Source: https://www.lawweb.in/2017/04/whether-post-acquisition-allottee-of.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 14:30:53+00:00

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Law Web: Whether post acquisition allottee of land has locus standi to be heard in matters of determination of compensation?
Whether post acquisition allottee of land has locus standi to be heard in matters of determination of compensation?
Satish Kumar Gupta etc. etc.
State of Haryana & Ors. etc.
Adarsh Kumar Goel, J.:— These appeals have been preferred against judgment and order dated 06th October, 2015 passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in R.F. A. Nos. 4316 of 2010 etc. etc.
3. Facts giving rise to the question may be briefly noted. Huge chunks of land were acquired by the State of Haryana in different phases for the public purpose of setting-up Industrial Model Township by the Haryana State Industrial Development Corporation (HSIDC) in Gurgaon District in Haryana. Substantial part of the acquired land was allotted by the HSIDC to Maruti Suzuki India Limited (MSIL). One of the clauses in the Conveyance Deed executed in favour of the allottee provided that if compensation was enhanced, the allottee shall be liable to pay additional price on that basis. In HSIDC v. Pran Sukh1, issue of compensation for land acquired in Phase I was decided by this Court. Review Petitions against the said judgment were dealt with in HSIDC v. Mawasi2 and HSIDC v. Pran Sukh3. Matter of determining compensation in respect of Phase II and Phase III came-up for consideration inHSIDC v. Udal4. As noticed in judgment of this Court in Udal (supra), the Reference Court awarded compensation in the light of compensation determined in the judgment of this Court in Pran Sukh (supra) and other awards relating to land acquired for Phase III. Against the decision of the Reference Court, the land owners as well as the HSIDC filed appeals under Section 54 of the Act. The High Court assessed the compensation based on judgment of this Court in Pran Sukh (supra). Reference to paras 29 to 33 of the judgment of this Court Udal (supra) shows that after referring to the plea of the HSIDC that the annual increase of 12% for the time gap was erroneous in view of ONGC v. Rameshbhai Jivanbhai Patel5 and Valliyammalv. Special Tehsildar (LA)6, this Court found merit in the arguments of the land owners that an important piece of evidence was not taken into account which necessitated remand. The matter was remanded to the High Court for fresh disposal and it was also observed that MSIL was free to file an appropriate application for its impleadment or for leave to act as intervenor.
c) As a result of enhancement of compensation by the Reference Court, the company in question was required to pay about Rs. 900 crores.
f) The principle behind giving the right of representation to a local authority or a company for whose benefit the land is acquired can also be applied to any person who is liable to pay the enhanced compensation treating such person to be the “person interested” under Section 3(b) of the Act.
7. On the other hand, learned counsel for the MSIL as well as the HSIDC and other allottees have supported the impugned judgment. They submit that since allottees have to pay the enhanced compensation, they ought to be treated as“person interested” under Section 3(b) of the Act. Reliance has been placed on judgments of this Court in Himalayan Tiles and Marble (P) Ltd. v. Francis Victor Coutinho (Dead) by Lrs.9; Santosh Kumar v. Central Warehousing Corporation10;Neyvely Lignite Corporation Ltd. v. Special Tahsildar (Land Acquisition) Neyvely11and; U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad v. Gyan Devi (Dead) by Lrs.12.
9. To determine the question whether the post-acquisition allottee of land is necessary or proper party or has any locus to be heard in the matter of determination of compensation, we may refer to the scheme of the Act. The acquisition may either be for a “public purpose” as defined under Section 3(f) or for a company under Part-VII of the Act. If the acquisition is for a public purpose (as the present case), the land vests in the State after the Collector makes an award and the possession is taken. Till the award is made, no person other than State comes into the picture. Once the land vests in the State, the acquisition is complete. Any transferee from the State is not concerned with the process of acquisition. The State may transfer the land by public auction or by allotment at any price with which the person whose land is acquired has no concern. The mere fact that the Government chooses to determine the allotment price with reference to compensation price determined by the Court does not provide any locus to an allottee to contest the claim for enhancement of compensation.
11. Again, in Peerappa Hanmantha (supra) inter alia the following questions were framed for consideration.
“30.1. (i) Whether the allottee Company (M/s. Ultra Tech Cement Ltd.) is either a beneficiary or interested person entitled for hearing before determination of the market value to award just and reasonable compensation in respect of the acquired land of the appellants either before the Deputy Commissioner or Reference Court?
“61. Further, both the learned Senior Counsel on behalf of KIADB and the Company have placed reliance on various decisions rendered by this Court in support of their above respective legal submissions that the Company is an interested person and, therefore, it has got right to participate in the proceedings before the Reference Court for determination of compensation before passing the award either by the Land Acquisition Officer or the Deputy Commissioner or the Reference Court at the instance of the owner or any other interested person. These include judgments rendered by this Court in U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad v. Gyan Devi, Himalayan Tiles and Marble (P) Ltd. v. Francis Victor Coutinho and P. Narayanappa v. State of Karnataka decisions which are not required to be mentioned in this judgment as they are all reiteration of the law laid down in the above cases.
15. In Himalayan Tiles (supra) the acquisition was under Part-VII of the Act. InSantosh Kumar (supra) the question was whether award of the Collector could be challenged, to which this Court answered in the negative except on the ground of fraud, corruption or collusion. In Neyvely Lignite (supra) again the acquisition was under Part-VII of the Act and in that context this Court held that the expression“person interested” could include a company or local authority for whose benefit the land was acquired. The post-acquisition allottee cannot by any stretch of imagination be treated at par with beneficiary for whom the land was acquired. In U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad (supra), the matter dealt with was in the context of statutory authority for whom the land was acquired. Delhi Development Authority v. Bhola Nath Sharma (dead) by Lrs.16 was a case in the context of beneficiary for whom the land was acquired.
20. It is clear that neither the Trial Court has refused to receive the evidence nor it could be said that the evidence sought to be adduced was not available despite the exercise of due diligence nor it could be held to necessary to pronounce the judgment. Additional evidence cannot be permitted to fill-in the lacunae or to patch-up the weak points in the case17. There was no ground for remand in these circumstances.

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