Source: https://mn.gov/law-library-stat/archive/ctapun/9802/1582.htm
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 18:19:32+00:00

Document:
International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 49 vs. Minnesota Department of Transportation, et al. and L & D Trucking, et al. vs. Minnesota Department of Transportation, et al. C6-97-1582, Court of Appeals Unpublished, February 24, 1998.
In this appeal from an order denying a motion to enforce a declaratory judgment, appellants argue that the denial of the motion rendered the declaratory judgment inoperative. We affirm.
This section does not apply to wage rates and hours of employment of laborers or mechanics engaged in the processing or manufacture of materials or products, or to the delivery of materials or products by or for commercial establishments which have a fixed place of business from which they regularly supply the processed or manufactured materials or products. This section applies to laborers or mechanics who deliver mineral aggregates such as sand, gravel, or stone which is incorporated into the work under the contract by depositing the materials substantially in place, directly or through spreaders, from the transporting vehicle.
Id., subd. 2 (1996). Respondent Minnesota Department of Transportation (MnDOT) is required to enforce this statute. Id., subd. 7 (1996).
MnDOT agrees to enforce, at a minimum, the State prevailing wage law, Minn. Stat. § 177.44, at all non-commercial off-site facilities associated with highway construction projects let based on bids as provided in Minn. Stat. § 161.32, regardless of whether federal funds are involved in the project on all contracts let after December 1, 1996, and all contracts associated with the St. Croix River Crossing Bridge (the Stillwater Bridge).
On December 9, 1996, MnDOT issued two notices to bidders on federal-aid highway construction projects. One notice stated that MnDOT would enforce Minn. Stat. § 177.44 on projects regardless of whether they received federal funding. The second notice stated that MnDOT would administer contracts according to Minn. Stat. § 177.44, subd. 2, and set forth guidelines for interpreting the term "commercial establishment" in Minn. Stat. § 177.44, subd. 2.
That [MnDOT] shall be enjoined from enforcement or seeking to enforce the interpretation of the term "Commercial Establishment" contained in Minn. Stat. § 177.44, Subd. 2 against Plaintiffs and all persons similarly situated, in proposals for contracts and state highway construction projects.
On April 18, 1997, MnDOT issued a notice that informed construction project bidders about the April 15, 1997, order. Quoting from the April 15 order, the notice stated that MnDOT had been "enjoined from enforcement or seeking to enforce the interpretation of the term "Commercial Establishment" contained in Minn. Stat. § 177.44, Subd. 2 against Plaintiffs and all persons similarly situated, in proposals for contracts and state highway construction projects." The notice also stated that the notices to bidders that MnDOT issued on December 9, 1996, were deleted in their entirety from proposals for contracts.
Believing that the April 18 notice meant that MnDOT would no longer follow the December 2, 1996 declaratory judgment, Local 49 filed a motion to enforce the order. The district court denied the motion.
has the authority to fashion an equitable remedy to effectuate its prior declaratory judgment if it determines that one of the parties breached its obligations under that judgment and that the additional remedy in question is appropriate.
Larken Minnesota, Inc. v. Wray, 881 F.Supp. 1413, 1420 (D.Minn. 1995).
Local 49 argues that the denial of its motion to enforce the December 2, 1996, declaratory judgment rendered the judgment inoperative. Local 49 contends that the fundamental error in the district court's order denying its motion to enforce is that the district court equated MnDOT's enforcement of the prevailing wage statute with enforcement of MnDOT's interpretation of the statutory term "commercial establishment." We disagree.
Local 49's argument is based on an unwarranted interpretation of MnDOT's response to the April 15, 1997, judgment. Local 49 contends that, using an abundance of caution following the April 15 judgment, MnDOT informed bidders on highway construction projects both that it would no longer enforce the interpretation of "commercial establishment" set forth by the guidelines in its December 9, 1996, notice to bidders, and that it would no longer comply with the December 2, 1996, judgment. We find no basis in the record for concluding that MnDOT's April 18, 1997, notice breached MnDOT's obligations under the December 2 judgment by informing bidders that MnDOT would no longer comply with the judgment.
The notices MnDOT issued following the December 2 judgment stated that MnDOT would enforce Minn. Stat. § 177.44 on projects regardless of whether the projects received federal funding and set forth guidelines for interpreting the term "commercial establishment" in Minn. Stat. § 177.44, subd. 2. The fact that MnDOT later deleted these notices from proposals for contracts does not mean that MnDOT would no longer follow the December 2 judgment. MnDOT can enforce Minn. Stat. § 177.44, as required under the December 2 declaratory judgment, without enforcing its previous guidelines for interpreting the term "commercial establishment." MnDOT's enforcement will simply have to be on a case-by-case basis. See Bunge Corp. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 305 N.W.2d 779, 785 (Minn. 1981) (administrative policy may be formulated by promulgating rules or on a case-by-case determination; agency has discretion to decide what method is appropriate in a particular situation). Also, MnDOT can enforce Minn. Stat. § 177.44 on all noncommercial off-site facilities associated with highway construction projects that involve federal funds without first issuing a notice that it will do so.
Because MnDOT can enforce the December 2, 1996, declaratory judgment without violating the April 15, 1997, injunction, there was no basis in the record for the district court to conclude that MnDOT had breached its obligations under the December 2, 1996, declaratory judgment and that an additional remedy was appropriate.

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