Source: http://www.baileydaily.com/2012/01/
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 04:39:34+00:00

Document:
First District Dismisses Appeal Challenging Trial Court’s Refusal to Compel Arbitration of “Individual” PAGA Claims: Reyes v. Macy’s, Inc.
On January 19, 2012, the First District (Division 3) published its opinion in Reyes v. Macy’s, Inc., __ Cal.App.4th __ (2012), which dismissed Macy’s appeal “from an order granting Macy’s motion to compel arbitration of plaintiff’s individual claims but denying the request to dismiss class allegations and plaintiff’s claim under the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA)….” See Slip Opinion, at 1. As reasoned by the Court, the trial court's ruling on Macy's motion to dismiss the class allegations and the PAGA claim was a non-appealable interlocutory order, and could not be construed as a denial of the motion to compel arbitration insofar as Macy’s did not seek to compel arbitration of the class allegations and the PAGA claim. See Slip Opinion, at 2-3.
Second District Creates Division in Authority on Whether Denial of Certification May Have Collateral Estoppel Effect: Bridgeford v. Pacific Health Corp.
California courts have held or suggested that the denial of class certification can establish collateral estoppel against absent putative class members on issues that were actually decided in connection with the denial. (Alvarez v. May Dept. Stores Co. (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1223, 1236; Bufil v. Dollar Financial Group, Inc. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1193, 1202-1203 (Bufil); see also Johnson v. GlaxoSmithKline, Inc. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1497, 1510-1513 & fn. 8 (Johnson) [assuming the point while expressing reservations].) Alvarez stated that the principles of collateral estoppel ensure that the absent putative class members‟ interests were adequately represented in the prior proceeding. (Alvarez, supra, at p. 1236.) We conclude to the contrary that if no class was certified by the court in the prior proceeding, the interests of absent putative class members were not represented in the prior proceeding and the requirements for collateral estoppel cannot be established….
See Slip Opinion, at 11.
On December 29, 2011, the California Supreme Court overturned a court of appeal opinion finding that insurance claims adjusters are categorically “non-exempt” employees in Harris v. Superior Court, __ Cal.4th __ (2011). The Supreme Court found that the court of appeal’s conclusion that work “not carried on at the level of policy or general operations” is not administrative, thereby falling outside of Wage Order 4’s administrative exemption as a matter of law, failed to consider the facts under all relevant components of FLSA regulations incorporated by reference in 8 CCR 11040(2)(a)(f). As explained by the Court “[t]he essence of our holding is that, in resolving whether work qualifies as administrative, courts must consider the particular facts before them and apply the language of the statutes and wage orders at issue.” Slip Opinion, at 22. The judgment of the court of appeal – which had reversed the trial court’s denial of a plaintiff-filed MSJ – was reversed with instructions to apply the correct legal standard. The Court expressed no opinions on the propriety of certification, declining the defendant’s request to decertify the class. Id., at fn. 9.

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