Source: https://mynation.net/docs/1617-2011/
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 22:23:27+00:00

Document:
J U D G M E N T A.M. Khanwilkar, J.
1. This appeal emanates from the judgment and order passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad dated 30 th July, 2009 in Criminal Appeal No.1631 of 2008, whereby the High Court upheld the conviction recorded against the appellants for an offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) but converted the sentence of death into imprisonment for life with fine, and confirmed the conviction under Section 201 of the IPC and sentence of 2 years’ imprisonment and fine, as awarded by the Additional Sessions Judge/Special Judge, J.P. Nagar in Sessions Trial No.155/2004.
“Charges I, Mushaffey Ahmad, Addl. Sess. Judge, hereby charge you, Asar Mohammad, Asraf and Akhtar as follows:­ That you on two months ago from 24.1.2004 (date of information to the PS) at 1 am in the village of Panyati within the limits of PS Didopli Distt. J.P. Nagar committed murder by intentionally or knowingly causing the death of Smt. Zahida and Ishlam and thereby committed an offence punishable under Section­302 IPC and within the cognizance of this court of session.
That you on above date, time and place having the reason to believe that certain offence to with murder punishable with death has been committed, did cause certain evidence of, the said offence, to disappear, to with threw the dead bodies of victims, into gutter with the intention of screening the said Asar Mohammad, Asraf and Akhtar from legal punishment, and thereby committed an offence punishable u/s 201 of the Indian Penal Code and within the cognizance of this court of Sessions.
3. The prosecution examined 10 witnesses, namely, PW­1 Begum Bano, PW­2 Haji Iqbal, PW­3 Nawab Jan, PW­4 Harendra Singh, PW­5 Dr. Kuldeep Singh, PW­6 Doonger Singh Verma, PW­7 Shababul, PW­8 Jagdish, PW­9 V.K. Tyagi and PW­10 Surendra Singh. The defence of the accused was of total denial. They did not produce any evidence. The Sessions Court, after evaluating the entire evidence on record, eventually found that even though it was a case of circumstantial evidence, the prosecution had succeeded in establishing the guilt of the accused beyond all reasonable doubt and found them guilty of offences under Sections 302 and 201 of the IPC. As aforesaid, the Sessions Court vide judgment and order dated 1st March, 2008 awarded the death sentence with fine, for having committed the offence under Section 302 of IPC, and 2 years of imprisonment with fine in respect of offence under Section 201 of IPC to each of the appellants.
4. All the three appellants carried the matter in appeal before the High Court, being Criminal Appeal No.1631 of 2008, which was heard along with the death reference received by the High Court, being Reference No.3 of 2008. The High Court reappreciated the evidence on record and affirmed the view taken by the Trial Court, after referring to the relevant decisions cited before it. In conclusion, the High Court observed as follows:­ “27. We have scrutinized the submission of learned Counsel for the appellants and also decision of the Apex Court in the case of Aloke Nath Dutta (supra) in all its ramifications. Having gone through the decision, we must say that the said decision has been rendered in different facts and circumstances and flows from different perspective. In the said case, the Apex Court had rendered verdict acquitting other accused persons holding quintessentially that there was no direct evidence from which it could be deduced that other appellants also were part of the said conspiracy and that their presence had not been noticed by any of the witnesses and further that nobody saw them together in the house and also that no body saw Mrinal Dutta coming to the house even once. In the said decision accused were acquitted under section 120B I.P.C. In the present case the accused persons were residing in the same house and they were very proximate relation of the deceased. Therefore, the facts of the said case cannot be imported for application to the facts of the present case.
28. We have carefully scanned the evidence on record. In the facts and circumstances and evidence on record, it brooks no dispute that the prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that the deceased died homicidal death. The doctor has clearly held that cause of death of Zahida Begum was due to Asphyxia (fracture of Hyoid bone and Thyroid cartilage) and the death of Islam was also due to Asphyxia (fracture of Hyoid bone). The prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. Another circumstance unerringly pointing to the guilt of the accused is that, the dead bodies were recovered from the septic tank situated inside the house of appellant that too, on the pointing out of Asar Mohammad. PW­3 Nawab Jan and PW­8 Jagdish minced no words to say that dead bodies were recovered on the pointing of Asar Mohammad from septic tank, There is no dispute about the identity of the deceased. Yet another circumstance pointing accused finger at the appellants is that the appellants did not lodge any report about the missing of the deceased for about two months nor offered any explanation about their death in their statement under section 313 Cr.P.C….” (emphasis supplied) The High Court, however, noted that the facts and circumstances of the present case would not come within the purview of a rarest of rare case, for which reason it did not confirm the sentence of death awarded to the appellants. The High Court, instead, commuted the sentence to life imprisonment for offence under Section 302 of the IPC. Thus, the appeal filed by the appellants was partly allowed to that extent and the reference came to be rejected vide the impugned judgment and order dated 30 th July, 2009.
