Source: https://www.morelaw.com/verdicts/case.asp?n=17-2206%20&s=MA&d=125518
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 10:59:54+00:00

Document:
"speaking out and participating in a government investigation."
v. Fortuño–Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2011) (citing Fed. R.
1 Although Gilbert named Defendants Jane and John Doe in the caption of his amended complaint, they were not mentioned in its body.
2 The district court underscored that Gilbert's "complaint wavers back and forth chronologically and sometimes offers disconnected narratives, with links between the factual allegations and [Gilbert]'s supposed injuries often difficult to discern." Gilbert v. City of Chicopee, No. 3:16-cv-30024-MAP, 2017 WL 8730474, at *1 (D. Mass. Nov. 14, 2017). Indeed, "[i]mportant details confusingly appear for the first time only after the Statement of Facts." Id. at *4 (emphasis in original). For example, the district court pointed to "a reference to an email sent by Defendant Jebb regarding one 'Lieutenant Watson' on September 12, 2014" that "appears out of the blue in the text of Count 3" and noted that "critical factual details, such as the timing and nature of the supposed 'pretextual discipline' are simply absent from the complaint." Id.
[*] We pause to note this strange behavior Gilbert speaks of took place in the Police Department's booking and cellblock areas and involved Pronovost's efforts to communicate with the dead using crystal rocks tied to strings, and hardware store lights which he called "ghost traps."
2[Gilbert] alleges that Jebb was in the room with [him] and Pronovost during this incident. However,  Jebb disputes [Gilbert]'s version, stating that the event in question "never happened."
In 2012, [Gilbert] was promoted to the rank of Captain, and Charette was appointed Acting Police Chief. Defendant Jebb, also a candidate for Acting Police Chief, allegedly resented Charette and other police officers, including [Gilbert], who he believed had supported Charette's appointment.
That same year, certain Chicopee Police Officers responding to a murder scene took pictures of the victim's body and shared them with one another and with civilians outside the police department in violation of department regulations. At the time, Defendant Jebb was the Internal Affairs Investigative Officer tasked with investigating this incident. Jebb concluded that only one officer was responsible for the improper conduct, and he failed to recommend, in [Gilbert]'s view, a sufficiently stringent sanction. At some point in the 2012-2013 time frame, the investigation into the murder scene misconduct by Chicopee Police Officers resumed. This time the inquiry included an incident where photographs of the murder victim's corpse were allegedly displayed to civilians outside the police department at a football game.
investigated the officers who had distributed the gruesome photographs from the murder scene.
3"[Gilbert]'s complaint implies that these charges formed part of the investigation(s) then pending against Jebb and not merely allegations on [Gilbert]'s part offered in this litigation. (Dkt. No. 72 at 34). Although the complaint is ambiguous on this point, Jebb and Kos's Memoranda in support of their Motions to Dismiss clarify the context to some extent. Jebb's Memorandum notes that [Gilbert] made "written statements and testimony . . . to a government investigator relating to Jebb's alleged mishandling of ballots." (Dkt. No. 28 at 1). Kos's Memorandum observes that [Gilbert], "as a police captain and internal affairs investigator had investigated Chief Jebb's removal of evidence from the booking room."
[Gilbert] had been the investigating officer for the Major investigation, and he had recommended no discipline be taken against Sgt. Major . . . . [Gilbert] characterizes his participation in the ongoing investigations to include "provid[ing] information and participat[ing] in activity which focused on Police Chief William Jebb's conduct and practices of implementing less than proper discipline towards his friends and retaliating against those he was not friends with; and those who did not vote for him to be the Union President." (Dkt. No. 67-2 at 1).
In July 2013, then-Acting Police Chief Charette asked [Gilbert] to draft and file a written incident report about the episode six years earlier when  Pronovost had threatened [Gilbert] with his gun.
[Gilbert] did so. The report was technically late, in violation of Department policy, but Charette did not discipline [Gilbert], as [Gilbert] had verbally reported the incident to Charette and another of his immediate supervisors at the time it occurred.
According to [Gilbert],  Jebb was unhappy with [Gilbert]'s participation in the ongoing investigation of the gun incident and possibly other incidents. On October 15, 2013, [Gilbert] received a phone call from  Jebb in which the latter told him, "You have no idea about internal affairs, but you are going to learn. I am definitely without a doubt going to win my appeal [regarding his having been passed over for Acting Chief] and when I do, your [sic] fucked." (Dkt. No. 67-3 at 1).
In 2014,  Mayor Kos appointed  Jebb as Police Chief. [Gilbert] alleges that thereafter Jebb "began changing [Gilbert's] terms and conditions of employment and engaged in a concerted effort to have criminal charges initiated against [him]." (Dkt. No. 72 at 9). [Gilbert] claims  Jebb ordered him off all of his overtime details, citing as a reason [Gilbert]'s filing of a false police report in regard to the 2007 gun incident. [He] claims that  Jebb repeatedly "initiat[ed] pretextual discipline" against him, but he does not provide details or state when this occurred. In any event, the [amended] complaint specifies no disciplinary sanctions resulting from these proceedings.
