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[236 U.S. 1, 4] Messrs. R. R. Vermilion and W. F. Evans for plaintiff in error.
[236 U.S. 1, 7] agent, officer, or employee of any company or corporation violating the provisions of this act, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof shall be fined in a sum not less than $50, or imprisoned in the county jail not less than thirty days.
Hedges refused to sign this, and refused to withdraw from the labor organization. Thereupon plaintiff in error, as such superintendent, discharged him from the service of the company. [236 U.S. 1, 8] At the outset, a few words should be said respecting the construction of the act. It uses the term 'coerce,' and some stress is laid upon this in the opinion of the Kansas supreme court. But, on this record, we have nothing to do with any question of actual or implied coercion or duress, such as might overcome the will of the employee by means unlawful without the act. In the case before us, the state court treated the term 'coerce' as applying to the mere insistence by the employer, or its agent, upon its right to prescribe terms upon which alone it would consent to a continuance of the relationship of employer and employee. In this sense we must understand the statute to have been construed by the court, for in this sense it was enforced in the present case; there being no finding, nor any evidence to support a finding, that plaintiff in error was guilty in any other sense. The entire evidence is included in the bill of exceptions returned with the writ of error, and we have examined it to the extent necessary in order to determine the Federal right that is asserted ( Southern P. Co. v. Schuyler, 227 U.S. 601, 611 , 57 S. L. ed. 662, 669, 43 L. R.A.(N.S.) 901, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 277, and cases cited). There is neither finding nor evidence that the contract of employment was other than a general or indefinite hiring, such as is presumed to be terminable at the will of either party. The evidence shows that it would have been to the advantage of Hedges, from a pecuniary point of view and otherwise, to have been permitted to retain his membership in the union, and at the same time to remain in the employ of the railway company. In particular, it shows ( although no reference is made to this in the opinion of the court) that, as a member of the union, he was entitled to benefits in the nature of insurance to the amount of $1,500, which he would have been obliged to forego if he had ceased to be a member. But, aside from this matter of pecuniary interest, there is nothing to show that Hedges was subjected to the least pressure or influence, or that he was not [236 U.S. 1, 9] a free agent, in all respects competent, and at liberty to choose what was best from the standpoint of his own interests. Of course, if plaintiff in error, acting as the representative of the railway company, was otherwise within his legal rights in insisting that Hedges should elect whether to remain in the employ of the company or to retain his membership in the union, that insistence is not rendered unlawful by the fact that the choice involved a pecuniary sacrifice to Hedges. Silliman v. United States, 101 U.S. 465, 470 , 471 S., 25 L. ed. 987-989; Hackley v. Headley, 45 Mich. 569, 576, 8 N. W. 511; Emery v. Lowell, 127 Mass. 138, 141; Custin v. Viroqua, 67 Wis. 314, 320, 30 N. W. 515. And if the right that plaintiff in error exercised is founded upon a constitutional basis, it cannot be impaired by merely applying to its exercise the term 'coercion.' We have to deal, therefore, with a statute that, as construed and applied, makes it a criminal offense, punishable with fine or imprisonment, for an employer or his agent to merely prescribe, as a condition upon which one may secure certain employment or remain in such employment (the employment being terminable at will), that the employee shall enter into an agreement not to become or remain a member of any labor organization while so employed; the employee being subject to no incapacity or disability, but, on the contrary, free to exercise a voluntary choice.
It is true that, while the statute that was dealt with in the Adair Case contained a clause substantially identical with the Kansas act now under consideration,-a clause making it a misdemeanor for an employer to require an employee or applicant for employment, as a condition of such employment, to agree not to become or remain a member of a labor organization,-the conviction was [236 U.S. 1, 12] based upon another clause, which related to discharging an employee because of his membership in such an organization; and the decision, naturally, was confined to the case actually presented for decision. In the present case, the Kansas supreme court sought to distinguish the Adair decision upon this ground. The distinction, if any there be, has not previously been recognized as substantial, so far as we have been able to find. The opinion in the Adair Case, while carefully restricting the decision to the precise matter involved, cited (208 U. S. on page 175), as the first in order of a number of decisions supporting the conclusion of the court, a case (People v. Marcus, 185 N. Y. 257, 7 L.R.A.(N.S.) 282, 113 Am. St. Rep. 902, 77 N. E. 1073, 7 Ann. Cas. 188) in which the statute denounced as unconstitutional was in substance the counterpart of the one with which we are now dealing.
