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Timestamp: 2019-04-25 05:11:25+00:00

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Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the District of Columbia. [310 U.S. 534, 535] Robert H. Jackson, Atty. Gen., and Thomas E. Harris, of Washington, D. C., for appellants.
[310 U.S. 534, 536] Mr. J. Ninian Beall, of Washington, D.C., for appellees.
'(1) To regulate common carriers by motor vehicle as provided in this part (chapter), and to that end the Commission may establish reasonable requirements with respect to continuous and adequate service, transportation of baggage and express, uniform systems of accounts, records, and reports, preservation of records, qualifications and maximum hours of service of employees, and safety of operation and equipment.
'(2) To regulate contract carriers by motor vehicle as provided in this part (chapter), and to that end the Commission may establish reasonable requirements with respect to uniform systems of accounts, records, and reports, preservation of records, qualifications and maximum hours of service of employees, and safety of operation and equipment.
In the broad domain of social legislation few problems are enmeshed with the difficulties that surround a de- [310 U.S. 534, 542] termination of what qualifications an employee shall have and how long his hours of work may be. Upon the proper adjustment of these factors within an industry and in relation to competitive activities may well depend the economic success of the enterprises affected as well as the employment and efficiency of the workers. The Motor Carrier Act lays little emphasis upon the clause we are called upon now to construe, 'qualifications and maximum hours of service of employees.' None of the words are defined by the Section, 203, devoted to the explanation of the meaning of the words used in the Act. They are a part of an elaborate enactment drawn and passed in an attempt to adjust a new and growing transportation service to the needs of the public. To find their content, they must be viewed in their setting.
It is important to remember that the Commission has three times concluded that its authority was limited to securing safety of operation. The first interpretation was made on December 29, 1937, when the Commission stated: '... until the Congress shall have given us a more particular and definite command in the premises, we shall limit our regulations concerning maximum hours of service to those employees whose functions in the operation of motor vehicles make such regulations desirable because of safety considerations.' 40 This expression was half a year old when Congress enacted the Fair Labor Standards Act with the exemption of Section 13(b)(1). Seemingly the [310 U.S. 534, 550] Senate at least was aware of the Commission's investigation of its powers even before its interpretation was announced. 41 Under the circumstances it is unlikely indeed that Congress would not have explicitly overruled the Commission's interpretation had it intended to exempt others than employees who affected safety from the Labor Standards Act.
It is contended by appellees that the difference in language between subsections (1) and (2) and subsection (3) is indicative of a congressional purpose of restrict the regulation of employees of private carriers to 'safety of operation' while inserting broader authority in (1) and (2) for employees of common and contract carriers. Appellants answer that the difference in language is explained by the difference in the powers. As (1) and (2) give powers beyond safety for service, goods, accounts and records, language limiting those subsections to safety would be inapt.
Appellees call our attention to certain pending legislation as sustaining their view of the congressional purpose in enacting the Motor Carrier Act. We do not think it can be said that the action of the Senate and House of Representatives on this pending transportation legislation throws much light on the policy of Congress or the meaning attributed by that body to Section 204(a). Aside from the very pertinent fact that the legislation is still unadopted, the legislative history up to now points only to a hesitation to determine a controversy as to the meaning of the present Motor Carrier Act, pending a judicial determination. 42 [310 U.S. 534, 551] One amendment made to the then pending Motor Carrier Act has relevance to our inquiry. Section 203(b) reads as set out in the note below. 43 The words, 'except [310 U.S. 534, 552] the provisions of section 204(304) relative to qualifications and maximum hours of service of employees and scafety of [310 U.S. 534, 553] operation or standards of equipment,' italicized in the note, were added by amendment in the House after the passage of S. 1629 in the Senate with the addition of the disputed clause to Section 204(a)(1) and (2).44 It is evident that the exempted vehicles and operators include common, contract and private carriers. It seems equally evident that where these vehicles or operators were common or contract carriers, it was not intended by Congress to give the Commission power to regulate the qualifications and hours of service of employees, other than those concerned with the safety of operations.
