Source: https://veteranclaims.net/2009/10/24/lay-evidence-factual-analysis-of-lay-evidence/
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 22:31:58+00:00

Document:
Lay evidence, who is responsible for doing the “factual analysis” of lay evidence in VA cases.
Well according Judge Moorman, that is not the job of the Veterans Court or the Secretary when arguing before the Veterans Court. In this Memorandum decision the issue was remanded to the Board.
Can the Board accomplish this without a remand to the RO?
We’ve noticed the large number of remands coming out of the Veterans Court on lay evidence and what symptoms are capable of lay observation and what is a relatively simple condition, that lay testimony is thus sufficient to identify.
The Court cannot substitute its own factual analysis of the lay evidence or that of the Secretary for a missing analysis by the Board whose obligation it is to decide these factual questions in the first instance.
However, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has held that, in some cases, lay evidence will be competent and credible evidence of etiology. See Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d 1372, 1376-77 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Buchanan v. Nicholson, 451 F.3d 1331, 1336-37, 1336 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2006). In Jandreau, the Federal Circuit rejected as “too broad” the proposition that “competent medical evidence is required . . . [when] the determinative issue involves either medical etiology or a medical diagnosis.” 492 F.3d at 1376-77 (alteration in original). Instead, “[l]ay evidence can be competent and sufficient to establish a diagnosis of a condition when (1) a layperson is competent to identify the medical condition, (2) that layperson is reporting a contemporaneous medical diagnosis, or (3) lay testimony describing symptoms at the time supports a later diagnosis by a medical professional.” Id. at 1377; see Robinson v. Shinseki, 312 Fed. Appx. 336, 2009 WL 524737, at *3 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 3, 2009) (nonprecedential) (remanding for the Board to determine whether a low-back disability is the type of injury for which lay evidence is competent evidence).
contrary to the Secretary’s assertions on appeal here, find that the evidence had established that the appellant had injured her back in service and had continuous pain after service.
Compare Secretary’s Response at 3-4 (“[T]he fact that Appellant claims to have injured her back in service and to have experienced pain subsequently, was already established in the prior Board decision.”) with R. at 344 (1997 Board decision noting that evidence was “not sufficient to show that her back problems date back to service” and service medical records do not show “complaints referrable to the low back”).
The Court cannot substitute its own factual analysis of the lay evidence or that of the Secretary, see Resp. at 4-5 (“Appellant’s lay evidence is not material because a back disability is not a condition capable of lay diagnosis. Moreover, the new evidence here is not specific enough to establish continuity . . . .”), for a missing analysis by the Board whose obligation it is to decide these factual questions in the first instance.Accordingly, the Court will remand the Board’s denial of reopening for the Board to provide an adequate statement of reasons or bases for its conclusions in this regard.
connection for a back injury.
this decision. R. at 225-26, 228-29.
In October 1996, Ms. Clemons testified at a Board hearing. R. at 244-52.
doctors.” R. at 246, 249. A May 1997 Board decision denied the claim. R.
the claim, the Board found that there was no evidence corroborating Ms.
to service. R. at 341, 344.
issued the decision on appeal.
R. at 1-6. This appeal followed.
decisionmakers . . . [that] is neither cumulative nor redundant.” 38 C.F.R.
this Court. See Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 49, 57 (1990).
set forth in 38 U.S.C.
first instance. Id.; Gilbert, 1 Vet.App. at 52.
Secretary counters that the Board’s reasons or bases were adequate.
material evidence sufficient to reopen her claim.
sufficient basis for reopening a previously disallowed claim.” R. at 6.
in order to fairly decide the merits of the claim.” R. at 6.
those involving the musculoskeletal system, throughout service.
this entire time.” R. at 503.
backache,” and took pain medicine “on a consistent basis.” Id.
service. R. at 496, 502-03.
determination can only be supported by a person with “medical expertise.” The Board dismissed, at least in part, the lay assertions based upon the erroneous legal conclusion that medical expertise was required and, therefore, that the lay evidence was not competent to provide etiology evidence. However, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has held that, in some cases, lay evidence will be competent and credible evidence of etiology. See Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d 1372, 1376-77 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Buchanan v. Nicholson, 451 F.3d 1331, 1336-37, 1336 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2006). In Jandreau, the Federal Circuit rejected as “too broad” the proposition that “competent medical evidence is required . . . [when] the determinative issue involves either medical etiology or a medical diagnosis.” 492 F.3d at 1376-77 (alteration in original). Instead, “[l]ay evidence can be competent and sufficient to establish a diagnosis of a condition when (1) a lay person is competent to identify the medical condition, (2) that layperson is reporting a contemporaneous medical diagnosis, or (3) lay testimony describing symptoms at the time supports a later diagnosis by a medical professional.” Id. at 1377; see Robinson v. Shinseki, 312 Fed. Appx. 336, 2009 WL 524737, at *3 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 3, 2009) (nonprecedential) (remanding for the Board to determine whether a low-back disability is the type of injury for which lay evidence is competent evidence).
back in service and to have experienced pain subsequently, was already established in the prior Board decision.”) with R. at 344 (1997 Board decision noting that evidence was “not sufficient to show that her back problems date back to service” and service medical records do not show “complaints referrable to the low back”).
The Court cannot substitute its own factual analysis of the lay evidence or that of the Secretary, see Resp. at 4-5 (“Appellant’s lay evidence is not material because a back disability is not a condition capable of lay diagnosis. Moreover, the new evidence here is not specific enough to establish continuity . . . .”), for a missing analysis by the Board whose obligation it is to decide these factual questions in the first instance. Accordingly, the Court will remand the Board’s denial of reopening for the Board to provide an adequate statement of reasons or bases for its conclusions in this regard.
On remand, the appellant is free to submit additional evidence and argument on the remanded matters, which the Board must consider when readjudicating his claim. See Kay v. Principi, 16 Vet.App. 529, 534 (2002); Kutscherousky v. West, 12 Vet.App. 369, 372-73 (1999) (per curiam order). The Board and the RO must provide expeditious treatment of this matter on remand. See 38 U.S.C. §§ 5109B, 7112.
is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this decision.

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