Source: http://wv.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20180309_0000281.SWV.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 14:50:24+00:00

Document:
This action arises from a dispute between Plaintiff Anthony Long (“Long”) and his loan servicer, Defendant Nationstar Mortgage, LLC (“Nationstar”), regarding allegations of illegal debt collection.
Nationstar filed the present motion for partial summary judgment on October 19, 2017, as to Long's first, third, fourth, sixth, and seventh individual claims, and, in part, on Long's second individual claim insofar as they are the based on allegations that were the subject of the class settlement. (ECF No. 76 at 2.) Nationstar also requests summary judgment on Long's class claims, contending that Long cannot represent a class of individuals who were charged attorneys' fees because Long was never charged attorneys' fees. (Id. at 3.) Long subsequently filed a partial motion for summary judgment as to his class claims. (ECF No. 80.) Timely responses and replies were filed in both motions. (ECF No. 83; ECF No. 86; ECF No. 90; ECF No. 95.) Accordingly, both motions are fully briefed and ripe for review.
On October 27, 2017, Long filed a motion for class certification under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a), 23(b)(2)-(b)(3) seeking to certify a class composed of individuals who suffered the injuries alleged in his class claims. (ECF No. 78.) Nationstar filed a timely response in opposition to Long's motion, (ECF No. 89), and Long filed a timely reply. (ECF No. 94.) As such, that motion is also fully briefed and ripe for review.
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs motions for summary judgment. That rule provides, in relevant part, that summary judgment should be granted if “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact.” Summary judgment is inappropriate, however, if there exist factual issues that reasonably may be resolved in favor of either party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). “Facts are ‘material' when they might affect the outcome of the case, and a ‘genuine issue' exists when the evidence would allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” News & Observer Publ. Co. v. Raleigh-Durham Airport Auth., 597 F.3d 570, 576 (4th Cir. 2010). When construing such factual issues, the Court must view the evidence “in the light most favorable to the [party opposing summary judgment].” Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970).
The moving party may meet its burden of showing that no genuine issue of fact exists by use of “depositions, answers to interrogatories, answers to requests for admission, and various documents submitted under request for production.” Barwick v. Celotex Corp., 736 F.2d 946, 958 (4th Cir. 1984). Once the moving party has met its burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to “make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). If a party fails to make a sufficient showing on one element of that party's case, the failure of proof “necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Id. at 323.
“[A] party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment may not rest upon mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 256. “The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence” in support of the nonmoving party is not enough to withstand summary judgment; the judge must ask whether “the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Id. at 252.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c)(1) “affords a district court discretion to rule on a summary judgment motion before ruling on a class certification motion.” Rhodes v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 657 F.Supp.2d 751, 756 (S.D. W.Va. 2011); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1) (Adv. Comm. Note (2003)). Accordingly, the Court will address the cross-motions for summary judgment prior to the motion for class certification because a decision on the merits necessarily affects the decision on class certification. See Delebreau v. Bayview Loan Serv., LLC., 770 F.Supp.2d 813, 818-19 (S.D. W.Va. 2011); Rhodes, 657 F.Supp.2d at 756.
Cross-motions for summary judgment are reviewed separately if material facts are in dispute. Rossignol v. Voorhaar, 316 F.3d 516, 523 (4th Cir. 2003). Here, because material facts are in dispute, the Court will address each motion separately. Nationstar's partial motion for summary judgment seeks judgment as a matter of law on Long's individual and class claims while Long's partial motion for summary judgment only seeks judgment as a matter of law as to his class claims. As such, the Court will address Nationstar's motion before turning to Long's motion.
In his Amended Complaint, Long alleges seven individual claims against Nationstar. (See ECF No. 20.) As stated above, claims one through four and, in part, six and seven of Long's Amended Complaint survived Nationstar's motion to dismiss. In its partial motion for summary judgment Nationstar seeks judgment as a matter of law on Long's individual and class claims. The court will address Nationstar's arguments as to Long's individual claims first.
Nationstar contends that Long's first, fourth, sixth, seventh, and, in part, second and third individual claims are barred by res judicata due to the Triplett Settlement discussed above. Nationstar further offers arguments pertaining to specific claims as to why it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The Court will address the res judicata argument first before turning to Nationstar's other, claim specific arguments.
First, there must have been a final adjudication on the merits in the prior action by a court having jurisdiction of the proceedings. Second, the two actions must involve either the same parties or persons in privity with those same parties. Third, the cause of action identified for resolution in the subsequent proceeding either must be identical to the cause of action determined in the prior action or must be such that it could have been resolved, had it been presented, in the prior action.
Blake v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., Inc., 498 S.E.2d 41, 44 ( W.Va. 1997). In reviewing these factors, the Fourth Circuit noted that “[t]he preclusive affect of a prior judgment extends beyond claims or defenses actually presented in previous litigation.” Meekins v. United Transp. Union, 946 F.2d 1054, 1057 (4th Cir. 1991). Furthermore, “[t]he doctrine of res judicata bars claims that were ‘raised and fully litigated' as well as claims that could have been litigated in the prior proceeding, ‘regardless of whether they were asserted or determined.'” Fugate v. Frontier W.Va., Inc., No. 2:17-cv-00559, 2017 WL 3065216, at *3 (S.D. W.Va. 2017) (quoting Peugeot Motors of Am., Inc. v. E. Auto Distribs., Inc., 892 F.2d 355, 359 (4th Cir. 1989)).

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