Source: https://casetext.com/case/thiel-v-dept-labor-ind
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 18:13:51+00:00

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WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION — PROCEEDINGS TO SECURE — EVIDENCE — SUFFICIENCY — CAUSAL CONNECTION BETWEEN INJURY AND DEATH. In a workmen's compensation proceeding to secure a widow's pension, held that the claimant's case was without any factual foundation, where the only physician testifying in her behalf, on cross-examination, repudiated testimony given on direct examination that exposure of the workman to aluminum paint in the course of his employment was the most probable cause of the heart condition which caused his death.
See Ann. 13 A.L.R. 438, 19 A.L.R. 110; Am. Jur., Workmen's Compensation, §§ 198, 255.
FINLEY, ROSELLINI, FOSTER, and HUNTER, JJ., dissent.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Yakima county, No. 42520, Lloyd L. Wiehl, J., entered November 14, 1958, upon the verdict of a jury in a workman's compensation proceeding, reversing an order of the Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals, denying a widow's pension. Reversed.
The Attorney General and William J. Van Natter, Assistant, for appellant.
This is another heart case. An application by the widow of a workman for a pension under our workmen's compensation act was denied by the department of labor and industries; the supervisor of industrial insurance having concluded that the workman's death was due to a heart involvement and not "to any act or circumstances related to his employment."
The board of industrial insurance appeals sustained the action of the department. An appeal to the superior court was heard on the certified record made by the board, and resulted in the jury's answering in the affirmative the interrogatory "Was the death of the plaintiff's husband on September 22, 1956 a proximate result of any incident in the course of his employment on September 21, 1956?" The judgment on that verdict, in effect, directed that the claimant be granted a pension. The department appeals, asking for a dismissal of the claimant's appeal to the superior court, or for a new trial.
Our primary concern is whether there is any evidence to establish a causal relationship between the workman's death and his employment.
The workman, who was forty-seven years old and in apparent good health, died in his sleep shortly after midnight on September 22, 1956. He had been employed as "a handy man" for the preceding fifteen months by a business known as "The Farm Shop," which did repairing of farm and industrial machinery. The workman did spray painting as part of his duties; and, on September the 21st he had sprayed aluminum paint on a sheet metal box "4' x 6' in size." This work had been done in the open air.
The claimant testified that when her husband arrived home from work that evening, the exposed portions of his body (face, neck, hands) were covered with aluminum paint. He watched the Friday night fights on television, as was his custom, and then had his dinner, finishing about 7:30 p.m. He was a hearty eater, and "ate his normal amount." His wife then assisted him (because of an injury to his left thumb) in shaving and cleaning up. He watched television until about 10:35 p.m., after which he fixed and consumed a sandwich and a cup of coffee. He retired about 11:00 p.m., and went to sleep shortly thereafter. His wife was disturbed by his loud breathing, which she thought was snoring; shortly after midnight he took several loud breaths and was dead. An osteopathic physician and surgeon, Dr. Arthur E. Borchardt, living in the neighborhood, was called immediately. Later, he and another local doctor performed an autopsy. Specimen portions of the anatomy were submitted to pathologists, who determined the cause of death to be "`acute right heart failure secondary to chronic pulmonary fibrosis and emphysema'."
The claimant's theory of causation, supported by the testimony of Dr. Borchardt on direct examination, was that the immediate precipitating factor in the workman's acute heart failure was an edema in the lung. He explained how the edema would cause additional heart strain or effort, and testified that from his own examination, and the facts as supplied to him in a hypothetical question, the only possible cause of the edema was either an acute allergy or irritant agent. It was, further, his opinion, that, since nothing else was suggested, the irritating factor was probably one or more of the ingredients of the aluminum paint which the workman had been spraying that day.
". . . `This is just the every day autopsy findings of somebody that dies as a result of chronic pulmonary fibrosis, emphysema, chronic heart disease. . . .'"
We are not concerned with the testimony of the doctors from the standpoint of weighing it; but from the standpoint of its pinpointing the clear-cut issue of whether there was any causal relationship between the death of the workman and his employment.
The contention, on this appeal, is that after Dr. Borchardt's cross-examination his testimony on direct examination was repudiated and that the jury's verdict rests on nothing more substantial than conjecture.
". . . The right ventricle wall is increased in thickness, measuring 6 mm. (normal 3 mm.) The left ventricular wall is increased in thickness measuring 1.4 cm. The normal thickness is about 1.1 cm. . . ."
