Source: https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/501/663
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 06:11:29+00:00

Document:
1. This Court has jurisdiction. Respondents' contention that the case should be dismissed because the promissory estoppel theory was not argued or presented in the courts below and because the State Supreme Court's decision rests entirely on a state law interpretation is rejected. It is irrelevant to this Court's jurisdiction whether a party raised below and argued a federal law issue that the state supreme court actually considered and decided. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 274-275. Moreover, the Minnesota Supreme Court made clear that its holding rested on federal law, and respondents have defended against this suit all along by arguing that the First Amendment barred the enforcement of the reporters' promises. Pp. 667-668.
2. The First Amendment does not bar a promissory estoppel cause of action against respondents. Such a cause of action, although private, involves state action within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, and therefore triggers the First Amendment's protections, since promissory estoppel is a state law doctrine creating legal obligations never explicitly assumed by the parties that are enforceable through the Minnesota courts' official power. Cf., e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, [p664] 376 U.S. 254, 265. However, the doctrine is a law of general applicability that does not target or single out the press, but rather is applicable to all Minnesota citizens' daily transactions. Thus, the First Amendment does not require that its enforcement against the press be subject to stricter scrutiny than would be applied to enforcement against others, cf. Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132-133, even if the payment is characterized as compensatory damages. Nor does that Amendment grant the press protection from any law which in any fashion or to any degree limits or restricts its right to report truthful information. The Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, distinguished. Moreover, Cohen sought damages for a breach of promise that caused him to lose his job and lowered his earning capacity, and did not attempt to use a promissory estoppel cause of action to avoid the strict requirements for establishing a libel or defamation claim. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, distinguished. Any resulting inhibition on truthful reporting is no more than the incidental, and constitutionally insignificant, consequence of applying to the press a generally applicable law requiring them to keep certain promises. Pp. 668-672.
3. Cohen's request that his compensatory damages award be reinstated is rejected. The issues whether his verdict should be upheld on the ground that a promissory estoppel claim had been established under state law and whether the State Constitution may be construed to shield the press from an action such as this one are matters for the State Supreme Court to address and resolve in the first instance. Pp. 672.
During the closing days of the 1982 Minnesota gubernatorial race, Dan Cohen, an active Republican associated with Wheelock Whitney's Independent-Republican gubernatorial campaign, approached reporters from the St. Paul Pioneer Press Dispatch (Pioneer Press) and the Minneapolis Star and Tribune (Star Tribune) and offered to provide documents relating to a candidate in the upcoming election. Cohen made clear to the reporters that he would provide the information only if he was given a promise of confidentiality. Reporters from both papers promised to keep Cohen's identity anonymous, and Cohen turned over copies of two public court records concerning Marlene Johnson, the Democratic-Farmer-Labor candidate for Lieutenant Governor. The first record indicated that Johnson had been charged in 1969 with three counts of unlawful assembly, and the second that she had been convicted in 1970 of petit theft. Both newspapers interviewed Johnson for her explanation, and one reporter tracked down the person who had found the records for Cohen. As it turned out, the unlawful assembly charges arose out of Johnson's participation in a protest of an alleged failure to hire minority workers on municipal construction projects, and the charges were eventually dismissed. The petit theft conviction was for leaving a store without paying [p666] for $6.00 worth of sewing materials. The incident apparently occurred at a time during which Johnson was emotionally distraught, and the conviction was later vacated.
A divided Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the compensatory damages award. 457 N.W.2d 199 (Minn.1990). After affirming the Court of Appeals' determination that Cohen had not established a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation, the court considered his breach of contract claim and concluded that "a contract cause of action is inappropriate for these particular circumstances." Id. at 203. The court then went on to address the question whether Cohen could establish a cause of action under Minnesota law on a promissory estoppel theory. Apparently, a promissory estoppel theory was never tried to the jury, nor briefed nor argued by [p667] the parties; it first arose during oral argument in the Minnesota Supreme Court when one of the justices asked a question about equitable estoppel. See App. 38.
