Source: https://fmshrc.gov/decisions/alj/ALJd_12152017-SE%202012-275.htm
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 14:55:29+00:00

Document:
Douglas Flint, Esq., and Kristyn Atkinson, Esq., Flint, Connolly & Walker, LLP, for Respondent.
This proceeding is before me upon the Petition for the Assessment of Civil Penalty filed by the Secretary of Labor (“Secretary”) pursuant to section 105 of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 (“Mine Act” or “Act”), 30 U.S.C. § 815. This case involves one section 104(d)(1) citation and two section 104(d)(1) orders issued by the Secretary to Respondent N.J. Wilbanks Contractor, Inc. (“N.J. Wilbanks”).
On August 25, 2010, the Secretary issued Citation No. 8546331 and Order Nos. 8546333 and 8546335 following MSHA’s investigation into a hazard complaint lodged against N.J. Wilbanks. Citation No. 8546331 and Order Nos. 8546333 and 8546335 each allege a violation of 30 C.F.R. § 56.14101(a)(1) for failing to have a functioning service brake system on three separate Caterpillar 631E scrapers. The Secretary proposed a specially-assessed penalty of $26,600.00 for each violation for a total combined proposed penalty of $79,800.00.
On April 15, 2016, the Secretary filed a Motion for Adverse Inference and Exclusion of Testimony Due to Respondent’s Spoliation of Evidence. (Mot. at 1–14) The Secretary alleges that Respondent failed to produce and possibly destroyed inspection logs noting the condition of the mobile equipment involved in this matter. (Id. at 2) The Secretary states that the company’s superintendent showed the inspection logs to MSHA Inspector Raymond Dubics at the time of the inspection. (Id. at 3) The Secretary requests that an adverse inference be drawn against Respondent with respect to the content of the inspection logs and that any testimony from Respondent’s witnesses regarding the condition of the mobile equipment on or before the date of the inspection be excluded from the record. (Id. at 4) Respondent offered its response to the motion at hearing, asserting that Respondent was unaware of the existence of such logs, that the Secretary delayed in requesting these logs, and that the adverse inference requested by the Secretary would actually support Respondent’s case. (Tr. 14:8–16:9) At hearing, I informed the parties that I would issue my ruling on the motion with the decision. (Tr. 22:8–24:15) For the reasons provided below, the Secretary’s motion is DENIED.
I held a hearing on April 19, 2016, in Atlanta, Georgia. The Secretary presented testimony from N.J. Wilbanks President Chris Wilbanks and MSHA Inspector Raymond Dubics. Respondent presented testimony from Chris Wilbanks and former N.J. Wilbanks Project Manager Justin Crowe. The parties each submitted post-hearing briefs and reply briefs.
Accordingly, the following issues are before me: (1) whether MSHA had jurisdiction over the work site where MSHA cited N.J. Wilbanks; (2) whether N.J. Wilbanks violated 30 C.F.R. § 56.14101(a)(1) as alleged in Citation No. 8546331 and Order Nos. 8546333 and 8546335; (3) whether the Secretary’s gravity determinations are properly designated for the three violations, including the S&S designations; (4) whether Respondent’s negligence for the violations is properly designated as “reckless disregard” and constitutes an unwarrantable failure; and, (5) whether the proposed penalties are appropriate.
Section 4 of the Mine Act provides, in part, that “[e]ach coal or other mine, the products of which enter commerce . . . shall be subject to the provisions of this Act.” 30 U.S.C. § 803. Section 3(h)(1) of the Act defines “coal or other mine” to include “lands, excavations, underground passageways, shafts, slopes, tunnels and workings, structures, facilities, equipment, machines, tools, or other property . . . used in, or to be used in, or resulting from, the work of extracting such minerals from their natural deposits in non-liquid form . . . or used in, or to be used in, the milling of such minerals[.]” 30 U.S.C. § 802(h)(1) (emphasis added).
Section 4 unambiguously expresses Congress’ intent to regulate the mining industry to the full extent under the Commerce Clause, which includes the power to regulate mines whose products are sold entirely intrastate. D.A.S. Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Chao, 386 F.3d 460, 464 (2d Cir. 2004). In the legislative history of the Act, Congress instructed “that what is considered to be a mine and to be regulated under this Act be given broadest possibl[e] interpretation” and that “doubts be resolved in favor of . . . coverage of the Act.” S. Rep. No. 95-181, at 14 (1977).
