Source: http://lawsdocbox.com/Politics/77966382-The-puzzle-of-social-movements-in-american-legal-theory.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 18:17:45+00:00

Document:
Download "The Puzzle of Social Movements in American Legal Theory"
3 UCLA L. REV (2017) INTRODUCTION This Article is about a central puzzle of contemporary American legal scholarship: the dramatic rise of social movements as key actors in legal theory. 1 In the past fifteen years, references to social movements in U.S. legal periodicals have more than quadrupled in absolute terms and doubled in percentage terms over the preceding fifteen-year period. 2 Perhaps even more significantly, social movements have become critical to the work of prominent scholars in fields at the heart of American legal theory, where they have emerged as key drivers of legal change. 3 This is a surprising turnabout for social movements, which as empirical phenomena were more prominent in the 1960s and, as objects of scholarly study, have long occupied a marginal position in social science and have been largely ignored by legal academics. Yet, a half century after the zenith of social movements in American politics, 4 they have now achieved a privileged position in legal scholarship as engines of progressive transformation. Why social movements have come to play this impressive new role and what it means for legal theory and practice is the central inquiry of this Article. 1. See, e.g., Edward L. Rubin, Passing Through the Door: Social Movement Literature and Legal Scholarship, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 1 2 (2001). 2. Based on a search in Westlaw Classic, from 2000 to 2015, there were 7850 articles in Westlaw s Law Reviews & Journals database containing the search term social/2 movement, up from 1893 articles from 1985 to 2000; during the same periods, the number of total articles in the database grew from 205,401 to 402,421. There has been a similar increase of interest in social movements in sociology. See David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule & Hanspeter Kriesi, Mapping the Terrain, in THE BLACKWELL COMPANION TO SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 3, 5 (David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule & Hanspeter Kriesi eds., 2004) (noting the increase of social movement articles in the top four sociology journals between the 1950s and 1990s). 3. See, e.g., Sameer M. Ashar, Public Interest Lawyers and Resistance Movements, 95 CALIF. L. REV (2007); Jack M. Balkin, Brown, Social Movements, and Social Change, in CHOOSING EQUALITY: ESSAYS AND NARRATIVES ON THE DESEGREGATION EXPERIENCE 246 (Robert L. Hayman Jr. & Leland Ware eds., 2009); Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Elites, Social Movements, and the Law: The Case of Affirmative Action, 105 COLUM. L. REV (2005); Scott L. Cummings, Hemmed In: Legal Mobilization in the Los Angeles Anti-Sweatshop Movement, 30 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1 (2009); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Channeling: Identity-Based Social Movements and Public Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 419 (2001); Linda Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel, Before (and After) Roe v. Wade: New Questions About Backlash, 120 YALE L.J (2011); Lani Guinier & Gerald Torres, Changing the Wind: Notes Toward a Demosprudence of Law and Social Movements, 123 YALE L.J (2014); Douglas NeJaime, Winning Through Losing, 96 IOWA L. REV. 941 (2011); Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change: The Case of the De Facto ERA, 94 CALIF. L. REV (2006). 4. It was just over fifty years ago that Martin Luther King, Jr. led civil rights protestors across the Pettus Bridge in Selma, see TAYLOR BRANCH, PILLAR OF FIRE: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS, (1998), one of the symbolic highpoints of the civil rights movement captured in the recent movie SELMA (Paramount Pictures 2014).
