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Timestamp: 2019-04-22 20:03:18+00:00

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Helen G. Perez, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
John G. Schwartz and Nagle, Vale, McDowall & Cotter for Defendant and Respondent.
Elwyn L. Johnson, City Attorney (Modesto), and George H. Eiser III, Deputy City Attorney, as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent.
Plaintiff Helen G. Perez appeals from a judgment of dismissal entered following the granting of a motion for summary judgment [27 Cal. 3d 880] in an action seeking damages for invasion of her constitutional rights through discontinuance of water service.
We here confront the question whether a municipality providing water, sewer, and garbage disposal services to its citizens and billing therefor by means of a single unified statement may constitutionally resort to the remedy of cessation of water service when a citizen, refusing to pay that component of the unified billing relating to garbage collection and disposal services but paying the other components thereof, fails to make full and complete payment for municipal services rendered.
The City of San Bruno, acting pursuant to its police power (Cal. Const., art. XI, § 7), has provided in section 14-1 of its city code that "[t]he furnishing of water and sewer service and the collection and disposal of garbage and rubbish, as provided for in this Code, shall constitute municipal services, and shall be charged for as such. [¶] Every person, on making application for municipal services, shall make a service deposit ...."
Under currently applicable contractual provisions the contractor, the San Bruno Garbage Company, Inc., has agreed to "furnish all labor, material, and equipment required for the collection and removal of garbage [etc.] from all dwellings, business properties, and all other buildings and/or structures within the City," to furnish its own dump [27 Cal. 3d 881] site, and to render the indicated services in accordance with a stated schedule of fees, said schedule being subject to renegotiation between the parties at three-year intervals. Under the terms of the contract the contractor "delegates to [the city] the billing and collecting of garbage and refuse collection charges and agrees to pay to [the city] eighteen (18) percent of all sums collected for said services. It is agreed that Contractor will not hold City responsible for non-collection or for errors in billings, if any, whether through the fault of said City, or its employees, or not."
As further discussed below, the city, pursuant to section 14-1 of its city code (quoted ante) includes a charge for garbage collection and disposal on its unified monthly billing covering all "municipal services" -- i.e., water, sewer, and garbage. The same section goes on to provide as follows: "No person shall fail or refuse to pay the municipal service charges provided for in this Code. [¶] If any person shall fail or refuse to pay the lawful charges, including both delinquent and current charges, for any municipal services, the water service to the premises, regardless of tenancy, shall be shut off."
In summary the city's system, as we understand it, contemplates that one wishing to avail himself of the city's municipal services, after making application and deposit therefor, becomes entitled to receive all of such services; that the garbage collection and disposal aspect of the municipal services is to be performed by a private company under a contract binding it to remove garbage from all dwellings and other buildings in the city; that each such subscriber to municipal services is required to "engage" the company for this purpose; that the city includes, as a part of its unified billing for municipal services, a fee set by contract for garbage collection and disposal; and that such fees, when collected, are divided between the city and the private company on an 18/82 basis -- the city having no liability to the company for uncollected fees.
Plaintiff, who alleges that she disposes of all garbage produced on her premises by means of sanitary recycling techniques, has since 1973 refused to pay that portion of the unified billing for municipal services which relates to garbage collection and disposal. She has made her position in this matter known to city authorities but has been informed that city regulations require use of and payment for garbage collection services by all city residents. Four legal actions have resulted, including that here before us. Two of these were small claims actions by the city, [27 Cal. 3d 882] resulting in judgments for delinquent charges; one of these judgments was affirmed on appeal to the superior court. The third, filed by plaintiff late in 1974, sought damages against the city for mental and emotional distress suffered by her as a result of the city's actions; it was here alleged that the city through its agents had threatened to shut off water service to her premises in order to enforce payment, and that such action, although authorized in the city code, would be unconstitutional; no injunction was sought, however. This action was dismissed after the trial court sustained the city's demurrer without leave to amend.
