Source: https://www.texasappellatewatch.com/jury-charge/
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 21:42:38+00:00

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The Texas Supreme Court has two cases on its oral-argument docket for tomorrow, 12/5/13.
-- Can a landowner recover for permanent injury to land based on "stigma" when the environmental contamination was only temporary? Under this issue, the defendant argues, among other things, that the TCEQ standards displace any common-law duty.
-- Was the testimony of the plaintiff's valuation expert legally insufficient to support the award for diminution in market value? Among other things, the defendant argues that the testimony was speculative because the expert was uninformed about the contamination and he used sales that were not comparable.
-- Does the "specific order" doctrine apply on the basis that the seaman was operating under a perceived emergency situation? A specific order is one that requires a seaman to perform a task in a particular way. The doctrine excuses any contributory negligence by the seaman.
-- Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying the defendant's objection and tender of a definition of "specific order" to accompany the question given to the jury? The defendant objected and tendered before the charge was read to the jury (as required by TRCP 272), but the trial court ruled that the objection and tender should have been made the day before.
In its weekly orders (5/24/13), the Texas Supreme Court issued just one opinion and granted no cases for review. Click here to read the weekly order list.
The case is In re L.D.C., which is a juvenile-delinquency case, in which the jury was asked to find, in disjunctive fashion, whether the defendant was guilty of one of two acts of deadly conduct. The defendant complained on appeal about the disjunctive submission, because it may have resulted in a nonunanimous verdict. The Court held that the submission was harmless because it was highly likely that the jurors were unanimous.
The new 2012 edition of the Texas Pattern Jury Charges (Business, Consumer, Insurance, Employment) has just been published. Major changes from the last edition include: (1) a new question about breach of fiduciary duty defined by statute or contract; (2) revised admonitory instructions to conform to new Texas Supreme Court rules; (3) a revised question on retaliation under the Texas Whistleblower Act; (4) new questions on invasion of privacy; (5) a new chapter on preservation of charge error; and (6) many revised comments.
The new edition of the General Negligence & Intentional Personal Torts volume has also been published recently. Click here to order it.
If a tree falls in a forest, but the court reporter doesn't note it in the record, did the tree really fall?
A fundamental error-preservation principle is that if it's not in the record, it didn't happen. But the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure provide a little-used tool to correct or clarify the record after the fact. Although opportunities to use this tool may be somewhat limited, it can be a real lifesaver in the right circumstance.
Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.2 outlines the procedure for submitting a "formal bill of exception" to the trial court. Basically, a formal bill of exception is a recital of something that happened in court but is not reflected in the record for some reason. For example, if the court reporter does not transcribe a bench conference, a formal bill of exception could be used to memorialize what was said and any rulings that were made.
A party making the formal bill of exception submits it in writing to the court, and if the court agrees with the recital of events, the court signs the bill and it is filed in the papers of the case. The rule also provides procedures that must be followed if the court disagrees with the recitals in the formal bill. Once the bill is signed and filed, it has the same effect as if the events had been transcribed. And, significantly, a formal bill of exception can be filed up to 30 days after the notice of appeal is filed.
A recent case from the Texarkana Court of Appeals illustrates one use for a formal bill of exception. City of Lufkin v. AKJ Properties, Inc., No. 06-12-00005-CV, 2012 WL 2393087 (Tex. App.—Texarkana June 26, 2012, no pet.). At a pretrial jury charge conference, the City had requested in writing that several instructions be included in the charge. The court said it was not inclined to submit the requested instructions. The City did not renew its request at the formal charge conference.
In a post-trial bill of exception under Rule 33.2, the City asked the court to clarify that it refused to submit the instructions that the City had requested at the pretrial conference. After a hearing, the trial court filed an order stating: "The above request was presented to the court after the close of the evidence and before submission of the court's charge to the jury in the presence of the court and opposing counsel and the court now [sic] hereby and in all things refused." The court of appeals found that this was sufficient to preserve error on the refusal to submit the requested instructions.
To really understand the power of a formal bill of exception, compare the result in City of Lufkin with two other cases that I posted on earlier this year. First, I posted about Jones v. Cortes, in which the Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that error was not preserved by requesting an instruction in a pre-trial proposed jury charge. A formal bill of exception might have been useful in Jones to ask the trial court to confirm that it considered and refused to submit the requested instruction.
Second, I posted about Jelinek v. Casas, in which the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals held that error was waived because the written request for an instruction could not be found in the clerk's record, even though the reporter's record indicated that a written request was submitted. A post-trial formal bill of exception could have been used to get a copy of the written request in the record and thereby preserve error.
Of course, a formal bill of exception is only useful to make a record of something that actually happened but is not in the record for some reason. It cannot be used to make a record of something that did not happen. But in the right circumstances, it can be an important preservation tool in a trial or appellate lawyer's tool kit.
I would be interested to hear if any of our readers have used a formal bill of exception to clarify or supplement the record. If you can, please share in the comments any wisdom you might have about using formal bills of exception.
Although Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 272 requires only that a requested jury instruction be submitted to the court "before the charge is read to the jury," a recent opinion holds that making the request immediately before the charge is read may be too late.
In King Fisher Marine Service, L.P. v. Tamez, the Corpus Christi court of appeals found that a request for a jury instruction was waived when it was made immediately before the charge was read to the jury. No. 13–10–00425–CV, 2012 WL 1964567 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi May 31, 2012, no pet. h.). The trial court had entered a scheduling order that required the parties to submit their proposed jury questions and instructions at trial or immediately before trial.
The appellant did not submit its requested instruction in its proposed charge before trial. Nor did the appellant request the instruction at either the informal or the formal charge conference. Instead, right before the court was ready to bring in the jury to read the charge, the appellant tendered its requested instruction. The trial court stated that it was submitted too late and should have already been submitted.
