Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/101940/terry-vs-ohio
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 04:58:57+00:00

Document:
1. The Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, "protects people, not places," and therefore applies as much to the citizen on the streets as well as at home or elsewhere. Pp. 392 U. S. 8 -9.
2. The issue in this case is not the abstract propriety of the police conduct, but the admissibility against petitioner of the evidence uncovered by the search and seizure. P. 392 U. S. 12 .
3. The exclusionary rule cannot properly be invoked to exclude the products of legitimate and restrained police investigative techniques, and this Court's approval of such techniques should not discourage remedies other than the exclusionary rule to curtail police abuses for which that is not an effective sanction. Pp. 392 U. S. 13 -15.
4. The Fourth Amendment applies to "stop and frisk" procedures such as those followed here. Pp. 392 U. S. 16 -20.
(a) Whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has "seized" that person within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. P. 392 U. S. 16 .
(b) A careful exploration of the outer surfaces of a person's clothing in an attempt to find weapons is a "search" under that Amendment. P. 392 U. S. 16 .
regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest that individual for crime or the absolute certainty that the individual is armed. Pp. 392 U. S. 20 -27.
(a) Though the police must, whenever practicable, secure a warrant to make a search and seizure, that procedure cannot be followed where swift action based upon on-the-spot observations of the officer on the beat is required. P. 392 U. S. 20 .
(b) The reasonableness of any particular search and seizure must be assessed in light of the particular circumstances against the standard of whether a man of reasonable caution is warranted in believing that the action taken was appropriate. Pp. 392 U. S. 21 -22.
(c) The officer here was performing a legitimate function of investigating suspicious conduct when he decided to approach petitioner and his companions. P. 392 U. S. 22 .
(d) An officer justified in believing that an individual whose suspicious behavior he is investigating at close range is armed may, to neutralize the threat of physical harm, take necessary measures to determine whether that person is carrying a weapon. P. 392 U. S. 24 .
(e) A search for weapons in the absence of probable cause to arrest must be strictly circumscribed by the exigencies of the situation. Pp. 392 U. S. 25 -26.
(f) An officer may make an intrusion short of arrest where he has reasonable apprehension of danger before being possessed of information justifying arrest. Pp. 392 U. S. 26 -27.
6. The officer's protective seizure of petitioner and his companions and the limited search which he made were reasonable, both at their inception and as conducted. Pp. 392 U. S. 27 -30.
(a) The actions of petitioner and his companions were consistent with the officer's hypothesis that they were contemplating a daylight robbery and were armed. P. 392 U. S. 28 .
(b) The officer's search was confined to what was minimally necessary to determine whether the men were armed, and the intrusion, which was made for the sole purpose of protecting himself and others nearby, was confined to ascertaining the presence of weapons. Pp. 392 U. S. 29 -30.
7. The revolver seized from petitioner was properly admitted into evidence against him, since the search which led to its seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Pp. 392 U. S. 30 -31.
the denial of a pretrial motion to suppress, the prosecution introduced in evidence two revolvers and a number of bullets seized from Terry and a codefendant, Richard Chilton, [ Footnote 2 ] by Cleveland Police Detective Martin McFadden. At the hearing on the motion to suppress this evidence, Officer McFadden testified that, while he was patrolling in plain clothes in downtown Cleveland at approximately 2:30 in the afternoon of October 31, 1963, his attention was attracted by two men, Chilton and Terry, standing on the corner of Huron Road and Euclid Avenue. He had never seen the two men before, and he was unable to say precisely what first drew his eye to them. However, he testified that he had been a policeman for 39 years and a detective for 35, and that he had been assigned to patrol this vicinity of downtown Cleveland for shoplifters and pickpockets for 30 years. He explained that he had developed routine habits of observation over the years, and that he would "stand and watch people or walk and watch people at many intervals of the day." He added: "Now, in this case, when I looked over, they didn't look right to me at the time."
"had reasonable cause to believe . . . that the defendants were conducting themselves suspiciously, and some interrogation should be made of their action."