[u]nder a promissory estoppel analysis, there can be no neutrality towards the First Amendment. In deciding whether it would be unjust not to enforce the promise, the court must necessarily weigh the same considerations that are weighed for whether the First Amendment has been violated. The court must balance the constitutional rights of a free press against the common law interest in protecting a promise of anonymity.
in this case, enforcement of the promise of confidentiality under a promissory estoppel theory would violate defendants' First Amendment rights.
The initial question we face is whether a private cause of action for promissory estoppel involves "state action" within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment such that the protections of the First Amendment are triggered. For if it does not, then the First Amendment has no bearing on this case. The rationale of our decision in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), and subsequent cases compels the conclusion that there is state action here. Our cases teach that the application of state rules of law in state courts in a manner alleged to restrict First Amendment freedoms constitutes "state action" under the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., id. at 265; NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 916, n. 51 (1982); Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 777 (1986). In this case, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that, if Cohen could recover at all, it would be on the theory of promissory estoppel, a state law doctrine which, in the absence of a contract, creates obligations never explicitly assumed by the parties. These legal obligations would be enforced through the official power of the Minnesota courts. Under our cases, that is enough to constitute "state action" for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.
if a newspaper lawfully obtains truthful information about a matter of public significance, then state officials may not constitutionally punish publication of the information, absent a need to further a [p669] state interest of the highest order.
Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979). That proposition is unexceptionable, and it has been applied in various cases that have found insufficient the asserted state interests in preventing publication of truthful, lawfully obtained information. See, e.g., The Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989); Smith v. Daily Mail, supra; Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978).
[t]he publisher of a newspaper has no special immunity from the application of general laws. He has no special privilege to invade the rights and liberties of others.
Associated Press v. NLRB, supra, 301 U.S. at 132-133. Accordingly, enforcement of such general laws against the press is not subject to stricter scrutiny than would be applied to enforcement against other persons or organizations.
JUSTICE BLACKMUN suggests that applying Minnesota promissory estoppel doctrine in this case will "punish" Respondents for publishing truthful information that was lawfully obtained. Post at 675-676. This is not strictly accurate, because compensatory damages are not a form of punishment, as were the criminal sanctions at issue in Smith. If the contract between the parties in this case had contained a liquidated damages provision, it would be perfectly clear that the payment to petitioner would represent a cost of acquiring newsworthy material to be published at a profit, rather than a punishment imposed by the State. The payment of compensatory damages in this case is constitutionally indistinguishable from a generous bonus paid to a confidential news source. In any event, as indicated above, the characterization of the payment makes no difference for First Amendment purposes when the law being applied is a general law, and does not single out the press. Moreover, JUSTICE BLACKMUN's reliance on cases like The Florida Star and Smith v. Daily Mail is misplaced. In those cases, the State itself defined the content of publications that would trigger liability. Here, by contrast, [p671] Minnesota law simply requires those making promises to keep them. The parties themselves, as in this case, determine the scope of their legal obligations, and any restrictions which may be placed on the publication of truthful information are self-imposed.
