Source: http://www.buskersadvocates.org/saalegalCtFaneuilHall.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 14:01:55+00:00

Document:
COUNSEL: James A. Frieden, Boston, Massachusetts, for Plaintiffs.
JUDGES: Joseph L. Tauro, United States District Judge.
Plaintiffs are a non-profit corporation, Citizens To End Animal Suffering And Exploitation, and two of its members, Doreen Close Lavenson and Mark Sommers. They allege that defendant, Faneuil Hall Marketplace, Inc., infringed their First Amendment right of free expression when it arrested Lavenson and Sommers on grounds of criminal trespass for distributing literature on land leased by defendant from the City of Boston. Based upon that past action, and defendant's representation that it would arrest plaintiffs again under similar circumstances, plaintiffs seek to enjoin future interference with their freedom of expression.
n1 Faneuil Hall Marketplace, one of the nation's foremost tourist attractions, is a commercial development of restaurants, food stands, cocktail bars, boutique shops, and pushcarts offering sundry arts and crafts. It has wide, open cobblestoned lanes separating three buildings that house these commercial enterprises. There is also a large public outdoor seating area. The Faneuil Hall Marketplace Corporation holds a ninety-nine year lease for the Marketplace, which consists of the Quincy Market, North Market, and South Market buildings, and the cobblestoned lanes between them and to the west of them. See Affidavit of Robert O'Brien, para. 2.
n2 The characterization of this property as public or private is, of course, a central issue in determining whether plaintiffs' rights were violated. See infra.
After the protesters refused to disperse, defendant's security officers summoned the Boston Police. The police responded quickly, but left without making any arrests, notwithstanding the protesters' refusal to disperse. Defendant's security officers then arrested Lavenson and Sommers for criminal trespass. The pair were handcuffed and taken to defendant's security offices, where they were detained until the Boston Police returned. Defendant swore out criminal complaints against Lavenson and Sommers in the Boston Municipal Court. These criminal proceedings were ultimately dismissed for lack of prosecution.
As a result of this incident, plaintiffs filed a five-count complaint against defendant, alleging: 1) violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; 2) violation of Mass. Gen. L. c. 12 § 11I; 3) false arrest; 4) malicious prosecution; and 5) abuse of process.
Presently at issue is plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, by which they seek [**4] to enjoin future interference with their freedom of expression. This motion raises issues of justiciability, state action, first amendment fora, and the propriety of injunctive relief. Each will be addressed seriatim.
A federal court may only decide actual cases or controversies. See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2; Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 61, 90 L. Ed. 2d 48, 106 S. Ct. 1697, 1703 (1986) ("Article III of the Constitution limits the power of federal courts to deciding 'cases' and 'controversies.'"). To present a justiciable case or controversy, the plaintiff must demonstrate "a realistic danger of sustaining a direct injury. . . ." Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat. Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298, 60 L. Ed. 2d 895, 99 S. Ct. 2301, 2308 (1979) (citation omitted).
Plaintiffs have alleged a justiciable claim here. They wish to exercise their First Amendment rights at the Marketplace. See Letter to Michael E. Spear (Appendix B to Affidavit of Doreen Close Lavenson). Defendant arrested them for attempting to do so in the past, and filed a criminal complaint against them. At oral argument, defense counsel conceded that, if plaintiffs attempted another such protest on the premises, defendant would take the same action against them. These circumstances [**5] constitute an actual case or controversy, and justify this court's exercise of its equitable power. See Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 593, 67 L. Ed. 1117, 43 S. Ct. 658 (1923) ("One does not have to await the consummation of threatened injury to obtain preventive relief. If the injury is certainly impending that is enough."). See also Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 459, 39 L. Ed. 2d 505, 94 S. Ct. 1209, 1215 (1974). The motion for preliminary injunction, therefore, is properly before the court.
