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ASHINGDANE c. ROYAUME-UNI
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Type d'affaire : DecisionType de recours : Violation de P1-2 ; Non-violation de l'art. 3 ; Satisfaction équitable réservéeNumérotation : Numéro d'arrêt : 8225/78Identifiant URN:LEX : urn:lex;coe;cour.europeenne.droits.homme;arret;1982-02-05;8225.78 Analyses : (Art. 3) PEINE DEGRADANTE, (Art. 3) PEINE INHUMAINE, (P1-2) DROIT A L'INSTRUCTIONParties : Demandeurs : ASHINGDANEDéfendeurs : ROYAUME-UNITexte : APPLICATION/REQUETE NÂ° 8225/7 8 Leonard John ASHINGDANE v/the UNITED KINGDO M Leonard John ASHINGDANE c/ROYAUME-UN I DECISION of 5 February 1982 on the admissibility of the application DÃCISION du 5 fÃ©vrier 1982 sur la recevabilitÃ© de la requÃªt e
Artlcle 5, paragraph 1(e) of the Conventlon : Case of a criminally insane person whose state of mental health warranted his transJer from a secure to a more open institution . Do the exigencies of "lawful" detention extend to the nature and conditions of detention ? Artlcle 5, paragraph 4 and AAlcle 6, peragraph I of the Convention : Does the procedure by which a criminally insane person complains that the competent authorities keep him in a secure institution, failing to find him a place in a more open hospital, raise issues under either of these provisions ?
Artice 5, paragraphe 1, Iltt . (e), de la Conventlon : Cas d'un dÃ©linquant aliÃ©nÃ© dont l'Ã©tat, mÃ©dicalement, justifiait le transfert d'un Ã©tablissement fermÃ© d un Ã©tablissement ouvert . L'exigence d'une dÃ©tention "rÃ©guliÃ¨re" s'Ã©tend-elle aux modalitÃ©s de la dÃ©tention ? Anlclee 5, paragraphe 4, et 6, paragraphe l, de la Convention : La procÃ©dure par laquelle un dÃ©linquant aliÃ©nÃ© reproche aux autoritÃ©s compÃ©tentes de le maintenir dans un Ã©tablissement fermÃ© faute de lui trouver une place dans un Ã©tabllrsement ouvert relÃ¨ve-t-elle de l'une ou l'autre de ces dispositions ?
(jranÃ§ais : voir p . 21 )
The facts of the case, as submi tted by the parties, may be summarised as follows : The applicant is a United Kingdom citizen, born in 1929, normally resident in Rochester and currently detained in Oakwood Hospital, Kent . H e
presented his original application concerning his detention himself . A further complaint concerning his alleged denial of access to court was presented by MM . Bindman & Partners, Solicitors, of London, who now represent him . On 23 November 1979 the applicant was convicted at Rochester Intermediate Quarter Sessions of dangerous driving and unlawful possession of firearms . The court made a hospital order under S .60 of the Mental Health Act 1959 together with an order under S .65 of the Act restricting his discharge without limit of time . In essence the effect of the latter was to place decisions concerning his discharge, transfer etc . in the hands of the Home Secretary . The role of the Mental Health Review Tribunal in the case of restricted patients is only advisory . The applicant was (after a short period of detention in prison) initially detained at the local psychiatric hospital, Oakwood, where he had been detained for some four months the previous year under S .60 of the 1959 Act following another conviction . In April 1971 the applicant was transferred to Broadmoor, a special hospital for those requiring treatment under conditions of special security on account of their dangerous, violent or criminal propensities . â¢ In the period from April 1971 to October 1978 the applicant's case was considered on four occasions by a Mental Health Review Tribunal, which advised on each occasion that the applicant was not ready to be discharged or transferred . The Home Secretary accepted their advice . Periodic reports were also sent by his responsible medical officer to the Secretary of State for Social Services . It appears that at his own request he was also examined, on at least two occasions during this period, by independent doctors . The medical reports submitted to the Commission indicate that the reason for his initial and continued detention was that he was diagnosed as suffering from paranoid schizophrenia, that his condition in Broadmoor was controlled by medication and supervision and that it was considered that if he were released he would be dangerous . Maguire reported that the applicant no longe r .On31ctober978D posed "the threat he previously did" and that he might be properly treated in an open hospital . He therefore recommended his transfer to Oakwood Hospital . The applicant was examined by a Dr . Sherry of Oakwood Hospital who agreed with the diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia, said that the applicant was not as dangerous as he had been and accepted that he should be tried in an ordinary mental hospital .
â¢ S . 4 of the (now) National Health Service Act (1977) .
In December 1978 the Secretary of State for Social Services indicated his agreement with Dr . Maguire s recommendation . On 1 March 1979 the Home Secretary indicated he would be prepared to consent to the applicant's transfer to a local psychiatric hospital, provided that a suitable vacancy could be found . The applicant would still be subject to the restrictions set out in S .65 of the Mental Health Act 1959 . However the Kent Area Health Authority, the local authority responsible for Oakwood Hospital, refused to admit the applicant to Oakwood and the Secretary of State for Social Services refused to direct his transfer to Oakwood . The reason for these refusals was that the two branches of the trade union of the nursing staff at Oakwood (the Confederation of Health Service EmployeesCOHSE) were operating a ban on the adntission of patients subject to S .65 restriction orders . According to the Government the Secretary of State for Social Services was advised by the Health Authority that to admit the applicant without the agreement of the nursing staff would be likely to result in a withdrawal of labour which could endanger the health and well-being of other patients and would not be in the applicant's interests . They further advised that such action would prejudice the prospects of obtaining agreement from the staff to the lifting of the ban and that to admit the applicant to another hospital might not only result in industrial action at that other hospital, but would be likely to worsen industrial relations at Oakwood itself.
The Department of Health and Social Security had questioned Broadmoor in the meatime on the need to continue the S .65 restrictions in the applicant's case . On 19 February 1979 the applicant's responsible medical ot'ficer reported that in his view the restrictions should not be lifted until the applicant had "demonstrated stability and indeed improvement in the open conditions of a conventional psychiatric hospital, over a reasonable period of tinte" . No suitable accommodation could be found for the applicant at any hospital other than Oakwood and he therefore remained at Broadmoor . The applicant's case was again considered by a Mental Health Review Tribunal on 23 August 1979 . The Tribunal advised that it was essential for the applicant's well-being that he should remain under direct supervision to ensure that he continued to take his medication, but agreed that his condition was sufficiently improved to warrant transfer to a local hospital . On 17 September 1979 the Home Secretary reaffirmed his agreement in principle to the applicant's transfer . Meantime, having obtained legal aid, the applicant instituted High Court proceedings in August 1979 against (1) the Department of Health and Social Security, (2) the Kent Area Health Authority and (3) and (4) the secretaries o f -7-
the two union branches at Oakwood, to challenge the legality of his continued detention at Broadmoor . He initially claimed : i . a declaration that the Depa rtment were under a du ty to provide him hospital accommodation at Oakwood or some other appropriate local hospital ; ii . declarations that the Depa rt ment and Local Health Authority were .ultra vires in refusing to admit him or consider his admission to Oakwood because of the union's ban ; iii . a declaration that the union branch secreta ri es and members were acting unlawfully in causing the Depa rt ment and Local Health Authority to act in breach of their statutory duty ; iv . an injunction restraining the branch secretaries and members from so acting . The original statement of claim was amended in March 1980 to include an allegation that the union members were acting unlawfully in threatening the walk out of the hospital if the applicant was brought there and to include claims for injunctions and damages in respect of such conduct . On 13 December 1979 the union branch Secretaries applied for an order staying all proceedings against them on the ground that the applicant had not sought or obtained leave to bring proceedings under S .141 of the Mental Health Act-1959 and/or that such leave would not have been granted if sought . S .141 of the 1959 Act is in the following terms : "(t) No persons shall be liable, on the ground of want of jurisdiction or on any other ground, to any civil or criminal proceedings to which he would have been liable apart from this section in respect,of any act purporting to be done in pursuance of this Act or any regÃ»lations or rules thereunder, or in, or in pursuance of anything done in, the discharge of functions conferred by any other enactment on the Authority having jurisdiction under Part VIII of this Act, unless the act was done in bad faith or without reasonable care . (2) No civil or criminal proceedings shall be brought against any person in any Court in respect of any such act without the'leave of the High Court, and the High Court shall not give leave under . this Section unless satisfied that there is substantial ground for the-contention that the person to be proceeded against has acted in bad faith or without reasonable care . " On 21 December 1979, Mr Justice Dillon ordered the stay of proceedings against the union Secretaries for want of leave under . S .141 . He observed that there was no allegation in the pleadings that any of the defendants had acted "in bad faith or without reasonable care" . The only question therefore was whether the proceedings were brought in respect of acts "purporting to b e
done in pursuance of" the 1959 Act . He referred to the reasons given by the union for their action . These were (in substance) that the members considered that owing to lack of adequate resources, they could not provide sufficient treatment, rehabilitation and security for S .65 patients in the open environnient at Oakwood . The judge held that the union was acting for the protection of patients in the hospital and was involved in the whole process of consultation and decision-making at the hospital . It was therefore protected by S .141 . The Department of Health and Social Security and the Area Health Authority then sought orders staying the proceedings against them on the same grounds . Such orders were granted by Mr Justice Foster on 15 January 1980 . He rejected a submission that these defendants had waived any defence under S .141, and on the question of substance followed the reasoning of Mr Justice Dillon, observing that whether he was right or wrong in relation to the union Secretaries, the Department and Area Authority appeared to fall squarely within S .141 . The applicant appealed against both orders . On 18 February 1980 the Court of Appeal unanimously (a) dismissed the appeal against the order of Mr Justice Foster (relative to the Department and Health Authority) and (b) allowed the appeal against the order of Mr Justice Dillon (relative to the union Secretaries) . The relevant statutory provisions were reviewed by Lord Justice Bridge, who delivered the first judgment . The applicant could be transferred from Broadmoor under S .4t of the 1959 Act in conjunction with Regulation 13 of the Mental Health (Hospital and Guardianship) Regulations 1960 . The Secretary of State for Social Services could authorise such transfer (with the consent of the Home Secretary) only if he was satisfied that arrangements had been made for his admission to the hospital to which he was being transferred, within a period of 28 days . There was another power, in S .99 of the 1959 Act, under which he could direct the applicant's transfer without being satisfied that such arrangements had been made . The case for the Department of Health and Social Security was that a decision as to transfer (whether positive or negative) was an act done in purported pursuance of the 1959 Act and regulations thereunder and thus fell within the ambit of S .141 (1) . The Secretary of State had decided that such transfer would be impraticable . His good faith was not challenged and the action against the Department was thus barred under S .141 . The case for the Area Health Authority was that their decision as to admission to Oakwood was taken for purposes ancilla ry to the functions of the Secretary of State under the 1959 Act and the Regulations . Its good faith was not challenged and it was taken in purpo rted pursuance of the statute .
