Source: http://masscases.com/cases/sjc/308/308mass376.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 14:30:03+00:00

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The manner in which a person would fall when shot and where the blood from the bullet wound would be deposited were proper subjects of expert testimony by a medical examiner.
Evidence warranted a finding that a police chemist was qualified to testify as an expert on the effect which alcohol, found by him in parts of the body of a deceased person, would have had on the deceased; and the effect of the alcohol was a proper subject of expert testimony.
No reversible error at a criminal trial was shown by the admission of certain testimony, contended by the defendant to have been highly prejudicial, which the judge later ruled did not have a proper foundation, which he thereupon instructed the jury to disregard, and which was merely cumulative of other testimony previously admitted without objection.
No abuse of discretion appeared in the denial of a motion for a new trial in a criminal case, based on evidence to impeach the credibility of a witness for the Commonwealth and on alleged newly discovered evidence upon a material issue.
INDICTMENT, found and returned on June 21, 1938.
The case was tried in the Superior Court before Collins, J., and in this court was submitted on briefs.
H. F. Callahan, for the defendant.
W. J. Foley, District Attorney, & E. M. Sullivan, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.
a summary of the record, a transcript of the evidence, and an assignment of errors.
The deceased, Joseph Perotta, went into a liquor saloon, located on the corner of Winnisimmet and Williams streets, in Chelsea, at about nine o'clock on Sunday evening, May 22, 1938, where he met one James Giordano with whom he had spent several hours on the afternoon of that day in playing a bowling game. Both had drunk a considerable quantity of beer. While in the saloon an argument ensued between Perotta and Giordano. One Rose Capalbo, the daughter of the defendant, while passing the saloon observed that such an argument was taking place and went home and informed her father, the defendant. The latter took a loaded revolver from a bureau drawer and went to the saloon. The defendant told Giordano, who lived with him, to go home and also requested Perotta to go home. The defendant contends that Perotta then made an insulting remark, passed out the side door of the saloon to the street and invited the defendant to come outside, and that Perotta, with a knife in his right hand, commenced to climb the three steps that led from the street to this doorway, making two or three lunges with the knife as he approached the defendant who was standing near the door, when the latter pulled out the revolver from his pocket and shot Perotta, the bullet entering his forehead between the eyebrows and taking a downward course, finally lodging between the back of the skull and the scalp. There was other evidence that the shooting occurred inside the saloon. Perotta slumped down when he was shot. He then was taken to Gilman Place, in the rear of the barroom. There he was discovered by the police who took him to the hospital. He died within four hours. The defendant left the premises immediately after the homicide and was at large until he appeared at the Chelsea police station on the following Wednesday.
was owned by Perotta was the subject of a sharp conflict in the testimony.
The Commonwealth claims that the contention of the defendant that he shot in self defence was a fabrication. It points out that there was no evidence that the defendant had been injured although his revolver was only a matter of inches from Perotta's face when he was shot, that if Perotta had a knife it would have dropped from his grasp when he was shot and would have been found there at once after his body had been removed to Gilman Place. The position of the right hand in the trousers pocket, it contends, shows that, at the time he was shot, Perotta was grasping a dollar bill in this pocket, and that he could not have raised his hand out of the pocket after he was shot, and, furthermore, there was no blood upon the right hand. The weight to be given to these contentions was to be determined by the jury. Commonwealth v. Crowley, 168 Mass. 121. Commonwealth v. Peterson, 257 Mass. 473. Commonwealth v. Trippi, 268 Mass. 227.
v. Dorr, 216 Mass. 314, 317. Commonwealth v. Russ, 232 Mass. 58, 78. Commonwealth v. Snyder, 282 Mass. 401, 419. Commonwealth v. Mabey, 299 Mass. 96.
in the body, "in all probability the deceased was unsteady on his feet." Morrison v. Lawrence, 186 Mass. 456. Commonwealth v. Simpson, 300 Mass. 45.
There is nothing in the ninth assignment of error to the admission of testimony given before the grand jury by one Perotta, the owner of the saloon. Such evidence tended to contradict his testimony at the trial in reference to the identification of the knife. Commonwealth v. Mead, 12 Gray 167. Commonwealth v. Homer, 235 Mass. 526, 532, 533.
