Source: http://masscases.com/cases/app/75/75massappct175.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 02:02:44+00:00

Document:
Present: KANTROWITZ, MCHUGH, & MEADE, JJ.
Controlled Substances. "School Zone" Statute. Jury and Jurors. Practice, Criminal, Conduct of juror, Instructions to jury, Argument by prosecutor. Witness, Expert. Evidence, Hypothetical question.
During closing argument at a criminal trial, the prosecutor properly based an assertion on expert testimony and properly drew a connection between the defendant's conduct and typical conduct , made a reasonable infer-ence from the testimony , and did not improperly vouch for the credibility of police witnesses [188-189]; further, one statement, to which the defendant did not object, although improper because it was not based on evidence before the jury, did not create a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice, given the judge's instructions [187-188, 189-190].
COMPLAINT received and sworn to in the Boston Municipal Court Department on August 29, 2006.
The case was tried before Tracy-Lee Lyons, J.
Carina R. Canaan, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.
KANTROWITZ, J. The defendant was convicted by a jury of distribution of cocaine in violation of G. L. c. 94C, § 32A, and distribution within 1,000 feet of a school zone in violation of G. L. c. 94C, § 32J. On appeal, the defendant argues that (1) the trial judge erred in denying his motion for a required finding of not guilty; (2) he was deprived of his right to a fair trial because a juror slept through testimony; (3) the judge improperly admitted expert testimony; (4) the judge failed to instruct the jury on an essential element of the crime of distribution; and (5) the Commonwealth's closing argument was improper. He also argues ineffective assistance of counsel. With some reservations on the sleeping juror issue, and inviting counsel to file a motion for a new trial on that issue, we affirm.
Motion for required finding. In determining whether the judge properly denied the defendant's motion for a required finding of not guilty, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth. See Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671 , 676-677 (1979). A jury could have found the following facts.
walked out onto Tremont Street, walked directly to the Camry, and entered into the front passenger seat. Officer Champagnie observed Scardoni turn her back toward the passenger window and lean toward the center of the car. The defendant turned toward her and they appeared to have a brief conversation.
The defendant kept walking down West Springfield Street and entered the basement of a church that was hosting a Narcotics Anonymous/Alcoholics Anonymous (NA/AA) meeting. Officers Walsh, Donga, and McDonough, who were also surveilling the area and had learned from Officer Champagnie that drugs were found on Scardoni, placed the defendant under arrest.
At booking, a search of the defendant yielded no drugs, but $536 in cash, including one crumpled twenty dollar bill that was separate from the rest of the cash, was recovered. The police found one cellular telephone (cell phone) on the defendant and two other cell phones in his car.
Detective Timothy Lynch testified that the area of Tremont Street and West Springfield Street has a "medium to high" level of drug distribution. He stated that crack cocaine is commonly sold in denominations of ten dollars, twenty dollars, and higher quantities. Further, he testified that drug dealers commonly have multiple cell phones to separate drug transaction telephone calls from personal telephone calls. He acknowledged that it is quite possible for a drug dealer to have no drugs on his person.
The defendant, relying primarily on the fact that there was no eyewitness testimony of a drug transfer, contends that the evidence was insufficient to show that he distributed crack cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school zone.
In determining whether the judge properly denied the defendant's motion for a required finding of not guilty, we focus on whether "any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt" (emphasis omitted). Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. at 677, quoting from Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-319 (1979). "Under the standard set out in Latimore, circumstantial evidence is a permissible basis upon which to premise a conviction." Commonwealth v. Tanner, 66 Mass. App. Ct. 432 , 434 (2006). See Commonwealth v. Rivera, 31 Mass. App. Ct. 554 , 556 (1991).
was enough for a reasonable jury to conclude that the defendant sold cocaine. See Commonwealth v. Soto, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 109 , 111- 112 (1998); Commonwealth v. Tanner, 66 Mass. App. Ct. at 434-435. "The Commonwealth in proving its case need not exclude every hypothesis. The inference that the defendant sold the drugs 'need not be necessary or inescapable so long as it is reasonable and possible.' " Commonwealth v. Soto, supra at 112, quoting from Commonwealth v. Cohen, 412 Mass. 375 , 380 (1992).
