Source: https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/426/548
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 16:34:05+00:00

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FEDERAL ENERGY ADMINISTRATION et al., Petitioners, v. ALGONQUIN SNG, INC., et al.
Section 232(b) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended by the Trade Act of 1974, provides that if the Secretary of the Treasury finds that an "article is being imported into the United States in such quantities or under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the national security," the President is authorized to "take such action, and for such time, as he deems necessary to adjust the imports of (the) article and its derivatives so that . . . imports (of the article) will not threaten to impair the national security." When it appeared that a prior program established under § 232(b) for adjusting oil imports was not fulfilling its objectives, the Secretary of the Treasury initiated an investigation. On the basis of this investigation the Secretary found that crude oil and its derivatives and related products were being imported into the United States in such quantities and under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the national security, and accordingly recommended to the President that appropriate action be taken to reduce the imports. Following this recommendation, the President promptly issued a Proclamation, Inter alia, raising the license fees on imported oil. Thereafter, respondents eight States and their Governors, 10 utility companies, and a Congressman brought suits against petitioners challenging the license fees on the ground, Inter alia, that they were beyond the President's authority under § 232(b). The District Court denied relief, holding that § 232(b) is a valid delegation to the President of the power to impose license fees on imports, and that the procedures followed by the President and the Secretary in imposing the fees fully complied with the statute. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that § 232(b) does not authorize the President to impose a license fee scheme as a method of adjusting imports, but encompasses only the use of "direct" controls such as quotas. Held : Section 232(b) authorizes the action taken by the President. Pp. 558-571.
(a) Section 232(b) does not constitute an improper delegation of power, since it establishes clear preconditions to Presidential action, including a finding by the Secretary of the Treasury that an article is being imported in such quantities or under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the national security. Moreover, even if these preconditions are met, the President can act only to the extent he deems necessary to adjust the imports so that they will not threaten to impair the national security, and § 232(c) sets forth specific factors for him to consider in exercising his authority. Pp. 558-560.
(b) In authorizing the President to "take such action and for such time, as he deems necessary to adjust the imports of (an) article and its derivatives," § 232(b)'s language clearly grants him a measure of discretion in determining the method used to adjust imports, and there is no support in the statute's language that the authorization to the President to "adjust" imports should be read to encompass only quantitative methods, I. e., quotas, as opposed to monetary methods, I. e., license fees, of effecting such adjustments; so to limit the word "adjust" would not comport with the range of factors that can trigger the President's authority under § 232(b)'s language. Pp. 561-562.
(c) Furthermore, § 232(b)'s legislative history amply indicates that the President's authority extends to the imposition of monetary exactions, I. e., license fees and duties, and belies any suggestion that Congress, despite its use of broad language in the statute itself, intended to confine the President's authority to the imposition of quotas and to bar him from imposing a license fee system such as the one in question. Pp. 562-571.
171 U.S.App.D.C. 113, 518 F.2d 1051, reversed and remanded.
Francis X. Bellotti, Atty. Gen., and Harold B. Dondis, Boston, Mass., for respondents.
All parties to this case agree that § 232(b) authorizes the President to adjust the imports of petroleum and petroleum products by imposing quotas on such imports. What we must decide is whether § 232(b) also authorizes the President to control such imports by imposing on them a system of monetary exactions in the form of license fees.
* The predecessor statute to § 232(b) was originally enacted by Congress as § 7 of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1955, c. 169, § 7, 69 Stat. 166 (see n. 21, Infra ), and amended by § 8 of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1958, Pub.L. 85-686, 72 Stat. 678. The advisory function currently performed under § 232(b) by the Secretary of the Treasury was performed by the Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM) under the 1955 and 1958 statutes. But, like § 232(b), those statutes allowed the President, on a finding that imports of an article were threatening "to impair the national security," to "take such action as he deem(ed) necessary to adjust the imports of (the) article . . . ." In 1959, President Eisenhower, having been advised by the Director of ODM that " 'crude oil and the principal crude oil derivatives and products are being imported in such quantities and under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the national security,' " invoked the 1958 version of the provision and established the Mandatory Oil Import Program (MOIP). Presidential Proclamation No. 3279, 3 CFR 11 (1959-1963 Comp.); U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1959, p. 948. The MOIP, designed to reduce the gap between domestic supply and demand by encouraging the development of domestic production and refinery capacity, imposed a system of quotas on the importation of petroleum and petroleum products. The program was not wholly successful, however, and in the face of domestic consumption which continued to grow faster than domestic production, Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon each felt compelled to amend it by raising the permissible quota levels. App. 211-212.
