Source: https://acontrarioicl.com/author/linalaurina/
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 07:00:24+00:00

Document:
Although terrorism has already been on the agenda of the international community for many years, absence of attention to the concerns of victims of terrorism acts has been significant until fairly recently. The change in at least thirty years taking theoretical debate about victim role in criminal justice was caused by the growing attention to terrorism in general due to the spreading worldwide large-scale terrorist acts. Indeed, terrorism continues to pose a high threat to the security and, more importantly, has become more diverse in its methods and impact. Therefore, much of the public and political concerns are particularly directed towards terrorist acts which lead to many casualties and fatalities.
Figures of terrorist attacks speak for themselves: on 9/11, 2001, more than 3000 people were directly affected by loss of life or injuries; the Bali bombings of 2002 killed 202 people, 164 of whom were foreign nationals (resulting in so-called cross-border victims). A further 209 people were injured. Looking even at regional level, recent Europol’s report on situation of terrorism records a total of 249 terrorist attacks in the European Union (hereinafter – EU) in 2010. It is self-evident that specific support oriented to the needs of victims of acts of terrorism is sufficiently and unquestionably justified on national, regional and international levels.
Notwithstanding the enduring attempts of the international community to fight against terrorism, regrettably, victims of acts of terrorism were mostly “forgotten” and regarded only as collateral damage. Yet because the consequences caused by terrorism will continue to affect international community, which itself is notably showing an increased sensitivity to victims of such calamity, the discussion on the effective response not only to the perpetrators of such criminal acts but also to the victims, indicates the global significance of the the efficient support to victims of terrorism acts.
Regarding the specific characteristics of the victim of terrorism acts, paragraph 1 of the 1985 Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power, defines victims as: “persons who, individually or collectively, have suffered harm, including physical or mental injury, emotional suffering, economic loss or substantial impairment of their fundamental rights, through acts or omissions that are in violation of criminal laws operative within Member States, including those laws proscribing criminal abuse of power.” This definition comprises all situations where people are victimized as a result of criminal offences committed by terrorist organizations and individuals.
Thus, it is clear that victims of the terrorism acts would fall under the general definition of victim within the criminal justice system. However, it is important to note that terrorism acts as such have unique characteristics which, consequently, lead to the differentiation of the victims of terrorism acts from the victims of other violent crimes.
Regarding the definition of terrorism itself it is important to note that the definition is not generally yet agreed upon. However there were some efforts made to define International terrorism. Some authors, for instance, distinguished International terrorism as a “threat or use of violence for political purposes when such action is intended to influence the attitude and behavior of a target group other than its immediate victim and its ramifications transcend national boundaries”.
Continuing, Rianne Letschert and Antony Pemberton pointed out, that: ”Typologies of terrorism distinguish between religious-motivated terrorism, left and right-wing terrorism, ethno-nationalist or separatist terrorism, vigilante terrorism and single issue terrorism. Terrorism can be both single-phased (bombing and shooting), that is characterized by punctuated short-duration attacks and dual-phased incidents, involving protracted kidnappings, hijackings, and other acts of hostage-taking.” Consequently, the different types and forms of terrorism make it challenging for reaching the consensus on a definition that would cover all existing terrorism forms and could be used as a basis for the joint action under international criminal justice system.
Most acts considered as terrorism inflict large scale human and material devastation. These acts make impact not only to the direct victims, who may be physically injured or killed, but may also have lasting effects on indirect victims, such as their dependents or relatives, as well as vicarious victims, which may include members of the broader society.
Therefore, the category of victims of acts of terrorism is specific, especially addressing their needs regarding compensation arrangements. Furthermore, “victims of terrorism are different from victims of violent crime in that they may be seen as ‘instruments’ used by terrorists in order to modify or intervene in the political process. This public dimension requires a public response which may be seen as solidarity.” Furthermore, the difference in treatment afforded to victims of acts of terrorism, as distinct from victims of other crimes, should be guided by their specific needs and vulnerability.
It is important to note, that officials leading investigations or prosecutions may interrogate surviving victims of terrorist acts and thus may prejudice their status as victims or lead to secondary victimization. Therefore, if an investigation is necessary to determine whether victims really suffered harm as a result of criminal acts, victims should be questioned in a careful manner.
Furthermore, the question of the status of the victim should not be directly or solely dependent on the determination of guilt of the accused. as it is stated in the 1985 Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power “a person may be considered a victim, […] regardless of whether the perpetrator is identified, apprehended, prosecuted or convicted and regardless of the familial relationship between the perpetrator and the victim”.
The idea that victims should be allowed to participate in international criminal proceedings stems from a broader movement over the last several decades advocating for restorative as opposed to merely retributive justice. Proponents of this movement promote that criminal justice mechanisms should serve the interests of victims in addition to punishing wrongdoers, and that the participation of victims in criminal proceedings is an integral part of serving victims’ interests.
However, the most common approach to the role of the victims in the administration of criminal justice is the one of victim – as an evidence to prosecute crime – terrorism here is not an exception. In essence, “victims of crime were the forgotten persons of the criminal justice system, valued only for their capacity to report crimes and to appear in court as witnesses.” It is important to note, that the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda in their jurisdictions, did not envision the possibility of victims to intervene in the proceedings, except as witnesses. Such approach raises strong concerns for the ‘visibility’ of victims and more particularly, for the protection of their right to be heard in the criminal proceedings.
