Source: http://the9thcircuitwatch.com/wp/?cat=14
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 11:49:01+00:00

Document:
Another death penalty case reversed by a 9th Circuit panel in a 2-1 majority. This case qualifies as one of the worst decisions ever rendered by a 9th Circuit panel and warrants an en banc hearing. If denied, when the case on certiorari goes to the Supreme Court, their reversal language will exceed any other in their constant chastisement of the 9th Circuit. This case does not even come close to the repeated explanation of federal habeas corpus authority issued by the Supreme Court.
This case is a 1989 execution planned by Mann, and he executed it by killing two men inside a house. Mann and another person scrupulously cleaned and renovated the house where the execution occurred, both destroyed their weapons and buried the dead bodies in a remote location. The former girlfriend of Mann was present during the crime .Later, she reported the crime to police and testified at the trial. The jury convicted Mann, who did not testify, and the judge imposed the death sentence.
Even the majority opinion demonstrates excellent representation by defense counsel. At the sentencing hearing, counsel had introduced more than enough mitigation testimony at the trial, including a psychologist who testified Mann’s head injury suffered as an adolescent did not affect his judgment. Evidence that Mann thoroughly cleaned the house of any incriminating evidence, destroyed the weapons, and dumped the bodies in a remote area hardly suggests any cognitive impairment.
The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the merits and sentence. The federal district court affirmed. On appeal to the 9th Circuit, Mann alleged the usual “ineffective assistance of counsel” argument -so commonly used in the 9th Circuit the judges refer to it by its acronym; IAOC). At an evidentiary hearing held after trial, the defense lawyer testified he considered recusing himself because the defendant wanted to lie at the trial, and counsel would not engage in perjury. Further, Mann had previous convictions which would make impeachment of his testimony even worse. There is not a shred of mitigating testimony that would have changed the judge’s sentence.
Not according to the 9th Circuit panel, citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) and ignoring all the Supreme Court habeas corpus jurisprudence demanding the 9th Circuit to respect AEDPA and not to rule on collateral review as you would on direct review. The test: to reverse on habeas corpus: the federal court must find the state decision had been the result of an incompetent state judicial system. The rest of the Mann opinion cites alleged failures of counsel to get medical records, interview witnesses, and other defense tools.
According to the panel, the sentencing judge mistakenly applied the Strickland standard as “clearly established federal law.” The author of the Mann opinion should have read all the Supreme Court cases on the double deference accorded to state court decisions required to violate Strickland.
No lawyer in the 9th Circuit can escape the obvious fact that the death penalty will never be invoked no matter what it takes – including misinterpretation of the law as evidenced by the judicial manipulation in Schad v. Ryan.
For confirmation of this observation, read the dissent.
Some day, the Supreme Court will forbid federal habeas corpus in the 9th Circuit just as the Justices did in state search and seizure and parole cases. Ninth Circuit panels have issued a constant stream of opinions based on ineffective assistance of counsel when the court cannot find legal error.
Here is what the Supreme Court told the 6th Circuit about habeas corpus in Burt v.Titlow, 134 S.Ct. 10 (2013) “AEDPA instructs that, when a federal habeas petitioner challenges the factual basis for a prior state-court decision rejecting a claim, the federal court may overturn the state court’s decision only if it was “based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding;” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). The prisoner bears the burden of rebutting the state court’s factual findings “by clear and convincing evidence.” § 2254(e)(1). We have not defined the precise relationship between § 2254(d)(2) and § 2254(e)(1), and we need not do so here. See Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290, 293, 130 S.Ct. 841, 175 L.Ed.2d 738 (2010). For present purposes, it is enough to reiterate “that a state-court factual determination is not unreasonable merely because the federal habeas court would have reached a different conclusion in the first instance.” Id., at 301, 130 S.Ct. 841. AEDPA likewise imposes a highly deferential standard for reviewing claims of legal error by the state courts: A writ of habeas corpus may issue only if the state court’s decision “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by” this Court. § 2254(d)(1).
