Source: https://cbaclelegalconnection.com/2018/07/
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 08:24:20+00:00

Document:
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Black & Veatch Corp. v. Aspen Insurance (UK) LTD; Lloyd’s Syndicate 2003 on February 13, 2018.
This case is an insurance coverage dispute between Black & Veatch Corporation (B&V) and Aspen Insurance (UK) Ltd. and Lloyd’s Syndicate 2003 (collectively, Aspen). The issue is whether Aspen must reimburse B&V for the costs B&V incurred due to damaged equipment that its subcontractor constructed at power plants in Ohio and Indiana. The district court held that Aspen need not pay B&V’s claim under its commercial general liability insurance policy because B&V’s expenses arose from property damages that were not covered “occurrences” under the Policy. Because the only damages involved were to B&V’s own work product arising from its subcontractor’s faulty workmanship, the court concluded that the Policy did not provide coverage and granted Aspen’s motion for partial summary judgment.
B&V appealed. Because the Tenth Circuit predicted that the New York Court of Appeals would decide that the damages here constitute an “occurrence” under the Policy, it vacated the district court’s summary judgment decision and remanded for further consideration in light of this opinion.
B&V is a global engineering, consulting, and construction company. A portion of its work involves engineering, procurement, and construction contracts (EPC contracts). In 2005, B&V entered into an EPC contracts with American Electric Power Service Corporation to engineer, procure, and construct several jet bubbling reactors (JBRs), which eliminate contaminates from the exhaust emitted by coal-fired power plants. For at least seven of these JBRs, B&V subcontracted the engineering and construction of the internal components to Midwest Towers, Inc. (MTI). Deficiencies in the components procured by MTI and constructed by MTI’s subcontractors caused internal components of the JBRs to deform, crack, and sometimes collapse. After work on three of the JBRs was completed, and while construction of four others was ongoing, AEP alerted B&V to the property damage arising from MTI’s negligent construction. AEP and B&V entered into settlement agreements resolving their disputes relating to the JBRs at issue here. Under the agreements, B&V was obligated to pay more than $225 million in costs associated with repairing and replacing the internal components of the seven JBRs.
B&V submitted claims to its liability insurers for a portion of the $225 million it cost to repair and replace the defective components. After B&V recovered $3.5 million from Zurich, its primary insurer, it sought excess recovery from Aspen. Aspen denied coverage. B&V sued Aspen in federal district court for breach of contract and declaratory judgment as to B&V’s rights under the policy. B&V sought coverage for approximately $72 million, a portion of the total loss. On cross-motions for partial summary judgment on the coverage issue, the court sided with Aspen, holding that damage arising from construction defects was not an “occurrence” under the policy unless the damage occurred to something other than B&V’s own work product.
The threshold question was whether the New York Court of Appeals would hold that the policy’s basic insuring agreement covered the property damage to the JBRs as an “occurrence.” The Tenth Circuit concluded that the damages constituted an “occurrence” under the policy because they were accidental and harmed a third party’s property.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals began by addressing whether, under New York contract law, B&V sought payment from Aspen for a covered “occurrence” — the first step necessary for obtaining coverage under a CGL insurance policy. An occurrence triggers coverage. The damages at issue here satisfy the Policy’s accidental requirement.
The Policy covers costs arising from property damage. When AEP claimed damages against B&V, the separation of insureds clause rendered AEP a third party with respect to its claims for property damage against B&V. The principle risk B&V faced as an EPC contractor, and thus a main reason for obtaining CGL insurance, was the potential for claims alleging damages made by the property owner, AEP. Thus, the property damage to the JBRs constituted an “occurrence” under the policy. Furthermore, concluding otherwise would violate the New York Court of Appeal’s rule against surplusage. In other words, Aspen’s interpretation of “occurrence” as excluding the damages at issue here would render several Policy provisions meaningless in violation of New York contract interpretation rules.
