Source: https://www.jameseducationcenter.com/articles/nycp-attorney-client-privilege/
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 01:08:42+00:00

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Explain the elements of the lawyer-client communications privilege to your clients. Also explain that you may someday have to convince a judge that a communication was indeed privileged. A client who is aware of the prerequisites and benefits of a privilege is in the best position to conform communications to the privilege’s requirements, anticipate privilege disputes, and help create a record to enhance the prospects of prevailing should a dispute arise.
Some deposition questioning tactics are aimed at tricking a witness into revealing privileged communications. For example, opposing counsel deposing your client might ask, “Did you ever tell anyone, including your lawyer, whether you ran the red light?” Be listening for such questions, object to them on the basis of the lawyer-client communication privilege, and instruct your client not to answer.
Any confidential communication you have with a client may someday be the subject of an inspection request, interrogatory, or question at deposition or trial. If that happens, you must claim the privilege on your client’s behalf [see §25:40 ff], and may then have to oppose a motion to compel, or prosecute a motion for protective order.
In any privilege motion, the person or entity invoking the privilege must be prepared to prove the privilege applies to the information, and the holder has not waived the privilege. [See §25:60 ff.] To make satisfying those burdens an easier task, institute and faithfully observe basic formalities whenever communicating with clients. For example, create a record (i.e., a “paper trail”) to document the intention that communications were privileged when made, and the expectation they would remain confidential.
Do not co-mingle privileged communications with other files. Correspondence, memos and other documents and records containing attorney-client communications should be physically segregated from other documents.
Consider segregating document indexes from other privileged documents in your computer files.
Make the writing clearly reflect that the author, source or recipient of it is the lawyer, or an agent acting at the lawyer’s direction.
Restrict distribution to persons whose positions require they have access to the confidential information.
Be careful with faxes and e-mail, since you cannot absolutely assure that such transmissions will remain confidential.
And, with respect to e-mails, be extremely careful when you forward an apparently non-privileged e-mail, that you do not include in the forward any earlier “threads” of the e-mail dialogue that may contain privileged material.
The privilege prohibits the disclosure of a confidential communication. [CPLR 4503(a).] This means that it is the substance, not the fact of the communication that is protected.
The privilege encompasses both oral and written communications between counsel and client.
The privilege applies only to communications between attorney and client. It does not apply to the observations an attorney makes of the condition of the client, which any other person could have observed and recognized. However, even when attorney observations are not, strictly speaking, subject to the privilege, courts are loath to require the attorney to testify to those observations.
Thus, in Giannicos v. Bellevue Hospital Medical Center, 7 Misc3d 403, 793 NYS2d 893 (Sup Ct NY Co 2005), the issue was whether plaintiff was entitled to the “insanity” toll provided by CPLR 208. If not, his claim was time-barred. Defendant sought to compel plaintiff’s lawyers to produce documents memorializing conversations with plaintiff, and to testify, concerning his condition, and their ability to communicate with him. The court quashed the subpoena. The documents were entitled to the attorney work product privilege. As to the attorneys’ testimony, while agreeing that the observations made by them of “demeanor, physical characteristics and mental capacity are not protected by the attorney-client privilege,” because “any member of the public could make these observations,” the court, nonetheless, quashed the subpoena. “Public policy mandates that they not be compelled to testify,” because “the practice of calling opposing counsel as a witness at trial is so offensive to our conception of the adversarial process. Courts have made clear that attorneys should, only in rare and special circumstances, be forced to testify against their own clients.” The court adopted the 3-prong test used in some federal cases. To take the testimony of opposing counsel, “a party must establish that ‘(1) no other means exist to obtain the information than to depose opposing counsel; (2) the information sought is relevant and nonprivileged; and (3) the information is crucial to the preparation of the case.’” Here, defendant failed to demonstrate that no other means exists – since there are many other sources of information concerning plaintiff’s capacity at the time the cause of action accrued – and, also fails the third prong.
There is no requirement that the communication be related to litigation or an ongoing matter of any sort. Thus, it is not necessary that litigation be pending, or even anticipated. The purpose of the privilege is to allow and promote full and open communication between a client and attorney on all matters in which legal advice is sought.
It certainly does not hurt to label a document “Privileged — Attorney-Client Communication,” or some equivalent. But courts will look to the reality of the relationship between the parties reflected in the communication.
Furthermore, a fact does not become privileged simply because it is restated or recorded in a privileged communication.
Required response: Must answer the question (because the fact is not privileged).
Required response: Must object and refuse to answer (because the communication is privileged, and because counsel has an obligation to claim the privilege on the client’s behalf, and because counsel has an obligation not to reveal client confidences).
The privilege applies to evidence that client told the lawyer that the client knew the deal was unfair.
The privilege does not apply to evidence that client knew the deal was unfair.
The “common interest” privilege is actually a misnomer. It is the attorney-client privilege. The courts adopting the so-called “common-interest privilege” hold that the presence of parties with a “common interest,” and their lawyers does not waive an otherwise privileged communication. Thus, the attorney-client privilege applies to communications between clients and attorneys when there are two or more parties each with different attorneys, but with a common interest in an aspect of the lawsuit.
