Source: http://www.childrenslegalrightsjournal.com/childrenslegalrightsjournal/volume_35_issue_3?pg=41
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 15:59:36+00:00

Document:
55 “The Education Amendments of 1974 . . . added important new provisions to the [EHA, requiring] States to: establish a goal of providing full educational opportunities to all handicapped children; provide procedures for insuring that handicapped children and their parents or guardians are guaranteed procedural safeguards in decision regarding identification, evaluation, and educational placement of handicapped children; establish procedures to insure that, to the maximum extent appropriate, handicapped children, including children in public or private institutions or other care facilities, are educated with children who are not handicapped; and that special classes, separate schooling, or other removal of handicapped children from the regular education environment occurs only when the nature of severity of the handicapped is such that education in regular classes with the use of supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily . . . .” 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425, 1430, 1432, 1975 WL 12452, at *8 (Leg. Hist.); see Pub. L. No. 94-142, sec. 3, § 601(b)(8), 89 Stat. 773, 775; see also Pub. L. No. 94-142, sec. 3, § 601(b)(9), 89 Stat. 773, 775 (“[I]t is in the national interest that the Federal Government assist State and local efforts to provide programs to meet the educational needs of handicapped children in order to assure equal protection of the law . . . .”).
56 Education of the Handicapped Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-476, 104 Stat. 1103; 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1723, 1784 (1990). The IDEA was further amended in 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-119, 105 Stat. 587 (1994), in 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-17 (1997), and in 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-446 (2004).
57 Saba, supra note 54, at 138; Gordon, supra note 26, at 194–96. The 1997 amendments included greater specification of the IEP team, Pub. L. No. 105-17, § 614(d)(1)(B), 111 Stat. 37, 85 (1997), and expanded the contents of the IEP, making it a comprehensive document with the objective of enabling a child “to be involved and progress in the general curriculum.” Pub. L. No. 105-17, § 614(d)(1)(A)( ii)–( iii), 111 Stat. 37, 84–85.
58 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(3) (2012) (describing the “child find” requirement).
59 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A) (requiring a state to submit a plan to the Secretary of Education reflecting policies guaranteeing availability of a FAPE “to all children with disabilities residing in the State between the ages of [three] and [twenty-one], inclusive, including children with disabilities who have been suspended or expelled from school”).
60 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A).
61 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d) (2012) (providing for the development of an IEP for each child classified as disabled under the IDEA that specifies the setting in which a child is to be educated, the supplemental services and modifications, as well as annual goals).
62 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6)(A) (2012); see also N. Y.S. Ed. Law § 4404(1), 8 N.Y.C.R.R. 200.5(h)–(l) (setting forth requirements for mediation or the impartial due process hearing procedure). New York has a two-tiered administrative procedure. The initial complaint is heard by an Officer (“IHO”). N. Y.S. Ed. Law § 4404(1); 8 N. Y.C.R.R. 200.5( i), (j). An appeal may be taken to the second level for review by a State Review Officer (“SRO”). N. Y.S. Ed. Law § 4404(2); 8 N. Y.C.R.R. 200.5(k). Final determinations of the SRO may be appealed to either the state supreme or federal district court. N. Y.S. Ed. Law § 4404(3); 8 N. Y.C.R.R. 200.5(l).
63 20 U.S.C. § 1412(10)(C)( ii); see Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-17, § 612(a)(10)(C)( ii), 111 Stat. 39, 63; C.B. ex rel. B.B. v. Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 636 F.3d 981, 988 (8th Cir. 2011); see also Katie Harrison, Direct Tuition Payments Under the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act: Equal Remedies For Equal Harm, 25 J. CIV. RTS. & ECON. DEV. 873, 880–81 (2011) (arguing that the statute should explicitly allow for prospective reimbursement for unilateral private school enrollment where a public school district has failed to make a FAPE available). Exception is taken to Ms. Harris’s suggested language to the extent that it would require a child to have “received special education and related services under the authority of a public agency . . . .” Id. at 902. This is antithetical to Forest Grove School District v. T.A., which justified tuition reimbursement after finding a FAPE deprivation where parents provided the school district with independent evaluations and the school district refused to provide an IEP and special education services were never delivered within the public school. Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230, 240 (2009).

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