Source: http://www.edmecka.com/articles/class-action-lawsuit-charging-civil-rights-violations-by-the-automated-traffic-enforcement-system.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 18:23:22+00:00

Document:
3.(a) Emelike Agomo and Auto Ward, Inc., the named plaintiffs, as owners of automobiles, received notices of infractions, directly or indirectly, by mail from the District of Columbia ATES for alleged traffic violations. The District of Columbia charged these named plaintiffs with "speeding" in violation of the D.C. Code, section 502201.04, and 18 DCMR 2200 or with disobeying a "steady yellow signal" or a "steady red signal" in violation of the D.C. Code, section 50-2201.03(a)(1), and 18 DCMR 2103.5 and 2103.7.
(b) The District of Columbia charged Emelike Agomo's automobile with speeding on about November 10, November 14, November 21, December 12, December 22, and December 29, 2001, and January 9, January 19, February 9, February 16, and March 13, 2002, and on perhaps other occasions. on about July 17 or August 30, 2002, the defendant found Mr. Agomo liable on the notices of infractions for speeding on December 22, 2001, January 9, February 16, and March 13, 2002. The defendant still prosecutes the notices of infraction for speeding on December 12 and 29, 2001, and may well be prosecuting the notices for January 19 and February 9, 2002. Meanwhile, the defendant appears to be prosecuting the notices of infraction for speeding on November 10, 14, and 21, 2001, although the District of Columbia claims to have dismissed what it regards as identical notices for speeding on October 10, 14, and 21, 2001. When adjudicating these cases, the defendant found Mr. Agomo liable on the December 22, 2001, the January 9, the February 16, and the March 13, 2002, notices of infraction on the basis of Mr. Agomo's ownership of the vehicle in question.
(c) As for Auto Ward, Inc., a fleet operator which leases (or otherwise transfers custody of) hundreds of taxicabs to local drivers, the District of Columbia charged this plaintiff with at least fifty-seven different notices of infraction, both for speeding and for yellow-red light violations that allegedly took place from February 23, 2000, through October 23, 2002. As part of this ongoing pattern, the defendant has found Auto Ward, Inc., liable on some or all of the fifty-seven notices of infraction referred to in this paragraph. When the District of Columbia adjudicated these cases, it found Auto Ward, Inc., liable on some or all the notices of infraction on the basis of the company's ownership of the vehicles in question, and the defendant adjudicated these notices of infractions without providing notice and an opportunity to be heard on the charges.
(d) According to the ATES notices of infractions, these alleged traffic violations took place on highways, roads, or streets in the District of Columbia and, hence, provided for the civil liability assessed against the named plaintiffs. .
4. Mayor Anthony A. Williams serves as chief executive officer of the District of Columbia municipality, and the named plaintiffs sue Mayor Williams in his official capacity for civil rights violations committed under color of law by the District of Columbia with its ATES. With authority from the D.C. Code, section 50-2209.03, the mayor employs Affiliated Computer Services, Inc., a private contractor, for the administration of much of the ATES operations. Since about 1997 or 1998 when the municipality initiated ATES, the District of Columbia has prosecuted thousands of individual drivers on more than 500,000 ATES of infractions in violation of fifth amendment due process.
5. The named plaintiffs intend to represent the class of automobile owners prosecuted by ATES since July 31, 1999. As required by rule 23(a) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil procedure, the class of automobile owners prosecuted by ATES since July 31, 1999, would be so numerous that joinder of all class members would be impracticable. Also, as required by rule 23(a), questions of law or fact are common to the class, and the claims asserted by the representative plaintiffs would be the same as the claims typically available to the class. Moreover, as required by rule 23(a), the representative plaintiffs would fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
6. In addition, rule 23(b)(1)(8) permits class certification because the prosecution of separate actions by individual class members would create the risk of adjudications which as a practical matter would be dispositive of the interests of other class members not bringing this lawsuit. Also, rule 23(b)(2) permits class certification because the District of Columbia has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class of automobile owners prosecuted by ATES. As a result, final injunctive relief and corresponding declaratory relief for the entire class would be appropriate.
7. The plaintiffs estimate that more than 100,000 different automobile owners make up the class that the named plaintiffs seek to represent.
B. The named plaintiffs would be adequate representatives of the class because they have no conflict of interests, either among themselves or with the class as a whole. Indeed, the named plaintiffs simply received ATES notices of infractions that, on an individual basis, exposed each plaintiff to a possible civil fine of at least $50.00 for each infraction. Each member of the class faces or faced this same potential for liability. Also, each member of the class, including the named plaintiffs, faced the prospect of suspension of his or her driver's license or of his or her motor vehicle registration tags if he or she failed to pay the civil fine imposed by ATES.
