Source: https://scocal.stanford.edu/opinion/birkenfeld-v-city-berkeley-30384
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 18:41:33+00:00

Document:
Lois L. Johnson, City Attorney, Susan Watkins and Kathryn L. Walt, Assistant City Attorneys, Michael Lawson, Deputy City Attorney, Donald P. McCullum and Charles O. Triebel, Jr., for Defendant and Appellant.
Myron Moskovitz, Lawrence L. Duga, Barbara Dudley, Jeffrey J. Carter and Dennis Keating for Interveners and Appellants.
Edmund L. Regalia, Robert A. Belzer, Leslie A. Johnson and Miller, Starr & Regalia for Plaintiffs and Respondents.
Rich & Ezer and Mitchel J. Ezer as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Respondents.
In this case we consider the validity of an initiative amendment to the Charter of the City of Berkeley providing for residential rent control within that city. In a class action brought by plaintiff landlords the superior court declared the amendment void and enjoined the city from enforcing it principally on the ground that the evidence at a lengthy trial showed that the city was not faced with a serious public emergency of the sort the court deemed constitutionally prerequisite to imposition of rent controls under the police power. As hereinafter explained we have concluded that the existence of such an emergency is no more necessary for rent control than for other forms of economic regulation which are constitutionally valid when reasonably related to the furtherance of a legitimate governmental purpose, and that the facts established at the trial did not preclude the city from legislating on the subject of residential rent control. We have also concluded that [17 Cal.3d 136] state law does not preempt the field of placing maximum limits on residential rents and that an enactment for that purpose could properly take the form of an initiative amendment to the city charter.
However, we also hold for reasons hereinafter stated that the Berkeley Charter amendment transgresses the constitutional limits of the police power not because of its objectives but because certain procedures it provides would impose heavy burdens upon landlords not reasonably related to the accomplishment of those objectives. The amendment would require a blanket rollback of all controlled rents to those in effect on August 15, 1971, (or to any lower rents in effect thereafter) and would prohibit any adjustments in maximum rents except under a unit-by-unit procedure which for reasons to be explained would be incapable of effecting necessary adjustments throughout the city within any reasonable period of time. Even if we were to adopt counsel's suggestion of a judicial postponement of the rent rollback date to one that is more current, the absence of adequate adjustment procedures would leave arbitrary maximum rents in effect far longer than would be reasonably necessary to the amendment's stated purpose of alleviating hardship caused by rising and exorbitant rents exploiting a housing shortage in the city.
In addition to controlling rents the charter amendment imposes prerequisites and restrictions upon eviction proceedings. As hereinafter explained we concur with the trial court's view that the charter amendment's requirement that the landlord obtain a "certificate of eviction" from the city before seeking to recover possession of a rent-controlled unit is invalid in that it conflicts with state law prescribing procedures for evicting tenants. In the absence of these procedural restrictions the charter amendment's prohibition against dispossession of tenants who are in good standing apart from the expiration of their terms would be a permissible means of enforcing validly imposed rent ceilings. However, such prohibition necessarily falls along with the charter amendment's constitutionally defective mechanism for adjusting maximum rents. Accordingly we affirm the judgment.
The parties before us include not only the plaintiff landlords and defendant city but also a group of organizations and individuals who filed a complaint in intervention praying that plaintiffs be denied all relief. The interveners generally represent two types of interests: (1) students, disabled persons and other low-income tenants occupying rental housing in Berkeley and (2) Berkeley residents asserting environmental [17 Cal.3d 137] interests in preserving the existing housing stock and preventing an exodus of low-income residents. The interveners participated in the trial and have filed an appeal separate from that of defendant. The record on appeal is confined to the clerk's transcript.
 It is contended that the charter amendment even if otherwise valid could not be adopted through the initiative process without the concurrence of the city council. Several arguments are advanced in support of this contention; none of them has merit.
Although the rent control measure in no way touches upon the city council's power to levy taxes, it is theorized that rent control would "cause fiscal in the long run" by impairing the city's tax base. In [17 Cal.3d 144] support of this theory our attention is drawn to published articles depicting dire consequences attributed to rent control in New York City and other communities on the eastern seaboard. Interveners cite contrary material praising the effects of rent control. Although these disputed matters would be appropriate for consideration by a legislative body or the electorate in deciding whether to adopt a rent control proposal, they cannot be relied upon for the purpose urged here. Many sorts of initiative measures arguably affect the property tax base (e.g., the initiative zoning ordinances recently upheld in San Diego Bldg. Contractors Assn. v. City Council, supra, 13 Cal.3d 205, and Builders Assn. of Santa Clara-Santa Cruz Counties v. Superior Court (1974) 13 Cal.3d 225 [118 Cal.Rptr. 158, 529 P.2d 582]) but such speculative consequences do not constitute a prohibited interference by the initiative power with the function of a legislative body.
Another objection raised to the use of the initiative procedure to adopt the charter amendment is that the amendment prescribes detailed procedures for carrying out its substantive provisions and thus violates a supposed rule that the initiative cannot deal with administrative (as distinct from legislative) matters. However, the decisions cited in support of this objection concern the entirely different situation of an initiative ordinance that is deemed an improper interference with the local legislative body's administrative functions assigned to it by a state statute or other controlling instrument containing the legislative policies to be administered. (See Simpson v. Hite, supra, 36 Cal.2d at pp. 133-135; Housing Authority v. Superior Court (1950) 35 Cal.2d 550, 557-559 [219 P.2d 457]; McKevitt v. City of Sacramento (1921) 55 Cal.App. 117, 124 [203 P. 132].) The present charter amendment interferes with no preexisting legislative policy but instead performs the purely legislative function of introducing a new regulatory scheme.
 It is argued that the use of the initiative process to adopt a municipal rent control measure is precluded by the unavailability to the electorate of factfinding procedures by which a legislative body can ascertain the existence of facts that would warrant the imposition of rent controls. fn. 13 However, the cases relied upon for the argument deal only [17 Cal.3d 145] with factfinding procedures that are attached as conditions precedent to particular grants of legislative powers. Thus the empowering provisions of the relevant statute or charter were construed in those cases as imposing such factfinding prerequisites as ascertainment of the "prevailing wage" before fixing county salaries (Walker v. County of Los Angeles (1961) 55 Cal.2d 626 [12 Cal.Rptr. 671, 361 P.2d 247]), the holding of hearings before enactment of a zoning ordinance by a general law city (Taschner v. City Council (1973) 31 Cal.App.3d 48, 61-64 [107 Cal.Rptr. 214]), or the declaration and existence of a "great necessity or emergency" before exceeding the maximum tax rate (San Christina etc. Co. v. San Francisco (1914) 167 Cal. 762 [141 P. 384]) or of urgency necessitating putting an ordinance into immediate effect (In re Hoffman (1909) 155 Cal. 114, 119 [99 P. 517]).
