Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/333/95/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 02:20:59+00:00

Document:
When there are inherent in an appeal to this Court from a judgment of the highest court of a state questions of state law which were not presented to, or considered by, the highest court of the state, this Court will vacate the judgment and remand the cause to that court for consideration of those questions of state law. Pp. 333 U. S. 96-98.
110 Utah 533, 175 P.2d 724, vacated and remanded.
The Supreme Court of Utah affirmed a conviction of appellants for conspiracy "to commit acts injurious to public morals" in violation of the Utah Code Ann., 1943, § 103-11-1. 110 Utah 533, 175 P.2d 724. Judgment vacated and cause remanded, p. 333 U. S. 98.
Amendment to the Federal Constitution. In the trial court, a motion to dismiss the charge at the close of the evidence broadly indicated reliance on the Fourteenth as well as the First Amendment, and such reliance was indicated in requests for instructions. A preliminary motion to quash the information was stated in broad terms which it is claimed admitted argument of any federal grounds. Trial resulted in conviction, and the Supreme Court of the State overruled all constitutional objections and affirmed.
"(5) To commit any act injurious to the public health, to public morals, or to trade or commerce, or for the perversion or obstruction of justice or the due administration of the laws. . . ."
it may include. Standing by itself, it would seem to be warrant for conviction for agreement to do almost any act which a judge and jury might find at the moment contrary to his or its notions of what was good for health, morals, trade, commerce, justice, or order. In some States the phrase "injurious to public morals" would be likely to punish acts which it would not punish in others because of the varying policies on such matters as use of cigarettes or liquor and the permissibility of gambling. This led to the inquiry as to whether the statute attempts to cover so much that it effectively covers nothing. Statutes defining crimes may fail of their purpose if they do not provide some reasonable standards of guilt. See, for example, United States v. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U. S. 81. Legislation may run afoul of the Due Process Clause because it fails to give adequate guidance to those who would be law-abiding, to advise defendants of the nature of the offense with which they are charged, or to guide courts in trying those who are accused.
as this case is concerned, has been waived or lost because there was no timely or sufficient assignment of it as ground for dismissal to comply with state practice. We believe we should not pass upon the questions raised here until the Supreme Court of Utah has had opportunity to deal with this ultimate issue of federal law and with any state law questions relevant to it.
This trial was not conducted in federal court nor for violation of federal law. It is a prosecution by the State, in its courts, to vindicate its own laws. Our sole concern with it is to see that no conviction contrary to a valid objection raised under the Fourteenth Amendment is upheld. What the statutes of a State mean, the extent to which any provision may be limited by other Acts or by other parts of the same Act, are questions on which the highest court of the State has the final word. The right to speak this word is one which State courts should jealously maintain and which we should scrupulously observe. In order that the controversy may be restored to the control of the Supreme Court of Utah, its present judgment is vacated and the cause is remanded for proceedings not inconsistent herewith.
MR. JUSTICE RUTLEDGE, with whom MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS and MR. JUSTICE MURPHY concur, dissenting.
whether the state supreme court has construed the Utah statute to authorize punishment for exercising the right of free speech protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Federal Constitution.
The statute which appellants have violated provides that it shall be a crime for two or more persons to conspire "to commit any act injurious . . . to public morals." The opinion of the state supreme court construes these words to apply to conduct which induces people to enter into bigamous relationships and, more particularly, to the advocacy of the practice of polygamy. It held that the appellants were properly convicted because the evidence proved that they were parties to "an agreement to advocate, counsel, advise and urge the practice of polygamy and unlawful cohabitation by other persons."
by the Federal Constitution. But, as I read the opinion of the state court, it did not make a further limitation also required by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The Utah statute was construed to proscribe any agreement to advocate the practice of polygamy. [Footnote 5] Thus, the line was drawn between discussion and advocacy.
The Constitution requires that the statute be limited more narrowly. At the very least, the line must be drawn between advocacy and incitement, and even the state's power to punish incitement may vary with the nature of the speech, whether persuasive or coercive, the nature of the wrong induced, whether violent or merely offensive to the mores, and the degree of probability that the substantive evil actually will result. See Bridges v. California, 314 U. S. 252, 314 U. S. 262-263.
is started, the advocacy of polygamy may either be unlawful as inducing a violation of law or be constitutionally protected as essential to the proper functioning of the democratic process.