  AEDPA recognizes a foundational principle of our federal system: State courts are adequate forums for the vindication of federal rights. “[T]he States possess sovereignty concurrent with that of the Federal Government, subject only to limitations imposed by the Supremacy Clause. Under this system of dual sovereignty, we have consistently held that state courts have inherent authority, and are thus presumptively competent, to adjudicate claims arising under the laws of the United States.” Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458, 110 S.Ct. 792, 107 L.Ed.2d 887 (1990). This principle applies to claimed violations of constitutional, as well as statutory, rights. See Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 443, 97 S.Ct. 1911, 52 L.Ed.2d 486 (1977). Indeed, “state courts have the solemn responsibility equally with the federal courts to safeguard constitutional rights,” and this Court has refused to sanction any decision that would “reflec[t] negatively upon [a] state court’s ability to do so.” Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). Especially where a case involves such a common claim as ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland—a claim state courts have now adjudicated in countless criminal cases for nearly 30 years—“there is no intrinsic reason why the fact that a man is a federal judge should make him more competent, or conscientious, or learned … than his neighbor in the state courthouse.” Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494, n. 35, 96 S.Ct. 3037, 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976) (internal quotation marks omitted). [ Recognizing the duty and ability of our state-court colleagues to adjudicate *16 claims of constitutional wrong, AEDPA erects a formidable barrier to federal habeas relief for prisoners whose claims have been adjudicated in state court. AEDPA requires “a state prisoner [to] show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error … beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. ––––, ––––, 131 S.Ct. 770, 786–787, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011). “If this standard is difficult to meet”—and it is—“that is because it was meant to be.” Id., at ––––, 131 S.Ct., at 786. We will not lightly conclude that a State’s criminal justice system has experienced the “extreme malfunctio[n]” for which federal habeas relief is the remedy. Id., at ––––, 131 S.Ct., at 786 (internal quotation marks omitted).
After having been reversed by the Supreme Court (Ryan v. James, 133 S.Ct. 579 (2013), the 9th Circuit panel on remand rewrote its decision that will be reversed again when the State of Arizona files cert.
In a sadistic, vicious and brutal murder the defendant James kidnapped the victim, crushed his head with a rock, and threw him down an abandoned mine shaft to his death. James was convicted and sentenced to death in 1981 by an Arizona state court jury. After all appeals in state court were denied, James filed 3 post conviction habeas corpus petitions. All petitions alleged ineffective counsel (among other claims) and were denied by state court judges. In the last (3d) petition the state court judge wrote: “. . .[as] to the entire petition . . . there are no genuine or material issues of fact or law that are in dispute that would entitle [James] to an evidentiary hearing. No colorable claims have been made.” With that unambiguous statement, all the allegations of ineffective counsel were denied on substantive grounds. The U.S. district court agreed and denied James’ federal habeas corpus petition.
The 9th Circuit holds the state court language is a procedural ruling, the petition is not decided on the merits, and therefore AEDPA is inapplicable. Having reversed all Arizona courts and the U.S. district court judge, the panel reversed the state court penalty phase and remanded for a hearing on mitigation evidence and the ineffective counsel allegation. A 1981 case reversed once by the Supreme Court and destined for another one (unless the 9th Circuit votes to hear it en banc).
The Supreme Court has verbally lashed the 9th Circuit repeatedly for evading AEDPA, and this case is a dramatic example of judicial misapplication of the record. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S._ (2011). All the habeas corpus claims in Arizona state court assert ineffective counsel. The state court judge in the last petition wrote a 38 page opinion clearly denying the validity of all the ineffective counsel claims. There is no procedural interpretation and the case has been decided on the merits. Another example of 9th Circuit defiance of AEDPA and the Supreme Court.
