Source: https://cbaclelegalconnection.com/tag/felony/
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 18:19:34+00:00

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The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People v. DeBorde on Thursday, December 30, 2016.
Possession of a Controlled Substance—“Wobbler” Statute—Surcharge—Sentence—Felony—Misdemeanor—Inability to Pay.
DeBorde pleaded guilty to one count of possession of a controlled substance, a level 4 drug felony. The court imposed a mandatory $1,500 felony drug offender surcharge as part of his sentence. When DeBorde completed his community corrections sentence, the court vacated his felony conviction and entered a conviction for a class 1 misdemeanor.
On appeal, DeBorde contended that once his conviction was reduced to a misdemeanor, the court should have likewise reduced his drug offender surcharge to the misdemeanor amount of $1,000. CRS § 18-1.3-103.5(2)(a), the “wobbler” statute, contemplates vacation of only the felony conviction, not the sentence. Accordingly, the amount of the drug offender surcharge was properly determined by the initial conviction.
DeBorde also argued that the district court should have waived all or part of the felony drug offender surcharge based on a finding that DeBorde was unable to pay it. While evidence in the presentence report may have supported a finding of DeBorde’s present inability to pay, there was no evidence in the record of DeBorde’s future inability to pay the surcharge. Further, DeBorde had an opportunity to supplement the record with additional evidence of his inability to pay, but he declined the district court’s invitation to do so.
Lastly, DeBorde contended that under the wobbler statute, the court erred by placing the burden on him to show his entitlement to the misdemeanor conviction in place of the felony conviction. The Court concluded this claim was moot because DeBorde was already granted relief on his motion to apply the wobbler statute.
The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in Esquivel-Castillo v. People on Monday, January 25, 2016.
Sufficiency of an Information—Notice of Charges—Felony Murder.
Esquivel-Castillo petitioned for review of the judgment of the court of appeals affirming his conviction of felony murder. A jury acquitted him of a separate count of kidnapping, charged according to the “seized and carried” alternative way of committing that crime, but convicted him of felony murder for a death caused during his commission or attempted commission of kidnapping the same victim, during the same charged timeframe, by a different statutorily qualifying act of kidnapping. As pertinent to the issue on review in the Supreme Court, the court of appeals rejected Esquivel-Castillo’s assertion that the more specific kidnapping charge necessarily limited the scope of the more generally charged felony murder count to a charge of death caused in the course of or in furtherance of the commission of kidnapping by seizing and carrying the victim from one place to another, resulting in his having been convicted of a crime with which he had never been charged.
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals. Because one count of an information is not circumscribed by another count of that information unless the latter is incorporated in the former by clear and specific reference, the Court determined that the crime of kidnapping alleged more generally as an element of felony murder was not limited to the specific alternative act of kidnapping alleged in the separate kidnapping count. Therefore, jury instructions as to all statutory forms of kidnapping supported by the evidence did not constructively amend the felony murder charge.
The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in Doubleday v. People on Monday, January 11, 2016.
A jury found John Andrew Doubleday guilty of felony murder, despite finding him not guilty, based on the affirmative defense of duress, of the charged predicate offense. Under the plain language of CRS § 18-3-102(1)(b), to be convicted of felony murder, a defendant must have committed or attempted to commit one of the enumerated predicate offenses. The question presented in this case is whether Doubleday can be said to have committed the charged predicate offense of attempted aggravated robbery when he was acquitted of that offense based on the affirmative defense of duress. The Supreme Court concluded that to establish that a defendant committed a predicate offense within the meaning of the felony murder statute, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt all of the elements of the predicate offense, including the inapplicability of any properly asserted affirmative defense to the predicate offense. Because the prosecution did not meet this burden here, Doubleday’s felony murder conviction cannot stand.
The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People v. Nelson on Thursday, September 10, 2015.
Nelson was charged with aggravated cruelty to animals, cruelty to animals, and underage possession of alcohol after a 2011 incident in which he killed his mother’s dog. Nelson was a juvenile at the time of the offense, but he was charged as an adult under Colorado’s direct filing statute. Nelson pleaded guilty to aggravated cruelty to animals, and at his sentencing hearing, asked the district court to apply the direct filing statute’s amended sentencing provisions. He argued that he had been convicted of an offense that is no longer eligible for direct filing and, therefore, he should be sentenced as a juvenile. The district court denied his request and sentenced Nelson in accordance with the adult felony sentencing scheme.
On appeal, Nelson argued that the district court erred by failing to apply the amended direct filing statute to his case and remanding his case to the juvenile court for sentencing. House Bill 12-1271 did not change the district court’s discretion to sentence Nelson as an adult. Therefore, the judgment of conviction and sentence were affirmed.
On February 1, 2013, Rep. Mark Waller introduced HB 13-1214 – Concerning the Classification of Certain Drunken Driving Offenses as Felonies, and, in Connection Therewith, Making an Appropriation. This summary is published here courtesy of the Colorado Bar Association’s e-Legislative Report.
The violation occurred after three prior convictions, upon charges separately brought and tried and arising out of separate and distinct criminal episodes, for DWAI, DUI, or DUI per se; vehicular homicide; vehicular assault; or any combination thereof.
May require the person to submit to continuous alcohol monitoring using such technology or devices as are available to the court for such purpose.
Under the bill, the court is required to impose these conditions on such offenders.
If a person is sentenced to a period of probation pursuant to a class 5 felony conviction of DUI, DUI per se, or DWAI, the court shall not grant early termination of probation before the person has successfully completed at least two years of probation.
The bill repeals provisions relating to the crime of aggravated driving with a revoked license when the offender also commits DUI, DUI per se, or DWAI as part of the same criminal episode. On Feb. 21, the Judiciary Committee amended the bill and sent it to the Appropriations Committee for consideration of the fiscal impact to the state.

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