Source: http://www.janmeyerlaw.com/njliquorliability/
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 17:48:39+00:00

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For information on New York liquor liability laws, please click here. Please also visit our Guide to Recovery of PIP in New Jersey and Guide to Recovery of PIP in New York which also feature other selected laws related to subrogation.
Please note that this document is provided as a reference guide only and is provided subject to this disclaimer.
Originally, common law did not recognize a cause of action by an injured person against anyone who provided alcohol to the person who eventually caused an injury. For instance, a person injured by a drunk driver could not sue the bar that sold the alcohol to the drunk driver. However, over time, courts, including New Jersey courts, developed grounds for liability where one negligently provided alcohol, which contributed to a person's injuries.. Eventually, the New Jersey legislature pulled back on the reigns by crafting "Dram Shop" and "Social Host" statutes that delineate the basis of liability for providing alcohol in certain situations. As the New Jersey Supreme Court explained, the Dram Shop statute was, "carefully crafted to balance both the needs of licensed alcoholic beverage servers to secure affordable insurance and the rights of victims to recover for the negligent service of alcohol." Mazzacano v. Estate of Kinnerman, 197 N.J. 307, 322 (2009). Somewhat similarly, the Social Host statute was designed to "establish for social hosts who serve alcoholic beverages a clear, statutory standard of liability that cannot be expanded or limited except by the Legislature itself." Senate Law, Public Safety & Defense Committee, Statement to Senate Committee Substitute for Senate Bill Nos. 1152 and 545--L.1987, c. 404 (March 6, 1986) quoted in Dower v. Gamba, 276 N.J. Super. 319, 325 (App.Div. 1994). An outline of New Jersey's liquor liability laws follows.
Both the Dram Shop and Social Host statutes provide that they are the "exclusive civil remedy" for service/provision of alcohol by dram shops/social hosts.
Proving whether a person was visibly intoxicated when served/provided alcohol.
"Serving/Providing" alcohol does not necessarily mean handing the alcohol directly to the intoxicated person.
A social host serving an adult may only be liable for injuries resulting from a motor vehicle accident, while a dram shop may be liable for injuries resulting from other mechanisms (e.g. assaults perpetrated by the intoxicated individual).
A dram shop may be liable for injuries to the intoxicated person, while a social host may not be liable for injuries to the intoxicated adult.
Notes on joint tortfeasors, contribution, and comparative negligence.
Liability for DWI (or other dangerous activity) by other individuals.
No-fault (AKA) PIP and social host/dram shop liability.
Homeowner's policies and social host liability claims.
The licensed server served a visibly intoxicated person or served a minor where the server knew or should have known that the person is a minor.
Note that the only relevant question as to service of alcohol is whether a visibly intoxicated person or a minor was served (this can be proven through circumstantial evidence, see bleow section regarding proving whether a person was visibly intoxicated when served/provided alcohol). The fact that this is the sole basis for recovery grows out of the "exclusive remedy" provision discussed further below. For instance, Mazzacano v. Estate of Kinnerman, 197 N.J. 307 (2009) rejected liability on the basis of a failure to monitor alcohol consumption where alcohol was provided on a "self-service" basis (the relevant question was whether the person procured alcohol from the self-service station while visibly intoxicated). It is not relevant whether the service of alcohol violated any state law or regulation. Fisch v. Bellshot, 135 N.J. 374, 383 (1994). It is also not relevant whether the dram shop's employees were properly trained or supervised, Truchan v. Sayreville Bar and Restaurant, Inc., 323 N.J. Super. 40, 52-53 (App.Div. 1999), or whether witnesses saw other people being served while visibly intoxicated. See Verni ex rel. Burstein v. Harry M. Stevens, Inc., 387 N.J. Super. 160, 188-193 (App.Div. 2006) certif. den. 189 N.J. 429 (2007). In fact, although rules of evidence are quite case-specific, any such evidence may not even be admissible to demonstrate that it is more likely that the person in question was served while visibly intoxicated. See Id. Similarly, evidence of a dram shop's tendency to serve patrons who are visibly intoxicated or minors is not likely to be admissible to prove that a particular person was served. See id., Showalter v. Barilari, Inc., 312 N.J. Super. 494, 512-513 (App.Div.1998).
