Source: https://www.morelaw.com/verdicts/case.asp?n=2018MT%20292%0A&s=MT&d=122590
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 18:56:14+00:00

Document:
and Obstructing a Peace Officer, a misdemeanor, in violation of § 45-7-302, MCA.
(2015), presumes that a first-time drug offender is entitled to a deferred sentence.
Accordingly, defense counsel recommended imposition of a deferred sentence. 1 Section 46-18-501, MCA, has since been repealed. References to §§ 46-18-501 and -502, MCA, are to the 2015 statutes, which were in place at the time Walter was sentenced. Dexter v. Shields, 2004 MT 159, ¶ 13, 322 Mont. 6, 92 P.3d 1208 (holding that the statutes in effect at the time of the offense will be applied at sentencing).
that Walter “must be incarcerated for at least five years” pursuant to the PFO statute.
I do not think that there is a Montana Supreme Court case on point in this situation. Typically, someone on a first offense drug possession charge is entitled to a deferred imposition of sentence; in this scenario, the Defendant had a prior felony, and the State has filed a PFO designation in this case. The two statutes are certainly in conflict. They are distinguishable from the DUI statutes which specifically prohibit a deferred sentence on a DUI, however, I understand the analysis that both of you have used in Damon,2 and the State in the other two cited cases.
2 The District Court is referring to State v. Damon, 2005 MT 218, 328 Mont. 276, 119 P.3d 1194. In Damon, this Court held that the PFO statutes applied to an individual convicted of his fourth DUI. Defense counsel attempted to distinguish Damonand argued that unlike the DUI statute, § 45-9-102(7), MCA (2015), specifically includes a presumption in favor of a deferred sentence.
Mr. Walter, this is the law, and I’m required to follow the law as it’s written at this time. That doesn’t mean that I don’t wish you the best, and that I hope in the screening process as you get into the prison, I certainly hope that you can be placed in a treatment program immediately. I hope that they don’t make you serve the amount of time that they typically do before those kind of programs become available to you because what you need is treatment, and you have demonstrated in the past that after you’ve had treatment and when you are in a structured program that you do well.
the other two charges, and fined Walter $1,000.
which this Court reviews de novo. St. Germain v. State, 2012 MT 86, ¶ 7, 364 Mont.
DISCUSSION ¶11 Was Walter prejudiced by ineffective assistance of counsel?
counsel in criminal prosecutions. St. Germain, ¶ 8; U.S. Const. amend. VI; U.S. Const.
the deficient performance prejudiced the defendant. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
grounded on facts in the record and not on mere conclusory allegations. St. Germain, ¶ 8.
example of unreasonable performance under Strickland.” Hinton v. Alabama, 571 U.S.
that Walter would have received a different sentence.
the fees were incorrectly calculated.
Outcome: For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Walter’s attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to cite § 45-9-202, MCA, and Brendal, and that Walter was prejudiced as a result. We therefore reverse and remand this matter to the District Court for resentencing with effective counsel and with instructions to strike the $30 user surcharge and imposeonly one $10 user surcharge pursuant to § 3-1-317(1)(a), MCA.
¶19 Reversed and remanded for resentencing.

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