Before deciding whether defendant can be enjoined from prohibiting speech on its premises, the court must undertake a two-step inquiry. First, the court must determine whether this defendant, an ostensibly private party, may be held to constitutional standards when it attempts to regulate activity on its premises. See Hudgens v. National Labor Relations Board, 424 U.S. 507, 47 L. Ed. 2d 196, 96 S. Ct. 1029 (1976) (absence of state action precludes application of constitutional standards). If so, the court must then characterize the forum at issue, thereby setting the constitutional standards by which defendant's regulations are to be judged. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educational [*69] Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 797, 87 L. Ed. 2d 567, 105 S. Ct. 3439, 3446 (1985) (scope of right of expression [**6] is determined by type of forum involved).
Plaintiffs contend that the public nature of the Marketplace makes the protections of the First Amendment applicable. n3 Defendant, on the other hand, argues that the Marketplace is private property to which the First Amendment does not apply. See Hudgens, 424 U.S. 507, 47 L. Ed. 2d 196, 96 S. Ct. 1029 (1976) (First Amendment inapplicable to privately-owned shopping mall).
n3 Specifically, plaintiffs contend that the First Amendment applies to the Marketplace because: (1) the underlying property is owned in fee simple by the City of Boston; (2) Faneuil Hall traditionally has been a forum for public discourse in Boston; (3) the City of Boston extensively regulates the Marketplace; and (4) the lease of the Marketplace to defendant reserved an easement for public access over the leasehold. In addition, plaintiffs contend that defendant's agent acted "under color of state law" by arresting them.
n4 It should be noted at the outset of any such inquiry that, while the principle of "state action" may be "easily stated, the question of whether particular . . . conduct is private, on the one hand, or amounts to 'state action,' on the other, frequently admits of no easy answer." Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 172, 32 L. Ed. 2d 627, 92 S. Ct. 1965, 1971 (1972).
n6 The Supreme Court in Rendell-Baker, supra, considered a fourth factor, namely, the extent to which the defendant received and depended on federal funds. Rendell-Baker and its progeny make clear, however, that "receipt of government funds does not render the government responsible for a private entity's decisions concerning the use of those funds" and, therefore, it is not an independent factor to be considered. Stone v. Dartmouth College, 682 F. Supp. 106, 108, n. 1 (D.N.H. 1988) (quoting Gerena, 697 F.2d at 450).
n8 This case does not satisfy the "nexus test," however. HN4Under the nexus analysis, a government "'can be held responsible for a private decision only when it has exercised coercive power or has provided such significant encouragement, either overt or covert, that the choice must in law be deemed to be that of the State.'" San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Committee, 483 U.S. 522, 546, 97 L. Ed. 2d 427, 107 S. Ct. 2971, 2986 (1987), quoting Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. at 1004, 102 S. Ct. at. Indeed, "the party seeking to establish that action of a private party violated the Constitution must be able to point to the specific act or actions of the government which in fact motivated the private action." Ponce, 760 F.2d at 378 (citation omitted); see also Cohen v. President and Fellows of Harvard College, 568 F. Supp. 658, 660 (D.Mass. 1983) (Tauro, J.) (nexus analysis "focus[es] on whether the challenged action of the private entity was compelled or influenced by the government."). In the present case, plaintiffs have not offered evidence of such a high degree of involvement by the City of Boston in the decision by defendant to ban plaintiffs' protest.
n9 This test has proven difficult to satisfy. See, e.g., Blum, 457 U.S. 991, 73 L. Ed. 2d 534, 102 S. Ct. 2777 (provision of nursing homes not an exclusively state function); Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. 830, 73 L. Ed. 2d 418, 102 S. Ct. 2764 (education of maladjusted high school students not an exclusively state function); Vincent v. Trend Western Technical Corp., 828 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1987) (maintenance of military equipment not an exclusively state function).
n11 Fanueil Hall, also known as "The Cradle of Liberty," is one of Boston's most significant historical buildings. It has served as the city's central political forum for over two and one-half centuries, and has long been a site of great oratory and political agitation. See generally, A.E. Brown, Faneuil Hall and Market (Lee and Shepard 1900); see also, A.J. Langguth, Patriots: The Men Who Started The American Revolution (1988) (town meetings held at Faneuil Hall to discuss Colonial response to British tyranny); C. Bahne, The Complete Guide to Boston's Freedom Trail (1990) at 27 ("Nearly every American war from 1812 to Vietnam has also been debated within these walls."). The parties do not dispute that Faneuil Hall and Faneuil Hall Square are still purely public areas.
n12 In Evans, a former Georgia Senator devised to the City of Macon a "park and pleasure ground" for whites only. The city maintained the all-white park for years, but eventually decided to desegregate the park. Consequently, several individual managers of the park brought suit against the city to preserve the Senator's intentions. As a result of this lawsuit, the city resigned as trustee of the park, and three private individuals were appointed as trustees for the purpose of maintaining a segregated park. Several black citizens intervened, arguing that the racial limitation on the park was unconstitutional.
