Source: http://bc-injury-law.com/blog/2016/11
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 15:55:39+00:00

Document:
Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, assessing damages for persistent back and neck injuries.
 I have concluded that as a result of the accident, Ms. Lally has suffered pain and a loss of enjoyment of life, and that will continue to some extent, into the foreseeable future.
 As a result of the injuries she sustained in the accident, Ms. Lally suffered from severe pain in her neck, back and shoulder for several months. The neck pain triggered headaches that, at times, were severe. Although the pain gradually improved, she has been left with less severe but persistent neck and shoulder pain as well as occasional low back pain. While she is likely to experience improvement in her symptoms with active rehabilitation, particularly with respect to the low back and shoulder, even with sustained, active rehabilitation, she will likely continue to suffer from occasional pain in her neck and, to a lesser extent, her low back and shoulder.
 Ms. Lally’s pain is exacerbated by repetitive activities, heavy lifting or working at a level higher than her shoulders. She cannot sit still for long. When driving she has difficulty moving her head from side to side. When she watches television, reads or uses a computer she has to move her neck or it becomes stiff. Household chores and physical duties at work exacerbate the pain and when the neck pain is particularly bad it develops into a headache. This happens between two and five times a week and the headache lasts up to eight or nine hours. The neck pain disturbs her sleep.
 The pain has affected Ms. Lally’s mood. Before the accident, her mood was good and she enjoyed spending time with her family. For the first few months after the accident she was quiet and spent most of her time resting because of the pain. She continues to spend much of her non-working time resting at home using a massager and heat pad.
 Having considered all the authorities and the factors discussed in Stapley, I assess Ms. Lally’s non-pecuniary damages at $75,000, prior to any adjustment for her failure to mitigate. For the reasons already expressed, I reduce that amount by 10% to reflect her failure to have participated in a regular, sustained program of active rehabilitation.
Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, assessing damages for a shoulder injury caused by a vehicle collision.
 I find that the accident did trigger the onset of his symptoms associated with the tendinopathy. There is no basis on which I could conclude that it would have become symptomatic without the accident. As a result, I conclude that the accident caused the injury and that there is no basis to reduce the award on the basis of the prior shoulder injury.
…The accident resulted in the onset of pain in the patient’s left shoulder, which was subsequently found to be due to tendinopathy of the supraspinatus muscle. Mr. Rogers was treated initially with anti-inflammatories and physiotherapy but eventually underwent a surgical procedure to decompress the tendon. At the present time, Mr. Rogers has improved considerably but still finds he is unable to do some activities that are more physically demanding.
 In summary, I find that the plaintiff suffered an injury to his left shoulder which has caused pain and has impacted his ability to carry on some of his recreational and daily activities. He will continue to suffer some pain and restriction in his activities. However, the impact of the shoulder injury is much less than the plaintiff contends. He sought little in the way of medical attention for the condition until the end of 2012. I conclude he was more concerned with his other medical difficulties; both the pre-existing chronic pain and the ruptured tendon and pulmonary embolism. His activities were impacted initially and will continue to be impacted by the shoulder injury but not to the extent he alleges.
 I agree that the plaintiff’s pre-accident status is relevant. He was suffering from chronic pain which restricted his activities. His evidence regarding the level of his activities prior to the accident was misleading. He made no mention of his other painful conditions. When I take those into account, along with the other unrelated medical conditions that have impacted his enjoyment of life since the accident, I conclude that a fair award for non-pecuniary damages is $50,000.
Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, scrutinizing ICBC’s “checkered record” of paying for a plaintiff’s medical treatments.
In today’s case (Olson v. Farran) the Plaintiff was injured in a collision and was awarded just over $92,000 in damages including special damages and funds for future care costs. The Defendant, who was insured with ICBC, requested certain damages to be deducted because of the overlapping coverage for some expenses under the Plaintiff’s own ICBC policy.
Mr. Justice Pearlman denied aspects of the request raising concern about ICBC’s “past partial and disrupted” payments. In doing so the Court provided the following reasons.
 The onus of showing that a deduction should be made is on the defendant. I must estimate the amount to which Ms. Olson is entitled, exercising caution and taking into account any uncertainty concerning whether the benefits will be paid. Any such uncertainty must be resolved in favour of the plaintiff.
 Based on the Dr. Garbuz’s opinion, and the defendant’s position at trial that Ms. Olson would benefit from a three to six-month exercise program under the supervision of a physiotherapist, I am satisfied that a portion of the physiotherapy will be paid. I estimate that amount to be $500 and order that the amount to be deducted with respect to the physiotherapy is $500.
