Source: https://www.bruerlaw.com/read/archives/03-2017
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 06:10:22+00:00

Document:
The amount of time granted the parties for closing argument is within the discretion of the trial court. Bussell v. Leat, 781 S.W.2d 97, 103 (Mo. App. 1989); Floyd v. General Motors Corp., 25 Kan. App. 71, 77, 960 P.2d 763, 767-78 (1998).
Appellate courts will not disturb a trial court's decision permitting counsel a specified time limit within which to argue absent a clear abuse of the trial court's discretion. Bussell, 781 S.W.2d at 103. In determining a reasonable time for closing arguments, the trial court considers the length of the trial, the number of witnesses, the number and complexity of the issues involved, and the competence and experience of the trial attorneys. Bussell, 781 S.W.2d at 103. (Thirty minutes per side for a four-day trial).
See also Guess v. Escobar, 26 S.W.3d 235, 241 (Mo. App. 2000) (trial court erred in its allocation of time by granting each defendant separately the same amount of time as plaintiff, but no plain error occurred).
T]he rule has always been that a timely and sufficient objection must be made to closing argument so that the trial court can take corrective measures to remove the prejudice. Henderson v. Fields, 68 S.W.3d 455, 470 (Mo. App. 2001). A party who merely announces “I object,” and otherwise fails to inform the court as to the basis of an objection, preserves nothing for appellate review. Henderson, 68 S.W.3d at 470. Improper statements in oral argument may be cured, in given circumstances, by: withdrawal, reprimand or admonition, or by an instruction to the jury. Henderson, 68 S.W.3d at 470.
Where an objection to an aspect of closing argument is sustained, there is some authority for the proposition that the aggrieved party must make some showing of what it was unable to argue or its significance. See, e.g., Wetherill v. Hunt, 834 S.W.2d 199, 202 (Mo. App. 1991) (time limits). Floyd, 25 Kan. App. at 77, 960 P.2d at 768 (time limits). Presumably, this should be done at the trial court level as well as the appellate level.
A plaintiff’s final closing argument is called rebuttal. Warren Davis Properties V, L.L.C. v. United Fire & Casualty Co., 111 S.W.3d 515, 528 (Mo. App. 2003). It is typically limited to rebuttal argument. Warren, 111 S.W.3d at 528. Plaintiff’s counsel may cover any subject matter discussed in the defendant’s closing argument, but also may cover any topic discussed in plaintiff’s initial closing argument. Warren, 111 S.W.3d at 528. By confining plaintiff’s rebuttal portion of closing argument in this manner, the defendant is assured of the opportunity to answer or address the matters raised by plaintiff during closing. Warren, 111 S.W.3d at 528.
A rule in closing argument which is not subject to the discretion of the trial court states that plaintiff’s counsel may not ask for specific amounts of damages for the first time in the rebuttal portion of closing argument when defendant has made no argument as to that amount. Warren, 111 S.W.3d at 528.
In closing argument, counsel is afforded wide latitude to suggest inferences from the evidence, and the circuit court similarly has broad discretion to determine if a particular line of argument is proper. Boshears v. Saint-Gobain Calmar, Inc., No. 67443, 2008 WL 3286950 (Mo. App. Aug. 12, 2008); Skelly Oil Co. v. Urban Renewal Agency, 211 Kan. 804, 809, 508 P.2d 954, 959 (1973).
On appeal, the appellate court reviews the circuit court’s ruling for abuse of discretion. Boshears v. Saint-Gobain Calmar, Inc., No. 67443, 2008 WL 3286950 (Mo. App. Aug. 12, 2008).
A trial court abuses its discretion when its ruling is clearly against the logic of the circumstances then before it and is so unreasonable and arbitrary that the ruling shocks the sense of justice and indicates a lack of careful deliberate consideration. Powderly v. South County Anesthesia Associates, Ltd., 245 S.W.3d 267, 272 (Mo. App. 2008).
