Source: https://casetext.com/case/ware-v-colvin-12
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 15:12:52+00:00

Document:
LAURA WARE, Plaintiff, v. CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.
Plaintiff brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) to obtain judicial review of the final decision by the Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner") denying Plaintiff's claim for disability benefits. This case came before the Court on the administrative record and the parties' Motions for Summary Judgment [# 9 & # 13]. The Court RECOMMENDS that the District Court GRANT the Commissioner's Motion for Summary Judgment [# 13], DENY Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment [# 9], and AFFIRM the decision of the Commissioner.
Plaintiff filed an application for disability insurance benefits on August 24, 2011. (Transcript of Administrative Record ("T.") 186.) The application had a protective filing date of August 17, 2011. (T. 81, 197.) Plaintiff initially alleged an onset date of October 1, 2009 (T. 83, 186, 197), but she subsequently amended her onset date to May 1, 2011 (T. 42, 68, 180).
The Social Security Administration denied Plaintiff's claim. (T. 96-99.) Plaintiff requested reconsideration of the decision, which was also denied. (T. 100-2.) A series of disability hearings were then held before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"). (T. 33-80.) The ALJ then issued a decision finding that Plaintiff was not disabled from May 1, 2011, through the date of the decision. (T. 14-25.) Plaintiff requested review of the ALJ's decision, which was denied by the Appeals Council (T. 1-3). Plaintiff then brought this action seeking review of the Commissioner's decision.
An individual is disabled for purposes of receiving disability payments if she is unable to "engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months . . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); see also Mastro v. Apfel, 270 F.3d 171, 176 (4th Cir. 2001). The Commissioner undertakes a five-step inquiry to determine whether a claimant is disabled. Johnson v. Barnhart, 434 F.3d 650, 653 (4th Cir. 2005). Under this inquiry, the Commissioner must consider in sequence: (1) whether a claimant is gainfully employed; (2) whether a claimant has a severe impairment that significantly limits her ability to perform basic work-related functions; (3) whether the claimant's impairment meets or exceeds the listing of impairments contained in Appendix I of 20 C.F.R. Part 404, subpart P; (4) whether the claimant can perform her past relevant work; (5) whether the claimant is able to perform any other work considering her age, education, and residual functional capacity. Mastro, 270 F.3d at 177; Johnson, 434 F.3d at 654 n.1; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. If at any stage of the inquiry, the Commissioner determines that the claimant is or is not disabled, the inquiry is halted. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a) and 416.920(a).
(1) The claimant meets the insured status requirements of the Security Act through December 31, 2014.
(2) The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since May 1, 2011, the alleged onset date (20 CFR 404.1571 et seq.).
the back and chronic pain (20 CFR 404.1520(c)).
(4) The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1525 and 404.1526).
(5) After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform medium work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(c) which includes frequent postural activities (climbing ramps and stairs, balancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching and crawling) and occasional climbing ropes, ladders, and scaffolds. She should avoid concentrated exposure to hazards and would be limited to simple, unskilled work.
(6) The claimant is unable to perform any past relevant work (20 CFR 404.1565).
(7) The claimant was born on October 3, 1955 and was 55 years old, which is defined as an individual closely approaching advanced age, on the alleged disability onset date. The claimant subsequently changed age category to advanced age (20 CFR 404.1563).
(8) The claimant has at least a high school education and is able to communicate in English (20 CFR 404.1564).
(9) Transferability of job skills is not material to the determination of disability because using the Medical-Vocational Rules as a framework supports a finding that the claimant is "not disabled," whether or not the claimant has transferable job skills (See SSR 82-41 and 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2).
can perform (20 CFR 404.1569 and 404.1569(a)).
(11) The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from May 1, 2011, through the date of this decision (20 CFR 404.1520(g)).
