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Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › D.C. Circuit › 2000 › USA v. Johnson, Spencer L.
Edwards, Chief Judge: A jury convicted Spencer L. John- son of possession with intent to distribute over 50 grams of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. s 841(a)(1) & (b)(1)(A)(iii) (1994), and simple possession of marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. s 844(a) (1994). Judge Harold H. Greene sentenced Johnson to 121 months in prison and five years of supervised release on count one, and concurrent terms of 12 months in prison and one year of supervised release on count two.
Johnson appeals and requests a new trial. He asserts that the prosecutor substantially prejudiced the verdict by arguing to the jurors that their function included protecting the community from drugs. Defense counsel raised a timely objection to the prosecutor's comments at trial. Johnson is correct that the prosecutor's comments were error. Howev- er, the error was harmless. The improper comments did not substantially or injuriously affect the determination of the jury's verdict. As a result, we affirm the judgment.
In the alternative, Johnson argues that this court should remand the case for resentencing. Johnson has not been provided with a transcript of his sentencing proceedings in violation of the Court Reporter Act, 28 U.S.C. s 753(b) (1994). The Miller Reporting Company lost the stenomask tape and any transcript that might have been prepared. Johnson asserts that without resentencing there can be no meaningful review. The Government argues that the likeli- hood of a lower sentence is small, but concedes that it is not out of the realm of possibility.
the record could be reconstructed. The judge who succeeded the original trial judge issued an order stating that the record could not be reconstructed. Given what is known here about the sentencing proceedings before the original trial judge, it is possible that Johnson was entitled to a lesser sentence. In light of these unusual circumstances, and to ensure that all appropriate possibilities are considered, we remand the case for resentencing.
A. Trial On February 24, 1998, a federal grand jury indicted John- son for possession with intent to distribute over 50 grams of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. s 841(a)(1) & (b)(1)(A)(iii), and simple possession of marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. s 844(a). Johnson's first trial ended in a mistrial when certain jurors became unavailable entering the fourth day of deliberations. During Johnson's second trial, the Government presented the testimony of five police officers involved in appellant's arrest: Investigator Tommy Miller, Sergeant Curt Sloan, and Officers John Branch, Devinci Wooden, and Andre Wright. The Government also presented the testimony of a chemist and a police detective with exper- tise in narcotics. The defense presented the testimony of Johnson, and Johnson's friend, Larry Holmes, who witnessed the arrest.
hip. Officer Branch did not identify himself, but believed Johnson realized he was a police officer. See id. at 83-84. In the alley, Sergeant Sloan saw Johnson use a hook-shot twice to toss objects onto the roof. See Tr. 6/18/98 at 57. Officers Wooden and Wright saw Johnson throw two objects onto the roof. See id. at 95-96; Tr. 6/19/98 at 12. Officer Branch saw one of Johnson's throws. See Tr. 6/17/98 at 49-50. After the police reached Johnson, Officer Miller heard Johnson say he ran because he did not have his driver's license. See id. at 27. Officer Branch recovered two plastic bags from the roof containing 64 grams of cocaine. See id. at 51. A police detective with expertise in narcotics testified that this was more than an individual would normally possess for personal use. See Tr. 6/19/98 at 69. The officers also found a bag in Johnson's coat containing 26.5 grams of marijuana. See Tr. 6/17/98 at 62-63; Tr. 6/19/98 at 47.
Johnson's story was quite different from the testimony of the officers. He testified that on February 6, 1998, he parked near his former home on Chapin Street. See Tr. 6/19/98 at 105, 108-09. As he walked away from his car, a man jumped out of another car and chased him. Because his brother had been killed recently in crossfire in a drive-by shooting in the same area, Johnson feared for his life and ran instinctively. See id. at 106. He did not know the man chasing him was a police officer. See id. at 106-07. After he was stopped by the police in the alley, an officer told him the police were going to say he threw illegal drugs onto the roof. See id. at 118. Johnson testified that he could not have made a hook- shot motion because of an injury to his right shoulder. See id. at 104. He testified that he did not possess any drugs. See id. at 112. Larry Holmes testified that he saw Johnson run down an alley before being stopped by police. He did not see Johnson throw anything. See id. at 86.
