Source: https://nycrubberroomreporter.blogspot.com/2017/09/
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 06:09:28+00:00

Document:
Computers and Education: A Good or Bad Partnership?
One scenario currently being given major media play is that technology used in schools are harming students. Dr. Nicholas Karderas believes that.
I think there is no doubt that huge sums of money are being spent on computers and computer-related accessories for schools, universities and other places whose main business is education, and money sways politicians who make public policy.
When this 21st century computer phenomenon becomes good education policy for the diverse populations throughout America is anyone's guess.
As the dog days of summer wane, most parents are preparing to send their kids back to school. In years past, this has meant buying notebooks and pencils, perhaps even a new backpack. But over the past decade or so, the back-to-school checklist has for many also included an array of screen devices that many parents dutifully stuff into their children’s bag.
But if that’s true, why would we have allowed these “educational” Trojan horses to slip into our schools? Follow the money.
Education technology is estimated to become a $60 billion industry by 2018. With the advent of the Common Core in 2010, which nationalized curriculum and textbooks standards, the multi-billion-dollar textbook industry became very attractive for educational gunslingers looking to capitalize on the new Wild West of education technology. A tablet with educational software no longer needed state-by-state curricular customization. It could now be sold to the entire country.
This new Gold Rush attracted people like Rupert Murdoch, not otherwise known for his concern for American pedagogy, who would go on to invest over $1 billion into an ed-tech company called Amplify, with the stated mission of selling every student in America their proprietary tablet—for only $199—along with the software and annual licensing fees.
Amplify hired hundreds of videogame designers to build educational videogames—while they and other tech entrepreneurs attempted to sell the notion that American students no longer had the attention span for traditional education. Their solution: Educate them in a more stimulating and “engaging” manner.
But let’s look more closely at that claim. ADHD rates have indeed exploded by 50 percent over the past 10 years with the CDC indicating that rates continue to rise by five percent per year. Yet many researchers and neuroscientists believe that this ADHD epidemic is a direct result of children being hyper-stimulated. Using hyper-stimulating digital content to “engage” otherwise distracted students exacerbates the problem that it endeavors to solve. It creates a vicious and addictive ADHD cycle: The more a child is stimulated, the more that child needs to keep getting stimulated in order to hold their attention.
Despite the Amplify and LA debacles, others still seek to convince naïve school administrators that screens are the educational panacea. Yet as more American schools lay off teachers while setting aside scarce budget dollars for tech, many educators and parents alike have begun to ask: Do any of these hypnotic marvels of the digital age actually produce better educational outcomes for the kids who use them?
We could look to Finland, whose school system routinely ranks toward the top globally and has chosen to skip the tech and standardized testing. Instead, Finnish students are given as many as four outdoor free-play breaks per day, regardless of the weather—while here, a sedentary American child sitting in front of a glowing screen playing edu-games while over-scheduled and stressed by standardized testing is seen as the Holy Grail.
We are projecting our own infatuation with shiny technology, assuming our little digital natives would rather learn using gadgets—while what they crave and need is human contact with flesh-and-blood educators.
Schools need to heed this research in order to truly understand how to best nurture real intrinsic learning and not fall for the Siren song of the tech companies—and all of their hypnotic screens.
The issue of freedom of speech by a public employee is an important one. As seen below, the speech of a teacher who reports to a principal and/or other education policymakers what seems to be improper acts by another public employee is not protected under the First Amendment. In the case of Peter Cohn, the United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, affirmed the decision of the District Court, which denied the protection saying that Mr. Cohn was not speaking as a private citizen.
I believe that the pattern and practice of destroying any exposure of corruption and fraud in public agencies is an error of judgment which should be fought before there is none. If public employees and private individuals are afraid to speak up, our public dollars will continue to be wasted or stolen.
THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, ERIC STRAUSS, individually, and JAMES JOHNSON, individually, Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Block, J.).
