Source: https://www.jaredolen.com/law-school-resources/criminal-procedure/constitutional-criminal-procedure-outline/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 21:16:48+00:00

Document:
Katz v. United States: Is electronically eavesdropping on a conversation occurring within a closed glass phone booth without physically penetrating it an “unreasonable” search protected against by the 4th Amdt.?
HELD: Yes, the Govt.’s activities in electronically listening to and recording D’s words violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied while using the phone booth and thus constituted a “search and seizure” within the meaning of the 4th Amdt.
United States v. White: Does the 4th Amdt. bar testimony of govt. agents who related certain conversations that occurred between D and an informant, which agents overheard by monitoring a radio transmitter carried by the informant and concealed on his person?
Smith v. Maryland: Was the installation of a pen register on D’s phone line, which recorded only the numbers dialed on the phone and not the contents of the conversations, without a warrant a “search” against which D was protected by the 4th Amdt.?
California v. Ciraolo: Did police violate D’s 4th Amdt. protection against warrantless searches when they flew over D’s house at 1000 feet and observed marijuana plants growing in his yard only because police could not see them from the ground due to D’s 2 fences erected there?
HELD: NO, the 4th Amdt. does not require that police traveling in the public airways at 1000 feet need obtain a warrant in order to observe what is visible to the naked eye.
Bond v. United States: Is it a 4th Amdt. unreasonable search when a border patrol agent squeezes hard a passenger’s soft-sided carry-on bag that is located in the overhead bin above the passenger’s seat and feels a brick-like object inside the bag?
Test: What is the general level of tactile manipulation a person can expect from putting his bag in a public space (e.g., overhead bin)?
Kyllo v. United States: Is the use of a thermal imager to detect the heat output of a house in order to determine if high-intensity lights are being used to grow marijuana an unconstitutional search if such details are not available otherwise without physical intrusion into the home?
HELD: Yes, the surveillance is a “search” and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant when the govt. uses a device that is not in general public use to explore details of the home that would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion.
Email = Reasonable Expectation of Privacy?
United States v. Warshak: Does an individual have a reasonable expectation of privacy for the contents of his emails such that the Govt. must obtain a warrant to search and seize them?
Draper v. United States: Officers had PC to arrest Draper when they received a tip from a known informant that Draper would be bringing heroin back from his trip, and all of the informant’s information matched Draper’s description.
Spinelli v. United States: Was there PC for a warrant when the affidavit contained an informant’s tip that did not provide information to support its reliability nor did it provide the underlying circumstances which led to the conclusion in the tip?
HELD: No, the tip was not a sufficient basis for a finding of PC.
Illinois v. Gates: Is an anonymous tip via a letter that does not include info about where the tipster acquired the info nor about his credibility still a sufficient basis for determining that there is PC to search D’s house?
Whren v. United States: Is the temporary detention of a motorist who police have PC to believe has committed a civil traffic violation inconsistent with the 4th Amdt.’s protection against unreasonable seizures unless a reasonable officer would have been motivated to stop the car by a desire to enforce the traffic laws?
HELD: No, PC justifies a search or seizure.
Johnson v. United States: Did a police officer violate D’s 4th Amdt. rights by searching her hotel room without a warrant after the officer smelled a strong odor of burning opium and then knocked at the door and D let him in?
United States v. Watson: Did an officer violate D’s 4th Amdt. rights when he made an arrest without a warrant in a public place after believing that D was in possession of stolen credit cards?
HELD: No, officers have the right to arrest in public without a warrant so long as they have PC.
Atwater v. City of Lago Vista: Does the 4th Amdt. prohibit a warrantless arrest for a minor criminal offense such as a misdemeanor seatbelt violation punishable only by a fine?
HELD: No, if an officer has PC to believe that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, without violating the 4th Amdt., arrest the offender.
Virginia v. Moore: Did a police officer violate the 4th Amdt. when he arrested D based on PC to believe that D had broken the law, but state law prohibited arrest for this particular misdemeanor?
