Source: http://il.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20180731_0001595.NIL.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 17:25:23+00:00

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FindACase | Horia v. Nationwide Credit And Collection, Inc.
Horia v. Nationwide Credit And Collection, Inc.
NATIONWIDE CREDIT AND COLLECTION, INC., Defendant.
Plaintiff Henry Horia has sued Defendant Nationwide Credit and Collection, Inc. (“Nationwide”) alleging violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692, et seq., and the Illinois Collection Agency Act (“ICAA”), 225 ILCS 425, et seq. Now before the Court is Nationwide's motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Dkt. No. 13.) In its motion, Nationwide argues that Horia's claims are barred under the doctrine of res judicata. For the reasons that follow, the Court agrees and Nationwide's motion is thus granted.
For purposes of the instant motion, the Court accepts the facts alleged in the complaint as true and draws all inferences in Horia's favor. See Carlson v. CSX Transp., Inc., 758 F.3d 819, 826 (7th Cir. 2014).
In light of the dismissal with prejudice of Horia I, Nationwide now moves to dismiss the present case on the basis that Horia has engaged in impermissible claim-splitting by bringing the two suits separately. Nationwide argues that by splitting his claims, Horia is attempting to circumvent the $1, 000 limit on statutory damages for an FDCPA action and allow CLG to recover attorney's fees twice. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692k(a)(2)(A), (a)(3).
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Facts that are “merely consistent with” a defendant's liability and conclusory statements are, by themselves, insufficient. Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Instead, a claim may be considered plausible when “the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Adams v. City of Indianapolis, 742 F.3d 720, 728 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).
Nationwide argues that Horia's FDCPA claim should be dismissed because it is an attempt at claim-splitting, which is prohibited under the doctrine of res judicata. Res judicata “promotes predictability in the judicial process, preserves the limited resources of the judiciary, and protects litigants from the expense and disruption of being haled into court repeatedly.” Palka v. City of Chicago, 662 F.3d 428, 437 (7th Cir. 2011). When it applies, the doctrine precludes the subsequent litigation of claims that were raised or could have been raised in a prior action. Barr v. Bd. of Tr. of W. Ill. Univ., 796 F.3d 837, 839 (7th Cir. 2015). Res judicata “blocks a second lawsuit if there is (1) an identity of the parties in the two suits; (2) a final judgment on the merits in the first; and (3) an identity of the causes of action.” Id. at 840 (citing Palka, 662 F.3d at 437).
The first element of res judicata is satisfied here because the parties are identical in Horia I and the present suit. The second element is also met, as a dismissal with prejudice pursuant to a settlement agreement is a final judgment on the merits. See Brooks-Ngwenya v. Indianapolis Pub. Sch., 564 F.3d 804, 808-09 (7th Cir. 2009). However, the parties dispute whether the third element is satisfied. Nationwide argues that due to the similarities between Horia I and the present case, the causes of action in the two cases are the same. Horia, on the other hand, contends that res judicata does not apply because the two cases concern two different debts.
To determine whether an identity of the cause of action exists, federal courts apply the “same transaction” test. See Czarniecki v. City of Chicago, 633 F.3d 545, 548 & n.3 (7th Cir. 2011). The test is fact-oriented-“[t]wo claims are one for purposes of res judicata if they are based on the same, or nearly the same, factual allegations.” Id. at 550 (quoting Brzostowski v. Laidlaw Waste Sys., Inc., 49 F.3d 337, 339 (7th Cir. 1995)). In other words, “[w]hether there is an identity of the cause of action depends on whether the claims comprise the same core of operative facts that give rise to a remedy.” Adams, 742 F.3d at 736 (internal quotation marks omitted). And “[o]nce a transaction has caused [an] injury, all claims arising from that transaction must be brought in one suit or be lost.” Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 789 F.2d 589, 593 (7th Cir. 1986).

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