Source: http://stopforeclosurefraud.com/tag/countrywide/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 01:03:15+00:00

Document:
This isn’t about a banker going to jail, this is about a homeowner going to jail.
Hmmmm- Lets see why Fannie refused to? We can maybe name a few dozen since they most likely were in cahoots over the Nothing-Backed Securities.
If there were any punishments happening, there would also be cats coming out the bag from both.
Fannie Mae refused to seek large amounts of mortgage repurchases from Countrywide Financial Corp. as housing began to crash, according to the former head of its regulator.
James Lockhart, who led the Federal Housing Finance Agency until 2009 and its predecessor, the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight, “spent a lot of time” pushing Fannie Mae executives to seek more so-called putbacks on Countrywide loans that failed to match their promised quality, he said today.
“They didn’t want to offend their largest customer,” Lockhart, now the vice chairman at investment firm WL Ross & Co., said during a speech at a Mortgage Bankers Association conference in New York.
A whistleblower who exposed systemic fraud by Countrywide mortgage lenders called on the Department of Justice on Wednesday to prosecute her former colleagues, if not with fraud, then with covering it up.
“If there is insufficient legal evidence to convict these executives of what we believe are obvious crimes, then the federal government should refocus,” Eileen Foster, a former Countrywide fraud investigations chief, told an audience at the National Press Club gathered to honor her and five others for their truth-telling.
“Overwhelming evidence of perjury, witness tampering and obstruction of justice exist in the numerous claims, court filings and trial and investigative transcripts,” Foster said. She herself was fired after reporting that falsified income documentation and faked signatures had been used to steer borrowers into bad mortgages.
Alison Frankel: Will 2nd Circuit remake AIG’s MBS case against BofA?
Mortgage-backed securities litigation has been very good for some of the most obscure laws on the books. I’ve already mentioned the starring role the unheralded statute of repose has taken in bank motions to dismiss securities claims by MBS investors, and we all know about Bank of America’s ingenious (or nefarious, depending on your perspective) use of New York’s Article 77 — a proceeding so rarely invoked that the judge assigned the case had to look it up — to seek approval of its proposed $8.5 billion settlement with investors in Countrywide mortgage-backed notes. Today I bring you the Edge Act, a hundred-year-old law that grants federal-court jurisdiction to civil suits against any U.S corporation in which claims arise from international banking or banking transactions in a U.S. territory.
You’re probably wondering what the Edge Act has to do with U.S. MBS trusts in which securities are backed by U.S.-issued mortgages on properties in the United States. Well, it turns out that a handful of the mortgages backing BofA securities actually originated in the Virgin Islands and Guam. We are talking about a very small handful. According to a brief AIG submitted to the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals, of the 1.7 million mortgages underlying the 349 MBS trusts at issue in AIG’s $10 billion case against Bank of America, exactly 8 mortgages in 3 trusts originated in U.S. territories.
Bank Hapoalim has filed a massive $720 million suit against Bank of America, Merrill Lynch and Countrywide over its losses in the U.S. subprime crisis, alleging that the U.S. institutions misled and defrauded it.
Among Israel’s financial institutions, Hapoalim suffered the worst losses in the subprime crisis due to its investments in mortgage-backed securities.
Between 2005 and 2007, the bank, led by Shlomo Nehama and Zvi Ziv, snapped up mortgage-backed securities in an attempt to meet its goal of a 15% return on equity by 2007.
Ordinarily, there’s not much reason to get excited about a state intermediate appeals court upholding a procedural ruling by a trial court judge. But in the litigation between bond insurers and mortgage-backed securities issuers, decisions are not only magnified by the tens of billions of dollars at stake, but also by the paucity of precedent. Almost every ruling is groundbreaking, which means that decisions have an impact far beyond a single case.
With that in mind, there are two reasons why a ruling Thursday by the New York Appellate Division, First Department, is a setback for Bank of America: timing and authority.
Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., et al., Defendants, Bank of America Corp., Defendant-Appellant.
Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.,et al., Defendants, Bank of America Corp., Defendant-Appellant.
Patterson Belknap Webb & Tyler LLP, New York (Robert P.
Segregated Account of Ambac Assurance Corporation, respondents.
Financial Guaranty Insurance Co., respondent.
counsel), for Syncora Guarantee, Inc., respondent.
