Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=83209:57194&catid=1585&Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 04:34:26+00:00

Document:
G.R. No. 190277, July 23, 2014 - ABSOLUTE MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, Respondent.
ABSOLUTE MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, Respondent.
At bar is a Petition for Review on Certiorari with Application for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, of the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 101568 dated August 13, 2009 and November 13, 2009, respectively, reversing the Orders dated May 2, 20073 and September 3, 20074 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 80, and requiring the court a quo to allow respondent to participate in the proceedings of Civil Case No. Q-00-42105.
On October 5, 2000, Sherwood Holdings Corporation and Spouses Sandy Ang and Arlene Ang filed a case for sum of money against private respondent Absolute Management Corporation before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 80 and docketed as Civil Case No. Q-00-42105. Private respondent filed its answer and incorporated a third-party complaint against petitioner Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company.
In an Order dated January 30, 2004, the trial court set the case for pre-trial on February 7, 2004, but the same was cancelled on account of the filing by petitioner of a motion to admit fourth-party-complaint against the Estate of Jose L. Chua.
On September 5, 2005, the trial court issued an Order directing petitioner to produce and allow private respondent to copy, microfilm copies of several checks and the bank ledgers of Current Account Nos. 00719-250162-4 and 00700-250691-9. On November 20, 2006, the trial court set the case for pre-trial. When the counsels of the parties were asked by the trial court to produce their respective authorizations to appear at the said hearing, [counsel for petitioner] manifested that [her] authority to appear for petitioner was submitted by them at the first pre-trial hearing way back [in] 2004.
Petitioner’s counsel was given the chance to go over the records to look for [the] Secretary’s Certificate she allegedly submitted in 2004. Petitioner’s counsel, however, failed to show any written authority. As a result thereof, the trial court, upon motion of the private respondent, declared petitioner in default. Accordingly, the trial court allowed private respondent to present evidence ex-parte.
Without waiting for the written order of default, petitioner, on December 5, 2006, filed a Motion to Lift Order of Default seeking reconsideration of the Order dated November 20, 2006, attaching thereto an Affidavit of Merit together with the required Secretary’s Certificate dated July 16, 2006 and Special Power of Attorney dated December 5, 2006.
Respondent filed a petition for certiorari with the CA alleging that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the aforestated Orders dated May 2 and September 3, 2007.
The presumption in favor of the counsel’s authority to appear in behalf of a client is a strong one. A lawyer is not even required to present a written authorization from the client. In fact, the absence of a formal notice of entry of appearance will not invalidate the acts performed by the counsel in his client’s name. However, the court, on its own initiative or on motion of the other party[,] [may] require a lawyer to adduce authorization from the client.
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT A SPECIAL POWER OF ATTORNEY NEED NOT BE PRESENTED IN COURT DURING PRE-TRIAL HEARINGS SINCE THE AUTHORITY OF A LAWYER TO APPEAR IN BEHALF OF HIS CLIENT IS PRESUMED.
A) THE NON-APPEARANCE OF A PARTY IN PRE-TRIAL MAY BE EXCUSED ONLY IF A VALID CAUSE IS SHOWN THEREFORE OR IF A REPRESENTATIVE SHALL APPEAR IN HIS BEHALF FULLY [AUTHORIZED] IN WRITING.
B) THE CASES CITED BY THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, NAMELY: (1) LANDBANK OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. [PAMINTUAN], CO. AND (2) CEBU STEVEDORING VS. RAMOLETE, TO SUPPORT ITS RULING THAT THE AUTHORITY OF [A] LAWYER TO APPEAR IN BEHALF OF THE CLIENT IS PRESUMED, ARE INAPPLICABLE TO THE INSTANT CASE.
II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT THERE WAS GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE LOWER COURT, WHEN IN FACT THE LOWER COURT ONLY PROPERLY APPLIED THE PROVISIONS OF THE LAW REQUIRING THE PRESENTATION OF A SPECIAL POWER OF ATTORNEY DURING PRE-TRIAL.
III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT THE LIBERAL APPLICATION OF THE RULES SHOULD BE APPLIED IN THE CASE OF RESPONDENT.
IV. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT ORDERED RESPONDENT TO PARTICIPATE IN THE TRIAL OF THE COLLECTION CASE FILED WITH THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT.
When this case was called for pre-trial conference, co-plaintiff Sandy Ang failed to appear despite notice, thus, this case is hereby dismissed, insofar as he is concerned. Accordingly, defendant Absolute Management Corp. may now adduce evidence ex parte in support of its counterclaim against co-plaintiff Sandy Ang.
With respect to the third-party complaint of Absolute Management Corp., against third-party defendant Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company whose counsel failed to present a Secretary’s Certificate and Special Power of Attorney authorizing her to represent said bank in today’s pre-trial, said third-party plaintiff is hereby allowed to present evidence ex parte pursuant to the provisions of Sec. 5, Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Meanwhile, let this case be referred to the Philippine Mediation Center for mediation proceedings on December 6, 2006 at 10:00 in the morning. Let the pre-trial conference between the remaining plaintiffs and defendant Absolute Management Corp. be set on January 29, 2007 at 1:30 in the afternoon.
