Source: http://rightsandlegal.blogspot.com/2013/06/
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 04:32:30+00:00

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CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1362 OF 2005.
1. These appeals are directed against order dated 6.10.2004 passed by the Division Bench of Delhi High Court whereby it ismissed FAO(OS) No.212 of 2003 preferred by Skyline Education Institute (India) Private Limited (hereinafter referred to as `the appellant') against the order of the learned Single Judge who refused to restrain Satilila Charitable Society and S.L. Vaswani (hereinafter referred to as `the respondents') from using the name 'Skyline' as a part of their trading name in relation to their activities in the field of education and/or as a trademark in relation to any printed matter, including the course material, literature, syllabus etc. and partly allowed FAO(OS) No.213 of 2003 preferred by the respondents insofar as the learned Single Judge directed them not to start any new course similar to the course run by the appellant, namely, graduate and post-graduate courses in Management, Travel and Tourism and further directed them to insert a note in the advertisement etc. that their institute is in no way related to the appellant.
2. The appellant is incorporated under the Companies Act. Although, the appellant's main objects, as specified in para `A' of the Memorandum of Association, are to impart and train in all areas, subjects, fields and disciplines of education, including hospitality, tourism and business management; to act as representative of various foreign educational institutions, universities, organizations, bodies or any other type of institutions for recruiting students and rendering other related services; to establish and run in any part of India, colleges or schools to impart education on such terms and conditions as may be laid down by the Company from time to time but a closer look at the incidental or ancillary objects enumerated in para `B' and other objects enumerated in para `C' of the Memorandum of Association shows that the appellant can engage itself in all types of possible business activities.
4. The main object of respondent No.1 is to establish colleges for higher technical education for various sections of the community. In November, 2001, respondent No.1 acquired 13 acres of land in the Institutional complex, Greater NOIDA, U.P. At a cost of Rs.5.25 crores for establishing a multi disciplinary college. Thereafter, the respondents obtained permission from All India Council for Technical Education (AICTE) and established an institution with the name Skyline Institute of Engineering and Technology. They also recruited teaching faculty, made admissions in 4 disciplines and started five-year engineering course with effect from 9.9.2002.
the same was affecting its goodwill. Some dialogue appears to have taken place between the functionaries of the appellant and respondent No.1 but without any tangible result. Therefore, the appellant filed Suit No.1553 of 2002 in Delhi High Court for grant of permanent injunction restraining the respondents herein, their officers, servants, agents, representatives, franchisees or any of them from using the name `Skyline' as part of their trading name in relation to the activities in the field of education and/or as a trademark in relation to any printed matter, literature, syllabus, etc. or in any other manner whatsoever. The appellant further prayed for award of damages to the tune of Rs.5,01,600/- and for issue of a direction to the respondents to give details of the profits earned by them by the alleged wrongful use of the name `Skyline' and deliver all printed material including syllabi, course materials, stationery, blocks, dies, etc. bearing the name `Skyline'.
under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 read with Section 151 of Code of Civil Procedure (C.P.C.) for grant of temporary injunction restraining the respondents, their officers, etc. from using `Skyline' as a part of their trademark in relation to their activities in the field of education, etc.
"In the opinion of this Court, merely by the use of the word "Skyline" as a prefix in the name of the two institutes, there is to likelihood of such a confusion because the full name of the plaintiff institute is "Skyline Education Institute (India) Pvt. Ltd." while that of the defendant is "Skyline Institute of Engineering and Technology" used in defendant's name are sufficient to indicate to all concerned that the defendant is not the same institute as the plaintiff. In any case, care can be taken to clarify such a confusion, even if there is any likelihood of such a confusion."
"In the result, the application is partly allowed and till the disposal of the suit, the defendants are hereby restrained from starting any new courses similar to the courses run by the Plaintiff viz. graduate and post-graduate education in management, travel and tourism. The ex-parte ad-interim order dated 01.10.2002 is modified to the extent that the defendants will be free to make publicity/issue advertisements etc. in their existing name for any courses in technical/Engineering education provided the said advertisements contain a note to the effect that the institute of the defendants is not related to the Plaintiff's institute being run under the name of "Skyline Educational Institute (India) Pvt. Ltd.", in any way."
