Source: https://www.povertylaw.org/clearinghouse/fpmd/chapter9/section4
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 03:49:40+00:00

Document:
Court-awarded attorney fees are critical in preserving access to the courts for poor people. Some legal aid programs depend on fee awards for their very survival.1 Without attorney fees, numerous federal laws protecting rights to housing, health care, and other necessities would remain unenforced. The risk of having to pay plaintiffs’ attorney fees frequently induces settlement and deters illegal governmental and corporate conduct. Therefore, legal aid advocates need to have a working knowledge of fee issues.
The subject of court-awarded attorney fees has inspired books, even multivolume treatises.2 This section instead focuses chiefly on the major issues presented in fee litigation: how a plaintiff qualifies as a prevailing party; entitlement to fees; how to calculate a reasonable fee; timing of fee motions and the “Jeff D. problem” of defendants forcing plaintiffs’ counsel to waive fees as a condition of achieving a settlement on the merits.
In CRST Van Expedited, Inc. v. EEOC,8 the Supreme Court considered the circumstances under which the defendant was deemed to be a prevailing party. In that case, the defendant company prevailed in a Title VII sexual harassment case on grounds that did not reach the merits of the EEOC's claims. The Court held the defendant may nevertheless be a prevailing party "even if the court's final judgment rejects the plaintiff's claim for a nonmerits reason."9 As noted below, the defendant prevails for merits or nonmerits reasons if the plaintiff's "claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless."10 It would make little sense if Congress' policy of "sparing defendants from the costs of frivolous litigation,"11 depended on the distinction between merits-based and non-merits-based frivolity. Congress must have intended that a defendant could recover fees expended in frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless litigation when the case is resolved in the defendant's favor, whether on the merits or not. Imposing an on-the-merits requirement for a defendant to obtain prevailing party status would undermine that congressional policy by blocking a whole category of defendants for whom Congress wished to make fee awards available.
The second question—what form the victory must take for the plaintiff—became problematic after Buckhannon Board v. West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources.12 In Buckhannon, the Supreme Court held that voluntary change in behavior by a defendant caused by a pending lawsuit did not qualify the plaintiff as a prevailing party for fee purposes. After Buckhannon, whether a plaintiff who is victorious in a practical sense is a prevailing party for fee purposes depends roughly on how much judicial involvement was involved in the victory.
Once a plaintiff demonstrates that she is a prevailing party, showing entitlement to fees usually is not difficult under most federal fee-shifting statutes.
What constitutes “hours reasonably expended” is the most frequently debated question in fee litigation.
Courts and opposing counsel examine whether the hours are well documented. Some courts permit attorneys to reconstruct hours.44 However, inadequate documentation may result in a reduced fee award.45 Attorneys, paralegals, and law clerks should begin keeping contemporaneous time records as soon as they realize that a matter may become a case, erring on the side of overinclusiveness. They should record the date, the time spent to complete a task broken down into six-minute increments, and, most important, a sufficiently detailed description of what was done. As one court stated, records should give “enough information as to what hours were devoted to various activities and by whom for the district court to determine if the claimed fees are reasonable.”46 For example, “telephone call” or “research” are inadequate entries, but a court will approve “telephone call with Smith re failure to produce administrative record” or “research re summary judgment motion.”47 Ideally, there should be a separate entry for each telephone call, research project, or other activity. Bundling several activities into one entry, which is known as block billing, can be costly. One circuit court has approved a 20% reduction in compensation for the block-billed hours.48 Block-billing makes it difficult for courts to assess the number and reasonableness of the hours billed for each task.
Hensley states that “[w]here a plaintiff has obtained excellent results, his attorney should recover a fully compensatory fee. Normally this will encompass all hours reasonably expended on the litigation . . . .”49 However, attorneys seeking court-awarded fees are expected to exercise voluntary “billing judgment,” excluding from a fee request “hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary . . . .”50 In lengthy, multi-counsel litigation, where justifying every time entry or use of personnel would be difficult, some plaintiffs’ attorneys propose a voluntary across-the-board billing judgment reduction, which courts often appreciate.51 In other instances, where particular recorded activity seems vulnerable, plaintiffs’ counsel should consider making discrete reductions.
