Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&amp;view=article&amp;id=40369:g-r-no-140835-august-14,-2000-ramon-a-gonzales-v-andres-r-narvasa,-et-al&amp;catid=1396&amp;Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 04:01:37+00:00

Document:
RAMON A. GONZALES, Petitioner, v. HON. ANDRES R. NARVASA, as Chairman, PREPARATORY COMMISSION ON CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMS; HON. RONALDO B. ZAMORA, as Executive Secretary; COMMISSION ON AUDIT; ROBERTO AVENTAJADO, as Presidential Consultant on Council of Economic Advisers/Economic Affairs; ANGELITO C. BANAYO, as Presidential Adviser for/on Political Affairs; VERONICA IGNACIO-JONES, as Presidential Assistant/Appointment Secretary (In charge of appointments), Respondents.
It is alleged by respondents that, with respect to the PCCR, this case has become moot and academic. We agree.
Time Frame. The Commission shall commence its work on 01 January 1999 and complete the same on or before 31 December 1999. The Commission shall submit its report and recommendations to the President within fifteen (15) working days from 31 December 1999.
The PCCR submitted its recommendations to the President on December 20, 1999 and was dissolved by the President on the same day. It had likewise spent the funds allotted to it. 6 Thus, the PCCR has ceased to exist, having lost its raison d’etre. Subsequent events have overtaken the petition and the Court has nothing left to resolve.
The staleness of the issue before us is made more manifest by the impossibility of granting the relief prayed for by petitioner. Basically, petitioner asks this Court to enjoin the PCCR from acting as such. 7 Clearly, prohibition is an inappropriate remedy since the body sought to be enjoined no longer exists. It is well established that prohibition is a preventive remedy and does not lie to restrain an act that is already fait accompli. 8 At this point, any ruling regarding the PCCR would simply be in the nature of an advisory opinion, which is definitely beyond the permissible scope of judicial power.
In addition to the mootness of the issue, petitioner’s lack of standing constitutes another obstacle to the successful invocation of judicial power insofar as the PCCR is concerned.
Valmonte brings the suit as a citizen, lawyer, taxpayer and father of three (3) minor children. But nowhere in his petition does petitioner claim that his rights and privileges as a lawyer or citizen have been directly and personally injured by the operation of the Instant Sweepstakes. The interest of the person assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be direct and personal. He must be able to show, not only that the law is invalid, but also that he has sustained or in immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must appear that the person complaining has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute complained of.
We apprehend no difference between the petitioner in Valmonte and the present petitioners. Petitioners do not in fact show what particularized interest they have for bringing this suit. It does not detract from the high regard for petitioners as civic leaders to say that their interest falls short of that required to maintain an action under Rule 3, § 2.
Coming now to the instant case, petitioner has not shown that he has sustained or is in danger of sustaining any personal injury attributable to the creation of the PCCR. If at all, it is only Congress, not petitioner, which can claim any "injury" in this case since, according to petitioner, the President has encroached upon the legislature’s powers to create a public office and to propose amendments to the Charter by forming the PCCR. Petitioner has sustained no direct, or even any indirect, injury. Neither does he claim that his rights or privileges have been or are in danger of being violated, nor that he shall be subjected to any penalties or burdens as a result of the PCCR’s activities. Clearly, petitioner has failed to establish his locus standi so as to enable him to seek judicial redress as a citizen.
In still another case, the Court held that petitioners — the Philippine Constitution Association, Inc., a non-profit civic organization — had standing as taxpayers to question the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 3836 insofar as it provides for retirement gratuity and commutation of vacation and sick leaves to Senators and Representatives and to the elective officials of both houses of Congress. 18 And in Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works, 19 the Court allowed petitioner to maintain a taxpayer’s suit assailing the constitutional soundness of Republic Act No. 920 appropriating P85,000 for the construction, repair and improvement of feeder roads within private property. All these cases involved the disbursement of public funds by means of a law.
Appropriations. The initial amount of Three Million Pesos (P3,000,000.00) is hereby appropriated for the operational expenses of the Commission to be sourced from funds of the Office of the President, subject to the usual accounting and auditing rules and regulations. Additional amounts shall be released to the Commission upon submission of requirements for expenditures.
