Source: http://www.smithlawfirm.com/fraudulent-conveyance-suggesti
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 22:57:33+00:00

Document:
Plaintiff and Defendant Wehmeyer travelled together to South Carolina on May 6, 2008. Upon arriving in South Carolina, Defendant Wehmeyer attacked Blackwell with a metal flashlight, causing severe permanent injuries. Wehmeyer was charged in Lexington County, South Carolina, with assault and battery with intent to kill, and has since absconded and gone into hiding (see discussion below). On September 2, 2008, Plaintiff filed a suit this cause of action against Wehmeyer. Wehmeyer was served with the summons herein on September 16, 2008. More than one month later, on October 20, 2008, Wehmeyer is purported to have signed a deed of trust in the amount of $17,365.55 in favor of his parents (Defendants Linda and Patrick Donnelly). Assuming Wehmeyer actually signed said deed of trust, the purported transfer constitutes a fraudulent transfer under three separate sections of Missouri’s version of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act: §428.024.1(1), §428.029.1 and §428.029.2. Plaintiff’s Third Motion for Summary Judgment only relates to §428.029.1.
In order to establish that a transfer was fraudulent under 428.029.1, a plaintiff must establish three elements: (1) that the plaintiff was a creditor of the defendant before the transfer was made, (2) that the defendant made the transfer without receiving a reasonably equivalent value, and (3) that the defendant was insolvent at the time of the transfer or became insolvent as a result. Here, there is no genuine dispute concerning any of the three material facts. Where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the court shall enter summary judgment forthwith. Supreme Court Rule 74.04(c)(6); ITT Commercial Finance Corp. v. Mid-America Marine Supply Corp., 854 S.W.2d 371, 376 (Mo. 1993). Here, there is no genuine issue as to any of the above material facts.
A “creditor” is a “person who has a claim”; and a claim can include any right to payment regardless of whether the claim is liquidated or reduced to a judgment. See §§ 428.009(3) and 428.009(4). Here, there is no genuine dispute that Plaintiff was a creditor of Defendant Wehmeyer prior to the date of the transfer. Additionally, there is no genuine dispute that Wehmeyer is a debtor (defined in §428.009(6) as a “person who is liable on a claim”) of Plaintiff.
Plaintiff filed this suit on September 2, 2008, and the alleged transfer occurred on October 20, 2008. (See this Court’s record and Exhibit 3.) See also Exhibit 1, Number 11 (Wehmeyer admits that he was sued prior to October 20, 2008) and Number 29 (Wehmeyer admits that at the time of signing the Deed of Trust and Term Note, Plaintiff was a creditor of Wehmeyer).
In order to establish a fraudulent transfer under §428.029.1, the transfer must have been made without receiving a reasonably equivalent value. Here, there is no dispute that the value of the asset transferred (deed of trust) was significantly in excess of the value of consideration received by Wehmeyer. According to the plain language of both the deed of trust and promissory note, the value of the asset transferred was $17,365.55. See Exhibits 2-A and 2-B. However, Linda Donnelly admits that the value of the sums transferred to, or on behalf of, Wehmeyer amount to significantly less that the $17,365.55. In Exhibit 2-C she compiled a list of all sums purportedly transferred on behalf and to Wehmeyer. The expenditures listed on Exhibit 2-C amount to only $12,976.31. This is the amount that Linda Donnelly contends that she is owed. Exhibit 2, Page 29. Among the expenses listed, she includes such dubious charges as her own cellular phone bill through Sprint. (See Exhibit 2-C, charges dated December 6, 2008, and January 5, 2008). Linda Donnelly admits that the figure contained in the deed of trust and promissory note was “just kind of an estimate.” Exhibit 2, Page 26, Line 20. She also admits that she did not expend $17,365.55. Exhibit 2, Page 28. Even if Linda Donnelly is able to substantiate all payments listed in Exhibit 2-C during trial, there is no dispute with regard to the fact that the maximum possible amount expended totals $12,976.31, significantly less than the sum described in the deed of trust.
