Source: http://masscases.com/cases/sjc/288/288mass67.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 14:53:49+00:00

Document:
TOWN OF MOUNT WASHINGTON vs. FREDERIC W. COOK. FRANK H. WRIGHT vs. SAME.
Articles of Amendment XLVIII relating to The Referendum III section 4." The Secretary thereupon furnished blanks for subsequent signers which contained a copy of the document signed by the first ten voters together with their names and residences, followed by the requisite description of the emergency law, and, with appropriate headings for names and residences, space for the subsequent signers. Ten thousand voters signed such blanks. Held, that the blanks signed by the ten thousand voters sufficiently completed the petition of the ten within the requirements of "The Referendum" "III. Referendum Petitions," s. 4 of art. 48 of the Amendments to the Constitution of the Commonwealth, although the blanks did not contain in terms a statement that the ten thousand were "protesting against such law."
The meaning of the words in "III. Referendum Petitions" s. 2 of art. 48 of the Amendments to the Constitution of the Commonwealth, that a law, "the operation of which is restricted to a particular town, city or other political division or to particular districts or localities of the commonwealth," is a matter which is excluded from the operation of a referendum petition, is that such a restriction must be specified in the law itself in terms which expressly or by fair implication are geographically descriptive of territorial divisions of the Commonwealth.
A law which is general in its operation throughout the Commonwealth but which may by local option be suspended in territorial divisions is not such an excluded matter.
St. 1934, c. 275, is not such an excluded matter, but is subject to referendum under said, s. 4.
TWO PETITIONS, filed in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Berkshire on September 28, 1934, for writs of mandamus.
The petitions were heard by Lummus, J., who ordered them dismissed as a matter of law and reported the cases for determination by the full court.
F. H. Wright & H. N. Joyner, for the petitioners.
E. T. Simoneau, Assistant Attorney General, for the respondent.
RUGG, C.J. These are petitions for writs of mandamus to compel the respondent not to submit St. 1934, c. 275, on referendum at the approaching State election. That statute regulates the use of traps for the capture of fur-bearing animals and, by its preamble, was declared to be an emergency law.
the respondent has not been completed as required by "The Referendum" "III. Referendum Petitions," s. 4 of art. 48 of the Amendments to the Constitution of the Commonwealth. The contention is based on the words of that section as applied to the undisputed facts. The words of that section pertinent to the present controversy are these: "A referendum petition may ask for the repeal of an emergency law . . . . Such petition shall first be signed by ten qualified voters of the commonwealth, and shall then be filed with the secretary of the commonwealth . . . . The secretary of the commonwealth shall provide blanks for the use of subsequent signers, and shall print at the top of each blank a description of the proposed law as such description will appear on the ballot together with the names and residences of the first ten signers. If such petition filed as aforesaid is completed by filing with the secretary of the commonwealth . . . the signatures of not less than ten thousand qualified voters of the commonwealth protesting against such law and asking for a referendum thereon, then the secretary of the commonwealth shall submit such law to the people at the next state election . . . ." The section thus prescribes that the "referendum petition" to be filed by the first ten voters "may ask for the repeal of an emergency law," while the completing petition must be signed by not less than ten thousand voters "protesting against such law and asking for a referendum thereon."
were blanks for the subsequent signers. (Although not printed in the record, a sample blank was presented at the argument by agreement of all counsel.) The ten thousand voters signing the completing petition, therefore, signed the same petition as the first ten voters. They signed nothing which contained the precise words "protesting against such law." They simply indorsed by their signatures the form signed by the first ten voters petitioning for a referendum on the specified law and asking for its repeal pursuant to s. 4 of "III. Referendum Petitions" of art. 48 of the Amendments.
where the intention is clear there is no room for construction and no excuse for interpolation or addition."
