Source: https://apanewslaw.wordpress.com/2014/10/
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 01:00:12+00:00

Document:
R. v. McLean 2014 ABPC 231 – although a decision at the Provincial Court level, the principles discussed are worthy of education. The accused was pulled over for speeding near Cold Lake, Alberta, and charged with an offence. Subsequent to the Traffic Safety Act offence, police also began an impaired driving investigation and subsequently charged the accused with ss. 253(1)(a) and(b) of the Code.
Upon arrival at the Cold Lake detachment, the accused was provided with a second opportunity to exercise his s. 10(b) rights and placed in a small room (“the telephone room”) which was equipped with a telephone, a yellow page telephone directory, a counter and a chair. The arresting officer continually monitored the accused by looking through the small window in the door of the telephone room to ensure that the accused was not “messing around.” He explained that on the basis of past experience in impaired driving investigations, some accused persons “messed around” by eating pages from the telephone directory, by vomiting, and/or by sleeping rather than making earnest efforts to contact legal counsel.
In the course of monitoring the accused while he spoke with legal counsel, the officer overheard the words “Cold Lake” and “driving under the influence” through the shut door of the telephone room. In this regard, the officer took two to three steps away from the closed door to the telephone room to avoid hearing any more of the conversation. The officer recorded the words “Cold Lake” and “driving under the influence” in his duty note book. Aside from these utterances, the officer did not overhear any other words spoken by the accused while in the telephone room.
The accused admitted he did not then voice his privacy concerns to the officer because he wanted to appear cooperative and thought that it would not benefit his cause to do so. He assumed that he could subsequently “sort it out with counsel”. The accused also noted that it was nearing four in the morning and given that he had to report to work within a few hours, he did not feel there was anything to gain by raising these issues. He made it clear, however, that he would have preferred additional legal advice at that time in order to help him understand the criminal process he was facing.
Provincial Court Judge R.M. Saccomani said the s.10(b) Charter right to retain and instruct counsel includes the ability to do so in private without being overheard by police; R. v. Dowell, 2010 ABPC 389; R. v. Rudolph (1986), 32 C.C.C. (3d) 179 (Alta. Q.B.); R. v. Playford (1987), 40 C.C.C. (3d) 142 (Ont. C.A.). An accused person must be able to freely and candidly communicate with counsel in a manner consistent with the expectation of confidentiality — a hallmark of the solicitor-client relationship. It would defy common sense to expect an accused to properly instruct counsel if the conversation can be overheard; R. v. Edgar, 2013 ABPC 238 at para. 64; R. v. Playford, supra at para. 31. Conversations between a detainee and counsel typically require the provision of details or an explanation of the circumstances which led to the arrest. If such communications were overheard, they may be armed with the potential to seriously prejudice an accused in the exercise of legal rights; R. v. Playford, supra at para. 31; R. v. Burley, 2004 CanLII 9437 (ONCA). Police therefore have a duty to provide privacy to a detainee during his or her consultation with counsel. An actual lack of privacy in these circumstances is a breach of an accused’s s. 10(b) Charter rights; R. v. Hume, 2013 ONCJ 380 (Ont. C.J.) at para. 30; R. v. Carroll (2002), 2002 CarswellOnt 987 (Ont. S.C); R. v. Playford, supra at para. 40. Pure speculation or unreasonable assumptions on the part of an accused that communications could be overheard, however, would not be sufficient. On a balance of probabilities, there must be proof of a real or substantial possibility that a conversation was overheard; R. v. Stacey, 280 Nfld & P.E.I.R. 27 (Nfld. Prov. Ct.) at para. 25; R. v. Luong, 2000 ABCA 301.