The power of the Berkeley electorate to amend their city charter through the initiative is derived from article XI, section 3, of the Constitution and is free from any such factfinding prerequisite. Accordingly, as we said in another case with reference to an initiative city ordinance, the charter amendment "must be deemed to have been enacted on the basis of any state of facts supporting it that reasonably can be conceived." (Higgins v. City of Santa Monica (1964) 62 Cal.2d 24, 30 [41 Cal.Rptr. 9, 396 P.2d 41].) Even if the city council itself had proposed the charter amendment (Cal. Const., art. XI, § 3, subd. (b)), we could not probe the council members' motivations for doing so (County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (1975) 13 Cal.3d 721, 726-727 [119 Cal.Rptr. 631, 532 P.2d 495]) and would be required to judge the amendment's validity by its own terms rather than by the motives of or influences upon the legislators (City and County of San Francisco v. Cooper (1975) 13 Cal.3d 898, 913 [120 Cal.Rptr. 707, 534 P.2d 403]). The subjective motivations of the voters who petitioned for and approved the amendment's adoption are similarly irrelevant to our inquiry, which is therefore unaffected by any comparison between the factfinding procedures available to the electorate and to the city council.
The scope of the initiative power reserved to the people is to be liberally construed. (Farley v. Healey (1967) 67 Cal.2d 325, 328 [62 Cal.Rptr. 26, 431 P.2d 650]; Blotter v. Farrell (1954) 42 Cal.2d 804, 809 [270 P.2d 481]; Ley v. Dominguez (1931) 212 Cal. 587, 593 [299 P. 713].) Judicial protection of landlords' rights with respect to rent control enactments such as the present charter amendment lies not in placing arbitrary restrictions upon the initiative power but in measuring the substance of the enactment's provisions against overriding constitutional and statutory requirements.
The charter amendment imposes two kinds of restraint upon eviction proceedings: It limits the grounds upon which a landlord may bring an action to repossess a rent-controlled unit (§ 7, subd. (a)) and it requires that a landlord obtain a certificate of eviction from the rent control board before seeking such repossession (§ 7, subds. (b)-(g)). These two types of restriction will be considered in order.
Similarly in Wilson v. Beville (1957) 47 Cal.2d 852 [306 P.2d 789], we held that an inverse condemnation suit against a city could not be conditioned upon compliance with the claim-filing requirements of the city's charter. The state statutes fully occupy the field of assessing compensation for condemned property and therefore a city charter cannot make the recovery of such compensation more onerous.
We have thus far concluded (1) that in the absence of conflicting or preemptive state law the defendant city's police power within its territorial limits is as broad as the police power exercisable by the Legislature and (2) that general state law does not preclude the defendant city from imposing maximum limits on residential rents within its territory or from restricting the grounds for evicting tenants for the purpose of enforcing those limits insofar as such control of rents and evictions is a proper exercise of the police power. We now consider whether defendant could rightfully exercise its police power in this manner under the circumstances established by the record.
These decisions concerning rent controls in Washington, D.C. and the State of New York during the aftermath of World War I are the last in which the United States Supreme Court has specifically considered the extent to which the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments allow state legislatures, or bodies exercising equivalent powers, to impose rent controls. fn. 23 However, an examination of the evolution of the court's views in related fields of price and wage controls will demonstrate that the "emergency" doctrine invoked to uphold rent control measures of more than half a century ago is no longer operative as it was formulated as a special exception to limitations on the police power that have long since ceased to exist.
Many of the prior restrictive decisions were expressly overruled. Upholding a women's minimum wage statute and overruling Adkins v. Children's Hospital, supra, 261 U.S. 525, the court pointed out that the Constitution does not speak of freedom of contract but only of liberty subject to due process of law, "and regulation which is reasonable in relation to its subject and is adopted in the interests of the community is due process." (West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish (1937) 300 U.S. 379, 391 [81 L.Ed. 703, 708, 57 S.Ct. 578, 108 A.L.R. 1330].) The sweeping nature [17 Cal.3d 156] of the court's change of views and its direct relationship to the earlier rent control decisions is perhaps seen most clearly in Olsen v. Nebraska (1941) 313 U.S. 236 [85 L.Ed. 1305, 61 S.Ct. 862, 133 A.L.R. 1500], where a unanimous court upheld a statute regulating employment agency fees and not merely overruled Ribnik v. McBride, supra, 277 U.S. 350, but depicted a flood of its intervening decisions as engulfing and repudiating the philosophy and approach of the Ribnik majority. fn. 24 The repudiated legal standard was described as one by which "the constitutional validity of price-fixing legislation, at least in absence of a so-called emergency, was dependent on whether or not the business in question was 'affected with a public interest'." (Fn. omitted; italics added.) (313 U.S. at p. 245 [85 L.Ed. at p. 1309].) The Olsen court thus made clear that existence of "a so-called emergency" is no longer a prerequisite to the constitutionality of legislation fixing prices regardless of whether the regulated enterprise is "affected with a public interest."
Plaintiffs contend that a more pressing necessity is constitutionally required for regulation of rents than for the regulation of prices generally [17 Cal.3d 159] because of the historic preference for real property exemplified by the legal presumption that breach of an agreement to transfer real property cannot be adequately compensated by money damages (Civ. Code, § 3387; Remmers v. Ciciliot (1943) 59 Cal.App.2d 113, 119-120 [138 P.2d 306]). This contention is without merit. Among the foremost examples of proper exercises of the police power are restrictions on the use of real property. (See, e.g., Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. City of Los Angeles (1962) 57 Cal.2d 515 [20 Cal.Rptr. 638, 370 P.2d 342]; Miller v. Board of Public Works (1925) 195 Cal. 477 [234 P. 381, 38 A.L.R. 1479].) Plaintiffs' contention was fully answered in the earliest of the rent control cases on which they rely, where the court referred to such restrictions on the use of real property as building height limitations and succinctly observed that "if, to answer one need, the legislature may limit height, to answer another it may limit rent." (Block v. Hirsh, supra, 256 U.S. 135, 156 [65 L.Ed. 865, 871].) The court also stated that to restrict landlords to "a reasonable rent" "goes little if at all farther than the restriction put upon the rights of the owner of money by the more debatable usury laws." (256 U.S. at p. 157 [65 L.Ed. at p. 871].) Moreover, the virtual equivalence under modern conditions between the renting of property for residential purposes and the purchase of consumer goods and services (see Green v. Superior Court, supra, 10 Cal.3d 616, 623, 627) points to our applying the same constitutional standards to the regulation of rents that we apply to the regulation of other consumer prices.
[13a] We turn then to the question of whether the imposition of any form of residential rent controls for the purposes stated in the present charter amendment is within defendant's police power in that it is reasonably related to the accomplishment of an objective for which the [17 Cal.3d 160] power can be exercised. It has long been settled that the power extends to objectives in furtherance of the public peace, safety, morals, health and welfare and "is not a circumscribed prerogative, but is elastic and, in keeping with the growth of knowledge and the belief in the popular mind of the need for its application, capable of expansion to meet existing conditions of modern life." (Miller v. Board of Public Works, supra, 195 Cal. 477, 485; accord, Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 57 Cal.2d 515, 521-522.) The charter amendment includes in its stated purposes for imposing rent control the alleviation of the ill effects of the exploitation of a housing shortage by the charging of exorbitant rents to the detriment of the public health and welfare of the city and particularly its underprivileged groups. (§ 1.) fn. 28 The amendment thus states on its face the existence of conditions in the city under which residential rent controls are reasonably related to promotion of the public health and welfare and are therefore within the police power.
1. The City of Berkeley "offers a distinctive and attractive life style, and a superior school system which, because integrated, is desirable to minorities and to young people generally, ... is the site of the original campus of the University of California and has an established reputation as a university city ... [, and] is primarily residential in character with some industrial areas."
