Source: https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/the-case-law-concerning-the-2001-authorization-use-military-force-and-its
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 12:37:03+00:00

Document:
The Obama Administration’s determination that ISIS is an “associated force” that falls under the AUMF has not been challenged in court in the detainee context, and it is not clear that the courts will agree. The Trump Administration should therefore not attempt to detain ISIS fighters at Guantanamo Bay until it is on a stronger legal footing. Before using Guantanamo as a detention facility for members of ISIS, it should study the case law and evaluate the litigation risk. Given the fact that al-Qaeda and the Taliban still pose a substantial national security threat to the United States and its partners and that we continue to be engaged in armed conflict with those groups and associated forces, an AUMF that includes ISIS should not disturb the existing legal authorities applicable to al-Qaeda and the Taliban. This can be accomplished legislatively in a number of ways: either a stand-alone AUMF specific to ISIS and associated forces or an AUMF that includes al-Qaeda, the Taliban, ISIS, and associated forces.
President Donald Trump and his Administration are exploring the possibility of detaining ISIS terrorists at Guantanamo Bay to further the war effort to destroy ISIS.
However, it is not clear whether the courts would extend the scope of the detention authority for individuals connected to the Taliban and al-Qaeda to ISIS.
The Trump Administration should therefore support and Congress should consider an AUMF that includes ISIS before bringing any ISIS detainees to Guantanamo.
The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) continues to conduct hostilities against the interests of the United States and its allies. ISIS poses a significant threat and must be defeated. In the effort to achieve this goal, President Barack Obama argued that the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) gave him the legal authority to use military force against ISIS.[REF] This justification has proven somewhat controversial in the legal community, with distinguished scholars both supporting and challenging the applicability of the 2001 AUMF to ISIS.[REF] Now, President Donald Trump and his Administration are exploring the possibility of detaining ISIS terrorists at Guantanamo Bay to further the war effort to destroy ISIS.
The Obama Administration argued that ISIS is an “associated force” that falls under the scope of the 2001 AUMF, but this justification has not been challenged in a court of law. If an ISIS terrorist were detained at Guantanamo, it is very likely that he would file a habeas petition in federal court to challenge the scope of the government’s detention authority. In such a case, the courts would have to analyze closely whether ISIS falls into the covered class of individuals and organizations under the 2001 AUMF as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States and the lower federal courts. As evidenced by the approach that they have taken in their AUMF-detention jurisprudence, it is not clear that the courts would agree with the Obama Administration’s justification.
If the Trump Administration rushes to bring ISIS fighters to Guantanamo without a stronger legal basis, those detainees might successfully challenge not only their own detention under the AUMF, but also the Trump Administration’s entire legal justification for the authority to use all necessary and appropriate force in the fight against ISIS. A review of the Guantanamo habeas case law shows that the Trump Administration would be on more solid legal ground if it worked with Congress to craft an ISIS-specific AUMF before bringing any ISIS detainees to Guantanamo Bay.
Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution gives Congress the power “to declare War.” In the history of the United States, Congress has declared war 11 times relating to five different wars.[REF] It also has adopted over 40 authorizations for the use of military force.[REF] Every authorization is unique in its breadth and scope, especially when a war is formally authorized.
However, most of the AUMFs in U.S. history have been far more limited than the broad authorizations enacted in the five declared wars. These AUMFs themselves have varied considerably in breadth and scope. For example, in the late 1790s, Congress authorized the President to use “particular armed forces in a specified way for limited ends” against French naval vessels in the Quasi-War. Bradley and Goldsmith write that the authorizations in the Quasi-War did not authorize the President “to use all of the armed forces of the United States or to conduct military incursions beyond specified military targets, and they limited the geographical scope of the authorized conflict to the high seas.”[REF] In this way, the Quasi-War AUMF was very limited.
The 2001 AUMF,[REF] which has been used to prosecute the war against the Taliban and al-Qaeda, falls along the broader side of the spectrum when compared with AUMFs historically. It authorizes the President to “use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001….” Using their five analytical components for evaluating AUMFs, Bradley and Goldsmith conclude that “the  AUMF is as broad as authorizations in declared wars with respect to the resources and methods it authorizes the President to employ, and with respect to the purposes for which these resources can be used.”[REF] Thus, the 2001 AUMF follows the standard format for an AUMF that gives the President broad powers.
