Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&amp;view=article&amp;id=84267:59942&amp;catid=1594&amp;Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 22:29:06+00:00

Document:
G.R. No. 160728, March 11, 2015 - CLT REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. PHIL-VILLE DEVELOPMENT AND HOUSING CORPORATION, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (THROUGH THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL), AND THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF METRO MANILA DISTRICT III, CALOOCAN CITY, Respondent.
CLT REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. PHIL-VILLE DEVELOPMENT AND HOUSING CORPORATION, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (THROUGH THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL), AND THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF METRO MANILA DISTRICT III, CALOOCAN CITY, Respondent.
Once more, the Court has the opportunity to correct the errors in the Torrens system about the fake titles that were erroneously issued covering the controversial Maysilo Estate. This case calls for a direct application of the Court En Banc’s resolutions in Manotok Realty, Inc. v. CLT Realty Development Corporation1 as petitioner’s title involved here was conclusively dealt with in those cases.
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision2 dated February 27, 2003 and the Resolution3 dated November 10, 2003 (the questioned Decision and Resolution) both issued by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 52606, which affirmed the Decision4 dated March 15, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 122, Caloocan City, in Civil Case No. C-15045.
This case started with a Complaint6 for Quieting of Title, Damages and Injunction filed by respondent Phil-Ville against petitioner and the Register of Deeds of Metro Manila District III on August 28, 1991 before the RTC of Caloocan City, Branch 122, docketed as Civil Case No. 15045. Both corporations are domestic, duly organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the Republic of the Philippines.
Respondent Phil-Ville presented a chart10 showing that the 16 parcels of land were derived from and were part of Lot 26, Maysilo Estate originally covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 994 issued on May 3, 1917.
Submitted for resolution before this Court are the applications for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction of the plaintiff Phil-Ville Development and Housing Corporation Incorporated in its Complaint dated August 26, 1991, and that of the defendant CLT Realty Development Corporation Incorporated in its Answer dated January 9, 1992.
whereas defendant CLT is equally claiming right over the said subject properties by virtue of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-177013.
That the signatures “L. GARDOÑO”, Register of Deeds, appearing in both the questioned and the standard Transfer Certificates of Title exhibit the presence of sufficient number of agreeing significant personal writing individualities and the absence of basic differences, hence, the signatures L. GARDOÑO, Register of Deeds, were written by one and the same person.
That fundamental similarities in handwriting habits and identifying details of letters/elements exist between the handwritten entries appearing in the questioned and the standard Transfer Certificates of Title, indicative of common authorship of the aforementioned handwritten entries.
That significant similarities in printing characteristics such as, letter-design, size, printing lay-out and other minute identifying details exist between the printed entries, including the presence of the commonwealth seal watermarks, appearing in the questioned and the standard Transfer Certificates of Title, hence the questioned and the standard TCT were prepared from one source.
The questioned Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 4210 and 4211 are genuine.
To determine the age of ink and paper.
Examinations conducted on the above-mentioned specimens showed that the handwritten entries were written in black liquid pen ink, its iron component had oxidized.
Further examinations showed the presence of watermarks, brown spots and discoloration of the paper.
REMARKS: The above-mentioned specimens could be more or less fifty (50) years old.
11. That the titles of plaintiff Phil-Ville and the title of defendant CLT overlaps each other as per plans and testimonies presented to the Court (Exhs. “61 and “S”).
For the survey plan of the land allegedly covered by its TCT No. 177013 prepared by Geodetic Engineer Juanito B. Bustalino on February 17 – March 31, 1992, presented by it as its Exhibit “61” in this case, shows the relative locations and positions of the sixteen (16) lots registered in the name of plaintiff (under its TCT No. C-21568, et al.) in the much bigger area supposedly covered by defendant’s TCT No. 177013. The main task of the Court in this case, is to determine which of the competing and overlapping titles of the parties are the lots in question [sixteen (16) lots subject of the complaint] are valid and genuine.
The above notice or warning in Hipolito’s title should have put defendant on its guard when it acquired her alleged interests under her TCT No. R-17994 on December 10, 1988, and must have spurred it to investigate the basis of the above-quoted notice or warning in Hipolito’s title.
x x x Estelita Hipolito acquired the land supposedly covered by her TCT No. R-17994 by virtue of a Court Order dated October 18, 1977 (Exh. “RRRR-10”) approving the Compromise Agreement between her and Atty. Jose B. Dimson, wherein the latter transferred to Hipolito on September 2, 1976 Lot 26 of the Maysilo Estate, supposedly covered by his TCT No. R-15166, which property in turn appears to have been acquired by Dimson by virtue of a Court Order dated June 13, 1966 (Exh. “RRRR-11”), awarding to him as his attorney’s fees whatever remained undisposed of in Lots 25-A, 26, 27, 28 and 29 of the Maysilo Estate of Maria De La Concepcion Vidal. Thus, the acquisition by Atty. Dimson of the interests of the late Maria De La Concepcion Vidal in Lot 26 and other lots of the Maysilo Estate was subject to the condition, that something remained of said lot in the intestate estate of said deceased that have not been disposed of. The acquisition of the same Lot 26 by Estelita Hipolito from Dimson under her TCT No. R-17994, as well as the subsequent acquisition of the same lot by defendant CLT from Hipolito under its TCT No. T-177013, were both likewise subject to the condition, that something or some portion of Lot 26 of the Maysilo Estate belonging to former co-owner Maria De La Concepcion Vidal remained undisposed of.
