Source: https://hypothes.is/search?q=tag%3ATime
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 06:13:07+00:00

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This article talks about the challenges of developing for VR and the extra work involved over creating traditional games. It looks at the main areas of difficulty that come with virtual reality development and then presents what solutions developers are coming up with to overcome those challenges. Some of the challenges are familiar to developers, such as trying to obtain a high frame rate, but have new angles that need to be considered such as wider viewing angles and lower latency. The article covers eight main technical challenges and then dives into the solutions that developers are applying to these challenges. The author wraps up the article by stating some of the concerns about virtual reality and that some may consider it just a novelty. Overall though, he feels as if virtual reality is a huge leap in technology and is one that developers should start working on it.
The more recent the research is, the better—or at least, more relevant—it’s assumed to be.
Society does not change overnight, but thinking it does lends a sense of drama to our everyday lives.
Drama is more important that reality?
I'm thinking this is also a nod at the time women had/didn't have because of the various duties they had to fulfill. Also maybe a nod at the fact that women would probably not really have a space/place in which they could extensively read. Yes?
Similar to the phases of the moon. Represents time passing.
Cross-cultural disaster research may also provide further insights regard­ing disaster phases.
Evokes feminist, critical and post-colonial theory, as well as multi- and inter-disciplinary research methods/perspectives, e.g., anthropology, etc.
These points of view may also provide insights on how disaster phases interact with wholly different notions of social time.
As the field of collective behavior highlights, individuals in social settings have different perceptions of reality-social settings are not homogeneous (e.g., Turner and Killian I 987).' Thus, to tap further the mutually inclusive, multidimen­sional and social-time aspects of disaster phases, researchers should draw upon multiple publics and their definition of disaster phases.
Neal suggests avoiding the disaster phase terminology when interviewing various stakeholders (emergency mgt, disaster-affected people, government agencies) in order to "draw upon various groups' language to describe phases" instead of the National Governors Assn phases.
Consid� e�g the redefinition of disaster phases based on social time may help us WJtb the broader and more important struggle of defining disaster.
What happened with this call to arms? Did Neal or others in the emergency management research community follow up?
http://ijmed.org/articles/624/download/ <-- Neal's 2013 paper on "Social Time and Disaster"
Neal wrote a more recent 2013 paper discussing the topic of social time and disaster.
As early as 1970 (pre-Zerubavel, Adam, Nowotny, and Giddens), Dynes suggested that social time be taken into account for disaster response.
** Get this paper. What social time work did he cite?
The Phases Should Reflect Social Rather Than Objective Time Giddens (I 987), although not the first, makes an important theoretical distinction between social and objective time. Giddens defines clock time as the use of quantified units. Clock time represents "day-to-day" structured activities. Typically, studies refer to disaster phases with hours, days, weeks, or years. Social time, however, is contingent upon the needs or opportunities of a society.
Cites Giddens here to describe differences between social time (sturcturation) and clock time.
Complete quote runs over 2 pages: "Stoddard argues that the use of time-and-space models in disaster research provides an important methodological disaster research tool. Most important, he contends that the different phases of disaster represent different types of individual and group behavior."
Stoddard's definition offers a solid framework to begin the conversation about how and why it's important to understand the interaction between pluritemporal modes of time and humanitarian response (individual and group sensemaking and enactment).
The fact that information produced by discretionary decision making cannotbe conveyed anonymously has important implications for CSCW systems design.Naturally, such information must be accompanied by the identity of the source.But how to represent and present the identity of the source?
This dilemma also applies to the complexity of representing time in information systems.
This would be good to explore with SBTF in the interviews. Particularly, whether there are different meanings to time modes, time meta data, etc., applied by Core Team, Coordinators, GIS Team, experienced volunteers, new volunteers, etc.
Is this part of the problem with articulating the information extracted from social media and entering it in the Google Sheet in order to become an artifact?
Recording accurate and consistent time is often a challenge. Web log fi les record many different timestamps during a search interaction: the time the query was sent from the client, the time it was received by the server, the time results were returned from the server, and the time results were received on the client. Server data is more robust but includes unknown network latencies. In both cases the researcher needs to normalize times and synchronize times across multiple machines. It is common to divide the log data up into “days,” but what counts as a day? Is it all the data from midnight to midnight at some common time reference point or is it all the data from midnight to midnight in the user’s local time zone? Is it important to know if people behave differently in the morning than in the evening? Then local time is important. Is it important to know everything that is happening at a given time? Then all the records should be converted to a common time zone.
Two common ways to partition log data are by time and by user. Partitioning by time is interesting because log data often contains signifi cant temporal features, such as periodicities (including consistent daily, weekly, and yearly patterns) and spikes in behavior during important events. It is often possible to get an up-to-the- minute picture of how people are behaving with a system from log data by compar-ing past and current behavior.
Mentions challenges of accounting for time zones in log data.
Classifications may or may not become standardized. If they do not, they are ad hoc, limited to an individual or a local community, and/or of limited duration. At the same time, every successful standard imposes a classification system, at the very least between good and bad ways of organizing actions or things. And the work-arounds involved in the practical use of standards frequently entail the use of ad hoc nonstandard categories.
This may be a personal itch, but at least for personal archiving needs, I’m sick, sick, sick of the recency bias that’s eaten the internet since the first stirrings of Web 2.0. Wikis are practically the only sites that have escaped chronological organization. It would be cool to have easily-manipulated collections with non-kludgey support for series ordering, order-by-popularity, order-by-popularity with a manual bump for posts you want to highlight, hell even alphabetical ordering. None of these things are remotely unsolved problems, but they’re poorly supported on the social-media silos most people’s content lives on these days.
