Source: http://lawspace.stmarytx.edu/item/99KyLJ9
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 13:49:50+00:00

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This article examines both the work product doctrine’s historical and philosophical roots to determine whether the “anticipation of litigation” requirement should be a bar to protection of “core” work product from discovery. Part II examines the current state of the work product doctrine through Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3) and case law and compares the doctrine with the attorney-client privilege. Part II concludes by demonstrating how “core” work product can be discovered despite the protection of these two doctrines. Part III examines the Hickman v. Taylor case within its historical context, starting with the enactment of the first Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938 and concluding with an analysis of the Court’s decision itself. Part IV discusses the subsequent interpretations of Hickman v. Taylor, and how the “anticipation of litigation” requirement, or anticipation misconception, got its start through, of all things, a student note in the Harvard Law Review. Part IV concludes with a discussion of the Supreme Court’s interpretations of Rule 26(b) as it currently exists. Finally, Part V examines the “anticipation of litigation” requirement in light of this historical development and proposes that the requirement is unjustified historically, philosophically and as a matter of policy. Part V, therefore, proposes that, with regard to core work product, a new exception be established, or rather recognition that an old exception continues to exist.
Id. at 136-40. Id. at 133. 82 Id. 83 Id. at 156-62. The court noted that the corporation and its attorney were in a Catch-22 of sorts in that if they claimed they anticipated either a lawsuit or adverse FDA action, this would be based on failures in the field of the device which would put the company out of compliance with the FDCA and thus the notes could be discoverable under the crime-fraud exception. Id. at 157-58. Ultimately, the court concluded that the corporation and attorney had a weak anticipation showing and had also failed to show that the notes were produced because of the prospect of litigation. Id. at 162. 84 Id. at 155-56 (quoting Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 209 F.3d 1051, 1054 (8th Cir. 2000)).
had not actually begun an investigation and the prospect of private litigation was not likely at the time the documents were created.85 What is striking about both Hercules and In re Grand Jury Subpoena is that in each case, the court recognized that the documents sought reflected the mental impressions of an attorney acting in his or her capacity as legal counsel, yet the courts denied protection of the work product doctrine on an assumption that work product, even core work product, can only be protected if it was generated “in anticipation of litigation.” 86 This raises a rather basic question of whether the assumption that the “anticipation of litigation” requirement applies to “core” work product is correct or even justified. The remainder of this article discusses the origin of what is, in fact, a misunderstanding of the protection that should be afforded core work product. III.The Genesis of the Work-Product Rule As with most articles that address the work-product doctrine, a discussion of the seminal case of Hickman v. Taylor is in order. However, a mere recitation of the Supreme Court’s holding does not do justice to the nuances of the rule or the purposes for which it was created. To truly understand Hickman, it is necessary to set-up the historical context in which it was decided as well as the state of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as they existed at that time.
Id. Id. 106 Id. at 480; Marcus, supra n. 11, at 334. Curiously, the district court referred to Hickman as the plaintiff’s wife, which Richard Marcus points out is incorrect. Marcus, supra n. 11, at 334, n.43. As Marcus also points out, suit was also filed against Baltimore & Ohio Railroad (“B&O”). Id. at 332. B&O were the owners of a sunken car float which the J.M. Taylor had been hired to tow across the Delaware River the night of the accident. Id. 107 Hickman, 4 F.R.D. at 480. The interrogatory read, ‘State whether any statements of the members of the crews of the Tugs ‘J. M. Taylor’ and ‘Philadelphia’ or of any other vessel were taken in connection with the towing of the car float and the sinking of the Tug ‘John M. Taylor.’ Attach hereto exact copies of all such statements if in writing, and if oral, set forth in detail the exact provisions of any such oral statements or reports.' Id. (quoting interrogatory #38). 108 Id. 109 Id. 110 3 F.R.D. 300, 302 (E.D. Pa. 1943). 111 Hickman, 4 F.R.D. at 481-82.
Hickman, 329 U.S. at 500 and n.1. There was some question as to whether the case was even properly before the Court as the plaintiff had not properly attempted to depose Fortenbough under Rule 26, but the Court chose to move forward with the case rather than force the plaintiff to go through the empty formality of pursuing the correct procedural device. Id. at 504-05. 151 Id. at 507 (“Mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper litigation.”). 152 Id. at 508. 153 Id.
