Source: https://dc.fd.org/motions/appeals/sufficiency%20of%20evidence/salamanca.htm
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 10:37:35+00:00

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A. Parties and Amici: The parties below were the defendant-appellant, xxxxxxx A. xxxxxxx, the codefendant, xxxxxxx A. xxxxxxx, and the plaintiff-appellee, the United States of America. Defendant's appeal has been consolidated with the appeal of xxxxxxx xxxxxxx, No. 91-3057, by order of this court dated March 6, 1991. There are no amici.
The defendant-appellant, xxxxxxx A. xxxxxxx, was indicted on August 28, 1990, along with his brother, xxxxxxx xxxxxxx, in a four- count indictment (APP 1). Both defendants were charged in all of the counts, and all the counts specifically included an aiding and abetting charge, 18 U.S.C. § 2. Count One charged assault with a deadly or dangerous weapon of a federal officer engaged in the performance of duty, 18 U.S.C. § 111(b). Count Two charged assault with intent to commit murder within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, 18 U.S.C. § 114(a). Count Three charged maiming within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction, 18 U.S.C. § 114. Count Four charged attempted murder of an officer or employee of the United States, 18 U.S.C. § 1114. All the offenses were alleged to have occurred on August 12, 1990, and the alleged victim of all the offenses was United States Park Police Officer James xxxxxxx.
The charges arose out of an admittedly brutal attack on Officer xxxxxxx late on the night of August 12, 1990, in Rock Creek Park in the Northwest section of the District. Officer xxxxxxx was severely injured and lost the sight in his left eye as a result of the attack. Defendant's theory at trial was that his brother xxxxxxx was the one who attacked xxxxxxx, and that defendant had no involvement whatsoever in the attack. Defendant's contention throughout the trial was that if he was guilty of anything, it was of being an accessory after the fact.
The defendant lived at 1401 Tuckerman Street in Washington, while xxxxxxx lived at 1415 Tuckerman (11/28/90 : 90). Defendant worked for three to five years for Thomas Weldon, who did demolition and rehabilitation work (11/30/90 : 46-48). xxxxxxx was the head maintenance worker in the apartment building in which he lived, which has 60 units (12/3/90 : 30).
On Sunday, August 12, 1990, from 7:00 a.m. to 5:30 p.m., Mr. Weldon was supervising drywall finishing work at Mayfair McLean, a town house development in Fairfax County, Virginia (11/30/90 : 46). Defendant worked that day, as did Pedro Compose, who worked occasionally (11/30/90 : 53). Because all the other expected workers did not show up, Weldon asked defendant if he knew anyone who wanted to work (11/30/90 : 48-49). Defendant called xxxxxxx, who came in his Isuzu Trooper four wheel drive vehicle to the job, accompanied by a young woman, who also worked that day (11/30/90 : 49). That was the first day xxxxxxx had ever worked for Weldon (11/30/90 : 48). They all worked doing sanding (11/30/90 : 47).
The woman who accompanied xxxxxxx that day was Olinda Martinez, who was the only person other than Officer xxxxxxx and the defendants present when the assault itself occurred. She was the only witness who testified as to the events of the attack itself, although Officer xxxxxxx also testified at the trial about what occurred immediately before the attack.
Ms. Martinez met xxxxxxx about a year before the trial and had lived with him for seven to eight months in apartment J2 at 1415 Tuckerman (11/30/90 : 129). She had known defendant almost as long as she had known xxxxxxx (11/20/90 : 129).
On Sunday, August 12, 1990, she and xxxxxxx were in the apartment when defendant called and asked for help at the job site (11/30/90 : 130-131). She went with xxxxxxx; they left the apartment about 8:30 a.m., got to the job around 10:00 a.m., and worked until about 7:00 p.m. (11/30/90 : 131). At the job site defendant and xxxxxxx were with her the entire time (11/30/90 : 132).
