Source: https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_rul_rule100_sectionj
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 09:25:14+00:00

Document:
Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Geneva, 12 August 1949, Article 99, second para.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by the UN General Assembly, Res. 2200 A (XXI), 16 December 1966, Article 14(3)(g).
American Convention on Human Rights, adopted by the OAS Inter-American Specialized Conference on Human Rights, San José, 22 November 1969, also known as Pact of San José, Article 8(2)(g) and (3).
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), Geneva, 8 June 1977, Article 75(4)(f). Article 75 was adopted by consensus. CDDH, Official Records, Vol. VI, CDDH/SR.43, 27 May 1977, p. 250.
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), Geneva, 8 June 1977, Article 6(2)(f). Article 6 was adopted by consensus. CDDH, Official Records, Vol. VII, CDDH/SR.50, 3 June 1977, p. 97.
Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted by the UN Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Rome, 17 July 1998, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/9, Article 55(1)(a).
(g) Not to be compelled to testify or to confess guilt and to remain silent, without such silence being a consideration in the determination of guilt or innocence.
Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted by the UN Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Rome, 17 July 1998, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/9, Article 67(1)(g).
Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, annexed to the 2002 Agreement on the Special Court for Sierra Leone, Freetown, 16 January 2002, annexed to Letter dated 6 March 2002 from the UN Secretary-General to the President of the UN Security Council, UN Doc. S/2002/246, 8 March 2002, p. 29, Article 17(4)(g).
A suspect who is to be questioned by the Prosecutor shall not be compelled to incriminate himself or herself or to confess guilt.
(h) Not to be compelled to testify against himself or herself or to confess guilt.
Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, attached to the Agreement between the UN and the Lebanese Republic on the Establishment of a Special Tribunal for Lebanon annexed to UN Security Council Resolution 1757 of 30 May 2007, Articles 15(b) and 16(4)(h) and (5).
It shall be prohibited to take undue advantage of the situation of a detained or imprisoned person for the purpose of compelling him to confess, to incriminate himself otherwise or to testify against any other person.
Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, adopted by the UN General Assembly, Res. 43/173, 9 December 1988, Principle 21.
Article 8(h) of the 1991 ILC Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind provides that an individual charged with a crime against the peace and security of mankind has the right “not to be compelled to testify against himself or to confess guilt”.
Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, adopted by the International Law Commission, reprinted in Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-third session, 29 April–19 July 1991, UN Doc. A/46/10, 1991, Article 8(h).
Article 21(4)(g) of the 1993 ICTY Statute provides that, among the minimum guarantees, the accused is “not to be compelled to testify against himself or to confess guilt”.
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, adopted by the UN Security Council, Res. 827, 25 May 1993, as amended by Res. 1166, 13 May 1998 and by Res. 1329, 30 November 2000, Article 21(4)(g).
Article 20(4)(g) of the 1994 ICTR Statute provides that, among the minimum guarantees, the accused is “not to be compelled to testify against himself or herself or to confess guilt”.
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan citizens responsible for genocide and other such violations committed in the territory of neighbouring States between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994, adopted by the UN Security Council, Res. 955, 8 November 1994, as amended by Res. 1165, 30 April 1998, and by Res. 1329, 30 November 2000, Article 20(4)(g).
Article 11(1)(h) of the 1996 ILC Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind provides that an individual charged with a crime against the peace and security of mankind has the right “[n]ot to be compelled to testify against himself or to confess guilt”.
Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, adopted by the International Law Commission, reprinted in Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-eighth session, 6 May–26 July 1996, UN Doc. A/51/10, 1996, Article 11(1)(h).
Article 2(9) of Part III of the 1998 Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and IHL in the Philippines provides that the Agreement seeks to protect and promote the right against self-incrimination.
Argentina, Leyes de Guerra, RC-46-1, Público, II Edición 1969, Ejército Argentino, Edición original aprobado por el Comandante en Jefe del Ejército, 9 May 1967, § 2.083(1).
Canada, The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Level, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 1999, p. 10-7, § 76.
Canada, The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Level, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 1999, p. 17-3, § 29(f).
No PW may be tried or punished for any offence, which was not, at the time of its commission, forbidden by International Law or the law of the Detaining Power. No force of any kind may be imposed upon a PW to cause the PW to plead guilty.
Canada, The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Levels, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 13 August 2001, § 1040.2.
In its chapter on non-international armed conflicts, the manual states: “As a minimum, accused persons: … f. shall not be compelled to testify against themselves or to confess their guilt”.
Canada, The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Levels, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 13 August 2001, § 1716.2.f.
Colombia’s Basic Military Manual (1995) provides that it is prohibited to “compel someone to confess or to incriminate himself”.
Mexico’s Army and Air Force Manual (2009), in a section on the 1949 Geneva Convention III, states: “Judicial procedure must be regular, that is, it must include at least the following guarantees … the accused must not be coerced into confessing”.
d. the accused must not be coerced into confessing.
Mexico, Manual de Derecho Internacional Humanitario para el Ejército y la Fuerza Área Mexicanos, Ministry of National Defence, June 2009, § 238(C)(d).
41. Confession must be voluntary. – To be relevant, and therefore admissible as evidence, a confession must be voluntary. Though it is highly desirable that the prosecutor should prove the circumstances in which a confession was made, the onus lies upon the accused of showing that a confession made by him was not voluntary and, therefore, irrelevant. Unless, therefore, it appears doubtful whether a confession is voluntary, a court need not require the prosecutor affirmatively to establish that fact.
42. What this means. – A confession is not deemed to be, if it appears to the court to have been caused by any inducement, threat, or promise, having reference to the charge against the accused person, proceeding from a person in authority (e.g., the prosecutor person having the custody of the accused) and sufficient, in the opinion of the court, to give the accused person grounds, which would appear to him to be reasonable, for supposing that by making it he would gain any advantage or avoid any evil of a temporal nature in reference to proceedings against him (Qanun-e-Shahadat, Article 37).
Pakistan, Manual of Pakistan Military Law, Vol. 1, Ministry of Defence, Government of Pakistan, 1987, p. 76.
Peru’s IHL Manual (2004) states that a person charged with a criminal offence under international humanitarian law must be provided with certain guarantees, including: “no obligation to plead guilty”.
Peru, Manual de Derecho Internacional Humanitario para las Fuerzas Armadas, Resolución Ministerial Nº 1394-2004-DE/CCFFAA/CDIH-FFAA, Lima, 1 December 2004, § 32.n.(6).
Peru, Manual de Derecho Internacional Humanitario y Derechos Humanos para las Fuerzas Armadas, Resolución Ministerial No. 049-2010/DE/VPD, Lima, 21 May 2010, § 33(n)(6), p. 251.
The capturing power may ask further questions [from prisoners of war] to obtain tactical or strategic information but the prisoner of war cannot be forced to disclose any such information … No physical or mental torture or any other form of coercion may be used to obtain information. Nor may those who refuse to answer be threatened, insulted, or exposed to any unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any kind.
No moral or physical coercion may be exerted on a prisoner of war to induce him to admit his guilt of any offence charged. This rule would exclude, for example, the use of hypnosis, drugs and oppressive methods of questioning.
United Kingdom, The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, Ministry of Defence, 1 July 2004, § 8.131.
In the case of penal offences relating to the armed conflict, the basic principles of natural justice must be observed … These principles include the following: … no one shall be compelled to testify against himself or to confess guilt.
Note. Numerous pieces of domestic legislation provide for the right not to be compelled to testify against oneself or to confess guilt.
See, e.g., Georgia, Constitution, 1995, Article 42(8); India, Constitution, 1950, Article 20(3); Kenya, Constitution, 1992, Article 77(7); Mexico, Constitution, 1917, Article 20(II); Russian Federation, Constitution, 1993, Article 51(1).
4. The suspect and the accused shall not undergo intimidations or any form of physical or psychological pressure.
5. Their statements shall be made in a condition of absolute moral freedom.
6. The suspect and the accused have the right to abstain from making any statement even when they are questioned by the relevant police or judicial authorities.
8. The words or terms “suspect” and “accused” also include in their definition his [or] her defence counsel.
5. The accused may refuse to answer the questions of the Court consistent with his right to remain silent.
Afghanistan, Interim Criminal Procedure Code, 2004, Articles 5(4)–(8) and 53(5).
(a) No person can compel or force any person to make a statement against him[self].
(b) Any statement or confession taken from the suspect by compulsion or force will be invalid.
Afghanistan, Criminal Procedure Code for Military Courts, 2006, Article 13.
(1) No one can compel or force the accused or suspect to make a statement against him- [or] her[self].
(2) A statement or confession taken from a suspect by compulsion or force is invalid.
