Source: https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/apple-and-the-american-revolution-remembering-why-we-have-the-fourth-amendment-1
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 17:05:48+00:00

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This recent use of high-profile litigation to challenge the power of search warrants strikingly parallels a series of lawsuits from the 1760s. One such case was a petition brought by citizens of Boston asking the Superior Court to stop issuing “writs of assistance” that authorized forcible entry into their homes to search any “Vaults, Cellars . . . or other Places” and to open “any Trunks, Chests, Boxes, fardells or Packs” where smuggled goods or merchandise were “suspected . . . to be concealed.”21 This case and the ensuing controversy over writs of assistance were among the critical events leading to the American Revolution.22 A second series of cases, filed in England, successfully challenged the use of warrants to arrest suspected authors and publishers of political pamphlets and to seize all their personal papers. These warrants were condemned as “general warrants” because they authorized nationwide general searches and were not limited to specifically identified persons, places, and papers.
After reviewing this history, this Essay will show how the DOJ’s current practices in using search warrants for electronically stored information (ESI) violate these fundamental principles. This Essay concludes by proposing new legislation to restore Fourth Amendment protections to our “private papers” now kept in digital form.
This history makes clear that the text of the Fourth Amendment was addressed to the kinds of search warrants that were opposed in the writs of assistance and general warrants litigation. In particular, as we now turn to the DOJ’s use of search warrants for email stored in a cloud or on cell phones, we should keep in mind the facts of the Wilkes case, described as “the paradigm search and seizure case for Americans”51 in the eighteenth century, and especially the image of royal officers breaking open a locked cabinet, gathering all the papers they can find, and carrying them off for later review.
The DOJ also enjoys a tremendous strategic advantage due to the lack of due process in most ESI searches. Search warrant applications are approved ex parte, based entirely on the government’s one-sided presentation, with neither notice to the person affected nor the opportunity to be heard.65 Reliable estimates indicate that thousands of ESI search warrants are kept secret every year through orders to seal the file from both the public and the person affected.66The government can appeal the magistrate’s decision to deny a warrant application, but the person affected has no right to judicial review before the warrant is executed.67 As argued in the current Microsoft suit challenging DOJ-requested gag orders,68 the lack of due process is even worse when the warrant is directed at remotely stored email. The only way Americans affected by such gag orders will ever learn that the government has been able to read all of their emails is if the government decides to prosecute them and attempts to use what it has obtained to secure a conviction.
The bipartisan congressional initiatives described in the introduction are encouraging because Congress is the best forum for developing a comprehensive approach to ESI searches that honors the history and text of the Fourth Amendment.
In the Revolutionary Era, warrants to search private papers were consistently compared to extracting confessions by torture.69 We ought to take seriously the argument that, just as torture is always unlawful (even when national security may be at stake), Congress should categorically prohibit both federal and state governments from using warrants to obtain personal correspondence and other private information protected by user-controlled encryption that is stored on cell phones or in the cloud.
There have been warnings from an increasing number of federal judges about the DOJ’s disregard for the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment in its use of ESI search warrants.79 Scholars, including two former federal prosecutors with specialized knowledge about ESI search procedures, have also voiced concerns.80 Over twenty years ago Akhil Amar claimed that a view of the Fourth Amendment as just a tool of criminal procedure, primarily protecting “criminals getting off on...technicalities,” risked making the Amendment “contemptible in the eyes of judges and citizens.”81 Amar’s call for a “return to first principles” by reading carefully the words of the Fourth Amendment and the history that gave rise to those words82 fell largely on deaf ears. But in the last nine months, two of the three most valuable companies in America83 have taken the offensive against the federal government to assert the Fourth Amendment rights of everyone. This offensive has the potential to reinvigorate the nation’s commitment to the Fourth Amendment, generating momentum for a much-needed and long-overdue reassessment of the use of warrants to seize and search electronically stored information, whether stored in cell phones or conventional computers, or in the cloud.
Clark D. Cunningham is the W. Lee Burge Chair in Law & Ethics at Georgia State University College of Law in Atlanta. Thanks to Ryan Bozarth, Tosha Dunn, and reference librarians Pamela C. Brannon, Margaret Elizabeth Butler, and Jonathan Edward Germann for research assistance. The thinking that underlies this essay owes much to teaching and guidance received from James Boyd White and the late Joseph Grano. Cited case materials and other information are available at: http://‌clarkcunningham.org/Apple/ [https://perma.cc/7JPZ-BMXU].
