Source: https://blog.clearstoneip.com/
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 09:04:25+00:00

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The Federal Circuit issued an interesting decision involving willful infringement last week, in particular relating to evidence needed to support a period of time during which the alleged willful activity took place. In SRI International, Inc. v. Cisco Systems, Inc., the appeals court found that SRI had not presented sufficient evidence to support a willfulness finding for activity that took place before Cisco had become aware of the patent-in-suit. The court vacated the district court’s award of enhanced damages (which doubled the $23 million damages verdict). The Federal Circuit remanded for further consideration as to whether substantial evidence supported willfulness after knowledge had been acquired.
The district court relied on two primary pieces of evidence asserted by SRI in finding Cisco’s infringement to be willful: (1) “key” Cisco employees did not read the patents-in-suit until their depositions; and (2) Cisco designed the products and services in an infringing manner and that Cisco instructed its customers to use the products and services in an infringing manner.
As to the second of SRI’s willfulness arguments, that Cisco designed products in an infringing manner, the appeals court noted that this point simply amounts to proof that the products infringed. That is, there is nothing further to show that Cisco had knowledge of the patents prior to 2012 and otherwise acted egregiously.
However, it was undisputed that Cisco was aware of the patents-in-suit as of May 2012 (when SRI sent a notice letter to Cisco) and that Cisco could still face enhanced damages based on its behavior after that date upon remand. But two impediments may make this determination on remand rather difficult: (1) as the Federal Circuit noted, JMOL proceedings are not the ideal mechanism to evaluate when, if ever, willful infringement began; and (2) the jury trial took place prior to the Supreme Court’s Halo decision, which critically changed the willfulness standard. As a result, it appears unlikely that the factual record in the case will sufficiently support a finding of willful infringement under current law, without further proceedings.
Deloitte recently published a survey of 300 in-house legal department executives in nine different countries about their transformations in making better use of advances in technology to maximize efficiency, reduce cost and free up lawyers’ time to work more closely with the organization as a trusted business partner.
Risk management functions lead the way in readiness and adoption, which aligns well with our mission at ClearstoneIP to bring efficiencies and insight in patent risk management (i.e., freedom-to-operate and patent clearance).
Last week at the AIPLA Annual Meeting I had the pleasure of participating in a panel discussion on the topic of Defending Against Willful Infringement Post-Halo. Moderated by Jesse Adland, in-house counsel at AMD, and joined by Natalie Morgan of Wilson Sonsini, Sarah Guske of Baker Botts and the Honorable Judge Kewalramani of the Central District of California, each of the panel members presented a different aspect of life after Halo v. Pulse.
Natalie started us off with an excellent historical summary of the willful infringement doctrine. I followed with a look at pre-suit considerations to best position ourselves to defend against willfulness. Sarah then discussed various things to keep in mind and plan for during litigation, citing various data-based findings. Judge Kewalramani concluded with a unique from-the-bench perspective of pleadings trends and how recent plaintiffs have survived or failed on motions to dismiss.
From Natalie’s historical summary it was evident that one of the most uncertain areas in the current doctrine is the scope and treatment of waiver of the attorney-client privilege. For example, did Halo have any impact on Seagate’s exclusion of trial counsel from waiver? Will there be a mechanism to allow defendants to waive privilege for purposes of defending against willful infringement while maintaining privilege for the underlying infringement case?
The waiver issue bears heavily on both pre- and post-litigation considerations as attorneys try to understand the circumstances under which privilege will be protected. For now, we know that trial bifurcation is available at the courts’ discretion to resolve the Quantum dilemma, but it remains to be seen whether it is something that counsel can rely upon.
In my presentation on pre-suit considerations, I emphasized the important underlying theme of creating a record of diligence as early as possible. Timing matters. Whether the infringer, when they knew of the other’s patent, investigated the scope of the patent and formed a good-faith belief that it was invalid or that it was not infringed is one of the most important factors in determining willful infringement.
The best way to demonstrate compliance with this factor is to make sure that known patents are reasonably investigated as soon as possible. That includes whether the patents become known through routine clearance efforts or upon notice from the patentholder. A reasonable investigation does not require a formal counsel opinion or even an attorney in some situations, as some post-Halo cases have declined to enhance damages when the investigation was performed by a competently trained engineer. It is important to show that a designated decision-maker has reviewed the patent and its claims in relation to the accused product and has arrived at non-infringement or invalidity positions, or both.
