Source: https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/95unclass/Woolsey.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 14:34:36+00:00

Document:
Madame de Clarens's courage in collecting this intelligence and forwarding it under difficult circumstances led--through R.V. Jones's analysis and persuasive abilities in London--to the British raid on Peenemunde and to delays and disruptions in the V-1 and V-2 programs, saving many thousands of lives in the West.
I first heard about R. V. Jones some 12 or 13 years ago. In the aftermath of three-years' service in the Navy Department, I was appointed to an organization called the Chief of Naval Operations Executive Panel. I was the far-most junior and least prestigious member of this fine panel, and in a meeting one day in 1980 or 1981, an extremely clever idea was floated combining technical ingenuity and a truly crafty and nefarious twist of mind for dealing with the Soviet submarine threat. Either Albert Woolstetter or Charlie Hertsfeld, who is here today, muttered, "That sounds like an R. V. Jones idea," and I said, "Who is R. V. Jones?" A hush settled over the room. Either Albert or Charlie--I am not sure to this day which one--said, "I thought you were a reasonably well-read young man. You have not read The Wizard War?" I said, "No." He said, "Go read The Wizard War." I said, "All right"; I did.
So, although we are talking today about matters from the past, our focus really is on the future. We are not trying to relive the past, much less to reawaken animosities. The Fascist and Nazi regimes of Italy and Germany are long gone, replaced by democracies which are friends and allies, representatives of their intelligence services and others of our allies who are here today, as is the Ambassador of France. Indeed, in the intervening half century, we have together fought and won another whole war successfully--this time a cold one. The point is not what happened in the past in and of itself, but rather what the extraordinary accomplishments we honor today can tell us about what we have to do in the future.
The award we inaugurate today, and of which Reg is the first recipient, the R. V. Jones Award, will be similar in one way and different in several ways from other awards which we give in the Intelligence Community. Like a number of our other awards, the R. V. Jones Award will, in the future, ordinarily--probably exclusively--be given in private. For two reasons intelligence successes must almost always be celebrated only among a handful of people many, many years after they occur. You do not want those from whom you are successfully collecting intelligence to know that the success has occurred, and you also do not want to have the methods of success known because they may well be useful in other circumstances.
But unlike our other awards in intelligence, the R. V. Jones Award, engraved with Reg's likeness, will not be reserved for Americans, although Americans are eligible. It will be given in the future to intelligence officers or organizations in the United States or other countries who demonstrate "Scientific Acumen Applied With Art in the Cause of Freedom."
In evaluation and analysis, Reg Jones's superb gift for using intelligence to understand the mind of the enemy came from his ability to integrate information from many different sources, to use one type to tip off another, to take one type of clue--for example, the mere order of addresses on a signal intercept--and to see then that it would make an agent report fall entirely into place. It was Reg Jones's ability to integrate the output from the remarkable codebreaking that was going on at Bletchley, from agent reports, from captured equipment, from reconnaissance, and from many other sources that made him such a remarkable puzzle solver--puzzles in which many of the pieces had of course been hidden by his adversaries. He would patiently piece together clues, develop an hypothesis, task those who collected intelligence, manage the collection, form a conclusion, demand to be heard, persuade his superiors of his view, design actions to counter what he had learned about, and then do it all over again.
In the field of countermeasures, Reg invented "window," which we came later to know as "chaff," the principal method for deceiving radar in its time. His gift for putting himself in the shoes of his adversary--a gift that is common to all great chess players, poker players, and intelligence officers--was essential to these deception operations. By coming to understand which beacons, for example, would be finding night fighters on particular evenings, he was able to insert British long-range night fighters into the midst of the German formations, to begin firing, dart away, and thus start fights among the German fighters themselves.
In all of these efforts, Reg Jones's attitude and approach toward intelligence embodied some timeless principles. The first, and in many ways the most important of these, was his respect for the enemy's abilities. Reg was a resolute foe of a fallacy that is common in the intelligence business--frequently called mirror-imaging--namely, assuming that one's opponent will act as one does one's self. He was thus able to understand, for example, that the Germans had made a breakthrough in rocket fuels, which had not been thought of by Allied scientists. As he put it in one heated discussion around the Cabinet table in addressing the issue with Churchill, "Just because our experts have not thought of liquid fuels, there was no cause to assume that the rocket was either more or less eminent than it was before our argument had started."
He continually stressed that it was quite possible for the Germans to have succeeded in scientific undertakings, such as the Knockebein beams, where the British or the Allies had not yet conceived of the approach. His respect for his adversary's abilities, their very great abilities, led him to be able to learn from them, as in the case of the clever German operation that permitted the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau to escape the British blockade. Jones likened the German naval tactics to the principle he call "climatization by slow change"--one of a number of categories of practical jokes which Professor Jones, a lifelong practical joker and designer of humorous hoaxes (you can tell it from the poker face and the twinkle in the eye)--has often analyzed and set forth for admiring and chuckling audiences.
