Source: http://sundaysplits.com/
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 18:19:33+00:00

Document:
When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.
The opinion established the “narrowest grounds” test in order to provide guidance to lower courts as they set out to interpret the Supreme Court’s plurality opinions. The primary objective in establishing the test was to promote predictability in the law by ensuring adherence to Supreme Court precedence. Ultimately, the Marks decision may have added to the confusion rather than affording the clarity it intended, which leads us to the circuit split at issue.
The concept of “narrowest grounds” is undoubtedly vague, leaving ample room for interpretation. Because the Supreme Court left the notion undefined, it is unsurprising that the circuit courts have been unable to arrive at a consensus. Over forty years have passed since the Marks decision, and the circuit courts continue to struggle in determining what the Supreme Court meant by “narrowest grounds.” The Ninth Circuit even went so far as to acknowledge in United States v. Davis (2016) that “the Marks inquiry at times has baffled and divided the lower courts that have considered it, and that the test is more easily stated than applied.”.
In the years since Marks, two main definitions have emerged in an attempt to make sense of the “narrowest grounds” test. One interpretation focuses on the reasoning of the different opinions, and the other focuses on the ultimate outcome. Although some courts have adopted slightly more nuanced approaches, the reason-based and result-based methods appear to be leading the discussion.
Although plurality opinions are far outnumbered by majority opinions—the Court publishes on average about three plurality opinions per term—they are still important to understand. Plurality opinions do not always provide clear guidance to lower courts and are viewed as less binding than majority opinions—but they also provide unique insight into the Supreme Court and its decision-making process. The confusion over how to determine the opinion decided on the “narrowest grounds” illustrates, perhaps clearer than any other circuit split, the need for the Supreme Court to step in and clarify its jurisprudence. Circuits disagreeing over the technical aspects of statutory interpretation or how to apply an unclear majority opinion in different circumstances are inevitable—but at a core level, circuits should know which opinion is binding on them, and to what extent.
But the differences between prisoners and pretrial detainees don’t end there. Though plaintiffs under both the Eighth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment must show that prison officials acted with “deliberate indifference,” the standard of what constitutes “deliberate indifference” under the Fourteenth Amendment is murky at best. In Kingsley v. Hendrickson (2015), the Supreme Court held that pretrial detainees only need to show that an officer’s use of force was objectively unreasonable in excessive force claims. This contrasts with similar claims by prisoners, where they must show that the officer’s actions were subjectively unreasonable. In other words, pretrial detainees need not demonstrate that officers acted “maliciously and sadistically to cause harm,” or even be subjectively aware that their use of force was excessive.
But Kingsley left open several questions that the Court declined to answer. The Court did not note whether its holding extends beyond excessive force claims, for example, to claims involving improper conditions of confinement or inadequate medical care.
Did Kingsley alter the standard for all claims by pretrial detainees or just claims involving excessive force? Do any claims by pretrial detainees require a subjective consideration of the defendant’s state of mind?
Circuits are split on whether to apply the Kingsley Standard to claims regarding conditions of confinement and inadequate medical care brought by pretrial detainees. The Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have interpreted Kingsley as altering the standard for such claims, while the Fifth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits have held that the standard is unchanged.
Likewise, the Second Circuit in Darnell v. Pinero (2017) held that Kingsley no longer requires a subjective component for conditions of confinement claims by pretrial detainees. The Court reasoned that “the Due Process clause can be violated when an official does not have subjective awareness that the official’s acts (or omissions) have subjected the pretrial detainee to a substantial risk of harm.” Therefore, according to the Second Circuit, pretrial detainees must only show that the defendants’ actions were objectively unreasonable under the circumstances.
In contrast, the Fifth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits have held that Kingsley only applies narrowly to excessive force claims and does not extend to claims related to conditions of confinement or inadequate medical care.
In Anderson v. Concordia Parrish Correctional Facility (2017), the Fifth Circuit stated that in a claim for inadequate security and impermissibly delayed medical care, “a pretrial detainee must show subjective deliberate indifference to by defendants.” Perhaps illustrating its view that Kingsley is inapplicable, the majority in Anderson did not even discuss Kingsley in its opinion.
Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit decided not to apply the Kingsley Standard to a claim of deliberate indifference to a pretrial detainee’s medical needs in Dang ex rel. Dang v. Seminole County Sheriff (2017). Despite Kingsley, the Eleventh Circuit in Dang evaluated the plaintiff’s claims “under the same standard as a prisoner’s claim of inadequate care under the Eighth Amendment.” The Eleventh Circuit here interpreted Kingsley as only applying to claims of excessive force by pretrial detainees.
Until the circuit split is resolved, the standard required for claims of inadequate medical care or conditions of confinement by pretrial detainees will be vary by jurisdiction. One example where this has an impact is on claims for inadequate psychiatric care brought by the estates of prisoners who commit suicide in pretrial detention. Regarding conditions of confinement, an example would be a failure to protect claim when a pretrial detainee is harmed by another inmate. To ensure that the rights of pretrial detainees under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause are addressed consistently, the Supreme Court will need address whether Kingsley applies broadly or whether its application is limited to excessive force claims.
It’s Alive! (Or Is It?): Does Remmer’s Presumption of Prejudice for Jury Communication Still Apply?
In 1954, the Supreme Court held in Remmer v. United States that any unauthorized, private communication with a juror during a trial about any matter pending before the jury is presumptively prejudicial—and that the burden to prove that the contact was harmless to the defendant rests with the government. Remmer featured relatively straightforward facts: An unnamed person communicated with a juror about a profit that juror could make by bringing a verdict for the defendant. The juror reported the incident to the judge, who informed the prosecuting attorneys. The F.B.I. investigated the comment, but determined the statement was made in jest. The attorneys for the defendant were never notified by the judge or prosecutors, but instead found out about the comment and F.B.I. investigation from a newspaper article after the verdict. The Supreme Court held that “any private communication, contact, or tampering, directly or indirectly, with a juror during a trial about matter pending before the jury is . . . deemed presumptively prejudicial” if not authorized by the rules or instructions of the court, and required the government to prove that the communication was not harmful to the defendant. The case was remanded to the district court to hold a hearing to determine whether the incident was harmful to the petitioner.
While Remmer was long the standard regarding extrajudicial contact with jurors, the Court began to refine and narrow that standard. In Smith v. Phillips, a juror applied for a job in the prosecutor’s office during the trial. The Court held that due process required the trial court to hold a hearing where “the defendant has the opportunity to prove actual bias.” Phillips signaled a shift of burden to the defendant, rather than the government in Remmer. In O’Connor’s concurrence, she stated her concern that a hearing may be inadequate for uncovering a juror’s biases.
Later, in United States v. Olano, alternate jurors were present during jury deliberations. The Court’s opinion, written by O’Connor and grounded in similar logic to her concurrence in Phillips, held there “may be cases where intrusion should be presumed prejudicial, but a presumption of prejudice as opposed to a specific analysis does not change the ultimate inquiry: Did the instruction affect the jury’s deliberations and thereby its verdict?” The Court held the error of allowing alternate jurors to be present during jury deliberations did not “affect substantial rights” of the defendant.
Does the Remmer rebuttable presumption, which requires the government to rebut the presumption that extrajudicial contact with a juror about the matter pending before the jury is prejudicial, remain intact?
Since the Court’s decisions in Phillips and Olano, the circuit courts have answered differently the question of whether Remmer should be followed in whole, in part, or not at all. The splits revolve around two points of contention.
Should Phillips be read broadly to apply the shift in burden to the defendant in all cases?
Should the language of Olano be interpreted to imply a continuation of the rebuttable presumption standard or require a new standard of specific analysis of the intrusion’s effect on the verdict?
The circuits have also attempted to narrow the applicability of the Court’s holding in Phillips by holding that Remmer still has broad applicability. The Fourth Circuit, in Stockton v. Virginia, held Phillips did not overturn the holding in Remmer and the presumption of prejudice is applicable in cases in which “the danger is not one of juror impairment or predisposition, but rather the effect of the extraneous communication upon the deliberative process of the jury.” The Seventh Circuit, in Hall v. Zenk, stated that the focus of Phillips is not about the shift in burden from the government to the defendant during a Remmer hearing, but rather about the defendant’s mere right to a hearing.
On the other hand, the First, Third, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and D.C. Circuits have deviated from the Remmer standard to varying degrees.
