Source: https://dc.fd.org/motions/appeals/1000%20ft%20of%20school/diggs.htm
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 10:38:30+00:00

Document:
The district court had jurisdiction over this criminal case under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. A timely notice of appeal from the final judgment of the district court (entered December 14, 1995) having been filed on December 8, 1995, this Court has jurisdiction over this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
I. Whether the district court erred in ruling that Congress's enactment of the "schoolyard statute," 21 U.S.C. § 860(a), did not exceed its Commerce Clause power as defined in United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
II. Whether the trial court erred in coercing from Mr. xxxxx a waiver of his right to dismissal for a speedy trial violation by informing him only of the possibility of dismissal without prejudice and by telling him that the government would reindict him, when, in fact, he was entitled to seek dismissal with prejudice and, even if that were denied, whether to reindict would be determined by a grand jury, not the government.
III. Whether there was insufficient evidence from which the jury could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the distance from Tyler Elementary School to the point at which Mr. xxxxx possessed heroin with the intent to distribute was less than 1,000 feet.
A jury trial commenced before the Honorable Royce C. Lamberth on September 11, 1995. On September 13, 1995, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on both counts. On December 4, 1995, the court vacated Count One as a lesser included offense of Count Two (subject to reinstatement if Count Two were to be reversed on appeal) and sentenced Mr. xxxxx on the schoolyard count to 121 months in prison and 8 years of supervised release. (A. 29-32; 12/4 Tr. 5-7). Mr. xxxxx filed a timely notice of appeal. (A. 33).
1. The Speedy Trial Violation.
Mr. xxxxx was arrested on April 11, 1995 and arraigned on a criminal complaint before Magistrate Robinson on April 12, 1995. He was ordered held without bond. (A. 3). He was indicted on May 11, 1995, and arraigned on the indictment before Judge Lamberth on May 17, 1995. At the arraignment, Mr. xxxxx "ask[ed] for a speedy trial date" (5/17 Tr. 2) and the parties proposed July 10th or 11th (5/17 Tr. 3-4). When the court could not accommodate those dates and defense counsel told the court he was definitely expecting to file a pretrial motion, the court ordered pretrial motions due on May 30 and left the trial date open, to be set by further order. (5/17 Tr. 2-5; A. 10).
On June 8, 1995, defense counsel made an oral motion to extend the deadline for pretrial motions (A. 11). The court entered a written order granting the motion "[a]fter consulting with defense counsel in chambers and government counsel by telephone." (A. 11). The court ordered pretrial motions due on June 20, 1995, and set a trial date of September 11, 1995. (A. 11).
On August 15, 1995, defense counsel filed a motion to suppress evidence, (A. 12-15), and a motion for nunc pro tunc appointment under the Criminal Justice Act, stating that his client's inability to pay him under their retainer agreement had "hampered the presentation of certain substantive motions" (A. 18). On August 16, 1995, the government, noting that July 10th had been the 90th day after Mr. xxxxx's arrest, filed a motion to advance the trial date to August 18, 1995. (A. 20-22). (2) The court called an emergency status hearing late that afternoon, noting, "We've got tremendous problems here." (8/16 Tr. 2).
[PROSECUTOR]: [O]n May 11th the indictment was returned. From that day forward the clock is running. . . .
THE COURT: I thought it ran from the first of -- . . . After indictment it runs from first appearance or arraignment. . . . So the time will start on May 17th, was the arraignment before me.
[PROSECUTOR]: On June 8th . . . was the day that counsel requested the Court for more time to prepare motions.
[PROSECUTOR]: I believe that would suffice to toll the clock.
[PROSECUTOR]: The motion was due on June 20th, so I don't know if after June 20th, without a further filing. I assume the clock restarts on June 20th.
PROSECUTOR]: And I would assume that it was . . . August 14th that counsel's motion was filed, (3) the clock was tolled again. So the only periods that count for the 70 days are May 17th through June 8th and June 20th through August 14th.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: That's 60 days. (4) I don't think we need it. My client is willing to waive. He says he wants to go to trial September 11th. He doesn't want it to, you know, have it dismissed and reindicted. . . . And he understands the difference between the two, that you would probably, according to the law, grant dismissal, but you would give then 24 hours to reindict him, and we'll be back here tomorrow with a new calendar.
THE COURT: Now, we're here today on this emergency hearing because the Court looked at the Speedy Trial Act, and the motion not having been filed on your behalf, I believe from the Speedy Trial Act if you wanted to make a motion for me to dismiss this indictment, I would be compelled to dismiss it today.
The government advises me if I do that, they will have a special grand jury session tomorrow and reindict you on the same evidence tomorrow, and eventually the case would still go to trial.
