Source: http://www.mhla.co.uk/category/legal-updates/page/2/
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 22:34:37+00:00

Document:
Sentence appeal case. R v Ahmed (2012) EWCA Crim 99, (2012) MHLO 178 — (1) The appellant sought a s37/41 restricted hospital order in place of an IPP sentence. (2) The Responsible Clinician argued for a s45A hybrid order, for reasons summarised by the court as follows: ‘The appellant is an illegal immigrant. In order to be discharged from hospital he would have to undergo a period of controlled supervision. This would be in appropriate accommodation. Dr Swinton tells us that this is not an option open to an illegal immigrant like the appellant. Thus he cannot be discharged into the community because he cannot undertake the necessary conditioning which would satisfy the hospital that he was safe to be left in the community on his own. As a consequence he has to remain in hospital and he will take up a bed, apparently permanently. This is damaging to the wider public interest. If a section 45A order were made, then although the appellant would receive precisely the same treatment under a section 47 transfer as he currently does, a discharge can be effected by sending the appellant back to prison where the relevant supervision can be provided.’ (3) The Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence and, considering the appellant to be an ill man needing treatment rather than a criminal needing punishment, imposed a restricted hospital order.
Criminal case. R v Nightingale (2012) EWCA Crim 2734, (2012) MHLO 167 — The appellant, having pleaded guilty to possession of (a) a Glock 9mm pistol and (b) the following live ammunition: 122 x 9mm, 40 x 7.62mm, 50 x 9mm (frangible), 50 x .338 (armour piercing), 2 x .308, 74 x 5.56mm, had been sentenced to 18 months for the Glock and 6 months concurrently for the ammunition. On appeal against sentence, as ‘these offences were committed in exceptional circumstances by an exemplary soldier’, this was reduced to 12 months, suspended for 12 months.
Capacity case (ASBO). Pender v DPP (2013) MHLO 12 (QBD) — An ASBO was imposed with a ‘no begging’ condition. An appeal, based on uncontradicted medical evidence (that the appellant suffered learning difficulties, schizophrenia and severe nicotine addiction, and that begging was the manifestation of nicotine addiction), was unsuccessful. The Court of Appeal allowed an appeal by way of case stated, because the judge had failed to set out the factual basis for her factual conclusion (which was contrary to the medical evidence) that the appellant had been capable of complying with the ASBO.
Legislation. Mental Health (Discrimination) Act 2013 — This Act: (1) repeals, from 28/4/13, s141 MHA 1983 so that the seat of an MP is no longer vacated upon long-term detention under the Act; (2) amends, on a date to be appointed, the Juries Act 1974 so that (in addition to the existing category of those lacking capacity) only those liable to be detained under the MHA are excluded from jury service (see jury service page for current provisions); (3) amends, from 28/4/13, the Companies (Model Articles) Regulations 2008 so that a person no longer ceases to be a director when ‘by reason of that person’s mental health, a court makes an order which wholly or partly prevents that person from personally exercising any powers or rights which that person would otherwise have’.
Legal Aid legislation. Civil Legal Aid (Remuneration) Regulations 2013/422 — Payment rates for legal fees and independent experts. No change to MH legal fees. Some changes to independent expert maximum hourly rates, including: (a) psychiatrist is £135 in any area (previously £90 in London); (b) psychologist is £117 in any area (previously £90 in London). The previous rates continue to apply to cases started after 3/10/11 but before 1/4/13. In force 1/4/13.
Upper Tribunal case. AC v Partnerships in Care Ltd (2012) UKUT 450 (AAC), (2012) MHLO 163 — AC appealed against the tribunal’s rejection of his application for a notification under s74 that, if subject to a s37/41 hospital order rather than a s47/49 prison transfer direction, he would be entitled to a conditional discharge. (1) The tribunal failed to explain why it rejected Dr Kahtan’s independent evidence which supported discharge: (a) although it stated that the RC had more experience of the patient, this is not of itself a reason for preferring evidence but rather is the background to almost every case, and it does not always follow that greater knowledge means greater insight; (b) the tribunal’s criticisms of Dr Kahtan’s evidence on the link between the index offences and AC’s mental state did not necessarily undermine his views on discharge. (2) The tribunal was right not to consider the conditions which might be imposed by the Parole Board (and any consequent diminution of risk on release) and only to consider conditions possible with a conditional discharge: (a) the tribunal’s statutory function is limited to considering discharge from the scope of the Act; (b) it is true that the tribunal should take into account the practical reality, as in a case where release into the community is impossible and prison is the only alternative (Abu-Rideh), but this reasoning does not apply to a case such as AC’s because it is unknown whether the Parole Board will release or what conditions it might impose.
COP medical case. Re P (hunger strike) (2013) MHLO 4 (COP) — (1) The press has reported this case as follows: (a) P came to the UK on a six-month visa to learn English but refused to leave, asylum having been refused twice; (b) he stopped eating in May 2012 in protest at the UKBA’s refusal to return his passport unless he returns to Iran; (c) an NHS Trust in the South-east of England is seeking to force-feed him on the basis that he lacks capacity because of a delusional disorder. (2) The case is ongoing and a reserved judgment is expected by mid-February 2013.
