Source: https://www.inversecondemnation.com/inversecondemnation/judicial-takings/
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 12:48:21+00:00

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Posts categorized "▪ Judicial Takings"
Great crowd today in Austin for CLE International's Eminent Domain seminar, co-chaired by our colleagues Chris Clough, Sejin Brooks, and Christopher Oddo. We spoke about "National Trends and Developing Issues in Eminent Domain."
"Doggone stinky" government action, but no property right in use of land.
NJ Appellate Division: "take now, decide later" will not support redevelopment necessity. Unless there's "linkage"
Does the takings clause require compensation for the taking of use, or of value?
Does the takings clause protect investment expectations, or current profitability?
Antrim Truck Centre - the Supreme Court of Canada on circuitry of access and "injurious affection"
Here's the amicus motion and proposed brief we filed yesterday in a Third Circuit case we've been following, and which we wrote about recently.
In the few short days since that post, the owners are now also represented by the Institute for Justice, and have filed a petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc. We thought that was a good opportunity to chime in to point out the panel's fundamental misunderstanding of eminent domain.
The issue presented by the petition is whether a private condemnor exercising the delegated eminent domain power under the Natural Gas Act may obtain prejudgment possession of the property to be condemned by way of a preliminary injunction, when Congress has not delegated the ability to obtain prejudgment possession. This is an issue of pressing national importance, on which the panel decision conflicts not only with established Supreme Court doctrine, but the ruling of at least one other federal court of appeals.
The panel’s focus on the district court’s summary judgment order as the dispositive action misconstrued the nature and effect of that ruling. The panel erroneously concluded that obtaining summary judgment on the three predicates which a private pipeline company must satisfy in order to institute an eminent domain action in federal court under 15 U.S.C. § 717f(h), gave Transco a “substantive” right to the properties. Panel op. at 19 (the dispositive fact was that Transco had “established its substantive right to the property by filing for [and obtaining] summary judgment”). Thus, the panel concluded, because Transco’s condemnation was all but inevitable, it was entitled to possession before payment of compensation and title transfer.
The panel’s rationale not only violates the well-worn rule of statutory interpretation of eminent domain statutes (they must be liberally read in favor of the property owner, and strictly construed against the condemnor), but also reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of the eminent domain power, and process. Federal statutory takings become inevitable only when title transfers. And only then can the condemnor get possession. Here, by contrast, the panel acknowledged that title would not transfer until the end of the case, but nonetheless allowed possession. Panel op. at 20 (“Here, unlike a ‘quick take’ action, Transcontinental does not yet have title but will receive it once final compensation is determined and paid.”).
1. The NGA has a three-part requirement for a private pipeline to institute an eminent domain action in federal court: (1) it first obtain a certificate of public convenience from FERC; (2) it cannot acquire the property by voluntary purchase; and (3) the amount claimed by the owner is more than $3,000. 15 U.S.C. § 717f(h). In these circumstances, a private condemnor “may acquire the [right-of-way] by the exercise of the right of eminent domain in the district court of the United States for the district in which such property may be located[.]” Id.
We will keep you posted as this develops.
Motion and Brief Amicus Curiae of Owners' Counsel of America, Transcontinental Gas Pipeline Co., LLC v.
The case has been getting a lot of press, first in Northern California where it is a bit of a cause célèbre, and now nationally, with pieces like this article from the Los Angeles Times ("With Supreme Court challenge, tech billionaire could dismantle beach access rights — and a landmark coastal law"). Besides, the poor signal-to-noise ratio in beach cases (as we've written before) often makes hoping for a rational result futile. But the way the LA Times article framed the case (uber rich guy is trying to blow up your beach access!) made us want to point out a couple of things that did not make their way into in the cert petition.
Before we do so, first recall that the issue in the case is "[w]hether a compulsory public-access easement of indefinite duration is a per se physical taking." But wait, you say, this case is Property Owner, Petitioner vs. Surfrider Foundation, Respondent. Surfrider, last we checked, was a private organization and does not have the power of eminent domain, so how can this case involve a taking?
Because the essence of the petition is that this is a judicial taking.
