Source: http://ri.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20180801_0000115.DRI.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 22:16:40+00:00

Document:
STATE OF RHODE ISLAND, RHODE ISLAND STATE POLICE; CITY OF PROVIDENCE, by and through its Treasurer, J. Lombardi, III, alias; TOWN OF JOHNSTON, by and through its Treasurer, Joseph Chiodo, alias; CITY OF CENTRAL FALLS, by and through its Director of Finance, Cynthia Dejesus, alias; and HERBERT D. TILSON, alias; PETER DUHAMEL, alias; DEREK G. MELFI, alias; CHRIS SCHRAM, alias, each individually and in their official capacities as police officers in the Rhode Island State Police; and OMAR A. OSPINA, alias, individually and in his official capacity as an Officer in the Central Falls Police Department; WILLIAM DEMERS, alias, individually and in his official capacity as an Officer in the Johnston Police Department; NICHOLAS LUDOVICI, alias, individually and in his official capacity as an Officer in the Providence Police Department; and STEVEN G. O'DONNELL, alias, in his official capacity as the Superintendent of the Rhode Island State Police and the Commissioner of the Rhode Island Department of Public Safety, Defendants.
Before the Court are Defendants Rhode Island State Police Troopers Herbert Tilson, Derek Melfi, and Chris Schram's (collectively “Defendants”) Motion to Amend Order to Allow for Interlocutory Appeal or Alternatively, for Reconsideration (ECF No. 53) of the Court's Order (ECF No. 48) on Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment (ECF No. 35), and a Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 55) Plaintiff Genaro Ruiz's Complaint (ECF No. 1). The Motions are denied.
On September 9, 2016, just beating the statute-of-limitations deadline, Plaintiff brought a civil action against the individual Defendants engaged in the fracas, as well as the State of Rhode Island, Rhode Island State Police, among others. (Id. at ¶¶ 1, 3.) Plaintiff attempted to serve Defendants in both their individual and official capacities, and “Assistant Attorney General Michael W. Field accepted service on behalf of the Defendants, but noted on the summonses that he was doing so for the Defendants['] . . . ‘official capacity only.'” (Mem. and Order 2 (quoting Tilson Summons, ECF No. 6).) Realizing on June 28, 2017 that Defendants were not properly served in their individual capacities, Plaintiff sent correspondence in an effort to remedy the situation. (Pl.'s Mem. in Opp'n to Defs.' Mot. to Amend or Recons. Order (“Pl.'s Obj. Amend”) 2, ECF No. 58.) After failing to resolve the dispute with opposing counsel, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Default Judgment, or in the Alternative Extension of Time to Serve. (Id.) The Court denied the Motion for Default, but exercised its discretion under Rule 4(m) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to extend Plaintiff's time to serve thirty days from the date of the order. (See Mem. and Order 2.) One would think that would have been the end of this service-of-process dust-up; but, it was not to be. Defendants press on, urging this Court to either change its mind, or to allow them to march up to the Court of Appeals with their grievance. The answer is no, just as before.
Generally, the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear appeals from the final decisions of district courts. See Atrion Networking Corp. v. Marble Play, LLC, 31 F.Supp.3d 357, 359 (D.R.I. 2014) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982)). However, “28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) provides a limited exception whereby district courts may authorize interlocutory appeals of decisions that do not otherwise qualify as ‘final.'” Id. When pursuing interlocutory review, a party must show the district court's ruling: “(1) ‘involves a controlling question of law,' (2) ‘to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion,' and (3) ‘that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.'” Id. (quoting Cummins v. EG & G Sealol, Inc., 697 F.Supp. 64, 68 (D.R.I. 1988)).
The First Circuit has repeatedly warned district courts that “interlocutory certification under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) should be used sparingly and only in exceptional circumstances.” Caraballo-Seda v. Municipality of Hormigueros, 395 F.3d 7, 9 (1st Cir. 2005). And district courts have heeded this warning. See, e.g., Atrion, 31 F.Supp.3d at 359 (reasoning the wide use of certification would clog the courts); Cummins, 697 F.Supp. at 66 (stating certification should “be granted only in very rare cases”).
It is beyond cavil to suggest that this Court's previous decision to allow additional time for service was anything other than a discretionary one. (See Mem. and Order 6 (“Rule 4(m) ‘permits the district court to grant an extension even in the absence of good cause.'” (quoting Efaw v. Williams, 473 F.3d 1038, 1040 (9th Cir. 2007)))). And it would be a fool's errand - and an abuse of my discretion - to certify an interlocutory appeal on this issue. “A district court should refuse to certify such matters [that lie within the discretion of the district court], not only because of the low probability of reversal, but also because the recognition of discretion results from a studied determination that appellate courts generally should not interfere.” Wright & Miller, supra, at 5 (noting “[a]ppellate courts frequently note the inappropriateness of interlocutory review of most discretionary orders”); see also J.C. Trahan Drilling Contractor, Inc. v. Sterling, 335 F.2d 65, 66-67 (5th Cir. 1964) (denying an interlocutory appeal because it concerned an issue of judicial discretion, not a controlling legal question); Gilmore v. Stalder, No. 06-1509, 2007 WL 3036415, at *1 (W.D. La. Oct. 11, 2007) (deeming improper certification of the order to enlarge time for service, because, rather than a question of controlling law, it involved a discretionary matter). Enough is enough. Defendants' Motion to Amend is denied.
Defendants' fallback position is to ask for reconsideration under Rule 59(e). Not surprisingly, this pitch fares no better. “The granting of a motion for reconsideration is ‘an extraordinary remedy which should be used sparingly.'” Palmer v. Champion Mortg., 465 F.3d 24, 29-30 (1st Cir. 2006) (quoting 11 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2810.1 (3d ed. 2018) [hereinafter Wright & Miller § 2810.1]). The four grounds on which the Court may grant a Rule 59(e) motion are: (1) “manifest errors of law or fact, ” (2) “newly discovered or previously unavailable evidence, ” (3) “manifest injustice, ” and (4) “an intervening change in controlling law.” Markel Am. Ins. v. Diaz-Santiago, 674 F.3d 21, 32 (1st Cir. 2012); Wright & Miller § 2810.1, supra, at 7.

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