Source: https://cyber.harvard.edu/privacy/Introduction%20to%20Government%20Investigations.htm
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 01:11:23+00:00

Document:
In previous Modules we explored how private sector actors in the U.S. utilize technology to monitor use of cyberspace. In Modules IV and V, we turn to the more complex question of government surveillance of cyberspace. In Module IV we take as our task the description of the basic constitutional and statutory rules that govern cyberspace surveillance by the government. In Module V we take up the complicated question of how the new USA Patriot Act --enacted post-September 11--allows greatly expanded surveillance of cyberspace.
These two Modules are substantially more complex than the earlier ones for several reasons--largely having to do with the fact that the U.S. recognizes multiple sources of positive law. First, the United States follows a federal system in which not only Congress, but also most of the 50 individual states has enacted regulations to govern cyberspace. However, because federal statutes are much more significant, and preempt conflicting state laws, these Modules focus primarily upon federal legislation and the U.S. Constitution.
Second, as technology has evolved over time, Congress has enacted many statutes that govern different aspects of cyberspace. For example, different surveillance rules might apply depending on whether the target of governmental surveillance accesses the internet using a cell phone, telephone, or cable modem. Different rules might also apply depending on whether the type of cyberspace use involves email, instant-messaging, telephone, or websurfing. A recently-enacted federal statute, known as “USA Patriot,” attempts to moderate some of these conflicts, but issues linked to the different technologies remain. In this Module, we will attempt to set forth the principal federal statutory frameworks.
Third, different rules apply depending on the nature of the government’s surveillance. Does the government desire to know the contents of every email sent to or from a particular computer? Does the government intend to search widely for communications by a particular author? Or, does the government merely desire to know the name and email address of the sender of email to a particular address?
Finally, because all legislation must satisfy judicial interpretations of the U.S. Constitution, many statutes that appear to authorize certain surveillance practices might be held to be unconstitutional. Therefore, even a cursory introduction to government surveillance issues must identify some of the key constitutional cases that affect the interpretations of the statutes.
A Trap and Trace Order records the telephone numbers of telephones that are used to place calls to a particular phone. (i.e. Makes a log of incoming phone numbers.) Note that information of this sort is not gathered in the ordinary course of business.
o Wiretaps are used for ongoing surveillance of a telephone line or other electronic communications line. It allows interception of content (i.e. conversations or other data) passed over the line. Note that this is more information than is gathered by a Pen Register or Trap and Trace Orders – neither of these intercept content - rather, they simply collect numbers dialed/received.
The requirements for obtaining a subpoena are minimal. There is no ‘relevancy standard’ - no requirement that the information sought be relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation. Subpoenas can be issued by a prosecutor (sometimes through a grand jury investigation) without judicial intervention. However, a subpoena may not be used to obtain information or evidence protected by the Fourth Amendment unless Fourth Amendment requirements are satisfied.
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 dictates requirements for Trap and Trace Orders. For more information about Title III, see below.
Title III dictates requirements for wiretaps. Wiretaps are used for ongoing listening and invasion, and require a more comprehensive showing of need than a warrant. Title III also mandates court supervision and minimal intrusion for ongoing wiretaps.
The U.S. Constitution ordinarily grants individuals rights against the government (and not private parties). Since government agents are usually the ones who are engaging in a claimed invasion, the U.S. legal system relies upon an independent judiciary to enforce these Constitutional rights. Often--though not always--such cases arise in the context of a criminal trial in which a defendant seeks to exclude certain evidence from the trial record on account the government obtained the information in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Katz concluded in a famous tag line that the Amendment ''protects people, not places.'' Henceforth, electronic surveillance was made subject to the Amendment's requirements.
"[A] Fourth Amendment search occurs when the government violates a subjective expectation of privacy that society recognizes as reasonable." Conversely, "a Fourth Amendment search does not occur--even in the explicitly protected location of a house-- unless the individual manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the object of the challenged search, and society [is] willing to recognize that expectation as reasonable."
The two-part test ostensibly guides the Supreme Court and lower courts in its decisions, but interpreting such a vague standard leaves substantial room for judgment. The first requirement, the ''subjective expectation'' of privacy, has in practice eroded as a workable standard, because, as Justice Harlan concluded in a later case, ''our expectations, and the risks we assume, are in large part reflections of laws that translate into rules the customs and values of the past and present.'' In short, the Supreme Court sets the standards, and those standards in turn become the future reference points for individuals’ “expectations” of privacy against the governmental intrusions.
Note that, despite the rejection of the “property” rationale in Katz, the Court re-embraces the same concept via a backdoor description of “expectations.” The problem, of course, is that when these concepts of realspace are applied to cyberspace (or even telephonic communications) an individual owns no “property” in the mechanisms of transmission (e.g., the wires that carry the dataflow) that would support her claim of privacy in the communication. In sum, although the Fourth Amendment protects a person’s privacy, not her property, owning the property in which transmissions occur has become the surest means of protecting privacy.
