Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&amp;view=article&amp;id=30467:g-r-no-75315-may-7,-1990-bell-carpets-international-trading-corporation-v-court-of-appeals,-et-al&amp;catid=1263&amp;Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 08:16:47+00:00

Document:
BELL CARPETS INTERNATIONAL TRADING CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MILAGROS CAGUIOA, VICTOR R. STA. ANA, and MANILA BAY SPINNING MILLS, INC., Respondents.
Carmelito M. Santayo, for Petitioners.
Doroja Law Office for Respondents.
1.	REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION; CERTIORARI; CANNOT BE A SUBSTITUTE FOR THE REMEDY OF APPEAL. — The judgment of the Trial Court sought to be annulled has become final and executory by reason of BCITC’s failure to appeal therefrom within the time appointed, i.e., 15 days from notice of the judgment. The summary judgment was unquestionably a final one. It disposed of the case on the merits. It definitively declared which party was in the right and the nature and extent of the obligations of one party in relation to the other, and left nothing more to be done by the trial Court. The remedy against such a judgment is an appeal, regardless of the questions sought to be raised on appeal, whether of fact, or of law, whether involving jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion of the Trial Court. No appeal was taken from the summary judgment. Instead a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court was filed with the Intermediate Appellate Court praying for the annulment of the judgment. But it is obvious that the party aggrieved thereby did not have the option to substitute the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 for the remedy of appeal provided for in Rule 41. Indeed, the existence and availability of the right of appeal are antithetical to the availment of the special civil action of certiorari. The summary judgment having thus become final and executory, the proceedings at bar for its annulment are futile and inefficacious.
4.	ID.; PROVISIONAL REMEDIES; PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT; CLAIM OF TITLE TO THE PROPERTY SEIZED; NOT ESTABLISHED IN CASE AT BAR. — Petitioner BCITC’s claim of title to the property seized from Carpets International under the writ of preliminary attachment of the Trial Court, is not genuine, but sham and fictitious. This is amply proven by the factual findings of the Intermediate Appellate Court on this point, by which this Court is normally bound, viz.: "As to the ownership of the attached properties the following clearly demonstrate that the same was vested in Carpets International and that none of them was owned by petitioner (BCITC); (1) The attached goods were found and were stored in the factory compound of Carpets International at 1st Street, Maria Real Estate Subdivision, Bo. Bagumbayan, Taguig Metro Manila, the same address where private respondent (MBSMI) delivered the yarns purchased by Carpets International from it. (No acceptable explanation is given by petitioner as to how these goods which it claims its own found their way to the factory of Carpets International). (2) Carpets International filed a bond to have the attachment discharged which attachment covered the goods claimed by petitioner as well. (If Carpets International was not the owner of the goods, it would not have bothered to file a bond for the discharge of the attachment). (3) On the other hand, Petitioner, aside from its bare claim, had presented no evidence to show how it came to be owner of the attached goods."
Carpets International filed an answer dated November 27, 1984 denying the allegations of paragraphs 2 to 13 inclusive, of the complaint, the "truth of the matter," according to it, being that (a) the yarn had been sold to it "on consignment basis . . . to be manufactured to carpets to be paid from the proceeds of the sale of the manufactured carpets;" (b) 21 sales invoices were not signed by it, hence the yarn therein described was not received; (c) the post-dated checks were given as security for the consigned yarn; (d) the yarn could not have been received during the indicated period because there was a strike in the company at the time; (e) some of the yarn delivered was made out of waste cotton and was hence withdrawn by MBSMI and never replaced; (f) Carpets International had not refused to pay its debt, indeed there were on-going negotiations between it and MBSMI; (g)it had not removed or disposed its properties, in fact the same were already encumbered in favor of banking institutions, nor had it misappropriated or converted the yarn. On these premises, Carpets International also sought the dissolution of the attachment.
"On 7 December 1984, Carpets International filed a counterbond of P771,700.23 to secure the dissolution of the attachment, which dissolution was granted but subsequently restored on motion of private respondent (MBSMI) and the filing of a bond of P1 million.
In a motion dated 29 December 1984, private respondent moved for leave to implead petitioner (Bell Carpets International Trading Corporation, BCITC for brevity) as party defendant for the reason that it and Carpets International are one and the same entity, the latter having been merged into the former. Private respondent filed its amended complaint dated 2 January 1985, praying that petitioner (BCITC) and Carpets International be ordered jointly and severally to pay it the amounts claimed in its original complaint.
On 1 February 1985, the Honorable respondent Judge granted private respondent’s motion to implead petitioner as party defendant. On this day also Carpets International filed a manifestation stating that none of the items attached by respondent sheriff on 4 December 1984 belonged to it.
Petitioner filed its answer dated 25 February 1985 claiming that it is a separate and distinct corporation duly organized under the laws of the Philippines and that it had no participation in the alleged transactions between Carpet International and private Respondent. It set up a counterclaim against private respondent praying that the attachment on its properties consisting of finished goods, inventory and hand-tools valued at P867,000.00 be lifted and the articles returned to it; the amended complaint be dismissed as against it; and, private respondent be ordered to pay it actual damages of P867,000.00, damages of P200,000.00, exemplary damages of P50,000.00, and attorney’s fees of P50,000.00.
Private respondent filed a motion for summary judgment dated 20 August 1985 for the reason that the indebtedness, the amount thereof, and the ownership of the attached properties were all admitted by Carpets International and its responsible officers and, therefore, there are no disputed facts. Despite opposition by petitioner and Carpets International, the Honorable respondent Judge rendered a Summary Judgment on 18 September 1985 ordering Carpets International to pay private respondent the sum of P771,700.23, with legal rate of interest thereon from 23 October 1983 until fully paid; to pay private respondent the equivalent of 15% of the total unpaid claim as attorney’s fees; and to pay the costs of suit.