Pursuant to Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, access to justice is a fundamental right of all persons. Nevertheless, this, one of the most important international human rights instrument goes into detail only with regard to basic procedural rights that shall be afforded to accused persons. However, victims of terrorist crimes, as much as victims of crime in general, should be entitled to access criminal proceedings. Although the concept of victim participation in criminal proceedings is not easily defined, it may be described as victims “being in control, having a say, being listened to, or being treated with dignity and respect.” This also implies the additional right to put questions to the defendant, to call witnesses, and to provide additional evidence.
Naturally, the extent of victims’ role remains a central question for international criminal justice.
In light of this, the question is whether victim participation in recent developments of international criminal justice increased the “positive” role of the victims of terrorism acts within the criminal proceedings by actually allowing greater recognition of victims’ voices and experiences.
In this regard, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (hereinafter – STL), established in 2006, deals precisely with the crime of terrorism and therefore addresses the victims of terrorism acts. The establishment of this tribunal showes that terrorist crimes that are relatively small in terms of number of casualties can have large political intimidation effects. Michael P. Scharf noted on this concern: “with regard to the notion of fear, terror or panic, that those who are victim of such state of mind need not necessarily make up the whole population.”  Therefore, the assassination of the Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri has been held sufficiently important to result in the establishment of the STL.
Regarding the role of victims of terrorism act, the Statute of the STL grants rather broad access to the participation in the criminal proceedings, respecting also the rights of the accused. The Statute of the Tribunal established within the Registry a section for victims and witnesses, which „provides measures to protect the safety, physical and psychological well-being, dignity and privacy of victims and witnesses“ Subsequently, Rules of Procedure and Evidence govern, inter alia, the participation of victims and their protection in detail.
However, the normative framework of the STL also features a number of restrictions. Significantly, the victim‘s participation in the proceedings is limited to a participation through the legal representative unless the Pre-Trial Judge authorizes otherwise.
Nevertheless, participating in the proceedings are entitled to receive documents filed by the Parties (however, with the restriction on the interests of justice). In addition, two more rights are provided for the victims participating at the trial stage. Firstly, a victim „may request the Trial Chamber, after hearing the Parties, to call witnesses and to authorise him to tender other evidence“. It follows, that a victim may also exercise right to examine or cross-examine witnesses, however, „subject to the authorisation by, and under the control of, the Trial Chamber after hearing the Parties“. Secondly, under the conditions of Rule 87 (B) a victim may also file motions and briefs.
Therefore, it follows that, establishing the normative framework of the STL, introduces a changing role of a victim in criminal justice systems, moving from the perception of a victim as witness towards more victim-centred approach, which allows victims to participate in criminal proceedings independent of their role as witnesses and envisage to give victims a voice in the proceedings ensuring that justice is done in relation to their interests, however, in balance of a fair and expeditious trial.
However, to ensure effective access to justice for the victim of terrorism acts is possible only if the State puts in place legal aid mechanisms as the effective victim support, beyond criminal justice response, also requires, the necessary material, medical, psychological and social assistance, including information on available health and social services. In this regard, according to the findings of UNODC: “legal representation is a condition in most legal systems for the victims to participate in a trial.” Therefore, it is clear, that there is a strong link between legal status, legal access and defense of victims’ rights.
Terrorism will continue to be a difficult and persistent feature of international violence. Therefore, international cooperation and coordinated international efforts are necessary to ensure effective transnational proceedings and the protection of terrorist acts victim’s rights, beyond the borders. UNODC observed that: “Cross-border issues may add a layer of complexity to the measures required to protect victims’ access to justice and/or compensation.” As example here can be mentioned the location of the trial proceedings, which makes impact on the interests and involvement of the victim, and through this, also to the chances for a successful trial.
Therefore, in enhancing the effectiveness of their criminal justice systems, in particular regarding their ability to cope with large-scale crimes, States should also pay specific attention to the support afforded to victims and to the particular challenges faced by victims of acts of terrorism. Particularly in the field of criminal law and jurisdiction, states should, as a consequence of their participation in treaty regime, amend their legislation in accordance with the requirements of the treaty. This may entail substantial changes in their systems of criminal law and procedure. This area is sensitive in the States and thus national authorities too often neglect to implement changes.
Yet, it is also clear that only formal incorporation of relevant international law obligations into the domestic legal system does not guarantee, that anti-terror measures are effectively enforced. Enforcement itself is a complex activity, which ranges from formal incorporation of international law instrument to the monitoring of its practical applications by courts and also law enforcement officials.
Thus it is self-evident that such discrepancies, despite all the efforts of international community to harmonize criminal law standards on terrorism, are detrimental to the efficiency of anti-terror measures and therefore also for the effectiveness of the support of the victims of terrorism acts, irrespectively of the nationality of the victim, perpetrator, or the place of commission of the crime. From the focus on victim support from a criminal justice point of view, there is a clear necessity to criminalize acts of terrorism in the domestic legal order, implying the smooth implementation of international normative standards.
