Source: https://cbaclelegalconnection.com/tag/bankruptcy-law/
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 08:01:53+00:00

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On Tuesday, September 5, 2017, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals released its 2018 local rules for public comment. Comments will be accepted through October 31, 2017. A final version of the new rules will be posted on the Tenth Circuit’s website on December 1, 2017, and the rules will be effective January 1, 2018. A memo describing the changes to the local rules is available here, and a redline of the rule change is available here.
Effective December 31, 2017, two changes will be made to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. Rule 4(a)(4)(B)(iii) will be changed to re-insert a sentence confirming that no fees are due when an amended notice of appeal is filed. Additionally, Rule 28.1(e)(3) will be deleted to correct a scrivener’s error; the rule should have been deleted last year.
Comments regarding the rule change may be submitted to the court clerk via email.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals announced that it will upgrade its CM/ECF system to the Next Generation CM/ECF system (NextGen), beginning on Friday, May 12 at noon and finishing by Monday, May 15 at 7 a.m. CM/ECF will not be available during the upgrade. Frequently asked questions about the NextGen system are available here. There are also electronic learning modules available for the PACER NextGen; they are available here. For more information about the upgrade and NextGen, click here.
The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Farm Credit of Southern Colorado, ACA v. Mason on Thursday, April 6, 2017.
Zachary funded his farming operations with loans from Farm Credit of Southern Colorado, ACA and Farm Credit of Southern Colorado, FLCA (collectively, Farm Credit). Zachary was having difficulty paying his debt to Farm Credit and had planted crops on seven farms for the coming harvest. Written agreements between Farm Credit and Zachary granted Farm Credit a perfected security interest in Zachary’s crops (Crop Collateral) and their proceeds. Farm Credit refused to continue funding Zachary’s farming operations and Zachary was unable to cultivate the Crop Collateral. Zachary’s father, James, thereafter took over the cultivation of the Crop Collateral. James never attempted to transfer the Crop Collateral or its proceeds to Farm Credit. Farm Credit filed a complaint for various claims against Zachary and other parties, but not James. Zachary thereafter filed for bankruptcy. As part of a bankruptcy adversary proceeding, Farm Credit filed an amended complaint alleging that Zachary transferred the Crop Collateral to James. Farm Credit later amended the state trial court complaint to add James as a defendant. Ultimately, the trial court entered a judgment against James, finding him liable for converting the Crop Collateral and awarding Farm Credit damages plus interest.
On appeal, James argued that the trial court erred in striking his demand for a jury trial. Based on the complaint, Farm Credit’s remedy was in the nature of a foreclosure, an equitable action. Because the basic thrust of the underlying action was equitable and not legal in nature, the trial court did not err in striking James’s demand for a jury trial.
James also asserted that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of Zachary’s debt because Farm Credit did not disclose it before trial, and this nondisclosure was intentional and material. However, this nondisclosure was harmless because the amount of debt far exceeded the most optimistic estimate given for the Crop Collateral’s value at the time of conversion. Therefore, James was not denied an adequate opportunity to defend against Farm Credit’s assertion that the value of the outstanding debt exceeded the value of the collateral, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to dismiss the action as a result of this nondisclosure.
James next contended that the trial court reversibly erred when it determined that the defenses of abandonment, estoppel, waiver, and consent did not relieve him of liability for conversion. The written agreements evidencing Farm Credit’s perfected security interest in the Crop Collateral were “credit agreements” within the meaning of the Credit Agreement Statute of Frauds. Thus, any waiver involving Farm Credit’s rights to the Crop Collateral, including proceeds, would need to be in writing to be effective. Here, there was never a written waiver. Additionally, while the record shows that Farm Credit acquiesced to James’s cultivation and harvest of the otherwise doomed Crop Collateral, it does not show that Farm Credit consented to its security interest being completely extinguished. Finally, there is no evidence in the record showing Farm Credit manifested intent, or took action, to abandon the Crop Collateral and related claims at any point, including during the bankruptcy adversary proceeding. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in rejecting James’s defenses of waiver, consent, abandonment, and estoppel.
James further contended that the trial court erred when it determined that the bankruptcy court’s decision did not preclude Farm Credit from recovering on its claims and denied James’s motion for a directed verdict. Here, the legal issues before the bankruptcy court were different from those before the trial court. Because the issues litigated in the two proceedings at issue were not identical, the trial court correctly determined that collateral estoppel did not apply to the legal issues before it and properly denied James’s motion for a directed verdict.
