Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/103583/sampson-vs-murray
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 04:33:31+00:00

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Upon being notified that she was going to be discharged on a specific date from her position as a probationary Government employee, respondent filed this action claiming that the applicable Civil Service regulations for discharge of probationary employees had not been followed, and seeking a temporary injunction against her dismissal pending an administrative appeal to the Civil Service Commission (CSC). The District Court granted a temporary restraining order, and, after an adversary hearing at which the Government declined to produce the discharging official as a witness to testify as to the reasons for the dismissal, ordered the temporary injunctive relief continued. The Court of Appeals affirmed, rejecting the Government's contention that the District Court had no authority to grant temporary injunctive relief in this class of cases, and holding that the relief granted was within the permissible bounds of the District Court's discretion.
Held: While the District Court is not totally without authority to grant interim injunctive relief to a discharged Government employee, nevertheless under the standards that must govern the issuance of such relief, the District Court's issuance of the temporary injunctive relief here cannot be sustained. Pp. 415 U. S. 68 -92.
(a) The District Court's authority to review agency action, Service v. Dulles, 354 U. S. 363 , does not come into play until it may be authoritatively said that the administrative decision to discharge an employee does, in fact, fail to conform to the applicable regulations, and until administrative action has become final, no court is in a position to say that such action did or did not conform to the regulations. Here, the District Court authorized, on an interim basis, relief that the CSC had neither considered nor authorized -- the mandatory reinstatement of respondent in her Government position. Scripps-Howard Radio v. FCC, 316 U. S. 4 ; FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U. S. 597 , distinguished. Pp. 415 U. S. 71 -78.
(b) Considering the disruptive effect that the grant of temporary relief here was likely to have on the administrative process, and in view of the historical denial of all equitable relief by federal courts in disputes involving discharge of Government employees, the well established rule that the Government be granted the widest latitude in handling it own internal affairs, and the traditional unwillingness of equity courts to enforce personal service contracts, the Court of Appeals erred in routinely applying the traditional standards governing more orthodox "stays," and respondent, at the very least, must show irreparable injury sufficient in kind and degree to override the foregoing factors. Pp. 415 U. S. 78 -84.
(c) Viewing the order at issue as a preliminary injunction, the Court of Appeals erred in suggesting that, at this stage of the proceeding, the District Court need not have concluded that there was actually irreparable injury, and in intimating that, as alleged in respondent's unverified complaint, either loss of earning or damage to reputation might afford a basis for a finding of irreparable injury. Pp. 415 U. S. 84 -92.
149 U.S.App.D.C. 256, 462 F.2d 871, reversed.
REHNQUIST, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and STEWART, WHITE, BLACKMUN, and POWELL, JJ., joined. DOUGLAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 415 U. S. 92 . MARSHALL, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN, J., joined, post, p. 415 U. S. 97 .
after her employment with GSA began, she was advised in writing by the Acting Commissioner of the Public Buildings Service, W. H. Sanders, that she would be discharged from her position on May 29, 1971. She then filed this action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, seeking to temporarily enjoin her dismissal pending her pursuit of an administrative appeal to the Civil Service Commission. The District Court granted a temporary restraining order, and after an adversary hearing extended the interim injunctive relief in favor of respondent until the Acting Commissioner of the Public Buildings Service testified about the reasons for respondent's dismissal.
A divided Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed, [ Footnote 1 ] rejecting the Government's contention that the District Court had no authority whatever to grant temporary injunctive relief in this class of cases, and holding that the relief granted by the District Court in this particular case was within the permissible bounds of its discretion. We granted certiorari sub nom. Kunzi v. Murray, 410 U.S. 981 (1973). We agree with the Court of Appeals that the District Court is not totally without authority to grant interim injunctive relief to a discharged Government employee, but conclude that, judged by the standards which we hold must govern the issuance of such relief, the issuance of the temporary injunctive relief by the District Court in this case cannot be sustained.
of the Civil Service Commission, this career conditional appointment was subject to a one-year probationary period. [ Footnote 2 ] Applicable regulations provided that respondent, during this initial term of probation, could be dismissed without being afforded the greater procedural advantages available to permanent employees in the competitive service. [ Footnote 3 ] The underlying dispute between the parties arises over whether the more limited procedural requirements applicable to probationary employees were satisfied by petitioners in this case.
was based in part on her activities while in the course of her previous employment in the Defense Intelligence Agency, and that, therefore, she was entitled to an opportunity to file an answer under this latter provision.
Intelligence Agency. Relying upon the inclusion of the information concerning her previous employment, respondent's counsel requested that she be given a detailed statement of the charges against her and an opportunity to reply -- the procedures to which she would be entitled under the regulations if, in fact, the basis of her discharge had been conduct during her previous employment. This request was denied.
Respondent then filed an administrative appeal with the Civil Service Commission pursuant to the provisions of 5 CFR § 315.806(c), alleging that her termination was subject to § 315.805 and was not effected in accordance with the procedural requirements of that section. [ Footnote 7 ] While her administrative appeal was pending undecided, she filed this action. Her complaint alleged that the agency had failed to follow the appropriate Civil Service regulations, alleged that her prospective discharge would deprive her of income and cause her to suffer the embarrassment of being wrongfully discharged, and requested a temporary restraining order and interim injunctive relief against her removal from employment pending agency determination of her appeal. The District Court granted the temporary restraining order at the time of the filing of respondent's complaint, and set a hearing on the application for a temporary injunction for the following week.
