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Timestamp: 2019-04-24 22:08:26+00:00

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G.R. NOS. 175930-31 and G.R. NOS. 176010-11 - WILFRED A. NICOLAS v. HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, ET AL.
JOSE FRANCISCO ARRIOLA, Petitioner, v. THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
In the present consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, petitioners, Wilfred A. Nicolas (Nicolas) and Jose Francisco Arriola (Arriola), attribute to public respondent, Sandiganbayan, grave abuse of discretion in issuing its Resolutions of August 31, 20061 and December 7, 20062 denying their Demurrer to Evidence and their motions for reconsideration, respectively.
Nicolas and Arriola, former Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner, respectively, of the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB), stand charged before public respondent in Criminal Case Nos. 26267 and 26268,3 for violation of Section 36044 of the Tariff and Customs Code in the first case, and Section 3(e)5 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act or Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019 in the second.
On April 16, 1999, a 40-footer container van bearing Serial Number TRIU-576078-1 and Plate Number PKN 290, which was suspected to be carrying undeclared goods, was seized by EIIB operatives under the command of Arriola, then chief of the Special Operations Group. The van was turned over for safekeeping to the Armed Forces of the Philippines Logistics Command (LOGCOM) compound in Quezon City on April 19, 1999.
On May 6, 1999, however, the van was released by military police from the LOGCOM compound to representatives of the EIIB and Trinity Brokerage. While the van was heading to the docks for shipment to the alleged consignee, it surreptitiously exited at the North harbor with its cargo. It has since been missing.
For purportedly allowing the release of the goods, Nicolas and Arriola were indicted for conspiring with one John Doe who took possession of the goods without proper documentation and payment of customs duties and taxes in the alleged amount of P656,950, thereby depriving the government of revenue.
Both Nicolas and Arriola pleaded not guilty to the charges.
The prosecution presented four witnesses: (1) Commodore George T. Uy (Uy), former commander of the LOGCOM whose signature appeared in the Authority for the withdrawal of the van; (2) Romeo Allan Rosales, chief of the Informal Entry Division-Manila International Container Port (IED-MICP); (3) Ruel Pantaleon (Pantaleon), chief of the Supply Section of the General Services Division (GSD) of the Bureau of Customs; and (4) Alejo Acorda (Acorda) of the LOGCOM who signed as a witness in the Certification of Withdrawal of the van.
Through its testimonial and documentary evidence, the prosecution attempted to show that the withdrawal of the van from the LOGCOM compound was based on a Notice of Withdrawal signed by Nicolas, and on the Authority for the withdrawal of the van which, though it appeared to have been issued by Uy, was not actually signed by him.
The prosecution likewise attempted to establish that the documents, including Official Receipts allegedly presented to show payment of customs duties and taxes, were all spurious.
The rest of the Exhibits for the prosecution, being mere photocopies, were not admitted by public respondent. The excluded evidence consisted of Mission Order No. 04-105-99 dated April 19,1999 for the inventory of the contents of the van (Exhibit "B"); the Inventory List of the van (Exhibits "C" to "C-3"); the Notice of Withdrawal dated May 6, 1999 (Exhibit "D"); and portions of No. 4 Ledger Series-99, the official logbook of the IED-MICP (Exhibits "J-3" and "J-4").
Respecting the first Information, petitioners' respective Demurrer maintained that the evidence admitted by public respondent failed to identify and prove that they were the perpetrators of the crimes charged, for there was no showing that they caused, approved or acted in any manner relative to the release of the goods.
Petitioners went on to contend that none of the documentary evidence bore their names or signatures. And neither was there any testimonial evidence that they acted towards the release of the shipment.
Additionally, petitioners contended that the shipment was not shown to be imported, or for export, or otherwise subject of coastwise trade as to be subject to customs duties; and that even assuming that customs duties were due, there was no evidence that the same were not paid.
Regarding Import Entry Declaration Nos. 5000-99, 5001-99 and 5002-99 which, the prosecution maintained, were used for the release of the goods but were not processed through the IED-MICP, petitioners contended that the same were not shown to have a bearing on the shipment or to their indictment. These import entry declarations were not even presented as documentary evidence, they added.
On the prosecution's submission that customs duties were not paid, petitioners' contended that the same is visited by a similar failure to link the allegedly fraudulent Official Receipt18 Nos. 75071606, 7501609, and 75071603 to the cargo.
