Source: https://www.courts.maine.gov/opinions_orders/opinions/documents/00me160h.htm
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 10:16:39+00:00

Document:
Panel:		WATHEN, C.J., and CLIFFORD, RUDMAN, DANA, ALEXANDER, and CALKINS, JJ.
Majority:	WATHEN, C.J., and CLIFFORD, RUDMAN, and CALKINS, JJ.
Dissent:		DANA, and ALEXANDER, JJ.
authority, the court improperly entered summary judgment against him.
claims, we affirm the judgment.
Robert's Rules of Order to govern its meetings.
the court system to further racial equity.
was unwilling to do anything to challenge Chitwood.
Holland and asked him why he was there.  Holland refused to respond.
orders to leave the room.  Holland was then taken from the room.
and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People.
distress; and prima facie tort.  Sebunya moved for a summary judgment.
Holland, the court entered a summary judgment in favor of Sebunya.
Holland appeals from that judgment.
evidence, the defendant would be entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
Holland's federal and state constitutional rights.  See, e.g., Adickes v. S.H.
under color of state law."  American Mfr. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S.
Carpenters and Joiners of America v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825 (1983); Walter v.
establish the state action necessary to justify a recovery under section 1983.
must be a person who may fairly be said to be the state actor.
or because his conduct is otherwise chargeable to the State.
Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. at 937.
status or to the performance of his duties" to be chargeable as state action).
private citizen when he commits the alleged violation of right.  See Roe v.
Holland was accomplished because of "the privileges of [his] employment"
take action to prevent others from pursuing the police brutality claim of Ms.
regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community . . . ."
had Holland removed from the meeting over which Sebunya was presiding.
removal, Sebunya's actions do not "exceed all possible bounds of decency."
mental stress engendered" by that removal.
the private citizen to liability.  See id.; Vinton v. Weaver, 41 Me. 430 (1856).
the legal process, they are not liable for false imprisonment.  William L.
justification, Sebunya cannot be liable to Holland for false imprisonment.
Cf. Mavromatis v. United Greek Shipowners Corp., 179 F.2d 310 (1st Cir.
asked police to remove discharged employees from ship).
reasonable grounds to believe Holland was guilty of criminal trespass.
in believing the party guilty."  Price v. Patterson, 606 A.2d 783, 785 (Me.
1143, 1146 (Me. 1988).  Holland's arrest was instead under 17-A M.R.S.A.
by the owner or another authorized person."  17-A M.R.S.A. § 402(1) (Supp.
when an authorized person has some justification for requesting removal."
him by Robert's Rules of Order.
arises--a motion of the latter being a question of privilege.
during the meeting . . . .
Sebunya's discretion as President of the Portland Branch.
DANA, J., with whom, ALEXANDER, J., joins, dissenting.
speaking at the Executive Committee meeting constituted state action.
Sebunya individually withstands summary judgment analysis.
acting 'under color' of law for purposes of § 1983 actions."); Adickes v. S.H.
State" so as to deprive an individual of a constitutional right); see also R.A.V.
conduct because of disapproval of the ideas expressed.") (citations omitted).
him by the Constitution and laws of the United States.
attorneys' fees under 4 U.S.C. § 1988.
process and equal protection of the laws.
Holland was not disruptive or disorderly when he appeared at the meeting.
Sebunya called the police to come and remove Holland from the meeting.
4) [hereinafter D. 7(d) --].  The officers subsequently arrested Holland.
no reasonable view of the evidence could sustain a contrary verdict).
of the police were officially authorized or lawful."); see also Johnson v.
forcibly removed from the meeting.
failed to support her either emotionally or financially.
charlatan and that he was a dishonorable man" because Mr.
Sebunya's failure to perform responsibilities which Mr.
later became Mr. Holland's wife.
that Holland refused to respond to his questions about why he was there.
Court's proper function when simply reviewing a summary judgment.
it disapproves.  See, e.g., Helvey v. City of Maplewood, 154 F.3d 841 (8th Cir.

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