Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/271/251/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 18:59:25+00:00

Document:
Justia › US Law › US Case Law › US Supreme Court › Volume 271 › Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co. v. Durham Co.
1. The Uniform Bill of Lading Act of August 29, 1916, c. 415, § 23, presents no obstacle to garnishment of a carrier after the order bill of lading has been surrendered; neither does that Act confer a right of garnishment. P. 271 U. S. 256.
2. The fact that, by § 5 of the Uniform Bill of Lading, as construed by this Court in Michigan Central R. Co. v. Mark Owen & Co., 256 U. S. 427, a carrier may remain liable qua carrier to the consignee of an interstate carload shipment after surrender of the bill of lading and payment of charges and while the car is on a train track and turned over to the consignee for the purpose of unloading, and partly unloaded by him, is not determinative of the carrier's liability as garnishee in a suit by a stranger seeking to collect a debt from the consignee. P. 271 U. S. 255.
3. The carrier's liability to garnishment in such circumstances depends on the state law. P. 271 U. S. 257.
Certiorari to a judgment of the Supreme Court of Michigan holding the Railway Company liable as garnishee in a suit by Alvin R. Durham Company to collect a debt from one Fred S. Larson, as principal defendant. See also 224 Mich. 477.
the car was shifted several times by the railway for its own convenience in the use of the team tracks.
"under the interpretation of § 5 of the uniform bill of lading, as appears pears in Michigan Cent. R. Co. v. [Mark] Owen [& Co.], 256 U. S. 427, . . . the railway did have the custody, control, and possession of the interstate shipment."
Id., 229 Mich. 468. See also Chicago & N.W. R. Co. v. Durham Co., 265 U.S. 580. This Court granted a writ of certiorari. 268 U.S. 684. The sole question for decision is whether the railway is liable as garnishee.
railroad contended that, under § 5 of the bill of lading, there was no liability because the surrender of the car to the consignee, followed by breaking the seals and commencement of unloading, constituted a delivery, and that, in any event, its responsibility for the unloaded part of the contents had become that of warehouseman. This Court held that, since the theft occurred within the 48-hour period, there had not been, under the contract of the parties as expressed in § 5 of the bill of lading, such a delivery as would terminate the carrier's liability as insurer or reduce the liability to that of the warehouseman's exercise of reasonable care.
In the case at bar, it is sought to hold the railroad liable as garnishee to a stranger. It is not sought to enforce a liability arising under a federal law. As the order bill of lading had been surrendered, the Uniform Bill of Lading Act presented no obstacle to garnishment. Act of August 29, 1916, c. 415, § 23, 39 Stat. 538, 543. But that Act obviously confers no right to garnishment. Nor is there anything in the bill of lading which conceivably could be construed as either conferring or denying the right of garnishment. The plaintiff does not seek to enforce, as a derivative right, a claim of the consignee against the carrier under the bill of lading. It seeks to reach tangible property confessedly belonging to the principal defendant and to which the carrier confessedly makes no claim either of title or possession. Section 5 of the bill of lading clearly does not authorize a carrier, who had surrendered to the consignee control of the shipment upon surrender of the bill of lading, payment of charges and signing of the usual receipt, any right to recapture control of the unloaded part of the shipment in the event that garnishee proceedings are commenced within 48 hours after such surrender.
Whether, under the law of Michigan, the railway was liable as garnishee we have no occasion to inquire. There is nothing in the uniform bill of lading which would prevent the state court from holding that, although the freight car was in the carrier's possession, it was not liable as garnishee of the contents, because the apples were in the consignee's possession, although not unloaded. A person breaking open and taking the contents of a chest in his custody has been held guilty of larceny. Union Trust Co. v. Wilson, 198 U. S. 530, 198 U. S. 537. The state court, however, reversed the judgment of the trial court because it assumed that the liability of the garnishee was fixed by the federal law, and that, under the rule declared in the Mark Owen case, the railroad was liable. As this was error, the judgment must be reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. Ebert v. Poston, 266 U. S. 548. Compare Industrial Commission v. Nordenholt Corp., 259 U. S. 263; Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U. S. 109.
"The carrier or party in possession of any of the property herein described shall be liable for any loss thereof or damage thereto, except as hereinafter provided. . . ."
"Property not removed by the party entitled to receive it within forty-eight hours . . . after notice of its arrival has been duly sent or given may be kept in car, depot, or place of delivery of the carrier or warehouse subject to a reasonable charge for storage and to carrier's responsibility as warehouseman only. . . ."
Madden v. Union Pacific R. Co., 89 Kan. 282; Wood v. Edgar, 13 Mo. 451; Gleason v. South Milwaukee Bank, 89 Wis. 534. Compare Hooper v. Day, 19 Me. 56; Balkham v. Lowe, 20 Me. 369.
Nesbitt v. Ware, 30 Ala. 68; Cunningham v. Baker, 104 Ala. 160; Holcomb v. Winchester, 52 Conn. 447; Clark v. Brewer, 6 Gray 320; Martz v. Detroit Fire Ins. Co., 28 Mich. 201; Thorp v. Preston, 42 Mich. 511; Weil v. Tyler, 38 Mo. 545; Selheimer v. Elder, 98 Pa. 154.
Davis v. Millen, 111 Ga. 451; Shivers v. Wilson, 5 Har. & J. 130. Compare Disconto Gesellschaft v. Umbreit, 208 U. S. 570.
Edmondson v. De Kalb County, 51 Ala. 103; Danley v. State Bank, 15 Ark. 16; Lovejoy v. Albee, 33 Me. 414.
Buchanan v. Alexander, 4 How. 20; Fischer v. Daudistal, 9 F. 145; Pringle v. Guild, 118 F. 655; Moscow Hardware Co. v. Colson, 158 F.199; Allen-West Commission Co. v. Grumbles, 161 F. 461; In re Argonaut Shoe Co., 187 F. 784; Glass v. Woodman, 223 F. 621; Forbes v. Thompson, 2 Penn. 530; Columbia Brick Co. v. District of Columbia, 1 App.D.C. 351; Millison v. Fisk, 43 Ill. 112; Bivens v. Harper, 59 Ill. 21; Wallace v.Lawyer, 54 Ind. 501; Allen v. Wright, 134 Mass. 347; 136 Mass.193; School District v. Gage, 39 Mich. 484; White v. Ledyard, 48 Mich. 264; Hudson v. Saginaw Circuit Judge, 114 Mich. 116; McDougal v. Hennepin County, 4 Minn. 184; Clarksdale Compress Co. v. Caldwell County, 80 Miss. 343; Ross v. Allen, 10 N.H. 96; Burnham v. City of Fond du Lac., 15 Wis. 193. Compare Dunkley v. City of Marquette, 157 Mich. 339.
Compare Smith v. Gilbert, 71 Conn. 149; Stowe v. Phinney, 78 Me. 244; Massachusetts National Bank v. Bullock, 120 Mass. 88; Rozelle v. Rhodes, 116 Pa. 129.
Stevenot v. Eastern Ry. Co., 61 Minn. 104; Bates v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. P. Ry. Co., 60 Wis. 296. Compare Adams v. Scott, 104 Mass. 164; Rosenbush v. Bernheimer, 211 Mass. 146; Clifford v. Brockton Transp. Co., 214 Mass. 466; Landa v. Holck & Co., 129 Mo. 663.

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