Source: https://openjurist.org/404/us/226
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 12:27:45+00:00

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Petitioner was convicted of murder a month after his previous trial had ended with a hung jury. Both trials took place in a small town before the same judge and with the same counsel and court reporter, who (as was conceded) was well known to defense counsel and other local lawyers and would have read back his notes to defense counsel before the second trial had he been asked to do so. Between the two trials petitioner, alleging indigency, filed a motion for a free transcript, which the trial court denied. The appellate court affirmed the conviction, holding that an adequate alternative to the transcript was available. Held: In the narrow circumstances of this case, a transcript was not needed for petitioner's defense. Pp. 227—230.
Petitioner's three-day murder trial ended in a mistrial when the jury reported a hopeless deadlock. A retrial was scheduled for the following month. In the interim, petitioner filed a motion alleging that he was indigent, and asking for a free transcript of the first trial. The trial court denied his motion, and the North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed, stating that the record of the case did not reveal a sufficient need for the transcript. 8 N.C.App. 262, 174 S.E.2d 69 (1970). The North Carolina Supreme Court denied certiorari. We granted certiorari to determine whether the rule of Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 76 S.Ct. 585, 100 L.Ed. 891 (1956), applies in this context. 401 U.S. 973, 91 S.Ct. 1204, 28 L.Ed.2d 322 (1971). We conclude that it does, but that in the narrow circumstances of this case, no violation of that rule has been shown, and therefore we affirm.
Griffin v. Illinois and its progeny establish the principle that the State must, as a matter of equal protection, provide indigent prisoners with the basic tools of an adequate defense or appeal, when those tools are available for a price to other prisoners. While the outer limits of that principle are not clear, there can be no doubt that the State must provide an indigent defendant with a transcript of prior proceedings when that transcript is needed for an effective defense or appeal.1 The question here is whether the state court properly determined that the transcript requested in this case was not needed for an effective defense.
In prior cases involving an indigent defendant's claim of right to a free transcript, this Court has identified two factors that are relevant to the determination of need: (1) the value of the transcript to the defendant in connection with the appeal or trial for which it is sought, and (2) the availability of alternative devices that would fulfill the same functions as a transcript.2 Mr. Justice DOUGLAS suggests that the North Carolina courts refused to order a transcript in this case both because petitioner failed to make a particularized showing of need, and because there were adequate alternative devices available to him.
We agree with the dissenters that there would be serious doubts about the decision below if it rested on petitioner's failure to specify how the transcript might have been useful to him. Our cases have consistently recognized the value to a defendant of a transcript of prior proceedings, without requiring a showing of need tailored to the facts of the particular case.3 As Mr. Justice DOUGLAS makes clear, even in the absence of specific allegations it can ordinarily be assumed that a transcript of a prior mistrial would be valuable to the defendant in at least two ways: as a discovery device in preparation for trial, and as a tool at the trial itself for the impeachment of prosecution witnesses.
But the court below did not use the language of 'particularized need.' It rested the decision instead on the second factor in the determination of need, that is, the availability of adequate alternatives to a transcript. The second trial was before the same judge, with the same counsel and the same court reporter, and the two trials were only a month apart. In these circumstances, the court suggested that petitioner's memory and that of his counsel should have furnished an adequate substitute for a transcript. In addition, the court pointed to the fact that petitioner could have called the court reporter to read to the jury the testimony given at the mistrial, in the event that inconsistent testimony was offered at the second trial.
A defendant who claims the right to a free transcript does not, under our cases, bear the burden of proving inadequate such alternatives as may be suggested by the State or conjured up by a court in hindsight. In this case, however, petitioner has conceded that he had available an informal alternative which appears to be substantially equivalent to a transcript.6 Accordingly, we cannot conclude that the court below was in error in rejecting his claim.
Mr. Justice DOUGLAS with whom Mr. Justice BRENNAN concurs, dissenting.