Our conclusion, in view of the circumstances set out in this opinion, is that the meaning of employees in Section 204(a)(1) and (2) is limited to those employees whose activities affect the safety of operation. The Commission has no jurisdiction to regulate the qualifications or hours of service of any others. The decree of the district court is accordingly reversed and it is directed to dismiss the complaint of the appellees. It is so ordered.
The CHIEF JUSTICE, Mr. Justice McREYNOLDS, Mr. Justice STONE and Mr. Justice ROBERTS are of opinion that the decree should be affirmed for the reasons stated in the opinion of the district court, 31 F.Supp. 35.
[ Footnote 1 ] 49 Stat. 543, 49 U.S.C.A. 301 et seq.
[ Footnote 2 ] S.Doc. No. 152, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess., Regulation of Transportation Agencies, p. 350. See p. 25, for discussion of the preliminary steps of motor carrier regulation. Hearings on Regulation of Interstate Motor Carriers, H.R. 5262 and H.R. 6016, before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.; Hearings on S. 1629, Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.
[ Footnote 3 ] Section 202; Maurer v. Hamilton, 309 U.S. 598 , 60 S.Ct. 726, 84 L. Ed. --, decided April 22, 1940.
[ Footnote 4 ] Sections 202, 216, 217, 218, 49 U.S.C.A. 302, 316-318.
[ Footnote 5 ] Services, 203(a)(19); brokers, 203(a)(18), 204(a)(4); security issues, 214; insurance, 215; accounts, records and reports, 220.
[ Footnote 6 ] Maurer v. Hamilton, supra; Regulation of Transportation Agencies, supra, Highway and Safety Regulations, p. 32; Hearings on S. 1629, supra, pp. 122-123, 184.
[ Footnote 7 ] Ex parte No. MC-2, 3 M.C.C. 665, 667.
[ Footnote 8 ] 52 Stat. 1060, 29 U.S.C.A. 201 et seq.
[ Footnote 9 ] 13 M.C.C. 481, 488.
[ Footnote 10 ] 13 M.C.C. 481, 489.
[ Footnote 11 ] Interpretative Bulletin No. 9, Wage & Hour Manual (1940) 168.
[ Footnote 12 ] Section 204(a)(1), (6) and (7), (e); Rules of Practice I.C.C., April 1, 1936, Rule XV.
[ Footnote 13 ] Section 205(h), Motor Carrier Act; Urgent Deficiencies Act, 38 Stat. 220, 28 U.S.C. 47, 47a, 28 U.S.C.A. 47, 47a.
[ Footnote 14 ] Cf. Securities & Exchange Comm. v. United States Realty & Improvement Co., 310 U.S. 434 , 60 S.Ct. 1044, 84 L.Ed. --, decided today.
[ Footnote 15 ] Judicial Code 238, 28 U.S.C.A. 345; 38 Stat. 208, 219-220, 28 U.S.C.A. 43, 44, 47; 49 Stat. 543, 205(h), 49 U.S.C.A. 305(h).
[ Footnote 16 ] Story, J., in Minor v. Mechanics Bank, 1 Pet. 46, 64: 'But no general rule can be laid down upon this subject, further than that that exposition ought to be adopted in this, as in other cases, which carries into effect the true intent and object of the legislature in the enactment.' Pennington v. Coxe, 2 Cranch 33, 59; James v. Milwaukee, 16 Wall. 159, 161; Atkins v. Fiber Disintegrating Co., 18 Wall. 272, 301; White v. United States, 191 U.S. 545, 551 , 24 S.Ct. 171, 172; Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 194 , 43 S.Ct. 65, 67; United States v. Stone & Downer Co., 274 U.S. 225, 239 , 47 S.Ct. 616, 620; Gulf States Steel Co. v. United States, 287 U.S. 32, 45 , 53 S.Ct. 69, 74; Royal Indemnity Co. v. American Bond & M. Co., 289 U.S. 165, 169 , 53 S.Ct. 551, 553; Lincoln v. Ricketts, 297 U.S. 373, 376 , 56 S.Ct. 507, 509; Foster v. United States, 303 U.S. 118, 120 , 58 S.Ct. 424, 425.
