Source: http://bc-injury-law.com/blog/2017/10
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 16:06:50+00:00

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In what is one of the longest running personal injury claims I have come across, reasons for judgement were published today by the BC Court of Appeal finalizing a lawsuit started over 20 years ago.
In today’s case (Jalava v. Webster) the Plaintiff was tackled and badly injured by the Defendant who was “under the mistaken impression that Mr. Jalava had left the café without paying his bill“.
The Plaintiff started a lawsuit in 1996. He was self represented. He obtained an order that the Defendant pay him damages to be assessed. The claim dragged on for years without an assessment taking place and a Chambers Judge eventually dismissed the claim noting that “ it was legally impermissible for the Court to assess damages for personal injuries without a medical-legal report“.
The Plaintiff appealed and BC’s highest court overturned the result noting that a medico-legal report was not a required part of a personal injury prosecution.
The court did, however, in the absence of medical evidence assess a token judgment of $100 noting “this matter has dragged on long enough“.
 First, there is no legal rule to the effect that in order to have damages for personal injury assessed, a plaintiff must adduce a medical-legal report into evidence: see Reible v. Hughes  2 S.C.R. 880. There is no doubt that such reports are very helpful and that without one, it is difficult for a judge to assess damages. In this case, for example, Mr. Jalava told the Court that he had suffered a broken clavicle and a “banged up knee” as a result of the assault, but had no details of the injuries or the financial consequences he had suffered. At this point in time, several years after the assault, it would appear no further information is likely to be brought forward.
 However, since the plaintiff obtained judgment for assault, an intentional tort, it was open to the Court to award a nominal sum. Even if the tort had been negligence, the Court could have given an award of damages that would at least give some recognition of Mr. Jalava’s injuries.
 I also agree with counsel that the chambers judge should not have dismissed Mr. Jalava’s claim on his own motion and without prior notice to Mr. Jalava. The plaintiff was taken by surprise and, being unrepresented, was not able to make a meaningful attempt to forestall such an order. Finally, since Mr. Jalava had already obtained judgments against the defendants, it was simply not possible to dismiss “the claim”. The claims had been reduced to judgments years ago and those judgments could not be reversed or nullified except under Rule 3-8 of the Supreme Court Civil Rules or by this court on appeal.
 In all the circumstances, then, the appeal must be allowed and the chambers judge’s order set aside. Since this matter has dragged on long enough, I would also assess Mr. Jalava’s damages at $100.
Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, New Westminster Registry, assessing damages for chronic soft tissue injuries following a vehicle collision.
 I accept that the plaintiff continues to suffer the consequences of the Accident and that her condition has developed into one of chronic pain, the severity of which depends on her level of activity, particularly at work and at home. The more active she is and the more she pushes herself, the more significant her pain.
 I accept that the plaintiff received soft tissue type injuries in the Accident that have not resolved. I accept that she continues to be in pain, although not the type of pain that is debilitating. The plaintiff is able to function at work and at home, but with ongoing limitations. She can perform the duties she did before the Accident, but in pain, some days worse than others.
 The fact that the pain moves around her body depending on what she is doing, for example from the left shoulder to the right shoulder and back depending on if she is over-using an area, is, in my view, not overly significant. That is the nature of chronic pain, which could be non-organic and psychologically based.
 In the end, the assessment of general damages is based on the individual plaintiff and how the injuries have affected him or her physically, psychologically, vocationally, socially and recreationally. I have considered the plaintiff’s particular circumstances here, the fact the Accident occurred over 4 years ago, my assessment of the plaintiff as a witness, the chronicity of her pain together with the fact that she is improving but with a somewhat guarded prognosis. I am satisfied that with the continued counselling and therapies that I am ordering, she will continue to improve, will continue to function, but will experience ongoing pain to some degree.
 I assess general damages at $70,000.
In a rare case awarding punitive damages in a motor vehicle collision case reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, making such an award.