"Plaintiff may suffer immediate and irreparable injury, loss and damage before the Civil Service Commission can consider Plaintiff's claim. [ Footnote 8 ]"
The Government, desiring to test the authority of the District Court to enter such an order, has not produced Sanders, and the interim relief awarded respondent continues in effect at this time.
"Congress presumably could remove the jurisdiction of the District Courts to grant such equitable interim relief, in light of the remedies available, [ Footnote 9 ]"
the court found that the District Court had the power to grant relief in the absence of an explicit prohibition from Congress. The Court of Appeals decided that the District Court acted within the bounds of permissible discretion in requiring Sanders to appear and testify [ Footnote 10 ] and in continuing the temporary injunctive relief until he was produced as a witness by the Government.
While it would doubtless be intellectually neater to completely separate the question whether a District Court has authority to issue any temporary injunctive relief at the behest of a discharged Government employee from the question whether the relief granted in this case was proper, we do not believe the questions may be thus bifurcated into two water-tight compartments. We believe the basis for our decision can best be illuminated by taking up the various arguments which the parties urge upon us.
promulgated pursuant to a broad grant of statutory authority likewise make no provision for interlocutory judicial intervention.
"It is asserted that the Civil Service Commission has been given exclusive review jurisdiction. But, as noted initially, there is no statutory power in the Civil Service Commission to grant a temporary stay of discharge. Prior to the Civil Service Act, a United States District Court would certainly have had jurisdiction and power to grant such temporary relief. The statute did not explicitly take it away, nor implicitly by conferring such jurisdiction and power on the CSC; we hold the District Court still has jurisdiction, and may exercise the power under established standards in appropriate circumstances. [ Footnote 16 ]"
"'until he shall be removed therefrom by proper proceedings had under the Civil Service Act and the rules and regulations made thereunder or by judicial proceedings at law. . . .' [ Footnote 19 ]"
were not commenceed until the administrative remedy had been unsuccessfully pursued. [ Footnote 23 ] The fact that Government personnel decision are now ultimately subject to the type of judicial review sought in Service v. Dulles, supra, does not, without more, create the authority to issue interim injunctive relief which was held lacking in cases such as White v. Berry, supra.
"It has always been held, therefore, that, as part of its traditional equipment for the administration of justice,[*] a federal court can stay the enforcement of a judgment pending the outcome of an appeal. [ Footnote 26 ]"
authority. [ Footnote 29 ] This Court in Scripps-Howard held that the same principles governed the authority of courts charged by statute with judicial review of agency decisions, and that the authority to grant a stay exists in such a court even though not expressly conferred by the statute which confers appellate jurisdiction.
Scripps-Howard, supra, of course, is not the instant case. The authority of the District Court to review agency action under Service v. Dulles, supra, does not come into play until it may be authoritatively said that the administrative decision to discharge an employee does, in fact, fail to conform to applicable regulations. [ Footnote 30 ] Until administrative action has become final, no court is in a position to say that such action did or did not conform to applicable regulations. Here respondent had obtained no administrative determination of her appeal at the time she brought the action in the District Court. She was, in effect, asking that court to grant her, on an interim basis, relief which the administrative agency charged with review of her employer's action could grant her only after it had made a determination on the merits.
separation of respondent unless and until proper procedures had been followed. But this is not to say that it would hold respondent to be entitled to full reinstatement with the attendant tension with her superiors that the agency intended to avoid by dismissing her. Congress has provided that a wrongfully dismissed employee shall receive full payment and benefits for any time during which the employee was wrongfully discharged from employment. [ Footnote 31 ] The Civil Service Commission could conceivably accommodate the conflicting claims in this case by directing respondent's superiors to provide her with an opportunity to reply by affidavit, and by ordering that she receive backpay for any period of her dismissal prior to the completion of the type of dismissal procedure required by the regulations.
"Of course, no court can grant an applicant an authorization which the Commission has refused.
No order that the Court of Appeals could make would enable an applicant to go on the air when the Commission has denied him a license to do so. A stay of an order denying an application would, in the nature of things, stay nothing. It could not operate as an affirmative authorization of that which the Commission has refused to authorize. [ Footnote 32 ]"
Surely that conclusion would not vary depending upon whether the radio station had started broadcasting on its own initiative and sought to stay a Commission order directing it to cease. Yet here the District Court did authorize, on an interim basis, relief which the Civil Service Commission had neither considered nor authorized -- the mandatory reinstatement of respondent in her Government position. We are satisfied that Scripps-Howard, involving as it did the traditional authority of reviewing courts to grant stays, provides scant support for the injunction issued here.
temporary injunction to preserve the controversy before the agency. The Commission's application alleged, [ Footnote 34 ] and the court accepted, [ Footnote 35 ] that refusal to grant the injunction would result in the practical disappearance of one of the entities whose merger the Commission sought to challenge. The disappearance, in turn, would mean that the agency, and the court entrusted by statute with authority to review the agency's decision, would be incapable of implementing their statutory duties by fashioning effective relief. Thus, invocation of the All Writs Act, as a preservative of jurisdiction, was considered appropriate.
denial of relief, the Commission here has argued that judicial action interferes with the normal agency processes. [ Footnote 36 ] And we see nothing in the record to suggest that any judicial review available under the doctrine of Service v. Dulles would be defeated in the same manner as review in Dean Foods.