(3) No one can force a suspect or accused to make a statement against him[self] that is not relevant to the issue of the charge.
Article 14. Rights of the Accused.
1- The right to remain silent.
4- The right to know that the statements made by him can be used against him as evidence in court.
The accused has the right to [remain] silen[t] … during the interrogation.
Article 41. Procedure of Trial Proceedings.
Due to the accused[’s] silence rights, the accused may refuse to respond to the questions [by] the court.
Afghanistan, Military Criminal Procedure Code, 2010, Articles 13(1)–(3), 14(1)(1) and (4), 21(2) and 41(3).
(d) the discretion of a court to exclude illegally or improperly obtained evidence.
Australia, Crimes Act, 1914, as amended to 2007, Part IC, Division 3, s.23S, p. 285.
a) that the plea of guilty was entered voluntarily, consciously and with understanding, and that the accused was informed of the possible consequences.
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Criminal Procedure Code, 2003, Article 230(1); see also Article 231(4)(a).
China’s Criminal Procedure Law (1979), as amended in 1996, states: “It shall be strictly forbidden to extort confessions by torture and to collect evidence by threat, enticement, deceit or other unlawful means”.
China, Criminal Procedure Law, 1979, as amended in 1996, Article 43.
Any judicial officer who extorts confession from a criminal suspect or defendant by torture or extorts testimony from a witness by violence shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not more than three years or criminal detention. If he causes injury, disability or death to the victim, he shall be convicted and given a heavier punishment in accordance with the provisions of Article 234 or 232 of this Law.
China, Criminal Law, 1979, as amended in 1997, Article 247.
China’s Organic Law of the People’s Procuratorates (1979), as amended in 1983, “strictly forbid[s] the obtainment of confessions by compulsion”.
China, Organic Law of the People’s Procuratorates, 1979, as amended in 1983, Article 7.
c) that the fact that he or she remains silent not be used against him or her.
Colombia, Criminal Procedure Code, 2004, Article 8(c).
F. Not to be compelled to confess guilt, and to have the right to remain silent and not to testify without such silence being interpreted as evidence of guilt or innocence.
Iraq, Law of the Supreme Iraqi Criminal Tribunal, 2005, Article 19(4)(F).
Ireland’s Geneva Conventions Act (1962), as amended in 1998, provides that any “minor breach” of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, including violations of Article 99 of the Geneva Convention III, and of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, including violations of Article 75(4)(f), as well as any “contravention” of the 1977 Additional Protocol II, including violations of Article 6(2)(f), are punishable offences.
Japan, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1948, as amended in 2006, Article 146.
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Code of Criminal Procedure for Armed Personnel, 1999, Article 68.
27. (1) Any Sessions Court Judge may record any statement or confession made to him at any time before the commencement of the trial.
(3) No Sessions Court Judge shall record any such statement or confession unless, upon questioning the person making it, he is satisfied that it was made without threat, inducement or promise at that particular time.
Malaysia, Security Offences (Special Measures) Act, 2012, Articles 2 and 27.
“I have explained to (… name …), that he is not bound to make a confession and that, if he does so, any confession he may make may be used as evidence against him and I believe that this confession was voluntarily made. It was taken in my presence, and was read over to the person making it and admitted by him to be correct, and it contains a full and true account of the statement made by him.
Pakistan, Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, Section 21(H).
Peru’s New Code of Criminal Procedure (2004) states: “No person shall be compelled or induced to confess guilt, or testify against him- or herself”.
Peru, New Code of Criminal Procedure, 2004, Article IX(2).
No one shall be forced to testify against him- or herself. The exercise of this right shall not be construed to mean admission of facts or indication of guilt.
The adoption of any measure aimed at making the accused testify against him- or herself or at weakening his or her will shall be prohibited. Any admission of facts or any confession must be made freely and must be based on express consent.
Peru, Code of Military and Police Justice, 2006, Article 154.
2. [The right] to remain silent without this implying a presumption of guilt.
7. Not to be subject to techniques or methods that induce or alter the accused’s free will, or any measures against his or her dignity.
Peru, Code of Military and Police Justice, 2006, Article 208(2) and (7).
No member of the military or the police shall be obliged to make a statement against him- or herself. The exercise of this right may not be taken as admitting to have committed the alleged acts or as indicating responsibility.
It remains prohibited to adopt any measure designed to compel the accused to testify against him- or herself or against their will. Any admission of acts or confession must be made freely and spontaneously and with express consent.
Peru, Military and Police Criminal Code, 2010, Article 147.
2. To remain silent without this implying a presumption of guilt.
Peru, Military and Police Criminal Code, 2010, Article 199(2).
Philippines, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, 2000, Rule 115, Section 1(d) and (e).
The juvenile shall not be compelled to be a witness against himself and his silence shall not in any manner prejudice him.
Philippines, Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law, 2002, Section 26 (e).
No Torture or Coercion in Investigation and Interrogation. – No threat, intimidation, or coercion, and no act which will inflict any form of physical pain or torment, or mental, moral, or psychological pressure, on the detained person, which shall vitiate his freewill, shall be employed in his investigation and interrogation for the crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism; otherwise, the evidence obtained from said detained person resulting from such threat, intimidation, or coercion, or from such inflicted physical pain or torment, or mental, moral, or psychological pressure, shall be, in its entirety, absolutely not admissible and usable as evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative, or administrative investigation, inquiry, proceeding, or hearing.
Philippines, Republic Act No. 9372, 2007, Section 24.
Anyone who uses violence or threat with intent to influence the witness, expert, translator, prosecutor or accused person or in relation to that infringes inviolability thereof shall be punished by imprisonment for 3 months to 5 years.
Any public official, or any person under his command, who uses violence, threat or in any other way abuses physically or mentally another person with the purpose to obtain certain testimonies, explanations, information or declaration, shall be punished by imprisonment for 1 to 10 years.
1. Anyone who abuses physically or mentally of an imprisoned person shall be punished by imprisonment for 3 months to 10 years.
2. If the perpetrator acts with particular cruelty, he shall be punished by imprisonment for 1 to 10 years.
3. § 1 and 2 applies accordingly to any public official, acting against his obligations.
Poland, Penal Code, 1997, Articles 245–247.
Any civil servant who uses torture, force, or threats against a defendant, witness, or expert, or orders such to coerce same to confess a crime, testify or provide information regarding such or to conceal a matter relevant thereto, shall be imprisoned for a period not exceeding 5 years.
If the action of the civil servant resulted in injury to the victim, the perpetrator shall be imprisoned for 10 years.
If said action resulted in death of the victim, the perpetrator shall be sentenced to death or life imprisonment.
Qatar, Penal Code, 2004, Article 159.
10° The accused shall have the right to remain silent and not to be compelled to incriminate him or herself.
7º the right to remain silent and not to be compelled to incriminate him[- or] herself.
Rwanda, Organic Law concerning Transfer of Cases to the Republic of Rwanda from the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and from Other States, 2007, as amended in 2009, Article 13(7º).
When the signed statement of a witness who is subject to protection by ICTR or by the Mechanism is admitted into the case file, or an official of ICTR or the Mechanism who conducted the investigation is asked on such a statement, the identity of the witness shall not be disclosed unless the Mechanism or the witness authorizes such disclosure. No signed statement taken from a witness by an ICTR or the Mechanism investigator shall be used to incriminate the witness in any proceedings before Rwandan courts in case the investigator did not explain to the witness about his/her rights.
A confession otherwise inadmissible in any criminal proceedings shall be admissible in any proceedings instituted under this Act, for the purpose only of proving the fact that such confession was made.
Sri Lanka, Convention against Torture Act, 1994, Section 5.
Provided, however, that no such statement shall be proved as against such person if such statement was made to a police officer below the rank of an Assistant Superintendent.
(2) The burden of proving that any statement referred to in subsection (1) is irrelevant under section 24 of the Evidence Ordinance [which provides that confession evidence in criminal proceedings is inadmissible if it appears by the court to have been the result of an inducement, threat, or promise, with reference to the charge against the accused person, from a person in authority] shall be on the person asserting it to be irrelevant.
(3) Any statement admissible under subsection (1) may be proved as against any other person charged jointly with the person making the statement, if, and only if, such statement is corroborated in material particulars by evidence other than the statements referred to in subsection (1).
17. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any other law, the provisions of sections 25 [inadmissibility of confessions made to the police], 26 [inadmissibility of confession made in police custody unless made in the immediate presence of a magistrate] and 30 [inadmissibility of a confession of one of several joint accused against the other accused] of the Evidence Ordinance shall have no application in any proceedings under this Act.
