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COCONUT COOPERATIVE MARKETING ASSOCIATION, INC. (COCOMA), Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO COSICO, HERMOGENES COSICO and LUCAS COSICO, Respondents.
F.M. Poonin & Associates, for Petitioner.
Manuel A. Cordero, for Respondents.
2.	ID.; ID.; AGRICULTURAL WORKER; DEFINED. — On the other hand, the Court has defined an agricultural worker as follows: ". . . A ‘farm worker’ is any ‘agricultural wage, salary or piece worker but is not limited to a farm worker of a particular farm employer unless this Code (Agricultural Land Reform Code, supplied) explicitly states otherwise, and any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with, a current agrarian dispute or an unfair labor practice and who has not obtained a substantially equivalent and regular employment.’ The term includes ‘farm laborer and /or farm employer.’ An ‘agricultural worker’ is not a whit different from a farm worker. "From the definition of a ‘farm worker’ thus fashioned, it is quite apparent that there should be an employer-employee relationship between the farm employer and the farm worker. In determining the existence of an employer-employee relationship, the elements that are generally considered are the following: (1) selection and engagement of the employee; (2) the payment of wages; (3) the power of dismissal and (4) the employer’s power to control the employee’s conduct. It is this last element that constitutes the most important index of the existence of relationship." The above-mentioned characteristics of an agricultural worker or farm worker do not exist in share tenancy.
3.	ID.; ID.; DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN SHARE TENANT AND AGRICULTURAL WORKERS; PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ARE NOT AGRICULTURAL WORKERS. — Further, in one case, the Court compared an agricultural worker with a share tenant, and set out the following distinctions, among others, between the two: ". . . The agricultural laborer works for the farm employer, and for his labor he receives a salary or wage, regardless of whether the employer makes a profit. On the other hand, the share tenant participates in the agricultural produce. His share is necessarily dependent on the amount of the harvest. "Since the relationship between farm employer and agricultural laborer is that of employer and employee, the decisive factor is the control exercised by the former over the latter. On the other hand, the landholder has the ‘right to require the tenant to follow those proven farm practices which have been found to contribute towards increased agricultural production and to use fertilizer of the kind or kinds shown by proven farm practices adapted to the requirements of the land." This is but the right of a partner to protect his interest, not the control exercised by an employer . . ." The record of this case is bare of evidence to support the conclusion that the private respondents are mere agricultural workers. Unlike ordinary laborers, respondents did not observe regular hours of work. They did not work in shifts. Petitioner COCOMA could not even remember the number of days that private respondents worked on the land for each agricultural year. While petitioner kept a record of the full amount paid to respondents for each agricultural season, it did not keep an accurate record of the actual number of days respondents reported for work. The petitioner did not lay down regulations under which respondents were supposed to do their work. Neither did petitioner prescribe the manner by which the private respondents were to perform their duties as farmworkers. We do not find that degree of control and supervision essential to the presence of an employer-employee relationship between petitioner and respondents and before that, between Fule or Escudero, on the one hand and respondents, on the other.
4.	ID.; ID.; SHARE TENANCY RELATIONSHIP; CULTIVATION; AN IMPORTANT FACTOR IN DETERMINING THE EXISTENCE THEREOF. — Now well-settled is the rule that cultivation is an important factor in determining the existence of a share tenancy relationship. As to the meaning of cultivation, this Court has already held that: ". . . The definition of cultivation is not limited merely to the tilling, plowing or harrowing of the land. It includes the promotion to growth and the care of the plants, or husbanding the ground to forward the products of the earth by general industry. The raising of coconuts is a unique agricultural enterprise. Unlike rice, the planting of coconut seedlings does not need harrowing and plowing. Holes are merely dug on the ground of sufficient depth and distance, the seedlings placed in the holes and the surface thereof covered by soil. Some coconut trees are planted only every thirty to a hundred years. The major work in raising coconuts begins when the coconut trees are already fruit-bearing. Then it is cultivated by smudging or smoking the plantation, taking care of the coconut trees, applying fertilizer, weeding and watering, thereby increasing the produce. The fact that respondent Benitez, together with his family, handles all phases of farmwork from clearing the landholding to the processing of copra, although at times with the aid of hired laborers, thereby cultivating the land, shows that he is a tenant, not a mere farm laborer." It may thus be said that the caretaker of an agricultural land can also be considered the cultivator of the land. Applying the foregoing precedents to the case at bar, and given the kind of work performed by respondents on the landholding in question, the Court holds that respondents are, share tenants, not hired workers, of the petitioner.
