Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/99-5197/99-5197a-2011-03-24.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 00:13:46+00:00

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Richard Montague, Trial Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were David W. Ogden, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen- eral, Andrea W. McCarthy, Senior Trial Counsel, and Wilma A. Lewis, U.S. Attorney.
Randolph, Circuit Judge: Our first opinion in this case affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court's dismissal of William G. Moore, Jr.'s complaint against a prosecutor and postal inspectors and his complaint against the United States. See Moore v. Valder, 65 F.3d 189 (D.C. Cir. 1995). On remand, the district court again dismissed the claims against the prosecutor, Joseph B. Valder, and granted judgment on the pleadings in favor of the government, rulings from which Moore now appeals.
Moore's basic grievance is that he was unjustly prosecuted on charges concerning his dealings with the United States Postal Service. In the early 1980s, the company Moore headed--REI--wanted to sell the Postal Service multiple-line scanners, but the Service declined. Moore publicly criticized the decision. A Postal Service governor--Peter Voss--sug- gested to REI that it hire the consulting firm GAI to promote its product. REI did so. Voss had a side deal with GAI: thirty percent of the fees REI paid to the consulting firm were kicked back to Voss. After their crimes were discover- ed, Voss and several GAI officials plead guilty. William A. Spartin, GAI's president, negotiated an immunity deal in return for his cooperation.
Postal inspectors and prosecutor Valder, seeking to estab- lish that Moore and REI knew of the kickback scheme, were told instead by each of five of the admitted conspirators, including Spartin, that no one at REI had such knowledge. The postal inspectors later drafted, and the prosecutor pre- sented to the grand jury, "witness statements" for these individuals, but without this exculpatory information. Spar- tin's refusal to implicate Moore prompted Valder to tear up his immunity agreement and threaten to prosecute Spartin's son. Valder and the postal inspectors showed Spartin the government-drafted statements of the other witnesses. (Moore alleges this disclosure was a violation of grand jury secrecy rules.) Spartin continued to deny that he had per- sonal knowledge of Moore's involvement, repeating the point nineteen times during a polygraph test. Spartin then said "I have no knowledge of that at all.... But, you know, I read that goddam[n] testimony and I'm not a lawyer but Jesus, there's enough there to seem to me to hang REI from the yardarm." Spartin then testified before the grand jury that in his "opinion" Moore knew of the kickback scheme.
Postal inspectors also provided witness interview state- ments and lab results to Paul Carlin, a former Postmaster General dismissed by the Board of Governors during the scanner controversy. Then, weeks before an indictment was returned against Moore, the inspectors passed along a draft indictment to Carlin. Carlin later filed a civil RICO claim against Moore, alleging that Moore conspired to have the Board dismiss him.
court granted Moore's motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of the government's case, stating that "[m]uch of what the government characterizes as incriminatory evidence is not persuasive of guilt when viewed in its full context [and] some of the government's evidence is exculpatory and points to- ward innocent conduct...." United States v. Recognition Equip., Inc., 725 F. Supp. 587, 587-88 (D.D.C. 1989).
Moore then brought his suits against Valder and the postal inspectors under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), and against the United States under the Federal Torts Claims Act (FTCA), see 28 U.S.C. ss 2671-2680. After proceedings unnecessary to recount, the district court dismissed the com- plaints and Moore appealed. This court considered whether, as the district court determined, Valder enjoyed absolute immunity from civil liability for malicious prosecution and for retaliatory prosecution.1 See Moore, 65 F.3d at 192-95. Re- lying on the Supreme Court's distinction between a prosecu- tor's role as an advocate and his conduct as an investigator, see Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976), Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478 (1991), Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259 (1993), the court decided that absolute immunity shielded some, but not all, of Valder's conduct. Absolute immunity protected Valder from liability for his "decision to prosecute Moore," "for allegedly concealing exculpatory evidence from the grand jury," "for allegedly manipulating evidence before the grand jury to create a false impression of what Moore knew about the alleged fraudulent schemes," and for failing to disclose exculpatory material before trial. 65 F.3d at 194. But absolute immunity did not apply to Valder's "[i]ntimidat- ing and coercing witnesses into changing their testimony" or "disclosing grand jury information to unauthorized third par- ties." Id. at 194-95.
