Source: http://news.lawreader.com/?m=201307
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 03:17:34+00:00

Document:
LOUISVILLE, Ky. — A former judge from southeastern Kentucky and five other people could be released from federal prison soon while awaiting a retrial on charges they engineered a massive vote-buying scheme across three elections.
Federal prosecutors in Lexington told a judge Wednesday they didn’t object to former Clay County Circuit Judge R. Cletus Maricle, one-time county clerk Freddy Thompson and others being freed on bond before their new trial in October.
But the U.S. Attorney’s office is seeking to hold former school superintendent Doug Adams and ex-election officer William E. Stivers in custody because they violated their bond before being tried several years ago.
The U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals overturned the group’s convictions on July 17 after finding that the trial judge committed several errors in handling the case.
The appeals court concluded U.S. District Judge Danny Reeves allowed jurors to hear some evidence that should not have been admitted and erred in his handling of transcripts of secret tape recordings that an informant made during the FBI investigation.
The decision to grant bond rests with U.S. District Judge Karen Caldwell. The defendants who could be released include: Maricle; Thompson; former Magistrate Stanley Bowling; Charles Wayne Jones, who was the county’s Democratic election commissioner; and Bart and Debra Morris, a couple who owned a garbage business that had contracts with Manchester and Clay County.
Stivers and Adams have requested release, but Parman said each violated terms of bond leading up to the first trial on vote fraud charges. Parman said both men had impermissible contact with witnesses.
“This conduct establishes a serious risk that those defendants will obstruct justice and/or intimidate a potential witness,” Parman wrote.
Kent Westberry, the attorney for Adams, said his client had dinner with a potential defense witness during the first trial but did not discuss the case. His bond was later revoked. Westberry said all the factors point to Adams being released — a nonviolent crime, deep roots in the area and his agreeing to return to the prior conditions of bond.
“Finally, as a respected educator who passed all the rigorous screenings demanded of one who works in public education, Adams poses no danger to the community if released,” Westberry said.
Prosecutors argued that the group conspired to spend hundreds of thousands of dollars to buy votes in one of the nation’s poorest counties in 2002, 2004 and 2006. Several other local officials pleaded guilty to vote-buying and corruption charges in related cases.
Reeves handed down lengthy sentences in the case, including 24 years for Maricle, 69, who is being held at a federal prison in Beaumont, Texas, and 20 years for Adams, 61, who is being held at a federal prison in Elkton, Ohio.
Adams, who served as school superintendent from 1999 through 2007, was considered a political boss in Clay County. Maricle served as a judge from 1991 through 2007 and was also considered a political boss. Both men were portrayed by prosecutors as leaders of the conspiracy.
Telephone customers in western Kentucky soon can begin preparing for the changes that will come early next year when area code 364 is added to the same geographic area as the current area code 270.
Saturday, Aug. 3, marks the start of a six-month “permissive dialing” period during which customers will be able to dial either seven or 10 digits when making local calls in area code 270. Mandatory 10-digit-dialing of local calls begins Feb. 1, 2014.
The permissive dialing period allows telecommunication providers to prepare and test equipment in advance of the establishment of the new area code.
An informational video about the permissive dialing period is available on the PSC YouTube channel at http://www.youtube.com/KYPSC.
Area code 364 was created in December 2012 when the PSC decided that the best way to meet the need for more telephone numbers in area code 270 was through the creation of an overlay, which superimposes a new area code over an existing area code.
The overlay option is the least disruptive for all customers and imposes the smallest cost on businesses in the area, the PSC said in its order creating area code 364. This is the first area code in Kentucky created by an overlay.
During the permissive dialing period, all current dialing patterns will remain in place. However, customers who wish to switch to the new dialing patterns may do so. Calls will be connected either way.
Beginning Aug. 3, local calls within area code 270 (as well as local calls to numbers outside area code 270) may be dialed using either 7 or 10 digits – that is, with or without the area code. Dialing 1 for local calls will not be necessary under any circumstance. Local calls will not become long-distance calls.
“One of the critical tasks during the permissive dialing period falls on anyone who uses telephones for critical functions involving health or safety,” Armstrong said.
Emergency response agencies or others who use reverse 911 or other outbound dialing systems should use the time for preparation and testing. Phone-based security systems and medical alert systems also need to be prepared and tested well in advance of the mandatory date so that any problems can be detected and addressed.
In its December order, the PSC noted that public comments received in the case overwhelmingly favored an overlay. The other option was to split area code 270 and designate a portion as area code 364, with both landline and wireless customers in the affected portion required to change their area code as a result.
