Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/291/457/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 15:46:17+00:00

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Justia › US Law › US Case Law › US Supreme Court › Volume 291 › United States v. Illinois Central Railroad Co.
United States v. Illinois Central Railroad Co.
1. The provision of § 3(e) of the Inland Waterways Corporation Act, as amended, empowering the Interstate Commerce Commission, upon granting a certificate of public convenience and necessity to a prospective water carrier, to order all connecting common carriers to join with such water carrier in through routes and joint rates, and in such order to fix minimum differentials between all-rail rates and joint rates in connection with the water service, does not deprive a rail carrier affected of due process, since the rates so prescribed are tentative, and the railway, upon complaint, may have a full hearing concerning them and a plenary determination by the Commission before they go into effect. P. 291 U. S. 460.
2. A suit to enjoin enforcement of the Commission's order before the administrative process has been completed is premature. P. 291 U. S. 463.
3. A carrier which has not first availed itself of the remedy before the Commission is not in a position to seek equitable relief against rates fixed by the Commission's order. P. 291 U. S. 463.
4. The provision of the statute which puts the burden of proof upon carriers complaining of the rates fixed by the Commission's ex parte order is not inconsistent with the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. P. 291 U. S. 464.
Appeal from a decree of the District Court, of three judges, setting aside an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission, in a suit brought by several railroad carriers against the United States and the Commission.
"shall thereupon, by order, direct all connecting common carriers and their connections to join with such water carrier in through routes and joint rates,"
of these joint differential rates, and if they are unable to agree within a time specified in the act, the Commission shall determine and establish reasonable divisions to become effective coincident with the effective date of the joint rates. The act further authorizes the Commission, upon complaint at once, and if it so orders, without answer or other formal pleading, but upon reasonable notice, to enter upon a hearing concerning the reasonableness or lawfulness of any through route or joint rate filed pursuant to such order of the Commission, etc., and, after full hearings, to "make such order with reference to any such matters as it may find to be proper and in the public interest." The burden of proof in such case is put upon the carrier or carriers making the complaint, and preference is to be given to the hearing and decision of the questions involved over all other questions pending before it, except where like preference is given by law, and the Commission is directed to render a decision as speedily as possible.
carriers opposed the application and requested a hearing before action by the Commission. This hearing the Commission refused, and entered an order requiring the rail carriers to join with the Barge Line in publishing specified rail-barge-rail rates on cotton in carloads. The order, particulars of which need not be stated, was issued December 10, 1932, to become effective on January 25, 1933, which time was afterwards extended to June 1, 1933, a period altogether of nearly six months from the date of issue.
Appellees, on February 2, 1933, before the order had become effective, brought this suit and sought relief from the order upon the grounds (1) that it was made without according them a full and fair hearing, and that § 3(e) of the statute (as amended), insofar as it authorizes the Commission to make and enforce the order without such hearing, contravenes the due process of law clause of the Fifth Amendment, and (2) that it also constitutes a delegation to the Commission of legislative power. The court below held with appellees upon the first ground, and entered a decree enjoining, setting aside, annulling, and suspending the order of the Commission. 3 F.Supp. 1005.
"it would then be our duty to hear said complaint and decide said matter before said rates become effective; that, in the event such a hearing is not had and the matter disposed of before the effective date of said rates, it would be our further duty temporarily to suspend them until said matter is decided. . . ."
And he declared that this procedure would be necessary to comply with the requirements of due process of law.
granting the certificate of public convenience and necessity is not final and conclusive is clear, since, by the affirmative provisions of the act, the railway carriers may file the through routes and joint rates pursuant to the preliminary order, and immediately, upon complaint, secure a full hearing from, and a plenary determination by, the Commission. Pending that hearing, the Commission is authorized to suspend the operation of the preliminary order for as long as seven months beyond the time when it would otherwise go into effect, Interstate Commerce Act, as amended by Act March 4, 1927, U.S.C. Title 49, § 15(7), and it is made clear by what has already been said that, upon application and proper showing, the Commission would consider itself bound to take such action.