In the abstract, the problem could be solved in various ways. At one extreme, it could be said that society can best protect itself by prohibiting only the substantive evil and relying on a completely free interchange of ideas as the best safeguard against demoralizing propaganda. [Footnote 7] Or we might permit advocacy of lawbreaking, but only so long as the advocacy falls short of incitement. [Footnote 8] But the other extreme position, that the state may prevent any conduct which induces people to violate the law, or any advocacy of unlawful activity, cannot be squared with the First Amendment. At the very least, as we have indicated, under the "clear and present danger" rule, the second alternative stated marks the limit of the state's power as restricted by the Amendment.
on the theory that an agreement to advocate polygamy is unlawful. The trial court certainly proceeded on this theory, if it did not go further and consider discussion of polygamy as injurious to public morals as well. Therefore, even assuming that appellants may have been guilty of conduct which the state may properly restrain, the convictions should be set aside. A general verdict was returned, and hence it is impossible to determine whether the jury convicted appellants on the ground that they conspired merely to advocate polygamy or on the ground that the conspiracy was intended to incite particular and immediate violations of the law. Since, therefore, the convictions may rest on a ground invalid under the Federal Constitution, I would reverse the judgment of the state court. Cf. Thomas v. Collins, supra; Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U. S. 287; Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359.
"At one of these meetings, one Heber C. Smith, Jr. was made the specific object of remarks of various defendants." 10 Utah 533, 175 P.2d 724, 735.
Although the information in terms charged a conspiracy to advocate and practice polygamy, the state court construed it as though it charged a conspiracy to advocate the practice of polygamy. 175 P.2d 724, 730.
"It is true . . . that at certain meetings speakers discussed polygamy, reading from the Bible and making the claim that the ancient polygamous marriage system was instituted of God, and that 'plural marriage is a law of God;' and that some individuals at these meetings declared that legislation prohibiting the practice of polygamy violates the spirit of the First Amendment to the Federal Constitution; that some speakers denounced officials of the Mormon Church for excommunication of people for teaching or practicing plural marriage, stating that the leaders of said church have 'no divine authority,' and that such church is apostate, and that some services were conducted as 'testimonial meetings' at which members of the congregation arose voluntarily to express their views on any subject, and to acknowledge gratitude to God."
"If it were true that none of the defendants did anything other than to attend meetings as indicated above [see note 3 supra], expressing disagreement with some other denomination, criticizing legislation, and giving opinions on religious subjects, none of the convictions could be upheld. The right of free speech cannot be curtailed by indirection through a charge of criminal conspiracy."
"that an agreement to advocate, teach, counsel, advise and urge other persons to practice polygamy and unlawful cohabitation is an agreement to commit acts injurious to public morals within the scope of the conspiracy statute."
Utah, 175 P.2d 724, 731.
"Political agitation, by the passions it arouses or the convictions it engenders, may in fact stimulate men to the violation of law. Detestation of existing policies is easily transformed into forcible resistance of the authority which puts them in execution, and it would be folly to disregard the causal relation between the two. Yet to assimilate agitation, legitimate as such, with direct incitement to violent resistance is to disregard the tolerance of all methods of political agitation which, in normal times, is a safeguard of free government. The distinction is not a scholastic subterfuge, but a hard-bought acquisition in the fight for freedom, and the purpose to disregard it must be evident when the power exists. If one stops short of urging upon others that it is their duty or their interest to resist the law, it seems to me one should not be held to have attempted to cause its violation."
Judge Learned Hand in Masses Pub. Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535, 540.
"We have nothing to fear from the demoralizing reasonings of some if others are left free to demonstrate their errors, and especially when the law stands ready to punish the first criminal act produced by the false reasonings; these are safer corrections than the conscience of a judge."
Excerpt of letter written by Thomas Jefferson to Elijah Boardman of New Milford, Connecticut, on July 3, 1801, quoted by Charles A. Beard, The Nation, July 7, 1926, vol. 123, p. 8.
"But even advocacy of violation, however reprehensible morally, is not a justification for denying free speech where the advocacy falls short of incitement and there is nothing to indicate that the advocacy would be immediately acted on."
Mr. Justice Brandeis, concurring in Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, at 274 U. S. 376.

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