After finishing work that day they first dropped off a coworker, a man named Pedro (11/30/90 : 132). Pedro had gone with defendant in his car, while Ms. Martinez went with xxxxxxx in his car (11/30/90 : 132). She and xxxxxxx were going home, but on the way defendant and xxxxxxx bought a case of beer (11/30/90 : 133, 168). Ms. Martinez and xxxxxxx then stopped in Rock Creek Park on the way home, and defendant met them there about fifteen minutes later (11/30/90 : 133, 168).
Defendant and xxxxxxx got out of their cars and began drinking (11/30/90 : 134). Ms. Martinez did not drink any beer, as she never drinks (11/30/90 : 134). She waited in xxxxxxx's car while he and defendant sat outside and drank all the beer (11/30/90 : 169).
The Park Police have a Rock Creek substation at Beach Drive and Military Road, near the scene of the incident (11/27/90 : 95). Only two officers were working out of that station on the night shift on Sunday, August 12, 1990, from 10:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. (11/27/90 : 96-97). Officer xxxxxxx was working that night with his supervisor, Officer Charles Stuby (11/27/90 : 95).
The officers received a call from the mayor's command post for help in dealing with a washout on Klingle Road (11/27/90 : 98). Stuby told xxxxxxx to try to find some barricades while Stuby went to the Klingle Road site (11/27/90 : 102). xxxxxxx was unable to locate any barriers in the park, and was then cleared from that assignment (11/30 /90 : 64). He was driving a Chevy Caprice police cruiser and was in uniform with a short-sleeve shirt, no tie, and a badge (11/30//90 : 65). Officer xxxxxxx drove by a parking area known as Grove 13, and drove into the area when he saw a car with people around it (11/30/90 : 66).
While Officer xxxxxxx testified about the events immediately preceding the attack, Ms. Martinez was the only witness who testified about the assault itself. xxxxxxx testified that he pulled into the parking lot and parked his cruiser with the headlights facing the car and people he had seen (11/27/90 : 68). He first saw two males sitting on the curb to the rear of the driver's side of the parked car (11/30/90 : 68). xxxxxxx saw alcoholic beverage containers in the men's hands, which was illegal (11/30/90 : 69). He had the men stand up and the one closest to xxxxxxx appeared intoxicated (11/30/90 : 85). He performed a horizontal gaze test and determined that the man could not drive a car (11/30/90 : 70).
Both men produced identification cards at xxxxxxx's request, one a District of Columbia driver's license, and one a non-operator's license from another state (11/30/90 : 72, 86). xxxxxxx than called the dispatcher to tell him of the location (11/30/90 : 71). xxxxxxx decided at that point to check xxxxxxx's car for weapons (11/30/90 : 71). He opened the driver's door of the car and saw Ms. Martinez sitting in the front on the passenger's side (11/30/90 : 73, 95, 97). The keys were not in the car, so xxxxxxx asked Martinez for them, but she said she did not have them (11/30/90 : 73). xxxxxxx intended to lock the car and bring the keys to the station until someone was fit to drive it (11/30/90 : 73-74). xxxxxxx turned to ask for the keys from the person to whom he had given the test and that is the last thing xxxxxxx remembered about that night (11/30/90 : 74). The next thing he remembered was waking up in the hospital (11/30/90 : 75).
xxxxxxx recognized with certainty that xxxxxxx was the male with whom he had spoken and to whom he had given the sobriety test, and he recognized Martinez as the woman in the car (11/30/90 : 80). xxxxxxx thought he recognized defendant, who seemed to fit in his memory (11/30/90 : 79, 81).
Ms. Martinez, who was sitting in xxxxxxx's car at the time, saw xxxxxxx drive up in his cruiser, wearing his uniform (11/30/90 : 135-136). She told a slightly different version of the subsequent events than xxxxxxx. She testified that xxxxxxx got out of his car and asked defendant and xxxxxxx for identification, which they gave to xxxxxxx (11/30/90 : 136). Martinez stated that xxxxxxx shined his flashlight on her from the driver's side, but he did not open the door (11/30/90 : 171). xxxxxxx then asked xxxxxxx for the keys to his car and xxxxxxx went to his car to get them (11/30/90 : 136). When xxxxxxx opened the door to his car he told her, "I will not give him the keys", and told her not to give the keys to xxxxxxx (11/30/90 : 136, 172).
