Source: http://masscases.com/cases/sjc/299/299mass579.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 21:04:53+00:00

Document:
MANUEL PIMENTAL vs. JOHN E. COX CO., INC.
Workmen's Comensation Act, Liability of one person engaged in common employment for injury to another, Action by insurer against negligent third person. Words, "Some person other than the insured," "Common job."
An independent contractor, insured under the workmen's compensation act and performing part of the work of erecting a building, was a "person other than the insured" and not immune to an action at law under G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 152, §§ 15, 18, brought by the insurer of a second independent contractor on the job in the name of an employee of its insured injured through the negligence of the first contractor where the common hirer of the contractors was not insured with respect to such construction work.
TORT. Writ in the Superior Court dated January 22, 1935.
The action was tried before Walsh, J., and was submitted to this court on briefs.
H. E. Clarkin & J. T. Farrell, for the plaintiff.
H. S. R. Buffinton & R. A. Bogle, for the defendant.
reserved leave to enter a verdict for the defendant. On motion of the defendant such a verdict was entered subject to the plaintiff's exception. The judge reported the case upon the terms that if his "action in ordering the entry of a verdict for the defendant was correct, judgment is to be entered on the verdict, otherwise judgment is to be entered for the plaintiff in the sum of $1,000 plus interest from the date of the verdict."
There was evidence warranting a finding "that the plaintiff was in the exercise of due care and was injured by reason of the negligence of an agent or servant of the defendant acting within the scope of his employment, and that he did not assume the risk of the happening of such an accident as that which caused his injury." The defendant does not contend that the verdict returned by the jury was vitiated by error or that the plaintiff is not entitled to judgment thereon, unless, on the facts agreed upon by the parties, the plaintiff is precluded by the provisions of the workmen's compensation law, G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 152, from maintaining this action against the defendant.
building. These four contracts were in force on May 14, 1934, at the time of the accident. All four contractors carried workmen's compensation insurance as prescribed in chapter 152 of the General Laws and as required under the terms of their respective contracts with Cook Bros. Cook Brothers also carried workmen's compensation insurance as prescribed by said chapter 152 covering their freight forwarding and expressing business. All persons engaged in the construction of the freight terminal in any capacity were employees of one of these four contractors except said Deardon, the architect. The plaintiff in this case, an employee of William Dorley & Company, was injured on May 14, 1934, while working on the premises and on the job of building this freight terminal and was paid compensation for his injuries by the Ocean Accident and Guarantee Corporation, insurer of William Dorley & Company by whom he was employed. The plaintiff had not given notice of reservation of his common law rights under chapter 152 of the General Laws to William Dorley & Company, by whom he was employed, to the defendant, to Cook Bros. or to any other person. This suit is duly authorized by the said Ocean Accident and Guarantee Corporation, insurer of William Dorley & Company, which has paid compensation under the pertinent provisions of General Laws, chapter 152, to the plaintiff, Manuel Pimental."
The facts set forth in this stipulation did not justify the order of the judge that a verdict be entered for the defendant.
of the defendant, if any, for damages to the plaintiff. The present action was brought for that purpose by the insurer in the name of the plaintiff. See Becker v. Eastern Massachusetts Street Railway, 279 Mass. 435, 441-444. But the action can be maintained only if the injury for which the plaintiff was paid compensation was, in the language of G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 152, § 15, "caused under circumstances creating a legal liability" in the defendant, as "some person other than the insured."
The defendant's sole contention is that it was not "some person other than the insured" within the meaning of G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 152, § 15, but that it is entitled to the protection against an action at law for damages to which an "insured" is entitled. This contention cannot be sustained.
workmen employed by such independent contractor or subcontractor. G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 152, § 18. White v. George A. Fuller Co. 226 Mass. 1. Bindbeutel v. L. D. Willcutt & Sons Co. 244 Mass. 195. Catalano v. George F. Watts Corp. 255 Mass. 605. Dresser v. New Hampshire Structural Steel Co. 206 Mass. 97. Cozzo v. Atlantic Refining Co., ante, 260, 263. Accordingly an insured independent contractor or subcontractor engaged on a common job for a "common employer insured under the act" is not "some person other than the insured" within the meaning of G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 152, § 15, against whom an action at law can be maintained by, or in the right of, an injured employee -- who had not reserved his common law rights - of another independent contractor or subcontractor engaged on the common job.
compensation on the further ground that under G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 152, § 1 (4), it would not have been liable to pay compensation to "employees immediately employed" by Cook Brothers "if such work were executed" by them need not be decided. See 18. Moreover, the firm of Cook Brothers was not an "insured person" within the meaning of the workmen's compensation law with respect to the erection of a freight terminal and garage by reason of its contracts with the independent contractors which required such contractors to carry insurance under the statute. G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 152, § 1 (6) (7). Nor was the firm of Cook Brothers the employer of the employees of the independent contractors within the meaning of the workmen's compensation law except as it was made so by § 18 thereof if applicable. See Clancy's Case, 228 Mass. 316, 318; McDermott's Case, 283 Mass. 74.
The fundamental question for decision is whether the absence of a "common employer insured under the act" is fatal to the defendant's contention. The doctrine of the Dresser case, and related cases, has not heretofore been applied to a case where there was no such employer. We think it is not to be extended to such a case.
While it has been recognized as "the purpose of the workmen's compensation act to give all the workmen on a common job the benefit of that act and to put them on substantially the same footing as to compensation to be measured by earning capacity and the extent of injury" (Bresnahan v. Barre, 286 Mass. 593, 597, see Bindbeutel v. L. D. Willcutt & Sons Co. 244 Mass. 195, 198-199; Catalano v. George F. Watts Corp. 255 Mass. 605, 606), this purpose cannot be carried out in all cases. Otherwise there would be no room for the application of G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 152, § 15, under which an employee may share in the amount received by an insurer in an action at law for damages against "some person other than the insured." The words "common job" in the phrase quoted, considered in connection with other language of the opinions, must be taken to mean a "common employment" under a "common employer insured under the act."
contractors or subcontractors. In such a situation there is no basis for immunity of an independent contractor outside the scope of the insurance which such independent contractor has himself procured. This is the situation in the present case. The plaintiff was outside the scope of the insurance under the workmen's compensation law procured by the defendant.
It follows that in accordance with the terms of the report "judgment is to be entered for the plaintiff in the sum of $1,000 plus interest from the date of the verdict."

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