We are therefore unpersuaded that the temporary injunction granted by the District Court in this case was justified either by our prior decisions dealing with the availability of injunctive relief to discharged federal employees, or by those dealing with the authority of reviewing courts to grant temporary stays or injunctions pending full appellate review. If the order of the District Court in this case is to be upheld, the authority must be found elsewhere.
out of harmony with the uniformity of rate levels fostered by the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. [ Footnote 41 ]"
The overall scheme governing employees of the Federal Government falls neatly within neither of these precedents. Unlike Scripps-Howard, traditional stay practice lends little support to the sort of relief which the District Court granted respondent here, and the precedents dealing with the availability of equitable relief to discharged Government employees are quite unfavorable to respondent. Unlike Arrow Transportation, supra, the administrative structure is far more a creature of agency regulations than of statute. We are thus not prepared to conclude that Congress in this class of cases has wholly divested the district courts of their customary authority to grant temporary injunctive relief, and, to that extent, we agree with the Court of Appeals. But merely because the factors relied upon by the Government do not establish that the district courts are wholly bereft of the authority claimed for them here does not mean, as the Court of Appeals appeared to believe, that temporary injunctive relief in this class of cases is to be dispensed without regard to those factors. While considerations similar to those found sufficient in Arrow Transportation to totally deprive the district courts of equitable authority do not have that force here, they nonetheless are entitled to great weight in the equitable balancing process which attends the grant of injunctive relief.
"The President may prescribe rules, which shall provide, as nearly as conditions of good administration warrant, that there shall be a period of probation before an appointment in the competitive service becomes absolute."
5 U.S.C. § 1301-1302. [ Footnote 47 ] Part 752, the regulations governing adverse agency actions, provides certain procedural safeguards for employees but, as did the statutes cited above, exempts "employee[s] currently serving a probationary or trial period." [ Footnote 48 ] Such employees are remitted to the procedures specified in subpart H of Part 315, [ Footnote 49 ] the procedures at issue here. Under § 752.202 of the regulations, permanent competitive service employees are to be retained in an active duty status only during the required 30-day notice period, and the Commission is given no authority to issue additional stays. [ Footnote 50 ] It cannot prevent the dismissal of an employee or order his reinstatement prior to hearing and determining his appeal on the merits. Reasonably, a probationary employee could be entitled to no more than retention on active duty for the period preceding the effective date of his discharge.
of 1912 and provided that any person in the competitive Civil Service who was unjustifiably discharged and later restored to his position was entitled to full backpay for the time he was out of work. The benefits of this Act were extended to additional employees, including probationary employees, in 1966. [ Footnote 52 ] Respondent was eligible for full compensation for any period of improper discharge under this section.
As we have noted, respondent's only substantive claim, either before the District Court or in her administrative appeal, was that petitioners had violated the regulations promulgated by the Civil Service Commission. Those same regulations provided for an appeal to the agency which promulgated the regulations, and further provided that, until that appeal had been heard on the merits, the employer's discharge of the employee was to remain in effect. Respondent, however, sought judicial intervention before fully utilizing the administrative scheme.
standards governing more orthodox "stays." See Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Assn. v. FPC, 104 U.S.App.D.C. 106, 259 F.2d 921 (198). [ Footnote 53 ] Although we do not hold that Congress has wholly foreclosed the granting of preliminary injunctive relief in such cases, we do believe that respondent, at the very least, must make a showing of irreparable injury sufficient in kind and degree to override these factors cutting against the general availability of preliminary injunctions in Government personnel cases. We now turn to the showing made to the District Court on that issue, and to the Court of Appeals' treatment of it.
"Without passing on the merits of Mrs. Murray's contention that she will suffer irreparable harm if the sought-for relief is not granted (a task for the District Court here), we note that there was a determination that such a loss of employment could be 'irreparable harm' in Reeber v. Rossell (1950), a case quite similar to that at bar. We agree with the Reeber court that such a loss of employment can amount to irreparable harm, and that injunctive relief may be a proper remedy pending the final administrative determination of the validity of the discharge by the Civil Service Commission. [ Footnote 54 ] "
"As the District Court here felt that the hearing on the motion for the preliminary injunction could not be completed until Mr. Sanders was produced to testify, it was proper for him to continue the stay in order to preserve the status quo pending the completion of the hearing. [ Footnote 55 ]"
"The court's opinion does not hold, and the trial judge has not yet held, that interim relief is proper in Mrs. Murray's case, but we do hold that the trial judge may consider granting such relief, as this is inherent in his historical equitable role. [ Footnote 56 ]"
the adverse party or his attorney can be heard in opposition. . . . Every temporary restraining order granted without notice . . . shall define the injury and state why it is irreparable and why the order was granted without notice; and shall expire, by its terms, within such time after entry, not to exceed 10 days, as the court fixes, unless within the time so fixed the order, for good cause shown, is extended for a like period or unless the party against whom the order is directed consents that it may be extended for a longer period."
