Source: https://constitution.findlaw.com/article3/annotation12.html/
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 22:38:59+00:00

Document:
It may be that there will be a case assuredly within the Court's jurisdiction presented by parties with standing in which adverseness and ripeness will exist, a case in other words presenting all the qualifications we have considered making it a justiciable controversy, which the Court will nonetheless refuse to adjudicate. The ''label'' for such a case is that it presents a ''political question.'' Although the Court has referred to the political question doctrine as ''one of the rules basic of the federal system and this Court's appropriate place within that structure,'' 510 a commentator has remarked that ''[i]t is, measured by any of the normal responsibilities of a phrase of definition, one of the least satisfactory terms known to the law. The origin, scope, and purpose of the concept have eluded all attempts at precise statements.'' 511 That the concept of political questions may be ''more amenable to description by infinite itemization than by generalization'' 512 is generally true, although the Court's development of rationale in Baker v. Carr 513 has changed this fact radically, but the doctrine may be approached in two ways, by itemization of the kinds of questions that have been labeled political and by isolation of the factors that have led to the labeling.
The Doctrine Before Baker v. Carr .--Over the years, the political question doctrine has been applied to preclude adjudication of a variety of issues. Certain factors appear more or less consistently through most but not all of these cases, and it is perhaps best to indicate the cases and issues deemed political before attempting to isolate these factors.
(4) Prior to Baker v. Carr, 545 cases challenging the distribution of political power through apportionment and districting, 546 weighed voting, 547 and restrictions on political action 548 were held to present nonjusticiable political questions.
According to Justice Brennan, who delivered the opinion of the Court, ''it is the relationship between the judiciary and the coordinate branches of the Federal Government, and not the federal judiciary's relationship to the States, which gives rise to the 'political question.''' 556 Thus, the ''nonjusticiability of a political question is primarily a function of the separation of powers.'' 557 ''Deciding whether a matter has in any measure been committed by the Constitution to another branch of government, or whether the action of that branch exceeds whatever authority has been committed, is itself a delicate exercise in constitutional interpretation, and is a responsibility of this Court as ultimate interpreter of the Constitution.'' 558 Following a discussion of several areas in which the doctrine had been used, Justice Brennan continued: ''It is apparent that several formulations which vary slightly according to the settings in which the questions arise may describe a political question, although each has one or more elements which identify it as essentially a function of the separation of powers.
Powell v. McCormack .--Because Baker had apparently restricted the political question doctrine to intrafederal issues, there was no discussion of the doctrine when the Court held that it had power to review and overturn a state legislature's refusal to seat a member-elect because of his expressed views. 560 But in Powell v. McCormack, 561 the Court was confronted with a challenge to the exclusion of a member- elect by the United States House of Representatives. Its determination that the political question doctrine did not bar its review of the challenge indicates the narrowness of application of the doctrine in its present state. Taking Justice Brennan's formulation in Baker of the factors that go to make up a political question, 562 Chief Justice Warren determined that the only critical one in this case was whether there was a ''textually demonstrable constitutional commitment'' to the House to determine in its sole discretion the qualifications of members. 563 In order to determine whether there was a textual commitment, the Court reviewed the Constitution, the Convention proceedings, and English and United States legislative practice to ascertain what power had been conferred on the House to judge the qualifications of its members; finding that the Constitution vested the House with power only to look at the qualifications of age, residency, and citizenship, the Court thus decided that in passing on Powell's conduct and character the House had exceeded the powers committed to it and thus judicial review was not barred by this factor of the political question doctrine. 564 Although this approach accords with the ''classicist'' theory of judicial review, 565 it circumscribes the political question doctrine severely, inasmuch as all constitutional questions turn on whether a governmental body has exceeded its specified powers, a determination the Court traditionally makes, whereas traditionally the doctrine precluded the Court from inquiring whether the governmental body had exceeded its powers. In short, the political question consideration may now be one on the merits rather than a decision not to decide.
