Source: http://thewordout.net/pages/page.asp?page_id=56677
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 06:53:26+00:00

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This means that teachers must have the freedom to teach and impart knowledge in the most effective and appropriate manner possible. In this way, the democratic values that undergird the American system of government will thrive and be passed on from generation to generation.
The Constitution protects all persons, no matter what their calling, including public school teachers. Thus, “[a]ny inhibition of freedom of thought, and of action upon thought in the case of teachers brings the safeguards of [the First Amendment] vividly into operation.”9 Nevertheless, because teachers are not only private citizens, but also agents of the state, courts have held that “the rights of teachers in public schools are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings.”10 The following is an overview of how the courts have weighed these competing interests in determining the rights of public school teachers.
Therefore, if a court finds that a teacher’s expressive activity is such that a reasonable person would attribute it to the school, thus invoking the Hazelwood test rather than the Tinker test, the administrators’ decision to restrict the speech is likely to be upheld.
The court held that Bishop’s comments and optional class had a “coercive effect on students” and that the school had an interest in ensuring that its courses were “taught without personal religious bias unnecessarily infecting the teacher or the students.”35 The court held that these interests were sufficient to subordinate Bishop’s free speech rights. According to the court, Bishop’s “interest in academic freedom and free speech do not displace the University’s interest inside the classroom.”36 The court indicated, however, that the university’s censorship of Bishop would have been impermissible if the university had attempted to regulate meetings Bishop had explicitly disassociated from mandatory course work. The court explained that it was concerned that “[t]he phrasing ‘optional class’ or ‘optional meeting’ and the scheduling before finals gave the impression of official sanction” and that the university rightfully could seek to avoid such an appearance. If, however, the professor “makes it plain to his students that such meetings are not mandatory, not considered part of the course work, and not related to grading, the University cannot prevent him from conducting such meetings.”37 An even greater degree of explicit disassociation would likely be required of a secondary or elementary school teacher before a court would find that the teacher’s expressive activity was private speech not reasonably attributable to the school.
Thus, in the classroom the government (or a school board) may limit a teacher’s religious expression to ensure that the teacher does not violate the Establishment Clause.
Moreover, in some instances courts have upheld policies that have forbidden teachers from exercising their religious expression even where such expression would not violate the Establishment Clause on the ground that the school had a compelling interest in ensuring a religiously neutral environment.40 Nevertheless, this does not mean that the government may forbid all discussion of religious matters inside the school. The following are examples of how courts have applied the Establishment Clause to the actions of teachers in specific situations.
The Supreme Court has never decided the constitutionality of statutes or policies prohibiting teachers from wearing religious garb.44 Most of the cases addressing the constitutionality of policies forbidding teachers from wearing religious clothing have upheld those policies.45 These cases have generally held that school administrators may regulate or prohibit a teacher’s religious clothing not only to comply with the Establishment Clause, but also to achieve the appearance of a religiously neutral environment and to avoid litigation over close calls.46 Courts have held that these reasons justified regulations prohibiting Muslim and Sikh teachers from wearing clothing that is required by their faith. However, it would appear that Title VII’s requirement that employers reasonably accommodate employees’ religious convictions should at least require the accommodation of those for whom certain religious garb is a required element of their faith.47 However, a federal appellate court held that such an accommodation was not necessary for a Muslim woman who was prohibited from teaching in her abaya because, the court said, it would impose an undue burden on the school in the form of an increased risk of litigation.48 Title VII is discussed more fully below.
Teachers are free to read their Bibles or other religious texts, pray, or otherwise freely exercise their religion at school when they are outside of the presence of students.49 However, courts have restricted the rights of teachers to engage in such activities when in the presence of students.50 In Roberts v. Madigan, a federal appeals court held that school officials could prohibit a fifth grade teacher from reading silently from his Bible during silent reading assignments, leaving his Bible on his desk during the school day, keeping two books in his class library titled The Story of Jesus and The Bible in Pictures, and displaying a poster on his wall that read, “You need only to open your eyes to see the hand of God.” Roberts never read aloud from the Bible and never talked about his religious beliefs with students. Nevertheless, the court held that school officials could restrict him from reading from his Bible or leaving it on his desk during the school day because “[w]hen viewed from the eyes of the children in Mr. Roberts’ class, the placement of the two books in the class library, the placement of Mr. Roberts’ Bible on his desk, and Mr. Roberts’ reading of the Bible during the reading period provided a ‘crucial symbolic link between the government and religion.’”51 Thus, the Court held that school officials could restrict Roberts’ free speech and free exercise rights in order to avoid violating the Establishment Clause.