Purely for his own protection, the court held, the officer had the right to pat down the outer clothing of these men, who he had reasonable cause to believe might be armed. The court distinguished between an investigatory "stop" and an arrest, and between a "frisk" of the outer clothing for weapons and a full-blown search for evidence of crime. The frisk, it held, was essential to the proper performance of the officer's investigatory duties, for, without it, "the answer to the police officer may be a bullet, and a loaded pistol discovered during the frisk is admissible."
"No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law."
Union Pac. R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U. S. 250 , 141 U. S. 251 (1891). We have recently held that "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places," Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347 , 389 U. S. 351 (1967), and wherever an individual may harbor a reasonable "expectation of privacy," id. at 389 U. S. 361 (MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, concurring), he is entitled to be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion. Of course, the specific content and incidents of this right must be shaped by the context in which it is asserted. For "what the Constitution forbids is not all searches and seizures, but unreasonable searches and seizures." Elkins v. United States, 364 U. S. 206 , 364 U. S. 222 (1960). Unquestionably petitioner was entitled to the protection of the Fourth Amendment as he walked down the street in Cleveland. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U. S. 89 (1964); Rios v. United States, 364 U. S. 253 (1960); Henry v. United States, 361 U. S. 98 (1959); United States v. Di Re, 332 U. S. 581 (1948); Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132 (1925). The question is whether, in all the circumstances of this on-the-street encounter, his right to personal security was violated by an unreasonable search and seizure.
"the right of a police officer . . . to make an on-the-street stop, interrogate and pat down for weapons (known in street vernacular as 'stop and frisk'). [ Footnote 8 ]"
v. United States, 364 U. S. 206 , 364 U. S. 222 (1960). Courts which sit under our Constitution cannot and will not be made party to lawless invasions of the constitutional rights of citizens by permitting unhindered governmental use of the fruits of such invasions. Thus, in our system, evidentiary rulings provide the context in which the judicial process of inclusion and exclusion approves some conduct as comporting with constitutional guarantees and disapproves other actions by state agents. A ruling admitting evidence in a criminal trial, we recognize, has the necessary effect of legitimizing the conduct which produced the evidence, while an application of the exclusionary rule withholds the constitutional imprimatur.
police "field interrogation" conduct violates the Fourth Amendment. But a stern refusal by this Court to condone such activity does not necessarily render it responsive to the exclusionary rule. Regardless of how effective the rule may be where obtaining convictions is an important objective of the police, [ Footnote 10 ] it is powerless to deter invasions of constitutionally guaranteed rights where the police either have no interest in prosecuting or are willing to forgo successful prosecution in the interest of serving some other goal.
United States, 282 U. S. 344 , 282 U. S. 356 -358 (1931); see United States v. Di Re, 332 U. S. 581 , 332 U. S. 586 -587 (1948). The scope of the search must be "strictly tied to and justified by" the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294 , 387 U. S. 310 (1967) (MR. JUSTICE FORTAS, concurring); see, e.g., Preston v. United States, 376 U. S. 364 , 376 U. S. 367 -368 (1964); Agnello v. United States, 269 U. S. 20 , 269 U. S. 30 -31 (1925).
"'good faith on the part of the arresting officer is not enough.' . . . If subjective good faith alone were the test, the protections of the Fourth Amendment would evaporate, and the people would be 'secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,' only in the discretion of the police."
Beck v. Ohio, supra, at 379 U. S. 97 .
arrest, however, must, like any other search, be strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294 , 387 U. S. 310 (1967) (MR. JUSTICE FORTAS, concurring). Thus, it must be limited to that which is necessary for the discovery of weapons which might be used to harm the officer or others nearby, and may realistically be characterized as something less than a "full" search, even though it remains a serious intrusion.