Orders, Supreme Court, New York County (Eileen Bransten, J.), entered October 31, 2011 and November 2, 2011, which, among other things, denied defendant Bank of America Corp.’s motions to sever and consolidate plaintiffs’ successor liability claims for purposes of discovery, and held in abeyance defendant’s motion to consolidate the successor liability claims for purposes of trial, unanimously affirmed, with costs.
discovery, and consolidation would result in undue delay (see Barnes v Cathers & Dembrosky, 5 AD3d 122 ).
M-664 –Syncora Guarantee Inc. v Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., et al. and Bank of America Corp.
M-665 –MBIA Insurance Corporation v Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., et al. and Bank of America Corp.
M-745 –MBIA Insurance Corporation, et al. v Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., [*2]et al. and Bank of America Corp.
Motions to supplement the record on appeal (M-664, M-665) granted; cross motion to strike the supplemental record and reply brief, or for leave to supplement the record in the event the motion (M-665) is granted (M-745), granted to the extent of granting leave to supplement the record.
Does Pauley’s BNYM ruling spell new liability for MBS trustees?
Beth Kaswan of Scott + Scott has the fervor of a pioneer when she talks about the implications of U.S. District Judge William Pauley‘s ruling Tuesday that her client, a Chicago police officers’ pension fund, can proceed with some claims that Bank of New York Mellon violated its duty to Countrywide mortgage-backed securities investors under the federal Trust Indenture Act. “Judge Pauley is the first judge to say the Trust Indenture Act, in existence since 1939, does apply in this type of circumstance to mortgage-backed securities,” Kaswan told me Wednesday. “That means investors can sue trustees, even if they can’t cobble together 25 percent” of the voting rights in any particular trust — a prerequisite to suing under the pooling and servicing agreements governing most MBS trusts.
Kaswan, who said her firm was the first to assert the federal law against an MBS trustee, believes Pauley’s 19-page decision offers a significant new route to damages for MBS investors. The Manhattan federal judge ruled that the Chicago fund only has standing to bring claims for the trusts in which it invested, reducing the number of Countrywide MBS trusts in the case from 530 to 26. But he also said that investors in those 26 trusts can sue BNY Mellon for allegedly failing to notify certificateholders that Countrywide and Bank of America supposedly breached their obligations to the trusts and for failing to take action on those breaches.
first to let investors in mortgage-backed securities pursue claims against a trustee under the 1939 federal Trust Indenture Act.
A federal judge rejected Bank of New York Mellon Corp’s bid to dismiss a lawsuit by investors over its role as trustee for mortgage-backed securities that led to an $8.5 billion settlement by Bank of America Corp.
U.S. District Judge William Pauley in Manhattan said on Tuesday that bondholders who invested in 26 trusts alleged to have contained risky mortgage loans from the former Countrywide Financial Corp may pursue claims against Bank of New York Mellon. He dismissed a variety of other claims.
U.S. District Judge Mariana Pfaelzer of federal court in Los Angeles is poised to deliver a ruling in AIG’s mortgage-backed securities case against Countrywide that could have an impact on just about every company headquartered in New York. The issue: How long do N.Y. businesses have to bring fraud claims? Are they entitled to the benefit of the state’s generous six-year statute of limitations? Or, as Countrywide argues in a supplemental motion to dismiss filed on March 23, are companies headquartered in New York instead restricted to the generally stingier time limits in their states of incorporation?
To understand how this question arose in AIG’s MBS case, we have to back up a few steps. It’s no secret that in MBS litigation, there’s no more potent defense than arguments that investors waited too long to file suit. It’s a quick, clean way to excise big chunks of a plaintiff’s case, particularly because federal securities claims, with exceptions for American Pipe tolling (if you don’t know, don’t ask), are generally time-barred after three years under the statute of limitations or the more-obscure-until-MBS-litigation statute of repose. That’s why we’ve seen so many MBS plaintiffs — including AIG and the satellite insurance companies that are also plaintiffs in its Countrywide suit — assert state-law fraud claims in addition to federal securities claims.
most favorable to the Plaintiff. Powell v. Thomas, 643 F.3d 1300, 1302 (11th Cir.
legal matter. Belanger v. Salvation Army, 556 F.3d 1153, 1155 (11th Cir. 2009).
‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct.
defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id.
needed to either bring your loan current or to pay off your loan in full.” (Compl.
where no misleading or deception is claimed.
that BAC “received an assignment of the security deed and debt on June 19, 2009 .
as defined in §1692a of the FDCPA.
dismissal and remand this case to the district court for further proceedings.
