Source: https://www.ptab.us/2016/12/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 09:50:37+00:00

Document:
“It is impermissible within the framework of section 103 to pick and choose from any one reference only so much of it as will support a given position, to the exclusion of other parts necessary to the full appreciation of what such reference fairly suggests to one of ordinary skill in the art.” See In re Hedges, 783 F.2d 1038, 1041 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (citations omitted)).
Before we consider the teachings of Jagannathan and Trandal, however, we first address the issue of claim scope in light of this Board’s recent precedential decision in Ex Parte Schulhauser, Appeal No. 2013-007848 (PTAB April 28, 2016) (“Schulhauser”). In Schulhauser, the Board held, when construing a method claim according to its broadest reasonable interpretation, conditional steps in process claims need not be carried out to be within the scope of the claim. Schulhauser at 8.
Appellants correctly point out that “legal determinations of obviousness, as with such determinations generally, should be based on evidence.” App. Br. 6—7, 11; Alza Corp. v. Mylan Laboratories, Inc., 464 F. 3d 1286, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
“[P]ertinent properties guide the analysis [for modifying a lead compound], for it is the possession of promising useful properties in a lead compound that motivates a chemist to make structurally similar compounds.” Otsuka Pharm. Co., Ltd. v. Sandoz, Inc., 678 F.3d 1280, 1292–93 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (internal citation omitted).
Alza Corp. v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 464 F.3d 1286, 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2006)(“There is flexibility in our obviousness jurisprudence because a motivation may be found implicitly in the prior art. We do not have a rigid test that requires an actual teaching to combine...”).
See also Aspex Eyewear, Inc. v. Marchon Eyewear, Inc., 672 F.3d 1335, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (holding that “adapted to” in the claim at issue had the narrower “configured to” meaning, which required elements to be “designed or configured to accomplish the specified objective, not simply that they can be made to serve that purpose”).
However, these arguments are not persuasive of reversible error. First, “a non-enabling reference may qualify as prior art for the purpose of determining obviousness under § 103.” Symbol Techs., Inc. v. Opticon, Inc., 935 F.2d 1569, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
In other words, the idea that the claimed transition “seems natural” or is an obvious alternative choice to suddenly increasing the transition (as stated by the Examiner, discussed, supra) is not sufficiently buttressed by evidence or reasoning. See In re Vaidyanathan, 381 Fed.Appx. 985, 994 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (non-precedential) (“KSR did not free the PTO’s examination process from explaining its reasoning. In making an obviousness rejection, the examiner should not rely on conclusory statements that a particular feature of the invention would have been obvious or was well known. Instead, the examiner should elaborate, discussing the evidence or reasoning that leads the examiner to such a conclusion.”).
Feldman 2010, van Holten, and Vierboom are post filing date art. However, references that are published “after the filing date of appellant’s application . . . are not, therefore, evidence of subject matter known to ‘any person skilled in the art’ as required by 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 1.” In re Gunn, 537 F.2d 1123, 1128 (CCPA 1976).
If we were to adopt the Appellant’s position, it appears that claim 1 and claim 213 would be coterminous in scope. See Seachange Int'l, Inc. v. C-COR, Inc., 413 F.3d 1361, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“[T]here is still a presumption that two independent claims have different scope when different words or phrases are used in those claims.”).

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