Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=52945:am-rtj-01-1650-2009&catid=1522&Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 16:22:18+00:00

Document:
MARGIE CORPUS MACIAS, Complainant, v. MARIANO JOAQUIN S. MACIAS, Presiding Judge, Branch 28, Regional Trial Court, Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte, Respondent.
This involves an administrative complaint1 filed by complainant Margie C. Macias charging her husband, Mariano Joaquin S. Macias (Judge Macias), with immorality and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. The complaint was filed on March 7, 2001, when respondent was still sitting as the presiding judge of Branch 28 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte.
Complainant attached the affidavits of Shem Tabotabo,3 Zacarias Cordova,4 Zosima Carangan,5 Danny Layogue and Consolacion S. Layogue,6 her son Marictibert Corpus Macias,7 Ruben Perater,8 Roel Mutia,9 and Aniceto Zozobrado.10 However, five of them - Tabotabo,11 Cordova,12 Carangan,13 Danny Layogue,14 and Marictibert Macias15 - later recanted their affidavits.
On August 20, 2001, this Court issued a Resolution16 referring the complaint to Court of Appeals Associate Justice Eriberto U. Rosario, Jr. for investigation, report and recommendation. On October 29, 2001, Justice Rosario issued an Order17 setting the initial hearing on November 27, 28 and 29, 2001 and requiring the parties to submit a list of their respective witnesses and documentary evidence. The hearing was, however, reset to January 28, 29, 30, and 31, 2002 upon motion of complainant. On January 28, 2002, the parties informed the Investigating Justice that they were exerting all efforts for a possible reconciliation. Upon motion by both parties, the hearing was again reset to March 11, 12, 13, and 14, 2002.
On March 11, 2002, the parties again informed the Investigating Justice of their desire to confer in a last effort to settle. The request was again granted with an order that both parties should be ready the following day if no settlement was reached. The following day, March 12, 2002, the scheduled hearing proceeded after the parties failed to reach any amicable settlement.
The third witness, Engracio Dialo, Jr., was not allowed to testify after respondent's counsel objected because the intended testimony would cover an event that took place after the filing of the complaint, and Dialo's affidavit narrated matters that were not covered by the allegations in the complaint.24 Complainant manifested her intention to file a motion to amend the complaint.25 The Investigating Justice ordered the direct examination of the fourth witness, complainant Margie Macias, without prejudice to her presenting Dialo after the motion to amend the complaint shall have been resolved. Complainant, however, refused, saying that she would testify only after Dialo had testified.26 The Investigating Justice warned complainant that her refusal to testify shall be taken as a waiver of her right to present further witnesses and evidence.27 Despite the warning, complainant refused to proceed with her direct testimony. The Investigating Justice ordered complainant to rest her case, but she again refused.
The case now comes before this Court for final resolution.
There are two basic questions that must be resolved. First, considering the finding of the Investigating Justice, we ask: is it really necessary that administrative complaints against members of the judiciary be disposed of only after adducing evidence that will prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt? And second, do the acts complained of warrant the imposition of disciplinary sanction on respondent judge?
In several cases,31 this Court has ruled that if what is imputed to a respondent judge connotes a misconduct that, if proven, would result in dismissal from the bench, then the quantum of proof necessary to support the administrative charges or to establish grounds for the removal of a judicial officer should be more than substantial.
The procedure for the impeachment of judges of first instance has heretofore not been well defined. The Supreme Court has not yet adopted rules of procedure, as it is authorized to do by law. In practice, it is usual for the court to require that charges made against a judge of first instance shall be presented in due form and sworn to; thereafter, to give the respondent judge an opportunity to answer; thereafter, if the explanation of the respondent be deemed satisfactory, to file (sic) the charges without further annoyance for the judge; while if the charges establish a prima facie case, they are referred to the Attorney-General who acts for the court in conducting an inquiry into the conduct of the respondent judge. On the conclusion of the Attorney-General's investigation, a hearing is had before the court en banc and it sits in judgment to determine if sufficient cause exists involving the serious misconduct or inefficiency of the respondent judge as warrants the court in recommending his removal to the Governor-General.
Second, members of the judiciary are not a class of their own, sui generis, in the field of public service as to require a higher degree of proof for the administrative cases filed against them other than, perhaps, the fact that because of the nature of the responsibility judges have, they are required to live up to a higher standard of integrity, probity and morality.
