Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/509/389/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 04:22:12+00:00

Document:
A defendant can plead guilty or waive the right to counsel if it is established that he or she is competent to stand trial.
Mter respondent Moran pleaded not guilty to three counts of first-degree murder and two psychiatrists concluded that he was competent to stand trial, he informed the Nevada trial court that he wished to discharge his attorneys and change his pleas to guilty. The court found that Moran understood "the nature of the criminal charges against him" and was "able to assist in his defense"; that he was "knowingly and intelligently" waiving his right to the assistance of counsel; and that his guilty pleas were "freely and voluntarily" given. He was ultimately sentenced to death. When Moran subsequently sought state postconviction relief, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing before rejecting his claim that he was mentally incompetent to represent himself, and the State Supreme Court dismissed his appeal. A Federal District Court denied his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, but the Court of Appeals reversed. It concluded that due process required the trial court to hold a hearing to evaluate and determine Moran's competency before it accepted his decisions to waive counsel and plead guilty. It also found that the postconviction hearing did not cure the error, holding that the trial court's ruling was premised on the wrong legal standard because competency to waive constitutional rights requires a higher level of mental functioning than that required to stand trial. The court reasoned that, while a defendant is competent to stand trial if he has a rational and factual understanding of the proceedings and is capable of assisting his counsel, he is competent to waive counselor plead guilty only if he has the capacity for reasoned choice among the available alternatives.
whether to testify, whether to waive a jury trial, and whether to crossexamine witnesses for the prosecution. Nor does the decision to waive counsel require an appreciably higher level of mental functioning than the decision to waive other constitutional rights. A higher standard is not necessary in order to ensure that a defendant is competent to represent himself, because the ability to do so has no bearing upon his competence to choose self-representation, Faretta v. California, 422 U. S. 806, 836. When, in Westbrook v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 150 (per curiam), this Court vacated a lower court ruling because there had been no "hearing or inquiry into the issue of [the petitioner's] competence to waive his constitutional right to the assistance of counsel," it did not mean to suggest that the Dusky formulation is not a high enough standard in cases in which the defendant seeks to waive counsel. Rather, the "competence to waive" language was simply a shorthand for the "intelligent and competent waiver" requirement of Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458, 468. Thus, Westbrook stands only for the unremarkable proposition that when a defendant seeks to waive his right to counsel, a determination that he is competent to stand trial is not enough; the waiver must also be intelligent and voluntary before it can be accepted. While States are free to adopt competency standards that are more elaborate than the Dusky formulation, the Due Process Clause does not impose them. Pp. 396-402.
972 F.2d 263, reversed and remanded.
THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C. J., and WHITE, O'CONNOR, and SOUTER, JJ., joined, and in Parts I, II-B, and III of which SCALIA and KENNEDY, JJ., joined. KENNEDY, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which SCALIA, J., joined, post, p. 402. BLACKMUN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which STEVENS, J., joined, post, p. 409.
David F. Sarnowski, Chief Deputy Attorney General of Nevada, argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Frankie Sue Del Papa, Attorney General, and Brooke A. Nielsen, Assistant Attorney General.
Amy L. Wax argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With her on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Bryson, Acting Assistant Attorney General Keeney, and Joel M. Gershowitz.
This case presents the question whether the competency standard for pleading guilty or waiving the right to counsel is higher than the competency standard for standing trial. We hold that it is not.
On August 2, 1984, in the early hours of the morning, respondent entered the Red Pearl Saloon in Las Vegas, Nevada, and shot the bartender and a patron four times each with an automatic pistol. He then walked behind the bar and removed the cash register. Nine days later, respondent arrived at the apartment of his former wife and opened fire on her; five of his seven shots hit their target. Respondent then shot himself in the abdomen and attempted, without success, to slit his wrists. Of the four victims of respondent's gunshots, only respondent himself survived. On August 13, respondent summoned police to his hospital bed and confessed to the killings.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. by Steven R. Shapiro, Diann Y. Rust-Tierney, John A. Powell, and Bruce J. Winick; for the American Psychiatric Association et al. by James W Ellis and Barbara E. Bergman; and for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers by Jon May.
nounced its intention to seek the death penalty. On November 28, 1984, 21/2 months after the psychiatric evaluations, respondent again appeared before the trial court. At this time respondent informed the court that he wished to discharge his attorneys and change his pleas to guilty. The reason for the request, according to respondent, was to prevent the presentation of mitigating evidence at his sentencing.
