Source: https://patentlygerman.com/category/european-patent-convention/
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 02:24:32+00:00

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In the assessment of inventive step, can the computer-implemented simulation of a technical system or process solve a technical problem by producing a technical effect which goes beyond the simulation’s implementation on a computer, if the computer-implemented simulation is claimed as such?
If the answer to the first question is yes, what are the relevant criteria for assessing whether a computer-implemented simulation claimed as such solves a technical problem? In particular, is it a sufficient condition that the simulation is based, at least in part, on technical principles underlying the simulated system or process?
What are the answers to the first and second questions if the computer-implemented simulation is claimed as part of a design process, in particular for verifying a design?
The EPO case law on computer-implemented inventions has been quite stable for the last fifteen years. In particular, there has not been any decision of the Enlarged Board of Appeal (EBA) on this topic since G 3/08 of 12 May 2010.
Basically, a computer-implemented invention can be patented if it solves a technical problem by producing a technical effect. For the assessment of inventive step over the prior art only those features are taken into account, which contribute to the technical character of the invention.
There is, however, no general definition of what is “technical”.
The Technical Board of Appeal 3.5.07 (TBA) now has with decision of 22 February 2019 referred to the EBA the above three questions relating to the patentability of computer-implemented simulation methods. A decision by the EBA could have far-reaching consequences for applicants of computer-implemented inventions in Europe.
The invention disclosed in European patent application No. 03793825.5 and published as WO 2004/023347 A2 relates to a computer-implemented method of modelling the pedestrian crowd movement in an environment such as a train station.
The modelling can be used to help design or modify the venue (e.g. train station) and for that purpose achieve a more accurate and realistic simulation of pedestrian crowds in real-world situations. The application is based on the insight that human interaction can be expressed and modelled in the same way as interactions of physical objects as e.g. electrons in a semiconductor device.
In other words, if the system or method to be simulated is sufficiently technical (expressed in engineering-heavy language ?), then the simulation method itself is also a technical method and for the assessment of inventive step has to be compared with prior art simulation methods, not with the functioning of a general purpose computer.
In effect, the question to decide here is if the required technical effect of a simulation method can be provided not only in the way the simulation program is running on the computer – then the relevant prior art is a general purpose computer – or if this technical effect can be provided also by technical properties of the simulated system (here: the design of the train station; in T 1227/05: the electronic circuit). If the design of a train station with staircases, exits, shops etc. is regarded in the same way as a technical subject matter as the design of an electronic circuit (which in my personal view should not be in doubt), then questions 1 and 2 have to be answered in the affirmative.
The outcome of the referral has in my view implications far beyond simulation programs, for example also to inventions based on machine learning (ML). If you replace in the referral questions “simulation” by “machine learning process”, the same issues arise.
There can be no doubt: If the first two questions of the referral are not answered in the affirmative by the EBA, applicants of various types of computer-implemented inventions in Europe will be in trouble.
The patent dispute relating to the revolutionary CRISPR-Cas9 gene-editing technology between the Broad Institute (jointly operated by Harvard and MIT) on the one side and UC Berkeley on the other side is followed by the biotech community with great interest .
Broad Institute has been the first one to get a patent issued on CRISPR-Cas9 technology in Europe, namely EP 2 771 468. Against this patent, 9 oppositions have been filed, most of which so-called strawman oppositions. The oral hearing finalizing the first instance of the opposition proceedings has been scheduled to take place on 16-19 January at the EPO in Munich. In the preliminary opinion issued together with the summons to the oral hearing, the oppisition division took a non-binding provisional view that the four priorities P1, P2, P5, and P11 cannot be validly claimed by the patentee, because the priority right had not been validly transferred to the applicants of PCT application forming the basis of the granted EP patent.
