Source: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1261492/
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 15:05:33+00:00

Document:
KUMARI SHRILEKHA VIDYARTHI ETC. ETC.
rejected by the High Court.
from the vice of arbitrariness.
attaching to the `office' or `post'.
appointee whose appointment is terminated.
would be arbitrary and, therefore, against public policy.
with no public element attaching to it.
the basic requirements of Article 14.
`solely in order that it may use them for the public good'.
it has the uppermost duty to be governed by the rule of law.
satisfy the test of validity.
(15) There	is a presumption of validity of the State action and the burden is on the person who alleges violation of Article 14 to prove the assertion.	However, where no plausible reason or principle is indicated nor is it	dis- cernible and the State action, therefore, appears to be exfacie	arbitrary, the initial burden to prove the arbi- trariness is discharged shifting onus on the State to justi- fy its action as fair and reasonable.
(16) The wisdom of the policy or the lack of it or	the desirability of a better alternative is not	within	the permissible scope of judicial review in such cases. It is not for the courts to recast the policy or to substitute it with another which is considered to be more	appropriate, once the attack on the ground of arbitrariness is success- fully repelled by 629 showing that the act which was done was fair and reasonable in the facts and circumstances of the case.
Council of Civil Service Union v. Minister for	the Civil Service,  3 All E.R. 935.
(17) Arbitrariness is the very negation of the rule of law. Satisfaction of this basic test in every State action is sine qua non to its validity and in this respect.	the State cannot claim comparison with a private individual even in the field of contract.
(18) Every State action must be informed by reason	and it follows, that an act uninformed by reason, is arbitrary. Rule of law contemplates governance by laws	and not by humour, whims or caprices of the men to whom the governance is entrusted for the time being.
(19) Irrespective of the nature of appointment of	the Government Counsel in the districts in the State of U.P	and the security of tenure being minimal as claimed by	the State,	the impugned circular, in order to survive,	must withstand the attack of arbitrariness and be supported as an informed decision which is reasonable.
S.G. Jaisinghani v. Union of India,  2 SCR 703. (20) In the present case. the initial burden on	the petitioners appellants has been discharged by showing	that there is no discernible principle for the impugned action at the district level throughout the State of U.P. since there is nothing in the circular to indicate that such a sweeping action for all districts throughout the State was necessary which made it reasonable to change all Government Counsel in the districts throughout the State. even those whose tenure in office had not expired.
(21) Non-application of mind to individual cases before issuing a general circular terminating all such appointments throughout the State is itself eloquent of the arbitrariness writ large on the face of the circular.
John Wilkes's case  4 Burr. 2528.
(22) Arbitrariness is writ large in the impugned circu- lar issued by	the State of Uttar Pradesh. It gives	the impression that this action was 630 taken under the mistaken belief of applicability of "spoils system"	under our Constitution and the cavalier fashion in which the action has been taken gives it the colour of treating the posts of D.G.Cs. as bounty to be distributed by the appointing authority at its sweet will. Nothing worth- while has been shown on behalf of the State	of U.P. to support the impugned action as reasonable and non-arbitrary.
& ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition No. 706 of 1990. (Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India). Dr.	L.M. Singhvi, Dr. Y.S. Chitale, R.K. Garg,	R.N. Trivedi, Addl. Advocate General for the State of U.P,,	Mrs. Swaran Mahajan. Mrs. Geetanjali Mohan, Ms. Anuradha Mahajan. Sunil Gupta, R. Venkataramani, S.M. Garg, Suresh Harkauli. Sushil	Harkauli, Sunil Gupta, A.S. Pundir, Suresh Kumar Misra,	Mahesh Shrivastava, H.D. Pathak, Vishnu	Mathur	and Mrs. Shobha Dikshit for the appearing parties. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by VERMA, J. This judgment disposes of a bunch of matters comprising of some writ petitions under Article 32 of	the Constitution of India and special leave petitions under Article	136 of the Constitution of India, all of which involve	for decision certain common questions. The special leave petitions are directed against a common judgment	of the Allahabad High Court dismissing some writ petitions in which the same questions were raised. In view of the deci- sion of the High Court rejecting those contentions, the writ petitions were	filed in this Court directly for the	same purpose.
By one stroke, seemingly resorting to the Spoils System alien to our constitutional scheme, the Government of State of Uttar Pradesh has terminated by a	general order	the appointments of all Government Counsel (Civil, Criminal, Revenue) in all the districts of the State of U.P.w.e.f. 26.2. 1990 and directed preparation of fresh panels to	make appointments in place of the existing incumbents. This	has been done by Circular	G.O. No. D-284-Seven-Law-Ministry dated 6.2.1990, terminating all the existing	appointments w.e.f. 28.2. 1990, irrespective of the fact whether the term of the incumbent had expired or was subsisting. The validity of this State action is challenged in these matters after the challenge has been rejected by the Allahabad High Court. They have all been heard together since the common question 631 in all of them is the validity of the Circular G.O. No. D- 284-Seven Law-Ministry dated 6.2.1990 issued by the Govern- ment of State of Uttar Pradesh.
Leave is granted in the Special Leave Petitions and	the appeals	are also heard on merits along with the Writ Peti- tions.
Broadly, two questions arise for decision by us in	this bunch of matters. These are: Is the impugned circular amena- ble to	judicial review?; and if so, is it liable to be quashed	as violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, being arbitrary?
The	challenge in all these matters is to	validity of G.O. No. D-284-Seven-Law-Ministry dated 6th February, 1990, from Shri A.K. Singh, Joint Legal Remembrancer, Justice (Law Ministry) Section, Government of Uttar Pradesh, to all	the District Magistrates of Uttar Pradesh with copy to all	the District Judges of the State for information and necessary action.	The main question for decision in these matters being the validity of this circular, it would be appropriate to quote the same in extenso. It reads as under: "Subject:RENEWAL OF TENURE OF ALL THE	EXISTING GOVERNMENT COUNSEL, CALLING OF NEW PANELS FOR NEW APPOINTMENT. XXXX I have been directed to inform you on the subject mentioned above that the Administration has taken a decision to extend the tenure of all the Government Counsel, who	are presently working, till 28th February, 1990 only and to immediately receive new panels from the District Magistrates for new appointments in their places.
1. Separate single panal in each of the Civil side, Revenue 632 side, Criminal	side (including Anti-Dacoity) and Urban ceiling	side fixed for 12 districts, and separate single panel in each of the courts, functioning at District	and Tehsil	Headquarters, may be prepared. It may	be enlisted therein the names of the work zone, number of courts related to it, the number of sanctioned posts for Government Counsel and recommended names	of the Counsel in terms of their seniority.
