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Timestamp: 2019-04-23 04:04:18+00:00

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We come now to treat of estate, with respect to the number and connections of their owners, the tenants who occupy and hold them. And, considered in this view, estates of any quantity or length of duration, and whether they be in actual possession or expectancy, may be held in four different ways; in severalty, in joint-tenancy, in coparcenary, and in common.
1. He that holds lands or tenements in severalty, or is sole tenant thereof, is he that holds them in his own right only, without any other person being joined or connected with him in point of interest, during his estate therein. This is the most common and usual way of holding an estate; and therefore we may make the same observations here, that we did upon estates in possession, as contradistinguished from those in expectancy, in the preceding chapter: that there is little or nothing peculiar to be remarked concerning it, since all estates are supposed to be of this sort, unless where they are expressly declared to be otherwise; and that, in laying down general rules and doctrines, we usually apply them to such estates as are held in severalty. I shall therefore proceed to consider the other three species of estates, in which there are always a plurality of tenants.
In unfolding this title, and the two remaining ones in the present chapter, we will first inquire, how these estates may be created; next, their properties and respective incidents; and lastly, how they may be severed or destroyed.
I. The creation of an estate in joint-tenancy depends on the wording of the deed or devise, by which the tenants claim title; for this estate can only arise by purchase or grant, that is, by the act of the parties, and never by the mere act of law. Now, if an estate be given to a plurality of persons, without adding any restrictive, exclusive, or explanatory words, as if an estate be granted to A and B and their heirs, this makes them immediately joint-tenants in fee of the lands. For the law interprets the grant so as to make all parts of it take effect, which can only be done by creating an equal estate in them both. As therefore the grantor has thus united their names, the law gives them a thorough union in all other respects. For the properties of a joint estate are derived from its unity, which is fourfold; the unity of interest, the unity of title, the unity of time, and the unity of possession: or, in other words, joint-tenants have one and the same interest, accruing by one and the same conveyance, commencing at one and the same time, and held by one and the same undivided possession.
an action of waste against the other, by construction of the statute Westm. 2. c. 22.19 So too, tough at common law no action of account lay for one joint-tenant against another, unless he had constituted him his bailiff or receiver,20 yet now by the statute 4 Ann. c. 16. joint-tenant may have actions of account against each other, for receiving more than their due share of the profits of the tenements held in joint-tenant.
From the same principle also arises the remaining grand incident of joint estates; viz. the doctrine of survivorship: by which, when two or more persons are seized of a joint estate of inheritance, for their own lives, or pur auter vie, or are jointly possessed of any chattel interest, the entire tenancy upon the decease of any of them remains to the survivors, and at length to the last survivor; and he shall be entitled to the whole estate, whatever it be, whether an inheritance or a common freehold only, or even a less estate.21 This is the natural and regular consequence of the union and entirely of their interest. The interest of two joint-tenants is not only equal or similar, but also is one and the same. One has not originally a distinct moiety from the other; but, if by any subsequent act (as by alienation or forfeiture of either) the interest become separate and distinct, the joint-tenancy instantly ceases. But, while it continues, each of two joint-tenants has a concurrent interest in the whole; and therefore, on the death of his companion, the sole interest in the whole remains to the survivor. For the interest, which the survivor originally had, is clearly not divested by the death of his companion; and no other person can now claim to have a joint estate with him, for no one can now have an interest in the whole, accruing by the same title, and taking effect at the same time with his own; neither can any one claim a separate interest in any part of tenements; for that would be to deprive the survivor of the right which he has in all, and every part. As therefore the survivor’s original interest in the whole still remains; and as no one can now be admitted, either jointly or severally, to any share with him therein; it follows, that his own interest must now be entire and several, and that he shall alone be entitled to the whole estate (whatever it be) that was created by the original grant.