In this regard, imposing a worldwide recognized definition of terrorism would reduce a lot of recent controversies and it would help to limit the potential for abuses, that states sometimes have in defining crimes related to international terrorism in their domestic legal systems. The message arising from the mentioned ‘danger’ of the lack of common definition on terrorism is clear: conflicting interests of nation states can make universal counter-terrorism measures impossible.
However, justice from the victim point of view, depends not only on the prosecution of the perpetrators, but also on their role in the criminal proceedings and the capacity to restore the situation for victims. In response to victimization, it is absolutely essential to identify the rights and needs of victims of terrorism acts, to protect those rights, to support victims and to provide reparation for the damage they have suffered.
 Harry Mika, Mary Achilles, Ellen Halber, Lorraine Stutzman Amstutz, Listening to Victims – A Critique of restorative Justice Policy and Practice in the United States, Federal Probation Vol. 68 (2004), p. 38.
 Rianne Letschert, Antony Pemberton, Addressing the Needs of Victims of Terrorism in the OSCE Region, Security and Human Rights no. 4 (2008), p. 298.
 EU terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT), 19 April 2011. Available at: <https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/press/eu-terrorism-situation-and-trend-report-te-sat-2011-449>, (Last visited on 15 June 2012).
 Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power, Adopted by General Assembly resolution 40/34 of 29 November 1985, para. 1. Available at: <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/victims.htm>, (Last visited on 8 June 2012).
 See supra note 4, para. 2.
 SankarSen, Director General, Border Security Force, South Bengal, Features of Modern Terrorism, The Police Journal (1993), p. 37.
 Rianne Letschert, Antony Pemberton, Addressing the Needs of Victims of Terrorism in the OSCE Region, Security and Human Rights no. 4 (2008), p. 301.
 CyrilleBegorre-Bret, The Definition of Terrorism and the Challenge of Relativism, Cardozo L. Rev. 1987 (2005-2006), p. 1994.
 CyrilleBegorre-Bret, The Definition of Terrorism and the Challenge of Relativism, Cardozo L. Rev. 1987 (2005-2006), p. 1996.
 See supra note 7, p. 37.
 See supra note 11, p. 1996.
 See supra note 8, p. 309.
. Corrigendum, Decision on the Applications for Participation in the Proceedings of VPRS1, VPRS2, VPRS1, VPRS3, VPRS4, VPRS5, VPRS6, ICC-01/04-101-tEN-Corr, 17 January 2006. See also Redress Trust, Justice for Victims: The ICC’s Reparations Mandate (2011), page 54.
 Susana SaCouto, Victim Participation at the International Criminal Court and the Extraordinary Chamber in the Courts of Cambodia: a Feminist Project?, Mich. J. Gender & L. 297 (2011-2012) p. 314-315.
 According to the survey on the position of the victims in legal proceedings,all respondent states victims may participate in criminal proceedings as witnesses. See supra note 8, p. 304.
 Marc Clark, Victim-Centred Policing: The Shepherd’s Solution to Policing in the 21st Century, Police Journal 314 (2003), p. 316.
 The Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, adopted 25 May 1993 by SC Resolution 827.
 The Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, adopted 8 November1994 by SC Resolution 955.
 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), Article 14.
 Susana SaCouto, Victim Participation at the International Criminal Court and the Extraordinary Chamber in the Courts of Cambodia: a Feminist Project?, Mich. J. Gender & L. 297 (2011-2012) p. 314.
 See supra note 8, p. 304.
 Wayne A. Logan, Confronting Evil: Victims’ Rights in an Age of Terror (2007-2008),The Georgetown Law Journal (Vol. 96:721) p. 768.
 Such as Wayne A. Logan, Susana SaCouto.
 See supra note 25, p. 770.
 See supra note 23, p. 315.
 United Nations Security Council’s Resolution 1757 (2007), (S/RES/1757 ) adopted by the Security Council at its 5685th meeting, on 30 May 2007.
 Michael P. Scharf, Introductory Note to the Decision of the Appeals Chamber of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon on Definition of Terrorism and Modes of Participation, Int’l Legal Materials Vol. 50 (2011), p. 542, para. 112.
 Erin Greegan, A Permanent Hybrid Court for Terrorism, 26 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 237 (2010-2011) p. 249.
 The Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (2007), Article 12.
 See The Rules of Procedure and Evidence adopted on 20 March 2009. Last amendment made on 8 February 2012.
 The Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (2007), Article 17.
 See supra note 158,Rule 86 (C) (ii).
 Michael P. Scharf, Introductory Note to the Decision of the Appeals Chamber of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon on Definition of Terrorism and Modes of Participation, Int’l Legal Materials Vol. 50 (2011), p. 569, para. 226.
 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, The Criminal Justice Response to Support Victims of Acts of Terrorism (2011), p. 33, para. 133.
 See supra note 11, p. 39.
 See supra note 11, p. 42.
 See supra note 42, p. 4, para. 10.
 Ibid., p. 95, para. 383.
 Andrea Bianchi, Assessing the Effectiveness of the UN Security Council’s Anti-terrorism Measures: The Quest for the Legitimacy and Cohesion, The European Journal of International Law Vol. 17 No. 5 (2007). p. 895.