It appears that in January 1976, the city, having failed to obtain payment from plaintiff relating to the garbage collection and disposal component of her bill for municipal services, shut off her water service; for reasons which do not here appear, service was restored approximately one month later and has continued to the present. fn. 1 In the instant action, filed after denial of a claim against the city, plaintiff seeks damages resulting from the one-month discontinuation of water service, which she claims was in violation of her constitutional rights. The city moved for summary judgment on the grounds "that there is no triable issue of material fact on these issues, and that the action ... is barred by res judicata, collateral estoppel, and the valid and lawful exercise of police power as a matter of law." The motion was granted, and plaintiff appeals from the ensuing judgment.
The statutes of this state provide, and have long provided, that when a losing defendant in a small claims action takes an appeal of the small [27 Cal. 3d 885] claims judgment to the superior court, "... the action shall be tried anew" in accordance with rules of practice and procedure adopted by the Judicial Council. (Code Civ. Proc., § 117.10.) The relevant Judicial Council rule provides and has long provided that such a trial de novo is to be "conducted pursuant to law and rules in all respects as other trials in the superior court except that no written findings of fact or conclusions of law shall be required." (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 155.) It has recently been held that the right to a jury trial is available as in such "other trials." (Smith v. Superior Court (1979) 93 Cal. App. 3d 977, 979 [156 Cal. Rptr. 149].) In view of these considerations, we think it must be concluded that when a losing defendant in a small claims action invokes his right of appeal to the superior court, and when that court, pursuant to the above provisions, conducts a trial de novo and enters judgment against such appealing defendant, the considerations set forth in our Sanderson opinion are not applicable. [2b] Accordingly, unless some other recognized exception to the general rule is here pertinent (see generally, Rest.2d Judgments (Tent. Draft No. 4) § 68.1), it would appear that that rule must here operate to foreclose plaintiff from arguing that the city lacks the power to require all residents to subscribe to its garbage disposal service regardless of actual use thereof.
Even if it be assumed that the legal question of the city's power to impose charges in the indicated circumstances is one of such great public importance that the doctrine of collateral estoppel or issue preclusion should not be applied as a matter of policy (see City of Berkeley v. Superior Court (1980) 26 Cal. 3d 515, 520, fn. 5 [162 Cal. Rptr. 327, 606 P.2d 362]; Chern v. Bank of America (1976) 15 Cal. 3d 866, 872 [127 Cal. Rptr. 110, 544 P.2d 1310]; Louis Stores, Inc. v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control (1962) 57 Cal. 2d 749, 758 [22 Cal. Rptr. 14, 371 P.2d 758]; Rest.2d Judgments (Tent. Draft No. 4) §§ 68; 68.1, subds. (b), (e), reporter's notes, pp. 43-44, 46-48), it is manifest that this issue has been properly decided below. It is well established that the city, in the exercise of powers expressly granted it in the Constitution (Cal. Const., art. XI, § 7), may properly provide for the collection and disposal of all residents' garbage by a private contractor (see Health & Saf. Code, § 4250; Matula v. Superior Court (1956) 146 Cal. App. 2d 93, 98-99 [303 P.2d 871]; Davis v. City of Santa Ana (1952) 108 Cal. App. 2d 669, 676-677 [239 P.2d 656]) and may require that even those residents who do not choose to use such services pay all reasonable and nondiscriminatory fn. 2 charges assessed therefor. (See City [27 Cal. 3d 886] of Glendale v. Trondsen (1957) 48 Cal. 2d 93, 102-103 [308 P.2d 1].) The fact that a city, pursuant to its constitutional power, might select other means for preventing the accumulation of garbage within its limits -- such as, for instance, providing exemption for those able to demonstrate their willingness and ability to dispose personally of all solid wastes generated by them through recycling fn. 3 or other acceptable means fn. 4 -- clearly does not preclude a city, in the absence of some contrary provision of state law, from addressing the problem in the manner adopted by defendant.