2. The vacancy rate for residential housing was "in excess of 3%" and "such a vacancy rate is low." According to the court's memorandum opinion, the vacancy rate for apartment rental housing was 3.1 percent and "[b]y any standard the rate is low."
3. "The population of [Berkeley] ... was approximately 116,000 of which approximately 63% were tenants. Of the total population, approximately 30,000 persons comprise a group which spends in excess of 35% of its income for housing .... Of said 30,000 persons, about 25,000 were in the group earning under $5,000 per year, and such group consisted [17 Cal.3d 162] largely of students, low income (aged, minorities, and disabled) and 'other young people' in about equal numbers. ... It is evident that the housing conditions of low-income persons in Berkeley are serious ...."
4. In 1970 Berkeley had a black population of approximately 23.5 percent. These residents have received housing aid from "federally-funded assistance programs" but such programs "have, for the most part, ceased." "Many of the families of South Berkeley and West Berkeley [predominantly black] had low incomes or were receiving public assistance."
5. "[S]ome of the aged and disabled persons in Berkeley suffer adverse conditions in their capability of finding reasonably priced low-cost housing, ... and it is recognized that aid programs are inadequate for their needs. ... [T]he housing conditions for such groups in Berkeley were and are serious."
6. The group designated "other young people" "for the main part, consist of non-students who choose to live in Berkeley because they are attracted to its life style. Many of them have marginal incomes and the condition of their housing is generally comparable to that of the low-income group."
Offsetting these findings of serious housing problems are other findings of ameliorative conditions which would provide appropriate material for arguing to a legislative body that it should not enact rent controls but which do not dispel the constitutionally sufficient rational basis for residential rent control provided by the charter amendment's statement of purpose (§ 1; fn. 28, ante) and the findings previously summarized. The findings of ameliorative conditions are of three kinds.
First are findings of improvement in housing conditions which state as follows: Between 1960 and 1970 new rental housing increased faster than population and the vacancy rate rose from 2.6 percent in 1971 to 3.1 percent in 1972. At the time of trial further vacancies were expected to result from the carrying out of the plans of certain employers to move out of Berkeley or to reduce personnel. Dormitory space was available for almost all university students needing it and according to a university official adequate financial aid was available for students who established that their parents could not support them. The percentage of rental housing available for less than $200 per month in certain districts of Berkeley in 1970 ranged between 85 and 98 percent. Nonwhite home [17 Cal.3d 163] ownership increased markedly between 1960 and 1970. While all these facts are encouraging they do not push beyond the pale of rational debate the existence of a housing shortage and accompanying excessive rents serious enough to warrant the imposition of rent controls.
The second category of ameliorative findings consists in comparisons between housing conditions in Berkeley and in adjoining areas. It is found that Berkeley is "part of one continuous urban area geographically indistinguishable from Richmond on the north through Oakland on the south" and that the rental housing vacancy rate in both Richmond and Oakland was 6 percent as compared to 3.1 percent in Berkeley. With respect to the low-income group designated as "other young people" it is found that "their mobility is such as to make it possible for them to live in surrounding, relatively high vacancy areas." On the other hand the finding stating the adverse housing problems faced by the aged and disabled group in Berkeley adds that "their condition is not unlike that experienced in other metropolitan areas."
Neither the availability to some low-income residents of housing in adjoining cities nor the fact that the problems of the aged and disabled in Berkeley are no worse than in other metropolitan areas detracts from Berkeley's power to safeguard and promote the health and welfare of persons who choose to live in that city.  In a field of regulation not occupied by general state law such as rent control each city is free to exercise its police power to deal with its own local conditions which may differ from those in other areas. (See Galvan v. Superior Court, supra, 70 Cal.2d 851, 863-864.) Among Berkeley's local conditions, according to a previously quoted finding, are a distinctive lifestyle, school system, and reputation as a university city all of which attract residents and offer a likely explanation for a rental housing vacancy rate that is markedly lower than in adjoining cities. Berkeley is not constitutionally required to ignore any of its housing problems on the ground that they would not exist if some of its residents were to live elsewhere.
Finally the findings indicating the existence of serious housing problems are offset by statements in the findings that such problems "are not so wide-spread as to constitute an emergency" and that "no such emergency as referred to in [section 1 of the charter amendment] actually existed." We have already held herein that the existence of such an emergency is not a constitutional prerequisite for the imposition of rent controls. Plaintiffs contend however that the declaration in the charter amendment's preamble of the existence of "a serious public emergency" [17 Cal.3d 164] with respect to housing problems in Berkeley (§ 1, quoted in fn. 28, ante) makes the amendment invalid unless such an emergency actually existed even though the amendment would be valid in the absence of such declaration. With this contention plaintiffs challenge the measure not by disputing its statement of constitutional facts but by disputing statements not necessary to constitutionality. Their position is that the city electorate cannot have intended to adopt the charter amendment unless the preamble's statement of underlying facts were true and that such truth can be determined by a court which can then declare the measure invalid if it finds upon sufficient evidence that the statement is incorrect.
 Even if it be assumed that legislation can be invalidated for mistakes in its preamble concerning facts not essential to constitutionality or legislative authority, the mistakes asserted here are not grounds for invalidation. They involve at most only descriptive differences in the degree of seriousness of the housing problems sought to be remedied and any question of their correspondence with the findings could have been completely eliminated by only minor changes of wording. fn. 29 The preamble accurately declares the nature of the conditions to be alleviated and it is to be presumed that the Berkeley electorate became sufficiently informed from election campaign arguments for and against the measure to decide for themselves whether those conditions gave rise to a "public emergency" or were simply "serious." The ballot argument in favor of the charter amendment contained no representation of the existence of any emergency. We conclude that the "emergency" wording of the preamble did not prevent the adoption of rent controls to deal with those conditions described in the preamble which are consistent with the trial court's findings.
Defendant and interveners contend that any present consideration of the possible confiscatory effect of the charter amendment is premature until the amendment has been allowed to become operative and the actual rent ceilings imposed under it can be measured against constitutional standards. It is true that whether a regulation of prices is reasonable or confiscatory depends ultimately on the result reached. (Power Comm'n v. Hope Gas. Co. (1944) 320 U.S. 591, 602 [88 L.Ed. 333, 344-345, 64 S.Ct. 281].) However, such a regulation may be invalid on its face when its terms will not permit those who administer it to avoid confiscatory results in its application to the complaining parties. (City of Miami Beach v. Forte Towers, Inc. (Fla. 1974) 305 So.2d 764, 768; see Mora v. Mejias (1st Cir. 1955) 223 F.2d 814.) It is to the possibility of such facial invalidity that our present inquiry is directed.
 Selection of August 15, 1971, as the key date for determination of base rents under the charter amendment was appropriate and reasonable. The possibility of rent controls in Berkeley arose at least as early as March 1971 when controls were recommended in a minority report of the city council's rental housing committee. (See fn. 3, ante.) On August 15, 1971, the President of the United States, acting pursuant to the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970 (Pub. L. No. 91-379, 84 Stat. 799), ordered all rents frozen for 90 days at their highest level during the 30-day period prior to August 15, 1971. (Exec. Order No. 11615, 36 Fed. Reg. 15727.) Subsequent rent controls under the act used August 15, 1971, as the primary base date for calculating maximum rents. (See 6 C.F.R., pt. 301, 37 Fed. Reg. 13226 (July 4, 1972).) fn. 30 Thus the advantages of selecting August 15, 1971, as the key date for base rents under the charter amendment were that (1) it marked the latest time at which rents had been set in an unregulated market and (2) the importance of the date under the federal regulatory scheme greatly increased the probability that landlords would have records concerning rents on that date readily available.