x x x [W]hen Estelita Hipolito presented her Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd-288152, to which her TCT No. R-17994 was based to the Land Registration Authority (LRA) for approval on May 21, 1979, said plan was disapproved by the Chief of the Division of Registered Lands, for the reason that it “appears to be entirely inside (LRC) Pcs-1828; (LRC) Psd-5079; (LRC) Psd-50580 and (LRC) Psd-15345” (Exh. “RRRR-3”). And when the LRC appointed a seven (7) man Committee, headed by its then Deputy Commissioner Paz Lahoz-Argel to verify the correctness of said action of the Chief of its Division of Registered Lands and the validity of Estelita Hipolito’s TCT No. R-17994, the Committee unanimously confirmed the disapproval by its aforesaid official of Hipolito’s Plan (LRC) Psd-288152 and recommended the annulment of her TCT No. R-17994 on the ground that Hipolito’s title “is a duplication of TCT No. 4210 and TCT No. 4211 issued as early as September 5, 1918 in favor of Alejandro Ruiz and Mariano P. Leuterio, TCT No. 4210 being what corresponds to (LRC) Psd-5079 and (LRC) Psd-5080, and the TCT being what was expropriated by the government, subdivided and consolidated into seventy[-]seven (77) lots and sold through the National Housing Authority to occupant thereon under (LRC) Pcs-1828 in the name of the Republic of the Philippines” (Exhs. “RRRR”, “RRRR-1” to “RRRR-27”).
It is obvious then, that both Estelita Hipolito and defendant CLT were not innocent transferees of whatever interest Atty. Jose R. Dimson had in Lot 26 of the Maysilo Estate under his TCT No. 15166, because they both took said title of Dimson on condition - that there remained undisposed portions of Lot 26 in the intestate estate of the former owner Maria De La Concepcion Vidal, also on condition, as annotated at the back of Hipolito’s title TCT No. R-17994, that said title was “subject to verification by the LRC Verification Committee on questionable titles, plans, decrees and other documents”. Finally, subject indeed to the findings of the Verification Committee of the LRC, that “nothing more was left for the heirs of Maria De La Concepcion Vidal to convey to Jose R. Dimson as his attorney’s fees, and consequently, nothing at all was left for Jose R. Dimson to convey to Estelita Hipolito” (Exhs. “RRRR”, “RRRR-1” to “RRRR-27”).
In short, Estelita Hipolito’s TCT No. R-17994 is null and void as no land had been registered thereunder, and defendant CLT’s TCT No. T-177013 which was derived from Hipolito’s TCT No. R-17994 is similarly null and void for the same reason.
To repeat, plaintiff traces its titles to the sixteen (16) lots as far back as TCT No. 4211, issued by the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Rizal on September 9, 1918, to Alejandro Ruiz and Mariano P. Leuterio (Exh. “X”), which together with TCT No. 4210 issued to the same parties, covered Lot 26 of the Maysilo Estate. These two (2) titles, which are now seventy[-]seven (77) years old, had been issued to co-owners Ruiz and Leuterio by virtue of the Escritura de Venta executed in their favor by Don Tomas Arguelles and Don Enrique Llopis on August 21, 1918 before Notary Public Vicente Foz under the authority given to them by the Court in CFI Case No. 391 (Exh. “CC”), the two gentlemen Arguelles and Llopis having been appointed by the Court as commissioners to partition the vast Maysilo Estate among the co-owners and/or sell parts thereof to the claimants. x x x.
It is clear then that no approval of the Bureau of Land is required. The Court approval of said sale thus resulted in the issuance to the two buyers Alejandro Ruiz and Mariano P. Leuterio of TCT Nos. 4210 and 4211, the first with respect to the first and third portions of Lot 26 containing an area of 3,053.93 sq. mts., and 16,512.50 sq. mts., respectively (Exh. “W”), and the second with respect to the second portion of Lot 26 containing an area of 871,982 sq. mts. (Exh. “X”), all of which areas, when added together, total 891,547.33 sq. mts., which, as mentioned earlier, is the exact area of Lot 26 appearing in OCT 994 and Decrees No. 36455. In fact, the Memorandum of Encumbrances at the back of OCT 994, the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Rizal, L. Gardonio, made two entries both numbered 6665/0-994 noting that the Deed of Sale of the three (3) portions of Lot 26 to the buyers Alejandro Ruiz and Mariano P. Leuterio was inscribed by him on September 9, 1918 at 10:50 A.M. resulting in the issuance to them of TCT No. 4210 with respect to the first and third portions and TCT No. 4211 with respect to the second portion (Exh. “V-15-A”).
