Source: http://masscases.com/cases/sjc/427/427mass1006.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 10:18:43+00:00

Document:
had been scalded by overheated water in the shower. [Note 1] The Commonwealth tried the case on the theory that the burns could not have been caused by the shower and were caused instead by the defendant's application of some unknown scalding agent to the child. A panel of the Appeals Court, with one Justice dissenting, reversed the order that entered a judgment of acquittal. Commonwealth v. Roman, 43 Mass. App. Ct. 733 (1997). We allowed the defendant's application for further appellate review. We now affirm the defendant's conviction.
We examine the sufficiency of the Commonwealth's evidence under the any rational jury standard set forth in Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671 , 677 (1979), with proper attention to the principle that circumstantial evidence can establish guilt. Commonwealth v. Donovan, 395 Mass. 20 , 25 (1985). We keep in mind that "[a]n inference drawn from circumstantial evidence 'need only be reasonable and possible; it need not be necessary or inescapable,'" Commonwealth v. Merola, 405 Mass. 529 ,533 (1989), quoting Commonwealth v. Beckett, 373 Mass. 329 , 341 (1977), and that "[w]hether an inference is warranted or is impermissibly remote must be determined, not by hard and fast rules of law, but by experience and common sense." Commonwealth v. Drew, 4 Mass. App. Ct. 30 , 32 (1976). See United States v. Smith, 680 F.2d 255, 260 (1st Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1110 (1983) ("Neither juries nor judges are required to divorce themselves of common sense, but rather should apply to facts which they find proven such reasonable inferences as are justified in the light of their experience as to the natural inclinations of human beings").
The Commonwealth was not required to prove the particular scalding agent used by the defendant. Commonwealth v. Roman, supra at 736, and cases cited. As the Appeals Court noted: "The case . . . stands in the not particularly unfamiliar posture of a child left in the custody of an identified adult, who suffers injuries of a type that are inconsistent with the explanation given by the custodian and not attributable in the circumstances to ordinary accidental causes." Id. at 735. We agree that the case is a close one. We conclude, however, that the Commonwealth's proof was sufficient to permit the jury, without engaging in conjecture or excessive inference drawing, to place criminal responsibility on the defendant on the charge that he did "assault and beat [the child] by means of a dangerous weapon, namely an unknown hot liquid or substance."
The judge's order allowing the postverdict motion for a required finding of not guilty is reversed. The case is remanded to the Superior Court for sentencing on the jury verdicts.
Deborah Ahlstrom, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.
[Note 1] The defendant was also convicted by the jury of assault and battery for injuries inflicted when he slapped the child shortly before the child was burned. Sentencing was deferred on this conviction pending the outcome of the Commonwealth's appeal on the dangerous weapon charge. At the close of the Commonwealth's evidence, the judge allowed the defendant's motion for a required finding of not guilty of a third indictment charging mayhem.
[Note 2] The child had a first degree burn on his right shoulder and second degree burns on his left shoulder and right buttock.
[Note 3] Contrary to what is said in the Appeals Court opinion, the defendant did not testify, but his version of the incident was disclosed to the jury in the Commonwealth's case through the testimony of the police officer who interviewed him. The defendant told the officer that he had left the child alone in the shower with the water on "lukewarm," and that "for some reason the water in the bathtub goes from lukewarm to extremely hot by itself, that's how the baby got burnt."

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.