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Timestamp: 2019-04-26 04:12:41+00:00

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§ 245. Notwithstanding the declaration of the articles, that the union of the states was to be perpetual, an examination of the powers confided to the general government would easily satisfy us, that they looked principally to the existing revolutionary state of things. The principal powers respected the operations of war, and would be dormant in times of peace. In short, congress in peace was possessed of but a delusive and shadowy sovereignty, with little more, than the empty pageantry of office. They were indeed clothed with the authority of sending and receiving ambassadors; of entering into treaties and alliances, of appointing courts for the trial of piracies and felonies on the high seas; of regulating the public coin; of fixing the standard of weights and measures; of regulating trade with the Indians; of establishing post-offices; of borrowing money, and emitting bills on the credit of the United States; of ascertaining and appropriating the sums necessary for defraying the public expenses, and of disposing of the western territory. and most of these powers required for their exercise the assent of nine states. But they possessed not the power to raise any revenue, to levy any tax, to enforce any law, to secure any right, to regulate any trade, or even the poor prerogative of commanding means to pay its own ministers at a foreign court. They could contract debts; but they were without means to discharge them. They could pledge the public faith; but they were incapable of redeeming it. They could enter into treaties; but every state in the union might disobey them with impunity. They could contract alliances; but could not command men or money to give them vigour. They could institute courts for piracies and felonies on the high seas; but they had no means to pay either the judges, or the jurors. In short, all powers, which did not execute themselves, were at the mercy of the states, and might be trampled upon at will with impunity.
§ 248. The leading defects of the confederation may be enumerated under the following heads: In the first place, there was an utter want of all coercive authority to carry into effect its own constitutional measures.10 This, of itself, was sufficient to destroy its whole efficiency, as a superintending government, if that may be called a government, which possessed no one solid attribute of power. It has been justly observed, that “a government authorized to declare war, but relying on independent states for the means of prosecuting it; capable of contracting debts, and of pledging the public faith for their payment; but depending on thirteen distinct sovereignties for the preservation of that faith; could only be rescued from ignominy and contempt by finding those sovereignties administered by men exempt from the passions incident to human nature.”11 That is, by supposing a case, in which all human governments would become unnecessary, and all differences of opinion would become impossible. In truth, congress possessed only the power of recommendation.12 It depended altogether upon the good will of the states, whether a measure should be carried into effect or not. And it can furnish no matter of surprise under such circumstances, that great differences of opinion as to measures should have existed in the legislatures of the different states; and that a policy, strongly supported in some, should have been denounced as ruinous in others. Honest and enlightened men might well divide on such matters; and in this perpetual conflict of opinion the state might feel itself justified in a silent, or open disregard of the act of congress.
§ 249. The fact corresponded with the theory. Even during the revolution, while all hearts and hands were engaged in the common cause, many of the measures of congress were defeated by the inactivity of the states; and in some instances the exercise of its powers were resisted. But after the peace of 1783, such opposition became common, and gradually extended its sphere of activity, until, in the expressive language already quoted, “the confederation became a shadow without the substance.” There were no national courts having original or appellate jurisdiction over cases regarding the powers of the union; and if there had been, the relief would have been but of a very partial nature, since, without some act of state legislation, many of those powers could not be brought into life.
§ 254. But this consideration sinks into utter insignificance, in comparison with others. Requisitions were to be made upon thirteen independent states; and it depended upon the good will of the legislature of each state, whether it would comply at all; or if it did comply, at what time, and in what manner. The very tardiness of such an operation, in the ordinary course of things, was sufficient to involve the government in perpetual financial embarrassments, and to defeat many of its best measures, even when there was the utmost good faith and promptitude on the part of the states in complying with the requisitions. But many reasons concurred to produce a total want of promptitude on the part of the states, and, in numerous instances, a total disregard of the requisitions.24 Indeed, from the moment, that the peace of 1783 secured the country from the distressing calamities of war, a general relaxation took place; and many of the states successively found apologies for their gross neglect in evils common to all, or complaints listened to by all. Many solemn and affecting appeals were, from time to time, made by congress to the states; but they were attended with no salutary effect.25 Many measures were devised to obviate the difficulties, nay, the dangers, which threatened the Union; but they failed to produce any amendments in the confederation.26 An attempt was made by congress, during the war, to procure from the stales an authority to levy an impost of five per cent. upon imported and prize goods; but the assent of all the states could not be procured.27 The treasury was empty; the credit of the confederacy was sunk to a low ebb; the public burthens were increasing; and the public faith was prostrate.
