Source: https://lonang.com/library/reference/story-commentaries-us-constitution/sto-327/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 04:39:01+00:00

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§ 1277. BUT the most remarkable powers, which have been exercised by the government, as auxiliary and implied powers, and which, if any, go to the utmost verge of liberal construction, are the laying of an unlimited embargo in 1807, and the purchase of Louisiana in 1803, and its subsequent admission into the Union, as a state. These measures were brought forward, and supported, and carried, by the known and avowed friends of a strict construction of the constitution; and they were justified at the time, and can be now justified, only upon the doctrines of those, who support a liberal construction of the constitution. The subject has been already hinted at; but it deserves a more deliberate review.
§ 1279. It is obvious, that the treaty embraced several very important questions, each of them upon the grounds of a strict construction full of difficulty and delicacy. In the first place, had the United States a constitutional authority to accept the cession and pay for it? In the next place, if they had, was the stipulation for the admission of the inhabitants into the Union, as a state, constitutional, or within the power of congress to give it effect?
§ 1280. There is no pretence, that the purchase, or cession of any foreign territory is within any of the powers expressly enumerated in the constitution. It is no where in that instrument said, that congress, or any other department of the national government, shall have a right to purchase, or accept of any cession of foreign territory. The power itself (it has been said) could scarcely have been in the contemplation of the framers of it. It is, in its own nature, as dangerous to liberty, as susceptible of abuse in its actual application, and as likely as any, which could be imagined, to lead to a dissolution of the Union. If congress have the power, it may unite any foreign territory whatsoever to our own, however distant, however populous, and however powerful. Under the form of a cession, we may become united to a more powerful neighbour or rival; and be involved in European, or other foreign interests, and contests, to an interminable extent. And if there may be a stipulation for the admission of foreign states into the Union, the whole balance of the constitution may be destroyed, and the old states sunk into utter insignificance. It is incredible, that it should have been contemplated, that any such overwhelming authority should be confided to the national government with the consent of the people of the old states. If it exists at all, it is unforeseen, and the result of a sovereignty, intended to be limited, and yet not sufficiently guarded. The very case of the cession of Louisiana is a striking illustration of the doctrine. It admits, by consequence, into the Union an immense territory, equal to, if not greater, than that of all the United States under the peace of 1783. In the natural progress of events, it must, within a short period, change the whole balance of power in the Union, and transfer to the West all the important attributes of the sovereignty of the whole. If, as is well known, one of the strong objections urged against the constitution was, that the original territory of the United States was too large for a national government; it is inconceivable, that it could have been within the intention of the people, that any additions of foreign territory should be made, which should thus double every danger from this source. The treaty-making power must be construed, as confined to objects within the scope of the constitution. And, although congress have authority to admit new states into the firm, yet it is demonstrable, that this clause had sole reference to the territory then belonging to the United States; and was designed for the admission of the states, which, under the ordinance of 1787, were contemplated to be formed within its old boundaries. In regard to the appropriation of money for the purposes of the cession the case is still stronger. If no appropriation of money can be made, except for cases within the enumerated powers, (and this clearly is not one,) how can the enormous sum of eleven millions be justified for this object? If it be said, that it will be “for the common defence, and general welfare” to purchase the territory, how is this reconcileable with the strict construction of the constitution? If congress can appropriate money for one object, because it is deemed for the common defence and general welfare, why may they not appropriate it for all objects of the same sort? If the territory can be purchased, it must be governed; and a territorial government must be created. But where can congress find authority in the constitution to erect a territorial government, since it does not possess the power to erect corporations?
§ 1283. The mere recent acquisition of Florida, which has been universally approved, or acquiesced in by all the states, can be maintained only on the same principles; and furnishes a striking illustration of the truth, that constitutions of government require a liberal construction to effect their objects, and that a narrow interpretation of their powers, however it may suit the views of speculative philosophers, or the accidental interests of political parties, is incompatible with the permanent interests of the state, and subversive of the great ends of all government, the safety and independence of the people.
§ 1286. That this measure went to the utmost verge of constitutional power, and especially of implied power, has never been denied. That it could not be justified by any, but the most liberal construction of the constitution, is equally undeniable. It was the favourite measure of those, who were generally the advocates of the strictest construction. It was sustained by the people from a belief, that it was promotive of the interests, and important to the safety of the Union.
