Source: http://www.acoel.org/?page=46
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 06:41:31+00:00

Document:
Recently, the Bureau of Land Management ("BLM") and several Montana environmental groups agreed to suspend 61 Montana oil and gas leases as settlement of a case challenging lease issuance for failure to consider climate change effects. The leases, which had been issued, were suspended while BLM conducts additional analysis of greenhouse gas fugitive emissions and climate change impacts under the National Environmental Policy Act. As part of the settlement, BLM also asserts "authority to void or terminate any lease, if it determines upon review that such an action is appropriate.
On March 18, 2010, Judge Molloy of the United States District Court for the District of Montana entered an order dismissing the case based on the settlement agreement, despite the absence of the oil and gas industry from the settlement discussions. BLM and the environmentalist parties are seeking to keep confidential the deliberations that led to the settlement. This stands in contrast to prior positions taken by the United States regarding the release of settlement discussion documents under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) pursuant to the U.S. Supreme Court Klamath decision in 2000.
Unlike the 77 Utah leases that were voided by BLM in 2009, the agency did not admit to error in the NEPA process leading to issuance of the leases. The takeaway from these BLM actions is to make sure that your company has solid NEPA analysis that fully considers climate change and greenhouse gas issues, including those resulting from production and gathering operation fugitive emissions, when applying for leases and APDs. The willingness to suspend or void leases represents a new chapter in available remedies BLM is willing to use, whereby even already issued leases may now be at risk. Click here to review the settlement and click here to review the order.
Dredging of Delaware River Allowed to Begin ... Will It be Completed?
On March 1, 2010, the Army Corps of Engineers began to dredge a section of the Delaware River to deepen the shipping channel that services ports as far north as Philadelphia and Camden. While not a remarkable event as yearly maintenance dredging occurs, the dredging of the River to a lower depth was preceded by more than twenty years of debate, administrative actions and litigation surrounding the need to deepen the channel. Yet, even as the dredging takes place, the fight continues, as the Governor of New Jersey has pledged to oppose the channel deepening on economic and environmental grounds.
Litigation surrounding the dredging ensued earlier this year in the United States District Court for the District of Delaware after the Corps decided to proceed with the deepening project despite not having received all state permits and approvals to do so. Before proceeding, the Corps found that Delaware had refused to provide one such permit in a timely and responsible manner, thereby interfering with its authority to maintain navigation as directed by Congress, and concluded that its actions would conform to the applicable State Implementation Plans, pending the purchase of emission reduction credits.
The State of Delaware Department of Natural Resources and Environmental Control (“DNREC”) sought to enjoin the Corps from proceeding with the deepening project until the Corps demonstrated its compliance with all applicable state and federal requirements, alleging violations of the Clean Water Act, Clean Air Act, Coastal Zone Management Act and the state regulatory regimes associated with these statutes.
The District Court analyzed DNREC’s preliminary injunction motion under the Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., --U.S.--, 129 S. Ct. 365, 172 L.Ed. 2d 249 (2008), standard of (i) likelihood of success on the merits, (ii) likelihood of irreparable harm, (iii) balancing of the equities and (iv) the public interest. For likelihood of success on the merits, the court analyzed each alleged violation within the strictures of the Administrative Procedures Act.
DNREC first alleged that, under Section 313(a) of the Clean Water Act, the Corps’ sovereign immunity with respect to the project had been explicitly waived, subjecting it to the State’s regulatory process by which it must obtain the necessary permit prior to commencing construction. The court found that the Section 404(t) more limited waiver specifically governing discharge of dredged mater governed the Corps’ activities for the project. This meant that the Corps would be subject to the State’s administrative requirements so long as its authority to maintain navigation remained unimpaired. The Corps, however, had already made a finding that DNREC’s delay impaired its authority, and the court held that this finding, which was afforded great deference, was not arbitrary or capricious.
Addressing the Clean Air Act allegations, the court analyzed the sufficiency of the Corps determination that the project conformed to the applicable SIPs, focusing on the Corps’ choice to purchase ERCs as a mitigation measure to demonstrate conformity. The court found that absent from the conformity determination was an enforceable measure to obtain the ERCs. Without a specific source for and amount of ERCs, the record did not support that the Corps made a rational determination of conformity.
DNREC next argued that the Corps failed to certify to its “satisfaction” that the project was consistent with the Delaware Coastal Management Program as required under the Coastal Zone Management Act. While DNREC had initially concurred with the Corps consistency determination, it claimed that substantial changes to the project mandated that the Corps engage in a supplementary consistency determination. The court found that DNREC’s “satisfaction” was not required, and that the Corps could proceed with a project so long as it concluded that its project was “fully consistent” with the State’s management plan. For any interim changes after an initial consistency determination, the Corps was required to identify if any substantially different effects resulted therefrom, and the Corps had not identified any such results.
On the issue of irreparable injury, DNREC asserted two potential harms: (1) allowing the Corps to bypass the state regulatory process would run afoul of Delaware’s sovereign authority, and (2) that the Corps’ activities would result in harm to the environment. As to the first assertion, the court found that the federal supremacy principles apparent in the CWA, CAA and CZMA require that state law yield in certain statutorily defined circumstances, and that a federal agency’s employment of such a circumstance could not result in harm relevant to the Winter inquiry. For harm to the environment, while the court recognized that injury to the environment constitutes irreparable harm, such harm must be substantiated and the court found that DNREC had failed to do so. The court found “especially telling” that DNREC could not provide any physical evidence tending to show an injury, and that the Corps had proffered the only technical studies that were before the court.
In balancing of the equities and the public interest, the court weighed the interests of “nation’s environmental preservation efforts” versus the continued economic vitality of the Delaware River ports and found them equally compelling. The court then looked to Congress’ determination, as evidenced by its funding decisions, that it was in the public interest to proceed with the project.
Ultimately, the court found that DNREC had not carried its burden that the project should be enjoined and denied DNREC’s motion as to the first phase of the project. However, since the initial project stage would last through December 2010, and DNREC represented that an administrative review of the project would be concluded within a year, the court granted the motion as to the rest of the project. In doing so, however, the court went to great lengths to clarify that it was not suggesting that the project would not be completed. Rather, the court observed that further administrative review would be a means to accomplish the project without causing environmental harm, not a means to stop the project all together.
Following the district court’s decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit denied a motion by five environmental groups to block the ruling, finding that the groups had "failed to meet the standards for an injunction or stay pending appeal."
There is a fight brewing over the management of water resources in Texas. In a lawsuit that raises significant water rights implications, The Aransas Project (“TAP”), a non-profit corporation and an alliance of citizens, organizations, businesses and governmental entities, filed suit on March 10 in Corpus Christi against the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (“TCEQ”) alleging that the state agency’s actions have harmed and threaten future harm to Whooping Cranes, the species that has pre-eminently exemplified and symbolized the wildlife conservation movement at the heart of the Endangered Species Act. According to the petition, 23 Whooping Cranes died at or adjacent to the Aransas National Wildlife Refuge (“ANWR”) in Texas over the winter of 2008-2009. After reviewing the allegations and the relief requests, one may wonder if this is a lawsuit to protect Whooping Cranes or is it part of a strategy to control the continued population growth and economic development in Texas through the control of water resources.
