Source: http://bc-injury-law.com/blog/category/bcsc-civil-rule-3
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 15:51:51+00:00

Document:
Lawyer Ordered to Pay Costs Personally for "Shoddy Piece of Counsel Work"
In an illustration of a seldom used power, reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Victoria Registry, ordering a Plaintiff’s lawyer to pay costs to Defendants personally pursuant to Rule 14-1(33) after bringing an unsuccessful application to renew a lawsuit.
In this week’s case (Drover v. BCE Inc.,) the Plaintiff sued various Defendants challenging system access fees collected by cellular companies. It was a proposed class action. The lawsuit was filed in 2004 and various Defendants were served the lawsuit via fax. Some Defendants questioned the propriety of fax service to which the Plaintiff’s lawyer responded “we believe the Court will accept service by Facsimile“.
No steps were taken to perfect service until 2012 when the matter was brought before the Court with the Plaintiff asking the Court to permit “the plaintiffs to serve the statement of claim”. The Court refused noting that the Plaintiff’s lawyer “did not bother to consider the relief that might be available under the Rules. Instead, he seemed to be content with putting a general concept in his application in the hope of attracting the court’s sympathy.” The Court found this was “unacceptable” and dismissed the application after canvassing the factors under Rule 3-2(1).
 In my view, this is an exceptional case. The conduct of counsel for the plaintiffs has caused costs to be wasted through delay and neglect. Plaintiffs’ counsel neglected this action for over 8 years. When he got around to dealing with it by bringing this application, he failed to set out the proper relief. Furthermore, the application was not supported by any evidence explaining either the delay or the failure to comply with the Rules regarding the need for an endorsement and proper service. Moreover, the application was brought against defendants against whom there was no basis for the order(s) sought. To say that this was and has from the outset been a shoddy piece of counsel work would be an understatement.
 I am ordering that E.F. Anthony Merchant, Q.C. be personally liable for the foregoing awards of costs, payable forthwith.
When an infant sues for damages in BC they must do so through a litigation guardian. Typically a parent acts in this role. If an allegation arises that the litigation guardian’s negligence contributed to the child’s injuries can Third Party proceedings be brought against the litigation guardian? The answer is yes as was demonstrated in reasons for judgement released by the BC Supreme Court, New Westminster Registry, earlier this month.
In the recent case (Alamdar-Saadati v. Lee) the Plaintiff was involved in a pedestrian/motor vehicle collision in 2009. He was 6 years old at the time. He was travelling alone on a transit bus. After leaving the bus he “attempted to cross the street in front of the bus and was struck by a motor vehicle“. The Plaintiff, through his mom acting as litigation guardian, sued the driver of the vehicle.
 Ultimately, I have reached the conclusion that Ms. Alamdar’s status as litigation guardian does not impact the outcome of this case. She is, however, as a proposed Third Party, entitled to object to the issuance of the notice.
 The authorities indicate that a Third Party Notice should not be set aside on a motion under Rule 3-5(8) unless the applicant is able to establish beyond doubt that the pleadings disclose no cause of action. This test is identical to that applied on an application under Rule 9-5(1)(a) and, as a result, it has been held that a Third Party Notice should only be set aside if there is no serious question or issue to be determined, the question or issue raised by the Third Party Notice is not substantially the same as a question or issue in the original action or the question or issue should not properly be determined in the original action: Northmark Mechanical Systems Inc. v. King (Estate),  B.C.J. No. 1812, 2009 BCSC 1237.
 The Courts should only exercise its discretion in striking out a Third Party Notice where the question of whether the notice is founded is perfectly clear. If the issue is in doubt the Third Party proceedings should be allowed to proceed to trial for final resolution: Wade v. Marsolais,  B.C.J. No. 14.
 I am well aware that granting the order sought will disqualify the mother from continuing to act as her son’s litigation guardian. In all fairness, this is a matter which she ought to have considered at the outset. If not she, then surely her counsel should have considered that there was a possibility that a Third Party claim might be advanced against her by virtue of the circumstances of this accident.
 The infant plaintiff will not lose his claim but an alternate litigation guardian will have to be found.
 The father, I should have mentioned earlier, did not oppose the application to add him as a Third Party.
 In the result, an order will go granting the defendant leave to file a Third Party Notice naming Zoleikha Alamdar and Mohsen Saadati as third parties in the form attached as Schedule “A” to the application with the addition of these parties as third parties in the style of cause thereof.
Reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Supreme Court, Victoria Registry, ordering ICBC to provide particulars in support of an allegation that the Plaintiff provided a wilfully false statement.
In last week’s case (Biedermann v. ICBC) the Plaintiff was sued for damages following three motor vehicle collisions. ICBC refused to indemnify the Plaintiff arguing that he was in breach of his insurance by making a wilfully false statement.
 The plaintiff relies on Rule 3-7(22) of the Supreme Court Civil Rules (“SCCR”) which provides that the court may order a party to serve further and better particulars of a matter stated in a pleading (my emphasis).
 In its response, the defendant helpfully outlines the legal principles relevant to the application and interpretation of this Rule.
· to tie the hands of the party so that he cannot without leave go into any matters not included.
 After reviewing the pleadings and relevant authorities, I have concluded that the Response to Civil Claim does not provide sufficient particularity to meet the objectives of both the SCCRand those outlined by the court in Cansulex.