The injury or damage was "proximately caused" by this service of alcohol.
The injury or damage was the "foreseeable consequence of" this service of alcohol.
The social host “willfully and knowingly” provided alcohol to someone who was visibly intoxicated in his/her presence or if the person was not visibly intoxicated in the presence of the host, the host provided alcohol to a visibly intoxicated person “under circumstances manifesting reckless disregard of the consequences as affecting the life or property of another.” Note that if the person in question was tested at a blood alcohol of less than .10% there is an irrebuttable presumption that the social host does not meet this prong of the test. If the person tests between .10%-.15%, there is a rebuttable presumption that the social host does not meet this prong of the test (no presumptions are prescribed by the statute where the test is over .15%).
The social host provided the alcohol to the visibly intoxicated person "under circumstances which created an unreasonable risk of foreseeable harm to the life or property of another, and the social host failed to exercise reasonable care and diligence to avoid the foreseeable risk."
The injury arose out of "an accident caused by the negligent operation of a vehicle by the visibly intoxicated person who was provided alcoholic beverages by a social host."
Note that the Social Host statute does not address service of alcohol to minors. This is evident from the fact that N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.5 defines a social host as one who provided alcohol to a person of legal age and from the fact that N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.6 states that it is the exclusive civil remedy for the provision of alcohol to a person of age. As the New Jersey Supreme Court observed, this means that, "the Legislature specifically preserved full common-law liability of social hosts for damages caused by minors to others and even to themselves." Steele v. Kerrigan, 148 N.J. 1, 29 (1997)(dicta)(citations omitted) see further Camp v. Lummino, 352 N.J. Super. 414, 417 (App.Div. 2002) quoting Governor's Reconsideration and Recommendation Statement to S 1152 and 545, L. 1987, c. 404 ("The legislative history further indicates that the bill [was] not intended to affect the [then] current law regarding social hosts who serve individuals under the legal age to purchase and consume alcoholic beverages.").
Both the Dram Shop and Social Host statutes provide that they are the "exclusive civil remedy" for service/provision of alcohol by dram shops/social hosts. N.J.S.A. 2A:22A-4 (text available from Justia here - opens in new tab), N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.6(a). The import of these statements is not entirely clear. It clearly means that a dram shop/social host cannot be held liable for any other form of negligent service/provision of alcohol. See discussion above regarding the standard for dram shop liability. However, it is not clear whether a dram shop/social host can be held liable if it is negligent toward the person who caused the injury in some other manner unrelated to serving/providing the alcohol. For instance, if a bar serves alcohol to a sober patron who becomes inebriated and then stumbles out of the bar into his car and then gets into an accident, can the dram shop be held liable? The New Jersey courts came closest to answering this question in Bauer v. Nesbitt, 198 N.J. 601 (2009). In Bauer, the Court emphasized that the intoxicated person in question had not been served any alcohol at the bar and that, therefore, they would not impose a duty to monitor a person not served alcohol. However, the court also stated that its decision "in no way weakens" prior precedent requiring businesses, "to provide a safe environment" to the people they invite onto their premises." Id. at 615. The Court referenced out-of-state cases where courts found bars liable for failure to protect an intoxicated patron and stated that, "[w]e do not consider here whether a licensed alcoholic beverage server, who does not serve a patron a drink, would have a duty to act in those circumstances or whether the Dram Shop Act would offer a shield of immunity." Id. at 616.
