Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/444/248/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 04:23:56+00:00

Document:
The Court of Appeals, in affirming petitioner's conviction, accepted the Government's position that there had been no violation of the Department of Justice's "Petite" policy -- whereby United States attorneys are forbidden to prosecute any person if the allegedly criminal behavior was an ingredient of a previous state prosecution against that person (as in the instant case), except where federal prosecution is specifically authorized in advance by the Department itself upon a finding that the prosecution will serve compelling interests of federal law enforcement. But in this Court, the Solicitor General conceded that the United States Attorney had not obtained the proper authorization before bringing the prosecution.
Held: This Court will vacate the Court of Appeals' judgment and remand the case for that court's reconsideration in light of the Government's present position, rather than, as requested by the Government, vacate the Court of Appeals' Judgment and remand the case to the District Court with instructions to grant the Government's motion to dismiss the indictment.
Certiorari granted; 601 F.2d 591, vacated and remanded.
"to permit the effectuation of the government's policy against successive prosecutions by granting the petition, vacating the judgment of the court of appeals, and remanding the case to the district court with instructions to grant the government's motion to dismiss the indictment."
"petitioner's prosecution for unlawfully possessing a firearm was not supported by an independent compelling federal interest not satisfied by the state prosecution for armed burglary."
States, 435 U.S. 911 (1978); Rinaldi v. United States, 434 U. S. 22 (1977); Croucher v. United States, 429 U.S. 1034 (1977); Watts v. United States, 422 U. S. 1032 (1975); Ackerson v. United States, 419 U.S. 1099 (1975); Nayles v. United States, 419 U.S. 892 (1974); Thompson v. United States, 400 U. S. 17 (1970); Marakar v. United States, 370 U. S. 723 (1962); Petite v. United States, 361 U. S. 529 (1960).
This practice, which rests on the power of the Court to "afford relief which is just under the circumstances,' 28 U.S.C. § 2106," Rinaldi v. United States, supra at 25, n. 8, is not unique to violations of the "Petite" policy. The Court has also consistently vacated the judgments in other cases which the Solicitor General has represented were in violation of other Justice Department policies. See, e.g., Blucher v. United States, 439 U.S. 1061 (1979) (obscenity prosecution); Nunley v. United States, 434 U.S. 962 (1977) (prosecution for willfully making false statements concerning matters within jurisdiction of Department of Treasury); Marraf v. United States, 414 U.S. 1106 (1973) (prosecution for carrying a "concealed deadly or dangerous" weapon while boarding an aircraft); Robison v. United States, 390 U. S. 198 (1968) (addition of counts upon retrial); Redmond v. United States, 384 U. S. 264 (1966) (obscenity prosecution).
petition for certiorari. See, e.g., Garner v. United States, 430 U.S. 942 (1977).
THE CHIEF JUSTICE and MR. JUSTICE WHITE dissent.
MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN, with whom MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST joins, dissents for the reason that in this case the United States already has presented the "Petite" policy issue to the Court of Appeals and that court has passed upon the issue adversely to the Government's present position.
Promulgated in the wake of this Court's decision in Abbate v. United States, 359 U. S. 187 (1959), the policy was first recognized by the Court in Petite v. United States, 361 U. S. 529, 361 U. S. 531 (1960). It has since been known as the "Petite" policy.
The per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals is unreported, but the affirmance order is reported at 601 F.2d 591.

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 2106
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.