 An example of how enforcement must be carried out by means other than the formal incorporation of international legal standards is the complaint by the Chair of the CTC that states often limit themselves to ratifying anti-terror conventions and then fail to adopt the measures to properly enforce them.See Report by the Chair of the Counter-Terrorism Committee on the Problems Encountered in the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001) S/2004/70/, p. 6-7.
 See the Report from the Commission, based on Article 11 of the Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism, COM(2004)409 final, 8 June 2004.
* The picture by Caroline Glick, available at: http://www.carolineglick.com.
A top secret super-computer which has a complete control over a nuclear arsenal and the countdown to World War 3 – such scenarios, as the one of a movie “War Games” (1983) were presented as the science fiction in the last century. Indeed, new expansions in the tactical as well as technical dimensions have changed the landscape of warfare where a cyber space battlefield became a realization of that fictional future.
Today, cyberspace exists in all critical infrastructure sectors: telecommunications networks, the electric grid, power plants, traffic control centers, financial sectors, etc. The same technology that enables us to have live video chat on our mobile phones or remote controls used to control air conditioning units also makes it possible to turn off the lights in a city on the other side of the globe.
One of the main issues raised by “cyber war” is whether a cyber attack can rise to the kind of attack amounting to war. International Humanitarian Law (hereinafter IHL), also referred to as the laws of war, characterizes war as the resort to protracted and intense armed force by two or more parties. Armed conflict is either between States, characterized as international armed conflict, or between States or armed groups operating inside a single State, referred to as non-international armed conflict. The most well-known of the laws are the 1949 Geneva Conventions and 1977 Additional Protocols, which present rules for protecting civilians and those hors de combat (wounded, sick and unable to fight soldiers) in land, naval, and air warfare. As it can be expected, due to the development of new technologies, none of the provisions of these laws specifically mention cyber attacks.
Some researchers, such as Joel Brenner, are of the opinion that cyber attacks should not fall under IHL. As cyber warfare is not a kinetic action, it is not an armed attack and thus, IHL does not apply. However, the growing importance of the use of information technology in military activities and its potential to gain military advantage in a more cost effective way, urges to look at it from the IHL perspective and determine the circumstances, under which cyber operations (as opposed to the traditional kinetic military operations) can constitute attacks within the meaning of IHL.
The fact that a new concept of a cyber attack has come into existence after the treaty laws were adopted, does not preclude the applicability of these laws. Article 36 of Additional Protocol I (hereinafter AP I) says that in the study, development or adoption of a new weapon or method of warfare, States Parties are under an obligation to determine whether their employment would, in some or all circumstances, be prohibited by international law applicable to them. Also, in its 1996 Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, the International Court of Justice held that “it cannot be concluded […] that the established principles and rules of humanitarian law applicable in armed conflict did not apply to nuclear weapons. Such a conclusion would be incompatible with the intrinsically humanitarian character of the legal principles in question which permeates the entire law of armed conflict and applies to all forms of warfare and to all kinds of weapons, those of the past, those of the present and those of the future”. Hence, it has been well accepted already that “a lack of directly applicable treaty law does not create an international humanitarian law – free zone, where anyone can conduct hostile activities without rules or restraints.” Due to the fundamental prohibitions, IHL was designed to be flexible enough to accommodate technological developments, including those that could never have been anticipated at the time. It follows that cyberspace is not a distinct domain subject to a separate body of law.
In this framework, cyber warfare refers to means and methods of warfare that rely on information technology and are used in the context of an armed conflict. The experts of the recently issued Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare (hereinafter Tallinn Manual), defined cyber weapons as “any cyber device, materiel, instrument, mechanism, equipment, or software used, designed, or intended to be used to conduct a cyber attack.” It is also important to keep in mind that IHL is applicable in time of an armed conflict. Therefore, one of the challenges addressing war in cyberspace is to determine whether resort to cyber weapons can constitute an armed attack.
In accordance with Article 49 (1) of AP I “Attacks” means acts of violence against the adversary, whether in offence or in defence. A “cyber attack” is very fact-specific and must be distinct from cyber espionage, which is done by many nations including recent cases of China, Russia, Iran and does not violate traditional interpretations of IHL. Examples of the cyber operations that have been carried out so far, such as a 2007 Israeli cyber-attack on Syria that disabled all Syrian anti-air systems so that the Israeli air-force could bomb a secret Syrian nuclear reactor site undetected or the 2007 attacks on Estonian banks and government websites as well as the 2008 Russian cyber attacks on Georgia during the South Ossetia War, do not appear to have had serious consequences for the civilian population. However, they show that while the critical infrastructure of nations continually becomes more reliant on networks and cyberspace, the possible targets for cyber-attacks greatly increase. Logic bombs and computer viruses can disrupt everything from electric grids and the stock market to nuclear power plants and water treatment facilities. Therefore, potentially catastrophic scenarios, such as collisions between aircraft, the release of poisons from chemical plants, or the disruption of vital infrastructure and services cannot be dismissed. Such attacks would most likely have large scale humanitarian consequences and could result in significant civilian casualties and damages.
