Source: https://patentlyo.com/tag/claim-construction/page/2
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 06:17:26+00:00

Document:
It is hard to imagine an appeal more unsuitable for affirmance without opinion under Fed. Cir. R. 36 than this one.
If the Federal Circuit’s judgment is based upon new or alternative grounds not stated by the PTAB, then it must write an opinion. Although the reason for a judgment without opinion are not directly discernible, the petitioner here suggests that it was likely based upon theories first espoused by the court and respondent at oral arguments — sufficient to form a prima facie conclusion that the judgment relied upon new or alternate grounds.
LSI urges the en banc Court to grant rehearing to decide whether this Court can ever affirm a PTAB IPR decision without opinion. See 35 U.S.C. § 141 (in USPTO appeal, Federal Circuit “shall issue to the Director its mandate and opinion . . .”) (emphasis added). See also Crouch, Wrongly Affirmed Without Opinion, Univ. of Missou. L. Stud. Research Paper No. 2017-02, Forthcoming 52 Wake Forest Law Review ___ (2017) (http://ssrn.com/abstract=2909007).
In offering the first weaker option, LSI gives the court an option in case it “may hesitate to open a floodgate of rehearing requests.” Of course, there are only about a dozen R.36 decisions that are still within the court’s 30-day deadline for requesting rehearing. (The Supreme Court has a 90-day deadline). The stronger approach that I argue for: “LSI presents this argument here to preserve it for further appeal to the U.S.
The IPR proceedings below resulted in the creation of a dense factual record involving 24 declarations and 14 depositions. Almost all witnesses were scientists (many with Ph.D. degrees) having personal knowledge of the petroleum industry’s extensive efforts (and failures) to develop a commercially viable imaging system for detecting hydrocarbon gas leaks in the field. Most of these same witnesses also offered first-hand testimony of [the inventor] David Furry’s own efforts to solve the same technical problem. Several witnesses -top scientists from the largest petroleum companies – described the day in 2004 when Furry showed up at the industry’s “Scan Off” to demonstrate his “Hawk” camera against the industry’s then-best optical leak detection systems. These scientists, having dedicated years of work and countless resources to creating a commercially viable optical leak detection system, testified that they were completely surprised and astonished by the Hawk’s unexpected results. It was immediately apparent that Furry had solved an important technical problem that the petroleum industry had been unable to solve.
The topside briefs have been filed in TC Heartland with strong support for the petitioner who is looking to dismantle the notion of nationwide venue against accused patent infringers. The question presented in the case is one of basic statutory interpretation of Congress’s venue statute: Whether 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) is the sole and exclusive provision governing venue in patent infringement actions and is not to be supplemented by 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c).
28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) appears to severely limit venue in patent cases to “the judicial district where the defendant resides, or where the defendant has committed acts of infringement and has a regular and established place of business.” Section 1391(c), however seems to broaden the definition of residence “For all venue purposes . . . (2) . . .[defendant] shall be deemed to reside … in any judicial district in which such defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction.” Since most patent defendants are subject to nationwide personal jurisdiction, venue is then proper in any jurisdiction.
This first-level statutory interpretation seems to make TC Heartland’s case a loser. The thing is, the Supreme Court already decided what is almost the exact same case in its 1957 decision Fourco Glass (limiting patent venue) and the unusual concentration of patent cases in the E.D.Texas has certainly reached the ears of the high court in a way that may influence the outcome.
This is an extraordinary case because it presents a question of statutory interpretation that this Court specifically answered more than a half century ago.
One debate here that may arise is a question of what is the “settled law.” The Federal Circuit broad-venue doctrine has been the approach since its 1990 VE Holdings decision. Here, however, TC Heartland raises the little known case of Andrews v. Hovey (1888) for the proposition that a patent statute’s interpretation “cannot be regarded as judicially settled [until] so settled by the highest judicial authority which can pass upon the question.” I wonder though, whether creation of the Federal Circuit should be seen as overruling that prior statute – likely not.
Intel and Dell also offered a strong brief filed by Donald Verrilli in his new role at Munger Tolles: All indicia of statutory meaning show that Congress narrowed patent venue in 1897 and has never expressed an intent to expand it.” [16-341tsacintelcorporation]. Following onto Intel’s intent argument, WLF explains that post-Fourco amendments by Congress should be considered “within the context of a century of special rules governing patent cases. [16-341tsacwashingtonlegalfoundation] The Intel brief also focuses on a common complaint against the Federal Circuit – that it fails to really respect and follow the principles of statutory interpretation. Here though, the issue is failing to follow Supreme Court precedent. Intel argues that the “Court does not depart from the doctrine of stare decisis without some compelling justification.” (quoting Hilton v. S. Carolina Pub. Rys. Comm’n, 502 U.S. 197, 201 (1991).
Following on the heel of the Federal Circuit’s approval of preliminary relief in the water balloon case, the court here has reversed a lower court’s preliminary injunction – finding its claim construction error led the district court to incorrectly conclude that the patentee (CGI) was likely to prevail on the merits.
a wireless status condition data transmitter that is operably coupled to the controller, wherein the wireless status condition data transmitter transmits a status condition signal that: corresponds to a present operational status condition defined, at least in part, by at least two operating states from the plurality of operating states; and comprises an identifier that is at least relatively unique to the movable barrier operator, such that the status condition signal substantially uniquely identifies the movable barrier operator.
Depending upon the needs of the setting, the controller can be self-aware of such operational status conditions (as when, for example, the controller is aware that it has switched a given ambient light fixture on or off) or the controller can be provided with externally developed information regarding the condition.
In addition, at least one of the dependent claims required that the controller be provided its ‘state’ information from an external sensor.
With the broader construction, the Federal Circuit remanded to consider whether the presented prior art creates an invalidity problem. Reminder here – it was the patentee who wanted the narrow claim construction in order to avoid prior art problems and the broad claim language (permitted by the PTO) that created trouble.
Depending upon what happens below, the patentee may instead try to narrow these claims as part of a reissue application.
A sideline issue in the case involved the Federal Circuit’s aggressive undermining of Teva v. Sandoz. That Supreme Court decision requires that the Federal Circuit give deference to lower court’s factual findings on appeal. “Federal Circuit judges lack the tools that district courts have available to resolve factual disputes fairly and accurately such as questioning the experts.” Teva quoting Judge O’Malley.
I write solely in my personal capacity as someone who advises patent practitioners on ethical issues and litigates patent cases. These views are not those of my employer or my clients.
I have one broad concern and several more specific ones.
The USPTO Should Interpret the Patent Act Correctly and not Give False Security to Practitioners.
At a broad level, I agree uniformity is a good thing. However, there will not be uniformity because of the different claim constructions given in litigation than in proceedings before the Office. I also agree with the USPTO that it need not follow the Federal Circuit’s definition of materiality (or anything else) from Therasense. However, it seems incongruous for the agency, as the entity charged by Congress with implementing the Patent Act, to adopt a definition that it rejected. Given than uniformity will not exist, what does the USPTO believe is required by the Patent Act of applicants?