Video Url with start time information.
Deep Convolutional Neural Networks On Multichannel Time Series For Human Activity Recognition.
NEW - This study researches dropout rates in eLearning. There are many reasons for attrition with adult eLearners which can be complex and entwined. The researched provide different models to test and also a list of barriers to eLearning - where technology issues ranked first. In conclusion, the authors determined that further research was necessary to continue to identify the factors that contribute to adult learner attrition.
When you interrupt a task, it can be difficult to pick it up again.
yes, because people who always have inertia.
The notion of temporal structuring focuses attention on what people actually do temporally in their practices, and how in such ongoing and situated activity they shape and are shaped by particular temporal structures. By exam­ining when people do what they do in their practices, we can identify what temporal structures shape and are shaped (often concurrently) by members of a community; how these interact; whether they are interrelated, over­lapping, and nested, or separate and distinct; and the ex­tent to which they are compatible, complementary, or contradictory.
Different interaction patterns of temporal structures that are shaped by people and shape people's activities.
Viewed from a practice perspective, the distinction be­tween cyclic and linear time blurs because it depends on the observer's point of view and moment of observation. In particular cases, simply shifting the observer's vantage point (e.g., from the corporate suite to the factory floor) or changing the period of observation (e.g., from a week to a year) may make either the cyclic or the linear aspect of ongoing practices more salient.
Could it be that SBTF volunteers are situating themselves in time as a way to respond to a cyclic/linear tension? or a spatial tension?
An emphasis on the cyclic temporality of organizational life also underpins the work on entrain­ment, developed in the natural sciences and gaining cur­rency in organization studies. Defined as "the adjustment of the pace or cycle of one activity to match or synchro­nize with that of another" (Ancona and Chong 1996, p. 251 ), entrainment has been used to account for a variety of organizational phenomena displaying coordinated or synchronized temporal cycles (Ancona and Chong 1996, Clark 1990, Gersick 1994, McGrath 1990).
In spite of the general movement from particular to­wards universal notions of time (Castells 1996, Giddens 1990, Zerubavel 1981 ), we can see that in use, all uni versa! temporal structures must be particularized to local contexts because they are enacted through the situated practices of specific community members in specific locations and time zones.
Cites Castells (networks), Giddens (structuration) and Zerubavel (semiotics) as moving away from particular time to more universal notions of real-time, 24-hour clock, and calendars, respectively.
Orlikowski and Yates argue that even universal notions need situated and contextual practices to make sense of time.
One such op­position is that between universal (global, standardized, acontextual) and particular (local, situated, context­specific) time.
Orlikowski and Yates describe situated, contextual time as particular.
Event time definition -- as qualitative.
The haunting question is how do I fit into the story.
Need to read the football club paper to understand this context but is it referring to situating oneself in the story?
Read the Nâslund and Pemer paper to see how they are using the term "semantic fit".
Maclean et al. also demonstrate clearly how sensemaking can be defined by its stages. The movement through time of different forms of interpretive work is captured in their phrase ‘language that constructs and gives order to reality, which it (temporarily) sta-bilizes’ (p. 20). They suggest that this movement consists of locating, meaning-making, and becoming.
The idea of temporal stages and spatial movement that includes locating could also be a way to describe the situating behavior.
Later in their article, Cunliffe and Coupland effectively summarize sensemaking as embodied efforts to figure out what to do and who we are. That is a tidy framework for interpreting the life stories of elite bankers since they are essentially figuring out what they did and who they were, with heavy editing, to point up the legitimacy of the what and who that are retrieved.
Could "embodied efforts to figure out what to do and who we are" touch on what I'm calling situated time? Need to read the paper to see how they refer to the term embodied.
Gephart et al. define sensemaking as ‘an ongoing process that creates an intersubjective sense of shared meanings through conversation and non-verbal behavior in face to face settings where people seek to/produce, negotiate, and maintain a shared sense of meaning’ (2010: 284–285).
Could "shared meaning" be driving the need for SBTF volunteers to situate themselves in time in order to co-construct a story?
Cunliffe and Coupland treat sensemaking as ‘collaborative activity used to create, legitimate and sustain organiza-tional practices or leadership roles’ (p. 65). If we add the phrase ‘and individual’ to the word ‘collaborative’ in that definition then we have a rendition of sensemaking that works for the Maclean et al. article, right down to the focus on legitimacy and leadership.
This seems less relevant to the SBTF volunteers' situating behavior.
Could "process through which people interpret themselves and the world around them through the production of meaning" be driving the need for SBTF volunteers to situate themselves in time in order to co-construct a story?
Second, howtime is variously used in past constructions that givesense to what has occurred, in for example, nostal-gic tales that seek to sustain identity-relevant valuesand beliefs, or using time to leverage reformulationsin repositioning these tales, for example, with theaim of undermining nostalgia as a platform for resis-tance (see Brown and Humphreys 2002; Strangleman1999).
As Bojeet al. (2016a, p. 395)indicate, through situating antenarratives in subjec-tive time, they are able to show ‘how diverse voicesinterconnect, embed and entangle in organizationalstrategies’.
Need to unpack this a bit. Is this how to scaffold the SBTF situated time instances into a sensemaking process?