The PSC noted that area code overlays have become the preferred method for creating new area codes nationwide. Overlays pose the fewest technical issues for implementation by an increasing complex telecommunication industry, the PSC said.
The first numbers using area code 364 may be assigned beginning March 3, 2014. Area code 270 numbers can be assigned after that date, but their availability will depend on how many remain in the inventory of each individual service provider.
Service providers in area code 270 are required by the PSC to educate their customers about the changes resulting from the new area code.
All records in the area code case are available on the PSC website, psc.ky.gov. The case number is 2012-00129.
The PSC is an independent agency attached for administrative purposes to the Energy and Environment Cabinet. It regulates more than 1,500 gas, water, sewer, electric and telecommunication utilities operating in Kentucky and has approximately 90 employees.
1. All current area code 270 numbers remain unchanged. Everyone with a 270 area code number can keep it. Nobody is required to change their area code or phone number.
2. The overlay affects both landline and wireless services.
3. Area code 364 will be overlaid on top of area code 270. That means that area codes 270 and 364 will occupy the same physical space beginning March 2014.
4. In order to distinguish between phone numbers with area code 270 and those with area code 364, 10-digit dialing will be required for all local calls within the overlay.
5. Ten-digit dialing also will be required for local calls into or out of the overlay in those areas that now allow seven-digit local calling across the area code 270 boundary.
6. Ten-digit dialing means dialing the area code before dialing the number itself – for example: 270-555-1212 or 364-555-1212.
7. Long-distance calls within the overlay will require 11-digit (1-plus) dialing, just as long distance calls to other area codes do now.
8. A transition period, known as permissive dialing, will begin on August 3, 2013 and end on January 31, 2014. During that time, local calls can be made using either seven-digit or 10-digit dialing.
9. On February 1, 2014, 10-digit dialing for local calls will become mandatory in the area code 270/364 territory.
10. Numbers with area code 364 may be distributed beginning March 3, 2014. Telecommunication service providers may continue to distribute 270 numbers for as long as they have any remaining in their inventories.
Kentucky’s tenth governor, John Breathitt won a close election in 1832 in which there were many allegations of fraud. For example, John Breathitt won 162% of the vote in Oldham County.
Breathitt ran for Governor while he served as the Democratic Lt. Governor under Governor Stone Hammer Metcalfe (a Whig). Breathitt was a native of Virginia and served as Deputy Surveyor of Illinois Territory prior to his election as a State Representative from Logan County.
John Breathitt became a national figure in 1833 when he denounced South Carolina’s nullification of the Tariff Acts of 1828 and 1832. This Democratic Governor sent resolutions to the Whig dominated General Assembly denouncing the actions of South Carolina as one which could lead the disunion of the Union and civil war. The General Assembly passed the resolutions which were sent to governors and legislatures throughout the nation. Breathitt gave leadership to the growing sense of union in Kentucky, leading Kentucky to stay in the Union thirty (30) years later. In his January 1, 1834 State of the Commonwealth Message, Breathitt reported that governors from New York, Massachusetts, Maryland, New Jersey, Delaware, Ohio, Alabama and Pennsylvania responded positively to the resolutions.
Breathitt was a supporter of temperance or prohibition and blamed the large number of murders being committed in Kentucky on the consumption of alcoholic beverages.
In 1834, the Commonwealth of Kentucky owned stock in several turnpikes, including the Maysville, Washington, Paris and Lexington Turnpike (the one which went by Governor Metcalfe’s farm in Nicholas County) and the Shelby and Franklin Turnpike which was valued at $134,384.00.
Breathitt has the unfortunate distinction of being the second Kentucky Governor to die in office. On February 21, 1834, John Breathitt died of tuberculosis at the Governor’s Mansion in Frankfort at age 47. He was preceded in death by two wives.
Breathitt County in Eastern Kentucky was named in his honor.
In Shy v. Walker (issued 7/19/2013; not designated for publication), a panel of the Kentucky Court of Appeals by a vote of 2-1 upheld a $1.3 million jury verdict for the plaintiff in a medical negligence action even though the plaintiff’s lawyer in closing argument asked the jury to “send a message” to the defendant and to health-care providers in the community. The Court held that the argument, “even if improper,” was not grounds for a mistrial or reversal under the circumstances of the case.
It is interesting to note that the trial court had granted a defense motion in limine to exclude an argument to “send a message” to the defendant. While the Court of Appeals noted that arguments asking the jury to “send a message” are frowned upon in Kentucky (outside the context of a punitive damages claim), the Court held that such arguments do not automatically entitle the intended recipient of the “message” to a mistrial or reversal. The Court of Appeals’ majority concluded that any error in not granting a mistrial for the “send a message” argument was harmless and that the defendant’s counsel had “opened the door” on his closing argument by asking the jury to be proud of the local hospital and consider what it would be like without it. The Court conceded that the standard of care is national, not local, but nevertheless declined to reverse, despite the fact that the jurors were told they could determine what standard they will have in their community, because of the door they felt had been opened by the defendant’s argument.
