Source: http://nv.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20180330_0004045.DNV.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 04:16:03+00:00

Document:
E. K. McDANIEL, et al., Respondents.
This habeas corpus action, brought by petitioner Christopher Brown, is before the Court for resolution with respect to the merits of petitioner's claims raised in the first amended petition for writ of habeas corpus (ECF No. 12). Respondents have answered (ECF No. 51) and petitioner has replied (ECF No. 57). The Court also granted petitioner leave to file supplemental authorities. (ECF No. 63.) The Court finds that petitioner is not entitled to relief, and the Court denies the petition.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). “By its terms § 2254(d) bars relitigation of any claim ‘adjudicated on the merits' in state court, subject only to the exceptions in §§ 2254(d)(1) and (d)(2).” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 98 (2011).
A decision of a state court is "contrary to" clearly established federal law if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite that reached by the Supreme Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than the Supreme Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000). An "unreasonable application" occurs when "a state-court decision unreasonably applies the law of [the Supreme Court] to the facts of a prisoner's case." Id. at 409. "[A] federal habeas court may not "issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly." Id. at 411.
The Supreme Court has explained that "[a] federal court's collateral review of a state-court decision must be consistent with the respect due state courts in our federal system." Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003). The "AEDPA thus imposes a 'highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings, ' and 'demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.'" Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010) (quoting Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 333, n. 7 (1997); Woodford v. Viscotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam)). "A state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as 'fairminded jurists could disagree' on the correctness of the state court's decision." Harrington, 562 U.S. at 101 (citing Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). The Supreme Court has emphasized "that even a strong case for relief does not mean the state court's contrary conclusion was unreasonable." Id. (citing Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003)); see also Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011) (describing the AEDPA standard as "a difficult to meet and highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings, which demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt") (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
The burden of proof is upon the defendant to show by a preponderance of the evidence that he was intoxicated to such an extent that he did not premeditate or deliberate.
Defense counsel argued that the instruction “dilutes the State's burden of proving each and every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Brown, however, did not offer an alternative instruction. We agree with Brown and conclude that the instruction given by the district court was erroneous. Nevertheless, we further conclude that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
First, Brown did not present a defense based upon a lack of specific intent due to his voluntary intoxication. Brown presented evidence and corroborating testimony that he ingested drugs and alcohol on the day of the shooting; however, he did not argue that his ingesting rendered him unable to form the intent to kill. During opening arguments, defense counsel conceded that Brown shot the victim several times resulting in his death. But the theory of the defense, instead, was that “Brown was provoked. There was a sudden heat of passion.” As further evidence of the defense theory, Brown did not offer the district court an alternative instruction on voluntary intoxication, or object to the instructions on manslaughter and self-defense, both of which were more consistent with his defense at trial. Therefore, we conclude that the erroneous instruction on voluntary intoxication did not affect Brown's substantial rights in any practical way.
The Nevada Supreme Court was correct that petitioner did not present a defense of voluntary intoxication. Given that petitioner presented no defense of voluntary intoxication, the voluntary-intoxication instruction could not have “‘had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict.'” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 631, 638 (1993) (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946). The error was harmless, and the Court will deny habeas relief on Ground 1.
Ground 2 contains claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel and appellate counsel. The same person, Edward Horn, represented petitioner at trial and on direct appeal.
“[T]he right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel.” McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 & n.14 (1970). A petitioner claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must demonstrate (1) that the defense attorney's representation “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, ” and (2) that the attorney's deficient performance prejudiced the defendant such that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984). “[T]here is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance claim to approach the inquiry in the same order or even to address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one.” Id. at 697.
Establishing that a state court's application of Strickland was unreasonable under § 2254(d) is all the more difficult. The standards created by Strickland and § 2254(d) are both highly deferential, [Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689]; Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 333, n. 7, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 138 L.Ed.2d 481 (1997), and when the two apply in tandem, review is “doubly” so, [Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009)]. The Strickland standard is a general one, so the range of reasonable applications is substantial. 556 U.S., at 123, 129 S.Ct. at 1420. Federal habeas courts must guard against the danger of equating unreasonableness under Strickland with unreasonableness under § 2254(d). When § 2254(d) applies, the question is not whether counsel's actions were reasonable. The question is whether there is any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland's deferential standard.
Harrington, 562 U.S. at 105; see also Cheney v. Washington, 614 F.3d 987, 994-95 (2010) (acknowledging double deference required with respect to state court adjudications of Strickland claims).
Petitioner argues that the standard of appellate review that the Nevada Supreme Court used is contrary to Strickland. In disposing of petitioner's ineffective-assistance claims, the Nevada Supreme Court wrote, for example, “Brown has not demonstrated that the district court's findings are not supported by substantial evidence or is not clearly wrong.” (ECF No. 14-22 at 5.) Petitioner argues that these were applications of a substantial evidence standard that is contrary to Strickland.
In re Hardy, 163 P.3d 853, 891-92 (Cal. 2007).
Hardy then filed a federal habeas corpus petition. The district court denied the petition. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that when the California Supreme Court denied Hardy's petition, it used a substantial evidence standard that is contrary to Strickland. Hardy, 849 F.3d at 819-20. After de novo review, the Ninth Circuit directed the district court to grant the petition. In the alternative, the Ninth Circuit held that the California Supreme Court applied Strickland unreasonably.
The procedural posture of In re Hardy differs from the procedural posture of petitioner's case in one important respect. A person seeking post-conviction relief in the California courts usually files an original petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the relevant superior court, then in the relevant court of appeal, and then in the California Supreme Court. Although each level of review is styled as a separate habeas corpus petition, in effect appellate review is given in the court of appeal and in the California Supreme Court. See Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 221-22 (2002). Hardy did not use that typical path of post-conviction review in California. He filed his state habeas corpus petitions directly and only in the California Supreme Court. The California Supreme Court's order did not effectively affirm a denial of a habeas corpus petition by the superior court. The California Supreme Court's order was the denial of Hardy's habeas corpus petition.
Brown contends that the district court erred by denying his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. To state a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel sufficient to invalidate a judgment of conviction, a petitioner must demonstrate that counsel's performance was deficient, and that the petitioner was prejudiced by counsel's performance. Kirksey v. State, 112 Nev. 980, 987, 923 P.2d 1102, 1107 (1996) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1987)). To demonstrate prejudice arising from deficient performance of trial counsel, the petitioner “must show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the trial would have been different.” Id. at 988, 923 P.2d at 1107 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). To demonstrate prejudice arising from deficient performance of appellate counsel, the petitioner “must show that the omitted issue would have a reasonable probability of success on appeal.” Id. at 998, 923 P.2d at 1114. A petitioner must demonstrate the factual allegation underlying his ineffective assistance of counsel claim by a preponderance of the evidence. Means v. State, 120 Nev. 1001, 1012, 103 P.3d 25, 33 (2004). The district court's factual findings regarding ineffective assistance of counsel are entitled to deference when reviewed on appeal. Riley v. State, 110 Nev. 638, 647, 878 P.2d 272, 278 (1994).

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