Sarah followed up on the concerns that Natalie raised about privilege waiver, bifurcation, and general trial strategy. She highlighted the significant impact that willful infringement has when it is heard in the same trial as the underlying infringement case.
Sarah’s data showed that, in bifurcated trials, juries found willful infringement only 33% of the time, while willfulness in trials that were not bifurcated jumped up to an 81% occurrence rate. This data underscores the undue impact that willfulness-related issues (which involve a lot of derogatory characterizations of behavior and motive) can have on pure infringement issues (which are predominantly technical).
Judge Kewalramani concluded the panel presentations by providing unique insight into some of the issues that district courts are wrestling with in Halo’s aftermath. He touched on pleading requirements for willful infringement and the unclear importance of addressing the Read factors when assessing enhanced damages, among others.
A key observation that the Judge noted, and which has been a frequent subject of motions to dismiss, is that complaints are more likely to pass muster when they allege facts beyond mere knowledge of the asserted patent. To survive dismissals, complaints should provide a factual basis to suggest that the defendant ignored or otherwise failed to take reasonable action despite repeated attempts to engage by the patentholder.
If you’d like a copy of my presentation, please contact us.
Earlier this week, the Supreme Court issued an order denying certiorari in Bombardier Recreational Products Inc. v. Arctic Cat Inc. As a result, the holding of the underlying Federal Circuit case remains intact. We discussed this case and its implications in a blog post several weeks ago.
Halo did not disturb the substantive standard for the second prong of Seagate, subjective willfulness. Rather, Halo emphasized that subjective willfulness alone—i.e., proof that the defendant acted despite a risk of infringement that was “‘either known or so obvious that it should have been known to the accused infringer,'” Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1930 (quoting Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371)—can support an award of enhanced damages.
Bombardier challenged this holding as amounting to a negligence standard. Arctic Cat disagreed, arguing that the language comes from longstanding Supreme Court precedent defining “recklessness.” Irrespective of the label, the fact remains that willful infringement continues to be assessed according to a “knew or should have known” standard.
What does this mean to innovators and manufacturers? While there are still very few cases that have actually tested the “should have known” portion of the standard after Halo, producers should consider the following items.
First, a notion of slight comfort: mere knowledge of a patent has generally been insufficient to find subjective willfulness. A patentee must typically show that the accused infringer was in some way aware of a risk of infringement or that it was otherwise obvious. However, where the parties are close competitors who frequently assess each other’s patent portfolios, it may be possible for the patentee to demonstrate that the accused infringer should have known about the risk and therefore acted willfully even if it cannot prove direct knowledge of the patent-in-suit.
A “should have known” test necessitates a comparison between an accused infringer’s behavior and what should be expected from reasonable participants in a similar position. Companies should therefore familiarize themselves with relevant industry customs and standards with respect to freedom-to-operate, clearance, and diligence investigations to ensure that they are acting reasonably. If standards are unclear, companies should think about generating internal policies that set forth clear processes for handling and investigating third-party patents.
Well-documented records of investigation are key. It is important to establish early non-infringement and/or invalidity positions reflecting the beliefs of a competent decision-maker that is supported by a reasoned approach. The decision-maker need not be an attorney, but should be someone that has some degree of understanding as to how patents are interpreted.
Consider privilege issues. In some cases courts will grant a bifurcated trial to separate liability issues from damages issues, which would allow a defendant to maintain privilege for the liability case while choosing to waive privilege to defend against a charge of willfulness, if it becomes necessary (this is to address the so-called “Quantum dilemma”). To prepare for the possibility that bifurcation may not be granted, companies should consider how they might build non-privileged documentation that supports a subjective belief of non-infringement, or to compartmentalize privileged information that is intended to be waived if necessary.
We will also be keeping an eye on Corning Optical Comms. LLC v.