But, irrespective of whether it has received judicial recognition, is there any real distinction? The constitutional right of the employer to discharge an employee because of his membership in a labor union being granted, can the employer be compelled to resort to this extreme measure? May he not offer to the employee an option, such as was offered in the instant case, to remain in the employment if he will retire from the union; to sever the former relationship only if he prefers the latter? Granted the equal freedom of both parties to the contract of employment, has not each party the right to stipulate upon what terms only he will consent to the inception, or to the continuance, of that relationship? And may he not insist upon an express agreement, instead of leaving the terms of the employment to be implied? Can the legislature in effect require either party at the beginning to act covertly; concealing essential terms of the employment-terms to which, perhaps, the other would not willingly consent- and revealing them only when it is proposed to insist upon them as a ground for terminating the relationship? Supposing an employer is unwilling to have in his [236 U.S. 1, 13] employ one holding membership in a labor union, and has reason to suppose that the man may prefer membership in the union to the given employment without it-we ask, can the legislature oblige the employer in such case to refrain from dealing frankly at the outset? And is not the employer entitled to insist upon equal frankness in return? Approaching the matter from a somewhat different standpoint, is the employee's right to be free to join a labor union any more sacred, or more securely founded upon the Constitution, than his right to work for whom he will, or to be idle if he will? And does not the ordinary contract of employment include an insistence by the employer that the employee shall agree, as a condition of the employment, that he will not be idle and will not work for whom he pleases, but will serve his present employer, and him only, so long as the relation between them shall continue? Can the right of making contracts be enjoyed at all, except by parties coming together in an agreement that requires each party to forego, during the time and for the purpose covered by the agreement, any inconsistent exercise of his constitutional rights?
The decision in that case was reached as the result of elaborate argument and full consideration. The opinion states ( 208 U.S. 171 ): 'This question is admittedly one of importance, and has been examined with care and deliberation. And the court has reached a conclusion [236 U.S. 1, 14] which, in its judgment, is consistent with both the words and spirit of the Constitution, and is sustained as well by sound reason.' We are now asked, in effect, to overrule it; and in view of the importance of the issue we have reexamined the question from the standpoint of both reason and authority. As a result, we are constrained to reaffirm the doctrine there applied. Neither the doctrine nor this application of it is novel; we will endeavor to restate some of the grounds upon which it rests. The principle is fundamental and vital. Included in the right of personal liberty and the right of private property-partaking of the nature of each- is the right to make contracts for the acquisition of property. Chief among such contracts is that of personal employment, by which labor and other services are exchanged for money or other forms of property. If this right be struck down or arbitrarily interfered with, there is a substantial impairment of liberty in the long-established constitutional sense. The right is as essential to the laborer as to the capitalist, to the poor as to the rich; for the vast majority of persons have no other honest way to begin to acquire property, save by working for money.
An interference with this liberty so serious as that now under consideration, and so disturbing of equality of right, must be deemed to be arbitrary, unless it be supportable as a reasonable exercise of the police power of the state. But, notwithstanding the strong general presumption in favor of the validity of state laws, we do not think the statute in question, as construed and applied in this case, can be sustained as a legitimate exercise of that power. To avoid possible misunderstanding, we should here emphasize, what has been said before, that so far as its title or enacting clause expresses a purpose to deal with coercion, compulsion, duress, or other undue influence, we have no present concern with it, because nothing of that sort is involved in this case. As has [236 U.S. 1, 15] been many times stated, this court deals not with moot cases or abstract questions, but with the concrete case before it. California v. San Pablo & T. R. Co. 149 U.S. 308, 314 , 37 S. L. ed. 747, 748, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 876; Richardson v. McChesney, 218 U.S. 487, 492 , 54 S. L. ed. 1121, 1122, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 43; Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Cade, 233 U.S. 642, 648 , 58 S. L. ed. 1135, 1137, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 678. We do not mean to say, therefore, that a state may not properly exert its police power to prevent coercion on the part of employers towards employees, or vice versa. But, in this case, the Kansas court of last resort has held that Coppage, the plaintiff in error, is a criminal, punishable with fine or imprisonment under this statute, simply and merely because, while acting as the representative of the railroad company, and dealing with Hedges, an employee at will and a man of full age and understanding, subject to no restraint or disability, Coppage insisted that Hedges should freely choose whether he would leave the employ of the company or would agree to refrain from association with the union while so employed. This construction is, for all purposes of our jurisdiction, conclusive