Source: http://masscases.com/cases/distapp/2018/2018massappdiv167.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 22:49:21+00:00

Document:
Alexander W. Levine and Ellen A. Shapiro for the plaintiff.
Caroline B. Lapish and Rory Z. Fazendeiro for the defendant.
the driveway, Dr. Franco exited his vehicle and approached them in a threatening manner and threatened them.
Summary judgment shall be granted where there are no genuine issues as to any material fact in dispute and where the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Cassesso v. Commissioner of Correction, 390 Mass. 419, 422 (1983); Mass. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The moving party bears the burden of affirmatively demonstrating the absence of a triable issue, "and [further,] that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Pederson v. Time, Inc., 404 Mass. 14, 17 (1989). "In reviewing the grant of a motion for summary judgment, we conduct a de novo examination of the evidence in the summary judgment record . . . ." LeBlanc v. Logan Hilton Joint Venture, 463 Mass. 316, 318 (2012). We are also permitted, by Mass. R. Civ. P. 56(c), to render summary judgment, when appropriate, against the moving party.
There is nothing in the record that would permit even an inference that Franco, the unit owner, permitted her husband to engage in the conduct alleged to have occurred. [Note 5] The fine was improperly levied.
The trial court's allowance of the defendant's Mass. R. Civ. P. 56 motion and its entry of judgment in its favor are reversed and vacated. Summary judgment is to be entered for the plaintiff.
[Note 1] For clarity, we will identify Lisa M. Franco as Franco and Nicholas R. Franco as Dr. Franco.
[Note 2] A condominium is a creature of statute. See G.L. c. 183A; Kaplan v. Boudreaux, 410 Mass. 435, 442 (1991). State action may be present giving rise to constitutional implications even though the relationship is otherwise private between a condominium association and a unit owner. Board of Managers of Old Colony Village Condominium v. Preu, 80 Mass. App. Ct. 728, 731-732 (2011). In this case, the Master Deed provided that G.L. c. 183A would govern all matters not addressed in the Master Deed, Declaration of Trust, and By-Laws. No document addressed the levying of a fine. However, G.L. c. 183A, § 10(b)(5) allows for "reasonable fines" to be levied against a unit by the Trustees of the Gables Condominium Trust for violations of the Master Deed, Declaration of Trust, and By-Laws. It is this statutory provision that the Board relied upon to assess the fine levied.
[Note 3] The facts leave no room to interpret Dr. Franco's conduct as other than wilful in contrast to negligent action.
[Note 4] The Board informed the Francos by letter that it sought their participation at a Board hearing regarding the incident and its belief that it raised "concerns [of] [Dr. Franco's] use of his car and noxious and offensive conduct towards residents . . . which interfered with their right to have a safe and harmonious use and enjoyment of their unit and the common areas." Because of the result reached, we need not decide whether an activity is the same as conduct or whether "safe and harmonious use and enjoyment" is the equivalent to "rights, comforts or conveniences."
[Note 5] While G.L. c. 183A, § 10(b) provides authority for fines to be deemed "common expenses," and G.L. c. 183A, § 6(a)(ii) allows for "the organization of unit owners" to enforce expenses for the "misconduct of any unit owner, or his family members" as common expenses, the By-Laws in this case were drafted more narrowly than § 6(a)(ii), by qualifying the misconduct as constituting permitted wilful or negligent activity.
[Note 6] We note that G.L. c. 231A, § 3 states that the court "may refuse to render or enter a declaratory judgment or decree where such judgment or decree, if rendered or entered, would not terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the proceedings or for other sufficient reasons."

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