PPC Broadband, Inc., in which a petition for writ of certiorari was filed last week. Corning presents essentially the same question as did Bombardier, and also asks whether courts must consider “all relevant circumstances” regarding the infringement, including evidence that the defendant’s position was objectively reasonable in assessing enhanced damages. At first glance, certiorari does not seem likely because one question was already denied in Arctic Cat and the other question does not raise much of a controversial issue. Courts will generally consider the nine Read factors when considering enhanced damages and factor 5 relates to “the closeness of the case,” which is effectively a test of objective reasonableness.
Arctic Cat v. Bombardier at the Supreme Court — Is Willful Infringement Determined by a Negligence Standard?
Currently making its way through the Supreme Court appeal process (petition for certiorari filed, not yet granted), Arctic Cat v. Bombardier is an important willful infringement case that implicates the standard of care applicable to potential infringers when investigating patent risk.
The current rule is that, in order to show willfulness and obtain enhanced damages, a patentee must demonstrate that the infringer acted despite a risk of infringement that “was either known or so obvious that it should have been known.” The phrase “should have known” suggests the existence of a duty of care against which an accused infringer’s actions will be compared.
Does that make it a “negligence” standard? Does it matter? That’s what this case is about.
Specifically, the question presented to the Supreme Court is whether the Supreme Court’s Halo decision changed the prior subjective willfulness inquiry under Seagate (in addition to eliminating the objective inquiry) or if it simply kept the subjective part as it was. Under Seagate, the subjective inquiry required the patentee to demonstrate that a risk of infringement “was either known or so obvious that it should have been known to the accused infringer.” Bombardier argues that Halo changed this rule when the Court stated that “the subjective willfulness of a patent infringer, intentional or knowing, may warrant enhanced damages, without regard to whether his infringement was objectively reckless.” Arctic Cat argues that this statement does not necessarily preclude a “should have known” standard and, further, that the statement is not a controlling holding. This “should have known” language made its way into the jury instructions at trial, which was the basis for Bombardier’s appeal to the Federal Circuit and beyond.
Bombardier knew about the subject patents before they issued and in fact had made a note in a file to reexamine the patent after its issuance.
Bombardier did in fact later learn of the patents about a month after they issued.
The only pre-suit investigation relied upon by Bombardier “consisted of one conclusory sentence on a page of handwritten notes” and pertained to the published application, not the issued claims.
Bombardier recognized a likelihood of infringement of Arctic Cat’s patents and attempted to purchase them through an intermediary (to remain anonymous).
After the patent purchase was unsuccessful and after years of infringing activity, Bombardier sought opinion of counsel regarding infringement and invalidity.
By the time the opinion was received, Bombardier had already known about the patents for 8 years, and had been selling infringing products for at least 5 years.
The jury found willful infringement, and the district court trebled damages to a total of $46 million after consideration of the Read egregiousness factors. The court found that seven of the nine Read factors weighed in favor of enhancement including factors 1 (copying), 2 (lack of investigation), 4 (size and financial condition of infringer), 5 (closeness of the case), 6 (duration of misconduct), 7 (remedial action), and 9 (attempt to conceal misconduct).
Bombardier’s primary argument is that the Supreme Court set out a new standard for subjective willfulness when it stated that “the subjective willfulness of a patent infringer, intentional or knowing, may warrant enhanced damages,” which does not include the “knew or should have known” phrase. Bombardier further argues that “knew or should have known” amounts to a negligence standard and, as such, should not be a basis upon which to award punitive damages.
This case wouldn’t be sitting in Supreme Court chambers if it were easy. On one hand, the phrase “knew or should have known” essentially requires a standard of care against which to compare an accused infringer’s actions. How would you know whether an actor “should have known” about something without applying some kind of duty of care or objective conditions that determine whether they acted appropriately or within reasonable risk? And if a duty of care exists and is breached, isn’t that the definition of negligence?
On the other hand, the phrase “knew or should have known” must be taken in its context. The context typically describes the thing that should have been known as an “unjustifiably high” or “unreasonable” or simply “high” risk of infringement as part of a definition of recklessness. Ultimately, whether the rule is called “negligence” or “recklessness” is largely beside the point because neither label is explicitly part of the rule.
Experienced patent practitioners’ ears are surely ringing at the suggestion of a duty of care with respect to others’ patents. They know that the Federal Circuit unceremoniously disposed of any notion of an affirmative duty of care in 2007 with the Seagate decision. But if a premise of installing the Seagate two-part willfulness test was eliminating the affirmative duty, and Halo overruled Seagate, doesn’t that leave open the possibility that an affirmative duty could re-emerge? Or maybe it still exists in some form, perhaps just not as stringent as the one that Seagate rejected?
