Source: https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/262/182/
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 22:37:20+00:00

Document:
CITY OF TRENTON v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY.
Mr. A. V. Dawes, of Trenton, N. J., for plaintiff in error.
Mr. William Newcorn, of Plainfield, N. J., for the State of New Jersey.
The state of New Jersey recovered judgment against the city of Trenton for $14,310, in an action brought in the state Supreme Court. The judgment was affirmed by the Court of Errors and Appeals, and is here on writ of error.
'Every municipality, corporation or private person now diverting the waters of streams or lakes with outlets for the purpose of a public water supply shall make annual payments on the first day of May to the state treasurer for all such water hereafter diverted in excess of the amount now being legally diverted: Provided, however, no payment shall be required until such legal diversion shall exceed a total amount equal to one hundred (100) gallons daily per capita for each inhabitant of the municipality or municipalities supplied, as shown by the census of one thousand nine hundred and five.' Section 8.
By an act of February 29, 1804, the president and directors of the Trenton Waterworks were created a body politic and corporate. They and their successors and assigns were made capable of disposing of water to such as might apply for the same for such annual rent and under such restrictions as they might think proper, and they were authorized to lay and extend their water mains through the streets of the city. Certain springs constituted the company's source of supply, and by reason of increase of population ceased to be adequate. March 24, 1852 (P. L. p. 289), a supplement to the above-mentioned act was passed, by which the company was authorized to take the water required either in whole or in part from the Delaware river. Later, March 2, 1855 (P. L. p. 141), an act was passed, authorizing the city to purchase the whole or a majority of the shares of the capital stock of the water company, and the city purchased all of the stock. Thereafter an act of March 1, 1859 (P. L. p. 38), required the company to convey unto 'the inhabitants of the city of Trenton' all the real estate, works and property and all the corporate powers, franchises and privileges of the company, and this conveyance was duly made.
If the provision of the act of 1907 imposing the license fee is valid as against the city, the judgment is right. The Court of Errors and Appeals held that it was valid, that the state under its police power might impose a license fee as specified in the act, and that this does not deprive the city of any contractual or property right.
The stat undoubtedly has power, and it is its duty, to control and conserve the use of its water resources for the benefit of all its inhabitants, and the act of 1907 was passed pursuant to the policy of the state to prevent waste and to economize its water resources. Decision of the Court of Errors and Appeals in this case, 117 Atl. 158; McCarter v. Hudson Water Co., 70 N. J. Eq. 695, 701, 702, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 197, 118 Am. St. Rep. 754, 10 Ann. Cas. 116, £affirmed by this court in 209 U. S. 349, 355, 28 Sup. Ct. 529, 52 L. Ed. 828, 14 Ann. Cas. 560; Collingswood v. Water-Supply Commission, 84 N. J. Law, 104, 110, 86 Atl. 660; Cobb v. Davenport, 32 N. J. Law, 369, 378. The only way the city could acquire the right to take the water of the Delaware river was by grant from the state or by authorized purchase or condemnation from one to whom the right had been granted by the state. State v. Jersey City, 94 N. J. Law, 431, 433, 111 Atl. 544, 19 A. L. R. 646. The power to determine the conditions upon which waters may be so diverted is a legislative function. The state may grant or withhold the privilege as it sees fit. Assuming in favor of the city, that its grantor received a perpetual right, unburdened by license fee or other charge, to divert all the water required for the use of the city and its inhabitants, does it follow that the state as against the city is bound by contract and is without power to impose a license fee as provided in the act?
The relations existing between the state and the water company were not the same as those between the state and the city. The company was organized and carried on its business for pecuniary profit. Its rights and property were privately owned and therefore safeguarded by the constitutional provisions here sought to be invoked by the city against the legislation of the state. The city is a political subdivision of the state, created as a convenient agency for the exercise of such of the governmental powers of the state as may be intrusted to it. The diversion of waters from the sources of supply for the use of the inhabitants of the state is a proper and legitimate function of the state. This function may be left to private enterprise, subject to regulation by the state; it may be performed directly; or it may be delegated to bodies politic created for that purpose, or to the municipalities of the state. Power to own, maintain and operate public utilities, such as waterworks, gas and electric plants, street railway systems, public markets, and the like is frequently conferred by the states upon their cities and other political subdivisions. For the purpose of carrying on such activities, they are given power to hold and manage personal and real property.
In New Jersey it has been held that within the limits prescribed by the state Constitution, the Legislature may delegate to municipalities such portion of political power as they may deem expedient, withholding other powers, and may withdraw any part of that which has been delegated. Van Cleve v. Passaic Valley Sewerage Commissioners, 71 N. J. Law, 183, 198, 58 Atl. 571.
In the absence of state constitutional provisions safeguarding it to them, municipalities have no inherent right of self-government which is beyond the legislative control of the state. 1 A municipality is merely a department of the state, and the state may withhold, grant or withdraw powers and privileges as it sees fit. However great or small its sphere of action, it remains the creature of the state exercising and holding powers and privileges subject to the sovereign will. See Barnes v. District of Columbia, 91 U. S. 540, 544, 545, 23 L. Ed. 440.
In East Hartford v. Hartford Bridge Co., 10 How. 511, 533, 534, 536, 13 L. Ed. 518, it appeared that for many years a franchise to operate a ferry over the Connecticut river belonged to the town of Hartford, that upon the incorporation of East Hartford the Legislature granted to it one-half of the ferry during the pleasure of the General Assembly, and that subsequently, after the building of a bridge across the river, the Legislature discontinued the ferry. It was held that this was not inconsistent with the contract clause of the federal Constitution. The reasons given in the opinion (10 How. 533, 534, 13 L. Ed. 518) support the contention of the state here made that the city cannot possess a contract with the state which may not be changed or regulated by state legislation.