9. The named plaintiffs would be adequate representatives of the class because they have no conflict of interests, either among themselves or with the class as a whole. Indeed, each named plaintiff faces, or faced, potential civil fines of from $50.00 in the aggregate to $6,675.00 in the aggregate for all ATES infractions referred to in this complaint. That is to say, Eric Mercer, at one extreme, faced a potential civil fine of $50.00 for the cited ATES infraction. Meanwhile, at the other extreme, Emelike Agomo faces potential civil fines totaling $1,550.00 on the basis of about seventeen alleged ATES infractions while Auto Ward, Inc., faces potential liability of $6,675.00 on the 57 citations against that company. This small disparity in aggregate liability, from one named plaintiff to another, does not create a conflict of interests among either the named plaintiffs or the class members. To be sure, the named plaintiffs seek merely to protect their fifth amendment due process rights and those same rights in other class members. In a word, the named plaintiffs seek an injunction against further ATES operations, and these plaintiffs also seek reimbursement to class members of fines collected by ATES. The relief sought by the named plaintiffs fundamentally precludes them from asserting in this lawsuit interests in conflict with other class members.
10. Solely for purposes of this lawsuit, the plaintiffs stipulate to the following: (a) that the ATES attempted to identify the owners of the automobiles involved in each alleged infraction; (b) that the ATES accurately described the movement of the automobile in each alleged infraction; (c) that the ATES accurately stated the date and the time of each alleged infraction; (d) that the ATES accurately described the location of each alleged infraction; (e) that the ATES accurately described the license plate of the automobile charged in each infraction notice; and (f) that the ATES provided in each of its infraction notices an accurate "copy of the photo or digitized image of the violation".
(a) The owner of a vehicle issued a notice of infraction (by ATES) shall be liable for payment of the fine assessed for the infraction, unless the owner can furnish evidence that the vehicle was, at the time of the infraction, in the custody, care, or control of another person. In the event that the registered owner claims that the vehicle was in the custody, care, or control of another person, the registered owner of the vehicle shall provide evidence in a sworn affidavit, under penalty of perjury, setting forth the name and address of the person who leased, rented, or otherwise had care, custody, or control of the vehicle.
(d) The owner or operator of a vehicle shall not be presumed liable for violations in the vehicle recorded by an automated traffic enforcement system ... when the vehicle or tags have been reported stolen prior to the citation. . . .
D.C. Code, section 50-2209.02(a), (b), and (d).
Your vehicle was photographed violating District of Columbia Traffic Regulations on the date and time listed below. Under District law, the registered owner of a vehicle is liable for payment of the fine for violations recorded using an automated traffic enforcement system, unless the vehicle was not in the custody of the owner at the time of the infraction. POINTS WILL NOT BE ASSESSED AGAINST THE REGISTERED OWNER OR THE DESIGNATED DRIVER FOR THIS VIOLATION. On the back of this notice you will find detailed information regarding payment, ticket adjudication, and assignment of responsibility.
District of Columbia ATES Moving Violation Notice of Infraction. p. 1.
CERTIFICATION. You may either indicate the name and address of the driver [responsible for the alleged ATES infraction] or have the driver complete the form with their full name and address and answer the ticket as instructed. You must identify the full name and address of the person who leased, rented, or otherwise had custody, care, or control of your vehicle in the space provided below within 30 calendar days of the mail date of this citation. Otherwise, as registered owner, you or your company will be liable for this citation. A false representation of this information may subject you to criminal penalties. This form must be notarized before it is returned. You should not sign it until you are in the presence of the notary. The notary will require proof of identity at the time of notarization. Return the completed form to Automated Traffic Enforcement, P.O. Box 37075, Washington, D.C. 20013. PLEASE PRINT CAREFULLY.
District of Columbia ATES Moving Violation Notice of Infraction, p.2.
14.(a) This District of Columbia policy imposed on each relevant class member the burden of proving an essential element of a speeding violation under the D.C. Coda, section 50-2201.04, and 18 DCMR 2200. According to the D.C. Code, section 50-2201.04(d), an essential element of a speeding offense is the identity of the "individual violating" the law.
(b) Similarly, District of Colombia policy imposed on each relevant class member the burden of proving an essential element of passing a steady yellow or red signal in violation of the D.C. Coda, section 50-2201.03(a)(1), and 18 DCMR 2103.5 and 2103.7. According to 18 DCMR 2103.1, an essential element of a red or yellow signal offense is the identity of "drivers of vehicles" disobeying the traffic signals.
(c) The District of Columbia policy mandated by the D.C. Coda., section 50-2209.02 (a)-(b) and (d) established a presumption of liability (or of guilt) against plaintiffs and other class members, albeit while this presumption of liability exceeded the scope of the prima facie limits established in 18 DCMR 1035 and 3012.6.