2.	It may be clearly mentioned in the	panel which counsel	belong to Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribes, Back- ward Caste and Minority group.
3.	The panels prepared for civil, revenue and urban ceiling	side may contain the recommendations of names	only three times of the presently sanctioned posts.
4. In the criminal side, five times of the names of the present sanctioned posts may be recommended.
5.	The attested	copies of Bio-Data of	the Counsel recommended, attested details of their work during last	two years, certificate of registration as an Advocate, certifi- cate of birth and the attested copies of certificates of educational qualifications may also be sent.
6.	The names of any such counsel, who has practice experience for less than 7 years, or who has more than 60 years of age as on 1.1. 1990, or the person who is already working at a salaried Government or nonGovernmental posts, a full-time lecturer in a college, Notary, Marriage Officer, Executive Qazi or State, may not be included in the panels. However, on resignation from the present post, they can be included in the panel.
7. For preparation of new panel, a general notice which enlists the application, age, conditions of appointment	and the last date for submission of Bio-Data, may be prepared. This notice may be put on the Notice Boards of the Local Bar Associations, and in the offices of District	Magistrate, District Judge, Zonal Commissioner, S.D.M. and Munsif Magis- trate.
8. It will be a condition for appointment as a Government Counsel	that he will not be permitted to do private prac- tice. He will be entitled to plead, with permission from the Administration,	only the cases of State Government	and Central	Government, State Company Council, Local Bodies, Autonomous Institution and Authorities. He will be paid only the monthly remuneration fixed by the Administration and no fee will be paid according	to the	valuation of	the case/appeal. No extra fee will also be paid for any other work/consultation. It may also be clarified that appointment of a Government Counsel will be different from the Govern- ment employees	and no facilities to Government employees will be applicable to them. The appointment of Government Counsel will be done in the form of business engagement	and the State Government will be entitled to terminate engage- ment at any time, without giving reasons for it.
3. The Bio-Data and other desired papers, if received	from the counsel within the prescribed date, may	be examined minutely, as a special drive and after getting approval from the District Judge/Munsif Magistrate/SDM, as the case	may be, the names may be recommended in the panel as per senior- ity position. The details of last two years work, along with the attested copies of the certificates and	information desired in the enclosed format,`Ka' and `Kha' may be sent to the Administration along with the panel.
4. I have also been directed to state that the	appointments made on or after January, 1990, shall not be affected by the above mentioned policy decision and the same shall continue for the prescribed period.
5. I have also been directed to clarify that	the panels received prior to release of this Government Order, on	the basis of which, no appointments or. renewal has been made or which are still pending, may be understood as cancelled.
6. I have also been directed to request you that the	new panels	may be prepared in accordance with the above direc- tion on top priority basis, `and the same may be ensured to be sent to the undersigned in a confidential 634 envelope through a special messenger by 25th February, 1990. sd/-	(A.K. Singh) Joint Legal Remembrancer"
ments which is material only for indicating the extent of security of tenure of the appointee to these offices since in our opinion the main attack to the impugned circular on the ground of arbitrariness can be upheld even assuming	the security of tenure of the appointees	to be	minimal as claimed	for and on behalf of the State of U.P. We shall, therefore, only refer to the rival contentions regarding the nature of appointments and then proceed on the basis of	the minimum	status attaching to these appointments	to examine whether	the ground of arbitrariness is available and viti- ates the circular.
According to the learned Additional Advocate General of the State of U.P., the relationship of the appointees to these offices	of Government Counsel in the districts is purely	contractual depending on the terms of the contract and is	in the nature of an engagement of a Counsel by a private party who can be changed at any time at the will of the litigant, with there being no right in the	Counsel to insist	on continuance of the engagement. The learned Addi- tional Advocate General contended that for this reason,	the relationship being purely contractual, which cannot be continued against the will of either party, there is no scope for the argument that the State does not have	the right to change the Government Counsel at its will. It is common ground that the appointment, termination and renewal of tenure of all Government Counsel in the districts is governed by certain provisions contained in the Legal Remem- brancer's Manual, in addition to Section 24 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, applicable in the case of public prosecutors. The learned Additional Advocate General did not dispute	that if Article 14 of the Constitution of India is attracted to this case like all State actions, the impugned circular would be liable to be quashed if it suffers	from the vice of arbitrariness. However, his argument is	that there is no such vice. In the ultimate analysis, it is	the challenge of arbitrariness which the circular must withstand in order to survive. This really is the main point involved for decision by us in the present case.
"7.06.	Appointment and renewal--(1) The legal	practitioner finally selected by the Government may be appointed District Government Counsel for one year from the date of his taking over charge.
(2) At the end of the aforesaid period, the	Dis- trict Officer	after consulting the District	judge shall submit a report On his work and conduct to the Legal Remem- brancer	together with the statement of work done in	Form No. 9. Should his work or conduct be found to be unsatisfac- tory the matter shall be reported to	the Government	for orders. If the report in respect of his work and conduct is satisfactory, he may be furnished with a deed engagement in Form No. 1 for a term not exceeding three years. On	his first engagement a copy of Form No. 2 shall be supplied to him and he shall complete and return it the Legal Remem- brancer for record.
ment terminable at will on either side and is not appoint- ment to a post under the Government. Accordingly the Govern- ment reserves the power to terminate the appointment of	any District Government Counsel at any time without assigning any cause.
7.07 Political Activity--The District Government Counsel	shall	not participate in political activities so long they work as such; otherwise they shall incur a	dis- qualification to hold the post.
7.08 Renewal of term-- (1) at least three months before	the expiry of the term of a	District Government Counsel, the District Officer shall after consulting	the District Judge	and considering his past record of work, conduct and age, report to the Legal Remembrancer, together with the statement of work done by him in Form No. 9 whether in his	opinion the term of appointment of such counsel should	be renewed or not. A copy of the opinion of	the District Judge should also be sent along with the recommen- dations of the District Officer.
(2) Where recommendation for the extension of the term of a District Government Counsel is made for a speci- fied period only, the reasons therefore shall also be stated by the District Officer.
(ii) the District Officer shall give his report about	the suitability of	the District Government Counsel from	the administrative	point of view, his public reputation in general, his character, integrity and professional conduct.
(4) If the Government agrees with the recommendations of the District Officer for the renewal of the term of	the Government Counsel, it may pass orders for reappointing	him for a period not exceeding three years.
