Source: http://www.sportsandtaxation.com/2017/01/blanket-doping-bans-and-human-rights-does-a-blanket-ban-on-russian-athletes-competing-at-rio-2016-contravene-human-rights-law/
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 06:49:45+00:00

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This entry was posted on 04 Jan 2017 09:12, in GSLTR Vol.7. No. 4 December 2016 and tagged Doping, Olympic Games.
The Olympic Games, the greatest display of sporting ability in the world, is plagued by drug cheats and doping scandals. But our understanding of the scale and nature of modern-day doping dramatically changed in the build-up to the Rio Olympics and Paralympics. No longer were individuals cheating to gain an advantage over another competitor, but a whole nation of athletes was implicated by a government-led conspiracy.
On 18 July 2016, a report by Canadian law professor Richard McLaren (the McLaren Report) revealed the existence of a complex state-sponsored scheme of cover-up and deception by the Russian government, referred to as the “disappearing positives methodology”. He described a system whereby the Russian state “directed, controlled and oversaw the manipulation of athletes’ analytical results or sample swapping”. It is said by the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) that this scheme “represented the worst case of doping in the history of sport”.
The IOC and International Paralympic Committee (IPC) faced calls to take immediate action to ban all Russian athletes from Rio 2016. Their responses were starkly different, and led to claims of unfairness, illegality and breaches of human rights. The following analysis seeks to shed some light on the reasons for those differing responses and the legality of those decisions.
The Russian Olympic athletes avoided a blanket ban, but, unless they could prove that they had not benefitted from the state-sponsored doping cover-up, they would not be able to compete.
Ivan Balandin, a Russian rower, having been found by the International Rowing Federation (FISA) to be “implicated” in the doping scheme, sought a declaration that the IOC decision was illegal. The Panel of the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) considered the background to the IOC decision, and noted that “the aim of these criteria was to give an opportunity to those Russian athletes who were not implicated in the State-organised scheme to participate in the Rio Games”. There was nothing in the decision, according to the Panel, which violated the rules of natural justice or made the decision illegal.
In stark contrast to the IOC, on 7 August 2016, the IPC announced that it had suspended the membership of the Russian Paralympic Committee such that it would not be able to enter any athletes at Rio 2016. Although this ban was welcomed by many, several Russian government spokespersons and para-athletes considered this “blanket ban” to be grossly unfair. Indeed, one of the most prominent criticisms was that such a blanket ban was a breach of the athletes’ human rights.
Indeed, blanket bans are traditionally considered to be a disproportionate approach to limiting fundamental rights and thus unlawful. In Hirst v. United Kingdom (No.2), the European Court of Human Rights held that a blanket ban on all prisoners serving custodial sentences of the right to vote was a “general, automatic and indiscriminate restriction on a vitally important Convention right”; it was, therefore, disproportionate and a contravention of art. 3 of the European Convention. Similarly, in Thierry Delvigne v. Commune de Lesparre-Médoc, the Court of Justice of the European Union noted that limitations on the right to vote for prisoners must be “subject to the principle of proportionality, are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest”. In that case, the applicant had the opportunity to have that ban lifted, and, therefore, the ban was not a “blanket ban” and not unlawful.
However, when the Russian Paralympic Committee (RPC) challenged the IPC decision, CAS upheld the decision. Does CAS ignore the issue of proportionality when it comes to blanket bans? Or was the decision something other than a blanket ban?
On 7 August 2016, some sixteen days after initially notifying the RPC of suspension proceedings, the IPC suspended the membership of the RPC, and, with it, the ability to enter para-athletes into the Paralympic Games in Rio. Under the IPC Constitution, a member may be suspended for a failure to fulfil its obligations, including ensuring that “the spirit of fair play prevails” and contributing “to the creation of a drug free environment for all Paralympic athletes”. Although the CAS Panel were not satisfied that the RPC were complicit or involved in the scheme, it was plain that they were a passive bystander to the scheme and this was a breach of their obligations.
The key question for the Panel to answer, therefore, was whether the decision by the IPC to suspend the membership of the RPC – and consequently ban all Russian para-athletes from the Games – was a proportionate response to the identified violation. In other words, “whether the Decision served a legitimate purpose and was suitable, necessary and appropriate for the objective which it aims to achieve”. The RPC contended that the IPC could have adopted a “softer measure”, allowing clean athletes to compete such that the “blanket prohibition is not justified”.
In addition, the Panel considered that the fact that the damage was caused by such a systemic cover-up, and that there were no obvious alternative sanctions, led to the conclusion that the decision was not disproportionate. The IOC decision was irrelevant because the IOC constitutions and charters operate differently from those of the IPC. Not least, whereas the IOC devolved responsibility to individual international federations, the IPC itself is the international federation for ten Paralympic sports.
So, despite the balancing exercise that the CAS took at § 84 of its Award, as set out above, it seems this Award does not answer the question of whether a suspension of a national body, which amounts to a ban on all Russian competitors, is a breach of the human rights of the individual athletes.