The applicant argued that by submitting to union pressure, the Secretary of State and the Health Authority had in effect abdicated their functions and thus frustrated the policy and objects of the Act . He argued that anything which did that could not be an act purporting to be done in pursuance of a statute . Lord Justice Bridge held inter alia that where a statutory authority was acting in good faith in what it believed to be the proper manner of discharging its statutory responsibilities, "the fact that it is subsequently held to have been acting in a way which contravenes the statute to the point of frustrating its policy and objects, cannot lead to the conclusion that the original acts in good faith were not in purported pursuance of the Act" . He agreed with Mr Justice Dillon that S .141 (1) of the 1959 Act propounded a subjective not an objective text . "If a person is acting honestly with the intention of performing, in the best way he knows how, the statutory functions or duties which are cast upon him, then it seems to me he is acting in purported pursuance of the statute ." Although the applicant alleged a breach of statutory duty under the National Health Services Act 1977 to provide hospital accommodation to meet all reasonable requirements (S .3 National Health Services Act 1977), the essential act out of which liability was said to arise was the refusal of transfer which fell within the protection of S .141 . Lord Justice Bridge also dealt with an argument advanced on behalf of the applicant to the effect that the Department and Health Authority had waived any immunity they might have had under S .141 . Referring to the decision of the House of Lords in Pountney v . Griffiths (1976) A .C .314 he held that "S .141 does not create a personal immunity which is capable of being waived but imposes a fetter on the Court's jurisdiction which is not so capable" . For these reasons Lord Justice Bridge was in favour of dismissing the appeal against the order of Mr Justice Foster staying the proceedings against the Departnient and Health Authority . Lords Justice Cumming Bruce and Brightman agreed with his reasons . As to the action against the union branch secretaries, Lord Justice Bridge held that a decision or nursing staff to ban the admission of a whole class of patients, even if taken in the best of faith, was not within the express or implied authority of nurses under the Act . Nurses did not have authority under the Act to take decisions of broad policy . The acts of the union secretaries were not therefore protected by S .141 of the 1959 Act and the stay imposed by Mr Justice Dillon on the action against them should therefore be removed . Lords Justice Cumming Bruce and Brightman agreed with this conclusion for similar reasons . Lord Justice Brightman specified that in his view "th e
immunity conferred by S .141 is confined to an act done by a person to whom authority to do an act of that type is expressly or impliedly conferred by the relevant statute" . Since the decision by nursing staff that S .65 patients should not be admitted was a decision of a type which the nursing staff had no authority to take, S .141 afforded them no protection . Leave to appeal to the House of Lords was refused by the Court of Appeal . The union secretaries petitioned the House of Lords for leave to appeal and on 7 May 1980 the House of Lords refused it . The applicant states that he was advised by leading counsel that an appeal to the House of Lords in respect of his stayed actions against the Department of Health and Social Security and the Kent Area Health Authority has little prospect of success . He submits that he was thus unable to pursue his action against them . During the course of the proceedings referred to above, the applicant's condition was reported on various occasions . In particular the Department of Health and Social Security asked his responsible niedical officer to comment on allegations in his statement of claim to the effect that continued detention in Broadnioor was having an adverse effect on him and that transfer was an essential step in his recovery . On 19 October 1979 the responsible medical officer reported in the following terms : "i . It is my opinion that transfer from Broadmoor for further treatment and rehabilitation in a local psychiatric hospital is an essential step in the Plaintiffs (i .e . Mr Ashingdane's) recovery . ii . The disappointment at his rejection by Oakwood Hospital has ntade him tense and irritable . But more seriously one of his former delusional beliefs was to the effect that hospital authorities were persecuting him by continuing to detain him illegally . This delusion cleared when he gained some measure of insight . I fear that continued undue detention here will reactivate this to delusional intensity again and thus precipitate full scale relapse . His present mental condition remains reasonable stable and in m y .i opinion he is suitable for transfer to Oakwood Hospital . " In January 1980 the applicant was again examined by Dr . Sherry of Oakwood Hospital . In his report dated 10 March 1 980 Dr . Sherry reported that the diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia remained unchanged . He had the impression there had been a slight deterioration in the applicant's mental condition over the last year . He expressed the following opinion as to his condition : "Although not psychotic this man remains paranoid and I feel that his continued detention in Broadmoor is having an adverse effect on his mental health, i .e . it is making him even more paranoid . His drawn out involvement with the High Court can only aggravate this paranoia and further constrict his outlook ."
Dr . Sherry recommended that the applicant was not fit to return to the community but that it should be possible to manage him in an ordinary longstay psychiatric hospital with a closed ward .lt was unlikely he would have to remain in such closed ward for more than a year . He was satisfied that the applicant could be managed at Oakwood . Until September 1980 the Area Health Authority continued to advise that they were unable to admit the applicant to Oakwood because of the ban on admission to patients subject to S .65 . However on 4 September 1980 they stated that an agreement had been reached enabling him to be admitted there . On 15 September 1980 the applicant's Broadmoor doctor reported again that the applicant's proper rehabilitation continued to necessitate in-patient treatment due to his "lack of insight and long institutionalisation" . The report states that his continued hospitalisation is "necessary in the interests of the patient's health or safety and (ii) for the protection pf other persons" . The Home Secretary and Secretary of State for Social Services both consented to the applicant's transfer and he was admitted to Oakwood on I October 1980.
COMPLAINTS AND INITIAL SUBMISSIONS OF THE APPLICANT In his original application to the Commission the applicant complained of his detention in Broadmoor Hospital . He invoked Arts . 3, 4 and 5 of the Convention . He maintained that his detention was not covered by Article 5 (1) (e) of the Convention since, contrary to the opinion of his psychiatrist, he was not of unsound mind . In further submissions made on his behalf in June 1980 by his legal representatives, it was submitted that he had been denied the right to a fair trial in the determination of a civil right, contrary to Article 6 (1) . The right which the applicant sought to enforce in his proceedings against the Department of Health and Social Security and the Kent Area Health Authority was a "civil right" because : . (a) the applicant sought to establish that these defendants owed a duty to him personally, whose performance could be enforced in the courts . He sought declarations that they were in breach of their duty, in consequence of which he had suffered damage for which they were obliged to compensate him . He was thus seeking compensation for a wrong committed against him in breach of statutory duty ; (b) the applicant was unable to take employment in the community until transferred to a local hospital . The possibility of obtaining employment in the community (and obtaining release) was a private right intimately linked with his transfer to Oakwood . The determination of this right depended on the outcome of his proceedings against the Department and Health Authority .
It was submitted that the applicant's right of access to court under Article 6(1) had been denied him by virtue of S .141 of the 1959 Act . Whilst mental illness might render legitimate certain limitations on the exercise of that right, it could not, in the applicant's submission warrant its total absence . The restrictions placed on him by S .141 were not legitimate because : (a) they were an absolute bar to proceedings where (as here) bad faith or want of reasonable care was not alleged ; an d (b) the requirement to have substantial grounds for such an allegation in order to obtain leave obliged advance disclosure of evidence and required the court to decide the issue in the case at a preliminary stage, on affidavit evidence without benefit of oral evidence or cross-examination . Submlwlou as to domestlc remediee In his original application the applicant submitted that he had no remedy against his detention and that he had complied with Article 26 of the Convention by virtue of the various complaints he had made, and through having his case referred to Mental Health Review Tribunals . In respect of the further complaint concerning access to court, it was submitted that in view of leading counsel's advice legal aid would not be granted for a petition to the House of Lords for leave to appeal . Further the petition of the union secretaries had been refused and any petition by the applicant would have been dealth with the same way . Finally, he could not seek leave under S .141 (2) because he did not allege bad faith or want of reasonable care. Object of We appllcatio u The applicant stated that the object of his original application was to obtain his freedom . It was stated that the object of the further application lodged by his lawyers was to obtain (i) a declaration that his right to a fair trial under Article 6(1) had been violated and (ii) just satisfaction under Article 50 of the Convention .
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMhDSSIO N The Commission decided on 7 October 1980, in accordance with Rule 42 (2) (b) of its Rules of Procedure, to bring the application to the notice of the respondent Government and invite them to submit written observations on its admissibility and merits . It requested the Government to comment in particular on the question of the compatibility of the applicant's continued detention at Broadmoor with Article 5(1) of the Convention, and to conside r
under both Articles 5( 4) and A rt icle 6 (1) the applicant's complaint concerning the dismissal of his action against the hospital autho ri ties . The Government's obse rvations were subnti tt ed on 11 Februa ry 1981 and the applicant's observations were submi tt ed on 7 May 1981 . On 24 June 1981 the Government submi tt ed supplementa ry obse rvations on admissibility . On 16 July 1981 the Commission decided, in accordance with Rule 42 (3) (b) of the Rules of Procedure, to invite the pa rties to make fu rt her submissions at a heari ng on the admissibility and merits of the application . The heari ng was held on 5 Februa ry 1982 .
SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES The parties' submissions on the admissibility of the case, as set out in their written and oral pleadings, may be summarised as follows : 1 . The respondent Governmen t (a) Artic(e 5 (1) (e) ojthe Convention The Government observe that, according to the judgment in the Winterwerp Case, (para . 39), an individual must reliably have been shown to be of 'unsound mind' in order to be deprived of his liberty under Article 5(1) (e) and that this requires establishing unsoundness of mind of such a nature and degree as to justify compulsory hospitalisation . However, they submit by reference to the medical reports and advice of the Mental Health Review Tribunals that in the applicant's case these criteria have been satisfied . Furthermore the applicant's detention has at all times been both "in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law" and "lawful" as these terms have been interpreted by the Court in the Winterwerp Case . The procedural and substantive requirements of domestic law were complied with . In his High Court action the applicant did not challenge the legal basis for his detention under the 1959 Act . The action essentially concerned the treatment the applicant considered himself as entitled to, a matter not within the scope of Article 5, (Winterwerp Case . Report of the Commission para . 84, Judgment para . 51) . The Government therefore submit that the applicant's detention has at all times been compatible with Article 5(I) (e) of the Convention and that this aspect of the application is therefore manifestly ill-founded . (b) Article 5 (4) of the Conventio n The Government submit the applicant's action in the domestic courts did not relate to the legality of his detention as such, but to his treatment, and was not therefore within the scope of Article 5 (4) of the Convention . The essence of the action was that the applicant should be detained in a hospital other than a special hospital . The Government note that an order under S .6 0
of the 1959 Act must specify the hospital where the person is to be initially detained . However the location of the patient thereafter is determined under distinct provisions of the Act . The real issue in the action was whether there was a remedy for refusal to transfer the applicant . That was an issue concerning an administrative decision unrelated to the deprivation of liberty . Indeed the relief sought included a declaration that the local health authority was acting ultra vires in refusing to admit the applicant to Oakwood Hospital . In support of their submissions the Government cite the Court's judgment in the Vagrancy Case to the effect that decisions under a discrtionary power to release did not concern the lawfulness of an initial detention or its continuation (Judgment of 18 June 1971, paras . 81-84) . They submit that this aspect of the application is manifestly ill-founded . (c) A rt icle 6 (1 ) of the Conventio n The Government first submit that no civil ri ght of the applicant's was at issue in his action in the domestic cou rt s . The duty on the Secreta ry of State under S .3 of the National Health Se rv ice Act to provide hospital accommodation "to such extent as he considers necessa ry to meet all reasonable requirements" is not absolute . They refer in this respect to the decision of the Court of Appeal in R . Y . Secretary of State for Social Se rv ices and others ex pa rte Hincks, Fleming, Lloyd & Smith ( 18 March 1980), when it was held that this duty was intpliedly limited according to the resources available . Accordingly the duty under S .3 does not give rise to a correlative civil right . Fu rt hermore, the other "rights" referred to by the applicant and alleged to have been at issue in the proceedings, such as the right to work, the rights not to be treated in a manner damaging to mental health, the right to be treated in a manner ensu ri ng his rehabilitation and reintegration into the community, cannot be derived from domestic law and we re not at issue in the proceedings . Neither the prope rt y nor libe rt y of the applicant was at issue . This is not to say that the applicant had no "civil rights" in connection with his treatment . If, for instance , the doctors and nurses had been negligent in treating him, he would have had a civil right to damages against them . However, the applicant's action plainly did not relate to that civil right . He had never alleged negligence and if he had, S .141(I) would not have applied . Accordingly the claim which the applicant sought to have se tt led befo re the domestic cou rt s did not involve "civil rights" for the purposes of Article 6, and this provision accordingly was not applicable . Alternatively the Government submit that even if the decisions concerning the applicant's transfer did affect his civil ri ghts, there was no breach of Article 6( I) . Such decisions were not themselves directed to the determination of a dispute concerning the applicant's civil rights, but were decisions by executive authorities exercising statuto ry powers . Accordingly, these decisions
did not themselves have to be taken by a tribunal . Fu rthermore the domestic court held that the executive authorities had been entitled to act as they had done and the applicant's disputation of their decisions did not involve any legal element sufficient to activate the right of access to court under Article 6 (1) . In the fu rt her alternative the Government submit that the domestic proceedings satisfied any entitlement of the applicant to have his g ri evances determined by a court, since A rt icle 6(1) does not require that the re should necessa ri ly be access to a cou rt with jurisdiction to determine the full merits of decisions affecting pri vate rights and S .141 of the 1959 Act does not restrict the ju ri sdiction of the cou rts unreasonably . In support of these submissions the Government refer to the Commission's Report in the case of Kaplan v. the United Kingdom ( Application No . 7598/76, Decisions and Repo rt s 21, p . 5, paras . 151, 154, 161 and 163) . The Government therefore submit that the applicant's complaint under Article 6 of the Convention is incompatible with the Convention ratione materiae or manifestly ill-founded .