More troublesome, however, is the real likelihood that the narrow definitions from Therasense will be rejected by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has in recent years routinely rejected the Federal Circuit’s rigid, cabined interpretations of the Patent Act. While no one knows what the future holds, today’s practitioner’s conduct may be judged by a more stringent standard than suggested in Therasense and proposed here. That has happened with eligibility, obviously. Given that the Supreme Court could hold that the Patent Act requires more than avoiding intentionally obtaining a patent that you know you shouldn’t get, and given that that interpretation will likely be applied to all issued patents, and given the USPTO’s statement that it hopes that the new definition will result in less disclosure, one can see a trap for the unwary practitioner. This may give practitioners a false sense of security.
My more specific comments relate primarily to “who” is covered by these rules. They don’t make sense.
Rule 1.56 Makes Sense as to Who is Covered; Rule 1.555 Does Not.
As written, Rule 1.56 applies to “[e]ach individual associated with the filing and prosecution of a patent application,” and is further narrowed by subsection (c) which requires “substantive involvement.” The rule ties the individual to substantive involvement in prosecution or filing.
The amendment to Rule 1.555 seems to limit who can commit “affirmative egregious misconduct” to the patent owner and those who act “on behalf of” the patent owner. Rule 1.56 is not so limited, and is also written in the passive voice.
These differences and wordings raise three questions.
First, as noted above, the definition for reexamination would seem to allow for a patent to be held unenforceable due to conduct by every person “associated with” a patent owner, whether that person was involved in the reexamination, or not. Granted, it likely won’t be affirmative egregious misconduct if the person wasn’t involved, but having a clear definition may help.
Second, under Rule 1.555, can someone other than “the patent owner, each attorney or agent who represents the patent owner, and every other individual who is substantively involved on behalf of the patent owner” in a reexamination commit affirmative egregious misconduct? Presumably so; but is that the intent of the Office? Again, the comment in the prior paragraph may make this an academic point, but the way the rule is worded the person doesn’t need to be substantively involved in prosecution (and, as noted above, presumably substantive involvement is what was intended).
Third, when read in pari materia, Rule 1.56 is broader than Rule 1.555, since Rule 1.56’s “affirmative egregious misconduct” prong is not limited in the same way as Rule 1.555. When read together, under Rule 1.56 a person’s conduct can result in non-issuance of a patent even if that person was not acting on behalf of the patent owner. This seems harsh and unintended. My suggestion would be to make the two provisions in the different rules have the same scope, and affirmative egregious conduct “by or on behalf of the patent owner” probably is reasonably clear and meaningfully limited in scope.
In closing, as noted at the outset, uniformity can be a good thing. To that end, the USPTO has rules that relate to the same general concept – candor and disclosure – but which cover different groups of people. While there may be a policy basis to make the distinctions the rules make, I am not able to guess them.
For example, in addition to the differences discussed above, I note that Section 42.11 – the “rule 11” of IPR — applies to “parties and individuals involved” in an IPR. Section 42.11 does not require “substantive involvement,” just “involvement.” Further, because it includes “parties,” it creates the same problem discussed above with respect to Rule 1.555: everyone who works for a “party” apparently is covered by 42.11, even if that person has nothing to do with the IPR. As a final example of the varying coverage of these somewhat related rules, Section 42.51(b)(1)(iii) – the obligation in IPR to disclose inconsistent information — requires disclosure by “inventors, corporate officers, and persons involved in the preparation or filing of the documents or things.” Again, substantive involvement is not required, merely “involvement,” but “parties” are not subject to this rule.
It may be helpful to strive toward a single definition in these different rules is my point in closing. These create practical problems and potential traps and needless litigation.
Glad to provide further information if I can.
The patent at issue is covers a support pedestal used to secure tiles elevated above a flooring base. Some folks use these to support a roof-top deck, for instance. (Tile Tech’s Website showing use).
Quoting Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. New Images of Beverly Hills, 482 F.3d 1091, 1097 (9th Cir. 2007).
The Federal Circuit’s one interpretative change involved a portion of the injunction that barred Tile Tech from using using images of the patentee’s products in “any marketing material.” This portion of the injunction was not based upon the infringement claim but instead upon the parallel unfair competition claim. Still, Tile Tech argued that the injunction was over-broad because it would bar legal activities such as competitive advertising where there is no likelihood of confusion. On appeal, the Federal Circuit agreed with Tile Tech that such a prohibition would be over broad. However, instead of amending or vacating the injunction, the Federal Circuit determined that the injunction should simply be narrowly interpreted: “To the extent that in the future Tile Tech’s advertising clearly distinguishes its product from that of United’s in a comparative advertisement, in a way that is not ‘an act of unfair competition,’ we read the injunction to not prohibit such uses.” With that limitation, the injunction fit within the proper bounds.
(b) Information is but-for material to patentability if the Office would not allow a claim if the Office were aware of the information, applying the preponderance of the evidence standard and giving the claim its broadest reasonable construction consistent with the specification.
§ 1.555 Information material to patentability in ex parte reexamination and inter partes reexamination proceedings.
(a) A patent by its very nature is affected with a public interest. The public interest is best served, and the most effective reexamination occurs when, at the time a reexamination proceeding is being conducted, the Office is aware of and evaluates the teachings of all information material to patentability in a reexamination proceeding. Each individual associated with the patent owner in a reexamination proceeding has a duty of candor and good faith in dealing with the Office, which includes a duty to disclose to the Office all information known to that individual to be material to patentability in a reexamination proceeding under the but-for materiality standard as defined in paragraph (b) of this section. The individuals who have a duty to disclose to the Office all information known to them to be material to patentability in a reexamination proceeding are the patent owner, each attorney or agent who represents the patent owner, and every other individual who is substantively involved on behalf of the patent owner in a reexamination proceeding. The duty to disclose the information exists with respect to each claim pending in the reexamination proceeding until the claim is cancelled. Information material to the patentability of a cancelled claim need not be submitted if the information is not material to patentability of any claim remaining under consideration in the reexamination proceeding. The duty to disclose all information known to be material to patentability in a reexamination proceeding is deemed to be satisfied if all information known to be material to patentability of any claim in the patent after issuance of the reexamination certificate was cited by the Office or submitted to the Office in an information disclosure statement. However, the duties of candor, good faith, and disclosure have not been complied with if affirmative egregious misconduct was engaged in, any fraud on the Office was practiced or attempted, or the duty of disclosure was violated through bad faith or intentional misconduct by, or on behalf of, the patent owner in the reexamination proceeding. Any information disclosure statement must be filed with the items listed in § 1.98(a) as applied to individuals associated with the patent owner in a reexamination proceeding and should be filed within two months of the date of the order for reexamination or as soon thereafter as possible.
(b) Information is but-for material to patentability if, for any matter proper for consideration in reexamination, the Office would not find a claim patentable if the Office were aware of the information, applying the preponderance of the evidence standard and giving the claim its broadest reasonable construction consistent with the specification.
