Source: http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/55087
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 17:02:07+00:00

Document:
THE HEIRS OF JOLLY R. BUGARIN, NAMELY MA. AILEEN H. BUGARIN, MA. LINDA B. ABIOG AND MA. ANNETTE B. SUMULONG, PETITIONERS, VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 seeks to annul and set aside the April 3, 2006 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan which ordered the forfeiture of some of the properties of the. late NBI Director, Jolly R. Bugarin (Bugarin); pursuant to the January 30, 2002 Decision of this Court in Republic of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan, and its August 30, 2006 Resolution which denied the motion for reconsideration.
The late Bugarin was the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) when the late Ferdinand E. Marcos was still the president of the country from 1965-1986. After the latter’s downfall in 1986, the new administration, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), filed a petition for forfeiture of properties under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 1379 against him with the Sandiganbayan. The latter dismissed the petition for insufficiency of evidence in its August 13, 1991 Decision.
Bugarin moved for a reconsideration and while his motion was pending, he passed away in September 2002. With this development, his heirs, the petitioners herein, moved to have the case dismissed. The Court denied both Bugarin’s Motion for Reconsideration and petitioners’ Motion to Dismiss. Petitioners sought reconsideration but the same was likewise denied. Still, they filed their Motion for Leave to File a Second Motion for Reconsideration and its Admission with the attached Second Motion for Reconsideration, but it was likewise denied on July 27, 2004 for being a prohibited pleading while the attached motion was merely noted without action. On June 25, 2004, the January 30, 2002 Decision of the Court became final and executory and was entered in the Entry of Judgment.
Pursuant to this order, the PCGG filed its Partial Compliance, dated March 3, 2005, and Amended Partial Compliance, dated April 4, 2005. The latter contained a list of properties and investments found by the Court in the Republic case to have been acquired by Bugarin from 1968 to 1980 at P1,697,333.00. The PCCG, in a manifestation, informed the Sandiganbayan of its earnest efforts in verifying the status of Bugarin’s other business investments not included in their Amended Partial Compliance but only one replied to inform them that Bugarin was “not a stockholder of nor has he any investment in this company.” Thus, in the same manifestation, the PCGG prayed that its latest compliance be considered sufficient conformity to the Sandiganbayan’s Order of January 12, 2005. No comment was filed by petitioners.
In the hearing of May 5, 2005, petitioners moved to cancel the hearings on the ground that they had filed a motion for leave to file a motion to dismiss. The Sandiganbayan, thus, reset the hearing to August 29 and 30, 2005 and gave the PCGG time to comment on the motion and petitioners corresponding time to reply.
On May 10, 2005, instead of a copy of their motion for leave to file motion to dismiss, petitioners served upon PCGG their Manifestation and Ad Cautelam Motion to Dismiss dated May 5, 2005, to which PCGG filed a comment/opposition. On August 8, 2005, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioners’ Motion for Leave to File Motion to Dismiss, on the ground that the case sought to be dismissed had already been decided by the Court and which decision has, in fact, attained finality on June 25, 2004. As a result, the Manifestation and Ad Cautelam Motion to Dismiss subsequently filed by petitioners was ordered stricken off the record by the Sandiganbayan on September 1, 2005.
At the hearing this afternoon, only Attys. Crisostomo A Quizon and Joshua Gilbert F. Paraiso, counsels for the heirs of Jolly Bugarin, appeared. There was no appearance for the plaintiff (respondent Republic of the Philippines).
WHEREFORE, let this case be considered submitted for resolution and the Court shall determine which properties shall be forfeited in favor of the plaintiff, pursuant to the decision of the Supreme Court dated January 30, 2002.
Petitioners moved for the reconsideration of this order arguing that the Sandiganbayan could not determine the properties to be forfeited on its own, and further prayed that the parties be allowed to present evidence to determine what properties of Bugarin would be subject to forfeiture.
ORDER the Corporate Secretary of Makati Sports Club and of Manila Polo Club to effect the transfer of forfeited shares of Bugarin and/ or his transferees in favor of the Republic of the Philippines.
On April 6, 2006, a writ of execution was issued by the Sandiganbayan pursuant to the above resolution.
On August 30, 2006, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration of the April 3 Resolution.
Meanwhile, during the pendency of this petition before this Court, the Sandiganbayan issued its December 11, 2006 Resolution granting petitioners’ Motion To Quash Writ on the ground that its April 3, 2006 Resolution, executing this Court’s Judgment, had not yet attained finality due to the timely filing by petitioners of a motion for reconsideration. Accordingly, it ordered the Writ of Execution, dated April 6, 2006, quashed.
