Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/385/276/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 00:24:00+00:00

Document:
In No. 80, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit originally set aside a deportation order against petitioner on the ground that the Government has the burden of proving the facts supporting deportability beyond a reasonable doubt, but then reversed itself and held that the Government need only prove its case with reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence. In No. 40, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit did not explicitly deal with the burden of persuasion imposed on the Government at the administrative level, but found only that the underlying deportation order was supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole. Section 106(a)(4) of the Immigration and Nationality Act states that a deportation order, "if supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole, shall be conclusive," and § 242(b)(4) of the Act provides that "no decision of deportability shall be valid unless it is based upon reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence."
Held: No deportation order may be entered unless the Government proves by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence that the facts alleged as grounds for deportation are true. Pp. 385 U. S. 282-286.
(a) Sections 106(a)(4) and 242(b)(4) of the Act are addressed to the scope of judicial review, and not to the degree of proof required at the administrative level in deportation proceedings. Pp. 385 U. S. 282-284.
(b) Congress has not specified the degree of proof required in deportation proceedings, a matter traditionally left to the courts to resolve. P. 385 U. S. 284.
unequivocal, and convincing evidence, and that burden of proof is likewise appropriate in deportation proceedings. Pp. 385 U. S. 285-286.
No. 40, 370 F.2d 989, and No. 80, 350 F.2d 894, 901, judgments set aside and remanded.
The question presented by these cases is what burden of proof the Government must sustain in deportation proceedings. We have concluded that it is incumbent upon the Government in such proceedings to establish the facts supporting deportability by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence.
occurring 27 years earlier was imperfect, and admitted that his identification of the petitioner might be mistaken.
It is not clear what standard of proof the special inquiry officer and the Board of Immigration Appeals on de novo review applied in determining that it was the petitioner who had traveled to Spain and reentered the United States under the Samuel Levine passport. At the outset of his opinion, the special inquiry officer stated that the Government must establish deportability "by reasonable, substantial and probative evidence," without discussing what the burden of proof was. Later, he concluded that the Government had established its contentions "with a solidarity far greater than required," but did not further elucidate what was "required." The Board of Immigration Appeals stated that it was "established beyond any reasonable doubt" that the petitioner had obtained the Samuel Levine passport, and added that this established a "presumption" that the petitioner had used it to travel abroad. The Board further stated that it was a "most unlikely hypothesis" that someone other than the petitioner had obtained and used the passport, and asserted that "the Service has borne its burden of establishing" that the petitioner was deportable, without indicating what it considered the weight of that burden to be.
and probative evidence." [Footnote 4] We granted certiorari, 384 U.S. 904.
In Woodby (No. 40), the petitioner is a resident alien who was born in Hungary and entered the United States from Germany in 1956 as the wife of an American soldier. Deportation proceedings were instituted against her on the ground that she had engaged in prostitution after entry. [Footnote 5] A special inquiry officer and the Board of Immigration Appeals found that she was deportable upon the ground charged.
deportable. The Board stated that the evidence made it "apparent" that the petitioner had engaged in prostitution after the alleged duress had ended, and announced that "it is concluded that the evidence establishes deportability. . . ."
In denying a petition for review, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit did not explicitly deal with the issue of what burden of persuasion was imposed upon the Government at the administrative level, finding only that "the Board's underlying order is supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole. . . .'" We granted certiorari, 384 U.S. 904.
"might well agree that the standard of persuasion for deportation should be similar to that in denaturalization, where the Supreme Court has insisted that the evidence must be 'clear, unequivocal, and convincing,' and that the Government needs 'more than a bare preponderance of the evidence' to prevail. . . . But here,"
"to create a single, separate, statutory form of judicial review of administrative orders for the deportation and exclusion of aliens from the United States. [Footnote 11]"
"The requirement that the decision of the special inquiry officer shall be based on reasonable, substantial and probative evidence means that, where the decision rests upon evidence of such a nature that it cannot be said that a reasonable person might not have reached the conclusion which was reached, the case may not be reversed because the judgment of the appellate body differs from that of the administrative body. [Footnote 14]"
We conclude, therefore, that Congress has not addressed itself to the question of what degree of proof is required in deportation proceedings. It is the kind of question which has traditionally been left to the judiciary to resolve, [Footnote 15] and its resolution is necessary in the interest of the evenhanded administration of the Immigration and Nationality Act.
proceeding is not a criminal case, and that the appropriate burden of proof should consequently be the one generally imposed in civil cases and administrative proceedings -- the duty of prevailing by a mere preponderance of the evidence.
"the solidity of proof that is required for a judgment entailing the consequences of deportation, particularly in the case of an old man who has lived in this country for forty years. . . ."
Rowoldt v. Perfetto, 355 U. S. 115, 355 U. S. 120.
No less a burden of proof is appropriate in deportation proceedings. The immediate hardship of deportation is often greater than that inflicted by denaturalization, which does not, immediately at least, result in expulsion from our shores. And many resident aliens have lived in this country longer and established stronger family, social, and economic ties here than some who have become naturalized citizens.
