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Justia › US Law › US Case Law › US Supreme Court › Volume 428 › Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co.
"when pneumoconiosis prevents him from engaging in gainful employment requiring the skills and abilities comparable to those of any employment in a mine or mines in which he previously engaged with some regularity and over a substantial period of time,"
did not arise out of, or in connection with, employment in a coal mine."
A number of operators brought this suit claiming that the Act is unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment insofar as it requires benefit payments with respect to miners who left mine employment before the Act's effective date; that the statutory definitions, presumptions, and limitations on rebuttal evidence unconstitutionally impair the operator's ability to defend against benefit claims; and that certain regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Labor regarding the apportionment of liability for benefits among operators are inconsistent with the Act, and unconstitutional. The District Court upheld each challenged provision as constitutional, with two exceptions: (1) It held § 411(c)(3) unconstitutional as an unreasonable and arbitrary legislative finding of total disability "in terms other than those provided by the Act as standards for total disability." (2) Reading the evidence limitation on rebuttal in § 411(c)(4) to apply to an operator's defense in a § 415 transition period case, the court held the limitation arbitrary and unreasonable in not permitting a rebuttal showing that the case of pneumoconiosis afflicting the miner was not disabling. And, taking the provision to mean that an operator may defend against liability only on the ground that pneumoconiosis did not arise out of employment in any coal mine (rather than in a coal mine for which the operator was responsible), the District Court found the provision an arbitrary and unreasonable limitation on rebuttal evidence relevant and proper under § 422(c). The court enjoined the Secretary of Labor from seeking to apply the two provisions thus found unconstitutional.
1. This Court's summary affirmance in National Independent Coal Operators Assn. v. Brennan, 419 U.S. 955, did not foreclose the District Court's rulings regarding §§ 411(c)(3) and (4), which were not before the Court on that appeal. P. 428 U. S. 14.
2. The challenged provisions do not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Pp. 428 U. S. 14-38.
the operator's profits. Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton R. Co., 295 U. S. 330, distinguished. Pp. 428 U. S. 14-20, 428 U. S. 24-27.
(b) Though the operators contend that the § 402(f) definition of total disability is arbitrary because former miners who might be employable in other lines of work are compensated, a miner disabled under § 402(f)'s standards has suffered health impairment, and has been rendered unable to perform the work to which he has adapted himself, factors which afford a rational basis for compensation. P. 428 U. S. 21.
(c) The effect of § 411(c)(3)'s "irrebuttable presumption" of total disability -- to establish entitlement where a miner is clinically diagnosable as extremely ill with pneumoconiosis arising out of coal mine employment -- is clearly permissible, and the provision, being part of a statute regulating purely economic matters, is not rendered invalid by Congress' choice of statutory language. Pp. 428 U. S. 22-24.
(d) The presumptions in §§ 411(c)(1) and (2) are valid because there is a "rational connection between the fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed," Mobile, J. & K. C. R. Co. v. Turnipseed, 219 U. S. 35, 219 U. S. 43. In view of the medical evidence before Congress indicating the noticeable incidence of pneumoconiosis in cases of miners with 10 years' mine employment, it was not "purely arbitrary" for Congress to select the 10-year figure as a reference point for the presumptions; nor are the 10-year presumptions arbitrary because they fail to account for varying degrees of exposure. Pp. 428 U. S. 27-30.
(e) The 15-year durational basis of the presumption in § 411(c)(4) is likewise unassailable, particularly in light of medical testimony in the Senate Hearings on the 1969 Act. Pp. 428 U. S. 30-31.
(f) Congress had evidence showing doubts about the reliability of negative X-ray evidence as indicating the absence of the disease. That, through its adoption of § 413(b), Congress ultimately resolved those doubts in the disabled miner's favor does not render that provision arbitrary. Pp. 428 U. S. 31-34.
(g) The District Court improperly invalidated the limitation on evidence contained in § 411(c)(4) because the limitation is inapplicable to operators, and applies only to the Secretary of HEW. Thus the Act does not restrict the evidence with which an operator may rebut the § 411(c)(4) presumption. Pp. 428 U. S. 34-37.
385 F.Supp. 424, affirmed in part; reversed in part; vacated and remanded in part.
MARSHALL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BRENNAN, WHITE, and BLACKMUN, JJ., joined; in all but Part IV of which POWELL, J., joined; and in all but Part V-D of which STEWART and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. POWELL, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment in part, post, p. 428 U. S. 3. STEWART, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which REHNQUIST, J., joined, post, p. 428 U. S. 45. BURGER, C.J., concurred in the judgment. STEVENS, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the cases.
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, who are responsible for the administration of the Act and the promulgation of regulations under the Act.
On cross-motions for summary judgment, a three-judge District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky, convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2282 and 2284, found the amended Act constitutional on its face, except in regard to two provisions concerning the determination of a miner's total disability due to pneumoconiosis. The court enjoined the Secretary of Labor from further application of those two provisions. 385 F.Supp. 424 (1974). After granting a stay of the three-judge court's order, 421 U.S. 944 (1975), we noted probable jurisdiction of the cross-appeals. 421 U.S. 1010 (1975). We conclude that the amended Act, as interpreted, is constitutionally sound against the Operators' challenges.
pneumoconiosis) is generally diagnosed on the basis of X-ray opacities indicating nodular lesions on the lungs of a patient with a long history of coal dust exposure. As the Surgeon General has stated, however, post mortem examination data have indicated a greater prevalence of the disease than X-ray diagnosis reveals.
stage, its symptoms may become apparent only after a miner has left the coal mines.
In order to curb the incidence of pneumoconiosis, Congress provided in Title II of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, § 201 et seq., 30 U.S.C. § 841 et seq., for limits on the amount of dust to be permitted in the ambient air of coal mines. Additionally, in view of the then-established prevalence of irreversible pneumoconiosis among miners, and the insufficiency of state compensation programs, Congress passed Title IV of the 1969 Act, § 401 et seq., 30 U.S.C. § 901 et seq., to provide benefits to afflicted miners and their survivors. These benefit provisions were subsequently broadened by the Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972. 30 U.S.C. § 901 et seq. (1970 ed., Supp. IV).
under. § 415 of Part B, 30 U.S.C. § 925 (1970 ed., Supp. IV), by the Secretary of Labor. The United States is responsible for payment of these claims until December 31, 1973. Responsible operators, having been notified of a claim and entitled to participate in a hearing thereon, are thereafter liable for benefits as if the claim had been filed pursuant to Part C and § 422 had been applicable to the operator.
