Source: http://www.williamgoren.com/blog/tag/levorsen-v-octapharma-plasma-inc/
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 22:52:14+00:00

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Levorsen v. Octapharma Plasma Inc.
As readers of this blog know, I don’t usually blog more than once a week. However, I had a moment and a real cool idea already in the can so to speak, so here goes.
At least once a month, I get a call from someone around the country talking about how the court system is inaccessible. Usually, it is coming from a Family Court, but not exclusively so. Also, whether this State is red or blue doesn’t matter. I am proud to say that the State of Georgia has been busy working on these issues, and I have been doing what I can to help in a variety of ways, including, for example, volunteering to come up with a courtroom accessibility best practices checklist. I thought the readers of this blog would really appreciate it if I modified that list for our blog.
The following is a nonexclusive list of considerations for ensuring persons with disabilities have meaningful access per the ADA and §504 of the Rehabilitation Act (the latter may apply if federal funding is involved). Also, the list is not not exhaustive, and is also not a substitute for obtaining knowledgeable legal counsel on ADA matters as all of this can get really complicated as we know.
Make sure judges and administrative staff receive quality training from ADA knowledgeable individuals. I have often wondered just who is providing the training when it comes to ADA compliance across all ADA titles. Typically, when there is an ADA dispute and it settles, training is a required part of the settlement. If the training is good, I don’t understand why these things keep happening. Training should also be regular. Further, you need to have an ADA/§504 knowledgeable person/attorney to help out with the complicated questions that arise.
Have an ADA/§504 coordinator and an ADA/§504 grievance procedure. If the Rehabilitation Act applies, you need to have this if you have more than 15 employees. If only the ADA applies, you need to have it if you have more than 50 employees. Regardless, having both is excellent preventive law.
Don’t be afraid to get help from knowledgeable ADA counsel as ADA and §504 are extremely complicated. Also, don’t be afraid to bring in outside experts or ask for briefing. Check your State for the judicial rules in this area. For example, Georgia allows a court to bring in an outside expert to help sort things out providing all the parties are on notice as to why the expert is being brought in and what the expert will do. Your State may have similar rules.
The interactive process is critical. Remember, one size does not fit all. The ADA focuses on an individualized analysis.
Judges and all personnel should know the definition of a disability as amended by the ADA Amendments Act. The bottom line is that after the amendments it’s going to be really difficult to find that a person does not have a disability.
Make sure judges and all personnel are familiar with the federal regulations on service dogs and effective communication. With respect to service dogs, keep in mind, that it is entirely possible that your State laws on service dogs fall below the standard set by the DOJ in their final implementing title II and title III ADA regulations. With respect to effective communication, I really like this guidance, which we discussed in this blog entry. I realize that the guidance is not applicable to the court system, but it is so good that it should be useful in this context.
With respect to effective communication pertaining to court access, remember primary consideration must be given to the individual’s preferred mode of communicating because courts are public entities.
Make sure all requests for modifications are handled timely and with respect. If requesting documentation, make sure that documentation is narrowly focused and not excessive.
Don’t charge a person with a disability for any accommodations/modifications.
Read Silva v. Baptist Health South, Florida, 856 F.3d 824 (11th 2017). I have not blogged on this case. That said, I did co-counsel with an attorney here in Atlanta on an effective communication case involving a doctor and a hospital that did not provide an ASL interpreter for culturally deaf, Deaf, individuals. This case is a real game changer for the culturally deaf. It says that effective communication does not occur under the Rehabilitation Act if the communication hinders the culturally deaf individual’s understanding of what is being said. Silva took place in the medical context, but its reasoning easily transfers to the legal arena.
Remember reasonable accommodations/modifications are whatever gets the person with disability to the same starting line as a person without a disability. Reasonable accommodations/modifications must be done unless there is an undue burden or a fundamental alteration, both of which, as we know, are terms of art and are very difficult standards to meet.
Perform a self-evaluation plan. This plan should have been completed in 1992. If not done already, get one done.
Develop a transition plan to resolve issues arising from the self-evaluation plan.
