Source: https://www.norcalappeals.com/articles/ethics-for-appellate-dependency-counsel
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 03:58:13+00:00

Document:
**This article was prepared and part of the materials for the March 2016 California Appellate Defense Counsel Conference. It explores some of the ethical challenges confronting appellate counsel representing parents and children in dependency matters.
First, does appellate dependency counsel have an ethical obligation to file a writ petition for ineffective assistance of trial counsel or is it sufficient to argue ineffective assistance as part of the appeal? (See In re N.F. (Cal. Ct. App., June 29, 2010, D055922) 2010 WL 2594747 and Kemper v. County of San Diego (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 1075, as modified on denial of reh'g (Dec. 28, 2015), review filed (Jan. 14, 2016).
After discussing these hypotheticals, this article will review a few other special situations that apply to appellate dependency counsel.
Hypothetical #1: When does appellate counsel have an ethical duty to file a writ petition for ineffective assistance of counsel?
See, In re N.F. (Cal. Ct. App., June 29, 2010, D055922) 2010 WL 2594747 and Kemper v. County of San Diego (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 1075, as modified on denial of reh'g (Dec. 28, 2015), review filed (Jan. 14, 2016).
Mother was a 16-year-old minor living in Compton with her boyfriend at the time her infant daughter was removed from her care in San Diego while visiting the maternal grandmother. The petition was filed in San Diego. Mother was not present at the detention, jurisdiction, or dispositional hearings. Shortly thereafter, Mother contacted the social worker and a hearing was set one month later to appoint an attorney. Because the case was filed prior to January 1, 2009, the court was required to appoint a guardian ad litem for the mother at the initial hearing. (Former CCP §§ 372, subd. (a), 373; In re D.D. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 646, 653; In re A.C. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 146, 155.) However, at the hearing, Mother’s appointed counsel (Attorney #1) told the court that Mother didn’t need a GAL and no appointment was made.
During the reunification period, Mother was a considered a runaway, living in LA with her boyfriend and his parents, and refused to live with her parents in San Diego, who had drug problems. Mother minimally participated in services, visited her child only seven times out of 26 visits, and was pregnant again. The court terminated reunification services at the six month review hearing in February 2009 (Attorney #2). Mother filed a notice of intent to file a writ petition, but appointed counsel (Attorney #2) and his supervisor (Supervisor #3) declined to file it.
Meanwhile, Mother was arrested for burglary, made a dependent of the LA juvenile court, placed in foster care, and gave birth in April 2009. Mother’s case was transferred to another attorney in the same office (Attorney #4). After reviewing the file, Attorney #4 requested that Supervisor #3 transfer the case to an independent attorney, believing there had been substantial problems with the legal representation in the case. Supervisor #3 declined the transfer and told Attorney #4 to file a petition for modification instead.
In May 2009, Mother was doing well in foster care and filed a petition for modification requesting her child be returned to her. In August 2009, mother filed a second petition for modification seeking to dismiss the dependency and have the child returned because the court erred by failing to appoint a GAL at the detention hearing. After granting a hearing, the juvenile court found a GAL should have been appointed for Mother and the error was not harmless. However, it denied the petition because the requested modification was not in the child’s best interests. The juvenile court also found Mother had shown changed circumstances but had not shown it was in the child’s best interests to be placed with her. Then it terminated parental rights.
On appeal, in addition to arguing the failure to appoint a GAL resulted in a miscarriage of justice, mother argued trial counsel was ineffective. Mother claimed trial counsel (1) failed to challenge the jurisdictional findings under section 300, subdivision (g); (2) waived appointment of a guardian ad litem on her behalf; and (3) failed to raise these issues in a writ petition. Mother did not file a writ petition.
Did appellate counsel have an ethical duty to file a writ petition for ineffective assistance of counsel?
What are your ethical duties if the case was filed in the Third or Fifth District Court or Appeal and a petition to expand your appointment is denied?
On appeal, Mother’s IAC argument was rejected because the record did not affirmatively establish that counsel had no rational tactical purpose for the challenged act or omission. (In re N.F. (Cal. Ct. App., June 29, 2010, D055922) 2010 WL 2594747.) It also found there was no showing that the outcome, termination of parental rights, would have been different had counsel been effective.
While the case was pending on appeal, Mother filed a malpractice action against Attorneys #1 and #2, as well as Supervisor #3.
In the malpractice action, defendant’s motion for summary judgment was granted based on the collateral estoppel rules, holding that Kemper was precluded from relitigating the determination made by the N.F. court that Kemper's “parental rights were terminated as a result of her own actions, and not as a result of her attorneys' conduct.” The trial court also rejected Kemper's arguments that collateral estoppel does not apply because Kemper did not previously bring an ineffective assistance claim through a habeas corpus petition, and/or that Kemper's “new legal theories” preclude the collateral estoppel bar.
The court then explained that there was no exception to the collateral estoppel doctrine based on an analogy to the habeas corpus procedure in juvenile dependency cases because a habeas petition seeks to protect a parent’s fundamental liberty interest, which does not apply in a civil malpractice action. The habeas petition is brought as part of the dependency action, thus there is no collateral estoppel bar.
Hypothetical #2: What are your ethical obligations when your client, the child, tells you that his wishes are different than trial counsel’s recommendations and arguments in the trial court? Do your ethical obligations change based on the age of the child?
You are appointed to represent a 16 year-old minor on appeal from a dispositional hearing where the minor is removed from her mother and placed in foster care with reunification services. The minor tells you that she wants to return home. After conferring with the minor and reviewing the record, you make an independent determination that the court erred when it removed the minor from her mother and it is in the minor’s best interests to return home. However, the minor’s trial counsel, who is also her CAPTA guardian ad litem, argued in the trial court that it was in the minor’s best interests to remain in foster care. When you contact minor’s counsel, he continues to hold the same position.
