Source: https://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-supreme-court/368/424.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 15:22:44+00:00

Document:
1. Failure to follow the formal requirements of Rule 32 (a) is not of itself an error that can be raised by collateral attack under 28 U.S.C. 2255. Pp. 425-429.
2. Though petitioner denominated his motion as one brought under 28 U.S.C. 2255, it may be considered as a motion to correct an illegal sentence under Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure; but the narrow function of that Rule is to permit correction of an illegal sentence, not to re-examine errors occurring at the trial or other proceedings prior to the imposition of sentence. P. 430.
Curtis R. Reitz, by appointment of the Court, 365 U.S. 841 , argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner.
Julia P. Cooper argued the cause for the United States. With her on the briefs were Solicitor General Cox, Assistant Attorney General Miller, Richard J. Medalie and Beatrice Rosenberg.
The present litigation began in 1959 with the filing of a motion to vacate sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255. Among various grounds for relief asserted, the motion alleged that the petitioner at the time of sentencing had been "denied the right under Rule 32 (a) of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Title 18 U.S.C. to have the opportunity to make a statement in his own behalf and to present any information in mitigation of punishment." The District Court denied the motion without explicitly discussing the Rule 32 (a) claim. 186 F. Supp. 441. The Court of Appeals affirmed, per curiam, 282 F.2d 352. We granted certiorari "limited to the question of whether petitioner may raise his claim under Federal Criminal Rule 32 (a) in the proceeding which he has now brought." 365 U.S. 841 .
Rule 32 (a) in pertinent part provides: "Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an opportunity to make a statement in his own behalf and to [368 U.S. 424, 426] present any information in mitigation of punishment." The meaning of this Rule was before the Court last Term in Green v. United States, 365 U.S. 301 . Although there was no Court opinion in the Green case, eight members of the Court concurred in the view that Rule 32 (a) requires a district judge before imposing sentence to afford every convicted defendant an opportunity personally to speak in his own behalf. There thus remains no doubt as to what the Rule commands. Moreover, the present record makes clear that this petitioner was not given an express opportunity to make a personal statement at the time he was sentenced. This case, therefore, is totally unembarrassed by any such factual controversy as divided the Court in Green. The only issue presented is whether a district court's failure explicitly to afford a defendant an opportunity to make a statement at the time of sentencing furnishes, without more, grounds for a successful collateral attack upon the judgment and sentence. 2 We hold that the failure to follow the formal requirements of Rule 32 (a) is not of itself an error that can be raised by collateral attack, and we accordingly affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
The circumstances which led Congress in 1948 to enact this legislation were reviewed in detail by Chief Justice Vinson, writing for the Court in United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205 . It is unnecessary to review again here this legislative history, with which Chief Justice Vinson, as Chairman of the Judicial Conference of the United States, was particularly familiar. Suffice it to say that it conclusively appears from the historic context in which 2255 was enacted that the legislation was intended simply to provide in the sentencing court a remedy exactly commensurate with that which had previously been available by habeas corpus in the court of the district where the prisoner was confined. 4 See Heflin v. United States, 358 U.S. 415, 421 (concurring opinion).
The failure of a trial court to ask a defendant represented by an attorney whether he has anything to say before sentence is imposed is not of itself an error of the character or magnitude cognizable under a writ of habeas corpus. It is an error which is neither jurisdictional nor constitutional. It is not a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice, nor an omission inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of fair procedure. It does not present "exceptional circumstances where the need for the remedy afforded by the writ of habeas corpus is apparent." Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19, 27 . See Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490 ; Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 ; Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275 ; Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101 .
"We are dealing here with a problem which has radiations far beyond the present cases. The courts which tried the defendants had jurisdiction over their persons and over the offense. They committed an error of law . . . . That error did not go to the jurisdiction of the trial court. Congress, moreover, [368 U.S. 424, 429] has provided a regular, orderly method for correction of all such errors by granting an appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals and by vesting us with certiorari jurisdiction. It is not uncommon after a trial is ended and the time for appeal has passed to discover that a shift in the law or the impact of a new decision has given increased relevance to a point made at the trial but not pursued on appeal. . . . If in such circumstances, habeas corpus could be used to correct the error, the writ would become a delayed motion for a new trial, renewed from time to time as the legal climate changed. Error which was not deemed sufficiently adequate to warrant an appeal would acquire new implications. . . . Wise judicial administration of the federal courts counsels against such course, at least where the error does not trench on any constitutional rights of defendants nor involve the jurisdiction of the trial court." 332 U.S., at 181 -182.
[ Footnote 1 ] In an earlier motion filed under 28 U.S.C. 2255 the petitioner claimed that he had been prevented by government agents from appealing the judgment of conviction. The District Court denied the motion. The Court of Appeals set aside the District Court's order and directed that a hearing be had on the motion. 256 F.2d 957. After a hearing before a different district judge, the motion was again denied. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 268 F.2d 203.
[ Footnote 2 ] The majority of the Court in the Green case did not decide whether the issue of a Rule 32 (a) violation could be raised on collateral attack, or whether such a violation "would constitute an error per se rendering the sentence illegal." 365 U.S., at 303 .
[ Footnote 3 ] "A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence." 28 U.S.C. 2255.
[ Footnote 4 ] See Parker, Limiting the Abuse of Habeas Corpus, 8 F. R. D. 171.
[ Footnote 5 ] The Courts of Appeals, at least since the Hayman decision, appear to have consistently understood the substantive scope of 2255 to be the same as that of habeas corpus. See, e. g., Larson v. United States, 275 F.2d 673 (C. A. 5th Cir.); Black v. United States, 269 F.2d 38 (C. A. 9th Cir.); Taylor v. United States, 229 F.2d 826, 832 (C. A. 8th Cir.); Kreuter v. United States, 201 F.2d 33, 35 (C. A. 10th Cir.).