2. The failure of the undersigned counsel to present the above-mentioned authorization at the said occasion was due to their impression that the same was already submitted by them during the initial pre-trial hearing of the case that was held on February 27, 2004. Because of such impression, undersigned counsel did not bring anymore the required authorization from [respondent]. Upon inspection of the records of the case after the said pre-trial hearing, undersigned counsel, however, discovered and realized that no such authorization was submitted by them at the said first pre-trial hearing.
3. The records of the instant case will show that the undersigned counsel has been representing [respondent] in all the proceedings of the present case from the very start, including the cases before the Court of Appeals (CA G.R. SP No. 86336) and the Supreme Court (SC G.R. SP No. 170498), involving the issue of whether or not the former has the right to file a fourth-party complaint against the Estate of Jose Chua.
SEC. 5. Effect of failure to appear. - The failure of the plaintiff to appear when so required pursuant to the next preceding section shall be cause for dismissal of the action. The dismissal shall be with prejudice, unless otherwise ordered by the court. A similar failure on the part of the defendant shall be cause to allow the plaintiff to present his evidence ex parte and the court to render judgment on the basis thereof.
Everyone knows that a pre-trial in civil actions is mandatory, and has been so since January 1, 1964. Yet to this day its place in the scheme of things is not fully appreciated, and it receives but perfunctory treatment in many courts. Some courts consider it a mere technicality, serving no useful purpose save perhaps, occasionally to furnish ground for non-suiting the plaintiff, or declaring a defendant in default, or, wistfully, to bring about a compromise. The pre-trial device is not thus put to full use. Hence it has failed in the main to accomplish the chief objective for it: the simplification, abbreviation and expedition of the trial, if not indeed its dispensation. This is a great pity, because the objective is attainable, and with not much difficulty, if the device were more intelligently and extensively handled.
What needs stressing is that the parties as well as the Trial Court must realize that at the pre-trial, the parties are obliged not only to make formal identification and specification of the issues and of their proofs, as above described – indeed, there is no reason why the Court may not oblige the parties to set these matters down in separate writings and submit them to the Court prior to the pre-trial, and then to discuss, refine and embody the matters agreed upon in a single document at or shortly after the pre-trial – but also and equally as peremptorily, to directly address and discuss with sincerity and candor and in entire good faith each of the other subjects enumerated in Section 1, Rule 20, i.e., the “possibility of an amicable settlement or of a submission to arbitration,” the “advisability of a preliminary reference of issues to a commissioner,” and “such other matters as may aid in the prompt disposition of the action,” inclusive of a resort to the modes of discovery.
87. Moreover, a closer perusal of the SPA and the Secretary’s Certificate, which Respondent allegedly thought were submitted during the 27 February 2004 scheduled pre-trial, would show that the same were dated only on 05 December 2006 and 16 July 2006, respectively.
Indubitably, the appellate court ruled on the capacity of respondent’s counsel to represent it as its lawyer, or as its attorney, in the court a quo. Perforce, it ruled that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion when it declared that respondent’s counsel did not have the authority to represent it. We are constrained to disagree with this ruling. The crux of this controversy is whether respondent’s counsel had the authority to represent respondent in her capacity as its representative during the subject pre-trial, and not in her capacity as its counsel. Prescinding from the foregoing disquisitions, we agree with the court a quo that respondent’s counsel did not have the proper authority.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101568 dated August 13, 2009 and November 13, 2009, respectively, are REVERSED. The Orders dated May 2, 2007 and September 3, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 80, in Civil Case No. Q-00-42105 are hereby REINSTATED and UPHELD.
1Rollo, pp. 45-50. Penned by Associate Justice Monina Arevalo-Zenarosa with Associate Justices Fernanda Lampas Peralta and Priscilla J. Baltazar-Padilla concurring.
2 Id. at 43-44. Penned by Associate Justice Fernanda Lampas Peralta with Associate Justices Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr. and Priscilla J. Baltazar-Padilla concurring.
5 Id. at 45-47. Emphases omitted.
7 Id. at 48-49. Citations omitted.
9Lui Enterprises, Inc. v. Zuellig Pharma Corporation and the Philippine Bank of Communications, G.R. No. 193494, March 12, 2014, p. 18, citing Sps. Delos Santos v. Judge Carpio, 533 Phil. 42, 52-53 (2006); Acance v. Court of Appeals, 493 Phil. 676, 685 (2005); Indiana Aerospace University v. Commission on Higher Education, 408 Phil. 483, 497 (2001).
10INC Shipmanagement, Inc., et al. v. Moradas, G.R. No. 178564, January 15, 2014, p. 11. Citations omitted.
11Rollo, p. 113. Emphasis supplied.
16 251 Phil. 390 (1989).
17 Id. at 392-395. Italics in the original; emphasis supplied.
18Rollo, p. 408. Underscoring in the original.
20 Id. at 115-116. Emphasis supplied.
21 Id. at 416-417. Underscoring omitted.
22 Id. at 49. Citations omitted.

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