Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/california/supreme-court/3d/24/238.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 04:13:19+00:00

Document:
David R. Finch and Finch, Castello & Tennant for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Leonard Putnam and Robert W. Parkin, City Attorney, and Robert E. Shannon, Deputy City Attorney, for Defendants and Respondents.
Evelle J. Younger, Attorney General, Jack R. Winkler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Edward P. O'Brien, Assistant Attorney General, W. Eric Collins and Clifford K. Thompson, Jr., Deputy Attorneys General, Stephen Warren Solomon, William J. Ramey, Ralph B. Saltsman and Emanuel Cowitt as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents.
In 1972 Police Officer Vershaw shot and killed Roland Peterson. At the time of the killing Peterson was running from his apartment. Vershaw had responded to a radio call erroneously reporting a burglary in progress at the apartment. He approached with gun drawn. Peterson fled and was shot in the head. Vershaw had had no report of, nor did he see, any weapons, violence, or threat of violence at the apartment.
Plaintiffs, Peterson's parents, sued Vershaw and his employer, City of Long Beach, for wrongful death. The trial court, ruling that Vershaw's use of deadly force was justifiable, held in favor of both defendants. Plaintiffs appeal.
I. The Police Department Manual.
"5. The City of Long Beach Police Department Manual, Section 4242, though it may serve as a guideline for the conduct of Long Beach police officers, does not constitute a minimal standard of care for the use of firearms by said police officers.
"6. The failure of Officer Vershaw to comply with Section 4242 of the City of Long Beach Police Department Manual, in discharging his firearm herein, does not constitute a negligent or a wrongful act, so long as his conduct was within the permissible limit of the California Penal Code and it was within such limit. ..."
Defendants argue that, when the Legislature in Evidence Code section 669, subdivision (a) enacted the phrase "statute, ordinance, or regulation of a public entity," the intent was to cover local ordinances but not local regulations like section 4242 of the police manual. Even though the chief of police and the city manager were authorized to act for the city and duly prescribed section 4242 (see fn. 2, ante), the argument seems to be that their official positions did not clothe them with the attributes of a public entity.
What did the Legislature mean by "public entity"? Section 200 of the Evidence Code, enacted two years earlier than section 669, tells us that a public entity can be "a nation, state, county, city and county, city, district, public authority, public agency, or any other political subdivision or [24 Cal. 3d 244] public corporation, whether foreign or domestic"; and when those definitional words were proposed the California Law Revision Commission commented: "The broad definition of 'public entity' includes every form of public authority ...." (Italics added.) Those two italicized phrases, "public agency" and "every form of public authority," are apt here.
A city is a public entity. But so are the office of its city manager and the department that its police chief directs. Each traditionally has been regarded as an "agency" of the city, obviously "public." We find it hard to believe that the Legislature would not regard city managers and police chiefs (whose power to promulgate rules is conceded) as heads of a "form of public authority." Since, therefore, when they promulgated the manual the city manager and the police chief were acting as heads of a public entity, as defined by the Legislature, and since section 4242 of the manual clearly is a "regulation," fn. 4 we hold that the trial court should not have concluded that section 4242 "does not constitute a minimal standard of care for the use of firearms by said police officers." The trial court thus did not give due consideration to the rebuttable presumption of failure to exercise due care that Evidence Code section 669 prescribes.
So far we have focused on words and their plain meaning. We now examine legislative aims, to be sure that a conclusion as to words alone will not irrationally extend the Legislature's purpose.
 That definition surely includes standards for the use of weapons when the standards have the force of law fn. 7 and were adopted, as they were here, by the public entity's employees (city manager and police chief), pursuant to authority vested by charter or ordinance to implement, interpret, or make specific the law administered by those employees and their subordinates.
The trial court found that "at all pertinent times Officer Vershaw acted as a reasonable and prudent police officer in discharging the duties imposed upon him as a peace officer of the State of California." It also found that he violated the commands of section 4242. It did not, unfortunately, consider whether he "desired to comply" with that law. The sole evidence regarding his desire to comply suggests that he did not think of section 4242's command before shooting. fn. 8 Since, as we have shown, his violation raised a presumption of negligence, he cannot be freed from liability without a judicial inquiry as to whether he could successfully rebut the presumption. That inquiry, implicit in section 669, subdivision (b)(1), was not made because the trial court disregarded section 669, subdivision (a).