Section 405(g) of Title 42 provides that a plaintiff may file an action in federal court seeking judicial review of the Commissioner's denial of social security benefits. Hines v. Barnhart, 453 F.3d 559, 561 (4th Cir. 2006). The scope of judicial review, however, is limited. The Court "must uphold the factual findings of the Secretary if they are supported by substantial evidence and were reached through application of the correct legal standard." Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996). "Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). It is more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance of evidence. Id. When a federal district court reviews the Commissioner's decision, it does not "re-weigh conflicting evidence, make credibility determinations, or substitute [its] judgment for that of the Secretary." Id. Accordingly, the issue before the Court is not whether Plaintiff is disabled but, rather, whether the Commissioner's decision that she is not disabled is supported by substantial evidence in the record, and whether the ALJ reached the decision based on the correct application of the law. Id.
Thus, "[b]y negative implication, if a physician's opinion is not supported by clinical evidence or if it is inconsistent with other substantial evidence, it should be accorded significantly less weight." Craig, 76 F.3d at 590. Under such circumstances, the ALJ holds the discretion to give less weight to the testimony of a treating physician in the face of persuasive contrary evidence. See Hunter, 993 F.2d at 35.
Statements by medical sources that a patient is disabled, unable to work, or meets the listing requirements are not medical issues, but are administrative findings reserved for the Commissioner. SSR 96-5p, 1996 WL 374183 (Jul. 2, 1996); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d). Because they are administrative findings, "treating source opinions on issues that are reserved to the Commissioner are never entitled to controlling weight or special significance." SSR 96-5p, 1996 WL 374183 (Jul. 2, 1996).
Nontreating source means a physician, psychologist, or other acceptable medical source who has examined you but does not have, or did not have, an ongoing treatment relationship with you. The term includes an acceptable medical source who is a consultative examiner for us, when the consultative examiner is not your treating source.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1502. Of course, the ALJ may still give "great weight" to the opinion of a nontreating source and, under the right circumstances, may even find that it is entitled to greater weight than that of a treating source. See SSR 96-2P.
Plaintiff's first assignment of error is that the ALJ failed to properly evaluate the medical opinion of Dr. Lara Hume, Plaintiff's treating physician. Specifically, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred by assigning little weight to the January 30, 2013, opinion of Dr. Hume. The Commissioner contends that the decision of the ALJ to assign little weight to Dr. Hume's opinion is supported by substantial evidence in the record.
Dr. Hume indicated her assessment was based, in part, on "patient report", which the undersigned finds subjective; and imagine studies, which show degenerative changes but not to the degree that would preclude all work. Additionally, Dr. Hume's assessment is inconsistent with her own treatment records showing minimal findings. Moreover, Dr. Hume did not begin treating claimant until May 2012 and did not see the claimant on a regular and ongoing basis, and she did not prescribe more than conservative treatment.
Here, the ALJ gave specific reasons for the weight given to Dr. Hume's opinion. This is not a case where the ALJ made conclusory findings that frustrate meaningful review by the Court. Moreover, substantial evidence supports the decision of the ALJ to give little weight to the opinion of Dr. Hume. As the ALJ explained, the opinion of Dr. Hume was largely based on Plaintiff's subjective reports of pain.
The conservative treatment directed by Dr. Hume is not consistent with the severe restrictions and limitations Dr. Hume found in her opinion dated January 30, 2013. This opinion is also inconsistent with her own treatment notes during this time period, which fail to reflect the severity of impairments Dr. Hume indicates in her opinion and questionnaire. Upon a review of the record and the decision of the ALJ, the Court finds that the ALJ's determination that the opinion of Dr. Hume was entitled to little weight was the result of the application of the correct legal standard and is supported by substantial evidence in the record. The Court finds that remand is not required in this case as the result of the ALJ's decision to assign little weight to the opinion of Dr. Hume.
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to properly consider the Plaintiff's statements regarding her pain and symptoms. As an initial matter, the Court recognizes that it is not the role of this Court to determine whether Plaintiff's testimony was fully credible. Craig, 76 F.3d at 589. Rather, the question for the Court is whether the ALJ applied the proper legal standard in assessing Plaintiff's credibility and whether the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence. Id.
