Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=82732:56562&catid=1580&Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 04:09:35+00:00

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THE CITY OF MANILA, REPRESENTED BY MAYOR JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., AND MS. LIBERTY M. TOLEDO, IN HER CAPACITY AS THE CITY TREASURER OF MANILA, Petitioners, v. HON. CARIDAD H. GRECIA–CUERDO, IN HER CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 112, PASAY CITY; SM MART, INC.; SM PRIME HOLDINGS, INC.; STAR APPLIANCES CENTER; SUPERVALUE, INC.; ACE HARDWARE PHILIPPINES, INC.; WATSON PERSONAL CARE STORES, PHILS., INC.; JOLLIMART PHILS., CORP.; SURPLUS MARKETING CORPORATION AND SIGNATURE LINES, Respondents.
Before the Court is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the Resolutions1 dated April 6, 2006 and November 29, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA–G.R. SP No. 87948.
The record shows that petitioner City of Manila, through its treasurer, petitioner Liberty Toledo, assessed taxes for the taxable period from January to December 2002 against private respondents SM Mart, Inc., SM Prime Holdings, Inc., Star Appliances Center, Supervalue, Inc., Ace Hardware Philippines, Inc., Watsons Personal Care Stores Phils., Inc., Jollimart Philippines Corp., Surplus Marketing Corp. and Signature Lines. In addition to the taxes purportedly due from private respondents pursuant to Section 14, 15, 16, 17 of the Revised Revenue Code of Manila (RRCM), said assessment covered the local business taxes petitioners were authorized to collect under Section 21 of the same Code. Because payment of the taxes assessed was a precondition for the issuance of their business permits, private respondents were constrained to pay the P 19,316,458.77 assessment under protest.
In its Order3 dated July 9, 2004, the RTC granted private respondents’ application for a writ of preliminary injunction.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration4 but the RTC denied it in its Order5 dated October 15, 2004.
In its Resolution promulgated on April 6, 2006, the CA dismissed petitioners’ petition for certiorari holding that it has no jurisdiction over the said petition. The CA ruled that since appellate jurisdiction over private respondents’ complaint for tax refund, which was filed with the RTC, is vested in the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), pursuant to its expanded jurisdiction under Republic Act No. 9282 (RA 9282), it follows that a petition for certiorari seeking nullification of an interlocutory order issued in the said case should, likewise, be filed with the CTA.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration,7 but the CA denied it in its Resolution dated November 29, 2006.
I– Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction.
II– Whether or not the Honorable Regional Trial Court gravely abuse[d] its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in enjoining by issuing a Writ of Injunction the petitioners[,] their agents and/or authorized representatives from implementing Section 21 of the Revised Revenue Code of Manila, as amended, against private respondents.
III– Whether or not the Honorable Regional Trial Court gravely abuse[d] its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the Writ of Injunction despite failure of private respondents to make a written claim for tax credit or refund with the City Treasurer of Manila.
IV– Whether or not the Honorable Regional Trial Court gravely abuse[d] its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction considering that under Section 21 of the Manila Revenue Code, as amended, they are mere collecting agents of the City Government.
Without first resolving the above issues, this Court finds that the instant petition should be denied for being moot and academic.
To plaintiff SM Mart, Inc.
To plaintiff SM Prime Holdings, Inc.
To plaintiff Ace Hardware Phils., Inc.
To plaintiff Watsons Personal Care Health Stores Phils., Inc.
To plaintiff Jollimart Phils., Corp.
To plaintiff Surplus Marketing Corp.
To plaintiff Signature Mktg. Corp.
Defendants are further enjoined from collecting taxes under Section 21, Revenue Code of Manila from herein plaintiff.
The parties did not inform the Court but based on the records, the above Decision had already become final and executory per the Certificate of Finality11 issued by the same trial court on October 20, 2008. In fact, a Writ of Execution12 was issued by the RTC on November 25, 2009.
However, before proceeding, to resolve the question on jurisdiction, the Court deems it proper to likewise address a procedural error which petitioners committed.
Nonetheless, in accordance with the liberal spirit pervading the Rules of Court and in the interest of substantial justice, this Court has, before, treated a petition for certiorari as a petition for review on certiorari, particularly (1) if the petition for certiorari was filed within the reglementary period within which to file a petition for review on certiorari; (2) when errors of judgment are averred; and (3) when there is sufficient reason to justify the relaxation of the rules.18 Considering that the present petition was filed within the 15–day reglementary period for filing a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, that an error of judgment is averred, and because of the significance of the issue on jurisdiction, the Court deems it proper and justified to relax the rules and, thus, treat the instant petition for certiorari as a petition for review on certiorari.
Having disposed of the procedural aspect, we now turn to the central issue in this case. The basic question posed before this Court is whether or not the CTA has jurisdiction over a special civil action for certiorari assailing an interlocutory order issued by the RTC in a local tax case.
