Source: https://www.lawnet.gov.lk/1977/12/31/nadarajan-chettiar-v-sathanandan-et-al/
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 07:00:37+00:00

Document:
Present: Wijeyewardene and Nihill JJ.NADARAJAN CHETTIAR v. SATHANANDAN et al.296—D. C. Colombo, 940.
Fidei commissum—Deed of gift by father to his sons—Revocation of gift bysubsequent deed—Power given to “ mortgage ", " hypothecate ” and" tender ” property as security—Prohibition of lease for certain period—Lease for longer term—Lease repugnant to deed.
By deed P 2 of June, 1917, R. gifted the property In question to histhree sons, N., S. (the first plaintiff), and M. (second plaintiff), in equalshares, reserving to himself the right to revoke the gift and subject tocertain conditions.
during the term of his natural life and take and enjoy the issues,rents, and profits, but shall not be at liberty to sell, mortgage(except as hereinafter mentioned) or … . lease the samefor a term of more than five years at any one time ….
the donee to mortgage, hypothecate and tender the said property assecurity by him for all or each of the following purposes ….
being seized in execution for his debts other than those herein-before provided for, the same shall devolve subject to anyexisting mortgage, hypothecation, tender or charge as hereinbeforeprovided, on the children of the said donee in equal shares ..
,. or failing issue then in equal shares on his brothers, S. and M.
In 1936 N. and his wife, calling themselves lessors, executed indenture1 D1 in favour of the-first defendant who is described as lessee.
By it the lessors let to the lessee an undivided one-third of the propertyfor seven years from July 1, 1936. N. died on January 21, 1937, withoutissue.
Held, that the deed created a valid fidei commissum.
Held, further, that the lease was bad as being repugnant to PI andthat the lessee was not entitled to claim any rights under it a3 againstthe plaintiffs, the heirs of N.
1 undivided one-third share of a property in St. Paul&apos;s Ward,Colombo. The facts are stated in the head-note. The question to bedecided was whether the first defendant was entitled to possess thepremises under the lease 1 D1 against the plaintiffs, who claimed underPI. The District Judge held in favour of the plaintiffs.
At the most, PI contains a fidei commissum residui—Lee on RomanDutch law (3rd ed.), 376. The lease, therefore, prevails in any event.
The word “ charge ” in condition 3 of PI has a wide meaning andwould embrace a lease contemplated in condition 1. See meaning of“ charge ” in Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary.
V. Perera, K.C. (with him E. B. Wikremanayake and S. Mahadeva),for plaintiffs, respondents.—The lease is, in fact, for seven years and is,therefore, wholly bad inasmuch as it has exceeded the period for five yearsprescribed by PI. The term of five years fixed by condition 1 of PI isan essential term of the fidei commissum. The time or term of letting isan essential part of a lease. The whole of the lease under considerationis repugnant to PI—Jayawardene v. Jayawardene et al.*; 3 Maasdorp(4th ed.), p. 227.
used to include a lease. See meaning of “ charge ” in Salmond onJurisprudence (8th ed.), p. 464, and Misso v. Hadjear’.
PI is a conditional fidei commissum. A fiduciary may be given alimited power of alienation. Provided that “the three certainties” arepresent, any condition may be imposed and can be given effect to—Vol. 2 oj Burge’s Colonial Law (1st ed.) p. 166; Steyn on Wills, p. 207;1 Maasdorp (1903 ed.), p. 163 ; Sande on Restraints, p. 296.
W. Thambiah, for second defendant, respondent.
Thiagalingam, in reply.—It is one of “ the three certainties ”referred to by Sande, and in the text books, that is lackingin this case.
■ (1932) 34 N. L. R. 69.* (1930) 32N. L.R. 55.
* (1923) 24 N. L. R. 293.» (1939) 14P. L.tf 13.
» (1922) 2 N. L. R. 506.* (1916) 19 N. L.R 271 al 27S.
WIJEYEWAHDENE J.—Nadarajan Chettiar v. Sathanandan.
It is a contradiction in terms to say of a donee who is allowed to putaway the property that he is prohibited absolutely from alienating it.
