Source: https://deutschland-und-die-welt-2030.de/en/endnotes/
Timestamp: 2019-02-23 19:12:13+00:00

Document:
Endnotes – 2030
Why We Are Unprepared for 2030
1 Anton Kleihues took part in this article.
2 The Chinain Africa Podcast is part of“The China Africa Project”, an integrated theme campaign with website and appearances on Facebook, Twitter and Instagram, www.chinaafricaproject.com
3 2017. Die Welt im Jahr 2035, gesehen von der CIA und dem National Intelligence Council, published by National Intelligence Council and Karin Schuler. München: C. H. Beck.
4 Fink, Larry. 2018. Annual Letter to CEOs–A Sense of Purpose. Blackrock.com, www. blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/ larry-fink-ceo-letter
5 Cf. Burmeister, Klaus, Andreas Neefand Bert Beyers. 2004. Corporate Foresight: Unternehmen gestalten Zukunft. Hamburg: Murmann.
6 Cf. Steinle, Claus, Friedel Ahlersand Christoph Rutter. 2000. Zukunftsforschung und Strategieentwicklung in Finanzdienstleistungsunternehmungen: Konzept, empirisches Schlaglicht und Gestaltungsoptionen. In Kredit und Kapital. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot. 33.2000, 4, 571–604;
7 The following, among others, could not provide any information Allianz, Axel Springer, Bayer, Bosch, Daimler, Deutsche Bahn, Lufthansa, Deutsche Telekom, Siemens.
8 Bundesministerium der Verteidigung. 2016. Weißbuch zur Sicherheitspolitik und Zukunft der Bundeswehr. www.bmvg.de/resource/ blob/13708/015be272f8c0098f1537a491676bfc31/ weissbuch2016-barrierefrei-data.pdf
9 Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (BMZ). 2018. Development Policy in 2032: Global Trends and Hypotheses on Future Development Cooperation. BMZ-Paper 2. Berlin: BMZ.
10 Future Scenarios for R&I Policies in Europe. The report describes a range of futures we might be facing in the 2030s. European Commission, ec.europa.eu/research/foresight/index.cfm
11 Commission for Consultation of Sector Councils (COS). 2008. Horizon Scan Report 2007: Towards a Future Oriented Policy and Knowledge Agenda. Den Haag: COS. stt.nl/stt/wp-content/ uploads/2013/02/STT-horizonscan_2007-rapport_ horizonscan_2007_EN-binnenwerk.pdf
12 Bundeskanzleramt(BKAmt):Normenkontrollrat, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Rat für nachhaltige Entwicklung, Deutscher Ethikrat, Regierungskommission Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex. Auswärtiges Amt (AA): Arbeitskreis Forum globale Fragen, Völkerrechtswissenschaftlicher Beirat, VN-politischer Beirat, Beirat “Zivile Krisenprävention”,DeutschesKomiteefür Katastrophenvorsorge. Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Soziales (BMAS): Sozialbeirat, Technische Ausschüsse im Arbeitsschutz, Ausschuss für Betriebssicherheit, Ausschuss für Arbeitsstätten, Ausschuss für Gefahrstoffe, Ausschuss für biologische Arbeitsstoffe, Ausschuss für technische Arbeitsmittel und Verbraucherprodukte, Beirat für die Teilhabe behinderter Menschen, Bundesausschuss der Kriegsbeschädigten- und Kriegshinterbliebenenfürsorge, Ärztlicher Sachverständigenrat, Sektion Versorgungsmedizin, Ärztlicher Sachverständigenrat “Berufskrankheiten”,Hauptausschuss für Mindestarbeitsentgelte. Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung (BMBF): Forschungsunion “Wirtschaft – Wissenschaft zu Technologieperspektiven für Zukunftsmärkte”, Beirat für Ausbildungsförderung, Gesundheitsforschungsrat, Innovationskreis Berufliche Bildung, Innovationskreis Weiterbildung. Bundesministerium für Ernährung, Landwirtschaft und Verbraucherschutz (BMELV): Wissenschaftlicher Beirat Verbraucher- und Ernährungspolitik, Wissenschaftlicher Beirat für Agrarpolitik, Beirat für Biodiversität und genetische Ressourcen, Wissenschaftlicher Beirat für Düngungsfragen, Deutsche Wissenschaftliche Kommission für Meeresforschung. Bundesministerium der Finanzen (BMF): Wissenschaftlicher Beirat. Bundesministerium für Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend (BMFSFJ): Bundesjugendkuratorium, Bundesprüfstelle für jugendgefährdende Medien, Stiftung Deutsch-Russischer Jugendaustausch gGmbH, Beirat für den Zivildienst, Wissenschaftlicher Beirat für Familienfragen, Bundesweite Arbeitsgruppe Frauenhandel, Bund-Länder-Arbeitsgruppe Häusliche Gewalt, Ausschuss für die Bundesjugendspiele. Bundesministerium für Gesundheit (BMG): Zulassungs- und Nachzulassungskommissionen für den humanmedizinischen und für den veterinärmedizinischen Bereich, Sachverstän- digenrat zur Begutachtung der Entwicklung im Gesundheitswesen, Nationaler AIDS-Beirat, Sachverständigenausschuss nach § 1 Abs. 2 des Betäubungsmittelgesetzes, Ständige Impfkommission am Robert Koch-Institut, Kommission für Krankenhaushygiene und Infektionsprävention am Robert Koch-Institut, Zentrale Ethik-Kommission für Stammzellenforschung, Arzneibuchkommissionen, Kommission für Arzneimittel für Kinder und Jugendliche, Sachverständigen Ausschüsse Standardzulassungen, Apothekenpflicht und Verschreibungspflicht, Wissenschaftlicher Beirat der Bundeszentrale für gesundheitliche Aufklärung, Ständiger Koordinierungsausschuss, Gemeinsamer wissenschaftlicher Beirat im Bundesministerium für Gesundheit. Bundesministerium des Innern (BMI): Sachverständigenausschuss für explosionsgefährliche Stoffe, Beschussrat, Beirat für schießsportliche Fragen, Strategischer Beirat für den Zivil- und Katastrophenschutz, Kommission zum Schutz der Zivilbevölkerung, Beirat bei der Bundesakademie für öffentliche Verwaltung, Beratender Ausschuss für Fragen der dänischen Minderheit, Beratender Ausschuss für Fragen des sorbischen Volkes, Beratende Ausschüsse für Fragen der niederdeutschen Sprachgruppe und der friesischen Volksgruppe, Beirat für Spätaussiedlerfragen, Beirat jüdische Zuwanderung, Beirat bei dem Sondervermögen “Versorgungsrücklage des Bundes nach § 11 Versorgungsrücklagegesetz”, Beirat Verwaltungsverfahrensrecht beim Bundesministerium des Innern. Bundesministerium der Justiz (BMJ): Bundesstelle zur Verhütung von Folter, Beirat für Verbraucherfragen. Bundesministerium für Umwelt (BMU): Sachverständigenrat für Umweltfragen, Wissenschaftlicher Beirat der Bundesregierung Globale Umweltveränderungen, Strahlenschutzkommission, Reaktorsicherheitskommission, Kommission für Anlagensicherheit, Umweltgutachterausschuss. Bundesministerium für Verkehr, Bau- und Stadtentwicklung (BMVBS): Wissenschaftlicher Beirat, Beirat für Raumordnung, Beirat Radverkehr, Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung. Bundesministerium der Verteidigung (BMVg): Beirat für Fragen der Inneren Führung, Beirat für die Bundesakademie für Sicherheitspolitik, Beirat für das Militärgeschichtliche Forschungsamt und die Museen, Wehrmedizinischer Beirat, Tierschutzkommission beim Bundesministerium der Verteidigung. Rüstungswirtschaftlicher Arbeitskreis, Ausschuss für Marinehydrodynamik, Ausschuss zur Minderung von Geräuschen auf Schiffen der Bundeswehr, Arbeitskreis Wehrdienst und Berufswelt. Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Technologie (BMWi): Akkreditierungsbeirat, Außenwirtschaftsbeirat, Mittelstandsbeirat, Monopolkommission, Tourismusbeirat, Wissen- schaftlicher Beirat. Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (BMZ): Wissenschaftlicher Beirat. Beratungsgremien ohne Ressortzuordnung, Beratende Kommission mit der Rückgabe NS-verfolgungsbedingt entzogener Kulturgüter, insbesondere aus jüdischem Besitz, Wissenschaftsrat. Zusammengestellt in WD 3 – 3000 – 327/10, Wissenschaftliche Beratungsgremien bei der Bundesregierung und im Bundestag. A more up-to-date list is not available.
13 Nentwich, Michael, Petra Schaper-Rinkel, Leo Capari et al. 2017. Foresight und Technikfolgenabschätzung: Monitoring von Zukunftsthemen für das österreichische Parlament. www.parlament.gv.at/SERV/FTA
14 Aktion “‘Stummer Frühling’. Erst sterben Biene & Co, dann die Auswahl. Joint action of the Ministry of the Environment of Lower Saxony, PENNY and NABU”, 14. May 2018.
The Transformation of the International Order
1 Cf. Ruggie, JohnG. (ed.). 1993. Multilateralism Matters. The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form. New York: Columbia University Press; Ruggie, John G. 1996. Winning the Peace. America and World Order in the New Era. New York: Columbia University Press; Bobbitt, Philip. 2002. The Shield of Achilles. War, Peace, and the Course of History. New York: Anchor Books.
2 Cf. Kissinger, HenryA. 1962. Großmachtdiplomatie. Von der Staatskunst Castlereaghs und Metternichs. Dusseldorf/Vienna: Econ Verlag; Gilpin, Robert. 1987. The Political Economy of International Relations. Princeton, N. J.: Prince- ton University Press; Schwaller, RandallL. 1999. The Problem of International Order Revisited: A Review Essay. In International Security, 26, No. 1: 161–186; Gilpin, Robert. 2000. The Challenges of Global Capitalism. The World Economy in the 21st Century. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press.
3 Cf. Bull, Hedley. 1977. The Anarchical Society. A Study of Order in World Politics. New York/ London: Columbia University Press; Craig, Gordon,andAlexanderGeorge.1984.Zwischen Krieg und Frieden. Konfliktlösung in Geschichte und Gegenwart. Munich: Beck Verlag.
4 Mandelbaum, Michael. 2002. The Ideas that Conquered the World. Peace, Democracy, and Free Markets in the Twenty-first Century. New York: Public A airs.
5 Cf. Gaddis, John Lewis. 1972. The United States and the Origins of the Cold War 1941–1947. New York: Columbia University Press; Stromberg, Roland N. 1963. Collective Security and American Foreign Policy. New York: Praeger.
6 Cf. Trachtenberg, Marc. 1999. A Constructed Peace. The Making of the European Settlement 1945–1963. Princeton: Princeton University Press; Ikenberry, G. John. 2001. A er Victory. Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuild- ing of Order After Major Wars.Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press; Ikenberry, G. John. 2011. Liberal Leviathan. The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
7 Cf. Zartman, I.William(ed.). 2009. Imbalance of Power. US Hegemony and International Order. Boulder, Col./London: Lynne Riener.
8 Cf. Steil, Benn. 2018. The Marshall Plan. Dawn of the Cold War. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
9 Cf. Krause, Joachim. 2017. Die neue Zeitenwende in den internationalen Beziehungen: Konsequenzen für deutsche und europäische Politik. In Sirius – Zeitschrift für strategische Analysen, 1(1): 3–24.
10 Cf. Adomeit, Hannes. 2017. Innenpolitische Determinanten der Putinschen Außenpolitik. In Sirius – Zeitschrift für strategische Analysen, 1(1):33–52.
11 Cf. Krause, Joachim. 2013. The United Nation’s Role in Preserving Peace. In Routledge Handbook on the European Union and International Institutions, published by Knud Erik Jørgensen and Katie Verlin Laatikainen, 141–156. London: Routledge.
12 Cf. Krause, Joachim, and Natalino Ronzitti (eds.). 2012. The EU, the UN and Collective Security. Making Multilateralism Effective. London/New York: Routledge.
13 Own translation based on Bundesregierung. 2016. Weißbuch zur Sicherheitspolitik und zur Zukunft der Bundeswehr. 30f. Berlin: Bundesministerium der Verteidigung.
Ayad Al-Ani and Jörg Stenzel
Defence Platforms as Armed Forces of the Future
1 On the massive effects of digitisation on the economies of the South: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). 2016. Policy Brief No. 50. Robots and Industrialization in Developing Countries.UNCTAD, accessed 6. November 2017, www.unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/presspb2016d6_en.pdf.
2 Al-Ani, A., and W.Petritsch. 2017. Using the Crowd to Detect and Resolve Conflicts. In Administration Publica Vol. 25, 3 / 2017: 5–27, 13 .
3 For instance, the example of the Peace Factory platform, which connects Iranian and Israeli citizens and enables a new discourse away from the political lines of conflict.: Peace Factory, accessed: 6 November 2017, www.thepeacefactory. org. Without such a component, which can “override” or circumvent unwilling opponents or bring previously unheard voices into the conflict, a military platform in the newer sense cannot be created: “We need to develop robust counter-concepts to the war machine: the paramount task is to counter the representation and continuation of violence through infowar with a new concept for the prevention and resolution of conflict (…).” (Der Derian, J. 2009. Virtuous War. Mapping the Military-Industrial Media-Entertainment Network. 245. New York.).
4 On the services in the field of education and safety, which run in this “Crowdmodus” and turn those affected into producers cf. Al-Ani and Petritsch 2017, 18 .
