Source: https://openjurist.org/347/us/556
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 00:13:08+00:00

Document:
Camilo Leyra, age 75, and his wife, age 80, were found dead in their Brooklyn apartment. Several days later petitioner, their son, age 50, was indicted in a state court charged with having murdered them with a hammer. He was convicted and sentenced to death, chiefly on several alleged confessions of guilt. The New York Court of Appeals reversed on the ground that one of the confessions, made to a state-employed psychiatrist, had been extorted from petitioner by coercion and promises of leniency in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.1 People v. Leyra, 302 N.Y. 353, 98 N.E.2d 553. Petitioner was then tried again. This time the invalidated confession was not used to convict him but several other confessions that followed it the same day were used. Petitioner objected to the admission of these other confessions on the ground that they were also coerced, but the trial court submitted to the jury the question of their 'voluntariness.' The jury convicted and the death sentence now before us was imposed.2 The New York Court of Appeals, holding that there was evidence to support a finding that the confessions used were free from the coercive influences of the one previously given the psychiatrist, affirmed, Judge Fuld and the late Chief Judge Loughran dissenting. People v. Leyra, 304 N.Y. 468, 108 N.E.2d 673. We denied certiorari. 345 U.S. 918, 73 S.Ct. 730, 97 L.Ed. 1351. Petitioner then filed this habeas corpus proceeding in a United States District Court, charging that the confessions used against him had been coerced, depriving him of due process of law. The District Court properly gave consideration to the petition, Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 73 S.Ct. 397, 437, 97 L.Ed. 469, but denied it. 113 F.Supp. 556. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, Judge Frank dissenting. 208 F.2d 605. Petitioner then sought review in this Court, again urging that he was denied due process on the ground that his confessions to a police captain and to two assistant state prosecutors were forced. We granted certiorari because the constitutional question appeared substantial. 347 U.S. 926, 74 S.Ct. 533.
The use in a state criminal trial of a defendant's confession obtained by coercion—whether physical or mental—is forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment.3 The question for our decision is therefore whether the present confessions were so coerced. This question can only be answered by reviewing the circumstances surrounding the confessions. We therefore examine the circumstances as shown by the undisputed facts of this case.
When the father failed to appear at his place of business on Tuesday, January 10, 1950, petitioner, his business partner, and others went to the father's apartment about 3 p.m. and found the bodies of the aged parents. Police were called. Although they first suspected a prowling intruder, the presence on the couple's disarranged breakfast table of a third teacup led them to think that the killer was a welcome guest. This and other circumstances drew suspicion toward petitioner. He and others were questioned by the police until about 11 p.m. on the evening of the day the bodies were discovered. On Wednesday, police again questioned petitioner from about 10 in the morning to midnight. Once more, beginning about 9 Thursday morning petitioner was subjected to almost constant police questioning throughout the day and much of the night until about 8:30 Friday morning. At that time petitioner was taken by police to his partents' funeral. While petitioner was at the funeral and until he returned in the late afternoon, Captain Meenahan, his chief police questioner, went home to get some 'rest.' After the funeral petitioner himself was permitted to go to a hotel and sleep an hour and a half. He was returned to the police station about 5 p.m. on this Friday afternoon. During his absence a concealed microphone had been installed with wire connections to another room in which the state prosecutor, the police, and possibly some others were stationed to overhear what petitioner might say. Up to this time he had not confessed to the crime.
The petitioner had been suffering from an acutely painful attack of sinus and Captain Meenahan had promised to get a physician to help him. When petitioner returned to the questioning room after the funeral, Captain Meenahan introduced him to 'Dr. Helfand,' supposedly to give petitioner medical relief. Dr. Helfand, however, was not a general practitioner but a psychiatrist with considerable knowledge of hypnosis. Petitioner was left with Dr. Helfand while Captain Meenahan joined the state District Attorney in the nearby listening room. Instead of giving petitioner the medical advice and treatment he expected, the psychiatrist by subtle and suggestive questions simply continued the police effort of the past days and nights to induce petitioner to admit his guilt. For an hour and a half or more the techniques of a highly trained psychiatrist were used to break petitioner's will in order to get him to say he had murdered his parents. Time and time and time again the psychiatrist told petitioner how much he wanted to and could help him, how bad it would be for petitioner if he did not confess, and how much better he would feel, and how much lighter and easier it would be on him if he would just unbosom himself to the doctor. Yet the doctor was at that very time the paid representative of the state whose prosecuting officials were listening in on every threat made and every promise of leniency given.
