Source: https://openjurist.org/10/f1d/232
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 08:10:14+00:00

Document:
This was the very point decided in McClure v. John.qon, supra. It was there held that such an action could not be maintained because the money due was not assets belonging to the estate. And so, in the case before us, the action cannot prevail because the administrator has no title to the contracts sued on, either by operation of law or by express terms of the instruments. If he had the legal title to the chose in action, and if its proceeds, when collected, were assets belonging to the estate, he could maintain a suit for the money in whosesoever hands found. Demurrer to answer overruled. MCCRARY, C. J., concurs.
WALLER v. NORTHERN ASSURANCE Co.
1, INSURANCE POLICy-PROVISIONS BINDING ON INSURED-WAIVER NOT PRESUMED.
Where the terms of a policy of fire insurance provide that .. if the interest of the assured in the property be any other than the entire, unconditional, and sple ownership of the property for the uses and benefit of the assured, or if the building stands on leased ground, it must be so represented to these companies and so expressed in the written part of this policy; otherwise the policy will be void." It is the duty of the party applying for insurance to disclose the nature of his interest in the property to be insured, and from the mere fact that the company's al;ent made no inquiry concerning the extent of applicant's interest, a waiver of the provision on the part of the company cannot be presumed.
2. SAME-ExFonCEMENT OF PnovISION. Such provisions must be upheld and enforced, not simply on the ground that .t is a warranty to be enforced independently of their materiality, but upon the ground that it calls for the disclosure of material facts.
If the interest of the assured in the property be any other than the entire. 'lnconditionaI, and sole ownership of the property for the use and benefit of the assured, or if the building stands on leased ground, it must be so repr&sented to these companies, and so expressed in the written part of this policy; otherwise the policy will be void."
"It'may not be necessary that the person requiring insurance should state every encumbrance upon his property which it might require of him to state if it was offered for sale, but fair dealing requires that he should state everything which might influence, and probably would influence, tho mind of the underwriter in forming or declining the contract. "A building held under a lease for years, about to expire, might be generally spoken of as the building of the tenant; but no underwriter would be Willing to insure it as if it was his, and an ofTer for insurallce stating it to belong to him would be a gross imposition. .. Generally speaking, insurances against fire are made in the confidence that the assured will use all precautions to avoid the calamity insured against which would be suggested by his interest. The extent of his interest must always influence the underwriter in taking or rejecting the risk; and in estimating the premium, so far as it may influence him in these respects, it ought to be communicated to him."
ing: Ins. 00. v. Lawrence, 10 Pet. 507; Marshall, Fire Ins. 789; Jenkins v. Ins. Co. 7 Gray, 370; May, Ins. §§ 272, 287, 289, 291; Rohrbach v. Ins. Co. 62 N. Y. 47. But it is insisted that compliance with this provision of the policy was waived by the defendant company, because ite agent made no inquiry concerning the extent of plaintiff's interest, and plaintiff made no statement upon the subject. The evidence does not support this position. The contract was that if the interest of the assured was any other than the entire, unconditional, and sole ownership, then he was to represent the facts to the company,-not that he was to disclose them truthfully if requested, or that he would make trne and full answers to questilOns UpOl.. the subject. The duty of disclosing his interest, the same being less than the entire ownership, was plainly devolved upon the plaintiff, and for good reasori, since he knew and the agent of thE;l company did not know the facts. In other words, under the contract the defendant was authorized to assume that the property was owned absolutely by the applicant for insurance, unless the contrary was represented by him, and more especially in a case where the applicant held what appeared to be an absolute title. A waiver of this condition of this policy cannot, therefore, be presumed from the mere fact that the agent of the defendant made no inquiry upon this subject. The case might have been different if the plaintiff had been called upon to sign an application, and to answer written or printed questions touching his interest, and had failed to do so. In such a case the issuing of the policy, notwithstanding a failure to answer some of the questions, might well be held a waiver of such answers. Hall v. Ina. Co. 6 Gray, 186; Liberty Hall Asstn v. Ins. Co. 7 Gray, 265. And it may also be true that where the policy requires an application, and provides that it shall contain a full and true exposition of all the facts in regard to the condition, situation, value, and risk of the property insured, a company insuring without such application may be held to waive the representations required to be embraced therein. Com. v. Ins. Co. 112 Mass. 136. These authorities are not in point, for the reason that in the present case no written application was provided for in the policy, and, as already stated, the duty of divulging the fact that he was not the full owner of the property was devolved upon the plaintiff. Besides, it would be an unwarranted extension of the doctrine of estoppel hold that a party may waive that, the existence of which he does not know,and is not in duty bound to ascertain. .
The proof shows, and the fact is found by the jury, that the nature of the -interest of plaintiff was not known to defendant prior to the fire. It was a secret interest, and there is nothing in the evidence tending to show that the knowledge on the part of defendant of the nature of plaintiff's interest ought to be inferred. May, Ins. § 506; Finley v. Ins. Go. 30 Pa. St. 311; Fal'ten v. Ins. Go. 9 Cush. 490; Allen v. Ins. Go. 12 Cush. 366. Motion for new trial overruled. LOVE, D. J'J concurs.
(fJ'trcuit UOU1't, N. D. Illinois.
BANKS- VOLUN'l'ARY LIQUIDATION-CREDITOR'S BILL-VEXATIOUS LITlGATION-PLEA IN ABATK\lENT.
A creditor's bill was filed against a national bank, before the passage of the act of congress of June 30, 1876, (19 St. at Large, 63,) and a receiver was appointed, who took possession of the property of the bank. An amended bill was filed in the cause, aner the passage of that act, to secure the benefits of the act, to which all the stockholders were made parties. Subsequently the comptroller of the currency appointed a receiver to wind up the affairs of the bank, and this suit was brought by him against one of the stockholders. Held, on demurrer to a plea in abatement, which set forth these facts, that the defendant is entitled to judgment on the ground that, as the stockholder's liability can be completely enforced in the suit in equity, the general rule applies that a debtor shall not be vexed by two suits in the same jurisdiction for the same causc of action. 2.
SA\fE-AUTHORITY OF COMP1oROLI,ER OF CURRENCY-VOLUNTARY LIQUIDATION -ltECEIVERS.
Wh'ether the comptroller of the currency is authorized to appoint a receiver for a national bank, which is in voluntary liquidation, after a court of compotent jurisdiction has appointed a receiver and instituted proceedings under a creditor's bill to enforce the liability of the stockholders, qur.ere.

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