After the State's first murder prosecution of the petitioner ended in a hung jury in November 1969, Britt was retried, convicted, and sentenced to 30 years' imprisonment. During the interim between the two trials, the petitioner made a showing of indigency and asked that the State provide him with a free transcript of the mistrial. The trial court denied his motion despite Britt's contention that because a more affluent defendant could purchase such a transcript as a matter of right a denial of his request would offend the principle of Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 76 S.Ct. 585, 100 L.Ed. 891, (1956). On appeal, the North Carolina Court of Appeals was likewise unconvinced by Britt's equal protection claim and affirmed the trial court's refusal to order a free transcript, stating that (a) the petitioner had not made a particularized showing of need, (b) he had been represented by the same lawyer at both trials, and therefore (c) any suspected inconsistencies in prosecution evidence could have been developed by counsel's putting on the court reporter to read earlier testimony of the first trial. Because I am persuaded by Britt's argument I would reverse the decision of the North Carolina Court of Appeals.
Of these applications, Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S. 40, 88 S.Ct. 194, 19 L.Ed.2d 41 (1967), is most analogous to the instant circumstances. In Roberts, an indigent defendant before trial asked a state court to provide him with a free transcript of a preliminary hearing at which a key state witness had testified. In Roberts, as here, no special showing of need was made, the defendant was represented by the same counsel at all times, and the court reporter could have been called to read back previous testimony. Id., at 43, 88 S.Ct., at 196. Nonetheless, over the dissent of Mr. Justice Harlan that no prejudice had been shown id., at 44, 88 S.Ct., at 197, we held that withholding the requested transcript was an invalid interposition of a financial consideration between an indigent prisoner and his right to sue for his liberty. Id., at 42, 88 S.Ct., at 196.
Here the request was for a mistrial transcript, whereas in Roberts a motion had been made for a preliminary hearing transcript. In the ways in which either might be used I can perceive no differences. In both sets of circumstances it would seem that defendants would be interested in better trial preparation and in better positions from which to challenge discrepancies in government witnesses' stories.4 For both of these purposes a mistrial transcript would be more valuable than a preliminary hearing recording because the former is a virtual dry run of the entire prosecution's case, information which normally is clothed in top secrecy under the prevailing and restrictive rules against a criminal defendant's discovery.
Perhaps for these considerations the Second Circuit has squarely held that indigent state defendants have an absolute right to free transcripts of previous prosecutions ending in hung juries. United States ex rel. Wilson v. McMann, 408 F.2d 896 (CA2 1969). As both here and in Roberts, Wilson had made no showing of particular need, had been represented by the same lawyer at all times, and could have called the court reporter to read back previous testimony. And, as here, the defendant had requested a mistrial transcript during the interim between the two prosecutions. The Second Circuit considered Griffin and Roberts controlling.
The North Carolina Court of Appeals, however, has rejected the Griffin-Roberts-Wilson cases and sought refuge in the pre-Roberts authority of Nickens v. United States, 116 U.S.App.D.C. 338, 323 F.2d 808 (1963), which had emphasized, as did the court below, the defendant's failure to articulate a particular need for a transcript, the continuity of defense counsel, and the availability of the court reporter.5 I thought that these arguments had been found irrelevant for constitutional purposes under Griffin-Roberts-Wilson.
'* * * No responsible retained lawyer who represents a defendant at trial will rely exclusively on his memory (even as supplemented by trial notes) in composing a list of possible trial errors which delimit has appeal.' Hardy v. United States, supra, 375 U.S., at 288, 84 S.Ct., at 431 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
Similarly, while counsel is studying mistrial minutes, the precise words used by a witness might trigger mental processes resulting in legitimate defense strategies which otherwise might be overlooked. Such spontaneity can hardly be forecast and articulated in advance in terms of special or particularized need.
Thus, it is not surprising that Britt's investigative and preparatory resources were puny in contrast to those employed by his accusers. The local police were able to enlist the talent of the State Bureau of Investigation to trace and analyze fingerprint evidence. Investigators were able to study the situs of the murder. At their convenience officers were able to interrogate the incarcerated defendant, eventually eliciting from him an incriminating statement. After the mistrial the prosecutor, unlike Britt's lawyer, had access to a transcript to readjust his trial strategy.
This Court has been sensitive to the persuasive arguments for more liberal rules of criminal discovery.14 To the extent that a State permits criminal discovery by its accused, it is our duty to forbid distribution of its fruits according to formulas based on wealth, which, like race, is a suspect classification. Griffin v. Illinois, supra; Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 86 S.Ct. 1079, 16 L.Ed.2d 169, (1966); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600, (1969).