Your attorney said he talked to you and you would just as soon try to keep the September 11th trial date and get this over with, but it is really your option. If you want to make the motion to dismiss, I'll grant it, and it's up to you if you want to do that, but the government will, I'm sure, follow through with their word, and just reindict you tomorrow, and we'll still have a trial. It probably won't be September 11th that way, but it's really up to you, and you tell me in your own words what you want to do?
DEFENDANT xxxxx: I want to waive the dismissal and start trial September 11th.
THE COURT: And make sure we get to trial on September 11th. I'll accept that, and I think you understand. Do you have any questions at all you want to ask me about it?
THE COURT: You know just what I'm doing?
THE COURT: Do you know what you're doing?
The government's case consisted of testimony from the two officers who arrested Mr. xxxxx (Officer Stanley Greene and Officer Peter Schumacher), a DEA chemist, a drug expert, and the officer who measured the distance to the school.
Officers Greene and Schumacher testified that they were on mountain bike patrol at 6:00 p.m. on April 11, 1995, when they received a radio run lookout for a black male, wearing dark clothing, carrying a gun inside a paper bag at the rear of 712 12th Street, S.E. (Tr. 131-32; 249-50). (5) The officers rode their bikes west on I Street and turned north on 12th Street. (Tr. 134; 250). Officer Schumacher turned first and rode up the left side of 12th Street. (Tr. 134, 250-51). Officer Greene then turned onto the righthand sidewalk. (Tr. 134, 144, 251).
Greene immediately saw Mr. xxxxx walking towards him carrying a paper bag in both hands. (Tr. 134-36). He said, "Hey, my man. Come here. Let me talk to you." (Tr. 137). Mr. xxxxx stated, "Hey, what. I ain't done nothing," and turned around and ran up 12th Street toward G Street. (Tr. 137-38). Greene dismounted his bike and chased Mr. xxxxx up the sidewalk, calling ahead to his partner. (Tr. 138-39, 253-54, 256). When Schumacher turned and saw Mr. xxxxx running towards him, Schumacher dismounted his bike and began running down the sidewalk. (Tr. 139, 255-56). Mr. xxxxx then turned back toward Greene, threw the bag to his right into the street, and ran towards the Potomac Gardens fence on his left. (Tr. 139, 256-57). Mr. xxxxx attempted to scale the fence but Greene succeeded in pulling him down and arresting him with Schumacher's assistance. (Tr. 140-41, 257-58).
Meanwhile, a car had driven north on 12th Street, past the bag. (Tr. 260). It screeched as it backed up alongside the bag about 20-30 feet from where the officers were handcuffing Mr. xxxxx. (Tr. 189-90, 192, 260). When both passenger doors opened and the passengers started to get out, Schumacher drew his weapon, and the car drove off. (Tr. 211, 260-65). Greene then went to retrieve the bag, and found that it contained six plastic sandwich bags of white powder and an empty container labeled "quinine hydrochloric." (Tr. 141, 153-54). The chemist testified that the powder was 123.9 grams of heroin mixture cut to a purity of 24%. (Tr. 229). The drug expert testified that that quantity of heroin would cost between $16,000 and $20,000 wholesale, and could be sold retail for between $30,960 and $108,400, depending on how it was further cut and packaged. (Tr. 341-47). He explained that Southeast Asia is the source for the majority of heroin in the United States and that the poppy plants from which heroin is produced are not grown in the District of Columbia. (Tr. 335-36).
With respect to the measurement to the school, Officer Greene testified that Officer Catterton began the measurement at the point "where the bag was dropped" -- the point Greene "ha[d] marked on the diagram, Government's 1, and the photograph, Government's 2, with the red dot marked bag" (Tr. 162-63), which represented the spot where the bag had landed (Tr. 145, 151-52). Officer Catterton testified that he began the measurement "[s]omewhere like in the sidewalk area" between the alley and I Street on 12th Street ("[a]bout mid-block") -- what Officer Greene had pointed to as "the point of drop." (Tr. 305-07). Catterton used a "measuring wheel" to go north on 12th Street, west through the alley, and over to the rear entrance of Tyler Elementary School. That measurement was "approximately 825 feet." (Tr. 307-08). Catterton then went to the front entrance of the school (in the 1000 block of G Street) and measured east on G Street and then south on 12th Street back to the starting point. That measurement was "approximately 935 feet." (Tr. 307-08).
The jury returned a verdict of guilty on both the possession with intent to distribute count and the schoolyard count, but Judge Lamberth vacated the former as a lesser included offense of the latter.
Mr. xxxxx is entitled to a judgment of acquittal on the schoolyard count for two independent reasons.