Whether the “on sale” bar found in § 102(b) applies only to sales or offers of sale made available to the public, as Congress, this Court, and the United States have all made clear, or whether it also applies to non-public sales or offers of sale, as the Federal Circuit has held.
The Merck petition is focused on pre-AIA patents. The PTO (and patentees) are arguing more forcefully that the AIA certainly intended to exclude secret sales from the scope of prior art in cases now pending before the Federal Circuit.
As these new petitions were being filed, the Supreme Court has also denied the pending obviousness, anticipation, and eligibility petitions. In addition, Cooper v. Square has also been denied.
Whether the Federal Circuit erred in ordering entry of judgment as a matter of law on a ground not presented in a Rule 50 motion in the district court, even though the ground presented a purely legal question.
Both J&J and Eon are only marginally patent cases, the core procedure case now pending is TC Heartland that would substantially upset the status quo of patent lawsuit concentration in E.D. Texas. Briefing continues in TC Heartland. In recent weeks a set of seven amici briefs were filed on the top side.
Next week Supreme Court conference includes review of the most likely-to-be-granted petition of Impression Products, Inc. v. Lexmark International, Inc. that focuses on important questions of post-sale exhaustion of patent rights. The setup – If I buy a used product that was made and sold by the patentee, do I still need to worry that I might get sued for patent infringement? The Federal Circuit says yes. The Supreme Court is likely to add some caveats to that. The US Government (Obama Administration via DOJ) has argued that the case should be reviewed and that the Federal Circuit’s position should be rejected. Both parties then filed supplemental responsive briefs. Lexmark’s best argument here is that these principles are well settled and that Congress can take on the role of tweaking them if needed.
Upcoming Supreme Court Oral Argument: Life Tech (export of components) set for December 6, 2016.
In Phillips v. AWH, the en banc Federal Circuit included an oddball statement regarding PHOSITA perspective in claim construction. The court wrote that the focus is on the meaning to PHOSITA “at the time of the invention, i.e., as of the effective filing date of the patent application.” I call the statement odd because it incorrectly states that the time-of-the-invention is the same as the patent application’s effective-filing-date. The difference can be critical — although word-meaning changes slowly over time, recent invention is an important trigger for rapid definitional change.
Regardless of whether the Phillips statement is correct, going forward for Post-AIA patents, the court should now eliminate “the time of the invention” from its claim construction process. Under the statute, all of the focus now is on the effective filing date with invention shifted to a mere historic element of the patenting process.
Stepping Back: One problem with any time-of-the-invention analysis is that the traditional legal definition of invention involves a potentially wide temporal expansion. Remember, invention begins with conception but is not completed until the invention is reduced to practice. The patent courts added further to this by finding the filing of a patent application to be a constructive reduction to practice that completes the invention process. Because most patent applications are filed prior to a complete reduction to practice, for most patented inventions the time of invention completion is the same as the effective filing date of the patent at issue.
USPTO Director Michelle Lee offered a set of Remarks at the October 28, 2016 AIPLA Luncheon. As a presidential appointee, Director Lee is likely nearing the end of her term as USPTO Director. Although the likely election of fellow Democrat Hillary Clinton suggests a smooth transition that could extend her term beyond January 2017, I expect that she will step-down prior to that point and that Deputy Director Russ Slifer will step-up as Acting Director.
Thank you, Denise, for the introduction. And, good afternoon, everyone. It’s a real pleasure to be here with you today. I always look forward to the AIPLA annual meeting. In fact, it is the third time I’ve had the honor to speak at this conference. I’m reminded of the first time I spoke at AIPLA, the mid-winter conference in Phoenix, AZ in January 2014. It was literally just a few weeks after I had moved from California to Washington and became acting head of the USPTO. At that conference you all welcomed me to my new role and we began our work together to strengthen and protect the intellectual property system that we know is so critical to our country’s continued economic success.
Almost three years have passed since that meeting, and I find myself honored and humbled every single day to serve in this role and to be a part of an amazing team at the USPTO. I feel it every time I’m at an international conference, seated behind a flag of the United States on the table in front of me, reflecting on how I’m a child of immigrant parents representing the United States of America. And I feel it today, standing before you, reflecting on just how far the USPTO has come during this Administration.
Today, I’d like to share with you my views of the state of the United States Patent and Trademark Office and how this situates us to meet our future challenges. Back in January 2009, when our President was first sworn into office, the USPTO’s patent application backlog and pendency numbers were at all-time highs. Today, both our backlog and pendencies are now lower than they’ve been in more than a decade, and they continue to go down. That is hardly the only success story. But it’s emblematic of how much the USPTO has charged forward the last eight years, and how strongly it is positioned to face future challenges. This has been a team effort, with incredible work done by my predecessors, Congressional cooperation, the incredibly dedicated and talented staff at the USPTO, and all of you.
Together, we have put the Agency in a spot where we are ready to build on our successes. Today, we are financially more secure thanks to the America Invents Act, a milestone of this Administration, which gave us, among other things, fee setting authority. Additionally, we are more customer-service oriented and more responsive to stakeholder input than ever before. We’ve constantly welcomed—in fact solicited—feedback and input, and are willing to refine and improve where needed. We’ve had more RFC’s, Proposed Rules, and roundtables than ever before–and thank you for your input and patience responding to each. Whether you gave feedback on our EPQI, our 101 guidance, our PTAB implementation and refinements, and/or our transparency of patent ownership proposal, your input has been valuable.
We’ve also brought a broader range of services to support American innovators where and when needed, including: Through four regional offices across the country and over a dozen IP attaches across the globe. And, we’ve worked to provide you with more access to examiner interviews by training and promoting their benefits internally at the USPTO and externally, leading to an increase of 232% more interviewing hours in just eight years.
Finally, and importantly, the USPTO’s relationships with all of its partners is healthier and stronger than ever before–that’s with our users, our employees, our unions, Congress, and within the Administration. I want to take a brief moment on this topic, because I really do believe it is key to the Agency’s success – past and future. Thinking back to even just 10 years ago [under Jon Dudas], the relationship with our users was nowhere near as collaborative, transparent, or productive as it is today. The Agency often didn’t seek much public input on examiner guidance or implementation rules, and interviews weren’t encouraged as they are today. Together, we have changed that dynamic.
Second, we’ve strengthened our working relationship with our employees. All told, we have enjoyed some of the highest rankings in the Partnership for Public Service’s list of Best Places to Work in the Federal Government. And we all know, an engaged workforce produces better work product and services for all of you. Over the last eight years, our attrition rate has reduced significantly to the point where we compete favorably with some top companies in the private sector. Also, we’ve developed a productive relationship with our unions, allowing us to make better and faster improvements in important areas such as our production count system, patent quality, and our telework program.
We have also maintained a healthy working relationship with Congress on both policy proposals and operational issues. From the passage of AIA, to the Defend Trade Secrets Act, to technical assistance on various legislative proposals, we have engaged with our colleagues on the Hill in impactful ways and the USPTO’s voice is a respected one.
