Source: https://federalfmla.typepad.com/fmla_blog/employee_request_for_leave/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 07:47:49+00:00

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The FMLA allows an eligible employee of a covered employer to take FMLA leave to care for a covered family member, including a parent. A "parent" includes a biological, adoptive step or foster mother or father, or any other individual who stood in loco parentis to the employee when the employee was a son or daughter (e.g., under 18 years of age, or over 18 years of age an incapable of self-care due to a disability). 29 CFR 825. 122(b). In loco parentis means that the individual had day-to-day responsibility to care for or financially suport the employee when the employee was a son or daughter. 29 CFR 825.122(c)(3).
To invoke the protections of the FMLA, the employee must notify his or her employer of the need for FMLA-qualifying leave. The FMLA's notice requirements are not onerous. Basically, the employee must provide adequate information to apprise the employer that the leave may be in need of FMLA leave. An employee need not invoke the "FMLA" by name. If the employer needs more information to determine whether the leave is covered by the FMLA, they are required to inquire further.
In Ruble v. American River Transportation Co., No. 2:10 CV 24 DDN (E.D. Mo. June 29, 2011), Jack Ruble notified his supervisor (the boat captain) that his 90-year-old grandmother was ill and that he may need to leave the boat during the voyage. It was uncontested that Ruble's grandmother took exclusive care of Ruble when he was a child for several years.
During the voyage, Ruble was notified by his family that his grandmother had been diagnosed with terminal cancer and was not expected to live more than a week. That day, he told the boat captain that his grandmother had terminal cancer, that she was not expected to live more than a week, and that he wanted to leave the boat. Ruble and the crew lived on the boat during the voyage. Under Company policy, leaveing the boat during a voyage without approval was grounds for removal. The boat captain referred Ruble to the Company Personnel Manager, whom Ruble called and explained the situation.
Ruble told the Personnel Manager that his grandmother was ill and he needed to go see her before she died because she had taken care of him. He delayed leaving the vessel for a few days while the Company tried to secure a replacement. The Company asked Ruble to wait one more day for the replacement before leaving the boat. Ruble declined, and flew home. He did not, however, see his grandmother at the hospital until the following day.
Ruble's grandmother was discharged from the hospital a few days after he arrived. She stayed with her daughter, who was primarily responsible for her care. Ruble's grandmother did not live with him at his home near or before her death. Ruble stayed by his grandmother's side throughout her hospital stay, providing psychological comfort, and care. He also spent almost every day with his grandmother while at Shipley's house. Ruble's grandmother died on May 18.
Ruble was terminated from employment for leaving the boat without authorization during the voyage. He sued, alleging that his termination violated the FMLA. The Company moved for summary judgment to dismiss the case, arguing that Ruble failed to provide adequate notice that the leave may be FMLA-qualifying. The Company argued that Ruble failed to adequately notify it that his grandmother was his in loco parentis parent while Ruble was a child. Absent an in loco parentis relationship, the FMLA does not entitle an employee to take leave to care for a grandparent.
When an employee seeks to invoke FMLA benefits based on an in loco parentis relationship, the employee must provide his employer with sufficient facts indicating that such a relationship may exist. See Sherrod v. Philadelphia Gas Works, 57 Fed. Appx. 68, 72-73 (3d Cir. 2003)("Since [the employee] did not initially tell her employer that her grandmother had raised her, she failed to sufficiently explain her reasons for the needed FMLA."); Abousaidi v. Mattress Discounters Corp., No. 1:05CV1142 (JCC), 2005 WL 3797366, at *2 (E.D. Va. Dec. 8, 2005). Otherwise, the employer could not know that the employee's leave may be secured by the FMLA. See Wierman,638 F.3d at 1000 (the employer's duties do not arise until the employee gives sufficient information to who that he may be in need of FMLA leave).
The Court found that Ruble's assertion that he told the Personnel Manager that his grandmother "took care of him," coupled with his more effusive affidavit on the subject, created a genuine issue of material fact regarding the adequacy of Ruble's notice sufficient to defeat the Company's motion for summary judgment.
