Source: http://ca10.washburnlaw.edu/cases/2001/10/00-3347.htm
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 16:28:47+00:00

Document:
This case raises a single issue: whether a district court's failure at a section 2255 evidentiary hearing to provide counsel to a defendant entitled to have counsel under Rule 8(c) requires reversal. We conclude that it does.
A federal grand jury indicted Eric L. Lewis, the defendant-appellant, on October 27, 1998, for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute approximately one pound of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841, and for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute one-half gallon of a mixture or substance containing phencyclidine ("PCP"), in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. In addition to Mr. Lewis, the grand jury indicted several other individuals, including Antonette A. Huckaby.
After the district court denied his motion to suppress the evidence against him, Lewis pled guilty on February 6, 1999, to being an accessory after the fact. On May 5, 1999, the district court sentenced Mr. Lewis to 87 months in prison. On May 5, 2000, exactly one year after being sentenced, Mr. Lewis filed a motion with the district court seeking to have his sentence set aside, vacated, or corrected. The district court granted Mr. Lewis's motion to proceed in forma pauperis in that proceeding.
Mr. Lewis's motion advanced several grounds for setting aside his sentence, including that he received ineffective assistance of counsel during his trial because his attorney, Mr. Carl Cornwell, failed to inform him that he was professionally associated with Ms. Huckaby's attorney, Mr. Brian Johnson. The only evidence Mr. Lewis presented in support of this claim was a March 9, 2000, docket sheet that listed the same address for Mr. Cornwell and Mr. Johnson.
On August 28, 2000, the district court held an evidentiary hearing and concluded that all of Mr. Lewis's claims were without merit. (Doc. 214; August 28, 2000 Tr. at 23-25.) At the onset of the hearing, Mr. Lewis requested that the district court appoint counsel to represent him, which the court denied. (August 28, 2000 Tr. at 4.) The district court then explained to Mr. Lewis that, in light of the docket sheet, he had presented a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel and that the government would bear the burden of rebutting this presumption.
What is the appropriate remedy for the district court's apparent violation of Rule 8(c) in this case?
(Id. at 4.) We now address that issue.
As the government forthrightly concedes in its brief, every circuit to date that has addressed the issue raised in our August 10, 2001 order has held that a Rule 8(c) violation requires automatic reversal and is not eligible for harmless error review. See Green v. United States, 262 F.3d 715, 718 (8th Cir. 2001); Shepherd v. United States, 253 F.3d 585, 588 (11th Cir. 2001); United States v. Iasiello, 166 F.3d 212, 213 (1999); United States v. Vasquez, 7 F.3d 81, 85 (5th Cir. 1993); Rauter v. United States, 871 F.2d 693, 697 & n.7 (7th Cir. 1989) (all holding harmless error analysis inapplicable to the Rule 8(c) violations). See also United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 68 F.3d 369 (9th Cir. 1995) (noting that all circuits hold that Rule 8(c) mandates the appointment of counsel and summarily reversing a district court that did not appoint counsel).
Although we appreciate the government's argument, we reject it and hold that a violation of Rule 8(c) requires automatic reversal. We reach this conclusion for several reasons. First, precedent from this Circuit has already suggested that a Rule 8(c) violation under section 2255 requires automatic reversal. As touched on above, this Court held in Swazo that the failure to provide an attorney at an evidentiary hearing held under section 2254 requires reversal. 23 F.3d at 334 ("Because the district court did not appoint counsel when it required a hearing, we must remand the case for further proceedings.") (emphasis added). In reaching this conclusion, this Court expressly noted that the "rules governing § 2255 cases contain a similar [right to counsel] requirement" and invoked precedent from other circuits which hold that a Rule 8(c) violation under section 2255 is not subject to harmless error analysis and requires automatic reversal.(2) Id. at 334, citing Vasquez, 7 F.3d at 84 and Rauter, 871 F.2d at 695. Although we never expressly stated that a harmless error analysis was inapplicable, our summary reversal and holding that the appointment of counsel was required, as well as the precedent we relied upon, suggested such a result. 23 F.3d at 334.
Even if we are not bound by our decision in Swazo, the government has not convinced us that we should break from the position taken by all the circuits that have considered this issue. Although the government is correct in noting that cases where automatic reversal is required (i.e., cases involving "structural error") usually involve a constitutional violation, see Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8 (1999); United States v. Stevens, 223 F.3d 239, 244 (3d Cir. 2000) (noting that "generally" structural errors are constitutional in nature), it is incorrect in suggesting that only constitutional errors warrant automatic reversal. United States v. Annigoni, 96 F.3d 1132, 1144 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (noting that "numerous errors are subject to automatic reversal even though they do not violate constitutional rights"). As the Supreme Court explained in Arizona v. Fulminante, 449 U.S. 279 (1991), a structural error is an error that affects "the framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial process itself." Id. at 310. Among the rights deemed "structural" by the Supreme Court is the complete denial of counsel during a criminal trial, see Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), which so affects "[t]he entire conduct of the trial from beginning to end." Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 309. Structural errors exist "where there are . . . 'defects in the constitution of the trial mechanism, which defy analysis by 'harmless error' standards.'" United States v. Noushfar, 78 F.3d 1442, 1445, quoting Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 309 (emphasis added).
In light of precedent from this Court and other circuits, the district court's denial of counsel to Mr. Lewis is REVERSED and this case is REMANDED to the district court for a proper evidentiary hearing.
*.After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously to grant the parties' request for a decision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G).
2.Section 2254's Rule 8(c) is identical to section 2255's.
3.The facts in this case demonstrate the point articulated by our sister circuits. On appeal, the government contends that the "absence of counsel had absolutely no impact on the district court's decision denying the motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence." (Aple. Br. at 13.) Essentially, the government asks this Court to assume that no new information would have been revealed at the hearing had appointed counsel, as opposed to Mr. Lewis, been given the opportunity to cross-examine Mr. Lewis's former attorney. The government's argument, however, completely ignores the fact that Mr. Lewis, who described himself as nervous during the proceeding, expressly declined his right to cross-examine Mr. Cornwell. (August 28, 2000 Tr. at 10-11.) Perhaps as a result of this, we know very little about the relationship between Mr. Cornwell and Mr. Johnson prior to June 1999.

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