Source: http://www.swissarbitrationdecisions.com/dismissal-of-an-appeal-to-set-aside-a-cas-award-a-reference-to-a
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 04:21:29+00:00

Document:
The Cyprus Football Association investigated the matter. Its Judicial Committee issued a one year ban against the two players and a two year ban against the trainer. The World Anti-Doping Agency appealed to the CAS and a panel was constituted with Luigi Fumagalli as Chairman, and Richard H. McLaren and Michele Bernasconi as arbitrators. On October 26, 2010, the CAS issued its award, upholding the appeal with regard to the trainer and banning him for four years with costs.
The CAS award is published on the CAS website: www.tas-cas.org.
The trainer appealed to the Federal Tribunal. The issue was that, as a professional trainer registered with the Cyprus Football Association, the Appellant had undertaken to comply with the anti-doping provisions of the Cyprus Football Association as well as with the FIFA Statutes because the Cyprus federation statutes contained an undertaking to ensure that the members comply with FIFA regulations and statutes, which require compliance with anti-doping rules. It thus created the basis for CAS’ exercise of jurisdiction pursuant to articles 62 and 63 of the FIFA Statutes (see section 3.1 of the opinion for a verbatim quote of the pertinent articles of the FIFA Statutes).
Despite a well-reasoned argument that the reference to the Cyprus federation statutes was merely with regard to the substantive anti-doping rules of FIFA and was not intended to create CAS jurisdiction by reference to articles 62 and 63 of the FIFA Statutes, the Court rejected it. Instead, it emphasized the importance of CAS jurisdiction, albeit by what were at times somewhat thin references, because of the importance of ensuring that doping is not tolerated (see section 3.3.1 and 3.3.3 of the opinion in this respect).
As will be clear from the foregoing, the opinion will be of interest to readers who practice sports arbitration. The decision also shows that the Swiss Supreme Court is ready to broadly interpret CAS jurisdiction when there are public interest issues involved.
A.________ is domiciled in X.________ [name of the country omitted] (the Appellant) and is a professional football trainer.
The World Anti-doping Agency (WADA; Respondent 1) is a foundation under Swiss law with headquarters in Lausanne. Its goal is the worldwide fight against doping in sport.
The Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA; Respondent 2) is the international football federation with headquarters in Zurich. The Cyprus Football Association (CFA; Respondent 3) is the national football federation of Cyprus and as such a member of the FIFA.
At the relevant time the Respondent was active within the Cypriot football club of Y.________, which in its turn belongs to the CFA.
After the games of October 31, 2008, November 9, 2008, and November 24, 2008, various players of the Y.________ team were made to undergo a doping test. “Oxymesterone,” a substance which is on the list of prohibited anabolics, was found in two players’ samples. Consequently the CFA conducted an investigation into the positive doping tests. The person in charge of the investigation found, among other things in his report of December 31, 2008, that the Appellant, as trainer of Y.________, offered two white pills to the eleven players before the play. The players were not forced to take the pills and some did not take the pills, which the Appellant described as caffeine pills.
Based on this investigation, the CFA initiated disciplinary proceedings for breach of doping rules against the Appellant and the two players who had tested positive. In a decision of April 2, 2009, the Judicial Committee of the CFA issued a two year ban against the Appellant, valid from the day of the decision. The Judicial Committee held, with a view to the sanction to be pronounced, that the Appellant’s cooperation and his readiness to contribute to the clarification of the matter had to be taken into account. Accordingly the four year ban, as per the applicable provisions of the FIFA Disciplinary Code and of the World Anti-Doping Code, was reduced to two years. In a decision of April 24, 2009, the Judicial Committee imposed a one year ban against the two players who had tested positive. No disciplinary proceedings were opened against the other players.
On March 30, 2009, Respondent 1 appealed the decisions of the CFA in connection with the events described as to football club Y.________ (proceedings CAS 2009/A/1817) to the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). As Respondent 1 had not participated in the proceedings in front of the bodies of the Federation and had not been notified the decisions they took, it required from the CAS a notification of the corresponding decisions and of other documents. After receiving the decisions, Respondent 1 submitted the reasons for its appeal to the CAS on September 8, 2009. Respondent 1 requested that the decisions of the Disciplinary Committee of the CFA be annulled, that the Appellant be banned for four years, and the other players who had taken the pills for two. On May 5, 2009, Respondent 2 appealed to the CAS the decision of the CFA Disciplinary Committee of April 2, 2009, by which the Appellant had been banned for two years and submitted that the Appellant should be forbidden to work as a trainer for at least four years (CAS proceedings 2009/A/1844). In Its brief of September 8, 2009 Respondent 2 repeated its submissions and, as an intervening party in proceedings CAS 2009/A/1817, it confirmed the submissions made by Respondent 1. The CAS did not formally join both proceedings but informed the parties that both proceedings would be conducted simultaneously and decided by the same arbitrators.
