Source: http://crimmigration.com/2015/09/01/bia-exceptions-must-apply-to-consider-returning-lawful-permanent-residents-as-seeking-admission-to-the-u-s/
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 00:45:23+00:00

Document:
The Board of Immigration Appeals recently held that a returning lawful permanent resident may not be regarded as seeking admission to the United States unless one of the exceptions listed in INA § 101(a)(13)(C) applies. Matter of Pena, 26 I&N Dec. 613, 618 (BIA June 16, 2015).
INA § 101(a)(13)(C). None of the six exceptions apply to Mr. Pena, however, because the immigration judge concluded that Mr. Pena never even satisfied the basic premise of being a lawful permanent resident. Matter of Pena, 26 I&N Dec. at 614.
Mr. Pena is a native and citizen of the Dominican Republic married to a U.S. citizen who filed a visa petition on his behalf. Id. at 613. That petition was approved on September 9, 1996 and Mr. Pena subsequently filed an application for adjustment of status on December 1, 1999. Id. In an interview as part of his application for adjustment of status, Mr. Pena was informed that the Government’s records showed that Mr. Pena had been charged with passport fraud by the Department of State passport office on December 28, 1998. Id. Mr. Pena provided the requested documentation regarding the final disposition of the charges and his application for adjustment of status to lawful permanent resident was granted on June 5, 2000. Id.
Mr. Pena sought to reenter the United States after a trip abroad on May 24, 2010 at which point he gave a sworn statement to immigration officials regarding whether he had ever been arrested. Id. at 614. Mr. Pena told the officials that he had been arrested in 1998 for applying for a U.S. passport with the birth certificate and Social Security card of another person. Id. When asked why he did not report the arrest on his application for adjustment of status, Mr. Pena replied that he did not realize the experience at the Passport Office constituted an arrest. Id. Mr. Pena reported that after he found out he was being investigated, he had voluntarily presented himself at the passport office where he was fingerprinted and released. Id. Mr. Pena also clarified that he had never been charged or convicted of passport fraud or any other offense. Id.
Despite his explanation, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued a notice to appear and charged Mr. Pena as inadmissible based on his alleged fraud and prior ineligibility for adjustment of status based on that fraud. Id. The immigration judge at Mr. Pena’s hearing concluded that his permanent resident status was unlawfully obtained which meant that he could be considered an “arriving alien” and charged as inadmissible under INA § 212(a). Id. According to the immigration judge, applying Matter of Koloamatangi, 23 I&N Dec. 548 (BIA 2003), Mr. Pena never received permanent resident status because his false claim of having never been arrested made him ineligible for adjustment of status at the time that he applied. Id.
The Board disagrees. It concludes that Mr. Pena is not an arriving alien by relying on a plain language reading of the statute along with supporting case law known as the “Fleuti doctrine,” and the long-standing constitutional right of due process that is owed to lawful permanent residents. Id. at 616-18. According to the Board, the plain language of INA § 101(a)(13)(C) specifies that an immigrant with a colorable claim to lawful permanent resident status should not be treated as seeking admission unless he or she falls under one of the statutory exceptions listed. Id. at 616.
Additionally, the “Fleuti doctrine,” which predated INA § 101(a)(13)(C), states that a new entry did not occur when a lawful permanent resident’s trip outside the United States was “innocent, casual, and brief.” Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449, 462 (1963). The Board relies on the interpretation of the “Fleuti doctrine” in Matter of Rangel, 15 I&N Dec. 789, 791-92 (BIA 1976), in which it was held that the correct forum to adjudicate the lawfulness of an original admission is a deportation proceeding, not an exclusion proceeding. The Board analogizes Mr. Pena’s case to that in Matter of Rangel and holds that the proper forum for the determination of his original application for adjustment of status is a deportation proceeding and not an exclusion proceeding. Matter of Pena, 26 I&N Dec. at 617. Furthermore, the Board emphasizes that the decision in Matter of Rangel guarantees the constitutional right of due process that is owed to lawful permanent residents. Id. at 617 (citing Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 30-32 (1982)).
The Board concludes that Mr. Pena is a lawful permanent resident who does not fall under any of the exceptions of INA § 101(a)(13)(C) and therefore cannot be considered an arriving alien. Id. at 620. Because he was not an arriving alien he should not have been charged by DHS under INA § 212(a) and the Board sustains Mr. Pena’s appeal. Id. However, the Board remands Mr. Pena’s case in order to give DHS the opportunity to properly charge him under INA § 237(a). Id. This will also allow the immigration judge to determine whether Mr. Pena obtained his permanent resident status lawfully and, if necessary, permit Mr. Pena to apply for any relief from removal for which he qualifies. Id.
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I’m curious to hear you analysis about how DHS is currently blocking green card holders from re-entering the USA when the INA says lawful permanent resident cannot be considered an arriving alien.
How does the language in President Trump’s latest executive order make it possible for the restrictions to apply to green card holders?
More importantly, INA 101(a)(13) says LPRs are presumed not to be seeking admission. That might help explain why federal courts quickly pushed back.

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