Source: https://apanewslaw.wordpress.com/2014/09/
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 01:01:31+00:00

Document:
Bill C-489 contains several measures to help prevent contact between the accused and victim. It came into force September 19, 2014. This enactment amended section 161 of the Criminal Code (certain offences against a person who is under the age of 16 years) to require a court to consider making an order prohibiting certain offenders from being within two kilometres, or any other distance specified in the order, of any dwelling-house where the victim identified in the order resides or of any other place specified in the order. It also amended subsection 732.1(2) (probation) to ensure that the offender abstains from communicating with any victim, witness or other person identified in a probation order, or refrains from going to any place specified in the order, except in accordance with certain conditions. It made similar amendments to section 742.3 (conditional sentence orders) and subsection 810.1(3.02) (conditions of recognizance).
The enactment also amended section 133 of the Corrections and Conditional Release Act to provide that the releasing authority may impose any conditions on the parole, statutory release or unescorted temporary absence of an offender that it considers reasonable and necessary in order to protect the victim or the person, including a condition that the offender abstain from having any contact, including communication by any means, with the victim or the person or from going to any specified place.
R. v. Benedict 2014 ONSC 4918 – Benedict plead guilty to charges of robbery and 3 counts of breach of recognizance. He plead not guilty to use of an imitation firearm, specifically a 9 millimetre gun, while committing the robbery.
Benedict attended the convience store in a white limo which he had rented as his means of transportation for the night. He entered the store and asked to purchase a 25 pack of John Player’s cigarettes from the store clerk. During the transaction, Benedict while holding his right hand in his jacket, told the clerk that he had a 9 mm gun in his jacket and that he would shoot him if he did not provide him with the money from the cash register. As a result, the clerk provided Benedict with the cash from the register totalling approximately $440.00, as he feared for his safety and believed that Benedict was carrying a concealed firearm. Benedict then left the store with the stolen $440.00 and the stolen 25 pack of John Player’s cigarettes. Benedict then entered the limo and the clerk immediately contacted police.
Section 84 CC defines “imitation firearm” as any “thing that imitates a firearm, and includes a replica firearm”. The prosecution submitted that “thing” in the context of this section must be interpreted to include intent, words and gestures that lead the intended target of the offence, in the present case, the robbery, to reasonably believe that there is a firearm present and available for use by the offender. The defence took the view that the words “imitation” and “thing” must be interpreted to mean a physical object, either brandished or in some way discernable or observed by the intended victim.
The Honourable Robert Pelletier said there is a rather remarkable absence of any jurisprudence on this specific point. Whether a person committing a robbery, hand in pocket, claiming to have a gun, commits the offence of using an imitation firearm in the commission of an indictable offence, the Court informed and despite counsel’s exhaustive review of the jurisprudence, had never been determined. The determination of this issue revolved around the interpretation of “any thing that imitates a firearm” (s. 84).
Further, said Justice Pelletier, the word “thing” appearing elsewhere in the Criminal Code is used to denote a physical object, notably section 491, as opposed to references to words or gestures, as opposed to tangible items (things), as in s. 264.1 CC.
In the end, the Justice concluded that on the specific facts of this case, the offence under section 85(2) had not been made out.
At 2:58 AM, Mr. MacDonald was placed in the phone room and given instructions. There followed a series of exchanges between he and the constable regarding the following: how to make calls; the constable assisting him; his being unable to reach anyone; his asking for and receiving a pen and paper; his apparent lack of activity; his pen and paper being taken away and his being placed in a cell for 10 minutes because of that perceived lack; his being handcuffed during this time for being “resistant;” the return of his pen and paper and his return to the phone room; whether he had fallen asleep several times or was “resting his eyes;” and finally, regarding his having left a message for a lawyer and now waiting for a return call.
As Mr. MacDonald was now simply waiting for a return call, at 4:11 AM the constable removed him from the phone room and placed him in a cell, on the basis that it was unnecessary for him to wait for the call in the phone room. The constable’s notes indicated that at 5:50 AM a tow truck was en route to tow the vehicle, to comply with the new rules regarding seizures and suspensions, but his notes ended there. He indicated that Mr. MacDonald was in cells at that time and was released some time later.
