Source: http://www.juricaf.org/arret/CONSEILDELEUROPE-COUREUROPEENNEDESDROITSDELHOMME-19810717-868279
Timestamp: 2017-07-25 06:56:54+00:00

Document:
Type d'affaire : DecisionType de recours : Partiellement recevable ; partiellement irrecevableNumérotation : Numéro d'arrêt : 8682/79Identifiant URN:LEX : urn:lex;coe;cour.europeenne.droits.homme;arret;1981-07-17;8682.79 Analyses : (Art. 11) LIBERTE DE REUNION ET D'ASSOCIATION, (Art. 6-1) ACCES A UN TRIBUNAL, (Art. 6-1) DROITS ET OBLIGATIONS DE CARACTERE CIVIL, (Art. 6-1) JUGEMENT PUBLIC, (Art. 6-1) PROCES EQUITABLE, (Art. 6-1) PROCES PUBLIC, (Art. 6-1) TRIBUNAL IMPARTIALParties : Demandeurs : X.Défendeurs : REPUBLIQUE FEDERALE D'ALLEMAGNETexte : APPLICAIION/REQUETE NÂ° 8682/7 9 X . v/the FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMAN Y X . c/RÃPUBLIQUE FÃDÃRALE D'ALLEMAGN E DECISION of 17 July 1981 on the admissibility of the application DECISION du 17 juillet 1981 sur la recevabilitÃ© de la re quÃªt e
Artlcle 4, paragraph 2 of the Convention : A lawyer appointed as officia/ counsel, albeit with his agreement, to defend an accused person, cannot complain of being obliged to perform forced or compulsory labour because he receives litde remuneration . Article 1, pan aph I of P ro tocol NÂ° 1 : This provision is not violated when agi an offtcia/!y appointed defence counsel is obliged to repay an advance on his fees for not having assured the accused} defence up to the end of the proceedings .
Artlcle 4, paragraphe 2, de la Conventlon : Un avocat commis d'office, mais avec son accord, Ã la dÃ©fense d'un accusÃ© ne peut se plaindre d'avoir Ã©tÃ© astreint Ã un travai! forcÃ© ou obligatoire du fait qu'il ne recoit en dÃ©ftnitive qu'une faible rÃ©tribution . Article 1, paragraphe l, du Protocole additionnel : Cette disposition n'est pas violÃ©e lorsqu'un avocat commis d'office est contraint de restituer une avance sur honoraires pour n'avoir pas assurÃ© la dÃ©fense de l'accusÃ© jusqu'Ã /a ftn du procÃ¨s .
Summary of the facts (fran(-ais : voir p. 101) The applicant*, who is a barrister. was appointed by the investigating judge of the Federal Coun (Bundesgerichtshoj) as legal aid counsel for a â¢ The applicant was represented before the Commission by MM . Jungfer and Meier, lawyers in Berlin .
person accused of a serious criminal offence . At his request, the competent Berlin Court of Appeal granted him an advance of 6,000DM on the fee eventually due as officially appointed counsel. The applicant studied the voluminous case files and held discussions with the accused several times during-a period of over 15 months . During the trlal, which was to last 190 days, the applicant acted as defence counsel for 14 days. At that point he was anested, suspected of being involved in the escape of his client's co-defendant . He was detained for 12 hours and a search warrant for his office was issued, but these proceedings were discontinued. In such circumstances, the applicant considered that he could not continue and requested release from his functions as official defence counsel, being support ed in his opinion by the President of the Bar. The Court of Appeal refused to discharge the applicant of his duties . but nevertheless the applicant decided not to assure the accused's defence. _ The Court of Appeal ftnally ordered the withdrawal of the applicant's instructions and fued the sum of 5 623.30 DM as a fee for the defence work during 14 days. in accordance with Sections 83 and 97 of the Regulation on Lawyers* Fees (BRACO) . The applicant requested fees for the pre-trial defence work . The Court oJ Appeal awarded 200DM, obliging him to repay the excess sum he had received with the advance of 6 000 DM because another lawyer had had to be appoihted for the rest of the trial and had had to familiarise himself with the case, the applicants' pre-trial preparation thus being of no use.
