Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=81790:191696&catid=1569&Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 04:11:42+00:00

Document:
G.R. No. 191696, April 10, 2013 - ROGELIO DANTIS, Petitioner, v. JULIO MAGHINANG, JR., Respondent.
ROGELIO DANTIS, Petitioner, v. JULIO MAGHINANG, JR., Respondent.
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the January 25, 2010 Decision1 and the March 23, 2010 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CV No. 85258, reversing the March 2, 2005 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Malolos, Bulacan (RTC), in an action for quieting of title and recovery of possession with damages.
The case draws its origin from a complaint4 for quieting of title and recovery of possession with damages filed by petitioner Rogelio Dantis (Rogelio) against respondent Julio Maghinang, Jr. (Julio, Jr.) before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 280-M-2002. Rogelio alleged that he was the registered owner of a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-125918, with an area of 5,657 square meters, located in Sta. Rita, San Miguel, Bulacan; that he acquired ownership of the property through a deed of extrajudicial partition of the estate of his deceased father, Emilio Dantis (Emilio), dated December 22, 1993; that he had been paying the realty taxes on the said property; that Julio, Jr. occupied and built a house on a portion of his property without any right at all; that demands were made upon Julio, Jr. that he vacate the premises but the same fell on deaf ears; and that the acts of Julio, Jr. had created a cloud of doubt over his title and right of possession of his property. He, thus, prayed that judgment be rendered declaring him to be the true and real owner of the parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-125918; ordering Julio, Jr. to deliver the possession of that portion of the land he was occupying; and directing Julio, Jr. to pay rentals from October 2000 and attorney’s fees of P100,000.00.
He added that he was constrained to institute an ejectment suit against Julio, Jr. before the Municipal Trial Court of San Miguel, Bulacan (MTC), but the complaint was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and lack of cause of action.
In his Answer,5 Julio, Jr. denied the material allegations of the complaint. By way of an affirmative defense, he claimed that he was the actual owner of the 352 square meters (subject lot) of the land covered by TCT No. T-125918 where he was living; that he had been in open and continuous possession of the property for almost thirty (30) years; the subject lot was once tenanted by his ancestral relatives until it was sold by Rogelio’s father, Emilio, to his father, Julio Maghinang, Sr. (Julio, Sr.); that later, he succeeded to the ownership of the subject lot after his father died on March 10, 1968; and that he was entitled to a separate registration of the subject lot on the basis of the documentary evidence of sale and his open and uninterrupted possession of the property.
Plaintiff Rogelio Dantis testified that he inherited 5,657 square meters of land, identified as Lot 6-D-1 of subdivision plan Psd-031421-054315, located at Sta. Rita, San Miguel, Bulacan, through an Extrajudicial Partition of Estate of Emilio Dantis, executed in December 1993 which land was titled later on under his name, Rogelio Dantis, married to Victoria Payawal, as shown by copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-125918, issued by the Register of Deeds of Bulacan on September 29, 1998, declared for taxation purposes as Tax Declaration with ARP No. C20-22-043-07-046. According to him, defendant and his predecessor-in-interest built the house located on said lot. When he first saw it, it was only a small hut but when he was about 60 years old, he told defendant not to build a bigger house thereon because he would need the land and defendant would have to vacate the land. Plaintiff, however, has not been in physical possession of the premises.
Defendant Julio Maghinang, Jr., presented by plaintiff as adverse witness, testified that he has no title over the property he is occupying. He has not paid realty taxes thereon. He has not paid any rental to anybody. He is occupying about 352 square meters of the lot. He presented an affidavit executed on September 3, 1953 by Ignacio Dantis, grandfather of Rogelio Dantis and the father of Emilio Dantis. The latter was, in turn, the father of Rogelio Dantis. The affidavit, according to affiant Ignacio Dantis, alleged that Emilio Dantis agreed to sell 352 square meters of the lot to Julio Maghinang on installment. Defendant was then 11 years old in 1952.
ordering defendant Julio Maghinang, Jr. and all persons claiming under him to peacefully vacate the said real property and surrender the possession thereof to plaintiff or latter’s successors-in-interest.