In addition, Wehmeyer could not produce any testimony which would explain the shortfall between the $17,365.55 and $12,976.31. Wehmeyer admits that he did not receive a reasonably equivalent value. See Exhibit 1, Numbers 19, 31, 32, 38 and 39.
A debtor is insolvent if either his debts exceed his assets, or he is generally not paying his debts as they become due. §428.014.1. Here, there is no dispute that at the time of the transfer Wehmeyer’s debts exceeded his assets. There is also no dispute that at the time of the transfer he was not paying his debts as they became due.
Linda Donnelly admits that at time of the transfer Wehmeyer was not paying his car note, did not have assets other than a few household goods, was probably not going to repay his debts, had little or no money, was not working, and was not able to pay his debts. See Exhibit 2, pages, 13, 21, 24, 57, and 62-63. More importantly, Wehmeyer admits that he was insolvent at the time of the transfer. See Exhibit 1, numbers 16, 20-21, 23, and 26-27.
A plaintiff who establishes that a debtor conducted a fraudulent transfer is entitled to, among other remedies, an avoidance of the transfer. §428.039.1(1). Here, there is no genuine dispute that the transfer was fraudulent under 428.029.1. As such, Plaintiff is entitled to an avoidance of the transfer.
 All exhibits referenced herein are contained in Plaintiff’s “Exhibit List” filed concurrently herewith and incorporated herein.
Plaintiff and Defendant Wehmeyer travelled together to South Carolina on May 6, 2008. Upon arriving in South Carolina, Defendant Wehmeyer attacked Blackwell with a metal flashlight, causing severe permanent injuries. Wehmeyer was charged in Lexington County, South Carolina, with assault and battery with intent to kill, and has since absconded and gone into hiding (see discussion below). On September 2, 2008, Plaintiff filed a suit this cause of action against Wehmeyer. Wehmeyer was served with the summons herein on September 16, 2008. More than one month later, on October 20, 2008, Wehmeyer is purported to have signed a deed of trust in the amount of $17,365.55 in favor of his parents (Defendants Linda and Patrick Donnelly). Assuming Wehmeyer actually signed said deed of trust, the purported transfer constitutes a fraudulent transfer under three separate sections of Missouri’s version of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act: §428.024.1(1), §428.029.1 and §428.029.2. Plaintiff’s Second Motion for Summary Judgment only relates to §428.024.1(1).
In order to establish that a transfer was fraudulent under 428.024.1(1), a plaintiff must establish two elements: (1) that the plaintiff is a creditor of defendant, and (2) that the defendant’s transfer was made with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud the claims of the plaintiff. Id. Here, there is no genuine dispute concerning either material fact. Where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the court shall enter summary judgment forthwith. Supreme Court Rule 74.04(c)(6); ITT Commercial Finance Corp. v. Mid-America Marine Supply Corp., 854 S.W.2d 371, 376 (Mo. 1993). Here, there is no genuine dispute as to either of the above material facts.
The first consideration is whether the transfer was made to an insider. §428.024.2(1). An insider includes a “relative” of the debtor. §428.009(7)(a)a. Here, there is no dispute that Defendant Linda Donnelly is the biological mother of Defendant Wehmeyer. See Exhibit 2, pages 5 and 58. Additionally, there is no dispute that Defendant Patrick Donnelly is the father-in-law of Wehmeyer. See Exhibit 2, page 6. There is no dispute that the Donnellys are relatives of Wehmeyer.
The second consideration is whether the debtor retained possession or control of the property after the transfer. §428.024.2(2). There is no dispute that Wehmeyer retained possession of the property after October 20, 2008. See Exhibit 2, page 20, in which Linda Donnelly admits that Wehmeyer resided at the property in April of 2009. See also Exhibit 2, page 21-22 in which Linda Donnelly admits that Wehmeyer probably occupied the premises as late as June or July of 2009. See also Exhibit 2, pages 58-59, in which Linda Donnelly admits that she would have no objection to Wehmeyer staying at the house at any point in time, including the date of the deposition.
