Source: https://bostonipblog.typepad.com/dmass-ip-blog/written-description/
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 22:30:58+00:00

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In one of their many disputes (see here for further details) Bose sued Lightspeed for infringement of Patent No. 5,181,252 directed to drivers in noise cancelling headsets. After Judge Young construed the disputed limitations both parties moved for summary judgment on various grounds. Judge Young’s decision on those motions can be found here.
In view of the claim construction, Lightspeed conceded infringement of claim 1. As to anticipation, the court granted summary judgment for Bose that a first piece of prior art did not anticipate the patent. But the court did rule that a second piece of art met all the limitations of claim 1 and left for trial the question of whether that art was properly prior art for purposes of § 102(a) (known or used by others) or 102(g)(2) (made by another).
Lightspeed also moved for invalidity under § 112 for lack of enablement, improper written description, or indefiniteness. But that motion was denied because § 112 relies on an understanding of one skilled in the art and Lightspeed advanced no evidence on that point.
Plaintiff JCS (successor in interest to the original Holmes Group plaintiff) asserts infringement of Patent Nos. 6,425,932, 6,685,760, 7,041,147, and 7,276,100, directed to various configurations of replaceable air filters, against defendant RPS Products. The latter three patents are all continuations of the ‘932 patent and were added to this case at various stages. In particular the ‘147 claims appear to have been drafted with accused products in hand.
In a comprehensive decision on a number of issues, Judge Saylor effectively sides for the plaintiff across the board.
The parties cross-moved for summary judgment on infringement, which required the court to construe new claim terms in the ‘147 patent. The court favored plaintiff’s construction (relying partially on the doctrine of claim differentiation, validating at least one of plaintiff’s strategies in prosecuting the continuation). Having sided with the plaintiff on claim construction, and with no dispute as to the operation of the accused products (the filters are what they are), the court entered summary judgment of literal infringement (and declined to address infringement under DOE).
Judge Saylor denied a motion to strike defendant’s proposed inequitable conduct expert’s testimony on materiality, but granted it regarding her testimony on intent or as to the ultimate legal question of whether plaintiff engaged in inequitable conduct. A motion to preclude the testimony of the prosecuting attorneys due to late disclosure / conflicting invocation of the attorney-client privilege was denied.
Plaintiff moved for summary judgment on a number of defenses. The court granted summary judgment on the prosecution laches defense (five to seven years between initial filing and continuation filing was not excessive), written description defense (the original and common specification sufficiently disclosed a one-leg embodiment to satisfy § 112 for the corresponding claims in the continuation), obviousness (defendant failed to articulate a level of ordinary skill in the art and failed to make a case that the invention would have been obvious to one possessing such skill), indefiniteness (the court had no problem with the term “perimeter”), and statutory-double patenting (the asserted patents differ in scope).
The court denied summary judgment on obviousness-type double patenting since it wasn’t clear whether a terminal disclaimer was properly filed.
The court declined to strike plaintiff’s claim to damages due to discovery abuses (including failure to provide a computation of damages in plaintiff’s initial disclosures and failure to supplement the same) but it did suggest that the defendant propose an alternate sanction, such as a limited award of fees and costs.
Ariad v. Eli Lilly is a case that has garnered much attention in the patent law community, but it is also a case that originated D. Mass., as have many high profile Federal Circuit cases over the years. Originally before Judge Zobel, the case was heard en banc by the Federal Circuit, who issued its opinion today. The en banc court confirmed that 35 USC § 112, ¶ 1 contains a written description requirement separate from the enablement requirement. Today’s decision follows the original panel decision, reversing Judge Zobel’s denial of JMOL and holding the asserted genus claims of Patent No. 6,410,516 invalid for failure to meet the statutory written description requirement.
For an excellent take on how the written description and enablement requirements work together to preclude patenting of basic scientific research, I recommend Judge Newman’s short “additional views” which follow the majority opinion.

References: § 102
 § 112
 § 112
 § 112
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 § 112