Source: https://scocal.stanford.edu/opinion/long-beach-police-officers-assn-v-city-long-beach-34314
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 18:23:22+00:00

Document:
nozzle with a pistol grip.
California Public Records Act (Gov. Code, § 6250 et seq.).
information, using only a person‘s name as an Internet search term.
Defendant City supported plaintiff Union‘s request for injunctive relief.
retaliate against the officer. Cox mentioned eight ―Officer Safety Bulletins . . .
and their families outweighed any benefit the public would gain from disclosure.
not adversely affect the Times.
in the absence of a particularized showing regarding a specific officer.
requested information falls within the exemption (id., § 6255, subd. (a)).
the Legislature enacted in 1978 in response to our 1974 decision in Pitchess v.
Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 (Pitchess).
unwarranted invasion of [a peace officer‘s] personal privacy.‖ (Id., § 832.8, subd.
government information and to narrowly construe statutes that limit such access.
which are at issue here.
Records Act for disclosure of peace officers‘ names.
petitioned the superior court for a writ of mandate, seeking to compel disclosure.
appeal were confidential ―personnel records‖ under the Pitchess statutes (Pen.
the extent that decision conflicted with our analysis in Copley. (Copley, at p.
Appeal reversed, but a majority of this court disagreed with the Court of Appeal.
therefore it was subject to disclosure.
consider the disclosure request of the Times.
subd. (d)), which, by definition, are confidential ―personnel records‖ (id., § 832.8).
category of ―personnel records‖ (id., § 832.8).
imply any wrongdoing by those officers.
the identity of an officer involved in an on-duty shooting.
deputy‘s name) were confidential personnel records under the Pitchess statutes.
prevent disclosure of the names of officers involved in shootings. As noted (see p.
personal freedoms, not to mention bodily injury and financial loss.‘ (Gray v.
which was not made here.
involved in shootings could lead to harassment of those officers and their families.
public records request, quoted at p. 2, ante).
safety would not be an issue. We reject that blanket rule.
shooting, especially when the shooting results in the death of an unarmed person.
officer to display either a name or an identification number (Pen. Code, § 830.10).
court‘s denial of the Union‘s requested injunctive relief.
All further unlabeled statutory references are to the Government Code.
information.‖ (Commission on Peace Officer Standards, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p.
of great concern for the personal safety of both the officer and their [sic] family.
would disclosing an officer‘s home address. (See Frank v. City of Akron (6th Cir.
harassment‘].)‖ (Commission on Peace Officer Standards, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p.
constitute ―personnel . . . or similar files‖ under section 6254, subdivision (c).
The majority then moves on to its primary focus: the public‘s interest.
states, ―tips‖ the balance here ―strongly in favor of identity disclosure.‖ (Id. at p.
professional qualifications of a peace officer.‖ (Cal. Const., art. I, § 3, subd.
who are not in uniform, it indicates a legislative intent to protect their identities.
―disseminate data regarding the number, type, or disposition of complaints . . .
―legislative policy‖ Penal Code section 830.10 ―reflects.‖ (Maj. opn., ante, at p.
Miller, letter to Governor Ronald Reagan re Assem. Bill No. 1830 (1969 Reg.
Sess.) Aug. 8, 1969, p. 1.) This letter does not support the majority‘s assertion.
shooting. The majority cites, and I have found, no case supporting that view.
different from the disclosure sought in Stone v. F.B.I. (D.D.C. 1990) 727 F.Supp.
in connection with‖ officer appraisal or discipline (maj. opn., ante, at pp. 11-12).
section, it easily could have used the majority‘s far narrower phrase.
individual would not wish to be publicly disclosed.‘ ‖ (Ibid., quoting Halloran v.
Times Mirror, evidence regarding the dangers of disclosure was submitted.
from January 1, 2005, until December 11, 2010, surely includes such officers.
agencies to protect the very officers who are out there every day protecting us.
They deserve at least that much for their brave service.
section 6255 and Penal Code sections 832.7 and 832.8.
Law Offices of James E. Trott, James E. Trott and Larry J. Roberts for Plaintiff and Appellant.
The Law Offices of Charles Goldwasser, Charles A. Goldwasser, David A. Goldwasser and Theodore H.
Santa Barbara Police Officers Association as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.
as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.
Association of California as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.
Chiefs‘ Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Appellants.
Party in Interest and Respondent.
Amici Curiae on behalf of Real Party in Interest and Respondent.
