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Timestamp: 2019-04-23 00:12:20+00:00

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KING COUNTY, Respondent, v. SHELDON G. FARR et al., Petitioners.
 Eminent Domain - Proceedings - Phases. A condemnation action consists of an adjudication of public use and necessity, determination of damages, and payment of the amount of the award and entry into possession.
condemnation by a county need not set forth the precise reasons for the necessity of taking land, or contain a specific recital of a legislative determination of necessity.
 Administrative Law and Procedure - Judicial Review - Arbitrary and Capricious Action - What Constitutes. Arbitrary and capricious action is willful and unreasoning action, without consideration and regard for facts or circumstances. A belief by the reviewing authority that an erroneous conclusion has been reached does not render an honest decision arbitrary and capricious.
 Municipal Corporations - Ordinances - Notice of Hearing - Necessity. Notice of a hearing on the adoption of an ordinance is not required to be given except as specified in governing constitutional, statutory, or charter provisions.
 Eminent Domain - Proceedings - Project Hearing - Notice - Necessity. Absent an express constitutional or statutory provision, the owner of land being taken for a public project has no right to notice of the proceedings in which the project itself is approved.
 Eminent Domain - Public Use and Necessity - Elements - Public Use - Determination. Whether a use is really public is solely a judicial question. Plans as to the nature and time of the public use need only be sufficiently definite as to inform the property owner of the nature of the taking and permit him to evaluate his damages.
 Eminent Domain - Proceedings - Description of Property. While RCW 8.08.010 only requires property sought to be condemned by a county to be described in the petition with reasonable certainty, the legal description contained in the order of public use and necessity must be accurate.
 Eminent Domain - Evidence - Maps - Accuracy. The identification of a map as accurate need not be by the person who drew it. Limitations on the accuracy of a map do not prevent its admission if the trier of facts is aware of such limitations.
Certiorari to review a judgment of the Superior Court for King County, No. 736578, Horton Smith, J., entered November 10, 1971. Affirmed as modified.
Condemnation proceeding. Property owners seek review of an order of public use and necessity.
Powell, Livengood, Dunlap & Silvernale and Robert P. Tjossem, for petitioners.
Christopher T. Bayley, Prosecuting Attorney, and Bruce W. Rudeen, Deputy, for respondent.
appeal from an order of public use and necessity entered by the Superior Court for King County.
The purpose of the condemnation action, initiated by King County, was to acquire land for Big Finn Hill Park, the construction of which had been generally outlined in a "Park Site Selection Study" prepared in 1963 by the King County Planning Department. This study did not indicate which property would be necessary for the park.
After the Forward Thrust bond issue passed and money was thereby appropriated for the acquisition of Big Finn Hill Park, King County began to delineate the boundaries of the park. Big Finn Hill Park is planned as a "major urban park" as that tea is used in the King County comprehensive plan meaning it was to be approximately 100 acres in size with minimal development. Testimony in the record indicated the county wished to acquire all of a ravine containing Denny Creek and other property necessary to provide suitable access, parking and picnic areas. Additional land was necessary to control access to the ravine and to prevent problems with potential water runoff.
 A condemnation action consists of three phases: (1) adjudication of public use and necessity, (2) determination of damages to be awarded to the owner and (3) payment of the amount of the award and entry into possession. State ex rel. Lange v. Superior Court, 61 Wn.2d 153, 156, 377 P.2d 425 (1963); State Parks & Recreation Comm'n v. Schluneger, 3 Wn. App. 536, 538, 475 P.2d 916 (1970).
This appeal relates solely to the first phase.
In adjudicating public use and necessity, a trial court must make three separate, but interrelated, findings: (1) the use in question is really a public use; (2) public interests require it; and, (3) the property to be acquired is necessary to facilitate the public use. Des Moines v. Hemenway, 73 Wn.2d 130, 437 P.2d 171 (1968); State v.