In his answer to the appeal of October 26, 2009, the Appellant challenged the jurisdiction of the CAS and argued that the decision of the CFA Judicial Committee of April 2, 2009, was legally accurate. The Appellant argued, in support of his objection to jurisdiction, that the mere reference to the FIFA Statutes in the applicable Rules of the CFA was insufficient because the CFA did not explicitly provide in its Statutes for a right to appeal the decisions of the Judicial Committee to the CAS. Article R47 of the Procedural Rules of the CAS Code demanded an explicit reference to the jurisdiction of the CAS.
In an award of October 26, 2010, the CAS upheld the appeal against the decision of the CFA Judicial Committee of April 2, 2009, to the extent that it concerned the Appellant (award nr 1) and banned the Appellant for four years starting from April 2, 2009, (award nr 2). Furthermore the Appellant was ordered to pay costs (award nr 7).
In a Civil law appeal of November 24, 2010, the Appellant essentially submits that the Federal Tribunal should annul paragraphs 1, 2 and 7 of the CAS award of October 26, 2010, and should find that the arbitral tribunal has no jurisdiction over the Appellant. Alternatively paragraphs 1, 2 and 7 of the October 26, 2010, arbitral award should be annulled and the matter sent back to the arbitral tribunal for a finding that the arbitral tribunal has no jurisdiction as to the Appellant. More alternatively, paragraphs 1, 2 and 7 of the award under appeal should be annulled and the matter sent back to the arbitral tribunal.
The Respondents submit that the appeal should be rejected to the extent that the matter is capable of appeal. The CAS submits that the appeal should be rejected. On March 28, 2011, the Appellant filed a reply with the Federal Tribunal.
On December 20, 2010, the Federal Tribunal rejected a request for security for costs by Respondent 2. On February 2, 2011, the Federal Tribunal rejected the Appellant’s request for a stay of enforcement. On March 17, 2011, a new request for a stay of enforcement was rejected.
According to Art. 54 (1) BGG2 the Federal Tribunal issues its decision in an official language,3 as a rule in the language of the decision under appeal. When that decision was issued in another language, the Federal Tribunal resorts to the language used by the parties. The decision under appeal is in English. As this is not an official language and the Parties used various languages in front of the Federal Tribunal, the decision will be issued in the language of the appeal according to practice.
In the field of international arbitration a Civil law appeal is possible under the requirements of Art. 190-192 PILA4 (SR291) (Art. 77 (1) (a) BGG).
2.1 The seat of the arbitral tribunal is in Lausanne in this case. The Appellant and Respondent 3 had their seat outside Switzerland at the relevant time. As the parties did not rule out in writing the provisions of chapter 12 PILA, they are applicable (Art. 176 (1) and (2) PILA).
2.2 A Civil law appeal within the meaning of Art. 77 (1) BGG, in principle, may only result in the annulment of the decision (see Art. 77 (2) BGG ruling out the applicability of Art. 107 (2) BGG, to the extent that the provision empowers the Federal Tribunal to decide the matter itself). An exception may apply, however, to the extent that the dispute involves the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal, by which the Federal Tribunal can itself decide the jurisdiction (or lack thereof) of the arbitral tribunal (judgment 4A_456/2009 from May 3, 2010 at 2.4; 4A_240/2009 of December 16, 2009 at 1.2; all with references; compare in the framework of the old public law appeal with BGE 127 III 279 at 1b p. 282; 117 II 94 at 4 p. 95 ff). The Appellant’s main submission is therefore admissible.
2.3 The Federal Tribunal bases its judgment on the facts found by the arbitral tribunal (Art. 105 (1) BGG). It may neither correct nor supplement the factual findings of the arbitral tribunal, even where they are obviously inaccurate or based on a violation of the law within the meaning of Art. 95 BGG (see Art. 77 (2) BGG ruling out the applicability of Art. 97 BGG and Art. 105 (2) BGG). However the Federal Tribunal may review the factual findings of the award under appeal when some admissible grievances, within the meaning of Art. 190 (2) PILA, are brought against these factual findings or, exceptionally, when new evidence (see Art. 99 (1) BGG) is taken into account (BGE 133 III 139 at 5 p. 141; 129 III 727 at 5.2.2 p. 733; with references). Whoever relies on an exception to the rule that the Federal Tribunal is bound by the factual findings of the arbitral tribunal (and wants to rectify or supplement the factual findings on this basis) must show with reference to the record that the corresponding factual allegations were made during the arbitral proceedings in accordance with procedural rules (see BGE 115 II 484 at 2a p. 486; 111 II 471 at 1c p. 473; with references).