__________ 1 Moore did not appeal the dismissal of his other Bivens claims. See 65 F.3d at 191 n.3.
function" exception, which protects the government from liability for "the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Govern- ment...." 28 U.S.C. s 2680(a). The following alleged con- duct fell within the exception: "Deciding whether to prose- cute, assessing a witness's credibility to ensure that he is giving an accurate and complete account of what he knows, identifying the evidence to submit to the grand jury and determining whether information is 'exculpatory' and 'materi- al' and therefore must be disclosed pursuant to a Brady request." 65 F.3d at 197. "Disclosing grand jury testimony to unauthorized third parties, however, is not a discretionary activity nor is it inextricably tied to matters requiring the exercise of discretion." Id.
States government." See 28 U.S.C. s 2680(h). " '[I]nvestiga- tive or law enforcement officer' means any officer of the United States who is empowered by law to execute searches, to seize evidence, or to make arrests for violations of Federal law." Id. Postal inspectors are so empowered, see 39 C.F.R. s 233.1, but the district court concluded that federal prosecu- tors are not, see mem. op. at 32 & n.21 (citing Bernard v. United States, 25 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 1994); Gray v. Bell, 542 F. Supp. 927, 932 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd, 712 F.2d 490 (D.C. Cir. 1983)). The district court then ruled that the unprotected conduct of the postal inspectors did not establish a malicious prosecution or abuse-of-process claim and granted judgment in favor of the United States under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). See mem. op. at 32-43.
retaliatory prosecution claim could not go forward. But it is clear to us that the court did not pass judgment on the argument, explicitly or implicitly. It follows that the district court did not contravene the mandate of this court.
__________ 2 It may seem odd that the only official who could not be held liable for malicious or retaliatory prosecution is the prosecutor. A similar point was made in Imbler, to which the Court responded with a quotation: "As is so often the case, the answer must be found in a balance between the evils inevitable in either alternative. In this instance it has been thought in the end better to leave unredressed the wrongs done by dishonest officers than to subject those who try to do their duty to the constant dread of retaliation." Imbler, 424 U.S. at 428 (quoting Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949) (Hand, J.)).
that do not rely on the decision to prosecute. A violation of the Fourth Amendment is one of the more obvious examples.
__________ 3 Moore also contends that the district court improperly denied his request for discovery. But a district court may deny discovery requests when additional facts are not necessary to resolve the summary judgment motion. See White v. Fraternal Order of Police, 909 F.2d 512, 516-17 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (en banc).
inspectors' conduct fell within the FTCA's discretionary func- tion exception, see 65 F.3d at 197, and none of Valder's conduct can be the basis for a malicious prosecution claim against the government because he is not an investigative or law enforcement officer, see 28 U.S.C. s 2680(h).
In order to find that a defendant procured a prosecution, the plaintiff must establish "a chain of causation" linking the defendant's actions with the initiation of criminal proceedings. Dellums v. Powell, 566 F.2d 167, 192 (D.C. Cir. 1977) ("Del- lums I"). Moore's chain consisted of the postal inspectors' releasing of grand jury testimony to Spartin, which caused Spartin to incriminate him, which led to his indictment and then his prosecution.4 See mem. op. at 36; FTCA Complaint p 26.
__________ 4 In his brief, Moore stated only that Valder disclosed grand jury material to Spartin, though he mentions that the inspectors were present at the time. See Brief for Appellant at 10. The govern- ment jumps on this to argue that Moore's claim had to be dismissed because a malicious prosecution claim under the FTCA can rely only on the conduct of investigative or law enforcement officers and Valder is not one. Moore's complaint, however, alleged that "AUSA Valder and the Postal Inspectors violated Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)(2) ... by giving Spartin and former Post- master General Carlin access to the Grand Jury testimony of other witnesses...." FTCA Complaint p 26 (italics added). We there- fore assume that the postal inspectors did play a role in presenting grand jury materials to Spartin.
