Source: https://www.lawnet.gov.lk/1977/12/31/the-king-v-albert-appuhamy/
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 15:09:17+00:00

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HOWARD C J.—The King v. Albert Appuhamy.
1940Present; Howard CJT., Keuneman and Cannon JJ.
THE KING v. ALBERT APPUHAMY.
Misdirection of lain—Defence not set up by prisoner or his Counsel—Wheredefence arises on evidence—Duty of Judge.
Failure on the part of a prisoner or his Counsel to take up a certainline of defence does not relieve a Judge of the responsibility of putting tothe jury such defence if it arises on the evidence.
P. A. Senaratne, for the accused, applicant.—The accused had no legalaid in fhe drafting of the petition which is very meagre. There are twopoints of law arising in this case. On the evidence the Proctor whodefended the accused argued that the accused stabbed the deceased inthe course of a sudden fight and the learned Judge in his summing up tothe jury put in addition the defence of grave and sudden provocation.But the evidence given by the accused coupled with his statutory state-ment disclosed that he had acted in self-defence though he had exceededthat right. This defence was not put to the jury. It is the duty of theJudge to put to the jury every defence that arises out of the evidencealthough it has not been put forward by the accused. See The King v.Hopper1 and R. v. Dinnicks. The learned Judge in his summing, drewthe attention of the jury to the accused coming to the scene of themurder with his clasp-knife open, but failed to mention that in his evidencehe said that he had it open for the purpose of peeling an arecanut. Thisevidence negatives the intention that the accused came prepared to stab thedeceased.
Nihal Gunesekera, C.C., for the Crown.—Whatever be the defenceput forward by Counsel, it is for the Judge to put such questions tothe jury as appear to him properly to arise on the evidence (R. v. WilliamHopper’.) But a Judge is not bound in law to put a particular defenceto the jury if that defence has not been made out and the facts do notamount in law to proof of the defence (R..v. James Honeyands ‘).
The burden of proving that he acted in the exercise of the right ofprivate defence lies on the accused (Evidence Ordinance, section 105).
On the evidence of the accused the right of private defence did not arisein law (Penal Code, section 95).
■ (1915) 2 K. B. 431.3 11 Cr. App. R. 136.
– (1909) 3 Cr. App. R. 77.J 10 Cr. App. R. 60.
HOWARD C.J.—The King v. Albert Appuhair.y.
(b) That there was misdirection on the facts inasmuch as the learnedJudge omitted in his charge to refer to that part of the evidenceof the appellant in which the latter stated that he was using hisknife in the boutique to cut an arecanut. It was submittedthat this evidence negatived the suggestion that he came to theboutique armed with an open knife with which he intended tostab the deceased.
We are of opinion that there is no substance in the second ground.The evidence of the appellant was before the jury and there is no reasonfor suggesting that his reference to the use of the knife to cut the arecanutwas not present to their minds when they reached their verdict. Thematter was not of such transcending importance as to make it incumbenton the Judge to mention it in his summing up.
It has been held in a number of cases that failure on the part of aprisoner or his Counsel to take up a certain line of defence at his trialdoes not relieve a Judge of the responsibility of putting to the jury suchdefence if it arises on the evidence. Thus in The King v. Hopper&apos;, afterthe jury had returned a verdict of murder, on appeal it was held thatthere was evidence of such provocation as would, if the jury accepted it,justify them in finding a verdict of manslaughter, that the Judge oughtto have left to the Jury the question whether the crime was manslaughteronly, and that as he had omitted to do so, the Court, acting under section5 (2) of the Criminal Appeal Act, 1907, would enter a verdict of man-slaughter which the jury might have found if they had been directedupon the point. In this case the defence put forward at the trial byCounsel for the accused was that the killing was accidental. The King v.Hopper (supra) was considered in R. v. Thoma$ Clinton &apos;, where it was heldthat on an indictment for murder if defendant’s Counsel does not suggesta possible verdict of manslaughter but only acquittal on the ground ofaccident, the Judge is not bound to suggest that verdict. In that caseit was held that on the facts and having regard to the conduct of the casethe course adopted was the most favourable to the appellant. On the&apos; (1915) 2 K. B. 431.* 13 Or. App. Rep. 215.
HOWARD C.J.—The King v. Albert Appuhamy.
In R. v. Howard Ball", the same question was again considered. Inhis judgment Hewart L.C.J. stated that there were materials on whichthe jury, if they accepted certain evidence and took a certain view, mighthave reduced their verdict to one of manslaughter. In these circum-stances the question should not have been withdrawn from the jury.
“ He (Lord Reading in Rex. v. Hopper) then stated the principle asfollows : —‘ We do not assent to the suggestion that as the. defencethroughout the trial was accident, the Judge was justified in not puttingthe question as to manslaughter. Whatever the line of defenceadopted by Counsel at the trial of a prisoner, we are of opinion that itis for the Judge to put such questions as appear to him properly to ariseupon the evidence even although Counsel may not have raised suchquestion himself ’.
* 10 Cr. App. Rep. 140.5 16 Cr. App. Rep. 149.
28 Coxrs Cr. Cases 4.
12 Cr. App. Rep. 215.
there was no threat or attempt to commit an offence on the appellant.The latter could not, therefore, have had a reasonable apprehension ofdanger to his body arising from a threat by the deceased. In thesecircumstances it was impossible to say there was any evidence on whichthe jury could properly say that the case came within Exception 2 tosection 294 of the Penal Code. Moreover the learned Judge in puttingto the jury the question as to whether the case came within Exception 4to section 294 adopted a course that was on the facts the most favourableto the appellant.
We are, therefore, of opinion that the failure of the Judge to put thequestion of private defence to the jury did not in the circumstances ofthis case amount to misdirection. We are in this connection followingthe Indian cases referred to on page 364 of Mukerji, Trial by Jury andMisdirection.
The application for leave to appeal must, therefore, be refused.

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