Source: https://www.schlamstone.com/commercial/page/184/
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 16:15:39+00:00

Document:
There has been little rest for the lawyers engaged in the battle over non-compete clauses and other restrictive covenants allegedly covering Deutsche Bank’s departing discretionary portfolio management team. Last Friday, Justice Marcy Friedman entered a TRO enforcing post-employment restrictive covenants against six departing Deutsche Bank employees, including Benjamin Pace, formerly Deutsche Bank’s chief investment officer for wealth management in the Americas. On Tuesday morning, Pace sought interim vacatur of that TRO (insofar as it applied to him personally) by application to the First Department. Pace’s brief to the First Department (available here) relies principally on the absence of any restrictive covenants from his written employment agreement with Deutsche Bank predecessor, Bankers’ Trust. Pace evidently never signed any agreement directly with Deutsche Bank, and insists that the restrictive covenants contained in Deutsche Bank’s employee handbook are unenforceable because the handbook, by its own terms, does not create a binding contract of employment.
Justice Leland DeGrasse granted Pace’s request for emergency interim relief from the TRO. The order is merely an endorsement on Pace’s application for interim relief and does not set forth any reasoning (or effect any defendant other than Pace himself). The order is here. Justice DeGrasse’s vacatur of the TRO as to Pace seems to accept at least implicitly that covenants in written employment agreements are to be distinguished from those contained in employee handbooks — at least where, as here, the handbook contains disclaimer language to the effect that it does not create a written contract of employment.
This guest post was written by Isaac B. Zaur of Clarick Gueron Reisbaum LLP.
On June 3, 2014, the two most senior departing Deutsche Bank employees, Benjamin Pace and Lawrence Weissman, filed notices of appeal in both actions. The pre-argument statements are available here and here. The principal asserted grounds for reversal are: (1) the absence of any agreement between Deutsche Bank and Pace; and (2) the theory that both were constructively discharged without cause – rendering any restrictive covenants unenforceable.
Also on June 3, HPM moved by order to show cause for expedited document and deposition discovery in anticipation of the scheduled June 24 hearing on the parties’ respective requests for preliminary injunctions. The discovery sought focuses on the relevant employees’ personnel files (and hence the existence or non-existence of applicable covenants in written employment agreements) and Deutsche Bank’s conduct with respect to the investment instruments that Pace and Weissman claim they were being pressured to sell their clients. HPM’s brief in support of its motion for discovery is here.
On June 3, 2014, the First Department issued a decision in Culligan Soft Water Co. v. Clayton Dubilier & Rice LLC, 2014 NY Slip Op. 03955, holding that notwithstanding the internal affairs doctrine, New York law applied to some of the derivative plaintiff’s claims.
[T]he internal affairs doctrine . . . recognizes that only one State should have the authority to regulate a corporation’s internal affairs — matters peculiar to the relationships among or between the corporation and its current officers, directors, and shareholders. Since the internal affairs doctrine does not apply to those defendants who are not current officers, directors, and shareholders of Culligan Ltd., namely, Angelo, Gordon & Co., L.P., Silver Oak Capital, L.L.C., Centerbridge Special Credit Partners, L.P., CCP Credit Acquisition Holdings, L.L.C., CCP Acquisition Holding, L.L.C., and Clayton Dubilier & Rice LLC, Bermuda law does not apply to claims asserted against them.
Nor does the internal affairs doctrine apply to claims based on sections of the Business Corporation Law (BCL) enumerated in BCL §§ 1317 and 1319. BCL § 1319(a)(1) expressly provides that BCL § 626 (shareholders’ derivative action) shall apply to a foreign corporation doing business in New York. Thus, the issue of plaintiffs’ standing to bring a shareholder derivative action is governed by New York law, not Bermuda law. We note that Matter of CPF Acquisition Co. v. CPF Acquisition Co. (255 AD2d 200 [1st Dept 1998]) held that the plaintiff’s standing to sue was governed by Delaware law because Delaware was the State of the corporation’s incorporation. However, there is no indication that the plaintiff in that case raised BCL § 1319.
Pursuant to German-American Coffee Co. v. Diehl (216 NY 57, 62-64 ) and BCL §§ 1319(a)(1), 719(a)(1), and 510, New York law applies to the second cause of action, which alleges that the directors of Culligan Ltd. declared illegal dividends.
To the extent plaintiffs allege violations of BCL § 720 (e.g. waste and unlawful conveyance), which is made applicable to foreign corporations doing business in New York by BCL § 1317(a)(2), those claims are also governed by New York law. However, to the extent plaintiffs allege a violation of a section of the Business Corporation Law not enumerated in BCL § 1317 (e.g. § 717, which is part of plaintiffs’ breach of fiduciary duty claim), New York law does not apply. Those claims are governed by Bermuda law and were thus correctly dismissed.
BCL § 1317 permits plaintiffs to sue Culligan Ltd.’s directors and officers. However, defendant Clayton Dubilier & Rice Fund VI Limited Partnership (CDR Fund VI) is neither a director nor an officer of Culligan Ltd.; it is Culligan Ltd.’s majority shareholder. Hence, there is no basis for applying New York law to the claims against CDR Fund VI. It is undisputed that, under Bermuda law, plaintiffs’ claims against CDR Fund VI, as currently pleaded, were correctly dismissed.
One of the challenges in a derivative action is the proper application of the law of the jurisdiction of incorporation, not New York, to claims under the internal affairs doctrine. As this decision illustrates, however, the internal affairs doctrine might not apply to all claims in an action. Thus, a plaintiff needs to do a claim-by-claim analysis to determine which law applies to which claim.