The decision was issued already in the early afternoon of the second day of the hearing: The opposition division maintained its position laid out in the provisional opinion and decided that the patent proprietor cannot validly claim priorities P1, P2, P5, and P11. As a consequence the claims as granted (main request) were revoked on the ground of lack of novelty. The 64 auxiliary requests filed by the patent proprietor were not admitted to the proceedings. The patent was thus revoked in full. The course of the oral proceedings can be seen in this twitter thread.
In short, the grounds for losing the essential priority rights are as follows: In order to validly claim priority right of a European patent application either directly filed or as a national phase of a PCT application (as in the present case), either (i) the applicant of the priority application and of the later application are identical or (ii) the applicant of the priority application assigns the application to the applicant of the later application, or (iii) the applicant of the priority application assigns the priority right to the applicant of the later application.
The assignments of the application or the priority right must have occurred before the filing of the later application (here: the PCT application), since, for reasons of legal certainty, a retroactive effect is excluded. However proof of such transfer may be provided later.
Furthermore, in case of more than one joint applicants of the priority application, each applicant of the priority application must either be also applicant of the later application or have assigned the application or the priority right to one of the applicants of the later application before the later application date. This was not the case for the priority applications P1, P2, P5, and P11. One of the applicants (and inventors) of these US provisional priority applications was no longer applicant of the PCT application and did not assign the right to the application or the priority right to one of the applicants of the PCT application. As a harsh consequence, the applicants of the PCT application and proprietors of the European Patent lost priorities P1, P2, P5, and P11. Without entitle-ment to these priorities, the subject-matter of the granted claims lacked novelty over the prior art on record.
The written decision of the opposition division can be expected in approximately two to three months. In a press release issued shortly after the decision on priority and before announcement of the full decision, the Broad Institute already announced to lodge an appeal against the finding of the opposition division.
Disclaimer: Neither I myself nor the patent firm Betten & Resch, of which I am a partner, are involved in any patent cases relating to CRISPR-cas9 technology.
In the assessment of inventive step, the business person is just as fictional as the skilled person of Article 56 EPC. The notion of the skilled person is an artificial one; that is the price paid for an objective assessment. So it is too with the business person, who represents an abstraction or shorthand for a separation of business considerations from technical. A real business person, a real technically-skilled person, or a real inventor does not hold such considerations separately from one another.
Outsourcing a commercial transaction such as the authentication of an online purchase transaction to a different computing device cannot in all cases be abstracted to a purely business activity because it may encompass technical aspects such as the use of plug-ins and servers.
If a prima-facie technical prejudice existed at the relevant date against the outsourcing of a commercial transaction such as the authentication of an online purchase transaction to a different computing device, then this outsourcing involves an inventive step.
The patent application allowed by the decision T 1658/15 of the Technical Boards of Appeal of 29 November 2016 relates to online payment systems.
To complete an online purchase transaction in such systems, the buyer has to be authenticated. The online store passes information about the intended transaction to the credit-card company, which handles the task of ensuring the buyer is entitled to use the chosen payment instrument, and which informs the online shop of the outcome of the authentication procedure. The technical implementation of this authentication involves the server of the online shop communicating with the computer of the credit-card company. This communication is according to the prior art handled by a “plug-in” in the merchant server, a piece of software specific to the particular authenticating authority and to the needs of the authentication process. Different plug-ins are provided for different payment instruments. The update and maintenance of these different authentication plug-ins requires substantial resources of the operator of the merchant server.
To overcome these problems, the claimed invention in the decided case provides a separate computer called “merchant authentication processing system” (MAPS) handling the interface functionality with the authenticating servers, which was previously handled by the corresponding plug-ins of the merchant server. The invention thus replaces the three-machine prior art (buyer computer, merchant server, authenticating server) with a four-machine system (buyer computer, merchant server, authenticating server, and merchant authentication processing system). The invention thus differs from the prior art in the system architecture, namely replacing the several plug-ins for different payment instruments at the merchant server by a separate merchant authentication processing system. The advantage achieved by the invention is to reduce the service costs for the merchant. In addition, the operator of the merchant authentication processing system can offer this service to several different merchants and thus enjoy economies of scale for operating the authentication interface service for the authentication process.