Respecting the second Information, petitioners' Demurrer maintained that the prosecution failed to establish each and every material element thereof.
In the main, petitioners thus argued that the prosecution was not only unable to show that they were the perpetrators of the crimes charged or that they committed any prohibited act; it was also not able to prove that undue injury was caused the government.
Finally, as to both Informations, petitioners submitted that the existence of conspiracy between them and/or John Doe was not established.
To petitioners' motions to File Demurrer to Evidence19 and their Demurrer to Evidence,20 the prosecution filed a Comment/Opposition.
By the first questioned Resolution of August 31, 2006, public respondent denied petitioners' respective Demurrer to Evidence. In denying the Demurrer, public respondent held that, inter alia, the prosecution was able to establish that the goods apprehended by the EIIB for non-payment of customs duties were deposited at the LOGCOM in Quezon City and while there they were inventoried and found to be computer spare parts and not "parts of a rock crusher" as they were allegedly originally declared; and that on May 6, 1999, the goods were withdrawn from the LOGCOM compound on the strength of a Notice of Withdrawal purportedly signed by then LOGCOM Commander Uy who did not actually issue it as he was then in the United States on official travel nor by the then deputy LOGCOM commander, one Colonel Romero.
By the second questioned Resolution of December 7, 2006,25 public respondent denied petitioners' motions for reconsideration.
As stated early on, petitioners jointly ascribe grave abuse of discretion to public respondent for denying their Demurrer given what they submit is the absence or lack of evidence to sustain the cases against them.
Nicolas additionally submits that public respondent grievously abused its discretion when it disregarded this Court's December 16, 2004 Decision in G.R. No. 15466826 "Wilfred A. Nicolas v. Aniano A. Desierto," in which he was absolved of administrative liability for gross neglect of duty and dishonesty arising from the same incident subject of the criminal charges against him.
Invoking the doctrines of res judicata and stare decisis, Nicolas contends that public respondent particularly failed to abide by this Court's ruling in the said administrative case that he had acted in good faith in relying upon the apparently valid and genuine documents submitted to him when he requested for the release of the van from the LOGCOM compound.
Before delving on the substantive issues, this Court must first address the propriety of the availment of a petition for certiorari and prohibition in assailing a denial of a demurrer to evidence. Then, too, it must determine if the present petitions have been rendered moot and academic by the continuation of the trial - for reception of evidence for the defense. As to the latter issue, the Court notes that public respondent had cancelled the initial presentation of defense evidence upon the filing of the present petitions to afford the Court time to act on petitioners' applications for TRO or Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
By Order given in open court on March 27, 2007, public respondent subsequently cancelled and reset the hearing scheduled on even date and on March 28, 2007.31 It directed the initial presentation of evidence for Arriola on June 27, 2007 if no TRO was issued by this Court.
The Court did not issue a TRO or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction to stop public respondent from continuing the proceedings in the cases. There is no information if the defense has started or concluded the presentation of its evidence.
Be that as it may, the continuation of the trial should not stand in the way of this Court's ruling on the present petitions. Suffice it to stress that should the denial of petitioners' Demurrer be found to be tainted with grave abuse of discretion, whatever proceedings were conducted before public respondent during the pendency of the present petitions are void.
Such order, being merely interlocutory, is not appealable; neither can it be the subject of a petition for certiorari .34 The rule admits of exceptions, however. Action on a demurrer or on a motion to dismiss rests on the sound exercise of judicial discretion.35 In Tadeo v. People,36 this Court declared that certiorari may be availed of when the denial of a demurrer to evidence is tainted with "grave abuse of discretion or excess of jurisdiction, or oppressive exercise of judicial authority." And so it did declare in Choa v. Choa37 where the denial is patently erroneous.
Did public respondent commit grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners' Demurrer? The Court finds that it did.
Sec. 15. Demurrer to evidence. - After the prosecution has rested its case, the court may dismiss the case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence: (1) on its own initiative after giving the prosecution an opportunity to be heard; or (2) on motion of the accused with prior leave of court.
If the court denies the motion for dismissal, the accused may adduce evidence in his defense. When the accused files such motion without the express leave of court, he waives the right to present evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution.
