Source: https://www.incadat.com/en/case/923
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 14:32:34+00:00

Document:
Family case 3450/07 Ploni v. Aalmonit [published in nevo]; Family appeal 121/07 Plonit v. Ploni [published in nevo]; Leave for family appeal 5579/07 Ploni v. Plonit [published in nevo]; Family appeal 104/08 Plonit v. Ploni [publi92shed in nevo]; Civil appeal 7206/93 Gabay v. Gabai, P.D 51(2) 241 (1997); Leave for family appeal 7994/98 Dagan v. Dagan, P.D 53(3) 254 (1999); Leave for family appeal 672/06 Ploni v. Plonit ([published in nevo] 15.10.06); Civil appeal 4391/06 Ro v. Ro P.D 50(5) 338, 345-346 (1997); Civil appeal 5532/93 Gunsburg v Greenworld, P.D 49(3) 282, 293 (1995); Miscellaneous civil leaves 1648/92 Torna v Meshulam, P.D 46(3) 38 (1992); Civil appeal 1372/95 Segman v. Burk, P.D 49(2) 431, 437-438 (1995); High court for justice 4365/97 Tor Sinai v Foreign minister, P.D 53(3) 673, 693 (1998); Leave for civil appeal 2610/99 Plonit v. Ploni, P.D 53(2) 566, 573 (1999); Leave for family appeal 9114/07 Plonit v. Ploni [published in nevo]; Leave for family appeal 6102/92 Plonit v. The legal advisor to the government, P.D 48(2) 833, 836 (1994) Civil appeal 4391/96 Ro v. Ro (Jacovovitch), P.D 50(5) 338, 345 (1997); Leave for family appeal 5579/07 Ploni v. Plonit, clause 9 ([published in nevo] 7.8.2007); HCJ 5891/91 Quart v Quart-sharsho ([published in nevo] 24.5.1992); Leave for family appeal 902/07 Plonit v. Plonim, ([published in nevo] 26.4.2007); Leave for family appeal 27/06 Ploni v. Plonit, clause 24 ([published in nevo] 1.5.2006); Leave for family appeal 5082/05 The Attoreny-General v. Ploni, ([published in nevo] 26.10.2005).
The application related to a boy born in January 1999 to a Belgian non-Jewish father and Israeli/French Jewish mother. Divorce proceedings were issued in June 2002 and in July 2002 the mother was granted custody. In January 2004 the mother was given permission to relocate to France and she moved there with the child in March 2004.
The father appealed against the custody award and on 22 November 2005 a court of appeal in Belgium ordered that from 3 January 2006 the child should live with the father in Belgium. On 4 January 2006 the mother took the child to Israel, where she and the child adopted an ultra-orthodox way of life.
Return proceedings were initiated in Israel in December 2006. On 25 April 2007 the Court for Family Matters, Beersheva [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/IL 910] made a return order and rejected, inter alia, the mother's claims that the child would face a grave risk of harm or that he objected to a return.
The mother's appeal to the District Court was dismissed. However, the Supreme Court, allowing her appeal in August 2007 and ordered that the case be remitted to the District Court to enable the child to be heard directly by that court and for a further expert psychological opinion to be obtained.
The District Court, finding that despite the obvious strength of his objections, the boy was not sufficiently mature and his views were not independent, remitted the case back to the Family Court to consider whether a grave risk of harm existed.
The Family Court requested clarification of the expert opinion. The latter stated that return of the child to a completely different social and cultural environment in Belgium without the mother would be a catastrophe for him and that there was even a risk that he would become suicidal.
However, the opinion also stated that despite the child's excellent acclimatization in Israel, remaining in Israel would be harmful in the long term since he would lose all contact with his father. The Family Court held that whilst there was a grave risk of harm in returning the child, the option of leaving in him in Israel was no better and so made a return order.
In the hope that the mother would agree to return with the child, the court made various conditions including requiring the father to agree that the child would be in her temporary custody in Belgium and to obtain assurances from the prosecution authorities there that she would not face criminal charges.
The District Court, in a majority decision, dismissed the mother's subsequent appeal. The dissent had focussed mainly on the risk that the child might attempt suicide if returned to Belgium. The mother then appealed again to the Supreme Court.