In light of a Cabinet task force conclusion that the MOIP, as then constituted, was not fulfilling its objectives, 2 President Nixon, acting pursuant to § 232(b), radically amended the program in 1973. Presidential Proclamation No. 4210, 3 CFR 31 (1974); U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1973, p. 3407. The President suspended existing tariffs on oil imports and provided "for a gradual transition from the existing quota method of adjusting imports of petroleum and petroleum products to a long-term program for adjustment of imports of petroleum and petroleum products through . .. the institution of a system of fees applicable to imports of crude oil, unfinished oils, and finished products . . . ." Id., At 32, U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1973, p. 3407. This amended program established a gradually increasing schedule of license fees for importers. With respect to crude oil, the fee was scheduled to increase from an initial 10 1/2 cents per barrel on May 1, 1973, to 21 cents per barrel on May 1, 1975. With respect to most finished petroleum products, the fee was to rise gradually from 15 cents per barrel on May 1, 1973, to 63 cents per barrel on November 1, 1975. 3 Id., At 36. While initially some oil imports were exempted from the license fee requirements, the exemption levels were scheduled to decrease annually so that by 1980 the fees would be applicable to all oil imports.
President Nixon's 1973 program apparently did not wholly fulfill the objectives to which it was directed. Accordingly, the Secretary of the Treasury, acting pursuant to § 232(b), see n. 1, Supra, initiated an investigation on January 4, 1975, "to determine the effects on the national security of imports of petroleum and petroleum products." Memorandum from Secretary of the Treasury Simon to Assistant Secretary of the Treasury MacDonald (Simon Memorandum), App. 154. While § 232(b), directs the Secretary "if it is appropriate (to do so, to) hold public hearings or otherwise afford ierested parties an opportunity to present information and advice" as part of such an investigation, 19 U.S.C. 1862(b) (1970 ed., Supp. IV), the Secretary found that such procedures would interfere with "national security interests" and were "inappropriate" in this case. Simon Memorandum, App. 154. The investigation therefore proceeded without any public hearing or call for submissions from interested nongovernmental parties.
"crude oil, principal crude oil derivatives and products, and related products derived from natural gas and coal tar are being imported into the United States in such quantities as to threaten to impair the national security (and) the foregoing products are being imported into the United States under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the national security." App. 133.
"appropriate action be taken to reduce imports of crude oil, principal oil derivatives and products, and related products derived from natural gas and coal tar into the United States . . . ." Ibid.
Four days after the Proclamation was issued, respondents eight States and their Governors, 6 10 utility companies, 7 and Congressman Robert F. Drinan of Massachusetts challenged the license fees in two suits filed against the Secretary of the Treasury, the Administrator of the FEA, and the Treasurer of the United States in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, they alleged that the imposition of the fees was beyond the President's constitutional and statutory authority, that the fees were imposed without necessary procedural steps having been taken, and that petitioners (hereinafter the Government) violated the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 83 Stat. 852, 42 U.S.C. 4321 Et seq., By failing to prepare an environmental impact statement prior to the imposition of the fees.
The District Court denied respondents' motions for preliminary injunctions and filed findings of fact and conclusions of law which, at the request of respondents, it later declared to be final. See 171 U.S.App.D.C. 113, 124, 126, 518 F.2d 1051, 1062, 1064 (1975) (appendix to dissenting opinion in Court of Appeals). The court found that § 232(b) is a valid delegation to the President of the power to impose license fees on oil imports. Id., at 128-129, 518 F.2d, at 1066-1067. It further ruled that the procedures followed by the President and the Secretary of the Treasury in imposing the license fees fully conformed to the requirments of the statute. Id., At 130, 518 F.2d, at 1068. Finally, the court held that "in view of the emergency nature of the problem and the need for prompt action," Id., At 131, 518 F.2d, at 1069, the Government was not required to file an environmental impact statement prior to imposition of the fees and hence was not in violation of the NEPA. Ibid.
