Source: https://advocatemmmohan.com/2017/04/
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 05:18:48+00:00

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whether the copy of the case diary or a portion thereof can be provided to the accused under the provisions of the Right to Information Act, we are not deciding the said question in the matter on hand. In the case of Sidharth etc. etc. vs. State of Bihar, the entire case diary maintained by the police was made available to the accused by the trial Court. In that context certain observations were made by this Court which read thus:- “….But if the entire case diary is made available to the accused, it may cause serious prejudice to others and even affect the safety and security of those who may have given statements to the police. The confidentiality is always kept in the matter of criminal investigation and it is not desirable to make available the entire case diary to the accused. In the instant case, we have noticed that the entire case diary was given to the accused and the investigating officer was extensively cross-examined on many facts which were not very much relevant for the purpose of the case. The learned Sessions Judge should have been careful in seeing that the trial of the case was conducted in accordance with the provisions of CrPC.”- neither the police officer has refreshed his memory with reference to entries in the police diary nor has the trial court used the entries in the diary for the purposes of contradicting the police officer (PW-15), it is not open for the accused to produce certain pages of police diary obtained by him under the provisions of Right to Information Act for the purpose of contradicting the police officer. In view of the above, the High Court is not justified in permitting the accused to produce certain pages of police diary at the time of cross examination of PW-15/Investigating Officer. Accordingly, the impugned Order is liable to be set aside and the same stands set aside. The appeal is allowed.
Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO 694 OF 2017 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 9314 of 2016) Balakram ….Appellant Versus State of Uttarakhand & Ors. … Read More whether the copy of the case diary or a portion thereof can be provided to the accused under the provisions of the Right to Information Act, we are not deciding the said question in the matter on hand. In the case of Sidharth etc. etc. vs. State of Bihar, the entire case diary maintained by the police was made available to the accused by the trial Court. In that context certain observations were made by this Court which read thus:- “….But if the entire case diary is made available to the accused, it may cause serious prejudice to others and even affect the safety and security of those who may have given statements to the police. The confidentiality is always kept in the matter of criminal investigation and it is not desirable to make available the entire case diary to the accused. In the instant case, we have noticed that the entire case diary was given to the accused and the investigating officer was extensively cross-examined on many facts which were not very much relevant for the purpose of the case. The learned Sessions Judge should have been careful in seeing that the trial of the case was conducted in accordance with the provisions of CrPC.”- neither the police officer has refreshed his memory with reference to entries in the police diary nor has the trial court used the entries in the diary for the purposes of contradicting the police officer (PW-15), it is not open for the accused to produce certain pages of police diary obtained by him under the provisions of Right to Information Act for the purpose of contradicting the police officer. In view of the above, the High Court is not justified in permitting the accused to produce certain pages of police diary at the time of cross examination of PW-15/Investigating Officer. Accordingly, the impugned Order is liable to be set aside and the same stands set aside. The appeal is allowed.
(Reportable) IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.5368/2017 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Civil) No.35352 of 2016) Madanuri Sri Rama Chandra Murthy ….Appellant Vs. Syed Jalal … Read More During the pendency of suit, an application was filed by the defendant Nos. 1 to 5 including the appellant herein under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter called as ‘CPC’) for rejection of plaint. The said application was allowed by the Wakf Tribunal on 8th March, 2016. On revision by the plaintiff, the order of rejection of plaint passed by the Wakf Tribunal is set aside by the High Court.= The property in question is not notified in the Gazette as a Wakf Property at any point of time till this date and hence it is not open for the respondent to file this suit on the presumption that the property in question is a Wakf property. Since the property is not a Wakf property, the Wakf Tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. That though the notification issued containing the list of certain Wakf properties was gazetted by the Wakf Board as early as in the year 1962, the High Court is not justified in raising doubt in the year 2013 about such notification which had been remained unchallenged for more than 50 years. It is not open for the respondent to generate the litigation only to harass the appellant.- In the matter on hand, as mentioned supra, the Tribunal and the High Court, on facts have held that the property in question is not included in the list published in the Official Gazette as a wakf property. Such non- inclusion was never questioned by any person including the Wakf Board. The Board has not exercised jurisdiction under Section 27 of 1954 Act and Section 40 of 1995 Act, though 50 years have elapsed from the date of the gazette notification. Hence, in our considered opinion, the averments in the plaint do not disclose the cause of action for filing the suit. The suit is manifestly meritless and vexatious. So also the suit is barred by law for the reasons mentioned supra.
REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5369 OF 2017 (Arising out of SLP(C) No. 34653 of 2016) KALYAN DEY CHOWDHURY …..Appellant Versus RITA DEY CHOWDHURY NEE NANDY …..Respondent J U D G M E N T R. BANUMATHI, J. Leave granted. 2. Challenge in this appeal is to… Read More maintenance to the respondent-wife. – 25% of the husband’s net salary = Following Dr. Kulbhushan Kumar vs. Raj Kumari and Anr. (1970) 3 SCC 129, in this case, it was held that 25% of the husband’s net salary would be just and proper to be awarded as maintenance to the respondent-wife. In the result, the maintenance amount of Rs.23,000/- awarded to the respondent-wife is reduced to Rs.20,000/- per month and the impugned judgment is modified and this appeal is partly allowed. The maintenance of Rs.20,000/- per month is payable to the respondent-wife on or before 10th of every succeeding english calendar month. No costs.
whether, when the seat of arbitration is Mumbai, an exclusive jurisdiction clause stating that the courts at Mumbai alone would have jurisdiction in respect of disputes arising under the agreement would oust all other courts including the High Court of Delhi, whose judgment is appealed against.= In arbitration law however, as has been held above, the moment “seat” is determined, the fact that the seat is at Mumbai would vest Mumbai courts with exclusive jurisdiction for purposes of regulating arbitral proceedings arising out of the agreement between the parties.- It is well settled that where more than one court has jurisdiction, it is open for parties to exclude all other courts. For an exhaustive analysis of the case law, see Swastik Gases Private Limited v. Indian Oil Corporation Limited, (2013) 9 SCC 32. This was followed in a recent judgment in B.E. Simoese Von Staraburg Niedenthal and Another v. Chhattisgarh Investment Limited, (2015) 12 SCC 225. Having regard to the above, it is clear that Mumbai courts alone have jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts in the country, as the juridical seat of arbitration is at Mumbai. This being the case, the impugned judgment is set aside. The injunction confirmed by the impugned judgment will continue for a period of four weeks from the date of pronouncement of this judgment, so that the respondents may take necessary steps under Section 9 in the Mumbai Court. Appeals are disposed of accordingly.
REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 5370-5371 OF 2017 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (CIVIL) NOS.27311-27312 OF 2016) INDUS MOBILE DISTRIBUTION PRIVATE LIMITED … APPELLANT VERSUS DATAWIND INNOVATIONS PRIVATE LIMITED & ORS. … RESPONDENTS J U D G M E N T R.F. NARIMAN, J. 1. Leave granted. 2.… Read More whether, when the seat of arbitration is Mumbai, an exclusive jurisdiction clause stating that the courts at Mumbai alone would have jurisdiction in respect of disputes arising under the agreement would oust all other courts including the High Court of Delhi, whose judgment is appealed against.= In arbitration law however, as has been held above, the moment “seat” is determined, the fact that the seat is at Mumbai would vest Mumbai courts with exclusive jurisdiction for purposes of regulating arbitral proceedings arising out of the agreement between the parties.- It is well settled that where more than one court has jurisdiction, it is open for parties to exclude all other courts. For an exhaustive analysis of the case law, see Swastik Gases Private Limited v. Indian Oil Corporation Limited, (2013) 9 SCC 32. This was followed in a recent judgment in B.E. Simoese Von Staraburg Niedenthal and Another v. Chhattisgarh Investment Limited, (2015) 12 SCC 225. Having regard to the above, it is clear that Mumbai courts alone have jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts in the country, as the juridical seat of arbitration is at Mumbai. This being the case, the impugned judgment is set aside. The injunction confirmed by the impugned judgment will continue for a period of four weeks from the date of pronouncement of this judgment, so that the respondents may take necessary steps under Section 9 in the Mumbai Court. Appeals are disposed of accordingly.
