Source: http://lawlessamerica.com/index.php?option=com_content&amp;view=article&amp;id=1878:bill-windsor-asks-supreme-court-to-declare-montana-laws-unconstitutional&amp;catid=162:denial-of-constitutional-rights&amp;Itemid=236
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 20:16:44+00:00

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Bill Windsor asks Supreme Court to declare Montana laws unconstitutional.
Bill Windsor is being prosecuted for alleged crimes of sending an email and having a website. These aren't crimes.
So Bill Windsor has filed a Petition for Supervisory Writ with the Montana Supreme Court on Friday. William M. Windsor is asking the Montana Supreme Court to declare that a few dozen things that Judge James A. Haynes has done or hasn't done are unConstitutional.
Bill Windsor is also filing a Judicial Misconduct Complaint against Judge James A. Haynes and a Bar Complaint against Missoula County Attorneys Jennifer Clark and Kirsten Pabst. These are mighty juicy -- may be a record for the most violations of the Montana Code of Judicial Conduct in history.
William M. Windsor (“Windsor”) files this Petition for Writ of Supervisory Control pursuant to Rule 14(a)(b) of the Montana Rules of Appellate Procedure.
A. The matters at issue are purely legal questions.
This case involves various courts’ interpretations of Montana statutes 40-15-201, MCA and 40-15-302, MCA, which make unconstitutional certain provisions regarding the issuance and terms of ex parte temporary orders of protection. The facts in this case are not in dispute. This Petition only addresses pure questions of law that include matters of statewide importance as temporary orders of protection are sought daily all across the state.
Either the two statutes in question have been misinterpreted by the courts, or the statutes are plainly unconstitutional.
B. The District Court (“DC”) is proceeding under mistakes of law that are causing a gross injustice.
The mistakes of law in question are discussed in detail under the Argument section. The erroneous holdings include that as part of a TOP, a court can order an individual to refrain from all contact with over 1,700 unidentified “U of M Staff,” that the court can order a respondent to transfer his personal property to the Petitioner without compensation for the property, and that a temporary order of protection can properly restrain a Respondent for 546 days without a hearing.
C. The normal appeal process will be an inadequate remedy.
The trial in this case is set for January 5, 2016. The charges are based on unconstitutional restraints on Windsor’s liberty and deprivation of his property, and it will be a gross injustice to subject Windsor to a trial on such clearly meritless charges.
Windsor is facing a televised trial in which he could be convicted of one or two crimes. His conviction will be widely publicized. He will be sentenced, will go to jail, will be branded a criminal, will likely lose the ability to obtain a concealed handgun permit, and he might be blocked from purchasing guns. He will have to post bond or stay in jail. He will have to prepare and file an appeal pro se. He will have to incur debt to pay for transcripts and all other expense. Then he may have to go through the entire trial process again.
Windsor has no criminal record. His health has been significantly affected by what he has already endured over the last 13 months. He has been living in a hotel near Missoula for the seven months since he was finally released on bond. He hasn’t been home in a year. If he has to stay in our near Montana and go through an appeal and another trial, it will be expensive, and he can never get this time back. At his age, he might not even live through it.
Windsor is under a great deal of stress now trying alone to prepare for a trial that he thought would never happen because the law is so clear. The work of preparing over the next month will be especially stressful. The DC has just denied all but one of his planned defenses, so he is back to square one in preparing for trial.
MMC Case #OP-2013-00198 - On August 21, 2013, Sean Boushie filed an ex parte Petition for Temporary Order of Protection and Hearing (“Petition”) against Windsor.
DC Case #DV-13-969 (“DC-1). Windsor appealed the EX-PARTE-TOP to the DC (he did NOT remove the Petition) on August 26, 2013, complaining that inter alia the deprivation of his personal property, the inclusion of the entire U of M Staff, and the prior restraints on his speech were unconstitutional.
The MMC erroneously concluded the notice of appeal deprived it of jurisdiction over the entire Petition, and cancelled the scheduled hearing.
MSC Case #DA-13-0785. On November 25, 2013, Windsor appealed DC-1’s order to this Court (“MSC”). Again, the MMC erroneously concluded the notice of appeal to this Court deprived it of jurisdiction over the entire Petition and delayed scheduling a hearing on the Petition for the duration of the appeal.
