Source: http://voiceforthedefenseonline.com/story/januaryfebruary-2012-sdr-voice-defense-vol-41-no-1
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 16:19:07+00:00

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On November 4, 1993, in a chance encounter at the police station, a detective issued Miranda warnings to Dixon and asked him about Hammer’s disappearance; Dixon declined to answer questions without his lawyer present. While investigating the disappearance, police discovered that Dixon forged Hammer’s signature. On November 9th, police arrested Dixon for forgery. That day, police intermittently interrogated Dixon. Prior to the interrogation, the police decided not to give Dixon Miranda warnings for fear that Dixon would again refuse to speak with them. Dixon asserted his right to have an attorney present, but police continued to question Dixon without an attorney. Dixon admitted to the forgery but said he had no knowledge of Hammer’s disappearance. Later that day, police found Hammer’s body. Prior to subsequent police questioning, Dixon stated that he heard the police found a body and said, “I talked to my attorney, and I want to tell you what happened.” The police read Dixon his Miranda rights, obtained a signed waiver of those rights, and spoke with Dixon for half an hour. Then, using a tape recorder, police again advised Dixon of his Miranda rights; Dixon confessed to kidnapping, robbing, and murdering Hammer. At trial, he was convicted of forgery, kidnapping, robbery, and murder, and sentenced to death.
The Sixth Circuit held that the police should have terminated the forgery interrogation when Dixon requested counsel. The court also held that the police’s planned refusal to read Dixon his Miranda rights during the first session of his interrogation for murder was unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court rejected the Sixth Circuit’s description of the police’s technique as “question first, warn later,” mainly because Dixon did not repeat a vital earlier admission during the second murder interrogation; in other words, the first, unwarned interrogation did not directly enable a confession during the second session. The Court held, generally, that this “two-step interrogation process” did not unconstitutionally interfere with the effectiveness of Miranda warnings.
While Greene was appealing his conviction for murder, robbery, and conspiracy, Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185 (1998), held that it is unconstitutional for prosecutors to use redacted statements like those of Greene’s codefendants. Greene asked a Pennsylvania district court to vacate his conviction under the habeas corpus process. Habeas relief is allowed only when a state court violates “clearly established Federal law.” The district court held that Greene could not rely on Gray because that decision was not clearly established when the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed his conviction; the Third Circuit affirmed.
The Supreme Court affirmed the Third Circuit. Since the Pennsylvania Superior Court’s decision predated Gray by three months, Gray was not “clearly established Federal law” that would allow the federal court to grant Greene’s habeas corpus application. The Court observed that Greene missed two opportunities to obtain relief under Gray. Greene could have filed a petition for writ of certiorari after the Pennsylvania Supreme Court dismissed his appeal, which would have likely produced a remand in light of Gray. Greene also could have asserted Gray in a petition for post-conviction relief.
Furthermore, district court did not err in applying an enhancement for obstruction of justice under USSG § 3C1.1 in sentencing two defendants who testified at trial; the court did not clearly err in finding that defendants perjured themselves in material assertions that were not worthy of credence in light of the weight of the physical evidence, and that were flatly contradicted by other witnesses and the ultimate finding of the jury. However, the Fifth Circuit found erroneous the aggravating role enhancement (USSG § 3B1.1(c)) applied to one defendant because the presentence report (PSR) facts on which it rested differed in several material respects from the evidence at trial; because the Fifth Circuit could not tell whether the district court would have applied the enhancement had the PSR correctly summarized the trial evidence, the error was not harmless. The Fifth Circuit vacated D’s sentence and remanded for resentencing.
Newspaper’s appeal of district court’s order closing the sentencing of a drug cartel leader was not moot, even though the sentencing had already occurred. This is a prominent newspaper that seeks to cover major cases, and it is reasonable to expect that courts will close other criminal proceedings to the newspaper in future cases; at the same time, these issues often evade review due to the short duration of criminal trials.
With respect to D’s claim of improper use of post-arrest silence in violation of Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976), the Fifth Circuit held that this claim was not procedurally barred; however, on the merits, the state court did not unreasonably apply Doyle and its progeny in rejecting D’s claim. Doyle does not apply to cross-examination that merely inquires into prior inconsistent statements.
However, the Fifth Circuit held that as a threshold matter, plaintiff prisoner raising claims of inadequate medical care had not alleged valid claims under Title II. The Fifth Circuit remanded the case to allow the plaintiff (who had been proceeding pro se in the district court) an opportunity to amend his claims to remedy the deficiencies and bring them within Title II.
The Fifth Circuit vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing before a different judge.
