Source: http://nv.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20180309_0002897.DNV.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 00:09:27+00:00

Document:
JENNIFER A. DORSEY, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Petitioner Marvin Dwayne Mosby brings this petition for a writ of habeas corpus to challenge his 2011 Nevada State Court conviction for possession of a firearm by an ex felon, for which he is serving a sentence of life without the possibility of parole after having been deemed a habitual criminal. The State moves to dismiss ground 3 as unexhausted, and grounds four and five as both unexhausted and untimely. I grant the motion in part, dismiss grounds 3, 4, and 5 as procedurally defaulted, and direct the respondents to answer the petition's remaining grounds.
Mosby was convicted of possession of a firearm by an ex-felon after a state-court jury trial. The state district court adjudicated Mosby as a habitual criminal under Nev. Rev. Stat. § 207.010.Mosby appealed. On November 15, 2012, the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. Remittitur issued on December 12, 2012.
Mosby then commenced this action. I appointed the Federal Public Defender to represent him upon their request because they were representing Mosby in two other habeas corpus cases. I then stayed this case while Mosby pursued a post-conviction habeas corpus petition in the state courts.
On November 26, 2014, Mosby filed in the state district court a post-conviction habeas corpus petition. The state district court denied the petition. Mosby appealed, and the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. It held that the petition was untimely under Nev. Rev. Stat. § 34.726(1) because Mosby filed more than one year after the issuance of the direct-appeal remittitur. Mosby then returned to this court with a second amended petition. The respondents now move to dismiss it, arguing that ground 3 is unexhausted, and that grounds four and five are both unexhausted and untimely. Having reviewed the motion, Mosby's opposition, and the reply, I now grant the motion in part for the reasons below.
A. Grounds 3, 4 & 5 have been exhausted.
In ground 3, Mosby claims that the trial court violated his right to a fair trial by the admission of prior-bad-act evidence. Mosby did not raise this claim on direct appeal. Respondents argue that this ground is unexhausted, noting that the state post-conviction habeas corpus petition contains no specific grounds for relief. Mosby counters that he did present this very claim in his state habeas corpus petition. Respondents reply that Mosby is citing to a memorandum attached to an affidavit in support of a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and that the state district court could not be expected to read through that affidavit to discern what Mosby's claims were.
But the instructions for the state habeas corpus petition form that Mosby used permitted him to file a supporting memorandum. And the court cannot punish Mosby for following those instructions. If the docketing process led to the memorandum being attached to the financial affidavit and not to the habeas corpus petition, that was a matter entirely out of Mosby's control. The petition itself contained no grounds. Construing the exhibits liberally, Mosby probably intended to make his claims in the memorandum. By expressly allowing a petitioner to state his claims into two separate documents, Nevada runs the risk of one of those documents being docketed incorrectly, as appears to be the case here. The court cannot fault Mosby for that. I thus find that ground 3 has been exhausted.
In ground 4, Mosby claims that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by not objecting to his adjudication as a habitual criminal because the prosecution did not file a notice of intent to seek habitual-criminal adjudication. In ground 5, he claims that direct-appeal counsel provided ineffective assistance when he failed to raise that same issue on direct appeal. The parties do not dispute that Mosby did not present these claims to the state courts; Mosby contends that the court should consider them exhausted because they would be untimely under Nev. Rev. Stat. § 34.726(1) and successive under Nev. Rev. Stat. § 34.810 if he returned to the state courts, so the grounds would be procedurally defaulted in this court. Although a state court can excuse those procedural bars upon a showing of cause and prejudice, Mosby also argues that the only argument he has for cause and prejudice to excuse the procedural default-ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel-is not recognized in Nevada. Based upon Mosby's concession, I will consider grounds 4 and 5 to be exhausted. But they are also procedurally defaulted.
B. Grounds 3, 4, and 5 are procedurally defaulted.
The grounds for dismissal upon which the Nevada Supreme Court relied in this case are based on an adequate and independent state rule. So Mosby's claims in grounds 3, 4, and 5 are subject to the procedural-default rule. In an attempt to salvage ground 3, Mosby argues that the ineffective assistance of his appellate counsel supplies good cause for his failure to raise this ground on direct appeal. He relies on the decisions in Martinez v. Ryan and Ha Van Nguyen v. Curry for this argument.
The parties do not dispute that Nevada effectively requires claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel be raised in a post-conviction habeas corpus petition. Nor do they dispute that Mosby's state post-conviction habeas corpus petition was the initial review proceeding with respect to his claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. But Martinez offers no help to Mosby for ground 3 because it can save only claims of ineffective assistance by trial counsel, and ground 3 alleges trial- court misconduct. Martinez also provides no salvation for Mosby's ground 5, which alleges ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. So grounds 3 and 5 are procedurally barred.

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