Source: https://www.gsblaw.com/northwest-real-estate-forum/category/signs
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 22:30:31+00:00

Document:
Lamar Central Outdoor, LLC v. City of Los Angeles, 2016 WL 911406 (Cal. App.) constituted another round between cities and billboard companies over the limits of regulation. In 2002, defendant banned most billboards in the City, except for those allowed in a certain planned development zone and those advertising goods and services sold on the premises and for noncommercial billboards. The City also banned alterations to existing billboards. Exceptions to the ban included billboards allowed under a development agreement, special zoning district, and to work located primarily in a public right of way (such as a bus or transit stop). The City’s sign code rests on traffic safety and aesthetics.
Brown v. Town of Cary, 2013 WL 221978 (4th Cir.) was an appeal from the judgment of a federal trial court invalidating defendant’s sign code, a part of its Land Development Ordinance (LDO). The LDO allowed up to two residential signs of not more than 42 feet in height and five sq. ft. per sign in area, but exempted holiday decorations and public art, as defined in the ordinance. Bowden, a Cary residential property owner who was frustrated by the treatment received to his damage claim from a municipal road-paving project, wrote “Screwed by the Town of Cary” on a 15-foot swath 14-25 inches high across his house in fluorescent orange. Bowden was prosecuted by the Town for two LDO violations – one of which alleged he had a non-complying wall sign, rather than a residential sign – a wall sign was limited to two feet under the LDO. Secondly, the Town alleged that the sign was made with high intensity color. Neither allegation involved the content of the sign. Bowden then brought a Section 1983 action in federal court challenging the two exemptions under the sign ordinance as content-based. The trial court agreed, enjoined the ordinance, gave plaintiff $1.00 in damages, and awarded $36,197 in attorney fees and costs.
Bowden died during the pendency of this appeal and plaintiff succeeded him. Applying North Carolina law, the Fourth Circuit said that Bowden’s claim survived his death even though the damages were nominal. Moreover, the case involved the legitimacy of the exemption so the Fourth Circuit agreed that Bowden’s successors had standing to litigate the free speech issues.
While signs are a form of protected expression, they may be regulated by their physical characteristics such as height, area and the like. Their content cannot be regulated as easily but reasonable time, place and matter restrictions may be imposed. In those cases the principal issue is whether such regulation is imposed because of disagreement with the content. The trial court did not have before it the Fourth Circuit’s case of Wag More Dogs, LLC vs. Cozart, 680 F3d 359 (4th Cir., 2012) where the court took a more pragmatic approach used by the U.S. Supreme Court in Hill vs. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000), finding the content neutrality rule purpose was to prevent the Government from supervising the marketplace of ideas by choosing topics of public debate. If so, the equation of content distinction and content neutrality is incorrect. Content neutrality has only those distinctions imposed with a censorial intent, i.e., to value some forms of speech over others so as to restrict public debate or simply because one or more members of the public find the underlying ideas disagreeable. The court noted that some of its sister circuits had embraced an absolutist notion of content neutrality the way the trial court had decided its case. However, the Fourth Circuit said that such an approach imputed a censorial purpose to such content distinctions which did not imperil free speech, noting a Ninth Circuit view that, pushed to its logical conclusion, would allow for no sign except the blank sign.
Here, the court saw a distinction between on and off-premises signs which was unrelated to its content and served other aims (such as traffic safety and aesthetics) unrelated to the content of the speech. The principal case cited by plaintiffs was Metromedia, Inc. vs. City of San Diego, 459 US 490 (1981); however, the court found that this case was not on point because it turned on the preference of commercial over non-commercial messages which was inconsistent with the values of the Constitution that could not be justified in a content-neutral way. Thus, if the Town could justify a content-based regulation, it might show a “reasonable fit” between its legitimate interests in traffic safety and aesthetics and its exemptions for holiday decorations and public art. Those regulations could pass muster under the First Amendment. The court said it separated the issue of content distinction from that of content discrimination based on content and found the question to be whether that distinction bore a reasonable relationship to the asserted content-neutral format for these regulations.
Given the absolutist nature of Oregon’s free speech inquiry under Article I, Section 8 of the State Constitution, the question of this alternative analysis will not arise soon in this state. Still, the debate over absolutism vs. pragmatism will continue to be controversial.