[ Footnote 17 ] Cf. Davies, The Interpretation of Statutes in the Light of their Policy by the English Courts, 35 Columbia Law Review 519; Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 Harvard Law Review 863; Landis, A Note on 'Statutory Interpretation', 43 Harvard Law Review 886; R. Powell, Construction of Written Instruments, 14 Indiana Law Journal 199, 309, 324; Jones, The Plain Meaning Rule, 25 Washington University Law Quarterly 2.
[ Footnote 18 ] Taft v. Commissioner, 304 U.S. 351, 359 , 58 S.Ct. 891, 895, 116 A.L.R. 346; Helvering v. City Bank Co., 296 U.S. 85, 89 , 56 S.Ct. 70, 72; Wilbur v. United States, 284 U.S. 231, 237 , 52 S.Ct. 113, 114; Crooks v. Harrelson, 282 U.S. 55, 60 , 51 S. Ct. 49, 50; United States v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 278 U.S. 269, 278 , 49 S.Ct. 133, 136; Van Camp & Sons v. American Can Co., 278 U.S. 245, 253 , 49 S.Ct. 112, 113, 60 A.L.R. 1060; Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 490 , 37 S.Ct. 192, 196, L.R.A.1917F, 502, Ann.Cas.1917B, 1168; Pennsylvania R.R. v. International Coal Co., 230 U.S. 184, 199 , 33 S.Ct. 893, 896, Ann.Cas.1915A, 315.
[ Footnote 19 ] Armstrong Co. v. Nu-Enamel Corp., 305 U.S. 315, 332 , 59 S.Ct. 191, 199; Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 446 , 53 S.Ct. 210, 214, 86 A.L.R. 249; United States v. Ryan, 284 U.S. 167, 176 , 52 S.Ct. 65, 68.
[ Footnote 20 ] Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 194 , 43 S.Ct. 65, 67.
[ Footnote 21 ] Helvering v. Morgan's, Inc., 293 U.S. 121, 126 , 55 S.Ct. 60, 61; Johnson v. Southern Pacific Co., 196 U.S. 1, 14 , 25 S.Ct. 158, 160; Popovici v. Agler, 280 U.S. 379 , 50 S.Ct. 154; Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355 , 52 S.Ct. 397; Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553 , 53 S.Ct. 751; Maurer v. Hamilton, supra, 309 U.S. 598 , 60 S.Ct. pages 733, 735, 84 L.Ed . --.
[ Footnote 22 ] Boston Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 278 U.S. 41, 48 , 49 S. Ct. 52, 53, 54.
[ Footnote 23 ] Helvering v. New York Trust Co., 292 U.S. 455, 465 , 54 S.Ct. 806, 809.
[ Footnote 24 ] Cf. Committee on Ministers' Powers Report (Cmd. 4060, 1932), p. 135.
[ Footnote 25 ] United States v. Jefferson Electric Co., 291 U.S. 386, 396 , 54 S. Ct. 443, 446, 447; United States v. Arizona, 295 U.S. 174, 188 , 191 S., 55 S.Ct. 666, 670, 672; Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Finance Corp., 306 U.S. 381, 394 , 59 S.Ct. 516, 520; Ozawa v. United States, supra.
[ Footnote 26 ] 34 Stat. 1415, 45 U.S.C.A. 61-64.
[ Footnote 27 ] 38 Stat. 1164, 1169, 1170-1184.
[ Footnote 28 ] 52 Stat. 1007, 601(a)(5), 49 U.S.C.A. 551(a)(5). This authority has apparently been exercised only as to pilots and copilots. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Air Commerce, Civil Air Regulations, No. 61, Scheduled Airline Rules (Interstate), as amended to May 31, 1938, 61. 518-61.5185.
