Source: https://habeascorpusblog.typepad.com/habeas_corpus_blog/en-banc/
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 10:32:46+00:00

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Habeas Corpus - Martinez vs. Pinholster - Who wins?
Has the Ninth Circuit found another way around Pinholster? Can a petitioner rely upon a Martinez argument in order to have a federal court review "new" evidence? Boy, these pathways around Pinholster really are a hot topic in these parts.
On Monday March 4, Judge Tallman, joined by many, if not all, of the other conservative judges on the Ninth Circuit, issued a published order dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc in a capital habeas case called Schad v. Ryan.
In an unpublished order, the three-judge panel in Schad remanded the case to the district court for that court to determine whether petitioner could rely upon Martinez to establish cause for a procedurally defaulted IAC claim. Petitioner had raised an IAC claim based on counsel's failure to present mitigating evidence during the penalty phase. In his habeas petition, petitioner was relying upon mitigating evidence that post-conviction counsel ("PCC") failed to present to the state courts. While PCC had raised an IAC claim based on a failure to present mitigating evidence during the penalty phase, PCC had not presented this particular mitigating evidence to the state courts.* This failure was the basis of the Martinez argument.
* Specifically, in state court, the claim focused on counsel's failure to investigate and present additional evidence regarding his tragic history of child abuse. The new mitigating evidence in federal court was evidence of his mental illness as an adult.
This made these conservative judges angry. In their mind, petitioner was using an improper way around Pinholster to have the federal court consider new evidence not presented to the state courts. To them, this was not a "new" IAC claim. In their eyes, petitioner was simply making the old claim prettier with fancy new evidence and then improperly arguing that Martinez allowed the federal court to consider that better-looking new evidence under a new IAC claim.
I find the dissenting judges' analysis a little hard to accept. In my mind, these judges are simply unhappy with the logical consequences of Martinez. I really don't think that there can be much of a debate that what the three-judge panel allowed here is fully consistent with Martinez -- petitioner was arguing cause based on post-conviction counsel's "errors" for failing to "properly present" an IAC claim. Those are words quoted out of the first paragraph of Martinez.
So Martinez has the upper hand in this round. But the scorecard could change considerably after the en banc argument in Dickens. Actually, reviewing the Schad unpublished order, it also appears that a Martinez argument is going to be addressed in the Detrich en banc as well. Looks like there are going to be many battles up ahead over the reach of Martinez.
In January 2013, the Ninth Circuit granted a petition for rehearing en banc in a capital habeas case called Dickens v. Ryan. According to the Ninth Circuit's en banc page, the en banc argument will be calendared the week of June 24 in Seattle, Washington.
This case poses a really interesting situation. Petitioner lost on his main claim, that the death penalty could not be imposed on him because he was not a major participant in the murder, but obtained a remand to the district court for that court to consider a Martinez cause argument based on a procedurally-defaulted IAC claim.
Petitioner was the one who sought and obtained rehearing en banc. (ed. - see below) Petitioner's petition sought rehearing on the "major participant" issue. The Martinez issue was not mentioned at all in the petition or even in the State's opposition (ed. - but see below).
The three-judge panel opinion shall not be cited as precedent by or to any court of the Ninth Circuit.
I don't know the answer to these questions. (ed. - Well, the update gives answers to these questions, see below) It would be a shame for a petitioner to get rehearing on an issue on which he lost, and then have the en banc court take away the relief on the issue on which he won. (ed. - that would be a shame, but not applicable here) Particularly where the State did not even seek rehearing on that issue. Is this a risk that a petitioner takes when he seeks en banc review? I am really curious about this.
UPDATE/EDIT: I did not have all of the information about the en banc rehearing when I wrote the post. I guess that I should not have relied exclusively on the Ninth Circuit's en banc page which only linked to the habeas petitioner's en banc petition.
It turns out that the State separately sought rehearing on the Martinez issue. Although the order granting en banc doesn't specify, it would appear that both petitions were granted. So the whole thing is getting reviewed. I guess that answers most of the questions I had above. One question does remain unanswered (does a petitioner face the risk of giving up a partial win when seeking en banc review on the parts on which he lost). But that only applies to the hypothetical situation where both sides don't seek rehearing en banc in a "split" decision. I am still curious about that, but it's just not relevant here.
On February 25, 2013, the Ninth Circuit granted a habeas petitioner's request to rehear his case en banc in a case called Frost v. Van Boening.
"Ladies and Gentlemen of the jury, there are two separate and distinct reasons why you should find my client not guilty. Unfortunately, I may explain only one reason to you. (And a silent p.s.: I wish I could argue reasonable doubt to you, but I can't!)." This hypothetical summation mimics the extraordinary circumstances of Frost's closing argument, the legal equivalent of counsel having one hand tied behind his back. Due to a misunderstanding of state law, the trial judge forced Frost to "opt for one or the other" legitimate defense— arguing duress or putting the government to its burden of proof. This undisputed denial of the constitutional right to present proper argument on alternative defense theories created a Hobson's choice that violated Frost's Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel and his Fourteenth Amendment Due Process rights.
Should be a really fascinating en banc argument.