MRS. ALEXANDER T.J. CUPO, WIFE OF ALEXANDER T.J. CUPO AND CITIBANK SOUTH DAKOTA N.A., Defendants.
No. A-1212-10T2.Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division.
Argued October 5, 2011.Decided February 28, 2012.Gerald J. Monahan argued the cause for appellant.
Kristina G. Murtha argued the cause for respondent.
Before Judges Fuentes, Graves and Koblitz.
In this mortgage foreclosure action, defendant Alexander Cupo appeals from the decision of the Chancery Division, General Equity Part, denying his motion to vacate default judgment and dismiss the complaint filed by plaintiff Bank of New York, as Trustees for the Certificate-Holders CWABS, Inc., Asset-Banked Certificates, Series 2006-23. Defendant argues that the trial court erred when it denied his motion because: (1) plaintiff did not have physical possession of the promissory note at the time it filed its complaint for foreclosure; (2) plaintiff did not have standing to prosecute the foreclosure because the original lender, Countrywide Home Loans, assigned the promissory note and mortgage to plaintiff thirty-nine days after the complaint was filed; and (3) both plaintiff and its assignor Countrywide Home Loans failed to satisfy the requirements under N.J.S.A. 2A:50-56.
After reviewing the record before us, we reverse and remand this matter to the General Equity Part for a hearing to determine whether plaintiff has standing to file the complaint. As we made clear in Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. v. Mitchell, 422 N.J. Super. 214, 224 (App. Div. 2011), a foreclosing mortgagee must demonstrate that it had the legal authority to enforce the promissory note at the time it filed the original complaint for foreclosure. As correctly noted by defendant here, the record shows that the original lender, Countrywide Home Loans, assigned the promissory note and mortgage to plaintiff on May 10, 2007, thirty-nine days after the complaint was filed.
The following facts will inform our analysis of the issues raised by the parties.
On December 22, 2006, defendant signed a promissory note to Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., memorializing a $245,000 loan. To secure payment of the note, defendant executed a mortgage to Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS), acting solely as a nominee for Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. The mortgage was recorded on January 11, 2007. Defendant failed to make the first payment on the loan that was due on February 1, 2007. In fact, to date, defendant has not made any payments on the loan. Pursuant to the terms of the loan, defendant defaulted on March 1, 2007. Countrywide mailed defendant a notice of intent to foreclose dated March 5, 2007.
On May 10, 2007, plaintiff Bank of New York filed a complaint in foreclosure, seeking to sell the mortgaged lands to satisfy the amount due. The complaint indicated that “[b]y assignment of mortgage, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., acting solely as a nominee for Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. assigned its mortgage to Bank of New York as Trustee for the Certificateholders CWABS, Inc., Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-03 which assignment has been sent for recording in the office of the clerk of Hudson County.” Plaintiff served the summons and complaint on defendant on June 14, 2007.
The record shows that MERS assigned its mortgage to Bank of New York as Trustee for the Certificateholders CWABS, Inc., Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-23, on June 19, 2007. The assignment was recorded on July 5, 2007. Plaintiff filed a request to enter default against defendant on August 20, 2007. Plaintiff mailed a notice of intent to enter final judgment on August 29, 2007. In this light, the matter was deemed uncontested and the court entered final judgment by default on November 15, 2007.
Despite the entry of final judgment, plaintiff and defendant continued to discuss a possible settlement of the suit. Sheriff sales were postponed a number of times during these negotiations. The parties eventually proceeded to mediation. After two sessions, the parties reached an apparent impasse. Although a third session was scheduled for September 28, 2010, defendant moved to vacate the default judgment and dismiss plaintiff’s complaint on August 26, 2010, arguing that plaintiff lacked standing to prosecute the foreclosure action, and failed to comply with the notice requirements in N.J.S.A. 2A:50-56. Plaintiff argued that defendant had not established excusable neglect nor raised a meritorious defense. The trial court denied defendant’s motion to vacate the default judgment as well as his subsequent motion for reconsideration.
On motion, with briefs, and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or the party’s legal representative from a final judgment or order for the following reasons: (a) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (b) newly discovered evidence which would probably alter the judgment or order and which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under [Rule] 4:49; (c) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; (d) the judgment or order is void; (e) the judgment or order has been satisfied, released or discharged, or a prior judgment or order upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment or order should have prospective application; or (f) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment or order.