THE LA W The applicant complains that instead of an adequate lump sum fee for his defence activity as legal aid counsel in pre-trial criminal proceedings, he was granted an insignificant remuneration of 220 DM and therefore had to return an advance on fees in the amount of 6 000 DM paid to him at an earlier stage of these proceedings . He alleges violations of Article 4 (2) of the Convention and Article I of the First Protocol . Undisputedly, he has exhausted domestic remedies with regard to his complaint and he has respected the six months time limit (Art . 26 of the Convention) . As regards the concept of forced or compulsory labour within the meaning of Article 4(2) of the Convention, its elements are according to the Commission's jurisprudence that the work or service is performed by the worker against hi s
_9g -
will and that the requirement that the work or se rv ice performed is unjust or oppressive or the work or service itself involves unavoidable hardship (Collection of Decisions 46, 22, (321) . In the present case the applicant was not appointed as o ffi cial defence counsel against his will . He has not alleged that the service rendered by him did involve any hardship . The fact that he was later refused the payment of a lump sum fee does not retroactively transform the services which he has willingly accepted into forced labour . The present case is distinguishable from Applications Nos . 4897/71 and 5219/71 (Collection of Decisions 42, pp . 41 and 94) which were decla red admissible and were brought to a close by way of a friendly se ttlement . In these cases the applicant lawyer had received no remuneration at all for his legal aid services, while in the present case the applicant received altogether 5 835 .30 DM for his pa rt icipation in the criminal proceedings in question . He would have received a more adequate remuneration had he not refused to continue with his defence activities . The only remaining question therefore is whether the applicant had valid claim for a lump sum fee of which he was deprived, contrary to Article of the First Protocol . According to Section 97 in conjunction with Sections 83-86 of the Regulations on Lawyers' Fees (BRAGO), fixed fees are provided for with regard to unimportant criminal proceedings . However, with regard to complex criminal matters, Section 99 (1) BRAGO provides : "(I) In particularly complex or difficult criminal matters the legal aid counsel appointed by the court has to be granted at his request a lump sum for a part or the whole proceedings exceeding the fees provided for in Section 97 . (2) The Court of Appeal in the district in which the matter is being dealt with decides on the request . . . " In the present case the competent Court of Appeal rejected the applicant's request to be granted a lump sum payment for his pre-trial services . The Commission has always held that it is not competent to deal with applications alleging that errors of law or fact have been committed by domestic courts (see Decisions and Reports 18, pp . 31, 45) . It may, however, examine whether a domestic court arbitrarily denied an existing claim and thereby violated the guarantee contained in Article t of the First Protocol (see Decisions and Reports 7, pp . 8, 22, para . 17) . It appears from the wording of Section 99 (1) BRAGO ("has to be granted"/"ist zu bewilligen") that under the conditions set out in Ihis provision-i .e . if a case is complex or difficult-a lawyer has a right to claim a
lump sum fee . In the present case, it is, however, undisputed that the criminal case in question was complex and difficult . This .also follows from the fact that another legal defence counsel, who had preceded the applicant at the pre-trial stage, had received a lump sum fee of 2000DM . The respondent Government do not deny this, but submit that the claim under Section 99 BRAGO not only depends on the complexity and difficulty of the criminal matter but further pre-supposes that the defence counsel, who is appointed mainly in the public interest to assure a fair trial, assumes the defence throughout the whole proceedings and does not abandon his legal aid commitment in an irregular manner. Therefore such fee is not granted before the trial proceedings are terminated or before the of iiicial defence counsel has been discharged of his duty to act for an indigent defendant . They further argue that an advance on fees consequently is granted on the same condition only, namely that the legal aid counsel does not abandon his legal aid commitment . The Commission notes that the Court of Appeal obviously based its decision rejecting the applicant's request for a lump sum fee on the same reasoning . There is nothing to show that this interpretation of Section 99 BRAGO is arbitrary . It is neither incompatible with the wording of this provision nor has it been shown that it is contradicted by constant jurisprudence . In these circumstances, it cannot be clearly established that the applicant, who abandoned his legal aid services without the trial court's consent, had a valid claim for a lump sum fee, and the Commission cannot therefore find that the refusal to grant him such a fee for his pre-trial activity discloses the appearance of a violÃ¢tion of Article I of the First Protocol . The applicant's obligation to return the advance payment was a lawful consequence of the denial of a lump sum fee . This denial destroyed retroactively the legal basis for the advance payment and the applicant only had to return what was no longer due to him . In this context the Commission also notes that the advance payment was made after the filing of the indictment and the opening of the main proceedings . The applicant could at that stage reasonably be expected to render his services at least thioughout the trial proceedings and it was clear to him from the reasoning in the Appellate Court's decision of . . . February 1978 that the advance payment was granted on this condition . In fact, the Court pointed out in that decision that although the applicant could, at the time, not claim more than 200DM under Sections 97, 84(1) No . 1 BRAGO, he could not be expected to await the termination of the first instance proceedings or the termination of his legal aid appointment . This reasoning indicated that only the expectation of the future lump sum fee, which was not due to the applican t _1
unless he terminated at least the ftrst instance proceedings, justified the payment of an advance . An examination by the Commission of this complaint as it has been submitted does not therefore disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention and its Protocols and in particular in the above-cited Articles . It follows that the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 (2) of the Convention . For these reasons, the Commission
RÃ©sumÃ© des taits Le requÃ©rant', qui est avocat, a Ã©tÃ© dÃ©signÃ© d'office par le juge d'instruchbn prÃ¨s la Cour fÃ©dÃ©rale de justice (Bundesgerichtshof) pour reprÃ©senter un inculpÃ© dans une grave affaire criminelle . A sa demande, la cour d'appel de Berlin, compÃ©tente en l'espÃ¨ce . lui a consenti une avance de 6 000 DM Ã valoir sur ses honoraires d'avocat commis d'office.
