Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/792/1069/441734/
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 17:03:45+00:00

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Lamar B. Winegeart, III, Arnold, Stratford & Booth, Jacksonville, Fla., for plaintiff-appellant.
Dean C. Kowalchyk, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, Fla., for defendants-appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida.
Before GODBOLD, Chief Judge, RONEY, TJOFLAT, HILL, FAY, VANCE, KRAVITCH, JOHNSON, HATCHETT, ANDERSON and CLARK, Circuit Judges,* and TUTTLE** , Senior Circuit Judge.
We took this case en banc to consider the propriety of an injunction restricting Robert Procup, a Florida prisoner, from filing any case with the district court unless submitted by an attorney admitted to practice before the court. Procup v. Strickland, 567 F. Supp. 146 (M.D. Fla .1983), rev'd, 760 F.2d 1107 (11th Cir. 1985), vacated, 760 F.2d 1116 (11th Cir. 1985). The proceedings that brought the issue before this Court are set forth fully in those opinions.1 We hold that the district court's injunction was overbroad, but that the district court has authority to impose serious restrictions on Procup's bringing matters before the court without an attorney.
Procup, who is serving a life sentence for murder in the first degree, has engaged in ridiculously extensive litigation in the District Court for the Middle District of Florida, fully set out in the district court's opinion. 567 F. Supp. at 148-51. As of June 1983, Procup had filed 176 cases in the Jacksonville Division of the Middle District of Florida alone, not counting suits filed in other federal and state courts. Most of Procup's suits have been pro se, in forma pauperis civil rights actions under 42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1983. None has reached the stage of trial on the merits; most have been frivolous. Procup often has filed repeated claims and failed to comply with court rules and procedures. His pleadings are long and rambling. He has ignored repeated warnings and admonitions from the district court.
There is no question that Procup's activities call for some curtailment. The district court injunction against his filing any complaint with the court without the aid of an attorney is an attempt to reduce the number of frivolous lawsuits without foreclosing truly meritorious claims. The injunction was based on the premise that if Procup had an arguably meritorious claim, he would be able to obtain an attorney to handle it for him. The district court noted that because "virtually every action" filed by Procup had been brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1983, the provision for an attorney's fees award in 42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1988 would provide "ample incentive for members of the increasingly large private bar to handle a claim which appears to be meritorious." 567 F. Supp. at 160. The district court also noted the availability of legal assistance to indigent inmates from Florida Institutional Legal Services, Inc. From these, the district court concluded: [T]he attorney's duties under Rule 11, Fed. R. Civ. P. and the Code of Ethics--to file suit only where there are good grounds to support the pleading--will serve as an invaluable preliminary screening mechanism which will shield the Court from Procup's well-documented proclivity to barrage the Court with frivolous and ill-conceived lawsuits.
... Additionally, the Court will be ensured that claims brought before it on behalf of Procup have been conscientiously scrutinized before being filed. This has obviously not occurred in the past.
Id. at 161 (footnote omitted).
In this Court's judgment, however, the requirement that Procup file suits only through an attorney may well foreclose him from filing any suits at all. A private attorney, knowing Procup's track record, might well be unwilling to devote the time and effort necessary to sift through Procup's generally frivolous claims to see if there is one of sufficient merit to undertake legal representation. A legitimate claim could well go undiscovered. Moreover, due to Procup's shotgun litigation techniques, attorneys in the legal services office already have found themselves as defendants in Procup's rambling pleadings. This not only would deter an attorney from representing such a difficult client, but also raises the possibility that, due to intra-office conflicts of interest, the legal services attorneys would be unavailable to represent Procup. With the premise that Procup would simply be unable to get any attorney to represent him, the injunction then effectively enjoins Procup from filing any suit. The district court neither intended this result nor indicated in any way that such an absolute injunction would be appropriate. An absolute bar against a prisoner filing any suit in federal court would be patently unconstitutional. We, therefore, vacate the injunction and remand for consideration of such modification as will, as much as possible, achieve the desired purposes without encroaching on Procup's constitutional right to court access.
This does not mean that the district court was incorrect in employing injunctive relief. The district court was fully justified and within its authority in entering injunctive restrictions against Procup. Such action is necessary and prudent to protect the rights of all litigants in the federal system.