Similarly, the testimony of Officers Champagnie and Donga was sufficient for a rational juror to find that the defendant sold drugs near a school zone. The school zone statute applies to anyone who distributes cocaine within 1000 feet of "a public or private . . . elementary, vocational, or secondary school . . . ." G. L. c. 94C, § 32J, as amended by St. 1998, c. 194, § 146. "To discharge the Commonwealth's burden [of showing that the school met the statutory requirements], an arresting officer may testify upon personal knowledge that the subject school is an elementary school." Commonwealth v. Williams, 54 Mass. App. Ct. 236 , 245 n.11 (2002). Officer Champagnie testified that he passed by the school many times and saw young children playing, participating in after school programs, and being transported. See Commonwealth v. Laro, 68 Mass. App. Ct. 556 , 557-559 (2007). He also testified that the school was named Hurley Elementary School and that young children attended the school. Officer Donga testified that his former brother-in-law worked at the school as a custodian. See Commonwealth v. Williams, supra. "While there was no direct evidence that it was an elementary school, there was circumstantial evidence from which the jury could rationally reach that conclusion." Commonwealth v. Laro, supra at 559.
Based on the evidence presented by the Commonwealth, the judge properly denied the defendant's motion for a required finding of not guilty.
wakened the juror, and the trial proceeded to a conclusion without further apparent incident.
"judge abused his discretion by failing to conduct a voir dire where there was a very real basis for concluding that the juror was sleeping during testimony and the judge's instructions, thereby calling into question that juror's ability to fulfil her oath . . . . The juror's inattentiveness was not a momentary lapse, but an inattention that spanned all or portions of the testimony of two witnesses and the judge's instructions to the departing jury. That the judge was not certain whether the juror was sleeping and was unwilling to make such a finding should not have ended the inquiry. Uncertainty that a juror is asleep is not the equivalent of a finding that the juror is awake, or has a 'sour face' " (emphasis in original).
prejudice to the accused"); People v. South, 177 A.D.2d 607, 608 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991) (judge "should have granted the defendant's request and conducted a probing and tactful inquiry to determine whether juror number 9 was unqualified to render a verdict based upon her apparent sleeping episodes"); People v. Simpkins, 16 A.D.3d 601, 601-602 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005) (court "should have dismissed as grossly unqualified the juror who was repeatedly observed sleeping during the trial . . . [and w]here discharge of the juror would have made it impossible to continue with the trial, the court should have declared a mistrial").
A judicial observation that a juror is asleep, or a judge's receipt of reliable information to that effect, requires prompt judicial intervention to protect the rights of the defendant and the rights of the public, which for intrinsic and instrumental reasons also has a right to decisions made by alert and attentive jurors. To be sure, the judge has discretion regarding the nature of the intervention and the remedies for any sleeping that has occurred. If the sleeping is observed at the outset or when the juror is beginning to "nod off," it is likely that a break or a stretch will suffice.
If, however, the sleeping appears to have persisted, then, as we said in Braun, the judge has an obligation to conduct a sensitive voir dire to determine the extent to which the juror remains capable of fulfilling his or her obligation to render a verdict based on all of the evidence. We say a "sensitive" voir dire because the inquiry must stay clear of the juror's personal recollections of the substance of the evidence he saw or observed. Inquiry into that area would inevitably reveal aspects of the juror's thought processes, thus entering an area where judicial exploration is prohibited. See generally, e.g., Commonwealth v. Fidler, 377 Mass. 192 , 201 (1979). Instead, the inquiry should focus on how much of the evidence the juror has heard and witnessed and any impediments he or she may have to hearing and seeing the rest.
wrong, and an appellate court, acknowledging that the judge has a range of discretion, will not reverse his decision and vacate a conviction unless he is shown to have been arbitrary or unreasonable." Commonwealth v. Brown, 364 Mass. 471 , 476 (1973). See Commonwealth v. Means, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 788 , 798 (2008).
