Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&amp;view=article&amp;id=33860:g-r-no-106251-november-19,-1993-chiao-liong-tan-v-court-of-appeals,-et-al&amp;catid=1308&amp;Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 14:47:18+00:00

Document:
CHIAO LIONG TAN, Petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MANUEL T. MURO, Presiding Judge, RTC of Manila, Branch 54 and TAN BAN YONG, Respondents.
Joaquin M. Arao for Petitioner.
Macavinta & Sta. Ana Law Offices for Private Respondent.
1.	REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY; FINDINGS OF FACTS OF THE TRIAL COURT, GENERALLY UPHELD ON APPEAL; CASE AT BAR. — Since the Court of Appeals merely affirmed the trial court’s assessment of the credibility of the witnesses that testified before it, petitioner is in effect questioning the factual findings of said court and its appraisal of their testimony, which this Court cannot review, its jurisdiction being limited to questions of law. The considerable weight given to the findings of the trial court is not without any reason. It had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses which is usually not reflected in the transcript of records. The profundity of the conclusions thus reached is just the result of such observance. When the Court of Appeals affirmed said findings, it goes to show that no misapprehension of facts was committed as said Court has the power to scrutinize said factual findings under existing rules of procedures.
2.	ID.; ID.; CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRATION OF A MOTOR VEHICLE IN ONE’S NAME, CREATES A STRONG PRESUMPTION OF OWNERSHIP. — A certificate of registration of a motor vehicle in one’s name indeed creates a strong presumption of ownership. For all practical purposes, the person in whose favor it has been issued is virtually the owner thereof unless proved otherwise. In other words, such presumption is rebuttable by competent proof.
3.	CIVIL LAW; OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS; IMPLIED TRUST; CREATED WHERE CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRATION OF MOTOR VEHICLE WAS PLACED IN THE NAME OF ANOTHER; CASE AT BAR. — The New Civil Code recognizes cases of implied trust other than those enumerated therein. Thus, although no specific provision could be cited to apply to the parties herein, it is undeniable that an implied trust was created when the certificate of registration of the motor vehicle was placed in the name of petitioner although the price thereof was not paid by him but by private Respondent. The principle that a trustee who puts a certificate of registration in his name cannot repudiate the trust by relying on the registration is one of the well-known limitations upon a title. A trust, which derives its strength from the confidence one reposes on another especially between brothers, does not lose that character simply because of what appears in a legal document.
4.	REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL ACTIONS; REPLEVIN; MAY RESOLVE ISSUE ON OWNERSHIP; REASON. — It is true that the judgment in a replevin suit must only resolve in whom is the right of possession. Primarily, the action of replevin is possessory in character and determines nothing more than the right of possession. However, when the title to the property is distinctly put in issue by the defendant’s plea and by reason of the policy to settle in one action all the conflicting claims of the parties to the possession of the property in controversy, the question of ownership may be resolved in the same proceeding.
5.	ID.; ID.; ID.; FLEXIBLE TO AUTHORIZE SETTLEMENT OF ALL EQUITIES BETWEEN THE PARTIES. — Although a "replevin" action is primarily one for possession of personalty, yet it is sufficiently flexible to authorize a settlement of all equities between the parties, arising from or growing out of the main controversy. Thus, in an action for replevin where the defendant is adjudged entitled to possession, he need not go to another forum to procure relief for the return of the replevied property or secure a judgment for the value of the property in case the adjudged return thereof could not be had. Appropriately, the trial court rendered an alternative judgment.
Petitioner seeks in this petition the reversal of the Court of Appeals’ decision dated May 15, 1992 in CA-G.R. CV No. 29982 affirming the unfavorable decision of the trial court 1 in his suit for replevin and damages.
On the other hand, private respondent testified that CLT Industries is a family business that was placed in petitioner’s name because at that time he was then leaving for the United States and petitioner is the remaining Filipino in the family residing in the Philippines. When the family business needed a vehicle in 1987 for use in the delivery of machinery to its customers, he asked petitioner to look for a vehicle and gave him the amount of P5,000.00 to be deposited as down payment for an Isuzu Elf Van which would be available in about a month. After a month, he himself paid the whole price out of a loan of P140,000.00 which he obtained from his friend Tan Pit Sin. Inasmuch as the receipt for the downpayment was placed in the name of petitioner and since he was still on good terms with him, private respondents allowed the registration of the vehicle in petitioner’s name. It was also their understanding that he would keep the van for himself because CLT Industries was not in a position to pay him. Hence, from the time of the purchase, he had been in possession of the vehicle including the original registration papers thereof, but allowing petitioner from time to time to use the van for deliveries of machinery.