The Aransas-Wood Buffalo Whooping Crane flock winters at the ANWR along the Texas coast, northeast of Corpus Christi, and breeds in Canada’s Wood Buffalo National Park in the summer. It is the only natural wild flock remaining in the world. After decades of government protection in this country and in Canada, the flock has increased from 16 birds in the early 1940s to 270 in the spring of 2008. ANWR is located at or near the bays that are fed by freshwater flows of the Guadalupe and San Antonio Rivers into San Antonio Bay.
Is Permitted Freshwater Use the Problem?
TAP alleges that a critical reason for the Whooping Crane deaths was the lack of sufficient freshwater inflows, which adversely impact the Whooping Crane habitat by reducing the abundance of blue crabs and wolfberries, primary food sources, as well as the availability of drinkable water. These impacts are alleged to result in actual harm to the Whooping Cranes by significantly impairing their essential behavior and feeding patterns in violation of the Endangered Species Act.
TAP alleges that the TCEQ’s water rights regulations and practices constitute a prohibited taking in violation of Section 9 of the Endangered Species Act. TAP is seeking to enjoin the TCEQ from approving or processing new or pending water rights permits, to order the TCEQ to develop an approved Habitat Conservation Plan, to appoint a special master and to maintain court supervision and oversight in order to ensure sufficient freshwater flows into the Whooping Crane habitat.
Is There Another Agenda Here?
Reviewing the relief requested, TAP has targeted major water development projects previously announced in the Guadalupe River basin. In the petition, TAP has identified the water rights application of Guadalupe-Blanco River Authority to divert flood flows as well as the Authority’s contract to supply water from an existing water rights permit to Exelon Corporation for a new nuclear power plant. In addition, TAP is requesting, as part of the Habitat Conservation Plan, that existing water rights be reduced. Through this litigation, TAP has the potential to place future water resource development and existing water rights under the oversight of a special master and the federal judiciary.
Is the Whooping Crane being used to usurp Texas water rights? All parties and all Texans agree that the Whooping Crane should be protected. Will TAP be able to demonstrate the relationship of freshwater inflows and harm to the Whooping Crane? That nexus is in dispute. The Guadalupe-Blanco River Authority and the San Antonio River Authority commissioned a multi-year study to evaluate the relationship between freshwater inflows feeding San Antonio Bay and the health of Whooping Crane population at ANWR. The San Antonio Guadalupe Estuarine System Report concluded that the environmental factors that impact the Whooping Crane’s habitat are complex and not a simple correlation to freshwater flows and salinity.
TAP estimates that as of February 2010, the Whooping Crane flock numbers 263, down from an all-time high of 270 in the spring of 2008. Is this really about the Whooping Crane? If this strategy is successful, will it be used in other river basins with other endangered species?
Add Commentary: Many of our blog pieces appear to be articles. Although informative, by posting them sans the author's thoughts, the known is merely being restated...they're merely restating something already known. As bloggers, you want to take a stance and either add to the conversation or generate one. Ultimately this will keep readers coming back to your blog and hopefully leave comments.
In blogging, you want to provide as much first-hand information as possible to your readers. By linking to a first-hand source, a news wire or an article--it only strengthens the credibility of your commentary because you're allowing readers to read the details themselves.
This will keep your blog content fresh and also help keep post length short.
Shorten your paragraphs: Writing for blogs is different then writing for anything else. You don't want to scare away readers by inundating them with such large loads of text at once. They'll likely skim the first few sentences at best.
Each paragraph should consist of 2-3 sentences.
Shorten your posts: Just as you want to keep paragraph length pretty short, you want to do the same with your posts in general. When it comes to blogs, people anticipate short entries.
It's excellent that you have a lot to say, however try to synthesize a bit. Each post should roughly have no more than 10 little paragraphs.
This makes it easier on the eyes and less daunting for readers to read. Sometimes you can use the spacing to your advantage when you want to emphasize a point/idea/quote. I would also use a bit more space between paragraphs, just so it's clear there's a break.
Bold text: Wwithin the posts there is little to no use of bold text. In lengthier posts, this is crucial for reader retention.
Highlight key ideas: use this sparingly, however if you want a key phrase/word/idea to stand out, bold it!
Highlight the thesis: this makes it immediately obvious to readers what the author's thoughts are on the subject.
Pose a question: This is a great way to encourage reader feedback! Since the goal of blogging is to generate a conversation between the author and the readers, posing a question can be extremely effective , it gives them an easy subject to focus on.
Overall textual devices are invaluable tools to help readers get through reading on a computer and get a feel for what you're writing about. People's eyes need a break, therefore use little devices such as bolding and spacing to your advantage.
Linking: Anytime you refer to anything/everything that has a website, link to it! This allows your readers to read about something first-hand without you having to explain every little detail.
Give links a title, don't just paste in the direct URLs, it looks sloppy.
Paraphrase or only use a snippet of a quote and then link to the rest of the article/quote/story/case...this will minimize long post lengths.
Anytime you refer to a website/network (anything and everything as mentioned above) link to it. This helps with trackbacks, Search Engine Optimization and build credibility among readers.
When linking, bold the name of the company/publication, link to the article.
Whenever you can, attribute where you're getting info/text from. Because the writing is in 3rd person, it's obvious that this was from another source. This may disgruntle or confuse readers and somehow affect how they perceive your credibility. Because you only have a reader's attention for a split-second, little attributions are key.
It's best to show the readers what you're talking about with links, it backs-up whatever the author is talking about and ultimately builds your credibility. This allows you to refer to many things and depending on the background knowledge of your readers, they can select which things to click on and find more out.
--->Also, as long as you link throughout your post, a source list at the end of each post is not required. In fact, this deters readers because it looks like an essay.
Esoteric language: Remember, you're trying to attract potential clients who may not know much about the law. Therefore, they may be easily intimidated by "legal speak."
Therefore in posts like, "Kansas Agency Denies..." which are incredibly informative--may come across like it's a post from lawyers for lawyers. Just as mentioned in the bit about adding commentary, you want to generate a conversation and have them returning to your blog.
Or in the article, "Is Massachusetts Showing..."
'The closest that any statutes come to the promise of a comprehensive environmental statute is the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370(f)' <---------this will confuse and deter the average joe.
Therefore you want to write with language that's easily understandable.
For a webinar on the Art of Effective Blogging created by Lex Blog, please visit this link.
In June last year insurance giant Zurich issued a report of the work of its Emerging Risks Group study begun in 2006. The report stated that the risks with the greatest potential to affect Zurich and its customers are those associated with nanotechnology.
Similarly, an alphabet soup of regulators—foreign and domestic—is wrestling with largely unknown and largely theoretical risks. The human health and environmental alarms have been sounded by numerous commentators, without yet meaningful, documented empirical observation or controlled studies of human health and safety issues or environmental concerns. Regulation in a factual vacuum is potentially counterproductive and can stifle one of the 21st century’s most promising new technologies. But no one wants “another asbestos” or to have stood by silent in the spring while nanobots consume an ecosystem. This blog will skim the surface of an increasingly deeper and broader pond.