WHETHER OR NOT BUGARIN’S HEIRS SHOULD BE ACCORDED THEIR RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.
WHETHER OR NOT THE ASSAILED RESOLUTIONS ARE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT IN THE REPUBLIC CASE.
WHETHER OR NOT THE REPUBLIC CASE SHOULD BE SATISFIED BY FIRST EXHAUSTING ALL OF THE JUDGMENT DEBTOR’S PERSONAL PROPERTIES BEFORE PROCEEDING AGAINST ANY REAL PROPERTY PURSUANT TO SECTION 8(D), RULE 39 OF THE RULES OF COURT.
Foremost in petitioners’ arguments is their claim that they have been deprived of their right to due process of law when the Sandiganbayan, in its April 3, 2006 Resolution, ordered for the forfeiture of Bugarin’s properties pursuant to the January 30, 2002 Decision of this Court in the Republic case. They fault the selection process laid down in the said case which purportedly denied them the opportunity to show that “not all of the late Bugarin’s properties may be forfeited.” Petitioners accuse the Sandiganbayan of allegedly reducing their rights to a simple mathematical equation of subtracting the late Bugarin’s amassed wealth against his lawful income for the same period and using the difference as basis for choosing the properties to be forfeited for the sole reason that their total acquisition cost was closest to said difference. They, thus, want that another round of trial or hearing be conducted for “further reception of evidence” to determine which among the properties enumerated in the Republic case are ill-gotten wealth.
The Court finds no merit in the petition.
SEC 2. Filing of Petition. Whenever any public officer or employee has acquired during his incumbency an amount of property which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and to his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property, said property shall be presumed prima facie to have been unlawfully acquired. x x x.
The existence of which gives rise to a presumption that these same properties were acquired prima facie unlawfully.
SEC.6. Judgment. If the respondent is unable to show to the satisfaction of the court that he has lawfully acquired the property in question, then the court shall declare such property, forfeited in favor of the State, and by virtue of such judgment the property aforesaid shall become property of the State, x x x.
Nothing can be farther from the truth. In the Republic case, the Court already made a determination of what properties were to be ordered forfeited. There were tables showing summaries of Bugarin’s real property acquisitions, business investments, as well as shares in exclusive clubs, which were laid out and evaluated. Proceeds of sales, rentals, fees and pensions were likewise enumerated and studied. The case was ordered remanded to the Sandiganbayan to determine which properties, among those enumerated as forfeited, were to be actually seized or taken in favor of the government and which were to remain with petitioners.
The Court pored over the evidence adduced during the hearing at the Sandiganbayan. In the Republic case, Bugarin argued that some of the properties that were subject of the forfeiture proceedings were acquired by him and his wife before he became the NBI Director; that the acquisition cost of the properties he acquired during his incumbency was only P2.79 million; that in addition to his salaries as NBI Director, he received allowances from both government and private entities; and lastly, that his income was also derived from his and his wife’s investments.
From the summary of Bugarin’s assets, it can readily be seen that all of his real properties were purchased or constructed, as the case may be, from 1968 to 1980. The total acquisition cost thereof was P1,705,583.00. With the exception of those that had been liquidated, those acquired from 1981 onward, and those whose year of acquisition could not be determined, his shareholdings in various corporations and other investments amounted to P464,580.00 Hence, for the period from 1968 to 1980, he amassed wealth in the amount of P2,170,163.00.
It bears repeating that the proceeds of the loan granted to him by the GSIS in 1983 and the rental income from 1981 to 1986, as well as the proceeds of the sale of his real property in 1984, could not have been utilized by him as his funds for the real properties and investment he acquired in 1980 and in the preceding years. His lawful income for the said period being only P766,548.00, the same was grossly insufficient to finance the acquisition of his assets for the said period whose aggregate cost was P2,170,163.00. This gross disparity would all the more be emphasized had there been evidence of his actual family and personal expenses and tax payments.
Premises considered, respondent’s (Bugarin’s) properties acquired from 1968 to 1980 which were out of proportion to his lawful income for the said period should be forfeited in favor of the government for failure of the respondent to show, to the Court’s satisfaction, that the same was lawfully acquired.
Based on the assiduous reassessment of evidence in the Republic case, and after finding that Bugarin’s properties acquired during the period in question were grossly disproportionate to his lawful income during the same period without any satisfactory explanation as to how this came to be, the Court granted the petition, reversed and set aside the Sandiganbayan’s dismissal of the forfeiture proceedings, and ordered forfeited in favor of the government Bugarin’s properties acquired from 1968 to 1980 that were disproportionate to his lawful income earned during the same period. The case was then remanded to the Sandiganbayan “for proper determination of properties to be forfeited” in favor of the government.
