Source: https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/410/752
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 13:12:44+00:00

Document:
Held: New York's delayed-enrollment scheme did not violate petitioners' constitutional rights. Pp. 756-762.
(a) Section 186 did not absolutely prohibit petitioners from voting in the 1972 primary, but merely imposed a time deadline on their enrollment, which they chose to disregard. Pp. 756-758.
(b) The statute does not deprive voters of their right under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to associate with the party of their choice or subsequently to change to another party, provided that the statutory time limit for doing so is observed. Pp. 758-759.
(c) The cut-off date for enrollment, which occurs about eight months before a presidential, and 11 months before a nonpresidential, primary, is not arbitrary when viewed in light of the legitimate state purpose of avoiding disruptive party raiding. Pp. 760-761.
The petitioners argue that, through § 186, New York disenfranchised them by refusing to permit them to vote in the June, 1972, primary election on the ground that they had not enrolled in a political party at least 30 days prior to the preceding general election. More specifically, they contend that § 186 has operated to preclude newly registered voters, such as themselves, from participating in the primary election of the party of their choice. According to the petitioners, New York has no "compelling state interest" in its delayed-enrollment scheme so as to justify such disenfranchisement, and hence the scheme must fall. In support of this argument, the petitioners rely on several cases in which this Court has struck down, as violative of the Equal Protection Clause, state statutes that disenfranchised certain groups of people. Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1966); Kramer v. Union [p757] School District, 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969); Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419 (1970); City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
The only remaining question, then, is whether the time limitation imposed by § 186 is so severe as itself to constitute an unconstitutionally onerous burden on the petitioners' exercise of the franchise or on their freedom of political association. As the dissent acknowledges, the State is certainly justified in imposing some reasonable cut-off point for registration or party enrollment, which citizens must meet in order to participate in the next election. Post at 765. Hence, our inquiry must be whether the particular deadline before us here is so justified.
[T]he notion of raiding, its potential disruptive impact, and its advantages to one side are not likely to be as apparent to the majority of enrolled voters, nor to receive as close attention from the professional politician just prior to a November general election, when concerns are elsewhere, as would be true during the "primary season," which, for the country as a whole, runs from early February until the end of June. Few persons have the effrontery or the foresight to enroll as, say, "Republicans" so that they can vote in a primary some seven months hence, when they full well intend to vote "Democratic" in only a few weeks. And it would be the rare politician who could successfully urge his constituents to vote for him or his party in the upcoming general election while, at the same time, urging a cross-over enrollment for the purpose of upsetting the opposite party's primary. Yet the operation of section 186 requires such deliberate inconsistencies if large-scale raiding were to be effective in New York. Because of the statute, it is all but impossible for any group to engage in raiding.
Allowing enrollment any time after [p762] the general election would not have the same deterrent effect on raiding, for it would not put the voter in the unseemly position of asking to be enrolled in one party while at the same time intending to vote immediately for another.
1. See N.Y.Election Law § 131. The State's first comprehensive primary law was enacted in 1911.
All enrollment blanks contained in the enrollment box shall remain in such box, and the box shall not be opened nor shall any of the blanks be removed therefrom until the Tuesday following the day of general election in that year. Such box shall then be opened by the board of elections and the blanks contained therein shall be removed therefrom by the board, and the names of the party designated by each voter under such declaration, provided such party continues to be a party, as defined in this law shall be entered by the board, opposite the name of such voter in the appropriate column of the two copies of the register containing enrollment numbers for the election district in which such voter resides. . . . Such enrollment shall be complete before the succeeding first day of February in each year.
Application for special enrollment, transfer or correction of enrollment. 1. At any time after January first and before the thirtieth day preceding the next fall primary, except during the thirty days preceding a spring primary, and except on the day of a primary, a voter may enroll with a party, transfer his enrollment after moving within a county, and under certain circumstances, correct his enrollment, as hereinafter in this section provided.
2. A voter may enroll with a party if he did not enroll on the day of the annual enrollment (a) because he became of age after the preceding general election, or (b) because he was naturalized subsequent to ninety days prior to the preceding general election, or (c) because he did not have the necessary residential qualifications as provided by section one hundred fifty, to enable him to enroll in the preceding year, or (d) because of being or having been at all previous times for enrollment a member of the armed forces of the United States as defined in section three hundred three, or (e) because of being the spouse, child or parent of such member of the armed forces and being absent from his or her county of residence at all previous times for enrollment by reason of accompanying or being with such member of the armed forces, or (f) because he was an inmate or patient of a veterans' bureau hospital located outside the state of New York at all previous times for enrollment, or the spouse, parent or child of such inmate or patient accompanying or being with such inmate or patient at such times, or (g) because he was incapacitated by illness during the previous enrollment period thereby preventing him from enrolling.
