Source: https://familylaw.typepad.com/virginiafamilylawappeals/2018/04/index.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 06:55:45+00:00

Document:
After the trial court refused a jury instruction embodying his view of the law to be applied, counsel objected, then asked the judge to consider it a "continuing" objection so he wouldn't have to keep repeating it. The judge agreed. But the Supreme Court found the objection unclear: Which of the two legal issues in the instruction was it about? Or was it both? Counsel did not object about the issues when his opponent mentioned them in closing argument, and did not move for a curative instruction or a mistrial to counter the opponent's improper references to them. Williams v. Swenson, 4/5/18.
The Virginia Supreme Court, in a rare move, has declared a provision in a contract void because it was about something that was later abolished by a change in the law, making it impossible to perform the obligation which it created. The contract divided up two developers' rights to build up to a certain density under a County-imposed density cap, and said how to divide rights caused by a future increase in the cap. The cap was later abolished. The trial court and Supreme Court agreed that running the contractual formula now would involve using the number "infinity" in place of the previous cap, which made the calculation, and thus performance of the contract, impossible.
... See Mount Aldie, LLC v. Land Trust of Va., Inc., 293 Va. 190, 200, 796 S.E.2d 549, 555 (2017) (“Our presumption is always that the parties ‘were trying to accomplish something rational. Common sense is as much a part of contract interpretation as is the dictionary or the arsenal of canons.’” (quoting Fishman v. LaSalle Nat’l Bank, 247 F.3d 300, 302 (1st Cir. 2001))).
General objection to order, never putting arguments in writing nor on record, doesn't preserve issues for appeal.
“In order to avail oneself of the [good cause or ends of justice] exception [to Rule 5A:18], a [litigant] must affirmatively show that a miscarriage of justice has occurred, not that a miscarriage might have occurred.” Redman v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 215, 221, 487 S.E.2d 269, 272 (1997).
"Here, the record falls far short of affirmatively demonstrating a miscarriage of justice," the Court continues. In order to examine the "miscarriage of justice" question under Rule 5A:18, it effectively reviews the facts of the case for error anyway, concludes that "DSS presented clear and convincing evidence that father has been unwilling or unable to remedy substantially the conditions which led to the child’s foster care placement," and affirms. Woodard v. Dinwiddie DSS, unpublished 6/16/15.
The Court of Appeals upholds a monetary award for half the value of the marital share of a 401(k) valued as of the date of separation, even though the 401(k) had been spent in various ways for seemingly proper purposes, including the taxes on its early withdrawal. McGarrity v. McGarrity, unpub. 4/10/18.
The account's owner had not withdrawn it voluntarily; after separation he defaulted on a pre-separation loan the couple had taken against it, and so the company closed the account, paid off the loan, withheld taxes and sent him what was left, about $33,000 out of about $68,000. He used $7,000 to pay support arrears to the wife, $5,000 for his divorce lawyer, $1,800 to paint the marital home, and the rest on the mortgage payments and other living expenses. When the money was gone, the IRS said he owed $18,000 for taxes and penalties on the 401(k) funds, even though taxes had been withheld from the distribution.
The trial court said that the value at the time of separation, net of the loan, was $48,000. Based on the husband's evidently undocumented testimony that between $12,000 and $18,000 in premarital retirement accounts had been rolled into it, the trial court called the separate share $15,000 and the marital share $33,000, and ordered the husband to pay the wife half that sum, as a dollar amount, not a transfer of pre-tax retirement-account funds.
the trial court calculated the marital share of the Barrios 401(k) plan according to Code § 20-107.3(G)(1), which defines the marital share of a retirement account as “that portion of the total interest, the right to which was earned during the marriage and before the last separation of the parties, if at such time or thereafter at least one of the parties intended that the separation be permanent.” (Emphasis added). A trial court values the marital share of retirement assets by looking at the amount earned from the date of marriage to the date of separation. ... No party needed to file a motion for an alternate valuation date in order to have the trial court value the Barrios 401(k) plan as of the date of separation. Code § 20-107.3(G)(1) required the trial court to determine the value of the Barrios 401(k) plan as of the date of separation, not the date of the evidentiary hearing.

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