Source: http://isthatlegal.ca/index.php?name=Statutes-and-Statutory-Interpretation
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 14:24:40+00:00

Document:
The Supreme Court of Canada case of Rizzo v Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (SCC, 1998) is, by far, the modern leading case on statutory interpretation, having been cited in over 3,500 other cases. The issue in Rizzo was whether terminations of employment brought about by a bankruptcy would operate to trigger the employees' termination and severance rights under Ontario's Employment Standards Act, RSO 1980 ('ESA').
The lower Court of Appeal found that it did not, largely on the reasoning that several key ESA provisions made the act of termination that of the employer [“[n]o employer shall terminate the employment of an employee” (s. 40(1)), “the notice required by an employer to terminate the employment” (s. 40(2)), and “[a]n employer who has terminated or who proposes to terminate the employment of employees” (s. 40(5))].
This passage is quoted through the cases innumerable times. As well the court also relies on s.10 of the Interpretation Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 219, which provides that every Act “shall be deemed to be remedial” and directs that every Act shall “receive such fair, large and liberal construction and interpretation as will best ensure the attainment of the object of the Act according to its true intent, meaning and spirit”.
The court goes on to recognize the importance of the protection of the employment relationship in our society, and that the Court of Appeal's conclusion on these issues was effectively absurd in the sense of rendering the awarding of termination and severance pay arbitrary depending on when the employee's termination took place, ie. before or after the bankruptcy [paras 27-29].
29 What, then, in law is an ambiguity? To answer, an ambiguity must be “real” (Marcotte, supra, at p. 115). The words of the provision must be “reasonably capable of more than one meaning” (Westminster Bank Ltd. v. Zang,  A.C. 182 (H.L.), at p. 222, per Lord Reid). By necessity, however, one must consider the “entire context” of a provision before one can determine if it is reasonably capable of multiple interpretations. In this regard, Major J.’s statement in CanadianOxy Chemicals Ltd. v. Canada (Attorney General), 1999 CanLII 680 (SCC),  1 S.C.R. 743, at para. 14, is apposite: “It is only when genuine ambiguity arises between two or more plausible readings, each equally in accordance with the intentions of the statute, that the courts need to resort to external interpretive aids” (emphasis added), to which I would add, “including other principles of interpretation”.
30 For this reason, ambiguity cannot reside in the mere fact that several courts -- or, for that matter, several doctrinal writers -- have come to differing conclusions on the interpretation of a given provision. Just as it would be improper for one to engage in a preliminary tallying of the number of decisions supporting competing interpretations and then apply that which receives the “higher score”, it is not appropriate to take as one’s starting point the premise that differing interpretations reveal an ambiguity. It is necessary, in every case, for the court charged with interpreting a provision to undertake the contextual and purposive approach set out by Driedger, and thereafter to determine if “the words are ambiguous enough to induce two people to spend good money in backing two opposing views as to their meaning” (Willis, supra, at pp. 4-5).
55 After considering the entire context of s. 9(1)(c), and after reading its words in their grammatical and ordinary sense in harmony with the legislative framework in which the provision is found, I find no ambiguity. .... There is no need in this circumstance to resort to any of the subsidiary principles of statutory interpretation.
 It is necessary, therefore, to determine the purpose of the legislation, whether as a whole or as expressed in a particular provision.
 The starting point in a review of the modern principle of statutory interpretation is Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), 1998 CanLII 837 (SCC),  1 S.C.R. 27. That case provides both general guidance on the proper approach to statutory interpretation and specific guidance on how to apply that approach where the plain meaning of a provision appears to conflict with its underlying statutory purpose.
 The modern principle takes a more holistic view. As Iacobucci J. explained in Rizzo Shoes, at para. 21, the modern principle “recognizes that statutory interpretation cannot be founded on the wording of the legislation alone.” Sullivan expands on this idea, at §2.18: “Today, as the modern principle indicates, legislative intent, textual meaning and legal norms are all legitimate concerns of interpreters and each has a role to play in every interpretive effort” (emphasis added).
 That is the general guidance that Rizzo Shoes provides in all cases involving statutory interpretation. Equally important for present purposes is the guidance the case provides in circumstances where the plain meaning of a provision appears to conflict with its underlying statutory purpose. The issue in Rizzo Shoes was whether employees who lost their jobs when their employer went bankrupt were entitled to termination and severance pay under the Employment Standards Act, 1981, S.O. 1981, c. 22 (the “ESA”). That statute provided that such benefits were payable when a claimant’s employment was “terminated by an employer”: see ss. 40 and 40a. The question was whether bankruptcy acted as a “termination” for purposes of the Act.
 The judge at first instance held that it did. He reasoned that the object and intent of the Employment Standards Act was to provide minimum employment standards and to benefit and protect employees’ interests. As remedial legislation, the Act should be given a fair, large, and liberal interpretation to advance its goals.
 The Court of Appeal for Ontario disagreed. It focused on the plain meaning of the impugned provisions and concluded that the rights to termination and severance pay were limited to situations where the employer actively terminates the employee – not when the termination results by operation of law, as in a bankruptcy.
At the heart of this conflict is an issue of statutory interpretation. Consistent with the findings of the Court of Appeal, the plain meaning of the words of the provisions here in question appears to restrict the obligation to pay termination and severance pay to those employers who have actively terminated the employment of their employees. At first blush, bankruptcy does not fit comfortably into this interpretation.
 It was in this context that Iacobucci J. repudiated the view that statutory interpretation could be “founded on the wording of the legislation alone.” Instead, the words of the statute had to be read in their entire context, having regard not just to their ordinary and grammatical meaning but also to the scheme and object of the Act and to the legislature’s intention.
