Source: https://shayessite.wordpress.com/page/2/
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 22:24:03+00:00

Document:
Notice: “Tyhan first contends that the trial court abused its discretion by denying Tyhan’s motion for a new trial because Tyhan did not receive notice of the hearing on Cintas’s motion for summary judgment.
We review a trial court’s denial of a motion for new trial for abuse of discretion. Waffle House, Inc. v. Williams, 313 S.W.3d 796, 813 (Tex. 2010). But we do so only if the movant has preserved its complaint for appellate review; if a movant seeks a new trial on a ground on which evidence must be heard by the trial court, the movant must obtain a hearing on its new-trial motion to preserve error. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(b); Felt v. Comerica Bank, 401 S.W.3d 802, 808 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.). A movant must present evidence to show lack of notice as to a trial setting or hearing. Hendricks v. Barker, 523 S.W.3d 152, 157 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.); Wilson v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 897 S.W.2d 818, 820 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, no writ).
As usual, a number of cases dealt with situations in which parties did not raise their complaints in the trial court.
Summary Judgment: “In its first responsive argument, Roberts contends that Sanchez waived any argument that Roberts’s motion failed to address Sanchez’s purported strict products liability claim. Roberts notes that Sanchez did not file special exceptions and did not complain in either her motion to reconsider or motion for new trial that the trial court granted summary judgment on a claim not addressed in Roberts’s motion. Roberts contends that, because Sanchez failed to raise this issue in the trial court, the issue cannot be considered on appeal as grounds for reversal.
That’s all for now, buckaroos. Y’all have a good weekend.
While it involved a complaint that was not preserved, and I have typically quit mentioning those in this blog, you need to read both the majority and dissenting opinions in a case which dealt with “agreed to” language in a judgment, and when such language waives a complaint in an agreed judgment (and the effect of that waiver). I promise the facts alone are worth reading. In the Estate of Nielsen, No. 02-17-00251-CV, __WL__, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 7915, at *19-20 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Sep. 27, 2018, no pet. hist.). These opinions teach us the fraught-filled nature of this area of the law.
Summary Judgment Evidentiary Objections: “On appeal, Houle complains that the records attached to Trittipoe’s affidavit were not properly authenticated, were incomplete, and were not true and complete copies of the originals because they bore redaction of Houle’s specific account number with Capital One.
These purported defects are purely formal. See Well Sols., Inc. v. Stafford, 32 S.W.3d 313, 317 (Tex.App.–San Antonio 2000, no pet.)(objection to deposition or affidavit, that is, statement in writing of a fact or facts signed by party making statement, sworn to before officer authorized to administer oaths, and officially certified to by officer under his seal of office, on basis that statement does not establish foundation for statement is purely formal defect), citing Leggat, 904 S.W.2d at 645-46. Because Houle failed to object to the purported formal defects and secure a ruling from the trial court in order to preserve error, he may not raise these complaints for the first time on appeal. Tex.R.Civ.P. 166a(f); see Seim, 551 S.W.3d at 166, citing Well Sols., Inc., 32 S.W.3d at 317.
Although the Texas Supreme Court has recognized that an implicit ruling may be sufficient to preserve an issue for appellate review, it has clarified that the trial court’s ruling must be clearly implied by the record. See Seim, 551 S.W.3d at 166, citing In the Interest of Z.L.T., J.K.H.T., and Z.N.T., 124 S.W.3d 163, 165 (Tex. 2003). In Seim, the Court acknowledged the correct reasoning of the San Antonio Court [*13] of Appeals in Well Sols., Inc. v. Stafford, 32 S.W.3d 313, 317 (Tex.App.–San Antonio 2000, no pet.) when that court declared: “[R]ulings on a motion for summary judgment and objections to summary judgment evidence are not alternatives; nor are they concomitants. Neither implies a ruling–or any particular ruling–on the other. In short, a trial court’s ruling on an objection to summary judgment evidence is not implicit in its ruling on the motion for summary judgment; a ruling on the objection is simply not ‘capable of being understood’ from the ruling on the motion for summary judgment.” See Seim, 551 S.W.3d at 165.
All for now. Hope this helps. Y’all take care.
And now, here are those decisions.
Counsel: “In this case, J.B.J., Jr. was incarcerated throughout the case and was never informed of his right to be represented by an attorney or his right to a court-appointed attorney if he was found to be indigent. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 107.013(a)(1), 262.201(c), 263.0061(a). Further, the final trial of this case began without J.B.J., Jr. present and a witness testified without being cross-examined by J.B.J., Jr. However, the Department argues that J.B.J., Jr. failed to preserve his complaints for appellate review. The Department contends that J.B.J., Jr. did not object before or during trial to the timing of the appointment of his trial counsel. We disagree.
