Source: http://isthatlegal.ca/index.php?name=Estoppel-and-Res-Judicata
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 20:57:03+00:00

Document:
'Estoppel' refers generally to the phenomenon of someone being stopped from exercising what they think is a right but which they have surrendered by past behaviour.
'Estoppel', as I use the term, includes several similar themes. There are both 'cause of action' and 'issue' estoppel, which some judges consider to be aspects of res judicata. Then there is the near-evidentiary use of the term in the day-to-day cut & thrust of business, whereby one may be held to a position against the beneficial term of a contract if one has acted overtly against it. Then there is stare decisis, the 'legal' counterpart of estoppel, acting to prevent the same legal issue from being re-litigated. I've even seen it arise in the recent development of summary judgment law.
'Estoppel' is truly a broad-based and important legal concept.
 I would note, at the outset, that the scope of the “special circumstances” exception to issue estoppel constitutes a question of law. The standard of review is thus one of correctness: Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33 (CanLII),  2 S.C.R. 235, at para. 8.
 The requirements of, and purpose behind, the doctrine of res judicata were thoroughly canvassed in Danyluk v. Ainsworth Technologies Inc., 2001 SCC 44 (CanLII),  2 S.C.R. 460. In that decision, Binnie J. reviewed the historical development of the doctrine and its component parts: cause of action estoppel and issue estoppel. He also reviewed the development of the doctrine of collateral attack.
 As set out in Danyluk at para. 25, the preconditions to the operation of issue estoppel are: (i) that the same question has been decided; (ii) that the judicial decision which is said to create the estoppel was final; and, (iii) that the parties to the judicial decision or their privies were the same persons as the parties to the proceedings in which the estoppel is raised or their privies. It is clear that those three preconditions are met in this case.
The objective is to ensure that the operation of issue estoppel promotes the orderly administration of justice but not at the cost of real injustice in the particular case.
As a final and most important factor, the Court should stand back and, taking into account the entirety of the circumstances, consider whether application of issue estoppel in the particular case would work an injustice.
If the decision of a court on a point of law in an earlier proceeding is shown to be wrong by a later judicial decision, issue estoppel will not prevent relitigating that issue in subsequent proceedings. It would be unfair to do otherwise.
The discretionary factors that apply to prevent the doctrine of issue estoppel from operating in an unjust or unfair way are equally available to prevent the doctrine of abuse of process from achieving a similar undesirable result.
As the application of collateral attack in this case would work the same injustice as issue estoppel, it should not be applied to block the proposed pleadings.
 In our view, the application judge did not err by refusing to entertain the appellants’ constitutional argument on the ground that it had been conclusively and finally determined against them in the prior proceeding. We agree with his conclusion that the required elements of issue estoppel were made out.
3) the parties to both proceedings must be the same or their privies.
See Danyluk v. Ainsworth Technologies Inc., 2001 SCC 44 (CanLII),  2 S.C.R. 460, at para. 25.
 .... The applicable principle is that “litigation is conclusive upon issues actually brought before the court and upon any issues which the parties, exercising reasonable diligence, should have brought forward on that occasion”: Las Vegas Strip Ltd. v. Toronto (City) (1996), 1996 CanLII 8037 (ON SC), 30 O.R. (3d) 286 (Gen. Div.), aff’d (1997), 1997 CanLII 3841 (ON CA), 32 O.R. (3d) 651 (C.A.).
 The two individual appellants were parties to the Divisional Court proceeding as was the Federation of Ontario Traditional Chinese Medicine Association. All corporate appellants, except Committee of Certified Acupuncturists of Ontario, share the same registered address and they all share many of the same directors and officers, including the two individual appellants. In the context of these proceedings, this constitutes a sufficient degree of identification among the parties “to make it just to hold that the decision to which one was a party should be binding in the proceedings to which the other is a party”: Re EnerNorth Industries Inc., 2009 ONCA 536 (CanLII), 96 O.R. (3d) 1, at para. 62. In any event, even if the same parties requirement for issue estoppel is not strictly met, permitting the appellants to re-litigate the issue that was determined by the Divisional Court would amount to an abuse of process: see Toronto (City) v. C.U.P.E., Local 79, 2003 SCC 63 (CanLII),  3 S.C.R. 77, at para. 37.
3) the parties to the prior decision are the same persons as the parties to the proceedings in which the estoppel is raised.
She noted that if the preconditions were established, a court still had to determine whether, as a matter of discretion, issue estoppel ought to be applied.
