Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/308/444/
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 04:33:12+00:00

Document:
1. The guarantee by the Fourteenth Amendment of assistance of counsel in a criminal case is not satisfied by a formal appointment of counsel to defend the accused, but includes an opportunity for consultation between them and for preparation of the defense. P. 308 U. S. 446.
2. Upon review of a decision of a state court, the question whether an accused has been denied the federal constitutional right to the assistance of counsel is to be determined by this Court upon an independent examination of the record. P. 308 U. S. 447.
more time to prepare the defense did not, under the circumstances disclosed, deprive the accused of his constitutional right to the assistance of counsel. P. 308 U. S. 450.
237 Ala. 616, 188 So. 391, affirmed.
Certiorari, post, p. 540, to review the affirmance of a conviction of murder.
required both by Alabama law [Footnote 4] and the Fourteenth Amendment.
But the denial of opportunity for appointed counsel to confer, to consult with the accused, and to prepare his defense could convert the appointment of counsel into a sham, and nothing more than a formal compliance with the Constitution's requirement that an accused be given the assistance of counsel. [Footnote 6] The Constitution's guarantee of assistance of counsel cannot be satisfied by mere formal appointment.
Petitioner was convicted on an indictment filed in the Bibb County Circuit Court for murder alleged to have occurred in 1932. He was found and arrested in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, shortly before March 21, 1938. On that date, Monday, he was arraigned at a regular term of the Court; two practicing attorneys of the local bar were appointed to defend him; pleas of not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity were entered, and the presiding judge set his trial for Wednesday, March 23. The case was not reached Wednesday, but was called Thursday, the 24th, at which time his attorneys filed a motion for continuance on the ground that they had not had sufficient time and opportunity since their appointment to investigate and prepare his defense. Affidavits of both attorneys accompanied the motion.
One attorney's affidavit alleged that he had not had time to investigate and prepare the defense because he had been actually engaged in another trial from the time of his appointment at 2 P.M., Monday, until 9 P.M.
that evening; his presence had been required in the courtroom on Tuesday, March 22, due to employment in other cases set but not actually tried; he had been detained in court Wednesday, March 23, waiting for petitioner's case to be called; but, after his appointment, he had talked with petitioner, and "had serious doubts as to his sanity."
The affidavit by the other attorney stated that he too had not had proper time and opportunity to investigate petitioner's case because of his employment in other pending cases, some of which were not disposed of until Tuesday at 4:30 P.M.
No ruling on the motion for continuance appears in the record, but, on Thursday, the 24th, the trial proceeded before a jury.
The jury returned a verdict of guilty with the death penalty. On the same day, the 24th, petitioner's counsel moved for new trial, setting up error in the failure to grant the requested continuance. This motion for new trial was continued from time to time until June 30. In the interim, a third attorney had been employed by petitioner's sister, and, on June 30, petitioner's three lawyers filed an amendment to the motion for new trial, specifically setting out that the denial of a continuance had deprived petitioner of the equal protection of the laws and due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, by denying him "the right of counsel, with the accustomed incidents of consultation and opportunity of preparation for trial."
made by the trial judge, they stated that they had not made any request for leave of absence from the court to make further inquiry or investigation.
The motion for new trial was overruled.
Under the particular circumstances appearing in this record, we do not think petitioner has been denied the benefit of assistance of counsel guaranteed to him by the Fourteenth Amendment. His appointed counsel, as the Supreme Court of Alabama recognized, have performed their "full duty intelligently and well." Not only did they present petitioner's defense in the trial court, but, in conjunction with counsel later employed, they carried an appeal to the State Supreme Court, and then brought the matter here for our review. Their appointment and the representation rendered under it were not mere formalities, but petitioner's counsel have -- as was their solemn duty -- contested every step of the way leading to final disposition of the case. Petitioner has thus been afforded the assistance of zealous and earnest counsel from arraignment to final argument in this Court.
and spectators from every part of the county into the county seat for court. [Footnote 16] Unlike metropolitan centers, people in these rural counties know each other, and information concerning witnesses and events is more widespread and more generally known than in large cities. Because this was so, petitioner's attorneys were able to make the inquiries during Court Week at the county seat, to which they testified, and that they apparently withdrew the plea of insanity after this inquiry is significant. That the examination and preparation of the case, in the time permitted by the trial judge, had been adequate for counsel to exhaust its every angle is illuminated by the absence of any indication, on the motion and hearing for new trial, that they could have done more had additional time been granted.