2 . 7Le applicant (a) Article 5 (1) (e) ojthe Conventio n The applicant accepts that his detention at Oakwood and subsequently Broadmoor was "in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law" and that there was evidence from which the Secretary of State could properly conclude that he was a person of unsound mind . He does not accept that his detention was "lawful" or that he was suffering from mental illness of such a kind as to justify compulsory hospitalisation . The list of permitted exceptions to the right to liberty under Article 5(1) is exhaustive and they should be strictly interpretated . Accordingly, and in the light of Articles 17 and 18 of the Convention, detention of a person of unsound mind may not be justified under Article 5(1) (e) if it restricts his liberty to a greater extent or for a]onger period than is necessary, or for a purpose other than that for which the restriction is permitted . Such detention also ceases to be justified if it offends the principles of necessity and proportionality, (Application No . 7317/75, Lynas v . Switzerland, DR 6, p . 141 to p . 153) . To avoid being arbitrary, the detention must conform to all procedural and substantive safeguards provided by domestic law . The requirement of "lawfulness" applies not only to the ordering but also to the execution of the detention, (Winterwerp Judgment, para . 39) . The Government interpretation of Article 5, as relating solely to detainability is too narrow . The applicant submits that his detention in Broadmoor after October 1978 was not "lawful" detention for the purposes of Article 5 and did not conform to the purpose of the restriction permitted in Article 5 (1) (e) . His
continued detention there was not necessary for his treatment and was known to involve a serious risk of deterioration to his mental health . By delaying the necessary process of rehabilitation it almost certainly prolonged the overall length of his detention . The therapeutic purpose of detention under Article 5 (1) (e) was not being fulfllled and the purpose of his detention came essentially to be the preservation of industrial peace . Accordingly, in its nature, purpose, duration and effects, the applicant's continued detention at Broadmoor failed to comply with the safeguards implicit in Article 5(1) (e) and expressed in Articles 17 and 18 of the Convention . The applicant, in his written observations, also noted that the Commission, in the Winterwerp case, left open the question whether the absence or refusal ot'treatment could give rise to questions under other Article of the Convention . In his submission his continued detention in inappropriate conditions, for reasons purely of industrial relations policy, causing a marked and known deterioration in his mental health and extending the period of his detention raised serious issues under both Article 3 and Article 5 read in conjunction with Article 18 of the Convention . Fu rt hermore, his mental state did not warrant compulsory confinement, pa rt icularly in view of the alternative methods of dealing with him which were available . None of the medical repo rt s after October 1978 indicated a likelihood of violent behaviour . To justify compulsory detention, a person's disorder must manifest a clear and present danger . No "actual danger", such as was required under the Netherlands law considered in the Winterwerp case, existed here . The main concern of the authorities has been that he would not continue his medication if discharged, leading to deterioration of his condition . However he could be released on condition that he continued to attend hospital as an out-patient, and recalled if he failed to meet this condition . The applicant also observed that he had been detained for eleven years without any manifestation of violent behaviour . (b) Article 5 ( 4) ojthe Conventio n The applicant adopts the Commission's conclusions in the Winterwerp case (para . 90 of the Report) and the case of X . v . United Kingdom (Application No . 6998/75, paras . 125 et seq . of the Report) to the effect that Article 5, paragraph 4 guarantees a right to judicial review of both the substantive and the formal lawfulness of the detention . In his submission the Government's argument would limit the scope of review to the procedural propriety of the initial detention order . However there is no logical reason why the "lawfulness" to be reviewed under Article 5, paragraph 4 should be more limited that the "lawfutness" to be reviewed under Article 5, paragraph 1(e) . The term should have the same meaning in paragraphs I and 4, so that all aspects of the deprivation of liberty should be subject to review . - 17 -
The proceedings brought by the applicant concerned the lawfulness of his continued detention at Broadmoor, as the Government themselves stated in their observations . His allegation was that he was detained in Broadmoor in breach of domestic and Convention law . Accordingly the proceedings concerned the "tawfulness" of the execution of the detention and the applicant was entitled to access to a court (Winterwerp judgment, para . 60) . The applicant's claim, furthermore, was not analogous to requests for the exercise of a discretionary power such as those at issue in the Vagrancy Cases . He was seeking to compel performance of a legal duty . Accordingly, whether or not the applicant's allegations were wellfounded, the proceedings concerned the lawfulness of the execution of his detention in Broadmoor . Article 5, paragraph 4 entitled him to have the matter determined by a court, but he had been denied that right . The domestic courts did not decide on his claim concerning the lawfulness of his detention but held that they were prevented from doing so by a fetter on their jurisdiction . (c) A rt icle 6 (1) of the Conventio n The applicant maintains that his proceedings against the authorities involved the determination of a dispute concerning a "civil right" under Article 6, paragraph 1 . The substance of his claim was that the defendants owed him a statutory duty, that they had broken it and that he had suffered, or would suffer, loss or damage as a result . Clearly, in the applicant's submission, a person has a right of action for damages if in breach of statute he is given inappropriate, or no, medical treatment or supervision . The same is the case in respect of psychiatric treatment . Breach of statutory duty in English law gives rise to a private law right . The applicant rejects the Government's argument that the National Health Service Act did not confer any civil right on him . Although the duty under it was held to be limited according to the availability of resources, in his case the necessary resources were admittedly available . He also rejects their submission that his liberty was not at issue . In so far as he was required in practice to pass through a local psychiatric hospital prior to release, the failure to transfer him delayed his eventual release . The existence of a civil right is to be determined by reference to general principles of law common to the Council of Europe states . Assistance in relation to such principles may be derived from the case-law of the European Court of Justice concerning the basis for the non-contractual liability of the Communities' . In such cases the right to damages arising from "a sufficientl y â¢ Bayerische HNL Y . Council and Commission, Judgment of 25 May 1978 ; Amylum v . Council and Commission, Judgment of 5 Decentber 1979
serious breach of a superior rule of law for the protection of the individual" is by its very nature a"privatÃ©' right, although done by a public authority in its sovereign capacity . In his own proceedings he had contended, in substance, that the authorities' actions constituted sufficiently serious breaches of such rules, namely the principle of proportionality, the right to individual liberty and the "right to protection from harm" . Accordingly, the proceedings concerned the determination of a "civil right" . The applicant accepts that the relevant administrative decisions did not themselves have to be taken by a procedure complying with Article 6, paragraph I and maintains that his claim arising therefrom did contain the "legal element" referred to by the Commission in the Kaplan case . The Government's submissions on this point pray in aid the very breach of which he complains . The effect of S . 141 (1) of the 1959 Act is to take away the jurisdiction of the courts to determine certain classes of civil action, the very danger referred to by the Court in paragraph 34 of its judgment in the Golder case . The applicant had contended that the authorities were not entitled to act as they had done . The courts had not found that they were so entitled . The position merely was that S . 141 removed their jurisdiction to hear the merits of the matter . The proceedings before the domestic courts did not satisfy the applicant's right to have his claim determined by a court since they were struck out on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction to determine the matter .
The applicant accepts that judicial review of the exercise of discretionary powers may be limited, but the essence of his claim was not that the authorities had taken the wrong decision on the merits of the matter, but that they had acted unlawfully . Section 141 of the 1959 Act makes it impossible to bring proceedings, such as those the applicant attempted to bring, where negligence or bad faith is not alleged . Such a measure cannot be justified for the protection of doctors and others against vexatious litigation . Procedures exist in any event for the striking out of vexations actions and legal aid would also normally have to be obtained . Finally, the applicant observes that it is not necessa ry for the Commission to determine the merits of the claim he sought to bring in the domestic courts . The domestic courts rejected his case under S . 141 on the assumption that he would have had a good claim in law, holding that they nevertheless had no ju ri sdiction to deal with the matter .
THE LA W The applicant has complained of his detention in Broadmoor Hospital and of the dismissal under S . 141 of the Mental Health Act 1959 of the actio n
which he brought against the local health authority and the Department of Health and Social Security . He has invoked Articles S . paragraph 1, and 4 and Article 6, paragraph I of the Convention and has suggested in the course ot his submissions that issues may also arise under Articles 3, 17 and 18 of the Convention . The respondent Government have maintained that the application is inadmissible on the ground that it is manifestly ill-founded or insofar as concerned the complaint under Article 6, paragraph I of the Convention, incompatible with the Convention ratione materiae.
Having carried out a preliminary exantination of the parties' submissions the Commission finds that the application raises a number of substantial questions under the Convention . In particular, a substantial issue arises as to whether the applicant's detention in Broadmoor Hospital between October 1978, when his responsible medical officer reported that he was fit to be transferred, and I October 1980 when he was transferred to Oakwood Hospital, was compatible with Article S . paragraph I of the Convention . The question arises as to whether his detention in Broadmoor during this period was "lawful" detention for the purposes of Article 5, paragraph 1, in view of the applicant's claim to the effect that the authorities were in breach of a statutory duty to provide him with accommodation in another form of institution and that they were thus acting unlawfully in continuing to detain him in Broadmoor . In this connection an important question arises as to the interpretation of Article 5, namely whether it requires only that detention as such should be "lawful" or whether, and if so to what extent, it requires that measures taken in execution of a decision to detain, such as decisions on transfer or the location of detention, should also be "lawful" . Further issues of substance arise under Article 5, paragraph 4 and Article 6 . paragraph I of the Convention, in the Commission's view . In particular it is necessary to consider whether the action which the applicant brought against the Department of Health and Social Security and the Local Health Authority related either to the "lawfulness of his detention" for the purposes of Article 5, paragraph 4 of the Convention, or to his "civil rights and obligations" for the purposes of Article 6, paragraph I and, if so, whether the dismissal of the action involved an infringement of either of these provisions . The Commission accordingly finds that the applicant's complaints cannot be described as manifestly ill-founded or incompatible with the Convention . No other ground of inadmissibility is applicable and the case must accordingly be declared admissible . For these reasons, the Commissio n
DECLARES THIS APPLICATION ADMISSIBLE .
(TRADUCTION) EN FAIT Les faits de la cause, tels qu'ils ont Ã©tÃ© exposÃ©s par les parties, peuvent se rÃ©sumer comme suit : Le requÃ©rant est un ressortissant du Royaume-Uni, nÃ© en 1929, habitant habituellement Rochester mais actuellement internÃ© Ã l'hÃ´pital d'Oakwood dans le Kent . Il a prÃ©sentÃ© lui-mÃªme la requÃªte initiale relative Ã sa dÃ©tention, puis le cabinet d'avocats Bindman Ã Londres, qui le reprÃ©sente maintenant, a prÃ©sentÃ© le grief complÃ©mentaire de refus d'accÃ¨s Ã un tribunal . Le 23 novembre 1970, le requÃ©rant fut reconnu coupable par les assises de Rochester de conduite dangereuse d'une automobile et de dÃ©tention illÃ©gale d'armes Ã feu . ConformÃ©ment Ã l'article 62 de la loi sur la santÃ© mentale (Mental Health Act 1959), le tribunal rendit une ordonnance d'internement psychiatrique assortie, conformÃ©ment Ã l'article 65 de ladite loi, d'une ordonnance restrictive Ã durÃ©e illimitÃ©e quant Ã sa libÃ©ration . Ce texte avait pour effet essentiel de confier au Ministre de l'intÃ©rieur toute dÃ©cision relative Ã la libÃ©ration du requÃ©rant, Ã son transfert, etc . . . En effet, s'agissant des malades assujettis Ã une ordonnance restrictive, la commission de contrÃ´le psychiatrique n'a qu'un rÃ´le consultatif . AprÃ¨s un bref sÃ©jour en prison, le requÃ©rant fut internÃ© d'abord Ã l'hÃ´pital psychiatrique d'Oakwood, oÃ¹ il avait sÃ©journÃ© quatre mois l'annÃ©e prÃ©cÃ©dente conformÃ©ment Ã l'article 60 de la loi de 1959, aprÃ¨s une autre condamnation .