According to the established case law of the EPO (following T 0641/00: Two identities/COMVIK) only technical features of an invention comprising technical and non-technical features can contribute to the inventive step. The technical features are separated from the non-technical features. The non-technical features are implied as being known to the skilled person and only the technical features are compared with the closest prior art. It is then assessed which technical problem is solved by the distinguishing technical features and whether or not this technical solution of the technical problem would have been obvious for the skilled person at the priority date of the application.
This approach often results in a novel and non-obvious technical concept to be divided into a novel and non-obvious concept itself, which is deemed non-technical, lying in the field of business or organization, and the distinguishing technical features, which are regarded only as straightforward technical (mostly software) implementation, which is obvious for the technically skilled person leading to the refusal of the patent application. The “Comvik-Approach” thus often unduly reduces the chances of success of computer-implemented inventions compared to inventions in other technical fields.
“Thus, the notional business person might not do things a real business person would. He would not require the use of the internet, wireless, or XXXX processors. This approach ensures that, in line with the Comvik principle, all the technical matter, including known or even notorious matter, is considered for obviousness and can contribute to inventive step.
Applying these principles to the concrete case, the Board finds “that the transaction authentication in the present case cannot be abstracted to a purely business activity because it has aspects such as the use of plug-ins and servers.” Therefore, “the decision to centralise the plug-ins in a separate server that can be accessed by several merchant servers, in order to simplify installation and maintenance and reduce load, should be considered a technical matter”.
The Board considered that it might have been obvious for the skilled person seeking to simplify the merchant server or the installation or updating of plug-ins to locate the authentication interface functionality at a separate server that could be accessed by various merchants’ servers. On the other hand, at the priority date of the application a number of technical considerations spoke against relocation of the plug-ins, as increased latency, increased bandwidth requirements and security considerations. On balance, the Board concluded, there existed “a prima facie case for technical prejudice” against relocating the plug-ins to a separate server and the invention thus is to be regarded as involving an inventive step.
According to the Board´s decision, the selection of a favorable system architecture for a particular technical issue is thus to be regarded as a patentable invention if its technical implementation is not obvious even if such system architecture may be regarded obvious from a business perspective.
The technical problem solved by the claimed invention in the decided case can thus not simply be formulated as “to reduce the maintenance and update requirements of the merchant server” as this would be not a technical, but a commercial problem. The business person intending to solve this commercial problem would in turn formulate for the technically skilled person the technical problem “to provide a technical solution to reduce maintenance and update requirements of the merchant server”. The skilled person would thus consider – independently from any business considerations – different options to solve this technical problem, including amendments at the level of the merchant server itself as well as changes of the system architecture. As the Board found, the provision of the particular system architecture of the claimed invention, namely to provide a separate merchant authentication processing system handling the interface functionality with the authenticating servers, was not obvious for the skilled person at the priority date.
This decision may also prove to be helpful for inventors seeking to obtain patent protection in Europe for distributed or serverless applications based on distributed-ledger or blockchain technologies if the application of these technologies for the particular task was not technically obvious at the respective priority date.
wherein said modifying is cleavage of the target DNA.
A restriction to either eukaryotic or procaryotic cells seems not to be present. The contacting of the target DNA to be modyfied by the method, however, according to the claim has to take place in vitro or in a cell ex vivo.
A notice of allowance from the EPO (communication under Rule 71(3) EPC) can be expected soon.
Disclaimer: Neither I myself nor the patent firm Betten & Resch, of which I am a partner, is involved in any patent cases relating to CRISPR-cas9 technology.
This amicus curiae brief is submitted in accordance with Art. 10 of the Rules of Procedure of the Enlarged Board of Appeal providing observations on question 5 of the questions referred to the Enlarged Board of Appeal by the Technical Board of Appeal 3.3.06 in the case T 0557/13, pending as G1/15. The opinions expressed in the brief are my own and do not necessarily reflect the views of Betten & Resch or any of its clients.