5 Here a platform would be conceivable, which, similar to the platform“Beteiligungskompass” of the Bertelsmann Stiftung, www. beteiligungskompass.org, proposes decisionmaking processes and procedures and also moderates them or connects affected parties with each other, thus facilitating learning processes.
6 Cf. Turse, N. 2017. Pentagon Video Warns of Unavoidable Dystopian Future for the World’s Biggest Cities. The Intercept, accessed 6 November 2017, www.theintercept.com/2016/10/13/pentagon- video-warns-of-unavoidable-dystopian-future- for-worlds-biggest-cities
7 Platforms must be able to“(…)accompany and shape military actions in the informationspace in order to influence the ‘enemy’s will’. This also includes the ability to work together with others as an independent or accompanying operation in the information space.” (author team Kdo H II 1 (2). 2017. Thesenpapier. Wie kämpfen Landstreitkräfte künftig? 9. Pivot Area, accessed 6 November 2017,, www.pivotarea.eu/wp-content/ uploads/2017/09/OOO.pdf ).
8 “In the short term, advances in AI will likely allow more autonomous robotic support to warfighters and accelerate the shift from manned to unmanned combat missions.” (Allen, G., and T. Chan. 2017. Artificial Intelligence and National Security. 16. Cambridge / Mass.: Belfer Center for Science and International A airs.)
9 Jeschke, S .2015. Kybernetik und die Intelligenz verteilter Systeme. Nordrhein-Westfalen auf dem Weg zum Digitalen Industrieland. In Exploring Cybernetics. Kybernetik im interdisziplinären Diskurs, published by S. Jeschke et al., 277–370, 279. Wiesbaden.
10 Also: Al-Ani, A. 2017. CPS and the Worker. Reorientation and Requalification. In Industrial Internet of Things, published by S. Jeschke et al., 563–574. Wiesbaden.
11 See, for example, the US Navy’s attempts to “print out” entire parts of submarines: Liptak, A. 2017. The US Navy 3D Printed a Concept Submersible in Four Weeks. ‘Fleet-capable prototypes’ could be available for use by 2019. The Verge, accessed 6. November 2017, www.theverge. com/2017/7/29/16062608/us-navy-3d-printing- submersible-manufacturing-military
12 For various experiments / projects with so ware agents see cf. So ware Agents Group. MIT Media Lab, accessed 10 June 2018, agents. media.mit.edu.
13 Cf. Steele, R. D. 2012. The Open Source Everything Manifesto: Transparency, Truth, and Trust. Berkeley; Politics, A. 2003. The Citizen as ‘Intelligence Minuteman’. In International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 16, 2003: 34–38.
14 Here, military platforms will probably behave no differently from civilian platforms, which also have a tendency to form monopolies in order to collect data as comprehensive as possible and offer additional services: Srnicek, N. 2017. Platform Capitalism. 93 . Cambridge.
15 The Wikistrat platform provides access to thousands of policy experts who can deal with geopolitical challenges of all kinds, accessed 6 November 2017, www.wikistrat.com.
16 Here the national “Next Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan” of the People’s Republic of China is instructive: “Notably, this new plan explicitly highlights an approach of military-civil fusion (or civil-military integration) to ensure that advances in AI can be rapidly leveraged for national defense. Certain next generation AI technologies that have been prioritized will likely be used to enhance China’s future military capabilities. For instance, China intends to pursue advances in big data, human-machine hybrid intelligence, swarm intelligence, and automated decision-making, along with in autonomous unmanned systems and intelligent robotics. Accordingly, China seeks to ensure that scientific and technological advances can be readily turned to dual-use applications, while military and civilian innovation resources will be ‘constructed together and shared’.” (Kania, E. 2017. China’s Artificial Intelligence Revolution. A New AI Development Plan Calls for China to Become the World Leader in the Field by 2030. The Diplomat, accessed 6 November 2017, www.thediplomat.com/2017/07/ chinas-artificial-intelligence-revolution).
17 Srnicek 2017, 93 .
18 The Hague Center for Strategic Studies. 2017. Artificial Intelligence and the Future of Defense. Implications for Small and Medium Sized Force Providers. 76 f. Den Haag.
20 Ultimately, ML is about inductive reasoning: from examples to the whole or the context. Sometimes the solution can be calculated analytically, sometimes numerical methods and simulations or optimizations are used. The focus of ML here is on optimization: Each question is translated into a target function that is optimized with regard to the constraints. The optimum is the solution to the learning task. A very operative definition of ML was made by Mitchell: “A computer program is said to learn from experience E with respect to some class of tasks T and performance measure P, if its performance at tasks in T, as measured by P improves with experience E.” (Mitchell, T. 1997. Machine Learning. 2. Maidenhead).The more experience E we have, the better we can solve the task T (measured by power P).
21 Cf. Steele2012;Politi 2003.
22 Further relief is achieved through the use of autonomous and semi-autonomous machines. Analogous to the “Industry 4.0” concept, these machines can operate independently within the framework of their programming and place less strain on the central control circuit: “The agents ‘represent’ an entity or a specific task in the overall system. They negotiate the solution autonomously with each other, typically ‘with- out masterbrain’. They have the ability to absorb environmental information and thus act in a changing environment. They always have a local perspective, i.e. no agent has the full system overview. The approach assumes that global system knowledge is neither possible nor useful in systems of high complexity and a multitude of dynamic changes – instead, the carriers of the local information must communicate with each other and enter into negotiations. As a rule, there is no common memory for the individual entities.” Own translation (Jeschke 2015, 302f.)
23 See the Pentagon Directive, which regulates the use of lethal machines: United States Department of Defense. 2012 Directive 3000.09. Executive Services Directorate, accessed 6 November 2017, www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/ Documents/DD/issuances/dodd/300009p.pdf
24 “Like humans pushed out of labor markets by cheaper and better robotic workers, owners will be pushed out of capital markets by much cheaper and better robotic decision makers.” (Moravec, H. 1999. Robot. Mere Machine to Transcendent Mind. 133. New York.) Too early attempts of cybernetic control at the national level (Chile) for example: Medina, E. 2011. Cybernetic Revolutionaries. Technology and Politics in Allende’s Chile. London. On the first steps in ML’s control of military decisions in the Vietnam War for example: Madriga, C. 2017. The Computer that Predicted the U. S. Would Win the Vietnam War. A Cautionary Tale about the Dangers of Big Data. The Atlantic, accessed 6 November 2017, www. theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/10/ the-computer-that-predicted-the-us-would-win- the-vietnam-war/542046
25 Ferguson, A. 2017. The Rise of Big Data Policing. Surveillance, Race, and the Future of Law enforcement. 1f. New York.
26 This is probably also how the Russian president’s statement on ML and AI should be understood: “Whoever becomes the leader in this sphere (AI), will become the ruler of the world.” (Vincent, J. 2017. Putin says the nation that leads in AI ‘will be the ruler of the world’. The Russian president warned that arti cial intelligence o ers ‘colossal opportunities’ as well as dangers. The Verge, accessed 6. November 2017, www.theverge.com/2017/9/4/16251226/ russia-ai-putin-rule-the-world)
27 AllenandChan2017,11.
28 Rosenberg, S. 2017. Firewalls Don’t Stop Hackers. AI Might. Wired, accessed 6. November 2017, www.wired.com/story/ rewalls-dont-stop-hackers-ai-might.
29 Shane,S.,etal. 2018. How a Pentagon Contract Became an Identity Crisis for Google. The New York Times, 30.5.2018, accessed 12 June 2018, www.nytimes.com/2018/05/30/technology/ google-project-maven-pentagon.html
30 Franklin,H.B. 2008. WarStars. The Superweapon and the American Imagination. 207. Amherst.
31 Tesla. N. 1900. The Problems of Increasing Human Energy with Special References to the Harnessing of the Sun’s Energy. In Century Illustrated Magazine, June: 177–211, 184f.
32 Cf.Grossmann, D. 2009. On Killing. The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society. New York. For a discussion and criticism of these gures, cf. Gray, C. H. 1997. Post Modern War. The New Politics of Conflict. 201. New York. For the open letter of US-American drone pilots see: Drohnenpiloten erheben Vorwürfe gegen Obama. Zeit Online, 15 November 2015, accessed 6 November 2017, www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2015-11/ drohnen-piloten-offener-brief-obama
33 At the moment there seems to be an almost laboratory-like situation for ML warfare: “I remember doing one of thei nterviews with an Air Force offcer and asking him, ‘What do you think the experience of a predator drone attack is like?’ And he said: ‘You know, it’s probably like the opening scene of the Terminator movies, where the humans are hiding out in caves and the bunkers, and this sort of relentless robotic foe is coming at them. That’s what I bet it’s like for the Al-Qaeda and Taliban.’” (Sirius, R. U. 2015. Transcendence. The Disinformation Encyclopaedia of Transhumanism and the Singularity. 259. San Francisco.) This assessment of the effects was confirmed by extensive interviews in the affected areas: “US drone strike policies cause considerable and under-accounted-for harm to the daily lives of ordinary civilians, beyond death and physical injury. Drones hover twenty-four hours a day over communities in northwest Pakistan, striking homes, vehicles, and public spaces without warning. Their presence terrorizes men, women, and children, giving rise to anxiety and psychological trauma among civilian communities. Those living under drones have to face the constant worry that a deadly strike may be red at any moment, and the knowledge that they are powerless to protect themselves.” (Stanford Law School and NYU School of Law. 2012. Living Under Drones. Death, Injury, and Trauma to Civilians from US Drone Practices in Pakistan. VI. Center for Human Rights and Global Justice, accessed 6 November 2017, www.chrgj.org/wp-content/ uploads/2012/10/Living-Under-Drones.pdf ). On the initiative of Silicon Valley protagonists to restrict killing robots: Ghose, T. 2017. Elon Musk: Regulate AI Before Robots Start ‘Killing People’. Live Science, accessed 6 November 2017: www. livescience.com/59826-elon-musk-wants-ai- regulated.html
34 Eshel,T. 2015. Russian Military to Test Combat Robots in 2016. Defense Update, accessed 6 November 2017, www.defense-update. com/20151231_russian-combat-robots.html
35 On this military cynicism cf. Sloterdijk, P. 1983. Kritik der zynischen Vernunft . 416 . Frankfurt a. M.
36 About the Middle East: “[T]he Israeli dotcom generation seems not to have the stomach for mortal combat. They have started to ask why they should risk their lives when precision weapons can reduce war to a video game. For the pony-tailed youth of Tel Aviv’s night spots, the war in Lebanon was becoming their Vietnam and they would rather their government fought it by remote control.” (Daily Telegraph, 23 May 2000, quoted from: Der Derian, J. 2000. Virtuous War / Virtual Theory. In International A airs 76 (4), October 2000: 771–788, 773.) The military historian Keegan predicted this development in an almost prophetic way as early as the 1970s. He suspected that the experienced cruelties of open battles would lead to a rethink, especially among the younger generation, and that he could also anticipate the asymmetric conflicts: “The young have made their decision. They are increasingly unwilling to serve as conscripts in armies they see as ornamental. The militant young have taken their decision a stage further. They will fight for a cause they profess not through mechanisms of state and its armed power but, where necessary, against them, by clandestine and guerrilla methods. It remains for armies to admit that battles of the future will fought in never-neverland.” (Keegan, J. 1976. The Face of Battle. A Study of Agincourt, Waterloo and the Somme. 343. London.).
37 “We can rattle off casual tyrates of prototypical virtuous conflicts like the Gulf war (270 Americans lost their lives–more than half through accidents), the Mogadishu raid (18 Americans killed), and the Kosovo air campaign (barring accidents, a remarkable zero casualty conflict for the NATO forces). Yet, in spite of valorous efforts by human rights organizations, most people would probably come up short on acceptable gures for the other side of the casualty list. Post-Vietnam, the United States has made many digital advances; public body counts of the enemy are not one of them.” (Der Derian 2000, 772.)
38 Franklin2008,3.
39 Sloterdijk 1983,421.
40 Cf., for example, the planned Chinese system for controlling the economy, but also for individuals via a central social credit scoring system: Meissner,M.2017.China’s Social Credit System. A Big-Data Enabled Approach to Market Regulation with Broad Implications for Doing Business in China. Berlin.
41 Al-Ani,A., and J. Stenzel, 2018. Die Zukunft verteidigen. In Cicero4/2018,90–95,94.
42 For the link between CI and foreign policy tools, see: Scott, B., S. Heumann and P. Lorenz. 2018. Artificial Intelligence and Foreign Policy. Berlin.
43 “Immensely powerful reasoning and simulation modules will plan complex actions, but the desirability of possible outcomes will be defined by much simpler positive and negative conditioning modules. The conditioning suite will shape the character of the entire entity by defining its likes and dislikes. A company will be as unlikely to do something triggering strong negative signals as a human would be to thrust an arm in re. If the superrational style of intelligent machines works out, robot character may instead reside in an elaborate body of axioms, contrived to be inconsistent with prohibited behaviours.” (Moravec 1999, 140.)
The Next Europe. The EU as a Power for Formative Action
1 Schwarzer,Daniela. 2017. Europe, the End of the West and Global Power Shifts. In Global Policy 8: 18–26, 23–24.
2 EuropeanCommission.2017.Designing Europe’s future. Special Eurobarometer 461, April 2017. 43. ec.europa.eu/commfrontoce/publicopinion/index.cfm/Survey/ getSurveyDetail/instruments/SPECIAL/ surveyKy/2173.
