Source: http://legalarium.com/ttabquotes/LOC10.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 14:13:24+00:00

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The tenth du Pont factor is the market interface between applicant and registrant.
In further support of its contention that confusion is unlikely, applicant argues that registrant has impliedly consented "to the use by Applicant of Applicant's logo." (Applicant's brief at 7.) We deem this argument to fall under the tenth du Pont factor, i.e., the market interface between applicant and registrant. See In re Opus One Inc., supra.
If, as applicant contends, the United States Army in fact consents to applicant's registration of the mark, "there is available to applicant in a future application a type of evidence which, under du Pont and subsequent case law, is entitled to great weight in the likelihood of confusion analysis, i.e., a valid consent agreement between applicant and registrant. The evidence of record applicant relies on in the present case simply does not suffice as a substitute for such an agreement. We have given that evidence due consideration, but conclude that the tenth du Pont evidentiary factor, i.e., the "market interface" between applicant and registrant, does not weigh in applicant's favor to any significant degree in this case." In re Opus One Inc., supra, 60 USPQ2d at 1822.
Case Finding: The fact that opposer also uses other media such as print and television advertising to market its services does not raise a genuine issue regarding the parties' channels of trade.
The fact that opposer also uses other media such as print and television advertising to market its services does not raise a genuine issue regarding the parties' channels of trade. See Octocom Systems Inc. v. Houston Computers Services Inc., 918 F.2d 937, 16 USPQ2d 1783, 1788 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
We turn finally to the tenth du Pont factor, "the market interface between applicant and the owner of a prior mark" which includes consideration of "(b) agreement provisions designed to preclude confusion, i.e., limitations on continued use of the marks by each party..." du Pont supra at 567.
A settlement Agreement may not negate a finding of potential likelihood of confusion.
Having found that there exists a likelihood of confusion, we elect to sustain the opposition on this basis alone. We will not consider opposers' claim, which was unpled but which was tried by the consent of the parties, that the current applicants are bound by a 1985 settlement agreement entered into by opposers and Mego Corp., the former owner of the old MEGO mark. See American Paging Inc. v. American Mobilephone Inc., 13 USPQ2d 2036, 2039 (TTAB 1989), aff'd 17 USPQ2d 1726 (Fed. Cir. 1990) and cases cited therein.
Even though the parties had an agreement to not sell a particular class of goods, the general public would be unaware of the agreement and still likely to believe the goods are related.
However, opposer's ARDEN B clothing is sold exclusively in opposer's own ARDEN B clothing stores, and the ARDEN B stores sell, almost exclusively, opposer's house brand of clothing. Opposer has expressed no intention of expanding the sale of its merchandise to include the stores of others or the brands of merchandise of others. Applicant argues that because opposer's goods are only sold in opposer's stores, and since opposer is prohibited by the parties' agreement from selling cosmetics under the ARDEN B mark, the parties' clothing and cosmetic products in this case will never in fact be sold together. Applicant's statement is true, but not compelling. First, purchasers are not going to be aware that opposer is prohibited from selling cosmetic products under the ARDEN B mark. Further, where products are closely related, merely because the products in fact would not be sold together would not necessarily prevent consumers, when encountering the products in different outlets, from believing the products come from the same source. See Freedom Savings and Loan Association v. Fidelity Bankers Life Insurance Company, 224 USPQ 300, 304 (TTAB 1984) ("It is not necessary that goods be competitive or be sold together or through the same outlets if they can be shown to be related in some manner that would suggest to persons encountering them, even at different locations, sources, or offices a likelihood of common sponsorship").
It is not necessary that goods be competitive or be sold together or through the same outlets if they can be shown to be related in some manner that would suggest to persons encountering them, even at different locations, sources, or offices a likelihood of common sponsorship.
In cases where equitable defenses have been pleaded and proved, it is necessary to decide whether the question of likelihood of confusion is inevitable or reasonably debatable because the equitable defenses of laches and acquiescence are barred if confusion is inevitable.