 The trial judge dismissed the application on the basis that the consent judgment was not a decision on the merits and it was unclear that the issues in the two proceedings were the same.
 Ms. Dieckmann argues that the trial judge erred in finding that the test for issue estoppel was not met.
 Contrary to the trial judge’s conclusion, a consent judgment may be the basis for issue estoppel: Hardy Lumber Co. v. Pickerel River Improvement Co. (1898), 1898 CanLII 16 (SCC), 29 S.C.R. 211; and Re Ontario Sugar Co. (1911), 24 O.L.R. 332 (C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused (1911), 1911 CanLII 8 (SCC), 44 S.C.R. 659.
 I now turn to the second error the motion judge made in concluding that it would be an abuse of process for the appellant to pursue a civil action for wrongdoing against the state authorities. She came to this conclusion based on her view that all of the issues had already been determined by the Court of Appeal on the reference. In particular, the motion judge emphasized that the court found no wrongdoing on the part of the authorities.
 However, that finding was made only for the purpose of deciding whether the newly discovered evidence could be admitted on appeal based on trial unfairness. The court did not consider whether the respondents breached any common law duty of care or whether they owed any such duty to the appellant.
 Most importantly, the Court of Appeal admitted the evidence on other grounds and then ordered a new trial. The court placed no restrictions on the conduct of that trial or on the issues that could be raised. Clearly, had the trial proceeded, the defence would have raised the alibi and the fact that Detective McCombie had concluded in 1968 that the appellant was not the murderer. The Crown would have led the evidence of how the alibi was discredited. It would have been open to the jury to accept, reject or have a reasonable doubt about the key issue that the Court of Appeal could not decide: whether the Trenton alibi had been discredited. If the jury did not believe that the alibi had been discredited by Detective McCombie, then the finding by the Court of Appeal that there was no duty on the Crown to disclose would itself be implicitly discredited.
 Without seeking to set out a general rule applicable to all references, the nature of the reference in this particular case was such that the findings of the court could not have been intended to bind a future hearing if a new trial was ordered.
 It follows that the same conclusion applies with respect to a civil action. It is also consistent with the fairness analysis recently adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada in Penner v. Niagara (Regional Police Services Board), 2013 SCC 19 (CanLII), 2013 SCC 19,  2 S.C.R. 125.
 In that case, Cromwell and Karakatsanis JJ. discuss two ways in which the operation of the doctrine of issue estoppel can be unfair to a party. The first is when the original proceeding was unfair. The second occurs when it is unfair to use the results of a prior proceeding to bar a subsequent proceeding. They note that fairness in this context is a much more nuanced inquiry. As an example, injustice can arise when “there is a significant difference between the purposes, process or stakes involved in the two proceedings”: Penner, at para. 42. In my view, a similar analysis applies here in the related context of abuse of process: see also the discussion in C.U.P.E., at para. 53.
 The reference was a unique proceeding initiated by the Minister of Justice for the purpose of inquiring into a possible wrongful conviction. Mr. Phillion had the onus of proof to either show trial unfairness or meet the Palmer test in order to have the newly discovered evidence admitted. However, to do that, he did not need to prove anything about the police or Crown motive or intent behind their failure to disclose. His focus was on satisfying the court that his conviction had to be set aside.
 The motion judge acknowledged that at the reference, Mr. Phillion did not impugn the integrity of Mr. Lindsay or Detective McCombie, but she stated that the court would nevertheless have had to find improper conduct on their part in order to agree with Mr. Phillion that they should have disclosed the 1968 McCombie Report. She reasoned that the court implicitly found that the respondents did not act out of malice. Therefore, she held that although the appellant did not raise that issue on the reference, because of the court’s implicit finding, he is now precluded from raising their intent in a subsequent civil action.
 Contrary to the motion judge’s finding, in my view, the specific purpose of the reference and the questions it addressed indicate that the stakes, purpose and process were entirely different from this civil action. It would therefore be unfair to preclude the appellant from bringing a civil action on the basis that he is bound by an implicit finding made on the reference that there was no malice.
 Finally, and in any event, the findings made on the reference with respect to the conduct of the Crown and police did not consider any issues of negligence or a common law duty of care, as alleged in the statement of claim.
 In my view, the order dismissing the action as an abuse of process must be set aside. Such orders are only to be granted in the clearest cases and only when allowing the action to proceed would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. The motion judge erred in law in concluding that this was a case of relitigation and that it justified the application of the doctrine of abuse of process.