Limitations: “On appeal, Cavazos argues in part that the trial court erred if it granted summary judgment on these grounds because Stryker “fail[ed] to affirmatively plead a statute of limitations defense within all applicable deadlines.” We agree. Limitations is an affirmative defense which must be pleaded, or is waived. Tex. R. Civ. P. 94; Zorrilla v. Aypco Constr. II, LLC, 469 S.W.3d 143, 155 (Tex. 2015). Stryker concedes that it did not plead a limitations defense in its original answer, but it argues that the trial court granted it leave to file an amended answer to include that defense. The record contains a “Motion for Leave to Amend Answer” filed by Stryker but it does not contain an explicit ruling on that motion, and it does not reflect that [*27] an amended answer was ever actually filed. Accordingly, Stryker waived the defense.
Then, there were the usual spate of cases in which the party failed to raise the complaint in the trial court at all.
I hope this helps. Y’all take care.
A case in which the court held that the complaint about ambiguity was not sufficiently specific to bring it to the trial court’s attention, and another where the complaining party did not tell the trial court why she was entitled to the discovery she sought.
A case holding that you have several opportunities to preserve a complaint that the pleadings do not support a damage award.
Pleadings: “Slaughter also complains in his third issue of the damages and injunctive relief awarded to Johnson. Slaughter asserts Johnson did not file any pleadings to support his requests for affirmative relief. Slaughter emphasizes that Johnson never filed a counterclaim against Johnson.
Johnson asserts Slaughter waived this issue by failing to raise it before the trial court. To preserve an issue for appellate review, a party must make its complaint known to the trial court by a timely request or objection that is specific enough for the trial court to be aware of the complaint and then receive a ruling from the trial court. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1. Having reviewed the record, we disagree and find Slaughter adequately preserved this issue for appeal.
Dissent: “Finally, the majority observes, “The order denying Relators’ motion indicates that the trial court only considered the [*35] ‘Motion to Compel’ and heard counsels’ arguments,” and “Relators’ counsel has certified in the mandamus proceeding that ‘[n]o exhibits were offered in evidence at the hearing, and no testimony was adduced in connection with the matter complained of.'” Id. at 7.
The majority seizes upon these facts as if they were proof that the motion to compel was properly denied because insufficient evidence was presented to the trial court to satisfy the defendant Relators’ burden of proving that they had good cause to seek the plaintiff Abushaaban’s physical examination under Rule 204.1. But, in fact, the opposite is the case.
The majority’s description of the record in the trial court is misleading and incorrect on the law. The hearing below was a non-evidentiary hearing on a discovery motion. Contrary to the majority’s apparent understanding, parties are not required to obtain transcripts of non-evidentiary hearings on discovery matters to preserve error in the denial of the order; nor is oral testimony required at such a hearing. In re Ooida Risk Retention, 475 S.W.3d at 911; In re Pinnacle Eng’g, Inc., 405 S.W. 3d 835, 840 n.4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, orig. proceeding).
Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 52.7 governs the record on mandamus from a ruling on a discovery order, including an order under Rule 204.1. It provides for mandamus from both evidentiary and non-evidentiary hearings on a motion [*36] to compel and recites the requirements for the mandamus record. It states that the “[r]elator must file with the petition. . . (1) a certified or sworn copy of every document that is material to the relator’s claim for relief and that was filed in any underlying proceeding” and “(2) a properly authenticated transcript of any relevant testimony from any underlying proceeding, including any exhibits offered in evidence, or a statement that no testimony was adduced in connection with the matter complained of.” Tex. R. App. P. 52.7(a) (emphasis added). After the record is filed, any party may supplement the record from the trial court with “additional materials for inclusion in the record.” Tex. R.App. P. 52.7(b). All materials filed for inclusion in the record must be served on all parties. Tex. R. App. P. 52.7(c). Rule 52.8 then states that the appellate court will determine its ruling on the petition “from the petition and any response and reply.” Tex. R. App. P. 52.8(a).
Here, the trial court held a non-evidentiary hearing. Therefore, in their mandamus petition, Relators followed Rule 52.7(a)(2) and, “[i]n place of a transcript of relevant testimony and exhibits introduced in an underlying proceeding . . . provide[d] a ‘statement that no testimony was adduced in connection with the matter complained [*37] of'”— as the majority acknowledges. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 52.7(a)(2); Slip Op. at 7 (stating, “Relators’ counsel has certified in the mandamus proceeding that ‘[n]o exhibits were offered in evidence at the hearing, and no testimony was adduced in connection with the matter complained of.'”).
