Source: http://www.juricaf.org/arret/CONSEILDELEUROPE-COUREUROPEENNEDESDROITSDELHOMME-19780511-760476-771976-778177-
Timestamp: 2017-04-26 00:50:00+00:00

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Page d'accueil > Résultats de la recherche FOTI ET AUTRES C. ITALIE
Type d'affaire : DecisionType de recours : Partiellement irrecevableNumérotation : Numéro d'arrêt : 7604/76;7719/76;7781/77;...Identifiant URN:LEX : urn:lex;coe;cour.europeenne.droits.homme;arret;1978-05-11;7604.76 Analyses : (Art. 14) DISCRIMINATION, (Art. 3) PEINE DEGRADANTE, (Art. 3) PEINE INHUMAINEParties : Demandeurs : FOTI ET AUTRES C. ITALIETexte : APPLICATIONS/REQUÃTES NÂ° 7604/76, 7719/76 Et 7781/77 Ijoined/jointes l B . FOTI, F . LENTINI and D CENERINI v/ITAL Y B . FOTI, F . LENTINI et D . CENERINI c/ITALI E DECISION of 11 May 1978 on the admissibility of the applications DÃCISION du 11 mai 1978 sur la recevabilitÃ© des requÃ©te s
Article 6, paragraph 1 o f the Convention : Reasonable time (in criminal proceedings l a) The time to be taken into account starts to run from the momenr when the situation of the person concerned has been substantially affected as the result of the suspicions against him . bl When the start of the period to be taken into censideration is outside the comperence of the Commission rarione temporis, the Commission takes into account the stage which the proceedings had reached when it became competent ro deal with the matter in evaluating rhe reasonableness of the subsequent period of rime (complaint declared admissible) . Artic/e 19 of the Convention : By virtue of this provision, the Commission is competent to examine all rhe facts revealed by the case-file, independently of the applicant's arguments . Article 27, paragraph 2 of the Convention : An individual application is not an abuse of the right of perition merely because the context in which it anses concerns political events. 1t would be otherwise if irs primary objecr was to exert pressure or engage in political propaganda, alien to the purpose and spirit of the Convention .
A rticle 6, paragraphe 1, de la Convention : DÃ©lai raisonnable (au pÃ©nal) . al Le dÃ©lai Ã prendre en considÃ©ration court Ã partir du moment oÃ¹ les soupÃ§ons dont l'intÃ©ressÃ© Ã©tait l'objet ont eu des rÃ©percussions impon tantes sur sa situation .
b) Lorsque le dÃ©but du dÃ©lai Ã prendre en considÃ©ration est hors de la compÃ©tence ratione temporis de la Commission, celle-ci tient compte de l'Ã©tat oÃ¹ se trouvait la procÃ©dure Ã la date oÃ¹ elle est devenue compÃ©tente, dans l'apprÃ©ciation du caractÃ©re raisonnable de la durÃ©e ultÃ©rieure . (Grief dÃ©clarÃ© recevable) . Artic% 19 de la Convention : En vertu de cette disposition, la Commission a compÃ©tence pour examiner l'ensemble des faits ressortant du dossier d'une requÃ©te, indÃ©pendamment de l'argumentation du requÃ©rant . Article 27, paragraphe 2, de la Convention : Une requÃªte individuelle n'est pas abusive du seul fait qu'elle se situe dans le contexte d'Ã©vÃ©nements politiques . ll en irait autrement si elle avait pour but prÃ©pondÃ©rant d'exercer des pressions ou une action de propagande politiques Ã©trangÃ©res au but et Ã l'esprit de la Convention .
EN FAIT IExtraitl'
Les faits, tels qu'ils ont Ã©tÃ© exposÃ©s par les requÃ©rants, peuvent se rÃ©sumer comme suit :
A . RequÃ©te de M. Benito FOTI INÂ° 7604/761 Benito Foti, ressonissant italien, rÃ©side Ã Reggio Calabria, oÃ¹ il est employÃ© . Lors de l'introduction de sa requÃªte, le requÃ©rant Ã©tait reprÃ©sentÃ© pour la procÃ©dure devant la Commission par M . Clemente Corigliano, a Procuratore legale Â» Ã Reggio Calabria, Ã qui a succÃ©dÃ© Me Francesco Quattrone, Â« Procuratore legale n Ã Reggio Calabria . Contre le requÃ©rant qui avait pris part en 1970 aux manifestation s populaires de Reggio Calabria une procÃ©dure fut engagÃ©e sous l'inculpation d'avoir bloquÃ© la circulation routiÃ©re et d'avoir participÃ© Ã une manifestation sÃ©ditieuse le 9 octobre 1970 .
