. 1814) And the mingling of friendship or sympathy for the known enemy with the intent to aid him, knowing him an enemy, does not negative the treasonable intent United States v. Stephan, 50 F. Supp. 738, 740, n. 1, at 744 (E. D. Mich. 1943), 133 F. (2d) 87, 99 (C.C.A. 6th, 1943), United States v. Cramer, 137 F. (2d) 888, 893 (C.C.A. 2d, 1943) Nor does hostile duress acting on persons other than the defendant, or directed at property, justify giving aid United States v. Hodges, 26 Fed. Cas. 332, No. 15,374 (C.C. D Md. 1815), United States v. Pryor, 27 Fed. Cas. 628, No. 16,096 (C.C.D.Pa. 1814) Cf. United States v. Hughes, 26 Fed. Cas. 420, No. 15,418 (S.D. Ohio, 1864), Thompson, A Treason Trial in Ohio (1883) 4 Ohio Bar Assn. Appendix II, 54.
A contrary doctrine concerning sale of supplies to the enemy might seem to have evolved in the Confederate States of America Though originally regarded as clearly involving treason, there trade with the enemy "came to be more generally regarded as an offense against the revenue laws than as an act of treason." Robinson, Justice in Grey (1941) 177. The circumstances strongly suggest, however, that this course of opinion reflected a practical compromise with facts, such trade as was going on seemed probably of greater benefit to the South than to the North.
30 Thus, despite the confused argument of Pinckney for the defense, and the unsatisfactory charge of Duval, C.J., the issue of motive seems the real defense attempted in United States v. Hodges, cited in note 29 supra, and the jury's verdict of acquittal may amount to interposition of mercy.
31 Cf. United States v. Lee, 26 Fed. Cas. 907, No. 15,584 (C.C. D.C. 1814).
32 Cf. Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 29 (1945). "On the other hand, a citizen may take actions which do aid and comfort the enemy — making a speech critical of the government or opposing its measures, profiteering, striking in defense plants or essential work, and the hundred other things which impair our cohesion and diminish our strength — but if there is no adherence to the enemy in this, if there is no intent to betray, there is no treason. Note that the implication of the Court's observation rejects the broad possibilities seen for the treason clause in McKinney, Treason under the Constitution of the United States (1918) 12 Ill. L. Rev. 381 and Warren, What is Giving Aid and Comfort to the Enemy? (1918) 27 Yale L.J. 331.
33 See 8 Holdsworth, History of English Law (1937) 335 ff.
34 See Paterson, C.J., in United States v. Vigol, 28 Fed. Cas. 376, No. 16,621 (C.C.D.Pa. 1795), Iredell, C.J., and Peters, D.J., in Case of Fries, 9 Fed. Cas. No. 5,126, at 840, 909, 912, Chase, C.J., in the second trial of Fries, 9 Fed. Cas. No. 5,127, at 930 Needless to say, the Jeffersonian Congress impeachment of Mr Justice Chase was not based on any objection to such parts of his charge to the jury in the Fries trial as confined the definition of treasonable intention, and, significantly, Chase's answer to his impeachment boldly makes capital out of the fact that his refusal to allow defense counsel to describe early English treason law to the jury was based on its excessive scope, both in intent and in act See (Note) 9 Fed. Cas. 934, 938 ff.
35 26 Fed. Cas. 397, No. 15,407 (C.C. D. Vt. 1808).
36 Id at 400, 402 Livingston's ruling is the more striking because, though the particular enterprise was only a somewhat unusually open and brash smuggling attempt, it probably represented a type of conduct which then met with the approval of that substantial part of the community which was violently opposed to the Embargo A different temper of mind towards the scope of "treason" might have led the court to find that a case existed Cf. Moulton, A Vermont Treason Trial (1935) 29 Vt. Bar Assn. 121, 128-32.
37 26 Fed. Cas. No. 15,407, at 399, 401-402 (C.C. D. Vt. 1808).
38 26 Fed. Cas. 105, No. 15,299 (C.C. E.D.Pa. 1851).
39 See note 18 supra.
40 See 26 Fed. Cas. No. 15,299, at 128 (C.C. E.D.Pa. 1851). "Not because the numbers of [or?] force was insufficient But (1) for want of any proof of previous conspiracy to make a general and public resistance to any law of the United States, (2) because there is no evidence that any person concerned in the transaction knew there were such acts of congress, as those with which they are charged with conspiring to resist by force and arms, or had any other intention than to protect one another from what they termed 'kidnappers' (by which slang term they probably included not only actual kidnappers, but all masters and owners seeking to recapture their slaves, and the officers and agents assisting therein).
