Source: http://www.childrenslegalrightsjournal.com/childrenslegalrightsjournal/volume_34_issue_1?pg=109
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 22:39:06+00:00

Document:
Regardless of the Illinois Supreme Court’s justification for adopting federal political question jurisprudence,168 its application in Edgar and Lewis E. is also at odds with its own past political question cases.169 Cases involving political question issues prior to the education cases are few and far between, generally involved disputes over elections, and generally barred courts from ruling on any politically-tinged issue.170 In Donovan v. Holzman (1956), however, the court truly the highest court in terms of this body of law . . . [ i]t is free to interpret state laws or the state constitution in any way that does not violate principles of federal law.”); Gardner, supra note 24, at 808-09 (“[I]t is certainly possible for a state constitution to contain a political question doctrine, and it is even possible for the state doctrine to be so similar to the federal version that precisely the same analysis could be used for both—possible, but highly unlikely.”); O’Neill, supra note 27, at 578-79 (“It does not follow that the same barriers (political question doctrine) would apply to state court action.”).
162 See Blanchard, supra note 33 and accompanying text.
163 See Gardner, supra note 24, at 809 (“[V]irtually all state courts have significant common law powers that federal courts lack. The power to elaborate the common law is a power to make law.”); O’Neill, supra note 27, at 579 (noting state courts’ affirmative common law powers).
164 See Gardner, supra note 24, at 809; see also O’Neill, supra note 27, at 579 (noting that state courts have no case in controversy requirement, meaning that they may issue binding advisory opinions compelling state legislatures to formulate remedies); Blanchard, supra note 33, at 273 (noting that state courts are generally more involved in creating public policy than federal courts).
165 See Blanchard, supra note 33, at 273 (citing various reasons why greater authority for state supreme court justices would not threaten state separation of powers or democracy); Swenson, supra note 98, at 1152-53 (noting that many states have directly-elected justices).
166 Blanchard, supra note 33, at 273-74; see also Swenson, supra note 98, at 1152-53 (discussing various appointment systems for state supreme court justices).
167 State constitutions are re-written relatively often, and are generally easier to amend through state referendum. See Blanchard, supra note 33, at 273 (“[S]tate court opinions are more easily overruled by constitutional amendment.”). Article XIV of the Illinois State Constitution requires a referendum to be presented to voters every twenty years on whether a new constitutional convention should be convened. ILL. CONST. art. XIV, § 1.
168 It is worth noting that Article II, Section 1 of the Illinois State Constitution specifically provides for the separation of state powers, yet neither the Edgar nor Lewis E. opinion makes any mention of it, instead deferring to Baker v. Carr. See ILL. CONST. art. II, § 1; Comm. for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178, 1191 (Ill. 1996); Lewis E. v. Spagnolo, 710 N.E.2d 798, 802-05 (Ill. 1999).
169 See O’Neill, supra note 27, at 562 (discussing generally the Court’s past political question cases and noting that “[e]ducational adequacy cases are the only cases in which the Illinois Supreme Court has invoked the political question doctrine to preclude judicial review”).

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