Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/102990/pipefitters-vs-united-states
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 10:44:51+00:00

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Petitioner union and three of its officers were convicted of conspiracy to violate 18 U.S.C. § 610, which prohibited a labor organization from making a contribution or an expenditure in connection with a federal election. Evidence indicated that the union, from 1949 through 1962, maintained a political fund to which union members and others working under the union's jurisdiction were required to contribute, and that that fund was then succeeded by the present fund, which was, in form, set up as a separate "voluntary" organization; union officials, nevertheless, retained unlimited control over the fund, and no significant change was made in the regular and systematic collection of contributions at a prescribed rate based on hours worked; union agents, moreover, continued to collect donations at jobsites on union time, and the proceeds were used for a variety of purposes, including political contributions in connection with federal elections; those contributions, on the other hand, were made from accounts strictly segregated from union dues and assessments, and, although some of the contributors believed otherwise, donations to the fund were not, in fact, necessary for employment or union membership. Under instructions to determine whether the fund was in reality a union fund or the contributors' fund, the jury found each defendant guilty. The Court of Appeals rejected petitioners' challenges, and held that the fund was a subterfuge through which the union made political contributions of union monies in violation of § 610. The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, which became effective after oral argument here, added a paragraph at the end of § 610 that expressly authorizes labor organizations to establish, administer, and solicit contributions for political funds, provided that the fund not make a contribution or expenditure in connection with a federal election by utilizing money or anything of value secured by physical force, job discrimination, financial reprisals, or the threat thereof, or by monies required as a condition of employment or union membership.
financed union political funds. A legitimate political fund must be separate from the sponsoring union only in the sense that there must be a strict segregation of its monies from union dues and assessments, and solicitation by union officials, although permissible, must be conducted under circumstances plainly indicating that donations are for a political purpose, and that those solicited may decline to contribute without reprisal. Pp. 407 U. S. 401 -427.
2. Section 10 may be interpreted to prohibit the use of general union monies for the establishment, administration, or solicitation of contributions for union political funds. By clearly permitting such use, the Federal Election Campaign Act may, therefore, have impliedly repealed § 610. Pp. 407 U. S. 428 -432.
3. Even if there has been such an implied repeal, it nevertheless does not require abatement of the prosecution against petitioners because of the federal saving statute, 1 U.S.C. § 109. United States v. Reisinger, 128 U. S. 398 , followed. Hamm v. Rock Hill, 379 U. S. 306 , distinguished. Pp. 407 U. S. 432 -435.
4. The instructions to the jury were clearly erroneous because they permitted the jury to convict without finding that donations to the fund had been actual or effective dues or assessments. The sufficiency of the indictment is left open for determination on remand. Pp. 407 U. S. 435 -442.
BRENNAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which DOUGLAS, STEWART, WHITE, MARSHALL, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. POWELL, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BURGER, C.J., joined, post, p. 407 U. S. 442 . BLACKMUN, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
"It is unlawful . . . for any corporation whatever, or any labor organization to make a contribution or expenditure in connection with any election at which Presidential and Vice Presidential electors or a Senator or Representative in . . . Congress are to be voted for, or in connection with any primary election or political convention or caucus held to select candidates for any of the foregoing offices. . . ."
not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both."
"For the purposes of this section 'labor organization' means any organization of any kind, or any agency or employee representation committee or plan, in which employees participate and which exist [ sic ] for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work. [ Footnote 1 ]"
sentence accordingly. The Union was fined $5,000, while the individual defendants were each sentenced to one year's imprisonment and fined $1,000.
F.2d 1127 (1970), adopted Judge Van Oosterhout's panel opinion rejecting each of these claims, 434 F.2d 1116 (1970). The gist of the court's decision, insofar as pertinent here, was that the Pipefitters fund was a subterfuge through which the Union made political contributions of Union monies in violation of § 610, as demonstrated by the evidence that the fund regularly served Union purposes and that the donors to the fund contributed in the belief that their job security depended upon it. We granted certiorari. 402 U.S. 994 (1971).
because of erroneous jury instructions. [ Footnote 11 ] This disposition makes decision of the constitutional issues premature, and we therefore do not decide them. Cf.
United States v. Auto Workers, 352 U. S. 567 (1957); United States v. CIO, 335 U. S. 106 (1948).
We begin with an analysis of § 610.
"Nor do we dispute [petitioners'] conclusion, following their review of the legislative history of Section 610, that a union could 'establish a political organization for the purpose of receiving earmarked political monies directly from [voluntary contributions of] union members. . . .'"
"It was felt that the influence which labor unions exercised over elections through monetary expenditures should be minimized, and that it was unfair to individual union members to permit the union leadership to make contributions from general union funds to a political party which the individual member might oppose."
voluntary donations of the union membership. Union political funds had come to prominence in the 1944 and 1946 election campaigns and had been extensively studied by special committees of both the House and the Senate. Against the backdrop of the committee findings and recommendations, the Senate debates upon the reach of § 304 attached controlling significance to the voluntary source of financing of the funds. The unequivocal view of the proponents of § 304 was that the contributions and expenditures of voluntarily financed funds did not violate that provision.
political educational activities, including "get out the vote" drives, but were not directly contributed to any candidate or political committee. Thus, PAC had limited its direct contributions in federal campaigns to primaries, to which the Act at the time expressly did not apply, and restricted its activities in the elections themselves to so-called "expenditures," rather than "contributions." The Senate Special Committee on Campaign Expenditures concluded in 1945 that, in these circumstances, there was "no clear-cut violation" by PAC of § 313 of the Corrupt Practices Act. S.Rep. No. 101, supra, at 23. Although there was agreement within the committee that § 313 should be extended to federal primaries and nominating conventions because of their importance in determining final election results, id. at 81-82, [ Footnote 13 ] there was disagreement on whether § 313 should also be amended to proscribe "expenditures" in addition to "contributions." A majority believed that it should not be, in part because the amendment "would tend to limit the rights of freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and freedom of assembly as guaranteed by the Federal Constitution." Id. at 83. [ Footnote 14 ] Senators Ball and Ferguson, who dissented from this conclusion, nevertheless conceded that even as to "expenditures"
"[i]f the Political Action Committee had been organized on a voluntary basis and obtained its funds from voluntary individual contributions from the beginning, there could be no quarrel with its activities or program and in fact, both are desirable in a democracy."
"[I]t seems to me the conditions are exactly parallel, both as to corporations and labor organizations. [An association of manufacturers] receiving corporation funds and using them in an election would violate the law, in my opinion, exactly as the PAC, if it got its fund from labor unions, would violate the law. If the labor people should desire to set up a political organization and obtain direct contributions for it, there would be nothing unlawful in that. If the National Association of Manufacturers, we will say, wanted to obtain individual contributions for a series of advertisements, and if it, itself, were not a corporation, then, just as in the case of PAC, it could take an active part in a political campaign."
copies of the newspaper, and the union can put such matters in the newspaper if it wants to. The union can separate the payment of dues from the payment for a newspaper if its members are willing to do so, that is, if the members are willing to subscribe to that kind of a newspaper. I presume the members would be willing to do so. A union can publish such a newspaper, or unions can do as was done last year, organize something like the PAC, a political organization, and receive direct contributions, just so long as members of the union know what they are contributing to, and the dues which they pay into the union treasury are not used for such purpose. "
matters. But the prohibition is against labor unions using their members' dues for political purposes, which is exactly the same as the prohibition against a corporation using its stockholders' money for political purposes, and perhaps in violation of the wishes of many of its stockholders."
Ibid. (emphasis added). See also id. at 6437, 6438.
view also reflected concern that a broader application of § 610 might raise constitutional questions of invasion of First Amendment freedoms, and he wished particularly to reassure colleagues who had reservations on that score and whose votes were necessary to override a predictable presidential veto, see 93 Cong.Rec. 7485, of the Labor Management Relations Act. [ Footnote 18 ] We conclude, accordingly, that his view of the limited reach of § 610, entitled, in any event, to great weight, is, in this instance, controlling. Cf. Newspaper Pub. Assn. v. NLRB, 345 U. S. 100 , 345 U. S. 106 -111 (1953); Bus Employees v. Wisconsin Board, 340 U. S. 383 , 340 U. S. 392 n. 15 (1951). We therefore hold that § 610 does not apply to union contributions and expenditures from political funds financed in some sense by the voluntary donations of employees. Cf. United States v. Auto Workers, 352 U.S. at 352 U. S. 592 ; United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. at 335 U. S. 123 .
made in accordance with the applicable banking laws and regulations, and in the ordinary course of business) to any candidate, campaign committee, or political party or organization, in connection with any election to any of the offices referred to in this section; but shall not include communications by a corporation to its stockholders and their families or by a labor organization to its members and their families on any subject; nonpartisan registration and 'get out the vote' campaigns by a corporation aimed at its stockholders and their families, or by a labor organization aimed at its members and their families; the establishment, administration, and solicitation of contributions to a separate segregated fund to be utilized for political purposes by a corporation or labor organization: Provided, That it shall be unlawful for such a fund to make a contribution or expenditure by utilizing money or anything of value secured by physical force, job discrimination, financial reprisals, or the threat of force, job discrimination, or financial reprisal; or by dues, fees, or other monies required as a condition of membership in a labor organization or as a condition of employment, or by monies obtained in any commercial transaction."
