Source: http://ipbiz.blogspot.com/2017/08/
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 23:01:26+00:00

Document:
We reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.
Vicor Corp. v. SynQor, Inc., 603 F. App’x 969, 970 (Fed.
consideration in light of our anticipation decision. Id.
patents, without any explanation to justify such inconsistency.
and the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art resolved.
between the claims at issue in the respective reexaminations.
Bhd. of Teamsters v. N.L.R.B., 512 F.2d 564, 567 (D.C.
its reasons for reaching different results”).
Māori novelist Witi Ihimaera is one of the winners of the 2017 Prime Minister’s Awards for Literary Achievement.
Writer Witi Ihimaera - a university professor who became in 1973 the first indigenous Maori to have a novel published and went on to write The Whale Rider - has admitted plagiarism in his latest book, just as he was named a national arts treasure.
Reviewer Jolisa Gracewood outed Ihimaera in the weekly New Zealand Listener, saying that she stopped looking after identifying 16 different passages written by other authors in Ihimaera's historical novel The Trowenna Sea, which was published this month.
Ihimaera, 65, who has had 14 novels and 12 collections of short stories published since his debut 36 years ago, apologised for his "inadvertent copying" in The Trowenna Sea and said he would buy back all unsold copies and produce a second edition acknowledging all sources next year.
His announcement was followed by the revelation that Ihimaera had also plagiarised a book by a fellow professor at Auckland University, Keith Sorrensen, in another historical novel, The Matriarch, published in 1986.
CAFC in ALVARADO HOSPITAL. A dissent by Judge Newman.
One must always keep in mind that the CAFC has jurisdiction in non-patent areas.
seeking declaratory, injunctive, and mandamus relief.
in-part, reverse-in-part, and remand for further proceedings.
Treatment Ctr., Inc. v. United States, 444 F.3d 1379 (Fed.
determined that claims 1–3, 8, 9, 12, 16, and 19 of U.S.
anticipated or obvious. We affirm.
to allow joinder and institution in this case. Nidec disagrees.
reversal of its holding concerning anticipation by Hideji.
determination under Bessler and Kocybik).
as in this case, or the petitioner is a new party.
they would vote to set aside the earlier panel decision.
under 35 U.S.C. § 112. Id. at *2–3. We affirm.
is a question of fact we review for substantial evidence.
ULF Bamberg v. Dalvey, 815 F.3d 793, 797 (Fed. Cir.
2016) (citing Harari v. Lee, 656 F.3d 1331, 1341 (Fed. Cir.
mind might accept the evidence to support it.
Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1315 (Fed. Cir.
Software, Inc., 417 F.3d 1342, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
F.3d 1200, 1218 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
testimony is wholly conclusory. See J.A. 178 ¶ 6.
weight” to expert testimony in similar circumstances).
Board’s decision to disregard Mr. Miller’s testimony.
Maryland Senate President Thomas V. Mike Miller Jr. (D-Calvert) on Thursday [17 Aug 17] lashed out at Gov. Larry Hogan (R) for quickly advancing plans this week to remove a controversial State House statue of former U.S. Supreme Court justice Roger B. Taney, who defended slavery in the landmark 1857 Dred Scott decision.
The plaintiff confines his claim to the use of the conical form, and excludes from his specification any allusion to any other. He must have done so advisedly. He might have been unwilling to expose the validity of his patent, by the assertion of a right to any other. Can he abandon the ground of his patent, and ask now, for the exclusive use of all cars which, by experiment, shall be found to yield the advantages which he anticipated for conical cars only?
The claim of today is that an octagonal car is an infringement of this patent. Will this be the limit to that claim? Who can tell the bounds within which the mechanical industry of the country may freely exert itself? What restraints does this patent impose in this branch of mechanic art?
The dissent in Winans comprised MR. CHIEF JUSTICE TANEY, MR. JUSTICE CATRON, MR. JUSTICE DANIEL, and MR. JUSTICE CAMPBELL, .
Curtis was so disgusted with Dred Scott that he resigned from the Supreme Court.
Justice Benjamin Robbins Curtis, in dissent, attacked much of the Court's decision as obiter dicta, on the ground that once the Court determined that it did not have jurisdiction to hear Scott's case, it must simply dismiss the action, and not pass judgment on the merits of the claims. The dissents by Curtis and McLean also attacked the Court's overturning of the Missouri Compromise on its merits, noting both that it was not necessary to decide the question, and also that none of the authors of the Constitution had ever objected on constitutional grounds to the United States Congress' adoption of the antislavery provisions of the Northwest Ordinance passed by the Continental Congress, or the subsequent acts that barred slavery north of 36°30' N.
Georgetown Rail prevails over Holland at the CAFC. Analysis of the preamble.
analysis can be performed by the processing device . . .
(quoting ’329 patent col. 7 ll. 10−14).
marks omitted). This puts the caboose before the locomotive.
damages award of $1,544,333 was not an abuse of discretion.
The issue of copying sermons, re-visited .
Stipulating that there was unattributed copying, one notes, as to copyright, this would likely count as a transformative work. The major import of the emails was not the specific content, but rather that they were sent to Hillary Clinton and when (and why) they were sent.
