Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&amp;view=article&amp;id=26519:g-r-no-55252-december-26,-1984-people-of-the-phil-v-marcial-abucay,-et-al&amp;catid=1192&amp;Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 02:24:01+00:00

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THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MARCIAL ABUCAY and SALVADOR PEPITO alias "BADING", Defendants-Appellants.
R.S. Fajardo, M.P. Lagunsad, Jr., R.R. Rapanut & R.G. Parker, Jr., for Defendants-Appellants.
1.	REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; TESTIMONY OF WITNESS; GUILT OF THE ACCUSED PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT; CASE AT BAR. — Appellant contends that the prosecution’s medical evidence is basically ambiguous for it admits of two possibilities. One is that the wounds sustained by the victim were caused by a single sharp bladed instrument, and this possibility favors the accused. The other, is that the wounds were caused by two (2) sharp bladed instruments, a possibility which is adversed to the accused. There being doubt, the same must be resolved in favor of the appellant and not towards his guilt since accused is entitled to the constitutional presumption of innocence. But, appellant’s aforesaid submission lacks legal support and factual basis. The evidence on record indubitably shows that the deceased sustained two (2) stab wounds. One, a clean cut, narrow deep wound on the middle of the clavicle posterior to the right side of the neck; and another one, a laceration on the bridge of the nose about 1 ½ inches long, 1/8 of an inch wide and about ¼ or ½ inch deep (Necropsy Report, TSN., June 16, 1980, p. 7). Nowhere in the declaration of Dr. Vista could an incontrovertible conclusion be drawn that only one and the same bladed instrument was used by the assailant or assailants. What is clear and definite. however, is that both stab wounds sustained by the victim were produced by a sharp bladed instrument, a class to which the hunting knife used by accused Abucay, and the kitchen knife used by the appellant belong.
2.	ID.; ID.; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESS; INCIDENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES IN THE BAR MILITATE AGAINST APPELLANT’S INNOCENCE. — Appellant admits being present at the public dance held at the Cumpang Barrio Fiesta, the situs of the stabbing incident. He had been there for a period of no less than an hour prior to the stabbing. At the time the victim was stabbed. he was discussing with the victim the secondhand boat he proposed to buy from him. And it was at that juncture when his co-accused Marcial Abucay (who pleaded guilty upon arraignment and thereafter sentenced accordingly) came near them and right then and there stabbed the victim. Upon being hit, the victim staggered and fell to the ground bleeding profusely. He did not attempt to give him any physical support much less bring him to any physician or hospital for the much needed medical attendance to save him. Instead, he ran away together with his co-accused Abucay, leaving the victim dying. On top of that, he did not report the said stabbing incident to the barangay official of their place nor to the police authorities thereof, much less to the PC of Mayor in their locality. In fact he has not even condoled nor commiserated with the victim’s widow nor with any member of his bereaved family. Neither has he visited the victim while still in the hospital, nor attended the wake while the victim was lying in state, much less his funeral. On top of that, knowing that the police were running after him, he went into hiding, and of all places — in the very same hideout where his co-accused Abucay likewise sought sanctuary — in the house of Ponciano Abucay. To run away from the scene of the crime, is indicative of guilt (People v. Pajenado 69 SCRA 172). He gave himself up only on October 2, 1978, or more than two (2) weeks following the killing of Segundino Garbo, the victim. All the foregoing incidents and circumstances decidedly militate against appellant’s feigned innocence thus making his story an unreliable one and a big farce.
3.	ID.; ID.; ID.; TESTIMONY OF CO-ACCUSED EXONERATING APPELLANT, A MERE CONCOCTION; VERSION OF OTHER WITNESSES POINTING TO APPELLANT AS ONE OF TWO ASSAILANTS WHO STABBED THE VICTIM GIVEN CREDENCE; CASE AT BAR. — Appellant introduced his co-accused Marcial Abucay as his witness. Abucay, while on the witness stand and as expected, admitted sole responsibility for the killing of Segundino Garbo, totally exonerating his co-accused the appellant. Such a move hardly convinces the Supreme Court as emanating from a credible witness. Having been already convicted, as in fact, he is serving sentence for such conviction, and knowing fully well that his aforesaid admission cannot in anyway subject him to further or graver responsibility, his testimony must be received with extreme caution. But what is more telling and decisive is the fact that Abucay’s story on the witness stand — was never made known to nor revealed by him to any PC or police authority, barangay official of their place or mayor of their municipality. But what click and tighten the case of the PEOPLE against the appellant are the testimonies of Benjamin Garbo, Samuel Igot and Clarita Garbo all pointing to the appellant as one of the two (2) persons who stabbed the victim. Despite rigid and thorough cross-examination, their version of the incident appeared unshaken. Indeed, the trial court’s finding on their credibility is entitled to great respect (People v. Gomez, 124 SCRA 216; People v. Maranan, 124 SCRA 716). There being no circumstance of note and of sufficient importance which appeared to have been overlooked in the assessment of their testimonies.