The question of the kinds and nature of remedies available to cities and other local entities for the collection of charges imposed for utility services provided to citizens is one which has received substantial and explicit attention by the Legislature. Generally speaking, a general law city like defendant which chooses to provide such services itself rather than through formation of a special district is governed in this respect by the provisions of the Revenue Bond Law of 1941 (Gov. Code, § 54300 et seq.), fn. 5 which deals with the operation and financing of various "enterprises" fn. 6 undertaken by a "local agency." fn. 7 The provisions of this act, together with certain relevant provisions found elsewhere, envisage three basic remedies to which a city may have recourse to enforce payment of delinquent charges: (1) an action for unpaid deposits, [27 Cal. 3d 887] charges, and penalties; (2) the imposition of a lien on the real property served; and (3) the cessation of services. We address each of these in detail below.
We turn to the matter of specific remedies.
(1) Section 54353 provides: "As a remedy established for the collection of due and unpaid deposits and charges and the penalties thereon an action may be brought in the name of the local agency in any court of competent jurisdiction against the person or persons who occupied or, in the case of unoccupied property, who owned the property when the service was rendered or the deposit became due or against any person guaranteeing payment of bills, or against any or all of said persons, for the collection of the amount of the deposit or the collection of delinquent charges and all penalties thereon." Section 54347 provides for the collection of charges. Section 54348 provides for the imposition of penalties for nonpayment.
Section 38790.1 also makes specific provision for the imposition of such a lien by cities collecting garbage fees or charges "in the manner provided in Section 25831 for counties." The meaning of this dispensation, in light of the high degree of extrapolative powers required to take advantage of it, remains unclear. Insofar as the record before us shows, defendant city has not ventured this way.
(3) Section 54346 provides: "If all or part of the bill is not paid, the local agency may discontinue any and all service for which the bill is rendered." This section, immediately following that permitting unified billing for all city services (§ 54345, see text accompanying fn. 8, ante), would clearly seem to authorize the action by defendant city which is the subject of the instant lawsuit. fn. 9 The city code, as indicated above, expressly provides that upon failure to pay for "any municipal services, the water services to the premises, regardless of tenancy, shall be shut off."
It is provided in section 54357 that "[r]emedies for collecting and enforcing rates and charges set out in this chapter are cumulative and may be pursued alternately, or any thereof may be used consecutively when the legislative body so determines ...."
Leaving the matter of procedural fairness to one side for the moment, we believe that the stated standard is that which is properly applicable in determining whether the substantive requirements of the state and federal due process clauses have here been met. We recognize, of course, that legislation affecting certain specific rights -- namely those which either have been afforded express constitutional protection or are of a character so fundamental or "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" (Palko v. Connecticut (1937) 302 U.S. 319, 325 [82 L. Ed. 288, 292, 58 S.Ct. 149]) as to require equivalent protection (see, e.g., Roe v. Wade (1973) 410 U.S. 113, 129, 152-156 [35 L. Ed. 2d 147, 163-164, 176-179, 93 S. Ct. 705]; Griswold v. Connecticut (1965) 381 U.S. 479 [27 Cal. 3d 890] [14 L. Ed. 2d 510, 85 S.Ct. 1678]) -- is subjected to a more searching level of scrutiny than that above indicated, fn. 11 but we do not believe that the "right" to receive municipal water service may be classed in that category. fn. 12 As the United States Supreme Court has recently stated, "the customer's right to continued [water] service is conditioned upon payment of the charges properly due, ..." (Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, supra, 436 U.S. 1, 11 [56 L. Ed. 2d 30, 40].) In our view the determination of which charges are "properly due" in light of constitutional demands -- and whose nonpayment may therefore justify a discontinuance of service -- is to be made in light of traditional dueprocess standards. We therefore limit the scope of our inquiry to the question whether the legislative scheme set forth in the statutes and ordinances we have considered bears a reasonable relationship to a proper legislative goal.
[4b] It is manifest that the provisions here in question are directed toward a proper and legitimate public goal -- i.e., the protection of public health. (See generally text accompanying fns. 2-4, ante, and authorities cited therein.) The question, then, is whether those provisions may be said to bear a reasonable relationship to that laudable goal. To state the matter in specific terms: May a legislative scheme which permits (1) unified billing for all municipal utility services relating to public health protection, and (2) termination of all or any of such services upon failure to make payment in full, be said to bear a reasonable relationship to the goal of public health protection?
