Source: https://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/09-5327.ZS.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 10:48:42+00:00

Document:
(a) Several considerations support the Court’s holding. First, because AEDPA’s “statute of limitations defense … is not ‘jurisdictional,’ ” Day v. McDonough , 547 U. S. 198 , it is subject to a “rebuttable presumption” in favor “of equitable tolling,” Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs , 498 U. S. 89 . That presumption’s strength is reinforced here by the fact that “equitable principles” have traditionally “governed” substantive habeas law. Munaf v. Geren , 553 U. S. 674 , ___, and the fact that Congress enacted AEDPA after Irwin and therefore was likely aware that courts, when interpreting AEDPA’s timing provisions, would apply the presumption, see, e.g., Merck & Co. v. Reynolds , 559 U. S. ___, ___. Second, §2244(d) differs significantly from the statutes at issue in United States v. Brockamp , 519 U. S. 347 , and United States v. Beggerly , 524 U. S. 38 , in which the Court held that Irwin’ s presumption had been overcome. For example, unlike the subject matters at issue in those cases — tax collection and land claims—AEDPA’s subject matter, habeas corpus, pertains to an area of the law where equity finds a comfortable home. See Munaf, supra, at ___. Brockamp, supra, at 352, distinguished. Moreover, AEDPA’s limitations period is neither unusually generous nor unusually complex. Finally, the Court disagrees with respondent’s argument that equitable tolling undermines AEDPA’s basic purpose of eliminating delays in the federal habeas review process, see, e.g., Day, supra, at 205–206. AEDPA seeks to do so without undermining basic habeas corpus principles and by harmonizing the statute with prior law, under which a petition’s timeliness was always determined under equitable principles. See, e.g., Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U. S. 473 . Such harmonization, along with the Great Writ’s importance as the only writ explicitly protected by the Constitution, counsels hesitancy before interpreting AEDPA’s silence on equitable tolling as congressional intent to close courthouse doors that a strong equitable claim would keep open. Pp. 12–16.
(b) The Eleventh Circuit’s per se standard is too rigid. A “petitioner” is “entitled to equitable tolling” if he shows “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way” and prevented timely filing. Pace v. DiGuglielmo , 544 U. S. 408 . Such “extraordinary circumstances” are not limited to those that satisfy the Eleventh Circuit’s test. Courts must often “exercise [their] equity powers … on a case-by-case basis,” Baggett v. Bullitt , 377 U. S. 360 , demonstrating “flexibility” and avoiding “mechanical rules,” Holmberg v. Armbrecht , 327 U. S. 392 , in order to “relieve hardships … aris[ing] from a hard and fast adherence” to more absolute legal rules, Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co. , 322 U. S. 238 . The Court’s cases recognize that equity courts can and do draw upon decisions made in other similar cases for guidance, exercising judgment in light of precedent, but with awareness of the fact that specific circumstances, often hard to predict, could warrant special treatment in an appropriate case. Coleman v. Thompson , 501 U. S. 722 , distinguished. No pre-existing rule of law or precedent demands the Eleventh Circuit’s rule. That rule is difficult to reconcile with more general equitable principles in that it fails to recognize that, at least sometimes, an attorney’s unprofessional conduct can be so egregious as to create an extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable tolling, as several other federal courts have specifically held. Although equitable tolling is not warranted for “a garden variety claim of excusable neglect,” Irwin, supra, at 96, this case presents far more serious instances of attorney misconduct than that. Pp. 16–19.

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