Source: https://ukhumanrightsblog.com/2015/08/06/on-fairness-and-principle-the-legacy-of-zz-re-examined-michael-rhimes/?shared=email&msg=fail
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 22:13:25+00:00

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In my last post on UKHRB I commented on developments in UK, ECHR and EU jurisprudence relating to procedural fairness in the context of national security.
The developments in this recent case offer some further interesting thoughts on the topic. To explain the case, and put its ramifications in a broader context, this post will be divided into three parts. In the first I outline my original argument as set out in the earlier post. The second will explain the case itself. The third will offer five brief comments on the broader issues the cases touches upon.
In brief, the court in Kiani followed Tariq and held that AF-type disclosure (see below) was not a universal requirement of fairness; the interests of justice could require a lower standard of disclosure without violating the absolute right to a fair hearing.
It was noted that there could be two conceptions of due process.
On the one hand, there is a concrete understanding of procedural fairness, whose content can be determined only on the facts of a given concrete case. A possible example was examined: IR and GT v UK (ECHR, Applications nos. 14876/12 and 63339/12, 28 January 2014), especially at .
It was suggested that the approach of the EU aligns more closely with this understanding.
Second, in a situation broadly analogous to that of IR, the CJEU in ZZ  QB 1136 (Case C‑300/11) appeared to insist on a more rigid core minimum. Both dealt with the Home Secretary’s refusal to give detailed descriptions of why a given individual was not allowed to return, or enter, the United Kingdom for national security grounds as permitted in limited circumstances by Directive 2004/38 (‘The Directive’) .
Mr Kiani was in a very similar position to Mr Tariq, whose case in the Supreme Court has received a considerable amount of attention. Both are Pakistani Muslims, and both brought unlawful dismissal claims against the Home Office for dismissing them on racial and/or religious grounds when their security vetting was not renewed. No specific allegations were put against either of them; the Home Office’s concern was with the potential for abuse of position or blackmail. Whilst the concern in Mr Tariq’s case came from his ties with his cousin who was convicted of attempted murder in a failed terrorist bomb plot, in Kiani’s case the concern was related to his wife’s direction of a company that provides immigration advice.
An excluded party must be given sufficient information about the allegations against him to enable him to give effective instructions in relation to those allegations. (Lord Phillips ).
The Supreme Court in Tariq held that this was not an absolute requirement, and highlighted the fact that the case was essentially that of a monetary claim for discrimination as basis for not requiring AF type disclosure in order to ensure fairness. Overall, this might suggest a concretist understanding of procedural fairness. Like an elephant we cannot describe it in abstract, but we know fairness when we see it.
On this analysis, Kiani poses no question of principle. It is up to the judge to determine whether, on the facts of the case, the interests of justice are such that fairness could only be satisfied through the provision of AF-type disclosure.
(…)The court [in ZZ] was not purporting to enunciate a universal principle of EU law which applied in the same way regardless of the context. On the contrary, it made it clear in this paragraph (and other paragraphs) that it was interpreting articles 30(2) and 31 of the Directive. (…). If it had intended to say that the ECtHR context-dependent approach to article 6 of the Convention did not apply in EU law, it would surely have said so.
(…) there is nothing to suggest that the court was of the view that its conclusion as to the extent of the disclosure obligation in that case applied to all cases within the scope of EU law. Nor is there anything in the judgment to suggest that the court was purporting to lay down some new general principle of law.
In my view, this passage (At  of ZZ) is entirely consistent with the context-specific approach adopted by the ECtHR in relation to the Convention and inconsistent with the absolutist approach advocated by Mr Southey (Counsel for the appellant).
I can see no inconsistency between this approach and that adopted in the Convention jurisprudence in relation to article 6 of the Convention. Kadi (No 2) provides no support for the idea that article 47 of the Charter requires the essence of the factual basis of a decision to be supplied to the person concerned in all cases, regardless of the context and the particular circumstances.
Accordingly, there was no requirement for AF-type disclosure. Overall, therefore, the approach of Tariq not only still stands, but is reconciled with the approach of the CJEU to procedural fairness in the context of national security. There are clear abstract rights that are constitutive of fairness, but exactly how they are to be given effect – i.e. through AF disclosure or not – depends on the exigencies of a given case and not on an absolute application by rote.
It is worth making a few observations at this point.
Accordingly, we have clear doubt casted on the interpretation of the court in Kiani which was more ready to accept that there was no difference between the two jurisprudential voices of the CJEU and the ECHR.
Second, there is the question as to the dialogue between the ECtHR and the CJEU. It is remarkable that the CJEU in ZZ , unlike in Kadi II (C-584/10), did not cite the seminal ECHR case of A and others v United Kingdom  ECHR 301, whence the UK House of Lords in AF sourced the obligation of ‘gisting’ in the form we know it today. If the courts are engaging in similarly related cases of national security, it is worrying if they do not at least acknowledge each other’s jurisprudence. This, again, contributes to the complex confluence of the legal streams of these two bodies.
Third, there is a question as to how far the AF-disclosure obligation spreads. ZZ of the CJEU suggests that it is a core minimum whenever EU law applies. However, that does not seem how it was interpreted upon its return to the court of appeal in ZZ (No 2)  EWCA Civ 7. Richards LJ stated that the ratio was valid inasmuch as it applied to the fundamental freedoms in the EU order – most importantly, that of freedom of movement which was in issue in the very case itself (at ). However, to what extent does it extend to EU more generally, in cases where fundamental freedoms are not in issue?
The emphasis on specific circumstances leaves us in a position closer to that contemplated by the UK Court in Kiani rather than the more rigid approach of ZZ.
This sounds a bit like “the spirit of the law” that we are all fighting the good fight…infact there is no ‘spirit on the law’ it is either legal or illegal the rest are breaches.
Thanks for this very interesting post. I have been looking at due process in relation to immigration detention under the Return Directive and case law before the CJEU and I would just like to note that, in that context, it would seem that some defence rights should be considered as universally applicable. In Case Case C-383/13 MG, NR v Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie, AG Wathelet referred to the right to be heard in this manner: “Respect for the rights of the defence constitutes a fundamental principle of EU law, and the right to be heard in any proceedings forms an integral part of it.” (para 44). The CJEU confirmed this view by stating that defence rights are fundamental EU rights that must be respected even where not expressly provided for in the applicable procedures (para 101-02). Interesting to think why some more than others should be viewed as absolutely required. Perhaps it is a matter of degree.

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