Nor is Cohen attempting to use a promissory estoppel cause of action to avoid the strict requirements for establishing a libel or defamation claim. As the Minnesota Supreme Court observed here, "Cohen could not sue for defamation, because the information disclosed [his name] was true." 457 N.W.2d at 202. Cohen is not seeking damages for injury to his reputation or his state of mind. He sought damages in excess of $50,000 for a breach of a promise that caused him to lose his job and lowered his earning capacity. Thus, this is not a case like Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988), where we held that the constitutional libel standards apply to a claim alleging that the publication of a parody was a state law tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Respondents and amici argue that permitting Cohen to maintain a cause of action for promissory estoppel will inhibit truthful reporting because news organizations will have legal incentives not to disclose a confidential source's identity even when that person's identity is itself newsworthy. JUSTICE SOUTER makes a similar argument. But if this is the case, [p672] it is no more than the incidental, and constitutionally insignificant, consequence of applying to the press a generally applicable law that requires those who make certain kinds of promises to keep them. Although we conclude that the First Amendment does not confer on the press a constitutional right to disregard promises that would otherwise be enforced under state law, we reject Cohen's request that, in reversing the Minnesota Supreme Court's judgment, we reinstate the jury verdict awarding him $200,000 in compensatory damages. See Brief for Petitioner 31. The Minnesota Supreme Court's incorrect conclusion that the First Amendment barred Cohen's claim may well have truncated its consideration of whether a promissory estoppel claim had otherwise been established under Minnesota law, and whether Cohen's jury verdict could be upheld on a promissory estoppel basis. Or perhaps the State Constitution may be construed to shield the press from a promissory estoppel cause of action such as this one. These are matters for the Minnesota Supreme Court to address and resolve in the first instance on remand. Accordingly, the judgment of the Minnesota Supreme Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
the equally well-established line of decisions holding that generally applicable laws do not offend the First Amendment simply because their enforcement against the press has incidental effects on its ability to gather and report the news.
Ante at 669. See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972); Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 192-193 (1946); Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 581-583 (1983). I disagree.
the promise of anonymity arises in the classic First Amendment context of the quintessential public debate in our democratic society, namely, a political source involved in a political campaign.
457 N.W.2d 199, 205 (1990); see also id. at 204, n. 6 ("New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), holds that a state may not adopt a state rule of law to impose impermissible restrictions on the federal constitutional freedoms of speech and press"). Necessarily, the First Amendment protection afforded respondents would be equally available to non-media defendants. See, e.g., Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938) ("The liberty of the press is not confined to newspapers and periodicals. . . . The press in its historic connotation comprehends every sort of publication which affords a vehicle of information and opinion"). The majority's admonition that "‘[t]he publisher of a newspaper has no special immunity from the application of general laws,'" ante at 670, and its [p674] reliance on the cases that support that principle, are therefore misplaced.
these cases involve no intrusions upon speech or assembly, no . . . restriction on what the press may publish, and no express or implied command that the press publish what it prefers to withhold. . . . [N]o penalty, civil or criminal, related to the content of published material is at issue here.
the obligation of reporters to respond to grand jury subpoenas as other citizens do and to answer questions relevant to an investigation into the commission of crime.
public figures and public officials may not recover for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress by reason of publications such as the one here at issue without showing, in addition, that the publication contains a false statement of fact which was made with "actual malice,"
As in Hustler, the operation of Minnesota's doctrine of promissory estoppel in this case cannot be said to have a merely "incidental" burden on speech; the publication of important political speech is the claimed violation. Thus, as in Hustler, the law may not be enforced to punish the expression [p676] of truthful information or opinion. [n4] In the instant case, it is undisputed that the publication at issue was true.
To the extent that truthful speech may ever be sanctioned consistent with the First Amendment, it must be in furtherance of a state interest "of the highest order." Smith, 443 U.S. at 103. Because the Minnesota Supreme Court's opinion makes clear that the State's interest in enforcing its promissory estoppel doctrine in this case was far from compelling, see 457 N.W.2d at 204-205, I would affirm that court's decision.
if . . . respondent had merely reported that petitioner was performing at the fair and described or commented on his act, with or without showing his picture on television, we would have a very different case.
Id. at 569. Thus, Zacchini cannot support the majority's conclusion that "a law of general applicability," ante at 670, may not violate the First Amendment when employed to penalize the dissemination of truthful information or the expression of opinion.
that the defendant's conduct (1) is intentional or reckless; (2) offends generally accepted standards of decency or morality; (3) is causally connected with the plaintiff's emotional distress; and (4) caused emotional distress that was severe.
485 U.S. at 50, n. 3.
3. The majority attempts to distinguish Hustler on the ground that there the plaintiff sought damages for injury to his state of mind, whereas the petitioner here sought damages "for a breach of a promise that caused him to lose his job and lowered his earning capacity." Ante at 671. I perceive no meaningful distinction between a statute that penalizes published speech in order to protect the individual's psychological wellbeing or reputational interest and one that exacts the same penalty in order to compensate the loss of employment or earning potential. Certainly our decision in Hustler recognized no such distinction.
