Source: https://cbaclelegalconnection.com/tag/crim-p-35/page/2/
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 18:56:08+00:00

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The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People v. Morones-Quinonez on Thursday, November 5, 2015.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel—Advising of Immigration Consequences.
Defendant was charged with one count of criminal possession of a forged instrument and one count of criminal impersonation after officers conducting a traffic stop discovered a false identification card in her possession. She hired a lawyer whose practice focused on immigration and criminal law to represent her in both the criminal case and the removal proceedings that had been subsequently initiated.
Defendant alleged in her Crim.P. 35(c) motion that she was adamantly opposed to accepting any plea offer that would make her ineligible for relief from deportation. Her lawyer recommended she plead guilty to criminal impersonation, assuring her that she would be “just fine” in immigration court because it was “minor felony” and would not affect her immigration case. Defendant pleaded guilty to criminal impersonation and was later order deported by an immigration law judge. She filed this Crim.P. 35(c) motion, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. She contended that if she had been properly advised, she would have rejected the plea and proceeded to trial. The district court denied the motion without a hearing.
Defendant was entitled to a hearing so long as she asserted facts in her post-conviction motion that, if true, would provide a basis for relief. Applying the two-prong test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the Court of Appeals examined whether defendant showed that (1) counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) a reasonable probability exists that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the defendant.
The Court found that defendant had sufficiently pleaded deficient performance by her counsel. The Court disagreed that the district court could find as a matter of law that defendant’s allegation of prejudice was insufficient. It also found that the district court’s advisement did not cure any potential prejudice from the lawyer’s advice. Accordingly, the order was reversed and the case was remanded for an evidentiary hearing.
The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People v. Pendleton on Thursday, October 22, 2015.
Retrospective Competency Determination—Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.
Defendant gave birth in a public restroom and discarded her newborn son in the trash, where he was later found dead. In exchange for accepting a plea to the child abuse charge, the prosecution dismissed the murder charge and agreed to a sentencing range of between 16 and 40 years in prison. The trial court accepted the agreement and sentenced defendant to 40 years in prison. Almost three years later, defendant filed a motion for post-conviction relief under Crim.P.35(c), seeking to withdraw her plea. The motion was denied.
On appeal, defendant claimed that the post-conviction court erred when it retrospectively determined that she was competent at the time she entered her guilty plea. The Court of Appeals disagreed, finding that (1) the nature of defendant’s post-conviction claims made it necessary for the post-conviction court to evaluate defendant’s competency at the time of her plea; (2) the court had enough information to make a retrospective competency determination; and (3) the record supported the finding that defendant was competent. The Court also rejected defendant’s argument that her guilty plea was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent, because this claim hinged on defendant’s contention that she was not competent when she entered her plea.
Defendant also argued that the post-conviction court erred when it denied her motion for post-conviction relief on the ground that her plea counsel was ineffective. Defendant’s claim failed because she did not show both deficient performance and prejudice. Counsel’s advice to defendant to abandon her insanity defense in favor of the plea offer, as well as decisions counsel made regarding investigation of the case and defenses, did not fall outside the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Further, counsel argued effectively on defendant’s behalf at the sentencing hearing. The order was affirmed.
The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People v. Duran on Thursday, October 8, 2015.
Adequate Record on Appeal—Trial Transcripts—Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.
Duran was convicted of kidnapping, sexual assault, menacing, stalking, and violation of a protective order. He filed a post-conviction motion, arguing that he had received ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. The motion was denied without a hearing. Duran then filed a timely notice of appeal but did not include transcripts in the appellate record.
The People argued that because the trial transcripts were not included in the appellate record, the Court of Appeals must assume they would support the trial court’s order and affirm. To prove ineffective assistance of counsel, Duran needed to show that counsel’s performance was deficient and that he was prejudiced by counsel’s errors. In ruling on Duran’s motion, the trial court properly relied on its review of the trial record. Therefore, without an adequate record on appeal, it must be presumed that the court’s order was correct. The trial court’s order rejecting these claims was affirmed.
The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People v. Martinez-Huerta on Thursday, May 21, 2015.
Crim.P. 35(c)—Immigration—Ineffective Assistance of Counsel—Affirmative Advice—Justifiable Excuse—Justifiable Neglect.
