Source: http://thecabadvantage.com/articles/category/cases-from-bits/c30-volume-12-edition-8/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 14:55:31+00:00

Document:
Hitachi Simitomo Heavy Industries Const. Crane Co., Ltd. v. Midwest Specialized Transp., Inc.
MIDWEST SPECIALIZED TRANSPORTATION, INC., et al., Defendants.
JENNIFER B. COFFMAN, Chief Judge.
This matter is before the court on the plaintiff’s motion (R. 20) to request a telephonic conference. The court granted that motion (R. 22) and held a telephonic status conference on July 31, 2009, to determine (1) whether this action must be stayed because of the bankruptcy proceedings involving defendants Dallas & Mavis Specialized Carrier Co., LLC and Greatwide Logistics Services, Inc.; (2) whether the plaintiff’s notice of its claim to the defendants was sufficient under the Carmack Amendment, 49 U.S.C. § 14706, and related regulations; and (3) whether the court should allow expedited and bifurcated discovery and motion practice on the issue of limitation of liability.
This memorandum opinion will address only the issue of the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s notice. During the telephonic status conference, counsel for Dallas & Mavis and Greatwide conceded that the “automatic stay” provision of the Bankruptcy Code does not apply to the instant action since the events that gave rise to this action occurred after they filed for bankruptcy. Therefore, the defendants’ pending bankruptcy does not prevent this action from proceeding. The court also declined to consider the request of Dallas & Mavis and Greatwide to transfer the instant action, as it relates to them, to the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware because that issue was not raised in their answer or the plaintiff’s motion. Lastly, the court need not discuss its order permitting the parties’ proposed expedited and bifurcated discovery and motion practice because that order speaks for itself.
The plaintiff’s notice to the defendants of its claims under the Carmack Amendment, 49 U.S.C. § 14706, satisfies the requirements of the applicable regulation, 49 C.F.R. § 1005.2. This regulation provides that “[a] claim … for loss, damage, injury, or delay to cargo, shall not be voluntarily paid by a carrier unless filed … within the specified time limits applicable thereto.” 49 C .F.R. § 1005.2(a). The claim may be a written or electronic communication and must “(1) contain[ ] facts sufficient to identify the baggage or shipment (or shipments) of property, (2) assert[ ] liability for alleged loss, damage, injury, or delay, and (3) mak[e] claim for the payment of a specified or determinable amount of money….” 49 C.F.R. § 1005.2(b).
In the answer of Dallas & Mavis and Greatwide, they assert that a claim is not valid unless it is “filed in writing with the carrier within nine (9) months after delivery of the shipment or, in the case of failure to make delivery, then within nine (9) months after a reasonable time for delivery elapsed.” R. 8, at 8. On March 3, 2009, approximately four (4) months after the accident, the plaintiff’s counsel sent a letter to Great West Casualty Company, Midwest Specialized Transportation Company, and York Insurance in an attempt to settle the dispute. The letter identified the shipment of property as “a main unit, boom base and top boom of the Model 548 Crawler Crane” and included a picture of the crane. In addition, the letter stated that “due to the negligence of the driver, Lee K. Richard, the Crane was involved in an accident.” This statement, along with the language demanding settlement, asserts liability against the defendants for the alleged damage. Lastly, the plaintiff offered to settle any claims for $2,705,896.00, which is a specified or determinable amount of money (the demand also explained the plaintiff’s method of calculating this damage).
The purpose of requiring a plaintiff to provide written notice to the carrier of a potential claim “is not to permit the carrier to escape liability but to insure that the carrier has enough information to begin processing the claim.” Trepel v. Roadway Express, Inc., 194 F.3d 708, 713 (6th Cir.1999). Furthermore, the notice requirement will be met as long as the plaintiff substantially complied with 49 U.S.C. § 1005.2. Id. Because the plaintiff’s March 3, 2009, letter to the defendants provides them with enough information to “make a prompt and thorough investigation of the claim,” Trepel, 194 F.3d at 713 (quoting Ins. Co. of North America v. G.I. Trucking Co., 1 F.3d 903, 906 (9th Cir.1993)), it substantially complies with the regulation and satisfies the notice requirement. The March 9, 2009, letter from the former counsel of Dallas & Mavis and Greatwide supports the conclusion that the plaintiff’s notice enabled the defendants to investigate the claim because, in that letter, the defendants offered to settle the claim for $100,000.00 and denied it in all other respects. R. 20-5, at 3. The letter also expressly stated that Dallas & Mavis and Greatwide investigated the claim. Id. at 1. Thus, the contents of the plaintiff’s notice to the defendants and the fact that the defendants were able to investigate the claim support the finding that the notice satisfies the requirements of the Carmack Amendment, 49 U.S.C. § 14706, and related regulations.