The early cases in this area, generally speaking, looked not to the rationality of the unified system in light of the legislative goal but to the functional connection between the terminated service and that for which payment was withheld. Thus if it could be said that the matter for which payment remained due was "unrelated" or "collateral" to the [27 Cal. 3d 891] service terminated, termination was held to be foreclosed. (See generally cases collected at Annot. (1974) 60 A.L.R.3d 714.) The rationale appears to have been developed in cases involving water and sewer service, the notion being that because these two services are so functionally "interlocked" -- in that neither can be effective without the other -- termination of the former for nonpayment of the latter results in no unconstitutional action. (See generally cases collected at Annot. (1952) 26 A.L.R.2d 1359; A.L.R.2d (Later Case Service 1970) p. 271.) At the other extreme are cases in which one of the services involved lacked any demonstrable connection to the goal of public health protection, let alone any functional interconnection. (See, e.g., Owens v. City of Beresford (1972) 87 S.D. 8 [201 N.W.2d 890, 60 A.L.R.3d 707] (telephone and electrical service/garbage service); Edris v. Sebring Utilities Commission (Fla.App. 1970) 237 So. 2d 585 (water service/electrical service).) In these cases discontinuance of one service for nonpayment of the other has been disallowed.
Between these two extremes lie cases in which both of the services involved are connected with the goal of public health protection but they are not functionally "interlocked" to the extent of water and sewer services. Here we encounter cases such as that at bar, involving the discontinuance of water service for nonpayment of garbage or sanitation charges. We have been able to discover only three cases of this particular kind (excluding the superseded federal district court decision in Uhl v. Ness City, Kansas, supra, 406 F. Supp. 1012 -- see fn. 10, ante.) In Garner v. City of Aurora (1948) 149 Neb. 295 [30 N.W.2d 917] the court, following the functional analysis, ignored the common public health aspect of both services and simply applied cases involving electric services, holding garbage collection to be "collateral" to or "independent" from water service and therefore precluding discontinuance of the latter for nonpayment of the former.
It is true, of course, that when a statutory or legislative scheme utilizes a means to reach its end and which is unduly harsh or exacts a penalty which may be deemed oppressive in light of the legitimate objectives sought to be achieved, it may be held to be violative of constitutional due process guarantees. (Hale v. Morgan, supra; Walsh v. Kirby (1974) 13 Cal. 3d 95, 105-106 [118 Cal. Rptr. 1, 529 P.2d 33]; People v. Western Air Lines, Inc. (1954) 42 Cal. 2d 621, 642 [268 P.2d 723], and cases there cited.) Here, however, we are not concerned with a remedy in the nature of a penalty or exaction. Rather we deal with a system whereby a city, in furtherance of its police power and pursuant to statutory authorization, chooses to make the availability of all municipal utility services relating to public health protection contingent upon payment in full of a unified billing therefor. While those residents who do not choose to take part in the system in accordance with its terms may suffer serious practical consequences in the form of discontinued services, we cannot conclude that an unconstitutional deprivation results.
Because California law does not permit the termination of utility service to a customer without good cause (Schultz v. Town of Lakeport (1936) 5 Cal. 2d 377, 381-382 [54 P.2d 1110, 55 P.2d 485, 108 A.L.R. 1168]), the requirements set forth in the Memphis case are fully applicable here.
It does not appear that city procedures at the time of the termination here in question provided a specific channel for pretermination review of a disputed bill with a designated employee empowered to resolve such disputes. In this respect as well, then, the city's procedures fell short of that required by the Memphis case.
