Source: http://lebanoncountylegaljournal.org/steven-day-as-parent-and-natural-guardian-of-georgia-day-a-minor-v-paramount-sports-complex-inc-v-michelle-and-steven-day-no-2017-00910/
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 10:21:08+00:00

Document:
Seven (7) year old Plaintiff Georgia Day (“Georgia”) fractured her arm while performing a maneuver on the uneven parallel bars during a gymnastics class offered at Defendant Paramount Sports Complex, Inc (“Paramount”). Plaintiff Steven Day filed a Complaint in Negligence on behalf of Georgia against Paramount. Paramount filed an Answer denying liability with a Joinder Complaint joining Georgia’s parents, Michelle and Steven Day (“Parents”), in the action based upon an Agreement signed at the time of class registration agreeing to indemnify and to hold harmless Paramount against any claims associated with Georgia’s activities at its facility. Parents lodged Preliminary Objections in the nature of a demurrer to the Joinder Complaint, asserting that defects in the Agreement containing the indemnification clause renders the Agreement invalid.
1. A preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer properly is granted where the contested pleading is legally insufficient. In ruling on a preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer, all material facts set forth in the pleading and all reasonable inferences reasonably deducible therefrom are admitted as true.
2. Under Pennsylvania law, parents do not possess the authority to release claims or potential claims of minor children merely because of the parental relationship.
3. Where Paramount does not seek dismissal of the original Complaint and instead asserts in its Joinder Complaint that Parents agreed to accept responsibility for costs involved in any legal action resulting from Georgia’s participation in any activity at the facility based upon the Agreement, the Joinder Complaint asserting liability of Parents based upon the Agreement is legally sufficient.
4. Contracts against liability, although not favored by courts, violate public policy only when they involve a matter of interest to the public or the state, which matters include the employer-employee relationship, public service, public utilities, common carriers and hospitals.
5. Contracts in which an indemnitor agrees to indemnify an indemnitee against claims based upon the indemnitee’s own negligence do not intrinsically violate public policy.
6. The intention to include within the scope of an indemnity contract a loss due to the indemnitee’s own negligence must be expressed in clear and unequivocal language.
7. In light of the fact that the language of the Agreement is clear in its intent to obligate the parents or legal guardian to indemnify Paramount against claims made by a minor participant against Paramount, the demurrer to the Joinder Complaint on the basis that the indemnification clause in the Agreement is violative of public policy is overruled, as a determination that the indemnification clause with regard to recreational activities of children violates public policy is more appropriate for the legislative process.
L.C.C.C.P. No. 2017-00910, Opinion by Samuel A. Kline, Judge, February 8, 2018.
AND NOW, to wit, this 8th day of February, 2018, upon consideration of Additional Defendants’ Preliminary Objections to Defendant’s Joinder Complaint, Defendants’ Joinder Complaint and oral argument, the Preliminary Objections are DENIED.
Both parties are afforded leave to request an interlocutory appeal by permission pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1311.
Before the Court are additional Defendants’ Preliminary Objections to Defendants’ Joinder Complaint. For the reasons set forth herein, we deny Additional Defendants’ Preliminary Objections as specified below.
This matter involves an injury that seven-year old Georgia Day received while performing gymnastics at the Paramount Sports Complex. Georgia was enrolled and attending a gymnastics class on December 18, 2015, at Defendant Paramount Sports Complex, Inc. (“Paramount”) when she attempted to perform a basic maneuver on the uneven parallel bars. Georgia had not previously attempted this maneuver. The class was under the direct supervision of the owner of Paramount, Holly Plummer. While attempting the maneuver, Georgia fell to the ground and fractured her arm causing pain, subsequent surgeries and scarring.
On May 16, 2017, Plaintiff, Steven Day, filed the Complaint on behalf of Georgia, as her parent and natural guardian. The Complaint alleged that Georgia’s injuries were incurred as a result of Paramount’s negligence and sought damages in an unspecified amount in excess of arbitration limits.
IN CONSIDERATION of permitting my child/children and myself to participate in any and all activities at Paramount Sports Complex, Inc. in the City of Annville, County of Lebanon, and the State of Pennsylvania, beginning on the day that my computer stamps and/or ip address stamps my acceptance, the undersigned agrees for himself/herself, his/her family, his/her heirs, administrators and assigns, and voluntarily releases, discharges and promises not to sue and not to hold liable Paramount Sports Complex, Inc. or any of its officers, agents servants or employees for any and all claims for personal injury, property damages or wrongful death occurring himself/herself arising out of engaging (or receiving instructions) in said activity or any activities incidental thereto whenever or however it may occur and for whatever period the activities or instructions may continue and whether it is caused by the negligence, carelessness, or otherwise, of the persons or entities conducting or sponsoring the event or instruction.