A tape recording of the psychiatric examination was made and a transcription of the tape was read into the record of this case. To show exactly what transpired we attach rather lengthy excerpts from that transcription as an appendix. The petitioner's answers indicate a mind dazed and bewildered. Time after time the petitioner complains about how tired and how sleepy he is and how he cannot think. On occasion after occasion the doctor told petitioner either to open his eyes or to shut his eyes. Apparently many of petitioner's answers were barely audible. On occasions the doctor informed petitioner that his lips were moving but no sound could be heard. Many times petitioner was asked to speak louder. As time went on, the record indicates that petitioner began to accept suggestions of the psychiatrist. For instance, Dr. Helfand suggested that petitioner had hit his parents with a hammer and after some minutes petitioner agreed that must have been the weapon.
Finally, after an hour and a half or longer, petitioner, encouraged by the doctor's assurances that he had done no moral wrong and would be let off easily, called for Captain Meenahan. The captain immediately appeared. It was then that the confession was given to him which was admitted against petitioner in this trial. Immediately following this confession to Captain Meenahan, petitioner's business partner was called from an adjoining room. The police had apparently brought the business partner there to have him talk to petitioner at an opportune moment. Petitioner repeated to his partner in a very brief way some of the things he had told the psychiatrist and the captain. Following this, petitioner was questioned by the two assistant state prosecutors. What purports to be his formal confession was taken down by their stenographer, with a notation that it was given at 10 p.m., several hours after the psychiatrist took petitioner in charge.
On the first appeal the New York Court of Appeals held that the admissions petitioner made to the psychiatrist were so clearly the product of 'mental coercion' that their use as evidence was inconsistent with due process of law. On the second appeal, however, that court held that the subsequent confessions here challenged were properly admitted. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held the same thing. With this holding we cannot agree. Unlike the circumstances in Lyons v. State of Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596, 602, 603, 64 S.Ct. 1208, 1212, 88 L.Ed. 1481, the undisputed facts in this case are irreconcilable with petitioner's mental freedom 'to confess to or deny a suspected participation in a crime', and the relation of the confessions made to the psychiatrist, the police captain and the state prosecutors, is 'so close that one must sya the facts of one control the character of the other * * *.' All were simply parts of one continuous process. All were extracted in the same place within a period of about five hours as the climax of days and nights of intermittent, intensive police questioning. First, an already physically and emotionally exhausted suspect's ability to resist interrogation was broken to almost trance-like submission by use of the arts of a highly skilled psychiatrist. Then the confession petitioner began making to the psychiatrist was filled in and perfected by additional statements given in rapid succession to a police officer, a trusted friend, and two state prosecutors. We hold that use of confessions extracted in such a manner from a lone defendant unprotected by counsel is not consistent with due process of law as required by our Constitution.
'Q. What did you say? A. I said, 'Hello, Teddy.?
'Q. She told you what? A. 'Come and have a cup of tea. It will warm you up."
'Q. You argued more and more. Then what? A. I told him, 'Pop, why don't you stay home? Be satisfied. Our business is getting good. You don't have to work this way."
'Q. What did she say? A. She told him, 'Why don't you stay home. Why don't you do what your son says."
'Q. Go ahead, what happened? A. I told him 'Pop, think it over. We're silly to argue. It will do us no good.' He said, 'Finish your damn tea. I'm going out and get my paper."
'Q. Yes. A. He says, 'We'll go to the bank,' and he says, 'I'll go to Broadway and pick up the box tops and you'll go back and you'll all get out of this place;' and he says, 'If your mother agrees with you, she can go with you."
