Source: https://www.ptab.us/2010/08/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 10:24:49+00:00

Document:
“[T]he analysis that ‘should be made explicit’ refers not to the teachings in the prior art of a motivation to combine, but to the court’s analysis.” Ball Aerosol & Specialty Container, Inc. v. Ltd. Brands, Inc., 555 F.3d 984, 993 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
“[T]he ultimate inference as to the existence of a motivation to combine references may boil down to a question of ‘common sense.’” Philip W. Wyers v. Master Lock Company, 95 USPQ2d 1525, 1532 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (internal citations omitted).
A prior art rejection cannot be sustained if the hypothetical person of ordinary skill in the art would have to make speculative assumptions concerning the meaning of the claim language. See In re Steele, 305 F.2d 859, 862-63 (CCPA 1962).
Two criteria are relevant in determining whether prior art is analogous: “(1) whether the art is from the same field of endeavor, regardless of the problem addressed, and (2) if the reference is not within the field of the inventor’s endeavor, whether the reference still is reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventor is involved.” Comaper Corp. v. Antec, Inc., 596 F.3d 1343, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting In re Clay, 966 F.2d 656, 658-59 (Fed. Cir. 1992)). Whether a reference in the prior art is “analogous” is a fact question. In re Clay, 966 F.2d at 658. Wyers v. Master Lock Co., 95 USPQ2d 1525, 1530 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
See York Prods, Inc. v. Cent. Tractor Farm & Family Ctr., 99 F.3d 1568, 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (construing the term “substantially” as “largely but not wholly that which is specified”).
The law in the area of patent-eligible subject matter for process claims has recently been clarified by the Supreme Court in Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, No. 08-964, 2010 WL 2555192 (U.S. June 28, 2010). The Court held that the term “process” as used in § 101, does not categorically exclude business methods. Id. at *9.
At the same time, some business method patents raise special problems in terms of vagueness and suspect validity.” Id. (citing eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 397 (2006)) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
In searching for a limiting principle, this Court’s precedents on the unpatentibility of abstract ideas provide useful tools. See infra 12-15. Indeed, if the Court of Appeals were to succeed in defining a narrower category or class of patent applications that claim to instruct how business should be conducted, and then rule that the category is unpatentable because, for instance, it represents an attempt to patent abstract ideas, this conclusion might well be in accord with controlling precedent. Id.
By analogy, suppose that an inventor created a particular fuel-efficient automobile engine and described the engine in such detail in the specification that a person of ordinary skill in the art would be able to build the engine. Although the specification would meet the requirements of section 112 with respect to a claim directed to that particular engine, it would not necessarily support a broad claim to every possible type of fuel-efficient engine, no matter how different in structure or operation from the inventor's engine. The single embodiment would support such a generic claim only if the specification would "reasonably convey to a person skilled in the art that [the inventor] had possession of the claimed subject matter at the time of filing," Bilstad v. Wakalopulos, 386 F.3d 1116, 1125 (Fed. Cir. 2004), and would "enable one of ordinary skill to practice ‘the full scope of the claimed invention,’" Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 363 F.3d 1247, 1253 (Fed. Cir. 2004), quoting In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1993); PPG Indus., Inc. v. Guardian Indus. Corp., 75 F.3d 1558, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1996). To hold otherwise would violate the Supreme Court's directive that "[i]t seems to us that nothing can be more just and fair, both to the patentee and the public, than that the former should understand, and correctly describe, just what he has invented, and for what he claims a patent." Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 U.S. 568, 573-74 (1876); see also Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1321 ("The patent system is based on the proposition that the claims cover only the invented subject matter."); AK Steel Corp., 344 F.3d at 1244 ("as part of the quid pro quo of the patent bargain, the applicant's specification must enable one of ordinary skill in the art to practice the full scope of the claimed invention"). Thus, a patentee cannot always satisfy the requirements of section 112, in supporting expansive claim language, merely by clearly describing one embodiment of the thing claimed. For that reason, we hold that the description of one method for creating a seamless DWT does not entitle the inventor of the ′835 patent to claim any and all means for achieving that objective. See, LizardTech, Inc. v. Earth Resource Mapping, Inc., 424 F.3d 1336, 1344-1346 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
As our reviewing court has recently stated, “it is not enough to simply show that the references disclose the claim limitations; in addition, ‘it can be important to identify a reason that would have prompted a person of ordinary skill in the art to combine the elements as the new invention does.’” Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Contractors USA, Inc., --- F.3d ----, 2010 WL 3257312 at *4 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 401 (2007)).
“Where the printed matter is not functionally related to the substrate, the printed matter will not distinguish the invention from the prior art in terms of patentability. Although the printed matter must be considered, in that situation it may not be entitled to patentable weight.” In re Gulack, 703 F.2d 1381, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (footnote omitted). In dealing with printed matter, “the critical question is whether there exists any new and unobvious functional relationship between the printed matter and the substrate.” Id. at 1386.
see also In re Seid, 161 F.2d 229, 231 (CCPA 1947) (differences in ornamentation are entitled to little weight in determining the obviousness of a claim to a structure).
“An intended use or purpose usually will not limit the scope of the claim because such statements usually do no more than define a context in which the invention operates.” Boehringer Ingelheim Vetmedica v. Schering-Plough Corp., 320 F.3d 1339, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
To overcome a finding of obviousness by demonstrating commercial success, there must be a nexus between commercial success and the claimed features. Ormco Corp. v. Align Technology, 463 F.3d 1299, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2006). “[T]he asserted commercial success of the product must be due to the merits of the claimed invention beyond what was readily available in the prior art.” J.T. Eaton & Co. v. Atl. Paste & Glue Co., 106 F.3d 1563, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1997). “[I]f the commercial success is due to an unclaimed feature of the device, the commercial success is irrelevant. So too if the feature that creates the commercial success was known in the prior art, the success is not pertinent.” Ormco Corp. v. Align Tech. Inc., 463 F.3d at 1312 (footnotes omitted).
