Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=26964:g-r-no-l-69576-november-19,-1985-cicero-j-punsalan-v-estelito-p-mendoza&catid=1204&Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 12:41:46+00:00

Document:
CICERO J. PUNSALAN, etc., Petitioner, v. MINISTER ESTELITO P. MENDOZA, etc., Respondent.
Cicero J . Punzalan and Juan T . David, Cesar C. Carreon and Diosdado Rongcal for Petitioner.
Felix Q. Antonio, Jose Africa and Eduardo Hernandez for Respondent.
Wilfredo R. Mutuc for intervenor R. Nepomuceno.
On July 13, 1984, it appears, respondent again tendered his "resignation as Governor of the Province of Pampanga, effective at the pleasure of the President." 14 On July 16, 1984, he sent a letter 15 to the Minister of Local Government, Hon. Jose A. Roño, requesting that he "be considered on leave of absence" while the matter was "pending consideration by the President." On July 20, 1984, he received the Minister’s reply approving his request. 16 On July 21, 1984, according to the respondent, he advised the petitioner to assume "temporarily" the performance of the duties and functions of the Governor. 17 Whereupon the petitioner took his oath of office on July 23, 1984, before the Provincial Attorney, as "Gobernador ng Pampanga" (not Acting Governor), 18 relying on an alleged press release in the July 23, 1984-issue of Bulletin Today, that "the inhibition against Batasan Members from holding two elective positions is a constitutional provision which cannot be compromised," but it "allows the holding of two positions if the Batasan Member is appointed Prime Minister or Member of the Batasan." 19 Petitioner was able to discharge "all the powers and functions of Governor" until the end of the year.
We have carefully examined the pleadings and the lengthy memoranda and annexes thereof, in the light of the submission and oral arguments ventilated at the hearing of this case. The issues presented to this Court boil down to one determinative question: Can the respondent validly reassume the governorship of Pampanga after having tendered his resignation therefrom and having accepted an appointment as Minister of Justice as well as an "appointive" Batasan seat?
Petitioner’s contention. — NO. Reasons: (a) Respondent permanently vacated the Governor’s office as a result of his resignation and its "implied acceptance" by the President, and of abandonment when he failed to discharge the duties and responsibilities of the office from July 23, 1984 up to January 7, 1985; (b) Respondent’s reassumption is an unlawful "usurpation" of the powers and functions already being exercised by the petitioner as Governor by "right of succession" ; (c) Respondent had forfeited his right and title to the office when he accepted his appointment as Minister of Justice and that of "appointive" Batasan Member because of the incompatibility" of the positions with the Governor’s office (Section 10, Art. VIII of the Constitution).
Respondent’s submission. - YES because: (a) The resignation "effective at the pleasure of the President" was not accepted expressly or impliedly by the President; it was implicitly "rejected" ; (b) The alleged "abandonment of office" is predicated on the erroneous assumption that he just left the Governor’s post "without any leave of absence." 28 He was granted such leave "pending consideration" of his resignation; (c) It cannot be said that he clearly intended to "absolutely relinquish" the governorship during his absence; he asked petitioner merely to exercise "temporarily" the Governor’s duties and functions; (d) As Governor, respondent is eligible for appointment as Cabinet Member pursuant to Section 4(1), Article XII-B. As such Cabinet Member, he may subsequently be chosen to serve in the Batasan in accordance with Section 2, Art. VIII; and (e) The provision cited by the petitioner applies to an "elective" Batasan Member, but not to a Cabinet Member whose membership in the Batasan is "temporary" in nature. The disqualifications of a Cabinet Member are those specifically mentioned in Section 7 of Article IX, as amended; it no longer includes by reference "Section 10 . . . of Article VIII.
We find the petitioner’s conclusions factually and legally untenable.