Some language in Bauer does suggest that the New Jersey Supreme Court would not look kindly on claims for alternative bases for dram shop/social host liability. The Court wrote that "to permit a negligent-supervision cause of action to proceed in this case would fly in the face of the liability limits that the Legislature put in place in the Dram Shop Act." Id. at 613. On the other hand, the question of supervising a person who is served/provided alcohol was not before the Court in Bauer, and the court expressed particular consternation toward finding liability where the person "ate nothing more than chicken wings on the premises," and stated that, "[i]t is one thing . . . to be accountable for serving a visibly intoxicated patron an alcoholic beverage, it is another thing to serve that same person a Coca-Cola and still be responsible for his conduct once he leaves the premises[,]" id., suggesting that the case might have turned out differently had the intoxicated person been served any alcohol by the dram shop.
Truchan v. Sayreville Bar and Restaurant, Inc., 323 N.J. Super. 40, 52-53 (App.Div. 1999) may also provide some guidance on this question. The case involved a victim who was struck by a drunk driver. The Appellate Division affirmed dismissal of counts in the Plaintiff's complaint that included wrongful hiring, wrongful supervision of employees, failure to identify patrons at risk to become intoxicated, and "inappropriate exercise of the obligation to maintain the tavern premises as a safe environment after completion of actual service of alcoholic beverages." The Appellate Division agreed that, "some common law causes of action survive the Act." However, the court dismissed these counts, including the count related to maintaining a safe environment after serving alcohol because, "as best we can discern from this record, the common law claims plaintiff sought to assert against the Sayreville Bar all arose out of, and were related to, the negligent service of alcoholic beverages and are therefore barred by the exclusivity provisions of the Act." Id. at 53 (citations omitted). The Appellate Division did not explain further what forms of failure to maintain a safe environment after service of alcohol would be sufficiently separated from the service of alcohol so as to survive the Dram Shop Act's exclusivity provision.
Note that to the extent that the exclusivity provision limits a social host's liability for negligence not related to the providing of the alcohol, such restrictions would likely not apply to a social host's negligence regarding minors, because, as discussed above, the Social Host statute does not address service of alcohol to minors.
Proving whether a person was visibly intoxicated when served/provided alcohol can be difficult. Eyewitness testimony or photographic/video evidence to this effect can be highly effective. Therefore, interviews and investigations should involve attempting to find some eyewitness or video evidence. However, eyewitness testimony is not required and circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to prove visible intoxication. Halvorsen v. Villamil, 429 N.J. Super. 568 (App.Div. 2013). If blood alcohol testing was performed, the results can be very important, especially in social host cases where the test may lead to a rebuttable or irrebuttable presumption that the person was not visibly intoxicated as discussed above. Note that Halvorsen stated "[w]e do not conclude that" a doctor's toxicology report "alone creates a genuine issue of material fact on the visible intoxication issue," id. at 579, noting that the opinion was bolstered by the facts that the intoxicated person "only drank alcoholic beverages at" the bar in question, "the short time period between [the intoxicated person's] leaving [the bar] and his erratic driving," the intoxicated person "telling paramedics he felt no pain despite sustaining serious injuries" as well as the intoxicated person's blood alcohol content. Id. On the other hand, Halvorsen does not explicitly state that it would be impossible to have a case where a toxicology report would be sufficient on its own.
In this case, the trial court correctly instructed the jurors that if "the Happy Hour Social & Athletic Club of Maple Shade allowed Mr. Kinnerman to consume alcoholic beverages when he was visibly intoxicated, then you must find the [Club] was negligent." The Legislature did not intend that a licensed alcoholic beverage server would benefit from willful blindness by hosting a party that permits the self-service of alcohol. For purposes of N.J.S.A. 2A:22A-5(b), a licensed alcoholic beverage server that places at the disposal of its patrons a "beer truck" for the self-service of alcohol is serving alcohol within the intendment of the statute. See Dower v. Gamba, 276 N.J. Super. 319, 326 (App.Div.1994), certif. denied, 140 N.J. 276, (1995) ("[W]e have no doubt that a commercial server who provides alcohol to a customer by a means other than direct service may nonetheless be liable under N.J.S.A. 2A:22A-5b, notwithstanding the use of the term 'serve' in the statute."). Thus, if a licensed alcoholic beverage server serves alcohol in this manner to a visibly-intoxicated person, it is acting negligently and is exposed to civil liability.