COP medical case. Re AW (Permanent Vegetative State); The NHS Trust v AW (2013) EWHC 78 (COP), (2013) MHLO 3 — AW was in a permanent vegetative state, having suffered a spontaneous, severe intra-cerebral haemorrhage in 2008. The NHS Trust responsible for AW’s care sought a declaration that it would be lawful and in her best interests to withdraw active medical treatment, including specifically artificial nutrition and hydration, even though this would lead to AW’s death. The application was supported by AW’s family, by all the medical staff who looked after her, by the evidence of the expert witnesses provided reports, and by the Official Solicitor on behalf of AW herself. (1) The judge’s findings were as follows: (a) AW is in a permanent vegetative state; (b) there will be no change or improvement in her condition; (c) there is no treatment available which could confer any benefit and that accordingly her treatment regime is futile; and (d) he suffering caused by withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration will be managed by appropriate use of pain relief in accordance with the plan that has been created for AW. (2) The following declarations were made: (a) AW lacks capacity to litigate in these proceedings or to make decisions about the medical treatment she should receive, including as to the withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration and other life-sustaining treatment; (b) it is lawful and in AWs best interests for life-sustaining treatment in the form of artificial nutrition and hydration to be withdrawn; and (c) it is in AW’s best interests to receive such treatment and nursing care as may be appropriate to ensure that she retains the greatest dignity until her life ends. (3) By agreement, the NHS Trust was ordered to pay half of the costs of the Official Solicitor, to be subject to detailed assessment if not agreed.
COP medical case. Re P (abortion) (2013) MHLO 1 (COP) — The press has reported this case as follows: (1) The solicitor who was one of P’s deputies queried whether P had capacity in relation to whether to continue with her pregnancy or have an abortion. (2) Hedley J held that she manifestly lacked litigation capacity but did have capacity in relation to continuing the pregnancy. (3) Generally courts and health officials should not try to decide whether P would be able to bring up a child but should instead concentrate solely on whether the pregnancy itself is in her best interests (the reasoning being that once a child is born, if the mother does not have the ability to care for a child, society has perfectly adequate processes to deal with that). (4) The judge also stated that ‘[t]he purpose of [mental capacity legislation] is not to dress an incapacitated person in cotton wool but to allow them to make the same mistakes that all other human beings are able to make and not infrequently do’.
Community care case. R (Cornwall Council) v SSH (2012) EWHC 3739 (Admin), (2012) MHLO 162 — PH was a young man born with significant learning and physical disabilities. The Secretary of State decided that when he turned 18 he was ordinarily resident under the NAA 1948 in Cornwall, where his parents lived, despite his physical presence elsewhere. The court held that the Secretary of State had lawfully applied the test in Vale relevant to a person who is so severely handicapped as to be totally dependent upon a parent or guardian (termed ‘test 1’ in the guidance), which states that such a person is in the same position as a small child and his ordinary residence is that of his parents or guardian because that is his base.
Sentence appeal case. R v Fletcher (2012) EWCA Crim 2777, (2012) MHLO 161 — IPP sentence quashed and a restricted hospital order substituted in its place: the judge had not properly been informed as to the appellant’s mental state, because the original reports focussed on mental illness (which the appellant did not suffer from) rather than learning disability (which he did).
Employment case. West London MH NHS Trust v Dr Chhabra (2013) EWCA Civ 11, (2013) MHLO 2 — (1) Various complaints had been made against Dr Chhabra, including in relation to breaches of patient confidentiality, and the case investigator’s report stated that Dr Chhabra admitted to reading CPA notes and dictating reports on public transport. (2) Upon reading the case investigator’s report the case manager decided to convene a disciplinary panel to consider the following allegations and to consider them as potential gross misconduct which could lead to dismissal: (a) that Dr Chhabra breached patient confidentiality whilst reading notes and discussing patients whilst on public transport (the complaint being made by another passenger who happened to be Head of Secure Services Policy at the Department of Health); (b) that she undertook dictation on at least two occasions whilst completing Mental Health Tribunal reports whilst on public transport (the complaint being made by a member of secretarial staff); (c) that whilst travelling to work on public transport she would often call her secretary to discuss patient related matters breaching confidentiality (the complaint being made by her PA). (3) The High Court had made a declaration and injunction the effect of which were to prevent a disciplinary panel from investigating these complaints as matters of gross misconduct and under the terms of its disciplinary policy. (4) The Court of Appeal overturned that decision, stating the case manager’s decision was justified on the basis of the disciplinary procedures and the evidence: patients’ right to confidentiality is fundamental in the Health Service and must be respected by doctors and other staff; the case manager was entitled to regard breach of it in a public place by a consultant at Broadmoor as a potentially serious offence.
Upper Tribunal case. SH v Cornwall Partnership NHS Trust (2012) UKUT 290 (AAC), (2012) MHLO 143 — The appellant was subject to a CTO. When he attended for his depot injection, he said that he did not consent to it but nonetheless he submitted to receive it without resistance. He argued that his lack of consent meant that the ‘appropriate medical treatment is available for him’ test was not met, but the tribunal did not discharge. The UT held that the issue of consent is outside the jurisdiction of the tribunal: (a) the tribunal can only consider the statutory criteria (consent does not arise until the decision to treat has been made, whereas appropriateness and availability are issues that arise prior to that decision); (b) it is the courts which provide judicial oversight of treatment under the Act.
Best interests case (medical). Re L; The NHS Trust v L (2012) EWHC 2741 (COP), (2012) MHLO 159 — The Trust sought a declaration that it was not in the best interests of L to be the subject of forcible feeding or medical treatment notwithstanding that in the absence of such nutrition and treatment she would inevitably die. The court declared (to paraphrase) that: (1) L lacked capacity to litigate and to make decisions in relation to the serious medical treatment at issue, specifically, (a) nutrition and hydration, and (b) dextrose for hypoglycaemic episodes. (2) L had capacity to make decisions as to anti-biotic treatment, analgesia and treatment of her pressure sores. (3) In L’s best interests, the clinicians were permitted: (a) to provide nutrition and hydration and medical treatment where L complies; (b) to administer dextrose solution to L despite her objections where immediately necessary to save life; (c) not to provide L with nutrition and hydration with which she does not comply (all reasonable steps to gain L’s co-operation having been taken); (d) to provide palliative care in the terminal stage of L’s illness.
