Source: https://texascivilrightsreview.org/2010/07/21/hazahzas-appeal-for-immediate-release/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 07:12:59+00:00

Document:
of Magistrate Judge Paul D. Stickney.
held in abeyance until May 2, 2007. FCR. at 11.
amendment ensuring Courts have jurisdiction over due process claims).
(citation omitted); see also Rosales-Garcia v. Holland, 322 F.3d 386, 410 (6th Cir.
indefinite imprisonment at the will of the Executive.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S.
445 F.3d at 801 (quoting Torres-Aguilar v. INS, 246 F.3d 1267, 1271 (9th Cir.
were constitutionally sufficient. See Kentucky Department of Corrections v.
discharge from continued confinement of insanity acquittal).
flight.” Ngo v. INS, 192 F.3d 390, 399 (3d Cir. 1999).
review of the detention of Petitioners Mirvat, Hisham, Suzan and Ahmad.
procedures. This is so even where the internal procedures are possibly more rigorous than otherwise would be required.” Id. (citing Service v. Duties, 354 U.S.
statute… [and also] must respect their own procedural rules and regulations.”) U.S.
the agency itself); Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023 1041 (5th Cir.
the context of discretionary relief. See, e.g., United States ex rel.
(1954); United States ex rel. Hintopoulos v. Shaughnessy, 353 U.S.
discretion, to inquiry on the writ’).
St. Cyr v. INS, 533 U.S. 289, 308 (2001) (emphasis added).
that is presumptively reasonable. As such, ICE must release them forthwith.
Petitioners are a flight risk.
cannot withstand even the most basic of Constitutional scrutiny.
in the hands of the agency that cannot be circumvented in the name of expediency.
family for at least an additional three months.
statement of procedures normally used in mailing forms and requests to aliens.
deemed a flight risk as a result.
proof of a known residence. Petitioner Mirvat is married to a United States citizen.
under regulations prescribed by the Attorney General.
INA § 241(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a) (emphasis added).
changed circumstance is a legal error which undermines the Board’s decision.”).
failed to provide a tenable justification for continued detention.
must be “narrowly tailored” so as not to be excessive in relation to its purpose.
alternative purpose assigned’”) (citing Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 269 (1984)).
unconstitutional in this instance, even if authorized by statute as a general matter.
well-beyond the 90-day period post-order of removal.
INA § 241(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a).
within the 90-day period, if possible.).
otherwise absconded during this time.
activities that the Attorney General prescribes for the alien.
interpretation. See e.g.,; Horner v. Jeffrey, 823 F.2d 1521, 1530-32 (Fed. Cir.
alien.”); Vargas v. INS, 938 F.2d 358, 363 (2d Cir. 1991) (same).
U.S., at 684-686 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
upon Vulaj v. Baker, 2006 WL 3253256 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 8, 2006), is misplaced.
statute permitting detention well-beyond the 90-day order of removal. As such, this Court is respectfully urged to find that, in accordance with Zadvydas, 533 U.S.
Petitioner without further undue delay.

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