HELD: No, warrantless arrest for any crimes committed in the presence of an arresting officer are reasonable under the 4th Amdt., and state law requirements in addition do not alter the 4th Amdt.’s requirements.
States can impose greater protections, but that does not affect the 4th Amdt.
United States v. Grubbs: Is an anticipatory search warrant invalid because the property owner was not given the affidavit that contained the condition precedent to the warrant taking effect along with the copy of the warrant?
HELD: No, property owners needn’t receive the warrant at all.
Wilson v. Arkansas: Does an officer have to knock and announce his presence before kicking in a door to a house for which he has a valid search or arrest warrant?
HELD: Maybe – K&A is a factor in the reasonableness requirement.
In some circumstances an officer’s unannounced entry into a home might be unreasonable under the 4th Amdt.
Chimel v. California: Did a search of D’s entire house including closed desk drawers following his valid arrest amount to an unreasonable search under the 4th Amdt.?
HELD: Yes, the search was unreasonable because it far exceeded D’s person and immediate area.
United States v. Robinson: Was a search of a crumpled up cigarette pack in D’s pocket following D’s lawful arrest justifiable as a search incident to arrest?
HELD: Yes, in the case of lawful custodial arrest, a full search of the person is not only an exception to the warrant requirement, but it is also a reasonable search under it.
New York v. Belton: May a police officer search the passenger compartment of a vehicle and containers inside it without a warrant as incident to a valid arrest of its occupants?
HELD: Yes, when a police officer has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of a vehicle, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that vehicle.
Arizona v. Gant: May a police officer properly search the passenger compartment of a vehicle and its contents as a warrantless search incident to arrest if the arrestees are secured and cannot possibly reach any of the contents of the vehicle?
HELD: No, the police are authorized to search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s arrest only when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search.
Payton v. New York: May a police officer enter a private residence without a warrant and with force if necessary in order to make a routine felony arrest, even if allowed by state law?
Exigent Circumstances – Have a good answer to: Why didn’t you get a warrant?
Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden: Is a comprehensive search of a residence without a warrant a violation of the 4th Amdt. if an armed robbery had just occurred and police received a tip that the alleged robber had just entered the house in question?
HELD: No, the exigencies of the situation made the warrantless search for the robber and weapons imperative.
Vale v. Louisiana: May police officers search a house as incident to arrest if D was arrested outside the house on the front steps for allegedly selling narcotics?
Steagald v. United States: Police have a valid arrest warrant for D, but he’s not in his own home. Arrest warrant will allow officers to forcibly enter D’s own home but NOT someone else’s home.
Chambers v. Maroney: Is a warrantless seizure of a vehicle unreasonable under the 4th Amdt. if officers had PC to believe that the fruits & instrumentalities of crime would be found inside?
HELD: No, there is no constitutional difference between a warrantless search of the vehicle and a warrantless seizure (both are valid under the 4th Amdt. with PC).
Rare Exception: Police see a person put a paper bag in the trunk that they have PC to believe contains drugs, but they know the rest of the car is clean.
State v. Wallace: Positive dog sniff alerting to a car gives PC to search the car but does NOT give PC to search the passengers in the vehicle. The officer can have the dog sniff the passengers, however, and that won’t be a search.
California v. Carney: Is a warrantless search of a fully-mobile motor home reasonable under the vehicle exception to the 4th Amdt. warrant requirement if the officers have PC to believe that the F&I of crime will be found inside?
California v. Acevedo: Does the 4th Amdt. require the police to obtain a warrant to open a paper bag in a moveable vehicle simply because they lack PC to search the entire car?
HELD: No, the police may search an automobile and the containers within it where they have PC to believe contraband or evidence is contained.
Problem: Police had PC to believe that a car contained heroin so they seized it. However, the search became unreasonable because they searched the car 10 times without a warrant.