(5)	If the Government decides not to re-appoint a	Gov- ernment	Counsel, the Legal Remembrancer may call upon	the District Officer to forward fresh recommendations in	the manner laid down in para 7.03.
(6) The procedure prescribed in this para shall be followed on the expiry of every successive period of renewed appointment of a District Government Counsel.
Note--The	renewal beyond 60 years of age shall depend upon continuous good work, sound integrity and physical fitness of the Counsel.
7.09. Character roll--(1) The District Officer and	the District Judge shall, before the end of every year and	also while leaving the district on transfer, place on record	his opinion on the capacity and work of the District Government Counsel. The District Judge shall before recording	such opinion	obtain a report about the work and: conduct of	the District Government Counsel from the presiding officers of the courts, where they are generally required to practise. Similarly, the District Officer shall before recording	such opinion	obtain a report from the Superintendent of Police regarding the counsel's capacity for prosecution of cases and assistance	rendered to the investigating	agency.	The record, which shall be confidential, shall be maintained by the District Officer. Every adverse entry shall be communi- cated to the District Government Counsel concerned by	the District Officer, with the prior approval of the Government. (2)	The character roll of	every	District Government Counsel shall also be maintained by the Government in Judi- cial (Legal Advice) Section. For this purpose, the District Officer	shall forward to the Legal Remembrancer a copy of all the confidential reports, recorded by him and the	Dis- trict Judge on the work and conduct of the District Govern- ment Counsel by the first week of May every year 640 for being incorporated in the character roll, maintained by the Government.
(3) The District Officer shall forward a copy of all the confidential reports, referred to in para 7.09(2) in respect	of District Government Counsel (Criminal) to	Home (Police) Section of Secretariat also for information. (4) Any shortcomings on the part of the District Government Counsel shall at once be brought to the notice of the Legal Remembrancer."
These provisions show that the initial appointment is for a period of one year during which the work and conduct of the appointee is watched to adjudge his suitability and a report is required to be submitted at the end thereof by the District Officer after consulting the District Judge and on the same being found satisfactory, his engagement is	made for a term not exceeding three years. Before expiry of	the term of three years, the case of the incumbent is to be considered on	the basis of his work, conduct and age	for renewal	and the Government is required to decide the ques- tion of his reappointment for a period not exceeding three years on the basis of the report of the District Officer and the opinion of the District Judge. If the Government agrees with their recommendations, the term of the existing incum- bent is renewed for a period not exceeding three years. It is only if the Government decides not to reappoint a Govern- ment Counsel' that the Legal Remembrancer may call upon	the District Officer to forward fresh recommendations in	the manner	laid down in para 7.03. this procedure is to be followed on the expiry of every successive period of renewed appointment of District Government Counsel. The age factor mentioned in para 7.08 has to be read with the footnote to it, which says that `the renewal beyond 60 years of	age shall depend upon continuous good work, sound integrity	and physical fitness of the counsel'. Para 7.09 provides	for maintenance of	the character roll in	which the District Officer and the District Judge are required to record their opinion on the capacity and work of the District Government Counsel. Clause 3 of para 7.06, regarding termination of the appointment, would be considered later while dealing with an other argument of the learned Additional Advocate General. Part B of Chapter VII lays down `Duties' of D.G.Cs. The	above	provisions in the L.R. Manual clearly	show that the Government Counsel in the districts are treated as Law Officers of the 641 State who are holders of an `office' or `post'. The afore- said provisions in Chapter VII relating to appointment	and conditions of engagement of District Government Counsel show that the appointments are to be made and ordinarily renewed on objective assessment of suitability of the person based on the	opinion of the District Officer and the District Judge; and character roll is maintained for keeping a record of the suitability of the appointee to enable an objective assessment for	the purpose of his continuance as a	Law Officer in the district. There arc provisions to bar private practice and participation in political activity by D.G.Cs. Apart from clause 3 of para 7.06 to which we shall advert a little	later,	these provisions clearly indicate that	the appointment and engagement of District Government Counsel is not the same as that by a private litigant of	his counsel and there is	obviously an element of	continuity of	the appointment unless the appointee is found to be unsuitable either	by his own work, conduct or age or in comparison to any more suitable candidate available at the place of	ap- pointment. Suitability	of the appointee being the prime criterion for	any such appointment, it is obvious	that appointment of	the best amongst those	available, is	the object	sought	to be achieved by these	provisions, which, even otherwise, should be the paramount consideration in discharge of this governmental function aimed at promoting public interest. All Govt. Counsel are paid remuneration out of the public exchequer and there is a clear public element attaching to the `office' or `post'.
The	learned Additional Advocate General contended	that clause	3 of para 7.06 says that the appointment of a	Dis- trict Government Counsel is only professional engagement terminable at will on either side and not appointment to a post under the Government; and the Government has the power to terminate the appointment at any- time `without assigning any cause'. He contended that this power to terminate	the appointment at any time without assigning any cause and	the clear statement that the appointment is only	professional engagement terminable at will on either side is sufficient to indicate that the relationship is the same as that of a private client and his counsel. In our opinion, this provi- sion has to be read not in isolation, but in the context in which it appears and along with the connected	provisions, already	referred. The expression `professional	engagement' is used therein to distinguish it from `appointment to a post under the Government' in the strict sense. This, howev- er, does not necessarily mean that a person who is not a Government servant holding a post under the Government	does not hold any public office and the engagement is purely private with no public element attaching to it. This part of 642 clause 3 of para 7.06 means only this and no more. The other part of clause 3 which enables the Government to terminate the appointment `at any time without assigning	any cause' can also not be considered in the manner, suggested by	the learned Additional Advocate General. The expression `at	any time' merely means that the termination may be made	even during the subsistence of the term of appointment and `wit- hout assigning any cause' means without communicating	any cause to the appointee whose	appointment is	terminated. However, `without assigning any cause' is not to be equated with `without existence of any cause'. It merely means	that the reason for which the termination is made need not to be assigned or communicated to the appointee. It was held in Liberty	Oil Mills and Others v. Union of India and Others,  3 SCC 465 that the expression `without assigning	any reason'	implies that the decision has to be communicated, but reasons for the decision have not to be stated; but	the reasons	must exist, otherwise, the decision would be arbi- trary. The non-assigning of reasons or the non-communication thereof may be based on public policy, but termination of an appointment without the existence of any cogent reason in furtherance of the object for which the power is given would be arbitrary and, therefore, against public policy. Clause 3 of para 7.06 must, therefore, be understood to mean that the appointment of a District Government Counsel is not to be equated	with appointment to a post under the Government in the strict sense, which does not necessarily mean that it results in denuding the office of its public character;	and that the appointment may be terminated even during currency of the term by only communicating the decision of termina- tion without communicating the reasons which	led to	the termination. It does not mean that the appointment is at the sweet will of the Government which can be terminated at	any time, even without the existence of any cogent reason during the subsistence of the term. The construction, suggested on behalf of the State of U.P. of this provision, if accepted, would amount to conceding arbitrary power of termination to the Government, which by itself is sufficient to reject	the contention and thereby save it from any attack to its valid- ity.