§ 265. There were other defects seriously urged against the confederation, which, although not of such a fatal tendency, as those already enumerated, were deemed of sufficient importance to justify doubts, as to its efficacy as a bond of union, or an enduring scheme of government. It is not necessary to go at large into a consideration of them. It will suffice for the present purpose to enumerate the principal heads. (1.) The principle of regulating the contributions of the states into the common treasury by quotas, apportioned according to the value of lands, which (as has been already suggested) was objected to, as unjust, unequal, and inconvenient in its operation.49 (2.) The want of a mutual guaranty of the state governments, so as to protect them against domestic insurrections, and usurpations destructive of their liberty.50 (3.) The want of a direct power to raise armies, which was objected to as unfriendly to vigour and promptitude of action, as well as to economy and a just distribution of the public burthens.51 (4.) The right of equal suffrage among all the states, so that the least in point of wealth, population, and means stood equal in the scale of representation with those, which were the largest. From this circumstance it might, nay it must happen, that a majority of the states, constituting a third only of the people of America, could control the rights and interests of the other two thirds.52 Nay, it was constitutionally, not only possible, but true in fact, that even the votes of nine states might not comprehend a majority of the people in the Union. The minority, therefore, possessed a negative upon the majority. (5.) The organization of the whole powers of the general government in a single assembly, without any separate or distinct distribution of the executive, judicial, and legislative functions.53 It was objected, that either the whole superstructure would thus fall, from its own intrinsic feebleness; or, engrossing all the attributes of sovereignty, entail upon the country a most execrable form of government in the shape of an irresponsible aristocracy. (6.) The want of an exclusive power in the general government to issue paper money; and thus to prevent the inundation of the country with a base currency, calculated to destroy public faith, as well as private morals.54 (7.) The too frequent rotation required by the confederation in the office of members of congress, by which the advantages, resulting from long experience and knowledge in the public affairs, were lost to the public councils.55 (8.) The want of judiciary power coextensive with the powers of the general government.
§ 270. Whatever may be thought as to some of these enumerated defects, whether they were radical deficiences or not, there cannot be a doubt, that others of them went to the very marrow and essence of government. There had been, and in fact then were, different parties in the several states, entertaining opinions hostile, or friendly to the existence of a general government.63 The former would naturally cling to the state governments with a close and unabated zeal, and deem the least possible delegation of power to the Union sufficient, (if any were to be permitted,) with which it could creep on in a semi-animated state. The latter would as naturally desire, that the powers of the general government should have a real, and not merely a suspended vitality; that it should act, and move, and guide, and not merely totter under its own weight, or sink into a drowsy decrepitude, powerless and palsied. But each party must have felt, that the confederation had at last totally failed, as an effectual instrument of government; that its glory was departed, and its days of labour done; that it stood the shadow of a mighty name; that it was seen only, as a decayed monument of the past, incapable of any enduring record; that the steps of its decline were numbered and finished; and that it was now pausing at the very door of that common sepulchre of the dead, whose inscription is, Nulla vestigia retrorsum.
1. 2 Pitk. Hist. 16.
2. Dr. Rush, in apologizing for the defects of the confederation, has observed, “The confederation, together with most of our state constitutions, was formed under very unfavorable circumstances. We had just emerged from a corrupted monarchy. Although we understood perfectly the principles of liberty, yet most of us were ignorant of the forms and combinations of power in republics. Add to this the British army in the heart of our country, spreading desolation wherever it went.”a The North American Review, for Oct. 1827, contains a summary of some of the prominent defects of the confederation. Art. I. p. 249, etc.
a. 1 Amer. Museum, 8. See also, 1 Amer. Museum, 270.
3. 1 Amer. Mus. 1786, p. 270.
4. Language equally strong, and almost identical in expression, will be found in Mr. Jay’s Letter, addressed to the people of New-York, 1787; 3 Amer. Museum, 554, 556.
b. 3 Dall. 176; 1 Cond. Rep. 83, 88.
6. 5 Marshall’s Life of Washington, 64. See also 2 Pitk. Hist. 217; North Amer. Rev. Oct. 1827, p. 249, 254, 256, 259.
7. See 1 Amer. Museum, 275, 290, 364, 430, 447, 448, 449. The Federalist, No. 15 to 22; 2 Amer. Museum, 383; Id. 395, etc.; 3 Amer. Museum, 62 to 69; Id. 73; Id. 334 to 338; Id. 342; Id. 348, etc.; Id. 549, etc.; 1 Kent’s Comm. 201.
8. 1 Amer. Museum, 352.
9. 5 Marshall’s Life of Washington, 83.