[ Footnote 6 ] See Van Hook v. United States, 365 U.S. 609 , for the relief afforded on direct appeal in a case where the sentencing judge disregarded the mandate of Rule 32 (a).
[ Footnote 7 ] Rule 35 provides in pertinent part: "The court may correct an illegal sentence at any time."
[ Footnote 8 ] As has been pointed out, Rule 35 "was a codification of existing law and was intended to remove any doubt created by the decision in United States v. Mayer, 235 U.S. 55, 67 , as to the jurisdiction of a District Court to correct an illegal sentence after the expiration of the term at which it was entered." Heflin v. United States, 358 U.S., at 422 (concurring opinion).
[ Footnote 9 ] Compare Heflin v. United States, supra. In that case Rule 35 was invoked in a situation where we unanimously recognized that the only issue was whether "the sentence imposed was illegal on its face." 358 U.S., at 418 (Court opinion), 422 (concurring opinion). Heflin involved the imposition of separate consecutive sentences for a single offense.
The Court's contrary decision today, however, was perhaps foreshadowed last Term by the narrow scope given to Rule 32 (a) when the issue of the meaning of that Rule came before us for the first time in Green v. United States. 5 That case, like this one, involved an attempt to vacate a sentence as "illegal" under Rule 35 on the ground that the trial judge had failed to accord the defendant his right to make a statement before sentencing. The record there showed merely that the trial judge, in the presence of both the defendant and his counsel, had asked generally, "Did you want to say something?" and that, in response to this question, the attorney rather than the defendant had spoken. Recognizing that the right accorded by Rule 32 (a) is a personal right which must be extended to the defendant himself, the Court nonetheless denied relief, largely upon the view expressed by four members of the Court that: "A record, certainly this record, unlike a play, is unaccompanied with stage directions which may tell the significant cast of the eye or the nod of the head. It may well be that the defendant himself was recognized and sufficiently apprised of his right to speak and chose to exercise this right through his counsel." 6 This conclusion was reached in spite of the fact that the Government's brief before this Court expressly conceded that Green had not been personally afforded an opportunity to speak.
I think that a due observance of the requirements of Rule 32 (a), resting as they do upon the anciently recognized right of a defendant to speak to the court before sentence is imposed, is important to the proper administration of justice in the federal courts. And it seems to me that the Court is mistaken in thinking that the importance of that right is not reflected in this very case, for I cannot agree with the Court's conclusion that "there is [368 U.S. 424, 435] no claim that the defendant would have had anything at all to say if he had been formally invited to speak." According to the petitioner's brief, the denial of his right to speak was particularly injurious to him here because he had several previous convictions which presumably were known to the sentencing judge. 11 In this connection, he says: "Petitioner has been and is presently seeking collateral relief from those judgments and, indeed, has already had one set aside. This mitigating evidence, if known to the sentencing court, might have a profound impact upon the sentence imposed."
More importantly, however, whether the right to speak before sentence would have been of value to petitioner in this particular case or not, the right is one recognized by a rule which has the force of law and a sentence imposed in violation of law is plainly "illegal." If the Court is unhappy with the wording of Rule 35 - a wording adopted by the Court itself and submitted to Congress for approval as required by law - whatever change is necessary to bring the Rule into conformity with the Court's present preferences should be incorporated into the explicit language of the Rule and submitted to Congress for its approval. I would reverse this case and remand it to allow the District Court to resentence petitioner after granting him his right to speak under Rule 32 (a).
[ Footnote 1 ] Petitioner's attack upon his sentences was originally brought as a motion under 28 U.S.C. 2255. Since I agree with the Court that a motion under 2255 must, where appropriate, also be considered as a motion under Rule 35, and because I think petitioner is plainly entitled to relief under that Rule, I find it unnecessary to consider the question discussed by the Court as to whether petitioner is also entitled to relief under 2255.
[ Footnote 2 ] This does not of course mean that Rule 35 permits attack upon a sentence based upon mere trial errors. Rule 35 applies to any "illegal sentence," not to any illegal conviction, and thus by its terms the Rule protects only those rights which a defendant retains even if the judgment of guilt against him is proper. See Cook v. United States, 171 F.2d 567, 570-571.
[ Footnote 3 ] Rule 43 provides: "The defendant shall be present at the arraignment, at every stage of the trial including the impaneling of the jury and the return of the verdict, and at the imposition of sentence, except as otherwise provided by these rules. . . ."
[ Footnote 4 ] See Cook v. United States, 171 F.2d 567; Crowe v. United States, 200 F.2d 526. Cf. Williamson v. United States, 265 F.2d 236, 239. Similarly, it has also been held that Rule 35's corrective force extends to a sentence illegal by reason of the fact that the defendant upon whom it was imposed was insane at the time of sentencing. Byrd v. Pescor, 163 F.2d 775. See also Duggins v. United States, 240 F.2d 479, 483-484.
[ Footnote 5 ] 365 U.S. 301 .
[ Footnote 6 ] Id., at 304-305.
[ Footnote 7 ] But cf. MR. JUSTICE STEWART'S concurring opinion in Heflin v. United States, 358 U.S. 415, 420 , in which the four other members of the present majority concurred.
[ Footnote 8 ] 365 U.S., at 304 .
[ Footnote 9 ] Id., at 305.
[ Footnote 10 ] Domenica v. United States, 292 F.2d 483; Jenkins v. United States, 293 F.2d 96.

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