Source: https://arizona.lexroll.com/abbey-v-green-28-ariz-53-1925/
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 16:25:59+00:00

Document:
STEPHEN H. ABBEY, Plaintiff, v. E.L. GREEN, Defendant.
Civil No. 2326.Supreme Court of Arizona.
1. QUO WARRANTO — BURDEN OF DEFENDANT TO PROVE TITLE TO OFFICE SUSTAINED. — In quo warranto proceeding on verified complaint under Civil Code of 1913, paragraphs 1596-1602, to try title to office as judge of superior court of Pinal county, under paragraph 1599, defendant held to have sustained burden of proving title to office under evidence of election at recall election.
2. JUDGES — GROUNDS OF RECALL NEED NOT BE ATTACHED TO EACH SHEET OF PETITION. — Grounds, assigned for recall of judge in petition, need not be attached to each sheet, as more than one sheet is contemplated.
3. JUDGES — PETITION FOR RECALL NEED NOT ALLEGE SPECIFIC MISCONDUCT. — Grounds assigned in petition for recall of judge need not charge specific misconduct in office; any reasons of electorate for wishing to be rid of him being sufficient.
not fatally defective in absence of showing that signers lived in towns with streets and residences named and numbered, especially where no objection was made until after election.
5. OFFICERS — OFFICER MAY OBJECT TO DEFECTS OF RECALL PETITION BEFORE BOARD OF SUPERVISORS. — Where petition is being circulated for recall from office, any defects in or objections to petition may be taken before board of supervisors, and, if defects were such as to defeat jurisdiction of board, preventative measures might be taken.
duty to examine recall petition, when filed, as to sufficiency of signatures.
7. OFFICERS — SIGNATURES ON RECALL PETITION PRESUMED GENUINE. — Signatures on recall petition will be presumed genuine until proof of contrary is seasonably made.
8. JUDGES — EXAMINATION OF RECALL PETITION BY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS SUFFICIENT. — Inspection by board of supervisors of petition for recall of judge, apparently regular, and conclusion from knowledge of signers and county recorder’s examination of registration that petition was signed by necessary electors held sufficient, notwithstanding signers were not shown to be on great register for year of recall election.
9. OFFICERS — DEFECTS IN PROCEEDINGS FOR RECALL MUST BE ACTED ON PROMPTLY. — In proceedings for recall, knowledge of any defects before election must be acted on promptly to prevent election and consequent expense, or to correct known errors, or they will be regarded as waived.
10. OFFICERS — CANDIDATES NEED NOT FILE NOMINATION PETITION TO GET ON TICKET AT RECALL ELECTION. — In order to get on ticket at recall election, candidates need not file nomination petition as well as nomination paper announcing candidacy, as required in primaries under Civil Code of 1913, paragraphs 3012, 3013, in view of paragraph 3349, governing requirements for candidate to get on ticket at recall election, which prescribed only filing of nomination paper signed by certain percentage of electors.
11. OFFICERS — BALLOT NEED NOT MAKE RECALL INDEPENDENT QUESTION FROM THAT OF WHO SUCCESSOR SHOULD BE. — Ballot in recall election, in form prescribed by Civil Code of 1913, paragraph 3348, is sufficient, and need not separate issue of recall from question of who successor should be, in view of Constitution, article 8, section 4.
12. ELECTIONS — REGISTRATION LAWS SHOULD BE CONSTRUED SO AS TO UPHOLD CITIZEN’S RIGHT TO VOTE. — Registration laws should be construed so as to uphold citizen’s right to vote.
13. OFFICERS — PERSONS REGISTERED IN PRECEDING REGISTRATION PERIOD ENTITLED TO VOTE AT RECALL ELECTION HELD DURING PERIOD. — Where recall election was held during registration period, required by Constitution, article 7, section 12, as provided by Civil Code of 1913, paragraphs 2883, 2884, qualified electors under paragraph 2879, as required by Constitution, article 8, section 1, registered in preceding period, held entitled to vote, as recall statutes do not provide for special registration, and therefore must be governed by last general registration.
14. JUDGES — RECALL PROVISIONS OF CONSTITUTION NOT IN CONFLICT WITH FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. — Constitutional provisions for recall of judges held not in conflict with federal Constitution, as being contrary to public policy and undermining independence of courts.
