Source: http://masscases.com/cases/sjc/331/331mass677.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 14:31:14+00:00

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STATE TAX COMMISSION vs. ASSESSORS OF SPRINGFIELD.
John V. Phelan, Assistant Attorney General, (George Luftman with him,) for the State tax commission.
Charles D. Sloan, City Solicitor, for the assessors of Springfield.
WILKINS, J. This is an appeal by the State tax commission from a determination by the Appellate Tax Board of the valuation of the "machinery, poles, wires and underground conduits, wires and pipes" located in Springfield belonging to three public utility companies on January 1, 1954. This is the first occasion the main question as to the scope of this type of proceedings before the Appellate Tax Board has reached us at a time when we have not been constrained to term the issue moot. See Commissioner of Corporations & Taxation v. Assessors of Springfield, 329 Mass. 419; Assessors of Springfield v. New England Telephone & Telegraph Co. 330 Mass. 198; Commissioner of Corporations & Taxation v. Assessors of Springfield, 330 Mass. 433; Commissioner of Corporations & Taxation v. Assessors of Haverhill, 330 Mass. 553; State Tax Commission v. Assessors of Haverhill, ante, 306.
The Appellate Tax Board, on June 22, 1954, in a majority decision, accepted the testimony of the expert to the fullest extent and adopted his exact figures as the fair cash value of all the items of property.
1. The tax commission makes the basic contention that in the hearing before the Appellate Tax Board the burden was upon the assessors to prove that the original determination of value made by the tax commission was in error, unfair, unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious. We are unable to discover such a requirement in the pertinent statutes, which, although recently amended, have not undergone substantial change. The only new wording arises from the reorganization of the department of corporations and taxation and the substitution of the State tax commission for the commissioner of corporations and taxation.
tax board." "[W]ith as little delay as possible" the "board shall hear and decide the subject matter of such appeal . . . and its decision as to the valuation of the property shall be final and conclusive, except as provided in section seventy-three, relative to abatements." The assessors shall assess the property "at the value determined by the state tax commission or by the appellate tax board."
Up to this point the taxpayer is not a party to the proceedings. But by G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 59, Section 73, as amended, "Any company aggrieved by the taxes assessed on it relating to any property valued in accordance with section thirty-nine may, on or before December first of the year to which the tax relates, apply to the commission for an abatement thereof; and if the commission finds that the company is taxed at more than its [the company's] just proportion, or upon an assessment of any of its [the company's] said property in excess of its [the property's] fair cash value, it [the commission] shall make a reasonable abatement." The assessors may be heard on the matter of abatement, but only the taxpayer may appeal.
The Appellate Tax Board "shall have jurisdiction to decide appeals" under the provisions, among others, of c. 59, Sections 39, 73. G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 58A, Section 6, as amended. "The board shall make a decision in each case heard by it and may make findings of fact and report thereon in writing. . . . The decision of the board shall be final as to findings of fact. From any decision of the board upon an appeal from a decision or determination of the commission, or of a board of assessors . . . [with exceptions now immaterial] an appeal as to matters of law may be taken to the supreme judicial court . . .." G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 58A, Section 13, as amended.
for admitting the taxpayer before the Appellate Tax Board at the hearing of an appeal by assessors pursuant to Section 39, and the anomaly of excluding from participation the one whose property is to be valued for the assessment of a tax to be paid by him.
but even if it is sound, the procedure is one prescribed in unmistakable statutory detail.
The scheme of Sections 39 and 73 is undoubtedly anomalous, does not insure uniformity to the same extent as would be possible were there no recourse to the Appellate Tax Board, and may waste time. Whether an end should be put to the procedure is not for us to decide.
The tax commission's motion to dismiss and requests for rulings inconsistent with this opinion were rightly denied.
aerial cable was made; that it was not possible to examine physically the underground plant because the greater part is under the pavement in the streets; that, so far as he knew, the inventory of underground plant is always made from company records and prints, the locations being checked in the field, as he did; and that he had an opinion as to the fair cash value as of January 1, 1954, of the properties of the New England company in Springfield. The witness was then permitted to testify, subject to the tax commission's exception, that that value was $11,165,009. He further testified that he took into consideration the quantity of plant in place, the value of that plant at 1954 cost levels, the amount of depreciation "and other matters pertaining to or leading to . . . [his] opinion of the fair cash value as what a willing buyer would pay to a willing seller in the case of this property," and the net additions made by the company in 1953.
Subject to the tax commission's exception, the witness testified that in his opinion the total fair cash value of the American company in Springfield on January 1, 1954, was $665,084; that in arriving at that opinion he took into consideration the amount of property indicated by reports of the company to the "tax commissioner" and the witness's own "estimate of the current cost level of that property, its age as indicated by reports of the company to the tax commissioner over a period of years as relating to or as an indication of what a willing buyer would pay a willing seller for that property."
The witness gave his opinion that the fair cash value on January 1, 1954, of the property of the Western Union company in Springfield was $61,025. His reasons were substantially the same as those he gave for the American company.
Considering first the New England company, at least as to the major portion, which is the underground plant, there was no property in evidence before the tribunal sufficiently definite to be given a value. The amount and detail of the underground plant were not presented at first hand or adequately described. The sole foundation for the opinion as to the value of property which the expert did not see and could not see were inventories reported "in earlier years" to "the tax commissioner" and conduit prints in the city engineer's office. The inventories and prints, according to the witness, were made by the taxpayer, which, as has been observed, was not a party to the proceedings. These vaguely identified documents were not offered in evidence, for what reason does not appear. Their contents are not known in this proceeding.
question, which is whether there was any basis for his opinion, is one of substance and not of form. In New York Central Railroad v. Freedman, 240 Mass. 200, 210, the expert did not provide the only evidence as to what was the property which he had not seen.
The evidence as to the American company and the Western Union company was even more meager. The expert testified that he had obtained the "amount" of property, the amount not being otherwise stated, from reports of these taxpayers to the "tax commissioner." These reports were otherwise undescribed, and the contents of these writings were not attempted in any way to be shown.
That the case was tried before an administrative tribunal and not in a court of law does not render it subject to a different principle. To the slight extent that the record discloses what the property was, there is hearsay exclusively. Moran v. School Committee of Littleton, 317 Mass. 591. Sinclair v. Director of the Division of Employment Security, ante, 101.
[Note Page679-1] The word "apply" is undoubtedly synonymous with "appeal." See G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 58A, Section 6, as amended by St. 1953, c. 654, Section 24. In the immediately preceding revision of Section 39 the word was "appeal." St. 1953, c. 468, Section 32. In earlier predecessor statutes the word was "apply." To the Board of Appeal: St. 1915, c. 137, Section 1. St. 1918, c. 138. G. L. c. 59, Section 39. To the Board of Tax Appeals: St. 1930, c. 416, Section 12. G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 59, Section 39. St. 1933, c. 254, Section 36. To the Appellate Tax Board: see St. 1939, c. 451, Section 22.

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