* Together with No. 80, Sherman v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, on certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, argued on November 16-17, 1966.
Section 241(a)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 204, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2), provides for deportation of any alien who "entered the United States without inspection or at any time or place other than as designated by the Attorney General. . . ." Prior to 1952, the Government was required to bring deportation proceedings within five years of an alleged illegal entry, 39 Stat. 889 (1917), as amended 8 U.S.C. § 155(a) (1946 ed.). Thus, under the prior law, the petitioner would not have been subject to deportation proceedings commenced after 1943. However, this time limit was retroactively eliminated by the 1952 Act, § 241(d), 66 Stat. 208, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(d). See Developments in the Law, Immigration and Nationality, 66 Harv.L.Rev. 643, 683-684.
In conformity with its usual practice, the Board made its own independent determination of the factual issues after de novo examination of the record. See Gordon & Rosenfield, Immigration Law and Procedure 46-47 (1959).
350 F.2d at 901. The court adopted the reasoning of the opinion which Judge Friendly had filed as a dissent to the original decision. Judges Waterman and Smith, who had formed the original majority, dissented.
"by reason of any conduct, behavior or activity at any time after entry, became a member of any of the classes specified in paragraph (12) of section 212(a). . . ."
Among the classes specified in § 212(a)(12) of the Act, 66 Stat. 182, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(12), are "Aliens who are prostitutes or who have engaged in prostitution. . . ."
75 Stat. 651 (1961), 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(4).
66 Stat. 210 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4).
See Jaffe, Administrative Law: Burden of Proof and Scope of Review, 79 Harv.L.Rev. 914 (1966); Comment, 41 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 622 (1966); Standard of Proof in Deportation Proceedings, 18 Stan.L.Rev. 1237 (1966).
See McCormick, Evidence 681-685 (1954); 9 Wigmore, Evidence § 2497 (3d ed. 1940).
E.g., Rutkin v. United States, 343 U. S. 130, 343 U. S. 135. For discussion of variations of and alternatives to the usual rule, see Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal Procedure, 69 Yale L.J. 1149, 1157-1163 (1960).
H.R.Rep. No. 1086, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 22.
"Judicial Review of Orders of Deportation and Exclusion"
"Sec. 106. (a) The procedure prescribed by, and all the provisions of the Act of December 29, 1950, as amended (64 Stat. 1129; 68 Stat. 961; 5 U.S.C. 1031 et seq.), shall apply to, and shall be the sole and exclusive procedure for, the judicial review of all final orders of deportation . . . except that --"
"(4) . . . the petition shall be determined solely upon the administrative record upon which the deportation order is based and the Attorney General's findings of fact, if supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole, shall be conclusive. . . ."
75 Stat. 651 (1961), 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a).
"Finally, it is important to bear in mind the distinction between the burden of proof and the quality of the evidence which is required to establish that burden successfully. It is to be noted that subsection (b)(4) of section 242 of the act does not speak of the burden of proof, but of the quality of the evidence which the Service must produce before deportability can validly be found. . . ."
Matter of V___, 7 I. & N.Dec. 460, 463.
14. S.Rep. No. 1137, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 30. The House Report contains substantially identical language. H.R.Rep. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 57.
See McBaine, Burden of Proof: Degrees of Belief, 32 Calif.L.Rev. 242 (1944). See also 9 Wigmore, Evidence §§ 2488-2493, 2497-2498 (3d ed. 1940).
Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U. S. 118; Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U. S. 665; Nowak v. United States, 356 U. S. 660; Chaunt v. United States, 364 U. S. 350.
Gonzales v. Landon, 350 U.S. 920; Nishikawa v. Dulles, 356 U. S. 129. But see § 349(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 75 Stat. 656 (1961), 8 U.S.C. § 1481(c).
This standard, or an even higher one, has traditionally been imposed in cases involving allegations of civil fraud, and in a variety of other kinds of civil cases involving such issues as adultery, illegitimacy of a child born in wedlock, lost wills, oral contracts to make bequests, and the like. See 9 Wigmore, Evidence § 2498 (3d ed. 1940).
This standard of proof applies to all deportation cases, regardless of the length of time the alien has resided in this country. It is perhaps worth pointing out, however, that, as a practical matter, the more recent the alleged events supporting deportability, the more readily the Government will generally be able to prove its allegations by clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence.