See (1) 32 Cyc., p. 1461. (2) 33 C.J., p. 945. (3) 33 C.J., p. 945. (4) 33 C.J., p. 945 (1926 Anno.). (5) 29Cyc., p. 1406. (6) 29 Cyc., p. 1406. (7) 29 Cyc., p. 1406. (8) 33 C.J., p. 945 (1926 Anno.). (9) 29 Cyc., p. 1406. (10) 29 Cyc., p. 1406. (11) 29 Cyc., p. 1406. (12) 20 C.J., p. 82. (13) 29 Cyc., p. 1406. (14) 12 C.J., p. 743 (1926 Anno.).
 Scope and definition of initiative, referendum and recall, see note in L.R.A. 1917B, 15.
Original proceedings in quo warranto. Complaint dismissed.
Mr. Thomas W. Nealon and Mr. Thomas A. Flynn, for Plaintiff.
Messrs. Barnum Flanigan and Messrs. Kibbey, Bennett, Gust, Smith Lyman, for Defendant.
This is an original quo warranto proceeding brought upon the verified complaint of Stephen H. Abbey, after the Attorney General had refused to bring the action, and is in accord with the statutory law governing such proceeding. Chapter 8, title 6, Civ. Code 1913. The complaint sets forth that at the November, 1922, general election plaintiff was elected to the office of judge of the superior court of Pinal county, for the term beginning January 1, 1923, and ending December 31, 1926, and that thereafter he qualified and entered upon the discharge of the duties of such office and continued to perform such duties until on or about July 8, 1924, when defendant E.L. Green unlawfully usurped said office.
(1) The filing on May 26, 1924, with the clerk of the board of supervisors of Pinal county, of a recall petition, signed by more than 25 per centum of the qualified electors of the county voting for judge at the preceding election, demanding the recall of plaintiff and giving the reasons therefor.
(2) The giving of immediate notice in writing to plaintiff by such clerk of the filing of the recall petition and the grounds thereof, and his right to make and have printed on ballot a defense of his official conduct in not to exceed 200 words.
(3) The failure of plaintiff to make or deliver any defense to the clerk to go on ballot or to resign.
(4) The ordering on June 4th by the board of supervisors of the recall election to be held on June 28, 1924.
(5) The publishing in a newspaper of general circulation throughout Pinal county, not less than 10 days preceding the date of election, a notice thereof.
(6) The candidacy for such office of defendant, Green, and one H.G. Richardson by the filing of nomination papers signed by 5 per centum of the qualified electors of Pinal county.
(7) The adoption and use at such election of the form of ballot set out in paragraph 3348 of the recall law, with the names of plaintiff, Stephen H. Abbey, defendant, E.L. Green, and said H.G. Richardson printed thereon alphabetically without party designation, and also the grounds for recall.
(8) That at election 1,588 votes were cast, of which defendant received 779, plaintiff 484, Richardson 321, and scattering 4.
(9) That the board of supervisors on July 7, 1924, canvassed the returns and declared therefrom that defendant had received the highest number of votes, and was duly elected, and accordingly issued to defendant a certificate of election.
that the ballot used at election did not provide for a separate vote on the issue of whether the plaintiff should be recalled; that the names of the defendant, Green, and said Richardson were placed on ballot without authority of law, neither of them having filed a nomination petition; that other persons than those whose names appeared upon the register of 1924 were permitted to vote at election, to a number in excess of defendant’s plurality; that the board of supervisors had no jurisdiction; and that our constitutional and statutory law providing for the recall of judges contravenes the Constitution of the United States.
On the fourth day of December, 1924, and after issues formed, Ben L. Rudderow was appointed referee to take and reduce to writing all evidence offered, and report the same. This has been done. The respective counsel have filed their briefs, have been heard in oral argument, and the case is now ready for disposition.
and also the justification of the officer, if he make one, in not more than 200 words. The candidates are required to be put on the ballot without party designation. It is also provided the name of the officer against whom the recall petition is filed shall be placed upon the ballot, unless he request otherwise in writing, and that other candidates for the office may be nominated, to be voted for at the election, by 5 per centum of the qualified electors of the electoral district signing a nomination paper to that effect.