En avril 1971, le requÃ©rant fut transfÃ©rÃ© Ã Broadmoor, hÃ´pital spÃ©cial accueillant des malades dont le traitement doit se dÃ©rouler dans des conditions de sÃ©curitÃ© renforcÃ©es en raison de leur propension Ã la violence ou au crime* . Entre avril 1971 et octobre 1978, le dossier du requÃ©rant fut examinÃ© Ã quatre reprises par une commission de contrÃ´le psychiatrique qui, Ã chaque fois, exprima l'avis que l'Ã©tat du malade ne permettait ni libÃ©ration ni transfert . Le Ministre de l'intÃ©rieur se rangea Ã cet avis . Par ailleurs, le mÃ©decin traitant adressa pÃ©riodiquement des rapports au Ministre des Affaires sociales . Il semble qu'Ã sa demande, le requÃ©rant ait Ã©tÃ© Ã©galement examinÃ©, Ã deux reprises au moins pendant cette pÃ©riode, par des mÃ©decins indÃ©pendants . Il ressort des rapports mÃ©dicaux prÃ©sentÃ©s Ã la Commission que l'internement et le maintien en dÃ©tention du requÃ©rant Ã©taient justifiÃ©s par le diagnostic de schizophrÃ©nie paranofde, qu'Ã Broadmoor le malade Ã©tait sous surveillance mÃ©dicale et que l'on estimait qu'il serait dangereux s'il Ã©tait mis en libertÃ© . Le 31 octobre 1978, le Dr Maguire signala que le requÃ©rant . avait â¢ Article 4 de la loi de 1977 sur le Senice national de santÃ© (version actuelle
cessÃ© de constituer une menace + et pouvait Ãªtre traitÃ© dans un hÃ´pital . Il recommanda de transfÃ©rer le malade Ã l'hÃ´pital d'Oakwood . A Oakwood, le requÃ©rant fut examinÃ© par le Dr Sherry qui souscrivit au diagnostic de schizophrÃ©nie paranoÃ¯de, dÃ©clara que le requÃ©rant n'Ã©tait plus aussi dangereux qu'il l'avait Ã©tÃ© et reconnut qu'il pouvait Ãªtre soignÃ© dans un hÃ´pital psychiatrique de type classique . En dÃ©cembre 1978, le Ministre des Affaires sociales marqua son accord avec la recommandation du Dr Maguire . Le 1Â°' man 1971, le Ministre de l'intÃ©rieur se dÃ©clara prÃªt Ã consentir au transfert du requÃ©rant dans un hÃ´pital psychiatrique local, Ã condition de trouver une place lui convenant . Le requÃ©rant Ã©tait toujours soumis aux restrictions visÃ©es Ã l'article 65 de la loi de 1959 sur la santÃ© mentale . Cependant, l'AutoritÃ© sanitaire de la circonscription du Kent, service de tuttelle de l'hÃ´pital d'Oakwood, refusa d'admettre le requÃ©rant Ã Oakwood et le Ministre des Affaires sociales refusa d'ordonner le transfert de l'intÃ©ressÃ© dans cet Ã©tablissement . Le motif de ces deux refus Ã©tait que les deux sections du syndicat du personnel soignant d'Oakwood (The Confederation of Health Service Employees - COHSE) refusaient d'admettre les malades visÃ©s par les ordonnances restrictives prÃ©vues Ã l'article 65 de la loi . Selon le Gouvernement, l'AutoritÃ© sanitaire donna l'avis suivant au Ministre des Affaires sociales ; admettre le requÃ©rant sans l'accord du personnel soignant conduirait les infirmiers Ã se retirer de l'Ã©tablissement, ce qui mettrait en danger la santÃ© et le bien-Ãªtre des autres malades et ne serait pas dans l'intÃ©rÃªt du requÃ©rant . Elle formula aussi l'avis que ce transfert compromettrait les perspectives d'accord tendant Ã obtenir du personnel qu'il lÃ¨ve l'interdiction et qu'admettre le requÃ©rant dans un autre hÃ´pital pourrait non seulement entraÃ®ner des actions revendicatives dans cet autre Ã©tablissement mais aussi aggraver les rapports entre partenaires sociaux Ã l'hÃ´pital d'Oakwood mÃªme . Entretemps le MinistÃ¨re de la SantÃ© et de la SÃ©curitÃ© sociale avait interrogÃ© Broadmoor sur la nÃ©cessitÃ© de maintenir pour le requÃ©rant les restrictions visÃ©es Ã l'article 65 . Ix 19 fÃ©vrier 1979, le mÃ©decin traitant indiqua qu'Ã son avis les restrictions ne devaient pas Ãªtre levÃ©es tant que le requÃ©rant n'avait pas - fait preuve de la stabilitÃ© et l'amÃ©lioration nÃ©cessaire Ã un sÃ©jour dans un Ã©tablissement psychiatrique classique et ce, pendant un temps raisonnable . . Aucune possibilitÃ© d'hÃ©bergement n'ayant Ã©tÃ© trouvÃ©e pour l'intÃ©ressÃ© dans un autre hÃ´pital qu'Oakwood, le requÃ©rant demeura donc Ã Broadmoor . Le 23 aoÃ»t 1979, une commission de contrÃ´le psychiatrique rÃ©examina le dossier du requÃ©rant . Elle formula l'avis qu'il Ã©tait essentiel au bien-Ãªtre du malade de maintenir ce dernier sous surveillance directe pour s'assurer qu'il
continue son traitement mais reconnut que son Ã©tat s'Ã©tait suffisamment amÃ©liorÃ© pourjustifier son transfert dans un hÃ´pital local . Le 17 septembre 1979, le Ministre de l'intÃ© rieur rÃ©affirma son accord de principe au transfe rt du requÃ©rant . Dans l'intervalle, aprÃ¨s avoir obtenu l'assistance judiciaire, le requÃ©rant entama devant la High Court, en aoÃ»t 1979, une action contre ( 1) le MinistÃ¨ re de la SantÃ© et de la SÃ©cu ritÃ© sociale, (2) l'AutoritÃ© sanitaire de la circonsc ription du Kent et (3) et (4) les secrÃ©taires des deux sections locales du syndicat Ã Oakwood, en contestant la lÃ©galitÃ© de son maintien en dÃ©tention Ã Broadmoor. Il demandait initialement au juge : i . de dÃ©clarer que le MinistÃ¨re Ã©tait lÃ©galement tenu de lui fournir un hÃ©bergement hospitalier Ã Oakwood et/ou dans un autre hÃ´pital local appropriÃ© ; ii . de dÃ©clarer que le MinistÃ¨re et l'AutoritÃ© sanitaire locale avaient commis un abus de pouvoir en refusant de l'admettre ou d'envisager son admission Ã Oakwood en raison de l'interdiction dÃ©cidÃ©e par le syndicat ; iii . de dÃ©clarer que les secrÃ©taires et membres de la section locale du syndicat avaient enfreint la loi en amenant le MinistÃ¨re et l'AutoritÃ© sanitaire Ã agir contrairement Ã leurs obligations lÃ©gales ; iv . Ã interdire ce type d'action aux secrÃ©taires et membres de la section du syndicat . L'acte introductif d'instance fut modifiÃ© en mars 1980 pour y inclure l'allÃ©gation selon laquelle les membres du syndicat avaient agi contrairement Ã la loi en menaÃ§ant d'arrÃªter leur travail Ã l'hÃ´pital si le requÃ©rant y entrait et y inclure aussi les demandes d'injonction et de rÃ©paration Ã raison de ce comportement . Le 13 dÃ©cembre 1979, les secrÃ©taires de la section locale du syndicat sollicitÃ¨rent une ordonnance de suspension des poursuites engagÃ©es contre eux au motif que le requÃ©rant n'avait pas sollicitÃ© ni obtenu l'autorisation prÃ©vue Ã l'article 141 de la loi de 1959 sur la santÃ© mentale pour intenter une action en justice et/ou que cette autorisation n'aurait pas Ã©tÃ© accordÃ©e si elle avait Ã©tÃ© demandÃ©e . L'article 141 de la loi de 1959 est ainsi libellÃ© : (1) - Des poursuites, civiles ou pÃ©nales, ne peuvent Ãªtre engagÃ©es, pour incompÃ©tence ou tout autre motif, contre quiconque en aurait Ã©tÃ© passible en l'absence du prÃ©sente article, pour toute mesure rÃ©putÃ©e prise en application de la prÃ©sente loi ou de ses rÃ¨glements d'application, ou dans l'exercice (ou par suite de tout acte accompli dans l'exercice) de fonctions confÃ©rÃ©es par tout autre texte rÃ©glementaire Ã l'autoritÃ© compÃ©tente en vertu de la section VIII de la prÃ©sente loi, que si ladite mesure est entachÃ©e de mauvaise foi ou de nÃ©gligence .
(2) Des poursuites, civiles ou pÃ©nales, ne peuvent Ãªtre engagÃ©es devant quelque tribunal que ce soit contre l'auteur de quelque acte que ce soit sans l'autorisation de la High Court . Cette juridiction ne donnera l'autorisation prÃ©vue au prÃ©sent article que si elle est convaincue qu'il existe un motif valable de prÃ©tendre que l'intÃ©ressÃ© a agi de mauvaise foi ou avec nÃ©gligence . . Le 21 dÃ©cembre 1979, le juge Dillon ordonna l'arrÃ©t des poursuites contre les secrÃ©taires du syndicat, l'autorisation visÃ©e Ã l'article 141 faisant dÃ©faut . Il fit observer qu'il n'y avait dans les exposÃ©s aucune allÃ©gation selon laquelle l'un ou l'autre des dÃ©fenseurs aurait agi . de mauvaise foi ou avec nÃ©gligence . . La seule question qui se posait Ã©tait celle de savoir si l'action avait Ã©tÃ© engagÃ©e pour une mesure . rÃ©putÃ©e prise en application â¢ de la loi de 1959 . Le juge rappela les motifs donnÃ©s par le syndicat pour justifier son action . En substance, les membres du syndicat estimaient qu'en l'absence des moyens nÃ©cessaires . ils ne pouvaient pas garantir Ã suffisance le traitement, la rÃ©intÃ©gration et la sÃ©curitÃ© des malades visÃ©s Ã l'article 65 dans le milieu ouvert Ã l'hÃ´pital d'Oakwood . Le juge dÃ©clara que le syndicat agissait pour protÃ©ger les malades dans l'hÃ´pital et qu'Ã©tant associÃ© Ã tout le processus de consultation et de dÃ©cision dans l'Ã©tablissement il Ã©tait donc protÃ©gÃ© par l'article 141 . Le MinistÃ¨re de la SantÃ© et de la SÃ©curitÃ© sociale et l'AutoritÃ© sanitaire de la circonscription sollicitÃ¨rent alors pour les mÃªmes motifs des ordonnances d'arrÃªt des poursuites engagÃ©es contre eux . Le juge Foster y fit droit le 15 janvier 1 980. II rejeta l'argument selon lequel ces dÃ©fendeurs avaient renoncÃ© Ã tout moyen de dÃ©fense tirÃ© de l'article 141 et suivit quant au fond le raisonnement du juge Dillon ; qu'il ait tort ou qu'il ait raison Ã propos des secrÃ©taires du syndicat, il est bien certain que le MinistÃ¨re et l'AutoritÃ© sanitaire de la circonscription relevaient, eux, de l'article 141 . Le requÃ©rant interjeta appel contre les deux ordonnances . Le 18 fÃ©vrier 1980, la cour d'appel, se prononÃ§ant Ã l'unanimitÃ© (a) rejeta l'appel formÃ© contre l'ordonnance du juge Foster (concernant le MinistÃ¨re et l'AutoritÃ© sanitaire) et (b) fit droit Ã l'appel interjetÃ© contre l'ordonnance du juge Dillon (relative aux secrÃ©taires du syndicat) . Les dispositions lÃ©gales pertinentes furent examinÃ©es par le juge Bridge qui prononÃ§a le premier arrÃªt . Le requÃ©rant pouvait Ãªtre transfÃ©rÃ© de Broadmoor en vertu de l'article 41 de la loi de 1959, lu en liaison avec l'article 13 du RÃ¨glement de 1960 sur la santÃ© mentale (hospitalisation et tutelle) . Le Ministre des Affaires sociales ne pouvait autoriser ce transfert (avec l'assentiement du Ministre de l'intÃ©rieur) que s'il Ã©tait convaincu que, dans les 28 jours, des dispositions seraient prises pour admettre le requÃ©rant Ã l'hÃ´pital d'accueil . Par ailleurs, l'article 90 de la loi de 1959 confÃ©rait au Ministre le pouvoir d'ordonner le transfert de l'intÃ©ressÃ©, mÃ©me sans avoir cette conviction .
