Source: http://www.washdui.com/dui-case-law.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 10:10:12+00:00

Document:
• State v. Prado, 145 Wn.App. 646; 186 P.3d 1186 (2008) (The court ruled the stop of the defendant was invalid where he was stopped for crossing the fog line by two tire widths and for one second. The court also took into consideration the fact that no other traffic was present and no danger was posed to other vehicles. Importantly, it appears (to Judges), the “lane violation” occurred during a curvature in the road and not a straight area).
• State v. Terrovona, 105 Wn.2d 632, 716 P.2d 295 (1986) (Probable cause requires facts and circumstances within the arresting officer's knowledge which are sufficient to justify a reasonable belief that an offense has been committed).
• State v. Feller, 60 Wn. App. 678 (1991) (A stop of a vehicle for a traffic violation and a detention of the driver for a brief investigation must conform to the due process standards set forth in Terry v. Ohio).
• State v. Quaring, 32 Wn. App. 728 (1982) (The officer must have enough information to warrant the intrusion, balancing the state’s law enforcement interest against the individual’s right to freedom from interference of movement).
• City of Seattle v. Yaeger, 67 Wn. App. 41 (1992) (RCW 46.16.710 authorizes a stop of any vehicle that has been “tagged” by a police officer indicating a driver has been without a valid license, for the sole purpose of ascertaining whether the current driver is properly licensed).
• City of Seattle v. Mesiani, 110 Wn.2d 454, 755 P.2d 775 (1988) (A traffic stop is a "seizure" for the purpose of constitutional analysis, no matter how brief).
• State v. Wetherell, 82 Wash.2d 865, 869 514 P.2d 1069 (1973) (The stop of any motor vehicle must be valid and constitutional before we reach the issue of probable cause to arrest and reasonable grounds to believe that the person arrested was driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor).
• Boker v. DOL, 74 Wn. App. 523 (1994) (Invocation of the implied consent law is predicated on a lawful arrest).
• Tennant v. Roys, 44 Wn. App. 305 (1986).
• State v. Hobart, 94 Wn.2d 437 (1980); State v. DeArman, 54 Wn. App. 621 (1989); State v. Davis, 12 Wn. App. 32 (1974) (Just because the driving may be “odd” or “provoking” curiosity does not provide a basis for the stop, as long as the vehicle is being driven in a lawful manner).
• State v. Thorp, 71 Wn. App. 175 (1973) (Random stops for the purpose of checking for required permits are prohibited under Washington law – also see Illinois v. Lidster, 124 S. Ct. 885 (2004)).
• Bremerton v. Spears, 134 Wn. 2d 141 (1998); State v. McIntosh, 42 Wn. App. 573 (1989) (An officer may stop a vehicle based on probable cause to believe that a traffic infraction or a misdemeanor has been committed in his presence).
• State v. Maesse, 29 Wn. App. 642 (1981) (The “fellow officer rule” may supplement information the officer knows at the time of the stop or arrest as the standard for probable cause).
• State v. Gaddy, 114 Wn. App. 702(Data transmitted by the DOL may be used to supplement information known by the officer to validate probable cause – unless it turns out to be erroneous).
• State v. Mance, 82 Wn. App. 539 (1996) (The officer may not use information that he subsequently learns to validate an earlier arrest).
•City of Bremerton v. Spears, 134 Wn.2d 141, 158, 949 P.2d 347 (1998) (A traffic stop is constitutional if the officer has probable cause to believe a person has violated the traffic code).
•State v. Fricks, 91 Wn.2d 391, 398, 588 P.2d 1328 (1979); see also Campbell v. Dep't of Licensing, 31 Wn. App. 833, 835, 644 P.2d 1219 (1982) (an officer may make an investigatory stop, but before doing so must have a well-founded suspicion based on articulable facts that an offense has been committed or is presently being committed).
•State v. White, 76 Wn. App. 801, 805, 888 P.2d 169 (1995), aff'd on other grounds, 129 Wn.2d 105, 915 P.2d 1099 (1996) (Under the fellow officer rule, probable cause may be determined based on the information possessed by the police as a whole when they are acting in concert).
