Source: https://patentlyo.com/patent/2011/11/federal-circuit-again-declines-to-revisit-cybor.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 08:37:01+00:00

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I really got to hand it to you, anon. Expressly!!!!!
That is the point. There is NOTHING in the statute itself that addresses the very point of Halliburton. The statute itself is consistent with Halliburton and with Gibbs. I have given you the history and origin of 112, p. 6. As proposed to Congress, by Rich, the proposal WAS specifically intended to overturn Halliburton. But that is NOT what Congress enacted. Please read the legislative history from our article, posted above.
Please! It is critical to understanding the statute.
Frederico had the final say on 112, p. 6. He and the other counsel in Congress, who we identify, took what Rich proposed and rewrote it. As he had drafted it, the Rich proposal would have sanctioned all forms of functional claiming including single means claims. That was an anathema to the PTO. Did you expect Frederico to take that lightly?
Finally, what 1952 disctrict court case are you talking about?
Faulkner v. Gibbs is a Supreme Court case.
By the way, the appropriate case cite for the Faulkner v. Gibbs after enacted 1952 law case is 199 F.2d 635 (1952).
There is no discussion of “point of novelty” in that case.
If you are using Faulkner v Gibbs to buttress another decision that was expressly overruled and that other Supreme Court decision was Prior To the legislative change, your argument is stillborn.
A district court on remand, applying the then in place law does not help you, and only shows that you are misapplying law, lending more weakness to your positon, rather than the strength you think you have added. Further, the reference to Halliburton in the 1952 District Court case simply is not on point to the current discussion.
I suggest you take a mulligan before you pass it back to A New Light.
In an earlier post, I stated my belief that there were both institutional and individual problems impeding progress in patent jurisprudence.
With due respect to Judge Moore, it seems to me that in her written opinion in Retractable she directly contradicts one of the central points she is trying to make in that very same opinion.
She opines that “The error in Retractable is the majority’s attempt to rewrite the claims to better conform to what it discerns is the “invention” of the patent instead of construing the language of the claim.”–that is, it is unacceptable under Phillips to “change the plain meaning of a claim term to tailor its scope to what the panel believes was the ‘actual invention'”.
However, earlier in her opinion, she appears to suggest doing exactly that when performing a 112p2 analysis. In fact, the manner in which she discusses “metes and bounds” might call into question her understanding of the definite claim scope requirement of 112p2.
To my mind, the necessary implication of this statement is that in order to assess the metes and bounds of the claims, one must advert to an entirely extrinsic identification of “the invention”–i.e. to assess the metes and bounds of the claims, one must compare them to “what the inventor actually invented”–which is precisely what Moore advocates against doing.
Should Moore’s words be construed to preserve the internal consistency of her opinion? Did she just conflate the “metes and bounds” requirement with the “enablement” requirement, or does she really not understand the “metes and bounds” requirement? As I understand it, the “metes and bounds” requirement demands that the scope of the claims be clearly and definitely defined, and as such, they can NEVER “extend beyond what the inventor has invented”, as stated by Moore.
Whatever happened in this part of her opinion, Moore either expressed a misunderstanding of a basic patent validity requirement, or was very inarticulate about a key point of the opinion, or both. She has just exacerbated one of the very problems she claims to want solved regarding claim construction.
The opinion isn’t totally useless of course–but this point does, IMHO, illustrate well an apparent lack of rigor in the expression of some CAFC opinions.
While I applaud Moore for being on the right track, I call upon the CAFC to write better opinions.
After all, they’re not writing blog posts.
This part of her opinion, at least, is to my mind an impediment to the progress of patent jurisprudence.
A new light, you agree that the statute specifically authorizes the use of functional claiming in combination claims. The question is whether Halliburton has been overturned.
and its alleged infringement by petitioner. The District Court found the patent to be valid and infringed. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, 170 F. 2d 34 (1948). Being moved by the petition for certiorari that there was a conflict with Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker, 329 U. S. 1 (1946), we granted certiorari.
The record, briefs and arguments of counsel lead us to the view that Halliburton, supra, is inapposite. We there held the patent invalid because its language was too broad at the precise point of novelty. In the instant case, the patent has been sustained because of the fact of combination rather than the novelty of any particular element."