'Q. So then what happened? A. Mom said, 'Don't get excited."
'Q. Yes * * * say it. Say it. A. I said, 'He killd my brother, he'll kill my mother, and he'll kill me."
'Q. Come I am holding my hand on your forehead; I am making your thoughts clear. You know exactly what happened? A. Doc. I can't think. I must have done it but how.
'Q. What did you say? A. I said I must have done it but how.
'Q. You just told me, you had your hand on your head? A. I don't remember. From then on, I can't think of anything.
'Q. Did you have it in mind that your Mother would die with your Father because you always wanted it? A. She always said that.
'Q. She always said what? A. That she wanted to die with him.
'Q. You had it on your mind, didn't you? A. I don't know Doc.
'Q. Think and tell me; just think and tell me. A. She was just like a baby to me.
'Q. Just relax and your thoughts will come back to you because I have my hand on your forehead. Everything will be fine. If you tell us all the details we will know the whole story of what happened. You picked up the hammer and your Mother was sitting on the chair, you said, and you were standing at the sink? A. I was standing by the stove.
'Q. You were standing by the stove, excuse me I made a mistake. What did you do with the hammer, you swung it? A. I must have Doc. Nobody else could have done it.
'Q. Nobody else could have you say you must have swung it? A. I must have.
'Q. And your Mother fell down. How many times did you swing it. You must tell me that. How many times did you swing the hammer? A. I don't know Doctor.
'Q. Was it once or twice or three times? A. I don't know.
'Q. How many times? A. I was never angry with my mother.
'Q. Were you angry with your Father? A. I was very angry with him.
'Q. And you felt that your Mother should die at the same time with your Father? A. I don't know.
'Q. What did you do then, when your Father came in. You heard him come up. What floor do you live on? A. Street floor; I was in the back.
'Q. And your Father opened the door to the apartment, when he came back with the paper? A. I don't know, Doctor.
'Q. Think, think. A. I don't know why, I can't think.
'Q. I am helping you to think, if you want to you can. There is only a question of wanting. A. I want to so bad.
'Q. If you want to you can because you know everything that happened. We know that you are a nice man and I am trying to help you. When your Father came back with the paper; now here you are, you are in the apartment and your Father came back with the paper? A. I can't remember, Doctor.
'Q. Sure you can. A. I don't remember, Doctor.
'Q. Sure you can; try hard. A. I thought sometimes last night. I told the Captain last night I can't remember. That I would have to remember.
'Q. Why do you have to remember? A. Because if I can't remember these things here, my own children may not be safe. I can't remember what happened; I don't know what happened. I can't think.
'Q. What do you think will happen to the children? A. I don't know; it worries me.
'Q. What do you think might happen to the children? A. I was there with a hammer in my hand I know it. I remember having a hammer in my hand.
'Q. Take your time and relax. Now open your eyes and look at me, just open your eyes—look at me your thoughts will come back, look at me and concentrate. You said you were at the stove with the hammer in your right hand. You were very, very angry you said, right? A. I was never angry at my mother but my Father accused me.
'Q. Accuses you of what? A. That I was trying to put him out of business. The first day we went into the new business we gave him an equal share with us. (Noise) I knew for years that he killed my brother. My brother did the work of six men; he gave him a measly ten dollars a week. He'd sooner lose his son and stay in business so he could save the money and live with my mother.
'Q. Everybody is with you one hundred per cent. You were angry with your Father; you were never so angry like that in all your life? A. I can see what happened Doc but I can't remember.
'Q. I've got my hand on your forehead, your thoughts will come back to you, everything will be clear? A. Hold my temples Doc.
'Q. You say you want me to hold your temples. Now your thoughts are coming back, that's right. The pain was only a tension; it's nervousness. I'm trying to make you speak. I want you to speak up and I want you to tell me everything, now speak up. A. Do I have to?
'Q. Sure you have to; it will be much better for you, now speak up. A. I don't remember much. I promised the Captain I would speak up.
