Source: https://caselaw.findlaw.com/tx-court-of-criminal-appeals/1896539.html?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+FindLawTXCrimApp+%28FindLaw+Case+Law+Updates+-+TX+Crim+App%29
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 18:37:49+00:00

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To be sure, the fact that we previously adopted one understanding of language affecting the “degree of the offense” does not mean that we are inescapably bound to that understanding. “If a prior decision was poorly reasoned or unworkable, we do not achieve the goals sought through reliance upon stare decisis by continuing to follow that precedent.”23 And, as the majority rightly points out, when Calton said “[t]here can be no enhancement until a person is first convicted of an offense of a certain degree,” it failed to cite any authority for that proposition.24 But this lack of citation should be seen as a failure of annotation, rather than of logic; it proves neither that Calton was poorly reasoned nor that its central thesis is unworkable.
So the Legislature evidently intends that any fact issue affecting the “degree of offense” will ordinarily be resolved at the time that the defendant is “convicted,” i.e., at the moment he is adjudicated guilty of an offense by the jury.35 This amply supports Calton's assertion that “[t]here can be no enhancement until a person is first convicted of an offense of a certain degree.”36 And it means that the evidence necessary to resolve any such fact issue should be submitted to the jury before any adjudication of guilt.
Of course, as the majority ably demonstrates,37 there are clearly expressed exceptions to this general legislative preference for cementing the “degree of offense for which the defendant was convicted” in the guilt phase of trial.38 But the important question is what rule the Court should adopt in the absence of such a clear indication of legislative intent. I think that our jurisprudence would be better served, and the lower courts' future interpretive endeavors made easier, by adopting a bright-line rule:39 Absent clearly expressed legislative intent to the contrary, when a penal provision states that proof of a particular fact affects the degree of offense (e.g., “is a Class A misdemeanor”), rather than just the applicable punishment range (“is punishable as a Class A misdemeanor”), that fact must be proven in the guilt phase of trial. This rule, applied to the language of Penal Code Section 49.09(a), means that a defendant's single prior DWI conviction must be proven in the guilt phase of a second-offense DWI trial.
I would affirm the court of appeals for so concluding. Because the majority reverses the court of appeals, I respectfully dissent.
1. 176 S.W.3d 231, 233 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
4. Id. at 234 (“To sustain a conviction, all the elements of the offense must be proved at guilt.”); but see id. at 237 (Womack, J., dissenting) (“[A] mere requirement of proof does not an element make.”).
6. TEX. PENAL CODE § 49.09(a).
7. Calton, 176 S.W.3d at 232 (prior-conviction provision within the former evading arrest statute “must be proved at the guilt stage of trial because the statute presents it as an element of the offense”).
8. Majority Opinion at 9.
11. Calton, 176 S.W.3d at 233–34.
19. See id. at 233.
20. Obiter Dictum, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2009).
21. Compare TEX. PENAL CODE § 49.09(a), and TEX. PENAL CODE § 38.04(b)(2)(A) (West 2004) (each stating that, upon proof of certain facts, the resulting offense “is” a higher degree than it otherwise would have been), with TEX. PENAL CODE § 12.42(a) et seq. (stating that, upon proof of certain facts, “the defendant shall be punished” according to a range that is higher than it otherwise would have been).
22. Calton, 176 S.W.3d at 233–34.
23. Febus v. State, __ S.W.3d __, 2018 WL 850336, at *6 (Tex. Crim. App. Feb. 14, 2018).
24. See Majority Opinion at 9; Calton, 176 S.W.3d at 233–34.
25. Cf. Ex parte Keller, 173 S.W.3d 492, 498 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (“Under the normal rules of statutory construction, there is a presumption of statutory consistency. That is, a word or phrase that is used within a single statute generally bears the same meaning throughout that statute[.]”) (citations omitted).
26. TEX. PENAL CODE § 49.09(b).
27. Gibson v. State, 995 S.W.2d 693, 696 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).
28. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 36.01.
29. Tamez v. State, 11 S.W.3d 198, 201 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (“Article 36.01 ․ merely proscribes the reading of prior convictions that are enhancements only. Thus, standing alone, article 36.01 does not dispose of the issues, either.”).
30. Keller, 173 S.W.3d at 498 (quoting Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc., 513 U.S. 561, 570 (1995)).
31. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 42.01, § 1(14).
33. Ex parte White, 506 S.W.3d 39, 42–43 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016).
34. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 42.01, § 1 (“A judgment is the written declaration of the court signed by the trial judge and entered of record showing the conviction or acquittal of the defendant. The sentence served shall be based on the information contained in the judgment.”).
35. Id. § 1(14); see also TEX. PENAL CODE §§ 12.21–12.35 (each stating that an individual “adjudged guilty of” an offense of a particular degree “shall be punished” according to the sentencing ranges therein described).
36. Calton, 176 S.W.3d at 233–34.
37. Majority Opinion at 14–15.
38. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 42.01, § 1(14).
39. Cf. Zarychta v. State, 44 S.W.3d 155, 162 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. ref'd) (“The law prefers, where possible, bright-line rules.”).
KEASLER, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which YEARY, J., joined.

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