Nanotechnology involves the manipulation of matter at the near atomic or nanometer scale--a nanometer is one billionth of a meter; a standard sheet of paper is 100,000 nanometers thick. Materials composed of or including devices and systems with components at the nanometer scale represent fundamentally new molecular organizations with highly different and potentially unpredictable properties and functions compared to their macromolecular cousins. The technology has found uses in a wide variety of commercial products including wound dressings, pregnancy tests, toothpastes, lubricants, paints, nonstick coatings, tennis racquets, air filters and many other products. In each of these products, the nano scale materials exhibit dramatically different characteristics than would be true of those materials at normal scale. For example, gold is an excellent conductor of heat and electricity but simply reflects ordinary light. Properly structured gold nano particles absorb light and can actually convert light into heat (which, in turn, can be used for cutting purposes in thermal scalpels). Nano sized particles of titanium dioxide provide UV protection while remaining transparent. Nano scale materials in thin films applied to eyeglasses, computer displays and cameras make them water repellant, anti-reflective or give them other useful physical characteristics.
The primary human health concern for the extremely small size of nano materials is that they may be introduced into and affect the body in ways completely different than their bulkier macro cousins. See, e.g., Special Report, Nanotechnology: Benefits vs Toxic Risks, Functional Foods And Nutraceuticals (Feb. 2007) ("nanosized particles were found to traverse through lung tissue in unexpected ways, gaining access to blood and lymphatic systems").
The potential for different human health related characteristics such as enhanced adhesion, reactivity and absorption means that current methodologies for risk assessment simply are not applicable and safety data drawn from non-nano counterpart materials may be irrelevant. See, Fischer Nanotechnology -- Scientific and Regulatory Challenges, 19 Villanova Envt. L. J. 315 (2008). For example, when inhaled, nano particles are deposited more efficiently and deeply into the respiratory tract than non-nano materials, and these nano materials may evade human body defense mechanisms that trap larger particles. In addition, nano materials themselves have sometimes been the subject of problematic animal studies. See Lynn, Size Matters: Regulating Nanotechnology 31 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 349 (2007).
Moreover, ordinary risk management tools may also simply “not work” in the presence of nano materials. For example, the use of facial masks designed for non-nano aerosols may not be effective for nano sized particles.
Nanotechnology concerns have been heightened by an article published in the European Respiratory Journal in which researchers reported that seven (7) young women suffered permanent lung damage following months of unprotected exposures to fumes and smoke containing nano particles in spray painting operations in China. The researchers concluded that the patients' illnesses appeared to be a "nanomaterial -- related disease.” While the results of this study have been questioned, the legitimacy of concerns with respect to high level environmental exposures to these materials remains.
An intense regulatory focus on developing an appropriate scientific basis for ensuring that nano materials do not present unreasonable human health concerns is underway. See e.g., Dept. of Health and Human Services, Approaches To Safe Nanotechnology - Managing The Health And Safety Concerns Associated With Engineered Nanomaterials (March 2009). Giving further impetus to these concerns is the fact that there is a high concentration of nanotechnology applications in pharmaceutical, food and cosmetics applications, industry segments with direct and immediate human interactions. Every agency with jurisdiction over human and environmental health and safety has found or certainly will find reason to explore regulation. The USEPA has begun to issue rules about handling of and exposure to nano forms of alumina, silica and silver; the California Department of Toxic Substances is considering controls on carbon nanotubes. We can expect initiatives over time from the FDA and OSHA.
For its part, the insurance industry has focused on product liability concerns. Insurance industry studies have expressed significant reservations about liability issues associated with nano materials. See Lloyd's of London Emerging Risks Team Report, Nanotechnology - Recent Developments, Risks and Opportunities (2007). Indeed, one insurance carrier (Continental Western Insurance Group) has gone so far as to impose nano-technology exclusions in their standard CGL policies - notwithstanding the fact that no such claims have yet been presented.
It is clear that nanotechnology offers tremendous scientific and commercial opportunities in the future. These opportunities, however, are likely to be accompanied by health and safety based product liability and environmental risks, and those risks need to be taken into account in the development and exploitation of these products.
The United States Supreme Court recently declined to hear three relatively high-profile environmental cases: Croplife America v. Baykeeper (a permitting clash between FIFRA and CWA); Texas Water Development Board v. Department of Interior (weighing the designation of a nature refuge under NEPA versus economic development); and Rose Acre Farms Inc. v. United States (regulatory taking claim as a result of agency action). After a 2008-2009 term where the Court seemed to take aim at the environmentalist cause, the Court may have put some wind back in the environmentalist’s sails by declining to consider these three separate industry challenges to federal environmental regulations.
In Croplife America v. Baykeeper, the Court decided not to review the Sixth Circuit’s year-old ruling in National Cotton Council v. EPA requiring farmers to secure Clean Water Act permits for the use of pesticides already permitted under FIFRA. EPA had claimed that FIFRA approval incorporated compliance with the Clean Water Act, however, the Sixth Circuit ruled that the government was obligated to ensure that farmers using pesticides were subject to both regulations. The decision had been stayed until April 2011 while EPA reviews and revises its NPDES permitting process to comply with the ruling.
Two different groups—one representing environmental interest groups and the other representing industry interest groups—opposed the EPA’s new permitting rule as exceeding the EPA’s interpretive authority, and argued that it would create redundant bureaucracy and hamper agricultural production by forcing farmers to decide between not applying pesticides and risking legal and enforcement actions for discharging without a permit.
Another case denied review was Texas Water Development Board v. DOI, which weighed prospective future development against environmental conservation. The Supreme Court’s decision will disrupt any future plans by Dallas-area officials to build the proposed Lake Fastrill reservoir along the Neches River.
Finally, the Court declined to review Rose Acre Farms Inc. v. United States, a suit brought by an egg farm against the federal government for damages after a crack-down on potential salmonella contamination. Following an outbreak that was traced back to the farm, the USDA destroyed some of the farm’s eggs and required the company to sell others on the less-lucrative market for liquid, pasteurized eggs.
The Supreme Court’s decision to pass on the case leaves the Federal Circuit’s decision as the precedent for future takings cases involving federal agencies. As such, the government may have less to fear from regulatory takings claims when enforcing its public health and environmental regulations.
Declining to hear these cases, while generally viewed as favorable to environmentalists, may be reconciled with the Court’s overall trends in environmental cases over the past several terms. None of these declined cases originated in the Ninth Circuit, a jurisdiction that seems to garner heightened scrutiny from the Supreme Court, as the Court has repeatedly reined the Ninth Circuit’s high-profile, often pro-environment decisions. The Court has shown that it will look to the plain language of an underlying statute and its overall structure in trying to interpret Congress’ intent. More importantly, when there is room for interpretation, the Court has emphasized giving deference to agency expertise and decision-making. Thus, the question is not whether the Court may be pro- or anti-environment in a given term—it is simply whether it is abiding by its core principles and themes.