"when pneumoconiosis prevents him from engaging in gainful employment requiring the skills and abilities comparable to those of any employment in a mine or mines in which he previously engaged with some regularity and over a substantial period of time."
shown by X-ray or other clinical evidence to be afflicted with complicated pneumoconiosis is "irrebuttably presumed" to be totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis; if he has died, it is irrebuttably presumed that he was totally disabled by pneumoconiosis at the time of his death, and that his death was due to pneumoconiosis. 30 U.S.C. § 921(c)(3) (1970 ed., Supp. IV). In any event, the presumption operates conclusively to establish entitlement to benefits.
may rebut [this latter] presumption only by establishing that (A) such miner does not, or did not, have pneumoconiosis, or that (b) his respiratory or pulmonary impairment did not arise out of, or in connection with, employment in a coal mine."
In initiating this suit against the defendant Secretaries (hereafter Federal Parties), the Operators contended that the amended Act is unconstitutional insofar as it requires the payment of benefits with respect to miners who left employment in the industry before the effective date of the Act; that the Act's definitions, presumptions, and limitations on rebuttal evidence unconstitutionally impair the operators' ability to defend against benefit claims; and that certain regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Labor regarding the apportionment of liability for benefits among operators, and the provision of medical benefits, are inconsistent with the Act, and constitutionally defective.
The three-judge District Court held that all issues as to the validity of the challenged regulations were within the jurisdiction of a single district judge, and the court entered an order so remanding them. 385 F.Supp. at 426. The District Court upheld each challenged statutory provision as constitutional, with two exceptions. First, the District Court held that § 411(c)(3)'s irrebuttable presumption is unconstitutional as an unreasonable and arbitrary legislative finding of total disability "in terms other than those provided by the Act as standards for total disability." 385 F.Supp. at 430. Second, reading the limitation on evidence in rebuttal to § 411(c)(4)'s presumption of total disability due to pneumoconiosis to apply to an operator's defense in a § 415 transition period case, the District Court found that limitation unconstitutional in two respects. It held the limitation arbitrary and unreasonable in not permitting a rebuttal showing that the case of pneumoconiosis afflicting the miner was not disabling. 385 F.Supp. at 430. And taking the provision to mean that an operator may defend against liability only on the ground that the pneumoconiosis did not arise out of employment in any coal mine, rather than on the ground that it did not arise out of employment in a coal mine for which the operator was responsible, the District Court found the provision an unreasonable and arbitrary limitation on rebuttal evidence relevant and proper under § 422(c), 30 U.S.C. § 932(c). 385 F.Supp. at 430-431. The District Court accordingly entered an order declaring unconstitutional, and enjoining the Secretary of Labor from seeking to apply, § 411(c)(3)'s irrebuttable presumption and § 411(c)(4)'s limitation on rebuttable evidence.
The Operators' appeal, No. 74-1316, reasserts the constitutional challenges rejected by the District Court.
The appeal of the Federal Parties, No. 74-1302, seeks reversal of the declaration and injunction respecting the constitutionality of § § 411(c)(3) and (4). Neither side here questions the District Court's decision not to address the issues raised with respect to the Secretary of Labor's regulations. As we have already noted, we uphold the statute against all the constitutional contentions properly presented here. Because we read the limitation on rebuttal evidence in § 411(c)(4) as inapplicable to the Operators, however, we vacate that portion of the District Court's order which invalidates that limitation.
The Federal Parties direct our attention initially to National Independent Coal Operators Assn. v. Brennan, 372 F.Supp. 16 (DC), summarily aff'd, 419 U.S. 955 (1974), which raised a number of issues identical to those presented here. Our summary affirmance in that case did not foreclose the District Court's determination of unconstitutionality regarding §§ 411(c)(3) and (4), those issues not having been before us on the appeal. Several questions presented here -- most notably those of retroactivity and preclusion of sole reliance on X-ray testimony evidence -- were raised and decided in National Independent Coal Operators Assn. v. Brennan, but, having heard oral argument and entertained full briefing on these issues together with the other questions raised in the case, we proceed to treat them here more fully. Cf. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 415 U. S. 670-671 (1974).
and the survivors of such employees. [Footnote 13] The Operators accept the liability imposed upon them to compensate employees working in coal mines now and in the future who are disabled by pneumoconiosis; and they recognize Congress' power to create a program for compensation of disabled inactive coal miners. But the Operators complain that to impose liability upon them for former employees' disabilities is impermissibly to charge them with an unexpected liability for past, completed acts that were legally proper and, at least in part, unknown to be dangerous at the time.
It is by now well established that legislative Acts adjusting the burdens and benefits of economic life come to the Court with a presumption of constitutionality, and that the burden is on one complaining of a due process violation to establish that the legislature has acted in an arbitrary and irrational way. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U. S. 726 (1963); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U. S. 483, 348 U. S. 487-488 (1955). And this Court long ago upheld against due process attack the competence of Congress to allocate the interlocking economic rights and duties of employers and employees upon workmen's compensation principles analogous to those enacted here, regardless of contravening arrangements between employer and employee. New York Central R. Co. v. White, 243 U. S. 188 (1917); see also Philadelphia, B. & W. R. Co. v. Schubert, 224 U. S. 603 (1912).
before the date of enactment, the Act has some retrospective effect -- although, as we have noted, the Act imposed no liability on operators until 1974. [Footnote 14] And it may be that the liability imposed by the Act for disabilities suffered by former employees was not anticipated at the time of actual employment. [Footnote 15] But our cases are clear that legislation readjusting rights and burdens is not unlawful solely because it upsets otherwise settled expectations. See Fleming v. Rhodes, 331 U. S. 100 (1947); Carpenter v. Wabash R. Co., 309 U. S. 23 (1940); Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 294 U. S. 240 (1935); Home Bldg. & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398 (1934); Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Mottley, 219 U. S. 467 (1911). This is true even though the effect of the legislation is to impose a new duty or liability based on past acts. See Lichter v. United States, 334 U. S. 742 (1948); Welch v. Henry, 305 U. S. 134 (1938); Funkhouser v. Preston Co., 290 U. S. 163 (1933).
It does not follow, however, that what Congress can legislate prospectively it can legislate retrospectively.
(1975), or blameworthiness, cf. ibid.; De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U. S. 144, 363 U. S. 160 (1960).
