Source: http://nunchakulaw.blogspot.com/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 14:00:00+00:00

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NOTE: The December 14, 2018, decision was subject to possible appeal through January 25, 2019 (30 days from entry of judgment). No notice of appeal was filed by that deadline, so the decision should stand. Please visit again soon for further information and commentary.
On December 14, 2018, the United States States District Court for the Eastern District of New York rendered a final decision in Maloney v. Singas, my pro se constitutional case, striking down virtually all of the provisions of the New York Penal Code that ban the possession, sale, manufacture, or transfer of nunchaku. In doing so, the Court granted relief somewhat beyond what I had asked for (but I am not about to complain). Thanks to the many who have helped in many ways along the way. It has been a path with heart.
A pdf copy of the Court’s December 14, 2018, findings of fact and conclusions of law (the decision) may be viewed or downloaded by clicking the nunchaku and Bill of Rights displayed above. If you are using a mobile device and that image is not visible, click here instead.
IMPORTANT WARNING: Displaying, swinging, or twirling nunchaku in public within the State of New York could still give rise to criminal charges (menacing, disorderly conduct, etc.). Please respect those around you by practicing only in safe and private locations where no bystanders can be injured or intimidated.
Watch the Newsday video clip here.
Read my NY Daily News OpEd piece here.
The trial we are about to begin concerns the right of the people to keep and bear arms. As recently as ten years ago, the Supreme Court still had not given meaning and content to the provision in the Constitution that sets forth that right, although the Second Amendment has been part of our Constitution since 1791. Today, the balance between the exercise of that right and the recalcitrant plague of gun violence in America is finally beginning to be worked out. It will probably take decades for the courts and the legislatures to strike that balance in a way that protects us all from such horrific incidents as mass shootings at schools, movie theaters, and airports, while at the same time guaranteeing that the Second Amendment, which was first applied to the states only 6½ years ago in McDonald v. Chicago, is given real meaning and substance. Actually, we may never get it right, but I try to be an optimist, because I believe that the “path of the common law,” as Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. put it, is also, as Carlos Castañeda put it through his character Don Juan, a “path with heart.” Nothing in this case has anything to do with guns, or with carrying weapons on the street, or with mass shootings at schools, movie theaters, or airports. And yet, this case has everything to do with all of those things, because the path of the common law is also in some ways like the path of a particle in a quantum physics experiment: it travels in many different directions, all at once, because precedents are often applied in ways that aren’t always foreseen, or even reasonably foreseeable, when they’re made. So there is actually a lot more at stake here than might meet the eye at first glance. Can we get it right? Well, we can try. Right now the only question before us is whether the nunchaku, an ancient martial arts weapon, is commonly used for lawful purposes today. In a few years, the key Second Amendment questions may be somewhat different, so I ask the Court to be patient if it appears that at times I am straying from the path the Court has defined in order to establish a record that may become relevant down the road. And I also ask the Court to remember that the relief I’m seeking here, and have been seeking for nearly 14 years now, is real, and personal, separate and apart from all those big-picture considerations I’ve just described. But I have a duty, I think, to try to address both. Is it possible for me, one human being, acting alone, to fulfill that duty? No.
One of the conditions of settlement was that the companies had to provide the Attorney General with a list of the names and addresses of all NY customers who had received any of the companies’ “prohibited items” (which included “blackjacks, chuka sticks, slingshots and Kung Fu throwing stars”). The companies then had to mail all those customers notices advising them to turn the “prohibited items” over to the police. These notices further advised the addressees that “law enforcement officials have been provided with a list of consumers who received prohibited items.” Click here to view the form of the “IMPORTANT CONSUMER NOTICE” that the companies were forced to send to all NY purchasers in order to settle the Attorney General’s civil suits.
From 2003 to 2006, another Long Island man was prosecuted for having been in possession of nunchaku in his home. Aramis Sostre lived in a private home in Brentwood, NY, with his wife and children. His wife ran a home-based Avon business; customers frequently visited the house. After observing this activity, police obtained the testimony of a “confidential informant” regarding an alleged drug purchase there, conducted further investigation, and obtained a warrant to search the Sostre home, which they executed by surprise. The January 2003 “raid” by numerous police officers was, according to the federal civil complaint, supplemented by drug-sniffing dogs, but no drugs or drug paraphernalia were ever found. Instead, police discovered a pair of forbidden “chuka sticks” in Mr. Sostre’s closet, and he was charged with misdemeanor possession. It was the only criminal charge lodged against Mr. Sostre, but remained pending for more than three years before its disposition in March 2006 as an ACD (adjournment in contemplation of dismissal).
