Source: https://www.rhodeislandpersonalinjuryattorneyblog.com/massachusetts-workers-compensation-richard-famiglietti-v-city-of-lynn-school-department/
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 04:27:56+00:00

Document:
The case was heard by Administrative Judge Preston.
COSTIGAN, J. The self-insurer appeals from the administrative judge’s denial of its complaint to discontinue payment of benefits. The self-insurer argues the judge erred in his adoption of the § 11A impartial medical examiner’s opinion and improperly adopted conflicting medical evidence. Although the judge’s subsidiary findings could have been more carefully crafted, any error is harmless. Therefore, we affirm the decision.
[T]he employee sustained a workplace low back personal injury arising out of and in the course of his employment with the City of Lynn on December 17, 2003. I accept his credible testimony regarding this previous workplace accident that happened prior to this accepted March 21, 2006 incident. I am satisfied that the Employer had timely notice of the 2003 event. .
This accepted injury was on top of a previous work-related injury. Accordingly, the Employee does not have to prove more than “as is” causal relationship. The Insurer’s defense of § 1(7A), regarding a pre-existing condition, does not contain the factual predicates and does not have the legs to stand on. Nonetheless, the Employee’s incapacity since the Insurer’s request remains complete from that date forward through the hearing.
The self-insurer argues, and the employee acknowledges, the judge erred when he stated he adopted the impartial physician’s opinion on causal relationship. (Self-ins. br. 5; Employee br. 2.) Dr. Hewson expressed no causal relationship opinion. We agree with the employee, however, that the error is harmless, given the judge’s adoption of Dr. Lee’s causal relationship opinion. (Dec. 5.) It matters not that Dr. Lee opined the employee’s 2006 work injury was “a major” cause of his disability, as required by § 1(7A), because the judge found that statute inapplicable to the employee’s claim. It stands to reason simple “as is” causation is necessarily met by an opinion satisfying the higher “a major” causation standard under § 1(7A).
Lastly, the self-insurer argues the judge’s decision is arbitrary and capricious because he adopted conflicting medical opinions on disability, and his finding of total disability is inconsistent with the medical evidence he adopted. We disagree. Even accepting the premise proffered by the self-insurer that Dr. Hewson, the impartial physician, considered the employee unable to return to his former employment, but not totally disabled from all gainful employment, the judge’s finding of total incapacity, against the backdrop of only partial medical disability opinions, was amply supported by his own his belief of the employee’s testimony concerning his pain and physical restrictions. Mahoney v. City of Boston Police Dept., 18 Mass. Workers’ Comp. Rep. 127 (2004); Cugini v. Town of Braintree School Dept., 17 Mass. Workers’ Comp. Rep. 262 (2003); Reynolds v. Kay Bee Toys, 16 Mass. Workers’ Comp. Rep. 433 (2002); Anderson v. Anderson Motor Lines, 4 Mass. Workers’ Comp. Rep. 65 (1990). See also Scheffler’s Case, 419 Mass. 251 (1994), and Brown v. Northeast Underpinnings, Inc., 22 Mass. Workers’ Comp. Rep. 329, 331 (208), aff’d sub nom. Brown’s Case, 2009-P-119, Memorandum and Order pursuant to Rule 1:28 (December 31, 2009).
Accordingly, we affirm the judge’s decision. Pursuant to § 13A(6), the self-insurer shall pay employee’s counsel a fee in the amount of $1,497.28.

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