Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/358/184/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 05:01:24+00:00

Document:
"the Board shall not (1) decide that any unit is appropriate for such purposes if such unit includes both professional employees and employees who are not professional employees unless a majority of such professional employees vote for inclusion in such unit."
After refusing to take a vote among the professional employees of a labor organization to determine whether a majority of them would "vote for inclusion in such unit," the Board included both professional and nonprofessional employees in the bargaining unit that it found appropriate.
Held: a Federal District Court had jurisdiction of an original suit to set aside the Board's determination because it was made in excess of the Board's powers. Pp. 358 U. S. 184-191 .
101 U.S.App.D.C. 398, 249 F.2d 490, affirmed.
The Board, after refusing to take a vote among the professional employees to determine whether a majority of them would "vote for inclusion in such unit," included both professional and nonprofessional employees in the bargaining unit that it found appropriate. The sole and narrow question presented is whether a Federal District Court has jurisdiction of an original suit to vacate that determination of the Board because made in excess of its powers.
"share a close community of employment interests with [the professional employees, and their inclusion would not] destroy the predominantly professional character of such a unit."
The Board, after denying the Association's request to take a vote among the professional employees to determine whether a majority of them favored "inclusion in such unit," included the 233 professional employees and the nine nonprofessional employees in the unit and directed an election to determine whether they desired to be represented by the Association, by the other labor organization, or by neither. The Association moved the Board to stay the election and to amend its decision by excluding the nonprofessional employees from the unit. The Board denied that motion and went ahead with the election, at which the Association received a majority of the valid votes cast, and was thereafter certified by the Board as the collective bargaining agent for the unit.
the same unit without the latter's consent, and, in doing so, had acted in excess of its powers to the injury of the professional employees, and that the court had jurisdiction to grant the relief prayed. It accordingly denied the Board's motion and granted the plaintiff's motion, and entered judgment setting aside the Board's determination of the bargaining unit and also the election and the Board's certification. 148 F.Supp. 597.
On the Board's appeal, it did not contest the trial court's conclusion that the Board, in commingling professional with nonprofessional employees in the unit, had acted in excess of its powers, and had thereby worked injury to the statutory rights of the professional employees. Instead, it contended only that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The Court of Appeals held that the District Court did have jurisdiction and affirmed its judgment. 101 App.D.C. 398, 249 F.2d 490. Because of the importance of the question and the fact that it has been left open in our previous decisions, we granted certiorari, 355 U.S. 922.
contrary to the statute. . . ."
"But that question is not presented for decision by the record before us. Its answer involves a determination whether the Wagner Act, insofar as it has given legally enforceable rights, has deprived the district courts of some portion of their original jurisdiction conferred by § 24 of the Judicial Code. It can be appropriately answered only upon a showing in such a suit that unlawful action of the Board has inflicted an injury on the petitioners for which the law, apart from the review provisions of the Wagner Act, affords a remedy. This question can be properly and adequately considered only when it is brought to us for review upon a suitable record."
employees vote for inclusion in such unit."
(Emphasis added.) Yet the Board included in the unit employees whom it found were not professional employees, after refusing to determine whether a majority of the professional employees would "vote for inclusion in such unit." Plainly, this was an attempted exercise of power that had been specifically withheld. It deprived the professional employees of a "right" assured to them by Congress. Surely, in these circumstances, a Federal District Court has jurisdiction of an original suit to prevent deprivation of a right so given.
"While an affirmative declaration of duty contained in a legislative enactment may be of imperfect obligation because not enforceable in terms, a definite statutory prohibition of conduct which would thwart the declared purpose of the legislation cannot be disregarded. . . . If Congress intended that the prohibition, as thus construed, should be enforced, the courts would encounter no difficulty in fulfilling its purpose. . . . The definite prohibition which Congress inserted in the act can not therefore be overriden in the view that Congress intended it to be ignored. As the prohibition was appropriate to the aim of Congress, and is capable of enforcement, the conclusion must be that enforcement was contemplated."
Id. at 281 U. S. 568-569. And compare Virginian R. Co. v. System Federation, 300 U. S. 515.
of the National Mediation Board determining that all yardmen of the rail lines operated by the New York Central system constituted an appropriate bargaining unit, because the Railway Labor Board had acted within its delegated powers. But, in the course of that opinion, the Court announced principles that are controlling here.
"If the absence of jurisdiction of the federal courts meant a sacrifice or obliteration of a right which Congress had created, the inference would be strong that Congress intended the statutory provisions governing the general jurisdiction of those courts to control. That was the purport of the decisions of this Court in Texas & New Orleans R. Co. v. Brotherhood Clerks, 281 U. S. 548, and Virginian R. Co. v. System Federation, 300 U. S. 515. In those cases, it was apparent that, but for the general jurisdiction of the federal courts, there would be no remedy to enforce the statutory commands which Congress had written into the Railway Labor Act. The result would have been that the 'right' of collective bargaining was unsupported by any legal sanction. That would have robbed the Act of its vitality, and thwarted its purpose."