 In light of the Corporation’s past partial and disrupted payment for kinesiology, there is no certainty that the Corporation will pay for any further kinesiology treatments. I therefore decline to deduct any portion of the $800 sought by the defendant for kinesiology sessions.
 Similarly, there is no certainty that the insurer will pay for future massage therapy treatments, particularly where such treatments may only provide temporary relief to Ms. Olson, rather than a lasting improvement in her condition. Again, I decline to deduct any portion of the $920 sought by the defendant for massage therapy.
 The defendant also seeks a deduction of $870 for psychological services. Psychological therapy is a benefit payable in the Corporation’s sole discretion under s. 88(2)(f) of the Regulation.
 The defendant submits the Court should conclude from ICBC’s past funding for physiotherapy and active rehabilitation that there is no uncertainty about whether the Corporation will fund psychological therapy for the plaintiff.
 I disagree. The Corporation’s checkered record of funding the plaintiff’s treatment before trial raises significant uncertainty about whether this benefit will be paid. Further, Mr. Phan, the Corporation’s representative, offers no assurance in his affidavit that ICBC will pay for psychological therapy for Ms. Olson. Nor is there any opinion from the Corporation’s medical advisor, as required under s. 88(2), that the psychological services are likely to promote the rehabilitation of the insured. The uncertainty concerning whether this benefit will be paid must be resolved in favour of the plaintiff. I am not satisfied the Corporation will pay any portion of this benefit. Accordingly, there will be no deduction for psychological therapy.
 The deductions from the award of costs of future care for Part 7 benefits total $4000.
Today the Chief Justice of the BC Supreme Court published reasons for judgement finding that the ‘indivisible injury’ assessment that developed under tort law is equally applicable when damages are being assessed for a Charter breach.
 The plaintiff alleged that but for the separate actions or inactions of the City employees and provincial Crown counsel, he would not have been convicted and incarcerated for almost 27 years, and that but for the action or inaction of Canada he would have been released far sooner than he was.
 In tort law, where there are multiple causes of injuries, the Court must determine whether the injuries are divisible or indivisible when assessing whether double recovery principles will apply: Athey v. Leonati,  3 S.C.R. 458 and E.D.G. v. Hammer, 2003 SCC 52. I see no reason why such an approach is not equally applicable to an award of Charter damages.
 While the allegations against the Settling Defendants and non-settling defendants were based upon different allegations of fault, the relief sought was essentially the same: compensation for a wrongful conviction and some 27 years of incarceration. I find that the results alleged to have occurred from the causes of action pleaded against the City and the Province were indivisible.
 While the ambit of the compensation sought from the City defendants and the Province was broader than that sought from Canada, the compensation sought from Canada was in large measure subsumed in the award the plaintiff recovered against the Province. Thus, these claims are also indivisible.
 I am mindful of the fact that the plaintiff was obliged to proceed to trial by all of the original defendants and obliged by the Province to proceed to judgment before recovering any damages from it. The Alberta Court of Appeal in Bedard rejected that factor as a basis for not deducting settlement proceeds from damages awarded at trial. At para. 13, the Court confirmed the prevailing principle that the plaintiff cannot receive more in damages than the court awarded at trial.
 The effect of Bedard is that the risk of a Pierringer agreement falls on the plaintiff. If it settles and “under-recovers” from the settling defendant, it will not be able to make up that shortfall from the non-settling defendants. On the other hand, if it “over-recovers” from the settling defendant (as in Bedard) it will not be allowed to keep the windfall.
 I conclude that Hogarth correctly summarizes the effect of the decisions in Dos Santos and Bedard. In the result, I find that at least some of the settlement funds paid by the Settling Defendants to the plaintiff must be deducted from the damages that I have found the plaintiff is owed by the Province.
Interesting reasons were released today by the BC Court of Appeal limiting the scope of a contractual subrogated claim to exclude part 7 benefits a plaintiff recovered in an ICBC claim settlement.
 The Trustees have a broad discretion to establish and change the terms upon which benefits are paid but are entrusted to pay the benefits described in the Plan.
 Section 9 of the Plan describes the Disabled Employee’s obligation to reimburse the Plan. It is applicable where a Disabled Employee “recovers compensation from a Third Party [a person whose acts have caused or are alleged to have caused the Disability] or receives a Settlement [the conclusion of a Disabled Employee’s claim for monetary compensation against a Third Party]”. A Settlement is deemed to include payment of compensation by ICBC for damages arising out of the use or operation of a motor vehicle by an uninsured or underinsured motorist.