As for the authenticity of the signatures of Register of Deeds Gardonio on both titles TCT Nos. 4210 and 4211, they were found to be genuine and authentic both by the NBI experts who examined them upon order of this Court (Exhs. “WWWW”, “WWWW-1” to “WWWW-27”) and by the PNP Crime Laboratory whom plaintiff also asked to examine said signatures to determine their genuineness (Exhs. “VVVV”, “VVVV-1” to “VVVV-8”). x x x.
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed the RTC Decision that nullified its title and the Court of Appeals docketed it as CA-G.R. CV No. 52606.
On February 10, 1999, the Republic of the Philippines, acting through the administrator of the Land Registration Authority, filed with the Court of Appeals a Motion for Intervention and Petition-in-Intervention, which the Court of Appeals granted over petitioner’s opposition.
It is not surprising that in this case, the lower court did not discuss the validity or invalidity of the testimony or findings of the witnesses presented by both parties. There were plethora of facts and reasons which led to the inescapable conclusion regarding the questioned documents’ validity, genuineness and authenticity.
The NBI’s scientific examination and the PNP’s handwriting analysis were not meant to contradict each other since they involve varying techniques and methods peculiar to each examination. The former aims to establish the age of the ink and paper while the latter aims to establish the genuineness and authenticity of the signatures on the questioned documents. Both NBI and PNP findings should complement each other rather than collide. It is not a test of which is more scientific, advance or sophisticated, otherwise, one test which is less scientific would no longer be used. At a glance, there seems to be an apparent discrepancy in the test results. The NBI expert’s admission that its estimation of the age of the ink and strokes had an allowance of plus 5 and 10 years due to the oxidation reaction, clearly contradicted [petitioner’s] claim that the method used by the NBI is an exact science. Moreso, the exactness of the science theory, self-destructed when the same NBI expert witness admitted that there is a possibility that the questioned document could be 70 years of age.
This Court believes that the mere fact that TCT Nos. 4211, 5261 and 35486 were written differently, i.e., Spanish supposedly instead of English from the mother title which is written in English, is not enough reason to declare the same invalid. The fact that [respondent Phil-Ville] was able to present other certificates of title written in Spanish during or about the time the questioned titles were issued, belied [petitioner’s] speculation that it was not the “practice” then. The lower court correctly observed that the translation of the technical description in a mother title, i.e., from Spanish to English in the subsequent transfer certificate of title, did not violate any rule or guidelines of the administrative agency concerned. In fact, Memorandum of Encumbrances on OCT No. 994 which dates back in December 1917 to October 23, 1939 were all written in Spanish, despite the fact that OCT No. 994 is already in English. This only shows that it was the practice at that time to use either English or Spanish in official transactions, depending upon the person’s facility with the use of a specific language.
This Court finds the explanation of [respondent Phil-Ville] regarding the alleged non-inclusion of the original survey in TCT Nos. 4210 and 4211 and different date of survey found in the same titles as against the mother title, satisfactory and with factual basis x x x.
It is enough that the technical description of the land in the transfer certificate is exactly identical and do not exceed the area and technical description contained in the mother title. It may be a mistake or omission on the part of the official who issued TCT Nos. 4210 and 4211, but the same is not fatal.
The same categorically states that Psu-21154 is the subdivision plan of Lot No. 26 and was approved on November 4, 1946. In the light of the said certification, there is no need for the production of the original survey plan. [Respondent Phil-Ville] is not responsible for the safekeeping of the original survey plan. Another uncontroverted evidence on the existence of the alleged missing survey plan is the blue print copy of the approved plan Psd-21154 kept in the vault of the Register of Deeds of Pasig, presented and identified by [respondent Phil-Ville’s] witnesses, Rolando Golla and Mamerto Lara, of the same office.
The allegation of [petitioner] that the owner’s duplicate copy of OCT No. 994 in the custody of the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Rizal is spurious or fraudulently altered, does not hold water in the absence of any proof. Other allegations of fraud and defects of the owner’s duplicate copy of OCT No. 994 with the Register of Deeds and Escritura De Venta, are, likewise, unsubstantiated and merely conjectures.
