Source: http://bc-injury-law.com/blog/tag/post-traumatic-stress-disorder
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 18:53:22+00:00

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Reasons for judgement were published today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, assessing damages for post traumatic stress disorder as a result of a vehicle collision.
 On a balance of probabilities, I find that Ms. Harmati’s present disability, both physical and psychological, is a result of the accident. I accept Dr. O’Shaughnessy’s opinion that the PTSD was triggered by the accident, and I am satisfied that there is a substantial connection between the injuries Ms. Harmati suffered in this accident and her present symptoms sufficient to impose liability on the Defendants. Just as the Defendants are liable for any physical injuries caused to Ms. Harmati, they are too liable for any psychological injuries that arose from this accident.
 A few lay witnesses testified as to Ms. Harmati’s ongoing limitations.
 Mr. Gosling testified that Ms. Harmati is responsible for most of the cleaning, but that they don’t keep a clean house, and that Ms. Harmati is responsible for most of the cooking. She does more now than she did when they first cohabited because she is no longer working. I found Mr. Gosling a measured and careful witness, whose evidence I found credible.
 Mr. Gosling testified that Ms. Harmati does not want to be a burden, so she will insist on performing tasks that then require her to rest, such as carrying groceries and pots of boiling water.
 Having considered the evidence and cases, it is my view that an award of non-pecuniary damages in the amount of $100,000 is appropriate.
Reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, assessing damages for chronic psychological difficulties which arose as a result of a collision.
 The evidence of the plaintiff’s co-workers, son and friends indicates that the plaintiff, prior to the accident, was a high energy and enthusiastic teacher and that those traits carried through into her day to day life. They have all had the opportunity to observe and deal with her both before and after the accident.
 I am satisfied that as a result of the accident the plaintiff has gone from an independent, energetic teacher with an active and varied social life to an individual who is no longer able to work as a teacher, particularly of young children, who can no longer tolerate large groups nor the over stimulation of a variety of social situations. Her intention to keep working past 65 years of age has been thwarted as a result of this motor vehicle accident.
 Given the age of the plaintiff and the fact that it is now 5 years after the accident I am satisfied that the plaintiff while having recovered from the soft tissue injuries and to a certain extent from the PTSD has not, as noted by Dr. Shane completely recovered. Her present and future level of recovery is evidenced by Dr. Shane’s opinion that her status occupationally is unlikely to change and that she remains unable to return to teaching art.
 Having observed the plaintiff, her evidence of the effect of the accident and the corroborating evidence of the lay witnesses, as well as the medical evidence, I am satisfied that the plaintiff will not return to employment.
 Taking into account the evidence in this case as well as the authorities cited I am satisfied that an appropriate award for pain and suffering and a modest amount for loss of housekeeping is $90,000.
 Given my findings with respect to the pre-accident complaints there shall be no reduction for them.
Reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Supreme Court, Vernon Registry, assessing damages arising from injuries sustained a motor vehicle collision.
 The plaintiff indicated that the accident has left her with a feeling of vulnerability. She is very anxious in a motor vehicle, especially on highways, envisioning accidents unfolding. There are occasional panic attacks. She gets a tingling and pain down her right arm that is aggravated by repetitive motion and particular movements or positions. One of these, I note, was holding her child while breastfeeding. Others relate to her work as a vet.
 This plaintiff is a young professional, early in her career. She has historically been a high-achiever, endowed with intelligence, motivation and physical ability. The motor vehicle collision came as she was planning her wedding and the purchase of a business. Her wedding, as described by her, was not the enjoyable experience that she, as a young woman, had dreamed of.
 Taking what one can from those authorities and applying the general principles, as referenced in Stapley, it is my conclusion that an appropriate award for general damages is $75,000.
PTSD Claim By Accident Witness Dismissed as "Too Remote"
If a witness to a BC motor vehicle collision suffers psychological injuries as a result of what they see they can claim damages. There are, however, restrictions on when these claims can succeed. Reasons for judgement were released today addressing this area of law.
In today’s case (Deros v. McCauley) the Plaintiff witnessed a collision caused by an “inebriated” driver in 2001. At the time the Plaintiff was working on Highway 97 near Bear Lake, BC. The Plaintiff was installing rumble strips on the side of the highway. The Plaintiff was operating a sweeper and his friend, (Mr. Lance) was operating a grinder nearby. The Defendant lost control of a pickup truck and collided with the grinder. The Plaintiff witnessed the crash and was concerned for his friend. Fortunately Mr. Lance “was not seriously injured“.