5. Feeling aggrieved, the appellants have filed the present appeal. The principal argument of the appellants is that although it is a case of concurrent finding of facts recorded by the two Courts below, the same is replete with manifest errors and cannot stand the test of judicial scrutiny. It is submitted that the evidence produced by the prosecution falls short of the quality evidence required for recording a finding of guilt against the accused in a case of circumstantial evidence. In that, the motive behind the commission of crime has not been established at all. No evidence is forthcoming in respect of identification of the two dead bodies, much less to establish the fact that it was of none other than the second wife of appellant No.3 and son of appellant No.3 respectively. It is vehemently contended that the police has set up PW­7 as the informant, who was an obliging informant of the police. If his evidence is to be discarded, the genesis of the prosecution case must collapse and, in which case, the rest of the circumstances or the evidence would be of no avail. It is submitted that even the other reports prepared by the police purportedly during the investigation of the crime, were tailored to suit the prosecution case. That ought to be discarded. It is submitted that the evidence produced by the prosecution, taken as a whole or even in part, by no stretch of imagination establishes the complicity of the appellants in the commission of crime. The hypothesis on which the prosecution case rests is unsubstantiated. Further, the statement of the accused allegedly made to the police, which is the fulcrum of the prosecution case, is inadmissible in evidence and, at any rate, cannot be used against the co­accused. For all these reasons, the finding of guilt recorded against the appellants cannot be sustained either on facts or in law.
6. The learned counsel for the State, however, supported the judgment under appeal and would submit that no interference is warranted against the concurrent findings of fact. He submits that the prosecution has established the circumstances and the chain is complete in all respects, pointing towards the involvement of the appellants in commission of the crime and ruling out any other possibility. He submits that the appeals deserve to be dismissed.
7. We have heard Mr. S. K. Bhattacharya, learned counsel for the appellants and Mr. Rajesh K. Singh, learned counsel for the respondent. We have perused the entire record, including the original record.
(i) Information regarding the missing persons (Zahida and Ishlam) was given by the village watchman, viz., Shababul (P.W.7).
(iii) No ‘missing report’ was lodged by the appellants in respect of Zahida and Ishlam, for reasons best known to them.
(iv) Appellant No.1 told the police that he would show the place where the dead bodies were dumped and he led the police party to that spot in the backyard of the house of the appellants, which was within his exclusive knowledge and opened the lid of the septic tank himself to facilitate taking out the two dead bodies which he admitted as that of Zahida and Ishlam.
(v) One of the two dead bodies recovered from the septic tank in the backyard of the house of the appellants was of a full grown­up female around 32 years of age and another of a male child of about 11 years of age which corresponded with the age of Zahida and Ishlam respectively.
(vi) The dead bodies were dumped more than one month before the same were removed from the septic tank in a highly decomposed condition.
(vii) Ante­mortem injuries were noticed on the vital part of the neck on both the dead bodies which, according to the medical evidence, was the cause of death due to asphyxia and a case of homicidal death.
(viii) The accused neither disputed the identity of the two dead bodies being that of Zahida and Ishlam nor offered any explanation, even though they were confronted with the incriminatory evidence.
(ix) No evidence has been produced nor any explanation has been offered by the accused regarding the reason as to why they did not lodge a ‘missing complaint/report’ in respect of Zahida and Ishlam, who were closely related to them and were staying in the same house; nor have they produced any evidence that both of them were still alive and were residing elsewhere. Similarly, no explanation has been offered by them regarding the cause of death of Zahida and Ishlam, or for that matter, the circumstances in which their dead bodies were found in the septic tank in the backyard of their house and also about the ante­ mortem injuries noticed on the vital part of the dead bodies which, as per the medical evidence, was the cause of death due to asphyxia.