I don't think that is improper. It is a little of pressure on the jury, which is probably what Mr. Jones objected to, but I don't think it is improper enough that I should now tell the jury to forget about that. That is what you want me to do, right? That is reserved for a future time, for the third and fourth and fifth time. Id. at 71. The jury subsequently returned guilty verdicts on all charges.
C. Sentencing Judge Greene sentenced Johnson to 121 months in prison and five years of supervised release on count one, and concur- rent terms of 12 months in prison and one year of supervised release on count two. Unfortunately, the official court re- porter, Miller Reporting Company, lost the stenomask tape of the sentencing proceedings, so no transcript of the proceed- ings could be prepared. Subsequently, Johnson, pursuant to Rule 10(c) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, served a statement of proceedings on the Government in which Johnson, his trial attorney, and his mother, attempted to reconstruct the sentencing proceedings. In response, the Government elected not to contest or supplement Johnson's statement.
reconstruction and settlement of the sentencing record was not possible. See United States v. Johnson, Crim. No. 98-062, Order (D.D.C. Dec. 23, 1999) ("Order"), reprinted in Appellant's Appendix ("Appellant's App.") at 40.
A. Prosecutor's Statement Johnson raised a timely objection to the prosecutor's rebut- tal argument to the jury; therefore, we review the contested remarks for harmless error. See United States v. Saro, 24 F.3d 283, 287 (D.C. Cir. 1994). In any invocation of the harmless error standard, the Government carries the burden of proof; and the measure of "harm" under the standard is whether the error had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict, not merely wheth- er the record evidence is sufficient absent the error to warrant a verdict of guilt. See United States v. Smart, 98 F.3d 1379, 1390 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
In assessing claims of prosecutorial misstatements, the court is required to determine whether the disputed remarks constituted error and whether they substantially prejudiced the defendant's trial. See United States v. Childress, 58 F.3d 693, 715 (D.C. Cir. 1995). We typically consider several factors in this analysis: the closeness of the case, the centrali- ty of the issue affected by the error, and the steps taken to mitigate the effects of the error. See Gaither v. United States, 413 F.2d 1061, 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
There is no doubt here that the prosecutor's rebuttal argument to the jury was impermissible. A prosecutor may not make comments designed to inflame the passions or prejudices of the jury. See Childress, 58 F.3d at 715. And a prosecutor may not ask jurors to find a defendant guilty as a means of promoting community values, maintaining order, or discouraging future crime. See United States v. Monaghan, 741 F.2d 1434, 1441 (D.C. Cir. 1984). On its face, the prosecutor's argument in this case improperly suggested that the jury should convict the defendant in order to protect others from drugs.
The Government argues that the prosecutor's comments were a moderate response to defense counsel's allegations that the police employed Nazi tactics to frame the defendant. See Appellee's Br. at 15-16. It is undoubtedly correct that, in assessing the severity of impermissible arguments, a court must consider whether prosecutorial comments were offered in response to inflammatory statements by defense counsel. See United States v. Burnett, 890 F.2d 1233, 1241-42 (1989). In this case, defense counsel did indeed invoke Nazi practices in discussing police tactics. See Tr. 6/22/98 at 42. However, read in context, the prosecutor was not responding directly to allegations of police misconduct. Rather, the prosecutor was responding to defense counsel's legitimate statement that the promise of liberty and justice for all in the Pledge of Alle- giance applies to Johnson. See id. at 28.
The Government further argues that the prosecutor im- plied that the police, not the jury, had a duty to protect the community from drugs. See Appellee's Br. at 16. Despite this claim, the prosecutor's comments give no explicit indica- tion that their subject is the police. The plain meaning of the prosecutor's comments is that the jury should give justice not only to Johnson, but also to the individuals the drugs were intended to reach. See id. at 48.
evidence and reminded the jury that the lawyers' arguments were not evidence. See id. at 53-54.