The eleventh assignment of error is to the admission of certain evidence, on cross-examination of the defendant, that tended to show his relations with Mrs. Giordano. This testimony was admitted upon the contention of the Commonwealth that, during the argument in the saloon between James Giordano and Perotta, the latter had made a remark casting a reflection upon Mrs. Giordano; that the defendant learned of this incident and went to the saloon in search of Perotta. The judge ruled that the evidence was competent after the prosecuting officer had stated that he would prove that the defendant had learned that Perotta had made such a remark. The defendant excepted "provided the foundation . . . [was] laid." There is no contention that the prosecuting officer was not acting in good faith or that the Commonwealth did not have the right to prove a motive for the homicide. There was no error in this ruling. Commonwealth v. Feci, 235 Mass. 562, 567. Commonwealth v. Simpson, 300 Mass. 45, 58.
that the deceased had made any such alleged remark and instructed the jury to disregard such evidence.
The defendant now contends that the nature of this evidence was highly prejudicial to the defendant and could not be eradicated from the minds of the jury. But if the defendant believed that the instruction was not strong enough to counteract the effect of the evidence he should have requested an additional instruction. Commonwealth v. Damon, 136 Mass. 441. Commonwealth v. Enwright, 259 Mass. 152. The judge had a right to assume that the defendant was satisfied. The defendant did not save any exception to the instruction and, consequently, there is nothing upon which an assignment of error in this respect can be based. The point is not as a matter of right open to him. Commonwealth v. McDonald, 264 Mass. 324. Commonwealth v. Hamel, 264 Mass. 564. We have, however, examined the whole record in view of the contention made by the defendant's counsel. Commonwealth v. Chin Kee, 283 Mass. 248, 256.
previous to May was living on the first floor but that he was not living with the rest of the family. The defendant himself testified that he married Mrs. Giordano after the shooting of Perotta. Counsel for the defendant in his opening stated that James Giordano was not the son of the defendant. The evidence now in question did not to any substantial extent go beyond that just narrated, to none of which the defendant offered any objection. In other words, the evidence objected to was in the main merely cumulative of similar evidence which properly remained in the case. It is rarely that the admission or exclusion of cumulative evidence constitutes prejudicial error. Chandler v. Prince, 217 Mass. 451. Brown v. Wimpenny, 239 Mass. 278. Perivoliotis v. Eveleth, 251 Mass. 444. Jordan v. C. I. T. Corp. 302 Mass. 281. Kurland v. Massachusetts Amusement Corp. 307 Mass. 131. It must also be assumed that the jury, in compliance with the instruction of the court, disregarded the evidence now in question. Commonwealth v. Cline, 213 Mass. 225. Commonwealth v. Morrison, 252 Mass. 116.
The sixteenth assignment of error is grounded upon the refusal of the judge to grant the motion for a new trial. The principal grounds relied upon are that the weather at the time of the homicide was very foggy and not clear and fair as the witnesses stated at the trial: an attack upon the credibility of Rines, a witness for the Commonwealth; the prejudicial character of the evidence already discussed in disposing of the eleventh assignment of error; and newly discovered evidence.
from those disclosed at the trial, whether such difference considered alone or in conjunction with the other matters relied upon in support of the motion was so material that justice required a new trial.
Rines had testified that while walking along Williams Street in the vicinity of the side door he heard a shot fired in the saloon and that later, while standing inside the window of his home which was across the street, he saw a body fall through the doorway and land head first upon the stairs. He saw no one on the stairs with a knife in his hand. He testified that Perotta was carried into Gilman Place, and, upon this phase of the case, the witness was corroborated in effect by the testimony of Brown, the marks on the sidewalk, and the appearance of Perotta's shoes. On this state of the evidence, there would be no error if the judge should refuse to find that the fog was so heavy that it obstructed the view of Rines or that he was not entitled to credence.
in the motion. Commonwealth v. Borasky, 214 Mass. 313. Commonwealth v. Dascalakis, 246 Mass. 12. Commonwealth v. Devereaux, 257 Mass. 391. Commonwealth v. Chin Kee, 283 Mass. 248.

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