"We also find no force in the argument of the counsel for the respondent that the word `skyline' was not a generic word and was an adoptive word as far as education is concerned. A student who would like to go to an educational institution, he is not a lay customer. If a student likes to go to St. Stephens College in Delhi or want to go to Sri Ram College of Commerce or Hindu College, he will go to these colleges and not to other although there may be similarity of names of other colleges. When the learned single Judge came to the conclusion that there is no similarity in the name of two parties, appellant using the name `skyline' as a prefix with the institute of technology and engineering and the respondent using `skyline' business school', a student would not get any deception by both names. A very large number of institutes, firms and companies etc. are using the word `Skyline' as part of their name which fact has not been categorically denied by the respondent."
"Normally once all the ingredients like prima facie case, balance of convenience, equity if not found in favour of grant of injunction, injunction in any form ought not to have been granted. At the same time, that does not mean that Court in order to do justice cannot mould the relief or can grant an injunction in terms not prayed for to do justice between the parties. The concept of grant of injunction also have to be seen in the light as to what would be the loss suffered on account of an injury by non-grant of such an injunction. The argument, which has been raised before us that it was basically respondents suit for grant of an injunction against the appellant from using the word Skyline. Having come to the conclusion that Skyline was a word which was used by a very large number of people in India and abroad and it has a generic word, we cannot appreciate as to how the learned Single Judge has granted an injunction against the appellant not to start courses in management. To say the least, the present litigation is to have more commerce in education and less education in commerce. Private commercial houses by advertising fancy name of foreign universities lure students in this country. All this exercise is not in realm of imparting education but knowing fully well that in India the name of a foreign university is lucrative enough to get larger chunk of money from the pockets of the parents. What is the value of these degrees, whether they are permitted to do so or not, we will advert later. Here is a classic case of the respondent who got letters from the University of Lincolnshire and Humberside, UK both dated 17th October, 1996 which too was for a period of five years only with effect from 1st May, 1997. It as a certificate which the respondent was to given in travel and tourism. However, respondent started giving advertisements for education in BBA (Hons.) with specialization in marketing or tourism. One such advertisement is at page 516 of the paper book. It was contended before us by Mr. Singh that on 11 th March, 1998 they had also an arrangement of BBA Marketing programme from the said university. At this stage, we would not like to go to the question whether the respondent could have represented that they could offer courses in BBA Marketing or not, what is of relevant is even if we accept the argument of learned counsel for the respondent, they are `study centre' of a deemed university, Manipal Academy of Higher Education, that is also from the year 2003. The authorization to start courses came in the year 2003, although it was contended by the respondent that they have started courses from 2001. Was it justifiable on their part? Whether they could do so? Was there any legal bar? All are these issues which would be taken care of in the trial. Both the parties would be at liberty to lead evidence and argue the matter. At this stage, when the learned trial Judge has not entertained the plea of the respondent from prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury to respondent, restraining the appellant not to go ahead with their courses of BBA Management and MBA Management after due approval from AICTE in comparison to respondent being a `Study Center' only was without any basis."
entitled to an order of injunction against the use of that word by respondent No.1 as part of their educational activities and the learned Single Judge and Division Bench committed serious error by refusing to protect the appellant from illegal, unlawful and unauthorised use of the word `Skyline' by the respondents. Shri Sudhir Chandra pointed that the appellant is an affiliate of the University of Lincolnshire and Humberside, U.K. and an approved study center of Manipal University and argued that the High Court committed an error by declining the appellant's prayer to restrain the respondents from using the word `Skyline' with the Institute of Engineering and Technology established by them. Learned senior counsel emphasized that even an unregistered prior user can file an action for passing off and the High Court committed serious error by refusing relief to the appellant ignoring the fact that the respondents established the Institute of Engineering and Technology by prefixing the word `Skyline' with the sole object of encashing the goodwill generated by the appellant and its sister concern which is operating in UAE. In support of his arguments, the learned senior counsel relied upon the judgments of this Court in Kaviraj Pandit Durga Dutt Sharma v. Navaratna Pharmaceutical Laboratories 1965 (1) SCR 737, Ruston & Hornsby Ltd. v. The Zaminidara Engineering Co. 1969 (2) SCC 727, N.R. Dongre and others v. Whirlpool Corporation and another 1996 (5) SCC 714 and Satyam Infoway Ltd. v. Sifynet Solutions (P) Ltd. 2004 (6) SCC 145.
