Source: http://ny.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20180329_0000559.ENY.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 18:23:21+00:00

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THE CITY OF NEW YORK; VINCENT AGOSTINO; MICHAEL DICECCO; and RICKY ALEXANDER, Defendants.
Plaintiff Lashawn Burgess commenced this action for false arrest, denial of the right to a fair trial, and malicious prosecution under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as malicious prosecution and respondeat superior under New York State law against defendants the City of New York, and police officers Vincent Agostino, Michael DiCecco, and Ricky Alexander. (Am. Compl. (Doc. No. 13).) Defendants now move for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. (Mot. for Summ. J. (Doc. No. 42).) Burgess opposes the motion. (Pl.'s Opp'n (Doc. No. 48).) Because a jury could credit Burgess's version of what occurred on the night that he was arrested, summary judgment does not lie.
Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, interrogatories, admissions, and affidavits demonstrate that there are no genuine issues of material fact in dispute and that one party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). A genuine issue of material fact exists “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the evidence of the nonmovant “is to be believed” and the court must draw all “justifiable” or “reasonable” inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Id. at 255 (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-59 (1970)); see also Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 195 n.2 (2004). Once the moving party has satisfied its burden, “the nonmoving party must come forward with ‘specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial, '” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)), and “may not rely on conclusory allegations or unsubstantiated speculation, ” Scotto v. Almenas, 143 F.3d 105, 114 (2d Cir. 1998) (internal citations omitted). In other words, the nonmovant must offer “concrete evidence from which a reasonable juror could return a verdict in his favor.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. Where “the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment is warranted if the nonmovant fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to [its] case.” Nebraska v. Wyoming, 507 U.S. 584, 590 (1993) (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322) (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original). Thus, a “defendant moving for summary judgment must prevail if the plaintiff fails to come forward with enough evidence to create a genuine factual issue to be tried with respect to an element essential to its case.” Allen v. Cuomo, 100 F.3d 253, 258 (2d Cir. 1996) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48).
To state a claim for false arrest, a plaintiff must show that “(1) the defendant intended to confine the plaintiff, (2) the plaintiff was conscious of the confinement, (3) the plaintiff did not consent to the confinement, and (4) the confinement was not otherwise privileged.” Savino v. City of New York, 331 F.3d 63, 75 (2d Cir. 2003). A confinement is “privileged” when the arrest was based on probable cause. Torres v. Jones, 26 N.Y.3d 742, 759 (2016). Therefore, the existence of probable cause is an absolute defense to claims for false arrest. Jenkins v. City of New York, 478 F.3d 76, 84 (2d Cir. 2007).
“An officer has probable cause to arrest when he or she has knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information of facts and circumstances that are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that the person to be arrested has committed a crime.” Stansbury v. Wertman, 721 F.3d 84, 89 (2d Cir. 2013) (internal citations and alterations omitted). In determining whether an officer had probable cause, courts consider the totality of the circumstances, based on the facts available to the officer at the time of the arrest. Id. Where the question of whether an arresting officer had probable cause is dependent on a factual dispute, the issue should be decided by the jury. Murphy v. Lynn, 118 F.3d 938, 947 (2d Cir. 1997).
Taking the facts in the light most favorable to Burgess, a jury crediting his version of events could find that the officers lacked probable cause for his arrest. First, Burgess's mere proximity to “others independently suspected of criminal activity, does not, without more, give rise to probable cause.” Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91 (1979). This is true even when a person is arrested at a location known for drug sales, and when others in near proximity are found to be in possession of drugs. Flores v. City of Mount Vernon, 41 F.Supp.2d 439, 443-44 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (no probable cause to arrest bartender where owner had been selling cocaine from behind the bar, and patrons were found with cocaine).

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