Source: https://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-supreme-court/243/464.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 07:22:46+00:00

Document:
[243 U.S. 464, 465] Assistant Attorney General Warren and Mr. S. W. Williams for plaintiff in error.
Messrs. Henry E. Asp, Henry G. Snyder, Frederick B. Owen, and Walter A. Lybrand for defendants in error.
This is an action in ejectment, brought by the United States against James F. Rowell and two others. The land in controversy is a quarter section-160 acres-in an Indian school reserve in Comanche county, Oklahoma.
A patent was not issued to Rowell. He asked for one, but, at the suggestion of the chairman of the Committees on Indian Affairs in the Senate and House of Representatives, the President, in whose name such patents are issued, withheld his signature from the patent and directed that nothing be done until Congress could further consider the matter. Congress was not then in session, and when it reconvened the matter was again considered, with the result that the provision in the Act of June 17 was repealed.
The tract in controversy was part of a large reservation established by treaties in 1868 as a permanent home for the Kiowa, Comanche, and Apache Indians. 15 Stat. at L. 581, 589. In 1901 the members of these tribes were given allotments in severalty in this reservation and the greater part of the remaining lands was disposed of by the United States,- what was deemed to be their fair value being credited to the Indians as a trust fund. 31 Stat. at L. chap. 813, 6, p. 676. At that time a portion of the reservation, embracing the tract in controversy, was set apart for school purposes for these Indians, and this school reserve is still maintained and used for their benefit. The tribal relation of these Indians has not been terminated. They are still in a state of pupilage and under the control of the United States. It retains the title to their allotments and administers their tribal affairs and property.
James F. Rowell is a white man who went to the large [243 U.S. 464, 467] reservation as an Indian trader in 1899 and has since lived with these Indians. He is a physician and has practised among them. In 1903 he married a Kiowa woman and in 1909 was adopted as a member of the tribe. His wife received an allotment from the tribal lands in 1900, and some of their children received allotments in 1906 or 1908. 34 Stat. at L. chap. 2580, 6, p. 214; 35 Stat. at L. chap. 216, 24, p. 456. But no allotment had been made to him when the provision of June 17, 1901, was enacted. It was enacted at his solicitation, and the Committees on Indian Affairs in the Senate and House of Representatives, in recommending its repeal, reported that it was enacted in the belief that the tract described was of no greater value than the average of those allotted to other members of the tribe, or than other tracts still subject to allotment, when in truth it was of vastly greater value, and that misrepresentation and deception were practised by Rowell in securing the legislation. Senate Report No. 924 and House Report No. 1741, 61st Cong. 3d Sess. About two years before, the south half of the same section-320 acres-had been sold for town-site purposes under the Act of March 27, 1908, chap. 106, 35 Stat. at L. 49, for upwards of $250,000.
In June, 1911, six months after the date of the repealing act, Rowell entered upon the tract in controversy and since then his remained in possession, although promptly notified, through the Indian agent, that he was a trespasser and must vacate the premises. One of the defendants is Rowell's wife and another is the wife of a lawyer who assisted him in securing the passage of the provision which Congress felt called upon to repeal. She holds a deed from Rowell, made after the date of the repealing act, and purporting to convey to her an undivided one-half interest in the tract for a recited consideration of $50,000. The three defendants had come to be in possession when the action was begun. In the district court [243 U.S. 464, 468] there was a directed verdict and a judgment for the defendants.
In view of the scope of this power, as reflected by over a century of practice and by the decisions of this court, we think it was quite admissible for Congress to give effect to Rowell's status as an adopted member of the tribe, to recognize his claim to an allotment out of the tribal lands, to designate the land which he should receive, and to direct that it be conveyed to him by a patent in fee without awaiting the expiration of the usual trust period of twenty-five years. And if, before that direction was complied with, it was discovered that the land designated was lawfully devoted to a special use from which it could not be withdrawn with due regard for the tribe in general, or that its situation and value were such that to allot or to convey it to him would invest him with much more than a fair distributive share of the common property of the tribe, we think it was equally admissible for Congress [243 U.S. 464, 469] to recall that direction in the interest of the tribe as a whole. At most, that direction was but an exertion of the administrative control of the government over the tribal property of tribal Indians, and was subject to change by Congress at any time before it was carried into effect. Gritts v. Fisher, 224 U.S. 640, 648 , 56 S. L. ed. 928, 933, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 580. If the rule were otherwise and the quarter section upon which the Indian school buildings are situate had been inadvertently designated as the land which he should receive, the situation might have been one of great embarrassment. See United States v. Des Moines Nav. & R. Co. 142 U.S. 510, 544 , 35 S. L. ed. 1099, 1109, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 308; United States v. Old Settlers, 148 U.S. 427, 466 , 37 S. L. ed. 509, 523, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 650; Cooley, Const. Lim. 7th ed. 257-259.
But it is insisted that the provision of June 17, 1910, was a grant in praesenti and operated in itself to pass the full title to Rowell, and therefore that he had a vested right in the land which the repealing act could not affect. If the premise be right the conclusion is obviously so. But is the premise right? Of course, a grant may be made by a law as well as by a patent issued pursuant to a law, but whether a particular law operates in itself as a present grant is always a question of intention. We turn, therefore, to the provision relied upon to ascertain whether it discloses a purpose to make such a grant; that is to say, a purpose to pass the title immediately without awaiting the issue of a patent. We find in it no words of present grant, but only a direction to the Secretary of the Interior 'to issue a patent in fee' to Rowell for the tract described. Only through this express provision for a patent do we learn that a grant is intended, and, if it were eliminated, nothing having any force would remain. This, we think, shows that a present statutory grant was not intended, but only such a grant as would result from the issue of a patent as directed. The cases cited as making for a different conclusion are plainly distinguishable in that they deal with laws or treaties making grants, and [243 U.S. 464, 470] either containing no provision for a patent, or providing for one merely by way of further assurance.
It results that the verdict, instead of being directed for the defendants, should have been directed for the government, as was requested. This requires that the judgment be reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial.
[ Footnote 1 ] Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 174 U.S. 445, 488 , 43 S. L. ed. 1041, 1056, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 722; Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 294, 307 , 47 S. L. ed. 183, 190, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 115; Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 564 , 47 S. L. ed. 299, 305, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 216; Gritts v. Fisher, 224 U.S. 640, 648 , 58 S. L. ed. 928, 933, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 580; Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665, 671 , 56 S. L. ed. 941, 944, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 565; Sizemore v. Brady, 235 U.S. 441, 449 , 59 S. L. ed. 308, 311, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 135.

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