Source: https://connecticut.lexroll.com/140-main-street-derby-v-clark-development-llc-116-conn-app-188-2009/
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 06:52:45+00:00

Document:
140 MAIN STREET-DERBY, LLC v. CLARK DEVELOPMENT, LLC.
Bishop, Beach and Peters, Js.
parcels owned by the defendant, known as lots D1 and D2, over which the plaintiff claimed a prescriptive easement. The trial court rendered judgment in part for the plaintiff, from which the defendant appealed to this court. The defendant claimed that the trial court improperly found that the plaintiff had a prescriptive easement over lots D1 and D2, because the plaintiff did not use the subject parcels for the statutorily (§ 47-37) prescribed period of fifteen years. Since at least 1975, the plaintiff’s predecessor, C, had operated a chicken market on his property, and C’s tenants and customers used lot D1 for parking, and from 1976 on, they also used lot D2 for parking. Held that the trial court’s findings that the plaintiff had acquired a prescriptive easement over the subject parcels for parking and that C and his tenants and customers had used the subject parcels continuously for the statutory fifteen year period were not clearly erroneous; the evidence and testimony in the record showed that C’s use was continuous, predated the plaintiff’s use by approximately twenty-nine years and fulfilled the fifteen year requirement, and even though the defendant’s predecessor, I, had complained to C about the use of the two parcels for parking, following that confrontation in 1977, I made no efforts to limit C’s use of the property and did not have any further conversations with C regarding his use of the parcels for parking.
Action seeking to quiet title to certain real property, and for otherrelief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Ansonia-Milford and tried to the court, Hon. George W. Ripley II, judge trial referee; judgment in part for the plaintiff, from which the defendant appealed to this court. Affirmed.
Matthew B. Woods, for the appellant (defendant).
Joseph A. Kubic, for the appellee (plaintiff).
because the plaintiff did not continuously use the subject parcels for the statutorily prescribed period of fifteen years. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The following facts and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of the defendant’s appeal. The plaintiff and the defendant are owners of abutting property on Main Street in Derby. The plaintiff owns 140-146 Main Street, and the defendant is the owner of 148-156 Main Street, which is immediately to the west and south of the plaintiff’s property. The defendant’s property is denoted on maps as consisting of schedule B; schedule D, parcel 1; schedule E; and schedule D, parcel 2. The issue on appeal is whether parcels D1 and D2 are properly subject to a prescriptive easement for parking in favor of the plaintiff.
The plaintiff’s predecessor in interest, Francesco Cirino, purchased 140-146 Main Street with a partner in 1975. In 1977, Cirino became the sole owner of the property. The property consisted of a chicken market, which was run by Cirino and his partner until 1982, as well as other commercial buildings and residential apartments. Since at least 1975, the owners of 140 Main Street and their tenants and customers used D1 for parking. In 1976, after a bowling alley that had been on D2 burned down, that parcel was used for parking by such owners, tenants and customers as well. The defendant’s predecessor in interest, Alphonse Ippolito, owned 148-156 Main Street at this time. In 1977, Ippolito confronted Cirino concerning Cirino’s use of parcels D1 and D2. During that confrontation, Cirino told Ippolito that he would continue to park there “and that’s the way it is.” Cirino did not hear from Ippolito again concerning his use of parcels D1 and D2.
company, purchased 148-156 Main Street from Ippolito’s estate. At a meeting between Samuel Rizzitelli, the principal of the plaintiff limited liability company, and Yacobacci and Clark, Rizzitelli claimed a right to parcels D1 and D2 by adverse possession. The defendant thereafter sent letters to Rizzitelli and the tenants of his building, demanding that they stop using any of the property located at 148-156 Main Street. The defendant also placed a fence and “no parking” signs on the property.
The plaintiff then brought this action against the defendant, claiming, inter alia, that it had acquired a prescriptive easement over the parcels at issue. The court found, inter alia, that the plaintiff had acquired a prescriptive easement over parcels D1 and D2. This appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.
