Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&amp;view=article&amp;id=50083:gr-140656-2007&amp;catid=1496&amp;Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 02:03:53+00:00

Document:
G.R. No. 140656 and G.R. No. 154482 - MAYOR FELIPE K. CONSTANTINO v. HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, ET AL.
MAYOR FELIPE K. CONSTANTINO, Petitioner, v. HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (FIRST DIVISION) and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
NORBERTO N. LINDONG, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondents.
Before us are two (2) consolidated petitions, the determination of both rests ultimately on whether Felipe K. Constantino (Constantino), mayor of Malungon, Sarangani Province, was indeed guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (R.A. No. 3019), otherwise known as The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
In G.R. No. 140656, Constantino filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, assailing the 15 November 1999 decision1 and the 15 March 2000 resolution2 of the Sandiganbayan (First Division) in Criminal Case No. 23433 finding him and his co-accused, petitioner Norberto N. Lindong (Lindong) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.
On the other hand, G.R. No. 154482 is a petition for certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, filed by Lindong questioning three (3) orders3 of the Sandiganbayan (First Division) relative to the execution of judgment against him also in Criminal Case No. 23433.
1996 in the aggregate sum of PESOS: TWO MILLION ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY-SEVEN THOUSAND NINETY and 91/100 (P2,177,090.91), unwarranted benefits and advantage and causing undue injury to the government.
However, only five (5) days later, or on 23 April 1996, Sanggunian members Benjamin C. Asgapo, Rafael J. Suson, Sr. (Suson), Leo G. Ingay (Ingay), Pablo V. Octavio (Octavio) and Wilfredo P. Espinosa (Espinosa), and Vice Mayor Primitiva L. Espinosa (Vice Mayor Espinosa) filed a formal complaint against petitioners Constantino and Lindong for violation of R.A. No. 3019.
(d) to pay the costs of suit.
Lindong himself likewise filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 142379, to seek a reversal of the Sandiganbayan decision finding him guilty as Constantino's co-conspirator. On 10 July 2000, this Court denied Lindong's petition for failure to state the material date of receipt of the assailed decision of the Sandiganbayan. His subsequent attempts for reconsideration proved futile. On 25 July 2001, the Court issued the Entry of Judgment in the case.
Thereafter, the Sandiganbayan (First Division) issued three (3) orders relative to the execution of judgment against Lindong, all of which are assailed by the latter, in his petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 154482, for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion. The Sandiganbayan issued on 16 May 2002 the first challenged order which directed petitioner Lindong to appear before it in person for the execution of judgment. On 6 June 2002, the respondent court issued a resolution, the second assailed order herein, denying Lindong's urgent motion to defer execution of judgment. The third assailed order, a resolution issued on 3 July 2002, directed the issuance of a bench warrant against petitioner Lindong and the confiscation of his cash bond for provisional liberty pending appeal, and required him to surrender his person to the court and explain why judgment should not be rendered against the cash bond.
With the demise of Constantino during the pendency of his appeal, the same should normally be regarded as moot and academic following the norm that the death of the accused marks the extinction of his criminal liability.26 However, the present two petitions are so intertwined that the absolution of Constantino is ultimately determinative of the absolution of Lindong. Indeed, the exoneration of Constantino will necessarily signify the injustice of carrying out the penalty imposed on Lindong. Thus, the Court in this instance has to ascertain the merits of Constantino's appeal to prevent a developing miscarriage of justice against Lindong.
The "moot and academic" principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: First, there is a grave violation of the Constitution;27 Second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved;28 Third, when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public;29 and Fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.30 In the instant case, the exceptional character of the appeals of Constantino and Lindong in relation to each other, as well as the higher interest of justice, requires that the Court determine the merits of the petition and not dismiss the same outright on the ground of mootness.
Constantino's petition would have been granted and he would have been absolved of criminal liability had he been still alive today. This is why it is so.
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
Undoubtedly, the standard of culpability imposed by Section 3 of R.A. No. 3019 is quite high which, in this case, was not hurdled by the evidence presented against Constantino. Verily, the prosecution failed to satisfy the requisite proof to demonstrate Constantino's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. While Constantino should have exercised more prudence when he transacted with Norlovanian Corporation, he could not however be held liable for "gross inexcusable negligence" as contemplated in R.A. No. 3019. Indeed, in the earlier case of Constantino v. Desierto,45 the Court had already made an express finding that petitioner Constantino did not violate the mandate of Resolution No. 21 but instead merely carried out its directive.
