Source: https://www.jouretllc.com/blog/2019/3/6/judge-says-decision-the-death-knell-for-protection-against-self-incrimination-in-digital-age
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 12:01:07+00:00

Document:
On March 6, 2019, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court issued a significant decision concerning the constitutional rights of the criminally accused. In Commonwealth v. Jones (No. SJC-12564), the SJC held that when the Commonwealth seeks an order pursuant to the SJC’s 2014 decision in Commonwealth v. Gelfgatt compelling a defendant to decrypt an electronic device by entering a password, art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights (which like the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution creates a privilege against self-incrimination), the Commonwealth must “prove that the defendant knows the password beyond a reasonable doubt for the foregone conclusion exception to apply.” The “foregone conclusion” exception, set out in Gelfgatt, stands for the proposition that if the core information is already known to the Commonwealth it is a “foregone conclusion” and would not violate the privilege against self-incrimination.
Demonstrating that an accused knows the passcode for a device found on their person would presumably be exceedingly easy for the government to do. The mere fact of possession is most of the proof needed because it’s not ordinarily the case that people have possession of mobile devices that they cannot access.
In applying this clarification in the Jones case, the SJC further held that the Commonwealth met its burden in the case and also that a judge acting on a renewed Gelfgatt motion may consider additional information without first finding that it was not known or not reasonably available to the Commonwealth at the time the earlier Gelfgatt motion was filed.
In Jones, the defendant was indicted for trafficking a person for sexual servitude, G. L. c. 265, § 50 (a), and deriving support from the earnings of a prostitute, G. L. c. 272, § 7. When it arrested him, the Commonwealth also seized a cell phone from the defendant. Its investigation led the Commonwealth to develop information leading it to believe that the contents of the cell phone included material and inculpatory evidence. A trial court granted a search warrant to search the cell phone. But the Commonwealth couldn’t access the cell phone’s contents because they are encrypted.
So the Commonwealth sought to compel the defendant to decrypt the cell phone by filing a motion for an order requiring him to produce a personal identification number access code. The main issue for the trial court was whether compelling the defendant to enter the password to the cell phone would violate his privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed by both the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.
“1. What is the burden of proof that the Commonwealth bears on a motion like this in order to establish a ‘foregone conclusion,’ as that term is used in Commonwealth v. Gelfgatt, 468 Mass. 512, 520-526 (2014)?
“2. Did the Commonwealth meet its burden of proof in this case?
The SJC ultimately reversed the trial court’s denial of the Commonwealth’s renewed Gelfgatt motion, and remanded the case to the Superior Court for entry of an order compelling the defendant to enter the password into the cell phone at issue.
On the second question, application to the Jones case, the concluded that the record before the motion judge by the Commonwealth in its initial Gelfgatt motion and its renewed motion contained sufficient evidence for the Commonwealth to meet its evidentiary burden. One factor the SJC pointed to was the fact that the phone was in the defendant’s possession at the time he was arrested by police—he had it in his front pants pocket. But other information also supported the conclusion that the defendant knew the password, including the fact the LG phone subscriber had listed a “backup” telephone number. Police records pertaining to this backup telephone number showed that it belonged to a “Dennis Jones” with the same Social Security number and date of birth as the defendant.

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