Source: https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/362/60
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 00:29:03+00:00

Document:
Manuel D. TALLEY, Petitioner, v. STATE OF CALIFORNIA.
Argued: Jan. 13, 14, 1960.
Mr. A. L. Wirin, Los Angeles, Cal., for the petitioner.
Mr. Philip E. Grey, Los Angeles, Cal., for the respondent.
'(a) The person who printed, wrote, compiled or manufactured the same.
The Municipal Court held that the information printed on the handbills did not meet the requirements of the ordinance, found the petitioner guilty as charged, and fined him $10. The Appellate Department of the Superior Court of the County of Los Angeles affirmed the conviction, rejecting petitioner's contention, timely made in both state courts, that the ordinance invaded his freedom of speech and press in violation of the Fourteenth and First Amendments to the Federal Constitution. 2 172 Cal.App.2d Supp. 797, 332 P.2d 447. Since this was the highest state court available to petitioner, we granted certiorari to consider this constitutional contention. 360 U.S. 928, 79 S.Ct. 1457, 3 L.Ed.2d 1543.
In Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 58 S.Ct. 666, 82 L.Ed. 949, we held void on its face an ordinance that comprehensively forbade any distribution of literature at any time or place in Griffin, Georgia, without a license. Pamphlets and leaflects it was pointed out, 'have been historic weapons in the defense of liberty' 3 and enforcement of the Griffin ordinance 'would restore the system of license and censorship in its baldest form.' Id., 303 U.S. at page 452, 58 S.Ct. at page 669. A year later we had before us four ordinances each forbidding distribution of leafletsone in Irvington, New Jersey, one in Los Angeles, California, one in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, and one in Worcester, Massachusetts. Schneider v. State of New Jersey, Town of Irvington, 308 U.S. 147, 60 S.Ct. 146, 84 L.Ed. 155. Efforts were made to distinguish these four ordinances from the one held void in the Griffin case. The chief grounds urged for distinction were that the four ordinances had been passed to prevent either frauds, disorder, or littering, according to the records in these cases, and another ground urged was that two of the ordinances applied only to certain city areas. This Court refused to uphold the four ordinances on those grounds pointing out that there were other ways to accomplish these legitimate aims without abridging freedom of speech and press. Frauds, street littering and disorderly conduct could be denounced and punished as offenses, the Court said. Several years later we followed the Griffin and Schneider cases in striking down a Dallas, Texas, ordinance which was applied to prohibit the dissemination of information by the distribution of handbills. We said that although a city could punish any person for conduct on the streets if he violates a valid law, 'one who is rightfully on a street * * * carries with him there as elsewhere the constitutional right to express his views in an orderly fashion * * * by handbills and literature as well as by the spoken word.' Jamison v. State of Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 416, 63 S.Ct. 669, 672, 87 L.Ed. 869.
The broad ordinance now before us, barring distribution of 'any hand-bill in any place under any circumstances,' 4 falls precisely under the ban of our prior cases unless this ordinance is saved by the qualification that handbills can be distributed if they have printed on them the names and addresses of the persons who prepared, distributed or sponsored them. For, as in Griffin, the ordinance here is not limited to handbills whose content is 'obscene or offensive to public morals or that advocates unlawful conduct.' 5 Counsel has urged that this ordinance is aimed at providing a way to identify those responsible for fraud, false advertising and libel. Yet the ordinance is in no manner so limited, nor have we been referred to any legislative history indicating such a purpose. Therefore we do not pass on the validity of an ordinance limited to prevent these or any other supposed evils. This ordinance simply bars all handbills under all circumstances anywhere that do not have the names and addresses printed on them in the place the ordinance requires.
There can be no doubt that such an identification requirement would tend to restrict freedom to distribute information and thereby freedom of expression. 'Liberty of circulating is as essential to that freedom as liberty of publishing; indeed, without the circulation, the publication would be of little value.' Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. at page 452, 58 S.Ct. at page 669.
