Source: https://openjurist.org/18/f1d/547
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 22:13:56+00:00

Document:
(District Court, S. D. New YO'1'k.
SHIPPING-PART OWNER DISSENTING, NOT LIABLE FOR TORTS OF THE VOYAGE.
A part owner of a vessel whose title is denied by the other part owners, and who is excluded by them from all participation in the management of the vessel and profits of her voyages, is not personally liable for damages caused bya collision upon one of her voyages, as to which he has also given express notice of his dissent.
Though a bond or stipulation with sureties, obtained by libel in the admi- . raIty from the other part owners for the safe return of the vessel, is necessary to secure to the dissenting part owner the preservation of his interest in the vessel unimpaired, it is not essential to his exemption from personal liability where he has disclaimed all interest in the voyage by express notice of-dissent, and has never ratified or adopted it as his own.
Analogous cases of claims for repairs or torts, where the vessel is chartered or mortgaged, considered.
4. SAME-LIABILITY OF PART OWNER. In cases free from circumstances creating an eqUitable estoppel, the Ilability of a part owner for repairs, supplies, or torts depends upon the relation of master and servant, or principal and agent, existing between him and those in immediate control of the ship.
Semble, the statute of limitations is followed by analogy in admiralty, as in equity, where no special equitable reasons exist against its appllcation.
6. SAME-LmEL IN PERSONAM BARRED.
Where the defendant was a well-known merchant, accessibie daily, and a libel in personam was filed eight and a half years after the cause of action accrued, semble, it should be held barred in admiralty, though ineffectual proceedings in rem for the satisfaction of the same claim had been pending during most of that period. Intervention of a part owner as a claimant in a suit in rem, and his defending against a claim for a collision, is no ratification of the acts of the master or adoption of the voyage, such as to make him personally liable for the damages of those injured by a collision.· .
SAME-BUIT IN REM-INTERVENTION OF PART OWNER.
sive evidence it affords that the dissenting part owner abandoned all control and interest in the voyage to the other part owners. While this evidence is doubtless the best, it does not follow that it is the only evidence which the court should regard; and the numerous cases in which dissenting part owners have been held not liable for sup_. plies, shows that proof of actual dissent is sufficient. In' Horn v. Gilpin, Amb. 255, it was held that a court of chancery would not compel a part owner who had expressly notified his dissent to contribute to a luss; and the case of Gould v. Stanton, 16 Conn. 12,27, was decided on the ground that there was no express dissent to the voyage; while in Frazer v. Cuthbertson, above cited, (6 Q. B. Div.93,) the defendant, though one of the registered owners, was held not liable, as he had notified to the other owners his inteution not to take any part in the navigation or management of the ship. As respects the second defense, the statute of limitations, though this is not strictly a bar in admiralty, there does not seem to be ..uf· ficient reason why it should not be followed by analogy in this court as in equity, Willard v. Dorr, 3 Mason, 95; The Sarah Ann, 2 Sumn. 206.212; Saunders v. Buckup, Blatchf. & H. 269; Ben. Adm. § 575 ; 2 Conk!. Adm. 22. The defendant was at all times, during the eight and a half years prior to the commencement of this suit, a well-known merchant in this city, accessible daily. The libelant, it is true, was during most of this time diligently pursuing his remedy in rem, (The Zodiac, 5 FED. REP. 220;) but this has never been held to be a ground for the extension of the statutory period of limitation in reto remedies in personam. ' The intervention of Raymond as part owner and claimant when the vessel was libeled in rem for this collision, and his furnishing a surety to the other claimants in their stipulation for her release, do not affect his exemption from personal liability; for the vessel might be bound, though be was not personally answerable; and he had a right to intervene as claimant for the protection of his interest, and to defeat, if he could, the alleged lien upon the vessel and upon his interest in her for the alleged torts of the master. It was merely a defense of his own property against an asserted charge upon it, and it involved no ratification of the voyage, or of the appointment of the master as bis agent or representatative in the navigation. The libel should be dismissed, with costs.
(Di8trilJt Court, E. D. New York.
CHARTER-PARTY-DEMURRAGE-HEAVY CARGO-DANGER TO LIGHTERS-LIABILITY IrOR DEUY.
In an action on a charter-party to recover freight and demurrage, tIle cbarterer set up by way of recoupment a claim for damage to lighters employed to receive the cargo, and for detention of the lighters. It appears that there was six. days' demurrage, which was caused partly by the necessity to stop discharging on various occasions to permit canal. boats to pass the vessel from an ele. vator in the slip, and partly by the refusal of the lighters to permit the discharge of the cargo upon them by a chute, on account of the large size of some, of the pieces of. cliff·stone of which the cargo consisted, and partly by the failure of the lighters to be along-side and ready, and partly from rain. Held, that the charterer, and not the ship, was responsible for the delay caused by the necessity of allowing the to pass, as the place of discharging caused the delay and the charterer selected the place; that tIle duty of .the ship was performed by discharging the stone as received, and there was no obligation on the ship to break the ·liuge pieces of stone, and it was not the shjp's duty to sheathe the lighters with boards to prevent uamllge to them from the large stones; and that,as the stone could have been landed on a pier injury to the pier, and the charterer chose to have it landed in lighters, he was bound to provide lighters capable of receiving it by thelordinary method, and he was liable for the delay caused by the refusal of the lighters to receive it; that the ship was not. bound to use 8 longer chute than customary in order to avoid a danger caused by the charterer's deciding to receive his cargo in lighters ; that as it appeared that the ship was able and ready to discharge the amount specified in. the charter per day, weather permitting, the charterer had no claim on the ship for delay or injUry to lighters, but was himself liable for the six days' demurrage, and also for the amount paid to a tug to'change the berth of the ship at the request of the charterer.
byR. D. & Wyllys Benedict, of the New York bar.

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