Source: https://govlawweb.typepad.com/government_liability_upda/fees-and-costs/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 00:59:33+00:00

Document:
In National Lawyers' Guild v. City of Hayward, published September 28, 2018, the First District Court of Appeal, Division 3 reversed a trial court's issuance of a writ of administrative mandate directing the respondent city to refund to the petitioner payments the petitioner made for copies of police body cam video footage the city produced in response to a California Public Records request. The city charged the petitioner for the cost of city employees reviewing the videos and using Windows Movie Maker to redact material exempt from the CPRA on privacy or security grounds. The city sought the cost under a portion of the CPRA, Government Code section 6253.9, subdivision (b)(2). The statute requires the requester to bear the cost of producing a copy of an electronic record if the request would require "extraction" to produce the record. The trial court concluded that the phrase "extraction" does not apply to redaction of an electronic record, but only to extraction necessary to produce the record.
The appellate court disagreed. Concluding that the statute's language is ambiguous, the court reviewed the legislative history. It noted a concern that the cost of producing only portions of electronic records would exceed the cost of redacting paper documents. The court concluded that "extraction" as used in the statute includes the cost of redacting exempt portions of electronic documents before producing them under the CPRA.
In Pasadena Police Officers Association v. City of Pasadena (Los Angeles Times Communications, LLC, Intervenor), published April 12, 2018, the Second District Court of Appeal, Division 1 reversed in part and affirmed in part a trial court ruling on attorney fees in a reverse-PRA action (a suit challenging a public agency's decision to produce documents under the California Public Records Act). A group of organizations made a California Public Records Act request to the defendant city for a report concerning a police shooting. While the request was pending, two city police officers and the plaintiff Association filed a reverse-PRA action seeking a restraining order barring release of the report. The Los Angeles Times later intervened in the action on the side of those seeking release of the report. After the trial court concluded that a redacted version of the report could be released, the appellate court issued a writ petition holding that the redactions went too far. On remand, the trial court released the report with additional information unredacted. The Times moved for fees and costs. The trial court granted the Times attorney fees from the city under the CPRA, but only for the period that the matters was before the appellate court. It denied the Times private attorney general fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5, applying a rule that section 1021.5 fees were not available against a party that was attempting to protect the party's private interests--here, the officers' privacy interests.
The appellate court reversed the decision on the section 1021.5 fees. The policy applies only when fees are sought from a private individual who seeks a judgment that determines only the individual's private rights and did nothing to adversely affect the public interest besides being on the losing side of an important case. Here, the police officers and the Association sought a judgment preventing the report's release for the benefit of all of the associations' members, as well as police officers in general. Further, the individual police officers essentially acted as public officials in seeking to keep the report private. The case therefore involved public officials and a public employee union pursuing litigation designed to expand the ability of police officers and departments to withhold information from the public. Because the Times met the other requirements for obtaining fees under section 1021.5, it was entitled to fees from the officers and the association.
The appellate court affirmed the ruling that the Times was entitled to CPRA fees from the City only for the time that the action was pending before the appellate court. The trial court's exercise of its discretion in determining the prevailing party and the reasonable period for fees was supported by substantial evidence.
In Sviridov v. City of San Diego, ordered published August 15, 2017, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, Division 1 affirmed a decision awarding the defendant city its post-offer costs under Code of Civil Procedure section 998 in a lawsuit the plaintiff police officer brought under the Fair Employment and Housing Act and the Peace Officer's Bill of Rights. The plaintiff argued that case law holds that in a FEHA action fees and costs may be awarded to a defendant only if the action was frivolous. The appellate court ruled that the case law does not apply to section 998, under which a defendant who makes a settlement officer that the plaintiff fails to do better than is awarded the defendant's post-offer costs. The court also rejected the argument that the costs provisions of POBRA create an exception to section 998.
