Source: https://www.lawfareblog.com/military-commissions-loom-large-supreme-court
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 16:35:24+00:00

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The Supreme Court’s October term 2017 may be shaping up to be the year that finally brings some answers to several enduring questions surrounding the military commissions. On Thursday, the court granted certiorari in three cases–Dalmazzi v. United States, consolidated with Cox v. United States and Ortiz v. United States–that challenge, in part, the composition of the United States Court of Military Commission Review (CMCR), the intermediate appellate court between the commissions and the D.C. Circuit. These were among seven petitions pending on the court’s cert docket last week related to pending prosecutions (two of the remaining four filed relate to issues substantially similar to Dalmazzi, Cox, and Ortiz). The government has opposed granting cert in all of them.
The cases mostly concern an 1870 statute that generally prohibits active-duty military officers from holding “civil offices.” The issue is whether having active-duty military officers serve as judges on the CMCR violates this law. As to the statutory question, Steve Vladeck, who is counsel of record on all of these cases (and Abdirahman), provided a lay of the land.
In the military commissions context, there are two points to add to Professor Vladeck’s piece. First, counsel for Nashiri and Khalid Shaikh Mohammad have unsuccessfully raised similar arguments before (for a slightly fuller history of the below, see the government’s brief in opposition for Ortiz pgs. 3-5), which would be immediately reevaluated in light of any of these petitions succeeding on the merits. Second, the cases also raise new constitutional questions about the structure of the CMCR. If the court acted on those issues, it would reshape the CMCR for all military commission cases.
In November 2014, counsel for Abd Al-Rahim Hussein Muhammed Al-Nashiri (the alleged mastermind behind the USS Cole bombing and appellant in one of the petitions below) petitioned for a writ of mandamus in the D.C. Circuit seeking the disqualification of the active-duty military members of the CMCR hearing his appeal. His petition argued, in part, that the judges were “principal officers” and, accordingly, must be presidentially appointed and Senate-confirmed to their positions on that court.
The Military Commissions Act (MCA) provides for two ways someone can become a judge on the CMCR: (i) The secretary of defense may “assign persons who are appellate military judges to be judges” on the CMCR, or (ii) The president may “appoint, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, additional judges” who do not have to be military officers. Nashiri’s counsel argued that the judges then-serving under option one did so in violation of the Appointments Clause because they were principal officers. The D.C. Circuit held that the claim did not clear its standard for mandamus relief (see below). But it flagged that the issue could be resolved if the president simply appointed the CMCR’s military judges per the MCA’s other provided mechanism (and the government did so).
Nashiri’s counsel filed another motion soon after in the CMCR to disqualify the military judges on his panel on the grounds that their appointment violated 10 U.S.C. 973(b)(2)–the statute referenced above and at issue in the three granted petitions. The CMCR denied his motion, holding that (a) such service is “authorized by law” under the MCA, and (b) the position is not a “civil office.” The D.C. Circuit denied the writ of mandamus filed in response to this order.
So far, four judges on the CMCR have had their position called into question for the above reasons. Should Dalmazzi prevail on its statutory claim, not only would the two decisions made in Nashiri and KSM’s cases seemingly be invalid, but it also would undermine the validity of any CMCR ruling made by a panel containing one of those four judges whose service, as it turns out, was in violation of federal law. What more, Dalmazzi also raises a new constitutional argument that, if accepted, would provide an alternative mechanism for detainees to challenge the structure of the CMCR.
February 2008: Bahlul is re-charged under the 2006 Military Commissions Act (“2006 MCA”) with conspiracy to commit war crimes, solicitation of others to commit war crimes, and providing material support for terrorism. Bahlul boycotted the proceedings and instructed his counsel not to present a defense. He was convicted on all charges in November 2008.
January 2010: Bahlul’s appellate counsel appeals his convictions to the CMCR, which affirms in September 2011.
2012: Bahlul’s counsel appeals (in what is now referred to as “Bahlul I”) to the D.C. Circuit, contending, among other things, that his convictions violated: (i) Articles I and III of the Constitution, because he was accused of charges that needed to be before an Article III court; (ii) the Ex Post Facto Clause, because he was charged under a statute (the 2006 MCA) enacted after his capture; and (iii) the equal protection portion of the Due Process Clause, because the commissions themselves constituted a segregated form of justice in violation of the Fifth Amendment.
While this case was pending, a panel of the D.C. Circuit separately decided Hamdan v. United States (“Hamdan II”), holding that the 2006 MCA did not permit prosecution “for conduct committed before enactment of that Act unless the conduct was already prohibited under existing U.S. law as a war crime triable by military commission.” The government conceded that Bahlul’s convictions would need to be vacated under Hamdan II and accordingly appealed.