The argument in question, in appealing to the jurors’ sense of personal and community safety, echoed a plaintiffs’ litigation strategy sometimes referred to as “the reptile,” after the 2009 book Reptile: The 2009 Manual of the Plaintiff’s Revolution by David Ball and Don Keenan. The “reptile” reference comes from the theory that the human brain evolved in stages, and that the reptilian brain — thought to be the earliest part to have developed — instinctively seeks to protect the organism from danger. Defendants, of course, should be on guard for and strenuously challenge introduction of any argument or testimony that appears calculated to give the jury a sense that they have a stake in the outcome of the litigation, as an appeal to “the reptile” is arguably designed to do.
There are several potential saving graces for defendants in the Shy opinion: (1) the decision was not designated for publication, which limits its precedential value; (2) the Court did not say the “send a message” argument was proper, instead upholding the verdict “even if [the arguments were] improper” and invoking the harmless error rule; (3) there was some debate by the Court whether the objection to the plaintiff’s improper closing argument was properly preserved for appeal (notwithstanding the motion in limine and an objection made at the end of the plaintiff’s closing argument); (4) the ruling was based to a large extent on the Court’s determination that the defendant’s lawyer had opened the door (a conclusion the dissent strongly disagreed with); (5) the defendant failed to request a curative admonition from the trial court; and (6) the verdict was 9-3 and there was a well-written dissent, which are factors that should increase the prospects the Kentucky Supreme Court will grant discretionary review.
The Shy v. Walker opinion is not yet final. Nonfinal decisions should not be cited as precedent. Unpublished decisions, once final, may qualify for citation under CR 76.28(4)(c).
Can You Stand Your Ground in Kentucky?
The George Zimmerman trial and not guilty verdict in Florida has generated all kinds of reaction both pro and con. Many question whether George Zimmerman should have retreated instead of following Trevon Martin, or just the opposite, whether there was no duty to retreat on the part of Trevon Martin when engaged by Mr. Zimmerman. What many of you may not know is that Kentucky has had a self-defense law similar to Florida’s since 2006 under the Justification Chapter of the Penal Code, KRS 503.055(3).
A person who is not engaged in an unlawful activity and who is attacked in any other place where he or she has a right to be has no duty to retreat and has the right to stand his or her ground and meet force with force, including deadly force, if he or she reasonably believes it is necessary to do so to prevent death or great bodily harm to himself or herself or another or to prevent the commission of a felony involving the use of force.
The Kentucky Supreme Court in Jones v. Commonwealth, 366 S.W.3d 376 (2011), reviewed a jury instruction granted the prosecution which stated that the victim had no duty to retreat and could use defensive force if he was on his own property and believed it necessary to defend himself. Appellant – Defendant Jones received a self-defense instruction but was found guilty but mentally ill because the jury was allowed to consider the “no duty to retreat” instruction on behalf of the victim. He received a twenty-five year prison sentence.
The facts of the case are these. Mr. Jones was a 65 year old retired navy veteran living in a trailer. At some time in 2006, Mr. Jones began thinking he was being poisoned by toxic chemicals. Over time, he took steps to protect himself by putting up barbed wire, among other things, and patrolling his property from the roof top of his trailer in a bullet proof vest with a weapon.
At some point, Mr. Jones began suspecting his neighbor Perry Warren was the one poisoning him. On March 3, 2008, Mr. Jones saw Mr. Warren driving home. Mr. Jones got in his truck armed with a hand gun and followed Mr. Warren to his home to ask him some questions about the chemicals. Mr. Jones got out of his truck on Mr. Warren’s property. Mr. Warren, armed with a .22 rifle, told Mr. Jones to leave. Mr. Jones said he just wanted to get things cleared up and said that then Mr. Warren started to back him up. Mr. Jones said he was leaving but wanted to talk. Mr. Jones said that the next thing he heard was a crack, saw Mr. Warren’s rifle, and decided to fire back. Mr. Jones shot back and Mr. Warren died at the scene from receiving five gun shots wounds. Mr. Warren had indeed fired his rifle several times.
