Source: http://masscases.com/cases/app/23/23massappct679.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 14:24:32+00:00

Document:
DANIEL F. MARR, trustee, vs. BACK BAY ARCHITECTURAL COMMISSION.
Present: GRANT, KAPLAN, & BROWN, JJ.
CIVIL ACTION commenced in the Superior Court Department on January 23, 1984.
The case was heard by Jeremiah J. Sullivan, J., sitting under statutory authority.
Mary Ellen Nolan, Assistant Corporation Counsel, for the defendant.
Joseph J. Brodigan for the plaintiff.
Mark J. DeFrancisco, for Neighborhood Association of the Back Bay, Inc., & others, amici curiae, submitted a brief.
basement level of the front elevation of an addition to an existing building which the plaintiff has now constructed at 299 Beacon Street, Boston, which lies within the Back Bay architectural district (St. 1966, c. 625, Section [Note 2], as most recently amended by St. 1979, c. 456). The appeals were consolidated for trial before a probate judge sitting in the Superior Court under statutory authority. Seven days after the due date for the filing of proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, as well as the submission of posttrial briefs, the judge signed and filed a twenty-page document entitled "Findings" which concluded with an order of remand to the commission with a direction to issue a certificate of appropriateness to the plaintiff. On the same day the judge signed something entitled "Plaintiff's Judgment." The commission appealed to this court. St. 1966, c. 625, Section 10.
1. We deal first with the adequacy of the so-called "Findings." With minor exceptions not worth noting, they consisted of nothing more than a retyping of the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law which had been submitted by counsel for the plaintiff at the conclusion of the case.
2 More than one quarter of the twenty pages were devoted to disposing of a defense which the commission had set up in its answers, which had been litigated only faintly in the course of the trial, and which had been conspicuously waived by the commission in its posttrial brief. There was here not only an evident lack of the independent thought on the part of a trial judge in performing his duties under Mass.R.Civ.P. 52(a), 365 Mass. 816 (1974), which is called for by the Cormier and Markell cases and their progeny (supra note 1), there was also a transparent refusal to consider any of the contentions of the commission.
We turn now to a discussion of the various errors in the judge's decision.
certificate of appropriateness, and it is he who has the burdens of proof and persuasion on the question whether the decisions should be annulled. See Gumley v. Selectmen of Nantucket, 371 Mass. 718 , 724 (1977). Compare Dion v. Board of Appeals of Waltham, 344 Mass. 547 , 555-556 (1962); Framingham Clinic Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Framingham, 382 Mass. 283 , 297 (1981); Warren v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Amherst, 383 Mass. 1 , 10 (1981).
which might be thought material, [Note 5] such as whether the exterior architectural features of a particular proposal are "appropriate" within the meaning of St. 1965, c. 625, Section 8, as most recently amended.
The court is to restrict itself to a twofold inquiry into the reasons given by the commission for its decision. Logically, the first inquiry should be whether the reasons given on the face of the decision are "insufficient in law to warrant [the commission's] determination." Here, the inquiry is analogous to that in an appeal from a decision of a board of appeals on an application for a special permit under a zoning ordinance or by-law when it is claimed that the decision is based on legally untenable ground. See Gumley v. Selectmen of Nantucket, 371 Mass. at 724. For example, in the present case, has the commission improperly based its decisions on some notion of general policy which it believes will further the restated purposes of the statute under which it operates (St. 1966, c. 625, Section 1, as amended by St. 1981, c. 624, Section 1), or has the commission denied both applications because, in its judgment, the exterior architectural features of both proposals do not meet the criteria of "appropriateness" as they are now specifically delineated in the statute (St. 1966, c. 625, Section 8, as amended by St. 1981, c. 624, Section 4)? This type of inquiry is one which can normally be answered from the face of the decision in the particular case. If the decision appears to be based on a legally untenable ground, the reason(s) is (are) "insufficient in law" within the meaning of Section 10 and, as indicated in the Gumley case, the decision should be annulled without further ado unless the court, in the exercise of its discretion, chooses to request a supplemental statement of the commission's reasons before any further proceedings are had.
4. We come now to the action which the court should take if it concludes that the decision of the commission must be annulled. The provision in St. 1966, c. 625, Section 10, that the court may "make such other decree as justice and equity may require" is not to be taken as a blanket authorization to direct the commission to issue a certificate of appropriateness to an applicant.