"is competent in that he knew the nature and quality of his acts, had the capacity to determine right from wrong; that he understands the nature of the criminal charges against him and is able to assist in his defense of such charges, or against the pronouncement of the judgment thereafter; that he knows the consequences of entering a plea of guilty to the charges; and that he can intelligently and knowingly waive his constitutional right to assistance of an attorney." App. 21.
give testimony if called upon to do so." App. 8. The other psychiatrist believed that respondent was "knowledgeable of the charges being made against him"; that he had the ability to "assist his attorney, in his own defense, if he so desire[d]"; and that he was "fully cognizant of the penalties if convicted." Id., at 17.
On January 21, 1985, a three-judge court sentenced respondent to death for each of the murders. The Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed respondent's sentences for the Red Pearl Saloon murders, but reversed his sentence for the murder of his ex-wife and remanded for imposition of a life sentence without the possibility of parole. Moran v. State, 103 Nev. 138, 734 P. 2d 712 (1987).
On July 30, 1987, respondent filed a petition for postconviction relief in state court. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court rejected respondent's claim that he was "mentally incompetent to represent himself," concluding that "the record clearly shows that he was examined by two psychiatrists both of whom declared [him] competent." App. to Pet. for Cert. D-8. The Supreme Court of Nevada dismissed respondent's appeal, Moran v. Warden, 105 Nev. 1041, 810 P. 2d 335, and we denied certiorari, 493 U. S. 874 (1989).
2 During the course of this lengthy exchange, the trial court asked respondent whether he was under the influence of drugs or alcohol, and respondent answered as follows: "Just what they give me in, you know, medications." Id., at 33. The court made no further inquiry. The "medications" to which respondent referred had been prescribed to control his seizures, which were a byproduct of his cocaine use. See App. to Pet. for Cert. D-4.
3 The specific features of the record upon which the Court of Appeals relied were respondent's suicide attempt; his desire to discharge his attorneys so as to prevent the presentation of mitigating evidence at sentencing; his "monosyllabic" responses to the trial court's questions; and the fact that he was on medication at the time he sought to waive his right to counsel and plead guilty. 972 F. 2d, at 265.
4 In holding that respondent was not competent to waive his constitutional rights, the court placed heavy emphasis on the fact that respondent was on medication at the time he sought to discharge his attorneys and plead guilty. See id., at 268.
structed the District Court to issue the writ of habeas corpus within 60 days, "unless the state court allows [respondent] to withdraw his guilty pleas, enter new pleas, and proceed to trial with the assistance of counsel." Id., at 268.
