Source: http://www.childrenslegalrightsjournal.com/childrenslegalrightsjournal/volume_34_issue_1?pg=108
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 18:38:51+00:00

Document:
152 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962) (“The nonjusticiability of a political question is primarily a function of the separation of powers.”); see also NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 27, at 58-66 (providing a general overview of the United States Supreme Court’s political question jurisprudence); O’Neill, supra note 27, at 555-56 (“The political question doctrine is the judiciary's attempt to respect the structural boundaries between the three branches of federal government.”).
153 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. ( 1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). See generally NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 27, at 1-11 (summarizing the United States Supreme Court’s judicial review authority).
154 Baker, 369 U.S. at 210. Early in the Court’s history, the political question doctrine most often arose in cases involving the Guaranty Clause of Article IV, Section 4. See O’Neill, supra note 27, at 556; see, e.g., Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1, 42-43 (1849). Generally, these cases involved a dispute over an elected office, a matter the Court believed it lacked authority to decide. In Luther v. Borden, plaintiffs alleged the Rhode Island government failed to satisfy the Constitution’s guaranty of a republican government. Id. The Court refused to decide the case, instead asserting that either the President or Congress must resolve the conflict. Id.; see also O’Neill, supra note 27, at 556 (noting that “[v]ery early on, the Supreme Court used the doctrine to avoid political representation issues under the Guaranty Clause of the Constitution” and discussing Luther v. Borden).
155 Baker, 369 U.S. at 198-99. In Baker, the court was presented with the issue of whether voting districts that, due to population shifts, effectively diluted the voting power of a particular voting group violated the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 187-88. The defendants argued that issues of political reapportionment involved political questions, and as such, the court lacked authority to decide the matter. Id. at 197-98.
156 Id. at 217 (“The doctrine of which we treat is one of ‘political questions,’ not one of ‘political cases.’ The courts cannot reject as ‘no law suit’ a bona fide controversy as to whether some action denominated ‘political’ exceeds constitutional authority.”).
158 Id.; see also NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 27, at 59-60 (summarizing Baker’s impact on political question jurisprudence).
159 See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 27, at 61-66 (discussing the political question doctrine’s limited application to certain issues involving foreign affairs and war, constitutional amendments, impeachment, political gerrymandering, apportionment of congressional districts among states, and Origination Clause cases); Blanchard, supra note 33, at 272 (stating that Supreme Court commentators have observed a decrease in the use of the political question doctrine since the early 1960s); O’Neill, supra note 27, at 557-60 (noting that the doctrine has been limited in application to questions of political districting and foreign affairs, and then summarizing the few cases since Baker in which it has been at issue).
160 See, e.g., Comm. for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178, 1191 (Ill. 1996); Lewis E. v. Spagnolo, 710 N.E.2d 798, 802-03 (Ill. 1999); Neb. Coal.for Educ. Equity & Adequacy v. Heineman, 731 N. W.2d 164, 183 (Neb. 2007) (formally adopting the U.S. Supreme Court’s Baker test, finding that issues of education adequacy are political questions for the legislature to decide, and upholding the Nebraska state school funding system); City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40, 57-58 (R.I. 1995) (upholding Rhode Island’s funding system, and finding that the determination of what constitutes an adequate or equal education is a political question reserved for the state general assembly).

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