Source: https://www.complexip.com/civil-liability-and-the-wiretap-act-online-service-intercepts-and-stores-emails-without-authorization/
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 08:52:56+00:00

Document:
Awareness is the manufacturer of Web Watcher software which surreptitiously intercepts emails, instant messages, and other communications. The complaint asserts that Awareness intentionally intercepted Juan Luis’s electronic communications, in violation of the Wiretap Act. Javier Luis (“Luis”), a resident of Florida, developed an online personal relationship with Ohio resident Catherine Zang (“Catherine”). Catherine’s husband secretly install a product known as WebWatcher on the computer used by Catherine. Awareness Technologies, Inc., surreptitiously intercepted the emails, instant messages, and other communications. Luis filed suit against Joseph Zang (“Joseph”) and Awareness.
The WebWatcher program contemporaneously forwards the intercepted communications (emails, instant messages, etc.) to servers maintained by Awareness in California, where the communications are stored for later review. A WebWatcher user such as Joseph may then access the servers and peruse copies. The program allegedly records all PC activity including emails, websites visited, web searches, Facebook/MySpace activity, and anything typed in real time (keyboard sniffer software).
The complaint asserts that Awareness intentionally intercepted Luis’s electronic communications, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (part of the federal Wiretap Act). The complaint next alleges that Awareness violated 18 U.S.C. § 2512 (another part of the federal Wiretap Act) by manufacturing, marketing, selling, and operating a device that Awareness knew or had reason to know was to be used primarily for the surreptitious interception of electronic communications. Finally, the complaint asserts that Awareness violated Ohio state law by (1) intercepting and using his electronic communications within the meaning of Ohio’s Wiretap Act, and (2) invading his privacy within the meaning of the common-law tort. The Federal Wiretap Act provides: “(1) Except as otherwise specifically provided in this chapter[,] any person who(a) intentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any wire, oral, or electronic communication . . . shall be punished [by a fine or by imprisonment.]” 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a). However, civil action recovery is only permitted under 18 U.S.C. § 2520(a) of the Act.
An “intercept” for purposes of the Wiretap Act is defined as “the aural or other acquisition of the contents of any wire, electronic, or oral communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device.” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4). Courts interpreting this language have uniformly concluded that an intercept requires contemporaneity. See, e.g., Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 352 F.3d 107, 113 (3d Cir. 2003), as amended (Jan. 20, 2004).
Congress then passed the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) in 1986, in which the Wiretap Act was amended to cover “electronic communications.” In doing so, Congress drew a distinction between “electronic communications” and “electronic storage.” The former term is defined as “any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical system.” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12). In contrast, “electronic storage” is defined as “(A) any temporary, intermediate storage of a wire or electronic communication incidental to the electronic transmission thereof,” and “(B) any storage of such communication by an electronic communication service for purposes of backup protection of such communication.” § 2510(17). The term “intercept,” as noted above, applies only to electronic communications, not to electronic storage. See § 2510(4).
The phrase “engaged in that violation” plainly refers back to the earlier clause defining the “violation” as an “intercept, disclos[ure], or intentional use.” See 18 U.S.C. § 2520. The earlier clause thus defines the scope of the phrase “engaged in that violation,” with the implication that a court should not read the latter phrase as imposing liability for violations such as simple possession of a wiretapping device. See Treworgy, 373 F.3d at 1127 (“As explained by one district court, as a matter of grammar and sentence structure, the phrase ‘that violation’ refers to the interception, disclosure, or intentional use of communications mentioned earlier in the sentence, and not to the possession of prohibited devices.” (citation, emphasis, and internal quotation marks omitted)). End of quote from Luis v. Zang, Case No. 14-3601 (6th Cir. Aug. 16, 2016).

References: § 2511
 § 2512
 § 2511
 § 2520
 § 2510
 v. 
 § 2510
 § 2510
 § 2510
 § 2520
 v.