When this Court reviewed DC-1’s order on appeal, it was under the mistaken impression that DC-1 had held a hearing on the Petition: “Here, following the hearing on the TOP, the District Court determined that…” [Exhibit-4, P.6.] This misunderstanding had a material impact on this Court’s inquiry into whether DC-1 abused its discretion.
There has never been a hearing on B**shie’s Petition in any court. This Court also overlooked Windsor’s Constitutional arguments on the appeal.
DC Case #DC-14-509 (DC-3). On October 3, 2014, the State charged Windsor with five violations of the EX-PARTE-TOP. [Exhibit-6.] Windsor raised constitutional concerns in DC-3 on January 16, 2015, April 3, 2015, May 4, 2015, and December 2, 2015, but the court denied that motions without explanation. Exhibits-11,12,13,17 are the motions, and they present the arguments in full. Exhibits-14,19 are the orders.
I. Is 40-15-201, MCA, which describes the relief available in an ex parte TOP, unconstitutionally overbroad or vague? Suggested Answer: Yes.
II. Is 40-15-302, MCA, which automatically extends the term of a TOP during an appeal to a DC, unconstitutional because it results in deprivation of a Respondent’s right without a hearing for as long as 546 days? Suggested Answer: Yes.
I. Is 40-15-201, MCA, which describes the relief available in an ex parte TOP, unconstitutionally overbroad or too vague?
As the courts in this case have interpreted 40-15-201, MCA, the statute is unconstitutional. While civil and criminal statutes allow courts to restrict an individual’s civil liberties under certain narrowly-defined circumstances, broad and ill-considered injunctions that unnecessarily restrict those liberties are intolerable. Such restraints were issued in this case.
A. It is unconstitutional to order a Respondent to transfer his personal property to a Petitioner who had no ownership interest in the property, without a hearing, without compensation for the property, and without clarifying how the transfer was to take place, in an ex parte TOP.
Application of 40-15-201, MCA to Windsor requires an understanding of several other statutes and how they all work together.
According to 40-15-101, “The purpose of this chapter is to promote the safety and protection of all victims of partner and family member assault, victims of sexual assault, and victims of stalking.” In this case, Sean B**shie claimed he was a victim of stalking as defined in 45-5-220, MCA, and therefore he was eligible for an order of protection against Windsor pursuant to 40-15-102(2)(a).
Taking all of the foregoing together, it is clear that when a petitioner seeks a protective order pursuant to 45-5-220, it is the court’s duty to determine whether any of the complained of activity is Constitutionally-protected. Since such activity is excluded from 45-5-220, any order issued by the court would be limited to restricting unprotected activity.
Windsor owns the URL for the website seanb**shie.com. Windsor created the site in 2013 to rebut the endless defamatory statements Boushie was publishing about Windsor on the Internet and to express his opinions about B**shie. The content is Windsor’s intellectual property. B**shie had no ownership interest of any kind in the site.
The MMC did not make any determination that the content of any of Windsor’s publications about B**shie qualified as unprotected speech.
The right to due process is a “basic aspect of the duty of government to follow a fair process of decision making when it acts to deprive a person of his possessions. The purpose of this requirement is not only to ensure abstract fair play to the individual. Its purpose, more particularly, is to protect his use and possession of property from arbitrary encroachment …” Id.
The most significant due process protection is notice and the opportunity to be heard before the government may deprive an individual of liberty or property. (Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333, 47 L.Ed.2d 18, 32 (1976); United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43, 53, 126 L.Ed.2d 490, 503 (1993).) “[S]ome form of hearing is required before an individual is finally deprived of a property [or liberty] interest.” Id.
Notice must be “reasonably calculated to inform parties of proceedings which may directly and adversely affect their legally protected interests.” STEAB v. Luna, MT 125 (2010), citing Mont. Power Co. v. Public Serv. Commn., 206 Mont. 359, 368, 671 P.2d 604, 609 (1983). Due process requires notice and the opportunity to be heard “at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Id.
1. The website is Windsor’s personal property and Windsor had to purchase the URL. There is no authority to suggest B**shie was entitled to receive the URL or to gain control of Windsor’s intellectual property, especially in the course of petitioning for a TOP.
2. Nothing about the website required immediate court action to provide for B**shie’s safety and welfare. According to B**shie, Windsor had numerous places to continue posting his opinions about B**shie. In that case, it was pointless to restrain Windsor from posting about B**shie on a single website.