 The cases, to which I was referred, where damages for nervous shock have been awarded to witnesses of accidents who were not physically involved in the accidents, involve accidents or events which are more shocking than the accident in this case. All the cases involved accidents in which someone has died or been seriously injured: James v. Gillespie,  B.C.J. No. 442 (S.C.); Arnold v. Cartwright Estate, 2007 BCSC 1602; Easton v. Ramadanovic Estate (1988), 27 B.C.L.R. (2d) 45; Stegemann v. Pasemko, 2007 BCSC 1062; James v. Gillespie,  B.C.J. No. 442 (S.C.); Kwok v. British Columbia Ferry Corp. (1987), 20 B.C.L.R. (2d) 318 (S.C.).
The law in this province, as formulated by Rhodes, requires that the plaintiffs, in order to succeed, must experience something more than the surprise and other emotional responses that naturally follow from learning of the death of a friend or relative. Instead, there must be something more that separates actionable responses from the understandable grief, sorrow and loss that ordinarily follow the receipt of such information. In Rhodes, Taylor and Wood JJ.A. described the requisite experience as alarming and startling (and therefore sudden and unexpected), horrifying, shocking and frightening, and Southin J.A. referred to a “fright, terror or horror”.
 In this case, Mr. Deros witnessed a collision that involved no serious injuries. Even if I accept Mr. Deros’ evidence at trial that he initially thought a rod had skewered Mr. Lance, he knew within minutes this did not occur and Mr. Lance had not suffered serious injury….
 There is no evidence that a person of ordinary fortitude would have suffered nervous shock injury or mental illness as a result of witnessing this accident. The experts testified about Mr. Deros’ particular reaction to the accident, but not that a person of ordinary fortitude would have suffered mental injury.
 Mr. Deros does not argue that a person of ordinary fortitude would suffer mental injury from witnessing this accident. Rather, Mr. Deros argues that the evidence from the experts establishes that he was more prone to suffer from PTSD than an ordinary person was from witnessing this accident. As stated earlier, Mr. Deros argues that the evidence supports a finding he suffered mental or psychological injury from witnessing this accident because he was more prone to injury as a result of his pre-existing condition, i.e. he was a thin skull, and was not a person of ordinary fortitude.
 Having failed to establish that a person of ordinary fortitude would suffer a mental injury from witnessing this accident, it follows that Mr. Deros’ claim must fail.
Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court awarding a Plaintiff close to $340,000 in total damages as a result of injuries and loss from a BC car crash.
 The plaintiff was 43 years old at the time of this accident. She suffered injuries which, although not requiring more than a brief visit to the hospital, were nonetheless significant. The medical evidence was mostly consistent: her physical injuries include moderate right paracentral disc herniation at C3-4 on the right side and moderate paracentral disc protrusion at C6-7 on the left causing irritation of the left C7 root; and a bulging lumbar disc irritating the lumbar roots, all of which result in chronic left-sided neck, arm and low back pain, dizziness and headaches. She suffered from PTSD, now substantially resolved, but still suffers from insomnia, occasional nightmares, depression and chronic pain some three years after the accident.
 The chronic pain caused by the injuries received in the accident has resulted in depression, no doubt complicated by her difficult financial situation, but the plaintiff was happy and energetic before the accident notwithstanding the fact that she had very little money.
 She was able to work in a job which did not require great skill and which did not pay well but in which she could have continued for the indefinite future. It gave her some income and gave her the sense of participating in her family’s finances.
 The evidence of her friends and family support the substantial change she has undergone as a result of the accident. From a positive, lively person who enjoyed participating in her community, she has become somewhat reclusive and quiet and it appears she may even lose her romantic relationship because her physical limitations interfere with the activities she used to enjoy with her boyfriend.
 While she had suffered brief episodes of depression in the past, I am satisfied they were reactive depressions and were fully resolved at the time of the accident. I have no doubt that because she has suffered depression in the past, she was vulnerable to depression, but she is the thin-skulled plaintiff here rather than a crumbling skull plaintiff. However, I find that the depression which followed the accident and her chronic pain means that she is at risk of developing an even more severe depression in the future.
 Immediately following the accident, the plaintiff also had chest bruising and abrasions which resolved quickly. Her knee injury troubled her for about six months but is now resolved.
