Source: https://www.courts.gov.bc.ca/Jdb-txt/CA/08/01/2008BCCA0177.htm
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 12:20:37+00:00

Document:
This appeal illustrates with some acuity the challenges of applying the Child Support Guidelines (in this case, provincial Guidelines, which are adopted by regulation in virtually the same terms as the federal Guidelines), to a support dispute that arises not between the two parents of children, but between a stepfather on the one hand, and the natural parents on the other. Ultimately, the policy objectives behind the Guidelines must be addressed: are they intended to provide the children with a standard of living that is reasonable (given the standard enjoyed when the parents, or in this case, mother and stepfather, were cohabiting), such that the costs of providing that standard should be “apportioned” in some manner between the three parents; or should the Guidelines be interpreted so as to impose full “table” amount liability on all the parents so that support is maximized without regard to the living standard or other circumstances of the children? If the support obligations of a stepparent are to be treated as indistinguishable from those of a parent, is it “appropriate” (the term used in s. 5 of the Guidelines) for a stepfather who now has no contact with the children to bear the primary support obligation, leaving the natural father, whose income is greater than that of the stepfather, with only a secondary obligation? Last, what significance, if any, is to be attached in this case to the fact that when he and the mother were cohabiting, the stepfather insisted on being primarily responsible for the support of the children and the father relied on that “undertaking” to organize his affairs and assume new family obligations?
 I will refer throughout these reasons to the respondent/plaintiff as the “mother”, to the appellant/defendant as the “stepfather”, and to the respondent/defendant as the “father”.
 The mother and father were married in 1983 and separated in 1992, by which time they had two children, a daughter and a son. The parents divorced in 1994 but got along amicably and shared custody successfully. As noted by Madam Justice Boyd in earlier proceedings (see 2002 BCSC 926), the children “circulated freely between the two homes” according to a schedule agreed upon by the parents, and it was not necessary for either of them to seek a support order against the other. Both devoted time and money to the children and both were fully employed.
 Needless to say, the mother separated permanently from the stepfather. She immediately sought interim child support for the children from him. In November 1999, the court below made an interim order that he pay her $750 per month, based on his then Guideline income of $92,600 per year and the mother’s Guideline income of $65,100 per year. He was also required to pay half the mortgage costs, property taxes and maintenance costs for the family home. The father, against whom a support order was never sought, began of his own accord to contribute $100 per month to the mother for the children.
Considering all of the factors, including the fact that the defendant/stepfather took on the brunt of the children’s support during the duration of the relationship of 5-6 years; the length of the relationship; the fact that he has continued to support the children since the separation under an interim child support order; the fact that the children have no continuing relationship with him (and that he is indeed prohibited from doing so); the fact that the children’s natural father has an obligation to support them; and the fact that the children have no special or extraordinary needs at present – I order that the step-father pay child support to the mother in the sum of $297 per month, based on a current Guideline income of $20,000 per annum.
The natural father is ordered to pay child support of $297 [sic; $376] per month, based on the difference between his Guideline liability of $1222, and the mother’s Guideline liability of $846 per month.
Boyd J. also ordered the stepfather to provide the mother with “immediate notice of any employment he has succeeded in obtaining and thereafter at the end of each month … [to] provide the [mother] with advice of his total earnings for the month”.
 Meanwhile, the mother and the daughter had both brought civil actions for damages against the stepfather. The daughter’s action was finally settled in April 2005 when the stepfather paid the sum of $42,000 in damages plus $12,000 in legal costs to her; and in June, the mother agreed to accept his half-interest in the family home in return for the dismissal of her tort claims. The stepfather had been unable to find work during the time he was serving his conditional sentence, and did not begin to earn again until April 2003.