Make sure people are aware of how to request accommodations.
Is the court’s website meaningfully accessible per the ADA (WCAG 2.0 AA is the gold standard), for persons with disabilities. Pay particular attention to screen readers, voice dictation, and captioning of audio. Also, keep in mind that a website may be accessible for voice dictation users but not for screen readers and vice a versa.
Establish specific flexible procedures to address reasonable accommodation/modification request and to meet recurring accessibility needs. That is, do have procedures, but make sure they are flexible enough to deal with every situation being entirely different.
Your State may have a judicial handbook for courtroom accessibility. Georgia has one, and it is excellent.
For a resource, you can always look at this blog. I really love its search engine and use it all the time.
Next week, I explore once again just what is a service establishment. Without spoiling everything, let me say there is now a clear-cut Circuit Court split on the issue. In the meantime, you might want to review this blog entry.
Just What Is a Sales Establishment Anyway per Title III of the ADA?
In a recent blog entry, I discussed a 10th Circuit opinion that talked about just what is a service establishment. This blog entry talks about a similar issue, which is just what is a sales establishment? The case of the day essentially adopts the dissenting view of Judge Holmes in Levorsen, the case referenced above. As such, it makes you wonder whether there is not a split in the Circuits with respect to just what does it mean for a place of public accommodation to exist. I realize the issues are not exactly the same, since one involves sales establishments and the other involves service establishments. However, the applicable analysis is identical but with completely different outcomes. Therefore, one has to wonder whether the defendant in Levorsen have now increased its chances for an en banc rehearing and/or appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court.
Today’s case is Magee v. Coca-Cola Refreshments USA, Inc., a published Fifth Circuit decision. As is usual, my blog is divided into categories: facts; court’s reasoning; and takeaways. The reader is free to focus on any or all of the categories.
Coca-Cola’s glass-front vending machines are self-service, fully automated machines dispensing bottles and cans of Coca-Cola sodas, as well as juices, energy drinks, and waters. They have been around since 2000 and are equipped with many different features including: the ability to accept payment from smart phones and other near field communication devices; wireless Internet capabilities; credit and debit card processing; motion sensing technology; and onboard computer systems. Even so, the vending machines lack any meaningful accommodation for use by the blind. In particular, the machines use an alphanumeric keypad. Such a keypad does not contain a tactile indicator differentiating between letters and numbers, but yet the users have to identify and input selecting codes of the beverage they wish to purchase. Of course, a blind user (the plaintiff suffers from macular degeneration and is considered legally blind), can’t do that since the selecting codes are printed in place below each beverage inside the machine and are visible to the machine’s glass front. It is also possible that the vending machines could be made accessible to the blind by doing any of several different things including: retrofitting the machine with an audio interface system and a tactile alphanumeric keypad; developing a smart phone application capable of displaying a non-visual representation of the contents and corresponding prices for the vending machine; or imprinting a nonvisually displayed toll-free hotline that the visually impaired person to call for assistance in purchasing a beverage. The plaintiff encountered the vending machines at East Jefferson General Hospital in Metairie, Louisiana, and at a bus station in New Orleans, Louisiana. He has regularly used both of those places and reasonably expects to use those places in the future. The plaintiff’s filed suit against Coca-Cola Refreshments alleging that they were violating title III of the ADA by not having a sales establishment accessible to him. He did not sue the bus station or the hospital.
Two principles are critical for assessing whether the vending machine is a sales establishment. The first is noscitur a sociis, which means a word is known by the company it keeps. Second, ejusdem generis, which means when a general word or phrase follows a list of the specific, the general word or phrase will be interpreted to include only items of the same class as those listed.
The relevant portion of the statute uses the term “sales establishment,” following a list of retailers occupying physical stores.
The Third, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits have recognized that every term listed in 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) is a physical place open to public access. That is, they are actual, physical places where goods or services are open to the public, and places where the public get those goods or services. The court does note a split among the Circuits on this point as the First, Second, and Seventh Circuits have interpreted the term, “public accommodation” to extend beyond physical places.
