Source: https://www.scribd.com/doc/150141875/HOLLINGSWORTH-v-PERRY-Supreme-Court-Ruling
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 01:00:11+00:00

Document:
12-307 Shalala Sullivan West Apfel Etc.
HOLLINGSWORTH v. PERRY Syllabus whatever extent they choose to defend it. Brief for Walter Dellinger 23. Pp. 1316. (c) The Court does not question Californias sovereign right to maintain an initiative process, or the right of initiative proponents to defend their initiatives in California courts. But standing in federal court is a question of federal law, not state law. No matter its reasons, the fact that a State thinks a private party should have standing to seek relief for a generalized grievance cannot override this Courts settled law to the contrary. Article IIIs requirement that a party invoking the jurisdiction of a federal court seek relief for a personal, particularized injury serves vital interests going to the role of the Judiciary in the federal system of separated powers. States cannot alter that role simply by issuing to private parties who otherwise lack standing a ticket to the federal courthouse. Pp. 1617.
671 F. 3d 1052, vacated and remanded. ROBERTS, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which SCALIA, GINSBURG, BREYER, and KAGAN, JJ., joined. KENNEDY, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which THOMAS, ALITO, and SOTOMAYOR, JJ., joined.
proceeding. 52 Cal. 4th, at 1159, 265 P. 3d, at 1029. They are free to pursue a purely ideological commitment to the laws constitutionality without the need to take cognizance of resource constraints, changes in public opinion, or potential ramifications for other state priorities. Finally, the California Supreme Court stated that [t]he question of who should bear responsibility for any attorney fee award . . . is entirely distinct from the question before it. Id., at 1161, 265 P. 3d, at 1031. (emphasis added). But it is hornbook law that a principal has a duty to indemnify the agent against expenses and other losses incurred by the agent in defending against actions brought by third parties if the agent acted with actual authority in taking the action challenged by the third partys suit. 2 Restatement 8.14, Comment d. If the issue of fees is entirely distinct from the authority question, then authority cannot be based on agency. Neither the California Supreme Court nor the Ninth Circuit ever described the proponents as agents of the State, and they plainly do not qualify as such. IV The dissent eloquently recounts the California Supreme Courts reasons for deciding that state law authorizes petitioners to defend Proposition 8. See post, at 35. We do not disrespect[ ] or disparage[ ] those reasons. Post, at 12. Nor do we question Californias sovereign right to maintain an initiative process, or the right of initiative proponents to defend their initiatives in California courts, where Article III does not apply. But as the dissent acknowledges, see post, at 1, standing in federal court is a question of federal law, not state law. And no matter its reasons, the fact that a State thinks a private party should have standing to seek relief for a generalized grievance cannot override our settled law to the contrary.
The Article III requirement that a party invoking the jurisdiction of a federal court seek relief for a personal, particularized injury serves vital interests going to the role of the Judiciary in our system of separated powers. Refusing to entertain generalized grievances ensures that . . . courts exercise power that is judicial in nature, Lance, 549 U. S., at 441, and ensures that the Federal Judiciary respects the properand properly limitedrole of the courts in a democratic society, DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U. S. 332, 341 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). States cannot alter that role simply by issuing to private parties who otherwise lack standing a ticket to the federal courthouse. * * * We have never before upheld the standing of a private party to defend the constitutionality of a state statute when state officials have chosen not to. We decline to do so for the first time here. Because petitioners have not satisfied their burden to demonstrate standing to appeal the judgment of the District Court, the Ninth Circuit was without jurisdiction to consider the appeal. The judgment of the Ninth Circuit is vacated, and the case is remanded with instructions to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. It is so ordered.
law. The Supreme Court of California explained that its holding was consistent with recent decisions from other States. Id., at 11611165, 265 P. 3d, at 10311033. In Sportsmen for I143 v. Fifteenth Jud. Ct., 2002 MT 18, 308 Mont. 189, 40 P. 3d 400, the Montana Supreme Court unanimously held that because initiative sponsors may be in the best position to defend their interpretation of the initiative and had a direct, substantial, legally protectable interest in the lawsuit challenging that interpretation, they were entitled to intervene as a matter of right. Id., at 194195, 40 P. 3d, at 403. The Alaska Supreme Court reached a similar unanimous result in Alaskans for a Common Language Inc., v. Kritz, 3 P. 3d 906 (2000). It noted that, except in extraordinary cases, a sponsors direct interest in legislation enacted through the initiative process and the concomitant need to avoid the appearance of [a conflict of interest] will ordinarily preclude courts from denying intervention as of right to a sponsoring group. Id., at 914. For these and other reasons, the Supreme Court of California held that the California Elections Code and Article II, 8, of the California Constitution afford proponents the authority . . . to assert the states interest in the validity of the initiative when State officials decline to do so. 52 Cal. 4th, at 1152, 265 P. 3d, at 1024. The court repeated this unanimous holding more than a half-dozen times and in no uncertain terms. See id., at 1126, 1127, 1139, 1149, 1151, 1152, 1165, 256 P. 3d, at 1006, 1007, 1015, 1022, 1024, 1025, 1033; see also id., at 11691170, 265 P. 3d, at 10361037 (Kennard, J., concurring). That should suffice to resolve the central issue on which the federal question turns.
support of a school moment-of-silence law that the States Governor and attorney general declined to defend in court. In considering the question of standing, the Court looked to New Jersey law to determine whether Karcher and Orechio had authority under state law to represent the States interest in both the District Court and Court of Appeals. Id., at 82. The Court concluded that they did. Because the New Jersey Supreme Court ha[d] granted applications of the Speaker of the General Assembly and the President of the Senate to intervene as partiesrespondent on behalf of the legislature in defense of a legislative enactment, the Karcher Court held that standing had been proper in the District Court and Court of Appeals. Ibid. By the time the case arrived in this Court, Karcher and Orechio had lost their presiding legislative offices, without which they lacked the authority to represent the State under New Jersey law. This, the Court held, deprived them of standing. Id., at 81. Here, by contrast, proponents authority under California law is not contingent on officeholder status, so their standing is unaffected by the fact that they hold no office in Californias Government. Ante, at 12. Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U. S. 43 (1997), is consistent with the premises of this dissent, not with the rationale of the Courts opinion. See ante, at 13 14. There, the Court noted its serious doubts as to the aspiring defenders standing because there was no Arizona law appointing initiative sponsors as agents of the people of Arizona to defend, in lieu of public officials, the constitutionality of initiatives made law of the State. 520 U. S., at 65. The Court did use the word agents; but, read in context, it is evident that the Courts intention was not to demand a formal agency relationship in compliance with the Restatement. Rather, the Court used the term as shorthand for a party whom state law authorizes to represent the States interests in court. Ibid.
a century. Through the structure of its government, and the character of those who exercise government authority, a State defines itself as sovereign. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U. S. 452, 460 (1991). In California and the 26 other States that permit initiatives and popular referendums, the people have exercised their own inherent sovereign right to govern themselves. The Court today frustrates that choice by nullifying, for failure to comply with the Restatement of Agency, a State Supreme Court decision holding that state law authorizes an enacted initiatives proponents to defend the law if and when the States usual legal advocates decline to do so. The Courts opinion fails to abide by precedent and misapplies basic principles of justiciability. Those errors necessitate this respectful dissent.

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