Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/406/706/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 03:45:07+00:00

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Justia › US Law › US Case Law › US Supreme Court › Volume 406 › Brunette Machine Works v. Kockum Indus.
Brunette Machine Works, Ltd. v. Kockum Industries, Inc.
Title 28 U.S.C. § 1391(d), providing that "[a]n alien may be sued in any district," embodies the long-established rule that a suit against an alien is wholly outside the operation of all federal venue laws (whether general or special), and governs the venue of an action for patent infringement against an alien. The District Court therefore erred in holding that § 1400(b) (which provides that a patent infringement suit may be brought in the district of the defendant's residence, or where he has committed infringement acts and has a regular place of business) is the exclusive provision governing venue in patent infringement litigation. Pp. 406 U. S. 708-714.
regular and established place of business."
We are asked to decide which provision of Title 28 governs the venue of an action for patent infringement against an alien defendant.
Respondent Kockum Industries, Inc., an Alabama corporation doing business in Oregon, holds a United States patent on a machine that removes bark from logs. Kockum claims that petitioner Brunette Machine Works, Ltd., a Canadian corporation, has infringed that patent by assisting two American manufacturers to make and sell similar machines. [Footnote 1] Kockum obtained service of process on Brunette in Oregon, under that State's long-arm statute, Ore.Rev.Stat. § 14.035, and filed this action for patent infringement in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon. The District Court dismissed the complaint on the ground of improper venue, accepting Brunette's contention that § 1400(b) is the exclusive provision governing venue in patent infringement litigation, and that its requirements were not satisfied here. [Footnote 2] The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that § 1391(d) applies to patent infringement suits as to all others, and hence that Brunette is subject to suit as an alien in any district. 442 F.2d 420 (1971). We granted certiorari to resolve a conflict in the circuits on this question. [Footnote 3] 404 U.S. 982 (1971). We affirm.
"[N]o civil suit shall be brought before either [district or circuit] courts against an inhabitant of the United States, by any original process in any other district than that whereof he is an inhabitant, or in which he hall be found at the time of serving the writ. . . ."
1 Stat. 79. [Footnote 4] Because this limitation on the place where federal cases might be tried applied in terms only to suits against "an inhabitant of the United States," suits against aliens were left unrestricted, and could be tried in any district, subject only to the requirements of service of process.
The original venue provisions remained essentially unchanged until 1875, when Congress substantially revised the Judiciary Act and greatly expanded the scope of federal jurisdiction. 18 Stat. 470. [Footnote 5] In describing the class of cases subject to venue restrictions, the 1875 statute dropped the phrase "suit . . . against an inhabitant of the United States" and substituted "suit . . . against any person." This Court held, however, that the change was stylistic, and not substantive, and that Congress did not thereby bring suits against aliens within the scope of the venue laws. In re Hohorst, 150 U. S. 653 (1893).
with the longstanding judicial view that the 1789 language continues to color the venue statutes, with the result that suits against aliens are outside the scope of all the venue laws.
federal law. [Footnote 13] Over the objections of some legislators, who could see no reason for treating patent suits differently from any other federal question litigation, [Footnote 14] Congress took the opportunity to establish for patent infringement suits a special and separate venue statute. Thus, it is fair to say, as the Court did in Stonite and Fourco, that, in 1897, Congress placed patent infringement cases in a class by themselves, outside the scope of general venue legislation.
dropped the language that expressly excluded suits against alien defendants from the general venue statutes, or in 1897, when it enacted the special patent venue statute. But in 1948, Congress was apparently quite content to leave suits against alien defendants exempt from the venue statutes, in patent cases as in all others. In that year, Congress codified as § 1391(d) the rule exempting suits against aliens from the federal venue statutes. The Reviser's Notes, which provide the principal guide to interpretation of the 1948 Judicial Code, explain the intent to codify a rule that commands the "weight of authority," citing a pair of district court cases. These cases hold that the general venue laws do not control in a suit against an alien defendant, nor does the special patent venue law. Sandusky Foundry & Machine Co. v. DeLavaud, 261 F. 631 (ND Ohio 1918); Keating v. Pennsylvania Co., 245 F. 155 (ND Ohio 1917).
We conclude that, in § 1391(d), Congress was stating a principle of broad and overriding application, and not merely making an adjustment in the general venue statute, as this Court found Congress had done in Stonite and Fourco. The principle of § 1391(d) cannot be confined in its application to cases that would otherwise fall under the general venue statutes. For § 1391(d) is properly regarded not as a venue restriction at all, but rather as a declaration of the long-established rule that suits against aliens are wholly outside the operation of all the federal venue laws, general and special.
Respondent's suit against one of those manufacturers, an Oregon corporation, is now pending on appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Kockum Industries, Inc. v. Salem Equipment, Inc., No. 25870.