The applicable legal test in the circumstances is the ‘reasonable apprehension test’. In the absence of a proven privacy invasion there may nevertheless be a s.10(b) infringement where an accused establishes: 1) a subjective belief that he/she could not retain and instruct counsel in private; and that 2) said belief was objectively reasonable in the circumstances; R. v. Dowell, supra; R. v. Edgar, supra; R. v. Watamaniuk, 2012 ABPC 266; R. v. Veness, 2007 ABQB 283; R. v. Cairns,  O.J. No. 210 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Miller, 1990 CanLII 6490 (NL CA). In applying the test, the court must consider unique contextual factors including the actual location where the accused was offered the opportunity to speak with counsel and events surrounding the alleged breach; R. v. Stacey, 2008 Nfld & P.E.I.R. 27 (Nfld. Prov. Ct.). There is no legal burden on an accused to advise police of privacy concerns at the time they arise. The presence or absence of a complaint is simply one of the contextual factors to be considered within the analysis of the totality of the circumstances; R. v. MacKinnon, 2013 NSSC 356 (N.S.S.C.) at para. 29; R. v. Hume, supra at para. 33.
Judge R.M. Saccomani examined a number of cases in which a s. 10(b) Charter breach was not found, and others where a s. 10(b) Charter breach was found. Applying all these principles to the case at hand, Judge Saccomani said the accused stated he was uncomfortable, nervous, and felt constrained to speak freely with counsel because he feared he might be overheard by officers. The accused concluded that his conversation was not private because he could hear police voices outside the telephone room while he remained inside on the phone. Throughout his conversation with counsel, he observed that he was being continually watched through the small window fitted in the door by the investigating officer. Resultantly, the accused curbed his legal inquiries which he would have otherwise preferred to explore. The officer similarly presented as a credible witness whose testimony did not have any material inconsistencies. The officer admitted that he overheard words spoken by the accused while he stood outside the room. As he was aware that the accused was entitled to privacy, he immediately backed away from the door and recorded what he heard in his duty book. The officer acted in good faith and tried to ensure compliance with the accused’s s.10(b) Charter rights.
Judge Saccomani said the police telephone room, its construction, the manner in which it was utilized, or potentially a combination of these factors, created a space which failed to satisfy one of its primary functions [i.e.] a private space for the accused to communicate freely and candidly with counsel. Although the precise reason the room failed was not the focus of inquiry at trial, evidence nevertheless established that the accused heard conversations outside the room and that he too was overheard talking to legal counsel while inside the room. In the circumstances of this case, the breach in question seriously undermined the accused’s s.10(b) Charter right to retain and instruct counsel. In the Judge’s view, the intrusion was significant. Following the Grant Test, the Judge excluded the Certificate of Analysis from the evidence.
Will the officer not having a copy of the arrest warrant with them result in a s. 9 Charter violation?
R. v. Gerlitz 2014 ABQB 252 – Mr. Gerlitz was arrested and detained on eleven outstanding warrants relating to the Income Tax Act and the Criminal Code. Gerlitz, a sovereign citizen (i.e. an individual who does not recognize the authority of the government), alleged that his rights under sections 7, 9, 10(a), 10(b), 10(c) and 12 of the Charter were breached from that incident. He sought a judicial stay of proceedings as the only appropriate remedy under s. 24(2). While this case focused on other issues, the main issue was the rationale behind having a copy of the warrant upon arrest.
Despite acting on the basis of a valid warrant, the officers responsible for arresting and detaining Mr. Gerlitz did not have a copy of the warrant with them at the time of the arrest. The Crown conceded that it would have been feasible for the officers to have had a copy on them at the time of Mr. Gerlitz’s arrest. Therefore, by not having a copy of the warrant when it was feasible to do so, the police did not comply with s. 29(1) when arresting Mr. Gerlitz. However, the ABQB said that s. 29(2) is the applicable provision when dealing with an arrest warrant. As such, s 29(1) does not apply. Whether not having a copy of the warrant upon arrest amounted to a breach of Mr. Gerlitz’s Charter rights was the question.
