Source: https://delawareintellectualproperty.foxrothschild.com/
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 19:20:48+00:00

Document:
By Memorandum Order entered by The Honorable Richard G. Andrews in Bio-Rad Laboratories, Inc. v. 10X Genomics, Inc., Civil Action No. 18-1679-RGA (D.Del. April 8, 2019), the Court denied Defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101. The patents in-suit, U.S. Patent Nos. 9,562,837 (“the ‘837 patent”) and 9,896,722 (“the ‘722 patent”), claim technology related to handling samples in a way that reduces sample contamination and sample loss. Id. at *1. In its motion, Defendant asserted that the patents in-suit “are directed to ‘the natural phenomenon of allowing two different liquids of different densities to separate from each other.’” Id. at *5. Plaintiff responded that the patents are not that simple. Rather, the “the patents are directed to the patent-eligible result of a method and apparatus to reduce sample contamination when handling samples.” Id. The Court agreed with Plaintiff and denied the motion to dismiss. Id. at *5-7.
A copy of the Memorandum Order is attached.
By Memorandum Opinion entered by The Honorable Leonard P. Stark in 3 Shape A/S v. Align Technology, Inc., the Court denied Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims for direct, indirect and willful infringement pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). In short, Defendant argued that Plaintiff’s pre-suit induced infringement and contributory and willful infringement claims failed to meet the pleading standards set forth in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), and Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). Id. at *1. The Court disagreed finding that the Complaint sufficiently pled claims for direct, contributory and willful infringement. Id. at *2-7.
By Memorandum Order entered by The Honorable Leonard P. Stark in The Gillette Company LLC v. Dollar Shave Club, Inc., et al., Civil Action No. 15-1158-LPS-CJB (D.Del. March 21, 2019), the Court, among other things, denied Plaintiff’s motion seeking summary judgment as to the date of conception for the ‘513 patent. Plaintiff sought summary judgment that the invention of the ‘513 Patent was conceived in February 1998, which would have been before the prior art in the Bray Patent. Id. at *1-2.
After considering Plaintiff’s motion, the Court determined that there was a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether conception occurred in February 1998 or not until Spring 1999. Id. at *2-3. The Court noted that a reasonable juror could find that conception of the claims of the ‘513 Patent did not occur in February 1998 because of several reasons and concluded that what the inventors knew and appreciated in February 1998 was a material fact to be determined by the trier of fact. Id. at *3. Thus, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on the date of conception was denied. Id.
By Memorandum Opinion entered by The Honorable Colm F. Connolly in Deere & Company v AGCO Corp. et al., Civil Action No. 18-827-CFC (D.Del. February 19, 2019), the Court granted in part and denied in part the identical motions of defendants AGCO Corporation and Precision Planting LLC to dismiss Plaintiff Deere & Company’s claims for enhanced damages based on willful infringement for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
Deere alleged that it was entitled to enhanced damages under Section 284 of the Patent Act because (1) Defendants engaged in post-suit willful infringement of the eight patents asserted in Counts 4 and 7-12 of the amended complaints; (2) Defendants engaged in willful infringement of the four patents asserted in Counts 1, 2, 5 and 6 of the amended complaints after Deere sent Precision Planting a letter on August 11, 2017; and (3) Defendants engaged in willful infringement of U.S. Patent No. 10,004,173 (the “#173 Patent”) after Deere notified Defendants’ counsel on June 27, 2018 that Defendants’ activities infringed the #173 Patent. Id. at *11-12.
In support of their motions to dismiss Deere’s claims for enhanced damages, Defendants argued that “Deere’s willfulness allegations should be dismissed in their entirety because ‘Deere nowhere alleges – much less provides supporting facts that could show – that either defendant, at any point in time before or after the suits were filed, deliberately copied the asserted patents, attempted to conceal its allegedly infringing behavior, or engaged in any other conduct outside the standards of commerce in the agricultural industry.’” Id. at *12. While the Court acknowledged that enhanced damages under Section 284 were intended to only be awarded in egregious cases of misconduct that involve more than typical infringement, it recognized the Federal Circuit’s holdings binding on it setting forth the low threshold to plead a willfulness-based enhanced damages claim. Id. Specifically, the court noted that the Federal Circuit in Artic Cat, WesternGeco, and WCM made it clear that, to plead a willfulness-based enhanced damages claim, “a plaintiff need only allege facts that plausibly show that a risk of infringement was made known to a defendant or was sufficiently obvious that it should have been known to a defendant.” Id.
After analyzing Deere’s claims for willfulness-based enhanced damages based on that pleading standard, the Court determined that Deere’s allegations of willful infringement of the eight patents asserted in Counts 3-4 and 7-12 of the amended complaints easily met the threshold. Id. at *13-14. The Court also determined that Deere’s allegations of willful infringement of the #173 Patent asserted in Count 13 of the amended complaints also met the threshold. Id. at *15-16. Accordingly, the Court denied Defendants’ motion to dismiss the claims for enhanced damages alleged in Counts 3-4, 7-12 and 13 of the amended complaints. Id. at *13-16.