That case was a special civil action for certiorari filed by Constantino to seek the invalidation of the resolution of the Ombudsman finding him guilty of grave misconduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and/or gross neglect of duty, and on that account, dismissing him from service. The controversy arose from the same transaction entered into between Constantino and Norlovanian Corporation and involved the same subject matter as in the case at bar. The administrative complaint was initiated through a letter-complaint and joint affidavit signed by Vice Mayor Espinosa and to it was appended a certification signed by the Vice Mayor and Councilors Suson, Ingay, Asgapo, Espinosa and Octavio.
Two - an undertaking for the subsequent conveyance and transfer of ownership of the equipment to the municipality at the end of the term of the lease.
3) neither did they raise any objections (a) at the session of the Municipal Council on February 29, 1996, when Norberto Lindong explained the terms of the "negotiated contract" of "lease/purchase," or (b) at the time that the units were delivered and inspected by designated minicipal officials.
Now, it is germane to advert to the deplorable inaccuracies in the Joint Affidavit of private respondents (P.L. Espinosa, Suson, Sr., Ingay, W. P. Espinosa, Octavio, Asgapo) submitted as part of their complaint in the Ombudsman's Office. The affidavit contains a clearly distorted version of Resolution No. 21 of February 22, 1996. In that document of the affiants described Resolution No. 21 as authorizing Mayor Constantino "to purchase and acquire ** heavy equipments (sic) to be paid within five (5) years at the yearly amortization of P2.2 million **." This is a misleading reading of Resolution No. 21. As the most cursory perusal of that resolution at once discloses, what the Mayor was thereby empowered to do was "to enter into a negotiated contract" in the Municipality's behalf with "interested parties," in line with the expressed wish of the Municipality to "lease/purchase one (1) fleet of heavy equipment **" 'not simply to "purchase and acquire" said equipment (as complainant Councilors aver). Neither does Resolution No. 21 state (contrary to complainant's description of it) that the price shall be "paid within five (5) years at the yearly amortization of P2.2 million **;" indeed, as already above stressed, the resolution is completely silent as regards any terms and conditions of the "negotiated contract" that the Mayor was assigned to execute in the town's behalf. Such obvious distortions cannot but erode the complainant councilors' credibility and bona fides.
It is also relevant to draw attention to the flagrantly inaccurate statements and inferences about the Mayor's "negotiated contract" regarding the heavy equipment, contained in Resolution No. 47 approved only by four (4) Members of the Municipal Council at its session of June 6, 1996 (the four (4) being Councilors Octavio, Espinosa, Asgapo and Ingay). That Resolution No. 47, it will be recalled, stopped all "rental payment/expenditures relative to the pool of heavy equipment of the Norlovanian Company." The stoppage was based on prior resolutions of the Council - allegedly setting down the terms under which the heavy equipment should be acquired, and which terms were supposedly violated by the Mayor. but - unaccountably and again indicative of bad faith, if not malice, on the part of private respondents - Resolution No. 47 made absolutely no reference to two (2) resolution which on their face justify the Mayor's contract with Norlovanian Corporation, to wit: (1) Resolution No. 21 which, having been enacted after the cited resolutions, must be deemed to have superseded them, and which, to repeat, motivated and constitutes the justification for the lease-purchase agreement entered into by the Mayor and Norlovanian Corporation, and (2) Resolution No. 38 in which the Councilors not only expressly aknowledged that "the municipal government ** (had) just acquired its fleet of heavy equipment leased/purchased from the Norlovanian Corporation," but also "requested ** (the) Mayor ** to operate the newly acquired heavy equipment of the municipality leased/purchased from the Norlovanian Corporation."
In light of the forego[i]ng facts, which appear to the Court to be quite apparent on the record, it is difficult to perceive how the Office of the Ombudsman could have arrived at a conclusion of any wrongdoing by the Mayor in relation to the transaction in question. It is difficult to see how the transaction between the Mayor and Norlovanian Corporation ' entered into pursuant to Resolution No. 21 ' and tacitly accepted and approved by the town Council through its Resolution No. 38 ' could be deemed an infringement of the same Resolution No. 21. In truth, an examination of the pertinent writings (the resolution, the two (2) instruments constituting the negotiated contract, and the certificate of delivery) unavoidably confirms their integrity and congruity. It is in fine, difficult to see how those pertinent written instrument, could establish a prima faciecase to warrant the preventive suspension of Mayor Constantino. A person with the most elementary grasp of the English language would, from merely scanning those material documents, at once realize that the Mayor had done nothing but carry out the expressed wishes of the Sangguniang Bayan.