Preferred Citation: Clark D. Cunningham, Apple and the American Revolution: Remembering Why We Have the Fourth Amendment, 126 Yale L.J. F. 216 (2016) http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/ apple-and-the-american-revolution.
Id. at 107 [bracket in original].
Money v. Leach (1765) 97 Eng. Rep. 1075, 1078; 3 Burr. 1742, 1747.
Wilkes v. Wood (1763) 98 Eng. Rep. 489, 491, 494, 496; Lofft, 1, 5, 10, 14.
Howell, supra note 37, at 1066.
U.S. Const., amend IV (emphasis added).
Wilkes v. Wood (1763) 98 Eng. Rep. 489, 498 (KB).
Amar, supra note 24, at 772 (emphasis in original).
Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(e)(2)(B), Note to Rule 41(e)(2), Committee Notes – 2009 Amendment.
Id., Joint App’x at A47.
See id.; Computers and Obtaining Electronic Evidence in Criminal Investigations, supra note 52.
Amar, supra note 24, at 758-59, 799 (1994).
Order Compelling Apple, Inc. to Assist Agents in Search, In re Search of an Apple iPhone Seized During the Execution of a Search Warrant on a Black Lexus IS300, No. ED 15-0451M (C.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 2016).
Tim Cook, A Message to Our Customers, Apple (Feb. 16, 2016), http://‌http://www.apple.com‌/customer-letter [http://perma.cc/8EU6-49JK].
David Goldman & Laurie Segall, Apple’s Lawyer: If We Lose, It Will Lead to a ‘Police State’, CNNMoney (Feb. 26, 2016, 12:56 PM), http://‌money.cnn.com‌/2016‌/02‌/26‌/technology‌/ted‌-olson-apple [http://perma.cc/U3YQ-S6S3].
See Government’s Ex Parte Application for a Continuance, In re Search of an Apple iPhone, (C.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2016), http://www.scribd.com/doc/305549490/Apple-vs-FBI-Motion-to-Vacate [http://perma.cc/XKB2-KHEA].
See Government’s Status Report, In re Search of an Apple iPhone, No. 5:16-CM-00010 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2016), http://www.plainsite.org/dockets/2xdz3nkmq/california-central-district-court/usa-v-in-the-matter-of-the-search-of-an-apple-iphone-seized-during-the-execution-of-a-search-war/ [http://perma.cc/7QBJ-P5KZ].
Letter from Robert L. Capers, U.S. Attorney, U.S. Dep’t Justice, to Margo K. Brodie, Judge, E.D.N.Y. (Apr. 22, 2016) (“[T]he government no longer needs Apple’s assistance to unlock the iPhone, and withdraws its application.”), In re Apple, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 3d 341 (E.D.N.Y. 2016).
See, e.g., The Apple-F.B.I. Case, N.Y. Times, http://www.nytimes.com/news-event/apple-fbi-case [http://perma.cc/NT22-JXGC] (indexing more than thirty New York Times articles, including four that appeared on the front page); The Apple-FBI Debate over Encryption, Nat’l Pub. Radio, http://www.npr.org/series/469827708/the-apple-fbi-debate-over-encryption [http://perma.cc/29BC-MZSC] (indexing more than fifty National Public Radio stories); Lev Grossman, Inside Apple CEO Tim Cook’s Fight with the FBI, Time (Mar. 17, 2016), http://time.com/magazine/us/4262476/march-28th-2016-vol-187-no-11-u-s [http://‌perma.cc/YCC9-FXJS] (covering the controversy on Time’s front cover).
See, e.g., Michael D. Shear, David E. Sanger & Katie Benner, In the Apple Case, a Debate Over Data Hits Home, N.Y. Times (Mar. 13, 2016), http://‌http://www.nytimes.com‌/2016‌/03/14/technology/in-the-apple-case-a-debate-over-data-hits-home.html [http://‌perma.cc‌/8WLQ-8HW3] (describing the “enormous” pushback against the government’s position).
Editorial, Why Apple Is Right To Challenge an Order To Help the F.B.I., N.Y. Times (Feb. 18, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/19/opinion/why-apple-is-right-to-challenge-an-order-to-help-the-fbi.html [http://perma.cc/X3ST-UWY8].
Editorial, The FBI vs. Apple: The White House Should Have Avoided This Legal and Security Showdown, Wall St. J. (Feb. 19, 2016, 10:17 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-fbi-vs-apple-1455840721 [http://perma.cc/884M-36JH].