“Ordinarily, [a] nexus may be inferred when ‘the patentee shows both that there is commercial success, and that the thing (product or method) that is commercially successful is the invention disclosed and claimed in the patent.’” Iron Grip Barbell Co. v. USA Sports Inc., 392 F.3d at 1324 (citing Demaco Corp. v. F, Von Langsdorff Licensing Ltd., 851 F.2d 1387, 1392 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
See, e.g., KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007) (“[I]t can be important to identify a reason that would have prompted a person of ordinary skill in the relevant field to combine elements in the way the claimed new invention does.”); In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“hindsight” is inferred when the specific understanding or principal within the knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the art leading to the modification of the prior art in order to arrive at appellant’s claimed invention has not been explained); In re Fritch, 972 F.2d 1260, 1266 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (citing In re Gordon, 733 F.2d 900, 902 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“The mere fact that the prior art may be modified in the manner suggested by the Examiner does not make the modification obvious unless the prior art suggested the desirability of the modification.”).
Where application drawings are contended to provide the written descriptive support for a claim element, “the proper test is whether the drawings [convey] with reasonable clarity to those of ordinary skill that [the inventor] had in fact invented the [invention] recited in [the] claims.” Vas-Cath, 935 F.2d at 1566. See also Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lily & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (“[T]he test for sufficiency is whether the disclosure of the application relied upon reasonably conveys to those skilled in the art that the inventor had possession of the claimed subject matter as of the filing date.”). Consideration of what the drawings convey to persons of ordinary skill in the art is essential. Ralston-Purina Co. v. Far-Mar-Co, Inc., 772 F.2d 1570, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
A patent drawing teaches all that it reasonably discloses and suggests to a person of ordinary skill in the art. In re Aslanian, 590 F.2d 911, 914 (CCPA 1979).
Ex Parte Gatta 11/559,099 BAHR, O’NEILL concurring 102(b) BARLOW, JOSEPHS & HOLMES, LTD.
Ex Parte Norsworthy et al 10/382,297 HAIRSTON 102(b)/103(a) STMICROELECTRONICS, INC.
James F. Porcello, Jr. Emch Schaffer, Schaub and Porcello Co LPA Third Party Requester Scott Simpson Sills, Cummis & Gross, P.C.
Two criteria are relevant in determining whether prior art is analogous: “(1) whether the art is from the same field of endeavor, regardless of the problem addressed, and (2) if the reference is not within the field of the inventor’s endeavor, whether the reference still is reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventor is involved.” Comaper Corp. v. Antec, Inc., 596 F.3d 1343, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting In re Clay, 966 F.2d 656, 658-59 (Fed. Cir. 1992)). Wyers v. Master Lock Co., App. No. 2009-1412, 2010 WL 2901839, at *4 (Fed. Cir. July 22, 2010).
Under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6, a structure in the prior art (or infringing product) is “equivalent” to a structure described in the specification as corresponding to the claimed means if it “performs the claimed function in substantially the same way to achieve substantially the same result as the corresponding structure . . .” Hearing Components, Inc. v. Shure, Inc., 600 F.3d 1357, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting Odetics, Inc. v. Storage Tech. Corp., 185 F.3d 1259, 1268 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). “[S]tructures with different numbers of parts may still be equivalent under § 112, ¶ 6, thereby meeting the claim limitation.” Odetics, 185 F.3d at 1268.
Ex Parte Kapur et al 10/934,893 ADAMS 112(1) FISH & RICHARDSON P.C.
Ex Parte MacDonald et al 10/686,933 WALSH 103(a) DORITY & MANNING, P.A.
“It is impermissible to use the claimed invention as an instruction manual or ‘template’ to piece together the teachings of the prior art so that the claimed invention is rendered obvious….” See In re Fritch, 972 F.2d 1260, 1266 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
Ex Parte Yan et al 10/407,609 GAUDETTE 103(a) HARNESS, DICKEY & PIERCE, P.L.C.
In In re Crish, our reviewing court interpreted the phrase “consists of,” appearing in the body of a claim, as limiting the clause for which it acts as a transition to only those elements found in that particular clause. 393 F.3d 1253, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“The reasonable interpretation of … claims containing both of the terms ‘comprising’ and ‘consists' is that the term ‘consists' limits the ‘said portion’ language to the subsequently recited numbered nucleotides, but the earlier term ‘comprising’ means that the claim can include that portion plus other nucleotides.”). Although “comprising” is not as restrictive as “consisting of,” it is, nonetheless, “a term of art . . . mean[ing] that the named elements are essential, but other elements may be added and still form a construct within the scope of the claim,” Genentech, Inc. v. Chiron Corp., 112 F.3d 495, 501 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
Ex Parte Dureau 10/271,801 HAIRSTON 101/102(e)/103(a) OPTV/MEYERTONS MEYERTONS, HOOD, KIVLIN, KOWERT & GOETZEL, P.C.
Ex Parte Ng et al 10/561,194 MANTIS MERCADER 103(a) Dickinson Wright PLLCJames E. Ledbetter, Esq.
Ex Parte Tsuji et al 10/154,129 HAHN 103(a) HUNTON & WILLIAMS, L.L.P.
Ex parte CATERPILLAR INC. 10/952,887 LEE 103(a) CATERPILLAR/FINNEGAN, HENDERSON, L.L.P.
Ex Parte Buechler et al 10/193,960 GREEN 103(a)/102(b) 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) INVERNESS MEDICAL INNOVATIONS / WSGR WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI, P.C.

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