"The testimony of the prosecution shows that notice had been given that certain fugitives were pursued the not, insurrection, tumult, or whatever you may call it, was but a sudden conclamatio or running together, to prevent the capture of certain of their friends or companions, or to rescue them if arrested Previous to this transaction, so far as we are informed, no attempt had been made to arrest fugitives in the neighbourhood under the new act of congress by a public officer.
Insistence on specific intent underlies Grier's admission of defense evidence that in the previous nine months there had been rough seizure of Negroes in the neighbourhood by men of dubious character, who acted without show of official authority. This was recognized as a critical point, and was hard fought, on both sides See Hensel, The Christiana Riot and the Treason Trials of 1851 (1911) 78 The prosecution objected that the evidence was irrelevant Grier answered. "The objection of the prosecution would be irresistible if Hanway was indicted simply for resisting an officer of government But in treason there must be some previous agreement." Id at 112.
So also Grier and Kane, D.J., agreed that the prosecution, not having previously supplied the defense with a list of the witnesses on the point as the statute required, could not now introduce "rebuttal" evidence that for the year previous armed bands of Negroes had ranged the neighbourhood seeking out whites trying to reclaim slaves Judge Kane declared that "the two elements of the crime are the act and the preconcert The evidence which is now offered is merely to prove that preconcert It was an indispensable element of the original case." Id. at 114.
41 See id. at 126.
42 Id at 128 Grier's observations are the more striking in view of the clarity with which District Judge Kane, who sat with Grier in the Hanway trial, had charged the grand jury on the theory that an attempt by force generally to prevent the enforcement of a single law was treason by levying war See Charge to Grand Jury, 30 Fed. Cas. No. 18,276, at 1048 (C.C. E.D.Pa. 1851) Judge Kane, a former district attorney and Attorney-General of Pennsylvania, was herein merely reflecting his "well known views" on the need for strict enforcement of the constitutional right of slave owners to the return of their property See Hensel, op. cit. supra note 40, at 57-58 Justice Grier's evident distaste for the doctrine of constructive levying of war is further pointed by the contrast of his remarks with the clear presentation of the broader doctrine by the district attorney in his address to the jury See Robbins, Report of the Trial of Castner Hanway (1852) 45, 53.
Mr. Justice Grier's sweeping exclusion of the mortgage debtor's case can also be contrasted with the resort to force to stop the general operation of the mortgage foreclosure system in farm states at the depth of the depression of the 1930's See Skilton, Government and the Mortgage Debtor (1944) 74 So far as appears, no effort was ever made to charge these disturbances as constructive levying of war, though they seem within the scope of the older English authority.
43 See Appendix, III, pp. 268-269 infra.
44 There seems to be no evidence that any stronger measures than the use of Federal troops were considered in connection with the 1877 riots. In view of the broad construction of "conspiracy" used to convict the leaders in the Haymarket meeting, it is notable that no charge of treason was attempted Cf. Spies v. People, 122 Ill. 1, 12 N E 865 (1887), The Trial of the Chicago Anarchists, 12 American State Trials (Lawson ed. 1919) 1, David, History of the Haymarket Affair (1936) c. XIV.
The Spies decision was declared by (1887) 18 Weekly L. Bull 326, 327 to be "the most portentous and dangerous ... ever pronounced by a court of justice in the United States," because "the theories laid down in the Chicago case are essentially the exploded idea of constructive treason revived and applied to the crime of murder."
Whatever the pacific protestations of its organizers, Coxey's "petition in boots" was the sort of mass movement on the legislature which earlier English doctrine would almost certainly have regarded as within the scope of constructive levying of war, but, despite real official concern for the dangerous potentialities of the movement, the only prosecutions which eventuated were for the misdemeanors of unlawful parading on the Capitol grounds and trampling the grass See McMurry, Coxey's Army (1929) 104-106, 116, 123.
The value of fastening a serious criminal charge on the leadership of the Pullman strike both as a matter of influencing public opinion and breaking the morale of the strikers was fully appreciated by the government, which, yet, relied on a conspiracy charge rather than the more intimidating accusation of treason, and there seems to be no evidence that the possibility of the latter was considered See Lindsey, The Pullman Strike (1942) c. XII, 276, 278, 279, 280, cf. Consolidated Coal & Coke Co v. Beale, 282 Fed. 934, 936 (S.D. Ohio 1922) Any theory of constructive levying of war was conspicuously absent in strong charges delivered to grand juries in connection with the strike See In re Charge to Grand Jury, 62 Fed. 828 (N D Ill. 1894), In re Grand Jury, id., at 834 (S.D. Cal. 1894), In re Grand Jury, id., at 840 (N.D. Cal. 1894).
