Source: https://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-8th-circuit/1698797.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 21:25:41+00:00

Document:
CHAVIS VAN & STORAGE OF MYRTLE BEACH, INC., Plaintiff–Appellant Bruton Properties, LLC, Plaintiff v. UNITED VAN LINES, LLC; Transportation Services Group, Inc.; Unigroup, Inc., Defendants–Appellees.
Before SMITH, BENTON, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges. Todd H. Bartels, argued Saint Joseph, MO, (William E. Quirk, Jon R. Dedon, Kansas City, MO, Sharon Kennedy, Saint Joseph, MO, on the brief), for Plaintiff–Appellant. Michael Joseph Morris, argued Saint Louis, MO, (Sharon Rosenberg, Brian Lamping, Saint Louis, MO, on the brief), for Defendants–Appellees.
Chavis Van & Storage of Myrtle Beach, Inc. (“Chavis”) appeals from the district court's1 adverse grant of summary judgment on its breach-of-contract claim against United Van Lines, LLC.; Transportation Services Group, Inc.; and UniGroup, Inc. (collectively, “United”). Chavis also appeals the district court's denial of its motion to compel certain discovery requests. After reviewing the record de novo, we hold that the district court properly granted summary judgment to United. We also hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to compel. Accordingly, we affirm.
such rules, regulations, procedures, and directives issued by the Carrier [United] or directives and decisions of the Carrier's [United's] Board of Directors, whether now existing or as may be issued or amended from time to time during the term of this Agreement, all of which are or shall be adopted and incorporated herein by reference.
P. To appoint an origin or destination agent when the Agent [Chavis] is at a point other than point of origin or destination and the Agent [Chavis] is not prepared to perform the necessary origin Transportation Services ․ for a shipper; and the Agent [Chavis] agrees the Carrier [United] will divide the appropriate compensation in accordance with Carrier Policies.
Q. To appoint an agent of the Carrier [United] as origin agent when the Agent [Chavis] secures an order involving a Shipment originating from the warehouse of an agent of the Carrier [United]; and the Agent [Chavis] agrees the Carrier [United] will divide the booking compensation in accordance with Carrier Policies.
compensat[ing] the Agent [Chavis] for Transportation Services rendered in accordance with Carrier Policies and the Pooling Plan, including paying to the Agent a commission on Shipments booked by the Agent [Chavis] or upon Shipments concerning which the Agent [Chavis] has performed Transportation Services, which are accepted and served by the Carrier [United] at rates established by Carrier Policies.
R. This is the entire Agreement between the Carrier and the Agent and supercedes all previous agreements between the parties. No change in this Agreement shall be valid unless made in writing and signed by both parties. No failure to require strict performance or to exercise any right or remedy hereunder will preclude requiring strict performance or exercising any right or remedy in the future. Any notice required to be given by one party to the other will be effective hereunder when and only when placed in writing and delivered personally or deposited in the United States mail, certified, postage prepaid to the appropriate party.
Chavis filed suit against United for, among other things,3 breach of contract, alleging that United breached the Agency Agreement by unilaterally changing the roles that United agents play in servicing shipments. Specifically, Chavis alleged that United breached the Agency Agreement and longstanding policies incorporated into it by not assigning Chavis to certain roles in the chain of interstate shipments. According to Chavis, it should have been assigned the roles of origin agent and destination agent (1) based on its status as the “local” or “authorized” agent in the case of non-military shipments, i.e., its status as the agent closest to the original or destination address, and (2) based on its designation as the United agent “authorized” to service Shaw Air Force Base (“Shaw AFB”) in South Carolina in the case of military shipments. Chavis alleged that these policies were initially contained in an Agency Manual provided to all United agents and in other written policies and documents.