Subjective time (per the philosopher's term) is referred to as socially-constructed time (by the sociologists).
Get Roe's paper. This helps to bridge the ideas of "situated time" and "subjective time" -- or socially constructed ways of experiencing, thinking about and perceiving time.
There is also a need for mechanisms to support transformations and processesover time, both for scientific data and scientific ideas. These mechanisms should not only help the user visualize but also express time and change.
This is still true today. Is the problem truly a technical one or an opportunity to re-imagine the human process of representing time as an attribute and time as a function of evolving data?
Time as order considers temporal data as data that can be described by a time attribute, which can improve navigation or organization. Time as change considers temporal data as data that evolve over time.
The contrast of time as representing either order or change could be a very helpful way to categorize messy, dynamic humanitarian crisis data.
We need ways to capture data as an event timeline (X happened, then Y which demands response Z) as well acknowledge that X and Y may be in flux in an evolving crisis zone.
These same requirements exist in distributed computing, in which tasks need to be scheduled so that they can be completed in the correct sequence and in a timely manner, with data being transferred between computing elements appropriately.
Nature has been incorporated into social theorizing only in as far as it either has become an object to which meaning is attributed and which hence figures as part of human reflexivity, as object met with emotions or attitudes; or, it is seen as an object of transformation by those forces which act upon it: economic forces, but foremost forces emanating from science and technology. The natural environment, including the biosphere and a multitude of environmental risks which have come to the fore today, negate clear-cut boundaries between the effects of human intervention, and hence agency, and synergistic processes which are 'natural' but still a result of human interaction with the environment. Time, it has been emphasized, is not only embedded in symbolic meaning or intersubjective social relations but also in artifacts, in natural and in culturally made ones. Likewise, the ongoing transformation and endangering of the natural environment is performed by processes which are chemical and atmospheric, biological and physical. But they all interact with social processes tied to energy production and use, modes of food production and land utilization, demographic pressures and possible interferences through use of tech-nology.
Nowotny seems to share Adam's concern about extracting nature and natural time from social constructions of time.
Perhaps this is a good place to embed the study's disaster event temporality as a way to further make sense of DHN social coordination and actions/reactions of disaster-affected people?
I'm curious how this idea of mobility creates a precarious, contingent identity which forces people to use other temporal dimensions to situate themselves.
This could be an interesting way to approach the situated time phenomena I'm seeing in the SBTF study.
Major societal transformations are linked to information and communication technologies, giving rise to processes of growing global interdependence. They in turn generate the approxi-mation of coevalness, the illusion of simultaneity by being able to link instantly people and places around the globe. Many other processes are also accelerated. Speed and mobility are thus gaining in momentum, leading in turn to further speeding up processes that interlink the move-ment of people, information, ideas and goods.
Evokes Virilio theories and social/political critiques on speed/compression, as cited by Adam (2004).
Also Hassan's work, also cited by Adam (2004).
ut it will also have to come to terms with confronting 'the Other' (Fabian, 1983), with 'the curious asymmetry' still prevailing as a result of advanced industrial societies receiving a mainly endogenous and synchronic analytic treatment, while 'developing' societies are often seen in exogenous, diachronic terms. Study of 'Time and the Other' presupposes, often implicitly, that the Other lives in another time, or at least on a different time-scale. And indeed, when looking at the integrative but also potentially divisive 'timing' facilitated by modern communication and information-processing technology, is it not correct to say that new divisions, on a temporal scale, are being created between those who have access to such devices and those who do not? Is not one part of humanity, despite globalization, in danger of being left behind, in a somewhat anachronistic age?
Nowotny argues that "the Other" (non-western, developing countries, Global South -- my words, not hers) is presumed to be on a different time scale than industrial societies. Different "cultural variations and how societal experience shapes the construction of time and temporal reference..."
This has implications for ICT devices.
only structural functional theory, but all postfunctionalist 'successor' theories for their lack in taking up 'substantive' temporal issues, he was also pleading from the selective point of view of Third World countries for the exploration of theoretically possible alternatives or, to put it into other words, the delineation of what in the experience of western and non-western societies so far is universally valid and yet historically restric-ted. Such questions touch the very essence of the process of moderniz-ation. They evoke images of a closed past and an open or no longer so open future, of structures of collective memory as well as shifting collec-tive and individual identities of people who are increasingly drawn into the processes of world-wide integration and globalization. Anthropologi-cal accounts are extremely rich in different time reckoning modes and systems, in the pluritemporalism that prevailed in pre-industrialized societies. The theory of historical time - or times - both from a western and non-western point of view still has to be written. There exists already an impressive corpus of writings analysing the rise of the new dominant 'western' concept of time and especially its links with the process of industrialization. The temporal representations underlying the different disciplines in the social sciences allow not only for a reconceptualization of their division of intellectual labour, but also for a programmatic view forward towards a 'science of multiple times' (Grossin, 1989). However, any such endeavour has to come to terms also with non-western temporal experience.
Evokes Adam's critique of colonialization of time, commodification/post-industrial views, and need for post-colonial temporal studies.
Time' and time research is not ·an institutionalized subfield or subspeciality of any of the social sciences. By its very nature, it is recalcitrantly transdisciplinary and refuses to be placed under the intellectual monopoly of any discipline. Nor is time sufficiently recognized as forming an integral dimension of any of the more permanent structural domains of social life which have led to their institutionalization as research fields. Although research grants can be obtained for 'temporal topics', they are much more likely to be judged as relevant when they are presented as part of an established research field, such as studies of working time being considered a legit-imate part of studies of working life or industrial relations.