Well yes, this kind. As we pointed out in a post-Stop the Beach Renourishment article, the posture of this case is exactly the kind of case in which the question of "judicial takings" is squarely presented. The Martin's Beach case reminds us of our old favorite, PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980), where the appeal (yes, appeal) to the U.S. Supreme Court asserted that the California Supreme Court's decision holding shopping centers were a traditional forum for speech was a taking of the PruneYard's right to exclude.
Same here, where the property owner is asserting that the California Court of Appeal's decision to open the parcel to the public until such time the owner obtains a permit to "allow" him to close it "is a per se physical taking." In short, we think this is a great case in which the Court could confirm what to us is the least controversial aspect of the "judicial takings" canon: that when a court makes a ruling that is alleged to have taken property, the owners' remedy includes invalidation of the judicial act, and not only an award of just compensation. The easiest judicial takings case, like every other takings case, is the one where physical invasion is the result.
Now that we have that out of the way, here are the two items which were not featured in the petition.
The ownership of a thing is the right of one or more persons to possess and use it to the exclusion of others. In this Code, the thing of which there may be ownership is called property.
Now, we wish we had remembered this, but fortunately a California colleague pointed it out. One of the reasons we like doing this is that we learn something new every day.
Thus, the government cannot avoid liability for a taking when it floods property simply by asserting that it did not intend for the invasion to be permanent. Temporal metaphysics are less important than the actual permanent damage and deprivation of use inflicted by an invasion.
As long as the property is damaged for a length of time, that's good enough.
As an aside, the unusual situation in Kaiser Aetna repeated itself a few years later and resulted in a Ninth Circuit decision which affirmed the principle that the right to exclude is fundamental. See Boone v. United States, 944 F.2d 1489 (9th Cir. 1991), where the government argued that the public's right to navigate upon a waterway predated private ownership and lay "dormant" after the property became nonnavigable, and thus any interference with right to exclude was merely temporary. Same reasoning, same result as in Kaiser Aetna.
Should the Supreme Court grant cert in the Martin's Beach case? You now know what our answer is.
*Any other reason for not filing a brief, you ask? No time, brothers and sisters, no time. Otherwise, we'd be there.
New Judicial Takings Cert Petition: Can A Federal Court Take Property By Changing The Law?
Here's the cert petition, recently filed in a case we've been following as it has made its way from the Court of Federal Claims and through the Federal Circuit.
The underlying matter was litigated in the District Court and the Fifth Circuit. Those courts concluded that the plaintiff did not own mineral leases in Louisiana because under federal common law, it did not acquire any rights by prescription. The plaintiff then filed a Tucker Act claim in the in the CFC seeking compensation for a judicial taking on the theory that the Fifth Circuit's ruling altered the plaintiff's previously-established rights by changing the law.
The CFC accepted that fact as true, but concluded that the CFC has no jurisdiction to tell the Fifth Circuit it was wrong. The Federal Circuit affirmed, and here we are.
In Stop the Beach Renourishment v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection, 560 U.S. 702, 715 (2010), a plurality of this Court held that “[i]f a legislature or a court declares that what was once an established right of private property no longer exists, it has taken that property, no less than if the State had physically appropriated it or destroyed its value by regulation” (emphasis in original). The Takings Clause requires just compensation as the remedy for takings by the government. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 314-15 (1987). Under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1), the Court of Federal Claims has exclusive and compulsory jurisdiction over takings claims against the United States for just compensation greater than $10,000.
1. Whether the Takings Clause applies to the decisions of federal courts, and if so, under what circumstances may federal courts review and remedy federal judicial takings claims.
2. Whether the Court of Federal Claims may adjudicate federal judicial takings claims against the United States when the remedy sought is just compensation and not invalidation of another federal court’s decision.
We spelled out our thoughts on the "judicial takings" issue in this law review article: "Of Woodchucks and Prune Yards: A View of Judicial Takings From the Trenches," 35 Vt. L. Rev. 437 (2010).
Stay tuned. Follow along on the Court's docket here.
If you "get" this headline and the decision by the Federal Circuit, then congratulations, you are a super takings nerd. King of the Nerds. Off-the-charts nerd. Your takings law geek certificate is in the mail.