In spite of the foregoing we are reluctant to reverse the instant judgment on the ground of the city's failure, in 1975, to provide the procedural protections required by the 1978 Memphis case. As we have indicated, the instant dispute dates back to 1973, when plaintiff first took the position that her nonuse of city garbage collection services should relieve her from that portion of her bill for municipal services which related to garbage collection. Since that time she has apparently [27 Cal. 3d 895] had numerous conversations with city officials in which she has made her position clear. Four legal actions have resulted, one of which yielded a memorandum of decision containing a patient and lucid explanation of the legal basis of her liability for the garbage-collection component of the municipal services bill; the judgment in this latter case was affirmed by the superior court following a trial de novo. Plaintiff's position was clear and well-defined, as was that of the city. Her complaint was not one of inadvertent overcharge or double billing; her complaint was that of the city's system, insofar as it billed her for unused services, was in violation of the substantive requirements of the due process clause. In these circumstances we cannot conclude that her failure to receive notice and hearing of the kind made requisite in Memphis prior to the one-month termination of service here in question operated to deprive her of her right to fundamental fairness of procedure.
Tobriner, J., Clark, J., and Richardson, J., concurred.
Today, this court holds that a city which enjoys a virtual monopoly in supplying a vital service (water) breached no duty when it cut off a homeowner's paid-for water supply for nonpayment of a garbage collection bill. I cannot agree.
Although the majority state they recognize that due process may be violated when a statute "is unduly harsh or exacts a penalty which may be deemed oppressive in light of the legitimate objectives sought to be achieved ..." (maj. opn., ante, at p. 893), they quickly conclude that the present ordinance does not impose such a penalty. Again, I cannot agree.
Here, the ordinance requires that "If any person shall fail or refuse to pay the lawful charges ... for any municipal services, the water service to the premises, regardless of tenancy, shall be shut off." (San [27 Cal. 3d 896] Bruno City Code, § 14-1.) It should first be noted that this provision operates without regard to the availability of other, less draconian, means of collection. In this case, the city had obtained judgments for amounts due from plaintiff yet made no showing of attempts to enforce those judgments. Overlooked by the majority is the fact that the city required a "service deposit" before implementing its contract with plaintiff. However, there is no indication that this deposit was insufficient to cover the unpaid garbage bills. The inescapable conclusion is that the city intended to exact a penalty by turning off plaintiff's water.
The arbitrary nature of the ordinance is further shown by the fact that water, clearly a necessity of life, is singled out for termination no matter which municipal service has not been paid. Further, the termination of water service is not interrelated nor the billing "unified" with other services. The ledger supplied by the city shows separate columns of amounts charged for garbage, sewer, and water services. Moreover, the city in filing suit for the back garbage charges implicitly admitted the severability of those charges from other items of the bill.
A "law must not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious but must have a real and substantial relation to the object sought to be attained." (Gray v. Whitmore (1971) 17 Cal. App. 3d 1, 21 [94 Cal. Rptr. 904].) From the record before this court, the present ordinance fails to meet that test. Since the city has not shown that "there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that [it] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law" (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c), the judgment of the trial court should be reversed.
The city has ample remedies to employ against a recalcitrant homeowner. It may obtain a civil judgment for an unpaid municipal service bill. That was done through small claims court, but curiously the city has not attempted to satisfy its judgment. It may also terminate that service for which payment has not been made. When it attempts, however, to shut off water -- a necessity of life -- to satisfy a debt for garbage collection, it transcends constitutional or statutory authority.
The statute upon which the majority rely is Government Code section 54346, but I find that reliance to be misplaced. The section provides that if the bill is not paid in full a local agency "may discontinue any and all service for which the bill is rendered" (italics added). It is unquestioned here that the bill was rendered and unpaid only for garbage collection service. In my view the city was thus permitted to discontinue that service and that service alone, a remedy in which Mrs. Perez would have enthusiastically acquiesced. Had the city adopted that rational course, it would have avoided a Simon Legree image and the courts would have been spared this unnecessary litigation.
The contention that water service, sewerage service, and garbage disposal service are interlocking components of a public health program has a certain superficial appeal. But the fact is that in this instance each is separately calculated, particularly the garbage collection which is undertaken by a private business enterprise and not by a department of the municipal government.