Challenges of studying time and avoiding the false claim that is a neglected subject.
The standardization of local times into standard world time is one of the prime examples for the push towards standardization and integration also on the temporal scale (Zerubavel, 1982).
Zerubavel, E. (1982) 'The Standardization of Time: A Sociohistorical Perspective', American Journal of Sociology 1: 1-12.
Nowotny, H. (1989b) 'Mind, Technologies, and Collective Time Consciousness', in J. T. Fraser (ed.) Time and Mind, The Study of Time VI, pp. 197-216. Madison, CT: International Universities Press.
Despite the apparent diversity of themes, certain common patterns can be discerned in empirical studies dealing with time. They bear the imprint of the ups and downs of research fashions as well as the waxing and waning of influences from neighbouring disciplines. But they all acknowledge 'time as a problem' in 'time-compact' societies (Lenntorp, 1978), imbued with the pressures of time that come from time being a scarce resource.
Cites Carey "The Case of the Telegraph" -- "impact of the telegraph on the standardization of time"
Cites Bluedorn -- "it is omnipresent indecision-making, deadlines andother aspects of organizational behaviour like various forms of group processes"
Studies of time in organizations have long since recognized the importance of 'events' as a complex admixture which shapes social life inside an organiz-ation and its relationship to the outside world. 'Sociological analyses', we are told, 'require a theory of time which recognizes that time is a socially constructed, organizing device by which one set, or trajectory of events is used as a point of reference for understanding, anticipating and attempting to control other sets of events. Time is in the events and events are defined by organizational members' (Clark, 1985:36).
Review how this idea about events in organizations as a way to study time is used by Bluedorn, Mazmanian, Orlikowski, and/or Lindley.
Nowotny revisits Elias' idea about the relationship between time and events as a framework that is multidisciplinary, complex, integral to sensemaking, and appeals to empirical research.
The formation of time con epts and the making of time I measurements, i.e. the production of devices as well as their use and social function, become for him a problem of social knowledge and its formation. It is couched in the long-term perspective of evolution of human societies. Knowledge about time is not knowledge about an invariant part or object of nature. Time is not a quality inherent in things, nor invariant across human societies.
Combine this with the notes on Norbert Elias above.
As Bergmann (1981), and more recently, Ltischer (1989) and Adam (1990) and before them Joas (1980, 1989) have shown, a radical change in perspective away from time as 'flow' or time as embedded in the intentionality of the actor, can already be found in the social philosophy of time by G. H. Mead (Mead, 1936, 1932/1959, 1964). His is also a theory in which it is not the actor and his/her motives, interests or the means-ends scheme which dominates, but where action is interpreted as event -moreover, an event which is both temporal and social in nature.
Nowotny revisits the earlier mention of Mead's premise that "time is embedded in the intentionality of the actor."
It may well be, as Edmond Wright has pointed out (personal communi-cation) that by leaving sui generis time to the physicists, i.e. by leaving it out of social theory altogether, there is the risk of losing sight of the 'real' temporal continuum which serves as standard reference for all other forms of times. It also impedes coming to terms with 'time embedded' in natural objects and technical artifacts, as Hagerstrand (1974, 1975, 1988) repeatedly emphasized.
Nowotny argues that social theory is reduced to a narrow, dualistic society vs nature perspective by focusing on symbolism in social time and failing to consider other (sui generis) types of time.
This is especially problematic when exploring how time is embedded in "natural objects and technical artifacts".
quite different and much more radical approach is followed by Niklas Luhmann, who proposes to replace the subject/ action scheme by a time/action scheme, thus eliminating the actors alto-gether and replacing them with expectations and attributions.
Luhmann is a social systems theorist, whose work is not widely adopted in the US for being too complex. His work was also criticized by Habermas.
Esoteric. Not worth mentioning in prelim response.
To introduce time into present-day social theory means at its core to redefine its relation to social action and subsequently to human agency. It is there that the central questions arise, where differences begin to matter between action theory, structuration theory and system theory with regard to time.
Nowotny outlines the basic friction points for updating the prevailing social theories.
Pluritemporalism (multiple types of time representations/symbols) recognizes that there is no hierarchy/order between different "modes" or "shapes" of time be they described as physical, social, etc.
Another strategy in dealing with sui generis time consists in juxtaposing clock time to the various forms of 'social time' and considers the latter as the more 'natural' ones, i.e. closer to subjective perceptions of time, or to the temporality that results from adaptations to seasons or other kinds of natural (biological, environmental) rhythm. This strategy, often couched also in terms of an opposition between 'linear' clock time and 'cyclical' time of natural and social rhythms devalues, or at least ques-tions, the temporality of formal organizations which rely heavily on clock time in fulfilling their coordinative and integrative and controlling functions (Young, 1988; Elchardus, 1988).
by contrasting social time (as a natural phenomenon) against clock time, allows for a more explicit perspective on linear time (clock) and social rhythms when examining social coordination.
Mead used events as a unit of analysis in contrasting social time with sui generis time (all other unique times, natural, physical, etc.). This way, time can be still be viewed as a relationship between history/evolution (past) and events (past/present/future) and other temporal types.
"Time therefore structures itself through interaction and common temporal perspectives are rooted in a world constituted through practice."
Related to this encounter of the first kind, in which social theory meets the concept of time, is the question of the relationship between time in social systems with other forms of (physical, biological, 'natural') time or, as Elchardus calls it, 'sui generis time' (Elchardus, 1988).
