Source: http://courts.mrsc.org/supreme/059wn2d/059wn2d0493.htm
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 04:28:24+00:00

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THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, on the Relation of Robert H.
 MANDAMUS - SUBJECTS AND PURPOSES OF RELIEF - ENFORCEMENT OF RIGHTS. Mandamus, being one of the statutory forms of procedure provided for the enforcement of rights and the redress of wrongs, was a proper remedy for a veteran seeking reinstatement in a position from which he claimed to have been removed in violation of his veteran's preference in public employment established by RCW 73.16.010.
 LIMITATION OF ACTIONS - LIMITATION APPLICABLE TO PARTICULAR ACTION - INJURY TO PERSONAL RIGHTS. A violation of the preferential right to public employment granted to veterans by RCW 73.16.010, constitutes an injury to the rights of a person within the purview of RCW 4.16.080(2), which provides a three-year limitation on actions for such an injury; thus, the three-year statute of limitations is applicable to an action to enforce a veteran's preference in public employment.
 SAME - LIABILITIES CREATED BY STATUTE - NO DISTINCTION. There being no statute of limitations in this state specifically applicable to an action for a liability created by statute, an action based on a statutory right is limited no differently than one based on a nonstatutory right; and the two-year "catch-all" statute of limitations (RCW 4.16.130) is applied to such an action only if it is not provided for elsewhere.
ROSELLINI and HUNTER, JJ., dissent.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Thurston County, No. 31899, Raymond W. Clifford, J., entered February 15, 1960. Reversed and remanded.
Action to compel restoration of employment. Plaintiff appeals from judgment of dismissal.
Corbett, Siderius & Lonergan, for appellant.
The Attorney General and S. Fred Bruhn, Assistant, for respondents.
* Reported in 368 P. (2d) 676.
 See Ann. 58 A. L. R. (2d) 1005, Am. Jur., Veterans and Veterans' Acts § 13.
QUAERE: Does an action for restoration to position by a state employee-entitled to a veteran's preference in public employment (RCW 73.16.010), who was discharged without cause and replaced by a nonveteran-come within the two-year "catch-all" (RCW 4.16.130) or the three-year (RCW 4.16.080 (2)) statute of limitations?
Under none of these acts did the veteran have any means of enforcing the preference (State ex rel. Breslin v. Todd (1941), 8 Wn. (2d) 482, 113 P. (2d) 315), although an official who failed to comply with the act "in letter and in spirit" was, and is, guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not less than five dollars and not more than twenty-five dollars (RCW 73.16.020).
and their widows, shall be preferred for appointment and employment. Age, loss of limb, or other physical impairment, which does not in fact incapacitate, shall not be deemed to disqualify them, provided they possess the capacity necessary to discharge the duties of the position involved. [1951 c 29 § 1; 1943 c 141 § 1; 1919 c 26 § 1; 1915 c 129 § 1; 1895 c 84 § 1; Rem. Supp. 1943 § 10753.]" RCW 73.16.010.
Two cases, under this statute, have reached this court: State ex rel. Ford v. King Cy. (1955), 47 Wn. (2d) 911, 290 P. (2d) 465; and State ex rel. Day v. King Cy. (1957), 50 Wn. (2d) 427, 312 P. (2d) 637. Neither of these cases raised the issue now before us as to the applicable statute of limitations.
The three-year statute (RCW 4.16.080 (2)), relied upon by the relator-appellant, is applicable to: "An action . . . for any other injury to the person or rights of another not hereinafter enumerated."
"An action for relief not hereinbefore provided for, shall be commenced within two years after the cause of action shall have accrued." RCW 4.16.130.
The trial court was of the opinion that the latter was the applicable statute and dismissed the action by which the relator sought restoration to a position as safety inspector for the Department of Labor and Industries, from which he had been discharged almost thirty-four months before, the position having been filled by a nonveteran.
REASONS FOR ANSWER TO QUAERE: We must, at the outset, make it clear that no question is raised as to the application of either of these statutes of limitation to a mandamus action.
compel his reinstatement in the position from which he claims to have been removed in violation of his preference rights. We have recognized that mandamus is a proper remedy. State ex rel. Ford v. King Cy., supra; State ex rel. Day v. King Cy., supra; Luellen v. Aberdeen (1944), 20 Wn. (2d) 594, 148 P. (2d) 849.
