Source: http://lawtonlaw.com/appellate-navarette.php
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 14:55:48+00:00

Document:
PAUL J. NAVARETTE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. GINA E.HOLLAND, Defendant and Respondent.
n1 Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 976.1, this opinion is certified for publication with the exception of part II of the Discussion.
PRIOR HISTORY: APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County. No. 770663. J. Richard Haden, Judge.
DISPOSITION: Affirmed in part and reversed in part.
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Appellant ex-husband challenged a decision of the Superior Court of San Diego County (California), which sustained respondent ex-wife's demurrer on the ex-husband's defamation and intentional infliction causes of action on the grounds that the ex-wife's statements were privileged under Cal. Civ. Code § 47(b). The trial court further granted the ex-wife summary judgment on the ex-husband's malicious prosecution claim.
OVERVIEW: Before the couple divorced, the ex-wife accused the ex-husband of beating her. She told this to a neighbor, police officers, and attorneys. A jury found the ex-husband not guilty of spousal assault. After the couple divorced, the ex-husband brought this action. The trial court found that the ex-wife's allegedly false statements were absolutely privileged under Cal. Civ. Code § 47(b). On appeal, the court first held that it would no longer adhere to case law that declined to hold that statements made to police officers were absolutely privileged. The court found that the ex-wife's statements were privileged because they were made for the purpose of reporting alleged criminal conduct and/or pursuing criminal proceedings. The ex-husband's complaint did not allege sufficient facts to show that any of the ex-wife's allegedly false statements fell outside of § 47(b)'s privilege, but the ex-husband requested the opportunity to amend the complaint to allege that the ex-wife made statements to parties unconnected with the judicial proceeding. Assuming that the ex-husband was able to allege these facts in good faith, the court determined that he was entitled to amend the complaint.
OUTCOME: The court affirmed, after discussion in the unpublished portion of the opinion, the grant of summary judgment on the malicious prosecution claim. The court reversed on the remaining claims and directed the trial court to vacate the order granting the demurrer and grant the ex-husband's request for leave to amend the complaint.
COUNSEL: Cervantes & Associates and Lisa A. Cervantes for Plaintiff and Appellant.
JUDGES: HALLER, J.; Nares, Acting P. J., and O'Rourke, J., concurred..
OPINION: [**405] HALLER, J.--The plaintiff in this case was acquitted of spousal abuse charges in a prior criminal proceeding, and then sued his former wife alleging she lied to sheriff's deputies about his conduct. We conclude the wife's report to law enforcement officers was absolutely privileged (Civ. Code, § 47, subd. (b)), and thus the causes of action based on this allegation are barred. In so concluding, we determine this court's previous decision in Fenelon v. Superior Court (1990) 223 Cal. App. 3d 1476 [273 Cal. Rptr. 367][***2] is no longer supported by applicable authority and we therefore decline to follow it. In the unpublished portion of this opinion, we determine the trial court properly granted summary judgment on plaintiff's malicious prosecution cause of action.
We thus affirm the judgment on the malicious prosecution cause of action. We reverse on the remaining claims with directions[**406] to vacate the order granting the demurrer and to grant plaintiff's request for leave to amend the complaint to add allegations of false communications that were unconnected with the wife's report to law enforcement officers and prosecutors.
Paul Navarette and Gina Holland were married in March 1999. n2 Sixteen months later, the couple was in the process of moving out of their condominium when Gina called 911 from a neighbor's house to report that Paul had physically abused her. When sheriff's deputies arrived, they observed Gina had redness on her back, leg, and stomach, and a cut to her right wrist. Gina told the deputies that during an argument with her husband outside their home, "Paul got angry, grabbed [her] by the stomach and threw her to the ground. Paul then began to drag Gina down a flight[***3] of about (8) stairs, into the ... home. ... Paul [then] pushed/threw Gina into the first bedroom." Gina signed a report for a citizen's arrest.
n2 For convenience, we refer to the parties by their first names.
Based on Gina's statements and visible physical injuries, the deputies arrested Paul for domestic violence. At the ensuing criminal trial in which Paul was charged with spousal battery, Gina testified that Paul pulled her by the arm and dragged her during the argument, but she denied that Paul intentionally threw her down the stairs. Gina said that Paul appeared to have lost his balance and inadvertently dropped her to the ground. A jury found Paul not guilty of the charged offense.
After the couple divorced, Paul filed a civil action against Gina, claiming her initial statements to the neighbor, 911 operator, law enforcement officers, and district attorney employees were false and malicious. Paul sought to [*17]recover against Gina based on theories of defamation, intentional infliction of emotional[***4] distress, and malicious prosecution. The court sustained Gina's demurrer on the defamation and intentional infliction causes of action, finding each of Gina's alleged false statements was absolutely privileged under Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b). n3 The court further granted summary judgment on the malicious prosecution claim based on its determination that probable cause existed as a matter of law.
n3 All further statutory references are to the Civil Code unless otherwise specified.
(1a) Paul contends the trial court erred in sustaining the demurrer because Gina's alleged false statements fell outside section 47, subdivision (b)'s absolute privilege.
In examining this contention, we begin by describing the allegations of Paul's complaint, and assume the truth of those allegations. (See Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Lyons (2000) 24 Cal.4th 468, 515-516 [101 Cal. Rptr. 2d 470, 12 P.3d 720] .) We then set forth the law pertaining to the relevant scope of the privilege under section[***5] 47, subdivision (b). We then apply these legal principles to the allegations of the complaint. We conclude that although the defamation and intentional infliction claims are based solely on privileged statements, the trial court erred in rejecting Paul's request that he be permitted to amend his complaint to allege conduct that falls outside the privilege.
