Source: https://www.justice.gov/crt/case-document/ruby-j-v-jefferson-county-board-education-district-court-decision
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 06:41:21+00:00

Document:
RUBY J., individually and as mother and next friend of L.L., a minor, Plaintiff, v. JEFFERSON COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, Defendant.
for Judgment on Plaintiffs’ IDEA Appeal and Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs’ Rehabilitation Act Claims (Doc. 44), filed February 24, 2015. The parties have fully briefed their Motions (Docs. 43, 45, 49, 50), and the United States intervened in this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2403(a). (Doc. 46). Plaintiff Ruby J., individually and as mother and next friend to her daughter L.L., a minor, asserts claims against the Jefferson County Board of Education pursuant to section 504 the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794, and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. Plaintiff appeals from an administrative due process hearing decision which concluded that Defendant satisfied its obligations under the IDEA. (Doc. 1).
Plaintiff’s IDEA claims is due to be affirmed and Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s section 504 claims.
L.L. is a thirteen-year-old student who has several serious disabilities, including Angelman’s Syndrome (a rare genetic disorder), Reactive Airway Disease, a seizure disorder (including febrile, petit mal, and grand mal seizures), and Cystic Cerebromalacia. (R. 25-26, 417-418).1 Surgeries to reconstruct L.L.’s airway damaged her vocal chords, she uses a wheelchair for mobility, and L.L. has a G-tube through which she receives nutrition. (R 25-26, 417-18). Plaintiff is a single parent and the primary caretaker of L.L. As her mother, Plaintiff is responsible for L.L., including caring for her by administering some of her medications. (R. 24-27, 90).
L.L. was expected to experience increased seizure activity as she aged. Therefore, in the summer of 2012, L.L.’s treating physician, Dr. Lauree Jones, prescribed her Diastat to help control her seizure activity.2 L.L. needed to have Diastat available while being transported for trips in excess of ten minutes.3 (R. 25-26, 107-08, 507-08). Although Diastat is typically administered by a nurse or other health care provider, Dr. Jan Mathisen, L.L.’s treating neurologist, discussed with Plaintiff how to administer Diastat to L.L. in case of an emergency. (R. 25-26, 98-99). Dr. Mathisen felt that no physical demonstration was necessary; rather, he referred Plaintiff to certain websites for a visual demonstration. (R. 99).
1 “R.” refers to the administrative record, as filed by Defendant with the court under seal.
2 Fortunately, L.L.’s seizures appear relatively infrequent. L.L. has not had a seizure while enrolled in Jefferson County schools, and, at the time of this appeal was filed, the last seizure L.L. experienced was at an amusement park when she lived in California. (R. 153-54).
On December 17, 2012, Plaintiff first registered her daughter at the Clay-Chalkville Middle School in the Jefferson County School District. (R. 24-25, 28-29, 503). That is the school for which L.L. was zoned. (Id.). L.L. transferred to Jefferson County from the Birmingham City System. (R. 221-22).4 On December 20, 2012, Defendant held an individual education program (“IEP”) meeting for L.L., and with Plaintiff’s knowledge and agreement, L.L. was placed at the Burkett Center, a school which exclusively educates children with disabilities. (R. 29, 503). L.L. began attending school on January 3, 2013. (R. 222, 227).
4 While in Birmingham City schools, L.L. was transported to and from school by Plaintiff without objection on the basis of “monthly reimbursement for a.m. and p.m. pick up at current mileage rate.” (R. 226-27). Plaintiff had previously entered into reimbursement contracts with every school system in which L.L. had been enrolled, including Jefferson County. (R. 226-27, 266, 500, 229-36).
5 Defendant has presented evidence suggesting that Plaintiff informed school personnel that she would not administer the Diastat suppository gel. (R. 155, 387, 448, 106). Plaintiff disputes that assertion.
Plaintiff received no other compensation. (R. 35-36, 44-45). Plaintiff does not challenge this initial arrangement.
purpose. (R. 249-50). On March 8, 2013, four days after this nurse reported for duty (R. 247-48), L.L. was withdrawn from Jefferson County schools. (R. 272).
In late February 2013, Plaintiff and her children moved to California to care for Plaintiff’s seriously ill mother. On April 8, 2013, a month after Plaintiff’s withdrawal from Jefferson County schools, Plaintiff completed enrollment papers for L.L. in California. (R. 272). On June 3, 2013, L.L. began receiving educational services in California. (R. 245, 272-73). The school term ended on June 11, 2013. (R. 272).
In her prior IEP, transportation was provided by the parent with in lieu reimbursement. The IEP indicated the parent had a note from [L.L.’s] physician stating a nurse was needed for transportation on the bus that was more than ten minutes long. [Plaintiff] is in the process of establishing doctors in this area and will provide a note us when given by the Doctor. . . .
