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Timestamp: 2019-04-21 08:13:34+00:00

Document:
COLIN THOME', J., RANASINGHE, J. AND RODRIGO, J.
S. C. No 6/83 SPECIAL - S. C APPLICATION No. 20/83.
JANUARY 16, 17, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27 AND 31, 1984.
and Rule 65 (4) (ii) of the Supreme Court Rules.
being conducted "without the authority of a lawful permit" it became the petitioner's duty to prevent the procession.
treatment by the first respondent.
(2)That the petitioner-respondent had been arrested by the petitioner and not by the 1st respondent.
(3)That the said arrest was unlawful and therefore the State was liable in damages fixed at Rs.2,500.
No order for damages or costs was made against the petitioner.
with Rule 65 (1) (a) of the Supreme Court Rules.
(4) was restricted to the petitioner-respondent's allegation and complaint to Court under Article 126 (2).
(i) Article 126 (2) read with Rule 65 (1) and Rule 65 (4) (ii) of the Supreme Court Rules.
(ii)The rule of natural justice - audi alteram partem.
(iii) The rule of natural justice that justice must be seen to be done.
him of defending himselfand he was not a party to the proceedings nor added as a party.
it is right or wrong. That is the policy of the law and the purpose of Chapter XV of the Constitution.
and manifestly wrong and where it is necessary in the interests of justice Decisions madeperincuriamcanbecorrected.
to revise a judgment rendered by that court.
(ii)that such infringement or threat is by executive or administrative action.
disregard of the provisions of Article 126 (2) read with Rule 65 (2) and (4) (ii).
equitab1e to deny relief in such a case."
(5)Rule 65 merely states that the petitioner shall name the person who he allegeshascommittedtheunlawful act.
detract from the powers of Article 126.
that the Attorney-General should be heard."
liability for unlawful executive or administrative action.
questioned in these proceedings. Moreover it was based on facts disclosed by the petitioner in his affidavit.
suggests that when he used that word it did not have its ordinary English meaning. He has only himselftoblameforthis.
petitioner's action "as being in accordance with procedures established by law".
"The petitioner had gone out of his way to justify the arrest and sought cover for his actions in certainlegalprovisions.
This is a matter of law falling within the province of the judge".
(9)The petitioner was given such hearing as the Court considered necessary as provided in Article 134 (3).
not being given an opportunity to enter into the fray and take part in the argument.
(13) There is no justification for exercising any of the inherent powers of the Court in this case.
its finding a court has necessarily to believe and disbelieve the evidence given by the witnesses for the respective sides.
judgment of the proposed reasons for disbelieving him and be afforded an opportunity of making representations.
reasoning and without it he could not have come to a proper determination of the case.
that would be carrying the principle of audi alteram partem to absurd lengths."
(1)Re Exchange Street, Manchester,  3 All E.R. 490, 493.
(2)Waterhouse & Co. v. Gilbert, 15 Q . B. D. 569.
(3)Lyon v. Morris, 19 Q. B. D. 139.
(4)Mapalathan v. Elayavan, (1939) 41 NLR 115.
(5)Loku Banda v. Assen, (1897) 2 NLR 311.
(6)Elo Singho v. Joseph, (1948) 49 NLR 312.
(7)Mohamed v. Annamalai Chettiar, (1932) 12 C. L. Rec. 228.
(8)Karuppannan v. Commissioner for Registration of Indian and Pakistani Residents, (1953) 54 NLR 481.
(9)In Revision, (1921) 23 NLR 475.
(10)Alasupillai v. Yavetpillai, (1949) 39 CLW 107.
(11)Ranmenikhamy v. Tissera (1962) 65 NLR 214.
(12)King v. Baron Silva, (1925) 4 Times of Ceylon Law Reports 3.
(13)The Seistan,  1 All ER 32.
(14)Sheldon v. Bromfield Justices,  2 WLR 1066 2 Q .B 573.
(15)Appuhamy v. Regina,  1 All E. R. 762.
(16)Rex v. The Thames Magistrate's Court,  2 All E. R. 1219.
2 All E.R. 337, (1943) A. C. 627.
(18)Mahon v. Air New Zealand Ltd. and Others reported in Newspaper (Privy Council) Law Report of October 21, 1983.
(19)R. V. Deputy Industrial Injuries Commissioner: ex parte Moore, 1  1 Q.B. 456, 488, 490.
(20)Cinnamond v. British Airports Authority,  2 All E.R. 368, 377.
(21)R. v. Woking Justices, ex parte Gossage, [ 1973] 2 W.L.R. 529.
