Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/338/263/
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 14:08:59+00:00

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Justia › US Law › US Case Law › US Supreme Court › Volume 338 › Boyd v. Grand Trunk Western R. Co.
An agreement between a railroad and an employee injured by its negligence, which limits the venue of any action thereafter brought by the employee under the Federal Employers' Liability Act and deprives him of his right to bring an action in any forum authorized by the Act is void as conflicting with the Act. Pp. 338 U. S. 263-266.
321 Mich. 693, 33 N.W.2d 120, reversed.
In a suit brought by a railroad company in a state court of Michigan to enjoin petitioner from prosecuting a Federal Employers' Liability Act case against it in Illinois, the trial court held that a contract restricting the choice of venue was void, and dismissed the suit. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed. 321 Mich. 693, 33 N.W.2d 120. This Court granted certiorari. 3 37 U.S. 923. Reversed, p. 338 U. S. 266.
"such suit shall be commenced within the county or district where I resided at the time my injuries were sustained, or in the county or district where my injuries were sustained and not elsewhere. [Footnote 2]"
Although this provision defined the available forum as either the Circuit Court of Calhoun County, Michigan, or the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, petitioner brought an action in the Superior Court of Cook County, Illinois. To enjoin petitioner's prosecution of the Illinois case, respondent instituted this suit. The Michigan Circuit Court held that the contract restricting the choice of venue was void, and dismissed the suit. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed, 321 Mich. 693, 33 N.W.2d 120 (1948).
those courts which have held that contracts limiting the choice of venue are void as conflicting with the Liability Act.
"Any contract, rule, regulation, or device whatsoever the purpose or intent of which shall be to enable any common carrier to exempt itself from any liability created by this Act shall, to that extent, be void. . . ."
The contract before us is therefore void.
the injury occurred. The court below, in holding that an agreement delimiting venue should be enforced if it was reached after the accident, disregarded Duncan.
"does not limit or otherwise modify any right granted in § 6 of the Liability Act or elsewhere to bring suit in a particular district. An action may still be brought in any court, state or federal, in which it might have been brought previously."
337 U.S. at 337 U. S. 60.
The right to select the forum granted in § 6 is a substantial right. It would thwart the express purpose of the Federal Employers' Liability Act to sanction defeat of that right by the device at bar.
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER and MR. JUSTICE JACKSON concur in the result, but upon the grounds stated by Chief Judge Hand in Krenger v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 174 F.2d 556 at 560 (1949).
"That in any action brought against any such common carrier under or by virtue of any of the provisions of this Act, such common carrier may set off therein any sum it has contributed or paid to any insurance, relief benefit, or indemnity that may have been paid to the injured employee or the person entitled thereto on account of the injury or death for which said action was brought."
Referring to this provision, and interpreting a contract similar to the one here involved, at least one federal court has held that "[t]he contract to waive the venue provisions is of no effect . . . , because there was no consideration for it." Akerly v. New York Cent. R. Co., 168 F.2d 812, 815 (1948).
In accord with the decision below are: Roland v. Atchison, T. & S.F. R. Co., 65 F.Supp. 630 (1946); Herrington v. Thompson, 61 F.Supp. 903 (1945); Clark v. Lowden, 48 F.Supp. 261 (1942); Detwiler v. Chicago, R.I. & P. R. Co., 15 F.Supp. 541 (1936); Detwiler v. Lowden, 198 Minn. 185, 188, 269 N.W. 367, 369, 107 A.L.R. 1054, 1059 (1936). In conflict with the ruling before us are: Krenger v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 174 F.2d 556 (1949), petition for certiorari denied this day, see post, p. 866; Akerly v. New York Cent. R. Co., 168 F.2d 812 (1948); Fleming v. Husted, 68 F.Supp. 900 (1946); Sherman v. Pere Marquette R. Co., 62 F.Supp. 590 (1945); Peterson v. Ogden Union Railway & Depot Co., 110 Utah 573, 175 P.2d 744 (1946); cf. Porter v. Fleming, 74 F.Supp. 378 (1947).
See Krenger, supra, note 3 174 F.2d at 558; 174 F.2d at 561 (concurring opinion of L. Hand, C.J.); Akerly, supra, note 3 168 F.2d at 815; Peterson, supra, note 3 110 Utah at 579, 175 P.2d at 747.

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