Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=83172:57143&catid=1584&Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 10:15:31+00:00

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G.R. No. 179962, June 11, 2014 - DR. JOEL C. MENDEZ, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND COURT OF TAX APPEALS, Respondents.
DR. JOEL C. MENDEZ, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND COURT OF TAX APPEALS, Respondents.
Before the Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 651 filed by Dr. Joel C. Mendez (petitioner) assailing the June 12, 2007 and August 13, 2007 resolutions2 of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA).3 The assailed resolutions granted the prosecution’s Motion to Amend Information with Leave of Court and denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
That on or about the 15th day of April, 2002, at Quezon City, and within the jurisdiction of [the CTA] the above named accused, a duly registered taxpayer, and sole proprietor of “Weigh Less Center” with principal office at No. 31 Roces Avenue, Quezon City, and with several branches in Quezon City, Makati, San Fernando and Dagupan City, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously fail to file his Income Tax Return (ITR) with the Bureau of Internal Revenue for the taxable year 2001, to the damage and prejudice of the Government in the estimated amount of P1,089,439.08, exclusive of penalties, surcharges and interest.
the change in the name of his business to include the phrase “Mendez Medical Group” does not alter the fact the [petitioner] is being charged with failure to file his Income Tax Return... The change in the branches of his business, likewise did not relieve [the petitioner] of his duty to file an ITR. In addition, the places where the accused conducts business does not affect the Court’s jurisdiction... nor ... change the nature of the offense charged, as only one [ITR] is demanded of every taxpayer. We likewise see no substantial difference on the information with the insertion of the phrase ‘for income earned’ for it merely stated the normal subject matter found in every income tax return.
The petitioner claims in his petition that the prosecution’s amendment is a substantial amendment prohibited under Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. It is substantial in nature because its additional allegations alter the prosecution’s theory of the case so as to cause surprise to him and affect the form of his defense.18 Thus, he was not properly informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
Adopting the observation of a dissenting CTA justice, he claims that to change the allegation on the locations of his business from San Fernando, Pampanga and Dagupan City to Muntinlupa and Mandaluyong cities would cause surprise to him on the form of defense he would have to assume.
The respondents claim that the petitioner availed of the wrong remedy in questioning the CTA resolutions. Under Rule 9, Section 9 of the Revised Rules of CTA, the remedy of appeal to the CTA en banc is the proper remedy, to be availed of within fifteen days from receipt of the assailed resolution. The filing of the present petition was clearly a substitute for a lost appeal.
Contrary to the petitioner’s contention, the preparation of the defense contemplated in the law does not strictly include the presentation of evidence during the preliminary investigation because this stage is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties’ evidence.
Is the remedy of certiorari proper?
Whether the prosecution’s amendments made after the petitioner’s arraignment are substantial in nature and must perforce be denied?
We resolve to dismiss the petition.
The petitioner correctly availed of the remedy of certiorari. Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, certiorari is available when there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. After failing in his bid for the CTA to reconsider its admission of the amended information, the only remedy left to the petitioner is to file a petition for certiorari with this Court.
Contrary to the prosecution’s argument, the remedy of appeal to the CTA en banc is not available to the petitioner. In determining the appropriate remedy or remedies available, a party aggrieved by a court order, resolution or decision must first correctly identify the nature of the order, resolution or decision he intends to assail. What Section 9 Rule 922 of the Rules of the CTA provides is that appeal to the CTA en banc may be taken from a decision or resolution of the CTA division in criminal cases by filing a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. Under Section 1, Rule 43, the remedy of a petition for review is available only against a judgments or a final order.
A judgment or order is considered final if it disposes of the action or proceeding completely, or terminates a particular stage of the same action; in such case, the remedy available to an aggrieved party is appeal. If the order or resolution, however, merely resolves incidental matters and leaves something more to be done to resolve the merits of the case, as in the present case, the order is interlocutory and the aggrieved party’s only remedy after failing to obtain a reconsideration of the ruling is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
Nonetheless, while we rule that the petitioner availed of the correct remedy, we resolve to dismiss the petition for failure to establish that the CTA abused its discretion, much less gravely abused its discretion.
Amendment or substitution. — A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.
There is no precise definition of what constitutes a substantial amendment. According to jurisprudence, substantial matters in the complaint or information consist of the recital of facts constituting the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the court.23 Under Section 14, however, the prosecution is given the right to amend the information, regardless of the nature of the amendment, so long as the amendment is sought before the accused enters his plea, subject to the qualification under the second paragraph of Section 14.
Once the accused is arraigned and enters his plea, however, Section 14 prohibits the prosecution from seeking a substantial amendment, particularly mentioning those that may prejudice the rights of the accused.24 One of these rights is the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him, a right which is given life during the arraignment of the accused of the charge of against him. The theory in law is that since the accused officially begins to prepare his defense against the accusation on the basis of the recitals in the information read to him during arraignment, then the prosecution must establish its case on the basis of the same information.