The real crux of the issue is where to place the question of objective risk. With an affirmative duty to investigate like that which existed prior to Seagate, opinion of counsel essentially assured objectively reasonable risk at the front end. After Seagate, litigators in infringement suits were tasked with validating objectively reasonable behavior at the back end. So if Halo removed Seagate’s objective inquiry without implementing a duty of care, how do we now balance the requirement for competent patent investigation at the front end without overburdening innovation? In other words, today’s patent thickets can be extremely dense and companies must occasionally launch products at known risk — what is the proper mechanism, if any, to evaluate the reasonableness of that risk and what should be the consequences?
We’ll have more to say on this topic in coming weeks. The Supreme Court is scheduled to decide whether to grant certiorari in Arctic Cat on September 24, 2018.
ClearstoneIP will be attending two major IP community events this fall.
First, it’s the 2018 IPO Annual Meeting in Chicago on September 23-25th. ClearstoneIP will be exhibiting as part of the IP Expo, showcasing our continually evolving cloud platform for managing the complexities of the patent clearance and freedom-to-operate process, Clearstone FTO.
Learn what steps you can take, both pre-suit and during litigation, to minimize your risk of exposure to enhanced damages due to willful infringement.
We hope to see you at these great events!
The Federal Circuit last week affirmed a district court’s denial of enhanced patent infringement damages in Sociedad Espanola de Electromedicina y Calidad v. Blue Ridge X-Ray Co., limiting the total damages to just the $852,000 jury award.
Now, we have long advocated that early competitive patent investigation (e.g., freedom to operate) is not only good for innovation but is also a critical component in helping avoid enhanced damages due to willfulness, but this case was still somewhat surprising. After reading through the appellate briefs, the picture is slightly clearer but it suffices to say that we would not recommend modeling your patent diligence policies after this non-precedential case.
We recommend, at a minimum, that the early patent analysis is performed or reviewed by at least one individual who has a fair degree of competence in both the relevant technical field as well as in basic principles of patent law and claim interpretation. That said, this case is still a testament to the broad notion that early patent investigation is looked upon very favorably by courts when deciding on enhanced damages.
What might have happened here?
Based on pure conjecture and without cynicism, I think this case is simply an example of judicial efficiency trumping process. Sure, the plaintiff had a fairly strong willfulness case, but it was also awarded reasonable royalties well in excess of what it actually argued at trial. The final $852,000 jury verdict is nearly three times as much as the highest amount of reasonable royalty damages argued at trial — $297,500. In fact, these excess damages were the subject of the defendant’s JMOL and subsequent cross-appeal at the Federal Circuit.
The district court (and the Federal Circuit, in turn) could have felt that, yes, the jury should not have awarded damages that were so far beyond the argued amount. But the plaintiff did have a pretty good willfulness case, which could have ended up tripling damages in any event. The resulting competing motions, defendant’s motion to reduce the damages verdict and the plaintiff’s request for enhanced damages, each had merit and would have essentially canceled each other out.
Also of note is that it appears that the above-noted characterizations of the engineer’s analysis (unfamiliarity with patent law and consulting a Korean-English dictionary) were not admitted as evidence at trial, so were not considered by the trial court in deciding the motion for enhanced damages.
I don’t want to overstate any takeaways from this particular case because it was, after all, a non-precedential Rule 36 summary affirmance (decision without opinion), but it is still useful and instructive.
The general takeaway is that the Federal Circuit found no abuse of discretion when a trial court denied awarding enhanced damages even when the jury found that the defendant willfully infringed and intentionally copied the plaintiff’s design. The trial court afforded a great deal of weight to the early pre-suit investigation by a senior engineer even though the only evidence of that investigation was a single undated document that included a very brief analysis and conclusion of non-infringement regarding the patent-in-suit.
Certain patents can carry increased risk and should be investigated as soon as practicable after they become known within an organization. Factors that lead to increased risk include, for example, ownership by a close competitor, ownership by a litigious entity, or close proximity in a technical space.
