Source: https://www.in.gov/judiciary/opinions/previous/archive/060401.mcs.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 02:15:21+00:00

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This direct appeal concerns the re-sentencing of defendant Joshua Smith. In an earlier direct appeal, this Court held that defendant was entitled to a new sentencing order because it was unclear whether he had been properly sentenced. Smith v. State, 675 N.E.2d 693 (Ind. 1996). Defendant raises three issues concerning his re-sentencing: 1) whether the trial court improperly enhanced defendant's sentence; 2) whether the trial court impermissibly increased the sentence after a successful appeal; and 3) whether the sentence should be amended because the plea agreement upon which it rests contains an error. We answer each issue in the negative and affirm the trial court.
and one year of the probation on house arrest.
Defendant first argues that the trial court improperly enhanced his sentence above the presumptive sentence of forty years. Defendant contends that the trial court considered improper aggravating factors in making the sentencing decision and failed to find and weigh mitigating factors. Defendant also argues that the sentence is manifestly unreasonable considering the nature of the offense and offender.
Sentencing decisions are left to the discretion of the trial court, and we will review sentencing decisions only for an abuse of that discretion. Smith, 675 N.E.2d at 697. The trial court may, within its discretion, increase or decrease a presumptive sentence based upon aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Id. One valid aggravating factor is alone enough to enhance a sentence. Id. "The trial court is not obligated to explain why it did not find a factor to be significantly mitigating, nor must it weigh a mitigator the way defendant suggests the mitigating factor should be weighed. However, the trial judge 'may not ignore facts in the record that would mitigate an offense, and a failure to find mitigating circumstances that are clearly supported by the record may imply that the trial court failed to properly consider them.'" Birdsong v. State, 685 N.E.2d 42, 47 (Ind. 1997) (citations omitted).
evidence.See footnote 1 The trial court found and explained the following mitigating factors: (1) defendant's youth and (2) the fact that defendant has "completed two substance abuse courses and one course in anger management at the Indiana Department of Corrections; and further, defendant is continuing to pursue his education through Grace College and Indiana University." (S.R. at 4.) Finally, the trial court found that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors and enhanced the presumptive sentence as described above.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by enhancing defendant's sentence. In the original direct appeal, this Court found that the circumstances of the crime and defendant's criminal history are proper aggravating factors. Smith, 675 N.E.2d at 697. Properly explained victim impact evidence is also a valid aggravating factor. See Davenport v. State, 689 N.E.2d 1226, 1232-33 (Ind. 1997). Thus, the court found three valid aggravators. As was true in the original sentencing, it is also readily apparent that the trial court considered several mitigating factors and identified two of them to be significant mitigating factors.See footnote 2 Finally, the court determined that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors.
Defendant next argues that the trial court improperly and vindictively increased his sentence after a successful appeal. Originally, the trial court sentenced defendant in the following manner: a term of sixty years, with fifty years executed, five years on supervised probation, five years on unsupervised probation, and one year of the supervised probation on house arrest. On re-sentencing, the trial court sentenced defendant in the following manner: a term of sixty years, with fifty years executed, ten years on supervised probation, and one year of the supervised probation on house arrest. Defendant argues that the change from five years each of supervised and unsupervised probation to ten years of supervised probation constitutes an increase in sentence and must be vacated on the presumption of vindictiveness.
proceeding." Id. In the present case, the trial court made note of the fact that defendant has "received six to seven write-ups at the Indiana Department of Corrections which shows that he is not complying with those who have authority over him." (S.R. at 5.) The granting of probation is a matter of grace and is within the trial court's discretion. Gilfillen v. State, 582 N.E.2d 821, 824 (Ind. 1991). The trial court was within its discretion to change the terms of the probation given its finding that defendant is having trouble obeying authority.
the plea agreement so that the maximum executed sentence was forty years.See footnote 3 This issue was available to defendant in his original direct appeal, but it went unargued. As such, the issue is waived. See Harris v. State, 643 N.E.2d 309, 310 (Ind. 1994).
Footnote: 2 Defendant argues that the trial court failed to consider his guilty plea, his remorse, and his kind and caring character as significant mitigating factors. A trial court need not find these to be significant mitigating factors. See Crawley v. State, 677 N.E.2d 520, 523 (Ind. 1997).
Footnote: 3 Defendant's argument is that the State has waived the right to contest defendant's view of the plea agreement. At the re-sentencing hearing, defendant argued that it was his belief the parties had agreed that the maximum sentence would be the presumptive sentence. The prosecutor offered no rebuttal to this argument. Defendant cites to Richardson v. State, 456 N.E.2d 1063 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983) and argues that, by not objecting to defendant's assertions concerning the plea agreement, the State has waived the issue. Defendant's situation, however, has one key difference from the Richardson case. In Richardson, there was no written agreement and, after the defendant testified to his belief concerning what the parties had agreed, the State remained mute. Richardson, 456 N.E.2d at 1065-66. In the present case, there is a written agreement, signed by both parties, indicating the agreement's terms.

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