4.	CRIMINAL LAW; MURDER; MOTIVE; NOT ESSENTIAL FOR CONVICTION As a last-ditch attempt towards exoneration, appellant made capital of the fact that the prosecution failed to prove motive for killing the victim. Motive, however, is not an essential element of the crime and need not be proven for purposes of conviction (People v. Balbas, 122 SCRA 859). Neither is proof thereof essential when the identity of the criminal perpetrator is not in doubt (People v. Abadilla, 121 SCRA 368; People v. Pajenado, 69 SCRA 172).
5.	ID.; WHEN PRONOUNCEMENT ON APPELLANT’S CIVIL LIABILITY IS IN ORDER; CASE AT BAR. — The trial court made no pronouncement on appellant’s civil liability despite the fact that all throughout the proceedings the offended party was actively represented by a private prosecutor and no express reservation to file a separate civil action for its recovery is made nor a waiver thereof placed on record. An award of P30,000.00 (People v. Tiengo, Et Al., G.R. No. 55832, November 20, 1984: People v. Roberto Cruz, G.R. No. L-37173, November 20, 1984: People v. Capillas, Et Al., G.R. No. L-38756, November 13. 1984), by way of indemnity is in order for the killing of the victim.
Appeal 1 interposed by SALVADOR PEPITO alias BADING from the decision of the then Court of First Instance of Cebu-Branch IV. in its Criminal Case No. CU-5062 convicting him of MURDER and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua; and to pay half of the costs.
"Q	What kind of wounds are these, Doctor?
A	Number 1 is a clean and incised wound but the one on the nose is unclean that is why I placed lacerated wound.
Q	So in your expert opinion, what weapon could have been used in making those wounds?
A	Those wounds could have been inflicted by a sharp bladed instrument.
Q	Which wound was caused by a sharp bladed instrument?
A	The stab wound on the neck and this wound on the head.
Q	So, the two wounds?
Q	In your expert opinion, could it be that the accused have used two kinds of weapons?
Misleading. The witness testified that the two wounds could have been caused by a single bladed sharp instrument.
I am asking if it is possible that two kinds of weapons were used.
Appellant admits being present at the public dance held at the Cumpang Barrio Fiesta, the situs of the stabbing incident. He had been there for a period of no less than an hour prior to the stabbing. He likewise does not controvert that at the time the victim was stabbed, he was just beside him. 6 In fact, at the precise moment he was discussing with the victim the secondhand boat he proposed to buy from him. And it was at that juncture when his co-accused Marcial Abucay (who pleaded guilty upon arraignment and thereafter sentenced accordingly) came near them and right then and there stabbed the victim. 7 Appellant, however, failed to see where the victim was exactly hit because upon seeing his co-accused Abucay raising a knife, he (appellant) immediately ran away.
In his attempt to exculpate himself from criminal liability, appellant introduced his co-accused Marcial Abucay as his witness. Abucay, while on the witness stand and as expected, admitted sole responsibility for the killing of Segundino Garbo, totally exonerating his co-accused, the herein appellant. Such a move is not at all surprising and hardly convinces Us as emanating from a credible witness. Having been already convicted, as in fact he is now serving sentence for such conviction, and knowing fully well that his aforesaid admission cannot in anyway subject him to further or graver responsibility, his testimony must be received with extreme caution.
But what is more telling and decisive is the fact that Abucay’s story on the witness stand — was never made known to nor revealed by him to any PC or police authority, barangay official of their place or mayor of their municipality. Clearly then, Abucay’s attempt to salvage a hopeless cause is indubitably an eleventh-hour concoction which is part and parcel of a vain and futile attempt to exculpate the Appellant.
But what click and tighten the case of the PEOPLE against the herein appellant are the testimonies of Benjamin Garbo, Samuel Igot and Clarita Garbo all pointing to the herein appellant as one of the two (2) persons who stabbed the victim. Despite rigid and thorough cross-examination, their version of the incident appeared unshaken.
Indeed, the trial court’s finding on their credibility is entitled to great respect, 11 there being no circumstance of note and of sufficient importance which appeared to have been overlooked in the assessment of their testimonies.
WHEREFORE, and except as thus modified, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against Appellant.
Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Abad Santos and Escolin, JJ., concur.
1.	Not an automatic review as claimed by the appellant, the penalty imposed being that of Reclusion Perpetua.
2.	Pages 2, 3, 4 & 5, People’s Brief.
3.	Page 1, Appellant’s Brief.
4.	Necropsy Report, TSN, June 16, 1980, page 7.
5.	TSN, June 16, 1980, pages 10-12 or page 94 of the Record.
6.	TSN, June 17, 1980, page 7.
7.	TSN, June 17, 1980, page 14.
8.	TSN, June 17, 1980, page 32.
9.	People v. Pajenado, 69 SCRA 172.
10.	TSN, June 9, 1980, page 34.
11.	People v. Gomez, 124 SCRA 216; People v. Maranan, 124 SCRA 716.
12.	People v. Balbas, 122 SCRA 859.
13.	People v. Abadilla, 121 SCRA 368; People v. Pajenado, 69 SCRA 172.
14.	People v. Tiengo, Et Al., G.R. No. L-55832, November 20, 1984; People v. Ernesto Aquino, G.R. No. L-36468, November 20, 1984; People v. Roberto Cruz, G.R. No. L-37173, November 20, 1984; People v. Capillas, et al, G.R. No. L-38756, November 13, 1984.

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