tors for the district. Sub-section 4 requires the District Magistrate to prepare a panel of names of persons considered fit for such appointments, in consultation with the Session Judge. Sub-section 5 contains an embargo against appointment of any person as the Public Prosecutor or Additional Public Prosecutor for the district by the State Government unless his name appears in the panel prepared under sub-section 4. Sub-section 6	provides for such appointments, where in a State there exists a regular Cadre of Prosecuting Officers but if no suitable person is available in such cadre,	then the appointment has to be made from the panel prepared under sub-section 4.	Sub-section 7 says that a person shall be eligible for such appointment only after he has been in practice as an advocate for not less	than seven years. Section	25 deals with the appointment of Assistant Public Prosecutors in the district for conducting prosecution in the Courts of Magistrate. In the case of Public	Prosecutors also known as District Government Counsel (Criminal), there can be	no doubt about the statutory element attaching to such appointments by virtue of these provisions in the	Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. In this context, Section 321 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. is also	significant. Section	321 permits withdrawal from	prosecution by	the Public	Prosecutor or Assistant Public Prosecutor in charge of a case, with the consent of the Court, at any time before the judgment is pronounced. This power of the Public Prose- cutor in charge of the case is derived from statute and	the guiding consideration for it, must be the interest of admin- istration of justice. There can be no doubt that this func- tion of the Public Prosecutor relates to a public purpose entrusting him with the responsibility of so acting only in the interest of administration of justice. In the case of Public	Prosecutors, this additional public element flowing from statutory provisions in the Code of Criminal Procedure, undoubtedly. invest the Public Prosecutors with the	at- tribute	of holder of a public office which cannot be whit- tled down by the assertion that their engagement is purely professional between a client and his lawyer with no public element attaching to it.
.... A Government pleader is more than an advocate for a	litigant. He holds a public office. We	recall	with approval the observations a Division Bench of	the Madras High Court made in Ramachandran v. Alagiriswami, AIR	1961 Madras	460 and regard the view there.	expressed about a Government Pleader's office. as broadly correct even in	the Bihar set-up.
consider that the most useful test to be applied to determine the question is that laid down by Erie, J. in (1851)	17 QB 149. The three criteria are. source of	the office, the tenure and the duties. I have applied that	test and I am of opinion that the conclusion that the office is a public office is irresistible."
Similarly. in Mukul Dalai and Others v. Union of India	and Others.	 3 SCC 144. it was held that the	`office of the Public Prosecutor is 645 a public one' and `the primacy given to the Public Prosecu- tor under the Scheme of the Code (Cr.P.C.) has a social purpose'.
"The appellant's challenge to the action taken by the	re- spondents raises a question in my opinion. of administrative law. The respondents are a public authority. the appellant holds a public position fortified by statute. The considera- tions which determine whether he has been validly removed from that position go beyond the mere contract	of employ- ment, though no doubt including it. They are. in my opinion. to be tested broadly on arguments of public policy and	not to be resolved on narrow verbal distinctions The appellant is entitled to complain if. whether in procedure or in substance, essential requirements, appropriate to his situa- tion in the public service under the respondents, have	not been observed and. in case of non-observance. to come to the courts for redress.
are. therefore. unable to accept the argument of	the learned Additional Advocate General that the appointment of District Government Counsel by the State Government is	only a professional engagement like that between a private client and his lawyer, or that it is purely contractual with no public	element attaching to it. which may be terminated at an), time at the sweet will of the Government excluding judicial review. We have already indicated the presence of public	element attached to the `office' or `post' of	Dis- trict Government Counsel of every category covered by	the impugned circular. This is 646 sufficient to	attract Article 14 of the Constitution	and bring the question of validity of the impugned circular within the scope of judicial review.
The scope of judicial review permissible in the present case, does not require any elaborate	consideration since even the minimum permitted scope of judicial review on	the ground of arbitrariness or unreasonableness or	irrationali- ty, once Article 14 is attracted, is sufficient to invali- date the impugned circular as indicated later. We need	not, therefore, deal at length with the scope of judicial review permissible in	such cases since several nuances of	that ticklish question do not arise for consideration in	the present case.
Even otherwise and sans the public element so obvious in these appointments, the appointment and its	concomitants viewed	as purely contractual matters after the	appointment is made, also attract Article 14 and exclude arbitrariness permitting judicial review of the impugned State action. This aspect is dealt with hereafter.
Even apart from the premise that the `office' or `post' of D.G.Cs. has a public element which alone is sufficient to attract the power of judicial review for testing validity of the impugned circular on the anvil of Article 14, we	are also clearly of the view that this power is available	even without	that element on the premise that after the initial appointment. the matter is purely contractual. Applicability of Article 14 to all executive actions of the	State being settled	and for the same reason its applicability at	the threshold to the making of a contract in exercise of	the executive power being beyond dispute, can it be said	that the State can thereafter cast off its personality and exer- cise unbridled	power	unfettered by the requirements of Article 14 in the sphere of contractual matters and claim to be governed therein only by private law principles applica- ble to private individuals whose rights flow only from	the terms of the contract without anything more?	We have no hesitation in	saying that the personality of	the State, requiring regulation of its conduct in all spheres by	re- quirements of Article 14, does not undergo such a radical change	after the making of a contract merely because	some contractual rights accrue to the other party in addition. It is not as if the requirements of Article 14 and	contractual obligations are alien concepts. which cannot co-exist. The	Preamble of the Constitution of India	resolves to secure	to all its citizens Justice, social. economic	and political; and	Equality of status and	opportunity. Every State action must be aimed at achieving 647 this goal. Part IV of the Constitution contains	`Directives Principles of	State Policy which are	fundamental in	the governance of the country and are aimed at securing social and economic freedoms by appropriate State action which is complementary to individual fundamental rights guaranteed in Part III for protection against excesses of State action to realise the vision in the Preamble. This being the philoso- phy of the Constitution, can it be said that it contemplates exclusion of Article 14--non-arbitrariness which is basic to rule of law--from State actions in contractual	field	when all actions of the State are meant for public good	and expected to be fair and just? We have no doubt that	the Constitution does not	envisage or permit unfairness or unreasonableness in State actions in any sphere of	its activity contrary to the professed ideals in the Preamble. In our	opinion. it would be alien to	the Constitutional Scheme to accept the argument of exclusion of Article 14 in contractual matters. The scope and permissible	grounds of judicial review in such matters and the relief which may be available are different matters but that does	not justify the view of its total exclusion. This is more so when	the modern	trend is also to examine the unreasonableness of a term in such contracts where the bargaining power is unequal so that these are not negotiated contracts but standard form contracts between unequals.
