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Timestamp: 2019-04-22 18:05:45+00:00

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KELLER, P.J., delivered the opinion of the Court in which KEASLER, HERVEY, YEARY, and KEEL, JJ., joined. ALCALA, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which RICHARDSON and WALKER, JJ., joined. NEWELL, J., did not participate.
On April 25, 1980, Applicant and his companions, Ricky Koonce and Everett Pradia, were driving around Houston, looking for a place to commit their third robbery in two weeks. They chose the Birdsall Super Market after seeing that it was manned by two elderly people and a pregnant woman. Jim McCarble and Edna Scott were working in the courtesy booth. Koonce entered the booth and told McCarble and Scott that they were being robbed and demanded money. Applicant stood outside the booth, pointing a shotgun through the courtesy booth window. When Scott shouted out that they were being robbed and dropped to the floor, Applicant pointed the shotgun at McCarble, looked down the barrel at him, and shot his head off.
• Did those who knew the person best during the developmental stage—his family, friends, teachers, employers, authorities—think he was mentally retarded at that time, and, if so, act in accordance with that determination?
• Has the person formulated plans and carried them through or is his conduct impulsive?
• Does his conduct show leadership or does it show that he is led around by others?
• Is his conduct in response to external stimuli rational and appropriate, regardless of whether it is socially acceptable?
• Does he respond coherently, rationally, and on point to oral or written questions or do his responses wander from subject to subject?
• Can the person hide facts or lie effectively in his own or others' interests?
Nevertheless, we also assessed the second prong of the test, regarding adaptive deficits.28 We criticized the habeas court for relying upon a definition of intellectual disability presently used by the AAIDD that omits a requirement that an individual's adaptive deficits be related to significantly subaverage intellectual functioning.29 We also held that the Briseno evidentiary factors remained relevant to assessing adaptive deficits, and we held that we must look to all of the person's functional abilities, including those that show strength as well as those that show weakness.30 We concluded that the Briseno factors weighed heavily against a finding that any adaptive deficits were related to significantly subaverage intellectual functioning.31 In rejecting Applicant's claim that he had shown sufficient adaptive deficits,32 we made a number of other observations, but we will discuss those later in the application section of this opinion.
“The legal determination of intellectual disability is distinct from a medical diagnosis, but it is informed by the medical community's diagnostic framework.”45 In Moore, the Supreme Court indicated that the DSM-5 embodies “current medical diagnostic standards” for determining intellectual disability.46 When observing that the Briseno factors were inconsistent with Texas's own practices in other contexts, the Court referred to Texas's reliance on “the latest edition of the DSM.”47 The Supreme Court also observed that the DSM-5 retains a requirement that adaptive deficits be related to intellectual functioning deficits 48 —a requirement no longer explicitly retained by the AAIDD manual.49 Given Texas's reliance on the DSM-5 in other contexts, and the logic of requiring that adaptive deficits be related to deficient intellectual functioning, we conclude that the DSM-5 should control our approach to resolving the issue of intellectual disability.50 Although we retain a “relatedness” requirement in conformity with the DSM-5, we abandon reliance on the Briseno evidentiary factors in determining whether such a requirement is met.
Dr. Compton's methodology is consistent with the Supreme Court's dictates for evaluating intellectual disability. She explained that the major emphasis in an intellectual disability inquiry is “with adaptive deficits or adaptive functioning. That is primary. It supersedes the, you know, raw intelligence score.” She further explained that “somebody could have an IQ of 75 but have exceedingly low adaptive functioning and qualify for a diagnosis of intellectual disability.” She pointed to the three criteria for evaluating intellectual disability as well the three domains for evaluating adaptive deficits, and she referred to various adaptive areas that are cited in the DSM-5. She also talked about the various risk factors for intellectual disability and acknowledged that Applicant had some of those.
Dr. Compton rarely testified for the prosecution with respect to intellectual disability litigation in death penalty cases. Forty percent of the time she worked for the defense, and fifty percent of the time she worked directly for a court. She worked for the prosecution only ten percent of the time. She testified that she was not a fan of the death penalty and “took no joy” in giving her opinion in this case.
I think there is a greater probability than not that Mr. Moore suffers from borderline intellectual functioning. I do not believe – I do not have the data to support a diagnosis of mental retardation, simply because the adaptive functioning, I think, has been too great. Even before prison, I mean, there's indications of adaptive skills. So, I just – I do not have the adaptive deficits for a diagnosis.
I believe that I don't have enough information on his adaptive deficits or adaptive – I do not believe there's enough adaptive deficits to diagnose him with mental retardation. I do think he has below average intelligence but I do not believe there's enough in the record or from what I've seen to qualify for that diagnosis.
