Source: http://masscases.com/cases/sjc/287/287mass154.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 17:57:32+00:00

Document:
PAULINE E. MAIER HANSON vs. EDWIN H. HANSON.
A probate court in this Commonwealth has jurisdiction under G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 207, § 14, of a libel, grounded upon coercion and fraud practised on the libellant, for annulment of a marriage performed in the State of New Hampshire between parties, both of whom then were domiciled here.
Such a libel could not be maintained by a woman where it appeared that, upon discovery before marriage that the libellee had a venereal disease, she stated to him that she wanted nothing more to do with him and asked him to go away, but that, having entered an automobile with him, she was "whisked off" and told that they were going to New Hampshire to be married; that she made no outcry on the way and went through the ceremony, relying on the promise of the libellee that he would give her an annulment the next day; and that there were no sexual relations after the ceremony: the libellant entered into the marriage voluntarily, and was deceived only in thinking that the marriage could and would be annulled; such deception did not go to the essence of the marriage contract.
LIBEL for annulment of marriage, filed in the Probate Court for the county of Norfolk on March 29, 1933.
The libel was heard by McCoole, J. Material facts found by him are stated in the opinion. By his order, a decree was entered granting annulment "on account of duress practised upon" the libellant.
M. J. Segal, (S. L. Segal with him,) for the libellee.
H. J. Smith, for the libellant.
RUGG, C.J. This is a libel for the annulment of a marriage. There is no report of the evidence. A decree was entered annulling the marriage "on account of duress practised upon said libellant." The libellee appealed and at his request the probate judge reported the material facts found by him. G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 215, §§ 9, 11.
These findings of fact made upon unreported oral testimony must be accepted as true unless mutually inconsistent or plainly wrong. Glover v. Waltham Laundry Co. 235 Mass. 330, 334. The conclusion and the decree must stand unless not supported by the facts reported. Ripley v. Ripley, 259 Mass. 26. Slavinsky v. Slavinsky, ante, 28, 32-33.
libellee is alleged to be a resident of Boston in this Commonwealth, and his answer admits this allegation.
mining whether the marriage has ever existed, which is the issue upon a petition for annulment, our courts must be governed by the principles of law prevailing in the State where the ceremony took place, but may exercise jurisdiction over the marriage status of persons at all times domiciled within this Commonwealth. A sovereign State has authority in general to decide what marriages between its own citizens it will recognize. It is vested with power to exercise through its courts, with respect to cases where both spouses are domiciled within its borders, jurisdiction to nullify a marriage from its beginning or to dissolve a valid marriage. Whippen v. Whippen, 171 Mass. 560. Wright v. Wright, 264 Mass. 453. Witherington v. Eldredge, 264 Mass. 166, 174. Cunningham v. Cunningham, 206 N. Y. 341. The wisdom of a uniform rule of this nature is apparent, because parties would be without a forum to decide their cause if the courts of this Commonwealth do not have jurisdiction, since the courts of New Hampshire decline to entertain a petition for annulment of a marriage solemnized within that State between parties at all times domiciled outside that State. Turner v. Turner, 85 N. H. 249.
formed the ceremony. She was misled by her belief that the libellee would and could have the marriage annulled the next day. Her action in taking part in the ceremony was voluntary. She had complete freedom in the exercise of her will. Her choice to go through with the ceremony was not the result of fear or compulsion. She was, it is true, "whisked off in an automobile" by the libellee, but there is no indication that she protested or struggled against the drive to New Hampshire, or that her passive acquiescence was caused by fear. She did not ask him to stop, to take her home, or to let her leave him. These facts are not sufficient evidence of duress, such as will lead to an annulment. Day v. Day, 236 Mass. 362. See Laffey v. Mullen, 275 Mass. 277. Her apprehension for her personal safety, after learning of the libellee's physical condition, was in no way a factor leading to the marriage in which she participated of her own free will.
The libellant further contends that the decree of the Probate Court should be sustained on the ground that the marriage was induced by the fraud of the libellee even though the facts do not show duress; she invokes the rule that a right decision will be supported even though a wrong reason is given. Reilly v. Selectmen of Blackstone, 266 Mass. 503. It is doubtful whether that principle is applicable to a case like the present. The decree was founded on a definite ground; to that the report of material facts was directed. The argument, however, will be considered. She points out that the object of the libellee in going through the marriage ceremony was to retain his position and increase in salary and that the inescapable inference is that he never intended to consummate the marriage. These facts do not bring the case at bar within the decision of Anders v. Anders, 224 Mass. 438, where the fraud of a woman in marrying the libellant in order to become a married name, with the intent never to perform any one of her duties as a wife, was held cause for an annulment. There the fraudulent purpose was concealed. In the instant case the libellee made his purpose clear. He never misled the libellant into thinking that the marriage would be consummated. An executory contract may be invalidated with less difficulty than a fully executed one.
parties. Marriage is not something to be swept aside lightly. To permit the annulment of a marriage otherwise legal and binding upon mere proof that the parties agreed beforehand to have it annulled would destroy the dignity and lessen the importance of the marriage relation. The decree was not justified by the reported facts.

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