The final thing that we must consider in assessing a claim of prosecutorial misstatement is the likely impact of the improper remarks on the verdict. See United States v. Williams-Davis, 90 F.3d 490, 507 (D.C. Cir. 1996). Johnson argues that his conviction was uncertain. He points out that the first trial ended in a mistrial after three and one-half days of jury deliberations. See Appellant's Br. at 16-17. Though complete certainty is not to be had in this circumstance, we do not think it plausible, in light of the formidable evidence arrayed against Johnson, that the prosecutor's remarks are what account for Johnson's relatively speedy conviction at the second trial.
Johnson also argues that the Government's evidence was infected with the aura of collusion. In support of this claim, Johnson points out that two police officers, along with the prosecutor, admitted they revisited the crime scene during the trial. See Tr. 6/18/99 at 61, 71. Furthermore, Johnson alleges that a photograph the officers used to illustrate their testimony contained markings that enabled them to co- ordinate their testimony. See 6/22/98 at 35. Finally, Johnson argues that the odd consistency of the testimony among the officers, such as repetition of the term "hook-shot" and refer- ences to eye contact with Johnson, indicates collusion. See Tr. 6/17/98 at 16, 84; Tr. 6/18/98 at 16-17, 92, 125; Tr. 6/19/98 at 9-10, 37; Tr. 6/22/98 at 37.
Johnson in order to protect the community from drugs. Given the content of the prosecutor's misstatement, it was not likely to have affected the outcome of the case. Regardless of the prosecutor's statement, the evidence clearly supported the jury's verdict. Having considered these factors, we hold that, although the prosecutor's comments were impermissible, the error was harmless. Accordingly, the jury's verdict must stand.
B. Loss of Sentencing Record The Court Reporter Act, 28 U.S.C. s 753(b), requires that court reporters record verbatim all proceedings in criminal cases held in open court. However, failure to record a proceeding or make a whole transcript available does not per se require reversal. See United States v. Carrazana, 70 F.3d 1339, 1342 (D.C. Cir. 1995). We evaluate the burdens and benefits of remand on a case-by-case basis and consider "(1) the goal of deterring violations of the Court Reporter Act; (2) the ability (and reasonable efforts of the parties) to correct for violations of the Act by reconstructing the record; and (3) the likelihood that reversible error occurred." Id.
In this case, Miller Reporting Company defaulted on its responsibilities by losing the transcript. There is no mitigat- ing evidence that the transcript was lost as a result of inadvertent mechanical error. See, e.g., United States v. Winstead, 74 F.3d 1313, 1321 (D.C. Cir. 1996). Appellant asserts that Miller Reporting Company has engaged in a pattern of negligence. The Assistant Federal Public Defend- er in this case attests that this is the fifth case she has handled in six years in which the Miller Reporting Company has lost a transcript. See Appellant's Br. at 21. The Govern- ment admits that it has "been frustrated from time to time by lapses in the performance of this reporting company." Ap- pellee's Br. at 25 n.15. In light of this record, our interest in deterring violations of the Court Reporter Act weighs heavily in favor of remanding this case for resentencing.
the record pursuant to Rule 10(c) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. However, due to the unavailability of the transcript, the inability of the parties to recall everything that occurred at sentencing, and the illness of the presiding District Court Judge, Chief Judge Norma Holloway Johnson determined that complete reconstruction of the sentencing record was not possible. See Order, reprinted in Appellant's App. at 40. As a result, there is no reconstructed record in this case.
the ability of the defendant to allege specific prejudice arising out of an event in the missing portions [of the transcript]; the extent of the missing portions; the sig- nificance of the missing portions in a typical trial (e.g., final jury instructions are presumptively more significant than a bench conference); the likely significance of the missing portions in the context of the specific trial in question; and the use of new counsel on appeal. Carrazana, 70 F.3d at 1343. In this context, since the burden of resentencing is comparatively light, these factors need not weigh as heavily in favor of remand as when a new trial is at stake. See Saro, 24 F.3d at 288. We thus consider the Carrazana factors in light of this lower burden.