We find, however, that the imposition of liability for the effects of disabilities bred in the past is justified as a rational measure to spread the costs of the employees' disabilities to those who have profited from the fruits of their labor -- the operators and the coal consumers. The Operators do not challenge Congress' power to impose the burden of past mine working conditions on the industry. They do claim, however, that the Act spreads costs in an arbitrary and irrational manner by basing liability upon past employment relationships, rather than taxing all coal mine operators presently in business. The Operators note that a coal mine operator whose workforce has declined may be faced with a total liability that is disproportionate to the number of miners currently employed. And they argue that the liability scheme gives an unfair competitive advantage to new entrants into the industry, who are not saddled with the burden of compensation for inactive miners' disabilities. In essence, the Operators contend that competitive forces will prevent them from effectively passing on to the consumer the costs of compensation for inactive miners' disabilities, and will unfairly leave the burden on the early operators alone.
wisdom of Congress' chosen scheme by examining the degree to which the "cost savings" enjoyed by operators in the preenactment period produced "excess" profits, or the degree to which the retrospective liability imposed on the early operators can now be passed on to the consumer. It is enough to say that the Act approaches the problem of cost spreading rationally; whether a broader cost-spreading scheme would have been wiser or more practical under the circumstances is not a question of constitutional dimension. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. at 372 U. S. 730-732; Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. at 348 U. S. 488.
The Operators ultimately rest their due process argument on Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton R. Co., 295 U. S. 330 (1935), in which the Court found the Railroad Retirement Act of 1934 to be unconstitutional. Among the provisions specifically invalidated as arbitrary was a provision for employer-financed pensions for former employees who, though not in the employ of the railroads at the time of enactment, had been so employed within the year. Assuming that the portion of Alton invalidating this provision retains vitality, [Footnote 18] we find it distinguishable from this case. The point of the black lung benefit provisions is not simply to increase or supplement a former employee's salary to meet his generalized need for funds. Rather, the purpose of the Act is to satisfy a specific need created by the dangerous conditions under which the former employee labored -- to allocate to the mine operator an actual, measurable cost of his business.
former employees death or disability due to pneumoconiosis arising out of employment in its mines, even if the former employee terminated his employment in the industry before the Act was passed.
We turn next to a consideration of the Operators' challenge to the "presumptions" and evidentiary rules governing adjudications of compensable disability under the Act.
"prevents him from engaging in gainful employment requiring the skills and abilities comparable to those of any employment in a mine or mines in which he previously engaged with some regularity and over a substantial period of time. [Footnote 19]"
the final stage of the disease is always compensable if its existence can be shown by positive clinical evidence, and that any stage of the disease is compensable when physically disabling under the terms of § 402(f). The Operators maintain that both of these standards are constitutionally untenable.
The Operators contend that the definition of "total disability" set up in § 402(f) is unconstitutionally arbitrary and irrational, because it provides for the compensation of former miners who might well be employable in other lines of work, and who therefore are not truly disabled by their mining-generated afflictions. We think it patent that this attack on § 402(f) must fail. A miner disabled under § 402(f) standards has suffered in at least two ways: his health is impaired and he has been rendered unable to perform the kind of work to which he has adapted himself. Whether these interferences merit compensation is a public policy matter left primarily to the determination of the legislature. Cf. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U. S. 484 (1974). We cannot say that they are so insignificant as not to be a rational basis for compensation. Indeed, we long ago upheld against similar attack a workmen's compensation scheme providing benefits for injuries not depriving the employee of his ability to work. See New York Central R. Co. v. Bianc, 250 U. S. 596 (1919); cf. Urie v. Thompson, 337 U. S. 163, 337 U. S. 181-187 (1949).
"forecloses all fact finding as to the effect of that disease upon a particular coal miner. . . . To the extent that such presumption purports to making a finding of total disability in terms other than those provided by [§ 402(f)] as standards for total disability, it is unreasonable and arbitrary. As written, section [411(c)(3)] is violative of due process in precluding the opportunity to present evidence as to the effect of a chronic dust disease upon an individual in determining whether or not he is disabled."
385 F.Supp. at 429-430. We think the District Court erred in equating this case with those in the mold of Stanley and Vlandis.
purely economic matters, we do not think that Congress' choice of statutory language can invalidate the enactment when its operation and effect are clearly permissible. Cf. Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S. 749, 422 U. S. 767-785 (1975); McDonald v. Board of Election, 394 U. S. 802, 394 U. S. 809 (1969); United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144, 304 U. S. 154 (1938).
business, the avoidance of which might be thought to have enlarged the operator's profits. The damage resulting from a miner's death that is due to causes other than the operator's conduct can hardly be termed a "cost" of the operator's business.
In the case of a miner who died with, but not from, pneumoconiosis before the Act was passed, the benefits serve as deferred compensation for the suffering endured by his dependents by virtue of his illness. And in the case of a miner who died with, but not from, pneumoconiosis after the Act was passed, the benefits serve an additional purpose: the miner's knowledge that his dependent survivors would receive benefits serves to compensate him for the suffering he endures. In short, § 411(c)(3)'s presumption of death due to pneumoconiosis authorizes compensation for injury attributable to the operator's business, and, viewed as such, it poses no retroactivity problems distinct from those considered in our prior discussion.
Turning our attention to the statutory regulations of proof of § 402(f) disability, we focus initially on the Operators' challenge to the presumptions contained in §§ 411(c)(1) and (2). Section 411(c)(1) provides that a coal miner with 10 years' employment in the mines who suffers from pneumoconiosis will be presumed to have contracted the disease from his employment. [Footnote 26] Section 411(c)(2) provides that, if a coal miner with 10 years' employment in the mines dies from a respiratory disease, his death will be presumed to have been due to pneumoconiosis. [Footnote 27] Each presumption is explicitly rebuttable, and the effect of each is simply to shift the burden of going forward with evidence from the claimant to the operator. See Fed.Rule Evid. 301.
"That a legislative presumption of one fact from evidence of another may not constitute a denial of due process of law or a denial of the equal protection of the law, it is only essential that there shall be some rational connection between the fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed and that the inference of one fact from proof of another shall not be so unreasonable as to be a purely arbitrary mandate."
