Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/91794/united-states-vs-first-national-bank-detroit
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 17:05:06+00:00

Document:
But the government insists that to effect the legislative purpose the words must be interpreted as the Indians understood them, and cases from this Court ( Jones v. Meehan, 175 U. S. 1 ; Starr v. Long Jim, 227 U. S. 613 ) are cited to the effect that Indian treaties and acts to which the Indians must give consent before they become operative must be interpreted so as to conform to the understanding of the Indians as to the meaning of the terms used. The justice and propriety of this method of interpretation are obvious and essential to the protection of an unlettered race, dealing with those of better education and skill, themselves framing contracts which the Indians are induced to sign. But the legislation here in question is not in the nature of contract, and contains no provision that makes it effectual only upon consent of the Indians whose rights and privileges are to be affected. Evidently this legislation contemplated in some measure the rights of others who might deal with the Indians, and obviously was intended to enlarge the right to acquire as well as to part with lands held in trust for the Indians.
these after effects can have little weight in determining the meaning of the legislation, and certainly cannot overcome the meaning of plain words used in legislative enactments. If the effect of the legislation has been disastrous to the Indians, that fact will not justify the courts in departing from the terms of the act as written. If the true construction has been followed with harsh consequences, it cannot influence the courts in administering the law. The responsibility for the justice or wisdom of legislation rests with the Congress, and it is the province of the courts to enforce, not to make, the laws. St. Louis, Iron Mt. & S. Ry. Co. v. Taylor, 210 U. S. 281 , 210 U. S. 294 ; Texas Cement Co. v. McCord, 233 U. S. 157 , 233 U. S. 163 .
act the words necessary to make that intention clear -- that is, we deem this a case for the application of the often expressed consideration, aiding interpretation, that if a given construction was intended, it would have been easy for the legislative body to have expressed it in apt terms. Farrington v. Tennessee, 95 U. S. 679 , 95 U. S. 689 ; Bank v. Matthews, 98 U. S. 621 , 98 U. S. 627 ; Tompkins v. Little Rock, & Ft. S. R. Co., 125 U. S. 109 , 125 U. S. 127 ; United States v. Lexington Mill Co., 232 U. S. 399 , 232 U. S. 410 .

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