 In late 2005, the mother again applied to the Supreme Court of British Columbia to have the stepfather’s support increased. He in turn applied to have the obligation decreased or discontinued altogether, and to have the daughter declared no longer a “child” within the meaning of the Family Relations Act. The applications came before Mr. Justice Warren in Chambers. By this time, the stepfather had succeeded in obtaining work as an independent contractor, but he had not so advised the mother or the Court of the change in his earnings. Instead he had used the $80,012 and $88,245 he earned, in 2003 and 2004 respectively, to pay his living expenses and legal fees and to put money towards the settlement of the daughter’s action. He had also failed to pay his income taxes during this period and was assessed penalties which he had to pay, together with his tax arrears, in substantial monthly instalments in 2005–06. He deposed that he was left with no savings and indeed that he had incurred various other debts in order to pay the settlement amount and his own legal fees.
 Not surprisingly, the stepfather’s failure to disclose his new income levels led the mother to ask that his support be increased retroactively to April 2003. She had lost her employment in mid-2003 and was in receipt of 20 months’ severance pay due to end in December 2005. At the time of the hearing, she had started “new temporary full-time” employment as an accountant but was not optimistic that it would last beyond November 2005. She had also received some funds from the estate of her mother.
 The circumstances of the children, who were by this time ages 20 and 17, had also changed. For various reasons, the shared custody arrangement had been discontinued. The daughter was attending college and living in a basement suite in her mother’s home. (The Court found that she continues to be dependant on the parents for support, and that finding is not challenged on appeal.) The son was also spending less time at his father’s home – perhaps partly in response to the fact that the father now had young children by his second wife.
 Each of the three “parents” cited existing case law in support of the positions taken by them. The mother, seeking a straightforward application of the Guidelines to the stepfather, relied in particular on Chartier v. Chartier  1 S.C.R. 242, 168 D.L.R. (4th) 540, for the principle that the stepfather’s support obligation was on-going and “not qualified as to duration”. Based on his revived income, she sought support of $1,007 (the applicable table amount) per month, retroactive to the date he had started work again. The chambers judge did not refer to the mother’s position vis-à-vis the natural father, but she was not seeking any order of support against him and it would appear she was content with the existing arrangements.
 The father’s argument is summarized at paras. 47-60 of the chambers judge’s reasons. Perhaps not surprisingly, the father emphasized the stepfather’s previous “insistence that he assume the financial responsibility of providing for the children” and the fact that in part relying on this “position”, the father had, shortly before the stepfather was arrested, moved into a new house and assumed fresh financial obligations with a new family. Since Boyd J. had made her order, the father had voluntarily increased the amount he was obliged to pay under the order ($376 per month) to the mother and had agreed to share certain expenses with her relating to the children, including post-secondary education fees. He calculated that these “extra” expenses amounted to $516 per month, but the chambers judge did not make a finding on that point.
The father says that a good starting point in determining the amount of child support he should pay would be to use a simple set-off approach as suggested in s. 8, subject to such further adjustments as may be necessary to balance out the fairness and flexibility as envisioned under s. 9. He argues that the court should consider the fact that he assumed the responsibility of a new marriage and additional children and acquired another house with a mortgage of approximately $380,000 because he was relying on the status quo as it was in 1999. He has assumed a monthly mortgage payment of $3,300 and he has a $460 per month automobile loan, as well as a line of credit with an outstanding balance of $15,300 and personal credit card debts of some $12,000.
 The stepfather’s primary argument was that, to quote from para. 18 of Dutrisac, supra, “the time [had] come to relieve him in whole or part of the obligation to pay child support”. In his submission, the “primary” obligation of a natural or adoptive parent was different from that of a stepparent, whose support obligations could, as had been stated in Dutrisac, be varied or cancelled depending on the circumstances of the case. The stepfather advocated a “three-step process” under which his “prima facie” support obligation would be determined on the basis of his taxable income of $88,000; the father’s support obligation under the Guidelines would be determined on the basis of his income of $110,000; and the stepfather would be required only to ‘top up’ the support if the father’s “contribution” was “insufficient”. (As will be seen below, the ‘top up’ approach has been adopted in at least a few cases, including Adler v. Jonas (1999) 48 R.F.L. (4th) 228 (B.C.S.C.) and Squire v. Severs, 2000 BCSC 853.) Under this analysis, the combined child support obligations of the natural parents in this case amounted to $2,379 per month, which was sufficient to give the children a “fair standard of support”, so that no ‘topping up’ was necessary. The stepfather also cited various other factors militating against a continuing obligation on his part, including the facts that he still had a large income tax debt and was effectively insolvent; he had not had any relationship with the children for more than six years; and he was living in a basement suite in his mother’s home and had uncertain employment prospects.
