Source: https://recklessdrivingalexandriavirginiatraffic.wordpress.com/tag/alexandria-virginia-lawyers/page/2/
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 20:05:23+00:00

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If you are concerned about a 82-1-6 / 46.2-852 Penalty In Virginia, contact our law firm immediately for help.
Defendant appealed from an order of the Circuit Court of Alexandria (Virginia), which convicted him for reckless driving and feloniously driving after having been adjudicated an habitual offender in violation of Va. Code Ann. §§ 46.2-852 and 46.2-357(B)(2), respectively and also impose penalty for driving offense, contending that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions.
Va. Code Ann. § 46.2-852 provides, in part, that any person who drives a vehicle on any highway recklessly or at a speed in a manner so as to endanger the life, limb, or property of any person shall be guilty of reckless driving. Va. Code Ann. § 46.2-852. The word “recklessly” as used in the statute imparts a disregard by the driver of a motor vehicle for the consequences of his act and an indifference to the safety of life, limb or property. The essence of the offense lies not in the act of operating a vehicle, but in the manner and circumstances of its operation. Thus, the mere happening of an accident does not give rise to an inference of reckless driving. To convict, the Commonwealth of Virginia must prove every essential element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, with evidence which excludes every reasonable hypothesis of innocence and consistent only with guilt.
Reckless driving is not a status offense, and a defendant cannot be convicted upon speculation and conjecture as to what caused him to lose control of the car.
If you have been charged with a violation of reckless driving state law in Virginia and you are concerned about a conviction, contact our law firm immediately for help.
Reckless driving state law in Virginia.
When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, an appellate court considers the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party in the circuit court, and the appellate court accords the Commonwealth the benefit of all reasonable inferences deducible from the evidence.
There are many different penalties for violating the reckless driving state laws in Virginia.
If you are dealing with a violation of the reckless driving state laws in Virginia, contact our law firm immediately for help.
A jury in the Circuit Court of Alexandria (Virginia) convicted defendant of reckless driving by speed, in violation of Va. Code Ann. § 46.2-862. Defendant appealed. Defendant argued that the trial court erred in denying her proposed jury instruction that improper driving, an offense set forth in Virginia state traffic laws, Va. Code Ann. § 46.2-869, was a lesser-included offense of reckless driving by speed. The appellate court disagreed. Improper driving was not a lesser-included offense of reckless driving by speed. Every commission of reckless driving by speed did not also constitute improper driving. In addition, improper driving was not composed entirely of the elements of reckless driving by speed. Improper driving required an additional finding of slight culpability, an element excluded from § 46.2-862.
The plain and unambiguous reading of the improper driving statute, Va. Code Ann. § 46.2-862, makes clear that authority rests with the trial judge and not the jury to make the lesser degree of culpability determination. In the alternative, an attorney for the Commonwealth may reduce a reckless driving charge to improper driving at any time prior to the court’s decision. Thus, only the trial judge, or the prosecutor before the verdict is rendered, has the prerogative to reduce a reckless driving charge to improper driving under § 46.2-869.
A reviewing court’s responsibility in reviewing jury instructions is to see that the law has been clearly stated and that the instructions cover all issues which the evidence fairly raises.
There are many different penalties for a 46.2-852 Reckless Driving charge in Virginia.
If you are dealing with 46.2-852 Reckless Driving in Virginia, contact our law firm immediately for help.
Defendant appealed from the judgment of the Circuit Court of the Alexandria (Virginia), which, after a bench trial, convicted her of reckless driving. The sole issue presented by the appeal was whether the evidence was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant drove a vehicle recklessly on a highway in violation of Va. Code Ann. § 46.2-852. The court found that the evidence was insufficient and reversed the conviction. The court held that under the facts shown by the record, the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant, who had fallen asleep at the wheel after drinking alcoholic beverages, was guilty of reckless driving in violation of § 46.2-852.