According to Martinez, xxxxxxx then grabbed a stick, that was about two feet long, from under the seat and then he hit xxxxxxx with it (11/30/90 : 136). Martinez stayed in the car and screamed at xxxxxxx not to hit xxxxxxx, but xxxxxxx ignored her (11/30/90 : 138; APP 5). She did not know how many times xxxxxxx hit xxxxxxx because she screamed and covered her eyes and could only hear the blows (11/30/90 : 138, 175; APP 5).
When xxxxxxx hit xxxxxxx, defendant was 32 feet away (11/30/90 : 174; APP 13). She never saw defendant hit xxxxxxx (11/30/90 : 138; APP 5). Martinez uncovered her eyes, raised her head and looked over (11/30/90 : 176; APP 15). At that point the assault was over and xxxxxxx was lying on the ground (11/30/90 : 139; APP 6) As xxxxxxx put the stick back in the car, she saw defendant come over and bend over near xxxxxxx, but did not know what defendant was doing (11/30/90 : 141; APP 8). She had not heard any argument between xxxxxxx and xxxxxxx, nor did she go over to xxxxxxx after he was hit (11/30/90 : 181, 185).
Defendant then said to xxxxxxx, "let's go" (11/30/90 : 141; APP 8). Defendant asked xxxxxxx to push defendant's car, which was parked away from xxxxxxx's car, to get it started (11/30/90 : 142; APP 9). Defendant drove away in his car and Martinez and xxxxxxx drove away in his car.
Officer xxxxxxx somehow put out a call for help over his car radio. Park Police Officer Lance Ludwick was the first person to reach xxxxxxx in Grove 13, about 11:37 p.m. (11/27/90 : 141). Ludwick immediately pulled up to the cruiser, which was the only car there (11/27/90 : 143). Ludwick could not recognize xxxxxxx, who was sitting in his cruiser, because he was so covered with blood (11/27/90 : 144). xxxxxxx told Ludwick it was a red four by four Toyota with three people, two hispanic males and one female (11/27/90 : 145). Ludwick yelled this information to Stuby, who arrived just after Ludwick, and Stuby broadcast a lookout for the car (11/27/90 : 110, 116, 146). Ludwick comforted xxxxxxx for about four minutes until an ambulance arrived (11/27/90 : 150). A helicopter arrived a few minutes later and took xxxxxxx to Washington Hospital Center (11/27/90 : 150).
The paramedic who arrived at the scene testified that Officer xxxxxxx stopped breathing twice at the scene and once in the helicopter, and each time a blood clot had to be removed from his throat or he would have died (11/27/90 : 190-91, 196, 198). xxxxxxx had a cut above his left eyebrow which went from the middle of his forehead to the back of his head and exposed his skull (11/27/90 : 190). It looked like wood fragments in his eye (11/27/90 : 190).
Officer xxxxxxx spent eleven days in the hospital (11/28/90 : 12-13). He suffered skull, jaw, and multiple facial fractures and underwent eye surgery, ear, nose, and throat surgery, and neurosurgery (11/29/90 : 90-93). xxxxxxx lost the sight in his left eye, and because the optic nerve was damaged there is no chance he will regain vision in the eye (11/30/90 : 194-95).
Park Police Officer Renee Abt was at the hospital on August 15, when xxxxxxx first regained consciousness (11/30/90 : 39). xxxxxxx said that an Hispanic male with a mustache had hit xxxxxxx in the head (11/30/90 :41). xxxxxxx specifically said "he" hit me in the head, not "they" (11/30/90 : 45).