The Sixth and Eighth Circuits have focused on the shifting of the burden in Phillips from government to defendant. Both circuits have applied Phillips broadly, eliminating the presumption of prejudice and placing the burden on the defendant to demonstrate the communication affected their substantial rights.
Going forward, the Court may choose to address the two questions about which side carries the burden and whether there must be an analysis of the severity and likelihood of prejudice before a Remmer hearing. There are two types of cases that appear to be the most likely to result in the Court addressing the questions. The first type of case would be one where, using Phillips as precedent, the defendant has the burden to prove prejudice and is not able to meet the burden, but the government is unable to prove its burden either. (While this seems perhaps paradoxical and a solely academic question, this kind of result is possible because the burden for each side is so high; a situation could develop, therefore, where the issue of prejudice is a close call, and neither side can meet its heavy burden.) This scenario could mean that a motion for new trial could be decided by which party has the burden.
The second kind of case would be one in which a Remmer hearing is denied because the courts do not deem the severity and likelihood of prejudice to be high enough. This type of case may be less likely than the former, as it does mirror Phillips in many ways.
Ultimately, the possibility of these undesirable outcomes, coupled with the stark differences between the Circuits (and the relatively even divide between them), heightens the need for the Supreme Court to step in and clear the fog.
18 U.S.C. § 16(a) defines a “crime of violence” as “an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another.” In Leocal v. Ashcroft (2004), the Supreme Court held that the section requires courts “to look to the elements and the nature of the offense of conviction, rather than to the particular facts relating to petitioner’s crime.” Essentially, in applying § 16(a), courts must presume that a conviction rests upon nothing more than the least of the acts criminalized and then determine whether that conviction matches up with the federal offense.
The Supreme Court reinforced its holding in Johnson v. United States (2010), where it found a provision of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) similar to § 16(a). The Court observed that the word “force” might evoke the common-law crime of battery, where “the intentional application of unlawful force against the person of another” could “be satisfied by even the slightest offensive touching.” Thus, it rejected the ACCA’s interpretation and maintained its interpretation of “use of physical force” in Leocal.
However, in Castleman v. United States (2014), the Court adopted a different meaning of the phrase “use of physical force” in their interpretation of the Domestic Violence Gun Offender Ban. The Court departed from the interpretation adopted in Johnson and Leocal and held that under § 921(a)(33)(A) a prior conviction has the “use of physical force” as an element even if it can be satisfied by “the slightest offensive touching,” thus adopting for § 921(a)(33)(A) the common-law meaning of “force.” At the same time, the Court emphasized that nothing in its decision casted doubt on Leocal’s and Johnson’s holding that a “crime of violence” requires “violent force” and not mere common-law force. However, the Court expressly reserved the issue of whether or not the causation of bodily injury necessarily entails violent force as required by § 16(a).
Does an offense qualify as a crime of violence within the meaning of § 16(a) if a state statute criminalizes only the causation or threat of bodily harm—without a distinct element requiring the use or threatened use of physical force? Or does § 16(a) apply only if the statute also requires the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force?
The First, Second, and Fifth Circuits hold that § 16(a) does not apply to convictions under statutes that do not include physical force as an element of the crime, reasoning that bodily injury can be inflicted without physical force—such as by trickery or poisoning. However, the Eighth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits hold that § 16(a) covers such offenses considering that any bodily injury at least involves indirect physical force.
In Chrzanoski v. Ashcroft (2003), the Second Circuit explained that “use of force must be an element of that offense for that offense to be a crime of violence under § 16(a).” Therefore, where nothing in the language of the state statute requires the government to prove that force was used in causing the injury, the force element required by § 16(a) is absent. Accordingly, the Second Circuit rejected the Government’s argument “that force is implicit in the statute,” because “such an argument equates the use of physical force with harm or injury.” In United States v. Villegas-Hernandez (2006), the Fifth Circuit followed the Second Circuit’s reasoning, explaining that “Chrzanoski’s analysis is fully applicable” to a Texas domestic assault statute criminalizing the causation of “bodily injury to another.” The court held that the force element required by § 16(a) was absent because “‘bodily injury’ … could result from any number of acts” that would not require “the government … to show the defendant used physical force.” The First Circuit reached the same conclusion in Whyte v. Lynch (2015) by explaining that where the statute “identifies only two elements”—intent to cause physical injury and causing such injury—the crime does not contain as a necessary element “the use, attempted use, or threatened use” of violent force.