Ministers, in sermons about sharing, frequently point to the story of the two-stick Popsicle. Sometimes the ministers mention that the Popsicle was invented by an eleven year old boy, Frank Epperson, in 1905. And during the depression, the two stick popsicle was introduced so that one could share.
AND there is a sermon about a (mythical?) US submarine sunk in New York City harbor, with a sailor inside tapping out in code: is there hope?
The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office recently issued a final rejection of Crocs' key design patent, which Crocs has said it plans to appeal, according to Footwear News.
In a 2015 decision, SD NY gave summary judgment in favor of TIFFANY AND COMPANY, holding Costco liable for trademark infringement and trademark counterfeiting under the Lanham Act with respect to engagement rings sold under certain signage that referenced the mark "Tiffany" as a standalone term. A decision on August 14, 2017 addressed damages.
In the Summary Judgment Opinion, the Court stated that "[i]t was still an open question in the Second Circuit as to whether the accounting of profits in a trademark infringement action is an equitable or legal remedy." (S.J. Op. at 36.) In the parties' post-trial briefing, Costco contends that the jury verdict on the "Accounting of Profits Issues" was rendered on an equitable remedy for which there is no federal right to a jury trial, and that the Court is obligated to make an independent determination as to the accounting of profits. Tiffany, likewise, urges that "regardless of where the Court comes out on the state of the law, Tiffany believes the Court should set out findings of fact that would support the jury's determinations, whether or not it was advisory on actual profits." (Tiffany Br. at 3.) Although the Second Circuit has not explicitly ruled on the issue, in Gucci America, Inc. v. Weixing Li, a trademark infringement action under 15 U.S.C. Section 1117(a), the court characterized the accounting of profits sought by the plaintiff as an "equitable remedy." 768 F.3d 122, 130 (2d Cir. 2014). The Court will treat the jury verdict as to accounting of profits as advisory and make its own findings.
The Court finds that Costco has failed to prove that its profits on sales of rings under Standalone Signage were limited to the 10.31% margin computed by Costco's damages expert. That margin is artificially small, and was made possible chiefly by the subsidizing impact of membership fees, which are themselves enhanced by the pull of the "treasure hunt" tactic in which Costco uses extraordinary bargains on brand-name merchandise to pull customers into its stores. Fine jewelry is the first display case customers encounter in Costco's standard store layout, along with name-branded luxury watches. (Tr. 451-452, 466-467, 470.) In light of the role of the membership fees in Costco's business model and of its use of Tiffany's mark in selling fine jewelry, which is prominently displayed at the entrance of the stores to catch the [*16] eye of the customer, the Court finds it necessary and appropriate as an equitable matter to impute a sufficient portion of the membership revenue to the sale of these rings to bring the recoverable profit margin on the rings into the profit margin range of a typical run-of-the-mill jewelry store, which is approximately 50-100%. The Court further finds that the advisory jury's award of $3.7 million in profits on the Standalone Signage sales, a figure that is slightly more than 50% of the sales revenue proven in connection with those sales, constitutes a just and appropriate award of Costco's profits attributable to the infringing sales.
The issues of whether punitive damages were warranted and, if so, of how much punitive damages to award were within the province of the jury, and the jury's decision cannot be set aside unless "there exists such a complete absence of evidence supporting the verdict that the jury's findings could only have been the result of sheer surmise and conjecture, or the evidence in favor of the movant is so overwhelming that reasonable and fair minded persons could not arrive at a verdict against it." Providencia v. ex rel. K.V. v. Schultze, No. 02 CV 9516, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30411, 2009 WL 890057, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 2009) (quoting Brady v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 531 F. 3d 127, 133 (2d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted)). As the Court stated in its Summary Judgment Opinion, "Tiffany . . . proffered [in connection with that motion practice] evidence upon which the finder of fact could conclude that Costco's behavior satisfied the 'gross, wanton or willful' standard" required for awarding punitive [*21] damages." (Docket entry no. 175 at 34.) Even more evidence of conduct supporting punitive damages was adduced at trial, including evidence of the conduct and attitude of Costco's senior executives towards use of the "Tiffany" mark and the lawsuit, customer confusion, and marketing strategies designed to invoke an association with Tiffany. Given that there plainly was enough evidence to support the jury's award of punitive damages, the jury's finding that punitive damages were warranted will not be disturbed.
Treating the jury's verdict as advisory only as to the recovery of profits, the Court finds that Plaintiffs are entitled to recover trebled profits of $11.1 million, and judgment will be entered in their favor in that amount, plus prejudgment interest at the annual rate set under 26 U.S.C. § 6621(a)(2) for the period from February 15, 2013, through the date of judgment and punitive damages of $8.25 million, unless Plaintiffs file within seven (7) days from the date hereof a written election to instead recover the $2 million in statutory and $8.25 million in punitive damages awarded by the jury.
Costco is permanently enjoined from using the mark TIFFANY as a standalone term, not combined with any immediately following modifiers such as "setting," "set" or "style," in connection with its advisement and/or sale of any products that were not manufactured by Plaintiffs or their affiliates.