To begin with, neither the alleged "implied acceptance" of the respondent’s resignation nor the imputed "abandonment of office" has any factual support in the record. There was a tender of resignation "effective at the pleasure of the President." Obviously, it was not meant to be effective immediately; acceptance was still necessary. 29 Abandonment by the incumbent of his office before acceptance of his resignation is punishable under the Revised Penal Code.30 Petitioner claims that there was "implied" acceptance of said resignation. It appears, however, that action thereon was held in abeyance. The President, apparently, needed more time to consider the validity of the view submitted by the respondent in his memorandum 31 and confidential letter. 32 As Governor, the respondent contended, he can be appointed Cabinet Minister and, as such, assigned later to the Batasan without forfeiting the governorship. When the President finally acted, he shelved the resignation, approving instead the KBL caucus recommendation for the respondent to reassume the governorship. Plainly, abandonment cannot be inferred from the conduct of the Respondent. There was abandonment, petitioner believes, because respondent failed to discharge the Governor’s duties for "a period of more than five (5) months without any leave of absence." 33 This is belied, however, by the Local Government Minister’s approval of the request of the respondent that he be considered "on leave of absence" while his resignation was "pending consideration by the President." 34 It now appears that the petitioner was totally unaware of this important detail when he assumed office as "Gobernador ng Pampanga," and even at the time of the filing of the instant petition. His naked claim that the said approval of the respondent’s leave is "highly suspicious and dubious" 35 is neither proof nor sufficient showing that the earns is spurious. Good faith and the regularity in the performance of official duty are always presumed, in the absence of clear and convincing proof to the contrary.
This brings us to the pivotal legal issue.
The petitioner relies on the broad or general import of the first prohibition which provides that "A Member" of the Batasan cannot "hold any other office or employment in the Government," etc., except the four positions therein specifically mentioned.
Taking into account its context, however, as well as the pertinent and related constitutional provisions, it is quite clear that the said prohibition may not be construed and applied broadly or expansively. The Constitution itself divided the Batasan membership into three categories: The elective provincial/city/district representative; the sectoral representatives who are either "elected or selected as may be provided by law" ; and those "chosen" from Members of the Cabinet. 38 It is our opinion that the prohibition in question does not extend to the third group of members, those chosen from the Cabinet.
It may be pointed out, parenthetically, that one of the 1976 amendments (which provided for an interim Batasang Pambansa in lieu of the interim National Assembly) included this provision: "the Cabinet shall be subject only to such disqualifications as the President (Prime Minister) may prescribe . . ." Thus, even before 1981, Section 10 (Art. VIII) was not meant to apply ex proprio vigore to Cabinet Members assigned to sit in the interim Batasan in accordance with Amendment 1. Such assignment was not deemed equivalent to holding an office separate from and independent of their cabinet posts. The 1981 amendment, deleting from Section 8 (now 7) of Article IX the aforementioned reference to "section ten .. of Article VIII hereof," makes it self-evident that it does not extend to, and cannot embrace within its purview, such Members of the Cabinet.
Thirdly, there are valid reasons for the distinction. The "Cabinet representatives" to the Batasan differ in many respects from the regular Batasan Members: the elective provincial/city/district representatives. The latter, inter alia, (a) are voted into office for a fixed term of 6 years by the electorate of the political subdivisions or units thereof that they respectively represent; (b) the Speaker is elected "from among the elected provincial, city and district representatives" ; 41 (c) it is mandated that a majority of the Members of the Cabinet who are heads of Ministries shall come from the elective provincial, city or district representatives" ; 42 (d) they do not vacate their Batasan seats in case of resignation from their Cabinet posts for any cause; 43 and (e) pursuant to the prohibitions in Article VIII, these elective Batasan Members may appear before a court with appellate jurisdiction but are forbidden from appearing as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein the government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof is the adverse party, or in any criminal case wherein any officer or employee of the government is accused of an offense committed in relation to his office, or before any administrative body.
Fourthly, reciprocal representation in two branches — the executive and the legislative — of the government is a feature of our present modified Presidential or semi-parliamentary system, resulting in the modification to a certain extent of the principle of separation of powers. At least half of the Cabinet positions with Ministries are allocated to and occupied by the elective Batasan Members. Non-elective Cabinet Members, on the other hand, are assigned to Batasan seats to represent the Cabinet (which is "responsible" to the Batasan for the program of government"). 44 Nonetheless, for purposes of the disqualification clause, Cabinet Minister given such legislative assignment remains primarily a Cabinet Member who serves in the Batasan in an ex officio capacity or as a mere incident of his membership in the Cabinet.
The root cause of this controversy may be traced to the oath-taking of the petitioner as "Gobernador ng Pampanga" (not Acting Governor) on July 23, 1984, without waiting for the formal acceptance of the respondent’s resignation. Petitioner misread a newspaper item mentioned earlier and was misled into believing that there was an "implied acceptance" thereof. The so-called press release, however, merely attributed to the President a statement to the effect that a Governor (or City Mayor) who was elected to the Batasan cannot hold "two elective positions." This is correct as held recently by this Court in Pacana v. Adaza, 46 a case involving a Governor who got himself elected Mambabatas Pambansa and qualified as such, and who wanted also to retain his elective governorship. It is not so in the instant case.