In April 2007, defendant, a citizen of Mexico and a lawful permanent resident of the United States, pleaded guilty to vehicular eluding, a class 5 felony. At that time, he also admitted to violating the terms of his deferred judgment and sentence on an unrelated 2006 felony. In July 2007, the court sentenced him in both cases. In August 2013, defendant was placed into removal proceedings pursuant to § 237(a)(2)(A)(ii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as a noncitizen who, after admission, was convicted of two crimes involving moral turpitude not arising out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct. He was ordered removed from the United States in December 2013. In 2014, defendant filed a Crim.P. 35(c) motion seeking to withdraw his guilty plea, alleged ineffective assistance of plea counsel because his defense attorney assured him that a conviction would not have any immigration consequences. The trial court summarily denied his Crim.P. 35(c) motion as time barred. Defendant appealed.
When a defendant alleges that the untimely filing of a Crim.P. 35(c) motion resulted from a reasonable reliance on plea counsel’s affirmative but erroneous advice about the immigration consequences of the plea, causing the defendant to neglect to pursue timely collateral relief, the defendant is entitled to ahearing on the issue of justifiable excuse or excusable neglect. Therefore, the order was reversed and the case was remanded for a hearing on the merits of defendant’s Crim.P. 35(c) motion.
The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People v. Romero on Thursday, February 12, 2015.
Crim.P. 35(c)—Ineffective Assistance of Counsel—Fifth Amendment—Sixth Amendment—Right to Counsel—Competency—Prosecutorial Misconduct.
Romero was convicted of first-degree murder for shooting A.S. He was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. He filed a motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to Crim.P. 35(c), which was denied without a hearing.
On appeal, Romero contended that attorney F.G. ineffectively assisted him during his police interview when he failed to advise Romero of the consequences of submitting to police interrogation and a polygraph test. Romero’s Fifth Amendment right to counsel had not attached because the police interview was not custodial. Romero’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel had also not attached because Romero had not yet been charged. Accordingly, Romero’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim with regard to F.G.’s pre-indictment representation failed.
Romero contended that F.G. ineffectively assisted him during trial because F.G. visited Romero in jail and improperly advised him. Because F.G. did not represent Romero during any critical stages of the case, did not help him prepare his defense, and did not otherwise appear on his behalf, the constitutional guarantee of effective assistance did not apply. Accordingly, Romero’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim with regard to F.G.’s post-indictment advice also failed.
Romero further contended that D.J. and R.C. ineffectively assisted him when they (1) allowed him to be tried while incompetent, and (2) failed to object contemporaneously to alleged prosecutorial misconduct at trial. The record reflects that defense counsel raised the issue of Romero’s competency numerous times, and the court made adequate rulings on the record each time. In regard to Romero’s claims of prosecutorial misconduct, even assuming that the prosecutor’s statements were improper and that counsel’s failure to object constituted deficient performance, Romero failed to allege facts demonstrating prejudice. Therefore, the post-conviction court did not err in dismissing these claims without an evidentiary hearing. The order was affirmed.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued its opinion in United States v. Baker on Tuesday, October 28, 2014.
Defendant Frederick Baker and co-defendant Mark Akins were indicted on a fraudulent investment scheme. The trials were separate, and Baker was eventually sentenced to 41 months’ imprisonment, the low end of the Guidelines range. Three weeks after sentencing, Baker met with prosecutors and provided them information about his and Akins’ role in the fraud and offered to testify against Akins. An assistant U.S. attorney told Baker he would recommend a sentence reduction to the court based on Baker’s proffered information. Twice during the year following his sentencing, Baker and his attorney asked the government to file a Crim. P. 35(b) motion for sentence reduction. The government did not do so, instead waiting until the completion of Akins’ restitution, which fell outside Rule 35(b)’s one year time limit for requests for sentence reduction. Eventually, the government did petition the district court for a sentence reduction under Rule 35(b)(2)(B), but the district court denied the motion as time-barred. Baker appealed.
The Tenth Circuit examined Rule 35(b), which allows the government to petition the court within one year of sentencing for a sentence reduction for defendants who provide information that materially assists the government. The government filed its motion under 35(b)(2)(B), which allows an exception for the one-year time bar for defendants whose information did not become useful until after the expiration of the one-year period. In its motion, the government said that Baker’s information was useful both before and after the expiration of the one-year period, but the district court found that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the motion due to Rule 35’s one-year time bar. The Tenth Circuit, though sympathetic to Baker, could find no reason to reverse the district court’s finding. The ruling was affirmed.

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