Counsel appointed for the minor in the trial court is typically also appointed as "guardian ad litem" for the minor(s). (Welf. & Inst. Code § 326.5 and Rule 5.662. Rule 5.662(d) states: "(d) General duties and responsibilities-The general duties and responsibilities of a CAPTA guardian ad litem are: (l)To obtain firsthand a clear understanding of the situation and needs of the child; and (2) To make recommendations to the court concerning the best interest of the child as appropriate under (e) and (f)." The appellate courts have taken the position that the CAPTA GAL also manages the appellate litigation.
In Felicity S., the child’s appellate counsel determined that it was in the child’s best interests to return home to her mother and briefed the issue on that basis. (In re Felicity S. (Cal. Ct. App., Nov. 26, 2013, A137439) 2013 WL 6199269, at *10, as modified on denial of reh'g (Nov. 26, 2013), ordered not to be officially published (Nov. 26, 2013).) The appellate court was not pleased and attempted to sanction appellate counsel. In re Felicity S. (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1389, 1391, as modified (May 23, 2014), ordered not to be officially published (Aug. 20, 2014).) Although appellate counsel was ultimately not sanctioned, the proceedings raised serious issues about the independence of appellate counsel and the ability to represent minors on appeal without fear of sanctions when appellate counsel determines, based on the record and communication with her client, that it is in her client’s best interests to take a position on appeal that is different than the position of trial counsel.
Hypothetical #3: What are your ethical duties to your client and the court when you have no contact with your client?
As soon as you receive the record, you send your introductory letter to your client, the mother, at her last known address. The letter is returned unclaimed. You contact mother’s trial counsel and learn that trial counsel filed the notice of appeal and mother was not present at the section 366.26 hearing where her parental rights were terminated. However, in reviewing the record, you believe you have some meritorious issues. Do you file an opening brief despite no contact with mother? Do you keep sending service letters to your client knowing that they will be returned or can you serve your client’s trial counsel instead? Do you request oral argument?
Finally, we are troubled by this appeal. At oral argument, counsel for mother acknowledged that she has had no contact with mother, her client. (fn. 3) Neither counsel nor the agency has been able to locate mother. Mother's attorney stated that she had some contact with mother's trial counsel, who filed and signed the notice of appeal on behalf of mother, but appellate counsel had no contact with her client. We recognize that an appeal from the order terminating parental rights does not require the notice of appeal to be authorized by the parent, as is required in a writ petition to review an order to set a section 366.26 hearing. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.450(e)(3).) However, it is troubling that counsel has chosen to pursue an appeal that is borderline frivolous on behalf of a nominal client.We appreciate that appellate counsel for parents in dependency cases frequently find themselves in the position of representing a client whose whereabouts are unknown. In such situations, counsel clearly have an obligation to pursue vigorously issues that affect the rights of the parents. However, [198 Cal.App.4th 1547] dependency proceedings involve children who have been abused or neglected and a delay will generally be detrimental to the child. Thus, counsel have a heightened responsibility not to pursue issues of questionable merit, especially at the stage where the lower court has terminated parental rights and the child's interests are of paramount importance. Here, despite receiving no direction from her client and despite being aware of her client's apparent abandonment of any relationship with her child, counsel pursued a marginal appeal. For counsel, who has no reason to believe her client has any interest in this appeal, to take it upon herself to try to reverse the finding of adoptability, which was supported by the opinion of five experts, and thereby prevent P.C.'s chance of having an adoptive parent, raises, in our view, a significant ethical issue. This ethical issue, however, is one that may be unique to the dependency process and not directly addressed by the canons of professional conduct.
fn. 3 We note that counsel's request for oral argument is unusual. Unless the appeal in a dependency case raises a unique or compelling issue, counsel for parents normally forego requesting oral argument. In appeals from orders terminating parental rights, counsel are normally sensitive to the importance of having the case resolved as quickly as possible and recognize that requesting oral argument generally delays the issuance of an appellate court's decision.
Juvenile case files are confidential and may only be inspected by certain persons. (Welf. & Inst. Code § 827.) In addition, some records may be sealed under Rule 8.46. Therefore, appellate counsel must ensure the records remain confidential throughout the proceeding and when returning the record to the client. If a record contains material that is sealed or should be sealed, appellate counsel should ensure that the client is not provided access to the sealed materials. Also, Identity of mandatory reporters (Pen. Code, § 11167) and names and addresses of foster parents may be confidential. (See e.g. Welf. & Inst. Code, § 308(a), Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.715, 5.720, 5.725.) If the information, such as a foster parent’s address, can be easily redacted, appellate counsel may redact the record. Otherwise, appellate counsel may file a motion in the appellate court requesting counsel be provided with a new record that is properly redacted.
There are special considerations when retaining a juvenile dependency case file because previous dependency cases may impact current and future dependencies (See e.g. Welf. & Inst. Code, § 361.5, subds. (b)(10), (b)(11).) If you cannot return the file to your client, then consider maintaining a copy of the file in some form for the life of the client.
If you have not read this case, read it now to see how not to write an appeal.
Every ethics problem boils down to “How can I best protect and represent my client while simultaneously promoting respect and confidence in the legal profession?” It sounds easy, but as the above situations illustrate, there are not always easy answers and reasonable minds can disagree in some situations. But you’ll be prepared as long as you discuss your situation with your colleagues, periodically review the California Rules of Professional Conduct, and keep going to ethics presentations.

References: v. 
 v. 
 § 326
 § 827
 § 11167
 § 308
 § 361