Our evaluation of the proper balance that has to be struck in this type of case leads us to conclude that there must be a narrowly drawn authority to permit a reasonable search for weapons for the protection of the police officer, where he has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual, regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest the individual for a crime. The officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed; the issue is whether a reasonably prudent man, in the circumstances, would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger. Cf. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U. S. 89 , 379 U. S. 91 (1964); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S. 160 , 338 U. S. 174 -176 (1949); Stacey v. Emery, 97 U. S. 642 , 97 U. S. 645 (1878). [ Footnote 23 ] And in determining whether the officer acted reasonably in such circumstances, due weight must be given not to his inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or "hunch," but to the specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience. Cf. Brinegar v. United States supra.
scope of governmental action as by imposing preconditions upon its initiation. Compare Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347 , 389 U. S. 354 -356 (1967). The entire deterrent purpose of the rule excluding evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment rests on the assumption that "limitations upon the fruit to be gathered tend to limit the quest itself." United States v. Poller, 43 F.2d 911, 914 (C.A.2d Cir.1930); see, e.g., Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U. S. 618 , 381 U. S. 629 -635 (1965); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961); Elkins v. United States, 364 U. S. 206 , 364 U. S. 216 -221 (1960). Thus, evidence may not be introduced if it was discovered by means of a seizure and search which were not reasonably related in scope to the justification for their initiation. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294 , 387 U. S. 310 (1967) (MR. JUSTICE FORTAS, concurring).
We need not develop at length in this case, however, the limitations which the Fourth Amendment places upon a protective seizure and search for weapons. These limitations will have to be developed in the concrete factual circumstances of individual cases. See Sibron v. New York, post, p. 392 U. S. 40 , decided today. Suffice it to note that such a search, unlike a search without a warrant incident to a lawful arrest, is not justified by any need to prevent the disappearance or destruction of evidence of crime. See Preston v. United States, 376 U. S. 364 , 376 U. S. 367 (1964). The sole justification of the search in the present situation is the protection of the police officer and others nearby, and it must therefore be confined in scope to an intrusion reasonably designed to discover guns, knives, clubs, or other hidden instruments for the assault of the police officer.
"And as the right to stop and inquire is to be justified for a cause less conclusive than that which would sustain an arrest, so the right to frisk may be justified as an incident to inquiry upon grounds of elemental safety and precaution which might not initially sustain a search. Ultimately, the validity of the frisk narrows down to whether there is or is not a right by the police to touch the person questioned. The sense of exterior touch here involved is not very far different from the sense of sight or hearing -- senses upon which police customarily act."
People v. Rivera, 14 N.Y.2d 441, 445, 447, 201 N.E.2d 32, 34, 35, 252 N.Y.S.2d 458, 461, 463 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 978 (1965).
"as more police departments adopt 'aggressive patrol,' in which officers are encouraged routinely to stop and question persons on the street who are unknown to them, who are suspicious, or whose purpose for being abroad is not readily evident."
"motivated by the officers' perceived need to maintain the power image of the beat officer, an aim sometimes accomplished by humiliating anyone who attempts to undermine police control of the streets."
"we must be careful to distinguish that the 'frisk' authorized herein includes only a 'frisk' for a dangerous weapon. It by no means authorizes a search for contraband, evidentiary material, or anything else in the absence of reasonable grounds to arrest. Such a search is controlled by the requirements of the Fourth Amendment, and probable cause is essential."
State v. Terry, 5 Ohio App.2d 122, 130, 214 N.E.2d 114, 120 (1966). See also, e.g., Ellis v. United States, 105 U.S.App.D.C. 86, 88, 264 F.2d 372, 374 (1959); Comment, 65 Col.L.Rev. 848, 860, and n. 81 (1965).
"[T]he officer must feel with sensitive fingers every portion of the prisoner's body. A thorough search must be made of the prisoner's arms and armpits, waistline and back, the groin and area about the testicles, and entire surface of the legs down to the feet."
Priar & Martin, Searching and Disarming Criminals, 45 J.Crim.L.C. & P.S. 481 (1954).