The most important pieces of evidence found at the scene, lying at the curb, were defendant's Virginia identification card and xxxxxxx's District driver's license (11/28/90 : 25-26). The right end of the light bar on top of the cruiser had been broken, and part of it was lying on the cement (1/27/90 : 178). xxxxxxx's dented badge, flashlight, keys and key keeper were scattered around the area (11/28/90 : 31, 67). Just before he was hit, xxxxxxx had the badge on his shirt, the flashlight in his hand, and the keys and key keeper attached to his belt (11/30/90 : 77). Also found at the scene were a tape measure and ten Budweiser beer bottles, as well as a paper bag with a plastic bag inside containing two cardboard Budweiser six-pack holders (11/28/90 : 59, 65). No weapon was ever found (11/28/90 : 43).
Fingerprints taken from the beer bottles and bags were submitted to the FBI for analysis (1/28/90 : 63). Two of xxxxxxx's fingerprints were on the shopping bag and one on one of the beer bottles (12/3/90 : 12). Defendant's fingerprints were not found on the bag or bottles (12/3/90 : 12).
The Park Police subsequently obtained search warrants to both the residences and cars of xxxxxxx and defendant (11/28/90 : 92).
As the police were investigating, defendant and xxxxxxx and Martinez went from Grove 13 to Tuckerman Street (11/30/90 : 142; APP 9). Martinez asked xxxxxxx for the keys to their apartment and she went inside right away (11/30/90 : 142; APP 9). Before she went into the apartment xxxxxxx told her that she had not seen anything and that she should not say anything (11/30/90 : 144; APP 11). Defendant also told her in the garage before she went into the apartment that she should not say anything (11/30/90 : 145; APP 12). Defendant and xxxxxxx stayed outside for a little while, and then xxxxxxx came into the apartment (11/30/90 : 143; APP 10). Defendant did not come into the apartment (11/30/90 : 145; APP 12).
When xxxxxxx came into the apartment he changed his shirt, but not the blue jeans he had worn to work (11/30/90 : 144-145). xxxxxxx told her that he was leaving, but did not say where he was going, and that she should stay in the apartment (11/30/90 : 146) She left the apartment later to stay with her brother and went back to the apartment the next Saturday only to get her clothes (11/30/90 : 146, 185). The only time she had talked to xxxxxxx after the incident was when he called her shortly before trial to ask her to change a little bit of testimony and say she had been drinking (11/30/90 : 156).
Defendant and xxxxxxx then went to the house of their half sister, Martha xxxxxxx, in Hyattsville, Maryland (11/29/90 : 16, 17). They arrived unexpectedly between 10:00 and 11:00 p.m., both of them drunk (11/29/90 : 69). xxxxxxx came to the door and Ms. xxxxxxx's husband, Luis Jimenez, went outside to talk with xxxxxxx and defendant (11/29/90 : 70). xxxxxxx wanted to leave his Isuzu behind their house (11/29/90 : 70). In order to drive the Isuzu behind the house, Mrs. xxxxxxx's son, Carlos xxxxxxx, had to move his car out of the driveway (11/29/90 : 47, 70). After Carlos moved his car, xxxxxxx drove his Isuzu behind the house (11/29/90 : 71). After xxxxxxx left his car, he and defendant drove away in defendant's car (11/29/90 : 71).
xxxxxxx returned to his half-sister's house the next morning, Monday, August 13, between 9:00 and 10:00 a.m., and stayed at the house all day (11/29/90 : 20). That night xxxxxxx asked Carlos to take xxxxxxx's car somewhere and leave it (11/29/90 : 48). Carlos and a friend took xxxxxxx's car to a park a few miles away and left it (11/29/90 : 99). Before doing so they took the roof rack off the top and took the stereo out (11/29/90 : 50). xxxxxxx gave them some belongings from the car (11/29/90 : 50). The belongings were put in a little closet at Martha xxxxxxx's house (11/29/90 : 22). xxxxxxx also gave Martha some jewelry (11/29/90 : 21). Carlos's friend took the license plates off xxxxxxx's car and xxxxxxx put them in the trash (11/29/90 : 51, 75).