15. As required by the policy, the ATES infraction notice obliged each class member to prove the identity of the person violating the traffic laws. Otherwise, according to the policy, the District of Columbia presumed a class member, as owner of his or her automobile, to be liable for violating the speeding or the traffic signal laws.
16. With regard to ATES infraction notices, the District of Columbia never assumed the burden of proving who violated the speeding laws in the D.C. Cods, section 50-2201.04, and 18 DCMR 2200. Also, with regard to ATES infraction notices, the District of Columbia never assumed the burden of proving who violated the traffic signal laws in the D.C. Code, section 502201.03(a)(1), and 18 DCMR 2103.5 and 2103.7.
17. Under ATES policy, the District of Columbia never offered any proof whatever about the identity of drivers responsible for "moving violations" charged in ATES infraction notices under the D.C. Cods, section 50-2209.01.
18. However, fifth amendment due process as interpreted in Thomas v. D.C. Board of Appeals, 355 A.2d 789, 793 (D.C. 1976), and in Hell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 541-42, 91 S.Ct. 1586, 1591, 29 L.Ed.2d 90, 96 (1971), as well as District of Columbia law, imposes the burden of proof for ATES infractions on the District of Columbia, not on automobile owners. See D.C. Code, section 50-2302.06(a) (interpreting due process with the mandate that "the burden of proof shall be on the District and no infraction shall be established except by clear and convincing evidence"); see also D.C. Code, section 2-509(b) ("In contested cases, except as may otherwise be provided by law, ... the proponent of a rule or order shall have the burden of proof"); see also 18 DCMR 3012.1 and 3012.2 (a).
19. Count two incorporates by reference paragraphs (1) through (18).
20. Since July 31, 1999, the defendant employed a private contractor, Automated Computer Systems, Inc., for much of the adjudication in ATES cases. Automated Computer, as a corporate entity and through its employees, examines and, on a substantial basis, adjudges the validity and the content of notices of infractions issued by the defendant's ATES system. The plaintiffs make this allegation on the basis of reasonable sources of information and belief.
21. However, from July 31, 1999, through about April 24, 2002, the defendant paid Automated Computer Systems, Inc., about forty percent of the money collected in fines from ATES prosecutions. After April 24, 2002, the defendant paid Automated Computer Systems, Inc., a monthly flat fee nearly equal to monthly fees paid before April 25, 2002, under the original percentage-of-receipts formula. The plaintiffs make this allegation on the basis of reasonable sources of information and belief.
22. The compensation scheme used by the District of Columbia to pay Automated Computer Systems, Inc., for its role in adjudicating ATES prosecutions renders the defendant's adjudicative process, and Automated Computer Systems' role in that process, impermissibly partial towards a verdict against automobile owners. Accordingly, this compensation scheme and the ATES regime that employs it violates fifth amendment due process. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523, 532-34 (1927) (judge's compensation based on percentage of fines in traffic cases violated due process); Connally v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 245, 250-51 (1977) (per curium) (judge's compensation based on number of search warrants issued violated impartiality requirement of due process); see Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 820-25 (1986) (judge disqualified under due process because his personal lawsuit raised same issue as that in case before him); see also Ward v. Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972) (mayor as municipality's chief executive barred by due process from adjudicating traffic tickets prosecuted by municipality).
23. This portion of the complaint incorporates by reference paragraphs (1) through (22).
24. 42 U.S.C., section 1993, protects the fifth amendment due process rights of each member of the class.
25. The ATES operations, including its notices of infractions and the adjudicative role of Automated Computer Systems, Inc., violated the fifth amendment due process rights of each class member.
26. The fifth amendment due process violations described in this complaint resulted in the following injuries to the named plaintiffs.
(a) Emelike Agomo faces liability of about $2,300.00 despite his assertion of his due process rights. Also, the defendant has or will suspend Mr. Agomo's right to operate his or any other automobile in the District of Columbia. Moreover, the defendant has or will bar the District of Columbia vehicle registration of automobiles owned by Mr. Agomo.
(b) Auto Ward, Inc., faces liability of about $6,675.00 despite its assertion of its due process rights. Also, the defendant has or will suspend the District of Columbia vehicle registration for the automobiles owned by Auto Ward, Inc. This action will bar the lawful use of these automobiles in the District of Columbia.
2?. Identical fifth amendment due process violations caused similar injuries to each class member.
The plaintiffs demand a trial by jury on the issues of fact raised in this complaint.
I, Thomas Ruffin,. Jr., certify that, on December 12, 2002, I delivered a copy of this amended complaint to the office Edward Taptich, Esquire, the lawyer for the defendant.

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