Shortly after this case, 112, p. 6 is enacted authorizing the use of functional claiming in combination claims.
Once one takes a full look at what happened, as we describe in Rosetta Stone, there is nothing in the history of 112, p.6 that is inconsistent with enacting Faulkner v. Gibbs or inconsistent with Halliburton still being good law. That is a simple, undeniable, fact.
Yes, I can see the difference. But I am not sure your question is pertinent, as the real question is not a difference between claiming old structure and new structures, but rather claiming a new combination of old structures. I reject your premise that a point of novelty analysis forbids just where functional claiming is pertinent. I think that you are making this point of law up to suit your beliefs. The correct view in my mind is whether functional claiming is allowed (very much a simple yes or no question, quite apart from you philosophical crusade, and I think as aptly pointed out, quite apart from the conclusion of the paper that you had a hand in authoring).
I am a firm believer in the inherency doctrine of what an old structure has in regards to inherency. But this is quite different than any inherency in any combination of old structures.
To forestall the next question, I believe it a clear error to believe that a computer inherently has all possible future changed configurations.
I believe that the so called “House” argument is completely fallacious and unworthy of even appearing on a patent blog.
To me, that is too much akin to the Morse “all future modes, however invented” position. A computer may be designed to be changed, but that does not pre-empt all those future changes, nor does it make the computer inherently contain all such future configurations.
This is just too much stealing from future inventors.
This is also very much akin to the “play-pen” of molecules and molecular bonding. The “play-pen” of avaialable molecules and the existence of how molecualr bonding are each all known. This clearly does not mean that new configurations of molecules are beyond the reach of the reward of patents.
Note that these analogies are not my own and have appeared on these boards time and again. I just have not seen anyone provide refuting arguments that overcome the positions established. I amquite willing to entertain such arguments, but I am nnot willing to entertain naked assertions and blanket statements of conclusions to the contrary.
Lastly, I think you are applying your desired state to the law that overturns Haliburton. Whether or not the new law adequately addresses any such “pont of novelty” and functional claiming is a completely different matter than your impostion of re-installing a case that was overturned. Whether you think I should personally “get over it” is of course an opinion that you quite frankly have a right to have, but it is merely an opinion, and does not move the argument as you seem to think it does.
We have discussed this tendency of yours to over-read law at length and I do not think us revisiting it again will change anyone’s mind, so I will leave you with the offer to agree to disagree.
As I do not wish to be disagreeable or hostile I think we are done with this discussion, that is, unless you can address the various analogies previously presented.
And please, Malcolm, this is not addressed to you, so spare everyone your not so clever “click” response or accustion of sockpuppetry, or need for medication or whatever other vacuous reply that may enter your mind. I think the boards have seen quite enough of that type of mindlessness.
Whether you find my post “boring” or not concerns me less that your admonition not to “squirm” or whether you think my post lacks the ability to elicit sympathy.
I politely decline to join you in your desired pig sty unless you can rephrase your request in a clear and non-condescending manner. And even for argument’s sake that taking such a tone is a valid argument, you are simply in no position to be take such a tone.
In other words, grow up. This blog does not need another juvenile smart-mouth.
Agreed on the Federal Circuit legal standard.
But, don't just cringe a bit when the statute demands "clear" and the Federal Circuit says clear means "not impossibly ambiguous?"
Except that is not the actual legal standard, now is it?
Isn’t the actual legal standard something along the lines of irresolutely ambiguous? After all, cannot even dispassionate and reasonable people disagree on interpretations? Is not the very nature of langugae itself imperfect?
Do you not seek an unobtainable standard?
A new light, just a small question to you. Can you see the difference between claiming old structure and new structure?
With old structure, the particular structure that could perform the recited function was largely irrelevant. Any structure that could perform the recited function not only was intended by the claim, but was intended by the law prior to 1952. In other words, such means plus function elements were construed to cover the corresponding structure recited in the specification and equivalents, where equivalents were construed very broadly.
With new structure, however, the law is to the contrary. What the law provided prior to 1952 was the corresponding structure described in the specification and equivalents, but with equivalents narrowly construed.
The Halliburton court decided that when new element in a combination was cclaimed using functional language, the claim was inherently indefinite. I personally do not think there’s anything in section 112, paragraph 6, which overturns Halliburton. If this is the case, I think the use of functional claiming is quite permissible in a combination claim when element being claimed is old, but a violation of Halliburton when the element is new.