A substantial amount of evidence in the record substantiates Dr. Compton's conclusion and is contrary to various findings made by the habeas court. In the area of conceptual skills, the habeas court found that applicant had deficits in the area of communication, citing a speech impediment,87 that he had deficits in reading and writing,88 that he had difficulty with math,89 and that he was in general a “slow learner.”90 As will be discussed below, a good deal of evidence contradicts these conclusions. The habeas court found Applicant lacking in the area of social skills based on his withdrawn behavior as a child and low conduct scores on his report card. As will be discussed below, the evidence relied upon by the habeas court is limited and does not account for the social skills that Applicant has shown as an adult. In the area of practical skills, the habeas court concluded that Applicant lacks many practical life skills, cannot maintain a safe environment, and cannot live independently. As we shall see, some of the cited lack of skills are due to the lack of opportunity to learn while other conclusions about Applicant's practical skills conflict with the record.
The habeas court found that the commissary slips contained “numerous mathematical and spelling errors,” that the goods requested for Applicant often were well in excess of the spending limit, that Applicant was only within the $85 spend limit on two occasions, and that Applicant “orders almost the same thing every time.”123 This was based on the habeas court's examination of what it characterized as “the 24 commissary order slips in evidence,” which included examples ranging from 2012 to 2013.124 We conclude that these findings, though in accord with the record in some respects, are also at odds with the record in some respects.
Even if we concluded that all of the mark-throughs and quantity reductions were made by commissary staff, that does not necessarily show that any failure to abide by the spending limit was due to adaptive deficits on Applicant's part. Applicant might have purposefully requested excess items to account for the possibility that some of his items would turn out to be out of stock. Inmates were allowed to specify substitute items, which seems to be a recognition that an item might not currently be in stock even if it was on the list. In addition, LeBlanc testified that certain types of property items (such as a hot pot) required special approval. Once the item was approved, then it would appear on the commissary request. It is unclear from the testimony whether these specially approved items are supposed to be part of the spend total. And there may be other reasons for Applicant to make requests in excess of the spend limit that do not indicate a lack of understanding on Applicant's part.
A few of the commissary slips contain what appear to be up to three possible errors, but many of these may not be errors at all. Sometimes a line item specifies a quantity that may actually be a pack or two packs of an item. For example, Applicant would specify twelve Ibuprofen tablets, but the unit price and the total price would be the same—suggesting that what is being ordered was a twelve-pack.128 Or Applicant would order ten bars of soap, and the total price would be twice the unit price, which appears to mean that the soap came in packs of five.129 Also, Applicant would often specify substitute items on the same line, and they were not necessarily in the same quantities, which could complicate an attempt at a straightforward calculation of the final price from the quantity and the unit price. Some ostensible errors may also be writing legibility issues rather than actual errors in calculation.
A few entries appear to be errors but would not be if Applicant had ordered a different quantity of the item—suggesting the likelihood that Applicant changed his mind about how many of an item he wanted and did not recalculate the price.130 A few entries are clearly calculation errors. But these relatively few errors are not consistent with the habeas court's conclusion that the mathematical errors were “numerous.” Overall, the commissary slips support the conclusion that Applicant has well-developed math skills.
Some of the habeas court's statements about Applicant's practical skills might also be relevant to his social skills. The habeas court cited testimony from family and friends that Applicant was “always a follower,” “always allowed those around him to make decisions for him,” was “impressionable,” and was “easily led.”148 But this evidence cannot be squared with the testimony of more objective witnesses that Applicant influences others and stands up to authority. In addition to the mopping incident, there were a number of incidents in prison in which Applicant refused to follow orders.149 Although adaptive behavior may in general be expected to be higher in the controlled setting of the prison environment than in the “free world,” standing up to authority is one trait that the prison environment would be expected to suppress. Applicant's willingness to stand up to authority in prison (and at times give reasoned explanations for doing so) is at odds with the claim that he is an impressionable, easily-led follower.
Dr. Compton testified that some of the skills that her testing showed that Applicant lacked were things that he simply had not had the opportunity to learn.162 She had to assign zeroes to questions asking about areas for which Applicant had no exposure, such as writing a check or using a microwave oven.163 As we explained above, Applicant displayed considerable skill with writing and math, employed in practical uses such as reading books and newspaper articles—some of which related to the claims being made in his legal proceeding—writing letters, composing or at least copying legal motions, filling out commissary slips (which required both math and writing), and playing dominoes.
After reviewing the case under the standards set forth in the DSM-5, we conclude that Applicant has failed to show adaptive deficits sufficient to support a diagnosis of intellectual disability.170 Consequently, we deny relief.
1. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (exempting intellectually disabled persons from the death penalty).
