Source: https://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-supreme-court/325/79.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 13:10:49+00:00

Document:
[325 U.S. 79, 80] Messrs. Richard R. Fitzsimmons and William D. Sellers, both of Chicago, Ill., for petitioner.
Mr. T. Hayward Brown, of Washington, D.C., for respondent.
The question presented is whether a District Court has jurisdiction of a suit under R.S. 49151 to review the refusal of a claim for patent as not reading on the application. The court below answered in the negative.
The respondent confesses error. The language of the Act, its legislative history, administrative practice, and judicial construction, constrain us to hold that the District Court had jurisdiction of the suit and that the Court of Appeals should have reviewed its decision upon the merits.
January 10, 1941, the petitioner's assignor filed application for a reissue of a patent granted November 7, 1939, on an original application of August 8, 1936. The alleged invention is for improvements in a refrigerating system. A number of claims included in the application for reissue were copied, or substantially copied, from several later patents, in order to provoke interferences therewith and a contest as to priority of invention.
The Primary Examiner finally rejected four of the claims, stating that they were rejected 'as not reading on applicant's disclosure ... .' The Board of Appeals of the Pat- [325 U.S. 79, 81] ent Office affirmed the Examiner's decision. The petitioner then brought suit against the Commissioner of Patents under R.S. 4915 in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, to compel him to allow the four claims, to the end that interference proceedings might be instituted. The case was heard on the Patent Office record and additional evidence. The court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law and dismissed the complaint on the ground that the claims did not read on, that is, did not accurately describe, the disclosure in the application.
The court below held that in conformity to the general rule, a court of equity ought not to afford piecemeal relief pending completion of the administrative process, and consequently ought not to entertain a suit under the statute unless its adjudication would conclude all possible questions as to the right to a patent.
1. On its face the statute confers the right to sue 'Whenever a patent on application is refused by the Board of Appeals ....' The patent applied for (that is, the claims in question) was finally refused by the Board of Appeals. No appeal was taken to the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, and petitioner filed its bill within the time limited in the section.
The question is whether the differences in the character of the proceedings and the statutory effect of decision or adjudication require a holding that as to all decisions on the merits adverse to the applicant, other than the final action as to the issue of a patent, the applicant must obtain review by appeal to the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, and can proceed by bill under R.S. 4915 only when every step requisite to issue has been taken. If so, [325 U.S. 79, 84] the language of R.S. 4915 is ill chosen. 'Whenever a patent on application is refused' states precisely this case. The petitioner's application was refused. 'Whenever any applicant is dissatisfied with the decision of the board of interference examiners' states a case where the examiner's decision may be only one of a series of rulings in the Patent Office prior to issue of a patent. It can hardly be that these phrases have no effect and are to be read as 'Whenever, after all administrative steps are complete and a patent is about to issue, any person aggrieved may have remedy by bill in equity.' If that be the correct construction, one finally denied a patent could not resort to the specified remedy, since, even if his contention were sustained, he might thereafter have to leap the hurdles in the Patent Office of interferences, later references, and other obstacles to patentability.
On the face of the statutes the applicant is given alternative remedies resulting in the same sort of relief so far as concerns the further prosecution of the application in the Patent Office.
2. The legislative history confirms the view that Congress so intended.
Thus a District Court might set aside, on bill filed, any ruling refusing a patent, either on interference or otherwise, whether the ruling were that of the Patent Office or of a judge of the Circuit Court of the District of Columbia on appeal from the Patent Office decision.
By the Act of February 9, 189319 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia was created and jurisdiction of summary appeals from Patent Office rulings was transferred to that court. Thus the remedy by bill in equity was now to be pursued in a District court only after an appeal to the Court of Appeals of the District had resulted adversely to the applicant; and an adjudication in the equity suit was subject to review on appeal.
Finally, the Act of March 2, 192923 transferred from the Court of Appeals of the District to the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals jurisdiction of appeals from the Patent Office, but ex industria provided 'Nothing contained in this Act shall be construed as affecting in any way the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia in equity cases.' 28 U.S.C.A. 309a. This was of course to make it plain that suits in the District Court of the District of Columbia should be appealable as are suits under R.S. 4915 instituted in district courts in circuits outside the District.
Thus it is clear that throughout more than a century Congress has for correction of erroneous adverse rulings, which if unreversed would end the proceedings in the Patent Office, preserved the remedy by bill in a district court [325 U.S. 79, 88] either as additional to or alternative to that by summary appeal and has made the effect of adjudication in equity the same as that of decision on appeal.
The ruling of the Board of Appeals in the instant case was neither a procedural ruling31 nor an interlocutory one32 as to which the District Court should not entertain a suit under R.S. 4915. On the contrary, it finally denied a patent on the claims presented. In this respect it was like a dismissal of a suit in a court. Unless the applicant could sue to correct error in that dismissal, he could never sue under R.S. 4915. That he was accorded a right of suit in this case the language of the statute, its history, the administrative construction and judicial decision unite in affirming.
[ Footnote 1 ] 35 U.S.C. 63, 35 U.S.C.A. 63.
[ Footnote 2 ] App.D.C., 144 F.2d 514.
[ Footnote 3 ] See R.S. 4914, 35 U.S.C. 62, 35 U.S.C.A. 62.
[ Footnote 4 ] Butterworth v. Hoe, 112 U.S. 50, 61 , 5 S.Ct. 25, 31.
[ Footnote 5 ] R.S. 4911, supra.
[ Footnote 6 ] 5 Stat. 117.
[ Footnote 7 ] Sec. 7, 5 Stat. 119, 120.