Respondents' appeals from these judgments were consolidated with their petitions to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for review of the FEA regulations implementing the license fee program. The allegations in the challenges to the regulations were substantially the same as those raised in the District Court actions, adding only a contention that the FEA had failed to follow certain procedural provisions of the Federal Energy Administration Act, 88 Stat. 97, 15 U.S.C. 761 Et seq. (1970 ed., Supp. IV). The Court of Appeals, with one judge dissenting, held that § 232(b) does not authorize the President to impose a license fee scheme as a method of adjusting imports. 171 U.S.App.D.C. 113, 518 F.2d 1051 (1975). According to the court, reading the statute to authorize the action taken by the President "would be an anomalous departure" from "the consistently explicit, well-defined manner in which Congress has delegated control over foreign trade and tariffs." Id., At 117, 518 F.2d, at 1055. In the court's view, § 232(b)'s legislative history indicated that Congress' authorization of the President to "adjust the imports of (an) article" encompassed only the use of "direct" controls such as quotas and did not encompass the use of license fees. Id., At 121, 518 F.2d, at 1059. Finding no need to address any of the other issues that were raised, the court reversed the judgment of the District Court, instructed that court to enter appropriate relief for respondents, and set aside the challenged FEA regulations.
Preliminarily, we reject respondents' suggestion that we must construe § 232(b) narrowly in order to avoid "a serious question of unconstitutional delegation of legislative power." Respondents Brief for 42. Even if 232(b) is read to authorize the imposition of a license fee system, the standards that it provides the President in its implementation are clearly sufficient to meet any delegation doctrine attack.
"If Congress shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the (President) is directed to conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of legislative power." Id., At 409, 48 S.Ct., at 352.
Section 232(b) easily fulfills that test. It establishes clear preconditions to Presidential action Inter alia, A finding by the Secretary of the Treasury that an "article is being imported into the United States in such quantities or under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the national security." Moreover, the leeway that the statute gives the President in deciding what action to take in the event the preconditions are fulfilled is far from unbounded. The President can act only to the extent "he deems necessary to adjust the imports of such article and its derivatives so that such imports will not threaten to impair the national security." And § 232(c), see n. 1, Supra, Articulates a series of specific factors to be considered by the President in exercising his authority under § 232(b). 10 In light of these factors and our recognition that "(n)ecessity . . . fixes a point beyond which it is unreasonable and impracticable to compel Congress to prescribe detailed rules . . .," American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 105, 67 S.Ct. 133, 142, 91 L.Ed. 103 (1946), we see no looming problem of improper delegation 11 that should affect our reading of § 232(b).
In authorizing the President to "take such action, and for such time, as he deems necessary to adjust the imports of (an) article and its derivatives," the language of § 232(b) seems clearly to grant him a measure of discretion in determining the method to be used to adjust imports. We find no support in the language of the statute for respondents' contention that the authorization to the President to "adjust" imports should be read to encompass only quantitative methods I. e., quotas as opposed to monetary methods I. e., license fees of effecting such adjustments.
Indeed, reading respondents' suggested limitation into the word "adjust" would be inconsistent with the range of factors that can trigger the President's authority under § 232(b)'s language. Section 232(b) authorizes the President to act after a finding by the Secretary of the Treasury that a given article is being imported "in such quantities or Under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the national security." (Emphasis added.) The emphasized language reflects Congress' judgment that "not only the quantity of imports . . . but also the circumstances under which they are coming in: their use, their availability, their character" could endanger the national security and hence should be a potential basis for Presidential action. 104 Cong.Rec. 10542-10543 (1958) (remarks of Rep. Mills). It is most unlikely that Congress would have provided that dangers posed by factors other than the strict quantitative level of imports can justify Presidential action, but that that action must be confined to the imposition of quotas. Unless one assumes, and we do not, that quotas will always be a feasible method of dealing directly with national security threats posed by the "circumstances" under which imports are entering the country, limiting the President to the use of quotas would effectively and artificially prohibit him from directly dealing with some of the very problems against which § 232(b) is directed.
Turning from § 232's language to its legislative history, again there is much to suggest that the President's authority extends to the imposition of monetary exactions I. e., license fees and duties. The original enactment of the provision in 1955 as well as Congress' periodic reconsideration of it in subsequent years gives us substantial grounds on which to conclude that its authorization extends beyond the imposition of quotas to the type of action challenged here.
In explaining what action would be authorized under the Neely Amendment, Senator Martin, one of its cosponsors, explained that it authorized the President "to take such action as is necessary, including the imposition of import quotas Or the increase in duties, to protect the domestic industry concerned." Id., at 2097 (emphasis added). Thus, the Neely Amendment clearly would have given the President the authority to impose monetary exactions as a method of restricting imports.