4 The Puzzle of Social Movements 1557 To answer it, the Article claims that the social movement turn in legal scholarship can only be understood as the current version of an intense and longstanding historical debate over the appropriate role of law and lawyers in democratic social change. Although this debate crosses ideological lines, it has been most pronounced and controversial within progressive legal scholarship, 5 which has divided over the relation between law and transformative politics since the civil rights period. 6 The key contribution of this Article is to recover this critical intellectual history in order to explain how the emergence of social movements in contemporary legal scholarship addresses foundational critiques of court and lawyer cooptation of social change. The Article proceeds as follows. Part I frames what is at stake in the scholarly debate over the role of law and lawyers in social movements. To set the stage for the historical overview that follows, it briefly outlines the fundamental law-politics problem that has bedeviled progressive legal theory: how to mobilize law for social change while protecting the boundary between law (as neutral and procedural) and politics (as partisan and substantive). At the Article s heart, Part II offers a historical account that explains how the law-politics problem has structured progressive legal debate for more than a century. Its central thesis is that the story of how and why social movements have come to matter within contemporary legal scholarship can only be understood in connection with the broader progressive debate over the lawpolitics line. This debate emerged during the Progressive Era and erupted as an intellectual crisis after Brown v. Board of Education, 7 when it became linked to the controversial ideology of legal liberalism. 8 A deeply disputed concept, legal 5. The term progressive is used here to correspond to the range of views generally associated with the political left in the United States (beginning in the Progressive Era), which are directed at shifting power and resources to those at the bottom of social hierarchies, including the poor, racial and ethnic minorities, women, LGBT people, and political dissidents. Its basic tilt is toward the achievement of greater equality as opposed to individual liberty (although it is often linked with civil libertarianism). See generally DUNCAN KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT (Beard Books 2006) (1975); Herbert Hovenkamp, The Mind and Heart of Progressive Legal Thought, 81 IOWA L. REV. 149 (1995). 6. For the seminal contribution on this point, see Orly Lobel, The Paradox of Extralegal Activism: Critical Legal Consciounsness and Transformative Politics, 120 HARV. L. REV. 937 (2007) U.S. 483 (1954). 8. See LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM (1996). An early use of the term legal liberalism was by Fred Rodell, who described the Justices Black, Douglas, Murphy, and Rutledge bloc on the Court as a solid four-man core of living legal liberalism. FRED RODELL, NINE MEN: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT FROM 1790 TO 1955, at 283 (1955). It was not until the 1980s, with the advent of Critical Legal Studies (CLS), that the idea of legal liberalism took hold as a critique of reform through law. See generally Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE L.J. 997 (1985); Neil K. Komesar, Lawyering Versus Continuing Relations in the Administrative Setting, 1985 WIS. L. REV.
5 UCLA L. REV (2017) liberalism came to be associated with a cluster of ideas: confidence that courts could effectively respond to the problems of democratic pluralism; 9 faith in the leadership of lawyers pursuing policy reform through impact litigation; 10 and commitment to the protection of individual civil and political rights. Legal liberalism was thereby defined as an an alliance of activist courts and activist lawyers working in concert to advance progressive political change. Part II shows how legal liberalism disrupted the law-politics compromise of the earlier era and caused deep rifts among progressive scholars that led to intellectual impasse by century s close. It does so by way of a historical analysis of progressive legal theory through four critical periods of scholarly development: (1) legal realism, from the beginning of the twentieth century through the New Deal; (2) legal liberalism, from Brown through the end of the Warren Court; (3) critical legalism, during the era of conservative political ascendance; and (4) pragmatic liberalism, associated with the liberal-centrism of the 1990s. As this Part argues, the law-politics problem organized progressive scholarly debate at each stage in relation to underlying political conflict, producing a series of unstable theoretical resolutions that ultimately fractured progressive scholars around the question of law s appropriate role in social change. A key contribution of this account is to demonstrate how legal liberalism became identified with foundational critiques of courts and lawyers that they were ineffective in producing social change and unaccountable to the very constituencies they purported to serve. It also shows how these critiques came to frame debate in the two fields most closely linked to the legal liberal model (and invested in the law-politics boundary): constitutional law, concerned with the legitimacy of activist courts, and the legal profession, concerned with the legitimacy of activist lawyers. Debate in these two fields operated along parallel and strikingly similar lines even though the fields themselves were divided by academic status and did not interact. Within this debate, social movements played no affirmative analytical role rather, they operated as an implicit ideal against which legal liberalism was critiqued. The goal of Part II s intellectual history is to set the frame for the current social movement turn in legal theory helping to explain how and why social movements have ascended within progressive legal thought as a way of 751. Early critics of social reform through law coined the term liberal legalism to distinguish it from political liberalism. See, e.g., David M. Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some Reflections on the Crisis in Law and Development Studies in the United States, 1974 WIS. L. REV Kenneth W. Mack, Rethinking Civil Rights Lawyering and Politics in the Era Before Brown, 115 YALE L.J. 256, 258 (2005). 10. William H. Simon, Solving Problems vs. Claiming Rights: The Pragmatist Challenge to Legal Liberalism, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 127, (2004).