Le requÃ©rant Ã©tudia le volumineux dossier et eut de nombreux entrenÃ©ns avec l'inculpÃ© durant plus de quinze mois. Pendant le procÃ¨s, qui devait durer 190 jours, le requÃ©rant agit comme dÃ©fenseur durant 14 jours . A ce moment, il fut arrÃ©tÃ© comme soupÃ§onnÃ© d'avoir trempÃ© dans l'Ã©vasion de co-accusÃ©s de son client . Il fut dÃ©tenu durant 12 heures et une perquisition eut lieu Ã¢ son Ã©tude, mais l'affaire n'eut pas de suite. Dans ces conditions, le requÃ©rant estima ne plus pouvoir continuer Ã exercer son mandat et demanda Ã en Ã©tre dÃ©chargÃ©, en s'appuyant pour ce/a sur l'opinion du b8tonnier. La cour d'appel refusa de le dÃ©charger du mandat mais le requÃ©rant n'en dÃ©cida pas moins de cesser d'assurer la dÃ©fense. La cour d'appel prit finalement une ordonnance rÃ©voquant le mandat du requÃ©rant et lui alloua une somme de 5 623,30 DM Ã titre d'honoraires pour la dÃ©fense assurÃ©e au procÃ¨s pendant 14 jours, conformÃ©ment aux a rt icles 83 et 97 du RÃ¨glement sur les honoraires d'avocat (BRAGO). â¢ Le requÃ©rant Ã©tait representÃ© devant la Commission par MMes lungfer et Meier, avocats Ã Berlin.
Le requÃ©rant demanda alors Ã recevoir des honoraires au titre de son activitÃ© durant l'instruction prÃ©paratoire. La cour d'appel ne lui alloua que 200 DM et lui enjoignit de restituer le surplus de l'avance de 6 000 DM qu'il avait re Ã§ ue, au motij qu'un nouvel avocat avait dG Ãªtre nommÃ© pour la suite du procÃ¨s et que celui-ci avait d8 se familiariser avec l'affaire, rendant inutile le travail d'Ã©tude que le requÃ©rant avait effectuÃ© durant l'instruction prÃ©paratoire .