In this state, mandamus is one of the forms of procedure provided by statute (RCW 7.16.150 through 7.16.280) for the enforcement of rights and the redress of wrongs, and "has in it all the elements of a civil action." Luellen v. Aberdeen, supra; Washington Security Co. v. State (1941), 9 Wn. (2d) 197, 114 P. (2d) 965, 135 A. L. R. 1330; State ex rel. Hunt v. Okanogan Cy. (1929), 153 Wash. 399, 280 Pac. 31, 67 A. L. R. 668; State ex rel. Brown v. McQuade (1905), 36 Wash. 579, 79 Pac. 207; State ex rel. Race v. Cranney (1902), 30 Wash. 594, 71 Pac. 50.
 We are not, at the moment, concerned with any question of a monetary recovery for back pay or liability therefor, but with the enforcement, by reinstatement, of a preferential right to employment granted by statute to the relator.
The respondents disregarded that right when they discharged the relator without cause and replaced him with a nonveteran. When a legally protected interest or right is invaded or violated such action constitutes an injury thereto within the purview of RCW 4.16.080 (2), the threeyear statute of limitations hereinbefore quoted. Luellen v. Aberdeen, supra.
The relator's rights under the statute, in this case, are comparable to the statutory right of action given for violation of civil rights by a federal statute. The Kansas statute of limitations held to be applicable, in such a case, is that section which relates to an "`action for injury to the rights of another, not arising on contract.'" Wilson v. Hinman, 172 F. (2d) 914, 915 (C.A. Kan. 1949).
by its terms, only to actions for relief "not hereinbefore provided for." If, as we hold, this mandamus action by a veteran is for relief to an injury to his right of preferential employment, the "catch-all" statute has no application.
ANALYSIS OF RESPONDENTS' AUTHORITIES: Since our answer to the Quaere involves a setting aside of the trial court's order of dismissal, and since the trial court relied upon the authorities cited by the respondents, we will make clear why we deem them inapplicable to the present situation.
 All of the discussion about "a liability created by a statute," is a red herring. We do not have a statute of limitations, as many states do, specifically applicable to an action for a liability created by a statute.
Our cases quite properly held that the word "liability," in that statute, referred neither to a tort liability nor to a liability created by a statute, but only to a contractual liability. Northern Grain & Warehouse Co. v. Holst (1917), 95 Wash. 312, 163 Pac. 775; Robinson v. Lewis Cy. (1927), 141 Wash. 642, 252 Pac. 143; Constable v. Duke (1927), 144 Wash. 263, 257 Pac. 637; Noble v. Martin (1937), 191 Wash. 39, 70 P. (2d) 1064; Cannon v. Miller (1945), 22 Wn. (2d) 227, 155 P. (2d) 500,157 A. L. R. 530; and Heitfeld v. Benevolent & Protective Order of Keglers (1950), 36 Wn. (2d) 685, 220 P. (2d) 655, 18 A. L. R. (2d) 983. See, however, Pierce Cy. v. Newman (1946), 26 Wn. (2d), 63, 173 P. (2d) 127.
(RCW 4.16.080 (3)) applied only to contractual liabilities and not to liabilities created by a statute.
That does not mean, and here is the fallacy of the respondents position, that, therefore, an action on a liability created by a statute falls within the two-year "catch-all" statute of limitations. RCW 4.16.130. It may or it may not. We reiterate that there is no such category as "an action on a liability created by a statute" in our limitation statutes. Such an action does not fall within the "catch-all" statute unless there is no other statute of limitations applicable thereto, i.e., it is "an action for relief not hereinbefore provided for."
Examples of actions which are created by statute, to which the "catch-all" statute of limitations has never been applied, are Wrongful Death Act and Factory Act cases: Cook v. Clallam Cy. (1947), 27 Wn. (2d) 793, 180 P. (2d) 573; Calhoun v. Washington Veneer Co. (1932), 170 Wash. 152, 15 P. (2d) 943; Dodson v. Continental Can Co. (1930), 159 Wash. 589, 294 Pac. 265; Robinson v. Baltimore & S. M. & R. Co. (1901), 26 Wash. 484, 67 Pac. 274.
