Source: https://cbaclelegalconnection.com/tag/%C2%A7-1983-action/
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 10:55:53+00:00

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The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in L.J. v. Carracito on Thursday, January 11, 2018.
Wrongful Death—Child Protection Act of 1987—Colorado Governmental Immunity Act—Police Officer—Failure to Report Child Abuse—Public Entity—Vicarious Liability—Tort—Willful and Wanton—Exemplary Damages.
D.J.M., age 2, died after suffering a beating by his mother’s boyfriend. D.J.M.’s father brought an action against the City of Colorado Springs (City) and Officer Carricato, individually and in his capacity as an officer with the City of Colorado Springs Police Department, for failing to report child abuse that father complained about to them multiple times. The complaint alleged violation of the Child Protection Act of 1987 (CPA); negligence (wrongful death) by the City and Officer Carricato; negligence per se by the City and Officer Carricato; violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by the City and Officer Carricato; vicarious liability against the City; and an entitlement to exemplary damages under C.R.S. § 24-10-118(1)(c) against Officer Carricato. The district court determined that while the negligence claims for wrongful death and negligence per se were barred by the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (CGIA), the claim for violation of the CPA was not barred because it was not a claim based in tort. The district court allowed the claim for vicarious liability to stand insofar as it related to the violation of the CPA and found, without conducting a hearing under Trinity Broadcasting of Denver, Inc. v. City of Westminster, that the complaint alleged a sufficient factual basis to support a claim of willful and wanton behavior.
On appeal, the City and Officer Carricato argued that the district court erred because the CGIA bars the claim for violation of the CPA and father’s complaint does not allege specific facts sufficient to support a finding that Officer Carricato’s conduct was willful and wanton. The City is undisputedly a “public entity.” The exceptions to sovereign immunity are not applicable here because (1) the enumerated statutory exceptions are not at issue; (2) the CPA does not fit within any of the statutory exceptions; and (3) father is not requesting equitable, remedial, or non-compensatory remedies. Here, the essence of father’s claim is that the City breached a duty of care owed to D.J.M., which caused his death. Because father’s claim lies or could lie in tort, the CGIA bars the claim against the City for alleged violation of the CPA. Thus, the district court improperly denied that part of the motion to dismiss. Similarly, the vicarious liability claims are claims that lie in tort or could lie in tort and are thus barred by the CGIA.
Furthermore, public employees are immune from liability for tort claims unless their act or omission was willful and wanton. The district court must determine whether the conduct was in fact willful or wanton. Here, the district court failed to hold a Trinity hearing on this issue.
Finally, Officer Carricato argued that the claim for exemplary damages cannot stand because it was improperly pleaded and that exemplary damages cannot be awarded against a police officer. The CGIA allows a claim for exemplary damages against public employees only if their conduct was willful and wanton. The claim for exemplary damages against the police officer was prematurely pled.
The portions of the judgment on the claims against the City, the vicarious liability claim, and the exemplary damages claim were reversed. The portion of the judgment relating to the claims against Officer Carricato was remanded.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals published its opinion in Pompeo v. Board of Regents for the University of New Mexico on Tuesday, March 28, 2017.
Ms. Pompeo was a graduate student at the University of New Mexico (UNM). Ms. Pompeo filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against the Board of Regents of UNM, and Caroline Hinkley and Susan Dever in their individual capacities, for violation of her First Amendment rights. Ms. Pompeo submitted a paper that contained language relating to a politically charged topic. The Defendants met with the student on several occasions to assist the student in rewriting the paper to include citable authority and language consistent for an academic audience. Ms. Pompeo did not rewrite the paper and claimed she was banned from the class. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the individual defendants because they were entitled to qualified immunity. The UNM Board of Regents was immune under the Eleventh Amendment. Ms. Pompeo appealed.
The Tenth Circuit exercised jurisdiction under 29 U.S.C. 1291 and it reviewed the grant for summary judgment de novo.