12. Shri L.N. Rao, learned senior counsel for the respondents supported the impugned order to the extent the Division Bench rejected the appellant's prayer for restraining the respondents from prefixing the word `Skyline' with the Institute of Engineering and Technology established by them and argued that this Court may nullify the effect of the direction given by the learned Single Judge in its entirety. He submitted that the discretion exercised by the High Court in declining the appellant's prayer for injunction does not suffer from any legal error and this Court may not interfere with the impugned orders because the concurrent finding recorded by the learned Single Judge and Division Bench on the issue of prima facie case is based on correct appreciation of the factual matrix of the case and in any case, equity is not in favour of the grant of injunction in terms of the prayer made by the appellant.
"... In such appeals, the appellate court will not interfere with the exercise of discretion of the court of first instance and substitute its own discretion except where the discretion has been shown to have been exercised arbitrarily, or capriciously or perversely or where the court had ignored the settled principles of law regulating grant or refusal of interlocutory injunctions. An appeal against exercise of discretion is said to be an appeal on principle. Appellate court will not reassess the material and seek to reach a conclusion different from the one reached by the court below if the one reached by that court was reasonably possible on the material. The appellate court would normally not be justified in interfering with the exercise of discretion under appeal solely on the ground that if it had considered the matter at the trial stage it would have come to a contrary conclusion. If the discretion has been exercised by the trial court reasonably and in a judicial manner the fact that the appellate court would have taken a different view may not justify interference with the trial court's exercise of discretion."
"Injunction is a relief in equity and is based on equitable principles. On the above concurrent findings, the weight of equity at this stage is in favour of the plaintiffs and against the defendants. It has also to be borne in mind that a mark in the form of a word which is not a derivative of the product, points to the source of the product. The mark/name `WHIRLPOOL' is associated for long, much prior to the defendants' application in 1986 with the Whirlpool Corporation, Plaintiff 1. In view of the prior user of the mark by Plaintiff 1 and its trans-border reputation extending to India, the trade mark `WHIRLPOOL' gives an indication of the origin of the goods as emanating from or relating to the Whirlpool Corporation, Plaintiff 1. The High Court has recorded its satisfaction that use of the `WHIRLPOOL' mark by the defendants indicates prima facie an intention to pass off the defendants' washing machines as those of the plaintiffs or at least the likelihood of the buyers being confused or misled into that belief."
15. A somewhat similar view was expressed in Cadila Health Care Ltd. v. Cadila Pharmaceuticals 2001 (5) SCC 73.
16. The ratio of the above noted judgments is that once the court of first instance exercises its discretion to grant or refuse to grant relief of temporary injunction and the said exercise of discretion is based upon objective consideration of the material placed before the court and is supported by cogent reasons, the appellate court will be loath to interfere simply because on a de novo consideration of the matter it is possible for the appellate court to form a different opinion on the issues of prima facie case, balance of convenience, irreparable injury and equity.
make out a prima facie case. The learned Single Judge opined that the word `Skyline' is a generic word because the same is being used by thousands of persons and institutions as part of their trading name or business activities. The learned Single Judge noted that while the plaintiff is neither approved by AICTE nor affiliated with any university, the respondents have obtained the requisite recognition and affiliation from the concerned statutory bodies and 240 students have already been admitted in the five years course and held that grant of injunction in terms of the prayer made by the appellant will be inequitable. The Division Bench independently considered the entire matter and expressed its agreement with the learned Single Judge that the appellant has failed to make out a prima facie case for grant of injunction. The Division Bench also agreed with the learned Single Judge that the word `Skyline' was a generic word because it was being used by a large number of people in India and abroad. The Division Bench then held that after recording adverse findings on the issues of prima facie case, balance of convenience and equity, the learned Single Judge was not justified in directing the respondents not to undertake in courses in management, tour and travels, etc. and append a note in the advertisements that their institute has no concern, whatsoever with the appellant's institution. Accordingly, the Division Bench substantially vacated the modified injunction order passed by the learned Single Judge.