In Petro-Hunt, LLC v. United States, No. 16-1981 (July 13, 2017), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit considered Tohono, § 1500, takings statutes of limitations, judicial takings, Quiet Title, temporary takings, physical vs regulatory takings, Louisiana law mineral servitudes, and related contract claims. Lots of issues, and we leave it to you to read the whole thing. Well worth it. Bottom line: property owner loses.
But even in the midst of a loss on all substantive and procedural fronts, this bright point: the Federal Circuit concluded that if the plaintiff had followed the first-to-file process, the court would have upheld the jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims against the government's § 1500 challenge. We've been down this path before, see here for example, and our amicus brief in Tohono and in a follow up case.
Petro-Hunt could have avoided the force of § 1500 by following Tecon and filing its case first in the Court of Federal Claims. See Brandt v. United States, 710 F.3d 1369, 1379 n.7 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (stating that Tecon’s order-of-filing rule “remains the law of this circuit”); Hardwick Bros. Co. II v. United States, 72 F.3d 883, 886 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (the rule of Tecon “remains good law and binding on this court”).
This is logically backwards (the government action needs to be valid in order for there to be a taking, so the challenge to the validity of the action should be resolved before a takings challenge is ripe), but hey, who are we to quibble? The Supreme Court avoided this issue in Tohono (it really wasn't squarely presented), so we think it will be back. The Tecon dodge, as useful as it is for property owners as a practical matter, is, as a matter of principle, just that -- a dodge. Eventually, in the right case, the Supreme Court is going to have to confront this, or Congress is going to have to repeal or modify § 1500 for takings claims.
In the meantime, property owners, be sure to file first in the CFC, and only then file your district court action.
Here's the amici curiae brief we filed today on behalf of Owners' Counsel of America, NFIB Small Business Legal Center, Cato Institute, and Professor David Callies in support of a cert petition which we detailed here.
The case is a regulatory takings claim, and involves wet and dry sand beaches, public trust, and other favorite topics. The case arose because the N.C. Legislature by statute moved the "public trust" shoreline landward, and allowed the public to use what had formerly been private beach.
The North Carolina Court of Appeals permitted the Town of Emerald Isle (Town) to impress into public service the portion of the Nies family’s property above the mean high water mark as a road and park. North Carolina law has never subjected this dry sand to public ownership, through the public trust doctrine or otherwise. The court below, however, ignored this distinction, holding that the Town’s permitting the public to use to the Nies’ dry sand was not a taking because the Nies never owned the right to exclude the public from “public trust” areas of the beach. But under North Carolina law—and the law of the vast majority of other jurisdictions—the public trust is limited to land below the mean high water mark, and cannot be extended by the legislature or by a court, and at the same time avoid the constitutional obligation to pay just compensation. Simply put, the public trust doctrine isn’t a means to transform without compensation what has always been private property under North Carolina law, into a public resource.
This brief makes three points. First, the just compensation requirement is self-executing, and even if a state may alter its property law by statute, it cannot avoid its constitutional obligation to pay for the change. Second, since its inception, the scope of North Carolina’s public trust doctrine has been strictly limited to state-owned beaches seaward of the mean high water mark; until it was extended to include the dry sand beach up to the vegetation line, the North Carolina public trust was consistent with the law of a vast majority of other jurisdictions. Third, expansion of the “public trust” beyond its traditional scope cannot completely swallow up the Just Compensation Clause.
Br. at 4. Stay tuned.
Here's a cert petition recently filed, which asks the U.S. Supreme Court to review the opinion of the Maine Supreme Judicial Court under a judicial takings theory.
The petitioners argue that the Maine court took their private property when it departed from its prior decisions and a statute and concluded that a road to their home was a public beach access road, and not their private driveway.
1. Did the Maine Supreme Judicial Court effect a “judicial taking” in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution when it upheld the Superior Court’s reliance upon extrinsic evidence of the intent of petitioner’s deceased predecessor in title, John McLoon, to determine that the dedication and acceptance of “Coopers Beach Road” as a public way included the Petitioner’s driveway despite the fact that the dedication petition itself failed to specifically describe the driveway or the location of the driveway as required by the applicable state statute?
