Source: http://fl.bna.com/fl/19980922/20891.htm
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 14:40:26+00:00

Document:
In re Marriage of BERNADETTE and EVANGELIS BABAUTA.
Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Orange County, Robert D. Monarch, Judge. Affirmed.
Michael J. Naughton for Appellant.
Stuart W. Knight for Respondent.
At the time the parties divorced, Evangelis was a captain in the Marine Corps. Their 1991 dissolution judgment reserved the court's jurisdiction over Evangelis's military retirement pension.
Evangelis was eligible for retirement in 1995. In 1993, he took advantage of a voluntary separation program implemented pursuant to a Department of Defense (DOD) policy to reduce active duty forces. Two different benefits are provided for in 10 United States Code section 1175: VSI, consisting of monthly payments; or a lump sum payment--"Special Separation Benefit" (SSB). The DOD brochure explains a member is potentially eligible if, inter alia, he or she has fewer than 20 years of service. It warns, "If you are in a career field, pay grade, or year group for which your Service has more people than it needs[,] . . . you can expect to be offered the chance to elect one of the voluntary separation incentives before you are exposed to the possibility of involuntary separation."
Evangelis decided to forego his retirement pay, instead choosing to receive 36 annual VSI payments of $17,721. Not surprisingly, Bernadette argued the payments are community property and Evangelis claimed they are his separate property. The trial court ruled in Bernadette's favor, explaining, "[T]hese benefits resulted from a change in the form of the benefits to which [Evangelis] was already entitled even though he is receiving these earlier than provided in the original benefits package."
In McCarty v. McCarty (1981) 453 U.S. 210, our Supreme Court held state courts were without jurisdiction to divide federal military pensions. Thereafter, Congress wasted no time in enacting the Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act (USFSPA). (10 U.S.C. § 1408.) Pursuant to the USFSPA, state courts may divide a service member's disposable retired pay according to the laws of that state.
Evangelis argues VSI payments do not qualify as disposable retired pay because they are not "monthly retirement payments paid to a retired service member." Stated another way, he maintains Congress never intended VSI benefits to be subject to state court jurisdiction. He is wrong.See footnote 2 Indeed, the DOD brochure provides, "The treatment of VSI or SSB [by a state court in a divorce] is not dictated by Federal law. It will be up to the state courts to rule on the divisibility of these incentives."
That does not end our discussion. Having determined VSI benefits are subject to trial court jurisdiction, we still must decide their character. Evangelis argues VSI pay is separate property because it is a "cushion for job loss and job dislocation[,] as opposed to payment for past services rendered." Perhaps, but as the California Supreme Court recently explained in In re Marriage of Lehman, supra, 18 Cal.4th 169, an employer's motivation for the payment of benefits and an employee's reason for accepting them are irrelevant considerations in characterizing employment benefits.
The trial court did not err in finding it had jurisdiction to divide the VSI benefit and in characterizing it as community property.
The order is affirmed. Bernadette shall recover her costs on appeal.
Footnote: 1 At oral argument, Evangelis acknowledged he challenged the court's right to divide the benefit and if we found the court had the right to do so, then he questioned its characterization. He maintained it was separate property, but conceded if we determined it was community then Bernadette is entitled to half.
Footnote: 2 Evangelis relies on In re Marriage of Kuzmiak (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 1152 and In re Marriage of Costo (1984) 156 Cal.App.3d 781. Kuzmiak is inapt because it does not deal with the issue of a state court's right to divide a military benefit. And in any event, in light of In re Marriage of Lehman (1998) 18 Cal.4th 169, which we discuss infra, we question whether either Kuzmiak or Costo would be decided the same today.
Footnote: 3 Those cases are: In re Marriage of Crawford (Ariz.Ct.App. 1994) 884 P.2d 210; Kelson v. Kelson (Fla. 1996) 675 So.2d 1370; Blair v. Blair (Mont. 1995) 894 P.2d 958; Pavatt v. Pavatt (Okl.Ct.App. 1996) 920 P.2d 1074; Kulscar v. Kulscar (Okl.Ct.App. 1995) 896 P.2d 1206; Fisher v. Fisher (S.C.Ct.App. 1995) 462 S.E.2d 303; Marsh v. Wallace (Tex.Ct.App. 1996) 924 S.W.2d 423.
Only McClure v. McClure (Ohio 1994) 647 N.E.2d 832 has held otherwise. There, a service member chose VSI rather than subject himself to involuntary dismissal.

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