There is an obvious difference in the contracts between private parties and contracts to which the State is a party, Private	parties are concerned only with their personal interest whereas the State while exercising its powers	and discharging its functions, acts indubitably, as is expected of it, for public good and in public interest. The impact of every State action is also on public interest. This factor alone is sufficient to import at least the minimal require- ments of public law obligations and impress with this char- acter the contracts made by the State or its instrumentali- ty. It	is a different matter that the	scope	of judicial review	in respect of disputes failing within the domain of contractual obligations may be more limited and in doubtful cases the parties may be relegated to adjudication of their rights	by resort to remedies provided for adjudication of purely	contractual disputes. However, to the extent, chal- lenge is made on the ground of violation of Article 14 by alleging that	the impugned act is arbitrary, unfair or unreasonable, the fact that the dispute also fails within the domain of contractual obligations would not relieve	the State of its obligation to comply with the basic require- ments of Article 14. To this extent, the obligation is of a public	character invariably in every case irrespective of there being any other right or obligation in addition there- to. An additional contractual obligation cannot divest	the claimant of the guarantee under Article 14 648 of non-arbitrariness at the hands of the State in any of its actions.
Thus, in a case like the present, if it is	shown	that the impugned State action is	arbitrary and, therefore, violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, there can be no impediment in striking down the impugned act irrespective of the question whether an additional right, contractual or statutory, if any, is also available to the aggrieved	per- sons.
The State cannot be attributed the sprit personality of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde in the contractual field so as to impress	on it all the characteristics of the State at	the threshold while making a contract requiring it to fulfil the obligation of Article 14 of the Constitution and thereafter permitting it to cast off its garb of State to adorn the new robe of a private body during the subsistence of the	con- tract enabling	it to act arbitrarily subject only to	the contractual obligations and remedies flowing from it. It is really	the nature of its personality as State which is significant and must characterize all its actions, in what- ever field, and not the nature of function, contractual or otherwise, which is decisive of the	nature	of scrutiny permitted for	examining the validity of its act. The	re- quirement of Article 14 being the duty to act fairly, justly and reasonably, there is nothing which militates against the concept	of requiring the State always to so act, even in contractual matters. There is a basic difference between the acts of the State which must invariably be in public inter- est and those of a private individual, engaged	in similar activities, being primarily for personal gain, which may or may not promote public interest. Viewed in this manner, in which we find no conceptual difficulty or anachronism, we find no reason why the requirement of Article 14 should	not extend	even in the sphere of contractual matters for regu- lating the conduct of the State activity.
.... The whole conception of unfettered discretion is inappropriate to a public	authority, which possesses powers	solely in order that it may use them for the public good.
There	is nothing paradoxical in the imposition of such legal limits. It would indeed be paradoxical if	they were not imposed. Not is this principle an oddity of British or 649 American law: it is equally prominent in French law. Nor is it a special restriction which fetters only local authori- ties: it applies no less to ministers of the Crown. Nor is it confined to the sphere of administration:	it operates wherever discretion is given for some public purpose,	for example where a judge has a discretion to order jury trial. It is only where powers are given for the personal benefit of the	person empowered that the discretion is absolute. Plainly this can have no application in public law. For the same reasons there should in principle be no such thing as unreviewable	administrative	discretion, which should be just as much a contradiction in terms as unfettered discretion. The question which has to be asked is what is the scope of judicial review, and in a few special cases the scope for the review of discretionary decisions may be minimal. It remains axiomatic that all discretion is capable	of abuse, and that legal limits to every power	are to be found somewhere.
(emphasis supplied) The view, we are taking is, therefore, in consonance	with the current thought in this field. We have no doubt that the scope of judicial review may vary with reference to the type of matter involved, but the fact that the action is reviewa- ble, irrespective of the sphere in which it is exercised, cannot be doubted.
A useful treatment of the subject is to be found in (1990)	106 L.Q.R. at pages 277 to 292 in an article `Judi- cial Review and Contractual Powers of Public Authorities'. The conclusion drawn in the article on the basis of recent English decisions is that `public law principles designed to protect	the citizens should apply because of	the public nature of the body, and they may have some role in protect- ing the public interest'. The trend now is towards judicial re,dew of contractual powers and the other activities of the Government. Reference is made also to the recent decision of the Court of Appeal in Jones v. Swansea City Council,  1 W.L.R. 54, where the Court's clear inclination to the view that contractual powers should generally be reviewable is indicated, even though the Court of Appeal faltered at	the last step and refrained from saying so. It is significant to note that emphasis now is on reviewability of	every State action because it stems not from the nature of function, but from the public nature of the body 650 exercising that function; and all powers possessed by a public authority, howsoever conferred, are possessed `solely in order that it may use them for the public good'. The only exception limiting the same is to be found in specific cases where such exclusion may be desirable for strong reasons of public policy. This, however, does not justify exclusion of reviewability in the contractual field involving the State since it is no longer a mele private activity to be excluded from public view or scrutiny.
Unlike a private party whose acts uninformed by reason and influenced	by personal predilections in	contractual matters	may result in adverse consequences to it alone without	affecting the public interest, any such act of	the State or a public body even in this field would adversely affect the public interest. Every holder of a public office by virtue of which he acts on behalf of the State or public body is ultimately accountable to the people in whom	the sovereignty vests. As such, all powers so vested in him	are meant to be exercised for public good	and promoting	the public interest. This is equally true of all actions even in the field of contract. Thus, every holder of a public office is a trustee whose highest duty is to the people of	the country and, therefore, every act of the holder of a public office,	irrespective of the label classifying that act, is in discharge of public duty meant ultimately	for public good. With the diversification of State activity in a	Wel- fare State requiring the State to discharge its wide-ranging functions even through its several instrumentalities, which requires entering into contracts also, it would be unreal and not pragmatic, apart from being unjustified to exclude contractual matters from the sphere of State	actions	re- quired	to be non-arbitrary and justified on the touchstone of Article 14.
