Source: https://caselaw.findlaw.com/ca-court-of-appeal/1195667.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 15:39:58+00:00

Document:
IN RE: MARRIAGE OF Tara Rose and Scott James RICHARDSON.
IN RE: MARRIAGE OF Tara Rose and Scott James RICHARDSON. Tara Rose, Appellant, v. Scott James Richardson, Appellant.
Barbakow & Ribet, Claudia Ribet, Los Angeles, and Wendy A. Herzog for Appellant Tara Rose. Leslie Ellen Shear, Encino, Donald S. Eisenberg, Glendora, and Anne Haerhee Park for Appellant Scott James Richardson.
This is a family law “move away” case. Tara Rose (mother) and Scott James Richardson (father) cross-appeal from custody and visitation orders as to their minor son, Christopher Scott Richardson.1 The trial court issued a move away order after refusing to conduct a de novo review of the relevant facts and circumstances. In the published portion of this opinion, we address the question of whether a custody stipulation entered into by the parties constituted a “final judicial custody determination” within the meaning of Montenegro v. Diaz (2001) 26 Cal.4th 249, 258, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 575, 27 P.3d 289. If the custody stipulation constituted a final judicial custody determination, then the trial court was not obligated to conduct a de novo review of the facts in devising a parenting plan that serves the best interests of Christopher. We conclude that the March 14, 2001, initial custody order pursuant to stipulation entered into by the parties did not constitute a final judicial custody determination within the meaning of Montenegro. Hence, the trial court was obligated to conduct a de novo review of the facts before devising a parenting plan that serves the child's best interest. We find the trial court acted beyond the scope of its allowable discretion in concluding no de novo review of the relevant facts and circumstances concerning the youngster's best interests was required. Accordingly, as discussed in the published portion of this opinion, we reverse the visitation and custody orders and remand for further consideration.
After entry of the dissolution of marriage judgment, an arrangement developed whereby the father had physical custody of the child about 15 percent of the time-two evenings a week and alternate weekend overnights. As discussed below, the father contends he should have had more time with his son. But, the father argues, the mother restricted his contact and denied him reasonable visitation.
The father's order to show cause re modification of custody and visitation was first heard on October 22, 2001. The court ordered the mother could move to Washington; there would be no de novo review of the custody and visitation order; there was no reason to order an evaluation; visitation between father and son would not exceed a three day stretch; but the parties were to return to conciliation to “hammer it out.” The parties were ordered to return to court on October 30, 2001. At the October 30, 2001, hearing, the trial court denied the father's request to present further evidence, including expert evidence. The court stated it would consider the parties' separate visitation proposals and rule on the matter on December 3, 2001. On December 3, 2001, the court ordered the parties to present a joint statement of their positions on visitation by December 11, 2001.
The father contends the trial court erroneously concluded the March 14, 2001 stipulated judgment was a final judicial determination of custody and therefore did not consider, de novo, the best interest of the child. We agree.
In the present case, the trial court found the March 14, 2001, stipulated dissolution judgment included a final judicial custody determination. As a result, the trial court expressly refused to conduct a de novo review of custody and visitation utilizing the best interest of the child standard. In addition, the trial found no changed circumstances and thus denied the father's request for a child custody evaluation. We conclude the trial court erred in finding there was a clear, affirmative indication the parties intended the stipulation and resulting March 14, 2001, judgment to be a final judicial determination of custody. The parents stipulated, as reflected in the dissolution judgment, that they would have joint legal custody of the child; the mother would have “primary physical custody”; and the father would have “reasonable visitation.” However, as noted previously, the judgment further recites: “In the event the parties are unable to resolve their custody and visitation issues, they shall agree upon a therapist or counselor ․ to assist them in resolving their issues․ If after meeting with a therapist or counselor, the parties remain unable to resolve their differences, they shall make an appointment with the Conciliation Court ․ prior to either party filing a request with the Court for a hearing on the issue.” There is no “clear, affirmative indication,” as that term is used in Montenegro, that the parents intended the custody determination to be final. On the contrary, the language of the judgment, to which the parties consented, warrants the opposite conclusion-the parents disagreed and were to attempt to resolve the custody and visitation issues. (Cf. Montenegro v. Diaz, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 259, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 575, 27 P.3d 289; see Hogoboom & King, Cal. Practice Guide: Family Law, supra, ¶ 17:299.1, p. 17-70.) We conclude, therefore, that the March 14, 2001, order was not intended by the parties to be a final judicial determination of custody. Because there was no clear, affirmative indication the parties intended the stipulation and resulting March 14, 2001, judgment to be a final judicial determination of custody, the father was not required to show that a significant change of circumstances justified modifying the custody order. (Montenegro v. Diaz, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 256, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 575, 27 P.3d 289; In re Marriage of Burgess, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 37, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 444, 913 P.2d 473.) Accordingly, we reject the mother's argument that the father failed to meet his burden in that regard. Moreover, the trial court was required, exercising its wide discretion, to make an initial custody and visitation determination after considering all the circumstances bearing on the best interest of the child. (In re Marriage of Burgess, supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 31-32, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 444, 913 P.2d 473.) This the trial court failed to do. As a result, we will reverse the custody and visitation orders, and remand this matter for the trial court to exercise its wide discretion. Because we conclude the trial court acted beyond the scope of its allowable discretion in failing to consider de novo the child's best interest under all the circumstances, we need not address the parties' remaining arguments.
One final note is in order. The mother argues there is language in the March 14, 2001, judgment that reflects an affirmative indication the parties intended the stipulation be a final judicial determination of custody. No doubt, as noted previously, there is language which reflects the intention “to settle all rights and obligations” between the parties. (See pp. 3-4, supra ) However, the paragraphs containing the cited waiver language expressly state either “[e]xcept as otherwise expressly provided for in this Judgment” or “[e]xcept for the claims and demands and rights in this Judgment created against either of the parties hereto ․” The fairest reading of this language is that it excludes from the waiver of rights and duties the only portion of the stipulation that contains no finality-those matters relating to future efforts to resolve the custody issue. As noted previously, the judgment must be read as a whole. (Lazar v. Superior Court, supra, 16 Cal.2d at p. 622, 107 P.2d 249; Yarus v. Yarus (1960) 178 Cal.App.2d 190, 201, 3 Cal.Rptr. 50.) With respect, we reject the mother's contention that the agreement was intended to have the requisite finality in terms of custody and visitation issues.
The custody and visitation orders entered on December 14, 19, and 21, 2001, are reversed. The appeal from the order denying reconsideration is dismissed. The matter is remanded for reconsideration consistent with the views expressed in this opinion. In the interests of justice, the parties are to bear their own costs on appeal.
1. The mother's appeal is from the December 14, 2001, custody and visitation order, and, purportedly, from the February 4, 2002, minute order denying her reconsideration motion. The purported appeal from the reconsideration denial order is discussed in the unpublished portion of this opinion. The father appeals from custody and visitation orders entered on December 14, 19, and 21, 2001.
We concur: GRIGNON and MOSK, JJ.

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