Source: http://www.sughrue.com/resources/PublicationDetail.aspx?publication=6c1bd460-f32a-4119-aa01-035db1dc5286
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 21:50:48+00:00

Document:
On January 4, 2019, the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) issued examiner guidance for examining definiteness of functional claim limitations under 35 U.S.C. § 112. Although the new guidance does not have the force of law, it is important to have a comprehensive understanding of this guidance because it will affect how claims will be examined under § 112.
In short, the patent examination process under § 112 ensures that the claims of an application have proper written description and enablement support under § 112(a) in the disclosure of the application, and that functional limitations (i.e., claim limitations that define an element in terms of the function it performs without reciting the structure, materials, or acts that perform the function) are properly treated as means (or steps) plus function limitations under § 112(f) and sufficiently definite under § 112(b).
Specifically, instead of using the term “means” (or “steps”), a substitute term can act as a generic placeholder for the term “means” where that term would not be recognized by one of ordinary skill in the art as being sufficiently definite structure for performing the claimed function. In other words, when a claim term does not recite “means” (or “steps”), the presumption that § 112(f) does not apply can be overcome if the challenger demonstrates that the claim term fails to recite sufficiently definite structure or else recites function without reciting sufficient structure for performing that function. For example, terms such as “mechanism for,” “module for,” “device for,” “unit for,” “component for,” “element for,” “member for,” “apparatus for,” “machine for,” or “system for” may invoke § 112(f) claim interpretation.
With respect to § 112(f), examiners will apply § 112(f) to a claim limitation to determine if it meets the 3-prong analysis set forth in the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (“MPEP”). The 3-prong analysis includes evaluating whether (1) the claim limitation uses the term “means” (or “step”) or a generic placeholder, (2) the term is modified by functional language, and (3) the term is modified by sufficient structure, material or acts for performing the function.
In addition, in order to determine whether a word, term, or phrase coupled with a function denotes structure, the new guidance tells examiners to check whether: (1) the specification provides a description sufficient to inform one of ordinary skill in the art that the term denotes structure; (2) general and subject matter specific dictionaries provide evidence that the term has achieved recognition as a noun denoting structure; and (3) the prior art provides evidence that the term has an art-recognized structure to perform the claimed function.
The guidance provides that for a computer-implemented claim limitation under § 112(f), the specification must disclose an algorithm for performing the claimed specific computer function, or the claim is indefinite under § 112(b). In support, the guidance provides that in Noah Sys., Inc. v. Intuit Inc., the Federal Circuit has consistently required that the structure disclosed in the specification be more than simply a general purpose computer or microprocessor and that the specification must disclose an algorithm for performing the claimed function. In other words, special purpose computer-implemented § 112(f) claim limitations will be indefinite under § 112(b) when the specification fails to disclose an algorithm to perform the claimed function.
The guidance also warns that the disclosed algorithm must be able to perform all of the claimed functions. For example, when the specification discloses an algorithm that only accomplishes one of multiple identifiable functions performed by a means-plus-function limitation, the specification is treated as if it disclosed no algorithm.
Lastly, the guidance provides that a computer-implemented functional claim may also be indefinite when the 3-prong analysis for determining whether the claim limitation should be interpreted under § 112(f) is inconclusive because of ambiguous words in the claim.
In view of the recent guidance, patent applications directed to computer-implemented inventions will receive heightened scrutiny under 35 U.S.C. § 112 during examination. We will assess how much impact this new 112 guidance will bring with respect to the allowance rate of software patents in the upcoming months. Meanwhile, applicants are advised to be particularly mindful when drafting patent applications directed to computer-implemented inventions, in order to ensure the inclusion of sufficient structural elements in the specification that carry out the functional limitations, and described with enough detail to show that the inventor had possession of how the functional limitation is achieved at the time of filing.
 See Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (Mayer, J., concurring).
 See Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
 See 2019 Guidance for Examining Computer-Implemented Functional Claim Limitations for Compliance with 35 U.S.C. § 112 at page 5 (citing Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1349).
 See, e.g., MPEP §2181, subsection I.A.
 MPEP (9th ed. Rev. 08. 2017, Jan. 2018).
 See MPEP §2181, subsection I.
 See 2019 Guidance for Examining Computer-Implemented Functional Claim Limitations for Compliance with 35 U.S.C. § 112 at page 10 (citing Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
 See Noah Sys. Inc. v. Intuit Inc., 675 F.3d 1302, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
 See Noah Sys., Inc. at 1319.
 See 2019 Guidance for Examining Computer-Implemented Functional Claim Limitations for Compliance with 35 U.S.C. § 112 at page 18.
 See Vasudevan Software Inc. v. MicroStrategy Inc., 782 F.3d 671, 683 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
 See 2019 Guidance for Examining Computer-Implemented Functional Claim Limitations for Compliance with 35 U.S.C. § 112 at page 19 (citing Vasudevan, at 683).
 See 2019 Guidance for Examining Computer-Implemented Functional Claim Limitations for Compliance with 35 U.S.C. § 112 at page 21 (citing Trs. of Bos. Univ. v. Everlight Elecs. Co., LTD., 896 F.3d 1357, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2018)(explaining that while “the specification must enable the full scope of the claimed invention[,]” “[t]his is not to say that the specification must expressly spell out every possible iteration of every claim.”).
 See id; See also MPEP § 2161.01, subsection III, and MPEP § 2164.08.

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