388 U. S. 175 , 388 U. S. 194 (1967); NLRB v. Drivers Local Union, 362 U. S. 274 , 362 U. S. 291 -292 (1960).
"Section 610 was violated [the Government explains] if in fact, the [Pipefitters] Fund was merely a subterfuge through which the union itself made proscribed political contributions, irrespective of whether the moneys so contributed were voluntarily given to the Fund by the contributors. . . . [T]he evidence that the payments were voluntary [was only a factor relevant] in determining if it was the union or the Fund as a separate entity that made the political contributions in question. . . ."
are effectively assessed, that is, solicited in circumstances inherently coercive. [ Footnote 26 ] Petitioners, on the other hand, contend that, to be valid, a political fund need not be distinct from the sponsoring union, and, further, that § 610 permits the union to exercise institutional pressure, much as recognized charities do, in soliciting donations. See Brief for Petitioners 71, 73 n. 22.
We think that neither side fully and accurately portrays the attributes of legitimate political funds. We hold that such a fund must be separate from the sponsoring union only in the sense that there must be a strict segregation of its monies from union dues and assessments. [ Footnote 27 ] We hold, too, that, although solicitation by union officials is permissible, such solicitation must be conducted under circumstances plainly indicating that donations are for a political purpose, and that those solicited may decline to contribute without loss of job, union membership, or any other reprisal within the union's institutional power. Thus, we agree with the second half of the Government's position, but reject the first.
member. Whether the solicitation scheme is designed to inform the individual solicited of the political nature of the fund and his freedom to refuse support is, therefore, determinative.
"If the labor people should desire to set up a political organization and obtain direct contributions for it, there would be nothing unlawful in that, . . . just so long as members of the union know what they are contributing to, and the dues which they pay into the union treasury are not used for such purpose."
Supra at 407 U. S. 406 , 407 U. S. 407 .
taint of coercion or even any interference. We do not want any money except from those who want to see the reelection of Roosevelt. [ Footnote 30 ]"
operation after enactment of § 304 of the Labor Management Relations Act was that it be strictly financed by solicitations designed to result in knowing free choice donations.
"it shall be unlawful for such a fund to make a contribution or expenditure by utilizing money or anything of value secured by physical force, job discrimination, financial reprisals, or the threat of force, job discrimination, or financial reprisal; or by dues, fees, or other monies required as a condition of membership in a labor organization or as a condition of employment. . . ."
injury; and "dues, fees, or other monies required as a condition of membership in a labor organization or as a condition of employment" could be interpreted to mean only actual dues or assessments. But we think that the legislative history of § 205 establishes that "separate" is synonymous with "segregated"; that "threat" includes the creation of an appearance of an intent to inflict injury even without a design to carry it out; and that "dues, fees, or other monies required as a condition of membership in a labor organization or as a condition of employment" includes contributions effectively assessed, even if not actually required for employment or union membership.
"Nothing in this section shall preclude an organization from establishing and administering a separate contributory fund for any political purpose . . . . if all contributions, gifts, or payments to such fund are made freely and voluntarily, and are unrelated to dues, fees, or other moneys required as a condition of membership in such organization or as a condition of employment."
"in a truly voluntary manner, and without the employment of the kinds of threats or reprisals or other methods that are prohibited by this amendment."
is that intended by those who contribute to be used for political purposes, and not money diverted from another source."
Ibid. No one at that time disputed that the Crane and Hansen provisions were the same in these respects in codifying prior law.
After the conference committee had adopted the Hansen amendment, however, Crane inserted in the record a Wall Street Journal article suggesting that the Hansen amendment had been inspired by the AFL-CIO to overrule the Court of Appeals decision in this case by authorizing a union political fund even if it is not separate and distinct from the sponsoring union, and by altering the test of voluntariness to focus on the absence of force, rather than on the contributor's intent to make a donation of his own free and knowing choice. See 118 Cong.Rec. 323-324. [ Footnote 38 ] Crane did not significantly elaborate on the article or specifically endorse each of the particular points it made.
"amendment is consistent with the position taken by the Justice Department in the brief it filed with the U.S. Supreme Court in the Pipefitters case [which charged that the contributions to the Pipefitters fund 'were assessed by the union as part of its dues structure'] . . . ,"
"amendment is also consistent with the provisions of the so-called Crane amendment dealing with the legality of a separate, voluntary political fund."
"[A]s Senator DOMINICK stated, speaking in support of an amendment to section 610 he offered to the other body, the general view is that: "
" If a member wishes to pay money voluntarily to a candidate or to a labor organization fund for a candidate or even to a fund which the union will determine how it is to be spent, I have no objections."
"[117 Cong.Rec. 29329. [ Footnote 40 ]]"
making explicit what is implicit in the Crane amendment -- that unions and corporations may solicit contributions to these funds as long as they do so without attempting to secure money through 'physical force, job discrimination, financial reprisals,' or the threat thereof. Thus, the Hansen amendment does not break new ground; it merely writes currently accepted practices into clear and explicit statutory language."
Id. at 329. Crane made no reply to these assertions.
We conclude from this legislative history that the term "separate" in the Hansen amendment is synonymous with "segregated." Nothing in the legislative history indicates that the word is to be understood in any other way. To the contrary, Hansen's comments in general explanation of his amendment support that interpretation, as does the use of the term in the Crane provision, with which, Hansen said, his amendment was consistent. Moreover, Hansen did not deny that his amendment departed from the Court of Appeals' insistence in the Pipefitters decision that a permissible political fund be separate and distinct from the sponsoring union; instead, he merely found his amendment consistent with the Government's argument before this Court that political contributions and expenditures cannot be made from dues or assessments. Finally, both the Crane and the Hansen amendments expressly authorize unions to establish and administer voluntary political funds. The Hansen amendment also expressly authorizes union officials to solicit contributions and, as the quoted statement of Senator Dominick indicates, further permits them to determine the disposition of the monies raised. In these circumstances, it is difficult to conceive how a valid political fund can be meaningfully "separate" from the sponsoring union in any way other than "segregated."
Similarly, we conclude that the term "threat" and the phrase "dues, fees, or other monies required as a condition of membership in a labor organization or as a condition of employment" must be read broadly to encompass solicitation schemes that do not make plain the political nature of the union fund and the freedom of the individual solicited to refuse to contribute without reprisal. The term and the phrase, in other words, include apparent, as well as actual, threats and dues or assessments, respectively. Again, Hansen's explanatory statements are all consistent with that interpretation. Even his observation that the law cannot "control the mental reaction" of a union member approached by a union official seems better taken simply as justification for allowing solicitation by union officials at all, rather than as condoning the use of tacit force or pressure. Moreover, if the Hansen amendment is to be construed, as Hansen indicated it should be, in pari materia with the Crane provision, it, too, must require that donations be made "freely and voluntarily." Likewise, if the amendment is meant, as Hansen said it was, to embrace the Government's position in this case, we merely implement his purpose by interpreting "dues, fees, or other monies required as a condition of membership in a labor organization or as a condition of employment" as including not only actual, but also effective, dues or assessments.
Construed as we have done, § 205 of the Federal Election Campaign Act does nothing more than accomplish the expressed purpose of its author -- that is, codify and clarify prior law. But since we have arrived at our interpretation without reference to prior law, § 205 once again throws on § 610, as embodied in § 304 of the Labor Management Relations Act, "a cross-light" that confirms our understanding of the law applicable to this prosecution.
personnel is concerned. Union personnel assigned to full-time Political Action Committee work have typically been transferred from the union to the Political Action Committee payroll. But the part-time Political Action Committee services of persons who are both union and Political Action Committee officers cannot be thus readily segregated."