In our view, the sounder course is to recognize that the Fourth Amendment governs all intrusions by agents of the public upon personal security, and to make the scope of the particular intrusion, in light of all the exigencies of the case, a central element in the analysis of reasonableness. Cf. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S. 160 , 338 U. S. 183 (1949) (Mr. Justice Jackson, dissenting). Compare Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523 , 387 U. S. 537 (1967). This seems preferable to an approach which attributes too much significance to an overly technical definition of "search," and which turns in part upon a judge-made hierarchy of legislative enactments in the criminal sphere. Focusing the inquiry squarely on the dangers and demands of the particular situation also seems more likely to produce rules which are intelligible to the police and the public alike than requiring the officer in the heat of an unfolding encounter on the street to make a judgment as to which laws are "of limited public consequence."
This demand for specificity in the information upon which police action is predicated is the central teaching of this Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. See Beck v. Ohio, 379 U. S. 89 , 379 U. S. 96 -97 (1964); Ker v. California, 374 U. S. 23 , 374 U. S. 34 -37 (1963); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S. 471 , 371 U. S. 479 -484 (1963); Rios v. United States, 364 U. S. 253 , 364 U. S. 261 -262 (1960); Henry v. United States, 361 U. S. 98 , 361 U. S. 100 -102 (1959); Draper v. United States, 358 U. S. 307 , 358 U. S. 312 -314 (1959); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S. 160 , 338 U. S. 175 -178 (1949); Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10 , 333 U. S. 15 -17 (1948); United States v. Di Re, 332 U. S. 581 , 332 U. S. 593 -595 (1948); Husty v. United States, 282 U. S. 694 , 282 U. S. 700 -701 (1931); Dumbra v. United States, 268 U. S. 435 , 268 U. S. 441 (1925); Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132 , 267 U. S. 159 -162 (1925); Stacey v. Emery, 97 U. S. 642 ,6 97 U. S. 45 (1878).
See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347 , 389 U. S. 354 -357 (1967); Berger v. New York, 388 U. S. 41 , 388 U. S. 54 -60 (1967); Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10 , 333 U. S. 13 -15 (1948); cf. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S. 471 , 371 U. S. 479 -480 (1963). See also Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U. S. 108 , 378 U. S. 110 -115 (1964).
I agree that petitioner was "seized" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. I also agree that frisking petitioner and his companions for guns was a "search." But it is a mystery how that "search" and that "seizure" can be constitutional by Fourth Amendment standards unless there was "probable cause" [ Footnote 2/1 ] to believe that (1) a crime had been committed or (2) a crime was in the process of being committed or (3) a crime was about to be committed.
The infringement on personal liberty of any "seizure" of a person can only be "reasonable" under the Fourth Amendment if we require the police to possess "probable cause" before they seize him. Only that line draws a meaningful distinction between an officer's mere inkling and the presence of facts within the officer's personal knowledge which would convince a reasonable man that the person seized has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a particular crime.
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S. 160 , 338 U. S. 175 .
Until the Fourth Amendment, which is closely allied with the Fifth, [ Footnote 2/4 ] is rewritten, the person and the effects of the individual are beyond the reach of all government agencies until there are reasonable grounds to believe (probable cause) that a criminal venture has been launched or is about to be launched.
The meaning of "probable cause" has been developed in cases where an officer has reasonable grounds to believe that a crime has been or is being committed. See, e.g., 70 U. S. 3 Wall. 155; Stacey v. Emery, 97 U. S. 642 ; Director General v. Kastenbaum, 263 U. S. 25 ; Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132 ; United States v. Di Re, 332 U. S. 581 ; Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S. 160 ; Draper v. United States, 358 U. S. 307 ; Henry v. United States, 361 U. S. 98 . In such cases, of course, the officer may make an "arrest" which results in charging the individual with commission of a crime. But while arresting persons who have already committed crimes is an important task of law enforcement, an equally if not more important function is crime prevention and deterrence of would-be criminals. "[T]here is no war between the Constitution and common sense," Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 , 367 U. S. 657 . Police officers need not wait until they see a person actually commit a crime before they are able to "seize" that person. Respect for our constitutional system and personal liberty demands in return, however, that such a "seizure" be made only upon "probable cause."
And see Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10 , 333 U. S. 14 -15; Wrightson v. United States, 95 U.S.App.D.C. 390, 393-394, 222 F.2d 556, 559-560 (1955).

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