First, the schoolyard statute itself, 21 U.S.C. § 860(a), is outside Congress's Commerce Clause power. Under the rationale of the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1632-33 (1995), Congress cannot justify regulation of school zones on the theory that anything that damages the educational environment has an impact on interstate commerce. Although drug distribution does affect interstate commerce, that activity is already comprehensively criminalized under 21 U.S.C. § 841 (a lesser-included offense of § 860(a)). The only thing regulated by § 860(a) that is not regulated by § 841 is presence within 1,000 feet of a school. While Congress's purpose in attempting to eliminate criminal influences from school zones was worthy, criminal law enforcement and education are areas where states have historically been sovereign. The same federalism concerns that invalidated the Gun-Free School Zone Act in Lopez require invalidation of the schoolyard statute here.
Moreover, even assuming § 860(a) is constitutional, the government failed to present sufficient evidence that Mr. xxxxx committed his drug offense within 1,000 feet of a school. The only evidence on the distance element was Officer Catterton's measuring wheel reading of "approximately 825 feet" from where the bag landed to Tyler Elementary School. That measurement is insufficient to support the verdict for two reasons.
First, it measured from the point where the drugs had been abandoned rather than from the point where Mr. xxxxx possessed them with the intent to distribute them. It is impossible to tell on this record whether the additional distance to the point where the offense actually occurred was more or less than 175 feet.
Second, Officer Catterton qualified his own measurement by acknowledging that he had not calibrated the measuring equipment and that, for all he knew, he could have pushed the device 10 feet and registered a reading of 8 feet. Extrapolating that margin of error to the reading he did get means that, under Officer Catterton's own testimony, the actual distance (just to the abandoned bag) could have been 1031 feet or more. As qualified by Catterton, the reading he testified to was too uncertain to serve as the basis for a rational mind to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the locus of the offense was within 1,000 feet of a school.
In addition, the case must be remanded for dismissal under the Speedy Trial Act because Mr. xxxxx's waiver of his right to dismissal was based on legally erroneous information from the court. At the time of the emergency status conference, 93 non-excludable days had passed since Mr. xxxxx's indictment and he was statutorily entitled to have it dismissed. In obtaining his waiver of the right to dismissal, the court informed Mr. xxxxx only of the possibility of dismissal without prejudice when, in fact, Mr. xxxxx had a substantial claim to dismissal with prejudice. Moreover, the court told Mr. xxxxx that the government would certainly reindict him when, of course, the decision whether to reindict would be in the hands of a grand jury. Because Mr. xxxxx was misled with respect to the valuable right he was giving up, his "waiver" should be invalidated and the case returned to the trial court for a determination whether to dismiss with or without prejudice.
I. CONGRESS EXCEEDED ITS AUTHORITY UNDER THE COMMERCE CLAUSE WHEN IT ENACTED 21 U.S.C. § 860(a) CREATING ADDITIONAL PENALTIES WHEN DRUG TRAFFICKING TAKES PLACE WITHIN 1,000 FEET OF A SCHOOL.
The district court's ruling on the constitutionality of 21 U.S.C. § 860(a) (Tr. 375) is reviewed de novo.
B. The Schoolyard Statute Is Unconstitutional Under United States v. Lopez.
On several occasions since the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995), this Court has been presented with Commerce Clause challenges to § 860(a) but has not yet had to resolve this constitutional issue. In United States v. Applewhite, 72 F.3d 140, 141 (D.C. Cir. 1995), the Court did not have to decide the Lopez issue because it reversed the § 860(a) count on sufficiency grounds like those argued by Mr. xxxxx in Point III, infra. In United States v. Baucum, 66 F.3d 362 (D.C. Cir. 1995), reh'g denied, 80 F.3d 539 (D.C. Cir. 1996), and United States v. Edmonds, 69 F.3d 1172, 1177 (D.C. Cir. 1995), the defendants had not raised a Commerce Clause challenge in the trial court and this Court ruled that Lopez did not qualify as a "supervening decision" that would justify reaching the merits of the unpreserved claim. Here, the issue was preserved and Judge Lamberth's ruling upholding the statute is ripe for review.
In Lopez, the Supreme Court held that it was beyond Congress's constitutional power over interstate commerce to enact the Gun-Free School Zones Act (18 U.S.C. § 922(q)), which prohibited the possession of firearms within 1,000 feet of a school. Starting with "first principles" -- that "[t]he Constitution creates a Federal Government of enumerated powers" and that "a healthy balance of power between the States and the Federal govermment will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front," Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1626 -- the Court held that § 922(q) was an intolerable federal encroachment into areas that must be left to the states.
the Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by the States.
Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1634.
Anyone who violates section 841(a)(1) . . . by distributing, possessing with intent to distribute, or manufacturing a controlled substance in or on, or within one thousand feet of, the real property comprising a public or private elementary, vocational, or secondary school or a public or private college, junior college, or university, or a playground, or housing facility owned by a public housing authority, or within 100 feet of a public or private youth center, public swimming pool, or video arcade facility, is . . . subject to [twice the maximum punishment authorized by § 841(b)].