Under the Policy, the damages at issue here were caused by a coverage-triggering “occurrence.” First, the damages were accidental and resulted in harm to a third-party’s property, thus meeting the policy’s definition of an “occurrence.” Second, the district court’s interpretation would violate New York’s rule against surplusage by rendering the “subcontractor exception” meaningless. Third, the changes ISO has made to standard-form CGL policies demonstrate that the policies can cover the damages at issue here. Fourth, the overwhelming trend among state supreme courts has been to recognize such damages as “occurrences.” Fifth, New York intermediate appellate decisions are distinguishable, outdated, or otherwise inapplicable. For the foregoing reasons, the Tenth Circuit vacated the district court’s summary judgment decision and remanded for reconsideration in light of this opinion.
On Monday, July 30, 2018, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued one published opinion and two unpublished opinions.
On Friday, July 27, 2018, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued two published opinions and two unpublished opinions.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Utah Republican Party v. Cox on March 20, 2018.
The Utah Republican Party (URP) sued Utah Lieutenant Governor Spencer Cox in his official capacity, alleging that two aspects of the Utah Elections Amendments Act of 2014, commonly known as SB54, violated URP’s freedom of association under the First Amendment, as applied to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. The two challenged sections (1) require parties to allow candidates to qualify for the primary ballot through either the nominating convention or by gathering signatures, or both (the “Either or Both Provision”); and (2) require candidates pursuing the primary ballot in State House and State Senate elections through a signature gathering method to collect a set number of signatures (the “Signature Requirement”). In two separate orders, the United States District Court for the District of Utah balanced URP’s First Amendment right of association against the state’s interest in managing and regulating elections, and rejected URP’s claims. Reconducting that balancing de novo on appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed.
There were two lawsuits associated with this issue. For the first lawsuit, URP was joined by the Constitutional Party of Utah (CPU) and they sought an injunction and declaratory judgement that the SB54 law was unconstitutional as applied to URP and challenging the Signature Requirement. The district court denied URP and CPU and ruled that none of the alleged constitutional burdens were severe save for the Unaffiliated Voter Provision, which was not yet ripe for review, and the court denied the request for a preliminary injunction. This ruling invalidated the law’s Unaffiliated Voter Provision, but upheld the Signature Requirement, the Either or Both Provision, and all other aspects of SB54. The rulings of the first lawsuit were not addressed in this appeal.
In the second lawsuit, URP sought declaratory and injunctive relief that SB54 was unconstitutional, arguing that it violated its freedom of association under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, and claiming that the state should be judicially estopped from advancing an interpretation of the Either or Both Provision that differed from the one it advanced in the first lawsuit. The Utah Democratic Party (UPD) intervened as co-plaintiff, defending against the possibility that portions of the law would apply to one party but not the other, and arguing that URPs bylaws violated SB54.
In February 2016, the district court certified two questions of state law to the Utah Supreme Court. The first requested that court’s interpretation of the Either or Both Provision, asking whether that provision meant the candidate member or the party had the right to choose which—or both—of the qualification processes to use. The Utah Supreme Court replied that the Either or Both Provision allows the candidate member, not the party, to select which of those two paths to follow in an effort to be certified to the primary ballot. The second question, certified at the request of UDP, was what would happen if a party elects to become a QPP under Utah law, but fails to comply with the requirements of that status. The Utah Supreme Court declined to answer the second question, finding it not ripe for review because it was not yet clear whether URP was going to comply with SB54.
After the Utah Supreme Court answered the certified questions, the district court ruled on the remaining issues relating to the Either or Both Provision. It first held that URP was not precluded from challenging the constitutionality of the Either or Both Provision, and that the Either or Both Provision—as interpreted by the Utah Supreme Court—did not infringe on URP’s First Amendment right of association. Finally, the court rejected URP’s claim that SB54 was the result of impermissible viewpoint discrimination, and then the court granted summary judgment for the state. URP timely appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment. UDP subsequently cross-appealed, challenging the district court’s denial of judgment on the pleadings based on assertions of claim preclusion, issue preclusion, and claim splitting, and also the portions of the district court’s opinion which purport to invalidate URP’s bylaws and constitution to the extent those provisions conflict with SB54. The Tenth Circuit consolidated the related appeals and exercised jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
For this appeal, two primary issues were presented. First, URP challenged the district court’s decision to uphold the Either or Both Provision as a constitutional electoral regulation. Second, URP argued that the district court erred in concluding that the number of signatures required in the signature requirements for State House and State Senate are not unconstitutionally burdensome. The district court granted summary judgment for the state and against URP on both these issues pursuant to Rule 56(f). On appeal, the Tenth Circuit addressed claims raised by UDP, and the conduct of URP counsel Marcus Mumford.
The Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court’s summary judgment de novo. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the Lieutenant Governor on both the Either or Both Provision and the Signature Requirements, concluded that UDP’s claims were not ripe for review, and declined to pursue sanctions against Mr. Mumford.
For the “Either or Both Provision,” SB54 states that a political party that decides to register as a Qualified Political Party (QPP), and is eligible to maintain its caucus system, must also allow its members to “seek the . . . party’s nomination for any elective office by the member choosing to seek the nomination by either or both of the following methods: (i) seeking the nomination through the [the party’s] convention process . . . (ii) seeking the nomination by collecting signatures.” Utah Code § 20A-9-101(12)(c) (emphasis added). On appeal, URP argued that this provision creates an unconstitutional burden on its freedom of association under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
The Tenth Circuit took “great care to scrutinize any electoral regulation” that would appear to restrict access to the ballot and the ballot box thereby hindering individual freedoms and separation of powers. The Constitution grants states the right to prescribe “[t]he Times, Places and Manner of Holding Elections for Senators and Representatives,” Art I, § 4, cl. 1, and the Supreme Court has held that states enjoy similar authority to regulate their own elections. The Tenth Circuit acknowledged that regulations invariably impose burdens.
This case addressed the method by which a QPP selects its nominee to appear on the general election ballot for state and federal offices, which impacts the constitutional interests of both the political party and the state. The political parties’ First Amendment rights of association have to be balanced against the state’s role in structuring and monitoring the election process. URP argued that SB54 infringes on its First Amendment associational rights by forcing it to adopt a candidate-selection process that differed from its preferred process. However, the Supreme Court has recognized that when political parties become involved in a state-administered primary election, the state acquires a legitimate interest in regulating the manner in which that election unfolds—subject only to the same interest-balancing that occurs throughout the Court’s electoral jurisprudence. States have a manifest interest in a party’s actual nomination and election of an individual because that individual will swear to protect the Constitution, not the Party, and to represent all residents in his or her district. The Supreme Court has recognized the role of the state in primary elections and held that state-administered primary elections are subject to congressional and state regulations.
The Tenth Circuit determined that SB54 does not regulate URP’s internal process, and determined that the “Either or Both Provision” was only minimally burdensome, especially since URP’s traditional caucus systems were maintained as part of a compromise when SB54 was passed. The Circuit did not find that the “Either or Both Provision” left the party vulnerable to a nominee with whom it does not agree.
When balancing the burden on the Party against the interest of the State, the Circuit found that the state’s interests in promulgating SB54 predominated over the minimal burdens imposed upon URP. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding that the “Either or Both Provision” is a constitutional exercise of the state’s regulatory authority.
The Circuit found that the “Signature Requirement” was constitutional because it provided two methods (at the nominating caucus or by gathering signatures) for candidates to qualify for the primary ballot for a QPP.
URP also argued that the number of signatures required “severely burden[ed] its right of association with potential candidates of its party and cannot be saved as reasonably calculated to serve a compelling state interest.” The Circuit found that petition requirements are a constitutional method of serving a state’s legitimate interest in illustrating candidate support before adding the candidate to a ballot. When the Circuit evaluated at the total Utah Election Code, it did not find that URP’s First Amendment right of association was violated. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld that Utah’s legitimate interest in requiring a candidate to demonstrate a minimum degree of support in terms of gathering 1,000 or 2,000 signatures on a petition before being placed on the primary ballot for the State House or State Senate was sufficient to outweigh the provision’s minimal burdens on the URP. Therefore, it affirmed the district court’s ruling that the challenged Signature Requirements do not constitute an unconstitutional burden on the URP.