Mr. Jones was indicted for murder. At his trial in 2009, the jury was instructed on murder, first degree manslaughter, reckless homicide, insanity, and guilty but mentally ill. The prosecution at the beginning of the trial tried to prevent Mr. Jones from using the defense of self-defense found in KRS 503.055(3), because Mr. Warren was on his own property when the shooting occurred. The trial court allowed Mr. Jones to claim self-defense and the prosecution to counter that Mr. Warren had no duty to retreat on his own property and could defend himself too. As a result, the no duty to retreat instruction was given as a applied to the victim and a guilty verdict rendered. Mr. Jones appealed as a matter of right.
The issue on appeal was whether the victim, through the prosecution, could assert there was no duty to retreat or was the self-defense instruction reserved only to the criminal defendant charged with a crime, in this case Mr. Jones. The Kentucky Supreme Court ruled that it was meant to apply to the conduct of the person who is subject to criminal prosecution as a result of the use of force, and not the victim of such force. As a result, Mr. Jones conviction was reversed for the erroneous instruction and given a new trial.
It does seem from this case decision that if the George Zimmerman case had occurred in Kentucky the result probably would have been the same, not guilty.
The link for this Kentucky Supreme Court Case follows.
This case is final and can be cited as legal authority.
Nicholas M Nighswander PLLC Attorney at Law was established to help clients with their personal legal problems. We do not represent big businesses and corporations. Your legal problem is our problem and we want to have a positive impact with you in doing the best to solve it.
Washington, DC (July 29, 2013) – Jerry J. Cox, of Mount Vernon, Ky., was sworn in on Saturday, July 27, as President of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL) at its 56th Annual Meeting in San Francisco, California. Mr. Cox has previously served the Association as its President-Elect, First- and Second Vice-President, Treasurer, Secretary, and Parliamentarian, as well as on the Association’s Board of Directors.
Mr. Cox is a sole practitioner based in Mount Vernon, Ky. where he has been practicing criminal defense law for over 40 years. Throughout his career, Mr. Cox has published and lectured extensively on criminal law issues. He is deeply committed to the defense bar and has served on the faculty of the Kentucky Department of Public Advocacy’s (DPA) Trial Practice Institute for many years. In 2002, the Kentucky DPA recognized Mr. Cox’s commitment to criminal defense by awarding him the Nelson Mandela Lifetime Achievement Award.
Mr. Cox is also a Past President of the Kentucky Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and a member of the American Bar Association (ABA) and Kentucky Bar Association (KBA). He has served on the KBA’s Unauthorized Practice of Law Committee, Criminal Rules Committee, Legislative Committee, Prescription Drug Abuse Task Force and as Chair of the KBA’s Criminal Law Section. In 2004, he received the President’s Special Service Award from the Kentucky Bar Association. He also served on the Kentucky Criminal Justice Council’s Drug Strategy Committee, is chair of the Public Advocacy Commission, and served as president of the Kentucky Bar Foundation. Mr. Cox is certified as a Criminal Specialist by the National Board of Trial Advocacy (NBTA) and, in 2004, he served on the NBTA Board of Examiners.
Mr. Cox is a Life Member of NACDL and in numerous recent years, including 2009, Mr. Cox received NACDL’s President’s Commendation for outstanding service to the goals and objectives of the criminal defense bar and for outstanding service in fighting for the rights of all persons. Mr. Cox has been AV rated by Martindale-Hubbell since 1985 and was recognized in the March 2010 issue of Louisville Magazine as being selected by his peers as a Top Lawyer. Mr. Cox is a 1968 graduate of the University of Kentucky School Of Law and a 1965 graduate of Berea College.
In addition to the critical issues of fairness and justice for U.S. military veterans, racial disparity in the American criminal justice system, and the funding and independence of the constitutionally-mandated defense function, newly-installed NACDL President Jerry J. Cox spoke to the need to continue to work to address the ongoing problems of draconian sentencing, including for juveniles; pre-trial justice issues; the innumerable collateral consequences of a criminal conviction and the importance of post-conviction restoration of rights; the disproportionate leverage of prosecutors, its causes and the resulting ‘trial penalty’ that has led to a criminal justice system overwhelmingly administered via the ‘plea bargain’; and the critical importance of support for the Foundation of Criminal Justice.
A Hearing is scheduled July 30, 2013 about an Indiana lawyer who criticized judge in private e-mail. This is the same rule adpted in Kentucky as SCR 3.130, 8.2. A prosecution of attorney John M. Berry Jr. by the Ky. Bar Association ended up costing them close to $400,000 in attorney fees when the 6th. Circuit ruled in favor of Berry. Unfortunately the 6th. Circuit left the language of the rule intact and Indiana now seeks to silence one of their attorneys. Their upholding of Berry’s motion to dismiss was limited by the “as applied” rule. That means that anytime the KBA and the Ky. Supreme Court wants to….they can sanction an attorney if he makes any statement about a “judge or public legal officer” which they find is “reckless”. It doesn’t matter that the statement is true if they determine the statement is “reckless”.
