Source: http://ga.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20180608_0000389.NGA.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 18:11:16+00:00

Document:
Magistrate Judge John Larkins' Final Report and Recommendation (“R&R”)[Doc. 345] is currently before the Court. The R&R recommends the denial of Defendant's Motion to Suppress Statements [Doc. 300]. The Defendant has filed objections to the Magistrate Judge's R&R that challenge the Magistrate Judge's mixed factual and legal findings that 1) there was a lawful stop of Ms. Liverman and 2) that Ms. Liverman's statements were not given in response to interrogation [Doc. 349].
A district judge has broad discretion to accept, reject, or modify a magistrate judge's proposed findings and recommendations. United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 680 (1980). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the Court reviews any portion of the R&R that is the subject of a proper objection on a de novo basis and any non-objected portion on a “clearly erroneous” standard. Accordingly, the Court has reviewed the Defendant's motion on a de novo basis as Defendant's objections go to the essence of the Magistrate Judge's evidentiary and legal analysis.
Defendant was arrested on July 29, 2016 by the Southfield Police Department in Southfield, Michigan after a traffic stop. (Doc. 336, Ev. Hearing at 4-5.) The Southfield police allegedly conducted this traffic stop pursuant to an outstanding federal arrest warrant out of Atlanta, which local FBI had informed them of prior to the stop. (Id. at 11, 19.) Defendant argues that the government has failed to “establish that the initial stop of the vehicle and arrest of Ms. Liverman were lawful.” (Doc. 349) (citing United States v. Harris, 928 F.2d 1113, 1116 (11th Cir. 1991), “in order for the initial stop to be constitutionally firm, there must have been at least reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct.”) Defendant argues that there is no evidence that the stopping officer was aware of the Atlanta warrant before he stopped her, and thus her statements, as “fruits” of the stop, should be excluded. Segura v. United States, 1468 U.S. 796, 804 (1984).
In addition to accepting Agent Nevala's testimony as credible evidence that Southfield had been made aware of the Atlanta warrant prior to the stop, the Magistrate Judge found that the statements were admissible even if the Southfield officer had not known of the Atlanta warrant before the stop. (Doc. 345 at 5.) He found that, because the Southfield officers were aware of the warrant at some point during the stop, the attenuation doctrine applies. See Utah v. Strieff, 136 S.Ct. 2056, 2064 (2016).
The attenuation doctrine discussed in Strieff treats otherwise inadmissible evidence as admissible when the connection between the unconstitutional police conduct and the evidence is remote or has been interrupted by some intervening circumstance. Id. at 2061. The Supreme Court discusses three factors that guide an attenuation doctrine analysis: 1) the temporal proximity between unconstitutional conduct and discovery of evidence; 2) the presence of intervening circumstances; and 3) the purpose and flagrancy of official misconduct. Id. at 2062 (citing Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975)). In Strieff, the defendant was stopped after leaving a suspected drug house, and then arrested after the officer learned of an outstanding traffic warrant. Strieff, 136 S.Ct. at 2060. The officer then searched Strieff incident to the arrest, and found drugs. Id. In analyzing the situation under the factors established in Brown, the Supreme Court found that, even though the temporal proximity factor weighed in favor of suppression, the intervening circumstance of the valid warrant and the lack of flagrant misconduct outweighed temporal concerns. Id. at 2057.
The record before the Court suggests that the Southfield officers arrested Ms. Liverman with knowledge of the Atlanta warrant. (Doc. 336 at 11, 19.) Thus, the Court agrees with the interpretation and analysis of the Magistrate Judge in finding that the arrest was conducted pursuant to the Atlanta warrant; and arguendo, if not, the evidence is still admissible under the “attenuation doctrine” detailed in Strieff.

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