In a motion dated 23 September 1985, private respondent moved for execution pending appeal because: (1) the finished goods that were attached easily deteriorate and go out of fashion insofar as the shades and colors are concerned, thus making them unsaleable, and their continued storage will only make them dirty and further depreciate their value; (2) the judgment may become ineffective as Carpets International is in imminent danger of insolvency as it has not been in operation since the inception of the strike of its employees; (3) the indebtedness and the amount thereof are not denied by Carpets International and therefore, any appeal would be purely dilatory. Aside from opposing the aforesaid motion, Carpets International and petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the summary judgment.
BCITC filed a special civil action of certiorari with the Intermediate Appellate Court, praying that the summary judgment be annulled and a trial on the merits had. But by decision dated June 11, 1986, the Intermediate Appellate Court 6 affirmed the summary judgment, 7 and denied on July 9, 1986 BCITC’s motion for reconsideration thereafter filed. BCITC has appealed to this Court on certiorari.
2)	the order authorizing levy on execution on property of BCITC and the sale thereof at public auction was a despotic exercise of judicial authority.
The petition must be denied for lack of merit.
In the first place, the judgment of the Trial Court sought to be annulled has become final and executory by reason of BCITC’s failure to appeal therefrom within the time appointed, i.e., 15 days from notice of the judgment. The summary judgment was unquestionably a final one. It disposed of the case on the merits. It definitively declared which party was in the right and the nature and extent of the obligations of one party in relation to the other, and left nothing more to be done by the Trial Court. 8 The remedy against such a judgment is an appeal, regardless of the questions sought to be raised on appeal, whether of fact, or of law, whether involving jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion of the Trial Court. No appeal was taken from the summary judgment. 9 Instead a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court was filed with the Intermediate Appellate Court praying for the annulment of the judgment. But it is obvious that the party aggrieved thereby did not have the option to substitute the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 for the remedy of appeal provided for in Rule 41. Indeed, the existence and availability of the right of appeal are antithetical to the availment of the special civil action of certiorari. 10 The summary judgment having thus become final and executory, the proceedings at bar for its annulment are futile and inefficacious.
In any event, the facts, as found by the Intermediate Appellate Court to have been duly established from the pleadings, affidavits and other papers on record, show that the summary judgment was correctly and properly rendered by the Trial Court. The issues raised by Carpets International and BCITC in their answers (to the complaint of MBSMI) are demonstrably sham, fictitious, contrived.
(1)	The attached goods were found and were stored in the factory compounds of Carpets International at 1st Street, Sta. Maria Real Estate Subdivision, Bo. Bagumbayan Taguig, Metro Manila, the same address where private respondent (MBSMI) delivered the yarns purchased by Carpets International from it. (No acceptable explanation is given by petitioner as to how these goods which it claims it owns found their way to the factory of Carpets International).
(2)	Carpets International filed a bond to have the attachment discharged, which attachment covered the goods claimed by petitioner as well. (If Carpets International was not the owner of the goods, it would not have bothered to file a bond for the discharge of the attachment).
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED and the judgment of the Intermediate Appellate Court subject thereof, sustaining that of the Regional Trial Court, is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
2.	The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 51711.
3.	Rollo, pp. 53-54; 81-99.
7.	By Hon. Milagros V. Caguioa.
8.	Pan Realty Corp. v. CA and S.C. Tan Export Corp., 167 SCRA 564 citing cases; Gold City Integrated Port Services, Inc. v. IAC and Dumlao, G.R. No. 71771-73, March 31, 1989, citing Puertollano v. IAC, 156 SCRA 188.
9.	The only appeal in Civil Case No. 5711 was evidently that taken on October 15, 1986 by BCITC, from the Order of Judge Caguioa dated October 7, 1986 "denying the motion for reconsideration of . . . (said) BCITC for the disqualification of the presiding judge . . . (Rollo, p. 325-328).
10.	Pan Realty Corp. v. CA and S.C. Tan Export Corp., 167 SCRA 564, supra.
12.	Sec. 2, Rule 129.
13.	SEE Joe’s Radio & Electrical Supply v. Alto Electronics Corp., Et Al., 104 Phil. 333; Cunanan v. Amparo, 80 Phil. 227; Ramirez v. Orientalist Co., 38 Phil. 634; McDaniel v. Apacible, 44 Phil. 248; Santiago v. de los Santos, 61 SCRA 146.
15.	Messrs. Jose S. Orosa, Nicasio Cruz and Antonio Ocampo.
17.	Respondent Cruz and Ocampo appealed the Fiscal’s resolution to the Ministry of Justice but did not otherwise question this finding of fact.
19.	It is axiomatic that subject to a few exceptions, findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are final, conclusive and are not subject to review by this Court (e.g., Social Security System v. C.A., 156 SCRA 383 (1987); BPI v. Pineda, 156 SCRA 404 (1987); Mendoza v. C.A., 156 SCRA 597 (1987); Tong Brothers Co. v. I.A.C., 156 SCRA 725 (1987).
20.	Secs. 1 and 3, Rule 34, Rules of Court; Garcia, Et. Al. v. C.A., G.R. No. 82282-83, Nov. 24, 1988; Arradaza, Et. Al. v. C.A., G.R. No. 50422, Feb. 8, 1989.

References: v. 
 V. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.