Source: https://cbrayton.wordpress.com/2007/10/03/brazil-electronic-machine-politics-in-educational-broadcasting/
Timestamp: 2018-03-21 22:10:12+00:00

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Brazil: “Electronic Machine Politics in Educational Broadcasting” | The New Market Machines
Jornal Comtexto (UNOPAR) reproduces an article by Mr. de Lima that summarizes the reporting on Ms. Lobato of the Folha de S. Paulo, some of which I have translated for you before:
Brazil: The 10,000 Little Foxes of Tucanland
Ms. Lobato got onto a story, dug into the nitty-gritty details, and followed it closely for decades. This is one things that professional journalists 1.0 tend to do that blogging journalists 2.0 tend not to.
I have PROJOR’s whole report on the phenomena here. Interesting reading.
A prática da concessão de TV educativa sem licitação sofrerá, sem dúvida, um importante golpe. Existem, no entanto, outras “brechas” e, através delas, o “coronelismo eletrônico” continua se perpetuando travestido em diferentes disfarces.
The practice of granting educational TV concessions without competitive bidding will certainly suffer an important setback. But there still exist other loopholes through which “electronic machine politics” continues to perpetuate itself in other guises.
Artigo reproduzido do site Observatório da Imprensa, publicado em 12 de junho de 2007
Originally published on the Observatŕio da Imprensa on June 12, 2007.
Somente agora chegou ao conhecimento público, por intermédio de matéria da jornalista Elvira Lobato, na edição da Folha de S.Paulo de quinta-feira (7/6) [“Justiça veta concessão de TV educativa sem licitação”, acesso restrito a assinantes do UOL e/ou da Folha], uma decisão de juiz da 2ª Vara Federal de Goiás, tomada em abril de 2006, que pode pôr fim a uma “brecha” legal que é uma das portas abertas para a continuidade do que tem sido chamado de “coronelismo eletrônico”. Na decisão, provocada por ação do Ministério Público Federal iniciada em 2003, e ampliada em 2005, o juiz considerou inconstitucional o decreto-lei 236, de 1967, que serve de base à não-exigência de licitação pública para as concessões de televisão educativa.
Only know do we learn, though an article by Ms. Lobato of the Folha on June 7 [“Court bars educational TV concessions without competitive bidding” …], of the decision by a judge in Goiás, in April 2006, that could put an end to a legal loophole that leaves the door open for so-called “electronic machine-politics.” In this decision, in response to a 2003 lawsuit by the Federal Public Ministry (federal prosecutor’s office), as expanded in 2005, the judge ruled unconstitutional Decree Law No. 236 of 1967, which served as the basis for not requiring public competitive bidding for educational TV stations.
Coronelismo is a time-honored style of patronage politics originally associated with rural areas. Carlismo, they say, is an metropolitian variant on it, for example. The Mexican political cacique is a comparable figure to the Brazilian “colonel,” I think you could say — mutatis mutandis — and indeed, cacique and caudilho (caudillo) sometimes appear in the Tupi vocabulary as well.
Na verdade, o decreto-lei 236/67 exclui as TVs educativas de exigência estabelecida pelo Código Brasileiro de Telecomunicações de 1962. Diz o parágrafo 2º do Artigo 14 do decreto-lei:
In point of fact, Decree-Law 236/67 exempts educational TV from the requirement established in the Brazilian Telecommunications Code (CBT) of 1962. Paragraph 2 of Article 14 of the Decree Law reads:
“A outorga de canais para a televisão educativa não dependerá da publicação do edital previsto do artigo 34 do Código Brasileiro de Telecomunicações.”
“The granting of educational TV channels will not depend on the publication of the bid-soliciation provided for under Article 35 of the CBT of 1962.
O Artigo 34 do CBT, por sua vez, diz que:
Article 34 of the CBT reads:
“As novas concessões ou autorizações para o serviço de radiodifusão serão precedidas de edital, publicado com 60 (sessenta) dias de antecedência (…).”
“New concessions or licenses for broadcasting services will be preceded by a public bid solicitation, published 60 days in advance …”
Essa norma, por incrível que pareça, conseguiu “sobreviver” à Constituição de 1988, cujo artigo 175 exige licitação para a concessão de serviços públicos:
This rule (the Decree Law), incredible as it sounds, managed to survive the 1988 Constitution, whose Article 175 requires open bid solicitations for public services:
“It is incumbent upon the Public Authority, in the form of a law, directly or as part of a concession or licensing procedure, and always through a public soliciation of bids, to provide public services.”
