Source: http://ca.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20090123_0001258.ECA.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 14:42:32+00:00

Document:
This matter is before the court on defendant James D. Burke's ("Burke" or "defendant") motion to suppress over 28 boxes of evidence taken during the search of a Las Vegas residence and nearby storage facility on February 19, 2003. Defendant also moves to dismiss the indictment on the basis that the government allegedly lost or destroyed exculpatory evidence taken during the search. A three-day evidentiary hearing was held in August 2008. Thereafter, the court requested supplemental briefing. Having reviewed the file herein and heard the testimony of witnesses and arguments of counsel, the court DENIES defendant's motion to suppress and defendant's motion to dismiss.
Defendant is charged in the indictment with 33 felony counts, including bankruptcy fraud and money laundering. (Indictment [Docket #6], filed Sept. 8, 2005.) Defendant has pled not guilty to all of these charges.
On February 14, 2002, Truck-A-Way ("TAW"), a corporation controlled by defendant James Burke, commenced a voluntary Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding in the Eastern District of California. On March 6, 2002, the Bankruptcy Court issued an order to show cause why the petition should not be dismissed for failure to file the required documents. Subsequently, on May 1, 2002, the TAW bankruptcy proceeding was converted to a Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding. On June 13, 2002, a creditor filed a petition for involuntary bankruptcy against James Burke individually. The court granted the petition on January 7, 2003.
Subsequently, on February 19, 2003, J. Russell Cunningham*fn3 ("Cunningham"), counsel for the trustee in the TAW bankruptcy proceeding, filed an "Ex Parte Application for Order Authorizing the Immediate Entry, Search and Seizure of Property" ("the ex parte application") in the bankruptcy court.*fn4 The proposed order submitted by Cunningham purportedly authorized the search and seizure of property allegedly belonging to the bankruptcy estate at the Las Vegas residence, a residence in Palm Desert, California, and unspecified storage lockers. In re. Truck-A-Way, 300 B.R. 31, 33 (E.D. Cal. 2003). According to Cunningham, the ex parte application was necessary because his past experience indicated that James Burke was likely to defy any court order by concealing assets and records belonging to the bankruptcy estate. See id. The bankruptcy court granted the ex parte application without notice and signed Cunningham's proposed "Order Authorizing the Immediate Entry, Search and Seizure of Property" ("the order") without alteration. Id. The order allowed the trustees for the James Burke and TAW bankruptcy estates, along with "their designated professionals," to "[i]mmediately enter" James Burke's residences in Las Vegas and Palm Desert and "[a]ny storage unit reflected in documents" at those locations, "picking or re-keying the door locks if necessary." It also authorized searches of the premises, removal of items that were property of the Burke or TAW bankruptcy estates, and searches of "the persons and personal effects . . . of any person at the premises or who arrives at the premises while the search of the premises is being conducted." Id.
On July 2, 2007, defendant filed a motion to dismiss the indictment on the basis that the government destroyed exculpatory evidence and joined a motion filed by co-defendant Linda Burke to suppress all evidence taken during the February 19, 2003 search. On March 10, 2008, during a status hearing on the pending motions in the case, the court asked counsel for the defendant to address the issue of standing through the filing of a supplemental declaration. On April 14, 2008, Linda Burke pled guilty to a violation of 31 U.S.C. § 5324(a)(3), Structuring Financial Transactions. One week later, the defendant filed a supplemental declaration addressing his interest in the properties searched on February 19, 2003.
Between Friday, August 22, 2008, and Wednesday, August 27, 2008, the Court heard three days of testimony on the motions filed in this case. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court asked the parties to submit further briefing on the issue of standing and on defendant's motion to dismiss in light of the testimony given.
Defendant moves to suppress the evidence seized during the search executed on February 19, 2003. The government asserts that defendant James Burke cannot object to the search because he lacks a legitimate expectation of privacy in the Las Vegas residence and storage locker that were searched and in the particular items seized during that search.