6 The Puzzle of Social Movements 1559 reasserting a politically productive relationship between courts, lawyers, and social change. Specifically, it suggests how the promise of legal liberalism became recast as a failure of liberal lawyers, whose efforts to use law as politics undercut the very ideals that those lawyers advanced. As legal liberalism was thus blamed for the decline of political liberalism, the question became: How could law advance progressive politics without simply becoming politics? As I show in a companion article, scholars within progressive legal thought over the past decade have turned to social movements to help answer that question. 11 In both constitutional law and legal profession scholarship, scholars have incorporated social movements as independent actors that mobilize dissent in order to shift politics and culture, thereby producing changes in law that reflect and codify social movement goals. In this model, which I call movement liberalism, social movements are positioned as leaders of progressive legal reform in ways that promise to reclaim the transformative potential of law while preserving traditional roles for courts and lawyers. 12 The central goal of this Article is to set the stage for the emergence of movement liberalism by recovering the progressive debates in which it intervenes. Part II s intellectual history therefore leaves off at the pivotal social movement turn in American legal theory suggesting how the rise of social movements as critical legal actors in the current scholarly moment constitutes the newest progressive response to the age-old law-politics problem. Part III concludes by reflecting on the enduring legacy of legal liberalism, which is fundamentally a story about the decline of an ideal: that lawyers should play a leadership role in advancing a transformative and inclusive vision of law, and that law could be used instrumentally to change society in progressive directions. Part III articulates this decline in terms of the persistence of foundational critiques of lawyers and law emerging from the legal liberal period. It discusses the implications of these critiques for the development of constitutional law and legal profession scholarship (and their relation to empirical social science through the end of the millennium). Part III ends by suggesting how the fault lines within progressive legal thought emerging from legal liberalism precisely shape the intellectual terrain within which social 11. See Scott L. Cummings, The Social Movement Turn in Law, 42 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY (forthcoming 2018). 12. See id. In this companion piece, I delineate and analyze the features of movement liberalism, which are framed around two essential concepts, majoritarian courts and movement lawyering, responding to the critiques of legal liberalism. I conclude that, contrary to its ambitious effort to bridge divisions in progressive legal theory, the new social movement literature ultimately carries forward the very critiques of courts and lawyers it seeks to surmount, while reproducing the precise debate about the role of law and politics in progressive social change that it seeks to bridge.
7 UCLA L. REV (2017) movements are now being deployed in the current era of empirical legal studies as a response to the fundamental law-politics problem. I. FRAMING THE LAW-POLITICS PROBLEM IN LEGAL THEORY The central thesis of this Article is that social movements are a new answer to an age-old problem within progressive legal theory. This Part presents the essential outlines of this problem to frame the history of scholarly debate that follows. The law-politics problem in legal theory centers on the appropriate role of law in a democratic society. Theorists have long divided democracy into two spheres: one of politics, where norms are debated by interest groups and enacted into law in ways that reflect interest group power, and the other of law, where disputes are settled based on the application of rules to all individuals equally and neutrally irrespective of social position. 13 Theorists acknowledge that law is ultimately derived from norms generated through political conflict, but the idea of the rule of law is that, once these norms are codified in constitutions and statutes, legal rules should operate irrespective of the power of parties bound by them or the ideology of judges entrusted to apply them. 14 This is the foundation of a system of constitutional rights and judicial review, in which law operates to check the passion of the majority and the will of the powerful in favor of essential democratic values: equality and liberty. 15 The core problem of progressive legal theory arises precisely because the values that progressives seek to advance greater regulation of the private market, redistribution of resources, and protection of political dissidence and minority rights pit them against interests that typically 13. See generally BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, A GENERAL JURISPRUDENCE OF LAW AND SOCIETY (2001) (canvassing conceptions of law in Western legal thought). 14. Here, a controversial question is whether judges ever simply apply law or whether the idea of law is too indeterminate, thus requiring judges to exercise political discretion. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW S EMPIRE (1986); H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961); see also Scott J. Shapiro, The Hart-Dworkin Debate: A Short Guide for the Perplexed, in RONALD DWORKIN: CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY IN FOCUS 22 (Arthur Ripstein ed., 2007) (describing the central problem in philosophy of law as whether legality depends on judicial interpretations of morality). Bradley Wendel, focusing on lawyering and legal ethics, argues that lawyers faced with ethical discretion should exercise it in favor of upholding the political legitimacy of law. W. BRADLEY WENDEL, LAWYERS AND FIDELITY TO LAW 4 (2010) ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 289 (Phillips Bradley ed., Henry Reeve trans., 1945) (1835) ( When the American people are intoxicated by passion or carried away by the impetuosity of their ideas, they are checked and stopped by the almost invisible influence of their legal counsels. ).
