Source: http://www.childrenslegalrightsjournal.com/childrenslegalrightsjournal/volume_38_issue_2?pg=38
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 07:57:02+00:00

Document:
150 See Brewer, 779 F.2d at 264; Sullivan v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 475 F.2d 1071, 1077 (5th Cir. 1973); Levitt v. Univ. of Tex., 759 F.2d 1224, 1233 (5th Cir. 1985); Lamb, 826 F.2d at 529.
151 Hillman, 436 F. Supp. at 816.
152 Jennings, 397 F.3d at 1125 (because no personal animus was presented, the administrator could serve as an impartial hearing officer even though he investigated details of the case); Butler v. Oak Creek-Franklin Sch. Dist., 172 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1115 (E.D. Wis. 2001) (“absent evidence of particular bias or prejudgment, the same person or entity may first investigate and later adjudicate whether proscribed conduct occurred”).
153 Lamb, 826 F.2d at 529 (“the combination of an advisory function with a hearing participant’s prosecutorial or testimonial function does not create a per se facially unacceptable risk of bias”); Hillman, 436 F. Supp. at 816 (Principal who initiated suspension charges was not thereby disqualified from acting as an impartial hearing officer without any evidence of principal’s actual bias).
154 See Lamb, 826 F.2d at 529; Butler, 172 F. Supp. 2d at 1115 (extending Supreme Court interpretation of federal common law interpreting Administrative Procedure Act to the school discipline setting) (citing Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975)); Hillman, 436 F. Supp. at 816 (finding no due process violation where a hearing officer had also prosecuted the student’s case over which he presided).
155 See generally Alex v. Allen, 409 F. Supp. 379, 388 (W.D. Pa. 1976) (school board attorney may “prosecute the case against [the student], rule on evidentiary questions, and advise the board as to possible action”).
156 See C.B. by & Through Breeding, 82 F.3d at 388, n. 3.
157 Id. (“[ i]n the school context, it is both impossible and undesirable for administrators involved in incidents of misbehavior always to be precluded from acting as decision-makers”).
158 See, e.g., Linwood v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Peoria, 463 F.2d 763, 765, n. 4 (7th Cir. 1972). The local district in that case affirmatively chose to develop procedures that mandated an independent review panel made up of three outside approved attorneys and was not required to do so, consistent with the Seventh Circuit’s adoption of the majority approach. See Lamb, 826 F.2d 526.
159 See e.g., Gorman v. Univ. of R.I., 837 F.2d 7, 15 (1st Cir. 1988) (providing outside, independent decision-makers in the education context will involve an “improper allocation of resources,” and may be “counter-productive”).
160 See, e.g., Newsome, 842 F.2d at 921.
161 See, e.g., Newsome, 842 F.2d at 921.

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