Lastly, James argued that the trial court misapplied the law when assessing damages by determining that the date of conversion was the date of harvest rather than when James took over the crops’ cultivation. Because the trial court applied the correct standard in assessing damages and the record supports the trial court’s factual findings, there was no error with the damages award.
The orders and judgment were affirmed.
The U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado announced a courthouse closure. On Friday, December 9, 2016, from 12:45 to 6 p.m., the courthouse will be closed for business due to a law enforcement training exercise. The Alfred A. Arraj Courthouse will be closed to the public. The Byron G. Rogers Courthouse will remain open, but no court business will be conducted. Court business in the Durango and Grand Junction courthouses will be conducted as scheduled. All electronic systems to include CM/ECF and PACER will remain in operation during this time period. For more information, click here.
Complimentary hors d’oeuvres and a cash bar will be provided.
This event is proudly co-sponsored with the Bankruptcy Subsection of the Colorado Bar Association.
After an already impressive legal career and service as the U.S. Trustee for Region 19, Judge Tallman was appointed to the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado in 2002 and served as Chief Judge from 2007 to 2014. Judge Tallman will officially retire on Tuesday, January 3, 2017.
We hope you will join us for this retirement reception to honor Judge Tallman for his exemplary judicial service during his tenure with the U.S. Bankruptcy Court and his contributions to the practice of law throughout his legal career.
Questions? Click Here to Email Amanda Hoffman.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Tripodi v. Welch on Wednesday, January 13, 2016.
Nathan Welch was a real estate developer, and beginning in 2006, he worked to procure funding for the Talisman project. Robert Tripodi invested in the Talisman project, ultimately putting $1 million into the development, secured by promissory notes from Welch. When Talisman failed, Welch defaulted on the notes, and Tripodi filed a complaint against Welch in federal district court in 2009, alleging violations of federal and state securities laws. Welch answered the complaint, but a few months later his counsel moved to withdraw. The district court granted counsel’s motion and gave Welch 20 days to find new counsel or appear pro se. Several months later, Tripodi moved for default judgment, and, because Welch did not respond to the motion, the district court entered default judgment against him in April 2010. For the next year, Tripodi presented proof of damages, costs, and attorney fees, and the district court found Tripodi was owed $729,161.65 plus post-judgment interest.
Welch filed a voluntary petition for Chapter 7 bankruptcy in August 2011. Nearly two years later, Tripodi filed a motion for relief from the automatic stay. The district court granted Tripodi’s motion and directed its clerk to enter final monetary judgment. The clerk entered judgment in his favor for $729,161.65 plus post-judgment interest accruing since May 2011. Welch opposed a determination of damages and filed a cross-motion to set aside entry of default. The district court denied his motion as untimely. Each party then filed post-judgment motions. Tripodi moved for an order determining that the default judgment against Welch was non-dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(19), while Welch moved for the court to reconsider its order refusing to set aside the default, to set aside the default, and to enter a judgment on the pleadings in his favor. The district court granted Tripodi’s motion and denied Welch’s.
Welch appealed, arguing the district court erred in denying his motion for judgment on the pleadings and granting Tripodi’s motion that default is non-dischargeable under § 523(a)(19). The Tenth Circuit disagreed. The Tenth Circuit characterized Welch’s appeal as a roundabout way to challenge the entry of default against him by challenging the sufficiency of the pleadings. The Tenth Circuit addressed the district court’s grant of default judgment. The Tenth Circuit found that the pleadings were legally sufficient, as they showed (1) Tripodi invested in Talisman because he thought it would be a high-yeilding investment opportunity, (2) the investment was structured for broad distribution to unsophisticated investors such as himself, (3) the investing public would consider the notes to be securities, and (4) the collateral provided little security for investors. These four factors led the Tenth Circuit to conclude that the district court correctly ruled the notes were securities and Welch violated securities laws. The Tenth Circuit found no abuse of discretion.
Welch next contended that the district court erred in finding that the debt was non-dischargeable in bankruptcy under § 523(a)(19). The Tenth Circuit again disagreed. The Tenth Circuit noted that § 523(a)(19) renders debts non-dischargeable when they arise in connection with a violation of state or federal securities laws. Two factors prevent the debt from being discharged: (1) the debt must stem from a violation of federal or state securities law, and (2) the debt must be memorialized in a judicial order or settlement agreement. The Tenth Circuit found that Welch’s debt to Tripodi satisfied both factors.

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