Source: https://www.ptab.us/2010/04/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 10:34:06+00:00

Document:
Ex Parte Lockridge et al 10/223,844 HOFF 112(1)/102(b)/103(a) THOMSON MULTIMEDIA LICENSING INC.
It is well-established that an invention may be held to have been obvious without a specific finding of a particular level of skill where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level. See Chore-Time Equip., Inc. v. Cumberland Corp., 713 F.2d 774, 779 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
Ex Parte Janzig et al 10/731,699 PATE III obviousness-type double patenting/102(b) 103(a) 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) SHUMAKER & SIEFFERT, P. A.
Ex Parte Hollingsworth et al 10/795,652 WALSH 103(a) IAN C. McLEOD, P.C.
Ex Parte Beutel et al 10/755,128 TIMM 103(a) HARNESS, DICKEY & PIERCE, P.L.C.
Ex Parte Bit-Babik et al 10/945,234 HAIRSTON 102(e) MOTOROLA, INC.
The Federal Circuit has stated that simply disclosing a general purpose computer as the structure to perform the claimed function does not meet the corresponding structure requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112 sixth paragraph. Aristocrat, 521 F.3d at 1333. Rather, "the corresponding structure for a § 112 paragraph 6 claim for a computer-implemented function is the algorithm disclosed in the specification." Id (citing Harris Corp. v. Ericsson Inc., 417 F.3d 1241, 1249 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
Ex Parte Marvit et al 10/807,561 EASTHOM 103(a) BAKER BOTTS L.L.P.
Consistent with the holding in BPAI precedential opinion Ex Parte Ghuman, 88 USPQ2d 1478, 1480 (BPAI 2008), Appellant may not reserve arguments for some later time. Arguments Appellant could have made but chose not to make in the Briefs are waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.3 (c)(1)(vii)(2009).
Ex Parte YAGI et al 11/697,842 PAK 103(a) OBLON, SPIVAK, MCCLELLAND MAIER & NEUSTADT, L.L.P.
Because claims 24 and 25 include all the limitations recited in claim 23, we conclude claim 23 must have been obvious based on our conclusion of obviousness of claims 24 and 25. See Ormco v. Align Tech., 498 F.3d 1307, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (when a dependent claim is “found to have been obvious, the broader claims . . . must also have been obvious”).
Ex Parte Strebelle et al 10/534,299 FREDMAN 103(a) OBLON, SPIVAK, MCCLELLAND, MAIER & NEUSTADT P.C.
Ex Parte Ruppert et al 11/210,461 BAHR 102(b)/103(a)/non-statutory obviousness-type double patenting CARLSON, GASKEY & OLDS, P.C.
If the proposed modification would render the prior art invention being modified unsatisfactory for its intended purpose, then there is no suggestion or motivation to make the proposed modification. In re Gordon,733 F.2d 900, 902 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
Ex Parte Fischer et al 10445146 TIMM 103(a) BURNS, DOANE, SWECKER & MATHIS, L.L.P.
Ex Parte Gartland et al 10956440 TIMM 102(b)/103(a) CARLSON, GASKEY & OLDS, P.C.
Ex Parte Ohtani et al 10946072 COLAIANNI nonstatutory obviousness-type double patenting FISH & RICHARDSON P.C.
Thus, we find that Appellants’ claimed tangible machine readable media does not implicate a non-statutory carrier wave or a signal modulated by a carrier over a transmission medium. See In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d at 1357; Subject Matter Eligibility of Computer Readable Media, 1351 Off. Gaz. Pat. Office 212 (Feb. 23, 2010).
Ex Parte Frippiat et al 10182064 GRIMES 103(a) HAYES SOLOWAY P.C.
Ex Parte Simmons 10870608 HANLON 103(a) GIFFORD, KRASS, SPRINKLE, ANDERSON & CITKOWSKI, P.C.
Ex Parte Quine 10650511 MARTIN 103(a) Pitney Bowes Inc.
Ex Parte Khosravi et al 10461106 STAICOVICI 102(e)/103(a) VIDAS, ARRETT & STEINKRAUS, P.A.
Although the broadest reasonable interpretation of a claim under consideration must be consistent with the specification, we must be careful not to read a particular embodiment appearing in the written description into the claim if the claim language is broader than the embodiment. See Superguide Corp. v. DirecTV Enterprises, Inc., 358 F.3d 870, 875 (Fed. Cir. 2004). See also E-Pass Techs., Inc. v. 3Com Corp., 343 F.3d 1364, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
Ex Parte Sun et al 10279769 BAHR 102(b)/103(a) KIMBERLY-CLARK WORLDWIDE, INC.
Ex Parte Zawilinski et al 10930329 MEDLEY 103(a) CARLSON, GASKEY & OLDS, P.C.