The case G1/15 relates to the issue of self-collision between parent and divisional applications as mutual prior art documents under Art. 54(3) EPC, a situation which became notorious as “toxic divisional” or “poisonous divisional” problem. Surprisingly, this issue has come up for the first time only in September 2012 with the still singular Appeal Board decision T 1496/11, despite the large number of divisional applications pending or having been granted under the EPC since it coming into force in 1978.
The “toxic” situation occurs when of two related European patent applications EP1, EP2 (either parent or divisional) both claiming the same priority date P of an earlier application (either national or European) one application (e.g. EP1) comprises a patent claim containing a generalization with respect to the priority application such that the claim of EP1 as a whole cannot validly claim the priority date P of the earlier application and at the same time EP2 comprises a specific embodiment which can validly claim the priority date P. The specific embodiment of EP2 validly claiming priority P thus is novelty-destroying prior art under Art. 54(3) for the generalized claim of EP1 not enjoying priority P.
In the case T 1496/11 (referring decision T 0557/13, Reasons 15.1.7) claim 1 of the parent patent was directed to a security document including a security device which comprised a functionally defined “feature (10) which can be inspected, enhanced or optically varied by the optical lens when …“. The priority document disclosed only a “printed or embossed” feature for this purpose. The board concluded (Reasons, 2.1) that the claimed subject-matter had been generalized by omitting the more specific indication and thus encompassed security devices including features produced by other means. Hence, it did not constitute the same invention as that set out in the priority document (Article 87(1) EPC). Consequently, the subject-matter of claim 1 was found to be only entitled to the filing date of the parent application upon which the patent had been granted. The board went on to conclude that the subject-matter of claim 1 lacked novelty under Article 54(3) EPC over an embodiment disclosed in its published European divisional application. This embodiment was identically disclosed in the priority document and was hence entitled to the claimed priority date. Therefore it anticipated the subject-matter of claim 1 of the parent patent, which was not entitled to the priority.
As the situation that a priority application contains one or multiple specific embodiments and relatively narrow claims and a later European or PCT patent application has broader claims is rather common for users of the patent system due to continuous improvements of the claimed invention, the conclusion is obvious that poisonous parent or divisional applications “killing” their relatives are rather common and threaten a substantial number of European patents, in particular if national invalidity courts would follow T 1496/11 in applying Art. 54(3) EPC to parent/divisional applications.
5. If an affirmative answer is given to question 1, may subject-matter disclosed in a parent or divisional application of a European patent application be cited as state of the art under Article 54(3) EPC against subject-matter disclosed in the priority document and encompassed as an alternative in a generic “OR”-claim of the said European patent application or of the patent granted thereon?
In my view, question 5 should be answered independent from the answers to questions 1 – 4, and it should be answered in the negative. Both issues – partial priorities and the application of Art. 54(3) to parent/divisional applications – are very important as such, but not necessarily dependent on each other. Allowing partial priorities under the “conceptual approach“ suggested in T 1127/00 to distinguishing “a limited number of clearly defined subject-matters” as required by decision G2/98 is essential not only to establish novelty of an EP application having a generic “OR”-claim over a specific embodiment contained in its divisional or parent application, but also over such specific embodiment contained in its national or European priority application. The eligibility to partial priorities under the “conceptual approach“ is therefore to be affirmed. Conversely, the eligibility of divisional/parent applications or patents as prior art under Art. 54(3) EPC is a fundamental question of patent law under the EPC, which should be clarified by the Enlarged Board of the Appeal, also in order to serve as precedence for national invalidity courts in Europe.