i. The proceedings viz. Crime No. 198/92, RC.1(S)/92/SIC-IV/ND in the Court of the Special Judicial Magistrate at Rae Bareilly will stand transferred to the Court of Additional Sessions Judge (Ayodhya Matters) at Lucknow. ii. The Court of Sessions will frame an additional charge under Page 35 Section 120-B against Mr. L.K. Advani, Mr. Vinay Katiar, Ms. Uma Bharati, Ms. Sadhvi Ritambara, Mr. Murli Manohar Joshi and Mr. Vishnu Hari Dalmia. The Court of Sessions will frame additional charges under Section 120-B and the other provisions of the Penal Code mentioned in the joint charge sheet filed by the CBI against Mr. Champat Rai Bansal, Mr. Satish Pradhan, Mr. Dharam Das, Mr. Mahant Nritya Gopal Das, Mr. Ram Bilas Vadanti and Mr. Vaikunth Lal Sharma @ Prem. Mr. Kalyan Singh, being the Governor of Rajasthan, is entitled to immunity under Article 361 of the Constitution as long as he remains Governor of Rajasthan. The Court of Sessions will frame charges and move against him as soon as he ceases to be Governor. iii. The Court of Sessions will, after transfer of the proceedings from Rae Bareilly to Lucknow and framing of additional charges, within four weeks, take up all the matters on a day-to-day basis from the stage at which the trial proceedings, both at Rae Bareilly and at Lucknow, are continuing, until conclusion of the trial. There shall be no de novo trial. There shall be no transfer of the Judge conducting the trial until the entire trial concludes. The case shall not be adjourned on any Page 36 ground except when the Sessions Court finds it impossible to carry on the trial for that particular date. In such an event, on grant of adjournment to the next day or a closely proximate date, reasons for the same shall be recorded in writing. iv. The CBI shall ensure that on every date fixed for evidence, some prosecution witnesses must remain present, so that for want of witnesses the matter be not adjourned. v. The Sessions Court will complete the trial and deliver the judgment within a period of 2 years from the date of receipt of this judgment. vi. We make it clear that liberty is given to any of the parties before the Sessions Court to approach us in the event of these directions not being carried out, both in letter and in spirit.
Page 1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Criminal Appeal No.751 of 2017 (@Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No.2275 of 2011) State (through) Central Bureau of Investigation …Appellant Versus Shri Kalyan Singh (former CM of UP) & Ors. …Respondents J U D G M E N T R.F. NARIMAN, J. Leave granted. 1.… Read More i. The proceedings viz. Crime No. 198/92, RC.1(S)/92/SIC-IV/ND in the Court of the Special Judicial Magistrate at Rae Bareilly will stand transferred to the Court of Additional Sessions Judge (Ayodhya Matters) at Lucknow. ii. The Court of Sessions will frame an additional charge under Page 35 Section 120-B against Mr. L.K. Advani, Mr. Vinay Katiar, Ms. Uma Bharati, Ms. Sadhvi Ritambara, Mr. Murli Manohar Joshi and Mr. Vishnu Hari Dalmia. The Court of Sessions will frame additional charges under Section 120-B and the other provisions of the Penal Code mentioned in the joint charge sheet filed by the CBI against Mr. Champat Rai Bansal, Mr. Satish Pradhan, Mr. Dharam Das, Mr. Mahant Nritya Gopal Das, Mr. Ram Bilas Vadanti and Mr. Vaikunth Lal Sharma @ Prem. Mr. Kalyan Singh, being the Governor of Rajasthan, is entitled to immunity under Article 361 of the Constitution as long as he remains Governor of Rajasthan. The Court of Sessions will frame charges and move against him as soon as he ceases to be Governor. iii. The Court of Sessions will, after transfer of the proceedings from Rae Bareilly to Lucknow and framing of additional charges, within four weeks, take up all the matters on a day-to-day basis from the stage at which the trial proceedings, both at Rae Bareilly and at Lucknow, are continuing, until conclusion of the trial. There shall be no de novo trial. There shall be no transfer of the Judge conducting the trial until the entire trial concludes. The case shall not be adjourned on any Page 36 ground except when the Sessions Court finds it impossible to carry on the trial for that particular date. In such an event, on grant of adjournment to the next day or a closely proximate date, reasons for the same shall be recorded in writing. iv. The CBI shall ensure that on every date fixed for evidence, some prosecution witnesses must remain present, so that for want of witnesses the matter be not adjourned. v. The Sessions Court will complete the trial and deliver the judgment within a period of 2 years from the date of receipt of this judgment. vi. We make it clear that liberty is given to any of the parties before the Sessions Court to approach us in the event of these directions not being carried out, both in letter and in spirit.
