Source: https://govlawweb.typepad.com/government_liability_upda/dangerous_conditions_of_public_property/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 00:36:06+00:00

Document:
In Grossman v. Santa Monica-Malibu Unified School District, published March 25, 2019, the Second District Court of Appeal, Division 7 affirmed summary judgment granted to the defendant school district. The school district permitted a school booster group and the PTA to hold a carnival fundraiser on a school's grounds. During the carnival, an inflatable slide partially deflated and began to tip over while the plaintiff was on it, throwing the plaintiff to the concrete below. The plaintiff alleged that the slide was improperly set up on the grass infield next to concrete, and that it was not tethered to the ground. He alleged that the slide was a dangerous condition of property, and that the district knew or should have known that the slide was not set up, secured, or operated properly. It was undisputed that the district did not own, operate, or set up the slide.
The appellate court rejected the plaintiff's argument that Education Code section 38184 rendered the district liable for the plaintiff's injuries. Subdivision (i)(1) of the statute apportions liability between school districts and nonprofit entities using the school facilities or grounds. Under the statute, a district is liable for an injury resulting from the negligence of the school district in the ownership and maintenance of the school facilities or grounds. An entity using school facilities or grounds under this section is liable for an injury resulting from the negligence of that entity during the use of the school facilities or grounds. Subdivision (i)(2), however, provides that the statute does not limit or affect the immunity or liability of a school district under the Government Claims Act for an injury caused by a dangerous condition of public property. Based on this language, and the Education Code section's legislative history, section 38184 does not affect Government Code section 835's limitations on public entity liability for property conditions. Under section 835, the district was not liable for the slide. The slide was not district property, it was not operated by the district, the conditions the plaintiff complained about did not result from the acts or omissions of district employees, and there was no evidence district employees had actual or constructive notice of the slide.
In Guernsey v. City of Salinas, published December 17, 2018, the Sixth District Court of Appeal reversed a judgment based on jury verdict in a pedestrian v. auto case. A crosswalk on city property that runs across a driveway to a shopping center had faded, allegedly due to failure to maintain. Next to the crosswalk was a strip of pink stamped concrete on private property that also ran across the driveway. The stop sign for exiting drivers was on the pink strip instead of at the crosswalk. Bushes next to the driveway limited drivers' vision. The bushes were on private property. The city had the power to order them trimmed, but did not. An exiting driver hit the plaintiff pedestrian, seriously injuring him. The plaintiff was in the crosswalk. The driver considered the pink strip to be a crosswalk, and knew that there possibly had been a crosswalk where the faded lines were. At the city's request, the court instructed the jury: " “Plaintiffs have not alleged that the design of the Driveway created a dangerous condition. Instead, Plaintiffs have alleged that it was the City’s failure to maintain the crosswalk lines and the bushes that created a dangerous condition. [¶] To find that the Driveway presented a dangerous condition, you cannot rely on characteristics of the Driveway itself (e.g., the placement of the stop sign, the left turn pocket, and the presence of the pink cement). Although you can consider those elements of the Driveway when weighing whether or not the faded crosswalk lines and bushes created a dangerous condition, you cannot rely on those design elements of the intersection to find that a dangerous condition existed.” The court also instructed the jury that city property could be in a dangerous condition if adjacent property conditions, such as the pink strip or the stop sign location, exposed users of city property to a substantial risk of injury in conjuction with adjacent property. The jury found the driver and pedestrian at fault, but not the city. The jury wrote on the verdict form that the city should paint the crosswalk. The plaintiff contended that the trial court erred in giving the "design of the driveway" instruction.
The appellate court ruled the instruction was erroneous. The city contended that the design was subject to design immunity. The plaintiff based the case on the failure to maintain the sidewalk. The instruction went beyond informing the jury that the case was not based on the design. It extended to conditions that were not on city property, and so could not be the subject of design immunity. Telling the jury it could not "rely on" the elements of the driveway including the pink strip and bushes was legally incorrect, and conflicted with the instruction that it could consider conditions on adjacent property. The conflict was hopelessly confusing. The evidence, as well as the jurors' handwritten notation on the verdict form, showed that the error was prejudicial.
In Anselmo v. Grossmont-Cuyamaca Community College District, published August 3, 2018, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, Division 1 reversed dismissal of the plaintiff's lawsuit on demurrer. The plaintiff was a member of a community college women's volleyball team. The team traveled to the defendant district's community college's campus to participate in an intercollegiate beach volleyball tournament. The plaintiff alleged she was injured when she dove into the sand on the volleyball court and her knee hit a rock. She sued the district for maintaining a dangerous condition of public property. The trial court sustained the district's demurrer based on the field trips and excursions immunity provided to community colleges by title 5, section 55220 of the California Code of Regulations.
The appellate court ruled that the immunity does not apply to an injury suffered by a member of a visiting team during an intercollegiate athletic event. The immunity protected the plaintiff's college from liability for operating the excursion that brought the plaintiff to the defendant's campus, but it did not protect the defendant from allegedly violating its duty not to increase the risk inherent in the sport by creating a dangerous condition of public property. Otherwise, the district could be held liable to a student of the district for a dangerous condition, but could not be held liable to a visiting athlete injured by the same condition.