2. Moore v. State, 470 S.W.3d 481, 486-89 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015), vacated by Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039 (2017).
4. See Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039 (2017).
5. American Psychiatric Association, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF DISORDERS , 5th ed. (2013) (“DSM-5”).
6. Although it opposed granting relief on original submission, the State now contends that Applicant is entitled to relief in light of the Supreme Court's opinion. Because we conclude that Applicant has failed to show that he is intellectually disabled under the DSM-5 framework, we disagree with that assessment.
7. 536 U.S. at 316, 317.
9. Id. See also Moore, 470 S.W.3d at 486.
10. 135 S.W.3d 1, 4-5 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). See also Moore, supra.
11. Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 7-8.
12. Id. at 7 & nn.24-26.
13. Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 8-9.
14. See Ex parte Cathey, 451 S.W.3d 1, 11 n.23 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (noting change from “mental retardation” to “intellectual disability”); Ex parte Sosa, 364 S.W.3d 889, 893 n.17 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (noting change from AAMR to AAIDD).
15. Addendum Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Claims 1-3 (“Findings”), paragraph 66 (“As our standards of decency evolve, so too do the standards of psychological diagnosis.”). See also Moore, 470 S.W.3d at 486.
17. Moore, 470 S.W.3d at 486-89, 514, 526-27 (citing and discussing Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 7 & n.25, 8-9).
23. Id. at 487-88. See Findings, paragraphs 85-87.
24. Moore, 470 S.W.3d at 519.
29. Id. at 486. See Findings, paragraph 67 (outlining current AAIDD framework). But see id., paragraph 92 (referring to “relatedness” requirement).
30. Moore, 470 S.W.3d at 489.
33. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1049 (“The CCA's conclusion that Moore's IQ scores established that he is not intellectually disabled is irreconcilable with Hall[, 134 S.Ct. 1986 (2014)].”).
35. Id. (“But the presence of other sources of imprecision in administering the test to a particular individual, cannot narrow the test-specific standard-error range.”) (citation omitted, emphasis in original).
38. Id. at 1050 & n.8.
44. Id. at 1053 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“I agree with the Court today that those factors [seven ‘evidentiary factors' from Ex parte Briseno] are an unacceptable method of enforcing the guarantee of Atkins, and that the CCA therefore erred in using them to analyze adaptive deficits.”).
45. Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 2000 (2014).
46. 137 S. Ct. at 1045 (Court's op.). See also id. at 1048, 1053.
47. Id. at 1052 (citing 37 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 380.8751(e)(3) (2016)).
48. Id. at 1046 n.5.
49. See id. at 1055 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
50. Although we specifically adopt the DSM-5, nothing in this opinion suggests that a court must reject an expert's testimony if the expert relies upon the AAIDD manual. The standards in the DSM-5 and the AAIDD manual are largely the same, with the AAIDD manual exploring the issue of intellectual disability in greater detail. Nothing in this opinion should be construed to prevent a court from relying upon portions of the AAIDD manual to the extent that they amplify or clarify standards contained in the DSM-5. But if there is a conflict between the two publications, a court must decide which to adhere to, and our decision is that, in the event of a conflict, the DSM-5 controls.
77. Moore, 470 S.W.3d at 519.
78. Dr. Compton testified that the IQ score of 78 on the WISC was the most reliable because it was the only full scale IQ test administered during Applicant's developmental period. See id. at 517.
87. Findings, paragraphs 141, 172(d).
91. Moore, 470 S.W.3d at 491.
92. For example, at one point in the hearing on a motion to suppress his written statement, Applicant testified,They took me to a little room and told me that I may as well sign the statement since these dudes had identified me as being with them. I told them I wouldn't. The one; so he told me I was going to make it or else it would be up to him to make this statement on whatever it called for me to make a statement.When asked what happened at that point, Applicant stated,Well, one officer, he told one officer to leave the room and go do something. I don't know what he went to do; but, he got to hitting me upside the jaw and everything; and I still refused to sign the statement and everything; so he took me to another room where there was some typewriters and everything and asked me would I sign. I told him, no, I wouldn't sign it.