The third consideration is whether the transfer was concealed. §428.024.2(3). Here, there is no dispute that the defendants undertook at least some effort to conceal the transaction. Although it was recorded shortly before this Court granted Plaintiff’s writ of attachment, Linda Donnelly admits that she concealed the transfer from Wehmeyer’s attorney of record, Matthew Schroeder. See Exhibit 2, page 59. She also admits that she concealed the transfer from Mr. Blackwell. Exhibit 2, page 59. She admits that to the best of her knowledge, Wehmeyer did not disclose the transfer to anyone. Exhibit 2, page 61.
The fourth consideration is whether the debtor was sued, or threatened with suit, before the transfer was made. §428.024.2(4). Here, the record reflects that this suit was filed on September 2, 2008. The transfer is purported to have occurred on October 20, 2008. See Exhibits 2-A and 2-B. See also Exhibit 2, pages 23 and 24 in which Linda Donnelly claims that the transfer occurred on October 20, 2008.
The fifth consideration is whether the transfer was of substantially all of the debtor’s assets. §428.024.2(5). There is no dispute that on October 20, 2008, Wehmeyer’s only significant asset was the real estate in question. His vehicle had virtually no equity and was subsequently repossessed. Exhibit 2, page 13. Aside from this vehicle and a few household goods, Wehmeyer did not have any other assets. Exhibit 2, Page 62-63. Linda Donnelly believed Wehmeyer was probably not going to able to repay his debts. Exhibit 2, page 49. Wehmeyer was also unemployed with no likelihood of being rehired by his former employer. Exhibit 2, Page 24.
The sixth consideration is whether the debtor absconded. §428.024.2(6). Here, there is no dispute that Wehmeyer absconded. Exhibit 2, Page 13. A bench warrant was issued in South Carolina for Wehmeyer’s failure to appear. Exhibit 2, Page 63. Wehmeyer is presently seeking to avoid being located. Exhibit 2, Page 63. In addition, the Court record reflects that on or about July 14, 2009, Matthew Schroeder withdrew as Wehmeyer’s attorney on the ground that Wehmeyer refused to remain in contact with Schroeder.
The seventh consideration is whether Wehmeyer removed or concealed assets. §428.024.2(7). Here, there is no evidence that Wehmeyer was in possession of any significant assets other than the property in question. See discussion related to §428.024.2(5).
The eighth consideration is whether the value of consideration received by the debtor was reasonably equivalent to the value of the asset transferred. §428.024.2(8). Here, there is no dispute that the value of the asset transferred was significantly in excess of the value of consideration received by Wehmeyer. According to the plain language of both the deed of trust and promissory note, the value of the asset transferred was $17,365.55. See Exhibits 2-A and 2-B. However, Linda Donnelly admits that the value of the sums transferred to, or on behalf of, Wehmeyer amount to significantly less that the $17,365.55. In Exhibit 2-C she compiled a list of all sums purportedly transferred on behalf and to Wehmeyer. The expenditures listed on Exhibit 2-C amount to only $12,976.31. This is the amount that she contends Wehmeyer owes. Exhibit 2, Page 29. In addition, the expenditures include such dubious charges as Linda Donnelly’s own cellular phone bill through Sprint. See Exhibit 2-C, charges dated December 6, 2008, and January 5, 2008. Wehmeyer’s cellular phone bills (AT&T) are included too. See Exhibit 2-C. Ms. Donnelly admits that the figure contained in the deed of trust and promissory note was “just kind of an estimate.” Exhibit 2, Page 26, Line 20. She admits that she did not expend $17,365.55. Exhibit 2, Page 28. Even if Ms. Donnelly’s testimony is entirely true and accurate, there is no genuine dispute: the amount of money she expended is significantly less than the amount of the encumbrance stated in the deed of trust.
