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Timestamp: 2019-04-19 20:42:50+00:00

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Justia › US Law › Case Law › California Case Law › Cal. 2d › Volume 69 › Huntley v. Public Util. Com.
Huntley v. Public Util. Com.
FRED E. HUNTLEY et al., Petitioners, v. PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, Respondent; PACIFIC TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY, Real Party in Interest.
Reed H. Bement and Marshall W. Krause for Petitioners.
Mary Moran Pajalich, Roderick B. Cassidy, Timothy E. Treacy and W. Roche for Respondent.
Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro, John A. Sutro, Noble K. Gregory and George A. Sears for Real Party in Interest.
Petitioners, American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California and the real party in interest Fred E. Huntley, seek review of Decision No. 72568 of the Public Utilities Commission modifying and approving as modified revisions [69 Cal. 2d 70] of tariff schedules Nos. 32-T and 36-T of Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Company (hereafter referred to as PT&T). The schedules provide that subscribers who transmit recorded messages over its facilities must include in the recording the name of the individual or organization responsible for the message and the address at which the service is rendered. The commission later modified the tariff schedules by excusing the message sender from furnishing his address, if the address is published in a current directory listing. Failure to comply with these provisions is cause for termination of the automatic recording service.
The regulation traces its ancestry to complaints made by various organizations to the Federal Communications Commission (hereafter referred to as FCC) about anonymous recorded telephone messages. The tenor of the complaints was that the messages were often abusive or libelous attacks on individuals and institutions, and that anonymity encouraged such irresponsible action. Congressional hearings followed to explore possible legislation. In response to an FCC request American Telephone and Telegraph Company advised its subsidiaries (which include PT&T) to make available upon inquiry the names and addresses of subscribers to automatic announcements services. Since October 1965 PT&T has followed this policy.
In an attempt to avoid pending federal legislation, PT&T and the other Bell System companies prepared tariff provisions requiring that recorded public announcements include the names and addresses of those responsible for the message. Similar regulations were approved by the appropriate state agencies in 46 states and are now in effect.
The California regulation originated on December 30, 1965, when PT&T filed Advice Letter No. 9212 with the Public Utilities Commission (hereafter referred to as the commission) proposing to revise its tariff schedules Nos. 32-T and 36-T so as to require its subscribers to include in their recorded announcement their names and the address at which the service is provided. Failure to comply with this requirement, it was proposed, would be cause for termination of that particular service. Responding to complaints to the proposal, the commission initiated investigatory proceedings, ultimately resulting in the decision now before this court upholding the constitutionality and lawfulness of the regulation.
PT&T has about 5,700 automatic answering devices in operation. The devices fall into three categories: automatic [69 Cal. 2d 71] answering (about 2,300 installations); automatic answering and recording (about 3,200 installations); and recorder coupler (about 200 installations). Depending upon the nature of the equipment, the caller may just hear a message, record a message or hear and record a message.pre-recorded messages are typically used by theaters to announce current programs, by religious organizations to offer prayers, by commercial organizations to advertise services or products, and by individuals or organizations to present their views on current topics.
The regulation in question adversely affects only about 5 percent of those using the automatic answering services because the vast majority of the subscribers are anxious to publicize their sponsorship of the messages, and so are willing to include their name and address in their announcing message.
Petitioner Huntley, under the slogan "Let Freedom Ring," uses the service to declare his views on certain subjects which co-petitioner American Civil Liberties Union characterizes as "superpatriotic or conservative." Although Huntley identified his message with the Let Freedom Ring organization, he did not give his name or any address, and refuses to include such information in his announcing message.
[2a] In the instant case, the parties do not present any factual questions.petitioners urge that the identification requirement required by the commission unduly violates freedom of speech as guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and by article I, section 9 of the California Constitution.
Freedom of speech encompasses more than simply the right to be protected from censorship of content. It extends to communication in its most fundamental sense. The First Amendment embraces both the right to disseminate information (Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143, 146-147 [87 L. Ed. 1313, 1316, 1318-1319, 63 S. Ct. 862]; Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 [82 L. Ed. 949, 954, 58 S.Ct. 666])and necessarily the right to receive it (Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 [14 L. Ed. 2d 398, 85 S.Ct. 1493]).
The majority may freely assert its beliefs and is secured freedom of speech by the very fact of its mathematical majority. It is the minority, whether of the left or the right, which must overcome accepted views. To succeed, the minority must persuade others until, as is the nature of a democratic society, it hopefully attains the status of the majority. In doing so, the minority will frequently be subjected to criticism and debate, a necessary adjunct to the ascertainment of truth. But, depending upon the popularity of the minority position and the inviolability of the majority beliefs, the proponents of change may also be subjected to harassment, threats and violence.
