Source: http://www.caaflog.com/2017/05/07/argument-preview-a-messy-confluence-of-the-failure-to-state-an-offense-the-power-of-a-cca-the-statute-of-limitations-and-appellate-delay-in-united-states-v-carter-nos-17-0079af-17-0086af/
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 22:49:05+00:00

Document:
Certified Issue: Whether the Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals (AFCCA) erred by finding that the convening authority exceeded the scope of AFCCA’s remand when he referred Appellant’s case to an “other” trial under R.C.M. 1107(e)(2) following AFCCA’s original remand decision.
I. The Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals dismissed the charge and specifications in this case in 2013 and again in 2016. But it exceeded the eighteen-month presumption of unreasonable delay before doing so each time. Has Appellee been denied due process where he completed his sentence to three years of confinement 158 days before this court affirmed the lower court’s first dismissal of this case on August 2, 2013?
III. Whether United States Court of Military Commission Review Judge, Martin T. Mitchell, was statutorily authorized to sit as one of the Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals judges on the panel that decided Appellant’s case.
IV. Whether Judge Martin T. Mitchell’s service on both the Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals and the United States Court of Military Commission Review violated the appointments clause given his status as a principal officer on the United States Court of Military Commission Review.
V. Whether Judge Martin T. Mitchell was in fact a principal officer following his appointment by the President of the United States Court of Military Commission Review in light of the provisions of 10 U.S.C. § 949b(b)(4)(C) and (D), authorizing reassignment or withdrawal of Appellate Military judges so appointed by the Secretary of Defense of his designee.
Back in 2010, Master Sergeant (E-7) Carter was convicted of indecent liberties with a child in violation of Article 120(j) (2016), and of child endangerment and indecent acts with a child, both in violation of Article 134, and sentenced to confinement for 4 years, reduction to E-1, total forfeitures, and a dishonorable discharge. The convening authority disapproved the conviction of violation of Article 120(j) and reduced the sentence to confinement to three years, but approved the remainder of the findings and sentence.
The Article 134 specifications, however, failed to allege a terminal element and so therefore failed to state offenses. See United States v. Fosler, 70 M.J. 225 (C.A.A.F. 2011) (discussed here). Because there was no objection at trial, the Air Force CCA applied CAAF’s decision in United States v. Humphries, 71 M.J. 209 (C.A.A.F. 2012) (CAAFlog case page). Nevertheless, the CCA reversed the findings in 2013, the JAG certified, and CAAF summarily affirmed.
The case was remanded and new charges were preferred and referred to a new general court-martial. Carter made numerous objections (including objecting based on the statute of limitations), but the trial proceeded and Carter was again convicted. The second sentence included confinement for 40 months, total forfeitures, and reduction to E-1 (but not a punitive discharge).
The Air Force court, however, reversed again. In a 2016 decision discussed here, a three-judge panel of the Air Force CCA split 2-1 to conclude that the court’s 2013 decision did not authorize further proceedings and that the charges should be dismissed with prejudice. The dissenting judge found that the second trial was an independent proceeding based on a totally new charge – analysis that I found (and still find) to be persuasive.
CAAF will now review that decision and also determine whether the statute of limitations prohibited the second trial and whether delays in the CCA’s review deprived Carter of his right to speedy appellate review.
Military law recognizes three types of re-trials: a rehearing, a new trial, and an other trial. See R.C.M. 810. A rehearing (on findings, sentence, or both) may be ordered when findings or sentence are set-aside and is a continuation of the former proceedings; a new trial may be ordered when new evidence or a fraud on the court is discovered; an other trial can occur after the original proceedings are declared invalid due to lack of jurisdiction or failure to state an offense. In addition to these – perhaps – is the possibility of a totally separate court-martial involving new charges based on the same allegations after the original charges are dismissed after the first trial.
If the Court of Criminal Appeals sets aside the findings and sentence, it may, except where the setting aside is based on lack of sufficient evidence in the record to support the findings, order a rehearing. If it sets aside the findings and sentence and does not order a rehearing, it shall order that the charges be dismissed.
United States v. Carter, No. 37715, slip op. at 5-6 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Jan. 4, 2013) (link to slip op.). Reviewing this action in 2016, the two-judge majority of the CCA concluded that the 2013 dismissal did not authorize (and therefore precluded) any further proceedings, including an other trial. The certified issue challenges this conclusion.
After a CCA dismisses a charge, a convening authority may not initiate further proceedings unless authorized to do so by the CCA.
There is no statutory authority for “other trials.” The authority for such proceedings is rooted solely in this Court’s divided interpretation of the 1951 Manual for Courts-Martial in United States v. Padilla, 5 C.M.R. 31 (C.M.A. 1952), which should be expressly abandoned.
App. Br. on Certified Issue at 13. This argument is hedged by the alternative argument that even if other trials are authorized, “they are limited to situations involving jurisdictional error” (and the failure to state an offense is not jurisdictional). App. Br. on Certified Issue at 15.
Fundamentally, Carter’s argument is that if a CCA dismisses a charge – except perhaps on jurisdictional grounds – then the accused may never be recharged. The obvious problem with this argument, however, is that the charge the CCA dismissed in Carter didn’t state an offense, meaning he wasn’t charged with any offense. Accordingly, if the dismissal bars future charges, then Carter can never again be charged with anything. That’s absurd.
Article 43(g) (emphasis added). This UCMJ provision allows a second trial that isn’t a rehearing and doesn’t involve jurisdictional error – exactly the thing that Carter’s brief on the certified issue asserts isn’t allowed by the UCMJ.
App. Br. on Certified Issue at 17. This can’t possibly be right. Double jeopardy applies to offenses, not conduct; the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits having a person “be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy. . . ” (emphasis added). Because the first charges didn’t state offenses, there was no offense for jeopardy to attach to. Put differently, if jeopardy did attach, what exactly did it attach to?
The granted issues also present tricky questions.
The first granted issue involves Carter’s right to speedy appellate review and the presumption that appellate delay is unreasonable if it “is not completed and a decision is not rendered within eighteen months of docketing the case before the Court of Criminal Appeals.” United States v. Moreno, 63 M.J. 129, 142 (C.A.A.F. 2006). Both of the CCA’s reviews in Carter’s case took longer than 18 months.
The second granted issue involves the statute of limitations. The general statute of limitations in the UCMJ is five years. See Article 43. The prosecution advanced two ways around this limitation at the second trial: the savings clause in Article 43(g) (quoted above) and an exception to the 5-year limit for child abuse offenses in Article 43(b)(2)(B). But there are two problems with the application of these clauses.
The first problem is with the Article 43(g) savings clause. As quoted above, it provides an exception to the statute of limitations when the new charges are received by a summary court-martial convening within 180 days of a dismissal. The issue in Carter is when that clock starts. The second set of charges were’t received until more than 180 days after CAAF denied a petition for reconsideration of its decision affirming the CCA’s first dismissal, however they were received within 180 days of the expiration of the time to petition for certiorari. But the Government didn’t petition.
on divers occasions, between on or about 1 October 2007 and on or about 31 December 2007, was responsible for the care of [G.C.], a child under the age of 16 years, and did endanger the mental health, physical health, safety, and welfare of said [G.C.], by committing sexual acts with her and instructing her not to tell anyone about the said acts and that such conduct was by design, and that said conduct was of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces.
Gov’t Div. Br. on Granted Issues at 25 (emphasis added). I think CAAF will be skeptical that this isn’t a child abuse offense.
Another fine example of why the Supreme Court doesn’t take military cases.

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