Shortly thereafter, Gina called 911 and told the operator that " 'My husband just dragged me from the front of the house to the back and he's hurt me real bad. I need someone to help keep my husband off me.'“ Gina was in the presence of her neighbor Juarez when she made the call. When San Diego County Sheriff's Deputy Ron Hauser arrived, Gina said her husband had been verbally abusive to her, and that he threw her on the ground, grabbed her by the stomach, dragged her down a flight of eight stairs, and then threw her into a bedroom.
Paul alleged these "accusations " [were] heard by third parties, including Officer Hauser, the 911 operator, and Christine Juarez. [The] accusations ... were false. [P] ... [Gina] [***7] falsely accused [Paul] of verbal and physical abuse by stating these accusations to several third parties. [Gina's] false accusations resulted in the improper arrest of Paul ... . Paul further alleged that "as a direct result of the false accusations" repeated by Gina to these individuals, district attorney employees, and "other as yet unknown third parties," Paul's "name and reputation was and continues to be severely damaged."
Under this high court authority, it is now well settled that section 47, subdivision (b) applies to statements made[***13] preliminary to, or in preparation for, either civil or criminal proceedings. (See Kashian v. Harriman , supra, 98 Cal.App.4th at p. 927; Wise v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., supra, 83 Cal.App.4th at p. 1303; Dove Audio, Inc. v. Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susman (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 777, 781 [54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 830]; Passman v. Torkan, supra, 34 Cal.App.4th at pp. 616-619.) Thus, the fact that a police report is not itself a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding does not preclude the application of an absolute privilege. Once a court concludes that a communication is made for the purpose of instituting a judicial proceeding, the communication is necessarily covered by section 47, subdivision (b)'s absolute privilege.
Paul contends he should nonetheless be entitled to pursue his lawsuit because he alleged that Gina made nonprivileged defamatory statements to uninvolved third parties, including to Juarez, Gina's neighbor. Gina counters that any statements she made to neighbor Juarez were privileged because those statements were an integral part of her reporting the physical abuse to the police.
We agree with Gina that if Paul is seeking to base his claims on statements made to Juarez immediately following the alleged abuse incident, they are also covered by the privilege. A communication made to report alleged wrongful activity to law enforcement officials is covered by the privilege, even if it is not made directly to a police officer or is overheard by others. (See Devis, supra, 65 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1007-1010.) Paul's complaint alleges that after he inadvertently dropped Gina down the stairs, Gina ran to Juarez's house to falsely report Paul's alleged abuse to the authorities. Viewing this allegation together with the police report incorporated into the complaint, Gina's statements to Juarez were an integral part of Gina's phone call to the police to report the alleged abuse[***16] and were in furtherance of that report. Thus, Gina's statements to Juarez were likewise protected by the privilege.
Paul alternatively argues that he has alleged or could allege that Gina made false and defamatory statements that were wholly unconnected with her report to the police or prosecutors.
[*22] With respect to Paul's argument that his complaint currently includes these allegations, we find this argument to be without merit. We have carefully reviewed the pleading and conclude that although there are some vague references to false statements made to third parties, it is unclear whether these statements were made by Gina to parties unrelated to the police report or criminal proceeding. (3) Although we must liberally construe allegations in a complaint and make all reasonable inferences favoring the plaintiff, it is not the duty of a court to ferret out necessary elements of a cause of action. A party must directly allege facts essential to maintaining the particular cause of action. (See 4 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1997) Pleading, § 355, pp. 455-456.) If the existence of a potential privilege is disclosed on the face of the complaint, the plaintiff must allege sufficient[***17] facts to show the privilege is inapplicable. (See Green v. Uccelli (1989) 207 Cal. App. 3d 1112, 1124 [255 Cal. Rptr. 315].) (1c) Paul's complaint does not allege sufficient facts to show any of Gina's allegedly false statements fell outside section 47, subdivision (b)'s absolute privilege. Thus, we conclude the trial court properly sustained the demurrer.
(4) However, in the trial court below, Paul requested that the court allow him to "amend [the complaint] to show more of the accusations by [Gina] that happened outside the judicial proceeding ... ” Specifically, Paul's counsel said, "the facts that we have alleged in the first verified complaint do state that there were third parties that defendant spoke to. And we do know who those third parties are. But we do need time to discover exactly what was [**411] said to the additional third parties. And that's why we request leave to amend."
A court abuses its discretion when it sustains a demurrer without leave to amend if there is a reasonable possibility the defect in the complaint can be cured by amendment. ( Chavez v. Whirlpool Corp. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 363, 369 [113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 175].) Paul requested the opportunity to amend[***18] his complaint to allege that Gina made defamatory statements to third parties unconnected with the judicial proceeding and unrelated to Gina's statements to law enforcement officers. If Paul can allege these facts in good faith, he is entitled to amend the complaint.
Gina argues that to permit such an amendment would be to grant Paul "license ... to conduct some sort of fishing expedition" to investigate whether Gina has ever made any false statements about Paul to third parties. However, if Paul does not have facts to support his claim that Gina made such false statements to third parties, he may not properly amend the pleading. Knowingly pleading facts that are factually unsupported may subject the parties and/or counsel to punishment for perjury, sanctions, or [*23] professional disciplinary action. We further emphasize that even if Paul properly amends the complaint to allege nonprivileged statements to third parties, Paul will not be entitled to recover damages resulting from the allegedly false police report or the ensuing criminal proceeding. Instead, any recoverable damages are limited to injuries flowing from any false statements Gina made to these third parties.
* See footnote 1, ante, page 13.
We affirm the judgment on the malicious prosecution claim. We reverse the portion of the judgment relating to the defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims. We order the court to vacate its order granting the demurrer and instead grant Paul leave to amend the complaint. The parties to bear their own costs on appeal.
Nares, Acting P. J., and O'Rourke, J., concurred.

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