Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=81863:182072&catid=1571&Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 04:54:34+00:00

Document:
G.R. No. 182072, June 28, 2013 - UNIVAC DEVELOPMENT, INC., Petitioner, v. WILLIAM M. SORIANO, Respondent.
UNIVAC DEVELOPMENT, INC., Petitioner, v. WILLIAM M. SORIANO, Respondent.
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision1 dated October 24, 2007 and Resolution2 dated March 14, 2008 in CA-G.R. SP No. 96495. The assailed decision granted the petition filed by respondent William M. Soriano against petitioner Univac Development, Inc. and consequently nullified and set aside the April 28, 20063 and July 31, 20064 Resolutions of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC NCR CA No. 046028-05 (NLRC NCR Case No. 00-02-01664-05); while the assailed resolution denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner, on the other hand, denied the allegations of respondent and claimed instead that prior to his employment, respondent was informed of the standards required for regularization. Petitioner also supposedly informed him of his duties and obligations which included safekeeping of case folders, proper coordination with the company’s lawyers, and monitoring of the status of the cases filed by or against the company.10 Petitioner recalled that on January 5, 2005, a company meeting was held where respondent allegedly expressed his intention to leave the company because he wanted to review for the bar examinations. It was also in that meeting where he was informed of his unsatisfactory performance in the company. Thus, when respondent did not report for work on February 16, 2005, petitioner assumed that he pushed through with his plan to leave the company.11 In other words, petitioner claimed that respondent was not illegally dismissed from employment, rather, he in fact abandoned his job by his failure to report for work.
DECIDED IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR WITH APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE RENDERED BY THIS HONORABLE COURT, AND/OR HAS SO FAR DEPARTED FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS AS TO CALL FOR AN EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF SUPERVISION VESTED IN THIS HONORABLE COURT. THIS IS PARTICULARLY TRUE WHEN THE CA GRANTED THE PETITION OF SORIANO EVEN IF THE RULINGS OF THE NLRC ALREADY ATTAINED FINALITY AND WAS IN FACT ENTERED IN THE LATTER’S BOOK OF ENTRIES OF JUDGMENT, and WHEN THE CA WENT OVERBOARD BEYOND THE NARROW SCOPE AND INFLEXIBLE CHARACTER OF CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 (Tichangco v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 150629, 30 June 2004) BY NOT LIMITING ITSELF IN DETERMINING THE EXISTENCE OF GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION ON THE PART OF THE NLRC.
THE CA IN EFFECT RULED OF THE PRESENCE OF ACTUAL DISMISSALL (SIC) WHEN WHAT WAS FILED IS CONSTRUCTIVE ILLEGAL DISMISSAL.
THE CA REVERSED THE FINDINGS OF THE NLRC IN SPITE OF SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT ITS (NLRC) RULINGS (PT & T v. NLRC, 183 SCRA 451 ; Mateo v. Moreno, 28 SCRA 796 ).
Under Article 223 of the Labor Code, the decision of the NLRC becomes final and executory after the lapse of ten calendar days from receipt thereof by the parties. However, the adverse party is not precluded from assailing the decision via petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the CA and then to this Court via a petition for review under Rule 45.22 Thus, contrary to the contention of petitioner, there is no violation of the doctrine of immutability of judgment when respondent elevated the matter to the CA which the latter consequently granted.
Now on the main issue of whether respondent was illegally dismissed from employment by petitioner.
Art. 281. Probationary Employment. — Probationary employment shall not exceed six (6) months from the date the employee started working, unless it is covered by an apprenticeship agreement stipulating a longer period. The services of an employee who has been engaged on a probationary basis may be terminated for a just cause or when he fails to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with reasonable standards made known by the employer to the employee at the time of his engagement. An employee who is allowed to work after a probationary period shall be considered a regular employee.
Sec. 6. Probationary employment. – There is probationary employment where the employee, upon his engagement, is made to undergo a trial period during which the employer determines his fitness to qualify for regular employment, based on reasonable standards made known to him at the time of engagement.
(c) The services of an employee who has been engaged on probationary basis may be terminated only for a just or authorized cause, when he fails to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with the reasonable standards prescribed by the employer.
(d) In all cases of probationary employment, the employer shall make known to the employee the standards under which he will qualify as a regular employee at the time of his engagement. Where no standards are made known to the employee at that time, he shall be deemed a regular employee.
It is primordial that at the start of the probationary period, the standards for regularization be made known to the probationary employee.31 In this case, as held by the CA, petitioner failed to present adequate evidence to substantiate its claim that respondent was apprised of said standards. It is evident from the LA and NLRC decisions that they merely relied on surmises and presumptions in concluding that respondent should have known the standards considering his educational background as a law graduate. Equally important is the requirement that in order to invoke "failure to meet the probationary standards" as a justification for dismissal, the employer must show how these standards have been applied to the subject employee. In this case, aside from its bare allegation, it was not shown that a performance evaluation was conducted to prove that his performance was indeed unsatisfactory.
Indeed, the power of the employer to terminate a probationary employee is subject to three limitations, namely: (1) it must be exercised in accordance with the specific requirements of the contract; (2) the dissatisfaction on the part of the employer must be real and in good faith, not feigned so as to circumvent the contract or the law; and (3) there must be no unlawful discrimination in the dismissal.32 In this case, not only did petitioner fail to show that respondent was apprised of the standards for regularization but it was likewise not shown how these standards had been applied in his case.
Having been forced to litigate in order to seek redress of his grievances, respondent is entitled to the payment of attorney’s fees equivalent to 10% of his monetary award.39 Pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence, legal interest shall be imposed on the monetary awards herein granted at the rate of 6% per annum from date of termination until full payment.40 One final point. Petitioner claims that the instant case is covered by the stay order issued by the rehabilitation court in a rehabilitation case it earlier filed. The Court, however, takes judicial notice that in Asiatrust Development Bank v. First Aikka Development, Inc.41 docketed as G.R. No. 179558, this Court rendered a decision on June 1, 2011 dismissing the petition for rehabilitation filed by petitioner before the RTC of Baguio City, Branch 59, for lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner cannot, therefore, rely on the orders issued by said court relative to its alleged rehabilitation.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated October 24, 2007 and Resolution dated March 14, 2008 in CA-G.R. SP No. 96495, are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner Univac Development, Inc. is liable to pay respondent William M. Soriano the following: (1) backwages, inclusive of allowances and other benefits, or their monetary equivalent, computed from the date of his dismissal up to the finality of this decision; (2) separation pay in lieu of reinstatement equivalent to at least one month pay, or one month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher (with a fraction of at least six months being considered as one whole year), computed from the time of his employment or engagement up to the finality of the decision; (3) attorney’s fees equivalent to 10% of the monetary awards; and (4) interest at 6% per annum from date of termination until full payment.
Please take notice that on June 19, 2013 a Decision, copy attached herewith, was rendered by the Supreme Court in the above-entitled case, the original of which was received by this Office on June 28, 2013 at 4:25 p.m.

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