An urgent request arrived on Reg's desk from the signals organization in Malta asking what steps they should take in light of the effective German jamming. Because he had taken care to understand not only German jamming, but also--and this is the key--the way the German military forces made their decisions to see whether or not their jamming was successful, Reg gave a surprising response to Malta: do absolutely nothing different than you had been doing before--continue to scan.
Sure enough, after a few days, the German jammers on Sicily were turned off. At the end of the war General Martini, the Director General of Signals for the Luftwaffe, had been taken prisoner and was being questioned. During the discussion, he asked his former adversary, Reginald Jones, what remarkable antijamming device the British had been able to install in their Malta radar, and the General ruefully learned of Jones's deception--I suppose uttering some equivalent of "Curses, foiled again!"
Most delicious, in a sense--two senses--however, occurred when Reg was trying to persuade the group captain who was the head of the photographic branch of the Air Staff, D.D. Laws, nicknamed "Daddy," of the importance of moving to use wingtip cameras for photoreconnaissance to improve stereoscopic photography, and for a number of other reasons. As Jones puts it in The Wizard War, "By this time I was beginning to get on personal terms with "Daddy" Laws. Finally, I found his weak point. Of all the improbable hobbies for a group captain, his was the making of jam. If only I could convince him that I, too, was interested in jam-making, he might be more sympathetic to my ideas about cameras. My moment came when I asked him one day whether he had ever made quince jam. `No,' he exclaimed--and then with a wistful look in his eye--`but, by God, I'd like to.' I offered to get him quinces, and henceforward, photographic Mosquito aircraft for low-level work were fitted with forward-facing wingtip cameras."
When it came down to it, however--and in many ways this is the most important aspect of being an intelligence officer--when diplomacy and quince jam did not work, Reg Jones was a man who stuck to his guns and stood his ground. He was careful and deliberate in his analysis, but when the chips were down, he had, in the battles of Whitehall, the one absolutely essential ingredient for intelligence officers: courage. As he put it in the introduction to The Wizard War, dedicated to "all those in Nazi-occupied Europe, who in lone obscurity and of their own will risked torture and death for scientific intelligence," he noted that "courage is the quality that guarantees all others."
This is no less important when a young 28-year-old analyst, with a theory about some navigation beams that no one else has really heard of or understands, is confronting his mentor together with the prime minister and the entire War Cabinet. It is as important there as it is on the front lines. Time and again--on the beams, on the capabilities of the V-2 (dealt with in another Cabinet confrontation)--the strength of character behind Reg Jones's defense of his judgments was powerful.
This strength was born of devotion to those for whom he spoke--those whose lives were on the line. As he put it--referring to two members of the French Resistance who had been executed--"while men like Giran and Faye, and women, too, suffered torture and death for us alone among their perverted enemies, our squabbles in London went on." He added, "I knew what devotion was being offered by so many of our sources, and I was going to see that their sacrifices were turned to as good advantage as possible. This was the only way in which we could keep faith with them."
This brings us to my last point--Reg Jones's attitude toward espionage and to those who conduct it, as the medal says, "in the cause of freedom." Some today try to put the effective use of technology and classic espionage at odds with one another. Nonsense! In Reg Jones's mind and writings, there is no hint of any such false separation between the role of science and the role of human beings undertaking the dangerous, lonely, and heroic job of espionage "in the cause of freedom."
Finally, espionage in the cause of freedom has one great advantage because the human spirit is the Achilles heel of tyranny. Although democracies labor under some tactical disadvantages in espionage--and they will have their failures--in conducting espionage against regimes under the control of Nazis, Fascists, Communists, and the like, free governments have one great asset in those long twilight struggles. The uglier the regime, the more it will become vulnerable in time to its own people, including those who work for it officially--those who possess secrets. Through disgust, through cynicism sometimes, but often through a quiet, private thirst for freedom, those who are forced to live in and work for tyrannical regimes will come to be willing to reveal those regimes' plans and activities. When that happens, cracks appear in the regimes' armor.
A half century ago, it was espionage that led the Allies to understand the rocket and missile programs at Peenemunde, and that brings us to the second person we are honoring today--Jeannie Rousseau, the Viscomtesse de Clarens, codename AMNIARIX. She is listed first by Reg in the dedication of The Wizard War as one of those for whom "courage is the quality that guarantees all others."
As Reg relates it, when he first inquired about the source of the extraordinary report that had originally tipped off the British Government to what was going on at Pennemunde, all he could learn was that it came from "une jeune fille la plus remarquable de sa generation," part of a small espionage network reporting from occupied France. Early in the war she had, because of her gift with languages, served as an interpreter in transactions with the Germans and had begun to report on what she had seen and heard. She was arrested by the Gestapo in 1941 but was later released and prohibited from staying in the coastal area. She returned--if you know her, you would know why--immediately to espionage in Paris. During 1943, she filed two--indeed, many others--but two particularly remarkable intelligence reports about Peenemunde. These reports led Reg, and ultimately, the rest of the British Government and the rest of the Allies, directly to the missile and rocket development work going on there. Her courage in collecting this intelligence and in forwarding it under very difficult circumstances, led, through Reg Jones's analysis and persuasive abilities in London, to the British raid on Peenemunde and to delays and disruptions in the V-1 and V-2 programs, saving thousands of lives in the West.
