Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/california/supreme-court/4th/6/926.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 21:14:01+00:00

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In Ingersoll v. Palmer (1987) 43 Cal. 3d 1321 [241 Cal. Rptr. 42, 743 P.2d 1299] (hereafter Ingersoll), this court upheld the constitutionality of sobriety checkpoints conducted pursuant to various safeguards, observing, in the course of our analysis, that advance publicity is one such safeguard "important to the maintenance of a constitutionally permissible sobriety checkpoint." (Id. at p. 1346.) In the present case, the Court of Appeal interpreted Ingersoll to require advance publicity as a prerequisite to the constitutional validity of a sobriety checkpoint. As we shall explain, however, the United States Supreme Court's analysis of the constitutionality of sobriety checkpoints in Michigan State Police Dept. v. Sitz (1990) 496 U.S. 444 [110 L. Ed. 2d 412, 110 S. Ct. 2481] (hereafter Sitz), decided three years after our Ingersoll decision, establishes that advance publicity is not a constitutional prerequisite to the operation of such a checkpoint. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal.
A complaint thereafter was filed in municipal court charging defendant with violations of Vehicle Code former section 23152, subdivisions (a) and [6 Cal. 4th 932] (b), and other vehicular offenses. fn. 1 Defendant entered a plea of not guilty and moved, pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5, to suppress evidence (obtained at the sobriety checkpoint) establishing her alcohol-related impairment. Her motion, challenging the lawfulness of the sobriety checkpoint under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, maintained that the checkpoint did not conform to the guidelines set forth in Ingersoll.
 Pursuant to article I, section 28, of the California Constitution, a trial court may exclude evidence under Penal Code section 1538.5 only if exclusion is mandated by the federal Constitution. (In re Lance W. (1985) 37 Cal. 3d 873, 896 [210 Cal. Rptr. 631, 694 P.2d 744].) Thus, exclusion of the evidence obtained at the sobriety checkpoint, supporting the charge that defendant was under the influence of alcohol while driving her vehicle, was proper only if that evidence was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
That amendment provides, in pertinent part: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated ...." (U.S. Const., Amend. IV.)  State and local law enforcement officials are subject to the requirements of the Fourth Amendment based upon the operation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. (Mapp v. Ohio (1961) 367 U.S. 643 [6 L. Ed. 2d 1081, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 84 A.L.R.2d 933]; Wolf v. Colorado (1949) 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 [93 L. Ed. 1782, 1785-1786, 69 S. Ct. 1359].) [3a] The detention incident to the operation of sobriety "checkpoints" (which, for purposes of our analysis, we consider indistinguishable from sobriety "roadblocks") constitutes a "seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. (Sitz, supra, 496 U.S. 444, 450 [110 L. Ed. 2d 412, 420].)  The purpose of the Fourth Amendment prohibition is to "safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials." (Camara v. Municipal Court (1967) 387 U.S. 523, 528 [18 L. Ed. 2d 930, 935, 87 S. Ct. 1727]; see also Delaware v. Prouse (1979) 440 U.S. 648, 653-654 [59 L. Ed. 2d 660, 667-668, 99 S. Ct. 1391].) Thus, the narrow question presented in the present case is whether the detention involved in a sobriety checkpoint, established without advance publicity, constitutes a "reasonable" seizure and thus complies with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment.
[5a] The People contend this court's decision in Ingersoll does not require advance publicity, which we identified as one of eight factors to be examined in determining whether a sobriety checkpoint satisfies the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment. In the People's view, [6 Cal. 4th 935] Ingersoll contemplates a balancing of all relevant factors in determining the constitutionality of a sobriety checkpoint. The People further contend that, because the United States Supreme Court's decision in Sitz relied upon a balancing test identical to that employed in Ingersoll, Sitz is corroborative of Ingersoll's analysis and therefore lends no support to defendant's argument. Finally, the People argue that because Sitz, in evaluating the intrusiveness of a sobriety checkpoint, focused solely upon the nature of the detention, that decision implicitly rejects the notion that advance publicity is necessary if the constitutionality of a sobriety checkpoint is to be upheld.
Because the sobriety checkpoint program discussed in Ingersoll encompassed all eight factors, we had no occasion in that decision to examine the narrower question presented in this case-whether the absence of evidence relating to the factor of advance publicity is fatal to the constitutional validity of a sobriety checkpoint. As previously noted, that question was addressed by the appellate department of the superior court in People v. Morgan, supra, 221 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1.