United States v. Gainey, 380 U. S. 63, 380 U. S. 67 (1965).
beyond Congress' authority to refer to exposure factors in establishing a presumption that throws the burden of going forward on the operators. And in view of the medical evidence before Congress indicating the noticeable incidence of pneumoconiosis in cases of miners with 10 years' employment in the mines, [Footnote 28] we cannot say that it was "purely arbitrary" for Congress to select the 10-year figure as a point of reference for these presumptions. No greater mathematical precision is required. Cf. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61, 220 U. S. 78 (1911).
to the exclusion of the degree of dust exposure and other relevant factors, as signaling the point at which the operator must come forward with evidence of the cause of pneumoconiosis or death, as the case may be. We certainly cannot say that the presumptions, by excluding other relevant factors, operate in a "purely arbitrary" manner. Mobile, J. & K. C. R. Co. v. Turnipseed, supra at 219 U. S. 43.
in light of the Surgeon General's testimony at the Senate hearings on the 1969 Act to the effect that the 15-year point marks the beginning of linear increase in the prevalence of the disease with years spent underground, [Footnote 30] we think it clear that the durational basis of this presumption is equally unassailable.
The Operators also challenge § 413(b) of the Act, which provides that "no claim for benefits . . . shall be denied solely on the basis of the results of a chest roentgenogram [X-ray]." [Footnote 31] Congress, of course, has plenary authority over the promulgation of evidentiary rules for the federal courts. See, e.g., Hawkins v. United States, 358 U. S. 74, 358 U. S. 78 (1958); Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. at 319 U. S. 467; cf. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., supra at 220 U. S. 81. The Operators contend, however, that § 413(b) denies them due process because X-ray evidence is frequently the sole evidence they can marshal to rebut a claim of pneumoconiosis. [Footnote 32] We conclude that, given Congress' reasoned reservations regarding the reliability of negative X-ray evidence, it was entitled to preclude exclusive reliance on such evidence.
of exposure to coal dust, or the likelihood that the miner is disabled by some other cause. [Footnote 36] The prohibition is only against sole reliance upon negative X-ray evidence in rejecting a claim.
an cull conclusions from it." United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. at 380 U. S. 67. It is sufficient that the evidence before Congress showed doubts about the reliability of negative X-ray evidence. That Congress ultimately determined "to resolve doubts in favor of the disabled miner" [Footnote 38] does not render the enactment arbitrary under the standard of rationality appropriate to this legislation.
"[t]he Secretary may rebut [the presumption provided herein] only by establishing that (A) such miner does not, or did not, have pneumoconiosis, or that (b) his respiratory or pulmonary impairment did not arise out of, or in connection with, employment in a coal mine."
pneumoconiosis was mild, and did not cause the disability -- that the disability was wholly a product of other disease, such as tuberculosis or emphysema. Disability due to these diseases, as the Operators note, is not otherwise compensable under the Act.
The District Court, concluding that the quoted limitation on rebuttal evidence applied against an operator in a § 415 transition period case, and recognizing that pneumoconiosis is not inherently disabling in the § 402(f) sense, judged this limitation unconstitutional on the ground that it deprived an operator of a factual defense that the miner is not "totally disabled" due to pneumoconiosis under § 402(f). Additionally, reading the second part of the § 411(c)(4) limitation on rebuttal to preclude an operator's defense that the disease did not arise out of employment in the particular mines for which it was responsible, the District Court found this aspect of § 411(c)(4) unconstitutional as well.
"shall be bound by the determination of the Secretary of Labor [on a § 415 transition period claim] as if the claim had been filed pursuant to part C."
§ 411(c)(4) presumption. Accordingly, we vacate the order of the District Court declaring the § 411(c)(4) limitation on rebuttal evidence unconstitutional and enjoining the Secretary of Labor from limiting evidence in rebuttal to the § 411(c)(4) presumption. Cf. Van Lare v. Hurley, 421 U. S. 338, 421 U. S. 344 (1975); United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U. S. 36 (1950).
In sum, the challenged provisions, as construed, are constitutionally sound against the Operators' facial attack. The judgment of the District Court as appealed from in No. 74-1316 is affirmed. The judgment of the District Court as appealed from in No. 74-1302 is reversed, except insofar as it declares unconstitutional, and enjoins the operation of, the limitation on rebuttal evidence contained in § 411(c)(4) of the Act. In this latter respect, the judgment in No. 74-1302 is vacated, and the case remanded with directions to dismiss.
* Together with No. 74-1316, Turner Elkhorn Mining Co. et al. v. Usery, Secretary of Labor, et al., also on appeal from the same court.
The House and Senate Reports on the 1969 Act placed the number of afflicted active and retired miners at 100,000. S.Rep. No. 91-411, p. 6 (1969), and H.R.Rep. No. 91-563, p. 17 (1969). The Senate Report, supra at 7, specified that, on the basis of X-ray examination, the disease rat was 10% for then-active coal miners, and 20% for inactive coal miners. Other estimates have run significantly higher. See, e.g., Hearings on S. 355 before the Subcommittee on Labor of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, p. 641 (1969).
Coal workers' pneumoconiosis is a distinct clinical entity, and is not the only type of pneumoconiosis. The remarks of the Surgeon General, reproduced in H.R.Rep. No. 91-563, supra at 15, indicate that the pathological condition of pneumoconiosis may also be caused by inhalation of other dusty materials, such as cotton fibers or silica.
S.Rep. No. 91-411, supra at 7-8; H.R.Rep. No. 91-563, supra at 15-16.
There was evidence before Congress that the complicated stage of the disease is sometimes exhibited with "mild pulmonary function changes and little or no disability." Hearings on S. 355, supra, n. 1, at 858.
As of December 31, 1974, 556,200 claims had been filed under Part B of the law. As of that date, with all but 400 cases decided, 509,900 individuals had established eligibility as black lung beneficiaries under the Act. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Fifth Annual Report to Congress on the Administration of Part B of Title IV of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, p. 3 (1975).
The individual claimant is entitled to benefits at a rate equal to 50% of the minimum monthly payment to which a totally disabled federal employee in Grade GS-2 is entitled. § 412(a)(1), 30 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1). At current rates, the individual claimant's entitlement is $196.80 per month, or $2,361.60 per year. 40 Fed.Reg. 56886-56887 (1975); see 20 CFR § 410.510 (1975). These basic benefits are increased if the claimant has dependents; the maximum increase of 100% is available if the claimant has three or more dependents. § 412(a)(4), 30 U.S.C. § 922(a)(4) (1970 ed., Supp. IV). See also 30 U.S.C. §§ 922(a)(3), (5) (1970 ed., Supp. IV). Thus, the maximum in benefits to which a claimant could be entitled is $393.60 per month, or $4,723.20 per year. Benefits under Part C are reduced to account for certain alternative income. § 422(g), 30 U.S.C. § 932(g). In addition to these monthly benefits, the operators are responsible for claimants' medical expenses. See § 422(a), 30 U.S.C. § 932(a) (1970 ed., Supp. IV), incorporating 33 U.S.C. § 907 (1970 ed., Supp. IV).