With respect to petitioners' indictment for violation of Section 3604 of the Tariff and Customs Code, the prosecution needed to prove that: (1) at the time material to the case, petitioners were officials or employees of the Bureau of Customs or of any other agency of the government charged with the provisions of the Code; and (2) they either conspired or colluded with another or others to defraud the customs revenue or otherwise violate the law (paragraph d), or willfully made an opportunity for any person to defraud the customs revenue or failed to do any act with intent to enable any person to defraud the customs revenue (paragraph e).
From the testimonial and documentary evidence of the prosecution admitted by public respondent, the Court gathers that apart from establishing that petitioners were government officials, the prosecution was only able to establish that: (1) the van was turned over to the LOGCOM on April 19, 1999; (2) the same van was withdrawn from the LOGCOM compound on May 6, 1999; (3) the signature appearing above the name of prosecution witness, then LOGCOM commander Uy, in the Authority for the withdrawal of the van was not his; (4) Import Entry Nos. 5000-99 to 5002-99 were not filed with the IED-MICP; and (5) Bureau of Customs O.R. Nos. 75071606, 7501609, and 75071603 are spurious.
There is no competent or sufficient evidence of particular overt acts that would tend to show that petitioners colluded with each other or with another person or others to defraud the customs revenue or to otherwise violate the law, or that they willfully made it possible for John Doe to defraud the customs revenue.
Not one of the prosecution witnesses identified, mentioned or even alluded to either of petitioners as having personally interceded or been present during the release of the cargo from the LOGCOM compound, or testified as to any act or omission that may be construed to be in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy to defraud the customs revenue.
The Notice of Withdrawal (Exhibit "D"), the only document bearing the name and signature of petitioner Nicolas, was not even admitted by respondent court.
Respecting the purported failure of petitioners to note the fraudulent nature of O.R. Nos. 75071606, 7501609 and 75071603, the Court notes the testimony of Pantaleon, then chief of the Supply Section of the GSD of the Bureau of Customs, which is quoted in the Petition44 of Nicolas, and which merited no refutation from the prosecution in its Consolidated Comment.
Thus, during cross-examination, Pantaleon stated that only the Printing Office, his Division chief and he were privy to the formula used in the printing of BC Forms No. 38, and that other government offices including the EIIB have not been informed of this formula.
Q: Okay. Now, Mr. Witness, who were the persons to whom you divulged this formula?
A: Sa akin po at saka sa Hepe ng Division na nagretiro. To me and to the Chief Division that [sic] ha[s] retired.
Q: Aside from the two (2) of you, nobody knows the formula?
A: The printing office, Sir.
Q: So, you did not inform the EIIB in 1999 about this formula?
A: Hindi po. No, Sir.
Q: So they wouldn't know by just looking at the official receipt whether the official receipt is fake or not because they do not know the formula, would that be a fair statement?
A: They don't know the series, Sir.
Q: Now my question is, you wouldn't know whether the official receipts would be fake?
Clearly then, petitioners were not in a position to detect any fraud.
x x x. Under its standard operating procedure, [the EIIB] normally did the inventory in the presence of representatives of the AFP Logistics Command (which was the depository of apprehended container vans), the Bureau of Customs, the broker or importer, and the Commission on Audit. If there was any irregularity, only then would the EIIB turn over the cargo to the Bureau of Customs.
The prosecution attempted to build its case for violation of R.A. No. 3019 upon the theory that Nicolas and Arriola, as EIIB commissioner and deputy commissioner, respectively, and in connection with their official duties as such, were responsible for the release of the goods from the LOGCOM compound without the actual payment of customs duties and taxes, thereby causing injury to the government.
The prosecution proffered that the withdrawal of the van from the LOGCOM based on what turned out to be fictitious documents and the subsequent loss of its cargo, which they attributed to petitioners, were motivated by manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable neglect.
The evidence for the prosecution failed to sustain its case, however. In addition to this Court's earlier observations about the missing links in the prosecution's evidence, it failed to show by what particular acts petitioners had discharged their functions with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable neglect.
Simply alleging each or all of these methods is not enough to establish probable cause, for it is well settled that allegation does not amount to proof. Nor can we deduce any or all of the modes from mere speculation or hypothesis since good faith on the part of the petitioner as with any other person is presumed. The facts themselves must demonstrate evident bad faith which connotes not only bad judgment but also palpably and patently fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing for some perverse motive or ill will.