 Gross Compensation is defined by the Plan to be the total of sums paid or payable upon Settlement or contingent upon Settlement.
 The Reimbursement Agreement binds the appellant to make the repayment called for in the Plan, hence, repayment of a portion of any lump sum cash payment made upon or contingent upon resolution of a claim for compensation made against a Third Party.
 In my view, Part 7 benefits should not be included in Gross Compensation or calculation of the reimbursement obligation. Such benefits are not paid by or on behalf of a person whose acts or omissions have caused or are alleged to have caused the disability. They are not paid pursuant to Part 6 of the Regulation, which describes third-party liability insurance coverage; they are paid, rather, by the Disabled Employee’s insurer as first-party benefits. Pursuant to s. 79 of the Regulation, they are paid “to an insured in respect of death or injury caused by an accident that arises out of the use or operation of a vehicle” regardless of fault.
A person who has a claim for damages and who receives or is entitled to receive benefits respecting the loss on which the claim is based, is deemed to have released the claim to the extent of the benefits.
“Benefits” are defined in the Act as “the prescribed benefits”, including Part 7 benefits.
The enactments with which we are concerned have been changed from time to time. The general purpose of them, to shift responsibility from the person at fault to a body that provides insurance regardless of fault, has continued. The shift necessarily takes away the right to claim against a person other than the insuring body. That is a common feature in no-fault plans; the workers’ compensation scheme is a familiar example. This Court recognized that shift in Fisher v. Wabischewich (1978), 5 B.C.L.R. 335, 85 D.L.R. (3d) 106.
 While the Trustees are given authority to set the terms upon which Plan Members are entitled to benefits, and have broad discretion to determine what portion of Gross Compensation represents compensation for wage loss, they have established a Plan and must abide by its terms. Without amending the Plan, they do not have discretion to include in Gross Compensation amounts received by the member that are not paid by or on behalf of a tortfeasor.
 The chambers judge proceeded on the basis that the payment of the no-fault insurance benefits established by the statutory scheme of universal compulsory insurance could properly be considered to be compensation as defined by the Plan. Appellate courts must exercise caution in identifying errors of law in disputes arising from contractual interpretation: Sattva Capital Corp. v. Creston Moly Corp., 2014 SCC 53,  2 S.C.R. 633. However, in my view, the issue of whether Part 7 benefits constitute monetary compensation paid by or on behalf of a person whose acts are alleged to have caused the disability is a question of law requiring consideration of the legal distinction between first-party no-fault insurance benefits and tort damages.
Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Victoria Registry, dismissing two ICBC injury claims for being brought beyond the applicable limitation period.
 In my opinion, Ms. Johal did not state or infer that liability had been accepted by the defendants to the extent that the only remaining issue was the quantum of damages. The parties had not entered into negotiations, only discussions in which Ms. Johal came to the conclusion that the plaintiffs did not want to consider settlement at that point.
 Finally, even if the plaintiffs were able to establish that liability had been admitted and a promise made, I am of the view that they are unable to demonstrate they relied on such an assurance to waive the limitation period. In her examination for discovery, Mrs. DeWolfe admits that the main reasons why she did not commence her legal action earlier was that she simply did not realize there was a time frame in which she had to do so, and that “life just got busy”.
 Although case authorities such as Esau v. Co-Operators Life Insurance Company Limited, 2006 BCCA 249, have commented on the advisability of insurers informing their clients of limitation periods, for better or worse the law remains unchanged. In my view, ICBC had no obligation or duty to raise the limitation period issue with the plaintiffs. Consequently, the plaintiffs’ assertion that they were unaware of that period is insufficient to ground a claim of promissory estoppel.
 In my opinion, although the parties had discussed the possibility of settling the plaintiffs’ claims, there were no serious negotiations towards that end. At no point did ICBC concede to the plaintiffs that the defendants were responsible for the Accident and in my view there is no persuasive evidentiary foundation to infer that only the quantum of damages remained as an issue to be settled between them.
 Finally, I am not convinced that the plaintiffs relied to their detriment on any assurances made by Ms. Johal or any other representative of ICBC.
 In light of these findings, I conclude the defendants are not estopped from relying on the valid and complete defence that is available to them under the Limitation Act.
 The defendants’ applications are granted and the plaintiffs’ actions are dismissed.

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