In the March 9, 2009, letter, counsel stated, “I represent Lexington Insurance Company and its insureds, Greatwide Logistics and Dallas & Mavis Specialized Carrier Co., LLC (collectively referred to herein as “Dallas & Mavis”) … My client’s investigation of the claim shows that Dallas & Mavis received the shipment….” R. 20-5, at 1.
The court’s determination of the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s notice is not an advisory opinion, contrary to the defendants’ argument. Because an actual controversy exists in regards to the sufficiency of the notice, the court may issue a ruling. Unlike advisory opinions, which involve hypothetical scenarios, this opinion rests upon the facts concerning the instant dispute, which are concrete and definite. The simple fact that the plaintiff’s time to submit a notice of its claim has yet to expire does not mean that this issue is hypothetical. The plaintiff submitted a notice of its claim to the defendants and then commenced this action. Subsequently, the defendants filed their answers and raised the insufficiency of the notice as an affirmative defense.
Although neither this case nor the plaintiff’s request for a ruling on the sufficiency of its notice constitutes a declaratory-judgment action, this dispute satisfies all of the requirements for such an action. Before issuing a declaratory judgment, the court must determine whether “the facts alleged, under the circumstances, show that there is a substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal interest, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.” Kardules v. City of Columbus, Ohio, 95 F.3d 1335, 1343-44 (6th Cir.1996) (citation omitted). All of these criteria are met in this case. First, the controversy involving the notice is substantial because an insufficient notice could shield the defendants from liability. Second, the parties obviously have diverse interests since the plaintiffs are seeking to recover over two million dollars from the defendants. Lastly, the matter is of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the court’s determination of the sufficiency of the notice. If the court waited until after August 10, 2009, to issue a ruling and found that the notice did not meet the regulatory requirements, then the plaintiff would lose its ability to seek recovery for its alleged losses. The court, therefore, has the authority to rule on the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s notice, and such a ruling is not an advisory opinion.
Begala v. PNC Bank, 214 F.3d 776, 784 (6th Cir.2000), P.R. Diamonds, Inc. v. Chandler, 364 F.3d 671, 699 (6th Cir.2004), and Winget v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 537 F.3d 565, 573 (6th Cir .2008) do not support the assertion of Dallas & Mavis and Greatwide that the court’s ruling on this matter is an advisory opinion. Begala states that “[p]laintiffs [are] not entitled to an advisory opinion from the Court informing them of the deficiencies of the complaint and then an opportunity to cure those deficiencies.” Id. Taken out of context, the quote seems to support the defendants’ contention. However, the entire opinion and the facts of that case reveal that Begala does not preclude this court from determining whether the plaintiff’s notice satisfied regulatory requirements.
Begala involves plaintiffs, who had not properly moved for leave to amend earlier in the litigation, that attempted to amend the complaint following an adverse ruling on a motion to dismiss. The primary issue in the case was whether the plaintiffs should be given a chance to amend their complaint even though they had not moved for leave to amend or provided the proposed amendments to the court. The court emphasized that “the granting of a defendant’s motion to dismiss does not ordinarily afford the unsuccessful plaintiffs any ‘opportunity to further clarify their allegations’ with proof and evidence.” Id. This court’s determination of the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s notice under the applicable regulations does not concern pleadings or hypothetical amendments to a complaint. Instead, it involves a notice of claims that was sent to the defendants on March 3, 2009. The court simply is determining whether the notice complied with the regulation.
Lastly, United States v. Musick, 291 Fed. App’x 706, 727 (6th Cir.2008) is inapplicable to this action. In that case, the Sixth Circuit noted that “because appellant has not pointed to any injury from this ruling nor to any specific evidence actually admitted at trial, his objection seems to call for an advisory opinion about the meaning of Rule 16.” Id. Unlike Musick, the instant plaintiff does not seek a mere interpretation of a law. Hitachi identifies specific facts, namely the notice provided to the defendants, and requests that the court render a legal conclusion regarding the sufficiency of that notice. The court’s ruling, therefore, is not advisory in nature.