Commoner wrote this brilliantly simple principle in the context of ecosystems. But I find this law of nature reliably guides my thinking on how best to develop policies and regulations to mitigate and adapt to climate change.
The brain trusts that the Air Resources Board has assembled for these climate change solutions are a kaleidoscope of experts in energy, public health, urban planning, economics, venture capital, automotive and building design, forestry and dairy management – to name just some of the disciplines.
This holistic approach to problem solving is a relatively recent development at the ARB. In my first stint as board chairman, 1978 – 1983, engineers pretty much ran the air pollution control shop. Chemical engineers reformulated gasoline to be lead-free. Mechanical engineers redesigned exhaust systems to remove ozone-forming emissions. A big part of my job then was to phase out leaded gasoline and phase in catalytic converters.
The ARB, where I’m once again chairman, continues to rely on engineers for ever-cleaner fuels and engines. But our expanded mission of fighting global warming (Assembly Bill 32) has vastly diversified the expertise we require, the audiences we reach and the interests we regulate.
We recently expanded our venue from vehicles to entire transportation systems. We’re now at the forefront on streamlining freight operations across the board, from ships to ports to freeways and rail yards.
We entered the field of energy regulation last fall when Governor Schwarzenegger directed the ARB to implement an accelerated Renewable Portfolio Standard – by 2020 utilities must generate at least 33 percent of their electricity from sources such as solar and wind power that do not rely on fossil fuels.
At the same time, we’ve proposed the nation’s first plan for a broad-based cap-and-trade system to use market forces to reduce global warming emissions.
And, in what is perhaps our most eye-opening move afield, the ARB is venturing in land use – as yet another way to reduce climate-altering vehicle emissions. Under a new state “sustainable communities” law (Senate Bill 375), the board this year will be setting emission reduction targets for passenger cars and trucks in 18 urban areas in the state. But – significantly – we’re leaving it to local government to decide how best to achieve those goals. Regional transportation planning authorities will be working with counties and cities to develop planning measures such as compact and mixed-use housing that will lower the average household’s vehicle miles traveled.
The growing diversity and collaboration reflects a broader shift toward more integrated environmental problem solving, not just at the ARB or in California, but across continents. It’s a more holistic approach driven by the urgency of global warming and the lure of profit in the transition to a low-carbon economy. It reflects the interconnectivity of climate change itself.
Is There a New Era of Environmental "Veto" Legislation?
Will environmental issues play a prominent role in the upcoming elections? It appears so, particularly if your state’s Senior Democratic Senator is up for re-election, and is also Chairman of the Agriculture Committee and a member of the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources. Senator Blanche Lincoln (D. Ark.) cast the deciding vote in the Senate for health care reform, and received the typical “big government, liberal” moniker. Seven Republicans have lined up to run against her, and her $5 million (and growing) campaign war chest. But how will the competing campaigns deal with environmental issues? Senator Lincoln has a lifetime score of 49% on environmental issues from the League of Conservation Voters, an environmental activist group she has proudly referred to as “extremists.” Of the Democratic Senators up for re-election, Sen. Lincoln ranks the lowest. Labels are easy to assign, but are rarely very accurate.
Is SJ-26 a purely partisan move, with no chance of passage? Perhaps. Just note that Senator Lincoln is a prominent co-sponsor, one of 40 senators who have signed on, one of three Democratic co-sponsors, all of whom are up for re-election (Ben Nelson, D. Neb. and Mary Landrieu, D. La. being the others). Not all Republicans signed on—Scott Brown, newly elected from Massachusetts, passed on this one.
SJ-26 is not Senator Lincoln’s first foray into the climate change debate. At the end of October, 2009 Senator Lincoln attached a little known rider as a last minute addition to the current budget—a rider that now prohibits EPA from spending any money to require livestock producers to report GHG emissions under the new GHG reporting rules. As Chairman of the Agricultural Committee, she could pull this one off. Cattle and pigs may be flagellant, accounting for 1.7% of all GHG emissions (more by some estimates). But for now EPA cannot make anyone count up the farts, at least not for this fiscal year (ending September 30, 2010). Whether EPA should, or should not have included livestock producers in the GHG reporting rule is a judgment call, and one that we can all disagree upon. The importance of the farm vote in Arkansas, however, cannot be over estimated. And for those who believe this is just a matter of Southern politics (or “pork”), the same budget bill included a last minute exemption for 13 Great Lakes cargo steamships from a proposed EPA rule to require lower sulfur fuel.
Is this form of Congressional veto legislation a new era of environmental regulation? Some have referred to these efforts as borrowing from the Newt Gingrich playbook. Those who have followed these issues more closely than me will have to answer that one. For now, it’s just the beginning of what will prove to be a very interesting political season. Sen. Lincoln trails the leading contenders in recent polling.
"The Increasing Role of Constitutionalism in Environmental Law: It's Less Boring Than That Suggests!"
On February 26, 2010, Dan Farber, Doug Kysar, Rob Glicksman and I will be on a panel at Georgetown about emerging issues at the intersection of Constitutional and Environmental Law. We'll puzzle over recent developments and the constitutional shape of environmental law to come. There is much to discuss. We have the limitations on judicial involvement, say, the political question doctrine and the treaty clause in the context of climate litigation. Summer suggests that Scalian standing is alive and well, and that procedural standing is hardly, er, left standing. And then there are 1:1 ratio limits to awards of punitive damages in cases involving environmental harm with which to contend under substantive due process.
Federalism could experience resurgence. Oneida and Kelo give the states an opening to do more (and do worse). Yet preemption still looms large (as with cap & trade), and sovereign immunity jurisprudence has diminished state accountability.
And of course, there is an enfeebled Congress, which behaves as if its powers are as a majority of the Supreme Court imagined them to be in 1935. While non-delegation is still in desuetude, and Raich revived rational basis review of Commerce Clause authority for the time being, it's any wonder that Congress delivers so little about national environmental challenges these days. Or anything else, for that matter. But if we're really at war, then how about Congress using its war powers to address environmental challenges that impinge upon national security, like climate change? And does Missouri v. Holland give Congress authority unbridled by the 10th Amendment to address international environmental issues, say, water pollution? Climate change?
Which brings us back to Article II separation of powers, and Chevron. For the next 2 1/2 years, all may learn to love Justice Alito's interpretive approach in last term's Kensington.
What does the future hold? Who knows, except for ineffective congressional responses and a Supreme Court that seems at least skeptical about national environmental programs. So maybe a constitutional devolution of sorts. Opportunities abound for constitutional innovation under the General Welfare and Due Process Clauses, or invocation of state (here and elsewhere) provisions that putatively provide a right to a healthy environment.
And if judicial takings are constitutionally cognizable (this term's Beach Renourishment), then why not sustainable development under the Privileges & Immunities or Equal Protection Clauses, or the 9th Amendment?
Or maybe not. It is, after all, a constitution we are expounding.
Opposition to Wind Farm Siting Based on Adverse Health Effect from Infrasound?