To illustrate these points, in Almeda v. Judge Villaluz,25 the prosecution wanted to additionally alleged recidivism and habitual delinquency in the original information. In allowing the amendment, the Court observed that the amendment sought relate only to the range of the penalty that the court might impose in the event of conviction. Since they do not have the effect of charging an offense different from the one charged (qualified theft of a motor vehicle) in the information, nor do they tend to correct any defect in the trial court’s jurisdiction over the subject-matter, the amendment sought is merely formal.
In Teehankee, Jr. v. Madayag,26 the prosecution sought during trial to amend the information from frustrated to consummated murder since the victim died after the information for frustrated murder was filed. The accused refused to be arraigned under the amended information without the conduct of a new preliminary investigation. In sustaining the admission of the amended information, the Court reasoned that the additional allegation, that is, the supervening fact of the death of the victim was merely supplied to aid the trial court in determining the proper penalty for the crime. Again, there is no change in the nature of offense charged; nor is there a change in the prosecution’s theory that the accused committed a felonious act with intent to kill the victim; nor does the amendment affect whatever defense the accused originally may have.
In short, amendments that do not charge another offense different from that charged in the original one;27 or do not alter the prosecution's theory of the case so as to cause surprise to the accused and affect the form of defense he has or will assume are considered merely as formal amendments.
In the present case, the amendments sought by the prosecution pertains to (i) the alleged change in the date in the commission of the crime from 2001 to 2002; (ii) the addition of the phrase “doing business under the name and style of Mendez Medical Group;” (iii) the change and/or addition of the branches of petitioner’s operation; and (iv) the addition of the phrase “for income earned.” We cannot see how these amendments would adversely affect any substantial right of the petitioner as accused.
At the outset we note that the actual year of the commission of the offense has escaped both the petitioner and prosecution. In its Motion to Amend the Information, the prosecution mistakenly stated that the information it originally filed alleged the commission of the offense as “on or about the 15th day of April, 2001” – even if the record is clear that that the actual year of commission alleged is 2002. The petitioner makes a similar erroneous allegation in its petition before the Court.
Interestingly, in its August 13, 2007 resolution, denying the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, the CTA implicitly ruled that there was in fact no amendment of the date in the information by correctly citing what the original information alleges. This, notwithstanding, the petitioner still baselessly belaboured the point in its present petition by citing the erroneous content of the prosecution’s motion to amend instead of the original information itself.28 This kind of legal advocacy obviously added nothing but confusion to what is otherwise a simple case and another docket to the High Court’s overwhelming caseload.
That the actual date of the commission of the offense pertains to the year 2002 is only consistent with the allegation in the information on the taxable year it covers, i.e., for the taxable year 2001. Since the information alleges that petitioner failed to file his income tax return for the taxable year 2001, then the offense could only possibly be committed when petitioner failed to file his income tax return before the due date of filing, which is on April of the succeeding year, 2002.
Accordingly, the addition of the phrase “for the income earned” before the phrase “for the taxable year 2001” cannot but be a mere formal amendment since the added phrase merely states with additional precision something that is already contained in the original information, i.e., the income tax return is required to be filed precisely for the income earned for the preceding taxable year.
Since the petitioner operates as a sole proprietor from taxable years 2001 to 2003, the petitioner should have filed a consolidated return in his principal place of business, regardless of the number and location of his other branches. Consequently, we cannot but agree with the CTA that the change and/or addition of the branches of the petitioner’s operation in the information does not constitute substantial amendment because it does not change the prosecution’s theory that the petitioner failed to file his income tax return.
Still, the petitioner cites the case of Matalam v. Sandiganbayan, Second Division31 in claiming that the deletion of San Fernando (Pampanga City) and Dagupan City deprives him of the defenses he raised in his counter-affidavit.
The accused moved to dismiss the amended information for charging an entirely new cause of action and asked for preliminary investigation on this new charge of illegal dismissal.
The inapplicability of Matalam to the present case is obvious. Here, the prosecution’s theory of the case, i.e., that petitioner failed to file his income tax return for the taxable year 2001 did not change. The prosecution’s cause for filing an information remained the same as the cause in the original and in the amended information. For emphasis, the prosecution’s evidence during the preliminary investigation of the case shows that petitioner did not file his income tax return in his place of legal residence37 or principal place of business in Quezon City or with the Commissioner. In short, the amendment sought did not alter the crime charged.
At first, a change in the location of branches alleged in the information may appear to deprive the petitioner of his defense in the original information, i.e., the petitioner’s branches in Dagupan and San Fernando were registered only in 2003 and were therefore “inexistent” in 2001. However, this is not the kind of defense contemplated under the Rules of Criminal Procedure, and broadly under the due process of law.