The investigation should be performed, either primarily or secondarily, by a person or people with sufficient technical and legal competence. Cases have supported the notion that analysis by an engineer can be sufficient as a “reasonable investigation.” Out of further caution, we recommend that a patent professional, such as an agent or attorney, also perform or at least review the analysis.
Review by an attorney can carry the further benefit of establishing a privileged attorney-client communication (an upcoming article will discuss ways to preserve the attorney-client privilege while retaining the option to use the information to defend against willfulness under the new post-Halo paradigm).
Track patent analysis in a systematic way so that issues of authenticity and foundation are not in question (the evidence in Sociedad Espanola was somehow admitted, but certainly raised more than a few questions of authenticity/foundation when considering the deposition testimony). Internal policy directives and software tools should align to ensure that a collective patent review effort is best initiated, captured, and preserved.
Earlier this month, Judge Gilstrap of the Eastern District of Texas issued a post-trial decision penalizing a patent infringer for failing to form a good-faith non-infringement or invalidity position before the lawsuit. The court doubled the $4.1 million verdict for a total of $8.2 million in damages. Eidos Display, LLC v. Chi Mei Innolux Corp., 6:11-cv-00201 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 5, 2018).
This case arose in 2011 when Eidos Display sued a number of defendants alleging infringement of U.S. Patent No. 5,879,958, which related to a method for forming an electro-optical device. Chi Mei Innolux and Chi Mei Optoelectronics (collectively, “Innolux”) were the only defendants remaining when the case went to trial after all of the others settled out.
After trial in mid-2017, the jury returned a verdict finding that Innolux willfully infringed the ‘958 patent and awarded $4.1 million in damages.
Eidos moved for enhanced damages, alleging that Innolux’s conduct was “willful, wanton, malicious, bad-faith, deliberate, consciously wrongful, flagrant, or—indeed—characteristic of a pirate” per the standard set forth in the Supreme Court case Halo v. Pulse (see our earlier discussion of Halo here). As is typical in such cases, the court did not parse the meanings of those flowery words and instead walked through a measured analysis by considering the nine Read factors.
Judge Gilstrap found that five factors favored Eidos’ argument for enhancement, one factor favored Innolux, and three factors were neutral. With the weight of the factors on the plaintiff’s side, Judge Gilstrap opted to enhance the damages by 100%, to $8.2 million, which was short of the fully tripled amount allowed by statute.
Lack of Investigation or Good-Faith Belief of Non-Infringement/Invalidity (Read factor #2) – This factor weighed the heaviest against Innolux. Innolux’s predecessor (CMO) first learned about the ‘958 patent through one of its customers, Fujitsu, who received infringement claims from the patentholder and “repeatedly asked CMO to undertake a serious analysis.” The court found that no good faith pre-suit investigation occurred and that Innolux had not “formed, prior to this lawsuit, any reasonable non-infringement or invalidity positions.” As such, this factor favored enhancement.
Litigation Conduct (Read factor #3) – The court found that Innolux engaged in some degree of discovery misconduct relating to delays in producing documents, waiting until the last minute to resolve disputes, and other gamesmanship tactics. Though the behavior was not so severe as to warrant adverse jury instructions, the court found that it weighed in favor of enhancement.
Lack of Remedial Action (Read factor #7) – There was no real dispute that Innolux did not take any remedial action after learning of the ‘958 patent.
Closeness of the Case (Read factor #5) – The single factor found in Innolux’s favor was supported by the fact that Innolux had previously won summary judgment of invalidity due to indefiniteness, which decision was later reversed by the Federal Circuit on appeal.
Deliberate Copying (Read factor #1) – Eidos conceded that there was no evidence of affirmative copying.
Attempts to Conceal Misconduct (Read factor #9) – To the extent that Innolux’s discovery abuses could be considered an attempt to conceal misconduct, they had already been considered with respect to factor #3. The court did not address any other arguments.
Ignorance is not bliss when it comes to others’ patents.
A solid approach is to adopt a policy of prompt investigation, and to establish reasonable non-infringement or invalidity positions as soon as a relevant patent becomes known by anyone in the company.
Evidence demonstrating pre-suit non-infringement or invalidity positions would likely have saved this defendant $4.1 million, and may have led to design-arounds that could have avoided liability entirely.
