Source: http://pa.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20150717_0000898.WPA.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 16:24:50+00:00

Document:
M.D. JAWAD A. SALAMEH, Defendant.
LISA P. LENIHAN, Magistrate Judge.
Upon review of Defendant's Motion to Vacate (ECF No. 12) this Court's Order dated June 4, 2015, which granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and Plaintiff's Response in Opposition thereto (ECF No. 15), the following Amended Memorandum Order is entered.
Defendant maintains that Plaintiff has accumulated at least "three strikes" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), and, as such, he cannot proceed in forma pauperis in this action. Plaintiff maintains that he has, at most, one strike.
In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal a judgment in a civil action or proceeding under this section if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it was frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). In sum, under the three strikes rule, a prisoner who, on three or more prior occasions while incarcerated, has filed an action in a federal court that was dismissed as frivolous, malicious, or for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, must be denied in forma pauperis status unless he is in imminent danger of serious physical injury. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
While not all of the cases that Defendant relies on in support of his motion were dismissed as frivolous, malicious, and/or for failure to state a claim, Plaintiff has had at least three cases dismissed on that basis. Specifically, Wishnefsky v. Ouly, et al., 1:98-cv-907 (M.D. Pa. 1998) (dismissed pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) on October 4, 1999); Wishnefsky v. Carroll, et al., 4:99-cv-1494 (M.D. Pa. 1999) (dismissed pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) on December 3, 1999); and Wishnefsky v. Kurtz, et al., 4:99-cv-1889 (M.D. Pa. 1999) (dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A as being frivolous and for failure to state a claim on November 12, 1999). Furthermore, even though Plaintiff did not proceed in forma pauperis in all of the aforementioned cases, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has held that "strikes may be accrued in actions or appeals regardless of whether the prisoner has prepaid the filing fee or is proceeding IFP." Byrd v. Shannon, 715 F.3d 117, 124 (3d Cir. 2013).
Plaintiff maintains that the dismissal in Wishnefsky v. Carroll, et al., 4:99-cv-1494 (M.D. Pa. 1999), does not count as a strike because it was a RICO (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act) action, and not civil rights. However, this distinction is of no consequence within the meaning of § 1915(g). See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) ("In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action... if the prisoner has, on 3 or more occasions, ... brought an action ... that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted....) (emphasis added). See also Bonner v. Bosworth, 451 F.Appx. 410, 412 (5th Cir. 2011) (affirming the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's complaint alleging RICO claims as frivolous and for failure to state a claim and stating that the district court's dismissal counts as a strike for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)); McPherson v. Curry, 253 F.3d 706 (5th Cir. 2001) (stating that district court's dismissal of plaintiff's claims brought under, inter alia, RICO as frivolous counts as a strike for purposes of § 1915(g)); Keys v. Pennsylvania, 2011 WL 766978, at n.17 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 19, 2011) (upon screening of complaint, recommending dismissal of action, which included RICO claims, and stating that it may constitute the plaintiff's third strike under § 1915(g) if the court dismisses the entire case), adopted by 2011 WL 766950 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 25, 2011) (dismissing complaint).
We agree with the District Court that Wishnefsky's complaint lacks merit, for essentially the same reasons. While it is true that the appeal raises interesting questions concerning whether the District Court's dismissal under section 1915A was improper in light of the earlier denial of the defendants' motions to dismiss, there is no need to address them here. Even if the District Court should not have dismissed the complaint under section 1915A, section 1915(e) requires a court to dismiss an action at any time if it is frivolous or fails to state a claim. We agree with the court's determination that Wishnefsky's complaint met these criteria and, thus, find that the court could properly have dismissed the complaint under section 1915(e). Although it is true that most courts have held that a complaint should not be dismissed under section 1915(e)(2)(B) unless it is clear that amendment would be futile, we find that the District Court did not err in failing to allow Wishnefsky to amend because we do not believe that amendment could rescue his complaint.
Wishnefsky v. Kurtz, et al., No. 00-3011 (3d Cir. May 22, 2001) (footnote omitted and emphasis contained within).
A plaintiff cannot avoid incurring a strike by simply voluntarily dismissing a claim. This rule would subvert the purposes of the PLRA: a plaintiff could guard against incurring strikes by filing an action with a bogus claim and then voluntarily dismissing that claim, thereby allowing inmates to easily avoid strikes even if all of their claims were meritless. And we will not assume that a voluntary dismissal with prejudice means that a case had merit.

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