5 While the Ninth Circuit and the District of Columbia Circuit, see United States v. Masthers, 176 U. S. App. D. C. 242,247,539 F.2d 721, 726 (1976), have employed the "reasoned choice" standard for guilty pleas, every other Circuit that has considered the issue has determined that the competency standard for pleading guilty is identical to the competency standard for standing trial. See Allard v. Helgemoe, 572 F.2d 1, 3-6 (CA1), cert. denied, 439 U. S. 858 (1978); United States v. Valentino, 283 F. 2d 634, 635 (CA2 1960) (per curiam); United States ex rel. McGough v. Hewitt, 528 F.2d 339, 342, n. 2 (CA3 1975); Shaw v. Martin, 733 F.2d 304, 314 (CA4), cert. denied, 469 U. S. 873 (1984); Malinauskas v. United States, 505 F.2d 649, 654 (CA5 1974); United States v. Harlan, 480 F.2d 515, 517 (CA6), cert. denied, 414 U. S. 1006 (1973); United States ex rel. Heral v. Franzen, 667 F.2d 633, 638 (CA7 1981); White Hawk v. Solem, 693 F.2d 825, 829-830, n. 7 (CA8 1982), cert. denied, 460 U. S. 1054 (1983); Wolf v. United States, 430 F.2d 443, 444 (CAlO 1970); United States v. Simmons, 961 F.2d 183, 187 (CA111992), cert. denied, 507 U. S. 989 (1993). Three of those same Circuits, however, have indicated that the competency standard for waiving the right to counsel is "vaguely higher" than the competency standard for standing trial, see United States ex rel. Konigsberg v. Vincent, 526 F.2d 131, 133 (CA2 1975), cert. denied, 426 U. S. 937 (1976); United States v. McDowell, 814 F.2d 245, 250 (CA6), cert. denied, 484 U. S. 980 (1987); Blackmon v. Armontrout, 875 F.2d 164, 166 (CA8), cert. denied, 493 U. S. 939 (1989), and one of them has stated that the two standards "may not always be coterminous," United States v. Campbell, 874 F.2d 838, 846 (CA1 1989). Only the Ninth Circuit applies the "reasoned choice" standard to waivers of counsel, and only the Seventh Circuit, see United States v. Clark, 943 F.2d 775, 782 (1991), cert. pending, No. 92-6439, has held that the competency standard for waiving counsel is identical to the competency standard for standing trial. The Fourth Circuit has expressed the view that the two standards are "closely linked." United States v. McGinnis, 384 F.2d 875, 877 (1967) (per curiam), cert. denied, 390 U. S. 990 (1968).
sort.6 We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict. 506 U. S. 1033 (1992).
A criminal defendant may not be tried unless he is competent, Pate v. Robinson, 383 U. S. 375, 378 (1966), and he may not waive his right to counselor plead guilty unless he does so "competently and intelligently," Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458, 468 (1938); accord, Brady v. United States, 397 U. S. 742, 758 (1970). In Dusky v. United States, 362 U. S. 402 (1960) (per curiam), we held that the standard for competence to stand trial is whether the defendant has "sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding" and has "a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him." Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). Accord, Drope v. Missouri, 420 U. S. 162, 171 (1975) ("[A] person whose mental condition is such that he lacks the capacity to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to consult with counsel, and to assist in preparing his defense may not be subjected to a trial"). While we have described the standard for competence to stand trial, however, we have never expressly articulated a standard for competence to plead guilty or to waive the right to the assistance of counsel.
Relying in large part upon our decision in Westbrook v.
6 Compare, e. g., State v. Sims, 118 Ariz. 210, 215, 575 P. 2d 1236, 1241 (1978) (heightened standard for guilty plea); and Pickens v. State, 96 Wis. 2d 549, 567-568, 292 N. W. 2d 601, 610-611 (1980) (heightened standard for waiver of counsel), with People v. Heral, 62 Ill. 2d 329, 334, 342 N. E. 2d 34, 37 (1976) (identical standard for pleading guilty and standing trial); and People v. Reason, 37 N. Y. 2d 351, 353-354, 334 N. E. 2d 572, 574 (1975) (identical standard for waiving counsel and standing trial).
7 A criminal defendant waives three constitutional rights when he pleads guilty: the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to a jury trial, and the right to confront one's accusers. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U. S. 238, 243 (1969).
8 Although this case comes to us by way of federal habeas corpus, we do not dispose of it on the ground that the heightened competency standard is a "new rule" for purposes of Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288 (1989), because petitioner did not raise a Teague defense in the lower courts or in his petition for certiorari. See Parke v. Raley, 506 U. S. 20, 26 (1992); Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U. S. 37, 41 (1990).
Respondent 17-18, 27, 32; see also Tr. of Oral Arg. 33 ("Due process does not require [a] higher standard, [it] requires a separate inquiry").9 But even assuming that there is some meaningful distinction between the capacity for "reasoned choice" and a "rational understanding" of the proceedings, we reject the notion that competence to plead guilty or to waive the right to counsel must be measured by a standard that is higher than (or even different from) the Dusky standard.