In endorsing PAC in the enactment of § 304 of the Labor Management Relations Act, Congress clearly had in mind PAC's financial structure after July, 1944. Congress, therefore, may have considered that PAC's activities in the future could be financed only from voluntary donations separate from union dues and assessments, except for incidental expenses such as office space and part-time personnel. Alternatively, in view of the emphasis on protecting minority union interests and maintaining a strict segregation of funds, Congress may have thought that all of PAC's activities, including the costs of administration and solicitation of contributions, had to be paid for exclusively from voluntary contributions. The evidence is strong at least that Congress believed the costs of organization of new union political funds had to be financed in that way. See, e.g., S.Rep. No. 101, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 24 (1945) (statement by Sens. Ball and Ferguson, quoted supra at 407 U. S. 404 ).
"As a further safeguard [against the use of a compulsory fund for political purposes], the proviso also makes it a violation for such a fund to make a contribution or expenditure from money collected as dues or other fees required as a condition of membership or employment or obtained through commercial transactions. This insures that any money, service, or tangible item -- such as a typewriter, Xerox machine, and so forth -- provided to a candidate by such a fund must be financed by the voluntary political donations it has collected."
interests predominated [ Footnote 42 ] and "the interest of the minority [was] weakest. . . ." 117 Cong.Rec. 43380.
"At the present time, [Hansen summarized] there is broad agreement as to the essence of the proper balance in regulating corporate and union political activity required by sound policy and the Constitution. It consists of a strong prohibition on the use of corporate and union treasury funds to reach the general public in support of, or opposition to, Federal candidates, and a limited permission to corporations and unions, allowing them to communicate freely with members and stockholders on any subject, to attempt to convince members and stockholders to register and vote, and to make political contributions and expenditures financed by voluntary donations which have been kept in a separate segregated fund. This amendment writes that balance into clear and unequivocal statutory language."
Thus, § 205 may in one respect have impliedly repealed the substantive law relating to this prosecution. [ Footnote 43 ] But we need not now decide that question, because even if there has been such an implied repeal, it would not affect this prosecution for reasons to which we now turn.
"The principle involved is . . . not archaic, but rather is continuing and vital -- that the people are free to withdraw the authority they have conferred, and, when withdrawn, . . . the courts [cannot] assume the right to continue to exercise it."
obviate mere technical abatement such as that illustrated by the application of the rule in United States v. Tynen, 11 Wall. 88, decided in 1871. There, a substitution of a new statute with a greater schedule of penalties was held to abate the previous prosecution. In contrast, the Civil Rights Act works no such technical abatement. It substitutes a right for a crime. So drastic a change is well beyond the narrow language of amendment and repeal. It is clear, therefore, that, if the convictions were under a federal statute, they would be abated.
retains the basic offense -- contributions or expenditures by labor organizations in connection with federal elections are still forbidden so long as they are paid for from actual or effective dues or assessments. We therefore hold that, even if there has been an implied repeal of § 610, petitioners remain punishable under that provision. We turn now to determine whether the convictions below have been returned consistently with that law.
"The essential charge of the indictment and the theory on which the case was tried was that the [Pipefitters] Fund, although formally set up as an entity independent of Local 562, was, in fact, a union fund, controlled by the union, contributions to which were assessed by the union as part of its dues structure, collected from non-members in lieu of dues, and expended, when deemed necessary, for union purposes and the personal use of the directors of the Fund."
§ 610 that we have rejected in favor of the Government's narrower construction that the prerequisite for a permissible political fund is simply that it not be financed by actual or effective dues or assessments. See supra at 407 U. S. 413 -414. On the other hand, we find that the indictment may be read to allege not only that the Pipefitters fund was "a union fund, controlled by the union," but that "contributions to [it] were assessed by the union as part of its dues structure, [and were] collected from non-members in lieu of dues. . . ." For reasons that follow, however, we do not now construe the indictment as making this essential allegation, but leave that question open for determination on remand. We hold now only that the jury instructions failed to require proof of the essential element for conviction, and hence reverse the judgment below.
"The gist of the indictment is to allege that Section 610 . . . prohibits labor unions from forming parallel political organizations which receive voluntary contributions from the members of the union to be contributed and expended in Federal elections. Congress intended such political organizations to be legally authorized. Thus, the indictment fails to state an offense. . . ."
position that Section 610 . . . prohibits the members, officers, employees, agents, foremen and shop [stewards] of a union from establishing any political organization or fund for the purpose of making contributions and expenditures in connection with [federal] elections . . . [;] . . . whether it is the government's position and theory of the case that the alleged 'regular and systematic collection, receipt, and expenditures of money obtained from working members of Local 562 and from working members of other labor organizations employed under jurisdiction of the defendant Local 562' were voluntary or involuntary collections and contributions. [ Footnote 46 ]"
"[p]roof of the offense charged here does not depend upon whether the funds were volunteered or not by union members. The issue is whether these funds were the general funds of Local 562,"
id. at 56, which the indictment, in the Government's view, impliedly charged in alleging that petitioners " unlawfully, willfully and knowingly did conspire and agree with each other . . . to violate Section 610. . . .'" Id. at 54. The trial court overruled each of petitioners' motions without opinion.
truth and in fact, money belonging to Local 562."
"The failure of the indictment to allege that the payments to the fund were involuntary is not fatal. . . . If [the allegation that the money in the fund is in fact, Union money] is established by the evidence, the issue of whether the payment to the fund is voluntary or involuntary is not controlling."
"Of course, as observed by the [trial] court in its instructions, the issue of whether the payments to the fund were voluntary is relevant and material on the issue of whether the fund is the property of Local 562. Other considerations such as the intention of the donors as to ownership and control of the fund also bear upon the issue."
§ 610. The impressive lesson of that history in this regard is that the political contributions in issue violated § 610 if, and only if, payments to the fund were actually or effectively required for employment or union membership. In other words, the essence of the crime in this respect is whether the method of solicitation for the fund was calculated to result in knowing free choice donations. Whether the fund was otherwise controlled by the Union is immaterial.
whether the indictment should now be construed in light of the proceedings below to make this allegation is an altogether different question. [ Footnote 49 ] Since this precise question was not addressed below and has not been briefed or argued before us, and since the case must, in any event, be remanded, whereupon the issue may become moot, [ Footnote 50 ] we do not now undertake to decide it. Instead, in the event that the Government chooses to proceed with the indictment before us, petitioners shall have leave to renew their motion to dismiss.
"was in fact, a union fund, . . . the money therein was union money, and . . . the real contributor to the candidates was the union. . . . In determining whether the Pipefitters Voluntary Fund was a bona fide fund, separate and distinct from the union or a mere artifice or device,"
"A great deal of evidence has been introduced on the question of whether the payments into the Pipefitters Voluntary . . . Fund by members of Local 562 and others working under its jurisdiction were voluntary or involuntary. This evidence is relevant for your consideration, along with all other facts and circumstances in evidence, in determining whether the fund is a union fund. However, the mere fact that the payments into the fund may have been made voluntarily by some or even all of the contributors thereto does not, of itself, mean that the money so paid into the fund was not union money. "
"the issue of whether the payments to the fund were voluntary is relevant and material [but not determinative] on the issue of whether the fund is the property of Local 562."
Supra at 407 U. S. 438 .
The judgment of the Court of Appeals as to petitioners Callanan and Lawler is vacated, and the case is remanded to the District Court with directions to dismiss the indictment against them. See n 11, supra. The judgment of the Court of Appeals as to petitioners Local 562 and Seaton is reversed, and the case is remanded to the District Court for proceedings as to them consistent with this opinion.
"If two or more persons conspire . . . to commit any offense against the United States . . . and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both."
"If, however, the offense, the commission of which is the object of the conspiracy, is a misdemeanor only, the punishment for such conspiracy shall not exceed the maximum punishment provided for such misdemeanor."
"1. That at all times hereinafter mentioned defendant Pipefitters Local Union No. 562, St. Louis, Missouri, (hereinafter referred to as Local 562), affiliated with the United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipe Fitting Industry of the United States and Canada, AFL-CIO (hereinafter referred to as the United Association), was a labor organization within the meaning of Section 610 of Title 18, United States Code, that is to say, an organization in which employees participated and which existed, in part, for the purpose of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work."
"3. That from on or about October 12, 1966, up to and including the date of the filing of this indictment, defendant Lawrence L. Callanan was an officer of defendant Local 562."
"4. That at all times hereinafter mentioned defendant John L. Lawler was an officer of defendant Local 562."
"5. That at all times hereinafter mentioned, defendant George Seaton was an officer of defendant Local 562."
