Source: https://www.incadat.com/en/case/994
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 20:34:59+00:00

Document:
Ahmut v. The Netherlands (1996) 24 EHRR 62; Al-Nashif v. Bulgaria (2002) 36 EHRR 655; B. (Children) (Care Proceedings: Standard of Proof) (CAFCASS intervening), In re  UKHL 35;  3 WLR 1;  4 All ER 1, HL(E); Bensaid v. United Kingdom (2001) 33 EHRR 205; Beoku-Betts v. Secretary of State for the Home Department  UKHL 39;  3 WLR 166, HL(E); Bronda v. Italy (1998) 33 EHRR 81; Chahal v. United Kingdom (1996) 23 EHRR 413; Chikwamba v. Secretary of State for the Home Department  UKHL 40;  1 WLR 1420, HL(E); D v. United Kingdom (1997) 24 EHRR 423; Devaseelan v. Secretary of State for the Home Department  Imm AR 1; F v. United Kingdom (Application No 17341/03) (unreported) given 22 June 2004, ECtHR; Gül v. Switzerland (1996) 22 EHRR 93; Huang v. Secretary of State for the Home Department  UKHL 11;  2 AC 167;  2 WLR 581;  4 All ER 15, HL(E); In re J. (A Child) (Custody Rights: Jurisdiction)  UKHL 40;  1 AC 80;  3 WLR 14;  3 All ER 291, HL(E); Johansen v. Norway (1996) 23 EHRR 33; M. v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions  UKHL 11;  2 AC 91;  2 WLR 637;  4 All ER 929, HL(E); McMichael v. United Kingdom (1995) 20 EHRR 205; Mamatkulov and Askarov v Turkey (2005) 41 EHRR 494; Marckx v. Belgium (1979) 2 EHRR 330; N. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department (Terrence Higgins Trust intervening)  UKHL 31;  2 AC 296;  2 WLR 1124;  4 All ER 1017, HL(E) 933; N. v. United Kingdom (Application No 26565/05) (unreported) 27 May 2008, ECtHR; P., C. and S. v. United Kingdom (2002) 35 EHRR 1075; R (Razgar) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department  UKHL 27;  2 AC 368;  3 WLR 58;  3 All ER 821, HL(E); R (Ullah) v. Special Adjudicator  EWCA Civ 1856;  1 WLR 770;  3 All ER 1174, CA;  UKHL 26;  2 AC 323;  3 WLR 23;  3 All ER 785, HL(E); Soering v. United Kingdom (1989) 11 EHRR 439; United States of America (Government of the) v Montgomery (No 2)  UKHL 37;  1 WLR 2241;  4 All ER 289, HL(E); Z. and T. v. United Kingdom (Application No 27034/05) (unreported) given 28 February 2006, ECtHR.
The proceedings, which were in the context of immigration and asylum law rather than child abduction law, related to a Lebanese mother and child, the latter born in July 1996. They had travelled to the United Kingdom in December 2004 ostensibly to escape the consequences of the Lebanese family justice system.
Once in the United Kingdom, the mother attempted to claim asylum. This was first refused in February 2005 which set in train a series of appeals and challenges which culminated in a hearing before the House of Lords to determine the application of the European Convention on Human Rights to the facts of the case. In this final hearing, the child was afforded separate representation.
The salient facts related to the situation the mother and child had left in Lebanon and the situation which they would likely face were they to be sent back. The parents' marriage had been characterized by significant acts of domestic violence. On the day of the child's birth, the father and his family attempted to remove the child to Saudi Arabia. These actions were thwarted and the father had not seen the child subsequently.
The mother then divorced the father. The father retained custody of the child but the infant was placed in the care of the mother until he reached the age of 7, whereupon he was automatically to be placed in the care of the father, or another male member of the paternal family. No judicial discretion could be exercised to allow the child to remain in the care of the mother. The only issue that could be the subject of judicial consideration was the appropriateness of allowing the mother contact during supervised visits.
The mother's case before the Court of Appeal and thereafter the House of Lords was that were she to be removed to Lebanon on the decision of the Secretary of State for the Home Department, then her right to respect for her family life would be infringed and would be so on a discriminatory basis attributable to her being a woman.
As a "foreign case" - the only conduct of the British authority being challenged being the decision to remove her to a non-Convention State where she would suffer the previously identified consequences - the burden on her was accepted as being extremely heavy.