Sri Lanka, Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1979, as amended to 1988, Sections 16 and 17.
63. (1) At the trial of any person for an offence under any emergency regulation a statement made [by] such person whether or not it amounts to a confession and whether or not such person was in the custody of a police officer at the time the statement was made and whether or not such statement was made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate may be proved as against such person, if but only if, such statement is not irrelevant under Section 24 of [the] Evidence Ordinance [which provides that confession evidence in criminal proceedings is inadmissible if it appears by the court to have been the result of an inducement, threat, or promise, with reference to the charge against the accused person, from a person in authority].
Provided, however, that no such statement shall be proved against such person if such statement was made to a police officer below the rank of Assistant Superintendent of Police.
(2) In the case of an offence under any emergency regulation a statement made by any person which may be proved under paragraph (1) as against himself may be proved as against any other person jointly charged with such offence, if but only if, such statement is corroborated in material particulars by evidence other than a statement made under regulation 50 of these regulations.
(3) The burden of proving that any statement referred to in paragraph (1) or (2) is irrelevant under section 24 of the Evidence Ordinance shall be on the person asserting it to be irrelevant.
(4) The provisions of sections 25 [inadmissibility of confessions made to the police], 26 [inadmissibility of confession made in police custody unless made in the immediate presence of a magistrate] and 30 [inadmissibility of a confession of one of several joint accused against the other accused] of the Evidence Ordinance shall not apply in the case of any offence under any emergency regulation.
(5) A statement made by any person may be proved under [paragraph] (1) or paragraph (2) notwithstanding the provisions of sub-section (3) of section 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure Act, No. 15 of 1979 [which provides that statements made to police officers are admissible (to prove that the person made a different statement at another time) but cannot be used to corroborate the accused’s testimony].
Sri Lanka, Emergency Regulations, 2005, as amended to 5 August 2008, Section 63.
Switzerland, Criminal Procedure Code, 2007, as amended to 2012, Article 113(1); see also Article 158(1)(b).
D) It informs the detainee that he or she … is not obliged to incriminate him- or herself or to plead guilty and that he or she may remain silent without such silence being a consideration in the determination of guilt or innocence.
Uruguay, Law on Cooperation with the ICC, 2006, Article 48.3.D; see also Articles 49.2.D and 50.3.D.
Venezuela’s Law on the Protection of Children and Adolescents (2007) states: “An adolescent who is under investigation or detained must be informed … of the right not to incriminate himself or herself”.
Venezuela’s Penal Procedure Code (2009), which is applicable to the prosecution of war crimes, states: “The indicted [person] will have the following rights: … To be granted the constitutional precept that exempts him or her from testifying”.
Venezuela, Penal Procedure Code, 2009, Article 125(9); see also Articles 130–131 and 347.
Venezuela’s Penal Procedure Code (2012), which is applicable to the prosecution of war crimes, states: “The indicted [person] will have the following rights: … To be granted the constitutional precept that exempts him or her from testifying”.
Venezuela, Penal Procedure Code, 2012, Article 127(8); see also Articles 132–133 and 330.
Zimbabwe, Constitution, 1979, as amended to 2009, Sections 18(8) and 26(7).
Zimbabwe, Constitution, 2013, Sections 50(4)(a)–(c), 70(1)(i), 86(2)(b) and (3)(e), and 87(1) and (4).
I agree … that evidence obtained by torture, or other means precluded by the International Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment, ought not to be relied upon by a panel considering a refugee application.
Canada, Federal Court, Lia case, Reasons for Order, 3 February 2004, § 24.
The Federal Court of Appeal in 2005 held that “[s]tatements obtained by torture or other cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment are neither credible or trustworthy”.
Canada, Federal Court of Appeal, Lia case, Judgment, 11 April 2005, § 95.
70. This Court has recognized that the right against self-incrimination is a principle of fundamental justice: S. (R.J.), supra, at para. 95; Branch, supra; R. v. Jarvis,  3 S.C.R. 757, 2002 SCC 73. In Jarvis, at para. 67, the right against self-incrimination was described as “an elemental canon of the Canadian criminal justice system”. It has further been recognized in relation to the principle of individual sovereignty and as an assertion of human freedom: S. (R.J.), supra, at para. 81; R. v. Jones,  2 S.C.R. 229, at pp. 248-49; and R. v. White,  2 S.C.R. 417, at para. 43. Having recognized the centrality of the principle in Canadian law, this Court’s jurisprudence has further articulated general principles regarding the relationship of self-incrimination to criminal law more broadly. To this end, testimonial compulsion has been invariably linked with evidentiary immunity. Beginning in S. (R.J.), supra, and continuing in Branch, supra, Phillips, supra, and Jarvis, supra, the more recent jurisprudence of our Court on self-incrimination developed such that three procedural safeguards emerged: use immunity, derivative use immunity, and constitutional exemption.
71. Use immunity serves to protect the individual from having the compelled incriminating testimony used directly against him or her in a subsequent proceeding. The derivative use protection insulates the individual from having the compelled incriminating testimony used to obtain other evidence, unless that evidence is discoverable through alternative means. The constitutional exemption provides a form of complete immunity from testifying where proceedings are undertaken or predominately used to obtain evidence for the prosecution of the witness. Together these necessary safeguards provide the parameters within which self-incriminating testimony may be obtained.
Canada, Supreme Court, Application under s. 83.28 of the Criminal Code (Re), Judgment, 23 June 2004, §§ 70–71.
42. Although its temporal limits have not yet been fully defined, the right to silence has also received Charter benediction. In R. v. Hebert,  2 S.C.R. 151, the first decision from this Court recognizing it as a s. 7 right, an accused, who had been arrested and advised of his rights, refused to provide a statement to the police after consulting counsel. He was then placed in a cell with an undercover officer posing as a suspect under arrest. During the course of their conversation, the accused incriminated himself. The question before the Court was whether the statement to the undercover officer was admissible. Writing for the majority, McLachlin J. held that it was not admissible because it violated the accused’s right to silence found in s. 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
45. Although Chambers dealt specifically with silence after the accused had been cautioned, it would equally be “a snare and a delusion” to allow evidence of any valid exercise of the right to be used as evidence of guilt.
47. Evidence of silence is, however, admissible in limited circumstances. As Cory J. held in Chambers, at p. 1318, if “the Crown can establish a real relevance and a proper basis”, evidence of silence can be admitted with an appropriate warning to the jury.
Canada, Supreme Court, R. v. Turcotte, Judgment, 30 September 2005, §§ 41–47.
The application of the rule will by necessity be contextual. Hard and fast rules simply cannot account for the variety of circumstances that vitiate the voluntariness of a confession, and would inevitably result in a rule that would be both over- and under-inclusive. A trial judge should therefore consider all the relevant factors when reviewing a confession.
12. In Oickle, the Court recognized that there are several factors to consider in determining whether there is a reasonable doubt as to the voluntariness of a statement made to a person in authority, including the making of threats or promises, oppression, the operating mind doctrine and police trickery. Threats or promises, oppression and the operating mind doctrine are to be considered together and “should not be understood as a discrete inquiry completely divorced from the rest of the confessions rule” (Oickle, at para. 63). On the other hand, the use of “police … trickery” to obtain a confession “is a distinct inquiry … [given that] its more specific objective is maintaining the integrity of the criminal justice system” (para. 65).
13. With respect to promises, which are at issue in the present appeal, this Court has recognized that they “need not be aimed directly at the suspect … to have a coercive effect” (Oickle, at para. 51). While Iacobucci J. recognized in Oickle that the existence of a quid pro quo is the “most important consideration” when an inducement is alleged to have been offered by a person in authority, he did not hold it to be an exclusive factor, or one determinative of voluntariness. On the contrary, the test laid down in Oickle is “sensitive to the particularities of the individual suspect” (para. 42), and its application “will by necessity be contextual” (para. 47). Furthermore, Oickle does not state that any quid pro quo held out by a person in authority, regardless of its significance, will necessarily render a statement by an accused involuntary. For example, an offer of psychiatric or psychological assistance, although “clearly an inducement, … is not as strong as an offer of leniency and regard must be had to the entirety of the circumstances” (para. 50). Inducements “becom[e] improper only when … standing alone or in combination with other factors, [they] are strong enough to raise a reasonable doubt about whether the will of the subject has been overborne” (para. 57).
