Source: http://ny.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20180329_0000564.ENY.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 10:41:26+00:00

Document:
FindACase | Adams v. Delta Airlines, Inc.
Adams v. Delta Airlines, Inc.
DELTA AIRLINES, INC.; RICHARD ANDERSON, acting as CEO on behalf of Delta Airlines, Defendants.
Hon. Kiyo A. Matsumoto United States District Judge.
Presently before the court is the Report and Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge Lois Bloom, filed on December 18, 2017, recommending that that the motion to dismiss (ECF No. 18) filed by defendants Delta Airlines, Inc. (“Delta”) and its Chief Executive Officer, Richard Anderson (“Anderson, ” and together with Delta, “defendants”), be granted in part and denied in part. (Report and Recommendation re Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim (“R&R”), ECF No. 25 at 1-2.) Delta timely objected to Magistrate Bloom's R&R. (Delta Objection to R&R (“Def. Obj.”), ECF No. 26.) Plaintiff Bahji Adams, proceeding pro se, also objected to the R&R, though her objections were received by the court after the objection deadline had passed. (Plaintiff Objection to R&R (“Pl. Obj.”), ECF No. 27.) In any event, the court has undertaken a comprehensive de novo review of the R&R and the record in light of the written objections, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C).For the reasons set forth below, the court adopts Judge Bloom's R&R in its entirety, except that, for the reasons set forth below, the court declines to specify that the dismissal of plaintiff's NYSHRL claim against Anderson is without prejudice.
A district court reviews those portions of a Report and Recommendation to which a party has timely objected under a de novo standard of review, and “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C).
A plaintiff's complaint must be dismissed if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). In deciding a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6), the court evaluates the sufficiency of a complaint under a “two-pronged approach.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). First, courts generally accept as true the well-pleaded factual allegations of a complaint, but are not bound to accept legal conclusions when examining the sufficiency of a complaint. See Id. at 678 (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Second, after the court assumes all well-pleaded facts to be true, the court must “determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-56. A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
Where a plaintiff proceeds pro se, courts must construe the plaintiff's complaint “liberally” at the motion to dismiss stage. Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009). This means that the court must interpret a pro se complaint “to raise the strongest arguments that [it] suggest[s].” Pabon v. Wright, 459 F.3d 241, 248 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir. 1994)). Nonetheless, to survive a motion to dismiss, a pro se complaint “must contain sufficient factual allegations to meet the plausibility standard.” Green v. McLaughlin, 480 F. App'x 44, 46 (2d Cir. 2012) (summary order) (citing Harris, 572 F.3d at 72).
Judge Bloom recommended that this court deny the defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiff's claims against Delta alleging that it (1) failed to accommodate plaintiff's request for a desk and chair and (2) retaliated against her in violation of the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and the NYSHRL. Defendants objected to this recommendation, and the court will consider each objection de novo.
Defendants contend in their objections that plaintiff “admits she was hired by Delta as a temporary ‘greeter' at JFK airport and that her position required her to be available to direct passengers to the proper security lines and check-in counters in one of New York's busiest international airports.” (Def. Obj. at 2.) Accordingly, defendants assert, it is “apparent on its face that Plaintiff's request that she be provided a ‘chair and desk' would have prevented her from performing any of the functions of the ‘greeter' position, and, therefore, would not have been a reasonable accommodation as a matter of law.” (Id.) Defendants also contend that they accommodated plaintiff by granting her “several weeks of medical leave, ” which “was a reasonable accommodation in and of itself.” (Id. at 3.) These contentions are unavailing.
The amended complaint alleges that “portable desk stations” are available to Delta employees at other airports, specifically LaGuardia and Atlanta. (Am. Compl. p. 14 ¶ 19, p. 14 ¶ 22, p. 15 ¶ 23; see also Am. Compl. pp. 5-6 ¶ 11 (referring to a “portable desk” as a reasonable accommodation).) Read liberally, the amended complaint also asserts that Delta employees stationed at portable desks in the Atlanta airport were able to assist Delta customers. (See Am. Compl. p. 14 ¶ 22 (“July 2nd, 2014, Delta employees at ATL sitting down with portable desk stations, saying, ‘Let me Help you. see attached exhibit A, B, C.'” [sic]).) At the Rule 12 motion to dismiss stage, assuming the truth of these factual statements, the amended complaint sufficiently alleges that that plaintiff could have performed her essential job functions had she been provided a portable desk and chair as a reasonable accommodation.
Further, defendants' contention that the “concept of Plaintiff sitting in a chair in the middle of JFK is implausible” appears to be based on defendants' allegations beyond the complaint regarding the volume of passenger traffic at JFK. (Def. Obj. at 2-3.) At the Rule 12 motion to dismiss stage, the court may only properly consider the amended complaint and those documents integral to, incorporated by reference in, or attached to it. Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152-53 (2d Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). There is nothing in the amended complaint or any attachments regarding the volume of traffic at JFK airport, or any information as to how the volume of pedestrian traffic might limit plaintiff's ability to fulfill her job duties. In deciding defendants' Rule 12(b) (6) motion, the court cannot consider defendants' contentions to the extent they rely on information outside the pleadings.
Similarly, defendants' contention that “the medical leave provided to Plaintiff was a reasonable accommodation in and of itself, ” (Def. Obj. at 3), does not suffice to warrant dismissal at the Rule 12 motion to dismiss stage. As Judge Bloom correctly stated, at the Rule 12 stage, the employer “bears the weighty burden of showing that the fact-intensive inquiry prerequisite to a finding of reasonable accommodation falls completely in its favor.” Goonan v. Fed. Reserve Bank of New York, 916 F.Supp.2d 470, 482 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (citations omitted).

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