Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/204/647/
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 12:37:24+00:00

Document:
The excepting party should make it manifest that an error prejudicial to him has occurred in the trial in order to justify an appellate court in disturbing the verdict.
Where defendants deny liability for services rendered by plaintiff on the ground that the amount was fixed by contract and paid, and the jury, after instructions to find only for plaintiff in case there was no contract and the value of services exceeded the amount paid, find a verdict for defendant, all expert testimony as to the value of plaintiff's services based on the assumption that there was no contract becomes immaterial, and as, in view of the verdict, adverse rulings in regard to its admission were not prejudicial to the plaintiff, even if error, they become immaterial, and do not afford grounds for reversal.
Where plaintiff did not object below to instructions of the judge limiting expert evidence, he cannot claim on appeal that it was admissible for a broader purpose.
While §§ 2992, 3022 of the Statutes of New Mexico provide that all instructions to the jury must be in writing and that the jury may take the instructions with them, this Court will not presume, in the absence of the record's affirmatively disclosing such a fact, that the jury did not take with it the written instructions as finally corrected by the court.
A judge is not bound to charge the jury in the exact words proposed to him by counsel, and there is no error if he instructs the jury correctly and in substance covers the relevant rules of law proposed by counsel.
upon writ of error to that court. The exceptions are stated in the opinion.
MR. JUSTICE MOODY delivered the opinion of the Court.
the district and supreme courts of the territory, and did not cover the services in this Court, or in the subsequent proceedings in the courts of the territory, for which they claimed the sum of $75,000 as a reasonable compensation. The parties introduced evidence in support of their respective contentions. The jury returned a verdict for the defendants. Exceptions to the rulings and instructions of the court are presented here for consideration.
Both parties offered testimony of witnesses, who qualified as experts, as to the value of Jones' services, and their estimates ranged from $2,000 to $125,000. Three witnesses called by the defendants on this branch of the case, after testifying to their qualifications and their knowledge of the course of the litigation in which Jones was employed, gave their opinion of the value of Jones' services on the assumption that his fee was not fixed by contract. No objection was made to the testimony at the time it was given, but, it appearing upon cross-examination that each witness assumed in his own mind some value of the land in dispute in the litigation in which Jones was employed, counsel for the plaintiffs, without asking what that value was, in the case of each witness at the conclusion of his testimony, moved to strike it out because it was based upon an assumption of the value of the land in controversy in the original case, which was not disclosed to the jury and not based upon the evidence in the case on trial. To the refusal of the court to strike out the testimony, the plaintiffs excepted.
"should not consider the evidence of the various attorneys who have testified to the reasonable value of the services of the said Jones, but should disregard the same, for the reason that the contract has limited and fixed the amount to which said Jones is entitled."
issue which has become immaterial by the verdict of the jury. Any errors, therefore, if such there were, in admitting the evidence, became immaterial. Greenleaf v. Birth, 5 Pet. 132; Brobst v. Brock, 10 Wall. 519, 526 [argument of counsel -- omitted]; Poland v. Brownell, 131 Mass. 138; Sullivan v. Railway, 162 Mass. 536; Hotel Co. v. Grove Co., 165 Mass. 260; Geary v. Stevenson, 169 Mass. 23; Read v. Nichols, 118 N.Y. 224; Schrubbe v. Connell, 69 Wis. 476; Nones v. Northouse, 46 Vt. 587; Carruthers v. McMurray, 75 Ia. 173; Allen v. Blunt, 2 Woodb. & M. 129; Burnett v. Luttrell, 52 Ill.App. 19. For these reasons, the three foregoing exceptions should be overruled.
"In this case, the burden of proof is upon the plaintiffs as to every material fact, except that of payment, as to which fact the burden of proof is upon the defendants. In order to entitle the plaintiffs to recover in this case, they must establish every such material fact, with the exception aforesaid, by a preponderance of the evidence, and if you find that the evidence bearing upon the plaintiffs' case is evenly balanced, or that it preponderates in favor of the defendant, then the plaintiffs cannot recover, and you shall find for the defendants."