Well I think there’s a remedy in Congress recognizes it. What we need is to funnel patent cases to District Court judges that like patent cases and who do have a basic understanding of patent law.
Inviting, on “legal fact,” what precisely did you have in mind? I know in interpreting documents in general the parol evidence rule would prevent testimony about the construction of the contract which should be clear on space. If there is an ambiguity, parole evidence may be introduced. But in a patent, if there is an ambiguity, what does this mean?
What it means, it seems to me, is that the claim term is not clear. If the claim term is not clear, under the statute, it is indefinite.
So what are we doing if we have allow experts to testify on the meaning of patent terms?
Next you are going to argue that PA are paid to get their clients invalid patents — as if penalties mean nothing.
Lacks the ability to elicit the sympathy you’re looking for.
This time tell us why we should think that the ordinary use of prior art elements should be granted “inventive” status simply because more than one said element is made ordinary use of. Try not to squirm.
A better example would be the tax code.
Can you imagine the simplicity possible that will never happen because people are paid to not be clear?
Ned, I see that as too much a provisio to accept, with judicial discretion basicly meaning that a District Judge does whatever they want to do and so few seemingly having a grasp of patent basics.
Heck, we cannot even have the CAFC seeing eye to eye on patent law. How can we expect District Judges to uniformly apply anything?
I think we need to look elsewhere if we want to find a beacon of steadiness when it comes to claim interpretation.
Seriously IBP, you are too full of yourself.
Your suggestion that they are resolving QoL’s is conclusory.
I mentioned something some time ago on another thread that met with no recognition from anybody–the concept of a legal fact.
It is not my original concept, it was embedded in me in law school 15 yrs ago.
Does nobody else recognize this concept?
Anyway Ned, there are just overwhelmingly many practical reasons for doing CC at the district level, and according more deference thereto, IMHO.
I totally agree with you that we have to be stricter with claims, and that they have to be clear in the first instance. Absolutely. You know how many non-infringement opinions I’ve done where I could have totally destroyed the claim at issue were it not for the “what the inventor actually invented” paradigm?
Like Mooney said upthread, it can effectively render any non-final claim analysis pointless, and therefore only really strong, unavoidable 112 errors currently go into an opinion–i.e. essentially none.
Get a life, Word–everybody here knows it’s not the current law.
Yours was indeed a pathetic and failed attempt at disapprobation.
Says the man who has a coniption everytime someone takes one of his little pet theories and turns it on its head.
Ned Heller, the ultimate hypocrite.
Impossible, given that people are paid to not get it clear.
This blog is a perfect case in point.
The only reason district courts should be given deference is if they are resolving factual issues. When they are resolving questions of law, they should be given no deference. And when they are dealing with the patent that has a record, and with claims that are supposed to be clear, how can there be a question of fact?
To the extent that claim construction devolves into a contest of expert testimony on what one of ordinary skill in the art would understand a term to mean, I think we have a problem. The question in my view should always be resolved by what the specification said the claim term meant. If that in turn is not clear, then I suggest that the claim cannot be construed and the claim is indefinite.
A clue, a strong glue that a claim is indefinite if the Federal Circuit disagrees with the District Court on the District Court’s construction of the claim, provided that the District Court properly applied the canons of construction correctly. What the Federal Circuit should be doing primarily on appeal is to determine whether the District Court followed the law. If he did, but even so the Federal Circuit disagrees with the holding of the District Court, I would strongly consider not construing the claim differently, but simply holding the claim invalid.
We cannot expect patent applicants to draft claims clearly if the Federal Circuit goes out of its way to approve of claims which cannot be construed without a court battle, and even where different judges disagree on the result.
The get the system back on track, we have to require that the claims be clear in the first instance. The most serious probably have today in patent law, in my humble opinion, is indefinite claims.
Except that no matter how “pretentious” you are about it, the preamble is not always limiting.
No one died and made you absolute ruler – so stop acting like it.