3 Müller, Bettina, Marianne Haase, Axel Kreienbrink and Susanne Schmid. 2012. Klimamigration: Definitionen, Ausmaß und politische Instrumente in der Diskussion. Working Paper 45. Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge. www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/DE/ Publikationen/WorkingPapers/wp45-klimamigration.pdf?__blob=publicationFile.
Forced Migration. Refugees, Asylum Seekers and Internally Displaced Persons
1 Data of the UNHCR Population Statistics Database, rounded values, accessed 18 August 2018, www.popstats.unhcr.org/en/overview
A Region of Conflict and Crisis in Europe’s Neighbourhood.
1 Asarule, adistinctionis made between three subregions: North Africa, the Levant and the Persian Gulf countries. The OECD member Israel occupies a special position. However, the individual countries also differ considerably in other respects, such as per capita income, development status, natural resources, the political system, population composition and stability. The spectrum ranges from resource-rich countries with a high standard of living (Qatar, United Arab Emirates) to underdeveloped countries (Yemen) and from relatively stable regimes (Saudi Arabia) to states that have been destabilised lastingly by international interven- tionsorcivilwars(Yemen,Syria,Iraq,Libya).
2 Countries taken into consideration are: Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Western Sahara, and Yemen. See United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. 2017. World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision – Special Aggregates, accessed 26 June 2018, esa.un.org/unpd/wpp
3 Cf. United Nations Development Programme. 2016. Youth and the Prospects for Human Development in a Changing Reality. Arab Human Development Report (AHDR), 74 ., accessed 26 June 2018, www.arab-hdr.org/reports/2016/ english/AHDR2016En.pdf
4 The World Bank. 2017. ILO Labour Force Estimates and Projections, accessed 26 June 2018, data.worldbank.org/indicator/ SL.TLF.CACT. FE.ZS?locations=DZ-BH
5 For more detail see Asseburg, Muriel. 2011. Der Arabische Frühling. Herausforderung und Chance für die deutsche und europäische Politik. In SWP Studie S 17. Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP). For corresponding indicators, see also the table in the appendix on pages 34–39.
6 BP. 2017. BP Statistical Review of World Energy. June 2017, 13, accessed 26 June 2018, www. bp.com/content/dam/bp/en/corporate/pdf/ energy-economics/statistical-review-2017/ bp-statistical-review-of-world-energy-2017- oil.pdf; statista. 2018. Oil consumption in the Middle East from 1990 to 2017, accessed 26 June 2018, www.statista.com/statistics/264375/ oil-consumption-in-the-middle-east; Clemente, Jude. 2015. The Middle East’s Growing Oil Demand Problem. Forbes, 29 March 2015, accessed 26 June 2018, https://www.forbes.com/ sites/judeclemente/2015/03/29/the-middle-easts- growing-oil-demand-problem/#27a2eb2d44af
7 SaudiVision2030,accessed26June2018, vision2030.gov.sa/en; Qatar National Vision 2030, accessed 26 June 2018, www.mdps.gov.qa/ en/qnv1/pages/default.aspx
8 Cf. The graph on military spending Müller, Ruth, Stephan Sievert and Reiner Klingholz. 2016. Krisenregion Mena. Berlin: Berlin-Institut für Bevölkerung und Entwicklung, 5.
9 Cf. in more detail Asseburg, Muriel, Wolfram Lacher and Mareike Transfeld. 2018. Mission Impossible? UN Vermittlung in Libyen, Syrien und dem Jemen. SWP Studie S 12. Berlin: SWP.
10 Cf. in more detail Asseburg, Muriel. 2018. TheEasternMediterraneanDynamicsand the Evolving War in Syria. In The Eastern Mediterranean: New Dynamics and Potential for Cooperation, Joint Policy Study 9, published by Nimrod Goren et. al., 60–82. Barcelona: EuroMeS Co/Iemed.
11 Cf. Heydemann, Steven. 2018. Beyond fragility: Syria and the challenges of reconstruction in erce states. Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution.
12 Heidelberg Institut for International Con ict (HIIK). 2018. Con ict Barometer 2017. Heidelberg, www.hiik.de/konfliktbarometer/aktuelle-ausgabe
13 Cf. Asseburg, Muriel. 2009. Naher und Mittlerer Osten: Regionale (Un)Sicherheit seit dem 11. September 2001. In Internationale Politik als Überlebensstrategie, published by Mir A. Ferdowsi, 445-471. Munich: Bayerische Landes- zentrale für politische Bildungsarbeit.
14 Perthes, Volker. 2004. Naher und Mittlerer Osten. Unvollständige Regimebildung und die Suche nach regionaler Sicherheit. In Sicherheit und Frieden zu Beginn des 21. Jahrhunderts. Konzeptionen – Akteure – Regionen, published by Mir A. Ferdowsi. , 461–475, 470. Munich: Bayerische Landeszentrale für politische Bildungsarbeit.
15 Cf. Asseburg, Muriel, and Guido Steinberg. 2007. Konfliktdynamik im Nahen und Mittleren Osten. In Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 19, 2007.
16 Asseburg, Muriel. 2018. Die Palästinensische Autonomiebehörde und die Hamas-Regierung: Erfüllungsgehilfen der Besatzung? In Akteure des israelisch-palästinensischen Konflikts, published by Peter Lintl, 31–47. Berlin: SWP.
17 Cf. Zakaria, Sherouk. 2018. UN Official: UNRWA facing “most severe crisis” a er Trump’s aid cut. The Jerusalem Post, 6 March 2018, accessed 2 July 2018, www.jpost.com/Middle-East/UN-Official-UNRWA-facing-most-severe-crisis-a er- Trumps-aid-cut-544322
18 United Nations Country Team in Palestine. 2012. Gaza in 2020 – A liveable place? UNRWA, accessed 2 July 2018, www.unrwa.org/user les/ le/publications/gaza/Gaza%20in%202020.pdf
19 Asseburg, Muriel. 2017. “Shrinking Spaces” in Israel. SWP-Aktuell 2017 / A 61, August 2017. Berlin: SWP. 20 Asseburg,Muriel,andHeikoWimmen. 2015. Die bittere Ernte des Arabischen Frühlings – Transformation, Elitenwandel und neue soziale Mobilisierung. SWP Studie 22, December 2015. Berlin: SWP.
Germany. Finding a Balance Beyond Westbindung
1 See Szabo, Stephen F. 2015. Germany, Russia, and the Rise of Geo-Economics. London: Bloomsbury.
2 Bundesregierung. 2012. Globalisierunggestalten – Partnerschaften ausbauen – Verantwortung teilen: Konzept der Bundesregierung 4; see also Bagger, Thomas. 2013. The Networked Diplomat. In Internationale Politik 3 (August).
3 The Pacific Pivot was announced by the Obama Administration not by Trump. See Campbell, KurtM. 2016. The Pivot: The Future of American Statecraft in Asia. New York: Twelve.
4 As a number of German leaders, including Chancellor Merkel and Foreign Minister Gabriel, stated in 2017, this has now fundamentally changed and the changes in America’s relationship with Europe will go beyond the Trump presidency. For more on the continuities in Trump’s policies with prewar American policies see Wright, Thomas. 2016. Trump’s 19th Century Foreign Policy. In Politico, 20 January 2016, www. politico.com/magazine/story/2016/01/ 350
donald-trump-foreign-policy-213546; Kupchan, Charles A. 2018. The Clash of Exceptionalisms. In Foreign A airs, No. 97/2 (March/April): 139–148.
1 Rudd, Kevin. 2018. Understanding China’s Rise Under Xi Jinpin, Sinocism China Newsletter, accessed 8 June 2018, nb.sinocism.com/p/understanding-chinas-rise-under-xi-jinping-by- the-honourable-kevin-rudd.
2 see Fishman ,Edward. 2017. Even Smarter Sanctions. How to Fight in the Era of Economic Warfare. In Foreign A airs Vol. 96 (6): 102–110.
3 Fritsch, Manuel, Thorsten Lang and Edgar Schmitz. 2018. Industrie in Europa: Gutachten im Auftrag des Bundesverbands der Deutschen Industrie e.V.. Köln: IW Consult GmbH.
1 World Health Organization (WHO). 2017. Global Health Observatory data repository, accessed 9. July 2018, apps.who.int/gho/data/view.main.81605?lang=en
Major Challenges for the Global Economy
1 I would like to express my sincerest thanks for the extensive support by the staff of the German Council of Economic Experts, especially by Sebastian Breuer, and the constructive remarks of Wim Kösters.
2 This statement is an exemplary result of a conversion of the respective income per capita into purchasing-power parity of 1985 with a poverty line of two US dollars per capita, see for example German Council of Economic Experts (SVR). 2017. Towards a Forward-Looking Economic Policy. Annual Report 2017/18, Chapter 7: Stopping protectionism, supporting structural change. Wiesbaden.
3 W. Abelshauser describes the German route for economic policy as “a strategy of a regulatory policy of the visible hand”: Abelshauser, W. 2016. Einleitung: Der deutsche Weg der Wirtschaftspolitik. In Das Bundeswirtschaftsministerium in der Ära der Sozialen Marktwirtschaft: Der deutsche Weg der Wirtschaftspolitik, published by W. Abelshauser, 1-21. Berlin/ Boston: de Gruyter.
4 The German Council of Economic Experts has discussed the economic consequences of the demographic change of Germany extensively and updated its analysis in the following years, see SVR. 2011. Herausforderungen des demografischen Wandels: Expertise im Auftrag der Bundesregierung. Wiesbaden.
5 Furthermore, the stability of the social protection system is under threat by a decreasing number of contributors facing an increasing number of beneficiaries. So there has to be a discussion on extending the working life in the period beyond 2030. However, this article does not go into further detail on the matter.
6 That this cannot be taken for granted, becomes apparent with the German ‘productivity paradox’ – a leading role in the development of ‘Industry 4.0’ and high investment in digitalization have not yet resulted in a noteworthy increase of labour productivity, see Elstner, S., L. P. Feld, and Ch. M. Schmidt. 2018. The German Productivity Paradox: Facts and Explanations. Mimeo.
7 See for example Hightech-Forum. 2017. Gute Ideen zur Wirkung bringen: Umsetzungsimpulse des Hightech-Forums zur Hightech-Strategie. Berlin.
8 Representative for economic historical literature, see Clark, G. 2007. A Farewell to Alms: A Brief Economic History of the World. Princeton/ Oxford: Princeton University Press; Mokyr, J. 2017. A Culture of Growth: The Origins of the Modern Economy. Princeton/Oxford: Princeton University Press.
9 For the contribution of proactive training efforts in mastering more complex activities, see Görlitz, K., and M. Tamm. 2016a. The returns to voucher financed training on wages, employment and job tasks. In Economics of Education Review 52: 51–62.
10 The cumulative nature of educational efforts is likely to create considerable path dependencies. This is shown, for example, by differences in further training participation according to educational background: Görlitz, K., and M. Tamm. 2016b. Revisiting the Complementarity between Education and Training – The Role of Job Tasks and Firm Effects. In Education Economics 24 (3): 261–279.
11 Corresponding proposals have been developed by the Hightech-Forum (see Hightech-Forum 2017), which has been initiated by the German government to scientifically substantiate its high-tech strategy.
12 For an account of the debate on the income distribution in Germany, see Feld, L. P., and Ch. M. Schmidt. 2016. Jenseits der schrillen Töne: Elemente für eine rationale Diskussion über die Ungleichheit von Einkommen und Vermögen in Deutschland. In Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik 17 (2): 188–205.
13 Data of the EIA, German Federal Statistical Office, World Bank, and own calculations.
14 Group ‘high income’ pursuant to the definition of the World Bank. There are in total seventy-eight economies with a gross national income per capita of more than USD 12,235 in 2016.
15 Group ‘middle income’ pursuant to the definition of the World Bank. There are in total 109 economies with a gross national income per capita between USD 1,006 and USD 12,235 in 2016, amongst other China, Brazil, Russia, and India. 16 Residual value, which includes a proportion of developing countries as well as statistical inconsistencies.
17 Forecast of the United Nations (UN).
18 EC – emerging countries (‘middle income’) and DC – developed countries (‘high income’) pursuant to the definition of the World Bank. DE – Germany.
19 Share of the respective total population.
20 National values. Former Federal territory until 1990. 1970 to 1990: classification of the economic sectors, 2003 edition (WZ 2003). As of 1990: classification of the economic sectors, 2008 edition (WZ 2008).
21 Agriculture, forestry, and shery.
22 Production industry.
23 Services and other economic sectors.
24 Real gross domestic product per working hour. The values of the former Federal territory have been extrapolated in reverse based on the rate of change.
25 As of 2016 estimated values. For Germany, it is assumed that the goal of only producing forty-five per cent of 1990 CO2 emissions is reached by 2030. The assumed adjustment path is linear.
26 A team of interdisciplinary scientists (Rockström, J., W. Ste en, K. Noone, Å. Persson, F. S. Chapin III, E. F. Lambin, T. M. Lenton, M. Scheffer, C. Folke, H. J. Schellnhuber, B. Nykvist, C. A. de Wit, T. Hughes, S. van der Leeuw, H. Rodhe, S. Sörlin, P. K. Snyder, R. Costanza, U. Svedin, M. Falkenmark, L. Karlberg, R. W. Corell, V. J. Fabry, J. Hansen, B. Walker, D. Liverman, K. Richardson, P. Crutzen and J. A. Foley. 2009. A safe operating space for humanity. In Nature 461: 472–475) has developed limits for ten dimensions based on the concept of “planetary boundaries”, such as biodiversity or CO2 concentration in the atmosphere. A transgression of these limits could lead to irreversible and abrupt environmental changes. In the case of CO2 concertation, this threshold has already been exceeded.
