Source: http://ksag.washburnlaw.edu/opinions/2002/2002-047.htm
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 02:45:52+00:00

Document:
Based on the authority cited herein, it is our opinion that the Kansas appellate courts would interpret the term "item of appropriation of money" broadly enough to conclude that the veto of subsection 141(l) of 2002 Senate Bill No. 517 was within the spirit of the executive line-item veto power and constitutional. Cited herein: K.S.A. 75-3714a; Kan. Const., Art. 2, §§ 14, 16; L. 2002, Ch. 204.
You request our opinion regarding the authority of the Governor to exercise his line-item veto power to veto subsection 141(l) of 2002 Senate Bill No. 517, as enrolled and presented to the Governor. Subsection 141(l) was intended to prohibit the expenditure of state money in fiscal year 2003 to reinforce the State Capitol building dome in preparation for placement of the Ad Astra sculpture atop the dome.
2002 Senate Bill No. 517 is one of only two appropriations bills passed during this year's legislative session. As enacted, it contains 181 separate sections and spans 255 pages of the 2002 Session Laws of Kansas.(1) It contains appropriations for 80 Executive Branch agencies, boards and commissions (including several Regents' institutions), the Judicial Branch and the Legislature. After much debate and compromise in the House and Senate, the bill was presented to the Governor on May 13, 2002.(2) The Governor approved the bill on May 18, 2002, except for sections 120(c), 141(l) and portions of sections 88(a) and 157(a).(3) On May 31, 2002, a motion to override these line-item vetoes failed in the Senate.(4) Thus, the line-item vetoes were sustained(5) and the bill, absent those provisions, took effect on June 6, 2002.(6) Work on the dome has begun and moneys have been expended and/or encumbered for this purpose. Subsequently, on August 28, 2002, you requested this opinion. While you requested an expedited response, because the specific issue you raise regarding the dome reinforcement was moot (due to the work already being in progress and the money being already spent or encumbered) before the opinion was sought, and because of the gravity of the issue and its implications for other line-item vetoes, we believe a more deliberate, thoughtful approach is warranted.
"Section 141(l) has been line-item vetoed in its entirety.
You pose two questions: Was the Governor's veto of 2002 Senate Bill No. 517, §141(l), within the authority granted by Article 2, Section 14(b) of the Kansas Constitution; and if the action taken by the Governor was beyond the scope of this authority, does subsection 141(l) have force and effect thereby prohibiting expenditure of state funds to reinforce the statehouse dome?
"If any bill presented to the governor contains several items of appropriation of money, one or more of such items may be disapproved by the governor while the other portion of the bill is approved by the governor. In case the governor does so disapprove, a veto message of the governor stating the item or items disapproved, and the reasons therefor, shall be appended to the bill at the time it is signed, and the bill shall be returned with the veto message to the house of origin of the bill. Whenever a veto message is so received, the message shall be entered in the journal and, in not more than thirty calendar days, the house of origin shall reconsider the items of the bill which have been disapproved. If two-thirds of the members then elected (or appointed) and qualified shall vote to approve any item disapproved by the governor, the bill with the veto message, shall be sent to the other house, which shall in not more than thirty calendar days also reconsider each such item so approved by the house of origin, and if approved by two-thirds of all the members then elected (or appointed) and qualified, any such item shall take effect and become a part of the bill."
"The first tends to favor the legislature, either by limiting the portions of an appropriations bill that a governor can veto, or by assimilating the item veto to the traditional executive veto in order to limit the governor's ability to disaggregate the legislative compromises incorporated in a bill. In effect, the court will defer to the legislature's determination of how the portions of a bill fit together and whether two arguably severable provisions are really one item. This approach generates relatively predictable case law, but fails to appreciate how the item veto differs from the traditional veto and thereby erodes the item veto's anti-logrolling function.
"The second approach relies on some of the basic conceptual assumptions of the first and seeks to maintain the legislature's primacy in determining the structure and contents of legislative bills, but recognizes that the historic purpose of the item veto was to enhance the executive's role and to empower the governor to undo some of the linkages of material within a bill. Courts pursuing this approach seek an ongoing reconciliation of executive and legislative prerogatives, but the balance struck by particular courts will often seem arbitrary, and the lack of consistency in judicial decisions increases the likelihood of future litigated conflicts.
Attorney General Opinions No. 81-82 and 76-168 failed to consider or even acknowledge the second and third possible approaches.(14) More importantly, as noted previously, the opinions predate State ex rel. Stephan v. Carlin,(15) and Carlin itself predates significant developments in other states having similar constitutional provisions conferring line-item veto authority.