"The key word in this consideration is irreparable. Mere injuries, however substantial, in terms of money, time and energy necessarily expended in the absence of a stay, are not enough. The possibility that adequate compensatory or other corrective relief will be available at a later date, in the ordinary course of litigation, weighs heavily against a claim of irreparable harm. [ Footnote 65 ]"
"[It] . . . provides that an agency or department of the Government may remove any employee at any time, but that the employee shall then have a right of appeal. When he is removed, he is, of course, off the payroll. If he wins the appeal, it is provided that he shall be paid for the time during which he was suspended. [ Footnote 67 ]"
Respondent's complaint also alleges, as a basis for relief, the humiliation and damage to her reputation which may ensue. As a matter of first impression, it would seem that no significant loss of reputation would be inflicted by procedural irregularities in effectuating respondent's discharge, and that whatever damage might occur would be fully corrected by an administrative determination requiring the agency to conform to the applicable regulations. Respondent's claim here is not that she could not as a matter of statutory or administrative right be discharged, but only that she was entitled to additional procedural safeguards in effectuating the discharge.
issuance of a temporary injunction in this type of case. [ Footnote 68 ] We therefore reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals which approved the action of the District Court.
Murray v. Kunzig, 149 U.S.App.D.C. 256, 462 F.2d 871 (1972). For a discussion of the Court of Appeals' jurisdiction, and the jurisdiction of this Court, see infra at 415 U. S. 86 -88.
Compare 5 CFR §§ 315.801-315.807 with 5 CFR § 752.101 et seq.
"§ 315.805 Termination of probationers for conditions arising before appointment."
"When an agency proposes to terminate an employee serving a probationary or trial period for reasons based in whole or in part on conditions arising before his appointment, the employee is entitled to the following:"
"(a) Notice of proposed adverse action. The employee is entitled to an advance written notice stating the reasons, specifically and in detail, for the proposed action."
"(b) Employee's answer. The employee is entitled to a reasonable time for filing a written answer to the notice of proposed adverse action and for furnishing affidavits in support of his answer. If the employee answers, the agency shall consider the answer in reaching its decision."
"(c) Notice of adverse decision. The employee is entitled to be notified of the agency's decision at the earliest practicable date. The agency shall deliver the decision to the employee at or before the time the action will be made effective. The notice shall be in writing, inform the employee of the reasons for the action, inform the employee of his right of appeal to the appropriate office of the Commission, and inform him of the time limit within which the appeal must be submitted as provided in § 315.806(d)."
"A probationer whose termination is subject to § 315.805 may appeal on the ground that his termination was not effected in accordance with the procedural requirements of that section."
"It appearing to the Court from the affidavits and accompanying exhibits that a Temporary Restraining Order, pending the appearance before this Court of Mr. W. H. Sanders, Acting Commissioner, Public Buildings Service, should issue because, unless Defendants are restrained from terminating Plaintiff's employment, Plaintiff may suffer immediate and irreparable injury, loss and damage before the Civil Service Commission can consider Plaintiff's claim,"
"NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, that the Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court at twelve o'clock p.m., May 28, 1971, is continued until the appearance of the aforesaid W. H. Sanders."
"IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a copy of this Order be served by the United States Marshal on Defendants forthwith."
149 U.S.App.D.C. at 262 n. 21, 462 F.2d at 877 n. 21.
Id. at 263-264, 462 F.2d at 878-879.
29 U.S.C. §§ 160(j), ( l ).
415 U.S.C. §§ 77t(b), 78u(e).
"When an agency finds that justice so requires, it may postpone the effective date of action taken by it, pending judicial review. On such conditions as may be required and to the extent necessary to prevent irreparable injury, the reviewing court, including the court to which a case may be taken on appeal from or on application for certiorari or other writ to a reviewing court, may issue all necessary and appropriate process to postpone the effective date of an agency action or to preserve status or rights pending conclusion of the review proceedings."
The relevant legislative history of that section, however, indicates that it was primarily intended to reflect existing law under the Scripps-Howard doctrine, discussed infra, and not to fashion new rules of intervention for District Courts. See S.Rep. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 27, 44 (1945). Thus, respondent's various contentions may be grouped under her primary theory discussed in the text.
149 U.S.App.D.C. at 265, 462 F.2d at 880 (footnotes omitted).
"The appointment to an official position in the Government, even if it be simply a clerical position, is not a mere ministerial act, but one involving the exercise of judgment. The appointing power must determine the fitness of the applicant; whether or not he is the proper one to discharge the duties of the position. Therefore it is one of those acts over which the courts have no general supervising power."
"In the absence of specific provision to the contrary, the power of removal from office is incident to the power of appointment."
"It cannot for a moment be admitted that it was the intention of the Constitution that those offices which are denominated inferior offices should be held during life. And if removable at pleasure, by whom is such removal to be made? In the absence of all constitutional provision or statutory regulation, it would seem to be a sound and necessary rule to consider the power of removal as incident to the power of appointment."
" In re Hennen, 13 Pet. 230, 38 U. S. 259 ; Parsons v. United States, 167 U. S. 324 . Unless, therefore, there be some specific provision to the contrary, the action of the Secretary of the Interior in removing the petitioner from office on account of inefficiency is beyond review in the courts either by mandamus to reinstate him or by compelling payment of salary as though he had not been removed."
177 U.S. at 177 U. S. 293 -294.
The plaintiff in White protested that he was being discharged because of his political affiliation, a basis for discharge specifically prohibited under the Civil Service rules. 171 U.S. at 171 U. S. 367 -368. Such a contention obviously went to the heart of the Civil Service legislation, since a primary purpose of that system was to remove large sectors of Government employment from the political "spoils system" which had previously played a large part in the selection and discharge of Government employees. See generally H. Kaplan, The Law of Civil Service 1-22 (1958).
The Court quoted from Morgan v. Nunn, 84 F. 551 (CCMD Tenn 1898), and noted that "[s]imilar decisions have been made in other Circuit Courts of the United States." 171 U.S. at 171 U. S. 377 -378.
