Source: https://openjurist.org/262/us/489
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 06:03:33+00:00

Document:
This suit was brought to recover $3,650, being $3.65 per ton for 1,000 tons of coal furnished the Navy. Appellant claims that it is entitled to the market price at the time of delivery, $6.50 per ton. The United States claims that appellant was bound by contract to furnish it for $2.85 per ton. The Court of Claims made findings of fact, and concluded that appellant was not entitled to recover.
Appellant was notified of the acceptance of its proposal, and on June 5, 1916, a contract was made containing the portions of the bid and specifications above referred to.
March 26, 1917, appellant was informed by the department that the quantity estimated in its contract would be exceeded by ten per cent. Appellant answered that when it had furnished 10,000 tons, it would consider its obligation under the contract discharged, and that it was prepared to furnish the balance. The department cited the provisions of the contract as authority for requiring the additional tonnage, stated that the same requirement was made of other contractors, and expressed the hope that it would not be necessary to resort to extreme measures to accomplish compliance. Later the department informed appellant that the steamer Kennebec had been directed to coal with it, and that the quantity required was 2,180 tons. Appellant answered that the balance due under the contract was 560 tons, which it was ready to supply at any time, and that this amount was all that it was able to furnish. The department insisted that the full cargo assigned to the Kennebec must be furnished. Appellant reiterated its position. June 9, the department advised appellant that failure to supply the tonnage ordered would necessitate immediate purchase in the open market for its account. June 12 appellant replied that it had arranged to supply the Kennebec the full quantity required, and that it was 'doing this under protest, which can be straightened out later.' June 14 appellant wrote that it would agree to supply the 2,180 tons ordered, with the understanding that no further assignments would be made to it; that this was 1,620 tons more than it was obligated to deliver; that this excess would be furnished under protest, reserving the right to take the proper steps to recover the difference between the current market price and the contract price; it asked confirmation f om the department and stated that on receipt thereof it would furnish the coal.
There is nothing in the writing which required the government to take, or limited its demand to, any ascertainable quantity. It must be held that, for lack of consideration and mutuality, the contract was not enforceable. Cold Blast Transportation Co. v. Kansas City Bolt & Nut Co., 114 Fed. 77, 81, 52 C. C. A. 25, 57 L. R. A. 696; Fitzgerald v. First National Bank, 114 Fed. 474, 478, 52 C. C. A. 276; A. Santaella & Co. v. Otto F. Lange Co., 155 Fed. 719, 721 et seq., 84 C. C. A. 145; Golden Cycle Mining Co. v. Rapson Coal Mining Co., 188 Fed. 179, 182, 183, 112 C. C. A. 95.
United States v. Purcell Envelope Co., 249 U. S. 313, 39 Sup. Ct. 300, 63 L. Ed. 620, is not inconsistent with the conclusion that the contract here was not enforceable. There, the making and acceptance of the bid consummated the contract, and it was construed to bind the company to furnish and the department to take the envelopes and wrappers specified which the department would need during the period covered by the contract.
2. While the contract at its inception was not enforceable, it became valid and binding to the extent that it was performed. St. Louis Hay & Grain Co. v. United States, 191 U. S. 159, 163, 24 Sup. Ct. 47, 48 L. Ed. 130; Hartman v. Butterfield Lumber Co., 199 U. S. 335, 338, 26 Sup. Ct. 63, 50 L. Ed. 217; United States v. Andrews, 207 U. S. 229, 243, 28 Sup. Ct. 100, 52 L. Ed. 185.
See Insurance Co. v. Dutcher, 95 U. S. 269, 273, 24 L. Ed. 410; Topliff v. Topliff, 122 U. S. 121, 131, 7 Sup. Ct. 1057, 30 L. Ed. 1110; Old Colony Trust Co. v. Omaba, 230 U. S. 100, 118, 33 Sup. Ct. 967, 57 L. Ed. 1410; Nelson v. Ohio, 188 Fed. 620, 623, 112 C. C. A. 394; Bunday v. Huntington, 224 Fed. 847, 854, 140 C. C. A. 415; Bransford v. Regal Shoe Co., 237 Fed. 67, 69, 150 C. C. A. 269.

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