Calls for the Ky. Supreme Court to follow the lead of Ohio in changing the language of SCR 8.2 have so far been ignored.
Tarkington, who has written extensively on professional conduct and the free speech rights of attorneys, said Ogden is not alone in finding himself at odds with an attorney disciplinary system for comments that most other citizens are free to make. It is an issue that free speech advocates and legal scholars say is becoming more common — and troubling — across the U.S.
It is not just the attempts to stifle criticism, particularly statements made outside the courtroom, that Tarkington and others find troubling. It also is how the disciplinary process works.
In defamation cases regarding public officials, the First Amendment requires that the victim prove the statement was false and that the speaker knew it was false or entertained serious doubts as to its truth. Yet in many states, attorney discipline cases require the accused to prove their statements are true, which Tarkington opines is in direct violation of established First Amendment law.
Then there’s the reality that, in cases involving criticism of judges, it ultimately is a panel of judges — the Supreme Court in Indiana — that makes the final determination on guilt and punishment.
Unlike other public and elected officials, Tarkington said, judges can insulate themselves from public criticism by the people who know the most about them — attorneys.
By Joe Palazzolo Federal appeals judges pressed the nation’s top court to resolve a deepening split among their colleagues over whether police need a warrant to search the cell phone of someone under arrest.
the highest state court in Massachusetts.
against rehearing the case in order to speed its path to the U.S. Supreme Court. . . . .
Attorney General Jack Conway and his Office of Criminal Appeals have asked the United States Supreme Court to review the Kentucky Supreme Court’s decision in the case of N.C. A Child Under Eighteen v. Commonwealth. In the April 25, 2013 decision, the state Supreme Court held that students must be read their Miranda rights when questioned by a school administrator in the presence of a school resource officer when criminal activity might be discovered. The Attorney General’s Office sent the Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court on July 23, 2013.
In 2009, after a Nelson County High School teacher found a prescription pill bottle for hydrocodone in the boys’ bathroom belonging to a student, a juvenile referred to as “N.C.,” the school’s assistant principal questioned “N.C.” about the incident in the presence of the school resource officer. “N.C” told the assistant principal he had given some of the hydrocodone to another student, which resulted in his expulsion from school and charges of possession and distribution of a controlled substance in Nelson County Juvenile Court.
On April 25, 2013, the Kentucky Supreme Court reversed two lower court rulings in Nelson District and Circuit Courts holding that N.C. was not in custody for Miranda purposes, and therefore, there was no requirement that he be read his rights. The Kentucky Court of Appeals denied discretionary review of the matter.
• State appellate courts are divided over this issue. States that hold Miranda warnings are required include Georgia, North Carolina, and now Kentucky. States that hold Miranda warnings are not required include South Carolina, Virginia, Florida, Texas, Tennessee, New York, New Mexico, and Louisiana.
• The issue presented is recurring and important as the use of law enforcement officers as a resource in the school setting has become widespread over the last 20 years.
• The Attorney General’s Office maintains that the Kentucky Supreme Court’s decision was in error and that school administrators are not required to advise students of their Miranda rights, merely because a school resource officer may be present, when they are investigating school-related issues.
CINCINNATI (AP) — An Ohio appeals court has ruled a juvenile court judge in contempt for barring Cincinnati Enquirer reporters from covering the cases of six teens charged with beating a man.
The Ohio 1st District Court of Appeals on Tuesday gave Hamilton County Juvenile Judge Tracie Hunter until Thursday afternoon to reverse her earlier order against allowing Enquirer coverage of proceedings. Hunter said Wednesday she will appeal to the Ohio Supreme Court.
Hunter told The Associated Press by telephone that she couldn’t comment on pending cases, but sent a statement that contended she was following court rules and denied disobeying the higher court’s order.
“Judicial officers are held to the highest standards, and in following the rules of the court and the existing laws of the land, while balancing the policies governing the treatment of children, I believe that I have followed the law and upheld my judicial obligations to the public,” she said in her statement.
The Enquirer reports that it considered Hunter’s earlier order against publishing the juveniles’ names, which appeared in police reports, a violation of First Amendment press freedom rights. Editor Carolyn Washburn said The Enquirer is pleased that the judge has been required to comply with the law.
The juveniles were charged last summer with badly beating a man police said they targeted because they were bored. The 46-year-old man, Pat Mahaney, died recently, and prosecutors are waiting for autopsy results on what caused his death before considering whether to seek additional charges against the teens.