The defendant here has not met his burden. The present record does not entitle the defendant to a new trial, for it does not tell us how often the judge observed the juror sleeping and over what period of time, or what the judge observed the juror doing when she was not asleep. At the same time, the record raises a distinct possibility that the juror was asleep for a significant portion of the trial, the possibility, that is, of "[a] structural error . . . that so infringes on a defendant's right to the basic components of a fair trial that it can never be considered harmless." Commonwealth v. Villanueva, 47 Mass. App. Ct. 905 , 906 (1999).
We recognize that counsel, like the judge, did not have the benefit of Braun. As such, it appears that the wiser course of action would be to allow him to address this issue, through a motion for a new trial, the result of which would be full findings, based on the judge's observations and any other available evidence, regarding the extent to which the juror was sleeping during the course of the trial.
"If you were to observe a woman come into a street corner, looking around, waiting for about ten minutes and then immediately going to a motor vehicle, entering that motor vehicle for a very short time, less than thirty second [sic]. Perhaps turning her body to the driver of that motor vehicle. Then leaving that car and . . . what would your impression be of that situation?"
The use of narcotics police to testify as experts in drug cases has been consistently upheld. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 413 Mass. 598 , 604 (1992). A judge has broad discretion with regard to the admissibility of expert testimony. Commonwealth v. Dockham, 405 Mass. 618 , 628 (1989). In general, expert testimony is admissible where it is "beyond the jury's common knowledge and may aid them in reaching a decision." Commonwealth v. Colin C., 419 Mass. 54 , 60 (1994). "An opinion within the domain of the expert's professional knowledge may be admissible even if the expert's testimony touches on the ultimate issues before the jury." Commonwealth v. Woods, 419 Mass. 366 , 374- 375 (1995). See Mass. G. Evid. § 704 (2008-2009). "An expert may not, however, offer an opinion as to the defendant's innocence or guilt." Commonwealth v. Woods, supra at 375.
because they asked the expert to compare hypothetical facts to his own observations of the crime scene, essentially asking for comment on the credibility of the Commonwealth's case. Id. at 434-436.
Jury instructions. The defendant, for the first time on appeal, claims that the judge did not instruct the jury on the "knowing or intentional" element of unlawful distribution. In reviewing the jury instructions for error, we must "consider the charge, taken as a whole, and assess the possible impact of the alleged error on the deliberations of a reasonable juror, i.e., whether a reasonable juror could have used the instruction incorrectly." Commonwealth v. Rosa, 422 Mass. 18 , 27 (1996).
"First, that the substance in question is a Class B controlled substance, namely cocaine. Two, that the Defendant distributed some amount of that substance to another person or persons with the intent to distribute that person [sic] to another person. And third, that the Defendant did so knowingly or intentionally."
The judge went on to define "knowingly or intentionally" as doing something "consciously, voluntarily and purposefully and not because of ignorance, mistake or accident," in accordance with Instruction 5.53 of the Model Jury Instructions for Use in the District Court (1995).
charged with possession. So let me just go back, I'm going to read the second element." The judge then proceeded to explain unlawful distribution, the second element, and did not again explain the "knowing or intentional" element. There was no need to repeat the third element in conjunction with the corrected second element. See Commonwealth v. Maynard, 436 Mass. 558 , 571 (2002) (jury presumed to follow instructions). Given that the judge properly explained each of the three elements of unlawful distribution, there was no substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.
Commonwealth's closing argument. The defendant argues that four statements made by the prosecutor during closing argument were improper. As the defendant did not object to any of these statements at trial, we review each one in turn to determine whether there was a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice. See Commonwealth v. Zavala, 52 Mass. App. Ct. 770 , 776 (2001).