A violation is S&S “if, based on the particular facts surrounding that violation, there exists a reasonable likelihood that the hazard contributed to will result in an injury or illness of a reasonably serious nature.” Cement Div., Nat’l Gypsum Co., 3 FMSHRC 822, 825 (Apr. 1981). To establish a S&S violation, the Secretary must prove: “(1) the underlying violation of a mandatory safety standard; (2) a discrete safety hazard—that is, a measure of danger to safety—contributed to by the violation; (3) a reasonable likelihood that the hazard contributed to will result in an injury; and (4) a reasonable likelihood that the injury in question will be of a reasonably serious nature.” Mathies Coal Co., 6 FMSHRC 1, 3–4 (Jan. 1984) (footnote omitted); see also Buck Creek Coal, Inc. v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 52 F.3d 133, 135–36 (7th Cir. 1995) (affirming ALJ’s application of the Mathies criteria); Austin Power, Inc. v. Sec’y of Labor, 861 F.2d 99, 104 (5th Cir. 1988) (approving the Mathies criteria).
The Commission has recently explained that in analyzing the second Mathies element, Commission Judges must determine “whether, based upon the particular facts surrounding the violation, there exists a reasonable likelihood of the occurrence of the hazard against which the mandatory safety standard is directed.” Newtown Energy, Inc., 38 FMSHRC 2033, 2038 (Aug. 2016). In evaluating the third Mathies element, the Commission assumes the hazard identified in the second Mathies element exists and determines whether that hazard is reasonably likely to cause injury. Id. at 2045 (citing Knox Creek Coal Corp. v. Sec’y of Labor, 811 F.3d 148, 161–62 (4th Cir. 2016); Peabody Midwest Mining, LLC, 762 F.3d 611, 616 (7th Cir. 2014); Buck Creek Coal, 52 F.3d at 135). The Commission has specified that evaluation of the reasonable likelihood of injury should be made assuming continued normal mining operations. U.S. Steel Mining Co., 7 FMSHRC 1125, 1130 (Aug. 1985) (quoting U.S. Steel Mining Co., 6 FMSHRC 1573, 1574 (July 1984)). Finally, it is well settled that redundant safety measures are not to be considered in determining whether a violation is S&S. Cumberland Coal Res. LP, 717 F.3d at 1029 (D.C. Cir. 2013); Knox Creek Coal Corp., 811 F.3d 148, 162 (4th Cir. 2016); Buck Creek, 52 F.3d at 135; Brody Mining, LLC, 37 FMSHRC 1687, 1691 (Aug. 2015); Cumberland Coal Res., LP, 33 FMSHRC 2357, 2369 (Oct. 2011).
The Commission evaluates negligence using “a traditional negligence analysis.” Am. Coal Co., 39 FMSHRC 8, 14 (Jan. 2017) (quoting Mach Mining, LLC v. Sec’y of Labor, 809 F.3d 1259, 1264 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (citation omitted)). Because the Commission is not bound by the Secretary’s regulations set forth in 30 C.F.R. Part 100, the Commission and its Judges are not required to consider the negligence definitions in 30 C.F.R. § 100.3(d). Id. (citing Mach Mining, LLC, 809 F.3d at 1263–64). Under a traditional negligence analysis, an operator is negligent if it fails to meet the requisite standard of care. Brody Mining, LLC, 37 FMSHRC 1687, 1702 (Aug. 2015). In determining whether an operator met its duty of care, the Commission considers what actions would have been taken under the same circumstances by a reasonably prudent person familiar with the mining industry, the relevant facts, and the protective purpose of the regulation. Id. at 1702 (citation omitted). In making a negligence determination, a Judge is not limited to an evaluation of allegedly “mitigating” circumstances, but may consider the totality of the circumstances holistically and thus find “high negligence” in spite of mitigating circumstances or “moderate” negligence without identifying mitigating circumstances. Id. In this respect, the Commission has recognized that the gravamen of high negligence is that it “suggests an aggravated lack of care that is more than ordinary negligence.” Topper Coal Co., 20 FMSHRC 344, 350 (Apr. 1998) (citation omitted).
