Source: http://masscases.com/cases/distapp/2018/2018massappdiv42.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 15:06:17+00:00

Document:
Christopher J. Kirrane for the plaintiff.
WELCH, J. From a jury-waived summary process trial, both parties appeal. The plaintiff, Cheryl T. Duff ("Landlord"), is the owner of a property located at 47 Old Fields Road in Sandwich. The defendants, Aaron and Meghan Pouliot ("Tenants"), have been tenants since 2011 and, at the time of the hearing, were tenants at will. On June 8, 2016, Landlord filed a summary process summons and complaint upon Tenants seeking possession of the property and $2,900.00 in back rent. Answering the complaint, the Tenants brought counterclaims for retaliation, breach of implied warranty of habitability, security deposit violations, interference with utilities and use of home, violation of G.L. c. 93A, and rights under the "repair and deduct" statute, G.L. c. 111, § 127L. The court found for Landlord on the claims of retaliation, implied warranty of habitability, and G.L. c. 93A and granted possession to Landlord. The Court found for Tenants on the claims of violation of the security deposit law and breach of quiet enjoyment. As will be set forth more fully herein, we reverse, in part, the judgment of the court. The following is a summary of the history of the case with certain facts reserved for discussion in each claim of error.
of May through August, the month of the trial, Tenants did not pay the rent, alleging the nonpayment was an act of withholding rent due to the condition of the premises.
1. The first claim of error by Tenants is with the judge not allowing Tenants the option to maintain possession of the premises as a result of the court having found a breach of quiet enjoyment. As Landlord also appeals the findings of the court on the issue of a breach of quiet enjoyment, we will address both claims of error with the first being that of Landlord claiming the judge's rulings were clearly erroneous. On appeal, we are bound by a judge's findings of fact that are supported by the evidence, including all inferences that may reasonably be drawn from the evidence. Twin Fires Inv., LLC v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 445 Mass. 411, 420 (2005). See also Commonwealth v. Hawkesworth, 405 Mass. 664, 670 (1989) ("[T]he standard for appellate review of facts in both civil and criminal cases is identical . . . ."). The judge's findings will be set aside only if clearly erroneous. Mass. R. Civ. P. 52(c). See New England Canteen Serv., Inc. v. Ashley, 372 Mass. 671, 675 (1977). "A finding is 'clearly erroneous' when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." Commonwealth v. Wolcott, 77 Mass. App. Ct. 457, 471 n.12 (2010), quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948). The clearly erroneous standard "does not protect findings of fact or conclusions based on incorrect legal standards." Kendall v. Selvaggio, 413 Mass. 619, 621 (1992).
strict liability is not a recognized theory for a breach of quiet enjoyment, there was insufficient evidence for a finding that Landlord committed the breach. As such, the finding regarding Landlord having breached the quiet enjoyment of Tenants must be reversed. Given that result, we need not address Tenants' claim that the court erred in failing to grant them possession after a finding in their favor for breach of quiet enjoyment. See Lawrence v. Osuagwu, 57 Mass. App. Ct. 60, 64 (2003).
2. The next area of alleged error, as advanced by Tenants, relates to a finding for Landlord on the issue of breach of the implied warranty of habitability. A breach of warranty of habitability is defined as "defects in facilities vital to the use of the premises for residential purposes." Berman & Sons, Inc. v. Jefferson, 379 Mass. 196, 202 (1979), quoting Boston Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184, 199 (1973). Not every violation of the Sanitary Code results in a breach of warranty. Boston. Hous. Auth., supra at 200 n.16. The existence of a material breach is a question of fact to be determined by the circumstances of each case. Id. at 200. "Factors (not necessarily all inclusive) aiding the court's determination of the materiality of an alleged breach of the implied warranty of habitability include: (a) the seriousness of the claimed defects and their effect on the dwelling's habitability; (b) the length of time the defects persist; (c) whether the landlord or his agent received written or oral notice of the defects; (d) the possibility that the residence could be made habitable within a reasonable time; and (e) whether the defects resulted from abnormal conduct or use by the tenant." Id. at 200-201. As previously stated, findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.
It was agreed by the parties that Tenants would be responsible for the maintenance of the premises. During the course of the tenancy, there were no complaints made to the town's board of health. It was only after a notice to quit was filed that Tenants raised issues of habitability to the town of Sandwich and withheld rent. [Note 5] Among other minor violations, tree limbs needing pruning, screen doors in need of repair, and the necessity of cleaning the wood stove do not, per se, constitute a violation of the warranty of habitability, and the court was well within its discretion in so finding. Furthermore, as the court found, the replacement of the stove did not violate the Sanitary Code, 105 Code Mass. Regs. § 410.100, as there was no intentional refusal or unwillingness to provide a stove once it was learned it had stopped working.
found that the Tenants were not entitled to multiple damages and that the security deposit violation was not a violation of G.L. c. 93A.
Tenants are correct, however, that in finding in their favor on the security deposit counterclaim and awarding $1,400.00, plus interest, the court erred in entering judgment for possession for Landlord. A violation of the security deposit statute may be asserted as a defense to a summary process action for possession. See Meikle v. Nurse, 474 Mass. 207, 214 (2016). In Meikle, the Court stated, "Where a tenant prevails on a defense or counterclaim and is awarded damages in an amount less than the amount owed to the landlord, the statute [G.L. c. 239, § 8A] provides that 'no judgment shall enter until after the expiration of the time for such payment and the tenant has failed to make such payment.'" Id., quoting G.L. c. 239, § 8A.
In summation, the portions of the judgment finding a breach of quiet enjoyment against Landlord and possession to Landlord are reversed, and the matter is returned to the trial court for entry of an order providing notice to Tenants of the right to retain possession in compliance with G.L. c. 239, § 8A.
[Note 2] The Honorable Kathryn E. Hand recused herself from this appeal, and did not participate in its hearing, review, or decision.
Access to Lawrence Pond and Lakefield Farms Association Facilities."
[Note 4] The following are the facts regarding the issue of quiet enjoyment. In one unobjected-to, and hence admitted, piece of testimony, Meghan Pouliot testified, "Yeah, so Lakefield Farms has a pond and you can go. It has a playground, a pond, a clubhouse and we have never been able to get access to it because it has never been paid up." Subsequent to this admitted testimony, Tenant was asked about photographs of documents regarding payment from Landlord to the recreational facility, which drew an objection. The objection was sustained, not allowing the substance of the records to be admitted in evidence. Tenant then testified, without objection, that "I always asked for a pass and was denied a pass [to the recreational facility]." Landlord testified that all dues were paid and there was nothing preventing Tenants from accessing the facilities.
[Note 5] Due to an inadequate foundation, the letter from the board of health for the town of Sandwich was properly not admitted in evidence for the substance of any violations and was agreed to by the parties that its evidentiary value was limited to the fact of its issuance.
[Note 6] We note that both violations are made unfair and deceptive acts under 940 Code Mass. Regs. § 3.17(4), and so may result in treble damages upon a finding of violation of G.L. c. 93A. The court did not find a G.L. c. 93A violation, however, and Tenants have not appealed that finding.
[Note 7] See Neihaus v. Maxwell, 54 Mass. App. Ct. 558, 562 (2001) (landlord's obligation to return tenant's security deposit within thirty days of termination of tenancy under G.L. c. 186, § 15B(6)(e) arises when tenant relinquishes possession).

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