Source: https://www.dorsey.com/newsresources/publications/client-alerts/2016/06/the-surpeme-court--june-20-2016
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 02:47:50+00:00

Document:
RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community, No. 15-138: The European Union and 26 of its members filed an action in District Court against petitioners RJR Nabisco, Inc. and related entitles (collectively “RJR”). The suit alleged that RJR violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), by participating in a global money laundering scheme with organized crime groups where euros from black market dealings were used to pay for large shipments of RJR cigarettes into Europe. The District Court dismissed the suit on the basis that RICO does not extend to racketeering activity outside the United States or to foreign enterprises, but the Second Circuit reversed. Today, the Court reversed, holding (1) that a substantive RICO violation may be based on a pattern of racketeering that includes predicate offenses committed abroad, provided that each of those offenses violates a predicate statute that is itself extraterritorial; but (2) that RICO’s private right of action does not overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality, and thus a private RICO plaintiff must allege and prove a domestic injury to its business or property.
Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC v. Lee, No. 15-446: Garmin International and Garmin USA sought review from the Patent Office of the patent claims held by petitioner Cuozzo Speed Technologies under an agency procedure called “inter partes review.” That procedure is set forth in the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act and permits a third party to ask the Patent Office to reexamine claims in an already issued patent and cancel any that the agency finds are unpatentable in light of prior art. Here, as part of its inter partes review, the Patent Office cancelled three of Cuozzo’s claims. Cuozzo appealed to the Federal Circuit, challenging the Patent Office’s institution of review here, as well as the Patent Office regulation it applied which gave the patent claim “its broadest reasonable construction in light of the specification of the patent in which it appears.” 37 C.F.R. §42.100(b). The Federal Circuit concluded that the decision to institute inter partes review was non-appealable pursuant to the Act’s provision that the Patent Office’s decision “whether to institute an inter partes review . . . shall be final and non-appealable,” 35 U.S.C. §314(d), and further upheld the Patent Office’s “broadest reasonable construction” regulation. The Court today affirmed, holding (1) that Section 314(d), though it may not bar consideration of a constitutional question, does bar judicial review of the kind of run-of-the-mill claim at issue here, involving the Patent Office’s decision to institute inter partes review; and (2) that the Act’s grant of authority to the Patent Office to issue “regulations . . . establishing and governing inter partes review under this chapter” gave it authority to issue the “broadest reasonable construction” regulation.
Encinco Motorcars v. Navarro, No. 15-415: Under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), Congress requires that employees pay overtime compensation to covered employees, but since the FLSA’s amendment in 1974, expressly exempts “any salesman, partsman, or mechanic primarily engaged in selling or servicing automobiles, trucks or farm implements” at a covered dealership. Respondents were service advisors (i.e., someone who sells services for vehicles, rather than the vehicles themselves) at a Mercedes-Benz dealership and claimed they were entitled to overtime. Over the years, the Department of Labor had vacillated in its interpretation as to whether service advisors were subject to this statutory exemption. In 2011, with little explanation, the Department reversed course from its decades-old practice of treating service advisors as exempt, and instead provided that “salesman” exempt from overtime were only those who sold automobiles, trucks, or farm implements. The District Court found for the dealership that service advisors were exempt from the overtime requirement, but the Ninth Circuit reversed, following the Chevron doctrine and deferring to the Department’s 2011 interpretation. The Court today vacated and remanded, holding that the statutory exemption must be construed without placing controlling weight on the Department’s 2011 regulation because it was issued without the reasoned explanation required before being accorded Chevron deference.
Taylor v. United States, No. 14-6166: Petitioner David Anthony Taylor was indicted for two counts under the Hobbs Act, which makes it a crime for a person to affect commerce, or to attempt to do so, by robbery. 18 U.S.C. §1951(a). Taylor was prosecuted for two robberies targeting marijuana dealers. At Taylor’s retrial after a hung jury in the first, the District Court, at the urging of the Government, precluded Taylor from offering evidence that the dealers he targeted dealt in only locally-grown marijuana. Taylor was convicted and the Fourth Circuit affirmed. Today, the Court affirmed, holding that Congress may regulate intrastate drug theft, and thus the evidence in this case was sufficient to satisfy the Hobbs Act's commerce element.
Utah v. Strieff, No. 14-1373: A narcotics detective was conducting intermittent surveillance on a home for suspected narcotics activity based on an anonymous tip. During that time, the detective observed visitors who were only at the house for a few minutes, one of whom was respondent Edward Strieff. When Strieff exited the house and walked to a nearby convenience store, the detective detained Strieff in the parking lot, identified himself, and asked Strieff what he was doing at the residence. At the detective’s request, Strieff provided his identification, which the detective relayed to police dispatch, and was informed that Strieff had an outstanding warrant for a traffic violation. The detective then arrested Strieff pursuant to that warrant, searched him incident to arrest, and discovered methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia. When Strieff was charged with drug related offenses, he moved to suppress on the basis that the evidence was derived from an unlawful stop. The prosecution conceded that there was not reasonable suspicion for the stop, but argued the evidence of a valid arrest warrant attenuated the connection between the unlawful stop and discovery of the drug-related evidence. The trial agreed with the State and the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed, but the Utah Supreme Court reversed, finding the evidence inadmissible. Today, the Court reversed, holding that the evidence the detective seized as part of the search incident to arrest is admissible because the detective’s discovery of the arrest warrant attenuated the connection between the unlawful stop and the evidence seized incident to arrest.
Jennings v. Rodriguez, No. 15-1204: (1) Whether aliens seeking admission to the United States who are subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. §1225(b) must be afforded bond hearings, with the possibility of release into the United States, if detention lasts six months. (2) Whether criminal or terrorist aliens who are subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. §1226(c) must be afforded bond hearings, with the possibility of release, if detention lasts six months. (3) Whether, in bond hearings for aliens detained for six months under Sections 1225(b), 1226(c), or 1226(a), the alien is entitled to release unless the government demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that the alien is a flight risk or a danger to the community; whether the length of the alien’s detention must be weighed in favor of release; and whether new bond hearings must be afforded automatically every six months.
NLRB v. SW General, Inc., No. 15-1251: Whether the precondition in the Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1988 (“FVRA”), found at 5 U.S.C. §3345(b)(1), on service in an acting capacity by a person nominated by the President to fill a vacant office on a permanent basis applies only to first assistants who take office under Subsection (a)(1) of 5 U.S.C. §3345, or whether it also limits acting service by officials who assume acting responsibilities under Subsections (a)(2) and (a)(3).

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