Id. at 171 U. S. 378 .
In Service, an employee discharged under the provisions of the McCarran Rider, 65 Stat. 581, contended that the Secretary of State had not followed departmental regulations in effecting his dismissal. This Court agreed with plaintiff's position and decided that his "dismissal cannot stand." 354 U.S. at 354 U. S. 388 . However, the employee in that case had made a full effort to secure administrative review of his discharge prior to filing suit in the District Court. These efforts, as the Court noted, id. at 354 U. S. 370 , had "proved unsuccessful." In the present case, respondent has petitioned the court before ascertaining whether administrative relief will be granted.
"even though the Radio Act of 1927 contained no provisions dealing with the authority for the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia to stay orders of the Commission on appeal, the Court had been issuing stays as a matter of course wherever they were found to be appropriate, without objection by the Commission."
Scripps-Howard Radio v. FCC, 316 U. S. 4 , 316 U. S. 13 (1942).
"'Where, pursuant to the provisions of Section 402(b) of the Communications Act of 1934, an appeal has been taken, to the United States Court of Appeals, from an order of the Federal Communications Commission, does the court, in order to preserve the status quo pending appeal, have power to stay the execution of the Commission's order from which the appeal was taken, pending the determination of the appeal?'"
Id. at 316 U. S. 6 . The wording of the question certified makes clear that the Court was faced only with the situation in which an appeal has been filed seeking review of completed agency action.
The reliance of the Court on this provision was noted by the Court of Appeals in its opinion in this case. 149 U.S.App.D.C. at 261 n. 17, 462 F.2d at 876 n. 17.
For example, the two cases cited by the Court in Scripps-Howard involved situations in which a court accepted appeal jurisdiction and, in connection with that acceptance, issued a stay of the decision below. See In re Claasen, 140 U. S. 200 (1891) (writ of error to this Court); In re McKenzie, 180 U. S. 536 (1901) (appeal taken to the Circuit Court of Appeals). The All Writs Act, n 26, supra, provided the authority in each case.
See n 22, supra. As noted above, the employee in Service sought to have the Secretary's action declared invalid within the administrative system. He sought judicial relief only after it became evident that no administrative relief would be forthcoming.
"(b) An employee of an agency who, on the basis of an administrative determination or a timely appeal, is found by appropriate authority under applicable law or regulation to have undergone an unjustified or unwarranted personnel action that has resulted in the withdrawal or reduction of all or a part of the pay, allowances, or differentials of the employee --"
"(1) is entitled, on correction of the personnel action, to receive for the period for which the personnel action was in effect an amount equal to all or any part of the pay, allowances, or differentials, as applicable, that the employee normally would have earned during that period if the personnel action had not occurred, less any amounts earned by him through other employment during that period. . . ."
316 U.S. at 316 U. S. 14 .
"[T]he Commission is a governmental agency to which Congress has entrusted, inter alia, the enforcement of the Clayton Act, granting it the power to order divestiture in appropriate cases. At the same time, Congress has given the courts of appeals jurisdiction to review final Commission action. It would stultify congressional purpose to say that the Commission did not have the incidental power to ask the courts of appeals to exercise their authority derived from the All Writs Act."
384 U.S. at 384 U. S. 606 . A contrary decision, the Court felt, would have made it virtually impossible for the Commission itself to undertake review of the proposed merger. The congressional grant of authority to the FTC in Clayton Act cases thus could have been frustrated.
"consummation of the agreement would 'prevent the Commission from devising, or render it extremely difficult for the Commission to devise, any effective remedy after its decision on the merits.'"
Id. at 384 U. S. 600 . The Commission therefore was affirmatively asserting that the administrative remedy which it was authorized to fashion was inadequate.
Id. at 384 U. S. 601 .
In Dean Foods, the Commission confessed its inability to fashion effective administrative relief. But petitioners here admit no such thing. Rather, they strongly assert that the Back Pay Act, n 31, supra, provides a complete remedy for any procedural irregularities which may have occurred in this case.
316 U.S. at 316 U. S. 11 -13.
The Court compared the provisions of §§ 402(a) and 402(b) of the Communications Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1064. The former section specifically authorized temporary stays, through application of the Urgent Deficiencies Appropriation Act of Oct. 22, 1913, 38 Stat. 208, of orders of the Federal Communications Commission which were under review -- with certain exceptions. Those exceptions, which included the order there at issue, were treated under § 402(b), which made no specific provision for such stays. The Court thus was required to consider whether Congress deliberately sought to deprive courts of a power in those cases not governed by the Urgent Deficiencies Act which had been expressly authorized for those cases which were governed by the Act.
"[W]e cannot suppose that Congress, by vesting the new suspension power in the Commission, intended to give backhanded approval to the exercise of a judicial power which had brought the whole problem to a head."
372 U.S. at 372 U. S. 664 .
See 5 U.S.C. § 7501.
See 5 U.S.C. § 2108(3).
"a permanent or indefinite preference eligible who has completed a probationary or trial period as an employee of an Executive agency or as an individual employed by the government of the District of Columbia . . . ,"
subject to certain exceptions. Section 7512 provides that such an employee must receive written notice of the reasons for proposed adverse action, a chance to reply in writing and by affidavit, and notice of an adverse decision. A probationary employee, under the regulations, has more limited rights. See 5 CFR § 315.801 et seq.