Section 106(a)(1) of the Act, 75 Stat. 651 (1961), 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a) (1), provides that a petition for judicial review must be filed with the Court of Appeals not later than six months after a final order of deportation. In No. 40, Woodby, the petitioner's appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals was dismissed on March 8, 1963, and a motion for reconsideration was denied on May 27, 1963. Petition for review by the Court of Appeals was filed more than six months after the Board upheld the deportation order, but within six months after the denial of the motion to reconsider. The Court of Appeals did not pass on the question whether, in such circumstances, its power of review was limited to consideration whether the denial of the motion for reconsideration was an abuse of discretion, or whether it might also assess in full the validity of the deportation order. Following the decision of the Court of Appeals in this case, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held, in similar circumstances, that it had authority to undertake full review of the deportation order, as well as the denial of the motion to reconsider. Bregman v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 351 F.2d 401. In light of the Bregman decision, the Government before this Court expressly abandoned its contention that in this case the courts are limited to reviewing the denial of the motion to reconsider. See the Government's brief in No. 40, Woodby, p. 8, n. 3.
The Court, by placing a higher standard of proof on the Government, in deportation cases, has usurped the legislative function of the Congress and has, in one fell swoop, repealed the long-established "reasonable, substantial, and probative" burden of proof placed on the Government by specific Act of the Congress, and substituted its own "clear, unequivocal, and convincing" standard. This is but another case in a long line in which the Court has tightened the noose around the Government's neck in immigration cases.
I agree that § 106(a)(4), the 1961 amendment to the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, relates to judicial review of administrative orders of the Immigration Service but, with due deference, I cannot see how "It is hardly less clear" that § 242(b)(4) of the Act, as the Court says, likewise applies exclusively to judicial review. Indeed, on the contrary, the latter section was specifically enacted as the only standard of proof to be applied in deportation cases.
of the Administrative Procedure Act to deportation proceedings. Congress immediately exempted such proceedings from the Administrative Procedure Act, and, in 1952, established in § 242(b) an exclusive procedural system for deportation proceedings.
supra, carved deportation proceedings from the judicial overtones of the Administrative Procedure Act and established a built-in administrative procedure.
"The requirement that the decision of the special inquiry officer shall be based on reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence means that, where the decision rests upon evidence of such a nature that it cannot be said that a reasonable person might not have reached the conclusion which was reached, the case may not be reversed because the judgment of the appellate body differs from that below."
The courts consistently applied the standard of "reasonable, substantial and probative" evidence after the adoption of § 242(b). See, e.g., Rowoldt v. Perfetto, 355 U. S. 115, 355 U. S. 120-121 (1957).
General's findings of fact, if supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole, shall be conclusive."
Why Congress passed § 106(a)(4) if judicial review, as the Court holds, was already exclusively covered by § 242(b) is beyond my comprehension -- unless it was engaged in shadow boxing. I cannot believe that it was.
The Court says that both the special inquiry officer and the Board of Immigration Appeals failed to state what the burden of proof was in these cases. Fault is found in the officer's use of the phrase "solidarity" of proof "far greater than required." This language was apparently patterned after this Court's opinion in Rowoldt, supra, where the phrase "solidity of proof" was used. The findings of both the officers and the Board in these cases show specifically that the burden of proof followed in each case was that required of the Government in § 242(b) and the Regulations of the Attorney General, i.e., by "reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence." This standard has been administratively followed by the Immigration Service in a long and unbroken line of cases. See Matter of Peralta, 10 I. & N. Dec. 43, 46.
petitioners, the record shows, knew this, yet they remained in this country for years -- 46 in the case of Sherman and 10 in that of Woodby. Still, neither made any effort to obtain citizenship.
"no deportation order may be entered unless it is found by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence that the facts alleged as grounds for deportation are true."
(Italics added.) The ground alleged for deportation of Woodby was that she had "engaged in prostitution after entry." It has never been contended that this ground was not properly established. In fact, it is conceded that Woodby engaged in prostitution. The only factual dispute involved in her case centers on the question whether her activities arose from duress and ended when the conditions compelling her to stray ceased to exist. It seems clear to me that, since Woodby is raising duress as an affirmative defense, she bears the burden of establishing all elements of that defense. See In the Matter of M___, 7 I. & N. Dec. 251. And the record clearly shows that both the administrative authorities and the Court of Appeals rejected Woodby's "bizarre" story. Under familiar principles, those findings are binding on this Court, Universal Camera Corp. v. Labor Board, 340 U. S. 474, and nothing in what the Court holds today affects that conclusion.
I regret that my powers of persuasion with my Brethren are not sufficient to to prevent this encroachment upon the function of the Congress which will place an undue and unintended burden upon the Government in deportation cases. I dissent.
Thus the judicial review provision of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 1009(e)(5), limits the scope of review to a determination of support by "substantial evidence," and 5 U.S.C. § 1006 limits the agencies to acting on "reliable, probative, and substantial evidence." This pattern has traditionally been held satisfied when the agency decides on the preponderance of the evidence.
In Giova v. Rosenberg, 379 U. S. 18, this Court held only that denial of a petition to reopen or reconsider is reviewable. The Court did not specify the scope of review to be applied. The Court may be depending upon a concession by the Government on this point, but it is clear that jurisdiction cannot be waived. King Bridge Co. v. Otoe County, 120 U. S. 225; Good Shot v. United States, 179 U. S. 87.

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 § 349
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