Anonymous pamphlets, leaflets, brochures and even books have played an important role in the progress of mankind. Persecuted groups and sects from time to time throughout history have been able to criticize oppressive practices and laws either anonymously or not at all. The obnoxious press licensing law of England, which was also enforced on the Colonies was due in part to the knowledge that exposure of the names of printers, writers and distributors would lessen the circulation of literature critical of the government. The old seditious libel cases in England show the lengths to which government had to go to find out who was responsible for books that were obnoxious to the rulers. John Lilburne was whipped, pilloried and fined for refusing to answer questions designed to get evidence to convict him or someone else for the secret distribution of books in England. Two Puritan Ministers, John Penry and John Udal, were sentenced to death on charges that they were responsible for writing, printing or publishing books. 6 Before the Revolutionary War colonial patriots frequently had to conceal their authorship or distribution of literature that easily could have brought down on them prosecutions by English-controlled courts. Along about that time the Letters of Junius were written and the identity of their author is unknown to this day. 7 Even the Federalist Papers, written in favor of the adoption of our Constitution, were published under fictitious names. It is plain that anonymity has sometimes been assumed for the most constructive purposes.
We have recently had occasion to hold in two cases that there are times and circumstances when States may not compel members of groups engaged in the dissemination of ideas to be publicly identified. Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 80 S.Ct. 412; N.A.A.C.P. v. State of Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462, 78 S.Ct. 1163, 1171, 2 L.Ed.2d 1488. The reason for those holdings was that identification and fear of reprisal might deter perfectly peaceful discussions of public matters of importance. This broad Los Angeles ordinance is subject to the same infirmity. We hold that it, like the Griffin, Georgia, ordinance, is void on its face.
The judgment of the Appellate Department of the Superior Court of the State of California is reversed and the cause is remanded to it for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded with directions.
In judging the validity of municipal action affecting rights of speech or association protected against invasion by the Fourteenth Amendment, I do not believe that we can escape, as Mr. Justice Roberts said in Schneider v. State of New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 161, 60 S.Ct. 146, 151, 84 L.Ed. 155, 'the delicate and difficult task' of weighing 'the circumstances' and appraising 'the substantiality of the reasons advanced in support of the regulation of the free enjoyment of' speech. More recently we have said that state action impinging on free speech and association will not be sustained unless the governmental interest asserted to support such impingement is compelling. See N.A.A.C.P. v. State of Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 463, 464, 78 S.Ct. 1163, 1172, 2 L.Ed.2d 1488; Sweezy v. State of New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 265, 77 S.Ct. 1203, 1219, 1 L.Ed.2d 1311 (concurring opinion); see also Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 80 S.Ct. 412.
Here the State says that this ordinance is aimed at the prevention of 'fraud, deceit, false advertising, negligent use of words, obscenity, and libel,' in that it will aid in the detection of those responsible for spreading material of that character. But the ordinance is not so limited, and I think it will not do for the State simply to say that the circulation of all anonymous handbills must be suppressed in order to identify the distributors of those that may be of an obnoxious character. In the absence of a more substantial showing as to Los Angeles' actual experience with the distribution of obnoxious handbills, * such a generality is for me too remote to furnish a constitutionally acceptable justification for the deterrent effect on free speech which this all-embracing ordinance is likely to have.
On these grounds I concur in the judgment of the Court.
Mr. Justice CLARK, whom Mr. Justice FRANKFURTER and Mr. Justice WHITTAKER join, dissenting.
Therefore, before passing upon the validity of the ordinance, I would weigh the interests of the public in its enforcement against the claimed right of Talley. The record is barren of any claim, much less proof, that he will suffer any injury whatever by identifying the handbill with his name. Unlike N.A.A.C.P. v. State of Alabama, 1958, 357 U.S. 449, 78 S.Ct. 1163, 2 L.Ed.2d 1488, which is relied upon, there is neither allegation nor proof that Talley or any group sponsoring him would suffer 'economic reprisal, loss of employment, threat of physical coercion (or) other manifestations of public hostility.' Id. 357 U.S. at page 462, 78 S.Ct. at page 1172. Talley makes no showing whatever to support his contention that a restraint upon his freedom of speech will result from the enforcement of the ordinance. The existence of such a restraint is necessary before we can strike the ordinance down.
But even if the State had this burden, which it does not, the substantiality of Los Angeles' interest in the enforcement of the ordinance sustains its validity. Its chief law enforcement officer says that the enforcement of the ordinance prevents 'fraud, deceit, false advertising, negligent use of words, obscenity, and libel,' and, as we have said, that such was its purpose. In the absence of any showing to the contrary by Talley, this appears to me entirely sufficient.