While the Neely Amendment was not reported out of committee, it is strikingly similar in language to the Byrd-Millikin Amendment the substitute provision that was reported out and eventually enacted into law. The Byrd-Millikin Amendment authorized the President, after appropriate recommendations had been made by the Director of the ODM, to "take such action as he deems necessary to adjust the imports of (an) article to a level that will not threaten to impair the national security." S.Rep. No. 232, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 14 (1955), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1955, p. 2106. 16 Given the similarity in the operative language of the two proposals, it is fair to infer that if, as Senator Martin stated, the Neely Amendment was intended to authorize the imposition of monetary exactions, so too was the Byrd-Millikin Amendment.
Finally, we note two other statements on the floor of the Senate which lend direct support to the Government's reading of the Byrd-Millikin Amendment. Senator Bennett stated that it was his understanding that the Amendment would authorize use of "the entire scope of tariffs, quotas, restrictions, stockpiling, and any other variation of these programs in order to protect a particular industry." 101 Cong.Rec. 5588 (1955). 19 And Senator Barkley, a member of the Senate Committee on Finance, expressed his understanding that the Amendment would allow the President to "impose such quotas Or take such other steps as he may believe to be desirable in order to maintain the national security." Id., at298 (emphasis added).
Three years later, in the context of its consideration of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1958, Congress re-examined the Byrd-Millikin national security provision. In the course of its deliberations, the Subcommittee on Foreign Trade Policy of the House Ways and Means Committee had before it a 1957 report submitted to it by the ODM, expressing the views of the Executive Branch that "the imposition of new or increased tariff duties on imports . . . (was) authorized by the language adopted." 23 Fully aware that the Executive Branch then, as in 1955, understood the provision as authorizing the imposition of monetary exactions, the Committee did not recommend any change in its wording to confine more narrowly the bounds of its authorization. On the contrary, the Committee in its report indicated with approval its own understanding that the statute provided "those best able to judge national security needs . . . (with) a way of taking Whatever action is needed to avoid a threat to the national security through imports." H.R.Rep. No. 1761, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 13 (1958) (emphasis added).
While Congress in 1958 made several procedural changes in the statute and established criteria to guide the President's determination as to whether action under the provision might be necessary, it added no limitations with respect to the type of action that the President was authorized to take. 24 § 8, 72 Stat. 678. The 1958 re-enactment, like the 1955 provision, authorized the President under appropriate conditions to "take such action" "as he deems necessary to adjust the imports . . . ." Ibid.
"(3) the imposition of such other import restrictions as he finds necessary." 108 Cong.Rec. 19573 (1962).
The Court of Appeals inferred from the rejection of this amendment that Congress understood the then existing grant of authority to be limited to the imposition of quotas. According to the court, the amendment would have "explicitly (given) the President the same authority he claims derives implicitly from § (232(b),)" 171 U.S.App.D.C., at 121, 518 F.2d, at 1059, and Congress' refusal to enact the amendment was tantamount to a rejection of the Government's interpretation of the statute.
We disagree, however, with the Court of Appeals' assessment of the proposed amendment. The amendment was in reality far more than an articulation of the authority that the Government finds to be contained in § 232(b). Unlike § 232(b), the rejected proposal would not have required a prior investigation and findings by an executive department as a prerequisite to Presidential action. Moreover, the broad "national interest" language of the proposal, together with its lack of any standards for implementing that language, stands in stark contrast with § 232(b)'s narrower criterion of "national security" and § 232(c)'s articulation of standards to guide the invocation of the President's powers under § 232(b). In light of these clear differences between the rejected proposal and § 232(b), we decline to infer from the fact that the Senate amendment was proposed, or from the fact that it was rejected, that Congress felt that the President had no power to impose monetary exactions under § 232(b).
Only a few months after President Nixon invoked the provision to initiate the import license fee system challenged here, Congress once again re-enacted the Presidential authorization encompassed in § 232(b) without material change. Trade Act of 1974, Pub.L. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1993. Making no mention of the President's action, both the Senate Committee report and the conference report recited the language of the statute itself to reaffirm that under § 232(b) the President "may . . . take such action, and for such time, as he deems necessary, to adjust imports so as to prevent impairment of the national security." H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 93-1644, p. 29 (1974); S.Rep. No. 93-1298, pp. 96-97 (1974), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1974, p. 7186. The congressional acquiescence in President Nixon's action manifested by the re-enactment of § 232(b) provides yet further corroboration that § 232(b) was understood and intended to authorize the imposition of monetary exactions as a means of adjusting imports.