(3) Decisions of provincial or City Boards of Assessment Appeals in cases involving the assessment and taxation of real property or other matters arising under the Assessment Law, including rules and regulations relative thereto.
7. Decisions of the Secretary of Trade and Industry, in the case of nonagricultural product, commodity or article, and the Secretary of Agriculture in the case of agricultural product, commodity or article, involving dumping and countervailing duties under Section 301 and 302, respectively, of the Tariff and Customs Code, and safeguard measures under Republic Act No. 8800, where either party may appeal the decision to impose or not to impose said duties.
1. Exclusive original jurisdiction over all criminal offenses arising from violations of the National Internal Revenue Code or Tariff and Customs Code and other laws administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue or the Bureau of Customs: Provided, however, That offenses or felonies mentioned in this paragraph where the principal amount of taxes and fees, exclusive of charges and penalties, claimed is less than One million pesos ( P 1,000,000.00) or where there is no specified amount claimed shall be tried by the regular Courts and the jurisdiction of the CTA shall be appellate. Any provision of law or the Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the criminal action and the corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability for taxes and penalties shall at all times be simultaneously instituted with, and jointly determined in the same proceeding by the CTA, the filing of the criminal action being deemed to necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil action, and no right to reserve the filing of such civil action separately from the criminal action will be recognized.
a. Over appeals from the judgments, resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in tax cases originally decided by them, in their respected territorial jurisdiction.
b. Over petitions for review of the judgments, resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in the exercise of their appellate jurisdiction over tax cases originally decided by the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in their respective jurisdiction.
1. Exclusive original jurisdiction in tax collection cases involving final and executory assessments for taxes, fees, charges and penalties: Provides, however, that collection cases where the principal amount of taxes and fees, exclusive of charges and penalties, claimed is less than One million pesos ( P 1,000,000.00) shall be tried by the proper Municipal Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court and Regional Trial Court.
a. Over appeals from the judgments, resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in tax collection cases originally decided by them, in their respective territorial jurisdiction.
A perusal of the above provisions would show that, while it is clearly stated that the CTA has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over decisions, orders or resolutions of the RTCs in local tax cases originally decided or resolved by them in the exercise of their original or appellate jurisdiction,there is no categorical statement under RA 1125 as well as the amendatory RA 9282, which provides that the CTA has jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari assailing interlocutory orders issued by the RTC in local tax cases filed before it.
existence of appellate jurisdiction.20 Thus, in the cases of Pimentel v. COMELEC,21Garcia v. De Jesus,22Veloria v. COMELEC,23Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board v. Lubrica,24 and Garcia v. Sandiganbayan,25 this Court has ruled against the jurisdiction of courts or tribunals over petitions for certiorari on the ground that there is no law which expressly gives these tribunals such power.26 It must be observed, however, that with the exception of Garcia v. Sandiganbayan,27 these rulings pertain not to regular courts but to tribunals exercising quasi–judicial powers. With respect to the Sandiganbayan, Republic Act No. 824928 now provides that the special criminal court has exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for the issuance of the writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari,habeas corpus, injunctions, and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
In the same manner, Section 5 (1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution grants power to the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. With respect to the Court of Appeals, Section 9 (1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (BP 129) gives the appellate court, also in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, the power to issue, among others, a writ of certiorari,whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. As to Regional Trial Courts, the power to issue a writ of certiorari, in the exercise of their original jurisdiction, is provided under Section 21 of BP 129.
The foregoing notwithstanding, while there is no express grant of such power, with respect to the CTA, Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides, nonetheless, that judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law and that judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
On the strength of the above constitutional provisions, it can be fairly interpreted that the power of the CTA includes that of determining whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC in issuing an interlocutory order in cases falling within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the tax court. It, thus, follows that the CTA, by constitutional mandate, is vested with jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari in these cases.
Indeed, in order for any appellate court to effectively exercise its appellate jurisdiction, it must have the authority to issue, among others, a writ of certiorari. In transferring exclusive jurisdiction over appealed tax cases to the CTA, it can reasonably be assumed that the law intended to transfer also such power as is deemed necessary, if not indispensable, in aid of such appellate jurisdiction. There is no perceivable reason why the transfer should only be considered as partial, not total.
Furthermore, Section 6, Rule 135 of the present Rules of Court provides that when by law, jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such court or officer.
If this Court were to sustain petitioners’ contention that jurisdiction over their certiorari petition lies with the CA, this Court would be confirming the exercise by two judicial bodies, the CA and the CTA, of jurisdiction over basically the same subject matter – precisely the split–jurisdiction situation which is anathema to the orderly administration of justice.35 The Court cannot accept that such was the legislative motive, especially considering that the law expressly confers on the CTA, the tribunal with the specialized competence over tax and tariff matters, the role of judicial review over local tax cases without mention of any other court that may exercise such power. Thus, the Court agrees with the ruling of the CA that since appellate jurisdiction over private respondents’ complaint for tax refund is vested in the CTA, it follows that a petition for certiorari seeking nullification of an interlocutory order issued in the said case should, likewise, be filed with the same court. To rule otherwise would lead to an absurd situation where one court decides an appeal in the main case while another court rules on an incident in the very same case.
