Source: https://www.docketalarm.com/cases/New_York_Southern_District_Court/1--11-cv-02794/Tymoshenko_et_al_v._Firtash_et_al/131/
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 10:29:11+00:00

Document:
`Ukrainian businessman Dmytro Firtash, several Ukrainian associates, and a number of U.S.
`and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968, as well as state law.
`amend their complaint for a fourth time.
`background. A more detailed discussion of this background can be found in Tymoshenko v.
`Firtash, 57 F. Supp. 3d 311, 314–319 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (Wood, J.) (“Tymoshenko II”).
`(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2013) (Wood, J.).
`issue of extraterritoriality. 57 F. Supp. 3d at 319.
`CMZ Ventures, LLC; The Dynamic Group; Brad S. Zackson; and Vulcan Properties, Inc.
`See [Dkt. No 121] (Manafort, et al.); [Dkt. No. 124] (Vulcan).
`Moving Defendants’ motions to dismiss. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
`arguments” made in the Manafort Defendants’ motion, Mem. of Law in Supp. (Vulcan) [Dkt. No. 125] at 3.
`Therefore the Court considers the motions together.
`with unfounded and malicious prosecutions that resulted in her imprisonment. Id. ¶¶ 4, 43.
`controlled by Firtash, and a number of U.S.-based corporations and U.S. citizens. See id. ¶ 65.
`opportunities at “grossly inflated” prices, id. ¶¶ 13, 150.
`issue in those proceedings and the scheme alleged here. See id. ¶¶ 133–36.
`plausible,” a district court must dismiss the complaint. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
`conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
`proximately caused Plaintiffs’ injuries. See Mem. of Law in Supp. (Manafort et al.) [Dkt. No.
`122]; Mem. of Law in Supp. (Vulcan) [Dkt. No. 125].3 The Court agrees.
`of the prior offenses. Id. § 1962(d).
`him, as he did in response to the AC and the SAC. See Mem. of Law in Supp. (Manafort et al.) [Dkt. No. 121] at 24.
`As in the two previous opinions, the Court resolves the motion without reaching Manafort’s jurisdictional argument.
`“personally committed or aided and abetted in the commission of two predicate acts.” Sanchez v.
`(emphasis added) (quoting McLaughlin v. Anderson, 962 F.2d 187, 192 (2d Cir. 1992)).
`plaintiff must also demonstrate that he has standing, which requires: (1) a violation of 18 U.S.C.
`F.3d 395, 400 (2d Cir. 1994); Sperber v. Boesky, 849 F.2d 60, 65 (2d Cir. 1988).
`and therefore fails to state a civil RICO claim.
`value (i.e. money or property) “in the victim’s hands.” Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S.
`the statements.’” Lefkowitz v. Reissman, No. 12 CIV. 8703, 2014 WL 925410, at *4 (S.D.N.Y.
`Mar. 7, 2014) (Abrams, J.) (quoting Moore v. PaineWebber, Inc., 189 F.3d 165, 173 (2d Cir.
`inadequate to establish any of these as a predicate act for RICO purposes. Id. at 321–22.
`civil RICO claim based on a predicate act of wire or mail fraud.
`Enterprise; and (3) the transfer of funds from the U.S. back to the Ukraine. 57 F. Supp. 3d at 323.
`not apply to all subsections of the international money laundering statute, in contrast to the domestic statute.
`1956(c), none of which encompasses the “skimming” conduct Plaintiffs describe.
`official.” 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7)(B)(iv).
`establish that the Defendants were involved.
`racketeering activity” requires “at least two acts of racketeering activity.” 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5).
`activity beyond the period during which the predicate acts were performed,” Cofacrédit, S.A. v.
`F.3d 286, 321 (2d Cir. 2001).
`and in what capacity. See Reply Mem. in Supp. [Dkt. No. 130] at 6.
`act focuses only on Plaintiff Tymoshenko.
`McLaughlin, 962 F.2d at 192.
`support their civil RICO claim.
`Plaintiffs also bring claims under state law alleging fraud and malicious prosecution.
`supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state law claims, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).
`not remedied the fundamental defects identified by this Court in Tymoshenko II.
`directed to close this case.

References: v.

 v. 
 § 1962
 v.

 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 1956
 § 1961
 v.

 § 1367