Source: https://www.uclpractitioner.com/ucl_restitution/
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 06:24:31+00:00

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Posts categorized "UCL - restitution"
New UCL and class certification opinion: Espejo v. The Copley Press, Inc.
In Espejo v. The Copley Press, Inc., ___ Cal.App.5th ___ (Jul. 7, 2017), the Court of Appeal (Fourth Appellate District, Division One) considered a series of challenges to a post-trial judgment in a certified class action alleging that the plaintiff newspaper carriers were incorrectly classified as independent contractors, in violation of the Labor Code and thus the UCL. The 81-page opinion affirmed the judgment on liability, but directed that certain adjustments be made to the amount of the restitution and attorneys' fees awards on remand.
Given that trials in UCL class actions are relatively rare, this case is instructive procedurally.
The trial court bifurcated the equitable UCL claim from the remaining claims, and heard the equitable claim first, in a bench trial. Slip op. at 5-9. Because the plaintiffs prevailed in the bench trial and were awarded full monetary restitution, no jury trial went forward. See id. Attorneys' fees were awarded under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5, rather than under any applicable Labor Code provision. See id. A portion of the fees were to be paid by the defendant, with the rest payable from the common fund. Id. at 9-10.
In the first section of its opinion, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's holding that the newspaper carriers were the defendant's employees, not independent contractors. Slip op. at 10-25.
In the next section, the court rejected the defendant's argument that the class should have been decertified because the class representatives became inadequate after certification, adhering to the "changed circumstances" rule: "We find no significant change in circumstances between the time the class was certified and the time of trial that would support our decertifying the class or reversing the judgment on the ground of inadequacy of the class representatives." Id. at 28 (citing Kight v. CashCall, Inc., 231 Cal.App.4th 112, 125-26 (2014)). The court also rejected the argument that all but one of the class representatives became inadequate because they did not testify at the trial. Id. at 30.
The third section considered the defendant's argument that the trial court had awarded classwide relief on an uncertified claim. The opinion examined the trial court's class certification order and found it broad enough to encompass that claim. Id. at 32-36.
The next section affirmed the trial court's order allowing post-trial amendment of the complaint to conform to proof, rejecting the defendant's argument that such amendments should not be allowed in a certified class action. Id. at 36-39. "We see no reason why a trial court has any less discretion to allow amendment of a pleading to conform to proof in a class action than in other civil actions." Id. at 37.
Next, the opinion considered the trial court's order bifurcating the equitable UCL claim and trying it first, and held that the defendant had acquiesced in the order and therefore could not challenge it on appeal. Id. at 39-42.
The defendant's next series of arguments challenged various aspects of the $4.95 million in restitution and prejudgment interest awarded to the class, which included several different types of expense reimbursements under Labor Code section 2802, as construed in Gattuso v. Harte-Hanks Shoppers, Inc., 42 Cal.4th 554 (2007). Slip op. at 42-67.
The court had no difficulty concluding that unpaid expense reimbursements were recoverable as restitution under the UCL because such reimbursements are considered part of an employee's wages. Id. at 50-51 (citing, inter alia, Cortez v. Purolater Air Filtration Products Co., 23 Cal.4th 163 (2000)).
The court also held that certain "credits and reversals" should have been subtracted from the restitution award because those sums had been "already paid" to the class. Id. at 51-56.
A UCL restitution award, like a damages award, need not be calculated with strict "mathematical precision," and the trial court did not err in accepting the plaintiffs' expert's "reasonable estimate" of the amount owed the class in mileage reimbursements. Id. at 57-58 (citing Duran v. U.S. Bank Nat. Assn., 59 Cal.4th 1, 40 (2014)).
However, the trial court did err in accepting an unreasonable estimate of the amount of another type of reimbursement. Id. at 59-61.
The trial court properly exercised its discretion to award prejudgment interest on the restitution award. Id. at 62-67. The panel rejected the defendant's argument that prejudgment interest is not recoverable under the UCL, but determined that the amount of interest should be recalculated after the adjustments to the base restitution award, discussed above, were made. See id.
