Source: https://www.cunninghambounds.com/blog/2017/january/default-judgment-kirtland-factors-hilyer-v-forti/
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 07:04:11+00:00

Document:
In Kirtland, we held that a trial court's broad discretionary authority to set aside a default judgment under Rule 55(c) should not be exercised without considering the following three factors: 1) whether the defendant has a meritorious defense; 2) whether the plaintiff will be unfairly prejudiced if the default judgment is set aside; and 3) whether the default judgment was a result of the defendant's own culpable conduct. 524 So. 2d at 605. "'"However, in order to trigger the mandatory requirement that the trial court consider the Kirtland factors, the party filing a motion to set aside a default judgment must allege and provide arguments and evidence regarding all three of the Kirtland factors."'"
"'A trial court has broad discretion in deciding whether to grant or deny a motion to set aside a default judgment. Kirtland v. Fort Morgan Auth. Sewer Serv., Inc., 524 So. 2d 600 (Ala. 1988). In reviewing an appeal from a trial court's order refusing to set aside a default judgment, this Court must determine whether in refusing to set aside the default judgment the trial court exceeded its discretion. 524 So. 2d at 604. That discretion, although broad, requires the trial court to balance two competing policy interests associated with default judgments: the need to promote judicial economy and a litigant's right to defend an action on the merits. 524 So. 2d at 604. These interests must be balanced under the two-step process established in Kirtland.
"Zeller v. Bailey, 950 So. 2d 1149, 1152-53 (Ala. 2006)."
Manci v. Ball, Koons & Watson, 995 So. 2d 161, 165 (Ala. 2008).
Ms. *16-17. The Court then examined each of the three required Kirtland elements in detail.
"To present a meritorious defense, for Rule 55(c) purposes, does not require that the movant satisfy the trial court that the movant would necessarily prevail at a trial on the merits, only that the movant show the court that the movant is prepared to present a plausible defense. Kirtland, 524 So. 2d at 605.
"'The defense proffered by the defaulting party must be of such merit as to induce the trial court reasonably to infer that allowing the defense to be litigated could foreseeably alter the outcome of the case. To be more precise, a defaulting party has satisfactorily made a showing of a meritorious defense when allegations in an answer or in a motion to set aside the default judgment and its supporting affidavits, if proven at trial, would constitute a complete defense to the action, or when sufficient evidence has been adduced either by way of affidavit or by some other means to warrant submission of the case to the jury.
"Kirtland, 524 So. 2d at 606."
Sampson v. Cansler, 726 So. 2d 632, 634 (Ala. 1998).
"The second factor that a trial court must consider in ruling on a motion to set aside a default judgment is whether the plaintiff will be unfairly prejudiced if it grants the motion. Kirtland, 524 So. 2d at 606-07. This prejudice cannot take the form of mere delay or increased costs, because those can be remedied by imposing additional costs on the defendant if the plaintiff later prevails. 524 So. 2d at 607. Rather, the prejudice must be substantial, facilitating fraud or collusion, resulting in the loss of evidence, or hindering discovery. 524 So. 2d at 607.
"Phillips v. Randolph, 828 So. 2d 269, 278 (Ala. 2002). Additionally, a defendant cannot simply state that the plaintiff will not be prejudiced if the motion to set aside the default judgment is granted. Phillips, 828 So. 2d at 275."
Royal Ins. Co. of America v. Crowne Invs., Inc., 903 So. 2d 802, 811 (Ala. 2004).
"To warrant a refusal to set aside a default judgment, the defaulting party's actions that resulted in the entry of the default judgment must constitute willful conduct or conduct committed in bad faith. Negligence alone is not sufficient. Bad faith or willfulness is identified by 'incessant and flagrant disrespect for court rules, deliberate and knowing disregard for judicial authority, or intentional nonresponsiveness.' Kirtland, 524 So. 2d at 608 (citing Agio Indus., Inc. v. Delta Oil Co., 485 So. 2d 340, 342 (Ala. Civ. App. 1986)). A trial court's finding with respect to the culpability of the defaulting party is subject to great deference. Jones v. Hydro–Wave of Alabama, Inc., 524 So. 2d 610, 616 (Ala. 1988)."
Zeller v. Bailey, 950 So. 2d 1149, 1154 (Ala. 2006).
Finding that the defendant introduced evidence satisfying each of the three Kirtland factors, the Court holds the Elmore Circuit Court exceeded its discretion in refusing to set aside the default judgment such that reversal of that order was required.

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