Chief Justice Warren disposed of the other factors present in political question cases in slightly more than a page. Since resolution of the question turned on an interpretation of the Constitution, a judicial function which must sometimes be exercised ''at variance with the construction given the document by another branch,'' there was no lack of respect shown another branch, nor, because the Court is the ''ultimate interpreter of the Constitution,'' will there be ''multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question,'' nor, since the Court is merely interpreting the Constitution, is there an ''initial policy determination'' not suitable for courts. Finally, ''judicially . . . manageable standards'' are present in the text of the Constitution. 566 The effect of Powell is to discard all the Baker factors inhering in a political question, with the exception of the textual commitment factor, and that was interpreted in such a manner as seldom if ever to preclude a judicial decision on the merits.
In short, the political question doctrine may not be moribund, but it does seem applicable to a very narrow class of cases.
[Footnote 510] Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549, 570 (1947); cf. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 278 (1962) (Justice Frankfurter dissenting). The most successful effort at conceptualization of the doctrine is Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question: A Functional Analysis, 75 Yale L.J. 517 (1966). See Hart & Wechsler, op. cit., n. 250, 270-294.
[Footnote 511] Frank, Political Questions, in E. Cahn (ed.), Supreme Court and Supreme Law (Bloomington: 1954), 36.
[Footnote 513] Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 208 -232 (1962).
[Footnote 514] 5 U.S. (1 Cr.) 137, 170 (1803).
[Footnote 515] In Decatur v. Paulding, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 497, 516 (1840), the Court, refusing an effort by mandamus to compel the Secretary of the Navy to pay a pension, said: ''The interference of the courts with the performance of the ordinary duties of the executive departments of the government, would be productive of nothing but mischief; and we are quite satisfied, that such a power was never intended to be given to them.'' It therefore follows that mandamus will lie against an executive official only to compel the performance of a ministerial duty, which admits of no discretion, and may not be invoked to control executive or political duties which admit of discretion. See Georgia v. Stanton, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 50 (1867); Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475 (1867); Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838).
[Footnote 516] 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796).
[Footnote 517] 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19 (1827).
[Footnote 518] 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
[Footnote 519] Cf. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 218 -222 (1962); id., 292- 297 (Justice Frankfurter dissenting).
[Footnote 520] Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 40 (1849).
[Footnote 521] Id., 42 (citing Article IV, Sec. 4).
[Footnote 526] Article IV, Sec. 4.
[Footnote 527] As it was on the established government of Rhode Island in Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849). See also Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700 (1869); Taylor v. Beckham, 178 U.S. 548 (1900).
[Footnote 528] Pacific States Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912); Kiernan v. City of Portland, 223 U.S. 151 (1912) (attacks on initiative and referendum); Marshall v. Dye, 231 U.S. 250 (1913) (state constitutional amendment procedure); O'Neill v. Leamer, 239 U.S. 244 (1915) (delegation to court to form drainage districts); Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 U.S. 565 (1916) (submission of legislation to referendum); Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219 (1917) (workmen's compensation); Ohio ex rel. Bryant v. Akron Metropolitan Park District, 281 U.S. 74 (1930) (concurrence of all but one justice of state high court required to invalidate statute); Highland Farms Dairy v. Agnew, 300 U.S. 608 (1937) (delegation of legislative powers).
[Footnote 529] All the cases, however, predate the application of the doctrine in Pacific States Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912). See Attorney General of the State of Michigan ex rel. Kies v. Lowrey, 199 U.S. 233, 239 (1905) (legislative creation and alteration of school districts ''compatible'' with a republican form of government); Forsyth v. City of Hammond, 166 U.S. 506, 519 (1897) (delegation of power to court to determine municipal boundaries does not infringe republican form of government); Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall) 162, 175 -176 (1875) (denial of suffrage to women no violation of republican form of government).
[Footnote 530] Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918); Chicago & S. Air Lines v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948).
[Footnote 531] United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610 (1818); Kennett v. Chambers, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 38 (1852).
[Footnote 532] Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202 (1890); Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918). See Ex parte Hitz, 111 U.S. 766 (1884).
