Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/315/685/
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 14:42:51+00:00

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Justia › US Law › US Case Law › US Supreme Court › Volume 315 › Labor Board v. Electric Vacuum Cleaner Co., Inc.
National Labor Relations Board v. Electric Vacuum Cleaner Co., Inc.
to join the union was supported by substantial evidence P. 315 U. S. 690.
2. The conclusion of the Board that the closed shop agreement between the employer and a labor union in this case was not valid under § 8(3) of the National Labor Relations Act, because, prior to such agreement, the union -- although then the collective bargaining representative of a majority of the employees -- had been assisted by cooperation of the employer, constituting unfair labor practice, was supported by substantial evidence. P. 315 U. S. 694.
The evidence supports the Board's ruling that the employer, contrary to a collective bargaining agreement, coerced old employees to join certain unions with which the employer had no closed shop contracts, in violation of the freedom of employees to organize, guaranteed by the Labor Act.
3. An order of the Board requiring the employer in this case to cease and desist from encouraging membership in such union and discouraging membership in another; from giving effect to the closed shop provision of the contract; from giving effect to the remainder of the contract, when any other labor organization shall be certified as exclusive bargaining representative; from interfering with its employees' rights to self-organization, and requiring reinstatement with back pay of certain employees, posting of notices of compliance, and notification of the Board, was supported by the evidence and the findings, and was valid and enforceable. Pp. 315 U. S. 689, 315 U. S. 698.
4. A finding by the Board that a clause of a contract between an employer and a labor union whereby new employees would be required to join the union was abandoned and not subsequently revived held supported by substantial evidence. P. 315 U. S. 696.
5. Shortening the period for which the Board ordered compensation to be paid to employees wrongfully discharged or refused employment is not justified by the delays in disposing of this case. P. 315 U. S. 698.
Certiorari, 314 U.S. 600, to review a judgment refusing enforcement of and setting aside an order of the National Labor Relations Board.
The basic question for determination by this review is the right of the respondent employer, the Electric Vacuum Cleaner Company, Inc., to cooperate with unions, representing an uncoerced majority of its employees, to secure new members. The right is challenged because exercised prior to a closed shop agreement.
"remain in full force and effect for one year from date and thereafter, subject to thirty (30) days' written notice of my desire to withdraw such power and authority to act for me in the matters referred to herein."
We assume that the cancellation clause is ineffective prior to twelve months from the date of the card, and that all cards were dated just prior to the termination of the first, or 1935, contract.
United Electrical and Radio Workers of America (hereafter called United) affiliated with the Committee for Industrial Organization, began an effort to organize the plant. The Board, on adequate evidence, found that about sixty employees immediately signed United cards, that, on March 19th, a meeting of United was held at the Post Office building in East Cleveland, attended by a "large number of employees," and that, on March 28th, another United meeting was held "by a large number of persons, for the purpose of securing formal resignations from the A.F. of L. Affiliates." It is undisputed that a United charter was issued to the interested employees for a Local 720, and that, on April 2nd, the Local notified the employer by letter that a majority of its employees had resigned their memberships in the Affiliates and had "affiliated" themselves with United. Local 720 claimed in the letter the right to negotiate grievances "under the existing contract," i.e., that expiring June 23, 1937. This letter was not received by the employer until April 5th.
than those now employed, the Employer will secure such employees through the Unions; if, however, the Unions are unable to furnish such employees, the Employer may secure them elsewhere, it being understood, however, that such employees so secured shall become members of the Union."
members of the United to resume their work was justified because, at the time, a valid closed shop contract in favor of the Affiliates under § 8(3) of the statute, set out below, was in effect. [Footnote 2] Deeming the issues important in the administration of the Act, we granted certiorari. 314 U.S. 600.
In addition to the facts just stated, the Board found there was an oral provision pertaining to a closed shop included in the 1935 and 1936 contracts. This was to the effect, the Board concluded, that all employees hired after the date of the first contract (referred to as new employees) should be required, after a work-probation period of two weeks, to become members of the appropriate Affiliate union. Respondents contend the oral addition was somewhat different, and that under it not only were new employees compelled to join the Affiliates, but old employees (those employed before the first contract) who were or who became members of the Affiliates were required to maintain their membership unimpaired. Respondents' position was upheld by the Circuit Court of Appeals for this and other reasons. The freedom of old employees, under the earlier contracts, to join or not, as they wished, is acknowledged by all.
for a specified period, and being bound not to become a member of a different union during the term of the contract. The first situation, not the second, arose from the earlier contracts.
by the employer in order to maintain the membership of the Affiliates. Without a closed shop contract covering the employees involved, this company effort to maintain a union violates provisions protecting the freedom of employees to organize as they may wish. 49 Stat. 452, §§ 7, 8(1), (3), 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158(1), (3).
Respondents assert that whatever employer assistance was rendered the Affiliates was justified even under an interpretation of the contract which restricts the oral portion to a requirement that new members join the Affiliates. The assistance, it is urged, was rendered to collective bargaining representatives, selected freely by a majority of the employees and possessed of unrestricted and unrevoked powers to negotiate generally over labor conditions, including the closed shop clause of April 3rd and the new closed shop contract of May 20, 1937. Under this view, since the discharges took place after a valid closed shop amendment, they were in conformity with § 8(3) of the Labor Act.
"Provided, That nothing in this Act . . . shall preclude an employer from making an agreement with a labor organization (not established, maintained, or assisted by any action defined in this Act as an unfair labor practice) to require as a condition of employment membership therein, if such labor organization is the representative of the employees as provided in section 9(a) in the appropriate collective bargaining unit covered by such agreement when made."