evidence that the state of Kansas intends by this legislation to punish conduct such as that of Coppage, although entirely devoid of any element of coercion, compulsion, duress, or undue influence, just as certainly as it intends to punish coercion and the like. But, when a party appeals to this court for the protection of rights secured to him by the Federal Constitution, the decision is not to depend upon the form of the state law, nor even upon its declared purpose, but rather upon its operation and effect as applied and enforced by the state; and upon these matters this court cannot, in the proper performance of its duty, yield its judgment to that of the state court. St. Louis South Western R. Co. v. Arkansas, 235 U.S. 350, 362 , 59 S. L. ed. --, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 99, and cases cited. Now, it seems to us clear that a statutory provision which is not a legitimate police regulation cannot be made such by being placed in the same act with a police regulation, or by being enacted under a title that declares a [236 U.S. 1, 16] purpose which would be a proper object for the exercise of that power. 'Its true character cannot be changed by its collocation,' as Mr. Justice Grier said in the Passenger Cases, 7 How. 458, 12 L. ed. 775. It is equally clear, we think, that to punish an employer or his agent for simply proposing certain terms of employment, under circumstances devoid of coercion, duress, or undue influence, has no reasonable relation to a declared purpose of repressing coercion, duress, and undue influence. Nor can a state, by designating as 'coercion' conduct which is not such in truth, render criminal any normal and essentially innocent exercise of personal liberty or of property rights; for to permit this would deprive the 14th Amendment of its effective force in this regard. We, of course, do not intend to attribute to the legislature or the courts of Kansas any improper purposes or any want of candor; but only to emphasize the distinction between the form of the statute and its effect as applied to the present case.
Laying aside, therefore, as immaterial for present purposes, so much of the statute as indicates a purpose to repress coercive practices, what possible relation has the residue of the act to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare? None is suggested, and we are unable to conceive of any. The act, as the construction given to it by the state court shows, is intended to deprive employers of a part of their liberty of contract, to the corresponding advantage of the employed and the upbuilding of the labor organizations. But no attempt is made, or could reasonably be made, to sustain the purpose to strengthen these voluntary organizations, any more than other voluntary associations of persons, as a legitimate object for the exercise of the police power. They are not public institutions, charged by law with public or governmental duties, such as would render the maintenance of their membership a matter of direct concern to the general [236 U.S. 1, 17] welfare. If they were, a different question would be presented.
And since a state may not strike them down directly, it is clear that it may not do so indirectly, as by declaring in effect that the public good requires the removal of those [236 U.S. 1, 18] inequalities that are but the normal and inevitable result of their exercise, and then invoking the police power in order to remove the inequalities, without other object in view. The police power is broad, and not easily defined, but it cannot be given the wide scope that is here asserted for it, without in effect nullifying the constitutional guaranty.
We need not refer to the numerous and familiar cases in which this court has held that the power may properly be exercised for preserving the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare, and that such police regulations may reasonably limit the enjoyment of personal liberty, including the right of making contracts. They are reviewed in Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 391 , 42 S. L. ed. 780, 790, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 383; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. McGuire, 219 U.S. 549, 566 , 55 S. L. ed. 328, 338, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 259; Erie R. Co. v. Williams, 233 U.S. 685 , 58 L. ed. 1155, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 761; and other recent decisions. An evident and controlling distinction is this: that in those cases it has been held permissible for the states to adopt regulations fairly deemed necessary to secure some object directly affecting the public welfare, even though the enjoyment of private rights of liberty and property be thereby incidentally hampered; while in that portion of the Kansas statute which is now under consideration-that is to say, aside from coercion, etc.-there is no object or purpose, expressed or implied, that is claimed to have reference to health, safety, morals, or public welfare, beyond the supposed desirability of leveling inequalities of fortune by depriving one who has property of some part of what is characterized as his 'financial independence.' In short, an interference with the normal exercise of personal liberty and property rights is the primary object of the statute, and not an incident to the advancement of the general welfare. But, in our opinion, the 14th Amendment debars the states from striking down personal liberty or property rights, or materially restricting their normal exercise, excepting [236 U.S. 1, 19] so far as may be incidentally necessary for the accomplishment of some other and paramount object, and one that concerns the public welfare. The mere restriction of liberty or of property rights cannot of itself be denominated 'public welfare,' and treated as a legitimate object of the police power; for such restriction is the very thing that is inhibited by the Amendment.