The Appellant argues on the basis of Art. 190 (2) (b) PILA that the arbitral tribunal wrongly accepted jurisdiction.
1. FIFA recognises the independent Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) with headquarters in Lausanne (Switzerland) to resolve disputes between FIFA, Members, Confederations, Leagues, clubs, Players, Officials and licensed match agents and players' agents.
2. The provisions of the CAS Code of Sports-Related Arbitration shall apply to the proceedings. CAS shall primarily apply the various regulations of FIFA and, additionally, Swiss law.
1. Appeals against final decisions passed by FIFA's legal bodies and against decisions passed by Confederations, Members or Leagues shall be lodged with CAS within 21 days of notification of the decision in question.
2. Recourse may only be made to CAS after all other internal channels have been exhausted.
(c) decisions against which an appeal to an independent and duly constituted arbitration tribunal recognised under the rules of an Association or Confederation may be made.
4. The appeal shall not have a suspensive effect. The appropriate FIFA body or, alternatively, CAS may order the appeal to have a suspensive effect.
5. FIFA is entitled to appeal to CAS against any internally final and binding doping-related decision passed by the Confederations, Members or Leagues under the terms of par. 1 and par. 2 above.
6. The World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) is entitled to appeal to CAS against any internally final and binding doping-related decision passed by FIFA, the Confederations, Members or Leagues under the terms of par. 1 and par. 2 above.
The arbitral tribunal held that it was proved that the Appellant was registered with the CFA as trainer of the football club Y.________ and that in the framework of that registration he had agreed to comply with the statutes and regulations of the CFA (including their anti-doping provisions).
Article 22.5 of the CFA Statutes provides for the applicability of the FIFA Statutes to disputes between members of the CFA and foreign law subjects.
The arbitral tribunal held accordingly that Articles 62 and 63 of the FIFA Statutes were binding for the Appellant. To the extent that an appeal to the CAS was possible according to these Statutes, they justified jurisdiction of the CAS to decide the dispute at hand. Based on the general reference to the FIFA Statutes in the CFA Statutes, the CAS had jurisdiction to decide the appeal made by Respondents 1 and 2 in conformity with Article R47 of the CAS-Code.
3.2.1 The Federal Tribunal may freely review the legal issues as to the jurisdictional grievance according to Art. 190 (2) (b) PILA, including the preliminary substantive issues on which the determination of jurisdiction depends. However, it reviews the factual findings of the decision under appeal only when some admissible grievances, within the meaning of Art. 190 (2) PILA, are brought against these factual findings or, exceptionally, when new evidence is taken into account. This also applies in the framework of the jurisdictional grievance (BGE 134 III 565 at 3.1 p. 567; 133 III 139 at 5 p. 141; 129 III 727 at 5.2.2 p. 733).
The arbitration clause must meet the requirements of Art. 178 PILA. However, the Federal Tribunal views the agreement of the parties to refer disputes to an arbitral tribunal in sport matters with some “benevolence;” this is with a view to encouraging the swift resolution of disputes by specialized tribunals which, like the CAS, offer adequate guarantees of independence and impartiality (BGE 133 III 235 at 4.3.2.3 p. 244 ff with references). The liberal interpretation which characterizes case law of the Federal Tribunal in this context appears in the assessment of the validity of arbitration clauses by reference (judgment 4A_548/20096 of January 20, 2010, at 4.1; 4A_460/20087 of January 9, 2009 at 6.2 with references). The Federal Tribunal has thus, at times, found valid a general reference to the arbitration clause contained in the statutes of a federation (judgment 4A_460/20088 of January 9, 2009, at 6.2; 4P.253/2003 of March 25, 2004, at 5.4; 4P.230/2000 of February 7, 2001, at 2a; 4C.44/1996 of October 31, 1996, at 3c; see BGE 133 III 235 at 4.3.2.3 p. 245; 129 III 727 at 5.3.1 p. 735; all with references). In the case of a football player who was a member of a national federation, for example, this Court considered a provision contained in the Statutes requiring sportsmen belonging to the federation to comply with FIFA rules as a legally valid reference to the arbitration clause contained in the FIFA Statutes (judgment 4A_460/20089 of January 9, 2009, at 6.2).