Judge Lamberth ruled that Congress had authority to enact this statute in light of the "long tradition of federal regulation of food and drugs under the commerce power." (Tr. 375). It is true that the distribution of drugs affects interstate commerce. See, e.g., United States v. Leshuk, 65 F.3d 1105, 1111-12 (4th Cir. 1995) (upholding 21 U.S.C. § 841 post-Lopez); United States v. Davis, 561 F.2d 1014, 1018-20 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (same, pre-Lopez). But drug distribution is already comprehensively criminalized in 21 U.S.C. § 841 -- the lesser-included offense of § 860(a). When Congress created a separate prohibition on violating § 841 near schools, the only thing it was regulating that was not already regulated was the environment surrounding schools.
The legislative history of § 860(a) does not indicate that Congress ever discussed, or apparently even considered, whether the activity of distributing drugs within 1,000 feet of a school affects interstate commerce -- a fact that disturbed the Lopez Court about the statute challenged in that case. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1632 ("to the extent that congressional findings would enable us to evaluate the legislative judgment that the activity in question substantially affected interstate commerce, even though no such substantial effect was visible to the naked eye, they are lacking here").
protection of them is most needed within the school and its proximate surroundings.
[I]f Congress can, pursuant to its Commerce Clause power, regulate activities that adversely affect the learning environment, then, a fortiori, it also can regulate the educational process directly. Congress could determine that a school's curriculum has a "significant" effect on the extent of classroom learning [and] mandate a federal curriculum for local elementary and secondary schools.
Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1633. To allow such federal regulation of the schools would be to eliminate entirely any "distinction between what is truly national and what is truly local." Id. at 1634.
The Supreme Court's decision in Lopez has implications far beyond the Gun-Free School Zones Act. Congress can no longer assume that every worthy thing it wants to do can be justified under the mantra "interstate commerce." Just recently, Judge Kiser of the Western District of Virginia relied on Lopez in striking down the Violence Against Women Act. See Washington Post, July 30, 1996, at A1, col. 1 (opinion not yet available on Westlaw). The schoolyard statute is likewise outside Congress's commerce power; Congress's justification in passing it -- protecting the educational environment -- was found insufficient in Lopez itself.
II. MR. xxxxx'S WAIVER OF THE RIGHT TO DISMISSAL UNDER THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT WAS INVALID BECAUSE IT WAS BASED ON ERRONEOUS INFORMATION FROM THE TRIAL COURT CONCERNING THE VALUE OF SUCH A DISMISSAL.
Whether the district court provided Mr. xxxxx with legally erroneous information about his rights under the Speedy Trial Act is a question of law reviewed de novo. See United States v. Ortega-Mena, 949 F.2d 156, 158 (5th Cir. 1991) (facts supporting Speedy Trial Act ruling reviewed under clearly erroneous standard; legal questions reviewed de novo).
B. This Court Should Invalidate Mr. xxxxx's Waiver And Remand For A Determination By The District Court Whether Dismissal Should Be With Or Without Prejudice.
Under the Speedy Trial Act, "the trial of a defendant charged in an . . . indictment . . . shall commence within seventy days from the filing date (and making public) of the . . . indictment, or from the date the defendant has appeared before a judicial officer of the court in which such charge is pending, whichever date last occurs." 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1). As of the emergency hearing on August 16, 1995, 93 non-excludable days had passed under the Speedy Trial Act: May 12 through May 16 (5 days); May 18 through June 7 (21 days); and June 9 through August 14 (67 days). Mr. xxxxx was therefore entitled to dismissal of his indictment under the sanction provision of 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2), which sets forth factors to be considered by the district court in determining whether the dismissal should be with or without prejudice. Because the district court misinformed Mr. xxxxx as to the legal ramifications of a motion to dismiss, his ostensible waiver of such a motion was not valid.
The speedy trial clock began to run on the day of indictment (May 11), because the indictment post-dated Mr. xxxxx's first appearance before a judicial officer (his April 11 arraignment on the criminal complaint). See § 3161(c)(1); United States v. Ortega-Mena, 949 F.2d 156, 158 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v. Owokoniran, 840 F.2d 373, 374 (7th Cir. 1987); United States v. Pringle, 751 F.2d 419, 431 (1st Cir. 1984); United States v. Haiges, 688 F.2d 1273, 1274 (9th Cir. 1982). (10) The date of the indictment (May 11) and the date of the arraignment on the indictment (May 17) are excludable under § 3161(h)(1) as "other proceedings concerning the defendant." Pringle, 751 F.2d at 431; Ortega-Mena, 949 F.2d at 158; Haiges, 688 F.2d at 1274. Likewise, June 8 (the date the court heard and granted the defendant's oral motion for an extension of time to file motions) is excludable as such a proceeding. § 3161(h)(1)(F).
