Source: https://chestofbooks.com/real-estate/Law-Of-Real-Property/Future-Estates-At-Common-Law.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 17:44:17+00:00

Document:
(b) Possibilities of reverter (p. 281).
162. A reversion is the estate which remains in an owner after he has granted away part of his estate. The estate granted is called the particular estate. There may be a reversion after any estate except a fee.
"An estate in reversion is the residue of an estate left in the grantor to commence in possession after the determination of some particular estate granted out by him." 1 A reversion can be created out of any estate except an estate at will or at sufferance. Out of the latter estates there can be no reversion, because in creating a reversion the grant of a particular estate is necessary, and no alienation is possible of the whole or of part of an estate at will or at sufferance.2 Any number of particular estates may be created by one owning a fee-simple, and still a reversion may remain, so long as the fee itself is not disposed of. For example, the owner of a fee may grant a fee tail, and on failure of the specified heirs the estate will revert to the grantor or his heirs. So out of a fee tail a life estate might be granted, and there would be a reversion, or out of a life estate there might be a reversion after an estate for years. The owner of an estate for years may grant to another a term for a shorter time than his own, and the balance may revert to him; but, if he grants an estate of as long duration as his own, it will be an assignment, and there will be nothing to revert.3 Reversions may exist, also, after estates created by operation of law; for instance, after an estate of dower.4 So, too, there are reversionary interests in equitable estates, as where there is a resulting trust to the grantor after an equitable life estate in another person.5 In each case the estate which precedes the reversion is called a particular estate.
1 2 Bl. Comm. 175.
2 See ante, pp. 157, 164.
3 See ante, p. 148. And see, as to reversions generally, Cook v. Hammond, 4 Mason, 467, Fed. Cas. No. 3,159; State v. Brown, 27 N. J. Law, 13; Me-kelway v. Seymour, 29 N. J. Law, 321.
4 See ante, p. 102.
5 Loring v. Eliot, 16 Gray (Mass.) 568; Read v. Stedman, 26 Beav. 495.
163. After a fee on condition or on limitation, the interest remaining in the grantor is called a possibility of reverter.
8 2 Washb. Real Prop. (5th Ed.) 806.
9 See Martin v. Tobin, 123 Mass. 85.
10 Hughes v. Robotham, Cro. Eliz. 302; Stephens v. Bridges, 6 Madd. 66. 11 Jackson v. Schoonmaker, 4 Johns. (N. Y.) 390.
12 Slegel v. Lauer, 148 Pa. St. 236, 23 Atl 996; Nicoll v. Railroad Co., 12 N. Y. 121.
164. A remainder is an estate depending on a preceding particular estate, created by the same instrument, and limited to arise on the termination of the preceding estate, but not in derogation of it.
It will be seen from the above definition of a remainder that it differs from a reversion principally in that the residue of the estate remaining after the particular estate in the case of a reversion goes back to the grantor or his heirs, but in a remainder this residue is limited over to a third person.17 Remainders are always created by express limitation, and can never arise by operation of law.18 A remainder must always be created by the same instru13 See ante, p. 45.
14 2 Washb. Real Prop. (5th Ed.) 801.
15 Slegel v. Lauer, 148 Pa. St. 236, 23 Atl. 996; Scheetz v. Fitzwater, 5 Pa. St. 126. Contra, Nicoll v. Railroad Co., 12 N. Y. 126.
♦Graves, Real Prop. 135, citing Boiling v. Mayor, etc, of Petersburg, 8 Leigh (Va.) 229; Leonard v. Burr, 18 N. Y. 96.
17 Booth v. Terrell, 16 Ga. 20; Phelps v. Phelps, 17 Md. 120.
18 See Dennett v. Dennett, 40 N. H. 498. As to the difference between purchase and descent, see post, p. 399.
19 2 Washb. Real Prop.
20 Hennessy v. Patterson, 85 N. T. 91; Doe v. Oonsidine, 6 Wall. 458, 474.
21 See Burdet v. Hopegood, 1 P. Wms. 486.
22 l stim. Am. St. Law, §§ 1421, 1426.
23 2 Washb. Real Prop. (5th Ed.) 601. In New York, Michigan, and some other states contingent remainders are not bad because they may defeat the preceding estate. 1 Stim. Am. St Law, § 1426 C. And see Gillespie v. Allison, 115 N. C. 542, 20 S. E. 627.
24 See post, pp. 299, 300.
25 See ante, p. 177.
27 See Proprietors of Church In Brattle Square v. Grant, 3 Gray (Mass.) 142.

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