Source: http://bc-injury-law.com/blog/2010/06/page/2
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 10:30:13+00:00

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“Chinese Drywall Lawsuits” are claims for damages based on the allegation that defective drywall, manufactured in China, was installed in homes across North America. There are not only health complaints alleged to be associated with this drywall but also allegations that the drywall effects the integrity of the home.
To fix these problems some homeowners have resorted to gutting and replacing the drywall in their homes leading to significant repair costs.
There have been thousands of Chinese drywall lawsuits filed in the US and the first of these reached verdict earlier this month. As reported on NPR, a US Jury just awarded a Florida couple $2.4 Million in damages to compensate them not only for the repair costs of “gutting and renovating their home” but also for the loss of enjoyment of their home and potential in reduction of the home’s resale value.
The Star reported on June 20, 2009 that an estimated 920,000 square metres of “Chinese drywall” came into Canada through Vancouver from 2001 – 2007. While some of this was then further exported outside of BC some of this product may have been used in new construction in the lower mainland.
Thomas Martin was quoted as saying that the Chinese Drywall crisis is “the worst case of sick houses in US history“. The question remains, is there an equally large problem of ‘sick houses‘ in Canada?
If you are a BC home-owner and are concerned that your home may be contaminated with defective drywall you should have a proper inspection carried out from a qualified engineer or home inspector. If in fact your concerns are justified you should promptly seek legal advice to ensure you don’t jeopardize your right to be properly compensated for your financial losses.
Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, ordering ICBC to pay ‘double costs‘ after losing a breach of insurance claim.
In today’s case (Barsaloux v. ICBC) the Plaintiff was the owner of a vehicle that was stolen and subsequently recovered. It was damaged beyond repair. The Plaintiff had insurance with ICBC and applied for coverage. ICBC refused to pay stating that the Plaintiff was in breach of his policy of insurance for making a false declaration about the identity of the vehicle’s principal operator.
The Plaintiff successfully sued ICBC and was awarded $13,850 in damages. Prior to trial, the Plaintiff made a formal settlement offer of $13,700. The Plaintiff applied to Court to be awarded double costs under Rule 37B.
 I stress that ICBC was directly a party to this action. That distinguishes this case from Bailey v. Jang, 2008 BCSC 1372, where Hinkson J. declined to consider the relative financial positions of the plaintiff and ICBC where ICBC’s involvement was in its capacity as insurer for the named defendant.
 In the circumstances, ICBC should have realized the weakness of its position well before trial. The offer to settle was the only means the plaintiff had to exert additional, although modest, pressure and to provide ICBC with a further opportunity to re-assess and reconsider its position in light of the evidence that existed. I find that it was an offer that ought reasonably to have been accepted.
 That conclusion is not altered by the fact that the revised offer to settle was delivered only two days before trial. ICBC relies on Bailey, where the court said seven days was a reasonable period of time to consider an offer and ordered double costs for the period beginning seven days after delivery of the offer.
 I do not read Bailey as stating anything more than what was a reasonable period for consideration of an offer on the facts of that case. Rule 37B sets no time limit for delivery of a settlement offer. In that regard, it differs from the former Rule 37, where an offer delivered less than seven days before trial attracted different consequences than one delivered earlier. In fact, Rule 37B(6)(a) specifically refers to an offer that ought reasonably have been accepted “either on the date that the offer to settle was delivered or on any later date” (emphasis added).
 In the circumstances of this case, including the issues involved, the delivery date of the offer gave ICBC sufficient time to consider its position before trial. As said above, ICBC should have known well before the offer was delivered that it could not prove an essential part of what it was alleging. I find the plaintiff is therefore entitled to double costs for the trial of this action.
Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, addressing the issue of fault for a collision between a school bus and a cyclist.
In today’s case (Torok v. Sekhon) the Plaintiff was travelling southbound on a sidewalk in Surrey, BC. He was travelling on the left side of the street. At the same time the Defendant was operating a school bus and driving in the opposite direction of travel. As the Defendant approached an intersection he put on his right turn signal and proceeded to make a right turn. The Plaintiff, who was travelling down hill, did not yield and entered the roadway from the sidewalk. A collision occurred.
