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Timestamp: 2019-04-22 04:04:42+00:00

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A jury's determination of damages is considered inviolate unless an award is so excessive as to shock the judicial conscience and raises an irresistible inference that passion, prejudice, corruption or other improper cause invaded the trial. Malandris v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 703 F.2d 1152, 1168 (10th Cir. 1981); Xiong v. Knight Transportation, Inc., 77 F.Supp.3d 1016, 1020-21 (D. Colo. 2014), aff'd sub nom. Pahoua Xiong v. Knight Transportation, Inc., 658 Fed.Appx. 884 (10th Cir. 2016). See also Blangsted v. Snowmass-Wildcat Fire Prot. Dist., 642 F.Supp.2d 1250, 1256 (D. Colo. 2009). A verdict will not be set aside on this basis, however, unless it is so plainly excessive as to suggest that it was the product of such passion or prejudice on the part of the jury. Id. Such bias, prejudice or passion can be inferred from excessiveness. Malandris, 703 F.2d at 1168. See also Fitzgerald v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 68 F.3d 1257, 1262 (10th Cir. 1995); Wells v. Colo. College, 478 F.2d 158, 162 (10th Cir. 1973). Focus should be on “whether the compensatory award was excessive in relation to the injury[.]” McInerney v. United Air Lines, Inc., 463 Fed.Appx. 709, 723 (10th Cir. 2011) (quoting Malandris, 703 F.2d at 1169; Fox v. Pittsburg State Univ., 257 F.Supp.3d 1112, 1150 (D. Kan. 2017)). Cases analyzing the grant of a new trial where damages shock the conscience with their excess recognize the principle that if the court determines that the verdict was the result of passion or prejudice, or for any other reason it appears that the jury erred or abused its discretion on not only on the issue of damages but also on the issue of liability, the court must unconditionally order a new trial and cannot give the plaintiff the option to accept a lesser amount. Malandris, 703 F.2d at 1168 (emphasis added). See also Minneapolis St. Paul and Sault Ste. Marie Ry. Co. v. Moquin, 283 U.S. 520, 521-22 (1931) (“In actions under the federal statute no verdict can be permitted to stand which is found to be in any degree the result of appeals to passion and prejudice.”); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 160 (1967) (“a verdict based on jury prejudice cannot be sustained even when punitive damages are warranted”). If the court finds that an irresistible inference that passion, prejudice, corruption or other improper cause invaded the trial, “then the court must order a new trial on all issues because it is impossible to determine the degree to which these factors affected the jury generally and therefore influenced the determination of liability.” Cook v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 564 F.Supp.2d 1189, 1201 (D. Colo. 2008), rev'd on other grounds, 618 F.3d 1127 (10th Cir. 2010). See also Higgs v. Dist. Ct., 713 P.2d 840, 860-61 (Colo. 1985); Malandris, 703 F.2d at 1168; Mason v. Texaco, Inc., 948 F.2d 1546, 1560 (10th Cir. 1991).

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