The ninth consideration is whether the debtor was insolvent or became insolvent shortly after the transfer was made. §428.024.2(9). Here, there is no dispute that Wehmeyer was insolvent on or shortly after October 20, 2008. His vehicle was repossessed. Exhibit 2, Page 13. He was not working. Exhibit 2, Page 24. He was not paying his electric bill. Exhibit 2, Page 21. He has very little money, if any, in his bank account. Exhibit 2, Page 57. He had no assets other than the some household goods and the property in question. Exhibit 2, Pages 62 and 63. Wehmeyer is insolvent within the meaning of §428.014.1. He was unable to pay his bills as they became due. In addition, his liabilities, including his liability in this suit exceed the value of his assets.
The tenth consideration is whether the transfer occurred shortly before or shortly after a substantial debt was incurred. §428.024.2(10). Here, the record reflects that a suit was filed on September 2, 2008; and a Judgment in the amount of $750,000 was entered against Wehmeyer on August 25, 2009. The purported transfer occurred on October 20, 2008, after this suit was pending and after Wehmeyer was served with the summons.
The eleventh consideration (§428.024.2(11)) is not applicable in this case in that no assets of a business were transferred.
The Donnellys are “insiders”, with relation to Wehmeyer, as described in §428.005, et seq. See Exhibit 1, Number 3.
At all times between October 20, 2008, and July 16, 2009, Wehmeyer remained in possession and control of the property in question. Exhibit 1, Number 8.
The Donnellys concealed the purported execution of the Deed of Trust and Term Note. Exhibit 1, Number 10.
Wehmyer concealed the purported execution of the Deed of Trust and Term Note. Exhibit 1, Number 9.
Plaintiff sued Wehmeyer and threatened to sue Wehmeyer prior to October 20, 2008. Exhibit 1, Number 11.
Wehmeyer acted in concert with the Donnellys to conceal the purported deed of trust from Wehmeyer’s creditors. Exhibit 1, Number 14.
Wehmeyer concealed the purported deed of trust from Plaintiff and Wehmeyer’s attorney of record, Matthew Schroeder. Exhibit 1, Number 15.
The transfer referenced in the Deed of Trust was of substantially all of Wehmeyer’s assets. Exhibit 1, Number 16.
Wehmeyer absconded sometime between April of 2009 and July 16, 2009. Exhibit 1, Number 17.
Wehmeyer removed or concealed assets including a vehicle and cash. Exhibit 1, Number 18.
The value of consideration received by Wehmeyer in exchange for executing the deed of trust was not reasonably equivalent to, and was substantially less than, the value of the property right sought to be conveyed to the Donnellys in the Deed of Trust. Exhibit 1, Number 19.
Wehmeyer was insolvent at the time of the transfer to the Donnellys or became insolvent as a result. Exhibit 1, Number 20.
Wehmeyer was insolvent at the time of executing the Deed of Trust and Term Note; or he became insolvent as a result. Exhibit 1, Number 21.
The transfer from Wehmeyer to the Donnellys, referenced in the Deed of Trust and Term Note, occurred shortly after a substantial debt was incurred. Said “debt” was the debt owed to Plaintiff as a result of Wehmeyer’s attack of Plaintiff. Exhibit 1, Number 22.
Wehmeyer advised the Donnellys on or before September 16, 2008 that he was insolvent. Exhibit 1, Number 23.
Wehmeyer was insolvent at the time of signing the Deed of Trust. Exhibit 1, Number 26.
Wehmeyer was insolvent at all times after signing the Deed of Trust. Exhibit 1, Number 27.
Wehmeyer signed the Deed of Trust and Term Note with actual intent to hinder, delay, and defraud Plaintiff. Exhibit 1, Number 28.
At the time of signing the Deed of Trust and Term Note, Plaintiff was a creditor of Wehmeyer. Exhibit 1, Number 29.
