Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/274/380/
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 16:17:25+00:00

Document:
1. A decision of a state court applying and enforcing a state statute of general scope against a particular transaction as to which there was a distinct and timely insistence that, if so applied, the statute was void under the federal Constitution necessarily affirms the validity of the statute as so applied, and the judgment is therefore reviewable by writ of error under § 237 of the Judicial Code. P. 274 U. S. 385.
2. The inquiry then is whether the statute is constitutional as applied and enforced in respect to the situation presented. P. 274 U. S. 385.
3. This Court will review the finding of facts by a state court where a federal right has been denied as the result of a finding shown by the record to be without evidence to support it; or where a conclusion of law as to a federal right, and a finding of fact, are so intermingled as to make it necessary, in order to pass upon the federal question, to analyze the facts. P. 274 U. S. 385.
means of effecting industrial or political revolution, or for profit . . ."
"[t]hat the working class and the employing class have nothing in common, and that there can be no peace so long as hunger and want are found among millions of working people and the few who make up the employing class have all the good things of life. Between these two classes, a struggle must go on until the workers of the world organize as a class, take possession of the earth and the machinery of production, and abolish the wage system. Instead of the conservative motto, 'A fair day's wage for a fair day's work,' we must inscribe on our banner the revolutionary watchword, 'Abolition of the wage system.' By organizing industrially, we are forming the structure of the new society within the shell of the old."
Held: that there being no charge or evidence that the organization advocated any crime, violence, or other unlawful acts or methods as a means of effecting industrial or political changes or revolution, thus applied, the statute is a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. P. 274 U. S. 386.
Error to a judgment of the Supreme Court of Kansas which affirmed a conviction of Fiske under the Kansas Criminal Syndicalism Act.
State, 117 Kan. 69, 230 P. 88; and this writ of error was allowed by the Chief Justice of that court.
The only substantial Federal question presented to and decided by the State court, and which may therefore be reexamined by this Court, is whether the Syndicalism Act, as applied in this case, is repugnant to the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
"Section 1. 'Criminal syndicalism' is hereby defined to be the doctrine which advocates crime, physical violence, arson, destruction of property, sabotage, or other unlawful acts or methods, as a means of accomplishing or effecting industrial or political ends, or as a means of effecting industrial or political revolution, or for profit. . . ."
"Sec. 3. Any person who, by word of mouth, or writing, advocates, affirmatively suggests or teaches the duty, necessity, propriety or expediency of crime, criminal syndicalism, or sabotage . . . is guilty of a felony. . . ."
"by word of mouth and by publicly displaying and circulating certain books and pamphlets and written and printed matter, advocate, affirmatively suggest and teach the duty, necessity, propriety and expediency of crime, criminal syndicalism, and sabotage by . . . knowingly and feloniously persuading, inducing and securing"
"a branch of and component part of the Industrial Workers of the World organization, said defendant then and there knowing that said organization unlawfully teaches, advocates and affirmatively suggests:"
"Instead of the conservative motto, 'A fair day's wages for a fair day's work,' we must inscribe on our banner the revolutionary watchword, 'Abolition of the wage system.' By organizing industrially we are forming the structure of the new society within the shell of the old."
On the trial, the State offered no evidence as to the doctrines advocated, suggested or taught by the Industrial Workers of the World organization other than a copy of the preamble to the constitution of that organization containing the language set forth and quoted in the information. The defendant, who testified in his own behalf, stated that he was a member of that organization and understood what it taught; that, while it taught the matters set forth in this preamble, it did not teach or suggest that it would obtain industrial control in any criminal way or unlawful manner, but in a peaceful manner; that he did not believe in criminal syndicalism or sabotage, and had not at any time advocated, suggested or taught the duty, necessity, propriety and expediency of crime, criminal syndicalism or sabotage, and did not know that they were advocated, taught or suggested by the organization; and that, in taking the applications for membership in the organization, which contained the preamble to the Constitution, he had explained the principles of the organization so far as he knew them by letting the applicants read this preamble.
of the World was an organization that taught criminal syndicalism as defined by the Syndicalism Act.
"court erred in refusing to quash the information, in overruling the demurrer to the evidence, and in overruling the motion in arrest of judgment, because the information and the cause of action attempted to be proved were based upon"
the Kansas Syndicalism Act, "which, insofar as it sustains this prosecution, is in violation . . . of the Constitution of the United States, and especially of the Fourteenth Amendment," including the due process clause thereof.
teach or even affirmatively suggest physical violence as a means of accomplishing industrial or political ends. It is open to that interpretation, and is capable of use to convey that meaning. . . . The jury were not required to accept the defendant's testimony as a candid and accurate statement. There was room for them to find, as their verdict shows they did, that the equivocal language of the preamble and of the defendant in explaining it to his prospects was employed to convey and did convey the sinister meaning attributed to it by the state. A final contention is that the statute . . . is obnoxious to the due process of law clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. Statutes penalizing the advocacy of violence in bringing about governmental changes do not violate constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech."
A decision of a State court applying and enforcing a State statute of general scope against a particular transaction as to which there was a distinct and timely insistence that, if so applied, the statute was void under the Federal Constitution, necessarily affirms the validity of the statute as so applied, and the judgment is therefore reviewable by writ of error under section 237 of the Judicial Code. Dahnke-Walker Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U. S. 282, 257 U. S. 288. The inquiry then is whether the statute is constitutional as applied and enforced in respect of the situation presented. Ward & Gow v. Krinsky, 259 U. S. 503, 259 U. S. 510; Cudahy Co. v. Parramore, 263 U. S. 418, 263 U. S. 422. And see St. Louis &c. Railway v. Wynne, 224 U. S. 354, 224 U. S. 359.
question, to analyze the facts. Northern Pacific Railway v. North Dakota, 236 U. S. 585, 236 U. S. 593; Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Dunken, 266 U. S. 389, 266 U. S. 394, and cases cited.
by violence or other related unlawful acts or methods. Compare Whitney v. California and Burns v. United States, ante, pp. 274 U. S. 357, 274 U. S. 328.
The result is that the Syndicalism Act has been applied in this case to sustain the conviction of the defendant without any charge or evidence that the organization in which he secured members advocated any crime, violence or other unlawful acts or methods as a means of effecting industrial or political changes or revolution. Thus applied, the Act is an arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of the police power of the State, unwarrantably infringing the liberty of the defendant in violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The judgment is accordingly reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

References: § 237
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