"The term 'total disability' has the meaning given it by regulations of the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, except that such regulations shall provide that a miner shall be considered totally disabled when pneumoconiosis prevents him from engaging in gainful employment requiring the skills and abilities comparable to those of any employment in a mine or mines in which he previously engaged with some regularity and over a substantial period of time. Such regulations shall not provide more restrictive criteria than those applicable under section 423(d) of Title 42."
The Act defines "pneumoconiosis" as "a chronic dust disease of the lung arising out of employment in a coal mine." § 402(b), 30 U.S.C. § 902(b) (1970 ed., Supp. IV).
These presumptions are applicable directly to Part B adjudications by the Secretary of HEW, and indirectly to transition period and Part C adjudications by the Secretary of Labor by operation of §§ 422(h) and 411(b), 30 U.S.C. §§ 932(h) and 921(b) (1970 ed. and Supp. IV). See S.Rep. No. 92-743, p. 21 (1972). See also §§ 422(f)(2), 430, 30 U.S.C. §§ 932(f)(2), 940 (1970 ed., Supp. IV).
The use of this presumption in Part C adjudications is limited in some regards not significant in this case. See §§ 422(f)(2), 430, 30 U.S.C. §§ 932(f)(2), 940 (1970 ed., Supp. IV).
"[t]he amendments made by the Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972 to part B . . . shall, to the extent appropriate, also apply [with limitations not relevant here] to . . . part [C]."
The legislative history, moreover, makes clear that the § 413(b) limitation on use of X-ray evidence, enacted as § 4(f) of the 1972 Act, was intended to apply to Part C claims as well as Part B claims, see H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 92-1048, p. 9 (1972), and the Operators so concede. Brief for Operators 21.
For simplicity of discussion, we will generally refer to claims as though presented by the miner himself, although they may, in fact, be maintained upon death by a survivor. Neither the District Court nor the parties have distinguished miners' claims from survivors' claims under the constitutional attacks raised in this case.
The Federal Parties suggest that, since a claim for benefits under Part C must be filed within three years of the discovery of total disability due to pneumoconiosis (or the date of death), § 422(f)(1), 30 U.S.C. § 932(f)(1) (1970 ed., Supp. IV), the operators will not ordinarily be liable for any disabilities maturing before enactment of their responsibility. See also § 422(f)(2), 30 U.S.C. § 932(f)(2) (1970 ed., Supp. IV). This does not hold true, however, for non-underground operators, since Part C liability did not apply to them until 1972. See Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972, § 3, 86 Stat. 153, amending §§ 401, 402(b), (d), 411(c)(1), (2), 422(a), (h), 423(a), 30 U.S.C. §§ 901, 902(b), (d), 921(c)(1), (2), 932(a), (h), 933(a) (1970 ed., Supp. IV). In any event, we think the point unnecessary to our conclusion.
The Operators have not contended, however, that the Act is constitutionally defective insofar as it requires them to provide compensation for present employees whose disabilities may stem from exposure that was terminated before enactment of the Act.
Whether or not a person who could have anticipated the potential liability attaching to his chosen course of conduct would have avoided the liability by altering his conduct has been significant in at least one line of cases in this Court. In Welch v. Henry, 305 U. S. 134 (1938), the Court upheld against a due process attack a state statute enacted in 1935 taxing 1933 dividend income that the 1933 taxing statute had explicitly exempted. Adopting the view that a stockholder would have continued to receive corporate dividends even if he knew that the dividends would subsequently be taxed, the Court distinguished prior cases invalidating the retroactive taxation of gifts on the ground that the donor might have refrained from making the gift had he anticipated the tax. Id. at 305 U. S. 147-148. But see Carpenter v. Wabash R. Co., 309 U. S. 23 (1940); Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Mottley, 219 U. S. 467 (1911).
Coal miner's pneumoconiosis was recognized in Great Britain as early as 1943. It was not generally recognized in the United States as an entity distinct from silicosis until the 1950's. S.Rep. No. 91-411, p.8 (1969).
Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, joined by Justices Brandeis, Stone, and Cardozo, dissented from the Court's invalidating the Railroad Retirement Act altogether, but agreed with the Court that the provision for allowances to former employees was arbitrary. 295 U.S. at 295 U. S. 374, 295 U. S. 389.
For the full text of § 402(f), see n 9, supra.
"[I]f a miner is suffering or suffered from a chronic dust disease of the lung which (A) when diagnosed by chest roentgenogram, yields one or more large opacities (greater than one centimeter in diameter) and would be classified in category A, B, or C in the International Classification of Radiographs of the Pneumoconioses by the International Labor Organization, (b) when diagnosed by biopsy or autopsy, yields massive lesions in the lung, or (C) when diagnosis is made by other means, would be a condition which could reasonably be expected to yield results described in clause (A) or (B) if diagnosis had been made in the manner prescribed in clause (A) or (B), then there shall be an irrebuttable presumption that he is totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis or that his death was due to pneumoconiosis or that at the time of his death he was totally disabled by pneumoconiosis, as the case may be."
"[shall] be applicable to each operator of a coal mine . . . with respect to death or total disability due to pneumoconiosis arising out of employment in such mine."
The original House and Senate bills that gave rise to the Conference bill enacted as Title IV of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 each provided for compensation only for complicated pneumoconiosis. H.R. 13950, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., §§ 112(b)(1), (7)(B), as it passed the House, 115 Cong.Rec. 32061 (1969), continued the diagnostic criteria presently embodied in § 411(c)(3), and deemed complicated pneumoconiosis to be "totally disabling" and compensable. S. 2917, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., §§ 501-504, as amended on the floor, 115 Cong.Rec. 27632 (1969), and passed, id. at 28243, established a program of interim benefits for total disability due to complicated pneumoconiosis, and directed the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare to develop standards for determining total disability due to complicated pneumoconiosis.
"[n]o payment of benefits shall be required under this section . . . (2) for any period prior to January 1, 1974; or (3) for any period after twelve years after December 30, 1969."
