Source: http://welglawyers.ca/practice-note-on-what-date-does-a-testator-need-testamentary-capacity-by-john-e-s-poyser-daniel-watts/
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 00:57:23+00:00

Document:
When does the client have to have testamentary capacity during the will making process?
As an example where the timing of a testator’s testamentary capacity is important, the English courts recently reaffirmed the law in Clancy v. Clancy.3 The testatrix had given instructions in November 1999. She was at the time of sound mind. However, she had not yet executed her will when she was diagnosed with terminal cancer in March 2000. She survived only two weeks after diagnosis. However, within that time, the lawyer attended the hospital at her request and signed the will with a staff nurse as the second witness. At the time of execution, the testatrix was heavily drugged, and it is very unlikely that she could have had testamentary capacity. However, the judgment reaffirmed the law in which she need only understand what the document was that she was signing, and not that she had testamentary capacity. The will was valid.
The affidavit of execution included in the Queen’s Bench Rules at Form 74F is potentially problematic. It provides that “the testator was of sound mind, memory, and understanding at the time of execution of the will.” It speaks to the date of execution, not to the date on which the instructions are given. One possibility is that the phrase “sound mind, memory and understanding” does not equate to testamentary capacity in this context, and only refers to the lesser standard imposed at execution. Otherwise, the affidavit of execution might be construed as being at odds with the common law.
The testator was of sound mind, memory and understanding at the time instructions were taken, and understood that he was executing a will giving effect to those instructions as of the date of execution.
It is submitted that the best practice is to amend the affidavit of execution under circumstances where the Parker v. Felgate doctrine is clearly in play.
The wording of the Alberta affidavit of execution appears to more closely parallel the common law as expressed in the Parker decision and could be used as an alternate formulation of the amendment that might be made to the Manitoba form where circumstances warrant or demand.
1. Parker v. Felgate (1883), L.R. 8 P&D 171 (PDA) [Parker].
2. Bradshaw Estate (Re) (1988), 30 E.T.R. 276, 90 N.B.R. (2d); Faulkner v. Faulkner (1920), 60 S.C.R. 386; Rogers v. Davis,  S.C.R. 407,  3 D.L.R. 351.
3. Clancy v. Clancy (2003) All E.R. (D) 536.
4. E.g. Laramee v. Ferron (1909), 41 S.C.R. 391, ¶ 44.
5. Queen’s Bench Rule 1.06.
6. Surrogate Rules, Alta. Reg. 130/1995, NC8.
* John E.S. Poyser is a member of the Wealth and Estate Group at Inkster Christie Hughes LLP. He is a past chair of both the Manitoba and National CBA sections dealing with wills and estates. Daniel Watts is an articling student working within the practice group. © John E. S. Poyser 2009. This article was current when it was written. No effort has been made to update it. It is not a replacement for legal advice.

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