Dawes, 66 Wn.2d 578, 404 P.2d 20 (1965); State ex rel. Sternoff v. Superior Court, 52 Wn.2d 282, 325 P.2d 300 (1958). A determination that an acquisition is for a "public use" is not precisely the same thing as determining it is a "public necessity," even though the two terms do overlap to some extent and cannot be separated with scalpellic precision. Des Moines v. Hemenway, supra; King County v. Theitman, 59 Wn.2d 586, 369 P.2d 503 (1962).
An Ordinance authorizing condemnation of property for the Big Finn Hill Park Site.
That condemnation proceedings are hereby authorized to acquire property and property rights together with the right to construct and maintain a public County Park on the following described lands in King County, Washington.
The landowners argue that statutes delegating the state's power of eminent domain must be strictly construed, Seattle v. State, 54 Wn.2d 139, 338 P.2d 126 (1959), and that a specific recital of a legislative determination of necessity is therefore required under RCW 8.08.010. The ordinance quoted above does not contain such recital, and the record does not contain the information that was presented to the council prior to enactment of the ordinance.
Such petition alleges, one, a fatal defect in the appropriation resolution by its omission to set forth the necessity for appropriating Ellis' land, . . .
As to the first proposition, the very adoption of the appropriation resolution indicates the necessity for the appropriation in the minds of the members of the Turnpike Commission, and the resolution is not fatally defective by omitting to state in terms that the appropriation is necessary.
A condemning authority is not required to set forth the precise reasons for the necessity of taking land in the ordinance which authorizes the condemnation proceeding. State Parks & Recreation Comm'n v. Schluneger, supra.
When private property is taken for a public purpose, the question has frequently been raised as to the necessity of the proposed improvement or more particularly the need of the land of any one owner or group of owners for the improvement. . . . [W]here,. . . the municipality decides to take certain public property for a public park, the owner of the particular property involved may wish to resist the proceedings on the ground not that the park itself is unnecessary but that his property is not necessary to the park, or that the park may better be located elsewhere.
The second question often raised in condemnation proceedings is the "public purpose" for which the property is sought. It is an inherent requirement of any condemnation that before private property can be acquired either by the State or any public corporation that it is for a public use. . . . . . . We see, therefore, that the two major problems in a condemnation proceeding, aside from the question of compensation, are those of "necessity" and "public use."
On numerous occasions, this court has announced that ". . . The rule is well settled in this state that a declaration of necessity by the proper municipal authorities is conclusive, in the absence of actual fraud or such arbitrary or capricious conduct us would amount to constructive fraud. State ex real. Northwestern Electric Co., v. Superior Court, 28 Wn. (2d) 476, 183 P. (2d) 802 (1947), 173 A. L. R. 1351, and cases cited. . . ." (Italics ours.) State ex rel. Church v. Superior Court, 40 Wn. (2d) 90, 91, 240 P. (2d) 1208 (1952).
A port's determination of necessity to condemn property, as distinguished from a determination of public use, is conclusive unless a challenger is able to prove actual or constructive fraud. Tacoma v. Welcker, 65 Wn.2d 677, 684, 399 P.2d 330 (1965). Accord, In re Port of Seattle, 72 Wn.2d 932, 936, 435 P.2d 991 (1967). The burden of proving either fraud or constructive fraud is on the objector. Medical Lake v. Brown, 63 Wn.2d 41, 45, 385 P.2d 387 (1963). See also Asotin County Port Dist. v. Clarkston Community Corp., supra; State v. Burdulis, 70 Wn.2d 24, 421 P.2d 1019 (1966); Tacoma v. Welcker, supra; Medical Lake v. Brown, 63 Wn.2d 41, 385 P.2d 387 (1963): State Parks & Recreation Comm'n v. Schluneger, supra; 1 P. Nichols, Eminent Domain § 4.11 (1964).
