Source: http://courts.mrsc.org/appellate/077wnapp/077wnapp0948.htm
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 01:13:33+00:00

Document:
THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent, v. JOELLEN EILEEN MORRIS, Appellant.
 Statutes – Construction – Legislative Intent – In General. A court interprets a statute by ascertaining and carrying out the legislative intent.
 Statutes – Construction – Meaning of Words – Statutory Definition – Effect. The meaning of a word in a statute is controlled by an applicable statutory definition.
 Statutes – Construction – Meaning of Words – Absence of Statutory Definition – Resort to Dictionary. In the absence of a statutory definition of a word, a court may use the commonly understood meaning of the word as set forth in dictionaries.
 Controlled Substances – Delivery – What Constitutes – Purchase. A person who purchases a controlled substance does not commit the crime of delivering a controlled substance (RCW 69.50.401(a)).
 Statutes – Construction – Acts Relating to Same Subject – In General. Related statutory provisions should be construed together.
 Controlled Substances – Delivery – Aiding and Abetting – Accomplice of Seller. A purchaser of a controlled substance is not criminally liable as an accomplice of the seller.
Nature of Action: Prosecution for delivering a controlled substance. The defendant had purchased cocaine from an undercover police informant.
Superior Court: The Superior Court for Cowlitz County, No. 93-1-00252-9, Don L. McCulloch, J., entered a judgment of guilty on August 17, 1993.
Court of Appeals: Holding that the defendant had not "delivered" a controlled substance, the court reverses the judgment.
Alfred Arthur Bennett, for appellant (appointed counsel for appeal).
James J. Stonier, Prosecuting Attorney, and Susan Irene Baur, Deputy, for respondent.
We hold that the indicia of legislative intent – the statutory definition of "deliver", the common meaning of "transfer", the consistent statutory distinction between delivery and mere possession, and uniformity of interpretation of the Uniform Act – all lead to the conclusion that a purchaser of controlled substances does not deliver. We reverse.
James Moloney, a confidential informer for the Cowlitz-Wahkiakum County Narcotics Task Force, posed as a drug dealer. Morris stipulated that she met with Moloney and purchased one-eighth ounce of cocaine from Moloney. Moloney then offered to sell an additional one-sixteenth of an ounce of cocaine to Morris, and she purchased the additional cocaine. Task force agents immediately arrested Morris. She was charged with two counts of delivery of controlled substances. Morris stipulated to the facts and that she was guilty of possession, but denied her guilt of delivery. The trial court found that the two sales should be considered as one and that Morris was guilty of delivery "by taking part in a delivery of a controlled substance".
«5» Rozner v. Bellevue, 116 Wn.2d 342, 347, 804 P.2d 24 (1991).
«6» Seattle v. Shepherd, 93 Wn.2d 861, 866, 613 P.2d 1158 (1980).
«7» American Legion Post 32 v. Walla Walla, 116 Wn.2d 1, 8, 802 P.2d 784 (1991).
«8» State v. Ramirez, 62 Wn. App. 301, 308-09, 814 P.2d 227 (1991), review denied, 118 Wn.2d 1010 (1992).
Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1968).
15. A conveyance, by sale, gift, or otherwise, of real or personal property, to another.
Random House Dictionary of the English Language (1967).
To convey or remove from one place, person, etc., to another; pass or hand over from one to another; specif., to make over the possession or control of (as, to transfer a title to land); sell or give.
«9» Marino Property Co. v. Port of Seattle, 88 Wn.2d 822, 833, 567 P.2d 1125 (1977).
[4, 5] Under these definitions, a person who buys drugs does not "transfer", and hence does not "deliver". The dictionaries define the verb "transfer" with active verbs describing the actions of a transferor, not the actions of a transferee – cause to pass, carry or take, convey or remove, pass or hand over, sell or give. These definitions all contemplate that a person who transfers undertakes the active task of relinquishing control to another. The person who takes control does not "transfer" or "deliver", but accepts the transfer or delivery.
«10» Compare RCW 69.50.401(a)(1)(i) with .401(d).