(R. 480) (emphasis supplied). Yuba County agreed to provide a nurse on L.L.’s bus once it received the appropriate documentation from L.L.’s doctor; however, in the interim, L.L.’s IEP clearly reflects that Plaintiff agreed to transport L.L. to and from school for reimbursement. (R. 300, 475, 480).
On August 10, 2013, shortly before the start of the 2013-14 school year, L.L.’s family moved back to Alabama prior to the beginning of the 2013-14 school year, and returned to the same home they previously occupied in the Clay-Chalkville school zone. (R. 113-16). The heart of this dispute is the nearly two months after that (between August 27, 2013, and October 24, 2013), during which Plaintiff was responsible for her daughter’s transportation. (R. 43-45, 391-92).
Plaintiff claims she was initially unsuccessful in contacting the school’s administration to set up L.L.’s program for the next school year. (R. 28-31, 116-17). Plaintiff alleges that she attempted to contact Defendant “prior to school starting” on August 19, and again on August 21 and 22. (R. 116:6-11). Plaintiff also asserts she contacted the Exceptional Education Department several times, but was only given Special Education Director Susan Wirt’s voicemail. (R. 116).
which was dated July 1, 2013. Plaintiff told Dan Roth, the Burkett Center’s principal, that she was no longer able to transport L.L. to the Burkett Center. (R. 119-21). She asked that Defendant to transport her daughter. (R. 119-21). Roth told Plaintiff that, because Defendant didn’t have the necessary transportation set up yet, Plaintiff would have to temporarily transport her daughter to school. (R. 122, 249-51, 256-59). Because L.L. was deemed an out-of-state transfer, Defendant believed it was not required to immediately hold an IEP meeting to address Plaintiff’s inability to continue transporting her daughter. (R. 85, 207-08, 267-68, 270, 279). Roth told Plaintiff that her request for bus transportation with medical support would be considered at a board meeting on September 24, 2013.8 (R. 122). Accordingly, Plaintiff began transporting L.L. (R. 40-42, 89-90).
8 Although Jefferson County has the ability to contract with private nurses, salaries may not be paid until a position is created and approved by the school board.
Plaintiff and Defendant came to an agreement that L.L.’s absence would not be counted against her.10 (R. 41-42, 127, 180).
In addition, the parties dispute whether Plaintiff was told that she had to accompany her daughter on field trips. Plaintiff alleges that Jefferson County told Plaintiff that if she did not accompany L.L. during off-campus activities, including L.L.’s adaptive physical education class and other community based activities, L.L. could not attend these events. (R. 45-49, 77-78, 129, 174, 177-78, 392). Defendant has offered testimony from Rob Dawson, an Exceptional Education teacher at the Burkett Center, which, Defendant argues, undermines Plaintiff’s assertion entirely.11 (See R. 159-61).
10 In Alabama, attendance policies for schools differ from school system to school system, but the Alabama State Board of Education adopts standards for a mandatory and enforceable attendance policy for all students in public schools in the State. Ala. Code § 16-28-2.1. Parents can be held accountable for the failure of their child to attend school under these policies. Id.
Q. What were the circumstances under which [Plaintiff] attended [one of the field trips]? Did she come of her own volition? Did you tell her if she didn’t come that [L.L.] couldn’t go, or was there a conversation about that?
A. Oh, no. I’m sure I asked her if she could go. I never told [Plaintiff] or any of my parents that they had to do anything. No.
initial advertisement for an RN (pursuant to Dr. Jones’s recommendation), but the advertisement produced no applicants for the position. (R. 257-58). Wirt personally contacted L.L.’s physician to determine whether an LPN could meet L.L.’s transportation needs. (R. 258). When Dr. Jones agreed that an LPN would be sufficient (R. 390), a qualified LPN was hired and has accompanied L.L. on the bus since that date. (R. 261-62).
As the school system was attempting to secure a nurse to meet her physician’s request, Wirt attempted to contractually reimburse Plaintiff for transporting L.L. to and from school. (R. 251-52). Defendant had done this during Plaintiff’s first enrollment. (Id.). Wirt explained the need for a written contract (R. 394), which was only a temporary measure until the nurse could be hired. (R. 247-48). Although Plaintiff initially agreed to enter into the contract, Plaintiff ultimately declined to sign the contract that Defendant sent her on September 24, 2013. (R. 394-95, 450-51). On October 8, 2013, Plaintiff wrote Ms. Wirt declining to honor Defendant’s request for her signature on the transportation reimbursement contract. (R. 397). Plaintiff stated that it was not her responsibility to transport her daughter to and from school. (Id.). In addition, Plaintiff’s letter requests hourly wages ($10 per hour) for transporting her daughter — in addition to the reimbursement that the school offered. (Id.). Plaintiff also requested that the school provide her daughter with compensatory education to make up for the time L.L. missed school when Plaintiff brought her in late and checked her out early on school days. (R. 398). Lastly, Plaintiff expressed her concern that her daughter might not be getting the services she needs since she did not have a current IEP. (Id.).
transportation reimbursement contract, Defendant would not reimburse Plaintiff for mileage. (Id.). On October 14, 2013, Plaintiff wrote to Wirt. (R. 399-400). Plaintiff indicated that she believed the Defendant miscalculated the mileage to the Burkett Center from her house. (R. 399). Plaintiff also reiterated her demand for hourly wages in transporting her daughter to and from the school every day, as well as on school field trips. (R. 399).
