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Timestamp: 2019-04-25 02:48:49+00:00

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Although natural justice has an impressive ancestry and is said to express the close relationship between the common law and moral principles, the use of the term today is not to be confused with the "natural law" of the Canonists, the mediaeval philosophers' visions of an "ideal pattern of society" or the "natural rights" philosophy of the 18th century. Whilst the term natural justice is often retained as a general concept, in jurisdictions such as Australia,:583 and the United Kingdom,:320 it has largely been replaced and extended by the more general "duty to act fairly". Natural justice is identified with the two constituents of a fair hearing,:322 which are the rule against bias (nemo iudex in causa sua, or "no man a judge in his own cause"), and the right to a fair hearing (audi alteram partem, or "hear the other side").
A portrait of the Lord Chancellor, Lord Cottenham (Charles Pepys, 1st Earl of Cottenham, 1781–1851), by Charles Robert Leslie. In Dimes v Grand Junction Canal (1852), his Lordship was disqualified from hearing a case as he had a pecuniary interest in the outcome.
One form of imputed bias is based on the decision-maker being a party to a suit, or having a pecuniary or proprietary interest in the outcome of the decision. Once this fact has been established, the bias is irrebuttable and disqualification is automatic – the decision-maker will be barred from adjudicating the matter without the need for any investigation into the likelihood or suspicion of bias. A classic case is Dimes v Grand Junction Canal (1852), which involved an action between Dimes, a local landowner, and the proprietors of the Grand Junction Canal, in which the Lord Chancellor, Lord Cottenham, had affirmed decrees made to the proprietors. However, it was discovered by Dimes that Lord Cottenham in fact owned several pounds worth of shares in the Grand Junction Canal. This eventually led to the judge being disqualified from deciding the case. There was no inquiry as to whether a reasonable person would consider Lord Cottenham to be biased, or as to the circumstances which led Lord Cottenham to hear the case.
The real likelihood test centres on whether the facts, as assessed by the court, give rise to a real likelihood of bias. In R v Gough (1993), the House of Lords chose to state the test in terms of a "real danger of bias", and emphasized that the test was concerned with the possibility, not probability, of bias. Lord Goff of Chievely also stated that "the court should look at the matter through the eyes of a reasonable man, because the court in cases such as these personifies the reasonable man".:670 However, the test in Gough has been disapproved of in some Commonwealth jurisdictions. One criticism is that the emphasis on the court's view of the facts gives insufficient emphasis to the perception of the public. These criticisms were addressed by the House of Lords in Porter v Magill (2001). The Court adjusted the Gough test by stating it to be "whether the fair-minded and informed observer, having considered the facts, would conclude that there was a real possibility that the tribunal was biased".:494 This case therefore established the current test in the UK to be one of a "real possibility of bias".
In contrast, in Re Shankar Alan s/o Anant Kulkarni (2006), Judicial Commissioner Sundaresh Menon thought that there was a real difference between the reasonable suspicion and real likelihood tests.:101 In his opinion, suspicion suggests a belief that something that may not be provable could still be possible. Reasonable suggests that the belief cannot be fanciful. Here the issue is whether it is reasonable for the one to harbour the suspicions in the circumstances even though the suspicious behaviour could be innocent. On the other hand, likelihood points towards something being likely, and real suggests that this must be substantial rather than imagined. Here, then, the inquiry is directed more towards the actor than the observer. The issue is the degree to which a particular event is not likely or possible:99 Menon J.C. also disagreed with both Lord Goff in Gough and Phang J.C. in Tang Kin Hwa in that he thought the shift of the inquiry from how the matter might appear to a reasonable man to whether the judge thinks there is a sufficient possibility of bias was "a very significant point of departure".:103 The real likelihood test is met as long as the court is satisfied that there is a sufficient degree of possibility of bias. Although this a lower standard than satisfaction on a balance of probabilities, this is actually directed at mitigating the sheer difficulty of proving actual bias, especially given its insidious and often subconscious nature. The reasonable suspicion test, however, is met if the court is satisfied that a reasonable member of the public could harbour a reasonable suspicion of bias even though the court itself thought there was no real danger of this on the facts. The difference is that the driver behind this test is the strong public interest in ensuring public confidence in the administration of justice.:107–8 As of September 2011, the Court of Appeal of Singapore had not yet expressed a view as to whether the position taken in Tang Kin Hwa or Shankar Alan is preferable.