1. Did the panel err by substituting its judgment for that of the state post-conviction court and concluding that the state court unreasonably applied Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)?
2. Did the panel err by considering evidence that was not presented in state court notwithstanding the United States Supreme Court’s directive in Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388 (2011), that federal review of a claim addressed on the merits in state court is limited to the evidence presented in state court?
Obviously, I care more about the second question than the first. I am guessing the en banc court will focus more on it as well.
To note, here's the panel: Kozinski, Pregerson, Reinhardt, Graber, W Fletcher, Gould, Bea, Murguia, Christen, Nguyen, Watford. As I have discussed before, there is no guarantee that any of the original panel members sit on the en banc panel. And, indeed, only one of the original members, Pregerson, is sitting on the en banc panel. He was in the majority, which granted the habeas petition.
Here is the 55-minute video of the en banc argument. Haven't watched it yet, but I will. And here's the audio if you just want to listen to it. Gotta love the Ninth Circuit for making these available (yes, I am looking right at you, Second Circuit).
After my post last week about the en banc decision in Carrera, Alex sent me an e-mail in which he pointed out a couple of interesting things about the decision that I didn't mention. First, the breakdown of judges was 10 to 1. He opined that, with that type of breakdown, it’s hard to see why the case went en banc in the first place. Especially because there was not really an important legal issue.
*With a concurring opinion from CJ Kozinski.
All of these en banc decisions got me thinking. Empirical research shows that the Ninth Circuit takes far more habeas cases en banc than I saw in the Second Circuit. I think I could count on one hand the number of habeas cases that went en banc in the Second Circuit over the past 15 to 20 years. I have mentioned six in the Ninth Circuit in the past three years. And I think that’s true across the board for all types of cases. The Ninth Circuit takes a lot more cases en banc generally than the Second Circuit. See this link for more info on current en banc cases. To note, there is one habeas case currently pending en banc, Detrich v. Ryan.
Why the disparity in en banc habeas cases? It could simply be that the Ninth Circuit sees that many more habeas petitions, which results in many more likely candidates for en banc review. That’s probably the most likely reason. It’s also probably true that it is more likely for a death penalty case to go en banc and the Second Circuit does not see many habeas death penalty cases while the Ninth Circuit sees a lot of them.
But another contributing factor may be the different en banc processes in each court. The Ninth Circuit’s process is actually different from not just the Second Circuitm but every other circuit. In every circuit, I believe that the voting process is the same. A judge must call for a vote of all of the active judges on whether to take the case en banc. FRAP 35(f). The rule itself does not indicate whether that judge has to be an active judge. The case will go en banc if a majority of the active judges vote to have it go that way. FRAP35(a).
Here’s where the Second and Ninth Circuits differ. In the Second Circuit, the en banc panel will consist of all of the active judges on the court plus any senior judges who were on the original panel. Currently, the Second Circuit has thirteen active judges. And I believe it is at full capacity.
*Actually, Congress passed a statute that says that any circuit with more than 15 active judges can institute this type of process. I believe that the only other circuit that qualifies is the Fifth with 17 active judical positions. But that court has not instituted this procedure.
I think that the limitation on the number of judges makes it easier for the court to vote a case en banc. Outside of the CJ, there is less than a 50% chance that a judge who votes for an en banc hearing will have to sit on the panel. I would think that this would have an impact on voting patterns – a yes vote would not automatically mean more work for the individual judge.
Another interesting aspect is that the 10 judges beyond the CJ are selected at random. This means that the judges who sat on the original panel may not end up sitting on the en banc panel.
That’s precisely what happened in Carrera. None of the three judges on the original panel sat on the en banc panel. Two were active and one was a senior judge. I don’t see any rules that excludes the original panel from sitting en banc. In fact, I went and looked at the en banc in Pinholster and two of the judges in the original panel sat in the en banc panel (one was CJK, who had to sit on the en banc). It really is a random selection of the active judges.
The fact that the original panel members may not end up on the en banc panel may weigh in favor of more cases going en banc. I think that the Second Circuit judges limit the number of en banc cases in order to prevent the proverbial stepping on each other toes. They want to remain collegial and respectful to each other. Not sure if that’s the best motivation, but that seems to be one main reason why so few go en banc.
However, in the Ninth, because the original panel may not show up on the en banc panel, that does provide a level of buffer. The judges on the en banc panel could potentially reverse the original panel without having to face any members of the original panel. Because there is no guarantee that the original panel will be there, a voting judge may not feel it necessary to be deferential. It makes it easier to say that those judges got it wrong.
On the other hand, I guess it could be the opposite. It isn’t really too fair to the members of the original panel that they don’t automatically get to sit on the en banc panel. With this in mind, a voting judge may think it is more respectful to be deferential to the original panel because the original members may not be there to defend their positions.
In any event, whatever the reasons why, the Ninth Circuit takes a lot more cases en banc than the Second Circuit. That is definitely true for habeas cases.
One last thing to note, the local rules do say that all 28 judges of the Ninth Circuit can rehear an en banc case en banc. The literal en banc2. The idea of that is pretty awesome.
Unfortunately, it has never happened. But, in the words of the immortal Wooderson, it would be a lot cooler if it did.

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