Therefore, the situations when cyber activities result in death, injury, or significant destruction would likely be treated as a use of force.” However, the determination of the threshold for the use of force, especially, in cases not involving physical harm, remains problematic. It might depend on the degree of damage that a computer network attack causes –“the greater the damage, the more likely the situation will be viewed as an armed conflict.” The other factors, that may be significant for the classification of cyber operation as a use of force, include: immediacy (the speed with which consequences manifest), directness (the causal relation between a cyber operation and its consequences), invasiveness (the degree to which a cyber operation intrudes into targeted systems), measurability of the effects, military character of the cyber operation, extent of State involvement, and presumptive legality (acts not expressly prohibited by international law).
Generally speaking, cyber operations are not violent in the sense of releasing kinetic energy, unless they qualify as an attack by virtue of their consequences, specifically injury or death of persons, damage or destruction of objects. Therefore, the principle of distinction between military and civilian objectives, prohibition of indiscriminate attacks, requirement to take the necessary precautions and abstain from attacks if civilian damage is likely to be excessive to the value of the military objective to be attacked are also applicable to such attacks and operate in the same way as to the attack which is carried out using traditional weapons. Nevertheless, in practice, IHL faces some significant challenges dealing with cyber warfare.
The challenges met by the international legal regulation in cyber warfare are due to the fact that cyberspace consists of innumerable computer systems across the world where civilian and military computer networks are highly interconnected. A lot of military infrastructure relies on civilian computers or computer networks. It is estimated that 95 percent of world data and voice traffic is carried over fiber optic cables, providing shared bandwidth services to both public and private sectors. Indeed, the interconnectivity of military and civilian networks are so high that it is questionable whether a military-civilian separation in cyberspace is possible and, thus, if a military objective can accurately be targeted without any damage to the civilian cyber infrastructure. For example, 95 percent of American military communication goes through a civilian infrastructure.
It is important to stress, that IHL prohibits indiscriminate attacks. The principle of distinction, as stipulated in the Article 48 of AP I, requires that parties to a conflict distinguish at all times between civilians and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives. In accordance with Article 51 (4) of AP I, an indiscriminate attack is defined as one which is either not aimed at a specific military objective or because the effects of an attack on a military objective are uncontrollable and unpredictable. Attacks may only be directed against combatants or military objectives, which in pursuant to the Article 52 (2)  AP I are the ones that make an effective contribution to the military actions of the adversary and in the circumstances at the time when they are attacked must give a direct and concrete military advantage to the attacker.
Military objectives, such as communication lines, command and control systems, computers or computer systems used in support of military infrastructure or for military purposes can be targeted. As long as the two conditions that determine a military objective are fulfilled and as long as the attack does not spill over to civilian damage and suffering, the act is legitimate. It follows that attacks via cyber space may not be directed against computer systems used in medical facilities, schools, and other purely civilian installations that has special protections against attacks, such as drinking water installations and irrigation works, dams, dykes, or nuclear electric stations that have the ability to release dangerous forces.
Thus, the uncontrollable computer virus would be prohibited as an indiscriminate weapon in the same way that the use of a biological virus would be prohibited; while a destructive cyber attack that leads to the overheating and destruction of exclusively military cyber installations would raise no particular legal concerns. An obvious example would be the release of a virus or a range of viruses into the computer systems of a target State. Even if introduced only into the military network of a State, if the virus is virulent enough, it would soon seep out of that network and into civilian systems of the targeted State or even beyond to neutral or friendly States. Such viruses must most likely should be considered as indiscriminate because they cannot be directed against a specific military objective, and they would be a mean or a method of combat which effects cannot be limited as required by AP I even if aimed accurately at the intended target.
Also, some dilemmas are raised on the use of social networks for military purposes. Indeed, in recent conflicts, it became a common practice to transmit military information via Twitter, Facebook and other social media. The experts of the Tallinn Manual agreed that such use of social networks would transform those facets of the social media networks that are used for military purposes into military objectives. However, the entire networks would not be subject to direct attack.
Another problematic issue is the status of persons involved in cyber operations.
When activities related to cyber attack are performed directly by the personnel of armed forces, it is considered to be performed by a combatant and, thus, such person can directly be attacked and are subject to have prisoners of war status. The problem is that since the specific technical expertise of computer technology mostly lies in the civilian domain, the use of civilians for military activities can be a common practice. It follows, that civilians who are directly participating in hostilities (hereinafter DPH) can become legitimate targets. The involvement in DPH can be manifested through various forms. For example, civilians may be those who launch a cyber attack or they are used to maintain the computer programs or computer network from which a cyber attack is launched. However, the interpretation of the concept of DPH in activities related to cyber attacks, which results to the loss of protection under IHL, is still debatable.
In addition, it is a fundamental rule of IHL that if a party to an armed conflict intends to carry out a cyber attack it is under a legal obligation to conduct a proportionality assessment and to take precautions before launching such an attack. Respect for these principles, as reflected in Article 57 AP1, includes the obligation of an attacker to take all necessary precautions in the choice of means and methods of attack in order to avoid or minimize civilian casualties and collateral damages. For example, commanders must decide whether launching a worm attack on the network of the adversary is feasible or not because the functioning of a worm is such that it has a very high capability of infecting large networks, and that shows its capability of damaging civilian cyber infrastructure, including that of hospitals and banks. In this view, collateral damage is perceived as the loss of civilian objects during military combat operations due to the violent character of war.