It has been suggested that the rule requiring a fair hearing is broad enough to include the rule against bias since a fair hearing must be an unbiased hearing. However, the rules are often treated separately. It is fundamental to fair procedure that both sides should be heard.:402 The right to a fair hearing requires that individuals are not penalized by decisions affecting their rights or legitimate expectations unless they have been given prior notice of the cases against them, a fair opportunity to answer them, and the opportunity to present their own cases.
In Ridge v Baldwin, Lord Reid reviewed the authorities extensively and attacked the problem at its root by demonstrating how the term judicial had been misinterpreted as requiring some additional characteristic over and above the characteristic that the power affected some person's rights. In his view, the mere fact that the power affects rights or interests is what makes it "judicial" and so subject to the procedures required by natural justice.:413–5 This removal of the earlier misconception as to the meaning of judicial is thought to have given the judiciary the flexibility it needed to intervene in cases of judicial review.
The mere fact that a decision-maker is conferred wide discretion by law is not reason enough for a weakening of the requirements of natural justice. In the United Kingdom context, this is demonstrated by Ahmed v H.M. Treasury (No. 1) (2010). The Treasury had exercised powers to freeze the appellants' financial assets and economic resources on the ground that it reasonably suspected the appellants were or might be persons who had committed, attempted to commit, participated in or facilitated the commission of terrorism, pursuant to the Terrorism (United Nations Measures) Order 2006 and the Al-Qaida and Taliban (United Nations Measures) Order 2006 made under the United Nations Act 1946. The Supreme Court of the United Kingdom held that since the Al-Qaida Order made no provision for basic procedural fairness, it effectively deprived people designated under the order the fundamental right of access to a judicial remedy and hence was ultra vires the power conferred by the United Nations Act 1946 for the making of the Order.
Article 6 does not, however, replace the common law duty to ensure a fair hearing. It has been suggested that Article 6 alone is not enough to protect procedural due process, and only with the development of a more sophisticated common law will the protection of procedural due process extend further into the administrative machine.:405 Nonetheless, Article 6 supplements the common law. For example, the common law does not impose a general duty to give reasons for a decision, but under Article 6(1) a decision-maker must give a reasoned judgment so as to enable an affected individual to decide whether to appeal.
Every person has the right to have a hearing and be allowed to present his or her own case.:582 Should a person not attend the hearing, even with adequate notice given, the adjudicator has the discretion to decide if the hearing should proceed. In Ridge v Baldwin, a chief constable succeeded in having his dismissal from service declared void as he had not been given the opportunity to make a defence. In another case, Chief Constable of the North Wales Police v Evans (1982), a chief constable required a police probationer to resign on account of allegations about his private life which he was given no fair opportunity to rebut. The House of Lords found the dismissal to be unlawful. Likewise in Surinder Singh Kanda v Federation of Malaya (1962), a public servant facing disciplinary proceedings was not supplied with a copy of a prejudicial report by a board of inquiry which the adjudicating officer had access to before the hearing. The Privy Council held that the proceedings had failed to provide him a reasonable opportunity of being heard.
Currently, the principles of natural justice in the United Kingdom and certain other jurisdictions do not include a general rule that reasons should be given for decisions. In R v Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal, ex parte Shaw (1951), Denning L.J. stated: "I think the record must contain at least the document which initiates the proceedings; the pleadings, if any; and the adjudication; but not the evidence, nor the reasons, unless the tribunal chooses to incorporate them. If the tribunal does state its reasons, and those reasons are wrong in law, certiorari lies to quash the decision.":352 It has been stated that "no single factor has inhibited the development of English administrative law as seriously as the absence of any general obligation upon public authorities to give reasons for their decisions".