(22)R. v. Hopkins, ex parte Harward,  1 W.L.R. 967.
(23)Maharaj v. The Attorney-General of Trinidad and Tobago (No. 2),  A. C. 385, 399.
(24)Re A. Solicitor,  2 All E. R. 432, 434.
(25)Guardians of Westham Union v. Churchwardens of Bethnal Green,  A.C. 477.
(26)Sirinivasa Thero v. Thero, (1960) 63 NLR 31, 33.
(27)Selvadurai v. Rajah, (1940) 41 NLR 423.
(28)Narayan Chetty v. Jusey Silva, (1903) 8 NLR 162.
(29)Eswaralingarn v. Sivagnanasunderam, (1962) 64 NLR 396, 398.
(30)Andris Appu v. Kolande Asari (1916) 19 NLR 225, 229.
(31)Olagappa, Chettiar v. Reith, (1941) 43 NLR 91.
(32)Victor de Silva v. Jinadasa de Silva, (1964) 68 NLR 45.
(33)Commissioner of Inland Revenue v. Ranaweera (1969) 72 NLR 294 296.
(34)Edirisinghe v. District Judge of Matara, (1949) 51 NLR 549.
(35)Sinnathamby v. Yokammah (1958) 61 NLR 183, 185.
(36)De Costa and Sons v. S. Gunaratne (1967) 71 NLR 214.
(37)Huddersfield Police Authority v. Watson  All E. R. 193.
(38)Morrelle Ltd. v. Wakeling,  1 All E. R. 708.
(39)Billimoria v. Minister of Lands, [1978- 79] 1 S. L. R. 10, 12.
(40)Menchinahamy v. Muniweera, (1950) 52 NLR 409, 414, 415.
(41)Ex parte Brown, Re Tunstall,  1 N. S. W. R. 770, 775.
(42)Ridge v. Baldwin,  2 All E. R. 66, 80.
(43)Cooper v. The Board of Works for Wandsworth District, (1863) 14 C.B. (N.S) 180.
(44)Franklin v. The Minister of Town and Country Planning-Stevenage Case,  A. C. 87.
(45)Nakkuda Ali v. Jayaratne, (1950) 51 NLR 457.
(46)Board of Education v. Rice, A.C. 179.
(47)Pearlberg v. Varty,  1 WLR 534, 547.
(48)Durayappah v. Fernando, (1966) 69 NLR 265.
(49)Wiseman v. Borneman,  A. C. 297, 308.
(50)Matlock v. Aberdeen Corporation,  1 WLR 1578, 1599.
(51)John v. Rees,  Ch 345, 402.
(52)R. v. Thames Magistrate's Court, Ex parte Polemis,  2 All E.R. 1219,  1 WLR 1371.
(53)R. v. Hendon justices, Exparte Gorchein,  1 WLR 1502.
(54)Vadamardchy Hindu Educational Society Ltd v. The Minister of Education, (1961) 63 NLR 322.
(55)Kapoor v. Jagmohan, (1980) 4 S. C. C. 379.
(56)R. v. Sussex Justices, ex parte McCarthy,  1 KB 256, 259.
(57)De Verteuiel v. Knaggs, AC 559.
(59)Rose v. Humbles,  1 WLR33,  1 All ER 314,318.
(60)Mariyadas Rai v. The Attorney-General and another S. C. Application No. 130/82: S.C. Minutes of 14. 2. 83.
(61)Caldera v. Santiagopillai, (1920) 22 NLR 155.
(62)Juan Perera v. Stephen Fernando, (1902) 2 Br. 5.
(63)Thambiraja v. Sinnamma, (1935) 36 NLR 442.
(64)Burford (Corporation of) v. Lenthall, 2 Atk. 55126 E. R. 731.
(66)Craig v. Kanssen,  K. B. 256 1 All E R. 108.
(66)Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co. Ltd,  K. B. 718 2 All E.R. 293.
APPLICATION in revision and for the exercise of the inherent powers and jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
Dr. Colvin R. de Silva with Batty Weerakoon, Miss M. Kanapathipillal and Miss Saumya de Silva for the petitioner-respondent.
The application in this case is a direct consequence of the order made by a Bench of three Judges of this court incaseNo.
subjected to cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment by the first respondent.
petitioner, and not by the first respondent.
way prejudiced by the order of this Court.
added as a party and that the Court in making the said finding acted in contravention of natural justiceandperincuriam.
