Source: https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_rul_rule47_sectionc
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 09:01:36+00:00

Document:
When persons entitled to protection as prisoners of war have fallen into the power of an adverse Party under unusual conditions of combat which prevent their evacuation … they shall be released and all feasible precautions shall be taken to ensure their safety.
If the conditions do not allow for the evacuation of prisoners of war, they must … be guarded while waiting until their evacuation is possible … [or] they must be released, while taking certain precautions for the security of [both the capturing forces] and of the prisoners of war.
The Regulations also states that “[i]t is prohibited to attack … the wounded, sick, shipwrecked, [or] prisoners of war”.
Burundi, Règlement n° 98 sur le droit international humanitaire, Ministère de la Défense Nationale et des Anciens Combattants, Projet “Moralisation” (BDI/B-05), August 2007, Part I bis, pp. 9 and 10.
Where persons entitled to protection as prisoners of war (PWs) have fallen into the power of an adverse party under unusual conditions of combat that prevent their evacuation as provided for in [the 1949 Geneva Convention III], they shall be released and all feasible precautions shall be taken to ensure their safety.
The “unusual conditions of combat” may include, for example, the capture of a PW by a long-range patrol that does not have the ability to properly evacuate the PW. In such circumstances, there would be an obligation to release the PW and take all feasible precautions to ensure his safety. Such precautions might include providing the PW with sufficient food and water or other aids to assist in rejoining unit lines.
Canada, The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Level, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 1999, p. 6-3, §§ 18 and 19.
1. Where persons entitled to protection as prisoners of war (PWs) have fallen into the power of an adverse party under unusual conditions of combat that prevent their evacuation as provided for in the GIII, they shall be released and all feasible precautions shall be taken to ensure their safety. For the obligations of a belligerent with respect to the evacuation of PWs, refer to Chapter 10 (Treatment of Prisoners of War).
2. The “unusual conditions of combat” may include, for example, the capture of a PW by a long-range patrol that does not have the ability to evacuate the PW properly. In such circumstances, there would be an obligation to release the PW and take all feasible precautions to ensure his safety. Such precautions might include providing the PW with sufficient food and water or other aids to assist in rejoining unit lines.
Canada, The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Levels, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 13 August 2001, § 609.
Troops holding PWs [prisoners of war] may not kill them to preserve themselves, even in cases of extreme necessity; for instance, because they slow up their movements, require guards needed for other purposes, consume scarce supplies or appear certain to be set free by their own forces. If they cannot be held, they must be released unharmed.
Ireland, Basic Guide to the Law of Armed Conflict, TP/TRG/01-2005, Director of Defence Forces Training, Department of Defence, July 2005, p. 8.
Considerations such as the delay involved in guarding prisoners of war as opposed to the attainment of an objective, or even the allocation of manpower for transferring them to the rear line, do not permit the harming of prisoners who surrendered and were disarmed. It is hard to imagine a military mission so urgent as to render impossible the evacuation of prisoners to the rear or even binding them until additional forces arrive and which justifies their murder.
Israel, Laws of War in the Battlefield, Manual, Military Advocate General Headquarters, Military School, 1998, p. 45.
Considerations such as delays in reaching the objective due to the need to guard prisoners-of-war or even assigning personnel for the purpose of transferring them to the home front, do not permit attacking prisoners-of-war who have surrendered and have been disarmed. It is difficult to think of a military mission of such urgency that it does not allow the removal of prisoners-of-war to the rear or even immobilising them until the arrival of reinforcements.
Kenya’s LOAC Manual (1997) states that, when the capturing unit, such as a small patrol operating in isolation, is not in a position to evacuate prisoners, “that unit shall release them and take precautions: a) for its own safety …; and b) for the released’s safety (e.g. giving them water and food, the means to signal their location, and subsequently providing information about their location to rescue teams)”.
Kenya, Law of Armed Conflict, Military Basic Course (ORS), 4 Précis, The School of Military Police, 1997, Précis No. 3, p. 8.
A. Prisoners of war must not be unnecessarily exposed to danger while awaiting evacuation from a fighting zone. When they have been captured in unusual circumstances, which prevent them from being evacuated in the normal way, they must be released and all feasible precautions taken to ensure their safety.