^ Frederick F. Shauer (1976), "English Natural Justice and American Due Process: An Analytical Comparison", William and Mary Law Review, 18 (1): 47–72 at 47 .
^ See generally Bernard Schwartz (1953), "Administrative Procedure and Natural Law", Notre Dame Lawyer, 28 (2): 169 , cited in Shauer, "English Natural Justice and American Due Process", p. 51, n. 24.
^ a b c d Lord Woolf; Jeffrey Jowell; Andrew Le Sueur, eds. (2007), "Procedural Fairness: Introduction, History and Comparative Perspectives", De Smith's Judicial Review (6th ed.), London: Sweet & Maxwell, pp. 317–354 at 321, ISBN 978-0-421-69030-1 CS1 maint: Extra text: authors list (link).
^ J.R.S. Forbes (2006), "Natural Justice: General", Justice in Tribunals (2nd ed.), Sydney: The Federation Press, pp. 100–118 at 103, ISBN 978-1-86287-610-1 .
^ a b c d Kioa v West  HCA 81, (1985) 159 CLR 550 (18 December 1985), High Court (Australia).
^ David Phillip Jones; Anne S. de Villars (2009), "Natural Justice and the Duty to be Fair", Principles of Administrative Law (5th ed.), Carswell, pp. 208–223 at 209, ISBN 978-0-7798-2126-6 .
^ Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 1999 CANLII 699,  2 S.C.R. 817, Supreme Court (Canada).
^ a b c d Knight v. Indian Head School Division No. 19 1990 CANLII 138,  1 S.C.R. 653, S.C. (Canada).
^ a b Surinder Singh Kanda v Federation of Malaya  UKPC 2,  AC 322 at 337, Privy Council (on appeal from Malaya).
^ Lord Mackay of Clashfern, ed.-in-chief (2010), Halsbury's Laws of England, 61 (5th ed.), London: LexisNexis, para. 629, ISBN 978-1-4057-3424-0 .
^ See the "Right to a fair hearing" section below.
^ a b c Tang Kin Hwa v. Traditional Chinese Medicine Practitioners Board  SGHC 153,  4 S.L.R.(R.) [Singapore Law Reports (Reissue)] 604 at 610, para. 11, High Court (Singapore).
^ a b Metropolitan Properties Co (FGC) Ltd v Lannon  EWCA Civ 5,  1 QB 577, Court of Appeal (England and Wales).
^ R v Sussex Justices, ex parte McCarthy  1 KB 256 at 259, High Court (King's Bench) (England & Wales).
^ Chee Siok Chin v. Attorney-General  SGHC 153,  4 S.L.R.(R.) 541 at 547–548, para. 9, H.C. (Singapore).
^ a b c d e Dimes v Grand Junction Canal Proprietors (1852) 3 H.L. Cas. 759, 10 E.R. 301, House of Lords (UK).
^ R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 2)  UKHL 1,  1 AC 119 at 133, House of Lords (UK).
^ a b c Locabail (UK) Ltd v Bayfield Properties Ltd.  EWCA Civ 3004,  QB 451, Court of Appeal (England and Wales).
^ Ex parte Pinochet, pp. 132–133.
^ R v Rand (1866) LR 1 QB 230 at 233, High Court (Queen's Bench) (England & Wales).
^ a b R v Gough  UKHL 1,  AC 646, House of Lords (UK).
^ Webb v The Queen  HCA 30, (1994) 181 CLR 41, High Court (Australia).
^ a b Porter v Magill  UKHL 67,  2 AC 357, House of Lords (UK).
^ R v Liverpool City Justices, ex parte Topping  1 W.L.R. 119 at 123, High Court (Queen's Bench) (England & Wales).
^ Jeyaretnam Joshua Benjamin v. Lee Kuan Yew  1 S.L.R.(R.) 791 at 825–826, paras. 80–83, C.A.; Tang Liang Hong v. Lee Kuan Yew  3 S.L.R.(R.) 576 at 595–596, para. 46, C.A.
