Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/00-7108/00-7108a-2011-03-24.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 15:42:17+00:00

Document:
General Counsel, and Robert J. Kniaz, Deputy General Coun- sel.
Before: Edwards, Chief Judge, Rogers and Garland, Circuit Judges. Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Rogers.
Rogers, Circuit Judge: In this interlocutory appeal, the court addresses whether an employee of the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority ("WMATA") is absolute- ly immune from suit for negligent conduct arising during the course of making an arrest. As a result of his arrest, Hullon Griggs sued WMATA and Metro Transit Police Officer Doug- las Haymans, as well as the D.C. Metropolitan Police Depart- ment, alleging in part that Officer Haymans negligently failed to control his police dog in the course of arresting Griggs. The district court denied Officer Haymans' motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of absolute immunity, and, alternatively, for summary judgment on the ground that the complaint was barred by the one-year statute of limitations for assault and battery. Because the WMATA Compact, D.C. Code s 1-2431 et seq. (1981), provides that Officer Haymans' conduct in arresting Griggs was subject to the laws applicable to a member of the D.C. Metropolitan Police Department, and because Officer Haymans' statute of limitations defense is meritless, we affirm.
__________ 1 In reviewing the denial of a motion to dismiss on the ground of immunity, the court must treat the allegations of the complaint as true. See United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 327 (1991) (citing Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 540 (1988)); Schuler v. United States, 617 F.2d 605, 608 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
the Madison Grocery store in Northwest, Washington, D.C. Metro Transit Police Officer Douglas Haymans and a police dog named "Buddy" responded to the scene. Upon their arrival, Officer Haymans released the dog into the Madison Grocery to search for the suspect. The dog located Hullon Griggs, who was asleep. When Griggs awoke, the dog's paws were on his head. As Griggs attempted to push the dog away, the dog began biting Griggs' right arm.
At this point, Officer Haymans entered the grocery store and ordered Griggs to stand and place his hands on his head. Griggs explained to Officer Haymans that the dog was biting him while he was on the ground, and that his efforts to push the dog away had failed. Officer Haymans pulled the dog away from Griggs and again ordered him to stand and place his hands over his head. Griggs complied immediately. Offi- cer Haymans then released the dog and commanded him to attack Griggs. Griggs again made attempts to push the dog away, but the dog continued to attack him, inflicting multiple, serious wounds on Griggs' arms, legs, and torso. Instead of commanding the dog to stop, Officer Haymans ordered Griggs to stay still and allowed the dog to continue to attack him. Then, Officer Haymans ordered Griggs to drop to his knees and place his hands on his head. Griggs complied, and Officer Haymans handcuffed him and pushed his head to the ground, during which time the dog continued to attack Griggs. Officer Haymans finally commanded the dog to stop his attacks. As Officer Haymans picked up Griggs, Griggs complained that the dog had injured him.
to court, Griggs fainted and was transported to D.C. General Hospital. After his arraignment and release, Griggs contin- ued to suffer from the injuries inflicted by the dog. On May 31, 1996, he called "911" and was transported to Howard County General Hospital where he was admitted for "infected hematoma secondary to dog bite" and where he remained hospitalized until June 5, 1996.
On May 24, 1999, almost three years later, Griggs filed a complaint in the D.C. Superior Court alleging negligence by WMATA and Officer Haymans for failure to control the police dog and by the D.C. Metropolitan Police Department for improper supervision. On June 15, 1999, the case was re- moved to the United States district court pursuant to s 81 of the Compact. See D.C. Code s 1-2431(81) (1981). As rele- vant here, WMATA and Officer Haymans moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of absolute immunity under s 80 of the Compact for claims involving governmental functions, see id. s 1-2431(80), and alternatively, for summary judgment on the ground that the complaint was barred by the one-year statute of limitations for assault and battery. See id. s 12-301(4). The district court denied the motion. On re- consideration, the district court granted WMATA's motion on the ground of absolute immunity, citing Burkhart v. WMA- TA, 112 F.3d 1207, 1216-17 (D.C. Cir. 1997), but denied Officer Haymans' motion for reconsideration.
complaint was not barred under D.C. Code s 12-301(4), which provides a one-year statute of limitations for excessive force claims. Because Officer Haymans' statute of limitations contention is meritless inasmuch as Griggs' complaint sounds in negligence for which there is a three-year statute of limitations, see id. s 12-301(8), as well as in intentional tort for which there is a one-year statute of limitations, see McCracken v. Walls-Kaufman, 717 A.2d 346, 350-53 (D.C. 1998); Etheredge v. District of Columbia, 635 A.2d 908, 918 (D.C. 1993),2 we turn to Officer Haymans' immunity claim.