No such period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by the court in accordance with this paragraph shall be excludable under this subsection unless the court sets forth, in the record of the case, either orally or in writing, its reasons for finding that the ends of justice served by the granting of such continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
After June 8, therefore, the speedy trial clock ran continuously until August 15 when defense counsel filed his motion to suppress evidence and motion for appointment of counsel nunc pro tunc under the Criminal Justice Act. § 3161(h)(1)(F). As of the emergency status hearing, 93 non-excludable days had passed. There is no question, therefore, that, as of the August 16 hearing, the 70-day limit had been violated and that Mr. xxxxx was entitled to dismissal of the indictment upon his motion therefore. See § 3162(a)(2) ("If a defendant is not brought to trial within the time limit required by section 3161(c) as extended by section 3161(h), the information or indictment shall be dismissed on motion of the defendant."). The trial court correctly recognized that, if Mr. xxxxx asked for a dismissal, the court would have no choice but to grant it. See 8/16 Tr. 11 ("I believe from the Speedy Trial Act if you wanted to make a motion for me to dismiss this indictment, I would be compelled to dismiss it today.").
Mr. xxxxx's "waiver" of his right to dismissal is invalid because it was based on erroneous legal information from the court. In obtaining the waiver, the court talked about dismissal only in terms of dismissal without prejudice and told Mr. xxxxx that "the government will, I'm sure, follow through with their word, and just reindict you tomorrow, and we'll still have a trial." (8/16 Tr. 11). In fact, Mr. xxxxx was entitled to move for dismissal with prejudice, in which case the court would have been required to consider specified statutory factors in deciding whether to dismiss with or without prejudice. See § 3162(a)(2). Even if the court had decided to dismiss without prejudice, reindictment was up to a grand jury, not the government. See United States v. Wright, 6 F.3d 811, 811-12 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (after dismissal without prejudice grand jury reindicted on only two of original five counts). And even if a grand jury had reindicted Mr. xxxxx and he had been convicted on the second indictment, he would have been entitled to appeal the district court's refusal to dismiss with prejudice.
The right to seek dismissal with prejudice is an extremely valuable right. "The statute itself does not favor either form of dismissal over the other." Wright, 6 F.3d at 813. Three factors, "among others," are to be considered by the district court in making the with/without prejudice decision: "the seriousness of the offense; the facts and circumstances of the case which led to the dismissal; and the impact of a reprosecution on the administration of this chapter and on the administration of justice." § 3162(a)(2).
[I]f the United States Attorney's Office persists in its ad hoc method of compliance, and if that method leads to more violations of the Act, the Government's "lackadaisical attitude" toward enforcing Congress's directives could well be used as evidence of a "pattern of neglect."
If Mr. xxxxx had not been misled as to his rights and had asked for dismissal, the district court would have had to consider the violation in his case as part of such a "pattern of neglect" before deciding what kind of dismissal was called for. The district court would have had to consider whether the government had heeded this Court's warning in Wright or had continued its ad hoc policy of leaving responsibility with the individual AUSA handling the case. The court would also have had to consider the number of other post-Wright cases that had been allowed to fall through the cracks. See § 3166(b)(3); § 3170 (requiring collection and maintenance of statistics on sanctions for noncompliance). The third factor -- the impact of reprosecution on the administration of justice -- would depend in large part on the court's resolution of the first two factors.
Given this Court's warnings in Wright, Mr. xxxxx had a substantial claim for dismissal with prejudice. The court's statements to Mr. xxxxx obscured the true value of the dismissal right he was giving up and rendered the resulting "waiver" invalid.
"Congress left the prejudice decision 'to the guided discretion of the district court.'" Wright, 6 F.3d at 813 (quoting United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 335 (1988)). Because "[t]he district court is best situated to decide whether to dismiss with prejudice," United States v. Willis, 958 F.2d 60, 64 (5th Cir. 1992), this Court should remand in order that the district court may exercise its discretion applying the three factors set forth in § 3162(a)(2).
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING MR. xxxxx'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL ON THE DISTANCE ELEMENT OF THE SCHOOLYARD COUNT.
This Court reviews the trial court's denial of a Mr. xxxxx's motion for judgment of acquittal de novo. This Court does not defer to the district court, but rather must make its own independent judgment regarding the sufficiency of the evidence, viewing it in the light most favorable to the government. See Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1978); United States v. Johnson, 952 F.2d 1407, 1409 (D.C. Cir. 1992). Mr. xxxxx's conviction must be reversed if, on the evidence presented, a reasonable mind could not find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-319 (1979).
B. No Reasonable Juror Could Conclude Beyond A Reasonable Doubt That The Actual Distance From Tyler Elementary School To The Locus Of The Offense Was Less Than 1,000 Feet.