On the other hand, the Court determined that Deere’s allegations of willful infringement of the four patents asserted in Counts 1, 2, 5 and 6 of the amended complaints did not meet the threshold. Id. at *14-15. In making that determination, the Court noted that the August 2017 letter was the only alleged source of Defendants’ knowledge of the four patents asserted in Counts 1, 2, 5 and 6. Id. The Court also noted that the amended complaints did not allege that the August 2017 letter identified the accused products, the pertinent combination of the accused products, or how the combination of the accused products infringed the patents-in-suit. Id. Thus, the Court determined there was no sufficient pleading that “Defendants knew or should have known from the alleged contents of the August 2017 letter that Defendants’ activities constituted a sufficient risk of infringement to make them cease those activities.” Id. at *15. Accordingly, the Court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss the claims for enhanced damages alleged in Counts 1, 2, 5 and 6 of the amended complaints. Id.
By Memorandum Opinion entered by The Honorable Maryellen Noreika in Prescient Medicine Holdings, LLC v. Laboratory Corp. of America Holdings, et al., Civil Action No. 18-600-MN (D.Del. February 14, 2019), the Court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss all claims of the Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) after finding that Plaintiff failed to allege sufficient facts to assert its antitrust claims.
In its Complaint, Plaintiff alleged that Defendants conspired to exclude Plaintiff from providing laboratory testing services to the Delaware market in violation of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and Section 16 of the Clayton Act. Id. at *1. In response, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss all claims of the Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6). Id. Specifically, Defendants argued that Plaintiff’s alleged antitrust claims failed because they did not plead sufficient facts to show antitrust standing and a relevant market. Id. at *3.
Upon review, the Court agreed that Plaintiff’s Complaint did not plead sufficient facts to show the threshold requirement of antitrust standing and relevant market. Id. at *3-12. Accordingly, the Court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss the federal antitrust claims and also dismissed Plaintiff’s accompanying state law claims after refusing to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over those claims because it had dismissed the federal antitrust claims over which it had original jurisdiction. Id.
By Memorandum Order entered by The Honorable Richard G. Andrews in T-JAT Systems 2006 LTD. v. Expedia, Inc. (DE) et al., Civil Action No. 16-581-RGA (D.Del. January 29, 2019), the Court denied Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration of the Court’s prior opinion and order granting Defendants’ motion to dismiss the action for patent infringement against Defendant Expedia-WA, a Washington corporation, for improper venue. In opposition to Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Plaintiff argued that venue over Expedia-WA exists “under 28 U.S.C. §1400(b), which provides that a patent infringement action may be brought in any district ‘where the defendant has committed acts of infringement and has a regular and established place of business.’” Id. at *2. The Court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss after finding that Plaintiff failed to show Expedia-WA has a regular and established place of business in Delaware. Id.
In its motion for reconsideration, Plaintiff raised a new theory for venue. Id. In short, Plaintiff asserted that venue in Delaware is proper with respect to Expedia-WA because Expedia-WA wholly owns CSC Holdings Inc. (“CSC Holdings”), which wholly owns CruiseShipCenters International, Inc. (“CSC International”), and CSC International has a regular and established place of business in Delaware. Id.
After considering the parties’ respective arguments and considering evidence outside of the Complaint through a Notice of Subsequent Authority filed by Plaintiff, the Court concluded that Plaintiff did not present any new evidence warranting reconsideration and the Court did not commit a clear error of law or fact. Id. at *5-10. As part of its analysis, the Court noted the fact that CSC International operates a Delaware store did not change the outcome of the motion to dismiss because “Plaintiff fail[ed] to show that CSC International is a place of business ‘of the defendant,’ as required to establish proper venue for Expedia-WA.” Id. at *7. In other words, the Court concluded that Plaintiff did not provide any evidence that Expedia-WA engages in business from CSC International’s Delaware location. Id. at *9.
Interestingly, in its brief, Plaintiff did include a screenshot of the Google Maps result for CSC International’s Delaware location which showed a storefront sign that read “Expedia cruiseship centers” and argued that it showed that Expedia-WA ratified the Delaware location as its own. Id. However, the Court noted that the use of the Expedia logo at CSC International’s Delaware location is by itself insufficient to show that the Delaware location is a place of business of Expedia-WA. Id.
The opinion leaves me wondering whether the result would have been any different if Plaintiff had included all of its venue assertions in the original complaint or an amended complaint before the Court issued its ruling on Defendants’ motion to dismiss. The standard on the motion for reconsideration likely made it more difficult for Plaintiff to survive the challenge to venue after the Court had previously granted the motion to dismiss.

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