18. In our opinion, the findings recorded by the learned Single Judge and Division Bench on the crucial factors like prima facie case, balance of convenience and equity are based on a correct and balanced consideration of various facets of the case and it is not possible to find any fault with the conclusions recorded by them that it is not a fit case for restraining the respondents from using the word `Skyline' in the name of the institute established by them. It has not been disputed on behalf of the appellant that the word `Skyline' is being used as trade name by various companies / organizations / business concerns and also for describing different types of institute/institutions. The voluminous record produced by the respondents before this Court shows that in India as many as 117 companies including computer and software companies and institutions are operating by using word `Skyline' as part of their name/nomenclature. In United States of America, at least 10 educational/training institutions are operating with different names using `Skyline' as the first word. In United Kingdom also two such institutions are operating. In view of this, it is not possible to agree with the learned counsel for the appellant that the Skyline is not a generic word but is a specific word and his client has right to use that word to the exclusion of others.
recognized or approved by AICTE/UGC. In 1996, University of Oxford approved the appointment of a center in the premises of the appellant at Laxman Public School, Hauz Khas Enclave, New Delhi for Certification in Leisure Studies and in Travel and Tourism. In 1997, Skyline Business School entered into a Memorandum of Cooperation with University of Lincolnshire and Humberside, U.K. whereby the latter agreed to offer its BBA (Hons.) Tourism course through a center established at the appellant's campus. In large number of advertisements issued in the name of the appellant or Skyline Business School, it has not been made clear that they are neither approved nor recognized by any of the statutory bodies like, AICTE, UGC, etc. Of course, in some of advertisements, it has been mentioned that the degrees/diplomas purported to be awarded by the Skyline Business School are not recognized by Government of India, State Government, UGC/AICTE. All this lends sufficient credibility to the observations made by the Division Bench of the High Court that the present litigation is to have more commerce in education and less education in commerce and gives an impression that functioning of the appellant is shrouded in mystery and those seeking admission in the courses organised by it may find themselves in serious trouble at any given point of time because the degrees and diplomas awarded in the name of foreign universities are not recognised by statutory bodies/authorities in India.
the public that the goods/services offered by him are that of the plaintiff and such misrepresentation has caused harm to the goodwill and reputation of the plaintiff or the plaintiff demonstrates that it has suffered loss due to such representation, but, in view of our conclusion that the appellant has failed to make out a case for interference with the discretion exercised by the High Court not to entertain its prayer for temporary injunction, we do not find any valid ground to entertain and accept the argument of the learned senior counsel. For the same reason, we do not consider it necessary to discuss the judgments on which reliance has been placed by Shri Sudhir Chandra.
21. Although, during the pendency of the suit, the appellant got registration of trade marks `Skyline MEDALLIST' under No. 795085 and `Skyline Institute' under No. 795086 in class 16 and its prayer for amendment of the plaint was granted by the High Court on 24.8.2006, but, that by itself, is not sufficient for entertaining the appellant's prayer for temporary injunction to restrain the respondents from using the word `Skyline' as part of the Institute of Engineering and Technology established by them.
22. We may now advert to C.A. No. 1362/2005. The respondents' grievance is that after having reached the conclusion that the learned Single Judge was not justified in restraining the respondents from starting new courses in business management, etc. and directing them to append a note in the advertisement that they are in no way related to the appellant, the Division Bench should have set aside all the directions impugned before it. We find merit in the contention of the respondents. When the Division Bench found that the learned Single Judge ought not to have given direction restraining the respondents from starting new courses in business management etc. and directed them to append a note in the advertisement that they are not related to the appellant, then it should have set aside the order of the learned Single Judge in its entirety. The omission on the part of the Division Bench of the High Court to do so calls for a corrective action by this Court.
unwarranted litigation thrust upon the respondents.
[ G.S. Singhvi ] .................................J.
[ Dr. B.S. Chauhan ]...........................J.
For Respondent in C.A. Nos.1360-1361/2009 & for Appellant in C.A. No.1362/2005 Ms. Hetu Arora,Adv.
Hon'ble Mr. Justice G. S. Singhvi pronounced the judgment of the Bench comprising Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tarun Chatterje, His Lordship and Hon'ble Dr. Justice B. S. Chauhan.
Civil Appeal Nos.1360-1361 of 2005 are dismissed and Civil Appeal No.1362 of 2005 is allowed and the modified injunction granted by the learned Single Judge is vacated in its entirety. The appellant shall pay Rs.50,000/- as cost of unwarranted litigation thrust upon the respondents.