Although the Court of Appeal looked to the plain meaning of the specific provisions in question in the present case, with respect, I believe that the court did not pay sufficient attention to the scheme of the ESA, its object or the intention of the legislature; nor was the context of the words in issue appropriately recognized.
• It would lead to absurd results because it would distinguish between employees’ entitlement to benefits based on whether they were dismissed the day before or the day after their employer’s bankruptcy became final.
There is a old common law 'rule' that has taken on much more importance with the extensive development of public welfare statutes. The idea is simple, that private parties can contract out of statutory protections that favour one of them. Many public welfare statutes now provide for 'non-waiver' provisions that override this common law history, without which the superior economic power of one party would render the statutory protections ineffectual [eg. Residential Tenancies Act, RSO 2006, c.17, s.3(1)].
The issue has also fallen to be decided as public policy.
In Fleming v. Massey (Ont CA, 2016), the issue was whether private parties could contractually waive protections granted one of them under the Workplace Safety and Insurance Act, which protections ensured workers compensation for workplace injuries. In this case the court expresses the view that the 'old' common law rule (that parties may contract out or waive statutory protections) should, in several statutory areas (eg. worker's insurance legislation, human rights legislation and others), be reversed on public policy grounds so that an express statutory provision should be required to allow such waiver [paras 29-33].
 ..... The construction of statutes presumes that legislatures do not intend to interfere with the common law except insofar as the statute clearly and unambiguously does so. The effect of the presumption is to enhance the stability of the law by favouring certainty and fair notice over vague and inadvertent change that could otherwise result. See Sullivan on the Construction of Statutes, 6th ed., (Markham, Ont.: LexisNexis, 2014), at pp. 504, 538-39; and Evans v. Gonder, 2010 ONCA 172 (CanLII), 54 E.T.R. (3d) 193, at para. 40.
 Inasmuch as there is no express indication from the legislature that s. 9 of the Act is meant to be an exhaustive code, or meant to preclude resort to the common law in actions for defamation, the legislation should be read as supplementing the common law in two respects. First, with respect to any action or proceeding for damages, including an action for negligence or abuse of process, s. 9 extends the common law immunity from prosecution for those performing quasi-judicial functions to officials of the Law Society conducting an investigation while acting in good faith. Thus, s. 9 is a rights-granting measure and not, as the appellant contends here, a rights-limiting measure. Insofar as defamation actions are concerned, it does not detract from the common law defence of absolute privilege in respect of an action for defamation in any way.
 Second, s. 9 also supplements the common law in actions where defamation is alleged. The common law defence of absolute privilege applies only if the alleged defamatory statement is related to the investigation. If Mr. McClyment had made a defamatory statement that was unrelated to the investigation, that statement would not be protected by absolute privilege at common law. But it could still potentially be protected by s. 9 if it was done in good faith.
This well-known principle of statutory interpretation, 'implied exclusion' or expressio unius est exclusio alterius, may apply when a condition is expressly applied to one situation but not the second. The idea is that when a statute expressly addresses the condition in one case, that it's absence in the second must be intentional. It's sort of a idea that statutes are omniscient.
 Rothstein J. reiterated, at para. 16, that the modern approach to statutory construction is “the words of an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament”.
 Reading the WSIA as a whole, it is apparent its objective is to ensure injured workers have access to compensation. It employs two different means to accomplish that objective. The first means provides workers with an insurance plan and completely eliminates workers’ civil actions. In the part of the Act dealing with the first means, it was necessary to prohibit only the waiver of benefits under the insurance plan. The second means, Part X, makes numerous changes to the common law to achieve the same statutory objective by providing workers with rights of action for damages. It seems to me that applying the implied exclusion principle to s. 16 to infer a worker can waive the rights provided by Part X would fundamentally undermine what the Legislature is trying to achieve in Part X.
The application of these principles has resulted in the presumption that whenever land is expropriated, compensation will be paid. This has been the consistent approach of this Court.
[O]nly if a provision is ambiguous (in that after full consideration of the context, multiple interpretations of the words arise that are equally consistent with Parliamentary intent), is it permissible to resort to interpretive presumptions such as "strict construction". The applicable principle is not "strict construction" but s. 12 of the Interpretation Act, which provides that every enactment "is deemed remedial, and shall be given such fair, large and liberal construction and interpretation as best ensures the attainment of its objects".
See also R. v. Dunn, 2013 ONCA 539 (CanLII), at paras. 36-39, Toronto Condominium Corporation No. 1908 v. Stefco Plumbing and Mechanical Contracting Inc., 2014 ONCA 4806, at para.37; Tyendinaga Mohawk Council v. Brant, 2014 ONCA 565 (CanLII), at para. 51; 1420041 Ontario Inc. v. 1 King West Inc., 2012 ONCA 249, at para. 32.
 The modern approach to statutory interpretation requires the court to consider the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words used, the broader context having regard to the scheme and objects of the Act, and the intention of the Legislature. There is no need to import a presumed intent when the actual intent is clear, and doing so in the absence of an irreducible ambiguity would be an error of law.
This principle applies when a prospective amendment is made to substantive ('rights') law. While any procedural rule takes effect immediately upon the amendment [Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v Deloitte & Touche (Ont CA, 2014) [paras 24], the 'old' substantive law persists. And it persists as far as pre-amendment rights are still at issue in any case, current or future.
This is an artifact of legal 'vesting', the idea that once you have claimed rights (if you claim them before the rights has been rescinded by amendment), then they can't be taken away.

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