Comment: To secure the benefits and protections of the FMLA, an employee requesting FMLA leave to care for an in loco parentis parent must articulate some facts to put the employer on reasonable inquiry notice that the leave might be FMLA qualifying. An in loco parentis parent does not have to involve a legal or biological relationship. All that is required is that the individual had responsibility to care for and/or financially support the employee when the employee was a son or daughter within the meaning of the FMLA. Absent a biological or legal relationship, it may not be obvious to an employer that a grandparent, older sibling, uncle, aunt, or someone else cared for the employee when the employee was a child. While an employee need not affirmatively assert an in loco parentis relationship (although they certainly could do so), the do need to articulate some facts suggesting an in loco parentis relationship. If the employer needs additional information to confirm an in loco parentis relationship, the burden is on the employer to inquire further.
As demonstrated in Ruble, the notice bar on this issue is relatively low (e.g., my grandma took care of me). It is not, however, non-existent. Employers, in turn, must be alert to in loco parentis relationships as a qualifying basis for FMLA leave. When in doubt, ask the employee to clarify the nature of what might be an in loco parentis relationship.
John Prigge told Sears, his employer, that he was absent for two days to receive radiation treatment for prostate cancer. In reality, Prigge suffered from bipolar disorder, which had been diagnosed several years earlier. Prigge was subsequenlty absent for seven days during which he was admitted to a medical clinic suffering from depression. On this occasion, Prigge advised Sears that his absence was due to incapacity and treatment for bipolar disorder. He also confessed that his prior absence was not due to prostate cancer, but to bipolar disorder.
Sears demanded that Prigge provide medical documentation substantiating his need for leave due to prostate cancer and bipolar disorder. Prigge provided medical documentation substantiating his need for leave due to bipolar disorder. He provided medical certification verifying that he did not suffer from prostate cancer. Sears fired for failure to substantiate his need for leave with medical documentation due to prostate cancer, and for lying about his need for prostate cancer.
The Third Circuit agreed with Sears. It found, essentially, that Sears had the right to terminate Prigge for lying about his need for leave, and because he failed to substantiate that need with supporting medical documentation.
Comment: However awkward or embarrassing, employees need to tell their employers the real reason for their need for FMLA leave. Courts have not allowed employees to tell their employer a false reason for the need for leave. In addition to being truthful, had Prigge told Sears the real reason for the prior leave it would have likely been covered by the FMLA. Courts have not excused employees from telling their employer the real reason for their need leave out of embarrassment or fear that the reason will be fodder for office gossip. Nor have they looked past the false reason to find FMLA coverage based on the real reason for the leave. Courts have consistently found that employers are entitled to the real reason animating the need for leave.
Prigge v. Sears Holding Corp., No. 10-3397 (3d Cir. June 23, 2011).
Upon learning that his wife was pregnancy and due in early 2008, Chad Wilson told his supervisor that he might need to take leave to care for his newborn if his mother-in-law was unavailable. Wilson was subsequently terminated for dismissing his supervisor's concerns about Wilson''s failure to follow the chain of command regarding a pay issue.
Wilson sued alleging that his termination was in retaliation for exercising FMLA rights. He argued that he engage din FMLA-protected activity by requesting leave to care for his child. The FMLA provides that an employee must "provide at least verbal notice sufficient to make the employer aware that the employee needs FMLA-qualifying leave, and the anticipated timing and duration of the leave." 29 CFR 825.302(c).
The Fifth Circuit found that Wilson failed to provide adequate notice of the need for FMLA leave. Wilson, the Court observed, " never informed Noble that he intended to take leave, only that he "might" need to take leave and that there was a "possibility" that he would need to take leave." The Court held that these comments were insufficient to make his employer aware that he needed FMLA-qualifying leave.
The Court also found that Wilson failed to notify his employer of the "anticipated timing and duration" of any leave. Wilson conceded that he did not get into any specifics as to who, what, when, or where of the leave. Telling his supervisor that he "might" need to take leave "early in the year after the baby was here" failed to inform the employer of the anticipated timing and duration of the leave, the Court held.
The Court held that Wilson failed to establish that his removal was in retaliation for requesting FMLA leave.