14. To the extent that any distinction in law may be asserted between the traditional “confessions rule” in Ibrahim v. The King,  A.C. 599 (P.C.), at p. 609, per Lord Sumner, and this Court’s decision in Oickle, the latter must prevail. In my view, however, Lord Sumner’s formulation of the “narrow” rule does not mean that any quid pro quo will automatically render a statement involuntary. Indeed, Lord Sumner required that in order for a statement to be admissible, it must not have been “obtained from [the accused] either by fear of prejudice or hope of advantage”. In the subsequent case of Director of Public Prosecutions v. Ping Lin,  A.C. 574 (H.L.), at p. 595, Lord Morris asked: “was it as a result of something said or done by a person in authority that an accused was caused or led to make a statement”.
15. Therefore, while a quid pro quo is an important factor in establishing the existence of a threat or promise, it is the strength of the inducement, having regard to the particular individual and his or her circumstances, that is to be considered in the overall contextual analysis into the voluntariness of the accused’s statement.
Canada, Supreme Court, R. v. Spencer, Judgment, 8 March 2007, §§ 11–15.
Canada, Supreme Court, R. v. Singh, Judgment, 1 November 2007, § 21.
Section 24 [of the Indian Evidence Act] lays down the obvious rule that a confession made under any inducement, threat or promise becomes irrelevant in a criminal proceeding. Such inducement, threat or promise need not be proved to the hilt. If it appears to the court that the making of the confession was caused by any inducement, threat or promise proceeding from a person in authority, the confession is liable to be excluded from evidence. The expression “appears” connotes that the Court need not go to the extent of holding that the threat etc. has in fact been proved. If the facts and circumstances emerging from the evidence adduced make it reasonably probable that the confession could be the result of threat, inducement or pressure, the court will refrain from acting on such confession, even if it be a confession made to a Magistrate or a person other than police officer.
India, Supreme Court, Parliament Attack case, Judgment, 4 August 2005.
… [T]the extrajudicial confession itself shows that, in the course of the custodial investigation, Appellant Binamira was not fully apprised of his constitutional rights.
… [T]he Court will not take up appellant’s allegations that he was tortured and maltreated by the investigating police and the security guards, because such consideration is no longer necessary in view of our holding on the violation of his right to counsel of choice. Where a confession is extracted contrary to the accused’s Miranda rights, it is ipso facto inadmissible in evidence. Hence, there is no more need for the appellant to prove duress or intimidation to attain the same objective of outlawing the confession.
Philippines, Supreme Court, Binimira case, Judgment, 14 August 1997.
The 1987 Constitution requires that a person under investigation for the commission of a crime should be provided with counsel. We have constitutionalized the right to counsel because of our hostility against the use of duress and other undue influence in extracting confessions from a suspect. Force and fraud tarnish confessions and render them inadmissible. In providing for said right, this Court has held in the same case that when the Constitution requires the right to counsel, it did not mean any kind of counsel but effective and vigilant counsel. The requirements of effectiveness and vigilance of counsel during that stage before arraignment were for the purposes of guarding against the use of duress and other undue influence in extracting confessions which may taint them and render them inadmissible.
Philippines, Supreme Court, Liwanag case, Judgment, 15 August 2001.
Notes maintained by the CID dated 30.11.2006 … [indicate that the petitioner was] produced immediately before and after the recording of his confession before a Judicial Medical Officer who recorded no complaint, or observed any injuries. On this date, Assistant Superintendent Wimal Samarasekera, upon examining the Petitioner noted contemporaneously, that the Petitioner had no visible injuries and that all relevant warnings had been issued to the Petitioner in terms of the law.
Sri Lanka, Supreme Court, Sivalingam case, Judgment, 10 November 2010, pp. 10–11.
Azerbaijan, Third periodic report to the Human Rights Committee, 10 December 2007, UN Doc. CCPR/C/AZE/3, submitted 4 October 2007, § 126.
[There is an] obligation to display in a clearly visible place in every detention centre a separate placard showing the rights of the detainee … The placard must mention the following rights [including]: … (2) To remain silent in order to avoid incriminating himself.
Chile, Third periodic report to the Committee against Torture, 28 October 2002, UN Doc. CAT/C/39/Add.14, submitted 18 February 2002, § 34.
In 2006, in its fifth periodic report to the Human Rights Committee, Chile stated: “The new Code [of Criminal Procedure] also enshrines the rights of persons charged with offences not to testify against themselves”.
Chile, Fifth periodic report to the Human Rights Committee, 5 July 2006, UN Doc. CCPR/C/CHL/5, submitted 7 February 2006, § 215; see also § 211.
Public security organs have practiced strict enforcement of the law and emphasized law enforcement in the interests of the people. They have … firmly dealt with violations of human rights involving the extortion of confessions by torture … and seriously dealt with law and discipline violations, so as to ensure that law enforcement by public security organs is strict, just and humane, and to protect and guarantee human rights.
China, White Paper of the Government of the People’s Republic of China: Progress in China’s Human Rights Cause in 2003, March 2004.
Since May 2004, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate has carried out a special campaign to severely deal with criminal cases involving government functionaries’ infringement upon human rights by misusing their powers, focusing on cases of illegal detention and search, extorting confessions by torture, gathering evidence with violence, [and] abusing people in custody.
Croatia, Second periodic report to the Human Rights Committee, 2 December 2008, UN Doc. CCPR/C/HRV/2, submitted 28 November 2007, § 207.
Act XXXIV of 1994 on the police also stipulates the prohibition of torture, extorting testimonies, and cruel, inhuman or humiliating treatment in line with international requirements, and regulates the most important guarantee provisions applicable to the use of means of extortion at the level of laws. According to the law, police officers shall not use torture, extortion of testimonies, or cruel, inhuman or humiliating treatment and shall refuse instructions to this effect given by their superiors. In addition, police officers shall take measures against persons exhibiting such behaviour for the sake of prevention, and initiate legal proceedings and investigations. Pursuant to the Decree of the Minister of the Interior No. 19/1995 on the procedures in police jails, the detainee shall be treated with respect for his human dignity in the course of any action.
Hungary, Second periodic report to the Committee on the Rights of the Child, 24 May 2005, UN Doc. CRC/C/70/Add.25, submitted 17 February 2004, § 226.
124. Torture within the meaning of the Convention violates section 226 (ill-treatment in official proceedings) or 227 (forced interrogation) of the Hungarian Criminal Code. If in addition to these offences bodily assault is also committed, the conduct is evaluated as constituting a cumulative crime.
126. In respect of such conduct, or the use of unauthorized bodily force, or orders calling for the commission of bodily assault, it has to be mentioned that official members of the armed forces and the police are supposed to know the legal provisions that govern their operation, rights and obligations. In the case of such offences, a subordinate member of the police or the armed forces shall not successfully allege that he acted upon an order. A knowledge of the above-cited legal provisions and regulations and of the relevant provisions of the Criminal Code is a prerequisite for admission into the service for official members. Therefore, in practice, official members of the police or the armed forces shall not use an excuse of non-familiarity with the relevant laws.
Hungary, Fourth periodic report to the Committee against Torture, 16 June 2004, UN Doc. CAT/C/55/Add.10, 14 February 2005, §§ 124–126.
158. The Constitution provides that “no person shall be compelled to testify against himself/herself” (art. 38, para. 1). The Code of Criminal Procedure gives the suspect the right to refuse testimony and provides that, at the time of the interview, the suspect shall be notified in advance that he/she is not required to make a statement against his/her own will (art. 198, para. 2).
161. Clearly, such interview methods as coercion, torture, and intimidation are not permitted. Interviews conducted in such a manner that would cast doubts on the voluntary nature of the testimony of the suspect are not permitted either. The Code of Criminal Procedure stipulates that any confession … which is suspected of not having been made voluntarily shall not be used as evidence (art. 319, para. 1). Furthermore, it provides that any deposition or written statement, including admission of facts adverse to the defendant’s interests, which may not have been made voluntarily shall not be used as evidence (art. 322, para. 1). If a dispute arises in a public trial concerning the voluntary nature or reliability of the testimony, the public prosecutor bears the burden of proof as to these issues, and the determination of these issues is left to the court.
Japan, Fifth periodic report to the Human Rights Committee, UN Doc. CCPR/C/JPN/5, 25 April 2007, submitted 20 December 2006, §§ 158 and 161.
Moroccan justice is extremely vigilant with regard to the form and substance of the reports prepared by officers of the judicial police. Should it prove to be the case that such reports contain confessions obtained under duress, they are simply rejected and proceedings are initiated against their authors.
Morocco, Third periodic report to the UN Committee against Torture, 21 May 2003, UN Doc. CAT/C/66/Add.1, submitted 23 March 2003, § 170.
In 2004, in its fifth periodic report to the Human Rights Committee, Morocco stated that “any confession obtained by violent means or coercion is, as article 293 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides, null and void”.
Morocco, Fifth periodic report to the Human Rights Committee, 11 May 2004, UN Doc. CCPR/C/MAR/2004/5, submitted 10 March 2004,§ 191.
