Source: https://chestofbooks.com/real-estate/Real-Property-Interests-Law/Necessity-of-acceptance-Part-4.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 18:10:14+00:00

Document:
115 Mass. 256; Jordan v. Warner's Estate, 107 Wis. 539, 83 N. W. 946; 3 Pomeroy, Eq. Jur. Sec. 1196.
11. Professor James Barr Ames, in 20 Harv. Law Rev. at p. 553, Lectures on Legal History 429. A like view is expressed in an able article by Professor Harlan F. Stone in 6 Columbia Law Rev. 326.
12. 4 Wigmore, Evidence, Sec. 2437.
13. See Campbell v. Dearborn, 109 Mass. 130, 12 Am. Rep. 671; Ruckman v. Alwood, 71 III. 155; Eckford v. Berry, 87 Tex. 415, 28 S. W. 937.
14. See Brick v. Brick, 98 U. S. 514, 25 L. Ed. 256; Gibbons v. Joseph Gibbons Consol. Mining & Milling Co., 37 Colo. 96, 11 Ann. Cas. 323, 86 Pac. 94; First Nat. Bank of Florida v. Ashmead, 23 Fla. 379, 2 So. 657, 665; Pickett v. Wadlow, 94 Md. 564, 51 Atl. 423; State Bank of O'Neill v. Mathews, 45 Neb. 659, 50 Am. St. Rep. 565, 63 N. W. 930; Mooney v. Byrne, 163 N. Y. 86, 57 N. E. 163; Williams v. Purcell, 45 Okla. 489, 145 Pac. 1151; Mills v. Sumter Lumber Co., - S. C. -, 95 S. E. 355; Gibson v. Hopkins, 80 W. Va. 756, 93 S. E. 826.
15. A different rule prevails when there is an agreement in terms that the grantor may repurchase the property. See post, this section, note 27.
16. Coyle v. Davis, 116 U. S. 108, 29 L. Ed. 583; Reeves v. Abercrombie, 108 Ala. 535, 19 So. 41; Prickett v. Williams, 110 Ark. 632, 161 S. W. 1023; Mahoney v. Bostwick, 96 Cal. 53, 31 Am. St. Rep. 175, 30 Pac. 1020; Perot v. Cooper, 17 Colo. 80, 31 Am. St. Rep. 258, 28 Pac. 391; Keithley v. Wood, 151 III. 566, 42 Am. St. Rep. 265, 38 N. E. 149; Rasch v. Rasch, 278 III. 261, 115 N. E. 871; Betts v. Betts, 132 Iowa, 72, 106 N. W. 928; Winston v. Burnell, 44 Kan. 367, 21 Am. St. Rep. 289, 24 Pac. 477; Jackson v. Maxwell, 113 Me. 366, 94 Atl. 116; Kellogg v. North-rup, 115 Mich. 327, 73 N. W. 230; Young v. Bake, 128 Minn. 398, 151 N. W. 132; Brightwell v. McAfee, 249 Mo. 562, 155 S. W. 820; Gibson v. Morris State Bank, 49 Mont. 60, 140 Pac. 76; Hogan v.
(c) Considerations determining character of transaction. In determining the question whether an absolute conveyance is a mortgage, the fact that an indebtedness on the part of the grantor to the grantee is created by the transaction, or that a former indebtedness is thereby continued in force, is usually conclusive that it is a mortgage.17 And conversely, the fact that no indebtedness exists, which the conveyance can be regarded as intended to secure, is conclusive that it is not a mortgage.18 The absence, however, of a covenant or other express agreement to pay is not conclusive evidence that the conveyance is not a mortgage, there being other evidence on which to base a personal liability on the part of the grantor,19 and even though no personal liability exists, still the conveyance may, it seems, be regarded as a mortgage,20 since such a liability does not invariably exist in the case of a mortgage.21 The language ordinarily used by the judges, however, suggests that a personal indebtedness is necessary in order that the conveyance may be regarded as a mortgage.
Jaques, 19 N. J. Eq. 123, 97 Am. Dec. 644; Beall v. Beall, 67 Ore. 33, 128 Pac. 835, 135 Pac. 185; Wallace v. Smith, 155 Pa. St. 78, 35 Am. St. Rep. 868, 25 Atl. 807; Bryan v. Boyd, 100 S. C. 397, 84 S. E. 992: Commercial & Savings Bank v. Cassem, 33 S. D. 294, 145 N. W. 551; McLean v. Ellis, 79 Tex. 389, 15 S. W. 394; Motley's Adm'r. v. Carstairs, 114 Va. 429, 76 S. E. 948; Nutter v. Cowley Inv. Co., 85 Wash. 207, 147 Pac. 896. But a different rule appears to control in Kentucky. Castillo v. McBeath, 162 Ky. 382, 172 S. W. 669; Carr v. Morrison, 178 Ky. 683, 199 S. W. 783.

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