1. Misstatement of amount of cash on defendant. The defendant argues that during the closing argument the prosecutor incorrectly stated that the amount of cash found on the defendant corresponded with the amount commonly held by drug dealers, as described by the expert witness. Specifically, the defendant points to the prosecutor's statement during closing that "[i]t's not surprising for drug dealers to have a fair amount of cash on them, but no more than a couple hundred dollars, which is exactly what he had." During the Commonwealth's case, Detective Lynch testified that drug dealers frequently do not carry large amounts of cash, for example "several hundred dollars." The prosecutor can properly base his argument on expert testimony and draw a connection between the defendant's conduct and typical conduct. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 429 Mass. 745 , 750 (1999) ("the prosecutor is allowed to assist jurors in analyzing the evidence and suggesting what conclusions they should draw from the evidence"). There was no error.
that night as well. He wasn't going there because he's nine years sober and clean. He was going because that's good business. If you're dealing drugs, where is it better to go than a roomful of sixty people who are recovering addicts. That's what he was doing on August 28th, 2006."
There was no evidence presented to the jury suggesting that the defendant conducted business at NA/AA meetings. The Commonwealth's theory of the case was that he sold drugs from his car, which he parked near an NA/AA meeting. "Prosecutors must limit the scope of their arguments to facts in evidence and inferences that may be reasonably drawn from the evidence." Commonwealth v. Coren, 437 Mass. 723 , 730 (2002). A prosecutor may not use "closing argument to argue or suggest facts not previously introduced in evidence." Commonwealth v. Storey, 378 Mass. 312 , 324 (1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 955 (1980). Here, the prosecutor's statement was improper because it was not based on evidence before the jury.
3. Misstatement of school zone testimony. The defendant next argues that the prosecutor misstated the evidence regarding the school zone charge when he said, "[T]here's testimony that parents are coming and dropping off and picking up their kids as you might expect at any elementary school." During the Commonwealth's presentation of its case, Officer Champagnie testified, "I've seen young children playing in the school yard, I've seen [them] doing their after school program, being picked up, seen the transportation." A prosecutor may argue for a conviction based on the evidence and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom. See Commonwealth v. Kozec, 399 Mass. 514 , 516 (1987). Here, the prosecutor made a reasonable inference from the testimony, namely that elementary school children would be picked up and transported by their parents. See Commonwealth v. Kirwan, 448 Mass. 304 , 317 (2007).
make up things that they didn't see. No one alleged oh I could see through the dash and see what was going on in the car. That's not believable and they didn't say that. They were honest about what they saw. And I suggest that you credit their testimony. . . . All we know is what we saw, what the police officers, is that [the defendant] pulled up behind them."
Improper vouching occurs when "an attorney expresses a personal belief in the credibility of a witness, or indicates that he or she has knowledge independent of the evidence before the jury." Commonwealth v. Kee, 449 Mass. 550 , 560 (2007), quoting from Commonwealth v. Ortega, 441 Mass. 170 , 181 (2004). However, a prosecutor may "point to reasons why a witness's testimony, or portions of a witness's testimony, should logically be believed." Commonwealth v. Raposa, 440 Mass. 684 , 696 (2004), quoting from Commonwealth v. Rolon, 438 Mass. 808 , 816 (2003).
Here, the prosecutor did not imply that he had "special knowledge by which [he could] verify the witness's testimony." Commonwealth v. Ciampa, 406 Mass. 257 , 265 (1989). The prosecutor's remarks emphasized that the police testified based on their observations, and did not express the prosecutor's personal opinion. Compare Commonwealth v. Nicholson, 20 Mass. App. Ct. 9 , 17-18 (1985) (improper to state "in my years of experience, [she] is one of the most truthful, sincere, candid witnesses that I have seen in any courtroom"); Commonwealth v. Sapoznik, 28 Mass. App. Ct. 236 , 246-247 (1990) (improper to use magistrate ruling to vouch for credibility of police witness). Further, nothing in the prosecutor's statements suggested that he had information outside the record. By using the phrase "I suggest" twice, the prosecutor urged the jury to draw inferences from the evidence and nothing more. See Commonwealth v. Silva, 401 Mass. 318 , 329 (1987). Therefore, the prosecutor did not vouch for the credibility of the police witnesses.