The provision in North Carolina permitting defendants to purchase mistrial minutes is obviously an important exception to the common-law prohibition. A mistrial transcript contains not only prosecution witnesses' names and addresses but their stories under oath and it contains the entire theory of the government's case. Such a document is a complete dossier of the opposing case for which even the most liberalized rules of civil discovery have no equivalent. While this exception endures, the State may not condition its availability upon financial considerations which effectively deprive the poor of this valuable tool.
The lower court's opinion suggests that whatever legitimate uses generally might be made of mistrial minutes could alternatively be accomplished by counsel's calling as a witness the court reporter of the previous prosecution. See also Nickens v. United States, 116 U.S.App.D.C., at 341, 323 F.2d, at 811. However satisfactorily that suggestion might facilitate impeachment of government witnesses, it should be clear that the procedure would provide no assistance in preparing counsel for trial.
Indeed these hazards were painfully present in United States ex rel. Wilson v. McMann, supra, in which Wilson's attorney erroneously believed he remembered an inconsistent statement of a prosecution witness who had testified at the prior mistrial. At the second trial the lawyer quizzed the witness concerning this prior remark but the witness denied having ever made it. The judge decided to delay the trial until the reporter of the mistrial could read back the precise words used by the witness. After 'considerable delay and perhaps some inconvenience to the jurors' counsel learned that he had been mistaken and that no contradiction, at least on the suspected issue had existed. Id., at 898.
Williams v. Oklahoma City, 395 U.S. 458, 89 S.Ct. 1818, 23 L.Ed.2d 440 (1969); Gardner v. California, 393 U.S. 367, 89 S.Ct. 580, 21 L.Ed.2d 601 (1969); Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S. 40, 88 S.Ct. 194, 19 L.Ed.2d 41 (1967); Long v. District Court of Iowa, 385 U.S. 192, 87 S.Ct. 362, 17 L.Ed.2d 290 (1966); Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487, 83 S.Ct. 774, 9 L.Ed.2d 899 (1963); Eskridge v. Washington State Bd. of Prison Terms and Paroles, 357 U.S. 214, 78 S.Ct. 1061, 2 L.Ed.2d 1269 (1958); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 76 S.Ct. 585, 100 L.Ed. 891 (1956).
See Draper v. Washington, supra, 372 U.S., at 495—496, 83 S.Ct., at 778—779, and other cases cited n. 1, supra.
In Griffin, the Court was able to rely on a concession of need by the State, 351 U.S., at 13—14, 16, 76 S.Ct., at 588, 589. In subsequent cases the Court has taken judicial notice of the importance of a transcript in a variety of circumstances, see Eskridge, supra, 357 U.S., at 215, 78 S.Ct., at 1062; Gardner, supra, 393 U.S., at 369—370, 89 S.Ct., at 582—583. Most recently in Long and Roberts the Court simply found it unnecessary to discuss the question, notwithstanding the fact that in Roberts Mr. Justice Harlan argued in dissent that petitioner had suggested no use to which the transcript could have been put, 389 U.S., at 43, 88 S.Ct., at 196.
While trial notes might well provide an adequate substitute for a transcript, the failure to make such notes does not bar an indigent prisoner from claiming the right to a free transcript, Eskridge, supra, 357 U.S., at 215, 78 S.Ct., at 1062. As for requiring a prisoner to rely on his memory, this Court rejected that as an alternative to a transcript in Gardner, supra, 393 U.S., at 369—370, 89 S.Ct., at 582—583, and Williams, supra, 395 U.S., at 459, 89 S.Ct., at 1819. Indeed, in Long we refused to consider any alternatives suggested by the State, on the ground that in that case a transcript was in fact available and could easily have been furnished. 385 U.S., at 194—195, 87 S.Ct., at 364. Whether a transcript is similarly available in this case does not appear from the record.
Tr. of Oral Arg. 12. Cf. Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 450—452, 60 S.Ct. 321, 324—325, 84 L.Ed. 377 (1940) (Black, J.).
Cf. Wade v. Wilson, 396 U.S. 282, 90 S.Ct. 501, 24 L.Ed.2d 470 (1970), in which no such concession was made. In that case it simply appeared from the record that petitioner might have been able to borrow a transcript from the prosecutor, in light of the fact that he had done so in an earlier proceeding. We remanded the case to permit exploration of that possibility.