Le 22 mars 1976 le requÃ©rant fut renvoyÃ© en jugement par ordonnance du Juge d'instruction auprÃ©s du Tribunal de Reggio Calabria . Ce procÃ¨s a Ã©tÃ© transfÃ©rÃ© au Tribunal de Potenza par ordonnance de la Cour de cassation du 20 dÃ©cembre 1976 . La premiÃ¨re audience a Ã©tÃ© fixÃ©e pour le 15 fÃ©vrier 1978 .
' Voir aussi la d0cision sur la recevabilit4 de la repuÃ¨te NÂ° 7913/77, p . 218.
D'autre part, une deuxiÃ¨me procÃ©dure pÃ©nale fut engagÃ©e contre le requÃ©rant pour les infractions suivantes : - violation de l'article 1, al . 1 et 3 du DÃ©cret lÃ©gislatif du 22 janvier 1948, NÂ° 66, pour avoir Ã©levÃ© des barricades sur la voie publique et bloquÃ© la circulation ;
- attroupement sÃ©ditieux larticle 655, al . 1 et 2 du Code pÃ©nal )-dÃ©tentionilÃ©galedegrenadeslacrimogÃ©neslanicle2delaLoid u 2 octobre 1967, NÂ° 8951 . Il fut arrÃªtÃ© et inculpÃ© le 17 septembre 1971 et renvoyÃ© en jugement par ordonnance du Juge d'instruction du Tribunal de Reggio Calabria du 10 novembre 1971 . Le 27 fÃ©vrier 1976, le Procureur de la RÃ©publique de Reggio Calabria demanda Ã la Cour de cassation le transfert du procÃ©s Ã un autre tribunal pour des raisons d'ordre public . La Cour de cassation confia le dossier au Tribunal de Potenza par ordonnance du 11 juin 1976 . Cette ordonnance n'Ã©tait pas susceptible de recours . Le 1 - fÃ©vrier 1977, le requÃ©rant a Ã©tÃ© condamnÃ© par le Tribunal de Potenza pour dÃ©tention illÃ©gale de grenades lacrimogÃ©nes Ã quatre mois d'emprisonnement avec sursis . Il a Ã©tÃ© acquittÃ© des autres chefs d'accusation . Le requÃ©rant a aussitÃ´t interjetÃ© appel . D'autre part, par ordonnance du Juge d'instruction du Tribunal de Potenza du 15 janvier 1977, le requÃ©rant fut renvoyÃ© en jugement pour avoir, en 1973, Ã©levÃ© des barricades el empÃ©chÃ© la circulation routiÃ©re . III avait Ã©tÃ© arrÃ©tÃ© et inculpÃ© le 21 mars 1973) . Par ordonnance de la Cour de cassation du 25 mars 1976, le procÃ©s a Ã©tÃ© transfÃ©rÃ© au Tribunal de Potenza, devant lequel la premiÃ¨re audience a eu lieu le 29 mars 1977 . Ce procÃ©s a alors Ã©tÃ© ajournÃ© au 7 juin 1977 .
Les griefs du requÃ©rant peuvent se rÃ©sumer comme suit : Le requÃ©rant considÃ©re que le transfert de son procÃ¨s est arbitraire . Il allÃ©gue une violation de l'article 6, paragraphe 1, de la Convention .
B . RequÃªte de M. Fetice LENTINI (NÂ° 7719/76) Felice Lentini, ressonissant italien, nÃ© en 1939, rÃ©side Ã Reggio Calabria oÃ¹ il est charpentier . Lors de l'introduction de sa requÃªte, le requÃ©rant Ã©tait reprÃ©sentÃ© pour la procÃ©dure devant la Commission par M . Clemente Corigliano, Â« Procuratore legale Â» Ã Reggio Calabria, Ã qui a succÃ©dÃ© Me Pietro Catanoso, avocat Ã Reggio Calabria .