2. Did the Maine Supreme Judicial Court’s approval of the Superior Court’s reliance upon extrinsic evidence of Mr. McLoon’s intent in derogation of the express specificity requirements of the state statute arbitrarily deprive the Petitioners of their property in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth& Amendment?
More on the case here, from the Bangor Daily News, "Couple takes Owls Head waterfront access case to US Supreme Court." More on the Maine court's ruling here ("Maine top court upholds Owls Head access to waterfront road").
Follow along with the Supreme Court's docket here.
A noteworthy opinion from the Court of Federal Claims in Petro-Hunt LLC v. United States, No. 00-512L (Apr. 26, 2016), dismissing a claim for a judicial taking for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the claim would require the CFC, an article I court, to review the actions of the Fifth Circuit, an article III court. The CFC concluded that in this situation, the Federal Circuit holds there's no jurisdiction.
Indeed, deciding Petro-Hunt’s current claim on the merits would require this court to determine if Petro-Hunt had an established property right that was taken by the Fifth Circuit. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S. at 715 (plurality opinion). The only way to determine if Petro-Hunt had an established property right in the mineral servitudes is to decide whether the mineral servitudes had prescribed, as a matter of federal common law, to the United States prior to the Fifth Circuit’s 2007 decision. In other words, this court would have to determine if the Fifth Circuit was correct in its finding that Little Lake Misere and Central Pines established that lands sold to the United States before the enactment of Act 315, like the surface lands in question here, were subject to Louisiana’s ten-year prescription rule. See Petro-Hunt, L.L.C. v. United States, 365 F.3d at 392–93. If the Fifth Circuit was correct in this finding, then Petro-Hunt lost possession of its land long before the 2007 Fifth Circuit decision and it had no established property right that could have been taken by the court’s decision. If the Fifth Circuit was incorrect in its application of precedent, and actually created a new rule depriving Petro-Hunt of its previously established property, then the Fifth Circuit may have effected a compensable taking of Petro-Hunt’s mineral servitudes. This court lacks jurisdiction to determine whether or not the Fifth Circuit correctly interpreted its own precedent, and, therefore, lacks jurisdiction over plaintiff’s judicial takings claim. See Shinnecock Indian Nation v. United States, 782 F.3d at 1348, 1352–53; Allustiarte v. United States, 256 F.3d at 1352.
Earlier today, we asked the Federal Circuit for its permission to file this amici brief urging the court to rehear its recent panel decision in Romanoff Equities, Inc. v. United States, No. 15-5034 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 10, 2016).
This is a rails-to-trails takings case in which the panel concluded that the words in the original easement grant "for railroad purposes and for such other purposes as the Railroad Company ... may ... desire to make" mean that the easement was a "general" easement which allowed the grantee to not only make railroad use of the easement, but literally any use it desired. Thus, when the railroad abandoned the line and the City of New York turned it into the Highline public park, the reversionary property owners were not entitled to compensation.
Words have meaning. Especially words in a document conveying an interest in real property. These words must be viewed in light of the intent of the parties as expressed by the terms of the instrument, state law, and the “special need for certainty and predictability where land titles are concerned.” Certainty and predictability in property is not a rule that exists for its own sake, sui generis, but one which forms the foundation of every other civil right. The panel, however, violated these principles when instead of certifying the question to the New York courts, it discovered in the Romanoff conveyance something never before seen in New York law (or the law of any other jurisdiction): a “general easement,” which can be used “for any purpose for which the grantee wishes.” In doing so, it permitted the Romanoff family’s property which its predecessors conveyed for railroad purposes, to be impressed into public service as a recreational space without compensation.
It is highly doubtful that a New York court—were it given the opportunity to consider the question—would conclude than an interest labeled by the grantor as an “easement” (usually defined as use for a “special purpose”), is a “general easement” that contemplated use for any purpose, especially uses as admittedly unrelated to the easement’s main railroad purpose as tai chi, “gender bending performances from the club and theater stage,” garden tours, and “stargazing.” Here, we have a very specific easement which was for railroad purposes to eliminate at-grade crossings. But even if the easement was granted in general terms, the rule of construction is to construe the extent of its use only as is “necessary and convenient for the purpose for which it is created.” An easement to do anything the grantee wants for as long as it wants isn’t really an “easement,” it is a grant of fee simple by another name. The panel’s ruling has effectively converted the grant of an easement for railroad purposes into a fee simple estate, contrary to both the terms of the instrument and New York law.