Messenger; Mickey H. Osterreicher; Amanda M. Leith; Covington & Burling, Kurt Wimmer; Bruce D.
of Real Party in Interest and Respondent.
Petition for review after the Court of Appeal affirmed an order denying a request for a preliminary injunction. This case presents the following issue: Are the names of police officers involved in on-duty shooting incidents subject to disclosure under the California Public Records Act?
On December 12, 2010, two City of Long Beach police officers shot and killed Douglas Zerby. They believed that he was pointing a gun at them; in fact, the object was a garden hose. Subsequently, reporter Richard Winton of the Los Angeles Times made a request under the California Public Records Act (Gov. Code § 6250 et seq.) of the Long Beach City Attorney’s Office for the names of the Long Beach police officers involved in all officer-involved shootings during the six-year period prior to the Zerby shooting.
The Long Beach Police Officers Association (the Union), supported by the City, filed a complaint in the California superior court to enjoin the City from disclosing the information sought by the Times. The superior court issued a temporary restraining order prohibiting the City from disclosing the names of the officers to the Times and permitted the Times to intervene in the action.
However, after continuing the case to a later date, the superior court denied the Union’s request for a preliminary or permanent injunction “without prejudice” to a renewed request demonstrating that releasing the names of particular officers would create a likelihood of harm. The superior court also dissolved the temporary restraining order.
The Union and the City appealed this ruling without success. The Supreme Court granted their petitions for review.
The Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court’s judgment that the police officers’ names must be disclosed to the Los Angeles Times. The particularized showing necessary to outweigh the public’s interest in disclosure was not made here, although the Supreme Court approved the trial court’s denial of injunctive relief without prejudice to any later evidentiary showing that disclosing a particular officer’s name would compromise that officer’s safety or the safety of the officer’s family.
A. The Union and the City argued that Penal Code Section 832.7(a), protecting a peace officer’s “personnel records,” and Penal Code Section 832.8(d), defining “personnel records” as including records of employee “appraisal or discipline,” protected the officers’ names from disclosure. (Those statutes, known as the Pitchess statutes, were enacted in reaction to Pitchess v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. 3d 531 (1974), a California Supreme Court case that allowed a defendant charged with battery on four sheriff’s deputies to discover from a peace officer’s employer the existence of previous complaints about the officer’s use of excessive force.) The Union and the City pointed to case law stating that “[t]he legislative concern [in adopting sections 832.7 and 832.8] appears to have been with linking a named officer to the private or sensitive information listed in section 832.8.” Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. 4th 278, 295 (2007).
The court determined that the term “personnel records” did not include every record that might be considered for purposes of an officer’s appraisal or discipline, and therefore did not cover records at issue in the case, such as the initial incident reports of an on-duty shooting. The court relied in part on Government Code Section 6254(f), which it found to require the disclosure of an officer’s name when recorded as one of the “factual circumstances” of a shooting by a peace officer during an arrest or in the course of responding to a complaint. The court viewed this provision as reflecting that the California Legislature drew a distinction between records of factual information about an incident (which generally must be disclosed) and records generated as part of an internal investigation of an officer in connection with the incident (which generally are confidential). The court found additional support for its conclusion in Commission on Peace Officer Standards, which limited the personnel records exemption to the categories of information that are expressly “enumerated” in Penal Code Section 832.8. The court also pointed to Penal Code Section 830.10, which requires uniformed officers to display their name or identification number, showing that the public generally has a right to know the identity of an officer involved in an on-duty shooting.
Finally, the court distinguished relevant precedents, namely Copley Press, Inc. v. Superior Court, 39 Cal. 4th 1272 (2006), as prohibiting the disclosure of records that pertained explicitly to termination proceedings and thereby would have “linked” an officer’s name to “private or sensitive” personnel matters. Commission on Peace Officer Standards, 42 Cal. 4th at 295. Here, by contrast, disclosing the names of officers involved in various shootings would not imply that those shootings resulted in disciplinary action against the officers, and would not link those names to any confidential personnel matters or other protected information.
B. The court found that Government Code Section 6254(c), which protects “[p]ersonnel, medical, or similar files, the disclosure of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy,” did not extend to this case. First, there was a serious question as to whether the names of peace officers in this case were “[p]ersonnel . . . or similar files.” Second, the public’s significant interest in the conduct of its peace officers usually outweighs an officer’s personal privacy interest. In fact, the court found that the general public interest was particularly great in connection with officer-involved shootings because such shootings often lead to severe injury or death. Here, in the absence of any particularized showing of a peculiarly strong privacy interest, the public interest trumped.