Best interests case. NHS Trust v K (2012) EWHC 2922 (COP), (2012) MHLO 150 — The Trust proposed to carry out surgery on K which could potentially cure her of cancer but which itself (given her co-morbidities including her 20-stone weight) raised a considerable risk of death. (1) K lacked capacity due to her chronic mental illness, and in particular her delusional belief that she did not have cancer, to make informed decisions about major medical treatment. (2) Orders were made that certain specified treatment would be lawful, subject to powers of veto given to specified people.
COP costs case. Re CP; WBC v CP (2012) EWHC 1944 (COP), (2012) MHLO 144 — LPM, the brother of CP (called C in the ‘blue room’ judgment) sought a costs order against the local authority. (1) The court should follow the general rule in welfare cases (that there be no order as to costs: rule 157) where it is appropriate, and it is only local authorities who have broken the law, or who are guilty of misconduct (that falls within rule 159) that have reason to fear a costs order (G v E). (2) The questions to be addressed are (a) is the departure from the general rule justified in all the circumstances, including the conduct of the parties, the outcome of the case and the role of the Applicant as a public body?; and (b) if so, what order should be made? (Neary). (3) The judge concluded that (a) the local authority’s actions were tainted with illegality, (b) the local authority’s decision making was impoverished and disorganised, (c) the local authority was responsible for the delay in referring CP’s circumstances to the Court of Protection and/or the High Court in its children and inherent jurisdictions, and (d) the local authority could have arrived at the position concluded by the court many months earlier. (4) The local authority was ordered to pay LPM’s costs to be assessed if not agreed.
Capacity case. Calvert v Clydesdale Bank Plc (2012) EWCA Civ 962, (2012) MHLO 131 — There is no requirement for a mortgagor to give consent or to be capable of giving consent at the time when the security is enforced. Accordingly, the bank were entitled to enforce their mortgage (by the appointment of receivers who sold the property) despite the mortgagor’s lack of capacity.
Hybrid order case. R v Jenkin (2012) EWCA Crim 2557, (2012) MHLO 141 — Having pleaded guilty to GBH with intent (for gouging his girlfriend’s eyes out), the appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment with a six-year minimum term, combined with a hospital direction and limitation direction under s45A MHA 1983. He appealed against sentence, arguing for a restricted hospital order or alternatively an IPP sentence. (1) A hospital order means that ‘release is dependent on the responsible authority being satisfied that the defendant no longer presents any danger which arises from his medical condition’: this would be inadequate as, irrespective of his delusional disorder, the appellant posed a significant risk of serious harm to the public. (2) A life sentence should be reserved for those cases where the culpability of the offender is particularly high or the offence itself particularly grave (R v Kehoe): both those limbs were met in this case. (3) The s45A hybrid order was appropriate as the criteria were met and the disorder was treatable, but when treatment is no longer necessary the risk to the public required that he be released from hospital to prison and for the Parole Board to make the release decision.
Criminal appeal. R v B (2012) EWCA Crim 1799, (2012) MHLO 119 — The trial judge found the appellant unfit to plead. The appellant had admitted the act charged during an interview under caution, and the judge refused to exclude that evidence. On the basis of that evidence, the jury found that the appellant had done the act charged. (1) Given that the appellant’s mental state was the same during interview as when found unfit to plead, the Court of Appeal found it impossible to understand how the interview could have been admitted: the finding that he had done the act was therefore set aside. (2) The Court of Appeal would have ordered a retrial but has no power to do; the court noted that it was ‘high time that Parliament remedied this most unfortunate error in the law’.
Criminal law capacity case. G v DPP (2012) EWHC 3174 (Admin), (2012) MHLO 140 — At the Youth Court it had been argued that the case should be stayed since it would be an abuse of the court’s process to proceed to an adjudication when the appellant was unfit to plead, to participate in his trial and to instruct his defence. Having heard medical evidence from both sides, the District Judge declined to stay the proceedings, arranged for the appointment of an intermediary and accepted the intermediary’s advice as to the way in which the appellant should be assisted during the course of the hearing; he found the charge proved. This was an appeal by way of case stated in relation to the appellant’s conviction at the Youth Court. (1) The High Court set out the rules for appeals and commented that the way in which the appeal had been prepared is was lamentable. (2) The District Judge had correctly followed the guidance (from DPP v P) for proceedings in the Youth Court in which capacity is relevant. (3) The defence expert confused the propriety of a prosecution with the ability to understand the nature of proceedings and communicate instructions and the District Judge was entitled to disagree with her.
Sentence appeal case. R v Channer (2012) EWCA Crim 1667, (2012) MHLO 157 — IPP sentence with minimum term of 23 months quashed and restricted hospital order substituted in its place.
Sentence appeal case. R v Searles (2012) EWCA Crim 2685, (2012) MHLO 156 — Custodial sentence of two years’ detention in a young offender institution quashed and unrestricted hospital order substituted in its place.
Sentence appeal case. R v Searles (2012) EWCA Crim 1839, (2012) MHLO 155 — Criminal appeal adjourned for second medical report in relation to the making of a hospital order.
Criminal appeal. R v Tudor (2012) EWCA Crim 1507, (2012) MHLO 127 — Following receipt of a psychiatric report which did not recommend a hospital order, the trial judge was entitled to impose an IPP sentence without adjourning for a second psychiatrist’s report.
Immigration case. R (D) v SSHD (2012) EWHC 2501 (Admin), (2012) MHLO 153 — Immigration case with mental health background. (1) D was entitled to damages for unlawful detention for breach of paragraph 55.10 of the Enforcement Instructions and s149 Equality Act 2010, or alternatively for breach of the Hardial Singh principles. (2) Nominal damages for the period during which, had regard been paid to the relevant matters, he would still have been detained. (3) Breaches of Article 3 and 8.
