Source: https://civil.sog.unc.edu/slip-ups-happen-but-when-are-they-excusable-neglect/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 12:50:55+00:00

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Slip-ups happen, but when are they “excusable neglect”?
This entry was contributed by Ann Anderson on August 14, 2015 at 5:00 am and is filed under Civil Practice, Civil Procedure-General.
Defendant fails to answer the complaint on time, so plaintiff seizes the moment and obtains default judgment. A party does not understand a notice of hearing, fails to attend, and the court enters a final order in the opponent’s favor. These and similar scenarios happen regularly in North Carolina courts, and afterward the most common argument for relief from the judgment is “excusable neglect.” Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) allows relief from a “final judgment, order, or proceeding” on this basis. But just what does excusable neglect mean?
• Plaintiff had consented to withdrawal of her prior counsel, was aware of the scheduled trial, and showed no diligent efforts to secure other legal services, Campbell v. First-Citizens Bank and Trust Co., 23 N.C. App. 631 (1974).
Failure to keep a current service address is a big no-no. The movant’s neglect will not be excused if judgment resulted from its failure to maintain a registered agent or to inform the court of a current address. See, e.g., Smith ex rel. Strickland v. Jones, 183 N.C. App. 643 (2007); Advanced Wall Systems, Inc. v. Highlande Builders, LLC, 167 N.C. App. 630 (2004); Standard Equip. Co. v. Albertson, 35 N.C. App. 144 (1978). In one such case, the Court of Appeals denied relief where failure to maintain a current North Carolina registered agent left a Maryland corporation responsible for a $300,000 default judgment. Anderson Trucking Serv., Inc. v. Key Way Transport, Inc., 94 N.C. App. 36 (1989).
• A self-represented litigant had a ninth grade education, could read and write, and had previously hired counsel in other matters, but did not attend to the case because “he did not believe plaintiffs could prevail,” Boyd v. Marsh, 47 N.C. App. 491 (1980).
An attorney’s neglect is imputed to the party. Finally, a party will not be relieved from judgment on grounds that its attorney was the cause of the neglect. In Briley v. Farabow, 348 N.C. 537 (1998), the Supreme Court stated that “[c]learly, an attorney’s negligence in handling a case constitutes inexcusable neglect and should not be grounds for relief under the ‘excusable neglect’ provision of Rule 60(b)(1).” The court reasoned that, “[i]n enacting Rule 60(b)(1), the General Assembly did not intend to sanction an attorney’s negligence by making it beneficial for the client and to thus provide an avenue for potential abuse.” Under this rule, the Court of Appeals has repeatedly declined to grant relief based on attorney mistakes, such as when counsel: failed to note the date of entry of dismissal, resulting in a missed refiling deadline, Nieto-Espinoza v. Lowder Constr., Inc., 748 S.E.2d 8 (2013); failed to ensure a notice of appeal had been filed, Sellers v. FMC Corp., 216 N.C. App. 134 (2011); entered into a settlement agreement without his clients’ knowledge, Purcell Int’l Textile Grp, Inc. v. Algemene AFW N.V., 185 N.C. App. 135 (2007); neglected to forward discovery to his clients, Brown v. Foremost Affiliated Ins. Svcs, Inc., 158 N.C. App. 727 (2003); failed to meet court-ordered discovery deadlines, Parris v. Light, 146 N.C. App. 515 (2001); mistook one docket entry for another, Clark v. Penland, 146 N.C. App. 288 (2001); and misapprehended the ramifications of a dismissal, Couch v. Private Diagnostic Clinic, 133 N.C. App. 93 (1999).
Even where a party gets over these hurdles and establishes excusable neglect, the court should not grant relief unless the party also shows a “meritorious defense” to the underlying claim. Norton v. Sawyer, 30 N.C. App. 420 (1976). In short, the court need not set aside the judgment if it must then turn around and grant the same judgment on the merits. There is, of course, more to say about the meritorious defense requirement, and I’ll address it in a later post.
This entry was tagged with the following terms: default judgment, excusable neglect, meritorious defense, Rule 60.
Ann Anderson is an associate professor with the UNC School of Government and specializes in civil procedure, civil practice, and judicial authority.

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