Lastly, it would not be amiss to point out that a court which is endowed with a particular jurisdiction should have powers which are necessary to enable it to act effectively within such jurisdiction. These should be regarded as powers which are inherent in its jurisdiction and the court must possess them in order to enforce its rules of practice and to suppress any abuses of its process and to defeat any attempted thwarting of such process.
In this regard, Section 1 of RA 9282 states that the CTA shall be of the same level as the CA and shall possess all the inherent powers of a court of justice.
Based on the foregoing disquisitions, it can be reasonably concluded that the authority of the CTA to take cognizance of petitions for certiorari questioning interlocutory orders issued by the RTC in a local tax case is included in the powers granted by the Constitution as well as inherent in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.
Finally, it would bear to point out that this Court is not abandoning the rule that, insofar as quasi–judicial tribunals are concerned, the authority to issue writs of certiorari must still be expressly conferred by the Constitution or by law and cannot be implied from the mere existence of their appellate jurisdiction. This doctrine remains as it applies only to quasi–judicial bodies.
Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo–De Castro, Brion, Bersamin, Abad, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza, Reyes, Perlas–Bernabe, and Leonen, JJ., concur.
1 Penned by Associate Justice Rebecca de Guia–Salvador, with Associate Justices Ruben T. Reyes (now a retired member of this Court) and Aurora Santiago–Lagman, concurring; Annexes “A” and “B,” rollo, pp. 43–48; 49–51.
3 Records, vol. II, pp. 476–480.
6 CA rollo, pp. 2–31.
9 Records, vol. II, pp. 761–762.
13Garcia v. COMELEC, 328 Phil. 288, 292 (1996).
14Caneland Sugar Corporation v. Alon, G.R. No. 142896, September 12, 2007, 533 SCRA 28, 33.
15Republic of the Philippines, represented by Abusama M. Alid, Officer–in–Charge, Department of Agriculture–Regional Field Unit XII (DA–RFU–XII) v. Abdulwahab A. Bayao, et al., G.R. No. 179492, June 5, 2013.
16Mendez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 174937, June 13, 2012, 672 SCRA 200, 207.
18Tagle v. Equitable PCI Bank, G.R. No. 172299, April 22, 2008, 552 SCRA 424, 444, citing Oaminal v. Castillo, 459 Phil. 542, 556 (2003); Republic v. Court of Appeals, 379 Phil. 92, 98 (2000); Delsan Transport Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 335 Phil. 1066, 1075 (1997); Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank v. Court of Appeals, 389 Phil. 644, 655 (2000).
20Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board v. Lubrica, 497 Phil. 313, 322 (2005); Veloria v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 94771, July 29, 1992, 211 SCRA 907, 915.
21 189 Phil. 581 (1980).
22 G.R. Nos. 88158 and 97108–09, March 4, 1992, 206 SCRA 779.
25 G.R. No. 114135, October 7, 1994, 237 SCRA 552.
26Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board v. Lubrica, supra note 20; Veloria v. COMELEC, supra note 20; Garcia v. Sandiganbayan, id. at 563–564; Garcia v. De Jesus, supra note 22, at 787–788; Pimentel v. COMELEC, supra note 21, at 587.
28 An Act Further Defining the Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, Amending for the Purpose Presidential Decree No. 1606, As Amended, Providing Funds Therefor, And for Other Purposes.
29 118 Phil. 1022 (1963).
30J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Jaramillo, et al., supra, at 1026.
31 G.R. No. 101630, August 24, 1992, 212 SCRA 823.
32De Jesus v. Court of Appeals, supra, at 827–828.
33 G.R. No. 192793, February 22, 2011, 643 SCRA 631, 635–636.
34 G.R. No. 195953, August 9, 2011, 655 SCRA 241, 246–247.
35Southern Cross Cement Corporation v. Philippine Cement Manufacturers Corp., 478 Phil. 85, 125 (2004).
36Breslin v. Luzon Stevedoring Company, 84 Phil. 618, 623 (1949).
37 4 Am Jur 2d, Appeal and Error, §5, p. 536; 2 Am Jur, Appeal and Error, §9, 850.
38Santiago v. Vasquez, G.R. Nos. 99289–90, January 27, 1993, 217 SCRA 633, 648.
39Treasurer–Assessor v. University of the Philippines, 148 Phil. 526, 539 (1971); Amalgamated Laborers’ Association v. Court of Industrial Relations, 131 Phil. 374, 380 (1968); Philippine Airlines Employees’ Association v. Philippine Airlines, Inc., 120 Phil. 383, 390 (1964). (Citations omitted).

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