Source: https://www.scribd.com/document/305267460/Sebastian-Brown-v-Muzooka-trademark-use-in-commerce-pdf
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 08:14:00+00:00

Document:
Plaintiff Sebastian Brown Productions, LLC (Plaintiff) sues Defendant Muzooka, Inc.
GRANTS Defendants motion to dismiss with prejudice.
Plaintiff is a California limited liability company headquartered in Livermore, California.
FAC 1. Plaintiff owns and operates the digital media storefront MuZook at muzook.com. Id.
animated short and feature films together with streaming live or recorded audio and video. Id. 8.
Through MuZook, Plaintiff advertises and sells downloadable music, videos, and books. Id. 9.
sell the multimedia produced by the artists collaboration program on muzook.com. Id. 7.
music and illustrations in works of fiction and non-fiction. FAC 11.
goodwill of the business symbolized by the Marks, and all registrations and applications therefor.
Office (PTO) issued Miller U.S. Patent No. 9,171,179 for this system. Id.
No. 69 (Defendants Request for Judicial Notice, or RJN) Ex. B.
and tablets. RJN Ex. B.
time to file a statement of use).
were not transferred by the October 1, 2011 assignment. Id.
July 14 and 18, 2013. RJN Ex. A. The contents of these statements of use are not in the record.
Mark, it is clear that the PTO relied on the statement of use filed on August 21, 2013.
website and mobile app. Id. 20, 2324.
the registration, the Muzooka Mark was first used in commerce on December 2, 2011. Id.
(3) unfair competition under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1125(a). Id. 3954.
that Plaintiff failed to properly serve Wilson and Aldridge, and extended the time for service. Id.
Plaintiffs claims to the extent that Plaintiff attempted to state a claim for secondary liability. Id.
because the PTO listed Millernot Plaintiffas the owner of the registered mark. Id. at 1516.
common law trademark infringement and Lanham Act unfair competition claims.
deficiencies identified in this Order will result in a dismissal with prejudice. Id. at 19.
counterclaim. ECF No 70. On January 12, 2016, Plaintiff opposed Defendants motion. ECF No.
71. Defendant replied on January 19, 2016. ECF No. 74.
On March 10, 2016, Plaintiff corrected one of the exhibits attached to the FAC. ECF No.
F.3d 1058, 1061 (9th Cir. 2005).
Defendant filed both an answer and a counterclaim. See ECF No. 68 (instant motion); ECF No.
plead enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Bell Atl. Corp. v.
defendant has acted unlawfully. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
dismiss. Adams v. Johnson, 355 F.3d 1179, 1183 (9th Cir. 2004).
technicalities. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (citation omitted).
522, 532 (9th Cir. 2008) (alteration in original).
exhibits attached to the complaint, and matters properly subject to judicial notice. Akhtar v.
does not reach below. The Court does not rely on the declarations for the instant motion.
complaint, unless the exhibits are properly subject to judicial notice. Akhtar, 698 F.3d at 1212.
attachment of these two exhibits to the opposition as a request for judicial notice.
is a matter of public record and the proper subject of judicial notice. Lee, 250 F.3d at 689.
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs request for judicial notice of Millers patent.
Court DENIES Plaintiffs request for judicial notice of Millers declaration.
(unfair competition under the Lanham Act).
An ownership interest in a mark is demonstrated through priority of use. See Wood, 375 F.
industry and market or within the senior users natural zone of expansion. Id. at 1047.
Zobmondo Entmt, LLC v. Falls Media, LLC, 602 F.3d 1108, 1111 n.3 (9th Cir. 2010).
to have been used in commerce before a protectible [sic] ownership interest in the mark arises.
infringement claim may only establish priority based on the actual use of the mark. See id.
use in commerce of the Muzooka Mark was in December 2011. See Opp. at 2.
interest in the Muzook Mark.
in commerce, and then turns to Plaintiffs constructive-use of the Muzook Mark.
the Muzook Mark, established by the federal registration of the Muzook Mark. See Opp. at 8.
the trademark . . . .).
determine whether Plaintiff has priority over Defendant.
November 8, 2015. Id. 17.
trademark infringement claim. See Wood, 375 F. Supp. 2d at 94748.
on this date because the assignment of the intent-to-use application to Plaintiff violates 15 U.S.C.