This circuit split is a significant because § 16(a) operates in numerous contexts and there are dozens of state crimes across the country that require only “bodily harm,” “physical harm,” or “physical injury,” without an additional “physical force” requirement. All of these statutes implicate the circuit split because inconsistent results will continue to occur unless the Supreme Court clarifies the issue. Right now, the government can engage in forum-shopping in a circuit with precedent favorable to the government. Furthermore, section 16(a) supplies the general definition for a “crime of violence” for the entire Criminal Code. As such, it operates in the context of more than a dozen criminal provisions, several of which impose severe, mandatory sentences for those deemed to have prior convictions for “crimes of violence,” regardless of the sentence imposed for the original offense.
The Proof is in the Pleading: When is Admissible Evidence Required to Support Class Certification?
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires plaintiffs in a class action suit to prove to a court that “questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members” to proceed in a class action lawsuit. Although the Supreme Court has never explicitly held that the plaintiff must do so using admissible evidence, in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes (2011), the Court said it “doubt[ed]” that Daubert does not “apply to expert testimony at the certification stage of class-action proceedings.” Daubert governs the admissibility of an expert witness’s testimony in federal court.
In Sail v. Corona Regional Medical Center (2018), the Central District of California refused to grant certification to a class because it would not consider evidence that would not be admissible at trial during the class certification proceedings. In May, the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that a court may consider inadmissible evidence when deciding whether to grant a class certification. The Ninth Circuit reached this decision because of the challenges a plaintiff faces in obtaining admissible evidence. The Ninth Circuit explained that “the evidence needed to prove a class’s case often lies in a defendant’s possession and may be obtained only through discovery.” In other words, requiring that a plaintiff provide evidence—prior to discovery—that is in the defendant’s possession would be an unreasonable standard.
On November 1, the Ninth Circuit refused a petition for a rehearing en banc. Judge Carlos Bea, along with four other judges, dissented. In a sharply worded dissent, Judge Bea wrote that the Ninth Circuit fell “on the short side of a lopsided circuit split,” noting that only one other circuit agreed with the Ninth Circuit’s decision.
Must the evidence presented during class certification proceedings be admissible at trial?
The Eighth Circuit and now the Ninth Circuit allow courts to consider inadmissible evidence at the class certification stage. Conversely, the Second, Third, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits require admissible evidence for class certification. Additionally, the Sixth Circuit and the Eleventh Circuits held that they require admissible evidence, but did so in unpublished opinions.
The Eighth Circuit, in In re Zurn Pex Plumbing Products Liability Litigation (2011), held that evidence for class certification does not have to be admissible at trial. However, the Eighth Circuit noted that a class’s status could change after discovery, writing that “exhaustive and conclusive Daubert inquiry before the completion of merits discovery cannot be reconciled with the inherently preliminary nature of pretrial evidentiary and class certification rulings.” Additionally, the district court in this case allowed the evidence only after a “focused Daubert analysis which scrutinized the reliability of the expert testimony in light of the criteria for class certification and the current state of the evidence.” This rule, according to Judge Bea, is more stringent than the Ninth Circuit’s new standard.
The Second, Third, Fifth, Seventh Circuits require admissible evidence during the class certification stage. The Third Circuit explained that a party cannot meet the standard articulated in Rule 23 through potentially inadmissible evidence In re Blood Reagents Antitrust Litig, (2015). Similarly, these other circuits also require that a district court determine whether or not evidence is admissible at the certification stage. To support this opinion, these Circuits often cited the Supreme Court case Comcast Corporation v. Behrend (2013) which held that a plaintiff must have “evidentiary proof” to satisfy Rule 23.
Although the Supreme Court has not explicitly ruled on this issue, now that the gap between the circuits has widened, they might have reason to do so. Until then, a plaintiff should be thoughtful when selecting a forum in which to bring a class action lawsuit.
Crossfire over Cross-Border Shootings: Does Bivens Extend to Foreign Nationals Killed Abroad by American Agents?
