Source: https://openjurist.org/37/f1d/182
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 15:53:45+00:00

Document:
R. F.' Glenn, for petitioner. James D. Hancock, for the receiver. Before McKENNAN and ACHESON, JJ.
PER CURIAM. The petitioner seeks to obtain reimbursementfrom the receiver of the sum of $478.44, with interest from April 3, 1887, which he alleges was unlawfully exacted from him as and for freights for the transpOliationofoil upon the railroad in the custody of the receiver. The exaction of this sum is admitted, as is also the fact that a less rate was charged to another shipper of oil upon the railroad. This charge is justified by the master upon the ground that the quantity of oil shipped by another. shipper was mucb larger than that shipped by the petitioner, and hence that the larger proportionate expense attending the handling and transportationof the smaller shipment warranted a higher rate than was charged for the larger shipment. In this conclusion we do not agree with the learned master. It does not differentiate the service performed for the several shippers, nor the conditions or circumstances under which it was performed. The only difference is that in one case the quantity shipped was larger, and in the other case it was smaller. This has been repeatedly held to be an insufficient and unwarrantable reason for discriminating rates of charge. See Hays v. Pennsylvania Co., 12 Fed. Rep. 309. In the statement of the law by Judge BAXTER we concur, and for this reason we cannot approve the master's finding that the petition ought to be dismissed. We agree with the master that the petitioner's claim for hire of cars ought to be disallowed. We therefore direct that a decree be eLtered in favorofthe petitioner for the sum of $478.44, with interest from April 3, 1887, and costs against the Buffalo, New York & Philadelphia Railroad Company.
PAC. Ry. Co. et al.
To a complaint by dealers in coal 1\ railroad company for dIscrimination in allowing freight rates to a rIval coal company lower than schedule rates. defendant alleged that defendant had become liable to the favored com. pany for trespass on its mines; that defendant had givl:ln up the working of certain coal mines, and had procured the favored company to take said mines off defendant's hands; and in order to procure the coal needed for defendant's consumption, and to settle the claim for trespass. and to get rid of the operationof the mines, defendant entered into a contract by which the favored company was to supply all defendant's coal at a low figure, and defendant was t? carry company's .coal at a low figure; and that by reason of said facts It was. believed when said contract was made that the amount to be paid by said favored company would be equal to the schedule rates. lje'd, that the answer set up considerations received by defendant from the favored company, for which less rates were given to.the latter, on which no estimate could be made to ascertain the amount of the charge, and such answer was insufficient.
GOODRIDGE V. UNION PAC. RY. CO.
Where plaintiffs and the favored company are both dealers in coal in the same marke.t, the direct effect of a reduced rate to the favored company is to reduce the plaintiffs' profits to the extent of such reduction, making an unjust or undue discrimination within the meaning of Const. Colo. art. 15, 6.
A general denial of all material allegations in the complaint is authorized bV Code Colo. 1887. .
At Law. On demurrer to answer. Action by Henry Goodridge and another against the Union Pacific Railway Company and others for discrimination in freight rates. The first count in the complaint was for a penalty; the second, for unlawful discrimination and to recover overcharges; the third, for money had and received ·to plaintiff's use. Sampson & Millett, for plaintiffs. Teller Orahood, for defendants.
pany have paid to this defendant. and this defendant has received of the Mara higher rate as a matter of fact shall Consolidated Coal Mining than one dollar per ton. although it was not intended that the rate should exceed the schedule price; that at the time of the making of said contract it was believed that the price at which the coal was to be furnished to this defendant for its use on locomotives. and on account of the settlement of the claims as aforesaid, and on' account of the benefits accrning to this defendant by reason of the Marshall Consolidated Mining Company taking and operating the said Louisville and Erie Mines. this defendant would receive from the said Marshall Consolidated Coal Mining Company. for the said period of five years, during which said contract was to operate, the same price as that fixed in the schedule price." .
rates, the alleged discrimination disappears, and the contract is no longer obnoxious to the law. If, to illustrate, the damages due from the Denver & Western Company had been liquidated, and the agreement was to carry a certain quantity of coal for the amount so fixed, the question would be different. As it stands, the agreement is to give to the Marshall Company a reduced rate for certain considerations which defendant says are sufficient to make up the discount from the schedule rate; and as to that matter, the fact cannot be ascertained from the contract or otherwise. So,understood it is clear that the contract affords no protection to defendant for the discrimination in rates to which plaintiffs and other shippers ofcoal over defendant's road are subjected. In this case no difficulty arises as to the meaning of the words "unjust or undue discrimination" in the law. Plaintiffs and the Marshall Company are dealers in coal in the same market, depending largely on the same rates of transportation for the profits of their business. The direct effect of a reduced rate to the Marshall Company is to reduoe the profits on plaintiff's coal to the extent of such reduction. The demurrer to the second defense will be sustained. . A general denial of all material allegations in the complaint was not allowed under the Code of 1877; but it is authorized by the New Code of 1887, § 56, and the demurrer to the first defense will be overruled.
An affidavit of defense is insufficient unless it sets forth explicitly all the facts necessary to constitute a substantial defense.