Noteworthy is that the title of [petitioner’s] predecessor-in-interest, Jose Dimson, over the subject land was by virtue of a Court Order dated June 13, 1966 awarding to him as attorney’s fees 25% of whatever remained under Lot 25-A, 26, 27, 28 and 29 undisposed of the intestate estate of Concepcion Vidal, one of the registered owners of the properties covered by OCT No. 994. Hence, under the court order, Jose Dimson, was awarded only 25% of the undisposed estate and whatever that percentage represents, if any, should be first determined and verified by the proper government agency, then the Land Registration Commission. When Estelita Hipolito acquired the property from Jose Dimson and was subsequently issued TCT No. R-17994, and when [petitioner] acquired the same property from Estelita Hipolito and was issued TCT No. T-177013, both titles should necessarily contain an annotation referring to the report of the LRC with regard to the “25% undisposed estate” which should be covered by the titles. The annotation and report of the LRC, were in effect the very bases of the titles’ existence or validity, and not an encumbrance. The court’s order gave Jose Dimson a right to 25% undisposed area of the aforesaid lots. This annotation merely gave notice that the undisposed estate was yet to be determined and verified. The LRC report finally disposed of the issue. The said report stated that there was nothing more for the heirs of Maria De La Concepcion Vidal to convey to Jose Dimson as his attorney’s fees. In short, there was no undisposed area to speak of, which Jose Dimson can acquire.
The subject annotation is, therefore, not prohibited and proscribed since it was not an encumbrance.
On December 23, 2003, petitioner filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari dated November 25, 2003, seeking to reverse the questioned Decision and Resolution.
After the parties submitted their respective Memoranda,30 this case was deemed submitted for decision.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT DISREGARDED ALL THE ADMITTED PATENT AND INHERENT TECHNICAL DEFECTS AND INFIRMITIES THAT PLAGUE THE ALLEGED TCT NOS. 4211, 5261, 35486 AND 1368 TO 1374 (FROM WHERE PRIVATE RESPONDENT PHIL-VILLE DERIVES ITS ALLEGED TITLES), WHICH PURSUANT TO JURISPRUDENCE CONCLUSIVELY RENDER SAID TITLES VOID AND INEFFECTIVE.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT COMPLETELY DISREGARDED A VITAL AND CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE IN ORDER TO JUSTIFY ITS QUESTIONED DECISION UPHOLDING THE SPURIOUS TITLES OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT PHIL-VILLE, I.E., THE EXPERT AND SCIENTIFIC ANALYSIS OF THE FORENSIC CHEMISTRY DIVISION OF THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION ON THE INK AND PAPER USED ON THE ALLEGED TCT NO. 4211 (WHERE PRIVATE RESPONDENT PHIL-VILLE DERIVED ITS ALLEGED TITLES), WHICH SCIENTIFICALLY FOUND THE ALLEGED TCT NO. 4211 TO HAVE BEEN PREPARED ONLY IN THE 1940s AND NOT IN 1918 AS INDICATED ON THE FACE OF THE DOCUMENT AND THUS, IS SPURIOUS.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT ROUTINELY AND ERRONEOUSLY RELIED ON THE ALLEGATIONS RAISED IN PUBLIC RESPONDENT REPUBLIC’S PETITION-IN-INTERVENTION ALTHOUGH THE STATE IS DEVOID OF ANY LEGAL INTEREST IN THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE LITIGATION UPON WHICH INTERVENTION COULD BE BASED ESPECIALLY IN LIGHT OF THE FACT THAT, AS RULED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS ITSELF IN ITS QUESTIONED DECISION, THE INSTANT CASE ADMITTEDLY INVOLVES PRIVATE LANDS ONLY AND THUS CANNOT BE ORDERED TO BE REVERTED TO THE REPUBLIC.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT BLINDLY ADOPTED THE TRIAL COURT’S ERRONEOUS RULING THAT PETITIONER CLT REALTY IS NOT AN INNOCENT TRANSFEREE ON THE SHEER BASIS OF AN AUTHORIZED AND ILLEGAL ANNOTATION ON ITS TCT.
Respondent Phil-Ville raises as an issue that this petition raises purely factual issues and this Court must respect the factual findings of the RTC and the Court of Appeals, which are supported by clear and convincing evidence.
WHETHER OR [NOT] LOT 26 COVERED BY PETITIONER’S TCT NO. T-177013 ACTUALLY OVERLAPS THE SIXTEEN (16) PARCELS OF LAND [COVERED] BY RESPONDENT PHIL-VILLE’S SIXTEEN (16) TRANSFER CERTIFICATES OF TITLE IN QUESTION.
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER’S TCT NO. T-177013 IS A SPURIOUS TITLE.
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT PHIL-VILLE’S SIXTEEN (16) TITLES IN QUESTION ARE VALID TITLES.
WHETHER OR NOT TCT NOS. 4210 AND 4211 SUFFER FROM DEBILITATING TECHNICAL INFIRMITIES.
WHETHER OR NOT THE USE OF SPANISH TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION IN TITLES SUCH AS TCT NOS. 4210, 4211 AND 35486 AT THAT TIME IS A COMMON ACCEPTABLE PRACTICE.
WHETHER OR NOT THE NON-INCLUSION OF THE DATE OF ORIGINAL SURVEY IN TCT NOS. 4210, 4211, 5261 AND 35486, IF AT ALL, IS NOT A FATAL OMISSION.