On October 24, 2013 -- two days after Plaintiff filed her due process hearing request --Wirt told Plaintiff that Defendant would provide bus transportation for L.L. with medical support. (R. 261-62). On the same day, Jefferson County sent Plaintiff a progress report which stated that L.L.’s “infrequent attendance has negatively impacted L.L.’s performance with [her sensory activities] goal” and with her “self-help skills, health” goal. (R. 81-82, 178, 409-12). On October 25, 2013, bus transportation began for L.L. (R. 82-83). On November 6, 2013, Plaintiff began working outside the home. (R. 89). That same day, Defendant developed L.L.’s new IEP, which included bus transportation with medical support as a related service. (R. 83-84, 417-19, 429).
Superintendent of Education. (R. 307). In her request, Plaintiff alleged that Defendant wrongfully denied Plaintiff’s request for specialized transportation. (Id.). On December 9, 2013, a hearing was held before Wesley Romine (the “Hearing Officer”), in Birmingham, Alabama. (R. 1, 307). At the hearing, Plaintiff requested compensatory education, reimbursement for mileage, and hourly wages for taking her daughter to school each day between August 27, 2013, and October 24, 2013. (R. 12-13, 366). On January 30, 2014, the Hearing Officer issued his decision, finding Plaintiff was not entitled to any compensation or other relief because her daughter was appropriately provided services under the IDEA without any procedural violations. (R. 542-58). Following this decision, Plaintiff timely filed an appeal to this court along with a claim under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. (Doc. 1).
the district court which must consider the administrative findings but is free to accept or reject them.” Walker Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Bennett ex rel. Bennett, 203 F.3d 1293, 1297-98 (11th Cir. 2000); see also Doe v. Ala. State Dep’t of Educ., 915 F.2d 651, 657 n.3 (11th Cir. 1990) (same). “Courts owe some judicial deference to local administrative agency judgments, though that’s typically limited to matters calling upon educational expertise.” Loren F., 349 F.3d at 1314 (citation omitted). The court reviews legal conclusions by the hearing officer under a de novo standard. Draper, 518 F.3d at 1284.
With respect to Plaintiff’s section 504 claim, the court reviews the parties’ motions for summary judgment pursuant to the familiar Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c). Under Rule 56(c), summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the pleadings or filings which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Once the moving party has met its burden, Rule 56(e) requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See id. at 324.
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted. See id. at 249.
If the moving party bears the burden of proof at trial, it can only meet its initial burden on summary judgment by coming forward with positive evidence demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact (i.e., facts that would entitle it to a directed verdict if not controverted at trial). Fitzpatrick, 2 F.3d at 1115. Once the moving party makes such a showing, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to produce significant, probative evidence demonstrating a genuine issue for trial.
If the moving party does not bear the burden of proof at trial, it can satisfy its initial burden on summary judgment in either of two ways. First, the moving party may produce affirmative evidence negating a material fact, thus demonstrating that the nonmoving party will be unable to prove its case at trial. Once the moving party satisfies its burden using this method, the nonmoving party must respond with positive evidence sufficient to resist a motion for directed verdict at trial.
The second method by which the moving party who does not bear the burden of proof at trial can satisfy its initial burden on summary judgment is to affirmatively show the absence of evidence in the record to support a judgment for the nonmoving party on the issue in question. This method requires more than a simple statement that the nonmoving party cannot meet its burden at trial, but does not require evidence negating the nonmovant’s claim; it simply requires the movant to show that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case. Fitzpatrick, 2 F.3d at 1115-16.
If the movant meets its initial burden by using this second method, the nonmoving party may either rely on evidence in the record, overlooked or ignored by the movant, sufficient to withstand a directed verdict, or the nonmoving party may come forward with additional evidence that is sufficient to withstand a directed verdict motion at trial based on the alleged evidentiary deficiency. However, when responding, the nonmovant can no longer rest on mere allegations, but must set forth evidence of specific facts. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 358 (1996) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992)).
On this appeal, Plaintiff challenges the Hearing Officer’s January 30, 2014, decision, finding that Defendant satisfied its obligations to L.L. by offering her services in accordance with her existing Yuba County IEP without procedural violations. After review, the court affirms both the Hearing Officer’s factual findings and conclusions of law.