5.	ID.; ID.; ID.; AGREEMENT TO SHARE THE HARVEST; PROBATIVE VALUE. — Further supportive of the existence of a share tenancy relationship between petitioner and respondents is their agreement to share the produce or harvest on a 1/7 to 6/7 basis in favor of the petitioner COCOMA. Though not a decisive indication per se of the existence of tenancy relationship, such sharing of the harvests, taken together with the other factors characteristic of tenancy shown to be present in the case at bar, strengthens the claim of respondents that, indeed, they are tenants.
7.	LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATIONS; AGRARIAN REFORM LAW; LAND-HOLDER; DEFINED; SUBJECT TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE AGRARIAN LAWS. — "A landholder shall mean a person, natural or juridical, who, either as owner, lessee, usufructuary, or legal possessor lets or grants to another the use or cultivation of his land for a consideration either in shares under the share tenancy system, or a price certain or ascertainable under the leasehold system." In accordance with the above provision, petitioner COCOMA is the landholder of the subject landholdings for (a) it is "juridical person" being a domestic corporation established under the laws of the Philippines; (b) it is the "legal possessor" of the land for it has the sole management and administration thereof; (c) it has authorized or retained the private respondents to cultivate the land; and (d) it has shared the harvest with the latter, albeit unlawfully, making it appear that they are laborers instead of tenants. Petitioner, being a landholder, as defined by law, is therefore subject to the rights, obligations, and limitations provided for under the agrarian laws.
8.	ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PRESERVATION OF THE LANDHOLDER-TENANT RELATIONSHIP IN CASES OF TRANSFER OF POSSESSION; LANDHOLDERS LIABILITY IN SUCH CASES. — There is also no question that, in this case, there was a transfer of the legal possession of the land from one landholder to another (Rule to petitioner COCOMA). In connection therewith, Republic Act 3844, Sec. 10 states: "Sec. 10. Agricultural Leasehold Relation Not Extinguished by Expiration of Period, etc. — The agricultural leasehold relation under this Code shall not be extinguished by mere expiration of the term or period in a leasehold contract nor by the sale, alienation or transfer of the legal possession of the landholding. In case the agricultural lessor sells, alienates or transfers the legal possession of the landholdings, the purchaser or transferee thereof shall be subrogated to the rights and substituted to the obligations of the agricultural lessor." Further, in several cases, this Court sustained the preservation of the landholder-tenant relationship, in cases of transfer of legal possession: ". . . in case of transfer or in case of lease, as in the instant case, the tenancy relationship between the landowner and his tenant should be preserved in order to insure the well-being of the tenant or protect him from being unjustly dispossessed by the transferee or purchaser of the land; in other words, the purpose of the law in question is to maintain the tenants in the peaceful possession and cultivation of the land or afford them protection against unjustified dismissal from their holdings." (Primero v. CAR, 101 Phil. 675); "It is our considered judgment, since the return by the lessee of the leased property to the lessor upon the expiration of the contract involves also a transfer of legal possession, and taking into account the manifest intent of the lawmaking body in amending the law, i.e., to provide the tenant with security of tenure in all cases of transfer of legal possession, that the instant case falls within and is governed by the provisions of Section 9 of Republic Act 1199, as amended by Republic Act 2263." (Joya v. Pareja, 106 Phil. 645)." . . that the tenant may proceed against the transferee of the land to enforce obligation incurred by the former landholder in relation to said land, for the reason that ‘such obligation . . . falls upon the assignee or transferee of the land’ pursuant to Sec. 9 abovementioned. Since respondents are in turn free to proceed against the former landholder for reimbursement, it is not iniquitous to hold them responsible to the tenant for said obligations. Moreover, it is the purposes of Republic Act 1199, particularly Sec. 9 thereof, to insure that the right of the tenant to receive his lawful share of the produce of the land is unhampered by the transfer of said land from one landholder to another." (Almarinez v. Potenciano, 120 Phil. 1154.) Therefore, Petitioner, being a landholder, can be held liable to private respondents for their shares in the coconuts harvested from the landholding in question.
