Source: https://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-6th-circuit/1727307.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 19:15:52+00:00

Document:
Before BATCHELDER, MOORE, and ROGERS, Circuit Judges. ARGUED:Michael E. Deutsch, People's Law Office, Chicago, IL, for Appellant. Jonathan Tukel, United States Attorney's Office, Detroit, Michigan, for Appellee. ON BRIEF:Michael E. Deutsch, People's Law Office, Chicago, Illinois, for Appellant. Jonathan Tukel, United States Attorney's Office, Detroit, Michigan, for Appellee. Katherine M. Gallagher, Center for Constitutional Rights, New York, New York, for Amicus Curiae.
In October 2013, Odeh was charged in a single-count indictment with violating 18 U.S.C. § 1425(a), the criminal denaturalization statute. Section 1425(a) provides that “[w]hoever knowingly procures or attempts to procure, contrary to law, the naturalization of any person” shall be fined or imprisoned. The indictment alleges that Odeh “procured her citizenship despite her criminal history and despite her having made ․ material false statements” related to her criminal history and to the truth of the statements in her immigrant visa application. The elements of the § 1425(a) violation, according to the district court's jury instruction, were that (1) Odeh was naturalized, (2) Odeh made a false statement in her naturalization application or during her naturalization interview, (3) Odeh knew the falsity of the statement, (4) the statement was material, and (5) Odeh procured citizenship as a result of the false statement, meaning that without the statement, her application would have been denied.1 After a jury convicted Odeh, the district court revoked Odeh's citizenship, as is required by 8 U.S.C. § 1451(e), and sentenced her to eighteen months' imprisonment.
After submitting the application, Odeh was interviewed by an immigration officer with the Department of Homeland Security, Jennifer Williams. Williams verbally repeated each question on Odeh's application and confirmed that Odeh's original answers were correct. Williams testified at trial that pursuant to her department's policy, in every interview, she added the phrase “anywhere in the world” at the end of every criminal history question. Williams thus testified that instead of asking, for example, whether Odeh had ever been charged with committing any crime, she asked whether Odeh had ever been charged with committing any crime anywhere in the world. Odeh did not change any of her answers related to her criminal history. Her naturalization application was approved and she worked as a community organizer with the Arab–American Action Network for the next ten years, providing services for immigrant women. At trial, a Government witness testified that if Odeh had been truthful on her application or in her interview, she would have been ineligible for citizenship due to false statements on her immigrant visa application and a statutory bar prohibiting entry to anyone who has engaged in a “terrorist activity.”2 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(6) (providing that any person “who has given false testimony for the purpose of obtaining any [immigration] benefits” is not of good moral character); § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(I) (rendering ineligible for admission foreigners who “ha[ve] engaged in a terrorist activity”); § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii)(V) (defining terrorist activity).
At trial, the Government introduced Israeli documents from 1969–1975 related to Odeh's arrest, indictment, convictions, and sentence. The Government used the documents to prove the falsity and materiality of Odeh's statements, her knowledge of their falsity, and that she procured citizenship because of the statements. These documents were admitted under a mutual legal assistance treaty between the United States and Israel. See Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the State of Israel on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, U.S.-Isr., Jan. 26, 1998, T.I.A.S. No. 12925 [hereinafter MLAT]. The MLAT provides, in pertinent part, that a requesting state may request “copies of any documents, records, or information which are in the possession of a government department or agency of th[e requested] State but which are not publicly available.” Id. art. IX, ¶ 2. The MLAT also provides that where there is an appropriate authentication by the requested state, “[n]o further authentication or certification shall be necessary in order for such records to be admissible” in United States court proceedings. Id .
Regardless of whether 18 U.S.C. § 1425(a) is a specific or general intent crime, Dr. Fabri's proffered testimony is relevant to whether Odeh knew that her statements were false. The district court accordingly erred in categorically excluding this testimony. Section 1425(a) provides that “[w]hoever knowingly procures or attempts to procure, contrary to law, the naturalization of any person” shall be fined or imprisoned. To satisfy § 1425(a)'s mens rea requirement, the parties agree that the Government must prove at least that Odeh knew that one of her statements was false. They also agree that if this is all that the Government must prove, § 1425(a) is a general intent crime.3 The parties contest whether the Government must also prove why Odeh made the false statements; that is, whether Odeh had a “bad purpose”—the key feature of specific intent crimes-to commit the unlawful act of procuring citizenship by lying. The Government maintains that this specific/general intent distinction determines whether Dr. Fabri's testimony is admissible. We need not decide, however, whether § 1425(a) is a general or specific intent crime to conclude that Dr. Fabri's testimony is not categorically barred by our decisions in Kimes, 246 F.3d 800, and Gonyea, 140 F.3d 649.4 The rule that the Government derives from those decisions does not apply in this case.