In a suit on a purchase-money mortgage the affidavit of defense set forth that the plaintiffs knew that defendant purchased the mortgaged premises to manufacture thereon iron and steel by a new process. and "the purchase was made upon the direct assurance. condition. and representation that natural gas would be immediately and continuously carried to and supplied to said premises in sufficient quantities for manufacturing purposes, "by C. company, with which some of the plaintiffs were connected. and plaintiffs "knew that without the supply of such goas said purchase would not have been made;" but that natural gas had not been so furnished by C. company, or by any o11e; although said company had completed its lines, and was supplying goas to other manufacturing concerns. Held, that the affidavit of defense was insufficient to prevent judgment.
Sci. Fa. BUr Mortgage. On rule for judgment for want of a sufficient affidavit of defense. John P. Vincent, for rule. S. ScluYyer, Jr., cOntra.
the legal plaintiffs and the use plaintiffs knew that affiant was making said purchase for the purpose of carrying on therein the business of manufacturing iron and steel by a new process, and such purchase was made upon the direct assurance, condition, and representation that natural gas would be immediately and continuously carried to and supplied to said premises in sufficient quantities for manufactul'ing purposes; and that the Columbia GasLight &I Fuel Company, then constructing its line, and with which the said Wheeler, or others of the plaintiffs, was connected, would so furnish and Bupply Said gas; and said legal and use plaintiffs well knew that without the supply of such gas said purchase would not have been made. * * * But notwithstanding said condition and representation upon which affiant made such purchase, gas was not furnished to said property at any time, either by the Columbia Gas-Light & Fuel Company, or any other company or person, although said Columbia Gas-Light &I Fuel Company have long since completed their said lines, and have been furnishing gas to other manufacturing concerns in Sharon and Middlesex."
some collateral writing? When were they made? Who gave the "direct assurance," or entered into the" condition," or made the" representation?" Was it one or other of the legal plaintiffs, or one of the use plaintiffs, or the attorney, referred to in another part of the affidavit, who acted both for the defendant and the use plaintiffs, or was it some different person altogether? Was the "condition" express or implied? What were its terms? If natural gas was not furnished, was the defenda-nt to be recompensed, or was the sale to be rescinded at his election? Upon all these material points the affidavit of defense is wholly silent. As was said in Marsh v. Marshall, supra, so may it be said here, that" upon such a loose and inconclusive statement of part of the facts of a case no court would deem it prudent to base a judgment." Again, according to the averment of the affidavit the natural gas was to be furnished and supplied not by the plaintiffs, or any of them, but by the Columbia Gas-Light & Fuel Company, "then constructing its line, and with which said Wheeler, or others of the plaintiffs, was connected." What this connection was, is not disclosed. It will be perceived, however, that no bad faith or misrepresentation is imputed to any of the plaintiffs. Indeed, the alleged "assurance," etc., (by whomsoever made,) related to something to be done in the future by the Columbia Gas-Light & Fuel Company. At the very utmost, then, the plaintiffs were only answerable for the refusal of that company to furnish and supply the needed gas. Now, the defendant contents himself with the cautious statement that no gas was supplied to him, although said company completed its lines, and has furnished natural gas to other manufacturing concerns. But he avoids saying that he put his manufacturing establishment in proper condition to receive natural gas, and he carefully refrains from averring that he ever notified or requested said company to furnish such supply, or that the company refused to furnish it. Furthermore, the affidavit of defense does not allege that the defendant has sustained any damages whatever by reason of the non-supply of natural gas. Giving the utmost allowable effect to the averments of the defendant's affidavit, it shows only a partial failure of consideration susceptible of compensation in damages, if any loss was sustained. Yard v. Patton, 13 Pa. St. 278-282. But the defimdant does not allege that he has suffered any actual damage. Certainly the affidavit of defense .presents no case for the rescission of an executed contract. No agreement to rescind is set out, and no grounds are laid upon which a court would base a decree of rescission. Stephen's Appeal, 87 Pa. St. 202. In the opinion of the court, the affidavit. of defense is incomplete, vague. and evasive in its statement of facts, and, under the authorities, altogether insufficient to prevent judgment. Oity of Erie v. Butler, 14 Atl. Rep. 153. And now, October 23,1888, the rule to show cause why judgment should not be entered for want of a sufficient affidavit of defense, is made absolute; and it is ordered that judgment be entered in favor of the plaintiffs for the amount of their claim, etc' l as set forth in their statement.
MASTER AND SERVANT-NEGLIGENCE OF VICE-PRINCIPAL-PLEADING.
In an action against a railroad company for the alleged negligent kflling of an engineer in defendant's employ, by decedent's engine colliding with an· other in the yard, a complaint which avers that engineers were authorized by a rule of the company to move their engines only on the signal of the "helpers," and that decedent saw the "helper" of the other engine, who gave no signal, but that the other engine was moved in obedience to a signal of the "master mechanic, having sole control of the yard," is demurrable. as not. showing that such master mechanic occupied a position rendering defendant liable for his negligence.

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