In cases such as this, where equitable defenses have been pleaded and proved, it is necessary to decide whether the question of likelihood of confusion is inevitable or reasonably debatable because the equitable defenses of laches and acquiescence are barred if confusion is inevitable. Ultra-White Co., Inc. v. Johnson Chemical Industries, Inc., 465 F.2d 891, 175 USPQ 166, 167 (CCPA 1972); Reflange Inc. v. R-Con International, supra; Hitachi Metals International v. Yamakyu Chain Kabushiki, 209 USPQ 1057, 1069 (TTAB 1981).
This is so because any injury to respondent caused by plaintiff's delay is outweighed by the public's interest in preventing confusion. Turner v. Hops Grill & Bar, Inc., 52 UPSQ2d 1310, 1313 (TTAB 1999), citing Coach House Restaurant Inc. v. Coach and Six Restaurants, Inc., 934 F.2d 1551, 19 UPSQ2d 1401, 1409 (11th Cir. 1991).
Earlier proceedings involving opposer's mark does not have a res judicata or collateral estoppel effect where the marks and goods at issue in the prior case are different from the earlier case(s).
Finally, the fact that opposer was the plaintiff in a 1978 opposition proceeding (No. 91062042) involving its MISS U.S.A. mark and a third party's MR. USA mark, in which the opposition ultimately was terminated and a registration issued to the applicant, is of no probative value in the present case. The only evidence pertaining to this prior case are TTABVUE and TARR records, which show only that the proceeding was filed on December 27, 1978 and instituted on March 6, 1979, that the applicant filed an answer on April 2, 1979, that an "appeal to CAFC" was taken on October 26, 1981, that the opposition was terminated on July 27, 1983, that a registration (Reg. No. 1253816) was issued to the applicant on October 11, 1983, and that the registration subsequently was cancelled under Section 8. There is no evidence from which we might ascertain the basis for the Board's apparent dismissal of the opposition and the Federal Circuit's apparent affirmance of such dismissal. We note that the goods identified in the third-party applicant's MR. USA application and registration were Class 25 clothing goods, a fact which in itself may have been the basis for a finding of no likelihood of confusion (assuming that such finding was in fact the basis of the decision and outcome of the case). The point is that we cannot determine what the basis of the decision in the prior case was; that case therefore is of no probative value. To the extent that applicant is arguing that this prior case has some sort of res judicata or collateral estoppel effect in the present case, such contention is without merit given the differences in the marks and goods at issue in the prior case.
Discussion of laches and estoppel in relation to the tenth du Pont factor.
FOOTNOTE 13 "Given the lack of sufficient evidence in the record to establish "laches or estoppel attributable to the owner of the prior mark," we need not reach the more fundamental question of whether applicant is entitled to rely on the tenth du Pont factor at all in this case. Arguably, the "laches and estoppel" provision set forth in subsection (d) of the tenth du Pont factor must be read in conjunction with the introductory language of the tenth factor. That is, "laches and estoppel attributable to owner of prior mark and indicative of lack of confusion" is relevant only as an example of "the market interface between applicant and the owner of a prior mark." No such market interface between applicant and registrant exists in this case; applicant relies solely on an alleged (but unproven) market interface between registrant and the Highland Orange Association, an entity with which applicant admittedly (see supra at footnote 8) shares no privity. This construction of the "laches and estoppel" provision of the tenth du Pont factor is consistent with the well-settled general rule, in inter partes cases, that laches and estoppel are personal defenses which may not be asserted by a third party, such as applicant in this case, who lacks privity with the person entitled to assert the defense. See, e.g., The Procter & Gamble Company v. Keystone Automotive Warehouse, Inc., 191 USPQ 468 (TTAB 1976). But see Interstate Brands Corp. v. Celestial Seasonings, Inc., 576 F.2d 926, 198 USPQ 151, 154 (CCPA 1978)(party's prior statement, in unrelated proceedings, of opinion on legal issue which is contrary to position taken in present proceeding is not an estoppel, but is relevant to the extent that it may be "illuminative of shade and tone in the total picture confronting the decision maker"). Additionally, and aside from the privity issue, we have found no reported cases in which the "laches and estoppel" provision of the tenth du Pont factor was applied in the context of an ex parte appeal, nor has applicant cited any such cases. It is true that du Pont itself was an ex parte case, but it did not involve laches or estoppel, on its facts. The only reported ex parte case we have found in which the applicant attempted to overcome a Section 2(d) refusal by asserting estoppel is the predu Pont case of In re National Distillers and Chemical Corporation, 132 USPQ 271 (CCPA 1962). The