2. Whether pleadings can be directed to be amended after the hearing of a case begins is the question involved in this appeal which arises out of a judgment and order dated 24.10.2007 passed by the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in Writ Petition No. 14013 of 2007.
3. On or about 16.12.2003, the plaintiffs - appellants filed a suit for specific performance of an agreement of sale. According to the plaintiffs, one Prashant Sooji (since deceased) executed an agreement of sale on 15.01.2001 in respect of the suit property for a sum of Rs. 21 lakhs. Defendants - Respondents are the predecessors in interest of the said Prashant Sooji.
A written statement was filed on 17.04.2004. An application for amendment of the written statement was filed on 8.11.2006. In between the period 17.04.2004 and 8.11.2006, however, indisputably issues were framed and parties filed their respective affidavits by way of evidence. Dates had been fixed for cross-examination of the said witnesses.
On or about 8.11.2006, an application had been filed under Order VI Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short "the Code"), which was marked as IA 9 of 2006, seeking amendment to the written statement. On the same day, another application, which was marked as IA 10 of 2006, had also been filed purported to be under Order VIII Rule 1A of the Code for production of additional documents.
"...However, this contention cannot be accepted. Because according to proposed amendment sought by defendants at para 3(a) will is dated 18.3.94. Therefore, naturally same would have been in the knowledge of defendants right from the date and moreover when they say that mother-in-law of defendant No. 1 is also necessary party and she is also got right and interest in the suit property and that she is alive, then through her defendants would have known about will right from beginning and hence it cannot be said that defendant No. 1 required time to gather information regarding will and further as details of will would have been within the knowledge of defendants and/ or could have been given by mother-in-law of defendant No. 1 i.e. Subhadrabai, then it was not necessary for defendant No. 1 to have any social activities or have knowledge of business to know about the will and hence proposed amendment regarding will cannot said to be not within the knowledge of defendants at the time of filing of written statement. Further regarding husband of defendant No. 1 being addicted to bad vices like womanizing, drinking etc again this would have been within the personal knowledge of defendant No. 1 as she is wife of deceased Prashant against whom whose allegations are made and this would have been in where knowledge right from the beginning and to have said knowledge again she need not have any knowledge of business or social activities and thus she also did not require any time to gather that the information which are well within her own knowledge..."
"There is no retracting of statement made in written statement already filed by the defendants".
"...According to Order 6 Rule 17, an amendment application can be filed at any stage of the proceeding. Filing of affidavit by way of evidence itself is not a good ground to reject the application filed seeking amendment of written statement. It is not out of place to mention that the parties must be allowed to plea. Such a valuable right cannot be curtailed in the absence of good ground."
I.A. 10 was also directed to be allowed.
5. Mr. S.K. Kulkarni, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants, would submit that in view of the proviso appended to Order VI Rule 17 of the Code, the High Court committed a serious illegality in passing the impugned judgment.
jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India particularly when it is well-known that an application for amendment of written statement should be dealt with liberally.
"Provided that no application for amendment shall be allowed after the trial has commenced, unless the court comes to the conclusion that in spite of due diligence, the party could not have raised the matter before the commencement of trial."
It is couched in a mandatory form. The court's jurisdiction to allow such an application is taken away unless the conditions precedent therefor are satisfied, viz., it must come to a conclusion that in spite of due diligence the parties could not have raised the matter before the commencement of the trial.
8. From the order passed by the learned Trial Judge, it is evident that the respondents had not been able to fulfill the said pre-condition.
19. It would, therefore, be clear that trial means act of proving or judicial examination or determination of the issues including its own jurisdiction or authority in accordance with law or adjudging guilt or innocence of the accused including all steps necessary thereto. The trial commences with the performance of the first act or steps necessary or essential to proceed with the trial.
The High Court, as noticed hereinbefore, opined that filing of an affidavit itself would not mean that the trial has commenced.
in every case shall be on affidavit.
included within the meaning of the word "trial"."
the CPC (Amendment) Act, 2002.
appellants disentitling them to relief."
The ratio in Kailash (supra) was reiterated stating that the trial is deemed to commence when the issues are settled and the case is set down for recording of evidence.
any stage of the proceedings.