"[t]he Civil Service Commission shall aid the President, as he may request, in preparing the rules he prescribes under this title for the administration of the competitive service."
Title 5 U.S.C. § 1302 empowers the Commission to prescribe regulations, "subject to the rules prescribed by the President. . . ."
5 CFR § 315.801 et seq.
"Except as provided in paragraph (e) of this section, an employee against whom adverse action is proposed is entitled to be retained in an active duty status during the notice period."
Section 752.202(a)(1) provides that "at least 30 full days' advance written notice" is required.
"(1) Has the petitioner made a strong showing that he is likely to prevail on the merits of his appeal? (2) Has the petitioner shown that, without such relief, he will be irreparably injured? (3) Would the issuance of a stay substantially harm other parties interested in the proceedings? (4) Where lies the public interest?"
149 U.S.App.D.C. at 263, 462 F.2d at 878.
Id. at 262, 462 F.2d at 877 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 265, 462 F.2d at 880.
Id. at 270, 462 F.2d at 885 (emphasis in original).
"It is because the remedy is so drastic and may have such adverse consequences that the authority to issue temporary restraining orders is carefully hedged in Rule 65(b) by protective provisions. And the most important of these protective provisions is the limitation on the time during which such an order can continue to be effective."
"It is for the same reason, the possibility of drastic consequences which cannot later be corrected, that an exception is made to the final judgment rule to permit review of preliminary injunctions. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). To deny review of an order that has all the potential danger of a preliminary injunction in terms of duration, because it is issued without a preliminary adjudication of the basic rights involved, would completely defeat the purpose of this provision."
"We hold, therefore, that the continuation of the temporary restraining order beyond the period of statutory authorization, having, as it does, the same practical effect as the issuance of a preliminary injunction, is appealable within the meaning and intent of 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1)."
Our Brother MARSHALL, in his dissenting opinion, nevertheless suggests that a district court can totally or partially impede review of an indefinite injunctive order by failing to make any findings of fact or conclusions of law. It would seem to be a consequence of this reasoning that an order which neglects to comply with one rule may be saved from the normal appellate review by its failure to comply with still another rule. We do not find this logic convincing. Admittedly, the District Court did not comply with Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 52(a), but we do not think that we are thereby foreclosed from examining the record to determine if sufficient allegations or sufficient evidence supports the issuance of injunctive relief. As discussed below, nothing in the pleadings or affidavits, or in the testimony at the hearing before the District Court, demonstrates that this is an extraordinary case supporting the award of judicial relief. See n 68, infra.
We note that Rule 65 requires a showing of irreparable injury for the issuance of a temporary restraining order as well. Therefore, for the purposes of this part of the discussion, it would make no difference that the order was styled a temporary restraining order, rather than a preliminary injunction.
"JEANNE M. MURRAY, being first duly sworn, deposes as follows:"
"1. I am presently employed by the Public Buildings Service of the General Services Administration (GSA) as a Program Analyst, GS-13."
"2. On May 20, 1971, at approximately five p.m., I was given a letter signed by Mr. W. H. Sanders, Acting Commissioner of the Public Buildings Service, informing me that my employment was to be terminated as of Saturday, May 29, 1971."
"3. I have never been told that GSA's Personnel files contain adverse information about my service in the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), nor have I ever seen a memorandum dealing with my employment there."
"4. I worked for slightly over a year at the DIA, and I have been informed by the Acting Chief of Staff of the DIA, Rear Admiral D. E. Bergin, that my personnel file at DIA contains nothing derogatory to me."
"5. In recent weeks, I was informed by Mr. William Mulroney, a DIA employee, that someone from GSA had been making inquiries of DIA personnel about my term of service there."
149 U.S.App.D.C. at 262, 462 F.2d at 877.
The Court of Appeals held that the Government's failure to produce witness Sanders, after the District Court chose to hear him orally, rather than to rely on his affidavit, allowed the District Court to continue the temporary restraining order until Sanders appeared. We have no doubt that a district court, in appropriate circumstances, may be justified in resolving against a party refusing to produce a witness under his control the relevant issues upon which that witness' testimony might have touched. But it is clear from the record that the testimony of the witness Sanders was desired to test the basis upon which respondent was discharged, testimony which, of course, would go to the issue of respondent's ultimate chances for success on the merits. While the District Court may well have been entitled to resolve that issue against the Government at that stage of the proceeding, this conclusion in no way dispenses with the necessity for a conclusion that irreparable injury will occur, since that is a separate issue that must be proved to the satisfaction of the Court by the person seeking equitable relief.
"motion for a stay of further proceedings pending completion of [the Court's] review of the Commission's orders denying intervention or rehearing."
104 U.S.App.D.C. at 109, 259 F.2d at 924. Such a fact situation was far closer to the traditional situation in which equity powers have been employed to grant a stay pending appeal than is the situation involved in the instant case.
Id. at 110, 259 F.2d at 925 (emphasis in original).
We recognize that cases may arise in which the circumstances surrounding an employee's discharge, together with the resultant effect on the employee, may so far depart from the normal situation that irreparable injury might be found. Such extraordinary cases are hard to define in advance of their occurrence. We have held that an insufficiency of savings or difficulties in immediately obtaining other employment -- external factors common to most discharged employees and not attributable to any unusual actions relating to the discharge itself -- will not support a finding of irreparable injury, however severely they may affect a particular individual. But we do not wish to be understood as foreclosing relief in the genuinely extraordinary situation. Use of the court's injunctive power, however, when discharge of probationary employees is an issue, should be reserved for that situation, rather than employed in the routine case. See also Wettre v. Hague, 74 F.Supp. 396 (Mass.1947); vacated and remanded on other grounds, 168 F.2d 825 (CA1 1948).