Collateral damage in order to get the direct and concrete military advantage is legal as long as it does not violate the rules of proportionality. According to them “[a] cyber attack that may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated is prohibited.” Therefore, no collateral damage is acceptable if it is in excess of the anticipated concrete and direct military advantage.
In this regard, the development of new technologies may successfully contribute to the purpose of protection reflected in the core principles of IHL. In certain cases cyber operations might cause fewer incidental civilian casualties and less incidental civilian damage compared to the use of traditional weapons.
However, despite the advantages provided by the new technologies, the digitalization on which cyberspace is built causes another difficulty in applying the rules of IHL to cyberspace, as in most cases, it is difficult if not impossible to identify the author of an attack, the location from which it is being conducted, and to estimate its destructive potential. It is often necessary to work a way back in the chain of computers controlling other computers in order to figure out who attacked. This implies some sort of intrusive capability to identify who is attacking and thus complicates the attribution of conduct.
However, from the general point of view, attribution is a practical/ technical problem in nature and therefore, can be resolved through practical or technical means, but not by means of the law. Hence, the tendencies of technological innovation may provide solutions to this practical difficulty much faster than we may anticipate today. Till that day, the anonymity of communications rise difficulties on the attribution of responsibility to individuals and parties to conflict on which IHL strictly relies.
The experts of Tallinn Manual came to an agreement that “no State may claim sovereignty over cyberspace per se” and that “States may exercise sovereign prerogatives over any cyber infrastructure located on their territory, as well as activities associated with that cyber infrastructure.” However, “the fact that a cyber operation has been routed via the cyber infrastructure located in a State is not sufficient evidence for attributing the operation to that State.” Indeed, the technology for conducting offensive operations in cyberspace can be obtained anywhere, for instance, by mail order, while the knowledge needed to conduct some kind of cyber attack is available on the internet. Thus, many non-state actors, such as companies, terrorists, organized crime, patriotic hackers or even teenagers, can have influence.
In this regard, the International Court of Justice in its very first case on Corfu Channel, held that a State may not “allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States.” For example, a State would be obligated to take necessary measures to end a cyber attack launched by a terrorist group from its territory against other States.
In this regard, the International Court of Justice in the Nicaragua judgment pointed out that the notion of an armed attack includes “‘the sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State of such as to amount to’ (inter alia) an actual armed attack conducted by regular forces, ‘or its substantial involvement therein’.” It follows that, for instance, providing an organized armed group with malware (funding, legal, practical support) to be used against another State would constitute a use of force, while only providing sanctuary to that group would not reach such level.
However, the more complicated question is whether a non-State actor’s cyber operations that are not attributable to a State can nevertheless qualify as an armed attack and thus can justify as the use of force in self-defense against that non-State actor.
An agreement can be reached that cyber operations resulting in death or serious injures of individuals or serious damage to objects can qualify as armed attacks. As mentioned before, whether a cyber use of force qualifies as an armed attack depends on its scale and effects. However, the defensive actions are also subject to the requirements of IHL (necessity, proportionality, imminency, and immediacy). It follows that, “[a] State that is the target of a cyber operation that rises to the level of an armed attack may exercise its inherent right of self-defense.” Furthermore, “a State need not take the first cyber hit before acting to defend itself” and, thus, by this approach the “anticipatory self-defense” is allowed under international law.
The world of new technologies is neither a world of virtual games nor it is a science fiction. Warfare in a cyberspace can cause death and damage to the real world. However, technology, in itself, is neither good nor bad, “it can be a source of good and progress or result in terrible consequences at worst.” Indeed, today, none of the so called natural domains (air, maritime or space) can function if cyberspace fails which would mean going back to the time of the messenger pigeon or a drawing board.
Even though international laws do not specifically mention cyber attacks, cyber warfare is not emerging in a legal hole or creating a new legal crisis. Cyber operations can be treated as a means and methods of warfare and therefore, IHL rules, that set limitations to cyber attacks through the principles of distinction, proportionality and precaution are applicable. However, the above mentioned challenges, for applying the pre-existing legal rules to a new technology, points out certain gray areas that require further analysis to determine whether these rules are sufficient and clear in light of the technology’s unique attributes. Therefore, specific cyber warfare laws or even a comprehensive treaty might be adopted in the future as technologies evolve and their impact becomes better understood.
Indeed, policy makers and military leaders all over the world are considering the implications of cyber warfare and a number of countries have already taken steps to increase their cyber-warfare capabilities, whereas NATO has listed cyber-defense as a major initiative of its new Strategic Concept. However, in a view of the current political environment, where states have varying views on cyber security, most probably the technology will develop faster than laws. Hopefully, it will not only bring new challenges but also will offer effective solutions for the successful application of IHL in cyberspace.
On Undergraduate Research (NCUR) 2011, New York, March 31 – April 2 2011, p. 1.
 Cordula Droege, No Legal Vacuum in Cyber Space, ICRC Interview, 16 August 2011, available at: http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/interview/2011/cyber-warfare-interview-2011-08-16.htm, [accessed 28 February 2013].
 Additional Protocols to the IV Geneva Conventions, 1977.
 In International Committee of the Red Cross,War and International Humanitarian Law, 2011.
