Source: https://facultyblog.law.ucdavis.edu/2016/04/default.aspx
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 06:22:40+00:00

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The U.S. Capitol Historical Society will hold its annual spring symposium, Congress and a Nation of Immigrants, 1790-1990: From the First Naturalization Act to the Simpson-Mazzoli Act, on May 5 and 6.
Professor Gabriel "Jack" Chin is among the symposium speakers who will tackle a range of topics that examine Congress and immigration law through various lenses, including race, quotas, politics, and popular culture. As speakers consider immigration law and related issues, they will detail and challenge popular perceptions of racial, ethnic, and political differences in American society from 1789 and the Alien Acts through the Simpson-Mazzoli Act in 1986.
Professor Chin will speak in in room 325 of the Russell Senate Office Building on Friday, May 6 from 10:55am to 11:40am. He will discuss the 1965 Immigration Act in a talk titled, "Was the Diversification of America an Unintended Consequence?"
This event is free and open to the public. For more information, visit http://uschs.org/news-releases/symposium-focuses-immigration-legislation/.
Writing in The New York Times last Friday, Curt Bradley and Jack Goldsmith argued that the Justice Against State Sponsors of Terrorism Act (JASTA) would "violate a core principle of international law," the principle of foreign sovereign immunity. At Lawfare, former State Department Legal Adviser John Bellinger seconded their assertion. Earlier in the week, White House Press Secretary Josh Earnest expressed similar concerns. (For a good primer on JASTA and its background, see Steve Vladeck's post here.) The amount of legal analysis one can fit into an op-ed is necessarily limited, and it would be welcome to see Curt, Jack, John, or others flesh out the argument. But, in my view, there are serious problems with the assertion that JASTA would violate customary international law governing sovereign immunity, problems that raise more general questions of how one identifies rules of customary international law.
A nation's immunity from lawsuits in the courts of another nation is a fundamental tenet of international law. This tenet is based on the idea that equal sovereigns should not use their courts to sit in judgment of one another. Many nations have tacitly agreed to limit immunity in specified contexts, such as when they engage in certain commercial activities. But apart from those exceptions (or where a binding treaty or Security Council resolution otherwise dictates), international law continues to guarantee immunity, even for alleged egregious crimes.
The first question to ask is where this fundamental tenet of international law comes from. I believe it is common ground that - as the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law puts it - "[c]ustomary international law results from a general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation." If one looks at state practice with respect to foreign sovereign immunity, one finds some situations in which states are consistently held to be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of other states, other situations in which states are consistently held not to be immune, other situations in which the practice is mixed, and still other situations in which there is no practice at all. How should one make sense of this practice?
Curt and Jack's approach with respect to foreign sovereign immunity seems to be to infer a general rule of immunity based on state practice granting immunity and to treat the state practice denying immunity as establishing exceptions to the general rule. Where the practice is mixed or non-existent, the general rule of immunity would govern because there is not a "general and consistent practice of states" sufficient to create an exception. Of course, this is not the only possible way to read the existing state practice. One could instead infer specific rules of immunity only in those situations where there is a general and consistent practice of granting immunity. Under this approach, where the practice is mixed or non-existent, a general rule of non-immunity would govern. As Curt has recently written on page 34 in his excellent contribution to the book Custom's Future, one must "necessarily make choices about how to describe [state practice], which baselines to apply in evaluating it, and whether or when to extend or analogize it to new situations." I agree. My point is simply that the choices Curt and Jack have made in their analysis of sovereign immunity are choices - and they need to be defended.
One way to defend their approach would be to invoke the International Court of Justice's 2012 decision in the Jurisdictional Immunities Case (Germany v. Italy), which took a similar approach to questions of sovereign immunity. But the ICJ took this approach because the state parties to the dispute both agreed on it. See paragraph 61 ("Both Parties agree that States are generally entitled to immunity in respect of acta jure imperii."). In light of the parties' agreement, the ICJ was certainly justified in starting with a general rule of immunity and then looking for state practice sufficient to support exceptions. But as Curt again has reminded us in his contribution to Custom's Future, "ICJ decisions are technically binding only on the parties and thus should not automatically be treated as the last word by the international community on the content of [customary international law]" (p. 59).