Our Legislature has consistently frowned upon the arbitrary termination of essential utility services. Where improperly undertaken by a private landlord severe civil sanctions are authorized. (Civ. Code, § 789.3; Kinney v. Vaccari (1980) 27 Cal. 3d 348 [165 Cal. Rptr. 787, 612 P.2d 877].) Specific due process requirements have been prescribed prior to termination of service by a public utility. (Pub. Util. Code, §§ 779, 780.) What is improper conduct for a private landlord and for a public utility would seem to be equally improper for a municipality. Here the city has acted inconsistently with the implied legislative intent to prevent unnecessary denial of utility service. Such insensitive conduct demonstrates that to a bureaucrat with a hammer in his hand everything looks like a nail.
Mrs. Perez, who has acted in propria persona throughout these proceedings, has undoubtedly annoyed city officials by insisting that one should not pay for municipal services unneeded and unused. Of such quiet heroics are martyrs born. fn. 1 Two and a half decades ago Mrs. Rosa [27 Cal. 3d 899] Parks annoyed the officials of Montgomery, Alabama, simply by insisting that she should not be required to sit in the back of the bus. (Kluger, Simple Justice (1975) p. 750.) Just as Mrs. Parks resisted bureaucracy for a principle -- and ultimately brought about the end of compulsory segregation in the south -- so Mrs. Perez in apparent splendid solitude is resisting a municipal bureaucracy for a principle. Although the majority fail to see it, I believe due process and justice are her companions.
FN 1. In 1977 plaintiff obtained a temporary restraining order enjoining the cessation of water service pending trial. In the proceedings leading to the issuance of that order the city indicated that it had no intention of discontinuing water service "pending the lawsuit."
It appears from the record that at the time of the subject discontinuation of water service plaintiff was delinquent on charges for municipal services of $73.48 -- all of which apparently related to garbage charges. As of February 1978 she was delinquent in the amount of $139.78.
FN 2. Plaintiff suggests certain residents of the city, most notably those employed by the garbage company, are not required to pay for the collection service. The record neither supports nor refutes this allegation, and we do not address it further.
FN 3. Regarding the community development of recycling facilities, see Government Code sections 68046, 68046.6 and 68047.
FN 5. Unless otherwise indicated, all section references hereafter are to the Government Code.
FN 8. Similar or comparable provisions making specific reference to garbage disposal services exist regarding municipal utility districts (Pub. Util. Code, § 12810); municipal water districts (Wat. Code, § 71689.22); and community services districts (Gov. Code, § 61621).
FN 9. For similar or comparable provisions see, e.g., Public Utilities Code section 12810 (municipal utility districts); Water Code section 71689.22 (municipal water districts); and Government Code section 61621 (community services districts).
FN 12. This does not mean, of course, that the availability of water service, albeit conditional, may be terminated without affording some fair procedure to determine whether the requisite conditions are satisfied. (See Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft (1978) 436 U.S. 1, 9-19 [56 L. Ed. 2d 30, 39-45, 98 S. Ct. 1554]; also compare Dandridge v. Williams (1970) 397 U.S. 471, 484-485 [25 L. Ed. 2d 491, 501, 90 S. Ct. 1153] with Goldberg v. Kelly (1970) 397 U.S. 254, 264 [25 L. Ed. 2d 287, 297, 90 S. Ct. 1011].) We address this matter below.
FN 13. It is clear, of course, that what we have said cannot be read to suggest that all unified billing procedures for city services are constitutionally authorized. Section 54309, which sets forth the types of "enterprises" which a city might undertake pursuant to the provisions of the Revenue Bond Law of 1941, lists several areas of service which bear no clear connection to the goal of public health protection -- e.g., the providing of public parking lots, airports, and golf courses. A situation in which a city, pursuant to sections 54345 and 54346, might undertake to include within its unified billing procedure services other than those of a utility nature relating to public health protection, would present issues not here before us.
FN 1. The city officials apparently agree with Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes who once wrote: "I do despise a martyr. He is a pigheaded adherent of an inadequate idea." (Howe, Holmes-Laski Letters (1953) p. 119.) And later he added that "martyrs were apt to be damned fools." (Id., p. 227.) Yet history has demonstrated over and again that principled zealots frequently achieve an ultimate transition from obloquy to apotheosis.

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