Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/105741/united-states-vs-doe
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 00:31:16+00:00

Document:
1. The contents of the subpoenaed records in question are not privileged under the Fifth Amendment. That Amendment protects the person asserting the privilege only from compelled self-incrimination. Fisher v. United States, 425 U. S. 391 , 425 U. S. 396 . Where the preparation of business records is voluntary, no compulsion is present. Here, respondent does not claim that he prepared the records involuntarily or that the subpoenas would force him to restate, repeat, or affirm the truth of the records' contents. The fact that the records are in his possession is irrelevant to the determination of whether the creation of the records was compelled. Pp. 465 U. S. 610 -612.
2. The act of producing the documents at issue in this case is privileged. Pp. 465 U. S. 612 -614.
use immunity (as the Government urges), in the absence of the formal request that the statute requires. Pp. 465 U. S. 614 -617.
POWELL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and WHITE, BLACKMUN, REHNQUIST, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. O'CONNOR, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 465 U. S. 618 . MARSHALL, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which BRENNAN, J., joined, post, p. 465 U. S. 618 . STEVENS, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, post, p. 465 U. S. 619 .
January 1, 1976, and the date of the subpoena. [ Footnote 1 ] The fourth subpoena sought production of a similar list of business records belonging to another company. [ Footnote 2 ] The final subpoena demanded production of all bank statements and cancelled checks of two of respondent's companies that had accounts at a bank in the Grand Cayman Islands.
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed. In re Grand Jury Empanelled March 19, 1980, 680 F.2d 327 (1982). It first addressed the question whether the Fifth Amendment ever applies to the records of a sole proprietorship. After noting that an individual may not assert the Fifth Amendment privilege on behalf of a corporation, partnership, or other collective entity under the holding of Bellis v. United States, 417 U. S. 85 (1974), [ Footnote 4 ] the Court of Appeals reasoned that the owner of a sole proprietorship acts in a personal, rather than a representative, capacity. As a result, the court held that respondent's claim of the privilege was not foreclosed by the reasoning of Bellis. 680 F.2d at 331.
not privileged because they are created voluntarily, and without compulsion. The Court of Appeals nevertheless found that respondent's business records were privileged under either of two analyses. First, the court reasoned that, notwithstanding the holdings in Bellis and Fisher, the business records of a sole proprietorship are no different from the individual owner's personal records. Noting that Third Circuit cases had held that private papers, although created voluntarily, are protected by the Fifth Amendment, [ Footnote 5 ] the court accorded the same protection to respondent's business papers. [ Footnote 6 ] Second, it held that respondent's act of producing the subpoenaed records would have "communicative aspects of its own." 680 F.2d at 335. The turning over of the subpoenaed documents to the grand jury would admit their existence and authenticity. Accordingly, respondent was entitled to assert his Fifth Amendment privilege rather than produce the subpoenaed documents.
Id. at 425 U. S. 409 -410.
"Compliance with the subpoena tacitly concedes the existence of the papers demanded and their possession or control by the taxpayer. It also would indicate the taxpayer's belief that the papers are those described in the subpoena. Curcio v. United States, 354 U. S. 118 , 354 U. S. 125 (1957). The elements of compulsion are clearly present, but the more difficult issues are whether the tacit averments of the taxpayer are both 'testimonial' and 'incriminating' for purposes of applying the Fifth Amendment. These questions perhaps do not lend themselves to categorical answers; their resolution may instead depend on the facts and circumstances of particular cases or classes thereof."
Title 18 U.S.C. §§ 6002 and 6003 provide for the granting of use immunity with respect to the potentially incriminating evidence. [ Footnote 14 ] The Court upheld the constitutionality of the use immunity statute in Kastigar v. United States, 406 U. S. 441 (1972).
The Government did state several times before the District Court that it would not use respondent's act of production against him in any way. But counsel for the Government never made a statutory request to the District Court to grant respondent use immunity. [ Footnote 15 ] We are urged to adopt a doctrine of constructive use immunity. Under this doctrine, the courts would impose a requirement on the Government not to use the incriminatory aspects of the act of production against the person claiming the privilege even though the statutory procedures have not been followed.