Clarence Page, Apple’s Standoff with FBI Is About More than One iPhone, Chi. Trib.: Page’s Page (Feb. 26, 2016, 1:05 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/page/ct-apple-fbi-marco-rubio-iphone-page-perspec-0228-20160226-story.html [http://perma.cc/VR57-WN5G].
See, e.g., Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. (2016) (questions to FBI Director James Comey by Rep. Bob Goodlatte, Chairman, H. Comm. on the Judiciary; Rep. John Conyers, Rep. Jerrold Nadler, Rep. Zoe Lofgren, Rep. Ted Poe & Rep. Hakeem Jeffries, Members, H. Comm. on the Judiciary), 2016 WestLaw NewsRoom 6586673; Interview by Scott Simon with Rep. Ted Lieu, After Apple Case, Encryption vs. National Security Dilemma Has Just Begun, Nat’l Pub. Radio (Apr. 2 2016, 8:06 AM), http://‌http://www.npr.org‌/2016/04/02/472784761/after-apple-case-encryption-vs-national-security-dilemma-has-just‌-begun [http://‌perma.cc/ZK57-UWXR] (“[T]here has been not a single case that the FBI or anybody else can come up with that would have showed that had the FBI had a back door to a smartphone that they could have stopped any terrorist attack anywhere. What the FBI really is trying to do is to make some law enforcement investigations easier so they can prosecute criminals. It is not a terrorism issue. It really is a law enforcement investigatory tool issue. And the question is - do you want to make some law enforcement investigations easier, but damage national security in the process?”); Cecilia Kang, Ron Wyden Discusses Encryption, Data Privacy and Security, N.Y. Times (Oct. 9, 2016), http://‌http://www.nytimes.com‌/2016‌/10‌/10‌/technology/ron-wyden-discusses-encryption-data-privacy-and-security.html [http://‌perma.cc‌/NGV6-UM4D].
Majority Staff of H. Homeland Sec. Comm., 114th Cong., Going Dark, Going Forward: A Primer on the Encryption Debate 3 (2016), http://homeland.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Staff-Report-Going-Dark-Going-Forward.pdf [http://‌perma.cc‌/WZ7P-ZFX8].
Digital Security Commission Act of 2016, H.R. 4651, 114th Cong. (introduced Feb. 29, 2016); see also McCaul-Warner Commission on Digital Security, H. Homeland Sec. Comm., http://homeland.house.gov/mccaul-warner-commission-2/ [http://perma.cc/DY63 -6DEN].
Press Release, H. Energy & Commerce Comm., Upton, Pallone, Goodlatte, Conyers Announce Bipartisan Encryption Working Group (Mar. 21, 2016), http://‌energycommerce‌.house.gov/news-center/press-releases/upton-pallone-goodlatte-conyers-announce -bipartisan-encryption-working [http://perma.cc/ZXA5-C4UQ]; Press Release, H. Energy & Commerce Comm., Congressional Leaders: Bipartisan Encryption Working Group Making Progress (June 22, 2016), http://‌energycommerce‌.house.gov/news-center‌/press -releases/congressional-leaders-bipartisan-encryption-working-group-making-progress [http://perma.cc/CQT5-B7MT].
See, e.g.,‌‌ Press Release, Office of Senator Orin Hatch, Hatch Urges DOJ to Work with Congress on ICPA (Oct. 13, 2016), http://‌‌‌‌‌‌‌www‌‌.hatch‌.senate‌.gov‌/public/index.cfm /2016/10/hatch-urges-doj-to-work-with-congress‌-on-icpa [https://perma.cc/E53Q-X2KE] (urging the Department of Justice to work with Congress on new legislation to respond to the Second Circuit’s decision in Microsoft).
First Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, Microsoft Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No. 16-cv-00538-JLR (W.D. Wash. June 17, 2016), 2016 WL 3381727.
Microsoft Corp. v. United States (In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled & Maintained by Microsoft Corp.), 829 F.3d 197, 201-02 (2d Cir. 2016).
Josiah Quincy, Jr., Reports of Cases Argued and Adjudged in the Superior Court of Judicature of the Province of Massachusetts Bay, Between 1761 and 1772, app. 404-05 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1865).
See text accompanying notes 26-30, infra; Oliver M. Dickerson, Writs of Assistance as a Cause of the Revolution, in The Era of the American Revolution 40 (Richard B. Morris ed., 1939); Tracey Maclin, When the Cure for the Fourth Amendment is Worse than the Disease, 68 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1, 13-25 (1994).
