Source: http://masscases.com/cases/sjc/373/373mass778.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 02:01:28+00:00

Document:
JOSEPH D. ROSENBLOOM, administrator, vs. FRANCES KOKOFSKY & others.
CIVIL ACTION commenced in the Probate Court for the county of Hampden on October 29, 1975.
The case was heard by Placzek, J.
Edward V. Leja for Jane A. Ely.
James Moriarty, Jr., for Frances Kokofsky & another.
QUIRICO, J. This is an appeal from a Probate Court judgment determining the rights of the beneficiaries under the will of Warren T. Elliot (testator). The appeal challenges the judge's conclusion that by virtue of G. L. c. 191, Section 2, a legacy or devise to the spouse of a necessary subscribing witness is void. We granted direct appellate review. G. L. c. 211A, Section 10 (A).
At common law, a person was incompetent to serve as a subscribing witness to a will under which he benefited as a devisee or legatee. 2 W. Page, Wills Section 19.76 (Bowe-Parker rev. 1960). A will witnessed by an interested party was therefore void unless there were a sufficient number of other competent witnesses to satisfy the requirements for execution. Id. Most States have altered this rule, substituting provisions which allow a devisee or legatee to serve as a subscribing witness, but restrict his right to benefit from the will. Id.
N.Y. Decedent Estate Law Section 27 (McKinney). Other States extend the application of this rule to bequests or devises to the spouse of a witness, so that such gifts are void so far as they exceed what would have been the spouse's intestate share. E.g., Davis v. Davis, 208 S.C. 182 (1946) (S.C. Code Section 19-260, Estate of Reichenberger, 272 Wis. 176 (1956) (Wis. Stat. Ann. Section 853.07  [West]).
Massachusetts is one of a small number of other States, see, e.g., N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. Section 551:3, which have chosen a third, more exclusive, rule. General Laws c. 191, Section 2, provides that "a beneficial devise or legacy to a subscribing witness or to the husband or wife of such witness shall be void unless there are three other subscribing witnesses to the will who are not similarly benefited thereunder." [Note 4] Mrs. Ely urges us to reject the construction of this provision which we adopted in Powers v. Codwise, 172 Mass. 425 , 426 (1899) -- that a bequest or devise to a subscribing witness or spouse of such a witness is entirely void -- and interpret the statute so as to bring the Massachusetts rule in line with the more liberal view held in many other jurisdictions. [Note 5] She contends that the provision as applied in the Powers case is inequitable because it is based on an outmoded concept of the legal identity of spouses, and that it operates to defeat the legitimate intentions of the testator.
Baker Transp., Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 371 Mass. 872 , 875-877 (1977). If the language of a provision is unclear, a court may look to outside sources for assistance in determining the correct construction. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Commissioner of Corps. & Taxation, 363 Mass. 685 , 690 (1973). Where, however, no such ambiguity exists, these outside aides are unavailable, id.; Rice v. Rice, 372 Mass. 398 , 400-401 (1977); Chouinard, petitioner, 358 Mass. 780 , 782 (1971), and the enactment must be interpreted according to the "usual and natural meaning" of its language. Commonwealth v. Gove, 366 Mass. 351 , 354 (1974). We cannot interpret a statute so as to avoid injustice or hardship if its language is clear and unambiguous and requires a different construction. Milton v. Metropolitan Dist. Comm'n, 342 Mass. 222 , 227 (1961).
We believe that the language of G. L. c. 191, Section 2, is clear and unambiguous. It states with no uncertainty that a legacy or devise to a subscribing witness or to the spouse of such a witness is entirely void. The plain meaning of the language of the statute must be given its full effect, and the testamentary gifts to the appellant here were thus properly declared void.
necessary for the proper execution of a will, but the language of the section that voids a legacy or devise to such witness or his spouse was left intact. See St. 1976, c. 515, Section 5. [Note 7] We presume from this action that the Legislature adopted the interpretation announced in the Powers case, see Bursey's Case, 325 Mass. 702 , 706 (1950); Dolan v. Commonwealth, 304 Mass. 325 , 332-333 (1939), and we reject the request to change it.
are not persuasive. The Massachusetts statute materially differs from these, and it mandates a different result. The judgment of the Probate Court was correct under our statute.
[Note 1] Article Second of the will left all the testator's personal property to his three daughters, article Third left them the proceeds from the sale of all his real property, and article Fourth, the residuary clause, gave them equal shares in the residue.
[Note 2] The testator had nominated Robert M. Raymond as executor in his will. However, because Raymond declined the trust in open court, the Probate Court instead appointed Mr. Rosenbloom as administrator.
[Note 3] At oral argument, the attorney for Mrs. Ely attempted to raise a constitutional challenge to the statute. Because this issue was neither presented to the Probate Court nor argued in the briefs, we do not reach it. See Mass. R. A. P. 16 (a) (4), as amended, 367 Mass. 919 , 921 (1975); Board of Appeals of Maynard v. Housing Appeals Comm., 370 Mass. 64 , 68 (1976).
[Note 4] Effective January 2, 1978, the requirement of Section 2 will change from three to two witnesses. St. 1976, c. 515, Section 5, as amended by St. 1977, c. 76, Section 2. In all other respects the provision remains the same.
[Note 5] See supra at 779-780.
[Note 6] This provision, substantially similar to G. L. c. 191, Section 2, provided: "A beneficial devise or legacy made in a will to a person who is a subscribing witness thereto, or to the husband or wife of such a person, shall be void unless there are three other competent subscribing witnesses to such will."
[Note 7] See note 4 supra.
[Note 8] The District of Columbia statute construed in Manoukian v. Tomasian, 237 F.2d 211 (D.C. Cir. 1956), D.C. Code Section 19-104, was a law of the district because it was a British statute enforced in Maryland prior to the Declaration of Independence. Manoukian, supra at 214-215. As such, the court held that it had the effect of judicial precedent rather than legislative enactment. Id. at 215.

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