Source: https://case-law.vlex.com/vid/801-f-3d-869-683400637
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 18:46:52+00:00

Document:
As Corrected September 21, 2015.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois. Nos. 13-cv-934 & 13-cv-944 -- David R. Herndon, Judge.
For George H. Edwards, Jr., Petitioner - Appellant: Jacob Moshe Roth, Attorney, Donald B. Ayer, Attorney, Jones Day, Washington, DC.
For JAMES N. CROSS, Warden, United States Parole Commission, Respondents - Appellees: Gerald M. Burke, Attorney, Office of The United States Attorney, Civil Division, Fairview Heights, IL.
which was repealed over twenty years ago in 1984, see Act of Oct. 12, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 224(a)(6). Although we concluded in Evans v. United States Parole Comm'n, 78 F.3d 262 (1996), that the Parole Commission could not reimpose special parole after a term of reimprisonment, that conclusion has since been called into question by the Supreme Court's subsequent decision in Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 120 S.Ct. 1795, 146 L.Ed.2d 727 (2000), interpreting the word " revoke" in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) (1988 & Supp. II 1990), a supervised release statute with some similarities to 21 U.S.C. § 841(c). The district court concluded that our interpretation of the word " revoke" in Evans was undermined by the Court's holding in Johnson and denied Edwards' petition. We conclude that the differences between former § 841(c) and § 3583(e) predominate over the admitted similarities; thus, we hold that our decision in Evans interpreting § 841(c) continues to be good law. Accordingly, we vacate and remand the decision of the district court.
of the special parole reduced only by the additional time spent in prison--he receives no credit for the " street time" spent on special parole before the violation.
This mechanism is illustrated by Edwards' long history of violating his special parole. In February 2000, Edwards began his term of special parole, which was due to expire in February 2010. In March 2001, he was taken into custody for violating the terms of his parole (by shoplifting, failing a drug test, and failing to provide personal and business records to his parole officer). His special parole was revoked, and he returned to prison on July 26, 2001. He was released from prison in December 2001. At this point, under § 841(c), his special parole reverted to a full ten year term less the time he spent in custody (March to December 2001); no credit was given for the time he had already spent on special parole. Thus, his new parole term was set to expire in March 2011.
But in 2007, Edwards pleaded guilty to one count of wire fraud. He was sentenced to one year and a day in prison to be followed by four years of supervised release. He completed the prison term for wire fraud in December 2007 but remained in prison because the Parole Commission revoked his parole. Reasoning that he had been on special parole when he pleaded guilty in 2007, the Parole Commission added six more years to his sentence to account for the forfeited street time between his December 2001 release from prison (following the first parole revocation) and his 2007 conviction. Edwards' parole term was then set to expire in February 2017.
Edwards challenged the reimposition of special parole following his wire fraud conviction. The Sixth Circuit rejected Edwards' challenge, noting that because he had been convicted of a crime, under current parole law Edwards would have forfeited his street time even if he had been serving regular parole. See Edwards v. Dewalt, 681 F.3d 780 (6th Cir. 2012); 28 C.F.R. § 2.52(c)(2) (providing that an ordinary parolee convicted of a new offense while on parole will not receive credit on service of his sentence for time spent on supervision). It thus concluded that it need not decide the " interesting and difficult issue" of whether its own holding that a revoked special parole term could not be reimposed survived the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 120 S.Ct. 1795, 146 L.Ed.2d 727 (2000), interpreting the supervised release statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) to allow reimposition of supervised release following its revocation. See Dewalt, 681 F.3d at 784-85 (citing Dolfi v. Pontesso, 156 F.3d 696, 698-99 (6th Cir. 1998) which had held that the Parole Commission lacked authority under 21 U.S.C. § 841(c) to impose a new term of special parole after revoking the original term).

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