9We have used the phrase "rational choice" in describing the competence necessary to withdraw a certiorari petition, Rees v. Peyton, 384 U. S. 312,314 (1966) (per curiam), but there is no indication in that opinion that the phrase means something different from "rational understanding."
time, without the distraction and burden of a trial.) This being so, we can conceive of no basis for demanding a higher level of competence for those defendants who choose to plead guilty. If the Dusky standard is adequate for defendants who plead not guilty, it is necessarily adequate for those who plead guilty.
whether such a defendant is competent to waive the right to counsel that (after Gideon) he under all circumstances has.
H We note also that the prohibition against the trial of incompetent defendants dates back at least to the time of Blackstone, see Medina v. California, 505 U. S. 437,446 (1992); Drope v. Missouri, 420 U. S. 162,171-172 (1975); Youtsey v. United States, 97 F.9d 7,940 (CA6 1899) (collecting "common law authorities"), and that "[b]y the common law of that time, it was not representation by counsel but self-representation that was the practice in prosecutions for serious crime," Faretta v. California, 422 U. S., at 823; accord, id., at 850 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting) ("selfrepresentation was common, if not required, in 18th century English and American prosecutions"). It would therefore be "difficult to say that a standard which was designed to determine whether a defendant was capable of defending himself" is "inadequate when he chooses to conduct his own defense." People v. Reason, 37 N. Y. 2d, at 354, 334 N. E. 2d, at 574.
12 The focus of a competency inquiry is the defendant's mental capacity; the question is whether he has the ability to understand the proceedings. See Drope v. Missouri, supra, at 171 (defendant is incompetent if he "lacks the capacity to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him") (emphasis added). The purpose of the "knowing and voluntary" inquiry, by contrast, is to determine whether the defendant actually does understand the significance and consequences of a particular decision and whether the decision is uncoerced. See Faretta v. California, supra, at 835 (defendant waiving counsel must be "made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that 'he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open''') (quoting Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U. S. 269,279 (1942)); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U. S., at 244 (defendant pleading guilty must have "a full understanding of what the plea connotes and of its consequence").
13We do not mean to suggest, of course, that a court is required to make a competency determination in every case in which a defendant seeks to plead guilty or to waive his right to counsel. As in any criminal case, a competency determination is necessary only when a court has reason to doubt the defendant's competence. See Drope v. Missouri, supra, at 180181; Pate v. Robinson, 383 U. S. 375, 385 (1966).
Requiring that a criminal defendant be competent has a modest aim: It seeks to ensure that he has the capacity to understand the proceedings and to assist counsel. While psychiatrists and scholars may find it useful to classify the various kinds and degrees of competence, and while States are free to adopt competency standards that are more elaborate than the Dusky formulation, the Due Process Clause does not impose these additional requirements. Cf. Medina v. California, 505 U. S. 437, 446-453 (1992). The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I am in full agreement with the Court's decision that the competency standard for pleading guilty and waiving the right to counsel is the same as the test of competency to stand trial. As I have some reservations about one part of the Court's opinion and take a somewhat different path to reach my conclusion, it is appropriate to make some further observations.
14 In this case the trial court explicitly found both that respondent was competent and that his waivers were knowing and voluntary. See supra, at 392-393.
competency required by the Due Process Clause if the decisions were not equivalent. I have serious doubts about that proposition. In discussing the standard for a criminal defendant's competency to make decisions affecting his case, we should not confuse the content of the standard with the occasions for its application.
We must leave aside in this case any question whether a defendant is absolved of criminal responsibility due to his mental state at the time he committed criminal acts and any later question about whether the defendant has the minimum competence necessary to undergo his sentence. What is at issue here is whether the defendant has sufficient competence to take part in a criminal proceeding and to make the decisions throughout its course. This is not to imply that mental competence is the only aspect of a defendant's state of mind that is relevant during criminal proceedings. Whether the defendant has made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary decision to make certain fundamental choices during the course of criminal proceedings is another subject of judicial inquiry. That both questions might be implicated at any given point, however, does not mean that the inquiries cease to be discrete. And as it comes to us, this case involves only the standard for determining competency.
with [a] lawyer," the crucial component of the inquiry is the defendant's possession of "a reasonable degree of rational understanding." In other words, the focus of the Dusky formulation is on a particular level of mental functioning, which the ability to consult counsel helps identify. The possibility that consultation will occur is not required for the standard to serve its purpose. If a defendant elects to stand trial and to take the foolish course of acting as his own counsel, the law does not for that reason require any added degree of competence. See ante, at 399-400, n. 10.