In M.D. v. Newport-Mesa School Dist., published October 19, 2016, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a district court decision dismissing a plaintiff's lawsuit for failure to file an amended complaint on time. The plaintiffs were a student and parent who sued the school district for alleged retaliation. After the district moved to dismiss the FAC, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed two claims (including a California Public Records Act claim). The district court then dismissed the remaining claim, but granted 30 days' leave to amend. The order was originally calendared on the CMF/ECF efiling system as made "in chambers." Two days later, a notice of clerical error was entered and the same order was redocketed as a separate entry. Plaintiffs' counsel, who did not customarily practice in the federal courts, erroneously calendared the 30 days as running from the correction of the clerical error. The plaintiffs therefore did not file within the 30 days. The day after the 30 days ran, the district filed a proposed judgment of dismissal. The plaintiffs filed their second amended complaint the next day. The district court nevertheless dismissed the case for failure to amend within the time allowed. The plaintiffs moved for relief under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1) based on excusable neglect. The district court denied the motion.
The Ninth Circuit ruled that the district court abused its discretion by denying the motion. A 60(b)(1) motion requires that the court consider at least four factors: (1) the danger of prejudice to the opposing party; (2) the length of the delay and its potential impact on the proceedings; (3) the reason for the delay; and (4) whether the movant acted in good faith. The district court addressed only the third factor, finding the reason for the delay insufficient. The defendant would not be prejudiced by granting relief; the length of delay was minimal; there was no evidence the movant acted in bad faith; and the calendaring error was excusable neglect.
The district court also denied the district's motion for attorney fees for the dismissal of the CPRA request. The appellate court held that the district court properly denied the request. The CPRA claim was not frivolous when brought, and the plaintiff eventually dismissed it.
In James v. City of Boise, published January 25, 2016, the United States Supreme Court reversed an Idaho Supreme Court decision awarding a defendant attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. section 1988. In Hughes v. Rowe (1980) 449 U. S. 5, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a defendant could recover fees under section 1988 only if the plaintiff's action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. The Idaho court concluded that it was not bound by that interpretation of section 1988. The U.S. Supreme Court held that it was.
In Bravo v. City of Santa Maria, published January 12, 2016, the 9th Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part a district court's award of attorney fees and costs in a 42 U.S.C. section 1983 case. The plaintiffs settled with one group of defendants (the city whose police carried out a search of their home) for $360,000. Their claims against another group of defendants (the police who sought the warrant) went to trial, resulting in a jury verdict of $5,000. In determining the degree of success the plaintiffs achieved, the district court considered both the amount obtained at trial and the amount obtained through settlement, and awarded fees of over $1 million. The 9th Circuit affirmed. In an issue of first impression, it held that a court may consider success obtained through both settlement and trial in determining a party's degree of success for 42 U.S.C. section 1988 fee award purposes.
The 9th Circuit reversed the district court's cost award, however. The district court refused to offset the costs awarded against the defendants who lost at trial with the costs already reimbursed by the settling defendants. In another issue of first impression, the 9th Circuit held that such an offset is appropriate.
In Klein v. City of Laguna Beach, published January 14, 2016, the 9th Circuit reversed an order denying the plaintiff an attorney fee award under 42 U.S.C. section 1988. Plaintiff sued the city under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 and California's Bane Act in an attempt to invalidate aspects of city ordinances prohibiting use of sound-amplification devices on city sidewalks. The city eventually amended its ordinances, and the plaintiff obtained nominal damages on his federal cause of action. He lost on the state cause of action. The district court denied him attorney fees under Farrar v. Hobby (2002) 506 U.S. 103, which holds that where a plaintiff seeks a large compensatory damages award but receives only nominal damages, the court may deny him attorney fees under section 1988.
The 9th Circuit held that Farrar does not apply where the plaintiff's main goal is not a large compensatory damages award, but a change in policy, and the plaintiff obtains that goal. Buckhannon Board and Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health & Human Resources (2001) 532 U.S. 598, which bars attorney fees under section 1988 where the lawsuit simply brings about a voluntary change in the defendant's behavior, did not apply, because the plaintiff received nominal damages in addition to voluntary compliance.
The 9th Circuit affirmed, however, the district court's ruling that the plaintiff was not entitled to fees under California's attorney general statute. The plaintiff lost on his California law claims, and success under his federal claims entitled him to fees only under the federal statute.

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