UPD intervened as a plaintiff to ““ensure [the State] appl[ied] the laws equally to all Utahns, no matter what political party, if any, they choose to join.” The Circuit did not reach merits of UPD’s claim because it had already determined URP’s constitutional claims failed.
Lastly, the Tenth Circuit addressed the conduct of Mr. Mumford, an attorney for URP, who had been placed on notice that “the judges assigned to decide this appeal on the merits may wish to address in greater depth counsel’s noncompliance with the court’s rules.” Mr. Mumford violated a series of procedural and timeliness requirements. The Circuit determined that if Mr. Mumford’s conduct continued in future appeals, it would be forced to take action against Mr. Mumford.
The Tenth Circuit concluded that states must have flexibility to enact reasonable, common sense regulations designed to provide order and legitimacy to the electoral process. SB54, as modified in the first lawsuit, struck an appropriate balance between protecting the interests of the state in managing elections and allowing the URP and all other political associations and individuals across Utah to express their preferences and values in a democratic fashion and to form associations as protected by the First Amendment. Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.
On Friday, July 26, 2018, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued one published opinion and four unpublished opinions.
On Thursday, July 26, 2018, the Colorado Court of Appeals issued nine published opinions and 35 unpublished opinions.
On Wednesday, July 25, 2018, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued no published opinion and one unpublished opinion.
Park v. First American Title Insurance Co.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued its opinion in McCoy v. Meyers on April 10, 2018.
Mr. DeRon McCoy sued three of the officers who participated in his arrest—Tyson Meyers, Darrin Pickering, and Brice Burlie (collectively, Appellees)—under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that they violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force during his arrest on March 22, 2011. Appellees moved for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. The district court granted the motion, determining that (1) Appellees had acted reasonably under the circumstances, and (2) the relevant law was not clearly established at the time of Appellees’ alleged conduct.
Mr. McCoy appealed the district court’s decisions. The Tenth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part, finding Appellees were entitled to qualified immunity for their conduct before Mr. McCoy’s arms and legs were bound while he was unconscious, but not for their conduct after this point.
During the pre-restraint period, Mr. McCoy was on the ground, lying face-down with his hands behind his back, and Officer Pickering “immediately” placed him in a carotid restraint. Unidentified officers “simultaneously” pinned Mr. McCoy down and hit him in the head, shoulders, back, and arms. Officer Pickering maintained the carotid restraint for approximately five to ten seconds and increased pressure, even though Mr. McCoy was not resisting, thereby causing Mr. McCoy to lose consciousness. While Mr. McCoy was unconscious, the officers handcuffed his hands behind his back and zip-tied his feet together.
Officer Meyers entered the motel room while Mr. McCoy was unconscious to perform a revival technique known as a “kidney slap,” which consists of “a slight tap to the lower back.” Officer Meyers positioned himself behind Mr. McCoy, moved Mr. McCoy into a sitting position, and performed the kidney slap. As Mr. McCoy regained consciousness, unidentified officers again struck him—more than 10 times—on his head, shoulders, back, and arms. Mr. McCoy tried to shield himself but realized he was handcuffed and zip-tied. Officer Meyers then placed Mr. McCoy, who was not resisting, in a second carotid restraint for less than 10 seconds, maintaining pressure until Mr. McCoy lost consciousness again. Mr. McCoy was then removed from the motel room and put into a police car outside. Less than ten minutes had elapsed between the five-member team’s entry into the room and Mr. McCoy’s removal.
Before being taken to the police station, Mr. McCoy was transported to the hospital, where doctors determined that nothing was broken or twisted. His arms, shoulders, and back were visibly bruised and cut.
Mr. McCoy sued the Appellees under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas, alleging violations of his Fourth Amendment rights by using excessive force in effecting his arrest. After the parties completed discovery, Appellees moved for summary judgment, asserting qualified immunity. The district court granted summary judgment for Appellees, holding that Mr. McCoy had failed to show a Fourth Amendment violation, and that in any event, the law was not clearly established at the time of the Appellees’ alleged violation.