It was not clear when exactly the decision to charge Mr. MacDonald was made. The constable testified that he was prepared to allow the accused to change his mind regarding giving a breath sample if he wished. He anticipated Mr. MacDonald speaking with counsel at the detachment, and then asking if he could provide a breath sample; the constable considered that if that occurred, the accused could provide one, and he wouldn’t be charged with the earlier ASD refusal. Those thoughts were not conveyed to Mr. MacDonald. The constable indicated that he conclusively determined to charge Mr. MacDonald when he felt he wasn’t making a sufficient effort to obtain legal advice; presumably, that was near the end of the activities in and around the phone room.
Of note in the Sparrow case, the detention was only an hour and 40 minutes, rather than over 6 hours as in the case at hand. The crown argued that Mr. MacDonald’s refusal to provide a breath sample in response to the ASD demand did not become unconditional until he had been given an opportunity to consult with counsel, and that consultation with counsel was necessary before the constable could properly consider the offence complete. The crown’s argument was that the constable was obliged to provide Mr. MacDonald with an opportunity to speak to a lawyer before he could properly be charged with the ASD refusal, and therefore taking him into custody was reasonable and necessary for that purpose.
Provincial Court Judge D.R. Shynkar said it is settled law that ASD demands do not require the police to accord an individual the opportunity to speak to a lawyer (except of course where the “forthwith” component cannot be met as per R. v. George,  O.J. No. 3287…this is my note, not the judge’s in this case as it was not an issue here), while a breath demand does, as per R. v Thomsen  1 S.C.R. 640. Because an individual’s. 10(b) rights must be respected in relation to a breath demand, it makes sense to consider a refusal as conditional until an individual has had a reasonable opportunity to exercise those rights. For an ASD demand, however, there is no such reason to consider a refusal conditional. In this instance, Judge Shynkar said the offence was complete when Mr. MacDonald answered “no” to the demand, notwithstanding that he wanted to contact a lawyer.
A stay was granted in this case.
R. v. Ternowsky 2014 ABPC 109 – another trial judge has examined whether or not the accused’s section 9 rights were breached by his being held in custody overnight. While this case focused on more than one Charter issue, it essentially hinged on the overnight detention of the accused following breath test results of 130 mg% and 120 mg%. The accused was 79 years of age, has high blood pressure, expressed an intention to spend the night in the sleeper of his truck, he was in a town unfamiliar to him, and it was October 17th, cool but not likely life-threatening on a short term basis, or necessarily even uncomfortable, given access to a vehicle with a sleeping compartment.
Provincial Court Judge D.R. Shynkar said that the gist of this issue was essentially whether Mr. Ternowsky should have been detained, and if so, whether he ought reasonably to have been released prior to the 6 hours until the following morning, and whether his being kept in cells breached his right to be free from arbitrary detention? The arresting officer was due to get off shift a little later than 2:35 AM and a guard watched Mr. Ternowski until the next officer came on shift at about 9 AM, when Mr. Ternowski was released.
Section 497 of the Criminal Code imposes a duty on peace officers to release an arrested person “as soon as practicable,” and detention is not to continue unless it is “necessary in the public interest.” Of course, some specific examples of the public interest are set out in s. 497(1.1) of the Code.
There are a number of decisions in this area, and as one might expect, they are very much dependent on their individual facts. An individual who is intoxicated to the point of being unable to walk unassisted is likely a suitable candidate for being held overnight; a mildly intoxicated individual who has a responsible person ready to pick him up should very likely be immediately released. Between these extremes there are countless permutations of facts that demand careful attention in each particular situation.
… Police officers must be live to the fact that an intoxicated person may be a danger to himself or others. Mr. Ternowski’s blood alcohol was over the legal limit, he did show signs of at least mild intoxication, and he was in a town the constable understood to be unfamiliar to him. It is not perfectly clear, however, that he would have been in danger because of his intoxication had he been released. There is no evidence as to what became of his truck, and whether he could reasonably walk to it, and stay in the sleeper without being “in care or control.” Unfortunately, that question was not explored, and it should have been.
The fact that an individual’s blood alcohol level exceeds the legal limit is not in itself reason for detention: citizens cannot be detained on the basis that they are at risk of driving simply because they have access to a vehicle and are “over.” The assumption could not be made in this case that because Mr. Ternowski intended to stay in the sleeper of his truck that he would necessarily drive it before his blood alcohol level dropped sufficiently. Indeed, having just been arrested and charged, one would expect him to be rather careful in that respect.
