Source: https://cbaclelegalconnection.com/tag/plain-error/
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 22:38:09+00:00

Document:
The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in People v. Lozano-Ruiz on Monday, October 29, 2018.
In this case, the supreme court reviewed the trial court’s reversal of a sexual assault conviction for failure to provide a jury instruction containing the statutory definition of “sexual penetration.” The court concluded that because the question of whether sexual penetration had occurred was not a contested issue at trial, the county court did not plainly err by failing to give a corresponding instruction to the jury. Accordingly, the court reversed the trial court’s order and affirmed Lozano-Ruiz’s conviction.
The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in People v. Zadra on Monday, February 27, 2017.
These two cases present the issues of whether double jeopardy claims can be raised for the first time on direct appeal and, if so, what standard of review applies. The Colorado Supreme Court addressed the same issues in four cases also decided on February 27 (consolidated as Reyna-Abarca v. People, 2017 CO 15, ___ P.3d ___). There, the court concluded that unpreserved double jeopardy claims can be raised for the first time on appeal and that appellate courts should ordinarily review such claims for plain error. Applying that ruling here, the court concluded that the divisions in People v. Zadra, 2013 COA 140, ___ P.3d ___, and People v. Adams, No. 12CA339 (Colo. App. Mar. 12, 2015), correctly conducted plain error review of defendants’ unpreserved double jeopardy claims and merged certain of defendants’ convictions. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgments in both cases.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued its opinion in United States v. Craig on Monday, July 27, 2015.
David Craig was convicted of possession of a stolen firearm and imprisoned. Upon release, he violated conditions of his supervised release. A revocation hearing was held on August 14, 2014, and Mr. Craig stipulated to various violations of his supervised release. The court stated its proposed findings, noted the applicable statutory maximum and Guidelines range, and announced its tentative sentence. At no point did Mr. Craig attempt to make a statement despite invitations to do so from the court. Mr. Craig appealed his sentence based on the district court’s denial of an opportunity to allocute.
The Tenth Circuit evaluated Mr. Craig’s claims under plain error review, declining his invitation to subject them to de novo review. The Tenth Circuit found that Mr. Craig’s counsel could easily have requested an opportunity for Mr. Craig to allocute at multiple points in the proceeding. The Tenth Circuit rejected counsel’s argument that it would have been impolite or unprofessional for him to interrupt the judge, noting that it is a lawyer’s job to object when the court is committing error.
The district court’s sentence was affirmed.
The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People v. McCoy on Thursday, June 18, 2015.
The prosecution charged McCoy with unlawful sexual contact against two men, P.K. and G.M., arising out of separate incidents. According to each of the victims, McCoy told them that he worked in the television industry and invited them to work for them. During the victim’s interviews and training, held at McCoy’s house, McCoy touched them and asked them sexual questions. McCoy had previously told the victims that he was a physician. A jury convicted McCoy of four counts of unlawful sexual contact.
McCoy argued on appeal that the prosecution presented insufficient evidence to sustain his convictions under CRS § 18-3-404(1)(g), because the statute proscribes only conduct occurring in a physician–patient relationship and as part of a medical exam or medical treatment. Although McCoy raised this issue for the first time on appeal, Colorado law contains no preservation requirement for sufficiency claims. Therefore, the Court of Appeals reviewed the sufficiency of the evidence de novo, and found that the statute is clear and unambiguous and is not limited to medical professionals or those who claim to be medical professionals.
Here, the jury could have concluded that the victims submitted to examinations because McCoy led them to believe the examinations were part of a hiring process. The jury could also reasonably have concluded that McCoy examined the victims for his sexual gratification, and not for bona fide medical purposes, because both victims testified that McCoy touched their intimate parts while he examined them. Therefore, the evidence was sufficient to sustain McCoy’s convictions under CRS § 18-3-404(1)(g). The Court further held that the statute’s plain terms are not unconstitutionally overbroad and vague. The judgment was affirmed.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued its opinion in United States v. Gallegos on Thursday, April 30, 2015.
A law enforcement investigation of Iran Zamarripa, the regional supervisor of an international methamphetamine ring, led to the arrest and trial of Simona Gallegos. Gallegos was the common law wife of a co-defendant, Pedro Juarez, and she purchased relatively small quantities of meth from Zamarripa on three occasions. Gallegos was tried with three co-defendants and ultimately found guilty of one count of conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine and possession with intent to distribute, two counts of possession with intent to distribute, and one count of use of a communication facility to facilitate the distribution of methamphetamine. Gallegos appealed.
Gallegos’ first argument on appeal was that the district court erred by admitting hearsay statements of her alleged co-conspirators without independent evidence she conspired with them. The Tenth Circuit declined to address the issue, finding Gallegos failed to point to specific statements.
Gallegos next challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting all four of her convictions. Gallegos contended the government’s evidence only supported that she obtained methamphetamine for personal use. However, the evidence forming the bases for her convictions showed she purchased the meth for Juarez, and on one occasion because he “ha[d] people[ ] waiting.” Gallegos contended the buyer-seller rule precluded her conviction even if she purchased the meth to distribute, but the Tenth Circuit found that contrary to its own precedent. The Tenth Circuit found the evidence that Gallegos “ha[d] people[ ] waiting” was by itself sufficient to infer an agreement to distribute methamphetamine, and further evidence that meth was delivered to Gallegos and she purchased meth on credit supported her convictions.
The Tenth Circuit also addressed Gallegos’ variance argument. Gallegos argued that the government proved only that she conspired with Juarez, and the evidence created a “spillover effect,” enabling her to be convicted of crimes for which she was not involved. After conducting a plain error review, the Tenth Circuit found little risk of the “spillover,” and certainly not enough to satisfy the third prong of the plain error test. The Tenth Circuit also found Gallegos unable to satisfy the fourth prong of the review.
Gallegos next argued that the district court erred in allowing testimony concerning a co-defendant’s post-arrest request for an attorney. The Tenth Circuit again reviewed for plain error since Gallegos failed to preserve the issue for appeal. Gallegos argued the evidence invited an inference of the co-defendant’s guilt, which was improperly imputed to her. The Tenth Circuit disagreed, finding the prosecution presented distinct evidence as to Gallegos and the other co-defendants.
The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in Martinez v. People on Monday, March 16, 2015.
Objections—Plain Error—Sufficiency of the Evidence.
In this case, the Supreme Court considered the effect of an erroneous deliberation instruction in a first-degree murder trial where defense counsel’s trial objection failed to identify the ground that rendered the deliberation instruction erroneous. The Court held that the plain error standard applies because the defense objection provided the trial court with no meaningful chance to avoid the instructional error. The Court concluded that the instructional error did not merit reversal under the plain error standard because overwhelming evidence proved that defendant deliberated, and the jury instructions as a whole adequately explained the law. The Court also held that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to convict defendant of first-degree murder after deliberation. The judgement of the court of appeals was affirmed and the case was remanded with instructions.

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 18
 § 18
 v. 
 v.