WHETHER OR NOT IT IS MANDATORY THAT WHEN LOT 26 WAS SUBDIVIDED INTO THREE (3) LOTS THE RESULTING LOTS SHOULD BE DESIGNATED AS LOT 26-A, LOT 26-B AND LOT 26-C.
WHETHER THE USE OF DIFFERENT TIE POINTS IN SUBDIVISION OF SEVEN (7) LOTS IN PSD-21154 SHOULD BE TIED TO BLLM “1”.
WHETHER OR NOT A COPY OF PLAN PSD-21154 IS NOT ANYMORE AVAILABLE IN THE BUREAU OF LANDS AND THAT SAID PLAN DID NOT ACTUALLY EXIST.
WHETHER OR NOT THE TITLES OF RESPONDENT PHIL-VILLE HAVE DEFECTS.
WHETHER OR NOT TCT NOS. 4210 AND 4211 ARE FORGED CERTIFICATES OF TITLE.
WHETHER OR NOT BOTH THE PNP AND NBI CONFIRMED THE AUTHENTICITY AND GENUINENESS OF TCT NOS. 4210 AND 4211.
WHETHER OR NOT THE AGE OF THE INK AND PAPER USED IN TCT NOS. 4210 AND 4211 COULD ONLY BE MORE OR LESS 50 YEARS OLD.
WHETHER OR NOT LOT 26 IS THE SAME LAND THAT WAS EXPROPRIATED BY THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES.
WHETHER OR NOT IT IS TOO LATE IN THE DAY FOR PETITIONER TO CONTEST THE VALIDITY OF THE RESPONDENT PHIL-VILLE’S TITLES IN QUESTION.
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER CLT IS AN INNOCENT PURCHASER OF THE LAND IN QUESTION.
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER’S CLAIM OF OWNERSHIP OVER LOT 26 IS BARRED BY THE DOCTRINE OF LACHES OR STALE DEMAND.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED ANY ERROR IN ALLOWING THE INTERVENTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES.
As this Court is not a trier of facts, with which the records of this case are replete, the only issue as far as this Court is concerned is the question of whether or not petitioner’s TCT No. T-177013 imposes a cloud on respondent Phil-Ville’s titles to the 16 parcels of land subject matter of this case, as provided in Article 476 of the Civil Code.
ARTICLE 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title.
Quieting of title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud upon, doubt, or uncertainty affecting title to real property. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest in real property by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding that is apparently valid or effective, but is, in truth and in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title. In such action, the competent court is tasked to determine the respective rights of the complainant and the other claimants, not only to place things in their proper places, and make the claimant, who has no rights to said immovable, respect and not disturb the one so entitled, but also for the benefit of both, so that whoever has the right will see every cloud of doubt over the property dissipated, and he can thereafter fearlessly introduce any desired improvements, as well as use, and even abuse the property.
In order that an action for quieting of title may prosper, two requisites must concur: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or equitable title or interest in the real property subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.
The RTC and the Court of Appeals both arrived at the conclusion that respondent Phil-Ville had a valid title to the 16 parcels of land subject of the complaint, and that petitioner’s title is invalid despite its prima facie appearance of validity. This conclusion was arrived at after a thorough study of the pieces of evidence presented by both parties.
The jurisdiction of this Court in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is limited to reviewing only errors of law. There are, in fact, exceptions to this general rule, as explained in Baricuatro, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,45 but we find that they are not present in this case.
The alleged errors assigned by petitioner to the Court of Appeals are, even at a glance, factual in nature and are not borne out by the evidence on record.
“Morever, it is not disupted that plalintiff’s titles were all derived from the so-called Gonzales Estate which was expropriated by the Republic of the Philippines (in proceedings which commenced in January, 1947) in the case of Republic of the Philippines vs. Jose Leon Gonzales, et al.” x x x.
If the Republic of the Philippines TCT Nos. 12836 to 12842 covering the parcels of land expropriated by it from the Gonzales Estate are valid and true, then necessarily, plaintiff’s titles over the sixteen (16) parcels of land here in question, which defendant admits to have been derived from the Republic’s aforesaid titles, must likewise be valid and true.
“Entry No. 44905/0-994 – Issuance of co-owner’s copy: By order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, a co-owner’s duplicate of this Certificate of Title No. 0-994 has been issued in favor of Maria De La Concepcion Vidal.
Date of the Inscription – April 12, 1962 at 3:15 P.M.
The co-owner’s duplicate copy of OCT 994, existing in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Rizal must thus be genuine and a true and faithful copy of the original before the latter was particularly damaged and destroyed, either by bad handling or by the passage of time, considering that said copy was issued by the official who had the custody of the original title and in compliance with a Court Order.
