Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/290/33/
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 22:19:08+00:00

Document:
"who have heretofore been or are now known as Indians of said tribes, affiliating with said Kickapoo Indians now or hereafter nonresident in the United States, who have been allotted land in Oklahoma or Indian Territory are hereby removed."
Then follow provisos that "any such Indian allottee who is a nonresident of the United States may lease his allotment without restriction for a period not exceeding five years," and that the parent or next of kin having care and custody of a minor allottee may lease his allotment, etc.
1. The Act does not remove the restriction on alienation from an allotment during the life of the allottee. P. 290 U. S. 38.
2. The qualifying phrase "now or hereafter nonresident in the United States" applies to the Kickapoos as well as to the other Indians named. P. 290 U. S. 39.
3. Where a direct allottee died a nonresident and the land descended to her son, who, though formerly a nonresident, resided at the time of her death and thereafter in the United States with the people of his tribe, the restriction on alienation of the inherited land was not removed by the Act; for at no time did the heir's nonresidence and his ownership of the land coincide. P. 290 U. S. 40.
Certiorari, 289 U.S. 721, to review the affirmance of a decree dismissing a bill brought by the United States to enjoin the respondent Reily from trespassing upon an Indian's inherited allotment, and from disturbing lessees in possession, under color of a deed from the Indian owner, and from prosecuting the lessees and certain federal administrative officials by certain civil proceedings in a state court.
This suit was brought by the United States to enforce its rights and regulations in respect of allotted Indian land held under a so-called trust patent. The land was allotted, and the trust patent issued, with the express restriction that the land should be inalienable for a designated period, which the President might extend, and that any alienation contrary to the restriction should be absolutely void. [Footnote 1] After the allottee's death and during the period of restriction, as extended by the President, the heir conveyed part of the land to the defendant.
The defendant prevailed in both courts below, 62 F.2d 621, and the United States petitioned for certiorari, which this Court granted.
It is settled, and is conceded, that a restriction on alienation such as is here shown is not personal to the allottee, but runs with the lands and operates upon the heir the same as upon the allottee. [Footnote 2] So it is apparent the heir's conveyance was void, unless in some way the restriction was removed before the conveyance was made.
The real question is whether the restriction was removed by Congress by the Act of June 21, 1906, [Footnote 3] which will be set forth later on.
Kickapoo Indian woman, and her infant son were members of the Kickapoo tribe of Oklahoma whose lands were allotted in severalty among its members in 1894. Both were then living with the tribe in Oklahoma, and each received an allotment from the tribal lands. In 1903, the mother, taking the son with her, moved into the Republic of Mexico and established a residence in a Mexican community or tribe of Kickapoos to be described later on. She continuously maintained that residence and affiliated with that tribe until 1929, when she died intestate, leaving the son as her only heir. The son resided in Mexico until 1920, and then gave up that residence and returned to the Kickapoo Reservation in Oklahoma. Continuously thereafter he made the latter place his residence and home. He was residing there in 1929 when his mother died, in 1930 when he made the conveyance to the defendant, and in 1931 when this suit was begun.
minor as herein provided, except that no such lease shall extend beyond the minority of said allottee."
In any view of the act, its words are not happily chosen. They are wanting in clarity, and lend themselves to ambiguity. Both administrative officers and courts have found need for resorting to interpretation and construction when applying the act.
"The purview discloses plainly and clearly a legislative intention to remove restrictions under given conditions; . . . when the whole paragraph is read with a view of sustaining it in all its parts the word 'otherwise,' in the second line, seems to be in contradistinction to allotment, so that it was clearly intended that all restrictions as to sale and incumbrance of lands, inherited or otherwise acquired (except allotments of surviving allottees), were removed under the conditions named."
"And the counts each allege that the deceased ancestor was an absentee Shawnee allottee, a member of the absentee Shawnee tribe of Indians, that the grantor was his heir and conveyed his inherited interest in his ancestor's allotment, and the stipulation shows that each grantor was an absentee Shawnee Indian and had been allotted lands in his own right. We think it also fairly inferable from the record that the grantors had been allotted lands in Oklahoma or Indian Territory, and that they and their ancestors were affiliated with nonresident Kickapoos."
