Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/296/10/
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 10:25:00+00:00

Document:
1. Tidelands in California, which had not been granted by Mexico or subjected to trusts requiring a different disposition, passed to the State upon her admission to the Union. P. 296 U. S. 15.
2. The Federal Government had no right to convey tideland which had vested in the State by virtue of her admission. P. 296 U. S. 16.
3. The words "public lands" are habitually used in our legislation to describe such as are subject to sale or other disposal under general laws. The term does not include tidelands. P. 296 U. S. 17.
4. The authority given the Land Department over surveys of "public lands" of the United States, and its authority under the preemption law to patent lands "belonging to the United States," did not empower it to make a survey defining the boundary between an upland lot belonging to the United States, and tideland belonging to a State, which would be conclusive against the State or her grantee in a subsequent suit against one claiming the lot under a preemption patent. Knight v. United States Land Assn., 142 U. S. 160, distinguished. P. 296 U. S. 16.
5. The question of the jurisdiction of the Land Department to act upon the subject matter -- a patent of lands -- is always open for judicial determination. P. 296 U. S. 17.
6. Where the District Court, due to the error of deeming a United States survey and patent conclusive, failed to determine the boundary between tideland granted by a State and upland patented by the United States, in a suit to quiet title involving that question and others, the cause was properly remanded for a new trial. P. 296 U. S. 21.
7. In a suit to quiet title brought by a party claiming tideland under grant from a State against a party claiming under a patent from the United States which purports to convey, according to a plat of survey, land bordering on the ocean, the question whether a part of the tideland is erroneously included by the survey and patent is necessarily a federal question, since it concerns the validity and effect of an act done by the United States and, involves the ascertainment of the essential basis of a right asserted under federal law. P. 296 U. S. 22.
8. Rights and interests in the tideland, which is subject to the sovereignty of the State, are matters of local law. P. 296 U. S. 22.
9. The tideland extends to the high water mark, which means, not a physical mark made upon the ground by the water, but the line of high water as determined by the course of the tides. P. 296 U. S. 22.
10. At common law, ordinary high water mark is the boundary of tideland. P. 296 U. S. 22.
11. The boundary is the mean high tide line, which is neither the spring tide nor the neap tide, but the mean of all the high tides. Pp. 296 U. S. 22, 296 U. S. 26.
12. Inasmuch as the United States Coast and Geodetic Survey defines mean high water at any place as the average height of all the high waters at that place over a considerable period of time, and finds that, from theoretical considerations of an astronomical character, there should be a periodic variation in the rise of water above sea level having a period of 18.6 years, the Court approves a ruling that, in order to ascertain mean high tide line with requisite certainty in fixing the boundary of valuable tidelands, an average of 18.6 years should be determined as nearly as possible. P. 296 U. S. 26.
Certiorari, 295 U.S. 729, to review the reversal of a decree of the District Court, which dismissed upon the merits a bill by the City to quiet title to land claimed to be tideland.
Petitioners claimed under a preemption patent issued by the United States on December 30, 1881, to one William Banning. The District Court entered a decree, upon findings, dismissing the complaint upon the merits and adjudging that petitioner, Borax Consolidated, Limited, was the owner in fee simple and entitled to the possession of the property. 5 Fed.Supp. 281. The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the decree. 74 F.2d 901. Because of the importance of the questions presented, and of an asserted conflict with decisions of this Court, we granted certiorari, June 3, 1935.
"Lot numbered one, of section eight, in township five south, of range thirteen west of San Bernardino Meridian, in California, containing eighteen acres, and eighty-eight hundredths of an acre, according to the Official Plat of the Survey of the said Lands, returned to the General Land Office by the Surveyor General."
and field notes of the survey; that all the lands described in the complaint were embraced within that lot, and that no portion of the lot was or had been tideland or situated below the line of mean high tide of the Pacific Ocean or of Los Angeles Harbor. The District Court held that the complaint was a collateral, and hence unwarranted, attack upon the survey, the plat, and the patent; that the action of the General Land Office involved determinations of questions of fact which were within its jurisdiction and were specially committed to it by law for decision, and that its determinations, including that of the correctness of the survey, were final, and were binding upon the State of California and the City of Los Angeles, as well as upon the United States.
years should be determined as near as possible by observation or calculation." 74 F.2d 901, pp. 906-907.
Petitioners contest these rulings of the Court of Appeals. With respect to the ascertainment of the shore line, they insist that the court erred in taking the "mean high tide line" and in rejecting "neap tides" as the criterion for ordinary high water mark.