In the analysis, the ABQB examined the pre-Charter case, Gamracy v. The Queen,  SCR 640. The issue in Gamracy was whether the officer was acting in the execution of his duty in arresting a person on the basis of an outstanding warrant without having the warrant and without having any knowledge of the contents of the warrant. The accused was charged with assaulting a police officer in execution of his duty when the accused resisted arrest. The court found that the duty of the arresting officer is “fully discharged by telling the arrested person that the reason for his arrest is the existence of an outstanding warrant”. As such, the majority in Gamracy, found that the officer was in the execution of his duty.
In the case at hand, the Honourable Mr. Justice M.D. Gates said in cases where an arrest is made on the basis of an outstanding warrant, there are conflicting cases about what will satisfy the requirement under s 10(a) of the Charter. One line of authority, following the majority in Gamracy, states that informing a person that he or she is being arrested for “outstanding warrants” is sufficient. The other line, following the minority in Gamracy, states that a person needs to be advised not only of the warrant, but also the nature of the charge set out in the warrant. Thus, in R. v. Wrightman, 2004 ONCJ 210, aff’d  OJ No. 1360 (SCJ), the failure of the arresting officer to advise the accused of the “particulars of the warrant” by stating only that there was a warrant for arrest fell below the constitutional requirement under s 10(a).
The evidence of the officer was that he told Mr. Gerlitz he was arresting him for outstanding warrants related to tax or fraud. In Justice Gates’ view, this satisfied the requirements under Gamracy and Wrightman. The inquiry under s 10(a) of the Charter did not, however, end there. The question was whether the information provided to Mr. Gerlitz, on his arrest and detention, “viewed reasonably in all the circumstances”, was sufficient for him to assess his legal position at the time.
Justice Gates said having a copy of the arrest warrant certainly would have been the “prudent police practice” as recommended in R. v. Beune, 2005 BCPC 175. While police are not required to always adhere to the best practices, the practice ultimately chosen in the circumstances of a given arrest must be sufficient to satisfy the Charter rights of the accused (see R. v. Cornell, 2010 SCC 31, at para 43; Beune, at para 59). The operative question in the analysis under s 10(a) of the Charter then was “whether what the accused was told, viewed reasonably in all the circumstances of the case, was sufficient to permit him to make a reasonable decision to decline to submit to arrest, or alternatively, to undermine his right to counsel under s. 10(b).
While I am of the view that the officers could have easily satisfied s. 29(1) in having a copy of the warrant to show to Mr. Gerlitz, I am not persuaded that Mr. Gerlitz lacked sufficient information to properly assess his legal position. It is, of course, very unfortunate that a copy of the warrant was not shown to Mr. Gerlitz at or near the time of his arrest. However, I take into consideration that throughout this proceeding Mr. Gerlitz has insisted on seeing original signatures on each and every document related to this prosecution. I am not at all certain that seeing a copy of the warrant would have met Mr. Gerlitz’s specific concerns. Having said that, I recognize that the determination of whether or not there was a breach of s. 10(a) involves an objective and not a subjective test. Viewed objectively, I am satisfied that Mr. Gerlitz was provided with sufficient information in this instance. As such, there was no breach of s. 10(a).
Therefore, a violation of s. 10(a) of the Charter depends on the circumstances. What we should learn from this: Best practice: have a copy of the arrest warrant upon the time of arrest. Alternative: advise the accused of the “particulars of the warrant” and provide a copy later when feasible.
R. v. Fedossenko 2014 ABCA 314 – the accused was injured in a single-vehicle accident. The accused was taken to the hospital in an ambulance. A police constable accompanied him in the ambulance. On the way to the hospital, the police constable asked the accused if he had anything to drink. The accused answered, “a few beers earlier”. The civilian witnesses, one was the EMT member, said nothing about alcohol or impairment. The constable and the paramedic who treated the accused testified that they could not detect the smell of alcohol in the ambulance. When the constable placed his nose close to the accused’s mouth, he said he could detect a “faint smell of alcohol.” The constable also testified that the accused was coherent and not slurring his speech. The accused’s eyes were noted to be red.
