Source: http://injurylawstpaul.com/messages/334.htm
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 08:36:17+00:00

Document:
Considered and decided by Klaphake, Presiding Judge; Shumaker, Judge; and Worke, Judge.
Independent School District No. 281, Robbinsdale, Minnesota, Relator, vs. Minnesota Department of Education, Respondent.
distributed to specified school personnel and (2) provide parents of all disabled, nonpublic-school students in the district with a redacted copy of the complaint decision and a letter, to be preapproved by MDE, explaining their �right to request an [individualized educational program (IEP)] meeting to discuss special education services including ESY and any necessary compensatory education.� On appeal, the district seeks reversal of the MDE‟s decision on several grounds, contending that (1) the MDE lacked authority to review the district‟s provision of ESY services for all nonpublic-school students with disabilities in the district, because the MDE‟s investigation arose from a complaint from one child‟s parent; (2) the MDE erroneously interpreted Minnesota law when it determined that the district had violated Minn. Stat. �� 125A.03 and 125A.18 by its policy of unilaterally limiting the special instruction and services, particularly ESY services, to disabled, nonpublic-school students residing in the district; (3) Minn. Stat. � 125A.18 does not apply to the complainant‟s child, because it only applies to students who attend classes part time in the school district and during the regular school day; (4) the MDE lacked authority to address violations based solely on state law; (5) the MDE‟s decision is arbitrary, capricious, and not grounded in substantial evidence because the record does not indicate that any parents of private-school students, other than complainant, sought ESY services from the district; and (6) the MDE‟s decision was untimely.
was all the district would provide. The complainant contracted with a private school for additional summer services. In a complaint filed July 21, 2006 with the MDE, the student‟s parent asserts that the district failed to provide appropriate ESY services to the student and violated federal and state law by denying ESY services to disabled, nonpublic-school students residing in the district. As a remedy, the complainant requested that the district reimburse her for tuition from the private school instruction the student received during the summer of 2006. In response, the district claimed that the complainant had agreed that the ESY services were sufficient, the student had completed the ESY program successfully, and that none of the other 17 special-education students enrolled in nonpublic schools during the 2005-06 school year requested or received ESY services. In its November 3, 2006 decision, the MDE concluded that the district‟s policy of unilaterally limiting the special instruction and services, particularly ESY services, violated Minn. Stat. �� 125A.03 and 125A.18 (2006) and 34 C.F.R. � 300.309 (2006). The MDE determined, however, that the district had provided appropriate ESY services to the student during the 2006 summer, even though it had misunderstood nonpublic-school students‟ rights to a FAPE. Thus, the district was not ordered to reimburse complainant for the tuition expenses.
due to the District‟s stated position on ESY for non-public students and not a lack of interest.� Consequently, as corrective action, the MDE ordered the district to prepare a memorandum, which was to be disseminated to specified personnel, regarding the FAPE rights of nonpublic-school students residing in the district and addressing their rights to special education and related services, including ESY services. The district was also ordered to provide parents of all disabled, nonpublic-school students in the district with a redacted copy of the complaint decision and a letter, which was also subject to the MDE‟s preapproval, explaining the parents‟ �right to request an IEP meeting to discuss special education services including ESY and any necessary compensatory education.� This appeal followed. ISSUES I. Does the MDE have authority to investigate the district‟s provision of ESY services for all nonpublic-school students with disabilities in the district and order corrective action, based on a complaint only from one student‟s parent? II. Does Minnesota law require school districts to provide special instruction and services to students with disabilities attending nonpublic schools? III. Does Minn. Stat. � 125A.18 (2006) apply if the student is not attending classes part time in the school district during the regular day? IV. Does the MDE have authority to address violations based solely on state law?
lack of indication in the record that any parents of nonpublic-school students, other than complainant, sought ESY services from the district? VI. Was the MDE‟s decision arbitrary, capricious, and not grounded in substantial evidence, because it was untimely? ANALYSIS The scope of review on appeal from an agency decision is narrow. �When reviewing agency decisions we adhere to the fundamental concept that decisions of administrative agencies enjoy a presumption of correctness, and deference should be shown by courts to the agencies‟ expertise and their special knowledge in the field of their technical training, education, and experience.� In re Excess Surplus Status of Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Minn., 624 N.W.2d 264, 278 (Minn. 2001) (quotation omitted). �The decision of an administrative agency will not be reversed unless it reflects an error of law, the determinations are arbitrary and capricious, or the findings are unsupported by the evidence.� Special Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. E.N., 620 N.W.2d 65, 68 (Minn. App. 2000) (quotation omitted). I.
