Source: https://www.ulcc.ca/en/annual-meetings/412-1996-ottawa-annual/civil-section-documents/1096-interprovincial-enforcement-of-non-money-judgements-1996?tmpl=component&amp;print=1&amp;page=
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 13:06:46+00:00

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Recent judgments of the Supreme Court of Canada1 have given judicial weight to the view that it is not appropriate to regard different provinces within a federal arrangement as truly distinct international entities.2 There are at least two related foundations to this argument. First, to maintain obstacles to enforcement of judgments and the flow of capital and labour across provincial boundaries is not in the spirit of federalism. Second, the common law provinces share a common legal heritage, and to look on a judgment of another superior court with the same distrustful eye that one looks at a judgment of a truly foreign court denies this common heritage.
These developments have occurred in the context of the enforcement of money judgments between Canadian provinces and they have stimulated a number of responses. Perhaps the most significant of these was the development, by the Uniform Law Conference of Canada, of the Uniform Enforcement of Canadian Judgments Act [UECJA] which was settled in 1991. Work on it actually pre-dated the decision in Morguard3 but that decision highlighted the necessity of developing rational uniform legislation in this area. Briefly stated, UECJA provides a mechanism under which a court in one province may register a judgment for a defined sum of money rendered by a court of another province, allowing the court in the registering province to treat the judgment as its own. This relieves the judgment creditor of many of the legal hurdles that would be confronted had the judgment been enforced by a fresh law suit on it.
The arguments and policies which support the creation of machinery to facilitate the enforcement of money judgments between Canadian provinces also have force in the context of non-money judgments. This report is concerned with the feasibility of developing a Uniform Act which achieves, in the realm of non-money judgments, what UECJA achieves in relation to money judgments.
B. Is a scheme for the interprovincial enforcement of non-money judgments appropriate?
The law has experience over the centuries of enforcing judgments for money that emanate from the courts of other states. The creation of modern legislation for the interprovincial enforcement of money judgments, therefore, was not perceived as some new and radical measure. The development of the UECJA was simply the most recent step in an evolutionary process which allows us to do better and more efficiently things we have always been able to do.
A scheme for the interprovincial enforcement of non-money judgments would have roots and antecedents of its own but they are much less obvious. Such a scheme is much more likely to be perceived as a significant break with the past and might, perhaps, meet resistance for that reason. In making the case for change, if it can be demonstrated that a scheme for the interprovincial enforcement of non-money judgments has doctrinal roots of its own, and is consistent with other contemporary legal developments, the possibility of its acceptance should be greatly enhanced. Some factors that support the creation of such a scheme are set out below.
As I see it, the courts in one province should give full faith and credit, to use the language of the United States Constitution, to the judgments given by a court in another province or territory, so long as that court has properly, or appropriately, exercised jurisdiction in the action. ... It seems both archaic and unfair that a person should be able to avoid legal obligations arising in one province simply by moving to another province. Why should a plaintiff be compelled to begin an action in the province where the defendant now resides whatever the inconvenience and costs this may bring and whatever degree of connection the relevant transaction may have with another province? And why should the availability of local enforcement be the decisive element in the plaintiff's choice of forum?
These comments apply with equal force to a proceeding where non-money relief, such as an injunction, is claimed.
This ancient practice of suing on a foreign judgment as a debt arose before the jurisdictions of the common law courts and the Courts of Chancery were combined by the Judicature Acts. The rules limiting the common law courts to granting money remedies caused them to only be able to treat foreign judgments as debts, and this limitation appears to have persisted to this day. However, there may be equitable jurisdiction to enforce foreign non-money orders6, though it does not have appeared to have been exercised since the implementation of the Judicature Acts.
In Houlditch v. Marquis of Donegal 9, the Marquis' creditors obtained orders against him in the English Chancery Court, enjoining him from collecting rent from his Irish lands and appointing a receiver. The Irish Lord Chancellor said that he could not enforce the English orders in Ireland. His decision was overturned by the House of Lords, who said that the plaintiffs had an action on the order in Chancery Court just as a judgment-creditor has an action in debt.