'Q. Was the Captain good to you? He was wonderful.
'Q. Was I good to you? A. Everybody was good to me.
'Q. We are all trying to help you, we are all trying to help you. Your thoughts are coming into you. Now what happened next. You think and you tell me; where were you standing?
'Q. Just close your eyes and it will all come back to you. Just close your eyes and relax. A. I'm trying to Doc. I came back from the cemetery today. All the way down from the cemetery I tried to force myself to remember. I can't. (Noise) I'm trying to remember, how could I do this to my mother. I'm trying to remember.
'Q. I can understand that you loved your mother? A. My mother yes. I can't think. It's awful.
'Q. I can understand how you feel about your mother. A. They told me to rest. I took a good shower and I slept. I was very tired; I was tired, when I got up.
'Q. I can understand how you feel about your Mother. (Noise) You were never so angry in all your life as you were at that time. You told your Mother that you were waiting to kill him. You were waiting for him to come back with the paper. That is what you told me. I can understand that the anger was sufficient to kill your Father? A. Why my mother?
'Q. I don't know about your Mother but as far as your Father was concerned your thoughts were pretty clear, right? A. When he came back I said I was going to settle it once and for all.
'Q. When he came back you said to him you were going to settle this thing once and for all? A. I said I was going to settle this thing once and for all. I stood there standing with the Hammer waiting for him to come back.
'Q. Just take your time now. You were standing there with the hammer. Now your Father came back again? A. I don't remember.
'Q. Close your eyes and your thoughts will come back, relax. I am going to make your mind recollect everything. Your mind is getting clearer and clearer; all your thoughts are coming back now. Now they're coming back. Now your Father went for the paper; your Father came back. Now talk to me. Now your mind is clear. (Noise) Speak up and tell me. A. I can't remember him coming back.
'Q. Yes you can concentrate, just concentrate and you can see your Father come back now. How long did it take for him to get the paper? A. Oh, just a few minutes.
'Q. And in a few minutes, you heard him come in? A. I don't remember him coming in.
'Q. What did you do to your mother in the meantime? A. I don't know. If I could only think.
'Q. What do you think? Come, think, think. I want to tell you something. You are a smart fellow. I may as well be very frank with you. Everything does not alter the case for you. They are not going to work with you and I am not going to work with you if you don't help yourself. A. I want to help myself.
'Q. Now, you see all the details are there. You say yourself, you were the only one there. You say you must have done it? A. We talked this over for twelve hours.
'Q. But you didn't remember all the facts that you told me. Now your mind is clear. A. I can't remember how that happened.
'Q. The fact that you remember or don't remember don't help you, you know. If you remember and come across like a good man—A. Doc, I want to help myself. I can't remember.
'Q. If you tell us the details and come across like a good man, then we can help you. We know that morally you were just in anger. Morally, you are not to be condemned. Right? A. Right.
'Q. But you have to tell us the details, then we will know that you are above board and on the level. Otherwise, we just don't do nothing to you and you will get the worst of it. A. I can't remember. I must have done it. I don't deny that I did it.
'Q. You don't deny what? A. I don't deny that I did it. I must have done it.
'Q. You don't deny that you didn't do it, you mean? A. No, I don't say I didn't do it. I know I did it.
'Q. You know you did it? A. Here is the proof of it.
'Q. Do you know you did it? A. I can't remember doing it. I know it happened. Look at my mother, the woman that I love most in the world. Look. How did it happen? I can't even remember. I can't remember him. I can't remember him coming back. Doctor, can anybody be this crazy?
'Q. That is not crazy, my friend. That is not crazy. When you don't remember anything, that is not crazy. If I forget that I owe somebody ten dollars, that doesn't mean that I am crazy. If you forget the incidents of this thing, that does not mean you are crazy. A. I didn't say it that way.
'Q. You said, 'Can anybody be that crazy?' You are not crazy. A. I want to remember this thing. I have got to remember it.
'Q. This is what we call amnesia and in other words, a wish to forget because it is not pleasant. It does not mean that you are crazy. A. I didn't say that doctor. You misunderstood me.
