Source: http://appealslawyer.net/do/case-list
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 03:01:27+00:00

Document:
Yanusvewski v. Marc & Nathan Auto Serv., Inc.
Patil v. Roy & Kelly Construction Co., Inc.
Advanced Polymers, Inc. v. Saber Machine Design Corp.
Parents owned 28 acres in Northwood, New Hampshire. Their son lived on the land and ran a horse farm. He contracted with a lumber company to build a barn and large horse riding arena. After the son made no payments, the lumber company sued for breach of the contract. Several times the son acknowledged the debt and renegotiated its terms, but never satisfied it. More than six years after the son originally entered the contract, the company sued the Parents for unjust enrichment of their land. I argued on behalf of the Parents that the son's acknowledgment of the debt may have tolled the statute of limitations against the son, but not against the parents. The New Hampshire Supreme Court agreed, ruling that "[m]ere receipt of the benefits of a contract does not suffice" to toll the statute of limitations. "What is required is an admission of liability and a willingness to pay." The court found that the Parents were not a party to the son's contract, nor had they made any promise to pay the lumber company. It thus ruled that the company's suit against the Parents was barred because it was filed beyond the statute of limitations.
B&M Knife Sharpening Service v. General Services, Inc.
Mosher v. Portsmouth Mobile Homes, Inc.
Landowner in Portsmouth, New Hampshire, sought to construct a 100 room hotel. His seven-acre triangle of land, however, was zoned for residential use. Although the City's zoning would not allow a hotel on the plot, the trial court judicialy re-zoned because the area had become commercial and there was a 125 room hotel across the street. Due to the odd shape of the lot, the City granted six setback variances from its zoning ordinance. Abutters objected to the variances. Shortly before this case the New Hampshire Supreme Court had determined that its former standard for variances was too restrictive to comply with New Hampshire's strong constitutional property rights, and thus the law was in flux. I argued on behalf of the Abutter that a smaller hotel was buildable without variances, and that the smaller hotel was commercially reasonable. Rearranging the law of variances in New Hampshire, the Supreme Court for the first time enunciated differing standards for area and use variances, and ruled that in the future financial factors may be considered in area variances. The court remanded for findings in light of the new standards. Subsequent variance cases repeatedly cite the standards Boccia created, and it has become a leading precedent in law journals and legal commentary.
There is no "common law marriage" in New Hampshire. But if one's long-time live-in partner dies, one can claim to inherit that person's estate under some circumstances. In this case, after the woman died, the putative husband entered a settlement in probate court of his inheritance claims such that he could maintain a life estate in their shared home on the condition that he made certain payments to the estate of the deceased. When the payments were missed, the probate court enforced the agreement and returned the property to the estate. On appeal the putative husband argued the probate court lacked jurisdiction to enforce the agreement because probate courts historically do not have authority over real property. I argued on behalf of the Estate that the Legislature had expanded the jurisdiction of the probate court to include issues involving the real property of the deceased that was "in" the deceased's estate, and it could thus enforce the agreement. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that the old law contained in Fleming v. Aiken and Estate of O'Dwyer had "been superseded by the current statutory scheme," of RSA 547 and RSA 554 and that therefore the "probate court’s jurisdiction encompassed enforcement of the settlement."
When owners of condominium units don't pay their condo fees, there are generally only two entities who might be liable - the lender holding the owner's mortgage, or the condominium association. In this case, the owner died leaving an unpaid arrearage. Her mortgage was then foreclosed on, and the association cut off common services to the unit. I argued, on behalf of the lender, that New Hampshire's condominium statute puts the burden of unpaid fees on the association. Quoting my brief, the supreme court agreed, writing that "because [the lender], as the post-foreclosure owner, is not responsible for [the dead woman's] debt, [the association] cannot continue to withhold services from the unit based upon the pre-foreclosure debt." The court also held that under the statute, the association has other remedies, such as getting a lien on the unit.
The town of Campton, New Hampshire acquired by tax deed properties located in a condominium development which included residences, open space, and recreation amenities. By auction buyer acquired an unimproved lot in the condominium. The condo Association sought to collect condo dues and assessments which arose after the tax deed, but buyer refused to pay. I argued for the Association that despite the tax sale, buyer was liable for the assessments. The New Hampshire Supreme Court agreed. It wrote that "the question of whether condominium covenants survive a tax sale is novel in this jurisdiction." It held that "condominium declarations are covenants running with the land," and that condo owners buy their interests "both burdened by the assessment obligation and benefited by the function that the assessments serve." It held that the buyer "took title subject to the condominium covenants," and was therefore liable for the assessments.
