Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=83268:57268&catid=1585&Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 19:51:50+00:00

Document:
G.R. No. 188133, July 07, 2014 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. OLIVER RENATO EDAÑO Y EBDANE, Appellant.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. OLIVER RENATO EDAÑO Y EBDANE, Appellant.
We resolve in this appeal the challenge to the October 16, 2008 decision1 and the December 23, 2008 resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 01142. The challenged CA decision affirmed the April 22, 2004 joint decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 103, Quezon City, finding appellant Oliver Renato Edaño guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 11, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165 (the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002), and imposing on him the penalty of life imprisonment. The assailed resolution, on the other hand, denied the appellant’s motion for reconsideration.
The prosecution charged the appellant and Godofredo Siochi with violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 under two separate Informations, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. Q-02-111200 and Q-02-112104.
The appellant and Siochi pleaded not guilty to the charge on arraignment. Joint trial on the merits followed.
The prosecution presented, as its witnesses, Police Inspector (P/Insp.) Aylin Casignia and Police Officer (PO) 3 Elmer Corbe. The appellant, Siochi and Ruben Forteza took the witness stand for the defense.
In its joint decision dated April 22, 2004, the RTC found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of shabu under Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment. It also ordered him to pay a P500,000.00 fine.
The RTC, however, acquitted Siochi on the ground of reasonable doubt.
The CA added that strict compliance with Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 was not required as long as the integrity of the seized item had been ensured. It further held that the police officers were presumed to have regularly performed their official duties.
Finally, the CA held that the prosecution was able to establish all the elements of illegal possession of shabu.
The appellant moved to reconsider this decision, but the CA denied his motion in its resolution dated December 23, 2008.
In his brief16 and supplemental brief,17 the appellant essentially alleged that PO3 Corbe’s testimony was “vague and equivocal;”18 it lacked details on how the appellant was lured to sell shabu to the informant, and how the entrapment operation had been planned. The appellant also argued that his warrantless arrest was illegal since he was not committing any crime when the police arrested him. He also claimed that the police did not mark and photograph the seized items, and that there was a broken chain of custody over the confiscated drugs.
After due consideration, we resolve to ACQUIT the appellant.
You and the informant were not able to approach Nato because he sense[d] that you are (sic) a policeman?
Our informant first approached Renato Edano[,] and they talked but when he (sic) called me, Renato run (sic), sir.
You said tinawag ka[,] who was that that call (sic) you?
How did she call you?
She waived (sic) her had (sic), sir.
She was talking to Alias Nato[,] sir.
I was still in the car[.] I was not able to hear[,] sir.
I could see them, sir.
They were not exchanging stuff and money, Mr. witness?
While talking[,] the female informant call[ed] you, Mr. Witness?
As testified to by PO3 Corbe himself, the appellant and the informant were just talking to each other; there was no exchange of money and drugs when he approached the car. Notably, while it is true that the informant waved at PO3 Corbe, the latter admitted that this was not the pre-arranged signal to signify that the sale of drugs had been consummated. PO3 Corbe also admitted on cross-examination that he had no personal knowledge on whether there was a prohibited drug and gun inside the space wagon when he approached it.
That the appellant attempted to run away when PO3 Corbe approached him is irrelevant and cannot by itself be construed as adequate to charge the police officer with personal knowledge that the appellant had just engaged in, was actually engaging in or was attempting to engage in criminal activity.
In other words, trying to run away when no crime has been overtly committed, and without more, cannot be evidence of guilt.
Considering that the appellant’s warrantless arrest was unlawful, the search and seizure that resulted from it was likewise illegal. Thus, the alleged plastic bag containing white crystalline substances seized from him is inadmissible in evidence, having come from an invalid search and seizure.
Even granting, for the sake of argument, that the appellant’s warrantless arrest was valid, the latter’s acquittal is still in order due to the prosecution’s failure to establish the evidence of the corpus delicti with moral certainty.
We stress that “[t]he existence of dangerous drugs is a condition sine qua non for conviction for the illegal sale and possession of dangerous drugs, it being the very corpus delicti of the crimes.”25 Thus, the evidence of the corpus delicti must be established beyond reasonable doubt.
In the present case, the various lapses – enumerated and discussed below – committed by the police in the handling, safekeeping and custody over the seized drug tainted the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated shabu.
This item was not marked at the place allegedly where you apprehended the suspect at McDonald’s, West Avenue, Quezon City, am I correct to say that?
You did not, Mr. Witness?
You were also required to put the date of apprehension, being the arresting officer, did you put the date in this evidence, Mr. Witness?
