Source: https://h2o.law.harvard.edu/cases/849
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 02:48:35+00:00

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295 U.S. 495 55 S.Ct. 837 79 L.Ed. 1570 A.L.A. SCHECHTER POULTRY CORPORATION et al.
UNITED STATES. UNITED STATES v. A.L.A. SCHECHTER POULTRY CORPORATION et al.
Nos. 854, 864. Argued May 2, 3, 1935. Decided May 27, 1935.
Phrase 'unfair methods of competition' within Federal Trade Commission Act has broader meaning than common-law term 'unfair competition,' but its scope cannot be precisely defined, and what constitutes 'unfair methods of competition' must be determined in particular instances, upon evidence, in light of particular competitive conditions and of what is found to be a specific and substantial public interest (Federal Trade Commission Act § 5 (15 USCA § 45)).
Messrs. Joseph Heller, Frederick H. Wood, and Jacob E. Heller, all of New York City, for petitioner A.L.A. Schechter Corporation and others.
The Attorney General and Messrs. Stanley F. Reed, Sol. Gen., and Donald R. Richberg, both of Washington, D.C., for the United States.
Petitioners in No. 854 were convicted in the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of New York on eighteen counts of an indictment charging violations of what is known as the 'Live Poultry Code,'1 and on an additional count for conspiracy to commit such violations.2 By demurrer to the indictment and appropriate motions on the trial, the defendants contended (1) that the code had been adopted pursuant to an unconstitutional delegation by Congress of legislative power; (2) that it attempted to regulate intrastate transactions which lay outside the authority of Congress; and (3) that in certain provisions it was repugnant to the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.
'The Circuit Court of Appeals sustained the conviction on the conspiracy count and on sixteen counts for violation of the code, but reversed the conviction on two counts which charged violation of requirements as to minimum wages and maximum hours of labor, as these were not deemed to be within the congressional power of regulation. 76 F.(2d) 617. On the respective applications of the defendants (No. 854) and of the government (No. 864), this Court granted writs of certiorari April 15, 1935. 295 U.S. 723, 55 S.Ct. 651, 79 L.Ed. —-.
poultry for slaughter and resale. After the poultry is trucked to their slaughterhouse markets in Brooklyn, it is there sold, usually within twenty-four hours, to retail poultry dealers and butchers who sell directly to consumers. The poultry purchased from defendants is immediately slaughtered, prior to delivery, by shochtim in defendants' employ. Defendants do not sell poultry in interstate commerce.
nate against them, and will tend to effectuate the policy' of title 1 of the act (15 USCA § 701 et seq.). Such codes 'shall not permit monopolies or monopolistic practices.' As a condition of his approval, the President may 'impose such conditions (including requirements for the making of reports and the keeping of accounts) for the protection of consumers, competitors, employees, and others, and in furtherance of the public interest, and may provide such exceptions to and exemptions from the provisions of such code as the President in his discretion deems necessary to effectuate the policy herein declared.' Where such a code has not been approved, the President may prescribe one, either on his own motion or on complaint. Violation of any provision of a code (so approved or prescribed) 'in any transaction in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce' is made a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not more than $500 for each offense, and each day the violation continues is to be deemed a separate offense.
The code fixes the number of hours for workdays. It provides that no employee, with certain exceptions, shall be permitted to work in excess of forty hours in any one week, and that no employees, save as stated, 'shall be paid in any pay period less than at the rate of fifty (50) cents per hour.' The article containing 'general labor provisions' prohibits the employment of any person under 16 years of age, and declares that employees shall have the right of 'collective bargaining' and freedom of choice with respect to labor organizations, in the terms of section 7(a) of the act (15 USCA § 707(a). The minimum number of employees, who shall be employed by slaughterhouse operators, is fixed; the number being graduated according to the average volume of weekly sales.
tute 'unfair methods of competition.' The final article provides for verified reports, such as the Secretary or Administrator may require, '(1) for the protection of consumers, competitors, employees, and others, and in furtherance of the public interest, and (2) for the determination by the Secretary or Administrator of the extent to which the declared policy of the act is being effectuated by this code.' The members of the industry are also required to keep books and records which 'will clearly reflect all financial transactions of their respective businesses and the financial condition thereof,' and to submit weekly reports showing the range of daily prices and volume of sales' for each kind of produce.