United States v. Chadwick: Is a warrantless search of a footlocker that the police have PC to believe contains the F&I of crime valid under the 4th Amdt. if it has been seized by police and under their exclusive control?
HELD: No, the footlocker is protected by the 4th Amdt. Warrant Clause, so it may only be searched with a warrant or under exigent circumstances.
Hawkins v. State: (Not SCOTUS) Is a cell phone similar enough to a “container” such that an officer may reasonably search it without a warrant as a contemporaneous incident to a lawful arrest?
South Dakota v. Opperman: Was a standard inventory search of the contents of a car that was impounded for multiple parking violations unreasonable under the 4th Amdt. if officers found marijuana in the glove box?
HELD: No, in following standard police procedures, prevailing throughout the country and approved by the overwhelming majority of courts, the conduct of the police was not “unreasonable” under the 4th Amdt.
Question: Was the inventory search done pursuant to the justification in Opperman, i.e., caretaking?
Illinois v. Lafayette: Was it unreasonable under the 4th Amdt. for an officer to search the contents of D’s shoulder bag upon arresting him and before incarcerating him if the officer found contraband inside?
HELD: No, it is not unreasonable for police, as part of the routine procedure incident to incarcerating an arrestee, to search any container or article in his possession in accordance with established inventory procedures.
Colorado v. Bertine: Was it unreasonable under the 4th Amdt. for an officer to open a backpack and the containers inside that was inside a van the officer was lawfully impounding pursuant to an arrest?
HELD: No, reasonable police regulations relating to inventory procedures administered in good faith satisfy the 4th Amdt. even though in hindsight courts might be able to devise equally reasonable rules.
Florida v. Wells: An inventory search of a locked suitcase found in the trunk of an impounded vehicle did violate the 4th Amdt. because highway patrol had no policy with respect to the opening of closed containers encountered during an inventory search.
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte: Must an individual be advised of his right to refuse consent to a search requested by police in order to be reasonable under the 4th Amdt.?
HELD: No, the prosecution must only show that the consent was in fact voluntarily given and not the result of duress or coercion, express or implied.
Holding: When a subject of a search is not in custody and the State attempts to justify a search on the basis of his consent, the 4th Amdt. requires that the consent was in fact voluntarily given and not the result of duress or coercion, express or implied.
Voluntariness is a question of fact to be determined from all the circumstances, and while the subject’s knowledge of the right to refuse is a factor, the prosecution needn’t demonstrate knowledge of this right.
What would a reasonable person have understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect?
United States v. Matlock: Was the government’s showing of 3rd party consent to search the premises constitutionally sufficient to render the evidence found therein admissible at trial?
Georgia v. Randolph: May police conduct a search consented to by a 3rd party if another cotenant is present and objects to the search?
HELD: No, a warrantless search of a shared dwelling for evidence over the express refusal of consent by a physically present resident cannot be justified as reasonable as to him on the basis of consent given to the police by another resident.
Illinois v. Rodriguez: Does an officer’s mistaken but objectively reasonable belief that a person has “common authority” to consent to a search of a residence render the search unreasonable if the person in fact does not live there but had a key?
Horton v. California: Is the warrantless seizure of evidence of crime in plain view prohibited by the 4th Amdt. if the discovery was not inadvertent?
HELD: No, even though inadvertence is characteristic of most legitimate “plain view” seizures, it is not a necessary condition.
Arizona v. Hicks: May police conduct a “search” greater than a cursory examination of an item found in plain view during a lawful search of the premises in order to find out more information about the item?
HELD: No, not unless police have probable cause to search the item.
United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing: May the govt. lawfully seize electronic information that is comingled with information for which it does not have a warrant to seize if the govt. did not follow the warrant’s requirements in segregating the data?
Terry v. Ohio: Is it always unreasonable for a police officer to seize a person and subject him to a limited search for weapons unless there is PC for an arrest?
HELD: No, where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him to reasonably conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity is afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons to discover weapons.