The Due Process Clause does not mandate different standards of competency at various stages of or for different decisions made during the criminal proceedings. That was never the rule at common law, and it would take some extraordinary showing of the inadequacy of a single standard of competency for us to require States to employ heightened standards. See Medina v. California, 505 U. S. 437, 446447 (1992). Indeed, we should only overturn Nevada's use of a single standard if it "'offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.'" Ibid. (quoting Patterson v. New York, 432 U. S. 197, 202 (1977)).
"[I]f a man in his sound memory commits a capital offence, and before arraignment for it, he becomes mad, he ought not to be arraigned for it; because he is not able to plead to it with that advice and caution that he ought. And if, after he has pleaded, the prisoner becomes mad, he shall not be tried; for how can he make his defence?" 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *24.
Accord, 1 M. Hale, Pleas of the Crown *34-*35.
Blackstone drew no distinction between madness for purposes of pleading and madness for purposes of going to trial. An English case arising in the Crown Court in 1865 indicates that a single standard was applied to assess competency at the time of arraignment, the time of pleading, and throughout the course of trial. See Regina v. Southey, 4 Fos. & Fin. 864, 872, n. a, 176 Eng. Rep. 825, 828, n. a (N. P. 1865) ("Assuming the prisoner to be insane at the time of arraignment, he cannot be tried at all, with or without counsel, for, even assuming that he has appointed counsel at a time when he was sane, it is not fit that he should be tried, as he cannot understand the evidence, nor the proceedings, and so is unable to instruct counsel, or to withdraw his authority if he acts improperly, as a prisoner may always do"); id., at 877, n. a, 176 Eng. Rep., at 831, n. a ("[I]f [the defendant] be so insane as not to understand the nature of the proceedings, he cannot plead").
A number of 19th-century American cases also referred to insanity in a manner that suggested there was a single standard by which competency was to be assessed throughout legal proceedings. See, e. g., Underwood v. People, 32 Mich. 1, 3 (1875) ("[I]nsanity, when discovered, was held at common law to bar any further steps against a prisoner, at whatever stage of the proceedings"); Crocker v. State, 60 Wis. 553, 556, 19 N. W. 435, 436 (1884) ("At common law, if a person, after committing a crime, became insane, he was not arraigned during his insanity, but was remitted to prison until such incapacity was removed. The same was true where he became insane after his plea of not guilty and before trial"); State v. Reed, 41 La. Ann. 581, 582, 7 So. 132 (1889) ("It is elementary that a man cannot plead, or be tried, or convicted, or sentenced, while in a state of insanity"). See also 2 J. Bishop, Commentaries on Law of Criminal Procedure §§ 664, 667 (2d ed. 1872) ("[A] prisoner cannot be tried, sentenced, or punished" unless he is "mentally competent to make a rational defense").
Other American cases describe the standard by which competency is to be measured in a way that supports the idea that a single standard, parallel to that articulated in Dusky, is applied no matter at what point during legal proceedings a competency question should arise. For example, in Freeman v. People, 4 Denio 2 (N. Y. 1847), it was held: "If ... a person arraigned for a crime, is capable of understanding the nature and object of the proceedings going on against him; if he rightly comprehends his own condition in reference to such proceedings, and can conduct his defence in a rational manner, he is, for the purpose of being tried, to be deemed sane." Id., at 24-25. Because the competency question was posed in Freeman at the time the defendant was to be arraigned, id., at 19, the Freeman court's conception of competency to stand trial was that of a single standard to be applied throughout.