9.	REMEDIAL LAW; JUDGMENTS; CONCLUSIVENESS; DECISIONS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE ARE CONCLUSIVE ON THE APPELLATE TRIBUNAL. — As to the fourth issue, i.e., that the computation of the private respondents’ thirty percent (30%) share in the harvest from 1971 to 1975, made by the Court of Agrarian Relations and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, is erroneous, this Court finds no compelling reason to depart from such computation, as it is a part of the findings of fact and conclusions drawn therefrom by the respondent appellate court. Such findings and conclusions should not be disturbed on appeal, in the absence of proof that they are unfounded or were arbitrarily arrived at or that the Court of Appeals had failed to consider important evidence to the contrary. In Bagsican v. Court of Appeals, it was held that: ". . . in agrarian cases, all that is required is mere substantial evidence. "x x x "Under this rule, all that the appellate court has to do, insofar as the evidence is concerned, is to find out if the decision is supported by substantial evidence. So much so that the findings of fact of the court of Agrarian Relations, if supported by such evidence, are conclusive on the appellate tribunal." The respondent appellate court, in the case at bar, acted correctly when it ruled: "On the whole, we are not at liberty to reverse the foregoing findings of fact of the Agrarian Court in the absence of any proof that are unfounded or where arbitrarily arrived at or that the court had failed to consider important evidence to the contrary. It is well-established that so long as the findings of fact of the Agrarian Court attain the minimum, evidentiary support demanded by law, that is, supported by substantial evidence, such findings cannot be reversed by the appellate tribunals. In the present case, We do not find any cogent reason to adopt a conclusion different from that reached by the court a quo.
The four (4) issues raised by the petitioner are: (1) whether or not the private respondents are share tenants in the coconut land in question; (2) whether or not private respondent Hermogenes Cosico can be adjudged a share tenant and the COCOMA ordered the reinstate him in the land involved in CAR Case No. 2238 when Hermogenes Cosico is not even a plaintiff in said Case No. 2238, but one Lucas Cosico; (3) whether or not COCOMA, contending to be a mere marketing agent which provides management and marketing services to the members of the cooperative, can be held directly liable to the private respondents-tenants for their share in the coconuts harvested; and (4) whether or not the computation of the alleged shares due the respondents Pedro Cosico and Hermogenes Cosico, made by the trial court is patently erroneous because the same was based on a wrong number of coconuts harvested and on conjectured prices.
As to the first issue, petitioner contends that private respondents were merely caretakers, of Fule and, later, Eddie Escudero, whose task included clearing the land by cutting grass and burning them to smudge the coconut trees to make them bear fruits, 9 planting of coconuts, and other fruit bearing trees, 10 and harvesting, gathering, picking and hauling coconuts, 11 and that, as caretakers, private respondents were paid separately in cash. 12 Hence, the petitioner would like this Court to believe that since private respondents were mere caretakers who were paid in cash for their services, they were therefore, hired laborers, not share tenants.
Petitioner’s contention is without merit.
In determining the nature of the relationship of the parties in the instant case, it would be well to review the concept of a share tenant as against that of an agricultural worker.
". . . A ‘farm worker’ is any ‘agricultural wage, salary or piece worker but is not limited to a farm worker of a particular farm employer unless this Code (Agricultural Land Reform Code, supplied) explicitly states otherwise, and any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with, a current agrarian dispute or an unfair labor practice and who has not obtained a substantially equivalent and regular employment.’ The term includes ‘farm laborer and /or farm employer.’ An ‘agricultural worker’ is not a whit different from a farm worker.