In specific terms, the Court has given the most protection to an individual’s home, while other “places” an individual frequents (e.g., automobile) or information about his activities are given little protection. Revealing information about one’s activities to another person has become a surefire road to the no privacy destination. In United States v. Miller, for example, the Court gave a restrictive reading to “reasonable expectations” in a case involving a bank depositor who claimed the government was required to satisfy Fourth Amendment standards in order to obtain his financial records from his bank. The Miller Court held that the depositor had no "legitimate 'expectation of privacy' in financial information "voluntarily conveyed to . . . banks and exposed to their employees in the ordinary course of business."
Similarly, in a key case posing the question of whether the government was required to obtain a warrant before installing a pen register, the Supreme Court held that an individual targeted in pen register monitoring does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the telephone numbers dialed from his home telephone. According to Smith v. Maryland, an individual is assumed to know that in dialing, he "convey[s] numerical information to the phone company” and that the phone company “record[s] this information for a variety of legitimate business purposes." The Court rejected strong dissents that argued that the numbers dialed consisted of communication “content”. Therefore, the Court held that the installation and use of a pen register "was not a 'search,' and no warrant was required."
The Court has not yet held that the content of those communications may be revealed without violating the Fourth Amendment. One could imagine, for example, an extension of the Smith rationale that the user knows when he dials he “conveys numerical information to the phone company” because he is using the phone company’s switching systems. Presumably, the user also knows that when he speaks, he is using the phone company’s lines and switching stations since the user must speak using the communication devices of his telephone service provider. However, The key distinction between (1) the “content” of the communication and (2) the telephone numbers dialed, time, length and date of call, has led one commentator to coin the phrase “communication attributes” to describe the latter. We will rely on this distinction as we consider the treatment of cyberspace communications.
What are the factors that guide the “balance?” That a person has taken precautions to maintain her privacy, that is, precautions customarily taken by those seeking to exclude others, is usually a significant factor in determining legitimacy of expectation. As indicated above, property interests in the thing or information are also relevant, and in the recent Kyllo case, apparently determinative. However, because the “needs” of law enforcement are weighed against these interests, it is difficult to determine in advance how much weight a court will give to any factor.
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 attempted to codify the Fourth Amendment principles set forth by Katz. Title III proscribes the interception of oral and wire communications, "while making provision for law enforcement to intercept these communications for use in criminal investigations."
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 ("ECPA") amended Title III when it became clear that Title III was not adequate to deal with developing technologies in the field of electronic communication. The ECPA was designed to align Title III with new innovations such as "cellular telephones, computer-to-computer transmissions, and electronic mail systems . . . ."
Note: A detailed summary of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 and the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA) will be found in the Statutory Assignment following the Introduction. Follow the link below to the Module IV Homepage.
 This Introduction and Module draws upon research papers authored by Cory Bragar (HLS 2002) and Emily Terrell (Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, 2004).
 277 U.S. 438 (1928). See also Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942) (detector placed against wall of adjoining room; no search and seizure); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961) (spike mike pushed through a party wall until it hit a heating duct).
 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967). Justice Harlan, concurring, 389 U.S. at 353, authored what became the two pronged test for determining whether the Fourth Amendment protects a given privacy interest: ''first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.''' Id. at 361.
 Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967).
 Kyllo v.United States, 121 S. CT. 2038, 2042 (2001).
 United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971). See also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 n.5 (1979) (government could not establish ''subjective expectations'' by announcing that henceforth all homes would be subject to warrantless entry, and thus destroy the ''legitimate expectation of privacy'').
 Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 368 (1968) (official had a reasonable expectation of privacy in an office he shared with others, although he owned neither the premises nor the papers seized).
 E.g., Kyllo v.United States, 121 S. CT. 2038 (2001)(where government used a thermal imaging device pointed at home to detect pattern of heat, “the surveillance is a 'search' and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant"); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980). 468 U.S. 705, 708-10 (1984). In United States v. Karo, a beeper signal was used to determine if a container holding a radio-controlled “beeper” was still in a house. The Court found the intrusion required compliance with the Fourth Amendment. "(P)rivate residences are places in which the individual normally expects privacy free of governmental intrusion not authorized by a warrant, and that expectation is plainly one that society is prepared to recognize as justifiable." In contrast, the Court in United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983), agents installed a beeper in a container of chloroform and followed the beeper signal as the container was transported. The Court found that the beeper had been monitored while on public streets, and thus no search had resulted because there could be no legitimate expectation of privacy on public streets.
 One has a diminished expectation of privacy in automobiles. E.g., United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 761 (1979) (collecting cases). See also Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) (passengers in automobile passengers who had no legitimate expectation of privacy in areas searched).
 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976).
 442 U.S. 735, 743, 746 (1979).
 Susan Freiwald, Uncertain Privacy: Communication Attributes After the Digital Telephony Act, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 949 (1996).
 United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786-87 (1971) (Justice Harlan dissenting).
 E.g., United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) (no warrant required to obtain bank records from bank); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (Fourth Amendment doesn’t protect numbers dialed from one's telephone); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984) (prison cell); Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765 (1983) (shipping container opened and inspected by customs agents and resealed and delivered to the addressee); California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988) (individual held to have abandoned privacy interest in papers placed in sealed plastic bags left at curb for garbage collection).
 18 U.S.C. § § 2510-2520 (1968).
 Michelle Skatoff-Gee, Changing Techologies and the Expectation of Privacy: A Modern Dilemma, 28 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 189, 201 (1996).
 See 18 U.S.C. § § 2510-2521.

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