"If the action is not governed by either of the two subdivisions 3 and 6 of § 159 [now RCW 4.16.080(3) and (6)], then concededly it is controlled by § 165 [now RCW 4.16.130, the catch-all statute].
and the chief inspector of the state grain department (and their surety company), because "carelessly, knowingly and negligently" they had licensed one Nichols to operate grain warehouses without obtaining the bond required by statute. The plaintiff had placed grain in the warehouses operated by Nichols, and when demand was made for the grain called for by its warehouse receipts, there was none available, and there was no bond to which it might have recourse.
". . . It was the failure of Nichols to either deliver the wheat or pay its value that directly caused appellant's loss a loss which it might have recouped itself for by an action upon the bond, had respondent officials exacted one. But the failure to give a bond was not the cause of Nichols' inability to respond to appellant's demand, and hence, while appellant might have ultimately recompensed itself from the bond given, it was not the failure to give a bond that directly occasioned its loss. The direct cause of appellant's loss was the default of Nichols and not the default of respondents."
The conduct of the public officials in the Northern Grain & Warehouse Co. case cannot be compared with the direct invasion of the relator's personal right to preferential employment by the respondents in the present case.
of officers of an insolvent bank who knowingly permitted it to accept deposits after insolvency. Liability was predicated upon the provisions of Art. 12, § 12, of the state constitution.
The court, in that case, dismissed as "untenable" the suggestion that it was an action for "injury to the person or rights of another," under what is now RCW 4.16.080(2), saying that it had been held in Northern Grain & Warehouse Co. v. Holst, supra, "that this statutory subdivision applies only to certain direct invasions of personal or property rights."
We can agree that there was no direct invasion of the plaintiff's personal or property rights in either the Northern Grain & Warehouse Co. case, or in Noble v. Martin, supra; but what can be a more direct invasion of a personal right than to deprive a person of the preference right to employment given to him by statute.
There is no case cited by the respondents that is, inconsistent with, or opposed to, our holding that to deprive the relator of his preferential right to public employment constitutes an injury to that right within the purview of RCW 4.16.080 (2), the three-year statute of limitations.
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE: Our conclusion that the threeyear statute of limitations is applicable to the mandamus action for reinstatement by the relator, makes it necessary to set aside the order of dismissal, which was based on the applicability of the two-year statute of limitations. That order will be set aside; and the cause is remanded to the superior court for the purpose of determining the merits of the affirmative defense of laches; and, if the action is not barred by laches, to determine the relief to which the relator is entitled.
FINLEY, C. J., DONWORTH, WEAVER, OTT, and FOSTER, JJ., concur.
February 28, 1957, to the present time, plus sick leave and vacation time. The claim in wages is in excess of $15,000.
The veterans' preference act was first enacted by Laws of 1895, chapter 84, § 1, p. 166, and with minor amendments has been continuously in effect since that time.
In State ex rel. Breslin v. Todd, 8 Wn. (2d) 482, 113 P. (2d) 315, we held that since the statute made a violation a misdemeanor on the part of the official involved, such criminal action was the exclusive remedy.
In 1951, the legislature added a new section (RCW 73.16.015) which provides: "Any veteran entitled to the benefits of RCW 73.16.010 may enforce his rights hereunder by civil action in the courts."
Prior to 1951, the veterans' preference act imposed no civil liability upon the employer which could be enforced by the veteran in the courts of this state. This liability was created by the 1951 enactment, and this is the only liability upon which a cause of action can be based.
imposed by statute upon national bank shareholders upon insolvency of the bank); Robinson v. Lewis Cy., 141 Wash. 642, 252 Pac. 143, 256 Pac. 503 (statutory liability imposed upon municipal officials for failure to take a contractor's bond); Douglas Cy. v. Grant Cy., supra (special act making Grant County liable for Douglas County obligations); and Heitfeld v. Benevolent & Protective Order of Keglers, 36 Wn. (2d) 685, 220 P. (2d) 655, 18 A. L. R. (2d) 983 (statutory liability imposed upon dealers, winners, and gambling proprietors for amounts lost).
"The decision in Noble v. Martin, supra, . . . 15 conclusive on this issue."
The same is true of the "veterans' preference act." Without it, the employer would have been under no obligation to give preference in employment to the relator. Consequently, the liability is one created by statute, and the well-settled rule is that the two-year statute applies.
"When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, "it means just what I choose it to mean neither more nor less."
HUNTER, J., concurs in the result of the dissent.

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