The recall cannot be invoked until six months after the officer takes his office, except in case of members of the legislature, and only one recall petition and election can be had against an officer during his term at the expense of the taxpayers.
think the reason of the rule as originally announced was that the writ was considered a prerogative one, issuing in England at the instance of the king, and in this country upon the motion of the legal representative of the people. Here, however, the Attorney General refused to institute the proceeding upon request from plaintiff, and it may be truthfully said the litigation is between plaintiff and defendant, and has for its purpose the trial of the title to the office of judge of the superior court of Pinal county. In such case, the sovereignty not being a party to the suit, the reason for casting the burden upon the defendant fails, and the general rule prevailing between private litigants probably is the one that should be invoked. State v. City of Harper, 94 Kan. 478, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 464, and note, 146 P. 1169. Be that however as it may, we think the defendant by his evidence in support of the chain of title set out in his answer, to wit, his election at recall election, fairly sustained such burden.
such election defendant, Green, received the highest number of votes.
But the plaintiff now says the recall petition was defective in not having on or attached to each sheet the grounds of recall; and because the grounds assigned for recall were merely scandalous and impertinent, not amounting to a charge of misconduct in office; and because the signers failed to add to their signatures their places of residence, giving the street and number, if any; and because signers were not on the great register of Pinal county for the year 1924.
“He is not worthy of belief.
“He has a violent and ungovernable temper.
“He violates the law by presiding in court with a pistol in his hip pocket.
“He has required certain of his employees to take a solemn oath that they will refrain from speaking to certain county officers.
“He is incompetent and inefficient.
“He has stated from the bench that he has the power to open court anywhere in Pinal county and fine people for contempt.
it is not necessary that the officer should have been guilty of misfeasance or malfeasance in his office. The grounds or reasons assigned in the petition for the recall may be very general in their nature and character. It was the evident purpose to permit the electorate to get rid of an obnoxious and unsatisfactory officer with whom, for any or no reason whatever for that matter, they may have become displeased. Conn v. City of Richmond, 17 Cal.App. 705, 121 P. 714, 719; Dunham v. Ardery, 43 Okla. 619, Ann. Cas. 1916A, 1148, L.R.A. 1915B, 233, 143 P. 331 State v. Harris, 74 Or. 573, Ann. Cas. 1916A, 1156, and note at pages 1161-1163, 144 P. 109. The grounds assigned by petitioners are of a very serious nature.
The next objection is that the signers to the petition did not give their place of residence, street, and number, if any. Both the Constitution and the statute require that this be done. However, the defendant asserts that there are no cities or towns in Pinal county in which the residences are numbered. It is conceded, though, that the towns of Florence, Casa Grande, Ray and Superior, or at least the first two, have streets, and that these streets are named. The purpose of requiring the street and number of the signers of petition to be given was for the convenience of the officers whose duty it was to pass upon the qualification of such signers by comparing the petition with the county’s registration of voters. As was said in Osborn v Board of Supervisors, 27 Cal.App. 88, 148 P. 971 (quoted i Chester v. Hall, 55 Cal.App. 611, 618, 204 P. 237.
The petition with reference to the residence of the signers might have been more specific and definite, but, in the absence of a showing that the signers thereof lived in towns with streets and residences named and numbered, we think the objection is untenable, especially when no objection was made thereto until after the election.
It is next objected that the petition was insufficient because the signers thereof were not shown to be on the great register for the year 1924. Without undertaking to say at this place who were qualified electors of Pinal county at the time the petition was circulated and signed, and therefore competent to sign said petition, it may not be amiss to suggest that, although the plaintiff was notified of the steps the people of Pinal county were taking to recall him, he paid no attention whatever to the proceeding. If the petition was defective, as he now contends, either in matter of form or substance, he must have been aware of it before the election was called. He had the right to appear before the board of supervisors before any action was taken upon the petition and interpose any and all the objections he now makes to the petition or action of the board. And, if the foundational proceedings were so defective as not to confer jurisdiction upon the board of supervisors, he might have called to his aid the processes of the law to prevent what he now claims was without legal sanction.
that all the signatures thereon were genuine and made in good faith, and that presumption would continue until positive proof to the contrary was seasonably made to appear. Neither the statute nor the Constitution provides what proof or evidence the board of supervisors shall take before passing upon the recall petition. In State v. Hall (N.D.), 186 N.W. 284, the court was passing upon a recall provision of the Constitution of that state wherein the duty of calling or ordering an election was imposed upon the officer with whom petition was filed, but no rule was given to test the validity or sufficiency of the petition, and in such circumstances it was held that the sufficiency of the petition must be determined from an inspection of the same, and we think that is the general rule under like provisions. The board concluded from an examination of the recall petition, apparently regular in form and sufficient in substance, and from a comparison of the knowledge that each of them possessed of the signers thereto, and from the county recorder’s examination of the registration books, that the petition was signed by the necessary number of qualified electors. They used the best and most available information at hand, and that seems to meet the requirements. State v. Carter, 257 Mo. 52, 165 S.W. 773; Wolfskill v. City Council, 178 Cal. 610, 174 P. 45 Bine v. Jackson, 266 Mo. 228, 181 S.W. 36.