WHEREFORE, the petition should be, as it is hereby, dismissed. No costs.
Plana, Gutierrez, Jr., Cuevas, Alampay and Patajo, JJ., concur.
Makasiar, C.J. and Abad Santos, J., took no part.
Concepcion, Jr., J., concur in the result.
Escolin, J., I reserve my vote in a separate opinion.
Relova, J., is on leave.
I concur. Minister Mendoza did not cease to be Governor because his resignation was not accepted. His appointment to the Batasan did not mean his disqualification from continuing as Governor because section 10 of Article VIII of the Constitution applies only to elected Batasan members, not to appointive Members.
"The language used in the above cited section is plain, certain and free from ambiguity. The only exceptions mentioned therein are the offices of prime minister and cabinet member. The wisdom or expediency of the said provision is a matter which is not within the province of the Court to determine.
"President Marcos said yesterday that the inhibition against Batasan members from holding two elective positions simultaneously is a constitutional provision which cannot be compromised.
The President said that this issue affects some members of both the ruling Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL) and the opposition parties.
The charter provision, however, allows the holding of two positions if the Batasan member is appointed Prime Minister or member of the Cabinet, he said.
Be it noted that such report of the unconditional and unqualified resignation of respondent in order to assume his new national offices of Minister of Justice and MP (as per his letter of July 13, 1984 to the President) was never denied nor repudiated much less was the claim made as now belatedly asserted post litem motam, that he wrote three days later on July 16, 1984 to the Minister of Local Government (not to the President) "requesting that he ‘be considered on leave of absence’ while the matter [of his resignation] was ‘pending consideration by the President.’" 5 Albeit, such resignation was forthwith accepted by the President, as above stated.
4.	The concave and convex distinctions sought to be drawn by respondent between elected and appointed members of parliament are irrelevant and at any rate untenable. — We start from the indubitable fact of the President’s acceptance of respondent’s resignation as governor upon his assumption of the office of the Minister of Justice and concurrently member of parliament. It is elementary that such acceptance requires no particular formalities. The mere constitutional incompatibility between the offices, as declared by the President himself, and confirmed by this Court in Adaza is more than sufficient manifestation of such acceptance of respondent’s resignation from the governorship. He thereby lost all title and right to the governorship, and could not claim at will to "reassume" or "take over" from his legal successor, petitioner Punsalan. The distinctions drawn by the majority decision between an elected and appointed member of parliament are irrelevant, by virtue of the established fact of the President’s publicly announced acceptance of his resignation as governor as confirmed in the newspapers. Actually, such acceptance was unnecessary and even superfluous, since the constitutionally incompatible position of MP and local governor cannot be validly held at the same time by one man. Respondent’s resignation of the governorship was the manifestation of his choice to serve as he did serve, as MP and Cabinet member. The forced interpretation given in the majority decision which would emphasize irrelevant distinctions between an elected, an appointed and an anointed ("chosen") MP 7 in relation to Article VIII, Section 10 of the Constitution 8 does not carry the day for Respondent.
5.	Respondent cannot be governor and MP at the same time. — Petitioner’s submittal is simple. Under the Constitution, there is a general ban against holding multiple offices by elective officials. No elective official (governor) is eligible for appointment to any office except as cabinet member. 9 When respondent, as cabinet member, was appointed MP in the Batasan, he fell also under the general ban in the Constitution against MP’s holding any other office or employment except the then express exemptions therein (Prime Minister, cabinet member or deputy minister). Under both prohibitions, respondent could not be a governor and MP at the same time. Hence, he resigned permanently as governor upon his appointment as MP and could not by afterwards resigning as MP "reassume" the governorship he had vacated.
8.	By virtue of the constitutional, legal and physical incompatibility of the offices held by respondent with that of governor, his acceptance in July 1984 of the second and third offices of cabinet member and MP vacated the first office of governor which he publicly yielded to petitioner. — This is settled in American and Philippine jurisprudence. The constitutional and legal incompatibility of the offices in question has already been hereinabove discussed.
The rule that physical impossibility to perform the functions of the two or more offices held constitutes legal incompatibility. The rule is founded on logic, common law and common sense.
It is based on public policy. "Public policy requires that any one accepting and retaining a public office should not place himself, by the accepting of another office, in such a position that it is physically impossible for him properly to perform the duties of both offices, and if the nature of the two offices is such that such impossibility does appear, the offices are ‘incompatible’ and the acceptance of the second office, ipso facto, vacates the first. Perkins v. Manning, 122 p. 857.
