Source: https://browardlandlord.wordpress.com/tag/notice/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 09:18:30+00:00

Document:
Any termination of this Agreement by the Landlord must be carried out in accordance with HUD regulations, State and local law, and the terms of this Agreement.
– advise the Tenant of his/her right to defend the action in court.
Please be advised that Millennia Housing Management, Ltd., the managing agent does hereby terminate your tenancy at this property, . . .
Your tenancy shall be terminated as of 08/18/2018.
In accordance with HUD guidelines, Millenia Housing Management Ltd., hereby advises you that you have ten (10) calendar days following the date of this letter in which you may meet with the Site Manager to discuss the proposed termination of your lease, and all charges which are delinquent on your account.
(c)Termination of tenancy. An owner may not terminate the tenancy or refuse to renew the lease of a tenant of rental housing assisted with HOME funds, except for serious or repeated violation of the terms and conditions of the lease; for violation of applicable Federal, State, or local law; for completion of the tenancy period for transitional housing or failure to follow any required transitional housing supportive services plan; or for other good cause. Good cause does not include an increase in the tenant’s income or refusal of the tenant to purchase the housing. To terminate or refuse to renew tenancy, the owner must serve written notice upon the tenant specifying the grounds for the action at least 30 days before the termination of tenancy.
In the instant case, the Plaintiff gave ten days written notice to the tenant that it was terminating the tenancy. The ten-day notice requirement in paragraph 23 of the lease only refers to the right to meet with the Landlord within ten days to discuss the issues related to termination of the tenancy. Paragraph 23 of the lease does not give the Landlord the right to terminate the lease on ten-days notice. Paragraph 23 of the lease provides that notice of termination must be given in accordance with HUD regulations. 24 C.F.R. 92.253 requires that prior to terminating the tenancy, the owner must give 30 days’ written notice to the tenant. Plaintiff failed to provide 30 days notice to the tenant that it was terminating the tenancy.
Defendant argued that the requirement to place funds in the registry of the court in order to defend against the action is preempted by 24 CFR 92.253. In Palma v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, 208 So. 3d 771 (Fla. 5th DCA, 2016) [41 Fla. L. Weekly D2694d], the Fifth District Court of Appeals found that when a contract incorporates HUD regulations, compliance with those regulations is mandatory. Because 24 CFR 92.253 provides conditions precedent to the termination of the tenancy, those conditions precedent were mandatory pursuant to Palma. For this reason, the Court did not reach the issue of Plaintiff’s defense to the motion to dismiss that Defendant did not place any funds in the registry of the Court. Because notice may not be retroactively cured, dismissal with prejudice was ruled appropriate.
Applicability to Community Banking Organizations: This guidance applies to all institutions supervised by the Federal Reserve, including those with total consolidated assets of $10 billion or less.
This letter provides background information about the recently restored Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act of 2009,1 which became effective on June 23, 2018. The law protects tenants from immediate eviction by persons or entities that become owners of residential property through the foreclosure process, and extends additional protections for tenants with U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development Section 8 vouchers. The law is self-executing; no federal agency has authority to issue regulations implementing the law or to interpret the law.
The fundamental purpose of the law is to ensure that tenants facing eviction from a foreclosed property have adequate time to find alternative housing. To that end, the law establishes a minimum time period that a tenant can remain in a foreclosed property before eviction. The law does not affect any state or local law that provides longer time periods or other additional protections for tenants.
Under the law, the immediate successor in interest at foreclosure must: (a) provide bona fide tenants with 90 days’ notice prior to eviction; and, (b) allow bona fide tenants with leases to occupy property until the end of the lease term, except the lease can be terminated on 90 days’ notice if the unit is sold to a purchaser who will occupy the property. A lease or tenancy is bona fide if the tenant is not the mortgagor or the parent, spouse, or child of the mortgagor, the lease or tenancy is the result of an arms-length transaction, and the lease or tenancy requires rent that is not substantially lower than fair market rent or that is reduced or subsidized due to a Federal, State, or local subsidy. The law does not cover tenants facing eviction in a non-foreclosed property, tenants with a fraudulent lease, tenants who enter in lease agreements after a foreclosure sale, or homeowners in foreclosure. Additionally, the law does not affect the requirements of any State or local law that provides for longer time periods or extends additional protections to tenants.
BROWARD COUNTY SELF STORAGE, INC., is the owner and landlord of a commercial property in the City of Wilton Manors. The property consists of a single roofed building in which are half a dozen businesses are located. Although the businesses each have their own separate “unit” in the premises, they all share the same address, with no separate demarked unit number. Mail is delivered to a single mailbox, which all occupants share.
Landlord entered into a Master Lease with, Naturally Broward, Inc. which then sublet separate units to different subtenants. The landlord did not object to this arrangement and took an Assignment of Rents and the subtenants paid their rents directly to the landlord.