Recent years have witnessed an explosion of prisoner litigation in the federal courts. From 218 civil rights petitions of prisoners to federal courts in 1966, there were 18,034 such suits in 1984. Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts for the Twelve Month Period Ended June 30, 1984, at 142-43. According to a 1979 study, 80% to 95% of prisoner filings are brought in forma pauperis. Turner, When Prisoners Sue: A Study of Prisoner Section 1983 Suits in the Federal Courts, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 610, 617 (1979).
The prisoner litigant may possess several distinct advantages over the ordinary litigant: time to draft multiple and prolonged pleadings; ability to proceed in forma pauperis and thus escape any financial obstacles confronting the usual litigant; and availability of free materials which the state must provide the prisoner, including paper and postage. As a result, there is virtually no cost to a prisoner's filing repeated, frivolous lawsuits.
In order to more adequately handle this upsurge of cases, the federal courts have adopted various administrative procedures designed to streamline the process. Some of these procedures are found in the in forma pauperis statute itself, 28 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1915. Others have been adopted from recommendations contained in the so-called Aldisert Report. See Federal Judicial Center, Recommended Procedures for Handling Prisoner Civil Rights Cases in the Federal Courts (1980). Many courts have developed sophisticated procedures involving the court, staff attorneys, magistrates, law clerks, and judges to try to sort out from the mass of frivolous suits, the meritorious ones.
Occasionally a particularly abusive prisoner, taking advantage of his unique situation, will come along with a flood of claims designed to either harass those in positions of authority or to grind the wheels of the judicial system to a halt. No matter how efficient a court's administrative procedures may be, when one litigant files upwards of a lawsuit a day, the claims of other litigants necessarily suffer. Every lawsuit filed, no matter how frivolous or repetitious, requires the investment of court time, whether the complaint is reviewed initially by a law clerk, a staff attorney, a magistrate, or the judge.
In devising methods to attain the objective of curtailing the activity of such a prisoner, however, courts must carefully observe the fine line between legitimate restraints and an impermissible restriction on a prisoner's constitutional right of access to the courts. Various courts have employed and approved a variety of injunctive devices.
--limitation of further pleadings without order of court, after the complaint has been filed.
There should be little doubt that the district court has the jurisdiction to protect itself against the abuses that litigants like Procup visit upon it. Federal courts have both the inherent power and the constitutional obligation to protect their jurisdiction from conduct which impairs their ability to carry out Article III functions. In re Martin-Trigona, 737 F.2d 1254, 1261-62 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 106 S. Ct. 807, 88 L. Ed. 2d 782 (1986).10 The fact that Procup's complaint in this case may have failed to state a justiciable federal claim is of no impact on the court's power to enter injunctive relief against such a recalcitrant litigant. The court has a responsibility to prevent single litigants from unnecessarily encroaching on the judicial machinery needed by others. Were a frivolous lawsuit a bar to the court's inherent jurisdiction, the court would be powerless to act upon even a flood of frivolous lawsuits which threatened to bring judicial business to a standstill.
We do not here design the kind of injuction that would be appropriate in this case. Considerable discretion necessarily is reposed in the district court. Procup can be severely restricted as to what he may file and how he must behave in his applications for judicial relief. He just cannot be completely foreclosed from any access to the court. The injunction is vacated and the case is remanded for the district court to consider an appropriate substitute order.
I concur with the majority opinion with one reservation. The opinion on pages 1072 and 1073 lists limitations and preconditions upon a person's right of access to the court. Certain ones have been advanced by other courts and others are suggested anew by the opinion. By listing these limitations, the majority impliedly authorizes their use so long as they are not applied in a manner to deny access to the courts.
In every other respect I agree with the majority opinion.
The majority's opinion recites a compelling tale of the problems abusive litigants, including Procup, can pose for the federal courts. An even more compelling version can be found in the district court's opinion. In its eagerness to sanction a means to curb these abuses, however, the majority neglects the time-honored principle that a court of appeals is constrained to decide only appealable decisions of the district court. The majority's opinion fails to discuss how this case arose, what actions were taken in the district court, and how the case came to this court on appeal. In fact, the majority's opinion scarcely acknowledges that the order in question arose in the context of an actual lawsuit. A proper consideration of the procedural history of this case in the district court makes it apparent that this court lacks jurisdiction to entertain this appeal.
