Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=28706:g-r-no-l-50871-august-4,-1988-carlos-velasco-v-amado-g-inciong&catid=1240&Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 00:12:40+00:00

Document:
CARLOS VELASCO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS RECEIVER OF THE BUSINESS UNDER THE NAME AND STYLE, "CENTRAL ENGINEERING,", Petitioner, v. HON. AMADO G. INCIONG, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and GEORGE MENDOZA, Respondents.
Corazon R. Paulino for Petitioner.
Gerardo B. Macaraeg for respondent George Mendoza.
1.	LABOR LAW; TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT; ABANDONMENT; HOW CONSTITUTED. — To constitute abandonment, there must be absence from work and "deliberate intent to discontinue one’s employment without any intention of returning back." Mere absence is not sufficient to give ground for abandonment. It must be accompanied by overt acts unerringly pointing to the fact that the employee simply does not want to work anymore.
3.	ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; UNDERSECRETARIES; PERFORMS QUASI-JUDICIAL DUTIES. — The authority of Undersecretaries includes the performance of quasi-judicial duties delegated to them by law or the department heads. The Administrative Code provides: "When a Department Secretary is unable to perform his duties owing to illness, absence, or other cause, or in a vacancy in the office, the respective Undersecretary, or the Undersecretary designated, as the case may be, shall temporarily perform the functions of said office."
Meanwhile, in Civil Case No. Q-20108, upon motion of therein defendant Ely Chan Velasco, the trial court, on 9 May 1977, authorized said defendant "to designate [her] representative with authority to stay in the premises of the Central Engineering during office hours for the purpose of watching or overseeing the management and/or operation thereof, by the duly appointed receiver." 4 And, pursuant thereto respondent Mendoza was duly designated as the representative of said Ely Chan Velasco.
Meanwhile, on 1 January 1978, the Company ceased operation due to the impossibility of renewing its license; as a consequence, on 15 March 1978, the Company was leased to a certain Mr. Lorenzo Tan, with the subsequent approval of the trial court having jurisdiction over the Company’s receivership.
Hence, this Petition by the Company.
Petitioner contends that private respondent Mendoza was not dismissed: 9 that when it filed the report for abandonment on 18 March 1977, it acted in good faith and on the belief that he (Mendoza) was no longer interested in his job, that, consequently, it cannot be held responsible for illegally dismissing said private Respondent. Likewise, petitioner alleges that the NLRC’s finding that Mendoza was illegally dismissed on 7 March 1977 is "not supported by any scintilla of fact" 10 and is thus null and void.
The alleged abandonment of Mendoza cannot, however, be deemed a resignation from his job, and, therefore, requiring only a report to, instead of a clearance from, the Regional Office, Department of Labor.
But, even on the assumption that abandonment by the employee required only a report to, and not a clearance from, the Regional Office, Department of Labor, the evidence in this case does not support the petitioner’s allegation of abandonment by Mendoza of his employment.
The petitioner calls attention to the findings of fact of the Labor Arbiter that respondent Mendoza "failed to report for work from 28 February to 5 March, 1977; that he attended the hearing in the City Court presided by Judge Gerino Tolentino on 4 March 1977, although he claims he was sick (tsn. p. 20, p. 22, 18 October 1977) [and]; that he also attended the pre-trial of Civil Case No. 20108, Florence Velasco Co. v. Ely Chan Velasco, Branch IV, CFI of Rizal, on 7 March 1977." 16 In petitioner’s view, these findings justified its (petitioner’s) filing of a case of abandonment against respondent Mendoza and should not have been "ignored" 17 by public respondent Inciong in applying the law to the facts of the case.
". . . On 7 March, [Respondent Mendoza also tried to report] for work to a certain Apolinar Martin, who appears to be the respondent’s shop manager, but the latter, evidently due to superior instructions, refused to give him work, saying that he should see the receiver first, one Carlos Velasco . . .
"Carlos Velasco was not around at the time, he did not visit the shop regularly, leaving the management thereof to Martin. The complainant was not able to see his (sic) for that reason. Martin, however, approached Mrs. Florence Velasco Co, who appears to weild real authority in the establishment, regarding the complainant’s situation, but she merely shook her head to indicate her negative reaction.
"The complainant returned the next day but, again, no work was given him; his presence was ignored. Again, he was not able to see Carlos Velasco, who was not around.
The treatment extended to respondent Mendoza by the petitioner, as found by the NLRC, negates the latter’s claim that when it filed with the Department of Labor the report of abandonment against the former, it acted in good faith and on the belief that the former was no longer interested in his job.
On the whole, the filing of the charge of abandonment only conspicuously showed the employer’s attempt to give a color of validity to a unilateral act of severing the employer-employee relationship which the employee sought, on the other hand, to preserve.
7.	Under Art. 223, P.D. 442 as amended.
11.	Sec. 3, Rule XIV, Rules & Regulations Implementing the Labor Code, promulgated on 16 February 1976.
(f)	Other causes analogous to the foregoing.
(f)	All other terminations of employment, suspensions, layoffs, or shutdowns not otherwise specified in this and in the immediately preceding sections.
20.	Capital Garment Corporation v. Ople, 117 SCRA 473.
21.	Flexo Manufacturing Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, 135 SCRA 145; Peñaflor v. National Labor Relations Commission, 120 SCRA 68; Capital Garment Corporation v. Ople, supra; Judric Canning Corporation v. Inciong, 115 SCRA 887.
22.	Flexo Manufacturing Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, supra, Judric Canning Corporation v. Inciong, supra.
23.	Valladolid v. Inciong, 121 SCRA 205.
28.	Administrative Code, Sec. 79, Par. 2.
29.	Robertson v. Baff, 285 F. 911, p. 915.

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