There are numerous dicta through the Civil War period to the effect that effort by force to prevent the general execution of a single law is a levying of war See Story, C.J., Charge to Grand Jury, 30 Fed. Cas. No. 18,275, at 1,047 (C.C. D R I 1842), Sprague, D.J., Charge to Grand Jury, 30 Fed. Cas. No. 18,263 at 1,015 (D Mass 1851), Nelson, C.J., Charge to Grand Jury, 30 Fed. Cas. No. 18,261, at 1,012 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1851), Kane, D.J., Charge to Grand Jury, 30 Fed. Cas. No. 18,276, at 1,048 (C.C. E.D.Pa. 1851), Curtis C.J., Charge to Grand Jury, 30 Fed. Cas. No. 18,269, at 1,025 (C.C. D Mass 1851), United States v. Gremer, 26 Fed. Cas. No. 15,262, at 39 (E.D.Pa. 1861), Field, C.J., in charge to jury in United States v. Greathouse, 26 Fed. Cas. No. 15,254, at 22 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1863), Charge to Grand Jury, In re Riots of 1844, 4 Pa Law Jour Rep 29, 35 (Phila. Quar. Sess. 1844), also quoted at 26 Fed. Cas. 116, Druecker v. Salomon, 21 Wis. 621, 626 (1867).
45 Cf. 8 Holdsworth, (2d ed. 1937) 320, 328-29, Kenny, Outlines of Criminal Law (15th ed. 1936) 315.
46 Paxson, C.J., in Commonwealth v. O'Donnel, 12 Pa Co 97, 104-105 (Oyer & Tr , Allegheny Cty 1892).
47 See Burgoyne, Homestead (1893) 294, Stowell, "Fort Frick" or the Siege of Homestead (1893) 291.
48 (1892) 26 Am. L. Rev. 912, 914, cf. (1892) 46 Alb L. Jour 345, (1892) 31 Am L. Reg. (N.S.) 691, 699, (1893) 15 Grim L. Mag 191, 197 Former Chief Justice Agnew, of Pennsylvania, is quoted as stating in a letter to the press that "it is easy to distinguish treason from not It lies in the purpose or intent of the traitor to overthrow the government or subvert the law or destroy an institution of the state Riot is a breach or violation of law, but without a purpose against the state." See Burgoyne, Homestead (1893) 202.
49 See Seagle, Riot in 13 Enc. Soc. Sci. (1934) 388.
50 See Appendix, IV, pp. 270-273 infra.
51 96 Utah 500, 503, 504-505, 87 P (2d) 807, 808-809 (1939), cf. 93 Utah 70, 71 P (2d) 104 (1937).
52 See Harno, Intent in Criminal Conspiracy (1941) 89 U of Pa L. Rev. 624, 646 The practical protection against a finding of "guilt by association" afforded by insistence upon a showing that any given defendant shared the specific intent to commit the plotted crime is shown in United States v. Bryant, 245 Fed. 682 (N.D. Tex. 1917), aff'd, 257 Fed. 378 (C.C.A. 5th, 1919) See, especially, 257 Fed. at 384.
A strict construction of the intent element in the general federal conspiracy statute was the instrument employed to prevent a dangerously vague extension of the crime in Haywood v. United States, 268 Fed. 795, 799-800 (C.C.A. 7th, 1920), cert denied, 256 U.S. 689 (1921) Cf. Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U.S. 678 (1887), for the same rationale of interpretation, though erroneously applied See Field, J., dissenting in 256 U.S. at 703, 705, Deady, D.J., in In re Impaneling and Instructing the Grand Jury, 26 Fed. 749, 754 (D Ore 1886).
53 United States v. Pryor, 27 Fed. Cas. 628, No. 16,096 (C.C.D.Pa. 1814) And compare the acquittal of Joshua Hett Smith, for lack of convincing proof of intent to join in Arnold's treason See note 97 infra.
54 Id at 630, 631.
55 See, e.g, United States v. Stephan, 50 F. Supp. 738, 740, n. 1, at 744, charge approved, 133 F. (2d) 87, 99 (C.C.A. 6th, 1943), United States v. Fricke, 259 Fed. 673, 676, 682 (S.D.N.Y. 1919), Douglas, J., dissenting in Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 49, n. 2 (1945).
56 See p. 193 supra.
58 The remaining overt act submitted to the jury was based on falsehoods told by Cramer after his arrest to FBI agents, admittedly for the purpose of shielding the saboteur The Supreme Court does not pass on the "complicated" problem presented by this phase of the case, since it reverses on the error found in submitting as overt acts Cramer's meetings with Thiel See 325 US 1, 36,n 45 (1945) The falsehoods would seem clearly to constitute a giving of aid, although Thiel was already under arrest when Cramer falsified, and the latter fact would seem irrelevant if prior doctrine were followed, and successful conferring of a benefit on the enemy did not have to be shown Since the lies were told to two or more of the Federal agents, they would seem to be established satisfactorily under the two-witness provision.
