Source: http://homelawlawyers.com/chase-appeal-affirms-you-cant-sue-and-win-under-show-me-the-note-respa-and-securitization-theories-in-california/
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 12:25:07+00:00

Document:
Firm Commentary: This recent appellate court summarizes and rejects many of the legal theories tried and tested over the last few years against Chase and other Loan Servicer. This case is a must read for any Foreclosure Defense Attorney or borrower considering filing a lawsuit.
Defendants and Respondent JP Morgan Chase Bank N.A. and Bank of America N.A.
Defendant and Respondent Quality Loan Service Corporation.
brought suit to avoid nonjudicial foreclosure and collect monetary damages.
amend. None of Jenkins‘s contentions have merit and we affirm the judgment.
succeeded to .all rights, titles, powers, and privileges. of the bank. (12 U.S.C.
lending or loan purchasing activities prior to September 25, 2008.
Quality recorded a notice of trustee‘s sale, seeking the unpaid balance of $392,314.77.
The foreclosure sale was subsequently postponed and has not been rescheduled.
Settlement and Procedures Act, 12 U.S.C. section 2601 et seq. (RESPA).
sustained the demurrer to the TILA cause of action without leave to amend.
mortgage, the court concluded the statute was inapplicable.
liabilities were never assumed by Chase or Quality.
A. Defendants’ Demurrers were Properly Sustained Without Leave to Amend.
to determine whether, as a matter of law, the complaint alleges a valid cause of action.
distinctions between a mortgage that contains a power of sale and a deed of trust. (4 Cal.
limitations (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 580a-580d, 726).
notice of the impending sale and has time to pursue opportunities to cure the default.
public auction to the highest bidder. (§ 2924g, subd. (a); Homestead Savings v.
throughout the foreclosure process to cure the default and avoid the sale of the property.
may bring the loan payments up to date and have the terms of the loan reinstated.
right to postpone the foreclosure sale for one day to pay off the outstanding debt.
sale is final between the parties and conclusive as to a bona fide purchaser.‘ [Citation.].
required,. and the debtor has no postsale right of redemption.‘ [Citation.]. (Id. at p.
date of the investment trust.
1641(g), when the promissory note was allegedly transferred to Freddie Mac.
order declaring any assignment(s) of the promissory note subsequent to the .closing date.
the nonjudicial foreclosure on her home.
Defendants’ authority to initiate nonjudicial foreclosure.
court found that such a preemptive action seeks to create .the additional requirement.
factual basis for alleging that the foreclosure was not initiated by the correct party.
would unnecessarily .interject the courts into [the] comprehensive nonjudicial scheme.
foreclosure of providing a quick, inexpensive and efficient remedy. [Citation.].
court that the provisions do not contain express authority for such a preemptive action.
possibility of lawsuits filed solely for the purpose of delaying valid foreclosures..
to whether Defendants have an enforceable secured interest in her home. We disagree.
time without providing notice of the transfer to Jenkins.
sell the real property security, thus initiating the nonjudicial foreclosure process.
instrument, a borrower must anticipate it can and might be transferred to another creditor.
show the existence of an actual, present controversy between herself and Defendants.
trustee was recorded, which occurred on June 11, 2010.
basis for her declaratory relief claim.
alleged violation of 15 U.S.C. section 1641(g).
interest created by the deed of trust.
2009. The provisions of 15 U.S.C. section 1641(g) require .the new owner or assignee.
otherwise transferred or assigned to [the new owner or assignee].. (15 U.S.C.
1208-1209.) In the present case, Jenkins clearly alleges the violation of 15 U.S.C.
cannot claim Defendants violated any obligations under 15 U.S.C. section 1641(g).
e. Jenkins cannot cure the defects in her first cause of action.
Defendants‘ involvement in the improper securitization of this mortgage..
pleaded by Jenkins that cannot be repaired or reconstructed by an amendment.
amend to Jenkins‘s first cause of action.
fails because Section 2932.5 is inapplicable to deeds of trust.
may be exercised by the assignee if the assignment is duly acknowledged and recorded..
