Source: https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=9760&amp;search=
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 11:44:10+00:00

Document:
On November 13, 1974, eighteen named individuals and fifteen named groups, relying on 42 U.S.C. § 1983, brought a civil action in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois against Chicago's mayor and police officials. The plaintiffs claimed that the police defendants engaged in a broad range of activities constituting unlawful intelligence gathering of suspected subversives in violation of the plaintiffs' rights under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, as well as their rights under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (regarding electronic surveillance). In addition to class action status for their case, the plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, compensatory damages, and attorneys' fees and costs. Private counsel and the Cook County Public Defender's Office represented the plaintiffs.
District Judge William J. Lynch, on May 16, 1975, denied the defendants' motion to dismiss, rejecting their justiciability, statute of limitations and insufficient pleadings-based challenges to the complaint. Alliance to End Repression v. Rochford, 407 F. Supp. 115 (N.D. Il. 1975). In an unpublished ruling on July 31, 1975, then-District Judge Joel M. Flaum issued a protective order to limit disclosure to plaintiffs' attorneys of documents produced in discovery. In succeeding months, the defense sought to extend the protective order to certain depositions and interrogatories.
Discovery proceedings proved contentious during the following year. On March 5, 1976, District Judge Alfred Y. Kirkland, Sr., denied a defense request for a protective order to shield the mayor from having to provide an oral deposition. Alliance to End Repression v. Rochford, 75 F.R.D. 428 (N.D. Il. 1976). Separately, Judge Kirkland also ruled upon plaintiffs' motion to compel a response to written interrogatories, finding (among other things) that no "informer's privilege" existed to resist disclosure of the identity of persons who participated in intelligence gathering on lawful activities, as opposed to those who provided information on violations of law. Alliance to End Repression v. Rochford, 75 F.R.D 430 (N.D. Il. 1975). Later that year, Judge Kirkland revised the protective order to protect the defendants' data gathering system from public disclosure, since it had not yet been shown to be illegal. Alliance to End Repression v. Rochford, 75 F.R.D. 431 (N.D. Il. 1976). Soon thereafter, the judge enjoined the defendants from joining or infiltrating the plaintiffs' legal team, a tactic which the plaintiffs' documentary evidence showed had been employed, earlier, by the defense. The court also enjoined the defendants from using data they or their agents obtained as a result of joining plaintiffs' legal team and by gathering information about plaintiffs' case by means other than orderly discovery procedures. Alliance to End Repression v. Rochford, 75 F.R.D. 435 (N.D. Il. 1976). In another ruling that day, to sanction the defendants for failure to answer interrogatories in a meaningful way, Judge Kirkland held that plaintiffs had made a prima facie showing of parts of their complaint, shifting to defendants the burden of showing that they had not engaged in certain activities. Alliance to End Repression v. Rochford, 75 F.R.D. 438 (N.D. Il. 1976).
On October 3, 1975, a second, similar lawsuit, ACLU v. Bell, was filed in the same court by several individual and organizational plaintiffs represented by private counsel and an assistant federal public defender. Over a period beginning in 1977, the FBI, Justice Department, CIA, various officials of these agencies, and the Secretary of Defense were added as defendants. The two cases were consolidated for discovery purposed on July 2, 1976. In mid-1977, discovery battles continued, with Judge Kirkland granting in part the federal defendants' request to stay class discovery pending interlocutory appeal of class certification (he allowed discovery relating to the named plaintiffs), and rejecting defense invocations of the informer's privilege. Alliance to End Repression v. Rochford, 75 F.R.D. 441 (N.D. Il. 1977). Earlier, Judge Kirkland had certified two classes of plaintiffs subjected to the alleged illegal surveillance and intelligence gathering-one of individuals and the other of organizations-with the certification applicable to the declaratory and injunctive relief requests only, excluding the damages aspect of the complaint. The defendants' interlocutory appeals failed, Alliance to End Repression v. Rochford, 558 F.2d 1031 (7th Cir. 1976) (table) and 565 F.2d 975 (7th Cir. 1977) (Circuit Judge Robert A. Sprecher), and the Supreme Court refused to grant certiorari to review the class certification. Rochford v. Alliance to End Repression, 434 U.S. 828 (1977). Continued litigation of discovery issues, including objections based upon informer's and state secrets privilege assertions, resulted in judicial suggestions to explore settlement. American Civil Liberties Union v. Brown, 609 F.2d 277 (7th Cir. 1979) (District Judge James E. Noland, by designation); American Civil Liberties Union v. Brown, 619 F.2d 1170 (7th Cir. 1980) (en banc) (Circuit Judge Walter J. Cummings).
