Source: https://openjurist.org/458/us/858
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 06:59:50+00:00

Document:
Respondent was indicted in Federal District Court for transporting one Romero-Morales in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2), which prohibits the knowing transportation of an alien illegally in the United States who last entered the country within three years prior to the date of the transportation. Two other illegal aliens—who, with Romero-Morales, were passengers in the car being driven by respondent and were apprehended with respondent—were deported after an Assistant United States Attorney concluded that they possessed no evidence material to respondent's prosecution. Romero-Morales was detained to provide a nonhearsay basis for establishing that respondent had violated § 1324(a)(2). The District Court denied respondent's motion to dismiss the indictment on the asserted ground that the deportation of the other passengers deprived him of the opportunity to interview them to determine whether they could aid in his defense and thus violated his Fifth Amendment right to due process and his Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process for obtaining witnesses. Following a bench trial respondent was convicted, but the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that although a constitutional violation occurs only when "the alien's testimony could conceivably benefit the defendant," the "conceivable benefit" test was satisfied without requiring the defendant to explain what beneficial evidence would have been provided by the alien—whenever, as here, the deported alien was an eyewitness to the crime.
Respondent, a citizen of Mexico, was indicted in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California for transporting one Romero-Morales in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2). That section generally prohibits the knowing transportation of an alien illegally in the United States who last entered the country within three years prior to the date of the transportation.1 Respondent was found guilty after a bench trial, but his conviction was overturned by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. That court held that the action of the Government in deporting two aliens other than Romero-Morales violated respondent's right under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution to compulsory process, and his right under the Fifth Amendment to due process of law. We granted certiorari in order to review the Court of Appeals' application of these constitutional provisions to this case, 454 U.S. 963, 102 S.Ct. 501, 70 L.Ed.2d 377 (1981),2 and we now reverse.
Following their arrest, respondent and the other passengers were interviewed by criminal investigators. Respondent admitted his illegal entry into the country and explained his reason for not stopping at the checkpoint: "I was bringing the people [and] I already knew I had had it—too late—it was done." App. 27. The three passengers also admitted that they were illegally in the country and each identified respondent as the driver of the car. Id., at 66. An Assistant United States Attorney concluded that the passengers possessed no evidence material to the prosecution or defense of respondent for transporting illegal aliens, and two of the passengers were deported to Mexico. The third, Enrique Romero-Morales, was detained to provide a nonhearsay basis for establishing that respondent had transported an illegal alien in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2).
The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction. The court relied upon the rule, first stated in United States v. Mendez-Rodriguez, 450 F.2d 1 (CA9 1971), that the Government violates the Fifth and Sixth Amendments when it deports alien witnesses before defense counsel has an opportunity to interview them. 647 F.2d 72, 73-75 (1981). Although it stated that a constitutional violation occurs only when "the alien's testimony could conceivably benefit the defendant," id., at 74, the court's application of the "conceivable benefit" test demonstrated that the test will be satisfied whenever the deported aliens were eyewitnesses to the crime.4 Respondent's failure to explain what beneficial evidence would have been provided by the two passengers was thus inapposite, for "the deported aliens were eyewitnesses to, and active participants in, the crime charged, thus establishing a strong possibility that they could have provided material and relevant information concerning the events constituting the crime." Id., at 75. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals held that respondent's motion to dismiss the indictment should have been granted by the District Court.
It simply will not do, therefore, to minimize the Government's dilemma in cases like this with statements such as "[t]he prosecution may not deny access to a witness by hiding him out. See Freeman v. State of Georgia, 599 F.2d 65 (5th Cir. 1979) (police detective concealed location of witness)." Brief for Respondent 35. Congress' immigration policy and the practical considerations discussed above demonstrate that the Government had good reason to deport respondent's passengers once it concluded that they possessed no evidence relevant to the prosecution or the defense of respondent's criminal charge. No onus, in the sense of "hiding out" or "concealing" witnesses, attached to the Government by reason of its discharge of the obligations imposed upon it by Congress; its exercise of these manifold responsibilities is not to be judged by standards which might be appropriate if the Government's only responsibility were to prosecute criminal offenses.
