Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&amp;view=article&amp;id=49834:gr-167727-2007&amp;catid=1494&amp;Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 14:18:08+00:00

Document:
G.R. No. 167727 - Crayons Processing Inc. v. Felipe Pula, et al.
CRAYONS PROCESSING, INC., Petitioner, v. FELIPE PULA and COURT OF APPEALS (Fifth Division), Respondents.
The key facts are undisputed.
Following the angiogram procedure, respondent was certified as "fit to work" by Dr. Recto. On 11 April 2000, Pula returned to work, but 13 days later, he was taken to the company clinic after complaining of dizziness. Diagnosed as having suffered a relapse, he was advised by his physician to take a leave of absence from work for one (1) month.
In a Decision6 dated 20 November 2001, Labor Arbiter Marita V. Padolina ruled that Pula had been illegally dismissed and ordered reinstatement to his former position without loss of seniority rights. Pula was awarded backwages computed from the time of his dismissal on 20 June 2000, as well as service incentive leave pay, 13th month pay, and attorney's fees.
On appeal, the NLRC ruled, in a Decision dated 18 March 2003,11 that there was indeed valid cause to terminate Pula's employment considering that he had a heart attack that kept him out of work for more than six (6) months. According to the NLRC, the fact that Pula was on leave for more than six months due to his illness rendered unnecessary the certification from a public health authority as required under the Omnibus Implementing Rules. As a result, the Labor Arbiter ruled that the dismissal was valid, although respondent was entitled to separation pay in accordance with Article 284 of the Labor Code.
Pula assailed the NLRC Decision by way of a special civil action for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. In a Decision12 dated 25 October 2004, the Court of Appeals annulled the NLRC Decision and reinstated the ruling of the Labor Arbiter.
In favoring Pula, the appellate court gave credence to his claims over that of Crayons, particularly stressing that Crayons failed to specifically deny respondent's allegations that he was no longer given any assignment by Crayons after he had reported back for work on 13 June 2000, and that he was asked to resign on 20 June 2000. The Court of Appeals thus engaged the suppletory application of Section 11, Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides in essence that material allegations in the complaint which are not specifically denied are deemed admitted.
We begin first by upholding the Court of Appeals when it refused to give credence to the Caluag report. It appears that this report emerged at first instance only in the proceedings before the Court of Appeals. No reference was made to it before the Labor Arbiter or the NLRC. The report, as attached to Crayons' Comment before the Court of Appeals, is undated and unverified. It is addressed to no one in particular, certainly not to any court or tribunal, and is not accompanied by any motion or pleading seeking its admission as evidence. It is, as the Court of Appeals ruled, hearsay in character. It could have easily been introduced in evidence before the Labor Arbiter. Caluag herself could have likewise easily appeared before the Labor Arbiter herself to give testimony or otherwise verify under oath the contents of such report, especially since she herself was named as a respondent in the complaint. Yet Crayons and Caluag did neither, limiting their participation before the Labor Arbiter to a three (3)-page, seven (7)-paragraph Position Paper22 that stands out as a classic example of a pro forma pleading, and which was, to boot, filed five (5) months late.
Before this Court, Crayons is all too willing to stress the neglect in the handling of the case by the former counsel of [Crayons] who represented it before the Labor Arbiter. Yet the general rule is that the client is bound by the mistakes of his counsel, save when the negligence of counsel is so gross, reckless and inexcusable that the client is deprived of his day in court.23 Espinosa v. Court of Appeals24 explicates the requisite character of counsel's negligence that would be sufficient to excuse the client from the consequences thereof.
Petitioner's counsel is a well-known practicing lawyer and dean of a law school. It is to be expected that he would extend the highest quality of service as a lawyer to the petitioner. Unfortunately, counsel appears to have abandoned the cause of petitioner. After agreeing to defend the petitioner in the civil case filed against her by private respondent, said counsel did nothing more than enter his appearance and seek for an extension of time to file the answer. Nevertheless, he failed to file the answer. Hence, petitioner was declared in default on motion of private respondent's counsel. After the evidence of private respondent was received ex-parte, a judgment, was rendered by the trial court.
Said counsel for petitioner received a copy of the judgment but took no steps to have the same set aside or to appeal therefrom. Thus, the judgment became final and executory.