59 Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 39-40 (1945).
60 See Appendix, V, pp. 273-276 infra.
61 See, e.g., Paterson, C.J., in United States v. Vigol, 28 Fed. Cas. 376, No. 16, 621 (C.C.D.Pa. 1795) Thus, though it be assumed that there is incontrovertible evidence of treasonable plotting to subvert the government, a conspiracy to levy war is not treason within the constitutional definition, says Mr Chief Justice Marshall, because plotting does not amount to a sufficient overt act Ex parte Bollman, 4 Cranch 75,126 (U.S. 1807) See Peters, D.J., in charge to jury in first trial of Fries, 9 Fed. Cas. No. 5,126, at 909 (C.C.D.Pa. 1799), and charge to Chase, C.J., on second trial, 9 Fed. Cas. No. 5,127, at 931 (C.C.D.Pa. 1800), Livingston, C.J., in charge to jury in United States v. Hoxie, 26 Fed. Cas. No. 15,407, at 398 (C.C. D. Vt. 1808), Story, C.J., Charge to Grand Jury, 30 Fed. Cas. No. 18,275, at 1,047 (C.C. D r 1 1842), Sprague, D.J., Charge to Grand Jury, 30 Fed. Cas. No. 18,263, at 1,015 (D Mass 1851), Grier, C.J., in charge to jury in United States v. Hanway, 26 Fed. Cas. No. 15,299, at 127 (C.C. E.D.Pa. 1851), Nelson, C.J., Charge to Grand Jury, 30 Fed. Cas. No. 18,271, at 1,035 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1861), Leavitt, D.J., Charge to Grand Jury, 30 Fed. Cas. No. 18,272, at 1,037 (S.D. Ohio 1861), cf. Wimmer v. United States, 264 Fed. 11, 13 (C.C.A. 6th, 1920), cert. denied, 253 U.S. 494 (1920).
On the other hand, where there was a clear overt act of armed resistance to constituted authority — as by an armed clash with troops seeking to enforce the Jeffersonian Embargo, or a forcible resistance to execution of the Fugitive Slave Law — verdicts were nevertheless directed when evidence of treasonable intent was lacking, or the evidence was ambiguous as to whether force was not applied for particular or private purposes and hence would not sustain the prosecution's burden of proof See, e.g., United States v. Hoxie, 26 Fed. Cas. 397, No. 15,407 (C.C. D. Vt. 1808), United States v. Hanway, 26 Fed. Cas. 105, No. 15,299 (C.C. E.D.Pa. 1851), cf. United States v. Lemer, S.D. N.Y. 1943 (unreported) (reprinted in Brief for Petitioner, p. 47, in United States v. Cramer, 325 U.S. 1 (1945)).
62 See, e.g., United States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. No. 14,692a, at 54 (C.C. D. Va. 1807), United States v. Lee, 26 Fed. Cas. 907, No. 15,584 (C.C. D.C. 1814), The Trial of Thomas Wilson Dorr, 2 American State Trials (Lawson ed. 1914) 5, 22 (R I Sup. Ct. 1844), Pitman, Report of the Trial of Thomas Wilson Dorr (1844) 10, cf. United States v. Fricke, 259 Fed. 673, 675 (S.D.N.Y. 1919) See also Douglas, J., dissenting in Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 54, n. 1 (1945) Marshall pointed out in effect that, if one of the two elements were merely corroborative of the other, it would plainly be improper and capable of prejudicial effect on defendant's rights to permit the prosecutor to prove the corroborative fact before establishing the fact corroborated. See United States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. No. 14,692a, at 54 (C.C. D. Va. 1807), and 7 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed. 1940) § 2038 (praising the "lucid opinion by Marshsll, C J.").
63 See Harno, op. cit. supra note 52, at 646.
64 325 US 1, 28 (1945).