"This is a case where the Government's informer was the sole participant, other than the accused, in the transaction charged. The informer was the only witness in a position to amplify or contradict the testimony of government witnesses. Moreover, a government witness testified that [the informer] denied knowing petitioner or ever having seen him before. We conclude that, under these circumstances, the trial court committed prejudicial error in permitting the Government to withhold the identity of its undercover employee in the face of repeated demands by the accused for his disclosure." 353 U.S., at 64-65, 77 S.Ct., at 630.
Because prompt deportation deprives the defendant of an opportunity to interview the witnesses to determine precisely what favorable evidence they possess, however, the defendant cannot be expected to render a detailed description of their lost testimony. But this does not, as the Court of Appeals concluded, relieve the defendant of the duty to make some showing of materiality. Sanctions may be imposed on the Government for deporting witnesses only if the criminal defendant makes a plausible showing that the testimony of the deported witnesses would have been material and favorable to his defense, in ways not merely cumulative to the testimony of available witnesses. In some cases such a showing may be based upon agreed facts, and will be in the nature of a legal argument rather than a submission of additional facts. In other cases the criminal defendant may advance additional facts, either consistent with facts already known to the court or accompanied by a reasonable explanation for their inconsistency with such facts, with a view to persuading the court that the testimony of a deported witness would have been material and favorable to his defense.9 Because in the latter situation the explanation of materiality is testimonial in nature, and constitutes evidence of the prejudice incurred as a result of the deportation, it should be verified by oath or affirmation of either the defendant or his attorney. See Fed.Rule Evid. 603; Fed.Rule Crim.Proc. 47.
* One cannot discount the importance of the Federal Government's role in the regulation of immigration.1 As the Court points out, Congress and the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the agency authorized to make such policy decisions, have decided that prompt deportation is the appropriate response to the tremendous influx of illegal aliens. Ante, at 864. The Court is also correct that the Federal Government has legitimate reasons for reducing the number of illegal aliens detained for possible use as material witnesses. Particularly because most of the detained aliens are never called to testify, we should be careful not to permit either needless human suffering or excessive burdens on the Federal Government. Under these circumstances, courts should be especially circumspect about interfering with congressional judgments.
The standard I propose is an amalgam of the approaches used by the Fifth and Ninth Circuits.2 As a matter of course, the deportable aliens who are potential witnesses should be detained for a very brief period to afford Government and defense counsel the opportunity to interview them. If, within that period, the defendant requests that certain aliens not be deported, a federal magistrate should hold a hearing to determine whether deportation of any of the witnesses should be deferred until after trial. As evidenced by the statistics provided by the respondent, similar procedures in the Ninth Circuit have produced very little litigation. See Brief for Respondent 30. Of course, the Government could be expected to abide by such a rule, but in the occasional event that it deports alien witnesses without affording the defendant any opportunity to interview them, the defendant should not be entitled to an automatic dismissal of the indictment; nor should the defendant be expected to prove prejudice—after all, the Government has deported his potential witnesses. Instead, I agree with the Court that sanctions should be available against the Government if the defendant sets forth some plausible theory explaining how the deported witnesses would have provided material evidence that was not simply cumulative of evidence readily available to the defendant.
Today's holding flaunts a transparent contradiction. On the one hand, the Court recognizes respondent's constitutional right, under the Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment, to the production of all witnesses whose testimony would be relevant and material to his defense. Ante, at 867-869. But on the other hand, the Court holds that the Government may deport illegal-alien eyewitnesses to respondent's alleged crime immediately upon their apprehension, before respondent or his attorney have had any opportunity to interview them—thus depriving respondent of the surest and most obvious means by which he could establish the materiality and relevance of such witnesses' testimony. Ante, at 872-873. Truly, the Court giveth, and the Court taketh away. But surely a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to interview eyewitnesses to his alleged crime before they are whisked out of the country by his prosecutor. The Court's decision today makes a mockery of that right. Accordingly, I dissent.
"[I]n criminal causes, '. . . the Government can invoke its evidentiary privileges only at the price of letting the defendant go free. The rationale of the criminal cases is that, since the Government which prosecutes an accused also has the duty to see that justice is done, it is unconscionable to allow it to undertake prosecution and then invoke its governmental privileges to deprive the accused of anything which might be material to his defense. . . .' " Id., at 671, 77 S.Ct., at 1014-15, quoting United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 12, 73 S.Ct. 528, 534, 97 L.Ed. 727 (1953).