When reviewing closing argument, the appellate court must consider the argument in light of the entire record and should only reverse if the challenged comments are clearly unwarranted and injurious to the other party. See Powderly, 245 S.W.3d at 272.
Where argument is not objected to at trial, plain error review may be available in a civil case to prevent manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice resulting from an unaddressed improper argument. Arrington v. Goodrich Quality Theaters, Inc., No. 28835, 2008 WL 4615860 at * 3 (Oct. 20, 2008). See also Skelly Oil, 211 Kan. at 804, 508 P.2d at 958 (the trial court should, of course, of its own motion without waiting for objection from opposing counsel protect litigants from misconduct of counsel, particularly where the misconduct is so prejudicial that it must influence the jury).
A trial court commits no error by permitting counsel to review admissible evidence in argument before the jury after the evidence is in the record. Powderly, 245 S.W.3d at 272 (replaying a videotape admitted into evidence).
Reading a statute to the jury is improper and, if in reading the statute, counsel misstates the law or misleads the jury, it is reversible error. Lasky v. Union Elec. Co., 936 S.W.3d 797, 802 (Mo. App. 1997).
While as a general rule, counsel is prohibited from instructing the jury on the law, the rule not only does not prohibit counsel from discussing the law as set forth in the court's instructions, but encourages it, as long as the discussion states the law fairly and accurately. Rice v. Bol, 116 S.W.3d 599, 612 (Mo. App. 2003).
See also Tamplin v. Star Lumber & Supply Co., 251 Kan. 300, 311, 836 P.2d 1102, 1110 (1992) (with respect to cap on damages, inappropriate to argue in closing argument that the jury should award $250,000 “for reasons I can’t explain” and “for reasons I’m not permitted to tell you,” but it is proper for an attorney to tell the jury that the plaintiff is only asking for $250,000 for noneconomic loss or that plaintiff's claim for such loss is limited to $250,000).
The use in argument by counsel of graphic aids such as charts or diagrams or plats which have not been put into evidence is permissible, provided they are used merely to illustrate a point in counsel’s argument based on the evidence, and provided they are not used in such a manner as to tend to confuse or mislead the jury into considering them as evidence. Friend v. Yokohama Tire Corp., 904 S.W.2d 575, 579 (Mo. App. 1995).
The trial court is accorded broad discretion in ruling on the propriety of closing arguments and will suffer reversal only for an abuse of discretion. Simpson v. Johnson’s Amoco Food Shop, Inc., 36 S.W.3d 775, 777 (Mo. App. 2001). However, when counsel for one side undertakes to comment on the failure of his opponent to call a witness, review has been stricter. Simpson, 36 S.W.3d at 777. The failure of a party to call a witness who has knowledge of facts and circumstances “vital to the case” generally raises the presumption that the testimony will be unfavorable to the party failing to offer the testimony. Simpson, 36 S.W.3d at 777-78. Where such a witness is not equally available to both parties, it is prejudicial error for the trial court to prevent the party to whom the witness is not equally available from requesting the jury to draw an adverse inference from the failure of the opposing party to produce the witness. Simpson, 36 S.W.3d 778.
“Equal availability” depends on several factors including: (1) one party's superior knowledge of the existence of the witness; (2) the nature of the testimony that the witness would be expected to give in light of his previous statements or declarations, if any, about the facts of the case; and (3) the relationship of the witness to the party. Simpson, 36 S.W.3d 778.
Where a party asserts that an adverse inference could be drawn from the circumstance that the opposing party’s wife was not called to testify, the opposing party’s counsel’s intimation that the wife might be upset if required to testify about her husband’s agonizing injuries was an appropriate response. See Ballinger v. Gascosage Elec. Co-op., 788 S.W.2d 506, 513 (Mo. 1990).
