Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/229/265/
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 14:49:23+00:00

Document:
Where the case was decided on the federal question, the fact that it might have been decided from a nonfederal point of view does not afford a basis for holding that it was decided on the latter ground and that this Court has no jurisdiction under § 709, Rev.Stat.
While the power of this Court to review the judgment of a state court is controlled by § 709, Rev.Stat., § 237, Judicial Code, yet where, in a controversy of a purely federal character, the claim is made and denied that there was no evidence tending to show liability under the federal statute, such ruling, when duly excepted to, is reviewable, because inherently involving the operation and effect of the federal law.
It was not the intent of Congress, in enacting the Hours of Service Act of 1907, to subject carriers to the extreme liability of insurers of the safety of their employees by rendering them liable for all accidents occurring during the period of overtime, whether attributable to the fact of working overtime or not.
In order to render the carrier liable under the Hours of Service Act, there must be proof tending to show connection between permitting the overtime work and the happening of the accident.
In this case, the evidence does not reasonably tend to connect the working overtime with the accident, which occurred about seven minutes after the expiration of the permitted period.
The facts, which involve the construction of the Hours of Service Act of 1907 and the liability of a railroad company thereunder, are stated in the opinion.
Carriers by Railroad to Their Employees in Certain cases,' which became a law on the 22nd day of April, 1908, 35 Stat. 65, and that the aforesaid negligent and wrongful acts of the officers and agents of the said defendant, and the said violation of the laws of the United States relating to interstate commerce, were the proximate and sole causes of the death of her said husband, and she relies on the laws of the United States made and provided in such cases."
for loaded cars. Exactly how long a time the operations at Bush consumed is not precisely fixed, one witness saying an hour, and another an hour and a half, and the same divergence exists as to the hour of departure on the return journey, one witness saying 12:30 and the other one o'clock. Gorham, where the branch line connects with the main line, is about twenty miles from Bush. When the train reached that point on the return trip is not shown. Certain it is, however, that, judging by the average speed of the train, somewhere about 6:15, the train passed a station called Howertown, where there was a siding, and found itself at either 7:35 or 7:37 drawing into a station called Wolf Lake, which is fifteen miles from Gorham and thirty-five miles from Bush. The proof as to what then took place is contained in the testimony of three witnesses. Guess, the engineer of the train, Roberson, the telegraph operator who was stationed at Wolf Lake, and Loper, the conductor of the train.
Gorham, but we changed from the main to the branch line. The train going up to Bush consisted of nine empties, a freight train. We stayed about an hour at Bush. We set out the train of empties, and turned the engine. It took about an hour to make the transfer at Bush. We came back to Gorham, going south towards Illmo. McWhirter was killed, returning at Wolf Lake, on the morning of February 23 at 7:35, as near as I can remember. It was in that neighborhood. He was killed performing his duty, going out to set a switch."
"Question. Just detail the manner as it occurred, as you know it."
"Answer. As I came into Wolf Lake, when I whistled for town, brakeman McWhirter asked me if I were going to head in at Wolf Lake. I told him yes, that we had to get in on account of the sixteen-hour law. He got up, went out at the front window on the left side of the engine along the footboard, and the next thing I seen was the operator at Wolf Lake very much excited in giving a stop signal. I stepped off of engine, asked him what was the matter. He said, 'My goodness, you have run over the brakeman.' I went looking for him, found him under the left tank wheel, cut in two."
"Q. Did you know this brakeman was in front of the engine?"
"Q. Did you see him go out of the cab window?"
"A. I seen him go out of the cab window. That is all."
"Q. What did you suppose he went out of the cab window for?"
"A. He is supposed to get out there to open the switch. I supposed that is what he went out there for."
"Q. Was it his duty to throw the switch in front of the window or not?"
"A. No, sir, it wasn't his place to throw it in front of the window. He wasn't supposed to go out on that pilot. "
"Q. What I mean is, was the switch that the brakeman was required to throw in front of the engine or behind of the engine?"
"A. It was in front of the engine. I have no record that would show the minute that the train arrived at Wolf Lake on the morning of the 23d. I testified before the coroner's jury. As near as I can remember I stated at the coroner's inquest that the train arrived at Wolf Lake at 7:35. That would make five minutes over the sixteen-hour law."
"Q. You stated before the coroner's inquest 'at 7:30, the sixteen-hour law was up. We were seven minutes over time.' Was that correct?"
"A. I suppose so. As near as I can remember, it was five minutes. It was 7:35. If I said 7:37, that was correct. Then I knew it. It has been over a year ago now. Neither cylinder of my engine was bad, more than ordinarily. It wouldn't make any difference in this case. Neither was leaking steam. I was not working steam when he was killed. The engine was drifting. Understand, shut off, there would be no leak there. Neither cylinder had been leaking steam that morning. There had not been anything the matter with the engine on this return trip. Nothing at all."