The charter amendment provides that the rollback of rents to base levels is to take effect 90 days after election of the rent control board. [17 Cal.3d 167] (§ 4.) This election was held on January 23, 1973, but the rollback was enjoined by preliminary injunction on April 26, 1973, and enforcement of the entire charter amendment was thereafter enjoined by the present judgment on June 22, 1973. Plaintiffs contend that marked rises in property taxes, utility rates, and the costs of goods and services since 1973 have eliminated any reasonable grounds which then existed for using August 15, 1971, as a rollback date and have made it highly probable if not certain that the present imposition of such a rollback would reduce rents to confiscatorily low levels pending individual upward adjustments. Interveners reply to this contention by pointing out that the present litigation has caused at least a three-year postponement in the charter amendment's operation which was not contemplated by those who selected the rollback date. Interveners propose that we remedy the problem created by the postponement by setting a new rollback date or by ordering that appropriate relief be provided upon remand. Such action on our part is unnecessary in view of our hereinafter explained conclusion that the charter amendment's provisions for adjusting maximum rents are constitutionally insufficient to relieve landlords from confiscatory rent levels even if the base rents were keyed to a more current date. To eliminate any issue of the propriety of using August 15, 1971, as the date for fixing base rents under section 4, we assume for purposes of the remaining discussion that the date used for this purpose would be the date this opinion is filed.
 Here the charter amendment drastically and unnecessarily restricts the rent control board's power to adjust rents, thereby making inevitable the arbitrary imposition of unreasonably low rent ceilings. It is clear that if the base rent for all controlled units were to remain as the maximum rent for an indefinite period many or most rent ceilings would be or become confiscatory. For such rent ceilings of indefinite duration an adjustment mechanism is constitutionally necessary to provide for changes in circumstances and also provide for the previously mentioned situations in which the base rent cannot reasonably be deemed to reflect general market conditions. The mechanism is sufficient for the required purpose only if it is capable of providing adjustments in maximum rents without a substantially greater incidence and degree of delay than is practically necessary. "Property may be as effectively taken by long-continued and unreasonable delay in putting an end to confiscatory rates as by an express affirmance of them ...." (Smith v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co. (1926) 270 U.S. 587, 591 [70 L.Ed. 747, 749, 46 S.Ct. 408] (enjoining enforcement of telephone rates because of unreasonable delay in acting upon application for rate increase).) The charter amendment is constitutionally deficient in that it withholds powers by which the rent control board could adjust maximum rents without unreasonable delays and instead requires the Board to follow an adjustment procedure which would make such delays inevitable.
The impracticability of regulating an enormous number of highly varied transactions wholly on a case-by-case basis has frequently led to regulation by means of rules and schedules derived from evidence typical of the members of the regulated group, subject to the right of any member to make a showing of sufficient deviation from the norm to warrant special treatment. One of the important reasons that hearings on the circumstances of each individual's situation are not constitutionally required for the imposition of regulation in such cases is that such individual treatment would be impracticable. (Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, supra, 390 U.S. 747, 756-758, 768-770 [20 L.Ed.2d 312, 329-331, 336-338]; Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. A., T. & S. F. R. Co. (1967) 387 U.S. 326, 340-343 [18 L.Ed.2d 803, 813-816, 87 S.Ct. 1585]; New England Divisions Case (1923) 261 U.S. 184, 196-199 [67 L.Ed. 605, 612-614, 43 S.Ct. 270]; Wilson v. Brown (Em.App. 1943) 137 F.2d 348, 352-354; Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Work. v. Connally (D.D.C. 1971) 337 F.Supp. 737, 758.) In the present case the imposition of rent ceilings in the form of a rollback to base rents is virtually automatic. Thereafter, regardless of how inequitable any rent ceiling may be under all the circumstances, it cannot be adjusted except by a procedure that inherently and unnecessarily precludes reasonably prompt action except perhaps for a lucky few.
A different question would be presented if the delays inherent in the charter amendment's requirement that rents be adjusted only on the basis of unit-by-unit hearings before a single tribunal were essential to its purpose. Clearly the Board's powers could be broadened so as to ameliorate the delays sufficiently while preserving the rights of all concerned. Nor do we preclude the possibility of other legislative solutions to the problem. But under the charter amendment as it now stands the combination of the rollback to base rents and the inexcusably cumbersome rent adjustment procedure is not reasonably related to the amendment's stated purpose of preventing excessive rents and so would deprive the plaintiff landlords of due process of law if permitted to take effect.
1. Statement of Purpose. A growing shortage of housing units resulting in a critically low vacancy rate, rapidly rising and exorbitant rents exploiting this shortage, and the continuing deterioration of the existing housing stock constitute a serious public emergency affecting the lives of a substantial proportion of those Berkeley residents who reside in rental housing. These emergency conditions endanger the public health and welfare of the City of Berkeley and especially the health and welfare of the poor, minorities, students and the aged. The purpose of this Article, therefore, is to alleviate the hardship caused by this emergency by establishing a Rent Control Board empowered to regulate residential housing and rentals in the City of Berkeley.
a) Board: The Rent Control Board established by Section 3 of this amendment.
b) Commissioners: Commissioners of the Rent Control Board established by Section 3 of this amendment.
(4) rental units which a governmental unit, agency or authority either owns, operates, manages, or subsidizes.
d) Housing services: Housing services include but are not limited to repairs, replacement, maintenance, painting, providing light, heat, hot and cold water, elevator service, window shades and screens, storage, kitchen, bath and laundry facilities and privileges, janitor services, refuse removal, furnishings, telephone, and any other benefit, privilege or facility connected with the use or occupancy of any rental unit. Services to a rental unit shall include a proportionate part of services provided to common facilities of the building in which the rental unit is contained.
e) Landlord: An owner, lessor, sublessor or any other person entitled to receive rent for the use and occupancy of any rental unit, or an agent or successor of any of the foregoing.
f) Rent: The consideration, including any bonus, benefits or gratuity demanded or received for or in connection with the use or occupancy of rental units or the transfer of a lease for such rental units, including but not limited to monies demanded or paid for parking, pets, furniture, subletting and security deposits for damages and cleaning.
g) Rental housing agreement: An agreement, verbal, written or implied, between a landlord and tenant for use or occupancy of a rental unit and for housing services.
h) Rental units: Any building, structure, or part thereof, or land appurtenant thereto, or any other real property rented or offered for rent for living or dwelling purposes, including houses, apartments, rooming or boarding house units, and other properties used for living or dwelling purposes, together with all housing services connected with the use or occupancy of such property.
i) Tenant: A tenant, subtenant, lessee, sublessee or any other person entitled under the terms of a rental housing agreement to the use or occupancy of any rental unit.
a) Composition: There shall be in the City of Berkeley a Rent Control Board. The Board shall consist of five elected Commissioners. The Board shall elect annually as chairwoman or chairman one of its members to serve in that capacity.