Three of the youths have pleaded guilty to felonious assault.
The Enquirer asked the state appeals court to order Hunter to allow its reporters inside her courtroom, and the court said March 29 that Hunter “shall” permit them. The Enquirer said she continued to refuse.
“Her status as a judicial officer does not exempt her from compliance with the court’s order,” Tuesday’s ruling stated.
Pass this on to your grown children and anyone else you can think of. This has been verified by the FBI. Please pass this on to everyone in your e-mail address book. It is spreading fast so be prepared should you get this call. Most of us take those summonses for jury duty seriously, but enough people skip out on their civic duty that a new and ominous kind of fraud has surfaced.
The caller claims to be a jury duty coordinator. If you protest that you never received a summons for jury duty, the Scammer asks you for your Social Security number and date of birth so he or she can verify the information and cancel the arrest warrant. Give out any of this information and bingo; your identity was just stolen.
The fraud has been reported so far in 11 states, including Oklahoma, Illinois, and Colorado, AZ, OR and more. This (swindle) is particularly insidious because they use intimidation over the phone to try to bully people into giving information by pretending they are with the court system.
Eric C. Deters & Partners, P.S.C.
A. The Failure of the Indictment to Descend to Particulars Prejudiced Mr.
perjury, but not the subject of the indictment.
985 F.2d 1027, 1031 (9th Cir.1993).
the accused of the specific offense … with which he is charged.” United States v.
indictment solely alleged that Mr. Lawrence filed a false form 1040.
duplicitous indictment. The government states as much in its response brief.
jury.” United States v. Walsh, 194 F.3d 37, 44 (2nd Cir. 1999).
which he is charged.” United States v. Hess, 124 U.S. 483 (1888).
charge rather than a 7206(1) charge.
offense may have been effectuated”).
items that “flowed through” to Mr. Lawrence’s personal 1040’s.
where all of Mr. Lawrence’s income should have been reported.
CPA and, as a result, never ended up on his tax returns.
sources of income that Mr. Lawrence failed to report.
with testimony and identification and marking them as exhibits.
hinged its prosecution of Mr. Lawrence on a strategy of diversion, to indict Mr.
Cir. 1948); United States v. Cseplo, 42 F.3d 360 (6th Cir. 1994).
forms and templates approved and recommended by the DOJ Tax Division.
this case. (Exhibit 2, Manual Excerpt).
documents funneled into Mr. Lawrence’s personal 1040’s. In all likelihood, Mr.
The lack of particularity in the factual assertions in the indictment led to Mr.
or in effect, in its terms. United States v. Beeler, 587 F.2d 340 (6th Cir. 1979).
reversible. United States v. Kramer, 955 F.2d 479 (7th Cir. 1990).
statement must be known at “the time of signing” the return. See United States v.
1204 (9th Cir. 1976); and United States v. Cashio, 420 F.2d 1132 (5th Cir. 1990).
is chosen by the agent, not the prosecutor who decides what information to present.
made false statements about each item of income.
Income pled as the perjured False Statement on the 1040.
p. 2166 – 2168, 2148, 2213, 2214, 2229 & 2226).
as security for the loans that were to be repaid to the lawyer was because this Mr.
at the PSC level before being loaned to the Partnership.
based on a letter that was written in December 2007, about half a year after Mr.
to assist in preparing Mr. Lawrence’s defense.
money represents from the standpoint of the company.
(RE 101, p. 2029 – 2033) and oversee the computerized accounting (RE 100, p.
caused by indictments as presented.
missing on the forms for which he was indicted.
require the defendant’s signature to sustain a conviction. (Government Brief, p.
signature is still required for 7206(1) to be invoked in the first place. It is Mr.
taxpayer, and no 8879’s were introduced into evidence for 2005 and 2006.
for the tax year 2004 and have satisfied the requirement showing that Mr.
same cannot be said for tax years 2005 and 2006.
being included in each count.
alleged errors. United States v. Fraduy, 456 U.S. 152 (1982).
and timely manner. Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687, 696 (6th Cir. 1974).
prosecutor’s case to meaningful adversarial testing. Id.
opportunity to defend against the charges due to the insufficient indictment.
clearly ineffective and the Court has sufficient facts to make a determination.
Therefore Mr. Lawrence requests that the Court reverse his conviction.
typeface using Times New Roman 14 point.
the person signing the brief.
RENDERED: JANUARY 11, 2013; 10:00 A.M.
ROGER MILLION, JR.; ELBY COX; ELBY COX, JR.