The district argues that the MDE lacks authority to review its provision of ESY services for all disabled, nonpublic-school students in the district, because the MDE‟s investigation arose from a complaint from only one student‟s parent. We disagree and conclude that the MDE has the general authority and responsibility to investigate the legality of the district‟s policies and, when necessary, to order corrective action to address the provision of appropriate services to children with disabilities in the future.
(C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary school, or secondary school education in the State involved; and (D) are provided in conformity with the individualized education program required under section 1414(d) of this title.
20 U.S.C. � 1401(9) (Supp. V. 2005). If necessary to ensure a FAPE, the school district must provide ESY services to students with disabilities. 34 C.F.R. � 300.309 (2006);2 Minn. R. 3525.0755, subp. 1 (2005).
There are two methods for resolving disputes over special education services: (1) an impartial due process hearing under 20 U.S.C. � 1415(f) (Supp. V. 2005) and Minn. Stat. � 125A.091, subd. 12 (2006); and (2) the administrative complaint procedure, in which a complaint is filed with the state educational agency (SEA), which in Minnesota is the MDE. See Megan C. v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 625, 57 F. Supp. 2d 776, 780 (D.
1 The current version of the United States Code includes all changes through January 2, 2006, and is the version applicable to the facts at hand. 2 The Federal Department of Education issued new IDEA regulations effective Oct. 13, 2006. See 71 Fed. Reg. 46540 (Aug. 14, 2006). The alleged violations in this case occurred during the summer of 2006, and therefore the new regulations do not apply to this matter.
(2) Appropriate future provision of services for all children with disabilities.
34 C.F.R. � 300.660(b)(1), (2) (2006). Thus, these regulations obligate the MDE to address appropriate future provision of services for all children with disabilities when violations are found. Here, the MDE concluded that the district did not fail to provide services to the complainant‟s child, because it ultimately agreed to provide reasonable ESY services to the student. The MDE did, however, conclude that the district‟s policy of unilaterally limiting the special instruction and services, such as ESY services, provided to disabled, nonpublic-school students in the district violated the law. Based, on this violation, the MDE ordered corrective action.
an independent stake in the substantive decisions regarding their children), and 34 C.F.R. � 300.344(a)(1)(2006) (providing that the IEP team includes the child‟s parents), and 34 C.F.R. � 300.345 (2006) (addressing parent participation), with 34 C.F.R. � 300.662(a) (specifying that individuals and organizations can file a complaint). Moreover, because the regulations specifically permit the MDE to address the �[a]ppropriate future provision of services for all children with disabilities,� the MDE did not exceed its authority or responsibility by considering, and addressing, the district‟s practice of denying ESY services to all disabled, nonpublic-school students in the district. 34 C.F.R. � 300.660(b)(2). Because the MDE has general supervisory authority to address the appropriate future provision of services for all children with disabilities when it has found a failure to provide appropriate services, the MDE must, by implication, necessarily also have the general supervisory authority to address the appropriate future provision of services for all children with disabilities when the district‟s stated policy violates the law by expressly precluding such services. We conclude that these regulations are not intended to prohibit the MDE from requiring the district to take the corrective steps ordered here in an effort to ensure that children with disabilities in the district are provided appropriate special education services in the future.
not require, as the district contends, the district to hold meetings with a group of parents, or with individual parents, nor does the decision order the district to provide particular services to any individual student. Rather, the decision merely requires the district to give these parents accurate notice of rights they already possess. II. The district also contends that the MDE erroneously interpreted Minnesota law when it determined that the district had violated Minn. Stat. �� 125A.03 and 125A.18 (2006) by limiting special instruction and services to disabled, nonpublic-school students in the district. In so arguing, the district contends that nonpublic-school students do not have an individual right to a FAPE.
This court reviews questions of statutory construction de novo. Bonney, 705 N.W.2d at 214 (citing St. Otto�s Home v. Minn. Dep�t of Human Servs., 437 N.W.2d 35, 39-40 (Minn. 1989)). On review, we are �not bound by an agency‟s interpretation of a statute.� Id. (citing St. Otto�s Home, 437 N.W.2d at 39-40). But, the agency‟s interpretation is entitled to some deference �where the statutory language is technical in nature, and the agency‟s interpretation is longstanding.� E.N., 620 N.W.2d at 68. If the statute is unambiguous, this court applies its plain meaning. Id. at 69; Kersten v. Minn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 608 N.W.2d 869, 874-75 (Minn. 2000). Furthermore, statutory language must be viewed in its proper context. Chiodo v. Bd. of Educ. of Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 298 Minn. 380, 382, 215 N.W.2d 806, 808 (1974) (�[W]ords of a statute are to be viewed in their setting, not isolated from their context.�).