Le moyen de dÃ©fense du MinistÃ¨re de la SantÃ© et de la SÃ©cu ri tÃ© sociale Ã©tait qu'une dÃ©cision de transfert (positive ou nÃ©gative) Ã© tait une mesure rÃ©putÃ©e p rise en application de la loi de 1959 et de ses rÃ¨glements d'application et relevait, Ã ce titre de l'a rticle 141, paragraphe 1 . Or, le Ministre avait dÃ©cidÃ© que le transfe rt Ã©tait impraticable. Sa bonne foi n'a pas Ã©tÃ© contestÃ©e et l'action engagÃ©e contre le MinistÃ¨re Ã©tait donc irrecevable par application de l'article 141 . Pour l'AutoritÃ© sanitaire de la circonsc ription, le moyen de dÃ©fense Ã©tait que sa dÃ©cision quant Ã l'admission du requÃ©rant Ã Oakwood visait un but annexe aux fonctions confÃ©rÃ©es au Ministre par la loi de 1959 et par le rÃ¨glements . Sa bonne foi n'a pas Ã©tÃ© contestÃ©e non plus et la dÃ©cision Ã©tait rÃ©putÃ©e p ri se en application d'un texte rÃ©glementaire . Le requÃ©rant soutenait, quant Ã lui, qu'en se soumettant Ã la pression du syndicat, le Ministre et l'AutoritÃ© sanitaire avaient en fait abdiquÃ© leur rÃ´le et donc toumÃ© la loi dans son esprit et ses objectifs . Il faisait valoir que pareil acte ne pouvait pas Ãªtre rÃ©putÃ© fait en application d'une loi . Lejuge Bridge dÃ©clara notamment que lorsqu'une autoritÃ© Ã©tablie par la loi agit de bonne foi en ce qu'elle estime Ãªtre une maniÃ¨re convenable de s'acquitter de ses responsabilitÃ©s lÃ©gales . .le fait de dÃ©clarer par la suite qu'elle a agi d'une maniÃ¨re contraire Ã la loi au point de la tourner dans son esprit et ses objectifs ne saurait mener Ã la conclusion que les mesures initialement prises de bonne foi ne sont pas rÃ©putÃ©es l'avoir Ã©tÃ© en application de la loi . . D'accord avec le juge Dillon, il estima que le texte de l'article 141, paragraphe 1 de la loi de 1959 avait un caractÃ¨re subjectif et non pas objectif . . Lorsqu'une personne agit honnÃªtement avec l'intention d'exercer, au mieux de sa connaissance, les fonctions ou obligations que la loi lui confÃ¨re, alors il semble qu'elle est rÃ©putÃ©e agir conformÃ©ment Ã la loi . . Bien que le requÃ©rant ait allÃ©guÃ© un ntanquement Ã l'obligation , prÃ©vue par la loi de 1977 sur le Service national de santÃ©, de lui fournir un hÃ©bergement hospitalier rÃ©pondant aux conditions raisonnables requises (article 3 de la loi), l'acte essentiel susceptible d'engager la responsabilitÃ© des autori tÃ©s Ã©tait le refus d'opÃ©rer le transfert qui, lui, Ã©tait un acte protÃ©gÃ© par l'article 141 .
Le juge Bridge examina Ã©galement l'argument du requÃ©rant selon lequel le MinistÃ¨re et l'Autori tÃ© sanitaire avaient renoncÃ© Ã toute immunitÃ© pouvant dÃ©couler de l'article 141 . Evoquant la dÃ©cision de la Chambre des Lords dans l'affaire Pountney c/Griffiths (1976) A .C . 314, le juge dÃ©clara que . l'article 141 ne crÃ©e par une immunitÃ© personnelle Ã laquelle il est possible de renoncer mais fait obstacle Ã la compÃ©tence de la Cour, laquelle doit donc se dÃ©clarer incompÃ©tente â¢ . Aussi le juge B ri dge se pronon Ã§ a-t-il en faveur du rejet de l'appel formÃ© contre l'ordonnance du juge Foster arrÃªtant les poursuites contre le MinistÃ¨re et l'AutoritÃ© sanitaire . Les juges Cumming Bruce et B ri ghtman se ralliÃ¨rent Ã ses motifs .
Quant Ã l'action engagÃ©e contre les secrÃ©taires de la section locale du syndicat, le juge Bridge dÃ©clara qu'une dÃ©cision du personnel soignant d'interdire l'admission de toute une catÃ©gorie de malades, mÃªme prise en toute bonne foi, ne rentrait pas dans les pouvoirs que la loi confÃ¨re, expressÃ©ment ou tacitement, au personnel infirmier . En effet, la loi n'autorise pas les infirmiers Ã prendre des dÃ©cisions de politique gÃ©nÃ©rale . Les mesures dÃ©cidÃ©es en l'espÃ¨ce par les secrÃ©taires du syndicat ne bÃ©nÃ©ficiaient donc pas de la protection de l'article 141 de la loi de 1959 et la dÃ©cision d'arrÃ©t des poursuites, prise par le juge Dillon Ã propos de l'action les concernant devait donc Ãªtre rapportÃ©e . Les juges Cumming Bruce et Brightman se ralliÃ¨rent Ã cette conclusion pour des raisons analogues . Le juge Brightman prÃ©cisa qu'Ã son avis . l'immunitÃ© confÃ©rÃ©e par l'article 141 ne concerne qu'une mesure prise par une personne Ã qui autoritÃ© pour ce faire a Ã©tÃ© donnÃ©e, expressÃ©ment ou implicitement, par la loi pertinente . . Or, la dÃ©cision prise par le personnel soignant de ne pas admettre les malades visÃ©s par l'article 65 appartenait Ã une catÃ©gorie de dÃ©cisions Ã©chappant Ã l'autoritÃ© du personnel et donc Ã l'immunitÃ© offerte par l'article 141 . La cour d'appel refusa l'autorisation d'interjeter appel devant la Chambre des Lords . Les secrÃ©taires du syndicat demandÃ¨rent alors Ã la Chambre des Lords l'autorisation de faire appel . lls furent dÃ©boutÃ©s le 7 mai 1980 . f.e requÃ©rant affirme avoir reÃ§u d'un Ã©minent avocat l'avis selon lequel un appel Ã la Chambre des Lords quant Ã l'arrÃªt des actions qu'il avait intentÃ©es contre le MinistÃ¨re de la SantÃ© et de la SÃ©curitÃ© sociale et l'AutoritÃ© sanitaire de la circonscription du Kent n'avait guÃ¨re de chance de rÃ©ussir. Il soutient qu'il n'Ã©tait donc pas en mesure de poursuivre l'action contre ces services . Pendant cette procÃ©dure, l'Ã©tat du requÃ©rant fit l'objet de plusieurs rapports . En particulier, le MinistÃ¨re de la SantÃ© et de la SÃ©curitÃ© sociale demanda au mÃ©decin traitant son avis sur les allÃ©gations formulÃ©es par le requÃ©rant dans son acte introductif d'instance, selon lesquelles la poursuite de son internement Ã Broadmoor avait sur lui des effets nÃ©fastes et que son transfert Ã©tait un Ã©lÃ©ment essentiel de sa guÃ©rison . Le 19 octobre 1979, le mÃ©decin traitant formula ainsi son rapport : i . Je suis d'avis qu'un transfert de Broadmoor dans un hÃ´pital psychiatrique local pour y poursuivre le traitement et la rÃ©intÃ©gration du plaignant (c'est-Ã -dire de M . Ashingdane) est un Ã©lÃ©ment essentiel de la guÃ©rison de l'intÃ©ressÃ© . ii . La dÃ©ception qui a suivi son rejet par l'hÃ´pital Oakwood en a fait un homme tendu et irritable . Mais, ce qui est plus grave, l'une de ses anciennes croyances hallucinatoires Ã©tait que les autoritÃ©s hospitaliÃ¨res le persÃ©cutaient en le maintenant illÃ©galement en dÃ©tention . Cette hallucination disparut lorsqu'il arriva Ã une mei0eure comprÃ©hension des choses, mais je crains que le maintenir indÃ»ment internÃ© ici ne relance cette illusion au point de prÃ©cipiter une grave rechute .
iii . Son Ã©tait mental actuel demeure relativement stable et, Ã mon avis, le malade peut Ãªtre transfÃ©rÃ© Ã l'hÃ´pital d'Oakwood . â¢ En janvier 1980, le requÃ©rant fut Ã nouveau examinÃ© par le Dr Sherry, mÃ©decin Ã l'hÃ´pital d'Oakwood . Dans son rapport du 10 mars 1980, le mÃ©decin indiqua que le diagnostic de schizophrÃ©nie paranÃ´tde demeurait inchangÃ© et que l'Ã©tat mental du requÃ©rant semblait s'Ãªtre lÃ©gÃ¨rement dÃ©tÃ©riorÃ© pendant l'annÃ©e Ã©coulÃ©e . Il formula Ã cet Ã©gard l'avis suivant : . Bien que cet homme ne soit pas franchement psychotique, il reste paranoÃ¯aque et j'ai le sentiement que son internement prolongÃ© Ã Broadmoor nuit Ã son Ã©tat mental, autrement dit renforce sa parantifa . Ses dÃ©mÃªlÃ©s interminables avec la High Court ne peuvent qu'aggraver la paranoÃ¯a et rÃ©trÃ©cir encore l'optique du malade . â¢ Selon le Dr Sherry, le requÃ©rant n'Ã©tait pas en mesure de retourner vivre dans la sociÃ©tÃ© mais il devait Ãªtre possible de l'hÃ©berger dans un hÃ´pital psychiatrique de type classique pour sÃ©jour de longue durÃ©e dans un pavillon fermÃ© . Sans doute ne devrait-il pas y rester plus d'un an . Le mÃ©decin Ã©tait convaincu que le requÃ©rant pouvait Ãªtre hÃ©bergÃ© Ã Oakwood . Jusqu'en septembre 1980, l'AutoritÃ© sanitaire de la circonscription maintient qu'elle n'Ã©tait pas en mesure d'admettre le requÃ©rant Ã Oakwood en raison de l'opposition Ã l'admission des malades visÃ©s par l'article 65 . Cependant, le 4 septembre 1980, elle dÃ©clara @tre parvenue Ã un accord qui permettait d'admettre le requÃ©rant . l,e 15 septembre 1980, le mÃ©decin traitant le requÃ©rant Ã Broadmoor signala Ã nouveau qu'une bonne rÃ©adaptation du malade nÃ©cessitait toujours un traitement en hÃ´pital en raison de son . absence de largeur de vue et de la longueur de son sÃ©jour en Ã©tablissement . . Le rapport dÃ©clare que le maintien en hÃ´pital est . nÃ©cessaire dans l'intÃ©rÃªt i) de la santÃ© ou de la sÃ©curitÃ© du malalde et ii) de la protection d'autrui . . Le Ministre de l'IntÃ©rieur et le Ministre des Affaires sociales consentirent tous deux au transfert du requÃ©rant qui fut donc admis Ã Oskwood le 1Â°' octobre 1980 .