(1) A European divisional application shall be filed directly with the European Patent Office in accordance with the Implementing Regulations. It may be filed only in respect of subject-matter which does not extend beyond the content of the earlier application as filed; in so far as this requirement is complied with, the divisional application shall be deemed to have been filed on the date of filing of the earlier application and shall enjoy any right of priority.
an applicant has the explicit right to a divisional application, either according to paragraph (1) in response to a non-unity objection of the patent examiner or according to paragraph (2) in his/her own right. The EPC constitutes, according to its preamble, a “special agreement within the meaning of Article 19 of the Paris Convention“. Hence, it shall not contravene the basic principles concerning priority laid down in the Paris Convention (Referring decision T 0557/13, Reasons 12.1; G 2/98, Reasons, 3).
It is very clear that a specific example or embodiment in the description of a European patent application cannot be cited as prior art under Art. 54(3) for a generalized claim (generic-OR-claim) in the very same application, even if the specific example can validly claim an earlier priority date as the generalized claim. Art. 76 (1) EPC as well as Art. 4G of the Paris Convention give the applicant the right to file a divisional application under the same conditions (same filing date, dame priority date) as the parent application. If the act of making use of this right through filing a divisional application retroactively creates prior art not present before and posing a high risk of invalidating not only the divisional but also the patent application, the applicant cannot properly enjoy this right to a divisional application but is at least partly deprived of the right to a patent for his/her invention disclosed to the public. The applicant should with respect to novelty over the prior art of the invention disclosed in the patent application not be in a worse position after filing the divisional application than before filing it. Applying Art. 54(3) EPC to parent/divisional applications is thus inconsistent with the right of the applicant to file divisional applications according to Art. 76 EPC as well as Art. 4G of the Paris Convention and therefore could in my view not have been the intention of the drafters of the EPC.
(2) The state of the art shall be held to comprise everything made available to the public by means of a written or oral description, by use, or in any other way, before the date of filing of the European patent application.
(3) Additionally, the content of European patent applications as filed, the dates of filing of which are prior to the date referred to in paragraph 2 and which were published on or after that date, shall be considered as comprised in the state of the art.
It recites two types of prior art, namely prepublished prior art according to Art. 54(2) EPC and fictional prior art (“shall be considered as comprised in the state of the art”) according to Art. 54(3) EPC. The latter is only relevant for the establishment of novelty but irrelevant for judging inventive step (Art. 56 EPC).
From the wording of the provision (“the content of European patent applications”) it is not clear, whether or not parent or divisional applications of a European patent application under consideration should be regarded as part of that fictional prior art.
“Article 54(3) EPC contains a legal fiction (…). The purpose of this provision is to include European prior rights into the state of the art in order to preclude double patenting.” (Travaux préparatoires to the EPC 2000, document CA/PL 17/99 e, page 1, items 1 to 2).
This was also confirmed by Enlarged Board of Appeal in its decisions G 1/03 (Reasons, 2.2.2) of April 8, 2004 and in G 2/98 (Reasons, 8.1) of May 31, 2001.
One should keep in mind, however, that with the formulation of Art. 54(3) EPC the “prior claim approach” to double patenting (which was e.g. applied in German patent law before the introduction of the EPC and the accompanying harmonization of substantive European patent law) was replaced by the “whole content approach”, which excludes from patent protection everything which was disclosed in an earlier filed, later published EP application. Therefore only the first inventor to file a patent application has the right to the patent to the disclosure in this application and later applicants are precluded from obtaining a patent therefor.
That is, to avoid double patenting between parent/divisional applications, the later examined application is refused based on the principle of avoiding double patenting applying the “prior claim approach”, but not through the application of Art. 54(3) EPC.
(1) The parent/divisional applications EP1, EP2 do not claim earlier priority dates such that the effective filing date of both applications is the actual filing date, which is by definition identical for both applications. They therefore cannot form prior art to each other under Art. 54(3) EPC, requiring an earlier date of one application, even if the claimed subject-matter is identical. In this case double patenting would be possible even when applying Art. 54(3) EPC to parent/divisional applications.