The district court, noting the volume and nature of Procup's previous litigation, issued an order to show cause why an injunction should not issue prohibiting Procup from filing any further pleadings in the district court. The Florida attorney general's office was sent a copy of the show cause order and given the opportunity to present its position to the court. Following the receipt of responses from both parties, the district court issued an opinion finding that Procup had engaged in extensive and abusive litigation in an attempt to disrupt the functioning of the federal courts and that sanctions were warranted. The district court concluded that the sanction necessary to curb Procup's abuses was an order "enjoining" the clerk of the court from filing any additional cases, or pleadings in those additional cases, submitted by Procup unless such additional cases or pleadings were submitted on behalf of Procup by an attorney.2 The district court rejected Procup's motions to reconsider its order and his attempts to have the "injunction" dissolved and granted Procup leave to appeal in forma pauperis.
The district court has made no finding that this case brought by Procup is frivolous or malicious. As far as the record indicates, Procup's section 1983 suit is still pending before the district court. The court's order to the clerk pertains to "additional cases or pleadings therein" and apparently does not preclude Procup from litigating his current action.3 In fact, contrary to any finding of frivolousness, Procup has, in effect, obtained leave to proceed in forma pauperis, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (1982), and the district court has not undertaken to dismiss the case as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1982). See supra note 1.
It is therefore beyond dispute that the district court has not rendered a final decision appealable pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982). The district court's order is interlocutory in nature and could only be appealed if it constituted an order granting an injunction within 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) (1) (1982).4 It is therefore necessary to look beyond what the district court's order was called and carefully consider its true nature.
The first thing to note, which is apparent on the face of the order, is that the court did not enjoin Procup's activities in any way. The order was directed to the clerk of the court, "enjoining" the clerk from filing non-complying pleadings. A careful reading of the court's order discloses that it does not attempt to constrain Procup's conduct in any fashion. In fact, the order contemplates that Procup probably will file additional cases or pleadings without a licensed attorney's participation. Because the district court expected such a situation to arise, it directed the clerk of the court to refuse to accept such filings. Contrary to the suggestion in the majority opinion, ante p. 1070, n. 1, Procup would not be in contempt of the court's order if he filed additional pleadings not signed by an attorney because the court's order does not prohibit such filings; it merely instructs the clerk of the court to refuse them.5 Nor can it be said that, although not directed at Procup, the order had the effect of preventing him from litigating this case. The district court did not issue the order to enable it to adjudicate the case before it. On the contrary, the order was inapplicable to pending cases. It is also clear that the court did not grant injunctive relief against Procup at the behest of beleaguered litigants harassed by Procup's litigation tactics. In sum, the district court's order was not tantamount to the granting of an injunction in this case6 and is not appealable as an interlocutory order under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) (1) (1982).
The district court's order, despite being entitled a permanent injunction, is in effect an administrative order, directed to the clerk of the court, governing the way the court will handle its business in the future as to one particular litigant. Although entered in the context of this case, the order bears no relation to it. There is no right to take an appeal from such an order where it has no effect on the current case. As pointed out previously, the district court has not prevented Procup from litigating this case to a conclusion.
Accordingly, I must respectfully dissent from the court's judgment.
While agreeing with most of what is stated in the majority opinion, I respectfully dissent from the vacating of the injunctive order issued by the district court. The district court reviewed in great detail the history of some of the suits filed by Procup with an analysis of an illustrative sampling. 567 F. Supp. 146, 148-155. After carefully weighing the importance of access to the courts, the district court placed restrictions upon future filings. I would affirm these restrictions for the reasons stated in the district court's most thoughtful opinion.
No one person has the right to deliberately attempt to destroy the operations of the courts of our country. Few of the most fundamental constitutional rights are absolute. Procup has "thumbed his nose" at every authority within his contact. He is literally playing games with the system. Such conduct should not and must not be tolerated!
Were this case properly before us, I would join Judge Johnson's opinion. I agree with Judge Johnson that the majority's opinion endorses disturbingly arbitrary guidelines for limiting access to the federal courts. I concur in Judge Tjoflat's procedural analysis, however, that the case is not properly before us at this time; accordingly, I join in his dissent. If, in the future, the clerk of the Middle District of Florida, pursuant to that court's injunction, should refuse to file another Procup pro se petition, Procup then could challenge the injunction by petitioning for a writ of mandamus pursuant to Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 21(a). At such time, the case properly would be before this court for determination on the merits.