The above-mentioned characteristics of an agricultural worker or farm worker do not exist in share tenancy.
". . . The agricultural laborer works for the farm employer, and for his labor he receives a salary or wage, regardless of whether the employer makes a profit. On the other hand, the share tenant participates in the agricultural produce. His share is necessarily dependent on the amount of the harvest.
Petitioner, in an attempt to support its pretense that private respondents are only hired laborers, not share tenants, claims that private respondents are mere caretakers who paid for their services as such, and whose work consists of clearing and cleaning the land, planting the coconut and other fruit-bearing trees, and harvesting, gathering, picking and hauling coconuts.
We do not sustain the petitioner’s pretense.
In Marcelo v. De Leon, plaintiff therein argued that the defendant was not a tenant inasmuch as the latter did not till or cultivate the land in order to grow the fruit-bearing trees because they were already full-grown; that he did not do the actual gathering of the fruits but merely supervised the gathering; that after deducting the expenses, he gave one-half of the fruits to the plaintiff all in consideration of the land.
Applying the foregoing precedents to the case at bar, and given the kind of work performed by respondents on the landholding in question, the Court holds that respondents are, share tenants, not hired workers, of the petitioner.
Further supportive of the existence of a share tenancy relationship between petitioner and respondents is their agreement to share the produce or harvest on a 1/7 to 6/7 basis in favor of the petitioner COCOMA. Though not a decisive indication per se of the existence of tenancy relationship, such sharing of the harvests, taken together with the other factors characteristic of tenancy shown to be present in the case at bar, strengthens the claim of respondents that, indeed, they are tenants.
The conclusion then, anent the first issue, as borne out by the evidence on record, is that private respondents Pedro and Hermogenes, both surnamed Cosico, are share tenants of the land in dispute.
"SEC. 165.	Power of the Court; Rules of Procedure . . .
We now move to the third issue.
As to the fourth issue, i.e., that the computation of the private respondents’ thirty percent (30%) share in the harvest from 1971 to 1975, made by the Court of Agrarian Relations and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, is erroneous, this Court finds no compelling reason to depart from such computation, as it is a part of the findings of fact and conclusions drawn therefrom by the respondent appellate court. Such findings and conclusions should not be disturbed on appeal, in the absence of proof that they are unfounded or were arbitrarily arrived at or that the Court of Appeals had failed to consider important evidence to the contrary.
". . . in agrarian cases, all that is required is mere substantial evidence.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
Melencio-Herrera, Paras and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
*	Penned by Justice Emilio A. Gancayco with the concurrence of Justices Venicio Escolin and Hugo E. Gutierrez Jr.
**	Penned by Judge Alberto A. Reyes.
7.	Court of Agrarian Relations Decision, January 26, 1976; Rollo, pp. 23-24.
8.	Court of Appeals Decision, May 19, 1977, p. 8; Rollo, p. 29.
9.	Brief for Petitioner, p. 18.
13.	Manuel Guerrero v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-44570, May 30, 1986, 142 SCRA 136.
14.	De Los Reyes v. Espineli, G.R. No. L-28280-81, November 28, 1969, 30 SCRA 574.
16.	t.s.n. July 31, 1974, pp. 93-106.
17.	Guerrero v. Court of Appeals, supra.
20.	105 Phil. 1175, G.R. No. L-12902, July 29, 1959.
21.	Exh. "9 to "9www."
22.	Guerrero v. Court of Appeals. supra.
25.	27 SCRA 7, G.R. No. L-20700, February 27, 1969.
26.	Sec. 5(b) of RA 1199.
27.	t.s.n. of July 31, 1974, pp. 110-111, inter alia.
28.	Court of Agrarian Relations Decision, pp. 10-12.
29.	141 SCRA 226, G.R. No. 62255, January 30, 1986.
30.	Court of Appeals Decision, p. 8, Rollo at 29.

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