See also Skelly Oil, 211 Kan. at 807, 508 P.2d at 957 (the failure of either party to a civil action to examine a witness equally available to both offers no foundation for prejudicial inference and is not a proper basis for argument).
but compare Hacker v. Quinn Concrete, Inc., 857 S.W.2d 402, 411-13 (Mo. App. 1993); Graeff v. Baptist Temple of Springfield, 576 S.W.2d 291, 301-04 (Mo. 1978).
See also Huxoll v. Nickell, 205 Kan. 718, 726-27, 473 P.2d 90, 96-97 (1970) (per diem argument not permissible but permissible to tell the jury what counsel considers a fair compensation for the injuries received); Timmerman v. Schroeder, 203 Kan. 397, 402-03, 454 P.2d 522, 526-27 (1969) (not inappropriate to display a chart showing the number of months (492) and weeks (2,312) of pain and suffering).
Counsel’s reference to dismissed or abandoned pleadings is improper because the pleadings are irrelevant and are used for the purpose of prejudicing the jury. Liberty Hills Dev. Inc. v. Stocksdale, 742 S.W.2d 209, 213-14 (Mo. App. 1987).
It is generally held improper for counsel to make an argument appealing to self-interests of the jurors. Williams v. North River Ins. Co., 579 S.W.2d 410, 413 (Mo. App. 1979).
See also Dent v. Jefferson County Com’rs, 118 Kan. 519, 235 P. 873, 874 (1925) (improper to suggest that if the jury allowed damages, the taxpayers of the county would have to pay out of their pockets).
Missouri courts have long shown displeasure with “send a message” arguments in which punitive damages are not sought. Beis v. Dias, 859 S.W.2d 835, 840 (Mo. App. 1993). When the message argument becomes the theme of the entire closing, it constitutes reversible error. Beis, 859 S.W.2d at 840.
Yet, from long experience, appellate courts recognize that trial courts are better positioned to assess the amount of prejudice injected by admittedly improper arguments. Beis, 859 S.W.2d at 840. Having only the cold record on appeal, appellate courts of this state uniformly uphold trial court's determinations of the prejudice injected by “send a message” arguments. Beis, 859 S.W.2d at 840.
It is improper to suggest, by one means or another, that the real defendant is an insurance carrier. Collins v. Nelson, 410 S.W.2d 570, 577 (Mo. App. 1965). It is just as improper to appeal to the jury’s sympathy because of the litigant’s poverty or lack of insurance coverage. Either kind of argument may result in prejudicial error. Collins, 410 S.W.2d at 577.
See also McKissick v. Frye, 255 Kan. 566, 577, 876 P.2d 1371, 1381 (1994) (a deliberate attempt by counsel to appeal to social or economic prejudices of the jury, including the wealth or poverty of the litigants, is misconduct where the asserted wealth or poverty is not relevant to the issues of the case).
Trials before juries ought to be conducted with dignity and in such manner as to bring about a verdict based solely on the law and the facts. Hence reckless assertions unwarranted by the proof and intended to arouse hatred or prejudice against a litigant or the witnesses are condemned as tending to cause a miscarriage of justice. . . . Due administration of justice demands that the jury in passing on such grave questions should not be allowed to have injected in a case, either by evidence, remarks of counsel, or even by the conduct of the judge, any extrinsic matter that tends to create bias or prejudice. The evil effect of such matters is not always cured by the ruling of the court withdrawing them from consideration or even by rebuking counsel. The red hot iron of prejudice has been thrust into the case; merely withdrawing it still leaves a festering wound. When there is no evidence to justify it is always improper for counsel to indulge in argument to the jury which tends towards the prejudice of one party or to the undue sympathy for the other.
Yingling v. Hartwig, 925 S.W.2d 952, 958 (Mo. App. 1996).
See also Henderson v. Hassur, 225 Kan. 678, 693, 594 P.2d 650, 663 (1979) (there can be little doubt as to the impropriety of an attorney referring to the opposing party as a criminal).

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