These cases do illustrate, at the very least, that the enforcement of a non-money judgment from another place is not a concept which the common law regards as an anathema.
Res judicata, loosely translated, means simply, "a thing judicially decided." The doctrine associated with the term is that, other than on appeal, a person may not bring a matter before the court that has already been the subject of a decision. The term and its maxim appeared in Roman Law13 and seem to have always been a part of the common law tradition.
There are at least two policy justifications for this prohibition. The first concerns an issue of public policy. It is in the community's general interest to bring some finality to litigation14, and it is a pillar of the legitimacy of the dispute-resolving function of the court that its judgements and orders should be considered final.
The second justification is one of private justice15. The individual should enjoy a right to be protected from harassment from repeated attacks on the same matter in the very public and very expensive forum of court.
The doctrine has been applied procedurally as "estoppel per rem judicatum", or estoppel "on the record". This means that a party will be estopped, or prevented, from raising as an issue a matter that has already been decided upon by a court of competent jurisdiction.
This estoppel may be pleaded in two forms: cause of action estoppel and issue estoppel. Cause of action estoppel prevents a party from relitigating a claim that formed the basis of previous litigation. It often appears where a plaintiff has not obtained judgment in its favour in a previous action, and attempts to re-try the matter in a new forum or with a different spin on the evidence it presented before. In such a situation, the court will strike out the plaintiff's new claims as being res judicata. Such was the case in Ordish v. City of London16, where the court bristled at the plaintiff's attempt to re-try a matter in an action for damages which had previously been found against him in judicial review proceedings.
Cause of action estoppel is fairly easy to understand and justify, especially if one thinks of its companion from criminal law, the rule against double jeopardy, enshrined in the Charter as the right to not have to stand trial for the same criminal charges more than once.
4) that the question at issue was fundamental to the judicial decision arrived at in the earlier proceedings.
An attempt to relitigate an issue is often described as an abuse of process. An application to have a claim struck is often on the basis that the claim is res judicata or an abuse of process, or both.
This rule may operate to prevent either a plaintiff or a defendant from making a claim or defence contrary to a previous judicial decision18.
The way in which these principles may become relevant is this. A has sued B in Alberta and obtained a permanent injunction restraining B from specified conduct. B moves to Vancouver and A wishes the injunction to continue. A commences a fresh action in Vancouver based on the same facts that were before the court in Alberta. The principles of res judicata and issue estoppel should require that B be estopped from relying on any defence that might have been raised in the Alberta action.
That, at least, is the theory, but concrete examples of its application are difficult to find. Questions of res judicata and issue estoppel arise almost exclusively where a plaintiff, having been unsuccessful in an action brought in terrirory A attempts to bring substantially the same action in terrirory B. Principles of res judicata will normally prevent the plaintiff from his attempt to re-litigate the claim.
The difference between recognition and enforcement should be noted. The terms are often interchanged, but, in actuality, a judgment needs to be recognised before it may be enforced. Recognition is the adoption of the foreign decision as res judicata and being as acceptable to the recognising court as if it were a decision of its own. Enforcement is the application of the court's powers to give effect to the decision and may follow recognition, for example, by enforcement proceedings or contempt proceedings. Of course, there are occasions when all a party wants is for the court to recognize the foreign decision as valid, and may only seek to enforce the decision, if at all, in the future. Some decisions, such as declarations of status (marriage, divorce, annulment, adoption, filiation, etc.) may be recognised, but they are not enforceable per se. Also, when a foreign decision is argued to raise an estoppel per rem judicatum, the party claiming the estoppel seeks only the decision's recognition, not its enforcement.
Foreign orders that require recognition only (as opposed to recognition and enforcement) are routinely given effect. This is particularly true where the order concerns matters of personal status such as divorce.
(6) the decision enforces obligations arising from the taxation laws of a foreign country.
This article draws no distinction between judgments for money and other judgments . it refers to "any decision rendered outside Quebec.."
There are two international conventions on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters. The first, the Brussels Convention, was designed to provide the framework for the enforcement of judgments between the members of the European Economic Community.22 The second, the Hague Convention,23 which was intended to be adopted more widely. The two conventions are quite similar.