4. The majority argues that, unlike the criminal sanctions we considered in Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979), the liability at issue here will not "punish" respondents in the strict sense of that word. Ante at 670. While this may be true, we have long held that the imposition of civil liability based on protected expression constitutes "punishment" of speech for First Amendment purposes. See, e.g., Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 386 (1973) ("In the context of a libelous advertisement . . . , this Court has held that the First Amendment does not shield a newspaper from punishment for libel when with actual malice it publishes a falsely defamatory advertisement") (emphasis added), citing New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-280 (1964); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) ("[P]unishment of error runs the risk of inducing a cautious and restrictive exercise of the constitutionally guaranteed freedoms of speech and press") (emphasis added). Cf. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 297 (Black, J., concurring) ("To punish the exercise of this right to discuss public affairs or to penalize it through libel judgments is to abridge or shut off discussion of the very kind most needed") (emphasis added).
Though they be civil, the sanctions we review in this case are no more justifiable as "a cost of acquiring newsworthy material," ante at 670, than were the libel damages at issue in New York Times, a permissible cost of disseminating newsworthy material.
when [such effects] have been justified by subordinating valid governmental interests, a prerequisite to constitutionality which has necessarily involved a weighing of the governmental interest involved. . . . Whenever, in such a context, these constitutional protections are asserted against the exercise of valid governmental powers, a reconciliation must be effected, and that perforce requires an appropriate weighing of the respective interests involved.
Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36, 51 (1961). Thus, "[t]here is nothing talismanic about neutral laws of general applicability," Employment Division, Dept. of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 901 (1990) (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in judgment), for such laws may restrict First Amendment rights just as effectively as those directed specifically at speech itself. Because I do not believe the fact of general applicability to be dispositive, I find it necessary to articulate, measure, and compare the competing interests involved in any given case to determine the legitimacy of burdening constitutional interests, and such has been the Court's recent practice in publication cases. See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988); Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
Nor can I accept the majority's position that we may dispense with balancing because the burden on publication is in a sense "self-imposed" by the newspaper's voluntary promise of confidentiality. See ante at 671. This suggests both the possibility of waiver, the requirements for which have not been met here, see, e.g., Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 145 (1967), as well as a conception of First Amendment rights as those of the speaker alone, with a value that may be measured without reference to the importance of the [p678] information to public discourse. But freedom of the press is ultimately founded on the value of enhancing such discourse for the sake of a citizenry better informed, and thus more prudently self-governed.
[T]he First Amendment goes beyond protection of the press and the self-expression of individuals to prohibit government from limiting the stock of information from which members of the public may draw.
[w]ithout the information provided by the press, most of us and many of our representatives would be unable to vote intelligently or to register opinions on the administration of government generally.
Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 492 (1975); cf. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 573 (1980); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 278-279 (1964).
The importance of this public interest is integral to the balance that should be struck in this case. There can be no doubt that the fact of Cohen's identity expanded the universe of information relevant to the choice faced by Minnesota voters in that State's 1982 gubernatorial election, the publication of which was thus of the sort quintessentially subject to strict First Amendment protection. See, e.g., Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Committee, 489 U.S. 214, 223 (1989). The propriety of his leak to respondents could be taken to reflect on his character, which in turn could be taken to reflect on the character of the candidate who had retained him as an adviser. An election could turn on just such a factor; if it should, I am ready to assume that it would be to the greater public good, at least over the long run.
This is not to say that the breach of such a promise of confidentiality could never give rise to liability. One can conceive of situations in which the injured party is a private individual, [p679] whose identity is of less public concern than that of the petitioner; liability there might not be constitutionally prohibited. Nor do I mean to imply that the circumstances of acquisition are irrelevant to the balance, see, e.g., Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 534-535, and n. 8 (1989), although they may go only to what balances against, and not to diminish, the First Amendment value of any particular piece of information.

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