[ Footnote 29 ] That the word 'employees' is not treated by Congress as a word of art having a definite meaning is apparent from an examination of recent legislation. Thus the Social Security Act specifically provides that 'The term 'employee' includes an officer of a corporation,' 42 U.S.C. 1301(a)( 6), 42 U.S.C.A. 1301(a)(6), while the Fair Labor Standards Act specifically exempts 'any employee employed in a bona fide executive, administrative, professional, or local retailing capacity ....' 29 U.S.C . 213(a)(1), 29 U.S.C.A. 213(a)(1). In the Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act, Congress expressly recognized the variable meaning of employee even when defined at length and used only in a single act: '... 'employee' (except when used in phrases establishing a different meaning) means ....' 45 U.S.C. 351(d), 45 U.S.C.A. 351(d). In a statute permitting heads of departments to settle claims up to $1000 arising from the negligence of 'employees of the Government,' Congress gives recognition to the fact that the term is not on its face all-inclusive by providing: "Employee' shall include enlisted men in the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps.' 31 U.S.C. 215, 216, 31 U.S.C.A. 215, 216. See also the varying definitions of 'employees' in the following statutes: Railroad Retirement Act, 45 U.S.C. 228a(b)(c), 45 U.S.C.A. 228a(b, c); Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. 1(7), 49 U.S.C.A. 1(7); Emergency Railroad Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. 251(f), 49 U.S.C.A. 251(f), Act June 16, 1933, 48 Stat. 211; Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. 210, 47 U.S.C. A. 210; National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 152(3), 29 U.S.C.A. 152(3); Maritime Labor Relations Act, 46 U.S.C. 1253(c), 46 U.S.C.A. 1253(c); Classification Act of 1923 (Civil Service), 5 U.S.C. 662, 5 U.S. C.A. 662; U.S. Employees' Compensation Act, 5 U.S.C. 790, 5 U.S.C.A. 790; Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. 902, 33 U.S.C.A. 902; Boiler Inspection Act, 45 U.S.C. 22, 45 U.S.C.A. 22; Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. 151(5), 45 U.S.C.A. 151(5).
Where the term 'employee' has been used in statutes without particularized definition it has not been treated by the courts as a word of definite content. See Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U.S. 514, 520 , 46 S.Ct. 172, 173 (consulting engineers performing services for states, municipalities, and water districts held not to be 'employees' under statute exempting 'officers and employees under ... any state , ... or any local subdivision thereof' from the income tax); Waskey v. Hammer, 223 U.S. 85 , 32 S.Ct. 187, 188 (mineral surveyor, appointed by the surveyor but paid by private persons, is within prohibition of statute prohibiting 'employees in the General Land Office' from purchasing public land); Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Railway Employees' Dept., etc., 6 Cir., 93 F.2d 340 (furloughed railroad workers entitled to priority in rehiring held 'employees' within meaning of Railway Labor Act), discussed in 51 Harv.L.Rev. 1299; Latta v. Lonsdale, 8 Cir., 107 F. 585, 52 L.R.A. 479 (attorney not 'employee' within meaning of statute giving 'employees' preference against assets of insolvent corporations); Vane v. Newcombe, 132 U.S. 220 , 10 S.Ct. 60 ( contractor who built lines for telegraph company not 'employee' within statute giving employees liens against corporate property); Malcomson v. Wapoo Mills, C.C., 86 F. 192 (same); cf. United States v. Griffith, 55 App. D.C. 123, 2 F.2d 925 (War Department clerk receiving disability compensation held employee of government within common law rule of the District of Columbia that employee of a litigant cannot be a member of jury); see also, Hull v. Philadelphia & Reading Ry., 252 U.S. 475 , 40 S.Ct. 358; Louisville, etc., R.R. v. Wilson, 138 U.S. 501 , 11 S.Ct. 405; Campbell v. Commissioner, 7 Cir., 87 F.2d 128; Burnet v. Jones, 8 Cir., 50 F.2d 14; Burnet v. McDonough, 8 Cir., 46 F.2d 944.
[ Footnote 30 ] S. 1629, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.
[ Footnote 31 ] S. Doc. 152, 73rd Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 352, 304(a)(1).
'The regulation of the hours of service of bus and truck operators is far more important from a safety standpoint than the regulation of the hours of service of railroad employees because the danger is greater. ... This could be accomplished by inserting in section 304(a)(1) and (2), lines 9 and 15, page 8, following the word 'records' in both lines, the words which appear in S. 394, as follows: 'qualifications and maximum hours of service of employees."