"7. That at all times hereinafter mentioned, the Pipefitters Voluntary, Political, Educational, Legislative, Charity and Defense Fund (hereinafter the Fund), was a fund of defendant Local 562, established, maintained, and administered by officers, employees, members, agents, foremen and job stewards of defendant Local 562, to effect a regular and systematic collection, receipt, and expenditure of moneys obtained from working members of defendant Local 562 and from working members of other labor organizations employed under the jurisdiction of defendant Local 562."
"9. That from in or about 1963 and continuously thereafter up to and including the date of the filing of this indictment, in the City of St. Louis, in the Eastern District of Missouri and elsewhere, Local 562, Lawrence L. Callanan, John L. Lawler and George Seaton, the defendants herein, and John F. Burke and Edward J. Steska, named herein as coconspirators but not as defendants, unlawfully, willfully and knowingly did conspire and agree with each other and with divers other persons to the grand jurors unknown, to violate Section 610 of Title 18, United States Code in that they did unlawfully, willfully, and knowingly conspire and agree to have Local 562 make contributions and expenditures in connection with elections at which Presidential and Vice Presidential electors or United States Senators and Representatives to Congress were to be voted for, and to willfully consent to the making of such contributions and expenditures by Local 562."
"10. It was a part of said conspiracy that the defendants and coconspirators would establish and maintain a special fund entitled 'Pipefitters Voluntary Political, Educational, Legislative, Charity and Defense Fund,' which fund would have the appearance of being a wholly independent entity, separate and apart from Local 562; and that the defendants and coconspirators would thereby conceal the fact that Local 562 would make contributions and expenditures in connection with elections at which Presidential and Vice Presidential electors or United States Senators and Representatives to Congress were to be voted for."
"11. It was further a part of the conspiracy that defendant John L. Lawler would be Director of the Fund and that, at a certain time he would be succeeded as Director of the Fund by defendant Lawrence L. Callanan; and that the Director of the Fund would appear to have control and management of the Fund, including the receipt and disbursement of money and the keeping of its books."
"12. It was further a part of the conspiracy that defendants John L. Lawler and Lawrence L. Callanan would not have the books of the Fund audited, or afford members of defendant Local 562 and other pipefitters contributing to the Fund any accounting for the money on hand, paid into or disbursed from the Fund."
"13. It was further a part of the conspiracy that the defendants and coconspirators, by means of the creation and operation of the Fund, would continue in new form the practice of collecting for political purposes One Dollar ($1.00) per day worked from members of defendant Local 562 and Two Dollars ($2.00) per day worked from non-member pipefitters employed on jobs within the jurisdiction of defendant Local 562."
"14. It was further a part of the conspiracy that the defendants and coconspirators would waive and fail to enforce Section 180 of the Constitution of the United Association in order to facilitate the payment of monies into the Fund, by failing to collect from non-members of Local 562, working under its jurisdiction, a required travel card fee of not in excess of Eight Dollars ($8.00) per month, and in lieu thereof, collecting payments to the Fund at the rate of Two Dollars ($2.00) per eight-hour working day from such non-members."
"15. It was further a part of the conspiracy that the defendants and coconspirators would cause general foremen, area foremen, job stewards, officers, agents, employees and other members of Local 562 acting in a supervisory capacity over members and pipefitters working on jobs under the jurisdiction of Local 562, to become agents of the Fund in order to facilitate the collection of monies for the Fund on a regular basis on job sites and at the headquarters of Local 562, 1242 Pierce Avenue, St. Louis, Missouri."
"16. It was further a part of the conspiracy that the defendants and coconspirators, in order to facilitate an orderly, regular and systematic collection of contributions to the Fund, would cause the agents of the Fund referred to in paragraph 15 of this Indictment to distribute to the pipefitters working at all job sites contribution agreement cards to be signed by such pipefitters, and to distribute to foremen and job stewards at such job sites printed collection sheets for the Fund upon which to record the number of hours worked by such pipefitters and the amount of the contributions paid by each into the Fund; and that such foremen or job stewards would advise newly employed pipefitters at such job sites of the existence of the Fund and of the rates of participation, that is, for members of Local 562, One Dollar ($1.00) per eight hours worked; and after January 1, 1965, Fifty Cents ($.50) per eight hours worked, and for members of other pipefitter locals Two Dollars ($2.00) per eight hours worked."
"17. It was further a part of the conspiracy that defendant Local 562 would make substantial contributions in connection with the 1964 General Election and the 1966 General Election and that defendants Lawrence L. Callanan and John L. Lawler would consent to such contributions by issuing checks drawn upon the account of the Fund in the approximate total amount of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars ($150,000)."
"It was undisputed that contributions to the Fund were routinely made at regular intervals at job sites; that they were routinely collected by union stewards, foremen, area foremen, general foremen, or other agents of the union; that they were determined by a formula based upon the amount of hours or overtime hours worked upon a job under the jurisdiction of the union; that they were at one rate for 562 members and at a different rate for members of other unions; that they began, continued and terminated with employment on a job under the jurisdiction of the union; that monies of the Fund were used to provide benefits to union members [as well as to make political contributions]; that non-members were not charged any dues and assessments, including travel card dues in the amount of eight dollars per month; that monies of the Fund were used in part to promote activities permitted to the union by its Constitution and by laws; that contributions to the Fund were only requested and received from Journeyman Pipefitters working on jobs under the jurisdiction of Local 562, and not from any other classes of persons or organizations; that expenditures from the Fund were under the control of its director, who was also the principal officer of the union; and that records used in the collection of the contributions to the Fund were similar to those employed from time to time by the union in the collection of its regular dues and assessments."
"It would appear to be unrealistic to believe that such a large number of workmen would make such substantial voluntary contributions to be used for political purposes unless they felt that their job security required them so to do."
434 F.2d 1116, 1122 (1970).
It also appears that the costs of administration of the fund, including the solicitation of contributions, were to some extent, though by no means entirely, similarly financed. See, e.g., App. 17 (indictment apparently charging fund disbursements to pay for authorization cards, see n 6, infra and collection sheets); 95-96, 99, 513 (one-time fund employee continuing to assist in fund bookkeeping activities in evenings and on Saturdays while on Union welfare fund payroll); 107-111 (another employee assisting in fund bookkeeping and collection activities while on Union welfare fund payroll before becoming full-time fund employee); 154 passim (Union agent collecting contributions on union time); 787 (Callanan never on Union and fund payrolls at same time).
"I, the undersigned, of my own free will and accord, desire to make regular contributions to the Political, Education, Legislative, Charity and Defense Fund which has been established and will be maintained by persons who are members of Local Union No. 562."
"I, therefore, agree to hereafter contribute ___% per 8-hour day to said fund and authorize my contributions to be used and expended by those in charge of the fund, in their sole judgment and discretion, for political, educational, legislative, charity and defense purposes."
"I understand that contributions are voluntary on my part and that I may revoke this agreement by a written notice to that effect mailed to the fund or to persons in charge thereof. I also understand that my contributions are no part of the dues or financial obligations of Local Union No. 562 and that the Union has nothing whatsoever to do with this fund."
See App. 171-172; 189-190; 239-240,244-245; 256,259-260; 299, 311; 322-323; 347; 359-361, 363-365; 382-384; 404, 411; 446; 460; 481-483; 529; 541, 543; 554-555; 561-562; 566, 570-571; 572-573; 577-578; 581; 584-585; 593-594; 600-602, 606; 617; 633-634; 641; 653; 659; 663; 669; 685, 689; 694; 700-702; 705; 710; 715; 718; 723; 731; 752-753; 766; 835; 840; 845-847; 850; 854; 858; 860; 865-866; 869, 871; 872; 875; 877; 887; 889; 894; 902; 915; 919; 925; 930; 944, 947; 948; 953; 956; 962. The only contrary evidence was the testimony of William Copeland, id. at 194-213, a non-562 member who was laid off from a job two days after refusing to contribute when the Union steward explained that everyone had to pay. A coworker, however, who was also a non-562 member, but paid his contributions, was discharged at the same time, and although he was shortly thereafter put on another 562 job, Copeland did not return to the Union hiring hall for further work. Moreover, Copeland acknowledged on cross-examination that he had "strong feelings" against Local 562 not only because of the political fund, but because of an earlier dismissal at another job involving a jurisdictional dispute between 562 and his own union.
"Q. Was it of any concern to you as to what the members who were being solicited thought about it, the atmosphere in which the solicitation was made, was that of any concern to you?"
"A. None, because it made no difference as a matter of law and as a matter of procedure. I would have no way of knowing what assumptions people reach. I have no way of knowing what people think. My concern is what was said, what was done, and how it was done."
"Q. Well, in your opinion to [the organizers of the fund] did you not make it clear that in no way should it appear compulsory to the members who were asked to contribute?"