[A]buse of process may be established where: (1) the proceedings are oppressive or vexatious; and, (2) violate the fundamental principles of justice underlying the community’s sense of fair play and decency. The concepts of oppressiveness and vexatiousness underline the interest of the accused in a fair trial. But the doctrine evokes as well the public interest in a fair and just trial process and the proper administration of justice.
 As it relates to this case, the doctrine has been applied to prevent relitigation when the requirements of issue estoppel cannot be met (as is the case here, because the parties to the two proceedings are not the same), but when “allowing the litigation to proceed would nonetheless violate such principles as judicial economy, consistency, finality and the integrity of the administration of justice”: C.U.P.E., at para. 37. The court emphasized that the focus of the doctrine of abuse of process is less on the parties and more on “the integrity of judicial decision making as a branch of the administration of justice”: C.U.P.E., at para. 43.
 With respect to the motion judge, in finding that abuse of process should be applied in this case, in my view she fell into error in two respects. First, she failed to analyze the nature and purpose of the reference, including the specific question the court was asked to answer, in comparison with the issues raised in the civil claims. In that context, she erred in concluding that the issue whether the Trenton alibi had been discredited was a roadblock to the civil claim, and in taking an overly broad view of the findings of fact that she believed were made by the Court of Appeal on the reference.
 Second, in holding that on the reference the court made findings of fact that could not be revisited, she did not consider the effect of the remedy that the reference court ordered, which was a new criminal trial. At the new trial, all issues would have been open for decision by a jury, including, most importantly, whether the Trenton alibi had been discredited.
 Dealing with the first error, the statement of claim is broadly drafted. It seeks compensation in tort for the appellant’s conviction because information about an alibi was withheld from the defence. The court on the reference found that if the jury had been told about the Trenton alibi and about Detective McCombie’s evidence of how he discredited it, including the fact that the documentation and the car radio he took from Trenton had been lost by the time of the trial, they may have had a reasonable doubt about the appellant’s guilt.
 Accepting that at the time, the Crown did not have a positive obligation to disclose a discredited alibi, the police and Crown could arguably still be found liable to the appellant in tort. For example, had the detective not given misleading answers at the preliminary hearing about the extent of his investigation – answers that the Crown did not correct – the defence may well have learned about his 1968 report and his assertion that he later changed his view. Defence counsel would then have been able to explore the issue with the jury. As Moldaver J.A. stated, that information would have been “gold” in defence counsel’s hands.
. Plate v. Atlas Copco Canada Inc.
 In order to understand what the court was saying in para. 11, it is important to understand the context of the case.
 In Punko, the Supreme Court considered the application of the doctrine of issue estoppel in the context of a multi-issue criminal jury trial. A prolonged investigation of the Hells Angels by the RCMP identified a number of possible criminal offences. Some of those offences were within the jurisdiction of the provincial Crown; others were within the jurisdiction of the federal Crown.
 The provincial offences proceeded to trial first. Four accused were tried on a number of offences, including offences allegedly committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal organization (i.e. the Hells Angels). The four accused were found guilty of a number of offences, but acquitted on all the criminal organization counts.
 Meanwhile, federal prosecutors charged two of the four accused with various drug-related offences and, on some of the counts, it was again alleged that they had done so for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal organization (i.e. the Hells Angels). The two accused argued that the Crown was estopped from leading evidence that the Hells Angels was a criminal organization, because the issue had been decided by the jury in the provincial prosecution. In making this argument, the accused referred to certain findings made by the sentencing judge in the provincial proceedings.
 Criminal issue estoppel is a narrow doctrine. It precludes the Crown from re-litigating those facts that were decided in favor of the accused at the earlier trial: Punko, at para. 7; citing R. v. Mahalingan, 2008 SCC 63 (CanLII),  3 S.C.R. 316, at paras. 22, 31, 33. The resolution of an issue in favor of the accused must be a “necessary inference from the trial judge’s findings or from the fact of the acquittal”: Punko, at para. 7; Mahalingan, at para. 52. Where the prior proceeding was before a jury, the finding in favor of the accused must be logically necessary to the jury’s verdict of acquittal: Punko, at para. 8; Mahalingan, at para. 53.