According to current Office policy, computer programs per se are not considered patentable subject matter under §101, as they are in themselves purely non-functional descriptive constructs. See U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Interim Examination Instructions for Evaluating Subject Matter Eligibility Under 35 U.S.C. § 101, Aug. 2009, at 2, available at http://www.uspto.gov/patents/law/comments/2009-08-25_interim_101_instructions.pdf. Also see MPEP § 2106.01 (I), citing In re Warmerdam, 33 F.3d 1354, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
Patentable weight need not be given to descriptive material absent a new and unobvious functional relationship between the descriptive material and the substrate (here the system). See In re Lowry, 32 F.3d 1579, 1582-83 (Fed. Cir. 1994). In re Ngai, 367 F.3d at 1338. See also, Ex parte Mathias, 191 Fed. Appx. 959 (CCPA sic [Fed. Cir.] 2006).
Ex Parte Shannon et al 10/823,364 OWENS 103(a) MOSER IP LAW GROUP / APPLIED MATERIALS, INC.
Ex Parte Kokis et al 10/294,998 FETTING 102(e)/103(a) FISH & RICHARDSON P.C.
"It is impermissible to use the claimed invention as an instruction manual or 'template' to piece together the teachings of the prior art so that the claimed invention is rendered obvious." In re Fritch, 972 F.2d 1260, 1266 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (citing In re Gorman, 933 F.2d 982, 987 (Fed. Cir. 1991)). Furthermore, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit "has previously found a proposed modification inappropriate for an obviousness inquiry when the modification rendered the prior art reference inoperable for its intended purpose." Fritch, 972 F.2d at 1266 n.12 (citing In re Gordon, 733 F.2d 900, 902, 221 USPQ 1125, 1127 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).
Ex Parte Lisziewicz et al 10/081,922 FREDMAN Opinion dissenting-in-part McCOLLUM 112(2)/102(e)/103(a) LOOPER,VALERIE E.
It is by now axiomatic that claim language is not to be read in a vacuum but in light of the supporting specification as it would reasonably be read by one of ordinary skill in the art. In re Sneed, 710 F.2d 1544, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1983); In re Moore, 439 F.2d 1232, 1235 (CCPA 1971). Also, claims are not to be read in manner that renders them inoperative. In re Kamal, 398 F.2d 867, 872 (CCPA 1968); In re Sarett, 327 F.2d 1005, 1019 (CCPA 1964).
See Optivus Tech., Inc. v. Ion Beam Appl’ns S.A. , 469 F.3d 978, 989 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“[A]n issue not raised by an appellant in its opening brief . . . is waived.”) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Ex parte Scholl, No. 2007-3653, slip op. at 18 n.13 (BPAI Mar. 13, 2008) (informative), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/bpai/its/fd073653.pdf.
Ex Parte King 10/793,588 HASTINGS 103(a) PPG Industries, Inc.
Ex Parte Hild et al 10/848,203 GARRIS 102(a)/103(a) HARNESS, DICKEY & PIERCE, P.L.C.
Ex Parte Berry et al 11/095,725 BARRETT 102(b)/103(a) HARNESS, DICKEY & PIERCE, P.L.C.
In KSR, the Court indicated that there is "no necessary inconsistency between the idea underlying the TSM test and the Graham analysis" provided that the test is not applied as a "rigid and mandatory" formula. Id. at 419. The TSM test is applied in an overly rigid and formalistic manner when the "obviousness analysis" is confined "by a formalistic conception of the words teaching, suggestion, and motivation, or by overemphasis on the importance of published articles and the explicit content of issued patents." Id.
"Common sense has long been recognized to inform the analysis of obviousness if explained with sufficient reasoning and where there is a factual foundation from which the analysis flows." Perfect Web Technologies, Inc. v. InfoUSA, Inc., 587 F.3d 1324, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
Recently, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit decided en banc the scope and purpose of the written description requirement within the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112. The court reaffirmed that the written description requirement found in the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112 is separate and distinct from the enablement requirement of that provision. Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly and Co. , --- F.3d ----, 2010 WL 1007369, at *12 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (citing Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1562-1563 (Fed. Cir. 1991)). Further, the purpose of the written description requirement in 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, is to “clearly allow persons of ordinary skill in the art to recognize that [the inventor] invented what is claimed.” Ariad, 2010 WL 1007369, at *12.
Accordingly, “the test for sufficiency is whether the disclosure of the application relied upon reasonably conveys to those skilled in the art that the inventor had possession of the claimed subject matter as of the filing date.” Id. (citing Ralston Purina Co. v. FarMar-Co, Inc. , 772 F.2d 1570, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). The hallmark of the written description is disclosure. Ariad, 2010 WL 1007369, at *12. As such, not just possession, but “‘possession as shown in the disclosure’ is a more complete formulation.” Id. Thus, the test for whether the claims are adequately described “requires an objective inquiry into the four corners of the specification from the perspective of a person of ordinary skill in the art.” Id. “Based on that inquiry, the specification must describe an invention understandable to that skilled artisan and show that the inventor actually invented the invention claimed.” Id. This inquiry is a question of fact. Id. (citing Ralston Purina, 772 F.2d at 1575). “[T]he level of detail required to satisfy the written description requirement varies depending on the nature and scope of the claims and on the complexity and predictability of the relevant technology.” Ariad, 2010 WL 1007369, at *12 (citing Capon v. Eshhar, 418 F.3d 1349, 1357-58 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).

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