Comment: While employees need not invoke the FMLA by name when requesting leave, they must provide their employer with sufficient information to alert the employer that FMLA leave may be needed. Telling an employer that you "might" or "possibly" may need FMLA leave, even for an FMLA-qualifying reason, is not sufficient. To be a valid request, courts also want more specificity in terms of the timing and duration of the leave. Employees do not invoke the protections of the FMLA by telling your employer that you may need leave at unnknown time in the future. To invoke the FMLA, employees need to provide more specifics, not less, when requesting leave.
Shauna Saenz was approved for intermittent leave for partial complex epileptic seizures. The letter approving the leave indicated that Saenz needed to request FMLA leave by contacting a third party provider (Hartford) no later than 2 days after each time she took intermittent leave. The letter warned that failure to provide the necessary notice could result in the loss of FMLA protection. Without incident, Saenz exercised her right to intermittent leave 9 times in the ensuring five months. Each time, the letter approving the leave referenced the 2-day n notice requirement. Saenz missed work on December 29-31 and January 3-4.
On December 28, Rhonda Galloway, Saenz's mother, discovered Saenz hallucinating and disoriented. Galloway determined that Saenz could not work that day, and informed Saenz's immediate supervisor. Galloway also informed a higher level supervisor of the need for leave. Galloway took Saenz to the emergency room of the hospital where she worked for treatment. The higher level supervisor personally came and visited Saenz while she was in the emergency room. Gallow secured a court order appointing her to be a guardian of her daughter for purposes of making medical decision. Saenz was subsequently transferred to another health care facility for treatment. She was released three days later. On her release, she stayed with her mother. Galloway called Saenz's immediate supervisor, explained what had happened in the interim, and requested an indeterminate amount of leave. The supervisor reminded Galloway that Saenz was required to request leave through Hartford. Galloway apparently did not call The Hartford. Saenz was subsequently diagnosed with bipolar disorder. Saenz called The Hartford on January 9 regarding her absences of December 29, 30, 31, and January 3 and 4, 2007. The Hospital subsequently terminated her employment due to her non-FMLA approved absences. The letter explained that her absences were not FMLA-approved because she failed to request leave within two days of her hospital discharge as required by the employer's policy.
Saenz sued the hospital alleging violation of the FMLA. The district court awarded summary judgment to the hospital. Saenz appealed to the Fifth Circuit. The Fifth Circuit reversed the decision of the district court. Specifically, the court found that, pursuant to 29 CFR 825.303, Saenz contacted the hospital "as soon as practicable" and provided enough information to hospital staff to alert her employer that she was requesting FMLA leave. The fact that she did not timely contact the third party provider within two days as required by the hospitals' more restrictive policy was not, the court concluded, controlling. In that regard, the FMLA establishes a more relaxed notice requirements, which is all the employee was required to satisfy.
Comment: The decision, in my opinion, correctly determined that, under the circumstances, the employee timely provided adequate notice of the need for FMLA leave "as soon as practicable." The court also correctly determined that, to perfect her request for FMLA leave, the employee need only satisfy the minimum requirements of the FMLA leave, and not the more stringent procedural requirements imposed by the employer's policy.
The decision is based on the pre-2009 revisions to the DOL regulations. The court correctly declined to aply the post-2009 DOL notice regulations retroactively. As revised, the "new" DOL notice regulations provide that, absent unusual circumstance, an employee must abide by an employer's "usual and customary" notice and procedural requirements for requesting unforeseen leave. See 29 CFR 825.303(c). In dicta, the Fifth Circuit observed that, if the new standard applied, the employer "might very well be entitled to summary judgment." Opinion at n. 9. My opinion: If the circumstances of this case are not "unusual," the term has no meaning. On these facts I don't' believe the result would, or should, change.
The lesson: an employee who is incapable of complying with an employer's more stringent "usual and customary"notice procedures may still be entitled to FMLA leave if they satisfy the minimum notice requirements of the FMLA. An employee who fails to adhere to the employer's leave requesting procedures may, however, be subject to discipline for such failure even though FMLA leave was granted.