 Against this backdrop, Deschamps J. held that although s. 724(2)(b) of the Criminal Code permits a judge imposing sentence after a jury trial to “find any other relevant fact that was disclosed by evidence at the trial to be proven, or hear evidence presented by either party with respect to the fact”, such findings cannot be relied on in support of issue estoppel: Punko, at para. 19. Since the merits of the case in a jury trial “pertain to the issues the jurors can take into consideration in reaching a verdict” and issue estoppel applies “only where the unanimity of the jury on an issue can be discerned through reasoning based on logical necessity”, a finding under s. 724(2)(b) cannot ground issue estoppel: Punko, at para. 11. Deschamps J.’s statement, at para. 11, that a finding made under s. 724(2)(b) “does not constitute a judicial determination on the merits” (emphasis in original) but rather a “judicial determination only for the purpose of sentencing” must be understood in this context.
 Understanding para. 11 in context, Punko does not preclude the respondent from seeking to rely on findings made under s. 724(2)(b) in the context of this civil action: a finding under s. 724(2)(b) – while not a finding “on the merits” or relating to the accused’s criminal liability – is still a judicial finding.
 Punko also underlines the point that findings made in sentencing proceedings must be understood in context – and, in particular, in light of the statutory scheme that governs such findings. That point is consistent with Malik, to which I now turn.
[A] judgment in a prior civil or criminal case is admissible (if considered relevant by the chambers judge) as evidence in subsequent interlocutory proceedings as proof of its findings and conclusions, provided the parties are the same or were themselves participants in the prior proceedings on similar or related issues. It will be for that judge to assess its weight. The prejudiced party or parties will have an opportunity to lead evidence to contradict it or lessen its weight (unless precluded from doing so by the doctrines of res judicata, issue estoppel or abuse of process).
 Although Malik considered the admissibility of a prior judgment in a subsequent interlocutory proceeding, its reasoning is not restricted to interlocutory proceedings: R. v. Jesse, 2012 SCC 21 (CanLII),  1 S.C.R. 716, at paras. 43-44. Malik has been applied in the context of final determinations on the merits in subsequent civil proceedings: see e.g. MacRury v. Keybase, 2017 NSCA 8 (CanLII), 411 D.L.R. (4th) 255; National Bank Financial Ltd v. Barthe Estate, 2015 NSCA 47 (CanLII), 359 N.S.R. (2d) 258; I.K.K. v. M.P., 2018 ONSC 2743 (CanLII), 8 R.F.L. (8th) 367; Deposit Insurance Corp. of Ontario v. Malette, 2014 ONSC 2845 (CanLII); and Kay v. Caverson, 2011 ONSC 4528 (CanLII), 5 C.L.R. (4th) 17, aff’d 2013 ONCA 220 (CanLII), 19 C.L.R. (4th) 213.
 In Binnie J.’s view, a “prior judicial decision between the same or related parties or participants on the same or related issues” is not “merely another controversy over hearsay or opinion evidence”: Malik, at para. 52. Rather, the “court’s earlier decision [is] a judicial pronouncement after the contending parties [have] been heard” having a “substantial effect on their legal rights”: Malik, at para. 52. In this vein, “the admissibility of prior civil or criminal judgments in subsequent civil proceedings, and the effect to be given to them, must be seen in the context of the need to promote efficiency in litigation and reduce its overall costs to the parties”: Malik, at para. 37. The rule in Hollington gave rise to unnecessary inefficiencies, and any resulting unfairness in admitting prior judicial findings into evidence could be addressed on a case-by-case basis: Malik, at para. 52.
The fraudulent scheme pleaded in the statement of claim is the same fraudulent scheme described by [the sentencing judge] in the Decision on Sentencing. The fiduciary duty of [the appellant] toward the [respondent] pleaded in the statement of claim arises out of the same relationship as the fiduciary duty about which [the sentencing judge] made findings of fact. There is very clearly a large overlap of issues between the civil and criminal proceedings even if all the issues in the one were not present in the other and vice versa.
[The appellant] was of course a party to both proceedings and was, as I have indicated, vitally concerned in the criminal proceedings. While [the respondent] was not a party to the criminal proceedings per se, [the respondent] was the victim of the crime being tried.
 I agree that the sentencing judge’s findings, including those made under s. 724(2)(b) of the Criminal Code, were admissible on the summary judgment motion.