The parties agree that the dispute involved “school-sponsored speech” that “a school affirmatively promotes, as opposed to speech that it tolerates.” Educators do not offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial control over the style and content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.” Reviewing courts give “substantial deference to educators’ stated pedagogical concerns.” “Courts may override an educator’s judgment where the proffered goal or methodology was a sham pretext for an impermissible ulterior motive.” The educator may “limit or grade speech in the classroom in the name of learning and not as a pretext for punishing the student for her race, gender, economic class, religion or political persuasion.” The court found that summary judgment was appropriate in this case because the defendants’ actions were justified as truly pedagogical.
The court AFFIRMED the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Castillo v. Day on Monday, June 22, 2015.
Plaintiffs in this case are a group of women formerly incarcerated at the Hillside Community Corrections Center in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. As part of an off-site work program, the women performed landscaping and groundskeeping work at the Oklahoma Governor’s Mansion. They were not under the direct supervision of any prison guard while at the mansion, but were supervised by the mansion’s groundskeeper, Anthony Bobelu. Bobelu and Russell Humphries, a cook at the mansion, sexually assaulted and raped the women at the mansion. In January 2009, plaintiff Reeder told Hillside guard Mary Pavliska that she had been sexually abused by Bobelu and Humphries. Pavliska told her to return to her dorm, and Reeder never heard anything else about it. Pavliska testified that she told Charlotte Day, another guard, about the assaults, but Day denied being told. On another occasion, Day taunted plaintiff Garell about beginning a sexual relationship with Bobelu.
Plaintiffs brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and alleging violations of their Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. Their complaint named 15 defendants, including Bobelu, Humphries, Day, and Pavliska. The claims against several defendants were dismissed without prejudice, and all remaining defendants except Bobelu moved for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment to all except Day and Pavliska, finding a jury could conclude they were deliberately indifferent to the known substantial risk of serious harm to plaintiffs. Day and Pavliska filed interlocutory appeals, arguing the district court erred in finding they were not entitled to qualified immunity.
The Tenth Circuit quickly disposed of Day’s appeal, noting that her challenge was to the district court’s sufficiency determination and not that the plaintiffs failed to assert violation of a constitutional right. Because the sufficiency issue was not ripe for appeal, the Tenth Circuit dismissed Day’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
Finding jurisdiction to evaluate Pavliska’s appeal, the Tenth Circuit considered her arguments that she was entitled to qualified immunity because plaintiffs did not allege she affirmatively violated their constitutional rights, the conduct of Bobelu and Humphries did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation, and she did not have actual knowledge of the bad acts of Bobelu and Humphries. Plaintiffs asserted Pavliska violated their Eighth Amendment right to be free from sexual assault while imprisoned by failing to take reasonable measures to abate the risk of assault. Pavliska argued that because she had no official authority over Bobelu and Humphries she could not be liable for their conduct, which the Tenth Circuit characterized as an argument that she could only be liable for conduct of those she supervised directly. The Tenth Circuit rejected this argument, finding it well established that prison officials can be held liable for failing to prevent assault. Pavliska also argued that the conduct of Bobelu and Humphries was not sufficiently serious to constitute a constitutional violation. The Tenth Circuit noted that this was a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence and it lacked jurisdiction to hear the issue. Finally, Pavliska argued she could not be held liable for any acts occurring before January 2009, but the Tenth Circuit noted the plaintiffs in their opening brief asserted claims arising after January 2009 only.
The district court’s denial of summary judgment as to Pavliska was affirmed insofar as it was a challenge to the motion denial and not to the sufficiency of the evidence, and Day’s and Pavliska’s appeals challenging sufficiency were dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Nixon v. City & County of Denver on Thursday, April 30, 2015.
Ricky Nixon was a Denver police officer who was involved in two highly publicized incidents of excessive force. He was cleared of wrongdoing after the first incident, but the Denver manager of safety ordered a 30-day suspension after the second incident and ordered his termination when he was not truthful about the incident. A panel of the Denver Civil Service Commission reversed the termination but ultimately the Colorado Court of Appeals remanded. While the Commission decision was being challenged by the City, Nixon filed a § 1983 suit against the manager of safety, the City, and others in federal district court. The district court dismissed all his claims, but on appeal Nixon challenged the dismissal of only two: (1) the City and manager violated his First Amendment rights by retaliating against him for protected speech, and (2) a Due Process claim based on his protected status as a police officer.