It is well establish that remedies for violations of constitutional rights are only "afforded to a person 'who belongs to the class for whose sake the constitutional protection is given.'" United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 86 (1980) (quoting Hatch v. Reardon, 204 U.S. 152, 160 (1907)). Specifically, "Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which, like some other constitutional rights, may not be vicariously asserted." Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133 (1979) (quoting Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969)); see Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) ("[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places."). Therefore, the exclusionary rule, which allows the suppression of evidence obtained where a party's constitutional rights have been violated, may only be asserted by a person whose rights have been violated; "[a] person who is aggrieved by an illegal search and seizure only through the introduction of damaging evidence secured by a search of a third person's premises or property has not had any of his Fourth Amendment rights infringed." Rakas, 439 U.S. at 134. Rather, a disputed search and seizure must have infringed upon an interest of the defendant "which the Fourth Amendment was designed to protect." Id. at 140. The Court has made clear that, in this context, the Fourth Amendment protects against government intrusion in those places where a person has a legitimate expectation of privacy. Id. at 143.
California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986); United States v. Shryock, 342 F.3d 948, 978 (9th Cir. 2003); United States v. Nerber, 222 F.3d 597, 599 (9th Cir. 2000). "The defendant has the burden of establishing, under the totality of the circumstances, the search or seizure violated his legitimate expectation of privacy in a particular place." United States v. Davis, 932 F.2d 752, 756 (1991) (citing Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104-05 (1980)).
After a review of the credible evidence presented by the parties, the court finds that defendant has not borne his burden of demonstrating that he had an actual, subjective expectation of privacy in the Las Vegas residence searched, and more particularly, in the boxes and computer seized from the residence and sought to be suppressed by this motion.
The determination of whether a defendant has a subjective expectation of privacy in a particular place may be based upon statements made by the defendant, Rakas, 448 U.S. at 105, as well as his actions, United States v. Haydel, 649 F.2d 1152, 1155 (5th Cir. 1981). Where a defendant unequivocally disclaims ownership of the place searched, he gives up any expectation of privacy. United States v. Decoud, 456 F.3d 996, 1007 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 241 (1960) (holding that one who has voluntarily abandoned property cannot subsequently complain about its search and seizure); United States v. Nordling, 804 F.2d 1466, 1469-70 (9th Cir. 1986) (stating that a defendant relinquishes any expectation of privacy after disclaiming interest in the property); United States v. Cella, 568 F.2d 1266, 1283 (9th Cir. 1977) (explaining that denying ownership of property when questioned constitutes abandonment of that property)).
Linda called -- trustee named Aceituno there & Police, demanding to search the house -- I asked for what -- she said records or something. I told her that everything there is yours & kids personal property and your business interest records -- he shouldn't even be there.
I asked her to put Aceituno on the phone. Aceituno answered. -- I asked him what he was doing there -- he said "I'm here to search your home for anything that belongs to your or Truck-A-Way's estate." I told him I don't live there -- he said "Yeah, that's what your wife said." I told him that any records in the house is a property of Linda & kids & their business interest records. . . . Linda confirmed she told him I no longer lived there & everything in the house was hers/kids. . . . Linda is very upset -- doesn't want anyone in her house searching for ??? (Govt. Ex. 20; Tr. 1:43-45.) Thus, in addition to statements made verbally to Aceituno, defendant explicitly stated in the foregoing memorialization he drafted subsequent to the search that he did not live at the residence, that the residence was Linda's home, and that everything in the house was Linda's and children's personal property.
With respect to the computer seized during the search, the computer was located in the second floor office-area loft. (Tr. 3:22-23; Govt. Ex. 19.) There were no doors or other means to close off the space. (Tr. 3:23.) Linda Burke purchased the computer. (Tr. 3:25.) It did not require a password to log on, and both Linda Burke and her daughter had full access to everything on the computer. (Tr. 3:25-26.) Furthermore, defendant had his own lap top that he brought when he came to visit. (Tr. 3:26.) Beyond defendant's unequivocal denial of ownership in the house and the property within the house, defendant failed to evince any conduct that demonstrates an expectation of privacy in the computer; rather, the evidence demonstrates that anyone who had access to the computer also had full access to all its contents.

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