Source: http://blog.federaldefendersny.org/category/ineffective-assistance-of-cousnel/
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 08:48:09+00:00

Document:
Only one summary order from the Circuit today in the criminal realm: In United States v. Jeremy Viles, Docket No. 15-885-cr, the Court (Livingston, Carney, Stanceu), rejected the defendant’s claim that he should be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea based on then-counsel’s allegedly erroneous advice regarding the advisory Guidelines range he would face at sentencing. Under Circuit law, in order to meet Strickland’s prejudice component in this context, the “‘defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that were it not for counsel’s errors, he would not have pled guilty and would have proceeded to trial.’” Order at 2 (quoting United States v. Arteca, 411 F.3d 315, 320 (2d Cir. 2005)). Viles fails to do so.
The Circuit issued three Opinions today that are relevant to people litigating issues of criminal law. Below is a brief description, which will be followed up with more discussion later.
I. In Pierotti v. Walsh, No.15-1944-pr (Circuit Judges: Pooler, Livingston, and Lohier), the Circuit ruled in favor of a State prisoner. It holds that his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, presented under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, is not procedurally barred.
The petitioner in the case was hearing impaired since childhood and required two hearing aids. His last hearing aid was destroyed while he was in jail awaiting trial. The ineffective assistance of counsel (“IAC”) claim was that his trial lawyer did not take measures to ensure his hearing disability was accommodated at trial, so he could not understand much of what was occurring.
In United States v. Pendergrass, 15-1965, the Second Circuit affirmed the conviction of Terrence Pendergrass, a former captain at Rikers Island, on one count of willfully violating the constitutional rights of an inmate, who died following the ingestion of cleaning supplies, by refusing to get him medical attention and prohibiting other guards from getting him medical attention. Pendergrass raised three issues: that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial, that the District Court improperly instructed the jury regarding willfulness and conscious avoidance, and that his above-guideline sentence was unreasonable.
Petitioner Michael Matthews was convicted of a 2006 bank robbery and received a life sentence under the federal “three strikes” statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c). After exhausting his direct appeals, he filed a 2255 motion alleging, amongst other things, ineffectiveness of his trial counsel.
Defendant Chad Marks was convicted after a jury trial of drug trafficking offenses and two § 924(c) counts, and was sentenced to the resulting 40-year mandatory minimum. The trial came after months of plea negotiations, including an offer by the government to resolve the case with a 20-year sentence.
Before trial, Marks had filed a motion with the district court seeking to compel the government to follow up on a different plea offer that, apparently, was in the nature of a cooperation agreement. The court denied the motion and the case proceeded to trial.
It seems as if most Second Circuit habeas decisions deal only with the procedural hurdles faced by state prisoners. So it is indeed remarkable that the court has decided two cases less than one week apart in which it got through the procedural thicket and actually resolved the substantive issue presented in the case. This decision, in which the court agrees that the petitioner’s state court appellate counsel was constitutionally ineffective, is accordingly blog-worthy.

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