15 In this case, the United States intervened for the limited purpose of defending the constitutionality of the IDEA. (Doc. 46 at 1). Because the court concludes that Plaintiff’s IDEA appeal is due to be denied and that Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s Rehabilitation Act claim, the court finds it unnecessary to address Defendant’s constitutional defenses. Nevertheless, to the extent a determination on Defendant’s immunity issues is necessary, the court concludes that Defendant is not entitled to immunity. Even if Defendant were deemed to be an “arm of the State,” the State of Alabama has waived any immunity that it could otherwise claim by accepting federal funding under the IDEA. 20 U.S.C. § 1403(a) (A “State shall not be immune under the 11th amendment to the Constitution of the United States from suit in Federal court for a violation of this chapter.”); see, e.g., Pace v. Bogalusa City Sch. Bd., 403 F.3d 272, 274 (5th Cir.) (en banc) (by accepting federal IDEA funds Louisiana validly waived immunity), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 933 (2005); A.W. v. Jersey City Pub. Sch., 341 F.3d 234, 238 (3d Cir. 2003) (New Jersey similarly waived its immunity); M.A. v. State-Operated Sch. Dist. of City of Newark, 344 F.3d 335, 338 (3d Cir. 2003) (same); Board of Educ. of Oak Park & River Forest High Sch. Dist. No. 200 v. Kelly E., 207 F.3d 931, 935 (7th Cir.) (Illinois similarly waived its immunity), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 824 (2000); Bradley v. Arkansas Dep’t of Educ., 189 F.3d 745, 753 (8th Cir. 1999), vacated in part on reh’g en banc, 235 F.3d 1079 (8th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 533 U.S. 949 (2001).
When the IDEA, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 et seq.,16 first became law, “the majority of disabled children in America were either totally excluded from schools or sitting idly in regular classrooms awaiting the time when they were old enough to drop out.” Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 52 (2005) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 332, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1975)). With the passage of the IDEA and its predecessor statutes, Congress sought to “reverse this history of neglect,” Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 52, by ensuring “that all children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs,” 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A).
16 Congress first passed the IDEA in 1970 as part of the Education of the Handicapped Act, Pub. L. No. 91-230, 84 Stat. 175. Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 51-52 (2005). It was substantially amended by the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773, and became known as the IDEA in 1990, Pub.L. 101–476, 104 Stat. 1142. See Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230, 239 n.6 (2009).
(D) are provided in conformity with the individualized education program required under section 1414(d) . . . .
20 U.S.C. § 1401(9). To provide a FAPE, a school formulates an IEP during a meeting between the student’s parents and school officials. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)-(B); Loren F. ex rel. Fisher v. Atl. Indep. Sch. Sys., 349 F.3d 1309, 1312 (11th Cir. 2003); see generally M.M. ex rel. C.M. v. Sch. Bd. of Miami-Dade Cnty., Fla., 437 F.3d 1085, 1095-96 (11th Cir. 2006) (detailing the IEP process). Notably, “[t]he FAPE described in an IEP need not be the best possible one . . . rather, it need only be an education that is specifically designed to meet the child’s unique needs, supported by services that will permit him to benefit from the instruction.” Loren F., 349 F.3d at 1312 n.1 (quoting Pace v. Bogalusa City Sch. Bd., 325 F.3d 609, 618-19 (5th Cir. 2003)).
impartial due process hearing has a right to judicial review of a FAPE determination in a federal district court. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)-(3).
courts can require no more.” Rowley, 458 U.S. at 207.
On appeal, Plaintiff argues that two procedural defects caused L.L. to be denied a FAPE. According to Plaintiff, Defendant did not provide proper notice regarding its decision to deny Plaintiff’s request for transportation as a related service and did not appropriately consult Plaintiff regarding the provision of “comparable services” under the Yuba County IEP. (See Doc. 45, at 30, 37). The court disagrees. The record reflects that no procedural defects occurred in this case. But even if a procedural defect did occur (and, again, to be clear, it did not), there was simply no harm that would entitle Plaintiff to relief. The court addresses each of these conclusions, in turn.
As Defendant sought to secure transportation in accordance with Plaintiff’s request, Defendant offered Plaintiff an interim arrangement. And Plaintiff’s own testimony reflects this interim offer was not a rejection. (R. 122). Rather, the offer was an accommodation that, at a minimum, satisfied Defendant’s obligations under Plaintiff’s operative Yuba County IEP. Therefore, because Defendant never rejected Plaintiff’s request for additional services, the notice requirement was never triggered and no procedural violation occurred.
that schools provide these services “in consultation with the parents.” 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(2)(C)(i)(II); 34 C.F.R. § 300.323(f); Ala. Admin. Code r. 290-8-9-.05(10)(b).
