Source: http://nh.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20180215_0000105.DNH.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 06:19:26+00:00

Document:
William Quin-Anthony Day, pro se Seth R. Aframe, Esq.
William Quin-Anthony Day, formerly an inmate at the Federal Correctional Institution in Berlin, New Hampshire (“FCI-Berlin”), has filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus (Doc. No. 1), pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, seeking to challenge: (1) the validity of the sentence imposed in his federal prosecution, which was based on the sentencing range for career offenders established under the advisory United States Sentencing Guidelines (hereinafter “Claim 1”); and (2) the failure of the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) to credit a total of 13 months and 14 days towards his federal sentence for time served from September 30, 2005 until November 1, 2005, and from April 29, 2006 until May 13, 2007 (hereinafter “Claim 2”). Before the court are: the respondent FCI-Berlin Warden's motion to dismiss (Doc. No. 8) Claim 1, challenging the validity of Day's enhanced sentence; and petitioner's motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 9), seeking relief on Claim 1. Neither party has moved for a ruling on Claim 2, Day's claims challenging the calculation of his sentence.
Day pleaded guilty in 2007 in the Middle District of North Carolina, to an indictment charging possession with intent to distribute 7.7 grams of cocaine base (“crack”) in September 2005, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B) (2005) (Count One); and possession of a firearm in furtherance of that drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i) (Count Two). See Apr. 2, 2007 Change of Plea H'g Tr., at 33, United States v. Day, No. 1:07-cr-32-1 (M.D. N.C. ) (“Criminal Case”) (ECF No. 27, docketed Sept. 22, 2008); see also Apr. 2, 2007 Plea Agt., Criminal Case (ECF No. 12). Day was advised by the sentencing court, at his change of plea hearing, that on Count One of the indictment, he would be sentenced to a minimum of five years, and could be sentenced to up to forty years in prison, and that the sentence range on Count Two of the indictment was five years to life. See Apr. 2, 2007 Change of Plea H'g Tr., at 27-28, 33 Criminal Case (ECF No. 27, docketed Sept. 22, 2008); see also 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(iii) (2005); 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A).
At the time of Day's sentencing, section 4B1.1 of the Advisory Guidelines provided, in pertinent part, that a defendant is a “career offender if . . . the defendant has at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense.” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a). Day's criminal history included four prior North Carolina drug crime convictions. The court deemed those convictions to be predicate controlled substance offenses, qualifying him for a career offender designation under § 4B1.1. Day was sentenced in July 2007 to an aggregate term of 262 months, consisting of a 202-month sentence on the drug charge (Count One), based on the career offender Guidelines range, followed by a consecutive sentence of 60 months on the firearms charge (Count Two). See Doc. No. 8-1, at 12-13 (July 3, 2007 Sent'g Proc'gs Tr., Criminal Case (ECF No. 28, docketed Sept. 22, 2008)); see also May 1, 2009 Report and Recommendation (“R&R”), at 13, Criminal Case (ECF No. 41), R&R approved, Oct. 27, 2009 Order, Criminal Case (ECF No. 45). The federal sentence was set to run consecutively to the state sentence that Day was then serving. See Aug. 9, 2007 Am. J., at 2, Criminal Case (ECF No. 18).
Day, who did not file a direct appeal of his conviction and sentence, filed his first post-conviction motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in 2008. The Middle District of North Carolina denied that motion in 2009. See Oct. 27, 2009 Order, Criminal Case (ECF No. 45). In 2010, Day moved for resentencing, under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), based on the reduction in the Guidelines sentencing range for crack cocaine, made retroactive by the United States Sentencing Commission. The sentencing court denied that motion, finding Day ineligible for resentencing because his final offense level was derived from the career offender Guideline, and was not dependent on the amount of cocaine base charged in Count One of the indictment. See July 13, 2011 Order, Criminal Case (ECF No. 62).
In 2014, Day filed a second § 2255 motion in his federal criminal case, arguing, in pertinent part, that none of his prior convictions qualified as a predicate for purposes of the Advisory Guidelines career offender provision, U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. Day withdrew that § 2255 motion before a ruling was issued on it, after the Fourth Circuit issued its decision in United States v. Foote, 784 F.3d 931 (4th Cir. 2015) (challenge to career offender designation was not cognizable in § 2255 motion, where none of petitioner's convictions had been vacated, he had been sentenced under Advisory Guidelines, and his sentence fell within permissible statutory range). Day thereafter filed the instant § 2241 petition, again challenging his career offender designation under the Advisory Guidelines (Claim 1), and adding Claim 2, asserting that the BOP miscalculated his sentence.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, the court where the federal prosecution occurred generally has exclusive jurisdiction over a federal inmate's post-conviction motions challenging the validity of his or her federal conviction or sentence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). Section 2255(e), known as the “savings clause, ” preserves a limited role for the court in the district where a federal inmate is incarcerated to consider a § 2241 petition challenging the validity of his or her detention. See United States v. Barrett, 178 F.3d 34, 49 (1st Cir. 1999). Day thus filed his § 2241 petition here, seeking to invoke this court's “savings clause” jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e).

References: § 2241
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 § 3582
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 § 2241
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