Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=83341:57388&catid=1586&Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 02:53:32+00:00

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OLONGAPO CITY, Petitioner, v. SUBIC WATER AND SEWERAGE CO., INC., Respondent.
We resolve in this petition for certiorari1 under Rule 65 the challenge to the July 6, 2005 decision2 and the January 3, 2006 resolution3 (assailed CA rulings) of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 80947.
The compromise agreement also contained a provision regarding the parties’ request that Subic Water, Philippines, which took over the operations of the defendant Olongapo City Water District be made the co-maker for OCWD’s obligations. Mr. Noli Aldip, then chairman of Subic Water, acted as its representative and signed the agreement on behalf of Subic Water.
Subsequently, the parties submitted the compromise agreement to RTC Olongapo for approval. In its decision dated June 13, 1997,22 the trial court approved the compromise agreement and adopted it as its judgment in Civil Case No. 580-0-90.
On May 7, 1999, to enforce the compromise agreement, the petitioner filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution26 with the trial court. In its July 23, 1999 order,27 the trial court granted the motion, but did not issue the corresponding writ of execution.
The trial court denied Subic Water’s special appearance, motion for reconsideration, and its motion to quash. Subic Water then filed a petition for certiorari33 with the CA, imputing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction to RTC Olongapo for issuing its July 29, 2003 and October 7, 2003 orders as well as the writ of execution dated July 31, 2003.
In its decision dated July 6, 2005,34 the CA granted Subic Water’s petition for certiorari and reversed the trial court’s rulings.
A judgment on a compromise agreement is immediately executory and is considered to have been entered on the date it was approved by the trial court.36 Since the compromise agreement was approved and adopted by the trial court on June 13, 1997, this should be the reckoning date for the counting of the period for the filing of a valid motion for issuance of a writ of execution. Petitioner thus had until June 13, 2002, to file its motion.
The CA further remarked that while it was true that a motion for execution was filed by petitioner on May 7, 1999, and the same was granted by the trial court in its July 23, 1999 order,37 no writ of execution was actually issued.
As the CA looked at the case, petitioner, instead of following up with the trial court the issuance of the writ of execution, did not do anything to secure its prompt issuance. It waited another four years to file a second motion for execution on May 30, 2003.38 By this time, the allowed period for the filing of a motion for the issuance of the writ had already lapsed. Hence, the trial court’s July 29, 2003 order granting the issuance of the writ was null and void for having been issued by a court without jurisdiction.
The CA denied petitioner’s subsequent motion for reconsideration. Petitioner is now before us on a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
Lastly, the petitioner contended that the compromise agreement was signed by Mr. Noli R. Aldip, then Subic Water’s chairman, signifying Subic Water’s consent to the agreement.
We DISMISS the petition for being the wrong remedy and, in any case, for lack of merit; what we have before us is a final judgment that we can no longer touch unless there is grave abuse of discretion.
Certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal.
At the outset, we emphasize that the present petition, brought under Rule 65, merits outright dismissal for having availed an improper remedy.
Supplementing Rule 45 are Sections 341 and 442 of Rule 56 which govern the applicable procedure in the Supreme Court.
Appeals from judgments or final orders or resolutions of the CA should be made through a verified petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.43 In this case, petitioner questioned the July 6, 2005 decision44 and the January 3, 2006 resolution45 of the CA which declared as null and void the writ of execution issued by the trial court. Since the CA’s pronouncement completely disposed of the case and the issues raised by the parties, it was the proper subject of a Rule 45 petition. It was already a final order that resolved the subject matter in its entirety, leaving nothing else to be done.
The aggrieved party is proscribed from assailing a decision or final order of the CA via Rule 65 because such recourse is proper only if the party has no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the course of law. In this case, petitioner had an adequate remedy, namely, a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. A petition for review on certiorari, not a special civil action for certiorari was, therefore, the correct remedy.
The petitioner received the CA’s assailed resolution denying its motion for reconsideration on January 9, 2006. Following Rule 45, Section 2 of the Rules of Court,48 the petitioner had until January 24, 2006 to file its petition for review. It could have even filed a motion for a 30-day extension of time, a motion that this Court grants for justifiable reasons.49 But all of these, it failed to do. Thus, the assailed CA rulings became final and executory and could no longer be the subject of an appeal.
Apparently, to revive its lost appeal, petitioner filed the present petition for certiorari that – under Rule 65 – may be filed within sixty days from the promulgation of the assailed CA resolution (on January 3, 2006). A Rule 65 petition for certiorari, however, cannot be a substitute for a lost appeal. With the lapse of the prescribed period for appeal without an action from the petitioner, the present petition for certiorari – a mere replacement –must be dismissed.