 The sentencing judge’s findings were relevant to the issues raised on the summary judgment motion. The appellant (as the criminal accused) and the respondent (as the complainant) were “parties” or “participants” in the prior criminal proceedings, which raised similar or related issues. Malik directs that lack of identity of issue goes to weight, not admissibility: at para. 43. At the sentencing proceedings, the extent of the appellant’s breach of trust was a relevant consideration, pursuant to s. 718.2(a)(iii) of the Criminal Code. It is in relation to this factor that the sentencing judge found the appellant to have breached a fiduciary duty to the respondent. Thus, the fact that the issues in the criminal proceedings were not identical to those in the civil proceeding did not operate as a bar to admissibility of the sentencing judge’s findings relative to the respondent’s breach of fiduciary duty.
. Vanden Bussche Irrigation & Equipment Limited v. Kejay Investments Inc.
 The court in Ashak further noted at paras. 8-11 that while a court has the power to make binding determinations of fact under rule 20.05 when dismissing a motion for summary judgment if a court proposes to exercise that power the motion judge should say so and the formal order should reflect that. A similar power to make a binding determination of law likely exists under rule 20.04(4), but again, if the motion judge purports to exercise that power, the judge should specifically invoke and reference the rule and the legal determination made should form part of the formal order.
 Since the decision in Ashak, there has been jurisprudence from our court explaining that in some cases to determine whether an order is truly final or interlocutory one needs to look at the reasons and determine whether a defendant has been deprived of a substantive right or defence that could resolve all or part of the proceedings: Walchuk, Estate Trustee and Houghton,  O.J. No. 6492, at para. 14.
 In this case, the motion judge did not specifically invoke and reference the rule giving him the power to make a binding determination nor does the order taken out reflect any determination on the issue of the limitation period. Although the limitation period defence was the only issue before the motion judge and he purported to decide it, he also refused to grant summary judgment on the claim to the plaintiff and sent the matter on for trial. It does not appear that there would be any reason for him to do so unless he was of the opinion that there was a genuine issue requiring a trial respecting the limitation period.
 In the result, I have concluded that the motion judge’s determination that the limitation period had not run is not binding and is not a final order. Accordingly, were I to grant leave to file a notice of appeal, this court would not have jurisdiction to entertain the appeal and for this reason the motion is dismissed.
 Of course, the doctrine of stare decisis is no longer completely inflexible. As the Court noted in Bedford, the precedential value of a judgment may be questioned “if new legal issues are raised as a consequence of significant developments in the law, or if there is a change in the circumstances or evidence that fundamentally shifts the parameters of the debate” (para. 42). Where, on the other hand, the legal issue remains the same and arises in a similar context, the precedent still represents the law and must be followed by the courts (Bedford, at para. 46).
 Although relatively uncommon in Quebec civil procedure, the mechanism for dismissing actions at a preliminary stage on the basis of stare decisis is similar to the res judicata exception (art. 165(1) C.C.P.). Under both of them, the legal issues raised by the applicant must already have been clearly resolved by the courts. However, unlike res judicata, stare decisis does not necessarily require that the dispute be between the same parties. What must be established is that the issue is the same and that the questions it raises have already been answered by a higher court whose judgment has the authority of res judicata.
[translation] In this context, the manufacturers’ argument that this case is not res judicata, because Imperial was not decided by a court of competent civil law jurisdiction or because strict identity of parties, cause and object is not established, does not appear to me to be determinative. I see no need for further discussion of the distinctions the manufacturers raise with respect to these identities of parties, cause and object, which in their view refute the AGC’s res judicata argument. In my opinion, the appropriate principle to apply to resolve the issue is instead stare decisis.
The Superior Court should have held on the basis of stare decisis that it was bound by Imperial. The Supreme Court, by ruling as it did on the issue of the AGC’s immunity in relation to the course or principle of action challenged by the manufacturers, had in a sense barred the manufacturers’ actions in warranty by rendering them unfounded in law, even if the alleged facts were assumed to be true.
 In our opinion, it is clear that the unions’ action has no reasonable chance of success. On the basis of stare decisis, it is apparent that their main argument that the Consolidated Revenue Fund was indebted to the Employment Insurance Account is unfounded, and this conclusion dictates the outcome of the case. As a result, this Court’s decision in CSN v. Canada provides a complete, certain and final solution to the entire dispute that the unions are trying to revive. Their action was therefore properly dismissed by Perrault J. under art. 165(4) C.C.P.
