Source: http://masscases.com/cases/sjc/345/345mass747.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 15:40:08+00:00

Document:
SAMUEL SCHERTZER & another vs. CITY OF SOMERVILLE & others.
PETITION filed in the Land Court on April 29, 1959.
Elliott H. Stone for the respondents Alphonso F. Corrado & another.
David B. Nissenbaum (Morris Nissenbaum with him) for the petitioners.
the petition had been filed to prevent Schertzer from using the locus for the parking or storage of trucks as that type of business "would cause deterioration in the value of nearby residential properties." Thereafter the planning board forwarded a recommendation to the Somerville board of aldermen that the "lots numbered 121 and 123 Prospect Street, and that portion of the lot known as 9-11 Houghton Street now in Business Zone, be removed from said Business Zone, and designated hereafter as Residence `B' zone." The board of aldermen passed ordinance No. 346 to that effect and it became effective on April 13, 1959. There followed the entry of this petition.
Corrado to the action of the judge in allowing the petitioners to amend their petition by filing the "Amended Substituted Petition," and to the court's decision, findings, rulings and refusals to rule.
The judge found, inter alia, that Prospect Street is a main artery of travel between Cambridge and Somerville. Traffic is now four to five times as heavy on that street as it was in 1925. All the houses on the street were built prior to 1925 and all except one prior to 1985. There has been a general erosion of residences in the vicinity of Prospect Street and a gradual change and conversion of property from residential to industrial or commercial use.
1. The trial judge did not err in allowing the motion to amend the petition. It lies within the sound judicial discretion of the judge to allow any amendment which may enable the petitioner to sustain the action "for the cause for which it was intended to be brought." G. L. c. 231, Section 51. See Boston Trust Funds, Inc. v. Henderson, 341 Mass. 730, 731. The objective of the petitioners first stated in the original petition remained unchanged in the light of ordinance No. 356 which was enacted subsequent to their entry of this proceeding. Indeed, in their brief, the respondents Corrado make note that ordinances No. 346 and No. 356 aimed at the same target.
No desirable purpose would have been served by a judicial exercise of discretion to deny the motion to amend when the entry of a second proceeding presenting the same essential issues of fact would follow. See Atherton v. Building Inspector of Bourne, 343 Mass. 284. It is not novel to allow amendments to pleadings for the purpose of presenting facts which have intervened since the commencement of a proceeding. Giles v. Giles, 293 Mass. 495, 499. Caputo v. Board of Appeals of Somerville, 330 Mass. 107, 114.
2. The test of the validity of the amendments to the zoning ordinance affecting the locus is similar to that to be applied to the ordinance itself, i.e., does it comply with the terms of the enabling statute, G. L. c. 40A. Caires v. Building Commr. of Hingham, 323 Mass. 589, 594. 122 Main St.
Corp. v. Brockton, 323 Mass. 646, 648. Lamarre v. Commissioner of Pub. Works of Fall River, 324 Mass. 542, 544. Shannon v. Building Inspector of Woburn, 328 Mass. 633, 636. Burnham v. Board of Appeals of Gloucester, 333 Mass. 114, 117. A zoning ordinance may be amended to accomplish any of those purposes for which the ordinance was originally enacted in accordance with G. L. c. 40A. Shannon v. Building Inspector of Woburn, supra, 637-638. Every presumption is to be afforded in favor of the validity of an ordinance and if its reasonableness is fairly debatable the judgment of the local authorities who gave it its being will prevail. Caires v. Building Commr. of Hingham, supra, 595, 597. 122 Main St. Corp. v. Brockton, supra, 649. Lamarre v. Commissioner of Pub. Works of Fall River, supra, 545. Burnham v. Board of Appeals of Gloucester, supra, 116-117. It will be sustained unless there exists no substantial relation between it and the expressed purposes of the statute. Conversely, it will be held invalid if it be arbitrary or unreasonable, or substantially unrelated to the public health, safety, convenience, morals or welfare. Caires v. Building Commr. of Hingham, supra, 593. Lamarre v. Commissioner of Pub. Works of Fall River, supra, 545. Caputo v. Board of Appeals of Somerville, 330 Mass. 107, 113. Cohen v. Lynn, 333 Mass. 699, 705. Jenckes v. Building Commr. of Brookline, 341 Mass. 162, 166.
and less residential in the intervening time. The 1955 expert study found it properly classified for business. It was set off from similar adjacent business lots at the instigation of citizens who objected to a particular proposed business use. This constituted arbitrary and unreasonable action. If not spot zoning in the sense of picking out an undifferentiated area within a district (Whittemore v. Building Inspector of Falmouth, 313 Mass. 248, 249), it was analogous to it and equally violative of the principle of uniformity. See Shapiro v. Cambridge, supra, 659. We are of the opinion that the judge properly ruled ordinance No. 356 invalid and a fortiori ordinance No. 346 also invalid.
There was no error in the refusal to grant the respondents' requests for rulings.

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