To be sure, the IDEA is very deferential to parents of children with disabilities, and with very good reason. Nevertheless, the following facts contained in the record are not lost on the court. First, the Yuba County IEP was not prepared and finalized until July 2013. (R. 465, 480). Prior to that, there was about a one-month gap between the time Plaintiff withdrew L.L. from school in Jefferson County, Alabama and the date she completed enrollment papers for her school in California. (R. 272). The record reflects that it was another couple of months before L.L. began receiving educational services in California.18 (R. 245, 272-73).
letter from L.L.’s physician. The school agreed to reimburse Plaintiff for transporting L.L. during the interim between her enrollment of L.L. and the hiring of the person(s) needed to provide the service. (R. 251-52). In light of these facts, the court cannot say Defendant violated the IDEA.
In this case, however, a review of the record indicates that (1) Defendant provided transportation as a related service “in consultation with” Plaintiff, and (2) Plaintiff had actual notice of every decision with respect to L.L.’s transportation.19 This is not to say that Plaintiff was always satisfied with the manner in which her specialized transportation requests were fulfilled — she clearly was not. But Plaintiff’s dissatisfaction with the product of her consultation with Defendant does not render that consultation procedurally defective. Moreover, and alternatively, even if Defendant failed to perfectly comply with the IDEA’s notice and consultation requirements (which, to be clear, it did not), the record plainly reflects that any such procedural defect did not result in the denial of a FAPE.
consider the impact of the procedural defect, and not merely the defect per se.” G.J. v. Muscogee County Sch. Dist., 668 F.3d 1258, 1270 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting Weiss, 141 F.3d at 994); see also Doe, 915 F.2d at 661-63 (holding deficiencies failing to impact parental involvement were not sufficient to warrant relief).
In considering the impact of the procedural defect alleged here, the court looks to whether it resulted in harm to the child and whether it thwarted the purpose of the procedural requirement. Weiss, 141 F.3d at 996-97; DeKalb Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. J.M., No. 1:06-CV-125-TCB, 2008 WL 8429694, at *5 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 3, 2008), aff’d, 329 F. App’x 906 (11th Cir. 2009) (“[T]o succeed on a procedural challenge, W.M. must show that harm flowed from the procedural violations . . . To do this, W.M. must show that the procedural violations resulted in a failure to provide an educational benefit or restricted the ability of the parents to participate fully in their child’s education.” (citation omitted)). The purpose of the IDEA’s notice and consultation requirements is to ensure “full participation of concerned parties throughout the development of the IEP.” Doe, 915 F.2d at 661-63 (quoting Rowley, 458 U.S. at 205-06); see also Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 311 (1988) (“Congress repeatedly emphasized throughout the [IDEA] the importance and indeed the necessity of parental participation in both the development of the IEP and any subsequent assessments of its effectiveness.”); Loren F., 349 F.3d at 1313 n.2 (“Parental involvement in the handicapped child’s education is the purpose of many of the IDEA’s procedural requirements.”); M.M., 437 F.3d at 1095-96 (same).
perspective) -- including a delay in Defendant’s provision of medically supervised bus transportation -- cannot be said to have resulted from any procedural defect of notice or consultation.20 Accordingly, Plaintiff’s objections regarding Defendant’s alleged procedural defects are overruled.
(b) The Yuba County IEP is Reasonably Calculated to Enable L.L.to Receive an Educational Benefit.
In the second step of the court’s FAPE analysis, the court must address the sufficiency of Defendant’s special education services provided under L.L.’s IEP. This inquiry calls upon the court to ask whether the IEP is reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefit. See K.C., 285 F.3d at 982. The Hearing Officer concluded that Defendant satisfied its IDEA obligations to L.L. by offering the same services contemplated by the Yuba County IEP. (R. 553-54). Plaintiff contends that the Hearing Officer’s decision violated the IDEA’s substantive mandates because: (1) Defendant had the obligation to transport L.L.; (2) L.L.’s transportation denied her a full day of education; and (3) L.L.’s transportation was not “free.” For the reasons outlined below, the court concludes that the Hearing Officer’s decision comports with the IDEA’s substantive requirements.
(1) Defendant Satisfied Its Obligation to Transport L.L.
FAPE because L.L. did not receive the “related service” of transportation. (Doc. 45, at 20).
20 A review of Defendant’s compliance with the IDEA’s substantive requirements, below, further confirms that L.L. did not suffer harm from any of the alleged procedural defects.
Defendant does not dispute that, under the IDEA, L.L. was generally entitled to the specialized transportation as a “related service.” See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9), (26)(A); 34 C.F.R. § 34(a). Rather, Defendant contends that it fulfilled its obligation to provide specialized transportation to L.L. by providing transportation services comparable to those offered under her existing Yuba County IEP, while at the same time pursuing bus transportation with medical support.