^ a b c d e Re Shankar Alan s/o Anant Kulkarni  SGHC 194,  1 S.L.R.(R.) 85, H.C. (Singapore).
^ Geoffrey A. Flick (1979), Natural Justice: Principles and Applications, London: Butterworths, pp. 138–139, ISBN 978-0-409-35260-3 .
^ Great Charte v Kennington (1795) 2 Str. 1173, 93 E.R. 1107.
^ Wakefield Local Board of Health v West Riding and Grimsby Rly. Co. (1865) L.R. 1 QB 84, High Court (Queen's Bench) (England & Wales).
^ R v Byles, ex parte Hollidge (1912) 77 J.P. 40.
^ a b c d e f g Wade, H.W.R.; Forsyth, C.F. (2009), Administrative Law (10th ed.), Oxford; New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press, p. 400, ISBN 978-0-19-921973-5 .
^ a b Allison v General Council of Medical Education and Registration  1 QB 750, Court of Appeal (England & Wales).
^ a b c d e Thio Li-ann (1999), "Law and the Administrative State", in Kevin Y[ew] L[ee] Tan (ed.), The Singapore Legal System (2nd ed.), Singapore: Singapore University Press, pp. 160–229 at 192–193, ISBN 978-9971-69-213-1 .
^ Ridge v Baldwin  UKHL 2,  AC 40, House of Lords (UK).
^ a b Cooper v Wandsworth Board of Works (1863) 14 C.B.N.S. 180, 143 E.R. 414, Court of Common Pleas (England). This was seen in cases such as Local Government Board v Arlidge  AC 120, House of Lords (UK); and R v Leman Street Police Station Inspector, ex parte Venicoff  3 KB 72, High Court (Kings Bench) (England & Wales).
^ a b R v Electricity Commissioners, ex parte London Electricity Joint Committee Co. (1920), Ltd.  1 KB 171, High Court (Kings Bench) (England & Wales).
^ See also Nicholson v. Haldimand-Norfolk Regional Police Commissioners 1978 CANLII 24,  1 S.C.R. 311, S.C. (Canada).
^ M. Sornarajah. "Natural Justice, Fairness and Administrative Functions" (PDF). (1977) 5(3) University of Tasmania Law Review 268 at 269.
^ Ahmed v Her Majesty's Treasury  UKSC 2,  2 AC 534, Supreme Court (UK).
^ Terrorism (United Nations Measures) Order 2006 (S.I. 2006 No. 2657).
^ Al-Qaida and Taliban (United Nations Measures) Order 2006 (S.I. 2006 No. 2952).
^ United Nations Act 1946 (1946 c. 45), s. 12.
^ See, for instance, Ahmed, p. 685, para 246, per Lord Mance J.S.C.
^ Art. 6(3) sets out some of the requirements of the right to a fair hearing, but only in the context of criminal proceedings.
^ Hadjianastassiou v Greece  ECHR 78, (1992) 16 E.H.R.R. 219, European Court of Human Rights.
^ a b c d e f Timothy Endicott (2009), Administrative Law, New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press, p. 110, ISBN 978-0-19-927728-5 .
^ a b R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Doody  UKHL 8,  1 AC 531 at 560, House of Lords (UK).
^ Chief Constable of the North Wales Police v Evans  UKHL 10,  1 W.L.R. 1155, House of Lords (UK).
^ a b R. (Morgan Grenfell & Co Ltd) v Special Commissioner of Income Tax  EWCA Civ 329,  2 W.L.R. 255 at 286, para. 47, Court of Appeal (England and Wales).
^ a b Lloyd v McMahon  1 AC 625, House of Lords (UK).
^ Kay Swee Pin v. Singapore Island Country Club  2 S.L.R.(R.) 802 at 806, para. 7.
^ a b c d e Secretary of State for the Home Department v AF  UKHL 28,  2 AC 269, House of Lords (UK).
^ A v United Kingdom  ECHR 301, (2009) 49 E.H.R.R. 625, E.C.H.R.
^ Tan Boon Chee David v. Medical Council of Singapore [1979–1980] S.L.R.(R.) 523, H.C. (Singapore).