Here's the full agenda for the 2016 Eminent Domain and Land Valuation Litigation / Condemnation 101 Conference, January 28-30, 2016, in Austin, Texas.
Professor Ilya Somin will speak about his recently-published book in a segment entitled "The Impact of Kelo and the Limits of Eminent Domain."
"Pipelines and Energy Corridors: Valuation Perspectives of Condemnors and Condemnees" with the lawyers on the front lines of one of the hottest topics in eminent domain law nationwide.
Retired Minnesota Supreme Court Justice Paul H. Anderson will give us his tips in "The Art of Effective Negotiation - A Judicial View." Justice Anderson has a unique view on eminent domain, since he not only litigated cases as a lawyer and resolved them as a jurist, he was also a property owner in a condemnation action.
"Advice to Condemnees From Condemnors" - two lawyers who represent agencies with the power of eminent domain will share their thoughts on the do's and don't from a condemnor perspective.
You often hear "war stories" about lawyers' successes. But often, you learn the most from your mistakes, and your recovery from those errors. In "Eminent Domain Trials: Lessons Learned the Hard Way," three experienced eminent domain lawyers will reveal their missteps, and how they became better lawyers as a result.
Dana Berliner and W. Andrew Gowder will present about one of the cutting-edge topics in the nation's courtrooms: "First Amendment for Fifth Amendment Lawyers: Free Speech, Signs, Defamation, FOIA, and RLUIPA Claims."
The concept of highest and best use means that eminent domain lawyers are often land use lawyers as well. In "Probability of Rezoning as an Element of Valuation," land use law experts Nikelle Meade, Dwight Merriam, and Charles W. (Chase) Ruffin will get you the information you need to know.
We especially focused on the ethics component this year, and are looking forward to the session on "Ethics: Tips and Traps for the Eminent Domain Practitioner" at the first plenary session on the second day.
The complete agenda is posted here, and we think it has more than a few sessions that will catch your interest.
Mark F. (Thor) Hearne, II, Arent Fox LLP, Washington, D.C.
Register here (includes hotel registration information as well as information on how to take advantage of early-bird and multiple attendee registrations).
The 2016 Conference is looking good, and we're looking forward to topping last year's San Francisco attendance.
Come, join your colleagues for three days of fantastic programming, networking, and fun in Austin. Hope to see you there.
A $1,105,000,000 (that's $1.1 billion and change) is the Nation's claim in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims for what the Hamptons are worth. Slip op. at 3. Sounds about right.
The Nation sued the State of New York in U.S. District Court, alleging that in the mid-19th Century, the State "enacted legislation allowing thousands of acres of the Nation's land to be wrongfully conveyed to the government of the Town of Southampton." Slip op. at 2.
USDC: case dismissed (laches, you know). Appeal to the Second Circuit remains pending.
Off to the CFC they went, seeking the abovementioned $1.1 billion, claiming the federal government violated its trust obligations when it failed to provide the Nation with a remedy for the misappropriation of its land (at New York's hands). The government sought dismissal, arguing the case was not ripe.
In addition to arguing the case was ripe, the Nation also asked to amend its complaint to add a new claim which asserted the District Court's dismissal of its claim on laches grounds was a "judicial taking." The CFC disagreed on both counts. Case dismissed.
Federal Circuit: the CFC case is not ripe because the Second Circuit appeal has not been resolved, and the Supreme Court avenue has not been exhausted. Pursuing these avenues are not futile (even though every time the Nation has asked the Second Circuit for similar relief, it has held that the laches doctrine is applicable to Indian land claims), because hey, the Second Circuit might grant en banc review to revisit the issue this time, or SCOTUS could grant cert. Slip op. at 7. Any bets on the likelihood of either of those happening?