He asks for relief from this Court.
also refers to the effect of the order made. I would take the same attitude which Harman, J. adopted in a similarsituation.
and conclusive" The use of these words primarily means that there can be no further appeal to a higher court orinstitution.
revision with cases tried or pending in original courts it had no power to revise cases decided by the Supreme Courtitself.
revision in cases decided by itself.
source of new jurisdictions to revise, a judgment rendered by that Court. Can such powers avail the petitioner in this case?
(1)It has made the finding against the Petitioner in respect of an Infringement not complained of to +Court byMrs.
rule 65(1)(a) of the Supreme Court Rules.
(4) is restricted to the Petitioner's allegation and complaint to Court under Article 126 (2).
(i) Article 126 (2) read with Rule 65 (1) and Rule 65 (4)(ii).
(ii)The rule of natural justice-audi alterampartem.
incuriam finding either in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction or powers of revision.
(2) Whether such infringement or threat is by executive or administrative action.
the affirmative then the question arises as to whether the act complained of constitutes executive or administrativeaction.
from the powers of Article 126. I therefore reject the contention raised in issues A 1 and 2 by Counsel for the petitioner.
to state that he used the word in a sense different to its ordinary connotation.
arrest was mistakenly attributed to the first respondent. Thatfindingcannotnowbequestionedintheseproceedings.
Moreover it was based on facts disclosed by the petitioner in his affidavit.
expunged or declared invalid, Counsel went the whole hog and asked that the entire order be set aside.
the chief officer regarding No. 5 bilge line non-return valve was reprehensible."
deprived of the opportunity of getting his tackle in order and being able to present his case in the fullest sense."
had been found guilty in the Divorce Court of adultery with a female patient of his who was suing herhusbandfordivorce.
(1)A finding must be based on evidence of probative value.
risks of the findings being made. (The emphasis is mine).
he was not a party to the case.
Ordinance it became my lawful duty under section 56 of the Police Ordinance to prevent the conduct of that procession."
useful to the argument. The parties to the case were heard by affidavit. Likewise thepetitionerwasheardbyaffidavit.
I dismiss the petitioner's application. The petitioner-respondent will be entitled to costs.
COLIN-THOME , J. - I agree.
take this opportunity of adding my own observations briefly on one or two of the legal issues before us.
punishment, fine, penalty or liability has been imposed on the petitioner or anyone else.
of the law, but the infringement remains.
affirmative, should such a hearing be granted only in certain limited and special circumstances?
suitable though it may reflect favourably or unfavourably on a witness.
Article 126 is against the State and the State has to bear the liability for unlawful executive or administrative action.
"Sub-Inspector Ganeshanantham was guilty of arresting the petitioner in contravention of the constitutional prohibition"
that the court has chosen to differ from the witness.
The petitioner had gone out of his way to justify the arrest and sought cover for his actions incertainlegalprovisions.
This is a matter of law falling within the province of the judge.
a right to ask that he be resummoned and be heardonthematter?Thisappearstobetherealissueinthiscase.
now turn deals with this aspect of the matter at some length.
Department of Justice as a punishment, a sum of 150,000 New Zealand dollars, being the public cost of the inquiry.
proceedings. That is very different from the case we are now considering.
criticism of his conduct which carries with it a moral overtone.
by Their Lordships in making it to be wholly dissociated from any moral overtones.
Earlier their Lordships had set out the two rules of natural justice that appliedto the appeal.
of time in preparing a judgment after hearing masses of evidence in a long an highly complex suit.
possible ground of appeal among many others and attracted no particular attention.
delivered allowed on that ground and no one thought any the worse of them for it.
reputation of the Judge among those who understood the legal position and it should not do so with anyone else."
that the witness facing a criminal charge should have been given a fair hearing.
of a breach of the peace if the complainants left the Court premisestheorderwaslawfulandcertiorariwasrefused.
fluid and flexible to deal with the justiceof a particular case."
that would be carrying the principle of audi alteram partem to absurd lengths.
application is misconceived. In any event his present application is premature, contingent and based on mere speculation.
allow this application nor is it one where we ought to grant relief. I agree to the order made by the Chief Justice.
was, therefore, entitled to seek relief and redress in terms of the provisions of Article 126 (2) of the Constitution.
inquiry before this Court, appeared for both the 2nd and 3rd respondents at the inquiry into the said Application No.20/83.
would amount to a violation of any of the fundamental rights pleaded by the petitioner-respondent.
petitioner was a tissue of falsehood, unworthy of any consideration whatever.

References: APPLICATION No. 20
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 Application No. 130
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 Application No.20