The Appellant rightly does not dispute that, as a professional trainer, he agreed through his registration with the CFA to comply with the statutes and regulations of the CFA. However he does not accept that Articles 62 and 63 of the FIFA Statutes apply to him.
The Appellant begins by accurately pointing out that Article 13.1 (d) of the FIFA Statutes (which requires the national football federations to ensure that their members comply with the Statutes, regulations, directives and decisions of FIFA) cannot be applied directly to the Appellant as he is not himself a member of FIFA. It is instead necessary that the CFA Statutes, by which the Appellant agreed to be bound in the framework of his registration as a football trainer, provide for the applicability of the corresponding provision of the FIFA Statutes directly or by global reference to the FIFA rules.
Article 11.7 of the CFA statutes provides that the anti-doping rules of the CFA have to comply with (among others) the Statutes and Regulations of FIFA. Contrary to the Appellant’s view this reference is not “a mere reference to the substantive anti-doping rules of FIFA” which cannot accordingly mean a reference to the formal provisions of Article 62 and 63 of the FIFA Statutes. It merely seeks to ensure that the strictest rules are applied in a given situation. There are no discernable hints that the reference would be limited to some specific anti-doping rules and that the arbitration clause in Article 62f of the FIFA Statutes would be excluded therefrom. Respondent 2 correctly points out that the FIFA Statutes, to which Article 11.7 of the CFA Statutes refer, contain no substantive anti-doping rules. However, in Article 63 (5) and (6) they do provide for a right of appeal by Respondents 1 and 2 to the CAS against final internal decisions in connection with doping. In view of these specific provisions, which aid the international fight against doping, the Appellant’s argument is unpersuasive, especially where it states in its reply that Article 2410 of the final provisions of the FIFA Statutes would indeed contain a substantive doping provision, according to which with reference to Art. 2 (e) of the FIFA Statutes, “FIFA shall take action especially, but not exclusively, against irregular betting activities, doping and racism”. It is not clear, and the Appellant does not explain more precisely, to what extent the Appellant considers that Article 11.7 of the CFA statutes should serve as a direct reference to this general provision, which aims at FIFA directly and illustrates the general objective in Art. 2 (e) of the FIFA Statutes. It is important to recognize that in the worldwide fight against doping, the CAS is of increasing significance. Thus a development in international jurisprudence towards CAS jurisdiction in doping matters should be supported, with a view to ensuring compliance with international standards in this field. Article 13.2.1 of the World-Anti-Doping Code (WADA-Code) provides for the CAS as appeal body for all doping cases in which international athletes are implicated; according to Article 13.2.3 (2) (2) of the WADA-Code, WADA and the international federation concerned are entitled to appeal to the CAS when national athletes participate (see already BGE 129 III 445 at 3.3.3.3 p. 462 and judgment 4A_149/2003 of October 31st, 2003 at 2.2.2). This development is also underscored by the reference in the appeal to the Statutes of the Swiss Football Federation (which are not decisive for the case at hand), according to whose Article 64bis (3), the decisions of the Disciplinary Chamber for Doping Cases of the Swiss Olympic Association can be appealed to the CAS.
Against this background it is unpersuasive to argue that the jurisdiction of the CAS over appeals against CFA doping decisions would have been impossible to establish for the Appellant. The arbitral tribunal did not act illegally when it saw a reference in Article 11.7 of the CFA Statutes to the jurisdiction of the CAS to adjudicate appeals against final decisions of national football federations in Article 63 (5) and (6) of the FIFA Statutes. To the extent that compliance with international standards by the national bodies must be ensured by way of an appeal to the CAS, this serves directly the worldwide fight against doping in sport (see judgment 4A_17/2007 of June 8, 2007 at 5). The Appellant’s argument that Article 62 (f) of the FIFA Statutes, as a procedural rule, would not be covered by the reference at Article 11.7 of the CFA statutes is accordingly not persuasive.
Even if there were no clear reference to Article 62 (f) of the FIFA Statutes in Article 11.7 of the CFA Statute, Article 21 of the CFA Statute would support CAS jurisdiction as it provides that, in case of unclear internal CFA provisions or failing any, the FIFA rules are applicable. In this case it would be unclear to what body the internal doping decision of CFA could be appealed, which would call for the application of Article 63 (5) (6) of the FIFA Statutes.