Both state and federal law help define Defendant’s obligations to children with disabilities that transfer from out-of-state schools with existing IEPs. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(2)(C)(i)(II); 34 C.F.R. § 300.323(f); Ala. Admin. Code r. 290-8-9-.05(10)(b). Under Alabama regulations implementing the IDEA, a school district must provide an eligible child with a FAPE, including services comparable to those described in the previously held IEP, until a new evaluation is conducted and eligibility is determined. Ala. Admin. Code r. 290-8-9-.05(10)(b). Accordingly, when L.L. enrolled in Jefferson County schools, Defendant had a duty to provide L.L. with a FAPE, including services “comparable” to those described under her existing Yuba County IEP.
After a due process hearing and briefing on the matter, the Hearing Officer determined that Defendant satisfied its IDEA obligations to L.L. because “an examination of [the Yuba County IEP] revealed that the child was offered the same transportation services when she re-enrolled in the Jefferson County School System as she was receiving in California.” (R. 552) (emphasis added). The Hearing Officer determined that the related transportation services provided under the Yuba County IEP and those offered by Defendant were “the same.” The court concludes that this finding is both correct and, in any event, due deference because it is certainly supported by sufficient evidence.
Under the Yuba County IEP, dated July 1, 2013, Plaintiff agreed to transport L.L. for reimbursement until Plaintiff had the opportunity to establish doctors in California who could confirm that bus transportation with medical support was necessary and appropriate. (R. 480). Plaintiff has never asserted that she did not voluntarily enter into this agreement.22 Less than two months later, after school had started, L.L. re-enrolled in Jefferson County schools and Defendant offered Plaintiff a transportation services contract that provided mileage reimbursement as a temporary measure until medical support for L.L.’s bus transportation could be provided. (R. 122, 251-52, 395).23 Although Plaintiff agreed to transport her daughter, she refused to execute the reimbursement contract. (R. 397-400).
22 Plaintiff’s voluntary agreement to provide transportation services for mileage reimbursement is one of the primary distinctions between this case and those instances where parents are “forced” to participate in the provision of services to their child. See, e.g., In re Montgomery County Public Schools, 504 IDELR 228 (SEA Md. 1982) (“[T]he provision of special education and related services to the child may not be conditioned on whether or not the parent participates in one of the related services.”).
23 In fact, this was the same reimbursement arrangement that Plaintiff accepted the previous year during her first enrollment in Jefferson County, except the dates were changed. (R. 252).
24 Contrary to Plaintiff’s assertion, Defendant’s request for an updated doctor’s confirmation (just like the one contemplated by the Yuba County IEP (see R. 480) did not undermine the “comparability” of Defendant’s offer.
evidence in the record which supports the Hearing Officer’s factual finding that Defendant offered Plaintiff comparable -- if not identical -- services to those provided under L.L.’s Yuba County IEP.
Moreover, the court cannot ignore the fact that the comparable services offered under the Yuba County IEP were merely a temporary accommodation provided while Defendant secured the additional transportation services Plaintiff requested (i.e., bus transportation with medical support). (See R. 122). It is hardly surprising that school districts may not always be able to immediately correct an inappropriate IEP, and that some delay may be expected depending on the type of services requested and the complexity of the problem to be accommodated.
It may be true that, as Plaintiff suggests, Defendant had Plaintiff’s 2012 doctor’s confirmation on file. However, circumstances change, and it was not unreasonable for Defendant, in accordance with its stated policy, to require annual documentation to support a parent’s request for services.
form of mileage reimbursement. (R. 397-400). Defendant’s behavior was clearly reasonable.25 Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to establish that Defendant did not provide L.L. transportation as a related service.
(2) L.L.’s Transportation Did Not Deny L.L. a Full Day of Education.
Plaintiff challenges the Hearing Officer’s decision insofar as Plaintiff believes it sanctions an IEP which would deprive L.L. a full day of instruction. Alabama’s rules implementing the IDEA require that children with disabilities receive a full day of educational programming unless the IEP team specifies a different length of time based on the individual needs of the child. Ala. Admin. Code r. 290-8-9-.05(2)(c); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9)(B); 34 C.F.R. § 300.11(c)(2).
25 Indeed, had Defendant decided to conduct an initial evaluation when L.L. enrolled to determine what services were necessary (as it was entitled to do under Alabama regulations), Plaintiff might not have received specialized transportation services for up to ninety days. Ala. Admin. Code r. 290-8-9-.02(1)(b) (public agency has sixty days to complete initial evaluation and thirty days thereafter to determine initial eligibility); see also Ala. Admin. Code r. 290-8-9-.04(1). Instead, the record reveals that Defendant expedited Plaintiff’s enrollment and provision of services by permitting Plaintiff to directly enroll in the Burkett Center and also by providing a menu of special education services even before Defendant could obtain the Yuba County IEP. (R. 31-32, 267-269, 454, 437).