Frances FORD, Michael E. Ford, Dakota Lines, Inc., Joanne F. Skinner, Paul Kuglar, Betsy Ann Kuglar, and Kurt Grigg, Defendants.
CHRISTOPHER C. CONNER, District Judge.
This is an insurance declaratory judgment action filed by plaintiff Great American Assurance Company (“Great American”). Great American seeks a declaration that it owes no duty to defend or indemnify defendants Frances Ford, Michael E. Ford and Dakota Lines, Inc. in three underlying civil actions brought by Paul Kuglar and Betsy Ann Kuglar, (collectively “the Kuglars”), Joanne Skinner (“Skinner”), and Kurt Grigg (“Grigg”), all of whom are also defendants herein. Presently before the court is the Kuglars’ motion for judgment on the pleadings (Doc. 22) and three motions for summary judgment filed by Skinner (Doc. 27), Grigg (Doc. 29), and Great American (Doc. 32). For the reasons that follow, Great American’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 32) will be granted, and the remaining motions will be denied.
In light the applicable standards of review, the court will present the facts as alleged in the complaint for purposes of the Kuglars’ motion for judgment on the pleadings and in the light most favorable to the non-moving party with respect to each motion for summary judgment. See infra Part II. This task is simplified because the instant matter involves only questions for legal determination and presents no disputes of fact.
Docket Entry No. 43 is Great American’s statement of material facts filed pursuant to Local Rule 56.1, to which none of the defendants filed a responsive statement fact statement. Defendants are therefore deemed to admit the facts set forth in Great American’s statement. See L.R. 56.1. The defendants’ motion papers confirm that they do not dispute the facts material to resolution of this matter.
The court consolidated the actions of Skinner and the Kuglars into a single proceeding on May 14, 2008. (See Doc. 71 in Skinner v. Ford, No. 1:07-CV-1059 (M.D.Pa.)).
a. A covered auto while used to carry property in any business.
b. A covered auto while used in the business of anyone to whom the auto is rented.
The policy issued by Great American is attached as Exhibit B to Docket Entry No. 32. Pinpoint citations to the policy refer to the identification numbers that appear in the lower lefthand corner of the various forms that comprise the policy.
Great American contends that it has no duty to defend or indemnity Ford in the underlying actions because this endorsement (hereinafter “the bobtailing endorsement”) excludes coverage for collisions that occur while the tractor is hauling freight. Great American commenced the instant suit on July 28, 2008 to ascertain the extent of its obligations under the endorsement. Plaintiffs contend that the bobtailing endorsement was never incorporated into the terms of the NTL policy and that, in the absence of the endorsement, the policy covers the collision at issue in the underlying actions. They alternatively assert that the endorsement is ambiguous and that it must be interpreted to provide coverage for the collision. The parties have fully briefed these issues, which are now ripe for disposition.
The pending motions for judgment on the pleadings and for summary judgment implicate two distinct standards of review. However, because the instant matter involves solely questions of law, the court may perform its analysis under either standard. See Klecha v. Bear, 712 F.Supp. 44, 45-46 (M.D.Pa.1989) (quoting Mellon Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 32 F.R.D. 365, 356 (W.D.Pa.1962) (noting that purely legal questions may be raised under either Rule 12 or Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
A motion for judgment on the pleadings is a procedural hybrid of a motion to dismiss and a motion for summary judgment. Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides: “After the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” FED. R. CIV. P. 12(c). To succeed on a motion under Rule 12(c), “the movant [must] clearly establish [ ] that no material issue of fact remains to be resolved and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Hayes v. Cmty. Gen. Osteopathic Hosp., 940 F.2d 54, 56 (3d Cir.1991); see also 5A CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL ., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1368, at 519 (2d ed.1990). When deciding a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the court is directed to view “the facts presented in the pleadings and the inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Hayes, 940 F.2d at 56.
Through summary adjudication the court may dispose of those claims that do not present a “genuine issue as to any material fact,” and for which a jury trial would be an empty and unnecessary formality. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). It places the burden on the non-moving party to come forth with “affirmative evidence, beyond the allegations of the pleadings,” in support of its right to relief. Pappas v. City of Lebanon, 331 F.Supp.2d 311, 315 (M.D.Pa.2004); FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). This evidence must be adequate, as a matter of law, to sustain a judgment in favor of the non-moving party on the claims. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250-57, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-89, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c), (e). Only if this threshold is met may the cause of action proceed. Pappas, 331 F.Supp.2d at 315.