But even without the procedural infirmity, the present recourse to us has no basis on the merits and must be denied.
period from entry of judgment.
Under Rule 39, Section 6,50 a judgment creditor has two modes in enforcing the court’s judgment. Execution may be either through motion or an independent action.
On May 7, 1999, within the five-year period from the trial court’s judgment, petitioner filed its motion for the issuance of a writ of execution. However, despite the grant of the motion, the court did not issue an actual writ. It was only on May 30, 2003 that petitioner filed a second motion to ask again for the writ’s issuance. By this time, the allowed five-year period for execution by motion had already lapsed.
As will be discussed below, since the second motion was filed beyond the five-year prescriptive period set by the Rules, then the writ of execution issued by the trial court on July 31, 2003 was null and void for having been issued by a court already ousted of its jurisdiction.
In Arambulo v. Court of First Instance of Laguna,53 we explained the rule that the jurisdiction of a court to issue a writ of execution by motion is only effective within the five-year period from the entry of judgment. Outside this five-year period, any writ of execution issued pursuant to a motion filed by the judgment creditor, is null and void. If no writ of execution was issued by the court within the five-year period, even a motion filed within such prescriptive period would not suffice. A writ issued by the court after the lapse of the five-year period is already null and void.54 The judgment creditor’s only recourse then is to file an independent action, which must also be within the prescriptive period set by law for the enforcement of judgments.
There seems to be no serious dispute that the 4th alias writ of execution was issued eight (8) days after the lapse of the five (5) year period from the date of the entry of judgment in Civil Case No. 367. As a general rule, after the lapse of such period a judgment may be enforced only by ordinary action, not by mere motion (Section 6, Rule 39, Rules of Court).
To clearly restate these rulings, for execution by motion to be valid, the judgment creditor must ensure the accomplishment of two acts within the five-year prescriptive period. These are: a) the filing of the motion for the issuance of the writ of execution; and b) the court’s actual issuance of the writ. In the instances when the Court allowed execution by motion even after the lapse of five years, we only recognized one exception, i.e., when the delay is caused or occasioned by actions of the judgment debtor and/or is incurred for his benefit or advantage.57 However, petitioner failed to show or cite circumstances showing how OCWD or Subic Water caused it to belatedly file its second motion for execution.
Strictly speaking, the issuance of the writ should have been a ministerial duty on the part of the trial court after it gave its July 23, 1999 order, approving the first motion and directing the issuance of such writ. The petitioner could have easily compelled the court to actually issue the writ by filing a manifestation on the existence of the July 23, 1999 order. However, petitioner idly sat and waited for the five-year period to lapse before it filed its second motion. Having slept on its rights, petitioner had no one to blame but itself.
a non- party to a case.
Subic Water never participated in the proceedings in Civil Case No. 580-0-90, where OCWD and petitioner were the contending parties. Subic Water only came into the picture when one Atty. Segundo Mangohig, claiming to be OCWD’s former counsel, manifested before the trial court that OCWD had already been judicially dissolved and that Subic Water assumed OCWD’s personality.
In the present case, the compromise agreement, although signed by Mr. Noli Aldip, did not carry the express conformity of Subic Water. Mr. Aldip was never given any authorization to conform to or bind Subic Water in the compromise agreement. Also, the agreement merely labeled Subic Water as a co-maker. It did not contain any provision where Subic Water acknowledged its solidary liability with OCWD.
Lastly, Subic Water did not voluntarily submit to the court’s jurisdiction. In fact, the motion it filed was only made as a special appearance, precisely to avoid the court’s acquisition of jurisdiction over its person. Without any participation in the proceedings below, it cannot be made liable on the writ of execution issued by the court a quo.
Solidary liability must be expressly stated.
In Palmares v. Court of Appeals,60 the Court did not hesitate to rule that although a party to a promissory note was only labeled as a co-maker, his liability was that of a surety, since the instrument expressly provided for his joint and several liability with the principal.
In the present case, the joint and several liability of Subic Water and OCWD was nowhere clear in the agreement. The agreement simply and plainly stated that petitioner and OCWD were only requesting Subic Water to be a co-maker, in view of its assumption of OCWD’s water operations. No evidence was presented to show that such request was ever approved by Subic Water’s board of directors.
Under these circumstances, petitioner cannot proceed after Subic Water for OCWD’s unpaid obligations. The law explicitly states that solidary liability is not presumed and must be expressly provided for. Not being a surety, Subic Water is not an insurer of OCWD’s obligations under the compromise agreement. At best, Subic Water was merely a guarantor against whom petitioner can claim, provided it was first shown that: a) petitioner had already proceeded after the properties of OCWD, the principal debtor; b) and despite this, the obligation under the compromise agreement, remains to be not fully satisfied.61 But as will be discussed next, Subic Water could not also be recognized as a guarantor of OCWD’s obligations.