According to Elchardus, the idea of a relationship between social time and other forms ("sui generis time") is also studied by Giddens and Luhmann.
Later in this passage, Nowotny writes: "Elchardus suggests defining the culturally induced temporality of systems when certain conditions (i.e. relative invariance and sequential order) are met. Time then becomes the concept used to interpret that temporality."
By clarifying the concept of time as a conceptual symbol of evolving complex relationships between continua of changes of various kinds, Elias opens the way for grounding the concept of time again in social terms. The power of choosing the symbols, of selecting which continua are to be used, be it by priests or scientists, also beconies amenable to social analysis. The social matrix becomes ready once more to house the natural world or our conception of it in terms of its own, symbol-creating and continuously evolving capacity. The question of human agency is solved in Norbert Elias's case by referring to the process of human evolution through which men and women are enabled to devise symbols of increasing power of abstraction which are 'more adequate to reality'.
Per Nowotny on Elias: thinking about time as a conceptual symbol it can more readily be described in social terms, it holds natural and social time together, and it accounts for human agency in creating symbols to understand time in practice and in the abstract.
Unless one learns to perceive human societies, living in a world of symbols of their own making, as emerging and developing within the larger non-human universe, one is unable to attack one of the most crucial aspects of the problem of time. For Elias it consists, stated very briefly, in how to reconcile the highly abstract nature of the concept of time with the strong compulsion its social use as a regulatory device exerts upon us in daily life. His answer: time is not a thing, but a relationship. For him the word time is a symbol for a relationship which a group of beings endowed with the capacity for memory and synthesis establishes between two or more continua of changes, one of which is used by them as a frame of reference or standard of measurement for the other.
Nowotny descrobes Norbert Elias' conception of social time not as a thing but a relationship between people and two more more continua of changes.
continua = multiple ways to sequentially evaluate something that changes over past, present and future states.
Requested the Elias book cited here.
Social time definition -- which incorporates notion of plural temporalities.
Martins draws a distinction between two criteria of temporalism and/or historicism. One he calls 'thematic tem-poralism', indicated by the degree to which temporal aspects of social life, diachronicity, etc., are taken seriously as themes for reflection of meta theoretical inquiry. The other criterion is the degree or level of 'substantive temporalism', the degree to which becoming, process or diachrony are viewed as ontological grounds for socio-cultural life or as methodologically prior to structural synchronic analysis or explanations.
Difference between "thematic temporalism" and "substantive temporalism."
Thematic = "issues of time, change and history being taken seriously as objects of study" Substantive = "issues of becoming, process and change viewed as essential features of social life which help explain social phenomena"
There is also a widespread acknowledgement, especially in evidence in the empirical literature, of what I will call 'pluritemporalism'. This is an acknowledgement of the existence of a plurality of different modes of social time(s) which may exist side by side, and yet are to be distinguished from the time of physics or that of biology.
The demise of structural-functionalism, he argues, has not brought about a substantial increment in the degree of temporalism and historicism in the theoretical constructs of general sociology, even though this was one of the major goals announced by the critics of functionalism, paramount to a meta-theoretical criterion of what an 'adequate' theory should con-sist of.
Contested area for early social theorists -- suggested that "temporalism" should be a criterion for future social theory as a successor to structural-functionalism.
Definition: Structural Functionalism is a sociological theory that attempts to explain why society functions the way it does by focusing on the relationships between the various macro-social institutions that make up society (e.g., government, law, education, religion, etc) and act as a complex system whose parts work together to promote solidarity and stability. Robert Merton was a proponent of structural-functionalism.
The question is, rather, why the repeated complaint about the neglect of time in social theory or in the social sciences in general?
Nowotny lists a number of possible reasons for inaccurate complaints that time has been neglected in social theory or it has not been taken seriously despite the large body of literature.
I would offer a simpler reason: The prior work is incredible dense, very abstract, and hard to relate to lived/social experience.
Sorokin and Merton in 1937, entitled 'Social Time: A Methodological and Functional Analysis' that some of the Durkheimian ideas were taken up again. This paper identified social time as qualitatively heterogeneous (e.g. holidays and market days), not quantitatively homogeneous as astronomical or physical time has it. Social time was seen as being divided into intervals that derive from collective social activities rather than being uniformly flowing. Local time systems, it was argued, function mainly in order to assure the coordination and synchronization of local activities which eventually become extended and integrated, thereby necessitating common time systems. The Durkheimian claim of the category of time being rooted in social activities, of time being socially constituted by virtue of the 'rhythm of social life' itself, buttressed by the analysis of the social functions it served, was a tacit rebuttal of Kant's a priori intuitions of time, space and causality.
Sorokin and Merton extended Durkheim's work and staked the claim that social time was qualitative, varied, rhythmic and useful for social coordination in contrast to Kant's philosophy of time, space and causality.
The claim to the existence of a concept of 'social time', distinct from other forms of time, was thus made early in the history of social thought. It continues to focus upon the claims of the peculiar nature of the 'social constitution' or the 'social construction' of time. These claims evidently put the category of 'social time' into the wider realm of 'symbolic time', a cultural phenomenon, the constitution of which has remained the object of inquiry of more disciplines than sociology alone, but which separates it from time in nature, embedded in things and artifacts.
Early work in social time focused on the social construction of time and symbolic/semiotic representations (see Zerubavel).