Of course we do not intend to say, nor to intimate, anything inconsistent with the right of individuals to join labor unions, nor do we question the legitimacy of such organizations so long as they conform to the laws of the land as others are required to do. Conceding the full right of the individual to join the union, he has no inherent right to do this and still remain in the employ of one who is unwilling to employ a union man, any more than the same individual has a right to join the union without the consent of that organization. Can it be doubted that a [236 U.S. 1, 20] labor organization-a voluntary association of working men-has the inherent and constitutional right to deny membership to any man who will not agree that during such membership he will not accept or retain employment in company with nonunion men? Or that a union man has the constitutional right to decline proffered employment unless the employer will agree not to employ any nonunion man? (In all cases we refer, of course, to agreements made voluntarily, and without coencion or duress as between the parties. And we have no reference to questions of monopoly, or interference with the rights of third parties or the general public. There involve other considerations, respecting which we intend to intimate no opinion. See Curran v. Galen, 152 N. Y. 33, 37 L.R.A. 802, 57 Am. St. Rep. 496, 46 N. E. 297; Jacobs v. Cohen, 183 N. Y. 207, 213, 214, 2 L.R.A.(N.S.) 292, 111 Am. St. Rep. 730, 76 N. E. 5, 5 Ann. Cas. 280; Plant v. Woods, 176 Mass. 492, 51 L.R.A. 339, 79 Am. St. Rep. 330, 57 N. E. 1011; Berry v. Donovan, 188 Mass. 353, 5 L.R.A.(N.S.) 899, 108 Am. St. Rep. 499, 74 N. E. 603, 3 Ann. Cas. 738; Brennan v. United Hatters, 73 N. J. L. 729, 738, 9 L. R.A.(N.S.) 254, 118 Am. St. Rep. 727, 65 Atl. 165, 169, 9 Ann. Cas. 698, 702). And can there be one rule of liberty for the labor organization and its members, and a different and more restrictive rule for employers? We think not; and since the relation of employer and employee is a voluntary relation, as clearly as is that between the members of a labor organization, the employer has the same inherent right to prescribe the terms upon which he will consent to the relationship, and to have them fairly understood and expressed in advance.
When a man is called upon to agree not to become or remain a member of the union while working for a particular employer, he is in effect only asked to deal openly and frankly with his employer, so as not to retain the employment upon terms to which the latter is not willing to agree. And the liberty of making contracts does not include a liberty to procure employment from an unwilling employer, or without a fair understanding. Nor may the [236 U.S. 1, 21] employer be foreclosed by legislation from exercising the same freedom of choice that is the right of the employee.
The decision in the Adair Case is in accord with the almost unbroken current of authorities in the state courts. In many states enactments not distinguishable in principle from the one now in question have been passed, but, except in two instances (one, the decision of an inferior court in Ohio, since repudiated; the other, the decision now under review), we are unable to find that they have been judicially enforced. It is not too much to say that such laws have by common consent been treated as unconstitutional, for while many state courts of last resort have adjudged them void, we have found no decision by such a court [236 U.S. 1, 22] sustaining legislation of this character, excepting that which is now under review. The single previous instance in which any court has upheld such a statute is Davis v. State (1893) 30 Ohio L. J. 342, 11 Ohio Dec. Reprint, 894, where the court of common pleas of Hamilton county sustained an act of April 14, 1892 (89 Ohio Laws, 269), which declared that any person who coerced or attempted to coerce employees by discharging or threatening to discharge them because of their connection with any lawful labor organization should be guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction fined or imprisoned. We are unable to find that this decision was ever directly reviewed; but in State v. Bateman (1900) 10 Ohio S. & C. P. Dec. 68, 7 Ohio N. P. 487, its authority was repudiated upon the ground that it had been in effect overruled by subsequent decisions of the state supreme court, and the same statute was held unconstitutional.
In Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Brown, 80 Kan. 312, 23 L.R.A.(N.S.) 247, 133 Am. St. Rep. 213, 102 Pac. 459, 18 Ann. Cas. 346, the same court passed upon chapter 144 of the Laws of 1897 (Gen. Stat. 1901, 2421-2424 ), which required the employer, upon the request of a discharged employee, to furnish in writing the true cause or reason for such discharge. The railway company did not meet this requirement, its 'service letter.' as it was called, stating only that Brown was discharged 'for cause,' which the court naturally held was not a statement of the cause. The law was held unconstitutional, upon the ground (80 Kan. 315) that an employer may discharge his employee for any reason, or for no reason, just as an employee may quit the employment for any reason, or for no reason; that such action on the part of employer or employee, where no obligation is violated, is an essential element of liberty in action; and that one cannot be compelled to give a reason or cause for an action for which he may have no specific reason or cause, except, perhaps, a mere whim or prejudice.
In the present case the court did not repudiate or overrule these previous decisions, but, on the contrary, cited them as establishing the right of the employer to discharge his employee at any time, for any reason, or for no reason, being responsible in damages for violating a contract as to the time of employment, and as establishing, conversely, the right of the employee to quit the employment at any time, for any reason, or without any reason, being likewise responsible in damages for a violation of his contract with the employer. The court held the act of 1903 that is now in question to be distinguishable from the [236 U.S. 1, 25] act of 1897, upon grounds sufficiently indicated and answered by what we have already said.
In five other states the courts of last resort have had similar acts under consideration, and in each instance have held them unconstitutional. In State v. Julow (1895) 129 Mo. 163, 29 L.R.A. 257, 50 Am. St. Rep. 443, 31 S. W. 781, the supreme court of Missouri dealt with an act (Missouri Laws 1893, p. 187) that forbade employers, on pain of fine or imprisonment, to enter into any agreement with an employee requiring him to withdraw from a labor union or other lawful organization, or to refrain from joining such an organization, or to 'by any means attempt to compel or coerce any employee into withdrawal from any lawful organization or society.' In Gillespie v. People (1900) 188 Ill. 176, 52 L.R.A. 283, 80 Am. St. Rep. 176, 58 N. E. 1007, the supreme court of Illinois held unconstitutional an act (Hurd's Stat. 1899, p. 844) declaring it criminal for any individual or member of any firm, etc., to prevent or attempt to prevent employees from forming, joining, and belonging to any lawful labor organization, and that any such person 'that coerces or attempts to coerce employees by discharging or threatening to discharge them because of their connection with such lawful labor organization' should be guilty of a misdemeanor. In State ex rel. Zillmer v. Kreutzberg (1902) 114 Wis. 530, 58 L.R.A. 748, 91 Am. St. Rep. 934, 90 N. W. 1098, the court had under consideration a statute (Wisconsin Laws 1899, chap. 332) which, like the Kansas act now in question, prohibited the employer or his agent from coercing the employee to enter into an agreement not to become a member of a labor organization, as a condition of securing employment or continuing in the employment, and also rendered it unlawful to discharge an employee because of his being a member of any labor organization. The decision related to the latter prohibition, but this was denounced [236 U.S. 1, 26] upon able and learned reasoning that has a much wider reach. In People v. Marcus (1906) 185 N. Y. 257, 7 L.R.A.(N.S.) 282, 113 Am. St. Rep. 902, 77 N. E. 1073, 7 Ann. Cas. 118, the statute dealt with (N. Y. Laws 1887, chap. 688), as we have already said, was in substance identical with the Kansas act. These decisions antedated Adair v. United States. They proceed upon broad and fundamental reasoning, the same in substance that was adopted by this court in the Adair Case, and they are cited with approval in the opinion ( 208 U.S. 175 ). A like result was reached in State ex rel. Smith v. Daniels (1912) 118 Minn. 155, 136 N. W. 584, with respect to an act that, like the Kansas statute, forbade an employer to require an employee or person seeking employment, as a condition of such employment, to make an agreement that the employee would not become or remain a member or a labor organization. This was held invalid upon the authority of the Adair Case. And see Goldfield Consol. Mines Co. v. Goldfield Miners' Union, 159 Fed. 500, 513.
