Source: https://www.floridalegalblog.org/2012/
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 04:18:04+00:00

Document:
"Possession of the Note Determines Standing to Foreclose"
We are compelled to point out that possession of the note determines standing to foreclose. See Taylor v. Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC, 74 So. 3d 1115, 1117 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011). The holder of the original note endorsed in blank has standing. Id. "[A] mortgage is but an incident to the debt, the payment of which it secures, and its ownership follows the assignment of the debt. If the note or other debt secured by a mortgage be transferred without any formal assignment of the mortgage, or even a delivery of it, the mortgage in equity passes as an incident to the debt . . . ." WM Specialty Mortg., LLC v. Salomon, 874 So. 2d 680, 682 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004)(quoting Johns v. Gillian, 184 So. 140, 143 (Fla. 1938)). More fundamentally, however,"[e]ven if [the plaintiff] lacked standing when it filed suit, the final judgment is merely voidable, not void." Dage v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co., 95 So. 3d 1021, 1024 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) (citing Phadael v. Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Americas, 83 So. 3d 893, 895 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012)).
As a result, the trial court's order was reversed.
In 2010, the Commissioner issued four summonses to third-party financial institutions to determine whether the Tribe had complied with its federal withholding requirements during the period from 2006 to 2009. The Tribe petitioned to quash the summonses on the grounds of sovereign immunity, improper purpose, relevance, bad faith, and overbreadth. The district court denied those petitions. Because we conclude that tribal sovereign immunity does not bar the issuance of these third-party summonses, the district court did not clearly err when it found that the summonses were issued for a proper purpose, and the Tribe lacks standing to challenge the summonses for overbreadth, we affirm.
"Indian tribes are required by law to deduct and withhold income taxes from gambling revenues paid to Indian tribe members. 26 U.S.C. § 3402(r)(1). Indian tribes are also subject to backup withholding, id. § 3406(a), and reporting requirements, id. § 6041(a). In 2005, the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service began to investigate the Miccosukee Tribe to determine whether the Tribe had complied with its reporting and withholding requirements."
The claim to tribal sovereign immunity here fails for two reasons. First, the summonses are not suits against the Tribe. Second, tribal sovereign immunity cannot bar a suit by the United States.
Are property owners who have recovered final judgments against the State of Florida in inverse condemnation proceedings constitutionally entitled to invoke the remedies provided in section 74.091, Florida Statutes, without first petitioning the Legislature to appropriate such funds pursuant to section 11.066, Florida Statutes?
The court's opinion in the case, released on July 25, 2012, can be viewed HERE. In the July 25th opinion, the court held: "We reverse that portion of the Palm Beach County order allowing execution against the Department and remand to the circuit courts for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We also reverse that portion of the Broward County order holding that section 11.066(3) was constitutional as applied, because the issue was not yet ripe."
Soleil Builders filed a Motion for Summary Final Judgment. Several months later, the parties convened for the hearing on the Motion, which resulted in a Partial Summary Final Judgment in favor of Soleil Builders for the total amount it sought. This judgment is the first reference to Soleil Builders’ motion as having sought only a partial summary judgment: the court reserved jurisdiction to determine pre-judgment interest and attorney’s fees and “all issues that remain pending before the Court, including deciding the issues raised in the counterclaim filed by the SANCHEZES.” Sanchez subsequently filed for rehearing of the Partial Summary Final Judgment, contending, among other things, that her affirmative defenses had not been considered at the hearing; Sanchez wanted her defenses heard and the counterclaims considered. Sanchez argued that since Soleil Builders had failed to refute her affirmative defenses or address the counterclaims, summary judgment was improper. Shortly thereafter, Soleil Builders filed its Motion for Summary Final Judgment on Sanchez’s counterclaims.
The problem in entering the Partial Summary Final Judgment and leaving for another day the issues raised in the affirmative defenses and counterclaims was made all the more apparent when Soleil Builders used the entry of the Partial Summary Final Judgment to successfully argue at the subsequent hearing that the affirmative defenses and counterclaims had already been decided adversely to Sanchez. In short, the case below was a muddle and reversal is required because of the error that occurred when the trial court entered the two summary judgments without properly addressing the issues raised by the affirmative defenses and counterclaims filed by Sanchez. Accordingly, the judgments under review are reversed and this case is remanded for further proceedings.
In Slominski v. Citizens Property Insurance Corporation (4D10-4372), the Fourth District affirmed the circuit court's summary judgment in favor of the appellee.​ The appellant's filed a lawsuit claiming their property was damaged by Hurricane Wilma on October 24, 2005. Three and a half years after the hurricane, the appellant's filed their claim with Citizens.
the contractor concluded that the wind damage would not have occurred “without hurricane-force winds,” but admitted that he could not be “100% sure” that the wind damage was caused by Hurricane Wilma, as opposed to Hurricane Frances in 2004. On the other hand, he testified that the direction from which the respective storms hit varied, which formed the basis for his opinion. He admitted that, with regard to water damage, there was “no way to differentiate” one storm from another. However, in his affidavit, the contractor stated: “Based on my expertise and personal knowledge of the Slominski home, I am able to determine that the damages as alleged in the lawsuit against Citizens occurred to the property as a result of Hurricane Wilma."