I think with all respect that, while the narrow isolated issue involved in this litigation is exposed in the opinion of the Court, the nature of the problem is not.
to respond in writing with supporting affidavits, and notice of any adverse decisions on or prior to the effective date of the termination, 5 CFR § 315.805.
The Congress in 1966 provided that all wrongfully discharged federal employees, including probationary employees, are entitled to backpay, 5 U.S.C. § 5596, and the Court concludes that that is the employee's exclusive remedy.
But where an agency has terminated employment and the employee appeals to the Civil Service Commission, the Commission has no power to issue a stay of the agency's action. This is, therefore, not a case where the employee has gone to the courts for relief which the Commission could have granted but refused to do so. Nor is respondent challenging the Civil Service law; nor is she asking for a ruling on the merits of her claim; nor did the District Court, whose judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, act in derogation of the administrative process. Rather, it protected that process by staying the discharge until the Commission had ruled on the appeal.
appeal is not then pending but may be later perfected." The District Court has at least a limited review of the Commission, Norton v. Macy, 135 U.S.App.D.C. 214, 217, 417 F.2d 1161, 1164; Dozer v. United States, 473 F.2d 866. Hence, the All Writs Act justified its power to grant a stay.
We have, therefore, a case where a stay supplements and does not curtail administrative power, the Commission having no authority to grant that relief. The District Court power preserves the status quo, does not pass on the merits of the controversy, and limits its stay to the date when the merits of the discharge are adjudicated by the Commission. I agree with the Court that that order was appealable.
agency involved refused to produce as a witness the officer who had decided to discharge respondent. Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals were. alert to the necessity to show irreparable injury before an injunction issues.
On that issue, there is more than meets the eye.
"[A]ppellee has shown that he will suffer irreparable damage if the stay is not granted. Irrespective of the government's recent assurance that the appellee would be reinstated if he prevails upon review of his discharge, the injury and the stigma attached to an undesirable discharge are clear."
in the eyes of friends and relatives, and ostracism from association with members of his own race.
over, this generation grew up in the age where millions of people were screened for "loyalty" and "security"; and many were discharged from the federal service; many resigned, rather than face the ordeal of the "witch hunt" that was laid upon them. Discharge from the federal service or resignation under fire became telltale signs of undesirability. Therefore, the case of irreparable injury for an unexplained discharge from federal employment may be plain enough on a hearing.
The District Court and the Court of Appeals were well within the limits of the law in granting a stay so that the issue of irreparable injury might be determined. It hardly comports with any standard for the expenditure of judicial energies to spend our time trying to find error in the exercise of the lower court's discretion to protect federal employees by giving them at least a chance to prove irreparable injury.
"It is sufficient to say that constitutional protection does extend to the public servant whose exclusion pursuant to a statute is patently arbitrary or discriminatory."
And see Schwartz v. Covington, 341 F.2d 537, 538.
With dossiers being compiled by commercial credit bureaus, state and local law enforcement agencies, the CIA, the FBI, the IRS, the Armed Services, and the Census Bureau, we live in an Orwellian age in which the computer has become "the heart of a surveillance system that will turn society into a transparent world." Miller, Computers, Data Banks and Individual Privacy: An Overview, 4 Col.Human Rights L.Rev. 1, 2 (1972). Although the subject of congressional concern, the problem is one which has thus far avoided legislative correction. See Federal Data Banks, Computers and the Bill of Rights, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). See also A. Miller, The Assault on Privacy (1971).
Illinois provides that photographs, fingerprints, etc., be returned to unconvicted arrestees upon acquittal or release and further provides that the arrestee may petition a local court to have the record expunged by the arresting authorities. There is, however, no method for retrieving records which have been distributed to other law enforcement authorities or to private individuals. Ill.Rev.Stat., c. 38, § 206-5 (1973). Connecticut has a statute with similar shortcomings. Conn.Gen.Stat.Ann. § 54-90 (Supp. 1971); see Satter & Kalom, False Arrest: Compensation and Deterrence, 43 Conn.B.J. 598, 612-613. New York's former Penal Law provided that all fingerprints, photographs, etc., of those acquitted of criminal charges had to be returned to the individual if no other criminal proceedings were pending against the individual and he had no prior convictions. N.Y.Penal Law § 516 (1909).
In my view, no appealable order has been entered in this case, and both the Court of Appeals and this Court accordingly lack jurisdiction.
"that the Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court at twelve o'clock p.m., May 28, 1971, is continued until the appearance of the aforesaid W. H. Sanders."
it wanted to hear from Mr. Sanders in person, the Government informed the court that Mr. Sanders was then out of town on vacation. The court relied: "Let me know when he can be available." Counsel for the Government responded: "Very well." And the District Court then said: "The T. R. O. will be continued until he shows up. . . . Tell the agency I will continue the temporary restraining order until the witness appears." Tr. 10.
It is well settled that the grant or denial of a temporary restraining order is not appealable, except in extraordinary circumstances, not present here, where the denial of the temporary restraining order actually decides the merits of the case or is equivalent to a dismissal of the suit. See generally 11 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2962, pp. 616-617 (1973), and cases there cited.
"in granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall . . . set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute the grounds of its action."