Oman, Second periodic report to the Committee on the Rights of the Child, 8 May 2006, UN Doc. CRC/C/OMN/2, submitted 28 April 2005, § 23; see also §§ 464–467.
The Polish Penal Code (articles 245–247) determines penal liability for manifestations of cruelty towards persons deprived of liberty and subjects to penal liability public officials who use or threaten to use violence or commit offences of tormenting either physically or psychologically for the purpose of obtaining a testimony or information. Through these provisions Poland introduced into its legislature the principle of international accountability for the prosecution of actions which constitute acts of torture. Depending on the result of a prohibited act, which may be regarded as torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, the Code envisages adequate sanctions.
Poland, Fifth periodic report to the Human Rights Committee, 26 January 2004, UN Doc. CCPR/C/POL/2004/5, submitted 13 January 2004, § 116.
61. The individual’s right not to be forced to testify against himself also includes the right to remain silent while in detention and during questioning, regardless of whether or not the information sought would implicate him in a crime.
Qatar, Initial report to the UN Committee against Torture, 5 October 2005, UN Doc. CAT/C/58/Add.1, submitted 9 February 2005, §§ 42 and 61; see also §§ 53, 58 and 81.
In 2006, in its initial report to the Committee against Torture, Serbia stated that its Charter on Human Rights (2003) “prohibits … the extraction of confession or information and evidence”.
Serbia, Initial report to the Committee against Torture, 8 February 2007, UN Doc. CAT/C/SRB/1, submitted 3 May 2006, as amended by CAT/C/SRB/2/Corr.1, 23 September 2008, § 186.
128. The draft federal code of criminal procedure embodies the right to remain silent. Before their first hearing by the police and subsequently by the examining magistrate, suspects must be informed that they may refuse to give a statement (art. 167, para. 1 (b)).
131. The Federal Tribunal recognizes the right of the accused to remain silent as a general and inviolable principle of criminal procedure (ATF 106 Ia 7). All judicial authorities are required to comply with this case law.
132. In addition, the law of several Swiss cantons recognizes the right of the accused not to incriminate themselves and to remain silent.
Switzerland, Fourth periodic report to the Committee against Torture, 2 July 2004, UN Doc. CAT/C/55/Add.9, submitted 18 December 2002, §§ 128 and 131–132.
Apart from the direct fight against insurgents, international humanitarian law also addresses other anti-guerrilla tactics. … If members of militias or opposition groups fall into the hands of the government they benefit from the protection of art. 75 of  Additional Protocol I as well as that of art. 3 common to the  Geneva Conventions.
My Lords, from the outset, the Government have urged the United States Government to resolve the position of the detainees. The Government are currently making vigorous representations to the United States Government about the future of the UK detainees at Guantanamo Bay. These representations cover a range of issues, including the need for any trials of UK detainees to be fair and to accord with international law, as well as the possible return of the detainees to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. My right honourable friend the Prime Minister will raise this matter with the President of the United States in the course of his imminent visit to Washington.
My Lords, the noble Lord raises two issues. We have made representations to the United States Government in regard to the physical conditions under which the individuals are held – for example, the inadequate facilities for exercise and the inadequate facilities for contact with their families. Representatives of the International Red Cross have visited Guantanamo Bay and are giving their advice to the United States Government.
United Kingdom, House of Lords, Statement by the Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Hansard, 17 July 2003, Vol. 651, Debates, cols. 965–968.
109. In response to the judgement of the European Court of Human Rights in John Murray v. United Kingdom, the Government introduced provisions prohibiting the drawing of inferences from silence where no prior access to legal advice has been granted. These were contained in the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999, and replicated for Northern Ireland at article 36 of the Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1999. Commencement of the provisions in England and Wales and in Northern Ireland will follow necessary revision of the PACE Codes [Codes of Practice issued under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. However, in both jurisdictions administrative arrangements have been in place for some time to ensure compliance with the judgement.
110. In Scotland, regardless of whether a legal adviser is present, no inferences can be drawn as to the credibility of the suspect’s evidence on any matter about which he declined to say anything while being interviewed, cautioned, or charged by the police.
278. As explained in paragraphs 121–123 of the initial report, under both statutory and common law, a confession that may have been obtained by oppression is inadmissible in the United Kingdom as evidence against the person who made that confession. When considering the admissibility of a confession the court must have in mind the provisions of sections 76 and 78 of the Police & Criminal Evidence Act 1984. Under section 76, the court must exclude a confession if it was or may have been obtained by oppression or in consequence of anything said or done which was likely to render a confession unreliable. Under section 78, the court may exclude a confession if, having regard to all the circumstances, its admission as evidence would have an unfair effect on the proceedings. Human Rights legislation (ECHR [1950 European Convention on Human Rights] article 3 as incorporated through the Human Rights Act 1998) also provides that the court may exclude a confession if it was obtained in violation of convention rights.
279. Although the PACE Act 1984 does not extend to Scotland, the same principle, that evidence of a confession obtained by oppression is inadmissible, also applies in Scotland.
280. Section 76 of the Terrorism Act provided for the admissibility of confession evidence in scheduled offences going before a Diplock court in Northern Ireland. The first annual report by Lord Carlisle, the Independent Reviewer of the Terrorism Act, suggested that consideration be given to the need for section 76 to continue to exist. Following a consultation exercise, Ministers were satisfied that practice had developed to the point similar to the PACE standard for confession evidence and, in July 2002, section 76 was repealed. The United Kingdom is not satisfied that section 76 was of itself a breach of the Convention. Nor does the United Kingdom accept that a provision in Northern Ireland different from the rest of the United Kingdom is an inherent breach of the Convention. Within the United Kingdom, different bodies of law apply in England and Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland.
United Kingdom, Fourth periodic report to the Committee against Torture, UN Doc. CAT/C/67/Add.2, 27 May 2004, submitted 6 November 2003, §§ 109–110 and 278–280.
54. An appeal by the British Government to the House of Lords on the use of torture evidence arose as a result of individual appeals by 10 of the individuals who were certified and detained under the ATCS [Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security] Act. On 8 December 2005, the Law Lords ruled that there is an exclusionary rule precluding the use of evidence obtained by torture. The effect of this ruling is simply to replace the British Government’s stated policy, namely, not to rely on evidence which is believed to have been obtained by torture by an “exclusionary” rule of law.
113. As regards paragraph 17 of the concluding observations (“The State party should reconsider, with a view to repealing it, the principle that juries may draw negative inferences from the silence of accused persons. This is to ensure compliance with the rights guaranteed under article 14 of the Covenant.”), the key question in addressing this issue is, whether the power to draw inferences from a person’s silence is compatible in principle with the right not to incriminate oneself. It is important to note that, while the ECtHR [European Court of Human Rights] has made clear that the right to silence and privilege against self incrimination is at the heart of a fair trial, and particular caution is required by a domestic court before it can invoke an accused’s silence against him, that Court has also made clear that the right is not absolute and that it must be considered in the context of the particular circumstances of each case.
114. The ECtHR has stated, in Murray v UK (1996 22 EHRR 29) that whether the drawing of adverse inferences from an accused’s silence infringes article 6 of the ECHR [European Convention on Human Rights] is a matter to be determined in the light of all the circumstances of the case, having particular regard to the situations where inferences may be drawn, the weight to be attached to them by national courts in their assessment of the evidence and the degree of compulsion inherent in the situation.
115. It is also important to note that, under British law, an inference cannot be drawn simply from failure to answer police questions. An inference may only be drawn if the defendant fails to answer police questions and then also fails to testify at trial, or if the defendant fails to mention something, which, in the circumstances existing at the time, he could reasonably have been expected to mention, and which he then seeks to rely upon in his defence at trial. The aim of the British legislation is to discourage an accused from fabricating a defence late in the day and to encourage the accused to make a speedy disclosure of any genuine defence or fact which may go to establishing a genuine defence. It is not to secure convictions at the expense of defendant’s rights.
116. The British Courts will have due regard to the requirements of article 6 of the ECHR and to the overall fairness of proceedings in determining whether to invoke an accused’s silence against a defendant. This was demonstrated in the recent case of R v Becouarn , UKHL 55, in which the House of Lords found that the recommended direction on drawing inferences was sufficiently fair to defendants, emphasizing as it did that the jury had to conclude that the only sensible explanation for a defendant’s failure to give evidence was that he had no answer to the case against him, or none that could have stood up to cross-examination. It was noted that trial judges had full discretion to adapt the direction if they considered that by doing so it would provide the best guidance to a jury and the fairest representation of the issues.