The Commission has not opined specifically as to what constitutes “reckless disregard.” However, Commission judges have noted that the term “reckless” describes conduct characterized by “the creation of a substantial and unjustifiable risk of harm to others and by a conscious (and sometimes deliberate) disregard for or indifference to that risk[.]” Stillhouse Mining, LLC, 33 FMSHRC 778, 803 (Mar. 2011) (ALJ) (citing Reckless, Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004)). “Deliberate action contrary to the Mine Act with the conscious knowledge that such activity may seriously endanger worker constitutes reckless disregard.” Winn Materials LLC, 36 FMSHRC 1430, 1435 (May 2014) (ALJ) (citing Roxcoal, Inc., 36 FMSHRC 625, 634 (ALJ) (Mar. 2013)).
The Commission has held that an unwarrantable failure is aggravated conduct constituting more than ordinary negligence. Emery Mining Corp., 9 FMSHRC 1997, 2004 (Dec. 1987). It is characterized by “indifference,” a “serious lack of reasonable care,” or “reckless disregard.” Id. at 2003–04; see also Buck Creek Coal, 52 F.3d at 136 (7th Cir. 1995) (approving the Commission’s unwarrantable failure test). Whether conduct is “aggravated” in the context of unwarrantable failure is determined by looking at all the facts and circumstances of a case to see if aggravating or mitigating factors exist. IO Coal Co., 31 FMSHRC 1346, 1350–51 (Dec. 2009). The Commission has identified several such factors, including: the length of time a violation has existed, the extent of the violative condition, whether the operator has been placed on notice that greater efforts are necessary for compliance, the operator’s efforts in abating the violative condition, whether the violation was obvious, whether the violation posed a high degree of danger, and the operator’s knowledge of the existence of the violation. Id. Because supervisors are held to a high standard of care, another important factor supporting an unwarrantable failure determination is the involvement of a supervisor in the violation. Lopke Quarries, Inc., 23 FMSHRC 705, 711 (July 2001) (citing REB Enters., Inc., 20 FMSHRC 203, 225 (Mar. 1998)). All relevant facts and circumstances of each case must be examined to determine whether an actor’s conduct is aggravated or if mitigating circumstances exist. Consolidation Coal Co., 22 FMSHRC 340, 353 (Mar. 2000).
The Mine Act defines “mine” as any land or property “used in, or to be used in . . . extracting such minerals from their natural deposits[.]” 30 U.S.C. § 802(h)(1) (emphasis added). Considering Congress’s intent that the statute be interpreted broadly in favor of MSHA jurisdiction, courts have held that the “to be used in” language would include properties that are not yet producing mine products, but are preparing to begin production. See Cyprus Indus. Minerals Co. v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 664 F.2d 1116, 1117–20 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that activities conducted in preparation for future mining may bring a site within the definition of a “mine” if the activities were in contemplation of mining); see also Lancashire Coal Co. v. Sec’y of Labor, 968 F.2d 388, 390 (3d Cir. 1992) (recognizing that the Mine Act refers to three time frames in section 3(h), including the term “to be used in” meaning contemplated use).
Because the statute must be interpreted broadly in favor of the Mine Act’s jurisdiction, I conclude that MSHA had jurisdiction over the site where N.J. Wilbanks performed work at the time of Dubic’s inspection.
The cited standard, 30 C.F.R. § 56.14101(a)(1), provides: “Self-propelled mobile equipment shall be equipped with a service brake system capable of stopping and holding the equipment with its typical load on the maximum grade it travels.” 30 C.F.R. § 56.14101(a)(1). The Commission has previously considered the “service brakes” on a Caterpillar 631 scraper to be its installed wheel brakes, which are “activated with a pedal in the operator’s compartment.” Missouri Rock, Inc., 11 FMSHRC 136, 137 (Feb. 1989). The Commission has also upheld determinations that dropping a scraper’s bowl is not always a safe and reliable braking method, noting that the bowl “alone may not effectively stop the scraper in all instances.” Id. at 140; see also Knife River Constr., 38 FMSHRC 1289, 1293 (June 2016) (holding that a judge did not err in relying on an inspector’s testimony that lowering the cutting tool to stop a scraper could put an operator at risk of injury in certain situations).