legislation to complex conditions involving a host of details with which the national Legislature cannot deal directly. We pointed out in the Panama Refining Company Case that the Constitution has never been regarded as denying to Congress the necessary resources of flexibility and practicality, which will enable it to perform its function in laying down policies and establishing standards, while leaving to selected instrumentalities the making of subordinate rules within prescribed limits and the determination of facts to which the policy as declared by the Legislature is to apply. But we said that the constant recognition of the necessity and validity of such provisions, and the wide range of administrative authority which has been developed by means of them, cannot be allowed to obscure the limitations of the authority to delegate, if our constitutional system is to be maintained. Id., 293 U.S. 388, page 421, 55 S.Ct. 241, 79 L.Ed. 446.
Accordingly, we look to the statute to see whether Congress has overstepped these limitations—whether Congress in authorizing 'codes of fair competition' has itself established the standards of legal obligation, thus performing its essential legislative function, or, by the failure to enact such standards, has attempted to transfer that function to others.
mental. It is whether there is any adequate definition of the subject to which the codes are to be addressed.
604, 9 S.Ct. 166, 32 L.Ed. 535; Howe Scale Co. v. Wyckoff, Seamans & Benedict, 198 U.S. 118, 140, 25 S.Ct. 609, 49 L.Ed. 972; Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 413, 36 S.Ct. 357, 60 L.Ed. 713. In recent years, its scope has been extended. It has been held to apply to misappropriation as well as misrepresenation, to the selling of another's goods as one's own to misappropriation of what equitably belongs to a competitor. International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 241, 242, 39 S.Ct. 68, 63 L.Ed. 211, 2 A.L.R. 293. Unfairness in competition has been predicated of acts which lie outside the ordinary course of business and are tainted by fraud or coercion or conduct otherwise prohibited by law.10 Id., 248 U.S. 315, page 258, 39 S.Ct. 68, 63 L.Ed. 211, 2 A.L.R. 293. But it is evident that in its widest range, 'unfair competition,' as it has been understood in the law, does not reach the objectives of the codes which are authorized by the National Industrial Recovery Act. The codes may, indeed, cover conduct which existing law condemns, but they are not limited to conduct of that sort. The government does not contend that the act contemplates such a limitation. It would be opposed both to the declared purposes of the act and to its administrative construction.
matter. We cannot regard the 'fair competition' of the codes as antithetical to the 'unfair methods of competition' of the Federal Trade Commission Act. The 'fair competition' of the codes has a much broader range and a new significance. The Recovery Act provides that it shall not be construed to impair the powers of the Federal Trade Commission, but, when a code is approved, its provisions are to be the 'standards of fair competition' for the trade or industry concerned, and any violation of such standards in any transaction in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce is to be deemed 'an unfair method of competition' within the meaning of the Federal Trade Commission Act. Section 3(b) of the act, 15 USCA § 703(b).
The government urges that the codes will 'consist of rules of competition deemed fair for each industry by representative members of that industry—by the persons most vitally concerned and most familiar with its problems.' Instances are cited in which Congress has availed itself of such assistance; as, e.g., in the exercise of its authority over the public domain, with respect to the recognition of local customs or rules of miners as to mining claims, 14 or, in matters of a more or less technical nature, as in designating the standard height of drawbars.15 But would it be seriously contended that Congress could delegate its legislative authority to trade or industrial associations or groups so as to empower them to enact the laws they deem to be wise and beneficent for the rehabilitation and expansion of their trade or industries? Could trade or industrial associations or groups be constituted legislative bodies for that purpose because such associations or groups are familiar with the problems of their enterprises? And could an effort of that sort be made valid by such a preface of generalities as to permissible aims as we find in section 1 of title 1? The answer is obvious. Such a delegation of legislative power is unknown to our law, and is utterly inconsistent with the constitutional prerogatives and duties of Congress.
whatever laws he thinks may be needed or advisable for the rehabilitation and expansion of trade or industry. See Panama Refining Company v. Ryan, supra, and cases there reviewed.