STEWART LEE KARLIN, Stewart Lee Karlin Law Group, PC, New York, NY., for Appellant.
ERIC LEE (Fay Ng on the brief), for Zachary W. Carter, Corporation Counsel of the City of New York, New York, NY., for Appellees.
PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS, JOSÉ A. CABRANES, RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR. Circuit Judges.
Peter Cohn, a New York City public school teacher, alleges that he suffered unlawful retaliation after he suggested that a fellow teacher had improperly assisted students prepare for a state-wide standardized test. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Block, J.) dismissed the complaint on motion, concluding that Cohn's speech was not protected by the First Amendment because it was made pursuant to his duties as a government employee. We review that decision de novo. Ruotolo v. City of New York, 514 F.3d 184, 188 (2d Cir. 2008). We assume the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues presented for review.
As part of his duties as an earth science teacher, Cohn was required to set up the laboratory portion of the New York State Regents Examination and help grade it. Cohn observed that approximately a dozen students in another teacher's class received perfect scores, and suspected that the teacher had improperly coached those students before the test. Cohn raised his concerns to the school's principal and assistant principal and, when they failed to act, Cohn informed the New York State Department of Education and the Board of Regents. Cohn alleges that he afterward suffered various adverse employment consequences, including unsatisfactory performance reviews.
Only certain types of speech made by government employees are protected by the First Amendment: it is necessary (but not sufficient) that the government employee "sp[eak] `as a citizen' rather than solely as an employee." Matthews v. City of New York, 779 F.3d 167, 172 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting Jackler v. Byrne, 658 F.3d 225, 235 (2d Cir. 2011)). There is no "brightline rule" to determine whether or not "a public employee is speaking pursuant to [his] official duties," i.e., speaking as an employee rather than as a citizen. Ross v. Breslin, 693 F.3d 300, 306 (2d Cir. 2012). "Courts must examine the nature of the plaintiff's job responsibilities, the nature of the speech, and the relationship between the two." Id.
In Weintraub v. Board of Education, a teacher alleged retaliation after complaining that a school administrator had declined to punish a student who had thrown books at the teacher. 593 F.3d 196, 198 (2d Cir. 2010). The teacher's complaint was made "pursuant to his official duties because it was part-and-parcel of his concerns about his ability to properly execute his duties as a public school teacher— namely, to maintain classroom discipline." Id. at 203 (citation and quotation marks omitted). Consequently, the teacher spoke as an employee rather than as a citizen.
So too here. Cohn and the other earth science teachers were responsible for setting up the laboratory exam, creating the answer key, and grading the exam. As in Weintraub, Cohn's speech was "part-and-parcel" of his job responsibilities—here, ensuring the fair and proper administration of a test for which he had some responsibility. Id. The alert to school officials that another teacher may have helped students cheat was therefore "pursuant to his official duties." Id. Accordingly, Cohn was speaking as an employee—rather than as a citizen—and his speech is unprotected by the First Amendment.
Cohn's counterarguments are unavailing. He contends that he was speaking in a private capacity when he raised his concerns beyond his immediate supervisors (the principal and assistant principal) by writing to state educational officials. A similar argument was rejected in Ross: "[t]aking a complaint up the chain of command to find someone who will take it seriously `does not, without more, transform . . . speech into protected speech made as a private citizen.'" 693 F.3d at 307 (quoting Anemone v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 629 F.3d 97, 116 (2d Cir. 2011)).
Cohn also argues that he spoke as a citizen rather than as an employee because private citizens may likewise write to state educational officials about suspected cheating. Although a "civilian analogue" to a government employee's speech militates in favor of an inference that the employee's speech is protected by the First Amendment, see Matthews, 779 F.3d at 175-76, the presence of an unofficial analogue does not necessarily mean the speech is protected. Weintraub concluded that the plaintiff teacher spoke as an employee (rather than as a citizen) before the opinion considered the presence of a civilian analogue. 593 F.3d at 203. Although the lack of a civilian analogue "supported" the conclusion that the teacher spoke as an employee, it was not determinative. Id. Even if private citizens can complain to state educational authorities in the same way he did, it would not change our conclusion that Cohn's speech was made pursuant to his official duties, and therefore unprotected by the First Amendment.