I stand second to none in supporting Talley's right of free speechbut not his freedom of anonymith. The Constitution say nothing about freedom of anonymous speech. In fact, this Court has approved laws requiring no less than Los Angeles' ordinance. I submit that they control this case and require its approval under the attack made here. First, Lewis Publishing Co. v. Morgan, 1913, 229 U.S. 288, 33 S.Ct. 867, 57 L.Ed. 1190, upheld an Act of Congress requiring any newspaper using the second-class mails to publish the names of its editor, publisher, owner, and stockholders. 39 U.S.C. 233, 39 U.S.C.A. § 233. Second, in the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act, 2 U.S.C. 267, 2 U.S.C.A. § 267, Congress requires those engaged in lobbying to divulge their identities and give 'a modicum of information' to Congress. United States v. Harriss, 1954, 347 U.S. 612, 625, 74 S.Ct. 808, 816, 98 L.Ed. 989. Third, the several States have corrupt practices acts outlawing, inter alia, the distribution of anonymous publications with reference to political candidates. 2 While these statutes are leveled at political campaign and election practices, the underlying ground sustaining their validity applies with equal force here.
No civil right has a greater claim to constitutional protection or calls for more rigorous safeguarding than voting rights. In this area the danger of coercion and reprisalseconomic and otherwiseis a matter of common knowledge. Yet these statutes, disallowing anonymity in promoting one's views in election campaigns, have expressed the overwhelming public policy of the Nation. Nevertheless the Court is silent about this impressive authority relevant to the disposition of this case.
All three of the types of statutes mentioned are designed to prevent the same abuseslibel, slander, false accusations, etc. The fact that some of these statutes are aimed at elections, lobbying, and the mails makes their restraint no more palatable, nor the abuses they prevent less deleterious to the public interest, than the present ordinance.
All that Los Angeles requires is that one who exercises his right of free speech through writing or distributing handbills identify himself just as does one who speaks from the platform. The ordinance makes for the responsibility in writing that is present in public utterance. When and if the application of such an ordinance in a given case encroaches on First Amendment freedoms, then will be soom enough to strike that application down. But no such restraint has been shown here. After all, the public has some rights against which the enforcement of freedom of speech would be 'harsh and arbitrary in itself.' Kovacs v. Cooper, 1949, 336 U.S. 77, 88, 69 S.Ct. 448, 454, 93 L.Ed. 513. We have upheld complete proscription of uninvited door-to-door canvassing as an invasion of privacy. Breard v. City of Alexandria, 1951, 341 U.S. 622, 71 S.Ct. 920, 95 L.Ed. 1233. Is this less restrictive than complete freedom of distributionregardless of contentof a signed handbill? And commercial handbills may be declared verboten, Valentine v. Chrestensen, 1942, 316 U.S. 52, 62 S.Ct. 920, 86 L.Ed. 1262, regardless of content or identification. Is Talley's anonymous handbill, designed to destroy the business of a commercial establishment, passed out at its very front door, and attacking its then lawful commercial practices, more comportable with First Amendment freedoms? I think not. Before we may expect international responsibility among nations, might not it be well to require individual responsibility at home.? Los Angeles' ordinance does no more.
Contrary to petitioner's contention, the ordinance as applied does not arbitrarily deprive him of equal protection of the law. He complains that handbills are singled out, while other printed mediabooks, magazines, and newspapersremain unrestrained. However, '(t)he problem of legislative classification is a perennial one, admitting of no doctrinaire definition. Evils in the same field may be of different dimensions and proportions, requiring different remedies. * * * Or the reform may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind. * * * The prohibition of the Equal Protection Clause goes no further than the invidious discrimination. (I) cannot say that that point has been reached here.' Williamson v. Lee Optical, 1955, 348 U.S. 483, 489, 75 S.Ct. 461, 465, 99 L.Ed. 563.
Schneider v. State of New Jersey, Town of Irvington, 308 U.S. 147, 154, 60 S.Ct. 146, 147, 84 L.Ed. 155. Cf. Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450, 58 S.Ct. 666, 668, 82 L.Ed. 949.
