Source: http://legalarium.com/ttabquotes/Treaties.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 16:41:43+00:00

Document:
The terms of a treaty are to be construed by the intentions of the signatory parties.
As discussed in Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Agagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 185 (1982), a court's role is "limited to giving effect to the intent of the Treaty parties." See generally Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States, Part III, Introductory Note at 144-145 (1987).
In construing a treaty, the terms thereof are given their ordinary meaning in the context of the treaty and are interpreted, in accordance with that meaning, in the way that best fulfills the purposes of the treaty.
In construing a treaty, the terms thereof are given their ordinary meaning in the context of the treaty and are interpreted, in accordance with that meaning, in the way that best fulfills the purposes of the treaty. See United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 365-66 (1989) (interpreting a treaty to carry out the intent or expectations of the signatories); Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 193-94, (1961) (a treaty should be interpreted to carry out its purpose).
A treaty will not be deemed to have been abrogated or modified by a later statute unless such purpose on the part of Congress has been clearly expressed.
A "treaty will not be deemed to have been abrogated or modified by a later statute unless such purpose on the part of Congress has been clearly expressed." Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 120 (1933) (emphasis added); see Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 252 (1984).
The clear purpose of the Pan American Convention is to protect the foreign trademarks which fall within the treaty's purview; and the intent of the treaty is to confer a substantive right to the protection of the foreign mark.
In accordance with these principles, our starting point is to discern the intent of the Pan American Convention. As stated by the Supreme Court in Bacardi, and as reiterated by the Board in British-American Tobacco: "Here, the clear purpose of the [Pan American Convention] is to protect the foreign trademarks which fall within the treaty's purview. ... The intent of the treaty is to confer a substantive right to the protection of the foreign mark ..."
The doctrine of territoriality means that rights to a mark in a foreign country do not create rights in other countries.
The TTAB's jurisdiction does not violate the doctrine of territoriality but rather constitutes an exception to the doctrine explicitly created by the Convention.
The TTAB's most notable decision involving the Pan American Convention is British-American Tobacco Co. v. Phillip Morris Inc., 55 USPQ2d 1585 (TTAB 2000).
The Pan American Convention is self-executing and became U.S. law upon ratification; moreover, the Convention has the same force as a federal statute and provides remedies independent of the Lanham Act.
Article 7 provides the owner of a mark in a contracting state the right to challenge the use and registration of an interfering mark in another contracting state upon proof that the interfering party had knowledge of the existence and continuous use of the mark and upon compliance with the domestic requirements in that contracting state.
Our next step is to analyze the text of Article 7. According to its plain meaning, an owner of a mark protected in a contracting state has the right to challenge the use and registration of an interfering mark in another contracting state, upon proof that the interfering party had knowledge of the existence and continuous use of the mark and upon compliance with the domestic requirements in that contracting state. The aggrieved owner may assert the preferential right to use and register the mark in the country where the claim is being asserted. Thus, the text of Article 7, when read in conjunction with the stated purpose of the treaty, clearly confers to eligible trademark owners a "preferential" or prior right where the requirements of the article have been satisfied.
Article 7 merely establishes as a prerequisite to assertion of a claim or defense under Article 7 compliance with the domestic legislation in the country where the actionable conduct takes place.
Furthermore, opposer's interpretation of the last clause of Article 7 strains the plain meaning of the text. The clause merely establishes as a prerequisite to assertion of a claim or defense under Article 7 compliance with the domestic legislation in the country where the actionable conduct takes place.
Nothing in the statutory language found in either Section 44 of the Lanham Act nor the legislative history of the Lanham Act evince a clear expression by Congress to override the rights set forth in Article 7 of the Pan American Convention.
In the case of an application based on a foreign registration in the United States Article 7 of the Pan American Convention requires the filing of an application pursuant to either Section 44(d) or (e).
In the case of an application based on a foreign registration in the United States (as is the case here), that requirement means the filing of an application pursuant to either Section 44(d) or (e). Opposer's proffered interpretation would otherwise defeat the purpose of the Convention which is to provide a uniform standard for the assertion of foreign trademark rights among the signatories.
Lastly, we find opposer's arguments regarding the import of Havana Club Holdings and Empresa unconvincing. We see no reason to apply the logic from Havana Club Holdings and Empresa since those cases pertain to rights derived from the Pan-American Convention within the context of statutory provisions and regulations implementing the U.S. embargo against Cuba.
Elements required in order to prevail on the issue of priority pursuant to Article 7 of the Pan American Convention.
Pursuant to Article 7, applicant is not required to establish that opposer knew that applicant was the owner of the foreign mark, only that the opposer had knowledge of the continuous use and existence of the mark.
Indeed, according to the text of Article 7, applicant is not required to establish that opposer knew that applicant was the owner of the PARDO'S CHICKEN mark in Peru. To the contrary, the terms of the treaty only require that the offending party have "knowledge of the continuous use and existence" of the mark.
The TTAB has the authority to hear applicant's affirmative defense of priority, based on use, under Article 7.
This brings us to the question of whether the Board has the requisite subject matter jurisdiction to entertain applicant's assertion of priority under Article 7 of the Convention. We hold that the Board does have the authority to consider applicant's affirmative defense. The relevant language of Article 7 provides that "[a]ny owner of a mark protected in one of the contracting states in accordance with its domestic law, . . . shall have the right to oppose such use, registration or deposit and shall have the right to employ all legal means, procedure or recourse provided in the country in which such interfering mark is being used or where its registration or deposit is being sought . . . " (emphasis added). In this instance, opposer's claim of priority is not predicated upon ownership of a federal registration but rather upon use in the United States. Thus, applicant, in asserting priority over opposer, is challenging opposer's purported prior rights derived from common law use of his mark. The text of Article 7 specifically gives the foreign owner of a mark the right to challenge priority rights based on use. Clearly the Board has the authority to determine prior rights arising from common law usage within the context of adjudicating Section 2(d) claims. It logically follows that the Board has the subject matter jurisdiction to entertain applicant's affirmative defense of priority under Article 7 of the Pan American Convention.
Case Finding: Applicant has made of record copies of valid and subsisting Peruvian registrations for it's marks and thus applicant's ownership of a mark protected in a contracting state to the Pan American Convention is not at issue.
As noted above, applicant has made of record copies of valid and subsisting Peruvian registrations for the mark PARDO'S CHICKEN in both typed and stylized form for use in connection with restaurants as well as various related goods and services. Accordingly, applicant's ownership of a mark protected in a contracting state to the Pan American Convention (in this case, Peru) is not at issue.

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