"The rule at common law ... is that if at any time while criminal proceedings are pending against a person accused of a crime, the trial court either from observation or upon suggestion of counsel has facts brought to his attention which raise a doubt of the sanity of defendant, the question should be settled before further steps are taken .... The broad question to be determined then is whether the defendant is capable of understanding the proceedings and of making his defense, and whether he may have a full, fair and impartial trial." Id., at 191 (citation omitted).
ant must make during the course of those proceedings. See Commonwealth v. Woelfel, 88 S. W. 1061, 1062 (Ky. 1905); Jordan v. State, 135 S. W. 327, 328-329 (Tenn. 1911); State v. Seminary, 115 So. 370, 371-372 (La. 1927); State ex rel. Townsend v. Bushong, 146 Ohio St. 271, 272, 65 N. E. 2d 407,408 (1946) (per curiam); Moss v. Hunter, 167 F.2d 683, 684-685 (CAlO 1948). Commentators have agreed that the common-law standard of competency to stand trial, which parallels the Dusky standard, has been applied throughout criminal proceedings, not just to the formal trial. See H. Weihofen, Mental Disorder as a Criminal Defense 428429, 431 (1954) ("It has long been the rule of the common law that a person cannot be required to plead to an indictment or be tried for a crime while he is so mentally disordered as to be incapable of making a rational defense"); S. Brakel, J. Parry, and A. Weiner, The Mentally Disabled and the Law 695-696 (3d ed. 1985) ("It has traditionally been presumed that competency to stand trial means competency to participate in all phases of the trial process, including such pretrial activities as deciding how to plead, participating in plea bargaining, and deciding whether to assert or waive the right to counsel").
That the common law did not adopt heightened competency standards is readily understood when one considers the difficulties that would be associated with more than one standard. The standard applicable at a given point in a trial could be difficult to ascertain. For instance, if a defendant decides to change his plea to guilty after a trial has commenced, one court might apply the competency standard for undergoing trial while another court might use the standard for pleading guilty. In addition, the subtle nuances among different standards are likely to be difficult to differentiate, as evidenced by the lack of any clear distinction between a "rational understanding" and a "reasoned choice" in this case. See ante, at 398.
It is true, of course, that if a defendant stands trial instead of pleading guilty, there will be more occasions for the trial court to observe the condition of the defendant to determine his mental competence. Trial courts have the obligation of conducting a hearing whenever there is sufficient doubt concerning a defendant's competence. See Drope v. Missouri, 420 U. S. 162, 180-181 (1975). The standard by which competency is assessed, however, does not change. Respondent's counsel conceded as much during oral argument, making no attempt to defend the contrary position of the Court of Appeals. See, e. g., Tr. of Oral Arg. 22 ("This is not a case of heightened standards"); id., at 31 ("We didn't argue a heightened standard. We did not argue a heightened standard to the Ninth Circuit, nor did we necessarily argue a heightened standard at any juncture in this case"); id., at 33 ("Due process does not require this higher standard, but requires a separate inquiry").
A single standard of competency to be applied throughout criminal proceedings does not offend any "'principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.'" Medina, 505 U. S., at 446. Nothing in our case law compels a contrary conclusion, and adoption of a rule setting out varying competency standards for each decision and stage of a criminal proceeding would disrupt the orderly course of trial and, from the standpoint of all parties, prove unworkable both at trial and on appellate review.
I would avoid the difficult comparisons engaged in by the Court. In my view, due process does not preclude Nevada's use of a single competency standard for all aspects of the criminal proceeding. Respondent's decision to plead guilty and his decision to waive counsel were grave choices for him to make, but as the Court demonstrates in Part II-B, there is a heightened standard, albeit not one concerned with competence, that must be met before a defendant is allowed to make those decisions.
With these observations, I concur in the judgment and in Parts I, II-B, and III of the Court's opinion.
Today, the majority holds that a standard of competence designed to measure a defendant's ability to consult with counsel and to assist in preparing his defense is constitutionally adequate to assess a defendant's competence to waive the right to counsel and represent himself. In so doing, the majority upholds the death sentence for a person whose decision to discharge counsel, plead guilty, and present no defense well may have been the product of medication or mental illness. I believe the majority's analysis is contrary to both common sense and longstanding case law. Therefore, I dissent.