Although the term “establishment,” could possibly be read to include a vending machine, a vending machine is not like any of the listed examples in the applicable statute.
A look at various dictionaries reveals that an establishment would not include a vending machine. The dictionaries consistently talk about places of business or residence with furnishings and staff when it comes to establishments.
The United States Supreme Court, in a Fair Labor Standards Act case, has recognized that the term “establishment,” is normally used in business and in government as meaning a distinct physical place of business.
Legislative history also backs up the use of noscitur a sociis and ejusdem generis. In particular, a House Report said that although not expressly mentioned, bookstores, video stores, stationery stores, pet stores, computer stores, and other stores offering merchandise for sale or rent are included as retail sales establishments. Another House Report notes that the category including a bakery, grocery store, clothing store, hardware store, shopping center, or other sales or retail establishment is only a representative sample and that other retail or wholesale establishments selling or renting items include such things as: a bookstore; videotape rental store; or pet store, all of which are physical places and actual stores.
The Department of Justice has noted that the category sales or rental establishments includes many facilities other than those specifically listed such as: video stores; carpet showrooms; and athletic equipment stores. Again, all of which are actual stores.
Holding otherwise leads to an absurd result, though the Fifth Circuit didn’t say it quite that way. For example, the Department of Justice has said that a building with five or more sales or retail establishments is a shopping center or mall. Accordingly, if the plaintiff’s theory is correct, that would mean that any building containing five vending machines would qualify as a shopping center or mall, which is clearly not the intent of the various drafters. That Department of Justice guidance also refers to counters and large windows and check out aisles as special features for sales or rental establishments, which are clearly not applicable to vending machines.
All of this is not to say that vending machines are not subject to various requirements under the ADA by virtue of their being located in a hospital or a bus station as both of those places are undoubtedly places of public accommodation per 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F) and 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(G).
For the reasons stated by the court, it is curious why the bus station and the hospital were not sued instead of Coca-Cola Refreshments. If the vending machines are still in the hospital and the bus station, it would make sense for the plaintiff to immediately go after the hospital and the bus station.
With respect to the hospital, since they take federal funds, the plaintiff will also have the option, assuming the vending machines are still there, of suing the hospital under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. It would also make sense to investigate whether the bus station takes federal funds. If the Rehabilitation Act is applicable, that opens up the possibility of damages, though that would involve meeting a high standard, in addition to attorneys fees and injunctive relief.
One wonders why it was not argued that the vending machines were an establishment serving food or drink per 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(B), but even there, you would have to get around the “establishment,” language for the vending machines to come within coverage of that clause. For that, you might argue for adoption of the majority decision in Levorsen, which basically says the key is the adjective and not the noun. That is, an establishment is simply a place carrying out a service or in this case, a sale.
The court also specifically references the split among the Circuits with respect to whether a place of public accommodation extends beyond physical spaces.
As mentioned above, we now have two United States Court of Appeals cases discussing places of public accommodations reaching diametrically opposite conclusions, albeit discussing different categories. One wonders if that doesn’t set up a Circuit court split or at a minimum, as mentioned above, increase the chances of an en banc hearing in Levorsen.
Common sense says to me that this would be a very difficult case to win on appeal, assuming the United States Supreme Court would take the case in the first place, since vending machines are involved and it involves a logical stretch from the statutory language. It is also worth noting that there was no dissent in Magee. That said, as mentioned above, this case does, to my mind, increases the possibility of a rehearing en banc in Levorsen or if that does not happen, an appeal to the United States Supreme Court on a Circuit court split theory.
Just What Is a Service Establishment Anyway?
Just what is a service establishment under title III of the ADA? A published case from the 10th Circuit that came down on July 12, 2016, Levorsen v. Octapharma Plasma, Inc., deals with this question. As is usual, the blog entry is divided into categories: facts, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F); majority reasoning; reasoning of dissent; and takeaways. The reader is free to focus on any or all of the categories.
