Source: https://www.floridaimmigrationlawyerblog.com/why_the_crime_of_battery_in_fl_1/
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 00:07:48+00:00

Document:
In 2013, the Supreme Court again weighed in on the issue of divisibility, that is when you can separate out different parts of a statute to determine what a person was really convicted of doing. Decamps v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 2276 (2013). For Florida’s battery statute, that decision meant that because a jury in Florida never has to decide between whether a defendant touched or struck a victim before they can find someone guilty, the statute is not divisible, but rather, it is overbroad.
Between these two decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court, immigrants in removal proceedings and fighting for benefits before USCIS could argue that their conviction for violating the first part of Florida’s Battery statute was never a crime of violence. Or, better yet, they could have their Board Certified Immigration attorney make that argument for them (like me: https://www.slgattorneysflorida.com/john-gihon.html).
Florida Courts have held many times that violating Florida’s battery statute does not require the use of physical force. Check out these cases for examples: Perkins v. State, 576 So.2d 1310 (Fla. 1991); State v. Hearns, 961 So.2d 211 (Fla. 2007); Bradley v. State, 106 So. 3d 530, 532 (Fla. App. Ct. 2013); and Santiago v. State, 76 So.3d 1027 (Fla. App. Ct. 2011).
However, immigration judges and USCIS have not always agreed that when an immigrant is possibly convicted of the portion of the statute that requires the intentional infliction of bodily harm, the conviction is not a crime of violence. This new BIA decision should end that discussion.
In Matter of Guzman-Polanco, 26 I&N Dec. 713 (BIA 2016) the Board held that in the context of a crime of violence analysis under 18 U.S.C. § 16(a), a statute that requires that the defendant intentionally inflict injury to a victim does not necessarily involve the use of violent physical force as required under Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010). The Board held that the culpable conduct that can violate the statute in this case, an intentional act that results in injury to the victim, can be accomplished in multiple ways that do not involve the intentional use of violent physical force. Therefore, the statute was not a categorical crime of violence. The Board withdrew its contrary decision in Matter of Martin, 23 I7N Dec. 291 (BIA 2002) and distinguished U.S. v. Castleman, 134 S.Ct. 1405 (2014) a case the Department often uses to argue that any intentional act that results in physical injury necessarily involves the use of violent physical force.
This decision means that because the part of Florida’s battery statute that criminalizes the intention infliction of bodily harm can be done without the use of violent physical force, that portion of the statute is not a categorical crime of violence. Now, no part of Florida’s battery statue is a categorical crime of violence and immigrants and their attorney are able to argue that the entire statute is overbroad and indivisible and can never be a crime of violence or domestic violence.

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