● The stepfather vigorously assumed the sole support responsibility of the children when he entered into the relationship with the plaintiff.
● The stepfather’s relationship with the children ended as a result of his criminal conduct and he cannot rely on this misconduct to argue he should be relieved of child support obligations because the relationship ended.
● The stepfather was obliged by court order to report changes in his circumstances and he was either wilfully blind in assuming he could rely upon the plaintiff’s lack of enquiry or he wilfully failed to report his change in fortune.
● The father, who was entitled to rely upon the stepfather’s undertaking, assumed fresh obligations.
● The father’s financial situation has not improved materially since the order of Boyd J. whereas the stepfather’s financial circumstances have improved significantly.
● The older child is now residing solely with the plaintiff and the younger child is residing primarily with the plaintiff. In short, the shared custody regime has ended and neither child is capable of living independently of the plaintiff.
● The older child is in full time attendance at university, has worked part-time in the past, and will work part-time in the future to contribute to educational expenses. Although she lives in a basement suite in her mother’s home and has an “adult relationship” with her boyfriend, there is no evidence that she is independent of her mother within the meaning of the Act.
● The plaintiff and the father share university tuition expenses in alternating years and the stepfather makes no direct contribution to those expenses.
● The amount of damages settled upon the older child was compensation for the tortious act of the stepfather and should not be considered as in some way ameliorating the father’s or stepfather’s support obligations. In the absence of evidence that some portion of the settlement was to be used for university expenses I infer it was in settlement of the claim for general damages.
A. The learned chambers judge erred when he failed to correctly assess the Father’s obligation to pay child support and take the same into account when determining the amount of child support payable by the Stepfather pursuant to s. 5 of the Guidelines.
B. The learned chambers judge erred when he failed to assess the Father’s obligation to pay child support at the dates that the shared custody regime ended and take the same into account when calculating the Stepfather’s arrears of child support.
C. The learned chambers judge erred in holding that the court did not have jurisdiction to relieve a step parent from his child support obligation or, alternatively, in failing to reduce the Stepfather’s obligation to zero in the circumstances of this case.
The first branch of the third ground was not pursued at the time of hearing, and rightly so, since the chambers judge did not suggest anywhere in his reasons that he was “without jurisdiction” to relieve a stepparent from his obligation of child support. The second branch may be equated with the first ground of appeal.
 It may be useful to begin by setting out the larger statutory framework in which the mother’s and stepfather’s applications were brought. Obviously, insofar as these applicants are concerned, it is the Family Relations Act, rather than the Divorce Act, which applies, since they were never married and divorced. The father’s child support obligations, on the other hand, are presumably governed by the Divorce Act and the federal Guidelines, but fortunately, there are no material differences between the two for purposes of this case.
(b) the application of the child support guidelines would be inequitable in the circumstances of the provisions to which paragraph (a) refers.
(3) If the court makes an order under subsection (2), it must record its reasons for having done so.
96 (1) If an application is made to vary or rescind a maintenance order not described in subsection (1.1), the court must consider changes in the needs, means, capacities and economic circumstances of each person affected by the order and make the appropriate change, if any.
(b) if satisfied that a change in circumstances as provided for under the child support guidelines has occurred, apply only the child support guidelines to determine the change of the amount of the maintenance obligation under the order.
(1.3) If the court makes an order under subsection (1.2), it must record its reasons for doing so.
129 (1) The Lieutenant Governor in Council may make regulations referred to in section 41 of the Interpretation Act.
(g) respecting the production of income information and providing for sanctions if that information is not provided.
(3) A regulation under this section may incorporate by reference, with any changes the Lieutenant Governor in Council considers appropriate, all or any part of a code, rule or standard as published by a provincial, national or international body as amended from time to time before or after the making of the regulation and relating to the subject matter of this Act.