Upon being arrested for drug dealing, the defendant's apartment was searched. In several places in the kitchen FBI agents found drugs, a gun, and some jewelry: "two men's watches, several men's chains and bracelets, a man's ring, several women's bracelets, and various other ornaments, together valued at approximately $44,328." I argued that the proximity of the jewelry to the drugs did not prove it was proceeds of a drug crime, and therefore the government cannot take the property. The federal appellate court wrote that "the undisputed facts give rise to two possible stories: either [the defendant] was a drug dealer who kept his valuables in his kitchen, and this included a collection of jewelry that he had amassed through legitimate means, potentially over the span of his life; or [he] was a drug dealer who kept his valuables in his kitchen, and this included a collection of jewelry that he had purchased with drug money." The court thus held the federal government had not proved the jewelry was proceeds of a crime.
A couple got divorced, then reconsidered and wanted to withdraw their divorce, but the Family Court delined. Because there was no party objecting, the New Hampshire Supreme Court appointed Attorney Gordon to file a brief as amicus curiae to defend the Family Court's judgement. The Supreme Court held that because divorce is committed to the legislature by the New Hampshire constitution, and there is no statute allowing an un-divorce, the couple's remedy is to get re-married.
The parties had a three-day divorce trial in December 2012, but the court delayed its decision nine months until September 2013. Meanwhile, shortly after trial, husband he was laid off from his engineering job, which he promptly reported to the court. In its eventual decision, the family court acknowledged husband's circumstances, but declined to hear evidence of the parties' changed situation. Rather it suggested that matter could be dealt with in a later modification proceeding. The New Hampshire Supreme Court disagreed. It held that although the family court has broad discretion to manage proceedings before it, on the facts here, "the trial court's decision not to reopen the record … was clearly unreasonable to the prejudice of the [husband]." The Supreme Court remanded for a hearing in which post-trial evidence could be considered.
Husband and Wife were married for 13 years. Husband received social security and veteran's disability benefits. Husband was also the beneficiary of his mother's estate, but he spent it all, much on illegal drugs. I represented the Wife, who was left penniless, homeless, and destitute. The family court awarded her alimony, and also a portion of the now-squandered inheritance. On appeal, the New Hampshire Supreme Court held that veteran's disability benefits can be used to pay alimony because they are for the purpose of supporting the vet and his family. The Supreme Court also held that even though Husband had squandered his inheritance, Wife could be awarded a portion of it.
Couple had a traditional marriage in which Husband earned money outside the house while wife raised the children, earned some sporadic and limited income, and participated in volunteer activities. After Husband sought a no-fault divorce, wife took no action in the legal case. She did not file an answer, did not request discovery, and did not seek alimony. The trial court thus defaulted her. Husband had proposed that in lieu of alimony, he would continue to pay wife's monthly living expenses, including mortage, property taxes, utilities, and insurance. When wife finally participated in the case, she requested alimony, but the trial court refused because of the default, and wife appealed. I argued for Husband that he "should not be held accountable for the wife's failure to participate in these proceedings." Construing New Hampshire's divorce statute and court rules, the Supreme Court agreed, holding that the lower court was not wrong in denying wife's tardy request for alimony and in approving Husband's alternative.
Wife sought divorce on the grounds that Husband was a "habitual drunkard" where he had become addicted to prescription painkillers following surgery. I argued for Husband that New Hampshire's divorce statute, which predates the existence of prescription drugs, contemplates the consumption of alcohol, not other substances. The New Hampshire Supreme Court found that standard definitions of drunkard refer to alcohol and "do not encompass one who habitually abuses or is impaired because of prescription drugs." Husband had lost a series of jobs due to his addiction. Wife claimed he was therefore voluntarily underemployed, and that therefore his pre-job-loss income should be imputed to him for the purposes of calculating child support. I argued that Husband's addiction was not voluntary. The Supreme Court agreed and remanded the case for recalculation of support.
Termination of Parental Rights of L.Z.
Mother made false allegations that father sexually assaulted their children. This lead to long separations of the children from their father, and to mother generally prevailing in the parents' custody contest. The New Hampshire Supreme Court held that a parent should not gain from such false allegations, and vacated the custody award.