In August 2000, police came to my home after a telephone company employee claimed that I had pointed a rifle at him from within my home. (There was a telescope involved, but no rifle.) When police arrived, they had neither a search warrant nor an arrest warrant, so I refused them entry. As a result, the situation escalated, and a team of police surrounded my home, cut off my phone lines, and persisted for twelve hours in demanding that I exit my home and surrender. They never obtained a warrant during that entire time. Nevertheless, after twelve hours, myself and my family worn out, I stopped asserting my constitutional right under Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980), of which I was well aware at the time, and came outside peacefully. In my absence, the police searched my home, finding my nunchaku under a couch.
I was never charged with resisting arrest, nor indeed with any “intent” crime (other than the alleged “menacing” of the phone worker, which was ultimately dismissed separate and apart from any plea bargaining), but the nunchaku found in my home gave rise to a misdemeanor possession charge against me that was not resolved until January 2003, when I pled guilty to a violation (not a crime), upon which all charges were dismissed.
Less than a month later, in February 2003, I commenced the federal constitutional challenge that was originally titled Maloney v. Spitzer, was later renamed Maloney v. Cuomo, and is now known as Maloney v. Rice. In the case, I sought (and continue to seek) a declaration that the criminalization of the mere possession of nunchaku in one’s own home is unconstitutional.
Dangerous instrumentality, ineffective weapon , or wise compromise?
To the casual reader of page 51 (“CLINICAL NOTES”) from the January 1988 issue of the medical journal Clinical Pediatrics (click displayed image for access to article online), a nunchaku would seem to have once been the cause of a skull fracture in a 10-month-old girl. But on closer reading, it becomes clear that the girl actually fractured her skull by falling and hitting a hardwood floor. While it is true that she fell because she was hit in the face by one stick that had come flying away from a homemade nunchaku that had been in the hands of her 11-year-old brother, that blow caused only swelling and a contusion. More to the point, any flying object--a ball, a frisbee, a champagne cork, etc.--could just as easily cause a 10-month-old standing on a hard surface to fall and sustain a head injury in the process. To blame the nunchaku, rather than the brother or even to some extent the parent(s), would make no sense, but the one-page article prudently concludes with warnings as to the capability of the weapon in expert hands and the possibility of its being overlooked as a potential danger in the hands of the untrained.
“Urban legends” persist that when these “deadly sticks” are being swung around, bones (including skulls) can be fractured with ease, even accidentally. The false underlying premise is that the centrifugal force generated is so great that the swinging stick will shatter or demolish any object it hits. In truth, unless certain nuances of striking are learned, the stick will much more readily tend to bounce or recoil off hard objects like bones.
So, the nunchaku, which was transformed some four centuries ago on a faraway island from farm implement to makeshift weapon, now holds a firm and even respectable place in Western culture. As the District of Columbia Court of Appeals noted in 1983: “It is worth making a few further observations about the nunchaku. Like the courts of other jurisdictions, we are cognizant of the cultural and historical background of this Oriental agricultural implement-turned-weapon. We recognize that the nunchaku has socially acceptable uses within the context of martial arts and for the purpose of developing physical dexterity and coordination.” In re S.P., Jr., 465 A.2d 823, 827 (D.C. 1983).
I began training with the nunchaku just after New York had made doing so illegal (although at the time I had no idea that had happened). I was then a high school student in Fort Lee, New Jersey, and was studying Uechi-Ryu, an Okinawan style of karate. I took a particular interest in the nunchaku because it is a very effective defensive weapon against an attacker armed with a knife. (My father had been stabbed to death about a decade earlier.) In 1976, I began studies at SUNY Maritime College in the Bronx, where I trained with the nunchaku every day in my dorm room. Neither I nor any of my classmates (many of whom came from other states and countries) had any idea that doing so was considered a crime under New York's newly enacted ban. In fact, one year I went to Philadelphia and brought back numerous nunchaku for myself and several classmates of mine who were on the fencing team and wanted to learn nunchaku. We practiced together.
Above are two photos from our summer training cruise of 1979, the last of three before we graduated and became licensed as merchant marine officers.
In 1981, a year after I graduated, I got into some trouble for demonstrating the use of nunchaku in public in New York. That was when I first learned of the state's ban. But I still did not fully appreciate that merely possessing nunchaku even in my own home could subject me to criminal prosecution.
It is widely accepted as historical fact that the nunchaku was adapted for use as a weapon by the people of Okinawa as part of the development of karate during the early 17th Century, after the Japanese invaded the island in 1609 and banned the possession of traditional weapons such as sword and spear. See Stephen P. Halbrook, "Oriental Philosophy, Martial Arts and Class Struggle," 2 Social Praxis 135, 139 (1974) (noting that the invading regime "banned all weapons but its own and brutally suppressed the population" and that a "people's revolutionary movement organized clandestinely, and its activities centered around the development of karate for peasant self-defense against the imperial dictatorship"). See also George H. Kerr, Okinawa: The History of an Island People 156-160 (1958) (discussing the invasion).

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