Plaintiff suffers from various psychiatric disorders, including borderline schizophrenia. For years, he had donated plasma in exchange for money in an effort to supplement his limited income. In May 2013, he attempted to do that at a Salt Lake City branch of Octapharma Plasma, Inc. (hereafter, defendant). The defendant operates in multiple places. At these places, the defendant collects donors’ plasma using a process called plasmapheresis. During that process, it draws and mechanically processes the donor’s blood, separating and reserving the plasma before returning the red blood cells to the donor. It pays it donors for this plasma, then sells it to pharmaceutical companies. When an employee of the defendant learned that the plaintiff suffers from borderline schizophrenia, the employee became concerned that he might have a schizophrenic episode while donating and dislodge the collecting needle, possibly injuring himself or someone else. The employee then advised the plaintiff that he was ineligible to donate plasma. Even though the plaintiff provided the defendant with a signed form from his psychiatrist, who both indicated that he was medically suitable to donate plasma twice a week, the defendant maintained its refusal to allow him to donate. He then brought suit under title III of the ADA. The defendant defended on the grounds that it was not a service establishment under 42 U.S.C. 12181(7)(F), and therefore, it was not subject to coverage under the ADA.
“a laundromat, dry-cleaner, bank, barber shop, beauty shop, travel service, shoe repair service, funeral parlor, gas station, office of an accountant or lawyer, pharmacy, insurance office, professional office of a health care provider, hospital, or other service establishment.” (Emphasis mine).
The argument that finding the defendant is running a service establishment contradicts regulations from the FDA doesn’t wash because this decision is not a decision on the merits, but rather one holding that it is subject to title III of the ADA in the first place.
Plasma donation centers resemble manufacturers much more than they do the kind of entities customarily providing services to the public under this section. That is, they manufacture a product, plasma. That product is derived from a raw commodity, whole blood, given by donors in exchange for a fee. Thus, plasma donation centers are more like paper mills, a manufacturer, than the other typical business providing services to the public under this section. Further, federal statutes clearly regard plasma donation centers as manufacturers as does the Food and Drug Administration. So, plasma centers may be manufacturers, but they are not service establishments.
This case is the first of its kind at the Circuit Court level. Both opinions have their strengths and weaknesses, and as a result, I would certainly expect the Circuits to eventually split on this question. Will the Supreme Court take the case before a split in the Circuits presents itself? They don’t usually do that, but it does happen on occasion. Which way would the Supreme Court go? If Justice Scalia was on the Court, there is little doubt in my mind that the dissenting view would prevail. However, he is no longer on the Court, and we have an election coming up. So, it is impossible to predict which way this case will ultimately go. Considering the dissent and how it is written, one wonders whether four Justices would even agree to hear the case as I could see this case being an even split. That is, a reasoning based on canons of statutory construction will, in my opinion, have a great deal of appeal to many Justices on the Supreme Court. That said, perhaps four would agree to hear the case and gamble on what the next Justice would do. Such a gamble would be a huge one because a case turning on interpretation of a statute with statutory canons of construction/legislative history being the critical factors does not fit neatly into a liberal-conservative dynamic.
Since canons of statutory construction have a great deal of appeal to jurists, one wonders if the 10th circuit will not grant a rehearing en banc, assuming one is sought.
How this case ultimately resolves itself depends upon whether legislative history combined with the statutory construction that you don’t read words into a statute that are not there prevails or whether the two canons of statutory construction that are the underpinning of the dissent prevails. It could go either way.
If the case goes forward, direct threat will be a factor. However, the Department of Justice regulations for title II and title III (28 C.F.R. § § 35.139, 208 respectively), unlike the EEOC regulations, do not include threat to self as one of the possibilities.
The manufacturing part of the dissenting opinion leads one to wonder if the dissent isn’t essentially claiming that the plasma centers are a commercial facility per 42 U.S.C. § 12181(2) . Commercial facilities are subject to new construction and alteration requirements but they are not subject to the auxiliary aids and nondiscrimination provisions (see here at discussion of 28 C.F.R. § 36.104).
Interestingly enough, under either the majority or dissenting opinion, software as a service, which I discuss here, would be a service establishment.

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