The service rendered [to the community] even by a private park of this character is municipal in nature. . . . Golf clubs, social centers, luncheon clubs, schools such as Tuskegee was at least in origin, and other like organizations in the private sector are often racially oriented. A park, on the other hand, is more like a fire department or police department that traditionally serves the community. Mass recreation through the use of parks is plainly in the public domain, and state courts that aid private parties to perform that public function on a segregated basis implicate the State in conduct proscribed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 301-302, 86 S. Ct. at 490.
n13 The similarity of the Marketplace to a municipal park is underscored by the absence of any discernable boundaries between the Marketplace and the immediately-adjacent, public areas, such as Fanueil Hall Square. The absence of such boundaries has proven to be critical in distinguishing between purely private shopping centers and shopping centers to which the Constitution applies. See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 513, 47 L. Ed. 2d 196, 96 S. Ct. 1029, 1033 (1976) ("'The town and the surrounding neighborhood . . . can not be distinguished from the Gulf property by anyone not familiar with the property lines . . . .'"), quoting Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 502-503, 90 L. Ed. 265, 66 S. Ct. 276, 277 (1946); Hudgens, 424 U.S. at 518, n. 5, 96 S. Ct. at 1035 ("'The principle difference between the two centers [is] that . . . Lloyd Center is much more intertwined with public streets than Logan Valley.'"), quoting Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 575, 33 L. Ed. 2d 131, 92 S. Ct. 2219, 2232 (1972).
The parallel between public streets and the crescent-shaped central concourses of the D/FW terminal buildings, where air travelers as well as the general public may shop, dine, imbibe, and sightsee, is clear and powerful. . . . The analogy between these terminal concourses and public streets is further strengthened by the lack of restrictions on public access to the commercial establishments located along the crescent-shaped passageways, whether or not persons must pass through security checkpoints first.
n15 A similar distinction between a private contractor and a state actor was noted in McQueen v. Druker, 438 F.2d 781 (1st Cir. 1971). In McQueen, the First Circuit found state action where the City had contracted with private parties to carry out its duty to provide for urban renewal displacees. The court concluded that the private parties were more than contractors because the function they contracted to perform was traditionally governmental. Id. at 784.
Suppose, for example, that a municipality entered into a contractual relationship with a private developer to manage a public housing project with the result that only white individuals were accepted as tenants. Were the state or town to do nothing when confronted with the discriminatory screening policy, we might well conclude that the state's total abstention from the performance of its legislative function would be equivalent to state approval of private action. See McQueen v. Druker, 438 F.2d 781 (1st Cir. 1971).
n16 The Supreme Court has been quick to point out that it "has never considered [whether] the private exercise of traditional police functions [is a 'public function.']" Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 163-64, n. 14, 56 L. Ed. 2d 185, 98 S. Ct. 1729, 1737 (1978). Moreover, those lower courts that have faced the question have not had occasion to address it squarely. See, e.g., Collins v. Womancare, 878 F.2d 1145, 1151-53 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1056, 110 S. Ct. 865, 107 L. Ed. 2d 949 (finding no state action on other grounds, court concluded that it was "unnecessary to reach the 'public function' argument. . . ."); Carey v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 823 F.2d 1402, 1404 (10th Cir. 1987) ("citizen's arrest" in airport was not "state action."); Lee v. Estes Park, 820 F.2d 1112, 1115 (10th Cir. 1987) (no state action where private party merely reports criminal activity and action is ultimately taken by state officials). But see, McQueen, 438 F.2d at 784 (the provision of public housing, "while perhaps not so traditionally governmental as parks, fire or police services, . . . is today one of the major concerns of most cities. . . .") (emphasis added).
