Source: http://myattorneyusa.com/matter-of-castro-tum-27-iandn-dec-271-ag-2018-ag-finds-that-ijsbia-lack-general-administrative-clo-0
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 02:16:17+00:00

Document:
This is the second part of our three-part series of articles on the important published Attorney General decision in the Matter of Castro-Tum, 27 I&N Dec. 271 (A.G. 2018) [PDF version]. This article presupposes that you have seen our first article in the series and are familiar with the case background and issues presented [see article]. In this article, we will discuss the Attorney General's reasoning for concluding that neither the statutes nor regulations provide for general administrative closure authority. We examine how the Attorney General resolved the issue of the outstanding cases that were administratively closed without authority in the final part of this article series [see article]. Please see our issue index for all three of these articles as well as other articles on the Matter of Castro-Tum litigation and articles on related issues [see index].
Citing to SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947) [PDF version], the Attorney General explained that he had the authority to resolve the case through “rulemaking or adjudication.” Rulemaking refers to crafting regulations to address an issue. For example, Attorney General Sessions cited to the prior Attorney General published decision in Matter of Compean, Bangaly & J-E-C-, 25 I&N Dec. 1, 2 (A.G. 2009) [PDF version], wherein then-Attorney General Eric Holder reversed a prior Attorney General decision in the same cases and ordered subsequent rulemaking to resolve the issues presented.
Citing to Matter of J-F-F-, 23 I&N Dec. 912, 913 (A.G. 2006) [PDF version], the Attorney General explained that he would “review de novo all aspects of the Board's and the Immigration Judge's decisions in this case.” Citing to section 103(a)(1) of the INA, he explained that “determination[s] and ruling[s] by the Attorney General with respect to all questions of law” regarding the INA and “all other laws relating to the immigration and naturalization of aliens,” “shall be controlling.” For this reason, the Attorney General made clear that his decision would be binding on the Board and overrule any past Board decisions to the extent that they are inconsistent with it.
In this brief section, we will examine an overview of the issues presented and the Attorney General's conclusion. In subsequent sections, we will examine the points and conclusions in greater detail.
The Attorney General explained that the INA vests in the Attorney General the responsibility for supervising immigration proceedings. In accordance with the INA and the implementing Attorney General regulations, immigration proceedings are administered by the immigration judges and the BIA. As such, immigration judges and the BIA exercise authority that is (1) provided by the INA or (2) delegated by the Attorney General. Immigration judges and the BIA do not have a separate, independent source of authority.
The Attorney General noted that several Federal appellate courts have held that neither the INA nor the Attorney General regulations sets forth a basis for administrative closure. For example, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Diaz-Covarrubias v. Mukasey, 551 F.3d 1114, 1118 (9th Cir. 2009) [PDF version], held that “there is no statutory basis for administrative closures. Nor is there any regulatory basis for administrative closures.” The Attorney General cited to several other decisions that held similarly at 27 I&N Dec. at 283.
The Attorney General found it relevant that while neither the statutes nor the Attorney General regulations confer general administrative closure authority to immigration judges and the BIA, they do specify authority for other procedural tools in immigration proceedings. Notably, the Attorney General regulations grant immigration judges and the BIA the authority to grant continuances under certain circumstances.
In light of the foregoing, Attorney General Sessions concluded that immigration judges and the BIA lack a general authority to grant administrative closures. Thus, the question remained whether he should delegate any such authority. For reasons that we will examine, the Attorney General ultimately declined to do so, upon finding that “legal or policy arguments do not justify it,” and he limited the authority of immigration judges and the BIA to order administrative closure to the specific cases where it is authorized in the Attorney General regulations or mandated by settlement agreement.
In the instant case, both the parties and amici agreed that neither the statutes nor the regulations explicitly delegate general administrative closure authority to immigration judges or the BIA. However, several of the amici ventured arguments in favor of the proposition that certain regulations give immigration judges and the BIA the implicit authority to administratively close cases. Some of these arguments tracked the Board's reasoning in Matter of Avetisyan, 25 I&N Dec. 688 (BIA 2012) [PDF version], and Matter of W-Y-U-, 27 I&N Dec. 17 (BIA 2017) [PDF version]. We discuss these decisions in our article on Matter of W-Y-U- [see article] and in one section of our first article on the instant decision [see section].
