Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/89413/anglo-american-provision-co-vs-davis-1
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 16:47:59+00:00

Document:
Consistently with Article IV, Section 1, of the Constitution of the United States, a state may deny jurisdiction to the courts of the state over suits by a corporation of another state against a corporation of another state on a foreign judgment.
MR. JUSTICE HOLMES, delivered the opinion of the Court.
"an action against a foreign corporation may be maintained by another foreign corporation, or by a nonresident, in one of the following cases only: . . . 3. Where the cause of action arose within the state, etc."
of the United States, the state could not thus exclude foreign corporations from suing upon judgments obtained in another state, because to do so was to deny full faith and credit to those judgments. The decision to the contrary is the error assigned.
The state court decides that the cause of action did not arise within the state in the sense of the words of the Code, and, of course, we follow its construction, subject to the inquiry whether the statute as construed is consistent with the Constitution of the United States. See Northern Central Railway Co. v. Maryland, 187 U. S. 258 , 187 U. S. 267 . The court also decides that the language quoted goes to the jurisdiction of the court.
8 Wall. 168; Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 177 U. S. 28 , 177 U. S. 45 , and did not set it up. The general power of a state to restrict the right of a foreign corporation to sue in its courts is assumed in Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet. 519, 38 U. S. 589 -591. As to discrimination against nonresidents, see Chemung Canal Bank v. Lowery, 93 U. S. 72 .
The plaintiff lays great stress upon Christmas v. Russell, 5 Wall. 290. In that case, suit was brought in Mississippi on a Kentucky judgment against a citizen of Mississippi upon a promissory note made in Mississippi and payable in New Orleans. A suit upon the note would have been barred by the Mississippi statute of limitations when the suit in Kentucky was begun, and the defendant set up a statute of Mississippi providing that no action should be maintained upon a judgment rendered in such circumstances without the state against a resident of the state. It was held that the statute was void, and that, as the judgment was valid in Kentucky, it could not be treated as invalid in Mississippi. It will be observed that this was a suit by a citizen. There was no suggestion that the statute went to the jurisdiction of the court. Obviously it did not. Indeed, the suit was brought in the United States circuit court. The statute made no discrimination in the right to come into court, according to the character of the plaintiff or of the cause of action, but attempted to create a defense against a plaintiff assumed to have a right to come into court and to invoke the jurisdiction. But when the plaintiff was in court, and exhibited his judgment, it was too late for the state to interfere. In the case at bar, the plaintiff had no right to come into the New York supreme court.
enough to consider the suggestion that the law is an interference with interstate commerce, within Cooper Mfg. Co. v. Ferguson, 113 U. S. 727 , 113 U. S. 734 , when the record presents it. The question is one of degree, and it is obvious that the supposed interference is very remote. See Diamond Glue Co. v. United States Glue Co., 187 U. S. 611 , 187 U. S. 616 .

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