Even assuming that it is necessary to import the concept of presence of some public element in a State action to attract	Article 14 and permit judicial review, we have no hesitation in saying that the ultimate impact of all actions of the State or a public body being undoubtedly on public interest, the requisite public element for this purpose is present also in contractual matters. We, therefore, find it difficult and unrealistic to exclude the State	actions in contractual matters, after the contract has been made,	from the purview of judicial review to test its validity on	the anvil of Article 14.
It	can no longer be doubted at this point of time	that Article	14 of the Constitution of India applies also to matters	of governmental policy and if the policy or	any action of the Government, even in 651 contractual matters, fails to satisfy the test of reasona- bleness, it would be unconstitutional. See Ramana Dayaram Shetty	v. The International Airport Authority of India	and Ors.,  3 SCR 1014 and Kasturi Lal Lakshmi Reddy v. State of Jammu and Kashmir & Anr.,  3 SCR 1338. In Col. A.S. Sangwan v. Union of India and Ors.,  Supp. SCC 559, while the discretion to change the policy in exer- cise of the executive power, when not	trammelled by	the statute	or rule, was held to be wide, it was emphasised as imperative and implicit in Article 14 of the	Constitution that a change in policy must be made fairly and should	not give the impression that it was so done arbitrarily or by any ulterior criteria. The wide sweep of Article 14 and	the requirement of every State action qualifying for its validi- ty on this touch-stone, irrespective of the field of activi- ty of the State, has long been settled. Later decisions of this Court have reinforced the foundation of this tenet	and it would be sufficient to refer only to two recent decisions of this Court for this purpose.
In M/s Dwarkadas Marfatia and Sons v. Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay, 3 SCC 293, the matter was	re- examined in relation to an instrumentality of the State	for applicability of Article 14 to all its actions. Referring to the earlier decisions of this Court and examining the argu- ment for applicability of Article 14, even in	contractual matters, Sabyasachi Mukharji,	J. (as	the learned Chief Justice	then was), speaking for himself and	Kania,	J., reiterated that `every action of the State or an instrumen- tality	of the	State must be informed	by reason ...... actions uninformed by reason may be questioned as arbitrary in proceedings under Article 226 or Article 32 of the	Con- stitution.' Ranganathan, J. did not express `any opinion on this point but agreed with the conclusion of the other learned Judges on the facts of the case. It is obvious	that the conclusion on the facts of the case could not be reached by Ranganathan, J. without examining them and this could be done only on the basis that it was permissible to make	the judicial review. Thus, Ranganathan, J. also applied that, principle without saying so. In view of the	wide-ranging and, in essence, all pervading sphere of State activity in discharge of its, welfare functions, the question assumes considerable importance and cannot be shelved. The basic requirement of Article 14 is fairness in action by the State and we	find it difficult to accept that the State can be permitted to act otherwise in any field of its activity, irrespective of the nature of its function, when it has	the uppermost duty	to be governed by the rule. of law.	Non- arbitrariness, in substance, is only fair play in action. We have no doubt that this obvious requirement must be satis- fied by every action of the State or its instrumentality in order to 652 satisfy the test Of validity.
(emphasis supplied) This decision clearly shows that no doubt was	entertained about the applicability of Article 14 of the Constitution to an action of the State or its instrumentality,	even where the action was taken under the terms of a contract of tenan- cy which alone applied by virtue of the exemption granted under the Rent Act excluding the applicability of the provi- sions thereof.
In another recent decision in Mahabir Auto Stores & Ors. v. Indian Oil Corporation & Ors., J.T. 1990 1 S.C. 363, it was held that Article 14 was attracted even where the	ag- grieved person did not have the benefit of either a contrac- tual or a statutory right. The grievance in that case	was made by a person who was not a dealer of the	Indian	Oil Corporation but merely claimed to have been treated as	one by a long course of conduct. it was held by	the learned Chief justice that the impugned act of the Indian Oil Corpo- ration was an administrative decision and could be impeached on the ground that it was arbitrary or violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. It was emphasised that	the Indian Oil Corporation being an instrumentality of the State	was bound to act fairly; and that `fairness in such actions should	be perceptible, if not transparent'. If	Article 14 was applied even without the benefit of a contract of deal- ership, the position cannot be worse with the added benefit of a contract. With respect, we concur with the view about the impact of Article 14 of the Constitution on every State action	as indicated by the learned Chief Justice in these two recent decisions.
No	doubt, it is true, as indicated by us earlier,	that there is a presumption of validity of the State action	and the burden is on the person who alleges violation of Article 14 to	prove the assertion. However,	where no plausible reason	or principle is indicated nor is it discernible	and the impugned State action, therefore, appears to be ex facie arbitrary, the initial burden to prove the arbitrariness is discharged shifting onus on the State to justify its action as fair and reasonable. If the State is unable	to produce material to justify its action as fair and reasonable,	the burden on the person alleging arbitrariness must be held to be discharged. The scope of judicial review is	limited as indicated in Dwarkadas Marfatia's case (supra)	to oversee the State action for the purpose of satisfying that it is not vitiated by the vice of arbitrariness and no more.	The wisdom	of the policy or the lack of it or the	desirability of a better alternative is not within the permissible scope of judicial review in such cases. it is not for the courts to recast the policy or to substitute it with another which is considered to be more appropriate, once the attack on the ground of arbitrariness is successfully repelled by showing that the act which was done, was fair and reasonable in	the facts and circumstances of the case. As indicated by	Di- plock, L.J., in Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service,  3 All ER 935, the power of judicial review is limited to the grounds of	illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety. In the case of arbitrariness, the defect of irrationality is obvious.
In our opinion, the wide sweep of Article 14 undoubtedly takes within its fold the impugned circular issued by	the State of U.P. in exercise of its executive power, irrespec- tive of the precise nature of appointment of the Government Counsel	in the districts and the other rights,	contractual or statutory, which the appointees may have. It is for	this reason	that we base our decision on the ground	that inde- pendent of any statutory right, available to the appointees, and assuming for the purpose of this case that	the rights flow only from the contract of appointment, the impugned circular, issued in exercise of the executive power of	the State, must satisfy Article 14 of the Constitution and if it is shown to be arbitrary, it must be struck down. However, we have referred to certain provisions relating to initial appointment, termination or renewal of tenure	to indicate that the action is controlled at least by settled guide- lines, followed by the State of U.P., for a long time.	This too is relevant for deciding the question of arbitrariness alleged in the present case.