July 2014: The D.C. Circuit, sitting en banc (“Bahlul II”), overruled Hamdan II. In addressing Bahlul’s case, the court used plain error review because Bahlul did not raise a defense at trial and thus forfeited a number of arguments. It vacated Bahlul’s conviction for solicitation and material support. It then remanded the question of whether conspiracy can be charged in a military commission consistent with Articles I and Article III; the court determined it was not “plain” that conspiracy was “not already triable” at the time of Bahlul’s conduct.
June 2015: A divided panel of the D.C. Circuit (“Bahlul III”) considered the conspiracy charge under de novo review because the court viewed Bahlul’s challenge as a “structural” one that could not be forfeited. The court vacated the charge on the grounds that it violated Article III.
This year, counsel for Bahlul filed a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court, raising the three issues described below. The government has opposed review of all of them.
As some context, under Article III, criminal defendants usually have the right to be tried before a civilian court with a jury. There are, however, exceptions. In Ex Parte Quirin, the Supreme Court held that Congress had the “authority to define and punish offenses against the law of nations by sanctioning, within constitutional limitations, the jurisdiction of military commissions” to try “offenses committed by enemy belligerents against the law of war.” What constitutes something “against the law of war” and that can acceptably be put before these Article I tribunals, though, is unclear: Everyone would agree that there are certain fundamental limits (for instance, Congress cannot place jaywalkers before military commissions) but where and how to draw the line is an open question. The issue raised by Bahlul’s case, essentially, is whether conspiracy falls into this exception contemplated by Quirin.
Bahlul’s counsel says no, describing conspiracy as a “wholly domestic crime.” Under its understanding of military commission jurisdiction, “against the law of war” means “against the international law of war.” Critically, in this case, the United States has conceded that conspiracy to commit terrorism is not an “offense under the law of war.” For Bahlul’s counsel, such a concession is fatal and the matter would end there.
As the petition acknowledges, not everyone sees it that way. In particular, in Bahlul IV, Judge Kavanaugh (joined by Judges Brown and Griffith) dismissed the notion that the commissions’ jurisdiction was fundamentally constrained by international law. He argued that Congress–through the Define & Punish Clause, Declare War Clause, and related powers–had independent authority to constitute commissions and make certain charges triable before them. The opinion recognized that there are certain limits to this power, but that “international law is not such a limit.” In order to figure out whether conspiracy fell within Quirin and was consistent with Article III, Judge Kavanagh turned, in large part, to history. He concluded that historical practice–including the “two most important commission precedents in U.S. history (Lincoln and Nazi conspirators, respectively)–confirmed conspiracy was triable by commission.
In its brief in opposition, the government argued that Bahlul’s conspiracy argument “lacks merit and does not warrant further review.” First, principles of forfeiture make clear that Bahlul’s claims should be reviewed under a plain error standard (Bahlul’s counsel argues they should be reviewed de novo as structural constitutional challenges). Second, the government largely endorsed the view of Article III articulated by Judge Kavanaugh, emphasizing that the “U.S. Common Law of War” clearly supported commission jurisdiction over conspiracy. And third, the brief contended that Bahlul’s case would be a particularly poor vehicle for review of this issue because of the “availability of alternative grounds,” including plain error review.
Bahlul’s counsel next raises both statutory and constitutional ex post facto claims. Remember, Bahlul was convicted under the 2006 MCA, a statute passed five years after he was arrested in Pakistan and two years after he was first charged in 2004.
The government, in its opposition brief, maintains that “[p]etitioner cannot show any violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause, let alone a violation that amounts to plain error.” The 2006 MCA was simply the “codification” of a crime that “has been traditionally charged” in commissions and therefore “creates no ex post facto problem.” Moreover, conspiracy was already illegal under domestic law when Bahlul acted to conspire outside the United States to kill U.S. nationals (18 USC §2332), so the “fact that the 2006 MCA provides a different forum for adjudication does not implicate ex post facto concerns in this case.” Lastly, the government denied that lower courts had decided “any question” regarding declarative law or the meaning of “law of war” under §821.
Bahlul’s counsel also argues that by limiting military commissions’ personal jurisdiction to non-citizens, Congress has created a segregated justice system in violation of the Fifth Amendment. The petition rejects the government’s national security rationale for this setup, arguing that the rationale improperly requires “blanket deference” from the judiciary and does not justify the high costs of “invidious discrimination” caused by the commissions. Such a system lacks acceptable historical analogs (Bahlul cites the immigration law tribunals created by the Chinese Exclusion Acts and invalidated by the Supreme Court in Wong Wing), ignores the traditional oversight role the federal judiciary has played over military commissions (e.g. in Ex Parte Quirin), and fundamentally undermines due process.