The federal IDEA does not require school districts to provide a FAPE to disabled students voluntarily enrolled in nonpublic schools. 20 U.S.C. � 1412(a)(10)(C)(i) (Supp V. 2005). Rather, the IDEA only requires districts to provide services proportional to those provided to public-school students. 20 U.S.C. � 1412(a)(10)(A)(i)(I) (Supp. V. 2005); 34 C.F.R. � 300.453(a)(1) (2006). But, the federal law represents minimum requirements, and states are free to impose additional requirements for special education services. Bonney, 705 N.W.2d at 214; 34 C.F.R. � 300.453(d) (2006) (�State and local educational agencies are not prohibited from providing services to private school children with disabilities in excess of those required by this part, consistent with State law or local policy.�).
126C.19, subdivision 4, because of attending a nonpublic school . . . .� Minn. Stat. � 125A.18 (emphasis added). The district contends, based on the absence of the word �special� from the second reference to �instruction and service,� that the shared-time statute does not require the district to provide �special instruction and service� to disabled students attending nonpublic schools; rather, the district urges that under this statute such students would only be eligible for �instruction and service,� apparently meaning non-special education instruction and services. In support of its argument, the district directs this court to the previous version of the shared-time statute. Before the statute was amended in 1998, the statute now known as section 125A.18 provided: �No resident of a district who is eligible for special instruction and services pursuant to this section shall be denied provision of this instruction and service on a shared time basis because of attendance at a nonpublic school . . . .� Minn. Stat. � 120.17, subd. 9 (1996) (emphasis added). When this court interprets a Minnesota statute, it construes words and phrases �according to rules of grammar and according to their common and approved usage.� Minn. Stat. � 645.08(1) (2006). One rule of construction directs that �general words are construed to be restricted in their meaning by preceding particular words.� Minn. Stat. � 645.08(3) (2006). �If a statute, construed according to ordinary rules of grammar, is unambiguous, a court may engage in no further statutory construction and must apply its plain meaning.� Bonney, 705 N.W.2d at 214 (citing State by Beaulieu v. RSJ, Inc., 552 N.W.2d 695, 701 (Minn. 1996)).
Applying these rules, we conclude that the shared-time statute, Minn. Stat. � 125A.18, is unambiguous and prohibits school districts from denying special education instruction and services to children with disabilities enrolled in nonpublic schools. The general term �instruction and service� is restricted in its meaning by the preceding particular term, �special instruction and services.� We note further that if the second reference to �instruction and service� does not refer back to the first reference to �special instruction and services,� it is completely unclear what this second reference to �instruction and service� means. If the legislature had intended the meaning advanced by the district then the legislature would have so directed. Because we conclude that the language is not ambiguous, we may not consider the legislative history arguments presented by both parties. See Minn. Stat. � 645.16 (2006) (providing that, where language is unclear, courts may look to several factors to discern its meaning); ILHC of Eagan, LLC v. County of Dakota, 693 N.W.2d 412, 419 (Minn. 2005) (�When a statute‟s meaning is plain from its language as applied to the facts of the particular case, a judicial construction is not necessary.�); see also Kersten, 608 N.W.2d at 874-75 (�When the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, it manifests the legislative intent and we must give the statute its plain meaning.�). III.
The district next argues that, even if the MDE‟s interpretation of Minn. Stat. � 125A.18 is correct, the statute is inapplicable here because the student was not enrolled in or taking classes part time at a public school and because the ESY services sought by the student would be given during the summer, not the regular school day.
Shared-time pupils are defined as �those pupils who attend public school programs for part of the regular school day and who otherwise fulfill the requirements of section 120A.22 by attendance at a nonpublic school.� Minn. Stat. � 126C.01, subd. 8 (2006). Schools receive funding, or shared-time aid, for such pupils. Minn. Stat. � 126C.19, subd. 1 (2006); Minn. Stat. � 126C.01, subd. 7 (2006). Although the district contends that the complainant‟s child was not a shared-time pupil, the record reveals that the student was in fact attending classes at one of the district‟s elementary schools. The student‟s IEP, dated March 17, 2006, provided for 30 minutes per week of direct math instruction, 10 minutes per week of indirect math services, 20 minutes per week of indirect occupational therapy, and 10 minutes per week of indirect organization skills service at the district public school. Therefore, the student was a shared-time pupil.
students with disabilities, like the complainant‟s child, and entitles them to special instruction and services, including ESY services. IV.