The failure of Crayons to submit any evidence worthy of credence to bolster its factual allegations stands independent of the failures of its former counsel before the Labor Arbiter. It may have been a different story had the Caluag report been verified under oath or submitted as an affidavit. Even if questions on its admissibility past the Labor Arbiter stage of proceedings would linger, at least it would manifest some good faith or earnest effort on the part of Crayons to submit credible evidence in support of its bare allegations. Such a showing may be cause to mitigate the damage wrought by the negligence of its former counsel. But instead, Crayons submitted a report with utterly no probative value.
As such, the factual version presented by Pula remains unrefuted, particularly the claim that he was no longer given work after 13 June 2000 and that he was asked to resign seven (7) days later. Notably though, even in the face of the foregoing facts, the NLRC still concluded that Pula's termination was proper. The NLRC was in error.
An employer may terminate the services of an employee who has been found to be suffering from any disease and whose continued employment is prohibited by law or is prejudicial to his health as well as to the health of his co-employees: Provided, That he is paid separation pay equivalent to at least one (1) month salary or to one-half (1/2) month salary for every year of service, whichever is greater, a fraction of at least six (6) months being considered as one (1) whole year.
work. Assuming that the burden did fall on Pula to establish that he was fit to return to work, those two medical certifications stand as incontestable in the absence of contrary evidence of similar nature from Crayons. Then again, the burden lies solely on Crayons to prove that Pula was unfit to return to work.32 Even absent the certifications favorable to Pula, Crayons would still be unable to justify his dismissal on the ground of ill health or disease, without the necessary certificate from a competent public health authority.
All told, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the reinstatement of the Decision of the Labor Arbiter is in order.
4 In respondent's Position Paper, it is accounted that Crayons Processing, Inc. was a subsidiary of Clothman Knitting Corp. and both corporations had as common stockholders Nixon Lee, Paul Lee, and Peter Su. Ellen Caluag, on the other hand, was the HR manager of both Crayons Processing, Inc. and Clothman Knitting Corp. See rollo, p. 67. Only Crayons Processing, Inc. is a party to the present petition.
5 CA rollo, pp. 34-35.
7 CA rollo, p. 35.
8 Id. Interestingly, while petitioners attached to their petition a copy of the Labor Arbiter's Decision, supra note 6 in relation to rollo, p. 31, page 3 of said copy, which highlighted petitioners' lapses before the Labor Arbiter, was omitted therefrom (footnote 7).
11 Rollo, pp. 186-191. Decision penned by Presiding Commissioner Lourdes C. Javier, concurred in by Commissioner Tito F. Genilo.
12 Id. at 49-60. Decision penned by Associate Justice Perlita J. Tria Tirona, and concurred in by Associate Justices Ruben T. Reyes (now Presiding Justice) and Jose C. Reyes, Jr.
13 CA rollo, pp. 101-112.
22 CA rollo, pp. 30-32.
23 Alarcon v. Court of Appeals, 380 Phil. 678, 688 689 (2000), citing Tenebro v. Court of Appeals, 275 SCRA 81 (1997) and Legarda v. Court of Appeals, 280 SCRA 642 (1997).
24 G.R. No. 128686, 28 May 2004, 430 SCRA 96.
26 Manly Express, Inc. v. Payong, Jr. G.R. No. 167462, 25 October 2005, 474 SCRA 323, 329.
27 Phil. Employ Services & Resources, Inc. v. Paramio,, G.R. No. 144786, 15 April 2004, 427 SCRA 732, 748; ATCI Overseas Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 414 Phil. 883, 893 (2001).
28 See Manly Express v. Payong, supra note 14, at 329; Cruz v. Court of Appeals, 381 Phil. 775, 783 (2000), citing Pantranco North Express, Inc. v. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 114333, January 24, 1996, 252 SCRA 237, 244; General Textile, Inc. v. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 102969, April 4, 1995, 243 SCRA 232, 236; Cebu Royal Plant v. Hon. Deputy Minister of Labor, et al., G.R. No. 58639, August 12, 1987, 15 SCRA 38, 43-44.
29 337 Phil. 667 (1997).
30 Id. at 674. Emphasis retained.
31 Sy v. Court of Appeals, 446 Phil. 404, 418 (2003); citing Triple Eight Integrated Services, Inc. v. NLRC, 299 SCRA 608, 618 (1998).
32 See Tan v. NLRC, supra note 17, at 674-675.

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