Based on the above, I reject Respondent’s argument that dropping the bowl on each scraper qualified as a “service brake system.” Rather, I determine that the Secretary has offered a reasonable interpretation of the standard that the scrapers’ foot pedal brakes are its “service brakes” given that this interpretation is consistent with the Commission’s prior findings. I also note that although Respondent demonstrated that the scrapers had an alternative method of braking, this method would not be ideal in all instances as Crowe testified to a number of situations where the pedal brakes would be used instead of dropping the bowl, including loading the scrapers onto a trailer. Given that N.J. Wilbanks subcontracted to work on the site for only a specific period of time, it can reasonably be inferred that the company would eventually have to move the scrapers and load them onto trailers — a task that could potentially lead to an accident if the scraper lacked a reliable braking method. It is undisputed that the pedal brakes on each of the scrapers did not function. Accordingly, I determine that the N.J. Wilbanks failed to have functioning service brakes on the three scrapers.
For the reasons stated, I conclude that Respondent violated 30 C.F.R. § 56.14101(a)(1) as alleged in Citation No. 8546331 and Order Nos. 8546333 and 8546335.
To establish the first element of the Mathies test, the Secretary must prove an underlying violation of a mandatory safety standard. N.J. Wilbank’s three violations of section 56.14101(a)(1) establishes the first element of an S&S violation.
With regard to the third and fourth Mathies elements, the Secretary must demonstrate a reasonable likelihood the hazard will result in a serious injury. In analyzing the third element, I must assume the hazard identified in the second Mathies element has been realized. Newtown Energy, Inc., 38 FMSHRC at 2045. If a scraper hit a miner because the service brake did not function, the miner would likely be crushed given that each scraper weighed anywhere from 15 to 35 tons. (Tr. 82:19–25, 176:4–7) Consequently, I determine that the hazard of a scraper hitting a miner would be reasonably likely to result in injuries, thus satisfying the third Mathies element. Furthermore, I determine that such injuries would be reasonably likely to be fatal given the size and weight of the mobile equipment, thus satisfying the fourth Mathies element.
In analyzing an unwarrantable failure, I must consider the Commission’s factors for determining aggravated conduct. See IO Coal Co., 31 FMSHRC at 1350–51. The record reveals multiple aggravating factors regarding these violations.
In term of knowledge and obviousness, N.J. Wilbanks acquired the scrapers knowing that the pedal brakes were defective. (Tr. 221:24–222:3) Crowe admitted that he would not have chosen the three scrapers had the company realized MSHA regulations applied because their pedal brakes did not work. (Tr. 197:16–24) I have previously determined that the company should have known MSHA regulations applied. See discussion supra Part V.A. The work site’s supervisor, Bishop, also trained workers to operate the equipment without using pedal brakes. (Tr. 71:25–72:11) Therefore, I conclude that N.J. Wilbanks had knowledge of the violation and its duty to maintain the service pedal brakes under the standard. The involvement of supervisors Crowe and Bishop also supports an unwarrantable failure determination. See Lopke Quarries, Inc., 23 FMSHRC at 711. Furthermore, multiple employees reported the defective conditions to a supervisor and on pre-shift examinations. (Tr. 70:13–71:3, 75:7–76:3) Given the reports and the company’s knowledge, I thus conclude that the conditions were obvious.
The other unwarrantable failure factor appears neither mitigating nor aggravating. The Secretary did not present evidence that N.J. Wilbanks had been placed on notice by MSHA that greater efforts were required for compliance with the service brake standard. Accordingly, I afford this factor no weight in the unwarrantable failure analysis.
After considering all the factors, particularly the violation’s obviousness, the company’s knowledge, and the involvement of multiple supervisors, I conclude that Citation No. 8546331 and Order Nos. 8546333 and 8546335 were a result of N.J. Wilbanks’ unwarrantable failure.
However, I do not find that N.J. Wilbanks’ negligence rose to the level of reckless disregard. Reckless disregard has been characterized by deliberate action, conscious knowledge of substantial risk, and disregard or indifference to that risk. See Stillhouse Mining, LLC, 33 FMSHRC at 803; Winn Materials, LLC, 36 FMSHRC at 1435; Roxcoal, Inc., 36 FMSHRC at 634. Here, I do not find that the company displayed complete disregard or indifference to the risk of miners being injured by the mobile equipment given that the company trained scraper operators to use an alternative braking method that would be effective in many, but not all, instances. Nevertheless, the company failed to meet the duty imposed by the standard to maintain functioning service brakes on the mobile equipment. Considering all the facts and circumstances, I conclude that N.J. Wilbanks’ negligence should be designated as “high” for the three violations.