Tan Pit Sin who had known private respondent since 1968, not only because they were classmates but also because of their business dealings with each other, confirmed that private respondent borrowed from him P140,000.00 in March, 1987 to buy an Isuzu Elf van. In fact, he had borrowed said vehicle of a few times.
"1.	. . . in finding the testimonies of private respondent’s witnesses credible.
In concluding that the testimonies of Tan Ban Yong, Tan Pit Sin and Gina Lu cast doubt on the petitioner’s ownership of the motor vehicle in question, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals attached significance to their respective interlocking accounts on how the motor vehicle was acquired, complete with the financing source and mode of repayment. Respondent Tan Ban Yong’s declaration that he borrowed P140,000.00 from Tan Pit Sin and paid the balance of the purchase price of the motor vehicle himself to Gina Lu of the Balintawak Isuzu Motors, is corroborated by the above-mentioned persons themselves. Tan Pit Sin not only confirmed the loan but also stated that the same was paid in three (3) months; P50,000.00 on the first payment; another P50,000.00 on the second payment and P40,000.00 on the last payment. 4 Gina Lu, who testified at the instance of petitioner, declared that the downpayment of P5,000.00 was paid by petitioner and so the receipt for the same was issued in his name but the balance of P133,000.00 was paid by private respondent and to make the record consistent, she issued the receipt in the name of petitioner again.
A certificate of registration of a motor vehicle in one’s name indeed creates a strong presumption of ownership. For all practical purposes, the person in whose favor it has been issued is virtually the owner thereof unless proved otherwise. In other words, such presumption is rebuttable by competent proof.
It is true that the judgment 11 in a replevin suit must only resolve in whom is the right of possession. Primarily, the action of replevin is possessory in character and determines nothing more than the right of possession. However, when the title to the property is distinctly put in issue by the defendant’s plea and by reason of the policy to settle in one action all the conflicting claims of the parties to the possession of the property in controversy, the question of ownership may be resolved in the same proceeding.
Finally, although a "replevin" action is primarily one for possession of personality, yet it is sufficiently flexible to authorize a settlement of all equities between the parties, arising from or growing out of the main controversy. 17 Thus, in an action for replevin where the defendant is adjudged entitled to possession, he need not go to another forum to procure relief for the return of the replevied property or secure a judgment for the value of the property in case the adjudged return thereof could not be had. Appropriately, the trial court rendered an alternative judgment.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Puno J., took no part.
1.	Penned by Judge Manuel T. Muro, RTC, Branch 54, Manila.
4.	TSN, March 22, 1990, p. 5.
5.	TSN, November 16, 1989, pp. 30-31.
9.	Art. 1447, New Civil Code.
10.	Bornales, IAC, G.R. No. 75336, 166 SCRA 524 (1988); Amerol v. Bagumbayan, G.R. No. L-33261, 154 SCRA 403 (1987); Cardiente v. IAC, G.R. No. 73651, 155 SCRA 689 (1987).
11.	Sec. 9, Rule 60, Rules of Court.
12.	Section 1, Rules 60, Rule of Court; Calo v. Roldan, 76 Phil. 445; Regalado, Florenz D., Remedial Law Compendium; Vol. 1, pp. 436-437 and Francisco, Vicente, Jr., The Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines, Annotated and Commented, Vol. IV-A, pp. 386-3817.
14.	45 ALR 3d 1206.
15.	407 U.S. 67, 32 L. Ed. 2d 556, 92 S. Ct. 1983.
16.	Section 5, Rule 58, Rules of Court, as amended by BP 224.
17.	Hales-Mullaly, Inc. v. Cannon, 119 P 2d 46, 48, 189 Okl. 613, cited in Words and Phrases, Replevin, Vol. 37, permanent ed.

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