Source: https://connecticut.lexroll.com/112-wash-st-llc-v-norwalk-zba-no-fst-cv-05-4003643-s-dec-5-2007/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 12:06:47+00:00

Document:
The record establishes the following facts: Plaintiff, 112 Washington Street, LLC (“112 Washington”), is the owner of commercial property located at 112 Washington Street in South Norwalk. Plaintiff, So No Entertainment Group, LLC (“So No”), former owner of the tavern, is now merely the owner of bar equipment located on the first floor and in the basement of 112 Washington Street. A third party, L1uvia Company, LLC, which is not a party to the appeal, leases the first floor and basement from 112 Washington and presently operates the tavern on the subject premises.
On December 20, 2004 the plaintiffs, acting pursuant to General Statutes § 8-6(a)(1), appealed the decisions of the Deputy Zoning Enforcement Officer to the Board. The Board held a public hearing on the plaintiffs’ appeal on February 3, 2005. After hearing the evidence, the Board voted unanimously to uphold all decisions of the Deputy Zoning Enforcement Officer.
An appeal from a decision by a zoning board of appeals is statutory in nature and the standard of review by the Superior Court is well established. The Supreme Court has succinctly stated the standards applicable to an appeal such as this one. “Following an appeal from the action of a zoning enforcement officer to a zoning board of appeals a court reviewing the decision of the zoning board of appeal must focus, not on the decision of the zoning enforcement officer, but on the decision of the board and the record before the board. Caserta v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 226 Conn. 435, 440, 586 A.2d 590 (1991). See als New London v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 29 Conn.App. 402, 405, cert. denied, 224 Conn. 922 (1992).
(2001). “It is well settled that a court in reviewing the actions of an administrative agency, is not permitted to substitute its judgment for that of the agency or to make factual determinations on its own.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) R R Pool Patio, Id. “Moreover, the plaintiffs bear the burden of establishing that the board acted improperly.” Wood v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 258 Conn. 691, 698 (2001).
“In reviewing a decision of a zoning board, a reviewing court is bound by the substantial evidence rule, according to which, [c]onclusions reached by [a zoning agency] must be upheld by the trial court if they reasonably supported by the record. The credibility of the witnesses and the determination of issues of fact are matters solely within the province of the [agency] . . . The question is not whether the trial court would have reached the same conclusion, but whether the record before the [agency] supports the decision reached. If a trial court finds that there is substantial evidence to support a zoning board’s findings, it cannot substitute its judgment for that of the board. If there is conflicting evidence in support of the zoning commission’s stated rationale, the reviewing court . . . cannot substitute its judgment as to the weight of the evidence for that of the [agency] . . . The agency’s decision must be sustained if an examination of the record discloses evidence that supports anyone of the reasons given.” CT Page 20862 (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Municipal Funding, LLC v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 270 Conn. 447, 453, 853 A.2d 511 (2004); Jaser v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 43 Conn.App. 545, 547-48, 684 A.2d 735 (1996).
“[A zoning] board is endowed with a liberal discretion, and its [actions are] subject to review by the courts only to determine whether [they were] unreasonable, arbitrary or illegal.” (Internal quotation markes omitted.) Francini v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 228 Conn. 785, 791, 639 A.2d 519 (1994). The same standard applies when appeals are taken from a board’s action in connection with an appeal from the decision of a zoning enforcement officer. Lawrence v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 158 Conn. 509, 515, 264 A.2d 552 (1969).
Mr. Lowenthal: I would concur. Everything that I CT Page 20863 have seen from April 1998 through the letter that Attorney Millici presented confirmed the agreement. It should be pretty clear to the proprietor that no live music was to be presented and infer that there was otherwise. So I agree we should uphold the Cease and Desist order.
Ms. Carbone: with that I will uphold the cease CT Page 20864 and desist order requiring the property owner to submit plans and application in accordance with Sections 118-501AB, 118-1110 and 118-1420, EG, modification of plans of Washington Street design district, property located at 112 Washington Street. Do I hear a second? All in favor say Aye. All opposed.
1. Section 118-501 which concerns the Washington Street Design District. Subsection A states the purpose and intent of the regulations. Subsection B states that the entire district is within the coastal boundary and is therefore subject to coast site plan review requirements under Section 116-1110. Subsection B further lists uses which are permitted in the district and those permitted by special permit.
2. Section 118-1110 deals with coastal site plan review. Subsection C. (4) of the regulations states “Any extension or change of an existing structure or use permitted by coastal site plan review which substantially changes its character or intensity shall require a new coastal site plan review.” However, nothing in the regulations purports regulate the interior layout of any permitted use. In fact, Section 118-1110(E)(1)(g) expressly provides: . . .”The following uses and structures shall be exempt from coastal site plan review: Interior modifications to buildings.” That exemption is authorized by General Statutes § 22a-109(b).
3. Section 118-1420 concerns the powers and responsibilities of the Zoning Inspector under the Regulations. Subsection D requires plans to be submitted to the Zoning Inspector prior to construction so that he may determine “the propriety of the proposed construction or addition.” Subsection E makes it unlawful to construct or alter any building without approval from the Zoning Inspector. Subsection G prohibits the occupancy of land or buildings (excluding dwellings) without a certificate of zoning compliance.
In its brief the Board claims that the plaintiffs waived their right CT Page 20865 to disagree with the findings of the deputy zoning enforcement office when they failed to raise any objections to the issuance of a conditional certificate of zoning compliance reserving judgment on the legality of the disk jockey booth on the lower level. The Board claims that by waiting until the issuance of a cease and desist order the plaintiffs lost their chance to be heard on whether the interior placement of the disc jockey booth was regulated by the Norwalk Zoning Regulations. The court finds nothing in the law which allows zoning enforcement officials to extend their power to otherwise unregulated activities simply because of the failure of property owners to object at the earliest possible time.
The court concludes that the Board has failed to state a valid reason for its decision on the record as required by General Statutes § 8-7. However, because of the absence of an actual written decision and in the interests of judicial economy, the court will consider that the board has not stated any reasons for its decision “upon its records.” “Where a zoning board of appeals does not formally state the reasons for its decision, however, the trial court must search the record for a basis for the board’s decision.” Bloom v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 233 Conn. 198, 208 (1995). “If any reason culled from the record demonstrates a real or reasonable relationship to the general welfare of the community, the decision . . . must be upheld.” Parks v. Zoning Commission, 178 Conn. 657, 661-62 (1979).
The Temporary Certificate of Zoning Compliance dated July 22, 2004 lists as a condition: “Upon resolution of issue regarding live music/disc jockey, selection dated July 20, 2004.
The appeal of plaintiff 112 Washington Street, LLC is sustained. Since the plaintiff, So No Entertainment Group LLC, failed to establish aggrievement, that plaintiff’s appeal is dismissed.

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