 Ms. Howell was unable to refer me to any case in which punitive damages had been awarded in a motor vehicle accident case involving a hit-and-run. However, in Legualt v. Tiapis, 2015 BCSC 517, Master Harper dismissed an application to strike a claim for punitive damages against a breached defendant for leaving the scene of an accident on the basis that she could not conclude that the punitive damages claim would prejudice or embarrass the fair trial of the proceeding. As that case did not proceed to trial, there is no authority for whether punitive damages are appropriate in a hit-and-run situation.
· In Herman v. Graves, 1998 ABQB 471, a plaintiff was awarded $3,500 in punitive damages arising from a road rage incident and, more recently, in McCaffery v. Arguello, 2017 BCSC 1460, I awarded $30,000 in punitive damages arising from a road rage incident.
 I have concluded that Mr. Machi’s actions are worthy of denunciation and retribution beyond the compensatory awards I have made in favour of Ms. Howell. In particular, although I concluded that his failure to stop after striking Ms. Howell did not amount to further negligence on his part, it is relevant to the punitive damages analysis. I have also taken into account the fact Mr. Machi has repeatedly shown complete disregard for the suspensions of his driver’s licence.
 In all the circumstances, I award Ms. Howell punitive damages of $100,000 against Mr. Machi.
Reasons for judgement were published today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, describing the suggestion of deciding fault for a collision based in part on a motorist’s past driving convictions as ‘frivolous’.
e. on January 17, , the defendant was charged with using an electronic device while driving. He failed to appear at the hearing and was deemed not to dispute the charge.
 The parties agree that there is no British Columbia authority on the issue of whether a pleading alleging similar fact evidence in the context of a prior driving record should be allowed in British Columbia. The defendant refers me to some Ontario authorities in support of his position that such pleadings are improper.
 I note that of the five driving infractions in our case, only two of them are for the same offence, namely speeding. Both were over five years old at the time of the accident. Indeed four of the five convictions were over five years old, with the fifth occurring some months after the accident. The defendant was not issued a violation ticket arising out of the accident.
 The only possible purpose for Similar Fact Pleading here, given the variety of infractions, would be to enable the plaintiff to suggest that the defendant is a generally bad driver based on his driving record. However, this does not inform the analysis of whether or not he was responsible for the subject accident, any more than a clean driving record would tend to absolve him of responsibility.
 It is highly improbable that the trial judge would admit the defendant’s prior infractions as similar fact evidence to support a finding of liability on the part of the defendant. Evidence of prior speeding infractions does not lead to the inference that the defendant was speeding at the time of the accident. Drivers often speed without receiving violation tickets. Proof of speeding does not conclusively establish negligence in the case of an accident. In Hamm Estate v. JeBailey (1974), 12 N.S.R. (2d) 27, evidence of driving record and habits was held to be irrelevant and inadmissible for the purpose of determining liability.
 In Witten v. Bhardwaj,  O.J. No. 1769, the court was asked to strike certain portions of a statement of claim that also involved a pedestrian struck by a vehicle. The plaintiff had pleaded that the defendant had a ‘pattern of reckless conduct’ that included multiple speeding offences. The allegations of speeding in the Witten case were a year before and a year after the accident in issue.
The plaintiff’s purpose in including these additional allegations about Paawan’s driving patterns could only involve one of two issues: 1) to enable the plaintiff to ask the court to rely on Paawan’s driving record when assessing whether he was likely speeding at the time of this accident; or, 2) to provide “colour” for the court, so that Paawan will be viewed as a bad driver generally, and hence, be seen as likely responsible for this accident. If the former, what the plaintiff seeks to plead in the impugned portion of paragraph 15 is clearly evidence, not material fact, and on that basis should be struck. If the latter, it is frivolous and should be struck.
 I agree. The Similar Fact Pleading is either evidence and therefore improper to include in a pleading, or is intended to suggest that the defendant is generally a bad driver and therefore he is more likely to be the cause of the subject accident, in which case it is frivolous.

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