Source: https://www.scribd.com/document/9666764/Order-on-Summary-Judgement-Woods-v-Gig-Harbor
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 20:24:27+00:00

Document:
This is an order e obtained in our client's favor dismissing aspects of the plaintiff employment claim.
Judgment will be to Halsted and Dougil.
Washington State Patrol’s Motion includes, but is not limited to, Defendants George R. Mars and Detective Orest Wilson.
All further references in this Order will be to WSP.
executing a search warrant. Defendants suspected Plaintiffs were growing marijuana on their property.
7 and involved excessive force.
18 residence or arresting him.
to Organic Sunflower Foundation Inc.
28 not a legal entity and is therefore not a proper defendant. See Hervey v. Estes, 65 F.3d 784, 791–92 (9th Cir.
WestNET, a multi-jurisdictional drug task force, at the time the events occurred. .
In 1998, an informant heard from friends that Plaintiffs were growing marijuana on their property.
not drive up to the residence without first traveling over an open [field.]” Pl. Resp. 4.
process of completing the school at the time he flew over Plaintiffs’ property.
1 that Plaintiffs’ neighbors told Dougil that they heard gunfire coming from the direction of Plaintiffs’ property.
13 access to his home. Trooper Wilson handcuffed Wood upon entering the home.
17 neither of these took place.” Pl. Resp. 7.
The evidence provided in support of the Complaint for the Search Warrant is discussed infra Part III.B.
1 opened the door, thereby eliminating the need for the officers outside the house to pry the door open.
6 ball gun, the dog was permanently blind in one eye.
17 marijuana as authorized by the Medical Marijuana statute, RCW 69.51A.
statute. Consequently, Officer Halsted arrested Wood.
take the dog to the pound. Wood declined the offer.
he did not enter Plaintiffs’ home until Wood had been detained and taken from the property.
dropped because Wood provided sufficient medical marijuana documentation.
reasonable [fact finder] could return a [decision] in its favor.” Triton Energy Corp., 68 F.3d at 1220.
13 “must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition.” Id.
17 229 (1991) (citing Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 343 (1986)).
23 Riverside, 120 F.3d 965, 972 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing Branch v. Tunnell, 937 F.2d 1382, 1387 (9th Cir.
occurred.” Id. at 973 (citing Hervey v. Estes, 65 F.3d 784, 788–89 (9th Cir. 1995)).
him and handed him over to the Pierce County Sheriff’s Office.
12 Wood was installing a motion sensor alarm on his property.
from the bed of a truck.
18 helicopter at an altitude of 700 feet. Both observed marijuana plants on the south side of the residence.
observations of marijuana prior to flying over Plaintiffs’ property.
Compl. for Search Warrant at 2–4 (Ex. 1 in Decl. of Mark Leemon).
6 Organic Sunflower Foundation Inc. and Solar Steam Inc. are fictitious entities. Decl. of Douglas Wood 5.
13 a finding that the officers violated Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.
Plaintiffs’ property but was never more specific than that. Matthew Dougil Dep. 11: 7–11, Oct. 3, 2006 (Ex.
application for the search warrant.
whether he was in the process of completing the training at the time he flew over Plaintiffs’ property.
the air, but Officer Dougil’s declaration does not contain a similar claim.
23 “substantial showing” under the first prong of test for denying Dougil and Halsted qualified immunity.
17 information does not lead to the conclusion that the warrant was issued without probable cause.
24 is sufficient to support issuance of the warrant. See United States v. Hammett, 236 F.3d 1054, 1059 (9th Cir.
rhetorical statement made by Plaintiffs’ counsel during Dougil’s deposition, not a comment by Dougil. Matthew Dougil Dep.
28 26: 9–10, Oct. 3, 2006 (Ex. 4 in Decl. of Mark Leemon).
immunity as to Plaintiffs’ lack of probable cause claims..
13 the Court grants WSP qualified immunity on that issue.
7 under the Fourth Amendment; they argue only that the force used was reasonable under the circumstances.
by Defendants WSP was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
The Court concludes that the present case is similar to Robinson v. Solano County, 278 F.3d 1007.
19 he used to shoot a neighbor’s dog. Id.
of the incident. Id. at 1013.
Plaintiff appeared to present no threat of harm to the officers, but instead was simply trying to comfort his pet.
18 were investigating a felony that potentially involved a firearm.
13 to qualified immunity. Id.
officer would have known that such conduct was unlawful. See id.
excessive force because they initiated the investigation and were responsible for obtaining the search warrant.
Halsted qualified immunity on the issue of the reasonableness of the search under the Fourth Amendment.
21 Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment claims. See Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201.
with respect to Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claim against WSP.
12 DATED this 3rd day of May, 2007.

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