Va. Code Ann. § 46.2-852 provides that, irrespective of the maximum speeds permitted by law, any person who drives a vehicle on any highway recklessly or at a speed or in a manner so as to endanger the life, limb, or property of any person shall be guilty of reckless driving.
The word “recklessly” as used in Va. Code Ann. § 46.2-852 imparts a disregard by the driver of a motor vehicle for the consequences of his act and an indifference to the safety of life, limb or property. The essence of the offense of reckless driving lies not in the act of operating a vehicle, but in the manner and circumstances of its operation.
Defendant was convicted of eluding a police officer and driving while intoxicated. Defendant argued that his conviction for eluding a police officer constituted a conviction for reckless driving, thereby requiring the trial court, in obedience to Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-294.1, to have dismissed a driving while intoxicated charge against him which arose out of the “same acts.” On appeal, the court affirmed the convictions.
Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-294.1 provides that whenever a person is charged with both reckless driving and driving while intoxicated “growing out of the same act or acts” and is convicted of one of the offenses, the trial court shall dismiss the remaining charge.
Defendant sought review before the court after he was convicted on charges of reckless driving, driving on a suspended operator’s license, and speeding to elude, and he claimed that his rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause of U.S. Const. amend. V and Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-294 were violated when the driver was again tried in another court on identical charges brought by a different police officer of out of state.
Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-294 reads that if the same act be a violation of two or more statutes, or of two or more ordinances, or of one or more statutes and also one or more ordinances, conviction under one of such statutes or ordinances shall be a bar to a prosecution or proceeding under the other or others. Furthermore, if the same act be a violation of both a state and a federal statute, a prosecution under the federal statute shall be a bar to a prosecution under the state statute.
Defendant was charged with driving under the influence of intoxicants and with speeding 55 miles per hour in a 25 mile per hour zone. Both charges grew out of the same driving activity. Defendant prepaid the speeding charge and claimed that Va. Code Ann. § 46.2-862 converted his speeding charge to a reckless driving charge. Defendant alleged that he was convicted of speeding by virtue of this payment of the fine and cost and therefore he could not be prosecuted for the driving under the influence charge because Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-294.1 prevented dual convictions of driving under the influence and reckless driving.
Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-294 states that if a defendant is charged with driving under the influence of intoxicants and with reckless driving and he is convicted of one of those charges, then the court shall dismiss the remaining charge. The purpose of § 19.2-294 is to prevent the conviction of two different class one misdemeanors arising out of the same driving acts, when one of the misdemeanors is driving under the influence of intoxicants and the other is reckless driving. Where the evidence supports prosecution under either of two parallel statutes, the Commonwealth has the right to elect under which statute to proceed.
Defendant had pulled into a rest stop to take a nap 15 minutes before his vehicle ran off the road. He informed police he did not remember why he ran off the road. The police testified there were no skid marks and no evidence of braking at the scene. At his trial for reckless driving, defendant stated that he previously had problems with control, consequences of wind caused by a passing truck, his tire combination and his vehicle was driven off the road. The trial court convicted defendant of reckless driving. On appeal, the court upheld the conviction..
The essence of the offense of reckless driving lies not in the act of operating a vehicle, but in the manner and circumstances of its operation.
The mere happening of an accident does not give rise to an inference of reckless driving.
Defendant appealed the judgment of the trail court (Virginia), which convicted him of reckless driving in violation of Va. Code Ann. § 46.2-852. The trial court held that Va. Code Ann. § 46.2-920 did not protect defendant, a police officer, from criminal prosecution for conduct constituting reckless disregard for the safety of persons and property. The trial court refused to apply a “reasonable officer” standard and impose penalties for reckless driving.
In enacting Va. Code Ann. § 46.2-920, the legislature balanced the need for prompt, effective action by law enforcement officers and other emergency vehicle operators with the safety of the motoring public. The purpose of § 46.2-920 is to give some leniency to the drivers of police, fire, and ambulance vehicles in certain emergency situations.

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