HELD: Yes, the detention of D was indistinguishable from a traditional arrest.
United States v. Mendenhall: Was an airline passenger “seized” under the 4th Amdt. when 2 DEA agents confronted her upon deplaning and asked her for her ticket and ID and then asked if she would accompany them to an office for further questioning?
Florida v. Bostick: Is a categorical per se rule that an impermissible “seizure” results when the police mount a drug sweep on a bus during a scheduled stop and question boarded passengers without articulable suspicion for doing so and thereby obtain consent to search the passengers’ bags consistent with the 4th Amdt.?
California v. Hodari D.: Was a fleeing suspect “seized” when a police officer was right behind him chasing him but had not yet had physical contact with the suspect?
HELD: No, an arrest requires either physical force or submission to the assertion of authority.
United States v. Pratt: (8th Cir.) When probable cause to arrest exists, the standard for determining whether an arrest has occurred is the same as that for determining whether a seizure has occurred.
Illinois v. Wardlow: May a police officer perform a Terry stop when he sees an individual flee from the scene when the police drive by a high-crime area?
Alabama v. White: Did an officer have reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify a Terry stop when the police received an anonymous tip that D would be carrying cocaine and not all of the information in the tip checked out?
Florida v. J.L.: Did officers have reasonable suspicion to believe that D would be carrying a gun when they received an anonymous tip that a young, black male in a plaid shirt at a certain bus stop was carrying a gun?
HELD: No, an anonymous tip lacking indicia of reliability of the kind contemplated in White does not justify a stop and frisk whenever and however it alleges the illegal possession of a firearm.
Hayes v. Florida: May the police take a suspect to the police station for the purpose of fingerprinting the individual if they do not have PC to make an arrest but they do have reasonable suspicion?
United States v. Sharpe: Was it unreasonable for officers to detain a truck for 20 minutes that they suspected was carrying marijuana while the officers tried to pull over another vehicle?
Hiibel v. 6th Judicial District Court of Nevada: A state law requiring a suspect to disclose his name in the course of a valid Terry stop is consistent with the 4th Amdt.
United States v. Place: Is a 90-minute detention of a traveler’s luggage in order to subject the bag to a dog sniff an unreasonable seizure under the 4th Amdt. if it was part of a Terry stop?
Michigan v. Long: May a police officer search the passenger compartment of a vehicle for weapons if he reasonably believes that the driver is potentially dangerous?
HELD: Yes, the balancing required by Terry clearly weighs in favor of allowing the police to conduct an area search of the passenger compartment to uncover weapons as long as they possess reasonable suspicion.
Minnesota v. Dickerson: Does the 4th Amdt. permit the seizure of contraband detected through a police officer’s sense of touch during a protective patdown if the incriminating character of the contraband is not immediately apparent?
Maryland v. Buie: Is a protective sweep of a house to ensure that there are no persons hidden that could harm officers while effecting an arrest reasonable under the 4th Amdt.?
New Jersey v. T.L.O.: Was it unreasonable for a school’s vice principal to search the contents of a student’s purse twice because he reasonably believed that she was smoking in the lavatory against school rules?
Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz: Is a highway sobriety checkpoint consistent with the 4th Amdt.’s prohibition on unreasonable seizures?
Stopping motorists at checkpoints is a seizure that invokes the 4th Amdt.
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte: Highway checkpoints for illegal aliens reasonably near the border are reasonable under the 4th Amdt.
City of Indianapolis v. Edmond: Is a drug-detection checkpoint on a road violative of the 4th Amdt.?
Illinois v. Lidster: Is a highway checkpoint for information gathering about a crime that had occurred a week earlier unreasonable under the 4th Amdt.?
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Association: Is it an unreasonable search of a railroad employee to automatically require him to undergo blood, urine, or breath tests immediately following certain incidents on a railroad in order to determine if he has consumed intoxicants despite lacking individualized suspicion?
Testing is a “search,” and compelled intrusions into the body do invoke the 4th Amdt.
