Source: http://ksag.washburnlaw.edu/opinions/2002/2002-037.htm
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 02:45:57+00:00

Document:
A municipal court judge may order an attorney to represent an indigent defendant charged with violation of a municipal ordinance where incarceration is likely. However, whether a noncompliant attorney can be punished for contempt will depend upon whether the attorney's noncompliance occurs in the presence of the court. If so, the municipal court judge can punish the attorney for direct contempt and proceed pursuant to K.S.A. 20-1203. If the noncompliance does not occur in the presence of the court, a municipal court judge has no authority to punish the attorney for contempt because, absent legislative authority, a municipal court judge has no authority to punish for indirect contempt. Cited herein: K.S.A. 12-1109; 12-4103; 12-4106; 12-4108; 12-4401; 12-4405; 12-4411; 12-4510; 12-4517; 20-1201; 20-1202; 20-1203; K.S.A. 2001 Supp. 20-1204a; Kan. Const., Art. 2, § 1; Art. 3, § 1.
As Municipal Judge for the City of Paola, you inquire whether a municipal court judge may require attorneys to represent indigent defendants charged with violations of municipal ordinances. If so, you inquire whether a municipal court judge has the authority to hold a noncompliant attorney in contempt.
Clearly, both state law and the United States Constitution require the appointment of counsel for an indigent defendant who faces the possibility of incarceration for violation of a municipal ordinance. K.S.A. 12-4405 places the onus on municipal court judges to appoint counsel. Therefore, in order for a judge to carry out this mandate, it is our opinion that a municipal court judge has the authority to appoint attorneys to represent indigent defendants.(5) The problem is whether that order can be enforced through the contempt process if an attorney does not comply.
"Because municipal courts are not courts of record, they do not have inherent power to punish for indirect contempt. Only courts of record have inherent authority to punish for contempt of court. (Citations omitted).
"Kansas case law has traditionally provided that municipal courts, police courts at the time of the cases cited below, had no power to punish for indirect contempt. (Citations omitted). Thus, if a municipal court is to have jurisdiction over indirect contempt matters, its jurisdiction must come from legislative enactment. No statute provides that authority."
Municipal courts are the successors to police courts(19) established in the latter part of the 19th century to hear ordinance violations.(20) Police judges had the same power as today's municipal judges to "fine or imprison for contempt committed in court."(21) In 1967, police courts and police judges were renamed municipal courts and municipal court judges, respectively.(22) Six years later, in1973, all of the statutes scattered throughout Chapters 13, 14, and 15 of the Kansas Statutes Annotated dealing with the former police/municipal courts were repealed and replaced by the Kansas Code of Procedure for Municipal Courts, K.S.A. 12-4101 et seq.
"In support of the judgment of the district court, it is argued that the doctrine of separation of the departments of government into legislative, executive, and judicial applies to the organization of cities of the second class; that the police judge . . . is a judicial officer. . . . [This] argument derives [from] the power of the Legislature to organize police courts and to provide for police judges from article 3, § 1, Const., which reads as follows: 'The judicial power of this state shall be vested in a Supreme Court, district courts, probate courts, justices of the peace, and such other courts, inferior to the Supreme Court, as may be provided by law.' The section of the Constitution quoted is not the true source of the Legislature's authority over the establishing of municipal courts. Such authority comes with the grant to the House of Representatives and Senate of all the legislative power of the state (Const. art. 2, § 1), which includes power to provide for the organization and government of cities.
While Article 3, Section 1 of the Kansas Constitution has been amended since the Keener decision, the amendments are not such as to cast doubt on Keener's implication that municipal courts and municipal court judges do not enjoy the same inherent judicial powers enjoyed by district courts and district court judges.
Clearly, a municipal court judge can fine or imprison for contempt "committed in court or for failure to obey process."(25) The problem is determining whether an attorney's failure to comply with a municipal court appointment order is contempt "committed in court" or whether it is indirect contempt.(26) In Judge Leben's concurring/dissenting opinion, he concluded that contempt "committed in court" is equivalent to "'direct contempt,' which is contempt committed in the presence of the sitting court or the judge sitting in chambers." Because failing to pay a fine occurs outside a judge's presence, Judge Leben opined that failure to pay a municipal court fine constitutes indirect contempt which is not cognizable by a municipal court judge. Moreover, in Judge Leben's opinion, summoning a person into court to explain why he or she fails to make a payment cannot transform a failure to pay into direct contempt.