It is not an authority for the proposition that the trial would not deemed to have commenced on the date of first hearing. In that case, as noticed hereinbefore, the documents were yet to be filed and, therefore, it was held that the trial did not commence.
13. Reliance has also been placed by Ms. Suri on Pradeep Singhvi and Another v. Heero Dhankani and Others [(2004) 13 SCC 432]. Therein, the suit was filed in the year 1995 and, therefore, the proviso appended to Order VI, Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure had no application.
Reliance has also been placed by Ms. Suri on Rajesh Kumar Aggarwal and Others v. K.K. Modi and Others [(2006) 4 SCC 385]. No doubt, as has been held by this Court therein that the court should allow amendments that would be necessary to determine the real question of the controversy between the parties but the same indisputably would be subject to the condition that no prejudice is caused to the other side.
14. It is the primal duty of the court to decide as to whether such an amendment is necessary to decide the real dispute between the parties. Only if such a condition is fulfilled, the amendment is to be allowed.
15. In Salem Advocate Bar Assn (supra), this Court has upheld the validity of the said proviso. In any event, the constitutionality of the said provision is not in question before us nor we in this appeal are required to go into the said question.
16. Furthermore, the judgment of the High Court does not satisfy the test of judicial review. It has not been found that the learned Trial Judge exceeded its jurisdiction in passing the order impugned before it. It has also not been found that any error of law has been committed by it.
The High Court did not deal with the contentions raised before it. It has not applied its mind on the jurisdictional issue. The impugned judgment, therefore, cannot be sustained, which is set aside accordingly.
17. However, we may observe that the question as to whether the documents should have been called for or not by the court without there being the amended written statement before it may be considered afresh.
18. The appeal is allowed. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.
MAINTENANCE U/Sec.125 Cr.P.C. TO AN EARNING WIFE.
Heard learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties.
The Magistrate dismissed the petition under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, `Cr.P.C.') on the sole ground that the wife was a working lady and had income from properties, as such, she may be able to maintain herself out of the said income. The said order has been con firmed by the High Court. Hence, this appeal by special leave.
According to the case of the appellant, her husband, who is Respondent No.1 herein, is a graduate in Engineering and his income is Rupees twenty thousand. In the counter affidavit filed before this Court, the fact that the income of the husband is Rupees twenty thousand per month has not been denied. However, it has been asserted that wife's returned income is Rs.98,820/- per annum, which shows that she was earning even less than Rupees nine thousand per month. Both the wife and husband are residing at Agra. In our view, it is not possible for the wife to maintain herself in the town of Agra with the income of less than Rupees nine thousand per month. The husband, who is earning at least Rupees Twenty thousand per month, as stated by the appellant in this appeal and not controverted, is liable to pay some amount of maintenance to the wife so that she may be able to maintain herself. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the view that it would be just and expedient to direct the husband to pay Rupees five thousand per month to the wife by way of maintenance from the date of filing of the petition under Section 125 Cr.P.C.
By 31st January, 2009, the balance amount.
drawn upon a Bank at Agra, in favour of the appellant-Minakshi Gaur. The bank draft shall be made over to the wife by the husband personally or through his representative within the aforesaid time. The current amount of maintenance beginning from the month of August, 2008, at the same rate shall be paid to the wife by 15th day of the following month, i.e., maintenance for the month of August, 2008, shall be paid by 15th September and in the like manner for subsequent months.
Can a lawyer keep to himself the papers of his client in case the client does not pay his fees; or in other words, "Has the advocate a lien for his fees on the litigation papers entrusted to him by his client?" The question poses forth an interesting issue which requires an analysis not just on the standards of ethical behaviour to the followed by the legal fraternity but also an appraisal of the psyche of the Indian legal service-receiver. As far as the law of precedent goes in India, however, the issue is already settled by the decision of the Supreme Court in R.D. SAXENA v. BALRAM PRASAD SHARMA (AIR 2000 SC 3039) wherein the Supreme Court declared in the negative.
