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Timestamp: 2019-04-23 00:13:23+00:00

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Judgment - Res Judicata - Collateral Estoppel - Purpose. The purpose of collateral estoppel by judgment is to preclude parties or their privies from relitigating an issue that has been finally determined by a court of competent jurisdiction after the party against whom the estoppel is claimed has had the opportunity to fairly and fully present his case.
 Same - Res Judicata - Collateral Estoppel - Ambiguous Judgment. An ambiguous or inconsistent judgment cannot be the basis for an estoppel by judgment.
 Same - Res Judicata - Collateral Estoppel - Identity of Issues. For collateral estoppel by judgment to be applicable, the facts or issues claimed to be conclusive on the parties in the second action must have been actually and necessarily litigated and determined in the prior action.
 Same - Res Judicata - Collateral Estoppel - Unjust Effect. Collateral estoppel by judgment will not be applied so as to work an injustice.
 Interest - Unliquidated Claim - Determinable. Interest may be properly allowed on claims which can be determined by ordinary computation; the interest running from the date the claim accrued.
 Evidence - Parol Evidence - Admissibility. Testimony as to a prior oral agreement is not admissible to vary the terms of a written agreement which is complete and not ambiguous.
Cross-appeals from a judgment of the Superior Court for King County, No. 633244, Donald L. Gaines, J., entered January 5, 1966. Affirmed.
«*» Reported in 431 P.2d 961.
Am. Jur., Judgments (rev. ed. § 328).
Action to recover sales commissions. Appeals taken from a judgment partially in favor of the plaintiff.
Helsell, Paul, Fetterman, Todd & Hokanson, Russell V. Hokanson, and Allan D. Loucks, for appellant.
Beresford & Booth, by Robert O. Beresford and Donald P. Lehne, for respondent and cross-appellant.
This is an action to recover commissions alleged to be owing to the plaintiff, J.
A. Henderson, by the defendant, Bardahl International Corporation.
shall remain a distributor of Bardahl, whichever period shall be the shorter.
At the time this agreement was executed Geddes had become the exclusive distributor of "Bardahl Concentrate" under contracts of indefinite duration in the following territories, among others: Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Casa Blanca and Morocco, France, Germany, Italy and South Africa.
At that time also there was in the process of negotiation between Geddes and Bardahl a 5-year-distributorship contract. However, differences between them culminated in a notice to the attorneys for Geddes on or about the 26th day of May, 1959, advising that the proposed 5-year contract would not be executed by Bardahl and that the Geddes distributorship would be terminated. Thereafter, by letter received on or about the 28th day of July, 1959, in Florence, Italy, Bardahl notified Geddes that his distributorship was terminated "effective immediately."
In September, 1960, Geddes brought an action in King County against Bardahl, making five claims aggregating $1,637,121.76. A supplemental complaint filed on February 16, 1962, added two claims aggregating $26,899.55.
The case came on for trial on May 14, 1963, and continued through July 19, 1963. The trial court found that the distributorship contract between Bardahl and Geddes "was a contract of indefinite duration, since no termination date was mentioned in any of the correspondence which evidences said contract." The findings, with reference to the termination of the distributorship, were that Geddes had been notified through his attorney on May 26, 1959, that the proposed 5-year-distributorship contract would not be signed, and that all his rights would be terminated; and that on or about the 28th day of July, 1959, he was "given written notice of cancellation of the distributorship contract, effective immediately."
days, instead of the sixty-day notice«2» given by defendants [Bardahl]. (Finding No. 11) Geddes recovered a judgment of $55,498.30. We regard the division of those damages as highly significant.
$19,849.97 represented profits Geddes should have made on sales prior to the termination of the contract.«3» At this point it is clear that the trial court in the Geddes case regarded the Geddes contract as terminated by the letter received in Florence July 28, 1959. This is further confirmed by the next item of damage.
«2» The 60 days can relate only to the time between May 26, 1959 and July 28, 1959; see footnote 5.
«5» The appellant Henderson asserts in his brief that the trial court in the Geddes case "specifically found" that the contract between Geddes and Bardahl was "terminated as of August 24, 1959." We find no reference to August 24, 1959, in the findings, conclusions and judgment in that case. The only way that date comes into the case is by the computation indicated.
«7» The parties stipulated that there would be no appeal from this judgment.
«8» There were numerous distributorship agreements between Geddes and Bardahl covering different territories, but there is absolutely nothing in the record to indicate that the one relating to Brazil was any different than the others with reference to the term of its duration, i.e., it was a "contract of indefinite duration." Concededly only one termination date is claimed for all of Geddes' distributorships.
was no concentrate manufactured and sold in Brazil after the 3,788 gallons in March or April, 1959, until during or after September, 1959, subsequent, of course, to August 24, 1959, which Henderson claims was the termination date of the Geddes contract. Henderson does not endeavor to meet this testimony, but takes the position that it should not have been admitted because the parties were bound by the findings in the Geddes case: that 13,851 gallons of concentrate was sold in Brazil "during the period covered by plaintiff's [Geddes] contract."