The provisions of § 3(e) with which we are dealing were enacted by Congress in an avowed effort to bring about cooperation on the part of the rail carriers with the water carriers. The report of the House Committee on the proposed legislation (H.Rept. 1537, 70th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 5, 6) recites the necessity of overcoming opposition on the part of the rail carriers in respect of through routes, joint rates, etc., without interminable delay and the heavy expense necessary to carry on proceedings before the Interstate Commerce Commission as a necessary prerequisite to the realization of privately owned transportation service on the inland waterways of the country. Transportation Act 1920 (U.S.C. Title 49, § 142) declares the definite policy of Congress to be "to promote, encourage, and develop water transportation, service, and facilities in connection with the commerce of the United States." Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. Co. v. United States, 274 U. S. 29, 274 U. S. 36. In the light of the situation disclosed by this report and of the policy declared by the act just named, Congress evidently prescribed the course of procedure which § 3(e) requires.
Without attempting to lay down any general rule, but confining ourselves to the statute and case in hand, we accordingly hold that it was not essential, under the due process of law clause, that a hearing should be accorded in advance of the initiating order. It is enough that opportunity was given for a full and fair hearing before the order became operative. Since no routes or rates were in existence when the order was made, that order constituted the preliminary step toward their creation, equivalent, in essence, to an ex parte order on the carriers to show cause why the designated routes and rates should not be established. The effect of that order was simply to put upon the rail carriers the necessity, within a comparatively brief period, of either availing themselves of the right to file the routes and rates and appear and be heard in opposition thereto (the operation of the order in the meantime being held in abeyance) or of suffering them to go into effect by default. The statute gives preference to the hearing and decision of the questions involved, and directs the Commission to render a decision as speedily as possible. Congress evidently believed that the procedure thus prescribed would bring about an earlier settlement of the matter than otherwise would be the case. The various steps to be taken constitute parts of the administrative process which must be completed before the extraordinary powers of a court of equity may be invoked. Porter v. Investors' Syndicate, 286 U. S. 461, 286 U. S. 470-471.
shall have fully availed themselves of this administrative remedy and the Commission shall have taken adverse action. Until then, they are in no situation to invoke judicial action.
The provision of the statute which puts the burden of proof upon the carriers is not inconsistent with the due process clause of the Constitution. New England Divisions Case, 261 U. S. 184, 261 U. S. 199; Minneapolis & S.L. R. Co. v. Minnesota, 193 U. S. 53, 193 U. S. 63.
"such reasonableness and lawfulness can be determined only by a full and fair hearing, and the establishment of rates and routes and differentials without such hearing constitutes necessarily an exercise by the Commission of pure legislative power."
Since the government and the Commission concede that a full and fair hearing must be accorded before the order becomes effective, this objection to the statute, as a distinct ground, necessarily falls.
the order and to suspend the rates after the order becomes effective. §§ 15(7), 16(6), Interstate Commerce Act..
As respondents have failed to invoke these administrative remedies by filing a complaint with the Commission, it seems plain that their rights, constitutional or otherwise, have not been infringed, and I see no occasion for speculation as to what the statutory duty of the Commission may be in the event a complaint is filed, or to resort to concessions of counsel in brief and argument to define that duty, or to suggest that the statute falls short of constitutional requirements if it fails to command the administrative action which it permits. The mere power, unexercised, to withhold constitutional right is not a denial of it. It is enough that respondents have filed no complaint with the Commission designed to secure a hearing. Before administrative action which respondents may invoke, but have not, it cannot be said that there is any infringement of their constitutional rights to a hearing or to protection from the rates pending a hearing. Compare Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Seattle, ante, p. 291 U. S. 300; Porter v. Investors' Syndicate, 286 U. S. 461, 286 U. S. 470-471.
Further, there is no intimation in the record that, upon resort to the administrative remedies which the statute permits, any relief to which respondents are justly and equitably entitled will be withheld. And there is no contention that the proposed rates will not yield a fair return, or that they otherwise infringe constitutional rights. At most, it appears that the interest sought to be protected is a prospective share in future traffic which it is feared may be diverted to the Barge Line, an interest to which the Constitution plainly affords no protection. Edward Hines Trustees v. United States, 263 U. S. 143, 263 U. S. 148; Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. United States, 279 U. S. 768, 279 U. S. 780; Sprunt & Son, Inc. v. United States, 281 U. S. 249.
Thus, regardless of what the statute commands, there is no such showing of threatened denial of a hearing or of injury to a property right as would warrant resort to the equity powers of a federal court. Vandalia Ry. Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 242 U. S. 255; United States v. Los Angeles & S.L. R. Co., 273 U. S. 299, 273 U. S. 314; White v. Johnson, 282 U. S. 367, 282 U. S. 373; Porter v. Investors' Syndicate, supra.

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