 There is a possibility she will require surgery in the future to address the herniation at C6-7 since the conservative treatment measures employed so far have not provided the plaintiff with any relief. She has resisted this surgery because, even if it is successful, she will be left with continuing neck pain so resort to surgery would only be a desperate measure if she begins to suffer nerve damage which follows from the herniation or if her chronic pain worsens.
 The plaintiff’s anxiety is worsened by the possibility she will need surgery in the future.
 The plaintiff is also less able to perform her household work than she was and has received assistance from her children. When she does do her housework, she does it more slowly and with some pain. This is a substantial change from the enthusiastic homemaker she was before the accident.
 I have considered the plaintiff’s loss of housekeeping capacity and the help she has been given and will continue to receive from her children under this head of damages and would assess the loss at $10,000.
 Considering the factors listed above, and upon reviewing the case law provided by both counsel, I find that an appropriate award of non-pecuniary damages is $100,000.00, including the loss of housekeeping capacity.
 Dr. Davis’ report differed substantially from those of all other experts. It is his opinion that none of the plaintiff’s current emotional difficulties stems from the motor vehicle accident. He is firmly of the view that her depression is solely attributable to her financial problems, her lack of a supporting husband and her limited skills in English.
 To support his position, Dr. Davis pointed to the two reactive depressions which had affected the plaintiff before the accident as establishing an “ongoing depression” and therefore her current symptoms were not causally related to the motor vehicle accident of October 2006.
 I note that when he wrote his report, Dr. Davis had not reviewed Dr. Tomaszewski’s notes of appointments with the plaintiff one week following the accident which recorded the occurrence of nightmares and acute anxiety. Dr. Davis stated that these symptoms were important but appeared to minimize them by indicating they would only be a problem caused by the accident in the first six months or so, at the same time as her soft tissue injuries should have been resolving.
 I have reviewed Dr. Davis’ testimony and find it to be argumentative, unyielding and seriously at odds with what I view to be the preponderance of other and more credible medical evidence. I do not accept his findings.
Tags: BC Pain and Suffering Cases, disc herniation, disc injury, disc protrusion, Dr. Davis, icbc injury claims, post traumatic stress disorder, PTSD, Smusz v. Wolf Chevrolet Ltd.
Reasons for judgment were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vernon Registry, awarding a Plaintiff just over $142,000 in total damages as a result of a 2005 BC Car Crash.
 There is evidence that the plaintiff has suffered from depression off and on since 1994, including post-partum depression after the births of her children. Additionally, the plaintiff has had a tumultuous relationship with her now ex-husband, which has certainly affected her emotional state. There is evidence, however, that the plaintiff’s prescription for depression medication a few months prior to the Accident was not filled. Dr. Pirolli stated in her report that the plaintiff’s current emotional problems include PTSD and low mood. The PTSD, as I have stated above, is a consequence of the Accident. Regarding the plaintiff’s low mood, Dr. Pirolli stated that it could not “be directly attributed to the accident itself. There is the possibility, however, that any psychological issues present at the time of the accident may have been exacerbated by the accident and its sequelae”. In my view, the plaintiff’s depression prior to the Accident was not significant, and I find that the plaintiff was not suffering from debilitating depression at the time of the Accident.
 As mentioned above, the plaintiff’s cuts and bruises resolved within three to six months after the Accident. She is left with a permanent one-inch scar on her elbow, a three and a half inch c-shaped scar on her left knee, and a dark scar on her left shin. Her nose was broken and she had dizziness and headaches. As described in the medical evidence above, the plaintiff’s right wrist pain, right shoulder and right chest area injuries have persisted. Though Dr. Travlos was of the view that the plaintiff would continue to improve over the next 18 months (from his report of April 2007), he stated: “To what extent she recovers is difficult to say at this time and a definitive prognosis cannot be made”. The plaintiff’s problems have not improved to any great extent over the course of the 18 months following that report.
 Dr. Travlos was of the view that the plaintiff’s problems of chronic pain syndrome related to the diffused soft-tissue pain that the plaintiff suffered in the right arm and shoulder. In cross-examination he stated that it was unlikely that the plaintiff will fully recover and there is no guarantee that participation in treatment recommendations will result in improvements of those symptoms. The plaintiff’s injuries restrict her ability to participate in physical activities that she formerly enjoyed, such as skiing and baseball. I believe, however, that part of the reason the plaintiff does not participate in these sports is because of a lack of financial resources.
 I am satisfied that taking into consideration the plaintiff’s PTSD and her multiple injuries, an appropriate award for non-pecuniary general damages would be $90,000.
Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court awarding just over $320,000 in damages as a result of a serious BC Truck Accident.