The Court has no doubt, therefore, that the co-owner’s duplicate copy of OCT 994 presented by plaintiff in this case as its Exhibit “V”, is indeed a true and faithful copy of the original of OCT 994 in the custody of the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Rizal, before said original of the title was materially damaged apparently to old age or mishandling before it was transferred to the Office of the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City in 1978.
First, defendant invites attention to the fact that while the technical descriptions of all the lots in the Maysilo Estate contained in OCT 994 are already in English, the lots registered under TCT Nos. 4210 and 4211 are still in Spanish.
The Court agrees with plaintiff, that agrimensor Fernando who subdivided Lot 26 into three (3) portions must have prepared their technical description in Spanish simply because he was more conversant in that language than in English. In fact, there are other titles in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Rizal, which are all derivatives of OCT 994 wherein the technical descriptions of the properties registered therein are also in Spanish (Exhs. “AAAA”, “BBBB”, “CCCC” and “DDDD”) and many entries in the Memorandum of Encumbrances in OCT 994 from December 1917 to October, 1939 also appear to be written in Spanish. Then obviously, both Spanish and English were used interchangeably in legal and official documents in the early years of the American rule in this country and such documents were either prepared in English and Spanish depending on which language the person who prepared the document was more conversant with.
Second, defendant observes that the dates of the original survey of the Maysilo Estate indicated in OCT 994 do not appear in TCT Nos. 4210 and 4211, which show a different survey date. But, there are also other titles in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Rizal, likewise derived from OCT 994 (Exhs. “AAAA” – “DDDD”) that do not also mention the dates of the original survey of the Maysilo Estate as indicated in OCT 994. Again, it is reasonable to assume, that it was not the practice during those days to state in the succeeding titles the dates of the original survey of a registered land as stated in its OCT. The failure to state the date of the original survey in succeeding titles did not render said titles defective or invalid.
Third, defendant finds it unusual why agrimensor Fernando, who subdivided Lot 26 into three (3) portions, did not designate said portions as Lot 26-A, Lot 26-B and Lot 26-C which is the usual practice. But defendant has not shown any requirement in the Rules of the General Land Registration Office, the predecessor of the Land Registration Authority (LRA), nor in the manual of the Bureau of Lands, requiring that the resultant lots when an isolated survey is made, like the subdivision made by agrimensor Fernando on Lot 26, should be designated as Lots A, B and C, a requirement prescribed in cadastral cases.
Fourth, neither does the non-indication of the survey number (a point also raised by defendant) in TCT Nos. 4210 and 4211 lessen the validity of these titles. The approval of the Bureau of Lands was not required in 1918 (Sec. 44, Act No. 496, enacted in 1902). For the technical description of the subdivided portions of Lot 26 prepared by agrimensor Fernando were also approved by the Court when it approved the Escritura de Venta (Exh. “CC”), embodying said technical descriptions without indicating the survey number so that we can also believe that the statement of the survey number in the description of registered lands was not mandatory at that time, as again shown by other titles derived from OCT 994 and also found in the records of the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Rizal (Exhs. “AAAA” – “DDDD”) which do not also indicate the survey numbers of the survey plans which led to their issuance.
Fifth, the fact noted by defendant, that the old titles and documents relied upon by the plaintiff are still in the files of the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Rizal and had not been transferred to Caloocan City when it was created, together with the original of OCT 994, is easily explainable. Caloocan City was formerly a municipality of the Province of Rizal, hence all land titles over properties in the former municipality of Caloocan and their supporting documents, formed part of the official records of the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Rizal. Upon the creation of Caloocan City in 1977 or 1978, certain titles and documents pertaining to properties located in Caloocan City were transferred from Pasig, Rizal to the Office of the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City either upon request of certain parties or upon the initiative of the latter Officials. Titles not requested to be transferred and other documents relating to early transactions involving properties located in the former municipality of Caloocan, however, remained with the Office of the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Rizal, such as the co-owner’s duplicate title of OCT 994, owner’s duplicate of TCT Nos. 4210, 4211 and 5261 and their supporting documents. (see the testimonies of Deputy Register of Deeds of Caloocan City, Norberto Vasquez, TSN November 12, 1991, pp. 23, 25; of Rolando Golla, representative of the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Rizal, TSN id., p. 23; TSN March 17, 1992, p. 27; TSN December 7, 1992, p. 18; and of Mamerto Lara, Records Officer of the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Rizal, TSN May 5, 1992, pp. 11-16).
Add to all the above, the further consideration that TCT Nos. 4210 and 4211 and the Escritura de Venta (Exhibit “CC”) as well as all the other documents supporting said titles and deed of sale are more than 75 years old, so that under the Rules of Court, no other evidence of their execution and authenticity need to be given as they were “produced from a custody in which would naturally be found if genuine” (Rule 132, Sec. 1, Revised Rules of Court). Moreover, said titles and deed of sale and other supporting documents, are all public documents and ancient at that, so that no further evidence than said documents themselves are necessary to provide their validity, genuineness and authenticity (Sec. 23, Rule 132, id.).
