Source: http://in.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20180313_0000335.SIN.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 22:19:20+00:00

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This matter comes before the court on the plaintiff's complaint seeking judicial review of the Commissioner's decision denying plaintiff's application for social security disability benefits. The parties have consented to the undersigned's jurisdiction. For the reasons that follow, the court reverses and remands.
Ms. Henson applied for Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) under Title II of the Social Security Act and Supplemental Security Income under Title XVI of the Act, alleging she has been disabled since November 3, 2012. Acting for the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration following a hearing in May 2015, an administrative law judge (ALJ) issued a decision on July 29, 2015, finding that Ms. Henson has not been disabled from the alleged onset date through the date of his decision. The Appeals Council denied review of the ALJ's decision on October 24, 2016, rendering the ALJ's decision for the Commissioner final. Ms. Henson timely filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for review of the Commissioner's decision.
Ms. Henson argues that the Commissioner's decision must be reversed and remanded because the ALJ erred in weighing the opinions of her treating medical providers, Timothy M. Lenardo, M.D., Ronald F. Baldwin, M.D., and Thomas E. Rea, Psy.D. She also argues that the ALJ's listings analysis was perfunctory and unsupported, and she maintains the ALJ erred in failing to consult a medical expert on the question of medical equivalence. Finally, Ms. Henson argues that the step 5 finding lacks an adequate foundation. In particular, she challenges the vocational expert's testimony about the number of jobs available for her to perform and the reliance on the Dictionary of Occupational Titles. The court will first describe the legal framework for analyzing disability claims, the standard of review and the ALJ's findings, and then address the assertions of error.
To prove disability, a claimant must show that she is unable to “engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) (DIB benefits); 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A) (supplemental security income (SSI) benefits). Ms. Henson is disabled if her impairments are of such severity that she is not able to perform the work she previously engaged in and, if based on her age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity, she cannot engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A). The Social Security Administration (“SSA”) has implemented these statutory standards by, in part, prescribing a five-step sequential evaluation process for determining disability. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520.
Step one asks if the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity; if she is, she is not disabled. Step two asks whether the claimant's impairments, singly or in combination, are severe; if they are not, she is not disabled. A severe impairment is one that “significantly limits [a claimant's] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). The third step is an analysis of whether the claimant's impairments, either singly or in combination, meet or medically equal the criteria of any of the conditions in the Listing of Impairments, 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. The Listing of Impairments includes medical conditions defined by criteria that the Social Security Administration has pre-determined are disabling, so that if a claimant meets all of the criteria for a listed impairment or presents medical findings equal in severity to the criteria for the most similar listed impairment, then the claimant is presumptively disabled and qualifies for benefits. Sims v. Barnhart, 309 F.3d 424, 428 (7th Cir. 2002).
If the claimant's impairments do not satisfy a listing, her residual functional capacity (RFC) is determined for purposes of steps four and five. RFC is a claimant's ability to do work on a regular and continuing basis despite her impairment-related physical and mental limitations. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545. At the fourth step, if the claimant has the RFC to perform her past relevant work, she is not disabled. The fifth step asks whether there is work in the relevant economy that the claimant can perform, based on her age, work experience, education, and RFC; if so, she is not disabled.
The individual claiming disability bears the burden of proof at steps one through four. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5 (1987). If the claimant meets that burden, the Commissioner has the burden at step five to show that work exists in significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant can perform, given her age, education, work experience, and functional capacity. Young v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 995, 1000 (7th Cir. 2004).
Judicial review of the Commissioner's (or ALJ's) factual findings is deferential. A court must affirm if no error of law occurred and if the findings are supported by substantial evidence. Dixon v. Massanari, 270 F.3d 1171, 1176 (7th Cir. 2001). Substantial evidence means evidence that a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Id. The standard demands more than a scintilla of evidentiary support, but does not demand a preponderance of the evidence. Wood v. Thompson, 246 F.3d 1026, 1029 (7th Cir. 2001).

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 § 423
 § 1382
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 § 404
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