The primary arguments in favor of implicit administrative closure authority relied upon the Attorney General regulations setting forth the general authority of the immigration judges (8 C.F.R. 1003.10(b)) and BIA (8 C.F.R. 1003.1(d)(1)(ii)). The pertinent regulation authorizes immigration judges to “exercise their independent judgment and discretion and … take any action consistent with their authorities under the [INA] and regulations that is appropriate for the disposition of … cases.” The pertinent regulation similarly authorizes the BIA . However, the Attorney General noted that these regulations “do not stand alone,” but rather go on to specify the scope and details of the authority of immigration judges and the BIA. For example, the regulations authorize immigration judges and the BIA to administer oaths, receive evidence, examine witness, and issue subpoenas. Furthermore, both are directed to “resolve the questions before them in a timely and impartial manner consistent with the [INA] and regulations.” (Emphasis added by the Attorney General.) As we will see, the Attorney General found it significant that these regulations set forth specific powers of immigration judges and the BIA which do not include administrative closure but which do affirmatively direct them to resolve every case before them “in a timely … manner consistent with the [INA} and regulations.” It is important to note that the Board relied upon both of these regulations in Matter of Avetisyan and Matter of W-Y-U-.
Citing to several cases, the Attorney General found that Federal appellate courts have generally concluded that the above regulations empower the immigration courts and the BIA with “latitude” in conducting proceedings. See e.g., Ramirez-Durazo, 794 F.2d 491, 496 (9th Cir. 1986) [PDF version]. Yet, courts have also found that the regulations are not open-ended. In a notable example, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit concluded that 8 C.F.R. 1003.1(d)(1)(ii) does not “expressly or impliedly” grant “plenary power[s]” to the BIA in Sosa-Valenzuela v. Gonzales, 483 F.3d 1140, 1146-47 (10th Cir. 2007) [PDF version].
The Attorney General concluded that “[n]either section 1003.10(b) nor section 1003.1(d)(1)(ii) confers the authority to grant administrative closure.” First, he noted that the language allowing immigration judges and the BIA to take measures “appropriate and necessary for the disposition of such cases” would seem to preclude a measure that effectively suspends cases indefinitely. Furthermore, he found that the “in a timely fashion” requirement conflicts with the notion that immigration judges and the BIA may grant administrative closure. See the next subsection for an additional important point made by the Attorney General.
The Attorney General devoted a footnote in the decision to disagree with a specific conclusion in the published decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Baez-Sanchez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 854, 855 (7th Cir. 2017) [PDF version]. In that decision, the Seventh Circuit read 8 C.F.R. 1003.10(b) as “a declaration that [immigration judges] may exercise all of the Attorney General's powers 'in the cases that come before them'” absent some other regulation that explicitly says otherwise. The Attorney General concluded that this holding conflicts with the Attorney General regulations, which limit the authority of the immigration judges to taking only such actions as are “appropriate and necessary” to resolving cases consistent with existing statutes and regulations. He added that the interpretation of the Seventh Circuit “would also render superfluous other specific grants of authority,” citing as examples the regulations which authorize administrative closure in specific and limited circumstances.
This footnote is particularly interesting because the Seventh Circuit in Baez-Sanchez declined to follow the Board's published decision in Matter of Khan, 26 I&N Dec. 797 (BIA 2016) [PDF version]. To learn more about the cases, please see our full articles on Matter of Khan [see article] and Baez-Sanchez [see article].
The Attorney General explained that prior OPPMs by the Chief Immigration Judge discussing administrative closure “have simply assumed-based on Board precedent-that the authority exists.” He added that the Board in Matter of Avetisyan did not discuss the regulations set forth in this subsection, but rather relied on the regulations delegating general powers to immigration judges and the BIA.
The Attorney General explained that Federal appellate courts, when reviewing Board decisions involving administrative closure, have generally also simply “assumed that immigration judges and the Board have such authority.” For example, in Gonzalez-Caraveo v. Sessions, 882 F.3d 885, 890-91 (9th Cir. 2018) [PDF version], the Ninth Circuit followed Matter of Aveitisyan “and identified section 1003.1(d)(1)(ii) and section 1003.10(b) as sources for [administrative closure authority].” Thus, the Attorney General explained, this decision and other circuit decisions that reached similar conclusions are “best read as merely restating the Board's reasoning in Avetisyan rather than independently parsing the regulations.” To this effect, the Attorney General noted that Gonzalez-Coraveo relied upon the Ninth Circuit's earlier decision in Diaz-Covarrubias v. Mukasey in correctly noting that administrative closure has no basis in the statutes or regulations. The Attorney General listed several other decisions that employed similar analysis, which can be found on page 287 of his decision.
