Source: https://mdafny.com/index.aspx?TypeContent=CUSTOMPAGEARTICLE&custom_pages_articlesID=14754
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 13:00:21+00:00

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The aftermath of Hurricane Irene in 2011 has given rise to a substantial increase in the number of lawsuits seeking to hold municipalities liable for property damage caused by flooding. In many cases the doctrine of sovereign immunity and the fact that flooding usually occurs after a supervening event outside of the municipality's control (such as a hurricane) may bar the plaintiff from recovery. This article explores the viability of the claims and defenses characteristic of cases brought against municipalities seeking to recover damages caused by flooding.
In determining what types of negligence claims are available relating to damages caused by municipal sewer systems, New York courts distinguish between claims based on the design of the sewer system and accidents stemming from negligent maintenance or construction of the sewer system.
New York courts have repeatedly dismissed plaintiffs' claims that a municipal sewer system was poorly designed, or that it had too small a capacity to prevent flooding after a heavy rainfall.4 However, plaintiffs may recover for damage caused by flooding if they can establish that a sewer system suffers from construction defects or has been inadequately maintained.
One additional wrinkle in pending cases involving claims of negligent performance of ministerial governmental actions is the potential impact of the Court of Appeals' recent decision in McLean v. City of New York.9 In McLean, a decision of tremendous import to municipal defendants, the Court of Appeals held that a governmental agency was not liable for the negligent conduct of its officers absent the existence of a special duty between the governmental entity and the plaintiff.10 Since many lower courts did not require the establishment of a "special relationship" as a prerequisite to holding municipalities liable for negligent conduct prior to McLean,11 municipal defendants are likely to argue that the cases holding municipalities liable for negligent inspection of their sewer systems are no longer good law.
The First Department reversed a jury verdict for the plaintiffs and directed judgment in favor of the defendants, finding that the plaintiffs' proposed method of inspection was impracticable because it would effectively require the city to periodically unearth its entire piping system to perform the tests.16 The court concluded that liability could be maintained only where the city had some warning of a possible defect in a specific portion of its underground piping.17 Accordingly, plaintiffs seeking to establish that an inaccessible underground water main was negligently inspected should be mindful of the practical impediments they face if their claims would place upon a municipality the duty to periodically inspect a large network of inaccessible underground pipes.
Given the possible inconsistency between Pickersgill and Biernacki, the viability of proving negligence solely via a res ipsa loquitur argument remains in doubt.
While this defense may seem attractive to municipal defendants in flooding cases, New York courts have construed the act of God defense narrowly in recent decisions. In Pickersgill, the court rejected the defendant's claim that heavy rainfall, an "act of God," led to the backup of the municipal sewers into the plaintiff's basement. The court noted that "in order to invoke the Act of God theory of defense the city must establish that the weather conditions were so extraordinarily harsh as to not be anticipated by reasonable design engineers of the sewers."27 The heavy rainfall prior to the flooding of plaintiff's basement was deemed insufficient to meet this standard.
Andrea M. Alonso and Carl S. Sandel are partners at Morris Duffy Alonso & Faley. Michael Czolacz , a paralegal, assisted in the preparation of the article.
1. See Biernacki v. Village of Ravena, 664 N.Y.S.2d 682, 683 (3rd. Dept. 1997).
2. Johnston v. District of Columbia, 118 U.S. 19, 20-21 (1886).
5. Briga v. Town of Binghamton, 778 N.Y.S.2d 545, 545-546 (3d Dept. 2004).
6. 736 N.Y.S.2d 699 (2d. Dept. 2002).
7. Holmes v. Incorporated Village of Piermont, 863 N.Y.S.2d 774 (2d. Dept. 2008).
8. De Witt Properties v. City of New York, 44 N.Y.2d 417, 424 (1978).
10. McLean, supra, at 199.
11. Signature Health Center v. State, 902 N.Y.S.2d 893, 906-907 (N.Y. Ct. Cl., 2010).
17. Id at 524 [citing DeWitt Properties v. City of New York, 44 N.Y.2d 417, 424 (1978)].
18. 304 A.D.2d 349 (1st Dept. 2003).
23. Pickersgill v. City of New York, 642 N.Y.S.2d 469, 471 (Civ. Ct. Queens Cty. 1996).
25. DiLorenzo v. Village of Endicott, 333 N.Y.S.2d 456 (Sup. Ct., Broome Co. 1972).
26. See generally, Memphis & Charlestown RR v. Reeves, 77 U.S. 176 (1870) (recognizing that common carriers are not liable for unforeseeable forces of nature).
27. Pickersgill, 642 N.Y.S.2d, 469, 470.
28. Prashant Enterprises v. State, 614 N.Y.S. 2d 653, 654 (3d Dept. 1994).

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