The preceding summary of the Republic case, readily shows that Bugarin was accorded due process. He was given his day in court to prove that his acquired properties were lawfully attained. A review of the full text of the said case will reveal that the summary of properties acquired by Bugarin during his tenure as NBI Director was based on his very own exhibits. From this enumeration, the Court set aside those properties that had been liquidated or those that had been obtained in 1981 onwards. Even those properties whose acquisition dates could no longer be determined were also excluded, all to the benefit of Bugarin. What remained was a trimmed down listing of properties, from which the Sandiganbayan may choose in executing the order of forfeiture of the Court.
Moreover, in arriving at the amount representing his lawful income or disposable income during his incumbency as NBI Director, the Court subtracted from Bugarin’s income as stated in “Exhibit -’38,” the personal expenses of his family, which according to the Court was quite conservative, again redounding to the benefit of Bugarin.
The essence of due process is the right to be heard.32 Based on the foregoing, Bugarin or his heirs were certainly not denied that right. Petitioners cannot now claim a different right over the reduced list of properties in order to prevent forfeiture, or at the least, justify another round of proceedings.
This Court continues to emphasize that due process is satisfied when the parties are afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their respective sides of the controversy. Thus, when the party seeking due process was in fact given several opportunities to be heard and air his side, but it is by his own fault or choice he squanders these chances, then his cry for due process must fail.
When the case was remanded to the Sandiganbayan for execution, petitioners were likewise accorded due process. Records of this case reveal that every motion by petitioners for resetting of hearing dates was granted, and every motion filed, either for reconsideration or leave of court, was heard. Although their counsel claimed that he did not receive the notice for the first hearing set on January 12, 2005 because it seemed that it was “sent to the wrong address,” the fact remains that by March 3, 2005, he had informed the Sandiganbayan of the mistake and, in fact, provided it with the correct address. More importantly though, after the January 12, 2005 setting, five (5) more hearings were set – May 5 and 6, September 29 and 30, and November 10, 2005. This time, petitioners were represented. Instead of questioning the order of January 12, 2005, which required the government to submit its list of properties to be forfeited from the delimited list found in the Republic decision, or seek leave to provide that court with their own alternative list of properties from the same delimited list, petitioners chose to pursue the course of seeking for the nth time the dismissal of the case altogether, an issue that had long been resolved and settled by this Court in Republic.
In that hearing set on May 5, 2005, petitioners’ collaborating counsel, in open court, sought leave to file a motion to dismiss. Necessarily, the hearing for that day and the following day were cancelled. On May 10, petitioners filed a Manifestation and Ad Cautelam Motion to Dismiss, dated May 5, 2005. The OSG pointed out that, save for the caption and the appellation of the parties, the above motion to dismiss was an exact replica of motion to dismiss filed and eventually dismissed by the Court in Republic. Eventually petitioners’ motion for leave to file a motion to dismiss was denied on August 8, 2005. The said Manifestation and Ad Cautelam Motion to Dismiss was subsequently ordered stricken off the record by the Sandiganbayan on September 1, 2005. Unrelenting, petitioners sought reconsideration which again resulted in the cancellation of the September 29 and 30 settings. Hearing was next reset to November 10, 2005 but this also did not push through because petitioners’ motion for reconsideration had not been resolved at that point. Hearing was eventually held on March 21, 2006. With petitioners duly represented and despite the absence of the counsels for the government, the Sandiganbayan issued an order declaring the case submitted for resolution and that it would determine which properties shall be forfeited. And as expected, petitioners also sought reconsideration for this.
Petitioners should have realized in the fallo, as well as in the body of the Republic decision, that the properties listed by this Court were all candidates for forfeiture. At that point, no additional proof or evidence was required. All that was needed was for the Sandiganbayan, as the court of origin, to make sure that the aggregate sum of the acquisition costs of the properties chosen remained within the amount which was disproportionate to the income of Bugarin during his tenure as NBI Director. To reiterate, the case was only remanded to the Sandiganbayan to implement the Court’s ruling in the Republic case.
To grant the petition and order the Sandiganbayan to receive evidence once again would be tantamount to resurrecting the long-settled disposition in the Republic case. This cannot be permitted. In settling this once and for all, Section 10 of R.A. No. 1379 is instructive.
