Source: https://veteranclaims.net/2010/08/01/cohen-v-brown-no-94-661-ptsd-10-vet-app/
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 22:32:52+00:00

Document:
military records, and all pertinent medical and lay evidence. See 38 U.S.
C. 1154(a); 38 C.F.R. 3.303(a), 3.304(f) (1996); see also Hayes v.
Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts 43, at 292 (5th ed.
reason-or-bases error with respect to the PTSD diagnoses.
Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535, 538, 539-40 (1959), and Service v.
Dulles, 354 U.S. 363 (1957)).
on independent medical evidence providing a basis for any such rejection.
in Vietnam, see Lizaso v. Brown, 5 Vet.App. 380, 386 (1993); Ohland v.
Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 147, 149-50 (1991); Hatlestad v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.
Karen L. Tomlinson for the appellant.
Counsel, were on the brief, for the appellee.
Before NEBEKER, Chief Judge, and FARLEY and STEINBERG, Judges.
Judge, filed a concurring opinion.
remand the matter for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
occupational specialty (MOS) was power generator equipment mechanic. R.
and given an honorable discharge. R. at 24.
casualties; (4) convoys; and (5) many hours of work and lack of sleep.
One night in early June we were hit with many mortars and rockets.
boy who had been taken away by military police for questioning. R. at 84.
in nightmares and flashbacks over the past 20 years. R. at 86.
nightmares also are dated as beginning at that time.
reducing his rank down to Private First Class from that of Sergeant.
suffering from symptoms of his past illness at that time.
and symptoms since his Vietnam experience.” R. at 99. It was Dr.
PTSD; and dysthymia with suicidal tendencies. R. at 101.
and he had been assigned to work as a heavy-equipment mechanic on convoys.
his third day in country. There were mortars from Marble Mountain.
armored personnel carriers. There were periods of sniper fire. . . .
jeopardized his life resulting in dissociation and amnesia.” Ibid. Mr.
with [PTSD]” and that his diagnostic impression “totally concurs with Dr.
PTSD, “chronic, delayed type”. R. at 129-30.
in order to attempt to document this type of incident.
and documented. . . .
An October 1990 RO decision denied service connection for PTSD. R.
at 157-58. In December 1990, the veteran filed a Notice of Disagreement (R.
memory of . . . what happened”, including how “I got back to my unit” (R.
. . . the attack, it was more of a harassment procedure.” R. at 185-86.
those people. R. at 187-88. In an April 1991 written statement, Mr.
October 1990 RO decision. R. at 198.
submitted evidence on appeal. R. at 218; see 38 C.F.R. 20.1304(c) (1996).
the leg and that was it”. R. at 226.
ready to go to the bunker and it just bothered me.
benefits because of his unemployability due to PTSD. R. at 247-48.
or stressors during service” (R. at 7).
Supplemental Record filed on April 16, 1996.
an in-service injury or disease and a current disability. See Caluza v.
Brown, 7 Vet.App. 498, 506 (1995), aff’d per curiam, 78 F.3d 604 (Fed. Cir.
by the Court under 38 U.S.C. 7261(a)(1). See Grivois v. Brown, 6 Vet.
App. 136, 139 (1994); Grottveit, supra.
current PTSD disability. See Caluza, Heuer, and King, all supra.
duty, was subjected to frequent mortar and rocket attacks (supported by Mr.
Caluza to well ground a PTSD claim.
to his claim. Although he was then entitled, pursuant to 38 C.F.R. 3.
characterized it as one to reopen.
1. Requisite elements of PTSD claim. VA regulations in 38 C.F.R.
evidence of the claimed in[-]service stressor.
38 C.F.R. 3.304(f) (1996) (boldface-italic emphasis added).
Moreau v. Brown, 9 Vet.App. 389, 394-95 (1996).
while his case was on appeal to the BVA. See Karnas v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.
Secretary . . . to do otherwise and the Secretary did so”); Fugere v.
Secretary cannot revoke that provision); see also Austin v. Brown, 6 Vet.
those additional requirements may not be applied against the claimant.
Ibid. They are not for further consideration and should not be used.
third edition, revised) and again in 1994 (DSM IV, the fourth edition).
Schedule for Rating Disabilities pertaining to mental disorders. 61 Fed.
Reg. 52,695 (Oct. 8, 1996); see also 60 Fed. Reg. 54,826 (Oct. 26, 1995).
requirements that are more restrictive than the applicable PTSD C.F.R.
regulation, they cannot be applied in a manner adverse to the veteran.
auxiliary role, as described below.
M21-1, 7.46(e) (1995), provision quoted in above parenthetical); VA Gen.
emphasis added); see also 38 C.F.R. 4.2, 19.9 (1996); cf. Massey v.
outside rating criteria is legal error).
physical violence.” DSM-III-R at 247-48; Zarycki, 6 Vet.App. at 99.
adjudication under DSM-IV differ substantially from those in DSM-III-R.
psychological] injury from the defendant’s conduct”).
applicable VA regulatory provisions discussed above. See Colvin v.