It will be remembered that the contract between Henderson and Bardahl (quoted in the second paragraph of this opinion) provided that Henderson should receive $1.10 on every gallon of Bardahl concentrate sold by Geddes until May 31, 1962, or for so long as Geddes shall remain a distributor of Bardahl, whichever period shall be the shorter.
The pivotal question in this case becomes: When did Geddes cease to be a distributor for Bardahl?
«9» We again note the fact that this was more than 60 days after May 26, 1959, when notice had been given that the Geddes distributorship would be terminated.
allowed Henderson his $1.10 on each gallon of Bardahl concentrate sold by or through Geddes or his subdistributors prior to July 28, 1959, and not previously accounted for. This included 3,788 gallons sold in Brazil which had been ordered in March or April, 1959. The trial court, holding that Geddes ceased to be a distributor of Bardahl on July 28, 1959, refused to give judgment for the additional $12,097.80 which Henderson claimed as his commission on the sales of Bardahl concentrate subsequent to that date. Actually, as heretofore indicated, there were no sales in Brazil subsequent to the 3,788 gallons until September, 1959 or later (probably November, 1959).
Henderson urges that in the Geddes case the trial court found that Geddes continued as a distributor for Bardahl until August 24, 1959, and that Bardahl is now estopped by that finding from asserting in this case that the distributorship terminated on July 28, 1959.
 The purpose of collateral estoppel by judgment is to preclude parties or their privies from relitigating an issue that has been finally determined by a court of competent jurisdiction after the party against whom the estoppel is claimed has had the opportunity to fairly and fully present his case. We have recently discussed the philosophy and the purpose of collateral estoppel by judgment in Bordeaux v. Ingersoll Rand Co., 71 Wn.2d 392, 429 P.2d 207 (1967). See also Walsh v. Wolff, 32 Wn.2d 285, 201 P.2d 215 (1949); 1B J. Moore, Federal Practice § 0.441(2), p. 3779 (2d ed.).
«10» Brainerd Currie in 9 Stan. L. Rev. 281, 282 (1957), "Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel: Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine," and in 53 Cal. L. Rev. 25 (1965) "Civil Procedure: The Tempest Brews."
We recognize that there are many cases where the issues of mutuality, privity, and the offensive-defensive distinction should not be permitted to obstruct the application of collateral estoppel by judgment. However, it is unnecessary to consider those issues in the present case, intriguing as they may be, because we are convinced that the trial court properly found collateral estoppel by judgment inapplicable. We would agree with the trial court for three basic reasons.
First: Certain findings and the judgment in the Geddes case are ambiguous and confusing, and not decisive of the issue as to the date of the termination of the Geddes distributorship.
«11» It is to be noted that Henderson was not a party in the Geddes case; that, as plaintiff, the only weapon in his legal arsenal on this appeal is his claim that Bardahl is estopped by the judgment and findings in the Geddes case to again litigate the issue of when the Geddes distributorship terminated.
«12» Offensively: Miller v. St. Regis Paper Co., 60 Wn.2d 484, 374 P.2d 675 (1962); Prince v. Saginaw Logging Co., 197 Wash. 4, 84 P.2d 397 (1932).
Defensively: Shoopman v. Calvo, 63 Wn.2d 627, 388 P.2d 559 (1964).
for profits on sales made direct to his subdistributors prior to the termination of the contract; and awarded him $12,821 as additional profits which he would have earned had he received a 90-day notice of termination instead of a 60-day notice.
In short, the trial court in the Geddes case regarded July 28, 1959, as the date of the termination in the Geddes distributorship, but because it found Geddes had not received adequate notice of the intent to terminate his distributorship he was permitted to recover the profits he would have made if he had received reasonable notice (90 days) of intent to terminate.
The only language used by the trial court in the Geddes findings which gives any support to Henderson's contention is finding No. 11, with reference to the Brazilian sales, which we have quoted in footnote 6. Recovery was permitted to Geddes of $1 per gallon on the 13,851 gallons of concentrate manufactured and sold in Brazil "during the period covered by plaintiff's [Geddes] contract." While Geddes' contract with Bardahl relative to Brazil limited him to only $1 a gallon on the Brazilian sales, no difference is pointed out with reference to Bardahl's right to terminate that distributorship when and as it did.
And, where, because of the ambiguity or indefiniteness of the verdict or judgment, the appellate court cannot say that the issue was determined in the prior action, collateral estoppel will not be applied as to that issue. This is supported by Hamm v. Camerota, 48 Wn.2d 34, 290 P.2d 713 (1955); Rufener v. Scott, 46 Wn.2d 240, 280 P.2d 253 (1955); Braley Motor Co. v. Northwest Cas. Co., 184 Wash. 47, 49 P.2d 911 (1935).
Second: The same issue was not necessarily decided in the Geddes and Henderson actions.