SEC. 10. Effect of Record of Title. The fact that any real property has been recorded in the Registry of Property or office of the Registry of Deeds in the name of respondent or of any person mentioned in paragraph (1) and (2) of subsection (b) of section one hereof shall not prevent the rendering of the judgment referred to in section six of this Act.
Property unlawfully acquired by the respondent, but its ownership is concealed by its being recorded in the name of, or held by, the respondent’s spouse, ascendants, descendants, relatives, or any other person.
Property unlawfully acquired by the respondent, but transferred by him to another person or persons on or after the effectivity of this Act.
It is equally clear in the earlier quoted fallo of the Republic that this Court had already made a determination, nay, a declaration that the properties of the late Bugarin acquired from 1968 to 1980 which were disproportionate to his lawful income were ordered forfeited in favor of the State. Following Section 6 of R.A. No. 1379, this means that the late Bugarin, now being represented by the petitioners, failed to convince the Court that the delimited list of properties were lawfully acquired. With this failure, the said properties have been ordered forfeited to the extent or up to that which is disproportionate to his lawful or disposable income which was likewise determined by the Court in that case.
The properties, consisting of real and other investments, acquired within the subject period were identified and listed down in the case of Republic. Both the acquisition dates which were likewise indicated there were reckoned. Still in Republic, the lawful income of Bugarin during the same period was also determined by the Court based on his very own “Exhibit ‘38’” minus that tempered amount representing his as well as his family’s personal expenses. Therefore, when the case was returned to the Sandiganbayan, it was not, as petitioners ardently claim – to conduct another full blown trial or proceeding to determine or establish the very same things that this Court had long decided in Republic. Rather, it was to choose from among the Court’s identified and declared reduced list of properties that would approximate the amount which was beyond or out of proportion to Bugarin’s lawful income also identified and declared by the High Tribunal in the same case.
As regards the third issue, petitioners argue that since proceedings in the Republic case are civil in nature, the Sandiganbayan, in executing the Republic decision, the late Bugarin’s personal properties should have been exhausted before resorting to the forfeiture of real properties following Section 8, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
Once again, petitioners are mistaken. Categorizing forfeiture proceedings as civil rather than criminal is all too simple. Petitioners, who at one point already took the opposite view, should know better. Forfeiture proceedings under R.A. No. 1379 is a peculiarity.
In the Republic case, this Court held that it is civil in nature because the proceeding does not terminate in the imposition of a penalty but merely in the forfeiture of the properties illegally acquired in favor of the government. In addition, the procedure followed was that provided for in a civil action. Yet, in the case of Cabal v. Kapunan, the Court also declared that forfeiture partakes the nature of a penalty. Thus, while the procedural aspect of these proceedings remain civil in form, the very forfeiture of property found to be unlawfully acquired is inescapably in the nature of a penalty.
Necessarily, petitioners' position must fail. In forfeiting the properties of Bugarin enumerated in the list, the ultimate end was to abandon and surrender the properties unlawfully acquired in favor of the government. It is not to simply satisfy some certain or specific amount which can be done by merely proceeding with the personal properties first and real properties next. More than the amount, it is the property, whether real or personal, that is illegally acquired that is being sought to be seized or taken in favor of the government.
The properties of Bugarin in the list have been found unlawfully acquired. The same have been ordered forfeited in favor of the government a decade ago. It is high time that the Republic decision be finally carried out.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, The Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan dated April 3, 2006 and August 30, 2006, implementing the January 30, 2002 Decision of the Court in Republic v. Sandiganbayan, are hereby AFFIRMED.
* Designated Additional Member in lieu of Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bemabe, per Special Order No. 1283 dated August 6, 2012.
 Rollo, pp. 47-52. Penned by Justice Norberto Y. Geraldez with Associate Justice Godofredo L. Legaspi and Associate Justice Efren N. De La Cruz, concurring.
 425 Phil. 752, 761 (2002)..
 Republic v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 2 at 757-761.
 Id. at 241 and 243.
 Id. at 519, 656-657, 718-719.
 Republic v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 2 at 758.
 Republic v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 2 at 770-771.
 Lacson v. Executive Secretary, G.R. Nos. 165399, 165475, 165404 and 165489, May 30, 2011, 649 SCRA 142, 155.
 Estrada v. People, 505 Phil. 339, 353 (2005).
 Philippine Guardian’s Brotherhood, Inc. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 190529, April 29, 2010, 619 SCRA 585, 596-597.
 G.R. No. 187984, November 15, 2010, 634 SCRA 723, 734-735.
 Cabal v. Kapunan, 116 Phil. 1361, 1366 (1962).
 Ong v. Sandiganbayan, 507 Phil. 6, 21-23 (2005).

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.