The clause in question came from 2(a)(1) of S. 394, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., a subsection otherwise substantially like the corresponding subsection in S. 1629.
'In order to make the highways more safe, and so that common and contract carriers may not be unduly prejudiced in their competition with peddler trucks and other private operators of motor trucks, a provision was added in subparagraph 3 giving the Commission authority to establish similar requirements with respect to the qualifications and hours of service of the employees of such operators. ...' 79 Cong.Rec. 5652.
[ Footnote 33 ] S.Rep. 482, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. The report stated: 'No regulation is proposed for private carriers except that an amendment adopted in committee authorizes the Commission to regulate the 'qualifications and maximum hours of service of employees and safety of operation and equipment' of private carriers of property by motor vehicle in the event that the Commission determines there is need for such regulation. Other amendments adopted by the committee confer like authority upon the Commission with respect to common and contract carriers.' Safety of operation and equipment was in the original bill.
[ Footnote 34 ] See last paragraph of remarks of Senator Wheeler, note 32 supra.
[ Footnote 35 ] Hearings, note 32 supra.
[ Footnote 36 ] 79 Cong.Rec. 12206.
[ Footnote 37 ] H.R.Rep. No. 1645, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.
[ Footnote 38 ] Norwegian Nitrogen Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, 315 , 53 S. Ct. 350, 358.
[ Footnote 39 ] Hassett v. Welch, 303 U.S. 303, 310 , 58 S.Ct. 559, 563.
[ Footnote 40 ] Ex parte No. MC-2, 3 M.C.C. 665, 667.
[ Footnote 41 ] 81 Cong.Rec. 7875.
[ Footnote 42 ] The pending legislation is S. 2009, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., 84 Cong. Rec. 3509. As to the point here under discussion, the report of the Senate Committee said: 'Paragraph (1) of section 34 of the bill is based on the provisions of subparagraphs (1), (2), and (3) of section 204(a) of the Motor Carrier Act. In the original draft, there was inserted at the beginning of the paragraph the clause 'in order to promote safety of operations.' thus making clear that the Commission's power to regulate qualifications and maximum hours of service of employees is confined to those who have anything to do with safety of operation. This is a question with respect to which considerable doubt seems to have arisen under the wording of the present law. Upon the strenuous objection of the truckers claiming conflict between this law and the Fair Labor Standards Act, the bill (i.e., the committee amendment) restores the law to the present provisions of the Motor Carrier Act.' S.Rep. No. 433, 76th Cong., 1st Sess ., p. 24. The bill passed the Senate. The House bill left 204(a)(1), (2) and (3) of the present act unchanged. 84 Cong.Rec. 9456; H.R.Rep. No. 1217, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., 84 Cong.Rec. 10125.
While the bills were in conference the Chairman of the Legislative Committee of the Interstate Commerce Commission sent to the chairmen of the House and Senate Committees a letter on the House and Senate bills which suggested that both bills explicitly limit the Commission's jurisdiction over qualifications and hours of service of employees to considerations of safety. The letter stated: 'While the subsection (in the Senate bill) follows the existing language of section 204 ..., a controversy has arisen in regard to the meaning of that language. ... This controversy has now reached the Supreme Court. We think it may well be determined in this new legislation. In our judgment, if restrictions on hours of labor for social and economic reasons are to be imposed, this should be done by Congress, and no duty in that respect should be delegated to the Commission, which has no experience which particularly fits it for the performance of such a duty. Our authority over qualifications and hours of service of employees should, therefore, be confined to the needs of safety in operation. ...' On April 26, 1940, the House conferees reported to the House a compromise bill agreed on by the conference committee which left 204(a)(1), (2), and (3) of the Motor Carrier Act unamended. 86 Cong.Rec. 7847; H.R.Rep. No. 2016, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. On May 9, 1940, the House because of disagreement with sections of this bill not here relevant voted to recommit the bill to the conference committee. 86 Cong.Rec. 8986.
[ Footnote 44 ] H.R.Rep. No. 1645, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.

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