In its supplemental briefing, Chavis argued that “[i]t is United's current existing policy that the authorized agent in a market is to be appointed as origin and destination agent.” In support of this argument, Chavis relied on (1) three sections from “United Van Lines, LLC Policies, May 2005” (“2005 Policies”); (2) ¶¶ 3P and 3Q of the Agency Agreement; and (3) a 2009 resolution adopted (and subsequently rescinded) by the Board of Directors of UniGroup (“2009 Rescinded Resolution”).
Chavis also argued that “[f]or military shipments the United agent to be appointed as origin or destination agent is the local United agent authorized for that military installation.” In support of this argument, Chavis relied on (1) three sections from the 2005 Policies; (2) United “Government 01–07” Bulletin issued on March 14, 2007 (“Government Bulletin”); (3) The Wire: Important News for Mayflower and United Agents, dated April 24, 2009 (“Newsletter”); and (4) United's Military Directory listing Chavis as the “Qualified Agent” for “Shaw AFB, SC” (“Military Directory”).
On appeal, Chavis argues that the district court erroneously granted summary judgment to United because a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether United breached its own policies. According to Chavis, United's longstanding policies, incorporated by reference into the Agency Agreement, provide that Chavis is the only authorized agent for Shaw AFB and for its home market and that this status entitles Chavis to serve as the origin and destination agent in those markets. Chavis contends that because substantial evidence demonstrates that these longstanding policies remain in force, the district court erred in concluding United was entitled to summary judgment on Chavis's breach-of-contract claim. Additionally, Chavis argues that the district court erred in denying Chavis's motion to compel discovery.
“We review de novo the district court's grant of summary judgment to [United] on the breach[-]of[-]contract claim.” Myers v. Richland Cnty., 429 F.3d 740, 750 (8th Cir.2005) (citation omitted). The Agency Agreement provides that it “shall be interpreted in accordance with the laws of the State of Missouri,” and both parties agree that Missouri law governs the present dispute.
“Under Missouri law, ‘[a] breach of contract action includes the following essential elements: (1) the existence and terms of a contract; (2) that plaintiff performed or tendered performance pursuant to the contract; (3) breach of the contract by the defendant; and (4) damages suffered by the plaintiff.’ “ Smith Flooring, Inc. v. Pa. Lumbermens Mut. Ins. Co., 713 F.3d 933, 941 (8th Cir.2013) (alteration in original) (quoting Keveney v. Mo. Military Acad., 304 S.W.3d 98, 104 (Mo.2010) (en banc)). “ ‘Under Missouri law, summary judgment is appropriate [in a contract case] where the language of the contract is clear and unambiguous such that the meaning of the portion of the contract in issue is so apparent that it may be determined from the four corners of the document.’ “ Deal v. Consumer Programs, Inc., 470 F.3d 1225, 1229 (8th Cir.2006) (alteration in original) (quoting Family Snacks of N.C., Inc. v. Prepared Prods. Co., 295 F.3d 864, 867 (8th Cir.2002)). A court must enforce as written a contract that “ ‘uses plain and unequivocal language.’ “ Id. at 1230 (quoting Lake Cable, Inc. v. Trittler, 914 S.W.2d 431, 436 (Mo.Ct.App.1996)).
“Whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law.” Lafarge N. Am., Inc. v. Discovery Grp. L.L.C., 574 F.3d 973, 979 (8th Cir.2009) (citing Edgewater Health Care, Inc. v. Health Sys. Mgmt., Inc., 752 S.W.2d 860, 865 (Mo.Ct.App.1988)). “To determine whether a contract is ambiguous, we consider the instrument as a whole, giving the words contained therein their ordinary meaning.” Deal, 470 F.3d at 1229 (citing Young Dental Mfg. Co. v. Engineered Prods. Inc., 838 S.W.2d 154, 156 (Mo.Ct.App.1992)). The parties may disagree about the contract's meaning without it being necessarily ambiguous. Id. (citing Sligo, Inc. v. Nevois, 84 F.3d 1014, 1019 (8th Cir.1996)). “If the contract is unambiguous, then the intent of the parties is to be gathered from the contract alone, and ‘any extrinsic or parol[ ] evidence as to the intent and meaning of the contract must be excluded from the court's review.’ “ Lafarge, 574 F.3d at 979 (quoting Vidacak v. Okla. Farmers Union Mut. Ins. Co., 274 S .W.3d 487, 490 (Mo.Ct.App.2008); see also Smith Flooring, 713 F.3d at 938 (“[T]he parol evidence rule bars admission of extrinsic evidence to vary or contradict the terms of an unambiguous and completely integrated written agreement.” (citation omitted)).
