Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/75/595/
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 12:22:03+00:00

Document:
"No person shall be prosecuted in any civil action for or on account of any act by him done, performed, or executed after the first of January, one thousand eight hundred and sixty-one, by virtue of military authority vested in him by the Government of the United States, or that of this state, to do such act, or in pursuance to orders received by him from any person vested with such authority, and if any action or proceeding shall have heretofore been, or shall hereafter be, instituted against any person for the doing of any such act, the defendant may plead this section in bar thereof,"
is not a bill of attainder within the meaning of that clause of the Constitution of the United States which ordains that no state shall pass any such bill.
2. Nor does it impair the obligation of a contract within the meaning of the same constitution because, in the case of a contract relating to real property -- as, ex. gr., a landlord's covenant that he will keep his tenant in possession -- its effect is to prevent a determination under particular state statutes of a party's mere right of possession, irrespectively of the merits of title, and where the same result might have confessedly been lawfully brought about by the state legislature by a repeal of the particular statute, and without impairing the obligation of any contract.
3. Semble that the case might be different if by giving effect to the provision, the party was precluded from asserting a title and enforcing a right.
In 1854, Mrs. Tyler leased to one Drehman, a house and lot in St. Louis for twenty years, that is to say, till 1874, and by the terms of the lease covenanted to keep the said Drehman in lawful possession of the premises during the term for which they were leased to him. In 1860, Mrs. Tyler sold the fee of the premises to one Stifle, who thus became landlord to Drehman, her lessee.
"No person shall be prosecuted in any civil action for or on account of any act by him done, performed or executed, after the first of January, one thousand eight hundred and sixty-one, by virtue of military authority vested in him by the government of the United States, or that of this state, to do such acts or in pursuance to orders received by him from any person vested with such authority, and if any action or proceeding shall have heretofore been or shall hereafter be instituted against any person for the doing of any such act, the defendant may plead this section in bar thereof."
that it was in the face of that clause of the Constitution of the United States, which declares that "no state shall pass any bill of attainder, . . . or law impairing the obligation of contracts."
The court instructed the jury that if the facts established by the evidence to their satisfaction brought the case within this provision of the Constitution of Missouri, the defense was valid, and that the defendant was entitled to the verdict. Drehman excepted. The jury found for Stifle, and the court gave judgment accordingly. Drehman therefore appealed to the supreme court of the state, which affirmed the judgment, and he accordingly brought the case to this Court under the 25th section of the Judiciary Act for review.
This case is brought here by a writ of error issued under the 25th section of the Judiciary Act of 1789, to the Supreme Court of the State of Missouri.
the parties relates by a lease terminating in 1874, and built upon the premises a dwelling house, store, and other improvements. The lessor sold and conveyed the reversion to Stifle. The house was rendered untenantable by fire. Stifle, as colonel of the "home guards," pursuant to an order from his military superior, took possession of the lot, removed all the buildings, and has since held and used the property for his own private purposes. Thereafter, on the 22d of December, 1863, Drehman commenced an action of forcible entry and detainer against Stifle before a justice of the peace to recover possession of the premises. The justice rendered a judgment in his favor for restitution for a large amount of damages, for a specified sum for rent per month, to be paid from the time of the recovery until restitution should be made, and for costs. Stifle removed the case by appeal to the St. Louis Land Court, where a verdict and judgment were rendered in his favor. Drehman appealed to the Circuit Court of St. Louis County.
"Section 4. No person shall be prosecuted in any civil action for or on account of any act by him done, performed or executed, after the first of January, one thousand eight hundred and sixty-one, by virtue of military authority vested in him by the government of the United States, or that of this state, to do such acts, or in pursuance to orders received by him from any person vested with such authority; and if any action or proceeding shall have heretofore been or shall hereafter be instituted against any person for the doing of any such act, the defendant may plead this section in bar thereof."
court of the state, which affirmed the judgment, and he has brought the case to this Court for review.
I. It is alleged that this section of the Constitution of Missouri "is a bill of pains and penalties within the meaning of the Constitution of the United States, and therefore invalid."
II. It is insisted that this section "is a law impairing the obligation of contracts, in violation of the Constitution of the United States."
of the said leased premises during this lease," &c. It is said that this covenant became obligatory upon Stifle by virtue of his being the assignee of the reversion of the estate; that the law of landlord and tenant of Missouri, in force when the lease was executed, became a part of the contract; that one of the remedies to which Drehman was entitled by this law to enforce the covenant in question was the proceeding by forcible entry and detainer; that this section of the Constitution of Missouri, as construed by the supreme court of the state, has deprived him of that remedy, and thus impairs the obligation of his contract. This view of the subject is supported by the counsel for the plaintiff in error with ingenuity, research, and ability, but they have failed to convince us of the soundness of the proposition.
The 26th section of the statute of Missouri upon the subject of forcible entry and detainer declares as follows: "The merits of the title shall in no wise be inquired into on any complaint which shall be exhibited by virtue of the provisions of this act." This proceeding has no relation to the rights of property of the parties. It turns entirely on the facts of lawful possession by the plaintiff and unlawful entry by the defendant. The defendant may have a valid title, the plaintiff possession without any title, and yet the defendant, having entered without the plaintiff's consent, may be dispossessed, and the plaintiff be restored to possession. If a party desires to assert his title and enforce his rights, he must resort to the remedies provided for that purpose. This form of procedure is not one of them. [Footnote 3] It cannot, therefore, be maintained that this remedy entered into the contract between the lessor and lessee. The legislature might have abolished it by repealing the statute without impairing any right within the meaning of the contract provision of the federal Constitution, acquired while the statute was in force. In this respect, it stands on the same footing with any other action ex delicto.
is an inquiry which lies beyond the sphere of our powers and duties. If an action of covenant or ejectment had been brought and it had been held that the Constitution of Missouri affected the right of recovery, the question would perhaps have presented a different aspect. But no such case is before us, and we have not had occasion to consider the subject. The right of a state legislature to pass retroactive laws where there is no inhibition in the Constitution of the state, provided they do not impair the obligation or a contract and are not ex post facto in their character, is too well settled to admit of doubt. [Footnote 4] We find no error in the record of which we can take cognizance.
2 Woodeson's Lectures, 622-624; Gaines v. Buford, 5 Dana 509; Story on the Constitution, § 1344; Ex Parte Garland, 4 Wall. 324.
Rowland on the English Constitution 563; 2 May 267, 324.
Gibson v. Ting, 29 Mo. 134; Butler v. Cardwell, 33 id. 86.
Williamson v. Leland, 2 Pet. 627; Watson v. Mercer, 8 Pet. 88; Kearney v. Taylor, 15 How. 494; Sattelee v. Mathewson, 2 Pet. 380; Society v. Pawlet, 4 Pet. 480; Railroad v. Nesbit, 10 How. 401; Albee v. May, 2 Paine 74; Andrews v. Russell, 7 Blackford 475.

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