This time limitation, applicable in Part C cases by its terms, is also applicable to transition period cases by virtue of § 415(a)(5), 30 U.S.C. § 925(a)(5) (1970 ed., Supp. IV). Thus, the operator is liable for monthly payments only for a period of eight years. The total amount payable to a single dependent survivor during this period, under current rates, is approximately $18,900. The maximum amount for which the operator would be liable, if the miner had four or more dependent survivors, is approximately $37,800. See n 8, supra.
Our analysis of the retrospective application of the § 411(c)(3) presumption of death due to pneumoconiosis is, of course, fully applicable to the retrospective application of any other provisions that might be construed to authorize benefits in the case of miners who die with, but not from, totally disabling pneumoconiosis. See §§ 422(a), (c), 412(a)(2), (3), (5), 411(a), 30 U.S.C. §§ 932(a), (c), 922(a)(2), (3), (5), 921(a) (1970 ed. and Supp. IV).
"[I]f a miner who is suffering or suffered from pneumoconiosis was employed for ten years or more in one or more coal mines there shall be a rebuttable presumption that his pneumoconiosis arose out of such employment."
"[I]f a deceased miner was employed for ten years or more in one or more coal mines and died from a respirable disease there shall be a rebuttable presumption that his death was due to pneumoconiosis."
See, e.g., Hearings on S. 355, supra, n 1, at 699 (testimony of Dr. Werner A. Laqueur).
"[I]f a miner was employed for fifteen years or more in one or more underground coal mines, and if there is a chest roentgenogram submitted in connection with such miner's, his widow's, his child's, his parent's, his brother's, his sister's, or his dependent's claim under this subchapter and it is interpreted as negative with respect to the requirements of paragraph (3) of this subsection, and if other evidence demonstrates the existence of a totally disabling respiratory or pulmonary impairment, then there shall be a rebuttable presumption that such miner is totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis, that his death was due to pneumoconiosis, or that at the time of his death he was totally disabled by pneumoconiosis. In the case of a living miner, a wife's affidavit may not be used by itself to establish the presumption. The Secretary shall not apply all or a portion of the requirement of this paragraph that the miner work in an underground mine where he determines that conditions of a miner's employment in a coal mine other than an underground mine were substantially similar to conditions in an underground mine. The Secretary may rebut such presumption only by establishing that (A) such miner does not, or did not, have pneumoconiosis, or that (b) his respiratory or pulmonary impairment did not arise out of, or in connection with, employment in a coal mine."
See S.Rep. No. 92-743, p. 13 (1972).
The Operators frame their argument by saying that the effect of § 413(b) is to render the rebuttable presumptions of § 411(c) effectively irrebuttable. But this dressing adds nothing. Once it is determined that the limitation on X-ray evidence is permissible generally, it is irrelevant that the burden of going forward with some rebuttal evidence is thrown upon the operator by a permissible presumption, rather than by the claimant's affirmative factual showing.
Our attention has not been directed to any authoritative indications that X-ray evidence of the presence of pneumoconiosis is untrustworthy.
"approximately 25 percent of a random sample of some 200 coal miners whose medical records based upon X-ray findings showed no coal worker's pneumoconiosis were found on post mortem examination to have the disease."
S.Rep. No. 92-743, supra at 12.
Id. at 9-16; H.R.Rep. No. 92-460, pp. 10 (1971).
"[i]n determining the validity of claims under this part, all relevant evidence shall be considered, including, where relevant, medical tests such as blood gas studies, X-ray examination, electrocardiogram, pulmonary function studies, or physical performance tests, and any medical history, evidence submitted by the claimant's physician, or his wife's affidavits, and in the case of a deceased miner, other appropriate affidavits of persons with knowledge of the miner's physical condition, and other supportive materials."
30 U.S.C. § 923(b) (1970 ed., Supp. IV).
This evidence was brought. to the hearings by the Social Security Administration, whose rules the § 413(b) limitation was designed to overrule, and was credited by the minority of the House Committee on Education and Labor. H.R.Rep. No. 92-460, supra, at 22, 29-30.
S.Rep. No. 92-743, supra, at 11.
Id. at 12. Similarly, the Conference Report refers to the limitation only as running against "the Secretary." S.Conf.Rep. No. 92-780, p. 8 (1972); H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 92-1048, p. 8 (1972).
It follows from our discussion of the § 411(c)(4) limitation on rebuttal that these regulations cannot stand as authoritative administrative interpretations of the statute itself. But the role of regulations is not merely interpretative; they may instead be designedly creative in a substantive sense, if so authorized. See, e.g., Mourning v. Family Publications Service, Inc., 411 U. S. 356 (1973). If the regulations promulgated here are to be upheld, it must be in this latter sense.
We see no reason to remand the case to the three-judge District Court for the purpose of determining whether the Operators should be granted leave to amend their complaint to include a statutory and constitutional challenge to the regulations. The three-judge court remanded to a single judge all questions regarding the validity of regulations challenged in the Operators' complaint, and that portion of the case is pending before a single judge. Any motion for leave to amend the complaint to include a challenge to any additional regulations can be addressed to that single judge.
MR. JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment in part.
Appellants in No. 74-1316, the Operators, challenge as unconstitutional the retroactive obligations imposed on them by the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 (Act), 83 Stat. 792, as amended by the Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972, 86 Stat. 150, 30 U.S.C. § 901 et seq. (1970 ed. and Supp. IV). The Court rejects their contention in Part IV of its opinion. I concur in the judgment as to Part IV, and concur in other portions of the opinion not inconsistent with the views herein expressed.
legislation providing' benefits to its victims until the enactment of this statute in 1969. In Title IV of the Act, Congress significantly redefined the respective rights and obligations of miners and their employers in regard to this disease by establishing a benefits scheme to compensate victims of pneumoconiosis. [Footnote 2/1] Under Title IV, miners who filed claims before July 1, 1973, are to collect benefits from the Federal Government, §§ 411-414, 30 U.S.C. §§ 921-924 (1970 ed. and Supp. IV). [Footnote 2/2] Miners filing claims after June 30, 1973, are to collect benefits until 1981, see ante at 428 U. S. 26 n. 24, from their individual employers. §§ 415, 421-431, 30 U.S.C. §§ 925, 931-941 (1970 ed. and Supp. IV). [Footnote 2/3] Under the statute, the class of claimants to which individual employers are liable includes both (i) miners employed at the time of or after enactment and (ii) miners no longer employed in the industry at the time of enactment (former miners).
is no rational justification for imposing liability to former miners upon individual mine owners.
