Source: https://case-law.vlex.com/vid/517-u-s-25-605297350
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 09:50:29+00:00

Document:
Party Name: BARNETT BANK OF MARION COUNTY, N. A. v. NELSON, FLORIDA INSURANCE COMMISSIONER, et al.
BARNETT BANK OF MARION COUNTY, N. A.
A 1916 federal law (Federal Statute) permits national banks to sell insurance in small towns, but a Florida law (State Statute) prohibits such banks from selling most types of insurance. When petitioner Barnett Bank, a national bank doing business in a small Florida town, bought a state licensed insurance agency, respondent State Insurance Commissioner ordered the agency to stop selling the prohibited forms of insurance. In this action for declaratory and injunctive relief, the District Court held that the State Statute was not pre-empted, but only because of the McCarran-Ferguson Act's special insurance-related anti-preemption rule. That rule provides that a federal law will not pre-empt a state law enacted "for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance" unless the federal statute " specifically relates to the business of insurance. " 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (emphasis added). The Court of Appeals affirmed.
The Federal Statute pre-empts the State Statute. Pp. 30-43.
authority not normally limited by, but rather ordinarily pre-empting, contrary state law. See, e.g., First Nat. Bank of San Jose v. California, 262 U.S. 366, 368-369. Where, as here, Congress has not expressly conditioned the grant of power upon a grant of state permission, this Court has ordinarily found that no such condition applies. See Franklin Nat. Bank of Franklin Square v. New York, 347 U.S. 373. The State's argument that special circumstances surrounding the Federal Statute's enactment demonstrate Congress' intent to grant only a limited permission is unpersuasive. Pp. 30-37.
(b) The McCarran-Ferguson Act's anti-pre-emption rule does not govern this case, because the Federal Statute "specifically relates to the business of insurance." This conclusion rests upon the Act's language and purposes, taken together. The word "relates" is highly general; and in ordinary English, the Federal Statutewhich focuses directly upon industry-specific selling practices and affects the relation of insured to insurer and the spreading of risk"specifically" relates to the insurance business. The Act's mutually reinforcing purposesthat state regulation and taxation of the insurance business are in the public interest, and that Congress' " silence . . . shall not be construed to impose any barrier to [such] regulation or taxation," 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (emphasis added)also support this view. This phrase, especially the word "silence," indicates that the Act seeks to protect state regulation primarily against inadvertent federal intrusion, not to insulate state insurance regulation from the reach of all federal law. The circumstances surrounding the Act's enactment also suggest that the Act was passed to ensure that generally phrased congressional statutes, which do not mention insurance, are not applied to the issuance of insurance policies, thereby interfering with state regulation in unanticipated ways. The parties' remaining arguments to the contrary are unconvincing. Pp. 37-43.
state statute enacted "for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance" unless the federal statute " specifically relates to the business of insurance. " McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (emphasis added). We decide that the McCarran-Ferguson Act's special anti-pre-emption rule does not govern this case, because the federal statute in question "specifically relates to the business of insurance." We conclude that, under ordinary pre-emption principles, the federal statute pre-empts the state statute, thereby prohibiting application of the state statute to prevent a national bank from selling insurance in a small town.
"In addition to the powers now vested by law in national [banks] organized under the laws of the United States any such [bank] located and doing business in any place [with a population] . . . [of not more than] five thousand . . . may, under such rules and regulations as may be prescribed by the Comptroller of the Currency, act as the agent for any fire, life, or other insurance company authorized by the authorities of the State . . . to do business [there], . . . by soliciting and selling insurance . . . Provided, however, That no such bank shall . . . guarantee the payment of any premium . . . And provided further, That the bank shall not guarantee the truth of any statement made by an assured [when applying] . . . for insurance." Act of Sept. 7, 1916 (Federal Statute), 39 Stat. 753, as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 92 (emphases changed).
"No [Florida licensed] insurance agent . . . who is associated with, . . . owned or controlled by . . . a financial institution shall engage in insurance agency activities . . . ." Fla. Stat. § 626.988(2) (Supp. 1996)(State Statute).
"any bank . . . [except for a] bank which is not a subsidiary or affiliate of a bank holding company and is located in a city having a population of less than 5,000 . . . ." § 626.988(1)(a).
Thus, the State Statute says, in essence, that banks cannot sell insurance in Floridaexcept that an unaffiliated small town bank (i. e., a bank that is not affiliated with a bank holding company) may sell insurance in a small town. Ibid.

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