… There is, of course, a need for constant vigilance for children on the roads, especially in suburban areas, for the very reason that they can not be expected always to act with the same care that is expected of adults.
 The plaintiff in Chen was 11 years old. The plaintiff in this case was somewhat older, but still of an age when a reasonable driver would know that he would not necessarily act “with same care that is expected of adults”. Indeed, the tendency of teenagers to engage in reckless behaviour is well known.
 Having seen Mr. Torok and knowing that their paths were about to cross, the duty of Mr. Sekhon was to proceed with caution and to complete his turn only when he could do so safely. That meant either satisfying himself that he could complete his turn before the boys reached the intersection or, more prudently, slowing or stopping until he knew that the boys had either passed the intersection or had stopped to allow him to pass.
 Mr. Sekhon failed to take either precaution. Although he clearly saw the boys and knew their direction of travel before his turn, he was apparently unaware of their location as he was actually making the turn. There is no evidence of anything that would have prevented Mr. Sekhon from stopping briefly in order to ensure that he could turn safely. I therefore find that, in the circumstances, Mr. Sekhon failed to take sufficient care and was negligent.
 However, I find that Mr. Torok also failed to take reasonable care for his own safety. He was riding his bicycle on a sidewalk, then into a crosswalk, and was riding on the left, rather than the right side of the road. All of those actions are violations of s. 183(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 318. He was also riding without a helmet, in violation of s. 184. Mr. Torok was of sufficient age and experience to know, and in fact did know, that he was riding in an illegal manner. He also knew that he was approaching an intersection at a high speed and needed to be aware of the possibility of vehicles turning either into or from 150th Street. He saw the approaching school bus and failed to notice its turn signal. As a result, I find that Mr. Torok was contributorily negligent.
 In my opinion, the plaintiff was at fault, and his fault was one of the causes of the accident. Contrary to law, he was riding his bicycle on the sidewalk against the flow of traffic. He saw the defendant’s vehicle moving towards the exit he was approaching. Rather than making eye contact with the defendant or stopping his bicycle and letting the defendant’s vehicle exit the gas station, the plaintiff assumed the defendant saw him and would not accelerate his vehicle. In these circumstances, he was at fault for continuing to ride his bicycle across the path to be taken by the defendant’s vehicle in exiting the gas station.
 Although I have found that Mr. Torok, at age 14, was old enough to be found contributorily negligent, I must still consider his age in the apportionment of fault. His conduct is to be measured against what is to be expected of a reasonable person of his age and experience, not against the standard of an adult: see Parker v. Hehr, (20 December 1993), Vancouver B914957 (B.C.S.C.), citing Ottosen v. Kasper (1986), 37 C.C.L.T. 270 (B.C.C.A.); and McEllistrum v. Etches,  S.C.R. 787.
 In the circumstances, I find that Mr. Torok and Mr. Sekhon were equally at fault. Each saw the other and each failed to take the necessary precautions to allow for the other’s presence and possible movements. Balancing all of the factors, including Mr. Torok’s violations of the governing statute, his age, and Mr. Sekhon’s knowledge of the nature of the area and the likely presence of young people, I cannot say that one party is more culpable than the other. I therefore find that the defendants must bear 50 per cent of the liability for the accident.
Can Interest on Unpaid Special Damages be Recovered in a Personal Injury Claim?
Special damages are out of pocket expenses incurred as a result of the intentional or negligent actions of others. In personal injury lawsuits the most common special damages relate to medical treatments such as physiotherapy, massage therapy, medications and similar expenses.
When a Plaintiff pays their own special damages and succeeds at trial they are entitled to be reimbursed for these expenses along with a modest amount of interest under the Court Order Interest Act. What about expenses that were not paid before trial where the medical providers charge interest on the unpaid accounts? Can a plaintiff recover damages for these additional expenses? Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court considering this issue.
