Source: https://www.scribd.com/document/321207710/Richardson-v-Branker-4th-Cir-2012
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 01:51:40+00:00

Document:
for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh.
Terrence W. Boyle, District Judge.
Judge Traxler and Judge Motz joined.
of being hit by and run over with a vehicle." Id. at 153.
and 3) lying in wait. 488 S.E.2d at 151.
store could only have been made by Richardsons right shoe.
well as several witnesses who provided an alibi for Hedgepeth, and determined that Hedgepeth was not involved in Ms.
aspects of Richardsons story, rendering Richardsons statements implicating Hedgepeth implausible. Id. at 152, 157.
over" Ms. Rich with her car. Id. at 152.
a dangerous weapon. Id. at 151.
of "[t]he age of the defendant at the time of the crime,"
and (vi) the defendant had no prior history of violent conduct. Id. at 160.
instruction should be given. Instead, "age" is a "flexible and relative concept" that takes into consideration emotional maturity in addition to chronological age. See State v. Johnson, 346 S.E.2d 596, 624 (N.C. 1986).
kidnapping conviction. Id. at 151.
courts failure to instruct the jury on the (f)(7) mitigation factor. The Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed Richardsons convictions and sentences. Id. at 162.
request that the instruction be given to the jury).
proceedings would have been different.
question of law and not fact.
Mental Retardation as required by [N.C.G.S. ] 15A2005.
Court of North Carolina. That court denied Richardsons petition. 667 S.E.2d 272 (N.C. 2008).
Amendment, under the Supreme Courts decision in Atkins.
months before petitioners trial and well before his appeal."
Richardson that "[h]is overall functioning would be comparable to that of an average eleven-and-a-half, twelve year old,"
reasonable doubt on appeal." Id. at 922.
Strickland." 769 F. Supp. 2d at 924.
claims. Id. at 908-19, 924-28.
assistance of appellate counsel. We review de novo the district courts order granting Richardson relief on this claim.
Kanai v. McHugh, 638 F.3d 251, 260 (4th Cir. 2011).
v. Branker, 642 F.3d 442, 449 (4th Cir. 2011).
habeas claims, as established by AEDPA, is grounded in fundamental notions of state sovereignty. Harrington, 131 S. Ct.
was unreasonable." 131 S. Ct. at 785 (emphasis added).
law is different from an incorrect application of federal law."
Id. (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 410) (emphasis in original).
the standard of an "incorrect" application of federal law.
538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003)).
to be." Id. at 786.
"when the two apply in tandem, review is doubly so." Id.
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
521 (2003); Williams, 529 U.S. at 390; Strickland, 466 U.S.
at 687; Jackson v. Kelly, 650 F.3d 477, 493 (4th Cir. 2011).
(1986), and Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259 (2000).
(1986); United States v. Tucker, 603 F.3d 260, 264 (4th Cir.
U.S. at 391; Gray v. Branker, 529 F.3d 220, 234 (4th Cir.
undermine confidence in the outcome," Strickland, 466 U.S.
(emphasis added); accord Jackson, 650 F.3d at 493.
U.S. 259, 285-86 (2000) (holding, in the context of an ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim, that the "prejudice"
v. Jarvis, 236 F.3d 149, 164 (4th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (same).
decision to the contrary constituted an unreasonable application of Strickland." 131 S. Ct. at 786 (internal citation omitted).
159-60 (4th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (discussing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S.
362, 399-401 (2000) (OConnor, J., concurring)).
that state court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt."
Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam).
under the "prejudice" prong of Strickland.
Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 786-87.
raised." Id. at 921, 924.
federal court should be especially deferential to a state postconviction courts interpretation of its own states law.
of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel was wholly lacking in the district courts consideration of the habeas petition.
a "mental age" of ten years.13 Id. at 882, 885.
The court held that the instruction should have been given despite evidence that Holden "had more life experience than a ten-year-old-child."
apply the "substantial evidence" standard used in that case.
been applied by that Court in several more recent cases. See, e.g., State v.
198-99 (N.C. 2001) (same); State v. Steen, 536 S.E.2d 1, 18-20 (N.C.
submission of the mitigation instruction under Holdens "substantial evidence" test.
that defendant committed the crime under the influence of mental or emotional disturbance).
worked for his fathers brick-washing business four or five days per week.
this conclusion, which, in any event, completely fails to afford the deference required by AEDPA to the MAR courts holding.
distinguish the holding in Spruill from the facts of this case.