At the hospital, the accused received emergency medical treatment. Part of the medical treatment involved taking samples of the accused’s blood. After those samples were taken, police informed the accused that he was under arrest for impaired driving. He was read his Charter and caution rights. The accused responded saying that he understood his rights and did not wish to speak to a lawyer. He agreed to a police demand that he provide samples of his blood. As a consequence, a second set of samples of the accused’s blood was taken.
The following night, the police constable made an application before a presiding justice of the peace for a search warrant pursuant to section 487 to seize the vials of blood taken from the accused by the hospital for medical purposes. In support of that application, an Information to Obtain a Search Warrant was affirmed by the police constable. The constable stated that vials of blood taken from the accused while receiving emergency treatment would afford evidence that the accused committed impaired driving offences. He said the police wished to seize the vials of blood so they could submit them to the RCMP for analysis to determine the concentration, if any, of alcohol in the accused’s blood. The stated grounds for the constable’s belief that the vials of blood (or their analysis) would afford evidence of impaired driving offences was that the accused, when asked if he had anything to drink, replied “a few beers a little earlier” and that he, the constable, could detect a faint smell of alcohol when he placed his nose close to the accused’s mouth. The application for the search warrant was denied by a justice of the peace on the basis that there were insufficient grounds for believing that an offence had been committed.
Weeks later, the police received the results of the analysis which the RCMP performed on the samples taken pursuant to the blood demand. Those results showed a prohibited blood alcohol content. Armed with the results of the RCMP blood-alcohol analysis, the police then applied for an order requiring the production of the hospital’s emergency medical records including records of the analysis done of the respondent’s blood by the hospital. This application for an order to produce documents was made pursuant to section 487.012. The application was made before a different justice of the peace than the one who heard the search warrant application.
In support of this application for a “production order” requiring the hospital to produce its analysis of the accused’s blood, the same police constable swore an Information to Obtain which was almost identical to the Information to Obtain he affirmed in support of the search warrant. However, in this second Information to Obtain, the police constable included the additional fact of the RCMP analysis of the accused’s blood taken from him pursuant to the blood demand which indicated a blood alcohol level in excess of the legal limit. The production order was sought on the basis that the hospital records including the analysis of the accused’s blood would corroborate the RCMP analysis of the accused’s blood and would thereby afford further evidence respecting the commission of the impaired driving offences.
Significantly, in his Information to Obtain the production order, the police constable swore that he had reasonable grounds to believe that the accused had committed offences and that the documents sought would afford evidence respecting the commission of those offences. He did not however, inform the justice of the peace hearing his production order application that his prior application for a warrant to seize the vials of blood had been denied because the justice of the peace hearing that application found that there were no grounds to believe that an offence had been committed.
In the result, the production order was granted on the basis that the Justice of Peace was satisfied that there were reasonable grounds to believe that the accused had committed the impaired driving offences and that the hospital records would afford evidence respecting the commissions of those offences.
Prior to trial, the accused filed a Charter Notice alleging, inter alia, a breach of section 8 (the right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure) of the Charter. At trial, the Crown conceded that the blood-alcohol analysis performed by the RCMP was inadmissible, having been obtained in breach of the Charter. Two witnesses to the accident, an EMS paramedic and the police constable who attended at the scene the night of the accident and who obtained the production order, testified. Following the evidence-in-chief of the police constable, defence counsel sought and obtained leave to cross-examine him on both his Information to Obtain the search warrant and his Information to Obtain the production order.
At the time of applying for the production order, the officer did not inform the JP that he had applied for an earlier search warrant and that he had been denied on the basis that there were no grounds to believe that an offence had been committed. If it had already been judicially determined that there were no grounds to issue a search warrant on this basis, then there would be also be no reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the accused and no reasonable and probable grounds to have the accused supply a sample of his blood. If I therefore excise from the ITO the illegally obtained results of the blood analysis, I am left with the identical ITO that had already been rejected.