Dr. Fabri's testimony is potentially admissible because it is relevant to whether Odeh knew that her statements were false, which is an element of a § 1425(a) prosecution. Because the Government must prove every element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt, see In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363–64, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970), a defendant's right to present a defense “generally includes the right to the admission of competent, reliable, exculpatory evidence” to negate an element of the offense, see United States v. Pohlot, 827 F.2d 889, 900–01 (3d Cir.1987) (citations omitted). Thus, in Chambers v. Mississippi, the Supreme Court held that the defendant should have been allowed to present testimony implicating another individual in the crime, because that testimony “bore persuasive assurances of trustworthiness” and “was critical to [the defendant's] defense.” 410 U.S. 284, 302, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973). The right to present a complete defense is therefore subject only to “reasonable restrictions” that “are not ‘arbitrary’ or ‘disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to serve.’ “ United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308, 118 S.Ct. 1261, 140 L.Ed.2d 413 (1998) (quoting Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 56, 107 S.Ct. 2704, 97 L.Ed.2d 37 (1987)). In this case, Dr. Fabri's testimony is potentially exculpatory because it undermines an element of the crime. The district court, however, did not rule on the competence or reliability of this testimony. Indeed, the district court did not tie the exclusion of evidence to a reasonable evidentiary restriction, but to a supposed categorical rule that does not apply. That ruling does not provide a sufficient basis for disallowing Odeh from presenting testimony that negates an element of § 1425(a).
In Gonyea, the defendant attempted to introduce psychological evidence that he was unable to resist committing the bank robberies for which he was charged. 140 F.3d at 650. The trial court precluded the defendant from offering this testimony. Id. In his brief on appeal, the defendant argued that bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) is a specific intent crime and that the psychological evidence showed that he did not specifically intend to commit an unlawful act. Final Brief of Defendant–Appellant Jerry Gonyea at 23, 26, Gonyea, 140 F.3d 649 (No. 962267). We held that the defendant's evidence was not admissible, concluding that § 2113(a) is a general intent crime. Gonyea, 140 F.3d at 654. Although we did not spell out the reasoning for our holding beyond stating that bank robbery is a general intent crime, it is apparent that we rejected the defendant's argument because his alleged inability to resist committing the crime did not negate the general intent requirement that a defendant must know that he is doing the act that makes up the crime. Indeed, the psychological evidence showed that “[t]he defendant felt compelled to continue to act on his obsessive goal of robbing the bank,” a fact that would tend to prove only that the defendant did not have a bad purpose. Id. at 650.
A similar set of facts arose in Kimes, a case involving an assault of a federal officer. 246 F.3d at 802–03. In Kimes, the defendant sought to introduce evidence that PTSD “robbed him of the ability to control his actions,” such that when a federal officer touched his shoulder, he could not help but overreact. Id . at 803. In rejecting this claim, we held that the assault of a federal officer under 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1) is a general intent crime because it is “sufficient for a defendant to act, regardless of the reason for the action.” Kimes, 246 F.3d at 808. Because the Government did not have to prove that the defendant specifically intended harm and the defendant's evidence was relevant only to his purpose in assaulting the officer, that evidence was properly excluded. Id. at 808–09. In United States v. Willis, too, we similarly held inadmissible evidence of paranoid personality disorder in a prosecution for the general intent crime of possessing a firearm as a felon, as the evidence did not suggest that the defendant did not know that he was carrying a gun, but instead that he “had no choice but to carry the gun.” 187 F.3d 639, 1999 WL 591440, at *7 (6th Cir. July 29, 1999) (unpublished table opinion).
In contrast to the proposed testimony in Kimes and Gonyea, Dr. Fabri's testimony does not suggest that Odeh felt compelled to commit a crime, but rather that Odeh did not know that her answers on the naturalization application were false. The district court therefore should not have excluded Dr. Fabri's testimony based on the supposed categorical rule in Kimes and Gonyea. The Third Circuit has provided helpful insight into why cases like Odeh's arise infrequently. According to that court, “[m]ost states ․ limit psychiatric evidence to specific intent crimes on the theory that mental abnormality can virtually never disprove the mens rea required for general intent crimes.” Pohlot, 827 F.2d at 897 n .4. In this case, however, Dr. Fabri's testimony potentially negates the general intent element of § 1425(a), Odeh's knowledge of the physical act of the offense. Kimes and Gonyea do not control.