Wade v. Wilson, 396 U.S. 282, 90 S.Ct. 501, 24 L.Ed.2d 470 (1970); Gardner v. California, 393 U.S. 367, 89 S.Ct. 580, 21 L.Ed.2d 601 (1969); Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S. 40, 88 S.Ct. 194, 19 L.Ed.2d 41 (1967); Long v. District Court of Iowa, 385 U.S. 192, 87 S.Ct. 362, 17 L.Ed.2d 290 (1966); Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487, 83 S.Ct. 774, 9 L.Ed.2d 899 (1963); Eskridge v. Washington Prison Board, 357 U.S. 214, 78 S.Ct. 1061, 2 L.Ed.2d 1269 (1958); Ross v. Schneckloth, 357 U.S. 575, 78 S.Ct. 1387, 2 L.Ed.2d 1547 (1958); People v. Montgomery, 18 N.Y.2d 993, 278 N.Y.S.2d 226, 224 N.E.2d 730 (1966). An indigent's right to a transcript of grand jury testimony in the federal courts is now protected by the Criminal Justice Act of 1964, at least to the extent that any defendant—whether rich or poor—has access thereto. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e) (1). In the Second and Seventh Circuits federal defendants have absolute rights to all grand jury minutes. United States v. Youngblood, 379 F.2d 365 (CA2 1967); United States v. Amabile, 395 F.2d 47, 53 (CA7 1968). And in all other circuits the grand jury testimony of an individual prosecution witness is discoverable under the recent amendments to the Jencks Act. 18 U.S.C. § 3500(e) (3).
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 91 S.Ct. 780, 28 L.Ed.2d 113 (1971); Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 81 S.Ct. 895, 6 L.Ed.2d 39 (1961); Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252, 79 S.Ct. 1164, 3 L.Ed.2d 1209 (1959).
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967); Swenson v. Bosler, 386 U.S. 258, 87 S.Ct. 996, 18 L.Ed.2d 33 (1967); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 83 S.Ct. 814, 9 L.Ed.2d 811 (1963); see also Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963).
These two reasons were offered by the Second Circuit to explain why a mistrial transcript might be useful. United States ex rel. Wilson v. McMann, 408 F.2d 896 (CA2 1969). Our discussion in Roberts did not suggest any ways in which the transcript of the pretrial hearing might have been useful, although our per curiam intimated that perhaps counsel desired to have a check against the testimony of a key witness, Roberts v. LaVallee, supra, 389 U.S., at 41, 88 S.Ct., at 195; nor did the Second Circuit's discussion of the issue, United States ex rel. Roberts v. LaVallee, 373 F.2d 49 (CA2 1967).
Nickens v. United States, 116 U.S.App.D.C. 338, 323 F.2d 808 (1963), was decided before the full development of our transcript cases. The majority opinion in Nickens gave the other issues in the case more plenary consideration. Judge Wright concurred in the majority's view that no transcript had been required but only because he believed a motion to obtain a transcript had not been properly raised. Id., at 345, 323 F.2d, at 815. Also cited in the North Carolina opinion was Forsberg v. United States, 351 F.2d 242 (CA9 1965), also a pre-Roberts opinion, which relied solely on Nickens in denying a mistrial transcript to an indigent. Id., at 248.
Professor Robert Keeton notes that in civil cases involving large amounts of money it is standard practice for lawyers to place 'a standing order with the reporter for 'daily copy' of the trial proceedings.' R. Keeton, Trial Tactics and Methods 104 (1954). Presumably when wealthy clients are haled before criminal courts rather than before civil ones, their attorneys likewise place such standing orders.
'(T)he law enforcement agency is often at the scene of the crime shortly after its commission. While at the scene, the police have better access to witnesses with fresher recollections. They are authorized to confiscate removable evidence. In addition, the financial and investigatory resources of law enforcement agencies permit an extensive analysis of all relevant evidence.
'The defendant has the option of hiring a private investigator. However, the investigator will probably get to the scene long after the occurrence of the crime and after the police have made their investigation and removed all relevant physical evidence. The defendant's investigator may have difficulty viewing the scene if it is on private property. Witnesses may be less accessible; their recollections will probably be less precise. Indeed they may choose not to cooperate at all with the defendant's investigator. However, it may all be irrelevant if, as is often the case, the defendant is unable to afford an investigator or is incarcerated pending trial.