Finally, no leave to amend to add the judicial takings claim, because it's a loosely-disguised collateral attack on the District Court's judgment. Slip op. at 14 ("Permitting parties aggrieved by the decisions of Article III tribunals to challenge the merits of those decisions in the Court of Federal Claims would circumvent the statutorily defined appellate process and severely undercut the orderly resolution of claims.").
The court didn't say this was a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, but implied so by holding that "[t]he Court of Federal Claims is without authority to adjudicate the Nation's claim that it suffered a compensable taking at the hands of the district court." Slip op. at 13 (emphasis added).
OK, we get the whole "collateral attack" thing (we've read Rooker and Feldman), but that begs the question of where a plaintiff could bring a judicial takings claim against the federal government asserting that a District Court did the taking, given that the CFC has exclusive jurisdiction over takings claims against the federal government which exceed $10,000. Nowhere, we guess.
For those of you who couldn't join us at the William & Mary Law School last month for the Brigham-Kanner Property Rights Conference (see our report here), the law school has made videos of the four panel presentations available here.
They're high quality videos, so be prepared for big downloads, but the presentations are worth it. While they are all good, our favorite was the impromptu discussion/debate during the third panel, "Balancing Private Property and Community Rights," featuring panelists Kames Burling (Pacific Legal Foundation), Professors Richard Epstein (NYU), Steven Eagle (Geo. Mason), Mark Poirer (Seton Hall), and James Stern (William & Mary).
Like love, takings claims can often be found in some very unusual places. And (like love) unfortunately, those claims are not always successful.
When we think of "takings," things like eminent domain condemning land, inverse condemnation (of land) by flood waters, and cases like that spring to mind first. Even when regulatory takings are involved, the conventional view at least starts with claims about land, and although the Supreme Court hasn't come out and said it, the argument has been made that the takings and exaction/unconstitutional conditions doctrines are reserved for claims involving land.
Here are three recent decisions where property rights and takings came up in situations you might not have expected.
The first is from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. In Sweeney v. Pence, No. 13-1264 (7th Cir. Sep. 2, 2014), the court held that Wisconsin's Right to Work Act, which prohibits unions from requiring membership (among other things), was not a taking.
we believe the union is justly compensated by federal law’s grant to the Union the right to bargain exclusively with the employer. The reason the Union must represent all employees is that the Union alone gets a seat at the negotiation table.
Slip op. at 21. Welcome to the Takings Bar, you labor lawyers.
One judge dissented, arguing that the Act is a taking because it transfers property from those who pay union dues to "free riders" (those who benefit from the union collective bargaining and other union services, but who under the Act will pay no fees). The property involved is not the dues money, but a "complusory provision of services." Dissent at 38. Interesting.
A hat tip to our colleagues Ron Kramer and Dwight Merriam for sending this our way.
on a demurrer to a cause of action for alleged financial elder abuse under the California Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act, for a “taking” of property to have occurred it is sufficient for the Complaint to allege that an elder had entered into an unconsummated agreement which, in effect, significantly impaired the value of the elder’s property although title to the property did not occur. The elder had been deprived of a property right by means of an agreement because although title to the real property did not change hands escrow instructions had been signed which significantly impaired the value of the property owned by the Trust.
Welcome to the Takings Bar, you estate planning lawyers.
"Don't smoke em if you got em"
Simply stated, there is no vested right at issue here. The only “right” Big John’s had to allow its customers to smoke was created by statute—the prior version of the Act, under which smoking in billiards parlors was regulated but not prohibited. That Act created nothing more than a mere expectation based upon continuance of the existing law and did not create a vested right. There was no regulatory taking here as a matter of law.
We now return you to regular programming.
We usually don't pay a whole lot of attention to unpublished opinions. Not that they are not interesting mind you, but if the court itself, for whatever reason doesn't believe the case is worthy of publication, then who are we to say otherwise? But occasionally, we read one that has something worth sharing. Like this case, for example.
In Dagres v. County of Hawaii Planning Dep't, No. CAAP-11- 0000071 (June 30, 2014), the Hawaii Intermediate Court of Appeals gave us one of those blogworthy tidbits, a short (one page) discussion of the appellant's judicial takings claim. We don't see many of those, so we had to follow up.