Mazdabrook Commons Homeowners’ Assn. v. Khan, 210 NJ 482, 46 A3d 507 (2012) involved the constitutionality of plaintiff homeowners association covenants, which generally banned political signs. Plaintiff ran for town council and posted two political signs – one in his window and another inside his door (which could be seen through the glass outside door). Plaintiff ordered their removal as its rules banned all but “For Sale” signs. In Committee for a Better Twin Rivers v. Twin Rivers Homeowners’ Assn., 192 NJ 344, 929 A2d 1060 (2007), the New Jersey Supreme Court had upheld restrictions limiting signs in windows and in common flower beds adjacent to homes, which was in contrast to the near-complete ban on all expressive activity in this instance. The Appellate Division nevertheless struck the ban in this case and the Association appealed.
Plaintiff Association is made up of 194 members who own townhouses and elect a Board of Trustees which operates the nonprofit corporation that manages homeowner affairs. There are no public streets in the development; however, it is not gated. Prospective homeowner-members are informed of its rules before buying their townhouses and the rules specifically prohibit posting of signs (again except for “for sale” signs), among other things. Under the rules, the Trustees have the authority (but without specific standards) to waive the posting regulations. Plaintiffs sued defendant over the ban, as well as over an unrelated matter, and prevailed on both at trial. Defendant appealed the sign issue and prevailed in the Appellate Division, a majority of which found the rule unconstitutional because it favored commercial speech over political speech, was not content-neutral, and foreclosed a significant type of communication.
Have you ever seen the iconic advertisements on the side of the Hotel Figueroa in Los Angeles? I bet you have - if not on a commute opportunity through the metropolis, then in a movie. Or, perhaps your business is similar to th e Pier House 60, Clearwater Beach Marina Hotel where a condition of approval required compliance with both the public art requirements for the development and the local sign code. If you are interested in how to avoid an eight-armed strangle on your business’ commercial speech, read on for guidance about how to avoid problems with local sign regulations.
The Washington Court of Appeals in Catsiff v. McCarty, 167 Wash App 698, 274 P3d 1063 (2012), issued a broad decision regulating commercial speech on signage. If you own a business that is on the lookout for name recognition and the perfect location for the right type of sign, you should consider this case of the Inland Octopus toy store. Catsiff, the owner of a toy store in Walla Walla, decided to paint a wall sign depicting an octopus hiding behind a rainbow over the rear entrance of the store. He did not obtain a permit. Later that year, he painted on the store front an octopus hiding behind several buildings with a rainbow over the buildings. Again, he installed the front entrance sign without obtaining a permit. The City of Walla Walla took code enforcement action against Catsiff for violating the sign code. In response, Catsiff admitted to the facts constituting the violation – exceeding the height limitations and not obtaining a permit to ensure compliance with the downtown design standards, but took umbrage to the overall sign code and countered that the regulations were unconstitutional.
The court reviewed Catsiff’s free speech rights under the state and federal constitutions. The court concluded that the two octopus signs were commercial speech and were placed as an expression related solely to the economic interests o f the speaker and audience because their design matched the store’s logo and Catsiff intended to invite people into his store to purchase toys through the advertisement. The court found that the city reasonably exercised its police powers through the adoption of its sign ordinance because such regulation of commercial speech, where the city was concerned about the obstruction of views and distraction to motorists legitimately call for regulation. The court found that the city’s size and design standards were content neutral and that all downtown businesses were subject to the same set of standards.
Similarly, Oregon’s Supreme Court upholds proper time, place and manner regulation of signs as discussed in Outdoor Media Dimensions, Inc. v. Department of Transportation, 340 Or 275, 132 P3d 5 (2006). In that case Outdoor Media Dimensions, Inc. had displayed several outdoor advertising signs without a permit in violation of the Oregon Motorist Information Act (1999) (“OMIA”). The media company, like Catsiff, challenged the citations on several state and federal constitutional grounds. The court concluded that size limits on signs are permissible time, place, and manner restrictions because such regulations are unrelated to the substance of any particular message. However, the court did rule that the OMIA impermissibly required a fee for off-premises signs while exempting on-premises signs from the fee requirement. The court ruled that the on-premises/off-premises distinction is not content neutral because that distinction allows a sign owner without a permit to display one narrowly defined category of message - a message related to activity conducted on the premises where the sign is located - but not to display any message respecting any other subject. Further, the court refused to accept that the state’s reliance on legitimate safety and aesthetic goals of the OMIA justified a prohibition of speech based on content. Therefore, the court concluded that the fee structure based on the type of expression is an impermissible restriction on the subject of expression under the state constitution.

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