Eventually, with trial slated to occur in 1981, the parties reached accord on two settlement documents, one referred to as the FBI settlement and the other as the CIA settlement. Most plaintiffs approved of the settlements. Two dissenting political organizations and a few individual plaintiffs dismissed their claims, rather than settle. On February 13, 1981, the court conducted a fairness hearing regarding the proposed settlements and, afterward, continued to receive input, objections, and clarifying information about the terminology and scope of the settlements. District Judge Susan Getzendanner accepted and approved the two settlements on August 11, 1981. Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 91 F.R.D. 182 (N.D. Il. 1981). Separately, proposed settlements between most plaintiffs and the City of Chicago and the Defense Department defendants were approved by Judge Getzendanner. Her March 30, 1982, order noted that the settlement with the city provided the plaintiffs with the injunctive relief they requested, barring political spying and harassment and limiting investigative activities based on First Amendment protected conduct except in four specific types of investigations: criminal, dignitary protection, public gatherings, and regulatory investigations, all governed by a commencement standard of reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. The settlement's restrictions on domestic intelligence gathering activities by the Defense Department prohibited unlawful activity by the agency and its agents. Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 561 F. Supp. 537 (N.D. Il. 1982). Appendices to that opinion contain the text of the settlement with the city and related documents. Id.
Despite the settlements, decades of litigation followed. On March 7, 1983, the Department of Justice issued new Guidelines on Domestic Security/Terrorism Investigations. Plaintiffs had Judge Getzendanner enjoin the FBI from implementing in Chicago the portion of the new guidelines that gave less protection from investigations based on First Amendment-protected activity than was provided for under the settlement agreement. Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 561 F.2d 575 (N.D. Il. 1983). On appeal, a panel of the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit deemed the injunction unwarranted, in the absence of any indication of substantial and imminent danger of the FBI violating the decree, and changed the injunction to a declaratory judgment. Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 733 F.2d 1187 (7th Cir. 1984) (District Judge Edward Dumbauld, by designation). The court then voted to hear the case, en banc. After re-argument, the court reversed the district court, saying that the new investigative guidelines were not inconsistent with the consent decree. Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 742 F.2d 1007 (7th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (Circuit Judge Richard A. Posner).
In an October 24, 1985 unpublished order, Judge Getzendanner sanctioned the city defendants for a years-before non-disclosure of certain files to plaintiffs, ruling that several paragraphs of the plaintiffs' complaint concerning dissemination of information would be deemed true without being subject to rebuttal, and allowing one of plaintiffs' attorneys fees incurred in seeking the files and the sanctions.
By the end of 1985, cross-motions for summary judgment had been filed by the remaining parties (two organizational plaintiffs, three individual plaintiffs, and the city defendant). Judge Getzendanner ruled that the actions of the city police as to lawful speech activities of a retired social worker, a civil liberties organization, and a peace organization violated these plaintiffs' First Amendment rights. The court awarded the organizations $20,625 apiece, plus costs, and the individual $10,000, plus costs. Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 627 F. Supp. 1044 (N.D. Il. 1985). Related attorneys' fee litigation occurred over the next few years, as discussed below.
Meanwhile, by 1989, the Chicago Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador ("Chicago CISPES") petitioned the district court for discovery under and enforcement of the settlement. They alleged that from March 1983 through June 1985, they were unlawfully investigated as a part of a national CISPES investigation that stemmed from unreliable and unverified informant information. On June 28, 1989, Magistrate Judge Joan Lefkow directed the FBI to provide discovery. Conceding defects in the CISPES investigation, the FBI had disciplined personnel connected with it, segregated and archived away from the FBI records gathered during the investigation, and conducted nationwide training on how to deal with activities protected by the First Amendment. These remedial actions, the FBI said, mooted CISPES' request for relief. In turn, CISPES cross-moved for summary judgment. On October 3, 1991, in an unpublished ruling, Judge Ann C. Williams granted CISPES' motion, finding the FBI had violated the settlement decree and the controversy was not moot, since the FBI had not shown that its misconduct was incapable of reoccurring. CISPES later prevailed in seeking additional discovery from the FBI concerning its interviews of Arab-Americans during the time period surrounding the Persian Gulf War in early 1991, when (in an April 9, 1992, unpublished decision) Magistrate Judge Lefkow ruled that such discovery would be relevant to whether the FBI's training was adequate as contemplated by the consent decree. In an also-unpublished order dated June 26, 1992, Judge Williams denied the FBI's objection to the discovery ruling. On October 14, 1992, Judge Williams directed expunging of data identifying Chicago CISPES members and associates from government records regarding the CISPES investigation. Later unpublished rulings awarded plaintiffs' counsel attorneys' fees for efforts in monitoring compliance with the court's decree. The award and the finding of intentional noncompliance with the court's decree were reversed by the Seventh Circuit, which ruled that negligent violation of the decree during nationwide efforts in the CISPES investigation did not merit the district court's earlier findings; in turn, the plaintiffs were not prevailing parties entitled to attorneys' fees. Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 119 F.3d 472 (7th Cir. 1997) (Circuit Judge Terence T. Evans).
