Source: https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/339/103
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 14:35:49+00:00

Document:
Respondent was tried in Germany on January 9 and 14, 1947, before a general court-martial which had been appointed by order of the commanding general of the Continental Base Section, European Theatre, on December 7, 1946. The detail appointed was comprised of a trial judge advocate and two assistant trial judge advocates, defense counsel and two assistant defense counsel, the law member and twelve other officers. The ranking officer of the detail, a Colonel of the Field Artillery with twenty-five years of commissioned service, was appointed law member. The only member of the detail appointed from the Judge Advocate General's Department was a captain who was designated an assistant trial judge advocate. 2 He was absent from respondent's trial on verbal orders of the commanding general.
The Court of Appeals determined that under these circumstances the court-martial had been appointed in disregard of the 8th Article of War, 41 Stat. 788, 10 U.S.C. 1479, 10 U.S.C.A. § 1479. The relevant provision of this article as in force at the time of respondent's trial is set forth in the margin. 3 The article was interpreted by the Court of Appeals as requiring, 'certainly in times of peace, that the presence of a duly qualified law member from the Judge Advocate General's Department be made a jurisdictional prerequisite to the validity of such court-martial proceeding, except in the single instance where such officer is actually, and in fact, 'not available." 175 F.2d at page 276. The Court of Appeals held that the availability of a law member from the Judge Advocate General's Department was conclusively indicated by the order detailing an officer from that department in another capacity without any explanation. Thus the court concluded that the proceeding was void.
The 8th Article has also been consistently interpreted and applied by the Army as vesting a discretion in the appointing authority, which when exercised is conclusive in determining not only the accessibility of personnel but also the suitability of the officer detailed as the law member of a general court-martial. CM 231963, Hatteberg, 18 B.R. 349, 366369 (1943); CM ETO 804, Ogletree, 2 B.R. (ETO) 337, 346 (1943); CM 209988, Cromwell, 9 B.R. 169, 196 (1938); Digest of Opinions of The Judge Advocate General (19121940) § 365(9). This established interpretation is entitled to great weight in our determination of the meaning of the article. Cf. United States ex rel. Hirshberg v. Cooke, 1949, 336 U.S. 210, 216, 69 S.Ct. 530, 533.
The exercise of the discretion thus conferred on the appointing authority may be reviewed by the courts only if a gross abuse of that discretion would have given rise to a defect in the jurisdiction of the court-martial. 5 However, we need not determine at this time whether the provision of the 8th Article relied upon below imposed a requirement going to the jurisdiction of the court-martial, for nothing in the record here involved indicates that the discretion of the appointing authority was improperly exercised. Clearly no abuse is disclosed by the appointment of an officer from the Judge Advocate General's Department to a capacity other than law member on the detail, or by reassignment of that officer to other duty at the time of trial, or by the standard of competence in legal matters shown by the law member at the trial.
The Court of Appeals also concluded that certain errors committed by the military tribunal and reviewing authorities had deprived respondent of due process. 6 We think the court was in error in extending its review, for the purpose of determining compliance with the due process clause, to such matters as the propositions of law set forth in the staff judge advocate's report, the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain respondent's conviction, the adequacy of the pretrial investigation, and the competence of the law member and defense counsel. Cf. Humphrey v. Smith, 1949, 336 U.S. 695, 69 S.Ct. 830. It is well settled that 'by habeas corpus the civil courts exercise no supervisory or correcting power over the proceedings of a court-martial * * *. The single inquiry, the test, is jurisdiction.' In re Grimley, 1890, 137 U.S. 147, 150, 11 S.Ct. 54, 34 L.Ed. 636. In this case the court-martial had jurisdiction of the person accused and the offense charged, and acted within its lawful powers. The correction of any errors it may have committed is for the military authorities which are alone authorized to review its decision. Application of Yamashita, 1946, 327 U.S. 1, 8-9, 66 S.Ct. 340, 344, 345, 90 L.Ed. 499; Swaim v. United States, supra, 165 U.S. at page 562, 17 S.Ct. at page 451, 41 L.Ed. 823.
'The authority appointing a general court-martial shall detail as one of the members thereof a law member, who shall be an officer of the Judge Advocate General's Department, except that when an officer of that department is not available for the purpose the appointing authority shall detail instead an officer of some other branch of the service selected by the appointing authority as specially qualified to perform the duties of law member. * * *' 41 Stat. 788, 10 U.S.C. 1479, 10 U.S.C.A. § 1479. The 8th Article was amended substantially in 1948, 62 Stat. 628 629. See note 5, infra.
The relevant legislative history of the provision of the 8th Article relating to the law member supports this interpretation. Prior to the adoption of the 8th Article of War in 1920, military law did not provide for the service of a law member on a court-martial. Under the impetus for reform following World War I, the original draft of what became the 8th Article provided that every general court-martial should have a judge advocate whose duties were to be similar to those of the 'law member,' as finally provided for. The proposed Article would have provided further that such judge advocate of the court be a member of the Judge Advocate General's Department or an officer whose qualifications were approved by the Judge Advocate General. Hearings on S. 64, Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs, 66th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 5. The proposed Article was, however, abandoned for the provisions of the 8th Article. See 18 B.R. 349, 366367 (1943).
The 8th Article of War, as in force since February 1, 1949, expressly imposes as a jurisdictional requirement that the law member be an officer from the Judge Advocate General's Department or an officer whose qualification for such detail has been certified by the Judge Advocate General. 62 Stat. 628629.
James Roy GOSA, Petitioner, v. J. A. MAYDEN, Warden. John W. WARNER, Secretary of the Navy, Petitioner, v. John W. FLEMINGS.
BURNS et al. v. WILSON, Secretary of Defense et al.
Robert W. BURNS and Herman P. Dennis, Jr., Petitioners, v. Charles E. WILSON, Secretary of Defense, Harold E. Talbot, Secretary of the AirForce, General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Chief of Staff, United States Air Force.

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