Source: http://bc-injury-law.com/blog/tag/master-scarth
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 10:21:52+00:00

Document:
Reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, ordering a Plaintiff to disclose details of previous settlements in a personal injury prosecution.
a. The public interest in the settlement of disputes generally requires “without prejudice” documents or communications created for, or communicated in the course of, settlement negotiations to be privileged:Middelkamp v. Fraser Valley Real Estate Board (1992), 71 B.C.L.R. (2d) 276 (C.A.).
b. A final settlement agreement is covered under the Middelkamp blanket protection for settlement communications: B.C. Children’s Hospital v. Air Products Canada Ltd., 2003 BCCA 177, confirming a general policy of non-production of all documentation relating to settlement negotiations.
c. To establish an exception to settlement privilege, the applicant must show that a competing public interest outweighs the public interest in encouraging settlement. An exception should only be found where the documents sought are both relevant, and necessary in the circumstances of the case to achieve either the agreement of the parties to the settlement, or another compelling or overriding interest of justice. Relevance alone is not sufficient to override the settlement privilege. See Middelkamp; Dos Santos v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada, 2005 BCCA 4, para. 21.
 It has yet to be established here that the injuries arising from the third accident are indivisible from those in the first and second. However, on the basis that indivisibility is at issue, and that there is potential for over-compensation, it is appropriate to require disclosure of the settlement documents at this time. I accept the submission of the defendants that such disclosure is necessary, in that it may assist in the settlement of the plaintiff’s claims arising from the third accident. Disclosure at this time is consistent with the previous decisions of this Court in Pete and Murray. I am satisfied that the defendants here do not seek a purely tactical advantage, as the Court found in Phillips v. Stratton, 2007 BCSC 1298, but rather, they wish to have the information necessary to assess their exposure, both for purposes of settlement and in the preparation of their case for trial.
 In Dos Santos at para. 34, the Court stated that “significant weight should be given to the just disposition of pending litigation in determining whether the documents sought come within an exception to settlement privilege.” In my view, to find that the documents should be disclosed at this time is consistent with this approach.
 To the extent that disclosure at this time raises concerns with respect to the fettering of the trial judge’s determination of damages, the parties may wish to agree that, as in Gnitrow Ltd, v. Cape plc,  3 All E.R. 763, the terms of the settlements not be disclosed to the trial judge until a determination of the damages payable by the defendant has been made: at para. 21.
 In the circumstances, I conclude that it is appropriate to make an order for production of the documents which set out the terms of the settlements of the plaintiff’s claims arising from the two previous accidents.
 The defendants are entitled to their costs in the cause.
Defence Medical Exams – Best Expert Not Required to "Level the Playing Field"
Further to my previous posts about Independent Medical Exams in BC Supreme Court Injury Claims unpublished reasons for judgement recently came to my attention (Hou v. Kirmani BCSC Vancouver Registry, 20091119) dealing with the ability for a Defendant to have an injured party undergo multiple exams where the first defence expert feels an opinion from a second expert would be of benefit.
(the Plaintiff) would benefit from an opinion from a foot and ankle orthopaedic surgeon, as further surgical intervetnion may be of benefit to her and this might include surgical correction of her deformity so as to allow her to bear weight and walk short distances more appropriately. …I do not feel further passive treatment for her left foot and ankle will be of any benefit to her..
…I am not of the view that Rule 30 is intended to allow follow-up on every issue which is raised by experts who examine the plaintiff.
Dr. Arthur was chosen, and I accept the submissions of the plainitff in this regard, with the knowledge that there were concerns regarding this plaintiff’s ankle. Thee is, it is fair to say, nothing new since Dr. Arthur was retained, apart from his reticence to provide an opinion. And he does not say, I do not believe, that he is not qualified to give the opinion which is missing, if it is missing. He simply says, I think it is fair to conclude, that in the best of all worlds she would be seen by an orthopaedic surgeon with a subspeciality training. In my view that is not the purpose of Rule 30.
As mentioned above, this is an unreported judgement but if anyone wants a copy feel free to contact me and I’ll be happy to e-mail a copy of the transcript.
Further to my post yesterday discussing this topic another case was released today by the BC Supreme Court discussing the jurisdiction of the British Columbia Courts in relation to out of province motor vehicle collision tort claims.