Deportation case. JO (qualified person – hospital order – effect) Slovakia (2012) UKUT 237 (IAC), (2012) MHLO 132 — The respondent had been charged with attempted murder, found not guilty by reason of insanity, and made subject to a restricted hospital order. The Secretary of State made a deportation order under the Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations 2006. Under those regulations, (a) a ‘qualified person’ (jobseeker or worker) is entitled to reside in the UK while he remains a qualified person, (b) after five years of such residence he is entitled to reside in the UK permanently, (c) a worker or self-employed person’s periods of inactivity due to illness or accident are treated as if they were periods of activity. (1) The term ‘illness’ should not be given a narrow or restricted meaning, either in terms of the type of illness (to exclude mental illness) or the period of incapacity (to exclude long-term illnesses). (2) Although a prison sentence does not count towards the qualifying period for permanent residence, time spent subject to a hospital order does: ‘The distinction is that a prison sentence follows the choice of an individual to act in a criminal manner, whereas a Hospital Order results from a finding that the individual suffers from a mental disorder and is not therefore criminally responsible for their otherwise culpable behaviour.’ [This distinction is fallacious, as it is mental state at sentencing that is relevant and most hospital orders follow a criminal conviction.] (3) The Secretary of State’s challenges in relation to the respondent’s ‘integration’ and work history were rejected as (respectively) integration was not relevant because the respondent fell within the regulations, and the FTT were entitled to reach the view it did as to work history.
Negligence claim. Buck v Norfolk and Waveney MH NHS Foundation Trust (2012) MHLO 123 (CC) — The defendant Trust granted unescorted leave to a detained patient who then ran in front of a bus. The claimant bus driver suffered PTSD and sued the Trust. The court held that a custody authority responsible for the negligent release of a patient did not owe a duty to a victim unless that victim had been identifiable: the Trust therefore owed no duty of care to the driver.
Housing case. Southend-on-Sea BC v Armour (2012) EWHC 3361 (QB), (2012) MHLO 152 — The recorder’s decision to refuse to grant a possession order (on the basis that by the time of the delayed hearing possession was no longer appropriate because there had been full compliance with the terms of the tenancy for the 12 months prior to the hearing) was upheld on appeal.
Housing case. Southend-on-Sea BC v AR (2012) EW Misc 25 (CC), (2012) MHLO 151 — The claimant local authority sought possession of an introductory tenancy on the basis of the defendant’s antisocial behaviour. (1) The procedure was followed properly so there was no defence to the claim under the Housing Act 1996. (2) The original decision to seek possession was a necessary and proportionate interference with the defendant’s Article 8 rights: in particular, the diagnosis of Aspergers and depression (which led to lack of litigation capacity and appointment of a litigation friend) did not explain the defendant’s conduct and was properly considered by the claimant. (3) However, there had been full compliance with the terms of the tenancy for the 12 months prior to the delayed final hearing, so possession was no longer proportionate. (4) No order for costs (despite the claimant seeking costs).
Miscellaneous (limitation) case. RAR v GGC (2012) EWHC 2338 (QB), (2012) MHLO 154 — (1) In relation to limitation the court held as follows: ‘I am satisfied that it would be fair and just to invoke the discretion afforded to the court by section 33 of the 1980 Act and permit this trial to proceed. I do so for the following reasons: (i) Having read the lengthy report of Dr Roychowdhury, it is clear that as a result of the abuse perpetrated upon her, the mental health of the claimant has been adversely affected. It has fluctuated over the years, at its worst, it has entailed compulsory hospitalisation. I find that the mental health of the claimant played a real part in the delay which has occurred in the bringing of the civil claim. I accept that the nature of the matters to be explored in this case are of themselves a deterrent for a person in the position of the claimant in bringing such a claim. (ii) In 1977/1978 the defendant had cause to consider allegations of sexual assault upon the claimant by reason of the criminal proceedings. That he did so, and that his memory remains to this day, is evidenced by the detailed witness statement which the defendant has filed in these proceedings. (iii) This case depends upon the evidence of two people, the claimant and the defendant. Although the claimant will find it distressing to give evidence, the detail contained in her witness statement demonstrates that she is able to remember and articulate her memories, however unpleasant. There is nothing in the witness statement of the defendant which demonstrates any difficulty on his part remembering the detail of relevant periods. The evidence of both parties remains sufficiently cogent to enable a fair trial to take place. (2) The other issues considered were: (ii) What was the nature and extent of the alleged assaults perpetrated by the defendant upon the claimant? (iii) What is the nature and extent of any resultant personal injury and loss? (iv) What is the appropriate level of damages?
Draft legislation. Mental Health (Discrimination) (No. 2) Bill 2012 — The Mental Health (Discrimination) Bill 2010 ran out of Parliamentary time so was reintroduced in 2012. The 2012 Bill has been approved by the House of Commons and will have its Second Reading in the House of Lords on 18/1/13. As with the previous Bill, if enacted it would: (1) Repeal s141 MHA 1983 so that the seat of an MP is no longer vacated upon long-term detention under the Act; (2) amend the Juries Act 1974 so that (in addition to the existing category of those lacking capacity) only those liable to be detained under the MHA are excluded from jury service (see jury service page for current provisions); (3) amend the Companies (Model Articles) Regulations 2008 so that a person no longer ceases to be a director when ‘by reason of that person’s mental health, a court makes an order which wholly or partly prevents that person from personally exercising any powers or rights which that person would otherwise have’; (4) amend the School Governance (Constitution) (England) Regulations 2007 so it is no longer the case that ‘[a] person is disqualified from holding or from continuing to hold office as a governor of a school at any time when he is detained under the Mental Health Act 1983’.
