Source: http://al.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20180323_0000293.NAL.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 00:46:01+00:00

Document:
Plaintiff Bertha Shankle appeals from the decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“Commissioner”) denying her application for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI"”) and Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”). (Doc. 1). Plaintiff timely pursued and exhausted her administrative remedies, and the decision of the Commissioner is ripe for review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3). For the reasons stated below, the Commissioner's decision is due to be affirmed.
Plaintiff was forty-eight at the time of the Administrative Law Judge's (“ALJ's”) decision. (See R. 21, 23). Plaintiff did not attend high school, never received her GED, and speaks English. (R. 32). Plaintiff's past work experience includes work as a nurse's assistant. (R. 143). Plaintiff alleged disability due to problems with her neck, right shoulder, and back, as well as mental problems. (R. 151).
When evaluating the disability of individuals over the age of eighteen, the regulations prescribe a five-step sequential evaluation process. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920; Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001). The first step requires a determination whether the claimant is performing substantial gainful activity ("SGA"). 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). If the claimant is engaged in SGA, he or she is not disabled and the evaluation stops. Id. If the claimant is not engaged in SGA, the Commissioner proceeds to consider the combined effects of all the claimant's physical and mental impairments. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). These impairments must be severe and must meet durational requirements before a claimant will be found disabled. Id. The decision depends on the medical evidence in the record. See Hart v. Finch, 440 F.2d 1340, 1341 (5th Cir. 1971). If the claimant's impairments are not severe, the analysis stops. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). Otherwise, the analysis continues to step three, at which the Commissioner determines whether the claimant's impairments meet the severity of an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(iii). If the impairments fall within this category, the claimant will be found disabled without further consideration. Id. If the impairments do not fall within the listings, the Commissioner determines the claimant's residual functional capacity (“RFC”). 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e).
At step four the Commissioner determines whether the impairments prevent the claimant from returning to past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(a)(4)(iv). If the claimant is capable of performing past relevant work, he or she is not disabled and the evaluation stops. Id. If the claimant cannot perform past relevant work, the analysis proceeds to the fifth step, at which the Commissioner considers the claimant's RFC, as well as the claimant's age, education, and past work experience to determine whether he or she can perform other work. Id.; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v). If the claimant can do other work, he or she is not disabled. Id.
Applying the sequential evaluation process, the ALJ found Plaintiff had not engaged in SGA since the alleged onset of her disability. (R. 11). At step two, the ALJ found Plaintiff suffered from the following severe impairments: cervical and lumbar degenerative disc disease ("DDD"); major depressive disorder; anxiety disorder NOS; and pain disorder. (R. 11-12).
[T]he claimant can occasionally climb, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl. The claimant can occasionally perform overhead work with the right upper extremity. The claimant can tolerate no exposure to heights, moving machinery, and driving. The claimant can understand, remember, and carry out short and simple instructions and make judgments on simple work-related decisions. The claimant can tolerate occasional contact with the public.
At step four, the ALJ determined Plaintiff had no past relevant work. (R. 21). Because the Plaintiff's RFC did not allow for the full range of light work, the ALJ relied on the testimony of a vocational expert (“VE”) in finding a significant number of jobs in the national economy Plaintiff can perform. (R. 22). The ALJ concluded by finding Plaintiff was not disabled. (R. 22-23).
Nonetheless, a court may not decide facts, weigh evidence, or substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1240 n.8 (11th Cir. 2004)). “The substantial evidence standard permits administrative decision makers to act with considerable latitude, and ‘the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency's finding from being supported by substantial evidence.'” Parker v. Bowen, 793 F.2d 1177, 1181 (11th Cir. 1986) (Gibson, J., dissenting) (quoting Consolo v. Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966)). Indeed, even if a court finds that the proof preponderates against the Commissioner's decision, it must affirm if the decision is supported by substantial evidence. Miles, 84 F.3d at 1400 (citing Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990)).
No decision is automatic, for “despite th[e] deferential standard [for review of claims], it is imperative that th[is] Court scrutinize the record in its entirety to determine the reasonableness of the decision reached.” Bridges v. Bowen, 815 F.2d 622, 624 (11th Cir. 1987) (citing Arnold v. Heckler, 732 F.2d 881, 883 (11th Cir. 1984)). Moreover, failure to apply the correct legal standards is grounds for reversal. See Bowen v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 629, 635 (11th Cir. 1984).
Plaintiff argues the Commissioner's decision should be reversed and remanded because the ALJ failed to properly evaluate her testimony of disabling symptoms in light of the Eleventh Circuit's pain standard. (Doc. 15 at 3). In particular, Plaintiff contends the ALJ's decision is not supported by substantial evidence insofar as it discounted Plaintiff's testimony concerning the nature and severity of her symptoms. (Id. at 4). Plaintiff primarily relies on her longitudinal treatment history for both physical and psychological ailments. (Id. at 5-8). Plaintiff also takes issue with the ALJ's disagreement with the opinions of treating and examining physicians. (Id. at 9-10). The evidence and issues regarding Plaintiff's psychological and physical impairments will be discussed in turn.

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