(TRADUCTION) EN DROIT Le requÃ©rant se plaint qu'au lieu de percevoir une somme forfaitaire convenable pour ses prestations d'avocat commis d'office lors de 1'instruction prÃ©paratoire Ã un procÃ¨s pÃ©nal, il n'a reÃ§u qu'une rÃ©munÃ©ration insignifiante de 220 DM, ce qui l'a obligÃ© Ã rembourser une avance sur honoraires, d'un montant de 6 000 DM, qui lui avait Ã©tÃ© versÃ©e au dÃ©but de la procÃ©dure . Il allÃ¨gue la violation de l'article 4, paragraphe 2, de la Convention et de l'article 1Â°' du Protocole additionnel . Incontestablement, il a Ã©puisÃ© les voies de recours internes Ã l'Ã©gard de son grief et respectÃ© le dÃ©lai de six mois (art . 26 de la Convention) . Selon la jurisprudence de la Commission, les Ã©lÃ©ments constitutifs de la notion de travail forcÃ© ou obligatoire au sens de l'article 4, paragraphe 2, de la Convention, sont que le travail ou le service soit imposÃ© Ã l'intÃ©ressÃ© contre son grÃ©, qu'il prÃ©sente un caractÃ¨re injuste ou oppressif ou constitue une Ã©preuve inÃ©vitable (Recueil de DÃ©cisions 46, pp . 22, 32) . Or, en l'espÃ¨ce, le requÃ©rant n'a pas Ã©tÃ© dÃ©signÃ© comme avocat d'office contre son grÃ© . Il n'a pas allÃ©guÃ© non plus que le service effectuÃ© par lui constituÃ¢t une quelconque Ã©preuve. Le fait qu'on lui ait, par la suite, refusÃ© le paiement d'une somme forfaitaire Ã titre d'honoraires ne transforme pas rÃ©troactivement en travail forcÃ© les services qu'il a volontairement acceptÃ©s . La prÃ©sente affaire se distingue des requÃªtes n- 4897/71 et 5219/71 (Recueil de DÃ©cisions 42, pp . 41 et 94), dÃ©clarÃ©es recevables et rÃ©glÃ©es par voie de rÃ¨glement amiable . Dans ces affaires-lÃ , en effet, l'avocat requÃ©rant n'avait perÃ§u absolument aucune rÃ©munÃ©ration pour ses services d'assistance judiciaire alors qu'en l'espÃ¨ce, le requÃ©rant a touchÃ© au total 5 835,30 DM pour sa participation Ã ]a procÃ©dure pÃ©nale en question . La rÃ©munÃ©ration aurait Ã©tÃ© plus appropriÃ©e s'il n'avait pas refusÃ© de poursuivre son activitÃ© de dÃ©fenseur . La seule question restant Ã trancher est donc celle de savoir si le requÃ©rant peut valablement rÃ©clamer des honoraires forfaitaires dont il aurait Ã©tÃ© privÃ© contrairement Ã l'article 1Â° 1 du Protocole additionnel . - 102 -
L'article 97, combinÃ© aux articles 83 Ã 86 du RÃ¨glement sur les honoraires d'avocat (BRAGO), prÃ©voit des honoraires fixes pour les affaires pÃ©nales mineures . Cependant, pour les affaires plus complexes, l'article 99 (1) du RÃ¨glement stipule que : .(1) Dans les affaires pÃ©nales particuliÃ¨rement complexes ou difficiles, l'avocat commis d'office par le tribunal doit percevoir, sur sa demande, pour tout ou partie de la procÃ©dure, une somme forfaitaire supÃ©rieure aux honoraires prÃ©vus Ã l'article 97 . .(2) La cour d'appel dans le ressort de laquelle l'affaire est traitÃ©e, statue sur la demande . . . â¢ En l'espÃ¨ce, la cour d'appel compÃ©tente a dÃ©boutÃ© le requÃ©rant de sa demande relative au paiement d'une somme forfaitaire pour ses services durant l'instruction prÃ©paratoire . La Commission a toujours dÃ©clarÃ© ne pas pouvoir connaitre de requÃªtes allÃ©guant que des erreurs de droit ou de fait ont Ã©tÃ© commises par les juridictions nationales (voir D .R . 18, pp . 31, 45) . Cependant, elle peut examiner si une juridiction nationale a arbitrairement opposÃ© un refus Ã une demande, contrairement Ã la garantie prÃ©vue Ã l'article 1 - du Protocole additionnel (voir D .R . 7, pp . 8, 22, par . 7) . Il ressort du libellÃ© de l'article 99 (1) du RÃ¨glement (â¢ doit percevoir .ist zu bewilligen - ) que, dans les conditions prÃ©cisÃ©es dans ce texte - c'est-Ã dire si l'affaire est complexe et difficile - l'avocat est fondÃ© Ã rÃ©clamer une somme forfaitaire Ã titre d'honoraires . En l'espÃ¨ce, il n'est pas contestÃ© que l'affaire pÃ©nale en question fÃ»t complexe et difficile . Du reste, un autre avocat de la dÃ©fense, qui avait prÃ©cÃ©dÃ© le requÃ©rant pendant 1'instruction prÃ©paratoire a perÃ§u des honoraires forfaitaires de 2 000 DM . Le Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur ne le nie pas mais soutient que les prÃ©tentions qui peuvent se fonder sur l'article 99 du RÃ¨glement ne dÃ©pendent pas seulement de la complexitÃ© et de la difficultÃ© de l'affaire pÃ©nale ; eBes prÃ©supposent en outre que l'avocat de la dÃ©fense, dÃ©signÃ© essentiellement dans l'intÃ©rÃªt gÃ©nÃ©ral pour assurer un procÃ¨s Ã©quitable, assume ses fonctions de dÃ©fense tout au long de la procÃ©dure et ne renonce pas irrÃ©guliÃ¨rement Ã son engagement d'assistance judiciaire . Aussi les honoraires ne sont-ils pas versÃ©s avant la fin du procÃ¨s ni avant que 1'avocat commis d'office n'ait Ã©tÃ© dÃ©chargÃ© de son devoir d'assister un accusÃ© indigent . Le Gouvernement ajoute qu'une avance sur horioraires n'est accordÃ©e qu'Ã la mÃªme condition, Ã savoir que l'avocat d'office ne renonce pas Ã son engagement d'assistance judiciaire . La Commission relÃ¨ve que, manifestement, la cour d'appel a fondÃ© sa dÃ©cision de rejet de la demande du requÃ©rant sur le mÃªme raisonnement . Rien ne montre que cette interprÃ©tation de l'article 99 du RÃ¨glement soit arbitraire . Elle n'est pas non plus incompatible avec le libellÃ© de cette disposition ni contredite par une jurisprudence constante .