"A. No, sir, I did no such thing. I simply told them that the contributions must not be made a condition of employment or a condition of Union membership, and that was the extent of my advice to them on what they must do, what they must not do, and how they should do it."
"You will note that Section 610 prohibits contributions by labor organizations for use in connection with an election for a federal office. It does not prohibit any person from making or agreeing to make such contributions or setting up an independent fund for such purpose separate and distinct from union funds either alone or in conjunction with others, simply because such person happens to be a member of a labor organization. That is, the statute is not violated unless the contribution is in fact, and in the final analysis made by the labor organization."
"In this case, evidence was offered by the Government to the effect that funds were contributed to or on behalf of candidates for federal office and that such funds were paid out upon checks drawn upon the Pipefitters Voluntary Political, Educational, Legislative Charity and Defense Fund. It is necessary, therefore, that the evidence establish that the Pipefitters . . . Fund was in fact, a union fund, that the money therein was union money, and that the real contributor to the candidates was the union. As to this issue, the defendants contend that the fund in question was a bona fide entity separate and apart from the union, established by the voluntary good faith act of members of the pipefitters Local 562 and others, from which contributions to candidates were made on behalf of the persons who created the fund and not on behalf of the union. On the other hand, the Government contends that the fund was a mere artifice or device set up by the defendant and others as a part of the alleged conspiracy to give the outward appearance of being an independent and separate entity, but, in fact, constituting a part of union funds. "
"In determining whether the Pipefitters Voluntary Fund was a bona fide fund, separate and distinct from the union or a mere artifice or device, you should take into consideration all the facts and circumstances in evidence, and, in such consideration, you may consider"
"1. Whether or not payments to the fund were routinely made at regular intervals at job sites,"
"2. Whether or not payments to the fund were routinely collected by union stewards, foremen, area foremen, general foremen, or other agents of the union,"
"3. Whether or not the payment to the fund was determined by a formula based upon the amount of hours or overtime hours worked upon a job under the supervision of the union,"
"4. Whether or not payments to the fund were at one rate for 562 members and at a different rate for members of other unions,"
"5. Whether or not payments to the fund began, continued and terminated with employment on a job under the jurisdiction of the union,"
"6. Whether or not. monies of the fund were used to provide benefits to union members in their capacity as members,"
"7. Whether or not payments to the fund by members of other unions were in lieu of payments to the union in the form of travel card dues in the amount of eight. dollars per month,"
"8. Whether or not monies of the fund were used in part to promote activities properly permitted to the union pursuant to Section 2.05 of its Constitution and by laws,"
"9. Whether or not payments to the fund were made by those affiliated with the union to the general exclusion of other classes of persons or organizations,"
"10. Whether or not contributions to the fund were required as a condition of employment or continued employment or membership in Local 562,"
"11. Whether or not the individuals who contributed to said fund signed a voluntary contribution agreement,"
"12. Whether or not the contributions to said fund were made voluntarily or involuntarily,"
"13. Whether or not the monies contributed to said fund were kept separate and distinct from the funds of Local 562,"
"14. Whether or not some persons who worked under the jurisdiction of Local 562 did not contribute to said fund,"
"15. Whether or not the monies of said fund were used in part to promote activities which were prohibited to Local 562 by its Constitution and by laws,"
"16. Whether or not said fund was established and maintained pursuant to the advice of counsel,"
"17. Whether or not the monies of said fund were reported to the Department of Labor on the LM-2 forms, which required the reporting of monies of Local 562,"
"18. Whether or not expenditures from the fund were under the control of the union and its officers,"
"19. Whether or not records used in the collection of the payments to the fund are similar to those employed from time to time by the union in the collection of its regular dues and assessments."
"If upon consideration of all the facts and circumstances in evidence you find that the contributions to the candidates for federal office for political purposes were in fact, made out of union funds by the union, and that the individual defendants as officers of the union, willfully consented thereto, then you may take this fact into consideration together with other facts in evidence in determining whether there was a prior understanding or agreement so to do."
"A great deal of evidence has been introduced on the question of whether the payments into the Pipefitters Voluntary Political, Educational, Legislative, Charity and Defense Fund by members of Local 562 and others working under its jurisdiction were voluntary or involuntary. This evidence is relevant for your consideration, along with all other facts and circumstances in evidence, in determining whether the fund is a union fund. However, the mere fact that the payments into the fund may have been made voluntarily by some or even all of the contributors thereto does not, of itself, mean that the money so paid into the fund was not union money."
"Does § 205 of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 [P.L. 92-225] affect the decision in this case, and, if so, with what result? More particularly, does § 205 effect a substantive change in 18 U.S.C. § 610 in any way material to this case, as, for example, by altering any of the attributes of permissible union political organizations, such as the method of organization or administration or the method of solicitation or collection of contributions? If so, must this prosecution abate under the doctrine of United States v. The Schooner Peggy, 1 Cranch 103, and its progeny? Or does the federal saving statute, 1 U.S.C. § 109, nullify any abatement of the prosecution? In answering the latter question, what effect should be given to Hamm v. Rock Hill, 379 U. S. 306 ?"
"The crime charged in this case requires proof of specific intent before a defendant can be convicted. . . . To establish specific intent the Government must prove that the defendant knowingly, willfully and purposely did an act which the law forbids. . . ."
"An act is done 'knowingly' if done voluntarily and with knowledge of the facts, and not because of mistake or inadvertence or other innocent reason."
" An act is done 'willfully' if done voluntarily and purposely and with the specific intent to do that which the law forbids; that is to say, with bad purpose either to disobey or to disregard the law. "
"An act is done 'unlawfully' if done contrary to law."
App. 1110 (emphasis added). See also id. at 1116 (instruction on good faith belief in legality of object of conspiracy). In view of this instruction the jury's special finding may well have been inconsistent with its general verdict, but that, we hold, could require only reversal, not acquittal.
The dissent declines to accept this agreement of the parties on the ground that the language of § 610 is so clear on its face that there is no warrant for turning to the legislative history of the provision. The contrary is plainly true: Section 610 wholly fails to specify what funds a labor organization is barred from contributing or expending in connection with a federal election. Moreover, as we shall shortly see, the dissent's "facial" interpretation of § 610 was expressly rejected by its proponents in 1947, both from concern that it would raise constitutional questions of invasion of First Amendment freedoms, and in an effort to ensure enactment of the law. In addition, Congress has only recently in the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 decisively rejected that interpretation on the basis of the very legislative history found dispositive herein. See n 20, infra. Congress in 1947 and again only a few months ago was able to come to this conclusion solely because of the facial ambiguity of the provision.
It is also worth noting that the dissent's own analysis reveals the necessity for resorting to the legislative history of the statute. The dissent, too, appreciates "the freedom of union members, as well as that of employees and stockholders of corporations to make uncoerced political contributions." If that is so, it obviously becomes imperative to determine the contours of that freedom, which, in turn, requires investigation of the legislative history of § 610.
See also H.R.Rep. No. 2093, 78th Cong., 2d Sess., 9 (1945); S.Rep. No. 1, pt. 2, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 36 (1947). But see H.R.Rep. No. 2739, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 46-47 (1946).
The Senate committee did recommend that the use of general union funds to finance the distribution of a political pamphlet in connection with a federal election be prosecuted as a test case to determine the scope of the term "contribution" in § 313. S.Rep. No. 101, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 57-59 (1945).
"The CIO Political Action Committee is a committee of the Congress of Industrial Organizations and, as such, under the Corrupt Practices Act, is likewise as a labor union prohibited [from] making any contribution in connection with any election at which a Representative to Congress is to be elected."
"The committee feels that whether or not the activities carried on by these organizations and the payment of salaries to men known as organizers or advisers who go into the congressional districts and actively assist in local campaign activities, and expenditures for radio time, newspaper advertising, printing and distribution of handbills and posters, and for transportation of voters, constitute violations of the letter of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act, they certainly constitute violations of the spirit and intent of the law and the [Act] should be so amended as to clearly and distinctly set out that such activities are prohibited."
The Senate committee studying the 1946 campaign joined this recommendation, but without any reference to PAC. See S.Rep. No. 1, pt. 2, supra, n 13, at 38-39. See also H.R.Rep. No. 2093, supra, n 13, at 9, 10-11 (noting the controversy over the scope of the term "contribution" and expressing views seemingly sympathetic with prohibiting "expenditures").
