Source: http://masscases.com/cases/sjc/362/362mass382.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 00:55:03+00:00

Document:
COMMONWEALTH vs. EMMITT THOMPSON, JR.
Present: TAURO, C.J., SPIEGEL, REARDON, & HENNESSEY, JJ.
At the trial of indictments, testimony by two witnesses that they had identified the defendant at a police station was admissible to contradict their inability to identify the defendant at the trial [385-386]; introduction in evidence of one of the witnesses' out-of-court identification before her contradictory in-court statement was made was a matter within the judge's discretion .
INDICTMENTS found and returned in the Superior Court on February 8, 1967.
A motion for a new trial was heard by Brogna, J.
Paul J. Driscoll for the defendant.
Paul V. Buckley, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.
REARDON, J. In a trial held March 8-10, 1967, subject to G. L. c. 278, Sections 33A-33G, the defendant was convicted by a jury on three indictments charging assault and battery, and three indictments charging assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon, the crimes having been allegedly committed on November 28, 1966.
In the early morning of November 28, 1966, three white females and one white male were assaulted by two black males in the Park Square area of Boston. At a police station about one week after the incident, Miss Helen Fuller, one of the female victims, identified the defendant at a time when he was the only black man in a room. However, at the time of the assault Miss Fuller had had an opportunity to view the defendant in a well-lighted restaurant over a period of about five minutes. She had also, before the police station confrontation, identified the defendant as he emerged with others from a Boston nightclub.
trial judge reported his findings. He reviewed the evidence regarding Miss Fuller and concluded that "her in-court identification was not tainted by any prior improper out-of-court identification or confrontation."
In so ruling, the judge impliedly found that the confrontation was not "so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification that . . . [the defendant] was denied due process of law." Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302. The defendant has been at great pains to emphasize evidence that would permit findings of fact contrary to those made by the judge. But the weight and credibility due the evidence, especially when it is oral testimony, are to be decided by the trial judge who hears the witnesses. It is not a function of this court on appellate review. Commonwealth v. McGrath, 361 Mass. 431, 437. The judge's decision, to the extent that it involves such findings of fact, is supported by our examination of the evidence in the transcript. The judge decided, in effect, that Miss Fuller's in-court identification of the defendant was "clearly and convincingly shown to have a source independent" of the improper police station confrontation. Cooper v. Picard, 316 F. Supp. 856, 864 (D. Mass.). Allen v. Moore, 453 F. 2d 970 (1st Cir.). There was no error in the admission of Miss Fuller's identification testimony.
v. Geetigan, 252 Mass. 450, 459. Commonwealth v. Rudnick, 318 Mass. 45, 61. Such evidence is admissible for the limited purpose of contradicting the witness. It possesses no evidential value and standing alone would be insufficient to support a guilty verdict. Commonwealth v. Turner, 224 Mass. 229, 237. Gibbs v. State, 7 Md. App. 35. See Kavanaugh v. Colombo, 304 Mass. 379, 381. There was no error in its admission. Although Miss Shea's statements regarding her pre-trial identification of the defendant as her assailant were introduced in evidence before her contradictory in-court statement was made, the order of introduction of this evidence was a matter of discretion for the judge (see Grace v. Monroe, 280 Mass. 184, 187).
identification of the defendant has not been directly challenged. Thus, in the light of the "totality of the circumstances" (Gregory v. United States, 410 F. 2d 1016, 1022 (D. C. Cir.), the error, if any, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
The second issue posed in this appeal by the defendant springs from his contention that he was denied due process of law because the Commonwealth failed to inform him that one Michael A. Bolis was present when Miss Fuller was assaulted on November 28, 1966. On April 21, 1967, the judge denied a motion for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence, the basis of which was an affidavit by Bolis. In the second motion for a new trial, the primary basis for the contention that the Commonwealth had unconstitutionally suppressed evidence favorable to the defendant was that affidavit and a second affidavit of Bolis dated February 24, 1971. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, held at page 87 "that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." We do not think that any such evidence was involved here.
room." Bolis in this first affidavit stated that the man held in custody had not been in the restaurant at the time of the attack. It could have been found on the basis of this first affidavit that the affiant was absent during the assault. That being so, such evidence could hardly be favorable to the accused and material to the issue of guilt. See Clarke v. Burke, 440 F. 2d 853, 855-856 (7th Cir.).
The 1971 affidavit of Bolis contains evidence very favorable to the defendant which, taken on its face, might indeed be material to the issue of guilt. Here Bolis expanded his account beyond what he had said in the first affidavit. The judge noted the passage of time and stated his doubt as to the reliability of the expanded material. He stated that such material would not warrant a new trial, in effect disbelieving the exculpatory contents of the second affidavit. This was not error. "The weight and import of the affidavits submitted in support of the defendant's motion were for the trial judge's discretion." Commonwealth v. Heffernan, 350 Mass. 48, 53. Commonwealth v. Crapo, 212 Mass. 209, 210. Commonwealth v. Millen, 290 Mass. 406, 410. Commonwealth v. Bernier, 359 Mass. 13, 16.
We conclude that the second motion for a new trial was properly denied.
Order denying second motion for new trial affirmed.
[Note 1] The case arose before the date of United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, and Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263. Hence the defendant does not claim that the out-of-court identifications by the witnesses violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
[Note 2] The Commonwealth argues that the defendant is precluded from raising questions arising from the pre-trial identification of the defendant by the three female victims and from the alleged suppression of evidence material to the issue of guilt because they were not raised at trial. However, in this case, on the motion for a new trial, the judge did consider these questions and they are thus properly before us. Commonwealth v. Blondin, 324 Mass. 564, 566-567. Commonwealth v. McGrath, 361 Mass. 431, 435, n. 2.

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