Source: https://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-supreme-court/323/574.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 01:34:02+00:00

Document:
[323 U.S. 574, 575] Mr. J. Vaughan Gary, of Richmond, Va., for petitioner.
Petitioner's husband was killed while in the performance of his duties as an employee of respondent railroad. She filed suit under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C., Sec. 51 et seq., 45 U.S.C.A. 51 et seq., alleging that her husband's death was caused by the negligent operation of a railroad car which struck and killed him, and because of respondent's failure to provide him a reasonably safe place to work. The District Court directed a verdict in favor of the railroad and the Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. 4 Cir., 128 F.2d 420. We reversed, holding that there was sufficient evidence of the railroad's negligence to require submission of the case to the jury. Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co., 318 U.S. 54, 68 , 73 S., 63 S.Ct. 444, 451, 454, 143 A.L.R. 967. On remand, petitioner amended her complaint in the District Court, over respondent's objection, by charging that, in addition to the negligence previously alleged, the decedent's death was caused by the railroad's violation of the Federal Boiler Inspection Act, 45 U.S.C. Sec. 22 et seq., 45 U.S.C.A. 22 et seq., and Rules and Regulations prescribed by the Interstate Commerce Commission pursuant to the provi- [323 U.S. 574, 576] sions of that Act. The jury returned a verdict in favor of petitioner, and the District Court refused to set it aside. The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, 4 Cir., 142 F.2d 718, and certiorari was granted because of the importance of questions involved relating to the administration and enforcement of the Federal Employers' Liability Act and the Federal Boiler Inspection Act. 323 U.S. 689 , 65 S.Ct. 71.
The locomotive which pushed backwards the string of cars one of which struck and killed the deceased was operated in violation of the literal words of this Regulation. It was being used in 'yard service' at respondent's Clopton Yards 'between sunset and sunrise.' There was no light on the rear of the locomotive, which was moving in reverse towards the deceased. 2 [323 U.S. 574, 578] It was for the jury to determine whether the failure to provide this required light on the rear of the locomotive proximately contributed to the deceased's death. The ruling of the court below that it was not a proximate cause was based on this reasoning: The general railroad practice in yard movements is to push cars attached to the rear of an engine; no express regulation of the Commission prohibits this; in the instant case the cars attached to the engine necessarily would have obscured any light on the rear of that engine; the light so obscured would not have enabled the engineer to see 300 feet backwards so as to avoid injuring the deceased nor would the light have been visible to the deceased standing at or near the track ahead of the backward movement. Therefore, the court concluded, the failure to furnish the light was not proximately related to the death of Tiller.
Assuming, without deciding, that the railroad could consistently with Rule 131 obscure the required light on the rear of the engine, it does not follow that, as a matter of law, failure to have the light did not contribute to Tiller's death. The deceased met his death on a dark night, and the diffused rays of a strong headlight, even though directly obscured from the front, might easily have spread [323 U.S. 574, 579] themselves so that one standing within three car-lengths of the approaching locomotive would have been given warning of its presence, or at least so the jury might have found. The backward movement of cars on a dark night in an unlit yard was potentially perilous to those compelled to work in the yard. Tennant v. Peoria & P.U. Ry. Co., 321 U.S. 29, 33 , 64 S. Ct. 409, 411. And 'The standard of care must be commensurate to the dangers of the business.' Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad, supra, 318 U.S. at page 67, 63 S.Ct. at page 451, 143 A.L.R. 967.
An additional ground of the reversal of this cause by the Circuit Court of Appeals was that part of the District Court's charge to the jury set out in the margin. 3 It instructed the jury that if they believed that the back-up movement was an unusual and unexpected one, and a departure from the general practice in making up that particular train, and that Tiller had no reasonable cause to believe that such a movement would be made, it became the duty of the defendant to give him adequate warning of that movement and if the jury found that the defendant failed to perform this duty, and that failure was the proximate cause of the injury, its verdict should be for the plaintiff. The original complaint alleged this as one of the grounds of negligence. The Circuit Court of Appeals held that there was substantial testimony to support a finding that the movement was an unusual one. [323 U.S. 574, 580] Nevertheless, because no railroad rule or custom prohibited such an unusual movement, because some of the evidence showed that the same movement had been performed on other occasions, and because Tiller was familiar with the local situation, the Circuit Court of Appeals held that the railroad owed no duty to warn him of such an unusual movement. We cannot say that a jury could not reasonably find negligence from the evidence which showed such an unprecedented departure from the usual custom and practice in backing cars, without giving 'adequate warning of the movement.' Compare Toledo, St. Louis & W.R.R. v. Allen, 276 U.S. 165, 171 , 48 S.Ct. 215, 217.4 The charge of the District Court in this respect was correct.
[ Footnote 1 ] Lilly v. Grand Trunk Western Railroad Co., 317 U.S. 481, 486 , 63 S. Ct. 347, 351; United States v. B. & O.R. Co., 293 U.S. 454 , 55 S.Ct. 268.
[ Footnote 2 ] The contention is made that since this locomotive was used in road service as well as yard service the Rule should be held inapplicable to it as a matter of law. Such a narrow interpretation of the Regulation would be wholly out of keeping with the liberal construction which we have constantly said must be given to this and the Safety Appliance Act, 45 U.S. C.A. 1 et seq. Lilly v. Grand Trunk Western Railroad Co., supra, 317 U.S. at page 486, 63 S.Ct. at page 351.
[ Footnote 4 ] See Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. De Atley, 241 U.S. 310 , 36 S.Ct. 564; Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. Peyton, 4 Cir., 253 F. 734; Ferringer v. Crowley Oil & Mineral Co., 122 La. 441, 47 So. 763; Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Asher's Adm'r, 178 Ky. 67, 198 S.W. 548, L.R.A. 1918B, 211; Director Gen'l v. Hubbard's Adm'r, 132 Va. 193, 111 S.E. 446; 2 Shearman & Redfield on Negligence, Rev.Ed., 566, 607; cf. Davis v. Philadelphia & R. Ry. Co., D.C., 276 F. 187.
[ Footnote 5 ] See Friederichsen v. Renard, 247 U.S. 207 , 38 S.Ct. 450; United States v. Memphis Cotton Oil Co., 288 U.S. 62 , 53 S.Ct. 278; United States v. Powell, 4 Cir., 93 F.2d 788, 790.

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