Mexico, Manual de Derecho Internacional Humanitario para el Ejército y la Fuerza Área Mexicanos, Ministry of National Defence, June 2009, § 161(A).
The Military Manual (1993) of the Netherlands provides that, when a person falls into the hands of the adversary under exceptional circumstances preventing his evacuation as a prisoner of war, this person must be released. This situation can occur, for instance, for a long-range post.
Netherlands, Humanitair Oorlogsrecht: Handleiding, Voorschift No. 27-412, Koninklijke Landmacht, Militair Juridische Dienst, 2005, § 0410.
f. Evacuate them as soon as the tactical situation permits. If you have to abandon them, you can tie them only if left where they can be found; or release them and give them food and water.
Sierra Leone, The Law of Armed Conflict. Instructor Manual for the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF), Armed Forces Education Centre, September 2007, p. 42.
Spain’s LOAC Manual (1996) states that when the conditions of combat make it impossible to treat prisoners of war properly and to evacuate them (e.g. isolated special operations, small units, mass capture which exceeds the possibility of the unit in question), the prisoners must be released and all feasible precautions must be taken to ensure their safety.
Spain, Orientaciones. El Derecho de los Conflictos Armados, Publicación OR7-004, 2 Tomos, aprobado por el Estado Mayor del Ejército, Division de Operaciones, 18 March 1996, Vol. I, § 7.4.c.
When the conditions in which the hostilities are being conducted prevent prisoners of war from being treated as required and evacuated (isolated action by special operation forces or small units, the capture of large numbers of prisoners of war that the detaining unit does not have the capacity to handle, etc.), they must be released and all feasible precautions taken to ensure their safety.
Spain, Orientaciones. El Derecho de los Conflictos Armados, Tomo 1, Publicación OR7–004, (Edición Segunda), Mando de Adiestramiento y Doctrina, Dirección de Doctrina, Orgánica y Materiales, 2 November 2007, § 7.4.c; see also § 8.3.c.
Switzerland, Lois et coutumes de la guerre (Extrait et commentaire), Règlement 51.7/II f, Armée Suisse, 1987, Article 109, commentary.
Whether a commander may release prisoners of war in the circumstances stated in the text is not clear … If such a release be made, it would seem clear that the commander should supply the prisoners with that modicum of food, water and weapons as would give them a chance of survival.
United Kingdom, The Law of War on Land being Part III of the Manual of Military Law, The War Office, HMSO, 1958, § 137, including footnote 1.
“When persons entitled to protection as prisoners of war have fallen into the power of an adverse Party under unusual conditions of combat which prevent their evacuation as provided for in Part III, Section I, of the Third Convention, they shall be released and all feasible precautions shall be taken to ensure their safety.” … This rule covers cases such as commando operations or long-range reconnaissance patrols in enemy held territory.
United Kingdom, The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, Ministry of Defence, 1 July 2004, § 5.8.
12.64. Although it is forbidden to “kill or wound an enemy who, having laid down his arms, or having no longer means of defence, has surrendered at discretion”, in air-to-air combat, surrender is usually impracticable and occurs very infrequently.
12.64.1. In the special circumstances of air-to-air combat the continuation of an attack after an indication by the opponent of a wish to surrender is not inconsistent with the rule in paragraph 12.64 as the enemy pilot who remains in his aircraft cannot be said to have “laid down his arms” or to have “no longer a means of defence”. However, if the surrender is offered in good faith and in circumstances that do not prevent enforcement, for example, when the engagement has not taken place over enemy territory, it must be respected and accepted. Surrenders of enemy aircraft and crews should not be discouraged because not only is a psychological advantage gained, but an enemy aircraft and defecting aircrew can provide intelligence which, if promptly and properly evaluated, may be of inestimable benefit to operations planning.
12.66. If it is clear that an enemy aircraft is disabled beyond recovery and is unable to continue and will not resume combat, or indeed is unarmed, and its immediate destruction would offer no military advantage then the attack must be broken off to allow its crew and passengers to evacuate.