"In the thirteenth instruction given you by the court, in which I spoke about the burden of proof, I have concluded to modify that instruction by striking out the words material fact in the second line and inserting in lieu thereof the word issue, and also in same line the word fact and insert in lieu the word issue, and in the fifth line strike out the words material fact and put in the word issue -- so the instruction will read, gentlemen, as follows:"
issue, with the exception aforesaid, by a preponderance of the evidence, and if you find that the evidence bearing upon the plaintiffs' case is evenly balanced, or that it preponderates in favor of the defendants, then the plaintiffs cannot recover, and you should find for the defendants."
"Now, gentlemen, I will withdraw instruction No. thirteen given to you before, and insert and give this amended instruction instead."
"As thus modified, I think the charge is absolutely without objection, if the court please."
"The amendment to the thirteenth instruction by the court to the jury as thus made was also taken down by the court's stenographer and transcribed by the said stenographer from his notes of the proceedings of the trial and attached to the original charge on file, after the verdict of the jury had been returned."
"the jury, when it retires, shall be allowed to take the pleadings in the case, instructions of the court, and any instruments in writing admitted as evidence,"
to send the amended instruction to the jury, the plaintiff is entitled to the benefit of the original exception which was abandoned in open court. Whatever merit this contention may have rests upon the assumption that the amended instruction was not taken by the jury when it retired. We do not know whether it was so taken or not. It is enough to say that the record does not affirmatively disclose that the judge failed to give the written amendment to the jury when it retired. If the plaintiffs' counsel did not discover at the time that the instructions were not taken by the jury in accordance with the terms of the statute, it is too much to expect this Court to conjecture that they were not taken, in the absence of any such statement in the record. Grove v. Kansas City, 75 Mo. 672.
"If the jury believes from the evidence that the plaintiff A. A. Jones agreed with the defendant Charles Springer to defend the case of the Maxwell Land Grant Co. v. Dawson, for a fee of $500, and that thereafter and before the rendition of all the services agreed to be rendered by said Jones in said cause, the said Springer said to the said Jones,"
"You cannot be expected to attend to this business for any $500; go on with the case, and we will see how we come out, and after it is all over, you will be paid what is right,"
"or words to that effect, and such proposition was accepted and acted on by said Jones, then the plaintiffs in this case are entitled to recover for the services of said Jones in said case whatever the same may be reasonably worth, as shown by the evidence in this case."
the $500 originally fixed, but that he was to go on with the litigation, see how it came out, and then Charles Springer would do what was right, and after the property should be sold he would pay said Jones a big cash fee."
"(8) If the jury believes from the evidence that the original contract in relation to Mr. Jones' compensation was afterward modified so that such compensation was not to be the $500 agreed upon, then you should find for the plaintiffs in such sum as you believe from the evidence to be the reasonable value for the services of Jones, less whatever sum may have been paid thereon."
"The court instructs the jury that the credibility of the witnesses is a question exclusively for the jury, and the law is that, where two witnesses testify directly opposite to each other, the jury are not bound to regard the weight of the evidence as evenly balanced. The jury have a right to determine from the appearance of the witnesses on the stand, their manner of testifying, their apparent candor and fairness, their apparent intelligence or the lack of intelligence, and from all of the other surrounding circumstances appearing on the trial, which witness is the more worthy of credit, and to give credit accordingly."
But, so far as the plaintiffs were entitled to this instruction, it was given to the jury by instruction 14. A judge is not bound to charge the jury in the exact words proposed to him by counsel. The form of expression may be his own. If he instructs the jury correctly and in substance covers the relevant rules of law proposed to him by counsel, there is no error in refusing to adopt the exact words of the request. Continental Improvement Company v. Stead, 95 U. S. 161.

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