Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/149/574/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 04:32:05+00:00

Document:
A demurrer lacking the affidavit of defendant and certificate of counsel is fatally defective, and a decree pro confesso may be entered unless something takes place between the filing of the demurrer and the entry of the decree to take away the right.
The filing of an amended bill after a demurrer, without first obtaining an order of the court therefor, and the withdrawal of it by the complainant's solicitor in consequence, without paying to the defendant the costs occasioned thereby and furnishing him with a copy with proper references, do not take away such right.
When one party contracts to erect a building for another party on land of the latter, and a law of the state gives a mechanics' lien upon the land upon which the building stands, the parties may contract that the lien shall extend to other adjoining land of the latter party.
When the state law gives either an action at law or a remedy in equity to enforce a mechanics' lien, proceedings in a federal court to enforce it may be had in equity.
mechanic's lien in conformity with the provisions of the state statute. In this statement, the furnace is stated to be situated at Sheffield, Colbert County, Alabama, on a site containing about twenty acres, described as follows: "Twenty acres of land in fractional section 29, . . . contiguous to the City of Sheffield," etc. On September 5, 1888, plaintiff filed his bill in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Alabama to foreclose this mechanic's lien. The bill avers that a contract was entered into for the construction of the furnace, that the amount due was $63,279.43, that a statement of lien had been filed, and prayed for foreclosure and for general relief. In the bill, the contract was not set out at length, but it was alleged that it was in writing, and would be produced at the hearing if necessary. Attached to the bill of complaint was the statement filed in the probate court. A subpoena was duly served upon the defendant on September 6. On October 1, the defendant applied for and received a copy of the bill. On October 3, it filed a paper which it called a demurrer, but which did not have the certificate of counsel or the affidavit of defendant essential to a demurrer, as required by Equity Rule 31. On the rule day in November (November 5th), a decree pro confesso was entered, and on December 19 a final decree was also entered, finding the amount due as claimed, the existence of a lien upon the twenty acres, and ordering a foreclosure and sale. At the final hearing, the plaintiff produced the lien papers, which were filed in the office of the probate court, the contract between the parties, a certificate from the superintendent of the company defendant of compliance with the terms of the contract, and an affidavit of counsel for the plaintiff to the genuineness of these documents. At the next term, and on February 4, 1889, a motion and petition were filed by defendant in the circuit court to set aside the final decree, which was overruled on the 15th of February, 1889. An appeal to this Court was duly perfected.
"The filing of this amended bill is erroneous, and the same is withdrawn; no order of the court having been obtained, ordering the filing thereof. Henry B. Tompkins, sol. for Complainant."
he had done neither of these things, he could claim no benefit from the filing of the amended bill, and when he entered upon it a withdrawal, he left the case to stand as though no amendment had been attempted. Besides, the defendant, being in default, was in no position to take advantage of the plaintiff's action in withdrawing the amendment. There was therefore nothing erroneous in the matter of procedure, nothing which would compel the court at a subsequent term to set aside the decree.
While in this motion and petition there are stated many matters in which it is claimed there was error on account of which the decree should be set aside, and the defendant given leave to plead, and while there is a general allegation that it has a full, perfect, and meritorious defense to the demand set up in the bill, yet it is not alleged that the contract for the building of the furnace was not made as stated, or that the statement for lien was not filed, or that the amount claimed to be due was not due and unpaid; so that the case is presented of an effort on the part of defendant to avoid or delay the payment of a just debt. Of course it need not be said that under such circumstances, a court of equity will not strain a point to assist a defendant. It is insisted in this motion to set aside the decree that the twenty acres described in the bill and decree are the absolute property of some other person or persons than the defendant. Even if that be true, we do not see how the defendant is prejudiced. If the plaintiff has made a mistake and is attempting to sell somebody else's land, the owner is the party who has the right to complain, and the defendant, whose property is not touched, has no ground to object.
the probate court; that such statement describes the land as contiguous to the City of Sheffield, and does not show that it is within the limits of any city, town, or village; that therefore the limit to which the lien and decree could go was one acre of the tract, and that such acre was not described; that the amendment which was attempted to be made averred that this land was in the City of Sheffield, and was a single lot or piece of ground necessary for the operation of the furnace, and that only by a consideration of matters thus presented in the amendment could the decree properly extend to the twenty acres. It is a sufficient answer to this contention to say that the bill claimed a lien on the twenty acres; that nothing in the bill or statement affirmatively shows that the land was not within the limits of some city, town, or village, and that the contract which was produced stipulated for security by mechanic's lien or first mortgage on all the furnace company's interests in Sheffield. Surely parties can contract to extend the area of property to be covered by a lien. Such a stipulation is tantamount to an equitable mortgage. Ketchum v. St. Louis, 101 U. S. 307, 101 U. S. 316-317; 3 Pomeroy's Eq.Juris. sec. 1235; Pinch v. Anthony, 8 Allen 536. The plaintiff, under his contract, was entitled to a written and express mortgage of the entire realty of the company at Sheffield, and when he demanded in his bill that the statutory lien which he had filed should be extended to the twenty acres, he was only relying upon the promise made by the defendant that the lien should extend to that tract -- a promise which the defendant might lawfully make, although, as to the excess of ground over one acre, the contract may be only in the nature of an equitable mortgage. This objection to the decree cannot be sustained.
"It is essentially a suit in equity, requiring specific directions for the sale of the property, such as are usually given upon the foreclosure of mortgages and sale of mortgaged premises."
"A construction, therefore, that would adopt the state practice in all its extent would at once extinguish, in such states, the exercise of equitable jurisdiction. The acts of Congress have distinguished between remedies at common law and in equity, yet this construction would confound them. The court therefore thinks that to effectuate the purposes of the legislature, the remedies in the courts of the United States are to be at common law or in equity not according to the practice of state courts, but according to the principles of common law and equity, as distinguished and defined in that country from which we derive our knowledge of those principles."
v. Scheimer, 23 How. 235; Sheirburn v. Cordova, 24 How. 423; Whitehead v. Shattuck, 138 U. S. 146, 138 U. S. 152; Scott v. Neely, 140 U. S. 106; Smyth v. N.O. Canal & Banking Co., 141 U. S. 656.
But, further, the defendant contends that by the state law the lien was limited to one acre of ground. The plaintiff claims that by virtue of his contract and the filing of his statement of lien, he was entitled to a decree subjecting a tract of twenty acres to the satisfaction of his debt. He therefore claims rights of an equitable nature, arising from something more than the statute and based partly upon his contract. Certainly such a claim as that is one of an equitable nature, and to be adjudicated only in a court of equity.

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