Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/269/102/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 10:29:01+00:00

Document:
(a) That certain legacy taxes, assessed under § 29 of the Spanish War Revenue Act, were "imposed" prior to July 1, 1902, within the saving clause of the repealing Act, c. 500, § 7, 32 Stat. 96, although the formal assessment by the Treasury Department was not made before that date. Cochran v. United States, 254 U. S. 387. P. 269 U. S. 109.
(b) That interests of residuary legatees in a portion of the estate not distributed prior to July 1, 1902, were not contingent beneficial interests not absolutely vested in possession or enjoyment prior to July 1, 1902, within the meaning of § 3 of the Act of June 27, 1902, c. 1160, 32 Stat. 406. Kahn v. United States, 257 U. S. 244; Simpson v. United States, 252 U. S. 547. P. 269 U. S. 109.
Appeal from a judgment of the Court of Claims dismissing the petition in a suit to recover money voluntarily paid as legacy taxes.
On January 26, 1916, the executors of Oswald Ottendorfer of New York City brought this suit in the Court of Claims to recover the sum of $543,708.44, voluntarily paid by them on December 10, 1902, for legacy taxes assessed under the Spanish War Revenue Act June 13, 1898, c. 448, § 29, 30 Stat. 448, 464, as amended by Act March 2, 1901, § 10. Section 29 had been repealed by Act of April 12, 1902, c. 500, § 7, 32 Stat. 96, 98, 99, the repeal to take effect July 1, 1902; but, by a proviso, all taxes theretofore imposed were continued in force. The time for presenting claims for the refunding of any tax under § 29 alleged to have been illegally assessed or to have been excessive or in any manner wrongfully collected was extended by Act of July 27, 1912, c. 256, 37 Stat. 240. The executors sought recovery of the whole amount paid, on the ground that the tax had not been imposed prior to July 1, 1902. Recovery of part of the amount was sought also on the ground that it was assessed upon legacies which had not vested in possession or enjoyment prior to that date. There is no claim here that the assessment was excessive. The lower court dismissed the petition. 58 Ct.Cls. 410. The case is here on appeal allowed June 25, 1923, under § 242 of the Judicial Code.
1901. There were some specific legacies, a residuary bequest which gave the bulk of the estate to three stepdaughters free from any trust, and a provision that all legacy or inheritance taxes should be paid out of the residue. The assets consisted largely of listed securities. On March 7, 1902, schedules were filed in the Surrogate's Court containing a description, and the estimated value of all of the property known by the executors to have been owned by the testator at his death, together with statements of decedent's debt, of the payments for administration expenses, of estimated commissions of the executors, and of further administration expenses. On June 5, 1902, the appraiser appointed by the Surrogate's Court filed his report appraising the property of decedent, but it was not until July 16, 1902, that the surrogate's order assessing thereon the New York inheritance tax was entered. The value of the personal property which passed to the executors was returned by them as $4,371,947.90. The debts and expenses to be set off against that sum were reported as $298,646.12. The assessment of the tax here in question was made by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue on December 10, 1902, in accordance with the executors' return, which had been filed with him on November 7, 1902.
that date and the end of the year 1908, each received in cash further sums aggregating $210,953.66. Some of the assets were still undistributed when the evidence was taken in this suit. The reason why no further or complete distribution of the residuary estate was made by the executors prior to July 1, 1902, was that they anticipated that the estate would be liable for payment of a New York estate transfer tax and the federal inheritance tax, for attorneys' fees, and other expenses of administration, and that the exact amount of the residuary estate left for distribution could therefore not be definitely determined prior to July 1, 1902.
below either to the order restricting the scope of the evidence, or to findings of fact made.

References: § 29
 § 7
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 § 3
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 § 29
 § 10
 § 7
 § 29
 § 242