For example, deciding to cross the street when a police officer says you may is not . . . a 'public function;' but authoritatively deciding who is free to cross and who must stop is a 'public function' whether or not the person entrusted under state law to perform that function wears a police uniform and is paid a salary from state revenues or wears civilian garb and serves as a volunteer crossing guard.
Indeed, the power to decide who can use a public easement goes beyond even that of a policeman. Unlike the policeman who merely executes decisions of policy, defendant here is actually making those policy decisions. Defendant's role is thus more like that of a legislature, which is even more clearly an exclusive state function. The essential purpose of the easement here is to ensure public access to the Marketplace. The exercise of control over the public's right to use the easement is subject to constitutional scrutiny, whether employed directly by the State or through delegation to a private party.
Under the "symbiotic relationship" test, actions of a private party are attributable to the State only where the State "has so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with [the private entity] that it must be recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity." Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 725, 6 L. Ed. 2d 45, 81 S. Ct. 856, 862 (1961). Again, notwithstanding the narrowness of this inquiry, n17 there is present here, as there was in Burton, [**19] such a substantial degree of interdependence between defendant and the City that it is fair to construe their relationship as "symbiotic."
n17 See Cohen v. President and Fellows of Harvard College, 568 F. Supp. at 658 ("The symbiotic relationship category is very narrow.").
In Burton, the Court attributed state action to a private restaurant, located in a public parking garage, that discriminated against black customers. In reaching its conclusion, the Court placed great emphasis [*73] on the fact that the restaurant leased its land from the State and was located in a public facility "dedicated to public uses," n18 and that the rent from the restaurant contributed to the support of the public facility. Burton, 365 U.S. at 723-24, 81 S. Ct. at 860-61.
n18 See Edwards v. Lutheran Senior Services of Dover, 603 F. Supp. 315 (D. Del.), aff'd without opinion, 779 F.2d 42 (3d Cir. 1985) ("Rendell-Baker and Blum reaffirm that . . . a court must find stronger indicia of state-private interdependence, such as location on public property. . . ."). Id. at 321 (emphasis added).
This case involves many of these same indicia. First, as in Burton, defendant leases its property from the City. n19 The City continues to own the land in fee simple, having acquired it by eminent domain.
n19 Several lower courts have also considered the fact that the property is leased from the State to be a significant indicium of state action. See e.g., Fernandes v. Limmer, 663 F.2d 619, 626-27 (5th Cir. 1981); International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, No. 75 Civ. 5388 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file); International Society for Krishna Consciousness v. Schrader, 461 F. Supp. 714, 717 (N.D. Texas 1978). Cf. International Society for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee 721 F. Supp. 572 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (private airlines settled case after magistrate concluded that they could be held liable for constitutional violations in privately-leased terminal areas).
(b) The substantial financing and other public aids that have been made available by law and by the United States and the City for the purpose of making such development possible; . . .the qualification and identity of the Lessee and any Owner are of particular concern to the community and the Lessor."
Indenture of Lease between Boston Redevelopment Authority and Faneuil Hall Marketplace, Inc. ("The Lease"), dated February 21, 1975, § 14.02. In addition, in its Urban Renewal Plan, the City stated as its "Basic Goals:"
The basic goal of urban renewal action in the Downtown Waterfront - Faneuil Hall Area is to stimulate and to facilitate development efforts in the area, by eliminating those severe conditions of blight, deterioration, obsolescence, traffic congestion and incompatible land uses which hinder private investment in new development without the aid of governmental action, in order to (1) revitalize a key portion of downtown Boston; (2) upgrade the pattern of land uses close by the North End residential community; (3) establish a functional connection between the area and its surrounding districts . . . .
Downtown Waterfront -- Faneuil Hall Urban Renewal Plan ("The Plan"), § 201, incorporated by reference in The Lease. The Plan also stated as policy objectives, inter alia, the elimination of blighting conditions, prevention of erosion of property values, the strengthening of Boston's tax base, promotion of historic preservation, the stimulation of tourism, and the provision of "public ways, parks and plazas which encourage the pedestrian to enjoy the harbor and its activities." The Plan, § 202. See also Id. at § 902 (relating to plan's conformity with community objectives).