27 Here it is important to avoid a confusion of objectives and instruments. Increasing the share of renewable resources in energy supply and the effcient use of energy are instruments on the way to reducing emissions, however, they are not meaningful targets in their own right, see Bradshaw, A., U. Erdmann, W. Münch, K. Pittel, C. Rehtanz, K. Sedlbauer, E. Umbach and U. Wagner. 2015. Priorisierung der Ziele – Zur Lösung des Konflikts zwischen Zielen und Maßnahmen der Energiewende. Schriften- reihe Energiesysteme der Zukunft. Nationale Akademie der Wissenschaften Leopoldina, acatech – Deutsche Akademie der Technikwissenschaften, Union der deutschen Akademien der Wissenschaften. Munich.
28 For an extensive discussion of the relations, see SVR. 2016. Zeit für Reformen, Jahresgutachten 2016/17, Chapter 11: Energiewende: Umsteuern zu einer globalen Klimapolitik. Wiesbaden.
29 The planned-economy and thus economically inefficient design of the German energy transition connected with its implementation as a project of national industrial policy has been strongly criticized in the economic literature for years, see SVR. 2009. Die Zukunft nicht aufs Spiel setzen, Jahresgutachten 2009/10, Chapter 6: Industriepolitik: Marktprozesse wirken lassen und Innovationen ermöglichen. Wiesbaden; or acatech – Deutsche Akademie der Technikwissenscha en. 2012. Die Energiewende finanzierbar gestalten: Effiziente Ordnungspolitik für das Energiesystem der Zukunft. Heidelberg: Springer.
30 This approach has been discussed among others by acatech – Deutsche Akademie der Technikwissenschaften, Nationale Akademie der Wissenschaften Leopoldina and Union der deutschen Akademien der Wissenschaften. 2015. Die Energiewende europäisch integrieren: Neue Gestaltungsmöglichkeiten für die gemeinsame Energie- und Klimapolitik. Munich; acatech – Deutsche Akademie der Technikwissenschaften, Nationale Akademie der Wissenschaften Leopoldina and Union der deutschen Akademien der Wissenschaften. 2017. Stellungnahme: Sektorkopplung – Optionen für die nächste Phase der Energiewende. Schriftenreihe zur wissenschaftsbasierten Politikberatung. Munich.
India 2030 and the Limits of Competitive Futurism
1 Kaviraj, Sudipta. 2012. The Empire of Democracy: Reading Indian Politics Through Tocqueville. In The Anxieties of Democracy, published by Partha Chatterjee und Ira Katznelson. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
2 Pricewaterhouse Coopers (PwC). 2017. The World in 2050. PwC, accessed 14 May 2018, www.pwc.com/gx/en/issues/economy/the-world- in-2050.html
3 Economist Intelligence Unit. 2015. India Country Report. Hongkong.
4 United Nations Department of Economic and Social A airs (UN DESA). 2017. World Population Prospects, The 2017 Revision. UN DESA, accessed 14 May 2018, esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/ publications/Files/WPP2017_KeyFindings.pdf
5 Manyika, James, Michael Chui, Mehdi Miremadi, Jacques Bughin, Katy George, Paul Willmott and Martin Dewhurst. 2017. Harnessing Automation for a Future that Works. McKinsey & Company, accessed 14 May 2018, www.mckinsey. com/featured-insights/digital-disruption/ harnessing-automation-for-a- future-that-works
6 UNDESA. 2014. World Urbanization Prospects, The 2014 Revision. UN DESA, accessed 14 May 2018, esa.un.org/unpd/wup/Publications/Files/WUP2014-Report.pdf
7 World Economic Forum. 2018. The Inclusive Development Index. World Economic Forum, accessed 14 May 2018, www.weforum.org/reports/the-inclusive-development-index-2018
The Many Paces of Development in Africa
1 Institute for Security Studies(ISS). 2017. African futures: Horizon 2025. Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies; Brahima, Coulibaly S. 2018. Foresight Africa. Top Priorities for the Continent in 2018. Washington, D. C.: Brookings Institu- tion; Bello-Schünemann, Julia, Jakkie Cilliers, Zachary Donnenfeld, Ciara Aucoin and Alex Porter. 2017. African Futures: Key Trends. Preto- ria: Institute for Security Studies; Lundsgaarde, Erik. 2011. Africa Toward 2030. Challenges for Development Policy. London: Routledge.
2 Sippel, Lilli, Tanja Kiziak, Franziska Woellert and Reiner Klingholz. 2011. Afrikas demografische Herausforderung. Wie eine junge Bevölkerung Entwicklung ermöglichen kann. Berlin: Berlin-Institut für Bevölkerung und Entwicklung; Stiftung Weltbevölkerung.
3 ISS2017;Deutsche Stiftung Weltbevölkerung. 2017. Soziale und demografische Daten weltweit. DSW-Datenreport 2017. Berlin: Deutsche Stiftung Weltbevölkerung.
4 Filmer, Deon, and Louise Fox. 2014. Africa Regional Report on Youth Employment. Washington, D. C.: World Bank.
5 Wissenschaftlicher Beirat der Bundesregierung Globale Umweltveränderungen (WBGU). 2017. Der Umzug der Menschheit: Die transformative Kraft der Städte. Berlin: Geschäftsstelle WBGU.
6 United Nations Development Program (UNDP). 2017. Income Inequality Trends in sub-Saharan Africa: Divergence, Determinants, and Consequences. New York: UNDP.
7 Brahima 2018.
8 Shimeles, Abebe, and Tiguene Nabassaga. 2017. Why is inequality high in Africa? In Journal of African Economies 27 (1): 108–126.
9 Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (HIIK). 2017. Conflict Barometer 2017. Heidelberg: HIIK.
10 International Telecommunication Union (ITU). 2017. ICT Facts and Figures 2017. Genf: ITU.
11 Serianu. 2016. Africa Cyber Security Report 2016. Lavington: Serianu.
12 Lee, Ching Kwan. 2018. The specter of global China: politics, labor, and foreign investment in Africa. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
13 Grävingholt, Jörn, Sebastian Ziaja, Constantin Ruhe, Patrick Fink, Merle Kreibaum and Christopher Wingens. 2018. Constellations of State Fragility v1.0. Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE). DOI: 10.23661 / CSF1.0.0.
14 Leininger, Julia. 2017a. Demokratieförderung schafft Stabilität. In Deutschlands neue Verantwortung: die Zukunft der deutschen und europäischen Außen-, Entwicklungs- und Sicherheitspolitik, published by Wolfgang Ischinger and Dirk Messner, 194–197. Berlin: Econ.
15 The country codes depend on the official use of the Federal Foreign Office: Egypt(EG), Algeria (DZ), Angola (AO), Equatorial Guinea (GQ ), Ethiopia (ET), Benin (BJ), Botswana (BW), Burkina Faso (BF), Burundi (BI), Côte d’Ivoire (CI), Djibouti (DJ), Eritrea (ER), Gabon (GA), Gambia (GM), Ghana (GH), Guinea (GN), Guinea-Bissau (GW), Cameroon (CM), Kenia (KE), Congo (CG), Democratic Republic of the Congo (CD), Lesotho (LS), Liberia (LR), Libya (LY), Madagascar (MG), Malawi (MW), Mali (ML), Morocco (MA), Mauritania (MR), Mozambique (MZ), Namibia (NA), Niger (NE), Nigeria (NG), Rwanda (RW), Zambia (ZM), Senegal (SN), Sierra Leone (SL), Zimbabwe (ZW), Somalia (SO), South Africa (ZA), Sudan (SD), South Sudan (SS), Swaziland (SZ), Tanzania (TZ), Togo (TG), Chad (TD), Tunesia (TN), Uganda (UG), Central African Republic (CF).
16 IMF Regional Economic Outlook 2018, World Bank Data 2017. International Monetary Fund. 2018. World Economic Outlook. Real GDP growth, www.imf.org/external/datamapper/ NGDP_RPCH@WEO/OEMDC/ADVEC/WEOWORLD.
17 Acled Data. 2018. Regional Overview-Africa 02 July 2018, www.acleddata.com/2018/07/03/regional-overview-africa-02-july-2018
18 Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik. Constellations of State Fragility, www.die-gdi.de/statefragility.
19 The V-Dem Institute. 2017. Codebook, Version 7, v-dem.net.
20 Lewis, David, John Heathershaw and Nick Megoran. 2018. Illiberal peace? Authoritarian modes of conflict management. In Cooperation and Conflict, April 2018. DOI: 10.1177 / 0010836718765902.
21 Deutsches Evaluierungsinstitut der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit (DEval). 2016. German Aid from a Partner Perspective. Experience-based Perceptions from AidData’s 2014 Reform E orts Survey. Bonn: Aid Data.
22 Leininger, Julia. 2017b. New wine in an old bottle? The German ‘Marshall Plan with Africa’. The Broker Online, www.thebrokeronline.eu/Blogs/Inclusive-Economy-Africa/New-wine- in-an-old-bottle-The-German-Marshall-Plan-with-Africa
23 Leininger, Julia, and Benjamin Schraven. 2017. Weg mit diesem Afrikabild! Zeit Online, 27.03.2017, www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2017-03/migration-fluechtlinge-afrika-europa-grenzen-replik-theo-sommer
1 Pricewaterhouse Coopers. 2017. The Long View: How Will the Global Economic Order Change By 2050? PWC.com, accesssed 24 April 2018, www. pwc.com/gx/en/issues/economy/the-world- in-2050.html
2 Dawisha, Karen. 2014. Putin’s Kleptocracy: Who Owns Russia? New York: Simon & Schuster.
3 Novokmet, Filip, Thomas Piketty and Gabriel Zucman. 2017. From Soviets to Oligarchs: Inequality and Property in Russia 1905–2016.InWID.world WORKING PAPER SERIES 2017/09.
4 Thomas, Landon, Jr. 2017. Deutsche Bank Fined in Plan to Help Russians Launder $10 Billion. The New York Times, 30 August 2017, www.nytimes.com/2017/01/30/business/dealbook/deutsche-bank-ned-for-helping-russians-launder-10-billion.html
5 For instance, the Shah of Iran engaged in two full-blown foreign interventions against leftist movements in Oman and Pakistan in the 1970s and provided support for Iraqi Kurdish groups throughout the early 1970s. Likewise, the Shah’s secret police maintained a vast network of informants in the Middle East and Europe and conducted assassinations of former regime officials abroad.
Ottmar Edenhofer, Kira Vinke, Jacob Schewe
1 An analysis of current greenhouse gas reduction commitments and their significance for global mean temperature can be found at www.climateactiontracker.org
2 Im, Eun-Soon, Jeremy S. Pal and Elfatih A. B. Eltahir, 2017. Deadly heat waves projected in the densely populated agricultural regions of South Asia. In Science Advances 3 (8): 1–8.
3 Vinke, Kira, Hans Joachim Schellnhuber, Dim Coumou, Tobias Geiger, Nicole Glanemann, Veronika Huber, Jürgen Kropp, Steffen Kriewald, Jascha Lehmann, Anders Levermann, Anastasia Lobanova, Maria Knaus, Christian Otto, Christopher Reyer, Alexander Robinson, Diego Rybski, Jacob Schewe, Sven Willner, Michel Wortmann, Fang Zhao and Bin Zhou. 2017. A Region At Risk – The Human Dimensions of Climate Change in Asia and the Paci c. Manila: Asian Development Bank.
4 The Internal Displacement Monitoring Center, www.internal-displacement.org, part of the Norwegian Refugee Council, reports regularly on these events.
5 Rigaud, Kanta Kumari, Alex de Sherbinin, Bryan Jones, Jonas Bergmann, Viviane Clement, Kayly Ober, Jacob Schewe, Susana Adamo, Brent McCusker, Silke Heuser and Amelia Midgley. 2018. Groundswell: Preparing for Internal Climate Migration. Washington, DC: World Bank, open- knowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/29461
7 Schleussner, Carl-Friedrich, Jonathan F. Donges, Reik V. Donner and Hans Joachim Schellnhuber. 2016. Armed-conflict risks enhanced by climate-related disasters in ethnically fractionalized countries. In Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 113 (33): 9216–21.
8 Hsiang, Solomon M., Kyle Meng and Mark A. Cane. 2011. Civil conflicts are associated with the global climate. In Nature 476 (7361): 438–41; Von Uexkull, Nina, Mihai Croicu, Hanne Fjelde and Halvard Buhaug. 2016. Civil conflict sensitivity to growing-season drought. In Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 113 (44): 12391–12396
9 Esteban, Joan, and Debraj Ray. 1999. Conflict and Distribution. In Journal o fEconomic Theory 87: 379–415; Esteban, Joan, and Debraj Ray. 2011. Linking Conflict to Inequality and Polarization. In American Economic Review 101: 1345–1374.
10 This example is taken from a lecture by Debraj Ray (Uneven Growth, Ethnicity and Conflict, 4 October 2014, Cornell University), www.youtube.com/watch?v=mP6grXotpqs
11 Pacific Sea Level Monitoring Project. 2018. Monthly Sea Level and Meteorological Statistics, accessed 18 April 2018, www.bom.gov.au/oceanography/projects/spslcmp/data/monthly.shtml
12 Mengel, Matthias, Anders Levermann, Katja Frieler, Alexander Robinson, Ben Marzeion and Ricarda Winkelmann. 2016. Future sea level rise constrained by observations and long-term commitment. In Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States o fAmerica113 (10): 2597–602.
