Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=82896:56736&catid=1581&Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 08:48:05+00:00

Document:
G.R. No. 157485, March 26, 2014 - REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES REPRESENTED BY AKLAN NATIONAL COLLEGE OF FISHERIES (ANCF) AND DR. ELENITA R. ANDRADE, IN HER CAPACITY AS ANCF SUPERINTENDENT, Petitioner, v. HEIRS OF MAXIMA LACHICA SIN, NAMELY: SALVACION L. SIN, ROSARIO S. ENRIQUEZ, FRANCISCO L. SIN, MARIA S. YUCHINTAT, MANUEL L. SIN, JAIME CARDINAL SIN, RAMON L. SIN, AND CEFERINA S. VITA, Respondents.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES REPRESENTED BY AKLAN NATIONAL COLLEGE OF FISHERIES (ANCF) AND DR. ELENITA R. ANDRADE, IN HER CAPACITY AS ANCF SUPERINTENDENT, Petitioner, v. HEIRS OF MAXIMA LACHICA SIN, NAMELY: SALVACION L. SIN, ROSARIO S. ENRIQUEZ, FRANCISCO L. SIN, MARIA S. YUCHINTAT, MANUEL L. SIN, JAIME CARDINAL SIN, RAMON L. SIN, AND CEFERINA S. VITA, Respondents.
This is a Petition for Review assailing the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA–G.R. SP No. 65244 dated February 24, 2003, which upheld the Decisions of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kalibo, Aklan in Civil Case No. 6130 and the First Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of New Washington and Batan, Aklan in Civil Case No. 1181, segregating from the Aklan National College of Fisheries (ANCF) reservation the portion of land being claimed by respondents.
On August 26, 1991, respondent heirs instituted in the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan a complaint against Lucio Arquisola, in his capacity as Superintendent of ANCF (hereinafter ANCF Superintendent), for recovery of possession, quieting of title, and declaration of ownership with damages. Respondent heirs claim that a 41,231–square meter–portion of the property they inherited had been usurped by ANCF, creating a cloud of doubt with respect to their ownership over the parcel of land they wish to remove from the ANCF reservation.
The ANCF Superintendent countered that the parcel of land being claimed by respondents was the subject of Proclamation No. 2074 of then President Ferdinand E. Marcos allocating 24.0551 hectares of land within the area, which included said portion of private respondents’ alleged property, as civil reservation for educational purposes of ANCF. The ANCF Superintendent furthermore averred that the subject parcel of land is timberland and therefore not susceptible of private ownership.
Subsequently, the complaint was amended to include ANCF as a party defendant and Lucio Arquisola, who retired from the service during the pendency of the case, was substituted by Ricardo Andres, then the designated Officer–in–Charge of ANCF.
The RTC remanded the case to the MCTC of New Washington and Batan, Aklan, in view of the enactment of Republic Act No. 7659 which expanded the jurisdiction of first–level courts. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 1181 (4390).
Before the MCTC, respondent heirs presented evidence that they inherited a bigger parcel of land from their mother, Maxima Sin, who died in the year 1945 in New Washington, Capiz (now Aklan). Maxima Sin acquired said bigger parcel of land by virtue of a Deed of Sale (Exhibit “B”), and then developed the same by planting coconut trees, banana plants, mango trees and nipa palms and usufructing the produce of said land until her death in 1945.
In the year 1988, a portion of said land respondents inherited from Maxima Sin was occupied by ANCF and converted into a fishpond for educational purpose. Respondent heirs of Maxima Sin asserted that they were previously in possession of the disputed land in the concept of an owner. The disputed area was a swampy land until it was converted into a fishpond by the ANCF. To prove possession, respondents presented several tax declarations, the earliest of which was in the year 1945.
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered declaring plaintiffs [respondent heirs herein] the owner and possessor of the land in question in this case and for the defendants to cause the segregation of the same from the Civil Reservation of the Aklan National College of Fisheries, granted under Proclamation No. 2074 dated March 31, 1981.
It is further ordered, that defendants jointly and severally pay the plaintiffs actual damages for the unearned yearly income from nipa plants uprooted by the defendants [on] the land in question when the same has been converted by the defendants into a fishpond, in the amount of Php3,500.00 yearly beginning the year 1988 until plaintiffs are fully restored to the possession of the land in question.
According to the MCTC, the sketch made by the Court Commissioner in his report (Exh. “LL”) shows that the disputed property is an alienable and disposable land of the public domain. Furthermore, the land covered by Civil Reservation under Proclamation No. 2074 was classified as timberland only on December 22, 1960 (Exh. “4–D”). The MCTC observed that the phrase “Block II Alien or Disp. LC 2415” was printed on the Map of the Civil Reservation for ANCF established under Proclamation No. 2074 (Exh. “6”), indicating that the disputed land is an alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
Noting that there was no warning in Proclamation No. 2074 requiring all persons to depart from the reservation, the MCTC concluded that the reservation was subject to private rights if there are any.
The MCTC thus ruled that the claim of respondent heirs over the disputed land by virtue of their and their predecessors’ open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession amounts to an imperfect title, which should be respected and protected.
Petitioner, through the Solicitor General, appealed to the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan, where the case was docketed as Civil Case No. 6130.
The RTC stressed that Proclamation No. 2074 recognizes vested rights acquired by private individuals prior to its issuance on March 31, 1981.
Petitioner Republic, represented by the ANCF and Dr. Elenita R. Andrade, in her capacity as the new Superintendent of the ANCF, elevated the case to the Court of Appeals through a Petition for Review. The petition was docketed as CA–G.R. SP No. 65244.