__________ 2 The statute of limitations contention is properly before the court in this interlocutory appeal. See Kiska Constr. Corp.-U.S.A. v. WMATA, 167 F.3d 608, 611 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Gilda Marx, Inc. v. Wildwood Exercise, Inc., 85 F.3d 675, 679 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
not all intentional or malicious torts committed in the normal course of employment necessarily fall within the scope of official duties. Officials "exceed the outer pe- rimeters of their responsibilities, and act manifestly be- yond their line of duty," for example, "when they resort to physical force to compel the obedience of their mana- gerial subordinates ... or when they use false threats of criminal charges to coerce an employee into resigning. Id. (quoting McKinney v. Whitfield, 736 F.2d 766, 771-72 (D.C. Cir. 1984), and citing Bishop v. Tice, 622 F.2d 349, 359 (8th Cir. 1980)).
__________ 3 In Carter, the plaintiff sued a member of the D.C. Metropoli- tan Police Department for assault and battery when the officer allegedly beat him after arresting him without probable cause. See 447 F.2d at 360-61.
[a] member of the Metro Transit Police shall have the same powers, including the power of arrest, and shall be subject to the same limitations, including regulatory limi- tations, in performance of his or her duties as a member of the duly constituted police force of the political subdi- vision in which the Metro Transit Police member is engaged in the performance of his or her duties. __________ 4 In originally denying the motion to dismiss on the ground of immunity, the district court noted that "the parties have not prof- fered evidence of the standard of permissible police action for the court to determine, as a matter of law, whether Officer Haymans acted beyond the bounds of his official duties." Assuming the parties had done so, the district court concluded that the allegations in the complaint, if true, would "preclude dismissal at this phase [of the case]."
D.C. Code s 1-2431(76(b)) (1981). Thus, in the District of Columbia, a Metro Transit Police officer engaged in a crimi- nal investigation and an arrest has the same powers and limitations as a member of the District of Columbia Metropol- itan Police Department, and consequently has only qualified immunity for his torts.
there are certain decisions made in the exercise of the discretionary functions of government for which there is no reason to believe a jury would render a sounder decision than those officials chosen, qualified, and pre- pared to make them. It is these that are labeled "discre- tionary" and which constitute policy decisions deemed immune from suit because there is no legal standard by which a judge or jury could gauge their arbitrariness and capriciousness or lack thereof. Id. at 1363 (quoting Chandler v. District of Columbia, 404 A.2d at 966).
Haymans' order to stand and place his hands on his head, and failing to command the dog to cease its attack. The use of a police dog to locate a suspected burglar is far different from the use of a police dog to attack a suspected burglar who has submitted to police authority.
Officer Haymans has two responses, neither of which is availing. First, he contends that reliance on Dellums and Carter is misplaced because those cases involved "the discre- tionary standard associated with both the Federal Tort Claims Act and District of Columbia law, and not the broader governmental/proprietary standard mandated by s 80." Offi- cer Haymans, however, misreads the court's recent decision in Beebe. Although the Federal Tort Claims Act was not at issue, the court in Beebe drew upon the precedent established by the Act in addressing s 80 of the WMATA Compact and endorsed the discretionary/ministerial dichotomy employed in Dellums and Carter. See Beebe, 129 F.3d at 1287 (citing Burkhart, 112 F.3d at 1216). The district court, therefore, could properly invoke the distinction long-recognized by the court, see McKinney, 736 F.2d at 769-71, between discretion- ary activity illustrated in Beebe, that cannot result in tort liability for WMATA, and ministerial arrest activity illustrat- ed in Carter, that may result in tort liability for a Metro Transit Police officer. Moreover, unlike the situation con- fronting the court in Beebe, where the Compact was silent as to the immunity of the WMATA employees being sued, the district court was instructed by Congress in s 76(b) of the Compact to look to the law applicable to D.C. Metropolitan Police officers in determining whether Officer Haymans was cloaked with the same immunity as WMATA.
was barred by immunity. See id. at 333. This result fol- lowed, the Court said, because the bank officials were autho- rized by statute to provide advice and oversight in a manner that left room for the exercise of political, social, or economic choice. See id. at 324-26. While the determination of the nature of an activity under the Compact is a question "of federal law," Burkhart, 112 F.3d at 1216 (quoting Sanders v. WMATA, 819 F.2d 1151, 1154 (D.C. Cir. 1987)), under s 76(b) of the Compact Officer Haymans was vested only with the powers and limitations of a D.C. Metropolitan Police officer when he responded to a call for assistance from the D.C. Metropolitan Police Department, and thus the discretion- ary/ministerial distinctions noted in Biscoe, 738 F.2d at 1363, continue to apply.
__________ 5 Because the appeal involves only the issue of Officer Hay- mans' entitlement to absolute immunity, we do not reach the issue of any claim that he may have to qualified immunity.

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