65 See Ex parte Bollman, 4 Cranch 75, 126 (U.S. 1807), United States v. Mitchell, 26 Fed. Cas. No. 15,788, at 1,280 (C.C.D.Pa. 1795), Csse of Fries, 9 Fed. Cas. No. 5,126, at 840 (charge to grand jury), 909 (first trial) (C.C.D.Pa. 1799), Case of Fries, 9 Fed. Cas. No. 5,127, at 924, 931 (C.C.D.Pa. 1800) (second trial), United States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. No. 14,6923, at 13-14 (C.C. D. Va. 1807), United States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. No. 14,693, at 168 (C.C. D. Va. 1807), United St3tes v. Pryor, 27 Fed. Cas. No. 16,096, 3t 630 (C.C. D Pa. 1814), United States v. Fricke, 259 Fed. 673, 677 (S.D.N.Y. 1919), United States v. Robinson, 259 Fed. 685, 690 (S.D.N.Y. 1919), United States v. Haupt, 47 F. Supp. 836, 839 (N D Ill. 1942), rev'd on other grounds, 136 F(2d) 66 1 (C.C.A. 7th, 1943), United States v. Stephan, 50 F. Supp. 738, 742-43 (E D Mich. 1943), approved, 133 F. (2d) 87, 99 (C.C.A. 6th, 1943) All of the rulings and dicta refusing to recognize a conspiracy as a sufficient overt act of levying war contain similar language or implications See cases cited, note 61 supra. The familiar analysis is in the background of those contemporary decisions refusing to concede that "mere words," 3s punished under sedition acts, could constitute treason, because they do not amount to sufficient execution of such treasonable intent as they evidence See cases cited in notes 106, 111, 112, and 118, all in chapter 4 supra To the same effect are numerous charges to grand and petit juries regarding disturbances against the Fugitive Slave Law and the outbreak of the Civil War See Charge to Grand Jury, 30 Fed. Cas. 1,015, No. 18,263 (D Mass 1851), Charge to Grand Jury, 30 Fed. Cas. 1,047, No. 18, 276 (C.C. E. D. Pa 1851), United States v. Hanway, 26 Fed. Cas. 105, No. 15, 299(C.C. E. D. Pa. 1851), Charge to Grand Jury, 30 Fed. Cas. 1,024, No. 18,269 (D. Mass 1851), United States v. Greiner, 26 Fed. Cas. 36, No. 15, 262 (E.D.Pa. 1861), United States v. Greathouse, 26 Fed. 18, No. 15,254 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1863), Charge to Grand Jury, 30 Fed. Cas. 1,034, No. 18,271 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1861), Charge to Grand Jury, 30 Fed. Cas. 1,036, No. 18,272 (C.C. S.D. Ohio 1861), cf. 10 Ops. Att'y Gen. 513 (1863).
66 The function of the overt act in treason is identified with this general policy of the criminal law in the charge to the jury in United States v. Stephan, 50 F. Supp. 738, 740, n. 1, at 742-43 (E D Mich. 1943), approved, 133 F. (2d) 87, 99 (C C. A 6th, 1943) See Hall, Criminal Attempt — A Study of Foundations of Criminal Liability (1940) 49 Yale L.J. 789, 818.
67 325 US 1, 28 (1945).
68 See United States v. Fricke, 259 Fed. 673, 677 (S. D. N.Y. 1919), Charge to Grand Jury, 30 Fed. Cas. No. 18,272, 3t 1,037 (C.C. S. D. Ohio 1861) This rationale is implicit in the decisions which sustain criminal syndicalism legislation against the claim that it trenches on the treason clause, by pointing out that legislation penalizing "mere words" does not ipso facto purport to punish treason See cases cited in notes 106, 111, 112, and 118, all in chapter 4 supra.
69 Ibid. 325 U.S. 1, 34 (1945).
71 Id., 38 Compare also the comment that "where the sufficiency of the overt acts has been challenged because they were colorless as to intent, we are persuaded the reason intent was left in question was that the acts were really indecisive as a giving of aid and comfort ' Acts "that are trivial and commonplace," it continues, "hence are doubtful as to whether they gave aid and comfort to the enemy." Id., 35. Likewise, in the court's summation, cited in note 59 supra, its insistence that the act of meeting with the saboteur is insufficient, because this would be "to take the intent for the deed," points to a requirement that aid actually be conferred on the enemy The majority's approving quotation of Lord Reading's formula that "aid" is "an act which strengthens or tends to strengthen the enemy" (325 U.S. 1, 28) is somewhat ambiguous and in isolation might suggest that something less than accomplished aid and comfort would suffice But the formula may also mean simply that a net accretion to the enemy's strength need not be shown, if it appears that some effect of defendant's efforts has at least reached the enemy More ambiguous are the majority's examples (id., 29) of "actions which do aid and comfort the enemy," such as "making a speech critical of the government ... profiteering, striking in defense plants ... ," for such acts would probably require the conjunction of other events to constitute them effective aid to the enemy.
74 See Note 59 supra.
75 325 U.S. 1, 28 (1945).
76 See United States v. Fricke, 259 Fed. 673 (S.D.N.Y 1919), cf. Douglas, J., dissenting in Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 55, n. 2 (1945).
77 See 2 Stephen, History of the Criminal Law of England (1893) 263, 4 Holdsworth, History of English Law (1924) 496-97, Cf. Learned Hand, J., in United States v. Robinson, 259 Fed. 685, 689-90 (S.D.N.Y. 1919).