See H.R.Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 46 (1947); 93 Cong.Rec. 3428, 3522-3523 (1947); H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 67-68 (1947). See also 93 Cong.Rec. 6389 (critical remarks of Rep. Sabath following the conference committee report). The only statement offering a rationale for § 304 was made by Representative Robsion after the House had voted to override President Truman's veto of the Act. Robsion stressed that it was unfair to union members to allow the expenditure of union funds in support of candidates for federal office whom they opposed. See 93 Cong.Rec. 7492.
"You also point out [the Attorney General wrote] that committees composed of members of unions are engaged in the solicitation of funds from individual union members, and you assert that committees of this kind 'are as much a labor organization as a union organization itself.' This contention is inconsistent with the provisions of the statute. In amending section 313 of the Corrupt Practices Act, the [War Labor Disputes Act] provided that, for the purposes of the amendment the words 'labor organization' should have the same meaning they have under the National Labor Relations Act. . . . I think it clear that committees of the kind that you describe are not labor organizations within the meaning of this definition, and they would not be recognized as bargaining agencies by the National Labor Relations Board. Even if it were true that these committees were identical with the labor organizations to which their members belong -- which I believe not to be the fact -- there would still be no violation of law because the statute applies to contributions made by labor organizations and in this case the contributions are made by individuals and not by the committees. "
See, e.g., 93 Cong.Rec. 6448, 6522-6523 (exchange between Sen. Pepper, who, in opposing § 304, decried it as Republican legislation in contravention of the First Amendment, and Sen. Ellender, who, as a Democratic representative on the conference committee, rose in support of Sen. Taft's construction). See also United States v. CIO, 335 U. S. 106 , 335 U. S. 120 (1948).
The exception involved whether nonpartisan registration and "get out the vote" campaigns could be directed to the public at large. See 117 Cong.Rec. 43379-43381, 43390.
Id. at 43379. See also 118 Cong.Rec. 329. In determining that § 610 has always permitted unions to organize voluntarily financed political funds, Hansen relied, as we have done, on Sen. Taft's floor explanation of § 304 of the Hartley bill. See 117 Cong.Rec. 43381; 118 Cong.Rec. 329.
See, e.g., 117 Cong.Rec. 43381 (remarks of Rep. Hays), 43383-43385 (remarks of Rep. Thompson), 43388-43389 (remarks of Reps. Steiger and Gude).
See, e.g., 117 Cong.Rec. 43382, 43386, 43390-43391; 118 Cong.Rec. 323-324.
See, e.g., id. at 43389-43390 (remarks of Rep. Devine).
"As used in this section, the phrase 'contribution or expenditure' shall include any direct or indirect payment, distribution, loan, advance, deposit, or gift, of money, or any services, or anything of value to any candidate, compaign [ sic ] committee, or political party or organization, in connection with any election to any of the offices referred to in this section, including any expenditure in connection with 'get out the vote' activities. Nothing in this section shall preclude an organization from establishing and administering a separate contributory fund for any political purpose, including voter registration or 'get out the vote drives,' if all contributions, gifts, or payments to such fund are made freely and voluntarily, and are unrelated to dues, fees, or other moneys required as a condition of membership in such organization or as a condition of employment. "
"[I]t is important that we understand neither the Crane amendment nor the Hansen amendment is directed toward voluntary or COPE [the successor of PAC] moneys. What we are talking about is Treasury money. The principal distinction is that the Hansen amendment would allow its use to 'get-out-the-vote' drives for union members while the Crane amendment would not."
Following the conference committee report, Crane rose once again in opposition to the Hansen amendment, this time, and for the first time, criticizing the amendment in its treatment of union political funds. The dispute centered then, however, not on whether voluntary funds were permissible, but on exactly what their prerequisites were. See infra at 407 U. S. 422 -426.
"A union member [the Government explains] may find irresistible the union's demand -- through its steward on the jobsite -- for contributions fixed as a regular percentage of days worked and money earned. Section 610 reduces this institutional pressure by forbidding the unions from making direct political contributions from money that is effectively assessed."
Brief for the United States 38. As we shall see, infra at 407 U. S. 435 -442, the Government's theory in prosecuting this case focused on the first, but not the second, of its arguments here presented.
For the scope of the required segregation of funds, see infra at 407 U. S. 428 -432.
"The statute itself . . . does not provide an exception when stockholders consent. We are of the opinion that Congress intended to insure against officers proceeding in such matters without obtaining the consent of shareholders by forbidding all such expenditures."
"The Supreme Court stated that the other legislative motivation [in addition to the protection of minority interests] for enactment of legislation such as section 610 was the necessity for destroying the influence over elections which corporations exercised through financial contributions. [ United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. at 335 U. S. 113 .] This consideration would be meaningless if a corporation could make expenditures for activities otherwise forbidden by section 610 by simply obtaining unanimous consent of its shareholders. In the Auto Workers case, the indictment contained no allegation that the expenditure of union funds [to finance television broadcasts designed to influence the electorate at large] was contrary to the wish of members. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court found the indictment sufficient."
"'that the fund used came from the Union's dues, was not obtained by voluntary political contributions or subscriptions from members of the Union, and was not paid for by advertising or sales.'"
In Auto Workers, therefore, we had no occasion to address the legitimacy of union controlled political contributions financed from the knowing free choice donations of union members. More important, the court in Lewis labored under the same misapprehension on which the Government's argument rests here -- namely, that the legislative purpose to eliminate the effects of aggregated wealth on federal elections reaches union- or corporation-controlled contributions and expenditures financed not from the general treasury, but from voluntary donations.
By saying this, we do not mean to suggest that the result in Lewis was incorrect. To the contrary, an indictment that alleges a contribution or expenditure from the general treasury of a union or corporation in connection with a federal election states an offense. See nn. 47 and | 47 and S. 385fn48|>48, infra. The unanimous vote of the union members or stockholders may at most (but we need not now decide) be a defense.
In United States v. CIO, this Court, of course, went further than Senator Taft's comments would allow by holding that § 304 did not bar a union from using union funds to publish a periodical, in regular course and for distribution to those accustomed to receiving it, that urged union members to vote for a candidate for Congress. The Court, however, arrived at that construction because the contrary interpretation would create "the gravest doubt" of the statute's constitutionality. 335 U.S. at 335 U. S. 121 .
Hearings before the House Committee to Investigate Campaign Expenditures on H.Res. 551, 78th Cong., 2d Sess., 79 (1944). See also id. at 16-17. PAC's method of collection of contributions appears, in large measure, to have been true to Hillman's words, since both its political and voluntary nature were well known. See id. at 51, 76-79, 712-713, 728-729, 800-801, 822-823, 844-845, 851, 864-866, 871, 880, 885-886, 921-925, 928, 935-936, 941, 946, 962, 964, 988, 999, 1017, 1021-1031, 1033-1038, 1041. In some instances complaints were lodged that pressure had been exercised in obtaining donations, and the House Committee noted in its report that in California some PAC monies were taken directly from union treasuries and "that at least one local union . . . , upon vote by its entire membership, levied an assessment of 25 cents per month upon each member. . . ." H.R.Rep. No. 2093, supra, n 13, at 6. This, nevertheless, was recognized as an exception "[to] the general national plan" following Roosevelt's nomination for reelection, under which PAC was generally financed by individual contributions "largely . . . taken by shop stewards outside working hours." Id. at 5. Indeed, the amount of individual contributions actually collected by PAC evidences that it successfully informed CIO members that donations were not mandatory assessments. Cf. L. Overacker, Presidential Campaign Funds 61 (1946). From an estimated CIO membership of five million, PAC might have collected $5 million at the requested rate of $1 a member. Yet the national PAC office, which received 50Ë˜ of each $1 donated, obtained only $376,910.77 in 1944, S Rep. No. 101, supra, n 14, at 23, suggesting contributions by less than 800,000 CIO members. See also H.R.Rep. No. 2739, supra, n 13, at 31 ($218,415.98 received in 1946).
See infra at 407 U. S. 428 -429.