“Where a contract is ambiguous and unclear, however, ‘a court may resort to extrinsic evidence to resolve an ambiguity.’ “ Lafarge, 574 F.3d at 979 (quoting Burrus v. HBE Corp., 211 S.W.3d 613, 616 (Mo.Ct.App.2006)). An ambiguous contract is one that “ ‘is reasonably susceptible to different constructions.’ “ Id. (quoting Burrus, 211 S.W.3d at 616). “If a contract is ambiguous, ‘then a question of fact arises as to the intent of the parties, and thus it is error to grant summary judgment.’ “ Id. (quoting Essex Dev., Inc. v. Cotton Custom Homes, L.L.C., 195 S.W.3d 532, 535 (Mo.Ct.App.2006)).
We begin with those documents that Chavis cites in support of its argument that it is the only “authorized” agent for its home market for non-military shipments and that such status entitles it to serve as the origin and destination agent in that market: (1) the Agency Manual and Agency Reference Manual (ARM); (2) the 2005 Policies; (3) ¶¶ 3P and 3Q of the Agency Agreement; and (4) the 2009 Rescinded Resolution.
The district court agreed with United that the Agency Manual was not a part of the parties' contract based on the “undisputed fact that any hard copy policies pre-dating the bulletin date of September 3, 1996 were replaced by the online agency manual,” i.e., the ARM. Recognizing the district court's conclusion based on the undisputed facts that the online ARM replaced the Agency Manual, Chavis argues that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the ARM contains the same policies or is merely an online version of the Agency Manual.
“The burden of proof rests with the party claiming breach of contract.” Scheck Indus. Corp. v. Tarlton Corp., 435 S.W.3d 705, 723 (Mo.Ct.App.2014) (citation omitted). Thus, it is Chavis's burden—not United's—to prove that the online ARM is a part of the parties' agreement. The difficulty for Chavis, however, is that neither party can locate a hard copy version of the ARM. As a result, the ARM's contents are unknown, and Chavis is left to speculate as to whether it contained the same material terms as the Agency Manual.
But the ARM's contents are ultimately of no consequence because the undisputed facts show that the ARM, like the Agency Manual, was eliminated years ago. Sonja Pullaro of United testified that the ARM was available through the library of Office Automation but that “Office Automation is old, this [the ARM] is very old.” She explained that Office Automation “was the precursor to e-mail, so to speak, on a Main Frame System” and was no longer in use. Likewise, Steve Dawkins of United testified that the ARM is “defunct, and it was ․ superseded or taken over by the Agency Resource Guide.” Dawkins explained that by “defunct” he meant that the ARM was “no longer in existence” and that the ARM became “defunct” “in the nineties, late nineties, middle nineties.” Chavis has offered no evidence challenging or contradicting Pullaro's or Dawkins's testimony. See Fatemi v. White, 775 F.3d 1022, 1046 (8th Cir.2015) (“[O]nce the defendants moved for summary judgment, Dr. Fatemi was required to discard the shielding cloak of formal allegations and meet proof with proof by showing a genuine issue as to a material fact.” (quotation and citation omitted)).
