Source: http://masscases.com/cases/sjc/370/370mass438.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 10:34:27+00:00

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INDICTMENT found and returned in the Superior Court on November 14, 1973.
WILKINS, J. The defendant was convicted of murder in the second degree for the killing of his wife. He challenges the judge's refusal to charge the jury on manslaughter and the admission of certain inculpatory statements. He also asks us to exercise our authority under G. L. c. 278, Section 33E, to order the reduction of his degree of guilt to manslaughter. There was no error of law, and we see no occasion to exercise our power under Section 33E in favor of the defendant.
1. The defendant argues that voluntary manslaughter was a permissible verdict on the evidence and that the judge should have charged the jury to that effect.
an obscenity, she told him to get out. He pulled out a gun and shot her.
Apparently, the victim did not state who the other man was. His identity may have been revealed in the course of an argument heard by two witnesses. The evidence would have warranted an inference that one of these witnesses was the other man and that he had asked the defendant to go to the victim's home to prove to the defendant that he (the witness) was living with the defendant's wife.
Voluntary manslaughter was not a permissible verdict because the evidence would not warrant a finding that sufficient provocation existed. The hostile and obscene character of the victim's statements clearly was not sufficient provocation. The well established rule in this Commonwealth is that "[i]nsults or quarreling alone cannot provide a reasonable provocation." Commonwealth v. Zukoski, ante, 23, 28 (1976). Commonwealth v. Vanderpool, 367 Mass. 743 , 746 (1975). Commonwealth v. Hartford, 346 Mass. 482 , 491 (1963). [Note 1] The defendant argues, however, that the wife's intimation that she had committed adultery informed the defendant of an occurrence which, in all the circumstances, constituted sufficient provocation to support a manslaughter verdict.
may be found in information conveyed to a defendant by words alone.
Nevertheless, this is not such a case. Past adultery lacks the peculiarly immediate and intense offense to a spouse's sensitivities which has led courts to recognize present adultery as adequate provocation, and many courts have refused to recognize discovery of past adultery as sufficient provocation. Palmore v. State, 283 Ala. 501, 508 (1969). Stewart v. State, 234 Ga. 3 (1975). Brown v. State, 228 Ga. 215, 218 (1971). People v. Pecora, 107 Ill. App. 2d 283, 296 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1028 (1970). People v. Wax, 75 Ill. App. 2d 163, 182 (1966), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 930 (1967). State v. Ward, 286 N.C. 304, 313 (1974) (no marriage). Commonwealth v. Collins, 440 Pa. 368, 374 (1970). See Palmore v. State, 253 Ala. 183, 185 (1949); People v. Arnold, 17 Ill. App. 3d 1043, 1047 (1974); Warren v. State, 243 Ind. 508, 513-514 (1963). Cf. Maher v. People, 10 Mich. 212, 224-225 (1862); Denham v. State, 218 Miss. 423, 429-430 (1953); Holmes v. Director of Pub. Prosecutions,  A.C. 588, 599-601; 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *191-192. [Note 4] In the present case, no reference was made to a specific act of adultery, and clearly any adultery occurred at a time remote from the shooting. Because sufficient provocation could not have been found on this record, no manslaughter instruction was necessary.
said, on more than one occasion, that he understood his rights. There was no error in the denial of the motion to suppress.
3. Finally, the defendant urges us to exercise our power and duty under G. L. c. 278, Section 33E, to reduce the verdict to manslaughter. Although this case involves a tragic circumstance, an apparently isolated event in the life of one who had no previous criminal record and who served with distinction in the Korean war, after a review of the entire record we see no justification for reducing the degree of guilt to manslaughter or otherwise exercising our authority under Section 33E.
[Note 1] This is the prevailing view elsewhere. See, e.g., People v. Thompson, 11 Ill. App. 3d 752, 757-758 (1973); Lang v. State, 6 Md. App. 128, 132, cert. denied, 254 Md. 719, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 971 (1969); State v. Fulford, 290 Minn. 236, 241 (1971); State v. Mosley, 415 S.W.2d 796, 799 (Mo. 1967). State v. Watson, 287 N.C. 147, 153-154 (1975); Commonwealth v. Myers, 419 Pa. 448, 451 n.6 (1965). But see People v. Valentine, 28 Cal. 2d 121, 143-144 (1946).
[Note 2] In Commonwealth v. Leate; 352 Mass. 452 , 458 (1967), a statement conveying information that the victim had raped the defendant's girl friend was said to be insufficient provocation, particularly since there was no sudden transport of passion on the defendant's part.
[Note 3] Under Section 210.3 (1) (b) of the Model Penal Code manslaughter would include any "homicide which would otherwise be murder . . . committed under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which there is reasonable explanation or excuse." (Proposed Official Draft 1962). One reason given for this broad formulation was that "the formulation sweeps away the rigid rules that have developed with respect to the sufficiency of particular types of provocation, such as the rule that words alone can never be enough. Given evidence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance, the question whether it is based on `reasonable explanation or excuse' may be confronted, as we think it should be, in the light of all the circumstances in the case." Comment at 46-47 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
[Note 4] But see Campbell v. State, 204 Ga. 399 (1948); Scroggs v. State, 94 Ga. App. 28, 30 (1956), Haley v. State, 123 Miss. 87 (1920); State v. Martin 216 S.C. 129, 140 (1949).

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