Source: http://arlingtonvirginiaduilawyer.com/
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 10:07:47+00:00

Document:
DUI is driving under the influence of a drug or driving while intoxicated. Many people in Virginia face DUI charges. The traffic rules for DUI or DWI in Virginia are very strict. Small amounts of BAC levels will cause a serious problem for you. Make sure that you do not drive under the influence of any drug at all. In any case, finding a traffic attorney who deals with such cases is important. If you live in Arlington, Virginia, you should know that you can go to jail for breaking the law and driving under the influence of a drug. Every day there are hundreds of people who drive and have the BAC levels higher than the amount the state allows. Not everyone knows if they have BAC levels at a higher percentage. It is when the officer stops them because of their driving behaviour, and they find out they are under the influence. It is why you should never drive after having alcohol. It takes some time for alcohol to drain out of your system. If you drink and then drive, it will be breaking the law, and you may receive a punishment for it. In case of DWI or DUI, you should always consult a specialist lawyer. These lawyers are experts in dealing with cases such as driving under the influence. These are specialists who know the laws, and they know how the courts work.
Hiring a lawyer who knows the laws in Virginia is the best thing you can do. A lawyer who has been serving in the state for many years knows what to do to get you out of trouble. It is why people only trust local lawyers. These lawyers know the law, they have resources and connections. You should hire these lawyers to ensure that you will not face charges.
Once you commit a crime such as driving under the influence of a drug, there are two things you can do. You can file the case against the charges and prove that you were not under the influence and you get free without any charges. You can also file the case to lessen the charges. The lawyer will gather information and evidence that you were not under the influence. He will help the court decision not to punish you. In case the BAC report comes, you only have a chance to plea to lessen the charges. In such case, the lawyer will try his best to ensure that the judge does not decide to give you the maximum punishment.
Getting in a problem is easy, but getting out is not. You should look for the best and the most expert DUI attorneys. These lawyers specialise in traffic laws in Arlington. You can trust these lawyers for helping you. These lawyers will take your case and handle all the legal paperwork for you. These lawyers are the best choice you have to reduce the sentence against you. Not hiring a lawyer for a DUI offence is a big mistake.
On April 29, 1995, Richard Wright, Jr., was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol in violation of Va. Code § 18.2-266. Following the defendant’s arrest and upon a determination that his blood alcohol content was greater than .08 grams per 210 liters of breath, Wright’s operator’s license was suspended for seven days pursuant to Va. Code § 46.2-391.2 (Administrative License Suspension, “ALS”). Wright moves the court to dismiss the warrant charging driving under the influence of alcohol on the grounds that he has been twice placed in jeopardy in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, namely, the “Double Jeopardy Clause.” The Commonwealth asserts that both the ALS action and the driving under the influence of alcohol prosecution are lawful and do not place the defendant twice in jeopardy. The court held an evidentiary hearing on July 14, 1995, and took the matter under advisement. The Court has considered the evidence presented, the memoranda of counsel, and many opinions of other trial courts and appellate courts and elsewhere.
Does the ALS action result in punishment?
Do the ALS action and the prosecution constitute the same proceedings or are they separate proceedings?
Do the ALS action and the prosecution provide punishment for the same offense?
Cases decided prior to Halper are of limited utility in the analysis of whether the ALS action results in punishment. No longer does the nomenclature of “civil,” “criminal,” or “administrative” have dispositive affect upon the underlying issue of whether a sanction is punitive in nature. Furthermore the distinction between a “right” and a “privilege,” is no longer helpful in resolving whether a sanction is punitive in nature.
whether a civil sanction, in application, may be so divorced from any remedial goal that it constitutes “punishment” for the purpose of double jeopardy analysis.
the labels “criminal” and “civil” are not of paramount importance. It is commonly understood that civil proceedings may advance punitive as well as remedial goals, and, conversely, that both punitive and remedial goals may be served by criminal penalties . . . . the determination whether a given civil sanction constitutes punishment in the relevant sense requires a particularized assessment of the penalty imposed and the purposes that the penalty may fairly be said to serve. Simply put, a civil as well as a criminal sanction constitutes punishment when the sanction as applied in the individual case serves the goals of punishment . . . .
Halper, 490 U.S. at 448.
Fundamentally, even assuming that [the forfeiture provisions] serve some remedial purpose, the Government’s argument must fail. “A civil sanction that cannot fairly be said solely to serve a remedial purpose, but rather can only be explained as also serving either retributive or deterrent purposes, is punishment, as we have come to understand the term.” Halper, 490 U.S. at 448, 109 S. Ct. at 1902 [emphasis added].
Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2812. It is the Court’s “emphasis added” which is most significant.
This case presents the question whether a tax on the possession of illegal drugs assessed after the State has imposed a criminal penalty for the same conduct may violate the constitutional prohibition against successive punishments for the same offense.
Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1941.
Montana no doubt could collect its tax on the possession of marijuana, for example, if it had not previously punished the taxpayer for the same offense, or indeed, if it had assessed the tax in the same proceeding that resulted in his conviction.
Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1945.
Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 114 S. Ct. 1937 at 1948, 128 L. Ed. 2d 767.
Additionally, the clear meaning and effect of §§ 46.2-391.2 and 46.2-391.4 demonstrate that remedial concerns cannot be the sole purpose of the legislature in enacting the ALS provisions. In the ALS action the Clerk of the General District Court shall return the defendant’s license at the end of the seven day period unless the probable cause determination is appealed and overruled during the same period. There is no requirement for alcohol evaluation or treatment during the seven day period and no mechanism to determine if the defendant poses a threat to the health and safety of the community. If the defendant was a threat to the health and safety of the community at the outset of the suspension, there is no reason advanced by the Commonwealth for a determination that he is no longer a threat at day seven or any other day.
Pursuant to Halper, Austin & Kurth Ranch and consistent with the stated legislative purpose and the clear effect of the ALS action, the Court determines that the suspension pursuant to § 46.2-391.2 constitutes punishment for the purposes of double jeopardy analysis.
If a breath test is taken pursuant to 18.2-268.2 or any similar ordinance of any county, city or town and the results show a blood alcohol content of 0.08 percent or more by weight by volume or 0.08 grams or more per 210 liters of breath, or the person refuses to submit to the breath test in violation of 18.2-268.3 or any similar local ordinance, and upon issuance of a warrant by the magistrate for a violation of 18.2-266 or 18.2-268.3, or any similar local ordinance, the person’s license shall be suspended immediately for seven days . . . .
The magistrate is a judicial officer for this purpose and his decision is pursuant to a judicial proceeding. See Article VI, § 8, Constitution; . Code § 19.2-48.1; Penick v. Ratcliffe, 149 . 618, 140 S.E. 664 (1927).
$ 405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d at 1216-17.
In the recently decided case of United States v. Ursery, 59 F.3d 568, 1995 WL 411189, (6th Cir. 1995), the government sought civil forfeiture of the home owned by the defendant and his wife because of use of the property to grow marijuana. The matter was settled with the government by a civil judgment for $ 13,250.00 which was paid by defendant and his wife. Shortly thereafter the government indicted the defendant on criminal charges based upon the same conduct, namely, manufacture of marijuana.
The Supreme Court has made clear that the government may seek and obtain both the full civil penalty and the full range of statutorily authorized criminal penalties in the same proceeding. Halper, 490 U.S. at 450.
The civil forfeiture proceeding and the criminal proceeding were instituted four months apart, presided over by different district judges, and resolved by separate judgments. The district court found these two proceedings to be part of a “single, coordinated proceeding” without providing any factual support for this determination. As a matter of principle, applying a label to something does not make it so. Without a reasonable analysis of the indicia of coordination, we do not believe these two proceedings logically become part of a single, coordinated procedure merely by labeling them as such. Similar to the Ninth Circuit, we find that applying the label of “single, coordinated prosecution” to the facts of this case simply goes too far. The civil forfeiture proceeding and the criminal prosecution were two separate proceedings for purposes of double jeopardy analysis.
The Court of Appeals considered a similar issue in the case of Small v. Commonwealth, 12 . App. 314, 402 S.E.2d 927 (1991). Therein the Commonwealth initiated simultaneously civil and criminal contempt proceedings against the defendant for violation of a prior decree of court. Criminal proceedings were held after civil proceedings because of problems related to proper service upon the defendant in the criminal case. The court heard the civil contempt charges and imposed a $ 3,000 fine upon the defendant in addition to attorney’s fees to the Commonwealth and restitution to customers.
While it is true that both criminal and civil sanctions may be imposed as a result of the same conduct, the double jeopardy clause bars the imposition of two separate penalties if both are punitive. The labels “criminal” and “civil” are not of great importance in determining whether a later punishment is barred by the double jeopardy clause. Furthermore, it is not the “fact of punishment but rather its character and purpose” that distinguishes civil and criminal contempt. The punishment for civil contempt is remedial and for the benefit of the injured party. The punishment for criminal contempt, however, is punitive, “to vindicate the authority of the court.” [citations omitted] . . . .
Small, 12 . App. at 317.
The Court determined that there was no remedial basis for the court’s award of the penalties; consequently, the penalties must be determined to be punitive in nature.
In order for the court to reach its conclusion, it must have determined that the proceedings were “separate.” This conclusion does not specifically appear in the majority opinion; however, it is confirmed in the dissent when the author notes: “Assuming, however, that the present case must be viewed as involving two separate proceedings . . . .” Small, 12 . App. at 321.

References: § 18
 § 46
 § 46
 § 8
 § 19
 v. 
 v. 
 v.