Contrary to the petitioner’s claim, the opportunity given to the accused to present his defense evidence during the preliminary investigation is not exhaustive. In the same manner that the complainant’s evidence during preliminary investigation is only required to establish the minimal evidentiary threshold of probable cause, the evidence that the respondent may present during trial is not limited to what he had presented during the preliminary investigation, so long as the evidence for both parties supports or negates the elements of the offense charged.
In the present case, this thread remained consistently under the amended information, alleging the petitioner’s failure to file his return and consequently to pay the correct amount of taxes. Accordingly, the petitioner could not have been surprised at all.
In the amended information, the prosecution additionally alleged that petitioner is “doing business under the name and style of ‘Weigh Less Center’/Mendez Medical Group.’” Given the nature of a sole proprietorship, the addition of the phrase “doing business under the name and style” is merely descriptive of the nature of the business organization established by the petitioner as a way to carry out the practice of his profession. As a phrase descriptive of a sole proprietorship, the petitioner cannot feign ignorance of the “entity” “Mendez Medical Group” because this entity is nothing more than the shadow of its business owner – petitioner himself.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DISMISS the petition for lack of merit, with costs against the petitioner.
Carpio, (Chairperson), Velasco, Jr.,*Del Castillo, and Perez, JJ., concur.
* Designated as additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe per Raffle dated June 9, 2014.
1 Under the Rules of Court.
2Rollo, pp. 23-27 and 33-36, respectively.
3 In CTA Crim. Case No. 0-014.
8 Sections 254, 255, 257, and 267, in relation with Sections 51(A)(1)(a), 56(a)(1) and 74(A) of the NIRC.
9 Dated October 10, 2005, Records, Vol. 1 p. 1. Two other informations were filed against the petitioner based on the same facts docketed as C.T.A. CRIM. NOS. 0-013 & 0-015.
11 The CTA initially dismissed without prejudice the information for lack of probable cause (Id. at 167-173) but on motion for reconsideration, the CTA (id. at 190-214) CTA reinstated the information on August 22, 2006 (id. at 271-273).
13Rollo, pp. 54-56; Id. at 484-486.
15 Id. at 492-496, with Justice Caesar Cassanova Dissented, pp. 497-501.
18 Citing in petitioner’s Reply Matalam v. The 2nd Division of the Sandiganbayan, 495 Phil. 664 , 675 (2005).
19 Citing in his Reply, People v. Labatete, 107 Phil. 697 (1960).
20 Memorandum; rollo, p. 133.
21 Citing People v. Casey (1958).
(b) An appeal to the Court en banc in criminal cases decided by the Court in Division shall be taken by filing a petition for review as provided in Rule 43 of the Rules of Court within fifteen days from receipt of a copy of the decision or resolution appealed from. The Court may, for good cause, extend the time for filing of the petition for review for an additional period not exceeding fifteen days.
23Almeda v. Judge Villaluz, 160 Phil. 750, 757 (1975).
24 See People v. Hon. Montenegro, 242 Phil. 655, 661 (1988).
25 160 Phil. 750 (1975).
26 G.R. No. 103102, March 6, 1992, 207 SCRA 134.
27Guinto v. Veluz, 77 Phil. 801 (1946).
29 Section 51 A 1(a), 2(a) and 4(a).
31 G.R. No. 165751, April 12, 2005, 455 SCRA 736.
34 Citing 2 CJS Sec. 240, pp. 1249-1250.
35 In Montenegro, the accused were charged with “robbery” as accessories after the fact. The prosecution sought to amend the information to (i) charge “robbery in an uninhabited place” instead; and (ii) delete all items and articles allegedly stolen in the original information and substituting them with a different set of items. The Court disallowed the amendment for being substantial. The Court said that changing the items affects the essence of the imputed crime, and would deprive the accused of the opportunity to meet all the allegations in the amended information, in the preparation of their defenses to the charge filed against them. In this case, in fact, the principal in the crime of robbery had been earlier convicted for taking the same items alleged in the information against the accused.
36 The Court took into account the fact that the first cause of action is related to, and arose from, the second cause of action as this circumstance would ordinarily negate the need for a new preliminary investigation. However, since it was not shown that the accused had already touched the issue of evident bad faith or manifest partiality in the preliminary investigation as to the alleged illegal dismissal, the Court ordered that the accused be given opportunity to thoroughly adduce evidence on the matter.
37 Per petitioner’s own petition, he indicated his address as follows: No. 31-G Roces Avenue, Quezon City.
38People v. Casey, No. L-30146, February 24, 1981, 103 SCRA 21.
39Juasing Hardware v. Hon. Mendoza, etc., et al., 201 Phil. 369 (1982); and Mangila v. Court of Appeals, 435 Phil. 870 (2002).
40 Records, Volume 1, pp. 144-149. In fact, in the certification issued by the Philippine Star in connection with petitioner’s paid advertisements, it confirmed the prosecution’s position when it stated that petitioner requested it “to advertise his businesses in the names of Weighless Center/Body and Face by Mendez/Mendez Medical Group” (Id. at 219).

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