Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&amp;view=article&amp;id=49828:gr-166875-2007&amp;catid=1494&amp;Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 02:03:12+00:00

Document:
G.R. No. 166875 - DIGNA CONSUMIDO v. HON. REYNALDO G. ROS, ET AL.
DIGNA CONSUMIDO, Petitioner, v. HON. REYNALDO G. ROS, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 33, RAMON SAURA, JR., and FATIMA SAURA, Respondents.
According to petitioner, until June 1999, she religiously paid the rentals to respondents, who had assumed the administration of the leased premises after the death of Ramon Saura, Sr., not knowing that as early as 18 April 1995, Sandalwood Real Estate Development Corporation (SREDC) had already bought the leased premises from VGFC. After discovering that the leased premises had already been titled to SREDC, petitioner negotiated with SREDC for her to continue occupancy of the leased premises.12 Thus, she claimed that she ignored the demands of respondents for just and legal grounds.
The RTC reversed the MeTC decision.15 Based on its finding that petitioner continued to remit the rentals to respondents when they assumed administration of the leased premises after the death of Ramon Saura, Sr., it held that respondents were entitled to the material possession of the leased premises.16 The RTC also found that the leased premises was previously the ancestral home of respondents, who remained in possession thereof even after the disputed sale of the leased premises by VGFC to SREDC.
4. To pay the cost of suit.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision18 on 13 September 2004, dismissing petitioner's appeal, and on 24 January 2005, its assailed Resolution19 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
A. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS REVERSIBLE ERROR OF FACT AND LAW WHEN IT RULED THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ARE THE REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST TO FILE THE EJECTMENT SUIT, AS SUCH RULING IS BASED ON PURE CONJECTURES AND PRESUMPTIONS.
Petitioner maintains that respondents instituted the ejectment suit in their personal capacities and not in representation of the VGFC, the previous owner of the leased premises.
On the other hand, respondents contend that petitioner is estopped from asserting that no landlord-lessee relationship exists between them because petitioner previously admitted in her answer that she religiously remitted rentals to respondents. They theorize that petitioner's act of continuously remitting rentals to respondents after the death of Ramon Saura, Sr. is an acknowledgement that respondents are her landlords and successors-in-interest of the late Ramon Saura, Sr.
In an action for unlawful detainer, the real party in interest is the landlord, vendor, vendee or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession, by virtue of a contract, express or implied.
The records show that petitioner did not enter into the lease agreement with respondents. Other than their bare allegations, respondents failed to present sufficient evidence showing that they are the landlords of the leased premises or its successors-in-interest or are authorized to institute the ejectment suit in the name of the real party in interest.
The MeTC's finding that VGFC is the landlord appears to be more plausible under the circumstances. Since a corporation is only a juridical person, it must act through its officers or agents in the normal course of business. Petitioner admitted that she entered into the lease contracts with the late Ramon Saura, Sr. While no written lease agreement was ever submitted in evidence, it is likely that at the time of the agreement, the late Ramon Saura, Sr. was acting on behalf of VGFC, which, since 1979, had been the registered owner of the leased premises before its purported sale to SREDC, the present registered owner.
That respondents were parties to the lease agreement is not supported by the evidence on record. Respondents were able to establish only as far as accepting the rental payments from petitioner. However, this fact alone cannot vest in them the right of a landlord but of a mere administrator or representative of the late Ramon Saura, Sr. and/or VGFC. Thus, as pointed out by the MeTC, respondents cannot institute the ejectment suit in their personal capacities. They must present their authority to prosecute the ejectment suit in the name of the real party in interest. This respondents failed to do.
Respondents as plaintiffs in the action for unlawful detainer had the burden of proving their allegations inasmuch as they claim that they were parties to the lease contracts. Respondents failed miserably to meet the burden of proof.
Respondents argue that petitioner is estopped from denying the landlord-lessee relationship between the parties because of her admission that she paid rentals to respondents in her belief that the former were the owners of the premises.
The first element is absent in the instant case. Respondents cannot claim estoppel against petitioner because they knew fully well that they were accepting rentals from petitioner in their capacity as mere administrators of the leased premises or only on behalf of the late Ramon Saura, Sr. and/or VGFC. Respondents cannot assert that they did not know for a fact that they were never parties to the lease agreement. The fact that petitioner initially thought respondents were the owners of the leased premises does not put her in estoppel because respondents were expected to know in what capacity they accepted the payments.
Neither is petitioner estopped in denying respondents' title. The conclusive presumption set forth in Rule 131, Section 2(b)29 of the Rules of Court applies only when the landlord and tenant relationship has been sufficiently established. In the case at bar, this is precisely the issue to be resolved as petitioner has consistently alleged that there was no lease agreement between the parties. Moreover, respondents themselves have not asserted ownership over the leased premises, the truth of the matter being that respondents were never the registered owners of the leased premises.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED and the Decision dated 13 September 2004 and Resolution dated 24 January 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 75285 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 28 of Manila in Civil Case No. 170458 is REINSTATED. Costs against respondents.
1 Rollo, pp. 13-20. Penned by Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr., J., and concurred in by Salvador Jr. Valdez, Jr., Chairperson of the Ninth Division, and Vicente Q. Roxas, JJ.
22 Borlongan v. Madrideo, 380 Phil. 215, 224 (2000), citing the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 3, Section 2.
23 Vidal v. Escueta, 463 Phil. 314, 337 (2003).
24 Umpoc v. Mercado, G.R. No. 158166, January 21, 2005, 449 SCRA 220, 238.
25 Borlongan v. Madrideo, 380 Phil. 215, 223 (2000), citing Summa Insurance Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 175 (1996).
26 Duero v. Court of Appeals, 424 Phil. 12, 21 (2002), citing La Naval Drug Corporation v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 103200, 236 SCRA 78, 87-88 (1994).
27 Arcelonia v. Court of Appeals, 345 Phil. 250, 284 (1997).
(b) The tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord at the time of the commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant between them.

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