'Q. I must have misunderstood you. A. I didn't say I was crazy.
'Q. You don't think you are crazy, do you? A. No, I hope not.
'Q. Do you think you might be crazy? A. No, I don't think so.
'Q. Of course not. You are not crazy. You are a nice fellow. I am willing to stay here with you and help you but you have got to help yourself. A. I have tried today for hours to recall from here on, from the time that my mother—I can recall everything. I did it last night. Here, it took hours to piece together things. I sat here. I was so confused that I didn't know whether I owned this suit. I didn't know whether I had a pair of shoes.
'Q. Everything is clear up to the point where you held the hammer in your hand? A. That's right but why can't I remember from there on?
'Q. If you will just stop for a minute, you will remember. And your thoughts will come into you. A. Doctor, I am exhausted, so please be patient.
'Q. I am patient. A. I appreciate that.
'Q. I will stay here with you all night, if you want to? A. The Captain and I last night, he was so patient. He waited for hours until these things came home.
'Q. For hours? A. I appreciate it.
'Q. Do you want me to wait? A. I told him that the last time. It's got to come back. I have been trying to remember all day.
'Q. Take your time. Just take your time. A. I am trying to remember.
'Q. You got a much better chance to play ball, (Then noice) than if you say you don't remember.
'Q. These people are going to throw the book at you unless you can show that in a fit of temper, you got so angry that you did it. Otherwise they toss premeditation in and it's premeditation. See?
'Q. Drink your coffee. Take your time. I got time. You got time. Just relax. Want some more coffee? A. I would like some hot coffee, doc. I would like to speak to the Captain.
'Q. To whom? A. To Captain Meenahan.
'Q. You would like to speak to him? You want me to call him? A. I wish you would.
'Q. Do you want me to come back? A. I don't know. He was awful good hunk last night.
'Q. Well, we were getting along very nicely. I am trying to straighten him out with his troubles. He seemed a little mixed-up. His mind is clear now. I made him concentrate. His mind is much clearer. You can take my seat, Captain.
'Q. Can I speak to the Captain?
He has already had two trials. His first conviction was appealed and reversed. The second one was appealed and affirmed, and this Court denied certiorari on a petition that set up the same constitutional questions now raised. Then habeas corpus proceedings were instituted in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York and relief was denied. That judgment was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and is the one now here on certiorari.
The case was tried a second time, and the question of the voluntariness of the subsequent confessions was submitted to the jury under clear and ample instructions as to which petitioner raises no objection here. The jury returned a verdict of guilty of first degree murder of the father, and a sentence of death was imposed.
The only question before us is whether the effects of the coercion practiced by Dr. Helfand so clearly continued to influence petitioner's mind as to make unreasonable any conclusion other than that the later confessions were also coerced. If there was evidence to support contrary inferences as to the continuing effect of the coercive practices, the conviction should not be disturbed. It is not our function to set aside state court convictions on the ground that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. Stein v. People of State of New York, 346 U.S. 156, 180, 73 S.Ct. 1077, 1090.
The evidence shows an involuntary confession to Dr. Helfand.1 It was followed a few minutes later by a confession to Captain Meenahan. Some half hour later petitioner confessed to a business associate, Herrschaft, saying, 'Well, you know what it's all about; I did it.' Herrschaft asked, 'Do you mean that you killed your own mother and father?' and petitioner replied, 'I did it.' This confession was admitted in this Court to have been voluntarily made, and no complaint is made of its admission in evidence. Sandwiched in between the Meenahan confession and the confession to the assistant district attorneys some two and one-half hours later, the Herrschaft confession presents enough evidence in itself to go to the jury on whether these three confessions, one admitted to have been valid, were all given by petitioner voluntarily with the considered purpose of making a clean breast of the whole thing.