Contre le requÃ©rant, qui avait pris part en 1970 aux manifestations populaires de Reggio Calabria, une procÃ©dure fut engagÃ©e pour le dÃ©lit aggravÃ© de rÃ©sistance aux forces de l'ordre . III fut arrÃ©tÃ© et inculpÃ© le 10 septembre 1970) . Par ordonnance de la Cour de cassation du 16 janvier 1975 signifiÃ©e au requÃ©rant le 5 juin 1975, le procÃ¨s fut transfÃ©rÃ© pour Â« des graves raisons d'ordre public Â» au Tribunal de Potenza . L'ordonnance de la Cour de cassation n'est pas susceptible d'appel . Le requÃ©rant a Ã©tÃ© acquittÃ© en premiÃ©re instance par jugement du 4 mai 1977 du Tribunal de Potenza . Les griefs du requÃ©rant peuveni se rÃ©sumer comme suit : Le transfert du procÃ©s au Tribunal de Potenza entraÃ®ne, aux dires du requÃ©rant, une violation de l'article 6 de la Convention .
C . RequÃªte de M. Demetrio CENERINI (NÂ° 7781/77) Le requÃ©rant, Demetrio Cenerini, nÃ© en 1942, rÃ©side Ã Reggio Calabria oG il est garÃ§on de courses . Lors de l'introduction de sa requÃ©te, le requÃ©rant Ã©tait reprÃ©sentÃ© pour la procÃ©dure devant la Commission par M . Clemente Corigliano, Â« Procuratore legale Â» Ã Reggio Calabria, Ã qui a succÃ©dÃ© Me Pietro Catanoso, avocat Ã Reggio Calabria . Le 15 juillet 1970 le requÃ©rant fut impliquÃ© dans les manifestation s populaires de Reggio Calabria . Il fut mis en Ã©tat d'arrestation au siÃ©ge de la PrÃ©fecture de Reggio Calabria . Le soir du mÃ©me jour il fut hospitalisÃ© Ã cause de ses blessures . Il fut mis en libertÃ© provisoire le 31 juillet 1970 . Le 10 octobre 1972 le requÃ©rant fut renvoyÃ© en jugement par ordonnance du Juge d'instruction du Tribunal de Reggio Calabria, avec de nombreux co-accusÃ©s, pour outrage grave Ã l'Ã©gard des forces de l'ordre . Par ordonnance du 18 septembre 1974, la Cour de cassation disposa le transfert du procÃ¨s au Tribunal de Potenza . Cette ordonnance ne fut signifiÃ©e au requÃ©rant que le 11 novembre 1976 . Le Tribunal de Potenza, par ordonnance du 30 novembre 1976, annula l'ordonnance de renvoi en jugement Ã©mise en 1972 par le Juge d'instruction de Reggio Calabria et chargea de l'affaire le Juge d'instruction du Tribunal de Potenza . Les griefs du requÃ©rant peuvent se rÃ©sumer comme suit : Le requÃ©rant se plaint que son procÃ¨s a Ã©tÃ© transfÃ©rÃ© du Tribunal de Reggio Calabria au Tribunal de Potenza . Il allÃ¨gue Ã cet Ã©gard une violation de l'article 6, paragraphe 1 de la Convention .
