Source: https://www.tdbarneslaw.com/blog/a-piece-of-law-probative-value-of-testimonial-evidence-of-a-co-conspirator
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 22:40:14+00:00

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The United States Court of Appeal, Second Circuit has clearly established that district courts must determine whether the probative value of evidence is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice resulting from the impermissible use of a declarant's statement. U.S. v. Forrester, 60 F.3d 52, 62 (2d Cir. 1995); see also U.S. v. Paulino, 445 F.3d 211, 217 (2d Cir. 2006); U.S. v. Reyes, 18 F.3d 65, 71 (2d Cir. 1994); U.S. v. Carneglia, 256 F.R.D. 384, 398 (E.D.N.Y. 2009). In Forrester, the Court determined that the assessment of prejudice consider factors such as whether the statement “addresses an important disputed issue in the trial,” whether it was made “by a knowledgeable declarant whose testimony is likely to be credited by the jury,” and whether a limiting instruction would “effectively protect against prejudice or misuse by the jury of the evidence.” Forrester, supra. The Court found, inter alia, that the prejudicial effect of the evidence greatly outweighed any probative value since the declarant’s statements addressed the defendant’s participation in the alleged crime, were made by a knowledgeable declarant whose testimony the jury would credit, and as limiting instructions would not avoid misuse or confusion of the statements by the jury. Id.; see also Reyes, supra (stating the “co-conspirators' statements addressed the most important disputed issue in the trial; they directly implicated the defendant in the crime… the declaration implicating the defendant in the crime came from a highly credible source” and “... the hearsay declaration communicated to the jury a powerful message that the defendant was guilty”); U.S. v. Carneglia, supra (holding that any “probative value was substantially outweighed by the potential to confuse or mislead the jury, even if offered under a limiting instruction”). Even if the Court were to determine that the proposed evidence is admissible, any probative value is greatly outweighed by its prejudicial effect. It is well settled that evidence is prejudicial when it has “some adverse effect upon a defendant beyond tending to prove the fact or issue that justified its admission into evidence.” U.S. v. Figueroa, 618 F.2d 934, 943 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that FRE 403 requires a the court to make an assessment of whether the probative value of the evidence on a disputed issue is substantially outweighed by it prejudicial tendency to have some other adverse effect on the defendant). Any probative value is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant by confusion of the issues, misleading the jury and causing undue delay. FRE 403; U.S. v. Afjehei, 869 F.2d 670, 674 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that FRE 403 allows the court to exclude even relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice).

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