Source: https://www.findforms.com/single_form.php/form/62610/Pretrial_Memorandum_District_Court_of_Delaware_District_Court_of_Delaware_Delaware
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 17:26:05+00:00

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("Swett") under the general maritime law. Plaintiff is seeking maintenance and cure from DRBA and compensatory and punitive damages, including counsel fees and pre-judgment interest, from DRBA for DRBA's willful failure to pay maintenance and cure. 2. Contested facts While plaintiff was engaged in his job of parking cars on defendant's ferry, MV DELAWARE, he directed a Ford Expedition to park at a designated spot and then went behind the vehicle to await the next car to be directed to a parking space behind the Ford Expedition. While plaintiff was standing there, the Ford Expedition driven by Swett backed up without warning and struck plaintiff. Plaintiff was taken to Beebe Memorial Hospital by ambulance and was treated and released. He was considered unable to work for 3 days and given a neck brace to wear for 2 weeks. Plaintiff was then treated by his family physician, who referred him to an orthopedist. He was out of work until November 25, 2002. Neither his medical bills nor his maintenance payments were paid. Plaintiff had been discriminated against due to his union activities before the accident, and he gave an Affidavit against some of the witnesses against him for unfair labor practices prior to the accident. There is no legal justification for defendant's failure to pay maintenance and cure because plaintiff became disabled while in the service of a vessel without misconduct on his part.
B. The Jones Act Defendant has admitted ownership and employment, so the only remaining burden is for plaintiff to prove DRBA's negligence. Negligence in these circumstances is ordinarily doing something that a reasonably prudent person would not have done or failing to do something which a reasonably prudent person would have done under the circumstances. See Gallick v. Baltimore and Ohio R.R. Co., 372 U.S. 108 (1963). Furthermore, a shipowner, DRBA, is under an absolute duty to provide its employees with a reasonably safe place to work. See e.g. Brabazon v. Belships Co., Ltd., 202 F.2d 904 (3rd Cir. 1953). The causation test is that the negligence need only have played any part, even the slightest, in producing the injury. See Rogers v. Missouri Pacific R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 507 (1957). The failure to warn drivers not to back up and to institute and enforce procedures which would have prevented drivers from backing their vehicles once parked created a workplace which was not reasonably safe and was therefore negligent. This more than satisfied the "even the slightest" causation test. C. Violation of a statutory duty Delaware Code Title 21 �4184 provides as follows: �4184. Limitations on backing: (a) The driver of a vehicle shall not back the same unless such movement can be made with safety and without interfering with other traffic. Permitting the breach of a statutory duty imposes absolute liability upon DRBA and does not require proof of negligence. Kernan v. American Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426 (1958).
As to Craig Swett A. The general maritime law Two tests must be satisfied for maritime jurisdiction to apply: (1) the locality test; and (2) the connection with maritime activity test. The foregoing was first established in Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249 (1972) and has been reaffirmed in Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668 (1982); Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 358 (1990) and Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527 (1995). Since the accident happened on a vessel which was in navigable waters and occurred while plaintiff was in the course of maritime employment, both tests are satisfied and the maritime jurisdiction attaches. The most widely cited statement of the standard of care to be applied in general maritime law cases is in Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625 (1959), and it simply imposes "the duty of exercising reasonable care under the circumstances of each case." The Supreme Court approved this formulation in Federal Marine Terminals, Inc. v. Burnside, 394 U.S. 404, 415 (1969), but it did not further define the contours of the duty. The general principle was reaffirmed in Scindia Steam Nav. Co., Ltd. v. De Los Santos, 451 U.S. 156 (1981), but the Court also observed that "the rule will undergo refinement as it is applied to various categories of cases."
However, if the jury finds that Swett violated The Delaware Motor Vehicle Code, this triggers the rule of The Pennsylvania, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 125 (1873) which requires the defendant to prove that its fault could not have been one of the causes of the accident. Although the rule of The Pennsylvania was originally intended to apply in maritime collision cases, the rule has been held to apply when a state statute has been violated. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Stokes Oil Co., 639 F.Supp. 291, 297 (W.D. Ky. 1986) affirmed 863 F.2d 1250 (6th Cir. 1988). See also Skidmre v. Grueninger, 506 F.2d 716 (5th Cir. 1975) and Ranger Ins. Co. v. Exxon Pipeline Co., 760 F.Supp. 97 (W.D. La. 1990) and Armour v. Gradler, 448 F.Supp. 741 (W.D. Pa. 1978). B. Damages recoverable under the general maritime law. The damages recoverable under the general maritime law include lost earnings. See Griffith v. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 452 F.Supp. 841 (W.D. Pa. 1978) modified in part, vacated in part, 610 F.2d 116 (3rd Cir. 1979). Damages also includes medical expenses. Pain and suffering and loss of life's pleasures are also recoverable. See Earl v. Bouchard Transp. Co., 917 F.2d 1320, 1326-27 (2d Cir. 1990). See generally Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Admiralty and Maritime Law 3d Ed. (West 2001). C. Damages recoverable against DRBA. These are the same as those available against Swett, although there can be only one recovery.
Inc., 904 F.2d 1527 (11th Cir. 1990), Sullivan v. United States, 179 F.2d 924 (2d Cir. 1949) and Gaham v. Texas Co., 218 F.Supp. 331 (E.D. Pa. 1963). Fighting is willful misconduct if the seaman is the aggressor. See Galledge v. United States, 337 F.Supp. 1108 (E.D. Pa. 1972) affirmed without opinion 474 F.2d 1340 (3rd Cir. 1973). Venereal disease is automatically disqualifying, but conduct which may lead to such consequences is not. Compare Koistinen v. American Export Lines, 194 Misc. 942, 83 N.Y.S. 2d 297 (1948) with Matthews v. Gulf and South American S.S. Co., 226 F.Supp. 555 (E.D. Pa. 1964) affd. per curiam 339 F.2d 702 (5th Cir. 1964). The language in Warren, Farrell and Aguilar stresses that the duty to pay maintenance is almost absolute and that the right to maintenance should be interpreted broadly for the benefit of the seaman. The most recent expression of this view is found in Vella v. Ford Motor Co., 421 U.S. 1, 4 (1975) as follows: "Thus, the breadth and inclusiveness of the shipowner's duty assures its easy and ready administration for "[i]t has few exceptions or conditions to stir contentions, cause delays and invite litigations." Farrell v. United States, 336 U.S. 511, 516 (1949)." DRBA has no defense to plaintiff's maintenance and cure claim. It accepted the records from Beebe Memorial Hospital as showing that plaintiff became disabled on August 9, 2002 and thereafter paid him for medical and then annual leave. It accepted medical slips to justify paying him for medical leave. DRBA's Insurance Manager admitted at deposition that DRBA has no evidence of willful misconduct. Whether or not the accident happened as plaintiff claims, it is undisputed that plaintiff became disabled while subject to the call of duty. DRBA paid Kopacz his medical and annual leave until those benefits were exhausted.

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