In today’s case (Sooparayachetty v. Fox) 8 separate plaintiffs were apparently involved in an Alberta motor vehicel accident. The Defendants were Alberta residents. Some of the Plaintiffs were BC Residents and others were resident in the UK. All of the Plaintiff’s brought lawsuits in both Alberta and BC with respect to their injuries.
 The Court of Appeal has recently confirmed that the question of jurisdiction is to be determined exclusively by the substantive rules set out in the Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act, S.B.C. 2003, c. 28 (“CJPTA”): Stanway v. Wyeth Pharmaceuticals Inc., 2009 BCCA 592, at para. 12.
(e) there is a real and substantial connection between British Columbia and the facts on which the proceeding against that person is based.
 Section 10 of the CJPTA sets out a list of circumstances that presumptively constitute a real and substantial connection between British Columbia and the facts on which a proceeding is based for the purposes of s. 3(e). A plaintiff who is unable to bring herself within the statutory presumptions may nevertheless prove other circumstances which constitute a real and substantial connection.
 While “real and substantial connection” has not been defined, the cases provide some guidance as to what connections are insufficient to found jurisdiction.
 It is clear that the fact that a plaintiff is resident in British Columbia is insufficient: Roed v. Scheffler et al, 2009 BCSC 731, at para. 35, citing Jordan v. Schatz, 2000 BCCA 409, and Williams v. TST Porter (c.o.b. 6422217 Canada Inc.) 2008 BCSC 1315.
In my view, any reliance on the Muscutt factors as a guide to determining the question of jurisdiction came to an end in British Columbia with the coming into force of the CJPTA.
 Accordingly, the test remains real and substantial connection which appears to require a straightforward determination of whether, on the facts, a real and substantial connection has been established.
 Applying Roed, the first connection upon which the plaintiff relies to found jurisdiction – damages suffered within British Columbia – is too tenuous. The question therefore becomes whether the fact that, since the Alberta accident, the plaintiff has been injured in a second accident which occurred in British Columbia can provide the basis for a finding of jurisdiction. These circumstances were not addressed in Roed.
 The parties appear to agree that a global assessment of Ms. Sooparayachetty’s injuries will be required. I take this to mean that they accept that, in order to assess damages for which the Alberta defendants may be liable, the court will be required to assess “global damages” as of the date of trial in respect of both accidents. Circumstances relating to the second accident will therefore be considered in the assessment of damages for the first.
 Section 3(e) of the CJPTA provides that the court has territorial competence if there is a real and substantial connection between British Columbia and the facts on which the proceeding against the defendants is based. While facts relating to the second accident may have to be canvassed in order to assess Ms. Sooparyachetty’s damages arising from the first accident, the two claims remain separate. In my view, the circumstances relating to the second accident are not facts upon which the proceedings against these defendants are based, and therefore cannot provide the real and substantial connection required by s. 3(e). The need to call evidence relating to the second accident in the trial of the first, while an appropriate consideration on the question of forum conveniens (see, for example, Stewart v. Stewart,  6 W.W.R. 402; 5 B.C.L.R. (3d) 350 (S.C.)), does not confer jurisdiction on this court in relation to the first accident, and Ms. Sooparaychetty’s action arising from it.
 The other plaintiffs did not press their argument in relation to territorial competence over their actions.
 I find that, the plaintiffs having failed to establish that there is a real and substantial connection between British Columbia and the facts on which these proceedings are based, the court does not have territorial competence in these proceedings.
(b) the commencement of the proceeding in a court outside British Columbia cannot reasonably be required.
Residual discretion permits the court to act as a “forum of last resort” where there is no other forum in which the Plaintiff could reasonably seek relief.
 It is clear that here, as in Lailey, British Columbia does not stand out as a forum of last resort. There are no limitation concerns as the plaintiffs have commenced actions in Alberta as well.
 I do not propose to address the issue of forum conveniens given my finding regarding territorial competence, and the fact that the notice of motion did not seek relief of that nature.
 The plaintiffs having failed to plead, or adduce in affidavit form, facts sufficient to establish jurisdiction, the application by the defendants is allowed and the plaintiffs’ actions are stayed pursuant to Rule 14(6).
One of the reasons why Plaintiffs try to bring their lawsuits in BC versus Alberta is the fact that British Columbia has greater rights in place for those injured at the hands of others. However, cases such as this one demonstrate that it is no easy task to establish jurisdiciton of BC Courts to hear cases inovlving foreign motor vehicle collisions.

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