In holding that giving the right of lien (unlike what is allowed to a Solicitor in England) would lead to disastrous consequences in as much as the flow of justice would be impeded, the Supreme Court also noted that given the socio-economic conditions prevailing in the country, holding such a right of the legal practitioner may be susceptible to great abuse and exploitation. The Court also set aside the technical objection that such papers were under an agreement of bailment and declared that it was upon the ordinary process of law that the lawyer should recover his dues but not by retaining the files of the client. The Supreme Court also went on to declare that while it was a professional duty and moral obligation of the lawyer to return the brief when the client required to change counsel but also declared that not returning the files would be considered as professional misconduct on the part of the erring lawyer.
Bankers, factors, wharfingers, attorneys of a High Court and policy- brokers may, in the absence of a contract to the contrary, retain, as a security for a general balance of account, any goods bailed to them; but no other persons have a right to retain, as a security for such balance, goods bailed to them, unless there is an express contract to that effect.
Files containing copies of the records (perhaps some original documents also) cannot be equated with the goods referred to in the section. The advocate keeping the files cannot amount to goods bailed. The word bailment is defined in Section 148 of the Contract Act as the delivery of goods by one person to another for some purpose, upon a contract that they shall be returned or otherwise disposed of according to the directions of the person delivering them, when the purpose is accomplished. In the case of litigation papers in the hands of the advocate there is neither delivery of goods nor any contract that they shall be returned or otherwise disposed of. That apart, the word goods mentioned in Section 171 is to be understood in the sense in which that word is defined in the Sale of Goods Act. It must be remembered that Chapter-VII of the Contract Act, comprising sections 76 to 123, had been wholly replaced by the Sales of Goods Act, 1930.
The word goods is defined in Section 2(7) of the Sales of Goods Act as every kind of movable property other than actionable claims and money; and includes stock and shares, growing crops, grass, and things attached, to or forming part of the land which are agreed to be severed before sale or under the contract of sale.
Thus understood goods to fall within the purview of Section 171 of the Contract Act should have marketability and the person to whom it is bailed should be in a position to dispose it of in consideration of money. In other words the goods referred to in Section 171 of the Contract Act are saleable goods. There is no scope for converting the case files into money, nor can they be sold to any third party. Hence, the reliance placed on Section 171 of the Contract Act has no merit.
226. Solicitors rights. At common law a solicitor has two rights which are termed liens. The first is a right to retain property already in his possession until he is paid costs due to him in his professional capacity, and the second is a right to ask the court to direct that personal property recovered under a judgment obtained by his exertions stand as security for his costs of such recovery. In addition, a solicitor has by statute a right to apply to the court for a charging order on property recovered or preserved through his instrumentality in respect of his taxed costs of the suit, matter or proceeding prosecuted or defended by him.
Before India attained independence different High Courts in India had adopted different views regarding the question whether an advocate has a lien over the litigation files kept with him. In P. Krishnamachariar vs. The Official Assignee of Madras, (AIR 1932 Madras 256) a Division Bench held that an advocate could not have such a lien unless there was an express agreement to the contrary.
The Division Bench has distinguished an earlier decision of the Bombay High Court in Tyabji Dayabhai & Co. vs. Jetha Devji & Co. (AIR 1927 Bombay 542) wherein the English law relating to the solicitors lien was followed. Subsequently, a Full Bench of the Madras High Court in 1943 followed the decision of the Division Bench. A Full Bench of the Patna High Court in In re B.N. Advocate in the matter of Misc. Judl. Case No.18/33 (AIR 1933 Pat 571) held the view that an advocate could not claim a right to retain the certified copy of the judgment obtained by him on the premise that an appeal was to be filed against it. Of course the Bench said that if the client had specifically instructed him to do so it is open to him to keep it.
28. After the termination of the proceeding, the Advocate shall be at liberty to appropriate towards the settled fee due to him, any sum remaining unexpended out of the amount paid or sent to him for expenses, or any amount that has come into his hands in that proceeding.
29. Where the fee has been left unsettled, the Advocate shall be entitled to deduct, out of any moneys of the client remaining in his hands, at the termination of the proceeding for which he had been engaged, the fee payable under the rules of the Court, in force for the time being, or by then settled and the balance, if any, shall be refunded to the client.