Powell may have made" to the prosecutors. Id. at 192-93. But Powell had knowingly misled the prosecutors when he failed to disclose the fact that the demonstrators were "peace- ful" and "not that disorderly." Id. at 193. This was suffi- cient evidence "from which the jury could have concluded that Chief Powell had procured the filing of informations...."5 Id.
We see two distinctions between Moore's case and Dellums I. The first is that the postal inspectors themselves did not make the misrepresentations, but allegedly caused Spartin to make them. The district court did not rely on this distinction and we think its effect is only to require Moore to prove an additional link: but for the postal inspectors' disclosure of grand jury testimony to Spartin, he would not have implicat- ed Moore before the grand jury. See Keeton et al. s 119, at 873 (stating that significant "second-hand" involvement in instigating a prosecution is sufficient).
__________ 5 The court ordered a new trial, however, because of improper jury instructions. See id.
initial step is of course a matter of the procedure of the particular jurisdiction; and where prosecution is begun by an indictment, or an information filed by the prosecuting attor- ney, it seems clear that this should be enough, since it constitutes official action and sets the law in motion.").
The government argues that because later actions--the presentation of evidence to the grand jury, for instance-- were protected, Moore's case collapses. The district court seemed to agree. See mem. op. at 37. If this were enough to break the chain of causation, if the "discretionary function" of presenting evidence to the grand jury or prosecuting the plaintiff shielded prior misconduct from liability, a plaintiff would never be able to make out a malicious prosecution claim against the government. Yet the FTCA specifically recognizes the tort of malicious prosecution. See 28 U.S.C. s 2680(h). We think it follows that although a plaintiff may not rely on an official's alleged misconduct during the exer- cise of discretionary functions, this does not immunize earlier, unprotected misconduct from ordinary principles of tort liabil- ity. Cf. Jones v. City of Chicago, 856 F.2d 985, 994 (7th Cir. 1988); Restatement (Second) of Torts s 653 cmt. g.
duct and Spartin's testimony, then the United States cannot be held liable. See Jones, 856 F.2d at 993. Since the case is still at the pleading stage, there is no telling how the evidence will turn out. All that concerns us now is that the complaint sufficiently set forth the first element of the malicious prose- cution tort. See Krieger v. Fadely, 2000 WL 489428, at *2 (D.C. Cir. May 5, 2000).
Under District of Columbia law, abuse of process occurs when "process has been used to accomplish some end which is without the regular purview of the process, or which compels the party against whom it is used to do some collateral thing which he could not legally and regularly be required to do." Jacobson v. Thrifty Paper Boxes, Inc., 230 A.2d 710, 711 (D.C. 1967) (citing 1 Am. Jur. 2d Abuse of Process s 4 (1962)). Local courts have emphasized that "[t]he critical concern in abuse of process cases is whether process was used to accom- plish an end unintended by law...." Morowitz v. Marvel, 423 A.2d 196, 198 (D.C. 1980); accord Bown v. Hamilton, 601 A.2d 1074, 1079 (D.C. 1992); see also Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486 n.5 (1994); Scott v. District of Columbia, 101 F.3d 748, 755 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ("The essence of the tort of abuse of process is the use of the legal system 'to accomplish some end which is without the regular purview of the pro- cess....' " (quoting Bown v. Hamilton, 601 A.2d 1074, 1079 (D.C. 1992)). The Restatement also focuses on this element of the tort: "For abuse of process to occur there must be use of the process for an immediate purpose other than that for which it was designed and intended." Restatement (Second) of Torts s 682 cmt. b.
__________ 6 Given that the indictment became public, we do not see how letting Carlin look at the draft could have damaged Moore unless the draft contained information omitted from the final version. We shall assume that the draft contained such information and that it was grand jury material.
__________ evidence to the grand jury--that is a discretionary function immune from suit under the FTCA. See Moore, 65 F.3d at 197; see also Doe v. Stephens, 851 F.2d 1457, 1462-63 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (causing a grand jury subpoena to issue falls within discretionary function exception). For another, prosecutors, not postal inspectors, con- vene and conduct grand jury proceedings--and the actions of a prosecutor cannot give rise to an abuse-of-process claim under the FTCA. See mem. op. at 32 & n.21 (citing 28 U.S.C. s 2680(h)).

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