Why did you not do that, Mr. Witness?
What I remembered there is an initial of the accused, sir.
Who put the initial, Mr. Witness?
He was the one, sir.
You did not put your initial?
Why did you not put your initial?
Marking, as used in drug cases, means the placing by the apprehending officer or the poseur-buyer of his/her initials and signature on the item/s seized. “Consistency with the "chain of custody" rule requires that the "marking" of the seized items - to truly ensure that they are the same items that enter the chain and are eventually the ones offered in evidence - should be done (1) in the presence of the apprehended violator (2) immediately upon confiscation.”27 The Court clarified in People v. Resurreccion28 that marking upon immediate confiscation contemplates even marking at the nearest police station or office of the apprehending team.
Thus, while marking of the seized drugs at the police station is permitted, the marking should be done by the police, and not by the accused. The appellant’s participation in the marking procedure should only be as a witness. Why the police failed to do a basic police procedure truly baffles us.
We also point out that per the testimony of P/Insp. Casignia, the Forensic Chemical Officer, the police forwarded two (2) plastic bags containing white crystalline substances to the crime laboratory for examination – one marked with the initials “OR” and the other marked with “GS.” Both plastic bags were used as evidence against the appellant. The records, however, did not indicate who marked the plastic bag with “GS,” who witnessed this marking, and when this marking had been made. As with the bag that had been marked “OR,” we express doubts on whether the plastic bag containing white crystalline substances marked as “GS” was the same plastic bag taken from the appellant’s co-accused, Siochi.
These conditions were not met in the present case, as the prosecution did not even attempt to offer any justification for its failure to follow the prescribed procedures in the handling and safekeeping of the seized items. “We stress that it is the prosecution who has the positive duty to establish that earnest efforts were employed in contacting the representatives enumerated under Section 21[a] of R.A. No. 9165, or that there was a justifiable ground for failing to do so.”31 The Court cannot simply presume what these justifications are.
In sum, we hold that the appellant’s acquittal is in order since the shabu purportedly seized from him is inadmissible in evidence for being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree. Corollarily, the prosecution's failure to comply with Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, and with the chain of custody requirement of this Act, compromised the identity of the item seized, leading to the failure to adequately prove the corpus delicti of the crime charged.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we REVERSE and SET ASIDE the October 16, 2008 decision and the December 23, 2008 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 01142. Appellant Oliver Renato Edaño y Ebdane is hereby ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He is ordered immediately RELEASED from detention unless he is otherwise legally confined for another cause.
Let a copy of this Decision be sent to the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City, for immediate implementation. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to report the action he has taken to this Court within five (5) days from receipt of this Decision.
1Rollo, pp. 2-12; penned by Associate Justice Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr., and concurred in by Associate Justices Bienvenido L. Reyes (now a member of this Court) and Mariflor P. Punzalan Castillo.
2 CA rollo, p. 139.
3 Id. at 21-27; penned by Judge Jaime N. Salazar, Jr.
4 TSN, February 21, 2003, pp. 2-3, 18.
5 Id. at 8 and 24.
7 Id. at 5-7, 23.
8 TSN, December 11, 2002, pp. 12-17.
9 TSN, December 9, 2003, pp. 3-4.
11 Id. at 8-12; and TSN, February 16, 2004, pp. 11-12.
12 TSN, December 9, 2003, pp. 14-18.
15 Supra note 1, at 10.
16 CA rollo, pp. 44-54, 104-107.
18 Supra note 16, at 48.
19 CA rollo, pp. 72-95.
20 See George Antiquera y Codes v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 180661, December 11, 2013.
21 See People v. Mendoza, G.R. No. 191267, June 26, 2013, 700 SCRA 42, 51; italics supplied.
22 TSN, February 21, 2003, pp. 19-21.
23 G.R. No. 201363, March 18, 2013, 693 SCRA 549.
24 Id. at 560; italics supplied, citations omitted.
25 See People v. Magat, 588 Phil. 395, 402 (2008).
26 TSN, February 21, 2003, pp. 14-15.
27 See People v. Sanchez, 590 Phil. 214, 241 (2008).
28 618 Phil. 520, 532 (2009).
29 See Records, p. 43.
30 People v. Garcia, 599 Phil. 416, 431 (2009), citing People v. Sanchez, 590 Phil. 214 (2008).
31 See People v. Umipang, G.R. No. 190321, April 25, 2012, 671 SCRA 324, 354; citations omitted.
32 See People v. Ancheta, G.R. No. 197371, June 13, 2012, 672 SCRA 604, 617.

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