Source: https://www.morelaw.com/verdicts/case.asp?n=02-17-00353-CR%20&s=TX&d=125548
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 10:12:14+00:00

Document:
FWPD officers were dispatched to the residence.
people were going to try to kill him.
coagulated blood and the black substance.
force to his neck. The chief deputy medical examiner concluded that James died from strangulation.
witnessed Appellant sitting on the ground handcuffed, naked, and covered in blood.
James in the course of committing or attempting to commit burglary of a habitation.
2On cross-examination, the captain clarified that “when I said [Appellant] was under the influence of something, I didn’t just think possibly narcotics. I thought maybe something spiritually was going on with him too.” 3Appellant had been treated at JPS for a methamphetamine overdose approximately one month earlier.
[APPELLANT’S TRIAL COUNSEL]: Judge, and to further amplify what the State is presenting, in this case it’s probably going to become clear for the Court that their -- their belief of intoxication or relevancy of intoxication is going to be intertwined very closely with our presentation of -- of insanity which we intend to -- to introduce.
Ultimately, there’s going to be a question as to whether the conduct was -- was based upon insanity, true insanity or from the State’s perspective whether intoxication played a role. The ultimate question is going to be left with the Court, of course. But it’s going to be a theme throughout at least the guilt/innocence portion.
[APPELLANT’S TRIAL COUNSEL]: And your belief is that he ingested some kind of drug, some -- some kind of drug. Do we know what kind of drug he ingested?
[DETECTIVE]: Yeah, he said he ingested methamphetamines.
[APPELLANT’S TRIAL COUNSEL]: And he said that he finished smoking 25, 30 minutes?
[DETECTIVE]: He said 30 to 45 minutes prior.
[PROSECUTOR]: . . . We want -- I think it’s 8.04 related to voluntary intoxication and the fact that temporary insanity is not a defense if -- if the intoxication was voluntary.
[APPELLANT’S TRIAL COUNSEL]: And we would object to -- to that, Judge.
THE COURT: . . . I’ll give you a chance maybe tomorrow to argue it a little bit more before I make my decision . . . And I’m going to go ahead and put in the instruction the State requested as well in both.
[APPELLANT’S TRIAL COUNSEL]: The intoxication discussion?
THE COURT: Yes. And your objection is noted.
[APPELLANT’S TRIAL COUNSEL]: I’ll make another objection tomorrow.
[APPELLANT’S TRIAL COUNSEL]: Well, Judge, that leaves me time to talk about intoxication, make my -- make my objection known to the intoxication.
THE COURT: I can’t hear. Go ahead.
[APPELLANT’S TRIAL COUNSEL]: Regarding any drugs or drug use, the issue is, of course, as the Court is aware, the presence of a negative -- negative drug screen after the offense. And it’s the Defense’s position that because of that objected evidence, the State has presented no evidence impeaching the actual screen. All of the evidence presented by the State . . . , even the statements of my client, all of them are not disputing the underlying fact that there is a negative drug screen associated by [Appellant] at that time.
The offer -- the evidence offered has only -- has not been impeachment. There has not been a demonstrative showing by the State that the test itself, the negative screen itself was not valid. There was no indication that the machine wasn’t working properly. No evidence at all other than the -- the -- the -- the questions answered by the prosecutor -- asked by the prosecutor which are not evidence.
And this suggestion, as -- as I -- as I objected to under 403, the suggestion by the prosecutor that this -- the jury would have to ignore a negative drug screen without any supplemental affirmative evidence either denying or impeaching the validity of that drug screen is not evidence. And they are not entitled to a charge of intoxication based on the simple inference of their -- of their question.
The questionings -- the questions that they presented or the evidence that they presented, none of it includes any objective evidence which we can then counteract. All they’ve said was, well, ignore it. And they’re inviting the jury to ignore evidence on the very issue which we’re entitled to rely on.
So, by -- by the Court keeping the intoxication language in, it -- it -- and in light of my 403 objections throughout the course of the guilt/innocence portion, it effectively undermines the intoxication defense without them having to affirmatively prove beyond a reasonable doubt the -- a portion of the -- of the defense that I’m relying -- relying upon.
So we’re in a solid situation where they didn’t have any proof, they didn’t have any proof to undercut or undermine or discredit the results that were given. All -- all -- all it was -- was in -- innuendo and reasons why it could be not true, and that’s not evidence. And I don’t think they’ve met their burden of -- by beyond a reasonable doubt of disproving our -- our affirmative Defense.
