Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=82450:56323&catid=1575&Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 22:37:54+00:00

Document:
G.R. No. 171136, October 23, 2013 - REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioners, v. LYDIA CAPCO DE TENSUAN, REPRESENTED BY CLAUDIA C. ARUELO, Respondent.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioners, v. LYDIA CAPCO DE TENSUAN, REPRESENTED BY CLAUDIA C. ARUELO, Respondent.
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal and setting aside of the Decision1 dated January 13, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 84125, which affirmed the Decision2 dated October 18, 2004 of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Taguig City, Branch 74 in LRC Case No. 172 (LRA Rec. No. N-70108). The MeTC confirmed the title of herein respondent, Lydia Capco de Tensuan (Tensuan), to the parcel of agricultural land, designated as Lot 1109-A, located at Ibayo, Sta. Ana, Taguig City, with an area of 4,006 square meters (subject property), and ordered the registration of said property in her name.
“A PARCEL OF LAND (Lot 1109-A of the Plan Swo-00-001456, being a conversion of Lot 1109, MCadm 590-D, Taguig, [Cadastral] Mapping, L.R.C. Record No. ), situated in Brgy. Sta. Ana, Mun. of Taguig, Metro Manila, Island of Luzon.
“A PARCEL OF LAND (Lot 1109-B, of plan Swo-00-001456, being a conversion of Lot 1109, MCadm 590-D, Taguig Cadastral Mapping, L.R.C. Record No. ), situated in Sta. Ana, Mun. of Taguig, Metro Manila, Island of Luzon.
On August 20, 1998, Tensuan filed an Urgent Ex Parte Motion to Withdraw Lot 1109-B from the Application for Registration and to Amend the Application.5 According to Tensuan, she was withdrawing her Application for Registration of Lot 1109-B because a review of Plan Swo-00-001456 had revealed that said lot, with an area of 338 square meters, was a legal easement. The MeTC, in its Order6 dated September 30, 1998, granted Tensuan’s motion.
To prove possession, Tensuan presented two witnesses, namely, her sister Aruelo and Remigio Marasigan (Marasigan).
Marasigan claimed that he had been cultivating the subject property for the last 15 years, and he personally knew Tensuan to be the owner of said property.13 Marasigan’s father was the caretaker of the subject property for the Capcos for more than 50 years, and Marasigan used to help his father till the same. Marasigan merely inherited the job as caretaker of the subject property from his father.
On May 26, 2000, an Investigation Report was prepared, under oath, by Cristeta R. Garcia (Garcia), DENR Land Investigator, stating, among other things, that the subject property was covered by a duly approved survey plan; that the subject property is within the alienable and disposable zone classified under Project No. 27-B, L.C. Map No. 2623; that the subject property is not reserved for military or naval purposes; that the subject property was not covered by a previously issued patent; that the subject property was declared for the first time in 1948 under Tax Declaration No. 230 in the name of Candida de Borja;21 that the subject property is now covered by Tax Declaration No. D-013-01408 in the name of Lydia Capco de Tensuan; that the subject property is agricultural in nature; and that the subject property is free from adverse claims and conflicts. Yet, Garcia noted in the same report that the “the applicant is not x x x in the actual occupation and possession of the land” and “LLDA rep. by Atty. Joaquin G. Mendoza possesses the legal right to file opposition against the application x x x.”22 The Investigation Report was submitted as evidence by the Republic.
WHEREFORE, from the evidences adduced and testimonies presented by the parties, the Court is of the considered view that herein applicant has proven by preponderance of evidence the allegations in the application, hence, this Court hereby confirms the title of applicant LYDIA CAPCO DE TENSUAN married to RODOLFO TENSUAN, of legal age, Filipino and a resident of No. 43 Rizal Street, Poblacion, Muntinlupa City to the parcel of agricultural land (Lot 1109-A, Mcadm 590-D, Taguig Cadastral Mapping) located at Ibayo-Sta. Ana, Taguig, Metro Manila containing an area of Four Thousand Six (4,006) square meters; and order the registration thereof in her name.
The Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals, insisting that the MeTC should not have granted Tensuan’s Application for Registration considering that the subject property is part of the Laguna Lake bed, hence, is not alienable and disposable. The appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 84125.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE TRIAL COURT’S GRANT OF THE APPLICATION FOR LAND REGISTRATION OF [Tensuan] DESPITE HER FAILURE TO PROVE OPEN, ADVERSE, CONTINUOUS, EXCLUSIVE AND NOTORIOUS POSSESSION IN THE CONCEPT OF AN OWNER OF THE SUBJECT LAND FOR THIRTY YEARS.