The Tenth Circuit noted that First Amendment claims should be evaluated under the Garcetti/Pickering test, and that to show a due process violation the employee must prove governmental defamation and alteration in legal status. The district court dismissed Nixon’s claims for failure to state a claim for relief.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court judgment.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Eastom v. City of Tulsa on Monday, April 20, 2015.
Dustin Eastom filed § 1983 claims for malicious prosecution against the City of Tulsa, a Tulsa police officer (Mr. Henderson), and an ATF agent (Mr. McFaddon). Mr. Eastom also filed a negligence claim against the city under Oklahoma’s Governmental Tort Claims Act. After Mr. Eastom filed suit, Mr. McFaddon filed for bankruptcy, and Mr. Eastom’s claim against him was automatically stayed by 11 U.S.C. § 362. The district court entered summary judgment for the City and Mr. Henderson, dismissing Mr. Eastom’s claims with prejudice. It declined to exercise jurisdiction over Mr. Eastom’s state law claims against the City and also dismissed them with prejudice.
Mr. Eastom appealed the summary judgment order, and the Tenth Circuit issued an order to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed because there was no final judgment as to all parties. Mr. Eastom voluntarily dismissed his district court claim against Mr. McFaddon without prejudice and responded to the show cause order that his appeal was now final because he was time-barred from refiling the claim. However, under Oklahoma’s savings statute, Mr. Eastom had an additional year to re-file his voluntarily withdrawn claims against Mr. McFaddon despite the time bar.
Mr. Eastom waited a year and again appealed to the Tenth Circuit. However, the § 362 stay was still in place, and the Tenth Circuit again ordered Mr. Eastom to show cause why his appeal should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Mr. Eastom contended the district court’s summary judgment was final because the time for refiling under the savings statute had elapsed.
The Tenth Circuit examined the interplay between the applicable statute of limitations, the savings statute, and the bankruptcy stay, and found that Mr. Eastom’s claims were still not final because the bankruptcy stay was still in place, tolling the statute of limitations. Because the automatic stay prevented Mr. Eastom from exercising legal remedies against the debtor, Oklahoma law prevents the running of the savings statute while the stay is in place.
The Tenth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Young v. Larimer County Sheriff’s Office on Thursday, September 11, 2014.
Medical Marijuana Amendment—42 USC § 1983—Seizure—Taking—Constitution.
Young leased property where he grew marijuana plants and distributed marijuana for medical use under the Medical Marijuana Amendment (MMA), Article XVIII, §14 of the Colorado Constitution. After obtaining search warrants, sheriff’s deputies entered Young’s property and seized forty-two marijuana plants by cutting them off just above the roots. This action killed the plants. After Young was acquitted of all charges against him, he brought this action for damages on the basis that the deputies had killed the plants seized from him. The trial court entered summary judgment against Young.
On appeal, Young argued that 42 USC § 1983 provides a remedy for state action that violates a right created by the MMA. Section 14(2)(e) of the MMA requires that medical marijuana that has been seized be returned upon acquittal of criminal charges. However, because federal law criminalizes possession of marijuana, such a claim is not cognizable under § 1983. Further, no express or implied private right of action exists under the MMA. Therefore, the trial court properly entered summary judgment on this claim.
Defendants argued that because Young’s complaint alleged a taking only under federal law (which is foreclosed by the federal criminalization of marijuana), a state law takings claim under Article II, §15 of the Colorado Constitution should not be considered. A valid seizure under criminal law does not constitute a taking for which the owner is entitled to just compensation, even if the defendant is later acquitted of the charges. Therefore, the trial court properly entered summary judgment on the state law takings claim. The judgment was affirmed.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Felders v. Malcom on Friday, June 20, 2014.
Sherida Felders and her two young passengers were traveling through Utah on her way from California to Colorado when she was stopped by Officer Bairett for speeding. Bairett observed that Felders appeared nervous, she had an air freshener in her car, and she had a religious license plate holder, which made him suspicious that she was transporting drugs. He called for a K-9 unit to conduct a dog sniff, and Officer Malcom and dog Duke responded. Felders did not consent to a search of her vehicle, but the dog was allowed legally to sniff the outside of the vehicle without consent. As Felders and her passengers exited the vehicle, Bairett held the doors open and did not close them prior to the sniff. Duke immediately jumped inside the car without alerting and began to sniff the inside of the vehicle. After a two-hour search, no drugs were found in the vehicle. Felders and the two passengers subsequently brought this action, alleging violations of Fourth Amendment violations under 28 U.S.C. § 1983. Officer Malcom moved for summary judgment on the unlawful search claim on qualified immunity grounds. The district court denied summary judgment and this interlocutory appeal followed.