78 See Appendix, VI, pp. 276-279 infra.
79 See cases discussed by Douglas, J., dissenting in Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 64 (App 73-74).
80 Cf. Ex parte Bollman, 4 Cranch 75, 126 (U.S. 1807), United States v. Lee, 26 Fed. Cas. 907, No. 15,584 (C.C.D.C. 1814), United States v. Pryor, 27 Fed. Cas. No. 16,096, at 631 (C.C.D.Pa. 1814), Story, C.J., Charge to Grand Jury, 30 Fed. Cas. No. 18,275, at 1,047 (C.C. D. R.I. 1842), United States v. Greathouse, 26 Fed. Cas. No. 15,254, at 24 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1863) United States v. Fricke, 259 Fed. 673, 678, 679 (S.D.N.Y. 1919), see United States v. Stephan, 50 F. Supp. 445, 448 (E.D. Mich. 1943) That the law of treason is probably, in fact, the origin of the general law of attempt, see Hall, Criminal Attempt (1940) 49 Yale L.J. 789, 794-97, 815. That treason is of the nature of a "direct attempt," see Strahorn, Effect of Impossibility of Criminal Attempts (1930) 78 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 962, 964. This is also the executive construction of the scope of "treason" in the President's proclamation of April 16, 1917, warning of the nature and penalties of treasonable activities See 18 U.S. C A § 1, annotation, at 4 (1940) Contra United States v. Robinson, 259 Fed. 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1919), Respublica v. Malm, 1 Dall. 33 (U. S. 1778) See Strahorn, op. cit. supra at 994-95.
81 See, e.g., Hanauer v. Doane, 12 Wall 342 (U.S. 1870) (sale of goods, intended for enemy use), United States v. Lee, 26 Fed. Cas. 907, No. 15,584 (C.C. D.C. 1814) (purchase of provisions, intended for enemy), United States v. Greathouse, 26 Fed. Cas. 18, No. 15,254 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1863) (fitting out a sailing vessel, intended to act as a privateer), United States v. Werner, 247 Fed. 708 (E.D. Pa. 1918) (words), United States v. Fricke, 259 Fed. 673 (S.D. N.Y. 1919) (holding of funds on deposit, or borrowing money, when for convenience of enemy agent), United States v. Haupt, 136 F(2d) 661 (C.C.A. 7th, 1943) (holding funds, securing lodgings, furnishing mailing address, when for convenience of enemy agent).
82 See Marshall, C.J., in Ex parte Bollman, 4 Cranch 75, 126 (U.S. 1807), and cases cited in note 61 supra.
83 This was one of the overt acts charged in United States v. Haupt, in an indictment the substantive validity of which was not involved in the reversal of the convictions 47 F. Supp. 836, 839 (N D Ill. 1942), rev'd, 136 F. (2d) 661 (C.C.A. 7th, 1943).
84 See United States v. Mitchell, 26 Fed. Cas. No. 15,788, at 1,278 (C.C. D.Pa. 1795), Case of Fries, 9 Fed. Cas. No. 5,126, at 914 (C.C.D.Pa. 1799) (first trial), Case of Fries, 9 Fed. Cas. No. 5,127, at 931 (C.C.D.Pa. 1800) (second trial), Ex parte Bollman, 4 Cranch 75, 134, (U.S. 1807), United States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. No. 14,692a, at 14 (C.C. D. Va. 1807), United States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. No. 14,693, at 165, 168 (C.C. D. Va. 1807), Charge to Grand Jury, 30 Fed. Cas. 1,015, No. 18,263 (D. Mass 1851), United States v. Haupt, 47 F. Supp. 836, 839 (N D Ill. 1942), rev'd on grounds not affecting the substance of indictment, 136 F. (2d) 661 (C.C.A. 7th, 1943) Cf. Stephan v. United States, 133 F. (2d) 87, 93, 94 (C.C.A. 6th, 1943) But cf. Story, C.J., Charge to Grand Jury, 30 Fed. Cas. No. 18,275, at 1,047 (C.C. D R.I. 1842), Grier, C.J., in charge to jury in United States v. Hanway, 26 Fed. Cas. No. 15,299, at 126 (C.C. E.D. Pa. 1851).