In Rodrieguez v. Department of Transportation, published March 27, 2018, the Fifth District Court of Appeal affirmed summary judgment for Caltrans in a case alleging a dangerous condition of public property. A pickup truck in which the plaintiff was a passenger ran off the road on a state highway. The plaintiff contended that the shoulder where the truck went off the road was in a dangerous condition because it did not have a "rumble strip," which would have alerted the driver that he had veered onto the shoulder. Caltrans moved for summary judgment based on design immunity under Government Code section 830.6. It presented the declaration of the Caltrans project engineer who drafted the 1992 plans for installing the eight-foot paved shoulder. The engineer declared that he had discretionary authority to approve the plans; that he approved them by signing them; and that he would not have approved them if they had not met appropriate engineering standards. He further declared that he did not consider using rumble strips, because at the time he approved the plans using rumble strips was not common practice, and that no standards or policies called for their use. The plaintiff contended the trial court erred by granting summary judgment based on design immunity, because the element requiring discretionary approval of the plan was not met. The plaintiff contended that the engineer had to consider whether to install rumble strips for the absence of the strip to be part of an approved plan.
The appellate court rejected the argument. Under case law, the factors the entity or employee approving the plan considered when exercising discretion to approve are irrelevant to the discretionary approval element. Instead, they are relevant only to the element requiring substantial evidence that the approval was reasonable. Case law requiring that the alleged dangerous condition be part of the approved plan did not require a different result. The alleged dangerous condition was the bare shoulder, without rumble strips; and the bare shoulder was part of the approved plan.
In Arvizu v. City of Pasadena, ordered published March 23, 2018, the Second District Court of Appeal, Division 3 affirmed summary judgment in the City's favor in a lawsuit alleging a dangerous condition of public property. The plaintiff entered a portion of the Arroyo Seco park in the early morning, while the park was closed, headed for a trail running along the Arroyo Seco stream near the Colorado Street Bridge. He attempted to walk down a natural slope toward the trail. He lost his footing on the slope, tumbled down it, across the trail, and across the edge of a concrete retaining wall level with the trail's edge, falling onto the dirt and rocks below. He alleged that the absence of guard rails or warnings along the edge of the retaining wall was a dangerous condition of public property. The trial court granted summary judgment, both on Government Code section 831.4's trail immunity and on the absence of a dangerous condition.
The appellate court affirmed solely on the section 831.4 immunity. Because the trail along the retaining wall lead to recreational activities, subdivision (b) of the statute applied. The plaintiff's argument that the immunity did not apply because he was not "using" the trail failed. He was with a group headed towards the trail; he was using the slope to get to the trail; and he briefly was on the trail before heading over the retaining wall. His argument that the dangerous condition was the lack of handrail or warning signs on the retaining wall, rather than a condition of the trail, also failed. Due to the narrow space along the retaining wall, any guardrail or warning sign would have to be on the trail. Further, the trail immunity applies to property abutting the trail that allegedly makes the trail dangerous.
In Mercury Casualty Co. v. City of Pasadena, published August 24, 2017, the Second District Court of Appeal, Division 3 reversed a court judgment holding the defendant city liable for inverse condemnation. A parkway tree that was over 100 feet tall grew in the parkway in front of Mercury's insured's house. In an unusual storm in which hurricane-force winds blew, the tree blew over onto the house. Mercury sued the city as its insured's subrogee. The trial court ruled that the tree was a public improvement, and that the city was therefore strictly liable in inverse condemnation for the damage it caused to the house.
the direction of the government entity as part of a planned project or design serving a public purpose or use, such as to enhance the appearance of a public road. Although the parkway was public property, there was no evidence showing who planted the tree. it was not the assigned type of city tree for that street. Although an ordinance directed city care of parkway trees, it post-dated the tree's planting. The city's maintenance of the tree through general maintenance of its urban forest did not turn the tree into a public improvement.
The court also ruled that there was no evidence that the city's maintenance plan established a taking. To establish inverse condemnation through maintenance, the plaintiff must show that the plan of maintenance of an improvement was deficient in light of a known risk inherent in the improvement. There was no evidence the city's maintenance plan was deficient. The city could still be held liable in tort for a fallen tree, e.g. under a dangerous condition of public property theory.
Two cases from different courts, published within days of each other, addressed whether Government Code immunities for dangerous conditions of public property applied to trees or tree branches falling onto plaintiffs.
In County of San Mateo v. Superior Court (Rowe), published July 25, 2017, the First District Court of Appeal, Division 2, affirmed a trial court decision denying summary judgment in a case where a tree in a campground fell on a tent in which a minor plaintiff slept. The County had moved for summary judgment based on Government Code section 831.2, the natural condition immunity, arguing that a condition of unimproved property caused the injury. The issue was whether the injury was caused by a condition of unimproved property. The appellate court found a triable issue of fact on whether the tree was growing in an unimproved area (since it was growing close to the campground, and its roots ran under the campground) and on whether the campground improvements were sufficient to amount to improved property. The court also found a triable issue on whether the improvements caused the tree to fall, since the experts for each side disagreed on that point.