The judgment for defendants is reversed.
I respectfully dissent. As the majority opinion explains, at issue here is the applicability of Evidence Code section 669 and its presumption of negligence. We must decide whether noncompliance [24 Cal. 3d 248] with a police department manual, containing guidelines regarding the use of firearms by police officers, invokes the statutory presumption. As will appear, contrary to the majority's holding, I would conclude that section 669 is inapplicable.
Section 669 applies only to a statute, ordinance or regulation of a "public agency," and it is certainly arguable that a police department manual should not be considered a public agency regulation under that section. (Accord, Vallas v. City of Chula Vista (1976) 56 Cal. App. 3d 382, 387-388 [128 Cal. Rptr. 469].) Yet, my objection to the majority's analysis focuses on an entirely different problem. We have held that section 669 requires a showing that the ordinance or regulation in question was "designed to protect persons in plaintiff's class from the type of injury which in fact occurred." (Mark v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (1972) 7 Cal. 3d 170, 183, fn. 10 [101 Cal. Rptr. 908, 496 P.2d 1276]; see Vesely v. Sager (1971) 5 Cal. 3d 153, 164-165 [95 Cal. Rptr. 623, 486 P.2d 151].) In other words, the regulation or other enactment must prescribe a standard of care by which to measure one's legal duty to others. The reason for the foregoing rule is clear: it would be highly improper and unfair to base a presumption of negligence solely upon the violation of an enactment which was not intended to create a duty of care.
In the present case, the trial court expressly found that the police manual was not intended as a standard of care, but was merely a set of guidelines describing departmental policies regarding firearm use. Specifically, the court found that the manual "... though it may serve as a guideline for the conduct of Long Beach police officers, does not constitute a minimal standard of care for the use of firearms by ... police officers." The court further found that the officer's failure to comply with the manual "... does not constitute a negligent or a wrongful act, so long as his conduct was within the permissible limit of the California Penal Code and it was within such limits [since] ... Officer Vershaw, in firing his weapon at Roland Peterson, used justifiable deadly force within the permissible limits of Section 196 of the California State Penal Code."
In the trial court's view, to which I fully subscribe, a presumption of negligence properly cannot be based upon violation of internal, departmental policies which were not intended as minimum standards of care. As stated in a recent case involving the identical manual provision, "The purpose of the regulation is to provide training and guidance to the officer so that he will not get into a situation where a plaintiff could claim that he used excessive force." (Long Beach Police Officers Assn. v. City of Long [24 Cal. 3d 249] Beach (1976) 61 Cal. App. 3d 364, 376 [132 Cal. Rptr. 348].) In other words, the manual was intended to encourage restraint over and above the limits imposed by law, in order to protect the officer and his employer from civil liability. It is highly ironic, I suggest, that guidelines which were intended to shield against civil suits may now furnish the sole basis for imposing such liability.
It is entirely reasonable to conclude that the departmental manual at issue herein was designed to promote police procedures regarding firearm use which are considerably more restrictive than the procedures presently required by law. (See, e.g., Pen. Code, § 196 [justifiable homicide by police officers]; Murphy v. Murray (1925) 74 Cal. App. 726 [241 P. 938].) Indeed, under present law, an officer is immune from civil liability if he acts in good faith under the apparent authority of an enactment such as Penal Code section 196. (Gov. Code, § 820.6.) As the trial court noted, the evidence failed to show any intent by the city or its police department to modify these existing legal requirements or to declare a minimum standard of care for purposes of measuring an officer's legal duty of care toward third persons. Accordingly, section 669 was clearly inapplicable.
"(4) The person suffering the death or the injury to his person or property was one of the class of persons for whose protection the statute, ordinance, or regulation was adopted.
"(1) The person violating the statute, ordinance, or regulation did what might reasonably be expected of a person or ordinary prudence, acting under similar circumstances, who desired to comply with the law ...."