As a preliminary matter, the circumstances under which respondent Richard Allan Moran waived his right to an attorney and pleaded guilty to capital murder bear elaboration. For, although the majority's exposition of the events is accurate, the most significant facts are omitted or relegated to footnotes.
In August 1984, after killing three people and wounding himself in an attempt to commit suicide, Moran was charged in a Nevada state court with three counts of capital murder. He pleaded not guilty to all charges, and the trial court ordered a psychiatric evaluation. At this stage, Moran's competence to represent himself was not at issue.
chologically, and perhaps legally speaking, this man, because he is expressing and feeling considerable remorse and guilt, may be inclined to exert less effort towards his own defense." Ibid. Nevertheless, under the circumstances, Dr. Jurasky felt that Moran's depressed state of mind was not "necessarily a major consideration." Ibid. Dr. William D. O'Gorman also characterized Moran as "very depressed," remarking that he "showed much tearing in talking about the episodes that led up to his present incarceration, particularly in talking about his ex-wife." Id., at 15-16. But Dr. O'Gorman ultimately concluded that Moran "is knowledgeable of the charges being made against him" and "can assist his attorney, in his own defense, if he so desires." Id., at 17.
1 Moran's medical records, read in conjunction with the Physician's Desk Reference (46 ed. 1992), corroborate his testimony concerning the medications he received and their impact upon him. The records show that Moran was administered dilantin, an antiepileptic medication that may cause confusion; inderal, a beta-blocker antiarrhythmic that may cause light-headedness, mental depression, hallucinations, disorientation, and short-term memory loss; and vistaril, a depressant that may cause drowsiness, tremors, and convulsions. App. 97-98.
for and against the proposed action. Did you do that?" This time, Moran responded: "Yes." Ibid.
It was only after prodding Moran through the plea colloquy in this manner that the trial judge concluded that he was competent to stand trial and that he voluntarily and intelligently had waived his right to counsel. Accordingly, Moran was allowed to plead guilty and appear without counsel at his sentencing hearing. Moran presented no defense, called no witness, and offered no mitigating evidence on his own behalf. Not surprisingly, he was sentenced to death.
It is axiomatic by now that criminal prosecution of an incompetent defendant offends the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Medina v. California, 505 U. S. 437 (1992); Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U. S. 127, 138 (1992) (KENNEDY, J., concurring); Drope v. Missouri, 420 U. S. 162, 171 (1975); Pate v. Robinson, 383 U. S. 375, 378 (1966). The majority does not deny this principle, nor does it dispute the standard that has been set for competence to stand trial with the assistance of counsel: whether the accused possesses "the capacity to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to consult with counsel, and to assist in preparing his defense." Drope, 420 U. S., at 171. Accord, Dusky v. United States, 362 U. S. 402 (1960). My disagreement with the majority turns, then, upon another standardthe one for assessing a defendant's competence to waive counsel and represent himself.
competent to stand trial establishes only that he is capable of aiding his attorney in making the critical decisions required at trial or in plea negotiations. The reliability or even relevance of such a finding vanishes when its basic premise-that counsel will be present-ceases to exist. The question is no longer whether the defendant can proceed with an attorney, but whether he can proceed alone and uncounseled. I do not believe we place an excessive burden upon a trial court by requiring it to conduct a specific inquiry into that question at the juncture when a defendant whose competency already has been questioned seeks to waive counsel and represent himself.