Id. Id. at 514. 156 Id. at 508-09. 157 Id. 158 Id. at 513. 159 Id. at 509, 511-512; We are thus dealing with an attempt to secure the production of written statements and mental impressions contained in the files and the mind of the attorney Fortenbaugh without any showing of necessity or any indication or claim that denial of such production would unduly prejudice the preparation of petitioner's case or cause him any hardship or injustice. Id. at 509. See also In re San Juan DuPont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 859 F.2d 1007, 1014 (1st Cir. 1988) (citing Hickman as the genesis of the “substantial need/undue hardship standard”); Sporck v. Peil, 759 F.2d 312, 316 (3d Cir. 1985) (same). The Court defined work product as including that which was reflected in “interviews, statements, memoranda, correspondence, briefs, mental impressions, personal beliefs, and countless other tangible and intangible ways.” Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511.
Id. at 511-12. Id. at 512. 162 The Court did note that the English courts had developed a privilege covering “documents prepared by or for counsel with a view to litigation.” Id. at 510, n.9. However, though the Court noted this qualification in the English courts, the Supreme Court did not make such a qualification in its own opinion. 163 Id. at 510-11.
Id. Id. at 513. 166 Report of the Advisory Committee on Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Recommending Amendments, 5 F.R.D. 339, 356 (1946). 167 Report of Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the United States, 5 F.R.D. 433, 458, 460 (1946). The Advisory Committee, in formulating its proposed amendment, rejected these as tests for whether production should be denied. Id. at 460.
Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511. See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389; Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 348 (1985) (“[T]he attorney-client privilege serves the function of promoting full and frank communications between attorneys and their clients. It thereby encourages observance of the law and aids in the administration of justice.”); Guy v. United HealthCare Corp., 154 F.R.D. 172, 177 (S.D. Ohio 1993) (quoting Weintraub); Marks, supra n. 47, at 157. 170 Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 517 (1947) (Jackson, J., concurring).
Kirst, supra n.66, at 274. 306 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1962). 183 Id. at 640.
Anderson, supra n. 7, at 782-83 (noting that the amendments were rejected). Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure Relating to Deposition and Discovery (Nov. 1967), 43 F.R.D. 211, 225 (1968). 201 Id. 202 Id. It is perhaps worth noting that the 1946 Amendment also contained an “anticipation of litigation” requirement, which may have simply been carried forward when it became time to amend the Rules. See part III.C., supra. 203 Hickman, 329 U.S. at 509, 511-12; Address by Fred A. Freund, Changes Ahead in Federal Pretrial Discovery, 45 F.R.D. 479, 494 (1968). 204 Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511-12.
See part II.A.1., supra. See, e.g., Advisory Committee’s Explanatory Statement Concerning Amendments of the Discovery Rules, 48 F.R.D. 487, 499-500 (noting the major difficulties with existing law but omitting any mention of “core” work product); Minutes of the May 20-21, 1966 Meeting of the Advisory Committee on Civil pp. 30-31, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/minutes.htm. The following excerpt is an example of the assumption that “core” work product is only an issue when litigation is pending: Mr. Acheson: I thought Mr. Jenner was merely talking about preparation in anticipation of trial and he said a lot of this is done before there is any trial at all. Mr. Jenner: Yes, there would be no counsel at that particular point. Id. (emphasis added). See also Minutes of the July 17-19, 1969 Meeting of the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure p. 3, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/minutes.htm; Minutes of the March 9-10, 1967 Meeting of the Advisory Committee on Civil pp. 6-7, 11-12, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/minutes.htm. 212 422 U.S. 225 (1975). 213 462 U.S. 19 (1983). 214 449 U.S. 383 (1981). Professor Roger Kirst also discusses these three cases in his article which advocates for expanded protection for the work of the transactional attorney. See Kirst, supra n.66, at 268-73.
Id.; Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 386-87. Id. at 387-88. 243 Id. at 388. 244 Id. at 387. The magistrate also concluded that Upjohn had waived the attorney-client privilege, but the Sixth Circuit rejected this finding. Id. 245 Upjohn, 1978 WL 1163, at *11-13. 246 Upjohn v. United States, 600 F.2d 1223, 1227-28, n.13 (6th Cir. 1979). 247 Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 398 (1981). 248 Id. at 398-99.
