Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/269/328/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 06:22:23+00:00

Document:
1. A bill by a state for an injunction against federal officers charged with the administration of a federal statute cannot be entertained by this Court where the bill does not show that any right of the state which, in itself, is an appropriate subject of judicial cognizance, is being or is about to be affected prejudicially by the application or enforcement of the Act, but seeks merely to obtain a judicial declaration that, in certain features, the Act exceeds the authority of Congress and encroaches upon that of the state. P. 269 U. S. 330.
2. The bill in this case, which seeks to draw in question the constitutionality of parts of the Federal Water Power Act in their relation to waters within or bordering on the complaining state, fails to present any case or controversy appropriate for exertion of the judicial power. P. 269 U. S. 334.
3. The power of Congress to regulate interstate and foreign commerce includes the power to control, for the purposes of such commerce, all navigable waters accessible to it and within the United States, and to that end to adopt all appropriate measures to free such waters from obstructions to navigation and to preserve, and even enlarge, their navigable capacity, and the authority and rights of a state in respect of such waters within its limits are subordinate to this power of Congress. P. 269 U. S. 337.
On a motion to dismiss a bill filed by the State of New Jersey against the Attorney General of the United States and the members of the Federal Power Commission, all alleged to be citizens of other states, to enjoin the defendants from taking any steps to apply or enforce, in respect of waters within or bordering on New Jersey, certain provisions of the Federal Water Power Act.
This is a bill in equity brought in this Court by the State of New Jersey against the Attorney General of the United States and the members of the Federal Power Commission, all alleged to be citizens of other states, to obtain a judicial declaration that certain parts of the Act of June 10, 1920, called the Federal Water Power Act, c. 285, 41 Stat. 1063, are unconstitutional insofar as they relate to waters within or bordering on that state and to enjoin the defendants from taking any steps towards applying or enforcing them in respect of those waters. The defendants respond with a motion to dismiss on the ground, among others, that the bill does not present a case or controversy appropriate for the exertion of judicial power, but only an abstract question respecting the relative authority of Congress and the state in dealing with such waters. If this be a proper characterization of the bill, the motion to dismiss must prevail, as a reference to prior decisions will show.
"It is only where the rights of persons or property are involved, and when such rights can be presented under some judicial form of proceedings, that courts of justice can interpose relief. This Court can have no right to pronounce an abstract opinion upon the constitutionality of a state law. Such law must be brought into actual or threatened operation upon rights properly falling under judicial cognizance, or a remedy is not to be had here"
for the exercise of judicial power; the rights in danger, as we have seen, must be rights of persons or property, not merely political rights, which do not belong to the jurisdiction of a court, either in law or in equity."
to the Constitution of the United States, and therefore void, and that it is the legal duty of the collecting officers of the state to receive them when offered in payment of such taxes and debts."
"But no court sits to determine questions of law in thesi. There must be a litigation upon actual transactions between real parties, growing out of a controversy affecting legal or equitable rights as to person or property. All questions of law arising in such cases are judicially determinable. The present is not a case of that description."
In Muskrat v. United States, 219 U. S. 346, the question was whether, consistently with the limitations of the judicial power, this Court could entertain, on an appeal from the Court of Claims, a suit brought under a permissive act of Congress by members of the Cherokee Tribe of Indians to determine the constitutional validity of congressional enactments enlarging prior restrictions on the alienation of their allotments and permitting newly born children and other members of the tribe omitted from a prior enrollment to share in the distribution of tribal lands and funds. In an extended opinion, the Court pointed out that the suit did not present an actual controversy between the parties respecting any specific right of person or property, but only a question of the power of Congress to enact the legislation described, and held that such a suit was not within the scope of the judicial power, and could not be entertained by this Court, originally or on appeal, even under a permissive act of Congress.
"The bill is of unusual length, 65 printed pages. Much of it is devoted to the presentation of an abstract question of legislative power -- whether the matters dealt with in several of the provisions of titles III and IV fall within the field wherein Congress may speak with constitutional authority, or within the field reserved to the several states. The claim of the state, elaborately set forth, is that they fall within the latter field, and therefore that the congressional enactment is void. Obviously this part of the bill does not present a case or controversy within the range of the judicial power as defined by the Constitution. It is only where rights, in themselves appropriate subjects of judicial cognizance, are being or are about to be affected prejudicially by the application or enforcement of a statute that its validity may be called in question by a suitor and determined by an exertion of the judicial power."
And in Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447, the Court recognized and gave effect to the reasoning and principle of those cases by dismissing a bill brought by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to restrain executive officers from giving effect to an act of Congress alleged to be an unconstitutional usurpation of power, but not shown to affect prejudicially any proprietary or other right of the state subject to judicial cognizance.
indicated sufficiently by describing the act and then pointing out the distinctive features of the bill.