ICBC admitted fault on behalf of the driver of the other vehicle leaving the court to deal only with an assessment of damages.
 Mr. Bonham was involved in a horrific collision which could easily have been fatal for him, as it was for the other driver. Although his minor physical injuries healed quickly, he suffered and continues to suffer from post traumatic stress disorder. There is no doubt that his psychological complaints are genuine and that this condition has a very real and severe impact on his life. His personality has changed. He no longer interacts with family and friends as he used to. He has lost confidence in his abilities and lost interest in most of the things he formerly enjoyed. The psychological symptoms persist more than two years after the collision. Although the plaintiff can expect some improvement in his condition, some symptoms are likely to remain indefinitely.
 Non-pecuniary damages must be assessed according to the impact of the injuries on the individual plaintiff. Decisions of the court in other cases are never completely comparable and provide no more than general guidance. However, recent decisions of this court that I have found particularly helpful in identifying a range of damages applicable to this care are: Leung v. Foo, 2009 BCSC 747; Carpenter v. Whistler Air Services, 2004 BCSC 1510; and Latuszek v. Bell Air Taxi, 2009 BCSC 798.
 Taking into account the differences and similarities between those cases and this one and, most importantly, the evidence of the impact of this plaintiff’s injuries on his life, I find $75,000 to be an appropriate award for non-pecuniary damages.
This case is also worth reviewing for the courts awards of Loss of Future Earning Capacity.
In this case the Plaintiff’s past wage loss was modest up to the time of trial totalling neat $6,000. Notwithstanding this minimal past wage loss the Court awarded significant damages of $225,000 for loss of future earning capacity because of the ongoing impact of the Plaintiff’s PTSD on his ability to work in his own occupation. Paragraphs 28-42 of this case are worth reviewing for anyone interested in the law of damages in BC relating to future wage loss.
Reasons for judgment were released today by the BC Supreme Court awarding a Plaintiff damages as a result of a signficicant motor vehicle accident which occurred in Burnaby, BC in 2005.
The Defendant lost control of a garbage truck which tipped over and landed on the Plaintiff’s Honda Civic. A photo of the collision is included at paragraph 2 of the reasons for judgement and this is worth glancing at to get a feel for the severity of this impact.
The Plaintiff was knocked unconsious as a result of the crash. His Glasgo Coma Scale was 9 by the time the ambulance crew arrived and this qucikly rebounded to 15 by the time the Plaintiff arrived at hospital.
There was no dispute that the Plaintiff suffered various injuries as a result of this crash, what was at issue was the ‘nature and extent of the Plaintiff’s current condiction and the degree to which improvement may occur in the future’.
 (The Plaintiff) has clearly suffered physical and psychiatric injury as a result of the August 19, 2005 collision. I accept that his injuries caused him headaches, back pain and neck pain and pain in his shoulder. Likely, he would have had some neck and shoulder problems from his previous condition without the August 2005 injury, however that injury clearly either initiated them anew or made them worse. The physical problems |(the Plaintiff) suffered because of the August 19, 2005 collision have, by the date of the trial almost three years later, largely resolved as documented in the medical records, however his psychiatric ones have not, and there is an issue that he may still be suffering symptoms of a mild traumatic brain injury in addition to his PTSD and major depressive disorder. (the Plaintiff) was clearly rendered unconscious by some degree of impact to his head as evidenced by the ambulance crew reports, Mr. Touffaha’s observations and the glass found embedded in his scalp. I find that (the Plaintiff) probably suffered a mild traumatic injury to his brain at the time of the collision.
 Whether or not (the Plaintiff) still is affected by his mild traumatic brain injury is not clear, particularly because his psychiatric condition can produce the same symptoms at this point. On the balance of probabilities, I accept the opinion of Dr. Teal, the neurologist, that (the Plaintiff) has not sustained persisting cognitive impairment as a result of traumatic brain injury, and will not have any long-term cognitive sequelae as a result of a neurological injury.
 I also find, on the balance of probabilities that while (the Plaintiff) was initially rendered essentially catatonic for the first six months following the collision, he has since that time made significant improvement, and I accept the opinion of Dr. Wiseman that with a course of cognitive behavioural therapy conducted by a specialist in that field, he will continue to make improvements. On the other hand, I accept that he will likely continue to have problems and symptoms from his PTSD and depression for the rest of his life. I find that it is highly unlikely that (the Plaintiff)will be able to return to his employment at Coastal Ford or any other competitive employment. The medical evidence is that to the date of trial he has been unfit for employment. He is now 67 years old, an age at which neither the body nor the brain is particularly resilient. His mental state in my opinion is and will remain too fragile for him to be competitively employed.