The undersigned further agrees for himself/herself, his/her family, his/her heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns, that in the event any claims for personal injury, property damage or wrongful death shall be prosecuted against Paramount Sports Complex, Inc. or any of its officers, agents, servants or employees, he/she shall indemnify, save and hold harmless the same Paramount Sports Complex, Inc. or any of its officers, agents, servants or employees for any and all claims by whomever or wherever made for personal injuries property damage or wrongful death whether caused by the negligence, carelessness, or otherwise, of the persons or entities mentioned above.
1. Will reimburse/indemnify Paramount Sports Complex, Inc. or their insurance company for any money, which they paid to participant.
2. Will reimburse/indemnify Paramount Sports Complex, Inc. or their insurance company for any reasonable costs incurred, including attorney’s fees.
3. Will hold Paramount Sports Complex, Inc. harmless.
I, on behalf of the minor participant and individually, further agree and promise to hold harmless and indemnify Paramount Sports Complex, Inc. or any of its officers, agents, servants or employees from all deferred costs, including attorney’s fees, or from other costs incurred in connection with claims for personal injury, property damage or wrongful death which I, or the minor participant, may negligently or intentionally cause to a third parties (sic) in the course of participating in any and all activities.
It is the intention of myself, by this document to relieve Paramount Sports Complex, Inc. or any of its officers, agents, servants or employees from any responsibility for personal injury, property damage or wrongful death whether caused by negligence, carelessness, or otherwise, of the persons or entities mentioned above.
I UNDERSTAND I AM ASSUMING ALL RISKS INHERENT WITH ANY AND ALL ACTIVITIES THAT I AM PARTICIPATING IN, WHETHER KNOWN RO UNKNOWN, AND THAT BY SIGNING THIS DOCUMENT I AM GIVIGN UP MY RIGHT TO SUE PARAMOUNT SPORTS COMPLEX, INC., WHETHER CAUSED BY THE NEGLIGENCE OF THE SAID PERSONS OR ENTITIES.
(Def.’s Joinder Compl., Ex. “B”)(bold and typeface in original).
Parents filed Preliminary Objections to the Joinder Complaint on August 10, 2017, in the nature of a demurrer, alleging defects in the Agreement rendering the Agreement invalid and voidable, and therefore renders the Joinder Complaint legally insufficient. The matter was originally listed for the September Term of Argument Court, but was relisted to the October Term upon motion of Defendant. Parents filed their brief on August 10, 2017 and Defendant filed its brief on August 28, 2017. Oral argument was heard on October 27, 2017. The matter is thus before us and ripe for disposition.
In ruling on preliminary objections, we accept as true all material facts set forth in the pleading as well as all inferences reasonably deducible therefrom. Santiago v. Pennsylvania Nat.’l Mutual Casualty Ins. Co., 613 A.2d 1235 (Pa. Super. 1992). However, a court need not accept as true conclusions of law, unwarranted inferences, allegations, or expressions of opinion. Bayada Nurses, Inc. v. Com., Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 8 A.3d 866, 884 (Pa.Super. 2010). “[P]reliminary objections will be sustained only if they are clear and free from doubt.” Milliner v. Enck, 709 A.2d 417, 418 (Pa. 1998).
A preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer is properly granted where the contested pleading is legally insufficient. Preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer require the court to resolve the issues solely on the basis of the pleadings; no testimony or other evidence outside of the complaint may be considered to dispose of the legal issues presented by the demurrer. All material facts set forth in the pleading and all inferences reasonably deducible therefrom must be admitted as true.
Weiley v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 2012 PA Super 106, 51 A.3d 202, 208 (Pa.Super. 2012)(internal citations omitted).
Parents first argue that the hold harmless portion of the Agreement is invalid and unenforceable under Pennsylvania law. Citing to Shaner v. State System of Higher Education, 40 Pa.D.&C.4th 308 (C.P. Dauphin 1998), aff’d, 738 A.2d 535 (Pa.Cmwlth. 1999), Parents contend that they “simply lack the capacity under Pennsylvania law to enter into a hold harmless agreement on behalf of a minor child.” (Add’l. Defs.’ Br. 5). Furthermore, Parents contend that through the commencement of suit, Georgia has effectively disaffirmed the contract. Citing again to Shaner, they argue that “this type of contract can be disaffirmed by the minor and that the act of filing suit within the statute of limitations accomplishes this purpose. (Add’l. Defs.’ Br. 5).