The district court found as a matter of law that Malcom could not establish probable cause to search the car prior to conducting the dog sniff and that material facts were in dispute regarding (1) whether Malcom’s canine, Duke, alerted prior to jumping into the vehicle; and (2) whether Malcom facilitated Duke’s entry into the vehicle prior to establishing probable cause. The Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court that Malcom did not have probable cause to search the vehicle prior to conducting the sniff. The facts provided by Bairett provided, at most, reasonable suspicion justifying the detention, and Malcom did not independently find any further evidence of wrongdoing.
As to whether Malcom facilitated Duke’s entry into the vehicle, the Tenth Circuit found that genuine issues of material fact existed as, precluding a grant of summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds as a matter of law. The Tenth Circuit noted that clearly established precedent prevented the officers from searching the inside of the vehicle until the dog alerted on the exterior sniff. Because the dog jumped into the car and it was not clear whether Malcom’s actions led the dog to enter the vehicle, summary judgment was inappropriate. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of summary judgment to Malcom on qualified immunity grounds.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals published its opinion in Estate of Marvin L. Booker v. Gomez on Tuesday, March 11, 2014.
Denver police arrested Marvin Booker on a warrant for failure to appear at a hearing regarding a drug charge. During booking, Mr. Booker died while in custody after officers restrained him in response to his alleged insubordination. Several officers pinned Mr. Booker face-down to the ground, one placed him in a chokehold, and another tased him. After the officers sought medical help for Mr. Booker, he could not be revived.
Mr. Booker’s estate sued Deputies Faun Gomez, James Grimes, Kyle Sharp, Kenneth Robinette, and Sergeant Carrie Rodriguez (collectively “Defendants”) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging they used excessive force against Mr. Booker and failed to provide him with immediate medical care, which resulted in Mr. Booker’s untimely death. The Defendants moved for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. The district court denied their motion because disputed facts precluded summary judgment. Defendants appealed.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 allows an injured person to seek damages against an individual who has violated his or her federal rights while acting under color of state law. Individual defendants named in a § 1983 action may raise a defense of qualified immunity, which shields public officials from damages actions unless their conduct was unreasonable in light of clearly established law. Generally, when a defendant asserts qualified immunity, the plaintiff carries a two-part burden to show: (1) that the defendant’s actions violated a federal constitutional or statutory right, and, if so, (2) that the right was clearly established at the time of the defendant’s unlawful conduct.
The court discerned five issues from the Defendants’ appeal: (A) whether the district court erred by considering Plaintiffs’ excessive force claim under both the Fourth and the Fourteenth Amendment standards; (B) whether the district court erred in failing to conduct an individualized analysis of each Defendant’s actions; (C) whether the district court erred in denying qualified immunity on Plaintiffs’ excessive force claim; (D) whether the district court erred in denying qualified immunity on Plaintiffs’ claim for failure to provide medical care; and (E) whether the district court erred in failing to grant qualified immunity to Sergeant Rodriguez on the Plaintiffs’ supervisory liability claim.
Determining which amendment applies to an allegation of excessive force requires consideration of where the plaintiff finds himself in the criminal justice system. It is well-established that the Fourteenth Amendment governs any claim of excessive force brought by a “pretrial detainee.” On the other hand, the Fourth Amendment governs excessive force claims arising from treatment of an arrestee detained without a warrant and prior to any probable cause hearing. The Tenth Circuit concluded the district court did not err in considering Plaintiffs’ excessive force claim under both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Rather, the district court did what many courts do: it analyzed the case under more than one legal rule and made alternative rulings, holding that Defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiffs’ excessive force claim under either the Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment.
The court held the Fourteenth Amendment applied to Plaintiffs’ excessive force claim in any event, because Mr. Booker was a pre-trial detainee.