Inc. v. United States, 850 F.3d 1343, 1347 (Fed. Cir.
. . . both from said bus master and said processor”), respectively.
recite all types and all forms of categorical data storage.
Can a state law or regulation define ownership of a US Patent?
undervalued their research. Soon thereafter, Mr.
didn’t give anything else away.” J.A. 2759:13–14.
the federal government to do so.
contractors. We hold that it does not.
Theoretically, Congress might have written Bayh-Dole differently, to displace the norm, and that would have been within the scope of Congressional powers. But, as you suggest, not likely within the scope of powers of Florida lawmakers. Or, is there an 11th Amendment/Florida Prepaid Postsecondary kind of issue?
Prior to Bayh-Dole, many government agencies were reluctant to relinquish their ownership of the government funded patents to universities or industry. Instead these agencies granted nonexclusive licenses to anyone who wished to produce the inventions.
Innovation's Golden Goose, supra note 10. ("Before Bayh-Dole, the fruits of research supported by government agencies had belonged strictly to the federal government.
Having established that state law generally controls patent ownership, Akazawa held that the same doctrine should apply when foreign law, rather than [*64] state law, controls.
Other state laws regulating issues related to patents have not been preempted. This seems to create some room for state legislatures to regulate a limited range of patent related issues.
We have previously held that patent ownership is determined by state, not federal law. Akazawa, 520 F.3d at 1357 (citing Jim Arnold Corp. v. Hydrotech Sys., Inc., 109 F.3d 1567, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ("[T]he question of who owns the patent rights and on what terms typically is a question exclusively for state courts.")). However, "the question of whether [**11] a patent assignment clause creates an automatic assignment or merely an obligation to assign is intimately bound up with the question of standing in patent cases," and therefore we have "treated it as a matter of federal law." DDB Techs., L.L.C. v. MLB Advanced Media, L.P., 517 F.3d 1284, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Usually, federal law is used to determine the validity and terms of an assignment, but state law controls any transfer of patent ownership by operation of law not deemed an assignment.
Under the classical conception of the patent, individual states lost the power to determine entitlement to a patent or the scope of the patent property right. But the Constitution's Patent Clause authorized Congress only to "secure" the exclusive patent right. Once a patent was issued and entered the stream of commerce, its management as a property right largely befell the states. That division of responsibility has very largely persisted, although with qualifications emanating from the first sale doctrine, federal antitrust, and misuse policy. Federal law defines entitlement to a patent, its appropriate scope, and enforcement power by means of infringement actions. By contrast, state commercial law determines questions about licensing, assignment, and descent.
The Tenth Circuit acknowledged that "states retain the power to 'adopt rules for the promotion of intellectual creation within their own jurisdictions' so long as those rules do not impermissibly interfere with the federal patent scheme."
174 F.3d 1104, 1108-9 (10th Cir. 1999).
declaratory relief from the PTO’s disciplinary proceedings.
thirty days to file a notice of appeal.
reconsider the October 27 order.
motion for reconsideration on December 30, 2015.
of the October 27, 2015 order to file his notice of appeal.
than four months after the summary judgment order.
within twenty-eight days of the entry of the judgment.
which may be filed within a year of entry of judgment.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1).
Unless otherwise provided by statute or rule (such as Fed. R. Civ. P. 50, 52 and 59), a motion for reconsideration shall be served and filed within 14 days after the entry of the order or judgment on the original motion by the Judge or Magistrate Judge. A brief setting forth concisely the matter or controlling decisions which the party believes the Judge or Magistrate Judge has overlooked shall be filed with the Notice of Motion.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) provides that a party may file a motion within ten days of the entry of a judgment requesting that the court alter or amend the judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). Such a motion is considered a motion for reconsideration.
"A proper Rule 59(e) motion must be based on either an intervening change in controlling law, the availability of new or previously unavailable evidence, or the need to correct clear error or prevent manifest injustice." Choi v. Kim, 258 Fed. App'x 413, 416 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing North River Ins. Co. v. CIGNA Reinsurance Co., 52 F.3d 1194, 1218 (3d Cir. 1995)).
The current version of FRCP 59(e) does recite 28 days: A motion to alter or amend a judgment must be filed no later than 28 days after the entry of the judgment.
the denial of a Rule 60(b) motion for abuse of discretion.
Aikens v. Ingram, 652 F.3d 496, 501 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
Amgen’s motion to compel discovery from Hospira, Inc.
provide information concerning “the process . . .
was disclosed in its application.
a conclusion that Amgen does not now dispute.
Amgen appealed the district court’s interlocutory order.
included in the list described in [paragraph (l)(3)(A)] . . .
for asserting baseless claims of patent infringement.
unenforceable, or will not be infringed.” 42 U.S.C.
further investigation or discovery.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
were infringing, but were unable to do so”); Morda v.
judgment action pursuant to § 262(l)(9)(C).”).
There was reference to a Supreme Court decision on finality.
A final decision of a district court means, with limited exceptions, an order that ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the district court to do but execute the judgment. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 467, 98 S. Ct. 2454, 2457, 57 L. Ed. 2d 351 (1978).

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