In today’s case (Bortnik v. Gutierrez) the Plaintiff sued for injuries sustained as a result of a 2007 BC motor vehicle collision. Mr. Justice Myers found that the Plaintiff had “exaggerated his injuries“. Despite this finding the Court concluded that the Plaintiff suffered “some minor whiplash injuries as a result of the accident” and awarded the Plaintiff $20,000 for his non-pecuniary damages.
The Plaintiff also was awarded damages to account for the expenses related to some of his post accident chiropractic treatments. The plaintiff did not pay these accounts before trial and the chiropractor charged interest on the unpaid accounts. The Plaintiff asked the court to award damages to account for this interest.
 It appears to me that the plaintiff acted reasonably in seeking chiropractic treatment. I would allow the expenses until December 31, 2009, when he was largely recovered.
 With respect to interest, while counsel have found some authority dealing with interest on disbursements, counsel advise they have not found any case dealing with interest on special damages. I therefore approach the matter on first principles.
 If the plaintiff had paid the chiropractor, he would have been limited to interest as provided by the Court Order Interest Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 79. Assuming that interest on special costs may in some instances be recoverable as damages – something which I need not decide – it follows from my finding that the plaintiff has not proved a past wage loss that he cannot hold the defendants responsible for his inability or failure to pay the bills as they became due and owing. He therefore is not entitled to claim interest as damages.
The BC Supreme Court has recently allowed interest on disbursements levied by service providers to be recovered in a personal injury case. In that decision the Plaintiff’s ability to pay for the disbursement was also a relevant factor. Today’s case leaves the door open for a similar result in appropriate circumstances for unpaid special damages.
Two judgements were released this week by the BC Supreme Court dealing with issues relating to civil claims arising in the context of alleged sexual assaults. The first case dealt with improper statements during closing arguments to a jury, the second with disclosure of records relating to a criminal prosecution.
The Plaintiff sued for damages and selected trial by Jury. The Defendant admitted to the assault and during the course of the trial conceded that the Plaintiff was entitled to some damages. The question was what amount was appropriate.
 Considering all the circumstances and applying the above framework to the case at bar, I find that the impugned portions of counsel’s submissions were highly prejudicial. First of all, the submission that the plaintiff will see the defendant’s face every time he makes love for the rest of his life has no foundation in the evidence. It was a highly speculative statement, with the sole purpose of inflaming the jury against the defendant. Counsel for the plaintiff says the statement did have a basis in the evidence because the plaintiff testified that he remembered the assault a couple of times a week, sometimes upon waking. He says Dr. Pulleyblank’s evidence that similar situations could trigger painful memories is a further factual basis for his argument.
 This argument is unconvincing. The evidence counsel relies on does not support the inference he asked the jury to draw; especially given evidence from the plaintiff that directly contradicts this statement. The plaintiff testified that since the assault he has had a positive sexual experience. There was also evidence that the plaintiff’s symptoms of posttraumatic stress disorder have diminished over time. To suggest the plaintiff would see the defendant’s face every time he made love for the rest of his life was more than mere rhetoric verging on the extravagant; it was a highly inflammatory statement that had no basis in the evidence.
 Likewise, counsel’s statement that the defendant groomed the plaintiff for a sexual encounter by inviting him to sleep over and providing him with alcohol has no basis in the evidence. Counsel says the basis for it lies in several statements made during trial. He relies on the statement of the plaintiff’s mother that two or three months earlier the defendant had phoned to ask if the plaintiff could sleep over. Counsel for the plaintiff also points to the plaintiff’s testimony that the defendant sometimes bought beer for his son and his friends. He also relies on the defendant’s testimony that in his youth he arranged consensual sexual acts with other males by asking them to ‘sleep over’. He says these statements, taken together, provide a basis for the jury to draw an inference that the defendant was grooming the plaintiff for a sexual encounter.