In assessing a claimant's statement of pain and other symptoms, the ALJ applies a two part process. Id. at 594; Hines, 453 F.3d at 565. First, the ALJ must assess whether there is a medically determinable physical impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce claimant's symptoms. 20 C.F.R. §404.1529(c)(1); Craig, 76 F.3d at 595; Hines, 453 F.3d at 565. If the ALJ finds that a claimant suffers such an impairment and that the impairment could reasonably be expected to produce the symptoms of pain of which claimant complains, the ALJ proceeds to step two. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(1); Aytch v. Astrue, 686 F. Supp. 2d 590, 604 (E.D.N.C. 2010).
At the second step, the ALJ must evaluate the intensity and persistence of the pain, as well as the extent to which the claimant's symptoms and pain impact his or her ability to work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(1); Craig, 76 F.3d at 595. "This evaluation requires the ALJ to determine the degree to which the claimant's statements regarding symptoms and their functional effects can be believed and accepted as true; thus the ALJ must consider conflicts between the claimant's statements and the rest of the evidence." Aytch, 686 F. Supp. 2d at 604. This evaluation takes into account all of the available evidence, including the claimant's medical history, the medical signs and laboratory findings, other objective medical evidence, and testimony or statements from claimant, physicians, or others regarding the pain and symptoms. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(1) & (2); Craig, 76 F.3d at 595.
The ALJ also provided detailed and specific reasons for why the ALJ found Plaintiff's testimony was not fully credible. (T. 22-23.) For example, the ALJ found that the medical evidence in the record, including her treatment history, did not support the level of severity of impairment alleged and that epidural steroid injections provided significant relief to Plaintiff's pain. (T. 20-22.) Plaintiff also reported that she was able to walk without much difficulty after the injections. (T. 21, 859.) As the ALJ explained, "[c]ontrary to her testimony, the claimant's examinations routinely showed minimal findings and she was responsive to physical therapy and epidural steroid injections." (T. 22.) Finally, the ALJ also considered Plaintiff's daily activities, including that Plaintiff could drive, went grocery shopping, walked five times a week, and cared for her personal needs and a pet cat. (T. 22.) As the regulations make clear, Plaintiff's daily activities are relevant to the ALJ's determination as to the severity of Plaintiff's symptoms. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(i).
Upon a review of the evidence in the record, the Court finds that the ALJ did not error in making a credibility determination, and this Court will not reweigh the evidence. While Plaintiff may disagree with the result that the ALJ reached based on the application of this two-step process, the record is clear that the ALJ applied the correct legal standard in assessing Plaintiff's credibility, and it is not the role of this Court to re-weigh the evidence and determine whether Plaintiff's testimony is credible or to substitute the judgment of this Court for that of the ALJ. See Craig, 76 F.3d at 589. The Court finds that the ALJ's determination that Plaintiff's testimony was not fully credible was the result of the application of the proper legal standard and is supported by substantial evidence in the record. As such, remand is not required based on the alleged error of the ALJ to assess Plaintiff's credibility.
This is not a case like Mascio where the ALJ failed to consider or address conflicting assessments; instead, the ALJ explicitly considered and rejected this conflicting evidence. The ALJ also explained in the decision why Plaintiff did not warrant additional limitations in sufficient detail to allow this Court to conduct meaningful review and determine whether the decision of the ALJ was supported by substantial evidence in the record. Accordingly, the Court the Court finds that remand is not required based on the alleged failure of the ALJ to conduct a function by function analysis in determining Plaintiff's RFC. The Court RECOMMENDS that the District Court GRANT the Commissioner's Motion for Summary Judgment [# 13], DENY Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment [# 9], and AFFIRM the decision of the Commissioner.
The Court RECOMMENDS that the District Court GRANT the Commissioner's Motion for Summary Judgment [# 13], DENY Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment [# 9], and AFFIRM the decision of the Commissioner.
The parties are hereby advised that, pursuant to 28, United States Code, Section 636(b)(1)(c), and Rule 72, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, written objections to the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendation contained herein must be filed within fourteen (14) days of service of same. Responses to the objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of service of the objections. Failure to file objections to this Memorandum and Recommendation with the district court will preclude the parties from raising such objections on appeal. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985), reh'g denied, 474 U.S. 1111 (1986); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1208 (1984).

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