Even if one adopts Curt and Jack's basic approach to sovereign immunity, there remains the question of how broadly or narrowly to read the state practice creating exceptions to the general rule. There is lots of state practice supporting a territorial tort exception to sovereign immunity - that is, an exception for torts that occur in the nation that would exercise jurisdiction over the foreign state. (See Jurisdictional Immunities paragraphs 62-79.) This is what allows Americans injured in traffic accidents by a foreign government employee to sue the foreign state for damages. One might argue that this state practice should be read narrowly to apply only in these sorts of situations. But states that have codified the exception have done so in general terms applicable to any tort.
The US Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) also codifies the territorial tort exception in general terms. (See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5).) But US courts have interpreted it to require that the "entire tort" occurs within the United States. (See the Second Circuit Court of Appeals 2013 decision from In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001.) It is this limitation that JASTA would remove. JASTA would still require that there be "physical injury or death, or damage to or loss of property, occurring in the United States," but it would make clear that the territorial tort exception applies "regardless of where the underlying tortious act or omission occurs."
Customary international law does not seem to require the "entire tort" limitation. Article 12 of the United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Properties would apply the territorial tort exception if the act or omission occurred "in whole or in part" in the territory of the state exercising jurisdiction. Most nations that have codified the exception appear to require some act or omission in their territories, but it is not clear that these nations have done so from a sense of international legal obligation rather than from comity. Even if customary international law were properly read to preclude a nation from applying the territorial tort exception solely on the basis of death and damage within its territory, the application of JASTA to the 9/11 cases would still not violate international law, since the 9/11 attacks clearly involved tortious acts in the United States.
Another, more controversial, path would be to expand the FSIA's terrorism exception, so that it covers state-sponsored terrorism even when the foreign state has not been designated by the State Department as a state-sponsor of terrorism, as is currently required under the FSIA. JASTA would not do this, but Curt and Jack discuss it at some length, so it is worth considering. They assert that the current exception "is almost certainly contrary to international law." If this is true of the existing exception, then it would also be true of an expanded exception.
But I am not so sure that the terrorism exception violates customary international law. First, the United States is not alone in having adopted such an exception - Canada has done so too in Section 6.1 of its State Immunity Act. Second, to my knowledge, these exceptions have not provoked the sorts of widespread protests one might expect from other nations in the event of a clear violation of customary international law. Curt and Jack anticipate this point, explaining that "[t]he controversy has been muted, however, because the exception applies to only a few nations designated as bad actors by the executive branch." This is true, but explaining away the absence of protests is not the same thing as having such protests as evidence of state practice. Third, Curt's and Jack's argument here necessarily depends on the choices they made at the outset about how to organize existing state practice. This is a situation in which the state practice is mixed - two states have such exceptions but most do not. Whether customary international law requires immunity for state-sponsored terrorism depends on whether one begins from a baseline of immunity (as Curt and Jack do) or from a baseline of non-immunity. To repeat what I said above, this is a choice and must be defended.
Of course, Curt and Jack are trying to make a policy argument based on reciprocity too. They write: "If the United States reduces the immunity it accords to other nations, it exposes itself to an equivalent reduction in its own immunity abroad." But their reciprocity argument against JASTA depends on several propositions. First, it depends on the proposition that other states would view the immunity that the United States currently extends (and that JASTA would take away) as required by international law. If not, then they are already free to reduce the immunity they extend the United States, whether JASTA passes or not. Second, it depends on the proposition that other countries would read JASTA broadly to authorize exceptions to sovereign immunity in non-identical situations. Curt and Jack write: "It might appear that the United States has little to fear in lawsuits abroad for acts of terrorism akin to 9/11. But terrorism is often in the eye of the beholder, and reciprocity need not be precise." A broad reading of JASTA is possible, but certainly not inevitable, and the United States would have strong arguments that its practice should be read more narrowly. Finally, Curt and Jack's reciprocity argument depends on the proposition that international law influences the behavior of other states. I believe that to be true, but Jack has co-written an entire book disputing the proposition. See The Limits of International Law.
In the end, I am not certain whether Congress should pass JASTA. Much depends on how one weighs the benefits of providing legal redress for victims of terrorism against the impact on relations with countries like Saudi Arabia that currently cooperate with US counterterrorism efforts. But as a legal matter, the argument that JASTA would violate international law is far from clear.
Thanks to Legal Skills Prof Blog for highlighting my paper "Some Thoughts on the Future of Legal Education: Why Diversity and Student Wellness Should Matter in a Time of 'Crisis'"
"Some vocal critics have loudly proclaimed that the challenges of law school economic have reached "crisis" proportions. They point to the well-known facts about recent developments in the market for law schools. Law schools have experienced a precipitous drop in applications. The global recession decimated the legal job market. To make matters worse, rising tuition has resulted in increasing debt loads for law graduates.