The court in Roberts emphasized that the students in the class were between 10 and 12 years of age, increasing the likelihood that they would impute Roberts’ activities to the state.52 The Supreme Court has previously recognized that high school students possess a degree of maturity that may permit them in some instances to distinguish between school-sponsored speech and private speech.53 Moreover, the Roberts court considered all of Roberts’ activities together in determining that students could perceive a symbolic link between the government and religion. Thus, even assuming that other courts would agree with the analysis of the Roberts court, high school teachers may still be found to be free to read religious texts, pray silently, or keep personal religious texts in their classrooms. This is particularly true if the teacher was careful to disclaim any connection between those actions and the state and kept the prayer or scripture reading as inconspicuous as possible.
The court drew no distinction between student-initiated conversations and those initiated by Peloza. As demonstrated above, courts have reached different conclusions as to the constitutionality of teachers’ conversations about religious beliefs with students on school grounds outside instructional time. To the extent that teachers engage in such conversations, they should ensure that the conversation is student-initiated and give brief answers to the student’s questions. Teachers should also refrain from advocating any particular religious viewpoint.
School administrators cannot prohibit religious discussions among faculty members when they are not engaged in classroom instruction.58 Religious discussion among adult faculty members not in the presence of students does not implicate the Establishment Clause concerns that courts have found in teacher/pupil religious discussions.59 Moreover, once a school opens the school grounds for teachers to hold meetings unrelated to school business, it cannot prohibit other groups of teachers from meeting to discuss religious matters. However, if the school has a general policy prohibiting teachers from holding organized meetings unrelated to school business on school grounds, it may apply that policy to prohibit teachers from holding organized religious meetings on school grounds as well.60 Thus, to the extent that school facilities are open for other of teachers to use the facilities for meetings about non-religious matters, the facilities should also be open to groups of teachers who wish to pray or study their Bibles together.
literature as part of their instruction about religion. Beyond these instances, however, teachers may not disseminate religious literature to students at school because courts have held that such activities violate the Establishment Clause.65 In Jabr v. Rapides Parish School Board, a federal district court held that a school principal violated the Establishment Clause by distributing Bibles to students. The court held that the principal’s distribution of the Bibles failed every Establishment Clause test. There was no secular purpose for the distribution of the Bibles, the primary effect of the Bible distribution was to advance religion, the distribution conveyed a message of endorsement of Christianity, and the principal’s position as an authority figure coerced the students into accepting the Bibles.66 Thus, outside of the context of a teacher’s permissible assignments pertaining to study about religion or comparative religion, teachers may not distribute religious literature or advertisements for religious activities at school.
The authority to determine the content of courses taught in public schools generally lies with the school board.67 Thus, teachers may not override the authority of the school board by adding or omitting course work from the prescribed curriculum.68 Nevertheless, the school board’s authority to determine the curriculum is not absolute.
Because, as will be discussed below, teaching about religion is permissible in the public schools, teachers should be permitted to use the Bible or other religious texts in their literature, history, or other courses so long as it is reasonably related to the subject matter in the curriculum.80 (For instance, a teacher may assign a passage from the Psalms in a literature class while discussing styles of poetry.)81 One federal court has also held that a school board order prohibiting “all political speakers” from access to the school violated a teacher’s right to choose the methods of instruction.82 In that case, the school board order was issued in response to a teacher’s decision to invite a Communist speaker to address her class. Applying the Tinker test, the court found no evidence of any material disruption of order in the school or any violation of others’ rights and thus held that this order infringed on the teacher’s right to use outside speakers as a method of teaching the proscribed curriculum.83 The court also held that the order violated the equal protection clause because it was intended to silence a particular viewpoint (Communism).84 The court said that the desire to avoid the discomfort that accompanied this unpopular viewpoint did not justify the order.85 Nevertheless, if a school had a policy prohibiting all non-students or faculty members from access to the school during instructional hours, the policy could probably be applied to prevent a teacher from bringing outside speakers, including speakers with a religious viewpoint, into the classroom. However, teachers should refrain from inviting only speakers with a religious viewpoint.
At the time of the publication of this brochure, twenty-two states had enacted socalled “Right to Work” laws. These laws secure the rights of employees, including teachers, not only not to join a labor union, but also to refuse to pay any fees to a labor union. The twenty-two states that have enacted these laws are: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Wyoming.111 Teachers in these states, regardless of the basis for their objections, may not be required to join or make contributions to a labor union as a condition of their employment.112 However, these laws may not apply to collective bargaining agreements entered into before the effective date of the relevant state statute.113 For this reason, and because state laws vary and are subject to change, we strongly encourage teachers to review the most recent versions of their state’s laws.
