Source: https://www.insuranceexpertplitt.com/blog/injuries/
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 16:52:08+00:00

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Is The Insurer Obligated To Notify The Insured Of Any Inadequacy Of Automobile Liability Coverage?
On behalf of Steven Plitt, Insurance Expert posted in Injuries on Thursday, March 14, 2019.
The question of whether an insurance company had an obligation to provide advice to the insured on the adequacy of liability coverage was recently addressed by the Washington Court of Appeals in Junfang He v. Norris v. Farmers Ins. Co. of America, 415 P.3d 1219 (Wash. App. Div. I, 2018). In this case, the Washington Appellate Court found that there were insufficient grounds to support the insured's claim that the insurance company was responsible for inadequate bodily injury limits that the insured purchased.
On behalf of Steven Plitt, Insurance Expert posted in Injuries on Wednesday, January 2, 2019.
In Hahn v. GEICO Choice Insurance Co., 420 P.3d 1160 (Alaska 2018), the Alaska Supreme Court held that UIM benefits did not extend to a person falling on an insured vehicle after it struck him. In this case, the insured was sitting on his motorcycle while stopped at a traffic signal. The tortfeasor's vehicle struck the insured's motorcycle, throwing the insured backward onto the tortfeasor's vehicle's hood, windshield, and roof. The motorcyclist then landed on the pavement. Focusing on the "upon" language in the GEICO UIM coverage, the motorcyclist attempted to argue that he was an occupant of the tortfeasor's vehicle which was insured by GEICO. The Alaska Supreme Court found this argument to be unreasonable. The Court found that the policy insured covered persons who were actually occupying the vehicle, and not persons who happened to be "upon" the insured vehicle. According to the Court, the concept of "occupying" meant "in, upon, getting into, or getting out of" in accordance with the policy's language. When the phrase was read in context rather than in isolation, the term "upon" was a subset of "occupying." The Court found that no reasonable person would come to the conclusion that the fortuity of where a person's body bounced enroute to being thrown to the pavement allowed for UIM coverage attachment.
By Steven Plitt of Steven Plitt, Insurance Expert posted in Injuries on Friday, September 15, 2017.
The Missouri Supreme Court in Swadley v. Shelter Mutual Insurance Co., 513 S.W.3d 355 (Mo. 2017) held that UIM coverage did not apply when the underinsured motorist had liability coverage limits greater than the insured's underinsured motorist limits. Previously, the Missouri Court of Appeals had explained the purpose of UIM coverage. "The purpose of underinsured motorist coverage is to provide insurance coverage for insureds who have been bodily injured by a negligent motorist whose own automobile liability insurance coverage is insufficient to pay for the injured person's actual damages." Wasson v. Shelter Mutual Insurance Co., 358 S.W. 3d 113, 117 (Mo. App. 2011).
By Steven Plitt of Steven Plitt, Insurance Expert posted in Injuries on Friday, September 8, 2017.
The Mississippi Supreme Court in Rylee v. Progressive Gulf Insurance Co., 2017 WL 949545 (Miss. Mar. 9, 2017) found that a UIM policy's "each person" limit applied not only to a husband's bodily injury claim, but also to the wife's loss of consortium claim, i.e., loss of consortium claims are part of the "each person" limit and are not afforded a separate "each person" limit. The court noted that on two separate prior occasions, the court had interpreted similar policy language and reached the same conclusion that to recover more than the "each person" limit for one person, there must be more than one person who sustained bodily injury during the accident. Citing State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co. v. Acosta, 479 S.2d 1089, 1090‑91 (1985) and Old Sec. Cas. Insurance v. Clemmer, 455 S.2d 781, 782 (Miss. 1984). Because the wife in the case at bar was not with her husband during the crash, her husband was the only person who sustained bodily injury in the accident. Therefore, the wife's loss of consortium claim fell under the "each person" policy limit available to the husband. The court also noted that the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals relied upon the Acosta decision when it rejected a similar claim. See, Reed v. State Farm Mutual Insurance, 784 F.2d 577, 578-79 (5th Cir. 1986).
By Steven Plitt of Steven Plitt, Insurance Expert posted in Injuries on Friday, June 23, 2017.