•State v. Chelly, 94 Wn.App. 254, 259, 970 P.2d 376 (YEAR) (A law enforcement officer may lawfully perform a traffic stop if he or she has "probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred").
• State v. Mathews, 884 P.2d 1224 (Or. 1994) (Court held that decriminalizing minor traffic stops, the legislature did not intend to change the probable cause standard applicable to stops for a traffic infraction).
• U.S. v. King, 244 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2001) (An officers’ mistake of law will not support probable cause).
• United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783 (10th Cir. 1995) (Fourth Amendment prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures is not violated when a police officer stops a suspect and has a reasonable suspicion that the person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime. This reasonable suspicion must be based on “specific and articulable facts” and not merely upon an officer's hunch – also see Terry v. Ohio, 392 US 1 (1968)).
• State v. Chatton, 463 N.E. 2d 1237 (Ohio 1984) (An officers’ mistake of law will not support probable cause).
• People v. Stodeman, 606 N.Y.S.2d 864 (Just. Ct. 1993) (“Hot pursuit” cannot justify entry into the driver’s garage).
• Megaard v. Comm. Of Public Safety, 500 N.W.2d 148 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (“Hot pursuit” cannot justify entry into the driver’s motor home).
• Terry v. Ohio, 392 US 1 (1968) (Fourth Amendment prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures is not violated when a police officer stops a suspect and has a reasonable suspicion that the person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime. This reasonable suspicion must be based on “specific and articulable facts” and not merely upon an officer's hunch. The Terry standard was later extended to temporary detentions contacted in traffic stops).
• Delaware v. Prouse, 440 US 648 (1979) Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996) (A traffic stop is a "seizure" for the purpose of constitutional analysis, no matter how brief).
• Illinois v. Lidster, 124 S. Ct. 885 (2004) (Random stops for the purpose of checking for required permits are prohibited – case involved a roadblock set up in an attempt to gather evidence about a previously committed crime – also see State v. Thorp, 71 Wn. App. 175 (1973)).
• State v. Michaels, 60 Wn.2d 638, 374 P.2d 989 (1962) (The court adopted a strict no-pretext rule stating that “[a]n arrest may not be used as a pretext to search for evidence").
• State v. Ladson, 138 Wn.2d 343 (1999) (The court. Concluded that there is a constitutionally protected interest against warrantless traffic stops or seizures on a mere pretext to dispense with the warrant when the true reason for the seizure is not exempt from the warrant requirement. Further, they held pretextual traffic stops violate article I, section 7, because they are seizures absent the "authority of law" which a warrant would bring. Const. art. I, § 7).
• State v. DeSantiago, 97 Wn. App. 446 (1999) (Pretext stops are unlawful).
• State v. Rainey, 107 Wn. App. 129 (2001) (Pretext stops are unlawful).
• State v. Myers, 119 Wn. App. 93 (2003) (Pretext stops are unlawful).
• State v. Simpson, 95 Wn.2d 170, 622 P.2d 1199 (1980) (The court affirmed the pretext rule in the context of automobile inventory searches, holding for a warrantless inventory search to be valid where the driver was already in jail, "the State must demonstrate that the impoundment was lawful, and that the inventory search was proper and not a mere pretext for an investigatory search").
• State v. Houser, 95 Wn.2d 143, 622 P.2d 1218 (1980) ("In sanctioning such a[n inventory] search, however, we recognize the possibility for abuse and have required that the State show that the search was conducted in good faith and not as a pretext for an investigatory search").
• State v. Angelos, 86 Wn. App. 253, 936 P.2d 52 (1997) (When determining whether a given stop is pretextual, the court should consider the totality of the circumstances, including both the subjective intent of the officer as well as the objective reasonableness of the officer's behavior).
• State v. Hendrickson, 129 Wn.2d 61, 917 P.2d 563 (1996); State v. Stroud, 106 Wn.2d 144, 720 P.2d 436 (1986); State v. Gunwall, 106 Wn.2d 54, 720 P.2d 808, 76 A.L.R.4th 517 (1986) (It is already well established that article I, section 7, of the state constitution has broader application than does the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution).