13 Storlazzi, Curt, Stephen B. Gingerich, Apvan Dongeren, Olivia M. Cheriton, Peter Swarzenski, Ellen Quataert, Clifford Voss, Donald W. Field, Hariharasubramanian Annamalai, Greg A. Piniak and Robert McCall. 2018. Most atolls will be uninhabitable by the mid-21st century because of sea-level rise exacerbating wave-driven flooding. In Science Advances 4, 1–10.
14 Wang, Guojian, Wenju Cai, Bolan Gan, Lixin Wu, Agus Santoso, Xiaopei Lin, Zhaohui Chen and Michael J. McPhaden. 2017. Continued increase of extreme El Niño frequency long a er 1.5 °C warming stabilization. In Nature Climate Change 7 (8): 568–572.
15 Chand, Savin S., Kevin J. Tory, Hua Ye and Kevin J. E. Walsh. 2017. Projected increase in El Niño-driven tropical cyclone frequency in the Paci c. In Nature Climate Change 7 (2): 123–127.
16 Weber, Eberhard. 2015. Envisioning South-South relations in the fields of environmental change and migration in the Pacific Islands – past, present and futures. In Bandung: Journal of the Global South 2:6, doi.org/10.1186/ s40728-014-0009-z
17 Call, Charles T. 2010. Beyond the ‘failed state’: Toward conceptual alternatives. In European Journal of International Relations 17 (2): 303–326.
18 Edenhofer, Ottmar, Jan C. Steckel, Michael Jakob and Christoph Bertram. 2018. Reports of coal’s terminal decline may be exaggerated. In Environmental Research Letters 13(2).
19 United Nations Environment Programme. 2007. Sudan Post-Conflict Environmental Assessment. Nairobi: UNEP.
20 Bennett, Kimberly, Alexandra Bilak, Noah Bullock, Ledio Cakaj, Margarite Clarey, Bina Desai, Justin Ginnetti, Capucine Maus de Rolley, Padraic McClusky, Lisa Monaghan, Sorcha O’Callaghan, Catherine Osborn, Andrés Lizcano, Rodriguez, Elizabeth J. Rushing, Dan Tyler and Michelle Yonetani. 2017. Global Report on Internal Displacement. Norwegian Refugee Council, Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, www.internal-displacement.org/global-report/ grid2017/pdfs/2017-GRID.pdf
21 See for example Edenhofer, Ottmar. 2018. Klima, Kohle, Kapital – Ökonomische Hebel in der internationalen Klimapolitik. In Politik und Zeitgeschichte, 68, 21–23/2018: 26–33.
22 United Nations Environment Programme. 2017. The Emissions Gap Report. Nairobi: UNEP.
23 For the chances of an effective CO2 pricing see for example Edenhofer, Ottmar und Michael Jakob. 2017. Klimapolitik – Ziele, Konflikte, Lösungen. Munich: C. H. Beck.
24 Edenhofer, Ottmar. 2015. King Coaland the queen of subsidies. In Science 349 (6254): 1286–1287.
25 Stiglitz, JosephE., etal. 2017. Report of the High-Level Commission on Carbon Prices. Washington: The World Bank.
Unpleasant Perspectives.
Global Environmental Projections
1 Fujino, J., et al. 2006. Multi-gas mitigation analysis on stabilization scenarios using AIM global model. In The Energy Journal Vol. 27 Special Issue; Hijioka, Y., et al. 2008. Global GHG emissions scenarios under GHG concentration stabilization targets. In Journal of Global Environmental Engineering 13: 97–108. Emission scenario RCP6.0 of the IPCC was selected as a reference in the forecast period.
2 Collins, M., et al. 2013. Long-term Climate Change: Projections, Commitments and Irreversibility.In Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge / United Kingdom und New York, USA: Cambridge University Press. The temperature change is based on the reference period 1850-1900 as a baseline. Emission scenario RCP6.0 of the IPCC was selected as a reference in the forecast period.
3 Data of Our World in Data on the basis of the Food and Agriculture Organization, accessed 18 August 2018, www. ourworldindata.org/meat-and-seafood-production-consumption. From 2014, own calculations.
4 Data of Plastics Europe, accessed 18 August 2018,www.plasticseurope.org/en/resources/market-data. From 2017, own calculations.
Service Provision as the Next Step for Foreign Trade
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2 Steinwender, Claudia. 2018 .Real Effects of Information Frictions: When the States and the Kingdom Became United. In American Economic Review 108 (3): 657–696.
4 Baldwin, Richard. 2016. The Great Convergence. Harvard University Press.
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6 Milanovic, Branko. 2016. Global Inequality: A New Approach for the Age of Globalization. Harvard University Press.
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9 Steinmeier, Frank-Walter. Eröffnung der Podiumsdiskussion “Ist die Vernunft noch zu retten? Verantwortliches Handeln in der Gegenwart”. Berlin, 27. May 2017. www.bundespraesident.de/SharedDocs/Reden/DE/Frank-Walter-Steinmeier/Reden/2017/05/170527-Panel- Kirchentag-Berlin.html
10 Cf. On the other hand, due to the necessary of interactivity: Krull, Wilhelm. 2003. Wissenschaft, Kommunikation und öffentliches Interesse. In science + action. Zwischen Nanowelt und globaler Kultur. 9–14. Berlin: Jovis.
11 Cf. IMPULSE-Magazin, 2018.
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13 Deutsche Akademie der Naturforscher Leopoldina e. V. 2014. Die Synthetische Biologie in der öffentlichen Meinungsbildung. Überlegungen im Kontext der wissenschaftsbasierten Beratung von Politik und Öffentlichkeit. 54
14 Nationale Akademie der Wissenschaften Leopoldina, acatec, Union der deutschen Akademien der Wissenschaften. 2017. Social Media und digitale Wissenschaftskommunikation. Analyse und Empfehlungen zum Umgang mit Chan
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52 Kickbusch, I. 2016. Governing the global health security domain. Global Health Programme Working Paper 12; Moon, S., D. Sridhar, M. A. Pate, A. K. Jha, C. Clinton, S. Delaunay, P. Piot et al. 2018. Will Ebola change the game? Ten essential reforms before the next pandemic. The report of the Harvard-LSHTM Independent Panel on the Global Response to Ebola. In The Lancet 386 (10009):2204–2221.
53 Farrow, R. 2018. War on Peace: The End of Diplomacy and the Decline of American Influence. New York: W. W. Norton & Company
54 Beck, U. 2007. Weltrisikogesellschaft –Auf der Suche nach der verlorenen Sicherheit. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
55 Kickbusch, I. ,C. Franz, A. Holzscheiter, I. Hunger, A. Jahn, C. Köhler, J. Schmidt et al. 2017. Germany’s expanding role in global health. In The Lancet 6736 (17): 31460–5.
56 One Health Global Network. What is One Health?, accessed 3 March 2018, www.onehealthglobal.net/what-is-one-health
57 Bangert, M., D.H. Molyneux, S.W.Lindsay ,C. Fitzpatrick and D. Engels. 2017. The cross-cutting contribution of the end of neglected tropical diseases to the sustainable development goals. In Infectious Diseases of Poverty 6 (1): 73.
Biotechnology and the Legal Framework for the Future Global Society
1 The article is based in particular on the following, more detailed articles by the author: Voeneky, Silja. 2018, forthcoming. Human Rights, and Legitimate Governance of Existential and Global Catastrophic Risks. In Human Rights, Democracy, and Legitimacy in a World of Disorder, published by Silja Voeneky and Gerald Neuman, 139–162. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Vöneky, Silja. 2015. Biosecurity – Freedom, Responsibility, and Legitimacy of Research. In Ordnung der Wissenschaft 2, 117–128. www.ordnungderwissenschaft.de/2015-2/pdfs/10_2015_voeneky_biosecurity_odw.pdf
2 This also applies to biosafety: Rees, Martin. 2014. We are in Denial about Catastrophic Risks. In What Should We Be Worried About, published by John Brockman, 12. New York: Harper Perennial.
3 Brynjolfsson, Erik, and Andrew McAfee. 2014. The Second Machine Age. New York City: W.W. Norton & Company. National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2016. Gene Drives on the Horizon, Advancing Science, Navigating Uncertainty, and Aligning Research with Public Values, S. 253. Washington, D. C.: The National Academies Press.
4 An existential risk can be defined as a hypothetical future event that has the potential to cause the extinction of human beings on earth; a catastrophic risk is a hypothetical future event that has the potential to cause the death of a large number of human beings or to cause the destruction of a major part of the earth. A risk is global if the risk has the potential to inflict damage on a global scale. For slightly different definitions: Bostrom, Nick. 2014. Super intelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies, 115. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
5 Sun, Lena. 2018. Bill Gates calls on U.S. to lead fight against a pandemic that could kill 33 million. Washington Post, accessed 15 May 2018, www. washingtonpost.com/news/to-your-health/wp/2018/04/27/bill-gates-calls-on-u-s-to- lead-fight-against-a-pandemic-that-could- kill-millions
6 Although there are different meanings oft he notion of “risk”, I will rely on the qualitative and broad meaning that a risk is an “unwanted event which may or may not occur”. See Hansson, Sven. 2011. Risk. In Stanford Encvclopedia of Philosophy, published by Edward Zalta, plato.stanford.edu/entries/risk. For a different, narrower notion of risk, excluding situations of uncertainty (“uncertainty versus risk”), see Sunstein, Cass. 2002. Risk and Reason: Safety, Law and the Environment, 129. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Sunstein, Cass. 2007. Worst-Case Scenarios, 146-47. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
7 These are experiments in which the pathogenic effects of a microorganism are increased either directly, or by increasing its transmissibility or by adapting it to new host organisms; see for example, German Ethics Council. 2014. Biosecurity – Freedom and Responsibility of Research. Berlin: German Ethics Council, www.ethikrat.org/les/opinion-biosecurity.pdf; for further discussion see National Academies of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine. 2016. Gain-of-Function Research: Summary of the Second Symposium March 10–11, 2016. Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press.
8 Dual use research of concern is “research that based on current understanding, can be reasonably anticipated to provide knowledge, products, or technologies that could be directly misapplied by others to pose a threat to public health and safety, agricultural crops and other plants, animals, the environment, or material.” See National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB). 2007. Proposed Framework for the Oversight of Dual Use Life Science Research. Accessed 15 May 2018 fas.org/biosecurity/resource/documents/NSABB%20dra %20guidelines%20on%20dual%20use%20research.pdf; the term was coined by the so-called Fink Report, see National Research Council. 2004. Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism. Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press.
9 Virologists modified the H5N1 avian flu virus so that it was airborne and transmissible in ferrets, which is a good model for humans, and published their findings; see Casadevall, Arturo, and Michael Imperiale. 2014. Risks and Benefits of Gain-of-Function Experiments with Pathogens of Pandemic Potential, such as Influenza Virus: A Call for a Science-Based Discussion. In mBio 5, no. 4: e01730-14, mbio.asm.org/content/5/4/e01730-14.extract. Some estimates suggested that if this modified virus were to escape from the laboratory, hundreds of millions of fatalities could occur, see Evans, Nicholas Greig, Marc Lipsitch, and Meira Levinson. 2015. The Ethics of Biosafety Considerations in Gain-of-Function Research Resulting in the Creation of Potential Pandemic Pathogens. In Journal of Medical Ethics. 41(11):905.
10 Maddalo, Danilo, Eusebio Manchado, Carla P. Concepcion, Ciro Bonetti, Joana A. Vidigal, Yoon-Chi Han, Paul Ogrodowski, et al. 2014. In Vivo Engineering of Oncogenic Chromosomal Rearrangements with the CRISPR/Cas9 System. In Nature 516: 423 et seq, www.nature.com/nature/journal/v516/n7531/pdf/nature13902.pdf
11 See the statement made in 2017 by the German Society for Virology referring to the danger of the as a biological weapon: “This also means that continued precautions are necessary in case of the renewed emergence of the pox pathogen due to an intentional release of conventional or newly-created virus material for the purpose of biological warfare.” (Translation from German). Gesellschaft für Virologie. 2017. Herstellung von Pferdepockenvirus mittels Gensynthese. Accessed 15 May 2018 www.g-f-v.org/sites/default/les/Stellungnahme%20Horsepox%20nal.pdf
12 CRISPR (clustered regularly-interspaced short palindromic repeats) are segments of bacterial DNA that, when paired with specific guide protein such as Cas9 (CRISPR-associated protein 9), can be used to make targeted cuts in an organism’s genome; Cas9 is an enzyme that can be programmed with RNA guides to target site-specifically any DNA sequence of interest: the CRISPR molecule is programmed to search for specific sequences, like mutated ones, in a DNA code of a living organism (this can be a plant, an animal or a human being). Once the mutation is found, the CRISPR unzips the twisted DNA strands and cuts the targeted DNA sequence with its molecular “scissors”; the organism can then repair itself on its own or scientists can patch in a corrected sequence; see Charpentier, Emmanuelle, and Jennifer A. Doudna. 2013. Rewriting a Genome. In Nature 495: 50–51. www. nature.com/articles/495050a.pdf
13 But biotechnology risks go beyond creating novel pathogens, see Nouri, Ali, and Christopher Chyba. 2011. Biotechnology and biosecurity. In Global Catastrophic Risks, published by Nick Bostrom, and Milan Cirkovic, 450. Oxford: Oxford University Press; National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2016. Gene Drives on the Horizon, Advancing Science, Navigating Uncertainty, and Aligning Research with Public Values, 105–119, 149. Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press.
