Source: https://federalcircuitweekly.com/2018/01/18/federal-circuit-rules-that-ptab-time-bar-determinations-in-iprs-can-be-appealed/
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 08:09:01+00:00

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Recognizing the strong presumption favoring judicial review, the majority started its analysis with the statutory language of § 314(d), which it interpreted as limiting “the reach of § 314(d) to the determination by the Director whether to institute IPR as set forth in § 314.” Wi-Fi One, slip op. at 15. It then looked to “the only subsection addressing substantive issues that are part of the Director’s determination ‘under this section’”—§ 314(a)—and concluded it does only two things: “it identifies a threshold requirement for institution [i.e., a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition], and as Cuozzo recognized, it grants the Director discretion not to institute when the threshold is met.” Id. at 15-16. “In contrast,” the majority noted, “§ 315(b) controls the Director’s authority to institute IPR that is unrelated to the Director’s preliminary patentability assessment or the Director’s discretion not to initiate an IPR even if the threshold ‘reasonable likelihood’ is present.” Id. at 17.
This entry was posted in 35 U.S.C. 101, Enforcement, Clearance & Defense, Intellectual Property, Inter Partes Review and tagged Cuozzo Speed Technologies llc v. lee, Finjan Inc. v. Blue Coat Sys. Inc., LLC v. Broadcom Corp., Wi-Fi One. Bookmark the permalink.

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