Fee opponents often seek reductions based on the argument that the plaintiffs were only partly successful. Plaintiffs rarely win all conceivable relief while prevailing along the way at every stage on all legal theories advanced. Courts do not, however, require that level of success to award fully compensatory fees.
In Blum v. Stenson the Supreme Court held that Section 1988 fees awarded to legal aid programs that do not charge their clients fees should be calculated at rates comparable to those charged by private attorneys in the community with comparable experience.74 The Court rejected as inconsistent with the legislative history of Section 1988 the argument that fees should be limited to the internal costs of the relatively low salaries paid by legal aid programs.
other fee award orders in the jurisdiction stating hourly rates for attorneys of comparable experience.
First, the parties may disagree on which city’s prevailing rates apply when plaintiff’s counsel practices outside the forum jurisdiction. While this issue can cut both ways, it appears to occur most frequently when an out-of-town big-city lawyer wins in a jurisdiction where prevailing rates are relatively low. Generally the forum community’s rates are applicable unless the plaintiff can show that “local counsel was unavailable, either because they are unwilling or unable to perform because they lack the degree of experience, expertise, or specialization required to handle properly the case.’”79 A declaration from the director of the legal services program serving the forum community sometimes can help prove this point.
As for the first factor, the Supreme Court held that possessing exceptional litigation skills is not good enough. The prevailing attorney must have “distinctive knowledge or specialized skill . . . .”94 The circuit courts have taken different approaches in construing the Underwood requirements. The First, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have interpreted Underwood to allow an enhancement in situations where the attorneys had specialized expertise in a particular area of law.95 By contrast, the D.C., Fourth, and Fifth Circuits have construed Underwood quite narrowly.96 Most other circuit courts have not squarely addressed this issue.
Even when the prevailing attorney possesses specialized expertise, the attorney must make a strong factual showing that the case could not have been brought by a smart generalist. Lead counsel should demonstrate to the court how the suit could only have been litigated by attorneys with existing contacts in the field or knowledge of hard-to-access rules and authorities. Plaintiffs also need to submit a declaration from a knowledgeable attorney showing the absence of other qualified counsel to litigate such a case.
In Perdue v. Kenny A.,105 the Court held that there is a "strong presumption" that the lodestar calculation is reasonable, but that there may be a "few" circumstances in which superior attorney performance is not represented in the lodestar calculation. In such cases, the lodestar amount would not have been sufficient to attract competent counsel initially. The Court identified three bases for a possible enhancement: that the hourly rate does not adequately measure the attorney's true market value, such as when the rate is keyed only to the number of years out of law school, 2) the performance involves an "extraordinary" outlay of expenses and litigation is protracted and 3) the performance involves an unanticipated delay in the recovery of fees.106 Any enhancement must be objective, reasonable and subject to meaningful appellate review.
While Perdue left the door slightly ajar for future multipliers, the opinion and its predecessors suggest a more practical approach for fee applicants. The Perdue Court recognized that "'brilliant insights and critical maneuvers sometimes matter far more than hours worked or years of experience.'"107 But "'in those cases, the special skill and experience of counsel should be reflected in the reasonableness of the hourly rates.'"108 Counsel who have performed exceptionally can use this reasoning to justify seeking higher hourly rates than would normally be warranted by their number of years of experience.
Neither Section 1988 nor most federal fee-shifting statutes specify when the fee motion must be filed.
Some local rules, however, also impose short deadlines for fee motions, which may require counsel to seek an order postponing the deadline or to postpone having a judgment entered until fee papers are prepared. Rule 54 requires only that the fee applicant state the basis for an award and either the amount or “fair estimate” of the amount; thus, the rule appears to permit counsel to file placeholder motions with details to be filled in later.
Fee petitions may also be filed pending appeal; the EAJA merely precludes fee petitions after the 30-day limit.112 Fee claimants and the government argued for years over what starts the EAJA clock running in Social Security Act cases until the Supreme Court decided the issue in Shalala v. Schaeffer.113 A plaintiff is a prevailing party, the Court held, when she obtains a “sentence four remand” under the Social Security Act: “a judgment modifying or reversing the decision of the Secretary . . . .”114 By contrast, a “sentence six remand,” which merely contemplates that new evidence will be introduced is not a judgment for attorney-fee purposes.115 Thus, a sentence four remand has the potential to start the clock running for an EAJA fee motion.