EN DROIT IExtraits l 1 . Les trois requÃªtes ont trait, dans l'ensemble, aux poursuites pÃ©nales engagÃ©es contre les requÃ©rants Ã la suite de leur prÃ©tendue participation Ã des manifestations populaires qui ont eu lieu Ã Reggio Calabria . Le Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur a soutenu que les requÃªtes Ã©taient abusives en ce que le conseil des requÃ©rants, au moment de l'introduction de leur requÃªte, aurait dÃ©formÃ© les faits Ã des fins de propagande politique . En ce qui concerne les termes dont le premier conseil des requÃ©rants a fait usage, la Commission rappelle qu'elle a dÃ©jÃ pris les mesures exigÃ©es par les circonstances en dÃ©cidant le 14 octobre 1977 de ne plus accepter ledit conseil comme reprÃ©sentant des requÃ©rants . Quant Ã l'objet mÃªme des requÃªtes, les parties s'accordent Ã reconnaPtre qu'il se situe dans le contexte d'Ã©vÃ©nements politiques . De l'avis de la Commission, cette circonstance, en elle-mÃ©me, ne permet nullement d'attribuer aux requÃ¨tes un caractÃ¨re abusif . La Commission se rÃ©fÃ©re ici Ã sa jurisprudence antÃ©rieure selon laquelle le fait pour une requÃªte d'avoir Ã©tÃ© inspirÃ©e par des motifs de publicitÃ© et de propagande politique n'aurait pas nÃ©cessairement pour consÃ©quence de rendre la requÃªte abusive INÂ° 332/57, Lawless c/Irlande, dÃ©c . du 30 aoÃ»t 1958, Ann . 2, p . 309, 339) . Une telle question ne pourrait se poser que s'il Ã©tait Ã©tabli que les requÃ©rants ont dÃ©libÃ©rÃ©ment usÃ© du droit de requÃªte individuelle et de la procÃ©dure devant la Commission dans l'intention prÃ©pondÃ©rante de se livrer Ã des pressions ou Ã une action de propagande politique Ã©trangÃ©res au but et Ã l'esprit de la Convention . La Commission estime que tel n'est pas le cas en l'espÃ©ce, de sorte que les requÃ©tes ne sauraient Ãªtre rejetÃ©es comme abusives, au sens de l'article 27, paragraphe 2, in fine, de la Convention . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .. . .. . . 4 . La Commission a examinÃ© d'office la durÃ©e des procÃ©dures pÃ©nales ouvertes contre les requÃ©rants, sous l'angle de l'article 6, paragraphe 1 de la Convention qui reconnalt Ã tout accusÃ© le droit Â« Ã ce que sa cause soit entendue . . . dans un dÃ©lai raisonnable Â» . a) Le Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur a contestÃ© le pouvoir de la Commission d'examiner cette question d'office . Il a fait valoir que la Commission n'en pourrait connaÃ®tre que si les requÃ©rants avaient pris l'initiative de la soumettre Ã la Commission en se prÃ©tendant explicitement victimes d'une violation de la Convention . Les requÃ©rants ont alors rÃ©pondu qu'ils se considÃ©raien comme victimes d'une violation des dispositions de la Convention sur ce point et ils ont formulÃ© expressÃ©ment leurs griefs .
Le Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur a rÃ©pliquÃ© que les requÃ©rants auraient dÃ» soulever ces griets dÃ¨s l'introduction de leurs requÃªtes . Sur ce point, la Commission rappelle qu'aux termes de l'article 19 de la Convention, elle a pour tÃ¢che Â« d'assurer le respect des engagements rÃ©sultant pour les Hautes Parties Contractantes Â» de ladite Convention . DÃ©s l'origine, la Commission a interprÃ©tÃ© cette disposition comme lui attribuant la compÃ©tence d'examiner l'ensemble des faits ressortant du dossier d'une requÃªte, indÃ©pendamment de l'argumentation prÃ©sentÃ©e par le requÃ©rant (voir, par exemple, dÃ©cision NÂ° 261/57, du 16 dÃ©cembre 1957, Annuaire 1, p . 255), et ne s'est jamais dÃ©partie de cette jurisprudence . En ce qui la concerne, la Cour europÃ©enne des Droits de l'Homme a adoptÃ© une attitude semblable (voir Affaire Handyside, arrÃªt du 7 dÃ©cembre 1976, par . 