 The Child Support Guidelines Regulation was enacted under the Family Relations Act. The Regulation came into force on April 14, 1998, and has since been amended slightly by B.C. Regs. 120/1998, 129/2006 and 94/2007. I will proceed on the basis of the current wording.
(d) to ensure consistent treatment of parents and children who are in similar circumstances.
(b) the amount, if any, determined under section 7.
(b) if the court considers that approach to be inappropriate, the amount that it considers appropriate, having regard to the condition, means, needs and other circumstances of the child and the financial ability of each parent to contribute to the support of the child.
Where the person against whom a maintenance order is sought stands in the place of a parent for a child, the amount of a maintenance order is, in respect of that person, such amount as the court considers appropriate, having regard to these Guidelines and any other parent's legal duty to support the child.
I have not reproduced s.10, the “undue hardship” provision, since it was not invoked in this case.
 Section 5 is clearly one of the exceptions to the presumptive rule, importing a discretion to determine what is “appropriate, having regard to these Guidelines and any other parent’s legal duty to support the child.” (As to the meaning of the word “appropriate”, see the discussion of “inappropriate” in Francis v. Baker  3 S.C.R. 250, 50 R.F.L. (4th) 228, at paras. 32-41.) On this point, Mr. Manson on behalf of the stepfather referred us to Russenberger v. Rebagliati, 2000 BCSC 82, 5 R.F.L. (5th) 130. There, a mother who had lived in a series of marriage-like relationships that had produced four children, sought child support from a previous common-law partner who had stood in the place of a parent to her children during their co-habitation. The Court, per Preston J., reviewed the terms of the Family Relations Act and B.C. Reg. 61/98, noting that “Recognition of the primary obligation of biological parents for the support of children is inherent in the structure of the Guidelines and the Family Relations Act.” (Para. 32.) This, he said, weighed heavily against a long-term award against the stepfather. Preston J. did not regard the considerations mentioned in s. 5 as exhaustive of the factors that should guide a court under that section, and took the view that all the circumstances of the case were relevant to determining the appropriate child support order. (Para. 31.) Considering in particular that both parties had formed other relationships, and that the stepfather had an obligation to support two other children and had no further relationship with the children’s mother, Preston J. concluded it would not be “appropriate” to grant her application.
In the result, the case was remanded to the Manitoba Court of Queen’s Bench to determine the quantum of support to be paid by the stepfather.
The appeal court judge appeared to read Chartier as precluding the court from reducing the level of child support being paid by a stepparent. He referred to Chartier in para. 42 of his reasons as seeming to "overrule" the result in Sharratt v. Green (1995), 11 R.F.L. (4th) 386 (B.C.S.C.), aff'd (1997), 27 R.F.L. (4th) 38 (B.C.C.A.), a case in which this court upheld the decision of Mr. Justice Thackray holding that a stepfather who had paid substantial maintenance to a child for a number of years should no longer be required to contribute to her maintenance.
The question of the extent to which someone who is not a parent either by blood or adoption should continue to be held responsible, perhaps for years, for children who may have no interest in him or her at all and whose natural parent may have acquired a new spouse, is a troubling one which appears to be arising more frequently and is deserving of more than cursory attention. It is not a question to be answered by the "blunt instrument" approach.
After quoting that passage, the appeal court judge said in para. 41 of his reasons that the Supreme Court of Canada had "... answered that the parent should continue to be held responsible".
As in Chartier, the matter was remitted back to the trial court for determination, the Court of Appeal again emphasizing that Mr. Dutrisac might succeed in having his support amount reduced to zero by reason of “undue hardship” under s. 10.
 Relying strongly on Dutrisac, the stepfather contends that the chambers judge in the instant case erred in failing to assess the natural father’s obligation to pay child support and to take that obligation into account in determining the support or “contribution” payable by the stepfather as required by s. 5. As in the court below, he submits that his support obligation should be reduced to zero given that there is no basis on which to reduce the father’s obligation under s. 3, least of all by reason of the father’s assumption of fresh family obligations in reliance on an “undertaking” of the stepfather that has long since ceased to have effect (and, one might add, that was irrelevant to the stepfather’s duty in any event). In his submission, the reference in s. 5 to “any other parent’s legal duty to support the child” requires that the father’s obligation under s. 3 be quantified before the amount of any child support obligation of the stepfather could be determined under s. 5. The father in this instance was before the court and is clearly able to provide a “fair standard of support” for the children.
