Source: http://nv.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20180321_0003412.DNV.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 04:25:57+00:00

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RENEE BAKER, et al., Respondents.
GLORIA M. NAVARRO CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
This habeas matter under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 by a Nevada state inmate comes before the Court for a final decision on the merits.
Petitioner Kamario Smith challenges his 2012 Nevada state conviction, pursuant to a jury verdict, of conspiracy to commit robbery, robbery with the use of a deadly weapon, and possession of a firearm by an ex-felon. He challenged the conviction in the state courts on direct appeal and post-conviction review.
On federal habeas review, petitioner challenges, inter alia, the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. The evidence presented at trial included, inter alia, the following.
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) imposes a "highly deferential" standard for evaluating state-court rulings that is "difficult to meet" and "which demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt." Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170 (2011). Under this highly deferential standard of review, a federal court may not grant habeas relief merely because it might conclude that the state court decision was incorrect. 563 U.S. at 202. Instead, under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), the court may grant relief only if the state court decision: (1) was either contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as determined by the United States Supreme Court; or (2) was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented at the state court proceeding. 563 U.S. at 181-88.
A state court decision is "contrary to" law clearly established by the Supreme Court only if it applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in Supreme Court case law or if the decision confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a Supreme Court decision and nevertheless arrives at a different result. E.g., Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 15-16 (2003). A state court decision is not contrary to established federal law merely because it does not cite the Supreme Court's opinions. Id. Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that a state court need not even be aware of its precedents, so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of its decision contradicts them. Id. Moreover, "[a] federal court may not overrule a state court for simply holding a view different from its own, when the precedent from [the Supreme] Court is, at best, ambiguous." 540 U.S. at 16. For, at bottom, a decision that does not conflict with the reasoning or holdings of Supreme Court precedent is not contrary to clearly established federal law.
A state court decision constitutes an "unreasonable application" of clearly established federal law only if it is demonstrated that the state court's application of Supreme Court precedent to the facts of the case was not only incorrect but "objectively unreasonable." E.g., Mitchell, 540 U.S. at 18; Davis v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 628, 638 (9th Cir. 2004).
. . . . [I]n concluding that a state-court finding is unsupported by substantial evidence in the state-court record, it is not enough that we would reverse in similar circumstances if this were an appeal from a district court decision. Rather, we must be convinced that an appellate panel, applying the normal standards of appellate review, could not reasonably conclude that the finding is supported by the record.
Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 1000 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Lambert, 393 F.3d at 972.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), state court factual findings are presumed to be correct unless rebutted by clear and convincing evidence.
The petitioner bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he is entitled to habeas relief. Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 569.
[FN1] Smith argues that the district court abused its discretion by allowing the victim to testify because her testimony was incredible and therefore more prejudicial than probative and no weapon was found. Because he did not object to this testimony, his claim is reviewed for plain error affecting his substantial rights. Mclellan v. State, 124 Nev. 263, 267, 182 P.3d 106, 109 (2008). Credibility matters associated with the victim's testimony and the prosecution's inability to produce the weapon allegedly used in the robbery go to the weight of the evidence not admissibility. McNair, 108 Nev. at 56, 825 P.2d at 573. We conclude that Smith has failed to demonstrate plain error.
At the very outset, Ground A as alleged in federal court in large part presents a state law claim of evidentiary error that clearly is not cognizable on federal habeas review. Smith argues at length that Applewhite's testimony should have been excluded under state statutory and case law. Such a claim of error under Nevada state law simply is not cognizable in a federal habeas proceeding. See, e.g., Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991). The state supreme court's holding under Nevada state law is the final word on that matter.
To the further extent that Smith alleges that the admission of Applewhite's testimony violated his Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial, the state supreme court's implicit rejection of the federal constitutional claim was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as determined by the United States Supreme Court. There are no Supreme Court precedents holding that a victim's testimony must be excluded because she initially lied to the police about a drug buy that turned into a robbery, she was addicted to painkillers, there were alleged inconsistencies in her testimony, the gun to which she testified was not found, and/or she failed to identify an accomplice. In short, there is no federal constitutional requirement that a complaining witness must be beyond all possible reproach with no alleged inconsistencies in her testimony and/or that an armed robber can be convicted based on the complaining witness' testimony only if the gun is found and his accomplice is identified. The state supreme court's rejection of this patently meritless claim was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, and the claim further would not provide a basis for relief even on a de novo review.
To the further extent that Smith alleges that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction, the state supreme court's explicit rejection of this claim was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.
On a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, the habeas petitioner faces a “considerable hurdle.” Davis v. Woodford, 333 F.3d 982, 992 (9th Cir. 2003). Under the standard announced in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979), the jury's verdict must stand if, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. E.g., Davis, 333 F.3d at 992. Accordingly, the reviewing court, when faced with a record of historical facts that supports conflicting inferences, must presume that the trier of fact resolved any such conflicts in favor of the prosecution and defer to that resolution, even if the resolution by the state court trier of fact of specific conflicts does not affirmatively appear in the record. Id. The Jackson standard is applied with reference to the substantive elements of the criminal offense as defined by state law. E.g., Davis, 333 F.3d at 992. When the deferential standards of AEDPA and Jackson are applied together, the question for decision on federal habeas review thus becomes one of whether the state supreme court's decision unreasonably applied the Jackson standard to the evidence at trial. See, e.g., Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1274-75 (9th Cir. 2005).

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