b) Eligibility: Residents of the City of Berkeley who are duly qualified electors of the City of Berkeley are eligible to serve as Commissioners of the Rent Control Board.
c) Full disclosure of holdings: Candidates for the position of Rent Control Board Commissioner, in addition to fulfilling the requirements of Article III, Section 6 1/2, when filing nomination papers, shall submit a verified statement listing all of their interests and dealings in real property, including but not limited to its ownership, sale or management, and investment in and association with partnerships, corporations, joint ventures and syndicates engaged in its ownership, sale or management, during the previous three (3) years.
d) Method of election: Commissioners shall be elected at general municipal elections in the same manner as set forth in Article III, except that the first Commissioners shall be elected within 180 days after approval of this Article by the State Legislature in accordance with the provisions of Article III.
e) Term of office: Commissioners shall be elected to serve terms of four years, except that of the first five Commissioners elected in accordance with Section 3(d), the two Commissioners receiving the most votes shall serve until the first general municipal election held more than three years after their election and the remaining three Commissioners shall serve until the first general municipal election held more than one year after their election. Commissioners shall serve a maximum of two full terms.
f) Powers and duties: The Rent Control Board is empowered to set maximum rents for all residential rental units in the City of Berkeley with the exception of those classes [17 Cal.3d 176] of units exempted under Section 2(c). The Board is empowered to roll back rents to a base rent established under Section 4(a). The Board is empowered to adjust maximum rents either upward or downward after conducting appropriate investigations and hearings as provided under Section 6. The Board may make such studies and investigations, conduct such hearings, and obtain such information as is necessary to carry out its powers and duties. The Board may seek injunctive relief under the provisions of Section 11 in order to carry out its decisions and may settle civil claims in accordance with the provisions of Section 10.
g) Rules and regulations: The Rent Control Board shall issue and follow such rules and regulations, including those which are contained in this Article, as will further the purposes of this Article. The Board shall publish its rules and regulations prior to promulgation in at least one newspaper with general circulation in the City of Berkeley. All rules and regulations, internal staff memoranda, and written correspondence explaining the decisions and policies of the Board shall be kept in the Board's office and shall be available to the public for inspection and copying. The Board shall publicize this Charter Amendment through the media of signs, advertisements, flyers, leaflets, announcements on radio and television, newspaper articles and other appropriate means, so that all residents of Berkeley will have the opportunity to become informed about their legal rights and duties under rent control in Berkeley.
h) Meetings: The Board shall hold two regularly scheduled meetings per month. Special meetings may be called upon the request of at least two Commissioners. All meetings shall be open to the public. Maximum rent adjustment and eviction hearings shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of Sections 6 and 7.
i) Quorum: Three Commissioners shall constitute a quorum. Three affirmative votes are required for a decision, including all motions, orders, and rulings of the Board.
j) Dockets: The Board shall maintain and keep in its office rent adjustment and eviction certificate hearing dockets. Said dockets shall list the time, date, place of hearing, parties involved, the addresses of the buildings involved, and the final disposition of the petitions heard by the Board.
k) Compensation: Each Commissioner shall receive for every meeting fifty dollars ($50.00), but in no event shall any Commissioner receive in any twelve month period more than twenty-four (24) hundred dollars for services rendered.
l) Vacancies: If a vacancy shall occur on the Board, the Board shall appoint a qualified person to fill such a vacancy until the following general municipal election when a qualified person shall be elected to serve for the remainder of the term.
m) Recall: Commissioners may be recalled in accordance with the provisions of Article IV of the Charter of the City of Berkeley.
n)Staff: The Board shall employ, subject to the approval of the City Council, such staff as may be necessary to perform its functions. Board staff shall not be subject to the requirements of Article VII, Section 28 (b) and (c) and Article IX, Section 56 of the City Charter.
a) Base rent: The base rent shall be the rent in effect on August 15, 1971 or any rent in effect subsequent to this date if it was less. If no rent was in effect on August 15, 1971, as in the case of newly constructed units completed after this date, the base rent shall be established by the Board based on the generally prevailing rents for comparable units in the City of Berkeley. The base rent shall take effect ninety (90) days after the election of the Board and the Board shall administer a rollback of rents in all controlled units to this level and shall determine, where necessary, the actual rent level in effect on August 15, 1971. Upon approval of this Charter Amendment by the California State Legislature and pending the establishment of base rents and the rollback of rents to the base rent level, no landlord shall increase rents in a rent-controlled unit.
b) Registration: The Board shall require registration of all rent-controlled units, their [17 Cal.3d 177] base rents, and the housing services provided on forms authorized and voted by the Board.
The Board may make individual rent adjustments, either upward or downward, of the maximum rent established as the base rent for rent-controlled units under Section 4(a). The Board shall receive petitions from landlords and tenants for such adjustments, and shall conduct hearings in accordance with the provisions of Section 6 to rule on said petitions.
In reviewing such petitions for adjustments, the Board shall consider relevant factors including but not limited to the following: a) increases or decreases in property taxes; b) unavoidable increases or decreases in operating and maintenance expenses; c) capital improvement of the rent-controlled unit, as distinguished from ordinary repair, replacement and maintenance; d) increases or decreases in living space, furniture, furnishings or equipment; e) substantial deterioration of the rent-controlled unit other than as a result of ordinary wear and tear; and f) failure on the part of the landlord to provide adequate housing services.
Any landlord who petitions the Board for an upward rent adjustment shall file with such petition a certification from the City of Berkeley Building Inspection Service which states that the premises in question are in full and complete compliance with the applicable State of California Health and Safety Codes and the City of Berkeley Housing Code based on an inspection made no more than six months prior to the date of the landlord's petition. Such certification shall be prima facie evidence of the nonexistence of Code violations, rebuttable by other competent evidence introduced by the tenant, certification notwithstanding. The Board may refuse to grant an upward adjustment if it determines that the rent-controlled unit in question does not comply with the requirements of the aforementioned Codes and if it determines that such lack of compliance is due to the landlord's failure to provide normal and adequate housing services.
a) Petitions: The Board shall consider an adjustment of rent for an individual rent-controlled unit upon receipt of a petition for adjustment filed by the landlord or tenant of such a unit on a form provided by the Board. No such adjustment shall be granted until after the Board considers the petition at an adjustment hearing.
b) Notice: The Board shall notify the landlord, if the petition was filed by the tenant, or the tenant, if the petition was filed by the landlord, of the receipt of such a petition. The Board shall schedule a hearing no earlier than the sixteenth (16th) day after the postmark of the notice of the hearing sent to the parties and shall notify both parties as to the time, date and place of the hearing. Hearings shall be scheduled for times most convenient for all parties, including evenings and weekends. Hearing may be postponed or continued for good cause provided that all parties receive notice timely of such action.
c) Records: The Board may require either party to a rent adjustment petition to provide it with all pertinent books, records and papers. Such documents shall be made available to the parties involved at least seven days prior to the hearing at the office of the Rent Control Board.
d) Open hearings: All rent adjustment hearings shall be open to the public.
e) Right to assistance: All parties to a hearing may have assistance in presenting evidence and developing their position from attorneys, legal workers, tenant union representatives or any other persons designated by said parties.