Id. at 320 U. S. 300.
Here, differently from the Switchmen's case, "absence of jurisdiction of the federal courts" would mean "a sacrifice or obliteration of a right which Congress" has given professional employees, for there is no other means within their control (American Federation of Labor v. Labor Board, supra) to protect and enforce that right. And "the inference [is] strong that Congress intended the statutory provisions governing the general jurisdiction of those courts to control." 320 U.S. at 320 U. S. 300. This Court cannot lightly infer that Congress does not intend judicial protection of rights it confers against agency action taken in excess of delegated powers. Cf. Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U. S. 579; Stark v. Wickard, 321 U. S. 288; American School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U. S. 94.
Where, as here, Congress has given a "right" to the professional employees, it must be held that it intended that right to be enforced, and "the courts . . . encounter no difficulty in fulfilling its purpose." Texas & New Orleans R. Co. v. Railway Clerks, supra, at 281 U. S. 568.
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, whom MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER joins, dissenting.
The legislative history of the Wagner Act, [Footnote 1] and of the Taft-Hartley amendments, [Footnote 2] shows a considered congressional purpose to restrict judicial review of Labor Board representation certifications to review in the Courts of Appeals in the circumstances specified in § 9(d), 29 U.S.C. § 159(d). The question was extensively debated when both Acts were being considered, and, on both occasions, Congress concluded that, unless drastically limited, time-consuming court procedures would seriously threaten to frustrate the basic national policy of preventing industrial strife and achieving industrial peace by promoting collective bargaining.
"for review in the courts only after the election has been held and the Board has ordered the employer to do something predicated upon the results of the election. [Footnote 7]"
Board's certification, because of the risk that time-consuming review might defeat the objectives of the national labor policy. See American Federation of Labor v. Labor Board, 308 U. S. 401, 308 U. S. 409-411; Madden v. Brotherhood and Union of Tr. Employees, 147 F.2d 439.
"Delay would be piled upon delay, during which time collective bargaining would be suspended pending determination of the status of the bargaining agent. Such delays can only result in industrial strife. [Footnote 11]"
"Subsection 9(d) of the conference agreement conforms to the Senate amendment. The House bill contained a provision which would have permitted judicial review of certifications even before the entry of an unfair labor practice order. In receding on their insistence on this portion, the House yielded to the view of the Senate conferees that such provision would permit dilatory tactics in representation proceedings."
"the inference [is] strong that Congress intended the statutory provisions governing the general jurisdiction of those [District] courts to control."
statute. The policy behind the limitation of judicial review applies just as clearly when the challenge is made on this ground. Plainly, direct judicial review of a Board's interpretation of the statute is as likely to be as drawn out, and thus as frustrative of the national policy, as is review of any other type of Board decision. That appears from the timetable in Inland Empire District Council v. Millis, 325 U. S. 697. That case also involved a challenge in a District Court to a statutory interpretation by the Board in a representation proceeding. The Court held that it was not necessary to reach the question of the District Court's jurisdiction, since it had not been shown that the Board's interpretation of the pertinent statute was erroneous. But over two years elapsed while the question was being litigated. The hearing which led to the certification was held in May, 1943, and this Court's decision was announced on June 11, 1945.
"It is hardly possible that Congress should have intended to permit review by District Courts of 9(c) proceedings while so carefully limiting review of such proceedings in the Circuit Courts of Appeals to cases in which an order under 10(c) has been entered."
Madden v. Brotherhood and Union of Tr. Employees, 147 F.2d 439, 442.
interpretation or otherwise, sufficient to get a foot in a District Court door under 28 U.S.C. § 1337. Even when the Board wins such a case on the merits, as in Inland Empire Council, while the case is dragging through the courts, the threat will be ever present of the industrial strife sought to be averted by Congress in providing only drastically limited judicial review under § 9(d). Both union and management will be able to use the tactic of litigation to delay the initiation of collective bargaining when it suits their purposes. A striking example of this was recently disclosed to the Select Committee of the Senate on Improper Activities in the Labor or Management Field. [Footnote 15] A union, by challenging Board certification proceedings in the District Courts, [Footnote 16] was able to extend a representation proceeding to over six months, even though only seven employees were involved and they did not support the union. By the time that the Board was able to certify a representative of the employees, the industrial strife of those six months had forced the employer out of business. Thus, collective bargaining was prevented, the basic purpose of the LMRA was frustrated, and the result was serious hardship to both the employer and employees. I fear that today the Court fashions a major setback for the goals of the national labor policy, at least until the Congress enacts new language to express a will which I think is already crystal clear.