[Footnote 533] United States v. The Three Friends, 166 U.S. 1 (1897); In re Baiz, 135 U.S. 403 (1890). Cf. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
[Footnote 535] Doe v. Braden, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 635 (1853).
[Footnote 536] Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270 (1902); Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947).
[Footnote 537] Kennett v. Chambers, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 38 (1852). On the effect of a violation by a foreign state on the continuing effectiveness of the treaty, see Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796); Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447 (1913).
[Footnote 538] Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796). Cf. Chinese Exclusion Cases, 130 U.S. 581 (1889) (conflict of treaty with federal law). On the modern formulation, see Japan Whaling Assn. v. American Cetacean Society, 478 U.S. 221, 229 -230 (1986).
[Footnote 539] Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325 (1939); United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407 (1886).
[Footnote 540] Commercial Trust Co v. Miller, 262 U.S. 51 (1923); Woods v. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138 (1948); Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U.S. 543 (1924); Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160 (1948); Lee v. Madigan, 358 U.S. 228 (1959); The Divina Pastora, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 52 (1819). The cases involving the status of Indian tribes as foreign states usually have presented political questions but not always. The Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28 (1913); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
[Footnote 541] Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892); Harwood v. Wentworth, 162 U.S. 547 (1896); cf. Gardner v. The Collector, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 499 (1868). See, for the modern formulation, United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990).
[Footnote 542] Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939) (Congress' discretion to determine what passage of time will cause an amendment to lapse and effect of previous rejection by legislature).
[Footnote 543] Missouri Pacific Ry. v. Kansas, 248 U.S. 276 (1919); Rainey v. United States, 232 U.S. 310 (1914); Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107 (1911); Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U.S. 196 (1897); Lyons v. Woods, 153 U.S. 649 (1894); United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1 (1892) (statutes); United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716 (1931); Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130 (1922); Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368 (1921); Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221 (1920); National Prohibition Cases, 253 U.S. 350 (1920); Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378 (1798) (constitutional amendments).
[Footnote 544] Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655 (1929); Wright v. United States, 302 U.S. 583 (1938).
[Footnote 545] 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
[Footnote 546] Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946); Colegrove v. Barrett, 330 U.S. 804 (1947).
[Footnote 547] South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276 (1950) (county unit system for election of statewide officers with vote heavily weighed in favor of rural, lightly-populated counties).
[Footnote 548] MacDougall v. Green, 335 U.S. 281 (1948) (signatures on nominating petitions must be spread among counties of unequal population).
[Footnote 549] Thus, see, e.g., Chicago & S. Air Lines v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948); Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 453 (1939).
[Footnote 550] Thus, see, e.g., Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 415, 420 (1839). Similar considerations underlay the opinion in Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849), in which Chief Justice Taney wondered how a court decision in favor of one faction would be received with Congress seating the representatives of the other faction and the President supporting that faction with military force.
[Footnote 552] For a statement of the ''prudential'' view, see generally A. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch--The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics (New York: 1962), but see esp. 23-28, 69-71, 183-198. See also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 267 (1962) (Justice Frankfurter dissenting.) The opposing view, which has been called the ''classicist'' view, is that courts are duty bound to decide all cases properly before them. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821). See also H. Wechsler, Principles, Politics, and Fundamental Law--Selected Essays (Cambridge: 1961), 11-15.
[Footnote 553] 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
[Footnote 554] Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Hadley v. Junior College District, 397 U.S. 50 (1970) (apportionment and districting, congressional, legislative, and local); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963) (county unit system weighing statewide elections); Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814 (1969) (geographic dispersion of persons signing nominating petitions).
[Footnote 555] Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969). Nonetheless, the doctrine continues to be sighted.