For the foregoing reasons, and finding no merit in Cohn's other arguments, we hereby AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
 Cohn sued his principal and assistant principal, as well as the New York City Department of Education and Board of Education.
COHN v Dept. of Educ. of N.Y.
Law Offices of Stewart Lee Karlin, P.C.
Peter Cohn ("plaintiff"), a high school teacher at the High School of Art and Design, brings the present action against the Department of Education of the City of New York, the Board of Education of the City of New York, Eric Strauss, and James Johnson (together, "defendants"). Plaintiff claims that defendants retaliated against him for exercising his First Amendment right to freedom of speech in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants now move to dismiss plaintiff's case for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). For the following reason, their motion is GRANTED.
The following facts are derived from the complaint, taken as true and viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff. See DiFolco v. MSNBC Cable L.L.C., 622 F.3d 104, 110-11(2d Cir. 2010). Plaintiff was on the grading team for the New York State Regent Examination in June 2011. While performing his duties on the grading team, he noticed that another teacher's students were receiving disproportionately high scores on the exam, which suggested that the teacher had improperly coached the students. After plaintiff reported this observation to defendants Strauss and Johnson—principal and vice principal, respectively, of the High School of Art and Design—and also to the New York State Department of Education Testing Division and the Board of Regents, Cohn claims he received a series of unsatisfactory teaching reviews and was removed from his position as Chairman of Math and Science. He argues that these actions amount to First Amendment retaliation.
A government employer "may impose restraints on the job-related speech of public employees that would be plainly unconstitutional if applied to the public at large." U.S. v. National Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 465 (1995). However, "[t]he Court has made clear that public employees do not surrender all their First Amendment rights by reason of their employment. Rather, the First Amendment protects a public employee's right, in certain circumstances, to speak as a citizen addressing matters of public concern." Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 417 (2006) (emphasis added). Thus, to establish a First Amendment retaliation case, a public employee must allege facts demonstrating that he or she "spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concern," rather than pursuant to his or her job duties. Id. at 418. If the employee spoke pursuant to his or her job duties rather than as a citizen on a matter of public concern, the employee has no First Amendment cause of action. See id. at 421 ("[W]hen public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes.").
Such is the case here. Plaintiff's speech arose directly from, and "w[as] made pursuant to his duties," on the grading team for the New York Regent Examination. See id. ("The controlling factor in Ceballos' case is that his expressions were made pursuant to his duties as a calendar deputy."). He was performing his duty of ensuring that the exam was fairly and properly graded; it "is part of what he . . . was employed to do." Id. As defendants point out, this case is directly on point with O'Connor v. Huntington U.F.S.D., No. 11-1275, 2014 WL 1233038, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. 2014), in which Judge Bianco held that a teacher on a grading team who reported grading irregularities on a statewide test was speaking "pursuant to his professional responsibilities and duties as a schoolteacher and grader[,]" rather than as a citizen on a matter of public concern.
Plaintiff here argues that O'Connor is distinct from his case because he reported his observation of grading irregularities to school administrators and the New York State Department of Education Testing Division and the Board of Regents, whereas the plaintiff in O'Connor only reported the grading irregularities to school administrators. But Garcetti instructs the Court to consider many factors, each non-dispositive, in a practical inquiry to determine whether the speech was made as a citizen rather than as an employee. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. 410, 420, 424 ("The proper inquiry is a practical one."). The mere fact that plaintiff here spoke outside of the small circle of school administrators is insufficient to transform his speech into that of a citizen on a matter of public concern. Thus, the facts plaintiff alleges in his Amended Complaint, taken as true and viewed in his favor, are insufficient to establish that he spoke as a citizen when he reported grading irregularities to Strauss, Johnson, and the New York State Department of Education Testing Division and the Board of Regents. And because he has not sufficiently alleged an underlying constitutional violation, his Monell claim also fails. City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986) ("If a person has suffered no constitutional injury at the hands of the individual police officer, the fact that the departmental regulations might have authorized the use of constitutionally excessive force is quite beside the point.").