or taking from what is proposed, as 'in his discretion' he thinks necessary 'to effectuate the policy' declared by the act. Of course, he has no less liberty when he prescribes a code on his own motion or on complaint, and he is free to prescribe one if a code has not been approved. The act provides for the creation by the President of administrative agencies to assist him, but the action or reports of such agencies, or of his other assistants their recommendations and findings in relation to the making of codes—have no sanction beyond the will of the President, who may accept, modify, or reject them as he pleases. Such recommendations or findings in no way limit the authority which section 3 undertakes to vest in the President with no other conditions than those there specified. And this authority relates to a host of different trades and industries, thus extending the President's discretion to all the varieties of laws which he may deem to be beneficial in dealing with the vast array of commercial and industrial activities throughout the country.
v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company, 293 U.S. 454, 55 S.Ct. 268, 79 L.Ed. 587. When the Commission is authorized to issue, for the construction, extension, or abandonment of lines, a certificate of 'public convenience and necessity,' or to permit the acquisition by one carrier of the control of another, if that is found to be 'in the public interest,' we have pointed out that these provisions are not left without standards to guide determination. The authority conferred has direct relation to the standards prescribed for the service of common carriers, and can be exercised only upon findings, based upon evidence, with respect to particular conditions of transportation. New York Central Securities Corporation v. United States, 287 U.S. 12, 24, 25, 53 S.Ct. 45, 77 L.Ed. 138; Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v. Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Railway Co., 270 U.S. 266, 273, 46 S.Ct. 263, 70 L.Ed. 578; Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 35, 42, 51 S.Ct. 337, 75 L.Ed. 824.
Similarly, we have held that the Radio Act of 192716 established standards to govern radio communications, and, in view of the limited number of available broadcasting frequencies, Congress authorized allocation and licenses. The Federal Radio Commission was created as the licensing authority, in order to secure a reasonable equality of opportunity in radio transmission and reception. The authority of the Commission to grant licenses 'as public convenience, interest or necessity requires' was limited by the nature of radio communications, and by the scope, character, and quality of the services to be rendered and the relative advantages to be derived through distribution of facilities. These standards established by Congress were to be enforced upon hearing and evidence by an administrative body acting under statutory restrictions adapted to the particular activity. Federal Radio Commission v. Nelson Brothers Bond & Mtg. Co., 289 U.S. 266, 53 S.Ct. 627, 77 L.Ed. 1166.
In Hampton, Jr. & Company v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 48 S.Ct. 348, 350, 72 L.Ed. 624 the question related to the 'flexible tariff provision' of the Tariff Act of 1922.17 We held that Congress had described its plan 'to secure by law the imposition of customs duties on articles of imported merchandise which should equal the difference between the cost of producing in a foreign country the articles in question and laying them down for sale in the United States, and the cost of producing and selling like or similar articles in the United States.' As the differences in cost might vary from time to time, provision was made for the investigation and determination of these differences by the executive branch so as to make 'the adjustments necessary to conform the duties to the standard underlying that policy and plan.' Id. 276 U.S. 394, pages 404, 405, 48 S.Ct. 348, 350, 72 L.Ed. 624. The Court found the same principle to be applicable in fixing customs duties as that which permitted Congress to exercise its rate-making power in interstate commerce, 'by declaring the rule which shall prevail in the legislative fixing of rates,' and then remitting 'the fixing of such rates' in accordance with its provisions 'to a rate-making body.' Id. 276 U.S. 394, page 409, 48 S.Ct. 348, 352, 72 L.Ed. 624. The Court fully recognized the limitations upon the delegation of legislative power. Id. 276 U.S. 394, pages 408—411, 48 S.Ct. 348, 72 L.Ed. 624.
nature of the few restrictions that are imposed, the discretion of the President in approving or prescribing codes, and thus enacting laws for the government of trade and industry throughout the country, is virtually unfettered. We think that the code-making authority thus conferred is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.