BEFORE: CLAYTON, LAMBERT AND STUMBO, JUDGES.
only entitled to $300,000. We agree with Universal and reverse and remand.
1 Mr. Gross and his dealership were not named as defendants in this case.
entitled to coverage based on the cases of Kentucky Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Gross’ Commercial Umbrella Coverage is limited in who it covers.
Generally, it only covers Mr. Gross, Emily Gross, and Bunt Gross Auto Sales.
find this reasoning was in error.
82 S.W.3d 869, 871 (Ky. 2002). This Court reviews issues of law de novo.
Umbrella Coverage should have been enforced as written.
becomes a de facto self-insurer of the vehicle.
v. Allstate Ins. Co., 244 S.W.3d 59 (Ky. 2008).
Umbrella Coverage insures is Mr. Gross. It does not cover permissive drivers.
automobile. The Auto Hazard Coverage specifically covers permissive drivers.
Coverage insurance policy should have been enforced as written.
under Gross’ Commercial Umbrella Coverage.
Former Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens took some of his former colleagues to task for their decision this summer on the Voting Rights Act, criticizing the majority that struck down as unconstitutional the pre-clearance part of the landmark civil rights law.
Writing “A Dissent” in The New York Review of Books, Stevens reflected on the book Bending Toward Justice: The Voting Rights Act and the Transformation of American Democracyy, by Gary May, which was released this April. Using May’s account of the events in the South that precipitated the passing of the Voting Rights Act in 1965, Stevens criticized Chief Justice John Roberts’s opinion over its analysis of history, and disputed its rationale for overturning the provision.
“The statistics set forth in Roberts’s recent opinion persuasively explain why a neutral decision-maker could reasonably conclude that at long last the imposition of the preclearance requirement on the states that lost the Civil War—or more precisely continuing to use the formula that in 1965 identified those states—is not justified by the conditions that prevail today. The opinion fails, however, to explain why such a decision should be made by the members of the Supreme Court. The members of Congress, representing the millions of voters who elected them, are far more likely to evaluate correctly the risk that the interest in maintaining the supremacy of the white race still plays a significant role in the politics of those states. After all, that interest was responsible for creating the slave bonus when the Constitution was framed, and in motivating the violent behavior that denied blacks access to the polls in those states for decades prior to the enactment of the VRA.
“The several congressional decisions to preserve the preclearance requirement—including its 2006 decision—were preceded by thorough evidentiary hearings that have consistently disclosed more voting violations in those states than in other parts of the country. Those decisions have had the support of strong majority votes by members of both major political parties. Not only is Congress better able to evaluate the issue than the Court, but it is also the branch of government designated by the Fifteenth Amendment to make decisions of this kind,” Stevens wrote.
An egregious appeals court ruling on Friday has dealt a major setback to press freedoms by requiring the author of a 2006 book to testify in the criminal trial of a former Central Intelligence Agency official charged with leaking classified information. The ruling and the Justice Department’s misplaced zeal in subpoenaing James Risen, the book’s author and a reporter for The Times, carry costs for robust journalism and government accountability that should alarm all Americans.
However, redistricting should not stop there. While it is true that federal one-person, one-vote principles do not apply to the judiciary (judges don’t “represent” anyone), judicial and governmental efficiency require significant attention to judicial circuits, which, in many cases, are grossly out of proportion when considering caseloads and population shifts. Redistricting circuit courts would more effectively employ the state’s limited resources and enable expansion of family courts to the rest of the state, among many other benefits.
The case for re-circuiting is incontrovertible. We have 95 non-family circuit judges across the state, with an average caseload of 1,209 filings per year. However, there are circuits in this state with nearly double the average caseload, and those areas (e.g., Jessamine, Bullitt, and northern Kentucky) are experiencing explosive growth. On the other end of the spectrum, there are circuits with half the average caseload, and those areas are experiencing drastic population decreases (e.g., Floyd, Knott/Magoffin, and far western Kentucky). For example, Floyd County is its own circuit, has three circuit judges (one is a family court judge), lost 7 percent of its population over the past 10 years, and would still be well below the average caseload if it lost one of its circuit judges.
With regard to population, Harlan (29, 278), Perry (28,712), Letcher (24,519), and Bell (28,691)—contiguous counties—is each its own circuit, with a total of four circuit judges. This is two more than their aggregate population would warrant. One suggestion is to combine Bell, Harlan and Letcher counties, keep their three circuit judges, but make one of them a family court judge. Then combine Perry County with Magoffin and Knott, keep their combined two circuit judges and make one of them a family court judge. Currently a family court judge elected in Floyd County covers family court cases in Magoffin and Knott. This judge could be discontinued, since Floyd County currently has about 1.5 more judges than its caseload and population warrants. This proposal would reduce one circuit judge that could be assigned to another area of the state that needs more judges. It would also expand family court to an area badly in need of the focused services provided by these courts.