Except for contracts of necessity, a minor is not competent to enter into a valid contract. Contracts with minors, while not void, are voidable upon the minor’s disaffirmance after reaching the age of majority, rendering the contract a nullity. On the other hand, a minor can ratify or affirm such a contract after reaching majority, rendering the contract enforceable.
Id. at 312–13. The trial court then continued that upon its own independent research, father’s signature on the release “did not exculpate defendants from [daughter’s] potential claims.” Id. at 314.
Paramount argues that the Agreement neither releases Georgia’s rights nor precludes her suit from moving forward. Paramount is not seeking to have Georgia’s suit dismissed. Instead, the Agreement merely provides that Parents and Paramount agreed that Parents would accept responsibility for the costs involved in any legal action that would arise from Georgia’s participation in any activity at the facility.
Pennsylvania law holds that the protection of minors “is one of the chief concerns of the law [and t]he rule is that no one may deal with a minor, except for necessaries.” In re O’Leary’s Estate, 42 A.2d 624, 625 (Pa. 1945). Similarly, Parents are correct that “[u]nder Pennsylvania law, parents do not possess the authority to release the claims or potential claims of a minor child merely because of the parental relationship.” Apicella v. Valley Forge Military Acad. & Junior Coll., 630 F.Supp. 20, 24 (E.D. Pa. 1985). We agree with Parents that, consistent with Pennsylvania law, any portion of the Agreement that purports to allow Parents to release Paramount from liability as to Georgia’s cause of action is unenforceable.
However, we also agree with Paramount that the hold harmless claim set forth in the Joinder Complaint do not prevent or preclude Georgia’s suit from moving forward. Despite Parents’ argument otherwise, the prohibition against a parent’s release of a minor’s claim under Pennsylvania law does not render the hold harmless language in the Agreement as invalid and unenforceable. While the term “hold harmless” is often paired with “indemnify” in contracts, “modern authorities confirm that ‘hold harmless’ has little, if any, different meaning from the word ‘indemnify.’” Majkowski v. Am. Imaging Mgmt. Servs., LLC, 913 A.2d 572, 589 (Del. Ch. 2006). Black’s Law Dictionary defines “hold harmless” as meaning: “To absolve (another party) from any responsibility for damage or other liability arising from the transaction; indemnify.” HOLD HARMLESS, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). Furthermore, the term “hold harmless agreement” is defined as “[a] contract in which one party agrees to indemnify the other. HOLD-HARMLESS AGREEMENT, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). The language of the Agreement itself contemplates that despite the release language within the Agreement, a participant may still bring a claim against Paramount, and that in such an event, parents (or legal guardian) would indemnify and hold Paramount harmless. This serves to bolster the interpretation that the hold harmless language is not implicated by the prohibition against parental release of minor claims.
Turning then to the Joinder Complaint, we find that Paramount has made two claims against Parents for indemnification and to be held harmless for the claims brought forth in the action. Since the prohibition against parental release of minor claims is not implicated by such language, and because Paramount’s Joinder Complaint does not seek to prevent or preclude Georgia’s claim from moving forward, we overrule Parents’ preliminary objection.
Since we find that the hold harmless language is not invalid and unenforceable as a consequence of the prohibition against parental release of minor’s claim, because it is not fatal to the claims brought forth on Georgia’s behalf, we do not need to address the merits of Parents’ claim that Georgia has disaffirmed the contract due to the suit filed herein. We note, however, that it is recognized under Pennsylvania law, that a minor may disaffirm a contract up until the age of majority and upon a reasonable time thereupon, and that bringing suit is such a disaffirmance. Haines v. Fitzgerald, 165 A. 52, 55 (Pa.Super. 1933). Suit brought on behalf of the minor is likewise considered an effective disaffirmance. Langdon v. Strawhecker, 46 Pa.D.&C.2d 764, 767 (C.P. Mercer 1969). Therefore, in the instant matter, the effect of suit brought on Georgia’s behalf would serve as a disaffirmance on her part and would render non-binding any release in the Agreement as to her claims.