Third. The Question of the Application of the Provisions of the Live Poultry Code to Intrastate Transactions.—Although the validity of the codes (apart from the question of delegation) rests upon the commerce clause of the Constitution, section 3(a) of the act (15 USCA § 703(a) is not in terms limited to interstate and foreign commerce. From the generality of its terms, and from the argument of the government at the bar, it would appear that section 3(a) was designed to authorize codes without that limitation. But under section 3(f) of the act (15 USCA § 73(f) penalties are confined to violations of a code provision 'in any transaction in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce.' This aspect of the case presents the question whether the particular provisions of the Live Poultry Code, which the defendants were convicted for violating and for having conspired to violate, were within the regulating power of Congress.
terminals serving the city, or elsewhere, the poultry was trucked to their slaughterhouses in Brooklyn for local disposition. The interstate transactions in relation to that poultry then ended. Defendants held the poultry at their slaughterhouse markets for slaughter and local sale to retail dealers and butchers who in turn sold directly to consumers. Neither the slaughtering nor the sales by defendants were transactions in interstate commerce. Brown v. Houston, 114 U.S. 622, 632, 633, 5 S.Ct. 1091, 29 L.Ed. 257; Public Utilities Commission v. Landon, 249 U.S. 236, 245, 39 S.Ct. 268, 63 L.Ed. 577; Industrial Association v. United States, 268 U.S. 64, 78, 79, 45 S.Ct. 403, 69 L.Ed. 849; Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 275 U.S. 257, 267, 48 S.Ct. 107, 72 L.Ed. 270.
cago v. Olsen, 262 U.S. 1, 35, 43 S.Ct. 470, 67 L.Ed. 839; Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v. United States, 280 U.S. 420, 439, 50 S.Ct. 220, 74 L.Ed. 524.
Did the defendants' transactions directly 'affect' interstate commerce so as to be subject to federal regulation? The power of Congress extends, not only to the regulation of transactions which are part of interstate commerce, but to the protection of that commerce from injury. It matters not that the injury may be due to the conduct of those engaged in intrastate operations. Thus, Congress may protect the safety of those employed in interstate transportation, 'no matter what may be the source of the dangers which threaten it.' Southern Railway Company v. United States, 222 U.S. 20, 27, 32 S.Ct. 2, 4, 56 L.Ed. 72. We said in Mondou v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co. (Second Employers' Liability Cases), 223 U.S. 1, 51, 32 S.Ct. 169, 56 L.Ed. 327, 38 L.R.A.(N.S.) 44, that it is the 'effect upon interstate commerce,' not 'the source of the injury,' which is 'the criterion of congressional power.' We have held that, in dealing with common carriers engaged in both interstate and intrastate commerce, the dominant authority of Congress necessarily embraces the right to control their intrastate operations in all matters having such a close and substantial relation to interstate traffic that the control is essential or appropriate to secure the freedom of that traffic from interference or unjust discrimination and to promote the efficiency of the interstate service. Houston, E. & W.T.R. Co. v. U.S. (The Shreveport Case), 234 U.S. 342, 351, 352, 34 S.Ct. 833, 58 L.Ed. 1341; Railroad Commission of State of Wisconsin v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. Co., 257 U.S. 563, 588, 42 S.Ct. 232, 66 L.Ed. 371, 22 A.L.R. 1086. And combinations and conspiracies to restrain interstate commerce, or to monopolize any part of it, are none the less within the reach of the Anti-Trust Act (15 USCA § 1 et seq.) because the conspirators seek to attain their end by means of intrastate activities. Coronado Coal Company v. United Mine Workers, 268 U.S. 295, 310, 45 S.Ct. 551, 69 L.Ed. 963; Bedford Cut Stone Company v. Journeyman Stone Cutters' Association, 274 U.S. 37, 46, 47 S.Ct. 522, 71 L.Ed. 916, 54 A.L.R. 791.
the live poultry industry. That was a suit to enjoin a conspiracy to restrain and monopolize interstate commerce in violation of the Anti-Trust Act. It was shown that marketmen, teamsters, and slaughterers (shochtim) had conspired to burden the free movement of live poultry into the metropolitan area in and about New York City. Marketmen had organized an association, had allocated retailers among themselves, and had agreed to increase prices. To accomplish their objects, large amounts of money were raised by levies upon poultry sold, men were hired to obstruct the business of dealers who resisted, wholesalers and retailers were spied upon, and by violence and other forms of intimidation were prevented from freely purchasing live poultry. Teamsters refused to handle poultry for recalcitrant marketmen, and members of the shochtim union refused to slaughter. In view of the proof of that conspiracy, we said that it was unnecessary to decide when interstate commerce ended and when intrastate commerce began. We found that the proved interference by the conspirators 'with the unloading, the transportation, the sales by marketmen to retailers, the prices charged, and the amount of profits exacted' operated 'substantially and directly to restrain and burden the untrammelled shipment and movement of the poultry,' while unquestionably it was in interstate commerce. The intrastate acts of the conspirators were included in the injunction because that was found to be necessary for the protection of interstate commerce against the attempted and illegal restraint. Id. 291 U.S. 293, pp. 297, 299, 300, 54 S.Ct. 396, 398, 78 L.Ed. 804.