"Q. Who saw this man run over?"
"A. Mr. Roberson was the only man I can say. Mr. Fred Roberson. He was standing on the platform. The train was going out to Wolf Lake. Destination was Illmo."
"The crew of my train did not go any further than Wolf Lake. There was another crew that came to relieve us there."
switch or place which we could enter at the expiration of the sixteen-hour law. It was McWhirter's duty as brakeman to throw the switch."
"Q. When was the first time that you knew of the unfortunate accident?"
"A. When Mr. Roberson told me what had happened."
"Q. Whom do you mean by Mr. Roberson, who was he?"
"A. The telegraph operator at Wolf Lake."
"It is about in the neighborhood of fifteen miles from Wolf Lake to Gorham, and about six miles from Wolf Lake to Howardtown. There is a switch at Howardtown. There was no defect in the pilot step, and I know nothing about how this accident happened except from the fact that the telegraph operator told me that something was wrong."
"I am employed as a telegraph operator by the St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railway Company, and have been so employed since July, 1904. I was stationed, as operator at Wolf Lake, on February 22, 1910. I was at the station on the morning of the 23d of February when extra train No. 503 came into Wolf Lake from the north. I saw the train when it pulled in. It was about 7:37, as well as I recollect, by the time it got to the depot."
"Q. Just tell what you know about the accident that happened at Wolf Lake on that morning."
and came down to the pilot, and as it was nearing the switch, he left the pilot and struck the ground running and the next I saw he fell face downward between the rails. I next saw him on his hands and knees. After that, I turned my eyes to the engineer and did not see him any more, giving the engineer a stop signal. When he came to a stop, I told the engineer something, but I do not remember what I told him, but that was the last I saw of the brakeman until he was taken from under the tender of the engine."
"He was dead when he was taken out from under the engine. The weather was pretty cold-weather chilly, cold. As near as I can remember, the ground was frozen. I do not remember that there was any ice and sleet on the ground."
"Q. Do you know how this man came to fall?"
"There were cinders between the rails where he was, ashes between the rails, a little higher than the other ground about the place he was killed. I believe they were frozen. I do not recollect whether it had been raining on the night of the 22d -- not that I remember of it raining. I do not think anyone else saw McWhirter at the time he was killed -- not at the office. At that time, there was no one else around there except the train crew on this freight train."
"Q. When you saw McWhirter's perilous condition, you say you turned your head. Why did you do that?"
"A. I don't remember saying I turned my head. I turned my eyes from the brakeman to the engineer."
"Q. Did you know that he was in a condition to be hurt?"
"A. I didn't positively know so, but I thought he was in a dangerous condition down there. "
"Q. How far did the train run before the engineer stopped it after you notified him of this trouble?"
"A. I suppose about the length of an engine. Maybe not quite so far, maybe a little further. I don't remember."
"Q. Do I understand you to say that Mr. McWhirter left the engine, passed down over the pilot, and was out on the ground when you saw him?"
"A. He was on the ground when I saw him."
"Q. How far was he from in front of that engine when he fell?"
"A. That is pretty hard for me to judge, because he was in line of the engine and myself."
"Q. How far was it from where he fell to the switch which he was called on the turn?"
"A. Perhaps three or four car lengths, maybe not so far."
"Q. How far is a car length -- how many feet?"
"A. That is pretty hard for me to say."
"Q. How long is a car?"
"A. Well, they ordinary run 36 feet, some of them 30, some of them 40."
"Q. Now, when you saw him fall, how far was he from this switch?"
"A. About three car lengths. About three car lengths."
"Q. You say that, at the time McWhirter fell, he was in line with you and the engine. Explain what you mean by that."
"A. In direct with me -- between where I stood and where he got off, putting me in direct line with him and where he got off. I can't tell whether he was ten, twenty, or how far he was from the engine."
"Q. You mean, if I understand you, that the train was coming towards you, and he stepped off between you and the engine; is that correct?"
"A. That is correct. "
"Q. Do you know whether or not the cylinder heads of this engine were leaking?"
"A. I couldn't say whether it was the cylinder heads or not. I recollect there was some steam or other from the engine."
"A. Steam was escaping from the engine, as well as I recollect."
"Q. Do you know what caused that?"
As to the testimony of conductor Loper, it suffices to say that he swore he was in the caboose and saw nothing of the accident, although he knew it occurred as the train was entering the station at Wolf Lake at 7:37 in the morning. When examined as a witness for the plaintiff, he testified on cross-examination that, at the time of the accident, the train could not have been going more than two miles an hour, because they stopped at an "engine's length," while, when called to the stand as a witness for the railroad company, he testified on cross-examination that, at the time of the accident, the train was going "about three or four miles an hour." Loper also testified that the night of the twenty-second of February, 1910, was a cold night, freezing, and the ground was frozen; that at the expiration of the sixteen-hour limit the train was probably two miles from Wolf Lake, which was the first switch on the expiration of that limit.
Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment. 145 Ky. 427. Among other things, the court held that there was testimony tending to show negligence, and therefore the binding instruction to the contrary asked by the defendant was rightly refused, and that an instruction as to the operation and effect of the hours of service act was also correct.
go to the jury to show liability under the federal law. While it is true, as we have said, that, coming from a state court, the power to review is controlled by Rev.Stat. § 709, yet where, in a controversy of a purely federal character, the claim is made and denied that there was no evidence tending to show liability under the federal law, such ruling, when duly excepted to, is reviewable, because inherently involving the operation and effect of the federal law. Kansas City So. Ry. v. Albers Commission Co., 223 U. S. 573, 223 U. S. 591; Creswill v. Knights of Pythias, 225 U. S. 246.
The plaintiff in error assigns twenty-two alleged errors. We deem it necessary only to refer to those which concern the following subjects: first, the refusal to give the binding instruction asking by the defendant, and second, an instruction given over the objection and exception of the defendant, concerning the Act of Congress commonly known as the Hours of Service Act, and in connection therewith a special charge on the same subject, given by the court of its own motion, which was excepted to by both parties.
death, you will find for the plaintiff such damages as you may believe from the evidence she has sustained by reason of his death, not exceeding the sum of $25,000."
"The court instructs the jury that unless they believe from the evidence that Etwal McWhirter came to his death on account of the carelessness and negligence of the officers, agents, and servants of the defendant, or that the said Etwal McWhirter was permitted or required by the defendant to be on duty more than sixteen consecutive hours next before his death, and that his being permitted or required to be on duty more than sixteen hours next before his death contributed to his death, the law is for the defendant, and the jury should so find."
"In thus requiring of the intestate more than sixteen consecutive hours of service, albeit the excess of service over the sixteen hours was but five or seven minutes, appellant violated the statute, supra, and as the death of the intestate, from the act of its engineer complained of, occurred while he was engaged in the required continuous service, and after the expiration of the sixteen consecutive hours allowed by the statute, there seems to be no escape from the conclusion that the act of appellant in thus extending his service beyond the statutory limit was negligence per se, to which the intestate's death must, as a matter of law, be attributed, and, if so, the right of appellee to maintain this action cannot be questioned."
of the statute prohibiting it from requiring its employees to remain on duty longer than sixteen consecutive hours, we find that the language of the provision in question is mandatory, and that the duty it imposes is a definite, absolute duty. Its nonperformance may not, therefore, be excused by a showing on the part of the railroad company that it used ordinary care or reasonable diligence to perform it, but was unable to do so. The violation of such a statutory duty is therefore negligence per se."
"The requirements of the statute with respect to the safety appliances to be used on appellant's trains are no more imperative or mandatory than is the statutory restriction here involved upon its right to suffer its employees to engage in its service more than sixteen consecutive hours. The violation of the statute in either case invites the penalty prescribed, and the offender will not be excused upon a showing of reasonable effort or diligence in attempting to comply with the statutory requirements."
instructions rested upon the same interpretation of the statute for the following reasons: (a) because, beyond the proof of working overtime, there was no offer of proof connecting the accident with the working overtime; and, (b) because it is apparent that the Court of Appeals interpreted the charge upon which it was passing as having that significance, and affirmed it for that reason.
of negligence, but also the inference of proximate cause, such concession can be of no avail here, since the instruction of the trial court and the ruling affirming that instruction were based upon the theory that the mere act of negligence in permitting an employee to work beyond the statutory period created liability irrespective of the connection between the alleged negligence and the injury complained of.
and the happening of the accident, reversible error was committed. Of course, the inquiry whether there was any proof having such tendency is not to be solved by indulging in mere surmise or conjecture or by resorting to imaginary possibilities, for to so do would but resolve the question back to the generic rule of liability as insurer which we have previously disposed of.
the signal from the operator, it is demonstrated with mathematical certainty that the deceased was not within the possible vision of the engineer as he leaped or stepped from the pilot for the purpose of running along the track to the switch.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals of Kentucky must be reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It seems to me that the rulings of the state court held to be erroneous are not within the scope of our review under the act (Rev.Stat. § 709) that alone confers jurisdiction upon this Court to review the judgment of a state court.
