Source: https://www.scribd.com/document/59304477/Kernal-Records-v-Mosley-Plaint-Res-to-Def-MSJ
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 19:21:10+00:00

Document:
tries to hide behind registration requirements. forth more fully below. I.
argument fails, because an identical argument has been addressed and squarely rejected by the leading case in this area. Moberg v. 33T LLC, 666 F. Supp. 2d 415 (D. Del. 2009) (rejecting simultaneous publication theory as contrary to the Berne Convention and U.S. copyright law). In that case, the defendants made an unsuccessful attempt to extend the pre-suit registration requirement to foreign works first published on a non-U.S. website. The court rejected the position Mosley is now taking. It refused to find that posting a work on the internet means simultaneous publication in every country in which the work is accessible, thus rendering the work a United States work subject to 411. Id. at 424. The Moberg court also contemplated a situation where first publication occurred prior to a work appearing on the internet. If these [works] had been published prior to the posting on the website, and that publication did not occur in the United States, the Courts analysis would be moot, because it could not be disputed that the [works] are not United States works, and therefore not subject to the registration requirements of the Copyright Act. Id. at 422 n.12. Since Gallefoss actually published AJE in a disk magazine in Australia several months prior to the online appearance of his AJE, clearly it is not a U.S. work. Mosley has presented no evidence that the first publication of AJE was by posting on the internet. 1. Acid Jazzed Evening was not first published on the internet.
21 of the Gallefoss Deposition for the proposition that Gallefoss chose the Internet as the means to first publish his work. Again, there is nothing on pages 20-21 of the Gallefoss deposition, or anywhere else in the transcript that Gallefosss work was first published on the internet. To the contrary, Gallefoss said in his deposition that the first publication was on a disk magazine - he never said that first publication was online. Ex. A at 43:19-43:24. Additionally, Gallefoss stated that back in 2002 he was concerned that the SID file size should be kept small so that it could fit on the disk magazine. Ex. A at 101:4-101:12. It would be nonsensical for Gallefoss to think about keeping his file size small if the SIDs intended publication source were the internet. This is further evidence, ignored by Mosley here but trumpeted by the other defendants in their motions, that Gallefoss first published in physical form on a computer disk called Vandalism News, not on the internet. Gallefoss Decl., DE 143-4, 23-25. The disk is in Commodore 64 format and thus viewable only on a C64 computer or an emulator. Ex. A at 44:12-44:21. Mosley does not provide any record evidence to show that the contents of the disk consisting of Vandalism News were simultaneously made available online. . Thus, Mosleys argument about internet first publication necessarily fails due to lack of evidence. 2. AJE is not a U.S. Work.
At all relevant times including when he created AJE, Gallefoss has resided in Norway. Gallefoss Dep. at 6:5-9:22, Ex. A. AJE was first published on a disk magazine in Australia. Gallefoss Decl., DE 143-4, 23. The only connection to the United States is the fact that Mosley, a U.S. resident, stole AJE in Miami, Florida. Even if the first publication of AJE were online, it is not a U.S. Work subject to registration requirements. First, recent case law has conclusively established that posting of a work on the internet in another part of the world does not make such a work a U.S. work. Id. Second, the term of protection in Australia at the time of AJEs first publication was not the same or longer than the term provided in the United States, a necessary requirement for qualifying a work as a U.S. work under 17 U.S.C. 101. A. Posting on the internet does not make AJE a U.S. Work.
address whether a foreign work posted on the internet is subject to U.S. registration held that foreign works are not subject to U.S. registration requirements simply because they are posted on the internet. Moberg v. 33T LLC, 666 F. Supp. 2d 415, 423 (D. Del. 2009). Mosley recognizes that Moberg held that the display of photographs on a German internet site did not amount to simultaneous publication that would render the work a United States work. DE 137 at 11. The only argument that Mosley makes is: The Moberg court is simply wrong in this regard. Id. at 11. As discussed below Moberg is a thorough treatment of the issues and exactly right. (i) Moberg correctly rejects the idea of simultaneous U.S. publication for foreign works placed on the internet.
does not alter the United States obligations under the Berne Convention. The Berne Convention abolished formalities for copyright protection and requiring registration for any work published on the internet would be a back door to reestablishing those formalities. Second, the law of this Circuit is that registration must be in hand before a lawsuit can be filed. See M.G.B. Homes v. Ameron Homes, 903 F.2d 1486 (11th Cir. 1990). Thus, a potential plaintiff must wait until the certificate is issued by the Copyright Office before filing suit, even though the statute of limitations is running. Thus, a foreign plaintiff, who would have no reason to register his work in the United States as a matter of course, would lose his remedies while the U.S. Copyright Office passed judgment on his claim. (ii) Kernels position is on all fours with Moberg.
taken an official position on the matter.9 It is far from clear that posting online constitutes publication for purposes of copyright law and after Moberg it is clear that even if it was, posting in one country would not make it simultaneous publication in the U.S. B. Australian term of protection shorter than U.S. term.
the term in the United States.12 In 2002 when AJE was first published Australia clearly did not offer a term of protection that was the same as or longer than the term provided in the United States. AJE does not qualify as a U.S. Work as defined in 17 U.S.C. 101 category (B) because Australia, while it is a treaty party, is not a treaty party that granted a term of copyright protection that is the same or longer than the term provided by the U.S. Nor does category (C) apply, because Australia is a treaty party.13 3. Courts do not lightly impose the burdens of registration on foreign works.
