Source: https://federalfmla.typepad.com/fmla_blog/2006/08/index.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 13:50:37+00:00

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The court agreed with the employer that what the employee was really asking for was in the nature of an award of consequential damages and/or personal injury damages, which are not available under the FMLA. Damages, the court found, recoverable under Section 2617(a)(I)(A)(i)(I) are limited to lost salary or wages, lost employment benefits, or other compensation “indicative of a quid pro quo relationship between an employer and employee. Here, the court found that, even if Briggs interfered with Harbuck’s FMLA rights as alleged, he did not sustained a lost of wages, salary, employment benefits or other compensation to which he was entitled as a result of his quid pro quo employment relationship with Briggs.
Comment: The FMLA does not compensate employees for all possible damages resulting from an employer’s violation of the Act. Emotional distress damages, consequential damages, and punitive damages are not recoverable under the FMLA. The decision should apply to cases arising under Title I, the CAA, and the PEOAA. The recovery of monetary damages in a civil suit for violation of Title II is not available.
In Gilbert v. Ohio Department of Rehabilitation & Corrections, et. al., No. 2:04-cv-13, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13584 (S.D. Ohio March 28, 2006) the court dismissed claims against individually named supervisors for allegedly violating correctional officers FMLA rights. Citing Sixth Circuit precedent, the court found that governmental officials or supervisors are not “employers” and cannot be held individually liable under the FMLA.
Comment: The courts are split regarding individual supervisor liability under Title I of the FMLA. The issue is addressed in Chapters 3 and 15 of A Federal Sector Guide to the Family and Medical Leave Act & Related Litigation (Dewey Publications, Inc. 2003 & 2005 Supp.). Individual supervisor liability does not exist under the other federal sector variants of the FMLA. Ohio, Kentucky, and Tennessee are in the Sixth Circuit.
In Hewett v. Willingboro Bd. of Ed., No. 05-2035, 2006 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 12495 (D.N.J. March 15, 2006), the court found that the Executive director of Human Resources and Administrative Service s and the Superintendent of the Willingboro Public Schools may be individually liable for violations of the FMLA in addition to agency liability. The decision gives a fairly through analysis of the issue.
Comment: Individual supervisor liability for violation of the FMLA in the private sector is well-established. The courts are split on individual supervisor liability for FMLA violations in the public sector. Individual liability means that public officials can be personally sued for monetary damages for their involvement with FMLA violations. Such liability may be in addition to any liability sought against the public agency itself.
Comments: In ruling in favor of the employer the Holpp court distinguishes the decision in Shtab v. The Great Bay Hoteland Casino, 173 F.Supp. 2d 255 (D.NJ. 2001). In that case, the court found that the employer interfered with the employee’s request for FMLA leave when it asked the employee to delay his leave until it was more convenient for the employer. Here, the court found that the employee voluntarily agreed to work from home.
In Steele v. Kroenke Sports Enterprises, LLC, o. 05-cv-00456-PSW-MJW (D.Colo. July 18, 2006), the federal district court of Colorado found that the employer neither interfered with nor retaliated against an employee as a result of the demand of the employee’s immediate supervisor that employee reveal why the employee took FMLA leave, threatened discipline, and by giving her a verbal warning. The employee had previously been granted FMLA leave for panic attacks by the Human Resources Department. The demand and threats occurred when a few days later when the employee, during the approved FMLA leave period, returned to work to attend to a previously arranged work matter within her responsibilities. In finding no violation, the court noted that the employee had received all FMLA leave she requested. Regarding the demand to reveal why she was on FMLA leave, the courted noted that the employee “cites not authority to support the notion of an FMLA right to secrecy or privacy as to why FMLA leave is being taken vis-à-vis an immediate supervisor, and she does not show how the verbal warning affected any subsequent leave sought or taken.” The court also relied on prior case law finding that verbal warnings do not rise to the level of an adverse action to support a retaliation claim.
Comment: The court is correct that the FMLA does not explicitly recognize a right to secrecy or privacy regarding the reason leave is being taken. It is well established that an employee need not assert that leave is covered by the FMLA, but only need express facts that fit within one of the FMLA covered conditions. Here, presumably the employee satisfied the notice requirement as her request for leave was approved by the Human Resources Department. Presumably, the supervisor knew little or nothing on the reason the employee took leave (shortly before a big concert date she was responsible for). In that context, the court may have simply been saying that the demand by the supervisor to know why already approved FMLA leave was being taken did not rise to the level of actionable interference or discouragement. If nothing else, the case reaffirms the importance that employees need to offer proof that they were in fact denied or discouraged from exercising FMLA rights by the interfering actions of the employer at issue. This may prove difficult where, as here, the employer otherwise provided the employee with all FMLA leave benefits they were entitled to receive.