11. The trial court as well as the High Court, after analysing the evidence on record including the evidence of PWs 4 to 10, had discerned the above circumstances pointing towards the involvement of the accused in the commission of the crime. Both the courts have taken note of the fact that Begum Bano (PW­1); Haji Iqbal (PW­2); and Nawab Jan (PW­3) were declared hostile, as a result of which the factum of motive behind the murder of Zahida and Ishlam could not be established by the prosecution. Notably, even these hostile witnesses (PWs 1 to 3) have not disputed the relationship of Zahida and Ishlam with the accused and the fact that they were residing with the accused in the same house before they went missing. Be that as it may, both the courts have ruled that other proved circumstances emanating from the evidence produced by the prosecution, coupled with the abject silence of the accused including having failed to offer any explanation with regard to the incriminatory circumstances referred to above, was sufficient to bring home the guilt against them and no other conclusion could be deduced except that the accused were responsible for the murder of Zahida and Ishlam. They were closely related to the deceased (as Zahida was the second wife of accused Akhtar (appellant No.3) and Ishlam was the son born in wedlock between them; and appellant nos.1 and 2 were the step sons of Zahida and step brothers of Ishlam). All of them were residing in the same house before Zahida and Ishlam went missing for about two months. That fact was reported by Shababul (PW­7) to the police. The fact that Shababul is on the payroll of the police cannot be the basis to disregard the proved fact that Zahida and Ishlam had gone missing for about two months before it was so reported to the police. None of the appellants have either disowned their relationship with Zahida and Ishlam or bothered to produce any tittle of evidence in defence to show that Zahida and Ashlam were still alive and residing elsewhere. This Court in Nika Ram Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh9, noted that the accused and deceased (his wife) resided together and as the accused failed to offer any cogent explanation about the circumstances in which his wife died, it pointed towards his guilt and thus, the Court deduced such inference. Suffice it to observe that the fact that PW­1, PW­2 and PW­3 became hostile and the prosecution could not establish the factum of motive cannot be the basis to doubt the correctness of the finding of guilt recorded by the two courts against the accused on the basis of other proved circumstances (1972) 2 SCC 80 including the confession of the accused No.1 about the murder of Zahida Begum and Ishlam and more importantly, having dumped the dead bodies in the septic tank in the backyard of their house and to have led the police to that place from where the two dead bodies, whose identity also has not been disputed, came to be recovered, coupled with the medical evidence that the cause of death of the two dead persons was due to the ante­ mortem injury caused on the neck resulting in their death due to asphyxia and is a homicidal death.
15. Where an offence like murder is committed in secrecy inside a house, the initial burden to establish the case would undoubtedly be upon the prosecution, but the nature and amount of evidence to be led by it to establish the charge cannot be of the same degree as is required in other cases of circumstantial evidence. The burden would be of a comparatively lighter character. In view of Section 106 of the Evidence Act there will be a corresponding burden on the inmates of the house to give a cogent explanation as to how the crime was committed. The inmates of the house cannot get away by simply keeping quiet and offering no explanation on the supposed premise that the burden to establish its case lies entirely upon the prosecution and there is no duty at all on an accused to offer any explanation.
12. The expression ‘provided that’ together with the phrase ‘whether it amounts to a confession or not’ show that the section is in the nature of an exception to the preceding provisions particularly Sections 25 and 26. It is not necessary in this case to consider if this section qualifies, to (2015) 1 SCC 253 AIR 1947 PC 67 (1976) 1 SCC 828 ; (1976) 1 SCR 715 any extent, Section 24, also. It will be seen that the first condition necessary for bringing this section into operation is the discovery of a fact, albeit a relevant fact, in consequence of the information received from a person accused of an offence. The second is that the discovery of such fact must be deposed to. The third is that at the time of the receipt of the information the accused must be in police custody. The last but the most important condition is that only ‘so much of the information’ as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered is admissible. The rest of the information has to be excluded. The word ‘distinctly’ means ‘directly’, ‘indubitably’, ‘strictly’, ‘unmistakably’. The word has been advisedly used to limit and define the scope of the provable information. The phrase ‘distinctly relates to the fact thereby discovered’ is the linchpin of the provision. This phrase refers to that part of the information supplied by the accused which is the direct and immediate cause of the discovery. The reason behind this partial lifting of the ban against confessions and statements made to the police, is that if a fact is actually discovered in consequence of information given by the accused, it affords some guarantee of truth of that part, and that part only, of the information which was the clear, immediate and proximate cause of the discovery. No such guarantee or assurance attaches to the rest of the statement which may be indirectly or remotely related to the fact discovered.
26. In State of Maharashtra v. Damu31 it has been held as follows: (SCC p.283, para 35) “35. … It is now well settled that recovery of an object is not discovery of a fact as envisaged in [Section 27 of the Evidence Act, 1872]. The decision of the Privy Council in Pulukuri Kotayya v. King Emperor32 is the most quoted authority for supporting the interpretation that the ‘fact discovered’ envisaged in the section embraces the place from which the object was produced, the knowledge of the accused as to it, but the information given must relate distinctly to that effect.” The similar principle has been laid down in State of Maharashtra v. Suresh33, State of Punjab v. Gurnam Kaur34, Aftab Ahmad Anasari v. State of Uttaranchal35, Bhagwan Dass v. State (NCT of Delhi)36, Manu Sharma v. State (NCT of Delhi)37 and Rumi Bora Dutta v. State of Assam38.
14. Applying the principle expounded by this Court, we have no hesitation in affirming the finding of guilt recorded against appellant No.1 – Asar Mohammed.