On May 27, 2014, the First Department issued a decision in Smile Train, Inc. v. Ferris Consulting Corp., 2014 NY Slip Op. 03785, enforcing an agreement term shortening the limitations period to bring a claim relating to the agreement.
An agreement which modifies the Statute of Limitations by specifying a shorter, but reasonable, period within which to commence an action is enforceable provided it is in writing. In addition, it must not be so vague and ambiguous that it is unenforcible. . . . .
We . . . disagree with plaintiff’s contention that [the limitations provision in the parties’ contract] does not apply to its claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. It is true that I.C.C. Metals v Municipal Warehouse Co. (50 NY2d 657 ) says that a party may not limit its liability for an intentional tort. However, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is not a tort; rather, it is a contract claim. A claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing may not be used as a substitute for a nonviable claim of breach of contract. It would be anomalous if plaintiff’s contract claim were subject to a three-month statute of limitations but its claim for breach of the implied covenant were not.
The decision to agree to a shortened limitations period might seem small when an agreement is signed, but transactional counsel should remember that such agreements will be enforced, sometimes with significant consequences.
On May 20, 2014, Justice Sherwood of the New York County Commercial Division issued a decision in Goddard Investors II, LLC v. Goddard Development Partners II, LLC, 2014 NY Slip Op. 31335(U), denying a motion for summary judgment in lieu of complaint based on a guaranty because the plaintiff’s right to payment could not be ascertained from the face of the guaranty.
A claim on an instrument for the payment of money is established by proof of the instrument and a failure to make the payments called for by its terms. Proof of the fulfillment of the condition precedent to the obligation to repay, comes within this limited category of elements of proof which may be established by extrinsic evidence without rendering accelerated treatment unavailable.
The fact that defenses may be asserted against the instrument sued upon does not preclude the use of CPLR § 3213 as long as the right to payment can be ascertained from the face of the document without regard to extrinsic evidence, other than simple proof of nonpayment or a similar de minimis deviation from the face of the document. Determining the amount to be paid under the guaranty by reference to a note or a mortgage to which the Guaranty relates is a de minimis deviation in CPLR § 3213 actions for payment.
An unconditional guaranty is an instrument for the payment of money only. A guaranty is not an instrument for the payment of money only when it is relates to a stock purchase agreement which did not specify a sum certain or a series of purchase orders with separately issued invoices. The same result is reached when the guaranty is conditioned upon creditor refraining from disparaging comments about her former employer, because it requires investigation into whether the condition was respected or not.
The Note [is not] an instrument for the payment of money only because the right to payment cannot be ascertained from the face of the document. Although the Note reads that the GDP promises to pay the principal amount of $500,000 with an annual 8% interest, the payment is expressly conditional on the acquisition and sale of property. This is not the sort of de minimus deviation from the face of document that CPLR 3213 contemplates.
CPLR 3213 is a powerful tool for resolving commercial disputes. As this decision shows, however, its scope is limited.
On May 29, 2014, the First Department issued a decision in Pleiades Publishing, Inc. v. Springer Science + Business Media LLC, 2014 NY Slip Op. 03917, affirming that the plaintiff had stated a claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
These allegations state a cause of action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. While the agreement granted defendant the discretion to decide how to market and promote the [database], defendant did not have the right to exercise that discretion in such a way as to frustrate plaintiff’s rights under the agreement, deprive plaintiff of the value of its journals, or benefit itself at plaintiff’s expense.
Claims for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing are often dismissed because of the narrow circumstances in which the covenant applies. This decision illustrates how successfully to plead such a claim.
On May 27, 2014, the First Department entered a decision in Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank PJSC v. Saad Trading, 2014 NY Slip Op. 03767, holding that lack of personal jurisdiction is not a defense to an action to domesticate a foreign judgment.
New York has traditionally been a generous forum in which to enforce judgments for money damages rendered by foreign courts. Historically, New York courts have accorded recognition to the judgments rendered in a foreign country under the doctrine of comity absent some showing of fraud in the procurement of the foreign country judgment or that recognition of the judgment would do violence to some strong public policy of this State.
Arguments the week of June 2, 2014, in the Court of Appeals that may be of interest to commercial litigators.
No. 129: People v. John F. Haggerty, Jr. (To be argued Tuesday, June 3, 2014) (this is a criminal case addressing an evidentiary issue also relevant to commercial litigators—the best evidence rule: specifically, whether the testimony of the attorney who drafted a trust is admissible to prove the ownership of the trust assets when the trust agreement was available). See First Department decision here.
No. 136: In re: Thelen LLP (Geron v Seyfarth Shaw LLP) and No. 137: In re: Coudert Brothers, LLP (Development Specialists, Inc. v K&L Gates LLP) (To be argued Wednesday, June 4, 2014) (addressing certified questions from the Second Circuit: “Under New York law, is a client matter that is billed on an hourly basis the property of a law firm, such that, upon dissolution and in related bankruptcy proceedings, the law firm is entitled to the profit earned on such matters as the “unfinished business” of the firm?” and “If so, how does New York law define a ‘client matter’ for purposes of the unfinished business doctrine and what proportion of the profit derived from an ongoing hourly matter may the new law firm retain?). See Second Circuit decisions in In re: Thelen LLP here and In re: Coudert Bros. LLP here .
On June 5, 2014, Schlam Stone & Dolan partner Jeffrey Eilender will co-chair a CLE program about discovery in the Commercial Division. Among the panelists will be Commercial Division Justice Jeffrey Oing. This event is part of a two-day program hosted by the New York State Bar Association to focus on federal and state-court commercial litigation.

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