While Leveque said that there is no distinction between the obligation of the natural parent and the step-parent, the court was not considering a case wherein the custodial parent had obligated a number of people to contribute. In that case it was the "conventional" situation of a wife's son from a previous relationship living with the parties throughout the marriage.
Turecki said that "a child is entitled to adequate maintenance from his parents, regardless of problems associated with access." It went on to refer to the obligation of parents as "mutual".
The plaintiff has done nothing to investigate the resources of the natural father and to ascertain if greater support could be gained. Rather, she has been content to shift his burden to the defendant and has successfully done so for many years. He was, to use the words from Ozanich, simply the "last in line."
Now there is a new "last in line." Mr. Bachinsky did not last long enough to qualify. However, Mr. Henry has. He has assumed the parenting role and a corresponding financial commitment. He is the beneficiary of all of the benefits, i.e. the love, companionship, etc. of the child. Furthermore, the plaintiff has a financial obligation to Melissa.
In the result, Thackray J. declined to vary an earlier order that required the stepfather to pay $500 per month for the support of the child, even though he could “undoubtedly afford to pay more”.
 Sharratt was decided before the Guidelines came into effect, but as has been seen, s. 3 would appear to impose an obligation on the natural father that is an inflexible and perhaps even a “primary” one. I did not understand either counsel for the mother, or the father (who appeared in person on the appeal) to disagree with the principle that the father does have a continuing obligation to support the children notwithstanding the availability of support from the stepfather. The sticking-point is how each parent’s obligation is to be approached and quantified in the particular circumstances of this case. The father regards Warren J.’s order as an appropriate balancing of the three parents’ obligations that properly takes into account the stepfather’s now-abandoned “undertaking”. As I understand it, the father wishes to retain a discretion to continue to pay major expenses of his choosing, such as the children’s college or university fees from time to time (and of course to support his new family). But while his conduct vis-à-vis the children has been admirable, there is authority to the effect that a parent who has a support obligation may not insist on meeting it by handing out benefits directly to the children as he or she chooses. The Guidelines require that in the absence of an agreement otherwise, a “payor” parent pay regular financial assistance in the applicable table amount to the custodial parent: see D.B.S., supra, at para. 109, citing Haisman v. Haisman (1994) 157 A.R. 47, 116 D.L.R. (4th) 671 (Alta. C.A.) at 691, lve. to app. refused  3 S.C.R. vi. As s. 3 states, the amount of a maintenance order “is” the applicable amount set out in the table to the Guidelines unless one of the ‘discretionary’ sections applies.
(f) Consider Guidelines amount for each payor, but also consider the means, needs and circumstances of the parties, the relationship between each potential payor and the child, its length, whether it continues and the extent to which the child relies on the support of the payor (Singh v. Singh (September 25, 1997), Doc. Kamloops 011364 (B.C. Master) and White v. Rushton (February 19, 1998), Doc. Campbell River D3640 (B.C. Master) [reported at 37 R.F.L. (4th) 373]).
In Mr. Sherman’s submission, Warren J. took the fourth approach mentioned by Hardinge J. and it cannot be said he committed reversible error in exercising the discretion he had under s. 5 in this manner.
 Returning to the case at bar, Mr. Sherman argued that the order of Warren J. had not resulted in a “windfall” to the children even though the total amount being contributed by the three parents exceeded somewhat the expenses listed on the mother’s Form 89. Nor did counsel see anything objectionable in taking this argument to its logical extreme – i.e., in the event that the custodial parent had, say, five serial live-in partners each of whom was a “parent” and was required to support the children under s. 5, each parent could, in his analysis, properly be required to pay his or her table amount, regardless of whether the children would receive an amount far exceeding what they had ever enjoyed previously. However, counsel did not cite any case in which such a result had occurred.