Id. at 397-98. Id. at 399 (quoting Hickman, 329 U.S. at 512). 251 Id. at 401-02. 252 Id. at 397-399. 253 Id. at 398; Kirst, supra n. 66, at 233. 254 In re Cedant Corp. Securities Litig., 343 F.3d 658, 662 (3d Cir. 2003); Whitlow v. Martin, 2009 WL 2241152 at *3 (Fed. Cl. 2009); Abdell v. City of New York, 2006 WL 2664313 at *3 (S.D. N.Y. 2006); Am. Fed. Bank v. United States, 60 Fed.Cl. 493, 497 (Fed. Cl. 2003); Epstein, supra n.8, at 815; Marcus, supra n.11, at 349-50; WRIGHT ET AL., supra n.11, § 2024; Charles P. Cercone, The War Against Work Product Abuse: Exposing the Legal Alchemy of Document Compilations as Work Product, 64 U. PITT. L. REV. 639, 658 (2003).
Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 399 (1981). See Leslie Wharton et al., 2 Successful Partnering Between Inside and Outside Counsel §33:32 (“The work product at issue had been created long before the contested tax summons was issued, and even before Upjohn had filed the report with the government that instigated the IRS's investigation.”). 257 See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 220 F.R.D. at 156; Guzzino, 174 F.R.D. at 63; Epstein, supra n.8, at 831 (citing same). See also Smith, supra n.64, at 35 (“Because the work product doctrine is narrower in scope than the attorneyclient privilege in that it only applies when litigation is ongoing or pending, an entity must next determine whether the investigation is being conducted as a result of pending litigation.”); Imperato, supra n.64, at 216 (“The key to this protection is that the work must be performed in anticipation of litigation.”).
the benefits that are viewed to result in a robust adversarial system. However, to cite only to this adversarial justification ignores the Hickman Court’s further statements with regards to the detrimental effect disclosure of work product materials would have on the legal profession as well as the attorney-client relationship.264 In this regard, the work product doctrine’s justification bears much in common with the instrumental justification that is the foundation of the attorney-client privilege, which is not tied to any litigation requirement.265 Indeed, even the cost-free nature of the privilege could be found to apply to the work product doctrine; instead of communications not existing absent the privilege, the cost free nature is found in the Supreme Court’s statement that “much of what is now put down in writing would remain unwritten.”266 A.Correcting the anticipation misconception In light of these misconceptions, a simple fix is possible: eliminating the “anticipation of litigation” requirement for “core” work product. This could be accomplished by simply extending Hickman, which already continues to have validity today despite Rule 26(b), and recognizing that “core” work product continues to retain a residuum of protection even outside of the litigation context.267 This would require a complete elimination of the temporal analysis and a modification of the motivational analysis. Instead of looking to whether the motivation for creating the work product is litigation, the test should be whether the work product sought was generated by the attorney to provide legal assistance.
Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511. Rumac, Inc., 143 Cal. App.3d at 816 (quoting Edward D. Re, The Lawyer as Counselor and the Prevention of Litigation, 31 CATH. U.L.REV. 685, 690-691 (1982)). See also LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN AMERICAN LAW IN THE 20TH CENTURY 461 (Yale Univ. Press 2002) (“Lawyers, in the main, service business. They help form corporations, they advise on corporate affairs, they maneuver through tangles of red tape; they cope with federal, state, and local government; they help put deals together.”). 273 This instrumental justification is important as it continues to have validity, at least in the Supreme Court’s view, in modern times. United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 562-63 (1989); Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1996); Swindler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 408 (1998); IMWINKELRIED, supra n.55, at 258-59 (citing Zolin, Jafee, and Swindler & Berlin).
inconsistent opinions that have resulted from the “anticipation of litigation” requirement have led to results that make distinctions without any true meaning. By simply recognizing that “core” work product is deserving of protection regardless of the prospect of litigation, so long as it is truly provided as part of an attorney’s provision of legal services, should, at the very least, provide courts with the ability to grant or deny protection in a more rational manner.
Colin P. Marks, “The Anticipation Misconception,” St. Mary's Law Digital Repository, accessed April 24, 2019, http://lawspace.stmarytx.edu/item/99KyLJ9.

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