Sociology and other disciplines see time as "embedded in things and artifacts" apart from what Adam refers to as natural time.
In the then undeveloped sociology of knowledge, Durkheim held as the most general conclusion that it is the rhythm of social life which is the basis of the category of time itself (Durkheim, 1912:7). These obser-vations opened up important questions about the social origins and func-tions of the category of time and how social time can be distinguished and is distinct from astronomical time.
Early history of "social time" via Durkheim.
A light fringe of snow lay like a cape on the shoulders of his overcoat and like toecaps on the toes of his goloshes; and, as the buttons of his overcoat slipped with a squeaking noise through the snow-stiffened frieze, a cold, fragrant air from out-of-doors escaped from crevices and folds.
Here we find yet another personification of air, which enwraps the story with subtle layers of movement and circulation. We could trace this pattern, and its effects on narrative time and narrative progress, through concordances and dispersion plots of "air" and any wind-related words.
Contemporary thinkers from a wide range of fields arrived at an understanding that recognises the implication of our past in the present; in other words, that our personal and social history forms an ineradicable part of us. I can find no good reason why we should exlude our biological and cosmic past from the acceptance of this general principle.
Adam contests Gidden's perspective on time-scale because he does not integrate biological or cosmic evolution into the influence that personal and social history can have on how people experience the present through the past.
Despite the limitations, Adam largely supports Mead's approach since it "emphasizes the complexity of time and imposes order on the multiple expressions" over other frameworks centered on time as a series of stages or experienced as dualities.
To Mead the past is irrevocable to the extent that events cannot be undone, thoughts not unthought, and knowledge not unknown. In this irrever-sible form, he contends, the past is unknowable since the intervening knowledge continuously changes the meaning of that past and relentlessly recreates and reformulates it into a new and different past. He argues this on the basis of the proposition that only emergence in the present has reality status. He does not accord the past and future such a status because they are real only with respect to their relation to the present. In Mead's thought the past changes with respect to our experiencing it in the present and the meaning we give to it. In contradistinction to the past, he conceptualises the reality of the present as changing with each emergence.
Adam describes Mead's conceptualization of past/present/future as fluid levels. Present experience constantly changes our understanding, meaning, and knowledge about the past and future.
Adam notes, however, that there are limits to Mead's concept of levels, as they tend to be organized as nested hierarchies. The emergence of a new reality (present) changes not only past and future, but pushes the present into a constant state of flux and change, which further alters the past and future.
It's a fun house mirror of theoretical madness.
Not the number of levels or their content are at issue here since these might be varied according to the degree of the analysis' generality but their static developmental stages where the level 'below' is denied aspects that characterise the level 'above'. In other words, whilst theories of time levels are theoretically of interest and echoed in many subsequent social science conceptualisations -including those of Sorokin ( 1964) and Elias (1982a, b, 1984), for example -they deny to non-human nature what we have found to be central: the importance of past, present, and future extension; of history, creativity, temporality, time experience, and time norms. If time differ-ences are conceptualised with reference to stable, integrative levels then this prevents any understanding in terms of resonance and feedback loops. With discrete, unidirectional levels, consciousness cannot be shown to resonate throughout all of nature; and what we think of as 'human time' stays falsely imprisoned at that level.
Adam contends that if time layers are viewed as bounded levels then "this prevents any understanding in terms of resonance and feedback loops."
She also talks about "discrete, unidirectional levels." This congers up thoughts about Bluedorn's writing about "time's directional arrow." Is this the same thing?
Despite these important advantages, however, there are difficulties associated with the conceptualisation of social time in terms of levels. These relate to our tendency to reify the levels, to conceptualise them hierarchically, and to postulate clear cut-off points between them. The three, as we shall see, are closely interconnected.
The idea of layers of time is problematic because people tend to want to transform abstract ideas into concrete examples (reify), assign rank order (hierarchy), and contain the layers (cut-off points).
A conceptualisation in terms of levels seems therefore well suited to explain and theorise the multitude of times entailed in contemporary life. To think of these times as expressions of different levels of our being avoids the need to discuss one aspect at the expense of all others. It means that we do not need to chose on an either/ or basis. It encourages us to see connections and not to lose sight of the multiplicity while we concentrate on any one of those multiple expressions.
Time is expressed in a variety of ways and conceptualizing them as levels allows people to imagine them holistically and as interconnected even while focusing on one aspect/layer.
However, this idea is contested further in the passage.
Does Adam's sense of time follow/counter Lindley's view of entangled time?
Recognising ourselves as having evolved, and thus being the times of nature, allows for the humanly constituted aspects of time to become one expression among the others. Biologists have dispelled the idea that only humans experience time or organise their lives by it. Waiting and timing in nature presuppose knowledge of time and temporality, irrespective of their being symbolised, conceptualised, reckoned, or measured. Yet, once time is constituted symbolically, it is no longer reducible to the communication of organisms or physical signals; it is no longer a mere sensory datum. For a person to have a past and to recognise and know it entails a representational, symbolically based imagination. Endowed with it, people do not merely undergo their presents and pasts but they shape and reshape them. Symbolic meaning thus makes the past infinitely flexible. With objectified meaning we can not only look back, reflect, and contemplate but we can reinterpret, restructure, alter, and modify the past irrespective of whether this is done in the light of new knowledge in the present, to suit the present, or for purposes of legitimation.