 The evidence does not provide a foundation for the statement that the defendant was grooming the plaintiff. There is no evidence the assault was premeditated. The defendant admitted he had called the plaintiff’s mother at an earlier time, but this was at his son’s request and to let the plaintiff’s mother know it was all right for the plaintiff to sleep over. The plaintiff’s arrival on the defendant’s doorstep that evening was clearly unplanned. Again, the sole purpose of this statement was to inflame the minds of the jury against the defendant. It was improper and amounts to misconduct.
 Counsel’s comments on the defendant’s presence in the courtroom were also inflammatory and prejudicial, and amount to misconduct, especially in light of the exchange of letters between the parties prior to trial. A party has a right to be in a courtroom. To suggest otherwise is improper. Even more improper is the suggestion that the defendant remained in court to intimidate or leer at the plaintiff. The defendant expressed a willingness to absent himself from the courtroom to spare the plaintiff’s feelings. Casting aspersions on a party for exercising his right to be present is misconduct. Suggesting a lack of empathy for remaining in court when counsel knew he had received a letter from the counsel for the defendant specifically offering to absent himself if doing so would make the plaintiff feel more comfortable is also misconduct.
 Counsel’s submission significantly prejudiced the defendant. The submission was relatively short. Taking all of Mr. McLeod’s inflammatory and improper statements together, I concluded that if I were to try to disabuse the jury of these matters I would simply re-emphasize them in the jurors’ minds. If I instructed the jury to disregard these portions of counsel’s brief submission entirely, my comments would likely rebound against anything he had said and against the plaintiff’s case. I concluded that I could not right the scales of the resulting prejudices with instructions anywhere close to neutral again. I must ensure there is no prejudice to either side. I do not see how any corrective judicial comments could do anything but suggest that counsel had misled the jury, intentionally or not.
 A judge discharges a jury with great reluctance. In this case, the jury was well constituted. They were attentive. At the beginning of the trial, I carefully explained their important role in the judicial system in British Columbia and the confidence placed in them. Discharging a jury in these circumstances embarrasses the court and, more importantly, tends to undermine public confidence in the justice system.
 However, given the circumstances, and considering the potential prejudice, no less to the plaintiff’s case then to the defendant’s, it would be unfair to continue with the jury in the circumstances. The only appropriate response was to discharge the jury with the regrets and thanks of the court.
 The defendant’s application to dismiss the jury and continue by judge alone is granted.
The second case released this week addressed the ability of a party to have the BC Supreme Court order production of materials relating to criminal charges arising from allegations of sexual abuse.
In this case (The British Columbia College of Teachers v. British Columbia (Attorney General) ) a former teacher was “criminally charged with sexually offending against a child.“. In the course of the prosecution a preliminary inquiry was held and the alleged victim testified. The Attorney General stayed the prosecution before trial.
The BC College of Teachers wanted to access a copy of the transcript of the preliminary inquiry evidence to use against the former teacher in “disciplinary proceedings“. The former teacher opposed this.
 In an analogous context of considering an ongoing publication ban, the Court of Appeal of this province considered that a trial judge’s analysis should not be based on whether a benefit to the administration of justice could be gained by the publication of redacted information, but rather, should be based on whether a serious danger could be avoided by declining to provide the information: Global BC, A Division of Canwest Media Inc. v. British Columbia, 2010 BCCA 169 at para. 72.
 Here, so long as the information is provided in a way that protects the identity of the complainant and thereby maintains the publication ban, there is no danger to be avoided by declining to allow the sought-after information to be provided. To put it another way, I do not consider that the administration of justice will be harmed if the preliminary inquiry transcript is produced to the College in a way that continues to protect the identity of the complainant.
 I am therefore persuaded that this is a case where I ought to exercise my inherent jurisdiction to allow for production of a transcript of the preliminary inquiry to the College, in such a way as to continue to maintain the publication ban pursuant to s. 486.4(2).
(b) the continuing publication ban imposed under s. 486.4(2) of the Code will not be violated if the Crown redacts all information that could identify the child complainant from the transcript of the evidence that was taken at the preliminary inquiry in Abbotsford Provincial Court Registry file No. 60256 and produces the redacted transcript to the College for its use in disciplinary proceedings against Mr. Sidhu.

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