[e]ach of these plaintiffs could have registered and enrolled on or before October 2nd, 1971, the last date of registration for the November 1971 elections. They each did not do so.
5. Although the June primary election has been completed and the petitioners will be eligible to vote in the next scheduled New York primary, this case is not moot, since the question the petitioners raise is "‘capable of repetition, yet evading review.'" Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 333 n. 2 (1972); Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814, 816 (1969); Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911).
6. Not only would the petitioners have been eligible for the 1972 primary, but, since they were eligible in 1971 for special enrollment under § 187, they could have, if they had timely registered and enrolled, participated in the September 14, 1971, primary.
7. The District Court held that the petitioners' failure to enroll before the cut-off date was not truly voluntary, because it was not done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences. But this argument could well be made any time a State imposes a time limitation or cut-off point for registration or enrollment. The petitioners do not claim that they were unaware of New York's deadline for enrollment.
[t]he Court apparently views this statute as a mere "time deadline" on petitioners' enrollment . . . that postpones through the next primary, rather than denies altogether petitioners' voting and associational rights.
Post at 766. And it argues that our decisions "have never required a permanent ban on the exercise of voting and associational rights before a constitutional breach is incurred." Post at 766-767. But the dissent mischaracterizes our view of § 186. We do not uphold the statute on the ground that it is merely a prohibition on voting in one particular primary, rather than a permanent ban on voting. That is neither our point nor the effect of the law. The point is that the statute did not prohibit the petitioners from voting in any election, including the 1972 primary, had they chosen to meet the deadline established by the law.
9. The petitioners also argue that § 186 establishes a durational residence requirement unconstitutional under Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972), and violates the right to travel under Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). Since the exemption in § 187 applies only to persons whose new residence is within the same county as their old residence, persons who arrive in New York State or move from one county to another after the cut-off date, and deposit their enrollment blank at that time, are barred by the delayed-enrollment scheme from voting in the next primary election. According to the petitioners, this constitutes an unconstitutional durational residence requirement, and is violative of the 1970 amendments to the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 84 Stat. 316, 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-1.
[i]n requiring that the state use to a proper end the means designed to impinge minimally upon fundamental rights, the Constitution does not require that the state choose ineffectual means.
It is important at the outset to place New York's cut-off date for party enrollment in perspective. It prevents prospective voters from registering for a party primary some eight months before a presidential primary and 11 months before a nonpresidential one. [n1] The Court recognizes, as it must, that the period between the enrollment and the primary election is a "lengthy" one. [n2] Indeed, no other State has imposed upon voters previously unaffiliated with any party restrictions which even approach in severity those of New York. [n3] And New York [p764] concedes that only one other State -- Kentucky -- has imposed as stringent a primary registration deadline on persons with prior party affiliations. [n4] Confronted with such a facially burdensome requirement, I find the Court's opinion unconvincing.
The right of all persons to vote, once the State has decided to make it available to some, becomes a basic one under the Constitution. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Kramer v. Union School District, 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965). Self-expression through the public ballot equally with one's peers is the essence of a democratic society. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). A citizen without a vote is to a large extent one without a voice in decisions which may profoundly affect him and his family. Whatever his disagreement may be with the judgments of public officials, the citizen should never be given just cause to think that he was denied an equal right to elect them.
If the cut-off date were a less severe one, I could agree. Certainly, the State is justified in imposing a reasonable registration cut-off prior to any primary or general election, beyond which a citizen's failure to register may be presumed a negligent or willful act forfeiting his right to vote in a particular election. But it is difficult to perceive any persuasive basis for a registration or party enrollment deadline eight to 11 months prior to election. Failure to comply with such an extreme deadline can hardly be used to justify denial of a fundamental constitutional right. Numerous prior decisions impose on us the obligation to protect the continuing availability of the franchise for all citizens, not to sanction its prolonged deferment or deprivation. Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1880); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964); Reynolds v. Sims, supra; Carrington v. Rash, supra; Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Kramer v. Union School District, supra; Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969); Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419 (1970); City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972); Dunn v. Blumstein, supra.