§ 1288. There remain one or two other measures of a political nature, whose constitutionality has been denied; but which, being of a transient character, have left no permanent traces in the constitutional jurisprudence of the country. Reference is here made to the Alien and Sedition laws, passed in 1798, both of which were limited to a short duration, and expired by their own limitation.11 One (the Alien act) authorized the president to order out of the country such aliens, as he should deem dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States; or should have reasonable grounds to suspect to be concerned in any treasonable, or secret machinations against the government of the United States, under severe penalties for disobedience. The other declared it a public crime, punishable with fine and imprisonment, for any persons unlawfully to combine, and conspire together, with intent to oppose any measure or measures of the United States, etc.; or with such intent, to counsel, advise, or attempt to procure any insurrection, unlawful assembly, or combination; or to write, print, utter, or publish, or cause, or procure to be written, etc., or willingly to assist in writing, etc., any false, scandalous, and malicious writing or writings against the government of the United States, or either house of congress, or the president, with intent to defame them, or to bring them into contempt, or disrepute, or to excite against them the hatred of the people, or to stir up sedition; or to excite any unlawful combination for opposing, or resisting any law, or any lawful act of the president, or to resist, oppose, or defeat any such law or act; or to aid, encourage, or abet any hostile designs of any foreign nations against the United States. It provided, however, that the truth of the writing or libel might be given in evidence; and that the jury, who tried the cause, should have a right to determine the law and the fact, under the direction of the court, as in other cases.
2. See the Debates in 1803, on the Louisiana Treaty, printed by T. & G. Palmer in Philadelphia, in 1804, and 4 Elliot’s Debates 257 to 260. — The objections were not taken merely by persons, who were at that time in opposition to the national administration. President Jefferson himself (under whose auspices the treaty was made,) was of opinion, that the measure was unconstitutional, and required an amendment of the constitution to justify it. He accordingly urged his friends strenuously to that course; at the same time he added, “that it will be desirable for congress to do what is necessary in silence“; “whatever congress shall think necessary to do should be done with as little debate as possible, and particularly so far as respects the constitutional difficulty.” “I confess, then, I think it important in the present case, to set an example against broad construction by appealing for new power to the people. If, however, our friends shall think differently, certainly I shall acquiesce with satisfaction; confiding, that the good sense of our country will correct the evil of construction, when it shall produce ill effects.” What a latitude of interpretation is this! The constitution may be over-leaped, and a broad construction adopted for favourite measures, and resistance is to be made to such a construction only, when it shall produce ill effects! His letter to Dr. Sibley (in June, 1803} recently published is decisive, that he thought an amendment of the constitution necessary. Yet he did not hesitate without such amendment to give effect to every measure to carry the treaty into effect during his administration. See 4 Jefferson’s Corresp. p. It 2, 3, Letter to Dr. Sibley, and Mr. 3. Q. Adams’s Letter to Mr. Speaker Stevenson, July 11, 1832.
3. Amer. Insur. Co. v. Canter, 1 Peters’s Sup. R. 511, 542; Id. 517, note, Mr. Justice Johnson’s Opinion.
4. Ibid. — In the celebrated Hartford Convention, in January, 1815, a proposition was made to amend the constitution so, as to prohibit the admission of new states into the Union without the consent of two-thirds or both houses of congress. In the accompanying report there is a strong though indirect denial of the power to admit new states without the original limits of the United States.
5. 6 Wait’s State Papers, 57.
6. 7 Wait’s State Papers, 25, Mr. Madison’s Letter to Mr. Pinkney; Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. R. 191, 192, 193.
7. Act, 22d December, 1807, ch. 5.
8. In point of fact, it remained in force until the 29th of June, 1809, being repealed by an act passed on the first of March, 1809: to take effect at the end of the next session of congress which terminated on the 28th of June, 1809.
9. United States v. The Brig William, 2 Hall’s Law Journal, 255; 1 Kent’s Comm. Lect. 19, p. 405; Sergeant on Const. Law, ch. 28, (ch. 30;) Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. R. 1, 191 to 193.
10. Mr. Jefferson, on many occasions, was not slow to propose, or justify measures of a very strong character; and such as proceeded altogether upon the ground of implied powers. Thus, in writing to Mr. Crawford, on 20th of June, 1816, he deliberately proposed, with a view to enable us in future to meet any war, to adopt “the report of the then secretary of the war department, for placing the force of the nation at effectual command,” and to “ensure resources for money by the suppression of all paper circulation during peace, and licensing that of the nation alone during war.” 4 Jefferson’s Corresp. 285. Whence are these vast powers derived? The latter would amount to a direct prohibition of the circulation of any bank notes of the state banks; and in fact would amount to a suppression of the most effective powers of the state banks.
11. Act of 25th of June, 1798, ch. 75; Act of 14th of July, 1798, ch. 91; 1 Tuck. Black. Comm. App. part 2, note G, p. 11 to 30.