12.66.1. A topic very closely related to that of surrender in the air is whether an attack should be continued against a disabled aircraft. The rule of the law of armed conflict forbidding the killing or wounding of an enemy who is hors de combat is difficult to apply in the context of aerial warfare. Sometimes pilots simulate disability or loss of control. It is frequently necessary in aerial combat to pursue to destruction an enemy aircraft apparently in distress because of the impossibility of verifying its condition. Despite its apparent condition the aircraft may not have lost the use of all its offensive systems.
United Kingdom, The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, Ministry of Defence, 1 July 2004, §§ 12.64–12.64.1 and 12.66–12.66.1.
12.68. On land, a “downed” airman from an aircraft in distress must be afforded a reasonable opportunity to surrender before the attack upon him is resumed. Clearly if the “downed” airman is incapacitated he is hors de combat and the general rule will apply. The attack may be resumed immediately if he offers violence, attempts to escape or if, suffering no incapacity, he is in territory controlled by his own forces. The pilot who has crash-landed his aircraft and is attempting to complete its destruction or the destruction of any part of his or its equipment is committing a hostile act and may be attacked immediately.
12.69. The use of, for example, military assets to rescue aircrew who have been “downed” on territory under the control of the enemy is a combat activity. It is therefore legitimate for an enemy in such circumstances to attack the rescuers or by some other means to impede or prevent the rescue activity. However, that would not apply in the case of medical personnel, units or transports collecting the sick or wounded, see chapter 7.
12.69.1. The mere fact that a rescue service saves enemy personnel as well as its own does not entitle it to immunity from attack. Once taken prisoner, such enemy personnel should be accorded all the rights of a prisoner of war, at least until their status has been determined. Arguably, any communication by downed aircrew with their national authorities constitutes a hostile act, which would at that point justify an attack upon that aircrew. Such justification may also arise from other conduct indicating that the downed individual is seeking to continue the fight.
12.70. A “downed” airm[a]n at sea falls within the definition of “shipwrecked” so that he must not be attacked if he refrains from hostile acts.
12.70.1. Although it can be argued that search and rescue by aircraft used exclusively for rescuing airmen “downed” at sea in areas either not controlled by friendly forces or not occupied by enemy forces should be regarded as a protected activity under the provisions of Geneva Convention II 1949, it has been the general practice not to afford such protection.
United Kingdom, The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, Ministry of Defence, 1 July 2004, §§ 12.68–12.70.1.
United Kingdom, The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, Ministry of Defence, 1 July 2004, § 8.32.
United States, Field Manual 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare, US Department of the Army, 18 July 1956, as modified by Change No. 1, 15 July 1976, § 85.
Under Ireland’s Geneva Conventions Act (1962), as amended in 1998, any “minor breach” of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, including violations of Article 41(3), is a punishable offence.
Ireland, Geneva Conventions Act, 1962, as amended 1998, Section 4(1) and (4).
When there are reasonable grounds to believe that the captive persons cannot endure the transfer for delivery in the light of the physical and mental condition of the captive persons, available means of transport and other circumstances, the SDF [Self-Defense Force] personnel … may … release the captive persons immediately, after taking all feasible precautions in accordance with the relevant situation, to ensure their safety, such as bringing them to nearby places where they can avoid the direct danger from combat actions, provision of appropriate medical supplies and such like.
Japan, Law concerning the Treatment of Prisoners of War and Other Detainees in Armed Attack Situations, 2004, Article 7.
In the Griffen case in 1968, a US Army Board of Review confirmed the sentence of unpremeditated murder for having executed a Vietnamese prisoner, following a “manifestly illegal” order to do so. The accused declared that “he felt that the security of the platoon would have been violated if the prisoner were kept, since their operations had already been observed by another suspect”. The Board of Review cited paragraph 85 of the US Field Manual prohibiting the killing of prisoners of war. It added that the “killing of a docile prisoner taken during military operations is not justifiable homicide”.
Upon accession to the 1977 Additional Protocol I, Algeria stated that the term “feasible” must be interpreted as referring to “precautions and measures which are feasible in view of the circumstances and the information and means available at the time”.
Algeria, Interpretative declarations made upon accession to the 1977 Additional Protocol I, 16 August 1989, § 1.