'The defendant is helpless to cope with the uncooperative witness while the prosecutor has numerous means to compel testimony. First, there is the possibility of (a) coroner's inquest or a preliminary hearing. And if the prosecution prefers not to have the defense present, some jurisdictions allow the prosecution to take testimony while the defendant and his attorney are excluded. The uncooperative witness can be subpoenaed to appear before the grand jury and required to testify, again without the presence of the defense. The defense cannot, usually, discover the grand jury minutes.
'Many states require that the defendant give notice of intended alibi or insanity defenses. The prosecution's burden, in bringing a charge, in contrast, has been substantially lessened. Mere recitation of the statute may be a sufficient pleading of the charge. Amendments to the indictment or information are liberally allowed; duplicity and variances are no longer serious defects. Liberal pleading rules deprive the defendant of effective notice of the circumstances of the offense.' Norton, Discovery in the Criminal Process, 61 J.Crim.L.C. & P.S. 11, 13—14 (1970). See generally Handzel, Criminal Law: Pre-Trial Discovery—The Right of an Indigent's Counsel to Inspect Police Reports, 14 St. Louis U.L.J. 310 (1969); Moore, Criminal Discovery, 19 Hastings L.J. 865 (1968); A State Statute to Liberalize Criminal Discovery, 4 Harv.J.Legis. 105 (1967). Comment, Disclosure and Discovery in Criminal Cases: Where Are We Headed?, 6 Duquesne U.L.Rev. 41 (1967); Golden & Palik, Bibliography: Criminal Discovery, 5 Tulsa L.J. 207 (1968); Symposium: Discovery in Federal Criminal Cases, 33 F.R.D. 47 (1963); Brennan, Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest For Truth?, 1963 Wash. U.L.Q. 279.
See Fed.Rules Crim.Proc. 15—17. See also Note, Discovery Procedures Under New York's New Criminal Procedure Law, 38 Brooklyn L.Rev. 164 (1971); Right of Accused in State Courts to Inspection or Disclosure of Evidence in Possession of Prosecution, 7 A.L.R.3d 8 (1966).
Statutory exceptions to the common-law ban in North Carolina may be found at N.C.Gen.Stat. § 8—74 (1969) (depositions of witnesses unable to attend trial); and at § 15—155.4 (Supp.1969). The latter provision was enacted in 1967 and permits limited discovery of prosecution evidence where (a) good cause is shown for discovery, (b) the prosecution intends to use the evidence at trial. The latter condition would effectively prevent defendants' discovery of evidence which might be favorable. The only reported decisions considering this addition are those in State v. Macon, 276 N.C. 466, 173 S.E.2d 286 (1970), affirming 6 N.C.App. 245, 170 S.E.2d 144 (1969), upholding the refusal of a trial court to permit an accused's inspection of notes which had been made by a specified police officer during the accused's interrogation.
The celebrated opinions in State v. Tune, 13 N.J. 203, 98 A.2d 881 (1953), contain a vigorous dissent by Justice (now Mr. Justice) Brennan who expressed regret over the majority's disregard of the successful implementation of liberal discovery in civil matters.
'There is a strong possibility that solicitors (consciously or unconsciously) withhold evidence favorable to the defendant * * *.' Id., at 16.
In addition to the discussion of such procedures in State v. Goldberg, 261 N.C. 181, 134 S.E.2d 334 (1964), see State v. Hamilton, 264 N.C. 277, 141 S.E.2d 506 (1965) (access to police reports and notes denied); State v. Overman, supra, 269 N.C., at 468, 153 S.E.2d, at 57; see also Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 62 S.Ct. 993, 86 L.Ed. 1322 (1942), cited with approval in Goldberg, supra, 261 N.C., at 191, 134 S.E.2d, at 341, holding that a defendant has no right to inspect memoranda used by prosecution witnesses to refresh their memories. See generally the restatement of the common-law rules of discovery, cited by the Goldberg court, supra, at 191, 134 S.E.2d, at 340 and 23 C.J.S. Criminal Law §§ 995(1) and (2).
The majority does not disagree that under ordinary circumstances Britt would have been denied equal protection of the laws. The majority, however, distinguishes Britt's case from the routine case because he was tried in a small town where defense counsel was well acquainted with the court reporter. Counsel, reasons the Court, ought to have prevailed upon the reporter between trials to assist in his making notes of the first trial. I believe that these kinds of fortuities ought not to be determinative of constitutional guarantees, especially where it may be difficult afterwards to establish the nature of such alleged relationships.

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