9 UCLA L. REV (2017) they too explicitly link legal reform to their substantive values they risk politicizing law and thereby undermining the very legitimacy they need to check the power of opponents and advance their goals. And even if they find a way to advance reform through law without destabilizing it, progressives may succeed only in tinkering at the margins and giving legitimacy to a legal order that remains structurally unfair. 21 From this standpoint, the law-politics problem within progressive legal theory presents a fundamental challenge: How to justify a legitimate role for courts and lawyers in shaping law to promote progressive ends, while preserving the democratic line between law as neutral and procedural, on the one hand, and politics as partisan and substantive, on the other. II. THE RISE AND FALL OF LEGAL LIBERALISM This Part provides a historical overview of progressive legal theory to show how the law-politics problem has animated scholarly development during four key periods: (1) legal realism, from the turn of the century through the New Deal; (2) legal liberalism, associated with the era of the Warren Court; (3) critical legalism, through the Reagan years; and (4) pragmatic liberalism, through the Clinton presidency. As this Part argues, the law-politics problem framed progressive scholarly debate at each stage in relation to underlying political conflict, producing a series of unstable theoretical resolutions that ultimately fractured progressive scholars around the question of law s appropriate role in social change. A key insight of this account is to show how the law-politics problem organized debate in the two scholarly fields most concerned with policing the law-politics boundary: constitutional law, focused on the appropriate role of courts, and the legal profession, attuned to the appropriate role of lawyers. Debate in these two fields operated along parallel and strikingly similar lines even though the fields themselves were divided by academic status and did not interact. To summarize the argument: Prior to the New Deal, legal realism avoided the law-politics problem by promoting a notion of legal independence that rested on judicial deference to class-based majoritarian political reforms and lawyer resistance to corporate client power, while advancing a theory of institutional specialization that separated law from policy making. Following 21. MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (1987) (discussing critical views of the role of law, which include the notion of law as convincing the masses that the existing distribution of perquisites and power is reasonably just ); Duncan Kennedy, Antonio Gramsci and the Legal System, 6 ALSA F. 32, 36 (1982) (discussing the hegemonic function of the legal system in maintaining the capitalist state).