Ordinarily a legal aid organization agrees to represent the client without charging a fee, except for recovering court-awarded fees. There are two potential problems with defense settlement offers in most cases handled by legal aid attorneys: (1) the offer is conditioned upon waiver of attorney fees or (2) in cases seeking monetary relief, the defendant offers a lump-sum inclusive of all damages and attorney fees and does not identify the amount of the award allocated to fees. Simultaneously negotiating the best settlement terms for the client and an award of fees for the legal work can create a conflict of interest between attorney and client.
Because such suits would not be easy to litigate and win, the goal should be to avoid Jeff D. offers in the first place. Some private attorneys have done so by including a provision in the client retainer agreement stating the attorney’s hourly rate and specifying that the client owes that amount if the client, against attorney’s advice, accepts a settlement offer that precludes a fee recovery.
This is not a viable option for legal aid programs. For legal aid attorneys, the key to minimizing Jeff D. problems is appropriate communication with opposing counsel and with clients. Some opposing counsel, who would never think to make a Jeff D. offer to a private attorney, might make such an offer to a legal services attorney, seeking to take advantage of the attorney's perceived idealism. Legal services attorneys need to convey to opposing counsel and the entire legal community, through consistent word and action, that of course, in addition to relief for their clients, they expect their programs to be paid no matter what. Consistently conveying this attitude will discourage Jeff D. offers. Client communication is also critical. Clients who are educated on the importance of the case and kept well informed throughout the litigation have been known to reject Jeff D. offers.
Even when there is no demand for waiver of fees, incorporating fees in a lump-sum settlement offer presents a serious challenge to the plaintiff’s attorney. The attorney must negotiate the maximum monetary and non-monetary relief for the client while also trying to recover fees. Because law firms representing indigent civil rights plaintiffs typically limit their requirement for the client to pay attorney fees to what can be recovered from the defendant, there is also an ethical challenge when the lump-sum does not allocate the portion of the award that represents the amount included for the fees of the plaintiff’s attorney. Where damages will be sought, the client retainer agreement needs to address specifically the possibility of a lump-sum settlement offer. The agreement needs to specify that the fees will be calculated in a certain way, and that an accounting of the total fees will be shown to the client at the time a settlement offer is made. Even with full disclosure and agreement from the client, negotiating these lump-sum settlement offers is challenging.
1. From 1995 to 2009, annual legislation appropriating funds to the Legal Services Corporation (LSC) prohibited LSC grant recipients from claiming attorney fees in most cases. The appropriation measure for 2010 eliminated the prohibition, and LSC then suspended its corresponding regulation, 45 C.F.R. § 1642.3. The National Legal Aid and Defender Program Enhancement Committee subsequently prepared a useful memorandum setting forth guidance to LSC funded organizations (but useful to any legal aid office) on how to document time, revise retainer and co-counseling agreements and collect attorney fees. See the Ohio Legal Services website for more information, www.ohiolegalservices.org. In addition, programs should seek attorney's fees in cases pending at the time of passage of the appropriations bill. See Rochelle Bobroff, Legal Services Attorney Fees Are Obtainable in Pending Cases, 44 Clearinghouse Review 157 (July-Aug. 2010).
2. See, e.g., 2 Martin A. Schwartz & John E. Kirklin, Section 1983 Litigation, Statutory Attorney's Fees (4th ed. 2013-2 Supplement).
3. Not all statutes require a recipient of attorney fees to be the prevailing party. Under the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, a court may award attorney fees in connection with an unsuccessful petition for compensation for injuries caused by vaccines if the petition "was brought in good faith and there was a reasonable basis for the claim for which the petition was brought . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(e)(1). In Sebelius v. Cloer, 133 S. Ct. 1886 (2013), the Court held that fees could be awarded under this statute even for an untimely petition brought in good faith. See Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Insurance Company, 560 U.S. 242 ( 2010) (holding that under ERISA provision, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1), which allows court to award fees to either party in its discretion, party must demonstrate "some degree of success on the merits" to be awarded fees).