14 Natural populations of species with short intervals between generations could be changed or wiped out through gene drives within short periods of time. Cf. Nuffield Council on Bioethics. 2016. Genome Editing: An Ethical Review, 79. London: Nuffield Council on Bioethics. nuffieldbioethics.org/wp-content/uploads/Genome-editing-an-ethical-review.pdf. In 2015, a U.S. group reported an efficient gene drive system which is capable of driving a mutation into 97 per cent of o spring in just two generations, see ibid. 81.
15 See Yong, Ed. 2017. One Man’s Plan to Make Sure Gene Editing Doesn’t Go Haywire. The Atlantic, accessed 15 May 2018 www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2017/07/a-scientists-plan-to-protect-the-world-by-changing-how-science- is-done/532962/ (quoting Kevin Esvelt) (“For gene drive, the closed-door model is morally unacceptable. You don’t have the right to go into your lab and build something that is ineluctably designed to affect entire ecosystems. If it escapes into the wild, it would be expected to spread and affect people’s lives in un-known ways. Doing that in secret denies people a voice.”).
16 DARPA. 2016. Broad Agency Announcement Insect Allies, Biological Technologies Office, HR001117S0002. For a general description of the research program by the funding agency, see www.darpa.mil/program/insect-allies. For an evaluation of this program see Reeves, Guy, Silja Voeneky, et al. 2018. Simplification of a U.S. defense agency program generates a new bioweapon and its means of delivery. In Science (manuscript under review).
17 For a detailed analysis see Wittes, Benjamin, and Gabriela Blum. 2015. The Future of Violence, 17–43. New York: Basic Books.
18 18 May 1977, adopted by Resolution 31/72 of the United Nations General Assembly on 10 December 1976.
19 16 December 1971, 1015 U.N.T.S. 163, entered into force on 26 March 1975.
20 5 June 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 79 , entered into force on 29 December 1993.
21 29 January 2000, 2226 U.N.T.S. 208, entered into force 11 September 2003.
22 15 October 2010, entered into force on 5 March 2018, available at treaties.un.org/doc/ source/docs/UNEP_CBD_BS_COP_MOP_5_17-E.pdf
23 Art.3 Cartagena Protocol: “(…)(i)‘Modern biotechnology’ means the application of: a. In vitro nucleic acid techniques, including recombinant deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) and direct injection of nucleic acid into cells or organelles, or b. Fusion of cells beyond the taxonomic family, that overcome natural physiological reproductive or recombination barriers and that are not techniques used in traditional breeding and selection; (…)”.
24 Art.1 Cartagena Protocol: “Inaccordance with the precautionary approach contained in Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, the objective of this Protocol is to contribute to ensuring an adequate level of protection in the eld of the safe transfer, handling and use of living modi ed organisms resulting from modern biotechnology that may have adverse effects on the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity, taking also into account risks to human health, and specifically focusing on transboundary movements.”
25 The US is not bound to the Treaty. Cf. list of parties, available at bch.cbd.int/protocol/parties/
26 Accession of the European Community in 2002; cf. Council Decision 2002/628/EC, available at eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/ PDF/?uri=CELEX:32002D0628&from=en
27 For the condition of causation cf. art. 4 Nagoya – Kuala Lumpur Supplementary Protocol: “A causal link shall be established between the damage and the living modi ed organism in question in accordance with domestic law.”.
28 What constitutes damage is de ned in art. 2, para. 2, lit. b. For exemptions cf. art. 6 Nagoya – Kuala Lumpur Supplementary Protocol.
29 Art. 1, para. 2 BWC: “Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never in any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain: (1) Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes; (2) Weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict.”
30 The negotiations of a compliance protocol failed, see Svarc, Dominaka. 2012. Biological Weapons and Warfare. In Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, published by Rüdiger Wolfrum, vol. 1, 948. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
31 The term “international so law” is understood in this article to cover rules that cannot be attributed to a formal legal source of public international law and that are, hence, not directly legally binding but have been agreed upon by subjects of international law (i.e. states, international organizations) that could, in principle, establish international hard law; for a similar definition see Thürer, Daniel. 2012. So Law. In Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, edited by Rüdiger Wolfrum, vol. 9, 271, para. 8.
32 For gene drive research, see National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2016. Gene Drives on the Horizon, Advancing Science, Navigating Uncertainty, and Aligning Research with Public Values, 29. Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press.
33 Adopted by the 18th WMA General Assembly, Helsinki, Finland, June 1964; amended by the 64th WMA General Assembly, Fortaleza, Brazil, October 2013, available at www.wma.net/policies-post/wma-declaration-of-helsinki-ethical-principles-for-medical-research-involving-human-subjects/
34 See Max Planck Society. 2010, rev. 2017. Guidelines and Rules of the Max Planck Society on a Responsible Approach to Freedom of Research and Research Risks. Accessed 15 May 2018 www.mpg.de/197392/researchFreedomRisks.pdf. For further references and an assessment of codes of conduct by private actors and stakeholders in Germany in the area of biosafety, biosecurity and dual use research, see German Ethics Council. 2014. Biosecurity – Freedom and Responsibility of Research, 116–40. Berlin: German Ethics Council. www.ethikrat.org/les/opinion-biosecurity.pdf
35 Available at future offife.org/ai-principles/
36 This was the case with the moratorium on certain GOFsoc in 2012–2013: from January 2012 until January 2013, researchers suspended research that could make avian influenza more dangerous, declaring a voluntary moratorium, see Fouchier, Ron A.M., Adolfo García-Sastre, Yoshihiro Kawaoka, Wendy S. Barclay, Nicole M. Bouvier, Ian H. Brown, Ilaria Capua, et al. 2012. Pause on Avian Flu Transmission Research. In Science 335: 400–401. www.sciencemag.org/site/feature/data/hottopics/biosecurity/Fouchier.Express.pdf
37 Callaway, Ewen. 2016. ‘Gene Drive’ Moratorium Shot Down at UN Biodiversity Meeting. In Nature, accessed 15 May 2018, www.nature.com/news/gene-drive-moratorium-shot-down-at- un-biodiversity-meeting-1.21216
38 For a summary of my view on the concept and notion of “legitimacy”, see Voeneky, Silja. 2010. Recht, Moral und Ethik, 130–62. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck. For discussion of the legitimacy of international law, see Buchanan, Allen. 2010. The Legitimacy of International Law. In The Philosophy of International Law, published by Samantha Besson, and John Tasioulas, 79–96. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Tasioulas, John. 2010. Legitimacy of International Law. In ibid., 97–116.
39 This means that the probability of the occurrence of a certain harm is low but not zero and the occurrence might have (potentially) major, even existential or catastrophic consequences.
40 This means that the probability of the occurrence of a certain harm is unknown but not zero and the occurrence might have (potentially) major, even existential or catastrophic consequences.
41 For an answer to the question “Why is it good to be rational?”, see Putnam, Hillary. 2008. Reason, Truth, and History, 181–88. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
42 This is the same as legal international human rights norms; for the linkage between human rights, legal international human rights norms and the concept of international legitimacy, see Buchanan, Allen. 2010. The Legitimacy of International Law. In The Philosophy of International Law, published by Samantha Besson, and John Tasioulas, 94–6. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
43 ICCPR arts. 18, 19; ECHR arts. 9, 10. A different approach is taken, however, in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 13 (Freedom of the arts and sciences). There it is expressly laid down that “(t)he arts and scientific research shall be free of constraint. Academic freedom shall be respected.” Similar norms are included in national constitutions, see e.g., German Grundgesetz art. 5, para. 3 which states: “(a)rts and sciences, research and teaching shall be free. The freedom of teaching shall not release any person from allegiance to the constitution.” (Translation from German).
44 The legitimate aims for which the righ tof freedom of expression and the right of freedom of science can be limited according to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights are even broader. See ICCPR art. 19, para. 3; ECHR art. 10, para. 2.
45 It is an obligation to protect, notonlyan obligation to respect; see U.N. Comm’n Hum. Rts., Res. 2005/69, Apr. 29, 2005, U.N. Doc. E/ CN.4/2005/L.10/Add.17; Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No 13, para. 46 (1999), reprinted in U.N. Doc. HRI/ GEN/1/Rev.9, 72 (2008).
46 171 states parties had ratified the ICCPR by May 2018.
47 For the right to life ,Art.6 para.1 ICCPR, the second sentence provides that the right to life “shall be protected by law.” In addition, the right to life is the precondition for the exercise of any other human right, part of customary international law and enshrined in all major general human rights conventions. The European Court of Human Rights has stressed the positive obligation to protect human life in several decisions.
48 Based on the fundamental rights laid down in the Basic Law whether the order of the Federal Constitutional Court of 18 February 2010 on the question of whether the Federal Republic is obliged to intervene against the series of experiments at CERN – 2 BvR 2502 / 08 – Rn. 1–30, available at www.bverfg.de
49 I am grateful to Cass R. Sunstein for discussing these scenarios with me.
50 As a human rights based approach requires procedural rights for individuals to participate in the making of decisions that affect them, these are only suggestions how to specify the human rights-based values with regard to the question on how to govern existential and global catastrophic risks and enhance substantive legitimacy.
51 Borrowed from game theory, Maximin stands for maximizing the minimum.
52 For instance as part of the ECHR.
53 These recommendations are based mainly on the report and recommendations of the German Ethics Council, see German Ethics Council. 2014. Biosecurity – Freedom and Responsibility of Re- search, 180 et seq. Berlin: German Ethics Council. www.ethikrat.org/les/opinion-biosecurity.pdf.
54 If the scientific and biotech community additionally agrees on a “Code of Conduct for Responsible Biotechnology and Biosecurity” as part of private rule making, this code should be coherent and not contradict the rules of the “Declaration (or: Treaty) for Responsible Biotechnology and Biosecurity”.
55 As for example research intended to enhance the susceptibility of a host population to listed agents; research intended to induce or increase the resistance of listed agents against therapeutic or prophylactic antimicrobial or antiviral substances; research intended to increase the transmissibility and infectious potential of listed agents; research intended to alter the host range of listed agents; research intended to increase the stability of listed agents;research intended to render detection of listed agents more di cult; research intended to reduce the effectiveness of medical countermeasures such as vaccinations and therapeutic and prophylactic substances with respect to listed agents. Cf. German Ethics Council. 2014. Biosecurity – Freedom and Responsibility of Research, 194 et seq. Berlin: German Ethics Council. www.ethikrat.org/les/opinion-biosecurity.pdf
The West Will Be Le Behind. Research and Development
1 Data of on the UNESCO Institute for Statistics, accessed 18 August 2018, www.data.uis.unesco.org. From 2016, own calculations.
Sensing, Synthesising, and Serving News in an Age of Automation
1 See for example Schifferes, Steve, etal. 2014. Identifying and Verifying News through Social Media: Developing a User-centred Tool for Professional Journalists. In Digital Journalism 2 (3): 406–418.
2 See for example Fletcher, Richard, Steve Schifferes and Neil Thurman. 2017. Building the ‘Truthmeter’: Training Algorithms to Help Journalists Assess the Credibility of Social Media Sources. In Convergence: The International Journal of Research into New Media Technologies, doi.org/10.1177/1354856517714955
3 See for example Thurman, Neil, Konstantin Dörr and Jessica Kunert. 2017. When Reporters Get Hands-on with Robo-writing: Professionals Consider Automated Journalism’s Capabilities and Consequences. In Digital Journalism 5 (10): 1240–1259.
4 See for example Thurman, Neil. 2011. Making ‘The Daily Me’: Technology, Economics and Habit in the Mainstream Assimilation of Personalized News. In Journalism: Theory, Practice & Criticism 12(4):395–415.
5 Thurman, Neil, etal. 2016. Giving Computers a Nose for News: Exploring the Limits of Story Detection and Verification. In Digital Journalism 4 (7): 838–848.
6 Data minr, www.dataminr.com
7 Thurman, Neil. 2017. Social Media, Surveillance, and News Work: On the Apps Promising Journalists a ‘Crystal Ball’. In Digital Journalism 6 (1): 76–97.
8 See for example Graefe, Andreas, et al. 2016. Readers’ Perception of Computer-generated News: Credibility, Expertise, and Readability. In Journalism: Theory, Practice & Criticism, doi.org/10.1177/1464884916641269
9 Gregory, Julia. 2017. Press Association Wins Google Grant to Run News Service Written by Computers. The Guardian, 6 July 2016, www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/jul/06/press-association-wins-google-grant-to-run-news-service-written-by-computers
10 Kerschbaumer, Ken. 2018. Cricket Australia Taps WSC Sport for Automated Content Creation. SVG News, 9 January 2018, www.sportsvideo.org/2018/01/09/cricket-australia-taps-wsc-sport-for-automated-content-creation
11 See for example Thurman, Neil and Steve Schifferes. 2012. The Future of Personalization at News Websites: Lessons from a Longitudinal Study. In Journalism Studies 13 (5–6): 775–790.
1 Cf. Gehlen, Martin. 2016. Das Ende jeden Friedens, Zeit Online, www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2016-05/sykes-picot-abkommen-syrien-irak-islamischer-staat. Own translation.
2 Anderson, Benedict. 1998. Die Erfindung der Nation. Zur Karriere eines folgenreichen Konzepts. Berlin.
3 Tönnies, Ferdinand. 1991. Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft. Grundbegriffe der reinen Soziologie. Darmstadt.
4 Bruckstein Çoruh, Shulamit. 2010. Die jüdisch-christliche Tradition ist eine Erfindung. Tagesspiegel, www.tagesspiegel.de/kultur/islam-debatte-die-juedisch-christliche-tradition-ist-eine-erfindung/1954276.html. Own translation.
5 Smith, Anthony D. 1998. The ethnic origins of nations. Oxford.
6 Weber, Max. 1922. Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft – Grundriss der verstehenden Soziologie. Tübingen. Own translation.