See text accompanying notes 31-41, infra; Donald A. Dripps, “Dearest Property”: Digital Evidence and the History of Private “Papers” as Special Objects of Search and Seizure, 103 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 49 (2013).
See text accompanying notes 31-41, infra; Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 757, 771-81, 807 (1994).
U.S. Const., amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their . . . papers . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause . . . and particularly describing the . . . things to be seized.”); In the Matter of the Search of Premises Known as: Three Hotmail Email Accounts, No. 16-MJ-8036-DJW, 2016 WL 1239916 (D. Kan. March 28, 2016), at *3-15 (explaining that the purpose of Fourth Amendment’s “particularly describing” requirement is to prevent issuance of general warrants).
Adams, later to serve as the second President, seconded the motion for independence passed by the Continental Congress on June 7, 1776, and was appointed to the Committee of Five that drafted the Declaration of Independence. See David McCullough, John Adams 117-36 (2001).
No. 44 Petition of Lechmere (Argument on Writs of Assistance), in 2 Legal Papers of John Adams 107 (L. Kinvin Wroth & Hiller B. Zobel eds., 1965) (quoting Letter from John Adams to William Tudor (March 29, 1817)).
William J. Cuddihy, The Fourth Amendment: Origins and Original Meaning 443 (2009) (“The warrant against The North Briton Forty-Five was among the most potent stimulants to adjudication in British legal history . . . . [T]he warrant figured directly in at least thirty suits or trials. Derivative trials numbered sixteen or more.”); Robert R. Rea, The General Warrant in the Courts of Law: The Cases Arising from North Briton No. 45, in The English Press in Politics 1760-1774, at 59-69 (1963).
Entick v. Carrington (1765) 95 Eng. Rep. 807, 812; 2 Wils. K.B. 275, 282. For a larger excerpt of the Entick decision, see 19 T. B. Howell, A Complete Collection of State Trials and Proceedings for High Treason and Other Crimes and Misdemeanors: From the Earliest Period to the Year 1783: 1753-70, at 1030 (1816).
See, e.g., Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 626-27 (1886). (“As every American statesman, during our revolutionary and formative period as a nation, was undoubtedly familiar with this monument of English freedom [Lord Camden’s opinion in Entick], . . . it may be confidently asserted that its propositions were in the minds of those who framed the fourth amendment to the constitution, and were considered sufficiently explanatory of what was meant by unreasonable searches and seizures.”).
Eric Schnapper, Unreasonable Searches and Seizures of Papers, 71 Va. L. Rev. 869, 912-14 (1985) (“One member of the Sons of Liberty . . . wrote that ‘The fate of Wilkes and America must stand or fall together.’”).
Paul Revere, Sons of Liberty Bowl, Museum of Fine Arts Boston, http://‌www‌.mfa.org/collections/object/sons-of-liberty-bowl-39072 [http://‌perma.cc‌/NVK4-YQG5].
Adams’ Minutes of the Argument at Suffolk Superior Court, Boston, on Feb. 24, 1761, in 2 Legal Papers of John Adams, supra note 27, at 142 (“Now one of the most essential branches of English liberty, is the freedom of one’s house . . . . This writ, if it should be declared legal, would totally annihilate this privilege.”).
Id. The inclusion of “papers” in the “right to be secure” also expands the potential meaning of “searches.” Clark D. Cunningham, A Linguistic Analysis of the Meanings of “Search” in the Fourth Amendment: A Search for Common Sense, 73 Iowa L. Rev. 541 (1988).
Adams’ Minutes of the Argument at Suffolk Superior Court, Boston, on Feb. 24, 1761, in 2 Legal Papers of John Adams, supra note 27, at 125-26, 141 (capitalization in original).
3 Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution 448-49 (J. Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1881).
Thomas K. Clancy, The Framers’ Intent: John Adams, His Era, and the Fourth Amendment, 86 Ind. L.J. 979, 981, 1031-51 (2011).
Comput. Crime & Intellectual Prop. Section, Computers and Obtaining Electronic Evidence in Criminal Investigations, U.S. Dep’t Just. 79-83 (3d ed. 2009), http://‌www‌.justice‌.gov‌/sites/default/files/criminal-ccips/legacy/2015/01/14/ssmanual2009.pdf [http://‌perma.cc‌/NEX5-P75T] (“Do Not Place Limitations on the Forensic Techniques That May Be Used to Search”).