[ Footnote 8 ] Sec. 16, 5 Stat. 123.
[ Footnote 9 ] 5 Stat. 191.
[ Footnote 10 ] Sec. 10, 5 Stat. 354.
[ Footnote 11 ] 5 Stat. 354.
[ Footnote 12 ] By the Act of August 30, 1852, 10 Stat. 75, such summary appeal might be heard by any judge of the Circuit Court of the District of Columbia.
[ Footnote 13 ] 16 Stat. 198.
[ Footnote 14 ] 16 Stat. 205.
[ Footnote 15 ] Sec. 50, 16 Stat. 205, 35 U.S.C.A. 62.
[ Footnote 16 ] Kirk v. Commissioner of Patents, C.D. 440; Fekete v. Robertson, 57 App.D.C. 73, 17 F.2d 335; Cooper v. Robertson, D.C., 38 F.2d 852.
[ Footnote 17 ] The relevant sections are 4911-4915 inclusive, 35 U.S.C.A. 59a- 63.
[ Footnote 18 ] 2 Cong.Rec. 646.
[ Footnote 19 ] 27 Stat. 434, 436.
[ Footnote 20 ] 44 Stat. 1335.
[ Footnote 21 ] H.R. No. 1889, pp. 2-3; S.R. No. 1313, p. 4, 69th Cong., 2d Sess.
[ Footnote 22 ] See H.R.1889, supra, p. 3; Hearings, House Committee on Patents, on H.R. 6252 and H.R. 7087, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 21-22; Hearings, House Committee on Patents, on H.R. 7563 and H.R. 13487, 69th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 11; Hearings, Senate Committee on Patents, on S. 4812, 69th Cong ., 2d Sess., p. 15; Hearings, House Committee on the Judiciary, on H.R. 6687, 70th Cong., 1st Sess., passim; cf. Hearings, House Committee on Patents, on H.R. 7563 and H.R. 13487, 69th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 31; Hearings, House Committee on Patents on H.R. 6252 and H.R. 7087, 69th Cong ., 1st Sess., p. 79.
[ Footnote 23 ] 45 Stat. 1475.
[ Footnote 24 ] Gandy v. Marble, 122 U.S. 432, 439 , 7 S.Ct. 1290, 1292; In re Hien, 166 U.S. 432, 439 , 17 S.Ct. 624, 627; Frasch v. Moore, 211 U.S. 1, 8 , 9 S., 29 S.Ct. 6, 7, 8; American Foundries Co. v. Robertson, 262 U.S. 209, 212 , 213 S., 43 S.Ct. 541, 542, 543; United States ex rel. Baldwin Co. v. Robertson, 265 U.S. 168, 180 , 181 S., 44 S.Ct. 508, 510, 511.
[ Footnote 25 ] Dilg v. Moore, 34 App.D.C. 106; E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. Coe, 67 App.D.C. 42, 89 F.2d 679; Pitman v. Coe, 62 App.D.C. 365, 68 F.2d 412; Power Patents Co. v. Coe, 71 App.D.C. 369, 110 F.2d 550; Tully v. Robertson, D.C., 19 F.2d 954; Monopower Corp. v. Coe, D.C., 33 F.Supp. 934; Booth Fisheries Corp. v. Coe, 72 App.D.C. 195, 114 F.2d 462; Forward Process Co. v. Coe, 73 App.D.C. 100, 116 F.2d 946.
[ Footnote 26 ] Pitman v. Coe, supra; International Cellucotton Co. v. Coe, 66 App. D.C. 248, 85 F.2d 869; American Cyanimid Co. v. Coe, 70 App.D.C. 330, 106 F.2d 851.
[ Footnote 27 ] American Steel & Wire Co. v. Coe, 70 App.D.C. 138, 105 F.2d 17; Abercrombie v. Coe, 73 App.D.C. 391, 119 F.2d 458; General Motors Corp. v. Coe, 74 App.D.C. 189, 120 F.2d 736; Radtke Patents Corp. v. Coe, 74 App.D. C. 251, 122 F.2d 937; Hydraulic Press Corp. v. Coe, 75 U.S.App.D.C. 159, 124 F.2d 521; Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Coe, 75 U.S.App.D.C. 131, 125 F.2d 198; Poulsen v. McDowell, Cust. & Pat.App., 142 F.2d 267.
[ Footnote 28 ] Gold v. Newton, 2 Cir., 254 F. 824.
[ Footnote 29 ] Section 16 of the Act of 1836, 5 Stat. 123, supra, expressly provided that upon a bill filed as a result of Patent Office decision on an interference the court might adjudge either of the patents void in whole or in part. This language was evidently omitted in later acts as surplusage, for obviously if either patent was void for lack of invention or other cause, the question of interference disappeared.
[ Footnote 30 ] This is equally true of Radtke Patents Corp. v. Coe, 74 App.D.C. 251, 122 F.2d 937, on which the court below relied.
[ Footnote 31 ] Butterworth v. Hoe, 112 U.S. 50 , 5 S.Ct. 25; Shoemaker v. Robertson, 60 App.D.C. 345, 54 F.2d 456; Chessin v. Robertson, 61 App.D.C. 376, 63 F.2d 267; Cherry-Burrell Corp. v. Coe, App.D.C., 143 F. 2d 372.
[ Footnote 32 ] American Cable Co. v. John A. Roebling's Sons Co., 62 App.D.C. 168, 65 F.2d 801; Synthetic Plastics Co. v. Ellis-Foster Co., 3 Cir., 78 F.2d 847.

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