Source: https://case-law.vlex.com/vid/412-u-s-306-606768278
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 10:50:45+00:00

Document:
Petitioners, parents of District of Columbia (D.C.) school children, brought this action seeking damages and declaratory and injunctive relief for invasion of privacy that they claimed resulted from the dissemination of a congressional report on the D.C. school system that included identification of students in derogatory contexts. The named defendants included members of a House committee, Committee employees, a Committee investigator, and a consultant; the Public Printer and the Superintendent of Documents; and officials and employees connected with the school system. The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's dismissal of the complaint on the grounds that the first two categories of defendants were immune by reason of the Speech or Debate Clause, and that the D.C. officials and the legislative employees were protected by the official immunity doctrine recognized in Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564.
1. The congressional committee members, members of their staff, the consultant, and the investigator are absolutely immune under the Speech or Debate Clause insofar as they engaged in the legislative acts of compiling the report, referring it to the House, or voting for its publication. Pp. 311-313.
2. The Clause does not afford absolute immunity from private suit to persons who, with authorization from Congress, perform the function, which is not part of the legislative process, of publicly distributing materials that allegedly infringe upon the rights of individuals. The Court of Appeals, therefore, erred in holding that respondents who (except for the Committee members [93 S.Ct. 2022] and personnel) were charged with such public distribution were protected by the Clause. Pp. 313-318.
3. The Public Printer and the Superintendent of Documents are protected by the doctrine of official immunity enunciated in Barr v. Matteo, supra, for publishing and distributing the report only to the extent that they served legitimate legislative functions in doing so, and the Court of Appeals erred in holding that their immunity extended beyond that limit. Pp. 318-324.
WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which DOUGLAS, BRENNAN, MARSHALL, and POWELL, JJ., joined. DOUGLAS, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which BRENNAN and MARSHALL, JJ., joined, post, p. 325. BURGER, C.J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, post, p. 331. BLACKMUN, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which BURGER, C.J., joined, post, p. 332. REHNQUIST, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which BURGER, C.J., and BLACKMUN, J., joined, and in Part I of which STEWART, J., joined, post, p. 338.
This case concerns the scope of congressional immunity under the Speech or Debate Clause of the United States Constitution, Art. I, § 6, cl. 1, as well as the reach of official immunity in the legislative context. See Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
The District Court, after a hearing on motions for a temporary restraining order and for an order against further distribution of the report, dismissed the action against the individual defendants on the ground that the conduct complained of was absolutely privileged.4 A divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed. Without determining whether the complaint stated a cause of action under the Constitution or any applicable law, the majority held that the Members of Congress, the Committee staff employees, and the Public Printer and Superintendent of Documents were immune from the liability asserted against them because of the Speech or Debate Clause and that the official immunity doctrine recognized in Barr v. Matteo, supra, barred any liability on the part of the District of Columbia officials as well as the legislative employees.5 We granted certiorari, 408 U.S. 922.
To "prevent intimidation of legislators by the Executive and accountability before a possibly hostile judiciary," Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 617 (1972), Art. I, § 6, cl. 1, of the Constitution provides that "for any Speech or Debate in either House, they [Members of Congress] shall not be questioned in any other Place."
The Speech or Debate Clause was designed to assure a co-equal branch of the government wide freedom of speech, debate, and deliberation without intimidation or threats from the Executive Branch. It thus protects Members against prosecutions that directly impinge upon or threaten the legislative process.

References: v. 
 v. 
 § 6
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 6