The Court thus reiterate, that the documents and titles from which plaintiff’s titles to the lots in question are derived, are genuine, authentic, valid and legitimate.
The Court of Appeals issued the questioned Decision and Resolution based on the evidence presented on trial even prior to this Court’s issuance of the historically-significant en banc resolutions in the consolidated cases, commonly entitled Manotok Realty, Inc. v. CLT Realty Development Corp.,47 wherein the Court reconsidered and reversed its earlier Decision in the same case, as well as related, previously-decided cases, referring to OCT No. 994 covering a portion of the Maysilo Estate. There were two resolutions in said cases, one dated December 15, 2007 (the 2007 Manotok Resolution) and a subsequent one dated March 31, 2009 (the 2009 Manotok Resolution).
Of particular relevance to this present case is the ruling in the 2009 Manotok Resolution that TCT No. T-177013, the certificate of title of herein petitioner CLT, who is also a party to said consolidated cases, is null and void.48 Therefore, the cloud on respondent Phil-Ville’s 16 titles subject matter of the complaint had already been removed.
It is evident from all three titles — CLT's, Hipolito’s and Dimson’s — that the properties they purport to cover were “originally registered on the 19th day April, in the year nineteen hundred and seventeen in the Registration Book of the Office of the Register of Deeds of Rizal.” Note, as earlier established, there is no such OCT No. 994 originally registered on 19 April 1917.
From these premises, the Court is able to make the following binding conclusions. First, there is only one OCT No. 994. As it appears on the record, that mother title was received for transcription by the Register of Deeds on 3 May 1917, and that should be the date which should be reckoned as the date of registration of the title. It may also be acknowledged, as appears on the title, that OCT No. 994 resulted from the issuance of the decree of registration on 17 April 1917, although such date cannot be considered as the date of the title or the date when the title took effect.
As a matter of fact, in Alfonso v. Office of the President and Phil-Ville Development and Housing Corporation,53 the Court penalized the former register of deeds of Caloocan who acquiesced to the change of the date of registration of OCT No. 994 from May 3, 1917 to April 19, 1917, which wreaked havoc on our country’s land titling system, and led to much confusion that continued to “rear its ugly head” in many cases pending before the courts.
The Special Division is tasked to hear and receive evidence, conclude the proceedings and submit to this Court a report on its findings and recommended conclusions within three (3) months from finality of this Resolution.
Which of the contending parties are able to trace back their claims of title to OCT No. 994 dated 3 May 1917?
Whether the imputed flaws in the titles of the Manotoks and Araneta, as recounted in the 2005 Decision, are borne by the evidence? Assuming they are, are such flaws sufficient to defeat the claims of title of the Manotoks and Araneta?
Whether the factual and legal bases of 1966 Order of Judge Muñoz-Palma and the 1970 Order of Judge Sayo are true and valid. Assuming they are, do these orders establish a superior right to the subject properties in favor of the Dimsons and CLT as opposed to the claims of Araneta and the Manotoks?
Whether any of the subject properties had been the subject of expropriation proceedings at any point since the issuance of OCT No. 994 on 3 May 1917, and if so what are those proceedings, what are the titles acquired by the Government and whether any of the parties is able to trace its title to the title acquired by the Government through expropriation.
The ultimate purpose of the inquiry undertaken by the Court of Appeals was to ascertain which of the four groups of claimants were entitled to claim ownership over the subject properties to which they claimed title thereto. One set of properties was disputed between CLT and the Manotoks, while the other set was disputed between Araneta and the Heirs of Dimson.
Another property in Dimson’s name, apparently taken from Lot 26 of the Maysilo Estate, was later sold to Estelita Hipolito, who in turn sold the same to CLT. Said property was registered by CLT under TCT No. T-177013, which also reflected, as its mother title, OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917. Said property claimed by CLT encroached on property covered by titles in the name of the Manotoks. The Manotoks traced their titles to TCT Nos. 4210 and 4211, both issued in 1918 and both reflecting, as their mother title, OCT No. 994 dated 3 May 1917.
Our findings regarding the titles of Jose Dimson necessarily affect and even invalidate the claims of all persons who seek to derive ownership from the Dimson titles. These include CLT, which acquired the properties they laid claim on from Estelita Hipolito who in turn acquired the same from Jose Dimson. Just as much was concluded by the Special Division as it evaluated CLT’s claims.
In view of the foregoing disquisitions, invalidating the titles of DIMSON, the title of CLT should also be declared a nullity inasmuch as the nullity of the titles of DIMSON necessarily upended CLT’s propriety claims. As earlier highlighted, CLT had anchored its claim on the strength of Hipolito’s title and that of DIMSON’s TCT No. 15166. Remarkably and curiously though, TCT No. 15166 was never presented in evidence for purposes of tracing the validity of titles of CLT. On this basis alone, the present remand proceedings remain damning to CLT’s claim of ownership.