spiracy to commit these violations. Interstate commerce is brought in only upon the charge that violations of these provisions—as to hours and wages of employees and local sales—'affected' interstate commerce.
alter the course of trade. The freedom of local trade may stimulate interstate commerce, while restrictive measures within the police power of the state, enacted exclusively with respect to internal business, as distinguished from interstate traffic, may in their reflex or indirect influence diminish the latter and reduce the volume of articles transported into or out of the state.' See, also, Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1, 21, 9 S.Ct. 6, 32 L.Ed. 346; Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U.S. 245, 259, 260, 43 S.Ct. 83, 67 L.Ed. 237.
of prices brings about a demoralization of the price structure. Similar conditions may be adduced in relation to other businesses. The argument of the government proves too much. If the federal government may determine the wages and hours of employees in the internal commerce of a state, because of their relation to cost and prices and their indirect effect upon interstate commerce, it would seem that a similar control might be exerted over other elements of cost, also affecting prices, such as the number of employees, rents, advertising, methods of doing business, etc. All the processes of production and distribution that enter into cost could likewise be controlled. If the cost of doing an intrastate business is in itself the permitted object of federal control, the extent of the regulation of cost would be a question of discretion and not of power.
commerce from burdens, interferences, and conspiracies to restrain and monopolize it. But the authority of the federal government may not be pushed to such an extreme as to destroy the distinction, which the commerce clause itself establishes, between commerce 'among the several States' and the internal concerns of a state. The same answer must be made to the contention that is based upon the serious economic situation which led to the passage of the Recovery Act—the fall in prices, the decline in wages and employment, and the curtailment of the market for commodities. Stress is laid upon the great importance of maintaining wage distributions which would provide the necessary stimulus in starting 'the cumulative forces making for expanding commercial activity.' Without in any way disparaging this motive, it is enough to say that the recuperative efforts of the federal government must be made in a manner consistent with the authority granted by the Constitution.
The other violations for which defendants were convicted related to the making of local sales. Ten counts, for violation of the provision as to 'straight killing,' were for permitting customers to make 'selections of individual chickens taken from particular coops and half coops.' Whether or not this practice is good or bad for the local trade, its effect, if any, upon interstate commerce was only indirect. The same may be said of violations of the code by intrastate transactions consisting of the sale 'of an unfit chicken' and of sales which were not in accord with the ordinances of the city of New York. The requirement of reports as to prices and volumes of defendants' sales was incident to the effort to control their intrastate business.
The delegated power of legislation which has found expression in this code is not canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing. It is unconfined and vagrant, if I may borrow my own words in an earlier opinion. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 440, 55 S.Ct. 241, 79 L.Ed. 446.
This court has held that delegation may be unlawful, though the act to be performed is definite and single, if the necessity, time, and occasion of performance have been left in the end to the discretion of the delegate. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, supra. I thought that ruling went too far. I pointed out in an opinion that there had been 'no grant to the Executive of any roving commission to inquire into evils and then, upon discovering them, do anything he pleases.' 293 U.S. 388, at page 435, 55 S.Ct. 241, 254, 79 L.Ed. 446. Choice, though within limits, had been given him 'as to the occasion, but none whatever as to the means.' Id. Here, in the case before us, is an attempted delegation not confined to any single act nor to any class or group of acts identified or described by reference to a standard. Here in effect is a roving commission to inquire into evils and upon discovery correct them.
