Source: https://case-law.vlex.com/vid/503-u-s-1-605186554
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 18:57:20+00:00

Document:
Petitioner Hudson, a Louisiana prison inmate, testified that minor bruises, facial swelling, loosened teeth, and a cracked dental plate he had suffered resulted from a beating by respondent prison guards McMillian and Woods while he was handcuffed and shackled following an argument with McMillian, and that respondent Mezo, a supervisor on duty, watched the beating, but merely told the officers "not to have too much fun." The Magistrate trying Hudson's District Court suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 found that the officers used force when there was no need to do so, and that Mezo expressly condoned their actions, ruled that respondents had violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments, and awarded Hudson damages. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding, inter alia, that inmates alleging use of excessive force in violation of the Amendment must prove "significant injury," and that Hudson could not prevail because his injuries were "minor," and required no medical attention.
Held: The use of excessive physical force against a prisoner may constitute cruel and unusual punishment even though the inmate does not suffer serious injury. Pp. 5-12.
or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm. Extending Whitley's application of the "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain" standard to all allegations of force, whether the prison disturbance is a riot or a lesser disruption, works no innovation. See, e.g., Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033. Pp. 5-7.
(b) Since, under the Whitley approach, the extent of injury suffered by an inmate is one of the factors to be considered in determining whether the use of force is wanton and unnecessary, 475 U.S. at 321, the absence of serious injury is relevant to, but does not end, the Eighth Amendment inquiry. There is no merit to respondents' assertion that a significant injury requirement is mandated by what this Court termed, in Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298, the "objective component" of Eighth Amendment analysis: whether the alleged wrongdoing is objectively "harmful enough" to establish a constitutional violation, id. at 303. That component is contextual, and responsive to "contemporary standards of decency." Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103. In the excessive force context, such standards always are violated when prison officials maliciously and sadistically use force to cause harm, see Whitley, 475 U.S. at 327, whether or not significant injury is evident. Moreover, although the Amendment does not reach de minimis uses of physical force, provided that such use is not of a sort repugnant to the conscience of mankind, ibid., the blows directed at Hudson are not de minimis, and the extent of his injuries thus provides no basis for dismissal of his § 1983 claim. Pp. 7-10.
(c) The dissent's theory that Wilson requires an inmate who alleges excessive force [112 S.Ct. 997] to show significant injury in addition to the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain misapplies Wilson, and ignores the body of this Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. Wilson did not involve an allegation of excessive force and, with respect to the "objective component" of an Eighth Amendment claim, suggested no departure from Estelle and its progeny. The dissent's argument that excessive force claims and conditions of confinement claims are no different in kind is likewise unfounded. To deny the difference between punching a prisoner in the face and serving him unappetizing food is to ignore the concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency that animate the Eighth Amendment. See Estelle, supra, 429 U.S. at 102. P. 10-11.
of their acts, they make a claim not addressed by the Court of Appeals, not presented by the question on which this Court granted certiorari, and, accordingly, not before this Court. Pp. 11-12.
O'CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., and WHITE, KENNEDY, and SOUTER, JJ., joined, and in which STEVENS, J., joined as to Parts I, II-A, II-B, and II-C. STEVENS, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, post, p. 12. BLACKMUN, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 13. THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which SCALIA, J., joined, post, p. 17.
Hudson sued the three corrections officers in Federal District Court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging a violation [112 S.Ct. 998] of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments and seeking compensatory damages. The parties consented to disposition of the case before a Magistrate, who found that McMillian and Woods used force when there was no need to do so, and that Mezo expressly condoned their actions. App. 26. The Magistrate awarded Hudson damages of $800. Id. at 29.
[t]he conduct of McMillian and Woods qualified as clearly excessive and occasioned unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.
Ibid. However, Hudson could not prevail on his Eighth Amendment claim, because his injuries were "minor" and required no medical attention. Ibid.
"the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain . . . constitutes cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth Amendment."
Id. at 319 (quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 670 (1977)) (internal quotation omitted).
What is necessary to establish an "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain," we said, varies according to the nature of the alleged constitutional violation. 475 U.S. at 320. For example, the appropriate inquiry when an inmate alleges that prison officials failed to attend to serious medical needs is whether the officials exhibited "deliberate indifference."
See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). This standard is appropriate because the State's responsibility to provide inmates with medical care ordinarily does not conflict with competing administrative concerns. Whitley, supra, 475 U.S. at 320.

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