Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&amp;view=article&amp;id=50117:gr-156100-2007&amp;catid=1496&amp;Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 12:10:05+00:00

Document:
G.R. No. 156100 - VILMA E. ROMAGOS v. METRO CEBU WATER DISTRICT, ET AL.
VILMA E. ROMAGOS, Petitioner, v. METRO CEBU WATER DISTRICT, EDITHA D. LUZANO and DULCE M. ABANILLA, Respondents.
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the July 5, 2002 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) which dismissed the appeal2 from Resolutions No. 0107133 and No. 0112224 of the Civil Service Commission (CSC); and the October 29, 2002 CA Resolution5 which denied the motion for reconsideration.
Furthermore, there are other additional evidence submitted by General Manager Abanilla showing that there were incidents which happened after August 20, 1999 involving Ms. Romagos where the latter was observed to again utter incoherent words and become hysterical. A narration of the incidents which happened on September 6 and 7, 1999 are contained in the affidavits executed by Ms. Diosdada Faelnar and Atty. Vesmindo M. Santiago, the Chief of the Medical and Dental Services and the Asst. General Manager for Administration, respectively. Even as of December 1999, Ms. Romagos' mental problems were still observed by the OIC of the HRD, per the Inter-Office Memorandum dated December 21, 1999, with the latter even going to the extent of asking for the assistance of the security guards out of fear on what the appellant might do.
Moreover, we note the different letters and reports/studies/ researches penned by the appellant clearly manifesting her mental disorder. Her report to General Manager Abanilla dated December 27 and 29, 1999 are incomprehensible, incoherent, muddled and so disorganized that we can't help but conclude that indeed appellant is not in her right frame of mind. This observa[tion] also holds true when we examine and read the papers and letters written and prepared by the appellant dated August 6, 10, 30, 1999 and January 28, 1994.
1. Incident Report dated January 25, 1999 of Mrs. Samuela M. Susan, Senior Industrial Relations Development Officer A, the pertinent portion of which states, "I was stunned when the next thing I knew, she was already behind me at a very close range and bombarded me with insensible statements. I remained silent and intentionally observed what would be her next move while she was at the height of her outburst of deep seated anger and suspicion. She addressed to me all her sentiments telling me about corruption, illegal practices, unfair practices in a loud, emotionally charged voice."
2. Inter-Office Memorandum dated January 25, 1999 of Editha D. Luzano, Officer-in-Charge of the Human Resources Department of the said agency, to wit, "On January 25, 1999, Ms. Vilma Romagos' behavior became unstable again. She began talking to herself and then started scolding other people in the HRD office. Her actions caused anxieties to the other employees, thus disturbing their work. Since December 1998, she has been behaving like this."
Hence, the continuous abnormal behavior of Romagos cannot be denied. The Commission is convinced that the dropping of the appellant from the rolls is justified.
Her motion for reconsideration was denied by the CSC in Resolution No. 01122222 dated July 18, 2001.
WHEREFORE, finding the instant petition not impressed with merit, the same is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE. Costs against petitioner.
Romagos filed a motion for reconsideration but the CA denied the same in the questioned October 29, 2002 Resolution.
The foregoing issues actually boil down to the question: whether the CA correctly held that there was proper procedure and substantial basis for MCWD (respondent) to declare petitioner mentally unfit to work and drop her from the rolls.
In the present case, existing evidence controvert the CA finding that respondent correctly declared petitioner mentally unfit. A review of its finding is called for.
Separation from the service for such cause is done by way of a disciplinary proceeding governed by Rule II of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 19, series of 1999 (MC 19-99).31 The minimum procedural requirements thereof are: a) that notice of the charge be served on the officer or employee; and, b) that the latter be given opportunity to be heard.
While Section 46 of E.O. No. 292 is silent on this matter, mental incapacity not arising from immoral or vicious habits is also a cause for separation under Section 2632 of E.O. No. 292 and Section 2(2), Article IX(B) of the 1987 Constitution,33 which demand of government officers and employees continuing merit and fitness. Separation from the service for such cause is carried out through a non-disciplinary process governed by CSC Memorandum Circular No. 40,34 series of 1998 (MC 40-98).