Still struggling a bit with this section but I think Adam is proposing that if we break down the barriers between understanding social time as symbolic and natural time as objective, that we can borrow methods of sensemaking from natural time and apply them to social time, it broadens our ways of knowing/understanding human temporal experience.
In other words, the idea of time as socially constituted depends fundamentally on the meaning we impose on 'the social', whether we understand it as a prerogative of human social organisation or, following Mead, as a principle of nature.
In a long prior passage about how time is conceptualized in nature and in social coordination, Adam argues that "time" as a social construct should be thought of holistically and not broken into dichotomies to be compared/contrasted.
A brief expansion of these general social science assumptions about nature will clarify this point. Nature as distinct from social life is understood to be quantifiable, simple, and subject to invariant relations and laws that hold beyond time and space (Giddens 1976; Lessnoff 1979· ~yan 1979). This view is accompanied by an understanding of natural time as coming in fixed, divisible units that can be measured whilst quality, complexit~, ~nd mediating knowledge are preserved exclusively for the conceptuahsat10n of human social time. On the basis of a further closely related idea it is proposed that nature may be understood objectively. Natural scientists, explain Elias (1982a, b) and Giddens ( 1976), stand in a subject-object relationship to their subject matter. Natural scientists, they suggest, are able to study objects directly and apply a causal framework of analysis whilst such direct causal links no longer suffice for the study of human society where that which is investigated has to be appreciated as unintended outcomes of intended actions and where the investigators interpret a pre-interpreted world. Unlike their colleagues in the natural sciences, social scientists, it is argued, stand in a subject-subject relation to their subject matter. In a?ditio? to the differences along the quantity-quality and object-subject d1mens10ns nature is thought to be predictable because its regularities -be they causal, statistical, or probabilistic -are timeless. The laws of nature. are c?nsi~ered to be true in an absolute and timeless way, the laws of society h1stoncally developed. In contrast to nature, human societies are argued to be fundamentally historical. They are organised around :alues, goals, morals, ethics, and hopes, whilst simultaneously being mfl~enc~d by tradition, habits, and legitimised meanings.
Critique of flawed social science perception of natural science as driven by laws, order, and quantitative attributes (subject-object) that are observable. This is contrasted with perception about social science as driven by history, culture, habit, and meanings which are socially constructed qualitative attributes (subject-subject).
Since our traditional understanding of natural time e~erged as inadequate and faulty we have to recognise that the analysis of social time is flawed by implication.
Adam states that "social time" theories should be contested since social science disciplinary understanding of "natural time" is incorrect.
Past, present, and future, historical time, the qualitative experience of time, the structuring of 'undifferentiated change' i?to episodes, all are established as integral time aspects of the subJect matter of the natural sciences and clock time, the invariant measure, the closed circle, the perfect symmetry, and reversible time as our creations.
Adam's broader definition of "natural time" which is socially constructed and not just a physical phenomena.
Sorokin and Merton (1937) may be said to have provided the 'definitive' classic statement on the distinction between social and natural time. They associate the physical time of diurnal and seasonal cycles with clock time and define this time as 'purely quantitative, shorn of qualitative variation' (p. 621). 'All time systems', Sorokin and Merton suggest further, 'may be reduced to the need of providing means for synchronising and co-ordinating the activities and observations of the constituents of groups' (p. 627).
classic definition of "social time" vs "natural time". This thinking is now contested.
Whilst social theorists are no longer united in the belief that all time systems are reducible to the functional need of human synchro~is_ation and co-ordination they seem to have little doubt about the validity of Sorokin and Merton's other key point that, unlike social time, the time of nature is that of the clock, a time characterised by invariance and quantity. Despite significant shifts in the understanding of social time, the assumptions about nature, natural time, and the subject matter of the natural sciences have remained largely unchanged.
Adam argues here that while the concept of "social time" has evolved, social scientists' ideas around "natural time" have not kept pace with new scientific research, and incorrectly continue to be described as constant and quantitative (aka clock time).
Further, "natural time" incorrectly incorporates other temporal experiences and seems to be used as a convenient counter foil to "social time"
Temporal focus is the degree of emphasis on the past, present, and future (Blue­dorn 2000e, p. 124).
Temporal focus definition. Like temporal depth, both are socially constructed.
Cites Lewin (time perspective) and Zimbardo & Boyd.
Comparison of Bluedorn's thinking about temporal depth vs temporal focus instead of framing it as a temporal orientation (the direction/domain that an individual or group emphasizes in sensemaking).
Is there a way to integrate dCog and a more sociotemporal theory, like Zimbardo & Boyd's Time Perspective Theory or some of Adam's work on timescapes?
This conjecture leads us to promote the ideal of a “balanced TP” as most psycho-logically and physically healthy for individuals and optimal for societal functioning. Balance is defi ned as the mental ability to switch fl exibly among TPs depending on task features, situational considerations, and personal resources rather than be biased toward a specifi c TP that is not adaptive across situations. The future focus gives people wings to soar to new heights of achievement, the past (positive) focus establishes their roots with tradition and grounds their sense of personal identity, and the present (hedonistic) focus nourishes their daily lives with the playfulness of youth and the joys of sensuality. People need all of them harmoniously operating to realize fully their human potential.
Balanced time perspective definition. Later called optimal time shifting in the Time Paradox book.
What are the heuristics and/or design implications for evoking more ideal time shifting behaviors and outcomes?