Waiver occurs when one party to a contract (or proceeding) takes steps that amount to foregoing reliance on some known right or defect in the performance of the other party. It will be found only where the evidence demonstrates that the party waiving had (1) a full knowledge of the deficiency that might be relied on and (2) an unequivocal and conscious intention to abandon the right to rely on it. The intention to relinquish the right must be communicated. Communication can be formal or informal and it may be inferred from conduct. The overriding consideration in each case is whether one party communicated a clear intention to waive a right to the other party.
The principles of promissory estoppel are well settled. The party relying on the doctrine must establish that the other party has, by words or conduct, made a promise or assurance which was intended to affect their legal relationship and to be acted on. Furthermore, the representee must establish that, in reliance on the representation, he acted on it or in some way changed his position.
 The promise can be inferred from the circumstances, but must be unambiguous: see Engineered Homes Ltd. v. Mason, 1983 CanLII 142 (SCC),  1 S.C.R. 641.
 Promissory estoppel is equitable relief. Therefore, the party seeking to invoke it must show that its “past record in the transaction is clean”: see Toronto (City) v. Polai, 1969 CanLII 339 (ON CA),  1 O.R. 483 (C.A.), at pp. 493-494; see also Servello v. Servello, 2014 ONSC 5035 (CanLII), 245 A.C.W.S. (3d) 330, at paras. 107-108, 117.
 Bastarache J. set out the following criteria for the application of the doctrine, at para. 59: (1) the parties' dealings must have been based on a shared assumption of fact or law: estoppel requires manifest representation by statement or conduct creating a mutual assumption. Nevertheless, estoppel can arise out of silence (impliedly); (2) a party must have conducted itself, i.e. acted in reliance on such shared assumption, its actions resulting in a change of its legal position; (3) it must also be unjust or unfair to allow one of the parties to resile or depart from the common assumption. The party seeking to establish estoppel therefore has to prove that detriment will be suffered if the other party is allowed to resile from the assumption since there has been a change from the presumed position.
In Immeubles Jacques Robitaille inc. v Québec (SCC, 2014), a regulatory offences case, the Supreme Court of Canada considers how and when estoppel operates on a public authority as a defence. The defendant appealed from a Quebec conviction for operating a commercial parking lot contrary to zoning by-laws, pointing to the municipality's prior collection of commercial-rate taxes, erection of a public sign directing people to the lot, and several other instances of apparent condonement of the illegal use.
 In the public law context, promissory estoppel requires proof of a clear and unambiguous promise made to a citizen by a public authority in order to induce the citizen to perform certain acts. In addition, the citizen must have relied on the promise and acted on it by changing his or her conduct (Mount Sinai Hospital Center v. Quebec (Minister of Health and Social Services), 2001 SCC 41 (CanLII), 2001 SCC 41,  2 S.C.R. 281, at paras. 45‑46 (“Mount Sinai”), quoting Maracle v. Travellers Indemnity Co. of Canada, 1991 CanLII 58 (SCC),  2 S.C.R. 50; J.‑P. Villaggi, L’Administration publique québécoise et le processus décisionnel: Des pouvoirs au contrôle administratif et judiciaire (2005), at p. 329).
 However, the doctrine of estoppel must yield in the public law context to an overriding public interest and may not be invoked to prevent the application of an express legislative provision (Mount Sinai, at para. 47; St. Ann’s Island Shooting and Fishing Club Ltd. v. The King, 1950 CanLII 28 (SCC),  S.C.R. 211, at p. 220).
 Furthermore, although the doctrine of estoppel has been applied against public authorities in the past, the promises made by the representatives of the authorities in those cases were not unlawful, or were actually consistent with a statutory discretion (Re Multi‑Malls Inc. and Minister of Transportation and Communications 1976 CanLII 623 (ON CA), (1976), 14 O.R. (2d) 49 (C.A.); Sous‑ministre du Revenu du Québec v. Transport Lessard (1976) Ltée,  R.D.J. 502 (C.A.); Aurchem Exploration Ltd. v. Canada reflex, (1992), 91 D.L.R. (4th) 710; Kenora (Town) Hydro Electric Commission v. Vacationland Dairy Co‑operative Ltd., 1994 CanLII 105 (SCC),  1 S.C.R. 80).