The investigator also opined that Resolution No. 21 should be interpreted in light of other official documents, executed a year earlier. He [Graft Prosecutor Buena] does not explain why he did not adopt the more obvious construction of Resolution No. 21 indicated by the elementary doctrine that it is within the power and prerogative of the town council to repeal its prior acts, either expressly, or by the passage of essentially inconsistent resolutions. When the town council passed Resolution No. 21 without any mention whatever of those prior official documents respecting the acquisition to heavy equipment, the evident intention was to supersede them and to have such acquisition governed solely by Resolution No. 21. This conclusion is strongly supported by the fact that the Sanggunian expressly admitted ' in the Second Whereas Clause of its Resolution No. 21 ' that there had been a "failure of bidders to submit bids despite of two biddings ... public announcement" [sic] ' the two biddings being obviously related to said earlier official acts of the town council. The conclusion is further bolstered by the fact that the Council (with full awareness of said "negotiated contract,") and of the delivery of equipment thereunder, had requested the Mayor to put the equipment into operation for the town projects. The Court is thus satisfied that it was in fact the Council's intention, which it expressed in clear language, to confer on the Mayor ample discretion to execute a "negotiated contract" with any interested party, without regard to any official acts of the Council prior to Resolution No. 21.
It is also difficult to see why the patent inaccuracies in the affidavit-complaint and Resolution No. 47 were ignored - as difficult to understand how the execution of two writings to embody one contract of "lease/purchase" could be regarded as fatally defective, and even indicative of a criminal conspiracy, or why said two writings should be interpreted in such a way as to magnify their seeming inconsistencies. The fundamental and familiar legal principle ' which the Office of the Ombudsman ignored ' is that it is perfectly legitimate for a bilateral contract to be embodied in two or more separate writings, and that in such an event the writings should be read and interpreted together in such a way as to eliminate seeming inconsistencies and render the parties' intention effectual.
It may be true that the basis of administrative liability differs from criminal liability as the purpose of administrative proceedings on the one hand is mainly to protect the public service, based on the time-honored principle that a public office is a public trust. On the other hand, the purpose of the criminal prosecution is the punishment of crime.50 However, the dismissal by the Court of the administrative case against Constantino based on the same subject matter and after examining the same crucial evidence operates to dismiss the criminal case because of the precise finding that the act from which liability is anchored does not exist.
It is likewise clear from the decision of the Court in Constantino that the level of proof required in administrative cases which is substantial evidence was not mustered therein. The same evidence is again before the Court in connection with the appeal in the criminal case. Ineluctably, the same evidence cannot with greater reason satisfy the higher standard in criminal cases such as the present case which is evidence beyond reasonable doubt.
Lindong ascribes grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent court in issuing the challenged orders. He argues that the Sandiganbayan erred in not holding in abeyance the execution of judgment against him in light of the pending Petition for Review by his co-accused before this Court of the same decision for which he was convicted. Should the decision be set aside by the Supreme Court, petitioner Lindong contends, he will be benefited to the extent that there can no longer be any judgment to legally execute against both himself and Constantino.
The virtual acquittal of Constantino inevitably puts a welcome end to the tribulations of Lindong. Thus, we grant the petition.
One of the essential elements for violating Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 is that the respondent is a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions, or that he or she is a private individual in conspiracy with such public officer. In the instant case, the essential acquittal of Constantino, as presaged in G.R. No. 140656 and presented in the disquisition, renders an absence in the critical requisite of a public officer with whom Lindong, the private individual, allegedly conspired to commit the crime charged.
Hence, we now have before us an incongruous situation where execution of judgment has been entered against a private person accused with conspiring with a public officer for violation of the anti-graft law, but at the same time said public officer would unequivocably be entitled to exoneration had he not died in the meantime. Yet, it is utterly illogical to absolve Constantino who entered into the contract on behalf of the government and send the private person to prison.
x x x [T]he acquittal of the former First Lady should be taken in the context of the Court's Decision dated January 29, 1198, in Dans, Jr. v. People, which the former First Lady sought to reconsider and, finding merit in her motion, gave rise to the Court's Resolution in Marcos. In Dans, the Information filed against the former First Lady and Jose P. Dans, Jr., then Minister of Transportation and Communications, for violation of Section 3(g) of R[.]A[.] [No.] 3019, alleged that they were both public officers and, conspiring with each other, entered into the subject lease agreement covering the LRTA property with the PGHFI, a private entity, under terms and conditions manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government.
The Court in its original decision affirmed the former First Lady's conviction for violation of Section 3(g) of R[.]A[.] [No.] 3019 but acquitted her co-accused, Dans, Jr., of the said offense. As stated earlier, upon the former First Lady's motion for reconsideration, the Court reversed her conviction in its Resolution in Marcos.
It is therefore apparent that in light of the prevailing milieu in the instant case, we cannot sustain the execution of judgment against Lindong. The reversal of the decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 23433 makes it legally absurd to execute any such judgment against him.
(a) An appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter.
