Source: http://oh.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20180329_0000478.NOH.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 21:06:51+00:00

Document:
SAMUEL A. YANNUCCI, et al., DEFENDANTS.
HONORABLE SARA LIOI UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
On June 7, 2016, plaintiff and eleven others were indicted by a federal grand jury in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio for conspiracy to distribute/possess with intent to distribute 100 kilograms of marijuana. See United States v. Duncan, No. 5:12 cr 286-10 (N.D. Ohio). SA Porrini conducted the drug trafficking investigation. As part of that investigation, Porrini obtained a Title III Order authorizing the interception of wire communications, including plaintiff's cell phones. The investigation led to the indictment of plaintiff and eleven other individuals on federal drug trafficking charges. Yannucci, Villa and Bulford were the AUSAs assigned to prosecute the criminal case. Plaintiff filed a motion to suppress the intercepted phone calls, but the court denied the motion. Plaintiff pleaded guilty to the charges on March 27, 2013. He appealed the denial of his motion to suppress, and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction. See United States v. Wright, 635 Fed.Appx. 162 (6th Cir. 2015).
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the present action pursuant to Federal Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6). They claim: (1) plaintiff's complaint is barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994); (2) the AUSA defendants are entitled to absolute immunity from damages; (3) plaintiff failed to state a claim for relief against Porrini and Bulford; and (4) Porrini and Bulford are entitled to qualified immunity.
A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief[, ]” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), in order to “give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). Although this pleading standard does not require great detail, the factual allegations in the complaint “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (citing authorities). In other words, “Rule 8(a)(2) still requires a ‘showing, ' rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief.” Id. at 556 n. 3 (criticizing the Twombly dissent's assertion that the pleading standard of Rule 8 “does not require, or even invite, the pleading of facts”).
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955). “While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. at 679.
In order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a civil rights plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2254; Heck, 512 U.S. at 486. A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable in a civil rights action. Therefore, when a prisoner seeks damages in a civil rights suit, the Court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence. If it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated. If, however, the Court determines that the plaintiff's action, even if successful, will not demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding criminal judgment against him, the action should be allowed to proceed, in the absence of some other bar to the suit.
In this case, plaintiff challenges the reasonableness of the Title III Warrant, and he further contends the information received by the wiretap was insufficient to proceed with an indictment. If his claims were found to have merit, they would call into question the validity of his conviction. See generally Schilling v. White, 58 F.3d 1081, 1086 (6th Cir. 1995). Therefore, if he is to proceed with this action, he must also demonstrate that his conviction was called into question by an appellate court or by the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. To the contrary, his conviction was upheld by the Sixth Circuit and there is no suggestion it was overturned by a federal habeas corpus decision. See, e.g., Chapman v. Lawson, 89 F.Supp.3d 959, 965 (S.D. Ohio 2015) (Section 1983 action alleging that Title III wiretap warrants were not supported by probable cause was barred by Heck, supra) (citations omitted).

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 2254
 v. 
 v.