Land Assn., supra; Shively v. Bowlby, supra. That limitation is not applicable here, as it is not contended that Mormon Island was included in any earlier grant. See De Guyer v. Banning, 167 U. S. 723.
"The right of the United States to the public lands, and the power of Congress to make all needful rules and regulations for the sale and disposition thereof, conferred no power to grant to the plaintiffs the land in controversy."
"Pollard v. Hagan, supra. See also Shively v. Bowlby, supra, pp. 152 U. S. 27-28; Mobile Transportation Co. v. Mobile, 187 U. S. 479, 187 U. S. 490; Donnelly v. United States, 228 U. S. 243, 228 U. S. 260-261."
"the power to make and correct surveys belongs to the political department of the government, and that, whilst the lands are subject to the supervision of the General Land Office, the decisions of that bureau in all such cases, like that of other special tribunals upon matters within their exclusive jurisdiction, are unassailable by the courts, except by a direct proceeding."
R.S. §§ 453, 2395-2398, 2478, 43 U.S.C. §§ 2, 751-754, 1201. Cragin v. Powell, 128 U. S. 691, 128 U. S. 698-699; Heath v. Wallace, 138 U. S. 573, 138 U. S. 585; Knight v. United Land Association, supra; Stoneroad v. Stoneroad, 158 U. S. 240, 158 U. S. 250-252; Russell v. Maxwell Land-Grant Co., 158 U. S. 253, 158 U. S. 256; United States v. Coronado Beach Co., 255 U. S. 472, 255 U. S. 487-488.
But this rule proceeds upon the assumption that the matter determined is within the jurisdiction of the Land Department. Cragin v. Powell, supra. So far as pertinent here, the jurisdiction of the Land Department extended only to "the public lands of the United States." The patent to Banning was issued under the preemption laws which expressly related to lands "belonging to the United States." Rev.St. §§ 2257, 2259. Obviously these laws had no application to lands which belonged to the states. Specifically, the term "public lands" did not include tidelands. Mann v. Tacoma Land Co., 153 U. S. 273, 153 U. S. 284. "The words public lands' are habitually used in our legislation to describe such as are subject to sale or other disposal under general laws." Newhall v. Sanger, 92 U. S. 761, 92 U. S. 763; Barker v. Harvey, 181 U. S. 481, 181 U. S. 490; Union Pacific R. Co. v. Harris, 215 U. S. 386, 215 U. S. 388.
"when we speak of the conclusive presumptions attending a patent for lands, we assume that it was issued in a case where the department had jurisdiction to act and execute it -- that is to say, in a case where the lands belonged to the United States, and provision had been made by law for their sale. If they never were public property, or had previously been disposed of, or if Congress had made no provision for their sale, or had reserved them, the department would have no jurisdiction to transfer them, and its attempted conveyance of them would be inoperative and void, no matter with what seeming regularity the forms of law may have been observed."
"the objection to the patent reaches beyond the action of the special tribunal, and goes to the existence of a subject upon which it was competent to act."
it could not? Such a controversy as to title is appropriately one for judicial decision upon evidence, and we find no ground for the conclusion that it has been committed to the determination of administrative officers.
Petitioners urge a distinction in that, at the time of the survey, no private right in the property had yet attached, and the question lay between the federal government and the State of California. But the distinction is immaterial. If tideland, the title of the state was complete on admission to the Union. No transfer to private parties was necessary to perfect or assure that title, and no power of disposition remained with the United States.
To support their contention as to the conclusiveness of the survey and patent, petitioners largely rely upon our decision in Knight v. United Land Assn., supra. But that decision is not in point, as it related to land which, albeit tideland, had been the subject of a Mexican grant made prior to statehood. What had there been done by the federal government was found to be in pursuance of the duty of the United States, imposed by the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo and the principles of international law, to protect the rights of property which had previously been created by the Mexican government. The contest related to land in Mission creek, an estuary of the Bay of San Francisco. The plaintiffs claimed under a tideland grant from the state. The defendant's claim rested upon the title of the City of San Francisco, as successor to the Mexican pueblo of that name. Following the procedure prescribed by statute with respect to the confirmation of such titles (Acts of March 3, 1851, 9 Stat. 631; July 1, 1864, 13 Stat. 332), the City had obtained a confirmatory decree from the United States Circuit Court in May, 1865. The statutes required that such a decree should be followed by a survey under the supervision of the General Land Office, and patent was to issue to the successful claimant when such survey had been finally approved.