^ Re Teo Choo Hong  2 S.L.R.(R.) 441, H.C. (Singapore).
^ Howe Yoon Chong v Chief Assessor [1977–1978] S.L.R.(R.) 386, H.C. (Singapore).
^ Front Row Investment Holdings (Singapore) Pte. Ltd. v. Daimler South East Asia Pte. Ltd.  SGHC 80 at para. 31, H.C. (Singapore); see also R v Industrial Injuries Commissioner, ex parte Howarth (1968) 4 K.I.R. 621; Kay Swee Pin, p. 806, para. 7: "[I]f a tribunal, after the close of the hearing, comes into possession of further evidence, the party affected should be invited to comment upon it".
^ a b SEF Construction Pte. Ltd. v. Skoy Connected Pte. Ltd.  1 S.L.R. 733 at 757, para. 58.
^ Kok Seng Chong v. Bukit Turf Club  3 S.L.R.(R.) 772, H.C. (Singapore).
^ a b R v Secretary of State for Home Department, ex parte Tarrant  1 QB 251, Divisional Court (England & Wales).
^ Doresamy v. Public Services Commission  2 Malayan Law Journal 127, High Court (Malaysia).
^ Ho Paul v. Singapore Medical Council  2 S.L.R.(R.) 780, H.C. (Singapore).
^ a b Rajeevan Edakalavan v. Public Prosecutor  1 S.L.R.(R.) 10, H.C. (Singapore).
^ Re Siah Mooi Guat  2. S.L.R.(R.) 165 at 178–179, para. 34, H.C. (Singapore).
^ a b R v Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal, ex parte Shaw  1 KB 338, Court of Appeal (England & Wales).
^ Keith Frank Goodfellow (1971), Administration under Law: A Report by JUSTICE, London: Stevens, p. 23, ISBN 978-0-420-43710-5 .
Kioa v West  HCA 81, (1985) 159 CLR 550 (18 December 1985), High Court (Australia).
Knight v Indian Head School Division No 19 1990 CANLII 138,  1 S.C.R. 653, Supreme Court (Canada).
Locabail (UK) Ltd v Bayfield Properties Ltd  EWCA Civ 3004,  QB 451, Court of Appeal (England and Wales).
Tang Kin Hwa v Traditional Chinese Medicine Practitioners Board  SGHC 153,  4 S.L.R.(R.) [Singapore Law Reports (Reissue)] 604, High Court (Singapore).
Thio, Li-ann (1999), "Law and the Administrative State", in Kevin Y[ew] L[ee] Tan (ed.), The Singapore Legal System (2nd ed.), Singapore: Singapore University Press, pp. 160–229, ISBN 978-9971-69-213-1 .
Wade, H.W.R; Forsyth, C.F. (2009), Administrative Law (10th ed.), Oxford; New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press, pp. 369–470, ISBN 978-0-19-921973-5 .
Lord Woolf; Jowell, Jeffrey; Le Sueur, Andrew, eds. (2007), "Procedural Fairness: Introduction, History and Comparative Perspectives", De Smith's Judicial Review (6th ed.), London: Sweet & Maxwell, pp. 317–354, ISBN 978-0-421-69030-1 CS1 maint: Extra text: authors list (link).
Chen, Siyuan; Leo, Lionel (2008), "Natural Justice: A Case for Uniform Rigour: Ho Paul v Singapore Medical Council  2 SLR 780; Kay Swee Pin v Singapore Island Country Club  2 SLR 802" (PDF), Singapore Academy of Law Journal, 20: 820–833, archived from the original (PDF) on 27 September 2011 .
Singh Rathore, Aakash, Introduction to Natural Justice] .
Maher, Gerry (1986), "Natural Justice as Fairness", in MacCormick, Neil; Birks, Peter, eds. (eds.), The Legal Mind: Essays for Tony Honoré, Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 103–120, ISBN 978-0-19-876196-9 CS1 maint: Extra text: editors list (link).
This page was last edited on 12 January 2019, at 04:21 (UTC).

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