This right of survivorship is called by our ancient authors22 the jus accrescendi, because the right, upon the death of one joint-tenant, accumulates and increases to the survivors; or, as they themselves express it, “pars illa communis accrescit superstitibus, de persona in personam, usque ad ultimam superstitem” . And this jus accrescendi ought to be mutual; which I apprehend to be the reason why neither the king,23 nor any corporation,24 can be a joint-tenant with a private person. For here is no mutuality: the private person has not even the remotest chance of being seized of the entirety, by benefit of survivorship, for the king and the corporation can never die.
such death the right so the survivor (which accrued at the other29) is already vested.30 4. It may also be destroyed, by destroying the unity of interest. And therefore, if there by or descends upon either, it is a severance of the jointure:31 though, if an estate is originally limited to two for life, and after to the heirs of one of them, the freehold shall remain in jointure, without merging in the inheritance, they are not separate estates, (which is requisite in order to a merger) but branches of one in-tire estate.32 In like manner, if a joint-tenant in fee makes a lease for life of his share, this defeats the jointure;33 for it destroys the unity both of title and of interest. And, whenever or by whatever means the jointure ceases or is severed, the right of survivorship or jus accrescendi the same instant ceases with it.34 Yet, if one of three joint-tenants alienes his share, the two remaining tenants still hold their parts by joint-tenancy and survivorship:35 and, if one of three joint-tenants releases his share to one of his companions, though the joint-tenancy is destroyed with regard to that part, yet the two remaining parts are still held in jointure;36 for they still preserve their original constituent unities. But when, by any act or event, different interests are created in the several parts of the estate, or they are held by different titles, or if merely the possession is separated; so that the tenants have no longer these four indispensable properties, a sameness of interest, an undivided possession, a title vesting at one and the same time, and by one and the same act or grant; the jointure is instantly dissolved.
In general it is advantageous for the joint-tenants to dissolve the jointure; since thereby the right of survivorship is taken away, and each may transmit his own part to his own heirs. Sometimes however it is disadvantageous to dissolve the joint estate: as if there be joint-tenants for life, and they make partition, this dissolves the jointure; and, though before they each of them had an estate in the whole for their own lives and the life of their companion, now they have an estate in a moiety only for their own lives merely; and, on the death of either, the reversioner shall enter on his moiety.37 And therefore, if there be two joint-tenants for life, and one grants away his part for the life of his companion, it is a forfeiture:38 for, in the first place, by the severance of the jointure he has given himself in his own moiety only an estate for his own life; and then he grants the same land for the life of another: which grant, by a tenant for his own life merely, is a forfeiture of his estate;39 for it is creating an estate which may by possibility last longer then that which he is legally entitled to.
is, because lands descending in fee-simple are distributed by the policy of law, for the maintenance of all the daughters; and, if one has a sufficient provision out of the same inheritance, equal to the rest, it is not reasonable that she should have more: but lands, descending in tail, are not distributed by the operation of law, so properly as per formam doni; it matters not therefore how unequal this distribution may be. Also no lands, but such as are given in frankmarriage, shall be brought into hotchpot; for no others are looked upon in law as given for the advancement of the woman, or by way of marriage-portion.62 And therefore, as gifts in frankmarriage are fallen into disuse, I should hardly have mentioned the law of hotchpot, had not this method of division been revived and copied by the statute for distribution of personal estates, which we shall hereafter consider at large.
The estate in coparcenary may be dissolved, either by partition; which disunites the possession; by alienation of one parcener, which disunites the title, and may disunite the interest; or by the whole at last descending to and vesting in one single person, which brings it to an estate in severalty.
IV. Tenants in common are such as hold by several and distinct titles, but by unity of possession; because none knows his own severalty, and therefore they all occupy promiscuously.63 This tenancy therefore happens, where there is an unity of possession merely, but perhaps an entire disunion of interest, of title, and of time. For, if there be two tenants in common of lands, one may hold is part in fee-simple, the other in tail, or for life; so that there is no necessary unity of interest: one may hold by descent, the other by purchase; or the one by purchase from A, the other by purchase from B; so that there is no unity of title: one’s estate may have been vested fifty years, the other’s but yesterday; so there is no unity of time. The only unity there is, is that of possession; and for this Littleton gives the true reason, because no man can certainly tell which part is his own: otherwise even this would be soon destroyed.