It	is now too well-settled that every State action, in order to survive, must not be susceptible to the vice of arbitrariness which is the crux of Article 14 of the Consti- tution	and basic to the rule of law, the system which	gov- erns us. Arbitrariness is the very negation of the rule of law. Satisfaction of this basic test in every State action is sine qua lion tO its validity and in this respect,	the State cannot claim comparison with a private individual even in the field of contract. This distinction between the State and a private individual in the field of contract has to be borne in the mind.
The	meaning and true import of arbitrariness is	more easily	visualized than precisely stated or defined.	The question, whether an impugned act is arbitrary or not, is ultimately to be answered on the facts and in	the circum- stances of a given case. An obvious test to apply is to	see whether there is any discernible principle emerging from the impugned act and if so, does it satisfy the test of reasona- bleness. Where	a mode is prescribed for doing an act	and there is no impediment in following that procedure, perform- ance of the act otherwise and in a manner which does	not disclose any discernible principle which is reasonable,	may itself attract the vice of arbitrariness. Every State action must be informed by reason and it follows that an act unin- formed	by reason, is arbitrary. Rule of law	contemplates governance by laws and not by humour, whims or caprices of the men to whom the governance is entrusted for the	time being.	It is trite that be you ever so high, the laws	are above you'. This is what men in power must remember, always.
"In this context it is important to	emphasize that	the absence	of arbitrary power is the first essential of	the rule of law upon which our whole constitutional system is based. In a system governed by rule of law, discretion, when conferred upon	executive authorities, must	be confined within	clearly	defined limits. The rule of law from	this point of view means that decisions should be made by	the application of known principles and rules and, in general, such decisions should be predictable and the citizen should know where he is. If a decision is taken without any princi- ple or	without any rule it is unpredictable	and such a decision is the antithesis of a decision taken in accordance with the rule of	law. (See Dicey--"Law of	the Constitution"-Tenth Edn., Introduction cx). "Law has reached its finest moments", stated Douglas, J. in United States v. Wunderlick, (*), "when it has freed man from the unlimited discretion of some ruler ... Where discretion is absolute, man has always suffered". It is in this sense that the	rule of law may be said to be the sworn enemy of caprice. Discre- tion, as Lord Mansfield stated it in classic terms in	the case of John Wilker (*), "means sound discretion guided by law. It must be governed by rule, not humour: it must not be arbitrary, vague and fanciful."
After Jaisinghani's case (supra), long strides have been taken in several well-known decisions of this Court expand- ing the scope of judicial review in such matters. It	has been emphasized time and again that arbitrariness is anathe- ma to	State action in every sphere and wherever the	vice percolates, this Court would not be impeded by	technicali- ties to trace it and strike it down. This is the surest	way to ensure the	majesty of rule of law	guaranteed by	the Constitution of India. It is, therefore, obvious that irre- spective of the nature of appointment	of the Government Counsel in the districts in the State of U.P. and the secu- rity of tenure being even minimal as claimed by the State, the impugned circular, in order to survive, must withstand the attack of arbitrariness and be supported as an informed decision which is reasonable.
No	doubt, it is for the person alleging arbitrariness who has to prove it. This can be done by showing in	the first instance that the impugned State action is uninformed by reason inasmuch as there is no discernible principle on which it is based or it is Contrary to the prescribed	mode of exercise of the power or is unreasonable.	If this is shown, then the burden is shifted to the State to repel	the attack	by disclosing the material and reasons which led to the action being taken in order to show that	it was an informed decision Which was reasonable. If after a prima facie case of arbitrarineSs is made out, the State is unable to show that the decision is an informed action which is reasonable, the State action must perish as arbitrary. In the present case. the initial burden on the petition- ers/appellants has been discharged by showing that there is no discernible	principle for the impugned action at	the district level throughout the State of U.P. since there is nothing	in the circular to indicate that such	a sweeping action for all districts throughout the State was necessary which made it reasonable to change all Government Counsel in the districts throughout the State, even those whose tenure in office had not expired. Such a drastic action could be justified only	on the basis of some extraordinary ground equally	applicable to all Government Counsel in the	dis- tricts	throughout the State which is reasonable. No	such reason appears in the circular.
"That the contents of para 38 of the writ petition are	not admitted. It is denied that the government took the present decision with a political motive and in an arbitrary manner. It is	also submitted that the decision to terminate	the prOfessional engagement has been taken in order to stream- line the conduct of the government cases and effective prosecution thereof."
It is difficult to appreciate this as a reasonable basis for the drastic and sweeping action throughout	the State, particularly when the provisions in the Legal Remembrancer's Manual	referred earlier provide ordinarily for	renewal of the tenure Of the appointees. To say the least. the contents of para 29 of this counter-affidavit Which alone are relied on to disclose the reasons for the circular are	beautifully vague and convey nothing of substance and cannot furnish any tangible support to the impugned circular. It was stated by the learned Additional Advocate General that many of the old incumbents were to be re-appointed even after this exercise and, therefore, a wholesale change was not to be made. If at all. this submission discloses a further infirmity in	the impugned circular. If it be true that many of the existing appointees were to be continued by giving them fresh	ap- pointments. the action of first terminating their appoint- ment and then giving them fresh appointment is. to say	the least,	Uninformed by reason and does not even	fail within the scope of the disclosed reason `to streamline the conduct of government cases and effective prosecution thereof'. It is obvious that at least in respect of all such appointees who are to be continued by giving them fresh appointments, the act of terminating their appointment in one stroke,	was without application of mind by anyone to the question wheth- er a change was at all needed in their case. It would be too much to assume that every Government Counsel	in all	the districts of the State of U.P. was required to be replaced in order to streamline the conduct of government cases	and indeed. that is not even the case of the State which itself says that many of them were to be re-appointed. Non-application of	mind to individual cases before issuing a general circular terminating all such appointments throughout the	State	of U.P. is itself eloquent of	the arbitrariness writ large on the face of the circular. It is obvious that issuance of the impugned circular 658 was not governed by any rule but by the whim or fancy of someone totally unaware of the requirements of rule of	law, neatly	spelled	out in the case of John Wilkes,  4 Burr. 2528 more than two centuries back and	quoted	with approval by this Court almost a quarter century earlier in Jaisinghani's case (supra). We have considered it necessary to re-emphasize this aspect and reiterate what has been said so often by this Court only because we find that some	per- sons entrusted	with the task of governance appear to be unaware	of the fact that the exercise of discretion	they have must be governed by rule, not by humour, whim, caprice or fancy or personal predilections. It also disturbs us to find that the Legal Remembrancer's Department of the State of U .P. which has the duty to correctly advise the State Government in	such matters. overlooked the	obvious	and failed	to discharge its bounden duty of correctly advising the State Government in matters of law. We would like to believe	that the impugned circular was issued for want of proper	legal advice in this behalf instead of any ulterior motive suggested by the petitioners/appellants. Conferment	of the power together with the discretion which goes with it to enable proper exercise of the power is coupled with the duty to shun arbitrariness in its exercise and to promote the object for which the power is conferred, which undoubtedly is public interest and not individual or private gain, whim or caprice of any individual. All persons entrusted with	any such power have to bear in mind	its necessary concomitant which alone justified con ferment of power under the rule of law. This was apparently lost sight of in the present case while issuing the impugned circular. Arbitrariness is writ large in the impugned circular dated 6.2. 1990 issued by the State of Uttar	Pradesh. It gives the impression that this action was taken under	the mistaken belief of applicability of "spoils system" under our Constitution and	the cavalier fashion in which	the action	has been taken gives it the colour of treating	the posts of D.G.Cs. as bounty to be distributed by the appoint- ing authority	at its sweet will. Such a change even by a private party is made keeping in view his own interest	when he finds that the existing lawyer is not suitable for	the assignment and. therefore. without making the change he incurs the risk of some loss. In the case of the State it is the public interest which should be the prime guiding	con- sideration to judge the suitability of the appointee but it appears	that the impugned State action was taken in	the present	case with only one object in view, that is, to terminate all	existing appointments irrespective of	the subsistance or expiry of the tenure or suitability of	the existing incumbents.