Separately, three activist groups filed an enforcement petition under the consent decree. They alleged misconduct by city police in connection with the Democratic National Convention in Chicago in 1996. Following a hearing, Magistrate Judge Edward A. Bobrick's unpublished October 27, 1999, report recommended granting summary judgment for the city. The plaintiffs' objected. On review, District Judge Joan B. Gottschall sustained the objections, in part. Using the "clear and convincing" standard of proof to determine whether violations of the decree had been established, the judge found that the plaintiffs' evidence failed to meet this standard in most instances; but some testimony, if believed by a fact-finder, could provide clear and convincing evidence that, because of plaintiffs' First Amendment-protected views and activities, police engaged in conduct violating the decree. As to events shown by this testimony, Judge Gottschall's unpublished May 8, 2000, order denied the city's summary judgment motion. Later, a four day bench trial occurred regarding these events. The judge ruled, in an unpublished order on December 22, 2000, that the plaintiffs' evidence failed to meet the clear and convincing standard of proof. Earlier, the judge's unrelated, unpublished order of September 21, 2000, rejected a petitioner's claim that police had violated the decree by mistakenly retaliating against him, a police officer, for his supposed leaks to the press during an investigation into police corruption.
By then, Judge Williams had denied the city's motion to modify the nearly twenty year old consent decree. Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 66 F. Supp.2d 899 (N.D.Il. 1999). In a different motion, the city submitted a number of hypothetical questions to the court, in hopes of receiving guidance to help avoid violations of the decree. The court ruled in a May 2000, unpublished order that Article III limitations precluded it from providing an advisory opinion. The city appealed Judge Williams' 1999 denial of their modification request. A Seventh Circuit panel, on January 11, 2001, reversed the lower court, directing it to modify the decree as the city had requested. Judge Posner noted that the city had not asked for abrogation of the decree and would still be bound to adhere to its' core protections and enforcement provisions. He observed that changing circumstances since the decree's entry-particularly the increased threat of terrorism-warranted ensuring that the police had the ability to monitor statements, build a file, or plant an undercover agent among a group discussing the desirability of committing acts of violence in pursuit of an ideological agenda. Unless the motives of the police were improper or the methods forbidden by other provisions of federal or state law, other cities' police could perform basic investigative functions inhibited by the decree in Chicago. Because prior misconduct of police should not impair public safety in the present and because the modified decree amply protected First Amendment rights, the appellate court ruled in the city's favor. Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 237 F.3d 799 (7th Cir. 2001). On remand, Judge Gottschall's unpublished March 2, 2001, order granted the city's motion and modified the consent decree.
From 1985 through 2004, many rulings addressed denials and awards of attorneys' fees. Litigation centered on the applicability of the Equal Access to Justice Act ("EAJA"), 28 U.S.C. § 2412, passed after the lawyers reached the 1981-82 settlements but effective after the court approved the settlements. To track the course of these disputes, review (1) Judge Getzendanner's unpublished orders of October 24, 1985, and September 4, 1986; (2) Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 820 F.2d 873 (7th Cir. 1987) (Circuit Judge Frank Easterbrook); (3) Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 899 F.2d 582 (7th Cir. 1990) (per curiam); (4) Judge Williams' unpublished order of August 9, 1990; and (5) Judge Gottschall's unpublished orders of May 26, 2000, September 21, 2000, and November 2, 2000. In 2000, the district court approved payment of attorneys' fees. Over $1 million in fees were awarded to plaintiffs' counsel for services performed during between 1994 and 2001. (We do not have a copy of the district court's ruling(s) granting these payments.) On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed the award. The panel opinion by Judge Posner observed that the legal services provided during the 1994-2001 period involved two failed contempt proceedings; the plaintiffs' failed opposition to the modification of the decree; and efforts to monitor the city's compliance with the decree, which efforts merely led to the failed contempt proceedings and which efforts were entirely uncalled for by the decree (which made monitoring duties a responsibility of a public body rather than of plaintiffs' counsel). Thus, the court could not say the applicant attorneys had represented "prevailing parties" in any of the efforts, nor that they acted pursuant to some obligation imposed by the decree or other law. Even when their services responded to the city's attempt at modification of the decree, the attorneys were not entitled to fee recovery because their opposition to modification "verged on the unreasonable." Judge Posner noted that the absence of a sunset provision or termination date in the decree posed a considerable defect, one not present in more modern decrees. He observed that, after the decree's modification, something of a sunset provision had been provided in that, after the completion of the independent audit in or before 2006, the district judge was to consider whether the decree had outlived its usefulness. Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 356 F.3d 767 (7th Cir. 2004).
On September 30, 2008, the Northern District of Illinois (Judge Gottschall) denied the City's motion to dissolve the modified consent decree. The court found that although the decree was "probably ripe for dissolution," the City had failed to conduct an independent audit that would allow the court to review the City's compliance.
The City appealed to the 7th Circuit, which dismissed the appeal on August 4, 2009. In the meantime, the district court (Judge Gotschall) dissolved the modified consent decrees in related cases (1:74-cv-3268 and 1:75-cv-3295).
On April 13, 2011, Judge Gotschall granted the City's motion to dismiss the case without prejudice. According to the order, petitioners were permitted to seek reinstatement of the petition if the City failed to conduct an audit and allow the court to review the results, as required by the modified consent decree. The court (Judge Gotshchall) gave the petitioners 45 days to file a motion to reinstate the petition, after which time the case would be dismissed without prejudice. There was no further court involvement in this case.

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 § 2412
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