Caluza, supra; Gabrielson v. Brown, 7 Vet.App. 36, 39-40 (1994); Gilbert v.
Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 49, 57 (1990).
stressor for purposes of supporting a diagnosis of PTSD. Zarycki, 6 Vet.
was caught in mortar fire “numerous” times or on only two occasions. Id.
two cases would not apply to the consideration of the DSM-IV criteria.
67) “but may be obtained from other sources”. Manual M21-1, Part VI, 7.
46.c (1995); see Moreau, 9 Vet.App. at 394-95; Doran v. Brown, 6 Vet.App.
limit the source of the required “credible supporting evidence”.
that are more favorable to the veteran. See Manual M21-1, Part VI, 7.
examination simply cannot be supported by the evidence”. R. at 13-14.
sufficient stressor to evoke PTSD”. Ibid.
of any material evidence favorable to the veteran. See Caluza, 7 Vet.App.
disability will be a fully informed one”)).
experience or an unusual experience, is not warranted in this case.
Accordingly, the Court will reverse the BVA decision in this respect.
to involve “intense fear, helplessness, or horror”. DSM-IV at 428. Dr.
over the harassing mortar fire and his inability to retaliate”. R. at 127.
stressors were related to combat.
was no indication in record that his alleged stressors were so related).
pursuant to section 1154(b). This Court has held that, under 38 U.S.C.
8 Vet.App. 246, 255-56 (1995) (Steinberg, J., separate views).
be tautological to conclude that it did. See Irby v. Brown, 6 Vet.App.
service stressors actually occurred would be required for him to prevail.
See 38 C.F.R. 3.304(f); Moreau, 9 Vet.App. at 394-95 Doran, 6 Vet.App.
service connection. See Moreau, 9 Vet.App. at 395; Doran, supra.
being taken away by military police. R. at 82, 83-84, 183-87, 224-37.
official records that reflected no personnel casualties. R. at 12-13.
that time, he reported his unit was only involved in one firefight.
light of the short period of time involved.
R. at 13 (emphasis added).
attacks while on guard and convoy duty and frequently while with his unit.
Dr. Robinson in July 1989 (R. at 98), in the history he provided to Mr.
Young in January 1990 (R. at 126-27), in the history he provided to Dr.
been established on this record. See 38 C.F.R. 3.304(f).
veteran’s claim for PTSD service connection was well grounded (see part II.
rocketed or mortared during the time he served there”. R. at 150.
where[,] and when’ of each stressor.” R. at 151.
veteran asserts the air base was under attack.
in the Board’s decision. See 38 U.S.C. 5107(a), 7104(d)(1).
who were killed, he “could see them through the gate” (R. at 228).
. 7261(b); Edenfield v. Brown, 8 Vet.App. 384, 390-91 (1995) (en banc).
erroneous”); Gilbert, 1 Vet.App. at 52-53.
service stressor in order for service connection for PTSD to be awarded.
it unclear to what extent Dr. Robinson (private psychiatrist), Mr.
landing stressor) — as the source of the veteran’s current symptoms (R.
contributed to the veteran’s current PTSD symptoms.
between current symptomatology and a particular in-service stressor.
separate the effects of the conditions, VA regulations at 38 C.F.R.  3.
claim based on an adequate statement of reasons or bases under 38 U.S.C.
set forth above regarding the rocket-and-mortar-attack stressor.
statement of reasons or bases. See 38 U.S.C. 5107(a), 7104(d)(1).
Williams (Willie) v. Brown, 4 Vet.App. 270, 273-74 (1993).
undisputed testimony that he had been assigned to guard and convoy duty (R.
the veteran’s current PTSD symptoms. See Williams, supra; Sheets v.
the PTSD diagnostic criteria by VA’s adoption, in 38 C.F.R. 4.125 and 4.
Veterans’ Benefits Improvements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-446, 302, 108 Stat.
provide for “expeditious treatment” for claims remanded by BVA or Court).
to submit additional evidence and argument” on the remanded claim.
on which notice of the new Board final decision is mailed to the appellant.
REVERSED IN PART; VACATED IN PART; REMANDED.
stressors actually took place, substantially as recounted by the veteran.
aff’d per curiam, 78 F.3d 604 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (table).
regulation, but the new regulation amends 38 C.F.R. 4.125 and 4.126.
Manual M21-1 continues to apply the criteria set forth in the DSM-III-R.
must receive the benefit of the most favorable version. See Karnas v.
Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 308, 312-12 (1991).
now a clinical determination for the examining mental health professional.
the examining medical professionals’ conclusions that Mr. Previous HitCohenNext Hit has PTSD.
stressor and the veteran’s current PTSD, no further inquiry need be made.
specific information about his being fired upon at the Da Nang air base.

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