[Footnote 556] Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962). This formulation fails to explain cases like Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. 78 (1909), in which the conclusion of the Governor of a State that insurrection existed or was imminent justifying suspension of constitutional rights was deemed binding on the Court. Cf. Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378 (1932). The political question doctrine was applied in cases challenging the regularity of enactments of territorial legislatures. Harwood v. Wentworth, 162 U.S. 547 (1896); Lyons v. Woods, 153 U.S. 649 (1894); Clough v. Curtis, 134 U.S. 361 (1890). See also In re Sawyer, 124 U.S. 200 (1888); Walton v. House of Representatives, 265 U.S. 487 (1924).
[Footnote 557] Id., 369 U.S., 210.
[Footnote 559] Id., 217. It remains unclear after Baker whether the political question doctrine is applicable solely to intrafederal issues or only primarily, so that the existence of one or more of these factors in a case involving, say, a State, might still give rise to nonjusticiability. At one point, id., 210, Justice Brennan says that nonjusticiability of a political question is ''primarily'' a function of separation of powers but in the immediately preceding paragraph he states that ''it is'' the intrafederal aspect ''and not the federal judiciary's relationship to the States'' that raises political questions. But subsequently, id., 226, he balances the present case, which involves a State and not a branch of the Federal Government, against each of the factors listed in the instant quotation and notes that none apply. His discussion of why guarantee clause cases are political presents much the same difficulty, id., 222-226, inasmuch as he joins the conclusion that the clause commits resolution of such issues to Congress with the assertion that the clause contains no ''criteria by which a court could determine which form of government was republican,'' id., 222, a factor not present when the equal protection clause is relied on. Id., 226.
[Footnote 560] Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966).
[Footnote 561] 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
[Footnote 562] Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
[Footnote 563] Id., 395 U.S., 519.
[Footnote 564] Id., 519-547. The Court concluded, however, by noting that even if this conclusion had not been reached from unambiguous evidence, the result would have followed from other considerations. Id., 547-548.
[Footnote 565] Supra, n. 552. See H. Wechsler, op. cit., n. 552, 11-12. Professor Wechsler believed that congressional decisions about seating members were immune to review. Ibid. Chief Justice Warren noted that ''federal courts might still be barred by the political question doctrine from reviewing the House's factual determination that a member did not meet one of the standing qualifications. This is an issue not presented in this case and we express no view as to its resolution.'' Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 521 n. 42 (1969). And see id., 507 n. 27 (reservation on limitations that might exist on Congress' power to expel or otherwise punish a sitting member).
[Footnote 566] Id., 395 U.S., 548-549. With the formulation of Chief Justice Warren, compare that of then-Judge Burger in the lower court. 395 F.2d 577, 591-596 (D.C.Cir. 1968).
[Footnote 567] Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973). Similar prudential concerns seem to underlay, though they did not provide the formal basis for, decisions in O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974), and Mayor of Philadelphia v. Educational Equality League, 415 U.S. 605 (1974).
[Footnote 568] Id., 413 U.S., 11. Other considerations of justiciability, however, id., 10, preclude using the case as square precedent on political questions. Notice that in Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 249 (1974), the Court denied that the Gilligan v. Morgan holding barred adjudication of damage actions brought against state officials by the estates of students killed in the course of the conduct that gave rise to both cases.
[Footnote 569] O'Brien v. Brown, 409 U.S. 1 (1972) (granting stay). The issue was mooted by the passage of time and was not thereafter considered on the merits by the Court. Id., 816 (remanding to dismiss as moot). It was also not before the Court in Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477 (1975), but it was alluded to there. See id., 483 n. 4, and id., 491 (Justice Rehnquist concurring). See also Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1002 (1979) (Justices Rehnquist, Stewart, and Stevens, and Chief Justice Burger using political question analysis to dismiss a challenge to presidential action). But see id. 997, 998 (Justice Powell rejecting analysis for this type of case).
[Footnote 15 (1996 Supplement)] Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993). The Court pronounced its decision as perfectly consonant with Powell v. McCormack. Id. at 236-38.
[Footnote 570] Japan Whaling Assn. v. American Cetacean Society, 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986). See also Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986) (challenge to political gerrymandering is justiciable).
[Footnote 571] United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990).
[Footnote 572] Id., 390 (emphasis in original).

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.