However, the 2001 AUMF is unique in one other important respect. In authorizing the President to use force against the nations, organizations, and persons that are connected to the September 11 attacks, the 2001 AUMF describes but does not specifically name the enemies targeted under the authorization.[REF] While the statute nominally gives the President the authority to make the determination about which organizations or persons fall under the class of individuals covered by the AUMF, the courts have played a major role in defining its scope, most notably through the context of Guantanamo detainee habeas litigation.[REF] The 2001 AUMF is self-limiting: “It is limited to al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and persons and forces associated with those ‘organizations.’ It is not a mandate to use force against any terrorist organization or other entity that may threaten U.S. national security.”[REF] It is also limited by the principle that force should be deployed only “in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States.”[REF] Further, it incorporates and is limited by the law of armed conflict.
Since the Supreme Court’s ruling in Boumediene v. Bush, Guantanamo detainees have used their constitutional right to habeas corpus review to challenge their detention under the 2001 AUMF. While the courts have denied writs in cases where the government can show that the detainee was connected to al-Qaeda or the Taliban, they have not ruled on how the 2001 AUMF would apply to members of other forces such as ISIS in the detainee context.
This unique, self-limiting characteristic of the 2001 AUMF and the case law it has generated leads to the following question: If the Trump Administration brings ISIS terrorists to Guantanamo and they challenge their detention through habeas petitions, how will the courts rule? The Obama Administration argued that ISIS is an “associated force” that falls under the AUMF,[REF] but this determination has not been challenged in court in the detainee context, and as evidenced by the approach the courts have taken in their AUMF jurisprudence, it is not clear that the courts will agree.[REF] Thus, in a habeas case involving an ISIS terrorist detained at Guantanamo, the courts must closely analyze whether ISIS could fall under the 2001 AUMF.
To begin to answer this question, we must look at how the courts have become involved in defining the enemy and how they have interpreted the 2001 AUMF through Guantanamo habeas cases.
Rarely in the history of warfare, and certainly not in U.S. history, have prisoners of war been able to challenge their wartime military detention in court. It would have been unheard of, for example, for the 400,000 German POWs held by the U.S. in World War II to be able to challenge their detention in court.
Historically, the courts have been reluctant to get involved with how the government decides to handle the detention of enemy combatants in wartime pursuant to the authority under a declaration of war or AUMF. The Supreme Court’s landmark World War II–era decisions in Ex Parte Quirin and Johnson v. Eisentrager illustrate this deference to the President with regard to detainee policy.
Thus, since the German prisoners were never in American territory, among other factors,[REF] they did not fall under the jurisdiction of U.S. federal courts. Justice Jackson further argued that even presence on U.S. territory is insufficient to generate rights, since “executive power over enemy aliens, undelayed and unhampered by litigation, has been deemed, throughout our history, essential to wartime security.”[REF] In its decision, the Court affirmed the President’s extensive power during wartime and concluded that enemy combatants—especially those who have never been or resided in the United States—have no constitutional right to a writ of habeas corpus in federal court.
Through these two cases, the Supreme Court affirmed the President’s broad powers to detain enemy combatants for the duration of a conflict when acting pursuant to a declaration of war and denied the detainees the right to challenge their detention in federal court.
But that all changed after September 11, 2001. The courts, like it or not, have become actively involved in wartime detention decisions. Through a succession of decisions—Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, Rasul v. Bush, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, and Boumediene v. Bush—the Supreme Court has interpreted the 2001 AUMF and the law of war to constrain the President’s power in the detainee context and has established that detainees in Guantanamo have the constitutional right to habeas corpus review. In the wake of these rulings, the federal courts now routinely review and decide habeas petitions filed by the detainees held at Guantanamo.
Thus, the Court concluded in Hamdi that the detention of individuals falling into the limited category of individuals created by its interpretation of the AUMF for the duration of the conflict is a fundamental incident to war and consistent with the authority that Congress has granted to the President. The Court also held, however, that although the President could detain citizens and non-citizens, due process required that detainees be able to challenge their classification as enemy combatants in the narrow category of individuals that fall under the 2001 AUMF.
On the same day that Hamdi was decided, the Supreme Court ruled in Rasul v. Bush that because the United States has jurisdiction over Guantanamo, federal courts have jurisdiction to consider habeas petitions from detainees held in Guantanamo under the federal habeas statute.[REF] The Court emphasized that the federal habeas statute is not dependent on a detainee’s citizenship status and that foreign nationals at Guantanamo were therefore entitled to invoke that statute.
The Supreme Court held that Hamdan’s military commission exceeded the statutory authority and wrote that the President “may not disregard limitations that Congress has, in proper exercise of its own war powers, placed on his powers.”[REF] The Court also held that Hamdan was entitled to the protections set out in Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and that the procedures of his military commission did not meet those standards.[REF] In the final analysis, the Court’s decision in this case limited the President’s executive power over war and was another signal that the Court would no longer defer to the President in the areas of war and national security.
