Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/90280/atlantic-coast-line-r-co-vs-corp-comm
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 18:55:17+00:00

Document:
Appellant Atlantic Coast Line R. Co.
Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company v.
Railroad companies, from the public nature of the business by them carried on and the interest which the public have in their operation, are subject as to their state business to state regulation, which may be exerted either directly by the legislative authority or by administrative bodies endowed with power to that end.
The public power to regulate railroads and the private right of ownership of such property coexist, and do not the one destroy the other, and where the power to regulate is so arbitrarily exercised as to infringe the rights of ownership, the exertion is void because repugnant to the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.
An order of a state railroad commission requiring a railroad company to so arrange its schedule as to furnish transportation between two points so as to make connections with through trains held, under the circumstances of this case, not to be so arbitrary or unreasonable as to transcend the limits of regulation and to be in effect either a denial of due process of law or a deprivation of the equal protection of the laws, or a taking of property without compensation.
Whether a regulation of a state railroad commission, otherwise legal, is arbitrary and unreasonable because beyond the scope of the powers delegated to the commission is not a federal question.
the convenience of the traveling public, and an order requiring the running of an additional train for that purpose, if otherwise just and reasonable, is not inherently unjust and unreasonable because the running of such train will impose some pecuniary loss on the company.
While the enforcement by a a general scheme of maximum rates so unreasonably low as to be unjust and unreasonable may be confiscation, and amount to taking property without due process of law, the states have power to compel a railroad company to perform a particular and specified duty necessary for the convenience of the public even though it may entail some pecuniary loss. Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 526 , distinguished.
Did the order of the North Carolina Corporation Commission, the enforcement of which was directed by the court below, invade constitutional rights of the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company, hereafter spoken of as the Coast Line, is the question which arises on this record for decision. A sketch showing the situation of the railway tracks at and relating to the place with which the controversy is concerned was annexed by the court below to its opinion, and that sketch is reproduced to aid in clearness of statement.
of the connection made with the Norfolk train at Rocky Mount, and would disarrange the running time of the train south of Selma, and disturb connections which that train made with other roads south of that point. However, it was pointed out that, as train No. 39 did not originate at Richmond, but was a through train, made up at New York, carried from thence to Washington by the Pennsylvania and from Washington to Richmond by the Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac, that negotiations would be put on foot with those roads with an endeavor to secure an acceleration of the time of the departure of the train from New York and Washington, so as thereby to enable an earlier departure from Richmond. On the eleventh of October, the change of time became operative, and the connection at Selma was broken.
"Whereas, the convenience of the traveling public requires that close connection be made between the passenger trains on the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad and the Southern Railway at Selma daily in the afternoon of each day;"
"And whereas, it appears that such close connection is practicable:"
"It is ordered that the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad arrange its schedule so that the train will arrive at Selma at 2:25 P.M. each day instead of 2:50 P.M., as the schedule now stands."
"It is further ordered that, if the Atlantic Coast Line trains have passengers en route for the Southern Railway and are delayed, notice shall be given to the Southern Railway, and that the Southern Railway shall wait fifteen minutes for such delayed trains upon receipt of such notice."
"This order shall take effect December 20, 1903."
"On October 6th, I further advised the Southern Railway that, if their train was scheduled to leave Selma at 2:25 P.M., this would break the connection with our No. 39, and stated to them that the connection was a most important one, being the principal outlet for passengers en route from eastern Carolina to Raleigh and other points on their line, and that we hoped that they could see their way clear not to disturb the connection, as it was impossible for us to get No. 39 to Selma at an earlier hour than the present schedule owing to the inability of northern connections to deliver the train to us at Richmond any sooner."
Proceeding to point out the failure of the negotiations with the Pennsylvania and recapitulating the previous statements concerning the rapidity of the schedule of No. 39 between Richmond and Selma, the exacting nature of its work and connections, the absolute impossibility of making it faster was insisted upon. Indeed, there was annexed to the letter a report of the time of No. 39 at Selma for a period of nearly five months, showing that the train had rarely made its connection at Selma.
a. That a train was operated from Plymouth to Rocky Mount, which left in the morning at 7:30 and arrived at Rocky Mount at 10:35, where it remained until 3:55 in the afternoon, when it returned to Plymouth.