On May 26, 2015, the landlord served a 3-day notice to the registered agent of Naturally Broward, Inc. The amount claimed on the 3-day notice was Naturally Broward’s unpaid portion of real estate taxes.
A week later, landlord filed an eviction against “Units 1, 2, and 5 as shown on an attached drawing.” The drawing does not clearly delineate which units are “1, 2, 5.” On the day the eviction was filed, the subtenants were current in their rent.
A 5-day summons was posted on the premises by a private process server. The return, however, reflects the single address for the property, without any delineation of the precise location or business it was posted.
On June 2, 2015, sub-tenant in unit 4, CHATEAU D’VINE, INC., attempted to tender June rent to the landlord, who refused it.
On June 26, 2015, Judge Stephen Zaccor entered a Judgment of Eviction and a Writ of Possession was eventually was posted directly on the business of Chateau D’Vine. This sub-tenant had no prior notice of the eviction.
A friend of the landlord took it upon himself to contact the local police rather than wait for the county sheriff to execute the writ of possession. An officer of the Wilton Manors Police Department advised Chateau D’Vine that it had until midnight to vacate the premises or it would be removed. Chateau D’Vine did so, feeling reasonably that it had no alternative.
Chateau D-Vine filed to quash the writ of possession. On review the court found that there was substantial doubt that a single summons can be used against an entire parcel of commercial property where there are separately operating businesses. First, there is some authority that a subtenant in possession is a tenant at sufferance, and as a result, must be served with an eviction summons. Second, due process dictate that a subtenant who is in possession with the knowledge of the landlord, and is paying rent directly to the landlord at the landlord’s insistence, be provided meaningful notice and an opportunity to heard before being divested of possession. “[D]ue process is a protean constitutional concept of rule according to law, fairness in the law’s proceedings, and fundamental rights.” J. Lieberman, Evolving Constitution 169 (1992). See Chef’s No. 4, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 117 Ill. App. 3d 410, 414, 453 N.E.2d 892, 895-96 (Ill. App. 1983) (subtenant entitled to notice); Arrieta v. Mahon, 31 Cal. 3d 381, 389 & n.7, 644 P.2d 1249, 1253-54 & n.7 (Cal. 1982) (same). The writ of possession was vacated.
Tenant occupied landlord’s premises under an oral month to month lease. On February 13 landlord e-mailed tenant a 15 day notice of non-renewal effective March 1 pursuant to 83.57 F.S. When the tenant failed to vacate, landlord filed for eviction and tenant defended on the basis that 15 day notice had not been “mailed” to him. The trial court ruled that the e-mail transmitted by landlord to tenant and acknowledged by tenant through a return e-mail satisfied the requirement set forth in §83.57 Fla. Stat. of 15 days notice to vacate by “mailing or delivery of a true copy” of the notice as set forth in §83.56(4), Fla. Stat.
§83.56(4) F.S. specifies that delivery of written notices shall be by mailing or delivery of a true copy thereof, or, if the tenant is absent from the premises, by leaving a copy thereof at the residence.
Accordingly, the court held that e-mail constitutes a mailing sufficient to satisfy a statutory requirement of a mailing of written notice, whenever a contract or course of dealing between parties establishes e-mail as a permissible means of notice, or whenever it is shown that the recipient received actual and timely notice through e-mail which is substantially the same notice as would have been provided in a writing mailed through conventional means.
HARARI, vs. WHITFORD. Circuit Court,15th Judicial Circuit (Appellate) in and for Palm Beach County. May 25, 2007. Appeal from the County Court in and for Palm Beach County, Judge James L. Martz. 14 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 701a.
On April 21, 2008, landlord filed a suit for tenant eviction and damages tenant in County Court. On May 2, 2008,landlord moved for entry of clerk’s default and default final judgment on Count I for removal of tenant and possession. On May 8, 2008, the County Court entered its Final Default Judgment on Count I for Removal of Tenant and Possession.
On May 19, 2008, landlord moved for entry of clerk’s default and default final judgment on Count II for unpaid rent, attorney’s fees and court costs, but did not send a copy to the tenant. On May 20, 2008, without holding a hearing, the County Court granted the landlord’s motion for damages, attorney’s fees, and court costs.
On June 19, 2008, tenant appealed, alleging a defective 3 day notice and that he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the damages count and proper notice thereof.
As to the damages, the appellate court ruled that a default admits a plaintiff’s entitlement to liquidated damages under a well-pled cause of action, but not to unliquidated damages, citing Bodygear Activewear, Inc. v. Counter Intelligence Services, 946 So. 2d 1148, 1150 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) [32 Fla. L. Weekly D35a]. A defaulting party has a due process entitlement to notice and an opportunity to be heard as to the presentation and evaluation of evidence necessary to a judicial interpretation of the amount of unliquidated damages.1 Id.