41, 2â¢ alinÃ©a, et les arrÃªts antÃ©rieurs qui y sont citÃ©s) . La Commission ne saurait donc retenir l'objection du Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur et estime que la question de la durÃ©e des procÃ©dures pÃ©nales ouvertes contre les requÃ©rants, bien que n'ayant pas Ã©tÃ© soulevÃ©e dans leurs requÃªtes introductives, n'Ã©chappe pas Ã son pouvoir d'examen . bl Pour dÃ©terminer si une cause a Ã©tÃ© entendue a dans un dÃ©lai raisonnable Â», au sens de l'article 6, paragraphe 1, de la Convention, la pÃ©riode Ã prendre en considÃ©ration dÃ©bute au moment oÃ¹ les premiÃ©res accusations sont formulÃ©es contre l'intÃ©ressÃ© (Cour eur . D .H ., Affaire Wemhoff, arrÃªt du 27 juin 1968, partie Â« En droit Â», par . 19) . Pour prÃ©ciser le moment 9 compter duquel on doit considÃ©rer qu'une personne est l'objet d'accusation, la Commission a retenu Â« le moment oÃ¹ les soupÃ§ons dont l'intÃ©ressÃ© Ã©tait l'objet ont eu des rÃ©percussions importantes sur sa situation Â» INÂ° 4517/70, Huber c/Autriche, Rapport de la Commission, par . 67, D .R . 2, pp . 4, 20 et 39 ) En l'espÃ©ce, la Commission retiendra comme dÃ©terminantes les dates auxquelles des mandats d'arrÃªts ont Ã©tÃ© lancÃ©s contre les requÃ©rants par le Juge d'instruction de Reggio Calabria, Ã savoir : pour M . Foti les 9 octobre 1970, 17 septembre 1971 et 21 mars 1973 ; pour M . Lentini le 10 septembre 1970 pour M . Cenerini le 15 juillet 1970 . Toutefois, l'Italie n'a reconnu la compÃ©tence de la Commission de se saisir de requÃªtes prÃ©sentÃ©es en application de l'article 25 de la Convention que dans la mesure oÃ¹ celles-ci portent sur des actes, dÃ©cisions, faits ou Ã©vÃ©nements postÃ©rieurs au 31 juillet 1973 . II s'ensuit que, faute de compÃ©tence ratione temporis, la Commission ne peut examiner, comme telle, la durÃ©e des procÃ©dures pÃ©nales ouvertes contre les requÃ©rants pour la pÃ©riode antÃ©rieure au 1^ 1 aoÃ¹t 1973 . cl Quant Ã la fin de la pÃ©riode A prendre en considÃ©ration, l'article 6, paragraphe 1, indique comme terme final le jugement statuant sur le bienfondÃ© de l'accusation, ce qui peut s'Ã©tendre Ã une dÃ©cision rendue par un e
juridiction de recours lorsque celle-ci se prononce sur le bien-fondÃ© de l'accusation ICour eur . D .H ., Affaire Neumeister, arrÃªt du 27 juin 1968, partie Â« En droit Â», par . 19) . En l'espÃ©ce, il n'a Ã©tÃ© statuÃ© sur le bien-fondÃ© de l'accusation dans aucun des cas des trois requÃ©rants, de sorte que la pÃ©riode Ã prendre en considÃ©ration est toujours en cours . d) En ce qui concerne le caractÃ©re raisonnable ou non de la durÃ©e des procÃ©dures ouvertes contre les requÃ©rants, le Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur soutient que ceux-ci ne peuvent se prÃ©tendre victimes de la lenteur de la procÃ©dure . D'une maniÃ©re gÃ©nÃ©rale, il fait observer qu'en principe ce n'est pas la personne accusÃ©e, mais la sociÃ©tÃ© qui a intÃ©rÃ©t au respect du dÃ©lai raisonnable exigÃ© par l'article 6, paragraphe 1 . La Commission constate, Ã ce sujet, que c'est aux personnes contre qui, comme en l'espÃ©ce, des accusations en matiÃ¨re pÃ©nale sont dirigÃ©es que l'article 6, paragraphe 1, garantit le droit d'Ã©tre jugÃ©es dans un dÃ©lai raisonnable . Elle constate en outre qu'au cours de la procÃ©dure devant la Commission les requÃ©rants ont prÃ©tendu qu'ils Ã©taient victimes d'une violation de ce droit . Dans les prÃ©sentes affaires, les requÃ©rants se plaignent de la lenteur d'une procÃ©dure pÃ©nale dirigÃ©e contre eux . Ils peuvent donc se prÃ©tendre victimes de la violation de la disposition susvisÃ©e de la Convention . Les procÃ©dures pÃ©nales dont il s'agit sont en cours depuis de longues annÃ©es . La Commission prÃ©cise Ã ce sujet que, si elle ne peut examiner pour elle-mÃ©me la durÃ©e antÃ©rieure au 1e1 aoÃ»t 1973 Ivoir ci-dessus), elle doit nÃ©anmoins tenir compte de l'Ã©tat oÃ¹ la procÃ©dure se trouvait Ã cette date pour apprÃ©cier le caractÃ©re raisonnable de la durÃ©e ultÃ©rieure (voir mutatis mutandis, quant Ã l'article 5, paragraphe 3, de la Convention, la dÃ©cision du 9 mars 1978 sur la requÃ©te NÂ° 7438/76, Ventura c/Italiel' . Compte tenu de ce qui prÃ©cÃ©de, la Commission estime qu'elle ne saurait, en l'Ã©tat du dossier, dÃ©clarer le prÃ©sent grief manifestement mal fondÃ© . Il nÃ©cessite, en effet, un examen approfondi qui relÃ©ve du fond de l'affaire . Cette partie des requÃªtes sera donc dÃ©clarÃ©e recevable .