This Court is not unmindful of its rulings that the dismissal of an administrative case does not bar the filing of a criminal prosecution for the same or similar acts subject of the administrative complaint and that the disposition in one case does not inevitably govern the resolution of the other case/s and vice versa.55 The applicability of these rulings, however, must be distinguished in the present cases.
In Ocampo v. Office of the Ombudsman56 and the other cases57 cited by the prosecution in its Consolidated Comment,58 it was the dismissal of the criminal cases that was pleaded to abate the administrative cases filed against the therein petitioners.
Where, as in this case, the administrative complaint was dismissed for failing to satisfy the degree of proof which is merely substantial evidence, a fortiori the criminal case based on the same facts and evidence cannot but falter and fall against the highest quantum of proof - proof beyond reasonable doubt.
In fine, absent the element of evident bad faith and gross neglect of duty, not to mention want of proof of manifest partiality on the part of Nicolas, the graft case against him cannot prosper.
Like in the case of Nicolas, no act or conduct on the part of Arriola was established that would tend to show that he had acted in evident bad faith, manifest partiality or gross inexcusable negligence in the performance of his functions, as then deputy commissioner of the EIIB and head of the Special Operations Group, relative to the release of the van.
Turning once more to the evidence in the present criminal cases, no documentary or testimonial evidence linking Arriola to the withdrawal of the van, much more, the loss of the goods it contained, is appreciated.
To stress, not one of the documents admitted for the prosecution contained Arriola's name, initials or signature. Neither did any of the prosecution witnesses, not even Acorda who was present during the deposit and withdrawal of the van from the LOGCOM compound, mention or refer to Arriola in any manner or testify on his probable complicity or involvement in the crimes charged. For that matter, nothing in the entire testimony of Acorda62 supports the submission that it was upon Arriola's request that the van was withdrawn from the LOGCOM.
A : For us, sir, when there is a request from the EIIB that the property be released, and if it is approved by our boss, it will be released, sir.
Even granting arguendo Arriola made a recommendation for the withdrawal of the van as the prosecution suggested, this alone does not prove that he acted in bad faith. The presumption of law being in favor of good faith, it was incumbent upon the prosecution to prove bad faith.
Even on the purported spurious receipts that prosecution witness Pantaleon testified on, there is no showing that Arriola was instrumental or participated in their preparation or that he knew of their fraudulent nature.
It bears emphasis that references to petitioner Arriola in the Decision on the administrative case against Nicolas were made only for the purpose of determining the culpability of the latter. These statements, therefore, are in no way binding on Arriola.
Given that the evidence presented by the prosecution against petitioners does not prima facie prove petitioners' culpability beyond reasonable doubt, the burden of evidence did not shift to the defense. The Court thus finds that public respondent gravely abused its discretion in denying their Demurrer to Evidence.
WHEREFORE, the consolidated Petitions for certiorari and prohibition are GRANTED. The Sandiganbayan's assailed Resolutions dated August 31, 2006 and December 7, 2006 are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion. The separate Demurrer to Evidence of petitioners are accordingly GRANTED and the cases against them DISMISSED.
* "Wilfredo" in some pleadings.
1 Penned by Justice Godofredo L. Legaspi, chairperson of the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan and concurred in by Justices Efren N. De La Cruz and Norberto Y. Geraldez. Rollo, G.R. NOS. 175930-31, pp. 125 - 132; rollo, G.R. NOS. 176010-11, pp. 39-46.
2 Id. at 133-134; id. at 66-67.
3 Similarly entitled "People of the Philippines v. Wilfred A. Nicolas, J. Francisco Arriola and John Doe."
5 Sec. 3. (e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefit, advantage, preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
6 Rollo, G.R. NOS. 176010-11, pp. 101-112.
8 Rollo, G.R. NOS. 175930-31, p. 291; rollo, G.R. NOS. 176010-11, p. 133.
9 Rollo, G.R. NOS. 176010-11, p. 113.
17 Rollo, G.R. NOS. 175930-31, pp. 292-348; rollo, G.R. NOS. 176010-11, pp. 47-51. Dated May 12, 2006 and May 3, 2006 for petitioners Nicolas and Arriola, respectively.