7 Statistisches Bundesamt. 2017. Bevölkerung mit Migrationshintergrund um 8,5 Prozent gestiegen, Pressemitteilung No. 26, 1 August 2018, www.destatis.de/DE/PresseService/Presse/Pressemitteilungen/2017/08/PD17_261_12511.html
8 Press conference of the Federal Chancellor Merkel, Federal Foreign Minister Gabriel, the President of the German Confederation of Skilled Crafts (ZDH), Wollseifer, and the Chairman of the German Trade Union Confederation (DGB), Homann, at the 8th Meseberger Zukunftsgespräch, www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Mitschrift/Pressekonferenzen/2017/06/2017-06-14-pk-meseberg.html. Own translation.
9 Karamba Diabyals erster Schwarzer im Bundestag, Die Welt, 25 November 2013.
10 Weichselbaumer, Doris. 2016. Discrimination against Female Migrants Wearing Headscarves. In Discussion Paper Series No. 10217.
11 SVR-Forschungsbereich. 2014. Diskriminierung am Ausbildungsmarkt. Ausmaß, Ursachen und Handlungsperspektiven. Berlin.
12 Foroutan, Naika, Jan Schneider and Petra Stanat. 2017. Vielfalt im Klassenzimmer. Wie Lehrkräfte gute Leistung fördern können. Berlin.
13 Foroutan et al. 2014.
14 Ibid., 35.
15 Foroutan, Naika, et al. 2014. Deutschland postmigrantisch I. Gesellschaft, Religion, Identität. Erste Ergebnisse. Berlin, 26. www.projekte.hu-berlin.de/de/junited/deutschland-postmigrantisch-1.
16 Ibid., 35.
17 Luther, Martin. 1543. Von den Juden und ihren Lügen. Own translation.
18 Kant, Immanuel. 1798. Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht.
19 Kant, Immanuel. 1802. Physische Geographie.
20 Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung. 2011. Die Herkunft spielt keine Rolle –“Postmigrantisches” Theater im Ballhaus Naunynstraße. In Dossier: Kulturelle Bildung, www.bpb.de/gesellschaft/bildung/kulturelle-bildung/60135/interview-mit-shermin-langhoff
21 Hobsbawm, Eric. 2012. Introduction: Inventing Traditions. In The Invention of Tradition, 20. edition, published by Eric Hobsbawm and Terrence Ranger, 1–14. Cambridge.
22 Brubaker, William Rogers. 1990. Immigration, Citizenship, and the Nation‐State in France and Germany: A Comparative Historical Analysis. In International Sociology 5 (4): 379–407.
23 Cf. Gergen, Kenneth J., and Mary M. Gergen. 1988. Narrative and the Self as Relationship. In Advances in Experimental Social Psychology 21: 17–56. San Diego: Academic Press.
24 Cf. Assmann, Jan. 1992. Das kulturelle Gedächtnis. Schrift, Erinnerung und politische Identität in den frühen Hochkulturen. München; Halbwachs, Maurice. 1991. Das kollektive Gedächtnis. Frankfurt am Main.
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6 Wissenschaftlicher Beirat der Bundesregierung Globale Umweltveränderungen (WBGU).
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11 Allmendinger, Jutta. 2014. Mythen–Fakten–Ansatzpunkte. Dimensionen sozialer Ungleichheit in Europa. Stuttgart: Stiftung Bundespräsident Theodor Heuss; World Bank. 2016b. Taking on inequality. Washington, D. C.: World Bank.
12 Appiah 2010.
13 Cremin, Teresa, et al. 2013. Reciprocity between narrative, questioning, and imagination; examining the role of narrative in possibility thinking. In Thinking Skills and Creativity 9, August 2013: 135–151.
14 Osterhammel 2009; Roeck, Bernd. 2017. Der Morgen der Welt: Geschichte der Renaissance. Berlin: Beck.
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18 Kant 1781.
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20 WBGU 2016.
21 Blom, Philipp. 2008. Der taumelnde Kontinent. Europa 1900–1914. Berlin: dtv; Kandell, Eric. 2012. Das Zeitalter der Erkenntnis. Berlin: Pantheon.
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23 Foundation, E. E. M. 2017. Cities in the Circular Economy: An Initial Exploration. 16. Cowes: The Ellen MacArthur Foundation; acatech. 2014. Resilience-by-Design: Strategien für die technologischen Zukunftsthemen. Berlin: acatech.
24 Villani, Cédric. 2018. For a meaningful artificial intelligence. Paris.
25 Tegmark, Max. 2017. Life 3.0. London: Random House; Domingos, Pedro. 2015. The Master Algorithm: How the Quest for the Ultimate learning machine will Remake Our World. New York: Basic Books; Villani 2018.
26 Villani 2018.
27 Bostrom, Nick. 2014. Super intelligence. Oxford: University Press.
28 Roeck 2017.
Global Progress is Possible
1 Data of the UNESCO Institute for Statistics, accessed 18 August 2018, www.data.uis.unesco. org. From 2016, own calculations.
2 Data of Bundesministeriums für Wirtschaft und Energie on the basis of the International Energy Agency, accessed 18 August 2018, www. bmwi.de/Redaktion/DE/Artikel/Energie/energiedaten-gesamtausgabe.html. From 2015, own calculations.
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4 Data of Our World in Data, accessed 18 August 2018, www.ourworldindata.org/democracy. From 2015, own calculations.
5 Data of the UNESCO Institute for Statistics, accessed 18 August 2018, www.data.uis.unesco.org. From 2016, own calculations.
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12 Data of the Food and Agriculture Organization, accessed 18 August 2018, www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/QC. From 2016, own calculations.
13 Data of Our World in Data on the basis of the World Health Organization, accessed 18 August 2018,www.ourworldindata.org/smallpox
14 Data of the World Bank on the basis of the World Intellectual Property Organization, accessed 18 August 2018, databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=2&series=IP.PAT. RESD&country=. From 2016, own calculations.
Ina Schieferdecker and Dirk Messner
The Digitalised Sustainable Society
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2 Messner, D. 2015. A social contract for low carbon and sustainable development: reflections 3 on non-linear dynamics of social realignments and technological innovations in transformation processes. In Technological Forecasting and Social Change 98: 260–270; WBGU (2016). Welt im Wandel – Der Umzug der Menschheit: Die transformative Kraft der Städte. Berlin: WBGU.
3 We would like to thank Marcel Dorsch, WBGU research associate, for his suggestions and for his joint work on the considerations outlined in this text.
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7 Steffen et al. 2011
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18 Habermas, J. 1981. Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp; Jacob, D., T. Thiel ed. 2017. Politische Theorie und Digitalisierung. Baden-Baden: Nomos.
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24 Dolata, U., and J.F. Schrape. 2018. Collectivity and Power on the Internet: A Sociological Perspective. Springer International Publishing.
25 Fontaine, S. 2017. Quo vadis Digitalisierung? Von Industrie 4.0 zur Circular-Economy. In EIKV-Schriftenreihe zum Wissens- und Wertemanagement. Luxembourg: European Institute for Knowledge & Value Management (EIKV).
26 WBGU–Wissenschaftlicher Beirat der Bundesregierung Globale Umweltveränderungen 2016.
27 EU-Kommission. 2006. EU-Government-Aktionsplan 2016–2020. Beschleunigung der Digitalisierung der öffentlichen Verwaltung. COM (2016) 179 nal. Brussels: EU-Kommission.
28 Kramer, H.J. 2002. Observation of the Earth and its Environment: Survey of Missions and Sensors. Springer Science & Business Media; Belward, A. S., and J. O. Skøien. 2015. Who launched what, when and why; trends in global land-cover observation capacity from civilian earth observation satellites. In ISPRS Journal of Photogrammetry and Remote Sensing 103: 115–128.
29 Geisberger, E., and M. Broy 2012. Integrierte Forschungsagenda Cyber-Physical Systems, Acatech Studie. 297. Munich: Acatech.
30 Ellison, N.B. 2007. Social network sites: Definition, history, and scholarship. In Journal of computer‐mediated Communication 13 (1): 210–230; Leiner, B. M., V. G. Cerf, D. D. Clark, R. E. Kahn, L. Kleinrock, D. C. Lynch, J. Postel, L. G. Roberts and S. Wolf. 2009. A brief history of the Internet. In ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review 39 (5): 22–31.
31 Chen, G., and D. Kotz. 2000. A survey of context-aware mobile computing research, Technical Report TR2000-381. Dept. of Computer Science, Dartmouth College; Al-Fuqaha, A., M. Guizani, M. Mohammadi, M. Aledhari and M. Ayyash. 2015. Internet of things: A survey on enabling technologies, protocols, and applications. In IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials 17 (4):2347–2376.
32 Byres, E., and J. Lowe. 2004. The myths and facts behind cyber security risks for industrial control systems. Proceedings of the VDE Kongress; Roman, R., P. Najera and J. Lopez. 2011. Securing the internet of things. In Computer 44 (9): 51–58.
33 Maren, A.J., C.T. Harston and R.M.Pap.2014. Handbook of neural computing applications. Academic Press.
34 Eberl, U. 2016. Smarte Maschinen. Wie künstliche Intelligenz unser Leben verändert. Munich: Hanser.
35 Kehl, C., and C. Coenen. 2016. Technologien und Visionen der Mensch-Maschine-Entgrenzung. Sachstandsbericht zum TA-Projekt “Mensch-Maschine-Entgrenzungen: zwischen künstlicher Intelligenz und Human Enhancement”. 170. Berlin: Büro für Technikfolgen-Abschätzung beim Deutschen Bundestag (TAB).
36 Kirn, S., and C.D. Müller-Hengstenberg. 2014. Intelligente (Software-) Agenten: Von der Automatisierung zur Autonomie? Verselbstständigung technischer Systeme. In Multi Media und Recht 17:225–232.
37 Kopacek, P. 2013. Robotik. Ine & iElektrotechnik und Informationstechnik 130 (2):41–41.
38 Peterson, S., and M. Sahinol. 2009. Jahrestagung der Gesellschaft für Technikgeschichte (GTG) 2009 “Geschichte(n) der Robotik”. In TG Technikgeschichte 77 (1):49–56.
39 Lévy, P., and R. Bononno. 1998. Becoming Virtual: Reality in the Digital Age. New York: Plenum Press; Dörner, R., W. Broll, P. Grimm and B. Jung. 2016. Virtual Reality und Augmented Reality (VR / AR). In Informatik-Spektrum 39 (1): 30–37.
40 Fan, S., Y. Zhang, J. Fan, Z. Heand Y. Chen. 2010. The Application of Virtual Reality in Environmental Education: Model Design and Course Construction. 1–4. Piscataway Township, NJ: Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE); Ahn, S. J., J. Bostick, E. Ogle, K. L. Nowak, K. T. McGillicuddy and J. N. Bailenson. 2016. Experiencing nature: Embodying animals in immersive virtual environments increases inclusion of nature in self and involvement with nature. In Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication 21 (6): 399–419.
41 Beath, C., I. Becerra-Fernandez, J. Rossand J. Short. 2012. Finding value in the information explosion. In MIT Sloan Management Review 53 (4): 18.
42 Jacobson, M.Z., M.A. Delucchi, Z.A.F. Bauer, S. C. Goodman, W. E. Chapman, M. A. Cameron, C. Bozonnat, L. Chobadi, H. A. Clonts and P. Enevoldsen. 2017. 100% clean and renewable wind, water, and sunlight all-sector energy roadmaps for 139 countries of the world. In Joule 1 (1): 108–121.
43 Eberl 2016.
44 The Ellen Mac Arthur Foundation. 2016. Intelligent Assets: Unlocking the circular economy potential. 39; The Ellen MacArthur Foundation. 2017. Cities in the Circular Economy: An Initial Exploration. 16; The Ellen MacArthur Foundation. 2017. Cities in the Circular Economy: The Role of Digital Technology. 10. Cowes: The Ellen MacArthur Foundation.
45 Hehl, W. 2016. Strömende Software und Bewusstsein. In Wechselwirkung, 129–153. Springer.
46 UNEP–United Nations Environment Programme. 2017. International Environmental Governance of the Global Commons. Nairobi: UNEP.
47 Messner, D., and S. Weinlich. 2016. Global Cooperation and the Human Factor in International Relations. London: Routledge.
48 Arbanowski, S., P. Ballon, K. David, O. Droegehorn, H. Eertink, W. Kellerer, H. Van Kranenburg, K. Raatikainen and R. Popescu-Zeletin. 2004. I-centric communications: personalization, ambient awareness, and adaptability for future mobile services. In IEEE Communications Magazine 42 (9): 63–69.
49 Helbing, D., B.S. Frey, G. Gigerenzer, E. Hafen, M. Hagner, Y. Hofstetter, J. van den Hoven, R.V. Zicari and A. Zwitter. 2017. Digitale Demokratie statt Datendiktatur. In Unsere digitale Zukunft, 3–21. Springer. 361
50 Lathrop, D., and L. Ruma. 2010. Open government: Collaboration, transparency, and participation in practice. O’Reilly Media, Inc.; Janssen, M., Y. Charalabidis and A. Zuiderwijk. 2012. Benefits, adoption barriers and myths of open data and open government. In Information systems management 29 (4): S. 258–268; Andries- sen, J., M. Baker, G. Cordasco, R. De Donato, D. Malandrino, G. Palmieri, M. Pardijs, A. Petta, D. Pirozzi and V. Scarano. 2017. Increasing Public Value through Co-Creation of Open Knowledge. Fourth International Conference on eDemocracy & eGovernment (ICEDEG). IEEE.