". . . What, then, does constitute incompatibility in offices? In 5 Bac.-Abr., Title Offices K, we find the rule laid down, upon the authority of Lord Coke in these words: ‘Offices are said to be incompatible and inconsistent, so as to be executed by the same person, when, from the multiplicity of business in them, they cannot be executed with care and ability; . . .’" (Emphasis supplied).
The broader test holds that "incompatibility of offices exists where there is conflict in the duties of the offices, so that the performance of the duties of the one interferes with the performance of the duties of the other. They are generally considered incompatible where such duties and functions are inherently inconsistent and repugnant, so that because of the contrariety and antagonism which would result from the attempt of one person to discharge faithfully, impartially, and efficiently the duties of both offices, considerations of public policy render it improper for an incumbent to retain both." 15 Under this test, respondent himself realized such conflict and contrariety when he told petitioner upon turning over the governorship that "he would not want his Office of Ministry of Justice to be involved in a controversy regarding dual positions, specially because it is his said office which rules on said controversy and issues arising therefrom for administrative purposes." 16 This was shown all the more when respondent ruled in his own favor in effect when in January, 1985 he" ‘Reassumed the position of governor’ . . . (in) implementation of the KBL Caucus recommendation approved by the President," 17 instead of disqualifying himself as a protagonist in view of the serious constitutional and legal obstacles.
"At common law, and under constitutional and statutory prohibitions against the holding of incompatible offices, a person who accepts and qualifies for a second and incompatible office is generally held to vacate, or by implication resign, the first office, so that no judicial proceedings are necessary to determine the title. The successor may at once be elected or appointed, although if the former occupant refuses to vacate the office, his successor may be compelled to take the necessary legal steps to oust him.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to grant the petition and to declare petitioner as having lawfully succeeded respondent as governor of Pampanga.
The section shall hereinafter be referred to simply as SEC. 4-1.
except as member of the executive committee referred to in Section 3, Article IX hereof." (Paragraphing supplied).
The third and last supplied paragraph shall hereinafter be referred to as the EXECOM CLAUSE.
except as Member of the Cabinet." (Paragraphing supplied).
The third and last supplied paragraph shall hereinafter be referred to as the CABINET CLAUSE.
The burden of this dissent is that the insertion into SEC. 4-1 of the CABINET CLAUSE has not been approved by the people.
2.	(a) On December 21, 1983, the Batasan Pambansa approved BP Blg. 643, providing for a plebiscite to be held on January 27, 1984 for the submission to the people of amendments to the Constitution of the Philippines which it had proposed during its Sixth Regular Session.
(b)	A scrutiny of said BP Blg. 643 reveals, however, that nowhere therein is the QUESTIONABLE AMENDMENT proposed.
(c)	Neither was the QUESTIONABLE AMENDMENT included in the plebiscite ballot nor in the Certificate of Canvass submitted by the COMELEC to the President on February 1, 1984.
3.	Parenthetically, Resolution No. 113 (on urban land reform and social housing program) approved on December 19, 1983, two (2) days before the passage of BP Blg. 643 on December 21, 1983, was neither incorporated in that law when the Batasan Pambansa was supposed to have known what resolutions for the constitutional amendments had been approved before said date of December 21, 1983. BP Blg. 643, as published in the Official Gazette specifically referred to Resolutions numbered 104, 105, 110, 111 and 112. No mention was made of Resolution No. 113. Reasonable doubt thus arises as to whether said amendment had been legally proposed by the Batasan Pambansa in accordance with constitutional provisions. Even if the people had actually approved the amendment proposed in Resolution No. 113 through Question No. 4, but if it was not legally proposed then the constitutional amendment based on that particular Resolution No. 113 should be deemed invalid.
as Resolution No. 113 was not "hereafter" approved.
After the approval of BP Blg. 643 on December 21, 1983, BP No. 644 was approved on January 5, 1984, providing for the amendment of RA 1862, as amended, which is in regard to retirement pay for the armed forces.
The next Batasan Pambansa legislation, numbered 645 was approved on March 7, 1984 (81 Off Gaz. 359), a date after the 1984 plebiscite.
What has to be noted is that the Batasan Pambansa had not approved any legislation between December 21, 1983 and January 27, 1984 (the date of the plebiscite), in relation to the plebiscite.