3 The MDE concluded that the district‟s policy violated Minn. Stat. �� 125A.03 and 125A.18 and 34 C.F.R. � 300.309. The violation of 34 C.F.R. � 300.309, however, was based on the MDE‟s interpretation of state law.
Bonney, 705 N.W.2d at 214. Therefore, we conclude that the MDE has the authority to enforce state laws that exceed the minimum federal standards. V. �The decision of an administrative agency will not be reversed unless it reflects an error of law, the determinations are arbitrary and capricious, or the findings are unsupported by the evidence.� E.N., 620 N.W.2d at 68 (quotation omitted). �When an agency performs the quasi-judicial function of receiving and weighing evidence, making factual findings, and applying a prescribed standard to reach a conclusion, a reviewing court applies the �substantial-evidence test.‟� Hurrle v. County of Sherburne ex rel. Bd. of Comm�rs, 594 N.W.2d 246, 249 (Minn. App. 1999). Under the substantial-evidence test, the reviewing court �evaluate[s] the evidence relied upon by the agency in view of the entire record as submitted.� Cable Commc�ns Bd. v. Nor-West Cable Commc�ns P�ship, 356 N.W.2d 658, 668 (Minn. 1984). Substantial evidence is defined as: �(1) such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion; (2) more than a scintilla of evidence; (3) more than some evidence; (4) more than any evidence; or (5) the evidence considered in its entirety.� Minn. Ctr. for Envtl. Advocacy v. Minn. Pollution Control Agency, 644 N.W.2d 457, 464 (Minn. 2002). If an agency engages in reasoned decision-making the reviewing court will affirm, even though it may have reached a conclusion different from the agency‟s conclusion. Cable Commc�ns Bd., 356 N.W.2d at 669.
request for such services. See 34 C.F.R. � 300.309(a)(2) (2006) (�Extended school year services must be provided only if a child‟s IEP team determines, on an individual basis . . . that the services are necessary for the provision of FAPE to the child.�). Thus, the MDE was not required to find that other nonpublic-school students sought, and were denied, ESY services, before it could order corrective action. VI. Lastly, the district argues that the MDE violated the IDEA by failing to comply with the 60-day decision deadline. The MDE is required to issue its final decision within 60 days after a complaint is filed, unless �exceptional circumstances exist with respect to a particular complaint.� 34 C.F.R. �� 300.661(a), (b)(1). The original deadline for the final decision was September 19, 2006. The MDE provided notice to the parties on September 19, 2006, informing them that it was extending the deadline of issue its final decision due to the �systemic nature of complaint.� The notice did not explain why the complaint was viewed as �systemic� or identify a new deadline. In a letter dated October 19, 2006, the district objected to the MDE‟s characterization of the complaint as �systemic,� because only one parent had filed a complaint, the complaint involved only ESY services for nonpublic-school students, and the district was not aware of any way in which other students were affected.
fashion an appropriate remedy for students who may have been affected by the district‟s misapplication of the law. The MDE also points out that the district also requested a 10-day extension of its deadline in responding to the complaint. These factors were �exceptional circumstances� which permit an extension. Furthermore, the district has not shown how, or even if, the district was harmed by the late decision. The complaint dealt with the provision of ESY services, most of which would seemingly be provided during the summer months, not the regular school year. Given the concerns raised about the provision of services for other students and the extension provided to the district, we conclude that the MDE‟s extension of the deadline was not arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise in violation of the law. D E C I S I O N When the MDE receives a written complaint regarding a dispute over the provision of special education services, it has the general authority and responsibility to investigate the complaint, assess the local school district‟s policies raised therein, and, if necessary, order corrective action to address the provision of appropriate services to children with disabilities in the future. Minn. Stat. � 125A.18 (2006) prohibits school districts from denying special education instruction and services to children with disabilities enrolled in nonpublic schools and entitles them to special instructions and services, including extended school year services.
authority to enforce state laws that exceed the minimum federal standards in its administrative complaint procedure. In addition, we conclude that the MDE was not required to find that other nonpublic-school students sought, and were denied, ESY services, before it could order corrective action to be taken and that the deadline extension was not arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise in violation of the law. Affirmed.

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