Source: http://al.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20180130_0000413.MAL.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 00:45:34+00:00

Document:
NANCY BUCKNER, individually and in her official capacity as Commissioner of DHR, ., Defendants.
On June 20, 2016, Plaintiff Meredith Garrard Stevens filed a civil complaint in this court averring claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and various state law claims against Nancy Buckner, Kim Mashego, and Corrine Matt, each in their individual and official capacities (collectively, “Defendants”). (Doc. 1). Defendants filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Fed.R.Civ.P. (Doc. 11). The District Judge granted that motion to the extent of dismissing Counts I and II of the Complaint as moot. (Docs. 39, 40). Count III is the sole remaining federal claim.
For the reasons stated herein, it will be further RECOMMENDED that the remaining claims of the Complaint be DISMISSED AS MOOT.
Subject matter jurisdiction is conferred by 28 U.S.C. § 1331 as to Plaintiff's federal causes of action, and the court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over her state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. The parties do not contest personal jurisdiction or venue, and the court finds sufficient information of record to support both. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391. On January 5, 2017, the above-styled matter was referred to the undersigned for review by United States District Judge Myron H. Thompson. (Doc. 23); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b); Rule 72, Fed. R. Civ. P.; United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667 (1980); Jeffrey S. v. State Board of Education of State of Georgia, 896 F.2d 507 (11th Cir. 1990).
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss tests the sufficiency of the Complaint against the legal standard set forth in Rule 8: “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2).
When evaluating a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the court must take “the factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Pielage v. McConnell, 516 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2008). However, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663 (2009). “[A] plaintiff's obligation to provide the ‘grounds' of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] ... a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 663 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). “[F]acial plausibility” exists “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The standard also “calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence” of the claim. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. While the complaint need not set out “detailed factual allegations, ” it must provide sufficient factual amplification “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. at 555.
“So, when the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief, ‘this basic deficiency should ... be exposed at the point of minimum expenditure of time and money by the parties and the court.'” Twombly, 550 U.S. 558 (quoting 5 Wight & Miller § 1216, at 233-34 (quoting in turn Daves v. Hawaiian Dredging Co., 114 F.Supp. 643, 645 (D. Haw. 1953)) (alteration original). “[O]nly a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

References: § 1983
 § 1331
 § 1367
 § 1391
 § 636
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 § 1216
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