 It is axiomatic that for collateral estoppel by judgment to be applicable, that the facts or issues claimed to be conclusive on the parties in the second action were actually and necessarily litigated and determined in the prior action. Ira v. Columbia Food Co., 226 Ore. 566, 360 P.2d 622, 86 A.L.R.2d 1378 (1961); The Evergreens v. Nunan 141 F.2d 927 (2d Cir. 1944), 152 A.L.R. 1187.
The trial court in the instant case had to decide when the Geddes distributorship terminated, and the parties to the Henderson-Bardahl contract had a right to be heard on that issue. For the purposes of that contract, Henderson's right to a commission on the Geddes sales of concentrate was to end when the latter's distributorship terminated.
For the purposes of the Geddes-Bardahl-distributorship contract, Geddes' right to recover for lost profits continued, so the trial court found in the Geddes case even after the actual termination and for a period sufficient to total 90 days from the notice of intent to terminate, given on May 26, 1959. The trial court in that case was concerned with the question of what was a reasonable notice of intent to terminate prior to the actual termination.
period covered by the Geddes-Bardahl contract 13,851 gallons were manufactured and sold in Brazil - is manifestly an error. As we have indicated, the unchallenged testimony is that after the 3,788 gallons were manufactured and sold in March or April, 1959, no other Bardahl concentrate was manufactured and sold in Brazil until at least September (probably November), 1959. The appellant Henderson does not dispute this testimony, but says that it should not have been admitted because the trial court in the Geddes case had found that 13,851 gallons had been manufactured and sold while the Geddes contract was in effect.
 This would be an $11,069.30 windfall for Henderson by estoppel, and a corresponding loss to Bardahl.
[T]his Court, among others, has gone so far as to hold that it will not invoke the doctrine of res adjudicata if to do so would work injustice. The propriety of such ruling can not be questioned when one reflects upon the fact that the primary purpose for which our courts were created is to administer justice. (Beverly Beach Properties, Inc. v. Nelson, 68 So.2d 604, 607, 41 A.L.R.2d 1071 (1953)).
It is generally recognized that the doctrine of res judicata (and this applies to that branch known as collateral estoppel by judgment) is not to be applied so rigidly as to defeat the ends of justice, or to work an injustice. DiCarlo v. Angeloni, 3 Cal. 2d 225, 44 P.2d 562, 99 A.L.R. 990 (1935). See 30A Am. Jur. Judgments, § 325.
Our conclusion is that the trial court in the present case properly held that the Geddes-Bardahl distributorship was terminated on July 28, 1959, and awarded to the plaintiff Henderson all the relief to which he was entitled.
$3,267 for commissions paid to him on 84 drums of concentrate, which Bardahl had sold to Geddes but which Bardahl subsequently had to buy back from him.
There seems to be merit to Henderson's contention that the defendant Bardahl International Corporation did not have such an assignment of this claim from Bardahl Manufacturing Corporation as would entitle it to maintain an action for the refund, or to use it as an offset. However, we prefer to dispose of the matter on the merits.
Mr. Simpson testified very forthrightly what happened.
Now, we find this situation: These products were sold to Mr. Geddes and they were paid for and they belonged to Mr. Geddes. This is not a case where products were turned back for credit and products taken in place or anything of that sort. Mr. Simpson had to buy this fellow out, good or bad, to get rid of him. This was not a case of either obligation on the part of Mr. Bardahl to take them back nor a right of Mr. Geddes for any credits or anything of that sort. This was a straight buy out, as I see it, of products that Geddes may have allowed to become contaminated and things of that sort.
There seems to be no reason to disagree with the analysis of the trial court.
2. Claim that no interest should be allowed on the items making up the judgment awarded Henderson: Henderson's judgment for $8,583.30 was made up of items due him; and the dates on which Bardahl had received payment on each item was established.
established the number of gallons purchased; the dates on which payments were made by "Geddes or by some person acting by, through or under Geddes or a subdistributor of Geddes." All that was needed was simple arithmetic - a multiplication of the number of gallons sold by $1.10, and the computation of interest from the date Bardahl received the payment. Bardahl's further complex relationship with Geddes had no bearing on these specific items due Henderson.
We agree with Bardahl that a written agreement may be modified by a subsequent oral agreement between the parties.
 The oral agreement, which Bardahl offered to prove, was prior to the execution of the written commission agreement of January 22, 1959, on which this action is based. The agreement is complete in itself and not ambiguous; there is no claim of accident, mistake or fraud. The trial court properly refused to admit parol testimony to vary the written agreement. Thomesen v. Hales, 52 Wn.2d 741, 328 P.2d 697 (1958).
This is closely related to the attempt to introduce evidence of an agreement by Henderson to waive his commissions on concentrate sold in Brazil. This is the commission on the 3,788 gallons of concentrate manufactured and sold in Brazil before the termination of the Geddes distributorship July 28, 1959. There is no evidence to sustain an agreement by Henderson to waive this commission.
On both the appeal and the cross-appeal the judgment appealed from is affirmed.

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