A. An officer or employee who is continuously absent for more than one (1) year by reason of illness may be declared physically unfit to perform his duties and the head of office in the exercise of his sound judgment may consequently drop him from the rolls.
b. An officer or employee who is intermittently absent by reason of illness for at least 260 working days during a 24-month period may also be declared physically unfit by the head of office.
c. An officer or employee who is behaving abnormally for an extended period which manifests continuing mental disorder and incapacity to work as reported by his co-workers or immediate supervisor and confirmed by the head of office, may likewise be dropped from the rolls.
For the purpose of the three (3) preceding paragraphs, notice shall be given to the employee containing a brief statement of the nature of his incapacity to work.
Clearly, before an officer or employee may be dropped from the rolls for mental incapacity, the following elements and process must obtain: first, that it has been observed that the subject officer or employee has been behaving abnormally for an extended period; second, that it has been established through substantial evidence that such abnormal behavior manifests a continuing mental disorder and incapacity to work; third, that a written notice is issued by the subject's immediate supervisor, describing the former's continuing mental disorder and incapacity to work and citing the reports of his co-workers or immediate supervisor, as confirmed by the head of office; and finally, that another notice is issued by the appointing authority or head of office, informing the subject of his separation from the service due to mental incapacity.
Thus, a declaration of mental disorder does not automatically translate to a judgment of mental incapacity to perform work. A window remains open for the affected officer or employee to counter opinion on his mental condition and to show that his ability to work remains unimpaired. Only then may the appointing authority or head of office decide on whether said officer or employee is no longer mentally capable of performing his work and should be discharged. These requirements are designed to obviate misuse of non-disciplinary modes of separation for petty vengeance or vicious harassment.
However, the factual bases relied upon by respondent in declaring petitioner mentally unfit to work appear inadequate as they failed to comply with the elements and process provided for in the MC 40-98, as earlier pointed out.
This is to certify that Mrs. Vilma Romagos, 41 years old, married, an employee of MCWD, sought consultation last Aug. 19, 1999 and today.
Respondent sufficiently established that petitioner suffers from a mental disorder. There is overwhelming evidence of this condition. The 1989 and 1991 medical certifications issued by Dr. Costas and Dr. Obra establish that petitioner was diagnosed to be suffering from Major Depression. The 1999 medical certification of Dr. Obra proves that, at the time of her separation from the service, petitioner was undergoing psychiatric treatment. The incident reports submitted by respondent's employees uniformly indicate that petitioner is mentally disturbed. The latter's own letters and reports also reveal an abnormal mental condition.43 Moreover, petitioner's abnormal mental condition appears to be in a continuing state, considering that she was first diagnosed to be suffering from Major Depression in 1989, yet, in 1999, she was still undergoing psychiatric evaluation.
The question, however, is whether respondent sufficiently proved that petitioner's mental condition has rendered her incapacitated to work as to justify her being dropped from the rolls.
All that the 1989 and 1991 medical certifications established is that, during said periods, petitioner was diagnosed to be suffering from Major Depression. These certifications hardly prove that petitioner's behavior manifests a continuing mental disorder and incapacity to work. In fact, the 1991 medical certification of Dr. Obra points to the contrary for it states that petitioner "may go back to work provided that she will come back for check up as scheduled."44 This view is bolstered by other documents of record, which respondent did not dispute, such as petitioner's school transcripts, indicating that from 1980 to 1995 the latter took a graduate course in business administration at the Southwestern University.45 Such endeavor negates the notion that from the time of her first diagnosis in 1989 to the time of her separation in 1999, petitioner was suffering from a mental impediment to work.
This has reference to Mrs. Vilma Romagos' observed abnormal behavior, We know you are fully aware of this considering that every time she creates trouble, Mrs. Faelnar always sought assistance from you. This year alone, she has been behaving abnormally on three occasions specifically on January 25-30, July 12-16 and the most recent incident was that of yesterday, August 4, 1999 during HRD's departmental meeting, per attached HRD report.
