Source: http://www.ptab.us/2010/08/reversed-ex-parte-belson-ex-parte.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 10:51:33+00:00

Document:
it can be important to identify a reason that would have prompted a person of ordinary skill in the relevant field to combine the elements in the way the claimed new invention does . . . because inventions in most, if not all, instances rely upon building blocks long since uncovered, and claimed discoveries almost of necessity will be combinations of what, in some sense, is already known.
Id. at 418-419 (emphasis added); see also id. at 418 (requiring a determination of “whether there was an apparent reason to combine the known elements in the fashion claimed by the patent at issue”) (emphasis added).
Ex Parte Reising 11/064,394 TIMM 103(a) PPG INDUSTRIES, INC.
Ex Parte Tanaka 10/674,169 TIMM 103(a) FLYNN THIEL BOUTELL & TANIS, P.C.
Ex Parte Holms et al 11/071,827 SILVERBERG 103(a) JANSSON SHUPE & MUNGER LTD.
Ex Parte Belson 11/129,168 SILVERBERG 102(b) INTUITIVE SURGICAL OPERATIONS, INC.
Determination of a priority date is purely a question of law if the facts underlying that determination are undisputed. See E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. MacDermid Printing Solutions, L.L.C., 525 F.3d 1353, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2008). However, determination whether a priority document contains sufficient disclosure to comply with the written description aspect of 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, is a question of fact. Waldemar Link v. Osteonics Corp., 32 F.3d 556, 558 (Fed.Cir.1994); Bradford Co. v. Conteyor North America, Inc., 603 F.3d 1262, 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2010)).
Prosecution history can also be relevant to claim interpretation. See Renishaw plc v. Marposs Societa per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1249 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“[A]ny interpretation that is provided or disavowed in the prosecution history also shapes the claim scope.”); see also Schwing GmbH v. Putzmeister Aktiengesellschaft, 305 F.3d 1318, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“[P]rosecution history . . . cannot be used to limit the scope of a claim unless the applicant took a position before the PTO that would lead a competitor to believe that the applicant had disavowed coverage of the relevant subject matter.”).
An applicant’s statement to the examiner is a compelling disclaimer of scope such that a patent may not be entitled to an earlier priority date. Bradford, 603 F.3d at 1269 (citing Microsoft Corp. v. Multi-Tech Sys., Inc., 357 F.3d 1340, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“We take the patentee at its word and will not construe the scope of ... [a] patent's claims more broadly than the patentee itself clearly envisioned.”)). That is because arguments made to persuade an examiner to allow an application trump an ambiguous disclosure that otherwise might have sufficed to obtain an earlier priority date. See Standard Oil Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 774 F.2d 448, 452 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (holding that any argument made to convince the examiner of the patentability of the claimed invention “limits the interpretation of claims so as to exclude any interpretation that may have been disclaimed or disavowed during prosecution in order to obtain claim allowance”).

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