In fact, the Court has at various times applied the foregoing provision without regard to the filing or non-filing of an appeal by a co-accused, so long as the judgment was favorable to him. In such cases, the co-accused already withdrew his appeal,59 failed to file an appellant's brief,60 or filed a notice of appeal with the trial court but eventually withdrew the same.61 Even more, in these cases, all the accused appealed from the judgment of conviction but for one reason or another, their conviction had already become final and executory. Nevertheless, the Court still applied to them the favorable judgment in favor of their co-accused.62 Therefore, we cannot find a reason to treat Lindong differently, especially so in this case where the public officer accused of violating the anti-graft law has been acquitted, and the appeal by Lindong was dismissed on a technicality.
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 23433 are NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. The Sandiganbayan is permanently enjoined from executing said orders.
Quisumbing, J., Chairperson, Carpio, Carpio-Morales, Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur.
1 Rollo, G.R. No. 140656, pp. 38-65. Penned by Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong and concurred in by Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena and Associate Justice Catalino R. CastaÃ±eda, Jr.
2 Sandiganbayan Records, Vol. II, pp. 94-109.
3 Rollo, G.R. No. 154482, pp. 13, 17-18.
4 Sandiganbayan Records, Vol. II, pp. 1-3.
5 Municipality of Malungon Resolution No. 2, Series of 1995. See Exhibit "A."
6 Municipality of Malungon Resolution No. 198, Series of 1995. See Exhibit "B." See also Certification, Exhibit "C."
7 Sandiganbayan Records, Vol. II, pp. 68-69.
9 Rollo, G.R. No. 140656, pp. 75-80. See Exhibit "F." TSN, 15 January 1998, pp. 19-20.
10 Folder of Exhibits; Delivery and Acceptance, Exhibit "G;" and Disbursement Voucher, Exhibit "I".
11 Folder 9, Exhibits; Check No. 001310, Exhibit "I."
12 Rollo, G.R. No. 140656, pp. 82-83.
13 Sandiganbayan Records, pp. 77-78.
14 Rollo, G.R. No. 140656, pp. 84-85.
15 Folder of Exhibits, Report on the Comprehensive Audit of the Financial Transactions of the Municipality of Malungon, Province of Sarangani, Exhibits "K."
16 Section 27. Public Bidding as the Primary Mode of Procurement. - Except as otherwise provided herein, acquisition of supplies or property by local government units shall be through competitive bidding.
e. purchase from government entities.
17 TSN, 28 October 1997, pp. 13-16, 26-44.
18 Folder of Exhibits, Undertaking, Exhibit "J."
19 TSN, 15 January 1998, pp. 8, 13-20, 26-28.
20 TSN, 30 October 1997, pp. 8-19.
22 Id. at 34-35, 47-49.
23 Rollo, G.R. No. 140656, p. 64.
25 Id. at 193-194. See Notice of Death of Petitioner.
26 Revised Penal Code, Article 89 (1).
27 David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, 3 May 2006, 489 SCRA 160, 213-214, citing Province of Batangas v. Romulo, G.R. No. 152774, May 27, 2004, 429 SCRA 736.
28 Id. at 214, citing Lacson v. Perez, G.R. No. 147780, May 10, 2001, 357 SCRA 756.
30 Id. at 215, citing AlbaÃ±a v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 163302, July 23, 2004, 435 SCRA 98; Acop v. Guingona, Jr., G.R. No. 134855, July 2, 2002, 383 SCRA 577; Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 159085, February 3, 2004, 421 SCRA 656.
31 351 Phil. 896 (1998).
32 Villanueva v. Ople, G.R. No. 165125, 18 November 2005, citing Peralta v. Desierto, GR No. 153152, 19 October 2005, 473 SCRA 322; Garcia-Rueda v. Amor, 365 SCRA 456, 20 September 2001.
34 Id., citing Pilapil v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 101978, 7 April 1993, 221 SCRA 349 and Diaz v. Sandiganbayan, 219 SCRA 675.
35 Id., citing Pareno v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 107110-20 & 108037-39, 17 April 1996, 256 SCRA 242.
36 Reyes v. Atienza, G.R. No. 152243, 23 September 2005, 470 SCRA 670, 683 citing Marcelo v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 69983, 14 May 1990, 185 SCRA 346.
37 Id., citing Marcelo v. Sandiganbayan, id., and Mendiola v. People, G.R. NOS. 89983-84, 6 March 1992, 207 SCRA 85.
38 Id., citing Fernando v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. NOS. 96182-83, 19 August 1992, 212 SCRA 680.
39 Sistoza v. Desierto, 437 Phil. 117, 130 (2002).
40 Rollo, G.R. No. 140656, p. 57.

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