Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&amp;view=article&amp;id=22589:g-r-no-l-29912-may-31,-1977-people-of-the-phil-v-asterio-marcina&amp;catid=1094&amp;Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 02:00:42+00:00

Document:
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ASTERIO MARCINA alias AGO, Defendant-Appellant.
Agustin M. Gramata for Appellant.
Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar, Assistant Solicitor General Antonio A. Torres and Solicitor Alicia V. Sempio-Dy for Appellee.
It was the death of a certain Eliseo Ganay that led to the prosecution and thereafter conviction for the crime of murder of the accused Asterio Marcina, now the appellant. The trial judge gave credence to the evidence for the prosecution that the victim having taken refuge in the house of the accused in San Fabian on October 17, 1967 as the typhoon Welming prevented his return to Sison, both municipalities being in Pangasinan, was thereafter killed by the latter. The motive presumably was jealousy induced by improper advances to the wife of the host. The testimony on behalf of the accused that the deceased met his death by drowning was thus found lacking in persuasiveness. Essentially then, this is another one of those cases where the oft-reiterated doctrine of the findings of fact by a lower court being entitled to respect in the absence of circumstances of weight and impact either ignored or improperly appraised possesses relevance. After a careful study of the record, this Court is unable to discern any justification for not applying such principle. We cannot reverse.
That is all, and it is not enough. The doctrine of an appellate tribunal according due weight and respect to the findings of a lower court stands in the way. A careful perusal of the record does not warrant a reversal.
1.	An excerpt from People v. Berame, 3 decided less than a year ago, is apropos: "This is a case, therefore, where the trial court, after hearing and observing the witnesses testify, and weighing what was said by them, did choose to believe the prosecution rather than the defense. For such a finding to be overturned, there must be a showing that it did overlook a material fact or circumstance or did misinterpret its significance." 4 Not that there is novelty to such a doctrine. One of its earliest formulations came from United States v. Ambrosio, 5 handed down in 1910. In the language of Justice Moreland, the ponente: "We do not feel like interfering with the intelligent conclusion of a court concerning the credibility of witnesses unless the record discloses that some fact or circumstance of weight and influence was overlooked by the court or has been misapprehended or misinterpreted. A careful examination of the record discloses to us no fact, no circumstance, upon which we may base ourselves in saying that the trial court had no right to arrive at the conclusion which he reached. His mind upon all the evidence was free from a reasonable doubt. So is ours." 6 A succinct statement of the reason that calls for such a principle may be found in Justice Malcom’s opinion in United States v. Remegio. 7 Thus: "Relative to these findings of the trial court, we should of course begin with the application of the oft-repeated rule as to the conclusion of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses. The reason for this rule is that the trial court who sees and hears the witnesses testify is in a far better position than the appellate court to determine their credibility." 8 There has been no retreat from such an approach. 9 The task before appellant then was for from easy, and it was not rendered any easier by the fact that the tone in which the decision was assailed, while vigorous, suffered from some discordant notes. That could not be helped as the testimony of the prosecution witnesses held fast notwithstanding all attempts to detect flaws or inconsistencies. The lower court, therefore, could not be blamed for lending it credence. Nor was there any showing of any fact that was overlooked or the significance of which was misinterpreted.
2.	It is undoubted that the well-settled doctrine as to matters of credibility being for the lower court to decide cannot, in the language of People v. Macaraeg 10 "rise above the constitutional presumption of innocence which can only be overcome if the proof of guilt is beyond reasonable doubt. A doctrine of this Tribunal, however well-grounded in our past decisions, cannot prevail as against a mandate of the Constitution." 11 It is quite understandable then why appellant did try to show that the deceased met his death by drowning. Such an attempt, however, was marked by futility. Considering the undeniable fact that the typhoon Welming was at its height in the vicinity, the waters of the river Bued thus rendered treacherous, it would be the height of folly to attempt to cross it by swimming. Common experience cautions against the acceptance of a tale so contrary to what a man is his right senses would do or refrain from doing. The lower court therefore cannot be blamed for refusing to yield assent.
