Source: https://www.tdcaa.com/journal/new-statutory-protections-for-%C2%ADvideotaped-interviews-of-child-victims/
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 20:40:10+00:00

Document:
In March 2011, the Court of Criminal Appeals denied the State mandamus relief and upheld a trial court’s order requiring the State to make a copy of a child victim’s videotaped forensic interview from the local Children’s Advocacy Center (CAC) for the defense. After a pointed dissent from Presiding Judge Keller, the 82nd Legislature acted quickly by amending both Article 39.15 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and §264.408 of the Family Code. Under both of the new provisions, the defense is allowed reasonable access to a videotaped CAC interview, but a trial court cannot order the State to provide the defense a copy of the video.
As a practical matter, most prosecutors did exactly what the district attorney did in In re District Attorney’s Office: The prosecutor informed defense counsel of the CAC video and invited defense counsel and any defense expert to view the video at a mutually agreeable time at the prosecutor’s office. If, however, the defense demanded its own copy of the video, the prosecutor would object and cite §261.201 as the basis. It has been the authors’ experience that this system worked fairly and efficiently. Rarely would a defense attorney who had been given adequate access to view the CAC video demand his own copy.
The dispute arose out of a continuous sexual abuse of a child case. Despite the fact that the State made the interview video available for viewing by defense counsel, the defense sought to have the trial court order the State to provide the defense a copy of the video citing the standard discovery provision, Art. 39.14(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Notwithstanding the State’s objections, the trial court granted the defense motion and required the State to make a copy of the CAC video and hand it over to the defense.
Shortly after the Court of Criminal Appeals decided In re District Attorney’s Office, the legislature amended both the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Family Code to ensure the defense fair access to a CAC video, but at the same time, make clear that a court could not compel the State to copy or reproduce a child victim’s videotaped interview for the defense.
A court shall deny any request by a defendant to copy, photograph, duplicate, or otherwise reproduce any property or material described by Subsection (a), provided the State makes the property or material reasonably available to the defendant.
After In re District Attorney’s Office, the legislature added Subsection (a)(3) to include video recordings of forensic interviews of children. Therefore, so long as the prosecutor makes the video reasonably available to the defense for viewing, Subsection (c)’s prohibition on defense requests for a copy of the video applies to CAC videos.
Second, the legislature amended §264.408 of the Texas Family Code. By adding Subsection (d-1), lawmakers made clear that while the videotaped interview was subject to production by making it reasonably available for defendants and their experts to view under Article 39.15’s discovery provisions, courts “shall deny any request by a defendant to copy, photograph, duplicate, or otherwise reproduce” a CAC video.
The legislature’s response to In re District Attorney’s Office really did not change the way most prosecutors and most defense attorneys already operated; the prosecutor notified defense counsel of the existence of the CAC video and then allowed defense counsel (and any designated defense experts) to view the video at a mutually agreeable time. The system worked well. Rarely did defense counsel demand, in addition to reasonable access to the video, a copy of the videotape. Following the legislative reaction to In re District Attorney’s Office, a trial court cannot grant a defendant’s demand for a copy of the videotape and the reasonable access, that was typically provided as a courtesy to defense counsel, is now expressly required. Most folks, on both sides of the docket, should be satisfied, and we are back to business as usual.
1 Tex. Fam. Code §261.201.
2 Dickens v. Ct. App. 2nd Sup. Jud. Dist., 727 S.W.2d 542, 553 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987); see also Coachman v. State, 692 S.W.2d 940, 945 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, pet. ref’d).
3 In re Dist. Attorney’s Office, 2011 WL 1235027.
4 Id. (Keller, P.J., dissenting).
7 Id. (citing In re State ex. rel Rosenthal, No. 14–02–00306–CV, 2002 WL 730786 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 25, 2002, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
8 See Edward L. Wilkinson, Legal Ethics & Texas Criminal Law, Prosecution, and Defense 275–76 (TDCAA 2006); see also Strickler v. Green, 527 U.S. 263 (1999).

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