Source: http://il.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20180727_0000368.CIL.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 17:24:07+00:00

Document:
GARY MILLER, JAMES TAYLOR, and BARB KING, Defendants.
Plaintiff proceeds pro se from his incarceration in Illinois River Correctional Center on a claim that Defendants violated his procedural due process rights by denying Plaintiff a meaningful opportunity to defend prison disciplinary charges. Defendants move for summary judgment, which is granted. Plaintiff does not explain what evidence he would have presented which might have made a difference in the outcome of the disciplinary proceeding. Plaintiff had already admitted to fighting with an inmate, and an officer reported that the officer saw Plaintiff stomping on the inmate's head with Plaintiff's foot.
The facts are set forth in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, drawing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff's favor and resolving material disputes in Plaintiff's favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Summary judgment must be denied if a reasonable juror could find for Plaintiff. Id.
Sometime after inmate Stephens left Plaintiff's cell that day, Plaintiff's cellmate-inmate Thompson-returned to the cell, and a fight between Plaintiff and his cellmate ensued. According to the disciplinary report, inmate Thompson told an investigator that Plaintiff had blamed Thompson for inmate Stephens' assault on Plaintiff and then “started to hit me and knocked me down to the floor and proceeded to stomp my head against the door and strike me with closed fist punches numerous times until the Officer stopped him and separated us.” (d/e 1-1 p. 5.) The disciplinary report also stated that Officer Robinson arrived at the scene and observed Plaintiff “standing over Thompson and was appearing to be stomping on Thompson's head with his foot.” (d/e 1-1, p. 4.) These statements are not taken for the truth of what actually happened but instead for what information the disciplinary committee had when the committee made its decision. Plaintiff was also interviewed but he refused to answer any questions other than stating that Plaintiff and Thompson were fighting, whereupon the interviewer warned that, because of Plaintiff's refusal to answer questions, Plaintiff would be charged with assault in both incidents while inmates Stephens and Thompson would receive a lesser charge of fighting. (Pl.'s Dep. 15-16.) Inmate Thompson had to be taken to the hospital after the incident.
The punishment Plaintiff received on the Stephens ticket was not serious enough to trigger procedural due process rights. See Sandin v. Conner, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 2301 (1995)(placement in typical segregation for 30 days did not trigger due process protections). In contrast, Plaintiff's one year of segregation on the Thompson ticket was serious enough to trigger Plaintiff's procedural due process rights, which included the right to call witnesses and present evidence. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974); Rowe v. DeBruyn, 17 F.3d 1047, 1053 (7th Cir. 1994)(year of disciplinary segregation triggered procedural due process protections). Looking at the record in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, Plaintiff did not have a meaningful opportunity to call witnesses or organize his defense because he had no writing utensil.
That is not the end of the inquiry, though. If Plaintiff's defense would not have changed the outcome of the disciplinary hearing, then the refusal to allow him time to gather that evidence amounted to harmless error. Jones v. Cross, 637 F.3d 841, 847 (7th Cir. 2011)(inability to call witnesses at prison disciplinary hearing was harmless error where prisoner's admission was enough evidence to find him guilty of assault); Piggie v. Cotton, 344 F.3d 674, 678 (7th Cir. 2003)(applying harmless error analysis to refusal to call witnesses in disciplinary hearings). Plaintiff does not explain what his defense would have been had he been given time to prepare. He does not explain what his witnesses would have said. More importantly, even if his witnesses might have stated that both inmates were fighting equally or that inmate Thompson started the fight, ample evidence still would have supported the disciplinary committee's finding that Plaintiff was guilty of assault: 1) Plaintiff admitted to fighting; 2) inmate Thompson wound up in the hospital; 3) Officer Robinson reported that he observed Plaintiff stomping on Thompson's head with Plaintiff's foot; and, 4) inmate Thompson told the investigator that Plaintiff knocked Thompson to the floor and stomped on Thompson's head. The committee's decision was more than supported by the evidence they had before them. See Scruggs v. Jordan, 485 F.3d 934 (7th Cir. 2007)(prison disciplinary decision need only be support by “‘some evidence.' . . . [O]nce the meager threshold has been crossed our inquiry ends and we will not reverse the disciplinary board's decision.”)(quoted and other cites omitted). Plaintiff offers no reason why his unspecified defense might have changed the disciplinary committee's decision.
(1) Defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted (d/e 64). The clerk of the court is directed to enter judgment in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiff. This case is closed, with the parties to bear their own costs. All deadlines and settings on the Court's calendar are vacated.

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