Source: http://taalikibnrad.myeweb.net/rich_text_53.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 01:46:44+00:00

Document:
Can the GOVERNMENT force psychiatric drugs on CITIZENS?
You can help Wikipedia change the world! » Donate now!
Drugs to make defendant competent to stand trial may be administered involuntarily under very limited circumstances.
Joined by: Rehnquist, C. J., and Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ.
Joined by: O’Connor and Thomas, JJ.
Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003) is a landmark decision in which the United States Supreme Court held that only under limited circumstances in which specified criteria had been met, could lower courts order the forcible administration of antipsychotic medication to an incompetent criminal defendant for the sole purpose of rendering him competent to stand trial. The court held that in this specific case, since the lower court had failed to determine that all the appropriate criteria for court-ordered forcible treatment had been met, the order was reversed.
Previously, in Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990), the court made clear that the forced medication of inmates with mental disorders could be ordered only when the inmate was a danger to himself or others and when the medication is in the inmate's own best interests. In addition, courts must first consider “alternative, less intrusive means” before resorting to forcible administration of psychotropic medication.
Using the framework found in Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992) the Court emphasized that an individual has a constitutionally protected "interest in avoiding involuntary administration of antipsychotic drugs" and this interest is one that only an "essential" or "overriding" state interest might overcome.
In 1997, Charles Thomas Sell, a St. Louis dentist who had a long history of a delusional disorder but no prior history of criminal behavior, was charged with fifty-six counts of mail fraud, six counts of medicaid fraud, and one count of money-laundering.
In 1997 a federal judge found Sell competent to stand trial and released him on bail. However, Sell's mental status deteriorated while he was on bail, and his bail was revoked in 1998. Also in 1998, on the basis of a videotape provided by an undercover agent, Sell was charged with one count of conspiring to commit the attempted murder of the FBI officer arresting him. The agent later interviewed Sell in jail, and by questioning got him to say something about hiring a hit man. In early 1999 Sell requested a competency hearing before standing trial for the fraud and attempted murder charges.
The question of whether the drug could be administered involuntarily was the subject of several other hearings. In August 2000 the magistrate found that Sell was a danger to himself and others, authorized Sell to be forcibly medicated on the grounds that only medication would reduce his dangerousness, that any serious side effects could be treated, that the benefits to Sell were greater than the risks, and that the medication were substantially likely to restore Sell's competence.
In 2001, Sell appealed on certiorari to the Federal District Court which, while reversing the federal magistrate's finding of dangerousness, upheld the order of forced medication on the grounds that it was necessary to restore Sell's competency to stand trial. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision in a divided vote. Sell's attorney pointed out that Sell had already been incarcerated for a longer period of time than if he were convicted for the offenses as charged.
Sell, on Writ of Certiorari, appealed to the United States Supreme Court. The American Psychological Association filed an amicus curiae brief taking a neutral position, supporting neither the government's nor Sell's position.
The question before the Supreme Court was whether the U.S. Constitution permits the federal government to forcibly administer antipsychotic medication to a mentally ill, but not dangerous, criminal defendant for the sole purpose of rendering him competent to stand trial for serious but nonviolent crimes, thereby violating his cognitive liberty. Civil liberties organizations contend Dr. Sell's right to physical and mental integrity is guaranteed under the First, Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.
Although the Supreme Court upheld two aspects of the appeal, it ultimately vacated and remanded on the question of the petitioner's dangerousness.
In a divided opinion (6-3), the Court held that the Constitution allows the Federal Government to administer antipsychotic drugs, even against the defendant's will, in limited circumstances. It affirmed that involuntary administration for the purposes of restoring a defendants competency to stand trial can be an appropriate means of acting in the state's interest to bring to trial defendants who are charged with serious crimes, overriding the defendant's right to refuse forced medication. However, the court outlined specific criteria which must be satisfied to justify involuntary medication. This framework was outlined in Riggins v. Nevada.
An important government issue must be at stake and only a case by case inquiry can determine whether the government's interest is mitigated by the possibility of a long civil commitment for the treatment of the mental illness or by the fact that long periods of confinement have already been served, as this would be subtracted from any criminal sentence.
There must be a substantial probability that the medication will enable the defendant to become competent without substantial undermining side effects.
The medication must be necessary to restore the defendant's competency, with no alternative, less intrusive procedures available that would produce the same results.
[T]he Constitution permits the Government involuntarily to administer antipsychotic drugs to a mentally ill defendant facing serious criminal charges in order to render that defendant competent to stand trial, but only if the treatment is medically appropriate, is substantially unlikely to have side effects that may undermine the fairness of the trial, and, taking account of less intrusive alternatives, is necessary significantly to further important governmental trial-related interests.
The Supreme Court held that the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals erred in approving the lower court's order allowing forced medication to restore Sell's competence to stand trial when the original decisions of the hospital and magistrate were based on Sell's dangerousness. Since the experts testifying at the hearings focused mainly on dangerousness and not on trial competence, there was not enough evidence in the record about the possible effect of the medication on Sell's ability to obtain a fair trial.