All prisoners are guaranteed access to federal courts, Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821, 97 S. Ct. 1491, 1494, 52 L. Ed. 2d 72 (1977); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321, 92 S. Ct. 1079, 1081, 31 L. Ed. 2d 263 (1972), and though that right is neither unconditional nor absolute, the Supreme Court has clearly forbidden the inferior federal courts from interposing restrictions that deprive a prisoner of "adequate, effective, and meaningful" access. Bounds, 430 U.S. at 822, 97 S. Ct. at 1495; Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 579-80, 94 S. Ct. 2963, 2986-87, 41 L. Ed. 2d 935 (1974); Mitchum v. Purvis, 650 F.2d 647, 648 (5th Cir.Unit B 1981). There can be no question that Robert Procup has abused the federal judicial system by filing scores of frivolous claims. Majority Opinion ante, at 1070. Nor can there be any suggestion that Procup is alone in his discovery of this modus operandi or that it does not pose serious problems for the courts. See, e.g., Harrelson v. United States, 613 F.2d 114, 116 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (non-criminal); Castro v. United States, 775 F.2d 399, 410 (1st Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (non-criminal); Abdullah v. Gatto, 773 F.2d 487, 488 (2d Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (criminal); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1231-32 (9th Cir. 1984) (criminal); In re Green, 669 F.2d 779, 786 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (per curiam) (criminal).
I have no quarrel with the notion that trial courts may restrict, though not interdict, court access by prisoners who abuse the adjudicatory process. Nor am I unmindful of the need to minimize the burden created by frivolous lawsuits of any ilk. But in our haste to respond to the "explosion of prisoner litigation in the federal courts," Majority Opinion ante, at 1071, we must keep paramount in our minds a concern for "the fine line between legitimate restraints and an impermissible restriction on a prisoner's constitutional right of access to the courts." Id. ante, at 1072. In responding to this sensitive problem courts must be especially careful to craft remedies "narrowly drawn to fit the specific vice encountered." Castro, 775 F.2d at 410; Abdullah, 773 F.2d at 488; Wood v. Santa Barbara Chamber of Commerce, 705 F.2d 1515, 1525 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1081, 104 S. Ct. 1446, 79 L. Ed. 2d 765 (1984). I write in dissent to emphasize that the Court's opinion is based upon and approves illegal restrictions on prisoner access to the courts. It sanctions access restrictions that standing alone might or might not be unobjectionable but which "taken together [are] so burdensome as to deny the litigant meaningful access to the courts." Green, 669 F.2d at 786; Abdullah, 773 F.2d at 488.
First, the majority endorses limiting abusive prisoner litigants to filing "only [in forma pauperis] claims alleging actual or threatened physical harm; and requiring payment of a filing fee to bring other claims," Majority Opinion ante, at 1072, and limiting "the number of filings by a particular inmate" in a given time period to a given number, id.
The common thread that has guided all courts of appeals in reviewing restrictions on court access has been the firm conviction that the relevant statute places upon the courts the ultimate responsibility for determining which claims are frivolous and which are not. See, e.g., Johnson v. Kemp, 781 F.2d 1570 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam); Phillips v. Mashburn, 746 F.2d 782 (11th Cir. 1984) (per curiam); Urban v. United Nations, 768 F.2d 1497 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (per curiam); Sires v. Gabriel, 748 F.2d 49 (1st Cir. 1984) (per curiam); In re Martin-Trigona, 737 F.2d 1254 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 106 S. Ct. 807, 88 L. Ed. 2d 782 (1986); Carter v. United States, 733 F.2d 735 (10th Cir. 1984) (per curiam), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 105 S. Ct. 915, 83 L. Ed. 2d 928 (1985). When Congress wrote 28 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1915(a) (1985), providing for in forma pauperis suits and vesting in the trial courts limited latitude to dismiss such cases if "frivolous or malicious," id. at Sec. 1915(d), it penned a prescription for individualized, case-by-case determination of the merit or frivolity of each filing. Green, 669 F.2d at 786; Carter, 733 F.2d at 737. On appeal we will not normally prescribe the particular method by which a trial court will undertake this determination, but we are nonetheless bound to compel the trial court to exercise some particularized review. Steffler v. United States, 319 U.S. 38, 41, 63 S. Ct. 948, 949, 87 L. Ed. 1197 (1943) (per curiam). To countenance any review less probing is inconsistent with the dictates of the statute. Green, 669 F.2d at 786.
