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Timestamp: 2019-04-24 19:01:33+00:00

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Recently Zhang et al [ Phys. Rev. A 95, 012333 (2017)] developed a new approach to estimate the failure probability for the decoy-state BB84 QKD system when taking finite-size key effect into account, which offers security comparable to Chernoff bound, while results in an improved key rate and transmission distance. Based on Zhang et al’s work, now we extend this approach to the case of the measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD), and for the first time implement it onto the four-intensity decoy-state MDI-QKD system. Moreover, through utilizing joint constraints and collective error-estimation techniques, we can obviously increase the performance of practical MDI-QKD systems compared with either three- or four-intensity decoy-state MDI-QKD using Chernoff bound analysis, and achieve much higher level security compared with those applying Gaussian approximation analysis.
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Fig. 1 Comparison for the key generation rates of the four-intensity scheme with different statistical fluctuation methods, in the case of N = 1011. The dashed curve and the dotted curve represent the results of using the Gaussian approximation analysis method and the Chernoff bound method, respectively. The solid curve corresponds to applying the improved statistical fluctuation analysis method.
Fig. 2 Comparison for the key generation rates of the four-intensity scheme with different statistical fluctuation methods, in the case of N = 1010. The dashed curve and the dotted curve represent the results of using the Gaussian approximation analysis method and the Chernoff bound method, respectively. The solid curve corresponds to implementing the improved statistical fluctuation analysis method.
Fig. 3 Comparison for the key generation rate between the three-intensity scheme and the four-intensity scheme, both applying the improved new statistical fluctuation analysis method, for N = 1011. The solid curve represents the four-intensity scheme and the dashed curve corresponds to the three-intensity scheme.
Fig. 4 The optimized key generation rates versus the total number of pulse pairs N for either the three-intensity scheme or four-intensity scheme.

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