51 Stone, P., R. Brooks, E. Brynjolfsson,R.Calo, O. Etzioni, G. Hager, J. Hirschberg, S. Kalyanakrishnan, E. Kamar and S. Kraus. 2016. Artificial Intelligence and Life in 2030. 52. Stanford, CA: Stanford University.
52 Bostrom, N., and A. Sandberg. 2009. The wisdom of nature: an evolutionary heuristic for human enhancement. In Human Enhancement, published by J. Savulescu and N. Bostrom, 375–416. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press.
Cities and the Fourth Industrial Revolution
1 This article re-elaborates prior arguments made in the following publications: Ratti, Carlo, and Daniele Belleri. 2017. A Robot for Living in. In Hello, Robot: Design between Human and Machine. 226–38. Weil am Rhein: Vitra Design Museum, MAK; Ratti, Carlo, und Matthew Claudel. 2016. The City of Tomorrow: Sensors, Networks, Hackers and the Future of Urban Life. New Haven: Yale University Press; Ratti, Carlo, und Matthew Claudel. 2015. Open Source Architecture. London: Thames & Hudson.
2 McLuhan, Marshall, and Gerald E. Stearn. 1967. Hot and Cool – A Primer for the Understanding of and a Critical Symposium with Responses by McLuhan. New York: Dial.
3 Castell, Manuel. 1996. The Rise of the Network Society. In The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture. 412. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell.
4 Negroponte, Nicolas. 1995. Being Digital. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
5 Cairncross, Frances. 1997. The Death of Distance: How the Communications Revolution Will Change Our Lives. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business Press.
6 Rogers, Lord Richard. 1995. Sustainable City, Lecture 1: The Culture of Cities. In Reith Lectures, BBC Radio 4.
7 Langfang. 2015. The great sprawl of China. TheEconomist,accessed13June2018, www.economist.com/china/2015/01/22/the-great-sprawl-of-china
8 Mitchell, William J. 1999. Etopia: Urban Life, Jim—But Not as We Know It. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press; Calabrese, F., et al. 2011. Interplay between Telecommunications and Face-to-Face Interactions: A Study Using Mobile Phone Data.In PLoS ONE 6, No.7.
10 Le Corbusier. 2007. Versune Architecture (Toward an Architecture). Translated by John Goodman. Los Angeles: Getty Research Institute.
11 Ratti, Carlo, and Anthony Townsend. 2011. Harnessing Residents’ Electronic Devices Will Yield Truly Smart Cities. In Scientific American 305 (3): S. 42–48.
12 National Research Council. 2001. Embedded, Everywhere: A Research Agenda for Networked Systems of Embedded Computers. Washington, D. C.: National Academy Press.
13 Kelty, Christopher. 2008. Two Bits: The Cultural Significance of Free So ware. Durham, NC: Duke University Press Books.
14 Moravec, Hans Peter. 2016. Robot. Encyclopaedia Britannica, accessed 28 September 2016, www.britannica.com/technology/robot-technology
15 Copenhagen Wheel. Superpedestrian.com, accessed 20 May 2018, www.superpedestrian.com
16 Čapek, Karel. 1920. R.U.R. Prague: Aventinum.
17 CERIMES. 2012. David Roentgen’s Automation of Queen Marie Antoinette, The Dulcimer Player (La Joueuse de Tympanon). Metropolitan Museum of Art, accessed 28 June 2016, www. metmuseum.org/metmedia/video/collections/ esda/automaton-of-queen-marie-antoinette
18 Schwab, Klaus. 2016. The Fourth Industrial Revolution: what it means, how to respond. World Economic Forum, 1 June 2018.
20 Mitchell1999.
22 O.V. 2012. The Third Industrial Revolution. The Economist, accessed 20 May 2018, www.economist.com/node/21553017
23 Benjamin, David. 2014. The Living. Interview by Jessica Liss. Emergency Voices, Architectural League of New York, 22 June 2015.
24 Gershenfeld, Neil. 2006. Unleash Your Creativity in a Fab Lab. TED Conference. Portola Plaza Hotel, Monterey, CA.
Johannes Ebert and Ronald Grätz
1 Second annual report of the Cultural Department of the Federal Foreign Office (KULTURABTEILUNG 1967).
3 Krastev, Ivan. 2017. Europadämmerung. Berlin: Suhrkamp, 132. Own translation.
4 European Commission. 2018. A New European Agenda for Culture.ec.europa.eu/culture/sites/culture/ les/commission_communication_-_a_ new_european_agenda_for_culture_2018.pdf
5 European Commission. 2017. Speech given by President Jean-Claude Juncker as part of the BDA (Confederation of German Employers’ Associations) series ‘Social partners in dialogue’, 31 May 2017, europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-17-1492_en.htm
6 Harari, Yuval Noah. 2017. Homo Deus. Munich: C. H. Beck, 536. Own translation.
7 Lanier, Jaron. 2012. Gadget. Berlin: Suhrkamp, 91. Own translation.
8 Kai Strittmatter. 2017. Chinas digitaler Plan für den besseren Menschen. Sueddeutsche.de, 22 May 2017, www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/neuer-ueberwachungsstaat-chinas-digitaler-plan-fuer-den-besseren-menschen-1.3517017. Own translation.
9 Demokratie unter Druck: Polarisierung und Repression nehmen weltweit zu. Bertelsmann Stiftung, www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/de/themen/aktuelle-meldungen/2018/maerz/demokratie-unter-druck-polarisierung-und-repression-nehmen-weltweit-zu
10 Jannis Grimm calls this appropriately “legalisation of repression” (own translation) in: 2015. Repressionen gegen Ägyptens Zivilgesellschaft. SWP-Aktuell 2015 / A 60, 2.
1 Wirthensohn, Andreas. 1999. Dem “ewigen Gespräch” ein Ende setzen: Parlamentarismuskritik am Beispiel von Carl Schmitt und Hans Herbert von Arnim. In Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen, 30(2): 500–534, 507.
2 For details on the so-called 80 percent myth and on measuring the europeanisation of German legislation, see Töller, Annette Elisabeth. 2008. Zur Messung der Europäisierung der Gesetzgebung des Deutschen Bundestages jenseits des 80-Prozent-Mythos. In Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen, 39(1): 3–17; Hölscheidt, Sven, and Tilman Hoppe. 2010. Der Mythos vom “europäischen Impuls” in der deutschen Gesetzgebungsstatistik. In Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen, 41(3): 543–551.
3 Cf. Schüttemeyer, Suzanne S. 2007. Modewort oder Alarmsignal? Befunde und Überlegungen zur Entparlamentarisierung. In Res publica semper reformanda (Festschrift für Heinrich Oberreuter zum 65. Geburtstag), published by Werner J. Patzelt, Martin Sebaldt and Uwe Kranenpohl, 241–253, 248f. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.
4 Hans Jürgen Papier in particular already propagated this view during his term in office as President of the Federal Constitutional Court and gave impetus to a broad discussion, see for example the reprint of one of his speeches in the“FAZ”, 31 January 2003. See for the following Schüttemeyer 2007, 242 .
6 Sven Siefken speaks of a ‘holy hunt’ in Sven Siefken. 2007. Expertenkommissionen zwischen Politikberatung und Verhandlungsarena. Eine Bilanz der rot-grünen Bundesregierung
1998 bis 2005. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.
7 For complete documentation of party membership figures, the parties’ ability to recruit and the socio-demographic composition of memberships, see the annually updated contributions by Oskar Niedermayer in “Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen”, last updated 2/2018 (49), 346-371.
8 What happens when such a place of learning is lacking can be seen in the questionable practice of self-recruiting politicians, for example in the USA.
9 For details, see the results of the comprehensive study on the list of candidates for the German Bundestag 2017 conducted by the Institute for Research on Parliamentarism (IParl).
10 Cf. Wiesendahl, Elmar, Benjamin Höhne and Malte Cordes. 2018. Mitgliederparteien – Niedergang ohne Ende? In Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen, 49(2): 304–324. 11 Cf. Ibid., 324.
1 An in depth analysis can be found here: Allmendinger, Jutta. 2017. Das Land, in dem wir leben wollen. Munich: Pantheon Verlag.
2 Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Soziales. 2017. Weißbuch Arbeit 4.0. Arbeit weiter denken. Berlin: Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Soziales; Jürgens, Kerstin, Reiner Hoffmann und Christina Schildmann. 2017. Arbeittrans-formieren! Denkanstöße der Kommission “Arbeit der Zukunft”. Bielefeld: transcript.
3 For an extensive discussion on the topic of school and the educational mandate, see Allmendinger, Jutta. 2012. Schulaufgaben. Wie wir das Bildungssystem verändern müssen, um unseren Kindern gerecht zu werden. Munich: Pantheon.
4 For legal entitlement to further training, see Kocher, Eva, and Felix Welti. 2013. Wie lässt sich ein Anspruch auf Weiterbildung rechtlich gestalten?, WISO-Diskurs, expertise on behalf of the division Wirtschafts- und Sozialpolitik der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, February 2013. library.fes.de/pdf-les/wiso/09665.pdf
5 There are exceptions, though: Under the WeGebAU-Act (further training of low-skilled and older workers employed in enterprises) labour market policy measures are available for low-skilled employees and employees in small and medium-sized enterprises. Under the “Weiterbildungsstärkungsgesetz”, vocational training in the case of unemployment (SGB III) takes priority over reintroduction into the labour force.
6 Sachverständigenkommission zum Zweiten Gleichstellungsbericht der Bundesregierung. 2017. Erwerbs- und Sorgearbeit gemeinsam neu gestalten, Chapter C. IX, S. 124–127. Berlin.
7 Allmendinger, Jutta, and Ellen von den Driesch. 2018. The extra years: creating more opportunities for women and men by redistributing (working) time. In Justice over the Course of Life, published by Christina Woopen. Wiesbaden: Springer (forthcoming); Grabka, Markus M., Björn Jotzko, Anika Rasner and Christian Westermeier. 2017. Der Gender Pension Gap verstärkt die Einkommensungleichheit von Männern und Frauen im Rentenalter. In DIW Wochenbericht 5: 87–96.
8 For the ‘part-time employment trap’ see Kelle, Nadiya, Julia Simonson and Laura Romeu Gordo. 2017. Is part-time employment after childbirth a stepping-stone into full-time work? A cohort study for East and West Germany. In Feminist Economics 23 (4). doi.org/10.1080/13545701.2016.1257143
9 See also the concept of an“Wahlarbeitszeitgesetz”, presented by the German Women Lawyers’ Association: www.djb.de/themen/wahlarbeitszeit/wazg-konzept
10 Allmendinger, Jutta, and Ellen von den Driesch. 2018. The extra years: creating more opportunities for women and men by redistributing (working) time. In Justice over the Course of Life, published by Christina Woopen. Wiesbaden: Springer (forthcoming).
11 Bernhardt, Janine, Lena Hipp and Jutta Allmendinger. 2016. Warum nicht y- y? Betriebliche Rahmenbedingungen der Aufteilung von Erwerbs- und Fürsorgearbeit in Paarfamilien. WZB Discussion Paper, SP I 2016-501. Berlin: WZB.
12 Atkinson, Anthony. 2016. Ungleichheit. Was wir dagegen tun können. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta.
The Future of the Liberal World Order.
Scenarios for Germany
1 Cf. Schoemaker, Paul J. H. 1995. Scenario Planning: A Tool for Strategic Thinking. In Sloan Management Review 36 (2): 25–40. Cambridge; see also Kosow, Hannah, and Robert Gaßner. 2008. Methods of Future and Scenario Analysis: Overview, Assessment, and Selection Criteria. Bonn: Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik gGmbH. Kosow and Gaßner distinguish between different methods of scenario building.
2 Tetlock, Philip. 2005. Expert Political Judgement. How Good Is It? How Can We Know? 20. Princeton N. J.: Princeton U. P.
3 Berlin, Isaiah. 1953. The Hedgehog and the Fox. An Essay. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson.
4 Zürn, Michael. 2018. A Theory of Global Governance. Authority, Legitimation, and Contestation. Oxford: Oxford U. P.
5 Forst, Rainer. 2007. Das Recht auf Rechtfertigung. Elemente einer konstruktivistischen Theorie der Gerechtigkeit. Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp.
6 Weber, Max. (1921) 2013. Kapitel III. Typen der Herrschaft. In Max Weber Gesamtausgabe, Volume I / 23. Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, published by Knut Borchardt, Edith Hanke, Wolfgang Schluchter ,449–591. Tübingen: Mohr. Own translation.
7 Cf. Zürn, Michael, and Matthias Ecker-Ehrhardt (eds..). 2013. Die Politisierung der Weltpolitik. Umstrittene internationale Institutionen. Berlin: Suhrkamp.
8 Morse, Julia, and Robert O. Keohane. 2014. Contested Multilateralism. In Review of International Organizations 9 (4): 385–412.
9 Cf. de Wilde, Pieter, Ruud Koopmans, Wolfgang Merkel, Oliver Strijbs and Michael Zürn. 2019. Struggle Over Borders. The Political Sociology of Cosmopolitanism and Communitarianism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, i. P.
10 Lipset, Seymour Martin, and Stein Rokkan. 1967. Cleavage Structures, Party Systems and Voter Alignments. An Introduction. In Party Systems and Voter Alignments. Cross-National Perspectives, published by Martin Seymour Lipset and Stein Rokkan, 1–64. New York: Free Press.
11 Lipset, Seymour Martin, and Earl Raab. 1970. The Politics of Unreason: Right-Wing Extremism in America, 1790–1970. New York: Harper and Row.

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