Source: https://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-supreme-court/429/10.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 11:13:12+00:00

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At respondents' trial on a charge of willfully filing false income tax returns in violation of 7206 (1) of the Internal Revenue Code, the District Court adequately instructed the jury on willfulness in accordance with the standard that willfulness in the context of 7206 and related statutes simply means a voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty, United States v. Bishop, 412 U.S. 346 , and hence an additional instruction on good faith was unnecessary.
After a jury trial, respondents were convicted of willfully filing false income tax returns in violation of 26 U.S.C. 7206 (1). 1 Based on its reading of United States v. Bishop, 412 U.S. 346 (1973), the Court of Appeals held that the jury was incorrectly instructed concerning willfulness, and remanded for a new trial. 528 F.2d 247 (1975). The United States petitioned for certiorari. We reverse.
The respondents were charged with falsifying tax returns in two principal ways: (1) they allegedly caused corporations they controlled to report payments to them as loans, when they knew the payments were really taxable dividends; and (2) they allegedly claimed partnership losses as deductions knowing that the losses were properly attributable to [429 U.S. 10, 11] a corporation. Their defense was that these transactions were correctly reported, or at least that they thought so at the time.
"The Court, in fact, has recognized that the word `willfully' in these statutes generally connotes a voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty. It has formulated the requirement of willfulness as `bad faith or evil intent,' [United States v.] Murdock, 290 U.S. [389,] 398, or `evil motive and want of justification in view of all the financial circumstances of the tax-payer,' Spies [v. United States], 317 U.S. [492,] 498, or knowledge that the taxpayer `should have reported more income than he did.' Sansone [v. United States], 380 U.S. [343,] 353. See James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213, 221 (1961); McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 471 (1969)." 412 U.S., at 360 .
Our references to other formulations of the standard did not modify the standard set forth in the first sentence of the quoted paragraph. On the contrary, as the other Courts of Appeals that have considered the question have recognized, willfulness in this context simply means a voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty. United States v. Pohlman, [429 U.S. 10, 13] 522 F.2d 974, 977 (CA8 1975) (en banc), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1049 (1976); United States v. McCorkle, 511 F.2d 482, 484-485 (CA7) (en banc), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 826 (1975); United States v. Greenlee, 517 F.2d 899, 904 (CA3), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 985 (1975); United States v. Hawk, 497 F.2d 365, 366-369 (CA9), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 838 (1974). The trial judge in the instant case adequately instructed the jury on willfulness. An additional instruction on good faith was unnecessary.
[ Footnote 2 ] We agree with the Court of Appeals that the instructions on this point were "full and complete." 528 F.2d 247, 249-250 (1975). The jury was told that the Government contended that respondents "couldn't claim this [the partnership losses] as a deduction . . . because by so doing they would know that they were filing a false report of their total gross income." Later the jury was instructed that, if they found the loans were incorrectly reported, they must also find that the return was "made willfully and with the specific intent and knowledge at the time they made it that it was in fact a false return." In explaining intent, the trial judge said that "[t]o establish the specific intent the Government must prove that these defendants knowingly did the acts, that is, filing these returns, knowing that they were false, purposely intending to violate the law." The jury was told to "bear in mind the sole charge that you have here, and that is the violation of 7206, the willful making of the false return, and subscribing to it under perjury, knowing it not to be true and [sic] to all material respects, and that and that alone."
[ Footnote 3 ] The Court of Appeals in Bishop held that the evidence under the misdemeanor statute "need only show unreasonable, capricious, or careless disregard for the truth or falsity of income tax returns filed." 455 F.2d 612, 615 (CA9 1972). This Court rejected the view that this lesser degree of culpability was required for a violation of the misdemeanor statute, and held on the contrary that "Congress used the word `willfully' to describe a constant rather than a variable in the tax penalty formula." 412 U.S., at 359 -360.

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