10. 1 Jefferson’s Corresp. 63.
11. 5 Marshall’s Life of Washington, 31. See also 1 Kent’s Comm. 199; 1 Elliot’s Debates, 208, 209, 210, 211; North Amer. Rev. Oct. 1827, p. 249, 257, etc.; The Federalist, No. 15.
12. The Federalist, No. 15.
13. Journals of Congress, 6th of March, 1779, 5th vol. p. 86 etc. to 90.
14. Penhallow v. Doane,3 Dall. 54; Carson v. Jennings, 4 Cranch, 2.
15. The Federalist, No. 15. See also 1 Jefferson’s Corresp. 63; President Monroe’s Message of May, 1822; 1 Tucker’s Black. Comm. App. note D. passim.
16. 1 Kent’s Comm. 200.
17. The Federalist, No. 21.
18. Yates’s Minutes, 4 Elliot’s Deb. 84.
19. The Federalist, No. 15; 1 Kent Comm. 200, 201.
20. See in 1 U. S. Laws, (Bioren & Duane’s Edition, p. 37 to 54,) the proceedings of the old congress on this subject See also The Federalist, No. 21; 1 Tucker’s Black. Comm. 235 to 238; The Federalist, No. 22, 32.
21. 5 Marshall’s Life of Washington, 55; 1 Amer. Museum, 449.
22. 2 Pitk. Hist. 158, 159, 160, 163; 1 Tucker’s Black. Comm. App. 237, 243 to 246; 1 U. S. Laws, 37 54.
23. The Federalist, No. 21, 30.
24. 2 Pitk. Hist. 156, 157. See also Remarks of Patterson J. in Hylton v. United States , 3 Dall. 171; 1 Elliot’s Debates, 208; The Federalist No. 21, 31; 3 Dall. 171, 178.
25. See 1 U. S. Laws, (Bioren & Duane’s ed. 1815,) from page 37 to 54.
26. 5 Marshall’s Life of Washington, p: 35, 36, 37.
27. 5 Marshall’s Life of Washington, 37; Jour. of Congress, 3d Feb. 1781 ,p. 26; Id. l6th Dec. 1782, p. 38; Id. 26th April, 1783, p. 194, 203.
28. The whole expense of the war was estimated at 135 millions of dollars, including the specie value of all treasury bills of the United States, reduced according to the scale of depreciation established by congress. 2 Pitk. Hist. 180.
29. 2 Pitk. Hist. 180; 5 Marsh. Life of Wash. 33.
30. 2 Pitk. Hist. 180, 181; Marsh Life of Wash. 35, 36; Journals of Congress, 12th Feb. 1783, p. 126; Id. 20th March, 1783, p 154, 157, 158, 160; Id. 18th April, 1783, p. 185 to 189.–An attempt was subsequently made in Congress to procure authority to levy the taxes for the Union separately from other state taxes; and to make the collectors liable to an execution by the treasurer or his deputy, under the direction of congress. But the measure failed of receiving the vote of congress itself. 5 Marsh. Life of Washington, 36, note.
31. 2 Pitk. Hist. 181, 182; 5 Marsh. Life of Wash. 32, 38, 39.
32. 5 Marsh. Life of Wash. 46, 47, 48; 2 Pitk. Hist. 216, 217. See also 2 Amer. Museum, 153 to 158, Mr. Pinckney’s Speech. See also 1 Kent. Comm. Lect. 10, p. 212 to 217, (2d edition.).
33. Journal of Congress, 1786, p. 34. See also 2 American Museum, 153.–The Report of a committee of congress of the 15th of February, 1786, contains a detailed statement of the acts of the states relative to the measure. Jour. of Congress, 1786, p. 34; 1 Amer. Museum, 282; 2 Amer. Museum, 153 to 160.
34. 2 Pitk. Hist. 184.
35. 5 Marsh. Life of Washington, 60.
36. 2 Pitk. Hist. 185.
37. Journals of Congress, 1786, P. 34 to 36; 1 Amer. Museum, 282, etc.–The Committee, who made the Report, were Mr. King, Mr. Pinckney, Mr. Kean, Mr. Monroe, and Mr. Pettit.
38. 2 Pitk. Hist. 184, 222; 5 Marsh Life of Washington, 62, 63, 124; 1 Tuck. Black. App. 158.–The speech of Col. Hamilton, the in legislature of New-York, in February, 1787, contains a very powerful argument in favor of the impost; and a statement of the extent, to which each of the states had complied with, or refused the requisitions of congress. During the past five years, he says, New- Hampshire, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia had paid nothing; Connecticut and Delaware, about one third; Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Maryland, about one half; Virginia, three fifths; Pennsylvania, near the whole; and New-York, more than her quota. I Amer. Museum, 445, 418.