Arbitrary and capricious conduct is willful and unreasoning action, without consideration and regard for facts or circumstances. Lillions v. Gibbs, 47 Wn. (2d) 629, 289 P. (2d) 203 (1955). Action, when exercised honestly, fairly, and upon due consideration is not arbitrary and capricious, even though there be room for a difference of opinion upon the course to follow, or a belief by the reviewing authority that an erroneous conclusion has been reached. Smith v. Hollenbeck, 48 Wn. (2d) 461, 294 P. (2d) 921 (1956). See also State ex rel. Dawes v. State Highway Comm'n, 63 Wn.2d 34, 385 P.2d 376 (1963); Miller v. Tacoma, 61 Wn.2d 374, 378 P.2d 464 (1963); State ex rel. Hunter v. Superior Court, 34 Wn.2d 214, 208 P.2d 866 (1949). Appellants have failed to prove that the legislative action was taken without consideration of the facts.
The record of the proceedings before the trial court contains ample evidence to support the view that these properties were necessary for the park. The legislative authorization of condemnation proceedings was not arbitrary or capricious. Even if the authorizing ordinance had been defective there is substantial evidence in the record to support the trial court's finding that the acquisition was necessary. Such findings will not be disturbed on appeal.
The county council pursuant to authorization in article 2, section 220.40 of the King County Charter, enacted ordinance No. 00583 which provides in part: [T]he County Council shall hold a public hearing after due notice, to consider the proposed ordinance. Due notice shall mean notifying press, radio and television in the County of such public hearing by posting a notice on the bulletin board outside the door of the County Council Chambers, and by such other means as may now or hereafter be required by law.
This procedure was fully complied with in this instance. The landowners additionally asked legal counsel for the county to give them personal notice of the meeting at which an ordinance concerning the necessity of the acquisition would be considered. Legal counsel for the county agreed to do so if possible but was unable to comply. Notice was given in compliance with the charter, and the inability to give additional personal notice does not constitute a lack of "due notice."
The purpose of requiring publication before an ordinance is adopted is to afford an opportunity to parties-in-interest and citizens to be heard on the subject matter and content of the ordinance while the purpose of publication after the passage of an ordinance is to afford the chance to have the ordinance judicially reviewed. Bruno v. Shrewsbury, 2 N.J. Super. 550, 65 A.2d 131 (1949). Notice of a hearing on the adoption of an ordinance is not required to be given except as specified in governing constitutional, statutory or charter provisions. Sweetwater Valley Memorial Park, Inc. v. Sweetwater, 213 Tenn. 1, 372 S.W.2d 168 (1963); Houston v. Kirschwing, 117 Colo. 92, 184 P.2d 487 (1947); 5 E.
McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 16.76 (J. Dray 3d rev. ed. 1969). The notice given was sufficient and appropriate. See Wood v. Seattle, 23 Wash. 1, 62 P. 135 (1900).
It is contended that the criteria used in deciding to acquire the Farr property was both illegal and improperly applied. Condemnees argue that the county incorrectly assumed all of the Farr property was within the ravine. These arguments are not borne out in the record. There is evidence to support the view that the county wished to acquire property located within the ravine and property adjacent to the ravine which was not platted or developed. Other considerations including potential picnic areas, parking and protection of the ravine were considered in deciding which property was to be taken. The record does not support the conclusion that the entire property was taken solely to avoid severance damages.
developed. These factors support the county council's finding of necessity as reasonable rather than arbitrary or capricious.
The condemnees contend that it is insufficient to merely assert that property is to be utilized for park purposes and that a more specific definition of future use is necessary to support a finding of public use and necessity.
 Whether a contemplated use is really "public" is solely a judicial question. Miller v. Tacoma, supra; Hogue v. Port of Seattle, 54 Wn.2d 799, 341 P.2d 171 (1959); State v. Bank of California, 5 Wn. App. 861, 491 P.2d 697 (1971); A. Jahr, Eminent Domain §§ 6, 9 (1953). Under RCW 8.08.020 any condemnation authorized under RCW 8.08.010-.080 is deemed to be for a public purpose when it "is directly or indirectly, approximately or remotely for the general benefit or welfare of the county . . ." A county park is clearly a public use. A. Jahr, Eminent Domain § 10 (1953).
The test of the sufficiency of the plans to be furnished the owner is whether or not such plans properly and adequately inform the owner of the details of the planned taking so that he and his witnesses may understand exactly the nature of the taking, and evaluate the owner's resultant damages. See also State v. Basin Dev. & Sales Co., 53 Wn.2d 201, 332 P.2d 245 (1958).
