Source: http://www.annalsofhealthlaw.com/annalsofhealthlaw/vol__24_issue_1?pg=132
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 08:40:02+00:00

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a component of an overall enforcement scheme. Clearly, when Congress explicitly creates a right, the statutory text limits the agency’s discretion. 292 This means that, even under this proposal, an agency could not take away private enforcement where the statute includes clear rights-creating language. But the majority approach to the enforcement of regulations through § 1983 removes agency discretion in every instance, even when the statute is vague or ambiguous, and remarkably, even when the statute explicitly delegates authority to an agency. This is in direct tension with the Chevron doctrine, which recognizes that statutory ambiguity communicates congressional intent to delegate authority to the implementing agency. 293 Permitting delegations in the specific context of rights-making authority is consistent with the general principles governing delegations to federal agencies.
292. Chevron U.S. A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984); Kristine Cordier Karnezis, Annotation, Construction and Application of “Chevron Deference” to Administrative Action by United States Supreme Court, 3 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 25 (2005) (Under Chevron doctrine, “[i]f the intent of Congress is clear, the Court said, that is the end of the matter, for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”).
293. Brian D. Galle, Can Federal Agencies Authorize Private Suits Under Section 1983? A Theoretical Approach, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 163, 165 (2003) (further explaining how the majority rule of the Appellate Courts is “inconsistent with the theoretical structure of modern administrative law,” and with theories of statutory interpretation, which would otherwise support looking to regulations to define “rights” for the purposes of § 1983. Id at 180.); Matthew C. Stephenson, Public Regulation of Private Enforcement: The Case for Expanding the Role of Administrative Agencies, 91 VA. L. REV. 93, 96 (2005) (noting that allowing agencies to create causes of action where statutes are ambiguous “[t]hough grounded in well-established administrative law principles, rejects the Supreme Court’s apparent preference for a clear statement rule under which ambiguous statutory language is presumed to reflect a congressional rejection of private enforcement.”).
294. See Shakhnes v. Berlin, 689 F.3d 244, 251 (2d Cir. 2012); Chaffin v. Kan. State Fair Bd., 348 F.3d 850, 858 (10th Cir. 2003), overruled by Cinnamon Hills Youth Crisis Ctr., Inc. v. Saint George City, 685 F.3d 917 (10th Cir. 2012).
295. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844.

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