Third, and most important, the City derives an economic benefit from defendant's policy of restrictions, at least as directly as that found in Burton. n21 In Burton, the Court concluded that the State profited from the restaurant's policy of discrimination, because the State's financial position was directly influenced by the restaurant's profits. Those profits, in turn, were enhanced by the policy of discrimination because, according to the restaurant's own argument, the restaurant would lose business if it did not discriminate. Burton, 365 U.S. at 724, 81 S. Ct. at 861. The Court found that this economic relationship was a [*74] direct one, noting that "the commercially leased areas were not surplus state property, but [instead] constituted a physically and financially integral and, indeed, indispensable part of the State's plan . . . ." Id. at 723-24, 81 S. Ct. at 861.
n21 See Ponce, 760 F.2d at 382 ("The key factor in determining the existence of a symbiotic relationship is whether the state profited from the discriminatory activity."), citing Rendell-Baker, supra.
Plaintiff's demonstration within the Marketplace injures its operations. Protests by groups of the size here involved . . . during crowded periods obstruct passage by patrons of the Marketplace. Picketing targeted at specific Marketplace lessees [i.e., veal-serving restaurants] injures their business . . . .
n23 This conclusion is bolstered by evidence that not only the City benefits from the relationship by realizing its policy objectives, see McQueen, 438 F.2d at 784 ("The landlords are, in return for an assured consideration, . . . helping the state realize its specific priority objective. . . ."), but defendant receives economic benefits as well. Cf. Burton, 365 U.S. at 724, 81 S. Ct. at 861 ("It cannot be doubted that the peculiar relationship of the restaurant to the parking facility in which it is located confers on each an incidental variety of mutual benefits.").
Most significantly, defendant receives a very valuable leasehold at a very favorable price -- $ 10.00/year. Moreover, the proximity of the Marketplace to many of Boston's historic -- and purely public -- areas enables defendant to profit from the passage of tourists through the Marketplace's terrain. While each of these benefits alone may not prove the existence of a symbiotic relationship, the totality of these circumstances do support such a finding.
For these reasons -- namely, that defendant performs a "public function" and is involved [**25] in a "symbiotic relationship" with the City -- it is fair to attribute defendant's action to the state and, accordingly, to examine defendant's conduct with constitutional scrutiny.
Under the First Amendment, a state actor may not restrict access to a forum without an appropriate governmental justification. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800, 87 L. Ed. 2d 567, 105 S. Ct. 3439, 3449 (1985). The degree of interest a state must show to justify its restriction depends on the type of forum it is regulating. Id. There are three types of fora: 1) traditional, or "quintessentially" public; n24 2) limited public; n25 and 3) nonpublic. n26 The more a forum resembles a traditional public forum, the greater an interest the state must show to justify restricting access. Student Government Assoc. v. Board of Trustees of University of Massachusetts, 676 F. Supp. 384, 386 (D. Mass. 1987) (Tauro, J.), aff'd 868 F.2d 473 (1st Cir. 1989).
n25 A limited public forum is a forum that is "generally open to the public even if [the state] was not required to create the forum in the first place." Id.
n26 A nonpublic forum is a forum which "is not by tradition or designation a forum for public communication. . . ." Id.
If the Marketplace were either a traditional or limited public forum, defendant's restriction would have to be valid at least in terms of "time, place, and manner." See Perry, 460 U.S. at 45, 103 S. Ct. at 955 (in traditional public forum, content-based exclusions must be necessary to [*75] serve compelling state interest, but content-neutral exclusions are permissible if valid regulations of time, place and manner.) n27 HN10To be a valid regulation of time, place, and manner, the restriction must be content-neutral, narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and offer ample alternative channels of communication. Id. at 37.