 The result of this collision and its consequent injuries to (the Plaintiff) is that he has lost a large measure of who he was. While human identity is partially associated with physical ability, it is much more related to a person’s mental state and abilities. (the Plaintiff) is quite simply not the man he was. Rather than being energetically and happily employed as the lease manager for Coastal Ford, he is unemployed. Rather than being the social outgoing man he was, he is socially withdrawn and has little or no interest in conversing about anything. Rather than being the patriarch supporting his family, he is dependent upon them in a way that corrodes his relationship with his wife and children. I find there is a real likelihood he will make progress in these areas so that his life is more enjoyable, however I do not think that will extend to re-employment.
 I assess general damages for the loss (the Plaintiff) has suffered consequent upon the collision for which the defendants are responsible at $200,000.
In reasons for judgement released today, the BC Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal of a $70,000 award of damages as a result of 2004 BC car accident.
The Plaintiff sued claiming various injuries including soft tissue injury, depression, anxiety, irremediable personality change, brain damage, concussion, post-consussion syndromne, post-traumatic stress disorder and chronic pain syndrome. The Trial Judge recjected the medical diasnoses of brain injury, PTSD and post-concussion Syndrome. In rejecting some of the alleged injuries the trial judge found that the Plaintiff was ‘unreliable’ as a witness.
The Plaintiff sought damages of over $1.7 Million. Given the trial judges findings a total of $70,000 in damages was awarded.
The Plaintiff appealed arguing tha the trial judge disregarded the evidence of four lay witnesses and three expert witnesses. The Plaintiff also argued that the trial judge should have confronted the Plaintiff during the trial to address the court’s concerns with her reliability.
 The plaintiff maintains that the rule established in the case of Browne v. Dunn (1893), 6 R. 67 (H.L.) applies to trial judges as well as opposing parties. The rule is that “if you intend to impeach a witness you are bound, whilst he is in the box, to give him an opportunity of making any explanation which is open to him” (at 70). The plaintiff says that, before determining that the plaintiff was lying, the trial judge was required to put that proposition to the plaintiff while she was testifying.
 The plaintiff cites no authority to the effect that the rule in Browne v. Dunn applies to judges. This is hardly surprising because such a rule would be antithetical to the role of a judge in Canada. In this country, we have an adversarial system, not an inquisitorial one.
 Such a rule would be unworkable with respect to judges in our system. Judges are required to be fair and impartial, and are expected to hear all of the evidence before making final decisions on the credibility of witnesses. They should not be required to confront a witness if they are concerned that there is any possibility that, after hearing all of the evidence, they may not accept all of the testimony given by the witness.
 The rule in Browne v. Dunn is not suited for application to judges. The rule stipulates that if the opposing party is intending to introduce evidence contradicting the testimony of a witness, such evidence should be put to the witness so that he or she will have an opportunity to provide an explanation. What is being suggested in this case is not that anticipated evidence be put to the witness, but that the judge should confront the witness with the possibility that the judge may conclude that the witness is not credible. That is not the rule in Browne v. Dunn – the rule does not require opposing counsel to confront a witness with the proposition that the witness is being untruthful before making submissions to the judge at the end of the trial that the witness should be found not to be credible.
 In addition, the rule in Browne v. Dunn has not been treated as an absolute rule. Evidence contradicting a witness’s testimony may be admitted despite a failure to put it to the witness, and the failure goes to the weight to be given to the evidence. This feature of the rule is not adaptable to judges.
 The plaintiff says the case of Volzhenin v. Haile, 2007 BCCA 317, 70 B.C.L.R. (4th) 15, is an example of what a trial judge is supposed to do in confronting a witness about whose credibility the judge has reservations. The ground of appeal in that case was that the plaintiff had not been given a fair trial because, among other things, “the trial judge intervened excessively, thus giving an inquisitorial aspect to the trial that detracted from the disinterested and impartial hearing to which he was entitled” (paragraph 14). In dismissing the appeal, this Court was not recommending the approach taken by the judge in that case. It simply held that the judge had not “improperly interjected himself into the hearing, or otherwise created an appearance of an unfair trial” (paragraph 25). Indeed, Volzhenin v. Haile illustrates the type of problem that could arise if judges were required to confront witnesses about their veracity.

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