A social host serving an adult may only be liable for injuries resulting from a motor vehicle accident, while a dram shop may be liable for injuries resulting from other mechanisms (e.g. assaults perpetrated by the intoxicated individual). The Dram Shop statute states that one can recover damages from the dram shop if the injuries were "proximately caused by" and a "foreseeable consequence of" the negligent service of alcohol. N.J.S.A. 2A:22A-5(a)(3)-(4). The Social Host statute states that one can recover damages from the social host if the injuries "arose out of an accident caused by the negligent operation of a vehicle." Thus, the victim of an assault perpetrated by someone who is served alcohol by a dram shop has a cause of action under the Dram Shop statute. See Steele v. Kerrigan, 148 N.J. 1, 22 (1997)("The Licensed Server Liability Act itself does not distinguish between damages caused by intentional torts and damages caused by negligent acts."). On the other hand, a claim may not be made under the Social Host statute for injuries other than those arising from a motor vehicle accident. Componile v. Maybee, 273 N.J. Super. 402 (Law Div. 1994). This statutory restriction would not apply to situations where the intoxicated person is a minor, since, as discussed above, the Social Host statute does not address service of alcohol to minors. However, it is not clear that New Jersey common law would recognize a claim for injuries resulting from an intoxicated minor unrelated to a motor vehicle accident. Prior to the passage of the Dram Shop and Social Host statutes, Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538, 559 (1984) clearly indicated that social host liability was limited to car accidents, and was subsequently followed by Griesenbeck v. Walker, 199 N.J. Super. 132 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 101 N.J. 264, (1985) cited with approval in Steele v. Kerrigan, 148 N.J. 1, 24-25 (1997) which rejected a social host claim predicated on an intoxicated adult's negligently causing a fire. However, neither Kelly nor Griensbeck involved service of alcohol to a minor by a social host (interestingly, in Finney v. Ren-Bar, Inc., 229 N.J. Super. 295, 302-303 (App.Div. 1988) the Appellate Division found that a claim predicated on a fire could lie against a dram shop serving alcohol to a minor). A.B. v. Johnson, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136780 (D.N.J. Dec. 23, 2010) accepted possible liability for service to a minor causing that minor to become a victim of sexual assault. However, this unpublished decision does not address Kelly.
A dram shop may be liable for injuries to the intoxicated person, while a social host may not be liable for injuries to the intoxicated adult. Voss v. Tranquilino, 206 N.J. 93 (2011) holds that an intoxicated driver may sue a dram shop that served him or her alcohol. N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.7 (text available from Justia here - opens in new tab) explicitly states that a person of drinking age cannot sue a social host for injuries resulting from providing alcohol to that person. Steele v. Kerrigan, 148 N.J. 1, 29 (1997), which is actually a case dealing with dram shop liability noted that in enacting the Social Host statute, "the Legislature specifically preserved full common-law liability of social hosts for damages caused by minors to others and even to themselves." (Citations omitted). Camp v. Lummino, 352 N.J. Super. 414 (App.Div. 2002) specifically held that an underage drinker can sue social host. For further discussion, see section above, noting that the Social Host statute does not address service of alcohol to minors.
Notes on joint tortfeasors, contribution, and comparative negligence: In general, New Jersey tort law applies a modified form of comparative negligence and joint and several liability as discussed on our web page discussing New Jersey PIP recovery and other laws related to subrogation in New Jersey (click here for discussion of comparative negligence and here for discussion of joint and several liability. The links will open up in a separate tab and the discussion will appear in the bottom frame). In situations governed by the Dram Shop or Social Host statutes, a number of important clarifications apply.