I have said that there is no standard, definite or even approximate, to which legislation must conform. Let me make my meaning more precise. If codes of fair competition are codes eliminating 'unfair' methods of competition ascertained upon inquiry to prevail in one industry or another, there is no unlawful delegation of legislative functions when the President is directed to inquire into such practices and denounce them when discovered. For many years a like power has been committed to the Federal Trade Commission with the approval of this court in a long series of decisions. Cf. Federal Trade Commission v. R.F. Keppel & Bro., 291 U.S. 304, 312, 54 S.Ct. 423, 78 L.Ed. 814; Federal Trade Commission v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 648, 51 S.Ct. 587, 75 L.Ed. 1324, 79 A.L.R. 1191; Federal Trade Commission v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421, 40 S.Ct. 572, 64 L.Ed. 993. Delegation in such circumstances is born of the necessities of the occasion. The industries of the country are too many and diverse to make it possible for Congress, in respect of matters such as these, to legislate directly with adequate appreciation of varying conditions. Nor is the substance of the power changed because the President may act at the instance of trade or industrial associations having special knowledge of the facts. Their function is strictly advisory; it is the imprimatur of the President that begets the quality of law. Doty v. Love, 295 U.S. 64, 55 S.Ct. 558, 79 L.Ed. —-. When the task that is set before one is that of cleaning house, it is prudent as well as usual to take counsel of the dwellers.
affected. In that view, the function of its adoption is not merely negative, but positive; the planning of improvements as well as the extirpation of abuses. What is fair, as thus conceived, is not something to be contrasted with what is unfair or fraudulent or tricky. The extension becomes as wide as the field of industrial regulation. If that conception shall prevail, anything that Congress may do within the limits of the commerce clause for the betterment of business may be done by the President upon the recommendation of a trade association by calling it a code. This is delegation running riot. No such plenitude of power is susceptible of transfer. The statute, however, aims at nothing less, as one can learn both from its terms and from the administrative practice under it. Nothing less is aimed at by the code now submitted to our scrutiny.
vasive. The licit and illicit sections are so combined and welded as to be incapable of severance without destructive mutilation.
If this code had been adopted by Congress itself, and not by the President on the advice of an industrial association, it would even then be void, unless authority to adopt it is included in the grant of power 'to regulare commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States.' United States Constitution, art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
I find no authority in that grant for the regulation of wages and hours of labor in the intrastate transactions that make up the defendants' business. As to this feature of the case, little can be added to the opinion of the court. There is a view of causation that would obliterate the distinction between what is national and what is local in the activities of commerce. Motion at the outer rim is communicated perceptibly, though minutely, to recording instruments at the center. A society such as ours 'is an elastic medium which transmits all tremors throughout its territory; the only question is of their size.' Per Learned Hand, J., in the court below. The law is not indifferent to considerations of degree. Activities local in their immediacy do not become interstate and national because of distant repercussions. What is near and what is distant may at times be uncertain. Cf. Board of Trade of City of Chicago v. Olsen, 262 U.S. 1, 43 S.Ct. 470, 67 L.Ed. 839. There is no penumbra of uncertainty obscuring judgment here. To find immediacy or directness here is to find it almost everywhere. If centripetal forces are to be isolated to the exclusion of the forces that oppose and counteract them, there will be an end to our federal system.
from regulation by the Congress in respect of matters such as these, there can be no 'code' for it at all. This is clear from the provisions of section 7(a) of the act (15 USCA § 707(a), with its explicit disclosure of the statutory scheme. Wages and the hours of labor are essential features of the plan, its very bone and sinew. There is no opportunity in such circumstances for the severance of the infected parts in the hope of saving the remainder. A code collapses utterly with bone and sinew gone.
2 The indictment contained 60 counts, of which 27 counts were dismissed by the trial court, and on 14 counts the defendants were acquitted.
3 Act of June 16, 1933, c. 90, 48 Stat. 195, 196; 15 U.S.C. § 703 (15 USCA § 703).
4 'Codes of fair competition.
'Sec. 3. (a) Upon the application to the President by one or more trade or industrial associations or groups, the President may approve a code or codes of fair competition for the trade or industry or subdivision thereof, represented by the applicant or applicants, if the President finds (1) that such associations or groups impose no inequitable restrictions on admission to membership therein and are truly representative of such trades or industries or subdivisions thereof, and (2) that such code or codes are not designed to promote monopolies or to eliminate or oppress small enterprises and will not operate to discriminate against them, and will tend to effectuate the policy of this title: Provided, That such code or codes shall not permit monopolies or monopolistic practices: Provided further, That where such code or codes affect the services and welfare of persons engaged in other steps of the economic process, nothing in this section shall deprive such persons of the right to be heard prior to approval by the President of such code or codes. The President may, as a condition of his approval of any such code, impose such conditions (including requirements for the making of reports and the keeping of accounts) for the protection of consumers, competitors, employees, and others, and in furtherance of the public interest, and may provide such exceptions to and exemptions from the provisions of such code. as the President in his discretion deems necessary to effectuate the policy herein declared.