3. The order was unconstitutional as a prior restraint on Windsor’s liberty and for deprivation of his property without a hearing.
4. The order failed to provide Windsor with a timeframe within which he was to comply.
5. Transfer of the site required Windsor to have contact with B**shie, even though other parts of the TOP restrained him from such contract. It was impossible for Windsor to determine exactly what the EX-PARTE-TOP did or did not allow. This was a violation of Windsor’s right to due process.
Even the State doesn’t know when Windsor “violated” the vague order. The state originally charged Windsor with violating the order on October 2, 2014, the day before the information was filed. Then the State moved for permission to amend the information to say that Windsor violated the order by failing to comply the day after the TOP was issued. Finally, the State has amended the information to state that sometimes over the course of 404 days, Windsor violated the TOP by failing to release seanb**shie.com to B**shie. The State simply has no basis to bring a criminal charge against Windsor for failing to meet some arbitrary, unstated deadline.
Windsor had not transferred the site to B**shie as of February of 2015, and B**shie sought and obtained a dismissal of his Petition.
This Court addressed prior restraint and overbroad terms in St. James Healthcare v. Cole, 178 P.3d 696, 341 Mont. 368, 2008 MT 44 (02/12/2008).
B. It is unconstitutional for a TOP to restrain an individual’s access to 1,700 individuals, describing them only as “U of M Staff,” particularly where none of the individuals in question petitioned the court for a TOP and there was no limitation on the type of contact.
There are 1,700 full-time U of M Staff and an unknown number of part-time, and it is impossible to be in Missoula without unknowingly having contact with some of the Staff. Further, no one from the U of M Petitioned for a TOP.
In sum, B**shie was not entitled to interfere with Windsor’s lawful activities simply by stating he felt harassed or intimidated by them. The prior restraints that were imposed on Windsor without any legal basis violated his Constitutional rights.
If, as this Court found, 40-15-201, MCA does permit a court to restrain a Respondent’s contact with over 1,700 people as described above, the statute is far too broad to be constitutional.
“The crucial question in addressing an overbreadth challenge is whether the statute sweeps within its prohibitions what may not be punished constitutionally.” O’Shaughnessy, 216 Mont. at 440, 704 P.2d at 1026; Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 114-15, 92 S. Ct. 2294, 2302 (1972).
MCA 40-15-201 improperly invades Constitutionally-protected activities.
On December 26, 2013, Windsor filed a lawsuit against B**shie for defamation, in the Texas state court. In order to avoid violating the no contact with B**shie provision of the TOP, on or about the 6th day of February, 2014, documents from the civil suit were sent to B**shie via Denker-Eccles.
Legal service mail is speech protected by the First Amendment.
On October 3, 2014, the State charged Windsor with Count II in this case, “On or about the 6th day of February, 2014, the above-named Defendant committed the offense of violation of an order of protection... to wit: Defendant emailed Claudia Denker-Eccles, Associate Counsel for the University of Montana.” See Exhibit-15, Amended Information.
II. Is 40-15-302, MCA, which automatically extends the term of a TOP during an appeal to a DC, unconstitutional because it results in deprivation of a Respondent’s liberty or property without a hearing for as long as 546 days and because it is vague?
If DC-3 is right, the statute authorizes an unconstitutional restraint on liberty and unconstitutional deprivation of property for a long period of time.
For all of the reasons stated above, the charges against Windsor should be dismissed.
granting the Petition for Supervisory Writ; granting a Stay of further proceedings; and providing any other relief that this Court feels is appropriate.
I hereby certify that this document is proportionately spaced, using Times Roman typeface, 14 point, and the word count is 3,999 words excluding the sections that are not to be counted.
I hereby certify that I have served the following by depositing said copies into the U.S. mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the following: Fourth Judicial District Court, Missoula County Courthouse, 200 West Broadway, Missoula, Montana 59802 and Judge James A. Haynes, Fourth Judicial District Court, Missoula County Courthouse, 200 West Broadway, Missoula, MT 59802.
Bill Windsor will be doing a special filming after the trial in Missoula. He wants to try to get as many victims as possible to come to the trial. Then a group session will be filmed followed by filming of individual stories. So, if you are in Montana or have friends there, please ask them to participate. January 5-6, 2016.

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