Shortly before D-Day, a plan to evacuate her and two other agents was aborted by the Gestapo. She was the first to be caught. But even as she was being captured, she succeeded in warning her comrades so that one was able to escape. And again, as Reg has put it: "AMNIARIX's reports stand brilliantly in the history of intelligence, and three concentration camps--Ravensbruck, Konigsberg (a punishment camp), and Torgau could not break her."
Reg, Mr. Woolsey, Madame. I think DCI Woolsey did a great job in describing a great man. I have a few personal things to contribute. I really cannot say anything that would add much to what you have already seen. This man is a close personal friend, and, as I thought about the remarks I wanted to make, I could not help but go back to some of the original statements that I read from Churchill--that, when World War II broke out in 1939, Reg Jones was a junior employee of the British Air Ministry working on a project to develop infrared detection of aircraft. He had been paid 50 pounds for that project, a princely sum.
In June, I received a painful shock. Professor Lindemen reported to me that he believed the Germans were preparing a device by means of which they would now be able to bomb by day or night, whatever the weather. A radio beam like an invisible searchlight would guide the bombers with considerable precision to their target. Lindemen told me also that there was a way of bending the beam, if we acted at once, but that I must see some of the scientists, particularly the Deputy Director of Intelligence Research at the Air Ministry, Dr. R. V. Jones.
When he was done, we opened the curtains and, standing behind him on stage, was the Air Force pipe band that began to play a tune for our visiting Scotsman. Then, just to continue this little play with Reg Jones, we brought in on a very special carriage a container carried by an honor guard with great pomp and ceremony. It had a vat in the middle of it, and we presented it to Dr. Jones in the finest traditions of dining in. It was a vat of menudo--a sort of Mexican haggis. It was only appropriate for him to determine if it was fit. He tasted it, and it was.
It is a great privilege to speak at this ceremony which recognizes Professor R. V. Jones's contributions to intelligence, and which establishes the R. V. Jones Medal for those who may follow in his footsteps. The concept of the medal is nontraditional, as befits the man after whom it is named. Most awards our society bestows upon its leading scientists honor its great inventors--men and women who invented devices like transistors or lasers. The R. V. Jones Award is different. It is designed to honor those who recognize curious linkages of technology to intelligence and then creatively exploit them.
Before World War II, technology had little impact on intelligence, although technology had repeatedly revolutionized warfare--the stirrup, the long bow, gunpowder, and the tanks and aircraft of World War II are some examples. But due in large measure to R. V. Jones during World War II, science and technology moved into the mainstream of intelligence, where they remain.
Recently, scientists have advanced the art still further, exhaustively processing radar returns to detect ground displacements that result from earthquakes--processing which requires another factor of 10 in computer power. But, while the computational accessories needed to understand and use such technology may have changed, the human creativity and insights required remain a constant.
Nuclear proliferation is of front page concern today, but it was R. V. Jones, during World War II, who appreciated the threat posed by a German nuclear capability. His analyses of German heavy-water production in Norway lead to a daring attack on the facility. He received his intelligence on that facility from agents. At that time, little technology was available to support his analyses. Today, we have access to sophisticated analytical tools--gas chromatography and mass spectrometer techniques that can detect impurities at concentrations as low as a part in a billion.
As we consider the current state of technology, I should note that my generation has access to a key technology that was not available to Professor Jones--the supercomputer. Supercomputers have enabled recent advances in modeling and simulation, where we can marry intelligence and military operations in ways which were once thought to be science fiction. Virtual simulation was introduced in support of the Persian Gulf war, to enable our fighting forces to rehearse their next day's mission by exposing them to the Intelligence Community's best estimate of the enemy threat. By merging the technologies of computer modeling and simulation, and also telecommunications, we have developed a real-time capability to exploit intelligence data instantaneously in a way that could revolutionize how we wage future conflicts.
As we look to the future, we see a host of challenges to the Intelligence Community posed by new circumstances. Whether these challenges come from ethnic, national, or regional strife that threaten our hope for a new world order, the demands on our technical and HUMINT collection and on our analytical capabilities will be immense. If we are to apply technology creatively to these unconventional intelligence problems, it will require unconventional perspectives. That is the model that R. V. Jones has established, and it is for us, the next generation of intelligence technologists, to appreciate that challenge and to react to it with the skill, creativity, and determination that are the hallmarks of R. V. Jones.

References: V. 
 V. 
 V. 
 V. 
 V. 
 V. 
 V. 
 V. 
 V. 
 V. 
 V. 
 V. 
 V. 
 V.