Hence, respondent cannot impugn the August 20, 1999 medical certification of Dr. Obra merely because said document is not favorable to it.
Moreover, respondent itself relied on the 1989 and 1991 medical certifications in declaring petitioner mentally unfit to work. The CSCRO, CSC and CA also cited said medical certifications. There is no reason for them not to assign equal probative value to the August 20, 1999 medical certification of Dr. Obra.
In sum, the CA gravely erred in affirming the dismissal of petitioner. While there is no question that at the time she was dropped from the rolls, petitioner was suffering from a protracted mental disorder, the same did not render her incapable of performing her work. There was therefore an incomplete cause or justification to drop her from the rolls.
The Court of Appeals correctly ordered respondent's reinstatement. However, the award of backwages and other monetary benefits should not be limited to 5 years and must therefore be modified in line with the recent case of Civil Service Commission v. Gentallan. We held in said case that an illegally dismissed government employee who is later ordered reinstated is entitled to backwages and other monetary benefits from the time of her illegal dismissal up to her reinstatement. This is only fair and just because an employee who is reinstated after having been illegally dismissed is considered as not having left her office and should be given the corresponding compensation at the time of her reinstatement.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The July 5, 2002 Decisionand the October 29, 2002 Resolution of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The dropping from the rolls of petitioner Vilma A. Romagos is DECLARED ILLEGAL and respondent Metro Cebu Water District is DIRECTED to reinstate petitioner to her previous position and pay her backwages.
1 Penned by Associate Justice Mariano C. del Castillo and concurred in by Associate Justices Martin S. Villarama, Jr. and Rebecca de Guia-Salvador; rollo, p. 41.
2 Docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 66579.
17 June 20, 2000 CSCRO Decision, rollo, pp. 101-103.
18 Petition, rollo, pp. 28-29.
23 CA rollo, p. 20.
25 Petition, rollo, pp. 26-27.
26 Binay v. Odena, G.R. No. 163683, June 08, 2007.
27 Civil Service Commission v. Ledesma, G.R. No. 154521, September 30, 2005, 471 SCRA 589, 606.
28 The other exceptions are: (1) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (2 when there is grave abuse of discretion; (3) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (4) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (5) when in making its findings, the CA went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (6) when the findings are contrary to the trial court; (7) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (8) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; and (9) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record. Asiatic Development Corporation v. Brogada, G.R. No. 169136, July 14, 2006, 495 SCRA 166, 168.
29 1987 Administrative Code, made effective November 23, 1989 by Proclamation No. 495.
30 Judge CaÃ±a v. Gebusion, 385 Phil. 773, 784 (2000); Office of the Court Administrator v. Alagaban, 331 Phil. 981, 996 (1996).
31 Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.
33 Section 2. x x x (2) Appointments in the civil service shall be made only according to merit and fitness to be determined, as far as practicable, and, except to positions which are policy-determining, primarily confidential, or highly technical, by competitive examination.
34 Revised Omnibus Rules on Appointment and other Personnel Action, amending MC 12, s. 1994 and MC 38, s. 1993.
35 Sections 57 and 58, MC 19-99.
37 National Power Corporation v. Zozobrado, G.R. No. 153022, April 10, 2006, 487 SCRA 16, 24.
38 Pablo Borbon Memorial Institute of Technology v. Albistor Vda. De Bool, G.R. No. 156057, August 25, 2005, 468 SCRA 128, 140.
40 Petition, rollo, pp. 34-35.
42 Petition, rollo, p. 27-30.
43 CA rollo, pp. 148-151; 199-209; 263-293.
45 CA rollo, pp. 189-191.
48 Binay v. Odena, supra note 26.
49 CSCRO decision, rollo, p. 102.
51 G.R. No. 167762, December 15, 2005, 478 SCRA 142, 152.

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