Strickland standards that we apply.
chronological age of 31 years. 452 S.E.2d at 285, 305.
de novo. Muhammad v. Kelly, 575 F.3d 359, 367 (4th Cir.
standard set forth in AEDPA.
(1995); United States v. King, 628 F.3d 693, 701 (4th Cir.
entire case in such a different light that confidence in the verdict is undermined. Strickler, 527 U.S. at 290; Kyles, 514 U.S.
at 435; King, 628 F.3d at 704.
908, 916 (4th Cir. 1997).
matched shoes seized from Richardson.
by Richardson on the night of the crime.
sketches showed a "zigzag" pattern that Richardson contended was consistent with the pattern of Hedgepeths shoes.
district courts rejection of this claim.
down and then goes up and then comes back down.
Q: And that is different than the shoe [Richardsons shoe] thats sitting in front of you, isnt it?
not constitute Brady material for this purpose. See McHone v.
trial testimony or merely cumulative to undisputed facts).
saw several portions of questioned footwear impressions, didnt you?
You could see them with the naked eye?
it with side lighting, but they were very small portions and not sufficient for comparison.
A. And I was not able to get anything for comparison purposes.
bring something thats real faint out? Is there anything that could do that?
to be photographed, they just disappeared.
detail whatsoever anywhere as to any shoe?
Not that I could use for comparison, no.
the shoes that you had?
reasonable jury could conclude from the evidence that the pattern in Agent Petzkas sketches of item 41 matched the pattern on Hedgepeths shoes.
[sic] came to my residence. Upon every visit, Mr.
clothes that they were wearing earlier that day.
told me that he did not want to hear that right now.
asked at the trial and not to volunteer information.
mony concerning the insufficiency of the shoeprint impression on item 41.
41 was insufficient to permit a comparison with another shoeprint.
didnt volunteer information because of what Mr.
trailer where I live now.
them, and he left. That was all. That was it.
What two friends did he ask you about?
resolve any credibility dispute between these two individuals.
Mike and [Kevin] Hedgepeth. Thats all he said.
And were they at your residence?
I dont have any idea.
she had not seen Hedgepeth with Richardson and that Richardson had asked her whether she had seen Hedgepeth.
because they didnt ask me" is refuted by the trial transcript.
Yeah, somewhere in that vicinity, yes.
He did call the name.
house that you had seen [Hedgepeth] that day?
Not sure of that, no.
According to computer records linked to the stores alarm system, Ms.
Richardson and Hedgepeth arrived at her home around 11:00 p.m.
fairminded disagreement?" See Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 78687.
home, or at home during the period when the crimes occurred." 769 F.
of Richardsons habeas petition. 769 F. Supp. 2d at 927-28.
both of which were manifested before the age of 18."
The first of these two requirements, "[s]ignificantly subaverage general intellectual functioning," is defined by the statute as "[a]n intelligence quotient [IQ] of 70 or below."
the "significant limitations in adaptive functioning" prong.
results were not qualifying I.Q. scores under the statute.
Richardson took in 1991 while enrolled in the tenth grade.
required under N.C. Gen. Stat. 15A-2005(a)(2).
a licensed psychologist. As noted by the MAR court, Dr.
licensed psychiatrist or psychologist," as required by N.C.
under the supervision of a licensed psychologist or neuropsychologist."
769 F. Supp. 2d at 8125 n.12.
these test scores complied with the requirements of N.C. Gen.
"[a]n [I.Q.] of 70 or below." N.C.G.S. 15A-2005(a)(1)(c).
We again examine this holding through the deferential standard of review mandated by AEDPA, as discussed previously.
that the MAR court should have adjusted downward his I.Q.
the basis of those theories.
of a claim on the merits.
law, nor could we find any such law, requiring courts to consider and apply the "Flynn effect" and the "practice effect."
courts observation that "there is no requirement under N.C.
Gen. Stat. 15A2005 for a court to adjust a defendants I.Q.
see also Green v. Johnson, 515 F.3d 290, 300 n.2 (4th Cir.
obligated to assume all facts alleged in his habeas petition to be true. Id.
to adjudicate [his] claim on a complete record").
not conclude that such a holding violated [AEDPA]").
counsel. We reverse this portion of the district courts judgment.

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