The reasonable amount of attorney’s fees and taxable costs to be awarded are unliquidated. Even though tenant was in default, he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing and proper notice thereof in order to determine the reasonable amount of attorney’s fees and taxable costs to be awarded. As a result, the County Court’s Final Default Judgment on Count II for Damages for Unpaid Rent must be affirmed in part, as to the total amount of damages for unpaid rent, and reversed in part, as to the reasonable amount of attorney’s fees and taxable costs. See Bodygear Activewear, Inc., 946 So. 2d at 1151.
1Damages are liquidated when the proper amount to be awarded can be determined with exactness from the cause of action as pleaded, i.e., from a pleaded agreement between the parties, by an arithmetical calculation or by application of definite rules of law. Bodygear Activewear, Inc., 946 So. 2d at 1150. However, damages are not liquidated if a Court must consider testimony or evidence to ascertain facts upon which to base a value judgment. Id.
Tax Deed upheld despite the fact that notice to mortgagee’s record address was returned as undeliverable.
Mortgagee sued to overturn a tax deed sale extinguishing its two mortgage liens on the subject property on the basis that the notice sent to it was returned as undeliverable.
Florida Statutes §197.522(1), provide that prior to a tax deed sale the Clerk of Court is to issue notice of the application for a tax deed to interested parties as identified in §197.502(4). “Interested parties” include any mortgagee of record if the address appears on the recorded mortgage. The Clerk sent notice of the Tax deed sale to the mortgagee at the address listed on both mortgages recorded against the subject property. The notice was returned as undeliverable. The mortgagee admitted that it had moved its primary address and did not directly notify the Tax Collector’s office of the new address. The Clerk’s office admits that after the notice was returned it took no further action to attempt to locate a new address for Beneficial.
The Florida Landlord – Tenant Statute contains two liquidated damages provisions allowing the landlord an opportunity to impose liquidated damages on the tenant for early termination or for failure to give notice of intent not to renew the lease.
☐ I agree, as provided in the rental agreement, to pay $ (an amount that does not exceed 2 months’ rent) as liquidated damages or an early termination fee if I elect to terminate the rental agreement, and the landlord waives the right to seek additional rent beyond the month in which the landlord retakes possession.
☐ I do not agree to liquidated damages or an early termination fee, and I acknowledge that the landlord may seek damages as provided by law.
§83.575 was also added to the landlord tenant statute in 2004 allowing the landlord to require the tenant to provide up to 60 days notice of intent to vacate at the end of a rental agreement of fixed duration, or face liquidated damages for failing to notify the landlord that the tenant is not renewing the lease. The statute, however, requires the landlord to first provide the tenant a “reminder notice” of the liquidated damages 15 days before the tenant’s notice period expires.
Black’s law dictionary defines a “tort” as denoting a wrong or wrongful act, for which an action will lie. When can a landlord’s failure to perform repairs become a tort ?
In the case of FISHER vs. PEARSON, [ Circuit Court, 17th Judicial Circuit in and for Broward County. Case No. 06-003536 CACE (04). October 27, 2008, 16 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 426a], the tenant moved into an apartment September 1, 2003. There were no apparent defects. On the morning of February 5, 2004, the tenant noticed a leak in the living room ceiling. The tenant notified the landlord of the leak. Within a few minutes of notifying the landlord of the leak the ceiling collapsed onto the tenant. The tenant sued the landlord for the injuries. The court granted summary judgment in favor of the landlord as the landlord had not been notified of the condition in time to remedy it.
The landlord’s seven-day notice of lease violation alleging unauthorized boarders was held defective for failing to provide the tenant with an opportunity to cure and also for alleging that the unauthorized boarder was arrested without indicating that boarder was engaged in criminal activity — Mere arrest is not tantamount to criminal activity or violation of lease.
1. Defendantl Warren, (hereinafter “Ms. Warren”) occupies residential real property owned by Plaintiff, Miami-Dade County, under a public housing lease.
2. Plaintiff filed a complaint for eviction against Ms. Warren on November 11, 2010, based upon a 7-Day Notice of Termination.
4. Proper statutory notices must be provided for each violation alleged by Plaintiff in the complaint.
5. Plaintiff’s 7-Day Notice of Termination is defective as it failed to provide Ms. Warren with an opportunity to cure regarding the allegation of unauthorized persons.
6. In accordance with Section 83.56(2)(b), Florida Statutes, an unauthorized person residing in a public housing unit is the type of non-compliance for which a tenant should be given an opportunity to cure.
7. Plaintiff’s 7-Day Notice of Termination is also defective as it alleges that the unauthorized person was arrested with a crime and does not indicate that the person has engaged in criminal activity.
8. Plaintiff cannot evict a public housing tenant for criminal activity when the only allegation is that the person has been arrested. Merely being arrested is not criminal activity and is not a violation of the lease.
9. As the notice of termination was defective, Plaintiff’s complaint for eviction is dismissed.

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