Under the findings already sustained, the Affiliates were assisted and maintained by the cooperation of the employer in dealing with the old employees. Such acts encouraged the labor organization in violation of the portion of § 8(3) preceding the proviso, set out in note 2 Consequently, when the closed shop agreement was adopted April 3rd, it was invalid because entered into with a labor organization assisted by an employer in the precise words of § 8(3) quoted above. Cf. International Assn. of Machinists v. Labor Board, 311 U. S. 72, 311 U. S. 81. Being invalid, the discharges violated §§ 7, 8(1) and (3).
Since we have held that assistance was given the Affiliates by the unfair labor practice of encouraging membership in those unions, it follows that the closed shop agreement of April 3rd, requiring old employees to be members of the Affiliates, was made with an assisted labor organization, and could be held invalid. International Assn. of Machinists v. Labor Board, 311 U. S. 72, 311 U. S. 75. How long that invalidity continues is an inference of fact for the fair determination of the Board. Cf. H. J. Heinz Co. v. Labor Board, 311 U. S. 514, 311 U. S. 522. Consequently, the refusal of the employer to permit the employees to work without clearance from the Affiliates could be found a forbidden interference and discrimination. § 8(1) and (3). Labor Board v. Link-Belt Co., 311 U. S. 584, 311 U. S. 601. Further, the Board's conclusion that the infirmities of the April 3rd arrangement were destructive of the May 20th contract proceeds naturally from its decision as to the effect of the employer activities prior to April 3rd. The force of the unfair practices was not necessarily dissipated so quickly.
The employer calls our attention to provisions of the order reinstating employees which it feels erroneous. So far as this objection is based on an interpretation of the 1936 oral contract to require old employees to maintain their membership, it is answered by prior portions of this opinion. The employer's refusal to admit these old employees to work on and after April 5th is properly remedied by reinstating them in their position and granting them back pay.
There is a different basis, however, for the objection to the reinstatement of the new employees. This is that, under any interpretation of the oral clause of the 1936 contract, these men must become members of the Affiliates, and therefore the employer's refusal to take them back on their jobs is proper even though the April 3rd arrangement is invalid. The Board answers that the April 3rd arrangement was an abandonment of the earlier oral clause, and that, consequently, the discharges made pursuant to the later invalid closed shop arrangements are improper. The abandonment, the Board finds, was intentional, and therefore the subsequent invalidation of the later arrangement did not revive the vitality of the earlier oral contract.
"solution to the problem [i.e., 'the situation that resulted in the closing of the plant'] is proper enforcement of the present agreement, and that no one be allowed to resume work unless affiliated with these organizations."
"[i]n substance, though not in form, the arrangement effected between the respondent and the A.F. of L. Affiliates on or about April 3, 1937, was an abandonment of the oral agreement as insufficient to meet the exigencies of the situation and its replacement by a closed shop agreement"
is unsupported by substantial evidence.
delay in entering the final order. Handling of complaints as quickly as is consistent with good administration is, of course, essential. It is important both to the employer who may have to pay back wages and to the employee who must live without his job. Unfortunately this cause took from June 10, 1937, to December 31, 1939. There is nothing in the record, beyond a failure of the Board to file an intermediate report, which would tend to justify us, however, in shortening the period for compensation. This error was admitted and corrected by the Board. We cannot penalize the employees for this happening.
The judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals is reversed with directions to enforce the order of the Board except as to reimbursement of federal, state, and local work-relief projects.
MR. JUSTICE ROBERTS is of the opinion the judgment should be affirmed for the reasons stated in the opinion of the Circuit Court of Appeals, 120 F.2d 611.
Certain clauses of the order relating to reimbursement of federal, state and local work relief projects are abandoned by the Board and should be eliminated. Republic Steel Corp. v. Labor Board, 311 U. S. 7.
"It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer -- . . (3) By discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization: Provided, That nothing in this Act or . . . any other statute of the United States shall preclude an employer from making an agreement with a labor organization (not established, maintained, or assisted by any action defined in this Act as an unfair labor practice) to require as a condition of employment membership therein, if such labor organization is the representative of the employees as provided in section 9(a) in the appropriate collective bargaining unit covered by such agreement when made."
"I, the undersigned, . . . hereby authorize my Craft Organization . . . to represent me and, in my behalf, to negotiate and conclude all agreements as to hours of labor, wages and other employment conditions. . . ."
"The full power and authority to act for the undersigned as described herein supersedes any power or authority heretofore given to any person or organization to represent me, and shall remain in full force and effect for one year from date and thereafter, subject to thirty (30) days' written notice of my desire to withdraw such power and authority to act for me in the matters referred to herein."
Labor Board v. Lund, 103 F.2d 815; National Labor Relations Bd. v. National Motor Bearing Co., 105 F.2d 652.
"The assertion that the bill favors the closed shop is particularly misleading in view of the fact that the proviso in two respects actually narrows the now existent law regarding closed shop agreements. While today an employer may negotiate such an agreement even with a minority union, the bill provides that an employer shall be allowed to make a closed shop contract only with a labor organization that represents the majority of employees in the appropriate collective bargaining unit covered by such agreement when made."
"Secondly, the bill is extremely careful to forestall the making of closed shop agreements with organizations that have been 'established, maintained, or assisted' by any action defined in the bill as an unfair labor practice. And, of course, it is clear that no agreement heretofore made could give validity to the practices herein prohibited by section 8."

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