Source: https://www.morelaw.com/verdicts/case.asp?n=14-18-00056-CR%20&s=TX&d=125573
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 10:24:48+00:00

Document:
On November 15, 2016, a Harris County grand jury indicted appellant for the felony offense of aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon. Appellant retained Lionel Castro to represent him. On June 26, 2017, appellant pleaded guilty to the charge. On July 6, Castro interviewed to become a Harris County magistrate. On July 7, Castro accepted a job offer for the magistrate position. On September 15, Castro withdrew as appellant’s counsel. Appellant hired new counsel, Carl Moore, who appeared on November 16. On December 14, the trial court held a punishment hearing and assessed punishment of twenty years in prison. Appellant filed a timely motion for new trial, arguing that Castro’s acceptance of the magistrate job on July 7 created a conflict of interest. Appellant argued that Moore had “very little time to prepare” for the punishment hearing because Castro did not timely notify appellant of the conflict. According to appellant, Castro rendered ineffective assistance by creating a conflict of interest that “affected Carl Moore’s ability to be an effective advocate.”1 Appellant later filed an untimely amended motion for new trial, arguing for the first time that Castro’s application for, not merely his acceptance of, the magistrate job created a conflict of interest. Castro applied for the magistrate position before appellant pled guilty. After a hearing, the trial court denied appellant’s motion for new trial, and appellant now appeals.
1 Appellant also argued in the trial court that the judge erred in failing to consider appellant’s eligibility for probation, but he does not re-urge that argument on appeal.
Analysis Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for new trial because appellant entered his guilty plea involuntarily due to his counsel’s ineffective assistance.
of interest” exists if counsel is required to make a choice between advancing his client’s interest in a fair trial or advancing other interests (perhaps counsel’s own) to the detriment of his client’s interest. See James v. State, 763 S.W.2d 776, 779 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989). The parties agree that Cuyler’s “actual conflict” standard applies. When, as here, an appellant first asserts ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel’s alleged conflict of interest in a motion for new trial, “that court will decide, in the first instance, whether the appellant has carried his burden with respect to the elements of his claim of conflict-of-interest ineffective assistance.” Odelugo v. State, 443 S.W.3d 131, 137 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). In doing so, the trial court conducts its evaluation under the familiar standards applicable when the court acts as the factfinder, including the right to weigh credibility and accept or reject part or all of any witness’s testimony. Id. (explaining standards). We then review the trial court’s rulings for an abuse of discretion, “reversing only if the trial judge’s ruling was clearly erroneous and arbitrary[,]” such as when “no reasonable view of the record could support the trial court's ruling.” Id.; see also Quintero v. State, 467 S.W.3d 671, 676-77 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, pet. ref’d) (reviewing motion for new trial raising claim of ineffective assistance based on a conflict of interest for abuse of discretion and applying Cuyler); Washington v. State, 417 S.W.3d 713, 724-25 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. ref’d). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, and we reverse only if no reasonable view of the record could support the trial court’s finding. Okonkwo v. State, 398 S.W.3d 689, 694 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Parker v. State, 462 S.W.3d 559, 562 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.). We review de novo the trial court’s decision on whether the appellant suffered prejudice, while giving deference to the trial court’s implied resolution of any underlying factual determinations. Washington, 417 S.W.3d at 725.
2 According to a notice of appearance filed in the trial court, Castro began representing appellant before his indictment in November 2016. Castro testified at the hearing on appellant’s motion for new trial that he was “not entirely certain” but he thought his “application [for the magistrate position] preceded [appellant’s] plea date.” 3 A motion for new trial must be filed within thirty days after sentence is imposed or suspended in open court. See Arizmendi, 519 S.W.3d at 150; Tex. R. App. P. 21.4(a). The motion can be amended at any time during that thirty-day period, but the trial court is barred from considering a ground for new trial raised outside the thirty-day period if the State properly objects. Arizmendi, 519 S.W.3d at 150. Because the State did not object to the timeliness of appellant’s amended motion, the trial court was not precluded from considering grounds raised in the amended motion.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court denied appellant’s motion for new trial. The trial court, in its discretion, could have believed Castro’s testimony that Castro’s application to become a magistrate did not impact his representation of appellant prior to or at the time of appellant’s guilty plea. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, we conclude that the court could reasonably have found that no actual conflict existed prior to appellant’s guilty plea. See Odelugo, 443 S.W.3d at 137; Okonkwo, 398 S.W.3d at 694. Appellant’s argument on appeal does not convince us otherwise. Appellant asserts that Castro’s application to become a magistrate “created the possibility he would have to withdraw from all cases.” But the mere “possibility of conflict is insufficient to impugn a criminal conviction.” Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 350. Appellant has not shown that, at the time he pleaded guilty on June 26, 2017, Castro was “actively represent[ing] conflicting interests,” id., or was otherwise required to choose between advancing his client’s interest in a fair trial or advancing Castro’s own interest to the detriment of his client’s interest, see James, 763 S.W.2d at 779. While Castro may have desired and sought an offer of employment from the State, at the time of appellant’s plea no offer had been extended to Castro and thus no risk existed that Castro would choose to represent the State’s interest to the detriment of appellant’s interest. Based on the record before us, we conclude that no conflict of interest existed at the time of appellant’s plea and, therefore, appellant has not shown that his plea was entered involuntarily. See, e.g., De Leon v. State, Nos. 13-0700187-CR, 13-07-00189-CR, 2008 WL 5575064, at *5 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi May 15, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (rejecting appellant’s argument that attorney’s dual representation of appellant and appellant’s brother constituted conflict of interest when record showed that attorney began representing brother after appellant’s guilty plea).
We overrule appellant’s first and only issue.
Outcome: Having overruled appellant’s sole issue on appeal, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

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