Petitioner also argues here that the ordinance both on its face and as construed and applied 'arbitrarily denies petitioner equal protection of the laws in violation of the Due Process and Equal Protection' Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. This argument is based on the fact that the ordinance applies to handbills only, and does not include within its proscription books, magazines and newspapers. Our disposition of the case makes it unnecessary to consider this contention.
The Court's entire sentence was: 'These (pamphlets and leaflets) indeed have been historic weapons in the defense of liberty, as the pamphlets of Thomas Paine and others in our own history abundantly attest.' It has been noted that some of Thomas Paine's pamphlets were signed with pseudonyms. See Bleyer, Main Currents in the History of American Journalism (1927), 9093. Illustrations of other anonymous and pseudonymous pamphlets and other writings used to discuss important public questions can be found in this same volume.
Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. at page 451, 58 S.Ct. at page 668.
Penry was executed and Udal died as a result of his confinement. 1 Hallam, The Constitutional History of England (1855), 205206, 232.
'What is it then, but an odious, unprofitable exertion of a speculative right, and fixing a badge of slavery upon the Americans, without service to their masters?' 2 Letters of Junius (1821) 39.
'When it is shown that state action threatens significantly to impinge upon constitutionally protected freedom it becomes the duty of this Court to determine whether the action bears a reasonable relationship to the achievement of the government purpose asserted as its justification.' 361 U.S. at page 525, 80 S.Ct. at page 417.
Thirty-six States have statutes prohibiting the anonymous distribution of materials relating to elections. E.g.: Kan.G.S.1949, § 251714; M.S.A. § 211.08; Page's Ohio R.C. § 3599.09; Purdon's Pa.Stat.Ann., Title 25, § 3546.
Mary DOE et al., Appellants, v. Arthur K. BOLTON, as Attorney General of the State of Georgia, et al.
Edwin MEESE, III, Attorney General of the United States and Joseph E. Clarkson, Appellants v. Barry KEENE.
CITY OF LAKEWOOD, Appellant v. PLAIN DEALER PUBLISHING CO.
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. LEILA JEANNE HILL, AUDREY HIMMELMANN, and EVERITT W. SIMPSON, Jr., PETITIONERS v. COLORADO et al.
COLUMBIA BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC., Petitioner, v. DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION et al., Petitioners, v. BUSINESS EXECUTIVES' MOVE FOR VIETNAM PEACE et al. POST-NEWSWEEK STATIONS, CAPITAL AREA, INC., Petitioner, v. BUSINESS EXECUTIVES' MOVE FOR VIETNAM PEACE. AMERICAN BROADCASTING COMPANIES, INC., Petitioner, v. DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE.
Raymond K. PROCUNIER, Director, California Department of Corrections, et al., Appellants, v. Robert MARTINEZ et al.
Edward H. HYNES et al., Appellants, v. The MAYOR AND COUNCIL OF the BOROUGH OF ORADELL et al.
Theodore R. GIBSON, Petitioner, v. FLORIDA LEGISLATIVE INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE.
German S. LOPEZ, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES.
Adell H. SHERBERT, Appellant, v. Charlie V. VERNER et al., as members of South Carolina Employment Security Commission, and Spartan Mills.
UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, Appellant, v. COUNCIL OF GREENBURGH CIVIC ASSOCIATIONS et al.
Hugo DeGREGORY, Appellant, v. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF the STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE.
UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA, DISTRICT 12, Petitioner, v. ILLINOIS STATE BAR ASSOCIATION et al.
B. T. SHELTON et al., Appellants, v. Everett TUCKER, Jr., etc., et al. Max CARR et al., Petitioners, v. R. A. YOUNG et al.
Margaret McGOWAN et al., Appellants, v. STATE OF MARYLAND. GALLAGHER, Chief of Police of the City of Springfield, Massachusetts, et al., Appellants. v. CROWN KOSHER SUPER MARKET OF MASSACHUSETTS, INC., et al. TWO GUYS FROM HARRISON-ALLENTOWN, INC., Appellant, v. Paul A. McGINLEY, District Attorney, County of Lehigh, Pennsylvania et al. Abraham BRAUNFELD et al., Appellants, v. Albert N. BROWN, Commissioner of Police of the City of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, et al.
LOUISIANA ex rel. Jack P. F. GREMILLION, Attorney General, et al., Appellants, v. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE et al.
NotFound v. SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES CONTROL BOARD.

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