"(1) Section 14(a) of Article 2 authorizes the governor to veto any bill which he does not approve by returning it, with a veto message of the objections, to the house of origin. This provision of the constitution contemplates the veto of an entire act. A veto of Senate Bill No. 470, however, coming at the close of the regular legislative session, would have left a large segment of state government without funds for the coming fiscal year.
"Section 14(b) of Article 2 provides the only authority for the governor to veto less than an entire legislative act. This subsection authorizes the governor to veto one or more 'items of appropriation of money,' when a single bill contains several such items. This provision contemplates a "line-item veto" the veto of one or more parts of an appropriation measure while approving the remainder. For example, under this subsection the governor may, if he chooses, veto the appropriation of a sum of money for a specified purpose while leaving the other provisions of an appropriation bill intact.
"Similarly, 'items of appropriation of money,' as that phrase is employed in Section 14(b), means the designation of specific sums of money which the legislature authorizes may be spent for specific purposes. Some common examples of 'items of appropriation of money' are these. There is appropriated (for a named agency) from the state general fund: for salaries and wages, $500,000; for operating expenditures, $200,000; for the purchase of a site (at a stated location for a certain purpose) $15,000; and for a certain purpose from a certain fund, no limit (the authorized sum being the amount in the described fund).
The inference that may be drawn from this case is that any provision that does something more or different than designate a specific sum of money to be spent for a specific purpose is not an "item of appropriation of money" subject to line-item veto. However, this is not actually the Court's holding in Carlin. Because the provision at issue in that case was an amendment to an existing substantive statute dealing with school finance and restrictions on school district budgets and held to be "wholly foreign to the subject of appropriations," it was clearly not an "item of appropriation of money" within the meaning of Article 2, Section 14(b); the Court did not need to, and in fact did not, discuss whether stand-alone restrictions or limitations on state expenditures that are properly included in an appropriations bill could or should be considered an "item of appropriation of money." While the Court uses examples of common "items of appropriation," it does not specifically limit its definition to these examples. In fact, because the Carlin Court held as it did with regard to the two-subjects issue, it really did not need to address the Governor's line-item veto power at all. As that discussion is not necessary to the holding, it might be considered dicta and therefore not binding precedent.
We consider the issue you raise, the extent of the executive line-item veto authority, one of great importance to the operation of this State's government. "The Governor's statutory authority to propose the State budget, and his constitutional power to exercise a selective veto over legislative appropriations, constitute significant responsibilities for the State's fiscal affairs, and are essential to an efficient, modern system of government."(19) As mentioned previously, subsection 141(l) was not the only provision to be line-item vetoed by the Governor in Senate Bill No. 517. Additionally, the Governor exercised line-item veto authority to veto certain sections and portions of sections contained in 2002 House Substitute for Senate Bill No. 363, another appropriations bill.(20) Thus, while you specifically question the line-item veto of only one particular provision, any opinion we provide in this regard will likely have a bearing on several other provisions. We therefore believe it imperative to proceed with caution and due regard for the magnitude of the issue presented. Because there is no conclusive authority in this State that expenditure restrictions and limitations are not to be considered "items of appropriation of money" for purposes of the Article 2, Section 14(b) of the Kansas Constitution, we believe that, should the issue reach them, the Kansas appellate courts would also undertake a more critical and comprehensive review of this issue, taking into account all the case law and scholarly studies, much of which postdates the decision in Carlin.
We read this to mean that, if a provision is properly included as a separable provision in an appropriations bill, whether or not the state has a two-subjects prohibition, it is fair game for line-item veto.
With regard to the second purpose behind the line-item veto, imposition of fiscal restrictions on the Legislature, the line-item veto of a restriction on spending would not typically further this goal. Vetoing a legislative restriction on spending actually allows for more unfettered spending and thus does not serve to prevent the legislative branch from overspending.
"The power and authority to appropriate funds are vested in the legislative branch of government. Although this power to appropriate and expend state monies is reserved exclusively to the Legislature, the Governor nonetheless plays a vital constitutional role in the budget process. The ultimate legislative authority over appropriations is subject to checks and balances from the executive. The Governor is statutorily authorized to 'examine and consider all requests for appropriations' and to 'formulate . . . budget recommendations to be forwarded to the Legislature for its consideration and ultimate approval.' N.J.S.A. 52:27B-20. Further, and of critical relevance in this case, the Governor is constitutionally empowered to object to any item or items included in an appropriation bill through the exercise of a selective veto.
"Because the purpose of the Governor's 'line-item' veto is to excise line items in appropriations bills, we should give effect to such a purpose. The Legislature frustrates such a purpose, however, if it drafts budget bills as lump sum appropriations to agencies. The only feature of modern legislative bill drafting in Washington that resembles the traditional budget line item is the budget proviso.