My views on Rich have changed the more I really got into the 101 issue. I knew he and Frederico did not see eye-to-eye on 112, 6. One of the reasons I felt inspired investigate the issue in the first place was because of Valmont and Donaldson. I felt that means plus function elements in combination claims should be interpreted broadly. I wanted and still wanted Donaldson reversed.
intended to sanction functional claiming ONLY in true combination claiming where to novelty was in the combination and not in the single element.
A new light, you constantly bring up the issue of "the claim as a whole." That is applicable when considering obviousness, and when considering patentable subject matter. It is not applicable when considering novelty. It is further not applicable when one is determining whether the claim is to a true combination or a faux combination.
Regarding your complaints about Malcolm, IANAE and me on a personal level, my suggestion to you is get over it.
THE PREAMBLE IS ALWAYS LIMITING.
3) there are glaring deficiencies in patent jurisprudence.
Number (3) is by far the most important–you have to recognize that there is a problem before you can do anything else.
O’Malley essentially agrees, but disagrees that the “what the inventor actually invented” paradigm, as used in Retractable was in violation of Phillips. O’Malley’s disagreement on this point appears to me to be insubstantial–Moore lays out a reasonable description of what actually happened, and makes some substantive observations to which O’Malley doesn’t respond. Nor does O’Malley present any of her own, she just seems to conclude in vacuo that “what the inventor actually invented” as applied in Retractable comports with Phillips. Hollow and conclusory, with no reasoning.
O’Malley does, however, seem to agree on (3), the most important point.
You can see these judges waking up, some more quickly than others–unfortunately, for one reason or another, they haven’t really been able to do much about any of the mess that currently exists. There seems to be a pattern emerging in CAFC opinions of a growing awareness of, and dissatisfaction with, the body of patent jurisprudence–not to mention that penned by SCOTUS.
Hopefully they can get their act together and actually get something done, sooner rather than later. I don’t even think it’s merely a matter of waiting for the perfect case to come along, either–there are other problems impeding progress, both individual and institutional.
Clark, we had endless debates about what to do. I personally favored a simple repeal, but wiser heads cautioned against that. The primary problem we were focused on was indefiniteness. We felt, the best way to handle that, in the end, was to simply allow the claims to cover the full scope they said the covered, but require enablement, etc. This seems to be the European practice.
where the novelty is in the combination, not in the single element. This we felt automatically prevented the claims from the vice of functional claim at the point of novelty.
You should know that we present the proposal to the AIPLA patent law committee. They voted in favor.
I know that Malcolm and IANAE would strongly approve. So, perhaps, would Rader.
Who wrote the conclusion of 23 RUCTLJ 227? It certainly does not sound like the same Ned Heller posting here. Who is the doppelganger?
That was a great article I read a few years back. Still the concerns noted therein go unheeded.
nm Ned, I have Heinonline. I just had to push the sign in button.
To be sending me a copy plz.
Enlighten us. What is my interest that blinds?
Single means claims is expressly NOT equivalent to old combinations with improvements expressed in functional language.
There is no logic in making this jump.
That, is part of the problem. You do not recognize your own blindness.
simple, all you have to do is compare what Rich proposed to Congress and what emerged. They are radically different. Yet Rich describes the effect of the new statute as if his proposal was enacted, not 112, p.6 as it emerged from Congress.
I suspect the final draft was made by Federico.
The novelty has to be in the combination, but the combination may have a new element. What remains condemned, even under 112, p. 6, is single means claims, or their equivalent, old combinations where one element is improved and that element is expressed in functional language.
The point of the statute as it emerged from Congress was not to overturn Halliburton, but to clarify that Continental Paper Bag was still good law. The net is that the use of functional language in combination claims is sanctioned, but not where the claim is like the claims in Perkins Glue and GE v. Wabash, where the novelty is in the one element.
Why do you find it odd?
Do you think your vested interest clouds your sight?
Would it be considered “snarky” if I were to say that this post was far too long and was not read, and compare the post to a request for help to an ancient city-state of Greece?
Or would a simple “thank you” suffice?
The reason for the statute becomes clear. The drafters wanted to make sure that when the novelty was in the combination, functional language was sanctioned, even if, as in Continental Paper Bag, the combination was a new combination.
A relevant excerpt from the Rosetta Stone article by Rudy Hofmann and yours truly.