In this context, as correctly contended by petitioners, anonymity may be an indispensable prerequisite to speech. When the content of speech may lead to harassment or reprisal, fear or apprehension may deter expression in the first instance. History is replete with unpopular ideas which now form the foundation of modern society's mores and laws, but which could only be asserted anonymously when first expressed.
The First Amendment right to remain anonymous recognized in Talley clearly encompasses all forms of expression whether they be writings, or as in the instant case, a recorded message published over the telephone.
It bears emphasis that the disclosure requirement upheld in Canon did abridge freedom of speech (61 Cal.2d at p. 460), but under the particular facts, the infringement was minimal and justified by a sufficient state interest.
The commission argues that Talley deals only with "primary actors," and that PT&T as an "intervening neutral or unsympathetic" commercial instrumentality may disassociate itself from authorship of the message by compelling disclosure.
The commission's reliance on Sokol v. Public Utilities Com., 65 Cal. 2d 247 [53 Cal. Rptr. 673, 418 P.2d 265], is misplaced. In Sokol, this court held that PT&T was not liable for damages caused by its compliance with an unconstitutional regulation imposed by the commission. This does not even imply that the commission can continue to enforce an invalid regulation simply because PT&T may not be responsible for complying with the regulation. The Sokol case has no application to the instant one.
PT&T also urges that identification is necessary, otherwise callers might assume that the message was sponsored by the telephone company. This assertion borders on the frivolous. It is very doubtful that callers would ascribe the contents of a recorded message to PT&T. This supposed danger would exist even where the message was not pre-recorded but recited by an anonymous individual. But even were there merit in this contention, the tariff would fail because of its overbreadth. [69 Cal. 2d 77]  As stated by the United States Supreme Court in Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 [5 L. Ed. 2d 231, 237, 81 S. Ct. 247], "even though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved." (Cf. Sherbert v. Verner, supra, 374 U.S. 398, 407 [10 L. Ed. 2d 965, 972].) Obviously, the telephone company could allay its fears by simply requiring the subscriber to state that the message was not sponsored by the telephone company. (Cf. Wirta v. Alameda-Contra Costa Transit Dist., supra, 68 Cal. 2d 51.) This would fully protect the telephone company's reputation while not infringing upon First Amendment rights.
Respondents contend that the instant case is controlled by Lewis Publishing Co. v. Morgan, 229 U.S. 288 [57 L. Ed. 1190, 33 S. Ct. 867], where the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of section two of the Post Office Appropriation Act of 1912 which required the users of second-class mailing privileges to annually publish with the post office and the public the names of their officers, owners, and creditors. Respondents ingenuously argue that failure to comply with the identification requirement would only result in loss of recorded message services, leaving other alternatives, as was true in Lewis Publishing Co. v. Morgan, where first-class mail was still available.
Lastly, respondents contend that we should uphold the constitutionality of the regulation since similar provisions may be found in the Federal Communications Act of 1934 as amended in 1960. (47 U.S.C. § 317 (a)(2).) Section 317 requires a broadcasting station to identify any person or organization which furnishes material concerning a political program or program involving discussion of any controversial issue.
The analogy is not persuasive. In the first place, the federal statute has never been constitutionally tested. fn. 2 It is true that insofar as section 317 requires identification of the sponsor of the message it is similar to the regulation before us. But, there the similarity ends. The environment of broadcasting stations is totally different from telephone service. The airways, by their very nature, necessitate federal licensing laws as to the number and permissible operating power of broadcasting stations. Because of the limited number of licenses available and significant influence of broadcasts, this is an area which greatly affects the public interest, and therefore can be carefully regulated to serve that interest. A "telephone number" hardly enjoys the same monopolistic position of a radio or television station. The broadcasts are imposed on the public generally and indiscriminately; whereas, a recorded telephone message must be actively sought by the caller. Moreover, unlike recorded telephone messages radio or television broadcasts require substantial expenditures. fn. 3 An organization large enough to afford radio or television time would be less susceptible to harassment or reprisals, and less likely to be intimidated than the user of the inexpensive telephone service.
For these reasons, section 317, as yet constitutionally untested, is not compelling authority for upholding a tariff schedule clearly falling within the constitutionally protected area recognized by the Supreme Court in Talley.
[2b] The tariff schedules unquestionably impair the First Amendment's guarantees of freedom of speech. Respondents have failed to establish a legitimate state interest justifying such impairment. The claimed need of PT&T to disassociate [69 Cal. 2d 79] itself from authorship of the recorded messages may be achieved in a manner not restrictive of First Amendment rights.
Traynor, C. J., McComb, J., Tobriner, J., Mosk, J., Burke, J., and Schauer, J., fn. * concurred.
FN 1. However, we found that section 12047 unconstitutionally discriminated in favor of California residents.
FN 3. The subscriber pays PT&T $35 for installation and $13.50 per month for use of the equipment.

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