Source: https://casetext.com/case/aldahe-v-matson-navigation-company-3
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 10:56:02+00:00

Document:
Aldahe v. Matson Navigation Company, Inc.
On July 26, 2006, the court granted in part and denied in part Plaintiff Jaber Aldahe's motion for partial summary judgment. Plaintiff filed the instant motion for reconsideration on August 7, 2006. Having reviewed the motion, the court concludes a hearing is unnecessary. See E.D. Mich. LR 7.1(e)(1). For the reasons stated below, the court will deny Plaintiff's motion.
Rule 7.1(g) of the Local Rules for the Eastern District of Michigan provides that a motion for reconsideration shall be granted only if the movant can (1) "demonstrate a palpable defect by which the court and the parties have been misled," and (2) show that "correcting the defect will result in a different disposition of the case." E.D. Mich. LR 7.1(g)(3). "A `palpable defect' is `a defect that is obvious, clear, unmistakable, manifest, or plain.'" United States v. Lockett, 328 F. Supp. 2d 682, 684 (E.D. Mich. 2004) (citing United States v. Cican, 156 F. Supp. 2d 661, 668 (E.D. Mich. 2001)). A motion for reconsideration which presents the same issues already ruled upon by the court, either expressly or by reasonable implication, will not be granted. E.D. Mich. LR 7.1(g)(3); Czajkowski v. Tindall Assocs., P.C., 967 F.Supp. 951, 952 (E.D. Mich. 1997).
Plaintiff failed to submit medical records indicating the ongoing nature of his medical condition. Under the collective bargaining agreement, the fact of Plaintiff's injury and his not fit for duty status were not sufficient, standing alone, to create for Defendant an obvious obligation to pay maintenance and cure. Plaintiff's argument that Defendant had "an immediate affirmative obligation," (Pl.'s Motion at 8), is flawed because it applies the federal common law rule without taking into account the parties' legitimate modification by contract. Al-Zawkari, 871 F.2d at 588.
Plaintiff objects to Defendant not informing him of the contractual requirement of medical records and intimates that it "conceal[ed] the pertinent information." (Pl.'s Motion at 8). Nonetheless, Plaintiff cites no provision of the contract or any other legal authority requiring Defendant to inform Plaintiff of his contractual rights and obligations. Moreover, Plaintiff's characterization of Defendant's conduct as willful, deliberate and callous invites the court to view the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court must instead view the facts and draw all reasonable inferences from the admissible evidence presented in a manner most favorable to Defendant, the nonmoving party. See Dunigan v. Noble, 390 F.3d 486, 492 (6th Cir. 2004). In that light, the record reflects that Defendant, at worst, caused miscommunication by strictly adhering to the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement. That conduct is a far cry from a willful, deliberate and callous refusal to honor an obvious obligation.
Finally, Plaintiff misplaces his reliance on Meade v. Skip Fisheries, Inc., 385 F.Supp. 725, 728 (D. Mass. 1974) (awarding exemplary damages where the defendant had "no semblance of an excuse" for withholding some payments). The court in Meade made no mention of a collective bargaining agreement and therefore is inapposite because it applied federal common law unmodified by contract. Furthermore, the defendant in Meade contested its liability, claiming that a previous shipowner should at least share in the liability because the plaintiff's disability was "but an exacerbation of his original disease." Id. at 727. Case law, however, unequivocally required the defendant to pay the benefits first and then seek reimbursement after the fact. Id. In this case, Defendant did not stonewall in the face of clear common law. Rather, it adhered to a plain provision of the collective bargaining agreement that does not run afoul of the common law. Exemplary damages pursuant to Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527, 530-531 (1962), are therefore inappropriate.
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff's "Petition for Motion for Reconsideration" [Dkt. # 15] is DENIED.

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