Source: http://jaapl.org/content/44/1/126
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 20:39:28+00:00

Document:
In Maine v. Giroux, 113 A.3d 229 (2015), the Maine Supreme Court considered Mr. Giroux's appeal of the denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas on the ground that his kleptomania diagnosis was new evidence that raised reasonable doubt related to his intent and should therefore have been admitted.
In December 2012, Collin Giroux was on probation from charges originating in 2008. He incurred seven new charges, including two counts of burglary, three counts of theft by unauthorized taking, criminal mischief, and violation of the conditions of release. Mr. Giroux subsequently requested an evaluation to determine his competence to stand trial and his criminal responsibility. He was found competent, able to appreciate the wrongfulness of his behavior, and able to plan his behavior at the time of the offenses.
Thereafter, Mr. Giroux waived indictment and pleaded guilty to all charges and accepted a plea bargain, including a 30-month cap on time to serve. Mr. Giroux's counsel requested that the case be continued for sentencing pending a third evaluation of the impact of Mr. Giroux's kleptomania diagnosis. The request was granted, and a presentence examination report was filed on January 1, 2013.
On August 13, 2013, Mr. Giroux moved to withdraw his guilty pleas, asserting that diagnostic information from the third report was new evidence of a mental abnormality that raised reasonable doubt as to intent pursuant to Maine statute 17-A M.R.S. § 38 (2014). The court denied his motion, finding that kleptomania is not a valid defense to theft under Maine common or statutory law.
Mr. Giroux was sentenced to five years' imprisonment with three years suspended and two years' probation. His earlier probation was partially revoked, and two years of the underlying sentence were to be served concurrent with the new sentence. Mr. Giroux appealed his conviction and was granted a certificate of probable cause to proceed.
The Maine Supreme Court upheld the ruling. In considering Mr. Giroux's claim, the supreme court reviewed Maine statutory and common law and found that both “make clear” that a person who “suffers from a compulsion to perform [a] prohibited act” may still have the requisite intent (Giroux, p. 232). In addition, the court noted that Mr. Giroux's argument was in essence an insanity plea; however, the Maine Legislature repealed the statutory volitional test of insanity in 1986. Ultimately, the supreme court found that the trial court did not err in denying Mr. Giroux's motion to withdraw his pleas, as his motion was not supported by common law, and it implicitly relied on Maine's former statutory volitional test for the insanity defense.
The supreme court considered four factors: length of time between entering and moving to withdraw a plea; potential prejudice to the state; Mr. Giroux's assertion of innocence; and deficiency in the proceeding at which the plea was entered (State v. Newbert, 928 A.2d 769 (Me. 2007)). The supreme court quickly eliminated the first, second, and fourth factors, while examining the third factor in more detail.
When evaluating the third factor, Mr. Giroux's declaration of innocence, the facts of the case were examined in light of Maine's current statutory and common law. Mr. Giroux admitted he committed the crimes but asserted he was innocent, because his kleptomania prevented him from acting with intent. Nonetheless, legal precedent in Maine does not support a claim that compulsions preclude acting with intent or awareness. Specifically, in State v. Ellingwood, 409 A.2d 641 (Me. 1979), the supreme court ruled that although the inability to control one's behavior may serve as an excuse for engaging in that behavior, it “does not negate the existence of a culpable mental state” (Ellingwood, p 646). Thus, an individual can know he or she is engaging in criminal behavior even in the presence of compulsions. Moreover, in State v. Mishne, 427 A.2d 450 (Me. 1981), the supreme court found that compulsions do not disprove intent. In fact, responding to a compelling need to act confirms that the individual acts with awareness. Likewise, in State v. Abbott, 622 A.2d 723 (Me. 1993), the supreme court ruled that feeling compelled to act does not prevent an individual from acting with purpose.
In further consideration of the third factor, the supreme court went beyond Maine law when it acknowledged that Mr. Giroux's claims that he was compelled to commit illegal acts could be appropriately considered in an insanity plea, pursuant to an insanity statute with a volitional component. Nonetheless, Mr. Giroux did not enter an insanity plea. Even if he had, the plea would have been viable only before 1986, when the volitional test was repealed from Maine's insanity defense statute. Finally, and significantly, Mr. Giroux knew about his diagnosis before entering guilty pleas, as evidenced by background information in the competency evaluation. Accordingly, the third evaluation was not considered new information, which would have influenced his pleas.
This case raises the question of which diagnoses are eligible for use in an insanity plea. As a result of the repeal of the volitional test in 1986, the state of Maine considers a defendant not criminally responsible by reason of insanity only if, due to mental disease or defect, the defendant establishes lack of capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his act at the time of the crime. Many states repealed the volitional test in response to the successful, but perceived unjust, use of the defense by John Hinckley, Jr., in his trial for attempting to assassinate President Reagan (see, Robinson PH, Dubber MD: The American model penal code: a brief overview. New Crim L Rev 10:3, 2007). The Maine Legislature repealed the volitional test in 1986, with one senator referring to it as the “devil made me do it defense” (Giroux, p. 234). While many states have limited their definitions of the insanity defense, some states continue to include the volitional test (e.g., Colorado, Connecticut, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Texas, and Virginia). In these states, a court may consider whether a defendant was able to control his behavior at the time of the crime. In Mr. Giroux's case, the court would have to determine whether he was able to control the impulse to steal.
On its face, kleptomania is not a particularly sympathetic diagnosis, given that a person acknowledges repetitive stealing. Is this person simply a savvy thief who was finally caught? The reader may also ask if this is the type of diagnosis the drafters of the Model Penal Code had in mind when articulating the insanity defense. In the present case, Mr. Giroux took extreme measures to avoid stealing; he handcuffed himself and considered tasing himself. Given his behavior, this case leads us to ask whether there is a level of irresistible impulse that negates the specific intent to steal.
Depending on the state, “repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct” may be excluded from the insanity defense (for example, Gen. Stat. § 53a-13 (2015)), giving rise to the question of whether kleptomania falls within this exclusion. The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition (DSM-5), however, classifies kleptomania as an impulse-control disorder, distinguishing it from antisocial personality disorder. This distinction suggests that kleptomania may be considered as not falling within the exclusion to the volitional test used in some states.
Perhaps a larger question is whether courts should examine symptom severity, rather than ruling out entire diagnoses. The current diagnostic trend, as reflected in DSM-5, is to move away from categorical diagnosis toward recognizing illness on a continuum, with various levels of symptom severity and dysfunction. For example, substance use disorders include severity specifiers (i.e., mild, moderate, and severe) based on the number of criteria met. Proponents of the dimensional approach point out that it allows for more precise diagnoses and the identification of individuals who would benefit from more targeted treatment strategies (Andrews G, et al: Dimensionality and …. Int J Methods Psychiatr Res 16:S41–S51, 2007; see also, Frances A: DSM-5 and dimensional diagnosis. Psychiatric Times March 22, 2010). The understanding that individuals with a diagnosis of the same disorder may experience widely disparate levels of impairment leads us to the question of whether courts should also consider a dimensional approach, as opposed to strict diagnoses, when evaluating whether insanity defense criteria are met. In regard to the questions posed in Giroux, is there a level of severity in kleptomania at which an individual cannot control himself in the eyes of the law?

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