It is also relevant to note that a Canada/France Convention on the enforcement of judgments is currently under negotiation. It is expected that this convention will provide for the enforcement of some non-money judgments.
One should, perhaps, not attach too much weight to these developments. Nonetheless, they do provide evidence that the international community does not regard the enforcement of non-money judgments between states as forbidden territory.
Other federation have adopted schemes for the enforcement of judgments between their internal units. A fuller description is set out below.
There is a significant number of threads of jurisprudence and legal policy which suggest that a scheme for the interprovincial enforcement of non-money judgments should be developed.
In considering the scope and content of a Canadian scheme for the interprovincial enforcement of non-money judgments it may be helpful to bear in mind some examples of circumstances where this scheme might be used.
1. A woman obtains a non-molestation order from a court in Alberta, enjoining her estranged husband from harassing her or from coming within 100 metres of her. Both parties move to Vancouver and the woman is afraid her husband will continue to harass her. What must she do to be protected in B.C.? Must she go to court to have a similar order instated in B.C.? How far can she rely on the Alberta order? If it is resisted, must the court hear the defences her husband raised in the Alberta action?
2. A company in Alberta fears that a former employee may divulge to competitors trade secrets that employee may have learned while working for the company. It goes to the superior Court in Alberta and obtains a permanent qua timet injunction against the former employee. The order enjoins the former employee from divulging any information learned while employed by the company. The former employee moves to Vancouver to work for a competitor. What can be done to prevent the employee from breaching the terms of the Alberta order while in British Columbia? What if the company had obtained an interim injunction only and the claim for a final inunction had not yet been heard?
3. A Saskatchewan court orders the specific performance by A of a contract to convey to B a parcel of land located in Saskatchewan. A moves to Alberta without complying with the order. Should B have any remedy in Alberta? What should it be? What if the order directed the specific performance by A of a contract to sell an oil painting to B and A moved to Alberta taking the oil painting with him? Alternatively, the order might have declared B's ownership of the oil painting and ordered that it be delivered up by A to B.
1. Is New Legal Machinery Desirable?
This is the threshold question: should a scheme governing the interprovincial enforcement of non-money judgments be developed? The answer it receives may well depend on the kind of order sought to be enforced. A fairly compelling case can be made that an injunction given in family law matters to prevent molestation or harassment should be given effect outside the territory where it was first made. It is unfair and unrealistic to expect an abused spouse to re-litigate entitlement to a protective order on moving to a new province. This is example no. 1 above.
The case is at its weakest in example no. 3 where the order is to convey land. In cases of non-compliance the Saskatchewan court can order that the conveyance be signed by some other person.There is no need to invoke the assistance of the Alberta Court.
Clearly there seems to be the need for legal machinery to enforce at least some kinds of orders. A second question is whether this legal machinery should take the form of uniform legislation? Here the answer seems to be self-evident. It would be a most unhappy development if competing schemes were to arise, each with its own scope and with differing degrees of loyalty to the concept of "full faith and credit." Realistically, it is unlikely that any province or territory will wish to proceed unilaterally to put a scheme in place. Action on this issue will almost certainly involve several provinces proceeding in unison and the possibility of this happening will be greatly enhanced by the existence of uniform legislation.
2. Whose judgments should be enforced?
If a scheme were developed its operation might be confined to Canadian provinces and territories only or it might be opened to embrace truly foreign judgments and orders. The advantage of a Canada-only scheme is that concerns about whether the order sought to be enforced was obtained in conformity with Canadian notions of fairness and due process cease to be of high importance. The narrower scheme lends itself to the adoption of a full faith and credit approach. On the other hand, judgments from outside Canada will now frequently be given effect here so long as only recognition is in issue and there is no need for consequential enforcement measures.
The better view would seem to be that the scheme should be confined to Canadian judgments. It is important that governments, and the public, have confidence in the scheme. If the scheme is so open ended as to embrace judgments which call for novel remedies and which are arrived at through unfamiliar processes, that confidence could be severely shaken. The treatment to be accorded truly foreign judgments, of all kinds, may be best left to a separate project.