The final sections of the opinion largely affirmed the attorneys' fees award under section 1021.5, but remanded for the trial court to determine, in the first instance, whether the amount of the award should be reduced because the base restitution award would be adjusted downward on remand. Slip op. at 67-76. The opinion also held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to apply a lodestar multiplier in fixing the amount of the fee award. Id. at 77-80.
The Ninth Circuit's recent opinion in Bayer v. Neiman Marcus Corp., ___ F.3d ___ (9th Cir. Jun. 26, 2017), contains a thought-provoking discussion of equitable vs. non-equitable forms of monetary relief. See slip op. at 16-20.
The case does not involve the UCL, and it considers federal law rather than California law, but the discussion resonates for me as I think about UCL restitution and the differences between restitutionary and non-restitutionary disgorgement. Because of course I think about that all the time, especially on warm summer days like today.
This UCL opinion published in April got lost in the Brinker blizzard, but it is important and warrants a belated post.
In Medrazo v. Honda of North Hollywood, 205 Cal.App.4th 1 (Mar. 27, 2012; pub. ord. Apr. 16, 2012), the Court of Appeal (Second Appellate District, Division Four) addressed a UCL "unlawful" prong claim that went to trial on behalf of a certified class of motorcycle buyers. Previously, in 2008, the Court of Appeal had reversed the trial court's order denying class certification. Medrazo v. Honda of North Hollywood, 166 Cal.App.4th 89 (2008) (discussed in this blog post). In its 2012 opinion, the Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's order granting the defendant's motion for judgment at the conclusion of the plaintiff's case-in-chief (essentally, a motion for nonsuit).
First, the opinion addresses the famous footnote of Tobacco II, where the Supreme Court explained that while reliance is an element of UCL standing in "fraudulent" prong cases, "there are doubtless many types of unfair business practices in which the concept of reliance, as discussed here, has no application." In re Tobacco II Cases, 46 Cal.4th 298, 325 n.17 (2009).
[T]he Supreme Court ... explained [in Tobacco II] that an actual reliance requirement does not apply to UCL actions that are not based upon a fraud theory. (Id. at p. 325, fn. 17). In those actions, the plaintiff must simply show that the alleged violation caused or resulted in the loss of money or property.
Medrazo, 205 Cal.App.4th at12 (emphasis added).
The relevant question, for standing purposes in an "unlawful" prong case, is going to be whether the defendant's statutory violation caused the plaintiff to lose money. In Medrazo, the defendant violated a Vehicle Code provision requiring that a hanger tag disclosing dealer-added charges be attached to all motorcycles offered for sale. Id. at 4. If the hanger tag is not attached, or if the dealer-added charges are not disclosed on the tag, the dealer may not collect the charges. See id. The plaintiff class lost money as a result of the defendant's violation because the class members paid such charges even though the defendant had not attached the required hanger tags. Id. at 13-14. It did not matter whether the class members had "relied" on the missing hanger tags, nor was proof required that they would or would not have bought the motorcycles if the hanger tags had been attached and read. See id. It was sufficient that the defendant had violated the law, that the plaintiffs had purchased the products, and that they paid the unlawfuly-imposed charges. See id.
Put another way, the violation was not the dealer's failure to disclose the added charges, but rather its collection of those charges in violation of the statute.
The second important holding relates to the measure of restitution to be awarded at trial. Medrazo is really the only helpful opinion on this issue since Colgan v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 135 Cal.App.4th 663 (2006). While Colgan was a "fraudulent" prong case, Medrazo addresses the measure of restitution in the context of the "unlawful" prong.
If, on retrial, the court determines that [the defendant's] sale of motorcycles without hanger tags (or without tags that disclosed dealer-added charges) violated the UCL, class members will be entitled to restitution of any money “which may have been acquired [by defendant] by means of such unfair competition” (Bus. & Prof.Code, § 17203)—i.e., the dealer-added charges that were not disclosed on hanger tags.
205 Cal.App.4th at 13-14 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). There was no question about the value of the motorcycles or whether the defendant could have sold them for the same price if the dealer-added charges had been properly disclosed. No, the defendant will be required on remand to refund the full amount of the unlawfully-collected charges, period.