This Essay contends that law schools should strive to address the noneconomic as well as the economic problems with modern legal education. In a time of considerable change, this is a most opportune time to consider and implement deep and enduring improvements that benefit students as well as the entire legal profession."
Here is the transcript to the oral argument earlier today in United States v. Texas, which raises the question of the lawfulness of the Obama administration's expanded deferred action program for undocumented parents of U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents (known as DAPA) announced in November 2015.
Lyle Denniston analyzed the argument on SCOTUSBlog and reads the tea leaves as indicating a possible win for the Obama administration.
The line-up of the advocates can be found here.
Standing under Article III of the U.S. Constitution is a threshold question. As should have been the case, it was the subject of considerable questioning during the argument. In the end, the Justices appeared to be divided on how a majority would ultimately come down on the question.
Solicitor General for the United States Donald Verrilli was the first to argue. The argument seemed to go generally as expected, with no big surprises. Standing figured prominently in the argument from the outset. Apparently having standing on his mind, Chief Justice Roberts redirected Verilli to address the issue after Justice Ginsburg almost immediately after the argument began inquired about the merits.
Although Verilli did get to briefly discuss the merits of the deferred action "guidance," the bulk of the questioning was on standing. Verilli argued that Texas and the states lacked standing under Article III because (1) the alleged injury of increased costs of issuing driver's licenses to deferred action recipients was not redressable by the relief being sought; and (2) there was no concrete particularized injury to the states resulting from the administration's expanded deferred action program.
Chief Justice Roberts, who dissented in Massachusetts v. EPA, asked Verilli whether the injury in this case was "any more indirect and speculative" (Transcript p. 18, lines 3-5) from that one. In that case, a majority held that Massachusetts had standing to challenge a failure of the Environmental Protection Agency to regulate greenhouse gas emissions.
Justice Alito asked who would have standing to challenge a President's policy decision to have "open borders."
Justice Breyer pushed the limits of the states' theory of standing by asking if Rhode Island would have standing to challenge a federal statute requiring that the states give a driver's license to every member of the armed forces and the federal government transferred 250,000 soldiers to Rhode Island. Justice Sotomayor also noted the potential expansiveness of a finding that Texas had standing and challenges to federal laws and regulations.
President/General Counsel of the Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund Thomas Saenz, next argued for three parent intervenors who would benefit from the expanded deferred action program. Although clearly he was primed on the merits, the Justices asked him about standing and Saenz responded credibly. In arguing that the states lacked standing, Saenz emphasized that"this is a political dispute. [The states challenging the Administration] do not agree with the policy adopted by the Administration . . . . " Transcript p. 39, lines 13-14. Along these lines, Justice Breyer later in the argument acknowledged that the case had "tremendous political valence." Transcript p. 61, line 5.
Chief Justice Roberts tried unsuccessfully to get Saenz to concede that a Texas policy denying deferred action recipients from driver's license eligibility would be unlawful. In response to a question from Justice Sotomayor, Saenz later noted that not every state makes deferred action recipients eligible for licenses.
Texas Solicitor General Scott Keller (formerly Chief Counsel to Presidential candidate Ted Cruz), for the 26 states challenging the expanded deferred action programs. He was asked more about the merits than the standing question.
During Keller's argument, several Justices pressed an apparent compromise solution. It involved the language in the administration's guidance affording deferred action recipients "lawful presence" and seems to have muddied the waters. Removal of that language might be a possible way to defuse the dispute. Verilli initially raised this possibility. When forced to address whether removal of the "lawful presence" language would be sufficient to address the issues raised by the states, Keller quoted language from the guidance: "Deferred action means that for a specified period of time, an individual is permitted to be lawfully present in the United States." (emphasis added). Keller (and later Erin Murphy) stated that removal of the language would not be sufficient but it was unclear to me whether any of the justices agreed.
Another issue came up in discussion of the merits. Under another regulation in place for decades, deferred action recipients and receive work authorization. That regulation was not challenged in this litigation. Justice Kennedy intimated that, if that was the true problem in this case, it might would have been proper to challenge the regulation under the Administrative Procedure Act.
Erin Murphy, partner at the law firm Bancroft LLP, argued last on behalf of the U.S. House of Representatives as amicus supporting the states' challenge to the President's immigration guidance. From a paper transcript, she appeared confident and pushed the envelope but did not have quite the grasp of the immigration laws of her colleagues. Murphy, for example, at the outset stated that the administration adopted immigration reform that Congress considered and did not enact. Justice Sotomayor quickly corrected Murphy and pointed out that the Obama immigration program in no way created a "pathway to citizenship" like that found in many comprehensive immigration reform proposals.