By Steven Plitt of Steven Plitt, Insurance Expert posted in Bad Faith on Friday, April 14, 2017.
In Barickman v. Mercury Cas. Co., 2 Cal.App.5th 508, 206 Cal.Rptr.3d 699 (2d Dist. 2016), an insurance company's refusal to consent to additional release language which was designed to preserve the claimant's rights to receive criminal restitution from the insured tortfeasor caused the case not to settle and, as a result, it was found that the insurance company breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by not doing all that it could do within its power to effectuate the settlement.
By Steven Plitt of Steven Plitt, Insurance Expert posted in Injuries on Friday, January 27, 2017.
In Arceneaux, et al. v. Amstar Corp., et al., 299 So.3d 277, 2015-0588(La., 9/7/16), the Louisiana Supreme Court allocated the costs of defending long legacy disease claims between the insurer and insured based on a time-on-the-risk allocation model. Under existing Louisiana law, an insurer's duty to indemnify was to be prorated among insurance carriers based on a time-on-the-risk approach the insurance carriers that were on the risk during the period of exposure to the injurious conditions. While the law in Louisiana was settled regarding time-on-the-risk pro rata allocation applying to indemnification, there was no Louisiana precedent on whether the insurer's duty to defend could also be pro rated among the insurers and the insured during periods of self-insurance in long latency disease cases. The Court then adopted the time-on-risk method of allocation for defense costs, adopting the reasoning of the Sixth Circuit United States Court of Appeals in Ins. Co. of North America v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1980), clarified on re'hrg 657 F.2nd 814 (6th Cir. 1981), cert denied, 454 U.S. 1109 (1981). The Louisiana Court found that the pro rata allocated scheme was an equitable system.
By Steven Plitt of Steven Plitt, Insurance Expert posted in Injuries on Friday, November 4, 2016.
In United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Fendi Adele S.R.I., 823 F.3d 146 (2nd Cir. 2016), the United States Court of Appeals held in favor of USF&G finding that USF&G's policy did not provide coverage for the legal liability of its insured for selling counterfeit handbags and other goods with counterfeit brand labels. The insured, Ashley Reed Trading, Inc., was in the business of purchasing and selling off-price branded handbags and other luxury goods. Ashley Reed was insured by USF&G under two liability policies for "advertising injury." Under the policies, "advertising injury" was defined by the policies as the act of "attracting the attention of others by any means for the purpose of seeking customers or supporters or increasing sales or business." The policies listed four advertising injury offenses which included the "use of another's advertising idea in your 'advertising,'" as well as "infringement of another's copyright, trade dress or slogan in your 'advertising.'"
Does a Parent Corporation Have Standing to Bring a Declaratory Judgment Action Against One of Its Subsidiaries Insurers? This question was recently answered by the California Court of Appeals.
By Steven Plitt of Steven Plitt, Insurance Expert posted in Insurance Law on Friday, October 21, 2016.
The California Court of Appeals recently held in D.Cummins Corp. v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 246 Cal.App.4th, 201 Cal.Rptr.3d 585 (1st Dist., 2016), that a parent corporation lacked standing to sue one of its subsidiary's insurers for declaratory relief. In this case, the parent corporation did not qualify as an insured under the subsidiary's liability policies. Therefore, the Court held that the parent company lacked standing to seek a declaratory judgment establishing the duties of the subsidiary's liability insurers to defend and indemnify for asbestos claims. The Court found that a mere practical interest in the outcome of a contractual dispute was not sufficient to establish standing. Under the Declaratory Judgment Act the plaintiff must show the existence of an "actual controversy" which required the court to evaluate the rights and duties that the plaintiff was asserting in making a standing determination. The Court found that the parent corporation's responsibility for the subsidiary's litigation strategy, which included making decisions about when to settle the personal injury actions, did not give the parent corporation sufficient direct in the subsidiary's liability policy to support jurisdiction. The California Declaratory Judgment Act gave discretion to the trial court in which the court could refuse to exercise the power granted by the Act in any case where the declaration or determination was not necessary or proper at the time under all of the circumstances presented. When the trial court declined jurisdiction under the Act, the trial court's decision would be viewed on an abuse of discretion standard.

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