Source: https://www.lawpipe.com/U.S.%20Supreme%20Court/Baylis_v_Travellers_Insurance_Co.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 02:06:52+00:00

Document:
In Baylis v. Travellers' Insurance Co., 113 U.S. 316 (1885) it was an action on a policy of accident insurance, and on the trial before a jury in the Circuit Court the parties differed as to whether the plaintiff's evidence was sufficient to sustain a verdict in her favor, no evidence being presented by the defendant.
The court directed a verdict for the plaintiff, subject to its opinion on the sufficiency of the evidence, and the jury conformed to that direction.
On further consideration, and construing the evidence in a manner deemed most favorable to the plaintiff, the court ruled that it was insufficient, because admitting of but one conclusion, namely, that the insured's death resulted from a cause not covered by the policy.
Judgment was then given for the defendant notwithstanding the verdict, and the plaintiff brought the case to the U.S. Supreme Court.
"If, after the plaintiff's case had been closed, the court had directed a verdict for the defendant on the ground that the evidence, with all inferences that the jury could justifiably draw from it, was insufficient to support a verdict for the plaintiff, so that such a verdict, if returned, must be set aside, it would have followed a practice sanctioned by repeated decisions of this court. Randall v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, 109 U.S. 478 (1883), and cases there cited. And, in that event, the plaintiff, having duly excepted to the ruling in a bill of exceptions, setting out all the evidence, upon a writ of error, would have been entitled to the judgment of this court, whether, as a matter of law, the ruling against him was erroneous.
"Or, if in the present case, a verdict having been taken for the plaintiff by direction of the court, subject to its opinion whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain it, the court had subsequently granted a motion on behalf of the defendant for a new trial, and set aside the verdict, on the ground of the insufficiency of the evidence, it would have followed a common practice, in respect to which error could not have been alleged, or it might, with propriety, have reserved the question, what judgment should be rendered, and in favor of what party, upon an agreed statement of facts, and afterwards rendered judgment upon its conclusions of law. But, without a waiver of the right of trial by jury, by consent of parties, the court errs if it substitutes itself for the jury, and, passing upon the effect of the evidence, finds the facts involved in the issue and renders judgment thereon.
"This was what was done in the present case. It may be that the conclusions of fact reached and stated by the court are correct, and, when properly ascertained, that they require such a judgment as was rendered. That is a question not before us. The plaintiff in error complains that he was entitled to have the evidence submitted to the jury, and to the benefit of such conclusions of fact as it might justifiably have drawn; a right he demanded and did not waive; and that he has been deprived of it, by the act of the court, in entering a judgment against him on its own view of the evidence, without the intervention of a jury. In this particular, we think error has been well assigned.
"The right of trial by jury in the courts of the United States is expressly secured by the Seventh Article of Amendment to the Constitution, and Congress has, by statute, provided for the trial of issues of fact in civil cases by the court without the intervention of a jury, only when the parties waive their right to a jury by a stipulation in writing. Rev. Stat., §§ 648, 649.
"This constitutional right this court has always guarded with jealousy. Elmore v. Grymes, 1 Pet. 469; De Wolf v. Rabaud, 1 Pet. 476; Castle v. Bullard, 23 How. 172; Hodges v. Easton, 106 U.S. 408."
In Baylis v. Travellers' Insurance Co., supra, the action was upon a policy of insurance to be paid to the plaintiff in case his father "should accidentally sustain bodily injury which should produce death within ninety days."
After the close of the testimony, the defendant moved to dismiss on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to support a verdict. The motion was denied, the plaintiff insisting that there were questions of fact which should be submitted to the jury.
The court then directed the jury to find a verdict for the plaintiff subject to its opinion upon the question whether the facts warranted a recovery. Subsequently the court denied a motion for judgment on the verdict in favor of the plaintiff and directed judgment to be entered for the defendant. The Court reversed the judgment and ordered a new trial.
"But, without a waiver of the right of trial by jury, by consent of parties, the court errs if it substitutes itself for the jury, and, passing upon the effect of the evidence, finds the facts involved in the issue, and renders judgment thereon.
"This is what was done in the present case. It may be that the conclusions of fact reached and stated by the court are correct, and, when properly ascertained, that they require such a judgment as was rendered. That is a question not before us. The plaintiff in error complains that he was entitled to have the evidence submitted to the jury, and to the benefit of such conclusions of fact as it might justifiably have drawn; a right he demanded and did not waive; and that he has been deprived of it, by the act of the court, in entering a judgment against him on its own view of the evidence, without the intervention of a jury.

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