GRIEFS ET ARGUMENTATION INITIALE DU REQUÃRAN T Dans sa requÃªte introductive Ã la Commission, le requÃ©rant s'est plaint de son internement Ã l'hÃ´pital de Broadmoor . Il a invoquÃ© les articles 3, 4 et 5 de la Convention . Il soutient que son internement ne relevait pas de l'article 5, paragraphe e), de la Convention puisque, contrairement Ã l'avis de son psychiatre, il n'Ã©tait pas aliÃ©nÃ© . Dans des observations complÃ©mentaires prÃ©sentÃ©es en son nom en juin 1980, ses avocats ont soutenu que, contrairement Ã l'article 6 . paragraphe 1, l e
requÃ©rant s'est vu refuser le droit Ã un procÃ¨s Ã©quitable pour faire statuer sur un droit de caractÃ¨re civil . Le droit que le requÃ©rant cherchait Ã faire respecter par l'action qu'i l avait engagÃ©e contre le MinistÃ¨re de la SantÃ© et de la SÃ©curitÃ© sociale et l'AutoritÃ© sanitaire de la circonscription du Kent Ã©tait bien . un droit de caractÃ¨re civil - puisque : a) le requÃ©rant cherchait Ã faire Ã©tablir que les dÃ©fendeurs avaient Ã son Ã©gard une obligation personnelle dont il pouvait rÃ©clamer l'exÃ©cution en justice . Il demandait au juge de dÃ©clarer qu'ils avaient failli Ã leur devoir, ce qui avait eu pour effet de lui infliger un prÃ©judice qu'ils Ã©taient tenu de rÃ©parer . Il rÃ©clamait donc rÃ©paration pour un dommage commis Ã son endroit en violation d'une obligation lÃ©gale ;
b) le requÃ©rant ne pouvait pas prendre un emploi dans la collectivitÃ© tant qu'il n'Ã©tait pas transfÃ©rÃ© dans un hÃ´pital local . La possibilitÃ© d'obtenir un emploi (et donc une libÃ©ration) Ã©tait un droit privÃ© Ã©troitement liÃ© Ã son transfert Ã Oskwood . La dÃ©cision quant Ã ce droit dÃ©pendait de l'issue de l'action qu'il avait engagÃ©e contre le MinistÃ¨re et l'AutoritÃ© sanitaire . Le requÃ©rant soutenait que le droit d'accÃ¨s au tribunal, protÃ©gÃ© par l'article 6, paragraphe 1, lui avait Ã©tÃ© refusÃ© par le jeu de l'article 141 de la loi de 1959 . Selon lui, une maladie mentale peut certes justifier des limitations Ã l'exercice de ce droit, mais non sa totale suppression . Or, les restrictions qui lui ont Ã©tÃ© imposÃ©es en vertu de l'article 141 n'Ã©taient pas lÃ©gitimes puisque : a) elles faisaient totalement obstacle Ã la procÃ©dure puisqu'ici la mauvaise foi ou la nÃ©gligence n'Ã©taient pas en cause ; e t b) la nÃ©cessitÃ© de motiver valablement une telle allÃ©gation pour obtenir l'autorisation obligeait Ã exposer par anticipation les Ã©lÃ©ments de preuve et Ã exiger du tribunal qu'il tranche la question d'entrÃ©e de cause, en se fondant sur des attestations sous serment . sans que l'accusÃ© puisse bÃ©nÃ©ficier de tÃ©moignages oraux ou de contre-interrogatoire des tÃ©moins . Argumentation relative Ã l'Ã©puisement des recours interne s Dans sa requÃªte introductive, le requÃ©rant a soutenu qu'il ne disposait d'aucun recours contre son internement et qu'il avait satisfait aux exigences de l'article 26 de la Convention par les diverses plaintes qu'il avait formulÃ©es et le renvoi de son dossier aux commissions de contrÃ´le psychiatrique . Quant au grief complÃ©mentaire relatif Ã l'accÃ¨s au tribunal, le requÃ©rant a soutenu que selon l'avis exprimÃ© par un Ã©minent avocat, l'assistance judiciaire ne lui serait pas accordÃ©e pour demander Ã la Chambre des Lords l'autorisation de faire appel . En outre, la demande adressÃ©e par les secrÃ©taires du syndicat avait Ã©tÃ© refusÃ©e et toute demande de la part du requÃ©rant aurai t
connu le mÃªme sort . Enfin, l'intÃ©ressÃ© ne pouvait pas fonder sa demande d'autorisation sur l'article 141 . paragraphe 2, puisqu'il n'allÃ©guait ni la mauvaise foi ni la nÃ©gligence .
Objet de la requÃªt e Le requÃ©rant a dÃ©clarÃ© que l'objet de sa requÃªte initiale Ã©tait de recouvrer la libertÃ© . L'objet de la requÃªte complÃ©mentaire introduite par ses conseils Ã©tait d'obtenir i) une dÃ©claration concluant Ã une mÃ©connaissance du droit Ã un procÃ¨s Ã©quitable que lui garantit l'article 6, paragraphe 1 . et ii) une satisfaction Ã©quitable conforme Ã l'article 50 de Ia Convention .
PROCÃDURE DEVANT LA COMMISSIO N Le 7 octobre 1980 . la Commission a dÃ©cidÃ© . conformÃ©ment Ã l'article 42, paragraphe 2 (b) de son RÃ¨glement intÃ©rieur, de donner connaissance de la requÃªte au Gouvemement dÃ©fendeur et d'inviter ce dernier Ã lui soumettre par Ã©crit ses observations sur sa recevabilitÃ© et sur le fond de l'affaire . Elle a demandÃ© au Gouvemement de formuler notamment des observations sur la question de la compatibilitÃ© de la prolongation de l'internement du requÃ©rant Ã Broadmoor avec l'article 5, paragraphe 1, de la Convention et d'examiner au regard des articles S . paragraphe 4, et 6, paragraphe 1, le grief formulÃ© par le requÃ©rant quant au rejet de son action contre les autoritÃ©s hospitaliÃ¨res . Le Gouvernement a prÃ©sentÃ© ses observations le 11 fÃ©vrier 1981 et le requÃ©rant y a rÃ©pondu le 7 mai 1981, Le 24 juin 1981, le Gouvernement a prÃ©sentÃ© des observations complÃ©mentaires sur la recevabilitÃ© . Le 16juillet 1981, la Commission a dÃ©cidÃ©, conformÃ©ment Ã l'article 42, paragraphe 3 (b), du RÃ¨glement intÃ©rieur, d'inviter les parties Ã prÃ©senter des observations complÃ©mentaires lors d'une audience sur la recevabilitÃ© et le bien-fondÃ© de la requÃªte . L'audience a eu lieu le 5 fÃ©vrier 1982 .
ARGUMENTATION DES PARTIES L'arguntentation des parties sur la recevabilitÃ© de l'affaire, telle qu'elle a Ã©tÃ© exposÃ©e dans les observations Ã©crites et les plaidoiries, peut se rÃ©sumer comme suit . Le Gouvemement dÃ©fendeur a) Sur l'article 5, paragraphe ! e), de la Convention Le Gouvernement fait remarquer que, selon l'arrÃªt rendu dans l'affaire Winterwerp (paragraphe 39), pour priver un individu de sa libertÃ© conforrnÃ©ment Ã l'article 5, paragraphe 1(e), il doit Ãªtre Ã©tabli que son aliÃ©natio n
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mentale revÃªt un cractÃ¨re et un degrÃ© propres Ã justifier une hospitalisation forcÃ©e . Or, il soutient, en se rÃ©fÃ©rant aux expertises et avis mÃ©dicaux des commissions de contrÃ´le psychiatrique qu'en l'espÃ¨ce, ces conditions ont Ã©tÃ© remplies . En outre, l'internement du requÃ©rant a, Ã tout moment, Ã©tÃ© pratiquÃ© selon les voies lÃ©gales . et de maniÃ¨re . rÃ©guliÃ¨re ., tel que la Cour a interprÃ©tÃ© ces expressions dans l'affaire Winterwerp . Les exigences de fond et de forme prÃ©vues en droit interne ont Ã©tÃ© respectÃ©es . Dans son action devant la High Court, le requÃ©rant n'a d'ailleurs pas contestÃ© le fondement juridique de sa dÃ©tention au regard de la loi de 1959. Son action portait avant tout sur le traitement auquel il estimait avoir droit, c'est-Ã -dire sur une question qui ne relÃ¨ve pas de l'article 5 (affaire Winterwerp . paragraphe 84 du rapport de la Commission et paragraphe 51 de l'arrÃªt) . Le Gouvernement soutient en consÃ©quence qu'Ã tout moment l'intemement du requÃ©rant a Ã©tÃ© compatible avec l'article 5, paragraphe 1 (e) de la Convention et que, sur ce point, la requÃªte est manifestement mal fondÃ©e . b) Sur ('article 5, paragraphe 4, de la Conventio n Le Gouvernement soutient que l'action engagÃ©e par le requÃ©rant devant les tribunaux intemes ne concernait pas la lÃ©galitÃ© de sa dÃ©tention en tant que telle, mais son traitement et qu'elle Ã©chappait dÃ¨s lors Ã l'article 5, paragraphe 4, de la Convention . Le no.ud de l'affaire c'Ã©tait que le requÃ©rant soit internÃ© dans un Ã©tablissement autre qu'un hÃ´pital spÃ©cial . Le Gouvernement relÃ¨ve qu'une ordonnance d'intemement Ã©mise en vertu de l'article 60 de la loi de 1959 doit prÃ©ciser l'hÃ´pital oÃ¹ l'intÃ©ressÃ© doit Ãªtre d'abord internÃ© . Cependant, le placement ultÃ©rieur du malade est rÃ©gi par des dispositions distinctes de la loi . Le point vÃ©ritablement litigieux en l'espÃ¨ce Ã©tait celui de savoir s'il existait un recours contre le refus de transfÃ©rer le requÃ©rant . Or, c'Ã©tait lÃ une question touchant Ã une dÃ©cision administrative et sans aucun lien avec la privation de libertÃ© . A la vÃ©ritÃ©, le remÃ¨de recherchÃ© comportait une dÃ©claration du juge selon laquelle l'AutoritÃ© sanitaire locale aurait excÃ©dÃ© ses pouvoirs en refusant d'admettre le requÃ©rant Ã l'hÃ´pital d'Oakwood . A l'appui de son argumentation, le Gouvernement cite l'arrÃªt rendu par la Cour dans l'Affaire de vagabondage, selon lequel les dÃ©cisions prises en vertu d'un pouvoir discrÃ©tionnaire d'Ã©largissement ne concernent pas la rÃ©gularitÃ© d'une dÃ©tention initiale ou sa prolongation (ArrÃªt du 18 juin 1971, paragrapges 81-84) . Le Gouvernement soutient dÃ¨s lors que la requÃªte est sur ce point manifestement mal fondÃ©e . c) Sur f'ar(ic(e 6, paragraphe !, de !a Conventio n Le Gouvernement soutient en premier lieu qu'aucun droit civil du requÃ©rant n'Ã©tait en cause dans la procÃ©dure menÃ©e devant les tribunaux inte rnes.