"Assuming that the statements made by the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company are true -- that it was, for the past five months, impossible for them to bring No. 39 to Selma by schedule time, to-wit, 2:50 P.M., more than twice, and that this train was more than ten minutes late every day except twenty-four -- we must conclude that it is impracticable to require them to make a faster schedule and place this train at Selma at 2:25 P.M. instead of 2:50 P.M., and therefore this much of the former order is revoked and annulled; but the commission is of the opinion that it is practicable, and that the convenience of the traveling public requires, that the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company furnish transportation for passengers from Rocky Mount to Selma after 12:50 P.M. and by or before 2:25 P.M. each day; that this can be done by extending the run of the Plymouth train to Selma instead of having it lie over at Rocky Mount as now, or by extending the run of the Spring Hope train to Selma instead of having it lie over at Rocky Mount as now. The distance from Plymouth to Rocky Mount is sixty-nine miles, and from Spring Hope to Rocky Mount is nineteen miles, and from Rocky Mount to Selma forty-two miles; or by providing a separate train for the service."
Railroad Company furnish transportation for passengers from Rocky Mount to Selma after 12:50 P.M. and by or before 2:25 P.M. each day."
"It is further ordered that the Southern Railway hold its train No. 135 at Selma fifteen minutes if for any reason the Atlantic Coast Line train connecting at that point is delayed."
"It is further ordered that this order take effect on and after the 26th day of January, 1904."
routes were in effect disposed of upon similar considerations to those above adverted to.
"The commission is of the opinion that the facilities given heretofore by the Atlantic Coast Line Company to the traveling public should not be lessened; that the connection furnished passengers from the Washington branch, the Norfolk & Carolina branch, the Plymouth branch, and the Nashville branch with No. 135, Southern Railway passenger train at Selma, and also for all points between Rocky Mount and Selma, for nearly ten years, should be restored; that, if this cannot be done by the Atlantic Coast Line train No. 39, as formerly, on account of this train's being heavier, containing usually one or more extra express cars, and in all usually ten or more cars, and on account of increase in business between Richmond and Selma, which necessitates longer stops, then other facilities should be furnished by the Atlantic Coast Line Company; that this connection, which was the principal outlet for passengers from eastern Carolina to Selma and other Southern Railway points for the last ten years, instead of being abandoned, should be made permanent and certain, and that this result be accomplished by carrying out the order heretofore made in this court. It is ordered therefore that the exceptions be, and they are hereby, overruled. "
"1. Is it practicable for train No. 39 of the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad due to arrive at Selma at 2:50 P.M. to make connection at Selma with train No. 135, westbound, of the Southern Railway, due to leave Selma at 2:25 P.M.?"
"2. Is it practicable to make said connection by extending the run of the Plymouth train daily from Plymouth to Selma and return, and, if so, what would be the additional expense?"
"3. Is it practicable to make said connection by the use of the Spring Hope train, and, if so, what would be the additional expense?"
"4. In order to make such connection would defendant company have to run an additional train on its main line from Rocky Mount to Selma?"
"5. Is it practicable for said train to safely run the schedule prescribed in plaintiff's order, having due regard to the number of trains and number of stops, on defendant's main line from Rocky Mount to Selma?"
"6. What would be the daily cost of operating such train from Rocky Mount to Selma and return?"
"7. What would be the probable daily receipts from such train?"
"8. Is it reasonable and proper that, for convenience of the traveling public, the defendant company should be required to make such connection? "
The answers to the first four questions were the result of peremptory instructions by the court, and the responses to the last four were deduced by the jury from the testimony submitted to its consideration.
"to interfere with the right of railway companies to regulate for themselves the time and manner in which passengers and property should be transported,"
the connection at Selma referred to in the findings, the court yet reviewed the means of performance therein stated. In doing so, it was decided that, although to execute the order of the commission it might be imperative for the Coast Line to operate at a pecuniary loss a new train from Rocky Mount to Selma, or the extension, with like result, of the movement of one or the other of the branch trains from Rocky Mount to Selma, no violation of any right of the Coast Line protected by the Constitution of the United States or of the state would arise. This was based upon the finding by the court that the average net earning of the railroad from its business in North Carolina was of such a character that an adequate remuneration would remain after allowing for any possible loss which might arise from operating either of the trains in question. 137 N.C. 14.
general rule, the assignments of error rest upon the hypothesis that the order which the court below enforced was so arbitrary and unreasonable in its character as to transcend the limits of regulation, and to be in effect a denial of due process of law, or a deprivation of the equal protection of the laws.