1060(a)(1), and therefore the application and resulting registration are void.
portion thereof, to which the mark pertains, if that business is ongoing and existing.
applicant, or portion thereof, to which the mark pertains, if that business is ongoing and existing.
(citing Clorox Co. v. Chemical Bank, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1098, 1104 (TTAB 1996) (precedential)).
publication, see 15 U.S.C. 1051(c), or a statement of use when filed after, see 15 U.S.C.
refer to amendment to allege use and statement of use).
statement of use was filed until August 21, 2013almost two years after the assignment.
which the mark pertains, if that business is ongoing and existing. 15 U.S.C. 1060(a)(1).
expectations, Grupo Gigante SA De CV v. Dallo & Co., Inc., 391 F.3d 1088, 1095 (9th Cir.
has been filed shall be assignable with the good will of the business in which the mark is used.
6732907, at *7 n.18 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 27, 2012) (noting that the law is not clear on this point).
recited in the application. 2008 WL 8973295, at *2 (TTAB July 17, 2008) (non-precedential).
a trademark symbolizes.); Greene v. Ab Coaster Holdings, Inc., 2012 WL 4442749, at *9 (S.D.
Ohio Sept. 25, 2012) (concluding that assignment requires transfer of goodwill); Fitzpatrick v.
trademark is assigned in gross, without its accompanying goodwill, the assignment is invalid.).
was not a successor to MRCOGs business and the assignment violated 1060(a)(1). Id. at *6.
found that the assignment violated 1060(a)(1). Id.
and existing business, or portion thereof, for each of the goods in an intent to use application.
some of the goods or services in the application is sufficient.
is no allegation that Miller provided each of the services in the original intent-to-use application.
allegation of use is filed, or to the successor of the applicants ongoing and existing business).
only use in the marketplace can establish a mark); Conversive, Inc. v. Conversagent, Inc., 433 F.
goodwill associated with the mark.); Jim Henson Prods. v. John T. Brady & Assocs., 867 F.
goodwill or an ongoing and existing business to assign.
Mark and is entitled to the constructive-use date established by the registration.
can not establish that a business was ongoing and existing before the October 2011 assignment.
in commerceestablish only that Miller intended to use the Muzook Mark in a future business.
([T]rademark rights are not conveyed through mere intent to use a mark commercially.).
at *3 (E.D. Cal. June 19, 1989), affd E. & J. Gallo Winery, 967 F.2d 1280.
music, and film clips, and negotiated for the production of a Cab Calloway Broadway musical).
and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. Fed. R.
Source Grp., 2015 WL 5118509, at *13 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2015).
purposes intended by the applicant at the time of the applicants trademark application. See Opp.
commerce or that the Muzook Mark accrued goodwill prior to the assignment.
a trademark must include the associated goodwill. Fitzpatrick, 2010 WL 3377500, at *2.
Muzook Mark complied with 1060(a)(1).
second assignment of the Muzook Mark from Miller to Plaintiff, dated December 7, 2015.
assignment was confirmed on December 7, 2015 in an assignment specifically conveying Reg.
instant motion, Plaintiff provided no explanation for the delay. See id.
related to the Mark available to assign in December 2015.
Act, plaintiff must allege ownership of a trademark).
Prof. Code 17200. Each prong of the UCL provides a separate and distinct theory of liability.
Inc. Data Breach Litig., 2016 WL 589760, at *17 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2016).
Plaintiff does not dispute, see generally Opp.
1190, 1201 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (citing Nelson v. Intl Paint Co., 716 F.2d 640, 643 (9th Cir. 1983)).
confusion. Nissan Motor Co. v. Nissan Computer Corp., 89 F. Supp. 2d 1154 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
1255, 126364 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Jackson v. Sturkie, 255 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1106 (N.D. Cal.
congruent to claims made under the Lanham Act, and considering all claims together).
amendment, [and] futility of amendment. See Leadsinger, 512 F.3d at 532.
this Order will result in a dismissal with prejudice of Plaintiffs claims. ECF No. 64 at 19.
prejudice. See Leadsinger, 512 F.3d at 532.

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