Fortunately, there is no better time than the 2013 session to address the judicial circuits. Every trial judge in the state will be on the ballot in 2014, as the circuit judges’ eight-year terms and the district judges’ four-year terms come to an end. And to properly address this complex issue, months of study and the interests of numerous constituencies need to be considered. For instance, re-circuiting will affect commonwealth’s attorney, whose districts are the same as the judicial circuits. But commonwealth’s attorneys are on a six-year election cycle as opposed to the eight-year cycle for the circuit judges. Another issue that requires considerable study is the expansion of family courts. But without re-circuiting, it will be effectively impossible to expand family courts to the approximately 25 percent of the population that currently do not have them.
With that in mind, the Kentucky Supreme Court should certify the necessity to “reduce, increase or rearrange” the judicial circuits pursuant to Section 112(2) of the Constitution, and then the Chief Justice and the leaders of the House and Senate should appoint a committee to make recommendations to re-circuit the state. This committee could recommend a few options to re-circuit the Commonwealth, including one limited to addressing the most glaring inefficiencies, such as the one identified above. The result could be either a reduction in the total amount of judges, or, more likely, a better reallocation of the judges currently in existence.
Re-circuiting the Commonwealth’s trial courts is a major undertaking, and it should not be done with haste. However, re-circuiting is long overdue and, because of the upcoming 2014 elections, there is no better time than the 2013 legislative session to get it done.
Admittedly, I have focused on southeastern Kentucky, which has the most glaring disparities. But similar problems exist in other places.
The Kentucky Bar Association’s 2013 Annual Convention was one for the record books, with a total of 2,253 attorneys registering for the three-day event at the Galt House Hotel & Suites in Louisville, outpacing a record established at the 2010 Annual Convention in Lexington with 2,120 attendees.
New KBA officers sworn into office during the Annual Banquet on Thursday, June 20, include President Thomas L. Rouse, Erlanger; President-Elect William E. Johnson, Frankfort; Vice President Douglass Farnsley, Louisville; Immediate Past President W. Douglas Myers, Hopkinsville; and Young Lawyers Division Chairman Carl N. Frazier.
Board governors who received their oath of office include Michael M. Pitman, Murray, 1st Supreme Court District (SCD); John David Meyer, Owensboro, 2nd SCD; Howard O. Mann, Corbin, 3rd SCD; Amy D. Cubbage, Louisville, 4th SCD; William R. Garmer, Lexington, 5th SCD; J. Stephen Smith, Ft. Mitchell, 6th SCD; and Earl M. “Mickey” McGuire, Prestonsburg, 7th SCD.
Other Kentucky Bar Governors recognized for their continuing service were Jonathan Freed, Paducah, 1st SCD; Thomas N. Kerrick, Bowling Green, 2nd SCD; M. Gail Wilson, Jamestown, 3rd SCD; Douglas C. Ballantine, Louisville, 4th Supreme Court District; Anita M. Britton, Lexington, 5th Supreme Court District; David V. Kramer, Crestview Hills, 6th Supreme Court District; Bobby Rowe, Prestonsburg, 7th SCD.
Also honored were retiring KBA President Myers; Immediate Past President Margaret E. “Maggie” Keane, Louisville; outgoing YLD Chair Jackie Sue Wright, Maysville; retiring Bar Governors Richard Hay, Somerset; Serieta Jaggers, Princeton; and R. Michael Sullivan, Owensboro; 2013 Annual Convention Planning Committee Co-Chairs Douglass Farnsley, John W. Bilby, and Bobby Simpson, all of Louisville; and CLE Committee Chair Richard Hay.
Photos from the 2013 Kentucky Bar Association Annual Convention in Louisville are available for download and can also be purchased in a variety of print sizes. To view the photos, please follow the instructions below.
Click on the thumbnail image of the desired photo.
Once the image is accessed in a larger format, an option to download the image or purchase prints will be available directly above it.
If you have any questions regarding the photos, please email KBA Communications Director Amy Carman at acarman@kybar.org.
THANK YOU TO OUR KBA ANNUAL CONVENTION SPONSORS FOR 2013!
For more convention coverage, be on the lookout for the upcoming issue of the Bench & Bar!
Joseph L. Hardesty, of Louisville, is an attorney at Stites & Harbison PLLC. He represents the Kentucky School Boards Association.
James A. “Tony” Fulkerson, of Owensboro, is a retired accountant. He represents the Kentucky League of Cities.
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