Finally, the USPTO is effectively fulfilling its role as principal advisor to the President and Administration on IP policy. I’ve been pleased with the confidence the President and the Secretary of Commerce have shown my team and I, allowing us to pursue policies and programs in the best interest of our innovators. All of this: the greater financial security, the increased customer service orientation and responsiveness, and the better relationships with all of our stakeholders, has enabled us to make real progress on our priorities, and positions us for even greater success going forward.
There is strong evidence of this in a number of important areas, including patent backlog and pendencies, quality and policy. During this Administration, we have: Reduced the backlog of unexamined patent applications by ~30%, despite an average ~4% year-over-year increase in filings. Reduced our first action pendency by ~38% to 16.2 months, and reduced total pendency by ~25% to 25.3 months. This is due to numerous actions taken by the USPTO leadership team and my predecessors, and the hard work of our examining corps, and we will continue to do more.
Armed with greater finances and a shrinking backlog, we embarked on an unprecedented effort to enhance the quality of patents – a core goal of the Agency. There is a cost to society when the USPTO issues a patent that we should not issue, just as there is a cost to society when we don’t issue a patent that should issue. And just as there is a cost to society when there is a patent in the system that properly issued, but that may no longer be valid due to changes in the case law. Recognizing this, we have enhanced the quality of patents in our system, both before they leave our office through our Enhanced Patent Quality Initiative (led by a new Deputy Commissioner and a newly created department within the Patents organization solely focused on this effort); and after the patents return to the office through our PTAB and other post grant review proceedings (which double check the Office’s work and allow reconsideration in light of evolving case law or newly discovered prior art).
Addressing the second prong first, the new PTAB proceedings have significantly changed the patent landscape. With over 5,000 PTAB petitions now filed, we have one of the busiest dockets in the country. These proceedings are meeting our Congressional mandate of providing a faster, more cost efficient quality check on the patents in the system. With extensive input from all of you, we have worked hard to implement and conduct these proceedings as fairly and efficiently as possible. That’s why I asked my team to engage the public in a series of listening tours that led to a set of “quick fixes” in 2015 and then more substantive revised rules last April. That’s also why we took it upon ourselves to assess the frequency of motions to amend and the reasons for their grants or denial. We’re applying your input to identify where we can do better. These PTAB proceedings have proven themselves a valuable check on patent quality, particularly in the later part of a patent’s lifecycle.
At this point, it makes sense to bring greater resources to bear if there are questions about a patent’s validity. The economics are different at the beginning of a patent’s lifecycle. The value of a patent is often not fully known at time of filing (perhaps due to the nascency of the technology, industry and/or market), and the time and resources afforded during examination are typically limited. Innovation isn’t served if the USPTO strives to issue very expensive, “bullet-proof” patents after many years of examination. Extensive time and expense would mean that innovators would file too few patent applications, given finite budgets. The purpose of the patent system—to incentivize disclosures to advance the progress of science and the useful arts—would be defeated because too few disclosures would be made. If over time the industry and the market determine that a piece of patented technology is valuable and the public believes it is not valid under current law or newly discovered art, then there is an economic incentive to expend greater resources to test the validity of the patent. And a panel of technically trained judges steeped in patent law is well-suited to perform this double-check quickly and efficiently. In short, to best incentivize innovation. The USPTO needs to issue IP rights that are as certain, reliable and affordable as they can reasonably be, and offer post-grant proceedings that quickly, accurately and cost-effectively test the validity of certain patents proven to be of economic importance if questions of validity arise.
With all of that said, it is essential that these post-grant proceedings are properly calibrated so that they provide a quality check but do not bar deserving patentees from enforcing their patent rights. It’s why some protections in the AIA are so important, such as restrictions on timing of challenges, thresholds petitioners must meet for institution, and strict estoppel provisions. It’s also why the Agency is committed to revising our rules as many times as needed so these proceedings are as fair and effective as possible within our Congressional mandate. It’s why it is critical, within this framework, the USPTO issue the very best quality patents possible. Patents that are issued correctly in accordance with the law, that are clear providing notice to the public of the patent’s boundaries, and that are issued consistently across the Patent Examination Corps. And, it’s why I launched the Enhanced Patent Quality Initiative in 2015, so patent owners can have greater confidence and certainty of their rights in this new environment. Today, we’ve got about a dozen initiatives underway that, we believe, will meaningfully move the needle on enhancing patent quality. This includes making sure we’re getting the most relevant prior art before our examiners as early as possible by: leveraging technology, making prior art cited in our PTAB proceedings available to the examiner handling a related pending child application, and transitioning our entire patent examination corps from the decades old, antiquated U.S. Patent Classification System to the updated, increasingly global Cooperative Patent Classification System. It also includes drilling down on best practices (such as clarity of the record) during examination coupled with targeted training. Developing new and better ways to measure our progress, like our Master Review Form and new Quality Metrics. And, providing a new after-final procedure that offers applicants the opportunity to make a presentation before a panel and receive a detailed write-up of the panel’s decision that might resolve an issue without going to appeal, or even result in the application being allowed.
So, this is what we’re doing at a high level. But I’d like to share more specifics about one of our flagship programs—our “Clarity of the Record Initiative”–and some of the great progress we have been making on our Clarity of the Record pilot program. The goal of this program is to develop best practices on how much detail to include in certain key parts of the prosecution record, for example: Interview summaries, or reasons for allowance, or construction of 112(f) limitations. Regarding interview summaries: How many times have you reviewed a file history, noted the patent rejected and then seen the patent allowed after an examiner interview with minimal or no changes to the claims and little or no explanation for the allowance? In this pilot, we worked to provide more detailed summaries including the substance of the examiner’s position, details of any agreement reached, and a description of next steps following the interview. After the pilot concluded, we measured 22 data points focused on clarity, and found an average of 15% improvement in clarity between the pilot examiners and a control group.
On reasons for allowance: How many times have you reviewed a prosecution history, and there is nothing in the record to indicate why the claims were allowed by the examiner? Because it is at the discretion of the individual examiner to set forth reasons for allowance, those reasons have not always been included in every Notice of Allowance. As part of this pilot, participants were trained on setting forth reasons for allowance in every Notice of Allowance. At the conclusion of the pilot, we found a 25% improvement in the clarity of reasons for allowance between the pilot examiners and a control group. Through the pilot, we also found the following practices significantly improved overall clarity addressing each independent claim separately, particularly identifying the applicant’s persuasive arguments (wherever they may be in the record), and identifying the specific allowable subject matter of the claim rather than merely reciting the entire claim as the basis for allowance. This pilot also helped us review the best practices around claim interpretation.
On claim interpretation: How many times have you seen a prosecution record where there was clearly an issue about how a claim was interpreted, but the record was devoid of any explanation of the claim’s interpretation? In the pilot, the examiners were given training on explicitly setting forth key claim interpretations to minimize ambiguities. For example: Explaining all Section 112(f) presumptions and whether the presumptions were overcome, identifying on the record the structure in the specification that performs the function, and when a prior art reference is used to reject multiple claims, clearly addressing specific limitations in each claim that provide the basis for the rejection.