Of course, the Government's duty to enforce the immigration laws should not be deferred indefinitely. But no inordinate delay is necessary in cases such as the one before us. The Southern District of California long ago adopted a procedure to enforce the Mendez-Rodriguez doctrine announced by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in 1971.2 The Southern District's procedure represents a practical and sensitive accommodation between a criminal defendant's constitutional rights under the Compulsory Process Clause and the Government's policy of prompt deportation of illegal aliens. Under that procedure, illegal-alien eyewitnesses are held in custody for a short period of time—about 10 days—after appointment of counsel for the criminal defendant. At the end of that period, the United States magistrate holds a material witness bail review hearing, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3149. In the intervening time, counsel for the defendant may interview the witnesses, and determine whether they can provide testimony material to the defense. At the hearing, both prosecution and defense are required to show the materiality of each of the detained witnesses, or they are released and deported. Brief for Respondent 6-7; Brief for United States 13-14, 18. If this traditional Southern District procedure had been adhered to in the present case, the Government would have clearly discharged its constitutional obligation to afford respondent an opportunity to develop evidence bearing upon the materiality of the testimony of the witnesses to his alleged offense. In contrast, the Court permits the Government to adopt a wholly unilateral procedure that deprives respondent and future criminal defendants of any such opportunity.
The Court suggests that a criminal defendant should be able to "demonstrate either the presence or absence of the required materiality" even without having had an opportunity to interview the detained eyewitnesses. Ante, at 871. But this notion has been flatly rejected by our precedents. Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 77 S.Ct. 623, 1 L.Ed.2d 639 (1957), denied the Government's claimed privilege to withhold the identity of its informer, "John Doe," from the petitioner.3 Roviaro, like respondent in the present case, was "present throughout the commission of this crime." Ante, at 871; see 353 U.S., at 64 ("So far as [Roviaro] knew, he and John Doe were alone and unobserved during the crucial occurrence for which he was indicted"). But the Court in Roviaro refused to say, as the Court does today, that a criminal defendant "can establish no Sixth Amendment violation without making some plausible explanation of the assistance he would have received from the testimony" that he seeks. Ante, at 871. Rather, the Court in Roviaro required disclosure simply because John Doe's testimony "might have been helpful to the defense." 353 U.S., at 63-64, 77 S.Ct., at 629 (emphasis added).
"Doe had helped to set up the criminal occurrence and had played a prominent part in it. His testimony might have disclosed an entrapment. He might have thrown doubt upon petitioner's identity or the identity of the package [of heroin]. He was the only witness who might have testified to petitioner's possible lack of knowledge of the contents of the package that he 'transported' . . . to John Doe's car. The desirability of calling John Doe as a witness, or at least interviewing him in preparation for trial, was a matter for the accused rather than the Government to decide." Id., at 64, 77 S.Ct., at 629 (emphasis added).
Like Doe in Roviaro, the illegal aliens deported by the Government in the present case "played a prominent part" in respondent's alleged offense—if, indeed, they did not help to set it up without the knowledge of respondent. And they, like Doe, might have testified to respondent's "possible lack of knowledge" respecting essential elements of the crime charged against him.4 Under Roviaro, respondent, not the Government, was entitled to decide whether or not the illegal-alien eyewitnesses in this case could give testimony material and relevant to the defense.
In order to obtain a conviction under 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2), quoted ante, at 860, n. 1, the Government was required to show (1) that respondent transported an alien within the United States, (2) that the alien had not been lawfully admitted or was not lawfully entitled to enter, (3) that this was known to respondent, (4) that respondent knew that the alien's last entry was within three years, and (5) that respondent acted willfully in furtherance of the alien's violation of the law. United States v. Gonzalez-Hernandez, 534 F.2d 1353, 1354 (CA9 1976). Since the third and fourth elements of this statutory requirement bear upon respondent's state of mind, it is plain that the illegal aliens whom respondent was transporting might very well have been able to testify to his lack of knowledge on these critical points.

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