Also on Monday night xxxxxxx asked Carlos to call the Greyhound bus station to check on busses to Houston (11/29/90 : 51). xxxxxxx said he was going back to El Salvador (11/29/90 : 52). The bus station in Silver Spring was closed that night (11/29/90 : 52). xxxxxxx stayed that night at Martha xxxxxxx's house and left about 5:00 a.m. Tuesday morning, August 14 (11/29/90 : 52).
On Wednesday, August 15, xxxxxxx was arrested by the FBI in Mobile, Alabama on a bus (11/29/90 : 118-120). A ticket agent at the Silver Spring Greyhound station had remembered that xxxxxxx had been there about 9:00 a.m. on Tuesday (11/29/90 : 101). When the agents in Mobile asked xxxxxxx his identity he told them he was xxxxxxx Torres (11/29/90 : 120). The agents found a resident alien card with xxxxxxx's true name in his possession, as well as a bus ticket from Silver Spring to Houston in his baggage (11/29/90 : 122).
xxxxxxx was interviewed by a Spanish speaking FBI agent the next day, after he waived his Miranda rights (11/29/90 : 131-33). xxxxxxx admitted he owned a red 1989 Isuzu trooper which he had recently abandoned in Maryland, although he could not remember exactly where, because he was going back to El Salvador (11/29/90 : 140). xxxxxxx stated that a woman had told him someone was looking for him and he was leaving to hide from whomever it was, although he did not know who it was (11/29/90 : 140). xxxxxxx thought it involved something that happened one night, which he could not remember (11/29/90 : 140). xxxxxxx said he had been drunk on August 12 and could not remember what he did with his driver's license (11/29/90 : 141). xxxxxxx first claimed he shaved his mustache because it did not look good, then he said he did it because someone was looking for him (11/29/90 : 140).
xxxxxxx recalled going to work with defendant on August 12, buying a lot of beer after work, and stopping in Rock Creek Park on the way home (11/29/90 : 142-43). xxxxxxx stated that at one point a car came to the parking area in the park where he and defendant were drinking beer, stopped, and then left (11/29/90 : 143). When asked what happened next xxxxxxx terminated the interview, stating that his recollection of what happened that night was vague because he had been drinking so much (11/29/90 : 143).
The government introduced several items of physical evidence, and testimony about them. A pair of blue jeans was found on a couch in xxxxxxx's apartment (11/30/90 : 11). They did not belong to Ms. Martinez (11/30/90 : 190). Blood grouping tests were done at the FBI lab, on a red stain on the bottom right leg (11/30/90 : 118). The tests first determine if a stain is blood, and if it is then it is tested to see if it is human blood, and if it is then certain characteristics of the blood are determined to try to show whether it could have come from a certain person (11/30/90 : 113). Blood samples from defendant, xxxxxxx, and Officer xxxxxxx were submitted to the lab (11/30/90 : 106-107). The blood on the jeans found in xxxxxxx's apartment absolutely could not have come from xxxxxxx or defendant, and could have come from xxxxxxx, because it had the characteristics of his blood, which are only present in about one percent of the population (1/30/90 : 115).
xxxxxxx's car, with no license plates, was found in Buck Lodge Community Park, an isolated wooded area, about two miles from Martha xxxxxxx's house (11/30/90 : 6). The items from xxxxxxx's car were found in a tool shed at her house (11/29/90 : 98). Tests performed on a swab used to take a blood sample from xxxxxxx's car likewise showed human blood, but inconclusive grouping (11/30/90 : 18, 177).
The Maxitt brand tape measure found at the scene had human blood stains on it, but the grouping test on it was also inconclusive (11/30/90 : 116). xxxxxxx had a tape measure on his hip while working for Weldon, which was unusual for a day laborer (11/30/90 : 51). Defendant carried a Stanley tape measure while working for Weldon, not a Maxitt, which is not a standard brand ordinarily used by most construction people (11/30/90 : 52).