Mother homeschooled child for religious and other reasons. Father preferred child to be more broadly educated in public school. The New Hampshire Supreme Court held that parents have equal rights to direct the education of their children, and that courts must decide when parents cannot. It allowed the child to continue in public school.
The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) has been enacted in most states to determine, as its name implies, what state's courts have control over the custody of children when there is a choice among multiple states. Here, the eight month old child was born in Massachusetts to unwed parents, but resided in New Hampshire when Father filed his petition for custody. Mother claimed that because she did not move from Massachusetts to New Hampshire until later, Massachusetts should exercise jurisdiction and she should have custody. I argued for Father that New Hampshire was the child's "home state" because the child lived in New Hampshire for more than the six consecutive months required by the UCCJA, and because the child's Father and grandparents with whom she had a significant relationships also lived in New Hampshire. The court agreed, holding that "jurisdiction follows the residency of the child and not the mother," and that "New Hampshire's exercise of jurisdiction was in [the child's] best interest, especially in light of the goals of the UCCJA."
In re Baby Girl P.
In the Matter of Megan S.
In re Amanda C. and Haley C.
The rights of prisoners to participate remotely in proceedings involving their children is a relatively new and evolving area of law because in the last few decades criminals have been given longer sentences and more are being incarcerated in far-away facilities. I have argued two cases in this area. Baby K. was a case of first impression in New Hampshire. Father was incarcerated for a long time in Pennsylvania for a drug crime. Just before going to jail he had fathered a child whom the mother had voluntarily put up for adoption upon birth. To consummate the adoption, the adoptive parents needed to terminate the father’s parental rights. The father’s attorney was present in the probate court, while the father participated from the jail by telephone. I argued for the adoptive parents that the arrangement sufficiently protected the father’s constitutional rights. The Supreme Court partially agreed. Applying the three-part test of Mathews v. Eldridge, the Court held that “due process does not absolutely require an incarcerated parent’s physical presence at a parental rights termination hearing, provided the parent is otherwise afforded procedural due process at the hearing.” The Court declined to mandate particular procedures that must be employed, and held that the measures afforded would depend upon the situation of each case. The phone system used here, however, required the father’s attorney to act not only as advocate, but also as the father’s conduit for information about courtroom proceedings. The Supreme Court found these two roles were impossible to simultaneously fulfill, and thus required that in future proceedings courts must provide more direct communication for the far-away prisoner. Brittany L. presented similar facts. The father was incarcerated for the child’s entire life in far-away places. The Mother sought to terminate his parental rights on the grounds of neglect because he had negligible contact with the child and showed no concern for her welfare. The father argued that participation in the termination hearing by telephone rather than in person violated his Sixth Amendment right to “be confronted with the witnesses against him.” I argued for the Mother, and the Supreme Court agreed, that because termination is a civil proceeding, and the Sixth Amendment applies only to criminal cases, the father’s constitutional rights were not violated.
Louis Nordle is a disabled veteran of the Vietnam War. Using a Veterans Administration grant, he adapted his home for his disabilities. A New Hampshire statute provides property tax exemption for disabled veterans who "acquire" a "specially adapted homestead" with VA funds. The town refused the exemption, and Mr. Nordle appealed. The Supreme Court found that the New Hampshire statute was ambiguous, but was designed to mimic benefits under federal VA law. The court held that because the adaptations qualify under the federal law, the New Hampshire veteran gets the tax exemption.
The town applied property tax to dish antennas and backup batteries which Directv had installed at a satellite uplink facility. The Supreme Court held they are not taxable. At issue was whether the antennas and batteries were “fixtures” that had “lost their character as personalty and … become part of the realty.” The court explained that personal property can become a fixture when it is “specially adapted to the realty” or has been “annexed to the realty.” It held that in determining whether an item is a fixture, “the central factors are the nature of the article and its use, as connected with the use of the underlying land.” The lower court held that the antennas and batteries had become fixtures because they were “essential to the use of the building as an uplink facility.” The Supreme Court overturned, holding that “the proper focus … is upon the relationship of the personalty to the realty itself – the buildings or land – rather than to the business enterprise carried on at the property.” The court likened the antennas and batteries to cases involving phone poles, storage trailers, and paper-manufacturing machines, which are not fixtures because they can “be removed without affecting the utility of the underlying land, the buildings, or the equipment itself,” and “could be equally useful and adapted for general use elsewhere.” The court distinguished antennas and batteries from cases involving ski lifts, which are fixtures because they are “intimately intertwined with the specially designed use of the land.” The court thus held that antennas and batteries are not fixtures, and are not subject to town property taxation.