We conclude that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the contents of the subpoenaed documents were privileged under the Fifth Amendment. The act of producing the documents at issue in this case is privileged, and cannot be compelled without a statutory grant of use immunity pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 6002 and 6003. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is, therefore, affirmed in part and reversed in part, [ Footnote 18 ] and the case is remanded to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Bellis defined a "collective entity" as "an organization which is recognized as an independent entity apart from its individual members." 417 U.S. at 417 U. S. 92 .
" Gould, then, stands for the proposition that an individual's business papers, as well as his personal records, cannot be subpoenaed by a grand jury."
425 U.S. at 425 U. S. 414 . We note that in some respects the documents sought in Fisher were more "personal" than those at issue here. The Fisher documents were accountant's workpapers in the possession of the taxpayers' lawyers. The workpapers related to the taxpayers' individual personal returns. To that extent, the documents were personal, even though in the possession of a third party. In contrast, each of the documents sought here pertained to respondent's businesses.
425 U.S. at 425 U. S. 399 . In Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U. S. 463 (1976), the petitioner also relied on Boyd. In rejecting his argument, we observed that "the continued validity of the broad statements contained in some of the Court's earlier cases [has] been discredited by later opinions." 427 U.S. at 427 U. S. 472 . See also United States v. Nobles, 422 U. S. 225 , 422 U. S. 233 , n. 7 (1975).
Id. at 427 U. S. 471 . The Court dismissed this argument and found the documents not to be privileged, because the petitioner "had voluntarily committed to writing" any incriminating statements contained therein. Id. at 427 U. S. 473 . Although Andresen involved a search warrant, rather than a subpoena, the underlying principle is the same in this context. If the party asserting the Fifth Amendment privilege has voluntarily compiled the document, no compulsion is present and the contents of the document are not privileged.
The Government concedes that the act of producing the subpoenaed documents might have had some testimonial aspects, but it argues that any incrimination would be so trivial that the Fifth Amendment is not implicated. The Government finds support for this argument in Marchetti v. United States, 390 U. S. 39 (1968). In Marchetti, the Court stated that a party who wishes to claim the Fifth Amendment privilege must be "confronted by substantial and real,' and not merely trifling or imaginary, hazards of incrimination." Id. at 390 U. S. 53 ; see United States v. Apfelbaum, 445 U. S. 115 , 445 U. S. 128 (1980). On the basis of the findings made in this case, we think it clear that the risk of incrimination was "substantial and real," and not "trifling or imaginary." Respondent did not concede in the District Court that the records listed in the subpoena actually existed or were in his possession. Respondent argued that, by producing the records, he would tacitly admit their existence and his possession. Respondent also pointed out that, if the Government obtained the documents from another source, it would have to authenticate them before they would be admissible at trial. See Fed.Rule Evid. 901. By producing the documents, respondent would relieve the Government of the need for authentication. These allegations were sufficient to establish a valid claim of the privilege against self-incrimination. This is not to say that the Government was foreclosed from rebutting respondent's claim by producing evidence that possession, existence, and authentication were a "foregone conclusion." Fisher, 425 U.S. at 425 U. S. 411 . In this case, however, the Government failed to make such a showing.
Of course, courts generally suppress compelled, incriminating testimony that results from a violation of a witness' Fifth Amendment rights. See United States v. Mandujano, 425 U. S. 564 , 425 U. S. 576 (1976); United States v. Blue, 384 U. S. 251 , 384 U. S. 255 (1966). The difference between that situation and the Government's theory of constructive use immunity is that, in the latter, it is the grant of judicially enforceable use immunity that compels the witness to testify. In the former situation, exclusion of the witness' testimony is used to deter the Government from future violations of witnesses' Fifth Amendment rights.
Respondent argues that any grant of use immunity must cover the contents of the documents, as well as the act of production. We find this contention unfounded. To satisfy the requirements of the Fifth Amendment, a grant of immunity need be only as broad as the privilege against self-incrimination. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U. S. 52 , 378 U. S. 107 (1964) (WHITE, J., concurring); see Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. at 253, n. 8; United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338 , 414 U. S. 346 (1974). As discussed above, the privilege in this case extends only to the act of production. Therefore, any grant of use immunity need only protect respondent from the self-incrimination that might accompany the act of producing his business records.