Ct . D .R . 12 P . 36 .
I TRANSLATIONI THE FACTS IExtractl ' The facts, as submitted by the applicants . may be summarised as follows :
A . Application of Mr Benito FOTI INÂ° 7604 /761 Benito Foti, an Italian national, is resident in Reggio Calabria, his place of employment . At the time of lodging his application, the applicant was represented in the proceedings before the Commission by Mr Clemente Corigliano, "Procuratore legale" at Reggio Calabria, and subsequently by Mr Francesco Quattrone, "Procuratore legale" at Reggio Calabria . Proceedings were brought against the applicant who had taken part in public demonstrations in Reggio Calabria in 1970, on a charge of obstructing the public highway and participating in a seditious demonstration on 9 October .1970 . On 22 March 1976, the applicant was sent for trial by order of the examining magistrate at the Court of Reggio Calabria .
The trial was transferred to the Potenza Court by order of the Court of Appeal on 20 December 1976 . The date of the first hearing was set for 15 February 1978 . In addition, a second criminal prosecution was brought against the applicant on the following charges : - infringement of Section 1, paragraphs 1 and 3, of Legislative Decree No . 66 of 22 January 1948, for erecting barricades on the public highway and obstructing traffic ;
- riotous assembly (Section 655, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Criminal Codel - illegal possession of tear-gas grenades (Section 2 of Act No . 895 of 2 October 1967) . He was arrested and charged on 17 September 1971 and committed for trial by order of the examining magistrate at the Court of Reggio Calabria on 10 November 1971 . On 27 February 1976, the Public Prosecutor at Reggio Calabria requested the Appeal Court to transfer the trial to another court for reasons of public order . The Appeal Court transferred the case to the Potenza Court by Order of 11 June 1976 . That order was not open to appeal .
See also the decision on the admissibility of Application No . 7913/77, p . 218 .
On 1 February 1977, the applicant was convicted by the Potenza Court of illegal poVession of tear-gas grenades and given a suspence of 4 months' imprisonment . He was acquitted on the other charges . The applicant immediately appealed . Further, by an order of the examining magistrate of the Potenza Court of 15 January 1977, the applicant was committed for trial for having, in 1973, erected barricades and obstructed iraffic (he had been arrested and charged on 21 March 1973) .
By order of the Court of Appeal of 25 March 1976, the trial was transferred to the Potenza Court, before which the first hearing took place on 29 March 1977 . The trial was then adjourned until 7 June 1977 . The applicant's complaints may be summarised as follows : The applicant considers that the transfer of his trial was arbitrary and alleges violation of Article 6(1) of the Convention .
B . Application of Mr Felice LENTIN/ (NÂ° 7719/76) Felice Lentini, an Italian national born in 1939, is resident at Reggio Calabria where he is a carpenter . At the time of lodging his application, the applicant was represented in the proceedings before the Commission by Mr Clemente Corigliano, "Procuratore legale" at Reggio Calabria, and subsequently by Mr Pietro Catanoso, Barrister at Reggio Calabria . Proceedings were brought against the applicant, who had taken part in pÃ»blic demonstrations in Reggio Calabria in 1970, for the aggravated offence of resisting the police (he was arrested and charged on 10 September 1970) . By order of the Court of Appeal of 16 January 1975, notified to the applicant on 5 June 1975, the trial was transferred for "serious reasons of public order" to the Potenza Court . No appeal lies from the order of the Court of Appeal . The applicant was acquitted at first instance by the Potenza Court's judgment of 4 May 1977 .