The case involved three buildings near the shoreline on the Big Island. The owner wanted to fix them up, and the Planning Department concluded that two of the buildings were exempt from the requirement to obtain a Special Management Area use permit, while the third needed only a SMA Minor permit. The neighbors didn't agree and appealed to the County Board of Appeals, which upheld the Department's conclusions. Up the chain they went under the Administrative Procedures Act, and the circuit court reversed, concluding that at least one of the buildings wasn't even permitted or legal, much less than it deserved to be exempt from the shoreline regulations. Next stop, ICA.
Even if we were to assume that HCF posits a viable judicial taking theory, the circuit court's decision was not a retroactive alteration of state law. In Waikiki Marketplace, this court merely held that a property owner "should not have been required to produce a building permit in order to establish that [an] addition was a 'nonconforming use'" under the applicable land use ordinance because terms such as "lawful use" and "previously lawful" as used in the land use ordinances only refer to compliance with previous zoning laws. The instant matter did not involve whether HCF could demonstrate status as a "nonconforming structure" or "nonconforming use" under the Zoning Code.
Slip op. at 30 (cttation omitted). Not much of a discussion of judicial takings, but we'll take what we can get.
No, not that Madison County, but rather Madison County, Montana.
The Court also explained that Kennedy’s takings argument is precluded by well-settled law in Montana. Montana’s well-settled law provides that the State owns all waters in trust for the people; that a riparian owner may not exclude the public from areas that are minimally necessary for the public to use its water resource; and that a riparian owner takes his property interest subject to a dominant estate in favor of the public.
In other words, the property owner owned no property that was taken. He did not have the right to exclude the public from wading into the river or floating on it, so requiring him to do so was not a taking.
It's a detailed and lengthy series of opinions (70 pages including the concurring and dissenting opinions), but well worth reading if these issues are your cup of tea.
Next week, we'll be in New Orleans for the 2014 edition of the ALI-CLE Eminent Domain program, now in its 31st year.
As usual, my Owners' Counsel colleagues Leslie Fields and Joe Waldo (the programming co-chairs) have put together a fantastic 2.5 day of programming, taught by expert faculty. At 11:00 a.m. on the first day of the program, I will be joining Professor James Ely to speak about "The Full and Perfect Equivalent for Just Compensation: The Historical Context and Practice."
Should be fun. If you are not joining us in-person, ALI-CLE is producing it as a live webcast, and will make the coursebook and video and audio available for later listening or viewing.
More details here, or download the brochure here, or below.
Here's the second of two amicus briefs filed in support of the petitioner in the judicial takings case we mentioned last week. This brief, filed by beverage distributors, who although they are respondents, urged the Supreme Court to take the case.
The brief argues that "Connecticut reached backwards in time to target and sweep a few private bank accounts into the general Treasury just because 'the legislature wanted as much money as possible' to redress a general budget deficit." Brief at 1. "the Connecticut Supreme Court held that this retroactive seizure was not a taking because the distributors' funds ceased being their property even before the funds were confiscated, at the moment the funds were deposited into special segregated acccounts. That court's re-writing of Connecticut property law 'contravene[d] the established property rights of' the beverage distributors and thereby effected a taking." Id. at 1-2 (emphasis original).
We'll post the BIO when available. Follow along on the Court's docket report here.
Here's the first of two amicus briefs filed in support of the petitioner in the judicial takings case we mentioned last week.
Amici’s interest in this case arises out of their commitment to the protection of private property rights and economic freedom. The case involves Connecticut’s assertion of the power to take private property (i.e., targeted funds of money) for public use without compensation, in violation of the U.S. Constitution.
In the midst of a fiscal crisis, the state legislature passed a bill that imposed on Petitioners a financial exaction so that the state could pay for public benefits that should properly be borne by the public as a whole. Although Petitioners successfully challenged the law in the trial court, the state Supreme Court ruled that Petitioners had no right to the money at all. The ruling was contrary to decades of settled expectations concerning their rights to such funds, rights acknowledged even by the state agency charged with implementing the Bottle Bill.
One more amicus brief to follow.

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