Source: https://www.morelaw.com/verdicts/case.asp?n=17-2033&s=MA&d=125581
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 15:58:20+00:00

Document:
explaining her decision not to nominate Heagney for the position.
At trial, the jury found for Heagney on both claims.
Firearms ("ATF"), where he had been employed since 2001.
where he had worked from 1985 to 1987.
2014 announcing her decision to nominate him for the position.
firm that Fitchburg had hired to assist in the selection process.
"[h]e has lost Mayor Wong's support."
from the ATF and the Falmouth and Attleboro Police Departments.
a dangerous weapon ended in Heagney's acquittal.
appear in court for a trial.
in which no conviction resulted.
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, § 4(9).
the other statements at issue were not false.
award him, however, $750,000 in punitive damages on that claim.
assault and battery and other charges when he was 21."
liability on Heagney's defamation claim.
could have credited Owen's testimony as to that point.
plaintiff proves that it was made in writing with actual malice.
quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added); see also Materia v.
Cross & Blue Shield of Mass., Inc., 809 N.E.2d 1034, 1036 (Mass.
evidence was insufficient to show that the statement was false.
N.E.2d 513, 517 (Mass. 1988)); see also Shaari, 691 N.E.2d at 927.
Inc. v. MBTA, 42 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1994)).
that Heagney was, in fact, "not forthcoming" about the "court case"
"characterized by openness, candidness, and forthrightness").
should be aware of," Heagney answered "no."
because he was obligated to disclose the charges to the City."
was acquitted on[.]" See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, § 4(9).
the question of whether the statement at issue was true or false.
whether he was in fact forthcoming in regard to that information.
case against him if he wished to be.
This conclusion comports with our decision in Noonan v.
here that "everything said in [Wong's statement] was true . . . ."
754 (Mass. 2007); Jones v. Taibbi, 512 N.E.2d 260, 266 (Mass.
thus reverse the judgment on the defamation claim.
the Chapter 151B claim as well as to the award of punitive damages.
We consider each of these arguments in turn.
Chapter 151B does not apply. See id. at 1021-22.
Cir. 2010) (citing Jennings v. Jones, 587 F.3d 430, 438 (1st Cir.
the record sufficed to show.
case against Heagney, but because Heagney was "not forthcoming"
provide "strong" or "direct" evidence that it was one reason.
the basis of its other "legitimate reason[s], standing alone."
Id. at 77 (internal quotation marks omitted).
evidence, so construed, suffices. See Kennedy, 617 F.3d at 527.
limit, or otherwise discriminate" against an applicant. Mass.
Heagney's candidacy for the position.
parties, and so we need to address that point up front as well.
an email to the city council around 5 p.m. on March 18, 2014.
mind to withdraw her support from Heagney when she made that call.
afternoon to ask him to withdraw his name from consideration.
of a motive other than the one prohibited by Chapter 151B.
N.E.2d at 1078 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Heagney's nomination because Heagney "was not forthcoming about .
N.E.2d at 1078. The record, moreover, also contains "strong"
charges mentioned in the letter were true."
a convincing case that there [wa]s an illegitimate motive present."
Haddad, 914 N.E.2d at 78.
standing alone, would have caused it to make the same decision."
conflicts in testimony, or in any other manner weigh the evidence."
F.3d 17, 23 (1st Cir. 1998).
nomination based on these reasons alone.
council was that what [she] had given them, his résumé, was a lie."
Heagney after the latter interview.
failure to include this employment on his application materials.
that no reasonable jury could find that Wong's motives were mixed.
nominate Heagney before she got on the phone with him.
Accordingly, this line of argument also lacks merit.
evidence, and its purpose is limited. . . .
are liable for violating General Law Chapter 151B.
suffered as a result of any violation.
compensatory damages on his Chapter 151B claim.
"[t]he judgment against the City on this claim must be vacated."
580 F.3d 55, 61 (1st Cir. 2009)).
doctrine." EventMonitor, Inc. v. Leness, 44 N.E.3d 848, 851 (Mass.
after-acquired evidence has no application to "failure to hire"
that reason did not motivate it at the time of the decision."
(emphasis added)); McKennon v. Nashville Banner Pub. Co., 513 U.S.
jury's award of punitive damages was unreasonable.
public condemnation and punishment." Id.
award of punitive damages is de novo. See Intercity Maint. Co. v.
sustained if it could 'reasonably have [been] arrived at . . .
72 (quoting Dartt, 691 N.E.2d at 536) (alteration in original).
Haddad, Heagney points to testimony from Unsworth and Stephens.
interfering with the legally protected rights of the plaintiff .
. . could be sufficient to support an award of punitive damages."
indifference to the rights of others." Id. at 73 (emphasis added).
damages on such a basis alone.
because of the candidate's failure to furnish that information.
inquire about arrests not resulting in conviction."
permitted." Haddad, 914 N.E.2d at 73.
state of the law in Massachusetts" regarding the conduct at issue.
Haddad, 914 N.E.2d at 75.
egregiousness necessary to support an award of punitive damages,"
concealment of that conduct by the defendant.
finding that the first four of these factors had been satisfied.
sufficient to support a punitive damages award").
Haddad, 914 N.E.2d at 75; Kiely, 13 N.E.3d at 621.
in which the second Haddad factor has been found to have been met.
punitive damages. Haddad, 914 N.E.2d at 75.
class that this part of Chapter 151B protects more generally. Id.
Fitchburg does not challenge the instruction.
for punishment and deterrence." Id. at 928.
that she did not know about the teacher's prospective testimony.
presence at the hearing where the teacher testified. Id.
could therefore infer . . . was meant to influence that testimony."
the issue of punitive damages before the jury." Id. at 617-18.
as an excuse for her decision not to nominate Heagney.
something related to Scott Heagney, and . . . forwarded it to Mr.
Stephens to be part of his file." Similarly, Wong's answer "no"
when asked if she told Owen that she "could no longer support Mr.
Heagney because he had not disclosed the early criminal charge"
the law equally," Dalrymple v. Winthrop, 740 N.E.2d 204, 211 (Mass.
that employs that official in a case involving facts like these.
151B claim. Each party shall bear its own costs.

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