• State v. Young, 123 Wn.2d 173, 867 P.2d 593 (1994) (quoting State v. Simpson, 95 Wn.2d 170,622 P.2d 1199 (1980)).Article I, section 7, of the Washington State Constitution is explicitly broader than that of the Fourth Amendment[fn1] as it "`clearly recognizes an individual's right to privacy with no express limitations'" and places greater emphasis on privacy).
• State v. Angelos, 86 Wn. App. 253, 256, 936 P.2d 52 (1997) ("When the use of the emergency exception is challenged on appeal, the reviewing court must satisfy itself that the claimed emergency was not simply a pretext for conducting an evidentiary search. To satisfy the exception, the State must show that the officer, both subjectively and objectively, `is actually motivated by a perceived need to render aid or assistance.'" (citations omitted) (quoting State v. Loewen, 97 Wn.2d 562, 568, 647 P.2d 489 (1982)).
• State v. Cottrell, 86 Wn.2d 130, 132-33, 542 P.2d 771 (1975) (An officer may examine the facts he knows in light of his own experience and expertise).
• Taglavore v. United States, 291 F.2d 262 (9th Cir. 1961) (“An arrest may not be used as a pretext to search for evidence").
• People v. Garrison, 189 Cal.App.2d 549, 11 Cal.Rptr. 398 (1961) (Police may not rely on a pretext to conduct a search or seizure).
• United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 76 L.Ed. 877, 82 A.L.R. 775 (1932) (“An arrest may not be used as a pretext to search for evidence").
• Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) (Pretextual traffic stops do not violate the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution – but see State v. Ladson, 133 Wn.2d 1028, 950 P.2d 476 (1998) and State v. Hendrickson, 129 Wn.2d 61, 917 P.2d 563 (1996)).
• United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 221 n. 1, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973) (The Supreme Court decided use of a "traffic violation arrest as a mere pretext for a narcotics search" is permissible under the Fourth Amendment so long as the motorist could have been arrested for the violation – see State v. Hehman, 90 Wn.2d 45, 578 P.2d 527 (1978) which rejects this case).
• Patricia Leary & Stephanie Rae Williams, Toward a State Constitutional Check on Police Discretion to Patrol the Fourth Amendment's Outer Frontier: A Subjective Test for Pretextual Seizures, 69 Temp. L. Rev. 1007, 1038 (1996). ("Pretext is, by definition, a false reason used to disguise a real motive. Thus, what is needed is a test that tests real motives. Motives are, by definition, subjective").
• David C. Anson, Note, Criminal Procedure Personal Search of Suspect Incident to Custodial Arrest Is Per Se "Reasonable"
• Sanford E. Pitler, The Origin and Development of Washington's Independent Exclusionary Rule: Constitutional Right and Constitutionally Compelled Remedy, 61 Wn. L.Rev. 459, 508 (1986).
• 1 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.2(b)-(e) (1978) (An officer may examine the facts he knows in light of his own experience and expertise).
• Froemming v. Spokane City Lines, 71 Wn.2d 265 (1967); Golub v. Mantopoli, 65 Wn.2d 361 (1965); Sanders v. Crimmins, 63 Wn.2d 702 (1964); Charlton v. Baker, 61 Wn.2d 369 (1963); Dunsmoort v. North Coast Transportation Co., 154 Wn. 229 (1929) (An officer's visual observation is not, by itself, sufficient to support a finding that the defendant was speeding).
• Cantrell v. State, 561 P.2d 973 (Okla. Cr. 1977) (affirming the defendant's conviction of assault and battery upon a police officer, committed after the defendant had been stopped for speeding, and holding that the radar evidence was admissible, without evidence showing the accuracy and reliability of the radar device, to show that the defendant had committed an offense in the presence of an officer on the date in question, not to show that the defendant was guilty of speeding).
• State v. Chisolm, 39 Wn. App. 864 (1985) (Some stops can be justified by the “community caretaking function,” such as when an officer wishes to warn a driver about some impending peril).
• State v. Gleason, 70 Wn. App. 13 (1993) (Once an officer’s concerns have ended, the officer has no further reason to proceed with any additional investigative efforts and the community caretaking function ends).