Second, some state statutes may also permit objectors to make donations to nonreligious charities or other charities mutually agreed upon by both the union and the objector.129 These state statutes are potentially more accommodating of religious objectors because the beneficiary mutually agreed upon by both the union and the objector could conceivably be a religious organization.130 However, because the substitute charity must be mutually agreed upon, the state legislatures that have enacted these laws have effectively conditioned such donations upon union consent. Thus, these statutes still prohibit a religious objector from choosing a religious charity as the recipient of their substitute payment.
Finally, section 701(j) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act prohibits employers from discriminating on the basis of religion unless they cannot reasonably accommodate the employee without undue hardship on the union or employer.131 Numerous courts have interpreted this provision to require accommodation through substitute charitable payments.132 Moreover, unlike section 19 of the NLRA, section 701(j) does not mandate that the beneficiaries of such payments be non-religious. In fact, section 701(j)’s express Prohibition against employment discrimination based on a person’s religion and its requirement that employers accommodate an employee’s religious observances or practices (absent undue hardship on the employer’s business) supports the argument that statutes that limit beneficiaries of substitute payments to non-religious charities may constitute a civil rights infringement under Title VII.
Thus, teachers who seek to take advantage of section 701(j)’s prohibition against discrimination on the basis of religion should be as cooperative as their religious beliefs permit in reaching an accommodation with their employer or union. Teachers are also reminded to document their correspondence concerning efforts to reach such an accommodation.
Teachers do not unconditionally surrender their constitutional rights once they enter public education. The courts, however, have determined that there are contexts in which these rights may be subject to limitation or must defer to other interests. Although recent court decisions have helped elucidate the extent to which a teacher may assert his or her constitutional rights in light of other competing interests, many unresolved issues remain. As a consequence, the struggle for the individual freedom of teachers continues.
Teachers who read this brochure, therefore, should do so not only to understand their rights, but also to weigh judicial and legislative means by which they as private citizens may achieve greater protection for the constitutional rights of public school teachers.
1 Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District, 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
2 Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
3 Red Lion Broadcasting Company v. Federal Communications Comm’n, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
4 Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 514 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (emphasis supplied).
6 Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957).
7 Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).
310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
9 Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960).
10 Daugherty v. Vanguard Charter School Academy, 116 F. Supp. 2d 897, 910 (W.D. Mich., 2000).
12 Pickering, 391 U.S. at 574.
15 Reeves v. Claiborne County Board of Education, 828 F.2d 1096 (5th Cir. 1987).
16 Fyfe, 902 F.2d at 404.
18 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514.
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1042.
27 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 274 (1988).
30 See id. at 273.
31 Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066 (11th Cir. 1991).
Downing v. W. Haven Bd. of Ed., 162 F. Supp. 2d 19, 27 (Conn. 2001).
40 United States v. Board of Ed. for the Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia, 911 F.2d 882 (3rd Cir. 1990).
teachers does not constitute sectarian teaching”).
N.D. 444 (1936); Hysong, 164 Pa. at 657.
43 Downing, 162 F. Supp. 2d at 27.
44 Bastian, 80 Geo. L.J., at 226.
46 Board of Ed. for the Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia, 911 F.2d at 890-91.
47 Bastian, 80 Geo. L.J., 211.
48 Board of Ed. for the Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia, 911 F.2d at 890-91.
50 Roberts v. Madigan, 921 F.2d 1047 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1218 (1992).
53 Bd. of Ed. of Westside Community Schools v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250-51 (1990).
54 Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 607 (1967).
55 Roman v. Appleby, 558 F. Supp. 449, 457 (E.D.P.A. 1983).
56 Peloza v. Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist., 37 F.3d 517, 521 (9th Cir. 1994).
58 May, 787 F.2d at 1114.
Dist., 314 F. Supp. 223 (E.D.N.Y. 1970).
60 May, 787 F.2d. 1105, 1114 (7th Cir. 1986).
61 20 U.S.C.S. § 4071; Mergens, 496 U.S. at 235-36.
62 20 U.S.C.S. § 4071(c)(3).
63 Mergens, 496 U.S. at 236.
endorsement of the Bible club). See also Peck v. Upshur County Bd. of Ed., 155 F.3d 274, 287 (4th Cir.
schools once per year and noting that no school official participated in making the materials available).
66 Jabr, 171 F. Supp. 2d at 664.
aff’d, 598 F.2d 535 (10th Cir. 1979).
U.S. 1026 (1980) (upholding dismissal of kindergarten teacher who refused to teach patriotic songs).