ATV-Watch is a non-profit organization which monitors use and development of all terrain vehicle trails in New Hampshire. It filed a Right-to-Know request for documents with the Department of Resources and Economic Development (DRED), “the agency charged by statute with developing, managing and creating multipurpose recreational trails in New Hampshire.” ATV-Watch sought “information relating to DRED’s intended purchase of a large tract of land” and “its plan to develop all terrain vehicle and other trails once the land was purchased.” DRED ultimately released all the documents requested, but admitted some were not disclosed within the statutory time limits. It hoped to excuse its tardiness, saying that it responded with reasonable speed, and that delays were not its fault or were harmless. DRED claimed that although it “may have technically violated the statute, the violation did not prejudice” ATV-Watch. I argued for ATV-Watch that the Right-to-Know statute provides absolute timetables by when administrative agencies must disclose documents. The New Hampshire Supreme Court agreed. It held that “the plain language of the provision does not allow for consideration of factors … such as “reasonable speed,” “oversight,” “fault,” “harm,” or “prejudice.” The Court thus found DRED “violated the Right-to-Know Law by its delayed disclosure.” It did not award attorneys fees, however, because all the documents ATV-Watch sought were released before it appealed.
Public Service Company of New Hampshire v. N.H. Public Utilities Commission, &a.
Huguelet v. Allstate Ins. Co.
An Insured person suffered a collision as a passenger in her own car, and made a claim against her insurance company. The company offered to settle the claim for a certain amount, which was understood by the parties to compensate both for her lost wages, and for her pain and suffering. The Insured cashed the check proffered by the company, which stated on its face, “Final settlement of any and all claims arising from bodily injury caused by accident.” The Insured later learned of greater injuries caused by the collision, and made a further claim. The company refused, on the grounds the matter had been settled. I argued for the Insured that the settlement amount was limited to missed wages, pain and suffering, but was not a global settlement of all possible claims. The New Hampshire Supreme Court agreed. It wrote that if “the purpose of the settlement was to buy peace,” then the cashed check had settled all claims, but if “its object was to compensate for injuries rather than to purchase peace, notwithstanding the language on the check,” then the settlement was not global. The Court held that because the settlement “refers only to compensation for injuries and lost wages, [the parties] cannot be regarded as having contracted with reference to future possibilities,” and thus allowed the Insured to press her claim for later-discovered injuries.
Scarponi v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co.
During the 2010 election, the New Hampshire Democratic Party made computerized "robocalls" which began: "This is State Democratic Chair Ray Buckley calling," and then made statements about a politician who went on to become the Republican Speaker of the New Hampshire House of Representatives. After he was in office, the Speaker sued the Democratic Party alleging it had violated New Hampshire’s robocalling statute by not adequately disclosing the identity of the caller. The New Hampshire Supreme Court held that a candidate who did not personally receive a robocall was not injured, and therefore the politician did not have standing to sue.
A national company based in Salem, New Hampshire contracted with movie chains to conduct their daily theater cleaning, and subcontracted the work to local cleaning crews. A key Employee signed a contract which contained a three-year non-competition clause that covered all territories served by the company. The Employee, whose job was to estimate the cost of cleaning each theater in the chain, worked there for just five monts. A dissatisfied co-worker started a competing company, which the Employee was alleged to have aided by sharing production rates and giving operations advice. I argued for the Employee that the non-competition clause was unenforceable because it covered too large a geographic area, lasted too long, and was broader than necessary to protect the company's legitimate interests. While noting that an employer has a legitimate interest in protecting information relating to unique business practices and influence over the company’s customer base, the Supreme Court held the non-competition clause was unenforceable because it covered too wide a geographic area, too large a section of the company’s customer base, and was unreasonably broad in scope. The Supreme Court remanded for a determination of whether the clause could be reformed.
Davis v. Lucent Technologies, Inc.
Deborah Cutler was an accidental landlord, in that she and her husband bought a property in New Hampshire as a second home, with hopes to move there in the future. When her husband died just a few days later, she allowed her son’s large family, clearly in need of assistance, to live in the home in exchange for maintaining it. The Supreme Court held that Ms. Cutler's eviction of the Knights was not in retaliation for finding lead paint. Rather, she evicted them because instead of preserving the property, the Knights took the house apart, both causing the lead dust and making it impossible for Ms. Cutler to fund and accomplish competent abatement.