I think the judgment should be affirmed. In present conditions a workman not unnaturally may believe that [236 U.S. 1, 27] only by belonging to a union can he secure a contract that shall be fair to him. Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 397 , 42 S. L. ed. 780, 792, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 383; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. McGuire, 219 U.S. 549, 570 , 55 S. L. ed. 328, 339, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 259. If that belief, whether right or wrong, may be held by a reasonable man, it seems to me that it may be enforced by law in order to establish the equality of position between the parties in which liberty of contract begins. Whether in the long run it is wise for the workingmen to enact legislation of this sort is not my concern, but I am strongly of opinion that there is nothing in the Constitution of the United States to prevent it, and that Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 , 52 L. ed. 436, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 277, 13 Ann. Cas. 764, and Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 , 49 L. ed. 937, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 539, 3 Ann. Cas. 1133, should be overruled. I have stated my grounds in those cases and think it unnecessary to add others that I think exist. See further, Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 104, 108, 35 L.R.A. 722, 57 Am. St. Rep. 443, 44 N. E. 1077; Plant v. Woods, 176 Mass. 492, 505, 51 L.R.A. 339, 79 Am. St. Rep. 330, 57 N. E. 1011. I still entertain the opinions expressed by me in Massachusetts.
The character of the question here involved sufficiently justifies, in my opinion, a statement of the grounds which impel me to dissent from the opinion and judgment in this case. The importance of the decision is further emphasized by the fact that it results not only in invalidating the legislation of Kansas, now before the court, but necessarily decrees the same fate to like legislation of other states of the Union. 2 This far- reaching result is attained because the statute is declared to be an infraction [236 U.S. 1, 28] of the constitutional protection afforded under the 14th Amendment to the Federal Constitution, which declares that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. The right of contract, it is said, is part of the liberty of the citizen, and to abridge it, as is done in this case, is declared to be beyond the legislative authority of the state.
It is therefore the thoroughly established doctrine of this court that liberty of contract may be circumscribed in the interest of the state and the welfare of its people. Whether a given exercise of such authority transcends the limits of legislative authority must be determined in each case as it arises. The preservation of the police power of the states, under the authority of which that [236 U.S. 1, 30] great mass of legislation has been enacted which has for its purpose the promotion of the health, safety, and welfare of the public, is of the utmost importance. This power was not surrendered by the states when the Federal Constitution was adopted, nor taken from them when the 14th Amendment was ratified and became a part of the fundamental law of the Union. Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27 , 28 L. ed. 923, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 357.
There is nothing in the statute now under consideration which prevents an employer from discharging one in his service at his will. The question now presented is, May an employer, as a condition of present or future employment, require an employee to agree that he will not exercise the privilege of becoming a member of a labor union, should he see fit to do so? In my opinion, the cases are entirely different, and the decision of the questions controlled by different principles. The right to join labor unions is undisputed, and has been the subject of frequent affirmation in judicial opinions. Acting within their legal rights, such associations are as legitimate as any organization of citizens formed to promote their common interest. They are organized under the laws of many states, by virtue of express statutes passed for that purpose, and, being legal, and acting within their constitutional rights, the right to join them, as against coercive action to the contrary, may be the legitimate subject of protection in the exercise of the police authority of the states. This statute, passed in the exercise of that particular authority called the police power, the Limitations of which no court has yet undertaken precisely to define, has for its avowed [236 U.S. 1, 33] purpose the protection of the exercise of a legal right, by preventing an employer from depriving the employee of it as a condition of obtaining employment. I see no reason why a state may not, if it chooses, protect this right, as well as other legal rights.
This court has many times decided that the motives of legislators in the enactment of laws are not the subject of judicial inquiry. Legislators, state and Federal, are entitled to the presumption that their action has been in [236 U.S. 1, 34] good faith and because of conditions which they deem proper and sufficient to warrant the action taken. Speaking for this court in Ex parte McCardle, 7 Wall. 506, 514, 19 L. ed. 264, 265, Chief Justice Chase summed up the doctrine in a sentence when he said: 'We are not at liberty to inquire into the motives of the legislature; we can only examine into its power under the Constitution.' In Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 7th ed. 257, that eminent author says: 'They [the courts] must assume that legislative discretion has been properly exercised. If evidence was required, it must be supposed that it was before the legislature when the act was passed; and if any special finding was required to warrant the passage of the particular act, it would seem that the passage of the act itself might be held equivalent to such finding.' 'The rule is general with reference to the enactments of all legislative bodies that the courts cannot inquire into the motives of the legislators in passing them, except as they may be disclosed on the face of the acts, or inferable from their operation, considered with reference to the condition of the country and existing legislation. The motives of the legislators, considered as the purposes they had in view, will always be presumed to be to accomplish that which follows as the natural and reasonable effect of their enactments. Their motives, considered as the moral inducements for their votes, will vary with the different members of the legislative body. The diverse character of such motives, and the impossibility of penetrating into the hearts of men and ascertaining the truth, precludes all such inquiries as impracticable and futile.' Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U.S. 703, 710 , 28 S. L. ed. 1145, 1147, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 730. 'We must assume that the legislature acts according to its judgment for the best interests of the state. A wrong intent cannot be imputed to it.' Florida C. & P. R. Co. v. Reynolds, 183 U.S. 471, 480 , 46 S. L. ed. 283, 287, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 176.