In 42 U.S.C. §1983, Congress provides a damages remedy for the violation of constitutional rights by state officials, but no such provision for federal officials exists. The Supreme Court recognized in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents (1971) that an implied damages action could be brought against a federal official who violated the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. In Ziglar v. Abbasi (2017), the Court rejected a Bivens claim from undocumented immigrants who were detained after the September 11 terrorist attacks. The Court held that, for a novel Bivens claim to succeed, it must be accompanied by some special factor that justifies the judiciary—as opposed to Congress—allowing such a suit for damages against federal officials. In Abbasi, that “special factor” did not exist.
The Court simultaneously declined to hand down an opinion in Hernandez v. Mesa (2017), a case appealed from the Fifth Circuit, in which the court held that a Mexican citizen killed on Mexican soil by a United States border agent is not protected by the Constitution. The Court remanded Hernandez to the Fifth Circuit in light of the Court’s holding in Abbasi.
Following Abbasi, can a suit for damages against a federal agent involving a cross-border shooting be sustained under Bivens?
Since the Abbasi decision, the Fifth and Ninth Circuits have applied it differently to cross-border shootings. When Hernandez was remanded, the Fifth Circuit applied Abbasi and ruled in 2018 that Bivens did not extend to the shooting. The court held that the cross-border shooting at issue did represent a “new context” for Bivens claims—specifically, the court noted that the case raised questions about the Constitution’s extraterritorial applicability to foreign nationals that the Supreme Court has not answered.
The court then looked to special factors before extending Bevins. Applying Abbasi’s separation-of-powers analysis, the court found three special factors in the Hernandez claims. First, the court contended that this proposed extension of Bivens would upset the existing separation of powers, which places national security under the purview of Congress and the President. More specifically, the court held that the threat of Bivens liability could undermine the Border Patrol’s ability to perform duties essential to national security—a responsibility specially granted by Congress.
Second, the court reasoned that extending Bivens in this instance would risk interference with foreign affairs. The court observed that by extending Bivens to cover a cross-border shooting, it would contradict the Executive Branch’s policy decision to deny extradition of the federal agent and to refuse to prosecute the agent. Therefore, the judiciary stepping in could unduly complicate American-Mexican foreign relations.
Third, the court held that Congress’s failure to provide a damages remedy in these circumstances is telling. The court found that silence to be intentional and thus illustrative of a purposeful gap in remedy for these types of cases.
But just months after the Hernandez decision from the Fifth Circuit, the Ninth Circuit handed down a ruling on the same issue. In Rodriguez v. Swartz, plaintiff alleges that Border Agent Swartz, without provocation, shot and killed a 16-year-old boy walking down a street in Mexico. In Rodriguez, the Ninth Circuit held that the mother of the Mexican citizen who was shot and killed in Mexico by a United States federal agent had a cause of action against the agent. Splitting with the Fifth Circuit, the Ninth Circuit applied the “new context” element of Bivens more narrowly, holding that applying the Fourth Amendment to these cases would only mean that federal officers cannot shoot people without reason.
Turning to special factors, the court differentiated Abbasi—it emphasized that there, the Court considered detention policies after September 11, not at all seizures and general incarceration policies. Therefore, the relevant examination under Abbasi was with the specific facts alleged, not cross-border shootings generally. And by narrowing the scope to the individual shooting, the court found that extending Bivens to allow the Mexican mother’s claim would not implicate national security: “[N]o one suggests that national security involves shooting people who are just walking down a street in Mexico.” Further, allowing liability here would not deter border patrol agents from performing their duties.
Taken together, the Ninth Circuit interpreted these factors to hold that Bivens can be extended to this class of cases.
In remanding Hernandez, the Supreme Court allowed lower courts to apply Abbasi and extend Bivens where appropriate. Given that two circuits have already disagreed on the meaning and application of Abbasi in cross-border shootings in just a year, the issue seems ripe for Supreme Court review. Additionally, three Justices have already articulated their positions on this issue: in remanding Hernandez, Justices Breyer and Ginsburg authored dissents in support of allowing the plaintiffs to bring suit, and Justice Thomas issued a separate dissent indicating that he would have sided with the defendants.

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 16
 v. 
 § 16
 v. 
 § 16
 v. 
 § 921
 § 921
 § 16
 § 16
 § 16
 § 16
 § 16
 v. 
 § 16
 § 16
 v. 
 § 16
 v. 
 § 16
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 §1983
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.