Search and Seizure Warrant, Joint App’x A44-48, Microsoft Corp. v. United States (In re Matter of a Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled & Maintained by Microsoft Corp.), 829 F.3d 197 (2016).
Letter from José R. Almonte, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Dep’t Justice, to Lawrence S. Lustberg, Gibbons P.C. (Feb. 19, 2016), United States v Ravelo (D.N.J. indicted Nov. 5, 2015), (2:15-cr-00576-KM) (no. 86-1).
Letter from Lawrence S. Lustberg, Gibbons P.C., to Kevin McNulty, Judge, Dist. N.J. (Apr. 29, 2016), United States v. Ravelo (D.N.J. indicted Nov. 5, 2015), (2:15-cr-00576-KM) (no. 84-1).
Reprinted in Father of Candor, A Letter Concerning Libels, Warrants, Seizure of Papers and Sureties for the Peace of Behaviour 56 (London: J. Almon ed., 5th ed.1765) (emphasis in original).
Letter from Andrew Kogan, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Dep’t Justice, to Kevin McNulty, Judge, Dist. N.J. (May 23, 2016), United States v Ravelo (D.N.J. indicted Nov. 5, 2015), (2:15-cr-00576-KM) (no. 90). “Privileged” refers to possible attorney-client privileged communications.
Letter from Andrew Kogan, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Dep’t Justice, to Kevin McNulty, Judge, Dist. N.J. (July 12, 2016), United States v Ravelo (D.N.J. indicted Nov. 5, 2015), (2:15-cr-00576-KM) (no. 90); see historical evidence to the contrary from the writs of assistance and general warrants cases, note 76, infra.
See In the Matter of the Search of Premises Known as: Three Hotmail Email Accounts, No. 16-MJ-8036-DJW, 2016 WL 1239916 (D. Kan. March 28, 2016), at *3-15 (collecting cases and critiquing the two-step process as violating the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement).
Search and Seizure Warrant, Joint App’x A44-48, Microsoft Corp. v. United States (In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled & Maintained by Microsoft Corp.), 829 F.3d 197 (2016).
See In the Matter of the Search of Premises Known as: Three Hotmail Email Accounts, No. 16-MJ-8036-DJW, 2016 WL 1239916 (D. Kan. March 28, 2016), at *3-4.
In re Sealing and Non-Disclosure of Pen/Trap/2703(d) Orders, 562 F. Supp. 2d 876, 878 (S.D. Tex. 2008).
Stephen Wm. Smith, Gagged, Sealed & Delivered: Reforming ECPA’s Secret Docket, 6 Harv. L. & Pol’y Rev. 313, 313 (2012) (describing the search warrant docket of federal magistrates as “the most secret docket in America” and presenting analysis indicating that more than 30,000 federal search warrants issued nationwide in 2006 pursuant to the Electronic Communications Privacy Act were entered subject to an order to seal and that the annual numbers have likely increased since then).
First Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment at para. 37, Microsoft Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No. 2:16-cv-00538-JLR (W.D. Wash. June 17, 2016), 2016 WL 3381727. As to the government’s argument that the Fourth Amendment does not require notice to the target of the search, see Reply Supporting Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P.12(B)(1) and 12(B)(6), at 11-13, Microsoft Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No. 2:16-cv-00538JLR (W.D. Wash. Sep. 23, 2016).
Entick v. Carrington (1765) 95 Eng. Rep. 807, 814; 2 Wils. K.B. 275; Wilkes v. Wood (1763) 98 Eng. Rep. 489, 490; Lofft 1, 5 (1886).
Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1), (4) (2012) (stating that, except as otherwise provided in the statute, any person who (a) intentionally intercepts any wire, oral, or electronic communication or (b) intentionally discloses the contents of such interception shall be fined and/or imprisoned not more than five years); id. § 2515 (“Whenever any wire or oral communication has been intercepted, no part of the contents of such communication and no evidence derived therefrom may be received in evidence in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding . . . .”).
Cf. id. at § 2516(1)(a)-(t) (stating that the Attorney General may authorize an application for judicially-approved interceptions when such interception may provide evidence relating to particular serious offenses enumerated in the statute, such as those punishable by death or imprisonment for more than one year).
Cf. id. at § 2518(3)(c) (providing that a judge may authorize interception if she determines “on the basis of the facts submitted by the applicant” that “normal investive procedures have been tried and have failed or reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous”).