These four cases established that the President had the authority to detain enemy combatants who were part of or assisted the Taliban, al-Qaeda, or associated forces during hostilities under the 2001 AUMF; that trial by military commission must comply with the UCMJ and Geneva Conventions; and that detainees in Guantanamo had the constitutional and statutory rights to challenge their detentions through habeas petitions.
In the wake of Boumediene, numerous detainees held at Guantanamo have filed habeas petitions alleging that the circumstances of their particular cases place them outside the explicit or implied class of individuals to which the President’s detention power under the AUMF applies. These individuals have advanced a range of arguments in habeas petitions that include not having involvement with the 9/11 attacks, not having connections to the Taliban or al-Qaeda, not participating in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners, and not committing direct hostile action with a weapon in armed conflict against the United States.
Defining the Approach. The district courts and the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals have rejected many of these habeas petitions by extending the reasoning in Hamdi that the President has the authority to detain individuals who were part of or associated with the Taliban or al-Qaeda. In these cases, the courts require that the government show that the detainee in question has a connection to the Taliban or al-Qaeda, but their interpretation of what it means to be “part of” and “associated with” the Taliban, al-Qaeda, or associated forces is broad.
Thus, in each case, while the government must show by a preponderance of the evidence that a detainee has a connection to the Taliban, al-Qaeda, or an associated force, the courts have extended the range of characteristics and activities sufficient to prove a connection to one of those groups.
Thus, while intention to join the fight against the United States is not by itself sufficient to establish that an individual is “part of” al-Qaeda, it is one of many elements the courts have employed in determining whether an individual is “part of” or “associated with” al-Qaeda or the Taliban.
The court rejected that argument and ruled that Al-Bihani’s role as part of associated forces was sufficient to justify detention. First, the court stated that accompanying the 55th Arab Brigade on the battlefield, carrying a brigade-issued weapon, cooking for the unit, and following brigade orders establish that Al-Bihani “was part of and supported a group—prior to and after September 11—that was affiliated with Al Qaeda and Taliban forces and engaged in hostilities against a U.S. Coalition partner.”[REF] Consequently, Al-Bihani was detainable under both versions of the Military Commissions Act for purposefully and materially supporting al-Qaeda and the Taliban.
Thus, the court established that close association with a force that is covered by the AUMF, even if in a non-combat role, is grounds for detention under the AUMF.
Taken together, the court established that Barhoumi’s activities and identification as a member by another member of an organization covered by the AUMF constituted grounds for his detention.
Thus, the court concluded that even if training in a camp is insufficient on its own to establish a connection to al-Qaeda, it is clearly a criterion upon which detention can be justified under the AUMF. In this case, the court found that Al-Adahi’s training at Al Farouq was sufficient to show that he was “part of” or “associated with” al-Qaeda.
In dismissing Ali’s arguments, Judge Brett Kavanaugh of the D.C. Circuit wrote that “[t]he standard of proof for military detention is not the same as the standard of proof for criminal prosecution, in part because of the different purposes of the proceedings and in part because military detention ends with the end of war.”[REF] The purpose of detention is to detain enemy combatants for the duration of hostilities to keep them off the battlefield. Thus, the government did not need to establish “guilt,” only that it is more likely than not that Ali was “part of” or “associated with” al-Qaeda.
Taken together, the court established that Ali’s activities and lengthy stay at a guesthouse inhabited by Abu Zubaydah and other senior al-Qaeda–affiliated leaders were sufficient to meet the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard. Consequently, Ali could be detained under the AUMF as “part of” al-Qaeda.
Taken together, the court established that Hussain’s activities and possession of a weapon provided to him by an enemy force constituted grounds for his detention.
As the cases demonstrate, the detention authority in each one depends heavily on the facts and circumstances in evidence when considered in their entirety. This approach has raised some concern that in certain cases, the government may not be willing or able to provide a court with certain sensitive or classified information to meet the evidentiary standard to show that a detainee is “part of” or “associated with” al-Qaeda or the Taliban. By ruling on an expansive range of characteristics that can be used to justify detention, the courts’ approach has alleviated some of these concerns.
However, while the courts have ruled on the scope of characteristics that may be used to show that an individual detainee is “part of” or “associated with” the Taliban, al-Qaeda, or associated forces, all of their rulings have very clearly depended on showing a connection between the detainee and these specific, named groups.