Early investigation of patent threats can help avoid a finding of willful infringement; positions developed at the time of litigation are too late and irrelevant.
Prior art-based invalidity positions can form the basis for a subjective intent sufficient to defeat willfulness.
Exmark sued Briggs for infringement of U.S. Patent No. 5,987,863, relating to high-end lawn mowers. After a jury trial, the Nebraska district court awarded $48 million to the plaintiff after doubling the damages as a result of willful infringement. Notably, the trial took place before the Supreme Court’s decision in Halo v. Pulse, which meant that the district court applied the now-overruled Seagate standard for willfulness. After determining that Briggs’ defenses were objectively unreasonable, the trial court precluded Briggs from presenting prior art evidence at trial. Briggs’ hope was to use the prior art evidence to support a subjective state of mind that lacked willfulness.
The district court must reconsider its decision to exclude evidence of the prior art during the jury trial on willfulness to determine whether Briggs had developed any views about the prior art at the time of accused infringement or whether the evidence only relates to Briggs’ litigation-inspired defenses.
The Federal Circuit vacated the damages award and the enhancement due to willfulness, and remanded to the district court for a new trial on those and other issues.
The Exmark case is a straightforward but significant application of the willfulness doctrine after the Supreme Court’s standard-shifting decision in Halo v. Pulse. In Halo, the Court made it easier for a patentee to obtain enhanced damages from a willful infringer by rejecting the “objectively reckless” prong while also lowering the burden of proof from “clear and convincing” to “preponderance of the evidence.” In practice, the former standard allowed even blatant copiers to escape liability for enhanced damages if they could come up with a reasonable non-infringement or invalidity position at the time of litigation. Now, the focus is on the subjective knowledge, intent, and behavior of the infringer at the time of infringement.
Cases following Halo have begun to shape the new willfulness doctrine. While Exmark does not include an extensive discussion regarding willfulness, the takeaways are clear. If Briggs could have shown that it had developed prior art-based invalidity positions when it allegedly committed the infringement, then it would have been able to use that evidence to prove a lack of subjective willfulness and avoid enhanced damages. But if no pre-litigation analysis had taken place, then the trial court would exclude the prior art evidence, and Briggs would likely be liable for up to three times the jury’s damages verdict.
In Presidio Components, Inc. v. Am. Tech. Ceramics Corp., 2016-2607 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 21, 2017), the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of enhanced damages even when the jury determined that the defendant willfully infringed. An engineer for ATC knew about the patent-in-suit for years, which knowledge contributed to the jury’s finding that ATC behaved with reckless disregard. However, due to a later re-examination that resulted in amended claims, the period of infringement was set to begin on a later date — a time when the parties were already well into litigation (the court had issued claim constructions and ATC had developed its defenses). So while the jury found that ATC’s conduct was willful, the district court recognized these “unique circumstances” and ultimately declined to enhance damages because, looking at ATC’s conduct after the relevant date, the case was a “garden-variety” patent infringement action. Had the patent not undergone a re-exam that ended up resetting the infringement period, logic suggests that enhanced damages would have been much more likely.
In Tinnus Enterprises, LLC, Zuru Ltd. v. Telebrands Corporation, 6:16-cv-00033 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 21, 2017), several defendants are currently staring down the barrel of potential liability of up to $36 million (if trebled) after a recent jury verdict of willful infringement. The facts of the case relating to willfulness have not yet come to light, as much of the briefing and trial records are under seal, but we will monitor the case as it makes its way through post-trial motions and appeal. This is a high-profile case against a so-called “knock-off company” that has garnered much attention.
This article is made available for educational purposes only as well as to give you general information and a general understanding of the law, not to provide specific legal advice. By using this blog site you understand that there is no attorney client relationship between you and the author or ClearstoneIP. The blog site should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a licensed professional attorney in your state.
Jackie Hutter thinks differently about IP protection and business value creation, and has built her practice around maximizing businesses’ return on innovation investment. She has a unique ability to recognize and seize opportunity for her clients, rather than put up fences.
Quite simply, because of the functional and elegant dashboard in the Clearstone FTO product, I was able to look at the relevant aspects of each patent document and make substantive notations of the relevance (or lack thereof) at a speed I never before thought possible.
Click here to read Jackie’s article.

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