4. For a detailed discussion of these issues, see Gill Deford, The Imprimatur of Buckhannon on the Prevailing-Party Inquiry, 42 Clearinghouse Review 122 (July-Aug. 2008).
5. Texas Teachers Association v. Garland School District, 489 U.S. 782, 791 (1989).
6. See Section 9.4.C.1 of this MANUAL.
7. Texas Teachers Association, 489 U.S. at 793.
8. 136 S. Ct. 1642 (2016).
9. Id. at 1651. The Court declined to decide whether the nonmerits grounds of a decision must be preclusive in nature. Id. at 1653.
10. Id. at 1652 (quoting Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 422 (1978)).
11. Fox v. Vice, 563 U.S. 826, 840 (2011).
12. Buckhannon Board and Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health & Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598, 603 (2001).
13. Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 761 (1987).
14. Lefemine v. Wideman, 133 S. Ct. 9, 11 (2012) (per curiam).
16. Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 115 (1992).
17. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 605.
18. Id. at 609 (quoting Friends of the Earth, Incorporated v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Incorporated, 528 U.S. 167, 189 (2000)). Mootness is discussed in detail in Chapter 3 of this MANUAL.
19. Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754 (1980).
20. See, e.g., Higher Taste, Incorporated v. City of Tacoma, 717 F.3d 712, 716 (9th Cir. 2013); Common Cause/Georgia v. Billups, 554 F.3d 1340, 1355-56 (11th Cir. 2009); People Against Police Violence v. City of Pittsburgh, 520 F.3d 226, 232-33 (3d Cir. 2008) ("nearly every Court of Appeals to have addressed the issue has held that relief obtained via a preliminary injunction can, under appropriate circumstances, render a party 'prevailing.'"); Dearmore v. City of Garland, 519 F.3d 517, 523-24 (5th Cir. 2008); Preservation Coalition of Erie County v. Federal Transit Administration, 356 F. 3d 444, 451 (2d Cir. 2004). But see Smyth v. Rivero, 282 F.3d 268, 276-77 (4th Cir. 2002) (doubting that winning a preliminary injuncti0n can ever qualify a plaintiff as the prevailing party).
21. See, e.g., Race v. Toledo-Davila, 291 F.3d 857, 858-59 (1st. Cir. 2002).
22. Sole v. Wyner, 551 U.S. 74 (2007).
23. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 605.
26. Id. at 604 n.7.
27. For a discussion on how to structure settlements in light of Buckhannon, see Section 9.2 of this MANUAL.
28. See, e.g., Perez v. Westchester County Department of Corrections, 587 F.3d 143, 149-53 (2d Cir. 2009); Aranov v. Napolitano, 562 F.3d 84, 88-95 (1st Cir. 2009) (en banc); Campaign for Responsible Transplantation v. Food and Drug Administration, 511 F.3d 187 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Roberson v. Giuliani, 346 F.3d 75 (2d Cir. 2003); Barrios v. California Interscholastic Federation, 277 F.3d 1128, 1134-35 n.5 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 820 (2002); American Disability Association, Incorporated v. Chmielarz, 289 F.3d 1315, 1320 (11th Cir. 2002); Smyth v. Rivero, 282 F.3d 268, 278-81 (4th Cir. 2002) ; Truesdell v. Philadelphia Housing Authority, 290 F.3d 159, 165 (3d Cir. 2002).
29. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E)(ii).
30. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). For a list of other federal attorney-fee provisions, see Gary F. Smith, Federal Statutory Attorney Fees: Common Issues and Recent Cases, 28 Clearinghouse Review 744, 746 (Nov. 1994).
31. 42 U.S.C. § 1988. A potentially illuminating recent example outside the traditional legal services context involved an interpretation of the identical fee-shifting language in the Copyright Act. Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1979 (2016). There, the Court tried to interpret the fee provision in a manner that would further the purpose of the Copyright Act. It determined that this purpose would be better served by a test that gave "substantial weight to the reasonableness of a losing party's position" and considered other relevant factors than one that gave "special consideration to whether a lawsuit resolved an important and close legal issue and thus 'meaningfully clarifie[d]' copyright law." Id. at 1985, 1986-89. In this context, the "substantial weight" test is not equivalent to a presumption against fee shifting."
32. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 428 (1983) (citations omitted).
33. Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 14 (1980) (quoting Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978) (internal quotation marks omitted)). See James v. City of Boise, 136 S. Ct. 685 (2016) (per curiam).
34. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 9 (1980).
35. Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 130-33 (1980); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 693-700 (1978).
36. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). The fee petition must, among other things, affirmatively allege that the government’s litigation position was not substantially justified. Scarborough v. Principi, 541 U.S. 401, 408 (2004).
37. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(D).
38. Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988).
39. Id. at 568-69. In Pierce itself, for example, the Court did not find it dispositive that the government had lost 11 straight times on the same issue. Id. at 569. Neither did the Court agree with the government that a Supreme Court grant of certiorari and a stay on the same issue compelled a conclusion that the government’s position must have been substantially justified. Id.
41. Astrue v. Ratliff, 560 U.S. 586 (2010).
42. See Gors v. Colvin, No. Civ. 12-4162 (D.S.D. March 12, 2013) ("Post-Ratliff the approach of most courts has been to honor such fee assignments in the absence of the litigant's pre-existing debt to the United States.") (citing Walker v. Astrue, No. 2:09-cv-960 (M.D. Ala. April 5, 2011) (Ratliff does not explicitly reject the practice of awarding fees to attorneys where the litigant has assigned them "'in cases where the plaintiff does not owe a debt to the government . . .'"); Wigginton v. Astrue, No. 3:09CV00101 (E.D. Ark. April 4, 2011) (same); Blackwell v. Astrue, No. CIV 08-1454 (E.D. Cal. March 21, 2011) (same); Dornbusch v. Astrue, No. 09-CV-1734 (D. Minn. March 1, 2011) (same)).
43. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433.
44. See Kline v. City of Kansas City, Missouri, Fire Department, 245 F.3d 707 (8th Cir. 2001); Riordan v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Comapny, 977 F.2d 47, 53 (2d Cir. 1992); Davis v. City & County of San Francisco, 976 F.2d 1536, 1542 (9th Cir. 1992), vacated in part on other grounds, 984 F.2d 345 (9th Cir. 1993); Carter v. Sedgwick County, 929 F.2d 1501, 1506 (10th Cir. 1991).
45. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433.
46. Rode v. Dellarciprete, 892 F.2d 1177, 1191 (3d Cir. 1990).
47. For a comparison of what one court considered to be adequate and inadequate time records, see Chrapliwy v. Uniroyal Inc., 583 F. Supp. 40, 47 (N.D. Ind. 1983). Interestingly, the time summaries the court approved broke down time by quarter hours rather than tenths, and several of the entries were block billed. Neither practice is likely to pass judicial muster today.
48. Welch v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, 480 F.3d 942, 948 (9thCir. 2007). At the same time, the Court of Appeals stated that the reduction could not be imposed across-the-board because many of the time entries were not block-billed. See also Torres-Rivera v. O'Neill-Cancel, 524 F.3d 331, 340 (1st Cir. 2008).
49. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435.
51. See, e.g., Davis, 976 F.2d at 1543.
52. Moreno v. City of Sacramento, 534 F.3d 1106, 1112 (9th Cir. 2008).
53. Webb v. County Board of Education, 471 U.S. 234, 243 (1985).
54. Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council, 478 U.S. 546, 559 (1986).
55. See, e.g., Gagne v. Maher, 594 F.2d 336, 344 ( 2d Cir. 1979), aff’d on other grounds, 448 U.S. 122 (1980), cited with approval, Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154, 162 (1990). In Jean the Court held that, under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), fees for time spent on the fee issue should be awarded without a separate inquiry over whether the government’s position on the fee issue was substantially justified.
56. Webb, 471 U.S. at 242.
58. Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council, 478 U.S. at 558-59.
59. See, e.g., Schwartz & Kirklin, supra note 2, § 4.07[F] at 4-101 (collecting cases dealing with compensability of travel time).
60. Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 573 n.6 (1986).