85 See 26 Fed. Cas. No. 15,254, at 24 (C.C. N D Cal. 1863).
86 See United States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. No. 14,693, at 165, 168 (C.C. D. Va. 1807).
88 See note 71 supra.
89 See note 80 supra.
90 U.S. Const. Art III, § 3 The clause, of course, also recognizes confession in open court as a basis for conviction.
91 325 U.S. 1, 30 (1945), see Marshall, C.J., in United States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. No. 14,693, at 176 (C.C. D. Va. 1807), Baldwin, C.J., in United States v. Doebler, 25 Fed. Cas. No. 14,977, at 886 (C.C. E.D. Pa. 1832) The suggestion of Judge Hand in United States v. Robinson, 259 Fed. 685, 691 (S. D. N.Y. 1919), that the requirement of direct evidence represents a continuance of an archaic philosophy of proof by oath bearers seems without conviction in logic, and is certainly without evidence in history It seems clear that a rational theory of probative values, whether mistaken or not, underlies the two-witness requirement. Indeed, it would be difficult to find two members of the Federal Convention less likely to have been moved by considerations drawn from a "system of trial not rational in its processes (Id at 691), than Benjamin Franklin and James Wilson, whose remarks alone are recorded on the point. See p. 133 supra, 7 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed. 1940) § 2039, 259 Fed. at 692-93 The cases cited in this note discuss the basis of the two-witness requirement wholly in terms of probative values, and the same approach has been taken toward the requirements for proof of overt acts in English law See 7 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed. 1940) §§ 2036, 2037.
92 When the Court says (325 U.S. 1, 35) that "The two-witness principle is to interdict imputation of incriminating acts to the accused by circumstantial evidence or by the testimony of a single witness," it seems merely to state its conclusion, not an argument therefor, since the meaning of the assertion depends on the content of the "incriminating" act. This is true also of the statement that "The words of the Constitution were chosen, not to make it hard to prove merely routine and everyday acts, but to make the proof of acts that convict of treason as sure as trial processes may be." Ibid. The germ of an argument why aid or intent must be evidenced by the act seems at first glance implied in the remark that the framers, "having thus by definition made treason consist of something capable of direct proof," wrote the two-witness requirement to safeguard the trial procedure Id., 29 But, again, the significance of the statement turns on the meaning of the act, for obviously an act which merely furthers defendant's plan of aiding the enemy is, qua act, as much "capable of direct proof" as an act which completes the aid.
93 Cf. Case of Fries, 9 Fed. Cas. No. 5,126, at 909, 914 (C.C.D.Pa. 1799) (first trial), see United States v. Doebler, 25 Fed. Cas. , No. 14,977, at 885-86 (C.C. E.D. Pa. 1832), 7 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed. 1940) § 2037.
94 325 U.S. 1, 31 (1945), cf. Douglas, J., dissenting, at 59.
95 325 U.S. 1, 31 (1945).
96 Id , 34, cf. Douglas, J., dissenting, id., 58 The fact that the intent and the act elements have always been recognized as distinct, so that the prosecution must equally establish each, and that distinct functions have been ascribed to them, in itself suggests that the evidence sufficient to establish one element may not necessarily be required to be of a character relevant to establishing the other As an a priori matter, it may of course be argued also that both elements are designed, ultimately, to prove the intent, which is the basic factor which may make the accused a dangerous man, and that it would not be irrational, in promotion of the obvious concern of the framers to safeguard the rights of the accused, if the overt act were intended to be such as would offer corroborative evidence of the intent It may fairly be urged that men in all ages would be perfectly willing to punish one whom they were sure was adhering to the state's enemies by treacherous thoughts, that the practical problem is one of securing adequate proof to assure against abusive prosecutions of the innocent, and that, hence, if the overt act element is construed to require proof which will provide cumulative evidence of intent, this is not to say that the overt act requirement is rendered meaningless Whatever the persuasiveness of this latter analysis, certainly it must carry the burden of proof, for, by familiar principles of construction, distinct elements in a constitutional, legislative, or judge made rule of law are to be taken prima facie as intended to serve distinct purposes See Marshall, C.J., in Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 174 (U.S. 1803) Further, if the evidence to establish the overt act is required to be such as will corroborate the existence of the intent, it is difficult to understand the decisions which so rigorously insist on full proof of each element, acquitting those whose intent is assumed treasonable, but who have not been shown guilty of an "overt act" Likewise, it is hard to see how it can be said to be immaterial which element of the crime is proved first (see note 62 supra), if one is corroborative of the other True, in the cases of ruling on the order of proof, the issues arose because the prosecution sought first to introduce its evidence on intent, and it might be argued that it is hence wholly consistent with a corroborative function of the act element to introduce the principal evidence on intent first But the rulings make no such distinction, and Marshall, C.J., plainly says that there is none an answer which is the more to the present point because it was in response to the contention that the act must be proved first.
97 Cf. United States v. Schulze, 253 Fed. 377, 379 (S.D. Cal. 1918), aff'd without reference to the point here relevant, 259 Fed. 189 (C.C.A. 9th, 1919), Hall, op. cit. supra note 80, at 794-97, 824-25.