The Patent Act of 1952 was enacted in part as a response to the harsh attitude toward patents in the thirties and forties, and as a reaffirmation of the merits of our patent system. The Act sought to improve the law and settle the controversy in regard to the social and economic rationales for the patent system.(198) The drafters planned and carried out comprehensive programs of study and discussion of the patent statutes in which the drafters always maintained the fundamental principles of the patent system.(199) The drafters recognized patents are distinct from obnoxious monopolies and are a reward or an inducement to bring forth new knowledge.(200) It was against this background that the Patent Act of 1952, and consequently section 112, was born.
In the beginning, the patent community sought a legislative solution to define the test for invention,(201) which had never been statutorily defined, and to restore the doctrine of contributory infringement.(202) The House Subcommittee on Patents, Trade-Marks, and Copyrights conducted hearings, but otherwise took no legislative action. As a result of the discontent in the patent community, the House Subcommittee became interested in a comprehensive amendment and codification of the patent laws. The House Subcommittee sought the assistance of Pasquale J. Federico to revise and codify the patent laws.(203) Mr. Federico prepared a draft of the codification within six months of the request, and submitted the draft to the House Subcommittee in January, 1950.
Shortly thereafter, Henry R. Ashton, chairman of the National Council of Patent Law Associations (N.C.P.L.A.), sought to coordinate the efforts of the various regional patent law associations with regard to the “Federico Amendments.” To that end, the N.C.P.L.A. established a Coordinating Committee, which formed a two person Drafting Committee. The Coordinating Committee appointed patent attorneys Paul A. Rose and Giles S. Rich(204) to serve on the Drafting Committee. The Drafting Committee, including a virtual third member in Mr. Ashton, was given the task of preparing from the Federico Amendments a codification that contained only changes on which substantial agreement of the patent community could be obtained. Over two-thousand copies of the Federico Amendments were circulated, and every interested person or organization was invited to provide suggestions to the Drafting Committee. The Drafting Committee, with Mr. Federico and Charles J. Zinn, the House Subcommittee Law Revision Counsel and codification expert, prepared a redraft of the Federico Amendments for the House Subcommittee.(205) Subsequently, House Subcommittee Chairman Joseph R. Bryson introduced the first bill, H.R. 9133,(206) with regard to this effort, on July 17, 1950.
by the inventor of carrying out his invention.
The bill was introduced at the end of a Congress for the deliberate purpose of getting it into wide circulation in a form most likely to attract serious consideration. Criticisms and suggestions came to the Drafting Committee from patent groups throughout the country.
The proposed section addressed the holding in Halliburton, where the Court proscribed the use of functional language at the point of novelty in a combination claim. The proposed section also could have been directed to the claims at issue in General Electric Co. v. Wabash Appliance Corp., where the patentee distinguished the invention over the prior art with a statement of its function. The proposed section would have sanctioned a single means clause, such that the patentee could obtain protection for a function or result never before achieved. Arguably, only functions and results never before achieved would be covered by the proposed section, and that the claim itself would be required to define over the prior art, as suggested by the phrase: “Where the essence of novelty of any claim.” The proposed section would have applied to both apparatus claims and process claims.
Save one minor modification to “structure or acts,” the paragraph in the bill was in the same form as it was enacted. At the request of the House Subcommittee, Mr. Federico drafted a report to accompany the bill. Mr. Harris delivered the bill and report to the full Judiciary Committee which unanimously approved the bill on April 29, 1952.
The House of Representatives passed the bill by unanimous consent on May 19, 1952. The Judiciary Committee of the Senate reported the bill favorably with a few formal amendments on June 27, 1952, accompanied by a Senate Report.(221) The Senate Report was substantially the same as the House Report and was identical to the House Report with respect to section 112. The Senate passed the bill by unanimous consent on July 4, 1952, and the amendments made by the Senate were concurred in by the House on the same day. President Truman signed the bill on July 19, 1952, to become effective on January 1, 1953.
Then we have that bit by Frederico that said that of novelty was in the one element and not in the combination, that it would not be tolerated.
I’m sorry. But you must assume that I do not know what I’m talking about. You ought to read my Law Review article on this topic.
Revisionist history at its finest, or rather, its worst.
That’s easy. it isn’t. Next.