The applicant's complaints may be summarised as follow s According to the applicant, the transfer of the trial to the Potenza Court constitutes a violation of Article 6 of the Convention .
C . Applicetion of Mr Demetrio CENERINI (NÂ° 7181/ 77) The applicant, Demetrio Cenerini, was born in 1942, and is resident at Reggio Calabria where he is employed as an errand boy . At the time of lodging his application, the applicant was represented in the proceedings before the Commission by Mr Clemente Corigliano, "Procuratore legale" at Reggio Calabria, and subsequently by Mr Pietro Catanoso, barrister at Reggio Calabria .
On 15 July 1970, the applicant was involved in public demonstrations in Reggio Calabria . He was placed under arrest at the Office of the Prefecture of Reggio Calabria . On the evening of that same day he was taken to hospital because of his injuries . He was released on bail on 31 July 1970 . On 10 October 1972, the applicant was committed for trial by order of the examining magistrate at the Court of Reggio Calabria, together with many other co-accused, on a charge ofgrossly insulting the police . By order of 18 September 1974, the Court of Appeal ordered the trial to be transferred to the Potenza Court . The applicant was only notified of that order on 11 November 1976 . The Potenza Court, in its order of 30 November 1976, set aside the order (issued on 1972 by the examining magistrate at Reggio Calabria) committing the applicant for trial and placed the case in the hands of the examining magistrate al the Potenza Coun . The applicant's complaints may be summarised as follows : The applicant complains that his trial was transferred from the Court at Reggion Calabria to the Potenza Court . He alleges a violation of Article 6(1) of the Convention in this connection .
THE LAW IExtract l The lhree applications all relate to the criminal prosecutions brought against the applicants following their alleged participation in public demonstrations which took place in Reggio Calabria . The respondent Government has maintained that the applications were an abuse of the right of petition in that counsel for the applicants, when their applications were lodged, has distorted the facts for purposes of political propaganda . Regarding the expressions used by the first counsel for the applicants, the Commission recalls that it has already taken the steps required in the circumstances by deciding, on 14 October 1977, no longer to accept the said counsel as representing the applicants .
As regards the actual substance of the applications, the parties agree that it should be seen against the background of political events . In the Commission's opinion, this circumstance in itsetf in no way justifies the description of the applications as an abuse of the right of petition . The Commission refers here to its earlier case-law according to which the fact that a n - 142-
application was inspired by motives of publicity and political propaganda did not necessarily render the applications an abuse of the right of petition INÂ° 332/57 . Lawless, v/Ireland, Decision of 30 August 1958, Yearbook 2, pp . 309, 339) . Such a question could arise only if it were established that the applicants had deliberately used the right of individual petition and the proceedings before the Commission primarily in order to exert pressure or engage in political propaganda alien to the purpose and spirit of the Convention .