• State v. DeArman, 54 Wn. App. 621 (1989) (Once an officer’s concerns have ended, the officer has no further reason to proceed with any additional investigative efforts and the community caretaking function ends).
• State v. Markgraf, 59 Wn. App. 509 (1990) (Once an officer’s concerns have ended, the officer has no further reason to proceed with any additional investigative efforts and the community caretaking function ends).
• State v. Kinzy, 141 Wash.2d 373 (2000) (To qualify under the emergency doctrine’s community caretaking function exception, police encounters must be completely divorced from a criminal investigation. Community caretaking functions include “delivering emergency messages, giving directions, searching for lost children, assisting stranded motorists, and rendering first aid“).
• State v. Acrey, 148 Wash.2d 738 (2003) (Whether a stop incident to such functions is ‘reasonable’ requires balancing “the competing interest involved in lights of all surrounding facts and circumstances, particularly the individual’s interest in freedom from police interference against the public’s interest in having the police perform a community caretaking function).
• Barrett v. Comm., 435 S.E.2d 902 (Va. App. 1993); State v. Cryan, 727 A.2d 93 (N.J. Super. 1999) (Once an officer’s concerns have ended, the officer has no further reason to proceed with any additional investigative efforts and the community caretaking function ends).
• Campbell v. DOL, 31 Wn. App. 833 (1982); State v. Jones, 85 Wn. App. 797 (1997) (An officer may not stop a vehicle based solely on an uncorroborated informant’s tip-also see Florida v. J.L,. 529, U.S. 266 (2000)).
• State v. Davis, 12 Wn. App. 32 (1974) (“A police officer’s unfounded suspicion or hunch is not a legal basis … even for a momentary [intrusion]”).
• State v. Valdez, 561 P.2d 1006 (Ore. 1977) (“[An officer’s] instinct and experience cannot … form the entire basis for a reasonable suspicion” [for a stop]).
• State v. Glass, 769 N.E.2d 639 (Indiana App. 2002). (An anonymous tip without specific details did not justify a stop).
• Parres v. Director of Revenue, State of Missouri, 75 S.W.3d 311 (Missouri 2002). The eyewitness told the police officer that he had observed a purple jeep driving erratically. The informant personally gave the information to the police officer. The court found the subsequent detention and arrest lawful.
• City of Pratt v. Stover, 32 P.3d 1143 (Kan. 2001). The informant gave her name and address along with a description of the car. The court upheld the detention and indicated that a citizen informant who leaves her name and address is presumed to be credible.
• Frette v. City of Springdale, 959 S.W.2d 734 (Ark. 1998). In this case the tipster identified himself and noted that he witnessed criminal activity. Subsequent observations by the police officer confirmed the tipster’s claims. As such, the detention was upheld.
• Commonwealth v. Butterfield, 691 N.E.2d 975 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998). Information from a known citizen was deemed reliable.
• State v. Evans, 692 So.2d 216 (Fla. App. 1997). The court described the facts in this case as an example of an informant whose tip was considered highly reliable.
• State v. Goodrich, 683 N.E.2d 855 (Ohio App. 1996) (An officer may not stop a vehicle based solely on an uncorroborated informant’s tip, even when the tip is a radio dispatch from another officer unless shown that the officer making the transmission had a reasonable suspicion to justify the stop).
• State v. Gaddy, 182 W 2d 64 (2004) (The information received by a non police agency such as the DOL is presumptively reliable when used for a stop).
• Florida v. J.L,. 529, U.S. 266 (2000) (An officer may not stop a vehicle based solely on an uncorroborated informant’s tip – also see State v. Jones, 85 Wn. App. 797 (1997) and Campbell v. DOL, 31 Wn. App. 833 (1982)).
Coming soon is a list of the most important cases in DUI Defense.
Criminal law and DUI Defense is guided by Statute (Revised Code of Washington - RCW; Washington Administrative Code), the Constitution and Case Law. Cases that have been heard and adjudicated at appellate and Supreme Court level have significance in every driving under the influence case. This area of law is critical, complicated and evolving. The following is a long list of important cases in DUI law. The number of cases on this page is lengthy, so scroll down to find the area of DUI you wish to focus on. The cases relevant to that area of law will be listed.

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