Source: https://www.ptab.us/2016/08/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 10:17:21+00:00

Document:
Although we acknowledge that neither relative terms nor functional language is per se indefinite, we find here that the recitation of “small,” “increase,” and “enlarged” fails to provide for a reasonably precise claim scope. “The claims, when read in light of the specification . . . , must provide objective boundaries for those of skill in the art.” Interval Licensing LLC v. AOL, Inc., 766 F.3d 1364, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
Appellant asserts that Brander is a monolithic structure and argues that this claim limitation requires that the mounting enclosure be formed from a plurality of pieces (id.). However, we agree with the Examiner that as a product claim, even as a product-by-process claim, the structure is not limited by the method of manufacture (Ans. 8). See Greenliant Sys., Inc. v. Xicor LLC, 692 F.3d 1261, 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ("'[i]n determining validity of a product-by-process claim, the focus is on the product and not the process of making it."). Further, nothing in the claim language, or Specification, limits the meaning of "portions" to pre-assembly portions.
As an initial matter, we are not persuaded by Appellants' argument that a person of ordinary skill would have been forced to conduct undue experimentation in wild-type rats to arrive at the conclusions of Forte I. See App. Br. 10. "Undue experimentation" is part of the test for determining whether a claim is enabled by the specification. See Nat 'l Recovery Techs., Inc. v. Magnetic Separation Sys., Inc., 166 F.3d 1190, 1196 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ("The scope of enablement, in turn, is that which is disclosed in the specification plus the scope of what would be known to one of ordinary skill in the art without undue experimentation").
A prior art reference that enables a single embodiment within the scope of a claim anticipates that claim, even if the same embodiment would not enable the full scope of the later-claimed invention. Cf In re Lukach, 442 F.2d 967, 970 ( CCPA 1971) (" [T]he description of a single embodiment of broadly described subject matter constitutes a description of the invention for anticipation purposes ... , whereas the same information in a specification might not alone be enough to provide a description of that invention for purposes of adequate disclosure.").
See NetMoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2008). "[I]t is not enough [for an anticipation rejection] that the prior art reference ... includes multiple, distinct teachings that the artisan might somehow combine to achieve the claimed invention.").
1746 Ex Parte EIFLER et al 13968580 - (D) HANLON 102/103 102/103 Abel Law Group, LLP LEE, DANIEL H.
It is well established that teaching an alternative method does not teach away from the use of a claimed method. In re Dunn, 349 F.2d 433, 438 (CCPA 1965); see also, Ex parte Shuping, No. 2008-0394, 2008 WL 336222, at *2 (BPAI 2008) ("[T]eaching a way is not teaching away").
We are not persuaded the Examiner erred because the body of claim 12 is silent regarding the IEEE 802.11 standard recited in the preamble.
6 Contra Eaton Corp. v. Rockwell Int 'l Corp., 323 F.3d 1332, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (citing e.g., Electro Sci. Indus. v. Dynamic Details, Inc., 307 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2002)) ("When limitations in the body of the claim rely upon and derive antecedent basis from the preamble, then the preamble may act as a necessary component of the claimed invention").

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.