The Eighth Circuit erred in approving forced medication solely to render Sell competent to stand trial. Because that court and the District Court held the Magistrate’s dangerousness finding clearly erroneous, this Court assumes that Sell was not dangerous. And on that hypothetical assumption, the Eighth Circuit erred in reaching its conclusion. For one thing, the Magistrate did not find forced medication legally justified on trial competence grounds alone. Moreover, the experts at the Magistrate’s hearing focused mainly on dangerousness. The failure to focus on trial competence could well have mattered, for this Court cannot tell whether the medication’s side effects were likely to undermine the fairness of Sell’s trial, a question not necessarily relevant when dangerousness is primarily at issue. Finally, the lower courts did not consider that Sell has been confined at the Medical Center for a long time, and that his refusal to be medicated might result in further lengthy confinement. Those factors, the first because a defendant may receive credit toward a sentence for time served and the second because it reduces the likelihood of the defendant’s committing future crimes, moderate the importance of the governmental interest in prosecution. The Government may pursue its forced medication request on the grounds discussed in this Court’s opinion but should do so based on current circumstances, since Sell’s condition may have changed over time.
In examining the lower courts' findings, the court found no evidence that Sell was dangerous, so the court assumed that he was not. Determining that the findings of the District Court and Court of Appeals did not satisfy these criteria, the Court vacated the appellate court's judgment.
The court in its decision wrote that the standards outlined will allow involuntary medication solely for the purposes of rendering the dependent competent to stand trial only in rare instances. The standard implies that a court must make the finding that important governmental interests are at stake and its interest in bringing the accused to trial for serious crimes is important enough to override constitutional issues, and that the forced medication will not significantly interfere with the defense or have untoward side effects. Therefore, in each case the facts and circumstances must be considered individually, balancing the government's responsibility to ensure timely prosecution with an equal interest in making sure a defendant obtains a fair trial. The court must weight these factors and decide if forced medication will significantly further or hinder these conflicting interests of the state.
It is unknown in how many cases involuntary administration will now be justified, and any procedure outlined by the Court will require the government to submit proof on all the criteria outlined by the court. Beyond the federal situation, any constitutional ruling will apply to all criminal proceedings, state as well as federal. However, although this decision possibly affects only a small percentage of trials, it seems to add weight to a growing acceptance of the belief that government can override the constitutional rights of self determination on medical matters. The case potentially could have addressed a more serious question of whether governmental manipulation of an individual's mental state through psychotropic drug administration is based on false assumptions of what makes up a person's individuality. The court chose to sidestep this issue.
However, others disagreed, arguing that the strict limits imposed by the Supreme Court on involuntary medication meant that the involuntary medication of a non dangerous defendant would be rare, especially since government's "important" interest in bringing the defendant to trial must be unattainable by alternative, less invasive means.
At the very least however, the criteria set forth by the court will ensure that the lower courts considering the issue of forced medication must determine why it is medically appropriate to force drug an individual who is not dangerous and furthermore is competent to make up his own mind about treatment.
In 2004, Sell was found competent to stand trial and trial was scheduled. A week before the trial was to begin, the prosecution and defense claimed that he was mentally unfit for trial and the trial was continued.
On April 18, 2005, Sell pleaded no contest to federal charges of fraud and conspiracy to kill a federal agent, after serving eight years without trial in federal prison. The U.S. District Judge sentenced him to time served, six months in a halfway house and three years on parole.
^ a b c d e Sell v. United States. Cornell University Law School (June 16, 2003). Retrieved on 2007-10-30.
^ a b c d Prisoners Can Be Forced To Take Anti-Psychotic Drugs: Commentary on Sell v. United States. Duke Law School. Retrieved on 2007-10-30.
^ a b c Charles Thomas Sell, D.D.S., to be released on Alford plea. Association of American Physicians and Surgeons, Inc. (April 18, 2005). Retrieved on 2007-11-01.
^ Sell v. United States. Oyez.org. Retrieved on 2007-10-30.
^ Sell v. United States. Findlaw.com (June 16, 2003). Retrieved on 2007-10-30.
^ Court's Decision in Sell v. United States Reflects Psychology's Recommendation that Alternatives to Drug Therapy Should be Considered. American Psychological Association (June 17, 2003). Retrieved on 2007-11-01.
^ a b c Charles Thomas Sell, Petitioner v. United States on Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court. Supreme Court (June 16, 2003). Retrieved on 2007-10-30.
^ Does the Constitution Forbid Forcibly Drugging an Arrestee to Make Him Competent to Stand Trial?. Cognitive Liberty.org (March 3, 2003). Retrieved on 2007-11-01.
^ a b Drugging Defendents. The Christian Science Monitor (June 18, 2003). Retrieved on 2007-11-01.
^ Supreme Court Limits Forced Medication of Some for Trial. The New York Times (June 17, 2003). Retrieved on 2007-11-01.
^ a b Dr. Sell denied trial; videotapes document prison abuse. Association of American Physicians and Surgeons, Inc. (November 22, 2004). Retrieved on 2007-11-01.
This page was last modified 17:11, 25 November 2007.

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.