One of the big hurdles for further development of wind power in the U.S. is landowner objections to placement of turbines near their homes. The rationale du jour for such objections is that the sound produced by turbines causes a broad range of health effects. In particular, objectors point to infrasound, which is sound generally below the level of human perception. A recent case in Wisconsin was one of the first in the country to test the objectors' theories. When a Wisconsin utility applied for permission to build 90-turbine development north of Madison, objectors argued for extremely low limits for wind turbine sound and a mile-and-a-quarter setback, limits which would have made the project impossible.
The principal proponent of the theory that wind turbine sound causes physiological harm is a New York pediatrician, Nina Pierpont. Dr. Pierpont has written and self-published a book, entitled "Wind Turbine Syndrome: A Report on a Natural Experiment," which chronicles complaints by 10 families around the world who have lived near wind turbines. As presented by Dr. Pierpont, the symptoms include everything from headaches to nausea, tachycardia, irritability and panic episodes associated with sensations of movement or quivering inside the body. Dr. Pierpont argues that infrasound works in two principal ways to cause these symptoms: first by exciting the human vestibular (balance) system; and second vibrating the diaphragm and organs, thereby passing on confusing messages to the body.
Dr. Pierpont draws upon and supports the work of noise control engineers George Kamperman and Richard James, who, in various proceedings in the U.S. and abroad, advocate very low thresholds for sound from turbines (35 dBA, which is approximately the level of a quiet bedroom). In the Wisconsin case, objectors hired Mr. James to provide expert testimony, which he did, relying heavily on Dr. Pierpont's theories.
Quarles & Brady retained two experts to address sound issues on behalf of the utility. Dr. Geoff Leventhall is an acoustician, consultant and professor from the U.K. who has been involved in studying infrasound for nearly 50 years. Dr. Leventhall testified that neither of Dr. Pierpont's theories make sense. In fact, he testified, the author of the study Dr. Pierpont relies upon for her vestibular disturbance theory specifically disclaimed that his work supported her conclusions. As for Dr. Pierpont's theory that infrasound vibrates the diaphragm and organs, Dr. Leventhall testified that simple math dooms her argument. Sound from turbines results in movement of the diaphragm of less than 10 microns (one tenth the thickness of a human hair), while during normal breathing, the diaphragm moves several centimeters. Dr. Leventhall also pointed out that Dr. Pierpont's analysis completely ignores another, much stronger, source of internal infrasound--the heart.
Quarles & Brady also retained Dr. Mark Roberts, a Chicago-based epidemiologist, biostatistician and physician. Dr. Roberts testified that "wind turbine syndrome" is not a medical diagnosis supported by peer reviewed, published, scientific literature. He completed a review of the literature, and found no support for the claim that wind turbine sound causes physiological harm. Dr. Roberts also identified several flaws in Dr. Pierpont's methodology, limiting the usefulness of her research, including selection bias and a failure to adhere to accepted epidemiological principles in developing her theories. Summarizing Dr. Pierpont's work, Dr. Roberts concluded that it consisted of "opinions that are unsubstantiated," and as he pointed out, "everyone has opinions." Dr. Roberts warned against allowing such "science" to shape public policy.
Both Dr. Leventhall and Dr. Roberts agreed that sound from wind turbines may annoy neighbors or disturb their sleep. Dr. Roberts summarized such concerns as follows: "The underlying complaint of annoyance is, in and of itself, not a disease or a specific manifestation of a specific exposure, but instead a universal human response to a condition or situation that is not positively appreciated by the human receptor."
Ultimately, while the Wisconsin Public Service Commission recognized that no development is without cost to those who live nearby, it adopted the utility's suggestion of a 50 dBA sound threshold, with a lower 45 dBA threshold during summer nighttime hours, when neighbors are likely to have their windows open. These thresholds allow the utility to move forward with the project, while, in the Commission's view, striking an appropriate balance between neighbors' interests and those of the utility.
The construction and rehabilitation of our nation’s infrastructure has come to the fore with the advent of both climate change and the transformation of our energy production. As water shortages continue to move eastward from the western states and new water quality standards are promulgated to address previously unregulated pollutants, the handling of water will ultimately require as much, if not more, attention from corporate counsel than the current focus on fossil fuel. To anticipate this potential sea change, counsel should be aware of the evolution of governmental regulation of the use and handling of water, as well as monetary incentives to achieve compliance with the emerging laws.
To provide a brief history, in 1972, the Clean Water Act was amended to regulate direct discharges from industrial facilities and publicly owned treatment works (POTW), and later expanded to cover indirect discharges (e.g., runoff of stormwater) from agriculture and land development. Although the 1972 laws created a discharge permit system (NPDES) and initial funding for POTW construction, it wasn’t until the enactment of the Water Quality Act of 1987 that EPA received annual funding to award to states who set up revolving grant and loan funds to address problems with wastewater, drinking water and stormwater systems within each of their states.
Although the amounts varied with the changes in the executive office and congressional makeup, these funds were normally matched by the states through general obligation and/or revenue bonds and derived from the loan repayments and interest earnings to ensure that the funds would continue to be available to achieve their mission year after year. One such example is the Pennsylvania Infrastructure Investment Authority (PENNVEST), which awards grants and loans for wastewater, drinking water and stormwater projects, including brownfields, acid mine drainage and nutrient trading. Similar programs exist in each of the 50 states.
The enactment of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) provided additional stimulus funds, designed to create jobs, and required that 20 percent of the funds be disbursed for “green infrastructure” projects. EPA received $4 billion of stimulus money, to encourage the full recycling of wastewater and stormwater to reduce energy costs, augment future water supplies and minimize adverse impacts on water quality. Since there are financial federal incentives from both the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) and the Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”), you should proceed with due diligence to determine if funding opportunities are available for your organization. If an appropriate match is identified, assist in the requisite applications for these funds.
It has been nearly nine months since the U.S. Supreme Court decided Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway Company v. United States (BNSF), a case some called a landmark decision that would change the Superfund practice. In some respects that has turned out to be the case, in others it has not. There have been several reported cases citing BNSF, and all of them confirm that the decision requires both the EPA and potentially responsible parties (“PRPs”) to engage in a more fact-intensive inquiry into “arranger” liability. Less clear, however, is how the apportionment of liability among liable parties in private contribution cases will be affected, given the relatively small number of reported decisions.
Readers will recall that the BNSF decision had two elements: (1) it addressed the scope of arranger liability under CERCLA, and (2) it affirmed the view of several circuit courts that PRPs can avoid joint and several liability if a “reasonable basis” to apportion liability exists. This article reviews how lower court decisions issued subsequent to BNSF have applied those two components.
BNSF was issued on May 4, 2009. The 8-1 decision written by Justice Stevens arose out of a fairly common fact pattern for CERCLA cases: a small chemical distributor Brown & Bryant, Inc. (“B&B”) owned and operated a facility that repackaged agricultural chemicals. B&B’s operation was on a 3.8-acre parcel, a portion of which was leased from predecessors to BNSF and the Union Pacific Railroad. Neither railroad played any part in B&B’s operations. The other PRP, Shell Oil, sold a soil fumigant to B&B which was shipped via commercial carrier FOB destination, meaning that the buyer was responsible for the product once it arrived at the facility.