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling that the request was too late. The court relied primarily on the trial court's discretion to control its own docket and enforce its scheduling order. Because the requested instruction was not submitted in accordance with the scheduling order, at the informal conference, or at the formal conference, the court of appeals found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing the instruction.
It would be interesting to see if the same result would obtain if the requested instruction had been submitted at either the informal or the formal charge conference. Given the language of Rule 272, it seems unlikely. The trial court's discretion does not likely extend far enough to require all requested questions or instructions before the charge conference. I'd be interested to hear your thoughts in the comments.
The Texas Supreme Court issued one new opinion in its weekly orders on 5/11/12. The court also granted review in one case. Click here to read the weekly order list.
The opinion was in Thota v. Young, which involved an argument that there was Casteel error in a jury charge. This is an important case, because the court found there was no Casteel problem in the charge, but also clarified what it takes to preserve Casteel error. My partner Rich Phillips has already posted an entry on this blog, with a detailed discussion of the opinion. Click here to access the opinion.
The case in which the court granted review is Tedder v. Gardner Aldrich LLP. This is a family law case involving attorney's fees and the liability of one spouse for the other spouse's debt.
Omitted Element or Defective Instruction?
The always-confusing universe of preserving error in the court's charge may have become a little more complicated after the Dallas Court of Appeals' decision in PopCap Games, Inc. v. MumboJumbo, LLC, 350 S.W.3d 699 (Tex. App.--Dallas 2011, pet. filed).
PopCap complained on appeal that there was no evidence that MumboJumbo's damages were proximately caused by PopCap's conduct. MumboJumbo argued that PopCap waived any error because it did not object to the court's charge, which asked the jury to find the damages that "resulted from" PopCap's conduct.
The court of appeals held that PopCap's complaint was about an omitted element of MumboJumbo's claim (proximate cause) and that, therefore, no objection to the charge was necessary to preserve error. Instead, the court found that PopCap preserved its objection to a deemed finding in its motion to disregard jury findings.
An argument can be made that the question did not omit causation; it just submitted causation incorrectly because it required the jury to find only that the damages "resulted from" PopCap's conduct rather than that they were "proximately caused" by it. That would seem to make the error a defective instruction, which must be preserved with a proper objection. But in light of the PopCap opinion, no objection at the charge conference was necessary and the objection could be preserved post-trial.
Last week I posted about two cases that illustrate the importance of timely objections to the court's charge. Careful practioners also need to be sure that written requests for questions or instructions actually make it from the judge's desk into the appellate record.
In Jelinek v. Casas, the defendant requested that the charge include an instruction on unavoidable accident. No. 13-06-00088-CV, 2008 WL 2894889 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi July 29, 2008, rev’d on other grounds 328 S.W.3d 526 (Tex. 2010). Although the transcript of the charge conference reflected that the defendant submitted the requested instruction in writing, the clerk's record did not include the instruction. The court of appeals therefore found that the defendant had not properly preserved error. Because the Texas Supreme Court rendered judgment based on the defendant's no-evidence arguments, it did not reach the error- preservation issue.
Benham v. Lynch involved similar facts, but the San Antonio Court of Appeals reached a different result because of one key difference. No. 04-09-00606-CV, 2011 WL 381665 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Feb. 2, 2011, no pet.). In Benham, just as in Jelinek, the transciprt reflected that the appellant tendered a written request for an instruction, but the clerk's record did not contain the written request. But in Benham, the parties agreed that a proposed charge attached to the appellant's brief contained the instruction that was requested. Therefore, the court of appeals found that error was preserved.
The real lesson here is that the job of preserving error in the court's charge is not done when the formal charge conference is over. Counsel needs to be sure that written requests have been properly signed by the judge, and that they get from the bench to the clerk's record. I frequently offer to take them immediately after the charge conference from the courtroom to the clerk for filing. If the court refuses that offer, I am sure to follow up with the clerks office while the jury is deliberating to make sure the requests have been filed. I sometimes feel like a pest, but anything less risks waiver.
Preserving error in the jury charge can be a daunting task during the heat of trial. Two decisions from last year illustrate the importance of the timing of the objection. In one, the objection came just a little too late. And in the other, the objection was too early.
The San Antonio Court of Appeals looked at an objection that was too late in Wackenhut Corp. v. Gutierrez, No. 04-10-00661-CV, 2011 WL 3915630 (Tex. App.--San Antonio Sept. 7, 2011, no pet. h.). The court's charge included a spoliation instruction. At the formal charge conference, appellant's counsel stated that he had no objections to the proposed charge. Then, right after the charge was read to the jury, appellant's counsel requested a bench conference and objected to the spoliation instruction. The court of appeals held that the error was waived.
Because Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 272 is very clear that an objection must come before the charge is read to the jury, the Gutierrez decision is not very surprising. But careful lawyers should be aware that an objection can also be made too early. Jones v. Cortes, No. 02-10-00304-CV, 2011 WL 4008021 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth Sept. 8, 2011, no pet.). Jones is a premises-liability case, and the appellant complained that the trial court submitted the liability question with an instruction on licensee status. She asserted that the jury should have been instructed on invitee status. But she did not raise this objection at the formal charge conference. On appeal, she argued that she had preserved error by submitting a proposed charge two days before the charge conference with an instruction on invitee status. The court of appeals noted that she did nothing to bring the prior filing to the trial court's attention during the charge conference. Nor was the written request "endorsed" and signed as required by Rule 276. Therefore, the earlier objection was not sufficient to preserve the complaint about the charge.
Trial lawyers should therefore remember that the "just right" time to preserve error in the charge is during the formal charge conference. Failure to object at that time risks waiver, even if the objection was raised earlier.

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