The majority concludes that there is no need for such a hearing because a defendant who is found competent to stand trial with the assistance of counsel is, ipso facto, competent to discharge counsel and represent himself. But the majority cannot isolate the term "competent" and apply it in a vacuum, divorced from its specific context. A person who is "competent" to play basketball is not thereby "competent" to play the violin. The majority's monolithic approach to competency is true to neither life nor the law. Competency for one purpose does not necessarily translate to competency for another purpose. See Bonnie, The Competence of Criminal Defendants: A Theoretical Reformulation, 10 Behav. Sci. & L. 291, 299 (1992); R. Roesch & S. Golding, Competency to Stand Trial 10-13 (1980). Consistent with this commonsense notion, our cases always have recognized that "a defendant's mental condition may be relevant to more than one legal issue, each governed by distinct rules reflecting quite different policies." Drope, 420 U. S., at 176. See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U. S. 715, 739 (1972). To this end, this Court has required competency evaluations to be specifically tailored to the context and purpose of a proceeding. See Rees v. Peyton, 384 U. S. 312, 314 (1966) (directing court "to determine [petitioner's] mental competence in the present posture of things").
"Although petitioner received a hearing on the issue of his competence to stand trial, there appears to have been no hearing or inquiry into the issue of his competence to waive his constitutional right to the assistance of counsel and proceed, as he did, to conduct his own defense." See also Medina, 505 U. S., at 446-448 (distinguishing between a claim of incompetence and a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity); Riggins, 504 U. S., at 140-144 (KENNEDY, J., concurring) (distinguishing between functional competence and competence to stand trial).
2 The majority's attempt to distinguish Massey as a pre-Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 (1963), case, ante, at 399-400, n. 10, is simply irrelevant. For, as the majority itself concedes, Massey stands only for the proposition that the two inquiries are different-competency to stand trial with the assistance of counsel is not equivalent to competency to proceed alone.
3 According to the majority, "there is no indication ... that the phrase ['rational choice'] means something different from 'rational understanding.''' Ante, at 398, n. 9. What the majority fails to recognize is that, in the distinction between a defendant who possesses a "rational understanding" of the proceedings and one who is able to make a "rational choice," lies the difference between the capacity for passive and active involvement in the proceedings.
4 According to the majority, "Westbrook stands only for the unremarkable proposition" that a determination of competence to stand trial is not sufficient to waive the right to counsel; "the waiver must also be intelligent and voluntary before it can be accepted." Ante, at 401-402. But the majority's attempt to transform a case about the competency to waive counsel into a case about the voluntariness of a waiver needlessly complicates this area of the law. Perhaps competence to waive rights is incorporated into a voluntariness inquiry, but there is no necessary link between the two concepts.
self-representation." Ante, at 400. But Faretta does not confer upon an incompetent defendant a constitutional right to conduct his own defense. Indeed, Faretta himself was "literate, competent, and understanding," and the record showed that "he was voluntarily exercising his informed free will." 422 U. S., at 835. "Although a defendant need not himself have the skill and experience of a lawyer," Faretta's right of self-representation is confined to those who are able to choose it "competently and intelligently." Ibid. The Faretta Court was careful to emphasize that the record must establish that the defendant "'knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.''' Ibid., quoting Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U. S. 269, 279 (1942).
The majority asserts that "the competence that is required of a defendant seeking to waive his right to counsel is the competence to waive the right, not the competence to represent himself." Ante, at 399. But this assertion is simply incorrect. The majority's attempt to extricate the competence to waive the right to counsel from the competence to represent oneself is unavailing, because the former decision necessarily entails the latter. It is obvious that a defendant who waives counsel must represent himself. Even Moran, who pleaded guilty, was required to defend himself during the penalty phase of the proceedings. And a defendant who is utterly incapable of conducting his own defense cannot be considered "competent" to make such a decision, any more than a person who chooses to leap out of a window in the belief that he can fly can be considered "competent" to make such a choice.
To try, convict, and punish one so helpless to defend himself contravenes fundamental principles of fairness and impugns the integrity of our criminal justice system. I cannot condone the decision to accept, without further inquiry, the self-destructive "choice" of a person who was so deeply medicated and who might well have been severely mentally ill. I dissent.
5 Whether this same evidence implies that Moran's waiver of counsel and guilty pleas were also involuntary remains to be seen. Cf. Miller v. Fenton, 474 U. S. 104 (1985) (voluntariness is a mixed question of law and fact entitled to independent federal review).

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.

 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.