Taken as a whole then, the legislative history of § 232(b) belies any suggestion that Congress, despite its use of broad language in the statute itself, intended to limit the President's authority to the imposition of quotas and to bar the President from imposing a license fee system like the one challenged here. To the contrary, the provision's original enactment, and its subsequent re-enactment in 1958, 1962, and 1974 in the face of repeated expressions from Members of Congress and the Executive Branch as to their broad understanding of its language all lead to the conclusion that § 232(b) does in fact authorize the actions of the President challenged here. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals to the contrary cannot stand.
A final word is in order. Our holding today is a limited one. As respondents themselves acknowledge, a license fee as much as a quota has its initial and direct impact on imports, albeit on their price as opposed to their quantity. Brief for Respondents 26. As a consequence, our conclusion here, fully supported by the relevant legislative history, that the imposition of a license fee is authorized by § 232(b) in no way compels the further conclusion that Any action the President might take, as long as it has even a remote impact on imports, is also so authorized.
otherwise beginning an investigation under this subsection. If the Secretary finds that such article is being imported into the United States in such quantities or under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the national security, he shall so advise the President and the President shall take such action, and for such time, as he deems necessary to adjust the imports of such article and its derivatives so that such imports will not threaten to impair the national security, unless the President determines that the article is not being imported into the United States in such quantities or under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the national security."
"For the purposes of this section, the Secretary and the President shall, in the light of the requirements of national security and without excluding other relevant factors, give consideration to domestic production needed for projected national defense requirements, the capacity of domestic industries to meet such requirements, existing and anticipated availabilities of the human resources, products, raw materials, and other supplies and services essential to the national defense, the requirements of growth of such industries and such supplies and services including the investment, exploration, and development necessary to assure such growth, and the importation of goods in terms of their quantities, availabilities, character, and use as those affect such industries and capacity of the United States to meet national security requirements. In the administration of this section, the Secretary and the President shall further recognize the close relation of the economic welfare of the Nation to our national security, and shall take into consideration the impact of foreign competition on the economic welfare of individual domestic industries; and any substantial unemployment, decrease in revenues of government, loss of skills or investment, or other serious effects resulting from the displacement of any domestic products by excessive imports shall be considered, without excluding other factors, in determining whether such weakening of our internal economy may impair the national security."
See Cabinet Task Force on Oil Import Control, The Oil Import Question 128 (1970).
Under President Nixon's plan, the fee for motor gasoline was scheduled to reach its maximum of 63 cents on May 1, 1975. App. 97.
The Proclamation did not alter the schedule by which exemptions from the first-tier fees were not to be eliminated until 1980.
The States joining in the suit together with their Governors were Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Vermont. The State of Minnesota intervened as a plaintiff after the complaint was filed and is also a respondent here.
The 10 utility companies are Algonquin SNG, Inc., New England Power Co., New Bedford Gas and Edison Light Co., Cambridge Electric Light Co., Canal Electric Co., Montaup Electric Co., Connecticut Light and Power Co., Hartford Electric Light Co., Western Massachusetts Electric Light Co., and Holyoke Water Power Co.
Respondents' suits are not barred by the Anti-Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C. 7421(a), which in relevant part provides that "no suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court by any person . . . ." The Anti-Injunction Act applies to suits brought to restrain assessment of taxes assessable under the Internal Revenue Codes of 1954 and 1939. 26 U.S.C. 7421(a), 7851(a)(6)(A), 7851(a)(6)(C)(iv). The license fees in this case are assessed under neither Code but rather under the authority conferred on the President by the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended by the Trade Act of 1974. The fees are therefore not "taxes" within the scope of the Anti-Injunction Act.
Respondents rely on our decision in National Cable Television Assn. v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 94 S.Ct. 1146, 39 L.Ed.2d 370 (1974), to support their delegation doctrine argument. But we find that case clearly distinguishable from the one before us today. In National Cable Television, We held that the fees to be imposed on community antenna television systems should be measured by the "value to the recipient" even though the language of the general statute allowing fee setting by federal agencies, 31 U.S.C. 483a, permits consideration not only of "value to the recipient" but also of "public policy or interest served, and other pertinent facts." The Court's conclusion that the words of the last-quoted phrase were not relevant to the CATV situation was apparently motivated by a desire to avoid any delegation doctrine problem that might have been presented by a contrary conclusion. 415 U.S., at 342, 94 S.Ct., at 1149. But what might be considered the open-ended nature of the phrase "public policy or interest served, and other pertinent facts" stands in contrast to § 232(b)' § more limited authorization of the President to act only to the extent necessary to eliminate a threat of impairment to the national security, and § 232(c)'s articulation of standards to guide the President in making the decision whether to act. See n. 1, Supra.