 As should be clear from the foregoing, although the broad principles of law relating to the existence of child support obligations on the part of stepparents are clear, Canadian courts have differed as to how those obligations, as stated in the Guidelines, are to be determined in practice. I read s. 5 as requiring that the legal duties of support of the “other parent(s)” – in this case, the natural parents – be considered when support is sought from a stepparent. If such duties are to be considered, it seems obvious that they must be quantified if possible. For this purpose, the “other parent(s)” should be before the court, or other evidence satisfactory to the court relating to that parent’s status should be adduced, as occurred in Dutrisac and Kobe (but not in Chartier.) Unless that other parent is a stepparent, s. 3 requires that his or her support be the applicable table amount unless custody is being shared, the child is over age 19, or one of the other ‘discretionary’ provisions applies. (In the case at bar, the daughter had reached 19 by the time of the hearing below, but was still dependant on parental support, and no argument was advanced invoking s. 3(2)(b) of the Regulation. None of the other discretionary provisions applied.) At this stage, the process is not one of “balancing” or even “apportionment”: it appears that the natural parent’s obligation can be determined only in accordance with the non-discretionary “presumptive rule” of s. 3.
 Thus the chambers judge below did err, in my respectful view, in failing to determine whether the father was in fact contributing an amount at least equal to what he would have been required to pay under s. 3 had he been making regular monthly payments in accordance with the Guidelines. Whether or not the father was doing so, the chambers judge should then have ordered him to pay his table amount – although if the mother was content to accept support in the form of the payment of tuition fees or other expenses, she could enter an agreement with him to that effect. She could not, however, choose to give the father a “pass” in favour of pursuing the stepfather for all the support the children required.
Thus a “fair standard of support”, objectivity of calculation, and reduction of conflict between parents are relevant to the determination of “appropriate” support by the stepparent. On the other hand, s. 5 does not, in my view, confer a discretion that is so broad as to encompass “all” the circumstances of a case (as was suggested in Russenberger) or “fairness” to the father arising from a kind of promissory estoppel against the stepparent (as was suggested by the chambers judge in this case).
 Given the “children-first” perspective of the Guidelines (see D.B.S., supra, at para. 43), primacy should be given to the children’s standard of living. Where for example the stepparent provided a standard to the children during the period of cohabitation that was materially higher than that which the natural parents can provide by means of their Guidelines amounts, a court might find it appropriate to make an order against the stepparent that is designed to provide the higher standard, or something approximating it, “on top of” the other parents’ support. However, where the ‘piling’ of Guidelines amounts would result in a standard beyond one that is reasonable in the context of the standard the children have previously enjoyed, such a ‘windfall’ or “wealth transfer” (see Francis v. Baker, supra, at para. 41) is unlikely to be “appropriate”. At the other end of the spectrum, where the three (or more) parents’ Guidelines “contributions” together are needed to provide the children with a reasonable standard of living, then both the stepparent and the non-custodial parent(s) may well be required to pay full Guidelines amounts. Or, where one of the natural or adoptive parents is not present or is unable to pay any support, the stepparent may well have to pay his or her full table amount. The Legislature has left it to the judgment of trial and chambers judges in the first instance to fashion orders that are “appropriate” under s. 5. At the same time, the Guidelines system is not thereby jettisoned in favour of a ‘wide open’ discretion. The inquiry must, like the Guidelines themselves, focus on the children and their needs.
 In this case, the income levels of the father and stepfather were not very different. When the stepfather was supporting the children, the father was sharing custody and was therefore not expected to contribute funds to the mother for the children’s care. Now, the natural parents are able to provide a quite comfortable standard of support – the father by paying his Guidelines amount and the mother by providing her presumed contribution as custodial parent. The chambers judge reasoned that the mother’s expenses were slightly more than her Form 89 had indicated – about $2,570 per month from May 1, 2006. In this, he has not been shown to be wrong. Where he erred was in approaching the natural father’s obligation as a secondary one, losing sight of the non-discretionary obligation created by s. 3. If the chambers judge had factored in the Guidelines obligations of the natural parents, which come to a total of $2,210 per month, he would have been left with a shortfall of $360 per month. If the stepfather had been ordered to “top up” this amount, the children would have a more than a “fair standard of support” and the other requirements and objectives of the Guidelines would have been met.