Thus, even after providing a right for an advocate to deduct the fees out of any money of the client remaining in his hand at the termination of the proceeding for which the advocate was engaged, it is important to notice that no lien is provided on the litigation files kept with him. In the conditions prevailing in India with lots of illiterate people among the litigant public it may not be advisable also to permit the counsel to retain the case bundle for the fees claimed by him. Any such lien if permitted would become susceptible to great abuses and exploitation. There is yet another reason which dissuades us from giving approval to any such lien. We are sure that nobody would dispute the proposition that the cause in a court/tribunal is far more important for all concerned than the right of the legal practitioner for his remuneration in respect of the services rendered for espousing the cause on behalf of the litigant. If a need arises for the litigant to change his counsel pendente lite, that which is more important should have its even course flowed unimpeded. Retention of records for the unpaid remuneration of the advocate would impede such course and the cause pending judicial disposal would be badly impaired. If a medical practitioner is allowed a legal right to withhold the papers relating to the treatment of his patient which he thus far administered to him for securing the unpaid bill, that would lead to dangerous consequences for the uncured patient who is wanting to change his doctor. Perhaps the said illustration may be an over-statement as a necessary corollary for approving the lien claimed by the legal practitioner. Yet the illustration is not too far-fetched.
No professional can be given the right to withhold the returnable records relating to the work done by him with his clients matter on the strength of any claim for unpaid remuneration. The alternative is that the professional concerned can resort to other legal remedies for such unpaid remuneration.
A litigant must have the freedom to change his advocate when he feels that the advocate engaged by him is not capable of espousing his cause efficiently or that his conduct is prejudicial to the interest involved in the lis, or for any other reason. For whatever reason, if a client does not want to continue the engagement of a particular advocate it would be a professional requirement consistent with the dignity of the profession that he should return the brief to the client. It is time to hold that such obligation is not only a legal duty but a moral imperative.
In civil cases, the appointment of an advocate by a party would be deemed to be in force until it is determined with the leave of the court, (vide order 3, Rule 4(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure). In criminal cases, every person accused of an offence has the right to consult and be defended by a legal practitioner of his choice which is now made a fundamental right under Article 22(1) of the Constitution. The said right is absolute in itself and it does not depend on other laws. In this context reference can be made to the decision of this Court in State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Shobharam and ors. (AIR 1966 SC 1910). The words of his choice in Article 22(1) indicate that the right of the accused to change an advocate whom he once engaged in the same case, cannot be whittled down by that advocate by withholding the case bundle on the premise that he has to get the fees for the services already rendered to the client.
If a party terminates the engagement of an advocate before the culmination of the proceedings that party must have the entire file with him to engage another advocate. But if the advocate who is changed midway adopts the stand that he would not return the file until the fees claimed by him is paid, the situation perhaps may turn to dangerous proportion. There may be cases when a party has no resource to pay the huge amount claimed by the advocate as his remuneration. A party in a litigation may have a version that he has already paid the legitimate fee to the advocate. At any rate if the litigation is pending the party has the right to get the papers from the advocate whom he has changed so that the new counsel can be briefed by him effectively. In either case it is impermissible for the erstwhile counsel to retain the case bundle on the premise that fees is yet to be paid.
Even if there is no lien on the litigation papers of his client an advocate is not without remedies to realise the fee which he is legitimately entitled to. But if he has a duty to return the files to his client on being discharged the litigant too has a right to have the files returned to him, more so when the remaining part of the lis has to be fought in the court. This right of the litigant is to be read as the corresponding counterpart of the professional duty of the advocate.
Professional misconduct may consist in betraying the confidence of a client, in attempting by any means to practise a fraud or impose on or deceive the court or the adverse party or his counsel, and in fact in any conduct which tends to bring reproach on the legal profession or to alienate the favourable opinion which the public should entertain concerning it.
It it is shown that an Advocate in the pursuit of his profession has done something with regard to it which would be reasonably regarded as disgraceful or dishonourable by his professional brethren of good repute and competency, then it is open to say that he is guilty of professional misconduct.
In this context it is to be mentioned that the aforesaid definition secured approval by the Privy Council in George Frier Grahame vs. Attorney-General, Fiji,(1936 PC 224). We are also inclined to take that wide canvass for understanding the import of the expression misconduct in the context in which it is referred to in Section 35 of the Advocates Act.
We, therefore, hold that the refusal to return the files to the client when he demanded the same amounted to misconduct under Section 35 of the Act. Hence, the appellant in the present case is liable to punishment for such misconduct.

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