Mr. McCoy appealed, alleging four acts of excessive force: Appellees’ strikes and Officer Pickering’s carotid restraint before he was handcuffed and zip-tied, and Appellees’ strikes and Officer Meyers’ carotid restraint after he was handcuffed and zip-tied.
The Circuit’s qualified immunity analysis relied heavily on three Tenth Circuit decisions that applied the Graham balancing test. For each of these three cases, all of which involved excessive force allegations against law enforcement officers under § 1983, the court applied the Graham test and held that the plaintiff had shown sufficient facts to plead a Fourth Amendment violation.
In the case at hand, Mr. McCoy contended that Appellees’ use of force both before and after he was handcuffed and zip-tied violated clearly established Fourth Amendment law. The Tenth Circuit agreed with him in part, concluding that the pre-restraint force did not violate clearly established law, but the post-restraint force violated Mr. McCoy’s clearly established right to be free from the continued use of force after he was effectively subdued.
skipped prong one of the qualified immunity analysis because Mr. McCoy’s failure to show clearly established law provided a sufficient basis to affirm. For the second prong, Mr. McCoy failed to show clearly established law because no reasonable jury could conclude that Mr. McCoy was effectively subdued in the pre-restraint period, and preexisting precedent would not have made it clear to every reasonable officer that using the force employed here on a potentially dangerous individual—who had not yet been effectively subdued—violated the Fourth Amendment.
According to Mr. McCoy’s testimony, as soon as he hit the ground, Officer Pickering “immediately” placed him in a carotid restraint while, “simultaneously,” unidentified officers hit him in the head, shoulders, back, and arms. Even if Mr. McCoy was lying face down with his hands behind his back and with several officers pinning him, a reasonable officer in Appellees’ position could conclude that he was not subdued when the allegedly excessive force occurred. Under these circumstances, the preexisting precedent would not have made it clear to every reasonable officer that striking Mr. McCoy and applying a carotid restraint on him violated his Fourth Amendment rights. Based on the foregoing, Mr. McCoy failed to show clearly established law prohibiting the Appellees’ pre-restraint use of force. Appellees were therefore entitled to qualified immunity for the pre-restraint force as to Mr. McCoy’s claims based on this conduct.
In this case, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Mr. McCoy, any resistance on his part had fully ceased by the time of the post-restraint force. Even if Appellees had previously perceived that Mr. McCoy pointed a gun at them and reached for Officer Burlie’s duty weapon, Mr. McCoy had been rendered unconscious, handcuffed, and zip-tied before he was revived. And as he regained consciousness, even though he did not resist, the Appellees struck him more than 10 times and placed him in a carotid restraint with enough pressure to render him unconscious again. The cessation of active resistance on Mr. McCoy’s part weighs in favor of finding that the post-restraint force was unreasonable.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Mr. McCoy, preexisting Tenth Circuit precedent made it clear to any reasonable officer in the Appellees’ position that the post-restraint force was unconstitutional.
In sum, qualified immunity applied to Mr. McCoy’s claims based on the pre-restraint force, due to the lack of clearly established law, but not to the claims based the post-restraint force, which violated Mr. McCoy’s clearly established right to be free from continued force after he was effectively subdued. The Tenth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s grant of summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
On Monday, July 23, 2018, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued six published opinions and no unpublished opinion.
On Friday, July 20, 2018, the Colorado State Judicial Branch announced an upcoming vacancy on the Pueblo County Court in the 10th Judicial District. The vacancy will be created by the resignation of Hon. Valerie Haynes, effective August 17, 2018.
Applications are now being accepted for the upcoming vacancy. Eligible applicants must be qualified electors of Pueblo County at the time of investiture and must have been admitted to practice law in Colorado for five years. Application forms are available from the State Judicial website or from the ex officio chair of the 10th Judicial District Nominating Commission, Justice Monica Márquez. Applications must be received by 4 p.m. on August 13, 2018; anyone wishing to nominate another must do so no later than 4 p.m. on August 6.

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