In addition, in reviewing all of Constable Coates’ evidence, I concur with the JP who denied the search warrant request. Constable Coates fell well short of having reasonable grounds to arrest the accused and to make the demand. The only indicia of impairment was a single vehicle accident, admission of a few beers earlier, red eyes, a faint smell of alcohol on his breath, but only when the officer put his nose to Mr. Fedossenko’s mouth. Absent was any information about road conditions or driving pattern. The evidence of the EMS personnel was that Mr. Fedossenko estimated his speed to be between 50 and 60 kilometres. Neither the civilian witnesses nor Mr. Corey Amberley, the EMT that treated Mr. Fedossenko, noted any signs of impairment. Mr. Coates confirmed the accused was coherent, compliant and able to understand. Constable Coates testified that Mr. Fedossenko did not slur his words. He was able to respond appropriate. This was also confirmed by Mr. Corey Amberley, the EMT member.
If I remove the information in the ITO that should be excised, in particular, reference to the blood analysis, and include in the ITO the relevant information that the prior application for a search warrant in relation to the same investigation had been denied, and taking into consideration the totality of the evidence that I have heard, I find that on the material before me, there was no basis upon which the authorizing judicial officer could have been satisfied that the pre-conditions for the granting of the probation [sic] order was authorized. Having found that there was no basis on which to grant the production order that was being sought, I therefore find that there is a section 8 breach.
The summary conviction appeal judge dismissed the Crown’s appeal on the basis that the trial judge did not err in law in her interpretation of the standard required by section 487.012(3) for a valid production order. The summary conviction appeal court judge found the trial judge to be “right” when she found that the standard or standards for obtaining a search warrant and a production order are the same, that is, reasonable grounds to believe that the respective Code requirements were present.
The primary issue in this appeal to the ABCA was whether or not the granting of the production order complied with section 8 of the Charter. In order to determine whether the granting of the production order complied with the Charter, it was necessary to determine whether the obtaining of the production order complied with the relevant provision of the Criminal Code, namely section 487.012(3)(a), and whether the production order complied with that provision turns on how “reasonable grounds to believe that an offence … is suspected to have been committed” is to be interpreted.
“Section 487.012(3)(a) of the Code sets one of three criteria for the potential grant of a production order to acquire evidence. Section s 487.012(3) provides that the information in support of the grant of the order must show “… that there are reasonable grounds to believe that (a) an offence against this Act or any other Act of Parliament has been or is suspected to have been committed; …”. Both courts below interpreted that language to mean that the information in support of the order must always set out reasonable and probable grounds to believe that an offence has been committed.
The interpretation of s 487.012(3) of the Code by the Courts below is plainly wrong.
This provision, s 487.012(3) has two other requirements, namely (b) and (c). Altogether they provide for judicial authority to seize evidence which has already been obtained from the subject and is lawfully possessed by third parties. To effectively remove the words “or is suspected” from s 489.012(3)(a) would be unsupportable under the principle that Parliament does not use words to no purpose. … The appellant submits that to give s 487.012(3)(a) its ordinary grammatical meaning in its context would produce a different result than he says has been established under Charter principles as to s 487(1) of the Code respecting traditional search warrants. But the provisions are different and for a different purpose.
The majority said that the medical interests of the accused were not at odds with his constitutional rights. As the trial judge and summary appeal judge excluded evidence and ultimately acquitted Fedossenko based on a mistaken interpretation of the legislative requirements for obtaining production of Fedossenko’s medical records, a new trial was required.
A new report from the National Research Council recommends best practices that law enforcement agencies and courts should follow to improve the likelihood that eyewitness identifications used in criminal cases will be accurate. Science has provided an increasingly clear picture of the inherent limits in human visual perception and memory that can lead to errors, as well as the ways unintentional cues during law enforcement processes can compromise eyewitness identifications.
… [M]emory is often an unfaithful record of what was perceived through sight; people’s memories are continuously evolving. As memories are processed, encoded, stored, and retrieved, many factors can compromise their fidelity to actual events. Although the individual may be unaware of it, memories are forgotten, reconstructed, updated, and distorted.

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