Written Request. (QWR) and by failing to provide an adequate response to her QWR.
alleged .Robo-[s]igner. to execute the purportedly fraudulent substitution of trustee.
2932.5 was an unlawful business practice.
preliminary injunction prohibiting Defendants from foreclosing on her home.
fact and has lost money or property as a result of unfair competition.. (Bus. & Prof.
transaction, costing money or property, that would otherwise have been unnecessary.
of Business and Professions Code section 17204.
third cause of action was proper.
b. Jenkins cannot cure the defect in her third cause of action.
possibility she could cure the standing defect by way of an amendment to her SAC.
as to the third cause of action.
to Chase numerous times.; (7) violating the Fair Debt Collection Practice Act, 15 U.S.C.
contract. (Carma Developers (Cal.), Inc. v. Marathon Development California, Inc.
the contract presupposes the party will do to accomplish the agreement‘s purposes.
gives rise to a contract claim. (See Storek & Storek, Inc. v. Citicorp Real Estate, Inc.
independent claim for breach of the implied covenant.. (Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v.
a. Jenkins fails to plead facts to assert a claim against Quality.
Jenkins‘s SAC in which both Quality and Jenkins may be held to enforceable duties.
(2) refused to perform a specific act presupposed by the terms of the deed of trust.
surrender the deed of trust.
postponed the sale of the property.
loan servicing activities prior to WaMu’s financial collapse.
than one year before Chase acquired the defunct bank‘s assets from the FDIC.
c. Jenkins cannot base her claim on alleged statutory violations.
time Chase breached the implied covenant by violating section 2923.5.
leave to amend as to the claims relating to these alleged statutory violations was proper.
d. Jenkins fails to plead facts to assert a claim against Chase.
implied covenants found in the deed of trust and promissory note she executed in 2007.
something to interfere with her right to receive the benefits of the agreement.
Jenkins‘s fourth cause of action was proper.
e. Jenkins cannot cure the defects in her fourth cause of action.
of action to cure these defects.
violated by the purported wrongful acts Jenkins‘s alleges Chase committed.
leave to amend to Jenkins‘s fourth cause of action.
brief to this court, Jenkins seems to suggest she is also raising this claim against Quality.
Quality as to this cause of action was in error.
seek a loan modification; and constant worrying about the loss of her [H]ome..
she .is entitled to statutory damages in the amount of $2,000 per violation..
RESPA regulates the settlement process for real estate disputes (Hardy v.
subordinate lien on residential real property are regulated by the federal government.
with a .written response acknowledging receipt of the correspondence within 20 days..
the event a loan servicer fails to comply with RESPA‘s provisions. (12 U.S.C.
including attorneys fees, incurred in connection with a successful action under the statute.
Fin. Mortg. Corp. (N.D.Cal. 2009) 660 F.Supp.2d 1089, 1097 (Allen); Hutchinson v.
of the failure [to comply with RESPA requirements].‘. (Lal v. Am. Home Servicing, Inc.
caused damage to plaintiffs‘ credit and precluded them from obtaining other loans.
(Ibid.; see also Yulaeva v. Greenpoint Mortg. Funding, Inc. (E.D.Cal. Sept. 3, 2009, No.
actual damages with respect to Chase‘s alleged RESPA violation.
Jenkins‘s fifth cause of action was proper.
has incurred because of Chase‘s failure to respond to the QWR.
proposed amendment would not cure this defect in her fifth cause of action.
Jenkins‘s fifth cause of action without leave to amend.
relief, and violations of 15 U.S.C. section 1641(g).
431, 436.) .The demurrer was therefore properly sustained without leave to amend..
C. We Need Not Decide the Tender Issue.
Notice of Default and Substitution of Trustee.
and validity of the two documents.
statement made by the court during the demurrer hearing on September 27, 2011.
not have a valid interest in [her] loan..
to an issue in the action without requiring formal proof of the matter.‘ [Citation.].
an express allegation of the pleading.‘ [Citation.]. (Fontenot v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
depends upon the nature of the facts of which the court takes notice from the document..
recorded documents is without merit.
beneficiary,. not as the trustee under the deed of trust.
the court did not abuse its discretion under Evidence Code section 452.

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