Source: http://clscommonlaw.com/
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 06:56:13+00:00

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The 2016 United States election saw the increased prevalence of so-called “ballot selfies” and a corresponding dialogue concerning the legitimacy of laws prohibiting the taking of such photos. In the run-up to the election, eighteen states had statutes on the books disallowing ballot selfies. These prohibitions against photos taken in the voting booth were challenged in court in several states including Colorado, Michigan, New York, New Hampshire, and California. In some of these states, litigation has extended past Election Day, and how the courts resolve the issue will have long-lasting implications for how First Amendment rights are vindicated in the face of efforts to prevent corruption in American elections.
Some decisions leading up to the election depended on procedural matters. For example, the Sixth Circuit addressed a challenge to a Michigan statute “forbidding voters from exposing their marked ballots to others.”  On the basis that the plaintiff had not raised the issue in a timely manner, that court stayed a preliminary injunction against enforcing the law that had been granted by the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan. After the election, the Sixth Circuit reversed the preliminary injunction in light of the fact that the merits of the First Amendment claim were being considered in the district court, and that litigation is ongoing.
When addressed on the merits, the principal interest asserted by the state in these cases has been one of preventing vote buying: being able to take a photo of a completed ballot allows parties to provide proof of the vote they cast, making exchanging that vote choice for something of value, including monetary payment, feasible. However, statutes prohibiting voters from taking and distributing photos of their completed ballots may be subject to strict scrutiny by the courts because they have been deemed content-based restrictions. After concluding that the correct standard was strict scrutiny, a federal court in Indiana found that the challenged statute was not narrowly tailored to address the state’s interests. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, on the other hand, denied a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the New York statute, suggesting that “polling places are generally not considered to be public fora […] and therefore any regulation of speech at a polling place is evaluated only under a reasonableness standard.” These few cases on the issue suggest there is ambiguity in the law that warrants clarification by a higher court.
A federal appeals court declared New Hampshire’s statute invalid as a violation of voters’ First Amendment rights on September 28, 2016. However, the state has filed a petition to the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of certiorari. It is important that the Supreme Court grant cert in this case because it provides an opportunity to address the issue in a definitive manner well in advance of the next major elections. This will mitigate uncertainty across the country about whether or not taking a photo of a completed ballot is permissible, and if the Supreme Court comes down on the side of First Amendment protection there will be much-needed uniformity in this area. Because this issue has not been definitively resolved but is much less complex than, for instance, the constitutionality of voter identification laws, a Supreme Court ruling would go a long way in resolving the conflict in the decisions on the First Amendment right to photograph one’s ballot.
Ballot Selfies: A look at where they are allowed or not, The Associated Press (Oct. 23, 2016) http://bigstory.ap.org/article/04c313da0672422ba28bb57c4e4a7ca0/ballot-selfies-look-where-they-are-allowed-or-not.
 Katie Rogers, Can You Take a Voting Selfie? States Wage Legal Battles Days Before Election, The New York Times (Nov. 2, 2016) http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/03/us/politics/voting-selfie.html.
 Crookston v. Johnson, 841 F.3d 396 (6th Cir. 2016).
 Crookston v. Johnson, 2016 WL 7383999 (6th Cir. 2016).
 See Indiana Civil Liberties Union Foundation. Inc. v. Indiana Secretary of State, 2017 WL 264538 (United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Indianapolis Division 2017).
 Silberberg v. Board of Elections of the State of New York, 2016 WL 6537691 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).
 Rideout v. Gardner, 123 F.Supp.3d 218 (D.N.H. 2015).
 Rideout v. Gardner, 838 F.3d 65 (2016), petition for cert. filed (U.S. Aug. 11, 2015) http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/16-828-cert-petition.pdf.
Though Bustamante-Conchas had not been explicitly given the opportunity to speak on his own behalf during his sentencing, the district court sentenced him to two years less prison time than the lowest end of the recommended guideline range, On appeal of his sentence, a panel of the Tenth Circuit denied Bustamante-Conchas’ request for a remand for resentencing, pointing out that he had received a sentence below his guideline range and that he had not shown that there was any additional information he would have provided to the court if he had been given the opportunity to allocute. As such, Bustamante-Conchas had failed to make the necessary showing that the error seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings. The Tenth Circuit granted a rehearing en banc on the issue of denial of allocution, and reversed.
In reversing the decision of the panel, the Tenth Circuit adopted the reasoning of several other circuits regarding the denial of allocution in the face of a statutory minimum sentence, stating that “[i]f a sentence could not have been lower, a defendant cannot show prejudice.” In so doing, the court adopted a view of “prejudice” that is limited, and ignores the values of allocution other than mitigation of sentence, which, somewhat ironically, the court had previously described in depth.