A related question is whether an enforcement scheme should be based on reciprocity of the kind embodied in the old Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act and Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Maintenance Orders Act. Or should the concept of reciprocity be rejected as was done in UECJA?
3. What kinds of a judgment should be enforced?
What kinds of judgments should be recognized and enforced under the scheme? Should the scheme embrace all non-money judgments?
If the scheme should not embrace all non-money judgments what is the best approach to defining its scope? Should there be a "list" of the types of judgments and orders that are suitable for enforcement under the scheme on the basis that those, and only those, will be enforceable?
A selected list of types of orders that ought to be enforceable under the scheme would probably be limited to those situations where there may be an obvious need to invoke the powers of the court of the enforcing province and where the law currently provides no remedy. Obvious candidates are orders for specific performance, injunctions and orders for the delivery up of specific goods.
Or should a starting point be the proposition that all non-money judgments are enforceable under the scheme, subject to a list of specified exceptions setting out types of orders that are not appropriate for enforcement? This approach, taken in the UECJA and in the U.K.and Australia seems to be most widely accepted and is probably the best suited to Canada.
A list of orders that ought not to be enforceable under the scheme might include orders that are enforceable under existing legislation, such as custody orders and foreign probates.
What defences should be available where the enforcement of a judgment is sought under the scheme? Should one adopt a full faith and credit position and permit no defences that call into question the validity of the original judgment. Should the defendant be permitted to assert that the original court lacked jurisdiction to make the order. What if the defendant alleges some other allegedly invalidating cause?
In most schemes for the ienforcement of judgments between territories a precondition to enforcement is some sort of process involving the enrollment or registration of the foreign judgment with the local court. UECJA is a good example of this. Does this requirement place an unnecessary burden on the person seeking enforcement where the order is one that restrains or limits contact of one spouse with the other (a protection order).
When the police are called on to intervene in a situation of spousal harassment, their response may well turn on whether a valid protection order exists. If the police are satisfied that a protection order exists, they may be prepared to act in marginal situations. If they are forced to rely solely on powers derived from the Criminal Code they may be reluctant to intervene except in cases where the potential for violence or a breach of the peace is beyond doubt. Law enforcement policy in these circumstances may vary a good deal from province to province and even within particular provincess.
threatened spouse to produce what purports to be a copy of the order. In other places its existence may be evidenced in more formal ways. British Columbia has dealt with this question by creating a "central registry of protection orders." This database of orders is accessible to the police on a 24-hour basis to confirm whether the protection order exists, whether it is valid and what conditions it includes.
Even if one concludes that it is desirable to ensure that out-of-province protection orders are recognized by the police, is it possible to deal with this in a uniform fashion? This may be difficult. In British Columbia the obvious answer would be to permit the registration of out-of-province protective orders directly in the central registry as an alternative or supplement to registration in the superior court. Other provinces may require a legislative statement that gives an out-of-province protection order special status.
(b) Should there be a judicial escape hatch?
(c) Should the scheme embrace interim orders?
A condition at common law for the enforcement of a foreign judgment for money was that the judgment had to be final. This requirement of finality continues to be reflected in legislation on the enforcement of foreign of judgments such as UECJA and the English legislation. Should be requirement of finality be retained in a new scheme?
In many instances when an injunction is sought, although the pleadings are drafted to claim a final injunction, the real battle is over whether or not an interim injunction should be granted. When an interim injunction is granted, very often no further steps are taken. Should a scheme recognize this reality and permit the extra-provincial enforcement of interim injunctions?
The same concern applies to the whole range of interlocutory injunctions that might be issued in the course of a proceeding. For example, orders may be given designed to preserve or protect the subject matter of the litigation. The court may issue a Mareva injunction to prevent the defendants disposing of specified assets. Orders such as these would not meet the test of "finality" but is that a sufficient reason to deny their enforcement outside the place where the order was made?
Under the Australian scheme an order is enforceable between states "whether or not the ... order is final."