A woman became too sick to live on her own so rented her home to Tenants, who then alleged the water was bad. Landlord arranged for treatment, which included running the faucets, which in turn overloaded the sewerage system. Tenants complained to court. Although Landlord “admitted that she had not taken any action to restore potable water because she had been ill,” tenants “had refused to let [Landlord’s] boyfriend into the house to try to rectify the problem,” and tenants had not followed up by scheduling an appointment with the sewerage company. The tenants also complained the furnace did not work, but there was evidence that all scheduled service had been done and the tenants were not operating it properly. The court awarded tenants significant per-diem statutory damages and Landlord appealed. I argued for Landlord that despite the various problems, she was not in violation of the landlord/tenant statute. She had arranged for service with the water, septic, and furnace companies, and any delays were due to her terminal illness and the tenants' failure to follow through with the well and septic companies and to operate the furnace properly. The New Hampshire Supreme Court held “it is not clear from the record which facts the trial court relied upon in finding that the Landlord violated the statute or that the Landlord acted willfully.” The Supreme Court thus vacated the monetary damages and remanded to determine whether the landlord had “willfully” interrupted the tenants’ water, sewage and heat.
The Defendant dropped off his girlfriend, who was drunk, at her house in the middle of the night and waited to see she got safely inside. A police officer, who saw him pull to the side of the road and remain there, thought the explanation was “unusual,” so parked a cruiser behind the Defendant’s vehicle and activated all the lights. The police then discovered the Defendant didn’t have a valid license, and he was convicted. On appeal the State claimed the seizure was lawful because the police, acting as “community caretaker,” may conduct “routine checks on health and safety.” I argued for the Defendant that it was unconstitutional because there was nothing suspicious about the event. The New Hampshire Supreme Court agreed. It held that “the officer may have had reason to believe that the drunk female needed aid, but he had no reason to believe that the Defendant, the sole occupant of the vehicle, needed it. Absent any indication that the Defendant needed aid, the officer was not justified in seizing him under the community caretaking exception.” The Court reversed the conviction.
The Defendant was a black man was traveling through New Hampshire from Boston to his college in Vermont with two white passengers. His car was stopped in Chesterfield, New Hampshire for speeding and a defective taillight. After being satisfied that his license and registration were in order, but before returning the documents, the police nonetheless ordered the Defendant, but not the two white passengers, out of the car. The police questioned him, apparently believing that “hanging out” at a “frat party” in Boston created a suspicion that he was involved with drugs. The police gained the Defendant’s consent to search his car, which produced nothing. Without informing him he had a right to refuse consent, the police also got his consent to search his person, and found a small amount of marijuana in his back pocket. The Defendant was later convicted of possession and appealed. I argued for the Defendant that although the traffic stop was legitimate, once the police were done with it, their authority to detain him evaporated, and the police had no right to continue interrogating him. Because the police had not returned his license and registration, the Defendant was not free to leave, thereby giving the Defendant little choice in consenting to the searches. I urged the Supreme Court to adopt a rule requiring suppression of evidence gained during illegal detentions unless the police apprise people of their right to decline consent to searches of them and their things. The New Hampshire Supreme Court reversed the conviction. It held that although no pre-consent warning is required, if the taint of the illegal detention is not purged, the evidence cannot be used. It then adopted the three-part test of the United States Supreme Court holding in Brown v. Illinios -- temporal proximity, intervening circumstances, and flagrancy of misconduct -- and applied it to this case. Here, because the Defendant’s license and registration had not been returned, he was under continuing illegal detention. There was “absolute temporal proximity” because the consent had been obtained while the defendant was unlawfully obtained. “There were no intervening circumstances, such as the officer informing the defendant of his right to refuse consent, that would purge the taint of the unlawful detention and support a conclusion that the consent was an ‘act of free will.’” The Court also found that the police action was flagrant because “the officer – a Caucasian – had just accused the defendant – an African American male in his twenties – of drug trafficking and had not informed the defendant that he had a right to refuse to consent” and because “hanging out” at a “frat party” in Boston before returning to college in Vermont were “innocuous facts.” The case has since been cited by a number of law reviews and treatises concerning search and seizure law.

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