The act must be taken as an attempt of the legislature to enact a statute which it deemed necessary to the good [236 U.S. 1, 35] order and security of society. It imposes a penalty for 'coercing or influencing or making demands upon or requirements of employees, servants, laborers, and persons seeking employment.' It was in the light of this avowed purpose that the act was interpreted by the supreme court of Kansas, the ultimate authority upon the meaning of the terms of the law. Of course, if the act is necessarily arbitrary and therefore unconstitutional, mere declarations of good intent cannot save it, but it must be presumed to have been passed by the legislative branch of the state government in good faith, and for the purpose of reaching the desired end. The legislature may have believed, acting upon conditions known to it, that the public welfare would be promoted by the enactment of a statute which should prevent the compulsory exaction of written agreements to forego the acknowledged legal right here involved, as a condition of employment in one's trade or occupation.
It would be impossible to maintain that because one is free to accept or refuse a given employment, or because one may at will employ or refuse to employ another, it follows that the parties have a constitutional right to insert in an agreement of employment any stipulation they choose. They cannot put in terms that are against public policy either as it is deemed by the courts to exist at common law, or as it may be declared by the legislature as the arbiter within the limits of reason of the public policy of the state. It is no answer to say that the greater includes the less, and that because the employer is free to employ, or the employee to refuse employment, they may agree as they please. This matter is easily tested by assuming a contract of employment for a year and the insertion of a condition upon which the right of employment should continue. The choice of such conditions is not to be regarded as wholly unrestricted because the parties may agree or not, as they choose. And if the state may pro- [236 U.S. 1, 36] hibit a particular stipulation in an agreement because it is deemed to be opposed in its operation to the security and well being of the community, it may prohibit it in any agreement, whether the employment is for a term or at will. It may prohibit the attempt in any way to bind one to the objectionable undertaking.
'A man may not barter away his life or his freedom, or his substantial rights. In a criminal case, he cannot, as was held in Cancemi's Case, 18 N. Y. 128, be tried, in any other manner than by a jury of twelve men, although he consent in open [236 U.S. 1, 37] court to be tried by a jury of eleven men. In a civil case he may submit his particular suit by his own consent to an arbitration, or to the decision of a single judge. So he may omit to exercise his right to remove his suit to a Federal tribunal, as often as he thinks fit, in each recurring case. In these aspects any citizen may, no doubt, waive the rights to which he may be entitled. He cannot, however, bind himself in advance by an agreement, which may be specifically enforced, thus to forfeit his rights at all times and on all occasions, whenever the case may be presented.' Home Ins. Co. v. Morse, 20 Wall. 445, 451, 22 L. ed. 365, 368.
It may be that an employer may be of the opinion that membership of his employees in the National Guard, by enlistment in the militia of the state, may be detrimental to his business. Can it be successfully contended that the state may not, in the public interest, prohibit an agreement to forego such enlistment as against public policy? Would it be beyond a legitimate exercise of the police power to provide that an employee should not be required to agree, as a condition of employment, to forego affiliation with a particular political party, or the support of a particular candidate for office? It seems to me that these questions answer themselves. There is a real, and not a fanciful, distinction between the exercise of the right to discharge at will and the imposition of a requirement that the employee, as a condition of employment, shall make a particular agreement to forego a legal right. The agreement may be, or may be declared to be, against public policy, although the right of discharge remains. When a man in discharged, the employer exercises his right to declare such action necessary because of the exigencies of his business, or as the result of his judgment for other reasons sufficient to himself. When he makes a stipulation of the character here involved essential to future employment, he is not exercising a right to discharge, and may not wish to discharge the employee when, at a [236 U.S. 1, 38] subsequent time, the prohibited act is done. What is in fact accomplished, is that the one engaging to work, who may wish to preserve an independent right of action, as a condition of employment, is coerced to the signing of such an agreement against his will, perhaps impelled by the necessities of his situation. The state, within constitutional limitations, is the judge of its own policy and may execute it in the exercise of the legislative authority. This statute reaches not only the employed, but, as well, one seeking employment. The latter may never wish to join a labor union. By signing such agreements as are here involved he is deprived of the right of free choice as to his future conduct, and must choose between employment and the right to act in the future as the exigencies of his situation may demand. It is such contracts, having such effect, that this statute and similar ones seek to prohibit and punish as against the policy of the state.