117. The Government considers that the ability to draw negative inferences from an accused’s silence under British law cannot be said to be, on its face, a breach of article 14, and that each case will be subject to the supervisory scrutiny of the Courts to ensure that the requirements of a fair trial are met. The arrangements therefore will remain in place.
- There are important safeguards to this which can be found in paragraph 387 of the fifth periodic report.
527. Following the ECHR case of Murray (1996), these safeguards were further enhanced by section 58 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999. This amended the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 provisions to prevent inferences being drawn if a suspect has not had the opportunity to speak to a solicitor and PACE [Police and Criminal Evidence Act] Code C was amended accordingly with effect from 1 April 2003.
United Kingdom, Sixth periodic report to the Human Rights Committee, UN Doc. CCPR/C/GBR/6, 18 May 2007, submitted 1 November 2006, §§ 54, 113–117 and 526–527.
In a resolution adopted in 2004 on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, the UN General Assembly urged States to ensure that “any statement that is established to have been made as a result of torture shall not be invoked as evidence in any proceedings, except against a person accused of torture as evidence that the statement was made”.
UN General Assembly, Res. 59/182, 20 December 2004, § 6, adopted without a vote.
In a resolution adopted in 2005 on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, the UN General Assembly urged States to ensure that “any statement that is established to have been made as a result of torture shall not be invoked as evidence in any proceedings, except against a person accused of torture as evidence that the statement was made”.
UN General Assembly, Res. 60/148, 16 December 2005, § 6, adopted without a vote.
In a resolution adopted in 2006 on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, the UN General Assembly urged States to ensure that “any statement that is established to have been made as a result of torture shall not be invoked as evidence in any proceedings, except against a person accused of torture as evidence that the statement was made”.
UN General Assembly, Res. 61/153, 19 December 2006, § 7, adopted without a vote.
In a resolution adopted in 2007 on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, the UN General Assembly strongly urged States “to ensure that any statement that is established to have been made as a result of torture shall not be invoked as evidence in any proceedings, except against a person accused of torture as evidence that the statement was made”.
UN General Assembly, Res. 62/148, 18 December 2007, § 10, adopted without a vote.
75. The Appeals Chamber agrees with the parties that the standard for determining whether a guilty plea is informed is that articulated by Judges McDonald and Vohrah in Erdemović such that the accused must understand the nature of a guilty plea and the consequences of pleading guilty in general, the nature of the charges against him, and the distinction between any alternative charges and the consequences of pleading guilty to one rather than the other.
76. Although the Appellant claims the Trial Chamber should have made it “clear to the accused that by pleading guilty the only possible sentence would be life imprisonment and that a plea agreement would never mitigate the penalty seeing the gravity of the offences”, the Appeals Chamber cannot accept this argument. The duty of a Trial Chamber to inform an accused person of the possible sentence is not to be mechanically discharged. The proceedings have to be read as a whole, inclusive of the submission of the parties. The transcripts show that both parties accepted that the imposition of a sentence of life imprisonment was a possibility. There being no dispute on the point, when the Appellant told the Trial Chamber, “I fully know the consequences of my guilty plea”, he fell to be understood as acknowledging that possibility.
84. The Appeals Chamber notes that, as articulated by Judges McDonald and Vohrah in the Erdemović case, “[w]hether a plea of guilty is equivocal must depend on a consideration, in limine, of the question whether the plea was accompanied or qualified by words describing facts which establish a defence in law.” This Appeals Chamber agrees with this statement.
94. The Appeals Chamber finds no merit in the Appellant’s contention that the Trial Chamber, in accepting his guilty plea, could not have been satisfied that there was sufficient evidence to indicate that the Appellant was guilty.
ICTR, Kambanda case, Judgment on Appeal, 19 October 2000, §§ 61, 75–76, 84 and 94.
In its judgment in the Blagojević and Jokić case in 2005, the ICTY Trial Chamber noted that “Article 21(4)(g) of the [1993 ICTY] Statute provides that no accused shall be compelled to testify against himself. In the present case, both Accused exercised their right to remain silent; no adverse inferences were drawn from the fact that they did not testify”.
ICTY, Blagojević and Jokić case, Judgment, 17 January 2005, § 19.
Article 21(4)(g) of the [1993 ICTY] Statute provides that accused shall not be compelled to testify against themselves or to confess guilt. In this case, the Accused has made use of his right to remain silent. The Trial Chamber has drawn no unfavourable inference therefrom and acknowledges that silence may not be used as evidence to prove guilt and may not be interpreted as an admission.
ICTY, Orić case, Judgment, 30 June 2006, § 16.
476. The Chamber took cognisance of the fact that Article 17(4)(g) of the  Statute of the Special Court guarantees to every person charged with a crime or crimes falling within the jurisdiction of the Court, the right not to incriminate himself. … [I]n conformity with general principles of law recognised by the community of nations, we recognised the due process rights of [one of the accused], acknowledging that his decision to remain silent did not amount to an admission of guilt.
477. [The other two accused], however, chose to testify, and in accordance with Rule 85(C) [of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Special Court for Sierra Leone], gave evidence and thereafter, called witnesses in their defence. The fact that they elected to testify is not indicative that either of the Accused accepted an evidential burden to prove his innocence, or that a choice had to be made between the evidence of the Accused or the evidence of the Prosecution. Rather, the burden remained on the Prosecution to establish all essential elements of the crimes charged in the Indictment.
SCSL, Sesay case, Judgment, 2 March 2009, §§ 476–477.
In the Kaing case before the ECCC, the accused was charged, both individually and as a superior, with, inter alia, various crimes against humanity and grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. In its judgment in 2010, the Trial Chamber stated that “[a]ccused persons enjoy a fundamental right not to be compelled to testify against themselves or to confess guilt”.
ECCC, Kaing case, Judgment, 26 July 2010, § 50.
6. … [A]s article 7 [which states that no one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment] is also non-derogable in its entirety, no statements or confessions or, in principle, other evidence obtained in violation of this provision may be invoked as evidence in any proceedings covered by article 14, including during a state of emergency, except if a statement or confession obtained in violation of article 7 is used as evidence that torture or other treatment prohibited by this provision occurred.
41. … [A]rticle 14, paragraph 3 (g), guarantees the right not to be compelled to testify against oneself or to confess guilt. This safeguard must be understood in terms of the absence of any direct or indirect physical or undue psychological pressure from the investigating authorities on the accused, with a view to obtaining a confession of guilt. A fortiori, it is unacceptable to treat an accused person in a manner contrary to article 7 of the Covenant in order to extract a confession. Domestic law must ensure that statements or confessions obtained in violation of article 7 of the Covenant are excluded from the evidence, except if such material is used as evidence that torture or other treatment prohibited by this provision occurred, and that in such cases the burden is on the State to prove that statements made by the accused have been given of their own free will.
60. To ill-treat persons against whom criminal charges are brought and to force them to make or sign, under duress, a confession admitting guilt violates both article 7 of the Covenant prohibiting torture and inhuman, cruel or degrading treatment and article 14, paragraph 3 (g) prohibiting compulsion to testify against oneself or confess guilt.
Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 32 [Article 14: Right to Equality before Courts and Tribunals and to a Fair Trial], 23 August 2007, §§ 6, 41 and 60.
… The Committee notes that evidence is not admissible if it is shown to have been obtained by improper means, but remains concerned that the victim bears the burden of proof in this event.
… All allegations that statements of detainees have been obtained through coercion must lead to an investigation and such statements must never be used as evidence, except as evidence of torture, and the burden of proof, in such cases, should not be borne by the alleged victim .
Human Rights Committee, Concluding observations on the consolidated second and third periodic reports of the Philippines, UN Doc. CCPR/CO/79/PHL, 1 December 2003, § 12.
The Committee is concerned that the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) remains in force and that several of its provisions are incompatible with the [1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights] (arts. 4, 9 and 14). The Committee welcomes the decision of the Government, consistent with the Ceasefire Agreement of February 2002, not to apply the provisions of the PTA and to ensure that normal procedures for arrest, detention and investigation prescribed by the Criminal Procedure Code are followed … The PTA … places the burden of proof on the accused that a confession was obtained under duress. The Committee is concerned that such provisions, incompatible with the Covenant, still remain legally enforceable, and that it is envisaged that they might also be incorporated into the Prevention of Organized Crimes Bill 2003.
Besides banning torture outright, the State party should prohibit the use of confessions obtained in violation of article 7 of the Covenant in any Sudanese court. In its next report, the State party should also indicate the number of appeals for review of conviction resulting from an unfair trial or the use of a confession obtained under torture.
Human Rights Committee, Concluding observations on the third periodic report of the Sudan, UN Doc. CCPR/C/SDN/CO/3, 29 August 2007, § 25.