 When Dr. Borchardt retracted his indispensable testimony: that the exposure to aluminum paint was the most probable cause of the workman's death, and admitted that it was not the most probable cause, he left the claimant's case without any factual foundation. Lyle v. Department of Labor Industries (1956), 49 Wn.2d 540, 304 P.2d 668; Sawyer v. Department of Labor Industries (1956), 48 Wn.2d 761, 296 P.2d 706; Stampas v. Department of Labor Industries (1951), 38 Wn.2d 48, 227 P.2d 739; Rambeau v. Department of Labor Industries (1945), 24 Wn.2d 44, 163 P.2d 133.
We find it unnecessary to pass on the question of whether the italicized portion of the quoted statement from Dr. Borchardt should have been stricken; nor is it necessary to consider the line of cases dealing with expert testimony based on an erroneous assumption of fact, such as Rode v. Department of Labor Industries (1955), 47 Wn.2d 619, 289 P.2d 354, and Parr v. Department of Labor Industries (1955), 46 Wn.2d 144, 278 P.2d 666. It is clear that inasmuch as Dr. Borchardt's statements supporting the claimant's theory were repudiated on cross-examination, there was no evidence or inference therefrom in the certified-appeal-board record to support the jury's answer to the interrogatories, and that the trial court erred in denying the department's motion to dismiss the claimant's appeal from the board of industrial insurance appeals; and erred again in failing to grant its motion for judgment n.o.v.
The judgment appealed from is reversed, with directions to enter an order dismissing the claimant's appeal to the superior court from the order of the board of industrial insurance appeals.
WEAVER, C.J., MALLERY, DONWORTH, and OTT, JJ., concur.
"When Dr. Borchardt retracted his indispensable testimony: that the exposure to aluminum paint was the most probable cause of the workman's death, and admitted that it was not the most probable cause, he left the claimant's case without any factual foundation. Lyle v. Department of Labor Industries (1956), 49 Wn.2d 540, 304 P.2d 668; Sawyer v. Department of Labor Industries (1956), 48 Wn.2d 761, 296 P.2d 706; Stampas v. Department of Labor Industries (1951), 38 Wn.2d 48, 227 P.2d 739; Rambeau v. Department of Labor Industries (1945), 24 Wn.2d 44, 163 P.2d 133."
It seems to me that this demonstrates that the majority are weighing and evaluating the evidence. This, I think, is the function of the jury rather than this court on appeal. Inconsistencies in the testimony of a witness are matters affecting the weight and credibility thereof, and these matters are exclusively within the province of the jury. Dupea v. Seattle (1944), 20 Wn.2d 285, 147 P.2d 272, and cases cited therein. I dissent for this reason.
ROSELLINI, FOSTER, and HUNTER, JJ., concur with FINLEY, J.
While I have signed Judge Finley's dissent, I think the reasons for this view are nowhere better stated than by Mr. Justice Brennan in Sentilles v. Inter-Caribbean Shipping Corp., 361 U.S. 107, 4 L.Ed. 2d 142, 80 S.Ct. 173 (Nov., 1959).
"The jury's power to draw the inference that the aggravation of petitioner's tubercular condition, evident so shortly after the accident, was in fact caused by that accident, was not impaired by the failure of any medical witness to testify that it was in fact the cause. Neither can it be impaired by the lack of medical unanimity as to the respective likelihood of the potential causes of the aggravation, or by the fact that other potential causes of the aggravation existed and were not conclusively negated by the proofs. The matter does not turn on the use of a particular form of words by the physicians in giving their testimony. The members of the jury, not the medical witnesses, were sworn to make a legal determination of the question of causation. They were entitled to take all the circumstances, including the medical testimony, into consideration. See Sullivan v. Boston Elevated R. Co., 185 Mass. 602, 71 N.E. 90; Miami Coal Co. v. Luce, 76 Ind. App. 245, 131 N.E. 824. Though this case involves a medical issue, it is no exception to the admonition that, `It is not the function of a court to search the record for conflicting circumstantial evidence in order to take the case away from the jury on a theory that the proof gives equal support to inconsistent and uncertain inferences. The focal point of judicial review is the reasonableness of the particular inference or conclusion drawn by the jury. . . . The very essence of its function is to select from among conflicting inferences and conclusions that which it considers most reasonable. . . . Courts are not free to reweigh the evidence and set aside the jury verdict merely because the jury could have drawn different inferences or conclusions or because judges feel that other results are more reasonable.' Tennant v. Peoria Pekin Union R. Co., 321 U.S. 29, 35. The proofs here justified with reason the conclusion of the jury that the accident caused the petitioner's serious subsequent illness. See Rogers v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 352 U.S. 500."
September 29, 1960. Petition for rehearing denied.

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