Source: http://legalarium.com/ttabquotes/UncleanHands.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 14:34:46+00:00

Document:
Hornblower & Weeks, Inc. v. Hornblower & Weeks, Inc., Opposition No. 110,043, (TTAB 2001).
Although poorly articulated, we view applicant's pleading as an attempt to set up an affirmative defense that opposer has "unclean hands." Assertion of the defense of unclean hands, though often based on allegations of fraud, misrepresentation of source, or violation of antitrust laws, "may result from any imaginable immoral or illegal conduct." See 3 J. Gilson Trademark Protection and Practice §8.12 (1999).
Allegation of unclean hands regarding registration only applies to plaintiff's ability to rely on its registration.
Where the conduct alleged to have resulted in unclean hands relates to a plaintiff's acquisition, or attempt to acquire, a registration, the unclean hands defense goes only to the plaintiff's ability to rely on its registration, not to its common law rights. See, e.g., Gilbert/Robinson Inc. v. Carrie Beverage-Missouri Inc., 758 F.Supp. 512, 526, 19 USPQ2d 1481, 1489 (E.D. Mo. 1991) (Even though a jury found that plaintiff had obtained its trademark registration fraudulently, the court held, "[n]onetheless, plaintiff is still entitled to protect its common law rights, and the doctrine of unclean hands does not act as a bar to that right.").
Where allegation in support of defense of unclean hands is based on improper conduct, the affirmative defense may also be considered in relation to (common law) rights acquired through use.
Unclean hands cannot be asserted as a ground for its notice of opposition.
Seculus Da Amazonia S/A v. Toyota Jidosha Kabushiki Kaisha t/a/ Toyota Motor Corporation, Opposition No. 152,062, (TTAB 2003).
While a party may allege unclean hands as an affirmative defense in a Board proceeding, there is no authority for opposer's assertion thereof as a ground for its notice of opposition.5 See Trademark Rule 2.106(b)(1) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b). See also Leatherwood Scopes International, Inc. v. James M. Leatherwood, 63 USPQ2d 1699 (TTAB 2002); and University Book Store v. University of Wisconsin Board of Regents, 33 USPQ2d 1385, 1401 n. 39 (TTAB 1994). FOOTNOTE 5 "Furthermore, to the extent that the allegations contained in the notice of opposition may be construed as asserting a cause of action grounded in unfair competition, it is well-settled that the Board is not authorized to determine the right to use, nor may it decide broader questions of infringement or unfair competition. See, for example, Person's Co. v. Christman, 900 F.2d 1565, 14 USPQ2d 1477 (Fed. Cir. 1990); and Paramount Pictures Corp. v. White, 31 USPQ2d 1768 (TTAB 1994)."
Case Finding: Hornblower case concerns use of unlean hands defense regarding fraudulent trading on reputation of others.
In this case, we find that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that as a matter of law applicant cannot succeed on the unclean hands defense that opposer is fraudulently trading on the reputation of others, i.e., applicant and/or its shareholders.
The affirmative defense of unclean hands, based on its contention that opposer adopted its mark with knowledge of applicant's reputation overseas does not raise an unclean hands defense.
Applicant also raised the affirmative defense of unclean hands, based on its contention that opposer adopted its mark with knowledge of applicant's reputation overseas. Such knowledge, even if proved, would not raise an unclean hands defense. See Person's Co, supra. On the other hand, applicant has neither pleaded nor established that its mark is well-known in the United States, within the meaning of Article 6bis of the Paris Convention. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, as rev. at Stockholm, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, Art. 6bis, 828 U.N.T.S. 305. See Aktieselskabet af 21. November 2001 v. Fame Jeans Inc., 77 USPQ2d 1861, 1864 (TTAB 2006).
Any registration issued under the Act of March 3, 1881, or the Act of February 20, 1905, or of a mark registered on the principal register provided by this chapter and owned by a party to an action shall be admissible in evidence and shall be prima facie evidence of the validity of the registered mark and of the registration of the mark, of the registrant's ownership of the mark, and of the registrant's exclusive right to use the registered mark in commerce on or in connection with the goods or services specified in the registration subject to any conditions or limitations stated therein, but shall not preclude another person from proving any legal or equitable defense or defect, including those set forth in subsection (b) of this section, which might have been asserted if such mark had not been registered.
(9) That equitable principles, including laches, estoppel, and acquiescence, are applicable.

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