Comment: Employers must train their supervisors that FMLA leave is a right, not a privilege, and that the law protects employees who exercise that right from interference and retaliation. In that environment, adverse op-ed comments by supervisors may bloom into expensive FMLA litigation.
In Newton v. Suntrust Bank, No. 6:05-cv-604-Orl-18JGG, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37051 (M.D.Fla. June 7, 2006), the court awarded summary judgment to the Bank dismissing the employee’s FMLA retaliation claim. In that case, the employee provided a medical certification from her physician covering certain dates. The employer told the employee that the certification was not sufficient and that she needed to submit a new certification. The employee claimed that she contacted her physician’s office whereupon someone told her that could change the Form herself and that the doctor would sign off on the changes. The employee made the changes by using whiteout over the original dates. She then submitted the altered from to the Bank without the doctor’s initials indicating his approval of the changes. Suspecting that the medical Form had been altered, the Bank met with the employee to discuss the form. The employee stated that her doctor’s office had made the changes to the Form. Prior to the meeting, the Bank had contacted the doctor’s office and was told that the office had not made the changes. The Bank terminated the employee because she failed to be honest in her responses to the Banks questions regarding the Form. The employee alleged that the Bank terminated her for exercising her rights under the FMLA. Even though the court found that the employee had engaged in protected activity (use of FMLA leave), it nevertheless concluded that the Bank did not fire her for exercising those rights, but because she failed to be honest with her supervisors regarding the alteration of the medical Form. The court dismissed as “mere speculation” the employee’s belief that she was discriminated against because she had requested FMLA leave.
Comment: The case serves as reminder that the exercise of FMLA rights does not insulate employees from unrelated discipline.
Comment: The FMLA permits an employer, pursuant to a uniformly applied policy or practice, to require the employee submit to a fitness for duty certification as a condition of returning the employee to leave. The court in this case basically rejected the employee's argument that an employer with such a policy could not require a fitness for duty examination where the original medical certification included a return to work date.
In Knapp v. America West Airlines, Inc., No. 2:01CV793 TC, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30511 (D.Utah Nov. 18, 2005), the employee, a pilot, alleged that America West violated the FMLA when it denied her leave to care for her son. America West moved to dismiss the case alleging that Ms. Knapp did not meet the 1250 work-hours requirement and, therefore, was not eligible for FMLA leave. The court counted 400 hours Ms. Knapp served on active duty or in training during the twelve months preceding the commencement of the FMLA leave at issue. The court also counted 364 hours of “layover time” spent by Ms. Knapp. Layover time is time spent away from home between flights during which she was required to remain at the airport, she was prohibited from consuming alcohol, and was required to rest for eight hours. Applying FLSA principles, the court found such restrictions sufficient to impede Ms. Knapp’s personal pursuits. The court declined to count “reserve time” toward the 1250 hours. While on reserve, Ms. Knapp could not drink alcohol. She also had to be available by pone and be able to report to the airport within one hour of a telephone call. She could, however, serve reserve time at home. The court concluded that such restrictions were not so severe that they render those hours compensable and, therefore, such hours did not count towards the FMLA’s 1250 work hours eligibility requirement.
Comment: The 1250 work hours eligibility requirement is determined based on FLSA principles.
In Lombardo v. Air Products and Chemicals, Inc., No. 05-1120, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46077 (E.D.Pa. July 7, 2006), the court found that Mr. Lombardo did not have the FMLA right to return to work from FMLA leave because, at the expiration of his 12 weeks of leave, he could not perform all of the essential functions of his warehouse position. An essential function of his job was lifting and reaching for heavy objects. At the expiration of his 12 weeks of FMLA leave Mr. Lombardo could, at best, have returned to work with lifting and reaching restrictions. The FMLA, the court found, does not require that an employer make job accommodations in order to facilitate an employee’s return from FMLA leave. Air Products was not, therefore, obligated by the FMLA to reinstate Lombardo to his same or equivalent position, the court found.
Comments: The FMLA right to return to work on the conclusion of the need for FMLA leave is conditioned on the employee's ability to perform all essential job functions. Of course, the requirements of other applicable laws and/or an employer's more generous policy or practice may permit or require an employer to return an employee to work even though they are unable to perform all essential job functions.

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