Summarizing, a municipal court judge may order an attorney to represent an indigent defendant charged with violation of a municipal ordinance where incarceration is likely. However, whether a noncompliant attorney can be punished for contempt will depend upon whether the attorney's noncompliance occurs in the presence of the court. If so, the municipal court judge can punish the attorney for direct contempt and proceed pursuant to K.S.A. 20-1203. If the noncompliance does not occur in the presence of the court, a municipal court judge has no authority to punish the attorney for contempt because, absent legislative authority, a municipal court judge has no authority to punish for indirect contempt.
2. 225 Kan. 599, 605 (1979).
3. 407 U.S. 25, 92 S.Ct. 2006, 32 L.Ed.2d 530 (1972).
4. See State ex rel. Stephan v. Smith, 242 Kan. 336, 353 (1987) (while the selection of counsel to represent indigent defendants charged with statutory crimes is discretionary, the appointment of counsel is nondiscretionary); Clark v. Ivy, 240 Kan. 195, 202 (1986) (judiciary has obligation to appoint counsel for indigent defendants charged with crimes, whether felonies or misdemeanors).
5. You indicate that the City has adequate funds to compensate attorneys so there is no Fifth Amendment "takings" issue as occurred in State ex rel. Stephan v. Smith, 242 Kan. 336 (1987).
6. K.S.A. 12-4411 (failure to obey subpoena); K.S.A. 12-4510 (failure to pay fine); K.S.A. 12-4517 (failure to comply with court order requiring fingerprinting).
7. Process is any means used by a court to acquire jurisdiction over a person. Black's Law Dictionary (5th Ed. 1979) at 1084. See K.S.A. 12-4108 (municipal court clerk shall issue all process).
9. State v. Jenkins, 263 Kan. 351, 355 (1997).
10. K.S.A. 20-1202. ("That contempts committed during the sitting of the court or of a judge in chambers, in its or his presence, are direct contempts. All others are indirect contempts.") See In re Administration of Justice in the Eighteenth Judicial District, 269 Kan. 865, 872 (2000) (Leben, S., concurring and dissenting) (a "contempt committed in [municipal] court" would appear to be equivalent to "direct contempt," which is contempt committed in the presence of the sitting court or the judge sitting in chambers.") See also State v. Anders, 64 Kan. 742 (1902) (disobeying a subpoena occurs outside the presence of the court and, therefore, the contempt is indirect).
11. In re Administration of Justice in the Eighteenth Judicial District, 269 Kan. 865, 879 (2000) (Leben, S., concurring and dissenting).
14. 269 Kan. at 879-880.
16. "The judicial power of this state shall be vested exclusively in one court of justice, which shall be divided into one supreme court, district courts, and such other courts as are provided by law; and all courts of record shall have a seal. The supreme court shall have general administrative authority over all courts in this state."
17. State v. Keener, 78 Kan. 649, 653 (1908).
18. Id. See Cyr v. Cyr, 249 Kan. 94, 99 (1991) ("the power to punish for contempt of court does not arise from legislative action, but is inherent in the court itself").
20. See K.S.A 13-601 et seq. (cities of the first class); K.S.A. 14-801 et seq. (cities of the second class); K.S.A. 15-501 et seq. (cities of the third class) (repealed L. 1973, Ch. 61, §12-4702).
21. K.S.A. 13-615, 14-817, 15-517 (repealed L. 1973, Ch. 61, § 12-4702); K.S.A. 12-4106(a).
23. 78 Kan. 649 (1908).
24. 78 Kan. at 650, 653.
26. See State v. Jenkins, 263 Kan. 351, 361 (1997) (the Court struggled to determine whether an attorney's absence and tardiness in district court constituted direct or indirect contempt. The Court adopted a "hybrid" approach which defers the characterization of whether a contempt is direct or indirect until the attorney has an opportunity to explain. If the contempt is direct, then the procedure outlined in K.S.A. 20-1203 applies; if the contempt is indirect, then K.S.A. 2001 Supp. 20-1204a applies. This approach does not work in the municipal court scenario because, unlike district court, the issue is whether a municipal court has jurisdiction).
27. K.S.A. 12-4103 ("[i]f no procedure is provided by [the Kansas Code of Procedure for Municipal Courts], the court shall proceed in any lawful manner consistent with any applicable law and not inconsistent with this code."); K.S.A. 20-1201; State v. Jenkins, 263 Kan. 351 (1997).

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