61. See, e.g., In re Continental Illinois Securities Litigation, 962 F.2d 566, 570 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that unjustified across-the-board cuts in attorney fees for time spent in conference was an abuse of discretion); Berberena v. Coler, 753 F.2d 629, 633 (7th Cir. 1985) (in “a difficult case with significant social effects . . . the participation of [four] attorneys . . . in . . . strategy conferences and negotiations ‘may indeed have been crucial . . . .’”); Scelta v. Delicatessen Support Services, Incorporated, 203 F. Supp. 2d 1328, 1333 (M.D. Fla. 2002); McKenzie v. Kennickell, 645 F. Supp. 437, 450 (D.D.C. 1986) (“conferences between attorneys to discuss strategy and prepare for oral argument are an essential part of effective litigation . . . there is no reason or authority for allowing only one lawyer to charge for time that more than one lawyer justifiably spent”).
62. See, e.g., United States v. City & County of San Francisco, 748 F. Supp. 1416, 1421 (N.D. Cal. 1990), aff’d in relevant part sub nom. Davis, 976 F.2d 1536 (counsel compensated for 3,500 hours in conferences with co-counsel and clients); Riverside, 477 U.S. at 573 n.6 (affirming compensation for 197 hours of conversation between two attorneys); Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 466 F. Supp. 732, 743 (D. R.I. 1979), aff’d, 616 F.2d 598 (1st Cir. 1980) (attorneys fully compensated for 208 hours spent in conference). See also In re Olson, 884 F.2d 1415, 1429 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (limiting compensation for conferencing hours to 10 percent of total fee request).
63. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436 n.11.
64. Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 115 (1992).
65. Id. at 121-22 (O’Connor, J., concurring). See, e.g., Barber v. T.D. Williamson, Incorporated, 254 F.3d 1223, 1229-33 (10th Cir. 2001) (evaluating factors); O’Connor v. Huard, 117 F.3d 12, 17-18 (1st Cir. 1997) (affirming a lodestar fee award, where nominal damages award achieved individual plaintiff’s goal and served as a deterrent).
66. See, e.g., Hawa Abdi Jama v. Esmor Correctional Services, 577 F.3d 169, 174-76 (3rd Cir. 2009); Mercer v. Duke University, 401 F.3d 199, 204 (4th Cir. 2005), and cases cited there.
67. Riverside, 477 U.S. at 564-65, 581 (plurality opinion); id. at 581-86 (Powell, J., concurring in judgment) (rejecting argument to limit fees to one-third of damages).
68. Id. at 586 (Powell, J., concurring).
69. Cabrales v. County of Los Angeles, 935 F.2d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 1991).
70. Id. (“Just as time spent on losing claims can contribute to the success of other claims, time spent on a losing stage of litigation contributes to success because it constitutes a step toward victory”).
71. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 440.
72. Id. By contrast, when a portion of a suit is frivolous, entitling the defendant to attorney fees under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988 and similar statutes, the defendant is entitled to reimbursement only "for costs that the defendant would not have incurred but for the frivolous claims." Fox v. Vice, 131 S. Ct. 2205, 2211 (2011).
74. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 892-96 (1984).
75. Id. at 893 (citing S. Rep. No. 94-1011, at 6 (1976)).
76. Id. at 896 n.11.
77. Specific hourly rate information is more persuasive than a declaration of a private attorney that merely says the attorney has looked over the rates sought and thinks they are “reasonable.” The latter type of declaration “might properly be characterized by a reviewing court as one given out of courtesy, but it provides little or no evidentiary support for an award.” Norman v. Housing Authority of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292, 1304 (11th Cir. 1988).
78. See, e.g., Salazar v. District of Columbia, 123 F. Supp. 2d 8,14 (D.D.C. 2000) (relying upon National Survey Center and National Law Journal surveys to determine reasonable hourly rates in the District of Columbia). But see Davis, 976 F.2d at 1547 (rejecting reliance on a different survey because, among other reasons, the survey reported only statewide average rates rather than rates specific to San Francisco, where case was litigated).
79. Barjon v. Dalton, 132 F.3d 496, 500 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 827 (1998) (quoting Gates v. Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392, 1405 (9th Cir. 1992)).
80. Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 284 (1989).
81. Because waivers of sovereign immunity are strictly construed, fee awards against the federal government after multiyear litigation may not include a multiplier for delay or be based on current hourly rates. Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310, 317-20 (1986).
82. Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 925 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1117 (1997). Accord Malloy v. Monahan, 73 F.3d 1012 (10th Cir. 1996); Brooks v. Georgia Board of Elections, 997 F.2d 857, 869-70 (11th Cir. 1993).
83. See, e.g., Lopez v. San Francisco Unified School District, 385 F. Supp. 2d 981, 992 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (holding that attorney fees should be reduced when tasks could have been delegated to less experienced attorneys in typical firm environment); Finkelstein v. Bergna, 804 F. Supp. 1235, 1237-38 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (awarding 0 per hour for some of work by plaintiffs’ lead counsel and 0 per hour (still a high rate for 1992) for less complex work). See also McDonald v. Pension Plan of the NYSA-ILA Pension Trust Fund, 450 F.3d 91, 98 n.6 (2d Cir. 2006) (approving cautiously of district court's reduction in solo practitioner's rate based on fact that larger firms incur greater overhead.
84. See, e.g., Hutchison v. Amateur Electronic Supply, Incorporated, 42 F.3d 1037, 1048 (7th Cir. 1994) (“plaintiff asserts that her counsel was essentially a sole practitioner with only part-time associates and law clerks during much of this litigation. If true, the district court’s reduction for what it saw as top-heavy staffing cannot be sustained.”).
85. American Petroleum Institute. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 72 F.3d 907, 916 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“often, as audits reveal, there is so much senior time billed for reviewing, revising, and discussing the document that it usually would be cheaper to have the senior lawyer simply sit down and draft it”). Accord Daggett v. Kimmelman, 811 F.2d 793 (3d Cir. 1987); Muehler v. Land O’Lakes, Incorporated, 617 F. Supp. 1370, 1379 (D. Minn. 1985); Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Incorporated, 572 F. Supp. 354, 366 (D.D.C. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 746 F.2d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1985). See also Gary Greenfield, Efficient Litigation: An Ethical Imperative? 20 American Lawyer 38 (April 1994).
86. Jenkins, 491 U.S. at 284-89. Accord, Richlin Security Service Company v. Chertoff, 128 S. Ct. 2007 (2008) (same conclusion for fees awarded under Equal Access to Justice Act).
87. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A).
88. Id.; Sorenson v. Mink, 239 F.3d 1140, 1148 (9th Cir. 2001). Before 1996, the limit was per hour, subject to the same statutory exceptions. Id.
89. Sorenson, 239 F.3d at 1148. See Zheng Liu v. Chertoff, 538 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1124 (D. Minn. 2008) ("Court may use the CPI-U to adjust EAJA rate for inflation"); Associationn of American Physicians and Surgeons v. Food and Drug Administration, 391 F. Supp. 2d 171, 178 n.5 (D.D.C. 2005) (accepting plaintiff's request for increase over 5 limit for cost-of-living expense based on CPI).
90. Kerin v. United States Postal Service, 218 F.3d 185, 194 (2d Cir. 2000); Masonry Masters, Incorporated v. Nelson, 105 F.3d 708, 711-13 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
91. Sorenson, 239 F.3d at 1148.
92. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B).
93. Rueda-Menicucci v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 132 F.3d 493, 496 (9th Cir. 1997) (denying rate increase where special expertise was unnecessary to successful result); Raines v. Shalala, 44 F.3d 1355, 1360-61 (7th Cir. 1995); Pirus v. Bowen, 869 F.2d 536, 541-42 (9th Cir. 1989).
94. Underwood, 487 U.S. at 572.
95. See Raines, 44 F.3d at 1361 (“an identifiable practice specialty not easily acquired by a reasonably competent attorney” can be considered a special factor warranting fee enhancement); Pirus, 869 F.2d at 541-42 (fee enhancement available for specialized expertise in social security class actions); Jean v. Nelson, 863 F.2d 759, 774 (11th Cir. 1988), aff’d, 496 U.S. 154 (1999) (immigration law expertise may qualify). See Atlantic Fish Spotters Association. v. Daley, 205 F.3d 488, 491 (1st Cir. 2000) (holding that practice experience in fisheries can be special factor, but such expertise was not required in this case).