1. Justice Kennedy viewed the case as one about the limits of discretion and suggested that the expanded deferred action programs constituted a legislative act by the President, which is "just upside down." It was not clear to me of his take on the standing question.
2. There was no questions from the justices on the "Take Care" argument based on Article II, section 3. The Court had ordered the parties to brief the issue. Nor did any of the advocates raise the issue.
3. Justice Thomas was silent at the oral argument.
4. The argument did not highlight that the expanded deferred action programs were (1) temporary in nature and did not afford undocumented immigrants any kind of permanent relief; and (2) could be changed by a new President and/or Congress.
As we learned from the Affordable Care Act case, it is hazardous to predict how the Supreme Court will rule on a case based on the oral arguments. After that argument, few commentators thought that Verilli and the Obama and administration would prevail; but they did. Here, although the outcome is hard to predict with certainty, it appears that (1) standing in this case is a central issue to the justices: (2) the "Take Care" argument is not; and (3) winning is not a sure thing for either side. Still, my instincts are that the Obama administration may come out okay in United States v. Texas in the end.
The School of Law is proud to host the 2016 Conference of Asian Pacific American Law Faculty (CALALF) at King Hall today and tomorrow. There is a new addition to an already outstanding speaker line-up: California Supreme Court Justice Goodwin Liu.
Here is the program from the CAPALF website.
Plenary: #BlackLivesMatter and Asian Pacific Americans?
Last Thursday and Friday (March 31st and April 1st), I attended the 2016 Jacobus tenBroek Disability Law Symposium in Baltimore, Maryland.
The right of access to public accommodations and common carriers is a civil right. It is a basic right indispensable to participation in the community, a substantive right to which all are fully and equally entitled.
Jacobus tenBroek, The Right to Live in the World: The Disabled in the Law of Torts, 54 CAL. L. REV. 841, 858 (1966).
Race is a little discussed topic in the disability rights movement despite its connection to some of the central issues of racial justice today. For example, disability should be front and center in legal and policy discussions about prisoners' rights (approximately 24-37% of all people in prisons and jails in the U.S. self-report as people with disabilities and are disproportionately people of color).
This year's symposium brought diversity to the forefront of the conversation. "Diversity in the Disability Rights Movement: Working Together to Achieve the Right to Live in the World" raised difficult issues about race, gender, and sexual orientation. I attended a breakout session on the intersection of trans rights and disability that was facilitated by Victoria M. Rodríguez-Roldán, Director, Trans and Gender Non-Conforming Justice Project, National LGBTQ Task Force. A packed room of legal scholars and practitioners shared ideas on how the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act can be used to remedy discrimination against trans people with disabilities. Claudia Center, Senior Staff Attorney in the Disability Rights section of the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation discussed the applicability of the ADA to police arrests following the Supreme Court decision in City and County of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S.Ct. 1765 (2015). While the Court appears to have answered the question as to whether the ADA applies to police arrests (turning on whether police arrests constitute a "program or service" under Title II of the ADA), the question of what constitutes "reasonable accommodations" in the context of arrests remains unanswered.
The highlight of the symposium for me - other than having a chance to exchange ideas with disability practitioners and scholars - was the keynote address by the Honorable Myron H. Thompson, U.S. District Judge, United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama. Judge Thompson, an African American federal judge with a disability (childhood polio), shared the role of race and disability in constructing identity. He emphasized the power of internal stigma that comes from low expectations and invisibility and the therapeutic potential of community building and cross-movement pollination. Judge Thomson reminded the conference participants of the legacy of Dr. tenBroek and called for greater educational opportunities for law students to understand that disability rights are civil and human rights. He encouraged law schools to build a disability rights law curriculum and law professors to build connections across subject areas so that the next generation recognizes the interconnectivity of race, ethnicity, disability, class, gender, and sexual orientation.
Judge Thompson was energized when he learned that UC Davis is among a small group of law schools offering disability rights courses taught by full time professors, supporting a student-led Disability Law Society, and regularly inviting practitioners and scholars to discuss disability rights.
Two King Hall alumnae practicing disability law approached me after the lunch discussion to introduce themselves and applaud King Hall's commitment to disability rights. I look forward to bringing them back to King Hall in the future to speak with students about careers in disability rights.

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