The defendant and xxxxxxx stipulated that Grove 13 was within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States (12/3/90 : 13).
Neither xxxxxxx nor defendant testified. xxxxxxx presented two character witnesses, the manager of the apartment building in which xxxxxxx lived and worked, and one of the tenants (12/3/90 : 29, 35). xxxxxxx's stepdaughter also testified, primarily about his drinking habits (12/3/90 : 38). xxxxxxx also presented the testimony of a psychologist, Lanning E. Moldauer, who testified about xxxxxxx's drinking and that xxxxxxx suffered from diffuse brain damage (12/3/90 : 48, 60-61). xxxxxxx also called a friend of his, who also knew Ms. Martinez (12/3/90 : 92). None of xxxxxxx's witnesses testified about defendant or his activities.
Defendant had filed a pretrial motion for severance of his case from that of xxxxxxx, primarily based upon the disparity of the evidence in the case (10/25/90 : 13). Defendant pointed out that Ms. Martinez's statements showed that defendant was an accessory after the fact, but not an aider and abettor (10/25/90 : 15). Defendant argued the motion again just before the beginning of the trial (11/21/90 : 190). Defendant repeated his argument about being an accessory after the fact (11/21/90 : 204). The court denied the severance motion (11/21/90 : 210).
At the close of all the evidence, defendant renewed all his motions (12/4/90 : 2). In its closing argument the government told the jury that it was xxxxxxx who struck xxxxxxx with the club (12/4/90 : 26). The government argued that defendant was guilty as an aider and abettor because he assisted xxxxxxx at the scene and later in the cover up and concealment of the assault (12/4/90 : 26).
At one point the jury sent out a note asking for, among other things, defendant's shirt and all the pictures in evidence (12/5/90 : 2). The jury subsequently convicted defendant of Counts One, Three, and Four, and convicted xxxxxxx of all four counts (12/5/90 : 6-7).
Defendant filed a renewed motion for a judgment of acquittal after the verdict as well as a motion for a new trial on the ground that his severance motion should have been granted. This was at least the fourth time defendant had raised the arguments (2/21/91 : 22; APP 38). The district court discussed both these motions at some length, and expressed its concerns about the issues involved. Defendant essentially repeated his argument that he was guilty, if at all, of being an accessory after the fact, not an aider and abettor. The government argued that defendant's presence, his flight afterwards, his statement to Martinez in the garage, the attempted destruction of evidence at the scene, the blood on the shirt taken from defendant's car, and defendant being bent over xxxxxxx, all justified the verdict (2/22/91 : 16-17; APP 32-33). The government also argued that defendant should have tried to stop the attack and "leave to get help, or at least leave" (2/22/91 : 18; APP 34). The government also felt that if Martinez had testified that defendant told xxxxxxx to stop, a judgment of acquittal would have been appropriate (2/22/91 : 25; APP 41).
Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction as an aider and abettor. The evidence conclusively established that defendant had no advance knowledge of the offense and did not participate in it in any way. At most, defendant may have been guilty of being an accessary after the fact, as all defendant's actions occurred after the offense was complete. In addition, defendant claims the extreme disparity in the evidence between defendant and xxxxxxx resulted in defendant suffering prejudice when the district court refused to sever the trials. Finally, defendant argues that a remand for resentencing is required because the district court failed to state any findings at the sentencing, and failed to give defendant a downward adjustment for his mitigating role in the offense.
