Source: http://masscases.com/cases/sjc/293/293mass4.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 04:18:20+00:00

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ROYAL INDEMNITY COMPANY vs. PITTSFIELD ELECTRIC COMPANY.
Present: RUGG, C.J., PEIRCE, FIELD, LUMMUS, & QUA, JJ.
On all the evidence, a finding was warranted that an electric company maintaining, under an easement but not an exclusive right to any land, an insulated wire carrying a dangerous current of electricity high above the ground across a house lot was guilty of negligence causing the death by electric shock of a radio repairman which occurred while he was in a tree on neighboring land, as a licensee of the neighbor, attempting to lift from the wire a radio antenna which had been strung from the house to the tree at right angles to and a few feet above the wire, and which had sagged onto the. wire at a place where the insulation had worn off; and a ruling was not required that the repairman was guilty of negligence contributing to his death.
in the tree working on the antenna at the request of the owner of the house and the antenna, was a licensee of the neighbor.
A finding that one killed by a severe electric shock lived or suffered consciously after the shock was not warranted on evidence that he emitted "a scream," or "two cries" about a second apart.
TORT. Writ dated May 1, 1931.
The action was tried in the Superior Court before F. T. Hammond, J., who ordered a verdict for the defendant. The plaintiff alleged an exception.
E. J. Sullivan, for the plaintiff.
J. M. Rosenthal, for the defendant.
LUMMUS, J. The plaintiff, the insurer of The Meyer Store, Incorporated, under the workmen's compensation act, having paid compensation for the death of an employee of the latter named Francis Bruce, brings this action by virtue of G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 152, s. 15, to recover for the conscious suffering and death of Bruce. The only exception is to the direction of a verdict for the defendant.
antenna rested on it. Bruce untied the antenna, fastened his piece of wire to it to lengthen it, and tried to lift it from the electric light wire. In so doing, he received a shock which killed him.
It could not have been ruled as matter of law that Bruce was shown to be guilty of contributory negligence. He was not an electrician. The fact that the insulation was worn off could not readily be seen from below. It does not appear that he knew that the resting of the antenna upon the electric light wire had previously produced flashes of electricity. There was evidence that if the insulation had been sound what he was doing would not have been unsafe. Griffin v. United Electric Light Co. 164 Mass. 492. McCrea v. Beverly Gas & Electric Co. 216 Mass. 495. Jordan v. Malden Electric Co. 244 Mass. 342. The case is unlike Pina v. Cape & Vineyard Electric Co. 289 Mass. 85.
antenna wire could be lifted off the electric wire without the person raising the antenna receiving any shock." Bloomberg testified that on the evening before the accident he called the defendant on the telephone and "told them that there seemed to be something the trouble with his aerial, and it seemed to be touching some wires, and there were flashes coming from wires in the rear of his house." See Sarna v. American Bosch Magneto Corp. 290 Mass. 340, 343. It could be found that the defendant had notice which imposed upon it a duty to all persons who might lawfully be within the range of danger, to guard against the danger sooner than it did. Lutolf v. United Electric Light Co. 184 Mass. 53. Linton v. Weymouth Light & Power Co. 188 Mass. 276. Prince v. Lowell Electric Light Corp. 201 Mass. 276. McCrea v. Beverly Gas & Electric Co. 216 Mass. 495. Romana v. Boston Elevated Railway, 218 Mass. 76. Philbin v. Marlborough Electric Co. 218 Mass. 394.
It is immaterial that at the moment of his injury and death Bruce was not on the Bloomberg lot, but on the land of a neighbor. It does not appear that he was a trespasser there. On the contrary, the facts that the antenna had remained fastened to the tree for six months, and that there was no evidence of any objection, warranted a finding that in working upon the antenna Bruce was a licensee of the neighbor. He was not a trespasser as to any rights of the defendant. Sarna v. American Bosch Magneto Corp. 290 Mass. 340, 344-345. See also Philbin v. Marlborough Electric Co. 218 Mass. 394. He was engaged rather in correcting what might be deemed an interference with the defendant's easement. His position was unlike that of the plaintiff in Falardeau v. Malden & Melrose Gas Light Co. 275 Mass. 196. The plaintiff was entitled to go to the jury on the first count, for negligently causing death, under G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 229, s. 5.
The remaining question is, whether there was evidence of a cause of action accruing to Bruce in his lifetime, which survived under G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 230, s. 1; c. 228, s. 1. See Treasurer & Receiver General v. Sheehan, 288 Mass. 468.
Continuance of life after a personal injury, though not continuance of consciousness, is necessary to the existence and survival of a cause of action for the injury; but to permit the assessment of damages for bodily mutilation or physical or mental suffering there must have been pain or at least consciousness of injury. Hollenbeck v. Berkshire Railroad, 9 Cush. 478. Tully v. Fitchburg Railroad, 134 Mass. 499, 504, 505. Mulchahey v. Washburn Car Wheel Co. 145 Mass. 281. Battany v. Wall, 232 Mass. 138. The burden of proof in these matters is on the plaintiff. Fuller v. Andrew, 230 Mass. 139, 147, 148.
Railway v. Craft, 237 U. S. 648, 655. Great Northern Railway v. Capital Trust Co. 242 U. S. 144.
In the present case, the evidence was that two women, in neighboring houses, heard "a piercing sound" or "a scream," or, as one testified, "two cries," about a second apart. Several minutes later both came out. All was still, no children or other persons were about, and the body of Bruce was in the tree. We think that it could be found that the sound came from Bruce. But we do not think that common knowledge would enable a jury to say (Crowley's Case, 287 Mass. 367, 375, 376) that the sound indicated the continuance of life or conscious suffering, rather than the mechanical expulsion of air by spasmodic muscular contraction caused by the shock. See Kearney v. Boston & Worcester Railroad, 9 Cush. 108, 110; Mears v. Boston & Maine Railroad, 163 Mass. 150. The verdict for the defendant was rightly directed as to the second count.
The result is, that the exceptions are sustained, and a new trial is to be had on the first count only.

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