Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=82077:56121&catid=1572&Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 08:00:45+00:00

Document:
G.R. No. 189121, July 31, 2013 - AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON, JENNETH QUIAZON AND MARIA JENNIFER QUIAZON, Petitioners, v. MA. LOURDES BELEN, FOR AND IN BEHALF OF MARIA LOURDES ELISE QUIAZON, Respondent.
AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON, JENNETH QUIAZON AND MARIA JENNIFER QUIAZON, Petitioners, v. MA. LOURDES BELEN, FOR AND IN BEHALF OF MARIA LOURDES ELISE QUIAZON, Respondent.
This case started as a Petition for Letters of Administration of the Estate of Eliseo Quiazon (Eliseo), filed by herein respondents who are Eliseo’s common-law wife and daughter. The petition was opposed by herein petitioners Amelia Garcia-Quaizon (Amelia) to whom Eliseo was married. Amelia was joined by her children, Jenneth Quiazon (Jenneth) and Maria Jennifer Quiazon (Jennifer).
Eliseo died intestate on 12 December 1992.
On 12 September 1994, Maria Lourdes Elise Quiazon (Elise), represented by her mother, Ma. Lourdes Belen (Lourdes), filed a Petition for Letters of Administration before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City.3 In her Petition docketed as SP Proc. No. M-3957, Elise claims that she is the natural child of Eliseo having been conceived and born at the time when her parents were both capacitated to marry each other. Insisting on the legal capacity of Eliseo and Lourdes to marry, Elise impugned the validity of Eliseo’s marriage to Amelia by claiming that it was bigamous for having been contracted during the subsistence of the latter’s marriage with one Filipito Sandico (Filipito). To prove her filiation to the decedent, Elise, among others, attached to the Petition for Letters of Administration her Certificate of Live Birth4 signed by Eliseo as her father. In the same petition, it was alleged that Eliseo left real properties worth P2,040,000.00 and personal properties worth P2,100,000.00. In order to preserve the estate of Eliseo and to prevent the dissipation of its value, Elise sought her appointment as administratrix of her late father’s estate.
Claiming that the venue of the petition was improperly laid, Amelia, together with her children, Jenneth and Jennifer, opposed the issuance of the letters of administration by filing an Opposition/Motion to Dismiss.5 The petitioners asserted that as shown by his Death Certificate,6 Eliseo was a resident of Capas, Tarlac and not of Las Piñas City, at the time of his death. Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court,7 the petition for settlement of decedent’s estate should have been filed in Capas, Tarlac and not in Las Piñas City. In addition to their claim of improper venue, the petitioners averred that there are no factual and legal bases for Elise to be appointed administratix of Eliseo’s estate.
On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto in the 28 November 2008 Decision10 rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 88589. In validating the findings of the RTC, the Court of Appeals held that Elise was able to prove that Eliseo and Lourdes lived together as husband and wife by establishing a common residence at No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas City, from 1975 up to the time of Eliseo’s death in 1992. For purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of Eliseo’s estate, the Court of Appeals upheld the conclusion reached by the RTC that the decedent was a resident of Las Piñas City. The petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution11 dated 7 August 2009.
Sec. 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. – If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance [now Regional Trial Court] in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance [now Regional Trial Court] of any province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record. (Emphasis supplied).
Viewed in light of the foregoing principles, the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for affirming the ruling of the RTC that the venue for the settlement of the estate of Eliseo was properly laid in Las Piñas City. It is evident from the records that during his lifetime, Eliseo resided at No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas City. For this reason, the venue for the settlement of his estate may be laid in the said city.
Relevant to the foregoing, there is no doubt that Elise, whose successional rights would be prejudiced by her father’s marriage to Amelia, may impugn the existence of such marriage even after the death of her father. The said marriage may be questioned directly by filing an action attacking the validity thereof, or collaterally by raising it as an issue in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse, such as in the case at bar. Ineluctably, Elise, as a compulsory heir,26 has a cause of action for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the void marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, and the death of either party to the said marriage does not extinguish such cause of action.
Having established the right of Elise to impugn Eliseo’s marriage to Amelia, we now proceed to determine whether or not the decedent’s marriage to Amelia is void for being bigamous.
Neither are we inclined to lend credence to the petitioners’ contention that Elise has not shown any interest in the Petition for Letters of Administration.
In the instant case, Elise, as a compulsory heir who stands to be benefited by the distribution of Eliseo’s estate, is deemed to be an interested party. With the overwhelming evidence on record produced by Elise to prove her filiation to Eliseo, the petitioners’ pounding on her lack of interest in the administration of the decedent’s estate, is just a desperate attempt to sway this Court to reverse the findings of the Court of Appeals. Certainly, the right of Elise to be appointed administratix of the estate of Eliseo is on good grounds. It is founded on her right as a compulsory heir, who, under the law, is entitled to her legitime after the debts of the estate are satisfied.29 Having a vested right in the distribution of Eliseo’s estate as one of his natural children, Elise can rightfully be considered as an interested party within the purview of the law.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals assailed 28 November 2008 Decision and 7 August 2009 Resolution, are AFFIRMED in toto.
1 Penned by Associate Justice Ramon R. Garcia with Associate Justices Josefina Guevara–Salonga and Magdangal M. De Leon, concurring. CA rollo, pp. 94-106.
3 Special Proceeding No. M-3957. Records, Vol. I, pp. 1-9.
7 Sec. 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. – If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance [now Regional Trial Court] in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance [now Regional Trial Court] of any province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.
13 Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. L-40502 and L-42670, 29 November 1976, 74 SCRA 189, 199.
18Jao v. Court of Appeals, 432 Phil. 160, 170 (2002).
20Quiazon v. Garcia, Civil Case No. Q-43712. Records, Vol. II, pp. 234-240.
21Golden (Iloilo) Delta Sales Corporation v. Pre-Stress International Corporation, G.R. No. 176768, 12 January 2009, 576 SCRA 23, 35; Seaoil Petroleum Corporation v. Autocorp Group, G.R. No. 164326, 17 October 2008, 569 SCRA 387, 394; Ejercito v. M.R. Vargas Construction, G.R. No. 172595, 10 April 2008, 551 SCRA 97, 106.
22Juliano-Llave v. Republic, G.R. No. 169766, 30 March 2011, 646 SCRA 637, 656-657 citing Niñal v. Bayadog, 384 Phil. 661, 673 (2000).
26 New Civil Code. Art. 961. In default of the testamentary heirs, the law vests the inheritance, in accordance with the rules hereinafter set forth, in the legitimate and illegitimate relatives of the deceased, in the surviving spouse, and in the State.
New Civil Code. Art. 988. In the absence of legitimate descendants or ascendants, the illegitimate children shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased.
(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or if the absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven years, is generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according to Articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until declared null and void by a competent court.
28Solinap v. Locsin, Jr., 423 Phil. 192, 199 (2001).
29 New Civil Code. Art. 961. In default of the testamentary heirs, the law vests the inheritance, in accordance with the rules hereinafter set forth, in the legitimate and illegitimate relatives of the deceased, in the surviving spouse, and in the State.

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