The majority excuses the challenged statute because it does not "absolutely" disenfranchise petitioners or impose any absolute ban on their freedom of association. [n6] [p766] The State likewise contends this is "not a disenfranchising statute." [n7] The Court apparently views this statute as a mere "time deadline" on petitioners' enrollment that disadvantages no identifiable class and that postpones through the next primary, rather than denies altogether, petitioners' voting and associational rights. [n8] I cannot agree. Deferment of a right, especially one as sensitive and essential as the exercise of the first duty of citizenship, can be tantamount to its denial. And any statute which imposes for eight or 11 months an absolute freeze on party enrollment and the consequent right to vote totally disfranchises a class of persons who, for quite legitimate reasons, decide to register closer than eight months to the primary date and those who, for equally legitimate reasons, wish to choose or alter party affiliation. Our decisions, moreover, have never required [p767] a permanent ban on the exercise of voting and associational rights before a constitutional breach is incurred. Rather, they have uniformly recognized that any serious burden or infringement on such "constitutionally protected activity" is sufficient to establish a constitutional violation, Dunn v. Blumstein, supra, at 343; NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963); Reynolds v. Sims, supra, at 561-562.
The majority does not identify the standard of scrutiny it applies to the New York statute. We are told only that the cut-off date is "not an arbitrary time limit unconnected to any important state goal"; [n9] that it is "tied to a particularized legitimate purpose, and is in no sense invidious or arbitrary." [n10] The Court does not explain why this formulation was chosen, what precedents support it, or how and in what contexts it is to be applied. Such nebulous promulgations are bound to leave the lower courts and state legislatures in doubt and confusion as to how we will approach future significant burdens on the right to vote and to associate freely with the party of one's choice.
[T]he right of suffrage is a fundamental matter in a free and democratic society. Especially since the right to exercise the franchise in a free and unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil [p768] and political rights, any alleged infringement of the right of citizens to vote must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized.
Reynolds v. Sims, supra, at 561-562. See also Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
if a challenged statute grants the right to vote to some citizens and denies the franchise to others, "the Court must determine whether the exclusions are necessary to promote a compelling state interest."
Dunn v. Blumstein, supra, at 337, quoting Kramer v. Union School District, supra, at 627 (emphasis added in Dunn). See also Cipriano v. City of Houma, supra, at 704; City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, supra, at 205, 209. Likewise, the Court has asserted that "the right of individuals to associate for the advancement of political beliefs" is "among our most precious freedoms," Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. at 30, and must be carefully protected from state encroachment. NAACP v. Alabama, supra; Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960); Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Committee, 372 U.S. 539 (1963).
Political parties in this country traditionally have been characterized by a fluidity and overlap of philosophy and membership. And citizens generally declare or alter party affiliation for reasons quite unconnected with any premeditated intention to disrupt or frustrate the plans of a party with which they are not in sympathy. Citizens customarily choose a party and vote in its primary simply because it presents candidates and issues more responsive to their immediate concerns and aspirations. Such candidates or issues often are not apparent eight to 11 months before a primary. That a citizen should be absolutely precluded so far in advance from voting in a party primary in response to a sympathetic candidate, a new or meaningful issue, or changing party philosophies in his State, runs contrary to the fundamental rights of [p770] personal choice and expression which voting in this country was designed to serve.
cannot choose means which unnecessarily burden or restrict constitutionally protected activity. Statutes affecting constitutional rights must be drawn with "precision," NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963); United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 265 (1967), and must be "tailored" to serve their legitimate objectives. Shapiro v. Thompson, supra, at 631. And if there are other, reasonable ways to achieve those goals with a lesser burden on constitutionally protected activity, a State may not choose the way of greater interference. If it acts at all, it must choose "less drastic means." Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
The Court indicates that placing the enrollment deadline before the preceding general election serves well the state interest in discouraging party "raiding." [n12] This fails to address the critical question of whether that interest may be protected adequately by less severe measures. [p771] A foreshortening of the challenged period in this case would not leave the party structure of New York helpless and vulnerable to "raiding" activities. Other States, with varied and complex party systems, have maintained them successfully without the advanced enrollment deadline imposed by New York.
Ante at 757, 758. See also ante at 762, where the Court refers to § 186 as merely imposing "a legitimate time limitation on their [petitioners'] enrollment, which they chose to disregard."
Section 186 of New York's Election Law, however, is quite different. It did not absolutely disenfranchise the class to which the petitioners belong -- newly registered voters who were eligible to enroll in a party before the previous general election. Rather, the statute merely imposed a time deadline on their enrollment, which they had to meet in order to participate in the next primary.
For the same reason, we reject the petitioners' argument that § 186 violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment right of free association with the political party of their choice. Since they could have enrolled in a party in time to participate in the June, 1972, primary, § 186 did not constitute a ban on their freedom of association, but merely a time limitation on when they had to act in order to participate in their chosen party's next primary.
Ante at 757 and n. 6, supra.

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