In order to prove a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 860 (a), the government was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. xxxxx knowingly and intelligently possessed a controlled substance with the intent to distribute ("PWID"), and that he did so within 1,000 feet of a school. United States v. Stephens, 23 F.3d 553, 555 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 522 (1994) (citing United States v. McDonald, 991 F.2d 866, 869 (D.C. Cir. 1993)). "Section 860(a) is violated only if the distance between the real property of a school and the locus of the defendant's PWID . . . is less than 1,000 feet." United States v. Applewhite, 72 F.3d 140, 144 (D.C. Cir. 1995). Here, as in Applewhite and United States v. Johnson, 46 F.3d 1166, 1169-70 (D.C. Cir. 1995), the government failed to present sufficient evidence from which the jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the distance between the location where the crime occurred and the protected location was less than 1,000 feet.
In Johnson, this Court found that the government failed to carry its burden of proof when it "inexplicably offered evidence not of the distance from a school to the point in the house where Johnson possessed the drugs, but only of a measurement made by Officer Reid from Randle Heights Elementary School to a point five feet up the walkway to Johnson's house." 46 F.3d at 1169. Likewise in Applewhite, this Court concluded that the government had not met its burden where the police measured the distance only up to the apartment building in which the drugs were found and not to the actual "locus of the drug offense" -- the point in the kitchen of the apartment where the PWID actually occurred. 72 F.3d at 144. Similarly here, the government used an "improper terminal point" of measurement, Johnson, 46 F.3d at 1169, and failed to present evidence from which a jury could determine the omitted distance beyond a reasonable doubt.
As in [Johnson], however, there is no evidence in the record here from which the jury could have derived the shorter straight line distance. The Government's case must therefore stand or fall upon the adequacy of the 920.2 foot measurement as proof that the appellant possessed the drugs within 1,000 feet of the school.
It is entirely possible -- perhaps probable -- that [the straight line distance was sufficiently shorter than the pedestrian distance to make up for the improper terminal point]. If so, we have no idea why the government did not prove it. . . . Since there is no evidence of either the straight line measurement or the distance between the terminal point of Reid's measurement and the point of possession, it is impossible to determine whether or not this equation [for calculating the necessary differential between the straight line and pedestrian measurements] is true. Therefore, the government cannot prevail.
The government has an additional fundamental problem in this case that was not present in Johnson or Applewhite. Even aside from the fact that the government measured to "a point short of the location of [the PWID]," Applewhite, 72 F.3d at 144, the evidence is insufficient here because Officer Catterton admitted that the measurement he reported was within his margin of error. Given that Catterton's testimony allowed for a range of possible distances both over and under 1,000 feet, it was a matter of pure speculation for the jury as to the side of the line on which the actual distance fell. For this reason, too, "the distance in this case was not resolved with the precision necessary to support the jury's verdict." Applewhite, 72 F.3d at 143 (emphasis added).
[I]f the Intoxilyzer were truly prone to erroneous readings, then Intoxilyzer results without more might be insufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979).
467 U.S. at 489 n.10 (emphasis added).
Not only did Officer Catterton not calibrate the device before or after he used it, (16) he admitted to a large margin of error, acknowledging specifically that he would not have noticed any discrepancy if the actual distance had been 25% more than the odometer reading -- if he had "pushed it ten feet, and it came back eight feet." (Tr. 316). Extrapolating that testimony to the "approximately 825 feet" measurement Catterton reported means that, under Catterton's own testimony, the actual distance (just to the bag) could in fact have been 1031 feet (825 + (25% of 825)) (17) -- and very possibly more, since the 825 feet was only "approximate" and since Catterton was not asked whether he would have noticed an even larger discrepancy.
No reasonable jury could convict beyond a reasonable doubt on the state of this record. The measurement provided by Catterton was simply too uncertain and open-ended to serve as the basis for a reasonable mind to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the relevant distance was less than 1,000 feet. (18) "'A jury is entitled to draw a vast range of reasonable inferences from evidence, but may not base a verdict on mere speculation.'" United States v. Teffera, 985 F.2d 1082, 1085 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (quoting United States v. Long, 905 F.2d 1572, 1576 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 948 (1990)). Given the qualifications Officer Catterton placed on his measurement, and the absence of any other evidence of the relevant distance, whether the actual distance was more or less than 1,000 feet was, on this record, a matter of pure speculation.
the prosecution must establish that the result of the chemical test involved "when taken together with its tolerance for error must equal or exceed the statutory" threshold of .10 BAC to prove "beyond a reasonable doubt that the actual weight of alcohol in [a defendant's] blood was at least 0.10%."
State v. Dibenedetto, 906 P.2d 624, 632 (Haw. Ct. App. 1995) (quoting State v. Boehmer, 613 P.2d 916 (Haw. 1980)).