See, E. g., Hearings on H.R. 1 before the House Committee on Ways and Means, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 1006 (analytical balance industry), 1264 (petroleum industry) (1955); Hearings on H.R. 1 before the Senate Committee on Finance, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 602 (lead and zinc mining industry), 721 (coal mining industry) (1955).
The Symington amendment is currently codified in somewhat modified form at 19 U.S.C. 1862(a).
In contrast to the Senate Committee on Finance, the House Committee on Ways and Means concluded that the Symington Amendment was adequate to deal with any potential threats to the national security posed by foreign imports. H.R.Rep. No. 50, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 44 (1955), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1955, p. 2071.
A separate portion of the Neely Amendment would have placed quotas on petroleum imports.
Unlike the Neely Amendment, see n. 15, Supra, the Byrd-Millikin Amendment did not single out any named industries for protection by quotas.
Differing with the Court of Appeals, we do not believe that the fact that Senator Millikin represented a State that might have benefited from an expansive reading of the statute "blur(s) (the) probative value," 171 U.S.App.D.C. 113, 120, 518 F.2d 1051, 1058 (1975), of his explanation. Many if not most pieces of legislation are sponsored by Members of Congress whose constituents have a special interest in their passage, but we have never let this fact diminish the weight we give a sponsor's statements.
Moreover, Senator Byrd's reference in the above-quoted exchange to the power of the President under the Amendment "to impose a quota Or to reduce the imports," 101 Cong.Rec. 5297 (1955), also suggests that he understood that power to extend beyond the imposition of quotas. See Note, 89 Harv.L.Rev. 432, 435 n. 31 (1975).
The Court of Appeals characterized Senator Bennett's remarks as going to "the entire bill and other existing laws." 171 U.S.App.D.C., at 119, 518 F.2d, at 1057. Our examination of the context of his remarks persuades us, however, that they were more probably made with specific reference to the Byrd-Millikin Amendment.
A copy of the Morgan letter was also sent to Senator Byrd, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Finance. See 101 Cong.Rec. 8162 (1955).
"In order to further the policy and purpose of this section, whenever the Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization has reason to believe that any article is being imported into the United States in such quantities as to threaten to impair the national security, he shall so advise the President, and if the President agrees that there is reason for such belief, the President shall cause an immediate investigation to be made to determine the facts. If, on the basis of such investigation, and the report to him of the findings and recommendations made in connection therewith, the President finds that the article is being imported into the United States in such quantities as to threaten to impair the national security, he shall take such action as he deems necessary to adjust the imports of such article to a level that will not threaten to impair the national security."
We are not unmindful that, as respondents point out, much of the congressional debate referred to the Byrd-Millikin Amendment in the context of giving the President the power to impose import quotas. See, E. g., 101 Cong.Rec. 5572 (1955) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey); Id., at 5582, 5584 (remarks of Sen. Douglas); Id., at 5593 (remarks of Sen. Monroney). But nowhere do the congressional debates reflect an understanding that under the Amendment the President's authority was to be Limited to the imposition of quotas. In light of this fact, we feel fortified in attaching substantial weight to the positive indications discussed above that the authority was not so limited.
Foreign Trade Policy, Compendium of Papers on United States Foreign Trade Policy Collected by the Staff for the Subcommittee on Foreign Trade Policy of the House Ways and Means Committee 643 (1958).
Indeed, while under the 1955 provision the President was authorized to act only on a finding that "quantities" of imports threatened to impair the national security, the 1958 provision also authorized Presidential action on a finding that an article is being imported "under such circumstances" as to threaten to impair the national security. 72 Stat. 678. See Supra, at 561.
Samuel K. SKINNER, Secretary of Transportation, Appellant, v. MID-AMERICA PIPELINE COMPANY.
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF OHIO, Appellant v. June M. BETTS.
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD CO. v. Kermit Kimball SHEEHAN.

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