Source: http://www.lawschoolcasebriefs.net/2014/05/admin-law-outline-fall-2011-william.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 23:12:12+00:00

Document:
Textbook: Administrative Law: Cases and Materials, by Koch, Jordan, & Murphy (Lexis 5th ed.).
(b) Independent Agencies (FCC, FTC, NLRB): have boards, rather than sole agency heads so they won’t change w/ political whims. Also have fixed terms – cant remove w/o cause.
b) Agency must always have a statutory grant of power – ALWAYS inquire whether the agency is w/in power – the key to AL is knowing the limitation of A authority (i.e. applied Con Law) - statutory grant will mark the limit of the agency’s power.
b) P#2: work for regulated parties rather than the public, e.g. United Air can offer or refuse to hire the Civil Aeronautics Board (an A that regulates the mkt for air travel by regulating rates for flying) in the private sector if reg’trs make barriers to entry difficult to routes for United (i.e. cushy r’ships with reg’trs), e.g. certifiers for power plants less interested in environmental factor b/c in bed w/ industry, e.g. Boeing v. NLRB re move to SC (Obama – “I don’t control NLRB”).
i) Ex: investigate implementation of statutory programs, congressional demands for info / reg’try reporting.
b) Issues / problems: 1) Separation of powers (e.g. Daffy Duck v. Elmer Fudd prize fight where referee is a duck and audience members are ducks), 2) Level of discretion and 3) Punishment authority, BUT this is highly EFFICIENT and deference is appropriately given to EXPERTS.
i) Raises question: Can we conceptualize Agency action (AA) as fundamentally legitimate despite SoPowers issues.
1) Non-Delegation: Article I vests “the legislative power of the United States” in Congress.
a) 2 views as to How can agencies draft regulations that look and act like statutes?
(1) Rule: Intelligible Principle standardàdiscernible standards in statute?
(2) Thus, though it carries little bite, Congress grants broad discretion to agencies. A statute will never be struck down for NDD reasons BUT it acts as a negative magnetic field and pushes Congress away from extremely broad delegations.
Ø Whitman v. American Trucking: The EPA revised national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) under the §109(b)(1) of the CAA. Several states challenged the new promulgated rules, questioning whether 6109(b)(1) of CAA delegates legislative power to the EPA?
o Held: no NDD problem and 109 disallows factoring in costs in setting air quality; (in dicta?), states that agency nor courts should resolve NDD issues.
§ CoA suggested remanding to A for interpretation of “air quality” but Scalia says: not role of A to cure its own NDD problem, e.g. by limiting own discretion. Purpose of NDD is to prevent Cong from writing an overly broad stat and delegating power citizen have given to Cong, not unelected A’s.
§ Souter agrees, stating: allowing A to cure violation of NDD by narrowing reg’n 1) puts A in legislating role when they are technocrats and 2) puts courts in legislating role by evaluating A interpretation of unintelligible principle.
a) Adjudication by a non-article III court: Article III vests judicial power in SCOTUS and in inferior federal courts.
o (2) public v. private rights distinction (non-Art. III, i.e. martial, deal w/ public): matters which arise “between the government and persons subject to its authority in connection with the performance of the constitutional functions of the executive or legislative departments” – in contrast private is between to private parties.
Ø *CFTC v. Schor: Schor brought suit against his broker, who then filed a counterclaim (private claim but ancillary to Schor’s). The broker prevailed and Schor challenged CFTC’s authority to adjudicate the counterclaim as violated Art. III. The limited jurisdiction that CFTC asserts over state law claims as a necessary incident to the adjudication of federal claims willingly submitted by the parties for initial agency adjudication does not contravene separation of powers principles or Article III.
iii) Balancing test – weighs the threat to Art. III values against the concerns that led to the assignment of adjudicatory authority to the agency.
(4) Public v. Private à still a factor.
b) As one factor is more important, the others are less so (i.e. some mutual exclusivity).
i) Legislative Veto: Congress enacts a law delegating broad responsibility to an agency – but reserves for itself the right to reject any agency action taken pursuant to that authority.
o Why does Congress have to endure bicameralism and presentment, but not agencies, when both are making laws? APA provides procedures for review of procedural fairness, appropriate deliberations and rationality. Gen’ly cant be ___, aside from toothless constitutional standard of rational basis).

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