Likewise, in Haynes v. State, 865 P.2d 753, 754, 755-56 (Alaska 1993), the Alaska Supreme Court held that a defendant must be given the benefit of the Intoximeter's margin of error and that it violated due process under the Alaska Constitution to revoke the license of a driver whose BAC measured .106 where the .01 margin of error raised the possibility that the actual BAC was .096 -- less than the statutory requirement of .10 -- even though the standard for revocation was merely a preponderance of the evidence. See also State v. Hvistendahl, 405 N.W.2d 273, 276 (Neb. 1987) ("a test result which is subject to margin of error must be adjusted so as to give the defendant the benefit of that margin") (citing State v. Bjornsen, 271 N.W.2d 839 (Neb. 1978) (dismissing case for insufficiency where government chemist conceded on cross-examination that 0.10 BAC reading was subject to 0.005 margin of error)). Cf. People v. Magri, 3 N.Y.2d 562, 147 N.E.2d 728, 731 (N.Y. 1958) ("were the only evidence here that of the untested radar equipment, we would hold, as in the case of an untested automobile speedometer [citation omitted] that such evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction for speeding").
Those courts that have allowed conviction despite the fact that, taking account the margin of error, the actual blood alcohol concentration might have been under the statutory limit, have done so only by interpreting their substantive statutes as creating an offense of registering a particular BAC reading as opposed to actually having a particular blood alcohol level. See Haynes, 865 P.2d at 755 (discussing the two approaches). In other words, these courts conclude that their legislature considered the inherent margin of error and incorporated it into the statutory limit. Id. See, e.g., Nelson v. Commonwealth, 430 S.E.2d 553, 554-55 (Va. Ct. App. 1993) (General Assembly was presumably aware that measuring devices have inherent margins of error yet chose to word statute such that BAC is to be determined "as indicated by a chemical test administered in accordance with [state code]"); Isbell v. Miller, 797 P.2d 738, 743 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990) (state regulations define 10% margin of error as acceptable for breath tests; distinguishing Alaska statute); Nugent v. Iowa Dept. of Transportation, 390 N.W.2d 125, 127-28 (Iowa 1986) (license revocation statute allows administrative revocation based solely on particular test result without consideration of margin of error; distinguishing criminal cases requiring proof of a BAC high enough to allow for margin of error).
Obviously, the "schoolyard statute" at issue here is not of this type. Congress in § 860(a) did not penalize trafficking in drugs at a location that yields a measuring wheel reading of less than 1,000 feet to the nearest school. Congress penalized trafficking in drugs at a location that actually is within 1,000 feet of a school. Given that requirement, Mr. xxxxx's conviction cannot stand since, under the government's own evidence, (19) the distance to Tyler Elementary school could have been at least 1031 feet.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment against Mr. xxxxx must be vacated and the case remanded to the district court for entry of a judgment of acquittal on Count Two. In addition, the case must be remanded to the district court for determination whether dismissal under the Speedy Trial Act should be with or without prejudice and, if the court dismisses without prejudice, for a new trial on Count One.
I hereby certify that the foregoing Brief for Appellant Kenneth A. xxxxx does not exceed the number of words permitted pursuant to D.C. Circuit Rule 28(d).
I hereby certify that two copies of the foregoing Brief for Appellant Kenneth A. xxxxx have been delivered by hand to the United States Attorney's Office, John R. Fisher, Esq., Appellate Division, Room 10-435, 555 Fourth Street, N.W., Washington, D.C., 20001, this 30th day of July, 1996.
September 11, 1995, and ending with page 485 on September 13, 1995 (Appendix. Tab C). "12/4 Tr. __" refers to pages of the December 4, 1995, sentencing transcript (Appendix. Tab D).
2. The 90-day limit was a reference to the Speedy Trial Act requirement that detained defendants be tried within 90 days of their detention. 18 U.S.C. § 3164(b). The sanction for violation of this requirement is automatic review of release conditions. § 3164(c). The government's motion did not mention the 70-day limit applicable to all defendants (§ 3161(c)(1)), the sanction for violation of which is dismissal (§ 3162(a)(2)).
3. The defense motions were actually filed on August 15. (A. 12, 17).
4. In fact, even under the prosecutor's erroneous calculation -- excluding everything but May 18 through June 7 and June 21 through August 13 -- 75 days of speedy trial time had passed.
5. The citizen's 911 report that was the basis for the radio run in fact described the man with the gun as wearing a multicolored jacket and a baseball cap with a red Orioles insignia. (A. 24). The jury never learned that Mr. xxxxx did not fit the citizen's description (he was wearing a black shirt, green jacket, and blue jeans) (Tr. 134), because the government succeeded in excluding the 911 tape in limine. (Tr. 4-8; A. 24-27).
6. Despite this testimony, the court sustained the government's objection to defense counsel's statement in closing that "[Catterton] told you, 'I approximate that,' because something might be wrong with the equipment." (Tr. 453).