The government dismisses this claim on the grounds that “Congress’s decision to limit military jurisdiction to alien unlawful enemy combatants” fulfilled a “vital national security interest in establishing a military forum in which to bring to justice foreign unlawful belligerents.” The commission structure thus “provides for a fundamentally fair proceeding without requiring that such aliens be admitted into the United States” and merits the court’s usual deference to the political branches in this sphere. The government also notes that “none of the multiple, lengthy opinions below agreed” with Bahlul’s position here.
Al-Nashiri is the alleged mastermind behind the bombings of the USS Cole in 2000, which killed 17 crewmembers, and the M/V Limburg, a French supertanker, in 2002. He was captured in 2002, held for a period of time in CIA “black sites” as part of the CIA’s Rendition Detention and Interrogation program, and ultimately charged before a military commission in 2011 for his role in the bombings. The government has not charged Nashiri with any involvement in the September 11 attacks.
The main issue with Nashiri’s prosecution is that the Military Commission Act (as amended in 2009) identifies 32 offenses “triable by military commission,” provided they were “committed in the context of and associated with hostilities.” But were any of the above bombings committed in the context of “hostilities”? Nashiri’s counsel say no: They peg the start of hostilities to operations in Yemen in September 2003, arguing that was the first time and place the president “extend[ed] the AUMF’s war-making authorities” as recognized in a War Powers Resolution report. If this date is correct, Nashiri would have been in custody for roughly a year before “hostilities” started and the commission would lack jurisdiction over him under the MCA.
Nashiri’s counsel has raised this claim since his initial hearings. They first moved to dismiss his charges on these grounds in 2012, but the presiding military judge denied the motion, finding that (i) the political branches had determined that hostilities commenced before September 11 (in part as explained in the language of the MCA), and (ii) the existence of hostilities during Nashiri’s specific conduct was a question for trial (essentially, how long before 9/11 did hostilities begin?). Nashiri filed an amended habeas petition in 2014 on the same grounds, but the D.C. district court refused to resolve the question. Instead, the court abstained under Schlesinger v. Councilman.
On appeal, where Nashiri’s counsel also filed for a writ of mandamus, a divided panel of the D.C. Circuit affirmed the district court’s application of Councilman and also denied mandamus relief. Writing for the court, Judge Griffith agreed that Councilman abstention could be extended from courts-martial (its original application) to military commissions, since the government satisfied both comity considerations and there were no extraordinary circumstances. Nashiri’s counsel filed a petition for certiorari appealing these decisions to the Supreme Court. As with Bahlul, the government has opposed review of both issues.
Nashiri’s counsel attack both the applicability and application of Councilman. The petition argues that extending Councilman–a case that simply barred “service-members from circumventing the military disciplinary system”–to the commissions would effectively remove the availability of habeas corpus “when a petitioner raises a substantial challenge to a military commission’s jurisdiction.” As such, Article III courts will only be able to review “the most fundamental precondition for [military commission] jurisdiction” (the commencement of hostilities) after conviction. Such a system, reason Nashiri’s counsel, undermines the Constitution’s structural safeguards and removes judicial oversight from situations where it is particularly needed (the petition calls the commissions a “novel and permanent system of rump criminal courts”) and has been historically present (e.g. in Ex Parte Quirin).
Even if Councilman does apply, however, Nashiri’s counsel contend that its “extraordinary circumstances” exception is certainly triggered here. In support, the petition cites the effects of “years of torture and humiliation” Nashiri allegedly endured at CIA black sites coupled with the psychological demands of a protracted capital trial.
The government, on the other hand, asserts that the D.C. Circuit properly “concluded that the MCA provides both adjudicatory procedures that are sufficient to protect the rights of those tried” and an “appropriate system of appellate review.” In light of this system, established by the political branches and revised by the judiciary, Councilman abstention is quite appropriate. Councilman doctrine was developed both to “avoid duplication of legal proceedings” as well as to recognize the primary role of the political branches in balancing the demands of military order with equitable justice. Through the MCA, Congress and two Presidents purposefully postponed review by Article III courts until all other appeals (including through the CMCR) are complete. Abstention here would not only respect that arrangement, consistent with Councilman, but also recognize the subject-matter versus personal jurisdiction divide that has informed other abstention doctrines.
Nashiri’s petition also raises the claim that the D.C. Circuit adopts a “uniquely restrictive interpretation of the standard of review in mandamus cases.” This, in turn, undercuts the government’s position that the “exclusive avenue for interlocutory review of a military commission’s jurisdiction should be via petitions for writs of mandamus.
The government rejects Nashiri’s characterization of the D.C. Circuit’s standard of review. The court’s decisions “do not reflect the categorical rule petitioner ascribes to them,” as evidenced by its recent decision disqualifying a judge on the CMCR. According to the opposition brief, the court was correct in finding that Nashiri’s claims had legitimate “open questions” and mandamus relief was thus inappropriate.

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