Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/222/444/
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 14:09:42+00:00

Document:
Southern Railway Co. v. Reid, ante, p. 222 U. S. 424, followed to effect that legislation of Congress in regard to matters of interstate commerce need not be inhibitive, but only to occupy the field, in order to supersede state statutes on the same subject. Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. Washington, ante, p. 222 U. S. 370.
This case is controlled by and decided on authority of Southern Railway Co. v. Reid, ante, p. 222 U. S. 424, notwithstanding certain differences in fact.
This case involves a consideration of the statute of North Carolina passed on in No. 487, and was argued and submitted with the latter case. The question, then, only is whether the principles there expressed apply to it.
The action was brought by defendants in error, a copartnership, against the plaintiff in error, a railway company and a common carrier, for penalties under the statute, which is set out in the opinion in No. 487, to recover the sum of $50 a day for fifteen days for failing and refusing for such time to receive a carload of shingles tendered to the company at Rutherfordton, North Carolina, for shipment to one James Haddox at Scottsville, Tennessee.
affirmed by the supreme court, two of the members of the court dissenting as in No. 487. 150 N.C. 753.
The statute is attacked on the same ground as in case No. 487. The facts, as recited by the supreme court, are as follows: defendants in error having received an order for a carload of shingles from Haddox at Scottsville, Tennessee, applied at Rutherfordton to the railway company for a car. It was furnished and loaded, shipping instructions given, prepayment of the freight tendered, and a bill of lading demanded. The agent of the company refused to give the bill of lading or ship the goods, assigning as a reason that he did not know where Scottsville was nor the road to it. Defendants in error demanded that the goods be shipped, and told the agent that they would pay any additional amount found to be due, and requested that, when the agent got ready to ship, to telephone them, and they would come over and pay the freight due. Another agent "came to take over the agency, and being told, on inquiry of plaintiffs (defendants in error), about the carload of shingles and what the trouble was," he asked for instructions, which were given him, and on July 19th the freight was paid, the bill of lading given, and the shingles shipped as directed, "arriving at their destination without further let or hindrance." Defendants in error testified that they had received no pecuniary injury by reason of the delay, and that the first agent "still had charge of the depot when the shingles were shipped."
railway company (plaintiff in error) had paid all of the employees of the Knoxville & Augusta Road their salaries.
"that the penalty [under the statute] accrues before the 'freight is accepted for transportation,' and on the principle applied in the case of Coe v. Errol, 116 U. S. 517."
"that the goods when tendered for transportation to another state, as to matters involved in such transportation, and in reference to these penalty statutes, should be considered and dealt with as interstate commerce,"
"in the absence of inhibitive congressional legislation, or of interfering action on the part of the Interstate Commerce Commission, the statute in question is a valid regulation in direct and reasonable enforcement of the duties incumbent on . . . [the railway company] as a common carrier."
We have shown in the opinion in No. 487 ante, p. 222 U. S. 424, that there need not be directly "inhibitive congressional legislation," but congressional legislation which occupies the field of regulation and thereby excludes action by the state. Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. State of Washington, ante, p. 222 U. S. 370.
"The presumption is that the company has complied with the law. And if it were otherwise, we are of opinion that the act of Congress, and the orders of the Commission made thereunder requiring the publication of rates, were made for an entirely different purpose from that involved in this inquiry, and do not constitute such interfering action. See Harrill v. Ry., 144 N.C. pp. 540-541."
We have set forth in No. 487 our reasons for holding otherwise.
MR. JUSTICE LURTON does not agree with the court as to the facts of this case, and for that reason does not think that it falls under No. 487. He therefore dissents.

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