Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=82104:g-r-no-181359,-august-05,-2013&catid=1573&Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 08:49:56+00:00

Document:
HADJI PANGSAYAN T. ABDULRAHMAN, Petitioner, v. THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN FOR MINDANAO AND GUIAMALUDIN A. SENDAD, Respondents.
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Resolutions dated 21 July 20051 and 14 November 20062 of the Court of Appeals Mindanao Station (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 85727. The CA Resolutions dismissed the petition for certiorari impugning the Order of Implementation3 issued by the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao (Ombudsman), which had directed the Depm1ment of Environment and Natural Resources ( DENR) Region XII (XII) Regional Executive Director (RED) to dismiss petitioner from service.
The letter-complaint found its way to the Ombudsman. Instead of submitting a counter-affidavit in compliance with the Ombudsman’s Order dated 17 July 1992,10 petitioner filed a Manifestation11 dated11 August 1992. He manifested that private respondent had already executed an Affidavit of Desistance.12 In that affidavit, private respondent indicated that he had forgiven petitioner after the latter produced the missing documents and returned the money solicited together with incidental expenses. Thus, petitioner prayed that he be dropped as respondent in the complaint.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied in an Order dated 19 February 1999.16 He then filed a Motion for New Trial or Second Motion for Reconsideration,17 attaching thereto the Affidavit18 of private respondent, as well as the Joint-Affidavit19 of Mama Sangeban, Jr. (Sangeban) and Mario Tuhok (Tuhok), both dated 16 August 1999.
In his Affidavit, private respondent stated that the amount of ?P5,450 was actually paid to Sangeban, the driver of a truck, and Tuhok, the owner of two horses. The truck and two horses were used in transporting private respondent, petitioner and Undi Tumindig when they went to South Upi, Maguindanao to conduct an ocular inspection of the lands covered by the homestead applications of Unos Pacutin and Ting Midtimbang. This statement was corroborated by Sangeban and Tuhok in their Joint-Affidavit.
In an Order dated 23 August 1999, the Ombudsman denied the motion for being a second motion for reconsideration.20 Under the mistaken notion that petitioner’s Motion for New Trial or Second Motion for Reconsideration had yet to be resolved by the Ombudsman, the new DENR Region XII RED ordered the retention of petitioner in the latter’s position pending the resolution of the second motion for reconsideration.
In a letter24 dated 15 March 2004, the DENR XII RED officer-in-charge inquired about the status of the case of petitioner as the latter was then still reporting for work and even applying for a promotion.
On 31 March 2004, the Ombudsman issued an Order of Implementation25 directing DENR XII RED officer-in-charge Jim Sampulna to implement the dismissal from service of petitioner and to show proof of compliance within 10 days from receipt.
Whether the CA misapprehended facts by concluding that petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies.
In this case, the CA dismissed petitioner’s special civil action for certiorari because of procedural errors, namely: (1) failure to implead private respondent; (2) failure to attach copies of the pleadings and documents relevant to the petition; (3) failure to file a motion for reconsideration of the Order of Implementation; and, consequently, (4) failure to allege material dates in the petition.
Petitioner argues that the rules of procedure should be liberally construed when substantial issues need to be resolved.
Section 11, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, states that neither the misjoinder nor the non-joinder of parties is a ground for the dismissal of an action.46 If it was truly necessary to implead Guiamaludin Sendad, what the CA should have done was to order petitioner to add him as private respondent to the case.
The CA is correct on this point. It is clear that upon receipt of a copy of the Order of Implementation dated 31 March 2004, petitioner immediately filed the petition for certiorari and prohibition before the CA three days later. The motions for reconsideration that petitioner referred to were filed by him in connection with the Resolution dated 14 March 1995 recommending his dismissal from service.
There are well-settled exceptions48 to the general rule that a motion for reconsideration is a condition precedent to the filing of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.49 However, none of them finds application in this case, especially since questions raised in the certiorari proceeding before the CA were different from those passed upon by the Ombudsman. The question raised before the CA was the legality of the Order of Implementation. On the other hand, what was passed upon by the Ombudsman was whether petitioner was guilty of grave misconduct.
Nevertheless, while we agree that in clearly meritorious cases, the higher demands of substantial justice can transcend the rigid observance of procedural rules, it is not the case here.
In this case, petitioner claims that the order should have been addressed to the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources as the head of office. According to petitioner, directing it to the DENR XII RED amounted to grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman.
Thus, when the recommendation to dismiss petitioner from service was issued by the Ombudsman through the Resolution dated 14 March 1995, the recommendation was coursed through then DENR XII RED Macorro Macumbal. Later, due to the query of the DENR XII RED officer-in-charge regarding the status of the case of petitioner, the Order of Implementation dated 31 March 2004 was directed to the former to effect petitioner's dismissal.
The Ombudsman was never informed of any change in the status of appointment of petitioner. Thus, the Ombudsman had reason to believe that his employment continued to be under a contract of service. Even if this belief was mistaken, we find that it does not amount to grave abuse of discretion.
Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, Mendoza,* and Reyes, JJ., concur.
* Designated additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr. per Special Order No. 1502.
1Rollo, pp. 151-152. The Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) Mindanao Station's Twenty-Second Division was penned by Associate Justice Normandie B. Pizarro with Associate Justices Arturo 0. Tayag and Rodrigo F. Lim, Jr. concurring.
2 Id. at 153-158. The Resolution of the CA Mindanao Station's Twenty-First Division was penned by Associate Justice Rodrigo F. Lim, Jr. with Associate Justices Teresita Dy-Liacco Flores and Mario V. Lopez concurring.
39Serrano v. Galant Maritime Services, Inc., 455 Phil. 992, 997 (2003).
41Go, Jr. v. CA, G.R. No. 172027, 29 July 2010, 626 SCRA 180, 189.
43Cortez-Estrada v. Heirs of Samut, 491 Phil. 458 (2005).
44PLDT v. Imperial, 524 Phil. 204 (2006).
45Great Southern Maritime Services Corporation v. Acuña, 492 Phil. 518 (2005).
46Cuyo v. People, G.R. No. 192164, 12 October 2011, 659 SCRA 69, 73.
48 (a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceeding have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the proceeding was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or public interest is involved.
49Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto, G.R. No. 135703, 15 April 2009, 585 SCRA 18.
51 503 Phil. 396 (2005).
December 2008, 575 SCRA 449; Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals, 554 Phil. 656 (2007); Ombudsman v. Lucero, 537 Phil. 917 (2006); Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals, 537 Phil. 751 (2006).
53 Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, supra note 51.
56Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, supra.
57Republic v. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division), G.R. No. 152375, 16 December 2011, 662 SCRA 152, 186.
59Rollo, p. 61; Records, p. 4.

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