It is generally understood that Congress enacted section 112 paragraph 6 in reaction to Halliburton, the Supreme Court case that extended to apparatus claims its prior holdings in cases such as Perkins Glue involving composition of matter and Gen. Electric Co. v. Wabash Co., 304 US 364 (1938) involving articles of manufacturer, that claims “functional at the point of novelty” were indefinite. Thus we see in section 112 paragraph 6 the authorization not only to use means plus function language, but also the authorization to use functional language in describing “materials” and “acts,” implicitly overruling not only Halliburton, but Perkins Glue. But if this was the intent of the drafters, they drafted the statute in that odd way. The statute authorizes functional claiming only in “combination claims.” Because claims to articles of manufacture and to composition of matter are not normally expressed in combination claims, section112 paragraph 6 does not seem to expressly apply. Rather, section 112 paragraph 6 seems to apply only with respect to apparatus claims which are normally claimed as combination of elements. The statute might also be applicable to method claims because they comprise a series of steps which could be construed to be combinations. But the latter point is not clear.
Regardless, if one focuses solely on means plus function claims in “combination” claims, there is nothing in section 112 paragraph 6 which expressly authorizes the use of means plus function claims at the point of novelty. Rather, it authorizes the use of means plus function claims in combination claims; and combination claims at the time of enactment were fairly well understood to be a form of claim where the novelty was in the combination rather than in a particular element; meaning that all elements of a combination could be old and yet the claim as a whole could recite patentable subject matter. Thus the suggestion that section 112 paragraph 6 authorizes functional claiming at the point of novelty in combination claims reads something into the statute that literally is not there. Rather the statute as written can be interpreted to be consistent with the Halliburton case rather than inconsistent with it, because the Halliburton court did not object to the use of the means plus function claim format in the old elements of a combination claim.
This latter point has to be emphasized. The Halliburton court did not object to the use of means plus function claim format in the old elements of a combination claim. So when section 112 paragraph 6 authorizes the use of means plus function claim format it appears to be codifying the holding of Halliburton not reversing it. Moreover, an interpretation of section 112 paragraph 6 that is consistent with Halliburton and not inconsistent with it probably is preferred when one is attempting to construe section 112 paragraph 6.
The bottom line is this: there is nothing in section 112 paragraph 6 that expressly authorizes the use of means plus function claiming at the point of novelty. It authorizes instead the use of means plus function claim format in elements of a combination, which the Halliburton court affirmed was proper.
If this is correct, I would suggest that the use of means plus function language in a claim is tantamount to an admission that the claim element is an old element, because if it was a new element, the claim would be invalid under Halliburton.
Ned Overbroad claiming is the rule, not the exception.
And the way to deal with that is to invalidate the claims under 101 (e.g., if the claims are deemed to be abstract or if the claims effectively preclude otherwise non-infringing actors from thinking), 102, 103, or 112.
should be the object of claim construction.
As IANAE notes, this is the job of claim drafting. Otherwise, let’s just move to omnibus claiming and turn the USPTO into a publishing house. That is what you are asking for, Ned. I have no idea why anyone in the US would prefer such a system to the present system … unless they are a patent owner who believes that such a system would benefit them personally, e.g., by increasing uncertainty about patent scope generally. That would be a logical position for a non-practicing entity to take.
Should be the object of claim drafting, I think you mean.
If, for whatever reason, one claims more than one is entitled to claim, one’s claim is invalid. That’s trite law, and uncontroversial. It’s also what dependent claims are for, incidentally.
"Functional claiming at the point of novelty." Condemned repeated by the Supreme Court but sanctioned by Congress only if one limits the claim to the corresponding structure, etc. I think, Malcolm, what you really want is to repeal 112, p.6.
Just did. Thanks. The claim was construed to cover all ways to calculating DWT, but only one was disclosed and all ways were not enabled.
So many cases center on this exact problem, but so many are approved by the Federal Circuit as to suggest there is a fundamental problem with the Federal Circuit. There is no consistency. Overbroad claiming is the rule, not the exception.
at the point of novelty….
Uhm, how ’bout invalidating them?
We don’t? You might want to peruse the archives of just this site. 112, 1st and 2nd jurisprudence seems to be alive and well.
if we did have a robust Section 112, 1&2, jurisprudence, my concerns would not be so great. But we all know that we do not.