Three months after the Morgan decision (and three years after Ingersoll), the United States Supreme Court rendered its decision in Sitz, addressing for the first time the constitutionality of sobriety checkpoints. [3b] In analyzing the issue of the validity of the initial detention of a motor vehicle at such a checkpoint, the court in Sitz acknowledged at the outset "that a Fourth Amendment 'seizure' occurs when a vehicle is stopped at a checkpoint" (496 U.S. at p. 450 [110 L.Ed.2d at p. 420]), recognizing that "[t]he question thus becomes whether such seizures are 'reasonable' under the Fourth Amendment." (Ibid.) Sitz mirrored the opinion in Ingersoll in determining that the balancing analysis of Brown v. Texas (1979) 443 U.S. 47 [61 L. Ed. 2d 357, 99 S. Ct. 2637] provided the governing framework for ascertaining the reasonableness of such a sobriety-checkpoint seizure.
[5b] Relying upon Sitz, the People contend that the United States Supreme Court has determined that, under the federal Constitution, advance [6 Cal. 4th 942] publicity is not an essential element of a valid sobriety checkpoint. Arguing to the contrary, defendant urges that Sitz is not controlling authority for the narrow question posed in the present case, and that instead we should adopt the reasoning of People v. Morgan, supra, 221 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, to conclude that a sobriety checkpoint is constitutionally invalid in the absence of advance publicity. We are persuaded by the People's argument.
In analyzing the question of intrusiveness, the high court in Sitz considered both the "objective intrusion" of a checkpoint stop upon motorists, and the "subjective intrusion" involved. (Sitz, supra, 496 U.S. at p. 452 [110 L.Ed.2d at p. 421].) With respect to the objective-intrusion criterion, that is, "the duration of the seizure and the intensity of the investigation," the court in Sitz found that the objective intrusion occasioned by a sobriety checkpoint is no different from the intrusion involved in a border-control checkpoint, which the court previously had upheld. (496 U.S. at pp. 451-452 [110 L.Ed.2d at pp. 420-421] [citing United States v. Martinez-Fuerte (1976) 428 U.S. 543, 558 (49 L. Ed. 2d 1116, 1128, 96 S.Ct. 3074)].) The presence or absence of advance publicity would appear to be irrelevant to the objective intrusion occasioned by a sobriety checkpoint, and defendant does not contend otherwise.
[5c] Thus, Sitz establishes that a sobriety checkpoint may not be held violative of the federal Constitution simply because a court may believe that the law enforcement interests sought to be served by the checkpoint would more effectively be served by a level of advance publicity greater than that believed appropriate by politically accountable officials. The nature and degree of publicity sought or provided by law enforcement officials prior to [6 Cal. 4th 944] the operation of sobriety checkpoints inevitably involve policy judgments reflecting not only the fiscal resources available to the agencies in question, but also a determination as to whether to attempt to achieve greater deterrence during a specified time period (e.g., a holiday weekend) or at a particular location (e.g., near a professional sports stadium), or whether, instead, to seek the more generalized deterrence arguably obtainable when motorists learn-through personal experience or by word of mouth-that sobriety checkpoints may be established without advance publicity. fn. 7 Sitz establishes that the constitutionality of a sobriety checkpoint should not hinge upon a court's evaluation of the wisdom of policy decisions made by accountable law enforcement officials.
 In arguing that Sitz must be read to establish advance publicity as a prerequisite to a constitutionally valid sobriety checkpoint program, defendant relies upon the circumstance that the statement of facts in Sitz indicates [6 Cal. 4th 945] the sobriety checkpoint at issue in that case was established under guidelines providing for some form of unspecified publicity. (See Sitz, supra, 496 U.S. at p. 447 [110 L.Ed.2d at p. 418].) Defendant maintains that, because the sobriety checkpoint program in Sitz contained advance publicity, the decision in that case cannot be relied upon as authority for the proposition that advance publicity is not constitutionally required.
Although the United States Supreme Court's reasoning in Sitz demonstrates the untenable nature of defendant's position, it also is instructive to examine court decisions from other jurisdictions that have addressed the question whether advance publicity is necessary to the operation of a constitutionally permissible checkpoint. Although nearly all of these decisions predate Sitz, we briefly review them to demonstrate that, even prior to Sitz, [6 Cal. 4th 946] defendant's position was rejected overwhelmingly by the state courts that have considered the issue now before us.
