Source: http://la.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20180402_0000414.ELA.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 16:24:27+00:00

Document:
EBM MEDICAL, LLC, ET. AL.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Corporate Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Rec. Doc. 22) is DENIED as to Counts I, II, IV, V, and VI, and GRANTED as to Count VIII.
Plaintiff Alfasigma USA, LLC (“Alfasigma”) is a pharmaceutical company that manufactures and sells physician-prescribed medical foods. Rec. Doc. 1. Relevant here are three of Alfasigma's medical foods: CerefolinNAC, Deplin, and Metnax (the “Alfasigma Products”). Id. at 2. Alfasigma markets the Alfasigma Products directly to physicians who then prescribe the Alfasigma Products to their patients. Rec. Doc. 1 at 9.
Made defendants in this case are two corporations, EBM Medical and Food For Health (the “Corporate Defendants”), and seven individuals. Rec. Docs. 1 and 22. Defendant EBM Medical (“Defendant EBM”) is a Missouri based start-up, founded in 2016. Rec. Doc. 22-1 at 2. Defendant EBM markets, promotes, and sells medical products to health care providers, including medical foods: EB-C3, EB-P1, EB-N3 and EB-N5 (the “Defendant Products”). Rec. Docs. 1 and 22-1. In particular, the Complaint alleges that Defendant Heard co-founded EBM Medical shortly after leaving his position as Director of Marketing for Alfasigma in April 2016. Rec. Doc. 1 at 10.
Essentially, Corporate Defendant EBM pays Corporate Defendant FFH to manufacture and distribute the Defendant Products to various healthcare providers. Rec. Doc. 22-1 at 2.
Alfasigma alleges that Defendant Products are “knock-off” versions of Alfasigma's Products using Alfasigma's proprietary and confidential information. Rec. Doc. 1 at 2. Specifically, Alfasigma alleges that Defendant Product EB-C3 is a “purported equivalent” of Alfasigma Product CerefolinNAC, EB-P1 is an alleged equivalent of Deplin, and that EB-N3 and EB-N5 are purported equivalents of Metnax. Rec. Doc. 1 at 3. Alfasigma further alleges that the Corporate Defendants used Alfasigma's confidential customer lists in order to market the Defendant Products to Alfasigma's physician customers. See generally, Rec. Doc. 1.
On August 11, 2017, Alfasigma filed an eight-count Complaint (Rec. Doc. 1) against Defendants, alleging the following: Count I) misappropriation of trade secrets in violation of the 18 U.S.C. § 1836 (the Defend Trade Secrets Act or “DTSA”); Count II) misappropriation of trade secrets in violation of LS § 51:1431 (the Louisiana Uniform Trade Secrets Act or “LUTSA”); Count III) breach of contract; Count IV) false advertising in violation of the Lanham Act; Count V) unfair competition in violation of the Lanham Act; Count VI) violation of the Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices Act; Count VII) Louisiana Civil Code, Article 2315; and Count VIII) tortious interference. The instant motion to dismiss was filed by the Corporate Defendants and seeks to dismiss Counts I, II, IV, V, VI, and VIII. Rec. Doc. 22.
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a party to move for dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Such a motion is rarely granted because it is viewed with disfavor. See Lowrey v. Tex. A & M Univ. Sys., 117 F.3d 242, 247 (5th Cir. 1997).
When reviewing a motion to dismiss, courts must accept all well-pleaded facts as true and view them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 196 (5th Cir. 1996). However, “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Gonzales v. Kay, 577 F.3d 600, 603 (5th Cir. 2009)(quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009))(internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court in Iqbal explained that Twombly promulgated a “two-pronged approach” to determine whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950. First, courts must identify those pleadings that, “because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id. Legal conclusions “must be supported by factual allegations.” Id. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. at 1949.
Upon identifying the well-pleaded factual allegations, courts “assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement of relief.” Id. at 1950. A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 1949. This is a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. The plaintiffs must “nudge their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.

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