This Rule applies to preliminary injunctions, and as no findings of fact and conclusions of law have yet been filed in this case, no valid preliminary injunction was ever issued. See National Mediation Board v. Air Line Pilots Assn., 116 U.S.App.D.C. 300, 323 F.2d 305 (1963); Sims v. Greene, 160 F.2d 512 (CA3 1947).
Rule 52(a), meaningful review is well nigh impossible.
"It is of the highest importance to a proper review of the action of a court in granting or refusing a preliminary injunction that there should be fair compliance with Rule 52(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure."
Mayo v. Lakeland Highlands Canning Co., 309 U. S. 310 , 309 U. S. 316 (1940).
It is suggested that, if an indefinitely extended temporary restraining order remained unappealable, the District Court would have virtually unlimited authority over the parties in an injunctive action. At the outset, this cannot justify this Court's reaching the merits of Mrs. Murray's claim for a preliminary injunction. Even if the order entered by the District Court is appealable, it should be appealable only for the purposes of holding it invalid for failure to comply with Rule 52(a). This was the precise course taken by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in National Mediation Board, supra, on which the majority relies. See also Sims v. Greene, supra.
corrected its error and gone on to resolve the issues presented by the application for a preliminary injunction. The end result would have been the grant or denial of a preliminary injunction, with findings of fact and conclusions of law, which we could meaningfully review.
Here, instead, we find the Supreme Court determining that, although the District Court had jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief, the equities of Mrs. Murray's case did not support a preliminary injunction, when neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals has yet confronted the latter issue. [ Footnote 3/2 ] I do not believe this makes for sound law.
Since the majority persists in considering the merits of Mrs. Murray's claim for injunctive relief, some additional comment is in order. I agree with the majority's conclusion that Congress did not divest federal courts of their long-exercised authority to issue temporary injunctive relief pending the exhaustion of both administrative and judicial review of an employee's claim of wrongful dismissal. I cannot accept, however, the way in which the majority opinion then proceeds to take away with the left hand what it has just given with the right, by precluding injunctive relief in all but so-called "extraordinary cases," whatever they may be.
majority would have courts weigh before granting injunctive relief are all encompassed within the traditional formulations. The adequacy of backpay as a remedy, for example, is relevant in determining whether the party seeking relief has shown that "without such relief, it will be irreparably injured." Id. at 110, 259 F.2d at 925. Likewise, the possible disruptive effect which temporary injunctive relief might have on the office where respondent was employed or on the administrative review process itself relates to whether "the issuance of a stay [will] substantially harm other parties interested in the proceedings." Ibid.
he will return to his former Government position if his appeal is successful. Finally, the loss of income may be "temporary" in only the broadest sense of that word. Not infrequently, dismissed federal employees must wait several years before the wrongful nature of their dismissal is finally settled and their right to backpay established. See, e.g., Paroczay v. United States, 177 Ct.Cl. 754, 369 F.2d 720 (1966); Paterson v. United States, 162 Ct.Cl. 675, 319 F.2d 882 (1963).
The availability of a backpay award several years after a dismissal is scant justice for a Government employee who may have long since been evicted from his home and found himself forced to resort to public assistance in order to support his family. And it is little solace to those who are so injured to be told that their plight is "normal" and "routine." Whether common or not, such consequences amount to irreparable injury which a court of equity has power to prevent.
Nor can I agree with the majority's analysis of Mrs. Murray's claim of damaged reputation. It is argued that Mrs. Murray can suffer no significant loss of reputation by procedural irregularities in effectuating her discharge because her claim is not that she could not, as a matter of statutory or administrative right, be discharged, but only that she was entitled to additional procedural safeguards in effectuating the discharge. Ante at 415 U. S. 91 . In my view, this analysis not only reflects a total misunderstanding of the gist of Mrs. Murray's complaint, but also fails to comprehend the purposes behind the Civil Service Commission regulations at issue here.
if he is given an opportunity to present his side of the story. Mrs. Murray does not seek a hearing as an end in itself, but rather to correct what she believes is a mistaken impression the agency had about her conduct in her prior job, in the hope that, with the record straight, the agency would not discharge her. She seeks to save her job and to avoid the blot on her employment record that a dismissal entails, and it is in this sense that she claims her dismissal would injure her reputation.
Whether the likelihood of irreparable injury to Mrs. Murray if she is not allowed to retain her job pending her administrative appeal, when balanced against the Government's interests in having her out of the office during this period, supports equitable relief in the present case is a question I would leave for the District Court. Because of Mr. Sanders' absence, the District Court cut short its hearing on the application for a preliminary injunction before either the Government or Mrs. Murray had an opportunity to present witnesses or other evidence. Mrs. Murray still has not had her day in court to present evidence supporting her allegation of irreparable injury, and what that evidence would be were she given that opportunity we can only speculate.
"On 2 days' notice to the party who obtained the temporary restraining order without notice or on such shorter notice to that party as the court may prescribe, the adverse party may appear and move its dissolution or modification, and in that event, the court shall proceed to hear and determine such motion as expeditiously as the ends of justice require."
The Court of Appeals expressly stated that it was not evaluating Mrs. Murray's claim of irreparable injury because "any such finding . . . is for the trial judge, who has not yet [decided (and may never decide)] this point in favor of Mrs. Murray." 149 U.S.App.D.C. 256, 262 n.21, 462 F.2d 871, 87 n. 21 (1972).

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