L'obligation faite au Ministre par l'article 3 de la loi sur le Service national de santÃ© de fournir un hÃ©bergement hospitalier . dans la mesure oÃ¹ il le juge nÃ©cessaire pour rÃ©pondre Ã toutes les exigences raisonnables â¢ n'a pas un caractÃ©re absolu . Le Gouvernement renvoie Ã cet Ã©gard Ã l'arrÃªt rendu par la cour d'appel dans l'affaire R . Secretary of State for Social Services and others ex parte Hincks, Fleming, Lloyd and Smith (18 mars 1980), oÃ¹ elle a dÃ©clarÃ© que cette obligation se trouvait implicitement limitÃ©e en fonction des ressources disponibles . Aussi l'obligation citÃ©e Ã l'article 3 ne donne-t-elle pas lieu Ã un droit civil correspondant . Au surplus, les autres . droits â¢ Ã©voquÃ©s par le requÃ©rant et censÃ©s Ãªtre en cause de l'espÃ¨ce, par exemple le droit au travail, le droit de ne pas Ã©tre traitÃ© de maniÃ¨re nuisible Ã l'Ã©tat mental, celui d'Ãªtre traitÃ© de maniÃ¨re Ã garantir une rÃ©adaptation et une rÃ©intÃ©gration dans la sociÃ©tÃ©, ne sauraient dÃ©couler de la lÃ©gislation interne et n'Ã©taient pas en jeu ici . De mÃªme, les biens ou la libertÃ© du requÃ©rant ne se trouvaient pas en cause . Cela ne signifie pas que l'intÃ©ressÃ© ne jouissait pas . de droits civils â¢ en liaison avec son traitement . Si par exemple mÃ©decins et infirmiers s'Ã©taient montrÃ©s nÃ©gligents dans le traitement, le malade aurait eu civilement le droit de leur rÃ©clamer des dommages-intÃ©rÃªts . Cependant, l'action engagÃ©e n'Ã©tait manifestetoent pas liÃ©e Ã ce droit civil, puisque le requÃ©rant n'a jamais allÃ©guÃ© la nÃ©gligence et que, s'il l'avait fait, l'article 141, paragraphe 1, n'aurait pas Ã©tÃ© appliquÃ© . En consÃ©quence, la contestation que le requÃ©rant cherchait Ã faire trancher par les tribunaux internes ne mettant pas en jeu des â¢ droits de caractÃ¨re civil â¢ au sens de l'article 6, cette disposition n'Ã©tait pas applicable au cas d'espÃ¨ce . A titre subsidiaire, le Gouvernement soutient que mÃªme si les dÃ©cisions relatives au transfert du requÃ©rant affectaient les droits civils de l'intÃ©ressÃ©, il n'y a pas eu mÃ©connaissance de l'article 6, paragraphe 1 . En effet, ces dÃ©cisions ne visaient pas elles-mÃªmes Ã trancher un litige relatif aux droits civils du requÃ©rant mais Ã©taient des mesures prises par des instances exerÃ§ant des pouvoirs rÃ©glementaires . Aussi n'Ã©taient-elles pas de la compÃ©tence d'un tribunal . En outre, la juridiction interne a dÃ©clarÃ© que ces instances administratives Ã©taient habilitÃ©es Ã agir comme elles l'ont fait et que la contestation de leurs dÃ©cisions par le requÃ©rant n'apportait pas d'Ã©lÃ©ment juridique suffisant pour faire intervenir le droit d'accÃ¨s Ã un tribunal garanti par l'article 6, paragraphe 1 . Ensuite, toujours Ã titre subsidiaire, le Gouvernement soutient que la procÃ©dure interne a fait droit Ã la possibilitÃ© pour le requÃ©rant d'amener un tribunal Ã se prononcer sur ses griefs ; en effet, l'article 6, paragraphe 1, n'exige pas nÃ©cessairement l'accÃ¨s Ã un tribunal compÃ©tent pour statuer sur le fond de dÃ©cisions affectant des droits privÃ©s et l'article 141 de la loi de 1959 ne limite pas la compÃ©tence des tribunaux de maniÃ¨re dÃ©raisonnable . A l'appui de sa thÃ¨se, le Gouvernement renvoie au rapport de la Commission dans l'affaire Kaplan c/Royaume-Uni (requÃªte nÂ° 7598/76, D .H . 21, p . 5, par . 151, 154, 161 et 163) .
Le Gouvernement prÃ©tend en consÃ©quence que le grief tirÃ© par le requÃ©rant de l'article 6 de la Convention est soit incompatible ratione materiae avec la Convention, soit manifestement mal fondÃ© . Le requÃ©rant a) Sur l'article 5. paragraphe 1(e), de la Conventio n Le requÃ©rant reconnait que son internement Ã Oakwood d'abord, puis Ã Broadmoor, a Ã©tÃ© effectuÃ© â¢ selon les voies lÃ©gales â¢ et qu'il existait des Ã©lÃ©ments de preuve au vu desquels le Ministre pouvait valablement conclure Ã son aliÃ©nation mentale . En revanche, il n'admet pas que sa dÃ©tention fut â¢ rÃ©guliÃ¨re â¢ ou qu'il souffrit d'un trouble mental de nature Ã justifier une hospitalisation forcÃ©e . La liste des exceptions autorisÃ©es au droit Ã la libertÃ© que garantit l'article 5 . paragraphe 1, est exhaustive et ces exceptions doivent s'interprÃ©ter trÃ¨s strictement . En consÃ©quence, et au vu des articles 17 et 18 de la Convention, l'internement d'un aliÃ©nÃ© peut ne pas se justifier au regard de l'article 5, paragraphe 1(e), s'il restreint sa libertÃ© plus ou plus longuement qu'il n'est nÃ©cessaire ou dans un but autre que celui pour lequel la restriction est autorisÃ©e . La dÃ©tention cesse Ã©galement de se justifier si elle est contraire aux principes de nÃ©cessitÃ© et de proportionnalitÃ© (RequÃªte nÂ° 7317/75, Lynas c/Suisse, D .R . 6, p . 141 Ã la p . 153) . Pour ne pas Ã©tre entachÃ© d'arbitraire, l'internement doit donc Ãªtre conforme Ã toutes les garanties de fond et de forme prÃ©vues par la lÃ©gislation interne . DÃ¨s lors, la condition de â¢ rÃ©gularitÃ© â¢ s'applique non seulement Ã l'ordonnance d'internement mais aussi Ã son exÃ©cution (ArrÃ©t Winterwerp, par . 39) . L'interprÃ©tation donnÃ©e par le Gouvernement de l'article 5, comme ne s'appliquant qu'Ã la possibilitÃ© d'Ãªtre internÃ©, est trop restrictive . Le requÃ©rant prÃ©tend que son internement Ã Broadmoor aprÃ¨s octobre 1978 n'Ã©tait pas une dÃ©tention â¢ rÃ©guliÃ¨re ., au sens de l'article 5 et n'Ã©tait pas conforme au but fixÃ© par la restriction autorisÃ©e par l'article 5, paragraphe 1(e) . Par ailleurs, la prolongation de l'internement n'Ã©tait pas nÃ©cessaire au traitement et il s'avÃ©rait qu'elle risquait de dÃ©tÃ©riorer gravement son Ã©tat mental . En retardant le processus nÃ©cessaire de rÃ©adaptation, elle a presque certainement allongÃ© la durÃ©e totale de la dÃ©tention . L'intemement n'avait donc pas l'objectif thÃ©rapeutique prÃ©vu Ã l'article 5, paragraphe 1(e), mais visait avant tout Ã maintenir la paix sociale . Aussi, par sa nature, son objectif, sa durÃ©e et ses effets, le maintien en dÃ©tention du requÃ©rant Ã Broadmoor n'a-t-il pas respectÃ© les garanties figurant implicitement Ã l'article 5, paragraphe 1(e), et expressÃ©ment aux articles 17 et 18 de la Convention . Dans ses observations Ã©crites, le requÃ©rant a relevÃ© Ã©galement que, dans l'affaire Winterwerp, la Commission n'a pas tranchÃ© la question de savoir si l'absence ou le refus de traitement pouvait faire problÃ¨me au regard d'autre s
articles de la Convention . Selon lui, son maintien en dÃ©tention dans des conditions inapprop riÃ©es et uniquement pour des motifs de relations professionnelles, maintien provoquant une dÃ©tÃ© rioration nette et reconnue de son Ã©tat mental et prolongeant son internement, soulevait de graves problÃ¨mes sur le terrain de l'article 3 comme de l'article 5 . lus en liaison avec l'article 18 de la Convention . En outre, le requÃ©rant estime que son Ã©tat mental ne justifiait pas un internement forcÃ©, d'autant qu'il existait d'autres mÃ©thodes de traitement . Aucun des rapports Ã©tablis par les mÃ©decins aprÃ¨s octobre 1978 ne fait Ã©tat d'une probabilitÃ© de violence dans son comportement . Pour justifier un internement forcÃ©, le trouble dont souffre l'individu doit reprÃ©senter un danger clair et actuel . Or, il n'existait dans son cas aucun - danger rÃ©el . comme celui qu'exigeait le droit nÃ©erlandais examinÃ© dans l'affaire Winterwerp . La principale crainte des autoritÃ©s Ã©tait de voir le requÃ©rant interrompre son traitement une fois remis en libertÃ©, ce qui amÃ¨nerait une dÃ©tÃ©rioration de son Ã©tat . Pourtant, le requÃ©rant aurait pu Ãªtre libÃ©rÃ© Ã la condition de suivre un traitement ambulatoire et rÃ©internÃ© s'il ne remplissait pas cette condition . Le requÃ©rant fait Ã©galement observer qu'il a Ã©tÃ© internÃ© pendant onze ans sans jamais avoir manifestÃ© un comportement violent . c) Sur l'article 5, paragraphe 4, de la Conventio n Le requÃ©rant fait siennes les conclusions de la Commission dans l'affaire Winterwerp ( par . 90 du rappo rt ) et dans l'affaire X . c/Royaume-Uni ( requÃªte nÂ° 6998/75, par . 125 et suiv . du rappo rt ), selon lesquelles l'article 5, paragraphe 4, garantit le droit Ã un contrÃ´le ju ri dictionnel de la lÃ©galitÃ© matÃ© rielle et formelle de la dÃ©tention . Selon lui, l'argument du Gouvemement limiterait la portÃ©e du contrÃ´le judiciai re Ã la rÃ©gularitÃ© formelle de la premiÃ¨re ordonnance d'internement . Cependant, on ne voit pas logiquement pourquoi la . lÃ©galitÃ© - Ã contr0ler au regard de l'a rt icle 5, paragraphe 4, serait plus limitÃ©e que la â¢ rÃ©gularitÃ© . Ã vÃ© ri fier sur le terrain de l'a rt icle 5, paragraphe 1( e) . L'expression doit avoir le mÃªme sens aux paragraphes 1 et 4, de maniÃ¨re que tous les aspects de la p rivation de libe rtÃ© puissent Ãªtre soumis Ã un contrÃ´le . Comme le Gouvernement lui-mÃªme l'a dÃ©clarÃ© dans ses observations, l'action engagÃ©e par le requÃ©rant concernait la rÃ©gularitÃ© de son maintien en dÃ©tention Ã Broadmoor. Il prÃ©tendait que son internement dans cet Ã©tablissement Ã©tait contraire Ã Ia lÃ©gislation interne et Ã la Convention . En consÃ©quence, la procÃ©dure concemait bien la â¢ lÃ©galitÃ© - de la mise en Â¢uvre de la dÃ©tention et le requÃ©rant avait le droit d'accÃ¨s Ã un tribunal (arrÃªt Winterwerp, par . 60) . Au surplus, le grief du requÃ©rant n'Ã©tait pas analogue aux demandes d'exercice d'un pouvoir discrÃ©tionnaire telles que celles qui Ã©taient en jeu dans les Affaires de vagabondage puisque ce qu'il rÃ©clamait c'Ã©tait l'exÃ©cution d'une obligation lÃ©gale .