The Attorney General explained that reading the regulations as implying general administrative closure authority would conflict with regulatory provisions that specifically authorize administrative closure in limited cases.
The Attorney General found the language of 8 C.F.R. 1214.2(a), which provides that immigration judges may grant administrative closure in cases involving certain human trafficking victims, to be particularly relevant. He reasoned that if there was an implicit general administrative closure authority, the provision that immigration judges may grant administrative closure in these specific cases “would be superfluous.” Attorney General Sessions cited to several judicial decisions supporting this reading of the regulations. For example, a plurality of the Supreme Court in Yates v. United States, 135 S.Ct 1074, 1085 (2015) (plurality opinion) [PDF version], stated that “[w]e resist a reading of [the relevant statutory provision] that would render superfluous an entire provision passed in proximity as part of the same Act.” Here, the Attorney General concluded that there would be no need to grant by regulation the discretionary authority to administratively close certain cases if immigration judges already possessed the general authority to administratively close cases.
Attorney General Sessions briefly examined the regulations specifying the authority to grant continuances for immigration judges (8 C.F.R. 1003.29 and 1240.6). He noted that continuances are “the docket-management device that most resembles administrative closure.” The regulations permit the granting of continuances (reasonable adjournment) by immigration judges (1) at his or her instance, or (2) for good cause show upon application by one of the parties.
The Attorney General explained that continuances “temporarily defer a case for a fixed period while it remains on the docket.” He added that if the regulations are to be read as allowing administrative closure generally, which allows for the suspending of cases indefinitely and removing them from the active docket, “those same general authorizations would surely empower immigration judges to suspend cases for finite periods through continuances.” In short, he argued that general administrative closure authority would imply continuance authority, thus rendering the regulations authorizing continuances superfluous. He explained that he was bound to interpret the regulations in a matter that gives each regulation meaning, rather one that renders certain regulations unnecessary. Here, he again appealed to the Yates decision.
First, he noted that the INA gives the DHS “the exclusive authority to decide whether and when to initiate proceedings.” The Board recognized this point in Matter of W-Y-U-, 27 I&N Dec. at 19.
The Supreme Court held in INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 107 (1988) [PDF version], that the requirements of 8 C.F.R. 1003.10(b) reflect the “strong public interest in bringing litigation to a close as promptly as is consistent with the interest in giving the adversaries a fair opportunity to develop and present their respective cases.” The Supreme Court recognized in Doherty, 502 U.S. at 323, that delay generally works to the detriment of the Government. However, the Board noted in Matter of W-Y-U-, 27 I&N Dec. at 20, that delay may also work in certain cases to the detriment of aliens who may have avenues for obtaining lawful status is.
In the instant case, the Attorney General concluded that the immigration judge had been required to adjudicate the removal proceedings in absentia after the DHS established that it had provided sufficient notice to the respondent. Furthermore, the Attorney General held that even if the DHS had provided insufficient notice, the immigration judge should have either granted a continuance or terminated proceedings, and should not have ordered administrative closure. The Attorney General discussed the notice in the context of the specific case at 27 I&N Dec. at 291 & n.12.
The Attorney General added that Federal district courts employ administrative closure less frequently than did the immigration courts. Furthermore, administratively closed Federal cases “remain on an inactive docket and can be recalendared upon either party's request or at the court's discretion.” Here, he referred to the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in CitiFinancial Corp. v. Harrison, 453 F.3d 245, 250-51 (5th Cir. 2006) [PDF version]. By contrast in immigration cases, administratively closed cases are halted indefinitely, not tracked, and only recalendared if the party seeking recalendaring satisfies its burden of demonstrating a good reason to resume proceedings, per Matter of W-Y-U-, 27 I&N Dec. at 17-18 & n.4.
In the portion of Matter of Castro-Tum discussed in this article, the Attorney General concluded that there exists no general administrative closure authority for immigration judges and the BIA. With this decision, the Attorney General moved to create a rule for the disposition of outstanding cases that were administratively closed without requisite authority. To learn about his new rule, please see our third and final article in this series of articles about the decision [see article].

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.