Petitioner does not "reside" in Oregon, because the residence of a corporation for purposes of § 1400(b) is its place of incorporation. Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prods. Corp., 353 U. S. 222 (1957), discussed infra at 406 U. S. 711 and n. 10. And while the alleged infringement occurred in Oregon, petitioner apparently has no regular place of business there.
Compare the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit below with Coulter Electronics, Inc. v. A. B. Lars Ljungberg & Co., 376 F.2d 743 (CA7), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 859 (1967). Several district courts in other circuits have adopted the view taken by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in this case, see Chas. Pfizer & Co. v. Laboratori Pro-Ter Prodotti Therapeutici, 278 F.Supp. 148 (SDNY 1967); Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp. v. Molins Organizations, Ltd., 261 F.Supp. 436 (ED Va.1966).
The provision for venue wherever the defendant "shall be found" is deceptively broad. The grant of federal jurisdiction at that time consisted almost exclusively of suits between parties of diverse citizenship. Unlike the present statute, however, which provides for jurisdiction over suits "between . . . citizens of different States," 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1), the 1789 statute provided for jurisdiction over suits "between a citizen of the State where the suit is brought, and a citizen of another State." 1 Stat. 78. Thus, the litigants were effectively confined to the district of residence of one of them, by the jurisdictional grant, though not by the venue statutes. This restriction was eliminated in 1875, when a number of important changes were made in the Judiciary Act, see n 5, infra and the relevant clause of the grant of diversity jurisdiction was rephrased in its present form, 18 Stat. 470.
The jurisdiction of the federal courts was extended to include suits "arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States," i.e., the federal question jurisdiction now found in 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a). And the diversity jurisdiction was rephrased, see n 4, supra.
In re Hohorst, 150 U. S. 653, 150 U. S. 661 (1893), citing In re Louisville Underwriters, 134 U. S. 488, 134 U. S. 492 (1890), and Shaw v. Quincy Mining Co., 145 U. S. 444, 145 U. S. 448 (1892), for the proposition that the substitution "has been assumed to be an immaterial change."
In 1875, the restrictions on venue in the federal courts were those imposed by the 1789 statute quoted in text: suit could be brought where the defendant was an inhabitant, or where he could be found. In 1887, however, Congress eliminated the provision authorizing suit wherever the defendant could be found: federal question cases could be brought only where the defendant was an "inhabitant," and diversity cases only where either the plaintiff or the defendant resides. 24 Stat. 552. A suit against an alien was not regarded as a true diversity suit, and hence it was necessary to satisfy the requirements of federal question venue, i.e., residence of the defendant. Hohorst, supra, at 150 U. S. 660.
Today, the general venue provisions for federal question and diversity cases appear in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(a) and (b); they follow the 1887 statute, except that Congress has added a provision for venue where "the claim arose," see n 8, infra.
There have been, and perhaps there still are, occasional gaps in the venue laws, i.e., cases in which the federal courts have jurisdiction but there is no district in which venue is proper. One such gap arose in connection with cases involving multiple plaintiffs and defendants. Venue was fixed at the residence of the defendant, or, in diversity cases, at the residence of the plaintiff as well. When there were multiple plaintiffs or defendants, the district of residence for venue purposes was the district where all plaintiffs or all defendants reside. Smith v. Lyon, 133 U. S. 315 (1890). If they resided in different districts, then there was no proper venue. In 1966, Congress acted to close the gap with a provision authorizing suit where "the claim arose," 80 Stat. 1111, which, in most cases, provides a proper venue even in multiple-party situations. The development supports the view that Congress does not in general intend to create venue gaps, which take away with one hand what Congress has given by way of jurisdictional grant with the other. Thus, in construing venue statutes, it is reasonable to prefer the construction that avoids leaving such a gap.
Section 1392(a), originally 11 Stat. 272 (1858), affords some relief in a very small class of cases that fall in the gap described in n. 8, supra. When multiple defendants reside in different districts within the same State, the suit may be brought in any one of them.
"A corporation may be sued in any judicial district in which it is incorporated or licensed to do business or is doing business, and such judicial district shall be regarded as the residence of such corporation for venue purposes."
See supra at 406 U. S. 709-710.
See Stonite Prods. Co. v. Lloyd Co., 315 U. S. 561, 315 U. S. 564-565 (1942); conflicting decisions collected at 29 Cong.Rec.1901 (1897).
Venue in a federal question case was at that time proper only where the defendant was an inhabitant, 24 Stat. 552 (1887), as corrected, 25 Stat. 434 (1888). Thus, the new statute gave patent claimants an advantage by authorizing as an additional venue alternative any district where the defendant maintained a regular place of business, and committed acts of infringement. Ironically, changes in the general venue law have left the patent venue statute far behind. Since 1948, the general venue law has authorized suit against a corporate defendant not only where he maintains a "regular and established place of business," as in § 1400(b), but also where he is "doing business." 62 Stat. 935, now § 1391(c). And, since 1966, the general venue law has authorized suit where "the claim arose," see n 8, supra.
See 29 Cong.Rec.1901 (remarks of Cong. Payne).

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