In order to show prejudice, one must show that the error had “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the . . . verdict.” The Supreme Court has also stated that one must show “a reasonable probability that but for [the error claimed], the result of the proceeding would have been different.” But this leaves open the questions of who may define “injurious” and whether the different outcome spoken of must necessarily have been a lower sentence. In the Tenth Circuit’s estimation, it is the judge who decides what is injurious, and that if a sentence could not have been lowered, the defendant could not have been injured. However, this ignores the possibility that a defendant’s view of what is “injurious” to the verdict is not in line with that of the judge.
If a defendant is appealing a statutory minimum sentence, we cannot assume that the object of his appeal is a lower sentence. The requirement in Olano is that to show prejudice, one must show a reasonable probability that but for the error, the outcome may have been different. So what happens where a defendant asserts that they would have made an argument of anger or grievance that would have had a reasonable probability of driving their sentence upward, and they are prejudiced by their inability to do so? Certainly such an argument would be consonant with the tenth circuit’s understanding of the alternative bases for allocution beyond reduction in sentence. For a fully-informed defendant who sees the loss of that opportunity as a benefit denied, it seems paternalistic of the courts to argue that there is, in fact, no prejudice in such a situation.
 United States v. Price, 265 F.3d 1097, 1107 (10th Cir. 2001) (summarizing the test developed in United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993)).
 Id. at *2 (“The court did not personally address Bustamante-Conchas prior to imposing sentence or otherwise offer him an opportunity to allocute.”).
 Bustamante-Conchas en banc at *1, *2 (stating that the guideline range was 292 to 265 months, and that the court announced a sentence of 240 months).
 Bustamante-Conchas en banc at *2.
 Id. at *3 (discussing how allocution “maximizes the perceived equity of the process” and “suppl[ies] ‘a forum in which defendants may challenge societal injustice, and may provide answers to victims’ questions regarding the crime.”).
 United States v. Dominguez-Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 81 (2004) (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776).
 Id. at 82 (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985)).
Native American tribes across the country are fighting for water rights. In southern California, the Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians has been working for recognition of its interest in the groundwater of Coachella Valley. The tribe brought suit against the Coachella Valley Water District and the Desert Water Agency to assert its rights to the groundwater and its right to participate in making decisions regarding the groundwater. The agencies manage the Coachella aquifer, which has been over-drafted and filled with low-quality water, practices the tribe has objected to for years.
In deciding this question, the Ninth Circuit applied the Winters doctrine, derived from Winters v. United States, which held that “the creation of an Indian reservation impliedly reserves water rights to the tribe or tribes occupying the territory, that those water rights are reserved in order to carry out the purposes for which the lands were set aside, and that the rights are paramount to water rights later perfected under state law.” The Ninth Circuit found that the U.S. impliedly reserved water rights when creating the Agua Caliente Reservation. The primary purpose of the establishment of the reservation was “to create a home for the Tribe,” which required water. The court went on to hold that the Winters doctrine and the tribe’s reserved water rights extend to groundwater.
 See Stand with Standing Rock, Standing Rock Sioux Tribe (2017) available at http://standwithstandingrock.net/.
 Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians, Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians Has Rights to Groundwater, Ninth Circuit Confirms (March 7, 2017) available at http://www.aguacaliente.org/content/News%20&%20Events/?showStoryID=109.
 Ian James, Calif. Tribe Wins Appeal in Landmark Water Case, USA Today (March 7, 2017) http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-now/2017/03/07/calif-tribe-wins-appeal-landmark-water-case/98878688/.
 Agua Caliente Band v. Coachella Valley Water Dist., No. 15-55896, slip op. at 9 (9th Cir. Mar. 7, 2017).
 Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 562 (1908).
 Felix S. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 1210 (2012 Ed.).
Currently, there is only one vacancy on the Supreme Court left by Justice Antonin Scalia. Replacing Justice Scalia with another conservative judge would probably not be enough to overturn Roe v. Wade. “Right now there are about five judges on the Supreme Court that would favor Roe v. Wade.” (Source: TheHill.com). Justice Scalia’s successor would not be enough for a majority vote against the landmark case. However, there are several judges who are in their 70’s and almost 80’s. It is possible that President Trump may get a chance to replace a second or even third seat on the Supreme Court; at which point Roe v. Wade could be in significant danger.
Furthermore, there is always a chance that the President may surprise the country and nominate someone who is pro-choice. Conservative champion former President Ronald Reagan tapped Justice Anthony Kennedy and former Justice Sandra Day O’Connor who both consistently voted to ratify the core or Roe v. Wade. (Source: Politico) It is possible that President-elect Trump follows in the path of former President Reagan. The abortion debate will definitely be something to keep an eye on now that the President’s taken office.

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