Durante o governo de Fernando Henrique Cardoso, o decreto 1.720, de 28/11/1995, estendeu à radiodifusão as exigências de licitação regulamentadas pela lei 8.666/1993, alterando o Regulamento dos Serviços de Radiodifusão (decreto 52.795 de 31/10/1963). A partir de então, as outorgas de radiodifusão comercial só poderiam ser feitas por meio de licitação.
During the Cardoso government, Decree No. 1,720 of November 11, 1995, extended to broadcasting the requirement of public bid-solicitation as regulated by Law No. 8,666/1993, altering the Tegulation on Broadcasting Services (Decree No. 52,795 of October 31, 1963). From then on, commercial broadcasting concessions could only be granted through an open bidding process.
Passou despercebida, todavia, a redação do Parágrafo 2º do inciso XV do Artigo 13 do decreto 1720/1995, que dizia:
Overlooked, however, was the text of Article 13, Clause XV of Decree No. 1,720/1995, which read:
“Não dependerá de edital a outorga para execução de serviço de radiodifusão por pessoas jurídicas de direito público interno e por entidades da administração indireta instituídas pelos Governos Estaduais e Municipais, nem a outorga para a execução do serviço com fins exclusivamente educativos” [grifo meu].
“The granting of license to provide broadcasting services to public legal entities and legal entities founded by state and muncipal governments shall not require solicitation of bids, nor shall the grant of broadcasting rights for purely educational purposes.”
As emissoras de rádio e televisão educativas ficavam, portanto, dispensadas das licitações e poderiam continuar autorizadas através de critérios estabelecidos diretamente pelo Ministério das Comunicações, embora continuassem tendo que ser submetidas ao Congresso Nacional conforme manda a Constituição de 1988.
Radio and TV broadcasters were therefore exempted from competitive bidding and could keep their licenses based on criteria established directly by the Ministry of Education, though they remained subject to congressional oversight under the Constitution of 1988.
Estava discretamente “aberta a porta” para a continuidade do uso das concessões de rádio e televisão como moeda de barganha política – só que, agora, exclusivamente para as rádios e televisões educativas.
The barn door was discreetly left open for the use of radio and TV concessions as political bargaining chips to continue — except now, only in the area of “educational” radio and TV.
Cerca de um ano depois, o decreto 2.108 de 24/12/1996 promove nova alteração que consagrada a “brecha”. Está lá no Parágrafo 1º do inciso XV do Artigo 13:
Nearly a year later, Decree 2,108 of December 12, 1996 makes a fresh change that reinforces this loophole. It’s in Article 13, Clause XV, Paragraph 1:
I do not actually know that “clause” is a good translation for inciso, by the way. I have to check that. What is the standard hierarchical document model for Brazilian legalese, anyway? Has it been translated into XML yet? I should know this by now.
“É dispensável a licitação para a outorga para a execução de serviço de radiodifusão com fins exclusivamente educativos.”
“Competitive bidding for the granting of purely educational broadcast licenses can be dispensed with.”
Define “educational.”
Em agosto de 2002, uma seqüência de reportagens realizadas pela mesma repórter na Folha mostrava detalhadamente como o governo de Fernando Henrique Cardoso havia dado continuidade à pratica de distribuição de TVs educativas a políticos aliados. Na matéria inicial, sob o título “FHC distribuiu rádios e TVs educativas para políticos”, publicada em 25/8/2002, está escrito:
In August 2002, a series of reports by Lobato of the Folha showed in detail how the Cardoso government had continued the practice of distributing educational TV stations to political allies. In the first report in the series, under the headline “FHC distributed educational radio and TV stations to politicians” (August 3, 2002), she wrote:
“Em sete anos e meio de governo, além das 539 emissoras comerciais vendidas por licitação, FHC autorizou 357 concessões educativas sem licitação. (…) A distribuição foi concentrada nos três anos em que o deputado federal Pimenta da Veiga (PSDB-MG), coordenador da campanha de José Serra, esteve à frente do Ministério das Comunicações. Ele ocupou o cargo de janeiro de 99 a abril de 2002, quando, segundo seus próprios cálculos, autorizou perto de cem TVs educativas. Pelo menos 23 foram para políticos. A maioria dos casos detectados pela Folha é em Minas Gerais, base eleitoral de Pimenta da Veiga, mas há em São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Espírito Santo, Bahia, Pernambuco, Alagoas, Maranhão, Roraima e Mato Grosso do Sul.”