f) Hearing record: The Board shall make available for inspection and copying by any person an official record which shall constitute the exclusive record for decision on the issues at the hearing. The record of the hearing, or any part of one, shall be obtainable for the cost of copying. The record of the hearing shall include: all exhibits, papers and [17 Cal.3d 178] documents required to be filed or accepted into evidence during the proceeding; a list of participants present; a summary of all testimony accepted in the proceeding; a statement of all materials officially noticed; all findings of fact; the ruling on each exception or objection, if any are presented; all recommended decisions, orders or rulings; all final decisions and/or orders; and the reasons for each recommended and each final decision, order or ruling.
g) Decisions: The Board shall make a final decision no later than fifteen days after the conclusion of the hearing. No rent adjustment shall be granted unless supported by the preponderance of the evidence submitted at the hearing. All parties to a hearing shall be sent a notice of the Board's decision and a copy of the findings of fact and law upon which said decision is based. At the same time, parties to the proceeding shall also be notified of their right to judicial review of the decision pursuant to Section 9 of this Charter Amendment.
h) Consolidation: The Board may consolidate petitions relating to rent-controlled units in the same building with the written consent of a majority of the tenants and all such petitions may be considered in a single hearing.
i) Repetition: Notwithstanding any other provision of this Section, the Board may, without holding a hearing, refuse to adjust a maximum rent level upward for an individual rental unit if a hearing has been held with regard to the rental level of such unit within the prior twelve months.
j) Inadequate or false information: If information filed in a petition for rent adjustment or in additional submissions filed at the request of the Board is inadequate or false, no action shall be taken on said petition until the deficiency is remedied.
(1) the tenant has failed to pay the rent to which the landlord is entitled under the rental housing agreements; (2) the tenant has violated an obligation or covenant of her or his tenancy other than the obligation to surrender possession upon proper notice and has failed to cure such violation after having received written notice thereof from the landlord; (3) the tenant is committing or permitting to exist a nuisance in, or is causing substantial damage to, the rent-controlled unit, or is creating a substantial interference with the comfort, safety or enjoyment of the landlord or other occupants of the same; (4) the tenant is convicted of using or permitting a rent-controlled unit to be used for any illegal purpose; (5) the tenant, who had a rental housing agreement which has terminated has refused after written request or demand by the landlord, to execute a written extension or renewal thereof for a further term of like duration and in such terms as are not consistent with or violative of any provisions of this Charter Amendment and are materially the same as in the previous agreement; (6) the tenant has refused the landlord reasonable access to the rent-controlled unit for the purpose of making necessary repairs or improvement required by the laws of the United States, the State of California or any subdivision thereof, or for the purpose of inspection as permitted or required by the rental housing agreement or by law or for the purpose of showing the rental housing unit to any prospective purchaser or mortgagee; (7) the tenant holding at the end of the term of the rental housing agreement is a subtenant not approved by the landlord; (8) the landlord seeks to recover possession in good faith for use and occupancy of herself or himself, of her or his children, parents, brother, sister, father-in-law, mother-in-law, son-in-law, or daughter-in-law; or (9) the landlord seeks to recover possession to demolish or otherwise remove the rent-controlled unit from housing use.
b) A landlord seeking to recover possession of a rent-controlled unit shall apply to the Board for a certificate of eviction. Such application shall include a copy of the notice to quit served on the tenant(s) and must contain statements made under pains and penalties [17 Cal.3d 179] of perjury that: (1) there are no outstanding Code violations on the premises or, if there are any, they were all substantially caused by the present tenants; (2) the landlord or her or his agent has properly sent to or personally served on the tenant a notice terminating the tenancy and said notice has taken legal effect; and (3) there exist facts which justify issuance of a certificate of eviction under Section 7(a).
c) The Board shall notify all concerned tenants of the landlord's application for a certificate of eviction and of their right to contest issuance of such a certificate by requesting a hearing within five (5) days after receiving such notification from the Board. Said notification shall include a copy of the landlord's application and statements and attachments.
d) If the tenant requests such a hearing, the Board shall schedule such a hearing within seven (7) days after receipt of the tenant's request and notify all parties as to the time, date and place of the hearing.
e) At said hearing the burden of proof is on the landlord to prove the facts attested to in her or his application. No eviction certificate shall be issued if: (1) the landlord fails to prove that no Code violations exist on the premises or that any violations which do exist were substantially caused by the present tenant(s); or (2) the eviction is in retaliation for reporting Code violations or violations of this Article, or for organizing other tenants, or for enforcing rights under this Charter Amendment. The provisions of Section 6(d), (e), (f), (g), (h), (i), and (j) apply in a similar manner to eviction hearings.
f) The Board shall grant or deny the certificate of eviction within five (5) days after a hearing is held on the landlord's application.
g) A landlord who seeks to recover possession of a rent-controlled unit without first obtaining a certificate of eviction or who recovers possession without first obtaining a certificate of eviction shall be in violation of this Article and shall be subject to the civil penalties available to the Board, the City or the tenant under Section 10. This subsection shall not apply if, after the landlord has applied for a certificate of eviction, the tenant voluntarily abandons the rent-controlled unit. The provisions of this Section shall be construed as additional restrictions on the right to recover possession of rent-controlled units. No provision of this Section shall entitle any landlord to recover possession of such a rent-controlled unit. Upon a decision of the Board concerning the granting or withholding of a certificate of eviction, either party may seek judicial review of this decision in accordance with the provisions of Section 9.
Any provision whether oral or written, in or pertaining to a rental housing agreement whereby any provisions of this Article for the benefit of a tenant is waived, shall be deemed to be against public policy and shall be void.
A landlord or tenant aggrieved by any action, regulation, or decision of the Board may seek judicial review by appealing to the appropriate court within the jurisdiction.
b) If the tenant from whom such payment is demanded, accepted, received, or retained in violation of the provision of this Article or any rule, regulation or order hereinunder promulgated fails to bring an action under this Section within thirty days from the date of the occurrence of the violation, the Board may settle the claim arising out of the violation or bring such action. Thereinafter, the tenant on whose behalf the Board acted is barred from also bringing action against the landlord in regard to the same violation for which the Board has made a settlement. In the event the Board settles said claim, it shall be entitled to retain the costs it incurred in the settlement thereof, and the tenant against whom the violation has been committed shall be entitled to the remainder.
c) A judgment for damages or on the merits in any action under this Section shall be a bar to any recovery under this Section against the same landlord on account of any violation with respect to the same tenant prior to the institution of the action in which such judgment was rendered. Action to recover liquidated damages under the provisions of this Section shall not be brought later than one year after the date of the violation.
d) The Municipal or Superior Court, as the case might be, within which the rent-controlled unit affected is located shall have jurisdiction over all actions and complaints brought under this Section.
e) Any tenants who have paid in excess of the maximum rent set by the Board as determined at a hearing held by the Board or whose rent was suspended due to a violation of this Article shall be entitled to a refund in the amount of the excess payment. Tenants may elect to deduct such amount of the refund due them from their future rent payments, rather than pursuing the remedy provided under Section 10(a), provided that they inform the landlord in advance in writing as to their intention to do so. Tenants shall not be penalized by landlords for deducting their refund pursuant to this Section.
f) If a landlord evicts a tenant without a certificate of eviction obtained from the Board, the tenants' obligation to pay rent to the landlord during the period beginning with the date of the actual eviction and continuing for the period in which the tenant is dispossessed for a maximum of one year is automatically suspended and the tenant is entitled to a refund of rent in accordance with the provisions of Section 10(e).