The Republic contends that Tensuan failed to present incontrovertible evidence to warrant the registration of the property in the latter’s name as owner. Aruelo’s testimony that her father possessed the land even before the Second World War and Marasigan’s claim that he and his father have been tilling the land for a total of more than 65 years are doubtful considering that the subject property is located below the reglementary lake elevation and is, thus, part of the Laguna Lake bed. Also, the CENRO Certification is not sufficient evidence to overcome the presumption that the subject property still forms part of the public domain, and is not alienable and disposable.
On the other hand, Tensuan asserts that the Petition should be dismissed outright for raising questions of fact. The findings of the MeTC and the Court of Appeals that the subject property is alienable and disposable, and that Tensuan and her predecessors-in-interest had been in open, adverse, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the same for the period required by law, are supported by preponderance of evidence.
We find the instant Petition meritorious.
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court provides that only questions of law shall be raised in a Petition for Review before this Court. This rule, however, admits of certain exceptions, namely, (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misappreciation of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when, in making its findings, the same are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; and (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
The requisites for the filing of an application for registration of title under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree are: (1) that the property in question is alienable and disposable land of the public domain; and (2) that the applicants by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation; and that such possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.29 In Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic,30 we affirmed our earlier ruling in Republic v. Naguit,31 that Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree merely requires the property sought to be registered as already alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed.
We proceed to determine first whether it has been satisfactorily proven herein that the subject property was already alienable and disposable land of the public domain at the time Tensuan filed her Application for Registration on August 11, 1998.
[I]t is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and disposable. The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land registration must present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be established to prove that the land is alienable and disposable. Respondent failed to do so because the certifications presented by respondent do not, by themselves, prove that the land is alienable and disposable.
Only Torres, respondent’s Operations Manager, identified the certifications submitted by respondent. The government officials who issued the certifications were not presented before the trial court to testify on their contents. The trial court should not have accepted the contents of the certifications as proof of the facts stated therein. Even if the certifications are presumed duly issued and admissible in evidence, they have no probative value in establishing that the land is alienable and disposable.
The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, certifications do not fall within the class of public documents contemplated in the first sentence of Section 23 of Rule 132. The certifications do not reflect “entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer,” such as entries made by the Civil Registrar in the books of registries, or by a ship captain in the ship’s logbook. The certifications are not the certified copies or authenticated reproductions of original official records in the legal custody of a government office. The certifications are not even records of public documents. The certifications are conclusions unsupported by adequate proof, and thus have no probative value. Certainly, the certifications cannot be considered prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.
While we may have been lenient in some cases35 and accepted substantial compliance with the evidentiary requirements set forth in T.A.N. Properties, we cannot do the same for Tensuan in the case at bar. We cannot afford to be lenient in cases where the Land Registration Authority (LRA) or the DENR oppose the application for registration on the ground that the land subject thereof is inalienable. In the present case, the DENR recognized the right of the LLDA to oppose Tensuan’s Application for Registration; and the LLDA, in its Opposition, precisely argued that the subject property is part of the Laguna Lake bed and, therefore, inalienable public land. We do not even have to evaluate the evidence presented by the LLDA given the Regalian Doctrine. Since Tensuan failed to present satisfactory proof that the subject property is alienable and disposable, the burden of evidence did not even shift to the LLDA to prove that the subject property is part of the Laguna Lake bed.
Given the lack of evidence that the subject property is alienable and disposable, it becomes unnecessary for us to determine the other issue in this case, i.e., whether Tensuan has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation; and that such possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier. Regardless of the character and length of her possession of the subject property, Tensuan cannot acquire registerable title to inalienable public land.
1Rollo, pp. 27-36; penned by Associate Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso with Associate Justices Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos and Amelita G. Tolentino, concurring.
12 TSN, March 16, 1999, pp. 7-9.
20 TSN, September 5, 2001, pp. 5-6, 12-14.
26 Republic v. Javier, G.R. No. 179905, August 19, 2009, 596 SCRA 481, 491.
27 Republic v. De la Paz, G.R. No. 171631, November 15, 2010, 634 SCRA 610, 618.
28 G.R. No. 166516, September 3, 2009, 598 SCRA 61, 74-75.
29Lim v. Republic, G.R. No. 158630, September 4, 2009, 598 SCRA 247, 257.
30 G.R. No. 179987, April 29, 2009, 587 SCRA 172, 203.
31 489 Phil. 405, 414 (2005).
32Zarate v. Director of Lands, 478 Phil. 421, 433 (2004).
33 G.R. Nos. 167707 & 173775, October 8, 2008, 568 SCRA 164, 184-192.
34 G.R. No. 154953, June 26, 2008, 555 SCRA 477, 489-491.
35Republic v. Serrano, G.R. No. 183063, February 24, 2010, 613 SCRA 537; Republic v. Vega, G.R. No. 177790, January 17, 2011, 639 SCRA 541.

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