benefit of doubt.= PW-3 the eye-witness to the incident has neither stated as to when the accused came with alleged weapons nor he extended any help to the deceased. Rather he fled away from the spot as per his deposition, and came to know about the death of the deceased in the evening. This peculiar fact of the case completely over-rides the direct evidence rule, because ultimately probabilities creating doubts with respect to the cause and modus-operandi of offence increases when alleged eye-witness flee away from the place of occurrence. Where the medical evidence is such that it does not give any clear opinion with respect to the injuries inflicted on the body of victim or deceased, as the case may be, the possibilities that the injuries might have been caused by the accused are also ruled out. Such medical evidence is also very important in assessing the testimony of eye- witnesses and in determining whether the testimony of eye-witnesses can be safely accepted. Moreover, it is settled law of criminal jurisprudence as has been recognized by this Court in State of U.P. Vs. Krishna Gopal, (supra) that “A person has, no doubt, a profound right not to be convicted of an offence which is not established by the evidential standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt.” After meticulously scrutinizing the facts and circumstances of the present case, and keeping in mind the proposition of law as observed in Yogesh Singh Vs. Mahabeer Singh & Ors. (supra), we are of the considered opinion that there are not only actual but substantial doubts as to the guilt of the respondents herein. We are, therefore, unable to find any evidence as to how the deceased was killed and by whom. The unfortunate man succumbed to injuries but the substantial doubts, mentioned above, confer a right upon the accused-respondents to be held not guilty.
REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1794 of 2013 MACHINDRA …APPELLANT(S) VERSUS SAJJAN GALPHA RANKHAMB & ORS. ….RESPONDENT(S) J U D G M E N T Pinaki Chandra Ghose, J. The… Read More benefit of doubt.= PW-3 the eye-witness to the incident has neither stated as to when the accused came with alleged weapons nor he extended any help to the deceased. Rather he fled away from the spot as per his deposition, and came to know about the death of the deceased in the evening. This peculiar fact of the case completely over-rides the direct evidence rule, because ultimately probabilities creating doubts with respect to the cause and modus-operandi of offence increases when alleged eye-witness flee away from the place of occurrence. Where the medical evidence is such that it does not give any clear opinion with respect to the injuries inflicted on the body of victim or deceased, as the case may be, the possibilities that the injuries might have been caused by the accused are also ruled out. Such medical evidence is also very important in assessing the testimony of eye- witnesses and in determining whether the testimony of eye-witnesses can be safely accepted. Moreover, it is settled law of criminal jurisprudence as has been recognized by this Court in State of U.P. Vs. Krishna Gopal, (supra) that “A person has, no doubt, a profound right not to be convicted of an offence which is not established by the evidential standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt.” After meticulously scrutinizing the facts and circumstances of the present case, and keeping in mind the proposition of law as observed in Yogesh Singh Vs. Mahabeer Singh & Ors. (supra), we are of the considered opinion that there are not only actual but substantial doubts as to the guilt of the respondents herein. We are, therefore, unable to find any evidence as to how the deceased was killed and by whom. The unfortunate man succumbed to injuries but the substantial doubts, mentioned above, confer a right upon the accused-respondents to be held not guilty.
Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL No.4399 OF 2007 The Commissioner of Income Tax, Ahmedabad ….Appellant(s) VERSUS Equinox Solution Pvt. Ltd. …Respondent(s) J U D G M E N T Abhay Manohar Sapre, J. 1) This appeal is filed by the Revenue (Income Tax Department) against the order dated… Read More claimed deduction under Section 48 (2) of the Act as it stood then by treating the sale to be in the nature of “slump sale” of the going concern being in the nature of long term capital gain in the hands of the assessee.= claim was rejected – According to the Assessing Officer, the case of the assessee was covered under Section 50 (2) of the Act because it was in the nature of short term capital gain as specified in Section 50 (2) of the Act and hence did not fall under Section 48 (2) of the Act as claimed by the assessee -Apex court held that the case of the respondent (assessee) does not fall within the four corners of Section 50 (2) of the Act. Section 50 (2) applies to a case where any block of assets are transferred by the assessee but where the entire running business with assets and liabilities is sold by the assessee in one go, such sale, in our view, cannot be considered as “short-term capital assets”.- the entire running business with all assets and liabilities having been sold in one go by the respondent-assessee, it was a slump sale of a “long-term capital asset”. It was, therefore, required to be taxed accordingly.

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