In short, Medrazo is a very significant opinion that should be widely cited in other "unlawful" prong cases. Here is my publication request filed in April on behalf of CAOC. Several other publication requests were also filed.
Finally, the Court of Appeal rested its holding in part on a line of cases that have read the “lost money or property” requirement as confining standing under section 17204 “ ‘to individuals who suffer losses . . . that are eligible for restitution.’ ” (Quoting Buckland v. Threshold Enterprises, Ltd., supra, 155 Cal.App.4th at p. 817; see also Silvaco Data Systems v. Intel Corp. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 210, 245; Citizens of Humanity, LLC v. Costco Wholesale Corp. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1, 22; Walker v. GEICO General Ins. Co. (9th Cir. 2009) 558 F.3d 1025, 1027 [following Buckland].) Because plaintiffs were not entitled to restitution, the Court of Appeal reasoned, they necessarily lacked standing.
Slip op. at 29-32 (footnote omitted; emphasis added). Even the dissent acknowledges that a competitor who suffered "lost sales and profits due to Kwikset's misrepresentations" (which would not normally be recoverable as restitution) would have standing under Prop. 64. Dissent, Slip op. at 11.
In explaining why section 203 penalties are not recoverable as restitution, it is first helpful to briefly discuss why unpaid wages are recoverable.
By contrast, permitting recovery of section 203 penalties via the UCL would not “restore the status quo by returning to the plaintiff funds in which he or she has an ownership interest.” (Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1134, 1149.) Section 203 is not designed to compensate employees for work performed. Instead, it is intended to encourage employers to pay final wages on time, and to punish employers who fail to do so. In other words, it is the employers’ action (or inaction) that gives rise to section 203 penalties. The vested interest in unpaid wages, on the other hand, arises out of the employees’ action, i.e., their labor. Until awarded by a relevant body, employees have no comparable vested interest in section 203 penalties. We thus hold section 203 penalties cannot be recovered as restitution under the UCL.
Slip op. at 14-15 (footnote omitted).
The Court also held that a three-year, rather than a one-year, statute of limitations applies to all claims for penalties brought directly under Labor Code section 203, regardless of whether unpaid wages are also sought in the same action. Slip op. at 3-13. The Court of Appeal had concluded that a one-year statute of limitations applied in some cases. Id. at 3.
The practical effect of the opinion, therefore, is that workers will be able to recover section 203 penalties going back three years, not one year, as the Court of Appeal had held, and not four years, as the UCL would have permitted.
Well, I'm interrupting my hiatus already because the Supreme Court just announced that tomorrow (November 18, 2010) it will hand down its opinion in Pineda v. Bank of America, no. S170758, which was argued on October 5, 2010.
Many thanks to the blog reader who drew my attention to a new federal decision of interest, In re Neurotonin Marketing & Sales Practices Litigation, ___ F.Supp.2d ___, 2010 WL 4325225 (D. Mass. Nov. 3, 2010). In this post-trial decision, the court orders the defendant (Pfizer) to pay $95 million in restitution to the plaintiff (Kaiser Foundation Health Plan) for violations of the UCL's "fraudulent" prong.
The decision is lengthy and covers a variety of very interesting UCL-related subjects, including "reliance" post-Tobacco II, partial omissions, the delayed discovery rule, choice-of-law, causation, the measure of restitution, and pre-judgment interest in UCL actions.
This case shows just how powerful the UCL can be.
I've been meaning to write more on Clark v. Superior Court (Nat'l Western Life Ins. Co.), 50 Cal.4th 605 (Aug. 9, 2010). In Clark, the Supreme Court held that the enhanced remedies of Civil Code section 3345 (applicable in certain cases brought by senior citizens and disabled persons) are not recoverable in a UCL "unlawful" prong case predicated on violation of that statute.
For the reasons given above, we conclude that trebled recovery may be awarded under Civil Code section 3345, subdivision (b) only if the statute under which recovery is sought permits a remedy that is in the nature of a penalty. We now consider whether the unfair competition law, the basis of plaintiffs' private party action, falls within that category.