A conditional fidei commissum is one where the fideicommissaryis called to the inheritance .on the happening of an event or in the eventof a contravention.—Voet 36.1.4; Steyn, p. 208; Lee p. 316.
In the present case this question does not arise.
“ Charge ” must be given the dictionary meaning. See OxfordDictionary.
The plaintiffs instituted this action for declaration of title to anundivided one-third of a property in St. Paul’s Ward within the Munici-pality of Colombo.
WIJEYEWARDENE J.—Nadarajan Chettiar v. Sathanandan.
(i.) That the “ lessors ” shall “ see that the monthly rent is duly andpromptly paid to the lessee by the tenant for the time being”&apos;of the leased premises.
(ii.) That in the event of the tenant failing to pay to the lessee themonthly rent of Rs. 80 “ the lessors jointly and severally agreeto pay the said sum of Rs. 80 or any portion thereof as mayremain unpaid by the tenant with interest thereon at 15 per cent,per annum.
(iii.) That in the event of the said leased premises being vacant theperiod of the lease is to be extended to enable the lessee to makegood the consequential loss.
(iv.) That if the monthly rent is over Rs. 80 the excess shall be creditedto the lessors.
Nagasen died on January 21, 1937, without any issue.
The question that has to be decided is, whether the first defendantis entitled to possess the premises under the lease 1 D1 against theplaintiffs who claim under PI. The District Judge held in favour ofthe plaintiffs and the first defendant has appealed from this judgment.The second defendant who is made a respondent to the appeal claimsto be a monthly tenant under the first defendant. .
(ii.) that even if the deed created a fidei commissum, the fidei com-missum was more or less of the nature of a residuary fidei com-missum and that the properly would devolve on the plaintiffsubject to the “charge” of a lease of five years, that being theperiod for which Nagasen was permitted to lease the property.The first point does not appear to present much difficulty. The deed PIdesignates the persons on whom the property should devolve, and statesthat such devolution should take place either on the death of the doneeor the seizure of the property by the Fiscal, if the property is seized bythe Fiscal during the lifetime of the donee for any debts save thosespecifically mentioned. The property that would devolve would be theproperty mentioned in the deed, subject to such transactions as havebeen specifically provided for. I hold that the deed creates a good fideicommissum.
The second point is not free from difficulty. The Counsel for theappellant argues that, even if the deed creates a fidei commissum, theplaintiffs can claim according to condition 3 of PI only the undivided1/3 share of the property subject to any existing “ mortgage hypothe-cation tender or charge” as provided for under that condition.He contends that the words “mortgage”, “hypothecation ”, “tender”in condition 3 refer to the transactions contemplated by condition 2,which are expressly referred to by these terms and that, therefore,the word “ charge ” could only have been intended to refer to the leasesmentioned in condition 1. He concedes that 1 D1 which he calls alease for seven years has been executed in contravention of condition 1. .but states that 1 D1 should be regarded as a valid lease for five years,and that, therefore, the first defendant could under the joint operationof conditions 1 and 3 of PI claim to possess the property against theplaintiffs for five years from July 1, 1936. This is a very attractiveargument and should be examined in detail.
It is best to examine at the very outset the terms “ hypothecate ”.
WIJEYEWARDENE J.—Nadarajan Chettiar v. Sathananthan.
In condition 2 and “ lease ” in condition 1. Though perhaps it may notbe quite possible to say that the term “ charge ” cannot be used inreference to a lease it is undoubtedly an unusual word to be so used.
It was, no doubt, the difficulty created by condition 3 that madethe employers of Nagasen refuse to accept the security tendered by himunless P2 was revoked. The revocation of P2 was accordingly effectedby PI which aimed at securing the position of the employers of Nagasenby providing that the property devolving on the reversioners should besubject to such mortgages. Is it possible to credit the donor furtherwith an intention to safeguard the lessees whom he had not protectedby P2 and about whose interests no question appears to have arisenat the time of the execution of PI?
during his lifetime. It is difficult to gather from PI any intention onthe part of the donor to protect against the reversionary heirs a lesseewho has taken a lease prohibited by him. I hold, therefore, that theappellant is not entitled to claim any rights under 1 D1 against theplaintiffs.

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