Second, the Government argues that Odeh was not prejudiced by the exclusion of the testimony. An evidentiary ruling is prejudicial if the excluded evidence “creates a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist.” United States v. Blackwell, 459 F.3d 739, 753 (6th Cir.2006) (quoting Washington v. Schriver, 255 F.3d 45, 57 (2d Cir.2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because Dr. Fabri's testimony, if believed, negates an element of § 1425(a), and because the trial testimony of Odeh and Williams would not necessarily undermine Dr. Fabri's theory, we cannot uphold the district court's ruling on the basis that Odeh was not prejudiced.
In support of its no-prejudice theory, the Government argues that Dr. Fabri's testimony would have contradicted Odeh's trial testimony. The Government reasons that Dr. Fabri would have testified that Odeh subconsciously blocked her torture in Israel when reading questions on the naturalization application and hearing questions during the interview, while Odeh testified that she misunderstood the questions and consciously decided that they referred only to her time in the United States. In a pretrial evidentiary hearing, Dr. Fabri testified that Odeh's blocking of her memory would have been “automatic.” Dr. Fabri also stated that Odeh's professed understanding of the questions is consistent with the symptoms of chronic PTSD. At trial, Odeh testified that if she had known that the questions referred to her time in Israel, she would have disclosed her criminal history in that country. Odeh also testified that her understanding of the questions was based in part on several questions in the application listed before the criminal history questions at issue in this case. Those questions were confined in scope to the United States. Odeh's trial testimony is not as inconsistent with Dr. Fabri's opinion as the Government argues, because Odeh's decision about what the questions were asking, under Dr. Fabri's theory, might have been shaped by the subconscious filtering of traumatic events in Israel. Odeh's testimony would not necessarily contradict Dr. Fabri's theory.
18 U.S.C. § 17(a). Under the IDRA, to prove insanity—an affirmative defense that absolves a defendant of liability even if the defendant is factually guilty—a defendant must “show, by clear and convincing evidence, that he was ‘unable to appreciate the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his acts.’ “ Kimes, 246 F.3d at 806 (quoting § 17(a)). Notwithstanding the IDRA's restrictions on the use of mental defect evidence as a defense, evidence of a defendant's diminished mental capacity remains admissible to prove that the defendant could not form the required mens rea. Id.
Odeh next makes two arguments concerning the Israeli documents—and particularly Exhibit 3, the indictment—that appear to be based on Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. That rule prohibits, among other things, the admission of relevant evidence if its “probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of ․ unfair prejudice.” Fed.R.Evid. 403. Odeh urges that the district court erred in (1) refusing to order the Government to stipulate that Odeh was convicted of “serious offenses” and served ten years in prison, and (2) refusing to redact Exhibit 3 to omit language that Odeh characterizes as unfairly prejudicial. We review the district court's rulings on these issues for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Henley, 360 F.3d 509, 518 (6th Cir.2004) (citation omitted). Neither argument requires reversal.
The Government was not required to stipulate to the fact of Odeh's conviction and sentence, because the Government may generally prove the elements of a crime with any admissible evidence and the limited exception to this rule does not apply here. The general rule is that a “defendant has no right to selectively stipulate to particular elements of the offense.” United States v. Boyd, 640 F.3d 657, 668 (6th Cir.2011) (quoting United States v. Hebeka, 25 F.3d 287, 291 (6th Cir.1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted). In Old Chief v. United States, the Supreme Court announced what we have described as a “narrow limitation” to this rule, see id., holding that the Government cannot refuse a defendant's offer to stipulate to his felon status in prosecutions under the federal felon-in-possession statute. Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 191–92, 117 S.Ct. 644, 136 L.Ed.2d 574 (1997). The Court explicitly confined its holding “to cases involving proof of felon status.” Id. at 183 n. 7. Because this case does not involve a prosecution under the felon-in-possession statute, the Old Chief exception does not apply.