In signing the Deed of Trust and Term Note, Wehmeyer conspired and acted in concert with the Donnellys to hinder, delay and defraud Plaintiff. Exhibit 1, Number 30.
Wehmeyer did not receive reasonably equivalent value from the Donnellys in exchange for signing the Deed of Trust and Term Note. Exhibit 1, Number 31.
Wehmeyer did not receive reasonably equivalent value from the Donnellys in exchange for the transfer/obligation referenced in the Deed of Trust and Term Note. Exhibit 1, Number 32.
Wehmeyer did not receive any consideration in exchange for giving the Deed of Trust and Term Note. Exhibit 1, Number 38.
Wehmeyer did not receive any consideration in exchange for incurring the obligations referenced in the Deed of Trust and Term Note. Exhibit 1, Number 39.
A plaintiff who establishes that a debtor conducted a fraudulent transfer is entitled to, among other remedies, an avoidance of the transfer. §428.039.1(1). Here, there is no genuine dispute that the transfer was fraudulent under 428.024.1(1). As such, Plaintiff is entitled to an avoidance of the transfer.
Plaintiff and Defendant Wehmeyer travelled together to South Carolina on May 6, 2008. Upon arriving in South Carolina, Defendant Wehmeyer attacked Blackwell with a metal flashlight, causing severe permanent injuries. Wehmeyer was charged in Lexington County, South Carolina, with assault and battery with intent to kill, and has since absconded and gone into hiding (see discussion below). On September 2, 2008, Plaintiff filed a suit this cause of action against Wehmeyer. Wehmeyer was served with the summons herein on September 16, 2008. More than one month later, on October 20, 2008, Wehmeyer is purported to have signed a deed of trust in the amount of $17,365.55 in favor of his parents (Defendants Linda and Patrick Donnelly). Assuming Wehmeyer actually signed said deed of trust, the purported transfer constitutes a fraudulent transfer under three separate sections of Missouri’s version of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act: §428.024.1(1), §428.029.1 and §428.029.2. Plaintiff’s Fourth Motion for Summary Judgment only relates to §428.029.2.
In order to establish that a transfer was fraudulent under 428.029.2, a moving party must establish five elements: (1) that the moving party became a creditor of the transferor prior to the transfer, (2) the transferor is a relative or insider of the transferee, (3) the transfer was made in exchange for an antecedent debt, (4) the transferor was insolvent at the time of the transfer, and (5) the transferee had reasonable cause to believe the transferor was insolvent. Where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the court shall enter summary judgment forthwith. Supreme Court Rule 74.04(c)(6); ITT Commercial Finance Corp. v. Mid-America Marine Supply Corp., 854 S.W.2d 371, 376 (Mo. 1993). Here, there is no genuine issue as to any of the above material facts.
An “insider” includes “a relative of the debtor”. 428.009(7). Here, there is no dispute that the Donnellys are relatives of Wehmeyer. See Exhibit 2, pages 5, 6 and 58 (in which Linda Donnelly admits that she and Patrick Donnelly are relatives of Wehmeyer). See also Exhibit 1, number 3 (in which Wehmeyer admits that the Donnellys are relatives/insiders).
There is no genuine dispute that the purported debt is an “antecedent debt”. See Exhibit 1, number 34 (Wehmeyer admits that the transfer was in exchange for the satisfaction of an antecedent debt). To the extent that this Court accepts Linda Donnelly’s testimony as credible, her own testimony will establish that the transfer was in exchange for an antecedent debt. She has presented a comprehensive list of all purported expenditures in Exhibit 2-C. The exhibit reflects that $7,937.16 of the $12,976.31 was expended prior to the execution of the deed of trust on October 20, 2008.