As the public power to regulate railways and the private right of ownership of such property coexist, and do not the one destroy the other, it has been settled that the right of ownership of railway property, like other property rights, finds protection in constitutional guaranties, and therefore wherever the power of regulation is exerted in such an arbitrary and unreasonable was as to cause it to be in effect not a regulation, but an infringement upon the right of ownership, such an exertion of power is void because repugnant to the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. [ Footnote 3 ] The result, therefore, is that the proposition relied upon is well founded if it be that the order which the court below enforced was of the arbitrary and unreasonable character asserted.
ten propositions of error found in the record and reproduced in the briefs of counsel, as each proposition, although numbered separately, but reiterates grounds of error to be found in the others. In other words, the various grounds of error are so interblended in the several propositions as to render it impossible to treat one as distinct from the other. All the grounds, however, which the propositions assert as establishing the arbitrary and unreasonable character of the order complained of may be embraced under four general headings, which we proceed to dispose of.
1. That the order was arbitrary and unreasonable because beyond the scope of the authority delegated to the corporation commission by the state law.
As this proposition involves no federal question, and is concluded by the judgment entered below, we put the subject out of view. And, although not cognate to this proposition, to clear the way for the consideration of the substantial issues, we also put aside the suggestion made in argument, that, as the Southern Railway, by its change of schedule, originally rendered the connection at Selma impossible, therefore that road should have been compelled to restore the connection by a modification of the schedule or schedules of the trains by it operated. We put this suggestion aside because it does not seem to have been seriously urged in the court below, and besides is so directly refuted by the findings that we think it requires no further notice.
2. The order was arbitrary and unreasonable because, when properly considered, it imposed upon the Coast Line a duty foreign to its obligation to furnish adequate facilities for those traveling upon its road.
of the Coast Line. This reduces itself to the contention that, although the governmental power to regulate exists in the interest of the public, yet it does not extend to securing to the public reasonable facilities for making connection between different carriers. But the proposition destroys itself, since at one and the same time it admits the plenary power to regulate, and yet virtually denies the efficiency of that authority. That power, as we have seen, takes its origin from the quasi -public nature of the business in which the carrier is engaged, and embraces that business in its entirety, which, of course, includes the duty to require carriers to make reasonable connections with other roads so as to promote the convenience of the traveling public. In considering the facts found below as to the connection in question -- that is, the population contained in the large territory whose convenience was subserved by the connection and the admission of the railroad as to the importance of the connection -- we conclude that the order in question, considered from the point of view of the requirements of the public interest, was one coming clearly within the scope of the power to enforce just and reasonable regulations.
3. That the facilities afforded the public by the railroad were of such a character as to demonstrate that the extra burden which would result from the compliance with the order was wholly arbitrary and unreasonable.
essential to be considered in determining whether an order directing an increase of such facilities is just and reasonable, and that the deficiency of facilities must clearly appear to justify an order directing the furnishing of new and additional facilities, we think the proposition here relied on to be without merit. Its error arises from assuming that adequate facilities were afforded at Selma or via Weldon and the Seaboard without reference to the order complained of. In view of the facts as to the connections at Selma and the Weldon route, found by the commission and reiterated by the court, which we have previously stated, and which we accept, we cannot escape drawing for ourselves the conclusion deduced both by the commission and the court below that the connections relied on were wholly inadequate for the public convenience, and therefore a state of things existed justifying the order.
4. That, however otherwise just and reasonable the order may have been, it is inherently unjust and unreasonable because of the nature of the burden which it necessarily imposes.
"A state enactment, or regulations made under the authority of a state enactment, establishing rates for the transportation of persons or property by railroad that will not admit of the carrier earning such compensation as, under all the circumstances, is just to it and to the public, would deprive such carrier of its property without due process of law, and deny to it the equal protection of the laws, and would therefore be repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States."
the unreasonableness of the order. Such, however, is not the case when the question is as to the validity of an order to do a particular act, the doing of which does not involve the question of the profitableness of the operation of the railroad as an entirety. The difference between the two cases is illustrated in St. Louis &c.; Ry. Co. v. Gill, 156 U. S. 649 , and Minneapolis & St.Louis R. Co. v. Minnesota, 186 U. S. 257 . But even if the rule applicable to an entire rate scheme were to be here applied, as the findings made below as to the net earnings constrain us to conclude that adequate remuneration would result from the general operation of the rates in force, even allowing for any loss occasioned by the running of the extra train in question, it follows that the order would not be unreasonable, even if tested by the doctrine announced in Smyth v. Ames and kindred cases.