In several cases, the Human Rights Committee explained that the guarantee of Article 14(3)(g) of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights must be understood “in terms of the absence of any direct or indirect physical or psychological pressure from the investigating authorities on the accused, with a view to obtaining a confession of guilt”.
Human Rights Committee, Saldías López v. Uruguay, Views, 29 July 1981, §§ 11.5–13; Teti Izquierdo v. Uruguay, Views, 1 April 1982, § 9; Estrella v. Uruguay, Views, 29 March 1983, § 10; Hiber Conteris v. Uruguay, Views, 17 July 1985, § 10; Cariboni v. Uruguay, Views, 27 October 1987, § 10; Kelly v. Jamaica, Views, 8 April 1991, § 5(5); Berry v. Jamaica, Views, 7 April 1994, § 11(7); Johnson v. Jamaica, Views, 22 March 1996, § 8(7).
In Singarasa v. Sri Lanka in 2004, the author submitted that he had been subjected to torture and ill-treatment by members of the Sri Lankan Criminal Investigation Department, in order to extract a confession. He was subsequently convicted by the High Court on the sole basis of that alleged confession, which, he claimed, amounted to a violation of his right to a fair trial.
On the claim of a violation of the author’s rights under article 14, paragraph 3 (g) [of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights], in that he was forced to sign a confession and subsequently had to assume the burden of proof that it was extracted under duress and was not voluntary, the Committee must consider the principles underlying the right protected in this provision. It refers to its previous jurisprudence that the wording, in article 14, paragraph 3 (g), that no one shall “be compelled to testify against himself or confess guilt”, must be understood in terms of the absence of any direct or indirect physical or psychological coercion from the investigating authorities on the accused with a view to obtaining a confession of guilt. The Committee considers that it is implicit in this principle that the prosecution prove that the confession was made without duress. It further notes that pursuant to section 24 of the Sri Lankan Evidence Ordinance, confessions extracted by “inducement, threat or promise” are inadmissible and that in the instant case both the High Court and the Court of Appeal considered evidence that the author had been assaulted several days prior to the alleged confession. However, the Committee also notes that the burden of proving whether the confession was voluntary was on the accused. This is undisputed by the State party since it is so provided in Section 16 of the PTA [Prevention of Terrorism Act No. 48 of 1979]. Even if, as argued by the State party, the threshold of proof is “placed very low” and “a mere possibility of involuntariness” would suffice to sway the court in favour of the accused, it remains that the burden was on the author. The Committee notes in this respect that the willingness of the courts at all stages to dismiss the complaints of torture and ill-treatment on the basis of the inconclusiveness of the medical certificate (especially one obtained over a year after the interrogation and ensuing confession) suggests that this threshold was not complied with. Further, insofar as the courts were prepared to infer that the author’s allegations lacked credibility by virtue of his failing to complain of ill-treatment before its Magistrate, the Committee finds that inference to be manifestly unsustainable in the light of his expected return to police detention. Nor did this treatment of the complaint by its courts satisfactorily discharge the State party's obligation to investigate effectively complaints of violations of article 7. The Committee concludes that by placing the burden of proof that his confession was made under duress on the author, the State party violated article 14, paragraphs 2, and 3(g), read together with article 2, paragraph 3, and 7 of the Covenant.
Human Rights Committee, Singarasa v. Sri Lanka, Views, 23 August 2004, § 7.4.
5.1 The author claims that Mr. Deolall was ill-treated during interrogations by police officers and forced to sign a confession statement, a claim that raises issues under article 14, paragraphs 1 and 3 (g) and article 6, of the [1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights]. The Committee refers to its previous jurisprudence that the wording, in article 14, paragraph 3 (g), that no one shall “be compelled to testify against himself or confess guilt”, must be understood in terms of the absence of any direct or indirect physical or psychological coercion from the investigating authorities on the accused with a view to obtaining a confession of guilt, and that it is implicit in this principle that the prosecution prove that the confession was made without duress (3). In the current case, the Committee notes that the testimony of 3 doctors at the trial, that Mr. Deolall displayed injuries, as outlined in paragraph 2.2 above, as well as Mr. Deolall’s own statement, would prima facie support the allegation that such ill-treatment indeed occurred during the police interrogations, prior to his signing of the confession statement. In its instructions to the jurors, the court clearly stated that if the jurors found that Mr. Deolall was beaten by the police prior to giving his confession, even though it was a slight beating, they could not attach any weight to that statement and would need to acquit the defendant. However, the Court did not instruct the jurors that they would need to be convinced that the prosecution had managed to prove that the confession was voluntary.
5.2 The Committee maintains its position that it is generally not in the position to evaluate facts and evidence presented before a domestic court. In the current case, however, the Committee takes the view that the instructions to the jury raise an issue under article 14 of the Covenant, as the defendant had managed to present prima facie evidence of being mistreated, and the Court did not alert the jury that that the prosecution must prove that the confession was made without duress. This error constituted a violation of Mr. Deolall’s right to a fair trial as required by the Covenant, as well as his right not to be compelled to testify against himself or confess guilt, which violations were not remedied upon appeal. Therefore, the Committee concludes that the State party has violated article 14, paragraphs 1, and 3 (g), of the Covenant in respect of Mr. Deolall.
Human Rights Committee, Deolall v. Guyana, Views, 28 January 2005, §§ 5.1–5.2.
6.3 … In the present case, the facts presented by the author clearly demonstrate that the Supreme Court acted in a biased and arbitrary manner with respect to the complaints related to the author’s son’s torture during the preliminary detention, because of the summary and unreasoned rejection of the evidence, properly and clearly documented by the author, that he had been tortured. In their effect, the action of the courts placed the burden of proof on the author, whereas the general principle is that the burden of proof that the confession was made without duress is on the prosecution. The Committee concludes that the treatment of Mr. Kurbonov during his preliminary detention, and the manner the courts addressed his subsequent claims to this effect, amounts to a violation of article 7 and of article 14, paragraph 1, of the [1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights]. In light of this finding, the Committee considers unnecessary separately to examine the claim made under article 10.
6.4 In light of the above finding, the Committee concludes that the author’s son’s rights under article 14, paragraph 3 (g), have also been violated, as he was compelled to confess guilt to a crime.
Human Rights Committee, Kurbonov v. Tajikistan, Views, 19 April 2006, §§ 6.3–6.4.
On the claim of a violation of the author’s sons’ rights under article 14, paragraph 3 (g) [of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights], in that they were forced to sign a confession, the Committee must consider the principles that underlie this guarantee. It refers to its previous jurisprudence that the wording, in article 14, paragraph 3 (g), that no one shall “be compelled to testify against himself or confess guilt”, must be understood in terms of the absence of any direct or indirect physical or psychological coercion by the investigating authorities on the accused with a view to obtaining a confession of guilt. The Committee considers that it is implicit in this principle that the burden of proof that the confession was made without duress is on the prosecution. However, the Committee notes that in this case, the burden of proof whether the confession was voluntary was on the accused. The Committee notes that both the Tashkent Regional Court and the Supreme Court ignored the allegations of torture made by the author’s sons. Therefore, the Committee concludes that the State party has violated article 14, paragraphs 2, and 3 (g).
Human Rights Committee, Sultanova v. Uzbekistan, Views, 19 April 2006, § 7.3.
On the claim under article 14, paragraph 3 (g) [of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights] read alone, the Committee notes the Supreme Court was aware of … allegations of ill-treatment. The Committee considers that the obligations under article 14, paragraph 3(g) entail an obligation of the State party to take account of any claims that statements made by accused persons in a criminal case were given under duress. In this regard, it is immaterial whether or not a confession is actually relied upon, as the obligation refers to all aspects of the judicial process of determination. In the present case, the State party's failure, at the level of the Supreme Court, to take account of the author’s claims that his confession was given under duress, amount to a violation of article 14, paragraph 3(g).
Human Rights Committee, Kouidis v. Greece, Views, 26 April 2006, § 7.5.
8.2 The author claims that her husband and his brother were beaten and subjected to torture by investigators during the early stages of their detention, thus forcing them to confess guilt in the bombing … She contends that these allegations were raised in court but were ignored. The State party merely argues that the case file does not contain complaints about mistreatment. The Committee observes that the decision of the Supreme Court’s Appellate Chamber also does not address the issue. In the absence of other pertinent information in this regard, due weight must be given to the author’s claims. The Committee recalls that it is essential that complaints about torture must be investigated promptly and impartially by competent authorities. In the present case, no substantive refutation was made by the State party in this regard, and the Committee concludes that the treatment Dovud and Sherali Nazriev were subjected to amounts to a violation of article 7, read together with articles 14, paragraph 1 and 2, paragraph 3, of the [1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights].