When we dismiss a public officer or employee from his position or office for the commission of a grave offense in connection with his office, we merely require that the complainant prove substantial evidence. When we disbar a disgraceful lawyer, we require that complainant merely prove a clear preponderance of evidence to establish liability.39 There appears no compelling reason to require a higher degree of proof when we deal with cases filed against judges.
Judges play a vital role in the dispensation of justice. In this jurisdiction, the integrity demanded of a judge does not commence only when he dons the habiliments of a magistrate or ends when he sheds off his judicial robe. The nature of the position requires nothing less than a 24-hour daily obeisance to this mandate of integrity. Any judge who cannot live up to this exacting requirement has no business sitting on the bench. Considering the proliferation of complaints of abuses and immorality committed by judges, it is only proper that the Court be ever vigilant in requiring impeccable conduct from the members of its bench.
Under Sections 8 and 11 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, a judge found guilty of immorality can be dismissed from the service, if still in the active service, or may forfeit all or part of his retirement benefits, if already retired, and disqualified from reinstatement or appointment to any public office including government-owned or controlled corporations.42 We have already ruled that if a judge is to be disciplined for a grave offense, the evidence against him should be competent and derived from direct knowledge.43 This quantum of evidence, complainant failed to satisfy.
The testimonies of Mutia and Zozobrado are specious and insufficient to convincingly prove that respondent committed disreputable conduct. This considered, complainant should not have refused to testify during the hearing. More than anyone else, it was complainant who had a direct interest in making sure that the evidence adduced met the necessary burden of proof, considering that the allegations in her complaint involved charges that cannot be lightly dealt with. She should have been more zealous in prosecuting her complaint.
Nevertheless, we agree with the findings of the Investigating Justice that although the charges of immorality and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service were not satisfactorily proven by complainant, respondent cannot be completely exonerated.44 Mutia's testimony that he saw Judge Macias having dinner with Seranillos and entering a bedroom with her may not satisfactorily prove the charge of immorality, but this act certainly suggested an appearance of impropriety, Judge Macias being a married man. Such behavior undeniably constituted unbecoming conduct, a light offense punishable by a fine not less than P1,000.00 but not more than P10,000.00.45 In light of the circumstances affecting not only the reputation of Judge Macias himself but the image and reputation of the whole judiciary as well, we find it reasonable to impose upon him the maximum fine of P10,000.00.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the administrative complaint for immorality and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service against respondent Judge Mariano Joaquin S. Macias of RTC, Branch 28, of Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte is DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence. However, respondent is held administratively liable for UNBECOMING CONDUCT and FINED in the amount of P10,000.00 to be deducted from his retirement benefits.
1 Rollo, Vol. I, pp. 6-12.
12 Id. at 155-156, 157-158.
18 Rollo, Vol. 2, pp. 174-176.
31 Alcuizar v. Carpio, A.M. No. RTJ-07-2068, August 7, 2007, 529 SCRA 216; Duduaco v. Laquindanum, A.M. No. MTJ-05-1601, August 11, 2005, 466 SCRA 428; Reyes v. Mangino, A.M. No. MTJ-05-1575, January 31, 2005, 450 SCRA 27; Layola v. Gabo, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-00-1524, January 26, 2000, 323 SCRA 348; CastaÃ±os v. EscaÃ±o, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-93-955, December 12, 1995, 251 SCRA 174. But see Gutierrez v. Belen, A.M. No. RTJ-08-2118, June 26 2008, 555 SCRA 424; Reyes v. Paderanga, A.M. No. RTJ-06-1973, March 14, 2008, 548 SCRA 244; Naval v. Panday, A.M. No. RTJ-95-1283, December 21, 1999, 321 SCRA 290.
32 43 Phil. 212 (1922).
39 Agpalo, Legal and Judicial Ethics, p. 673 (2002), citing Pimentel, Jr. v. Llorente, 339 SCRA 154, 159-160.
40 Reyes v. Paderanga, supra note 31, at 252.
43 CaÃ±ada v. Suerte, A.M. No. RTJ-04-1884, February 22, 2008, 546 SCRA 414, 423.
44 Rollo, Vol. II, p. 187.
45 RULES OF COURT, Rule 140, Secs. 10 and 11.

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