‘…A confession of a co­accused is obviously evidence of a very weak type. It does not indeed come within the definition of ‘evidence’ contained in Section 3 of the Evidence Act. It is not required to be given on oath, nor in the presence of the accused, and it cannot be tested by cross­examination. It is ILR (1911) 38 Cal 559 (1964) 6 SCR 623 ; AIR 1964 SC 1184 a much weaker type of evidence than the evidence of an approver, which is not subject to any of those infirmities. Section 30, however, provides that the court may act; but the section does not say that the confession is to amount to proof. Clearly there must be other evidence.
16. In view of the above, it is not permissible to proceed against appellant nos.2 and 3 solely on the basis of the confession of appellant No.1 made before the police, even if the relevant part of the confession is admissible and has been duly proved. As no substantive evidence is forthcoming to show the involvement of appellant nos.2 and 3 for having caused the murder of Zahida and Ishlam, it is not open to convict them for offence punishable under Section 302, IPC. This is also because the charge, as has been framed, is simpliciter for offence under Section 302 and not for offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of IPC or Section 302 read with Section 120­B of IPC. No evidence has been produced by the prosecution in this regard. Resultantly, the finding of guilt albeit concurrently recorded by the two courts against appellant nos.2 and 3 for offence punishable under Section 302 IPC cannot be sustained on facts or in law. These appellants, therefore, will have to be acquitted in connection with offence punishable under Section 302 IPC.
17. The next question is whether appellant Nos.2 and 3 can be held guilty for offence punishable under Section 201 IPC. The fact that appellant nos.2 and 3 cannot be convicted for offence punishable under Section 302 IPC does not extricate them from the offence under Section 201 IPC. We say so because the proved circumstances discerned from the record leave no manner of doubt that Zahida and Ishlam were residing along with the appellants in the same house. Further, Zahida was the second wife of appellant No.3 and Ishlam was none other than the son of appellant No.3 born in wedlock with Zahida. Zahida was the step mother of appellant Nos.1 and 2 and Ishlam was their step brother. This relationship has not been disputed. It is also an established fact that Zahida and Ishlam had suddenly gone missing for over two months. Obviously, no efforts were made by appellant nos.2 and 3 to trace Zahida and Ishlam nor did they think it necessary to report that fact to the local police. This indeed cannot be a natural behavior or conduct of appellant No.3, the husband of Zahida and father of minor son Ishlam. Further, appellant nos.2 and 3 have not challenged the identity of two dead bodies found from the septic tank in the backyard of their house at the instance of appellant No.1 – Asar Mohammed. No explanation whatsoever has been offered by them as to why they did not report about the sudden disappearance of Zahida and Ishlam (until their bodies were recovered from the septic tank in the backyard of their house after two months). The concomitant is that appellant Nos.2 and 3 had knowledge that Zahida and Ishlam had been murdered and their dead bodies were dumped in the septic tank in the backyard of their house and yet, they did not disclose that fact with an intention to screen appellant No.1 – Asar Mohammed, the offender, from legal punishment. In other words, even though they cannot be made liable for the murder of Zahida and Ishlam for want of legal evidence in that regard, they would certainly be guilty of having committed offence under Section 201 IPC as established from the proved circumstances coupled with their abject failure to offer any explanation, much less cogent explanation, about their conduct. The inevitable and legitimate conclusion to be deduced is that they are guilty of offence punishable under Section 201 IPC for which they have been rightly convicted and sentenced by the trial court and which opinion of the trial court has been affirmed by the High Court. As a result, the appeal filed by appellant nos.2 and 3 would partly succeed only to the extent of acquitting them for offence punishable under Section 302 IPC.
18. In view of the above, the appeal filed by appellant No.1 – Asar Mohammed is dismissed. Whereas, the appeal filed by appellant Nos.2 and 3 – Asraf Mohammed and Akhtar, respectively, is partly allowed by setting aside the conviction and sentence recorded against them for offence punishable under Section 302 IPC but the conviction and sentence for offence punishable under Section 201 IPC against them is upheld. Ordered accordingly.
Date : 24-10-2018 This appeal was called on for Judgment today.
For Appellant(s) Mr. S. K. Bhattacharya, AOR Mr. L. K. Paonam, Adv.
Hon’ble Mr. Justice A. M. Khanwilkar pronounced the reportable Judgment of the Bench comprising His Lordship and Hon’ble Mr. Justice L. Nageswara Rao.
The appeal filed by appellant No.1 – Asar Mohammed is dismissed. Whereas, the appeal filed by appellant Nos.2 and 3 – Asraf Mohammed and Akhtar, respectively, is partly allowed by setting aside the conviction and sentence recorded against them for offence punishable under Section 302 IPC but the conviction and sentence for offence punishable under Section 201 IPC against them is upheld.
Pending interlocutory application(s), if any, is/are disposed of.

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.