The Appellant may not be followed when he argues that the lack of reference to a possibility to appeal to the CAS would be an intentional omission. He concedes that, according to Article 64 of the FIFA Statutes, the national federations are obliged to adopt a provision in their statutes and regulations preventing their members from bringing football related disputes before state courts. Instead, the national federations must provide for the jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal, which can be either the CAS or another arbitral tribunal. Yet he did not show in the arbitral proceedings or before the Federal Tribunal that a doping decision of the CFA could be appealed to an independent arbitral body according to its statutes. In view of the general obligation of the CFA to make possible an appeal either to the CAS or to another independent tribunal, and contrary to the point of view argued in the appeal, there can be no finding of an intentional omission whereby decisions of the Judicial Committee of the CFA could be appealed neither to the CAS nor to another arbitral tribunal. To the contrary, such reasoning appears even from the legal opinion as to Cyprus law produced by the Appellant (however scantily reasoned), which, moreover, does not deal with the legal situation of the case at hand.
The reference to the anti-doping rules of the FIFA Statutes contained in the CFA statutes and thus the jurisdiction of the CAS provided in Article 63 (5) and (6) to adjudicate appeals by Respondents 1 and 2 against doping decisions of national football federations must be considered as legally binding. This is clear in view of case law of the Federal Tribunal as to the validity of arbitration clauses by reference in the field of sport arbitration (see above E 3.2.2). If it is sufficient for a statutory provision to contain the general applicability of the rules of the international sport federation, including an arbitration clause among others, with regard to a sportsman who validly submitted to the statutes of a national federation according to Art. 178 (1) PILA (see judgment 4A_460/2008 of January 9, 2009 at 6.2), then the same must apply to a (limited) reference to parts of the statutes which provide for the jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal for specific disputes – in this case decisions in the field of doping.
When the Appellant argues in his reply (with reference to the formal requirement of Art. 178 (1) PILA) that nowhere in the award did the CAS find that he made a written statement joining the CFA or submitting to the CFA statutes, he does not show the violation of any jurisdictional provisions. The arbitral tribunal held that it was proved that the Appellant, as trainer of football club Y.________, was registered with the CFA and in the framework of that registration had agreed to comply with the Statutes and regulations (including the Anti-Doping provisions) of the CFA. It is true that the award under appeal does not go into the details of that registration. However the arbitral tribunal had no reason to clarify these circumstances any further as the Appellant did not dispute that there was a formally valid declaration of intent to be bound in the arbitral proceedings. Instead, the Appellant merely – and wrongly, as was shown – took the view that the reference contained in the pertinent CFA rules to the FIFA Statues was not sufficient but that it was necessary for the CFA statutes to contain an explicit right to appeal the decision of the Judicial Committee to the CAS. In view of the fact that this was not contested, the arbitral tribunal did not violate Art. 178 (1) PILA when it found that the registration met the necessary requirement of written form. To the extent that the Appellant would want to deny ever having made a written statement submitted to the CFA statutes, this would be a new argument raised for the first time before the Federal Tribunal and would be therefore inadmissible (Art. 99 (1) BGG).
The same applies to the argument that the arbitral tribunal found that the Appellant would have had the FIFA Statutes at hand or that their contents would have been known to him at the point in time when he submitted to the CFA statutes. The Appellant’s argument that the formal requirement of Art. 178 (1) PILA is not met appears accordingly unfounded to the extent that his arguments are not admissible at all.
The appeal proves to be unfounded and is to be rejected to the extent that the matter is capable of appeal. In view of the outcome of the proceedings the Appellant must pay costs and compensate the other Parties (Art. 66 (1) and Art. 68 (2) BGG).
The appeal is rejected to the extent that matter is capable of appeal.
The Court costs of CHF 5,000 shall be paid by the Appellant.
The Appellant shall pay CHF 6,000 to each of the Respondents for the federal proceedings.
2. Translator’s note: BGG is the German abbreviation for the Federal Statute of June 17, 2005, organizing the Federal Tribunal, RS 173 110.
10. Translator’s note: It would appear to be Article 14.

References: Art. 54
 Art. 190
 Art. 77
 Art. 77
 Art. 107
 Art. 95
 Art. 77
 Art. 97
 Art. 105
 Art. 190
 Art. 99
 Art. 190
 Art. 190
 Art. 190
 Art. 178
 Art. 2
 Art. 2
 Art. 178
 Art. 178
 Art. 178
 Art. 178
 Art. 68