5.	The accused was found guilty of murder, the qualifying circumstance of alevosia being appreciated. Why the offense should be thus qualified was explained in the appealed decision. Thus: "The manner in which the accused disposed of and killed Eliseo Ganay shows a mind disposed to commit a crime of murder, and was done so under a circumstance in which the deceased was not able to offer any resistance, or could not, in any way, defend himself. Of course, it cannot be said with certainty that the deceased, Eliseo L. Ganay, was shot while still sleeping, but it can be said that he was not shot while lying down. The motive for the killing is very clear, the accused himself provided it in his admission to Staff Sergeant Alejandro Acosta, jealousy." 18 In reaching such a conclusion, the lower court appeared to have ignored the equally well-settled doctrine that the same degree of proof to dispel any reasonable doubt is required to justify a finding of a qualifying circumstance. More specifically as to alevosia, Justice Mapa in United States v. Rana, 19 a 1905 decision, categorically affirmed: "As the [qualifying] circumstance of treachery (alevosia) is an important one, in considering it, it should by all means be based on some positive conclusive proof and not merely upon hypothetical facts drawn more or less logically, because it is necessary that the existence of this circumstance in the commission of the crime should be proven as fully as the crime itself, in order to aggravate the penalty incurred by the guilty party." 20 There was a reiteration of such a principle in the recent case of People v. Ardisa 21 in these words: "The qualifying circumstance of treachery may not be simply deduced from presumption as it is necessary that the existence of this qualifying or aggravating circumstance should be proven as fully as the crime itself in order to aggravate the liability or penalty incurred by the culprit." 22 There are a number of decisions to the same effect. 23 The lower court thus clearly failed to meet the exacting norm required by the law to justify the verdict that murder was committed. At the most, only homicide in the state of the competent and credible evidence of record could be imputed to Appellant.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of November 15, 1968 is modified in the sense that appellant Asterio Marcina is found guilty of the crime of homicide and adjudged to suffer the indeterminate sentence of 8 years and one day of prision mayor as minimum and 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum. In all other respects, the appealed decision is affirmed.
Aquino and Martin, JJ., concur.
Barredo and Antonio, JJ., concurs in the result.
1.	Apparently, he was never apprehended for his participation. the information filed in this case being only against Marcina.
2.	Decision, Annex to Brief, 40.
3.	L-27606, July 30, 1976, 72 SCRA 184.
7.	37 Phil. 599 (1918).
9.	Cf. People v. Gumahin, L-22357, Oct. 31, 1967, 21 SCRA 729; People v. Panganiban, L-22476, Feb. 27, 1978, 22 SCRA 817; People v. Pelago, L-24884, Aug. 31, 1968, 24 SCRA 1027; People v. Manos, L-27791, Dec. 24, 1970, 36 SCRA 457; People v. Beraces, L-25016, March 27, 1971, 38 SCRA 127; People v. Sabandal, L-31129, Sept. 30, 1971, 41 SCRA 179; People v. Dramayo, L-21325, Oct. 29, 1971, 42 SCRA 59; People v. Angcap, L-28748, Feb. 29, 1972, 43 SCRA 437; People v. Carandang, L-31012, Aug. 15, 1973, 52 SCRA 259; People v. Macaraeg, L-32806, Oct. 23, 1973, 53 SCRA 285; People v. Cudalina, L-34969, April 29, 1975, 63 SCRA 499; People v. De la Victoria, L-30037, June 27, 1975, 64 SCRA 400; People v. Ordonio, L-33829, Dec. 19, 1975, 68 SCRA 397; People v. Sarile, L-37148, June 30, 1976, 71 SCRA 593; People v. Berame, L-27606, July 30, 1976, 72 SCRA 184.
10.	L-32806, October 23, 1973, 53 SCRA 285.
11.	Ibid, 291. The opinion cited People v. Alto, L-18660, November 29, 1968, 26 SCRA 342 and People v. Pagkaliwagan, L-29948, November 26, 1970, 36 SCRA 113.
12.	He was assisted by the then Assistant Solicitor General Antonio A. Torres and the then Solicitor, now JDRC Judge, Alicia V. Sempio-Dy.
13.	Brief for Appellee, 10-11.
16.	112 Phil. 546 (1961).
18.	Decision, Annex to Brief, 51-52.
21.	L-29351, January 23, 1974, 55 SCRA 245.
23.	Cf. People v. Pelago, L-24884, Aug. 21, 1968, 24 SCRA 1027; People v. Torejas, L-29935, Jan. 31, 1972, 43 SCRA 158; People v. Palacpac, L-27822, Feb. 28, 1973, 49 SCRA 440; People v. Ardisa, L-29351, Jan. 23, 1974, 55 SCRA 245; People v. Manlapaz, L-27259, Feb. 27, 1974, 55 SCRA 598; People v. Ybanez, L-30421, March 28, 1974, 56 SCRA 210; People v. Manzano, L-33643, July 31, 1974, 58 SCRA 250; People v. Besana, L-26191, May 19, 1975, 64 SCRA 84; People v. Samonte, L-31225, June 11, 1975, 64 SCRA 319; People v. Macaso, L-30489, June 30, 1975, 64 SCRA 659; People v. Anin, L-39046, June 30, 1975, 64 SCRA 729; People v. Payao, L-29364, Nov. 21, 1976, 68 SCRA 70.

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