"In order to meet the future demands for parks, acquisition of sites should begin now. Moreover, acquisition should begin as part of a total program to assure the best locations."
Of course, that is tied in with the thoughts that population in King County would definitely expand.
Exhibit No. 3, which is the Comprehensive Plan for King County, Washington, particularly on page 43, states there should be a major urban park, and that is what, apparently, the denomination is here of at least 100 acres in size for every 40,000 potential urban population based on one acre per hundred population. Mrs. Langstaff has testified that it is nowhere a reality yet. The County Council has at least passed a resolution, of which I have taken judicial notice, which at least is an Ordinance statm.g and authorizing the condemning of property for the Big Finn Hill Park site. The Ordinance itself just states, "To maintain a public County park on the following described lands," setting forth those lands with legal descriptions.
We agree the plans were sufficiently specific.
Condemnees contend that the county has no authority to acquire their fee interest underlying the dedicated streets adjacent to the properties.
We need not concern ourselves with the question of whether the county has the power to condemn land which has been dedicated for county roadways. The county acknowledges it has no intention of vacating these roads at present. The fee underlying the dedicated streets remains with the condemnees. Damages is another question.
The legal description of the Farr property contained in both the petition and the "Order of Public Use and Necessity" was faulty in that it did not close.
 Property sought to be condemned by a county need only be described with "reasonable certainty" in the petition. RCW 8.08.010.
must be amended so as to accurately disclose the property to be taken.
Error is assigned to the admission of two maps offered by the county. It is contended that the county failed to lay a proper foundation as to their authenticity and accuracy.
The maps were identified by an engineering technician for the King County Park Department. The technician had marked certain areas on contour maps obtained from the Department of Public Works. The marked areas demonstrated the approximate location of the property belonging to appellants in conformance with the legal descriptions of that property. He did not have personal knowledge of the preparation of the contour maps other than that the maps were normally used in the engineering procedures of the Department of Public Works and that he had been told by someone in that department how they had been prepared. He testified that he determined tile location of the parcels he outlined upon the contour maps by measuring from assessor's maps of the same area. He had no firsthand knowledge of the assessor's maps but believed they were accurate within the margin of error to which he was able to draw the parcels.
The use of demonstrative evidence is to be encouraged. State v. Tatum, 58 Wn.2d 73, 360 P.2d 754 (1961); Cady v. Department of Labor & Indus., 23 Wn.2d 851, 162 P.2d 813 (1945). The admission of photographs lies within the discretion of the trial court. Toftoy v. Ocean Shores Properties, Inc., 71 Wn.2d 833, 431 P.2d 212 (1967), and the same is true of maps and diagrams. See generally 5 H. Meisenholder, Wash. Prac. § 32 (1965).
42 A.L.R.2d 800 (1953); Schwede v. Hemrich, 29 Wash. 124, 69 P. 643 (1902); Annot., 9 A.L.R.2d 1044 (1950).
The identification of a map as accurate, while necessary, need not be by the person who drew it. Portland & S. Ry. v. Clarke County, 48 Wash. 509, 93 P. 1083 (1908); Portland & S. Ry. v. Ladd, 47 Wash. 88, 91 P. 573 (1907).
This is not a case where no evidence was offered as to the accuracy of the exhibit and where no person with knowledge of its content was available for cross-examination. San Juan County v. Hage, 54 Wn.2d 419, 341 P.2d 872 (1959). Nor where conditions had changed so as to render the map inaccurate. Hall v. King County Fire Dist. 43,67 Wn.2d 446, 408 P.2d 14 (1965).
that they did more than explain testimony of a somewhat technical nature and assist the jury in its determination of the facts. The court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the exhibits into evidence.
The maps were properly admitted.
The case is remanded to correct the erroneous legal description in the "Order of Public Use and Necessity" and to reflect the county's position on appeal that the fee ownership underlying the roads in question is not to be condemned. In all other respects the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Petition for rehearing denied October 31, 1972.
Review denied by Supreme Court December 15, 1972.

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