In 2006, the Appellate Division, Second Department, became the first appellate court in New Yorkto explicitly hold that the “common interest privilege” applies to civil cases. [U.S. Bank National Association v. APP International Finance Company, 33 AD3d 430 (2d Dept 2006) (“before a communication can be protected under the common interest rule, the communication must satisfy the requirements of the attorney-client privilege; that is, the communication must have been made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of legal advice or services in the course of a professional relationship and have been primarily or predominantly of a legal rather than a commercial nature” [emphasis by the Court]).] Previously, the Appellate Division, First Department, had suggested the application of the “privilege” in Feygin v. Martell, 283 AD2d 304 (1st Dept 2001).
The court’s logic in Parisi v. Leppard is difficult to challenge. There appears to be no reason why the well-entrenched rule in criminal cases should be inapplicable in civil cases.
When the communications are designed to aid the client to commit a crime or a fraud.
When the client, having terminated the services of the lawyer, retains another lawyer to complete the matter which underlies the malpractice action against the original counsel, issues may arise as to whether the privilege that would ordinarily attach to communications between the client and new counsel are waived. In IMO Industries, Inc. v. Anderson Kill & Olick, P.C., 192 Misc2d 605 (Sup Ct NY Co 2002), defendant law firm had represented plaintiff, simultaneously with another lawyer, with respect to the matters giving rise to the malpractice claim. After defendant’s withdrawal from the matter, the other lawyer continued to represent plaintiff with respect to that matter, which is now completed. The court concluded that the relevant communications between plaintiff and the other lawyer are not privileged. The court analogized to medical malpractice claims. The waiver of the physician-patient privilege which follows the placing of plaintiff’s physical condition in issue “encompasses subsequent treatment of the same injury, even if the alleged malpractice occurred before the patient consulted with other physicians.” Nor would divulging of the material prejudice plaintiff’s relationship with the other attorney, since the matter was completed.
And, like the attorney-client privilege, the attorney work product privilege is an absolute privilege. That is, it is never discoverable. So, it does not matter whether the work product material is otherwise unavailable to the demanding party without undue hardship, or even entirely unavailable.
Thus, indices of documents are not work product. [Bloss v. Ford Motor Co., 126 AD2d 804, 510 NYS2d 304 (3d Dept1987).] And, when a witness dictates a statement to an attorney, and the attorney acts as a scribe, the statement is not work product. [Elstein v. Barenfeld, NYLJ, September 6, 1994, p 32, col 2 (Sup Ct Kings Co); Frawley v. Albrecht, 163 Misc2d 630, 621 NYS2d 800 (Sup Ct Nassau Co 1994).] Presumably, however, the attorney’s notes about the witness, which would reflect analysis and strategy, are work product.
Attorney work product is limited to materials created by the attorney with respect to litigation — actual or contemplated. Therefore, early drafts of a contract, or other material created for a transaction, even if solely the product of an attorney’s skill and learning, are not privileged. Thus, when the intent of the parties to a contract may be gleaned by tracing the history of the negotiations through the trail of drafts, a party may not refuse to produce those drafts. Some transactional attorneys make a practice of disposing of early drafts once an agreement has been executed. This, of course, is a two-edged sword. It prevents an adversary from discovering and relying upon them. It also prevents the attorney’s client from relying upon them. And it is often difficult to know, in advance, what shape a future dispute may take.
Interview notes: facts only. When you interview a witness and put in writing what the witness stated were the facts, in the witness’ own words, the “transcript” is not work product.
Interview notes: facts plus opinions. When you create a document that both reports on a witness interview and contains mental impressions, opinions, conclusions, or legal theories, that document is work product and is exempt from discovery.
Materials prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial are protected by a qualified privilege. [CPLR 3101(d)(2).] This means that the materials are protected from discovery unless the party seeking is able to overcome the privilege.
The privilege for material created for litigation covers all material created by a party specifically and solely for the purposes of litigation, such as expert reports, photographs of the scene, witness statements, and the like.
Has substantial need of the materials in the preparation of the case.
Is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means.
Although settlement negotiations are considered to carry a privilege, clarify this with a stipulation.
The rule requires disclosure of any films, photographs, video tapes or audio tapes “involving” a party. So, for example, in a matrimonial action a husband, accused of physically abusing the children of the marriage, could have access to home movies in the custody of the wife, presumably showing him playing with the children. [Kosovsky v. Zahl, 165 Misc2d 164, 627 NYS2d 523 (Sup Ct NY Co 1995); Sgambelluri v. Recinos, 192 Misc2d 777, 747 NYS2d 330 (Sup Ct Nassau Co 2002) (in a personal injury action, defendant was entitled to a copy of the videotape taken at plaintiff’s post-accident wedding).] And it might even be argued that, when a lawyer informally interviews an employee of a corporate adversary [see Niesig v. Team I, 76 NY2d 363, 559 NYS2d 493 (1990)], if the lawyer decides to audio tape the conversation rather than just take notes, the audio tape is discoverable. This is not a likely outcome, but no court has as yet passed upon the issue.
The difficulty in applying this rule is in determining whether an accident report is made in the regular course of business, or whether it is made solely for the purpose of expected litigation.
They are the authors of New York Pretrial Practice, from which this article is excerpted.

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