 I would allow the appeal on the basis that the chambers judge erred in his approach to the determination of the stepfather’s obligation under s. 5 of the Regulation and the father’s obligation under s. 3, and in considering factors that do not come within the wording of s. 5.
 I turn next to the question of retroactivity. At least in this court, the stepfather did not contest the fact that he had failed to comply with Boyd J.’s order of June 21, 2002 that he provide the mother with “immediate notice of any employment he has succeeded in obtaining” and thereafter, with “advice of his total earnings” for each month, including paystubs or contracting invoices.
 The stepfather contends, however, that the chambers judge erred when he “failed to assess the father’s obligation to pay child support at the dates that the shared custody regime ended and take the same into account when calculating the stepfather’s arrears of child support.” Just as the stepfather was under an obligation (which in this case was stated in a court order) to disclose the change in his income, he says the father should be “called to account” to pay his full Guidelines amount, which would have increased when the shared custody arrangement ended. (The stepfather contends that this took place in March 2004 in respect of the daughter and in April 2005 in respect of the son.) According to the stepfather’s calculation, the father should have paid $31,000 in arrears based on the difference between his table amount and the amount of child support actually paid by him and it would be an “unjustified windfall” for the mother to receive arrears of child support from both the stepfather and the father. (In fact, of course, the stepfather is actually complaining about what he regards as a “windfall” to the children, since it is they, not the mother, who are the beneficiaries of child support.) Considering the mandatory nature of the father’s obligation under s. 3, he contends that since the father’s “arrears” exceed those of the stepfather found by Warren J., the mother’s application for a retroactive order against the stepfather should have been dismissed.
 In all the circumstances, I conclude that a retroactive award against the father would not have been appropriate in this case and that the chambers judge below did not err in failing to make such an order.
 I have also considered whether the stepfather should receive some credit or even ‘refund’ of support in recognition of the fact that (assuming Warren J.’s order has been complied with pending appeal) he has in a sense “overpaid” the mother on behalf of the children. In this regard, what little authority there is suggests that this is a discretionary matter: see the discussion at §17:15.08 of T.W. Hainsworth, Divorce Act Manual (looseleaf); Prewada v. Prewada (1993) 88 Man. R. (2d) 2, 48 R.F.L. (3d) 190 (Man. C.A.). (On the other hand, no discretion was suggested in E.E.C. v. M.A.C., 2003 BCCA 666, 21 B.C.L.R. (4th) 308.) One may assume any such order would affect the children very negatively, and would only mean the mother would be thrown into debt and thus have less with which to discharge her own support obligation. In all the circumstances, I conclude that a retroactive adjustment of this kind would not be in the interests of justice or of the children.
 I would allow the appeal, set aside paras. 3 and 4 of the chambers judge’s order below, and substitute an order that the father shall pay the sum of $1,581 to the mother from and after May 1, 2008, and continuing on the first day of each month until further court order; and that the stepfather pay $360 per month to the mother from May 1, 2008, and continuing on the first day of each month until further court order. (This order rests on the assumption that both children remain “children” for purposes of the Family Relations Act. If this is no longer the case, a variation order could be sought below or the parties might agree on a different figure.) As well, I would order that both the father and stepfather shall notify the mother in writing of any material change in their respective earnings; and provide copies of paystubs and other supporting documents to her upon request from time to time, and not less than annually, as of May 1.
 Given that success in this appeal has been mixed, I would give the parties leave to make written submissions as to costs should they wish to do so. Counsel should agree amongst themselves for filing dates, subject to a June 15, 2008 deadline for the last submission.
 As requested by counsel, I would confirm the application of s. 486(3) of the Criminal Code to this judgment, and have therefore used initials in place of the parties’ names throughout.

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