Rules 52.7, 52.8, and the applicable case law all direct the court of appeals to look to the mandamus record—i.e., “the petition and any response and reply”—to determine the proper outcome of a discovery motion. When there is no statement of facts from the hearing in the trial court or findings of fact or conclusions of law by that court and when the trial court heard no evidence and, instead, based its decision on the papers filed and the argument of counsel, that is the record to which the Court of Appeals must look. See Tex. R.App. P. 52.7, 52.8; Otis Elevator Co. v. Parmelee, 850 S.W.2d 179, 181 (Tex. 1993) (applying rule in discovery sanctions case); In re Pinnacle Eng’g, Inc., 405 S.W.3d at 840 n.4 (granting petition for mandamus filed on denial of motion to compel physical examination under Rule 204.1, holding that transcript of hearing was not necessary on non-evidentiary motion and citing Otis Elevator Co.); In re Ooida Risk Retention, 475 S.W.3d at 911 (upholding trial court’s order on mandamus, where trial court heard no evidence and there was no reporter’s record, in combined hearing on summary judgment and motion [*38] to appoint umpire and stating, “Parties are not required to obtain transcriptions of non-evidentiary hearings to preserve error”).
Both the trial court and the majority have failed to follow the law governing the proof of a Rule 204.1 motion to compel, have failed to credit evidence in support of the motion properly before the court, and have improperly denied the defendant Relators an order compelling the physical examination of a plaintiff seeking damages for his personal injuries alleged to have been caused by defendants so that Relators may combat assertions made in support of the plaintiff Abushaaban’s claims by his for medical experts.
And then there were more than a dozen cases holding that parties had not preserved error because they failed to raise their complaint in the trial court.
Ambiguity: “ We discern no contract formation challenge on this record, and we do not believe that we are within our power to address the effect of the ambiguities for two reasons. First, counsel never actually challenged the arbitration agreement on formation grounds in the trial court, and even under a liberal view of the record, counsel’s stray references to ambiguity in pleadings and oral argument at the hearing cannot be expanded to embrace a formation challenge that is cognizable on appeal.
. . . . we [*27] can only affirm the trial court’s judgment on a contract malformation ground if Double Eagle actually advanced a contract malformation ground in resisting arbitration in the trial court. Bray, 499 S.W.3d at 102 (affirmation of denial appropriate only on those grounds advanced in the trial court).
This dissent next maintains that even if the burden was on Double Eagle, this Court can entertain appellate argument related to contract malformation because Double Eagle “indirectly” alerted the trial court to the contract malformation issue by referring to the arbitration clause’s ambiguous and conflicting terms in its pleadings and at the motion to compel hearing. We do not find Double Eagle’s fleeting references to the ambiguity to be enough to place the issue of contract malformation before the trial court. . . . . None of these three defensive grounds asserted by Double Eagle in the trial court ever raised any formation issues; rather, they raised only affirmative defenses to enforcement (ground one and two) and interpretational issues (ground three). And while we look to the content of the argument in a pleading and not just the subject headings in deciding what issues were before the trial court, Double Eagle only mentioned the ambiguity in passing twice.
First, Double Eagle mentioned the ambiguity in the Background portion of factual recitals when it characterized the arbitration clause as being “ambiguous, onerous, and internally inconsistent[.]” The ambiguity is also mentioned in passing in Double Eagle’s response as part of an argument Double Eagle makes about Ridge having waived the right to arbitrate by substantially invoking the judicial process. . . .
Although Double Eagle mentioned the ambiguity, Double Eagle never once argued in its pleading that the ambiguity dealt with material terms or that the conflicting provisions otherwise invalidated the arbitration agreement. The reference to ambiguity occurred in a discussion of prejudice resulting from a purported waiver of the right to arbitrate, and even then, it appeared only in the context of a general complaint about how the arbitration rules would not provide Double Eagle with as much discovery as the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. The gulf between this argument and the argument advanced on appeal regarding contract malformation based on a lack of a meeting of the minds is too wide to be bridged. The conceptual connection between the trial argument and the appellate argument is simply not there.
Counsel’s arguments during the Tipps hearing were also not enough to alert the trial court about any potential contract malformation issues. At the hearing, counsel for Double Eagle focused his argument heavily on the subjects of fraudulent inducement and [*31] unconscionability . . . .[But b]eyond this comment that the ambiguity was “interesting,” counsel never again returned to the issue of the arbitrator’s identity. Apart from using the poor draftsmanship of the arbitration agreement to make a brief rhetorical point to the trial court, the legal effect of these conflicting provisions was never discussed at all. Instead, Double Eagle focused its argument on the inherent unfairness of the transaction as a whole from a substantive and procedural standpoint, repeatedly arguing that the McDaniels transaction was a “scam” and a “bait and switch” that resulted in the transfer of an oil-and-gas interest for below-market value. While that argument does embrace fraud-based or unconscionability-type challenges to the arbitration agreement, it does not subsume a meeting-of-the-minds or formation argument.
That’s all for now. I hope this helps.
Then, there were fourteen cases in which courts held that the complaint was not raised at all in the trial court.
All for now. Hope this helps. Y’all take good care.

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