7. This testimony was supported by photographs the police had taken in which there were skidmarks so close to the sidewalk that Schumacher conceded that if those marks belonged to the car that he had heard screech, the bag would not have been visible to him. (Tr. 279-84).
8. The Ninth Circuit rejected Commerce Clause challenges to the schoolyard statute in two pre-Lopez decisions. United States v. McDougherty, 920 F.2d 569, 571-72 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Thornton, 901 F.2d 738, 741 (9th Cir. 1990). The Seventh and Fifth Circuits have upheld § 860(a) since Lopez. United States v. Rogers, 1996 WL 399850, *11-12 (7th Cir. July 17, 1996); United States v. Clark, 67 F.3d 1154, 1165-66 (5th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1432 (1996).
9. At least 46 states regulate the distribution of drugs on or near school grounds. See, e.g., Ala. Code § 13A-12-250; Alaska Stat. § 11.71.030(b); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3411(A)(2).
10. In light of this authority, the district court erred as a matter of law in concluding that the clock did not begin to run until the May 17 arraignment on the indictment. (8/16 Tr. 6).
11. It does not appear that the extension of the motions deadline qualifies as a "continuance" in any event. The time during which motions are being prepared is not ordinarily excluded and there is no indication that the trial date was pushed back by the granting of the extra days.
the bag. According to the diagram admitted into evidence as Government's Exhibit 1 (currently being held for safekeeping by government counsel), Mr. xxxxx threw the bag from the grassy area along the sidewalk. If, as Officer Greene testified, that diagram is "a fair approximation of the rough scale of things" (Tr. 143), the distance from where Mr. xxxxx threw the bag to where it landed appears to be almost the width of two car lanes. See Tr. 295-96 (12th Street is a four-lane road).
13. The measurement was begun "[a]bout mid block." (Tr. 305). See also Gov't. Exhibit 1 (red dot indicating where bag landed is precisely halfway between G and I Streets). Because the 700 block of 12th Street is twice as long as an ordinary block -- running from G to I Streets without any break for H Street -- the mid-point of the 700 block is actually a full city block from either corner. Gov't. Exhibit 1.
14. See Tr. 123 (prosecutor's opening statement: "And they walked -- they didn't even do it as the crow flies. They went around blocks, and around corners, to the school and still came out less than 1,000 feet, measuring to two different doors of the school; one less than 1,000 feet, one less than 900."); Tr. 307 (eliciting testimony from Catterton that the distance he walked would be greater than "how a crow would fly"); Tr. 439 (prosecutor's closing argument: "And, in fact, as you know, he erred in favor of the defense in the way he measured. He did it as the person walks, around corners and angles, not the more direct route, as the crow flies").
15. The mechanism that actually calculates the distance is not visible but is inside of a box which is positioned between two wheels. The odometer readout is on top of the box. (Tr. 321).
Q How do you know that that instrument was accurate?
A Well, through the police department I don't know, so for my own safety, what I do is before and after each measurement I calibrate it. And how I calibrate it is I take a separate tape measure, run the tape along the ground. I did this in the hallway of my office. Ran the tape along the ground, measured, and then check the meter against the measurements on the tape. I did it five times. And then I go out to the scene [and take the measurement] and went back to the station, [and] checked the meter again to make sure it was still accurate.
17. Looking at the extrapolation another way, Officer Catterton testified that, for all he knew, the measuring wheel reading could have been only 80% of the actual distance (a reading of 8 feet when the distance was really 10 feet). His reading of 825 feet could therefore have represented an actual distance of 1031 feet, since 80% of 1031 is 825.
18. A reasonable doubt is a doubt that would "cause a reasonable person to hesitate or pause in the graver or more important transactions of life." Criminal Jury Instructions for the District of Columbia (RedBook), Instruction 2.09 at p. 76 (4th ed. 1993). Suppose a reasonable person knew that he had to travel to a certain remote (and gas-stationless) location in order to prevent conviction of an innocent person and that he knew that his gas tank would take him exactly 1,000 miles. If, using a 10-year-old map measuring wheel that had been bouncing around the back of his trunk, he measured the distance on the map as 825 miles but thought from eyeballing it that it could be 1031 miles or more, any reasonable person would have the kind of doubt that would cause him to hesitate before venturing out without an extra can of gasoline.
19. The issue would obviously be different if the margin of error evidence had come from someone other than Catterton. If Catterton had denied any margin of error or testified to a margin of error too small to make a difference in the outcome, the jury would of course have been free to disregard any other evidence indicating a material margin of error. See People v. Gustafson, 551 N.E.2d 826, 834 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (jury was free to reject defense expert's margin of error testimony); State v. Hvistendahl, 405 N.W.2d 273 (Neb. 1987) (trier of fact is entitled to choose between conflicting margins of error). But here, Catterton's reading was offered with the qualification that it could be inaccurate to a degree that was legally significant.

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 § 922
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