Chandler v. Miller: Is a state statute that requires all candidates for certain public offices to submit a certification of drug testing an unreasonable search without individualized suspicion?
United States v. Flores-Montano: Is disassembly of a vehicle’s gas tank in order to search it for secreted contraband unreasonable if the border patrol agents didn’t have reasonable suspicion that it contained contraband?
United States v. Seljan: Random, suspicionless searches at the border by opening packages mailed from the US to foreign countries. Border context can be used as an excuse for general rummaging.
Tennessee v. Garner: Is it reasonable for an officer to use deadly force to stop a fleeing felon under all circumstances?
Schmerber v. California: Was it unreasonable for the police to force a blood sample to be taken at a hospital in order to determine D’s blood alcohol content following being arrested for DUI?
Blood test is a search and seizure protected by the 4th Amdt.
Winston v. Lee: It is an unreasonable search for a state to require D to undergo an operation to remove a bullet from his chest to be used against him if the state has substantial evidence to use against him at trial already?
Involuntariness due to police misconduct?
If counsel, did police stop questioning until lawyer was present?
If no, then did D re-initiate?
(Or, was D released from custody and allowed to consult attorney, and did the police wait 2 weeks (Shatzer v. Maryland (2010))?).
Ashcraft v. Tennessee: Is a confession obtained through constant questioning for over 36 hours without letting D sleep or leave the room valid against D?
Spano v. New York: Was a confession voluntarily obtained if D repeatedly asked to speak with his attorney but wasn’t allowed and D refused to speak until his friend/new cop convinced him to talk?
Arizona v. Fulminante: After D was having a "rough time" in prison, a prison informant offered D protection from the other inmates if he told him about the murder of D's stepdaughter.
Colorado v. Connelly: Was a confession voluntarily given if D blurted it out to police officers who did not coerce him at all but it later turns out that D was suffering from psychosis?
HELD: Yes, coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to finding a confession not “voluntary” within the meaning of the DPC.
Miranda v. Arizona: Must a suspect be informed of his constitutional rights against self-incrimination and assistance of counsel and give a voluntary and intelligent waiver of those rights as a necessary precondition to police questioning and the giving of a confession?
New York v. Quarles: Was an officer justified in questioning a D immediately upon detention about the whereabouts of a gun that the officer believed was missing without advising D of his Miranda rights in the name of public safety?
HELD: Yes, the needs for answers in a situation posing a threat to the public safety outweighs the need for the prophylactic rule protecting the 5th Amdt.’s privilege against self-incrimination.
Black-Letter Law: No Miranda warnings are necessary as a condition of admissibility for voluntary statements made during custodial interrogation in circumstances where a reasonable police officer might believe the question necessary to protect the safety of the public (including the suspect and the officer).
Dickerson v. United States: Was Miranda a constitutional decision such that a statute enacted by Congress essentially overruling it is invalid?
Berkemer v. McCarty: Was a D taken into “custody” and thus his statements barred from evidence per Miranda if he was detained at a traffic stop and subjected to standard questioning and a balancing test?
Black-Letter Law: There is no Miranda requirement for questions asked during traffic stops or Terry stops because, while they are “seizures” for 4th Amdt. purposes, they are not “custodial” for 5th Amdt. purposes.
Rhode Island v. Innis: Was an individual “interrogated” under Miranda if the 2 officers in the police car said that it would be unfortunate for a little handicapped girl to die by finding a sawed-off shotgun hidden by the individual?
Black-Letter Law: “Interrogation,” for purposes of the “custodial interrogation” test, means any act, verbal or non-verbal by the police that they should know is reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. It’s not a subjective test on either side.
Illinois v. Perkins: Does an undercover law enforcement officer have to give Miranda warnings to an incarcerated suspect before asking him questions that may elicit an incriminating response?
North Carolina v. Butler: Must officers obtain an express waiver from a D of his Miranda rights as a necessary condition to the admissibility of a subsequent statement?