It is vitally important to note that in the detainee context, the courts have not addressed whether the President’s authority under the AUMF extends to detainees who were “part of” or “associated with” ISIS. Nowhere in all of the habeas case law reviewed in this paper do the courts specifically list any associated forces other than those related to the 9/11 attacks, which have been determined to be the Taliban and al-Qaeda. As noted, the case law denying habeas petitions relies heavily on connecting individual detainees to the Taliban or al-Qaeda. Thus, it is unclear whether the President’s authority under the AUMF to detain an enemy combatant in Guantanamo would be extended to an ISIS fighter.
Thus, in a habeas case involving an ISIS terrorist detained at Guantanamo, the courts must closely analyze whether ISIS could fall under the 2001 AUMF. That is, given the historical connection between ISIS and al-Qaeda, does ISIS fit into the narrow class of targets that fall under the 2001 AUMF?
Preston may be correct, but the courts may nevertheless disagree with him.
While this justification has raised eyebrows in the legal community, especially with respect to how it would hold up in the detainee context, no one with standing to challenge it has done so. If President Trump begins to bring detainees to Guantanamo who were “part of” or “associated with” ISIS, those detainees will use their constitutional right to habeas review established under Boumediene to challenge their detention on the grounds that the 2001 AUMF does not extend to ISIS—at least not in the detainee context.
Although the courts have not addressed this question explicitly and have ruled expansively on the scope of the detention authority for individuals connected to the Taliban and al-Qaeda, it is not clear that they would extend that authority to ISIS. In fact, the dissenting opinions in several habeas cases suggest that the courts are beginning to question the attenuation of detention authority jurisprudence.
Taken together, the lack of an explicit mention of ISIS as a group covered under the AUMF and the subsequent questions surrounding the applicability of the AUMF to ISIS fighters in the detainee context suggest that the Trump Administration would be on more solid legal ground if it worked with Congress on an ISIS-specific AUMF. If the Trump Administration rushes to bring ISIS fighters to Guantanamo without a stronger legal basis, those detainees might successfully challenge not only their own detention under the AUMF, but also the Obama Administration’s entire legal justification for the authority to use all necessary and appropriate force in the fight against ISIS.
The Obama Administration argued that ISIS is an “associated force” that falls under the AUMF, but this determination has not been challenged in court in the detainee context. Moreover, as evidenced by the approach the courts have taken in their AUMF jurisprudence, it is not clear that the courts will agree. Consequently, the Trump Administration should not attempt to detain ISIS fighters in Guantanamo until it is on stronger legal footing.
The Bush Administration learned the hard way that using Guantanamo Bay as a military detention facility and setting up military commissions without congressional legislation had negative unintended consequences. If President Bush had asked the Congress in October 2001 to authorize the use of the U.S. Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay for the detention of enemy combatants, Congress would certainly have approved such legislation by an overwhelming margin. Much, but perhaps not all, of the controversy surrounding Guantanamo Bay would have been alleviated.
Similarly, had the Bush Administration worked with Congress in 2001 to pass legislation authorizing the use of military commissions against those enemy combatants who committed war crimes, Congress would likely have done so. That would not have guaranteed the absence of litigation stemming from military commissions’ defendants, but it might have avoided a decision like Hamdan, which set back military commissions by years.
As Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said years ago, we cannot kill or capture our way out of this war. But military detention of the enemy during wartime is a lawful, traditional means of incapacitating the enemy to deprive it of additional forces and shorten the war effort.
This war is like no other. It will require all lawful elements of national power to defeat the enemies of the United States. If the Trump Administration makes good on its promise to use Guantanamo Bay as a detention facility for terrorist detainees, including ISIS members, it should study the case law and evaluate the litigation risk of bringing ISIS members to the island detention facility. If Administration officials study the issue, they may well conclude that the litigation risk of an ISIS member’s winning his habeas case is not insubstantial.
Given the fact that al-Qaeda and the Taliban also still pose a substantial national security threat to the United States and its partners and that we continue to be engaged in armed conflict with those groups and associated forces, an AUMF that includes ISIS should not disturb the existing legal authorities applicable to al-Qaeda and the Taliban. This can be accomplished legislatively in a number of ways: either a stand-alone AUMF specific to ISIS and associated forces or an AUMF that includes al-Qaeda, the Taliban, ISIS, and associated forces.
Considering the interests at stake, the Trump Administration should support and Congress should consider an AUMF that includes ISIS before bringing any detainees to Guantanamo.
—Charles D. Stimson is Manager of the National Security Law Program and Senior Legal Fellow in the Center for National Defense, of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy, at The Heritage Foundation. He served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs from 2006–2007. Hugh Danilack is a graduate of Dartmouth College where he was editor of the Dartmouth Law Journal. He will be attending law school in the fall.

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