Viewed in any manner, the impugned circular dated 6.2.90 is arbitrary. It terminates all the appointments of Govern- ment Counsel in the districts of the State of Uttar Pradesh by an omnibus order, even though these appointments were all individual. No	common	reason applicable to all of	them justifying their termination in one stroke on a reasonable ground has been shown. The submission on behalf of the State of Uttar Pradesh at the hearing that many of them	were likely	to be re-appointed is by itself ample proof of	the fact that there was total non-application of mind to	the individual cases before issuing the general order terminat- ing all the appointments. This was done in spite of	the clear provisions in the L.R. Manual laying down detailed procedure for appointment, termination and renewal of tenure and the requirement to first consider the existing incumbent for renewal of his tenure and to take steps for a fresh appointment in his place only if the existing incumbent is not found suitable in comparison to more suitable persons available for	appointment at the time of renewal. In	the case of existing appointees. a decision has to be first reached	about	their non-suitability	for renewal before deciding to take steps for making fresh appointments to replace them. None of these steps were taken and no material has been produced to show that any existing incumbent	was found unsuitable for the office on objective assessment before	the decision to replace all by fresh appointees	was taken. The prescribed procedure laid down in the L.R. Manual which has to regulate exercise of this power	was totally ignored. In short, nothing worthwhile has been shown on behalf	of the State of U.P. to support the impugned action as reasonable and non-arbitrary. The impugned circular must, therefore, perish on the ground of arbitrariness which is an available ground for judicial review in such a situation. In	view of the above conclusion, all the existing	ap- pointees to the posts of Government Counsel in the districts throughout the	State	of U.P., by whatever name called, governed by the impugned circular dated 6.2. 1990, who	were in position at the time of issuance of the circular,	must continue in office and be dealt with in accordance with	the procedure laid	down in the L.R. Manual. Those Government Counsel, whose term had then expired or was to expire there- after,	would be considered for renewal of their tenure in the manner prescribed and steps for preparation of a fresh panel to replace them would be taken only if they are found unsuitable for	renewal of their term as a result of an informed decision in the manner prescribed. The power of termination of any appointment during the subsistence of the term available to the State Government shall also be avail- able for exercise only in the manner	indicated, wherever considered necessary.
In short, the status quo ante as on 28.2. 1990, on which date the impugned circular dated 6.2. 1990 was made effec- tive, will be restored and be maintained till change in	any appointment is	found necessary and is made in	the manner prescribed. The fresh appointments, if any, made by	the State Government in implementation of the impugned circular dated 6.2. 1990, being subject to the validity of the circu- lar and the result of these matters, would stand superseded in this manner. The State Government will implement	this direction within two weeks of the date of this order. In our view, bringing the State activity in	contractual matters also within the purview of judicial review is inevi- table and is	a logical corollary to	the stage already reached in the decisions of this Court so far. Having fortu- nately	reached this point, we should not now turn back or take a turn in a different direction or merely stop there. In our opinion, two recent decisions in M/s Dwarkadas Marfa- tia and Sons,	(supra) and Mahabir Auto Stores & Ors., (supra) also lead in the same direction without saying so in clear terms. This appears to be also the trend of the recent English	decisions. It is in consonance with our commitment to openness which implies scrutiny of every State action to provide	an effective check against arbitrariness and abuse of power. We would much rather be wrong in saying so rather than be wrong in not saying so. Non-arbitrariness, being a necessary concomitant of the rule of law, it is imperative that all actions of every public functionary,	in whatever sphere,	must be guided by reason and	not humour, whim, caprice	or personal predilections of the persons entrusted with the task on behalf of the State and exercise of	all power must be for public good instead of being an abuse of the power.
In	view of the conclusion reached by us and the above direction restoring status quo ante as on 28.2.1990, we have not gone into individual matters brought before us.	Some argument was advanced from both sides in W.P. No. 706 of 1990 (Km. Shrilekha Vidyarthi v. State of U.P. & Ors.), wherein	the fact of renewal of petitioner's tenure is	dis- puted.	It is unnecessary for us to go into that question also since the order, we are making, governs the case of all Government Counsel in the districts throughout the State of U.P. including that of the petitioner in this writ petition. The subsequent	rights	of this petitioner also would be governed in the manner indicated above. If and when such a situation arises, it would be open to the parties to	have the dispute, if any, adjudicated wherein the	question of renewal	of tenure, claimed by the petitioner, can also be gone into.
Consequently, these appeals and	writ petitions	are allowed. The impugned	circular G.O.	No. D-284-Seven-Law-ministry dated	6.2. 1990, issued by	the Government of State of U.P., is quashed resulting in resto- ration	of status quo ante as on 28.2. 1990, the date	from which this circular was made effective. No costs.

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
	v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.