This Court has recognized that the decision to dismiss as frivolous is entrusted to the "broad discretion" of the trial court. Pace v. Evans, 709 F.2d 1428, 1429 (11th Cir. 1983) (per curiam). My quarrel with the majority is with the assumption that, under the rubric of "discretion," we can permit trial courts to issue a blanket ruling that certain types or more than a certain number of filings are, ipso facto, frivolous. "Discretion" connotes more than a mere arithmetic counting of filings as determinative of the likely merits of any subsequent claim. "Instead, one must analyze the nature of plaintiff's litigation in light of the scope of the Section 1915 privilege and additionally pinpoint specific abuses to which appropriate responsive remedies can be tied." Carter v. Telectron, Inc., 452 F. Supp. 944, 990 (S.D. Tex. 1977). The trial court may not, we have clearly held, "act arbitrarily and it may not deny the application on erroneous grounds." Pace, 709 F.2d at 1429; Johnson, 781 F.2d at 1572 (reversing trial court for setting restrictions on frivolous prisoner filings "on the basis of litigation history without regard to the particular circumstances thereof and their relevance to the [restriction imposed]."); Flowers v. Turbine Support Division, 507 F.2d 1242, 1244 (5th Cir. 1975). I have difficulty conjuring a more obvious recipe for arbitrary or erroneous decisionmaking than the issuance of a per se limit on the filing of claims of abuse either to an arbitrarily selected number (say six, as the majority suggests) or unless the abuse is physical in nature.
The majority's approach will erect a complete bar preventing some prisoners from presenting valid, actionable claims of constitutional magnitude2 simply because the delict is something other than physical abuse or follows on the heels of a randomly selected "magic number" of previous filings that year. To that extent, the majority's approach violates the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.3 Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1232, (9th Cir. 1984); Green, 669 F.2d at 786. The effect of the majority's limitation is to rewrite the statutory provisions Congress provided. The majority also sanctions the trial court's abdication of its obligation to determine if it should take the awesome step of interdicting the access of a citizen to the courts of justice. It creates an irrebuttable presumption that, at least for some, no claim of non-physical abuse is worthy of even cursory consideration.
Second, I find troubling the majority's willingness to restrict in forma pauperis actions to those alleging claims of physical harm while permitting other such actions to go forward only upon "payment of a filing fee." Majority Opinion ante, at 1072. Proceeding in forma pauperis is a privilege and not a right. 28 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1915(d). Nevertheless, when a prisoner presents a meritorious allegation of constitutional deprivation in the form of an in forma pauperis civil action, and he has no other reasonable avenue to secure relief, he simply may not be required to pay a filing fee. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 380-82, 91 S. Ct. 780, 787-88, 28 L. Ed. 2d 113 (1971);4 Davis v. Page, 618 F.2d 374, 383 n. 9 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied sub nom. Davis v. Gladstone, 464 U.S. 1052, 104 S. Ct. 735, 79 L. Ed. 2d 194 (1984). I see no principled basis for pretermitting Boddie's holding merely because the valid claim comes to the court amid a sea of frivolous suits.
I object to the fee requirement for a second reason: it has the effect of erecting a hierarchy of value preferences within the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Henceforth, the Court determines, for a discrete class of litigants non-physical abuse is either a due process violation of a lesser order or, more accurately, no longer an actionable deprivation at all. I had always thought that the Constitution protected citizens against due process and equal protection violations be they in the form of physical or emotional abuse, derogation of civil rights, denial of legal process, or any other of the congeries of rights subsumed under the banner of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Third, the majority suggests that trial courts may require "a plaintiff to file an affidavit setting forth what attempts he has made to obtain an attorney to represent him." Majority Opinion ante, at 1073. The purpose of this restriction is puzzling. The Court evidently assumes that the tide of frivolous suits may be stemmed by requiring a prisoner to secure counsel, in the expectation that doing so will introduce an element of restraint. Presumably this restraint results from fear of sanctions available under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11.
The Court's reliance on this restriction is misplaced for two reasons. To the extent that the majority uses Rule 11 sanctions as a means to minimize frivolous filings there is little advantage to be gained by the requirement of counsel. Rule 11 sanctions are equally available for use against lawyers and pro se litigants. But more importantly, the clear implication of the Court's requirement is that if a prisoner can obtain counsel he must obtain counsel. This is squarely at odds with the right to self-representation protected by the Sixth Amendment, Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 832-34, 95 S. Ct. 2525, 2539-41, 45 L. Ed. 2d 562 (1975), and by statute, 28 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1654 (1985).