"Although to carry out the judgment may require the exercise by the plaintiff in error of the power of eminent domain, and will also result in some, comparatively speaking, small expense, yet neither fact furnishes an answer to the application of defendant in error. Worcester v. Norwich & W. R. Co., 109 Mass. 112; People ex Rel. Green v. Dutchess & C. R. Co., 58 N.Y. 152, 163; People ex Rel. Kimball v. Boston & A. R. Co., 70 N.Y. 569; People v. New York, L. E. & W. R. Co., 104 N.Y. 58, 67."
"1. The train from Rocky Mount, southbound, in the early morning makes a close connection at Goldsboro at 6:50 o'clock with the Southern for Raleigh and all points west."
"2. The trains from Norfolk and Richmond make close connection at Goldsboro and Selma with the night train on the Southern for Raleigh and all points west."
"3. The train from Weldon to Kinston makes close connection at Kinston with the Atlantic & North Carolina train for Goldsboro, which train in turn makes close connection with the Southern at Goldsboro at 9:40 P.M. for Raleigh and all points west."
"4. The train No. 39, from Washington to Jacksonville, is due at Selma at 2:50 P.M. and the accommodation train No. 183, on the Southern, from Selma to Raleigh and all points west, is scheduled to leave Selma at 3:25 P.M."
"5. Train No. from Jacksonville to Washington is due to arrive at Selma at 2:10 o'clock, and makes close connection there with the Southern, which leaves Selma at 2:25 P.M. for Raleigh and all points west."
"6. Two trains leave Wilmington for the north, the first at 9:30 A.M., No. 48, and the other, No. 42 at 6:50 P.M. Both of these trains make close connections at Goldsboro with the Southern trains for Raleigh and all points west."
"7. No. 34, leaving Smithfield at 7:00 A.M., makes close connection at Selma with the Southern going west for Raleigh and all points beyond, and the same train makes close connection at Weldon with the Seaboard train for Raleigh, and for Seaboard points south and west."
"8. No. 102 leaves Goldsboro for Norfolk at 7:30 A.M., and makes close connection at Hobgood with No. 58, the train from Kinston to Weldon, and there with the Seaboard for Raleigh and points west."
Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Iowa, 94 U. S. 155 ; Peik v. Chicago & N.W. R. Co., 94 U. S. 164 ; Chicago, M. & St.P. R. Co. v. Ackley, 94 U. S. 179 ; Winona & St. Peter R. Co. v. Blake, 94 U. S. 180 ; Stone v. Wisconsin, 94 U. S. 181 ; Ruggles v. Illinois, 108 U. S. 536 ; Illinois Central R. Co. v. Illinois, 108 U. S. 541 ; Stone v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 116 U. S. 307 ; Stone v. Illinois Central R. Co., 116 U. S. 347 ; Stone v. New Orleans & Northeastern R. Co., 116 U. S. 352 ; Dow v. Beidelman, 125 U. S. 680 ; Charlotte, C. & A. R. Co. v. Gibbes, 142 U. S. 386 ; Chicago & Grand Trunk R. Co. v. Wellman, 143 U. S. 339 ; Pearsall v. Great Northern. R. Co., 161 U. S. 646 , 161 U. S. 665 ; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Kentucky, 161 U. S. 677 , 161 U. S. 695 ; Wisconsin, M. & P. R. Co. v. Jacobson, 179 U. S. 287 ; Minneapolis & St.L. R. Co. v. Minnesota, 186 U. S. 257 ; Minneapolis & St.L. R. Co. v. Minnesota, 193 U. S. 53 ; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Illinois, 200 U. S. 561 , 200 U. S. 584 ; Atlantic Coast Line v. Florida, 203 U. S. 256 ; Seaboard Air Line v. Florida, 203 U. S. 261 .
Stone v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 116 U. S. 307 , 116 U. S. 331 ; Chicago, M. & St.P. R. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U. S. 418 , 134 U. S. 455 ; Chicago & Grand Trunk R. Co. v. Wellman, 143 U. S. 339 , 143 U. S. 344 ; Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 154 U. S. 362 , 154 U. S. 399 ; St. Louis & San Francisco R. Co. v. Gill, 156 U. S. 649 , 156 U. S. 657 ; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226 , 166 U. S. 241 ; Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466 , 512 [argument of counsel - omitted]; Chicago, M. & St.P. R. Co. v. Tompkins, 176 U. S. 167 , 176 U. S. 172 ; Minneapolis & St.L. R. Co. v. Minnesota, 186 U. S. 257 ; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Illinois, 200 U. S. 561 , 200 U. S. 592 .

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