Court rejected the applicant's estoppel argument in that case, and held that laches, estoppel and acquiescence are applicable only in inter partes proceedings, not in the context of ex parte appeals: "We think that the clear intent of Congress was that section 19 [Trademark Act Section 19, 15 U.S.C. §1069] be limited to inter partes proceedings, and this for the very sound reason that the equitable principles of laches, estoppel and acquiescence are based on facts and should not be applied either in favor of or against one not a party to the proceeding. An ex parte proceeding arising from the refusal of the Patent Office to register a trademark does not become an inter partes proceeding in the sense of section 19 of the Lanham Act (15 U.S.C. 1069), as urged by applicant, merely because the applicant and the Patent Office appear many times in opposing roles." 132 USPQ at 276. It is unclear whether this statement of the law was implicitly overruled by the Court in du Pont. However, that question, as well as the privity question, are moot in this case because the evidence of record does not demonstrate any laches or estoppel attributable to the owner of the registration cited as a bar to registration of applicant's mark. 14 According to the allegation of use in the cited registration registrant commenced use of its mark in 1925. Use of the Highland Orange Association mark apparently commenced in 1898, and continued until some undetermined time between 1953, when its registration was renewed, and the expiration of its registration in 1973. See infra at footnote 16. Applicant commenced use of its mark in 1997.
Absent any evidence in the record, the TTAB may not infer that a party has consented to the other's use of a mark.
Even assuming, as applicant contends, that the United States Army consents to applicant's use of its mark, there is nothing in the record from which we might infer that the United States Army also consents to applicant's registration of the mark. See In re Thomas, 79 USPQ2d 1021 (TTAB 2006).
Indeed, there is no evidence that the United States Army is even aware that applicant has applied to register the mark. See In re Opus One Inc., supra.
Registrant's failure to respond to applicant's letters that registrants have consented to registration does not support applicant's claim that registrant has consented or has no objection to the registration of applicant's mark.
Nor will we infer from registrants' failure to respond to applicant's letters that registrants have consented to registration or that registrants have no objection to the registration of applicant's mark. The registrants clearly had no obligation to respond to applicant's inquiries. Therefore, their failure to respond does not support applicant's claim that they have no objection.
Similarly, we cannot conclude that registrant had no objection to applicant's earlier registration simply because registrant failed to object to it. We are not privy to registrant's reasons for not challenging the registration and we will not speculate about them. We do, however, note that any objections registrant may have had to applicant's earlier registration were eliminated once the registration was cancelled.
Priority under Article 7 of the Pan American Convention.
Applicant has moved for summary judgment by asserting priority under Article 7 of the Pan American Convention as an affirmative defense to opposer's Section 2(d) claim. Article 7 provides as follows: "Any owner of a mark protected in one of the contracting states in accordance with its domestic law, who may know that some other person is using or applying to register or deposit an interfering mark in any other of the contracting states, shall have the right to oppose such use, registration or deposit and shall have the right to employ all legal means, procedure or recourse provided in the country in which such interfering mark is being used or where its registration or deposit is being sought, and upon proof that the person who is using such mark or applying to register or deposit it, had knowledge of the existence and continuous use in any of the Contracting States of the mark on which opposition is based upon goods at the same class, the opposer may claim for himself the preferential right to use such mark in the country where the opposition is made or priority to register or deposit in such country, upon compliance with the requirements established by the domestic legislation in such country and by this Convention."
The Section 7(b) presumptions accorded a registration on the Principal Register, including the presumption of use of the mark, accrue only to the benefit of the owner of the registration, and thus only come into play in an inter partes proceeding when the registration is made of record by its owner.
FOOTNOTE 17 "The Section 7(b) presumptions accorded a registration on the Principal Register, including the presumption of use of the mark, accrue only to the benefit of the owner of the registration, and thus only come into play in an inter partes proceeding when the registration is made of record by its owner. See TBMP §704.03(b)(1)(B)."

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