After the State of California ordered B&B to clean up soil and groundwater contamination, B&B went out of business and then EPA listed the site on the National Priorities List. Both railroads and Shell were named as PRPs. The railroads were ordered to clean up the entire site, even though the portion of the site that they owned did not require remediation. Shell was named a PRP for having delivered chemicals to the site which it knew or should have foreseen would be spilled by B&B. In 1996, the United States and the State of California filed a cost recovery action against the railroads and Shell, seeking to recover over $8 million in response costs.
In affirming that “arranger liability” under CERCLA must be determined on a case-by-case basis, the Court set up a continuum. At one end are cases where an entity entered into a transaction “for the sole purpose of discarding a used and no longer useful hazardous substance.” In such cases, there is a clear intent to discard the product, and therefore liability under section 107(a)(3). On the other end are situations where a company sells a useful product and “the purchaser of that product later, and unbeknownst the seller, disposed of the product in a way that led to contamination.” The Court acknowledged that there were “many permutations of ‘arrangements’ that fall between these two extremes.” In these cases, based on a “plain reading” of the CERCLA statute, the Court held that “an entity may qualify as an arranger when it takes intentional steps to dispose of a hazardous substance.” Applying this statement of the law to the facts, the Court held that Shell’s mere knowledge of the spills did not amount to an “intent” that they be spilled or otherwise disposed of and that Shell was therefore not liable as an arranger.
Of the four published cases that have substantively applied BNSF in the context of arranger liability, all suggest that lower courts are taking seriously the Supreme Court’s instruction to conduct a factually-intensive review of the parties’ intent. Prior to BNSF, the view prevalent among at least some government attorneys, and even some private party attorneys, was that every party who somehow came into contact with a hazardous substance was liable as having “arranged for disposal.” That view has been shattered.
Two cases, in particular, illustrate this point. The first is Appleton Papers Inc. v. George A. Whiting Paper Co. Plaintiffs in that case were companies who had manufactured and sold carbonless paper. The emulsion used in the paper contained microscopic capsules that burst when pressure was applied, releasing a dye, and allowing the words on a page to be transferred from one sheet to another. The microcapsules were dissolved in a solvent which contained PCBs. The PCBs were released into the Fox River from manufacturing plants which produced the paper. An even greater proportion of PCBs were released by companies that recycled carbonless paper and by municipal wastewater utilities that discharged PCB-contaminated wastewater.
Plaintiff manufacturers filed a contribution action under CERCLA §113 against the recyclers and municipalities (their §107 claim was previously dismissed by the court). The court bifurcated the case into a liability and apportionment phase. In the liability phase, on cross-motions for summary judgment, the court considered whether the defendants knew they were disposing of hazardous chemicals, and concluded that they did not. The analysis – while not explicitly using the word “intent” – focused on what the defendants knew when they recycled the carbonless paper or discharged wastewater from the plants that did. After reviewing a record that included roughly 900 exhibits – including expert reports, government reports, corporate records, laboratory records and deposition transcripts – the court sided with the defendants, finding that they had little or no knowledge that they were disposing of PCBs into the river.
Defendants are recyclers of paper and municipal sewerage entities who simply processed paper and water, and they would have had little reason or ability to inspect or investigate the chemical makeup of anything that came in the door…[t]he recyclers were the ‘innocent victims’ of the circumstances [citation to record omitted]. This is even more true for Defendants who merely received and released wastewater containing invisible PCBs in it.
Similarly, in a case in Washington state, the district court made clear that the issue of arranger liability after BNSF turns squarely on the facts. United States v. Wash. State Department of Transp. In that case, EPA sued the Washington State Department of Transportation (“WSDOT”) to recover cleanup costs at a contaminated site that the state had acquired to build a bridge. During construction of the bridge, a contractor discovered three open-bottom tanks containing tar, which appeared to have been placed there by a coal gasification plant. The State counterclaimed, arguing that the United States was also liable, because the US Army Corps of Engineers (“USACE”) had dredged a portion of the waterway that the coal gassification plant was located on, thereby moving hazardous substances released by others and causing additional releases to the environment. The United States moved for summary judgment. Judge Bryan denied the motion, holding that the United States’ liability, if any, turned on a fact-intensive inquiry that the parties had yet to conduct.
At this point, the facts are insufficiently developed to determine what level of control USACE exerted over the dredging process and what responsibility it may have had regarding disposal of the dredged materials.… As the Supreme Court stated in Burlington Northern, “the determination whether an entity is an arranger requires a fact-intensive inquiry that looks beyond the parties’ characterization of the transaction as a ‘disposal’ or ‘sale’ and seeks to discern whether the arrangement was one Congress intended to fall within the scope of CERCLA’s strict-liability provisions.” 129 S. Ct. at 1879. Considering the USACE’s involvement with dredging the contaminated waterways in light of CERCLA’s strict liability standard, the court cannot say as a matter of law that upon further discovery, the facts will fail to show that the USACE “qualif[ies] as an arranger under [§107(a)(3) when taking] intentional steps to dispose of a hazardous substance” through the granting of permits to dredge the waterway.
Meanwhile, across the country in Maine, a district court applied BNSF in the context of a cleanup of the Penobscot River.See Frontier Communications Corp. v. Barrett Paving Materials. We previously reported on this case. See District Court in Maine Applies Supreme Court’s BNSF Decision on “Arranger” Liability, Marten Law Environmental News (July 22, 2009). The court in the Maine case reiterated that the question of arranger liability is “fact-intensive,” but it found that the record contained sufficient facts to conclude that the defendant had intended to dispose of wastes through a sewer into the river.
Finally, in New Hampshire, General Electric asked a judge to reverse a prior ruling holding GE liable as having “arranged for disposal” of PCB-containing “scrap Pyranol” when it sold the material to a paint manufacturing company. GE relied on BNSF to argue that the phrase “arranged for disposal” required “an intentional action toward achieving the purpose: disposal.” The court did not dispute GE’s reading of the law, but held that there was sufficient evidence of intent to hold GE liable as an arranger.
We have located two reported decisions expressly dealing with the “apportionment” arm of the BNSF decision. In the first case, the court essentially punted, holding that the best way to apportion liability was to let the case go to trial. See Evansville Greenway and Remediation Trust v. Southern IN Gas and Elec. Co., Inc.
One question not answered by BNSF is the quantum of proof necessary to establish a reasonable basis for apportionment. Judge Shira A. Scheindlin addressed that question in a non-CERCLA case involving environmental torts, holding that: (1) a fact finder may rely on the “available evidence” in apportioning liability among joint tortfeasors; and (2) the burden of production necessary to support a showing of divisibility is “low.” In re MTBE, S.D.N.Y. Case No. 00 MDL 1898, Docket No. 352 (July 14, 2009). See Applying BNSF, District Court in New York Finds “Best Available Evidence” Is Sufficient to Apportion Liability, Marten Law Environmental News (July 22, 2009). It remains to be seen whether this approach will be extended in a CERCLA context.