For the aforementioned reason, defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is GRANTED.
Advocatz' purpose is to assist any person or group who have been challenged by false reports or evaluations, defamation, libel, and/or who have received charges which are false or life/career-altering.
We believe that all people have the right to due process of law, as well as the right to expose corruption and fraud. We help you do that.
We also assist attorneys in vacating judgments of "substantiated" false claims by investigating the investigators and defending the legal and contractual rights of all who are brought to grievances, mediation, arbitration, and/or want to go to settlement at any administrative hearing. We have extensive experience in winning cases in Education Law 3020-a arbitration.
We are not attorneys and do not practice law. We investigate, research, seek facts wherever they may be in recorded information, emails, and any other social media sources, and assist the victim in creating a comprehensive and detailed report on exactly how the problem arose ....and can be resolved.
We believe that the work needed to be done on each case is too much for a single attorney or a single representative who may not have or give the time needed to obtain all the details of what happened and that is why we give our clients unlimited time for discussion and research. All information is discussed and reviewed to give backup support and to manage all the case details for the attorney or client, if the client is pro se. In arbitration, mediation and negotiation where there is no attorney, and the appellant is pro se, we give the same assistance and support. Our opinions are not legal advice.
We help people who feel they have been harmed understand what the process is, and how an individual victimized by false claims can defend him or herself. Arbitration proceedings such as 3020-a hearings, do not take place in a Court of Law and there is no judge or jury.
We work as paralegals with Attorneys who subpoena witnesses, submit Motions To Dismiss charges, and argue for compliance with 3020-a Law on the determination of probable cause, the Just Cause Standard, Section 2590-h, and Section 3020-a. In addition, we research case law for Article 75 and 78 appeals, Part 83 Appeals, First Department Appeals, and civil actions in State and Federal Court.
Parentadvocates.org, NYC Rubber Room Reporter, New York Court Corruption, National Public Voice, NYC Public Voice, and Inside 3020-a Teachers' Trials.
We at Advocatz use terms such as "Just Cause" (or 'good cause') and "bad faith" in our defense of a Respondent brought to Education Law 3020-a arbitration. We want the Hearing Officer to look at the facts, or lack thereof, and the fairness and integrity of the process followed in support of those facts.
"Good cause is a legal term denoting adequate or substantial grounds or reason to take a certain action, or to fail to take an action prescribed by law. What constitutes a good cause is usually determined on a case by case basis and is thus relative.
Often the court or other legal body determines whether a particular fact or facts amount to a good cause. For example, if a party to a case has failed to take legal action before a particular statute of limitations has expired, the court might decide that the said party preserves its rights nonetheless, since that party's serious illness is a good cause, or justification for having additional time to take the legal action."
( Henry Campbell Black; Joseph R. Nolan; Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley (1991). "good cause". Black's Law Dictionary. West Pub. Co. p. 476).
Thus, a sustainable, valid defense in any forum results from a thorough, fact-based inquiry into the background of a case using the "good cause" justification.
Similarly, a valid defense should have a fact-based opposition to any bad faith by the defendant(s).
"Bad faith (Latin: mala fides) is double mindedness or double heartedness in duplicity, fraud, or deception. It may involve intentional deceit of others, or self-deception.
Some examples of bad faith include: a company representative who negotiates with union workers while having no intent of compromising; a prosecutor who argues a legal position that he knows to be false; an insurer who uses language and reasoning which are deliberately misleading in order to deny a claim."

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