Under the rule announced in these cases a duty is imposed upon one who would question the correctness or regularity of an election to act promptly, and, if he has information before the election of any defects in the proceedings, he must take steps to prevent the election and the consequent expense or to correct known errors, or he will be regarded as having waived them.
Primary Law and file his nomination paper in time to get his name on ballot, since the recall election must be held not less than 20 nor more than 30 days after it is ordered. Evidently the legislature intended that the nomination paper mentioned in paragraph 3349 was all that the candidate was required to file in order to be eligible to go on the ballot at a recall election.
“Unless the incumbent receive the highest number of votes, he shall be deemed to be removed from office, upon qualification of his successor. In the event that his successor shall not qualify within five days after the result of said election shall have been declared, the said office shall be vacant, and may be filled as provided by law.” Article 8, § 4.
We cannot read out of our constitutional provisions the necessity of submitting the separate propositions contended for, and, unless it was manifestly required, we would certainly feel like following the construction placed upon it by the legislature when it adopted at its first session after statehood the form of ballot it did. While our constitutional recall provisions are very similar to those of Oregon, and may have been largely taken from that state, the above-quoted language is not found in that instrument. The difference in the two instruments is great.
As we read ours, it is not possible for an incumbent to be recalled and at the same time retained in the office. He must receive the highest number of votes, else he is recalled. Unless he receive the highest number of votes, a vacancy automatically occurs when his successful opponent refuses to qualify. The paradox of being recalled and at the same time elected is not possible under our Constitution. The wisdom of the framers of our Constitution is at once apparent. It avoids the absurd situation that is possible under the Oregon Constitution.
at such election were either on the register of voters for 1922 or that of 1924; and, while a few persons might have voted who were not on the registers of such years, they were doubtless negligible, since they are not given or estimated by the plaintiff or the defendant. At all events, if all such were deducted from defendant’s vote, it would still leave him the highest vote.
and become functus officio, with the general and primary elections of the year it is made. It holds good “for the purpose of voting at all elections which are now or may be hereafter authorized by law,” at least until the next succeeding registration period has expired, unless the legislature has otherwise directed.
day of May, the date of filing recall petition, and only 188 on June 4th, the date of ordering election. Suppose the election had been held on one of these dates. Very few of the voters of Pinal county, if the 1924 registration only be used to guide the election officers, could have voted. We are of the opinion the legislature intended, not only that the last preceding register, but the one in the making, where the election occurs in the registration period, should be the guide as to who is a qualified elector and entitled to vote at recall elections. This construction accords with the language of the election laws, as also the spirit thereof. It cannot in any way impair the security of elections nor facilitate abuses of the elective franchise. It will permit persons not on the previous register, but who have since attained majority or met the statutory requirement as to residence, to register and vote; and it will also preserve the right of those on the register of the preceding registration period to participate in the election.
Plaintiff asks us to declare the recall provisions of our Constitution, as applied to the judiciary, unconstitutional as in conflict with the federal Constitution. He cites no authority, but argues that the innovation is not in harmony with the basic ideas of our institutions, tends to undermine the independence of the courts, and is contrary to public policy. All these questions pertain to the sovereign powers of the people in their political aspect, have been unalterably settled, and may not be changed except in the manner provided by the Constitution.
or unimportant to a correct disposition of the case.
We conclude that the election, including the recall petition and other proceedings leading up to the election, was in substantial compliance with the law; that those voting at such election were qualified voters; that of the candidates for the office of judge of the superior court of Pinal county defendant, E.L. Green, received the highest number of votes, and was duly elected to the office.
Under the common-law proceeding of quo warranto the court did not decide who was entitled to the office, but by our statute, paragraph 1599, the relief is extended so that the court is required to adjudge who is entitled to the office.
We accordingly hold that the defendant, E.L. Green, was, at the time of the institution of this proceeding, and is now, entitled to the office of judge of the superior court of Pinal county. Judgment should be entered accordingly, with costs to the defendant.

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