The Commission considers that this is not so in the case in point, and that consequently the applications cannot be dismissed as an abuse of the right of petition within the meaning of Article 27 (2) in fine of the Convention . ............... 4 . The Commission has examined ex officio the length of criminal proceedings brought against the applicants from the standpoint of Article 6 111 of the Convention which secures to every accused person the right "to a fair . . . hearing within a reasonable time" . a . The respondent Government challenged the Commission's competence to examine this question ex officio . It argued that the Commission could consider the question only if the applicants had taken the initiative of submitting it to the Commission, explicitly claiming to be the victims of a violation of the Convention . The applicants then replied that they considered themselves to be victims of a violation of the provisions of the Convention on this point and expressly formulated their complaints . The respondent Government replied that the applicant ought to have raised those complaints at the time of lodging their applications . On this point, the Commission recalls that under Article 19 of the Convention, its task is "to ensure the observance of the engagements undertaken by the High Contracting Parties" to the said Convention . From the outset the Commission has interpreted this provision as empowering it to examine all the facts arising from the documents relevant to an application, independently of the arguments submitted by the applicant (see, for example, Decision NÂ° 261/57 of 16 December 1957, Yearbook 1, p . 255), and has never departed from this case-law . For its part, the European Court of Human Rights has adopted a similar attitude (see Handyside Case, judgment of 7 December 1976, paragraph 41, second sub-paragraph, and the earlier judgments cited therein) . The Commission cannot therefore accept the respondent Government's objection, and considers that the question of the length of the criminal proceedings against the applicants, although not raised in their initial applications, does not lie outside its powers of examination . - 143-
b. In order to determine whether a case was heard "within a reasonable time" within the meaning of Article 6 (1) of the Convention, the period to be taken into consideration begins at the time when the first charges were brought against the accused IEuropean Court of Human Rights, Wemhoff Case, judgment of 27 June 1978, "As to the law", paragraph 191 : In deciding on the time from which a person must be regarded as having been charged, the Commission decided that "the relevant stage is that which the situation of the person concerned has been substantially affected as the result of the suspicion against him" ICase NÂ° 4517/70, Huber v/Austria, Report of the Commission, paragraph 67, DR 2, pages 4, 20 and 39) . In the case in point, the Commission will take as the decisive dates those on which warrants of arrest were issued against the applicants by the examining magistrate at Reggio Calabria, i .e . : in the case of Mr Foti, 9 October 1979, 17 September 1971 and 21 March 1973 ; in the case of Mr Lentini, 10 September 1970 ; and in the case of Mr Cenerini, 15 July 1970 . However, Italy has recognised the jurisdiction of the Commission to deal with applications submitted under Article 25 of the Convention only in so far as they relate to acts, decisions, facts or events subsequent to 31 July 1973 . As a result, the Commission is incompetent ratione tempons to examine as such the length of the criminal proceedings brought against the applicants for the period prior to 1 August 1973 . â¢ c . As regards the end of the period to be taken into consideration, Article 6 ( 1) indicates as the final point the judgment determining the charge, and this may be a decision given by an appeal court when such a court pronounces upon the merits of the charge (European Court of Human Rights, Neumeister Case, judgment of 27 June 1968, "As to the law", paragraph 19) . In the present case, no judgment has been given on the merits of the charge in any of the cases of the three applicants, so that the period to be taken into consideration is still running . d. Regarding the reasonableness or otherwise of the length of the proceedings against the applicants, the respondent Government maintains that the applicants cannot claim to be victims of dilatory proceedings . Generally speaking, it observes that it is not normally the accused but society which stands to gain from conforming to the reasonable time required by Article 6 (1) . The Commission points out in this connection that it is tÃ´ persons against whom, as in this case, criminal charges have been brought that Article 6 11) guarantees the right to be tried within a reasonable time . It further notes that in the course of the proceedings before the Commission, the applicants claimed that they were victims of a violation of this right . In the present cases, the applicants complain of dilatoriness in the crimina l _144_
proceedings against them . They can therefore claim to be victims of a violation of the above-mentioned provision of the Convention . The criminal proceedings in question have been in ptogress for many years . The Commission points out in this connection that, while it cannot itself examine the duration prior to 1 August 1973 (see above), it must nonetheless take into account the progress made in the proceedings by that date in order to assess the reasonablenessof the subsequent duration (see, mutatis mutandis, in respect of Article 5 (3) of the Convention, the decision of 9 March 1978 on Application NÂ° 7438/76, Ventura v/Italyl' . Bearing in mind the foregoing considerations, the Commission considers that the present complaint cannot be said to be manifestly ill-founded in the present state of the file . In fact a thorough examination into the merits of the case is required . This part of the applications will therefore be declared admissible .
' See D .H . 12 P . 38 .
- 145 -Origine de la décision Pays : Conseil de l'EuropeJuridiction : Cour européenne des droits de l'hommeFormation : Commission (plénière)Date de la décision : 11/05/1978Fonds documentaire : HUDOC Haut de page

References: l'article 1
 l'article 6
 l'article 6
 l'article 6
 l'article 27
in fine
 l'article 6
 l'article 19
 l'article 6
 l'article 25
 l'article 6
 l'article 6
 l'article 6
 l'article 5
in fine