Judge Shynkar was of the view that the decision to detain Mr. Ternowski at the onset was defensible based on the circumstances existing at that time. The officer made a judgment call at that point based on the existing considerations, and the judge did not find that it was unreasonable. He was an elderly man, at least slightly intoxicated, in an unfamiliar town in the small hours of the morning, with no one to take charge of him. His s. 9 rights were not breached at that point.
However, the length of the detention following that time became problematic, said the Judge. Given that Mr. Ternowski’s level of intoxication was not particularly high, it was clear that the circumstances justifying his continued detention would change long before the start of the next shift at 9 a.m., over six hours away. Sometime during that six hour period, very likely close to the beginning of it, and perhaps in as little as an hour, it could be expected to be abundantly clear that Mr. Ternowski’s sobriety just did not justify keeping him in a cell, notwithstanding his age, the time of day, or the unfamiliar town. At that point, his s. 9 Charter rights were breached.
It needs to be noted that there was in fact an opportunity for a reassessment at about 4 a.m., when the [arresting officer], then off-shift, came back to the detachment to see that Mr. Ternowsky had his medication. As noted above, there was evidence that at that time Mr. Ternowsky was wanting release, and while it appears there was discussion of his also wishing to go to his truck, there was unfortunately no exploration of the possibility of immediate release. Given my finding that his detention several hours earlier was defensible but not mandatory, he would almost certainly have been releasable at this time.
Implicit in the evidence is that he was not released because there was no one there, officially, to release him: [the officer], before going off-shift after 2:30 or so, decided that Mr. Ternowsky would be held until 9 the next morning, not because that is when he would be releasable, but because that would be when the resources available to the detachment would permit release; also implicit is that she did not reassess and release Mr. Tarnowsky at 4 a.m. because she was off-shift, and there only to ensure he had his medication.
Police officers working in such circumstances are necessarily constrained by the resources available to them; they cannot work 24 hours a day, and cannot be faulted when they simply do not have the manpower required. At the same time, the breach of an individual’s Charter rights cannot be overlooked because of a lack of police resources: if that lack is resulting in Charter breaches, it is a lack that requires attention.
As a result of the s. 9 Charter breach, Judge Shynkar excluded evidence of the service of the certificate of analyst and “notice of intention”. Without that evidence, all that was left for the trial proper were the observations and testimony of the officer regarding Mr. Ternowsky’s ability to operate a motor vehicle and whether it was impaired by alcohol. The Judge said while it was suspicious that Mr. Ternowsky’s ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired by alcohol, the court was not able to conclude that to be so beyond a reasonable doubt, based on the available evidence. Both counts of 253(1)(a) and 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code were dismissed.
Here, as in other areas, police officers are called upon to make prompt judgment calls in the course of their working day, knowing that a decision made with the best intentions in the short time available to make it may be scrutinized and argued about for hours or even days in a subsequent court proceeding, and that a judge has the luxury of taking weeks or even months to consider exactly what decision should have been made and in what fashion.
Does the act of a police officer opening a vehicle door amount to a search within section 8 of the Charter?
R. v. Thomas 2014 ABPC 172 – although this is a Provincial Court decision, I found it important to post as it again addresses the confusion of the “safety search” and the threshold to conduct one. On the early morning of October 4th, 2013, a female R.C.M.P. officer was on patrol in the Village of Forestburg, Alberta. Police had received 911 calls before midnight complaining of trucks and motorcycles speeding there. The early morning hours also tended to be a busy time as there is a bar in Forestburg. At 12:55 a.m., the officer heard the sound of a truck accelerating and saw it pass her police vehicle “quite quickly”. She formed the opinion that it was travelling at a high rate of speed and elected to undertake a traffic stop. The truck had two occupants, neither of whom was known to the officer. Thomas was in the driver’s seat and a female occupied the passenger seat. The officer directed Thomas to produce his operator’s licence. He did not do so, advising the officer that he had left it at a gas station. Both Thomas and his passenger were questioned about the consumption of alcohol and both denied having consumed any liquor. However, the officer could detect an odour of alcohol from within the vehicle. Given the officer’s height (just under 5’3″) and the height of the truck, she could not see the occupants’ hands unless they were on the dash or steering wheel.
The officer testified that Thomas was looking through his papers and what not, kind of leaning farther away and low down, and with it being dark, not very well lit, with no street lights, she could not see very well into the truck, so she opened the door of the truck. At this time, the officer saw a beer can and smelled alcohol on the driver’s breath. Thereafter, she demanded that Thomas provide a breath sample suitable for analysis by an approved screening device and Thomas refused.