Parents continue that indemnity language that, in effect, contracts away a minor’s rights against a negligent third-party, is unenforceable. They argue that such a prospective release of liability contravenes public policy. The Commonwealth’s interest in protecting a minor’s rights against all intrusion, is evidenced in the necessary approval of settlements for actions brought on behalf of minors. Contracts requiring a parent to indemnify a tortfeasor against claims brought by a minor cause a conflict in a parent’s duty to their child in pursuit of relief on the child’s behalf. Furthermore, because the nature of indemnity agreements is to protect against loss or liability of one party brought about by the activities of another party or by conditions that were under the control of the other party, the Agreement in this case is outside of any such agreement as Paramount was in control of the facilities and the class at the time of the incident.
Parents cite to Lang v. Beishline, 56 Pa.D.&C.2d. 633 (C.P. Bucks 1972), for support of their position. In Lang, the trial court was hearing an action brought by a minor plaintiff who had been injured as a passenger in a car operated by defendant. The defendant joined the minor’s parents as additional defendants pursuant to a written release settlement with the parents in which parents agreed to indemnify defendant against any further claim brought by the minor in relation to the accident. Parents objected to the indemnification agreement as contrary to public policy. The trial court agreed, stating that “[i]t is the public policy of this State to protect the property rights of minors against encroachments from all sources, including the minors’ parents.” Id. at 635. The court continued that “[t]he effect [of the indemnification agreement] is not only to circumvent court approval, but also to dissuade the parents from their duty to promote their child’s rights by suit if need be. The knowledge by parent and child that the parent has incurred a liability for payment of any verdict which the child may obtain will result in most instances in abandonment of those rights.” Id. Finally, the court stated that the indemnification agreement is “clearly void as against public policy because it is an agreement, the object or necessary tendency of which is to place a person owing a duty to a third person, in a position where he is under obligations inconsistent with such duties.” Id. at 636 (citing Loesch v. Vassiliades, 86 A.2d 14 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1952)). While Parents admit that they can cite no Pennsylvania appellate authority to support the specific position, they argue that such indemnification agreements “place parents in a position of conflict with respect to their children and inhibit protection of the rights of those who are unable to protect themselves.” (Add’l. Defs.’ Br. 8).
Paramount contends that the terms of the Agreement are not per se invalid and, relying on Chepkevich v. Hidden Valley Resort, L.P., 2 A.3d 1174 (Pa. 2010), argues that agreements shifting risk have been routinely upheld in Pennsylvania courts. Citing to the rule set forth in Topp Copy Prods., Inc. v. Singletary, 626 A.2d 98, 98 (Pa. 1993), Paramount states that exculpatory agreements should be upheld when they meet three conditions – the exculpatory clause must not contravene public policy, the contract must be between persons relating entirely to their own private affairs and each party must be a free bargaining agent to the agreement so that the contract is not one of adhesion. Topp Copy at 99. Paramount argues that the Agreement clearly relates only to the private affairs of Parents and Paramount. It further notes that Chepkevich stands for the proposition that “voluntary participation in inherently dangerous sporting activity does not easily lend itself to a claim that an exculpatory agreement governing that activity is an invalid adhesion contract” where “[t]he signer is under no compulsion, economic or otherwise, to participate, much less to sign the exculpatory agreement, because it does not relate to essential services, but merely governs a voluntary recreational activity.” Chepkevich at 1190-1191. Paramount states that where Pennsylvania courts have held settlement agreements by parents on behalf of minor children to be invalid, that such were based on the public policy that the settlements were not court approved, and not that parents cannot freely agree to indemnify an organization for activity in which the minor child is participating.
Our independent research has yielded the same result as Parents admit. We find no Pennsylvania appellate opinion supporting the proposition that pre-injury indemnification agreements, by which parents or legal guardians agree to indemnify a defendant against claims for injuries sustained by a minor child, are counter to public policy. The court in Lang encountered a situation in which the parents had signed a post-injury release and indemnification upon receipt of settlement, the court noting that no evidence had been shown to demonstrate an allocation or protection of the minor’s share of that settlement. The court further observed that the “effect [of the settlement was] not only to circumvent court approval, but also to dissuade the parents from their duty to promote their child’s rights by suit if need be.” Lang at 635.
When examining whether a contract violates public policy, this Court is mindful that public policy is more than a vague goal which may be used to circumvent the plain meaning of the contract.
Public policy is to be ascertained by reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from general considerations of supposed public interest. As the term “public policy” is vague, there must be found definite indications in the law of the sovereignty to justify the invalidation of a contract as contrary to that policy[.] … Only dominant public policy would justify such action. In the absence of a plain indication of that policy through long governmental practice or statutory enactments, or of violations of obvious ethical or moral standards, the Court should not assume to declare contracts … contrary to public policy. The courts must be content to await legislative action.