"if there were any tidelands within the pueblo, the power and duty of the United States under the treaty to protect the claims of the city of San Francisco as successor to the pueblo were superior to any subsequently acquired rights of California."
"were dependent upon Mexican laws, and when Mexico established those laws, she was the owner of tidelands as well as uplands, and could have placed the boundaries of her pueblos wherever she thought proper."
when fixing the limits of the claim of the city as successor to the pueblo. Id., pp. 142 U. S. 186-187. The obligation of protection was "political in its character, to be performed in such a manner and on such terms as the United States might direct." Accordingly, Congress had established a special tribunal to consider claims derived from Mexico, had authorized determinations by the court upon appeal, and had "designated the officers who should in all cases survey and measure off the land when the validity of the claim presented was finally determined." Id., pp. 142 U. S. 202-203. The survey upon which the patent rested in the Knight case was thus made pursuant to the authority reserved to the United States to enable it to discharge its international duty with respect to land which, although tideland, had not passed to the state. See Shively v. Bowlby, supra, pp. 152 U. S. 30-31; United States v. Coronado Beach Company, supra.
The distinguishing features of the instant case are apparent. No prior Mexican grant is here involved. We conclude that the state was not bound by the survey and patent, and that its grantee was entitled to show, if it could, that the land in question was tideland.
In this view, it is not necessary to consider whether the lines designated in the plat of the Norway survey as "meander" lines were intended as boundaries.
3. As the District Court fell into a fundamental error in treating the survey and patent as conclusive, it was not incumbent upon the Court of Appeals to review the evidence and decide whether it showed, or failed to show, that the land in question was tideland. The court remanded the cause for a new trial in which the issues as to the boundary between upland and tideland, and as to the defenses urged by petitioners, are to be determined. In that disposition of the case we find no error.
Court to ascertain as the boundary "the mean high tide line," and in thus rejecting the line of "neap tides."
Petitioners claim under a federal patent which, according to the plat, purported to convey land bordering on the Pacific Ocean. There is no question that the United States was free to convey the upland, and the patent affords no ground for holding that it did not convey all the title that the United States had in the premises. The question as to the extent of this federal grant -- that is, as to the limit of the land conveyed, or the boundary between the upland and the tideland -- is necessarily a federal question. It is a question which concerns the validity and effect of an act done by the United States; it involves the ascertainment of the essential basis of a right asserted under federal law. Packer v. Bird, 137 U. S. 661, 137 U. S. 669-670; Brewer-Elliott Oil & Gas Co. v. United States, 260 U. S. 77, 260 U. S. 87; United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U. S. 49, 270 U. S. 55-56; United States v. Utah, 283 U. S. 64, 283 U. S. 75. Rights and interests in the tideland, which is subject to the sovereignty of the state, are matters of local law. Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U. S. 324, 94 U. S. 338; Shively v. Bowlby, supra, p. 152 U. S. 40; Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U. S. 371, 140 U. S. 382; Port of Seattle v. Oregon & Washington R. Co., 255 U. S. 56, 255 U. S. 63.
ebb and flow. When, therefore, the sea, or a bay, is named as a boundary, the line of ordinary high water mark is always intended where the common law prevails."
United States v. Pacheco, 2 Wall. 587, 69 U. S. 590.
every month at full and change of the moon." And (3) "ordinary tides, or nepe tides, which happen between the full and change of the moon." The last kind of shore, said Lord Hale, "is that which is properly littus maris." He thus excluded the "spring tides" of the month, assigning as the reason that, "for the most part, the lands covered with these fluxes are dry and maniorable" -- that is, not reached by the tides.
"It is true of the limit of the shore reached by these tides that it is more frequently reached and covered by the tide than left uncovered by it. For about three days, it is exceeded, and for about three days, it is left short, and on one day it is reached. This point of the shore therefore is about four days in every week, i.e., for the most part of the year, reached and covered by the tides."
"Lord Hale gives as his reason for thinking that lands only covered by the high spring tides do not belong to the Crown that such lands are for the most part dry and maniorable, and, taking this passage as the only authority at all capable of guiding us, the reasonable conclusion is that the Crown's right is limited to land which is for the most part not dry or maniorable. The learned Judges whose assistance I had in this very obscure question point out that the limit indicating such land is the line of the medium high tide between the springs and the neaps. All land below that line is more often than not covered at high water, and so may justly be said, in the language of Lord Hale, to be covered by the ordinary flux of the sea. This cannot be said of any land above that line."