It is constantly emphasized that the case presented is not one of coercion. But in view of the relative positions of employer and employed, who is to deny that the stipulation here insisted upon and forbidden by the law is essentially coercive? No form of words can strip it of its true character. Whatever our individual opinions may be as to the wisdom of such legislation, we cannot put our judgment in place of that of the legislature and refuse to acknowledge the existence of the conditions with which it was dealing. Opinions may differ as to the remedy, but we cannot understand upon what ground it can be said that a subject so intimately related to the welfare of society is removed from the legislative power. Wherein is the right of the employer to insert this stipulation in the agreement any more sacred than his right to agree with another employer in the same trade to keep up prices? He may think it quite as essential to his 'financial independence,' and so in truth it may be if he alone is to be considered. But it is too late to deny that the legis- [236 U.S. 1, 39] lative power reaches such a case. It would be difficult to select any subject more intimately related to good order and the security of the community than that under consideration-whether one takes the view that labor organizations are advantageous or the reverse. It is certainly as much a matter for legislative consideration and action as contracts in restraint of trade.
It is urged that a labor organization-a voluntary association of working men-has the constitutional right to deny membership to any man who will not agree that during such membership he will not accept or retain employment in company with nonunion men. And it is asserted that there cannot be one rule of liberty for the labor organization and its members and a different and more restrictive rule for employers.
I entirely agree that there should be the same rule for employers and employed, and the same liberty of action for each. In my judgment, the law may prohibit coercive attempts, such as are here involved, to deprive either of the free right of exercising privileges which are theirs within the law. So far as I know, no law has undertaken [236 U.S. 1, 40] to abridge the right of employers of labor in the exercise of free choice as to what organizations they will form for the promotion of their common interests, or denying to them free right of action in such matters.
But it is said that in this case all that was done in effect was to discharge an employee for a cause deemed sufficient to the employer,-a right inherent in the personal liberty of the employer protected by the Constitution. This argument loses sight of the real purpose and effect of this and kindred statutes. The penalty imposed is not for the discharge, but for the attempt to coerce an unwilling employee to agree to forego the exercise of the legal right involved as a condition of employment. It is the requirement of such agreements which the state declares to be against public policy.
If one prohibitive condition of the sort here involved may be attached, so may others, until employment can only be had as the result of written stipulations, which shall deprive the employee of the exercise of legal rights which are within the authority of the state to protect. While this court should, within the limitations of the constitutional guaranty, protect the free right of contract, it is not less important that the state be given the right to exert its legislative authority, if it deems best to do so, for the protection of rights which inhere in the privileges of the citizen of every free country. [236 U.S. 1, 41] The supreme court of Kansas, in sustaining this statute, said that 'employees, as a rule, are not financially able to be as independent in making contracts for the sale of their labor as are employers in making a contract of purchase thereof,' and in reply to this it is suggested that the law cannot remedy inequalities of fortune, and that so long as the right of property exists, it may happen that parties negotiating may not be equally unhampered by circumstances.
This language was quoted with approval in Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. McGuire, 219 U.S. 549, 570 , 55 S. L. ed. 328, 339, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 259, in which a statute of Iowa was sustained, prohibiting contracts limiting liability for injuries, made in advance of the injuries received, and providing that the subsequent acceptance of benefits under such contracts should not constitute satisfaction for injuries received after the contract. Certainly it can be no substantial objection to the exercise of the police power that the legislature has taken into consideration the necessities, the comparative ability, and the relative situation of the contracting parties. While all stand equal before the law, and are alike entitled to its protection, it ought not to be a reasonable objection that one motive which impelled an enactment was to protect those who might otherwise be unable to protect themselves.
[ Footnote 1 ] Constitution of the state of Kansas.
[ Footnote 2 ] Statutes like the Kansas statute have been passed in California, Colorado, Connecticut, Indiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Porto Rico, and Wisconsin. Bulletin of the Bureau of Labor Statistics No. 148, volumes 1 and 2; Labor Laws of the United States.

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