Source: https://connecticut.lexroll.com/abercrombie-v-bartlett-nuclear-inc-2271-crb-8-95-1-6-26-96/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 12:46:29+00:00

Document:
The claimant was represented by Terrance D. Lomme, Esq., Lomme Douglas.
The respondents were represented by David J. Weil, Esq., Nuzzo Roberts, L.L.C.
The respondents have petitioned for review from the January 13, 1995 Finding and Award of Compensation of the Commissioner acting for the Eighth District. They argue on appeal that the commissioner erroneously included payments received by the claimant for reimbursement of his temporary duplicate living expenses in his average weekly wage under § 31-310 C.G.S. We agree with the respondents, and reverse the trial commissioner’s decision.
should include the $50.00 per diem payments he received from Bartlett. The respondents have appealed that decision.
(decided June 25, 1996), in which matter this board recently issued an opinion. There, the parties stipulated that the claimant received allowances for living expenses which were not reported as income to the federal government. They also stipulated that Bartlett made the payments in an attempt to comply with federal tax regulations allowing an employee to receive a per diem expense stipend without the need for substantiating the actual expenses. No other evidence was presented in that case. The commissioner speculated that the claimant could have pocketed the entire allowance, as no one presented evidence of actual living expenses, and he ruled that it should be included the claimant’s total wages under § 31-310.
(f)(2). Moreover, there were no facts in the stipulation to establish that the claimant received the allowance as compensation for his services. The commissioner improperly went outside the scope of the stipulation in penalizing the respondents for failing to provide evidence of the claimant’s actual living expenses. At the very least, he should not have made a finding in that regard without giving both parties the chance to address that concern at a hearing.
The trial commissioner’s role in the instant case was somewhat different, as she was not limited to considering a stipulation of facts. Instead, she heard the testimony of several witnesses, much of which focused on the nature of the living expense payments. The only exhibits in evidence were a form signed by the claimant entitled “Certification for Reimbursement of Temporary Lodging Expenses,” and a table of the claimant’s 1993 wages. From this evidence, the trial commissioner was charged with the duty of finding the facts, thus vesting in her the authority to determine the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence presented. Webb v. Pfizer. Inc.,14 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 69, 70, 1859 CRB-5-93-9 (May 12, 1995). Her findings may be altered on review only if they are unsupported by the evidence in the record. Id., 71.
court noted that, in the absence of unusual circumstances, reimbursement payments for the living expenses of an employee who is away from home should not be included in his earnings. Id., 413. The court also stated that when an employer makes an allowance of a fixed sum to an employee when he is away from home, “no definite rule can be formulated but each case must be left to the reasonable determination of the commissioner upon its peculiar circumstances. Such an allowance may be the result . . . of an intent to grant additional compensation on account of the employee having to leave his home and the conditions under which he must live away from it, rather than as a mere reimbursement of expenditures incurred.” Id., 414-15 .
as, for example, tips, bonuses, commissions, and room and board constituting real economic gain to the employee.” (Emphasis added.)).
As we discussed in Wonacott, where the only evidence reveals an intent by the parties to comply with federal tax regulations excluding employer-provided living expenses from taxable income, the record is insufficient to support a conclusion that such payments should be included in total wages under § 31-310. Some relationship between the benefit provided to the employee and the services the employee provides to the employer needs to be established in order for the benefit to qualify as compensation. See Pascarelli v. Moliterno Stone Sales,14 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 328, 2115 CRB-4-94-8 (Sept. 19, 1995) (“Income” is more broadly defined than “wages” under the Workers’ Compensation Act); see also Wilcox v. Borough of Naugatuck,8 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 24, 26, 812 CRD-5-89-1 (Feb. 1, 1990) (commissioner logically must deduct necessary expenses, i.e. taxes, to determine net “definite economic gain” to the employee).

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