 The penal recourse exists to enable a municipality to enforce zoning by‑laws, which are adopted to ensure harmonious development of the urban area (M.‑A. LeChasseur, Le zonage en droit québécois, (2006), at p. 1). Moreover, [translation] “zoning is established for the benefit of each of the various owners in a zone, and unlawful use by one owner is generally at the expense of the rights of the others” (Mascouche (Ville) v. Thiffault, 1996 CanLII 6503 (QC CA), 1996 CanLII 6503, at p. 3 (Que. C.A.)). In my opinion, the public interest must be taken into account in adopting a zoning by‑law, and the by‑law’s penal provisions ensure that it is complied with. Given how explicit this provision is, the doctrine of estoppel is of no assistance to the appellant.
 The application of public law promissory estoppel could force a public authority to exercise a discretion in a particular way (Villaggi, at p. 329). The adoption or amendment of a municipal by‑law generally falls within the discretion of the municipal council (J. Hétu and Y. Duplessis, Droit Municipal: Principes généraux et contentieux (2nd ed. (loose‑leaf)), vol. 1, at para. 11.25; Laurentide Motels Ltd. v. Beauport (City), 1989 CanLII 81 (SCC),  1 S.C.R. 705, at p. 722). However, the same is not true of ensuring compliance with municipal by‑laws: [translation] “Although it is generally agreed that municipal authorities have a broad discretion in exercising their power to adopt by‑laws, the situation is quite different when it comes to the enforcement of by‑laws: at that stage, any discretion must give way to the principle of equality before the law” (Loblaw Québec ltée v. Alimentation Gérard Villeneuve (1998) inc., 2000 CanLII 9893 (QC CA),  R.J.Q. 2498, at para. 79 (C.A.), citing City of Verdun v. Sun Oil Co., 1951 CanLII 53 (SCC),  1 S.C.R. 222).
 Although a municipality is not under an obligation to do everything it can to ensure compliance with its by‑laws and cannot be compelled to enforce them (s. 576 of the Cities and Towns Act; Hétu and Duplessis, at para. 8.203), neither can it grant citizens a right to non‑conforming uses on its territory. The authorization by a municipal employee or elected official of a use that violates a provision of a by‑law cannot create rights or oust the applicable standards set out in the by‑law (Hétu and Duplessis, at para. 8.207; Sainte‑Barbe (Municipalité de la paroisse) v. Cadieux, 2004 CanLII 20665 (QC CS), 2004 CanLII 20665, at para. 66 (Que. Sup. Ct.)).
 Insofar as the appellant in the case at bar is arguing that the substance of the promise was an authorization to violate the zoning by‑law (a “promise” that flowed from the respondent’s actions or from a tolerance on its part), the only possible conclusion is that such a promise cannot lead to the application of public law estoppel. Since a municipality cannot deviate from its zoning by‑laws or authorize such a deviation (with the exception of minor exemptions under s. 145.1 of the Act respecting land use planning and development), it cannot be forced to do so by means of the doctrine of estoppel.
[translation] The effect of “promissory estoppel” is to prevent an authority from deviating from its undertakings. However, there is an important qualification to this doctrine, namely that the authority in question may not make undertakings that are contrary to law or to the public interest. This is what the Supreme Court held in Mount Sinai Hospital Center v. Quebec (Minister of Health and Social Services) . . . .
In my opinion, therefore, the doctrine of “promissory estoppel” would not have been available if no exception had been applicable. If a citizen is subject to the By‑law, a municipality must [require that it be complied with].
 Analogies with other penal offence schemes are not without relevance in this regard. For example, a public authority cannot be precluded from issuing a statement of offence against an individual who allegedly contravened the highway safety code on the basis that the authority has never done so before or that some of its representatives suggested to the individual that his or her conduct was acceptable. Strict liability regulatory offences are adopted in the public interest (R. v. Sault Ste. Marie, 1978 CanLII 11 (SCC),  2 S.C.R. 1299), are specific and have the force of law — including against the public authority that adopted and enforces them. The doctrine of public law estoppel cannot prevent their being applied.
 In short, the doctrine of estoppel cannot be relied on as a defence in the case of a regulatory offence. It is well established that this doctrine cannot be raised in a public law context in the face of a clear legislative provision. In the instant case, the by‑law is clear, and it creates a strict liability offence on grounds related to the public interest and does not authorize the municipality to consent to a non‑conforming use.
 Nor, it should be added — although it is not necessary to do so to decide this appeal, which arises in a penal law context — can estoppel be raised as a defence in a civil proceeding relating to an express provision of a by‑law in which a non‑conforming use is at issue. The principle that estoppel cannot be raised in the face of an express legislative provision is valid both in the penal law context and in that of a civil proceeding.

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