The second Rule 403 argument challenges the district court's refusal to redact two phrases in Exhibit 3. Those phrases state that Odeh was charged with “plac[ing] explosives in the hall of the SuperSol in Jerusalem ․ with the intention of causing death or injury” and that “[o]ne of the bombs exploded and caused the death of Leon Kannar and Edward Jaffe, May Their Memory Be a Blessing, as well as injuries to a multitude of people.” Rule 403 protects against “evidence which tends to suggest decision on an improper basis.” United States v. Schrock, 855 F.2d 327, 335 (6th Cir.1988) (quoting United States v. Mendez–Ortiz, 810 F.2d 76, 79 (6th Cir.1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The district court was not required to redact the first phrase, as the phrase had highly probative value for the Government's case—value that the district court noted was “overwhelming.” Without this information, the Government might not have been able to prove materiality and procurement. The district court explained that “a conviction for participating in a bombing that resulted in the death of two civilians would be material because it would be relevant to Defendant's good moral character. An arrest for minor offenses such as jay-walking or loitering would not satisfy the materiality requirement.” The district court also reasoned that the information in Exhibit 3 was strong evidence of procurement contrary to law, because the fact that Odeh placed a bomb with the intent to kill civilians triggered a statutory bar to admission to the United States. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(I) (excluding from entry any alien who “has engaged in a terrorist activity”); § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii)(V)(b) (defining terrorist activity to include the use of an explosive “with intent to endanger ․ the safety of one or more individuals”). No good reason requires disturbing the district court's analysis.
The names of the victims and the Jewish saying “May Their Memory Be a Blessing” also did not require redaction.5 In this case, the six-word blessing was not inflammatory or unduly prejudicial. Indeed, the blessing added no information beyond that which was already contained in the statements that Odeh was charged with placing a bomb in the SuperSol with the intent to kill, and that two people died. Moreover, the district court gave a limiting instruction that Odeh was not on trial for the events in Israel and that the information in the Israeli documents was relevant only to whether Odeh unlawfully procured naturalization. Such a limiting instruction is presumed to have reduced the risk of impermissible inferences. United States v. Feagan, 472 F. App'x 382, 390 (6th Cir.2012) (citing United States v. Merriweather, 78 F.3d 1070, 1077 (6th Cir.1996)).
As an initial matter, no procedural defects affected Odeh's sentence. A court commits procedural error if it “fail[s] to calculate (or improperly calculat[es] ) the Guidelines range, treat[s] the Guidelines as mandatory, fail[s] to consider the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors, select[s] a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or fail[s] to adequately explain the chosen sentence.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007). The district court took none of these missteps. The district court also did not commit procedural error by failing to state explicitly why it would not reduce Odeh's sentence based on her age or PTSD. In United States v. Gunter, we held that a sentencing court need not, in a “point-by-point” fashion, respond to each mitigation argument offered by a defendant. 620 F.3d 642, 646–47 (6th Cir.2010). Instead, a reviewing court must only be satisfied that the sentencing “court ․ conduct[ed] a meaningful sentencing hearing and truly consider[ed] the defendant's arguments.” Id. at 646 (citing United States v. Wilson, 614 F.3d 219, 226–27 (6th Cir.2010) (Martin, J., concurring)). The sentencing hearing in this case meets this requirement.
Nor is Odeh's sentence substantively unreasonable on the basis that the district court did not accord sufficient weight to Odeh's age, PTSD, social work, and torture. Our review for substantive reasonableness involves a “totality of the circumstances [analysis] .” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. A presumption of reasonableness attaches to sentences, like Odeh's eighteen-month sentence, that are within the Guidelines range. United States v. Vonner, 516 F.3d 382, 389–90 (6th Cir.2008) (en banc). Odeh cannot rebut this presumption, because the district court thoroughly considered Odeh's history and characteristics in imposing the sentence. The court noted that although Odeh's history “include[s] some terrorist[ ] activities,” she had “been involved in doing a lot of good work[ ] in helping Arab immigrant women in the Chicago area” in the recent past and had been “reformed.” The court further acknowledged that it had received letters from people across the United States on Odeh's behalf, and the court commended Odeh for her social work. Notwithstanding Odeh's social work and reputation, however, the court noted that “Odeh lied under oath to get an immigration visa and to become a U.S. Citizen,” and found that she perjured herself on the stand and refused to follow the court's instructions about off-limits topics. Finally, the court stated that although the case had been politicized by Odeh, the Israeli–Palestinian conflict was irrelevant because the case was about Odeh unlawfully procuring citizenship. In sum, the court properly considered Odeh's history, social work, and other relevant characteristics, as well as the remaining § 3553(a) factors.