Julio, Jr. moved for a reconsideration of the March 2, 2005 Decision, but the motion was denied by the RTC in its May 3, 2005 Order.10 Feeling aggrieved, Julio, Jr. appealed the decision to the CA.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is reversed. The heirs of Julio Maghinang Jr. are declared the owners of the 352-square meter portion of the lot covered by TCT No. T-125968 where the residence of defendant Julio Maghinang is located, and the plaintiff is ordered to reconvey the aforesaid portion to the aforesaid heirs, subject to partition by agreement or action to determine the exact metes and bounds and without prejudice to any legal remedy that the plaintiff may take with respect to the unpaid balance of the price.
The motion for reconsideration12 filed by Rogelio was denied by the CA in its March 23, 2010 Resolution. Unfazed, he filed this petition for review on certiorari before this Court.
The fundamental question for resolution is whether there is a perfected contract of sale between Emilio and Julio, Sr. The determination of this issue will settle the rightful ownership of the subject lot.
In the case at bench, the CA and the RTC reached different conclusions on the question of whether or not there was an oral contract of sale. The RTC ruled that Rogelio Dantis was the sole and rightful owner of the parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-125918 and that no oral contract of sale was entered into between Emilio Dantis and Julio Maghinang, Sr. involving the 352-square meter portion of the said property. The CA was of the opposite view. The determination of whether there existed an oral contract of sale is essentially a question of fact.
In petitions for review under Rule 45, the Court, as a general rule, does not venture to re-examine the evidence presented by the contending parties during the trial of the case considering that it is not a trier of facts and the findings of fact of the CA are conclusive and binding upon this Court. The rule, however, admits of several exceptions. One of which is when the findings of the CA are contrary to those of the trial court.16 Considering the incongruent factual conclusions of the CA and the RTC, this Court is constrained to reassess the factual circumstances of the case and reevaluate them in the interest of justice.
It is an age-old rule in civil cases that he who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and a mere allegation is not evidence.17 After carefully sifting through the evidence on record, the Court finds that Rogelio was able to establish a prima facie case in his favor tending to show his exclusive ownership of the parcel of land under TCT No. T-125918 with an area of 5,657 square meters, which included the 352-square meter subject lot. From the records, it appears that TCT No. T-125918 is a derivative of TCT No. T-256228, which covered a bigger area of land measuring 30,000 square meters registered in the name of Emilio Dantis; that Emilio died intestate on November 13, 1952; that Emilio’s five heirs, including Rogelio, executed an extra-judicial partition of estate on December 22, 1993 and divided among themselves specific portions of the property covered by TCT No. T-256228, which were already set apart by metes and bounds; that the land known as Lot 6-D-1 of the subdivision plan Psd-031421-054315 with an area of 5,657 sq. m. went to Rogelio, the property now covered by TCT No. T-125918; and that the property was declared for realty tax purpose in the name of Rogelio for which a tax declaration was issued in his name; and that the same had not been transferred to anyone else since its issuance.
Julio, Jr. failed to discharge this burden. His pieces of evidence, Exhibit “3” and Exhibit “4,” cannot prevail over the array of documentary and testimonial evidence that were adduced by Rogelio. The totality of Julio, Jr.’s evidence leaves much to be desired.
Jurisprudence dictates that an affidavit is merely hearsay evidence where its affiant/maker did not take the witness stand.21 The sworn statement of Ignacio is of this kind. The affidavit was not identified and its averments were not affirmed by affiant Ignacio. Accordingly, Exhibit “3” must be excluded from the judicial proceedings being an inadmissible hearsay evidence. It cannot be deemed a declaration against interest for the matter to be considered as an exception to the hearsay rule because the declarant was not the seller (Emilio), but his father (Ignacio).
Exhibit “4,” on the other hand, is considered secondary evidence being a mere photocopy which, in this case, cannot be admitted to prove the contents of the purported undated handwritten receipt. The best evidence rule requires that the highest available degree of proof must be produced. For documentary evidence, the contents of a document are best proved by the production of the document itself to the exclusion of secondary or substitutionary evidence, pursuant to Rule 130, Section 322.