 Joel Brenner, Cyber-Security: Regulating Threats to the Internet under International Law, ASIL Live-Blogging, available at: http://thenewinternationallaw.wordpress.com/2012/03/29/asil-live-blogging-cyber-security-regulating-threats-to-the-internet-under-international-law, [accessed 28 February 2013].
 Additional Protocol I, Article 36, 1997.
 Michael N. Schmitt, International Law in Cyberspace: The Koh Speech and Tallinn Manual Juxtaposed, December 2012, p. 5.
 International Institute of Humanitarian Law, International Humanitarian Law and New Weapon technologies, 2011, p. 24.
 Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare, Cambridge University Press 2013, available at: http://www.ccdcoe.org/249.html, [accessed 28 February 2013].
 Supra note 8., Article 49 (1).
 Supra note 1., p. 6.
 Supra note 10., p. 7.
 Knut Dörmann, Applicability of the Additional Protocols to Computer Network Attacks, p. 3.
 Supra note 11., p. 148.
 Supra note 8., Article 48.
 Bhaskar Sharma, Cyber War and Jus in Bello, December 2012, available at: http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2012/12/03/cyber-war-and-jus-in-bello, [accessed 28 February 2013].
 Supra note 17., p. 5.
 Supra note 8., Article 57.
 Supra note 10., p. 16.
 Supra note 11., p. 142.
 International Court of Justice, Corfu Channel Case (U.K v. Alb.) 1949 I.
 Articles of State Responsibility, Article 8.
 Supra note 12., p. 23.
 International Court of Justice, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986.
 Supra note 11., p. 182.
 NATO, Strategic Concept, 2010, Available at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68580.htm#cyber, [accessed 28 February 2013].
“Trafficking in human beings is the slavery of our times” stresses the European Commission. This position is largely reflected in the European Union (hereinafter EU) political interventions, which are usually seen in the international arena as exemplary with regard to fighting the crime of human trafficking in Europe. Indeed, the political commitment at the EU level to address this problem was established with large number of initiatives, measures and funding programmes both within the EU and external countries since the 1990s.
However, the current economic situation faced by the EU countries raises business opportunities for traffickers. Human trafficking is considered to be one of the most profitable criminal activities worldwide, which estimated global annual profits are 31.6 billion U.S. dollars. The warning of a dramatic increase in human trafficking put this complex issue involving criminality and law enforcement back on the political agenda of the EU and its Member States. Despite the lack of the reliable data, which makes it very problematic to develop comprehensive and effective measures to fight human trafficking, the estimated number of people trafficked to or within the EU amounts to several hundred thousand a year.
Data collected by the European Commission in September 2011 shows that 76 % of registered victims of human trafficking were trafficked for sexual exploitation,14 % for forced labour, 3 % for forced begging,1 % for domestic servitude and the rest 6 % for criminal activities, removal of organs, etc. It also shows that women and girls are the main victims of this crime (79 %). Most Member States reported that majority of victims from within the EU come mainly from Romania, Bulgaria, Poland and Hungary, whereas most victims from non-EU countries are from Nigeria, Vietnam, Ukraine, Russia and China.
While systematically collected and managed data on human trafficking remains essential for the efficient response to this crime, legal instruments to approach human trafficking need be harmonized within the EU Member States.
Human Trafficking is specifically prohibited by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which states that: “Trafficking in human beings is prohibited.” A lot of attention has also been paid to the United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (hereinafter Palermo Protocol) and the Council of Europe Convention on Actions against Trafficking in Human Beings. Indeed, in the EU human trafficking is defined uniformly according to the Palermo Protocol: “Trafficking in persons shall mean the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs”.
In the case of Rantsev v Cyprus and Russia the European Court of Human Rights provided a decisive human rights benchmark with clear obligations for the EU Member States to take the necessary steps to address different areas of human trafficking. These include recruitment, investigation, prosecution, protection of human rights, and providing assistance to victims. If the authorities are aware of a case of human trafficking, or that an individual risks being a victim of this crime, they are obliged to take appropriate measures.
A major step forward was the adoption of the new Directive on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings, in 2011. The Directive adopts a comprehensive approach to human trafficking from a gender (as beforehand mentioned, women and children are particularly affected) and human rights perspective. It supports the harmonisation of the EU Member States’ criminal laws, possibility not to prosecute and apply penalties to victims for unlawful activities they were forced to commit by the traffickers, possibility to prosecute the EU nationals for human trafficking offences committed in another EU State or outside the EU. It also includes robust provisions on victim’s protection, including special measures for children as well as victims’ support, such as shelters, medical and psychological assistance, translation services. The new Directive also requires Member States to set up a ‘National Rapporteur’ responsible for monitoring and implementation of anti-trafficking policy at national level. Whereas the European Commission has already appointed an EU Anti-trafficking Coordinator who will oversee the implementation of the EU Strategy towards the eradication of trafficking in human beings 2012-2016 (hereinafter the EU Strategy).
The EU Strategy focuses on prevention, protection, prosecution, partnerships and also increasing knowledge on emerging concerns related to human trafficking. This instrument reflects a number of EU initiatives in various policy areas which contribute to addressing human trafficking. For instance, the development of guidelines to improve identification of victims; the guidelines on child protection systems; the improvement of access to information for victims of their rights and support for them to exercise these rights effectively; the measures to reduce the demand for and supply of services and goods by victims of human trafficking; the development of the EU-wide guidance on future prevention measures and gender-sensitive information campaigns, as the awareness-raising campaigns already implemented in the Member States were evaluated as insufficient in their scale and impact.