26 The court agrees with and affirms the Hearing Officer’s conclusion that “[t]he same rational applies to the late enrollment of [L.L.] for the 2013-2014 school year. Timely enrolling a child in school is the responsibility of the parent — not the school system.” (R. 556).
(3) L.L.’s Related Transportation Service Was Provided at No Cost to Plaintiff.
qualify as ‘free’ . . . special education and related services must be provided at no cost to parents.” (emphasis added)); see also, e.g., Richardson Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Michael Z, 580 F.3d 286, 298 (5th Cir. 2009) (“Department of Education regulations provide that ‘[i]f placement in a public or private residential program is necessary to provide special education and related services to a child with a disability, the program, including non-medical care and room and board, must be at no cost to the parents of the child.’” (emphasis added)). For the following reasons, the court concludes that Plaintiff’s argument lacks merit. Defendant’s offer of services contemplated reimbursing Plaintiff for all the costs arising from L.L.’s transportation.
28 IRS, Standard Mileage Rates for 2013, http://www.irs.gov/uac/Newsroom/2013-Standard-Mileage-Rates-Up-1-Cent-per-Mile-for-Business,-Medical-and-Moving.
29 See, e.g., IRS, Standard Mileage Rates for 2015, http://www.irs.gov/uac/Newsroom/New-Standard-Mileage-Rates-Now-Available;-Business-Rate-to-Rise-in-2015.
Second, the court rejects Plaintiff’s argument that she is entitled to recover additional “costs” related to her temporary transportation of L.L. because Plaintiff saved Defendant from the necessity of incurring various expenses, including hiring a bus driver and medical support. (Doc. 45, at 29). Plaintiff characterizes this claim as her attempt to recover for “replacement costs.” (Id.). The replacement costs Plaintiff has identified are merely hypothetical expenses associated with Defendant’s transportation of L.L. by a means other than reimbursing Plaintiff. But Plaintiff never had to bear these hypothetical “costs” in order to provide L.L. with transportation. Therefore, Plaintiff has not shown that her actual and identifiable costs exceeded those contemplated by the IRS’s standard mileage reimbursement rate. What Plaintiff actually seeks is compensation. She is entitled to costs, not wages. The court concludes that Defendant did not deny Plaintiff a FAPE by offering her only the costs associated with transporting L.L. to and from the Burkett Center, and not the costs that Defendant would have had to pay an employee in her stead.
Plaintiff counters that a FAPE requires schools to reimburse parents not only for the out-of-pocket costs of the services that they provide for their eligible children, but also for their time and effort in providing those services. Plaintiff’s argument relies on School Committee of the Town of Burlington, Massachusetts v. Department of Education of Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 359 (1985), and two related lower court decisions. Hurry v. Jones, 734 F.2d 879 (1st Cir. 1984); Bucks County Department of Mental Health/Mental Retardation v. Pennsylvania, 379 F.3d 61 (3d Cir. 2004). A brief review of the case law confirms the Hearing Officer’s correctly concluded that Plaintiff’s reliance on Burlington, Hurry and Bucks County is misplaced.
by statute to include administering medications and treatments prescribed or directed by authorized medical personnel for compensation. Ala. Code § 34-21-1(3). Family members are exempt from the regulations and licensure requirements governing the profession only to the extent they administer medications and treatments “gratuitously.” Ala. Code § 34-21-6. Under Alabama law, Plaintiff likely could not have received Defendant’s compensation for providing “nursing” services without violating criminal law. Ala. Code § 34-21-7.
In Burlington, the Supreme Court interpreted the provision of the IDEA’s predecessor statute that mandated reviewing courts grant “appropriate” relief as conferring broad discretion on those courts, and stated that “the only possible interpretation is that the relief is to be ‘appropriate’ in light of the purpose of the Act.” 471 U.S. at 370. The Court held that reimbursing parents for expenses incurred by placing their child in private school is “appropriate” relief when a court has found that the public school placement was inappropriate and that the parents’ private placement was appropriate. Id. Although the Burlington Court did not address whether a reimbursement in excess of a parent’s out-of-pocket expenses was ever “appropriate” under the IDEA, in two instances, lower courts have concluded that it is.
In Hurry, the First Circuit addressed whether a child’s parents were required to provide transportation when a district refused to do so. 734 F.2d at 883. In that case, a school district discontinued door-to-door transportation for a disabled child after he grew too heavy for the bus driver to carry him up and down the steps of his home to his bus each day. Id. at 881. The district court concluded that this constituted a denial of related services in violation of the IDEA’s predecessor statute.31 Thus, the district court had concluded that by refusing to transport the child, the school system had denied a FAPE. In attempting to fashion “appropriate” relief, the district court decided that reimbursement should not be limited to out-of-pocket expenses. Id. at 883-84.