Dans ces conditions, on ne saurait clairement Ã©tablir que le requÃ©rant, qui a abandonnÃ© ses fonctions d'assistance judiciaire sans l'accord de la juridiction de jugement, puisse valablement rÃ©clamer des honoraires forfaitaires . La Commission ne peut donc pas contester que le refus d'honoraires pour les activitÃ©s dÃ©ployÃ©es lors de l'instruction prÃ©paratoires dÃ©note l'apparence d'une violation de l'article 1 1, du Protocole additionnel . L'obligation faite au requÃ©rant de rembourser l'avance Ã©tait une consÃ©quence rÃ©guliÃ¨re du refus d'accorder des honoraires forfaitaires . Ce refus a rÃ©troactivement dÃ©truit le fondement juridique du paiÃ©ment anticipÃ© et le requÃ©rant n'a eu qu'Ã restituer l'indÃ» . A cet Ã©gard, la Commission relÃ¨ve Ã©galement que l'avance a Ã©tÃ© faite aprÃ¨s mise en accusation et ouverture du procds .A ce moment, on pouvait donc raisonnablement attendre du requÃ©rant qu'il accomplisse ses prestations au moins pendant le procÃ¨s et il Ã©tait clair pour l'intÃ©ressÃ©, aprÃ¨s le raisonnement suivi par la cour d'appel dans sa dÃ©cision du . . . fÃ©vrier 1978, que l'avance avait Ã©tÃ© faite Ã cette condition . De fait, la cour a soulignÃ© dans sa dÃ©cision que le requÃ©rant ne pouvait certes pas, Ã l'Ã©poque, rÃ©clamer plus de 200 DM en vertu des articles 97, 84 (1) nÂ° 1 du RÃ¨glement, mais qu'on ne pouvait pas exiger de lui qu'il attende la fin de la procÃ©dure de premiÃ¨re instance ou l'expiration de son mandat pour Ãªtre payÃ© . Ce raisonnement indiquait bien que l'avance ne se justifiait que par le versement escomptÃ© des futurs honoraires forfaitaires, qui ne devait intervenir qu'Ã la fin de la procÃ©dure de premiÃ¨re instance . L'examen par la Commission de ce grief, tel qu'il a Ã©tÃ© formulÃ©, ne rÃ©vÃ¨le donc aucune apparence de violation des droits et libertÃ©s inscrits dans la Convention et dans ses Protocoles, et notamment dans les articles prÃ©citÃ©s . Il s'ensuit que la requÃªte est manifestement mal fondÃ©e au sens de l'article 27, paragraphe 2, de la Convention . Par ces motifs, la Commissio n
DÃCLARE LA REQUETEIRRECEVABLE .
- 1pq -Origine de la décision Pays : Conseil de l'EuropeJuridiction : Cour européenne des droits de l'hommeFormation : Commission (plénière)Date de la décision : 17/07/1981Fonds documentaire : HUDOC Haut de page

References: l'article 4
 l'article 1
 l'article 4
 l'article 1

L'article 97
 l'article 99
 l'article 97
 l'article 1
 l'article 99
 l'article 99
 l'article 99
 l'article 1
 l'article 27