8.3 In light of the above, the Committee concludes that Dovud and Sherali Nazriev’s right under article 14, paragraph 3 (g), was also violated, as they were compelled to confess guilt to a crime.
Human Rights Committee, Shukurova v. Tajikistan, Views, 26 April 2006, §§ 8.2–8.3.
The author has claimed that her son was beaten by police investigators to force him to confess guilt. She affirms that she personally witnessed, on two separate occasions, in the police premises, how investigators beat her son. She also adds that at the beginning of his trial, her son notified the court that he had been beaten and that his confession was obtained under duress, that he provided the names of the responsible officers, and that these complaints were neither recorded in the trial record nor investigated. The Committee recalls that when a complaint against maltreatment contrary to article 7 [of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights] is lodged, a State party is under a duty to promptly and impartially investigate it. In the circumstances of the present case, and in the absence of any pertinent information submitted by the State party in this relation, due weight must be given to the author’s allegations. Accordingly, the Committee decides that the facts as presented disclose a violation of article 7, read together with article 14, paragraph 3 (g), of the Covenant.
Human Rights Committee, Tarasova v. Uzbekistan, Views, 10 November 2006, § 7.1.
The author claims that her son confessed guilt under torture. During the preliminary investigation, she complained to the authorities about this, but all her complaints were to no avail. When her son retracted his confessions at the court as obtained under duress, the judge interrogated several witnesses and investigators who denied any use of coercion against him. The State party has only contended that the courts examined these allegations and found them to be groundless. The Committee recalls that once a complaint against maltreatment contrary to article 7 [of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights] is filed, a State party must investigate it promptly and impartially. In the present case, the author has presented documents with a detailed description of the torture allegedly suffered by her son. The Committee considers that the documents before it indicate that the State party’s authorities did not react adequately or in a timely way to the complaints filed on behalf of the author’s son. No information has been provided by the State party to confirm that a further inquiry or medical examination was conducted in order to verify the veracity of Mr. Chikunov’s torture allegations. In the circumstances of the case, the Committee concludes that the facts as presented disclose a violation of article 7, read together with article 14, paragraph 3 (g), of the Covenant.
Human Rights Committee, Chikunova v. Uzbekistan, Views, 3 May 2007, § 7.2.
The authors claimed that the alleged victims were beaten and tortured by the investigators, so as to make them confess guilt. These allegations were presented both in court and in the context of the present communication. The State party has replied, in relation to the case of Mr. Karimov, that these allegations were not corroborated by the materials in the case file, and that the alleged victim was examined on two occasions by medical doctors who did not find marks of torture on his body. The State party makes no comment in relation to the torture allegations made on behalf of Mr. Askarov and the Davlatov brothers. In the absence of any other pertinent information from the State party, due weight must be given to the authors’ allegations. The Committee recalls that once a complaint about ill-treatment contrary to article 7 [of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights] has been filed, a State party must investigate it promptly and impartially. In the present case, the authors have presented a sufficiently detailed description of the torture suffered by Messrs Karimov, Askarov, and the Davlatov brothers, and have identified some of the investigators responsible. The Committee considers that in the circumstances of the case, the State party has failed to demonstrate that its authorities adequately addressed the torture allegations put forward by the authors. In the circumstances, the Committee concludes that the facts as presented disclose a violation of article 7, read together with article 14, paragraph 3 (g), of the Covenant.
Human Rights Committee, Karimov and Nursatov v. Tajikistan, Views, 3 May 2007, § 7.2.
The author claims that her son was beaten and tortured by investigators, and thus forced to confess his guilt. He retracted his initial confessions in court, claiming that they had been obtained under duress and identifying the names of those responsible for his ill-treatment. The State party has rejected the claim as a defence strategy, and has asserted that no torture or unlawful methods of investigation were used against Khudayberganov, and that the entire investigation and all court proceedings complied with the law in force. The author has also claimed that her son was ill-treated on death row, which was not contested by the State party. The Committee recalls that once a complaint about ill-treatment contrary to article 7 [of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights] has been filed, a State party must investigate it promptly and impartially. It notes that the case file contains copies of complaints about the author’s son’s ill-treatment that were brought to the attention of the State party’s authorities, including copies of letters from the alleged victim’s sister, from lawyers, from NGOs’, as well as a letter from Khudayberganov himself, which detailed the methods of torture used against him. The Committee considers that in the circumstances of the case, the State party has failed to demonstrate that its authorities adequately addressed the torture allegations advanced by the author, both in the context of domestic criminal proceedings and the present communication. Accordingly, due weight must be given to her allegations. In the circumstances, the Committee concludes that the facts as presented disclose a violation of the author’s son’s rights under article 7, read together with article 14, paragraph 3 (g), of the Covenant.
Human Rights Committee, Khudayberganova v. Uzbekistan, Views, 7 August 2007, § 8.2.
The author has claimed that her son was beaten and tortured by investigators to force him to confess guilt in the murder. According to her, and contrary to the requirements of a Ruling of the Uzbek Supreme Court of 20 February 1996, the Tashkent City Court used her son’s confessions to establish his guilt and to convict him. The author also claims that her son’s lawyer submitted a request to the District Police Department to have her son examined by a medical doctor, so as to confirm that he was subjected to ill-treatment but the investigator in charge of the case refused to comply with the request. These allegations were also brought to the attention of the Presidential administration when the author’s son requested a Presidential pardon, but no reply was ever received. The Committee recalls that once a complaint against ill-treatment contrary to article 7 [of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights] is filed, a State party is duty bound to investigate it promptly and impartially. In this case, the State party has not refuted the author’s allegations nor has it presented any information, in the context of the present case, to show that it conducted any inquiry in this respect. In these circumstances, due weight must be given to the author’s allegations, and the Committee considers that the facts presented by the author disclose a violation of her son’s rights under article 7 and article 14, paragraph 3 (g), of the Covenant.
Human Rights Committee, Tulyaganova v. Uzbekistan, Views, 7 August 2007, § 8.2.
The author has claimed that her brother was beaten and tortured by investigators to force him to confess guilt in the murder and other crimes. In court, he retracted his initial confessions made during the investigation, and explained that they were obtained under beatings and torture. The court rejected his claim as constituting a defence strategy aimed at avoiding criminal liability. These allegations were brought to the attention of the Supreme Court of Uzbekistan and were rejected. The Committee recalls that once a complaint against ill-treatment contrary to article 7 [of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights] is filed, a State party is duty bound to investigate it promptly and impartially. In this case, the State party has not specifically, by way of presenting the detailed consideration by the courts, or otherwise, refuted the author’s allegations nor has it presented any particular information, in the context of the present communication, to demonstrate that it conducted any inquiry in this respect. In these circumstances, due weight must be given to the author’s allegations, and the Committee considers that the facts presented by the author disclose a violation of her brother’s rights under article 7 and article 14, paragraph 3 (g), of the Covenant.
Human Rights Committee, Uteeva v. Uzbekistan, Views, 13 November 2007, § 7.2.
The right not to be compelled to testify against oneself or to confess guilt has been seen by the European Court of Human Rights as one element of the right to a fair trial.
European Court of Human Rights, Funke case, Judgment, 25 February 1993, § 44; Serves v. France, Judgment (Chamber), 20 October 1997, § 47.
In its judgment in Coëme and Others v. Belgium in 2000, the European Court of Human Rights stated that what mattered was that the guilt of the accused must not be established through evidence obtained from him by force or other forms of pressure.
European Court of Human Rights, Coëme and Others v. Belgium, Judgment, 22 June 2000, § 128.
In its report in a case concerning Argentina in 1990, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights stated that conviction on the basis of confessions obtained under torture violated Article XXVI of the 1948 American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man.
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Case 9850 (Argentina), Report, 4 October 1990, Part III, § 7.
In its report in a case concerning Nicaragua in 1989, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights found a violation of Article 8(2)(g) of the 1969 American Convention on Human Rights because a confession had been obtained whilst the defendant was being held incommunicado which was therefore invalid under Article 8(3).
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Case 10.198 (Nicaragua), Resolution, 29 September 1989, § 1.
Frédéric de Mulinen, Handbook on the Law of War for Armed Forces, ICRC, Geneva, 1987, § 202(f).
Turku Declaration of Minimum Humanitarian Standards, adopted by an expert meeting convened by the Institute for Human Rights, Åbo Akademi University, Turku/Åbo, 30 November–2 December 1990, Article 9(e), IRRC, No. 282, 1991, p. 334.

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