Those state courts that, prior to Sitz, invalidated sobriety checkpoints did so for reasons unrelated to the question whether advance publicity is constitutionally mandated. These decisions can be divided into two groups: those that invalidated sobriety checkpoints as per se unconstitutional under the federal Constitution, or, more commonly, the respective state constitution [6 Cal. 4th 948] (see Pimental v. Department of Transportation (R.I. 1989) 561 A.2d 1348; State v. Church (La. 1989) 538 So. 2d 993; Higbie v. State (Tex.Crim.App. 1989) 780 S.W.2d 228; State v. Henderson (1988) 114 Idaho 293 [756 P.2d 1057; City of Seattle v. Mesiani (1988) 110 Wn.2d 454 [755 P.2d 775]; Nelson v. Lane County (1987) 304 Ore. 97 [743 P.2d 692]; State v. Koppel (N.H. 1985) 499 A.2d 977; State v. Smith (Okla.Crim.App. 1984) 674 P.2d 562; State v. Olgaard (S.D. 1976) 248 N.W.2d 392, 394-395), and those decisions that invalidated sobriety checkpoints on the ground they were operationally defective, because they were not operated pursuant to neutral criteria, or because they allowed field officers to exercise unbridled discretion in operating the checkpoint (see State v. Parms (La. 1988) 523 So. 2d 1293; Webb v. State (Tex.Crim.App. 1987) 739 S.W.2d 802; State v. Jones (Fla. 1986) 483 So. 2d 433; Commonwealth v. Amaral (1986) 398 Mass. 98 [495 N.E.2d 276]; State v. Crom (1986) 222 Neb. 273 [383 N.W.2d 461]; Commonwealth v. Leninsky, supra, 519 A.2d 984; State v. Kirk (1985) 202 N.J. Super. 28 [493 A.2d 1271]; State v. Muzik (Minn.Ct.App. 1985) 379 N.W.2d 599; State ex rel. Ekstrom v. Justice Ct. of State (1983) 136 Ariz. 1 [663 P.2d 992]; Commonwealth v. McGeoghegan (1983) 389 Mass. 137 [449 N.E.2d 349, 37 A.L.R.4th 1]; see also Commonwealth v. Tarbert (1987) 517 Pa. 277 [535 A.2d 1035] [roadblocks exceeded statutory parameters]).
As is disclosed by our survey of the foregoing decisions from other jurisdictions, the weight of judicial authority has viewed advance publicity as insignificant or (consistent with our own decision in Ingersoll) has considered such publicity as a factor, but not a prerequisite, in assessing the constitutionality of sobriety checkpoints. Those decisions that have disapproved sobriety checkpoints, with the exception of the appellate department opinion in the California case of People v. Morgan, supra, 221 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, and the Court of Appeal's opinion in this case, reached their conclusions based upon issues unrelated to the question whether advance publicity is essential to the operation of a constitutionally permissible sobriety checkpoint.
[5d] In light of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Michigan State Police Dept. v. Sitz, supra, 496 U.S. 444, and consistent with the weight [6 Cal. 4th 949] of authority examined above, we conclude that the operation of a sobriety checkpoint conducted in the absence of advance publicity, but otherwise in conformance with the guidelines we established in Ingersoll v. Palmer, supra, 43 Cal. 3d 1321, does not result in an unreasonable seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. fn. 10 Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal and direct that court to affirm the judgment of conviction of driving under the influence of alcohol rendered by the municipal court.
In my view the majority wants it both ways. Clearly it does not wish to encourage law enforcement officials to announce sobriety checkpoints in [6 Cal. 4th 951] advance, but it also does not want to hold that advance publicity is irrelevant.
FN 1. Vehicle Code former section 23152 provided in pertinent part: "(a) It is unlawful for any person who is under the influence of an alcoholic beverage or any drug, or under the combined influence of an alcoholic beverage and any drug, to drive a vehicle.
FN 2. California Rules of Court, rule 62(a), provides in pertinent part: "A Court of Appeal may order a case transferred to it for hearing and decision when the superior court certifies or the Court of Appeal on its own motion determines ... that such transfer appears necessary to secure uniformity of decision or to settle important questions of law."
FN 3. The municipal court found that, but for the absence of advance publicity, the sobriety checkpoint in this case complied with the standards set forth in Ingersoll. The narrow question certified to, and addressed by, the Court of Appeal was whether advance publicity is a prerequisite to a constitutionally operated sobriety checkpoint. Accordingly, in this decision we limit our discussion to that issue and do not revisit the broader questions addressed in Ingersoll and Sitz pertaining to the constitutionality of sobriety checkpoints generally, and to the conflicting empirical evidence as to their effectiveness. (See, e.g., 4 LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment (2d ed. 1987 & 1993 supp.) Vehicle Use Regulation, § 10.8(d), pp. 69-85 [examining sobriety checkpoints generally].) Furthermore, because the question presented in this case is limited to whether advance publicity is a prerequisite to a constitutionally valid sobriety checkpoint, nothing in our decision should be construed to suggest that any of the eight guidelines set forth in Ingersoll, including advance publicity (43 Cal.3d at pp. 1341-1347), are not relevant to a consideration of the intrusiveness of a sobriety checkpoint stop.
FN 4. People v. Morgan, supra, 221 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, appears to be the only published decision in the nation (other than the Court of Appeal's decision in this case) that has invalidated a sobriety checkpoint exclusively upon the basis of a lack of adequate advance publicity.
FN 10. To the extent People v. Morgan, supra, 221 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, is inconsistent with the views expressed herein, it is disapproved.

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