Ignoring AEDPA again and writing a decision as though on direct appeal of a state court decision – a practice repeatedly condemned by the Supreme Court – a 9th Circuit panel reversed another case on collateral review. Not only did the panel overrule the Arizona Court of Appeal and the Arizona Supreme Court, but reversed the U.S.District Court as well. All courts had denied the petition for habeas corpus.
The district court held an evidentiary hearing on the usual “ineffective assistance of counsel” argument alleging trial counsel had failed to read the records before trial. The magistrate judge recommended dismissal of the petition for habeas corpus. The district court judge agreed, but there is nothing in the record to show that counsel had failed to read the file when preparing for trial. The 9th Circuit panel cites no evidence in the evidentiary hearing to support that assertion.
Vega was convicted of sexual misconduct with his stepdaughter whose mother testified at trial her daughter had recanted her allegations. Despite cross examination of the victim on this issue, the jury convicted the defendant. Several weeks after the trial, counsel learned the victim had previously recanted in talking with a Catholic priest. No one, including Vega, had told counsel about this evidence, and the Arizona Court of Appeal and the Arizona Supreme Court held this evidence not “newly discovered.” The trial was the third trial against the defendant, and based on the two prior trials Vega and his prior trial lawyers were all aware of this recantation. Yet nothing in the record establishes the other lawyers or Vega told counsel at the third trial. When counsel did learn of the second recantation he immediately filed a motion to vacate the verdict. The trial court, in addition to the Arizona Court of Appeals, the Arizona Supreme Court and the district court judge all denied the appeal and post verdict proceedings.
How can a lawyer be “ineffective” if the defendant knows about important information and fails to tell counsel about it? The panel says the additional recantation would possibly have tilted the balance in defendant’s favor. If the jury hears the mother of the victim tesity her daughter recanted her testimony and the jurors nevertheless convicted the defendant, where does this judicial conclusion emerge?
Congress must address eliminating federal court habeas corpus review of state courts. The record demonstrates a constant misconstruction of which this case is another example.
Note: The 9th Circuit panel withdrew the original opinion and rewrote it resulting in the same judgment.
Those who opposed the death penalty at the November election argued the budget deficit justified ending capital punishment because of the excessive cost of capital cases. That cost is attributable to one source never discussed: the Ninth Circuit. To illustrate: (Paraphrasing the Ninth Circuit panel). In March,1980, Lambright and Smith (another defendant) were traveling across the country with Lambright’s girlfriend. Smith complained to Lambright about the absence of a traveling companion. In response, Lambright said they would find him a girl. Lambright also said that “he would like to kill somebody just to see if he could do it.” The trio encountered a hitchhiker, Sandra Owen, and offered her a ride. Owen accepted and got in the car. Smith raped Owen in the back seat of the car on the way to a mountain site where they exited the vehicle. Smith then raped Owen a second time and thereafter began choking her. Lambright then stabbed Owen numerous times while Smith restrained her. Finally, Lambright struck Owen in the head with a rock. Owen died as a result of her injuries.
Lambright, convicted of murder and kidnapping, was sentenced to death.The media never report the facts in capital cases, but this crime is only one example of a savage and brutal killing of an innocent woman that warrants the death penalty. On direct appeal the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. Lambright filed his federal petition in 1987 unencumbered by AEDPA. The district court denied his petition. On appeal the 9th Circuit reversed and remanded for an evidentiary hearing on Lambright’s claim alleging ineffective assistance of counsel; 191 F.3d. 1181(1999); Another hearing in the district court, reversed and remanded on appeal ; 220 F.3d 1022 (2000); Another hearing in the district court, reversed and remanded on appeal; 241 F.3d 1201 (2001). Another hearing in the district court reversed and remanded on appeal; 490 F.3d 1103 (2007); Another hearing in district court reversed and remanded on appeal; 698 F.3d 808 (2012).