Fourth, the majority proposes that trial courts may elect to impose "limitation of further pleadings without order of court, after the complaint has been filed." Majority Opinion ante, at 1073. My objection here is two-fold. By placing limitations on subsequent "pleadings," rather than on subsequent "causes of action," the majority permits a prisoner to start an action but makes it extraordinarily difficult for him to resolve it expeditiously. Each time an in forma pauperis prisoner seeks to file a reply brief, to tender a motion for summary judgment or to respond to one, to compel discovery--in short to engage in the usual motion practice--he must wait upon the trial court for a specific grant of leave to file. If our objective is to minimize the diversion of court resources to frivolous cases, this seems an odd way to effect that goal.
If the majority's opinion is interpreted to limit a prisoner's filing of subsequent causes of action, this argument fails for the reasons I advanced in considering the Court's proposed limitation on filings to a given number or type of injury. The simple fact that one delict has already occurred is in no way indicative of the likely merits of subsequent claims. Such a limitation, I believe, impermissibly deprives the prisoner of "adequate, effective, and meaningful" access to the courts. Bounds, 430 U.S. at 822, 97 S. Ct. at 1495; Mitchum v. Purvis, 650 F.2d at 648.
Finally, I take exception to the majority's opinion in a fifth respect. The Court suggests that one means of curbing frivolous litigation is by entering injunctions against so-called "jailhouse lawyers" who help prisoners generate dozens of meritless complaints. The Supreme Court has determined that prisoners have, at least in limited circumstances, a protected interest in access to an inmate writ writer. Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 490, 89 S. Ct. 747, 751, 21 L. Ed. 2d 718 (1969). It is clear that states retain power to impose certain limitations on the activities of such persons, or even to forbid them from plying their craft. Id. But we are not properly called upon today to consider or decide the scope of that power. Procup is his own publicist. He relies on his own wits to generate his pleadings. Accordingly, that portion of the majority's holding is obiter dictum.
The majority's opinion represents a response to what it perceives as a serious threat to the integrity of the adjudicatory process. We must always be careful as judges not to sound the alarm too hastily. We must be even more careful not to become swept up in our own rhetoric and on that account to attack problems with blunt, poorly chosen tools that inflict damage of a constitutional sort far worse than the blight we set out to excise. The majority today does just that. It makes available a plethora of access restrictions that are ill-advised and ill-suited to the task at hand. I am unable to join in its opinion. Therefore, with deference, I dissent.
A number of other courts, while not imposing injunctions in the particular case, have recognized the courts' power to enter this sort of injunction. Sires v. Gabriel, 748 F.2d 49 (1st Cir. 1984); Carter v. United States, 733 F.2d 735 (10th Cir. 1984) (per curiam), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 105 S. Ct. 915, 83 L. Ed. 2d 928 (1985); Howard v. King, 707 F.2d 215 (5th Cir. 1983) (per curiam); Kondrat v. Byron, 587 F. Supp. 994 (N.D. Ohio 1984).
Several courts have held that a total ban on all IFP filings by a particular litigant as a sanction for abuse is impermissible. Abdullah v. Gatto, 773 F.2d 487 (2d Cir. 1985) (per curiam); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221 (9th Cir. 1984); Carter v. United States, 733 F.2d 735 (10th Cir. 1984) (per curiam), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 105 S. Ct. 915, 83 L. Ed. 2d 928 (1985); In re Green, 669 F.2d 779, 786 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (per curiam).
ADJUDGED that the Clerk of Court for the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida is hereby permanently enjoined from filing any additional cases or pleadings therein submitted by or on behalf of Robert Procup, unless such additional cases or pleadings therein are submitted on behalf of Procup by a duly licensed attorney admitted to practice before this Court.
DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 17 day of June, 1983.
The arguments for [imposing fees and costs in bringing a civil action for divorce] are that the State's interest in the prevention of frivolous litigation is substantial, its use of court fees and process costs to allocate scarce resources is rational, and its balance between the defendant's right to notice and the plaintiff's right to access is reasonable.
Boddie, 401 U.S. at 381-82, 91 S. Ct. at 788.
Of course, the majority can find no refuge in the bona fide nature of the claims in Boddie, for it here declines to provide prisoners with the opportunity to demonstrate that their claims are in good faith brought. Rather, the majority simply assumes that they are not.

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