Q. … Tell us why you could not have focused your flashlight on those three areas [the glove compartment, console and wallet] without opening up the door?
A. When looking into the vehicle, it’s hard to see in and over and to what’s going on. It’s much easier to be able to see what’s happening in people’s hands to open the door.
Q. So it was easier for you just to do it that way?
A. To see what — what’s in somebody’s hands, you know, maybe it’s my height, maybe I’m, you know, too small, but you just can’t see in properly being my height in a big vehicle.
It was the officer’s policy to always maintain visibility of a detained motorist’s hands. On some occasions, this necessitated opening of the vehicle’s door. When asked what were the grounds for making the demand, the officer testified that she could smell alcohol coming from his breath when he was in this vehicle, so she suspected that he had alcohol in his body and he was operating a motor vehicle.
The issue was whether the act of opening the driver’s door of Thomas’ truck constituted an unreasonable search or seizure? The court said that officer safety during a roadside traffic stop involves different considerations than officer safety in other circumstances, including those described by the SCC in R. v. MacDonald, 2014 SCC 3 . Officer safety needs may also differ from one traffic stop to the next. In this case, the officer was a shorter individual, acting alone, who had stopped a truck on a rural highway late at night. She was dealing with a complete stranger. Moreover, she could not see into the truck and had lost sight of Thomas’ hands. These circumstances required the opening of the truck door for officer safety reasons. The extent of any safety search needed to ensure the safety of an investigating officer will also vary, depending on the circumstances of each case, said the court. Here, the safety search involved only the opening of a truck door and the truck itself was parked on a public highway.
The Respondent took no issue with the submission that the officer’s opening of the truck door was a search, but argued it was authorized by law on the pretext that safety searches are authorized on a threshold of ‘reasonable suspicion’ (R. v. Mann, 2004 SCC 52); a reasonable possibility of an imminent threat to the public or the investigating officer, and there is support for that view (see my earlier post on this issue: R. v. Le, 2014 ONSC 2033). Thomas argued that was not the interpretation adopted by the Supreme Court itself. In the minority, concurring judgment authored by Moldaver J., the court expressed the view that Lebel J.’s use of the phrase “reasonable grounds to believe” imported the standard required for a lawful arrest or making of the demand authorized by s.254(3) C.C. (MacDonald, at para.91). At least one provincial superior court has recognized its obligation to follow the express words of the majority decision (see my earlier post on this issue: R. v. Green, 2014 ONSC 1470).
The court in Thomas said that the judgment of the court in MacDonald is not ambiguous or unclear. Its wording has been considered by three members of the Supreme Court and interpreted to mean what it clearly states. If that meaning works a profound change in the law, it is for trial courts to embrace and apply that change; not ignore it, said the judge. The judge was satisfied that a safety search can only be justified where a police officer believes on reasonable grounds that his or her safety is at stake and that, as a result, it is necessary to conduct a search. A ‘reasonable suspicion’ will not suffice.
Provincial Court Judge B.D. Rosborough had no hesitation in concluding that the officer honestly believed that it was necessary to open the driver’s door of Thomas’ truck in order to see his hands and thereby ensure both her safety and the safety of the public. However, there was no evidence whatsoever available to the officer to enable her to fear the presence of weapons, and there was nothing else, other than the speeding, about the manner in which Thomas operated his vehicle that would have raised safety concerns.
Was it ‘reasonably necessary’ for [the officer] to open the driver’s door of Thomas’ truck? Were there other reasonable means to ensure officer safety without (or before) opening the truck door?
I am loathe to second-guess the actions of the police and I recognize that they are often required to make split-second decisions in fluid and potentially dangerous situations.
the Respondent has not proven that [the officer] had reasonable grounds to believe that there was an imminent risk to her safety or the safety of the public when she opened the driver’s door of Thomas’ truck.
Accordingly, Judge Rosborough found that the officer’s search of Thomas’ truck by opening the driver’s door constituted an unreasonable search in violation of the Charter, s.8. However, given the particular facts of this case, it was Judge Rosborough’s view, after the three-prong Grant analysis, that the breach in this case was not serious, the judge was not satisfied that Thomas had proven on a balance of probabilities that admission of the officer’s ‘post-search’ evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute, so Thomas’ application was dismissed.

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