Source: https://openjurist.org/312/us/450
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 14:32:44+00:00

Document:
Messrs. Ernest W. Gibson, Jr., of Brattleboro, Vt., and C. L. Dawson, of Washington, D.C., for petitioner.
The petition for certiorari presented two questions: First, whether there was sufficient evidence to sustain the verdict; Second, whether the Circuit Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the cause instead of remanding it for a new trial. This second question invoked our jurisdiction in order to obtain an authoritative construction of subdivision (b) of Rule 50 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723c. In part that subdivision provides: 'Whenever a motion for a directed verdict made at the close of all the evidence is denied or for any reason is not granted, the court is deemed to have submitted the action to the jury subject to a later determination of the legal questions raised by the motion. Within 10 days after the reception of a verdict, a party who has moved for a directed verdict may move to have the verdict and any judgment entered thereon set aside and to have judgment entered in accordance with his motion for a directed verdict; * * *.' Since the government made no such motion within 10 days after the verdict, petitioner urged here that the Circuit Court of Appeals was without power to dismiss the cause but should have remanded it for a new trial. But while this important point, upon which the Circuit Courts of Appeals are not in complete agreement,3 is one of the two questions upon which the petition for certiorari rested, there is no occasion for us to reach it here. For we find that there was sufficient evidence to sustain the jury's verdict, and we hold that the District Court properly denied the government's motion for a directed verdict in its favor.
It was not necessary that petitioner be bed-ridden, wholly helpless, or that he should abandon every possible effort to work in order for the jury to find that he was totally and permanently disabled.8 It cannot be doubted that if petitioner had refrained from trying to do any work at all, and the same evidence of physical impairment which appears in this record had been offered, a jury could have properly found him totally and permanently disabled. And the jury could have found that his efforts to work—all of which sooner or later resulted in failure—were made not because of his ability to work but because of his unwillingness to live a life of idleness, even though totally and permanently disabled within the meaning of his policies.9 Nor does the fact that he waited thirteen years before bringing suit stand as an insuperable barrier to his recovery. His case was not barred by any statute of limitations. Whatever weight the jury should have given to the circumstance of petitioner's delay in filing his claim, that weight was still for their consideration in connection with all the other evidence in the case.
There was evidence from which a jury could reach the conclusion that petitioner was totally and permanently disabled. That was enough. The judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals is reversed, and that of the District Court is affirmed. It is so ordered.
Judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and that of the District Court affirmed.
2 Cir., 111 F.2d 615.
Compare Conway v. O'Brien, 2 Cir., 111 F.2d 611, 613, reversed this day, 312 U.S. 492, 61 S.Ct. 634, 85 L.Ed. —-, with Pruitt v. Hardware Dealers Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 5 Cir., 112 F.2d 140, 143. And see United States v. Halliday, 4 Cir., 116 F.2d 812, decided January 9, 1941.
Compare Slocum v. New York Life Insurance Co., 228 U.S. 364, 33 S.Ct. 523, 57 L.Ed. 879, Ann.Cas.1914D, 1029, with Baltimore & Carolina Line v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 55 S.Ct. 890, 79 L.Ed. 1636.
See Gunning v. Cooley, 281 U.S. 90, 94, 50 S.Ct. 231, 233, 74 L.Ed. 720; Richmond & Danville R.R. v. Powers, 149 U.S. 43, 45, 13 S.Ct. 748, 749, 37 L.Ed. 642; Texas & Pacific Ry. v. Cox, 145 U.S. 593, 606, 12 S.Ct. 905, 908, 36 L.Ed. 829; Sioux City & P. Railroad Co. v. Stout, 17 Wall. 657, 663, 21 L.Ed. 745.
Lumbra v. United States, 290 U.S. 551, 559, 560, 54 S.Ct. 272, 275, 276, 78 L.Ed. 492.
See United States v. Rice, 8 Cir., 72 F.2d 676, 677; Nicolay v. United States, 10 Cir., 51 F.2d 170, 173; United States v. Lawson, 9 Cir., 50 F.2d 646, 651; United States v. Godfrey, 1 Cir., 47 F.2d 126, 127; United States v. Phillips, 8 Cir., 44 F.2d 689, 691.

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.