There was no plan to assault Officer xxxxxxx that night. Defendant, xxxxxxx, and Ms. Martinez stopped in Rock Creek Park on their way home. It was happenstance that xxxxxxx pulled in to see what was taking place. There was no evidence defendant and xxxxxxx talked about the attack at all. xxxxxxx did tell Martinez that xxxxxxx would not get the keys, but xxxxxxx said nothing to defendant, and there was no evidence defendant overheard xxxxxxx tell Martinez about the keys. Indeed, while Ms. Martinez heard xxxxxxx ask defendant and xxxxxxx for identification, she did not testify to hearing defendant and xxxxxxx converse at all while xxxxxxx was there.
xxxxxxx's action was a bizarre, unprovoked act. There is no evidence defendant had any idea xxxxxxx was about to do such a thing. Martinez's testimony was clear that defendant was 32 feet away when xxxxxxx struck xxxxxxx. There was no testimony that defendant offered any encouragement or support. Indeed, all the witnesses who saw xxxxxxx at the time, including xxxxxxx, testified that xxxxxxx was intoxicated. There was also testimony about xxxxxxx suffering from brain damage. Defendant could not have anticipated xxxxxxx's irrational and unplanned act.
Martinez testified that defendant did nothing with respect to xxxxxxx, except bend over him, after xxxxxxx had completed the attack and while xxxxxxx was putting the club back in the car. All defendant did was bend over and look at xxxxxxx. That there were tiny unidentified blood stains on a shirt found in defendant's car adds nothing to the case. It may have been xxxxxxx's shirt that he had taken off after leaving Martha xxxxxxx's house. The stains may have been old. Even if it were defendant's shirt, Officer xxxxxxx was suffering from an arterial bleed, and it would not be surprising that when defendant bent over xxxxxxx, some blood may have gotten on defendant's shirt.
All of defendant's actions occurred after xxxxxxx had committed the crime. "A person cannot be found guilty of aiding and abetting a crime that already has been committed." United States v. Shulman, 624 F.2d 384, 387 (2nd Cir. 1980). An example of this concept in a situation analogous to the present case is found in Roberts v. United States, 416 F.2d 1216 (5th Cir. 1969). In Roberts, one defendant knew in advance that a codefendant was going to pass a counterfeit $20.00 bill in a store. Id. at 1220. The defendant was with the codefendant, who was detained by store employees to await the police. Id. at 1218. The codefendant gave the defendant nine other counterfeit bills, which the defendant took and burned. Id. The court reversed the defendant's conviction for aiding and abetting the passing of the counterfeit bill, because the defendant's "act could not have aided and abetted [the codefendant] in the passing of the counterfeit currency because that was already an accomplished act." Id. at 1221. The court noted that the defendant "may well . . . have been charged and convicted as an accessory after the fact on the basis of the destruction of the money as helping [the codefendant] escape detection or punishment, but the charge was not so framed in the indictment." Id. The reasoning of Roberts is equally applicable to the present case.
There is no indication defendant had any advance knowledge or warning about xxxxxxx's actions. The factors which the government pointed out to the district court were all efforts to help xxxxxxx avoid capture. They in no way, however, indicate that defendant aided and abetted the attack itself. Leaving the scene with xxxxxxx, and telling Ms. Martinez to say nothing, and trying to avoid the police all indicate an effort by defendant to help xxxxxxx or for defendant to avoid being wrongfully blamed himself, especially because defendant was an alien and did not speak English. It is noteworthy that, unlike xxxxxxx, defendant returned to his apartment and was making no attempt to leave the area. In addition, xxxxxxx is the one who called Martinez asking her to change her testimony.
Defendant in the present case contends that he fits squarely within the rule of Grey Bear. The most that was shown was his mere presence and "negative acquiescence" in the assault. The government admitted as much in its closing argument when it told the jury that defendant assisted xxxxxxx at the scene, but never described how. (12/4/90 : 26). In the rebuttal portion of its closing the government merely said that defendant was with xxxxxxx "every step of the way" (12/4/90 : 65). That is not enough to make defendant guilty, however, where the attack was clearly a sudden, unanticipated event, and he took no part in it.