Legislation. High Security Psychiatric Services (Arrangements for Safety and Security at Ashworth, Broadmoor and Rampton Hospitals) Amendment Directions 2012 — These Directions amend the High Security Psychiatric Services (Arrangements for Safety and Security at Ashworth, Broadmoor and Rampton Hospitals) Directions 2011 with effect from 18/6/12.
Welsh legislation. Mental Health (Hospital, Guardianship, Community Treatment and Consent to Treatment) (Wales) (Amendment) Regulations 2012 — These Regulations amend the Mental Health (Hospital, Guardianship, Community Treatment and Consent to Treatment) (Wales) Regulations 2008 by adding a new form form CO 8 entitled ‘Mental Health Act 1983 Part 4A — certificate of consent to treatment for community patient (Approved Clinician Part 4A certificate)’. This form will be for the Responsible Clinician to fill in, when the requirement for a SOAD certificate in these circumstances is removed by s299 Health and Social Care Act 2012.
Welsh legislation. Mental Health (Primary Care Referrals and Eligibility to Conduct Primary Mental Health Assessments) (Wales) Regulations 2012 — In force 1/10/12.
Welsh legislation. Mental Health (Regional Provision) (Wales) Regulations 2012 — In force dates: 8/5/12 and 6/6/12.
Welsh legislation. Mental Health (Secondary Mental Health Services) (Wales) Order 2012 — In force 6/6/12.
Welsh legislation. Mental Health (Wales) Measure 2010 (Commencement No.3) Order 2012 — This Order lists certain provisions which came into force on 1/10/12.
Welsh legislation. Mental Health (Wales) Measure 2010 (Commencement No.2) Order 2012 — This Order lists provisions which come into force on 6/6/12.
Welsh legislation. Mental Health (Wales) Measure 2010 (Commencement No.1 and Transitional Provision) Order 2011 — This order sets out provisions which come into force on 3/1/12, 2/4/12, and 8/5/12.
Legislation (from 2008). Mental Health (Absconding Patients from Other Jurisdictions) (Scotland) Regulations 2008 — In force 1/10/08.
Legislation (from 2008). Mental Health (Cross-border Visits) (Scotland) Regulations 2008 — “These Regulations make provision in connection with escorted mental health patients who visit Scotland whilst on leave of absence under the law of England and Wales, Northern Ireland, the Isle of Man or any of the Channel Islands.” In force 6/5/08.
New page. Wales — This page sets out some of the documents which are different for Wales.
Capacity case (imprisonment for contempt). SCC v JM (2012) MHLO 111 (COP) — (1) One of JM’s children, WM, had breached court orders by, amongst other things, (a) arranging for JM to be taken from the care home to hear judgment delivered, and separately to see a solicitor, (b) discussing the possibility of moving back home with him, (c) harassing her father and employees of the local authority and care home. (2) WM was sentenced to five months’ imprisonment for contempt because (a) there had been a considerable number of breaches of court orders, and (b) she had no intention, unless restrained by a severe measure by the court, of obeying the orders herself.
Capacity case (deputyship). Re AS; SH v LC (2012) MHLO 113 (COP) — AS’s niece objected to a panel solicitor’s application to be appointed deputy with specific authority to sell a property. (1) Generally speaking the order of preference for the appointment of a deputy is: (a) P’s spouse or partner; (b) any other relative who takes a personal interest in P’s affairs; (c) a close friend; (c) a professional adviser, such as the family’s solicitor or accountant; (d) a local authority’s Social Services Department; and finally (e) a panel deputy, as deputy of last resort. (2) The court prefers to appoint a family member or close friend because of: (a) familiarity with P’s affairs, wishes and communication methods; (b) likely greater ability to consult with P and encourage participation; (c) reasons of economy; (d) the concept of deputyship of last resort. (3) The appointment of a family member will generally be a less restrictive alternative, though the question remains as to whether this will achieve the desired objective as effectively as the appointment of a panel deputy. (4) The court would not appoint a family member in cases involving, for example: (a) financial or other abuse; (b) conflict of interests; (c) an unsatisfactory track record in managing financial affairs; and (d) ongoing friction between various family members. (5) On the facts, the niece was appointed as there was no need for a deputy of last resort. (6) The general rule as to costs (that AS pay) was followed.
Capacity case. Dunhill v Burgin (2012) EWHC 3163 (QB), (2012) MHLO 115 — The ‘compromise rule’ in the Civil Procedure Rules provides that where a claim is made by or on behalf of a party who lacks capacity to conduct the proceedings (a child or protected party), no settlement of that claim shall be valid without the approval of the court. (1) The rule applies to a claim settled at the door of the court where at the time of the settlement the claimant was not known to lack capacity. (2) The claimant was a protected party (‘a party, or an intended party, who lacks capacity to conduct the proceedings’) and the Court of Appeal had decided that she lacked capacity to settle her claim. (3) The compromise in this case was invalid; the judgment based on it must be set aside, and the substantive claim should proceed to a trial on the merits. (4) The judge granted a certificate under s12 Administration of Justice Act 1969 to enable an application to be made to the Supreme Court for permission to bring a ‘leapfrog’ appeal from this decision.
Capacity case. Supreme Court permission granted on 23/10/12. Dunhill v Burgin (2012) EWCA Civ 397, (2012) MHLO 33 — (1) In deciding whether the claimant had capacity to settle a claim for £12,500 (at hearing it would have been worth at least £800,000) the question was not whether she had capacity to enter into that settlement but whether she had capacity to litigate. (2) On the facts, she had lacked capacity, and the compromise would never have been approved by the court.