With our trainings on interview summaries, reasons for allowance and claim interpretations, we saw a statistically significant improvement in clarity when examiners used these best practices. Perhaps the most telling indicator of progress from this pilot is that when these pilot examiners were examining applications not included in the pilot program, they continued to apply the pilot’s best practices. This is a strong indication of the success of our training. Also, the clarity of the record initiative furthers the goal of compact prosecution by encouraging the applicant to rebut the examiner’s on-the-record position promptly and directly if there is disagreement. In short, we are already taking steps to clarify the record and you will see our examiners doing so increasingly over time.
Of course, patent quality also means applying the law accurately and clearly even in areas of the law that are evolving. Including, for example, the 101 jurisprudence on what is patent eligible subject matter. As many of you know, we’ve spent a fair amount of effort on this in recent years. Following major court rulings, we’ve revised our examination guidance, with input from all of you, multiple times and trained our examiners on the new guidance. Based upon input from our stakeholders, we also introduced training focused on clear drafting of 101 rejections and subsequent responses. And, we just announced in a Federal Register Notice two roundtables focused exclusively on the topic of patent eligible subject matter. At the first roundtable, we will discuss potential updates to our examination guidance, and at the second roundtable, we will discuss the impact of the current 101 jurisprudence on innovation, what changes might be considered to further support innovation, and whether such changes are best achieved legislatively, judicially or administratively. We thought it would be helpful to begin the public discussion, to create a record of where there is agreement or disagreement and what, if any, need for improvement. We welcome your participation on this important and complex issue.
As I hope you can see from this quick run-down of our initiatives, we are very excited about EPQI! It is an ambitious effort that is yielding results now and will yield many more in the long run. To learn more about our EPQI progress to date, please join us— mark your calendars—on December 13, at the USPTO, where we will spend a good part of the day sharing details of the results of each of the dozen or so EPQI. We think you will like what you hear.
Turning now to some of our policy and other accomplishments over the course of this Administration, thanks to the AIA, we can now engage more directly with innovators—through our regional patent offices in Detroit, Denver, Silicon Valley, and Dallas. As you know, I started my tenure in public service as the Director of the Silicon Valley Regional Office. Having had the opportunity to help define the vision of these Offices, and stand up three of the four regional offices, I am very proud of this legacy to our IP system that will endure for generations to come. I’ve always said that, one day when my daughter is old enough, I can point to the Silicon Valley Regional Office in our hometown and say, “Your mom had a hand in opening that office.” And I’d feel very proud about my contribution to our community and society for that. Through these offices, we powerfully expand our ability to educate regional innovators about intellectual property and help small and large businesses and inventors directly access a wider range of services offered by the USPTO.
Getting girls interested in science, invention and IP early through efforts like our Girl Scout IP Patch and retaining and supporting women in STEM fields by mentoring, training and simply highlighting the female success stories through social media and inventors baseball trading cards for distribution to our school-aged children, so all our kids can see themselves as inventors! It’s not just a social imperative, it’s an economic imperative as we look compete in an increasingly global and competitive environment.
And, it is no less an economic imperative to ensure that intellectual property beyond patents is properly calibrated to support creativity and entrepreneurship. We’ve advocated for significant modernizations of copyright law, beginning with our Green and White Papers on Copyright Policy, Creativity, and Innovation in the Digital Economy, where we made in the White Paper legislative recommendations on reforms to statutory damages for copyrights. We completed two historic copyright treaties and sent ratification packages to Congress—One on facilitating access to published works by the visually impaired, and another to expand copyrights for actors in audiovisual works.
On Trademarks, we’ve taken steps to improve the efficiency of our operations by adopting policies to encourage electronic filings of trademark applications which permitted fee reductions; and introducing the first major overhaul of rules at the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board since 2007, and I was pleased to recently join the President in the Oval Office when he signed the Defend Trade Secrets Act, which created a new federal civil cause of action for trade secrets This provided much needed, additional protections to innovators of today, in an environment where confidential business information can be quickly transported or emailed over state—or international—lines. While modern trade secret protection is essential, we are mindful that inventors need to be able to have the choice to instead disclose their invention in exchange for the exclusivity guaranteed by a patent—through reliable patent protection here and abroad.
As many of you know, there’s an entire department at the USPTO devoted to this very mission, complemented by IP attachés stationed in about a dozen countries across the globe. With this team, I have frequently represented the USPTO abroad, helping to ensure that a strong and equitable IP system does not stop at our nation’s borders. One such trip—to China in 2015—stands out in my mind, both because of the importance of promoting strong IP rights in the second largest economy in the world, and because I experienced, on a personal level, the depth of opportunity offered by our country. As I articulated our positions on these critical IP policy issues with the Vice Premier in Zhongnanhai, Beijing, the central headquarters for the Chinese government, I thought for a moment of my parents back home in the Bay Area. When they bravely left their homeland in China to move to the United States to build a new life, did they ever imagine their daughter would one day be in such a meeting, in such a role? They understood America is the land for those willing to work hard and embrace its values.
I’ve had the honor and privilege of having many great opportunities over the last three years while leading the USPTO, and, I’ve capitalized on those opportunities for the benefit of innovators because, each and every day, I’ve been able to count on an amazing team of public servants at the USPTO working hard to best serve all of you. I firmly believe that the United States Patent and Trademark Office is healthy, well-functioning and poised to successfully handle whatever challenges and opportunities lie ahead.
Our issues are important, complex and nuanced. And while not everyone will always agree with all that the Agency does, we are well prepared to work together and with all of you to accomplish our top priorities and successfully address the challenges ahead. So, thank you for all your help. And thank you for all I know you will continue to do to ensure that our greatest inventions are yet to come.
by Dennis Crouch – Note, the prevailing party here (Merck & Co.) is represented in this case by MBHB Partner Dan Boehnen. MBHB is a major sponsor of Patently-O.
This case offers a straightforward narrowing claim construction analysis involving the ProFoot’s patented method of fitting shoe inserts. U.S. Patent No. 6,845,568. The decision also lays traps for prosecutors hoping for implicitly broad claims.
After a narrowing claim construction, the plaintiff stipulated that Merck’s Dr. Scholl’s process did not infringe and the case was dismissed. On appeal, the Federal Circuit has affirmed in a nonprecedential opinion.
The claim construction process looks to provide additional meaning and context to the expressly stated claims. The approach is to look for how a personal of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the application filing date would have interpreted the claim language. In this process, Phillips v. AWH indicates that the primary sources for interpretation are the intrinsic documents: the patent document (the single best guide) and the prosecution history (a helpful additional resource). When appealed, the Federal Circuit reviews claim construction determinations de novo while giving deference to underlying factual findings.