4.	The foregoing underscores the need for publication of laws in the Official Gazette. In the undersigned’s Separate Opinion in Almario v. Alba (127 SCRA 69, 93-97 ), she objected to the holding of the plebiscite on January 27, 1984 on the ground that the BP Resolutions involved, as well as BP Blg. 643, had not yet been published in the Official Gazette. BP Blg. 643 was published only on September 3, 1984 in 80 O.G., pp. 4732-4739, and again on October 8, 1984 in 80 O.G. pp. 5343-5350; while she has yet to see an Official Gazette publication of Resolution No. 110, with the QUESTIONABLE AMENDMENT.
"1.	Abolition of the Executive Committee and Creation of the Office of the Vice-President.
(1)	The Executive Committee provided in Section 3, Article IX of the Constitution is abolished.
"2.	Presidential succession before the election of 1987.
(1)	In case a vacancy in the Office of President occurs before the presidential election of 1987, the Speaker of the Batasang Pambansa shall act as President until a President and a Vice-President or either of them shall have been elected and shall have qualified.
(2)	The Batasang Pambansa shall, at ten o’clock in the morning of the third day after the vacancy occurs, convene in accordance with its Rules without need of a call and within seven days enact a law calling for a special election for President and Vice-President to be held not earlier than forty-five days and not later than sixty days from the time of such call. The convening of the Batasang Pambansa cannot be suspended nor the special election postponed. No special election shall be called if the vacancy occurs within seventy days before the date of the presidential election of 1987.
(3)	The tenure of office of the President and Vice-President elected in the special election shall commence at noon of the tenth day following their proclamation, and shall end at noon on the thirtieth day of June of the sixth year thereafter.
"3.	Limitations on the powers of the Speaker acting as President.
(1)	The Acting President may not declare martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus without the prior consent of at least a majority of all the Members of the Batasang Pambansa.
(2)	He may not issue any decree, order or letter of instruction while the law-making power of the President is in force.
(3)	He shall be deemed automatically on leave and the Speaker Pro-Tempore shall act as Speaker. While acting as President, the Speaker may not be removed.
(4)	He shall not be eligible for election in the immediately succeeding election for President and Vice-President.
(5)	Appointment extended by the Acting President shall remain effective unless revoked by the newly elected President within ninety days from his assumption of office.
(2)	In case of permanent disability, death, removal from office or resignation of the President, the Vice President shall become the President to serve the unexpired term.
(1)	The Batasang Pambansa shall by law provide who shall act as President or the manner in which one who is to act shall be selected if neither a President-elect nor a Vice-President-elect shall have been chosen nor shall have qualified, or both shall have died at the time fixed for the beginning of their term.
Question No. 2 can be thoroughly scrutinized, and it will be seen that no reference whatsoever was made to the substitution of the EXECOM CLAUSE by the CABINET CLAUSE in SEC. 4-1. What can negatively appear from the people’s affirmative reply to Question No. 2 is that the people had never consented to the substitution of the EXECOM CLAUSE by the CABINET CLAUSE. Although the substitution had been proposed in the QUESTIONABLE AMENDMENT, it cannot be implemented because it was not voted upon by the people through a "yes" vote for Question No. 2.
It is quite true that in reference to Resolution No. 110, it was proposed in Question No. 2 that the Executive Committee be abolished. Approval of that amendment can affect SEC. 4-1 so as to exclude the EXECOM CLAUSE therefrom. However, the elimination of the EXECOM CLAUSE from the provision will not justify its substitution by the CABINET CLAUSE. The provision should now revert to its original phraseology that "no elective official shall be eligible for appointment to any office or position during his term of office." Whether the phrase "unless otherwise provided by law" should be retained can be the subject of another proceeding. Generally speaking, the phrase, if used in a Constitution, can be the seed of the Constitution’s own destruction.
2.	Under the 1981 constitutional amendment, a Governor who is appointed a member of the Executive Committee can resign from the committee without vacating his gubernatorial position (Sec. 9, Art, IX). There can be no impracticability in the resignation provision because membership in the Executive Committee, in so far as the Governor is concerned, is merely to assist the President.
"SEC. 8.	The Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minister or any Member of the Cabinet, may resign for any cause without vacating his seat as provincial, city, district or sectoral representative in the Batasang Pambansa, or any other government position."
cannot defeat the provisions of SEC. 4-1. In the same manner as SEC. 4-1 was not legally amended, neither was Article IX, Section 8, legally amended because of its non-inclusion in BP Blg. 643, nor in the plebiscite ballot nor in the Certificate of Canvass submitted by COMELEC to the President of the Philippines on February 1, 1984. It was, therefore, never submitted to the people for approval or disapproval.