As we have seen, restitution is the only monetary remedy authorized in a private action brought under the unfair competition law. (Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., supra, 29 Cal.4th at pp. 1146, 1148.) Restitution is not a punitive remedy. The word “restitution” means the return of money or other property obtained through an improper means to the person from whom the property was taken. (Kasky v. Nike, Inc., supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 950; Kraus v. Trinity Management Services, Inc., supra, 23 Cal.4th at pp. 126-127.) “The object of restitution is to restore the status quo by returning to the plaintiff funds in which he or she has an ownership interest.” (Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 1149, italics added.) In contrast, a penalty is a recovery “ ‘without reference to the actual damage sustained....’ ” (Murphy v. Kenneth Cole Productions, Inc. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1094, 1104.) “Penalties provide for ‘ “recovery of damages additional to actual losses incurred, such as double or treble damages....” ’ ” (Ibid.) Because restitution in a private action brought under the unfair competition law is measured by what was taken from the plaintiff, that remedy is not a penalty and hence does not fall within the trebled recovery provision of Civil Code section 3345, subdivision (b).
In re Tobacco II Cases, 46 Cal. 4th 298, 312 (2009) (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
So, enthusiastic readers, are the two holdings consistent, and if not, how do we reconcile them?
From a UCL perspective, the most interesting issue in Pineda is whether waiting time penalties under Labor Code section 203 may be recovered as restitution in a UCL "unlawful" prong case for violation of that section. The opening brief on the merits relies on the "vested interest" theory of UCL restitution, arguing that like the "earned wages" "due and payable” in Cortez, the penalty wages are also due and payable by operation of statute, giving the workers a property interest in the funds recoverable under the UCL as restitution. I think that's a persuasive argument, wholly consistent with Cortez and the purpose of UCL restitution generally.
The brief says that Judge David Velasquez of the Orange County Superior Court has adopted that reasoning in at least one other case. The order referred to appears to be the same one discussed in this blog post from May 2008.
For more on the "vested interest" theory of UCL restitution, see my article on the subject (link accessible to CAOC members only).
Yesterday, the Supreme Court posted its oral argument calendar for October. One case of interest, Pineda v. Bank of America, no. S170758, has been set for argument, on Tuesday, October 5, 2010 at 1:30 p.m. The Court is holding a special oral argument session that week at the Fifth District Court of Appeal in Fresno.
(1) When a worker files an action to recover penalties for late payment of final wages under Labor Code section 203, but does not concurrently seek to recover any other unpaid wages, is the statute of limitations the one-year statute for penalties under Code of Civil Procedure section 340, subdivision (a), or the three-year statute for unpaid wages under Labor Code section 202? (2) Can penalties under Labor Code section 203 be recovered as restitution in an Unfair Competition Law action (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17203)?
(Emphasis added.) My original post on the Court of Appeal opinion in Pineda is at this link.
"Supremes Hand Win to Workers with Google Age Bias Ruling"
In a unanimous opinion published today, the court held that applying the federal "stray remarks" doctrine in employment discrimination cases — which deems statements made outside of the company's decision-making process to be irrelevant — might lead to an unfair result.
The court also held that a trial judge's failure to rule on evidentiary objections at a summary judgment hearing makes for an implied overruling, preserving them for appellate review. That's how San Jose's Sixth District Court of Appeal treated Google's objections in the immediate case, reversing a judgment in the company's favor.
This was my post on the UCL aspects of the Court of Appeal's decision in October 2007. The Supreme Court's opinion does not appear to address the UCL.
Another notable part of Clayworth v. Pfizer, Inc., ___ Cal.4th ___ (Jul. 12, 2010) is its confirmation that plaintiffs who did not purchase a product "directly" from the defendant may nonetheless bring a UCL claim and recover restitution if the plaintiff's loss can be traced to the defendant's pockets. This was an issue in some cases involving purchases of products from retail intermediaries, until the Court of Appeal rejected the argument in Shersher v. Superior Court, 154 Cal.App.4th 1491 (2007) (discussed in this blog post).
Slip op. at 38-39 (emphasis added).
Many thanks to the blog reader who emailed to advise that the Supreme Court's opinion in Clayworth v. Pfizer, Inc., no. S166435, will be handed down on Monday at 10:00 a.m., according to the Notice of Forthcoming Filings posted today.