In Righi v. SMC Corp. of America, No. 07-cv-1064, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15429 (C.D. Ill. Feb. 27, 2009), the employee requested leave to care for his mother, a diabetic who was hospitalized after accidentally took an overdose of mediation. At the time, SMC was aware that the employee was caring for his mother due to her medical condition. SMC had approved leave for this purpose in the past. As a result of his mother's overdose, the Righi requested "a couple of days off" to make medical care arrangements for his mother. In the e-mail requesting leave, Righi mentioned that, although he could apply for FMLA leave, he did not want to do so at this time. Instead, he asked for vacation. On receipt of the e-mail, SMC made several unsuccessful attempts to contact Righi. Righi admitted later that he turned off his cell phone for a week. Righi was subsequently terminated for violating SMC's call-in policy. Righi sued alleging interference with the FMLA.
Righi argued that his e-mail message referencing the FMLA was sufficient to place SMC on notice that he was, in fact, asking that his absence be covered by the FMLA. In rejecting the argument and awarding summary judgment to SMC, the Court found that the burden of inquiry never shifted to SMC to determine if the absence might be covered by the FMLA. The Court found that SMC was not legally obligated to ignore the employee's own statement that he was not interested in applying for approved FMLA leave to cover his absence. Nor was SMC required to persuade an employee to take FMLA leave where the employee has indicated they do not wish to.
Comment: Employees who seek FMLA protections after they have knowingly elected not to exercise their FMLA rights in order to preserve the ability to use FMLA leave in the future have not fared well in the courts. To get over this high hurdle, employees would need to show that, for example, the employer failed to satisfy its notice requirements, or that the employer otherwise misled the employee regarding FMLA rights and responsibilities.
The case is a reminder that an employee who decides to use non-FMLA leave in order to preserve it for future use risks discipline.
Susan and Paul Murphy, husband and wife for 22 years, were employed as truck drivers by Watkins Motor Lines, which was subsequently purchased by FedEx. Due to a serious illness, Paul went on approved FMLA leave. His wife went on FMLA leave a few weeks later to care for Paul. Paul died unexpectedly a week later. Susan informed FedEx of Paul's death that same day. She was crying when she called. She remained on leave. A few days later Susan asked for an additional 30 days of leave "to take care of things." FedEx approved the leave. FedEx management testified that Susan was often crying and seemed "very sad" during these two discussions. Susan understood that she was approved for an additional 30 days of FMLA leave. FedEx subsequently informed Susan that she had been separated from the company prior to the expiration of the 30-day period.
The Court believes that Plaintiff's employer's knowledge of Plaintiff's husband's death, the fact that she was crying, and that she asked for additional time to "take care of things" could be sufficient to put her employer on notice that she was asking for FMLA leave. If the employer had questions regarding whether Plaintiff was attempting to continue her FMLA based upon her own illness, it should have followed up with Plaintiff.
Comment: The decision is not as far fetched as it might initially seem. It is very clear that an employee is not entitled to FMLA leave "to care for" a covered family member once that family member passes away. The employee would, however, be still entitled to FMLA leave due to their own serious health condition, or to care for another covered family member with a serious health condition (e.g., emotional distress resulting from the death of the original covered family member, assuming the condition meets the definition of a serious health condition).
In Murphy, Susan requested leave for herself. The request was sufficient to shift the burden of inquiry to the employer because FedEx knew (1) she was asking for an extension of her approved FMLA leave; (2) the extension was for a significant period of time; and (3) Susan was demonstrably upset by the death of her spouse of 22 years.
Where an eligible employee requests leave due to a death in the family employer's should proceed with caution. Courts and jury's are likely to be very sympathetic to the employee. Employer's might want to think twice before jumping to the conclusion that the employee is only requesting bereavement leave outside of the protections of the FMLA. Employer's would be well advised to make additional inquiries to determine whether the leave is FMLA-qualifying.
Murphy v. FedEX National LTL, Inc. No. 4:07CV01247 JCH, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79147 (E.D.Mo. Oct. 8, 2008).
In Krenzke v. Alexandria Motor Cars, Inc., No. 07-1561, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 17654 (4th Cir. Aug. 15, 2008), the court found that a doctor's note faxed to the employer stating, "I recommend 2 weeks of no work due to medical complications and illness" was sufficient to alert the employer of the possibility that the leave may be covered by the FMLA. The court observed that, "[a]lthough the note was summary in nature, it was received from a medical doctor and stated that an extended leave was needed for medical reasons." The burden of inquiry shifted to the employer to gather additional information and determine if the leave was actually covered by the FMLA. The employer did not inquire further. As such, the court concluded that Krenzke provided sufficient notice that she was entitled to leave under the FMLA.
