Source: https://www.tdcaa.com/journal/atkins-litigation-in-the-wake-of-ex-parte-moore/
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 20:56:36+00:00

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Texas has a new legal standard to apply when an individual challenges his death sentence as being cruel and unusual punishment due to an alleged intellectual disability (abbreviated as ID). In Ex parte Bobby James Moore (Moore II), a case on remand from the United States Supreme Court, the Court of Criminal Appeals determined that the American Psychiatric Association’s (APA’s) most recent diagnostic framework of ID would control these Eighth Amendment challenges.1 This framework is contained within the fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5).2 The Court of Criminal Appeals also held that a court could rely on the ID framework advanced by the American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities (AAIDD) in the 11th edition of its definition manual (AAIDD-11).
The United States Supreme Court vacated and remanded Moore I, concluding that Briseno was based on superseded and unsupported medical standards, the application of which created an “unacceptable risk” that a person with ID will be executed in violation of the Eighth Amendment.12 The Supreme Court was particularly critical of two aspects of the Court of Criminal Appeals’ Moore I opinion. Understanding these criticisms explains the Court of Criminal Appeals’ Moore II decision to adopt the DSM-5 as the new Atkins standard.
4) examination of adaptive functioning during incarceration.
A. Deficits in intellectual functions, such as reasoning, problem solving, planning, abstract thinking, judgment, academic learning, and learning from experience, confirmed by both clinical assessment and individualized, standardized intelligence testing.
B. Deficits in adaptive functioning that result in failure to meet developmental and socio-cultural standards for personal independence and social responsibility. Without ongoing support, the adaptive deficits limit functioning in one or more activities of daily life, such as communication, social participation and independent living, across multiple environments, such as home, school, work, and community.
The adaptive functioning second prong focuses on deficits, not strengths.24 For example, a person with significant deficits in intellectual functioning may be otherwise mature in social interactions and act appropriately in terms of personal care. However, if he possesses significant deficits in learning academic skills such as reading, writing, arithmetic, or money management, a clinician may determine he is intellectually disabled.25 In short, strengths cannot outweigh or balance out the deficits.
Examination of adaptive functioning during incarceration. Clinicians and courts often confront the problem of how to assess second-prong adaptive functioning in an individual who has been incarcerated for an extended period of time. For example, Moore has been in continuous incarceration since Jimmy Carter was President of the United States.
3) whether deficits in adaptive functioning must be “directly related” to deficits in intellectual functioning.
The last dissimilarity—direct relatedness—is almost certain to generate clinical and legal disagreement in Atkins litigation.
“Trait” versus “state.” A profound difference between the APA and AAIDD rests in their respective views as to whether ID is a “trait” or a “state.”35 Understanding this distinction helps explain the differences regarding age of onset and direct relatedness.
In Moore, the Supreme Court made clear that all intellectually disabled individuals are per se excluded from the death penalty.49 As such, age of onset at age 19 or 20 must be permissible. By selecting the DSM-5 standard, the Court of Criminal Appeals avoided the “unacceptable risk” posed by the AAIDD-11’s hard age cutoff.
The absence of a relatedness inquiry from the AAIDD-11 makes sense when ID is a state—a construct to identify the “intensity of supports necessary for a person to participate in activities linked to normative human functioning.”52 Under this approach it should not matter if the deficits are “directly related” because the individual needs support services. However, when ID is viewed as a “trait,” as in the DSM-5, the reasons for why there are significant deficits in adaptive functioning do matter so as to properly classify the individual as having an intellectual disability, a different condition, or both.
In adopting the DSM-5 in Moore II, the Court of Criminal Appeals implicitly held that it views ID as a trait rather than a state. The Court explained that there is “logic of requiring that adaptive deficits be related to deficient intellectual functioning.”53 Unfortunately, the Court did not explain what “directly related” means.
The phrase “obvious limits imposed by other ailments” is noteworthy. An “ailment” is a physical or mental disorder.56 While the APA recognizes that the “most obvious” physical disabilities of blindness or deafness could affect adaptive functioning, other ailments also unquestionably pose “obvious limits,” including attention deficit/hyper activity disorder, autism spectrum disorder, bipolar disorder, and traumatic brain injury.
The task of determining the cause(s) of what may be an adaptive deficit is different [from] determining the cause of [ID]. Some behaviors or patterns of behavior could be related to intellectual difficulties, personality traits, both, or a combination of those and other factors. For example, a person might drop out of school after repeated failure to succeed no matter how hard he tried. Or a person might drop out to pursue a criminal lifestyle. Both could be true for the same person.
In essence, a clinician offering an expert opinion in Atkins litigation needs to be able to show her work. She must explain in detail why significant deficits in adaptive functioning can be explained by significant deficits in intellectual functioning and not by the presence of a different physical or neurological ailment.
1 Ex parte Moore, 548 S.W.3d 552 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018).
2 For a primer on the changes between the fourth edition of the DSM to the fifth, read this article from the November-December 2013 issue of this journal: www.tdcaa.com/journal/significant-changes-dsm-iv-dsm-5.
3 Ex parte Moore, at 560 n. 50.
4 Applying the DSM-5 standard, the Court of Criminal Appeals determined that Moore is not intellectually disabled. Moore is challenging this decision in the United States Supreme Court. The authors believe that Moore is unlikely to contest the DSM-5 as the appropriate standard to review his claim and will instead argue that the Court of Criminal Appeals erred as it interpreted the DSM-5 and applied it to his specific case. While the outcome of this litigation is unclear, the authors are confident that the DSM-5 will remain the new legal standard in Texas.