Odeh's last argument is that the district court should have taken into account the fact that her citizenship would be revoked. No court, however, has required a sentencing court to consider the possibility of a defendant's deportation at sentencing. In fact, some courts have held that doing so is categorically impermissible. See United States v. Chin Chong, No. 13–CR570, 2014 WL 4773978, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Sept.24, 2014) (recognizing split of authority). We have previously held that some consequences of a conviction—such as legal fees, the loss of a professional license, or the fact of a felony conviction—are impermissible factors for courts to consider. United States v. Musgrave, 761 F.3d 602, 608 (6th Cir.2014). Although we have not yet addressed whether deportation is a permissible factor, this question need not be decided in this case; even if Odeh's deportation is a permissible factor, the sentence was reasonable. As explained earlier in this opinion, Odeh's middle-of-the-range sentence was based on the district court's thorough review of the statutory factors. In United States v. Samayoa–Baltazar, an unpublished decision, we held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by failing to explicitly address deportation at sentencing, because the district court properly weighed the § 3553(a) factors. 436 F. App'x 620, 626 (6th Cir.2011). Moreover, limiting punishment to deportation would be unacceptable, according to the district court in this case, because this “would not serve any kind of deterrence.” The sentencing hearing was procedurally and substantively reasonable.
Federal Rule of Evidence 403 states that a “court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of ․ unfair prejudice.” Unfair prejudice results from evidence which tends “to suggest decision on an improper basis, [such as] an emotional one.” United States v. Whittington, 455 F.3d 736, 739 (6th Cir.2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The military tribunal indictment states that Odeh “placed explosives in the hall of the SuperSol in Jerusalem[ ] with the intention of causing death or injury.” R. 186–6 (Military Tribunal Indictment) (Page ID # 2632). It then states that “[o]ne of the bombs exploded and caused the death of Leon Kannar and Edward Jaffee, May Their Memory Be a Blessing, as well as injuries to a multitude of people.” Id. The first statement—describing Odeh's actions and intent—does not require redaction. It has considerable probative value and there is little risk of unfair prejudice. The second statement does require redaction. The victims' names and the prayer have no probative value—they are wholly unnecessary. What is more, the danger of unfair prejudice is significant. The names and the prayer give color and texture to the bombing, so that it becomes both more real and more difficult to separate from the instant offense. They provide exactly the kind of detail likely to provoke a visceral reaction. This is too much for a limiting instruction to overcome. An admissible statement would be that “[o]ne of the bombs exploded and caused the death of [two people], as well as injuries to a multitude of people.” Id.
But if this case is only about lying under oath, then I cannot see how allowing any of the objected-to portions of the Israeli indictment to go before the jury was not an abuse of discretion under Rule 403. As Judge Moore points out, the names of the victims and the prayer have almost no probative value and present a serious danger of unfair prejudice. Likewise, proving that Odeh lied under oath, and even that that lie was “material,” would not require evidence that she was charged with “plac[ing] explosives in the hall of the SuperSol in Jerusalem ․ with the intention of causing death or injury.” The risk of unfair prejudice from this evidence was enormous, especially since Odeh was not permitted to testify at trial about her claims of torture. The word “terrorist” may never have been uttered before the jury, but it was doubtless in the minds of everyone present.
R. 66 at PageID # 593.1 The majority's summary conclusion that Odeh's constitutional arguments have “no bearing” on the admissibility of the Israeli documents under the MLAT because “the jury was tasked with deciding only whether the elements of § 1425(a) had been met” is likewise inadequate. Maj. Op. supra at 14. That evidence was used not only to prove that Odeh in fact had been arrested, charged, convicted, and imprisoned, but also that she was not a person of good moral character.
ROGERS, J., delivered the opinion of the court and an opinion in Part II.b, in which MOORE, J., joined in part and in the judgment in part, and BATCHELDER, J., joined in part. MOORE, J. (pp. 19–20), delivered a separate opinion concurring in part and in the judgment in part. BATCHELDER, J. (pp. 21–24), delivered a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.

References: § 1425
 § 1425
 § 1451
 § 1101
 § 1182
 § 1182
 § 1425
 § 1425
 § 1425
 § 1425
 § 1425
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 1425
 § 2113
 § 2113
 § 111
 v. 
 § 1425
 v. 
 v. 
 § 1425
 § 17
 § 17
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 1182
 § 1182
 v. 
 v. 
 § 3553
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 3553
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 3553
 v. 
 § 1425