69 Webster v. New Lenox Sch. Dist. No. 122, 917 F.2d 1004, 1007 (7th Cir. 1990); Zykan v. Warsaw Comm.
Sch. Corp., 631 F.2d 1300, 1305 (7th Cir. 1980).
70 Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603.
71 Epperson, 393 U.S. at 107.
topics relevant to a classroom discussion).
73 Krizek v. Bd. of Ed., 713 F. Supp. 1131, 1138 (N.D. Ill. 1989), quoting Cary, 427 F. Supp. 945, 953.
74 Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603.
75 See Donald F. Uerling, “Academic Freedom in K-12 Education,” 79 Neb. L. Rev., 956, 957 (2000).
76 See Kingsville Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Cooper, 611 F.2d 1109, 1113 (5th Cir. 1980); Dean v. Timpson Ind. Sch.
Dist., 486 F. Supp. 302, 308 (E.D. Tex. 1979); Wilson v. Chancellor, 418 F. Supp. 1358 (D. Or. 1976).
77 Dean, 486 F. Supp. at 308.
78 Kingsville, 611 F. 2d at 1113.
79 Dean, 486 F. Supp. at 308; Milliken v. Bd. of Dir., 611 P.2d 414, 417-18 (Wash. 1980); Uerling, 79 Neb.
L. Rev. 956, 968. See also Tinker, 393 U.S. 503.
80 Sch. Dist. of Abington Township. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963).
82 Wilson, 418 F. Supp. 1358, 1363.
83 Id. at 1363, 1367.
86 Abington, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 434 (1962).
87 Abington, 374 U.S. at 225.
90 Brown v. Gilmore, 258 F.3d 265 (4th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S.Ct. 465.
92 Id. at 279, citing Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 41 (1985).
93 See Palmer, 603 F.2d 1271.
(holding that the teaching of evolution did not violate the Establishment Clause).
(Scalia, J. dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C.J. and Thomas, J.).
97 393 U.S. at 107.
101 Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 586 (1987).
(Stewart, J., concurring in the result).
Constitution,” 84 (P. Kurland & R. Lerner eds. 1987).
109 E.E.O.C. v. University of Detroit, 904 F.2d 331 (6th Cir. 1990).
them to withhold certain dues or even to choose not to join the union.
111 “Right to Work States,” http://www.nrtwc.org/rtws.php3, site visited August 8, 2002.
kind to any labor union or labor organization”).
Right to Work,” http://www.state.ok.us/~okdol/admin/rtw%20faq.pdf, site visited August 8, 2002.
114 431 U.S. 209, 235 (1977).
118 Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Association, 500 U.S. 507, 519 (1991).
119 Id., discussing Ellis v. Railway Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 456.
120 Id. at 522 and 559.
121 Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292 (1986).
123 Id. at 306, quoting Abood, 431 U.S. at 239-40, n.40, quoting Bro. of R. & S.S. Clerks v. Allen, 373 U.S.
protected by a “Right to Work” law may not be compelled to join or pay any fees to a labor union.
must consider my job expendable” (emphasis supplied).
Scott & Cynthia Weingart, A Professor’s Choice: Employment or Religious Conviction: E.E.O.C. v.
University of Detroit, 18 J.C. & U.L. 315 (1991).
127 29 U.S.C.A. § 169 (1995 West Supp.).
128 Wilson v. N.L.R.B., 920 F.2d 1282, 1287-88, 1290 (6th Cir. 1990), cert denied, 112 S. Ct. 3025 (1992).
129 See e.g., Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. §243.666 (1991); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 41.56.122(1) (1991).
130 Yott v. North American Rockwell Corp., 602 F.2d 904, 906 (9th Cir. 1979).
131 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e(j), 2000e-2(a) (1994).
132 University of Detroit, 904 F.2d at 333; Int’l Assoc. of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, Lodge 751 v.
Workers D.A.L.U. 19806, 643 F. 2d 445 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied sub nom.; AO Smith Corp. v.
Nottelson, 454 U.S. 1046 (1981); Tooley v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 648 F.2d 1239 (9th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1098 (1981); Yott v. North American Rockwell Corp., 602 F.2d 904 (9th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 928 (1980); McDaniel v. Essex Int’l, Inc., 571 F.2d 338 (6th Cir. 1978).
133 Int’l Assoc. of Machinists v. Boeing Co., 833 F.2d at 170.
http://www.nrtw.org/b/nr.php3?id=112, site visited August 13, 2002.
135 University of Detroit, 904 F.2d 331.
136 Yott, 602 F.2d at 906.

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