Defendants argued the district court should have assessed their actions individually, rather than judging the conduct of all the deputies as a whole. The Tenth Circuit disagreed and concluded that individualized analysis was not necessary at the summary judgment stage: all Defendants actively and jointly participated in the use of force, and even if a single deputy’s participation did not constitute excessive force, that deputy could be liable under a failure-to-intervene theory. The court concluded that the district court did not err in failing to consider each officer’s use of excessive force individually.
The Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity unless the Plaintiffs could show (a) a reasonable jury could find unconstitutional the deputies’ use of force—a carotid restraint, pressure on Mr. Booker’s back, and application of a taser—once Mr. Booker was fully restrained; and (b) this use of force violated clearly established law.
The Tenth Circuit concluded Plaintiffs met both burdens. The court looked to these three factors in evaluating the excessive force claim under the Fourteenth Amendment: (1) the relationship between the amount of force used and the need presented; (2) the extent of the injury inflicted; and (3) the motives of the state actor.
The evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, showed the deputies used various types of force—including substantial pressure on his back, a taser, and a carotid neckhold—on Mr. Booker while he was not resisting. Because Mr. Booker was handcuffed and on his stomach, the court concluded the force was not proportional to the need presented. Second, the autopsy report concluded that Mr. Booker died of cardiorespiratory arrest as a result of restraint. A reasonable jury could conclude this evidence of Mr. Booker’s cause of death supported the Plaintiffs’ claim of excessive force. Next, the subjective intent standard for an excessive force due process violation is force inspired by unwise, excessive zeal amounting to an abuse of official power that shocks the conscience, or by malice rather than mere carelessness. A reasonable jury could conclude that the Defendants’ use of substantial pressure on Mr. Booker’s back, a two-minute carotid hold on his neck, and a taser while Mr. Booker was subdued and struggling to breathe in a prone position demonstrated the requisite level of culpability for a due process violation. The Tenth Circuit held that the Plaintiffs met their burden to show the Defendants violated Mr. Booker’s constitutional rights because a reasonable jury could conclude the Defendants engaged in excessive force in violation of the Due Process Clause.
Second, the legal norms underlying the three-factor due process analysis—proportionality, injury, and motive—were clearly established at the time of Mr. Booker’s death. The court therefore affirmed the district court’s denial of summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ excessive force claim.
Prison doctors and prison guards may be liable under § 1983 for indifference manifested in their response to the prisoner’s needs or by intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care or intentionally interfering with treatment once prescribed. This standard applies to pretrial detainees. First, the detainee must produce objective evidence that the deprivation at issue was in fact sufficiently serious. A medical need is sufficiently serious if it is one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention. Second, under the subjective component, the detainee must establish deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs by presenting evidence of the prison official’s culpable state of mind.
First, Plaintiffs’ experts provided sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude that the Defendants’ delay in seeking medical care contributed to Mr. Booker’s death, which was without doubt, sufficiently serious to meet the objective component necessary to implicate the Fourteenth Amendment. Second, the disputed facts regarding Mr. Booker’s condition after the use of force ended precluded summary judgment.
There is little doubt that deliberate indifference to an inmate’s serious medical need violates a clearly established constitutional right. The court stated that any reasonable officer in the Defendants’ position (and with their training) would have known that failing to check Mr. Booker’s vital signs, perform CPR, or seek medical care for three minutes when he was limp and unconscious as a result of the Defendants’ use of force could violate the Constitution.
A plaintiff must satisfy three elements to establish a successful § 1983 claim against a defendant based on his or her supervisory responsibilities: (1) personal involvement; (2) causation; and (3) state of mind.
The court held that a reasonable jury could find Sergeant Rodriguez actively participated in—and failed to intervene and prevent—the use of excessive force to satisfy the first and second elements. Similarly, the court’s earlier conclusion that a reasonable jury could find Sergeant Rodriguez exhibited excessive zeal—by using the taser on Mr. Booker for 60 percent longer than the recommended time period when he was no longer resisting and fully subdued by handcuffs, and the carotid neck hold, satisfied the third element. Finally, the court’s previous conclusion regarding clearly established law, also precluded summary judgment on this claim.

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