Under Section 110(i) of the Mine Act, I must consider six criteria in assessing a civil penalty: (1) the operator’s history of previous violations; (2) the appropriateness of the penalty relative to the size of the operator’s business; (3) the operator’s negligence; (4) the penalty’s effect on the operator’s ability to continue in business; (5) the violation’s gravity; and, (6) the demonstrated good faith of the operator in attempting to achieve rapid compliance after notification of a violation. 30 U.S.C. § 820(i).
Based on the criteria above, I conclude that the Secretary’s proposed penalty is inappropriate. The Secretary’s special assessment was based on the Secretary’s alleged gravity and negligence designations. However, I have lowered both these gravity and negligence determinations. The record therefore does not support the Secretary’s special assessment.
The minimum penalty under the Mine Act for an unwarrantable failure section 104(d)(1) citation or order is $2,000.00. 30 U.S.C. § 820(a)(3)(A). Taking into account N.J. Wilbanks’ small size, its lack of a history of violations, its good faith efforts to abate the violations, modifications to the violations’ gravity and negligence, as well as considering all the facts and circumstances set forth above, I hereby assess a civil penalty of $2,000.00 for each of the three violations, or $6,000.00 in total.
WHEREFORE, it is ORDERED that Respondent pay a total penalty of $6,000.00 within forty (40) days of the date of this order.
 Section 56.14101(a)(1) provides that “[s]elf-propelled mobile equipment shall be equipped with a service brake system capable of stopping and holding the equipment with its typical load on the maximum grade it travels.” 30 C.F.R. § 56.14101(a)(1).
 Spoliation refers to “the destruction or significant alteration of evidence, or the failure to preserve property for another’s use as evidence in pending or reasonably foreseeable litigation.” Oil Equipment Co. v. Modern Welding Co., 661 F. App’x 646, 652 (11th Cir. 2016) (citing West v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 167 F.3d 776, 779 (2d Cir. 1999)). Sanctions for spoliation of evidence are intended “to prevent unfair prejudice to litigants and to insure the integrity of the discovery process.” Flury v. Daimler Chrysler Corp., 427 F.3d 939, 944 (11th Cir. 2005). When a party does not preserve evidence in its control, a judge can draw an adverse inference that the evidence destroyed would have been unfavorable to the destroying party. See IO Coal Co., 31 FMSHRC 1346, 1359 & n.11 (Dec. 2009). Excluding evidence is an extreme sanction not to be imposed absent a showing of willful deception or flagrant disregard. Gray v. N. Fork Coal Corp., 35 FMSHRC 2349, 2360 (citations omitted). To determine what sanctions are warranted for spoliation of evidence, factors to consider are the extent of prejudice caused by the spoliation based on the importance of the evidence, whether that prejudice can be cured, and the culpability of the spoliator. Oil Equipment Co., 661 F. App’x at 652.
Here, because the condition of the mobile equipment was the subject of MSHA’s inspection and alleged violations, I find that N.J. Wilbanks had a duty to preserve the inspection logs in anticipation of litigation. However, because the MSHA inspector can testify to the content of the inspection logs, the prejudice suffered to the Secretary can be cured and does not warrant the severe sanctions requested. Respondent’s inability to produce the inspection logs may be factored into my weighing of the evidence and assessing credibility in the final decision. Accordingly, the Secretary’s motion is DENIED.
 I also find the company’s claim that it did know the defective pedal brakes constituted a violation because it did not know MSHA regulations applied suspect given that OSHA’s regulation regarding service brakes nearly mirrors that of MSHA, providing that scrapers “shall have a service braking system capable of stopping and holding the equipment fully loaded[.]” 29 C.F.R. § 1926.602(a)(4).

References: § 815
 § 56
 § 56
 § 803
 § 802
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 100
 § 802
 v. 
 v. 
 § 56
 § 56
 § 56
 § 820
 § 820
 § 56
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 1926