Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/303/10/
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 22:15:37+00:00

Document:
Justia › US Law › US Case Law › US Supreme Court › Volume 303 › Brady v. Terminal Railroad Assn.
The defendant carrier hauled a string of freight cars over its own line and left them on the receiving track of a connecting carrier, where they then stood temporarily whilst being inspected by an employee of the connecting carrier to determine whether they should be accepted by the latter for further transportation. Due to a defectively attached grab-iron, the employee fell from one of the cars and was injured. Both carriers were engaged in interstate commerce. Held that the defendant carrier was liable under the Federal Safety Appliance Act.
1. The defective car was "in use," within the meaning of the statute. P. 303 U. S. 13.
2. The responsibility of the defendant carrier, which had brought the car, was not ended, since the other carrier had not accepted it, nor assumed control. P. 303 U. S. 13.
3. The duty of the defendant carrier under the Act extended to the person injured, although he was not its employee. P. 303 U. S. 14.
4. A railroad employee is not denied the protection of the Act because his work is that of inspection for the purpose of discovering defects, including defects in the appliances prescribed. P. 303 U. S. 14.
The duty imposed is absolute, and the Act expressly excludes the defense of assumption of risk.
240 Mo. 841, 102 S.W.2d 903, reversed.
Certiorari, 302 U.S. 678, to review the reversal of a judgment recovered by the present petitioner in an action for personal injuries.
The Supreme Court of Missouri reversed a judgment which petitioner had recovered under the Federal Safety Appliance Act, 102 S.W.2d 903, and rendered a final judgment in favor of respondent. See State ex rel. McGrew Coal Co. v. Ragland, 339 Mo. 452, 456, 458, 97 S.W.2d 113. In view of the importance of the question in the administration of the federal statute, this Court granted certiorari.
Petitioner was employed by the Wabash Railway Company as a car inspector in its yard at Granite City, Ill. He was injured in November, 1927, while inspecting a car which was one of a string of cars brought by the respondent, Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis, from St. Louis to Granite City and placed upon a track of the Wabash known as a "receiving" or "inbound" track. The purpose of the inspection was to determine whether the cars were to be accepted by the Wabash.
Both the Wabash and the Terminal Companies were carriers engaged in interstate commerce.
While making his inspection, petitioner stood upon one of the side ladders of the car, and, in attempting to pull himself to the top of the car, petitioner took hold of a grab-iron which, with the board to which it was attached, became loose, causing him to fall. The board was found to have "become rotten from end to end on the under side, and to some extent on the upper side around the bolts by which the grabiron was attached to it."
Petitioner first sued his employer, the Wabash, under the provisions of the Federal Safety Appliance Act, but a judgment in his favor was reversed upon the ground that the car had not yet been accepted by the Wabash Company, which therefore had not hauled or used it, or permitted it to be hauled or used, within the prohibition of the statute. Brady v. Wabash Ry. Co., 329 Mo. 1123, 49 S.W.2d 24. While that suit was pending, petitioner brought the present suit against respondent.
"[I]t shall be unlawful for any common carrier subject to the provisions of this Act to haul, or permit to be hauled or used on its line any car subject to the provisions of this Act not equipped with appliances herein provided for, to-wit: all cars must be equipped with secure sill steps and efficient hand brakes; all cars requiring secure ladders and secure running boards shall be equipped with such ladders and running boards, and all cars having ladders shall also be equipped with secure hand holds or grab irons on their roofs at the tops of such ladders."
of this chapter shall not be deemed thereby to have assumed the risk thereby occasioned, although continuing in the employment of such carrier after the unlawful use of such locomotive, car, or train had been brought to his knowledge."
See also Federal Employers' Liability Act, 35 Stat. 65, 66, c. 149, § 4, 45 U.S.C. § 54.
The first question is whether the car can be said to have been in use by the respondent at the time in question. The statute gives no ground for holding that it was the intent of Congress that, in a situation such as is here presented, neither the Wabash nor the Terminal Association should be subject to the statutory duty. The "use, movement or hauling of the defective car," within the meaning of the statute, had not ended when petitioner sustained his injuries. Chicago Great Western R. Co. v. Schendel, 267 U. S. 287, 267 U. S. 291-292. The car had been brought into the yard at Granite City and placed on a receiving track temporarily pending the continuance of transportation. If not found to be defective, it would proceed to destination; if found defective, it would be subject to removal for repairs. It is not a case where a defective car has reached a place of repair. See Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Hooven, 297 F. 919, 921, 923; New York, C. & St.L. R. Co. v. Kelly, 70 F.2d 548, 551. The car in this instance had not been withdrawn from use. Johnson v. Southern Pacific Co., 196 U. S. 1, 196 U. S. 21-22; Delk v. St. Louis & San Francisco R. Co., 220 U. S. 580, 220 U. S. 584-586; Great Northern Railway Co. v. Otos, 239 U. S. 349, 239 U. S. 351; Chicago Great Western R. Co. v. Schendel, supra. The car was still in use, though motionless. Minneapolis, St. Paul & S.S.M. Ry. Co. v. Goneau, 269 U. S. 406, 269 U. S. 409. In view of that use, either the Terminal Association or the Wabash was subject to the obligation imposed by the statute.
fact that it was placed by the Terminal Association on the receiving track to await inspection and acceptance by the Wabash.
"was required to go upon said car for the purpose of inspecting the equipment thereon and of accepting or rejecting said car on behalf of his employer, the Wabash Railway Company."
We cannot agree with the view, expressed in the opinion of the state court, in reversing the judgment, that, "granted that the cars were still (in the legal sense) in the possession of the Terminal," it might still be held that "the right of control" had passed to the Wabash. As the Wabash had not accepted the car, the Wabash had not assumed control and petitioner was examining the car in order to determine whether the Wabash should assume control.
he was not employed by the carrier holding the car in use, unless he was outside the scope of the statute because of the special character of his work. His work was that of inspection to discover defects of the sort here found to exist, as well as others.
"if the failure to comply with the requirements of the Act is a proximate cause of the accident resulting in injury to him while in the discharge of his duty, although not engaged in an operation in which the safety appliances are specifically designed to furnish him protection."
point for repairs, while the act relieves the carrier in such a case from the prescribed penalties, the carrier still remains subject by the express terms of the statute to civil liability for injuries sustained by "any railroad employee" in the course of such a movement by reason of the defective equipment. Act of April 14, 1910, c. 160, § 4, 36 Stat. 299, 45 U.S.C. § 13. See New York, C. & St.L. R. Co. v. Kelly, supra.
"springs from its being made unlawful to use cars not equipped as required, not from the position the employee may be in or the work which he may be doing at the moment when he is injured,"
provided the defective equipment is the proximate cause of the injury.
The fact that petitioner was looking for defects of the sort which caused his injury does not prevent recovery, as the statute expressly excludes the defense of assumption of risk. 45 U.S.C. §§ 7, 54.

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