Because the Agency Resource Guide superseded the online ARM in the nineties, the ARM was not a part of the parties' 2007 Agency Agreement; therefore, it does not matter whether the ARM contained the same terms as the hard copy of the Agency Manual or whether its terms support Chavis's claim. In summary, neither the Agency Manual, which the ARM replaced in 1996, nor the ARM, which the Agency Resource Guide superseded in the nineties, are a part of the parties' 2007 Agency Agreement, as those documents were not in existence at the time of the agreement or thereafter.
when a booking agent—the agent receiving a request from a customer for a move—is not located in the place where the shipment originates, it must appoint as the origin agent the local United agent where the shipment originates. Similarly, when the booking agent is not located in the place where the shipment is destined to go, the booking agent must appoint as the destination agent the local United agent at the destination.
We need not determine whether United is liable for the acts or omissions of its agents because we, like the district court, conclude that ¶¶ 3P and 3Q do not grant Chavis any rights to serve as an exclusive origin and destination agent. First, ¶ 3P provides that the booking agent may provide origin and destination services for any United order that it obtains when it is located at the place of origin or destination and is prepared to perform—thus, it need not appoint another agent at all.
Although Chavis argues that this policy requires a booking agent to appoint “the local United agent where the shipment originates [or terminates],” this argument is contrary to the plain language of the agreement which unambiguously says “an ” agent, not “the ” agent. Once again, Chavis fails to grasp the distinction between “an ” and “the.” This distinction, however, is fatal to Chavis'[s] breach[-]of[-]contract claim. Moreover, this provision of the agreement does not use the phrase “local agent” as argued by Chavis. Chavis cannot rewrite the unambiguous language of the agency agreement to create a requirement that the booking agent appoint “the local agent” when no such requirement exists. The language plainly permits the appointment of any origin or destination agent and cannot be read to state otherwise. The same analysis applies to the agency agreement's requirement to appoint “an agent of the Carrier as an origin agent when the Agent secures an order involving a shipment originating from the warehouse of an agent of the carrier.” (emphasis supplied).
RESOLVED, where United Van Lines and/or Mayflower Transit has an authorized agent either in the market or within 100 miles of origin or within the local agent's public service radius (“Local Agent”), an agent operating under a United or Mayflower agency agreement, or any entity affiliated with that agent, is required to assign a Local Agent for origin and destination service. This requirement will apply even if the booking agent intends to pack, load and haul a shipment from the origin location.
Notwithstanding the adoption of such proposal, it was later rescinded by the Board by a vote of seventeen to one. In connection with the rescission, the Board instructed the Operations Committee to consider the matter further before any policy change is presented to the Board for consideration.
Chavis acknowledges the Board's stated rescission of the resolution but argues that “the circumstances of the supposed rescission are highly questionable.” It maintains that United “produced a new version of the meeting minutes of April 28–29, 2009, for the first time on December 19, 2012,” and that “[t]his later-produced version reflects that it is the fifth version of the minutes.” Chavis questions the reference in the minutes to the resolution being “later rescinded” but failing to reflect that someone made a motion to rescind. Chavis also points to the failure of any of United's witnesses who were present to recall the details of the rescission. And, it contends that while the Board purportedly approved the April 28–29, 2009 minutes on August 19–20, 2009, “other information United produced reflects that the fifth version of the April 28–29, 2009 board minutes were not even created until February 9, 2010, which was around the time that Chavis started threatening litigation.” Chavis maintains that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether a rescission of the 2009 Resolution actually occurred.
