Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&amp;view=article&amp;id=40388:g-r-no-139882-august-16,-2000-oriental-assurance-corp-v-solidbank-corporation&amp;catid=1396&amp;Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 04:02:40+00:00

Document:
ORIENTAL ASSURANCE CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. SOLIDBANK CORPORATION, Respondent.
The second Resolution denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.
Petitioner Oriental Assurance Corporation issued Fire Insurance Policy No. F-92/22733-D, insuring the stock of finished and/or unfinished products including raw materials, machinery and equipment belonging to Wear Me Garments Manufacturing, Inc. (Wear Me). The policy insured against loss and/or damage by fire from March 20, 1991 to March 20, 1992. The policy was subsequently renewed for another year from March 20, 1992 to March 20, 1993 under Renewal Receipt No. 40948. A Memorandum stating that the policy was" [m]ade further subject to MORTGAGEE CLAUSE in favor of ‘SOLIDBANK CORPORATION’" was typewritten on the face of the receipt.
On April 27, 1993, petitioner issued another Fire Insurance Policy (No. F-93-40690-D) insuring the same items of Wear Me from March 20, 1993 to March 20, 1994.
As holder of trust receipts over the burned goods, Solidbank Corporation sent an undated telegram to petitioner, asking the latter to pay the proceeds of Fire Insurance Policy No. F-92/22733-D. Petitioner refused to comply, because the Policy did not contain a mortgagee clause in favor of Solidbank.
On August 18, 1995, respondent filed a Motion for Execution pending appeal. It was opposed by petitioner, which filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the RTC Decision.
Subsequently, the trial court issued an Omnibus Order granting the Motion for Execution and denying the Motion for Reconsideration. On October 23, 1995, petitioner appealed the RTC Decision and Omnibus Order to the Court of Appeals. It should be added that before elevating the records of the case to the appellate court, the RTC granted respondent’s Motion to Stay Execution Pending Appeal Based on Supersedeas Bond.
As earlier mentioned, the CA denied petitioner’s appeal and subsequent Motion for Reconsideration.
(c)	Failure of the appellant to pay the docket and other lawful fees as provided in section 5 of Rule 40 10 and section 4 of Rule 41;"
Petitioner contends that these Rules cannot be given retroactive effect because such action would impair its "vested" rights under the old Rules. 11 The latter required an appellant to pay the docket fees within fifteen days from the receipt of notice from the CA clerk of court that the record on appeal has been received.
The retroactive application of procedural rules to pending cases is undoubtedly well settled. 12 Petitioner even admits this in its efforts to reason out its case. 13 For this reason alone, the present Petition should be dismissed.
Even assuming that it is entitled to the aforecited right, the CA’s dismissal of the appeal still stands.
Indeed, it is the duty 15 of petitioner’s counsel to check the status of a pending appeal. 16 This duty is even more compelling in this case because the appeal had been pending for over three years, 17 and counsel had not received any notice to pay the required docket and other lawful fees. These circumstances should have compelled to action petitioner’s counsel, whose reason for the delay was flimsy and unacceptable. Erroneous and irrelevant is the allegation that" [t]he long pendency of petitioner’s appeal was due to the filing by Prudential of the petition for certiorari and the filing by the respondent of the motion to dismiss the appeal." 18 We stress that the relevant matter is the failure of petitioner to check the status of its appeal. Under the circumstances, it is bound by the negligence of its counsel.
In view of the foregoing conclusion, the parties’ lengthy discussions of the merits of the appealed case need not be ruled upon.
1.	Rollo, p. 112; penned by Justice Angelina Sandoval Gutierrez and concurred in by Justices Romeo A. Brawner and Martin S. Villarama, Jr.
3.	Namely, Blue Cross Insurance, Inc., Central Surety & Insurance Co., Cibeles Insurance Corporation, Liberty Insurance Corporation, Philippine British Assurance Co., Philippine First Insurance Co., Commonwealth Insurance, Inc., Pioneer Asia Insurance Corporation, Prudential Guarantee & Assurance, Inc., Reliance Surety & Insurance Co., and Western Guaranty Corporation.
4.	Branch 49, presided by Judge Salvador P. De Guzman, Jr.
5.	This was actually a Supplemental Motion for Summary Judgment submitted together with an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated February 23, 1995, denying the first Motion for Summary Judgment.
6.	Dated July 27, 1995.
7.	RTC Decision, p. 9; rollo, p. 90.
8.	The case was deemed submitted for resolution on May 12, 2000, upon receipt by this Court of Respondent’s Memorandum, signed by Atty. Maximino Z. Banaga, Jr. of De los Reyes Banaga Briones & Associates. Petitioner’s Memorandum, signed by Atty. Alejandro P. Ruiz, Jr., was received earlier on April 28, 2000.
9.	Memorandum for Petitioner, p. 7; rollo, p. 182.
"SEC. 4.	Notice of receipt of record. — The clerk upon receiving the record on appeal shall cause a notice of that fact to be served on the parties.
12.	See People v. Sumilang, 77 Phil 764, December 18, 1946; Alday v. Camilon, 120 SCRA 521, January 31, 1983; Lim Law v. Olympic Sawmill Co., 129 SCRA 439, May 28, 1984; Bernardo v. CA, 168 SCRA 439, December 14, 1988; Duremdes v. Commission on Elections, 178 SCRA 746, October 27, 1989; Ocampo v. CA, 180 SCRA 27, December 8, 1989; People’s Financing Corp. v. CA, 192 SCRA 34, December 4, 1990; Aris (Phil) Inc. v. NLRC, 200 SCRA 246, August 5, 1991; Asset Privatization Trust v. CA, 229 SCRA 627, February 3, 1994; Del Rosario v. CA, 241 SCRA 519, February 21, 1995; Diu v. CA, 251 SCRA 472, December 19, 1995.
13.	Petitioner’s Memorandum, pp. 10-11; rollo, pp. 185-186.
16.	Arambulo v. CA, supra. See Estella v. CA, 185 SCRA 732, May 28, 1990, cited in respondent’s Memorandum.
17.	The notice of appeal was filed on October 24, 1995 (October 23, 1995, according to respondent). The CA Resolution dismissing the appeal was received by petitioner on March 24, 1999.
18.	Petitioner’s Memorandum, p. 13; rollo, p. 188.
19.	Reyes v. CA, 189 SCRA 46, August 24, 1990.

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