Source: http://halakhah.com/gittin/gittin_53.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 08:13:03+00:00

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But if we accept [the teaching] learnt by the father of R. Abin, 'At first they said, The one who renders unclean and the one who makes a libation, but later they added also the one who mixes,' why do I require all the items?7 — They are still necessary. For if only the one who renders unclean had been mentioned, I should have said that the reason is because no greater penalty is involved, but I should not have applied the rule to one who makes a libation, where a greater penalty is involved. If again the one who makes a libation had been mentioned, I should have said this was because the stuff is spoilt entirely, but I should not have applied the rule to one who renders unclean, where the stuff is not spoilt entirely. If again these two had been mentioned, I should say the reason is because the loss involved is considerable, but I should not apply the rule to one who mixes, where the loss involved is small.8 Hence all were necessary.
Hezekiah said: The rule of the Torah is that one who commits these offences whether inadvertently or deliberately is liable to pay compensation. The reason is that damage of which there is no visible sign9 is legally accounted as damage.10 Why then did the Rabbis lay down that [if one does these things] inadvertently he is not liable? So that they should tell [the victims].11 If that is the reason, then one who does these things presumptuously should also be quit? — How can you think so? Seeing that he deliberately tries to injure him, will he not certainly tell him?12 R. Johanan said that the rule of the Torah is that whether one commits these offences innocently or deliberately he is not liable, the reason being that damage of which there is no visible sign is not legally accounted damage. Why then did the Rabbis ordain that [one who does them] presumptuously is liable? So that it should not become a common thing for a man to go and render unclean the foodstuffs of his neighbour and say, I have no liability.
Kenas v. Glos. Because the damage done is not visible. This point is discussed infra.
But the rule must be stated expressly in each case. Lit., 'we do not derive from Kenas'.
I.e., as food for the priest. V. supra p. 236, n. 7.
On account of the Perushim. V. p. 236, n. 7.
And therefore it was deemed necessary to impose a fine.
From which we learn that the lighter penalty stands in this case, v. supra p. 237. n. 4.
Surely if there is liability for libation which involves a heavier penalty there must be a penalty for mixing.
Because the stuff can still be sold to a priest at no great sacrifice.
E.g., here, where the stuff is in exactly the same condition after the offence has been committed as before.
And the Torah in the case of damage done by man makes no distinction between innocent and presumptuous, v. B.K. 85b.
And so save them from eating terumah etc. unwittingly.
Since his whole purpose is to vex him.
V. Lev. XIX, 7: And if it (the flesh of the peace-offering) be eaten on the third day, it is an abomination (piggul). The Rabbis derived from the language of the text the rule that the flesh became piggul even if there was merely an intention of eating it on the third day.
To the bringer of the sacrifice, who now has to bring a new one.
Lit., 'for the good order of the world'. I.e., this is a Rabbinic, not a Scriptural rule.
So that they should tell the owners. Because according to the Torah they are liable. V. supra, n. 2.
The 'red heifer': v. Num. XIX. It was forbidden to do any work work with it.
V. B.K. 56a. I.e., he is punished by the hands of heaven but not with any earthly punishment.
I.e., he had not yet done with it any work for which the earthly court could punish him, but he is punished by heaven for his intention.
We assume that the exact weight of the water was known to him. In this case he had done no actual work with the water.
against which weights have been balanced is not disqualified? — There is no contradiction; the one [Raba] speaks of weighing against the water, the other of weighing in it.1 When he weighs in it he is doing work with it,2 and if damage which is intangible is legally accounted damage he should be punishable also in a human court? — We must say therefore that both speak of weighing against the water, and still there is no contradiction: the one [R. Eleazar] speaks of where he forgot for the moment [that it was water of purification]3 and the other of where he did not forget.
R. Papa raised an objection [from the following]: If a man robbed another of a coin which afterwards was withdrawn from circulation,4 or terumah which became unclean, or leaven and the Passover intervened,5 he can say to him, Here is your property, take it.6 Now if you say that damage of which there is no visible sign is legally accounted as damage, this [man] is a robber, and ought to pay the value in full?7 — This is a refutation.
May we say that Tannaim also [differ on this point]? [For it was taught:] If one defiles [another's foodstuffs] or mixes terumah with them or pours a libation from his wine, whether inadvertently or deliberately, he is liable [to make compensation]. So R. Meir. R. Judah says: If inadvertently he is not liable, if deliberately he is liable. Is not the point at issue between them this, that the one authority holds that damage of which there is no visible sign is legally accounted damage, while the other holds that it is not legally accounted damage? — R. Nahman b. Isaac said: Both agree that damage of which there is no visible sign is not legally accounted damage, and here the point at issue between them is whether the inadvertent [act] should be penalised on account of the presumptuous one,8 one holding that the innocent act is penalised on account of the presumptuous one and the other that it is not so penalised.
A contradiction was now pointed out between two statements of R. Meir, and also between two statements of R. Judah. For it has been taught: 'If one cooks food on Sabbath, if by inadvertence he may eat it, but if deliberately he may not. So R. Meir. R. Judah says: If [it was cooked] inadvertently he may eat it after the expiration of Sabbath, but if deliberately he may never eat it. R. Johanan ha-Sandalar9 says: If [it was cooked] inadvertently it may be eaten after the expiration of the Sabbath by others but not by the one who cooked it, if deliberately it may never be eaten either by him or by others'.10 One statement of R. Meir seems to contradict another11 and one statement of R. Judah seems to contradict another? — Between the two statements of R. Meir there is no contradiction: where he imposes a fine is for [innocently breaking] a regulation of the Rabbis12 but not for [breaking] a rule of the Torah.13 But pouring a libation is forbidden by the Torah, and yet he imposes a fine for doing so [innocently]? — This is because of the special seriousness of the sin of idolatry. Between the statements of R. Judah there is no contradiction: where he imposes no fine is for [breaking] a rule of the Rabbis, but for [breaking] a rule of the Torah he imposes a fine.14 But pouring a libation is forbidden by the Torah and he imposes no fine for doing so? — Because of the seriousness of the sin of idolatry people keep clear of it.
Like butchers, who place meat in water to see how far it will rise, and judge the weight accordingly.
Lit., 'he diverted his mind'. And since it says, the water shall be to you for a charge, this disqualifies the water, though it does not render him liable to an earthly court.
Rendering the leaven forbidden for any use, v. Pes. II, 2.
And he has no further liability, although the property has meanwhile become worthless, because the robbed article is deemed to have been all the time in the possession of the owner; v. B.K. 96b.
Even though according to strict justice he should not be so penalised.
B.K. 71a. (Sonc. ed.) pp. 408-9. q.v. for notes.
For cooking innocently on the Sabbath he imposes no fine but for defiling foodstuffs he does impose one.
Defiling foodstuffs etc. A fine is necessary because people are more careless about Rabbinical ordinances.
Because the offence is more serious.
Which shows that he does impose a fine for breaking a rule of the Torah innocently.
Which shows that R. Judah does not impose a fine for innocently breaking a rule of the Torah, so that he also contradicts himself in the same way as R. Meir.
E.g., for the years of 'uncircumcision' (v. Lev. XIX, 23ff.) Hence they remember if a tree was planted in the Sabbatical year, and if it were allowed to remain they might take it as a precedent, and so it was necessary to impose a fine in this case.

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