Source: https://www.bostonlawyerblog.com/free-speech-trespass-massachusetts-sjcs-decision-glovsky-v-roche-bros-supermarkets-inc/
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 20:39:51+00:00

Document:
The question that the Glovsky decision raises for those of us who are not seeking public office is whether the protection that the SJC has granted to Glovsky under art. 9 would extend to individuals seeking to exercise a right to freedom of speech under the Declaration of Rights art. 16. In other words, should someone passing out political pamphlets or waving a protest sign at a shopping mall in Massachusetts be treated differently than a candidate for political office seeking signatures for ballot access? The answer to this question is important, in practice, because many private institutions (including, in our firm’s experience, many universities) not only restrict the exercise of such speech on their property, but give activists no-trespass warnings and have them arrested if they persist.
Second, the balancing test outlined in Glovsky and Batchelder I, which looks at the rights of the property-owner as well as of the person seeking to exercise a constitutional right on private property, would ensure that protecting free speech on certain private properties wouldn’t disrupt business at shopping malls, supermarkets or universities. The public policy of the Commonwealth, which has its roots in a history of freedom of political expression, also favors an expansive interpretation of art. 16; freedom of expression on political issues is “a right growing out of our free institutions and essential to the support of them.” Commonwealth v. Blanding, 3 Pick. 304, 313, 315 (1825). The Batchelder I court also noted with approval cases in which the high courts of other states found a right to orderly exercise of free speech on private property. Id. at 90 (discussing State v. Schmid, 84 N.J. 535 (1980) and Commonwealth v. Tate, 495 Pa. 158, 173 (1981)). And finally, it would be troubling from a policy perspective to protect the constitutional rights of candidates for office–relatively few, high status individuals–more carefully than the free speech rights we all share.
The difference between free speech and art. 9 rights to free elections and to be a candidate equally with others is not purely theoretical. Ideas and views can be transmitted through the press, by door-to-door distributions, or through the mail, without personal contact. On the other hand, a person needing signatures for ballot access requires personal contact with voters.
Id. Glovsky repeats this caution. The extent of the right to free speech on private property in Massachusetts thus remains unresolved pending some future action of the SJC; we will watch the law as it continues to develop.

References: art. 9
 art. 16
 art. 16
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 art. 9