defendants claims of no material dispute of fact suspicious. Gallefosss arrangement of AJE is a derivative work entitled to copyright protection under 17 U.S.C. 103.15 It is also undisputed AJE is an original arrangement. A derivative work within the meaning of the Copyright Act consists of a contribution of original material to a preexisting work so as to recast, transform or adapt the pre-existing work, and the variation from the original must be sufficient to render the derivative work distinguishable from its prior work in any meaningful manner. 1 Melville B. and David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright, 3.03[A]; see also Schrock v. Learning Curve Intl, Inc., 586 F.3d 513, 520-21 (7th Cir. 2009); Woods v. Bourne Co., 60 F.3d 978, 990 (2d Cir. 1995). Gallefosss arrangement of AJE meets and exceeds this low standard. 1. Gallefosss use of AJE is lawful.
permission before releasing the arrangement. Id (emphasis added).
insofar as it provided for the transfer of an exclusive copyright. DE 137 at 16. Maxwell involved a baseball team for whose promotion a song had been written. The composer of the song brought a claim against the team, when the team failed to honor an oral agreement to compensate the composer and to give him credit at performances of the song at games. The court refused to allow the composer to allege infringement in a federal copyright since he had given the team a non-exclusive license to play the song at its games. Nowhere in that case was there an allegation of a violation of a copyright in a derivative work. Mosleys reliance on the concept of a nonexclusive license is illogical. It is simply not applicable in the context of an author of a derivative work suing for infringement of its rights by a third party. Mosley next cites Micro Star v. Formgen, Inc., 154 F.3d 1107, 1113 (9th Cir. 1998) for the proposition that Section 204 of the Copyright Act requires the transfer of the exclusive rights granted to copyright owners (including the right to prepare derivative works) to be in writing. DE 137 at 16. Nowhere in the case does it state that the maker of a derivative work may not sue the infringer of his or her work, simply because the maker of the derivative work holds a nonexclusive license. 3. Third parties cannot dispute whether or not valid permission was given, when licensor and licensee agree.
In this case, Gallefoss and Suni agree that Suni gave Gallefoss permission to create AJE and Mosley the infringer - tries to dispute that fact. The decision of the Finnish Court, which defendants rely on in other places, DE 135-7 at 10, conclusively established that Suni gave permission to Gallefoss to create his own version of AJE, which is a derivative work. It is contrary to established doctrine in this area for Mosley to dispute this fact. Courts have held that in situations in which the copyright holder appears to have no dispute with its licensee on [the issue of transfer], it would be anomalous to permit a third party infringer to invoke this provision against the licensee. Eden Toys, Inc. v. Florelee Undergarment Co., Inc., 697 F.2d 27, 36 (2d Cir. 1982); accord Imperial Residential Design, Inc. v. Palms Dev. Group, Inc., 70 F.3d 96, 99 (11th Cir. 1995) (adopting the rule of Eden Toys); Kenbrooke, 690 F. Supp. at 301 (applying the rule of Eden Toys); 3 Nimmer, 10.03[A] at 10-38.
The statute of limitations has run on Sunis ability to challenge Gallefosss ownership of Gallefosss arrangement and sound recording.
permission to Gallefoss in Finland. DE 135-7 at 10. Gallefoss first found out about Defendants infringement after July 31, 2006 in an e-mail from Suni that stated that the intro to AJE was stolen by defendants for their song Do It. Gallefoss Decl., 143-4 28 & Ex. A In that e-mail Suni informs Gallefoss that defendants Do It was sampled from the SID version you [Gallefoss] made Id. [emphasis added]. Suni subsequently encouraged Gallefoss to file suit for the infringement of Gallefosss rights in his version of AJE. Gallefoss Decl., 143-4 29 & Ex. 29 and a case was subsequently brought in Finland. DE 135-7 at 10. If this is not an objection to Defendants illegal use of AJE, it is hard to imagine what else is. There is no record evidence that Gallefoss gave anyone permission to infringe his rights in his version of AJE. Even though he was aware that his work was available on the online High Voltage SID collection, it does not mean that he gave his permission to defendants to infringe his rights.
The cases cited by Mosley are easily distinguished. Failure to object to unknown parties downloading his AJE from a website does not satisfy the requirements of the legal theory on which Mosley seeks to proceed. The legal requirement is to show that Gallefoss knew of Mosleys infringement and permitted Mosley to carry on without objection. Clearly as soon as Gallefoss found out he objected by filing a lawsuit as quickly as he could have. Similarly, two other cases cited in support of its argument to an implied license, Field v. Google, Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106 (D. Nev. 2006) and Parker v. Yahoo!, Inc., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d 1779, 2008 WL 4410095 (E.D.Pa. 2008) involved specific knowledge of the alleged infringers activities and a failure by the owner to object to continued infringements. DE 137 at 19. Both of these cases involved claims by authors of certain works against internet search engines. Both cases involved claims that the popular search engines Google and Yahoo respectively violated copyright law when they permitted the works to be displayed on the search engines. Field v.

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