Had defendant done something to assist or encourage xxxxxxx, this would be a much different case. A good example of such a situation occurred in United States v. Ferreboeuf, 632 F.2d 832 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 934 (1981). In Ferreboeuf, the defendant was convicted of being an accessory after the fact to murder and of aiding and abetting an assault on a federal officer. The defendant and her husband were in a customs building at the Canadian border. One customs inspector was shot and killed inside the building. Id. at 833. While defendant held the door open her husband shot at another inspector who was outside. Id. During an ensuing chase, defendant acted as the lookout. Id. The court found conviction on both charges was proper. Proof of acting as the lookout supported the accessory after the fact of the murder charge. Id. at 836. Proof that defendant held the door open to assist in the assault satisfied the aiding and abetting charge. Id. It is interesting that the defendant was not charged with aiding and abetting the murder, apparently because there was no evidence whether she assisted that crime in any way during its commission.
The obvious difference between Bryant and the present case is that in the present case there was an eyewitness, Martinez, who testified that defendant had nothing to do with the assault. Nothing about xxxxxxx's brief, although brutal, attack showed any concert of action.
Obviously, if the court finds that the evidence was insufficient to sustain defendant's convictions, as discussed above, then the court need not decide the other issues discussed in this brief. Should the court find the evidence sufficient, then defendant contends he should have received a trial separate from xxxxxxx, because of the disparity in the evidence. The district court's decision to deny a severance motion is reviewed for abuse of discretion. United States v. Tarantino, 846 F.2d 1384, 1398-99 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 840 (1988).
Defendant acknowledges that it was proper to charge xxxxxxx and him in the same indictment under Fed. R. Crim. P. 8. Defendant argues that under Fed. R. Crim. P. 14, he was prejudiced by joinder with xxxxxxx for trial, and that the district court should have severed the trials.
In the present case, it is, of course, defendant's position that the disparity in the evidence was so extreme that there is not enough to support defendant's conviction. In fact, it is likely that defendant's conviction was obtained just as a result of being on trial with xxxxxxx. The danger of prejudice was especially great in this case because defendant and xxxxxxx are brothers, and it is likely the jury viewed them as acting in concert by that fact alone. The government played upon this in its closing by arguing to the jury that defendant was guilty because he was with xxxxxxx every step of the way, even though there was no evidence to support this assertion.
The disparity in this case was reflected in the testimony about the crucial fact that xxxxxxx talked mostly to xxxxxxx. Only xxxxxxx struck xxxxxxx. It was xxxxxxx who hid and abandoned his car. xxxxxxx fled on a bus headed for Houston, while defendant went back to his apartment. xxxxxxx's statement was introduced into evidence. xxxxxxx's blood was identified only on the pants found in xxxxxxx's apartment. xxxxxxx talked to Martinez to ask her to change her testimony.
For all these reasons, defendant respectfully requests that even if the court does not reverse his conviction for insufficient evidence, it at least reverse his conviction and afford him a new trial free from the taint of being tried with xxxxxxx.
The district court's decision regarding a downward adjustment under § 3B1.2 is given due deference, Williams, 891 F.2d at 926, and is largely committed to the discretion of the trial judge. Caballero, 936 F.2d at 1299. Defendant's position is, once again, that there was no evidence to convict him of the offenses. Even if the court finds there was sufficient evidence, however, it is clear that defendant's role was minimal compared to that of xxxxxxx. In determining the adjustment for a mitigating role the district court must assess the defendant's culpability "compared to that of the other participant." Id.
Defendant was plainly far less culpable than xxxxxxx. "There is a thin line between a minor and a minimal participant, and at times, it is difficult to determine just where to draw it." United States v. Vega-Encarnacion, 914 F.2d 20, (1st Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 1626 (1991). Without repeating all the facts above, defendant contends he is entitled to a four-point downward adjustment as a minimal participant under § 3B1.2(a). Interestingly, had defendant been charged and convicted of being an accessory after the fact, which is the most of which he contended he was guilty, he would have received a six-point downward adjustment from the offense level, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2X3.1. Thus, the four-point reduction is clearly warranted if the court upholds the conviction itself. Defendant respectfully requests that if the court affirms the conviction it remand the case for findings by the district court with respect to the appropriate guideline range and adjustments, including a mitigating role adjustment.

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