This conclusion appears to have been approved in Massachusetts. Commonwealth v. City of Roxbury, 9 Gray 451, 483; East Boston Co. v. Commonwealth, 203 Mass. 68, 72, 89 N.E. 236. See also New Jersey Zinc & Iron Co. v. Morris Canal & Banking Co., 44 N.J.Eq. 398, 401; Gould on Waters, p. 62.
and submerged lands" situated "below the line of mean high tide of the Pacific ocean." [Footnote 4] Petitioners urge that "ordinary high water mark" has been defined by the state court as referring to the line of the neap tides. [Footnote 5] We find it unnecessary to review the cases cited or to attempt to determine whether they record a final judgment as to the construction of the state statute, which, of course, is a question for the state courts.
In determining the limit of the federal grant, we perceive no justification for taking neap high tides, or the mean of those tides, as the boundary between upland and tideland, and for thus excluding from the shore the land which is actually covered by the tides most of the time. In order to include the land that is thus covered, it is necessary to take the mean high tide line which, as the Court of Appeals said, is neither the spring tide nor the neap tide, but a mean of all the high tides.
period of time," and the further observation that, "from theoretical considerations of an astronomical character," there should be "a periodic variation in the rise of water above sea level having a period of 18.6 years," [Footnote 7] the Court of Appeals directed that, in order to ascertain the mean high tide line with requisite certainty in fixing the boundary of valuable tidelands, such as those here in question appear to be, "an average of 18.6 years should be determined as near as possible." We find no error in that instruction.
MR. JUSTICE McREYNOLDS is of opinion that Knight v. United Land Assn., 142 U. S. 161, is controlling, and that the decree of the District Court should be affirmed.
"There is hereby granted to the City of Los Angeles, a municipal corporation of the California, and to its successors, all the right, title, and interest of the State of California, held by said state by virtue of its sovereignty, in and to all tidelands and submerged lands, whether filled or unfilled, within the present boundaries of said city, and situated below the line of mean high tide of the Pacific Ocean, or of any harbor, estuary, bay or inlet within said boundaries, to be forever held by said city, and by its successors, in trust for the uses and purposes, and upon the express conditions following, to-wit: . . ."
The conditions which followed are not material here.
The granting clause above quoted is the same in the Act of 1917 (St.1917, p. 159).
See "The Tide." H. A. Marmer, Assistant Chief, Division of Tides and Currents, U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey, pp. 9, 10.
"There is generally an interval of one or two days between full moon or new moon and the greatest range of the tide. And a like interval is found between the first and third quarters of the moon and the smallest tides."
"is probably due to the fact that as the moon leaves the meridian of the sun in her orbital transit round the earth and approaches the quarters, the tides begin to 'fall off' or are 'nipped,' and neap tides ensue. As she leaves the quarters for the meridian they begin to 'lift,' or 'come on,' or 'spring up,' and when the meridian is reached, spring tides ensue."
"A Practical Manual of Tides and Waves," W. H. Wheeler, p. 49.
See also Tracey Elliott v. Earl of Morley, Ch.Div. 51 Sol.Journal (1907) 625.
See Teschemacher v. Thompson, 18 Cal. 11, 21; Ward v. Mulford, 32 Cal. 365, 373; Eichelberger v. Mills Land & Water Co., 9 Cal.App. 628, 639, 100 P. 117; Forgeus v. County of Santa Cruz, 24 Cal.App. 193, 195, 140 P. 1092; F.A. Hihn Co. v. City of Santa Cruz, 170 Cal. 436, 442, 150 P. 62; City of Oakland v. E. K. Wood Lumber Co., 211 Cal. 16, 23, 292 P. 1076; Otey v. Carmel Sanitary District, 219 Cal. 310, 313, 26 P.2d 308. In a number of cases, the state court has referred to the limit of the shore as the "ordinary" high water mark. See Wright v. Seymour, 69 Cal. 122, 126, 10 P. 323; Long Beach Co. v. Richardson, 70 Cal. 206, 11 P. 695; City of Oakland v. Oakland Water Front Co., 118 Cal. 160, 183, 50 P. 277; Pacific Whaling Co. v. Packers' Assn., 138 Cal. 632, 635, 636, 72 P. 161; People v. California Fish Co., 166 Cal. 576, 584, 138 P. 79. See also Strand Improvement Co. v. Long Beach, 173 Cal. 765, 770, 161 P. 975; Miller & Lux v. Secara, 193 Cal. 755, 761, 762, 227 P. 171.
"Tidal Datum Plane," Special Publication No. 135, p. 76.

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