Source: http://www.caaflog.com/2017/10/03/argument-preview-determining-when-a-prosecution-appeal-is-authorized-in-united-states-v-jacobsen-no-17-0408ar/
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 22:49:45+00:00

Document:
The ACCA’s narrow, structural interpretation of Article 62, UCMJ, frustrates the legislative intent behind the statute and divorces the statute from its intended purpose.
Gov’t Div. Br. at 4. The brief then reviews the related federal statute (18 U.S.C. § 3731) and cases interpreting it. See Gov’t Div. Br. at 7-11. It ultimately concludes that “in its opinions, the ACCA does not offer any reason why these appeals should operate differently in the military than in federal civilian courts.” Gov’t Div. Br. at 11. But this isn’t quite right, as the Army court based its decisions on the fact that 18 U.S.C. § 3731 and Article 62 (10 U.S.C. § 862) are worded differently.
[S]hort of a constitutional bar, the United States has a broad right of appeal under Article 62, U.C.M.J. While this may mean that many rulings are potentially eligible for appellate review, from a practical standpoint, the military’s interest in preventing a backlog within its own system will act to prevent an abuse of the right. Any further limitation on the exercise of appellate review is an area for legislative, not judicial action.
Viewing the facts sub judice, we find that the Petitioners have properly alleged that the excluded evidence was substantial proof of a fact material to the proceedings. We are not persuaded by the Respondent’s argument that the evidence was cumulative. In an interlocutory appeal, it is beyond the scope of this Court to speculate as to what weight or importance a particular piece of evidence might have at trial. It is sufficient that the petitioner believes that the evidence is significant enough to seek reversal of a military judge’s exclusionary ruling rather than continue at trial with whatever other evidence that might be available. Accordingly, we hold that this Court has jurisdiction to hear Petitioner’s appeal.
Scholz, 19 M.J. at 840-41. This is persuasive evidence that the Army court’s rejection of the appeal in this case was wrong.
To the extent that the ACCA held that the difference between Article 62, UCMJ, and 18 U.S.C. § 3731 reflects a substantive difference in the two appeals, it makes a distinction without a difference. In United States v. True, 28 M.J. 1, 2 (C.A.A.F. 1989), this Court specifically analyzed the differences between Article 62, UCMJ, and § 3731. . . . After noting that the “wording” and “presentation” of Article 62 differed from § 3 731, this Court held that “the practical effect of the … language in both statutes is the same, i.e., avoidance of technical barriers to government appeals.” Id. . . . Thus, the ACCA departed from both the plain meaning of Article 62 and this Court’s precedent on the relationship between the two appeals statutes.
Gov’t Div. Br. at 19-20. It concludes with the argument that “Congress enacted the existing text of Article 62, which allows the Government to select and certify its own interlocutory appeals and confers jurisdiction over those appeals directly to the appellate courts.” Gov’t Div. Br. at 23.
In United States v. Bradford, this Court found the trial counsel’s appeal did not meet the statutory criteria, and then held the lower court did not have jurisdiction to review the substance of the appealed ruling. 68 M.J. 371, 373 (C.A.A.F. 2010). See also United States v. Anderson, 69 M.J. 176 (C.A.A.F. 2010); United States v. Borgman, 69 M.J. 84 (C.A.A.F. 2010).
Accused’s Br. at 10. Bradford, however, addressed a prosecution motion to preadmit evidence, which is a nonexistent procedure to admit trial evidence at a pre-trial hearing (prior to a court-martial’s assembly, members selection, and opening statements). The military judge rightly rejected the motion, and CAAF rejected the prosecution appeal because “the Government has not [yet] moved to admit the document at trial.” 68 M.J. 373. Anderson and Borgman were trailer cases raising the same issue. These cases are fundamentally different from the issue presented in Jacobsen because they didn’t address the exclusion of evidence (but rather merely required the prosecution follow the rules and admit the evidence at trial). CAAF’s resolution of United States v. Vargas, 74 M.J. 1 (C.A.A.F. 2014) (CAAFlog case page) (finding no jurisdiction), reached a similar conclusion.
If a trial counsel’s “certification of the appeal conclusively establishes jurisdiction in the appellate courts” – as the government alleges in its brief – then a timely appeal under Article 62, UCMJ, could never be dismissed on jurisdictional grounds by an appellate court. (Gov’t. Br. 4) (See also Gov’t. Br. 11) (“Under Article 62, UCMJ, as under 18 U.S.C. § 3731, the trial counsel’s certification is conclusive for purposes of establishing jurisdiction”). This position is directly contradicted by Bradford.
Accused’s Br. at 12. This is a strong point. If an appellate court can reject a prosecution appeal on the basis that is does not exclude evidence (as CAAF did in Bergman and Vargas; both of which were not appealed), then presumably it can also reject a prosecution appeal on the basis that the excluded evidence is not substantial proof of a material fact.
Jacobsen’s brief also highlights the differences between 18 U.S.C. § 3731 and Article 62. See Accused’s Br. at 13-18.
Through its narrow focus on the certification requirements, the government argues that trial counsel have the unilateral ability to mandate appellate review of any evidentiary ruling excluding evidence at any time before or during a trial, as long as they certify such evidence meets the applicable standard. Again, such unfettered authority is not even granted to United States Attorneys. Plain and simple, the similar certification requirements within the two statutes does not obviate their clear textual differences, nor the structural differences between courts-martial and federal civilian criminal prosecutions.
This Court should not construe the certification requirements of Article 62, UCMJ, differently from those detailed in 18 U.S.C. § 3731 without some compelling rationale based in the difference between military and civilian practice.
Reply Br. at 9. Our #2 Military Justice Story of 2015 comes to mind.
[I]n the present court-martial, where the Government had begun to present evidence, the Government still had yet to rest its case. (Govt. Br. at 2-3.) As such, the Army Court of Criminal Appeals did not have the necessary and complete factual basis to conclude that the excluded prior consistent statement was not substantial proof of a fact material in the proceeding.
Amicus Br. at 4. This is a pretty appealing observation, except that the question of whether something is substantial proof of a material fact may well be a question of law, not a question of fact. The Mil. R. Evid. 403 criteria, for example, are questions of legal relevance that seem to directly address whether something is substantial proof of a material fact. Evidence that is, say, needlessly cumulative, or misleading, or would waste time, would not be substantial proof of a material fact.
Considering this, next week’s oral argument might focus less on the meaning of the statute and more on what the CCA actually decided.

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