A further limitation of the generalizability of our scale may lie in its cultural relevance to individualist societies and their ambitions, tasks, and demands rather than to more collectivist, interdependent societies in which time is differently val-ued and conceptualized (Levine 1997 ). Obvious cross-cultural adaptations of the ZTPI are called for.
Acknowledged limitations in the original paper note that students may be more future oriented and the scale was predominantly tested on Western individualist cultures.
Later work has demonstrated that these concerns are not born out.
Our scale also has dem-onstrated predictive utility in experimental, correlational, and case study research.
The ZPTI is predictive of other psychological concepts -- emotional, behavioral, and cognitive -- that have temporal relationships.
Temporality is a rare psychological variable that can influence "powerful and pervasive impact" on individual behavior and societal activities.
The scale is based on theoretical reflection and analyses, interviews, focus groups, repeated factor analyses, feedback from experiment participants, discriminant validity analyses, and specifi c attempts to increase factor loadings and internal consistencies by item analyses and revisions.
Claims the ZPTI is both valid and reliable due to mixed-method empirical study and factor analysis to establish measurable constructs and consistency of findings.
Critique of previous research as overly simplified, one-dimensional (focused on future or present states, ignored past) and lack of reliable and valid measures for assessing time perspectives.
Thus, we conceive of TP as situationally determined and as a relatively stable individual-differences process.
Such limiting biases contrast with a “balanced time orientation,” an ideal-ized mental framework that allows individuals to fl exibly switch temporal frames among past, future, and present depending on situational demands, resource assess-ments, or personal and social appraisals. The behavior of those with such a time orientation would, on average, be determined by a compromise, or balancing, among the contents of meta-schematic representations of past experiences, present desires, and future consequences.
A temporal bias results from habitual overuse/underuse of past, present or future temporal frames.
Introduces the idea of optimal time shifting to incorporate various environmental forces.
In both cases, the abstract cognitive processes of reconstructing the past and constructing the future function to infl uence current decision making, enabling the person to transcend compelling stimulus forces in the immediate life space and to delay apparent sources of gratifi cation that might lead to undesirable con-sequences.
Core premise of Zimbardo and Boyd's time perspective theory diverges from Nuttin, Bandura and Carstensen's work.
Time Perspective Theory posits that dynamic influences on present behavior and cognition comes from top-down abstract (past/future) ideas and bottom-up environmental forces (social, biological, sensory).
More recently, Joseph Nuttin ( 1964 , 1985 ) supported the Lewinian time-fi lled life space, where “future and past events have an impact on present behavior to the extent that they are actually present on the cognitive level of behavioral functioning” ( 1985 , p. 54). Contemporary social–cognitive thinking, as represented in Albert Bandura’s ( 1997 ) self-effi cacy theory, advances a tripartite temporal infl uence on behavioral self-regulation as generated by effi cacy beliefs grounded in past experiences, current appraisals, and refl ections on future options. Behavioral gerontologist Laura Carstensen and her colleagues (Carstensen et al. 1999 ) have proposed that the perception of time plays a funda-mental role in the selection and pursuit of social goals, with important implications for emotion, cognition, and motivation.
Bandura's position supports his self-efficacy theory that temporal influences affect a person's innate ability to exert control over one's behavior in order to achieve goals.
Carstensen proposes that time perception influences choices, motives, and emotions about social goals.
TP is the often nonconscious process whereby the continual fl ows of personal and social experiences are assigned to tem-poral categories, or time frames, that help to give order, coherence, and meaning to those events.
Time perspective is an intuitive, unconscious process that people use for sensemaking in the present, recall of the past and to predict the future.
In this view, the present is concrete where past and future are abstract.
Lewin ( 1951 ) defi ned time perspective (TP) as “the totality of the individual’s views of his psychological future and psychological past existing at a given time” (p. 75).
Per Zimbardo/Boyd, Lewin's view incorporates a Zen-like present orientation that evokes a circular motion of time over the Western-centric linear/directional motion.
I felt my soul receding into some pleasant and vicious region; and there again I found it waiting for me. It began to confess to me in a murmuring voice and I wondered why it smiled continually and why the lips were so moist with spittle.
There are quite a few religious references throughout the text, and not only in direct reference to the priest . I would be interesting to run they words using a narrative time analysis to see ho they are used through out the entire piece. I would also be interested in running a collocation analysis to see if they appear together frequently.
We pleased ourselves with the spectacle of Dublin’s commerce—the barges signalled from far away by their curls of woolly smoke, the brown fishing fleet beyond Ringsend, the big white sailing-vessel which was being discharged on the opposite quay. Mahony said it would be right skit to run away to sea on one of those big ships and even I, looking at the high masts, saw, or imagined, the geography which had been scantily dosed to me at school gradually taking substance under my eyes. School and home seemed to recede from us and their influences upon us seemed to wane.
The narrator's description of the commercial ships, and his fantasy of sailing away from Dublin, briefly suspend the narrative, creating a temporal and spatial expansiveness that pressures the story's geographic containment. It would be interesting to track and investigate the language of imagination and fantasy throughout Dubliners with a concordance and collocations.
Larger firms appear to more polychronic. That finding seems to follow Bluedorn's own speculative findings of a relationship between polychronic organizations and a culture that values speed (time compression).
Note: Organizational studies of polychronicity have been conducted through quantitative methods (surveys and questionnaires).
Decision strategies, like polychronicity, are often intuitive and unconscious.
Bluedorn mentions how culture and personality play a critical role in decision strategies. Potential intersection with Zimbardo's time perspective theory.

References: sui generis
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