“In seven and a half years in government, besides the 539 broadcast concessions sold through competitive auction, FHC authorized 357 educational concessions without competitive bidding. Those concessions were concentrated during the three years in which federal deputry Pimenta da Viega (PSDB-Minas Gerais), José Serra’s campaign coordinator, headed the Ministry of Communications.
Serra showing up at the inauguration of Record News the other day and saying few, but very tactful and guardedly approving, things about the virtues of a competitive market, was notable.
Pimenta occupied the post from January 1999 to April 2002, during which, according to his own calculations, he authorized nearly 100 educational TV stations. At least 23 went to politicians. Most of the cases were detected by the Folha were in Minas Gerais, Pimenta’s electoral base, but other cases were found in São Paulo, Espírito Santo, Bahia, Pernambuco, Alagoas, Maranhão, Rorairm and Mato Grosso do Sul.”
Da mesma forma, quatro anos depois, em junho de 2006, novamente Elvira Lobato publicou matéria na mesma Folha de S.Paulo, de 19/6/2006, sob o título “Governo Lula distribui TVs e rádios educativas a políticos”, na qual se afirmava:
Likewise, four years later, in June 2006, Lobato published another article in the Folha, on June 19, 2006, headlined “Lula government distributed educational TV stations to politicians,” writing:
“O governo Lula reproduziu uma prática dos que o antecederam e distribuiu pelo menos sete concessões de TV e 27 rádios educativas a fundações ligadas a políticos. (…) Entre políticos contemplados estão os senadores Magno Malta (PL-ES) e Leonel Pavan (PSDB-SC). A lista inclui ainda os deputados federais João Caldas (PL-AL), Wladimir Costa (PMDB-PA) e Silas Câmara (PTB-AM), além de deputados estaduais, ex-deputados, prefeitos e ex-prefeitos. Em três anos e meio de governo, Lula aprovou 110 emissoras educativas, sendo 29 televisões e 81 rádios. Levando em conta somente as concessões a políticos, significa que ao menos uma em cada três rádios foi parar, diretamente ou indiretamente, nas mãos deles.”
The Lula goverment has reproduced the practice of his predecessors and conceded at least 7 educational TV concessions and 27 radio concessions to foundations tied to politicians.
The novelty being the use of NGOs and non-profits as fronts, I gather, something that a late-term decree by FHC II made possible, as I understand it dimly.
Remember that when you read “Lula” here, what is meant is Lula’s Minister of Communications, currently former Globo talking head and executive Hélio Costa — an appointment that pissed a lot of Lula voters off. See also
If the granting of the ministry to a Globo talking head was supposed to result in some kind of political payoff for the forces of Lulism — such as an end to the patented Globo art of the gabbling ratfink of the type that borked Lula in favor of Collor in 1989, as seen in Beyond Citizen Kane — it apparently did not work out very well. See, for example,
Fact-Checking Arnaldo Jabor
Among the politicians contemplated are Senators Malta (PL) and Pavan (PSDB). The list also includes deputies Caldas of Alagoas (PL), Costa of Paraná (PMDB), and Câmara of Amapá (PTB) …
None of them petistas, at any rate, and some of them staunch oppositionists. It would be interesting to compare the partisan composition of all the beneficiaries in the two cases as well.
What, for example, is the post hoc ergo propter hoc quid pro quo in the Lulist case, if any?
… as well as state deputies, former state deputies, mayors and ex-mayors. In three and a half years in office, Lula approved 110 educational broadcasters, 29 TV and 81 radios. Taking into account the concessions to politicians, this means that one in 3 radio stations wound up, directly or indirectly, in the hands of pols.
A decisão do juiz goiano, até agora desconhecida inclusive pelas dezenas de concessionárias de radiodifusão educativa diretamente atingidas, poderá colocar um fim nessa “brecha” – que, aliás, não é a única.
The decision of the Goianian judge, which not even the dozens of broadcasters affected had even heard of until now, could close this loophole — which, however, is not the only loophole that exists.
A prática sofrerá, sem dúvida, um importante golpe. Existem, no entanto, outras “brechas” e, através delas, o “coronelismo eletrônico” continua se perpetuando travestido em diferentes disfarces.
But the practice has taken a significant blow. There are, however, other loopholes through which “electronic machine politics” continues to perpetuate itself, in other guises.
*Venício A. de Lima é pesquisador sênior do Núcleo de Estudos sobre Mídia e Política (NEMP) da Universidade de Brasília e autor, entre outros, de Mídia: crise política e poder no Brasil (Editora Fundação Perseu Abramo, 2006)
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References: Artigo 14
 artigo 34
 Artigo 34
 artigo 175
 Artigo 13
 Artigo 13