En consÃ©quence, que les allÃ©gations du requÃ©rant soient fondÃ©es ou non, la procÃ©dure concernait bien la lÃ©galitÃ© de la mise en Â¢uvre de sa dÃ©tention Ã Broadmoor. L'article 5, paragraphe 4, l'autorisait Ã faire trancher l'affaire par un tribunal mais il s'est vu refuser ce droit . Les tribunaux intemes ne se sont pas prononcÃ©s sur son grief relatif Ã la rÃ©gularitÃ© de son internement mais ont dÃ©clarÃ© en Ãªtre empÃªchÃ©s par une entrave Ã leur compÃ©tence . c) Sur l'article 6. paragraphe 1 . de la Convention Le requÃ©rant soutient que l'action qu'il avait engagÃ©e contre les autoritÃ©s emportait dÃ©cision sur une contestation relative Ã un â¢ droit de caractÃ¨re civil â¢ au sens de l'article 6, paragraphe 1 . Son grief Ã©tait en substance que les dÃ©fendeurs avaient Ã son Ã©gard une obligation lÃ©gale qu'ils n'avaient pas respectÃ©e, ce qui l'amenait ou l'amÃ¨nerait Ã subir une perte ou un dommage . A ses yeux, il est manifeste qu'une personne a le droit d'intenter une action en dommages-intÃ©rÃªts si, contrairement Ã la loi, elle reÃ§oit un traitement ou une surveillance mÃ©dicale inappropriÃ©s ou inexistants . 11 en va de mÃªme d'un traitement psychiatrique . Or, en droit anglais . la mÃ©connaissance d'une obligation lÃ©gale donne naissance Ã un droit de caractÃ¨re privÃ© . Le requÃ©rant rejette l'argument du Gouvemement selon lequel la loi relative au Service national de santÃ© ne lui confÃ©rait aucun droit de caractÃ¨re civil . Certes, l'obligation qui en dÃ©coule Ã©tait limitÃ©e en fonction des ressources disponibles, mais il est notoire que, dans son cas, les ressources nÃ©cessaires existaient bien . Le requÃ©rant rejette Ã©galement la thÃ¨se du Gouvemement selon laquelle sa libertÃ© n'aurait pas Ã©tÃ© en cause . En effet, dans la mesure oÃ¹ il Ã©tait obligÃ©, en pratique . de passer par un hÃ´pital psychiatrique local avant d'Ãªtre remis en libertÃ©, le fait de ne pas le transfÃ©rer retardait sa libÃ©ration finale . L'existence d'un droit de caractÃ¨re civil se dÃ©termine par rÃ©fÃ©rence aux principes gÃ©nÃ©raux du droit communs aux Etats membres du Conseil de l'Europe . A ce propos, on peut s'appuyer sur la jurisprudence de la Cour europÃ©enne de justice relative au fondement de la responsabilitÃ© extracontractuelle des CommunautÃ©s (1) . Dans ce genre d'affaires, le droit Ã rÃ©paration nÃ© d'une â¢ mÃ©connaissance suffisamment grave d'une rÃ¨gle de droit primordiale pour la protection de l'individu Â» est par sa nature-mÃªme un â¢ droit privÃ© â¢, mÃªme s'il est mis en cxuvre par la puissance publique dans l'exercice de sa souverainetÃ© . Dans l'action qu'il avait engagÃ©e, le requÃ©rant soutenait en substance que les mesures prises par les autoritÃ©s constituaient des mÃ©connaissances suffisamment graves des rÃ¨gles suivantes : le principe de la proportionnalitÃ©, le droit Ã la libertÃ© individuelle et le . droit d'Ãªtre protÃ©gÃ© contre ce qui est nuisible . . En consÃ©quence, l'action concernait bien la dÃ©termination d'un droit de caractÃ¨re civil . â¢ Bayerische HNL c. Conseil et Commission, arrÃªt du 25 mai 1978 ; Amylum c . Conseil et Commission, arrÃªt du 5 dÃ©cembre 1979 .
Le requÃ©rant reconnaÃ®t qu'en elles-mÃªmes, les dÃ©cisions administratives pertinentes ne devaient pas forcÃ©ment satisfaire Ã l'article 6, paragraphe 1, mais soutient que le grief qu'il en tire contenait bien - l'Ã©lÃ©ment juridique . Ã©voquÃ© par la Commission dans l'affaire Kaplan . L'argumentation dÃ©veloppÃ©e par le Gouvernement Ã cet Ã©gard vient prÃ©cisÃ©ment renforcer la mÃ©connaissance mÃªme dont se plaint le requÃ©rant . L'effet de l'article 141, paragraphe 1 de la loi de 1959 est d'enlever aux tribunaux compÃ©tence pour se prononcer sur certains types d'action civile, ce qui est le danger mÃªme Ã©voquÃ© par la Cour au paragraphe 34 de son arrÃªt dans l'affaire Golder . Le requÃ©rant a soutenu que les autoritÃ©s n'Ã©taient pas habilitÃ©es Ã agir comme elles l'ont fait, ce que les tribunaux n'ont pas constatÃ© non plus . Simplement, l'article 141 leur a Ã´tÃ© la compÃ©tence de connaitre de la question de fond . L'action menÃ©e devant les juridictions internes ne rÃ©pondait pas au droit du requÃ©rant de voir son grief tranchÃ© par un tribunal puisqu'elle a Ã©tÃ© Ã©cartÃ©e au motif que le tribunal n'Ã©tait pas compÃ©tent pour en connaÃ®tre . Le requÃ©rant admet qu'il peut y avoir des limites au contrÃ´le juridictionnel de l'exercice de pouvoirs discrÃ©tionnaires, mais l'essentiel de son grief n'Ã©tait pas que les autoritÃ©s avaient pris une mauvaise dÃ©cision quant au fond, mais qu'elles avaient agi illÃ©galement . L'article 141 de la loi de 1959 empÃªche d'engager une action comme celle que le requÃ©rant a tentÃ©e, si nÃ©gligence ou mauvaise foi ne sont pas allÃ©guÃ©es . Pareille mesure ne saurait se justifier par la nÃ©cessitÃ© de protÃ©ger les mÃ©decins et le reste du personnel mÃ©dical contre l'abus des procÃ©dures judiciaires. Du reste, il existe des moyens d'Ã©carter les actions abusives et il faudrait normalement aussi obtenir l'aide judiciaire . Enfin, le requÃ©rant observe qu'il n'est pas nÃ©cessaire Ã la Commission de se prononcer sur le bien-fondÃ© du grief qu'il cherchait Ã faire valoir devant les tribunaux internes . Ceux-ci ont en effet rejetÃ© sa demande conformÃ©ment Ã l'article 141 en admettant l'hypothÃ¨se que sa prÃ©tention Ã©tait fondÃ©e en droit mais que les tribunaux n'avaient nÃ©anmoins pas compÃ©tence pour en connaÃ®tre .
EN DROIT Le requÃ©rant s'est plaint de son internement Ã l'hÃ´pital de Broadmoor et du rejet, conformÃ©ment Ã l'article 141 de la loi de 1959 sur la santÃ© mentale, de l'action qu'il avait intentÃ©e contre l'AutoritÃ© sanitaire locale et le MinistÃ¨re de la SantÃ© et de la SÃ©curitÃ© sociale . Il a invoquÃ© l'article 5, paragraphes 1 et 4, et l'article 6, paragraphe 1, de la Convention et laissÃ© entendre, au cours de son argumentation, que des problÃ¨mes pourraient aussi se poser sur le terrain des articles 3 . 17 et 18 de la Convention . Le Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur a soutenu, quant Ã lui, que la requÃªte est irrecevable pour dÃ©faut manifeste d e
fondement ou, en ce qui concerne le grief tirÃ© de l'article 6, paragraphe 1 . de la Convention, pour incompatibilitÃ© ratione materiae avec celle-ci . AprÃ¨s avoir procÃ©dÃ© Ã un premier examen de l'argumentation des parties, la Commission estime que la requÃªte pose un certain nombre de questions importantes au regard de la Convention . En particulier, se pose la question essentielle de savoir si l'internement du requÃ©rant Ã l'hÃ´pital de Broadmoor entre octobre 1978 (date Ã laquelle le mÃ©decin traitant signala que le malade pouvait Ãªtre transfÃ©rÃ©) et le 1Â° , octobre 1980 (date de son transfert Ã l'hÃ´pital d'Oakwood) Ã©tait compatible avec l'article 5, paragraphe l, de la Convention . Il importe de dÃ©terminer si l'internement Ã Broadmoor pendant cette pÃ©riode Ã©tait une . dÃ©tention rÃ©guliÃ¨re ., au sens de l'article 5, paragraphe 1, compte tenu du grief formulÃ© par le requÃ©rant selon lequel les autoritÃ©s ont mÃ©connu leur obligation lÃ©gale de lui fournir un hÃ©bergement dans une autre catÃ©gorie d'Ã©tablissement et donc agi contrairement Ã la loi en le maintenant internÃ© Ã Broadmoor . A cet Ã©gard, une importante question se pose qui conceme l'interprÃ©tation de l'article 5 : cette disposition demande-t-elle seulement que la dÃ©tention en tant que telle soit . rÃ©guliÃ¨re . ou exige-t-elle - et si oui, jusqu'Ã quel point - que les mesures prises pour exÃ©cuter une dÃ©cision d'internement concernant par exemple un transfert ou le choix du lieu d'internement, soient elles aussi . rÃ©guliÃ¨res . ? La Commission estime qu'il se pose Ã©galement d'autres questions de fond sur le terrain des articles 5, paragraphe 4, et 6, paragraphe 1, de la Convention . Il Ã©chet notamment d'examiner si l'action que le requÃ©rant a intentÃ©e contre le MinistÃ¨re de la SantÃ© et de la SÃ©curitÃ© sociale et contre l'AutoritÃ© sanitaire locale concernait la . lÃ©galitÃ© de la dÃ©tention ., au sens de l'article 5, paragraphe 4, de la Convention, ou ses . droits et obligations de caractÃ¨re civil . au sens de l'article 6, paragraphe 1, et, dans l'affirmative, si le rejet de sa demande emportait mÃ©connaissance de l'une ou l'autre de ces dispositions . La Commission estime en consÃ©quence que les griefs du requÃ©rant ne sauraient Ã©tre qualifiÃ©s de manifestement mal fondÃ©s ou incompatibles avec la Convention . Aucun autre motif d'irrecevabilitÃ© n'Ã©tant apparu, la requ@te doit Ãªtre dÃ©clarÃ©e recevable . Par ces motifs, la Commissio n
- 36 -Origine de la décision Pays : Conseil de l'EuropeJuridiction : Cour européenne des droits de l'hommeFormation : Cour (chambre)Date de la décision : 05/02/1982Fonds documentaire : HUDOC Haut de page

References: l'article 62
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 l'article 41
 l'article 13
 l'article 90
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 l'article 141
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 l'article 65
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 l'article 65
 l'article 5
 l'article 6
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 l'article 141
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 l'article 26
 l'article 141
 l'article 6
 l'article 50
 l'article 42
 l'article 5
 l'article 42
 l'article 5
 l'article 5
 l'article 5
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 l'article 60
 l'article 3
 l'article 3
 l'article 141
 l'article 6
 l'article 6
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 l'article 141
 l'article 6
 l'article 5
 l'article 5
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 l'article 5
 l'article 3
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 l'article 18
 l'article 5
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 l'article 6
 l'article 6
 l'article 6
 l'article 141
 l'article 141
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 l'article 141
 l'article 141
 l'article 5
 l'article 6
 l'article 6
 l'article 5
 l'article 5
 l'article 5
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