Legislation. Mental Health (Approval Functions) Act 2012 — This Act states: ‘Any person who before the day on which this Act is passed has done anything in the purported exercise of an approval function is to be treated for all purposes as having had the power to do so.’ It defines ‘approval function’ as: ‘(a) the function of giving an approval for the purposes of section 12 of the Mental Health Act 1983 (practitioners approved to give medical recommendations), or (b) the function of approving a person as an approved clinician for the purposes of that Act.’ The Secretary of State’s approval functions were lawfully delegated to Strategic Health Authorities on their formation in 2002. This Act was passed with it was discovered that four SHAs had unlawfully delegated these functions to NHS mental health trusts. In force 31/10/12.
Legislation. Administration of Justice Act 1969 — Part 2 of the Act deals with ‘leapfrog’ appeals from the High Court directly to the Supreme Court, skipping out the Court of Appeal: for example, see Dunhill v Burgin (2012) EWHC 3163 (QB), (2012) MHLO 115 in which case a certificate for this was granted by the High Court.
New website feature. Recent Twitter ‘retweets’ appear on website home page. These are often updates that have not yet been added to the website.
Capacity case. CYC v PC and NC (2012) MHLO 103 (COP) — (1) PC lacked capacity to litigate and lacked capacity to decide whether to resume married life with NC (upon the expiry of a 13-year sentence for his sexual offences against previous wives). (2) The resumption of married life with NC was lawful as being in her best interests.
ECHR/capacity case. RP v UK 38245/08 (2012) ECHR 1796, (2012) MHLO 102 — The appointment of the Official Solicitor (who decided, against RP’s wishes, not to oppose the making of a care order and a placement order) did not breach RP’s Article 6 or Article 8 rights.
Capacity case. Re Clarke (2012) EWHC 2947 (COP), (2012) MHLO 109 — (1) Michael Clarke’s application that the court postpone a decision on costs (and in the interim to make orders for disclosure and for the production of further accounts by the Deputy and the Office of the Public Guardian) was refused. (2) The costs of the other family members and the deputy would be charged from Ann Clarke’s estate. (3) In the light of the one-sided publicity that Michael Clarke gives to the affairs of the family, the three judgments were placed into the public domain.
Capacity case. Re Clarke (2012) EWHC 2714 (COP), (2012) MHLO 108 — Michael Clarke objected to the deputy selling of his elderly mother’s (Ann Clarke’s) house to pay for future care as he considered it to be his. (1) No party asked for an oral hearing and the judge was satisfied that there was nothing to be gained by that. (2) Thre was a balance to be struck between the consequences of (a) retaining the property and leaving Ann Clarke on a low income, or (b) selling the property and maintaining a higher standard of living for Ann Clarke until the funds are exhausted, with her having no familiar home and, if she lived long enough, no money either. (3) Mrs Clarke’s Blackpool property shall not be sold or charged during her lifetime without an order of this Court. (4) The deputyship was therefore discharged. (5) Publication of the judgments was authorised as, given Michael Clarke’s comprehensive and long-standing breaches of his mother’s entitlement to privacy, the court’s reasons should be made known.
Capacity case. Re Clarke (2012) EWHC 2256 (COP), (2012) MHLO 107 — Following an accident, Ann Clarke suffered brain injuries and was awarded damages of £775,000. This money was used to pay for care and buy a home in Blackpool which was worth £200-250,000. The deputy proposed to sell the house to pay for care when the remainder of the money ran out, but Michael Clarke (son and carer) applied to court to prevent this. (1) Ann Clarke had the mental capacity to make a will (in particular, one leaving the house to the applicant and nothing to his siblings). (2) Whether or not Ann Clarke had mental capacity to manage her state pension and benefits it was lawful and in her best interests for these to be paid to her carer(s) to be applied for her benefit. (3) Ann Clarke did not have the mental capacity to decide whether or not her Blackpool property should be sold.
Lifer appeal case. R v Petrolini (2012) EWCA Crim 2055, (2012) MHLO 105 — The appellant had unsuccessfully argued diminished responsibility at trial, but subsequently it became apparent that he had indeed been in the prodromal stage of schizophrenia at the time of the offence. The Court of Appeal (1) granted an extension of time of 16 years and 16 months, (2) quashed the conviction for murder and substituted for it a verdict of manslaughter by reason of diminished responsibility, and (3) made a restricted hospital order in place of the 16-year-tariff life sentence. The hospital order was made for admission to Broadmoor, but the intention was that the patient would remain in Carstairs hospital in Scotland.
Criminal case. C v R (2012) EWCA Crim 2034, (2012) MHLO 104 — The appellant appealed against his convictions for sexual offences on the basis that there had been no sexual relationship with the complainant (his step-daughter) before she was 16 years of age, and that thereafter the sexual relationship had been consensual. There was a substantial body of evidence which showed apparent consent to sexual activity after the complainant was 16 years old. But once the jury were satisfied that sexual activity had occurred when the complainant was a child, and that it impacted on and reflected the appellant’s dominance and control over the complainant, it was open to them to conclude that the evidence of apparent consent when the complainant was no longer a child was indeed apparent, not real, and that the appellant was well aware that in reality she was not consenting.
Legal Aid case. R (Hossacks) v Legal Services Commission (2012) EWCA Civ 1203, (2012) MHLO 106 — This appeal followed an unsuccessful judicial review of the LSC’s rejection of the appellant’s tender in relation to community care law in 2010. (1) The issues were set out by the court as follows: (a) Were any of the Appellant’s applications acceptable without clarification or amendment? (b) Leaving aside the evidence of the Commission’s communications with other applicants, should the Commission have sought clarification or suggested amendment of any of the applications, and if so should the Commission have accepted the resulting application(s)? (c) Do the Commission’s communications with other applicants show that by rejecting the Appellant’s applications, it acted in breach of its duty to treat all applicants equally? (2) The appeal had no real prospects of success and therefore permission was refused. (3) The LSC were awarded its costs: (a) the appellant’s impecuniosity and the fact that her activity both as a solicitor and as a proposed foster parent may be or indeed are in the public interest does not justify depriving the Commission of the normal order; (b) the Appellant was clearly warned of the costs risks of pursuing her application for permission to appeal and her application for disclosure, which was liable to be very expensive indeed; and (c) the court directed a rolled up hearing for her benefit, so that her claim could be determined as soon as possible, as she sought.