Indeed, in a letter to regional PAC directors, the national PAC office itself referred to the organization "as an instrumentality of the Congress of Industrial Organizations." S.Rep. No. 101, supra, n 14, at 22. See also Hearing before the Senate Special Committee to Investigate Presidential, Vice Presidential, and Senatorial Campaign Expenditures on S.Res. 263, 78th Cong., 2d Sess., 19 (1944) (testimony of Sidney Hillman) ("We just speak and act for the C.I.O. organizations"); House Hearings, supra, n 30, at 839-840 (testimony of state PAC president) (local PAC is agent of union local). It is true that Senator Taft stated at one point in the Senate debates that "[t]he PAC is a separate organization which raises its own funds for political purposes, and does so perfectly properly." 93 Cong.Rec. 6437 (1947) (emphasis added). But if meant to indicate anything more than that PAC had a formal identity separate from the CIO, this isolated statement was clearly inconsistent with well known facts about the organization. Moreover, neither Taft nor any of his colleagues appears to have attached any particular significance to the statement. Nor can we, in view of Taft's endorsement of direct union electioneering through political newspapers paid for through subscriptions. See supra at 407 U. S. 406 -408, 407 U. S. 416 -417. It is also true that the Attorney General, in his letter to Senator Moore in 1944, opined that committees like PAC were not "labor organizations" within the meaning of the War Labor Disputes Act, inasmuch as they were not bargaining agencies. See n 17, supra. But the Senate Campaign Expenditures Committee, implicitly in 1945, and the House Committee, expressly in 1946, rejected that conclusion. See S.Rep. No. 101, supra, n 14, at 23; H.R.Rep. No. 2739, supra, n 13, at 43 (quoted in n 15, supra ). See also House Hearings, supra, n 30, at 27 (whether PAC was a "labor organization" "highly debatable" in opinion of PAC counsel).
"The relationship between the Political Action Committee and the Congress of Industrial Organizations is . . . close on every level of organization. Mr. Hillman is president of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, as well as chairman of the Political Action Committee. The State political action committees typically utilize the existing mechanism of the Congress of Industrial Organizations State councils, and the local political action committees are similarly set up as committees of the Congress of Industrial Organizations locals."
The national PAC organization did not endorse senatorial, congressional, state, or local candidates, but gave advice to state and local political action committees in that regard. The national organization did endorse President Roosevelt on May 17, 1944, when, in the words of Sidney Hillman, "substantially all of the C.I.O. international unions and the great majority of its State councils had already acted. . . ." House Hearings, supra, n 30, at 8. The national organization also endorsed Vice President Truman. Candidates for Congress were apparently chosen for endorsement by state or local PAC committees composed of representatives of the international CIO unions after review of incumbents' voting records in consultation with the regional PAC offices. See S.Rep. No. 101, supra, n 14, at 21; Senate Hearing, supra, n 32, at 12-13, 20-22; House Hearings, supra, at 8, 39-41, 43-46, 709-712, 714-715, 725-728, 842-845, 896-898, 904, 906-908, 942-944, 949-950, 954-960, 977-979, 983-985, 993-995, 1001, 1003, 1006-1007. PAC's endorsement procedures were described in 1951 as follows: the chairman of the local political action committee, who was usually the union president, would consult with a prospective candidate together with a screening committee. If that committee acted favorably, the candidate would then be presented to the political action committee for a vote on formal endorsement. Any endorsement would then be reported to the constituent unions of the area PAC and to the state and national PAC offices, and activity in support of the candidate would get under way. J. Kroll, The CIO-PAC and How it Works, in The House of Labor 120, 122-123 (J. Hardman & M. Newfeld eds.1951).
"Although the political action committee of the CIO was separately organized, and in most cases its separate identity was scrupulously preserved, it is hard to escape the conclusion that it was the alter ego of the organization which inspired it. The circumstances under which it came into being, the 'interlocking of directorates' at the top, and the close cooperation at the local level all point in that direction."
"This fund [Hansen stated] must be separate from any union or corporate funds, and contributions must be voluntary. To insure that contributions are voluntary, the amendment prohibits the use by the separate political fund of any money or anything of value obtained by the use or threat of force, job discrimination, or financial reprisal, or by dues or fees, or other monies required as a condition of employment or membership in a labor organization. . . ."
"The essential prerequisite [Hansen said] for the validity of such political funds is that the contributions to them be voluntary. For that reason, the final section of this amendment makes it a violation of section 610 to use physical force, job discrimination, financial reprisals or the threat thereof, in seeking contributions. This is intended to insure that a solicitor for COPE or BIPAC [union political funds] cannot abuse his organizational authority in seeking political contributions. Of course, nothing can completely erase some residual effects on this score, any more than the law can control the mental reaction of a businessman asked for a contribution by an individual who happens to be his banker, or of a farmer approached by the head of his local farm organization. The proper approach, and the one adopted here, is to provide the strong assurance that a refusal to contribute will not lead to reprisals, and to leave the rest to the independence and good sense of each individual."
"[ignored the Court of Appeals decision in this case] that holds that labor can raise campaign cash only through voluntary funds that are 'separate and distinct' from the sponsoring union'"
asserted that, under the Hansen amendment, "union chiefs . . . wouldn't be required to tell members for what purpose the money [solicited] is going"; and quoted an Associate Deputy Attorney General as reporting the Government's position to be " that a contribution to a political fund [must] be not only "voluntary," in the sense of an absence of force, but also knowingly made.'"
"I will say to the gentleman that what he is saying will be the legitimate legislative history, and that what somebody down in the Department of Justice, some Assistant Attorney General's opinion [ see n 38, supra ], is worth exactly as much as the piece of paper it is printed on, no more and no less."
Compare Senate Hearing, supra, n 32, at 41 (regional PAC offices, to Sidney Hillman's knowledge, separate from CIO offices, as "we don't like them to mix their union business with political activities"), and House Hearings, supra, n 30, at 717, 901 (testimony of regional PAC directors) (regional office financed from national PAC headquarters), with House Hearings, id. at 717-718, 736, 841, 857-861, 867-868, 872 (overlapping use of offices on state and local level).
"[E]very organization should be allowed to take the steps necessary for its growth and survival. There is, of course, no need to belabor the point that Government policies profoundly affect both business and labor. . . . If an organization, whether it be the NAM, the AMA or the AFL-CIO, believes that certain candidates pose a threat to its wellbeing or the wellbeing of its members or stockholders, it should be able to get its views to those members or stockholders. As fiduciaries for their members and stockholders, the officers of these institutions have a duty to share their informed insights on all issues affecting their institution with their constituents. Both union members and stockholders have the right to expect this expert guidance."
This reasoning, of course, applies as well to solicitations for contributions to voluntary political funds.
"[I]t is a familiar doctrine that repeals by implication are not favored. When there are two acts on the same subject, the rule is to give effect to both if possible. But if the two are repugnant in any of their provisions, the latter act, without any repealing clause, operates, to the extent of the repugnancy, as a repeal of the first. . . ."
"[h]ere, there is no problem of inferring legislative intent, because Congress [in the House debates] clearly expressed its intention that pending prosecutions should not abate."
"Obviously, the members of the joint Senate-House conference committee were not concerned about the suggested effect of this amendment on pending cases. Nor were Members of the other body who approved the conference report by a voice vote. There is no reason for Members of this body to be concerned. This is much needed and meritorious legislation. I strongly urge an overwhelming vote of approval."
118 Cong.Rec. 329. More important, Hansen's view that this prosecution would continue was possibly premised, as we have seen, on a mistaken understanding of what § 610 previously provided in terms pertinent to this case. If his understanding was, in fact, mistaken, we would have to assume that Congress would intend the general rule of abatement "applicable as part of the background against which [it] acts," Hamm v. Rock Hill, 379 U. S. 306 , 379 U. S. 314 (1964), to prevail.
"In short, the case was tried on the theory that the fund here involved was not the kind of a fund which the amended statute permits, but was the kind of a fund which was, and still is, a violation of Section 610 -- a fund which, while ostensibly separate, was, in fact, a union fund, supported by money collected as union money and used, when deemed desirable, as general union funds."
Supplemental Brief for the United States 5 (emphasis in original).
These inquiries were addressed to paragraphs 7, 10, and 17 of the indictment, see n 2, supra. Comparable inquiries were generally leveled at other pertinent paragraphs of the indictment.
The court arrived at this conclusion on the basis of United States v. Lewis Food Co., supra, n 28, where the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit sustained an indictment under § 610 that failed to allege expressly that an expenditure by a corporation in connection with a federal election was financed from the general corporate treasury (or, as discussed in n 28, supra, that it was made against the wishes of an individual stockholder).
"In our opinion [the court there explained], the allegation in the indictment that the corporation made an 'expenditure' for the stated purpose necessarily infers [ sic ] an allegation that general corporate funds were used. Corporate expenditures normally come from a corporation's general funds, and not from some independent fund contributed by shareholders or otherwise obtained."
"It was a part of said conspiracy that the defendants . . . would establish and maintain a special fund . . . which fund would have the appearance of being a wholly independent entity, separate and apart from Local 562; and that the defendants . . . would thereby conceal the fact that Local 562 would make contributions and expenditures in connection with [federal] elections. . . ."