Williams v. GEICO Gov’t Employees Ins. Co., 32 A.3d 1195, 1200 (Pa. 2011). Contracts such as the Agreement herein, are not uncommon. See Simmons by Grenell v. Parkette Nat. Gymnastic Training Ctr., 670 F.Supp. 140, 144 (E.D. Pa. 1987)(“it is this Court’s experience that agreements such as that involved herein have become commonplace in our society with regard to organizations such as little league, scouting, midget football and so on.”).
Moreover, Paramount is correct that contracts in which the indemnitor agrees to indemnify an indemnitee against claims based on the indemnitee’s own negligence are not intrinsically violative of public policy. See Hackman v. Moyer Packing, 621 A.2d 166, 169 (Pa.Super. 1993). Nevertheless, “the law is well settled that the intention to include within the scope of an indemnity contract, a loss due to the indemnitee’s own negligence, must be expressed in clear and unequivocal language.” Pittsburgh Steel Co. v. Patterson-Emerson-Comstock, Inc., 171 A.2d 185, 187 (Pa. 1961). Our review of the Agreement provides that the language is clear in its intent to obligate the parent or legal guardian to indemnify Paramount against claims made by the minor participant against Paramount, including claims for personal injury caused by the negligence of Paramount.
Parents have filed preliminary objections to the Joinder Complaint in the nature of a demurrer, challenging the legal sufficiency of the pleading. For the demurrer to be sustained, our review of the pleading must reveal that the claim therein cannot be sustained and upon which the law permits no recovery. Gekas v. Shapp, 364 A.2d 691, 693 (Pa. 1976). Any doubt should be resolved in favor of overruling the demurrer. Id. We are only free to address whether the Joinder Complaint fails to assert a cause of action as a matter of law. Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Fabinyi, 650 A.2d 895, 899 (Pa.Super. 1994). Absent clear precedent otherwise, this Jurist is reluctant to expand upon the public policy determinations of our appellate courts or to create an exception more appropriately reserved for the legislative process. We therefore find that Paramount’s Joinder Complaint states sufficient facts to withstand a demurrer. Both parties are afforded leave to request an interlocutory appeal of this issue by permission pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1311.
Parents lastly argue that the Agreement lacks the elements necessary to make it an enforceable indemnity agreement. Parents point out that the Agreement fails to name Georgia or the names of Parents anywhere on the Agreement. Furthermore, the Agreement is not actually signed by Parents, but instead bears a date and an IP identifier that is supposed to represent Parents’ consent. Additionally, Parents argue that the overall sloppiness of the form and the lack of specificity as to whom it binds should render the Agreement as unenforceable.
Paramount argues that the terms of the Agreement are clear and unambiguous and state in plain language that the parents recognize the risks associated with gymnastics and agree to relieve Paramount from responsibility for personal injury whether caused by negligence, carelessness or otherwise. Paramount contends that the Agreement is enforceable and Parents have failed to specify any provisions of the Agreement that is vague or ambiguous.
We disagree with Parents that the Agreement facially lacks the necessary elements of an enforceable indemnity agreement. Paramount has averred that Parents executed the Agreement as part of the enrollment process by which Georgia was registered for activities with Paramount. The Agreement provides that the signatory agrees that the time/date and IP address imprint will serve in lieu of an actual signature. The Electronic Transactions Act, 73, P.S. § 2260.101. et seq., defines “electronic signature” as “[a]n electronic sound, symbol or process attached to or logically associated with a record and executed or adopted by a person with the intent to sign the record.” 73 P.S. § 2260.103. Our reasonable inference from the pleading is that the Agreement attached is related to Georgia’s participation in activities at Paramount. The level of specificity necessary for indemnity enforcement is to the language effecting the indemnification itself and not necessarily to other elements of an agreement. Bester v. Essex Crane Rental Corp., 619 A.2d 304 (Pa.Super. 1993); Greer v. City of Philadelphia, 795 A.2d 376 (Pa. 2002). We are compelled in our review of the preliminary objections to accept Paramount’s averments as to the Agreement as true and to determine thereon whether the law says with certainty that no recovery is possible. Werner v. Plater-Zyberk, 799 A.2d 776, 783 (Pa.Super. 2002).
We therefore deny Parents’ preliminary objections to the Joinder Complaint. We will enter an order consistent with the foregoing.

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