11. Injunctive Relief: The Board and tenants and landlords of rent-controlled units may seek relief from a Municipal or Superior Court to restrain by injunction any violation of this Article and of the rules, regulations and decisions of the Board.
12. Partial Invalidity: If any provision of this Article or application thereof to any person or circumstances is held invalid, this invalidity shall not affect other provisions or applications of this Article which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this Article are declared to be severable.
Section B. The first sentence of Section 8, Article V of the Charter of the City of Berkeley is amended to read as follows: "The elective officers of the City shall be a Mayor, an Auditor, eight (8) Council Members, five (5) School Directors, and five (5) Rent Control Board Commissioners."
­FN 1. The judgment below declared the initiative procedure constitutionally insufficient for enactment of municipal rent controls in that it failed to provide landlords with reasonable notice and the right to be heard on the merits of the measure prior to its adoption. After the judgment was entered we held in San Diego Bldg. Contractors Assn. v. City Council (1974) 13 Cal.3d 205 [118 Cal.Rptr. 146, 529 P.2d 570] that the initiative procedure can be used to adopt a zoning ordinance constituting a general legislative (as distinct from adjudicatory) act notwithstanding the lack of notice or opportunity for hearing on the part of affected property owners. Clearly the present rent control measure is a general legislative act susceptible of adoption by initiative under our holding in San Diego Bldg. Contractors. (See id., at pp. 214-215.) Plaintiffs do not contend otherwise on this appeal.
­FN 2. Approval by concurrent resolution of both houses of the Legislature was required by the then provisions of section 3 of article XI of the Constitution. In 1974 subdivision (a) of section 3 was amended to dispense with the necessity for the Legislature's approving city charter amendments.
­FN 3. The initiative proceedings followed the city council's refusal at a public hearing on February 8, 1972, to place the rent control issue on the ballot. In 1969 the council had appointed a rental housing committee which made studies and in March 1971 issued an exhaustive report with recommendations but decided with one dissent not to recommend rent control.
­FN 4. Unless otherwise indicated, all section references hereinafter are to Article XVII of defendant's character, added by the charter amendment set out in the appendix to this opinion.
­FN 5. There is no exception for new housing construction generally. The ballot argument in favor of the charter amendment (incorporated into the pleadings) stated: "Controlled rents will discourage high rent-quick profit ticky-tacky apartment construction, thus helping stop destruction of older homes and preserving Berkeley's unique environmental character. Rent control will help ensure that new housing construction serves those most in need -- low income families, minorities, students and the aged."
­FN 6. Upon the Legislature's approval of the charter amendment no rent of a controlled unit could be raised pending "the rollback of rents to the base rent level." (§ 4, subd. (a).) The trial court adjudged this "rent freeze" to be valid up to (but not after) the date of entry of the judgment, declaring its intent that tenants be relieved of liability for rent in excess of freeze levels incurred before that date.
­FN 7. The separate provisions that the Board is "empowered" to roll back rents and to set and adjust maximum rents and that it may conduct investigations and issue regulations pertinent to its duties (§ 3, subds. (f), (g)) might in themselves seem to imply broader discretion to make general adjustments of rent levels, but any such implication is clearly dispelled by the specific restrictions described in the text.
­FN 9. Article XI, section 5, subdivision (a) provides: "It shall be competent in any city charter to provide that the city governed thereunder may make and enforce all ordinances and regulations in respect to municipal affairs, subject only to restrictions and limitations provided in their several charters and in respect to other matters they shall be subject to general laws. City charters adopted pursuant to this Constitution shall supersede any existing charter, and with respect to municipal affairs shall supersede all laws inconsistent therewith."
­FN 11. We here decide only that general state law does not preclude a California city from imposing some form of rent control. We need not consider whether a city is free to create the judicial remedies for violation of rent ceilings provided by sections 9, 10 and 11 of the present charter amendment in view of our conclusion, discussed hereinafter, that the amendment's provisions for fixing maximum rents are constitutionally deficient.
­FN 13. The electorate's lack of power to compel investigative committees or other agents to assemble information and make recommendations on particular issues does not prevent the voters from becoming well informed. Those voting on the present charter amendment had the benefit of a published report of the city council's rental housing committee and of arguments distributed with the ballots as well as the information disseminated during the campaign preceding the election.
­FN 14. The assumption that adoption of a city ballot measure to impose residential rent control is inevitable because tenants outnumber landlords is refuted both by the absence of rent control enactments in California communities other than Berkeley and by indications in the record that even the present measure had less than the complete support of tenants. The findings show that tenants constitute 63 percent of Berkeley's population; yet the charter amendment passed by only 52.5 percent of the vote. Moreover the declarations attached to the complaint in intervention, stating the interests of the original interveners (some of whom were later stricken as parties), show that the rent control measure received support from some homeowners who had such concerns as the preservation of the existing housing stock and the retention of low-income residents in the city.
­FN 15. Our language in Hopping v. Council of City of Richmond (1915) 170 Cal. 605, 617 [150 P. 977], that "[t]here may be grounds for excluding from the operation of [the initiative and referendum] powers legislative acts which are special and local in their nature" is not authoritative since we further stated that no such question was then before us and that "we express no opinion on the subject" (170 Cal. at p. 618). The decisions in Chase v. Kalber, supra, 28 Cal.App. 561 and Starbuck v. City of Fullerton (1917) 34 Cal.App. 683 [168 P. 583], holding the initiative and referendum inapplicable to local ordinances for street improvements to be financed by the local property owners involved cities without charters and were based on a construction of state street improvement statutes. All three of these cases were distinguished in Dwyer (200 Cal. at pp. 517-519).
­FN 17. Nothing in the charter amendment precludes a landlord from giving notice of the termination of a tenancy at will or periodic tenancy (see Civ. Code, §§ 789, 1946) or of a lease terminable at the landlord's option. Indeed such notice is a prerequisite to an application for a certificate of eviction. (§ 7, subd. (b).) What is prohibited is using the termination of the tenancy as a basis for eviction proceedings in the absence of another permissible ground for eviction.
­FN 22. We do not reach the question of whether the defendant city could have imposed the prerequisites for a certificate of eviction as direct substantive conditions upon the right to eviction. Interveners argue that defendant could implement its policies of preventing deterioration of existing housing and of limiting chargeable rents by depriving landlords of the right to evict tenants from units not conforming to housing code standards or in retaliation for the assertion of certain tenant rights. The argument is hypothetical as the charter amendment makes these matters the tests for the rent control board's issuance of a certificate of eviction rather than imposing them as conditions upon the right of repossession enforceable by the courts.