11 UCLA L. REV (2017) jurisprudential theory that marked the first effort within progressive legal thought to articulate a democratic role for courts and lawyers that addressed the law-politics problem. This section makes two claims about the legal realist period. First, it argues that the realist position ultimately avoided the law-politics problem by bracketing race and thus evading the countermajoritarian difficulty while arguing for judicial and professional roles that expressed law s independence from corporate influence in politics. 24 This view of independence allowed realists to present a tentative process oriented resolution of the law-politics problem that rested on institutional specialization. Second, by juxtaposing the conventional story of realism with historical accounts of black legal progressivism during this same period, this section argues that the realist law-politics resolution was both artificial and under pressure by the time of the New Deal. This comparison highlights that there were already competing strains of progressive thought well before the legal assault by the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) on Plessy v. Ferguson 25 began: While white realists advanced the dominant concept of independence, black progressives asserted the ideal of representation of subordinated minority groups by courts and lawyers acting to advance countermajoritarian rights. 1890s and that realists view of judging, skeptical that judging could be non-normative but also recognizing its rule-bound nature, mirrored what historical jurists wrote in the 1880s and 1890s). The idea of law constraining judicial decision making through deductive reasoning was championed by Blackstone and Hale. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *69; MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND (1713); see also CHRISTOPHER COLUMBUS LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, at viii (2d ed. 1879) ( Law [is] considered as a science.... ). A key concept within formalism was the public-private distinction, which carved out space within society for legal noninterference. Formalists, as classical liberals, tended to draw the public-private line in a way that located a broad range of market activity within the private sphere where it was protected against state regulation; as racial conservatives, they understood local rules addressing social interaction (i.e., racial segregation) as an expression of private preferences and therefore protected from higher-order (constitutional) interference. See HORWITZ, supra; see also RICHARD HOFSTADTER, SOCIAL DARWINISM IN AMERICAN THOUGHT, (1944); HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE OPENING OF AMERICAN LAW: NEOCLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT, (2015); KENNEDY, supra note For background on realism, see BRIAN LEITER, NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND NATURALISM IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY (2007); WILFRID E. RUMBLE, JR., AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM: SKEPTICISM, REFORM, AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1968); Brian Z. Tamanaha, Understanding Legal Realism, 87 TEX. L. REV. 731 (2009). Also see Mark Tushnet, Legal Scholarship: Its Causes and Cure, 90 YALE L.J. 1205, 1216 (1981), which states: Concern over Realism s legacy seems to recur at generational intervals U.S. 537 (1896).
12 The Puzzle of Social Movements Dominant Strain: Class and Independence Politically, realism intervened at a moment of national transformation shaped by struggles over race and class. The end of the Civil War and passage of the Thirteenth Amendment formally eliminated the legalized race-based slavery that had ravaged the Union. 26 This ushered in a period of rebuilding that unleashed pent-up forces of industrialization, 27 which swept through a nation recovering from catastrophic upheaval while still grappling with the unsettled legacy of its primary cause. Although the struggle for racial justice was a seminal problem of the Progressive Era, it played a minor role in national level progressive political discourse, 28 because African Americans were despite the Fifteenth Amendment effectively prohibited from voting by Jim Crow. Even as W.E.B. Du Bois proclaimed in 1903 that the problem of the Twentieth Century is the problem of the color-line, 29 it was class inequality to which legal realism responded with race relegated to a footnote in the debate. 30 From the perspective of scholars loosely allied under the realist banner white, male academic elites at Ivy League schools there were two central challenges to law posed by industrial capitalism in the Gilded Age 31 : first, keeping courts from interfering with the growing political success of class-based 26. See MARK V. TUSHNET, THE AMERICAN LAW OF SLAVERY, : CONSIDERATIONS OF HUMANITY AND INTEREST (1981); see also EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION: ERIE, THE JUDICIAL POWER, AND THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 11 (2000). 27. STEVEN J. DINER, A VERY DIFFERENT AGE: AMERICANS OF THE PROGRESSIVE ERA (1998); see also H.W. BRANDS, AMERICAN COLOSSUS: THE TRIUMPH OF CAPITALISM, , at 5 7 (2010); LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 256 (3d ed. 2005); PURCELL, supra note 26, at 11; ROBERT H. WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER: , at vii (1967). 28. PURCELL, supra note 26, at W.E. BURGHARDT DU BOIS, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK: ESSAYS AND SKETCHES, at vii (3d ed. 1903). 30. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, n.4 (1938). 31. See generally SEAN DENNIS CASHMAN, AMERICA IN THE GILDED AGE: FROM THE DEATH OF LINCOLN TO THE RISE OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT (3d ed. 1993). For treatments of the role of law in American society that laid the foundations upon which the Gilded Age was built, see FRIEDMAN, supra note 27, at , , which shows how, at the federal level, the government offered financing and land grants to railroad companies, and combined strict tariffs and loose money to fuel industrial growth, while states made it easier for corporations to form and combine. Also see JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY UNITED STATES (1956); CHRISTOPHER TOMLINS, FREEDOM BOUND: LAW, LABOR, AND CIVIC IDENTITY IN COLONIZING ENGLISH AMERICA, (2010); CHRISTOPHER L. TOMLINS, LAW, LABOR, AND IDEOLOGY IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC (1993); and ALAN TRACHTENBERG, THE INCORPORATION OF AMERICA: CULTURE AND SOCIETY IN THE GILDED AGE (anniversary ed. 2007).