12. The Alien, and Sedition Acts were the immediate cause of the Virginia Resolutions of December, 1798, and of the elaborate vindication of them, in the celebrated Report of the 7th of January, 1800. The learned reader will there find an ample exposition of the whole constitutional objections. See also 4 Jefferson’s Correspondence, 93, 27. The reasoning on the other side may be found in the Debates in Congress, at the time of the passage of these acts. It is greatly to be lamented, that there is no authentic collection of all the Debates in congress, in a form, like that of the Parliamentary Debates. See also 4 Elliot’s Deb. 251, 252; Debates on the Judiciary, in 1802, Mr. Bayard’s Speech, p. 371, 372; Addison’s Charges to the Grand Jury, No. 25, p. 270; Id. No. 26. p. 289. These charges are commonly bound with Addison’s Reports. See also 1 Tuck. Black. Comm. 296 to 300; Id. Part 2, App. note 6, p. 11 to 36; Report of Committee of House of Representatives of congress, 25th February, 1799, and Resolve of Kentucky, of 1798, and Resolve of Massachusetts, of 9th and 13th of February, 1799, on the same subject.
13. Mr. Vice President Calhoun, in his letter of the 28th of August, 1832, to Gov. Hamilton, uses the following language. “From the adoption of the constitution we have had but one continued agitation of constitutional questions, embracing some of the most important powers exercised by the government; and yet, in spite of all the ability, and force of argument, displayed in the various discussions, backed by the high authority, claimed for the Supreme Court to adjust such controversies, not a single constitutional question of a political character, which has ever been agitated during this long period, has been settled in the public opinion, except that of the unconstitutionality of the Alien, and Sedition laws; and what is remarkable, that was settled against the decision of the Supreme Court.” Now, in the first place, the constitutionality of the Alien, and Sedition laws never came before the Supreme Court for decision; and consequently, never was decided by that court. In the next place, what is meant by public opinion deciding constitutional questions? What public opinion? Where, and at what time delivered? It is notorious, that some of the ablest statesmen and jurists of America, at the time of the passage of these acts, and ever since, have maintained the constitutionality of these laws. They were upheld, as constitutional, by some of the most intelligent, and able state legislatures in the Union, in deliberate resolutions affirming their constitutionality. Nay more, it may be affirmed, that at the time, when the controversy engaged the public mind most earnestly upon the subject, there was, (to say the least of it) as great a weight of judicial, and professional talent, learning, and patriotism, enlisted in their favour, as there ever has been against them. If, by being settled by public opinion, is meant that all the people of America were united in one opinion on the subject, the correctness of the statement cannot be admitted; though its sincerity will not be questioned. It is one thing to believe a doctrine universally admitted, because we ourselves think it clear; and quite another thing to establish the fact. The Sedition and Alien laws were generally deemed inexpedient, and therefore any allusion to them now rarely occurs, except in political discussions, when they are introduced to add odium to the party, by which they were adopted. But the most serious doubts may be entertained, whether even in the present day, a majority of constitutional lawyers, or of judicial opinions, deliberately hold them to be unconstitutional.
If public opinion is to decide constitutional questions, instead of the public functionaries of the government in their deliberate discussions and judgments, (a course quite novel in the annals of jurisprudence,) it would be desirable to have some mode of ascertaining it in a satisfactory, and conclusive form; and some uniform test of it, independent of mere private conjectures. No such mode has, as yet, been provided in the constitution. And, perhaps, it will be found upon due inquiry, that different opinions prevail at the same time on the same subject, in the North, the South, the East, and the West. If the judgments of the Supreme Court (as it is more than hinted) have not, even upon the most deliberate juridical arguments, been satisfactory, can it be expected that popular arguments will be more so? It is said, that not a single constitutional question, except that of the Alien and Sedition laws, has ever been settled. If by this no more is meant, than that all minds have not acquiesced in the decisions, the statement must be admitted to be correct. And such must, under such a postulate, be for ever the case with all constitutional questions. It is utterly hopeless in any way to satisfy all minds upon such a subject. But if it be meant, that these decisions have not been approved, or acquiesced in, by a majority of the Union, as correct expositions of the constitution, that is a statement, which remains to be proved; and is certainly not to be taken for granted. In truth, it is obvious, that so long as statesmen deny, that any decision of the Supreme Court is conclusive upon the interpretation of the constitution, it is wholly impossible, that any constitutional question should ever, in their view, be settled. It may always be controverted; and if so, it will always be controverted by some persons. Human nature never yet presented the extraordinary spectacle of all minds, agreeing in all things; nay not in all truths, moral, political, civil, or religious. Will the case be better, when twenty-four different states are to settle such questions, as they may please, from day to day, or year to year; holding one opinion at one time, and another at another? If constitutional questions are never to be deemed settled, while any persons shall be found to avow a doubt, what is to become of any government, national or state? Did any statesmen ever conceive the project of a constitution of government for a nation or state, every one of whose powers and operations should be liable to be suspended at the will of any one, who should doubt their constitutionality? Is a constitution of government made only, as a text, about which, casuistry and ingenuity may frame endless doubts, and endless questions? Or is it made, as a fixed system to guide, to cheer, to support, and to protect the people? Is there any gain to rational liberty, by perpetuating doctrines, which leave obedience an affair of mere choice or speculation, now and for ever?

References: § 1279

§ 1280

§ 1283

§ 1286

§ 1288
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