Colorado v. Spring: Must a suspect be informed of all of the possible subjects of the interrogation as a necessary precondition to his waiver of his Miranda rights being voluntary and knowing?
HELD: No, a suspect’s awareness of all the possible subjects of questioning in advance of interrogation is not relevant to determining whether the suspect voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his 5th Amdt. privilege.
Michigan v. Mosley: Do police have to cease questioning forever after a suspect invokes his right to remain silent on certain subjects during questioning?
Miranda: If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease.
Berghuis v. Thompkins: Are police required to obtain an express waiver of the right to remain silent as a necessary precondition to the admissibility of uncoerced statements if the suspect was given his Miranda rights and understands them?
HELD: No, a suspect who has received and understands his Miranda rights and has not invoked these rights waives the right to remain silent by making an uncoerced statement to the police.
Davis v. United States: Must the police cease questioning of a suspect if he makes an objectively ambiguous mention of consulting with counsel?
Edwards v. Arizona: May the prosecution use a statement D made after he invoked his right to assistance of counsel if the police didn’t provide him with counsel and started a second round of questioning?
Minnick v. Mississippi: Is it necessary for police to refrain from questioning a D if he has invoked his right to counsel and did in fact consult with counsel but counsel was not present in the interrogation room?
Florida v. Powell: Do Miranda rights that tell a suspect that he has the right to assistance of counsel before questioning but also tell him that he can invoke his rights at any time satisfy Miranda?
Betts v. Brady: Does the 14th Amdt. DPC require that states appoint counsel to represent indigent Ds in all criminal cases?
Gideon v. Wainwright: Should Betts v. Brady be overruled as being inconsistent with the fundamental right of fairness at trial?
(2) D was prejudiced in that there was a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s deficient performance, the result of the proceeding would have been different.
Scott v. Illinois: Is the Argersinger “actual imprisonment” rule that no person may be incarcerated for any offense unless he was represented by counsel still valid?
When waiving right, judge has to tell D what sentences are possible, etc.
Massiah v. United States: May law enforcement agents use incriminating statements obtained surreptitiously from a D in the absence of D’s counsel who has already been indicted in evidence against D?
(2) Waived in Miranda setting (Montejo)?
Brewer v. Williams: Was it a violation of D’s right to assistance of counsel when officers made statements in a car with him reasonably likely to elicit incriminating responses from D in the absence of D’s attorney?
United States v. Henry: Was it a violation of D’s 6th Amdt. right to counsel when the govt. paid a fellow inmate to listen to D and report to the govt. if D made any incriminating statements while imprisoned after he was indicted and D’s attorney was not present?
Kuhlmann v. Wilson: Did police “deliberately elicit” incriminating statements from D in violation of D’s 6th Amdt. right to counsel when police placed an informant in D’s cell who merely listened to D?
What type of lineup was it?
United States v. Wade: Does a post-indictment lineup conducted for identification purposes out of the presence of D’s counsel violate the 6th Amdt. right to assistance of counsel?
Voice, likeness, etc. are not protected by the 5th Amdt.
Kirby v. Illinois: Was it a violation of D’s 6th Amdt. right to counsel when the police set up a witness identification of D in the police station following D’s arrest but before D was arraigned?
United States v. Ash: Was it a violation of D’s 6th Amdt. right to counsel when police used a photographic lineup outside the presence of D’s counsel to see if the witnesses could identify D?
Due Process Violation in Lineup?
Stovall v. Denno: Did police violate D’s due process rights by displaying him singly in a hospital room a day after the victim had major surgery and the victim made a positive ID?
Foster v. California: D was shown to V in each of 2 lineups. In the 1st lineup, D was 5-6 inches taller than all the other men and was wearing a leather jacket that was how the perp was dressed. In the 2nd lineup, D was the only person who was the same as before.
Manson v. Brathwaite: Did police violate D’s due process rights when the undercover officer who viewed D in dim light was given a single photo to view and ID’ed D as the alleged perp based on a vague and general description of D?
