Source: http://kirschenbaumesq.com/article/kingsbay-housing-co-section-1-inc-v-hoffman-61-ad2d-822-402-nys2d-57-nyad-2-dept-feb-21-1978
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 22:49:25+00:00

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Ronald HOFFMAN et al., Appellants.
Modified and, insofar as appealed from, affirmed.
to treat their motion to dismiss complaint as a motion for summary judgment.
CPLR 3211, 3211(a), pars. 2, 7, (c).
**58 Kenneth Kirschenbaum, Garden City, for appellants.
Before DAMIANI, J. P., and SUOZZI, RABIN and SHAPIRO, JJ.
complaint, granted summary judgment to plaintiff.
extended until 20 days after entry of the order to be made hereon.
of Special Term's intention to treat the motion as one for summary judgment.
the order and judgment insofar as it has been appealed from (see Rovello v.
Orofino Realty Co., 40 N.Y.2d 633, 389 N.Y.S.2d 314, 357 N.E.2d 970; Mareno v.
38 A.D.2d 713, 329 N.Y.S.2d 332; Brigham Park Co-op. Apts. Section No. 2 v.
Krauss, 21 N.Y.2d 941, 289 N.Y.S.2d 769, 237 N.E.2d 86; Linden Hill No. 2 Coop.
KINGSBAY HOUSING COMPANY, SECTION I, INC., Respondent,v.Ronald HOFFMAN et al., Appellants.
Action was instituted to enjoin defendants from violating an occupancy agreement with plaintiff. The Supreme Court, Kings County, Arthur S. Hirsch, J., denied defendants' motion to dismiss complaint and granted summary judgment to plaintiff, and defendants appealed. The Supreme Court, Appellate Division, held that trial court should not have entered summary judgment for plaintiff regardless of merits of case without first giving defendants adequate notice of its intention to treat their motion to dismiss complaint as a motion for summary judgment.
Trial court should not have entered summary judgment for plaintiff regardless of merits of case without first giving defendants adequate notice of its intention to treat their motion to dismiss complaint as a motion for summary judgment. CPLR 3211, 3211(a), pars. 2, 7, (c). **58 Kenneth Kirschenbaum, Garden City, for appellants.
Seavey, Fingerit & Vogel, New York City (Irwin K. Fingerit, New York City, of counsel), for respondent.
*822 In an action inter alia to enjoin defendants from violating their occupancy agreement with plaintiff, defendants appeal from so much of an order and judgment (one paper) of the Supreme Court, Kings County, dated October 24, 1977, as, upon denying their motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 to dismiss the complaint, granted summary judgment to plaintiff.
Order and judgment modified, on the law, by deleting the first decretal paragraph thereof. As so modified, order and judgment affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements. Defendants' time to answer is extended until 20 days after entry of the order to be made hereon.
Special Term, pursuant to CPLR 3211 (subd. (c)), decided to treat defendants-appellants' motion to dismiss the complaint under CPLR 3211 (subd. (a), pars. 2, 7), which was made prior to the service of their answer, as a motion for summary judgment. The court then granted summary judgment against defendants. However, it does not appear from this record that defendants were given adequate notice of Special Term's intention to treat the motion as one for summary judgment. Such notice is required and the failure to give it necessitates the reversal of the order and judgment insofar as it has been appealed from (see Rovello v. Orofino Realty Co., 40 N.Y.2d 633, 389 N.Y.S.2d 314, 357 N.E.2d 970; Mareno v. Kibbe, 32 A.D.2d 825, 302 N.Y.S.2d 324), even though it may well be that defendants have no defense on the merits (cf. Luna Park Housing Corp. v. Besser, 38 A.D.2d 713, 329 N.Y.S.2d 332; Brigham Park Co-op. Apts. Section No. 2 v. Krauss, 21 N.Y.2d 941, 289 N.Y.S.2d 769, 237 N.E.2d 86; Linden Hill No. 2 Coop. v. Leskowitz, 41 A.D.2d 741, 341 N.Y.S.2d 317, affd. 34 N.Y.2d 580, 354 N.Y.S.2d 946, 310 N.E.2d 543; Kings Bay Houses, Section Two v. Malkis, 50 A.D.2d 860, 377 N.Y.S.2d 982).

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