(2) Both parent/divisional applications EP1, EP2 claim earlier priority date P. The claims of both applications are identical and both can validly claim priority P. Again, the applications cannot form prior art to each other under Art. 54(3) EPC, even though the claimed subject-matter is identical. Therefore double patenting likewise cannot be prevented by application of Art. 54(3) EPC to parent/divisional applications.
(3) Both parent/divisional applications EP1, EP2 claim earlier priority date P. The claims of both applications are identical, but generalized with respect to priority application P such that both EP1 and EP2 cannot validly claim priority P but only the respective filing dates EP1 = EP2. Assuming that both applications EP1 and EP2 contain the same embodiment validly claiming priority P (the typical situation), then both applications form prior art to each other under Art. 54(3) EPC and none of it survives, even if the applicant would withdraw one of the applications after its publication. Again, not double patenting would be prevented by application of Art. 54(3) EPC, but both applications would be invalidated even if the applicant would itself avoid double protection by withdrawing one of the applications.
(4) Both parent/divisional applications EP1, EP2 claim earlier priority date P. The claims of both applications are not identical, EP1 being generalized with respect to priority application P such that EP1 cannot validly claim priority P, but EP2 can. Then EP2 would form prior art under Art. 54(3) EPC with respect to EP1, but not vice versa. Therefore EP2 would survive, but not EP1. Thus, one application would be eliminated, but because the claims are different. The effect again is contrary to avoiding double patenting.
In conclusion, the application of Art. 54(3) to parent/divisional applications of the European patent application under consideration is in clear contradiction to the purpose of this provision to avoid double patenting.
The provision of § 3 (2) German Patent Act (PatG) is worded as Art. 54(3) EPC, thus leaving it open whether or not parent/divisional applications can form novelty-destroying prior art. There are to date no FCJ decisions in which divisional applications have been cited as prior art for parent applications/patents or vice versa. According to § 39 German Patent Act (PatG) the division of a pending patent application into a parent application and a divisional application (the latter pending at the same stage of the procedure as the parent application) is regarded primarily as a procedural act dividing one application procedure into two separate procedures (“Schulte”, PatG, 9th edition, § 39, No. 10 – 13). § 39 (3) German Patent Act also speaks of a “declaration of division”, indicating the focus on the procedural aspect of a divisional application.
This focus on the procedural aspect gives rise to the following considerations: As in all jurisdictions, in German (as in European) patent law a specific example or embodiment in the description of a patent application cannot be cited as prior art for a generalized claim (generic-OR-claim) in the very same application, even if the specific example can validly claim an earlier priority date and the generalized claim cannot. If the filing of a divisional application is mainly a procedural act dividing one application procedure into two separate procedures, the declaration of division should not change the prior art status of the content of the original (combined) patent application. It would be a surprising result at least that new prior art should be created retroactively by the act of dividing one application procedure into two procedures. Based on these considerations, parent and divisional applications should not be regarded as prior art with respect to each other under German Patent Act.
In summary, parent and divisional applications should not be regarded as prior art under Art. 54(3) EPC to each other, independent from the practice of entitlement to partial priorities.
Applying Art. 54(3) EPC to parent and divisional applications of the patent application under consideration is not consistent with the purpose of Art. 4 G of the Paris Convention and Art. 76(1) EPC giving the applicant the right to divisional applications. If this right carries the risk that the parent application is invalidated by the divisional application or vice versa, the provisions are not appropriate and sufficient to provide the applicant this right.
Applying Art. 54(3) EPC to parent and divisional applications is also not consistent with the purpose of Art. 54(3), i.e. to avoid double patenting in the sense that only the first inventor to disclose an invention has the right to the patent.
As the intensive discussion about “poisonous” or “toxic” divisionals has shown, the application of Art. 54(3) EPC to parent and divisional applications exposes applicants and patentees under the EPC to a considerable invalidity risk. Conversely, no purpose or positive effect thereof can be recognized. Question 5 of the referral should therefore be answered in the negative.

References: application No. 03793825
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