An examination of the compromise agreement reveals that it was not accompanied by any document showing a grant of authority to Mr. Noli Aldip to sign on behalf of Subic Water.
Mr. Noli Aldip signed the compromise agreement purely in his own capacity. Moreover, the compromise agreement did not expressly provide that Subic Water consented to become OCWD’s co-maker. As worded, the compromise agreement merely provided that both parties [also] request Subic Water, Philippines, which took over the operations of Olongapo City Water District be made as co-maker [for the obligations above-cited]. This request was never forwarded to Subic Water’s board of directors. Even if due notification had been made (which does not appear in the records), Subic Water’s board does not appear to have given any approval to such request. No document such as the minutes of Subic Water’s board of directors’ meeting or a secretary’s certificate, purporting to be an authorization to Mr. Aldip to conform to the compromise agreement, was ever presented. In effect, Mr. Aldip’s act of signing the compromise agreement was outside of his authority to undertake.
Since Mr. Aldip was never authorized and there was no showing that Subic Water’s articles of incorporation or by-laws granted him such authority, then the compromise agreement he signed cannot bind Subic Water. Subic Water cannot likewise be made a surety or even a guarantor for OCWD’s obligations. OCWD’s debts under the compromise agreement are its own corporate obligations to petitioner.
Petitioner practically suggests that since Subic Water took over OCWD’s water operations in Olongapo City, it also acquired OCWD’s juridical personality, making the two entities one and the same.
This is an interpretation that we cannot make or adopt under the facts and the evidence of this case. Subic Water clearly demonstrated that it was a separate corporate entity from OCWD.
The burden of proving the presence of any of these probative factors lies with the one alleging it. Unfortunately, petitioner simply claimed that Subic Water took over OCWD’s water operations in Olongapo City. Apart from this allegation, petitioner failed to demonstrate any link to justify the construction that Subic Water and OCWD are one and the same.
Under this evidentiary situation, our duty is to respect the separate and distinct personalities of these two juridical entities.
We thus deny the present petition. The writ of execution issued by RTC Olongapo, Br. 75, in favor of Olongapo City, is hereby confirmed to be null and void. Accordingly, respondent Subic Water cannot be made liable under this writ.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DISMISS the petition. The Court of Appeals’ decision dated July 6, 2005 and resolution dated January 3, 2006, annulling and setting aside the orders of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo, Branch 75 dated July 29, 2003 and October 7, 2003, and the writ of execution dated July 31, 2003, are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the City of Olongapo.
2 Penned by Associate Justice Marina L. Buzon, and concurred in by Associate Justices Mario L. Guariña and Santiago Javier Ranada; Id. at 20-30.
8 Declaring a National Policy Favoring Local Operation and Control of Water Systems; Authorizing the Formation of Local Water Districts and Providing for the Government and Administration of such Districts; Chartering a National Administration to Facilitate Improvement of Local Water Utilities; Granting said Administration such Powers as are Necessary to Optimize Public Service from Water Utility Operations, and for Other Purposes.
9 PD 198, section 5.
11 PD 198 was subsequently amended by Presidential Decree No. 768 and Presidential Decree No. 1479.
12 PD 198, section 30 (b), as amended.
17 Id. at 129; 214-215.
36Manipor v. Ricafort, 454 Phil. 825, 833 (2003).
38 Id. at note 30.
43San Pedro and Dopeño v. Asdala, G.R. No. 164560, July 22, 2009, 593 SCRA 397, 401.
46 G.R. No. 165471, 581 Phil. 124 (2008).
52 CIVIL CODE, article 1144 in relation to article 1152.
53 G.R. No. L-31814, 53 Phil. 302 (1929).
55 G.R. No. L-22341, 137 Phil. 814 (1969).
57Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 91885, 329 Phil. 115, 122 (1996).
58Salamat Vda. de Medina v. Judge Cruz, G.R. No. L-39272, 244 Phil. 40, 48 (1988).
60 G.R. No. 126490, 351 Phil. 664 (1998).
61 Spouses Ong v. PCIB, G.R. No. 160466, 489 Phil. 673, 677 (2005).
62Cebu Mactan Members Center, Inc. v. Tsukahara, G.R. No. 159624, July 17, 2009, 593 SCRA 172, 176.
63 G.R. No. 117847, 357 Phil. 850 (1998).
64 Supra, note 62, at 177-178.
65Heirs of Tan Uy v. International Exchange Bank, G.R. No. 166282 & 166283, February 13, 2013, 690 SCRA 519, 525.
67 G.R. No. 108734, 326 Phil. 955 (1996).

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