"The retrospective aspects of legislation, as well as the prospective aspects, must meet the test of due process, and the justifications for the latter may not suffice for the former. Thus, in this case, the justification for the retrospective imposition of liability must take into account the possibilities that the Operators may not have known of the danger of their employees' contracting pneumoconiosis, and that, even if they did know of the danger, their conduct may have been taken in reliance upon the current state of the law. . . ."
"We find . . . that the imposition of liability for the effects of disabilities bred in the past is justified as a rational measure to spread the costs of the employees' disabilities to those who have profited from the fruits of their labor -- the operators and the coal consumers."
Ante at 428 U. S. 18.
"We are unwilling to assess the wisdom of Congress' chosen scheme by examining the degree to which the 'cost savings' enjoyed by operators in the preenactment period produced 'excess' profits, or the degree to which the retrospective liability imposed on the early operators can now be passed on to the consumer. It is enough to say that the Act approaches the problem of cost-spreading rationally. . . ."
Ante at 428 U. S. 18-19.
In my view, whether the retroactive liability is constitutional is a considerably closer question than the Court's treatment suggests. The rationality of retrospective liability as a cost-spreading device is highly questionable.
If coal mining concerns actually enjoyed "excess" profits in the preenactment period by virtue of their nonliability for pneumoconiosis, and if such profits could be quantified in some discernible way, Congress rationally could impose retrospective liability for the benefit of the miners concerned. But, in this context, the term "excess profits" must mean profits over and above those that operators would have made in years and decades past if they had set aside from current operations funds sufficient to provide compensation, although under no obligation to do so. It is unlikely that such profits existed. The coal industry is highly competitive, and prices normally are determined by market forces. One therefore would expect that, had a compensation increment been added to operating costs, the operators, over the long-term, simply would have passed most of it on to consumers, thereby leaving their profitability relatively unaffected. In short, the talk of "excess profits" in any realistic sense is wholly speculative.
greater than that of their competitors. (ii) Some companies engaged in coal mining in years past on a much larger scale and with many more employees than currently. This is not an unusual situation in a "depleting asset" industry, where smaller companies often lack the resources with which to continue the acquisition and development of new properties. Stronger competitors, on the other hand, may have operated on a constant or an increasingly large scale. [Footnote 2/8] In each case, the competitively disadvantaged companies may be unable to spread a substantial portion of their costs to consumers. In view of these considerations, it is unrealistic to think that the Act will spread costs to "the operators and the coal consumers," ante at 428 U. S. 18, and thus I question the Court's conclusion that the Act is rational in imposing retroactive liability.
Despite the foregoing, I must concur in the judgment on the record before us. Congress had broad discretion in formulating a statute to deal with the serious problem of pneumoconiosis affecting former miners. E.g., Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U. S. 78 (1971); cf. Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U. S. 483 (1955). Nor does the Constitution require that legislation on economic matters be compatible with sound economics, or even with normal fairness. As a result, economic and remedial social enactments carry a strong presumption of constitutionality, e.g., United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144, 304 U. S. 148 (1938), and the Operators had the heavy burden of showing the Act to be unconstitutional.
The constitutionality of the retrospective liability in question here ultimately turns on the sophisticated questions of economic fact suggested above, and these facts are likely to vary widely among the Operators. [Footnote 2/9] In this case, however, decided on the cross-motions for summary judgment, the Operators have failed to make any factual showings that support their sweeping assertions of irrationality. Although I find these assertions strongly suggestive that Congress has acted irrationally in pursuing a legitimate end, I am not satisfied that they are sufficient -- in the absence of appropriate factual support -- to override the presumption of constitutionality. Accordingly, I agree that the federal parties were entitled to summary judgment on this record.
Title II of the Act prescribes the maintenance of less hazardous mine conditions in the future. § 201 et seq., 30 U.S.C. § 841 et seq.
As does the Court, I simplify by not distinguishing between claims by employees and claims by their survivors. See ante at 428 U. S. 15 n. 13.
Claims filed between July 1, 1973, and December 31, 1973, were to be paid by the Federal Government until December 31, 1973, after which they became the responsibility of individual mining concerns. § 415, 30 U.S.C. § 925 (1970 ed., Supp. IV). Liability on the part of individual mining concerns arises only if the claimant does not have recourse to an applicable state workmen's compensation program approved by the Secretary of Labor, §§ 421-422, 30 U.S.C. §§ 931-932 (1970 ed. and Supp. IV), but no such state programs have been approved. See ante at 428 U. S. 8-9.
Favorable initial determinations have been made for claimants who left mine work in 1923, 1927, 1931, 1932, 1937, 1943, 1946, and 1948. Brief for Operators 30 n. 1. These determinations rebut the federal parties' suggestion that, in combination, the initial period of federal liability and the statute of limitations specified in § 422(f)(1), 30 U.S.C. § 932(f)(1) (1970 ed., Supp. IV), will prevent employer liability to miners who left the industry before passage of the Act. See ante at 428 U. S. 16 n. 14.
Congress apparently recognized that the employers burdened by retroactive liability were not blameworthy. Senator Javits, who played a significant role in the development of individual employer liability, see Brief for Operators 34, thought that the "blame" for past neglect must be shared by "all of us," including "the industry, the medical profession, and the Government -- particularly the Public Health Service." House Committee on Education and Labor, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., Legislative History -- Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act 338 (Committee Print 1970), 115 Cong. Rec . 27627 (1969) (floor remarks).
The retroactive nature of the liability makes deterrence an insufficient justification. In their prospective application, it is rational for Title IV and other workmen's compensation schemes to disadvantage competitively employers who take less effective precautions to protect their employees. But only prospective liability creates an incentive for occupational safety measures.
It is, of course, impossible to spread the cost to "coal consumers" who "profited from the fruits of [former employees'] labor." Ante at 428 U. S. 18. A coal mining concern cannot retroactively increase its prices to the former customers who benefited from the pre-1969 labors of former miners. The only consumers, therefore, who could bear these burdens are those who purchase coal currently. But, in a free market, such customers cannot be expected to pay a reparation add-on for coal produced by disadvantaged coal companies when the same product is readily obtainable from others at a lower price.
Indeed, the number of former miners and survivors whom an individual employer is obliged to compensate could be larger than the employer's present workforce.
In addition, the incidence of liability to former miners may be skewed artificially by the regulation imposing liability upon the company which last employed the claimant, without regard to previous employment with other companies. 20 CFR § 725.311 (1975). The validity of this regulation remains to be considered. See ante at 428 U. S. 14.