[Note 1] The police recovered the drugs from Scardoni and issued her a summons for court.
[Note 2] The defendant also testified at trial. He stated that he had been clean for about nine years and that on the night in question he attended the NA/AA meeting. He testified that Scardoni was a friend whom he saw as he was parking and with whom he spoke briefly in his car to encourage her to stay off drugs. He also testified that he only owned one cell phone and that the other two cell phones found in the car belonged to his girl friend and brother, who were both at the meeting.
[Note 3] The entire testimony consumes 112 pages of transcript. The judge's observation is recorded on the fifty-second page of that testimony, forty-six percent of the way through.
[Note 4] Specifically, Officer Lynch explained, "As you described, the person is looking around waiting for a certain car to arrive. When a car shows up, that person runs over to the car, enters the car, turning towards each other. I've seen that on numerous occasion [sic] where the drug dealer will display a drug. The person that's going to buy that drug will turn, look at the drug. At some point money is exchanged and that person, the buyer usually leaves the car as soon as the drug deal is done which could be as soon as ten seconds, could be longer."
[Note 5] After this testimony, the prosecutor continued the hypothetical by asking, "[W]hat if that same person then left the car and was shortly thereafter joined by the driver who had been in the car initially. Based on your training and experience, what would you think of that?" The witness replied, "My first thought would be maybe there was a problem, maybe the drug buyer didn't give enough money and the drug dealer wanted to talk to that person additionally. Or as I described earlier in my testimony, could be that the drug dealer, the person who's driving the car wanted to see where the drug buyer was going to see if that person might have been reporting to the police." As both hypotheticals raise the same issue, for purposes of the defendant's claim we focus on the first hypothetical question and answer.
[Note 6] Additional guidance may be found in child sexual abuse cases in that an expert may testify to the general characteristics of sexually abused victims, but may not compare a particular victim to those general characteristics. See Commonwealth v. Dockham, 405 Mass. 618 , 627-630 (1989); Commonwealth v. LaCaprucia, 41 Mass. App. Ct. 496 , 497-498 (1996).
[Note 7] The defendant makes several other arguments that certain testimony was improper, none of which are meritorious. Police testimony that the street corner was an area where they had made several drug arrests was admissible. See Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 47 Mass. App. Ct. 255 , 259 (1999); Commonwealth v. Best, 50 Mass. App. Ct. 722 , 727 (2001). Further, testimony by Officers Donga and Walsh about receiving police information before the arrest was admissible. See Commonwealth v. Miller, 361 Mass. 644 , 659 (1972) (purpose was to show police state of knowledge that impelled their approach to the defendant). Lastly, police testimony regarding the elementary school was admissible nonhearsay. See Mass. G. Evid. § 801(c).
[Note 8] The defendant also argues, pursuant to Commonwealth v. Moffett, 383 Mass. 201 , 203-209 (1981), that trial counsel's failure to request jury instructions on how to evaluate expert testimony constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. The judge properly instructed the jury to "determine which witnesses to believe and how much weight to give their testimony." This was sufficient.
[Note 9] Specifically, the judge stated: "The opening statements and the closing arguments of the lawyers are not a substitute for the evidence. They are only intended to assist you in understanding the evidence and the contentions of the parties."
[Note 10] The defendant argues that trial counsel's failure to object to certain testimony, erroneous jury instructions, and the Commonwealth's closing argument constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. He did not bring this claim as part of a motion for a new trial pursuant to Mass.R.Crim.P. 30(b), as amended in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001). Therefore, we will only reverse if the factual basis for the claim appears indisputably on the record. Commonwealth v. Zinser, 446 Mass. 807 , 811 (2006). His claims do not fit within this narrow exception.

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