Source: http://fl.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20171211_0004450.MFL.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 12:38:20+00:00

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JULIE S. SNEED UNTIED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
Plaintiff, Jaymie Perez, on behalf of C.P. (“Claimant”), her minor child, seeks judicial review of the denial of Claimant's claim for supplemental security income (“SSI”). As the Administrative Law Judge's (“ALJ”) decision was based on substantial evidence and employed proper legal standards, the decision is affirmed.
On July 11, 2013, Plaintiff filed an application for SSI on Claimant's behalf. (Tr. 144-53.) The Commissioner denied Plaintiff's claim both initially and upon reconsideration. (Tr. 66-74, 102-04.) Plaintiff then requested an administrative hearing. (Tr. 110-11.) Upon Plaintiff's request, the ALJ held a hearing at which Plaintiff and Claimant appeared and testified. (Tr. 35- 57.) Following the hearing, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision finding Claimant not disabled and accordingly denied Claimant's claim for SSI benefits. (Tr. 13-28.) Subsequently, Plaintiff requested review from the Appeals Council, which the Appeals Council denied. (Tr. 1-9, 34.) Plaintiff then timely filed a complaint with this Court. (Dkt. 1.) The case is now ripe for review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3).
An individual younger than the age of eighteen is considered to be disabled if he or she has a medically determinable physical or mental impairment that results in marked and severe functional limitations and that can be expected to result in death or that has lasted, or can be expected to last, for at least twelve months. 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(C)(i).
Child disability claims are assessed under a three-step sequential analysis. 20 C.F.R. § 416.924(a). Under this process, the ALJ must determine, in sequence, the following: (1) whether the claimant is engaging in substantial gainful activity; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment or combination of impairments; and (3) whether the claimant's impairment or combination of impairments meets, medically equals, or functionally equals a Listing. Id.
To “meet” a Listing, a child must actually suffer from the limitations specified in the Listing. Shinn ex rel. Shinn v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 391 F.3d 1276, 1279 (11th Cir. 2004). To “medically equal” the limitations found in a Listing, the child's limitations must be “at least of equal medical significance to those of a listed impairment.” Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.926). Alternatively, if a child's impairment does not meet or medically equal a Listing, a child may nonetheless be found disabled if the child's impairment “functionally equals” a Listing, which is determined by the extent to which the impairment limits the child's ability to function in the following six domains of life: (1) acquiring and using information; (2) attending and completing tasks; (3) interacting and relating with others; (4) moving about and manipulating objects; (5) caring for oneself; and (6) health and physical well-being. Id.; 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(b)(1)(i)-(vi). A child's limitations “functionally equal” those in the Listings, and thus constitute a disability, if the child's limitations are “marked” in two of the six domains or are “extreme” in one of the six domains. 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(a), (d). A child's limitation is “marked” when it is “more than moderate” but “less than extreme.” Id. § 416.926a(e)(2)(i). A marked limitation “interferes seriously” with a child's “ability to independently initiate, sustain, or complete activities.” Id. An “extreme” limitation is a limitation that is “more than marked” and “interferes very seriously with [the child's] ability to independently initiate, sustain, or complete activities.” Id. § 416.926a(e)(3)(i).
A determination by the Commissioner that a child is not disabled must be upheld if it is supported by substantial evidence and comports with applicable legal standards. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3). Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)); Miles v. Chater, 84 F.3d 1397, 1400 (11th Cir. 1996). While the court reviews the Commissioner's decision with deference to the factual findings, no such deference is given to the legal conclusions. Keeton v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 21 F.3d 1064, 1066 (11th Cir. 1994).

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