On these findings, the conveyances described in the eleven courts were held valid, and the decree of the District Court as to them was reversed. Of the conveyances described in the other counts, the court briefly said that the facts obtained from the record did not support the claim of a removal of restrictions, and so the decree of the District Court cancelling those conveyances was affirmed.
Both parties acquiesce in and place some reliance on that decision. It is pertinent insofar as it holds that the Act of 1906 did not remove the restriction on alienation from an allotment during the life of the allottee. Under that holding, with which we are in accord, the allotment in question remained subject to the restriction throughout the life of the mother, the original allottee.
was a Kickapoo. All were absentee Shawnees affiliated with the Kickapoos in Mexico. Here, the heir-grantor was a Kickapoo permanently residing with the Kickapoos in Oklahoma when he inherited from his mother and continuously thereafter.
The defendant insists that the Act of 1906 makes a distinction between Kickapoos and Shawnees, etc., in that it removes the restriction on alienation as to the former regardless of their residence and as to the latter only where they reside outside the United States. No reason for making such a distinction is suggested, nor is any perceived by us. The relation of all these Indians to the United States was the same. All were emerging from the old Indian life -- the Kickapoos not in advance of the others. Some of each of the designated tribes had migrated to Mexico, and others of each were inclined to do so. It was this migration, accomplished and prospective, which led to the act. In short, the circumstances were such as to suggest that a line of distinction be drawn at residence in or out of the United States, and not at membership in one or another of the designated tribes. This we think is what was intended. Although inartificially framed, the act, taken as a whole, comports with this view quite as well if not better than with the other, and due regard for the status and interests of the Indians affected, which always are to be considered in construing such laws, [Footnote 10] requires that it be preferred and given effect. Therefore we conclude that the qualifying phrase "now or hereafter nonresident of the United States" applies to the Kickapoos as well as to the Shawnees, etc.
"The lower court also found, and the proof sustains it, that I-nesh-kin and Nah-she-pe-eth [the heirs] 'were adults and residing in the Republic of Mexico on the twenty-first day of June, 1906, and thereafter.'"
The conveyance was made on a later date. Thus, the heirs' inherited ownership and their residence in Mexico coincided before the conveyance was made. On the facts recited, the court ruled that the case came within the act, and accordingly sustained the conveyance.
mother. In our opinion, such a situation was not within, but outside, the act, and the heir's conveyance to the defendant was void.
Acts Feb. 8, 1887, c. 119, § 5, 24 Stat. 388; March 3, 1893, c. 203, Art. IV, 27 Stat. 557, 558.
Bowling v. United States, 233 U. S. 528, 233 U. S. 535; United States v. Noble, 237 U. S. 74, 237 U. S. 80.
C. 3504, 34 Stat. 325, 363.
Treaties of Oct. 24, 1832, 7 Stat. 391; May 18, 1854, 10 Stat. 1078.
Treaty of June 28, 1862, 13 Stat. 623.
Handbook of American Indians, Hodge, Vol. 1, pp. 684, 685; Art. X of Treaty of 1862 just cited; Annual Report of Commissioner of Indian Affairs 1872, title "Kansas," subtitle "Kickapoos."
Annual Report Commissioner of Indian Affairs 1874, title "Kansas," subtitle "Kickapoos."
Kapler Indian Laws and Treaties, 2d ed., Vol. 1, 844; Annual Report of Commissioner of Indian Affairs 1883, p. 45.
Act March 3, 1893, c. 203, 27 Stat. 557.
Jones v. Meehan, 175 U. S. 1, 175 U. S. 10, 11; Minnesota v. Hitchcock, 185 U. S. 373, 185 U. S. 402; United States v. Celestine, 215 U. S. 278, 215 U. S. 290; Choate v. Trapp, 224 U. S. 665, 224 U. S. 675; Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U. S. 363, 280 U. S. 367.
Annual Reports Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 1906, title "Kickapoos;" 1911, title "Mexican Kickapoo Indians;" Senate Reports, Vol. A, No. 5, 60 Cong., 1st Sess.; Senate Report No. 710, 72 Cong., 1st Sess.; House Report No.1901, 72 Cong., 2d Sess.
Act February 17, 1933, c. 97, 47 Stat. 819.

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