98 See cases cited in note 81 supra.
99 See, e.g., United States v. Hodges, 26 Fed. Cas. 332, No. 15,374 (C.C. D. Md. 1815) (delivery of prisoners to enemy), United States v. Hoxie, 26 Fed Cas. 397, No. 15,407 (C.C. D. Vt. 1808) (armed clash with troops seeking to enforce national embargo), United States v. Hanway, 26 Fed. Cas. 105, No. 15,299, (C.C. E.D. Pa. 1851) (forcible resistance to execution of Fugitive Slave Law), United States v. Magtibay, 2 Philipp 703 (1903) (duress), United States v. Leiner, Cr. No. 113-120 (S.D.N.Y. 1943) (unreported, see note 61 supra) (misstatements to authorities regarding identity of spy) Distinguish cases where the prosecution fails because the acts shown are not deemed sufficiently advanced in execution of the intent See, e.g., United States v. Pryor, 27 Fed. Cas. 628, No. 16,096 (C.C.D.Pa. 1814) United States v. De Los Reyes, 3 Philipp 349 (1904).
There is no more striking example of conduct on its face clearly treasonable, but in fact found innocent, than the case of Joshua Hett Smith Smith, a resident of the West Point area, arranged to have two of his tenants row him on the night of September 21, 1780, to the British sloop Vulture, lying in the Hudson. He hailed the vessel as a friend, boarded her and was aboard for fifteen to twenty minutes, after which he returned to the rowboat accompanied by Major Andre, whom he then brought ashore for the meeting with Arnold. Smith took Andre to his house and furnished him with the civilian coat which Andre wore at the time of his capture. Smith was tried before a court-martial, convened under a resolution of the Congress authorizing the commander in chief thus to try any citizen who should harbor or secrete any of the subjects or soldiers of Great Britain, knowing them to be such, or should be instrumental in conveying intelligence to the enemy. His defense, apart from a challenge to the jurisdiction of the court martial, was that Arnold had enlisted his aid on the pretext that this was a means of obtaining information helpful to the American cause. The most careful student of the Arnold conspiracy apparently believes that Smith was telling the truth. Van Doren, Secret History of the American Revolution (1941) 330, 331, 337. The court-martial acquitted the defendant, finding that although he had aided Arnold, "yet they are of opinion, that the evidence is not sufficient to convict the said Joshua H. Smith of his being privy to, or having a knowledge of the said Benedict Arnold's criminal, traitorous and base designs." See The Trial of Joshua H. Smith for Assisting the Enemy, 6 American State Trials (Lawson ed. 1916) 486; 2 Chandler, American Criminal Trials (1844) 255; Smith, An Authentic Narrative of the Causes which Lead to the Death of Major Andre (1809) 118.
100. 325 U. S. 1, 32-33 (1945).
102. See notes 59 and 71 supra.
103. 325 U.S. 1, 35 (1945).
105. See note 100 supra.
106. 325 U. S. 1, 33 (1945). Emphasis added.
109. Douglas, J., dissenting in 325 U. S. 1, 59 (1945).
111. See pp. 133-134 supra.
112. See United States v. Robinson, 259 Fed. 685, 691-91 (S. D. N. Y. 1919).
113. 7 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed. 1940) § 2037.
114. The only effort to defend this position seems to be that of Judge Hand in United States v. Robinson, 259 Fed. 685, 689-90 (S. D. N. Y. 1919), and the scant historical evidence which he adduces does not present a convincing case. His interpretation of the significance of the repeal of 21 Rich. II, c. 3 (1397-98), by 1 Hen. IV, c. 10 (1399), is not unreasonable on the face of the statutes, considered in isolation. But see 1 Hale, History of the Pleas of the Crown. (Emlyn ed. 1736-1739) 85, 111, 266, 267; 2 Stephen, History of the Criminal Law of England (1883) 254. His attempt to derive the principle of the two-witness rule from the law of "oath bearers" seems to have no plausible relation to the hard-headed men who framed the treason clause. See note 91 supra. His argument that a heavy burden of proof must be laid on the prosecution, if the two-witness clause is to mean anything seems wholly a priori, and ignores the practical, evidentiary value which may be derived from the simple comparison of the testimony of two separate witnesses to what is allegedly the same transaction. See note 113 supra. And see, generally, note 96 supra.
115. The King v. Lord Preston, 1 Salk. 278, 91 Eng. Rep. 243 (1691).
116. 325 U.S. 1, 45 (1945).
117. The constitutional authority of Congress, under Art. III, § 3, to mitigate the penalty for treason, of course, limits but cannot be said to destroy the political, as compared to the legal, significance of the constitutional status of the crime. See pp. 146, 149-150 supra.

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