Additionally, "in deposition testimony, the engineer admitted that he was unable to determine exactly when the interior staining or roof damage occurred, but opined only that it was caused by a hurricane."
The Fourth District stated: "In delayed notice cases, “while prejudice to the insurer is presumed, if the insured can demonstrate that the insurer has not been prejudiced thereby, then the insurer will not be relieved of liability merely by a showing that notice was not given ‘as soon as practicable.’” (citations omitted). In this case, the only evidence submitted to rebut the prejudice to the insurer was the affidavit submitted by the contractor and the affidavit submitted by the engineer. However, in both cases, the affidavits conflicted with deposition testimony by the same person stating they could not determine when the damage to the property occurred Therefore, the insurer was prejudiced and the judgment was affirmed.
In Tennant v. West Virginia Secretary of State, a unanimous Supreme Court reversed a three judge district court's decision that agreed with the plaintiff's "claim that West Virginia’s 2011 congressional redistricting plan violates the “one person, one vote” principle that we have held to be embodied in Article I, §2, of the United States Constitution."
Deutsche Bank argues that Mr. Raza failed to prove a reasonable fee under Florida Patient's Compensation Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 1985). Principally, it argues that the record contains no information regarding the number of hours spent by Mr. Raza's counsel and the amount of work performed. Mr. Raza responds that the flat fee satisfies any evidentiary burden. We cannot agree.
Emphasis supplied.​ The court later stated that "We do not hold that the absence of time records is fatal to an effort to recover fees under a flat fee arrangement." The flat fee may be sufficient when "combined with expert testimony...if it accounts for all matters addressed in Florida Patient's Compensation Fund." In this case, the fee expert's affidavit "was facially inadequate" Finally, "Even if Mr. Raza did present sufficient evidence, the amount of fees remains in the trial court's discretion"
​In Swan Landing Development LLC v. First Tennessee Bank National Association (2D11-3410), the Second District reviewed the trial court's imposition of sanctions against the Appellant and its attorneys. Ultimately, the sanctions order was reversed because the organization had a colorable claim and basis to file a motion seeking relief they sought.
We are compelled to conclude based on the facts of this case that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding fees under section 57.105. Rule 1.540(b) permits a trial court to relieve a party from a final judgment based, in part, on "newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial or rehearing, . . . fraud . . . , misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party . . . ." Here, the Bank's audit inquiry letter, which was sent after entry of the final judgment of foreclosure, facially contradicted the Bank's position at trial that the parties had agreed to a concession. And because Swan Landing's efforts seeking an explanation of this contradiction proved unsuccessful, we conclude it was reasonable under these circumstances for Swan Landing and its attorneys to pursue the 1.540(b) motion.
​THIS published opinion released by the Eleventh Circuit last week had a Da Vinci Code feel to it.
The Plaintiff/Appellant was a religious order of the Roman Catholic Church. The Defendant/Appellee was "The Florida Priory of the Knights Hospitallers of the Sovereign Order of Saint John of Jerusalem, Knights of Malta, The Ecumenical Order (The Florida Priory) is also a charitable organization, having an expressly ecumenical, rather than Catholic, association." The two organizations have similar roots that the opinion discusses in some detail. The dispute related to allegedly confusingly similar marks used by both organizations.
The district court cancelled four of the Plaintiff's marks for fraud on the Patent and Trademark Office. The district court found the only remaining service mark visually dismissal to the defendants mark and rejected the Lanham Act claims for that remaining mark. Finding no likelihood of confusion, the district court also denied the Plaintiff's state law claims.
The Eleventh Circuit noted that "The district court explained that Pace was personally unaware of the existence of The Ecumenical Order at the time he signed the applications and the accompanying oath." The Eleventh Circuit discussed its prior law on the issue and held that "Pace had no awareness that any other organization was using the marks for which Plaintiff Order sought federal protection. This fact alone compels reversal of the fraud finding, as Pace could not have intended to deceive the PTO in attesting to an oath that he believed was entirely accurate."
The Eleventh Circuit also rejected the District Court's basis to support its finding of fraud. "To support its finding of fraud, the district court analogized to the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 2060 (2011). Global-Tech considered whether knowledge of infringement was required to sustain a claim that a party actively induced infringement of a patent under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b). Id. at 2063." …. "It was error to look to this case for the applicable standard to analyze a claim for fraud on the PTO. We have been admonished to exercise caution before importing standards from one area of intellectual-property law into another….The Florida Priory has not pointed to any authority to establish the sort of 'historic kinship' that may justify translation of a patent-infringement standard into the mark-application context."