Moreover, petitioner had not shown by competent evidence that the subject land was likewise declared a timberland before its formal classification as such in 1960. Considering that lands adjoining to that of the private respondents, which are also within the reservation area, have been issued original certificates of title, the same affirms the conclusion that the area of the subject land was agricultural, and therefore disposable, before its declaration as a timberland in 1960.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN UPHOLDING RESPONDENTS’ CLAIM TO SUPPOSED “PRIVATE RIGHTS” OVER SUBJECT LAND DESPITE THE DENR CERTIFICATION THAT IT IS CLASSIFIED AS TIMBERLAND.
The MCTC, the RTC and the Court of Appeals unanimously held that respondents retain private rights to the disputed property, thus preventing the application of the above proclamation thereon. The private right referred to is an alleged imperfect title, which respondents supposedly acquired by possession of the subject property, through their predecessors–in–interest, for 30 years before it was declared as a timberland on December 22, 1960.
At the outset, it must be noted that respondents have not filed an application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under the Public Land Act or the Property Registration Decree. Nevertheless, the courts a quo apparently treated respondents’ complaint for recovery of possession, quieting of title and declaration of ownership as such an application and proceeded to determine if respondents complied with the requirements therefor.
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
(1) those who by themselves or through their predecessors–in–interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
With respect to the second requisite, the courts a quo held that the disputed property was alienable and disposable before 1960, citing petitioner’s failure to show competent evidence that the subject land was declared a timberland before its formal classification as such on said year.11 Petitioner emphatically objects, alleging that under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State and that lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.
Under the Regalian doctrine, which is embodied in our Constitution, all lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to any ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land or alienated to a private person by the State remain part of the inalienable public domain. Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified as alienable or disposable to a private person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable public domain. Property of the public domain is beyond the commerce of man and not susceptible of private appropriation and acquisitive prescription. Occupation thereof in the concept of owner no matter how long cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title. The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or disposable.
This Court reached the same conclusion in Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources v. Yap,13 which presents a similar issue with respect to another area of the same province of Aklan. On November 10, 1978, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1801 declaring Boracay Island, among other islands, caves and peninsulas of the Philippines, as tourist zones and marine reserves under the administration of the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA). On September 3, 1982, PTA Circular 3–82 was issued to implement Proclamation No. 1801. The respondents–claimants in said case filed a petition for declaratory relief with the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan, claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular 3–82 precluded them from filing an application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes. The respondents claim that through their predecessors–in–interest, they have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of their lands in Boracay since June 12, 1945 or earlier since time immemorial.
On May 22, 2006, during the pendency of the petition for review of the above case with this Court, President Gloria Macapagal–Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 1064 classifying Boracay Island into four hundred (400) hectares of reserved forest land (protection purposes) and six hundred twenty–eight and 96/100 (628.96) hectares of agricultural land (alienable and disposable). Petitioner–claimants and other landowners in Boracay filed with this Court an original petition for prohibition, mandamus and nullification of Proclamation No. 1064, alleging that it infringed on their “prior vested right” over portions of Boracay which they allege to have possessed since time immemorial. This petition was consolidated with the petition for review concerning Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular 3–82.
The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or disposable. There must still be a positive act declaring land of the public domain as alienable and disposable. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, the applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. The applicant may also secure a certification from the government that the land claimed to have been possessed for the required number of years is alienable and disposable.
The requirements for judicial confirmation of imperfect title in Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended, and the equivalent provision in Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree was furthermore painstakingly debated upon by the members of this Court in Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic.16 In Malabanan, the members of this Court were in disagreement as to whether lands declared alienable or disposable after June 12, 1945 may be subject to judicial confirmation of imperfect title. There was, however, no disagreement that there must be a declaration to that effect.
In the case at bar, it is therefore the respondents which have the burden to identify a positive act of the government, such as an official proclamation, declassifying inalienable public land into disposable land for agricultural or other purposes. Since respondents failed to do so, the alleged possession by them and by their predecessors–in–interest is inconsequential and could never ripen into ownership. Accordingly, respondents cannot be considered to have private rights within the purview of Proclamation No. 2074 as to prevent the application of said proclamation to the subject property. We are thus constrained to reverse the rulings of the courts a quo and grant the prayer of petitioner Republic to dismiss Civil Case No. 1181 (4390) for lack of merit.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA–G.R. SP No. 65244 dated February 24, 2003, which upheld the Decisions of the Regional Trial Court of Kalibo, Aklan in Civil Case No. 6130 and the First Municipal Circuit Trial Court of New Washington and Batan, Aklan in Civil Case No. 1181 (4390), segregating from the Aklan National College of Fisheries reservation the portion of land being claimed by respondents is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. 1181 (4390) of the First Municipal Circuit Trial Court of New Washington and Batan, Aklan is hereby DISMISSED.
1Rollo, pp. 38–47; penned by Associate Justice Rodrigo V. Cosico with Associate Justices Rebecca de Guia–Salvador and Regalado E. Maambong, concurring.
4 165 Phil. 142, 155–156 (1976).
10Del Rosario–Igtiben v. Republic, 484 Phil. 145, 154 (2004); Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources v. Yap, 589 Phil. 156, 197 (2008).
12 G.R. No. 170757, November 28, 2011, 661 SCRA 299, 306–307.
15 531 Phil. 602, 616 (2006).

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 V. 
 v. 
 v.