Source: http://ca10.washburnlaw.edu/cases/2002/07/00-6141.htm
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 18:38:43+00:00

Document:
Gary Lott and Johnny Lott were indicted(1) and convicted by a jury of various counts in connection with a conspiracy to manufacture and distribute methamphetamine. These co-defendants at trial now bring separate appeals alleging various errors by the district court, which we address in this single opinion. Specifically, they both claim that their sentences run afoul of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). Gary Lott also contests the district court's failure to suppress the testimony of certain government witnesses and its denial of his motion for a judgment of acquittal on a firearm possession charge. Johnny Lott challenges the district court's admission of exhibits that he claims are hearsay and its failure to hold a hearing on his motion for substitute counsel. Exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
Johnny Lott claims that the district court erred when it failed to conduct an inquiry into his complaints about counsel following trial and prior to sentencing. "We review a district court's refusal to substitute counsel for an abuse of discretion." United States v. Beers, 189 F.3d 1297, 1302 (10th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). "To warrant a substitution of counsel, the defendant must show good cause, such as a conflict of interest, a complete breakdown of communication or an irreconcilable conflict which leads to an apparently unjust verdict." United States v. Padilla, 819 F.2d 952, 955 (10th Cir. 1987) (internal quotation marks omitted). "[T]he district court should make formal inquiry into the defendant's reasons for dissatisfaction with present counsel when substitution of counsel is requested." Id. at 956 n.1.
The essence of Johnny Lott's claim is that the district court's failure to make a formal inquiry into his complaints about counsel requires us to remand the case for resentencing. We disagree. Although Johnny Lott's complaints about his counsel's refusal to communicate with him after the trial were at times overwhelmed by his criticisms of his attorney's representation of him at trial, he nonetheless alleged on more than one occasion that he was having difficulty communicating with his attorney, potentially implicating a "total breakdown in communication" that could merit substitution of counsel. When a defendant's motion contains "vague allegations" of dissatisfaction the court should "engage [the defendant] with regard to the underlying facts." United States v. Graham, 91 F.3d 213, 221 (D.C. Cir. 1996). Such a colloquy "may not only help the pro se defendant adequately to express the reason for his dissatisfaction with counsel, thereby promoting confidence in the integrity of process and in the jury's verdict; it also creates an opportunity for the court to ease the defendant's concern if it is ill-founded." Id. (internal citations omitted). In this case, the district court should have conducted a hearing to inquire further into Johnny Lott's complaints that the communication between him and his attorney, and its failure to do so constitutes an abuse of discretion.
On appeal, Johnny Lott does not allege ineffective assistance of his counsel during his sentencing proceedings, nor can we discern any. Pertinent to his complaints about lack of communication, he does not allege that he possessed any useful information that would have benefitted him at sentencing but that he was unable to share with his attorney. Further, we find that Johnny Lott's counsel lodged objections to the PSR and that the district court reduced the base offense level by two levels from that which was recommended in the PSR, resulting in a guideline range of imprisonment of thirty years to life, as opposed to the PSR's recommendation of life. Under these circumstances, we discern no prejudice resulting from counsel's representation of Johnny Lott at sentencing, and therefore find that the district court's failure to hold a hearing to be harmless. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's denial of substitute counsel.
Perceiving no reversible error on any of defendants' claims, we AFFIRM the decision of the district court.
therefore is ordered submitted without oral argument.
15. In United States v. Allen, 895 F.2d 1577 (10th Cir. 1990), we held that when a defendant is left "entirely without the assistance of counsel," both Strickland's prejudice requirement and the harmless error analysis articulated in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), are inapplicable. 895 F.2d at 1580. Here, however, Johnny Lott does not allege that we was left "entirely without the assistance of counsel." Id. (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted). Therefore, we evaluate whether he can demonstrate prejudice based on ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing.

References: v. 
 § 1291
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.