In Toeppe v. City of San Diego, published July 27, 2017, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, Division 1, reversed a summary judgment granted to the defendant city in a case where a tree branch in a county park fell on the plaintiff while she was allegedly on a recreational trail in the park. The trial court granted summary judgment based on Government Code section 831.4, the Trail Immunity. The appellate court concluded that the Trail Immunity did not apply. The condition that caused the injury was the alleged negligent maintenance of the tree, rather than any condition of the trail. The tree was not so related to the trail as to be deemed a part of it, since it was remote from the trail, the trail was not the only way to approach the tree, and a person would not have to be on the trail to be exposed to danger from the tree's branches. Further, remedying the danger would not involve changing the trail, such as by adding barriers or handrails; it would involve maintaining the tree. The court also found a triable issue of fact on whether the plaintiff was using the trail when the branch hit her. Witnesses stated she was on the trail, but she declared that she was not.
In City of Pasadena v. Superior Court (Jauregui), published June 26, 2017, the Second District Court of Appeal, Division 4 issued a writ directing a trial court to sustain the defendant city's demurrer without leave to amend. The plaintiff was diagnosed with mesothelioma in September 2015. In October 2015, she sued various defendants for asbestos exposure. The complaint alleged that her father picked up asbestos to which the plaintiff was exposed at work places including the city, but the complaint did not include the city as a defendant. In August 2016, the plaintiff presented a claim for damages to the city. In October 2016, the plaintiff amended her complaint to include the city as a defendant. The city demurred on the ground that the plaintiff's complaint was presented more than six months after the accrual of her cause of action for asbestos exposure. The trial court overruled the demurrer, on the ground that under the statute of limitations for asbestos exposure, Code of Civil Procedure section 340.2, the limitations period had not yet commenced, and so the plaintiff's claim was timely.
The appellate court rejected that analysis. Under Government Code section 901, the date of accrual for purposes of the Government Claims Act is the date that the cause of action would have accrued within the meaning of the statute of limitations absent any claim requirements. To calculate the claim presentation deadline, the court must determine the date the cause of action accrued under the applicable statute of limitations. Under Code of Civil Procedure section 340.2,the time for commencement of the action is the later of the date of discovery or the date the plaintiff first suffered disability. Disability is the permanent termination of the person's ability to do her job, actually forcing the person off the job. The plaintiff here was never disabled, so the statute of limitations never began to run for her. But section 340.2 does not use the word "accrued." Instead, under Code of Civil Procedure section 312, a cause of action accrues when the party owning it is entitled to begin and prosecute an action thereon. That is generally immediately upon the commission of the wrong and the occurrence of harm. An exception is delayed discovery. Latent diseases such as mesothelioma are subject to the delayed discovery standard of accrual. The court concluded that as used in Government Code section 901, the date of accrual is the date on which the cause of action became actionable--when it became ripe. Here, that was when the plaintiff discovered or reasonably should have discovered she had suffered a compensable injury, which was no later than her September 2015 diagnosis. She failed to present her claim within six months of that date, and so did not comply with the Government Claims Act. The court rejected the argument that "accrue" meant only "commencement of the limitations period" under section 340.2. That would lead to the anomalous result that the plaintiff could not bring her action at all, because her limitations period never commenced. Section 340.2 extends the time to bring suit, not the time to present a claim.
In Garcia v. American Golf Corp., published May 3, 2017, the Second District Court of Appeal, Division 2 reversed summary judgment granted to a city in a personal injury lawsuit brought by a child hit by a golf ball and his mother. The mother was pushing the child in a stroller on a city-owned walkway that was adjacent to a private golf course. The trial court ruled that the city was immune from dangerous-condition liability under Government Code section 831.4, the recreational trail immunity.
The appellate court disagreed. The dangerous condition of the walkway did not stem from any defect in the walkway, but rather the design of the golf course, which took measures to prevent balls from flying out of the course that proved insufficient. The cases applying section 831.4 immunity to conditions of adjacent property involve natural conditions next to the trail, or integral parts of the trail. Here, the golf course was not an integral part of the trail. The reason for the trail immunity is to encourage municipalities to open up their land to recreation without facing liability for doing so. Here, the liability results from the proximity of the walkway to a revenue producing private facility, which can afford to deal with liability and provides the city with revenue so that it too can address liability. The appellate court also rejected design immunity, because the dangerous condition was design of adjacent private property rather than public property; and the argument that the city adequately warned of golf balls, because there was no evidence the city created the warning signs present and there was a triable issue of fact on whether the signs were adequate. It also rejected an assumption of risk argument: a passerby did not assume the risk of being hit by a golf ball under either primary or secondary assumption of the risk.

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