It is clear that if the Hurrys had hired a private agency to drive George to and from school, this expense would have been reimbursable under the EAHCA, just as the expense of placing George in a private school would have been reimbursable had the School Department wrongfully declined to provide him with an appropriate public education. Doe v. Brookline School Committee, 722 F.2d at 919-21. The fact that the Hurrys performed the service themselves rather than hiring someone else to perform it should not bar them from recovering the reasonable value of their time and effort.
Similarly, in Bucks County, the Third Circuit was faced with a school system’s refusal to provide services. The Bucks County court held that parents may seek reimbursement for their time and services, in addition to their out-of-pocket expenses, when a court “fashion[s] ‘appropriate’ relief.” 379 F.3d at 69.
remedy was based upon the conclusion that the school system had violated the IDEA. 379 F.3d at 67.
In summary, the record reflects that Defendant complied with all of its obligations to Plaintiff under the IDEA. The record does not reveal any procedural defect by Defendant, and, regardless, the record is clear that any such alleged defect certainly did not result in a denial of a FAPE. Defendant offered to provide specialized transportation services to L.L. in conformity with her then-existing Yuba County IEP until Defendant could secure a nurse to provide the requested services (which occurred on October 24, 2015). The court affirms the Hearing Officer’s decision that the services provided under the Yuba County IEP were comparable to those offered by Defendant and that those services provided L.L. with a FAPE.
33 The court also pauses to note that there is some question as to whether Defendant could legally have provided Plaintiff, as Plaintiff requested, compensation for any medical service Plaintiff provided to L.L. under the Yuba County IEP. Plaintiff admits that she seeks “reimbursement for her time spent providing related services for L.L., which included qualified health care services.” (Doc. 45, at 15 ¶ 45) (emphasis added). Plaintiff compares the services she was able to provide administering Diastat to those provided by a “private medical provider,” such as a RN or LPN. The practice of professional and practical nursing is defined by statute to include administering medications and treatments prescribed or directed by authorized medical personnel for compensation. Ala. Code § 34-21-1(3). Family members are exempt from the regulations and licensure requirements governing the profession only to the extent they administer medications and treatments “gratuitously.” Ala. Code § 34-21-6. Thus, under Alabama law, there remains a question as to whether providing Plaintiff with pay for performing “nursing” services would have violated Alabama Code § 34-21-7. But that question is moot in light of this court’s principal ruling in this case.
Rule of Civil Procedure 56. For the reasons outlined below, the court find that there are not genuine fact disputes related to this claim and concludes that Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Recognizing she is in a dubious posture by bringing a section 504 claim alongside an IDEA appeal,35 Plaintiff contends summary judgment is appropriate as to her section 504 claims on the very narrow ground that Defendant has discriminated against L.L. on account of her disability by failing to provide her with a full day of school.
The Rehabilitation Act prohibits an entity which receives federal funding from discriminating against individuals with disabilities. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). Section 504 mandates, “[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance . . . .” Id. To prevail on a section 504 claim, an individual must show that (1) that she is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) that she was either excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of a public entity’s services, programs, or activities, or was otherwise discriminated against by the public entity; and (3) that the exclusion, denial of benefit, or discrimination was by reason of the plaintiff’s disability. Bircoll v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 480 F.3d 1072, 1083 (11th Cir. 2007).36 The first element is not contested here. Instead, the issue is whether Plaintiff’s inability to get her daughter to and from school on time means Defendant has discriminatory denied L.L.’s statutorily mandated services.
35 Defendant argues that “appropriateness” claims (like Plaintiff’s) are not cognizable under either the Rehabilitation Act or the IDEA, but instead, are within the exclusive purview of the IDEA. The court need not decide the propriety of Plaintiff asserting these claims here, however. In any event, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on the section 504 claim for other reasons.
As discussed above with respect to Plaintiff’s IDEA claim, Defendant’s offer of services in conformity with L.L.’s Yuba County IEP did not deny Plaintiff’s access to a full day education; therefore, for these same reasons, the court concludes that Plaintiff cannot prove the second factor of the section 504 analysis as a matter of law.37 Accordingly, Plaintiff’s section 504 claim is due to be dismissed.
For the reasons outlined above, Defendant’s Motion (Doc. 42) is due to be granted, and Plaintiff’s Motion (Doc. 44) is due to be denied. The Hearing Officer’s decision under the IDEA is due to be affirmed, and Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s Rehabilitation Act claim. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims are due to be dismissed with prejudice.
A separate order will be entered in accordance with this Memorandum Opinion.
DONE and ORDERED this August 17, 2015.

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