237 Ala. 616, 188 So. 391.
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45; see Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U. S. 278, 297 U. S. 286.
Code of Ala. 1923, § 5567.
Franklin v. South Carolina, 218 U. S. 161, 218 U. S. 168; Isaacs v. United States, 159 U. S. 487, 159 U. S. 489; see Minder v. Georgia, 183 U. S. 559, 183 U. S. 561.
Cf. Powell v. Alabama, supra; Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U. S. 86, 261 U. S. 91.
Leeper v. Texas, 139 U. S. 462, 139 U. S. 467-468; Ughbanks v. Armstrong, 208 U. S. 481, 208 U. S. 487; Minder v. Georgia, supra, 183 U. S. 562.
Cf. Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97, 96 U. S. 104; Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U. S. 90, 92 U. S. 92.
Green v. Frazier, 253 U. S. 233, 253 U. S. 239-240, 253 U. S. 242; Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502, 291 U. S. 537-538.
Cf. Lewis v. United States, 146 U. S. 370, 146 U. S. 374-375.
Norris v. Alabama, 294 U. S. 587, 294 U. S. 590; Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U. S. 354, 306 U. S. 358.
The opinion of the Supreme Court of Alabama notes (237 Ala. 616, 188 So. 392): "Counsel first interposed a plea of not guilty, and another of not guilty by reason of insanity, but, upon the trial, withdrew the latter plea."
Vol. I, Fifteenth Census of the United States, 1930.
The first Constitution of Alabama (1819), Art. V, § 7, provided for the holding of a circuit court at least twice a year in each county, and this provision continues in the present constitution, Const. of Ala. (1901), Art. VI, § 144. While, in recognition of modern social needs (see Pound, Criminal Justice in America, 1930, pp. 152, 88, 150, 163, 164, 178, 183, 189, 190), circuit courts now, by statute, entertain causes at substantially all times (Code, 1923, § 6667), the holding of formal court at specific terms or sessions is emphasized in the requirement that each cause be called at least twice a year and as often as is necessary to secure prompt trials. (Id., § 6668). Cf. Ala.Civ.Code, 1907, c. 62, Art. I, § 3234, specifically providing for holding of circuit court in Bibb County on the first Monday before the last Monday in February and August of each year. In general, the practice in Alabama accords with that in all sections of the country, e.g., see Compiled Laws of Colorado, 1921, § 5656 et seq. fixing specific terms of district courts, and § 5734-5766, fixing specific dates of county court terms; Idaho Code Ann. (1932) 1-706 et seq., requiring at least two terms each year for the district court in each county to be fixed by court order; Burns Indiana Stat.Ann. (1933) 4-332 et seq., fixing specific terms of circuit courts, 4-407 et seq., and 4-607, fixing specific terms of superior courts; Rev.Stat. of Maine (1930), c. 91, § 21, p. 1262, fixing specific trial terms for superior courts; Mich.Stat.Ann. (Callaghan, 1938) § 27.546 et seq., providing for at least four terms of circuit court in each county organized for judicial purposes at fixed times subject to change by court order (§ 27.547); Cahill's Consol.Laws of New York, c. 31, § 84, providing that special and trial terms of supreme court be designated by the appellate division (see also § 150) and requiring that at least one special term and two trial terms must be held in each county annually, § 148; Rev.Stat. of Utah (1933), 20-3-6, 20-3-9, requiring at least three terms during each year for the district court at each county seat at times to be fixed by the respective district judges; Public Laws of Vermont (1933), § 1374, p. 296, fixing stated terms for holding county courts. In Pennsylvania, courts of quarter sessions, "of oyer and terminer and . . . jail delivery shall be holden four times, annually, in every county."
17 Purdon's Penn.Stat., §§ 331, 351, 371.
"together with their attachments, indictmenti, and all other muniments any ways concerning those prisoners . . . [be present, and that] all they, who will prosecute against those prisoners, be then and there to prosecute against them, as shall be just."
Stubbs, supra, 4, 5. See 1 Holdsworth's "History of English Law," 1927, pp. 49-51, 264 et seq.

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