Legal Aid update. Non-means-tested non-tribunal matters — If the reasoning given in a Costs Appeal Committee decision on a proposed Point of Principle on 17/10/12 were to be followed, it appears that means-testing would not apply to any matters where ‘advice about the Tribunal and possible applications and timing of such’ is provided to the client.
UT case. CNWL NHS Foundation Trust v HJ-H (2012) UKUT 210 (AAC), (2012) MHLO 88 — The tribunal granted discharge from a CTO, deferred for 3 months, expressing the hope that in the meantime the RC would consider reducing the level of the patient’s medication. The Trust appealed. (1) The challenge to the decision to discharge was essentially an attempt to re-argue the tribunal’s assessment of the evidence, and was therefore unsuccessful. In deciding on whether there is an error of law, the UT must respect the FTT’s assessment of the evidence and fact-finding role (provided this was carried out rationally and explained): (a) the UT’s statutory jurisdiction is limited to points of law; (b) the expert composition of the FTT means its fact-finding is worthy of such respect. (2) The challenge to the deferral also failed, as there was no evidence that the tribunal had misdirected itself by granting the deferral with the intention that that the patient’s medication could be reduced in order to make her ready for discharge on a future date. (3) If the FTT’s reasons for the deferral had not been set out adequately (ironically, the judge said the reasoning was ‘not pellucid’) then its decision would still not have been set aside; if anyone had cause to complain about the deferral it was the patient rather than the Trust. (4) If a CTO patient’s condition deteriorates after a deferred discharge decision: (a) before the discharge date, he can be recalled under the CTO which still remains in force, and/or have his medication changed; (b) after the discharge date, he can be detained under s2 or s3, if there is information which was not known to the tribunal which puts a significantly different complexion on the case as compared with that which was before the tribunal.
Capacity case. Re KK; CC v KK (2012) EWHC 2136 (COP), (2012) MHLO 89 — KK was moved to a care home against her wishes, subject to a DOLS standard authorisation, and appealed under MCA 2005 s21A. (1) Having heard her oral evidence, the judge disagreed with the unanimous expert evidence that she lacked capacity to make decisions about her residence and care. (2) In light of the case law and the facts of the case, she had not been deprived of her liberty.
NHSIC, ‘Mental Capacity Act 2005, Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards assessments – England, 2011-12, Third report on annual data’ (17/7/12). Key facts: (1) There has been a year-on-year increase in the number of applications completed for Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards (DoLS) since the safeguards were first introduced in 2009/10. There were 11,393 applications in 2011/12, which represents a 27per cent increase on the 8,982 in 2010/11 and a 59 per cent increase on the 7,157 applications in 2009/10 (the first year of the new safeguards). (2) The number of people subject to a standard authorisation at the end of the quarter had increased each quarter since the safeguards were introduced, from 536 at the end of June 2009 to 1,976 at the end of December 2011. However, between the end of December 2011 and March 2012 the numbers decreased by 16 per cent, the first fall in numbers seen. (3) Dementia accounted for 53 per cent of all applications and this is reflected in the age profile of people who are the subject of DoLS applications. (4) Fifty-eight per cent of applications relate to people over 74 and the population-based rate of applications is much higher for over 74s and over 84s. For the over 84s the application rate is 25 in 10,000. This compares to 12 in 10,000 for 75-84 year olds, 3 in 10,000 for 65-74 year olds and just 1 in 10,000 for 18-64 year olds (working-age adults). (5) There are wide variations in population-based application rates by region. The East Midlands has the highest rate of applications at 51 per 100,000, whilst London had the lowest rate at just 17 per 100,000. These compare to a rate for England as a whole of 28 per 100,000.
Ministry of Justice case. R (RW) v SSJ (2012) EWHC 2082 (Admin), (2012) MHLO 87 — The responsible clinician and tribunal were of the view in March 2011 that the patient required continued treatment in detention in hospital, and the tribunal recommended transfer from Broadmoor to a medium secure unit; in June the RC sought permission for trial leave to a MSU, with return to prison being the planned consequence if it were unsuccessful; trial leave in September was unsuccessful and, that month, the Secretary of State remitted the patient to prison on the RC’s advice. (1) There had been new information since the tribunal which put a different complexion on the case, namely the unsuccessful trial leave, so the Secretary of State was entitled to take at face value the RC’s new opinion that the patient did not require treatment in hospital for mental disorder. (2) It was not necessary for the Secretary of State to consider that lack of treatment in prison might breach Article 3 or require almost immediate re-transfer to hospital; the correct approach was to consider the remission request when made, and consider transfer to hospital later if necessary. (3) Permission to amend the grounds to challenge the alleged ongoing failure to transfer under s47 was refused, but the judge directed that if a fresh application were made within six weeks that the permission application be referred to him.
First-tier Tribunal case. Re Ian Brady (2012) MHLO 76 (FTT) — The tribunal hearing was adjourned from 9/7/12, to a date to be fixed, because of the patient’s (physical) medical condition.
First-tier Tribunal case. Re Ian Brady (2012) MHLO 75 (FTT) — The media’s request for one or more representatives to be present in the tribunal room at Ashworth was refused.