Here, the claimed insert-fitting method include use of a “neutralizer” that is used to place a customer’s ankle in a “neutral position.” Following the Markman process, the district court construed the “neutralizer” according to how it was described in the specification — requiring a housing, protractor, and angular-adjustable foot plate. On appeal, ProFoot argued that the district court improperly imported elements of the specification to limit the claims and that the claimed neutralizer does not require those specific components. Rather, according to ProFoot, a neutralizer should be defined based upon its functional ability rather than any particular physical elements.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit rejected ProFoot’s broad-construction argument — holding that “when read in the context of the [asserted] patent, this term requires a device that includes these components.” To reach this conclusion the court started with claim language that require a user to step on the neutralizer (claim 1 requires “place right foot on a neutralizer”) and to use the neutralizer to measure an angle. Looking to the specification, the court found that the patentee had described “only two embodiments of the neutralizer” – and both embodiments required all of the components found in the claim construction in ways that are consistent with the requirements of the claims.
One question that I have here involves the court’s use of prosecution history as providing “evidence of the inventor’s understanding of neutralizer.” The court has previously held that inventor’s understanding of claim meaning is not directly relevant to claim construction. Rather, the focus is on the objective meaning understood by someone of ordinary skill in the art.
providing an insert having an angle which represents the neutral state for the left ankle.
The USPTO continues to move forward with its Enhanced Patent Quality Initiative (EPQI) and is hosting a set of five Quality Forum events over the next month in DC, Milwaukee, KC, Baton Rouge, and Portland. [Link] See you soon!
Post-Prosecution Pilot: This ongoing pilot is part of the PTO’s continued search for compact-prosecution mechanisms. After final rejection, the patentee offers a 5-page argument and then participates in a 20-minute conference with a panel of three examiners who then offer a written opinion.
Post Grant Outcomes Pilot: This pilot is now being implemented office wide and basically makes sure that AIA Trial Proceedings (including applicant arguments and submitted prior art) are given to examiners handling pending related applications.
Stakeholder Training on Examination Practice and Procedure: The training program is for non-examiners on patent office practice. Looks awesome – and would be exceptionally helpful for someone studying for the bar exam.
From a policy perspective, the case is seen as a vehicle for defendants who do not like being sued in the Eastern District of Texas and into more venues perceived as more defendant friendly.
A group of 50+ law and economics professors led by Mark Lemley, Colleen Chien, Brian Love, and Arti Rai have filed an important brief in support of the TC Heartland petition that I have copied below. Their position is (1) the Federal Circuit has erred on interpreting the law; and (2) the permissive venue result has fueled many of the problems of our patent system.
Amici are 53 professors and researchers of law and economics at universities throughout the United States. We have no personal interest in the outcome of this case, but a professional interest in seeing patent law develop in a way that encourages innovation and creativity as efficiently as possible.
28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) provides that a defendant in a patent case may be sued where the defendant is incorporated or has a regular and established place of business and has infringed the patent. This Court made clear in Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prods. Corp., 353 U.S. 222, 223 (1957), that those were the only permissible venues for a patent case. But the Federal Circuit has rejected Fourco and the plain meaning of § 1400(b), instead permitting a patent plaintiff to file suit against a defendant anywhere there is personal jurisdiction over that defendant. The result has been rampant forum shopping, particularly by patent trolls. 44% of 2015 patent lawsuits were filed in a single district: the Eastern District of Texas, a forum with plaintiff-friendly rules and practices, and where few of the defendants are incorporated or have established places of business. And an estimated 86% of 2015 patent cases were filed somewhere other than the jurisdictions specified in the statute. Colleen V. Chien & Michael Risch, Recalibrating Patent Venue, Santa Clara Univ. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 10-1 (Sept. 1, 2016), Table 3. This Court should grant certiorari to review the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) because the Federal Circuit’s dubious interpretation of the statute plays an outsized and detrimental role, both legally and economically, in the patent system.
Section 48 of the Judiciary Act of 1897 limited jurisdiction in patent cases to districts that the defendant inhabited or had a place of business and committed infringing acts. Act of March 3, 1897, c. 395, 29 Stat. 695. In 1942, this Court confirmed that “Congress did not intend the Act of 1897 to dovetail with the general provisions relating to the venue of civil suits, but rather that it alone should control venue in patent infringement proceedings.” Stonite Prods. Co. v. Melvin Lloyd Co., 315 U.S. 561, 563 (1942).
In 1948, Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b), specifying that “patent venue is proper in the judicial district where the defendant resides, or where the defendant has committed acts of infringement and has a regular and established place of business.” In 1957, this Court confirmed that patent venue should not be interpreted with reference to the general jurisdiction statute, holding that “28 U.S.C. 1400(b) . . . is the sole and exclusive provision controlling venue in patent infringement actions, and that it is not to be supplemented by the provisions of 28 U.S.C. 1391(c).” Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prods. Corp., 353 U.S. 222, 223 (1957).
In 1990, the Federal Circuit declined to apply this Court’s longstanding precedent and decided that the general venue statute should define interpretation of the patent venue statute. It made this decision on the basis of a ministerial change Congress made in 1988 to 28 U.S.C. § 1391. VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917 F.2d 1574, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1990). That statutory language changed the wording in 28 U.S.C. § 1391, from defining residence “for venue purposes” to defining residence “for purposes of venue under this chapter.” There was no indication that Congress intended this change to impact the patent venue statute.
The Federal Circuit’s conclusion that Congress’s ministerial change overruled this Court’s longstanding precedent is incorrect for at least two reasons. First, it violates fundamental rules of statutory construction. It is well-established that Congress “does not alter the fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary provisions—it does not, one might say, hide elephants in mouseholes.” Whitman v. American Trucking Assns., Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001) (citing MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218, 231 (1994); FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159-60 (2000)).
The term “resides” in § 1400(b) must mean something different than having “a regular and established place of business.” Otherwise, there would have been no reason to include both provisions in the venue statute, or to link them through the disjunctive term “or.” In Brunette, this Court, interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) as well as 28 U.S.C. § 1391(d), confirmed that where a corporation “resides” is where it is incorporated. Brunette Mach. Works v. Kockum Indus., 406 U.S. 706, n.2 (1972).
shall be deemed to reside . . . in any judicial district in which such defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question . . . .
For patent infringement cases, the relevant aspect of personal jurisdiction is typically specific jurisdiction, which focuses on whether the defendant’s suit-related conduct establishes a “substantial connection” with the judicial forum in question. Walden v. Fiore, 134 S.Ct. 1115, 1121 (2014). But a corporation will have established a suit-related “substantial connection” with, and thus be subject to jurisdiction in, any district in which it “has committed acts of infringement and has a regular and established place of business.” So the Federal Circuit’s decision to read the § 1391(c) definition of “resid[ing]” into § 1400(b) renders the second half of the latter section superfluous as to corporations, a category which includes virtually all patent defendants. A judicial reading that renders half of a statutory provision superfluous is strongly disfavored. United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 131 S.Ct. 2313, 2330 (2011) (“‘As our cases have noted in the past, we are hesitant to adopt an interpretation of a congressional enactment which renders superfluous another portion of that same law.’” (quoting Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 837 (1988))); Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 687, 698 (1995) (noting “[a] reluctance to treat statutory terms as surplusage”).
