Source: https://www.mediainstitute.org/2014/09/05/capturing-the-future-patent-claims-and-after-arising-technologies/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 08:26:04+00:00

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Exclusive rights for new technologies, in order to promote innovation: that’s what the patent system is supposed to be about. And at least sometimes, even today, it still is. At times, to promote innovation today patents may be interpreted in a way that covers technologies that had not existed when the original patent was filed. This is one instance of a more general issue in patent law: the division of legal rights (and profits) between original “pioneering” inventors and later “improvers.” The classic theory in this general area – elegantly described by the economist Suzanne Scotchmer – shows that patent law can achieve a sort of magic balance, mixing incentives for a broad pioneering invention with incentives for the development of later or “after-arising” technologies (AATs).1 Patent law does and always has permitted patent claims to cover AATs; in some cases, it is considered appropriate. The first-generation technology is so important and “pioneering” that patent law permits that first-generation patent claim to cover technologies not yet developed.
What is the current state of play with regard to attempts to “claim the future”? And how well do current patent rules serve the purpose of promoting innovation – are they, in their current form, striking the right balance between pioneering inventors and improvers? These are the issues I consider in this brief essay.
One of the classic cases involving AAT is Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States.2 In Hughes, the Federal Circuit considered infringement of a patent where significant advances in computer technology had occurred after the patents in the case had issued. The smaller size and higher calculation capacity of second-generation computers allowed changes in the nature and location of calculations related to satellite positioning. The patent’s claims covered the control of satellite orientation using commands from a ground control station. The claims expressly required that the satellite provide the ground station with data sufficient to calculate an “instantaneous spin angle” (“ISA”) position.3 The ground crew would then make the necessary calculations and send a signal to the satellite to adjust its position. Due to vast reduction in the size and vast improvement in the capacity of computer components, the accused devices were able to calculate the ISA position onboard the satellite. The accused satellites transferred different information to the ground station because the onboard computer calculated ISA position. Despite this “missing limitation” from the claims, the after-arising technology still permitted the ground crew to control the satellite. The result was an insubstantial change in the way the satellites performed the claimed function.4 The AAT – smaller, faster computers – was said to be covered by the original (pioneering) claims.
These AAT cases have two key features. First, they are centered around technologies that are in fact quite innovative. The Hughes cases involved claims to an early geostationary orbital satellite, and the “attitude adjustment” feature of the claims involving positioning calculations was a key reason the satellites could stay in their orbits with such reliability. Likewise in the hearing aid case, the adjustment of hearing aid performance using filtering coefficients was considered an important step forward in the field.
There is another variety of AAT case that comes out very differently from cases such as Hughes. In these cases, claim drafters set out to cover “the next big thing” on the basis of some early, arguably preliminary, technological development. The courts have been much less solicitous of this type of AAT case. Under the written description doctrine, they have tended to hold that claims of this sort are invalid because they appear in patents that do not adequately describe the “over the horizon” technologies they claim.
One example is University of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co.7 In this case, university researchers discovered a mechanism – a cellular pathway – that was thought to hold significant promise as a new way to alleviate inflammation without causing the stomach upset associated with many analgesics. The claims in the case were essentially of the form, “any anti-inflammatory drug that uses the pathway we have discovered.” Some in the research community described these as “reach through” claims: they were an attempt to cover the as-yet-undiscovered drugs that were to be developed to take advantage of the discovered pathway. The Federal Circuit invalidated the claims under the written description doctrine, pointing out that the patentees claimed a host of molecules that had not actually been identified as of the patent’s filing date.
The claims in Ariad Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co.8 were quite similar, and the Federal Circuit once again invalidated them. The general thrust of the holding was, once again, that claims that are completely disproportionate to the information disclosed will not be tolerated.
Truly pioneering inventions will be allowed to cover AATs.
But a technology in existence when a claim is drafted will be treated differently, since the patentee could have at least tried to cover it but in effect chose not to.
Attempts to explicitly claim “ahead” on a technological trajectory will be rejected, because to grant these claims would in effect award pioneering drafting rather than pioneering innovation.
Though these general rules have evolved without specific reference to the economic theory of pioneers and improvers, overall they are a reasonable approximation of how that theory might be applied to complex technologies involving patent claims.
1. Suzanne Scotchmer, Innovation and Incentives (MIT Press, 2006).
2. 140 F.3d 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
5. Energy Transp. Grp., Inc. v. William Demant Holding A/S, 697 F.3d 1342, 1353-54 (Fed. Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2010, 185 L. Ed. 2d 868 (U.S. 2013).
[T]he cache memory functionality that is the basis for Gemalto’s theory was employed by microprocessor-based systems at the time of the invention. Gemalto has admitted that “‘microprocessors in 1996 did have cache memory,’” J.A. 1852, and that these microprocessors ran Java applications before the 1996 priority date of the asserted patents. If cache memory were equivalent to the recited memory that stores an application and interpreter, Gemalto’s claims would read on microprocessor systems that were widely used prior to its invention. The doctrine of equivalents cannot be applied to encompass the prior art as “this court has consistently limited the doctrine of equivalents to prevent its application to ensnare prior art.” Marquip, Inc. v. Fosber Am., Inc., 198 F.3d 1363, 1367 (Fed.Cir.1999) (citing Wilson Sporting Goods v. David Geoffrey & Assoc., 904 F.2d 677, 683 (Fed.Cir.1990)). In Marquip, we recognized that “[b]ecause prior art limits the exclusive right available to an inventor, it also limits the range of permissible equivalents of a claim.” Id. Applying the doctrine of equivalents to cover cache memory used in the prior art is not permissible. We agree with the district court that the accused devices do not infringe under the doctrine of equivalents due to their use of cache memory.
In particular, though elegant, the subject matter claimed by the ’389 patent involves relatively simple and well-known technologies. The patentees also stated that they were aware of other types of four bar mechanisms. (See June 10, 2003 Dep. of Michael D. Moffa at 89-95; June 9, 2003 Dep. of Brian W. McClintock at 46-47.) Yet, they chose to specifically limit the claims to slider-crank mechanisms vis-à-vis the “slidably mounted” moveable end limitation. Members of the public were therefore justified in relying on this specific language in assessing the bounds of the claim. Accordingly, we think that to now say the claims include other four bar mechanisms under the doctrine of equivalents would unjustly undermine the reasonable expectations of the public.
7. 375 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
8. 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010).

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