Comment: The decision adds to the long line of cases that have addressed the tipping point where the employee has provided enough, albeit incomplete, information suggesting the possibility that the FMLA may be involved to shift the burden of inquiry to the employer. Some courts have required that the reason articulated for leave come pretty close to the criteria for one of the serious health condition definitions. Others, like the Fourth Circuit here, have shifted the burden of inquiry based on far less specific information. Employers, of course, need to figure out whether the standard in their Circuit is horseshoes (requiring fairly specific information) or hand grenades (requiring less employee specificity) before the burden of inquiry shifts to them.
In the Fourth Circuit, the source of an otherwise vague leave notice, a doctor rather than an employee, would appear to lower the bar for purposes of suggesting the possibility of FMLA leave and shifting the burden of inquiry to the employer. I say this because there are cases out there where employees have asked for lengthy periods of leave due to "illness," "sickness," and the like and courts have not shifted the burden of inquiry.
To play it safe, employers who receive notice of the need for lengthy employee leave via doctor's notes should consider making further inquiries to determine if the FMLA may be implicated.
In Fritz v. Phillips Service Industries, Inc. No. 06-11149, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38266 (E.D. Mich. May 12, 2008), the employee requested leave on May 2, 2005, due to right knee pain. Frtiz called and reported that he was unable to work due to his "knee condition." In 2003, PSI had granted Fritz FMLA leave to undergo surgery on his right knee. PSI was also aware that Fritz was scheduled to undergo another surgery on his right knee on May 24, 2005.
On these facts, the court found that PSI had clear notice that Fritz had a serious health condition related to his right knee sufficient to shift the burden of inquiry to the employer to determine whether his May 2, 2005, request may be covered by the FMLA. PSI did not inquire further, but immediately fired Fritz. The employer had argued, unsuccessfully, that it was unreasonable to conclude that PSI should have known that the two events, the 2003 FMLA qualifying surgery and the May 2-3, 2005, were related. The court denied PSI's summary judgment motion.
Comment: The adequacy of an employee's request for leave that may be FMLA-qualifying is judged in light of an employer's institutional memory of the employee's past FMLA usage. Where an employee links their otherwise innocuous current request for leave with a previously recognized FMLA condition, the employee will have satisfied their obligation to reasonably apprise the employer that the leave may be FMLA-qualifying. Such linkage may be established despite the passage of several years since the last time FMLA leave was used.
To comply with the FMLA, employers should ensure that FMLA decision-makers have ready access to information regarding an employee's past FMLA usage in order to determine if their is any linkage with a current leave request. It is doubtful that compartmentalization of this information within an employer will defeat a claim that the employer, as opposed to any one supervisor, was not on notice of the prior, approved FMLA leave usage.
Similarly, employer's should put systems in place so that institutional memory of an employee's past FMLA usage is not lost because a leave administrator or supervisor transfers to another position or leaves the company.
Indeed, "feeling stressed out"' is common to the workplace and hardly puts an employer on notice of a "qualifying condition" under the FMLA.
Comment: To perfect the right to take FMLA leave an eligible employee must impart sufficient information, through words, conduct, or both, to reasonably apprise the employer that the leave may be needed for an FMLA-covered condition. In providing notice, the employee need not invoke the FMLA by name or use any "magic words." The critical test for substantively-sufficient notice is whether the information that the employee conveyed to the employer was reasonably adequate to apprise the employer of the employee's request to take leave for a serious health condition that rendered him unable to perform his job. If an employee provides enough information about a qualifying condition, the burden of inquiry shifts to the employer to seek further details to confirm that the leave may be covered by the FMLA.
In Lackman v. Recovery Services of New Jersey, Inc., No. 06-2016 (RMB), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11085 (D.N.J. Feb. 13, 2008), the employee's statement that he felt "stressed out" was so deficient that the court did not shift the burden of inquiry to the employer. Courts have similarly found that employee requests for leave because they felt "sick" or "didn't feel well" failed to provide adequate notice that the leave may be covered by the protections of the FMLA.

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