All considered, under SEC. 4-1, as it is believed it should now be worded, an elected provincial governor cannot be appointed to a Ministry.
It is in view of the foregoing considerations that I vote to grant the petition, and to hold that respondent Minister of Justice should be held as having technically abandoned the position of Governor of Pampanga and that he cannot now replace petitioner in the Governorship.
1.	Page 1, Petition; Emphasis supplied.
2.	Page 2, Reply, etc.; page 165, Rollo.
3.	On July 25, 1985.
4.	On February 8, 1985.
5.	Resolution of February 14, 1985.
6.	Assisted by Attys. Juan T. David, Cesar Carreon and Diosdado Roncal.
7.	Assisted by Justice Felix Q. Antonio, Attys. Jose Africa and Eduardo Hernandez.
10.	Governor Mendoza, 192, 769, votes; Vice-Governor Punsalan, 186, 919 votes.
11.	That of Solicitor General.
12	Pages 114 and 399, Rollo.
13.	But respondent assumed office as such member on July 23, 1985.
14.	Pages 115, 401 and 470, Rollo.
15.	Pages 115, 471, Ibid.
16.	Pages 116, 402, Ibid.
17.	It was "not for a temporary period," according to petitioner, page 182, Ibid.; respondent’s version on pages 116 and 402.
18.	Annex "B", Petition page 26, Rollo.
19.	Quoted in full, page 14, Petition; page 15, Ibid.
23.	Footnote reference not found in original copy.
25.	Pages 405, 481, 482 and 483, Ibid.
26.	Annex "LL-1", Reply; page 338, Rollo.
27.	Pages 406, 484 and 485, Ibid.
29.	Gamboa v. Court of Appeals, 108 SCRA 1.
31.	Sent the President by letter dated May 25, 1984; page 458, Rollo.
32.	Dated June 21, 1984, page 463, Ibid.
33.	Paragraph 18 of Petition, page 14, Ibid.
34.	See letters both dated July 16, 1984; pages 472 and 473, Ibid.
35.	Pages 253 and 293, Ibid.
36.	As amended February 1, 1984.
38.	Section 2, Article VIII.
39.	Section 3(1) and Section 7(1), Ibid.
40.	As further amended in 1984; ratified on January 27, 1984, and declared in full force and effect pursuant to Proclamation No. 2332 dated February 1, 1984.
41.	Section 7(1) Article VIII.
42.	Section 1, Article IX.
45.	Cooley, Treatise on Constitutional Limitations, 8th Ed., Vol. 1, pp. 128-129.
1.	G.R. No. 68159, prom. March 18, 1985, reported in 135 SCRA 431, per Escolin, J.
2.	Twelve of the fourteen members of this Court concurred, and then Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando and Justice Vicente Abad Santos took no part. The composition of this Court remains the same, except for the retirement last July 25th of C.J. Fernando and the subsequent appointment of Justice Lino Patajo to fill the vacant 14th seat.
5.	Majority decision, at page 3.
7.	At page 7, majority decision.
9.	Article XII-B, sec. 4(1) which reads: "SEC. 4(1). Unless otherwise provided by law, no elective official shall be eligible for appointment to any office or position during his tenure except as Member of the Cabinet." (as allegedly amended February 1, 1984.).
10.	Where the law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish.
11.	Note in brackets supplied.
12.	Supra, fns. 8 and 9.
13.	85 Phil. 101, 109 (1949); Emphasis supplied.
14.	66 Phil. 615 (1938); Emphasis supplied; see also Summers v. Ozaeta, 81 Phil. 754 (1948).
15.	63 Am. Jur. 2d. 73; Emphasis supplied.
16.	Supra, par. 3 hereof.
17.	Majority decision at page 3.
18.	63 Am. Jur 2d. 77; Emphasis supplied.
19.	Idem. at page 81.
20.	Idem. at page 168.
21. "Jesus Bigornia." Bulletin Today issue of Jan. 10, 1985.
22.	It will be recalled that said Major Rogelio Lagmay and three of his companions were shot dead at the town hall when he tried to reassume the post from vice and acting mayor Artemio Pagaduan after he had been cleared of charges filed against him by the latter, and for which he had been suspended from office. Murder and frustrated murder charges were subsequently filed against the vice-mayor and thirteen others, (Bulletin Today issue of February 16, 1985.).
23.	Olmstead v. U.S. 277 U.S. 438, dissenting opinion.

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