Source: https://www.resolvingdiscoverydisputes.com/appeals/obtaining-review-of-discovery-rulings/
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 01:02:36+00:00

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Have you ever had a judge give you a ruling in discovery that was so absolutely wrong that you knew you had to fight it? Yet, everyone you talk to tells you that it is almost impossible to get a writ in discovery so you just live with the ruling. Appellate Lawyer Jerry Clausen from San Francisco wrote a great article in Plaintiff Magazine titled “Obtaining Review of Discovery Rulings.” Here it is for your enjoyment.
Obtaining appellate review of a discovery ruling can be a daunting task with an unlikely prospect for success. Rarely are discovery orders themselves directly appealable. Furthermore by their nature they are particularly poor candidates for effective review on an appeal from an adverse judgment entered months or even years later. As a result, commonly the only chance for correcting an erroneous discovery order is by writ of mandamus or prohibition. Yet the judiciary, sensitive to the pretrial process that can result from injudicious use of prerogative writs to review discovery disputes, has long held to a policy of restricting the use of these writs to review discovery rulings.
Nevertheless, adverse discovery rulings do of course occur, and sometimes they are important enough–either to the litigation itself or to the personal, privacy, or commercial interests of the client–to justify an effort to obtain appellate review. In that event the litigant needs to know what options may be available and how to maximize his or her chances of success.
Most discovery orders, however, are not directly appealable because no statute makes them so. Like other interlocutory rulings they may be reviewed as a matter of right upon appeal from the final judgment. But for a number of reasons delaying review of a discovery ruling until an appeal from the final judgment is especially ineffective. (See Oceanside Union School Dist. v. Superior Court (1962) 58 Cal.2d 180, 185, fn. 4 (pdf); Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 161, 169-170 (pdf).) For one thing, in many discovery situations delayed review provides a wholly inadequate remedy. For example, if discovery is erroneously granted, it may be pointless to ask an appellate court to undo a disclosure that was compelled months or even years earlier. If, on the other hand, discovery is erroneously denied, it may be impossible to show that undisclosed information, had it been it been produced and admitted at trial, would have made a judgment in favor of the aggrieved party more likely—and hence impossible to show that the error was prejudicial.
For another thing, delayed review can result in irreparable injury. Where, for instance, an improper order grants discovery over a privilege objection, it will probably be impossible to restore the aggrieved party to the status quo ante once that information has been divulged.
The rationale for delaying review of discovery rulings until appeal from the final judgment rather than permitting direct appeal of them is twofold. First, it prevents the disruption and delay that would be caused by piecemeal review of trial court rulings. Second, it reduces the burden on the appellate courts, since many (if not most) discovery rulings will be mooted because the case settles, because the aggrieved party prevails on the merits, or because the discovery ruling is later “corrected” in the trial court (such as where matter erroneously ordered disgorged during discovery is subsequently excluded from evidence at trial).
One difference between these two formulations is that, while not all of the factors listed in Omaha Indemnity need be present for a writ to issue (id., 209 Cal.App.3d at p. 1274 [“extent to which these criteria apply depends on facts and circumstances of case”]), the same is not true under Oceanside: for a writ to issue under Oceanside, the case must raise a question that is (a) one of first impression and (b) one of general importance to the bench and bar and (c) one as to which general guidelines can be laid down for future cases.
Consider alternatives to a writ petition.
About nine out of every ten writ petitions are summarily denied, and although separate statistics are not available, the rate of summary denial of discovery writs is undoubtedly even higher. It therefore behooves a litigant to take every available measure to decrease the odds of a summary denial.
One sure way to avoid summary denial of a writ petition is not to file one in the first place. Because a discovery writ’s chances are so slight to begin with, counsel should first consider whether a more favorable alternative exists for overcoming or at least mitigating an adverse discovery ruling.
In rare cases, one alternative to a writ petition may be a direct appeal. As previously noted, most discovery rulings are not directly appealable, and delayed review after an appeal from a final judgment is often inadequate. But it may be possible to accelerate review by disobeying the discovery order and appealing from an adverse outcome imposed as a sanction for disobedience, such as a dismissal, an adverse judgment, or a monetary fine. (See above.) Such a tactic is obviously extreme and will be justified only in rare circumstances. Still, it may warranted where, for example, the ultimate effect of the discovery will be to effectively gut the party’s case entirely or where it may be the lesser of two evils for a client who has been ordered to disclose valuable or sensitive information that is more important to him or her than outcome of the lawsuit. It does have the undeniable advantage of guaranteeing immediate and meaningful appellate review.
In the more common situation, where direct appeal is not an option, most trial lawyers will do the obvious—try to skin the cat in a different way. For example, in some cases a litigant denied discovery from his or her opponent may be able to obtain the information by some other means—such as by consulting experts or other lawyers who have been involved in similar cases, by seeking the it, either formally or informally, from the another defendant or a third party, by making a request under either the California Public Records Act (Gov. Code, §§ 6250 et seq.) (see Fairley v. Superior Court (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1414, 1422 (pdf); Wilder v. Superior Court (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 77, 82) or the federal Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. § 552), or by searching the Internet.
Tailoring the issues. Once the decision is made to seek a writ, the emphasis should be on framing the issues in the petition in a manner calculated to bring them within the Oceanside requirements. The issues should be stated broadly, so as to demonstrate their general importance to the bench and bar. And they should be framed so as to emphasize their novelty or otherwise demonstrate a question of first impression.
In fact, in an appropriate case it may even be possible to submit with the writ petition additional evidence bearing on the Oceanside factors. Because writ review is an original proceeding, an appellate court has discretion to consider additional evidence not presented in the court below. (See Eisenberg et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Appeals and Writs (The Rutter Group 2012) ¶ 15:179.1 (rev. #1, 2011); Bruce v. Gregory (1967) 65 Cal.2d 666, 667-671 (pdf); McCarthy v. Superior Court (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 1023, 1030, fn.3 (pdf).) Although it usually will decline to do so where the additional evidence bears on the very issue decided by the trial court and was not before that court at the time of its decision (see People v. Superior Court (Lavi) (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1164 (pdf), and cases cited therein), the appellate court may be more receptive to new evidence if it bears solely on the factors to be determined in deciding the propriety of granting writ review.
Fortunately, although adverse discovery rulings do occur, rarely do they threaten to significantly imperil the outcome of a case. In those rare instances, where they do, writ review may be the only means of relief. By knowing the considerations relevant to such obtaining such relief a litigant can at least maximize the chances that it will in fact be granted.

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