96. Select Milk Producers, Incorporated. v. Johanns, 400 F.3d 939, 950-51 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (concluding that "expertise acquired through practice" was not a "special factor" that could warrant an enhanced fee); F.J. Vollmer Company v. Magaw, 102 F3d. 591, 598 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (market rate fees “available only for lawyers whose specialty ‘requir[es] technical or other education outside the field of American law’”); Estate of Cervin v. Commissioner, 200 F.3d 351, 354 (5th Cir. 2000); Hyatt v. Commissioner, 315 F.3d 239, 253 (4th Cir. 2002).
97. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b).
98. See, e.g. Hyatt v. Shalala, 6 F.3d 250 (4th Cir. 1993) (refusal of federal government to follow binding circuit precedent in social security cases amounted to bad faith warranting market rate fees); D & M Watch Corporation v. United States, 795 F. Supp. 1172, 1177 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1992) (market rate fees when Customs Service acted in bad faith); Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310, 319 (1986) (noting that Congress waived sovereign immunity to permit Title VII lawsuits and attorney-fee awards against the United States).
99. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434.
100. City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557 (1992).
101. See, e.g, Blum, 465 U.S. at 898-99. Counsel may wish to use this discussion to support relatively high hourly rates.
102. Oberfielder v. Bertolli, 67 Fed. Appx. 408, 411 (9th Cir. 2003) (applying multiplier where "the undesirability of the case is at least partially confirmed by Oberfelder's difficulty in obtaining legal representation and the consequent need for the district court to appoint pro bono counsel"); Guam Society of Obstetricians & Gynecologists v. Ada, 100 F.3d 691, 697 (9th Cir. 1996); Brotherton v. Cleveland, 141 F. Supp. 2d 907 (S.D. Ohio 2001).
103. Geier v. Sundquist, 372 F.3d 784, 795-96 (6th Cir. 2004).
104. Mangold v. California Public Utilities Commission, 67 F.3d 1470, 1478-79 (9th Cir. 1995) (affirming 2.0 multiplier under California state law in discrimination case).
105. Perdue v. Kenny A., 559 U.S. 542 (2010).
106. Id. at 554-56. The Supreme Court previously approved of an enhancement to account for unanticipated delays in payment. Jenkins, 491 U.S. at 284. But see Shaw, 478 U.S. at 321-23 (no compensation for delay in suits against federal government).
107. Id. at 555 n.5.
108. Id. (citing Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 898 (1984)).
109. Tire Kingdom, Incorporated v. Morgan Tire & Auto, Incorporated, 253 F.3d 1332, 1335 (11th Cir. 2001).
110. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B). The Supreme Court has held that a timely fee petition could be amended after 30 days to cure a failure to allege that the government’s litigation position was not substantially justified. Scarborough v. Principi, 541 U.S. 401 (2004).
111. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(G).
112. Pierce v. Barnhart, 440 F.3d 657, 662 (5th Cir. 2006); Scafar Contracting, Incorporated v. Secretary of Labor, 325 F.3d 422, 431-32 (3rd Cir. 2003); McDonald v. Schweiker, 726 F.2d 311, 314 (7th Cir. 1983); accord Cervantez v. Sullivan, 739 F. Supp. 517, 519 (E.D. Cal. 1990), rev’d on other grounds, 963 F.2d 229 (9th Cir. 1992). See also Adams v. Securities & Exchange Commission, 287 F.3d 183, 187-88 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (noting that Congress, in amending EAJA, adopted McDonald approach).
113. Shalala v. Schaeffer, 509 U.S. 292 (1993).
114. Id. at 300, citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), fourth sentence.
117. Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717 (1986).
118. Bernhardt v. County of Los Angeles, 279 F.3d 862 (9th Cir. 2002) (Section 1988 suit); Johnson v. District of Columbia, 190 F. Supp. 2d 34, 42-44 (D.D.C. 2002) (provision in Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), court relied in part on IDEA’s right to counsel provision to distinguish Jeff D.).

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