The trial court’s decision to vacate a judgment under Rule 4:50-1 “will be left undisturbed unless it represents a clear abuse of discretion.” Hous. Auth. of Morristown, supra, 135 N.J. at 283 (citing Mancini v. EDS, 132 N.J. 330, 334 (1993)). To vacate a default judgment, the defendant “must show that the neglect to answer was excusable under the circumstances and that he has a meritorious defense.” Marder v. Realty Constr. Co., 84 N.J. Super. 313, 318 (App. Div.), aff’d, 43 N.J. 508 (1964). Because a default judgment is not predicated on a determination that plaintiff has met its burden of proof after providing a defendant his or her day in court, the trial court should review a motion to set aside a default judgment “with great liberality, and every reasonable ground for indulgence is tolerated to the end that a just result is reached.” Hous. Auth. of Morristown, supra, 135 N.J. at 283-84 (quoting Marder, supra, 84 N.J. Super. at 318-19).
Here, defendant’s argument challenges directly the power of the court to grant the relief requested by plaintiff. Defendant argues that the default judgment obtained by plaintiff is utterly void from its inception because plaintiff did not have standing to prosecute the case at the time it filed the foreclosure complaint.
A mortgagee may establish standing by showing “that it is the holder of the note and the mortgage at the time the complaint was filed.” Deutsche Bank, supra, 422 N.J. Super. at 224-25 (internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiff must have “presented an authenticated assignment” dated prior to its filing of the original complaint. See id. at 225. Here, the only evidence of the assignment is the assignment document dated June 19, 2007, which is dated thirty-nine days after plaintiff filed the complaint. As was the case in Deutsche Bank, plaintiff here does not have standing as an assignee to prosecute this foreclosure action.
Because the record before us does not include a certified copy of the original promissory note, we do not address plaintiff’s potential standing under the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) governing the transfer of negotiable instruments. N.J.S.A. 12A:3-101 to-605. We thus remand this matter to the trial court to conduct a hearing to determine whether, before filing the original complaint, plaintiff was in possession of the note or had another basis to achieve standing to foreclose, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 12A:3-301.
Finally, defendant argues that plaintiff failed to provide notice, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:50-56(c), that defendant could sell his home prior to going into foreclosure. We reject this argument substantially for the reasons expressed by the trial court.
The plain language of the statute only requires inclusion of the right to transfer the real estate if the mortgagor actually has the right to transfer the real estate subject to the security interest. If the mortgage documents do not provide that right, the mortgagee does not have to include that language in its notice of foreclosure.
If all or any part of the Property or any Interest in the Property is sold or transferred… without Lender’s prior written consent, Lender may require immediate payment in full of all sums secured by this Security Instrument.
Thus, although the mortgage permits defendant to transfer the property, a nonconsensual transfer is treated as a default, authorizing plaintiff to accelerate the payment of the outstanding principal.
[T]he statute only requires that language to be in [the notice under N.J.S.A. 2A:50-56(c)] if that right exists, and in this case, as I understand it, the mortgage specifically provides that the defendant does not have the right to have anyone else assume the debt or to transfer his interest in the property without the lender’s consent.
There is language in the notice of intent, as I read it…, if you are willing to sell your property, your home, in order to avoid foreclosure, it is possible that the sale of your home can be approved through Countrywide, even if your home is worth less than what is owed on it.
So it tells him he can convey his home, it has to be approved by Countrywide, but to have it sold to anyone or to have someone else assume the debt is precluded by virtue of the mortgage instrument itself.
So… that would actually be misleading if that language were in there, because he doesn’t have that right…. [T]he language that you’re saying should be in the notice of intent is in violation of the mortgage document itself.
We agree with the trial judge’s analysis and ultimate conclusion. N.J.S.A. 2A:50-56(c) does not require the lender to notify the borrower of his or her right to transfer the property; it only requires notice of the right to transfer the property subject to the mortgage. Here, the mortgage document prohibits transfer of the property subject to the mortgage without consent. Under these circumstances, plaintiff was not required to provide defendant with notice of an unequivocal right to transfer the property.
Reversed on the issue of standing and remanded for such further proceedings as may be warranted. We do not retain jurisdiction.
 The parties met for a third and final mediation session on September 28, 2010. The mediation ended without a settlement.

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