"and for the expropriation to the government of excessive profits until' the state 'shall make provision for preventing excessive profits or the expropriation therefor [thereof] to"
"adapted to a comprehensive scheme of improvement and utilization for the purposes of navigation, of water power development, and of other beneficial uses,"
War, to bring suits to prevent, remedy, or correct violations of the act or lawful regulations or orders thereunder, and also suits to revoke permits or licenses for violations of their terms.
Rightly to appraise the bill, one should have in mind the doctrine, heretofore firmly settled, that the power to regulate interstate and foreign commerce, which the Constitution vests in Congress, includes the power to control, for the purposes of such commerce, all navigable waters which are accessible to it and within the United States, whether within or without the limits of a state, and, to that end, to adopt all appropriate measures to free such waters from obstructions to navigation and to preserve and even enlarge their navigable capacity, and that the authority and rights of a state in respect of such waters within its limits, and in respect of the lands under them, are subordinate to this power of Congress. Philadelphia v. Stimson, 223 U. S. 605, 223 U. S. 634, 223 U. S. 638; United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Co., 229 U. S. 53, 229 U. S. 62, 229 U. S. 65; Lewis Blue Point Oyster Co. v. Briggs, 229 U. S. 82, 229 U. S. 88; Greenleaf Lumber Co. v. Garrison, 237 U. S. 251, 237 U. S. 258 et seq.; Willink v. United States, 240 U. S. 572, 240 U. S. 580; United States v. Rio Grande Irrigation Co., 174 U. S. 690, 174 U. S. 703.
power at several places along streams which feed the canal and in designated localities along the Delaware River "where dams could be erected and power developed;" that the state "contemplates" utilizing these opportunities "through a state agency or by private enterprise," with a resulting profit to its treasury; that the state has an established policy respecting "the conservation of potable waters," which has been put into partial effect "through its agencies and by private enterprise" by means of reservoirs and waterworks constructed at large cost, and that, in its sovereign capacity, the state owns lands under the Bay of New York, the Hudson River, adjacent waters, and the Delaware River, from the leasing of which for dock, pier, and related purposes it derives a large revenue. These allegations are followed by others, similarly indefinite, to the effect that the challenged provisions of the act, if applied and enforced, will interfere with the state's contemplated development of "the aforesaid power projects," will jeopardize its policy respecting the conservation of potable waters and work serious injury to reservoirs and waterworks constructed and used in that connection, will deprive the state of revenue from the leasing of its submerged lands and from the development and conservation of water resources, and will subject the state and its citizens to onerous restrictions and conditions not required for the protection or promotion of navigation or of interstate or foreign commerce.
that right, and there is no showing that the defendants are taking or about to take any steps to prevent the state from exercising it. Passing that right, the state is merely shown to be contemplating power development and water conservation in the future. There is no showing that it has determined on or is about to proceed with any definite project. Neither is it shown that the defendants are now taking or about to take any definite action respecting waters bordering on or within the state, save as the commission is about to consider and act on "various applications from persons in New Jersey" for preliminary permits and licenses to utilize "navigable waters on the boundary and inland" for the development of water power. As the applications are not further described, it must be assumed that the permits are sought, as the act provides, "for the sole purpose of maintaining priority of application for a license," and that the licenses are sought conformably to the provision requiring applicants to submit satisfactory evidence of compliance with the laws of the state with respect to "the appropriation, diversion and use of water for power purposes" and to "the right to engage in" that business. While the state is thus apparently put in the position of objecting to the licensing of projects sanctioned by its own laws, the bill explains that the objection is chiefly to the restrictions and conditions to which, according to the terms of the act, an applicant is deemed to assent by seeking and accepting a license. These restrictions and conditions are assailed in the bill as passing beyond the field of congressional power and invading that reserved to the state. But whether they are thus invalid cannot be made the subject of judicial inquiry until they are given or are about to be given some practical application and effect. Naturally this will be after they become part of an accepted license, and after some right, privilege, immunity, or duty asserted under them becomes the subject of actual controversy.
Such a situation is not presented here. As respects the state's submerged lands, the bill signally fails to disclose any existing controversy within the range of the judicial power. Stating merely that the state will be deprived of revenue from the leasing of such lands is not enough. Facts must be stated showing that the act is being or about to be applied in a way which does or will encroach on or prejudicially affect the state's qualified right in the lands. There is no such showing.
state denies, that such a withdrawal is an interference with interstate commerce forbidden by the Constitution. This is essentially a judicial question. It concededly is so in suits between private parties, and, of course, its character is not different in a suit between states."
"What is sought is not an abstract ruling on that question, but an injunction against such a withdrawal presently threatened and likely to be productive of great injury. The purpose to withdraw is shown in the enactment of the defendant state before set forth and is about to be carried into effect by her officers acting in her name and at her command."

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