"It was further a part of the conspiracy that the defendants . . . would waive and fail to enforce Section 180 of the Constitution of the United Association in order to facilitate the payment of monies into the Fund by failing to collect from non-members of Local 562, working under its jurisdiction, a required travel card fee of not in excess of Eight Dollars ($8.00) per month, and, in lieu thereof, collecting payments to the Fund at the rate of Two Dollars ($2.00) per eight-hour working day from such non-members."
These allegations together, although not a model of clarity, might (but we do not now decide for the reasons stated in the text) constitute "a plain, concise and definite" statement, within the meaning of Rule 7(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, that the conspiracy included the actual or effective assessment of contributions to the Pipefitters fund as part of the Union's compulsory dues structure.
Compare, e.g., Hagner v. United States, 285 U. S. 427 (1932); United States v. Comyns, 248 U. S. 349 (1919), and Dunlop v. United States, 165 U. S. 486 (1897), with, e.g., United States v. Boston & M. R. Co., 380 U. S. 157 , 380 U. S. 159 n. 1 (1965), and Russell v. United States, 369 U. S. 749 (1962).
Although two of the petitioners died pending decision in this case, see n 11, supra, the Government may decide on remand to seek a new indictment against the remaining petitioners. The present indictment charges that the conspiracy continued up to the date of the indictment, May 9, 1968, and that an overt act was committed in furtherance of the conspiracy on July 14, 1967, in which case it does not appear that the five-year statute of limitations governing noncapital offenses has run. See 18 U.S.C. § 3282; Grunewald v. United States, 353 U. S. 391 , 353 U. S. 396 -397 (1957). See also United States v. Reisinger, 128 U. S. 398 (1888) (indictment valid, though returned after law repealed).
Petitioners offered seven instructions on "voluntariness." Two merely used the term without further definition, while others referred to whether the contributions constituted union dues or assessments or were made by the donors for political purposes. See App. 1096-1100. Hereafter, proper instructions on the question of voluntariness may be framed in terms of the application to the proofs of the language of § 205 of the Federal Election Campaign Act as herein construed. See supra at 407 U. S. 421 -427.
The Court of Appeals did not directly rule on the validity of the instructions because, in the majority's view petitioners had failed to preserve their objections on appeal. See 434 F.2d at 1125. See also id. at 1128 (Matthes, C.J., concurring). The dissent below makes a strong argument to the contrary, see id. at 1135 (Lay, J.), but we need not address the question, since the instructions were plainly erroneous, the claim of error was brought to the attention of the trial court, and we may notice a plain error not presented. See, e.g., Silber v. United States, 370 U. S. 717 (1962). See also 434 F.2d at 1130 (Heaney, J., dissenting), 1135 (Lay, J., dissenting).
the political life of this country. The holding, reversing a trend since 1907, opens the way for major participation in politics by the largest aggregations of economic power, the great unions and corporations. This occurs at a time, paradoxically, when public and legislative interest has focused on limiting -- rather than enlarging -- the influence upon the elective process of concentrations of wealth and power.
organization to make a contribution or expenditure in connection with"
tion. . . . tary donations of employees.
Ante at 407 U. S. 409 .
not found in the statutory language, which significantly changes the meaning of this Act of the Congress.
"This legislation seems to have been motivated by two considerations. First, the necessity for destroying the influence over elections which corporations exercised through financial contribution. Second, the feeling that corporate officials had no moral right to use corporate funds for contribution to political parties without the consent of the stockholders."
"Its legislative history indicates congressional belief that labor unions should then be put under the same restraints as had been imposed upon corporations. It was felt that the influence which labor unions exercised over elections through monetary expenditures should be minimized, and that it was unfair to individual union members to permit the union leadership to make contributions from general union funds to a political party which the individual member might oppose."
Id. at 335 U. S. 115 .
contributions from general union funds. It seems self-evident that both of these legislative purposes will be frustrated by the Court's holding that, despite the language of the statute forbidding union contributions, unions may now make political contributions and expenditures, provided only that the source of a fund is voluntary.
"There is substantial evidence to support a jury finding that the fund was not a bona fide separate and distinct entity but was, in fact, a device set up to circumvent the provisions of § 610, and that the fund constituted union money."
The majority opinion of this Court does not contest this view. It concludes, rather, that the jury was erroneously instructed, and that, accordingly the verdict and judgment must be set aside. If a new trial is held, the jury must be instructed in accordance with the Court's interpretation of § 610 that a union may lawfully make political contributions from a fund it collects and administers so long as the payments into it are voluntary.
It may be that the unions, by virtue of a system of collecting "political contributions" simultaneously with the collection of dues and regularizing such collections to the point where they are indistinguishable from dues, will be the primary beneficiaries. But the corporations are more numerous than the unions. They have millions of stockholders and hundreds of thousands of nonunion employees. Both unions and corporations have large financial resources. Today's interpretation of § 610 will enable a more direct and extensive political employment of these resources by both union and corporation.
By refusing to affirm the judgment below, the majority renders the ultimate fate of this litigation uncertain. If, on remand, the techniques of Local 562 should be sanctioned, other unions and corporations could easily follow Local 562 and obtain from members, employees, and shareholders a consent form attesting that the contribution (or withholding) is "voluntary." The trappings of voluntariness might be achieved while the substance of coercion remained. Union members and corporate employees might find themselves the objects of regular and systematized solicitation by the very agent which exercises direct control over their jobs and livelihood.
The only remaining requirement to meet the new standards is that the fund be separate from other union or corporate funds, although, under the majority's interpretation of § 205, it may be established and administered, and the contributions to it solicited, by the union or corporation with its own funds. Again, if Local 562 were to provide the standards, the separateness of such a fund need be nothing more than a separate ledger and bank account.
In sum, the opinion of the Court today, adopting an interpretation of § 610 at variance with its language and purpose, goes a long way toward returning unions and corporations to an unregulated status with respect to political contributions. This opening of the door to extensive corporate and union influence on the elective and legislative processes must be viewed with genuine concern. This seems to me to be a regressive step, as contrasted with the numerous legislative and judicial actions in recent years designed to assure that elections are indeed free and representative.
The alleged separate fund involved in this case was segregated only in the sense that there was a separate ledger and bank account. The Court of Appeals held that there was "substantial evidence to support a jury finding that the fund was not a bona fide separate and distinct entity." 434 F.2d 1116, 1121 (1970). The decision of the majority focuses attention on the issue of voluntariness, and gives little indication that a more realistic segregation of the fund is required.
"where a law is expressed in plain and unambiguous terms, whether those terms are general or limited, the legislature should be intended to mean what they have plainly expressed, and consequently no room is left for construction."
Lake County v. Rollins, 130 U. S. 662 , 130 U. S. 670 -671 (1889); Yates v. United States, 354 U. S. 298 , 354 U. S. 305 (1957); United States v. Standard Brewery, 251 U. S. 210 , 251 U. S. 217 (1920).
Even on the issue of voluntariness, which the Court of Appeals rightly found "relevant and material," though "not controlling," 434 F.2d at 1120, the evidence was impressive that the collection scheme was inherently coercive. Since Local 562 had consistently collected contributions to its political funds since 1949, "contributions" appear to have become a customary de facto condition to union membership or employment within Local 562's jurisdiction. Moreover, the regularity of these contributions -- week by week and year by year and each in the same amount as requested by the union -- seems suspiciously incompatible with the concept of free-will gifts.
My interpretation of the statute does not imply that no "separate fund" would be permissible. I recognize that, consistently with the statute (as amended by § 205), a union or corporation may be instrumental in establishing a political fund, provided it is a bona fide one -- separate and segregated from the union in a genuine, not merely formalistic, way. For example, such a fund might be managed by a separate nonprofit entity, with independent trustees not subservient to the union or corporate sponsor, who engage independent auditors, who make regular reports to contributors, and who provide realistic means by which contributors can express their preference as to political candidates or parties. Safeguards would be required to assure that contributions were not coerced, either directly or by means of an inherently coercive system or relationship. Such a bona fide fund would contrast quite sharply with that operated by Local 562, where there were no bylaws, no constitution, no independent trustees, no audit, no report to contributors, or other indications of genuine separateness or segregation, and where the union itself collected, operated, and expended the "contributions" in substantially the same manner as union dues and assessments.
I recognize, of course, that the recent enactment of § 205 of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 has supplemented and extended § 610 in defining permissible limits of union and corporate contributions. But § 205 still leaves intact the operative language of § 610 which explicitly proscribes political contributions by unions and corporations. The interpretative gloss today added unnecessarily on this language will result in rendering ineffectual the basic intention of the Congress to prevent the intrusion of corporate and union power into our political system.

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