"unfair to . . . the union that loses, which has no appeal at all no matter how wrong the certification may be; [and to] the employees, who also have no appeal. . . . [Footnote 17]"
The Court supports its decision by stating that Switchmen's Union v. National Mediation Board, supra, "announced principles that are controlling here." This is true, but I believe that those principles lead to, indeed compel, a result contrary to that reached by the Court. In that case, the Switchmen's Union sought to challenge in a District Court the certification of an employee representative by the National Mediation Board under the Railway Labor Act. The Board certified the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen as representative for all the yardmen of the rail lines operated by the New York Central system. The Switchmen's Union contended that yardmen of certain designated parts of the system should be permitted to vote for separate representatives, instead of being compelled to take part in a system-wide election.
The Board rejected this contention of the Switchmen's Union upon the ground that the Railway Labor Act did not authorize the Board to determine a unit of less than the entire system. The Board's interpretation was that the "Railway Labor Act vests the Board with no discretion to split a single carrier. . . ." Switchmen's case, 320 U.S. at 320 U. S. 309. This Court held that the action of the Switchmen's Union was not cognizable in a District Court. The Court held that the Railway Labor Act, read in the light of its history, disclosed a congressional intention to bar direct review in the District Courts of certifications by the Mediation Board. This was held notwithstanding the fact that the certification was based on an alleged misinterpretation of the Act.
"shall not . . . decide that any unit is appropriate . . . if such unit includes both professional employees and employees who are not professional employees unless a majority of such professional employees vote for inclusion in such unit. . . ."
"by the highly selective manner in which Congress . . . provided for judicial review of administrative orders or determinations under the Act."
Id. at 320 U. S. 305. Review is confined to review in a Court of Appeals in the circumstances specified in § 9(d).
and fashioned the tool which it deemed suited to that end. . . . All constitutional questions aside, it is for Congress to determine how the rights which it creates shall be enforced."
320 U.S. at 320 U. S. 301. The Court used the "sacrifice or obliteration" language solely to distinguish the situation where Congress created a "right," but no tribunal for its enforcement. This was the case in Texas & New Orleans R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Railway Clerks, 281 U. S. 548, and Virginian R. Co. v. System Federation, 300 U. S. 515. In the Texas case, the employer was attempting to prevent the organization of its employees in violation of § 2 of the Railway Labor Act, which provided that the employees could select representatives "without interference, influence, or coercion" by the employer. There was no agency designated to enforce this policy of the Act, and, unless the courts provided sanctions against the outlawed activity, there would be no official sanctions to prevent it. Similarly, in the Virginian R. Co. case, a union asked the Court to order an employer to obey the commands of the Railway Labor Act, because, without such relief, the employer would have been free to ignore the Act, since, at that time, the Railway Labor Act provided no agency for enforcement of the right. Thus, when the Court in Switchmen's talked about "the absence of jurisdiction of the federal courts" meaning "a sacrifice or obliteration of a right which Congress had created," it referred to the situations in the Texas and Virginian R. Co. cases. See Switchmen's case at p. 320 U. S. 300.
"Congress, for reasons of its own, decided upon the method for protection of the 'right' it created. It selected the precise machinery and fashioned the tool which it deemed suited to that end."
"even where a complainant possesses a claim to executive action beneficial to him, created by federal statute, it does not necessarily follow that actions of administrative officials, deemed by the owner of the right to place unlawful restrictions upon his claim, are cognizable in appropriate federal courts of first instance."
321 U.S. at 321 U. S. 306. The statutes under consideration in those cases do not have the common purposes and scheme of the National Labor Relations Act and Railway Labor Act. Furthermore, the general statutory scheme and the legislative history of those statutes simply did not demonstrate the intent to limit the judicial enforcement of the rights created, so compellingly demonstrated in this case, and in Switchmen's Union v. National Mediation Board.
I would reverse and remand the case to the District Court with instructions to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction of the subject matter.
The first Labor Board was created by Public Resolution 44 of June 19, 1934, 48 Stat. 1183, to administer § 7(a) of the National Industrial Recovery Act, 48 Stat. 198.
H.R.Rep. No. 1147, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 7.
See H.R.Rep. No. 1147, supra, p. 23.
S.Rep. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 6.
See Hearings before Senate Committee on Education and Labor on S. 1000 et al., 76th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 584-587.
H.R.Rep. No. 245, 8th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 43.
H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., § 10(f); see H.R.Rep. No. 245, supra, pp. 59-60.
H.R.Rep. No. 245, supra, p. 94 (minority report). It was conservatively estimated that one year would be the average time required for judicial review of a Board certification. Ibid.
See, e.g., H.R.Rep. No. 245, supra, p. 43.
See H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 56-57.
See Testimony of Boyd Leedom, Chairman of the Labor Board, before the Select Committee of the Senate on Improper Activities in the Labor or Management Field, November 20, 1958.
"We are experiencing now, I think, more than any time within my experience . . . a tendency of the United States District Courts to move into the area where we think we have exclusive jurisdiction, so that, in recent months, we have had several District Courts interfering with our election processes."
H.R.Rep. No. 245, supra, p. 43.
See notes 19 20 infra.
H.R.Rep. No. 1147, supra, p. 23.
S.Rep. No. 573, supra, p. 14.

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