I would not foreclose the possibility that a particular coal mining concern, in a proper case, may be able to show that the impact of the Act on its operations is irrational. Cf. ante at 428 U. S. 26-27.
MR. JUSTICE STEWART, with whom MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST joins, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
"operator . . . shall be bound by the determination of the Secretary of Labor [on a transition] claim as if the claim had been filed pursuant to part C of this subchapter and section 932 of this title had been applicable to such operator."
would apply "if the claim had been filed pursuant to part C . . . and section 932. . . ."
"the limitation applies only to 'the Secretary,' and not to an operator seeking to avoid liability under § 415 [30 U.S.C. § 925] or § 422 [30 U.S.C. § 932]."
"Senate Report on § 411(c)(4) [which] specifically states that the limitation on rebuttal applies to the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, but nowhere suggests that it binds an operator."
"The amendments made by the Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972 to part B of this subchapter shall, to the extent appropriate, also apply to [Part C]: Provided, That for the purpose of determining the applicability of the presumption established by section 921(c)(4) of this title to claims filed under this part, no period of employment after June 30, 1971, shall be considered in determining whether a miner was employed at least fifteen years in one or more underground mines."
part B be applied, wherever appropriate, to part C. . . ."
"Questions were raised during the Committee deliberations over whether the amendments to part B would automatically be applicable, where appropriate, to part C."
"Although it would appear clear that the same standards are to govern, the Committee concluded that it would be best to so specify."
"It is contemplated by the Committee that the applicable portions of following sections of part B, as amended, would apply to part C: section 411, section 412 (except the last sentence of subsection (b) thereof), section 413, and section 414."
S.Rep. No. 92-743, p. 21 (1972). See also id. at 33.
The only play in the tight linkage of Part C to the amendments to Part B is that afforded by the proviso in § 430 and by the phrase "to the extent appropriate" which appears in that section. The proviso does not remove the rebuttal limitation, but it does alter § 411(c)(4)'s allocation of the burden of proof in another crucial respect: it limits the period of employment which may be considered for purposes of determining the applicability of the presumption. The presence of the proviso is relevant in two respects. First, it underscores the basic applicability to Part C determinations of the § 411(c)(4) rebuttal presumption. Second, it demonstrates that Congress knew how to place a significant limitation on the applicability of that presumption when it chose to do so.
"if an X-ray [did] not show totally disabling pneumoconiosis, no further processing of a claim [was] allowed. Thus, any further evidence of disability [was] not allowed if the X-ray show[ed] negative."
"prohibiting denial of a claim solely on the basis of an X-ray, by providing a presumption of pneumoconiosis for miners with respiratory or pulmonary disability where they have worked 15 years or more in a coal mine, and by requiring the Social Security Administration to use tests other than the X-ray to establish the basis for a judgment that a miner is or is not totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis."
"[f]or work periods greater than 15 years underground, there was a linear increase in the prevalence of the disease with years spent underground,"
or in connection with, employment in a coal mine."
§ 411(c)(4), 30 U.S.C. § 921(c)(4) (1970 ed., Supp. IV).
"[t]he Secretary [of Health, Education, and Welfare] shall not apply all or a portion of the requirement of this paragraph that the miner work in an underground mine where he determines that conditions of a miner's employment in a coal mine other than an underground mine were substantially similar to conditions in an underground mine."
(Emphasis added.) If the operative principle is that provisions in § 411(c)(4) which bind "the Secretary [of Health, Education, and Welfare]" are automatically "inappropriate" for Part C proceedings, then surface miners would be stripped of the benefits of § 411(c)(4) as soon as the legislative scheme enters its transitional stage.
"standards for determining death or total disability due to pneumoconiosis . . . substantially equivalent to . . . those standards established under part B of this subchapter. . . ."
421(b)(2)(C), as set forth in 30 U.S.C. 931(b)(2)(C) (1970 ed., Supp. IV). One of the Part B standards is the rebuttal limitation in § 411(c)(4). Thus, the Secretary of Labor would not be empowered to approve a state law which did not contain a "substantially equivalent" evidentiary limitation.
The delegation of adjudicatory responsibility to the Secretary of Labor under Part C was a backstop measure, intended to provide a forum for presentation of claims during any period after January 1, 1974, when a state workmen's compensation law was not included on the Secretary of Labor's list of state laws with provisions "substantially equivalent" to those in Part B. § 421(a), 30 U.S.C. § 931(a) (1970 ed., Supp. IV). See S.Rep. No. 92-743, supra at 19-21. Since the very reason for withholding approval of a state law and providing an alternative federal forum is lack of "substantial equivalence" between the state law provisions and the "standards established under part B," including the rebuttal limitation in § 411(c)(4), it would be anomalous if the substitute federal forum could employ evidentiary rules which deviate substantially from those in Part B.
to the Secretary of Labor. The obvious purpose of the phrase "to the extent appropriate" is to accommodate minor linguistic variations resulting from this transfer of responsibility. Thus, the interaction of the phrase "to the extent appropriate" and the reference to "the Secretary" in the rebuttal limitation of § 411(c)(4) does not render the entire limitation "inappropriate" to Part C proceedings; it merely renders the reference to "the Secretary" inappropriate under Part C.
It is significant that the Court's interpretation of § 411(c)(4)'s rebuttal limitation is not urged or even suggested by any party to this suit. The Federal Parties' position is that the District Court erred by reading § 411(c)(4) to foreclose a showing that would refute total disability. That position is clearly correct. The § 411(c)(4) presumption comes into play only after the claimant establishes total disability. See § 411(c)(4), 30 U.S.C. § 921(c)(4) (1970 ed., Supp. IV) ("and if other evidence demonstrates the existence of a totally disabling respiratory or pulmonary impairment, then there shall be a rebuttable presumption . . ."). In addition, the District Court ruled that § 411(c)(4) places upon a specific coal mine owner the burden of proving that the respiratory or pulmonary disease did not arise out of coal mine employment. The Federal Parties urge that this construction is erroneous, because it overlooks the fact that, under § 422(c), 30 U.S.C. § 932(c), a specific operator can also defeat liability by showing that the disability did not arise, even in part, out of employment in his mine during the period when he operated it. Again, the Federal Parties are clearly correct. If the operator makes the § 422(c) showing, then the § 411(c)(4) presumption -- and the rebuttal limitation -- is irrelevant. Accordingly, I would reverse the District Court's ruling that the § 411(c)(4) rebuttal limitation violates the Constitution.

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