We have yet to find a case with circumstances identical to those present with the veto of subsection 141(l) of 2002 Senate Bill No. 517. The proviso contained in subsection (l) is not attached to a specific appropriation of money made in Senate Bill 517 (and even attempts to limit appropriations made in other bills), but it is included in the same section as the several appropriations for a specific agency, the Department of Administration; subsection (l) is a stand-alone provision, easily separable from the remainder of the section of which it is a part and the bill as a whole; the Governor vetoed the entire provision contained in subsection (l), he did not attempt to veto just a word, phrase or sentence of that subsection; subsection (l) prohibits expenditure of funds for a particular purpose, it does not authorize or appropriate funds for a specific purpose or transfer funds from one permitted purpose to another; subsection (l) is clearly related to appropriations and properly placed in an appropriations bill.
spirit of the executive line-item veto power and constitutional. Because we have concluded that the veto was appropriate, we need not address the second question you raise.
1. L. 2002, Ch. 204.
2. 2002 Journal of the Senate 2125.
3. 2002 Kan. Sess. Laws 1644-45.
4. 2002 Journal of the Senate 2305.
5. Id. See Kan. Const., Art. 2, § 14(b) (two-thirds vote of both houses needed to override line-item veto).
6. L. 2002, Ch. 204, § 181; Kan. Reg., Vol. 21, No. 23, 893 (June 6, 2002).
7. 2002 Journal of the Senate 1871.
8. 2002 Kan. Sess. Laws 1645 (emphasis in original).
9. State ex rel Stephan v. Carlin, 230 Kan. 252, 256 (1981).
10. Attorney General Opinion No. 81-82 (governor can not line-item veto appropriation bill provision effecting a transfer of money within the treasury or imposing conditions, limitations or qualifications on an appropriation or constituting an independent statement of substantive law); Attorney General Opinion No. 76-168 (governor can not line-item veto appropriation bill provision approving of statewide television system).
13. Richard Briffault, The Item Veto in State Courts, 66 Temp. L. Rev. 1171, 1184-85 (1993).
14. We note, however, that many of the cases cited by Professor Briffault were decided after those opinions were issued.
16. Manhattan Buildings, Inc. v. Hurley, 231 Kan. 20, 31 (1982).
17. See Heinz v. Larimer, 119 Kan. 861 (1925); State v. Dawson, 90 Kan. 839 (1913).
18. Carlin, 230 Kan. at 255-56 (emphasis added).
19. Archer v. Kean, 479 A.2d 403, 406 (N.J., 1984).
20. 2002 Kan. Sess. Laws 1646-49.
21. State v. French, 133 Kan. 579 (1931).
22. Richard Briffault, The Item Veto in State Courts, 66 Temp. L. Rev. 1171, 1177 (1993). See also Washington State Legislature v. Lowry, 931 P.2d 885, 889-90 (1997); State ex rel. Coll v. Carruthers, 759 P.2d 1380, 1383 (N.M. 1988).
24. See Reilly v. Knapp, 105 Kan. 565 (1919) (discusses evils of logrolling in appropriations acts).
25. Iowa Const., Art. III, § 29.
26. Turner v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 186 N.W.2d 141, 149-52 (Iowa 1971), quoting extensively State ex rel. Wisconsin Telephone co. v. Henry, 260 N.W. 486, 490-92. The Court noted that it saw no significant distinction between the terms "items of appropriation of money," "item," and "part," 186 N.W.2d at 149-50.
27. Turner, 186 N.W.2d at 152, quoting Henry, 260 N.W. at 492.
28. See K.S.A. 75-3714a et seq.
29. Richard Briffault, The Item Veto: A Problem in State Separation of Powers, 2 Emerging Issues in State Constitutional Law 85, 89-90 (Copyright 1989 by the National Association of Attorneys General).
30. 479 A.2d 403 (N.J. 1984).
31. Id. at 406 (citations omitted).
32. Id. at 416, citing cases in Massachusetts, New Mexico, Ohio and Wisconsin.
33. New Jersey's provision does allow veto of an item or items of an appropriation of money "in whole or in part," but this quoted language was not what the Court relied upon in reaching its conclusion in this regard. Rather, the language was found to be merely additional support for the conclusion already reached by the Court.
34. 495 S.W.2d 385 (Mo. 1973).
35. Id. at 390-92 (Mo. 1973).
36. 346 So.2d 153 (1977).
40. 931 P.2d 885 (1997).
42. 833 P.2d 20 (1992).
46. The New Jersey Supreme Court specifically approached the appropriateness of a line-item veto of a restriction on expenditures from a separation of powers perspective in Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO v. Florio, 617 A.2d 223 (1992).

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