It is still too early to get a good sense of whether BNSF will be the watershed case some had predicted. The first few cases have reinforced the Supreme Court’s holding that the inquiry into arranger liability is “fact-intensive.” Only two reported cases have addressed the apportionment arm of the decision, and neither reached the question of how apportionment is to be conducted.
 129 S. Ct. 1870 (2009).
 See, e.g., J. Barkett, The Burlington Northern Decision, American College of Environmental Lawyers Blog (May 19, 2009).
 129 S. Ct. at 1878.
 Slip Op., 2009 WL 5064049 (E.D. Wis., December 16, 2009).
 , ___ F. Supp.2d ___, 2009 WL 2985474 (W.D. Wa., September 15, 2009).
 District of Maine, Case No. 07-00133.
 General Electric Company’s Supplemental Memorandum on the Evidence of Intent or Knowledge Required to Prove that a CERCLA Defendant has “Arranged for” Disposal or Treatment of Hazardous Waste at 2, United States v. General Electric Co., 06-354, Doc. No. 89 (D.N.H. Nov. 5, 2008).
 Appleton Papers, Inc. v. George A. Whiting Paper Co., Slip Op., 2009 WL 3921036 (E.D. Wis. 2009), **4, 5.
Posted on February 3, 2010 by Thomas Lavender, Jr.
In a unanimous decision, the S.C. Supreme Court upheld the implementation of South Carolina’s Coastal Zone Management Plan (CZMP) and finally decided the question landowners have argued for years – how could the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (SCDHEC) enforce an unpromulgated rule?
The developer in the Spectre case had sought a land-disturbance permit under the SCDHEC stormwater program. The agency denied the permit contending that the proposed filling of 31.76 acres of isolated freshwater wetlands on a 62.93 acre site was inconsistent with the CZMP. An appeal of the denial was taken to the State Administrative Law Court, which held that the CZMP was not enforceable because it was not a regulation promulgated pursuant to the State’s Administrative Procedures Act (APA).
Following the United State Supreme Court’s decision in SWANCC, isolated wetlands in South Carolina have been largely without protection. South Carolina has seen the introduction of several bills aimed to fill the void by expressly authorizing the regulation of impacts to isolated wetlands; however, none are pending in the current session of the General Assembly. Nonetheless, in those areas covered by the CZMP, South Carolina relied upon its authority to determine consistency with the CZMP in connection with the consideration of state permits. Isolated wetlands beyond the reach of the CZMP remain unregulated. However, numerous attacks on the validity of the CZMP have been made, but none reaching the Supreme Court until Spectre.
SCDHEC was charged in 1976 with developing a comprehensive coastal management program that it was to enforce “in accordance with this chapter and any rules and regulations promulgated under this chapter.” The statute provided that statewide hearings and public review of the CZMP would occur and the CZMP would become the “final management plan for the State’s coastal zone” upon review and approval by the Governor and General Assembly.
It remains unclear where the Court will stop in crafting exclusions to the APA, but it now appears that the Court is prepared to conclude that a separate process by which a policy document is developed can be deemed functionally equivalent to the APA and afford an unpromulgated rule the force and effect of law.
 Spectre, LLC v. South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control, et al., (Opinion No. 26764, February 1, 2010).
 S.C. Code Ann. §§ 1-23-10, et seq. (2009).
 Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 12 S.Ct. 675, 531 U.S. 159, 148 L.Ed.2d 576 (2001).
 SC Code Ann. § 48-39-80 (2009).
 Captain’s Quarters Motor Inn, Inc. v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 306 S.C. 488, 413 S.E.2d 13 (1992).
 S.C. Code Ann. §§ 48-39-50(E), (F), (I), and (R), -70(A), -80(A), and -130(B).
 S.C. Code Ann. § 48-39-130(B) also provided that the interim rules and regulations were not subject to the APA.
As comprehensive climate legislation stalls in Congress, increased attention is being paid to alternative climate regimes, particularly the prospect of Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulation and regional and voluntary climate initiatives. Regional initiatives have faced their share of challenges during their infancy and, to varying degrees, may incur more with the development of a federal cap-and-trade program or EPA regulation of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions under the Clean Air Act (CAA).
The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) and the California Global Warming Solutions Act (AB 32) are the most advanced climate initiatives in the U.S. California’s AB 32 requires measures to reduce California’s GHG emissions by 174 million metric tons of CO2 equivalent, or 29%, by 2020. California recently issued a draft cap and trade regulation covering 600 of the state’s largest industrial and electric generating stationary sources. The RGGI program is more mature with a cap-and-trade program that commenced in 2009. It “stabilizes” CO2 levels during 2009-2014 and reduces emissions 10% by 2019.
In its first year, RGGI has generated several concerns. Unlike other cap-and-trade programs, such as the NOx Budget Trading Program, which distributed allowances to regulated entities, but incentivized them to invest in emission controls, RGGI states decided to sell emissions allowances. Under RGGI, a utility must both purchase allowances and pay for emission controls. The sale of allowances makes RGGI look more like a tax on energy and inevitably will lead to higher energy costs.
RGGI’s offset program is also restrictive, thereby narrowing compliance options. Although the model rule provides for use of offsets for reduction of emissions in certain categories such as landfill methane capture and afforestation, this opportunity is undercut by the requirement to demonstrate economic “additionality.” To be useable, these offsets must have been generated by projects that are not “economically attractive absent the revenue stream provided by an emissions offset.” This subjective test does not recognize the reality that many of these projects are economically marginal and need more than one source of revenue. This economic additionality requirement undercuts the creation of offsets.
Noticeably absent from RGGI is Pennsylvania, one of the largest coal-fueled utility states in the Northeast. Because Pennsylvania and other big coal states are included in larger electricity dispatch regions, CO2 regulation and increased cost on RGGI utilities will result in increased demand for electricity from the unregulated utilities in the same power region. A clear example of this is PJM, which oversees electric supply in the coal states of Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and West Virginia, as well as the RGGI states of Delaware, Maryland, and New Jersey. Untaxed electricity with high carbon-content from non-RGGI generators will be preferred and sold in larger quantities than more expensive power, thereby undercutting the objective of reducing emissions. This is the “leakage” phenomenon.
RGGI and other state and regional regulatory climate programs may be eliminated under proposed federal climate legislation. The House bill specifically pre-empts state and regional cap-and-trade programs between 2012 and 2017. Pre-emption concerns may already be impacting the RGGI market, where prices for 2012 allowances are barely above the Reserve Price.
In the meantime, EPA is forging ahead with its own GHG regulations. Last Fall, it made a GHG “endangerment” finding and required quantification and reporting of GHG emissions. EPA will soon finalize the regulation of GHGs from light-duty vehicles, setting in motion a statutorily required process to regulate GHGs from major stationary sources that are modified or constructed. Among the class of stationary sources that will be affected are municipal solid waste landfills, which are the source of approximately one fourth of methane emissions in the US. Once regulated by EPA, construction or modification of these sources would require GHG control and would no longer generate “offset” allowances because controls would be now required by law.