Furthermore, court did not violate one defendant’s Confrontation Clause rights by admitting phone records; the phone calls did not implicate the defendant who complained about their admission, and a defendant’s confrontation right is triggered only by a witness testifying against him. Additionally, the calls qualified as co-conspirator statements, which are not testimonial for purposes of the Sixth Amendment; the speakers’ identities were sufficiently authenticated; and any error in the admission of these calls was harmless to the complaining defendant, since the calls did not implicate him.
Agreeing with all other circuits, the Fifth Circuit held that the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act, 21 U.S.C. § 853, permits the imposition of personal money judgments against defendants. Nor did court err in entering judgment against the two challenging defendants for the full proceeds of the conspiracy. Finally, the court did not err in deciding that the “proceeds” of the conspiracy meant gross receipts, not just net profits; United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507 (2008), does not compel a net-profits interpretation in cases involving drug trafficking.
D was not entitled to relief on his habeas petition (brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 pursuant to the savings clause of 28 U.S.C. § 2255) claiming that his money laundering conviction was defective under United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507 (2011). Garland v. Roy, 615 F.3d 391 (5th Cir. 2010), did establish that Santos applies retroactively, so D satisfied this requirement for relief under the savings clause. However, unlike in Garland, Santos did not establish here that D was convicted of a nonexistent offense; viewing Justice Stevens’ concurrence in Santos as the controlling law, the Fifth Circuit held that because D was convicted of laundering money derived from the sale of contraband, Santos did not undermine his conviction. Thus, D could not satisfy the requirement that he may have been convicted of a nonexistent offense.
The Fifth Circuit was not persuaded that the statements in the warrant affidavit were a crucial, critical, highly significant factor upon which the jury based its verdict. The Fifth Circuit noted that its denial of habeas relief was not an endorsement that the evidence was overwhelming; the evidence consisted primarily of cross-racial identifications, which studies have demonstrated to be particularly unreliable.
The deference required by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) does not apply to habeas petitions brought by pretrial detainees under § 2241. However, on the merits, the federal district court erred in granting federal habeas relief precluding D’s retrial; where a case ends in a mistrial at defendant’s behest, or with defendant’s consent, the Double Jeopardy Clause bars retrial only if the prosecution or the court intended to goad defendant into requesting a retrial. Here, the record read as a whole did not support the district court’s conclusion that the presiding trial judge purposefully withheld his knowledge of how the jury was split (9 to 3 in favor of acquittal) to goad the defense into requesting a mistrial based on the jury’s deadlock. The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court’s order granting relief and denied D’s habeas petition.
D testified to an alibi defense at the guilt phase of his aggravated robbery trial, but did not testify at the punishment phase. In her final punishment argument, the prosecutor stated that D was not worthy of probation because he had not taken responsibility for the crime.
On appeal, the parties disagreed about the particular offense for which appellant was tried. This disagreement stemmed from the failure of the indictment and jury charge to include an essential element that would distinguish among the three possession-of-codeine offenses in the Health and Safety Code. The hypothetically correct jury charge required the State to prove the essential element of Penalty Group 1 that the codeine was “not listed in Penalty Group 3 or 4.” To prove this element, the State could show that (1) the concentration of the codeine was more than 1.8 grams of codeine per 100 milliliters, or (2) the codeine was not combined with active nonnarcotic ingredients in recognized therapeutic amounts or in sufficient proportion to confer on the compound valuable medicinal qualities other than those possessed by the codeine alone.The evidence at trial showed only the mere presence of promethazine; a rational juror could not infer whether the promethazine was or was not in recognized therapeutic amounts or in sufficient proportion to confer on the compound valuable medicinal qualities other than those possessed by the codeine alone. Because there was insufficient evidence as to an essential element of the particular offense for which appellant was tried, CCA concluded that appellant’s conviction violates due process. COA erred in failing to identify the offense, and then in failing to measure the sufficiency of the evidence against the essential elements of that offense.
CCA overruled Ross v. State, 486 S.W.2d 327 (Tex.Cr.App. 1972), which held that if a witness asserted her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination on the advice of counsel, “[n]oth­ing further [is] required of the court.” CCA agreed with appellant and found that this is contrary to U.S. Supreme Court case law. CCA agreed with the State, however, that the trial court did make the requisite inquiry in compliance with Supreme Court decisions. A hearing was held outside the presence of the jury at which the State proffered the witness’ expected testimony and at which the witness’ attorney explained that the witness feared incriminating herself in the face of evidence indicating that she may have encouraged the crime. This is about as much of an inquiry as was possible while protecting the witness’ right against self-incrimination and her privileged conversation with her attorney. COA’s judgment affirming appellant’s conviction was correct because the trial court’s inquiry into the reasonableness of the witness’ invocation of her Fifth Amendment privilege was sufficient to establish the risk of incrimination.

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