Some orders that are potentially enforceable under the scheme will issue out of Provincial Courts and be made by non-federally appointed judges. The most significant of these will be restraining orders in family law disputes issued under the authority of provincial family law legislation. Are there any problems in bringing these orders within the scheme? In the enforcing province, should they be enforced through the corresponding provincial court or should they be enforced through the superior courts like other out-of-province judgments.
6. What form might a Uniform Act take?
Depending on the decisions taken the conceptual content of a new Uniform Act on the Enforcement of Non-Money Judgments might closely parallel that adopted for money judgments. This raises the question whether uniform legislation on the interprovincial enforcement of non-money judgments should be cast as a stand-alone Uniform Act or be picked up in a new and extended UECJA.
A single statute would undoubtedly be more elegant. On the other hand, the provisions relating to the enforcement of non-money judgments may be perceived as more controversial. Some provinces may be quite prepared to adopt UECJA in its current form but might balk at doing so if it carried controversial "baggage."
Many of the issues which arise with respect to non-money judgments also arose and were debated extensively by the ULC in developing the Uniform Enforcement of Canadian Judgments Act. While new legislation must accomodate a number of functional differences between judgments to which UECJA applies and non-money judgments under consideration in this report, there is no reason to believe that the ULC will reverse itself on the major policy decisions underlying UECJA. This would be difficult to defend and could conceivably be regarded as showing a lack of confidence in UECJA itself.
On the assumption that the Conference will wish to adhere to the UECJA model, draft legislation has been prepared which conforms to that model. To help focus discussion, it has been cast as a separate statute although it could be readily consolidated with UECJA. This draft is not intended to foreclose or limit discussion on any of the questions raised above that are not expressly covered in the draft or any other questions that might be raised.
the validity of a judgment should not be subject to attack in the enforcing province for lack of jurisdiction in the original court or any other cause, This should be done only in the courts of the place where the judgment was given.
the scheme should extend to some decrees made by non-curial bodies.
Footnote: 1 The contribution of Jason Squire, a research assistant with the Law Reform Commission of British Columbia, in the preparation of this Report is gratefully acknowledged.
Eg. Aetna Financial Services Ltd. v. Feigelman,  1 SCR 2; Morguard Investments v. De Savoy,  2 WWR 217; Hunt v. T&N plc,  4 SCR 289.
Footnote: 2 John Swan, in "La 'constitutionalisation' d'un conflit de droit international privé canadien" (1994), 1 Canadian International Lawyer 14, goes as far as to say that Morguard and Hunt show that choice of law rules in interprovincial conflicts within Canada may be replaced by constitutional principles. Perhaps the common law is filling the void in our Constitution left by the lack of a full faith and credit provision?
Footnote: 3 Supra n. 1.
Footnote: 4 See Uniform Law Conference of Canada, 1992 Proceedings at 318. The Uniform Act is also reproduced in Law Reform Commission of British Columbia, Report on the UECJA at 44 (LRC 122,1992). The french language version of the Uniform Act will be found at Uniform Law Conference of Canada, 1991 Proceedings at 431.
Footnote: 6 Whyte, "Enforcement of foreign judgments in equity" (1982), 9 Syd LR 630.
Footnote: 7 (1737), 1 Atk. 408; 26 ER 259.
Footnote: 8 Ibid., at 259 (ER).
Footnote: 9 (1834) 8 Bligh NS 301; 2 Cl & F 470; 5 ER 955.
Footnote: 10 Houlditch is only mentioned in terms of the appointment by equity of a receiver for foreign immovable assets (8 Hals. (4th) par. 648). The equitable jurisdiction over enforcement of foreign decrees and orders is not considered.
Footnote: 11 (1888), 58 LJ Ch 5.
Footnote: 13 See Spencer Bower and Turner, The Doctrine of Res Judicata (2d ed.), Butterworths (London: 1969) for a more detailed history and analysis of the doctrine.
Footnote: 14 Ibid., para. 10.
Footnote: 15 Ibid., para. 10.
Footnote: 16 (1981) 32 O.R. (2d) 676 (HC).
Footnote: 17 Angle v. M.N.R.,  2 S.C.R. 248 at 254-55.
Footnote: 18 Spencer Bower and Turner, supra n. 13, para. 12.