5 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
6 Id. at 317 (“To the extent there is serious disagreement about the execution of mentally retarded offenders, it is in determining which offenders are in fact retarded. In this case, for instance, the Commonwealth of Virginia disputes that Atkins suffers from mental retardation. Not all people who claim to be mentally retarded will be so impaired as to fall within the range of mentally retarded offenders about whom there is a national consensus. As was our approach in Ford v. Wainwright with regard to insanity, we leave to the States the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction upon their execution of sentences”).
7 Moore v. Texas, 137 S.Ct. 1039 (2017).
8 Moore v. State, 700 S.W.2d 193 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985).
9 Moore v. State, No. AP-74,059, 2004 WL 231323, at *1 (Tex. Crim. App. Jan. 14, 2004) (not designated for publication).
10 135 S.W. 3d 1, 4-8 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).
11 Ex parte Moore, 470 S.W.3d 481, 514-28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015).
12 137 S.Ct. at 1048-53.
13 The AAMR subsequently changed its name to the AAIDD.
14 137 S.Ct. at 1055.
16 Id. at 1051-52; 1060.
17 Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 8.
18 See, e.g., “The Briseno Factors,” in The Death Penalty and Intellectual Disability, 219 (Edward A. Polloway ed., 2015) (“Few if any intellectual disability scholars, representative bodies, or specialists consider that the Briseno factors provide a valid diagnostic framework”).
24 AAIDD–11, at 47 (“significant limitations in conceptual, social, or practical adaptive skills [are] not outweighed by the potential strengths in some adaptive skills”); DSM–5, at 33, 38 (inquiry should focus on “deficits in adaptive functioning”; deficits in only one of the three adaptive-skills domains suffice to satisfy criteria).
26 536 U.S. at 317. (“Mental retardation” was the clinically correct term at the time Atkins was issued).
28 DSM-5 at 37; AAIDD-11 at 90; Denis W. Keyes & David Freeman, Retrospective Diagnosis and Malingering, in The Death Penalty and Intellectual Disability, 263, 263-64 (Edward A. Polloway ed., 2015); John H. Blume & Karen L. Salekin, Analysis of Atkins Cases, in The Death Penalty and Intellectual Disability, 37, 49 (Edward A. Polloway ed., 2015).
29 Gilbert S. Macvaugh, Mark D. Cunningham & Marc J. Tasse, Professional Issues in Atkins Assessments, in The Death Penalty and Intellectual Disability, 325, 333-34 (Edward A. Polloway ed., 2015) (emphasis in original).
30 DSM-5 at 40; AAIDD-11 at 58-63.
33 DSM-5 at 38; AAIDD-11 at 46. See also Leigh D. Hagan, Eric Y. Drogin, & Thomas J. Guilmette, Assessing Adaptive Functioning in Death Penalty cases after Hall and DSM-5, 44 J. Am. Acad. Psychiatry & L., 96, 102-03 (2016) (“Being in a controlled prison environment does not diminish the rich information available for a comprehensive assessment of adaptive functioning. Although prison life differs in many ways from circumstances in the larger community, both settings require adaptive behavior”).
34 548 S.W.3d at 582 (Alcala, Richardson, Walker, JJ. dissenting).
35 James C. Harris and Stephen Greenspan, “Definition and Nature of Intellectual Disability,” in Handbook of Evidence-Based Practices in Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities, 11, 16-17 (N.N. Singh (ed.).
42 Id. at 109-122; 151-66.
44 Van Tran v. Colson, 764 F.3d 594, 612-19 (6th Cir. 2014).
47 Stephen Greenspan, George W. Woods & Harvey N. Switzky, Age of Onset and the Developmental Period Criterion, in The Death Penalty and Intellectual Disability, 77, 78 (Edward A. Polloway ed., 2015).
49 137 S Ct. at 1051.
50 DSM-5 at 38 (emphasis added).
53 548 S.W.3d at 560.
54 Brief for American Psychological Association, American Psychiatric Association, American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law, National Association of Social Workers & National Association of Social Workers Texas Chapter as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Moore v. Texas, 137 S.Ct. 1039 (2017) (No. 15-797), 2016 WL 4151451, at *9.
55 Marc J. Tasse, Ruth Luckasson, & Robert L. Schalock, The Relation Between Intellectual Functioning and Adaptive Behavior in the Diagnosis of Intellectual Disability, 54 Intell. & Dev. Disabilities, 381, 387 (2016).
56 American Heritage Dictionary, 28 (4th ed. 2002).
57 Gilbert S. Macvaugh & Mark D. Cunningham, Atkins v. Virginia: Implications and Recommendations for Forensic Practice, 37 J. of Psychiatry & L., 131, 170-71 (2009).
58 Hall v. Florida, 134 S.Ct. 1986, 1993 (2014) (“Society relies upon medical and professional expertise to define and explain how to diagnose the mental condition at issue”).
59 Ex parte Hunter, 2016 WL 4793152, at *1 (Tex. Crim. App. March 9, 2016) (not designated for publication); U.S. v. Candelario-Santana, 916 F.Supp.2d191, 204-05 (D. Puerto Rico 2013); see also DSM-5 at 25 (“In most situations, the clinical diagnosis of a DSM-5 mental disorder such as intellectual disability … does not imply that an individual with such a condition meets legal criteria for the presence of a mental disorder or a specified legal standard”).

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