Source: http://ny.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20080226_0000148.WNY.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 10:48:46+00:00

Document:
Taiwan Lowmack ("Lowmack" or "petitioner"), proceeding pro se, has filed a petition (Docket No. 1) for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging the legality of his confinement pursuant to a state court judgment of conviction which became final for purposes of AEDPA on July 5, 2006. The matter has been referred to the undersigned for the issuance of a report and recommendation on the disposition of Lowmack's petition as well as to hear and decide all non-dispositive motions.
On July 3, 2007, Lowmack moved the Court to have his petition held in abeyance while he exhausted his state court remedies on the unexhausted ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim by means of a coram nobis application. (Docket No. 10). Respondent did not file any papers in opposition to Lowmack's stay request.
On October 3, 2007, the Court received a letter from Lowmack dated September 28, 2007. This letter also was docketed as a motion to stay (Docket No. 11). Lowmack wrote, "I request that this Court leave [sic] to renew petitioner's motion fo a stay of proceedings that was submitted on June 27, 07 . . .because I still haven't gotten a response on my decision regarding my Writ of Error Coram Nobis that was filled [sic] with the Appellate court on July 2,  07. . . . I would like to request for 60 days more added to my time for my stay motion. . . ." (Docket No. 11). Respondent did not submit any papers responsive to this piece of correspondence from Lowmack.
It appears that Lowmack is under the impression that a stay has been entered in this matter. That is not the case: No decision granting or denying Lowmack's stay motion (Docket No. 10) has been issued in the time since Lowmack filed the application on or about July 3, 2007. Specifically, this Court never ruled as to whether Lowmack's petition would be stayed and his exhausted claims held in abeyance while he pursued exhaustion of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. In other words, Lowmack's initial motion for a stay (Docket No. 10) is currently pending and will be addressed in this Order.
For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that it is a proper exercise of discretion to grant a stay in this case.
A presumption underlying Rose v. Lundy's "total exhaustion" requirement was that once a petitioner completed his exhaustion efforts, he would file a new federal petition. See id.; see also Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 274 (2005) (noting that Rose v. Lundy "imposed a requirement of 'total exhaustion' and directed federal courts to effectuate that requirement by dismissing mixed petitions without prejudice and allowing petitioners to return to state court to present the unexhausted claims to that court in the first instance"). The new strict limitations period imposed by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA") operated in conjunction with the "total exhaustion" doctrine to created a procedural catch-22: The habeas corpus petitioner whose mixed petition was dismissed under Rose but who then returned to federal court after exhausting his state remedies discovered that he was now barred from habeas review because the AEDPA limitations period had expired during the time in which he pursued his state remedies. Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 230 (2004).
Further obstacles to a petitioner meeting both the timeliness and "total exhaustion" requirements arose following Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167 (2001), in which the Supreme Court held that the AEDPA limitations period is not tolled during the period of time in which a federal habeas corpus petition is pending before a district court dismisses it under Rose v. Lundy for lack of exhaustion on some or all claims is included. Thus, the period of time in which a federal habeas petition may be pending through no fault of the petitioner's but only due to the district court's docket management, is not tolled under AEDPA's statutory tolling provision.
In 2005, the Supreme Court addressed these problems in Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 275 (2005), approving ing the "stay and abeyance" procedure fashioned by, e.g., the Second Circuit in Zarvela Artuz 254 F.3d 374 (2d Cir. 2001).*fn2 Instead of dismissing the mixed petition, the district court stays the petition and holds it in abeyance to allow the petitioner to return to state court to exhaust his unexhausted claims. Rhines, 544 U.S. at 275-76. Once the petitioner completes the exhaustion process, the district court enters an order lifting the stay and allows the petitioner to proceed in federal court. Id. Reasonable time limits are to be placed on the petitioner's trip to state court and back to federal court so as not to undermine the goals sought to be achieved by AEDPA's statute of limitations. Id. at 278 (citation omitted).

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