The more severe penalties for delivery demonstrate that the Legislature has distinguished between a drug seller and a drug possessor/user. We would erase, or at least blur, this legislative distinction if we treated the drug buyer identically with the drug seller. Most persons who possess drugs have purchased the drugs. It makes no sense to punish them far more severely if they are apprehended at the moment of purchase rather than at the later time of possession.
«13» "This chapter shall be so applied and construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law with respect to the subject of this chapter among those states which enact it." RCW 69.50.603.
«14» Compare RCW 69.50.101(f) with Uniform Controlled Substances Act § 101(f), 9 (pt. 2) U.L.A. 1, 11 (1988) and 21 U.S.C. § 802(8) (later amended to include not only transfer of "a controlled substance" but also of "a listed chemical").
«15» U.C.S.A. prefatory note, 9 U.L.A. at 2.
(1) The illegal traffic in drugs should be attacked with the full power of the Federal Government. The price for participation in this traffic should be prohibitive. It should be made too dangerous to be attractive.
(2) The individual abuser should be rehabilitated . . ..
«16» Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, H.R. No. 91-1444, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1437 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 4566, 4575.
Although Congress did not completely adopt the distinction between "the illegal traffic in drugs" and "small purchases and sales" by drug users, the disparate punishments for delivery and possession reflect the underlying premise that a person who delivers drugs is guilty of more reprehensible conduct than a person who merely purchases a small quantity of drugs. Washington's adoption of the identical definition of "deliver" implicates this basic philosophy, reinforcing our interpretation that a drug purchaser is not guilty of delivery.
«17» 92 Or. App. 223, 757 P.2d 1366 (1988).
«18» Frederickson, 92 Or. App. at 226.
«19» Frederickson, 92 Or. App. at 226.
«21» "This Uniform Act was drafted to achieve uniformity between the laws of the several States and those of the Federal government." U.C.S.A. prefatory note, 9 U.L.A. at 2.
«22» 10 F.3d 1374, 1418 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 330 (1994).
the Ninth Circuit ruled that a recipient of a drug delivery cannot be convicted of distribution. Distribute, under the federal act means "to deliver (other than by administering or dispensing) a controlled substance or a listed chemical." 21 U.S.C. § 802(11). In turn, "deliver" is defined as the actual, constructive or attempted transfer of a controlled substance. 21 U.S.C. § 802(8). Thus, the Ninth Circuit has, in effect, established that a buyer of a controlled substance does not transfer or deliver that substance.
«23» State v. Catterall, 5 Wn. App. 373, 486 P.2d 1167 (interpreting the now-repealed Dangerous Drug Act, RCW 69.40), review denied, 80 Wn.2d 1001 (1971); accord State v. Warnock, 7 Wn. App. 621, 622-23, 501 P.2d 625 (1972), review denied, 81 Wn.2d 1009 (1973).
«26» Sobrino v. State, 471 So. 2d 1333, 1335 (Fla. Ct. App. 1985); State v. McDaniel, 512 N.W.2d 305, 307-08 (Iowa 1994); State v. Stokoe, 224 Mont. 461, 465, 730 P.2d 415, 417-18 (1986); State v. Utterback, 240 Neb. 981, 990-91, 485 N.W.2d 760, 769-70 (1992); Robinson v. State, 815 S.W.2d 361, 363-64 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991); Wheeler v. State, 691 P.2d 599, 601-02 (Wyo. 1984).
«28» State v. Ramirez, 62 Wn. App. 301, 308-09, 814 P.2d 227 (1991), review denied, 118 Wn.2d 1010 (1992); State v. Grace, 61 Wn. App. 787, 812 P.2d 865, review denied, 117 Wn.2d 1019 (1991); State v. Matson, 22 Wn. App. 114, 587 P.2d 540 (1978).
«29» Ramirez, 62 Wn. App. at 303; Grace, 61 Wn. App. at 788-89; Matson, 22 Wn. App. at 116.
We agree and need not consider the liability of the procuring agent.
Morris's judgment and sentence are reversed.
SEINFELD, C.J., and MORGAN, J., concur.

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