Appeal dismissed and return ordered subject to conditions; the removal was wrongful and none of the exceptions had been established to the standard required under the Convention.
Justice Procaccia, giving the leading judgment, reiterated the need to interpret the exceptions in the Convention very narrowly so as not to undermine the objective of rooting out the evil of international child abduction and of not giving a reward to abducting parents.
The grave risk exception should only be invoked in circumstances which were exceptional in terms of the intolerability of the situation and the severity of the risk, which would be created by return. Whilst it was clear in this case that the transition to life in Belgium and the restoration of contact with the father would be difficult for the child, these did not constitute a reason not to fulfill the requirements and objectives of the Convention.
Justice Procaccia emphasized that the source of the harm which would be caused to the child was in the original abduction itself. She went further and suggested that even if the exception were established, the court might still exercise its discretion in favour of ordering return.
Whilst the other two judges agreed with Justice Procaccia that the exceptions did not apply, they did not agree with her decision that the child should be returned within 21 days. Justice Arbel took the view that in the light of the fact that the child had become settled in Israel, the lack of contact with his father for the past two years and huge disparity between the lifestyle of his two parents, he needed a period of time to adjust to and be prepared for the return.
She would have ordered a return two weeks after the end of the school year (i.e. 15 July 2008). Justice Jubran suggested a compromise, under which the child would be returned by 1 June 2008 (seven and a half weeks after the date of the decision) and this was accepted.
The Supreme Court adopted the conditions set out by the Family Court, adding the need for an assurance by the French authorities that the criminal proceedings against the mother there would be discontinued and ordering the social services to prepare the child for return and arrange meetings between him and the father.
Justice Procaccia took the opportunity to criticize the way in which the case had been handled by the legal system (there had been two decisions by the Family Court, three in the District Court and three in the Supreme Court). The resulting passage of time (even though each decision had been made without delay) had frustrated the objective of immediate return and had made return harder for the child.
It was necessary to find a way which would ensure that all the issues were examined fully within a reasonable timeframe. One possibility was to concentrate full clarification of all the issues in one hearing and, if necessary, to fill in any gaps at appellate level.
The first meeting between the father and child took place on 15 May 2008. On 21 May 2008, the Supreme Court, on the application of the mother, ordered that the return be delayed until 15 June 2008 in order to enable further preparation.
On 10 June 2008, the Family Court examined the documents which had been submitted by the father and held that, since there was no satisfactory assurance from the prosecution authorities in France, the mother could not be required to return the child to Belgium until such a document was received.
On 29 June 2009, the father applied to the Supreme Court ex parte requesting instructions. On 1 July 2009, the Supreme Court held that the conditions in the decision were not intended to delay the return date beyond that which had been fixed by the court and so the child should be returned immediately.
On 2 July 2009, the mother's lawyers received a fax from the father's lawyers attaching a copy of this order and informing them that the father had booked a ticket for the child on the flight to Belgium the following day and that if the mother wished to accompany the child she should book her own ticket.
The mother applied to the High Court of Justice for judicial review against the Supreme Court's decision, but this was dismissed. However, the child did not turn up at the airport and has not been seen since. The mother was arrested and charged with contempt of court and child abduction. The trial is still continuing.
Subsequently, the father obtained an ex parte search order (Anton Piller order) to search for and take mobile phones and computers from the mother to assist in locating the child. After the order was executed, the mother mounted a legal challenge claiming this breached her human rights.
This was rejected by the District Court which held that the Family Court had very wide powers to make orders which might assist in locating an abducted minor for the purpose of instituting proceedings or enforcing a decision under the Hague Child Abduction Convention and that the mother's rights were overridden by those of the child and the father.
As of January 2013, the child had still not been found. In March 2011, the mother was acquitted of abducting the child (punishable by up to 20 years in prison), but found guilty of the relatively minor offence of disobeying a court order and given a prison sentence of a year.
The State appealed against the acquittal and the mother appealed against the sentence. Execution of the sentence was suspended. The appeal has been adjourned on several occasions and is now scheduled to be heard in March 2013.
Additionally, the father brought proceedings against the mother for contempt of court. The mother was ordered to pay a daily fine until she produced the child. Non-payment of the fine subsequently led to her receiving a one month prison sentence in January 2012.

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