For its final note on the fraud claim, the Eleventh Circuit stated "[t]here is one additional aspect of the fraud analysis that the district court did not address. If the declarant subjectively believes the applicant has a superior right to use the mark, there is no fraud, even if the declarant was mistaken."
"The Lanham Act prohibits the unauthorized use of a mark in commerce that is confusingly similar to a registered service mark. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a). To prevail on a civil infringement claim brought under 15 U.S.C. § 1125, a plaintiff must establish that (1) its mark is entitled to protection and (2) the defendant 'adopted an identical or similar mark such that consumers were likely to confuse the two.' Int’l Stamp Art, Inc. v. United States Postal Serv., 456 F.3d 1270, 1274 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam)."
After describing the test it applies, the court held: "Here, because the district court did not make any additional factual findings to aid us in evaluating whether it committed clear error, we have an “insufficient basis” to evaluate its ultimate conclusion. Id. As a result, we remand the infringement claim so the district court may conduct the proper, multi-factor infringement analysis for the design marks. The district court should also conduct this analysis for Plaintiff Order’s word marks, which were improperly canceled for fraud."
"Under the Lanham Act, an entity that misrepresents the 'nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin' of its services in commercial advertising or promotion is liable to the persons damaged by the false or misleading representation. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)." ... "The district court essentially agreed with the version of history as presented by The Florida Priory and, specifically, by Papanicolaou. On appeal, Plaintiff Order argues that its witnesses, rather than those of The Florida Priory, accurately recited the relevant history. It attributes error to the district court’s reliance on the testimony of Papanicolaou—who did not hold himself out to be an expert in history—over the testimonies of Gamble and Dr. Vann—only one of whom was qualified as an expert in the history of the Order of Malta. We conclude that the district court did not clearly err in its factual findings and therefore affirm its disposition of the false advertising claim."
​"The success of Plaintiff Order’s state unfair competition and FDUTPA claims is tied to the federal Lanham Act claims for infringement and false advertising. See Natural Answers, Inc. v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 529 F.3d 1325, 1333 (11th Cir. 2008). Because we vacate the ruling on the infringement claim as related to the design mark and remand for reconsideration utilizing the multifactor test, we likewise vacate the district court’s conclusions with regard to the analogous state claims.
Next, because we reverse the district court’s cancellation of the registered word marks, we also vacate the portion of the district court’s order disposing of the state claims based on these word marks so it has the opportunity to revisit them based on a complete analysis under the correct standard."
The Village concedes that Harvard, as the representative of her son, qualifies as a "victim." However, the Village emphasizes that although section 985.04(3) permits the release of a juvenile offense report to a victim, such a release is discretionary, not mandatory. In support of its argument, the Village emphasizes the presence of the word "may" in the statute.
First, we address whether the Village was required to produce the requested juvenile offense report to Harvard under section 985.04(3). Our analysis begins by applying accepted rules of statutory construction. "Legislative intent is the polestar that guides a court?s statutory construction analysis." Bautista v. State, 863 So. 2d 1180, 1185 (Fla. 2003). In attempting to discern legislative intent, we first look to the actual language used in the statute. Joshua v. City of Gainesville, 768 So. 2d 432, 435 (Fla. 2000). If the statute is clear and unambiguous, we will not look behind its plain language for legislative intent or resort to rules of statutory construction to ascertain intent. See Lee County Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Jacobs, 820 So. 2d 297, 303 (Fla. 2002). In such an instance, “the statute’s plain and ordinary meaning must control, unless this leads to an unreasonable result or a result clearly contrary to legislative intent.” State v. Burris, 875 So. 2d 408, 410 (Fla. 2004). Here, the issue is whether the term “may” as used in section 985.04(3) is permissive or mandatory. We hold that the plain language of section 985.04(3) is unambiguous, and thus interpret the word “may” as a permissive term. Noel v. Sheldon J. Schlesinger, P.A., 984 So. 2d 1265, 1267 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (“The word ‘may’ denotes a permissive term rather than the mandatory connotation of the word ‘shall.’”) (citations and quotations omitted). Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s ruling that the Village was not required to produce the requested juvenile offense report to Harvard.
The court also rejected the mother's attempt to obtain a copy of the video interview of her son. The public records request fell into an exemption.
Because we find there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether Haim was a resident spouse on the date of loss, and because the Assignment did not relieve Alexandra of her post-loss obligations as a named insured under the policy, we reverse.

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 3402
 § 3406
 § 6041
 v. 
 v. 
 §2
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 271
 § 1114
 § 1125
 v. 
 § 1125
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.