Source: https://connecticut.lexroll.com/altamura-v-altamura-landscaping-2170-crb-7-94-10-9-3-96/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 12:29:52+00:00

Document:
The claimant was not represented at oral argument. Notice sent to Joseph N. Tauber, Esq.
The respondents were represented by Paul M. Cramer, Esq., Howard, Kohn, Sprague Fitzgerald.
The claimant has petitioned for review from the September 29, 1994 Amended Finding and Dismissal of the Commissioner acting for the Seventh District. He argues on appeal that the trial commissioner improperly dismissed his claim for benefits. We affirm the trial commissioner’s decision.
Practice Book § 4056 provides that a motion to dismiss an appeal based on failure to timely file papers must be filed “within ten days after the filing of the appeal . . . or if the ground alleged subsequently occurs, within ten days after it has arisen.” If the motion to dismiss is timely, this board may then consider dismissing the appeal. See Practice Book § 4055; see also § 31-301 (e) C.G.S. (procedure in appealing commissioner’s decision is the same as procedure used in appeals from superior court decisions, where applicable). If the appellee fails to move for dismissal within the ten-day period, the defect is waived. Sager v. GAB Business Services, Inc., 11 Conn. App. 693, 698 (1987).
The claimant argues in his brief that the trial commissioner erred by not finding that notice to the insurance agent was equivalent to notice to the insurer, and that she erred by concluding that the claimant failed to file a timely claim.
At the time of the alleged injury, § 31-294 [now §31-294c] C.G.S. provided that a workers’ compensation claim could not be maintained “unless a written notice of claim for compensation is given within one year from the date of the accident . . . which caused the personal injury. . . . Such notice may be given to the employer or any commissioner and shall state, in simple language, the date and place of the accident and the nature of the injury resulting therefrom, . . . and the name and address of the employee and of the person in whose interest compensation is claimed.” The purpose of this requirement is to ensure that an employer is aware that an employee has sustained a potentially compensable injury, and that such person is claiming or proposes to claim workers’ compensation benefits. Black v.London Egazarian Associates, Inc., 30 Conn. App. 295, 303 cert. denied, 225 Conn. 916 (1993). Compliance with the one-year limitation period is a necessary prerequisite to the subject matter jurisdiction of this Commission, although substantial compliance with the notice content requirements will toll the statutory period as long as the purpose of the statute has been fulfilled. Hayden-Leblanc v. New London Broadcasting,12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 3, 4, 1373 CRD-2-92-1 (Jan. 5, 1994).
supra; Yuknat v. State, 3 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 43, 274 CRD-2-83 (March 19, 1986). Thus, the factfinding authority and discretion of the trial commissioner factored into our decision. See Fair v. People’s Savings Bank, 207 Conn. 535, 539 (1988);Webb v. Pfizer, Inc., 14 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 69, 70-71, 1859 CRB-5-93-9 (May 12, 1995). Here, the commissioner specifically found that proper notice was not given to the employer or to the Workers’ Compensation Commission. Instead, reports of medical care and bills were forwarded to the insurer, along with a partially completed FRI; there was also confusion surrounding the exact date of injury.
(June 27, 1995), trial commissioners have rejected claimants’ arguments that their failure to comply with the terms of §31-294c should be excused based on their individual circumstances. This board has affirmed those decisions because the ultimate determinations involved the credibility of the witnesses and evidence. The instant case is no different. It was reasonable for the trial commissioner to conclude from the record that the information forwarded by the claimant to National Grange did not substantially comply with the notice content requirements of § 31-294, and we may not second-guess her factual findings on appeal. Webb, supra.
 The claimant also argues that the commissioner erred by finding that an alleged 1992 fall-down incident occurring at the claimant’s home was “not found to be related” to the November 1990 alleged injury. The respondents agreed in their brief that the issue of the compensability of the April 1992 injury was not before the Commissioner at the formal hearing, as the only issue was the compensability of the 1990 alleged injury. We agree that the 1992 injury was not at issue in this case, and construe the commissioner’s “finding” as a mere advisory statement that no conclusion was reached regarding the relationship of the 1992 injury to the alleged injury at issue here. See Southard v.Southard Development, 13 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 348, 1891 CRB-4-93-11 (April 27, 1995).

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