A secondary evidence is admissible only upon compliance with Rule 130, Section 5, which states that: when the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated. Accordingly, the offeror of the secondary evidence is burdened to satisfactorily prove the predicates thereof, namely: (1) the execution or existence of the original; (2) the loss and destruction of the original or its non-production in court; and (3) the unavailability of the original is not due to bad faith on the part of the proponent/offeror. Proof of the due execution of the document and its subsequent loss would constitute the basis for the introduction of secondary evidence.23 In MCC Industrial Sales Corporation v. Ssangyong Corporation,24 it was held that where the missing document is the foundation of the action, more strictness in proof is required than where the document is only collaterally involved.
Guided by these norms, the Court holds that Julio, Jr. failed to prove the due execution of the original of Exhibit “4” as well as its subsequent loss. A nexus of logically related circumstance rendered Julio, Jr.’s evidence highly suspect. Also, his testimony was riddled with improbabilities and contradictions which tend to erode his credibility and raise doubt on the veracity of his evidence.
Q: You don’t remember how old you were when this according to you you witnessed Emilio Dantis signed this?
A: Eleven years old, Sir.
Q: So that was 1953?
Q: And you were then…?
A: I was born October 1942, Sir.
Q: You were eleven (11) years old?
Q: And you mean to say that you witnessed the signing allegedly of the original of Exhibit “4” when you were eleven (11) years old?
Q: And you remember what was signed in this receipt. From your memory can you tell the title of this Exhibit “4”?
A: What I can say that it is a Sale, Sir.
Q: So, when you said that you witnessed an alleged sale you are referring to Exhibit “4”?
Q: Mr. Witness, I noticed that this document marked as Exhibit “4” is only a photocopy, where is the original of this document?
The above testimony of Julio, Jr. tends to give the impression that the original of the document was lost while it was in the possession of his parents. During cross-examination, however, he testified that it was lost while it was in his possession.
Q: x x x Where did you keep that document?
A: I was the one keeping that document because I live in different places, [the said] it was lost or misplaced, Sir.
Q: In other words, it was lost while the same was in your possession??
Still, later, Julio, Jr. claimed that his sister was the one responsible for the loss of the original of Exhibit “4” after borrowing the same from him.
Q: So, who is your sister to whom you gave the original?
Q: In other words now, you did not lost the document or the original of Exhibit “4” but you gave it to your sister, am I correct?
A: I just lent to her the original copy, Sir.
Q: So, you lent this original of Exhibit “4” to your sister and your sister never returned the same to you?
A: Yes, Sir, because it was lost, that was the only one left in her custody.
Witness referring to the xerox copy.
Q: In other words, it was your sister who lost the original, is that correct?
Q: And when did you last see the original?
A: When my mother died in 1993 that was the last time I tried to see the original of the document after her interment, Sir.
Q: Where did you see this document?
Q: When did you get this Exhibit “4” now, the photocopy from your sister?
A: When the interment of my mother in September 1993, Sir.
Q: Now, let us reform. Which one did you get after the interment of your mother, this Exhibit “4” or the original?
A: I asked that xerox copy because I have lost the original and I could not find the same, Sir.
Q: So, from the safe of your mother after her interment, what used you found and got this Exhibit “4”?
A: Yes, Sir, from my sister.
Q: So, not from your mother safe?
A: The original was taken from the safe of my mother, Sir.
Q: So after your mother’s death you never saw the original?
Third, it is quite strange that two receipts were prepared for the initial payment of P100.00 in connection with the sale of the subject lot. The Court notes that the contents of Exhibit “4” were similar to those of Annex “A”31 of Julio, Jr.’s Answer, dated June 9, 2002. Annex “A,” however, was typewritten and the name of the recipient indicated therein was a certain Cornelio A. Dantis, whose identity and participation in the alleged sale was never explained.
Fourth, apart from the lone testimony of Julio, Jr., no other witness who knew or read Exhibit “4,” much less saw it executed, was presented. In the absence of any shred of corroborative evidence, the Court cannot help but entertain doubts on the truthfulness of Julio, Jr.’s naked assertion.