[APPELLANT’S TRIAL COUNSEL]: Just briefly, Your Honor.
somebody would retain more methamphetamine in their system, certainly if they took all of the methamphetamine that they could into their lungs a short time before the offense.
The Defense would point the Court to the Routh case in which there is a discussion -- I believe it is Court of Appeals -- got a CR number, 11-15-0036, that’s the Chris Kyle case. And it’s similar situation where the Court found that there has to be some evidence, and in that case they actually had someone who was consuming marijuana with the individual on trial and convicted at that time. There’s got to be some connection other than just the allegation that maybe inherently the impartial or the independent drug test is -- is wrong.
But that’s -- that’s the Defense position, Your Honor. We would object to the language of intoxication in that charge.
The court overruled Appellant’s objection.
or defect such that he did not know that his conduct was wrong.
affirmative defense of insanity.” Ruffin v. State, 270 S.W.3d 586, 591–92 (Tex. Crim.
defect, did not know that his conduct was wrong.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 8.01(a).
30, 33 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
Dist.] 2000, pet. ref’d, untimely filed); see also Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 8.04(a); Torres v.
involuntary is a defense to criminal conduct. Torres, 585 S.W.2d at 749.
You are instructed that no act done in a state of insanity can be punished as an offense. It is an affirmative defense to prosecution of a criminal action that, at the time of the conduct charged against a person, as a result of severe mental disease or defect, he did not know that his conduct was wrong.
The severe mental disease or defect must have existed at the very time or times inquired about, that is, at the very time of the alleged commission of the offense.
The term “mental disease or defect” does not include an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct.
You are instructed that voluntary intoxication does not constitute a defense to the commission of a crime. You are further instructed that under our law neither voluntary intoxication nor temporary insanity of the mind caused by voluntary intoxication shall constitute any defense to the commission of a crime.
By the term “intoxication” as used herein is meant disturbance of mental or physical capacity resulting from the introduction of any substance into the body.
By the term “insanity” as used herein is meant that as a result of involuntary intoxication the defendant did not know that his conduct was wrong.
The burden of proof is upon the defendant to prove this affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence.
By the term “preponderance of the evidence” is meant the greater weight and degree of the credible evidence in this case.
establish the defense of insanity.
then stating that the term is “inherently ambiguous”).
charge, we conclude that this portion of the charge is ambiguous and thus in error.
Harkins v. State, 268 S.W.3d 740, 746 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2008, pet. ref’d).
case-specific. Gelinas v. State, 398 S.W.3d 703, 710 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Taylor v.
State, 332 S.W.3d 483, 489 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).
accused. Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 174.
in the abstract instruction is not reversible. Medina v. State, 7 S.W.3d 633, 640 (Tex.
234 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997); see also Arteaga v. State, 521 S.W.3d 329, 338–40 (Tex.
no act done in a state of insanity can be punished as an offense. It is an affirmative defense to prosecution of a criminal action that, at the time of the conduct charged against the person, as a result of severe mental disease or defect, he did not know that his conduct was wrong.
charge contained both the full definition of insanity and the ambiguous version.
then you will find the defendant “Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity,” and so state in your verdict.
Appellant’s mental state did not result from his consumption of drugs.
intoxication is not a defense to a crime.
There’s one other issue I want to talk with you about before I sit down. And you already know what it is. It’s the law of insanity. And the Court tells you in its instruction what insanity means, and you know what it means because we talked about it in jury selection. You’ve heard us talk about it during the course of this trial. And you know that insanity is when a person suffers from a severe mental disease or defect that causes [the person] not to know the difference between right or wrong.
But you also know from the Court’s Charge that voluntary intoxication is not a defense to crime. And the Court goes on to tell you that in order for someone to be temporarily insane, it can’t be from voluntary -- from voluntary intoxication. It has to be from involuntary intoxication.
Now let’s back that up a little bit and let’s just think about this. When we start talking about insanity, there’s two parts to it. You know that. One, that he was suffering from a mental disease, a severe mental disease and, two, that he didn’t know right from wrong.
intoxication somehow excused [the appellant’s] actions”).
such testimony if it fails to comport with the jurors’ concepts of sound logic.”).
harm. 4. Conclusion Regarding Harm Appellant claimed the defense of insanity and contended throughout trial that he was not intoxicated—be it voluntarily or involuntarily—at the time of the offense.
instruction explaining what type of intoxication could support the defense of insanity.
not accentuated by the argument of counsel or the evidence.
Outcome: Having overruled Appellant’s sole point, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

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