Great American filed the action sub judice to adjudicate its duties to defend and indemnify Ford and Dakota in the underlying actions. Defendants contend that the NTL policy covers the collision because the bobtailing endorsement is not a component of the NTL policy. They also assert that the endorsement is ambiguous and that the court must interpret the policy in favor of coverage.
An endorsement or contractual term constitutes a component of an insurance policy if the parties thereto mutually assent to be bound by it. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17(1) & cmt. c (1981); see also Arnold Pontiac-GMC, Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 786 F.2d 564, 572-73 (3d Cir.1986). In the instant matter, the bobtailing endorsement appears on the Schedule of Forms and Endorsements, which identifies all addenda to the insurance policy. (Doc. 33, Ex. B at TE 8801.) The terms of the bobtailing endorsement explain that it “modifies insurance provided under the [NTL policy].” (Id. at TE 2309.) Frances Ford purchased the NTL policy (including the bobtailing endorsement) to satisfy her husband’s obligations under the contractor agreement, which required him to procure coverage for accidents that occurred when he was not hauling freight. (Doc. 1 ¶ 17; Doc. 32, Ex. D ¶ 6; Doc. 43 ¶¶ 1, 6.) Hence, both Francis Ford and Great American assented to the bobtailing endorsement, thereby incorporating it into the NTL policy.
Defendants argue that the terms of the endorsement supply coverage for the collision notwithstanding the purposes for which Francis Ford and Great American executed them. Interpretation of an insurance contract is a issue of law that must be addressed by the court. Initially, the court must determine whether the policy term is ambiguous. Loomer v. M.R.T. Flying Serv., Inc., 384 Pa.Super. 244, 558 A.2d 103, 105 (Pa.Super.Ct.1989). A term is ambiguous “if reasonably intelligent people could differ as to its meaning. Id.; see also Lucker Mfg. v. Home Ins. Co., 23 F.3d 808, 814 (3d Cir.1994). The court must resolve ambiguities by giving effect to the interpretation most favorable to the insured, as the non-drafting party. J.C. Penney Life Ins. Co. v. Pilosi, 393 F.3d 356, 364 (3d Cir.2004). However, “[w]here the terms of the insurance contract are not ambiguous, [the court] must read the policy in its entirety and give the words therein their plain and proper meanings.” Loomer, 558 A.2d at 105; accord Lower Paxton Twp. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 383 Pa.Super. 558, 557 A.2d 393, 399 (Pa.Super.Ct.1989).
In the instant matter, the bobtailing endorsement excludes coverage for liabilities that accrue while a “covered auto” is being “used to carry property in any business” or is being operated “in the business of anyone to whom the auto is rented.” (Doc. 33, Ex. B at TE 2309.) Defendants contend that the phases “in any business” or “in the business of” are ambiguous and that the court should therefore require Great American to provide coverage for the collision in the underlying actions. They further assert that the tractor was not “carrying” property at the time of the collision, rendering the bobtailing endorsement inapplicable. The court will address these issues seriatim.
Defendants argue that the phrases “in any business” and “in the business of” are ambiguous. They are incorrect. This court previously addressed policy terms nearly identical to those presently at issue in Wenkosky v. Protective Insurance Co., 698 F.Supp. 1227 (M.D.Pa.1988) (Nealon, J.). In Wenkosky, the operator of a tractor had delivered a load of cargo pursuant to a lease agreement with a motor carrier similar to the independent contractor agreement between Ford and Dakota. Id. at 1229. When returning home, he carried a load of logs as a favor for a personal acquaintance, who was engaged in the business of building log homes. Id. The acquaintance paid him $200 but had no relationship to the lease agreement with the carrier. Id. The operator was involved in an accident during this trip. Id. Like the bobtailing endorsement presently at issue, the operator’s non-trucking liability policy excluded coverage for accidents that occurred “[w]hile the automobile or any trailer attached thereto is used to carry property in any business.” Id. (emphasis added). The operator argued that the policy was ambiguous because it failed to specify whether the term “business” referred to all activities undertaken for economic gain or was limited to activities performed under his agreement with the motor carrier. The court concluded that the policy was clear on its face. Id. at 1230-31, cited with approval in Canal Ins. Co. v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s London, 435 F.3d 431, 436 (3d Cir.2006). The operator had received economic remuneration for the trip and had transported the logs in furtherance of the acquaintance’s economic interest. Such activities constituted “business,” under the policy, placing the trip within the purview of the exclusion. Id. at 1232.