The voters who affixed their signatures to the completing petition here assailed expressed a definite intention. Indubitably they petitioned for a referendum on the statute and asked for its repeal. They stated that their petition was filed under the provisions of art. 48 of the Amendments, "The Referendum III section 4." Thus they attempted to incorporate by reference the essential provisions of that section so far as it affected them and their procedure. Their petition did not contain the words prescribed by that section that they were "protesting against such law." It is contended that the omission of those words is fatal to the petition. The point is difficult. It would have been much better if the completing petition had followed in its phraseology the words of the Amendment to the Constitution.
it is a formal avowal of adverse opinion; it is assertion of settled desire to annul. The statement signed by those subscribing the completing petition in the cases at bar does not bear indication of thoughtlessness or inattention. Its words given due weight and fair interpretation import deliberate determination to abrogate the law in the way provided by art. 48 of the Amendments; they imply deep personal conviction, based upon a grounded belief that the law is contrary to the public welfare. The blanks for the signatures of voters subsequent to the first ten were provided by the Secretary of the Commonwealth. No other blanks could be used. No reasonable voter, mindful of the contents of the petition, could be misled as to the substance and effect, the meaning and purpose, of what he was signing. No one else could be under misapprehension on that subject.
considerations lead us to the conclusion, that the supporting petition is not fatally defective, but is in compliance with the constitutional mandate that voters on the completing petition must append their signatures to something "protesting against" the law. To reach the opposite result would be to exalt the letter of the Constitution above its animating spirit.
II. The next contention is that the referendum petition is invalid because St. 1934, c. 275, falls within matters excluded from the operation of a referendum petition in that it is a law "the operation of which is restricted to a particular town, city or other political division or to particular districts or localities of the commonwealth." "III. Referendum Petitions," s. 2 of art. 48 of the Amendments. The law in question is general in its terms. When enacted as an emergency law it became immediately operative throughout the Commonwealth. It contains a provision, however, that in the several cities and towns there may be submitted to popular vote at a regular municipal election the question whether the operation of the law (s. 105B, inserted in G. L. [Ter. Ed.] c. 131) shall be suspended within their respective boundaries. If a majority of the votes cast are in the affirmative, the law shall be suspended within such city or town unless and until changed by vote at some subsequent election. The law also authorizes the commissioner of conservation to suspend for not exceeding thirty days the operation of the law (s. 105B) within any specified territory under the control of the department of conservation. The law further empowers the selectmen of any town, pursuant to petition, to call a special town meeting during the current year for the purpose of voting on the question of suspending the operation of the law (s. 105B) in that town. Opinion of the Justices, 286 Mass. 611. In one town at least such special town meeting has been held during the current year and the operation of the law has been suspended.
for exercising its local option features could not be put in motion even in the towns during the current year except after the lapse of some time. G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 39, s. 10. The power conferred upon the commissioner of conservation is one of very limited suspension and, in the nature of things, can be exercised by a conscientious official only after investigation and deliberation. In any event, even after suspension in one or numerous contiguous or separated towns and cities, the law continues to be operative. It may be reinstated and made practically effective at any time by the same means by which it became suspended in such towns and cities.
The meaning of the words of the amendment (already quoted and invoked in support of this contention), speaking broadly, is that the restriction to a particular town, city or other political subdivision or to particular districts or localities must be specified in the law itself in terms which expressly or by fair implication are geographically descriptive of territorial divisions of the Commonwealth, in order that the law be an excluded matter. Opinion of the Justices, 261 Mass. 523, 553, 554. Christian v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 283 Mass. 98. Opinion of the Justices, 254 Mass. 617. A law which is general in its operation but which may by local option be suspended in territorial divisions is not an excluded matter. Such a law recognizes differences in local preferences and gives opportunity for their expression from time to time; it does not of itself establish the localities and mark out the restrictions.
It becomes unnecessary to consider whether the town of Mount Washington is a proper party to bring a petition of this nature. See Chelsea v. Treasurer & Receiver General, 237 Mass. 422, 432.
It follows that the rulings of law made by the single justice were correct. The orders dismissing the petitions were right.

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