“Whether a [prescriptive easement] has been acquired presents primarily a question of fact for the trier after the nature and character of the use and the surrounding circumstances have been considered. . . . When the factual basis of the court’s decision is challenged, the reviewing court must determine whether the facts are supported by the evidence or whether they are clearly erroneous. . . . In such cases, the trier’s determination of fact will be disturbed only in the clearest of circumstances, where its conclusion could not reasonably be reached.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Stefanoni v. Duncan, 92 Conn. App. 172, 184, 883 A.2d 1271 (2005), rev’d in part on other grounds, 282 Conn. 686, 923 A.2d 737 (2007).
to have acquired it] must prove the necessary elements by a preponderance of the evidence. . . . In applying [§ 47-37, our Supreme Court] repeatedly has explained that [a] party claiming to have acquired an easement by prescription must demonstrate that the use [of the property] has been open, visible, continuous and uninterrupted for fifteen years and made under a claim of right.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)Stefanoni v. Duncan, supra, 92 Conn. App. 184. “Prescriptive easements . . . do not require exclusive use by the claimant . . . and the burden of proof is by preponderance of the evidence. . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Boccanfuso v. Green, 91 Conn. App. 296, 310, 880 A.2d 889 (2005). “Once established, a prescriptive easement appurtenant to the benefited property generally runs to all subsequent owners thereof.” Boccanfuso v. Conner, 89 Conn. App. 260, 268, 873 A.2d 208, cert. denied, 275 Conn. 905, 882 A.2d 668 (2005). Because the defendant contests only the court’s determination that the defendant’s use had been continuous for more than fifteen years, we limit our review to that element.
defendant put up fences and “no parking” signs. We disagree.
Maria Bellone-Anderson testified that in April, 1991, she opened a business located at 144 Main Street and remained at that location for sixteen and one-half years. She testified that she first became aware of the building at 144 Main Street in December, 1990. At that time, she noticed that cars, which she later learned belonged to tenants of 144 Main Street, were parked on parcel D1. She further testified that Cirino, her landlord, told her she could park behind the building. During Bellone-Anderson’s sixteen and one-half year tenancy at 144 Main Street, she, her customers, her employees and other tenants of 144 Main Street would park in parcels D1 and D2. She testified that her use of these parcels for parking was not interrupted until May, 2005. At that time, she received a letter from Yacobacci indicating that she could no longer park her cars in the subject location.
Main Street. He testified that from 1989 to 2005 he had knowledge of cars parking on 148-156 Main Street. Before purchasing 148-156 Main Street, Yacobacci and Clark, as members of the defendant, inspected the property. Yacobacci noticed cars parked on parcels D1 and D2.
Michael Lariccia lived in an apartment building on 146 Main Street from 1992 to the time of trial. He testified that from 1992 until May, 2005, he would park his vehicles, which ranged in number from three to nine, on parcels D1 and D2 without restrictions. He did so with the permission of Cirino.
twenty-nine years and fulfilled the fifteen year requirement. The court’s finding of continuous use by Cirino for the statutory period of fifteen years is not clearly erroneous.
 The plaintiff also claimed, inter alia, that it had an express easement over the schedule E area. The court agreed. The defendant makes no claim on appeal with respect to that finding.
 We note that “[i]f one party’s period of use or possession is insufficient to satisfy the fifteen year requirement, that party may `tack on’ the period of use or possession of someone who is in privity with the party, a relationship that may be established by showing a transfer of possession rights.” McBurney v. Cirillo, 276 Conn. 782, 813, 889 A.2d 759 (2006).” [A] party may establish a prescriptive right by proving the adverse use by a predecessor in title for the requisite amount of time.” Boccanfuso v. Conner, supra, 89 Conn. App. 268.
 The defendant also takes issue with the court’s finding that “[t]he testimony [of Cirino] does not suggest that Ippolito subsequently did anything to prevent Cirino or his tenants from using the property in the manner in which they had become accustomed until the present defendant erected fences and put up signs in May, 2005.” The defendant argues that because “the plaintiff bears the burden of proof . . . the court may not presume such noninterruption so as to make the plaintiff’s case on this essential element of prescription. . . . [T]he error in this finding is that it, in effect, shifted the burden to Ippolito’s successor to prove that Ippolito interrupted Cirino’s adverse use.” (Citation omitted.) “In a claim for a prescriptive easement, the burden is on the party claiming the right. . . . . The essential elements are a use which is open, visible, continuous and uninterrupted for fifteen years and made under a claim of right.” (Citations omitted.) Swenson v. Dittner, 183 Conn. 289, 294, 439 A.2d 334 (1981).
Cirino testified that following his 1977 confrontation with Ippolito, he made “no changes” in his use of the parcels, that Ippolito made no efforts to limit Cirino’s use of the property and that he “never saw [Ippolito] again.” There is no indication that the court, by the finding of fact at issue, improperly shifted the burden of proof, and the inference of continuous use was made permissibly.

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