5. The court cannot base a conclusion that the commission has acted arbitrarily or capriciously solely on the fact that there may be other buildings located in the vicinity of the plaintiff's building and in the Back Bay architectural district which have exterior architectural features similar to those desired by the plaintiff if the commission has had no occasion to pass on the appropriateness of those features. Compare Ferrante v. Board of Appeals of Northampton, 345 Mass. 158 , 161 (1962); Raia v. Board of Appeals of No. Reading, 4 Mass. App. Ct. 318 , 321-322 (1976).
zoning ordinance so as to legitimate the use of a portion of the building as a garage. This is simply another of the situations in which the Legislature has required multiple authorizations from different administrative bodies established to serve different purposes. See Opinion of the Justices, 333 Mass. 783 , 789 (1955). Compare Building Commr. of Medford v. C. & H. Co., 319 Mass. 273 , 282 (1946); Lovequist v. Conservation Commn. of Dennis, 379 Mass. 7 , 12-13 (1979); Fitz-Inn Auto Parks, Inc. v. Boston, 389 Mass. 79 , 82 (1983).
The judgment is reversed, and the case is to stand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
[Note 1] See, e.g., Mailer v. Mailer, 390 Mass. 371 , 375 (1983); Lewis v. Emerson, 391 Mass. 517 , 524 (1984); Roche v. Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 391 Mass. 785 , 792 (1984); Lovett v. Commonwealth, 393 Mass. 444 , 446-447 (1984); First Pa. Mortgage Trust v. Dorchester Sav. Bank, 395 Mass. 614 , 622 n.12 (1985); O'Hara v. Robbins, 13 Mass. App. Ct. 279 , 285-286 (1982); Ricky Smith Pontiac, Inc. v. Subaru of New England, Inc., 14 Mass. App. Ct. 396 , 404-405 (1982); Abbott v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 18 Mass. App. Ct. 508 , 522 (1984); Bottom Line Assocs. v. International Date Group, 18 Mass. App. Ct. 921 , 921 n.1 (1984); Edinburg v. Cavers, 22 Mass. App. Ct. 212 , 218-220 (1986); Kent v. Kent, 22 Mass. App. Ct. 340 , 341 (1986).
[Note 2] The body of the judgment was also copied from a form submitted by counsel for the plaintiff. The judge struck the word "Proposed" from the caption of the submission.
[Note 3] The language of Section 17 is traceable to G. L. c. 40, Section 30, as appearing in St. 1933, c. 269, Section 1, as amended by St. 1935, c. 388, Section 2, which was construed in Pendergast v. Board of Appeals of Barnstable, 331 Mass. 555 , 556-560 (1954). Virtually the same language was later to be found in St. 1955, c. 601 (Nantucket), Section 11 (Opinion of the Justices, 333 Mass. 773 , 775 ), and is now to be found in St. 1970, c. 395 (Nantucket), Section 12 (Gumley v. Selectmen of Nantucket, 371 Mass. at 723-724).
[Note 4] The language last quoted appears to have been taken from St. 1955, c. 616 (Beacon Hill), Section 40 (Opinion of the Justices, 333 Mass. 783 , 786 ). Virtually identical language also appears in St. 1965, c. 101 (Marblehead), Section 11.
[Note 5] There is such a directive as to most of the other special act historic districts. See St. 1956, c. 447 (Lexington), Section 10; St. 1960, c. 345 (Concord), Section 10; St. 1963, c. 40 (Sudbury), Section 10; St. 1964, c. 118 (Bedford), Section 10; St. 1965, c. 48 (Chatham), Section 10; St. 1965, c. 694 (Yarmouthport), Section 10; St. 1966, c. 211 (Petersham), Section 10; St. 1966, c. 502 (Hingham), Section 10; St. 1970, c. 395 (Nantucket), Section 12; St. 1973, c. 470 (Old King's Highway), Section 11, as amended by St. 1975, c. 845, Section 13. Contrast St. 1975, c. 654 (Falmouth), Section 10; G. L. c. 40C, Section 12A, as appearing in St. 1983, c. 429, Section 3.
[Note 6] The court can also annul the decision if it finds that the reasons given were a pretext for a legally untenable reason. Gumley v. Selectmen of Nantucket, 371 Mass. at 724-725.
[Note 7] The provisions of the third paragraph of St. 1975, c. 845 (Old King's Highway), Section 11, as most recently amended, are unique in allowing the court to modify or supersede the decision of the commission.
[Note 8] Such a remand is expressly authorized by St. 1975, c. 654 (Falmouth), Section 10, by St. 1975, c. 772 (Boston Landmarks), Section 9, and by G. L. c. 40C, Section 12A, as amended. Remand is expressly required by a majority of the special acts. See St. 1956, c. 447 (Lexington), Section 10; St. 1960, c. 345 (Concord), Section 10; St. 1963, c. 40 (Sudbury), Section 10; St. 1964, c. 118 (Bedford), Section 10; St. 1965, c. 48 (Chatham), Section 10; St. 1965, c. 694 (Yarmouthport), Section 10; St. 1966, c. 211 (Petersham), Section 10; St. 1966, c. 502 (Hingham), Section 10.
[Note 9] It should be noted that the sentence which follows the portion of the statute just quoted provides: "It is the intent of this act that the commission be strict in its judgment of plans involving substantial new construction . . . ."

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