Source: https://www.scribd.com/document/156062408/Green-Petition-for-En-Banc-Hearing-FCPA-Restitution
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 18:00:06+00:00

Document:
STATEMENT UNDER FED. R. APP. P. 35(b)(1)(A); 9TH CIR. R. 35-1 En banc review is appropriate to ensure consistency of Ninth Circuit precedent with two recent Supreme Court cases: Southern Union v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2344 (2012) and Alleyne v. United States,133 S. Ct. 2153 (2013). INTRODUCTION In the court of appeals, the Greens argued that the district courts criminal restitution order under the MVRA should be vacated because the order was predicated on a finding, not made by a jury, that the Greens conduct resulted in a pecuniary loss to an identifiable victim. The Greens principally relied on the Supreme Court decision in Southern Union v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2344 (2012), decided after the district courts order, which applied the Sixth Amendment Apprendi rule in the closely related context of criminal fines. The panel seemingly agreed in part, stating that Southern Union provides reason to believe Apprendi might apply to restitution, slip op. 9, and observed that it chips away at the theory behind [this Courts] restitution cases. Id. Nonetheless, the panel declined to so hold because it deemed the Supreme Courts decision not clearly irreconcilable with this Courts prior holdings. Id. A panel cannot depart from this Courts precedents unless the intervening case makes the prior precedent clearly irreconcilable. Id. Thus, this Court has never afforded plenary review of whether, in light of Southern Union, Apprendi applies to criminal restitution.
The Supreme Court further elaborated on Apprendi after Southern Union in Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2153 (2013), holding that Apprendi applies in the context of a mandatory minimum sentence for a crime. Given that criminal restitution under the MVRA also in effect constitutes a mandatory minimum for the money laundering charge here, the logic of Alleyne similarly should apply. In short, because this circuits precedents are not well-harmonized with Southern Union, slip op. 11, the issue is recurrent 1 and important, and because Alleyne further casts doubt on circuit precedent, this Court should provide plenary review of the question whether Southern Union and Alleyne apply to criminal restitution as well as to criminal fines. I. THERE IS NO MATERIAL DIFFERENCE WITHIN THE APPRENDI FRAMEWORK BETWEEN CRIMINAL FINES AND CRIMINAL RESTITUTION The Supreme Court in Southern Union held that the Apprendi rule applies to criminal fines. The Court stated that [o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 2350 (citation omitted). Because the judge instead of the jury determined the duration of Southern Unions statutory violation and set the fine accordingly, the Court vacated the sentence.
See, e.g., United States v. Rebollo, 506 Fed Appx. 544 (9th Cir. 2013).
The first Congress reflected prior practice in providing that criminal fines in part would be paid to the victim. See, e.g., Crimes Act of 1790, 16, 1 Stat. 112, 116 (larceny statute capped fine at four times the value of property stolen and directed that half be paid to the owner of goods).
is no requirement that the number of years in prison or the exact amount of fine be specified indeed, in Southern Union itself, the amount of fine was not capped but rather could vary with a determination of how many days the defendant violated the statute. The district court there selected 762 days, but it could have selected a single day or 381 days. The penalty turned on the statutory factor requiring a determination of the number of days of violation, just as in this case the penalty under the MVRA turns on the amount of the victims loss. Moreover, Southern Union explicitly held that the Apprendi rule applies in fines cases based on the victims loss 132 S. Ct. at 2350-51, which compels the conclusion that no numerical maximum need be ascertainable from the face of the statute for Apprendi to apply. The uncapped argument cannot survive Southern Union intact. The key is not whether the legislature prescribed a precise number of years or dollar amount, but rather whether the legislature predicated increased or additional punishment on specific factfinding. The Court explained in Southern Union that the statutory maximum for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant. Thus, while judges may exercise discretion in sentencing, they may not inflict punishment that the jurys verdict alone does not allow. (citation omitted).
Moreover, Deputy Solicitor General Drebeen at oral argument in Southern Union conceded that if one is applying an algebraic understanding of the relevant statutory maximum from the Blakely decision, restitution would be hard to justify because the jury verdict does not contain findings about harm to victims. The jury verdict finds guilt. Afterwards, the judge finds an additional fact, namely the amount of harm and imposes restitution. Transcript at 32. That is precisely why the Apprendi rule should apply to criminal restitution.
the mandatory minimum sentence together constitutes a new, aggravated crime, each element of which must be submitted to the jury. Id. at 2161. Such were the circumstances in this case the district court finding triggering the mandatory minimum was that an identifiable victim suffered pecuniary harm from the Greens conduct. As the panel recognized, that finding was not made by the jury, and the jury verdict was consistent with other factual scenarios that would not have triggered criminal restitution. Slip op. 5-6. Moreover, the Court in Alleyne explained that requiring the prosecution to present such issues in the indictment for jury consideration enables the defendant to predict the legally applicable penalty from the face of the indictment. 133 S. Ct. at 2161. Alleyne therefore reinforces the Greens reading of Southern Union, which makes the case for rehearing en banc that much more compelling. In short, this Court should afford plenary consideration of whether Apprendi applies to criminal restitution. Southern Union held that Apprendi applies to statutes, including those without numerical maximums, based on the victims loss as in this case, and Alleyne reinforces that what is critical is whether the legislature has predicated an additional penalty on discrete factfinding. As the panel itself noted, [h]ad Southern Union come down before our cases, those cases might have come out differently because this Courts prior case law is not well harmonized with Southern Union. Slip op. 11.
CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, this Court should grant the petition for rehearing en banc to permit consideration of whether Apprendi applies to criminal restitution.
* I Marilyn E. Bednarski, attest pursuant to Circuit Rule 25-5(e) that Attorney Harold J. Krent, on behalf of his client, Gerald Green, concurs in the content of this joint filing.
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH CIRCUIT RULE 32-1 Pursuant to Rule 32(a)(7) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and Ninth Circuit Rule 32-1, I hereby certify that: the foregoing Petition uses 14 point Times New Roman proportionately spaced type; text is double spaced and footnotes are single spaced; a word count of the word processing system used to prepare the brief indicates that the Petition (not including the table of contents, the table of authorities, the certificate of compliance with Circuit Rule 32-1, or the proof of service) contains approximately 2097 words.

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