Linda Donnelly had reasonable cause to believe that Weymeyer was insolvent. See Exhibit 2, page 13, 21, 24, 29, 57 and 62-63 (in which Linda Donnelly admits her awareness that, among other things, Wehmeyer’s car was repossessed, he was not able to pay his electric bills, he was not going to be able to repay his debts, he was unemployed, he had very little or no money, that this lawsuit was pending against him, and he did not have any assets other than the house). See Exhibit 1, numbers 12, 16, 23-25 (in which Wehmeyer admits that the Donnelly knew he was insolvent). See also this Court’s record, reflecting that this suit was filed and Wehmeyer was served prior to October 20, 2008. There is no genuine dispute as to the fact that Linda Donnelly had reasonable cause to believe that Wehmeyer was insolvent at the time of the purported transfer.
Plaintiff and Defendant Wehmeyer travelled together to South Carolina on May 6, 2008. Upon arriving in South Carolina, Defendant Wehmeyer attacked Blackwell with a metal flashlight, causing severe and permanent injuries. Wehmeyer was charged in Lexington County, South Carolina, with assault and battery with intent to kill, and has since absconded and gone into hiding (see discussion below). On September 2, 2008, Plaintiff filed a suit (this cause of action) against Wehmeyer. Wehmeyer was served with the summons herein on September 16, 2008. More than one month later, on October 20, 2008, Wehmeyer is purported to have signed a deed of trust in the amount of $17,365.55 in favor of Defendants Linda and Patrick Donnelly. Assuming Wehmeyer actually signed said deed of trust, the purported transfer constitutes a fraudulent transfer under three separate sections of Missouri’s version of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act: §428.024.1(1), §428.029.1 and §428.029.2. Plaintiff’s Fourth Motion for Summary Judgment only relates to §428.024.1(1).
In order to establish that a transfer was fraudulent under 428.024.1(1), a Court must find that two elements exist: (1) the plaintiff is a creditor of defendant, and (2) the defendant’s transfer was made with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud the claims of the plaintiff. Id. To determine whether the transfer occurred with “actual intent”, Courts consider eleven factors set forth in §428.024.2. Here, there is no genuine dispute concerning either material fact. Plaintiff is a creditor of Wehmeyer; and Wehmeyer acted with actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud Plaintiff.
Where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the court shall enter summary judgment forthwith. Supreme Court Rule 74.04(c)(6); ITT Commercial Finance Corp. v. Mid-America Marine Supply Corp., 854 S.W.2d 371, 376 (Mo. 1993). Here, there is no genuine dispute as to either of the above material facts.
The second consideration is whether the debtor retained possession or control of the property after the transfer. §428.024.2(2). There is no dispute that Wehmeyer retained possession of the property after October 20, 2008. See Exhibit 2, page 20, in which Linda Donnelly admits that Wehmeyer resided at the property in April of 2009. See also Exhibit 2, pages 21-22 and 58-59 (in which Linda Donnelly admits that Wehmeyer probably occupied the premises as late as June or July of 2009 and that she allowed him to reside there).
The third consideration is whether the transfer was concealed. §428.024.2(3). Here, there is no dispute that the defendants made an effort to conceal the transaction. Although it was recorded shortly before this Court granted Plaintiff’s writ of attachment, Linda Donnelly admits that she concealed the transfer from Wehmeyer’s attorney of record, Matthew Schroeder. See Exhibit 2, page 59. She also admits that she concealed the transfer from Mr. Blackwell. Exhibit 2, page 59. She admits that to the best of her knowledge, Wehmeyer did not disclose the transfer to anyone. Exhibit 2, page 61.
The sixth consideration is whether the debtor absconded. §428.024.2(6). Here, there is no dispute that Wehmeyer absconded. Exhibit 2, Page 13. A bench warrant was issued in South Carolina for Wehmeyer’s failure to appear. Exhibit 2, Page 63. Wehmeyer is presently seeking to avoid being located. Exhibit 2, Page 63. In addition, the Court record reflects that on or about July 14, 2009, Matthew Schroeder withdrew as Wehmeyer’s attorney on the ground that Wehmeyer refused to remain in contact with Schroeder. Since that time, he has neither appeared in Court or filed anything with the Court.