Moreover, it was noted that the test had never been satisfied in respect of any of the qualified Convention rights in any reported ECHR decision. (Lord Hope clarified that in the absence of very exceptional circumstances aliens could not claim any entitlement under the Convention to remain in the UK to escape from the discriminatory effects of the system of family law in their country of origin).
After considering a variety of domestic case law and making reference to ECHR judgments, the Court of Appeal ruled unanimously that the mother had failed to establish a breach of Article 8. In this a distinction was drawn between two of the criteria which had been applied in such cases, namely whether there had been a "flagrant denial of the very essence of the right" or a "complete denial or nullification" of the rights protected by Article 8.
The former was held to be quantitative, the latter qualitative. Two members of the Court of Appeal panel found that there had been a flagrant breach, but all agreed that this right of the mother had not been completely denied for she could enjoy some form of family life with her son. The mother was subsequently granted leave to appeal to the House of Lords.
Appeal allowed and return refused; a return to Lebanon would flagrantly violate, or completely deny or nullify, both the mother and child's right to respect for their family life together.
The House of Lords held that the Court of Appeal had misapplied the core test, for there was no distinction to be drawn between a "flagrant or gross violation" of a right and its "complete denial or nullification". The expressions were to be assimilated, although the fact remained that the test was a very hard one to satisfy.
On the facts of the present case the standard had been achieved, for not only would the mother and child's right to respect to their family life be flagrantly violated on their return to Lebanon, but it would be completely denied and nullified.
Giving the leading opinion, Lord Bingham held that in no meaningful sense could occasional supervised contact visits, outside of the mother's home, be described as family life. The effect of return would be to destroy the family life of mother and child as it currently existed.
In reaching this conclusion particular attention was given by the House of Lords to the nature of family life which existed in Lebanon prior to the move to the United Kingdom. It was noted that there had been no familial contact between mother and father since the birth of the child, the father had not seen the child since the day he was born, and there had been no contact with any members of the paternal family.
The only family life wthat existed, and had existed for at least for the last five years, was that of mother and son. This family life could not be replaced by a new relationship between father and son. In this Lord Bingham recalled the actions of the father towards the mother, the father's imprisonment for failing to support the son, and the son's hostile attitude in respect of the father.
Drawing a contrast with the context which would ordinarily prevail in cases of child abduction, Baroness Hale noted that in the present case it was not the wrongful removal which had interfered with family life for there was no family life between the child and father or the paternal family. There was unanimity on the finding that Article 8 would be breached were a return to be enforced. The Law Lords also discussed Shari'a law as applied in Lebanon.
Lord Bingham noted that whilst the family law applied in Lebanon would fall foul of both Article 8 and Article 14 of the ECHR, Lebanon was not a party to the European Convention. He acknowledged that Lebanese family law reflected a religious and cultural tradition which was respected and observed throughout much of the world.
He therefore questioned whether it would have availed the mother to have tried to rely on the arbitrary and discriminatory character of the Lebanese custody regime had she not shown that the return would have nullified her and her son's Art 8 right to family life.
Lord Hope was more definite in his assessment, he stated: "The return of a woman who arrives here with her child simply to escape from the system of family law of her own country, however objectionable that system may seem in comparison with our own, will not violate article 8 read with article 14. Domestic violence and family breakdown occur in Muslim countries just as they do elsewhere.
So the inevitable result under Shari'a law that the separated mother will lose custody of her child when he reaches the age of custodial transfer ought, in itself, to make no difference. On a purely pragmatic basis the Contracting States cannot be expected to return aliens only to a country whose family law is compatible with the principle of non-discrimination assumed by the Convention." Lord Carswell expressed his support for both views.
Lord Brown did likewise and added: "It is certainly not the arbitrary and discriminatory character of the rule of Shari'a law dictating that at the age of seven a child's physical custody automatically passes from the mother to the father (or another male member of his family)-wholly incompatible though such a rule is with certain of the basic principles underlying the Convention-which, uniquely thus far in the jurisprudence both of Strasbourg and the UK courts, qualifies this particular "foreign" case as one for protection under article 8."
Baroness Hale however did not endorse such a standpoint. In her comments she remarked that the discriminatory laws of Lebanon were the reason why there was a real risk the child would be deprived of the only family life he had or had ever had. They were also the reason why the interference could not be justified. Nevertheless she recognised that it was the effect upon the essence of the child's right which was central in the instant case.
As regards the application of the ECHR where the return of a child to a non Council of Europe State is at issue see also: Eskinazi and Chelouche v. Turkey (Application No 14600/05) [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/ 742].

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