Footnote: 19 See Uniform Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act; . Family Relations Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 121, part 2.1.
Footnote: 20 While there is no uniform act on this topic, substantial uniformity does exist. See (BC) Probate Recognition Act, R.S.B.C 1979, c. 339 [with origins as S.B.C. 1889, c. 19]; (Alberta) Administration of Estates Act, R.S.A. 1980, c. A-1, s. 30 [S.A. 1969, c. 31]; (New Brunswick) Probate Court Act, S.N.B. 1982, c. P-17.1, s. 73; (Ontario) Estates Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E.21, s. 52 [S.O. 51 V., c. 9 (1888)]; (Manitoba) Court of Queens Bench Surrogate Practice Act, R.S.M. 1987, c. C290, ss. 48, 50; (PEI) Probate Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1988, c. P-21, ss. 42-45 [S.P.E.I. 1939, c. 41, s. 56]; (Newfoundland) Judicature Act, R.S.N. 1990, c. J-4 [S.N. 1986, c. 42]; (Saskatchewan) Surrogate Court Act, R.S.S. 1979, c. S-66, ss. 78-80 [1930, c. 51, s. 76]; (Nova Scotia) Probate Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 359, s. 34 [1889, c. 12]. The statutes vary a bit in scope from province to province. All provinces except for Newfoundland name the United Kingdom in the legislation as a terrirory whose probates granted by a court of competent jurisdiction will be recognised. All provinces except for BC, PEI, Newfoundland and Nova Scotia mention the other Canadian provinces; presumably PEI would include other provinces as "any part of the British Commonwealth". BC and Newfoundland provide that territories whose probates will be recognised be designated by regulation. Nova Scotia will recognize the probates of any British province, territory or possession. New Brunswick, Manitoba and Saskatchewan also recognize the probate orders of all the United States. Many of the common law provinces' resealing provisions define "probate" to include letters of verification from Quebec.
Footnote: 21. Civil Code of Quebec, S.Q. 1991, c. 64.
Footnote: 24 The corresponding provision of the Brussels Convention, Art. 25, is framed in similar terms.
Footnote: 25. These include certain family law matters, succession matters and bankruptcy.
Footnote: 29 La Verne v. Jackson (1967), 84 Ill App 2d 445; 228 NE 2d 249, Schroeder v. Homestead Corp. (1956), 163 Neb 43; 77 NW 2d 618, Marie Callender Pie Shops, Inc. v. Bumbleberry Enterprises, Inc. (1979), 39 Or App 487; 592 P2d 1050.
Footnote: 30 The fact that "full faith and credit" does not seem to have provided a vehicle for the enforcement of non-money judgments may reflect other constitutional forces at work. The enforcement of an out-of-state judgment will be overlaid by a requirement that "due process" has been observed and the court in the state where enforcement is sought can inquire into whether the original court properly took jurisdiction.
Footnote: 31 Including Judgment Extension Act 1868 and Inferior Courts Judgment Extension Act 1868.
Footnote: 32 Re Dundee and Suburban Railway Co. (1888), 58 LJ Ch. 5.
Footnote: 33 Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982, Sched. 7, par. 6; R Black, "Enforcement of Scottish decrees outside Scotland and of non-Scottish decrees within Scotland." (1987) 32 JLS Scotland 10.
Footnote: 34 Ss. 18(3), (5).
Footnote: 35 S. 18(5)(d). This appears to reflect similar provisions in the Brussels Convention.
Footnote: 36 S. 18(5)(d). This probably corresponds to the common law requirement for finality. The provision likely excludes the enforcement of Mareva injunctions.
Footnote: 37 Schedule 7, par. 5(5). This seems aimed at creating a "public policy" exception.
Footnote: 38 Stone, "The Civil jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982: Some comments." (1983) 32 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 477 at 487-88.
Footnote: 44 See Law Reform Commission (Australia), ibid at 234.
Footnote: 45 Assuming it has adopted the Uniform Court Orders Compliance Act. See s. 5(2)(e).
(b) in the case of an award made in (enacting jurisdiction), remit it to the arbitral tribunal with the court's opinion, in which case the arbitral tribunal may award a different remedy.

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