Around this time, according to the complaint,  Jebb met with  Kos and Pronovost as part of a conspiracy to bring retaliatory criminal charges against [Gilbert] and Charette. Charges were eventually brought against [Gilbert] in Holyoke District Court, perhaps for filing a False Police Report. It is difficult to tell from the amended complaint, which does not provide a date these charges were brought, what exactly those charges were, or how the criminal case resolved. Count 4 in the amended complaint states that [Gilbert] was charged with Filing a False Police, which presumably is the criminal case [Gilbert] is referring to. Additionally, Gilbert states that the "process terminated in [his] favor," (Dkt. No. 72 at 17), though it is not clear if that means he was acquitted of the charge after a trial or the charge was dropped.
Gilbert, 2017 WL 8730474 at *1-3.
 Count 1: a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Mass. Gen.
3 In Count 1 of his complaint, Gilbert conclusorily states, "The Defendants acting under the color of state law violated the Plaintiff's due process rights . . . ." He does not allege anything further and his brief is completely silent as to this claim. We thus deem any due process arguments waived.
4 In so holding, the district court dismissed all claims against John Doe and Jane Doe with prejudice since those defendants were not named anywhere in the body of the amended complaint.
to offer concrete allegations demonstrating its existence." Id.
relief. Decotiis v. Whittemore, 635 F.3d 22, 29 (1st Cir. 2011).
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
context-specific analysis of the complaint. See Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 679; Maldonado v. Fontanes, 568 F.3d 263, 268 (1st Cir. 2009).
U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
F.3d 213, 216 (1st Cir. 2013).
5 Gilbert is not appealing the dismissal of Count 5.
6 Pronovost argues that we have no jurisdiction to review the district court's November 14, 2017 order granting the defendants' motions to dismiss because Gilbert's notice of appeal is defective, in violation of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(c)(1)(B). True, Gilbert's notice of appeal stated that he appealed from Docket #86, which is the district court judge's Memorandum and Order, instead of Docket #87, which is the Order of Dismissal. We reject Pronovost's contention. That Gilbert mixed up the dismissal order's docket number is of no matter in this instance because "[a] mistake in designating a judgment . . . in the notice of appeal ordinarily will not result in loss of the appeal as long as the intent to appeal a specific judgment can be fairly inferred from the notice and the appellee is not misled by the mistake." In re Spookyworld, Inc., 346 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2003) (quoting Kelly v. United States, 780 F.2d 94, 96 n.3 (1st Cir. 1986)). Here, Gilbert's intent is unambiguous. From the face of the notice of appeal, Gilbert specified that he sought to appeal "from the District Court's Order entered November 14, 2017 . . . allowing Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and dismissing Plaintiff's Complaint." Thus, we conclude that we have jurisdiction to review the district court's dismissal order.
retaliation for voicing his protected speech.
individual to retaliatory actions . . . for speaking out."
547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006).
whether the employee was commissioned or paid to make the speech in question; the subject matter of the speech; whether the speech was made up the chain of command; whether the employee spoke at her place of employment; whether the speech gave objective observers the impression that the employee represented the employer when she spoke (lending it "official significance"); whether the employee's speech derived from special knowledge obtained during the course of her employment; and whether there is a so-called citizen analogue to the speech.
7 Had we concluded that Gilbert made the speech in his private capacity, then we would have proceeded to the second requirement and balanced Gilbert's interest in speaking as a private citizen regarding matters of public concern with the interest of the government, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs. See Decotiis, 635 F.3d at 29 (citing Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968)). Then under the third requirement, Gilbert would have to have shown that the speech was a substantial or motivating factor in the adverse employment decision. See Curran, 509 F.3d at 45. If all three parts of the inquiry had been resolved in Gilbert's favor, the defendants could still escape liability if they had shown the same decision would have been reached even absent the protected conduct. Rodriguez-Garcia, 610 F.3d at 765-66 (citing Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977)).
of public concern and thus enjoys First Amendment protections.
concern for the citizens of Chicopee.
duties rather than as a citizen.8 We agree.
that Gilbert's statements were made in his capacity as a citizen.
refusing to follow a command if he refused" to write the report.
pursuant to his official duties. And his brief is replete with why his words should be deemed of public concern. Yet Gilbert never bothers either in his initial brief or reply brief to provide us with any reasoned explanation for why we should deem his speech that of a private citizen under the Decotiis test. Therefore, his argument is likely waived. Fernandez-Salicrup v. Figueroa-Sancha, 790 F.3d 312, 327 (1st Cir. 2015) (citing U.S. v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990)); McCoy v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 950 F.2d 13, 22 (1st Cir. 1991). Regardless, it lacks merit.
Cir. 2014); Hagen v. City of Eugene, 736 F.3d 1251, 1258 (9th Cir.
2013); Davis v. McKinney, 518 F.3d 304, 315-16 (5th Cir. 2008).
related speech made pursuant to official duties. See O'Connell v.
100 F.3d 1033, 1039 (1st Cir. 1996) (citing City of Los Angeles v.
122 F.3d 53, 57 (1st Cir. 1997).
allege that he testified under oath pursuant to a subpoena, Lane does not aid his cause. They also contend that Gilbert is unlike the plaintiff in Lane because sworn testimony, as opposed to internal reporting within the walls of a public employer, has a citizen element. Given that Gilbert never mentions Lane in his opening brief, even though the district court addressed it in its Memorandum and Order Regarding Defendants' Motions to Dismiss, and since even in his reply brief, he never explains why he is similarly situated to Lane, we need say no more. 10 Gilbert does not challenge the district court's exercise of discretion in deciding to rule on the merits of his state law claims against Kos. He thus waives any argument that the district court abused its discretion.
against Kos were properly dismissed.

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