Source: http://sclawreview.org/week-7-2018/
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 22:26:29+00:00

Document:
The Fourth Circuit upheld the preliminary injunction against Proclamation No. 9645, “Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry Into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats,” because the Plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their Establishment Clause claim; enjoining the unlawful Proclamation was in the public interest; and the district court’s grant of a nationwide injunction against enforcement of § 2 of the Proclamation, excepting North Korea and Venezuela, was not an abuse of discretion. The court thus affirmed the preliminary injunction granted by the district court, but stayed its decision pending the Supreme Court’s decision.
On September 24, 2017, President Trump issued Proclamation No. 9645, Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry Into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats (the “Proclamation”), 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161 (Sept. 24, 2017). Invoking both 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) and 8 U.S.C. § 1185(a), the Proclamation succeeded EO-2 and indefinitely suspended the entry of some or all immigrants and nonimmigrants from eight countries: Chad, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Somalia, Syria, Venezuela, and Yemen (the “Designated Countries”). Six of those countries—Chad, Libya, Iran, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen—were predominantly Muslim and had a combined population of approximately 150 million people.
Three separate lawsuits were brought or amended in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland, which were consolidated for this appeal. Plaintiffs moved to preliminarily enjoin the Proclamation in its entirety before it took effect, claiming that it violated the Establishment Clause’s prohibition on disfavoring religion, exceeded the President’s authority under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) and 8 U.S.C. § 1185(a)(1), violated 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)’s prohibition on nationality discrimination on the issuance of visas, and failed to comply with § 1182(f)’s procedural requirements. The district court granted the preliminary injunction, holding that Plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their § 1152(a) claim and their Establishment Clause claim but not on the merits of their § 1182(f) and § 1185(a)(1) claims. The U.S. District Court for the District of Hawaii also enjoined the Proclamation. On December 4, 2017, the Supreme Court granted the Government’s request for a complete stay pending appellate review of the two district courts’ preliminary injunctions.
The Fourth Circuit first held that Plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their Establishment Clause claim because the Proclamation, read in the context of President Trump’s official statements, failed to demonstrate on its face a primarily secular purpose. The court reasoned that to the objective observer, the Proclamation continued to exhibit a primarily anti-Muslim objective. Furthermore, Plaintiffs offered undisputed evidence that the President of the United States openly and often expressed his desire to ban Muslims from entering the United States. Thus, the court held the Proclamation was not only a likely Establishment Clause violation, but also struck at the basic notion that the government may not act based on religious animosity.
Next, the Fourth Circuit held that the likelihood of irreparable harm, the balance of equities, and the public interest all favored granting injunctive relief. First, Establishment Clause violations create the same type of immediate, irreparable injury as do other types of First Amendment violations. Because the Proclamation violated the Establishment Clause and was already in full effect, the court held that the injury was not only threatened and likely but already ongoing. Furthermore, the individual Plaintiffs whose family members were categorically rendered ineligible for visas demonstrated a likelihood of irreparable harm due to the anxiety and straining of relationships that accompanies prolonged and indefinite separation of parents, children, siblings, and partners. Second, the balance of equities weighed in favor of Plaintiffs, who were likely to continue suffering a violation of their Establishment Clause rights (the combination of religious marginalization with familial separation), rather than the Government, which was not likely to be harmed by an injunction against the enforcement of a likely unconstitutional Proclamation. The Government failed to show that national security could not be maintained without the unprecedented multi-national ban. Third, the court held that it could not be in the public interest for the President to violate the Establishment Clause. Furthermore, the unlawfully issued Proclamation would have a much broader deleterious effect on the public interest than the simple fact that certain foreign nationals would be excluded.
Finally, the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting a nationwide injunction against enforcement of § 2 of the Proclamation, excepting North Korea and Venezuela. The court reasoned that the balance of the equities favored the Government, the injunction should not extend to North Korea and Venezuela because there was no alleged Establishment Clause violation as to either, and the injunction did not apply to the President himself but instead to the agencies and agency heads charged with implementing the Proclamation. Furthermore, the “nationwide” aspect of the injunction was not an abuse of discretion because Plaintiffs were scattered throughout the country, Congress had instructed that the immigration laws of the U.S. should be enforced vigorously and uniformly, and enjoining the Proclamation only as to Plaintiffs would not cure its deficiencies because it was issued in violation of the Constitution.
Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the preliminary injunction granted by the district court, but stayed the decision pending the Supreme Court’s decision.

References: § 2
 § 1182
 § 1185
 § 1182
 § 1185
 § 1152
 § 1182
 § 1152
 § 1182
 § 1185
 § 2