'The question then arising is whether the Legislature, in the exercise of its general legislative power, could abrogate the provisions of the contract between the city and the railroad company with the assent of the latter, and provide another and a different method for the paving and repairing of the streets through which the tracks of the railroad company were laid under the permit of their extended location. We have no doubt that the Legislature of the commonwealth had that power. A municipal corporation is simply a political subdivision of the state, and exists by virtue of the exercise of the power of the state through its legislative department. The Legislature could at any time terminate the existence of the corporation itself, and provide other and different means for the government of the district comprised within the limits of the former city. The city is the creature of the state' citing East Hartford v. Hartford Bridge Co., 10 How. 511, 533, 534, 13 L. Ed. 518; United States v. Railroad Co., 17 Wall. 322, 329, 21 L. Ed. 597; New Orleans v. Clark, 95 U. S. 644, 654, 24 L. Ed. 521; Commissioners of Laramie County v. Commissioners of Albany County et al., 92 U. S. 307, 23 L. Ed. 552; Commissioners v. Lucas, 93 U. S. 108, 114, 23 L. Ed. 822.
The writ of error is dismissed.
Cf. 1 Dillon, Municipal Corporations (5th Ed.) § 98, p. 154, et seq.
Commissioners v. Lucas, 93 U. S. 108, 115, 23 L. Ed. 122; Meriwether v. Garrett, 102 U. S. 472, 518, 530, 26 L. Ed. 197; Essex Board v. Skinkle, 140 U. S. 334, 342, 11 Sup. Ct. 790, 35 L. Ed. 446; New Orleans v. Water Works Co., 142 U. S. 79, 91, 12 Sup. Ct. 142, 35 L. Ed. 943; Covington v. Kentucky, 173 U. S. 231, 240, 19 Sup. Ct. 383, 43 L. Ed. 679; Worcester v. Street Railway Co., 196 U. S. 539, 551, 25 Sup. Ct. 327, 49 L. Ed. 591; Monterey v. Jacks, 203 U. S. 360, 27 Sup. Ct. 67, 51 L. Ed. 220.
Some state cases holding that the state Legislature is not restrained by federal constitutional provisions: City of St. Louis v. Sheelds, 52 Mo. 351, 354; Police Jury of Bossier v. Corporation of Shreveport, 5 La. Ann. 661, 665; Trustees of Schools v. Tatman, 13 Ill. 27; Board of Education v. Aberdeen, 56 Miss. 518; Darlington v. Mayor &c. of New York, 31 N. Y. 164, 193, 88 Am. Dec. 248. See contra: Town of Milwaukee v. City of Milwaukee, 12 Wis. 93, 109; Grogan v. City of San Francisco, 18 Cal. 590, 612, 613; Mt. Hope Cemetery v. Boston, 158 Mass. 509, 519, 33 N. E. 695, 35 Am. St. Rep. 515; Spaulding v. Andover, 54 N. H. 38, 56; Ellerman v. McMains, 30 La. Ann. 190, 31 Am. Rep. 218.
Cf. Williams v. Eggleston, 170 U. S. 304, 310, 18 Sup. Ct. 617, 42 L. Ed. 1047; Mason v. Missouri, 179 U. S. 328, 335, 21 Sup. Ct. 125, 45 L. Ed. 214.
See City of Winona v. Botzet, 169 Fed. 321, 332, et seq., 94 C. C. A. 563, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 204, and cases cited. See, also, Brantman v. City of Canby, 15 Am. St. Rep. 442 (recovery permitted for injury 862 (recovery permitted for gas explosion where city furnished gas to inhabitants); Pettengill v. City of Yonkers, 116 N. Y. 558, 565, 22 N. E. 1095, 1k Am. St. Rep. 442 (recovery permitted for injury sustained by excavation in street to lay mains); Watson v. Needham, 161 Mass. 404, 411, 37 N. E. 204, 24 L. R. A. 287 (damages recovered for breach of contract by water commissioners to furnish water for plaintiff's boiler, resulting in injury to vegetables in greenhouse heated thereby); Brown v. Salt Lake City, 33 Utah, 222, 234, 93 Pac. 570, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 619, 126 Am. St. Rep. 828, 14 Ann. Cas. 1004 (city held liable for death by drowning in conduit forming a part of city waterworks system). These cases and others that might be cited serve in general to illustrate the course of decision.
Cf. 1 Dillon, Municipal Corporations (5th Ed.) § 110, p. 154.
See decisions per curiam: City of Chicago v. Dempcy, 250 U. S. 651, 40 Sup. Ct. 53, 63 L. Ed. 1189; People of the Stat of Michigan ex rel. Groesbeck v. Detroit United Railway, 257 U. S. 610, 42 Sup. Ct. 46, 66 L. Ed. 395; City of Chicago v. Chicago Railways Company, 257 U. S. 617, 42 Sup. Ct. 95, 66 L. Ed. 399; Township of Avon v. Detroit United Railway, 257 U. S. 618, 42 Sup. Ct. 168, 66 L. Ed. 400; Borough of Edgewood v. Wilkinsburg & East Pittsburgh Street Railway Co., 258 U. S. 605, 42 Sup. Ct. 313, 66 L. Ed. 786; City of Sapulpa v. Oklahoma Natural Gas Co., 258 U. S. 608, 42 Sup. Ct. 316, 66 L. Ed. 788.

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