Source: https://iccforum.com/forum/permalink/61/886
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 23:10:39+00:00

Document:
Currently, the International Criminal Court (ICC) case against President Omar Al Bashir faces the reality that no incumbent head of state has ever been arrested and prosecuted by an international tribunal, at least in part due to the well-established principle of head of state immunity. In analyzing the justifications and development of immunities under international law, I will argue that immunity does not protect Al Bashir from prosecution by the ICC; however, immunity does create a legal obstacle to his arrest so long as Al Bashir remains a sitting President.
One of the key issues to this debate is whether Al Bashir can even be legally prosecuted considering historical deference to immunity under customary international law. In issuing the arrest warrant, Pre-Trial Chamber I expressed the view that Al Bashir’s status as a sitting head of state does not grant him immunity before the ICC.1 However, the African Union has asserted that Al Bashir is protected by immunity.2 The question is: what is the basis of Al Bashir’s immunity and is it valid against the charge of genocide before the ICC?
Immunity from prosecution in customary international law exists out of mutual respect for the individual sovereignty of nations. Immunity can fall in one of two categories: functional immunity (ratione materiae) or personal immunity (ratione personae).3 Functional immunity exists for officials committing acts of state under the principle that people must be able to act on behalf of their government without fear of prosecution. Such immunity relates to the validity of specific acts, which means that immunity is permanent, even after the actor is no longer a government official.
Personal immunity confers protection for people in certain government offices on the basis that a state would not be able to function properly without those officials. This form of immunity covers both official and personal acts but lasts only so long as the individual is in a protected government position.
Without Art. 27 affirmatively suspending immunity, the question then becomes whether generally accepted justifications for recognizing immunities are applicable here. Generally, these immunities were developed and exercised “horizontally,” i.e. among equal sovereign states.6 Recognition of head of state immunity in state-to-state interactions is necessary for the basic function of international relations. However, the charge against Al Bashir is not being made by a single, co-equal state but rather by an international criminal tribunal, an entity which is not a “horizontal” co-equal but rather a “vertical” superior. Deferring to traditional immunities would defeat the purpose of creating an over-arching international criminal tribunal and would not follow the historic justifications for having immunities.7 Recent developments in international law indicate that such “vertical” contexts, the both functional and personal immunity are inapplicable.
Personal immunity is more problematic since the state of customary international law on this matter is not as clear as it is with functional immunity; however, personal immunity in this specific case has been undeniably revoked by Security Council Resolution 1593 .
From the customary international law perspective, recent developments in international law do indicate an inclination favoring derogation of personal immunity. Milosevic and Charles Taylor were both indicted by international tribunals while they had been sitting heads of state14, indicating that incumbent head of state immunity is no bar to prosecution for war crimes and crimes against humanity. This trend tends to indicate that customary international law regarding personal immunity is developing parallel to functional immunity, resulting in the derogation of all immunities for international crimes.
This trend is complicated by the fact that the principle behind personal immunity is arguably still applicable in cases before an international tribunal. Prosecuting incumbent government officials, especially heads of state, undoubtedly impedes the basic functions of that country.15 Thus, as a matter of policy, suspending personal immunity under customary international law may be untenable.16 In that case, derogation of immunity would need a specific basis rooted in a legal document. For Milosevic and Taylor, the instruments establishing the ICTY and the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) contemplate personal immunity and explicitly bar the use of such immunities. In both cases, the countries had submitted themselves and their officials to such jurisdiction. As noted above, Sudan has not submitted itself to the ICC and Art. 27 the Rome Statute .
However, Security Council Resolution 1593 alters the equation. Despite not being a party to the Rome Statute , Sudan became subject to ICC authority once the Security Council referred the matter to the ICC, stating that “the Government of Sudan and all other parties to the conflict in Darfur, shall cooperate fully with and provide any necessary assistance to the Court and the Prosecutor.”17 ICC authority is governed by the terms of the Rome Statute; by referring the situation in Darfur to the ICC, the Security Council essentially made Sudan subject to prosecution under the terms of the Rome Statute for the Darfur conflict. As such, Al Bashir’s immunity as head of state has been suspended.
The issue of immunity and Al Bashir’s arrest is a far greater battle for the ICC to fight so long as Al Bashir remains an incumbent President. Under Resolution 1593 , Sudan has the obligation to “cooperate fully” with the ICC, meaning the government of Sudan should surrender Al Bashir of its own accord. This is highly unlikely scenario considering Sudan still does not recognize ICC authority and would clearly be resistant to arresting its own head of state.
Since the ICC lacks a related police force, the only other viable alternative is to rely on its member states to effectuate the arrest. Here, the immunities question begins anew because the question is no longer about immunity before an international tribunal but about immunity between states.
Furthermore, Art. 28 of the Rome Statute also creates an obstacle to arrest. As noted above, Art. 98 lends some context to interpreting the application of Art. 27 on the matter of immunity from ICC prosecution; however, it is more substantively relevant on the matter of arrest by a member state. Art. 98(1) states, “The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender or assistance which would require the requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations under international law with respect to the State or diplomatic immunity of a person or property of a third State, unless the Court can first obtain the cooperation of that third State for the waiver of the immunity.” Under Art. 98, member states’ obligation to arrest Al Bashir would be subordinate to their obligations to respect Sudan’s head of state immunity under customary international law.
Arguably, Security Council Resolution 1593 could suspend head of state immunity for arrest as it did for prosecution. However, this argument is not wholly convincing. The exact terms of the resolution merely referred the Darfur situation to the Prosecutor and required Sudan to cooperate with “the Court and the Prosecutor.”21 These terms pertain to the “vertical” authority of the ICC and the Prosecutor, i.e. Al Bashir is subject to prosecution and Sudan is obligated to surrender him. However, the Resolution does not specifically address the issue of arrest by a state nor does it expressly force Sudan generally submit to the entire terms of the Rome Statute as a party would. In contrast, when the Security Council established the ICTY22 and SCSL,23 the Security Council expressly removed personal immunities.
The immunities question ultimately presents no obstacle to the ICC prosecution of Al Bashir considering the current trend derogating immunities under customary international law and the terms of Security Council Resolution 1593 . However, this combination of international law structures does not sufficiently justify the denial of immunity from arrest by a co-equal state. While the Genocide Convention may present a solution, the Rome Statute and established customary international law provide an insufficient basis for arrest of Al Bashir as long as he remains head of state.

References: Art. 27
 Art. 27
 Art. 28
 Art. 98
 Art. 27
 Art. 98
 Art. 98