The Federal Circuit’s expansive, and we believe incorrect, interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) effectively allows patent owners to file suit in any federal district where an allegedly infringing product is sold. In re TC Heartland, LLC, No. 2016-105, at 10 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 29, 2016) (holding that jurisdiction is proper in a patent suit “where a nonresident defendant purposefully shipped accused products into the forum through an established distribution channel and the cause of action for patent infringement was alleged to arise out of those activities”). The widespread availability of products over the internet means, in effect, that patentholders can bring their suits in any district in any state in the country.
The Federal Circuit’s expansive interpretation of 28 U.S.C. §1400(b) has harmed the patent system in three distinct ways. It has led to forum selling and forum shopping, it has contributed to the growth of opportunistic patent litigation by patent trolls, and it has led to undue case concentration.
Patent lawyers today spend a great deal of time figuring out the best districts in which to file patent cases, and for good reason. The district in which you file your patent case has consequences for how much your case will cost, how long it will last, and whether you will prevail in court. Mark A. Lemley, Where to File Your Patent Case, 38 AIPLA Q.J. 401 (2010); Brian J. Love & James C. Yoon, Predictably Expensive: A Critical Look at Patent Litigation in the Eastern District of Texas, Stan. Tech. L. Rev. ___ (forthcoming, 2016).
The choice of venue enabled by the Federal Circuit’s liberal interpretation of the statute has created an incentive for courts to differentiate themselves in order to compete for litigants and “sell” their forum to prospective plaintiffs. See J. Jonas Anderson, Court Competition for Patent Cases, 163 U. Pa. L. Rev. 631 (2015); Daniel M. Klerman & Greg Reilly, Forum Selling, 89 S. Cal. L. Rev. 241 (2016).
Among district courts, the Eastern District of Texas is the clear forum of choice for patent plaintiffs. It has been the most popular venue for patent cases in eight of the last ten years. Chien & Risch, supra at 3. Whether intentionally or not, judges in the Eastern District of Texas have adopted rules and practices relating to case assignment, joinder, discovery, transfer, and summary judgment that attract patent plaintiffs to their district. Klerman & Reilly, supra; Matthew Sag, IP Litigation in U.S. District Courts: 1994-2014, 101 Iowa L. Rev. 1065 (2016) (detailing evidence of “forum selling” and five advantages to plaintiffs of filing suit in the Eastern District of Texas).
A study of all patent cases filed from 2014 to June 2016 quantifies some of the advantages. Love & Yoon, supra. Compared to their colleagues across the nation, judges in the Eastern District of Texas take 150 additional days on average to rule on motions to transfer, id. at 15, and are 10 percentage points less likely to stay the case in favor of an expert adjudication on the validity of the patent by Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) in inter partes review, id. at 26., despite the fact that patents asserted in the Eastern District of Texas are challenged in inter partes review more often than patents asserted in any other district. Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Arti Rai, & Jay Kesan, Strategic Decision Making in Dual PTAB and District Court Proceedings, 31 Berkeley Tech. Law J. 45, 109 (2016). At the same time, judges in the Eastern District of Texas have adopted discovery rules that begin earlier, end sooner, and require broader disclosure than just about anywhere else in the country. Love and Yoon, supra at 19-22 (comparing discovery and other pretrial deadlines applicable in the Eastern District of Texas and District of Delaware). In combination, relatively early and broad discovery requirements and relatively late rulings on motions to transfer ensure that defendants sued in the Eastern District of Texas will be forced to incur large discovery costs, regardless of the case’s connection to the venue.
However, not all types of plaintiffs choose to take advantage of the leverage that these rules and procedures make possible. Patent assertion entities (PAEs), or patent “trolls” use patents primarily to gain licensing fees rather than to commercialize or transfer technology. Colleen V. Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The Complex Patent Ecosystem and Its Implications for the Patent System, 62 Hastings L.J. 297 (2010) Trolls make particular use of the advantages provided by the Federal Circuit’s permissive approach to forum shopping. Since 2014, over 90 percent of patent suits brought in the Eastern District of Texas were filed by trolls established for the purpose of litigating patent suits. Love & Yoon, supra at 9. By contrast, operating companies, individuals, and universities are more likely to sue in other districts. Chien & Risch, supra at 3-4, 40.
The troll business model explains this difference in behavior. As the FTC’s recent report describes, “litigation PAEs” sign licenses that are “less than the lower bounds of early stage litigation costs,” a finding “consistent with nuisance litigation, in which defendant companies decide to settle based on the cost of litigation rather than the likelihood of their infringement.” Federal Trade Commission, Patent Assertion Entity Activity: An FTC Study, https://www.ftc.gov/reports/patent-assertion-entity-activity-ftc-study. Rather than a decision on the merits and damages commensurate with the value of patented technology, litigation PAEs instead seek to leverage the high cost of litigation to coerce nuisance-value settlements keyed not to the merits of the lawsuit, but the cost of litigation. Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for the Trolls, 113 Colum. L. Rev. 2117 (2013). Further, unlike operating companies that sell products, litigation PAEs generally lack customers and regular operations and therefore have the flexibility to incorporate and file suit based solely on litigation considerations, through shell companies or otherwise.
The Court is well aware that an “industry has developed in which firms use patents not as a basis for producing and selling goods but, instead, primarily for obtaining licensing fees.” eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L. L. C., 547 U. S. 388, 396 (2006) (KENNEDY, J., concurring). Some companies may use patents as a sword to go after defendants for money, even when their claims are frivolous.
576 U.S. __, 135 S.Ct. 1920 (2015).
Because troll suits now dominate patent litigation nationwide, their filing patterns have led to an overall concentration of 44% of all patent cases in the Eastern District of Texas in 2015. Among cases initiated 2014 through 2016, one U.S. District Judge on the Eastern District of Texas—Judge Rodney Gilstrap of Marshall, Texas—was assigned almost one quarter of all patent case filings nationwide, more than the total number of patent cases assigned to all federal judges in California, New York, and Florida combined.
This level of concentration is a problem for the legal system whatever one thinks of the decisions of the Eastern District of Texas and regardless of how fair and capable the judges there are. Simply from a logistical standpoint, the current caseload in the Eastern District of Texas is problematic. If even 10 percent of the 1,686 patent cases assigned to Judge Gilstrap in 2015 go to trial, he will need to preside over three to four patent trials per week every week for an entire year to avoid creating a backlog.
Further, when Congress decided to consolidate patent appeals in the newly-created United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, it deliberately chose to include both appeals from the United States Patent and Trademark Office and the district courts, so the new court would not hear only appeals from patent owners. And it considered and rejected proposals to create a specialized district court to hear patent cases. But the Federal Circuit’s interpretation of § 1400(b) has in practice created just such a court.