Darya Klishina, a long jumper, was the only Russian track-and-field athlete to compete at the Rio Olympics 2016 following her successful challenge. The Drug Review Board had initially considered that she fell within the exceptional eligibility criteria (rule 22.1A), an exception to the presumption of guilt, having stayed outside Russia for a “sufficiently long period of time to provide substantial objective assurance of integrity”. The fact that she was subsequently implicated by the McLaren Report did not provide the DRB with a lawful basis to revisit its decision, as the rule provided for exceptional eligibility even where she was affected by the failures of the national federation. As such she was cleared to compete at Rio.
Despite the arguments deployed by WADA, the IOC and the IPC in the summer of 2016 that a strong message had to be sent out, there is a certain reluctance among sports’ governing bodies to sanction innocent athletes for the anti-doping rule violations of their cheating colleagues in team sports.
There is, nevertheless, a general reluctance to punish innocent athletes for the guilt of their cheating teammates.
It is notable that the two Awards of CAS – in respect to the IAAF and IPC bans – which aver that they do not take into account the rights of the individual athletes, nevertheless carry out a proportionality balancing exercise in respect of those rights and the sanction imposed. One might be entitled to assume that an appeal by an individual member of the Russian team against the IAAF or IPC decisions would still fail on the grounds that the suspension of the national federation was a proportionate response to the circumstances.
The protection of the individual rights of athletes to compete and the fight against doping and cheating in sport is a delicate and difficult balancing act for WADA and sports’ international governing bodies. The reluctance to punish innocent athletes should be applauded. The decision to ban an entire sporting nation from the biggest sporting event in the four-yearly calendar is an extreme and unusual step, but the McLaren Report is an unusual and extraordinary revelation. In the context of a state-run scheme to falsify doping reports, rendering every Russian athlete’s doping test results unreliable (although not positive), the decision is unsurprising.
Also, despite the protestations of many, the Awards discussed above indicate that CAS plainly consider the respective decisions of the IOC (to avoid a blanket ban but reverse the burden of proof) and the IPC (to suspend the RPC with the effect of banning all Russian para-athletes) to be lawful and proportionate responses to such an egregious and deceitful scheme.
 Barrister at 1 Crown Office Row, London. He is developing a practice specialising in human rights and public law, alongside clinical negligence and regulatory work. His experience includes cases involving sports law, international conflict of laws and jurisdictional issues, and medical, dental and professional disciplinary hearings. He has also worked on a variety of human rights cases and appeals before the High Court and Supreme Court. E-mail: gideon.barth@1cor.com.
 Barrister at 1 Crown Office Row, London, specialises in clinical negligence, regulatory and disciplinary law (especially in the healthcare, veterinary and sports spheres), sports law and serious personal injury (especially sports injuries). He has an even balance of claimant and defendant instructions in damages claims, but principally defends in regulatory hearings. In addition, he sits as a Recorder of the Crown Court. E-mail: richard.booth@1cor.com. Twitter: @DickBoothQC.
 CAS OG 16/21 Elena Anyushina & Alexey Korovashkov v. ICF & RCF, § 7.8.
 See, for example, “Former Olympians call for total Rio ban for Russia following doping report”, in: The Guardian, 18 July 2016, avialable at www.theguardian.com/sport/2016/jul/19/former-olympians-call-for-total-rio-ban-for-russia-following-doping-report (accessed on 30 October 2016).
 CAS OG 16/12 Ivan Balandin v. FISA & IOC, § 2.8.
 CAS OG 16/21 Elena Anyushina & Alexey Korovashkov v. ICF & RCF, § 7.20.
 The Fundamental Principles of Olympism, Preamble to the Olympic Charter, in force from 2 August 2016.
 “Russia given blanket Paralympic ban amid “medals over morals” criticism”, in: The Guardian, 8 August 2016, available at www.theguardian.com/sport/2016/aug/08/russia-blanket-paralympic-ban-medals-over-morals-rio-2016 (accessed on 30 October 2016).
 Akhzana Abdikarimova, Russian para-athlete, “Rio 2016 Paralympics: IPC risks “killing” Russian Para-sport with blanket ban”, in: BBC Sport, 12 August 2016, available at www.bbc.co.uk/sport/disability-sport/37052720 (accessed on 30 October 2016).
 Hirst v. United Kingdom (No.2), Case No. 74025/01, 6 October 2005.
 Thierry Delvigne v. Commune de Lesparre-Médoc (Case C-650/13).
 CAS 2016/A/4745 Russian Paralympic Committee (RPC) v. International Paralympic Committee (IPC), § 36.
 CAS 2016/A/4745 RPC v. IPC, § 82.
 CAS 2016 2016/A/4684 ROC, Lyukman and 67 Others v. IAAF.
 CAS OG 16/24 Darya Klishina v. IAAF.
 CAS 2004/A/593 Football Association of Wales (FAW) v. Union des Associations Européennes de Football (UEFA).
 CAS 2008/A/1545 Anderson, Clark, Miles-Clark, Edwards, Gaines, Hennagan, Richardson v. IOC.
 See, for example, International Biathlon Union Anti-Doping Rules, art. 11.1.

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