The action was based upon the Hours of Service Act of March 4, 1907 (34 Stat. 1416, c. 2939, § 2) and upon the Employers' Liability Act of April 22, 1908 (35 Stat. 65, c. 149), and the verdict and judgment rest upon the theory that plaintiff's intestate, Etwal McWhirter, a flagman or brakeman upon one of defendant's interstate trains, had been kept continuously at work far more than sixteen consecutive hours, in violation of the former act, and that his death was directly due to the negligence or the locomotive engineer upon the same train, either alone or in conjunction with McWhirter's excessive fatigue, due to his having been worked overtime. The negligence of the engineer was, of course, attributable to the defendant under the Act of 1908, and under that act, the negligence of the deceased, if shown, would not bar the action.
between the working overtime of the deceased and the catastrophe that resulted in his death. And so, I think, the Court of Appeals of Kentucky interpreted the instructions (145 Ky. 427, 441; Instructions 4 and 5).
However, let it be conceded for present purposes that the trial court erroneously instructed the jury that the effect of the violation of the Hours of Service Act was to create an unconditional liability for an accident happening after the expiration of the sixteen-hour limit, and to render the carrier an insurer of the safety of the employee while working beyond the statutory time. And let it be further conceded that the trial court held, and erred in holding, that there was enough in the evidence to warrant a finding that the locomotive engineer was negligent, so as to make the carrier liable under the Employers' Liability Act, or held, erroneously, that there was enough to show a causal relation between the working overtime of McWhirter and the disaster, so as to create a liability under the Hours of Service Act.
the general sense -- that is to say, they arose under the laws of the United States. And I concede that the judgment cannot be sustained upon any independent nonfederal ground. But, according to all previous decisions, so far as I am aware, the mere existence of a federal question in the record is not sufficient to give to this Court jurisdiction to review the judgment of a state court; it is necessary that the federal question shall have been decided in a particular way.
There is a clear distinction between the existence of a federal question such as would give original jurisdiction to a federal court because "arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States," etc. (Judicial Code, § 24), or such as would give a right of appeal to this Court from those courts (§§ 238, 241), and the denial by a state court of a federal right or immunity, under such circumstances as to give jurisdiction to this Court to review the state court's decision.
"where is drawn in question the validity of a treaty, or statute of, or an authority exercised under, the United States, and the decision is against their validity; or where is drawn in question the validity of a statute of, or an authority exercised under, any state, on the ground of their being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States, and the decision is in favor of their validity; or where any title, right, privilege, or immunity is claimed under the Constitution, or any treaty or statute of, or commission held or authority exercised under, the United States, and the decision is against the title, right, privilege, or immunity especially set up or claimed by either party, under such Constitution, treaty, statute, commission, or authority."
"in favor of their authority"-"against the title . . . or immunity especially set up," etc. -- are to be eliminated from the section, it must be construed as giving not a mutual or reciprocal right of review of federal questions decided in the state courts, but an unilateral right of review, dependent upon the way in which the question was decided in the state court.
The distinction has been recognized by this Court in cases without number. See Whitten v. Tomlinson, 160 U. S. 231, 160 U. S. 238; Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Austin, 168 U. S. 685, 168 U. S. 695; Holder v. Aultman, 169 U. S. 81, 169 U. S. 88; Field v. Barber Asphalt Co., 194 U. S. 618, 194 U. S. 620.
ex Rel. Carey v. Andriano, 138 U. S. 496, 138 U. S. 499; Jersey City & Bergen R. Co. v. Morgan, 160 U. S. 288, 160 U. S. 292; De Lamar's Nevada G.M. Co. v. Nesbitt, 177 U. S. 523, 177 U. S. 528.
In all these cases, the word "immunity," as used in § 709, Rev.Stat., like the associated words "title, right, privilege," has been given its normal affirmative force, the clause meaning not that the plaintiff in error may have merely denied a federal right asserted against him by his adversary, but that he must have claimed exemption from a liability or obligation asserted against him on grounds of state or of federal law by specially setting up an immunity because of some statute or treaty or constitutional provision of the United States.
The more recent decisions that are sometimes supposed to have given a different construction to § 709 do not, upon critical examination, bear out this view. Nutt v. Knut, 200 U. S. 12, 200 U. S. 19, and cases cited; Texas Pacific Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U. S. 426, 204 U. S. 434, etc.; Kansas City Southern Ry. v. Albers Commission Co., 223 U. S. 573, 223 U. S. 591; Creswill v. Knights of Pythias, 225 U. S. 246; Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Duvall, 225 U. S. 477. An apparent exception is St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. Ry. v. Taylor, 210 U. S. 281, 210 U. S. 291, etc. But, in that case, the plaintiff in error did at least assert a special construction of the federal act upon which its adversary's suit was based, and upon that special construction claimed an exemption from liability.
I am unable to find in § 709, or in previous decisions of this Court, any authority for a review by this Court of a decision by a state court, sustaining a defendant's liability in an action founded upon a federal law, although such decision be excepted to, or for reviewing a state court decision that, instead of impairing or limiting the effect of an act of Congress, is alleged to enlarge its scope and effect and the consequent responsibility of a defendant thereunder.

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