Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/93461/block-vs-hirsch
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 04:37:45+00:00

Document:
Held: (1) That the legislative declaration of facts affording the ground for the regulation was entitled to great respect, and was confirmed by common knowledge. P. 256 U. S. 154 .
(2) That the exigency existing in the District clothed the letting of buildings there with a public interest so great as to justify regulation by law, i.e., by the police power of Congress -- while such exigency lasts. P. 256 U. S. 155 .
(3) That, assuming the owner in this case did not desire the premises for his own use (as it might have turned out if the entire law had not been declared void) and treating the property as held for rent, the effect of the act, in allowing the tenant to retain possession at the rent stipulated in the expired lease or as it might be modified by the commission, was not, under the circumstances, an unconstitutional restriction of the owner's dominion and right of contract or a taking of his property for a use not public. P. 256 U. S. 156 .
(4) That such regulation was justified as a temporary measure, even though it might not be as a permanent change. P. 256 U. S. 157 .
(5) That it did not become otherwise if the "reasonable rent" it secured meant depriving the owner, in part at least, of the power of profiting by the sudden influx of people to Washington, caused by the needs of the Government and the War. P. 256 U. S. 157 .
(6) That the preference given to the tenant in possession was justified as an incident of the policy of the legislation. P. 256 U. S. 157 .
(7) That, the end being legitimate and the means reasonably related to it, the wisdom of the means was not for the courts to pass upon. P. 256 U. S. 158 .
(8) That the court was not prepared to say in this case that the law, being valid in its principal aspects, was invalid insofar as it might operate to deprive landlords and tenants of trial by jury on the right to possession. P. 256 U. S. 158 .
The general proposition to be maintained is that circumstances have clothed the letting of buildings in the District of Columbia with a public interest so great as to justify regulation by law. Plainly circumstances may so change in time or so differ in space as to clothe with such an interest what at other times or in other places would be a matter of purely private concern. It is enough to refer to the decisions as to insurance, in German Alliance Insurance Co. v. Lewis, 233 U. S. 389 ; irrigation, in Clark v. Nash, 198 U. S. 361 , and mining, in Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 200 U. S. 527 . They sufficiently illustrate what hardly would be denied. They illustrate also that the use by the public generally of each specific thing affected cannot be made the test of public interest, Mt. Vernon-Woodberry Cotton Duck Co. v. Alabama Interstate Power Co., 240 U. S. 30 , 240 U. S. 32 , and that the public interest may extend to the use of land. They dispel the notion that what in its immediate aspect may be only a private transaction may not be raised by its class or character to a public affair. See also Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U. S. 104 , 219 U. S. 110 , 219 U. S. 111 .
be disposed of now. The main point against the law is that tenants are allowed to remain in possession at the same rent that they have been paying, unless modified by the Commission established by the act, and that, thus, the use of the land and the right of the owner to do what he will with his own and to make what contracts he pleases are cut down. But if the public interest be established, the regulation of rates is one of the first forms in which it is asserted, and the validity of such regulation has been settled since Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113 . It is said that a grain elevator may go out of business, whereas here the use is fastened upon the land. The power to go out of business, when it exists, is an illusory answer to gas companies and waterworks, but we need not stop at that. The regulation is put and justified only as a temporary measure. See Wilson v. New, 243 U. S. 332 , 243 U. S. 345 , 243 U. S. 346 . Fort Smith & Western R.R. Co. v. Mills, 253 U. S. 206 . A limit in time, to tide over a passing trouble, well may justify a law that could not be upheld as a permanent change.
Assuming that the end in view otherwise justified the means adopted by Congress, we have no concern, of course, with the question whether those means were the wisest, whether they may not cost more than they come to, or will effect the result desired. It is enough that we are not warranted in saying that legislation that has been resorted to for the same purpose all over the world is futile or has no reasonable relation to the relief sought. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. McGuire, 219 U. S. 549 , 219 U. S. 569 .
The National Government by the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, and the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, are forbidden to deprive any person of "life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." A further provision of the Fifth Amendment is that private property cannot be taken for public use, without just compensation. And there is a special security to contracts in § 10 of Article I in the provision that "No State shall . . . pass any . . . law impairing the obligation of contracts. . . ." These provisions are limitations upon the national legislation, with which this case is concerned, and limitations upon state legislation, with which Marcus Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman, post 256 U. S. 170 , is concerned. We shall more or less consider the cases together, as they were argued and submitted on the same day and practically depend upon the same principles, and what we say about one applies to the other.
The "strength of the fabric" cannot be assigned to anyone provision; it is the contribution of all, and therefore it is not the expression of too much anxiety to declare that a violation of any of its prohibitions is an evil -- an evil in the circumstance of violation, of greater evil because of its example and malign instruction. And against the first step to it this court has warned, expressing a maxim of experience -- " Withstand beginnings. " Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616 , 116 U. S. 635 . Who can know to what end they will conduct?
There can be no conception of property aside from its control and use, and upon its use depends its value. Branson v. Bush, 251 U. S. 182 , 251 U. S. 187 . Protection to it has been regarded as a vital principle of republican institutions. It is next in degree to the protection of personal liberty and freedom from undue interference or molestation. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226 . Our social system rests largely upon its sanctity, "and that State or community which seeks to invade it will soon discover the error in the disaster which follows." Knoxville v. Knoxville Water Co., 212 U. S. 1 , 212 U. S. 18 .
But what is the power that is put in opposition to the Constitution and supersedes its prohibitions? It is not clear from the opinion what it is. The opinion gives to the police power a certain force, but its range is not defined. Circumstances, it is said, "have clothed the letting of buildings in the District of Columbia with a public interest so great as to justify regulation by law," though at other times and places such letting may be only of private concern, and the deduction is justified, it is said by analogy to the business of insurance, the business of irrigation, and the business of mining. German Alliance Insurance Co. v. Lewis, 233 U. S. 389 ; Clark v. Nash, 198 U. S. 361 ; Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 200 U. S. 527 . It is difficult to handle the cases or the assertion of what they decide. An opposing denial only is available.
* Welch v. Swasey, 214 U. S. 91 ; Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania, 232 U. S. 531 ; St. Louis Poster Advertising Co. v. St. Louis, 249 U. S. 269 ; Perley v. North Carolina, 249 U. S. 510 .

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