The appropriations for the PCCR were authorized by the President, not by Congress. In fact, there was no appropriation at all. "In a strict sense, appropriation has been defined ‘as nothing more than the legislative authorization prescribed by the Constitution that money may be paid out of the treasury’, while appropriation made by law refers to ‘the act of the legislature setting apart or assigning to a particular use a certain sum to be used in the payment of debt or dues from the State to its creditors.’" 21 The funds used for the PCCR were taken from funds intended for the Office of the President, in the exercise of the Chief Executive’s power to transfer funds pursuant to section 25 (5) of article VI of the Constitution.
In the final analysis, it must be stressed that the Court retains the power to decide whether or not it will entertain a taxpayer’s suit. 22 In the case at bar, there being no exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power, petitioner cannot be allowed to question the creation of the PCCR in his capacity as a taxpayer, but rather, he must establish that he has a "personal and substantial interest in the case and that he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of its enforcement." 23 In other words, petitioner must show that he is a real party in interest — that he will stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment or that he will be entitled to the avails of the suit. 24 Nowhere in his pleadings does petitioner presume to make such a representation.
Consistent with the abovementioned discussion on standing, petitioner does not have the personality to raise this issue before the Court. First of all, he has not proven that he has sustained or is in danger of sustaining any injury as a result of the appointment of such presidential advisers. Secondly, petitioner has not alleged the necessary facts so as to enable the Court to determine if he possesses a taxpayer’s interest in this particular issue. Unlike the PCCR which was created by virtue of an executive order, petitioner does not allege by what official act, whether it be by means of an executive order, administrative order, memorandum order, or otherwise, the President attempted to "create" the positions of presidential advisers, consultants and assistants. Thus, it is unclear what act of the President petitioner is assailing. In support of his allegation, petitioner merely annexed a copy of the Philippine Government Directory (Annex "C") listing the names and positions of such presidential consultants, advisers and assistants to his petition. However, appointment is obviously not synonymous with creation. It would be improvident for this Court to entertain this issue given the insufficient nature of the allegations in the Petition.
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
WHEREFORE, the petition is-dismissed, with the exception that respondent Zamora is ordered to furnish petitioner with the information requested.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Melo, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Ynares-Santiago and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Puno, J., I vote and dismiss on the ground that the case is moot.
1.	E.O. No. 43, sec. 1.
4.	Santiago v. Court of Appeals, 285 SCRA 16 (1998); Garcia v. Commission on Elections, 258 SCRA 754 (1996).
5.	E.O. No. 43, sec. 8.
6.	Comment of respondent Narvasa, 7-9.
8.	Aguinaldo v. Commission on Elections, 308 SCRA 770 (1998).
9.	Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Morato, 246 SCRA 540 (1995), citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 7 L. Ed. 2d 633 (1962).
11.	Telecommunications and Broast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. v. Commission on Elections, 289 SCRA 337 (1998).
12.	246 SCRA 540 (1995).
13.	The Anti-Graft League of the Philippines, Inc. v. San Juan, 260 SCRA 250 (1996).
14.	Flast v. Cohen, 392 US 83, 20 L Ed 2d 947, 88 S Ct 1942.
15.	Telecommunications and Broast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. v. Commission on Elections, 289 SCRA 337 (1998).
16.	See also The Anti-Graft League of the Philippines, Inc. v. San Juan, 260 SCRA 250 (1996); Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Morato, 246 SCRA 540 (1995); Dumlao v. Comelec, 95 SCRA 392 (1980).
17.	73 SCRA 333 (1976).
18.	Philippine Constitution Association, Inc. v. Gimenez, 15 SCRA 479 (1965).
19.	110 Phil 331 (1960).
20.	176 SCRA 251 (1989).
21.	Gonzales v. Raquiza, 180 SCRA 254 (1989).
22.	Dumlao v. Commission on Elections, 95 SCRA 392 (1980), citing Tan v. Macapagal, 43 SCRA 677 (1972); Sanidad v. Commission on Elections, 73 SCRA 333 (1976).
23.	People v. Vera, 65 Phil 50 (1937).
24.	Rules of Court, Rule 3, sec. 2; Board of Optometry v. Colet, 260 SCRA 88 (1997).
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decision, shall be afforded the citizen subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
29.	150 SCRA 530 (1987).
30.	Republic Act No. 6713, sec. 5 (a) and (e); see Rules Implementing the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, Rule IV.
31.	71 SCRA 14 (1976). See Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, 297 SCRA 754 (1998).
32.	Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, 150 SCRA 530 (1987).
33.	Lantaco, Sr. v. Llamas, 108 SCRA 502 (1981).

References: v. 
 § 2
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.