Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=83676:57834&catid=1587&Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 20:37:58+00:00

Document:
EMERITU C. BARUT, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
Hence, Barut now seeks the review of his conviction by petition for review on certiorari.
(b) The finding on the supposed consistency of the testimonies of the State’s witnesses constituted a sweeping conclusion.
We find no reversible error committed by the CA.
To start with, the CA held that it could not find from its review of the records any compelling reason to set aside the factual findings of the trial court. It ruled that Villas and Fabiano had clearly and consistently testified that Barut had been the person who had shot Vincent; and that Barut’s bare denial of firing at Vincent did not prevail over their positive and categorical identification of him as the perpetrator.
Although the record of the trial is laid bare and open during every appeal in a criminal case, the credibility of witnesses is a factual issue that the Court cannot disturb in this appeal.5 We reiterate that the findings of fact by the trial court are accorded great respect especially when affirmed on appeal by the CA.6 This great respect for such findings rests mainly on the trial judge’s access to the witnesses while they testify in her presence, giving the trial judge the personal and direct observation of their manner and decorum during intensive grilling by the counsel for the accused, thereby enabling her to see if the witnesses were fidgeting and prevaricating, or were sincere and trustworthy.
Noting that neither Ucag nor Ancheta had shot Vincent, the RTC explained that the former could not anymore fire his gun at Vincent not only because Vincent was his own son but also because he himself had already been lying on the ground after being hit in his lower extremities; and that Ancheta could not have fired at Vincent at all because he, too, had been already wounded and lying on the ground and profusedly bleeding from his own gunshot wounds. The RTC further noted that the slug extracted from the body of Vincent had come from a .38 caliber revolver, not from Ucag’s .45 caliber firearm.
Barut’s contention did not itself go unnoticed by the CA, which observed that the RTC could not take the declaration of Villas into consideration because Villas’ extra-judicial sworn statement containing the declaration had not been offered and admitted as evidence by either side. The CA stressed that only evidence that was formally offered and made part of the records could be considered; and that in any event, the supposed contradiction between the extra-judicial sworn statement and the court testimony should be resolved in favor of the latter.
A document, or any article for that matter, is not evidence when it is simply marked for identification; it must be formally offered, and the opposing counsel given an opportunity to object to it or cross-examine the witness called upon to prove or identify it. A formal offer is necessary since judges are required to base their findings of fact and judgment only—and strictly—upon the evidence offered by the parties at the trial. To allow a party to attach any document to his pleading and then expect the court to consider it as evidence may draw unwarranted consequences. The opposing party will be deprived of his chance to examine the document and object to its admissibility. The appellate court will have difficulty reviewing documents not previously scrutinized by the court below. The pertinent provisions of the Revised Rules of Court on the inclusion on appeal of documentary evidence or exhibits in the records cannot be stretched as to include such pleadings or documents not offered at the hearing of the case.
The Court also sees fit to correct the indeterminate sentence of 10 years and one day of prision mayor, as the minimum, to 17 years and eight months of reclusion temporal, as the maximum, fixed by the RTC and affirmed by the CA. The maximum of 17 years and eight months comes from the maximum period of reclusion temporal, but the maximum of the indeterminate sentence should instead come from the medium period of reclusion temporal, whose duration is from 14 years, eight months and one day to 17 years and four months, because neither the RTC nor the CA had found the attendance of any aggravating circumstance. The minimum of the indeterminate sentence is fixed at 10 years of prision mayor, and the maximum of 17 years and eight months of reclusion temporal is modified to 17 years and four months of the medium period of reclusion temporal.
x x x a violent death invariably and necessarily brings about emotional pain and anguish on the part of the victim’s family. It is inherently human to suffer sorrow, torment, pain and anger when a loved one becomes the victim of a violent or brutal killing. Such violent death or brutal killing not only steals from the family of the deceased his precious life, deprives them forever of his love, affection and support, but often leaves them with the gnawing feeling that an injustice has been done to them.
Also, in line with recent jurisprudence,20 the interest fixed by the RTC is reduced to six percent (6%) per annum on all the items of civil liability computed from the date of the finality of this judgment until fully paid.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the conviction for homicide of petitioner EMERITU BARUT, subject to the MODIFICATIONS that: (a) his indeterminate sentence is from 10 years of prision mayor, as the minimum, to 17 years and four months of reclusion temporal, as the maximum; (b) he shall pay to the heirs of the late Vincent Ucag civil indemnity of P75,000.00 for his death; moral damages of P75,000.00; and temperate damages of P25,000.00, plus interest of six percent (6%) per annum on each of the items of damages hereby awarded from the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid; and (c) he shall pay the costs of suit.
1Rollo, pp. 30-65; penned by Presiding Judge Norma C. Perello.
2 Id. at 21-29; penned by Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr. (retired/deceased), with the concurrence of Associate Justice Noel G. Tijam and Associate Justice Mariflor P. Punzalan-Castillo.
5Bernardo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 101680, December 7, 1992, 216 SCRA 224, 232.
6Castillo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106472, August 7, 1996, 260 SCRA 374, 381.
10Heirs of Emilio Santioque v. Heirs of Emilio Calma, G.R. No. 160832, October 27, 2006, 505 SCRA 665, 683-684; Pigao v. Rabanillo, G.R. No. 150712, May 2, 2006, 488 SCRA 546, 557.
11 G.R. No. 107493, February 1, 1996, 253 SCRA 78, 82-83.
12 People v. Napat-a, November 14, 1989, G.R. No. 84951, 179 SCRA 403, 407; People v. Mate, 103 SCRA 484 (1981); Vda. de Oñate v. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. 116149, November 23, 1995, 250 SCRA 283, 287.
16People v. Osianas, G.R. No. 182548, September 30, 2008, 567 SCRA 319, 339-340; People v. Buduhan, G.R. No. 178196, August 6, 2008, 561 SCRA 337, 367-368; People v. Berondo, Jr., G.R. No. 177827, March 30, 2009, 582 SCRA 547, 554-555.
17 People v. Panado, G.R. No. 133439, December 26, 2000, 348 SCRA 679, 690-691.
18People v. Lacaden, G.R. No. 187682, November 25, 2009, 605 SCRA 784, 804-805.
20Sison v. People, G.R. No. 187229, February 22, 2012, 666 SCRA 645, 667.

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