Source: http://masscases.com/cases/app/16/16massappct29.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 18:36:23+00:00

Document:
CIVIL ACTION commenced in the Superior Court on July 11, 1977. A motion to vacate judgment was heard by Wagner, J. Robert L. Marzelli, Town Counsel, for Board of Selectmen of Marshfield. Justin C. Barton for the plaintiffs.
"That the defendants are permanently enjoined from using or suffering to be used, directly or indirectly, the following area of land as a parking area: Lots 145, 147, 149, 151, 153 and 155 as shown on the Plan of Land, Duxbury Beach, in Marshfield, Plymouth County, Massachusetts recorded with Plymouth Registry of Deeds in Plan Book 1, Page 149, Serial No. 824."
The parties also agreed to "waive any and all rights of appeal from this judgment." A District Court judge sitting in the Superior Court by statutory designation entered judgment in accordance with the agreement. The judgment was recorded in the Registry of Deeds for Plymouth County.
a judgment may be sought by or on behalf of a person only if the judgment is or purports to be binding on him under the rules of res judicata . . . ." Restatement (Second) of Judgments Section 64 (1982). There is in an agreement for judgment, however, an element of contract. Hentschel v. Smith, 278 Minn. 86, 92-93 (1967). Pollard v. Steffens, 161 Tex. 594, 602 (1961). Washington Asphalt Co. v. Harold Kaeser Co., 51 Wash. 2d 89, 91 (1957). Cf. Medford v. Corbett, 302 Mass. 573 , 574-575 (1939). Accordingly, it is in order to apply to a consent judgment made with governmental authority the familiar principle that those who contract with the officers or agents of a governmental agency must, at their peril, "see to it that those officers or agents are acting within the scope of their authority." Sancta Maria Hosp. v. Cambridge, 369 Mass. 586 , 595 (1976). Adalian Bros. v. Boston, 323 Mass. 629 , 632 (1949). White Constr. Co. v. Commonwealth, 11 Mass. App. Ct. 640 , 648 (1981). Were it otherwise public officials could bind their governmental agencies to unlawful conduct by ready acquiescence in an agreement for judgment and, thus, circumvent the restrictions on their powers. [Note 6] The same officials, or as is the case here, their successors, face the dilemma of acting in excess of their powers or exposing themselves to a judgment of contempt. In those unusual circumstances, resort may be had to rule 60(b)(6). United States v. 119.67 Acres of Land, 663 F.2d at 1331. United States v. 32.40 Acres of Land, 614 F.2d 108, 114 (6th Cir. 1980). Cf. United States v. Gould, 301 F.2d 353, 355-357 (5th Cir. 1962). Without weakening the force of an agreement for judgment for purposes of res judicata, it is possible in the context of a motion to vacate judgment to take into account that, as a practical matter, when an agreement for judgment is filed, even its significant nuances will not come to the judge's attention.
We conclude that the judge who heard the motion to vacate judgment properly denied relief as to that portion of the judgment which dealt with the relief granted by the board of appeals but should have allowed the motion as to the encumbrance placed on the adjoining six lots. On the sketchy record before us, we do not know whether vacating part of the judgment might disturb obligations which the town had to State and Federal funding sources. We do know, of course, that it induced a change of position on the part of the plaintiffs, i.e. they abandoned their action under G. L. c. 40A. Although we do not require it so to do, the town may wish to consider its obligations to those funding sources and to the plaintiffs. To that end the order vacating the paragraph of the judgment which enjoins the defendants from using or suffering lots 145, 147, 149, 151, 153 and 155 to be used as a parking area is to be stayed until May 30, 1984, to enable the selectmen to insert in the warrant for the next special or annual town meeting an article authorizing the selectmen to impose the restrictions on those six lots to which the predecessors purported to commit the town at the time of the agreement for judgment. See Harrison v. Building Inspector of Braintree, 350 Mass. 559 , 563 (1966). See also Village on the Hill, Inc. v. Massachusetts Turnpike Authy., 348 Mass. 107 , 119 (1964). The denial of the motion to vacate judgment is affirmed as to the first and third paragraphs (not counting the introductory two lines as a paragraph) of the judgment and reversed as to the second paragraph. The second paragraph is vacated. The order shall be stayed in accordance with the preceding paragraph of this opinion. So ordered.
[Note 1] Jeane Ann Bowers.
[Note 2] Department of public works of Marshfield, superintendent of public works, and the board of selectmen of the town of Marshfield.
[Note 3] Town of Marshfield zoning by-law Section 12.02.
[Note 4] By-law Section 10.10.
[Note 5] Ordinarily "Rule 60 is to litigation what mouth-to-mouth resuscitation is to first aid: a life-saving treatment, applicable in desperate cases." Smith & Zobel, Rules Practice Section 60.1 (1977).
[Note 6] There is no suggestion that the judgment in this case was collusive. Most probably, in the exigency of the moment, the inhibition on the selectmen never came to attention.

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