18 BC Form No. 38.
19 Rollo, G.R. NOS. 176010-11, pp. 134-142. Dated May 17, 2006.
20 Rollo, G.R. NOS. 175930-31, pp. 349-396. Dated September 19, 2006.
21 Rollo, G.R. NOS. 175930-31, p. 131; rollo, G.R. NOS. 176010-11, p. 45. Resolution of August 31, 2006.
22 Id. at 360-396; id. at 68-81.
23 Rollo, G.R. NOS. 175930-31, pp. 397-408.
24 Id. at 409-427; rollo, G.R. NOS. 176010-11, pp. 171-181. Dated November 24, 2006 and November 9, 2006 for petitioners Nicolas and Arriola, respectively.
25 Rollo, G.R. NOS. 175930-31, pp. 133-134; rollo, G.R. NOS. 176010-11, pp. 66-67.
27 Rollo, G.R. NOS. 175930-31, pp. 168-173.
31 Rollo, G.R. NOS. 176010-11, p. 428.
32 Madrid v. Court of Appeals, 388 Phil. 366, 400 (2000), citing People v. Comesario, 366 Phil. 62, 68 (1999).
33 David v. Rivera, 464 Phil. 1006, 1013-1014 (2004); Ong v. People, 396 Phil. 546, 554(2000); Cruz v. People, 363 Phil. 156, 161 (1999).
34 David v. Rivera, supra; Tadeo v. People, 360 Phil. 914, 919 (1998). Vide Cruz v. People, supra; Katigbak v. Sandiganbayan, 453 Phil. 515, 535-536 (2003).
35 Tan v. Court of Appeals, 347 Phil. 320, 329 (1997); Bernardo v. Court of Appeals, 344 Phil. 335, 346 (1997).
36 Tadeo v. People, supra note 34.
37 441 Phil. 175, 182-183 (2002), citing Cruz v. People, supra note 33.
38 Soriquez v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 153526, October 25, 2005, 474 SCRA 222, 228; Rivera v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 163996, June 9, 2005, 460 SCRA 85, 91; Gutib v. Court of Appeals, 371 Phil. 293, 300 (1999).
39 Gutib v. Court of Appeals, supra.
40 Supra; Katigbak v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 34.
41 Farolan, Jr. v. Court of Tax Appeals, G.R. No. 42204, January 21, 1993, 217 SCRA 298, 304, cited in Remigio v. Sandiganbayan, 424 Phil. 859, 869 (2002).
42 People v. LarraÃ±aga, 66 Phil. 324, 388-389(2004); People v. Manuel, G.R. NOS. 93926-28, July 28, 1994, 234 SCRA 532, 542; Orodio v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-57579, September 13, 1988, 165 SCRA 316, 323; Magsuci v. Sandiganbayan, 310 Phil. 14, 19 (1995).
43 Transcript of Stenographic Notes (TSN), March 8, 2005, pp. 19-20; rollo, G.R. NOS. 176010-11, pp. 535-536.
44 Rollo, G.R. NOS. 175930-31, pp. 66-67.
45 Id., referring to the TSN of April 7, 2005, pp. 25-26.
48 Peralta v. Desierto, G.R. No. 153152, October 19, 2005, 473 SCRA 322, 332; Sistoza v. Desierto, 437 Phil. 117, 130 (2002).
53 Supra note 26 at 166.
55 Saludo, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121404, May 3, 2006; De La Cruz v. Department of Education, Culture and Sports, 464 Phil. 1033, 1049 (2004); AÃ±onuevo, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 458 Phil. 532, 541(2003); Ocampo v. Office of the Ombudsman, 379 Phil. 21, 27 (2000).
57 Office of the Court Administrator v. Matas, 317 Phil. 9 (1995); Tan v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 112093, October 4, 1994, 237 SCRA 353.
58 Rollo, G.R. NOS. 175930-31, pp. 452-477; rollo, G.R. NOS. 176010-11, pp. 397-427.
60 Paredes, Jr. v. Hon. Sandiganbayan, 322 Phil. 709, 730 (1996); Tecson v. Sandiganbayan, 376 Phil. 191 (1999). No administrative case was involved in Ong v. People (supra note 33); hence, the citation of the case was inappropriate.
61 Tala Realty Services Corp. v. Banco Filipino, 389 Phil. 455, 461-462 (2000); Negros Navigation Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 346 Phil. 551, 563 (1997); Paredes, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 55 at 730-731.
62 TSN, September 12, 2005, pp. 4-64; rollo, G.R. NOS. 176010-11, pp. 455-513.
63 Id. at 60; id. at 511.

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