Thus, both requisites in order for an action for quieting of title to prosper have been met in this case: (1) respondent Phil-Ville had established its equitable title or interest in the 16 parcels of land subject of the action; and (2) TCT No. T-177013, found to overlap titles to said properties of respondent Phil-Ville, was previously declared invalid.
In fine, the Court of Appeals, in its questioned Decision and Resolution, did not commit reversible error in upholding the RTC Decision dated March 15, 1996.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby DENIED. Costs against petitioner.
1 565 Phil. 59 (2007) and 601 Phil. 571 (2009).
2Rollo, pp. 103-134; penned by Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando with Associate Justices Ruben T. Reyes and Edgardo F. Sundiam, concurring.
4 Id. at 443-476; penned by Judge Silvestre H. Bello, Jr.
14 Records (Vol. I), pp. 183-208.
16 Records (Vol. I), pp. 409-410.
20 Records (Vol. II), pp. 79-81.
25 Records (Vol. II), p. 440.
30 Respondent Phil-Ville’s Memorandum was filed on October 25, 2004 (Rollo, pp. 1442-1555). Petitioner’s Memorandum was dated November 22, 2004 (Rollo, pp. 1556-1661).
43 G.R. No. 167391, June 8, 2011, 651 SCRA 327, 341-347.
44 Chacon Enterprises v. Court of Appeals, 209 Phil. 634, 647 (1983).
45 As we held in Baricuatro, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 382 Phil. 15, 24 (2000): It is a settled doctrine that findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are binding and conclusive upon this Court. Such factual findings shall not be disturbed, unless: (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjecture; (2) the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case and its findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellees; (7) the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) said findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (10) the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.
Even assuming arguendo, that Psd-21154 of the Gonzales family cannot be found either in the records of the Bureau of Lands or those of the LRA, as claimed by the defendant, such fact would not detract from the validity of the title TCT No. 4211 of Alejandro Ruiz and Mariano P. Leuterio or the succeeding titles of Francisco J. Gonzales, those of his six (6) children and later of the government, over the lots in question.
Entry No. 3731/T-1368 – Subdivision of the Land described in this certificate of title into seven (7) lots in accordance with subdivision plan Psd-21154 duly approved by the Director of Lands together with the technical description.
Date of Inscription – November 21, 1946 at 1:10 P.M.
On the other hand, while Eduardo Alejandro Santos, Jr., Acting Chief of the Vault Section, Docket Division on the Land Registration Commission, testified that the original tracing cloth of Plan Psd-21154 is not on file with their office, he stated that the old approved subdivision plans from the time the LRA was created up to the present are indeed not intact in their office as these plans could have been lost or some Register of Deeds perhaps did not follow the proper procedure (TSN March 27, 1995, p. 9). Santos added that he could not tell conclusively that on 1946, the submission of the original tracing cloths of subdivision plans to this office was required x x x.
Subdivision Plan Psd-21154 presented in this case by plaintiff as its Exh. “U” is therefore unquestionably genuine and authentic and had been duly approved by the Bureau of Lands, resulting in the issuance of TCT Nos. 1368 – 1374 to the Gonzales children, the heirs of Francisco J. Gonzales, who purchased the land covered by TCT No. 4211 from Alejandro Ruiz and Mariano P. Leuterio.
On the alleged use of different tie points, the Court believes that there is really no necessity of going into the technical matter of the points in determining the validity of Survey Plan Psd-21154 of the Gonzales family (Exh. “U”), since said plan and the succeeding plan LRC (Psd) 1828, covering the same land prepared for the PHHC (Exh. “AA”) had both been approved by the Bureau of Lands and the LRC (now LRA), the government agencies with the power and authority to approve subdivision surveys of registered lands. There is a presumption of regularity and compliance with existing regulations when both offices approved the aforesaid survey plans. There is therefore, no need to belabor the matter of the points brought up by defendant in its memorandum.
Be that as it may, the Court does not agree with defendant that the supposed deviation in tie points from BLLM “1” of the original survey Psu-2345 made in Psd-21154 resulted in the shifting of the position of the seven (7) subdivided lots of the Gonzales heirs to the west from their original positions, so that they no longer fall exactly inside the boundaries of the mother lot, as alleged by defendant based on the testimony of its witness Engineer Juanito Bustalino x x x.
48Manotok Realty, Inc. v. CLT Realty Development Corp., 601 Phil. 571, 636 (2009).
49 See petitioner’s Answer in Records, pp. 183-208, Memorandum in Rollo, pp. 1556-1659.
50Manotok Realty, Inc. v. CLT Realty Development Corp., 565 Phil. 59, 70-71 (2007).
53 548 Phil. 615, 637-638 (2007).
54Manotok Realty, Inc. v. CLT Realty Development Corp., 565 Phil. 59, 102-103 (2007).
55Manotok Realty, Inc. v. CLT Realty Development Corp., 601 Phil. 571, 577 (2009).

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