C. Finally, the court found that Government Code Section 6255(a), which contains a “catchall exemption” that allows a public agency to “justify withholding any record by demonstrating that…on the facts of the particular case the public interest served by not disclosing the record clearly outweighs the public interest served by disclosure of the record,” did not extend to this case. Because the balance of interests favored disclosing the names of peace officers involved in on-duty shootings, disclosure was required in the absence of a specific safety concern regarding any particular officer.
Moreover, Justice Chin disagreed with the majority’s assessment of the public interest. First, disclosure of the names of the officers involved in shootings would not actually satisfy the public’s interest in knowing whether specific officers had misused their authority. Second, Justice Chin viewed California Penal Code Sections 832.7 and 832.8 as reflecting the Legislature’s view that the public’s interest in officer conduct was limited. A similar perspective by California voters was evinced by the passage of a constitutional provision expressly preserving “statutory procedures governing discovery or disclosure of information concerning the official performance or professional qualifications of a peace officer,” Cal. Const., Art. I, § 3(b)(3). Justice Chin interpreted California Penal Code Section 830.10 as merely a technical requirement of identification display, applicable only to uniformed officers, and not, contrary to the majority’s view, evidence that officer’s names ought generally be disclosed. Justice Chin also disagreed with the majority’s claim that Section 6254(f) clearly establishes that law enforcement agencies “shall” disclose the names of officers involved in a shooting as a “factual circumstance surrounding” a shooting; rather, the Justice interpreted the statute as protecting the names of officers from disclosure as "information [that] would endanger the safety of a person involved in an investigation or would endanger the successful completion of the investigation or a related investigation" under that provision.
Finally, Justice Chin criticized the majority’s assessment of the officers' interest in nondisclosure. Because the information the Times seeks would reveal the participation of the named officers in particular cases as well as their connection to a shooting that they may not wish to be publicly disclosed, the officers have a heightened privacy interest in nondisclosure under Commission on Peace Officer Standards. Justice Chin also rejected the majority’s claim that Section 6254(c) requires specificity of proof as to the need for confidentiality, finding it inconsistent with the court’s precedent in Times Mirror Co. v. Superior Court, 53 Cal.3d 1325 (1991) (holding that nondisclosure of the Governor’s schedule was justified based on a potential threat to the Governor’s safety). Because the majority acknowledged the existence and validity of the safety concerns of officers who fear retaliation from the community, the Times Mirror standard was satisfied. The requirement of individualized threat was also flawed because it created an undue burden for law enforcement agencies.
California Public Records Act, Douglas Zerby, Los Angeles Times, California Government Code § 6250, California Government Code § 6254(c), California Government Code § 6254(f), California Government Code § 6255(a), California Penal Code § 830.10, California Penal Code § 832.7, California Penal Code § 832.8, Pitchess statutes, newspaper, media, investigation, identification, personnel records, privacy, police officers, disclosure, public interest, officer-involved shootings, police shootings, evidentiary showing, injunctive relief, denial without prejudice.
Annotation by Tess Reed, Stanford Law School Class of 2015.
Related Media Erika Aguilar, Southern California Public Radio, Audio: California Supreme Court Justices Question if the Names of Police Officers Involved In Shootings Can Be Withheld (2014).
Editorial, "How California's Supreme Court Called the Police Unions' Bluff," L.A.Times, June 2, 2014.
American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California, Long Beach Police Officers Association v. City of Long Beach, et al. (2014).
Peter Bibring, American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California, California Supreme Court Rules for Police Transparency (2014).
Kelli Sager, Rochelle Wilcox & Dan Laidman, Davis Wright Tremaine LLP, California Supreme Court Holds Names of Officers in Police Shootings Should Be Disclosed (2014).
Liebert Cassidy Whitmore, California Supreme Court Holds Names of Police Officers Involved in Shooting Are Subject to Disclosure Under the Public Records Act (2014).
Maura Dolan, "State High Court Seems to Favor Naming Police Officers in Shootings," L.A. Times, March 4, 2014 (report on oral argument of the case before the California Supreme Court).
SCOCAL, Long Beach Police Officers Assn. v. City of Long Beach , 59 Cal.4th 59, 172 Cal. Rptr. 3d 56, 325 P.3d 460 available at: (https://scocal.stanford.edu/opinion/long-beach-police-officers-assn-v-city-long-beach-34314) (last visited Sunday April 21, 2019).

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