Source: http://me.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20171031_0000663.DME.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 09:18:02+00:00

Document:
John C. Nivison, Magistrate Judge.
Following a guilty plea, Petitioner was convicted of bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 2113(a); the Court sentenced Petitioner to a below-guidelines term of 180 months in prison, to be followed by three years of supervised release. (Judgment, ECF No. 136 at 1-3; Statement of Reasons, ECF No. 137 at 3.) Petitioner appealed from the sentence, particularly, the denial of credit for acceptance of responsibility. The First Circuit affirmed. United States v. D'Angelo, 802 F.3d 205 (1st Cir. 2015).
Following a review of Petitioner's motion to amend (ECF No. 261), Petitioner's section 2255 motion (ECF Nos. 198, 202), and the Government's request for dismissal, I recommend that the Court grant Petitioner's motion to amend, and that the Court grant the Government's request and dismiss Petitioner's section 2255 motion.
On appeal, Petitioner challenged the denial of credit for acceptance of responsibility. D'Angelo, 802 F.3d at 206. The First Circuit concluded, in an October 2015 decision, that “the district court did not commit any error, much less clear error” when it denied a reduction for acceptance of responsibility. Id. at 211.
In June 2016, Petitioner filed the Johnson claim. (Motion, ECF No. 193). In July 2016, Petitioner filed a section 2255 motion with additional claims.
A person may move to vacate his or her sentence on one of four different grounds: (1) “that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States”; (2) “that the court was without jurisdiction” to impose its sentence; (3) “that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law”; or (4) that the sentence “is otherwise subject to collateral attack.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a); see Knight v. United States, 37 F.3d 769, 772 (1st Cir. 1994).
The burden is on the section 2255 petitioner to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she is entitled to relief. David v. United States, 134 F.3d 470, 474 (1st Cir. 1998); United States v. DiCarlo, 575 F.2d 952, 954 (1st Cir. 1978). When “a petition for federal habeas relief is presented to the judge who presided at the petitioner's trial, the judge is at liberty to employ the knowledge gleaned during previous proceedings and make findings based thereon without convening an additional hearing.” United States v. McGill, 11 F.3d 223, 225 (1st Cir. 1993); United States v. Isom, 85 F.3d 831, 838 (1st Cir. 1996) (applying McGill to a case involving a guilty plea).
“[I]ssues disposed of in a prior appeal will not be reviewed again by way of a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion.” Singleton v. United States, 26 F.3d 233, 240 (1st Cir. 1994) (quotation marks omitted); Elwell v. United States, 95 F.3d 1146 (1st Cir. 1996 (per curiam) (unpublished) (citing Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 342 (1974)) (holding that a petitioner “is not entitled on collateral review to relitigate issues raised on direct appeal, absent an intervening change in the law”).
A collateral challenge is not a substitute for an appeal. United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 165 (1982); Berthoff v. United States, 308 F.3d 124, 127 (1st Cir. 2002). “Accordingly, a defendant's failure to raise a claim in a timely manner at trial or on appeal constitutes a procedural default that bars collateral review, unless the defendant can demonstrate cause for the failure and prejudice or actual innocence.” Berthoff, 308 F.3d at 127-28.
An allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel can excuse a procedural default. Turner v. United States, 699 F.3d 578, 584 (1st Cir. 2012) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984)). In Strickland, the Supreme Court set forth the federal constitutional standard by which claims of ineffective assistance are evaluated; Strickland requires a petitioner to demonstrate that “counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, ” and that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” 466 U.S. at 688, 694. A court need not “address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one . . . .” Id. at 697.
The Court presumes “that counsel has ‘rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.'” Companonio v. O'Brien, 672 F.3d 101, 110 (1st Cir. 2012) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690). That an argument advanced by counsel failed to persuade the Court does not in itself render counsel's performance substandard. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 699 (concluding that “there can be little question, even without application of the presumption of adequate performance, that trial counsel's defense, though unsuccessful, was the result of reasonable professional judgment”).
If a petitioner's “claims fail on the merits, his related claims that counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to press the claims at trial or on appeal must also fail.” Tse v. United States, 290 F.3d 462, 465 (1st Cir. 2002) (per curiam).
Summary dismissal of a motion is permitted when the allegations are “‘vague, conclusory, or palpably incredible, '” even “‘if the record does not conclusively and expressly belie [the] claim.'” David, 134 F.3d at 478 (quoting Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 495 (1962)).

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