COP case. Re MW; LB Hammersmith and Fulham v MW (2012) MHLO 82 (COP) — (1) MW lacked capacity to make decisions in relation to contact with his childhood friend JC. (2) It was not in MW’s best interests for JC to visit MW’s home, so an order was granted restraining JC from doing so; this was endorsed with a penal notice because of previous breaches of an injunction. (3) The local authority and Official Solicitor’s requested that MW, who lacked litigation capacity, should not attend the hearing because this would be stressful and not conducive to the maintenance of his good mental health: the court acceded to this application. (4) Sensitive evidence was withheld from JC, at the request of the local authority and Official Solicitor, but the court came to its final decision based on the open evidence.
COP case. Re BS; SC v BS (2012) MHLO 78 (COP) — The jointly-instructed psychiatrist, although an expert in autism, did not have experience of applying the test for capacity in the context of litigation in the Court if Protection, so the court directed that an alternative expert be instructed.
EPA case. Re Stapleton (2012) MHLO 72 (EPA) — (1) The court directed the Public Guardian to cancel the registration of the EPA, because the attorney’s financial abuse made him unsuitable. (2) A panel deputy was appointed instead. (3) D was ordered to pay his own costs (a departure from the general rule in property and affairs cases that P pays) because of D’s conduct before and during proceedings.
Community care case. Davis v West Sussex County Council (2012) EWHC 2152 (QB), (2012) MHLO 83 — At a safeguarding vulnerable adults case conference the local authority determined that certain allegations of abuse at a care home were substantiated or inconclusive, made recommendations, and decided to refer three members of staff to their professional bodies. The claimants sought judicial review of the decisions (and of a subsequent Default Notice, although this was not pursued). (1) The local authority’s procedure was unfair, in breach of the rules of natural justice, its own guidance (based on government guidance), and legitimate expectations – a precis cannot do justice to how disgraceful the procedure was. (2) Two defences, arguing that no public law rights arose, failed: (a) there was no respect in which the duty to protect vulnerable adults conflicted with the less pressing obligation to treat other parties affected in a just manner; (b) there was a sufficient public flavour to make the process of investigation and decision a public function distinct from the contractual relationship. (3) The defendant’s arguments that no remedy should follow failed: in particular, because the decisions were unfair, inconsistent with or unsupported by the findings of external bodies, and had a serious continuing impact on the claimants and their residents and staff, and because the defendant showed an inability to recognise, even in hindsight, some basic requirements of fairness.
Extradition case. Turner v Government of the USA (2012) EWHC 2426 (Admin), (2012) MHLO 84 — The appellant was unable to demonstrate that the evidence that was before the High Court was ‘decisive’ such that if it had been before the District Judge he would have concluded that she had demonstrated that her mental condition was such that it would be oppressive to extradite her to the USA.
Mercy killing case. R (Nicklinson) v Ministry of Justice (2012) EWHC 2381 (Admin), (2012) MHLO 77 — (1) Voluntary euthanasia is not a possible defence to murder. (2) The DPP is not under a legal duty to provide further clarification of his policy. (3) Section 2 Suicide Act 1961, in obstructing the claimants from exercising a right in their circumstances to receive assistance to commit suicide, is not incompatible with Article 8. (4) The GMC and the SRA are not under a legal duty to clarify their positions. (5) It was unnecessary in this case to decide whether or not the mandatory life sentence for murder, in a case of genuine voluntary euthanasia, is incompatible with the Convention.
Draft legislation. Care and Support Bill — The draft Care and Support Bill would create single law for adult care and support, replacing more than a dozen different pieces of legislation.
Scottish SI. Mental Health (Safety and Security) (Scotland) Amendment Regulations 2012 — “These Regulations amend the Mental Health (Safety and Security) (Scotland) Regulations 2005 (‘the principal Regulations’) to add the Medium Secure Service, Rohallion Clinic, Murray Royal Hospital, Muirhall Road, Perth to the list of institutions specified in regulation 2(2)(a) of those Regulations (regulation 2). The principal Regulations provide for ‘specified persons’, who may be made subject to measures to protect the safety and security of themselves and others. A person is only a ‘specified person’ if certain conditions exist, one of which is that the person is detained in a state hospital or other place specified in regulation 2(2)(a) of the principal Regulations. The Mental Health (Safety and Security) (Scotland) Amendment Regulations 2007 are revoked.” [Explanatory Note.] In force 1/8/12.
Legal Aid information added. Non-means-tested non-tribunal matters — The information on this page may be useful to anyone considering appealing an LSC decision to nil assess a non-tribunal matter for lack of means testing, or for anyone considering the proposed Point of Principle in relation to this issue.
Practice Direction: Citation of Authorities (2012) — This Practice Direction sets out the requirements for the citation of authorities in court proceedings.
Updates from Mental Health Law Online.
Upper Tribunal case. EC v Birmingham and Solihull Mental Health NHS Trust (2012) UKUT 178 (AAC), (2012) MHLO 70 — (1) Appeals against tribunals’ refusals to hear arguments in relation to extra-statutory recommendations were dismissed as (a) there is no legal right to advance these arguments (this is a sufficient reason for not making an extra-statutory recommendation which can be implied if not stated), (b) refusal to consider a extra-statutory recommendation is neutral rather than disadvantageous to the patient, and (c) a flawed extra-statutory should have no effect because of its legal status. (2) The judge made further comments about (a) potential guidance to hospital managers about UT procedure, (b) secondary challenges by the appellants, and (c) tribunal procedure generally in relation to extra-statutory recommendations.
Stephen Neary damages. Re Steven Neary; LB Hillingdon v Steven Neary (2012) MHLO 71 (COP) — The Court of Protection approved a consent order under which the London Borough of Hillingdon is to pay £35,000 damages to Stephen Neary.

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