Nor was this the only evidence. Petitioner boldly examined Dr. Helfand, the State's witness, for the purpose, among others, of laying a foundation for the introduction of expert testimony by petitioner's psychiatrist that the effect of the coercion carried over to the later confessions. Petitioner's expert testified as expected. The State then placed on the stand another psychiatrist who gave the opposite opinion, based on evidence that petitioner in his later confessions gave details of the crime known only to him and gave them freely without urging. If this disagreement between experts did not under New York law constitute a conflict in the evidence sufficient standing alone to go to the jury, there was other evidence, such as the Herrschaft confession, to be considered, together with the testimony of the assistant district attorneys that petitioner seemed quite normal and relaxed, and relieved to talk to them. As I said before, it is not our function to weigh the evidence. Whether there was any evidence to go to a jury is the question. In my opinion, there was a question of fact presented by the evidence.
'We cannot say that an inference of guilt based in part upon Lyons' (later) McAlester confession is so illogical and unreasonable as to deny the petitioner a fair trial.' Lyons v. State of Oklahoma, supra, 322 U.S. at page 605, 64 S.Ct. at page 1214.
It is contended that the promises of leniency made by Dr. Helfand stand on a different footing; that once a promise is made, its effect must be presumed to continue until the promise is clearly withdrawn. But such has never been the law. See State v. Willis, 71 Conn. 293, 313, 41 A. 820. As in the case of other forms of coercion and inducement, once a promise of leniency is made a presumption arises that it continues to operate on the mind of the accused. But a showing of a variety of circumstances can overcome that presumption. The length of time elapsing between the promise and the confession, the apparent authority of the person making the promise, whether the confession is made to the same person who offered leniency, and the explicitness and persuasiveness of the inducement are among the many factors to be weighed.
The confession was also held to have been in violation of state law and the state's due process clause.
The death sentence was imposed under a conviction for first degree murder of the father. As to the death of his mother the jury found petitioner guilty of second degree murder of his mother, which does not carry the death sentence. This second degree conviction is not before us.
See, e.g., Brown v. State of Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 56 S.Ct. 461, 80 L.Ed. 682; Chambers v. State of Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 60 S.Ct. 472, 84 L.Ed. 716; Lisenba v. People of State of California, 314 U.S. 219, 62 S.Ct. 280, 86 L.Ed. 166; Ashcraft v. State of Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 64 S.Ct. 921, 88 L.Ed. 1192; Malinski v. People of State of New York, 324 U.S. 401, 65 S.Ct. 781, 89 L.Ed. 1029; Haley v. State of Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 68 S.Ct. 302, 92 L.Ed. 224; Watts v. State of Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 69 S.Ct. 1347, 93 L.Ed. 1801; Stroble v. State of California, 343 U.S. 181, 72 S.Ct. 599, 96 L.Ed. 872; Stein v. People of State of New York, 346 U.S. 156, 73 S.Ct. 1077. The above cases illustrate the settled view of this Court that coerced confessions cannot be admitted as evidence in criminal trials. Some members of the Court reach this conclusion because of their belief that the Fourteenth Amendment makes applicable to the states the Fifth Amendment's ban against compulsory self-incrimination.
The record discloses that petitioner was questioned by Captain Meenahan on Tuesday, the day of the murder, from about 9 or 10 in the evening until 10:30 or 10:45 at his parents' apartment. On Wednesday at about 10 in the morning, he was met at his place of business by detectives who questioned him off and on until 1:20 p.m., when Captain Meenahan began an interrogation which was concluded at 11:30 or 12 that night. He was then allowed to go home. It was not until Thursday that he was taken in custody. That morning he was taken out by detectives to check his alibi. Questioning by Captain Meenahan began again about 2 that afternoon. He was kept at the station until 8:30 o'clock Friday morning, but there was little questioning after 10 p.m. Thursday evening. On Friday morning, he was taken to his parents' funeral and then permitted to sleep for an hour and a half. He was returned to the police station, and about 5 o'clock Friday afternoon the interview with Dr. Helfand began. The coercion practiced by Dr. Helfand was forcefully condemned by the New York Court of Appeals and caused it to declare the confession to Dr. Helfand invalid as a matter of law. The validity of this confession is not involved.

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