FN 2. See Long Beach Police Officers Assn. v. City of Long Beach (1976) 61 Cal. App. 3d 364, 368 [132 Cal.Rptr. 348]: "Section 161 of the Long Beach City Charter provides that '[t]he City police department shall be governed at all times by such rules and regulations as the City Manager may prescribe.' On or about June 1, 1972, defendant John R. Mansell, the City Manager of the City of Long Beach, and defendant William J. Mooney, Chief of Police of the City of Long Beach Police Department, duly prescribed section 4242 of the Long Beach Police Department Manual. The relevant portion of this section is taken from a model firearms policy proposed by Professor Samuel G. Chapman, who was assistant director of the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice (Task Force on Police)."
"[I] 'The policy of the Department governing the display and discharge of firearms is that members shall exhaust every other reasonable means of apprehension before resorting to the use of a firearm.
" 'In the necessary defense of himself from death or serious injury when attacked.
" 'In the necessary defense from death or serious injury of another person attacked.
" 'To kill a dangerous animal or one that is so badly injured that humanity requires its removal from further suffering and other disposition is impractical.
" 'To give an alarm or to call assistance for an important purpose when no other means can be used.
" 'For target practice at an approved range.
"[B] 'An officer shall not fire at persons known to be, or suspected of being, juveniles (persons under 18 years of age) except (a) in the necessary defense of himself from death or serious injury when attacked or [italics in original] (b) in the necessary defense from death or serious injury of another person attacked.
'At moving or fleeing vehicles unless (a) in the necessary defense of himself from death or serious injury when attacked or [italics in original] (b) in the necessary defense from death or serious injury of another person attacked.'"
On pages 7 and 8 of his amicus brief filed to support defendants here the Attorney General conceded, "Long Beach held ... that a chartered city could enact greater restrictions upon use of deadly force by police than those imposed by state law."
FN 4. See our text following footnote 6, infra. We reject the trial court's suggestion that section 4242 contains mere guidelines. Its words are commands (e.g., "An officer shall not discharge a firearm" and "Firearms shall not be discharged"). Note also the section's detailed requirements as to notification, report, and investigation "whenever a member discharges a firearm (except at an approved range)."
FN 5. See Vallas v. City of Chula Vista (1976) 56 Cal. App. 3d 382, 387-88 [128 Cal. Rptr. 469], which we disapprove to the extent that its rulings are inconsistent with views expressed herein.
FN 6. See Hutchinson, Rule Making Function of California Administrative Agencies (1964) 15 Hastings L.J. 272; Lerch, Comments on the California Rule-Making Process and the Effects Thereon of the California Environmental Quality Act of 1970 (1972) 5 U.C. Davis L.Rev. 309; Livingston, Organizations and Administrative Practice -- A Balance to the Corporate State? (1974) 26 Hastings L.J. 89, 99-101; Newman, Two Decades of Administrative Law in California: A Critique (1956) 44 Cal.L.Rev. 190, 193; cf. California Administrative Mandamus (Cont.Ed.Bar 1966) page 399, appendix C; Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.6, subdivision (g).
FN 8. Penal Code section 196 provides that "Homicide is justifiable when committed by public officers ... when necessarily committed in arresting persons charged with felony, and who are fleeing from justice or resisting such arrest." Defendants argue that under section 196 homicide by a police officer is justifiable when any felony is involved, not just the "violent" felonies to which the police manual restricts the use of firearms. (But see Kortum v. Alkire (1977) 69 Cal. App. 3d 325 [138 Cal. Rptr. 26]; Long Beach Police Officers Association v. City of Long Beach (1976) 61 Cal. App. 3d 364, 373-374 [132 Cal. Rptr. 348].) We need not consider that argument. Even if section 196 permitted deadly force under these facts, it did not compel its use. Thus a desire to comply with that section could not rebut the presumption of negligence raised by a violation of section 4242 of the manual.
Nor need we consider the scope of section 196 for purposes of immunity under Government Code section 820.6, which protects a public employee who "acts ... under the apparent authority of an enactment that is ... inapplicable ... except to the extent that he would have been liable had the enactment been ... applicable." Even had section 196 referred to any felony, Vershaw could still be liable for violating the police manual regulation, which clearly forbade the shooting in this case. Therefore we do not reach the amici argument that section 196 is inapplicable because it provides a defense only to criminal liability, while Penal Code section 835a is the affirmative authorization of use of force by police officers ("reasonable force").

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