13 UCLA L. REV (2017) progressive social movements, 32 and second, preventing powerful corporations from exploiting loopholes to undermine public regulation in their business dealings. Legal realism responded to these challenges by asserting new roles for courts and lawyers that sought to protect law s independence from corporate power. For courts, independence meant deferring to labor-backed political reform, while for lawyers, it meant not deferring to corporate client self-interest. The realist position on courts reflected what scholars perceived to be the central political dilemma of the time: how to unleash the power of class-based policy reform from the punitive gaze of judicial review, 33 exercised by a Supreme Court solicitous of corporate power. 34 As the labor movement built strength at the turn of the century, 35 its legislative successes were repeatedly thwarted in court, 36 while union organizing was undercut by lower courts issuance of antilabor injunctions. 37 Particularly after Lochner v. New York 38 invalidated New York s maximum hour law for bakers on substantive due process grounds, 39 realists made it their project to reveal how formalist legal reasoning, which purported to be apolitical, 40 provided cover for a substantive political agenda 41 : advancing laissez faire capitalism See FRIEDMAN, supra note 27, at 254; see also JOHN WHITECLAY CHAMBERS II, THE TYRANNY OF CHANGE: AMERICA IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA, (1980); LEWIS L. GOULD, AMERICA IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA, (2001); RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM: FROM BRYAN TO F.D.R. (1955); MICHAEL MCGERR, A FIERCE DISCONTENT: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, (2003). 33. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 34. PURCELL, supra note 26, at See NELSON LICHTENSTEIN, STATE OF THE UNION: A CENTURY OF AMERICAN LABOR 11 (2002). 36. See WILLIAM E. FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT (1991); see also FRIEDMAN, supra note 27; BENJAMIN R. TWISS, LAWYERS AND THE CONSTITUTION: HOW LAISSEZ FAIRE CAME TO THE SUPREME COURT (1942); GEORGE WOLFSKILL, THE REVOLT OF THE CONSERVATIVES: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN LIBERTY LEAGUE, (1962). 37. CHRISTOPHER L. TOMLINS, THE STATE AND THE UNIONS: LABOR RELATIONS, LAW, AND THE ORGANIZED LABOR MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, , at 48 (1985); see also FORBATH, supra note 36, at 147 (describing federal legislation banning the antilabor injunction). Despite judicial hostility, the spread of industrialism produced a surge in union membership, which grew to 5 million by World War I. DINER, supra note 27, at 239. This gave it increasing political power, which it was able to assert as the country was plunged into the Depression and President Roosevelt was elected with a mandate for economic reform U.S. 45 (1905). 39. Id. at 53. The Lochner freedom of contract reading of the Fourteenth Amendment built on a series of pro-business state cases during this time. See Ritchie v. People, 40 N.E. 454 (Ill. 1895); Godcharles v. Wigeman, 6 A. 354 (Pa. 1886); see also HORWITZ, supra note 23, at See Joseph William Singer, Review Essay, Legal Realism Now, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 465, 499 (1988) (reviewing LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, (1986)).
Allard School of Law - University of British Columbia Jurisprudence and Critical Perspectives (3 cr.) LAW 300.003 Winter 2016 Tuesday and Thursday, 4:00-5:30pm Room 105 CONTACT INFORMATION Professor Jonas-S.

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 V. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.