Cf. id. at § 2516(1) (listing DOJ officials at or above the level of acting Deputy Assistant Attorney General as having the authority to authorize a wiretap application); id. § 2516(2) (explaining that the principal prosecuting attorney of any State or the principal prosecuting attorney of any political subdivision thereof may apply for a wiretap order if authorized by state statute).
Cf. id. at § 2519 (requiring each judge who issues a wiretap order to file a report with the Administrative Office of United States Courts (AOC), each state prosecutor who applies for a wiretap order to issue a similar report to the AOC, and the AOC itself to submit an annual report to Congress documenting the reports it has received); see, e.g., Wiretap Report 2015, U.S. Cts. (Dec. 31, 2015), http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/wiretap-report-2015 [http://perma.cc/6MB6-MBU2].
This notice and hearing requirement could be deferred in exigent circumstances, such as probable cause that a terrorist attack was imminent. Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(8) (explaining that a provider of electronic communication service may disclose the contents of communication to a governmental entity without a warrant or court order if “the provider, in good faith, believes that an emergency involving danger of death or serious physical injury to any person requires disclosure without delay of communications relating to the emergency”).
See, e.g., United States v. Kitzhaber (In re Grand Jury Subpoena, JK-15-029), 828 F.3d 1083, 1088 n.1 (9th Cir. 2016) (quashing grand jury’s subpoena of defendant’s email as overbroad and in violation of the Fourth Amendment and further describing a subpoena’s recipient’s ability to move to quash a subpoena before any search takes place as sufficiently protective of Fourth Amendment rights (citing City of Los Angeles, Cal v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443, 2453 (2015)). In condemning a Lord Halifax general warrant, Lord Camden said: “It is executed against the party, before he is heard . . . ; . . . [i]t is executed by messengers . . . in the presence or absence of the party, as the messengers shall think fit . . . ..[P]roper checks . . . would require [the messenger] to take an exact inventory, and deliver a copy . . . . [T]he want of [these precautions] is an undeniable argument against the legality of the thing.” Howell, supra note 37, at 1064-65, 1067. Likewise, Otis railed against the writ of assistance because “there’s no return, a man [the executing officer] is accountable to no person for his doings [as would be the case if an inventory was taken and returned with the warrant to the court]. Adams, Adams’ Minutes of the Argument at Suffolk Superior Court, Boston, on Feb. 24, 1761, supra note 27, at 142, 143. See also Wilkes v. Wood (1763) 98 Eng. Rep. 489, 498 (KB) (“no inventory is made”).
United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing Inc., 621 F.3d 1162, 1180 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (Kozinski, C.J., concurring).
In re Appeal of Application for Search Warrant, 71 A.3d 1158, 1167, 1186 (Vt. 2012) (incorporating all provisions but the waiver of plain view seizure proposed by Judge Kozinski in Comprehensive Drug Testing).
See, e.g, United States v. Ganias, 824 F.3d 199, 226 (2d Cir. 2016) (Chin, J. dissenting); In the Matter of the Search of Premises Known as: Three Hotmail Email Accounts, No. 16-MJ-8036-DJW, 2016 WL 1239916 (D. Kan. March 28, 2016), at *50; In re Search of Apple iPhone, 31 F. Supp. 3d 159, 164-65 (D.D.C. 2014); Comprehensive Drug Testing, 621 F.3d at 1178-80.
Paul Ohm, who led a task force in the DOJ Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section, described ESI search warrants as “the closest things to general warrants we have confronted in the history of the Republic,” saying in almost every computer search there is a “manifest lack of probable cause and particularity.” Massive Hard Drives, General Warrants, and the Power of Magistrate Judges, 97 Va. L. Rev. In Brief 1, 4, 11 (2011). Orin Kerr, who wrote the first edition of the DOJ manual on searching computers, Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 Harvard L. Rev. 531, 574 n.189 (2005), has also concluded that ESI searches conducted by the DOJ seem “perilously like the regime of general warrants that the Fourth Amendment was enacted to stop. Everything can be seized. Everything can be searched.” Orin S. Kerr, Executing Warrants for Digital Evidence: The Case for Use Restrictions on Nonresponsive Data, 48 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 1, 11 (2015).
Stephen Gandel, These Are the 10 Most Valuable Companies in the Fortune 500, Fortune (Feb. 4, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/02/04/most-valuable-companies-fortune-500-apple [http://‌perma.cc/KU6S-PXQ8] (noting that Apple is ranked number one, and Microsoft is ranked number three).

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