These and others EU instruments determine that any approach to human trafficking must be based on the needs of victims. This also means that the measures against this crime must involve work in countries of origin, transit and destination. As an example, the case of Siliadin v. France in 2005, was the first human trafficking case considered by the European Court of Human Rights. The applicant, a female Togolese national who lived in Paris, had served as an unpaid servant for several years as minor and her passport was confiscated. In this case the Court held that it could not be considered that the applicant had been held in slavery in the traditional sense of that concept but considered that the applicant had, at the least, been subjected to forced labour.
Despite a decade of efforts, the statistical figures show that a total number of cases related to human trafficking prosecuted in the EU remains low (1534 cases in 2008,1445- in 2009, 1144 in 2010). It is also clear, that human trafficking extends beyond individual Member States. Therefore the investigation and prosecution of human trafficking face additional problems. For instance, in the case Kodos v. Prosecutor General’s Office of the Republic of Lithuania (2010) the Prosecutor General’s Office sought the defendant from another Member State for the purpose of prosecution for sexual exploitation of 8 Lithuanian women in the United Kingdom.
Furthermore, “the trends, patterns and working methods of traffickers are changing in all the different forms of trafficking in human beings, adapting to changing patterns of demand and supply”. For example, in the Roma father casein Italy (2010), the father who sold his underage daughter for 200,000 Euros to people who were exploiting her for criminal activities (forcing her to steal) was charged with enslavement.
Thus to better investigate and prosecute traffickers and further increase cross-border cooperation and centralise knowledge on human trafficking, Member States are required to establish national multidisciplinary law-enforcement units on human trafficking. Such units would function as contact points for the EU agencies, in particular Europol. The national authorities of Member States and the EU agencies are also encouraged to create where relevant joint investigation teams and involve Europol and Eurojust in all cross-border trafficking cases.
Further, in accordance with the new Directive for monitoring and evaluation of the implementation of measures addressing human trafficking in the EU, the European Commission will present report every two years to the European Council and the European Parliament. The first report is to be issued in 2014, while the attention to the problems and possible actions by the EU agencies and Member States is brought every year on 18th October, the EU Anti-Trafficking Day.
All the EU existing and intended legal instruments and measures seem to establish a holistic system on preventing and combating human trafficking and protecting its victims. However, the effect of these efforts will depend to a large extent on the will of the Member States to implement those instruments in domestic laws in a harmonized and fair manner, cooperation of all the provided actors within and outside the EU, as well as funding opportunities for these actions.
The European Commission, Communication From the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, The EU Strategy towards the Eradication of Trafficking in Human Beings 2012–2016, COM(2012) 286 final, 19 June 2012, [hereinafter The EU Strategy], p. 3.
TheEuropean Commission, Communication on trafficking in women for the purpose of sexual exploitation, COM(96) 567 final; European Commission, Communication on Fighting trafficking in human beings: an integrated approach and proposals for an action plan, COM(2005) 514 final; The EU Plan on best practices, standards and procedures for combating and preventing trafficking in human beings, 2005/C 311/01; European Commission, Commission working document on the Evaluation and monitoring of the implementation of the EU plan, COM(2008) 657, final.
 Patrick Besler, Forced Labour and Human Trafficking: Estimating the Profits, working paper, International Labour Office, 2005.
The European Commission, Trafficking in human beings, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/organized-crime-and-human-trafficking/trafficking-in-human-beings/index_en.htm, [accessed 5 November 2012].
The EU Strategy, supra note 1, p. 2.
The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2000/C 364/01, Article 5.
supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 2000, [hereinafter Palermo Protocol]; The Council of Europe, Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings, CETS No.197, 16 May 2005.
European Court of Human Rights, Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, Application No 25965/04, Judgment (final), 10 May 2010.
International Centre for Migration Policy Development, Study on the Assessment of the Extent of Different Types of Trafficking in Human Beings in EU Countries, April 2010, p. 2.
Directive 2011/36/EU of the European Parliament and the Council on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and protecting its victims, L 101/1, 15 April 2011.
The European Commission, Together Against Trafficking in Human Beings, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/anti-trafficking/section.action?sectionId=847aa1b2-50c5-43a6-877b-e2baf0b23fc9&sectionType=TAG&page=1&breadCrumbReset=true&resetSessionTagsMapping=true, [accessed 5 November 2012].
The EU Strategy, supra note 1, p. 4.
European Court of Human Rights, Siliadin v. France , Application No. 73316/01 , Judgment (final), 26 October 2005.
The EU Strategy, supra note 1, p. 9.
Royal Courts of Justice, Kodos v. Prosecutor General’s Office of the Republic of Lithuania, Case No: CO/12374/2009, Judgment, 28 April 2010.
The EU Strategy, supra note 1, p. 14.
Supreme Court of Cassation, V. Criminal Section, The Roma father case, Case No. 35923, Judgment, 6 October 2010.
* The poster is designed by RJDaae: http://rjdaae.deviantart.com.

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 Application No. 73316
 v. 
 V.