39. New Jersey early felt the want of a power in congress, to regulate foreign commerce, and made it one of her objections to adopting the articles of confederation, in her representation to congress.–2 Pitk. Hist. 23, 24; I Secret Journ. 375; The Federalist, No. 38.
40. 2 Pitk. Hist. 192, 214, 215; 1 Amer. Museum, 272, 273, 281, 282, 288; The Federalist, No. 22.–1 Amer. Mus. 13 to 16; 2 Amer. Mus. 395 to 399; The Federalist, No. 7; 1 Elliot’s Debates, 75; 1 Tucker’s Black. Comm. App. 159, 248, 249.–Mons. Turgot, the Comptroller General of the Finances of France, among other errors in our national policy, observed, that in the several states, “one fixed principle is established in regard to imposts. Each state is supposed to be at liberty to tax itself at pleasure, and to lay its taxes upon persons, consumptions, or importations; that is to say, to erect an interest contrary to that of other states.” 1 Amer. Museum, 16.
41. 5 Marsh Life of Washington, 69, 72, 75, 79, 80.
42. 1 Tuck. Black. App. 157, 159; 5 Marsh. Life of Wash. 77, 78; 2 Pitk. Hist. 186 to 192; 1 Amer. Museum, 282, 288; 2 Amer. Museum, 263 to 276; Id. 371 to 373; 3 Amer. Museum, 551 to 557,562; North American Review, Oct. 1827, p. 249, 257, 258.
43. 5 Marsh. Life of Wash. 71, 72, 73; 2 Pitk. Hist. 189, 190; 3 Amer. Museum, 62, 64, 65.
44. Marsh. Life of Wash. 73; North American Review, Oct. 1827, p. 257, 258; Atcheson’s Coll. of Reports, p. 55.
45. Journals of congress, April 13,1787, p. 32; Rawle on Constitution, App. 2, p. 316.–It was drawn up by Mr. Jay, then Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and was unanimously adopted by congress. It however failed of is object. And the treaty of 1783, so far as it respected British debts, was never faithfully executed until after the adoption of the constitution of the United States. See Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dall. R. 199; Hopkins v. Bell, 3 Cranch, 454.
46. 2 Pitk. Hist. 192; 5 Marsh. Life of Wash. 70.
47. 5 Marsh. Life of Washington, 80, 81.
48. 5 Marsh. Life of Washington, App. note 1.
49. The Federalist, No. 21; 3 Amer. Museum, 62, 63, 64.
50. The Federalist, No. 21; 3 Amer. Museum, 62, 65.
51. The Federalist, No. 22.
52. The Federalist, No. 22; 1 Amer. Museum, 275; 3 Amer. Museum, 62, 66.
53. The Federalist, No. 22; 1 Amer. Museum, 8, 9; Id. 272; 3 Amer. Museum, 62, 66; 1 Kent’s Comm. Lect. 10, p. 200. [2d edit. p. 212.] 54. 1 Amer. Museum, 8, 9; Id. 363.
55. 1 Amer. Museum, 8, 9; 3 Amer. Museum, 62, 66.
56. The Federalist, No. 22.
57. See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. R. 419, 447.
58. The Federalist, No. 22.
59. The Federalist, No. 43.
60. The Federalist, No. 43; 1 Kent’s Comm. Lect. 10, p. 201. [2d edit. p. 214, 215.] 61. The Federalist, No. 42.
62. The Federalist, No. 38.
63. 5 Marsh. Life of Washington, 33.
64. 5 Marsh. Life of Wash. 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 104, 113, 114, 118, 120; 1 Kent’s Comm. 202; 1 Tuck. Black. Comm. App. note D, 142, 156; 1 Elliot’s Debates, 208 to 213; 3 Elliot’s Debates, 30, 31 to 34.
65. 5 Marsh. Life of Wash. 124.
66. Mr. Jefferson uses the following language: “The alliance between the states, under the old articles of confederation, for the purpose of joint defence against the aggressions of Great Britain, was found insufficient, as treaties of alliance generally are, to enforce compliance with their mutual stipulations; and these once fulfilled, that bond was to expire of itself, and each state to become sovereign and independent in all things.” 4 Jefferson’s Corresp. 444. Thus, he seems to have held the extraordinary opinion, that the confederation was to cease with the war, or, at all events, with the fulfillment of our treaty stipulations.

References: § 248

§ 249

§ 254

§ 265

§ 270
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