Tenancy in common may be created, either by the destruction of the two other estates, in joint-tenancy and coparcenary, or by special limitation in a deed. By the destruction of the two other estates, I mean such destruction as does not fever the unity of possession, but only the unity of title or interest. As, if one of two joint-tenants in fee alienes his estate for the life of the alienee, the alienee and the other joint-tenant are tenants in common: for they now have several titles, the other joint-tenant by the original grant, the alienee by the new alienation;64 and they also have several interests, the former joint-tenant in sm fee-simple, the alienee for his own life only. So, if one joint-tenant give his part to A in tail, and the other gives is to B in tail, the donees are tenants in common, as holding by different titles and conveyances.65 If one of two parceners alienes, the alienee and the remaining parcener are tenants in common;66 because they hold by different titles, the parcener by descent, the alienee by purchase. So likewise, if there be a grant to two men, or two women, and the heirs of their bodies, here the grantees shall be joint-tenants of the life-estate, but they shall have several inheritances; because they cannot possibly have one heir of their two bodies, as might have been the case had the limitation been to a man and woman, and the heirs of their bodies begotten:67 and in this, and the like cases, their issues shall be tenants in common; because they must claim by different titles, one as heir of A, and the other as heir of B; and those too not titles by purchase, but descent. In short, whenever an estate in joint-tenancy or coparcenary is dissolved, so that there be no partition made, but the unity of possession continues, it is turned into a tenancy in common.
description, and limit the estate to A and B, to hold as tenants in common, and not as joint-tenants.
As to the incidents attending a tenancy in common: tenants in common (like joint-tenants) are compellable by the statutes of Henry VIII. and William III, before-mentioned,76 to make partition of their lands; which they were not at common law. They properly take by distinct moieties, and have no entirety of interest; and therefore there is no survivorship between tenants in common. Their other incidents are such as merely arise from the unity of possession; and are therefore the same as appertain to joint-tenants merely upon the account: such as being liable to reciprocal actions of waste, and of account, by the statutes of Westm. 2. c. 22. and 4 Ann. c. 16. For by the common law no tenant in common was liable to account to his companion for embezzling the profits of the estate;77 though, if one actually turns the other out of possession, an action of ejectment will lie against him.78 But, as for other incidents of joint-tenants, which arise from the privity of title, or the union and entirety of interest, (such as joining or being joined in actions,79 unless in the case where some entire or indivisible thing is to be recovered80) these are not applicable to tenants in common, whose interests are distinct, and whose titles are not joint but several.
Estates in common can only be dissolved two ways: 1. By uniting all the titles and interests in one tenant, by purchase or otherwise; which brings the whole to one severalty: 2. By making partition between the several tenants in common, which gives them all respective severalties. For indeed tenancies in common differ in nothing from sole estates, but merely in the blending and unity of possession. And this finishes our inquiries with respect to the nature of estates.
8. Dyer. 340. 1 Rep. 101.
9. Litt. § 288. 5 Rep. 10.
10. Quilibet totum tenet et nihil tenet; scilicet, totum in communi, et nihil separatim per se. Bract. 1. 5. tr. C. 26.
21. Litt. § 280. 281.
22. Bracton, 1. 4. ir. 3. c. 9. § 3. Fleta. 1. 3. c. 4.
23. Co. Litt. 190. Finch L. 83.
25. Co. Litt. 188. 193.
29. Jus accrescendi praefertur ultimae voluntati. Co. Litt. 185.
32. 2 Rep. 60. Co. Litt. 182.
33. Litt. § 302. 303.
34. Nihil de re accrescit ei, qui nihil in re quando jus accresceret habet. Co. Litt. 188.
40. Litt. § 241. 242.
47. Co. Litt. 164. 174.
51. § 243 to 264.
52. Co. Litt. 166. 3 Rep. 22.
53. By statute 8 & 9 W. III. c. 3. An easier method of carrying on the proceedings on a writ of partition, of lands held either in joint-tenants, parcenary, or common, than was used at the common law, is chalked out and provided.
54. Co. Litt. 164, 165.
56. Bracton. l. 2. c. 34.Litt. § 266 to 273.
57. l. 2. t. 14. c. 15.
73. 1 Equ. Cas. Abr. 291.
74. 1. P. Wms. 17.
75. 3 Rep. 39.1 Ventr. 32.
76. pag. 185, & 186.

References: § 288
 § 280
 § 3
 § 302
 § 241
 § 243
 § 266