Assuming, in gratia argumenti, that Exhibit “4” is admissible in evidence, there will still be no valid and perfected oral contract for failure of Julio, Jr. to prove the concurrence of the essential requisites of a contract of sale by adequate and competent evidence.
Seemingly, Julio, Jr. wanted to prove the sale by a receipt when it should be the receipt that should further corroborate the existence of the sale. At best, his testimony only alleges but does not prove the existence of the verbal agreement. Julio, Jr. miserably failed to establish by preponderance of evidence that there was a meeting of the minds of the parties as to the subject matter and the purchase price.
Akong si Emilio Dantis may sapat na Gulang may asawa naninirahan sa Sta Rita San Miguel Bul. ay kusang nagsasasay ng sumosunod.
Na ako Tumanggap Kay Julio Maghinang ng P100.00 peso cuartang Pilipino, bilang paunang bayad sa Lupa niyang nilote sa akin 400 apat na raan mahigit na metro cudrado.
A perusal of the above document would readily show that it does not specify a determinate subject matter. Nowhere does it provide a description of the property subject of the sale, including its metes and bounds, as well as its total area. The Court notes that while Julio, Jr. testified that the land subject of the sale consisted of 352 square meters, Exhibit “4,” however, states that it’s more than 400 square meters. Moreover, Exhibit “4” does not categorically declare the price certain in money. Neither does it state the mode of payment of the purchase price and the period for its payment.
The CA held that partial performance of the contract of sale – giving of a downpayment coupled with the delivery of the res - took the oral contract out of the scope of the Statute of Frauds. This conclusion arose from its erroneous finding that there was a perfected contract of sale. The above disquisition, however, shows that there was none. There is, therefore, no basis for the application of the Statute of Frauds. The application of the Statute of Frauds presupposes the existence of a perfected contract.42 As to the delivery of the res, it does not appear to be a voluntary one pursuant to the purported sale. If Julio, Jr. happened to be there, it was because his ancestors tenanted the land. It must be noted that when Julio, Jr. built his house, Rogelio protested.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed January 25, 2010 Decision and the March 23, 2010 Resolution of the Court Appeals, in CA-G.R. CV No. 85258, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The March 2, 2005 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 18, in Civil Case No. 280-M-2002, is REINSTATED.
1 Penned by Associate Justice Mario L. Guariña III with Associate Justice Sesinando E. Villon and Associate Justice Franchito N. Diamante, concurring; rollo, pp. 89-97.
3 Penned by Judge Victoria C. Fernandez-Bernardo, record, pp. 236-240.
16 Hyatt Elevators and Escalators Corp. v. Cathedral Heights Building Complex Association, Inc., G.R. No. 173881, December 1, 2010, 636 SCRA 401, 406.
17 Heirs of Cipriano Reyes v. Calumpang, 536 Phil. 795, 811 (2006).
18 350 Phil. 138 (1998).
20Estrada v. Hon. Desierto, 408 Phil. 194, 220 (2001).
21Unchuan v. Lozada, G.R. No. 172671, April 16, 2009, 585 SCRA 421, 435.
22 Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. – When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, x x x.
23Santos v. Court of Appeals, 420 Phil. 110, 120 (2001).
24 G.R. No. 170633, October 17, 2007, 536 SCRA 408, 463.
25 TSN, dated February 17, 2004, pp. 19-20.
32 Art. 1458 of the Civil Code.
33 Art. 1319 of the Civil Code.
34 Montecalvo v. Heirs of Eugenia T. Primero, G.R. No. 165168, July 9, 2010, 624 SCRA 575, 589.
35Coronel v. Court of Appeals, 331 Phil. 294, 308-309 (1996).
36Manila Metal Container Corp. v. Philippine National Bank, 540 Phil. 451, 471 (2006).
37 483 Phil. 735, 752 (2004).
38San Miguel Properties Philippines, Inc. v. Huang, 391 Phil. 636, 646 (2000).
39 Platinum Plans Phil. Inc. v. Cucueco, 522 Phil. 133, 150 (2006).
40 151-A Phil. 868 (1973).
42Rosencor Development Corp. v. Inquing, 406 Phil. 565, 577 (2001).

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