Clayworth v. Pfizer, Inc., ___ Cal.4th ___ (Jul. 12, 2010).
Today, the Supreme Court took up two cases involving UCL issues.
First, the Court granted review in Pineda v. Bank of America, no. S170758, in which the Court of Appeal (First Appellate District, Division Three) held that Labor Code “section 203 penalties may not be recovered as restitution under Business and Professions Code section 17203.” Pineda v. Bank of America, N.A., 170 Cal.App.4th 388, 390 (2009) (discussed in this blog post). That opinion is no longer citable as precedent.
Second, does §17200 apply to the overtime work described in question one?
Third, does §17200 apply to overtime work performed outside California for a California-based employer by out-of-state plaintiffs in the circumstances of this case if the employer failed to comply with the overtime provisions of the FLSA?
Sullivan v. Oracle Corp., 557 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2009) (listing certified questions). See this blog post for more on the Ninth Circuit's withdrawn opinion, Sullivan v. Oracle Corp., 547 F.3d 1177 (9th Cir. 2008).
As soon as I have time, I will add these cases to my list of pending Supreme Court cases involving UCL and/or class certification issues.
In Grodensky v. Artichoke Joe's Casino, ___ Cap.App.4th ___ (Mar. 11, 2009), the Court of Appeal (First Appellate District, Division Two) held that employees may recover as UCL "restitution" tips that their employer unlawfully took from them, even though the employer then paid the tips to others (here, to shift managers whom the Labor Code prohibits from sharing in tips). Slip op. at 23-32. The opinion also has an interesting discussion of attorneys' fees under the private attorney general doctrine (Code Civ. Proc. section 1021.5). Id. at 34-42.
Incidentally, the opinion creates a split in authority with Lu v. Hawaiian Gardens, 170 Cal.App.4th 466 (2009), respecting whether the Labor Code provisions governing tips carry a private right of action. Id. at 13-23.
New UCL restitution decision: Pineda v. Bank of America, N.A.
In the published portion of Pineda v. Bank of America, N.A., ___ Cal.App.4th ___ (Jan. 21, 2009), the Court of Appeal (First Appellate District, Division Three) held that Labor Code "section 203 penalties may not be recovered as restitution under Business and Professions Code section 17203." Slip op. at 2; see id. at 7-10. The practical result of this holding is that, while the unpaid wages themselves may be recovered as UCL restitution (see Cortez v. Purolator Air Filtration Products Co., 23 Cal.4th 163, 173 (2003)), a shorter statute of limitations will apply to claims for any waiting time penalties associated with those unpaid wages.
The Complex Litigator has a detailed post on Pineda. Wage Law was following Pineda, but does not yet have a post on the new opinion.
(1) When plaintiffs pay overcharges on goods or services as a result of the anticompetitive conduct of defendant sellers but recover the overcharges through increased prices at which the goods or services are sold to end users, may defendants assert a "pass-on" defense and argue that plaintiffs were not injured because they did not suffer financial loss as a result of the anticompetitive conduct? (2) Is restitution available under the Unfair Competition Law (Bus. & Prof. Code, 17200 et seq.) to plaintiffs who recovered from third persons the overcharges paid to defendants? (3) When plaintiffs recover from third persons the overcharges paid to defendants, have they suffered actual injury and lost money or property for purposes of establishing standing under the Unfair Competition Law, as amended by Proposition 64?
I've added Clayworth to my list of pending California Supreme Court cases of interest to UCL and class action practitioners. I also added Brinker to that list.
Supreme Court grants review in UCL/antitrust case: Clayworth v. Pfizer, Inc.
Yesterday, the Supreme Court granted review in Clayworth v. Pfizer, Inc., no. S166435. In Clayworth, the Court of Appeal held that the "pass-on" defense applied to a price-fixing case brought by intermediate purchasers under California's Cartwright Act, and also that if the plaintiffs have passed on the entirety of their losses, they can no longer recover restitution under the UCL. Clayworth v. Pfizer, Inc., ___ Cal.App.4th ___, 83 Cal.Rptr.3d 45 (2008) (review granted). See this blog post for more on Clayworth.