At the CDDH, Canada stated that the word “feasible” when used in the 1977 Additional Protocol I, for example in Articles 57 and 58, “refers to what is practicable or practically possible, taking into account all circumstances existing at the relevant time, including those circumstances relevant to the success of military operations”.
Canada, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. VI, CDDH/SR.42, 27 May 1977, p. 224.
Canada, Reservations and statements of understanding made upon ratification of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, 20 November 1990, § 5.
Upon ratification of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, France stated that it considered that the term “feasible” as used in the Protocol meant “that which can be realized or which is possible in practice, taking into account all circumstances ruling at the time, including humanitarian and military considerations”.
France, Reservations and declarations made upon ratification of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, 11 April 2001, § 3.
Upon ratification of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, Germany stated that it understood the word “feasible” to mean “that which is practicable or practically possible, taking into account all circumstances ruling at the time, including humanitarian and military considerations”.
Germany, Declarations made upon ratification of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, 14 February 1991, § 2.
Ireland, Declarations and reservations made upon ratification of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, 19 May 1999, § 6.
Italy, Declarations made upon ratification of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, 27 February 1986, § 2.
Upon ratification of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, the Netherlands declared that “the word ‘feasible’ is to be understood as practicable or practically possible taking into account all circumstances ruling at the time, including humanitarian and military considerations”.
Upon ratification of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, Spain interpreted the term “feasible” as meaning that “the matter in question is feasible or possible in practice, taking into account all the circumstances prevailing at the time, including humanitarian and military aspects”.
Spain, Interpretative declarations made upon ratification of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, 21 April 1989, § 3.
United Kingdom, Declarations made upon signature of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, 12 December 1977, § b.
Upon ratification of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, the United Kingdom stated that it understood the term “feasible” as used in the Protocol to mean “that which is practicable or practically possible, taking into account all circumstances ruling at the time, including humanitarian and military considerations”.
United Kingdom, Reservations and declarations made upon ratification of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, 28 January 1998, § b.
The Report on UK Practice cites a former director of the UK Army Legal Services who stated that UK soldiers were not required to risk their own lives in granting quarter. He added that it may not be practicable to accept surrender of one group of enemy soldiers while under fire from another enemy position. Capture was to take place when circumstances permitted.
Report on UK Practice, 1997, Notes on a meeting with a former Director of Army Legal Services, 19 June 1997, Chapter 2.1.
Paragraph 3 [of Article 41 of the 1977 Additional Protocol I] dealing with the release of prisoners who could not be evacuated proved quite difficult. The phrase “unusual conditions of combat” was intended to reflect the fact that that circumstance would be abnormal. What, in fact, most representatives referred to was the situation of the long distance patrol which is not equipped to detain and evacuate prisoners. The requirement that all “feasible precautions” be taken to ensure the safety of released prisoners was intended to emphasize that the detaining power, even in those extraordinary circumstances, was expected to take all measures that were practicable in the light of the combat situation. In the case of the long distance patrol, it need not render itself ineffective by handing the bulk of its supplies over to the released prisoners, but it should do all that it reasonably can do, in view of all the circumstances, to ensure their safety.
CDDH, Official Records, Vol. XV, CDDH/236/Rev.1, 21 April–11 June 1976, p. 384, § 24.
In their commentary on the 1977 Additional Protocols, Bothe, Partsch and Solf mention Articles 19 and 20 of the 1949 Geneva Convention III (which require the prompt and humane evacuation of prisoners of war from the combat zone to places out of the danger area) and underline that “in certain types of operations, particularly airborne operations, commando raids, and long range reconnaissance patrols, compliance with these articles is clearly impractical, and there has been dispute as to what is required in such cases”.
Michael Bothe, Karl Joseph Partsch, Waldemar A. Solf (eds.), New Rules for Victims of Armed Conflicts, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1982, pp. 223 and 224.

References: § 609
 § 161
 § 0410
 § 7
 § 7
 § 8
 § 137
 § 5
 § 8
 § 85
 § 1
 § 5
 § 3
 § 2
 § 6
 § 2
 § 3
 § 24