Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/392/639/
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 12:17:35+00:00

Document:
Petitioner, a Pennsylvania state prisoner, brought this action in the District Court claiming that prison authorities had violated § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 by confiscating legal materials which petitioner had acquired for pursuing his appeal but which, in alleged violation of prison rules, were in another prisoner's possession. The District Court dismissed petitioner's complaint on the ground that petitioner had not exhausted certain state administrative remedies.
Held: It was not necessary for petitioner to resort to these state remedies in light of this Court's decisions in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167, 365 U. S. 180-183, and other cases.
Certiorari granted; 379 F.2d 556, reversed and remanded.
dismissed the complaint on the sole ground that petitioner had not alleged exhaustion of state administrative remedies, citing Gaito v. Prasse, 312 F.2d 169 (C.A.3d Cir.). The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed without opinion. We grant the petition for certiorari and reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
"to address a communication at any time to the Superintendent, the Deputy Commissioner of Correction, or the Commissioner of Correction, and as a final appeal, to the Attorney General."
Petitioner did seek relief from the Deputy Superintendent of his prison, but without result. He was told, he says, to "leave well enough alone." His mother's telephone calls and correspondence with prison authorities were likewise unavailing. He has not, however, taken an appeal to the Deputy Commissioner of Correction, the Commissioner, or to the Attorney General.
As we understand the submission of the Attorney General of Pennsylvania in this Court, the rules of the prison were validly and correctly applied to petitioner; these rules are further said to be strictly enforced throughout the entire correctional system in Pennsylvania. In light of this, it seems likely that to require petitioner to appeal to the Deputy Commissioner of Correction, the Commissioner, or to the Attorney General would be to demand a futile act. In any event, resort to these remedies is unnecessary in light of our decisions in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167, 365 U. S. 180-183; McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U. S. 668, 373 U. S. 671, and Damico v. California, 389 U.S.

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