93. See also Moore, 470 S.W.3d at 522.
95. Id. at 492, 522. Applicant did not have a lawyer to coach him for this hearing. Id. at 522.
96. Id. at 492. For example, Applicant read into the record a handwritten letter to his attorney that was dated February 13, 1983:Dear sir: Through the forgoing letter, I respectfully request unto you, sir, to be notified as to whether or not have yet the Appellant's Brief was filed on February 9, 1983, or if you has requested another extension of time in which to file said brief in the above reference cause number 314483.However, Mr. Bonner, sir, please be advised that I have filed three different motion with the court to review the record on Appeal and Prose Supplemental Brief to be considered along with your brief and the State's brief when sames are orally argued in accordance with Art. 44.33 V.A.C.C.P. and the rules of procedure of the Court of Criminal Appeals. I do not attempt to bump heads with you in any kind of way. All I wish to do is have the opportunity to defend my own life.However, again, sir, in the above three motions that I have filed to the Court of said, I respectfully request you, sir, to enter into judge of said presence, George Walker. In the favor behalf of myself in you asking Judge of said to grant my motions. For you consideration in attending to this causing matter request will be grately appreciated as I enter your presence I enclosed three motions in this letter. I pray that you, sir, will get in touch with me as soon as possible.(Passage as it appears in court reporter's record).
103. Id. at 522-23. In addition, Applicant testified that a typewritten pro se brief was familiar to him as a document someone had helped him prepare and that he had a part in researching it. Id. at 497.
126. The habeas court may have overlooked a commissary slip from 2/03/2013 that would appear to be within the spend total, regardless of whether marked-out items are included. Also, the 12/19/2012 commissary slip that the habeas court calculated as requesting $196.50 worth goods appears, by our calculations, to request only $100.50 worth of goods, if all marked-through items are included.
127. Examples of correct calculations include: 25 x 0.25 = 6.25, 14 x 0.80 = 11.20, 20 x 0.19 = 3.80, 15 x 1.70 = 25.50, 15 x 0.22 = 3.30.
128. Our conjecture is supported by the cost of the Ibuprofin. Several receipts show a request for 12 of this item, a unit price of $1.20 and a total price of $1.20. It seems to us more likely that a single Ibuprofin pill would cost ten cents than $1.20. It also seems unlikely that an inmate would order twelve pills at a time if they really cost $1.20 each.
129. There is at least one commissary slip in which soap was ordered when the quantity of two is marked out in favor of a quantity of ten, and the total price ($4.00) is twice the unit price ($2.00). Other slips simply order ten bars of soap where the total price is twice the unit price.
130. In at least some of these cases, the relative complexity of the calculation suggests that the error was not caused by a simple failure to know times-tables. For example, on the September 17, 2013 slip, Applicant specified a quantity of two peanut butter items with a unit price of $2.25 and a total price of $6.75. The correct total price was $4.50, but the price of $6.75 would be correct if Applicant had ordered three items.
131. See also id. at 513.
133. Id. Applicant demonstrated math ability included being able to add three-digit or four-digit numbers together.
136. Id. at 524. In a disciplinary report, an offender who was questioned after being found in Applicant's cell stated that he was there to play dominoes. Applicant also told the defense team in May 2000 that he played dominoes with another inmate. See id. at 508, 523 & n.55.
137. See supra at n.72 and accompanying text.
138. Moore, 470 S.W.3d at 494. This evaluation was done by Marcelle Tucker, M.Ed. Id.
145. Moore, 470 S.W.3d at 490, 497, 508.
146. See id. at 523.
147. See id. at 498-99.
149. At least twice, Applicant refused an order to shave, once saying that he had a “shaving pass” and the other time citing a medical condition. Moore, 470 S.W.3d at 498. One time, Applicant refused to get a haircut. Id. Another time, Applicant refused to sit down with a group of inmates in the day room. Id.
151. Moore, 470 S.W.3d at 497.
154. See Moore, 470 S.W.3d at 490.
156. See Moore, 470 S.W.3d at 523.
159. See supra at part B.8 (social skills).
160. Findings, paragraphs 132 (low score on test that included evaluating “one's ability to plan ahead”—score of “1”—the lowest Borda had ever recorded), 169(h) (concluding that Applicant lived so well in prison because it “leaves little room for independent decision-making” and that practical food, shelter, job, and bill-paying activities “would in all likelihood perplex him.”).
161. See also Moore, 470 S.W.3d at 522.
162. Id. at 470 S.W.3d at 521-22.
163. Id. See also id. at 509 (testimony that Applicant's family did not have kitchen appliances such as a microwave oven, and meals were cooked on a hot plate).
164. See supra at n.160.
165. See Moore, 470 S.W.3d at 503, 514 (e.g., score on Slosson test was 57, score on WAIS-IV was 59, overall score on WISC was 78, with a performance score of 83).
166. See supra at nn.132-34.
167. See Moore, 470 S.W.3d at 518 (suboptimal effort on WAIS-IV and Test of Memory Malingering).
169. See also id. at 518.
170. The dissent contends that our present opinion continues to employ Briseno-type factors and focuses on adaptive strengths rather than adaptive weaknesses. We disagree. We go into detail about Applicant's adaptive abilities to explain why the trial court's findings of fact are not supported by the record.

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