JUSTICE STEVENS states that we should affirm the Court of Appeals decision as a whole because our reasoning is entirely consistent with that of the courts below. See post at 465 U. S. 623 . As we stated above, see n 6, supra, we read the opinion of the Court of Appeals as holding that the contents of the subpoenaed records were privileged. It is that aspect of the court's opinion that we reverse today. Were we to adopt JUSTICE STEVENS' suggestion, respondent could argue on remand that any grant of use immunity must cover the contents of the records, because the records themselves are privileged under the holding of the Court of Appeals. To avoid that result, we must reverse the decision below insofar as it held that the contents of the subpoenaed records are privileged.
I concur in both the result and reasoning of JUSTICE POWELL's opinion for the Court. I write separately, however, just to make explicit what is implicit in the analysis of that opinion: that the Fifth Amendment provides absolutely no protection for the contents of private papers of any kind. The notion that the Fifth Amendment protects the privacy of papers originated in Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616 , 116 U. S. 630 (1886), but our decision in Fisher v. United States, 425 U. S. 391 (1976), sounded the death knell for Boyd. "Several of Boyd's express or implicit declarations [had] not stood the test of time," 425 U.S. at 425 U. S. 407 , and its privacy of papers concept "ha[d] long been a rule searching for a rationale. . . ." Id. at 425 U. S. 409 . Today's decision puts a long overdue end to that fruitless search.
I concur in the Court's affirmance of the Court of Appeals' ruling that the act of producing the documents could not be compelled without an explicit grant of use immunity pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 6002 and 6003. I dissent, however, with respect to that part of the Court's opinion reversing the Court of Appeals. The basis for the reversal is the majority's disagreement with the Court of Appeals' discussion of whether the Fifth Amendment protected the contents of the documents respondent sought to withhold from disclosure. Inasmuch as the Court of Appeals' judgment did not rest upon the disposition of this issue, this Court errs by reaching out to decide it. As JUSTICE STEVENS rightly insists, " [t]his Court . . . reviews judgments, not statements in opinions.'" Post at 465 U. S. 619 (quoting Black v. Cutter Laboratories, 351 U. S. 292 , 351 U. S. 297 (1956)).
Were it true that the Court's opinion stands for the proposition that "the Fifth Amendment provides absolutely no protection for the contents of private papers of any kind," ibid., I would assuredly dissent. I continue to believe that, under the Fifth Amendment, "there are certain documents no person ought to be compelled to produce at the Government's request." Fisher v. United States, 425 U. S. 391 , 425 U. S. 431 -432 (1976) (MARSHALL, J., concurring in judgment).
As the majority notes, "each of the documents sought here pertained to respondent's businesses." Ante at 465 U. S. 610 , n. 7.
See Couch v. United States, 409 U. S. 322 , 409 U. S. 350 (1973) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting) ("Diaries and personal letters that record only their author's personal thoughts lie at the heart of our sense of privacy. In contrast, I see no bar in the . . . Fifth Amendment to the seizure of a letter from one conspirator to another directing the recipient to take steps that further the conspiracy. Business records . . . lie between those cases").
(1956). [ Footnote 3/1 ] When both the District Court and the Court of Appeals correctly apply the law, and correctly dispose of the issue before them, I think it is poor appellate practice for this Court to reverse.
production may indicate a belief that the papers produced are those described in the subpoena. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 425 U. S. 410 . . . . "
"To be sure, the documents requested here, like those sought in Fisher, were voluntarily prepared, and therefore 'cannot be said to contain compelled testimonial evidence' in and of themselves. See Fisher, supra, 425 U.S. at 425 U. S. 409 -10. . . . But the Supreme Court in Fisher went to great lengths to demonstrate that, in certain situations, the very act of producing subpoenaed records might amount to an incriminating declaration. See id. at 425 U. S. 410 -13 . . . ; see also id. at 425 U. S. 430 -34 . . . (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment). And such a situation, we believe, is present in the dispute at bar."
"Appendix at 98 (footnote omitted). Under these circumstances, we are unable to say, as did the Court in Fisher, that responding to the subpoenas 'would not appear to represent a substantial threat of self-incrimination.' 425 U.S. at 425 U. S. 413 . . . . "
"Accordingly, we hold, therefore, that enforcement of these subpoenas would result in a compelled testimonial communication, an outcome neither compatible with the fifth amendment nor consonant with Fisher. "
More particularly, we review the judgment that the Court of Appeals entered in this case, not the judgment that it may have entered in some other case, see ante at 465 U. S. 609 , n. 6, or some isolated statement in its opinion commenting on the holding in some other case.

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