'(b) After the President shall have approved any such code, the provisions of such code shall be the standards of fair competition for such trade or industry or subdivision thereof. Any violation of such standards in any transaction in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce shall be deemed an unfair method of competition in commerce within the meaning of the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended (chapter 2 of this title); but nothing in this title (chapter) shall be construed to impair the powers of the Federal Trade Commission under such Act, as amended (chapter 2).
'(c) The several district courts of the United States are hereby invested with jurisdiction to prevent and restrain violations of any code of fair competition approved under this title (chapter); and it shall be the duty of the several district attorneys of the United States, in their respective districts, under the direction of the Attorney General, to institute proceedings in equity to prevent and restrain such violations.
'President of the United States.
6 The Administrator for Industrial Recovery stated in his report that the Code had been sponsored by trade associations representing about 350 wholesale firms, 150 retail shops, and 21 commission agencies; that these associations represented about 90 per cent. of the live poultry industry by numbers and volume of business; and that the industry as defined in the code supplies the consuming public with practically all the live poultry coming into the metropolitan area from forty-one states and transacted an aggreagate annual business of approximately $90,000,000. He further said that about 1,610 employees were engaged in the industry; that it had suffered severely on account of the prevailing economic conditions and because of unfair methods of competition and the abuses that had developed as a result of the 'uncontrolled methods of doing business'; and that these conditions had reduced the number of employees by approximately 40 per cent. He added that the report of the Research and Planning Division indicated that the code would bring about an increase in wages of about 20 per cent. in this industry and an increase in employment of 19.2 per cent.
8 See Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2, 120, 121, 18 L.Ed. 281; Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 426, 54 S.Ct. 231, 78 L.Ed. 413, 88 A.L.R. 1481.
10 See cases collected in Nims on Unfair Competition and Trade-Marks, c. I, § 4, p. 19, and chapter XIX.
11 Act of September 26, 1914, c. 311, 38 Stat. 717, 719, 720 (section 5 (15 USCA § 45)).
12 The Tariff Act of 1930 (section 337, 46 Stat. 703 (19 USCA § 1337)), like the Tariff Act of 1922 (section 316, 42 Stat. 943 (19 USCA § 174 et seq.)), employs the expressions 'unfair methods of competition' and 'unfair acts' in the importation of articles into the United States, and in their sale, 'the effect or tendency of which is to destroy or substantially injure an industry, efficiently and economically operated, in the United States, or to prevent the establishment of such an industry, or to restrain or monopolize trade and commerce in the United States.' Provision is made for investigation and findings by the Tariff Commission, for appeals upon questions of law to the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, and for ultimate action by the President when the existence of any 'such unfair method or act' is established to his satisfaction.
14 Act of July 26, 1866, c. 262, 14 Stat. 251; Jackson v. Roby, 109 U.S. 440, 441, 3 S.Ct. 301, 27 L.Ed. 990; Erhardt v. Boaro, 113 U.S. 527, 535, 5 S.Ct. 560, 28 L.Ed. 1113; Butte City Water Co. v. Baker, 196 U.S. 119, 126, 25 S.Ct. 211, 49 L.Ed. 409.
15 Act of March 2, 1893, c. 196, 27 Stat. 531 (45 USCA § 1 et seq.); St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. Railway Co. v. Taylor, 210 U.S. 281, 286, 28 S.Ct. 616, 52 L.Ed. 1061.
16 Act of February 23, 1927, c. 169, 44 Stat. 1162, as amended by the Act of March 28, 1928, c. 263, 45 Stat. 373.
17 Act of September 21, 1922, c. 356, title 3, § 315, 42 Stat. 858, 941 (19 USCA § 154 et seq.).

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 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 art. 1
 § 8
 v. 
 § 707
 § 703
 § 703
 v. 
 § 4
 § 45
 § 1337
 § 174
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 1
 v. 
 § 315
 § 154