Source: https://www.criminallawlibraryblog.com/category/constitutional-law/page/2/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 22:46:30+00:00

Document:
Findlaw Case Law Summaries: Constitutional Law. June 14 – 18, 2010.
U.S. Supreme Court, June 17, 2010 Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dept. of Env. Protection, Inc., No. 08–1151 In an action challenging the Florida Department of Environmental Protection’s approval of permits to restore a portion of beach eroded by several hurricanes, the Florida Supreme Court’s holding that the approval of the permits did not unconstitutionally deprive plaintiffs of littoral rights without just compensation is affirmed where there could be no taking unless petitioner could show that, before the Florida Supreme Court’s decision, littoral property owners had rights to future accretions and to contact with the water superior to the State’s right to fill in its submerged land.
May 31 – June 4, 2010.
U.S. Supreme Court, June 01, 2010 Levin v. Commerce Energy, Inc., No. 09–223 In an action by independent natural gas marketers (IMs) who offered to sell natural gas to Ohio consumers against the Ohio Tax Commissioner (Commissioner), alleging discriminatory taxation of IMs and their patrons in violation of the Commerce and Equal Protection Clauses, the Sixth Circuit’s reversal of the district court’s dismissal of the action is reversed where, under the comity doctrine, a taxpayer’s complaint of allegedly discriminatory state taxation, even when framed as a request to increase a competitor’s tax burden, must proceed originally in state court.
U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals, June 03, 2010 Chaparro v. Ruiz-Hernandez, No. 08-1989 In a 42 U.S.C. section 1983 suit brought by a group of twenty-two contract employees against a Puerto Rican municipality and its officers, a grant of plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment is affirmed in part, vacated in part and remanded where: 1) plaintiffs had a reasonable expectation of continued employment; 2) a one-year term of employment with Puerto Rican government bodies is generally considered a protected property interest for procedural due process purposes; and 3) defendants’ claim that plaintiffs were not deprived of protected property interests without due process of law because the process Puerto Rico provided was adequate is rejected.
U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals, June 04, 2010 Harrington v. Cty. of Suffolk, No. 09-3911 In an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 1983 asserting that defendants deprived plaintiffs of a property interest protected by the Due Process Clause by conducting an inadequate investigation into their son’s fatal traffic accident, the dismissal of the action is affirmed where plaintiffs had no property interest in an adequate police investigation.
U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals, May 17, 2010 Coggeshall v. Massachusetts Bd. of Registration of Psychologists, No. 09-1111 In plaintiffs’ 42 U.S.C. section 1983 suit against the Massachusetts Board of Registration of Psychologists, claiming multiple challenges to the constitutionality of the Board’s actions and the regulations involving plaintiff-psychologist’s evaluation of a seven-year-old boy, district court’s dismissal of the action is affirmed where: 1) the members of the Board, individually, are shielded from the damages claims by reason of quasi-judicial immunity; 2) district court’s dismissal on abstention ground is affirmed as this case is a paradigm for Younger abstention; and 3) third party lacks standing to pursue his nonmonetary claims as he suffered no legally cognizable injury in fact as a result of the Board’s actions.
U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals, May 20, 2010 Gorelik v. Costin , No. 09-1192 In plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. section 1983 suit against the president of the New Hampshire State Board of Medicine, arising from the Board’s mischaracterization of plaintiff’s temporary license as disciplinary action rather than as “Board action” and posted on the Board’s website and in newsletters, judgment of the district court is affirmed where: 1) the issuance of plaintiff’s temporary license and the posting of the newsletter labeling it a “disciplinary action” occurred eleven years before filing of the complaint, which is well outside the limitations period; and 2) plaintiff has failed to identify any retaliatory decision or action by the Board in response to her attempts to avail herself of administrative remedies.
U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals, May 18, 2010 Adams v. Zelotes, No. 07-1853 In an action challenging the constitutionality of a Bankruptcy Code provision, 11 U.S.C. section 526(a)(4), alleging that the provision’s prohibition on debt relief agencies advising clients to incur additional debt in contemplation of bankruptcy violated plaintiff’s First Amendment rights, an injunction in favor of plaintiff is reversed where the Supreme Court’s decision in Milavetz directly foreclosed plaintiff’s as-applied challenge by narrowly construing the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act to avoid his First Amendment complaint.
Findlaw Caselaw Summaries: Constitutional Law. May 3-7, 2010.
U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals, May 06, 2010 Dique v. New Jersey State Police, No. 05-1159 In plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claim for selective-enforcement, arising from his 1990 traffic stop that led to his conviction for drug related offenses which was vacated in 2002 on the ground that colorable issues of racial profiling existed at the time of the arrest, district court’s dismissal of the claim as time barred is affirmed where: 1) under Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384 (2007), in a case of selective-enforcement, it will no longer be required that the complainant have been convicted and have had that conviction reversed, expunged or invalidated, and the statute of limitations begins to run at the time the claimant becomes detained pursuant to legal process; and 2) plaintiff asserted his selective-enforcement claim over two years after July 2001, when his attorney became aware of the extensive documents describing the State’s pervasive selective enforcement practices, that plaintiff discovered, or by exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered that h! e might have a basis for an actionable claim. .

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