“Although a district court must rule on a motion for summary judgment after viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, it is not required to ‘accept unreasonable inferences or sheer speculation as fact.’ “ Reed v. City of St. Charles, Mo., 561 F.3d 788, 791 (8th Cir.2009) (quoting Howard v. Columbia Pub. Sch. Dist., 363 F.3d 797, 800 (8th Cir.2004)). As United points out, Chavis has offered no evidence contradicting “the express and unambiguous rescission of the 2009 resolution documented in the Board minutes. No conflicting testimony. Not a bulletin communicating the resolution to agents. Nothing.” While Chavis asserts that United's own witnesses could not recall details about the purported rescission, United cites record evidence in its brief detailing its witnesses' recollection of the rescission. United notes that only one witness testified to not “recalling” the details; this is not the same as a witness testifying that a rescission of the resolution did not occur. Cf. Unterreiner v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 8 F.3d 1206, 1210–11 (7th Cir.1993), overruled on other grounds by Hill v. Tangherlini, 724 F.3d 965, 967–68 (7th Cir.2013) (“Statements of Volkswagen's Personnel Manager, on the other hand, are unequivocal. He claims to have posted a notice which remained on the bulletin board at all times during Unterreiner's employment. Unterreiner might have established a ‘genuine’ issue of fact by obtaining the deposition testimony or affidavits of other employees who had a better recollection of the bulletin board. He did not do so, and we are left only with his own statement based on a vague and somewhat conflicting recollection. This does not create a genuine issue of material fact.”).
Even if we considered the 2009 Rescinded Resolution as part of the parties' agreement, it would not, as the district court explained, “afford Chavis the relief it seeks because the resolution speaks only of assigning ‘a ’ local agent for origin and destination services.'' As explained supra, the article “a” is “general in description” and “encompass[es] any of the class.” Shelter, 693 S.W.2d at 812 (quotation and citation omitted).
Having reviewed the record, we conclude that none of the documents that Chavis identifies support its argument that it is the only “authorized” agent for its home market for non-military shipments.
Chavis relies on three policies. The first relied-upon 2005 policy is the “Operations—Household Goods” policy concerning “Origin Agents,” discussed supra. For the reasons set forth above, we conclude that this policy does not support Chavis's breach-of-contract claim because it does not guarantee to Chavis—or any United agent—a single shipment. See supra Part II.A.1.b.
The third policy authorizing United “to appoint MILITARY ONLY agents at military bases where the corporation has no current representation” permits United to appoint non-United booking agents on military shipments that United obtains at bases not currently serviced by anyone in the United-agency system. As the district court explained, this policy “certainly does not apply here, where Chavis and other United agents service Shaw AFB. Moreover, this alleged policy does not speak to which destination and origin agents should be appointed: it deals instead with booking agents, which is not even part of Chavis'[s] claim.” And, like the previously discussed policy, this policy refers to “agents,” not “an” agent.
1. The booking agent is responsible for selecting a DoD approved UniGroup agent to provide SIT for DoD shipments. The agent selected must be approved through a military inspection process before they can store DoD household goods. If there are no UniGroup agents 4 available at destination to provide SIT, the booking agent should contact the origin transportation office and request permission to store the shipment at origin to avoid out of area storage at destination. This should be done before a van is assigned and the shipment loads.
Furthermore, as United points out, while Chavis is the only listed United agent, it is not the closest UniGroup agent listed in the Military Directory to Shaw AFB; instead, Nilson Van & Storage in Sumter, South Carolina, is the closest agent. Chavis, by contrast, is in Conway, South Carolina, over 80 miles away from Shaw AFB. This is a fact that we may take judicial notice of. See Hartman v. United States, 538 F.2d 1336, 1346 (8th Cir.1976) (“[T]he district court properly took judicial notice of the fact that Fort Smith is more than one hundred miles distant from St. Louis; similar notice may be taken with respect to all of Logan County, Arkansas in which Booneville is located.”).
DP3 Shipment Allocation for UniGroup DoD TSPs ․ There are several factors used when making decisions regarding allocation of United and Mayflower authority DP3 shipments to booking/origin agents. Some of these factors include current DoD five-star ratings, agent proximity to origin of shipment, current DoD-approved warehouses and availability to service the shipment. When a Transportation Service Provider (TSP) is tendered a shipment in DPS, the shipment must be serviced in a high-quality manner to generate higher best-value scores. Poor service or failures of any kind will result in lower best-value scores for the TSP and could result in nationwide suspension. In situations when agents in the area are unable to provide the required services, the selection of the booker/origin agent will move outside the area of responsibility. It is important for agents to monitor their DoD five-star ratings. These ratings are available through DSPA, NGS Agent or the DoD Government section on The U (www.unigroupinc.net). Additional DoD five-star rating information is provided in Mayflower Bulletin # 2045, United Bulletin # 08–06 and DP3 information is provided in Agent Communication # 208090098. If you have questions, contact the Government Transportation department.
