Source: http://masscases.com/cases/sjc/254/254mass480.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 01:40:16+00:00

Document:
AL FELDMAN vs. JULIUS P. WITMARK & another.
Present: RUGG, C.J., PIERCE, CARROLL, WAIT, & SANDERSON, JJ.
(4) The allegation of fraud was sufficiently specific.
Where the declaration in an action of contract or tort contains two counts, one in contract and one in tort, there should also be an allegation that the two counts are for the same cause of action and are joined because of doubt regarding the division to which the cause of action belongs.
CONTRACT OR TORT. Writ dated April 11, 1921.
was insufficient in law to enable the plaintiff to maintain his action; (2) that that count did "not state a cause of action"; (3) that that count did "not set forth concisely and with sufficient certainty substantive facts to constitute a cause of action."
The demurrer was heard and was sustained by Morton, J., who, being of the opinion that the rights of the parties were substantially affected by the order, reported his ruling to this court for determination pending a trial on the merits.
E. M. Dangel & M. M. Robinson, for the plaintiff.
Lee M. Friedman & J. J. Matthews, for the defendants.
on sales well might be found to be a material inducement to the sale or transfer of such song. The alleged false statements, if found to have been made, are sufficiently alleged to have been material and are categorically alleged to have been relied upon by the plaintiff; they, therefore, entered into the substance of the contract. The statement of fact as to present intention of the defendant, being susceptible of actual knowledge and being a fact alleged to have been false, may be made the foundation of an action for deceit. Litchfield v. Hutchinson, 117 Mass. 195. Weeks v. Currier, 172 Mass. 53, 55. Bates v. Cashman, 230 Mass. 167, 168.
While possibly the declaration may have been abbreviated and clarified somewhat, it cannot rightly be said that it does not set forth concisely with substantial certainty the substantive facts necessary to constitute a cause of action in tort. It does not offend in this respect the requirements of G. L. c. 231, s. 7, cl. 2.
The allegation of fraud is sufficiently specific. It states with positiveness the false representation of the intent of the defendant in the respects already pointed out. It is not open to objection as being mere general and loose epithets of fraud, under the rule in Cosmopolitan Trust Co. v. S. L. Agoos Tanning Co. 245 Mass. 69, 73. French v. Kemp, 253 Mass. 75. Dunn v. E. E. Gray Co., ante, 202.
By the writ the defendant was summoned to answer "in an action of contract or tort." The declaration does not allege that the first count, in contract, and the second count, in tort, are both for one and the same cause of action and are joined because of doubt to which division the cause of action belongs, as provided by G. L. c. 231, s. 7, cl. 6. That is not assigned as a cause for demurrer and is not reported by the judge. It is a defect easily curable by amendment.
The ruling that the demurrer be sustained was wrong and is reversed.

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