Dram shops and social hosts cannot be held liable for more then their percentage of fault (except, perhaps, a social host providing alcohol to someone who is under age). Both the Dram Shop law, at N.J.S.A. 2A:22A-6, and the Social Host law, at N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.8 specify that a party held liable under those statutes "shall be responsible for no more than that percentage share of the damages which is equal to the percentage of negligence attributable to" the dram shop/social host. Thus, a dram shop/social host held to be 75% at fault for an incident may only be held liable for 75% of the damages. As discussed above, the Social Host statute does not address service of alcohol to minors, and therefore this restriction likely does not apply to social hosts who provide alcohol to minors.
[O]nce a jury determines that a tavern continued to serve drinks to a visibly-intoxicated patron, the jury should not be instructed, absent exceptional circumstances, to determine the extent to which the patron retained some capacity to appreciate the risk of engaging in the activity that led to the accident. If a tavern serves alcohol to a visibly-intoxicated patron, a court will ordinarily presume the patron's lack of capacity to evaluate the ensuing risks.
If, as here, the driver has been served alcohol by the tavern when visibly intoxicated, the jury may allocate the fault involved in the negligent operation of the vehicle between the patron-driver and the tavern based on the jury's qualitative evaluation of all of the evidence bearing on the extent to which the respective conduct of the patron-driver and the tavern contributed to the negligent operation of the vehicle. In making that allocation, the jury may consider the patron-driver's conduct in becoming voluntarily intoxicated, the extent of the tavern's misconduct in continuing to serve the patron-driver, and the specific evidence relating only to the nature and circumstances of the negligent operation of the vehicle.
Id. at 185-186. In other words, the intoxicated person's capacity to appreciate the risk of driving a car or being a passenger with someone who is intoxicated may not be considered, however, the negligent manner in which the car was driven as well as the intoxicated person's level of fault in getting intoxicated may be considered.
In Fisch v. Bellshot, 135 N.J. 374, 390-391 (1994) the exceptional circumstance was that the intoxicated person was a bartender who served herself despite "her obligation not to drink at all while on duty" and who had "been trained in alcohol management and knew, more so than the average patron, the signs and ramifications of intoxication. Such training as well as her occupational experience had equipped decedent with an increased ability to assess the progression of intoxication and to understand the debilitating effect of excessive drinking."
[W]e do not believe that the assaultive patron is entitled to a presumption that he did not have the capacity to appreciate or control his own actions after being negligently served by the tavern. Such a presumption would, in the case of assaultive patrons, interfere with the jury's ability to focus properly on issues of foreseeability and causation in apportioning fault. Rather, the jury should be instructed to consider the patron's capacity to initiate or refrain from volitional assaultive conduct, as well as all other relevant evidence.
In Showalter v. Barilari, Inc., 312 N.J. Super. 494 (App. Div. 1998) the Steele rationale was extended to a situation where an intoxicated person punched out a window.
Liability for DWI (or other dangerous activity) by other individuals.A person may be liable for the drunk driving (or, presumably, other dangerous activity related to alcohol) of others where a special relationsip exists or where the person actively encouraged the person's dangerous activity. See Champion ex rel. Ezzo v. Dunfee, 398 N.J. Super. 112 (App.Div. 2008). Note that in Lombardo v. Hoag, 269 N.J. Super. 36 (App.Div. 1993) the court refused to apply such liability to a defendant who had been driving a vehicle and subsequently returned the keys to its intoxicated owner.
Dram shops (and presumably social hosts) can be liable for reimbursement of no-fault (AKA "PIP") benefits to the insurer of injured parties. See our discussion of this point on our web page discussing New Jersey PIP recovery and other laws related to subrogation in New Jersey (the discussion will appear in the bottom frame of the screen).
A homeowner's policy's restriction from coverage for liability arising from the use or operation of a motor vehicle will not exclude coverage for social host liability for service of alcohol even though this liability results particularly from the fact of a subsequent motor vehicle accident, since the liability arises from the provision of alcohol and not from the operation of the motor vehicle. Salem Group v. Oliver, 128 N.J. 1 (1992).

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