The eighth consideration is whether the value of consideration received by the debtor was reasonably equivalent to the value of the asset transferred. §428.024.2(8). Here, there is no dispute that the value of the asset transferred via promissory note and deed of trust was significantly in excess of the value of consideration received by Wehmeyer. According to the plain language of both the deed of trust and promissory note, the value of the asset transferred was $17,365.55. See Exhibits 2-A and 2-B. However, Linda Donnelly admits that the value of the sums transferred to, or on behalf of, Wehmeyer amount to significantly less that the $17,365.55. In Exhibit 2-C she compiled a list of all sums purportedly transferred on behalf and to Wehmeyer. The expenditures listed on Exhibit 2-C amount to only $12,976.31. This is the maximum amount that she contends Wehmeyer owes. Exhibit 2, Page 29. In addition, the expenditures include such dubious charges as Linda Donnelly’s own cellular phone bill through Sprint. See Exhibit 2-C, charges dated December 6, 2008, and January 5, 2008. See Exhibit 2-C. Ms. Donnelly admits that the figure contained in the deed of trust and promissory note was “just kind of an estimate.” Exhibit 2, Page 26, Line 20. She admits that she did not expend $17,365.55. Exhibit 2, Page 28. Even if Ms. Donnelly’s testimony is entirely true and accurate, there is no genuine dispute: the amount of money she expended is significantly less than the amount of the encumbrance stated in the deed of trust.
Plaintiff and Defendant Wehmeyer travelled together to South Carolina on May 6, 2008. Upon arriving in South Carolina, Defendant Wehmeyer attacked Blackwell with a metal flashlight, causing severe and permanent injuries. Wehmeyer was charged in Lexington County, South Carolina, with assault and battery with intent to kill, and has since absconded and gone into hiding. On September 2, 2008, Plaintiff filed a suit (this cause of action) against Wehmeyer. Wehmeyer was served with the summons herein on September 16, 2008. More than one month later, on October 20, 2008, Wehmeyer is purported to have signed a deed of trust in the amount of $17,365.55 in favor of Defendants Linda and Patrick Donnelly. Assuming Wehmeyer actually signed said deed of trust, the purported transfer constitutes a fraudulent transfer under three separate sections of Missouri’s version of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act: §428.024.1(1), §428.029.1 and §428.029.2. Plaintiff’s Third Motion for Summary Judgment only relates to §428.029.2.
In order to establish that a transfer was fraudulent under 428.029.2, a moving party must establish five elements: (1) that the moving party became a creditor of the transferor prior to the transfer, (2) the transferor is a relative or insider of the transferee, (3) the transfer was made in exchange for an antecedent debt, (4) the transferor was insolvent at the time of the transfer, and (5) the transferee had reasonable cause to believe the transferor was insolvent.
Where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the court shall enter summary judgment forthwith. Supreme Court Rule 74.04(c)(6); ITT Commercial Finance Corp. v. Mid-America Marine Supply Corp., 854 S.W.2d 371, 376 (Mo. 1993). Here, there is no genuine issue as to any of the above material facts.
Linda Donnelly had reasonable cause to believe that Weymeyer was insolvent. See Exhibit 2, page 13, 21, 24, 29, 57 and 62-63 (in which Linda Donnelly admits her awareness that, among other things, Wehmeyer’s car was repossessed, he was not able to pay his electric bills, he was not going to be able to repay his debts, he was unemployed, he had very little or no money, that this lawsuit was pending against him, and he did not have any assets other than the house). See Exhibit 1, numbers 12, 16, 23-25 (in which Wehmeyer admits that the Donnellys knew he was insolvent). See also this Court’s record, reflecting that this suit was filed and Wehmeyer was served prior to October 20, 2008. There is no genuine dispute as to the fact that Linda Donnelly had reasonable cause to believe that Wehmeyer was insolvent at the time of the purported transfer.

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