Having reviewed the record, we conclude that none of the documents that Chavis identifies support its argument that it is the exclusive agent for military shipments to and from Shaw AFB.
Chavis argues that the district court erred in denying its motion to compel discovery. Specifically, it challenges the district court's ruling on document requests concerning United's “policies, rules, procedures, or directives” and interrogatories and document requests concerning alleged damages.
[a]ny future discovery motions should demonstrate that counsel invested sufficient time and effort into resolving these discovery disputes (instead of simply highlighting them in anticipation for future Court involvement) before the motion was filed, and in no event shall any party file a motion relating to ESI [electronically stored information] without demonstrating that they discussed in good faith a plan for discovery of ESI with the opposing party. Good faith requires a party affirmatively propose a plan for the discovery of ESI.
Incredibly, Chavis attempts to blame the Court for its inability to state a breach[-]of[-]contract claim because I declined to compel defendants to respond to Chavis'[s] irrelevant and overly burdensome discovery requests. Yet Chavis cannot explain how it could even bring, no less maintain, a breach[-]of [-]contract claim without even knowing what contract terms defendants allegedly breached. Throughout this case, Chavis has employed a “throw everything against the wall and see what sticks” approach to litigation. The resulting mess is of its own—not the Court's—making.
We review for an abuse of discretion a district court's discovery decision. United States ex rel. Kraxberger v. Kan. City Power & Light Co., 756 F.3d 1075, 1082 (8th Cir.2014) (citation omitted). “ ‘A district court has very wide discretion in handling pretrial discovery and [this court is] most unlikely to fault its judgment unless, in the totality of the circumstances, its rulings are seen to be a gross abuse of discretion resulting in fundamental unfairness in the trial of the case.’ “ Id. (quoting Voegeli v. Lewis, 568 F.2d 89, 96 (8th Cir.1977)). “If [Chavis] can demonstrate a gross abuse of discretion, then [it] must also demonstrate prejudice.” Carr v. Anheuser–Busch Cos., Inc., 495 F. App'x 757, 767–68 (8th Cir.2012) (citing Ranger Transp., Inc. v. Wal–Mart Stores, 903 F.2d 1185, 1187 (8th Cir.1990) (per curiam)).
the [district] court must limit the frequency or extent of discovery otherwise allowed ․ if it determines that ․ the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit, considering the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties' resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the action, and the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues.
WWP, Inc. v. Wounded Warriors Family Support, Inc., 628 F.3d 1032, 1039 (8th Cir.2011) (alterations in original) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii)).
Here, the district court explained why it denied the motion to compel-the discovery requests were overly burdensome in that Chavis could not first identify what contract terms it was alleging that United breached. Having reviewed the full record, we conclude that the district court's denial of Chavis's motion to compel was not an abuse of discretion.
3. Chavis also brought claims for breach of implied contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, promissory estoppel, fraudulent misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, tortious interference with business expectancies, and civil conspiracy. The district court dismissed these claims, and Chavis does not challenge those dismissals on appeal.
4. UniGroup is the parent company of two sister household goods carriers, United Van Lines and Mayflower Transit. “UniGroup agents” thus refers to both independent United and Mayflower agents.
5. Because we find the parties' agreement clear and unambiguous, we are prohibited from resorting to extrinsic evidence to establish the intent and meaning of the parties' agreement. As a result, we will not consider witness testimony, emails, or other documents purporting to explain the agreement. See Lafarge, 574 F.3d at 979.

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