I’m not sure who you mean by “we”, Ned, but in the chem/bio area I can assure you that Section 112 is quite robust.
not practicing in the computer arts as I do, you may not fully appreciate the problem we have with the use of indefinite claiming.
I’m intimately familiar with the problem, Ned. As you suggest, the bigger issue is not “indefinite claiming” per se (although that remains an issue) but “functional claiming at the point of novelty.” These problems, however should not be solved on a case-by-case basis by the courts during claim construction, as you suggest. That will be a disaster.
I don’t think there is any question that the issues raised by the Retroactive decision are going to be addressed soon (within the next year) by the en banc Federal Circuit. If not, then the Supremes will have to step in. And there is no possible way that the Retroactive majority will come out the winner.
Have you read Lizard Tech?
I agree with you, MM, that Retractable Technologies is an awful decision. The dissenters are also correct: Federal Circuit claim construction law is an utter mess. Even longstanding doctrines, such as the doctrine of claim differentiation (which the Chief Judge correctly said in his dissent in the panel decision should have applied), aren’t applied correctly or consistently. And if SCOTUS gets ahold of this claim construction “mess,” look out.
Of course I acknowledge that there’s a problem there. We simply disagree on the solution.
I don’t see why it’s anybody’s problem but the patentee’s, if his claim has a problem. If he wants a narrower or more definite claim, that’s certainly an option available to him during prosecution. The public should be able to rely on the claims meaning what they say, and standing or falling on that basis.
Well, IANAE, what if the claim claims all means for achieving a result but discloses only one or a limited number? One can do this either by using functional language or the equivalent generic language. Do you at least acknowledge that there could be a problem here?
Judge Moore is right. A few years ago, you did not know what the claim construction rules would be until you saw what panel you were getting at oral argument. Now it had deteriorated to the point that you do not know what a patent’s claim construction is until you get the Fed.Circuit’s decision on appeal. What the District Judge says means nothing. Why have District Courts? Why not file all patent cases de novo at the Fed. Cir. let them do their claim construction magic and then remand to District Court for infringmen and damages determinations.
Why are you starting there? Surely the claim is king. The claim defines the patent right.
I’m all for “what one describes and enables is all that one can claim”, but surely that’s no more than a way of deciding whether a claim once construed is invalid for lack of support or enablement.
I’m with Malcolm here. If the applicant wants to assert a right in his invention, it’s his duty to adequately claim the scope of that right. The claim has to mean what it means. Otherwise, we might as well go back to the omnibus claim and at least save our clients a few billable hours for drafting.
Malcolm, nice try. If one starts from the principle that the specification is king, and what one describes and enables is all that one can claim, and that is our statutory scheme, what are we to do when claims, using broad indefinite language, claim subject matter neither described nor enabled.
Now if we did have a robust Section 112, 1&2, jurisprudence, my concerns would not be so great. But we all know that we do not.
Malcolm, not practicing in the computer arts as I do, you may not fully appreciate the problem we have with the use of indefinite claiming. I generally favor a rule that all claims should be construed to cover the corresponding structure, materials and acts described in the specification and their equivalents, the rule of construction announced by the Supreme Court in Westinghouse v. Boyden Power Brake, and enacted for certain claims in 112, p. 6.
Judge Moore asserts, the majority applied its own approach to claim construction, not that of Phillips, “[c]hanging the plain meaning of a claim term to tailor its scope to what the panel believes was the actual invention.” Id. at 6. This is not an isolated instance, Judge Moore points out, but is a common practice that points to a fundamental split on the court about the nature of claim construction: a disagreement over whether claim scope should be limited to “what the inventor actually invented” or instead construed according to the plain meaning to one of skill in the art, a meaning that may be informed – but is not dictated – by the specification.
Judge Moore is correct in her assertion. The majority in Retractable effectively spat in the face of Phillips’ teaching. Retractable is one of worst decisions ever written by the Federal Circuit, bar none. It effectively renders claims (the drafting and examination of them) pointless.
Why bother with “claims” and “claim construction” if the court is simply going to ignore the most basic rules of logic and reason and substitute narrower meanings for terms simply because the terms encompass more “invention” than the applicant seems entitled to? As a bonus, we can get rid of 112 entirely and simply turn it into The Other New Doctrine of Claim Construction (the First New Doctrine being that the “invention” can’t encompass the prior art).

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