Defendant's restriction does not satisfy these requirements. First, it is not "narrowly tailored." The only content-neutral interest proffered by defendant in support of its restriction is that "protests by groups of the size here involved . . . during crowded periods obstruct passage by patrons of the Marketplace." Leaving aside the question of whether this is a "significant" governmental interest, defendant's policy of arresting demonstrators is not narrowly tailored to this end. There is no suggestion that defendant attempted to reduce the bulk of the demonstration by, for example, requesting that the group break up into smaller segments and spread out through other parts of the area in order to remove obstructions to the patrons' access. Nor did defendant suggest that plaintiffs could resume their demonstration during a less-crowded period. Instead, defendant simply gave plaintiffs the choice of either leaving, or being arrested.
n28 Because the restriction is not content-neutral, it must, in order to be valid, be "necessary to serve a compelling state interest and . . . narrowly drawn to achieve that end." Perry, 460 U.S. at 37. The shielding of veal-serving restaurants from the commercial effects of protestors' speech, however, cannot be considered a "compelling state interest."
Although restrictions in a nonpublic forum need only be reasonable to be valid, see United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 111 L. Ed. 2d 571, 110 S. Ct. 3115, 58 U.S.L.W. 5013, 5015 (1990), the Marketplace is more than a nonpublic [**29] forum. As was stated above, a nonpublic forum is one which "is not by tradition or designation a forum for public communication. . . ." Perry, 460 U.S. at 46, 103 S. Ct. at 955. Here, however, the Marketplace has both traditional and designated characteristics of a public forum.
This area is one of the most valuable historic assets to the City of Boston, to the State of Massachusetts, and to the Nation. . . . It is intended that the historic uniqueness of this area be retained through a thoughtful blend of new construction, rehabilitation and conservation. . . . It is intended that the space formed by Faneuil Hall, the new Boston City Hall, the rehabilitated buildings along Faneuil Hall Square, and the proposed new building . . . be so designed that the intimate pedestrian scale that once existed in this area again be recaptured.
n30 Indeed, the lanes are similar to the public street described in Heffron v. Int'l Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 69 L. Ed. 2d 298, 101 S. Ct. 2559 (1981), which was "continually open, often uncongested, and constitute[d] not only a necessary conduit in the daily affairs of a locality's citizens, but also a place where people [could] enjoy the open air or the company of friends and neighbors in a relaxed environment." Id. at 651, 101 S. Ct. at 2566.
n31 And, because the analysis is the same for both traditionally public and limited public fora, see supra, it is unnecessary to categorize the Marketplace as one or the other. Cf. Kokinda (Kennedy, J., concurring) (unnecessary to categorize sidewalk as public or nonpublic forum where regulation satisfies tests under either category).
Finally, the court must decide the appropriateness of injunctive relief here. HN11A party is entitled to a preliminary injunction if it can establish: (1) a likelihood that it will succeed on the merits; (2) that it will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of injunctive relief; (3) that the balance of harms weighs in its favor; and (4) that issuance of the decree would not adversely affect the public interest. See Vargas-Figueroa v. Saldana, 826 F.2d 160, 162 (1st Cir. 1987).
For the reasons detailed in § III, supra, plaintiffs have established a likelihood of success on the merits. Plaintiffs have also demonstrated that they would suffer irreparable harm from the threatened arrest. See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373, 49 L. Ed. 2d 547, 96 S. Ct. 2673, 2689 (1976) ("The loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury."); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 487, 14 L. Ed. 2d 22, 85 S. Ct. 1116, 1121 (1965). The balance of harms also weighs in plaintiffs' favor. Plaintiffs' harm is immediate and irreparable, whereas defendant will suffer, if at all, only a decrease in business. Finally, the public interest is advanced by preserving First Amendment protections over an area long associated with expressive activities.
The Faneuil Hall area is no mere commercial shopping mall with a Colonial theme. Rather, it is a marketplace of ideas, expression, and community, providing a unique monument and tribute to one of this nation's most cherished centers for public debate. While the private interests of the participating entrepreneurs are important, and must be respected and protected, they can never be permitted to overshadow the fundamental purpose of this special landmark.
Accordingly, and for all of the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction is hereby ALLOWED. An order will issue.
For the reasons stated in the accompanying memorandum, plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction is hereby ALLOWED. It is so ordered.
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