First, appellant does not allege specific prejudice arising out of an event in the sentencing proceedings. This is not dispositive, however. We have found reversible error where a crucial stage of trial was missing even though the defendant could not allege specific prejudice. See United States v. Workcuff, 422 F.2d 700, 702 (1970) (per curiam).
other words, the subject matter of the missing transcripts in those cases was not crucial; as a result, it was held that reversible errors were unlikely. See Carrazana, 70 F.3d at 1344; Winstead, 74 F.3d at 1322. In contrast, in Workcuff, the court reporter was absent from a crucial stage of the trial--a jury instruction given after jury deliberations had begun--and, as a result, the court could not determine that no substantial right of the appellant had been violated. See Workcuff, 422 F.2d at 702. Similarly, in this case, although Johnson cannot point to prejudice arising out of a particular event, the loss of the transcript of the entire sentencing proceedings constitutes the absence of a crucial stage and itself increases the likelihood of error. The Government does not dispute the significance of this phase of the analysis.
120 months, the statutory mandatory minimum, rather than 121 months, the minimum guidelines recommendation. The Government argues this one-month discrepancy is not an appreciable difference. See id.
Johnson argues that, contrary to the Government's claims, the Presentence Investigation Report does not demonstrate that there was no error in the District Court's sentencing. Johnson presents the following example. The Presentence Investigation Report made it clear that Johnson met the first four criteria for the 2-level safety valve adjustment in U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual s 5C1.2 (1997), specifically, no criminal history points, no violence or weapon possession in the offense, no death or serious bodily injury, and no leader- ship role. However, only the District Court Judge could determine whether Johnson met the fifth criteria, i.e., truth- fully providing all information and evidence about the offense. See U.S.S.G. s 5C1.2.
If Judge Greene found that Johnson met the fifth criteria, and he also rejected the enhancement for obstruction of justice as the Government suggests, Judge Greene could have sentenced Johnson to less than 120 months. See U.S.S.G. s 2D1.1(b)(6). The Presentence Investigation Report pro- vides no assessment of this, and without a sentencing tran- script, there is no record of Judge Greene's analysis of this provision. See Appellant's Reply Br. at 9. In addition, according to the uncontested account that Johnson submitted in his attempt to reconstruct the record, during sentencing Judge Greene spoke about how harsh the sentencing guide- lines were, and stated that if he could sentence Johnson below the guidelines range, he would. See Appellant's Statement of Proceedings Prepared Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 10(c), reprinted in Appellant's App. 33-35. This further supports the possibility that Judge Greene would have granted John- son a lesser sentence, had the safety valve been brought to his attention.
information and evidence, is eligible for the safety valve. See United States v. Schreiber, 191 F.3d 103, 106 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that despite previous fabrications and obstruction defendant was eligible for safety valve). Under the plain language of U.S.S.G. s 5C1.2, a defendant has until "not later than the time of the sentencing hearing" to truthfully provide the Government with all information and evidence concerning the offense. Johnson bore the burden of persuad- ing the District Court that he was eligible for the safety valve. See United States v. Mathis, 216 F.3d 18, 29 (D.C. Cir. 2000), cert. denied, __ S. Ct. __, 2000 WL 1468603 (U.S. Oct. 30, 2000) (No. 00-6297). We are not in a position to weigh these factors and we cannot be certain what the trial judge's assessment might have been in this case.
As we discussed in Carrazana, we consider the foregoing factors in assessing the likelihood that reversible error oc- curred. We then weigh the likelihood that reversible error occurred, along with deterrence and the ability and efforts of the parties to reconstruct the record. See Carrazana, 70 F.3d at 1342-43. On balance, we find that this case presents a circumstance which qualifies for remand and resentencing. Johnson and the Government both acknowledge repeated loss of transcripts by Miller Reporting Company. Despite John- son's good faith effort to reconstruct the record, the District Court found that no reconstruction was possible. Both par- ties recognize that it is possible that Judge Greene could have sentenced Johnson to a lesser sentence. In addition, the loss of the entire transcript of the sentencing proceedings further supports resentencing. Based on these concerns, justice requires that the case be remanded for resentencing.

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