The current distribution of patent litigation filings is the result of strategic behavior by a specific type of patent enforcer, not an artifact of proximity to the original locus of invention or alleged infringement. Forum-shopping plaintiffs will naturally gravitate towards whatever district seems to have the most favorable rules. The effect of the Federal Circuit’s decision to expand patent venue beyond the scope of the statute and this Court’s decisions has been to create a de-facto specialized patent trial court, one chosen by litigants on one side rather than by Congress.
The Federal Circuit’s permissive venue rule has fundamentally shaped the landscape of patent litigation in ways that harm the patent system, by enabling extensive forum shopping and forum selling, supporting opportunistic patent litigation by patent trolls, and creating undue case concentration. This Court should grant certiorari in order to curb abuse of venue based on its misinterpretation of § 1400(b).
 No person other than the amici and their counsel participated in the writing of this brief or made a financial contribution to the brief. Letters signifying the parties’ consent to the filing of this brief are on file with the Court.
 According to Lex Machina, between January 1, 2014 and June 30, 2016 Judge Gilstrap was assigned 3,166 new patent suits, more than the combined total of all district courts in California, Florida, and New York: 2,656. Love & Yoon, supra, at 5 (collecting these statistics).
Signed, Professor John R. Allison (Texas); Professor Margo Bagley (Emory); Professor James Bessen (BU); Professor Jeremy Bock (Memphis); Professor Daniel H. Brean (Akron); Professor Michael A. Carrier (Rutgers); Professor Michael W. Carroll (American); Professor Bernard Chao (Denver); Professor Tun-Jen Chiang (George Mason); Professor Colleen V. Chien (Santa Clara); Professor Andrew Chin (UNC); Professor Robert Cook-Deegan (ASU); Professor Rochelle Dreyfuss (NYU); Dr. Dieter Ernst (Honolulu); Professor Robin C. Feldman (Hastings); Professor Lee Fleming (Berkeley); Professor Brian Frye (Kentucky); Professor William Gallagher (Golden Gate); Professor Shubha Ghosh (Wisconsin); Professor Eric Goldman (Santa Clara); Professor Bronwyn H. Hall (Berkeley); Professor Yaniv Heled (Georgia State); Professor Christian Helmers (Santa Clara); Professor Joachim Henkel (Technische Universität München); Professor Susan Helper (CWRU); Professor Tim Holbrook (Emory); Professor Herbert Hovenkamp (Iowa); Professor William Hubbard (Baltimore); Dr. Xavier Jaravel (Stanford); Professor Dennis S. Karjala (ASU); Professor Peter Lee (UC Davis); Professor Mark A. Lemley (Stanford); Professor David K. Levine (WashU); Professor David S. Levine (Elon); Professor Doug Lichtman (UCLA); Professor Yvette Joy Liebesman (SLU); Professor Orly Lobel (USD); Professor Brian Love (Santa Clara); Professor Phil Malone (Stanford); Professor Michael J. Meurer (BU); Dr. Shawn Miller (Stanford); Professor Matthew Mitchell (Toronto); Professor Susan Barbieri Montgomery (Northeastern); Professor Sean Pager (Michigan State); Professor Arti K. Rai (Duke); Professor Jacob H. Rooksby (Duquesne); Professor Jorge R. Roig (Charleston); Professor Matthew Sag (Loyola Chicago); Professor Pamela Samuelson (Berkeley); Ana Santos Rutschman (DePaul); Professor Lea Bishop Shaver (Indiana); Professor John L. Turner (Georgia); Professor Jennifer Urban (Berkeley); Professor Eric von Hippel (MIT).
In Apple and a case decided briefly after it, Nordock v. Systems, the Federal Circuit ruled that § 289 requires a court to award the total profit from the entire infringing product to a successful design patentee—even when the design patent claims a small portion of the overall product design.
In its cert petition and merits brief, Samsung argued that the “article of manufacture” in § 289 could be something less than the entire infringing product. In its brief opposing cert, Apple defended the Federal Circuit’s interpretation. Yet, in its merits brief, Apple agreed with Samsung (and the United States) that the relevant “article of manufacture” could be something less than the entire infringing product.
At oral argument, Samsung informed the Court that it was dropping its “causation argument” (i.e., that § 289 must be read in light of background causation principles from general tort law) and wanted to focus on its “article of manufacture” argument (i.e., its argument that a successful design patentee should be entitled to the “total profit” from the “article of manufacture” but that the relevant article should be determined mainly by looking at whether the patent claims a whole design or only part).
Unsurprisingly, the bulk of the oral argument was spent discussing how factfinders should determine what constitutes the relevant “article of manufacture” for the purposes of § 289. The Justices seemed particularly interested in how a jury could be instructed to perform this determination. The Justices spent a lot of time pressing the parties about the desirability of the four-part test proposed by the United States, asking if they thought that approach was appropriate and if there were any factors they would add.
It was also very clear during the argument that Apple really wanted to focus on its new waiver argument. In its merits brief (though not in its brief opposing cert), Apple argued that Samsung failed to preserve the “article of manufacture” argument for appeal. After a few questions, however, the Justices’ patience for this line of argument waned and the Chief Justice rather pointedly told Apple’s counsel to move on. The clear message conveyed was that the Justices didn’t need to be told what was in the record; they were perfectly capable of reviewing it for themselves.
On the whole, and based solely on the arguments, it seemed like the Justices were leaning toward adopting some form of multi-factor test to determine what constitutes the relevant “article of manufacture.” What that test might look like was far from clear. At some points, the Justices seemed visibly frustrated by the prospect of coming up with a workable test; whether they were convinced that any of the proposed tests would, indeed, be workable remains to be seen.
In this observer’s opinion, the real problem is the attempt to add a qualitative element to this test, instead of focusing on what the patentee actually claims. Also, it’s no wonder that the Justices and parties had difficulty trying to identify the relevant article of manufacture for the D’305 patent, which claims a design for a single screenshot of the iPhone graphical user interface (“GUI”). Like other GUI designs, the D’305 patent claims a design for software, not a design for a screen (no matter what the PTO says).
One thought: The phrase “article of manufacture” doesn’t just appear in § 289. It also appears in § 171, which defines design-patentable subject matter. Although the Federal Circuit wasn’t asked to construe that phrase in § 289 until Apple, it has issued a number of decisions on what constitutes an “article of manufacture” in the context of § 171. The Federal Circuit didn’t mention any of those cases in its decision in Apple and the parties haven’t relied on them to make their points before the Supreme Court. However, under normal principles of statutory construction, this phrase should mean the same thing in both of these key design patent provisions. It seems fairly clear that the Federal Circuit expanded the definition of “article of manufacture” in § 171 without thinking of the potential consequences for § 289 (arguably leading to the worst of the “absurd results” created by the Federal Circuit’s Apple/Nordock rule). And it seems likely that the reverse might happen here—the Justices might redefine the “article of manufacture” in § 289 without considering any potential consequences for § 171. Of course, those issues weren’t briefed. But it’s still an issue worth keeping an eye on.

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