In addition, the Supreme Court denied review in Medrazo v. Honda of North Hollywood, no. S167170. In Medrazo, the Court of Appeal (Second Appellate District, Division Four) reversed an order denying class certification of UCL and CLRA claims predicated on the defendant's violation of certain Vehicle Code provisions. Medrazo v. Honda of North Hollywood, 166 Cal.App.4th 89 (2008). See this blog post for more on Medrazo.
Finally, the Supreme Court will be handing down its decision this morning at 10:00 a.m. in the Vasquez attorneys' fees case. When it does, the opinion will be available at this link. Time permitting, I will post a summary of the holding later today.
Supreme Court extends time to grant or deny review in UCL/antitrust case: Clayworth v. Pfizer, Inc.
On October 31, 2008, the Supreme Court gave itself an extension of time, through December 4, 2008, to grant or deny review in Clayworth v. Pfizer, Inc., no. S166435.
Slip op. at 39. Cal Biz Lit had a nice post on Clayworth back in August.
In Theme Promotions, Inc. v. News America Marketing FSI, ___ F.2d ___ (9th Cir. Aug. 20, 2008), the Ninth Circuit affirmed the trial court's determination that the monetary loss the plaintiff suffered did not constitute "restitution" within the meaning of the UCL. Slip op. 11082-84.
Interesting UCL restitution order: Ybarra v. Aramark Corp.
Minute Order at 2. This would be a form of what I call "vested interest" restitution. Judge Velasquez therefore denied the motion to strike the complaint's references to UCL restitution and to the four-year statute of limitations (and overruled the defendant's demurrer to the UCL cause of action as a whole).
Many thanks to the blog reader who emailed this order to me. If you know of an interesting trial-level order like this one, I'd be glad to receive a copy of it (uclpractitioner@gmail.com).
The issue in the case before us is whether [the individual] defendants, who were not the employers, and who were not found to have required any employee to work for them personally, or to have misappropriated corporate funds for their own use, may also be required to pay the earned but unpaid wages as restitution.
Slip op. at 20-22 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). It is critical here that the owner-officers never misappropriated funds for their own use and contributed more capital to the corporation than they took out. Otherwise, a stronger argument might have been made that the value of the employees' labor passed from the employees, to the corporation, to the owners, and was thus traceable and subject to a restitutionary award.
Petition for review after the Court of Appeal affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment in a civil action. This case presents the following issues: (1) Should California law recognize the "stray remarks" doctrine, which permits the trial court in ruling on a motion for summary judgment to disregard isolated discriminatory remarks or comments unrelated to the decision-making process as insufficient to establish discrimination? (2) Are evidentiary objections not expressly ruled on at the time of decision on a summary judgment motion preserved for appeal?
E-mails were flying between litigators Thursday as word spread that the California Supreme Court had agreed to resolve a thorny issue over how trial court judges should treat evidence.
Specifically, the high court decided Wednesday it was time to take a closer look at so-called Biljac rulings to clarify what lawyers and trial court judges must do to ensure that evidentiary objections are preserved for appellate review when summary judgment motions are decided.
For more discussion of the Biljac issue, see this post from my other blog, The Appellate Practitioner.
Yesterday, the Supreme Court granted review in Reid v. Google, no. S158965. In that case, the Court of Appeal held (among other things) that the UCL did not permit the plaintiff to recover his unvested stock options as "restitution" in an individual action for age discrimination. Reid v. Google, Inc., 155 Cal.App.4th 1342 (2007).
Because the Supreme Court has not yet posted its statement of issues on review, we can't tell whether the Supreme Court will be reviewing the restitution issue or some other issue in the case. The Court of Appeal's opinion also addressed some interesting issues regarding summary judgment procedure, one of which might have grabbed the Supreme Court's attention. My original post on Reid v. Google is here.
Yesterday, the Supreme Court denied review and depublication of the Court of Appeal's opinion in Shersher v. Superior Court (Microsoft Corp.), 154 Cal.App.4th 1491 (2007). For more on this case, see this blog post. The Supreme Court's docket is here: Shersher v. Superior Court (Microsoft Corp.)., no. S157482.

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