The instant matter presents a similarly compelling scenario for excluding coverage. At the time of the collision, Ford was transporting cargo on behalf of Dakota under the contractor agreement. He received compensation for his time and expenses, and the load was being delivered in furtherance of Dakota’s shipping business. “[R]easonably intelligent people” would unanimously conclude that such activities constitute “business” under the bobtailing endorsement. Loomer, 558 A.2d at 105.
Defendants suggest that the bobtailing endorsement is susceptible to multiple interpretations because it could either apply solely to the act of hauling cargo for economic remuneration or include incidental travel necessary for the operator to arrive at or return from a job site. (Doc. 28 at 7.) Quibbling about the outer reaches of the bobtailing endorsement is unnecessary because the collision at issue plainly falls within the marrow of the endorsement. At the time of the accident, Ford was hauling cargo for economic remuneration in furtherance of Dakota’s operational activities. Such activities clearly constitute business regardless of whether hypothetical liabilities accruing in transit between job sites implicate the endorsement.
Defendants also contend that the bobtailing endorsement restricts coverage only when a “covered auto” is “carrying” property at the time of a collision. They assert that the tractor-not the trailer attached thereto-is the only “covered auto” under the policy. The endorsement is purportedly inapplicable because Ford’s cargo was located in the trailer (rather than within the confines of the tractor ) at the time of the collision.
Defendants’ proposed interpretation contorts the language of the contract beyond recognition. The bobtailing endorsement excludes coverage whenever a covered auto is carrying property. The policy defines “covered auto” as both the tractor owned by the insured and any trailers that are attached thereto but owned by third parties. (See Doc. 32, Ex. B at TE 0001 ¶ I.A.7.) Ford was towing a trailer owned by Dakota at the time of the collision. Hence, the trailer is part of the “covered auto” to which the bobtailing endorsement applies.
The declarations page of the policy defines the term “covered auto” by reference to a list standardized definitions that appear in the policy proper. (Doc. 33, Ex. B at TE 8010.) Ford’s declarations page references the definition of “covered auto” located at Symbol 7 of the policy. (Id.) The definition appearing at Symbol 7 states that covered autos include “Only those ‘autos’ [appearing on the declarations page] for which a premium charge is shown (and for Liability Coverage any “trailers” you don’t own while attached to any power unit described [on the declarations page] ).” (Id. at TE 0001 ¶ I.A.7 (emphasis added)).
Defendants’ claim also fails because the tractor itself was carrying property within the meaning of the bobtailing endorsement. The Oxford English Dictionary defines “carry” as “to transport” or “to convey, originally by cart or wagon, hence in any vehicle, by ship, on horseback, etc.” 2 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 919 (2d Ed.1989). Legal uses of the term demonstrate that the act of “carrying” refers to a range of activities performed to move objects through space either by attaching them to one’s person or using a vehicle. Hence, common carriers are charged with the transportation of goods, see BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 226 (8th ed.2004), a railroad carries goods in interstate commerce, see, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 10102(5) (defining a “rail carrier” as one who “provid[s] … railroad transportation for compensation” (emphasis added)), and drug traffickers carry firearms whenever they place them on their body or move them about using a vehicle, Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 131, 118 S.Ct. 1911, 141 L.Ed.2d 111 (1998). The verb to carry extends to any conveyance effected by using a vehicle regardless of whether the object conveyed is physically located within the vehicle or within a container or device attached thereto. Accordingly, a tractor may “carry” cargo by hauling it in a trailer propelled using force supplied by the tractor’s drive train. The court therefore concludes that Ford’s tractor was “carrying” property at the time of the collision.
The tractor covered by the NTL policy was carrying property in the course of business at the time of the collision at issue in the underlying actions. The bobtail endorsement therefore excludes coverage for the accident. Great American’s motion for summary judgment will be granted, and the remaining motions will be denied.
An appropriate order is attached.
1. The motion for judgment on the pleadings (Doc. 22) filed by Paul Kuglar and Betsy Ann Kuglar is DENIED.
2. The motion for summary judgment (Doc. 27) filed by Joanne F. Skinner is DENIED.
3. The motion for summary judgment (Doc. 29) filed by Kurt Grigg is DENIED.
4. The motion for summary judgment (Doc. 32) filed by Great American Assurance Company is GRANTED.
5. The Clerk of Court is instructed to enter JUDGMENT in favor of plaintiff Great American Assurance Company and against defendants on all claims.
6. The Clerk of Court is instructed to CLOSE this case.

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