Notwithstanding potential federal climate policy, the voluntary carbon markets should continue to flourish based on experience to date. Global voluntary carbon markets nearly doubled in 2008 and are expected to increase. Europeans purchased half of these offsets for noncompliance purposes. This continued interest in voluntary markets is partly motivated by individuals and corporations choosing to reduce their carbon footprint. Our law firm, for example, has purchased carbon credits since 2008 to offset air travel emissions as part of a Sustainability Initiative. As national awareness of climate issues continues to grow, voluntary carbon markets are likely to expand and thrive.
 The views presented in this article are the authors’ alone and not DLA Piper US LLP or its clients.
EPA has proposed lowering the NAAQS to a range of from 0.060 ppm – 0.070 ppm. Earlier this week, EPA’s Clean Air Science Advisory Committee, or CASAC, met and endorsed EPA’s proposed range. Some CASAC members did express concern about EPA’s proposed secondary seasonal standard, intended to protect crops and forests. However, overall, the CASAC seal of approval is pretty much the end of this argument.
It is important to recall how we got here. CASAC already endorsed the 0.060 ppm – 0.070 range several years ago, before EPA’s last ozone standard was issued. It was EPA’s refusal to follow the CASAC recommendations, and instead propose a 0.075 ppm standard, which led to litigation challenging the standard and the current controversy.
It is difficult to overstate the weight given the CASAC’s views. Indeed, EPA’s fine particulate standard was vacated in significant part because EPA failed to follow CASAC’s recommendations.
Thus, a standard that does not comport with CASAC’s recommendations would likely be rejected by the courts as arbitrary and capricious. However, I suspect that CASAC’s influence also runs the other way. Assuming that EPA does indeed promulgate a revised NAAQS in the 0.060 ppm – 0.070 ppm range, and assuming that industrial interests challenge the new standard, it will be very difficult to establish that the new standard is arbitrary and capricious if it has been endorsed by CASAC.
As I noted in connection with the fine particulate standard, it’s not obvious to me that this is a good thing. Depending on whose ox is being gored, anyone can get up on a soapbox and say that they want science to be free of politics. However, these are really policy decisions. It’s one thing to acknowledge that these are complicated issues and we thus have to allow Congress to delegate its authority to the EPA administrator. It’s another effectively to delegate the decision further to the CASAC, which is about as obscure an acronym body as we have. Do we really want standards which will result in compliance costs in at least the tens of billions of dollars being made by groups which truly are not accountable in any meaningful way?
To many Superfund practitioners, United States v. Burlington Northern & Sante Fe Railway Company, __ U.S. __, 129, S. Ct. 1870 (2009) represents the latest in a series of surprises from the Supreme Court. The decision follows Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc, 543 U.S. 157 (2004), from which we learned that the statutory words “during or following” really mean just what they say and contribution claims under the Comprehensive Response Compensation and Liability Act (also referred to as CERCLA or the Superfund statute) are only available in those limited circumstances. A few years later, in United States v. Atlantic Research Corp., 551 U.S. 128 (2007), we learned that “covered persons” (also referred to as potentially responsible parties or PRPs) under the statute may, in certain procedural circumstances, have cost recovery claims in the event they do not meet the criteria for contribution claims. In Burlington Northern, we learned that “arranger” liability may not be as broad as we had thought it was, and that joint and several liability may not be the automatic we thought it was. It is probably fair to say that the outcome in Burlington Northern, like the outcomes in Aviall and Atlantic Research, was not intuitive to Superfund practitioners.
A Superfund practitioner might have expected the Supreme Court decision in Burlington Northern to look more like the Ninth Circuit opinion it reversed (found at 502 F.3d 781), endorsing a broad reading of “arranger” liability under the statute and applying joint and several liability to all the defendants, the latter being the norm for more than 25 years since the seminal decision in United States v. ChemDyne, 572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
As with Aviall and Atlantic Research, it will probably take many years, and many decisions by the lower courts, before we fully appreciate the implications of Burlington Northern, but one thing is already clear. Defendants in multi-party Superfund sites will be contending for apportionment as the alternative to joint and several liability, if for no other reason than to avoid funding the orphan share represented by “covered persons” who can’t be found, no longer exist, or, as is more recently the case, are bankrupt. On the other hand, governments asserting cost recovery claims can be expected to continue to advocate aggressively for joint and several liability, so as to avoid having to absorb the orphan share themselves. The question is what practical impacts this battleground will have on Superfund practice at multi-party sites.
Burlington Northern raises several practical questions which will have to resolved as the law and practice develop. Here are some of them.
Whether a defendant is entitled to apportioned liability is a fact-intensive inquiry, resolved in Burlington Northern only after a six week bench trial, and only after the district judge took four years to render a decision. Will governments be able to obtain liability judgments at the beginning of cost recovery actions, as they have typically tried to do in the past? Will Burlington Northern force more cases to go to trial?
Whether liability is subject to apportionment is not likely to be decided until the end of a case, as it was in Burlington Northern. How will cost recovery defendants evaluate their chances of success in the early stages of a case? Will they feel compelled to develop a detailed record to support arguments that liability for a single harm is subject to apportionment, unlike the defendants in Burlington Northern, who limited their arguments to general denials of liability?
Governmental plaintiffs can be expected to insist that liability at multi-party sites is still joint and several, even after Burlington Northern. Will those governmental plaintiffs be willing to consider the litigation risk that liability may be subject to apportionment in negotiating settlements? If so, how will that litigation risk be taken into consideration?
If liability is apportioned, how will any resulting orphan shares be funded? Will EPA’s historic limitations on orphan share funding be adequate? If not, where will the funding come from? Is the Superfund tax more likely to be reinstated because of Burlington Northern?
Will the organization of multiple “covered persons” into PRP groups be more difficult if the defendants believe they can escape liability through apportionment? How will defendants balance that possibility against the potential benefit in the form of reduced costs that might be gained by performing cleanup work themselves?
Will ADR emerge as the norm for dividing responsibility among defendants who believe their liability is subject to apportionment, as it has in allocating joint and several liability? What evidence will be used to apportion liability? Burlington Northern endorsed many of the same causation-related considerations as the equitable factors historically used to allocate joint and several liability; will some or all of the Gore factors still be relevant? Burlington Northern also endorsed estimations and compromises, considerations not normally found in legal determinations; how will the lower courts react to imprecise calculations of apportioned liability?
How will defendants argue for an orphan share? Will they seek to establish an orphan share from the bottom up (by quantifying the share of missing PRPs), or from the top down (by quantifying their own individual shares)? Whichever way defendants decide to approach the issue, they can be expected to develop the record the district judge found lacking in Burlington Northern.
Finally, in states whose statutes make joint and several liability explicit (e.g, the New Jersey Spill Compensation and Control Act, N.J.S.A. 58:10-23.11g(c)(1)), how will apportionment decisions be made? Will the scope of liability be different to EPA and to such states? Under such statutes, is there no instance in which liability will be subject to apportionment, even for distinct harms?
Like Aviall and Atlantic Research before it, Burlington Northern promises to be a fertile source of future litigation.

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