Weeks v. United States: Should the trial judge have excluded evidence obtained from a search of D’s home conducted in violation of the 4th Amdt.?
Mapp v. Ohio: May evidence obtained from an unconstitutional search and seizure be admitted against a criminal D in state court?
Rakas v. Illinois: May passengers in an automobile that was the subject of an unconstitutional search assert the exclusionary rule to exclude the evidence obtained from that search against them?
Minnesota v. Carter: Does a temporary houseguest who is not staying overnight have a legitimate expectation of privacy such that he can object to an allegedly unreasonable search of the house?
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States: May the Govt. use the knowledge it gained from reading illegally seized documents as evidence against Ds at trial?
Murray v. United States: Must evidence obtained through a legal search be suppressed if an illegal search was conducted prior to the legal one but the knowledge gained from the illegal search was not used to obtain the warrant?
Facts X and Y are obtained from an illegal search, but fact Z is from an independent source. Fact Z is admissible.
Nix v. Williams: Should the Inevitable Discovery Doctrine apply to allow admission of evidence that would have been discovered if search teams continued as they would have if D had not led the police to the victim’s body?
Wong Sun v. United States: Did release from custody and a 2-week period sufficiently attenuate the taint of the unlawful police conduct in order for the later, voluntary statements to be admissible?
Brown v. Illinois: Did Miranda warnings sufficiently attenuate the taint of an illegal arrest in order for statements resulting from it to be admissible into evidence?
Hudson v. Michigan: Does a violation of the Wilson knock-and-announce rule when police were conducting a legal, warranted search of D’s home subject the evidence found pursuant to the search to the Exclusionary Rule?
HELD: No, an impermissible manner of entry does not necessarily trigger the Exclusionary Rule.
Oregon v. Elstad: Does an initial failure to administer Miranda warnings before questioning a suspect “taint” a subsequent voluntary, warned confession that was given after Miranda warnings were given and waived?
HELD: No, a suspect who has once responded to unwarned yet uncoercive questioning is not thereby disabled from waiving his rights and confessing after he has been given the requisite Miranda warnings.
No excludable “fruits”: It is an unwarranted extension of Miranda to hold that a simple failure to administer the warnings, unaccompanied by any actual coercion or other circumstances calculated to undermine the suspect’s ability to exercise his free will so taints the investigatory process that a subsequent voluntary and informed waiver is ineffective for some indeterminate period.
Missouri v. Seibert: Did midstream Miranda warnings serve to sufficiently dissipate the taint of previous, unwarned police questioning if the 2 sessions of questioning were essentially continuous and referred to each other?
Factors: Could the warnings effectively advise the suspect that he had a real choice about giving an admissible statement at that juncture?
United States v. Patane: Does the failure to give a suspect Miranda warnings require suppression of the physical fruits of the suspect’s unwarned but voluntary statements?
United States v. Leon: Should the 4th Amdt. Exclusionary Rule be modified so as not to bar the admission of evidence seized in reasonable, good-faith reliance on a search warrant that is subsequently held to be defective because there was no PC?
Massachusetts v. Sheppard: Did officers reasonably rely on a search warrant issued by a judge that was defective because it included an authorization to search for materials for which the officers had no PC and it didn’t incorporate the supporting affidavit?
Herring v. United States: Should the exclusionary rule apply to evidence found during a search incident to arrest if the arrest is subsequently invalidated due to a revoked warrant on which the officers reasonably relied in arresting D?
Harris v. New York: Can the prosecution use a statement obtained in violation of Miranda to impeach the D's testimony at trial?
United States v. Havens: Can the physical evidence, otherwise inadmissible because of a 4th Amdt. violation, be used to impeach a D at trial during cross-examination?
James v. Illinois: Should the impeachment exception to the Exclusionary Rule be expanded such that this evidence can be used to impeach all defense witnesses and not just Ds?

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