Source: http://masscases.com/cases/sjc/235/235mass244.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 08:17:02+00:00

Document:
NATHAN BARNETT vs. SARAH ROSEN & another.
Evidence, Relevancy and materiality. Contract, Consideration. Accord and Satisfaction.
Where, in the answer in a suit based upon a judgment debt alleged to be owed to the plaintiff by a woman, the defendant alleged satisfaction of the debt by an accord and satisfaction, the defendant properly may be allowed to introduce evidence of negotiations leading up to a payment of less than the amount of the judgment debt under an agreement by the plaintiff that such amount would be accepted in satisfaction of that debt and also of a judgment debt owed to the plaintiff by the defendant's husband, which she was under no obligation to pay, and that the plaintiff further in writing agreed to indorse full satisfaction upon executions which had issued upon the judgments.
An oral agreement by a judgment creditor with the judgment debtor to receive a certain sum, less in amount than the judgment debt, in full satisfaction of that judgment debt and also of a judgment debt owed to the creditor by another person, to which the first judgment debtor is a stranger, and to indorse satisfaction in full upon executions which had issued upon both judgments, when the first judgment debtor has made the payment stipulated and the creditor has made the indorsement of full satisfaction upon both executions, is not nudum pactum, and a suit in equity by the judgment creditor to enforce the first judgment must be dismissed.
judgment debt alleged to be owed to the plaintiff by the defendant Sarah Rosen (hereinafter called the defendant), an unliquidated claim against the defendant Providence Washington Insurance Company.
Upon stipulation of all the parties and with the consent and approval of the court, the bill was dismissed as against the insurance company after that defendant had paid into court $150 to abide the final decree in this suit.
"1. That upon all the evidence in the case the finding must be for the plaintiff.
"2. That upon the pleadings in the case the plaintiff is entitled to a finding in his favor.
"3. That the defendant cannot set up as a defence an alleged agreement contained in a receipt signed by the plaintiff, that he will accept $35 as payment in full and in satisfaction of a judgment of $116.24 due from the defendant as judgment debtor.
"4. That an agreement to accept a lesser amount as payment in full and in satisfaction of a greater amount, which amount is not in dispute, is void for want of consideration.
"5. That an agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant which is wanting in consideration is not enforceable in equity because of want of consideration.
"6. That in a suit to recover the balance of a judgment debt a promise made by the plaintiff to the defendant that upon payment to him by the defendant of a smaller amount than the judgment debt [the judgment debt should be discharged] is not available as a defence in said action.
"7. That if in the body of a receipt for money given by the plaintiff to the defendant it contained a statement that the plaintiff will indorse a statement of satisfaction in full upon an execution he held against the defendant upon the payment by the defendant to the plaintiff of a lesser sum than the sum due from the defendant as stated in said execution, such promise is without consideration, and is an agreement nudum pactum, is void and unenforceable.
"8. That the defendant cannot enforce specific performance of an alleged agreement made without consideration."
The requests were denied. The judge ordered a decree dismissing the bill; and the plaintiff alleged exceptions.
H. C. Dunbar, for the defendant Rosen.
BRALEY, J. The plaintiff, a judgment creditor, brings suit under R. L. c. 159, § 3, cl. 7, to reach and apply in satisfaction of a judgment recovered against the defendant Rosen the amount coming to her under a policy of fire insurance issued by the co-defendant, the insurance company. That company having paid into court a certain sum to abide the final decree, the bill by stipulation of parties has been dismissed against the company; and, the trial court having ordered a decree dismissing the bill, the case is before us on the plaintiff's exceptions to the admission of evidence, to the refusal to rule as requested, and to the order of dismissal.
We perceive no error in the admission of evidence. The answer avers that by an accord and satisfaction the judgment has been satisfied and the defendant properly was allowed to introduce evidence of the negotiations and of the settlement which included the obtainment of the necessary funds to make payment as well as the form in which payment was made. Way v. Greer, 196 Mass. 237.
borrowed $20 which was paid to the plaintiff who thereupon signed and delivered the following receipt: "Received of Mrs. Sarah Rosen twenty no/100 Dollars, and upon payment to me within one month of a balance of fifteen dollars, I will endorse a statement of satisfaction in full upon an execution which I have against Sarah Rosen and a similar endorsement upon an execution against Harry Rosen, and I will execute general release of all demands against said Harry and Sarah Rosen." It further appears that the "balance of fifteen dollars" was paid to the plaintiff who thereupon indorsed upon each execution that full satisfaction had been received and delivered them to the defendant.
A further finding, in justice to the plaintiff, should be referred to, namely: that "At the time of making of said oral contract and the execution of said written instrument, the plaintiff told the defendant's attorney that the receipt of said sum, and his agreement referred to in said receipt, was a nudum pactum and that he was not bound by his oral agreement or his signed receipt, and that the defendant would still be liable for the balance of her judgment, nothwithstanding he had agreed to accept a smaller sum in satisfaction thereof." The judge however was satisfied and expressly finds that the defendant's attorney, acting in her behalf and knowing the plaintiff to be a member of the bar, did not understand nor believe that the plaintiff proposed to collect the balance due upon the execution against her "notwithstanding his agreement and his written promise, and did not expect him so to do."
The requests all rest upon the single proposition that the promise of the plaintiff is unenforceable because it is unsupported by any valuable consideration. We are of opinion that the judge properly refused to give any of the requests and correctly ruled that the bill should be dismissed.
for a valid agreement by the plaintiff to discharge her own debt, brooks v. White, 2 Met. 283, 286. Bowker v. Childs, 3 Allen 434. Hastings v. Lovejoy, 140 Mass. 261. Marshall v. Billlard, 114 Iowa, 462. Melroy v. Kemmerer, 218 Penn. St. 381, 384. 1 R. C. L. 182, § 11. 1 C. J. 535, § 37, note 31; 545, § 51, note 27, where many authorities are collected.
It is enough that the consideration is valuable: it need not be adequate. Train v. Gold, 5 Pick. 380. Perkins v. Lockwood, 100 Mass. 249, 250. Hastings v. Lovejoy, 140 Mass. 261, 264.

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