­FN 23. Neither of the Supreme Court cases dealing with rent controls imposed on a nationwide basis by Congress during and immediately after World War II reached this issue. In Bowles v. Willingham (1944) 321 U.S. 503 [88 L.Ed. 892, 64 S.Ct. 641], the court considered whether Congress' conceded authority under its war powers to control rents throughout the nation during the war could be exercised in particular ways and concluded, inter alia, that the exigencies of the war eliminated any constitutional doubts that might otherwise have existed as to the propriety of (1) empowering an administrator to set rents that were fair and equitable under standards generally applicable throughout an area without considering factors peculiar to individual landlords (321 U.S. at pp. 516-519 [88 L.Ed. at pp. 904-905]) or (2) putting rent-fixing orders into effect prior to hearing objections from landlords (321 U.S. at pp. 519-521 [88 L.Ed. at pp. 905-907]). Woods v. Miller Co. (1948) 333 U.S. 138 [92 L.Ed. 596, 68 S.Ct.421], held that Congress could exercise its war powers to continue nationwide rent controls beyond the end of hostilities to cope with housing shortages caused by the demobilization of veterans and the reduction of housing construction during the war.
­FN 26. This decision may well rest on special rules of Pennsylvania law in view of the court's pronouncement elsewhere that "Pennsylvania ... has scrutinized regulatory egislation perhaps more closely than would the Supreme Court of the United States" (Pennsylvania State Board of Pharmacy v. Pastor (1971) 441 Pa. 186, 191 [272 A.2d 487, 44 A.L.R.3d 1290]).
"Statement of Purpose. A growing shortage of housing units resulting in a critically low vacancy rate, rapidly rising and exorbitant rents exploiting this shortage, and the continuing deterioration of the existing housing stock constitute a serious public emergency affecting the lives of a substantial proportion of those Berkeley residents who reside in rental housing. These emergency conditions endanger the public health and welfare of the City of Berkeley and especially the health and welfare of the poor, minorities, students and the aged. The purpose of this Article, therefore, is to alleviate the hardship caused by this emergency by establishing a Rent Control Board empowered to regulate residential housing and rentals in the City of Berkeley."
­FN 29. Section 1 of the charter amendment would unquestionably be consistent with the findings if the following five words shown as stricken were replaced by the wording shown in italics: "Statement of Purpose. A growing shortage of housing units resulting in a critically low vacancy rate, rapidly rising and exorbitant rents exploiting this shortage, and the continuing deterioration of the existing housing stock constitute a serious public emergency housing problem affecting the lives of a substantial proportion of those Berkeley residents who reside in rental housing. These emergency conditions endanger the public health and welfare of the City of Berkeley and especially the health and welfare of the poor, minorities, students and the aged. The purpose of this Article, therefore, is to alleviate the hardship caused by this emergency problem by establishing a Rent Control Board empowered to regulate residential housing and rentals in the City of Berkeley."
­FN 31. A finding states that "there existed a vacancy rate in excess of 3% (actual number of vacancies approximating 500 rental units)" and another finding states the vacancy rate "increased from 2.6% to 3.1% between 1971 and 1972." The memorandum opinion states that "the apartment rental unit vacancy rate rose from 2.6 in 1971 to 3.1 in 1973. (In actual numbers, an increase from 467 to 534.)" The indicated number of units is determined by dividing the vacancy rate into the number of vacancies.
­FN 32. Defendant contends that "nothing in the law's procedures prevents consideration by the Board of a petition for rental adjustment that is not accompanied by a building certification" and that "the Board may consider a petition which is accompanied by an adequate excuse for the failure to supply a building certification -- such as delay by the City Building and Inspection Services." But the charter amendment (§ 5) states unequivocally that "[a]ny landlord who petitions the Board for an upward rent adjustment shall file with such petition a certification ... that the premises in question are in full and complete compliance with the applicable [codes] ...." (Italics supplied.) The power of the board to make findings contrary to the certificate and nevertheless grant a rent increase does not affect the requirement that the certificate be filed.
Plaintiffs contend that the charter amendment would deny them due process by failing to provide landlords with any remedy against arbitrary refusal of the required certification or unreasonable delay in its issuance. Nothing in the charter amendment inhibits defendant's city council, Board or other organs from exercising their respective powers to prevent or alleviate such refusals or delays and therefore we cannot assume that any such denial of due process would occur.
­FN 33. Defendant argues that "there is no proscription against consolidating petitions and hearing procedures on the petitions submitted, in order to make [rental] adjustments, except in the case of petitions relating to rent-controlled units in the same building where written consent of a majority of tenants is required." We disagree. The requirement of written consent for consolidation of petitions for units in the same building evinces a policy of prohibiting the Board from consolidating petitions that are less related in that they pertain to separate buildings.
­FN 34. Section 3, subdivision (g), directs the Board to "issue and follow such rules and regulations ... as will further the purposes of this Article," but such rules could not undercut the express provision that "[n]o rent adjustment shall be granted unless supported by the preponderance of the evidence submitted at the hearing" (§ 6, subd. (g)).
­FN 35. Although tenants of a building would have an understandable motive for agreeing to consolidation of their own petitions for rent decreases, they would ordinarily have little or nothing to gain from signing a consent to a consolidation designed to make it easier for the landlord to obtain permission to raise their rents.
­FN 36. Interveners postulate that a landlord's application for an upward rent adjustment under the charter amendment would be acted upon in two or three months, citing a study which states that under the Massachusetts rent control law (Mass. Acts 1970, ch. 842) "[t]he average length of time between filing a petition and receiving a decision from the Rent Control Board ranges from four to five weeks in Somerville to 10 to 12 weeks in Brookline." But the Massachusetts statute gives local rent control boards the very powers which we have described as being withheld from the Berkeley Board by the charter amendment.
Interveners also attach to one of their briefs a declaration of the person who served as the Berkeley Rent Control Board's chief executive officer prior to the judgment below, describing the Board's plans for dealing with petitions for rent adjustments. We consider the declaration not as evidence of any facts or occurrences but for whatever light it may shed on the kinds of adjustment procedures that might be possible under the charter amendment. The declaration states in part: [¶] "The Board never completed action on determining the exact procedures to be followed in dealing with applications for rent adjustments. However, all of the proposals being considered involved the development of standardized formulae and procedures for determining the approved rent on any given rental unit. The Board's goal was to develop a formula that would allow it to calculate the rent it would approve on a given housing unit simply by taking into account data that would be provided yearly involving the owner's costs and equity investment in the building being considered. To the figure thus calculated, an adjustment would be made depending upon whether the building was 'average,' 'above average,' or 'below average,' in its condition and maintenance. Evidence as to condition and maintenance would be provided by the owner and tenants themselves as well as investigators working for the Board. The goal of these procedures was to be standardized and virtually automatic decisions in cases, with the Board setting policies to be administered by its staff. These policies would, hopefully, minimize contested hearings and allow decisions in the overwhelmingly vast majority of cases to be worked out informally by interested parties and the Board staff. Where decisions could not be worked out informally, hearing would be held by Board hearing officers with final decisions to be made by the Board. With these procedures, we anticipated that any given rent adjustment request could be handled and closed within 30 to 45 days."
The difficulty with these plans is that they were beyond the Board's powers under section 6. Rent adjustment decisions could not be worked out informally between the parties and the Board staff but in all cases would have to be based on the preponderance of the evidence submitted at a hearing on a particular rental unit, documented by a detailed hearing record. Moreover, hearings could not be held by "hearing officers" but only by the Board itself.
SCOCAL, Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley , 17 Cal.3d 129 available at: (https://scocal.stanford.edu/opinion/birkenfeld-v-city-berkeley-30384) (last visited Sunday April 21, 2019).

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 3
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 3387
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.