 Neither the Response to Civil Claim nor the response to this application identify the nature of the “wilfully false statement”. The Response separately pleads (and the defendant discloses in its affidavit material) that the plaintiff may have failed to update both the territory and rating for the Volkswagen Golf and also misrepresented the principal operator. Those details provide some information to the plaintiff as to the basis for denying the sought after insurance coverage. However, it is not at all clear from the Response whether these documents represent the “wilfully false statement” or whether the defence is relying on some other written or oral statement or representation given by the plaintiff.
 Nor does the Response address in any particularity the basis on which coverage is denied for the July 2008 accident. The Response simply says that Mr. Biedermann was no longer the legal owner of the vehicle involved in the accident.
 The defence has separately pled s. 75 (a) (ii) with respect to the 2009 accidents. However, s. 75 (c) is so broadly worded that the plaintiff (and the court) is unable to identify the nature of the impugned statement of misrepresentation with respect to any of the accidents.
 Accordingly, the order sought by the plaintiff is granted. Costs of the application will be to the plaintiff in the cause.
Order in Council #191 was approved by the Ministry of the Attorney General on May 26, 2011. This order comes into force on July 1, 2011 and makes various amendments to the BC Supreme Court Civil Rules.
I have a copy of the order and am happy to share it with anyone who contacts me and requests a copy.
Default Judgement is a step under Rule 3-8 of the BC Supreme Court Rules which lets a Plaintiff win their lawsuit if a Defendant fails to file a response in the time-lines set out in Rule 3-3.
Default judgement, however, is not a remedy that’s typically used in ICBC claims. The reason being that in addition to serving the Notice of Civil Claim on Defendants personally, Section 22 of the Insurance (Vehicle) Act requires that “Every person commencing an action for damages caused by a vehicle in BC must serve (ICBC) with a copy of the originating process….and file proof of the service in the court in which the action is pending…A further step in the action must not be taken until the expiration of 8 days after the filing“.
What this means is that if a Defendant fails to respond to a BC motor vehicle collision lawsuit in time you cannot successfully obtain default judgement unless you also served ICBC with the documents and they failed to respond.
Even if you’ve taken the above steps Default Judgement is not granted automatically and this was demonstrated in reasons for judgement published today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry.
9] I am advised by Mr. Schroeder, though there are no materials before me, that the plaintiff was injured in a car accident in the late 1990s and that his claim was settled in January of 2002. Furthermore and importantly, Mr. Schroeder confirms that because of the passage of time, his file has been destroyed, and that he has made inquiries with ICBC whose own file in relation to the matter has also, for the most part, been destroyed.
 Mr. Schroeder requires these materials to properly respond to Mr. Sandhu’s claims.
 I am not going to issue judgment. What I am going to do is adjourn the matter because of the following series of factors.
 First, the primary focus of Mr. Sandhu’s application is one that deals with Mr. Schroeder’s lack of compliance with time requirements. I have some flexibility or discretion with respect to such issues and, under the circumstances where Mr. Schroeder was endeavouring to ascertain what had happened in the past and to retrieve relevant file materials, I would be hesitant to award judgment.
While delay is rarely welcome in Injury Lawsuits sometimes it is part of the process. Very few ICBC claims are won by default judgment. It is always preferable for claims to be dealt with by their merits.
As a courtesy most plaintiff lawyers grant ICBC defense lawyers a little extra time if necessary to put in their formal defense. If you’re faced with this situation you’ll want to consider whether an application for default judgement has a meaningful chance of success prior to spending time and effort on a seldom used motion.
Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, New Westminster Registry, applying Rule 3-2(1) of the New BC Supreme Court Civil Rules. This rule permits the Court to renew a Notice of Civil Claim before or after it expires. Today’s case is the first I’m aware of applying this new rule.
In today’s case (Stuart v. Patterson) the Plaintiff was injured in two consecutive instances while engaging in exercises known as “dead-lifts”. These exercises were apparently being supervised by the Defendant. The Plaintiff started two separate lawsuits against the Defendant alleging that he was at fault for her injuries. The Plaintiff’s lawyer failed to serve the Writ of Summons within the first year after filing. The Plaintiff brought an application to renew the lawsuit relying on Rule 3-2(1) of the New Rules of Court.
1. Was the application to renew brought promptly?
2. Did the defendants have notice of the claim before the writ expired?
3. Did the defendant suffer prejudice?
4. Was the failure to serve the writ attributable to the actions of the defendants?
5. Was the failure to serve the writ attributable to the actions of the plaintiff?
 Recent considerations of these factors are found in our Court of Appeal decisions of Seeliger v. Eagle Ridge Hospital, 2007 BCCA 582, and Fast Fuel Services Ltd. v. Michelin North America (Canada) Inc., 2008 BCCA 216.
 It is clear from the authorities cited to me by both counsel that each case is to be decided on its particular facts.
 Further, counsel for Ms. Stuart refers me to the statements from the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal in Simpson v. Saskatchewan Government Insurance Office (1967), 61 W.W.R. 741, at p. 750, 65 D.L.R. (2d) 324, to the effect that failure to renew a writ is an “irregularity” and that “if the refusal to renew the writ would do an obvious and substantial injustice to the plaintiff, while to permit it is not going to work any substantial injustice to the defendant or prejudice the defendant’s defence, then the writ should be renewed”: see Bearhead, BCCA at para. 8; Lowe v. Christensen (1984), 54 B.C.L.R. 88 (C.A.) at para. 13; Sutherland v. McLeod, 2004 BCCA 653, at paras. 28-29.

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