And this record, deplorable as it is, compares with numerous other 9th Circuit reversals after state supreme courts have confirmed the conviction and denied post judgment relief. In the latest case at 698 F.3d 808 the argument is a “discovery issue” at an evidentiary hearing on alleged ineffective assistance of counsel. The 2-1 majority writes endlessly on trivia that should have been decided long ago. Lambright has never alleged “factual innocence” on the merits. What jury would not vote the death penalty regardless of what counsel did? According to the majority opinion, counsel failed to submit a psychiatric report at trial as mitigating evidence.
Convicted in 1987. In court in 2012.
Reversing another death penalty case (2-1), the 9th Circuit panel majority reviews an “ineffective counsel” claim in a case the prosecution will never be able to retry. The witnesses all were homeless wanderers, unreliable and inconsistent in their testimony. Nonetheless, the jury found the defendant guilty.
On direct appeal from the conviction the California Supreme Court ordered a hearing on the “ineffective counsel” claim, and was critical but did not reverse the verdict. On habeas corpus in the 9th Circuit the panel first reminded readers the petition had been filed before the effective date of AEDPA. This case was tried in 1985.
The ragtag witnesses, never identified the defendant as the killer, just testified to various facts linking him to the crime. The defense consisted of attempting to establish a third person committed the crime, also through various witnesses. One of the witnesses testified to facts implicating a third person (whose identity was never established) but who subsequently recanted all her testimony. According to the majority, they didn’t need to consider this fact.
This is another typical 9th Circuit case criticizing counsel. It is part of a pattern established a decade ago and continues even today. The majority opinion does nothing more that argue about the relevance of three witnesses, none of whom had important information on direct or rebuttal. The jury listened to this grabbag of witnesses, saw the evidence and not only found the defendant guilty but imposed the death penalty.
As the dissent points out, the California Supreme Court ordered an evidentiary hearing. The referee heard the evidence and found the facts did not warrnt reversing the conviction.The California Supreme Court agreed. But two federal judges disagreed in a case tried in 1985.
The judges on the 9th Circuit have repeatedly overruled the California Supreme Court on “ineffective counsel” claims. These judges have no understanding of criminal law trial practice and basically second guess the defense. In this case they chastise counsel for not locating a witness who no one knew existed. Counsel had the same problem with incoherent witnesses as did the prosecution.
In an opinion decided by judges Berzon and Fletcher, the “usual suspects” in criminal cases, the 9th Circuit panel set aside a death penalty case on the usual grounds of “ineffective counsel.” The defendant was convicted in 1981 based on overwhelming evidence of a gruesome and vicious murder. In 2012, twenty-three years later, and despite the repeated demands by the Supreme Court to conform to the Congressional act of AEDPA, this panel found ineffective counsel.
Apparently this defense did not occur to anyone else until this petition for habeas corpus was filed almost a quarter century after the trial. James filed repeated duplicate petitions in Arizona state court and in federal court arguing innumerable grounds-all denied. Until the case arrived in the 9th Circuit.
Unless the State of Arizona seeks review in the Supreme Court, the ability to present evidence necessary to sentence James is almost impossible. In the first place, one of the witnesses who testified against James was a juvenile, and sentenced to imprisonment until he turned eighteen. The prospect of finding him, assuming Arizona is able to subpoena him, and convincing him to testify, is slim.
The facts of this case warrant the death penalty regardless of James’ childhood, his drug use and the usual psychiatric testimony. James was not under the influence of any drug at the time of the murder; denied any opportunity to relent from his decision to murder the victim, and showed no evidence of remorse.
The 9th Circuit record of death penalty cases reversed on collateral review continues. With one exception (a case recently decided after the Supreme Court had thoroughly lashed the 9th Circuit for applying the wrong law for the last decde), the 9th Circuit has not affirmed a single death sentence in a decade.

References: v. 
 v. 
 § 2254
 § 2254
 § 2254
 § 2254
 v. 
 § 2254
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.