Source: https://ogalaws.wordpress.com/2014/10/01/aboriginal-rights-and-title-in-canada-after-tsilhqotin-more-consensus-or-more-confusion-on-this-wider-path/
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 12:27:59+00:00

Document:
Aboriginal Rights and Title in Canada after Tsilhqot’in – More Consensus or More Confusion on this Wider Path?
On Thursday, June 26, 2014, the Supreme Court of Canada released a landmark decision on a major B.C. dispute over aboriginal title and related rights. Since that time, three more cases in the Supreme Court of Canada and provincial Courts of Appeal have cited to that decision, in making their own substantial rulings on Aboriginal title and rights in Grassy Narrows, Tyendinaga, and Corporation Makivic. The question now, with all parties agreeing that the definition and scope of Aboriginal title has been expanded beyond what the Crown had hitherto understood it to mean and encompass, is whether this new, wider path will bring more consensus or more conflict in the field of Aboriginal Law. This blog post will explore some of the issues and conclude that there is indeed a fork in the road, either way, but that the Crown and Canada’s Aboriginal Nations, individually and collectively, all have but one path to take – that of good faith cooperation in consultation and accommodation; as mandated by (and if necessary, reviewed under), the laws of Canada pre- and post- patriation.
A maze of elements makes-up the field of Aboriginal Law in Canada. This includes the Indian Act, and the precedent prior to it in the Treaties with the Crown over the early years that cover much of what is Canada today, the Constitution Act, and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Tacked-onto this, are the various federal and provincial laws that do or may impact protected aboriginal rights in the realms of sovereignty, resource management, and land stewardship. A full or more complete coverage of all of these is far beyond the scope of this blog post. However, a brief overview of some of the more pertinent parts of this mix is necessary for a better understanding of Tsilhqot’in’s seminal role.
109. All Lands, Mines, Minerals, and Royalties belonging to the several Provinces of Canada, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick at the Union, and all Sums then due or payable for such Lands, Mines, Minerals, or Royalties, shall belong to the several Provinces of Ontario, Quebec, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick in which the same are situate or arise, subject to any Trusts existing in respect thereof, and to any Interest other than that of the Province in the same. (Emphasis added in italics).
Treaty 1 (1871) – covering Southern Manitoba and Saskatchewan, and entered into with the Ojibway and Cree First Nations.
Treaty 2 (1871) – covering Southern Manitoba and Saskatchewan, and entered into with the Ojibway and Cree First Nations.
Treaty 3 (1873) – covering Southeastern Ontario (Lake of the Woods region), and entered into with the Ojibway First Nation (Saulteaux).
Treaty 4 (1874) – covering Southern Saskatchewan (Qu’Appelle region), and entered into with the Cree and Ojibway (Saulteux) First Nations.
Treaty 5 (1875) – covering Central-northern Manitoba, and entered into with the Ojibway (Saulteux) and Swampy Cree First Nations.
Treaty 6 (1876) – covering Central Saskatchewan and Alberta, and entered into with the Plains and Woodlands Cree First Nations.
Treaty 7 (1877) – covering Southern Alberta, and entered into with the Blackfoot and other First Nations.
Treaty 8 (1899) – covering Northern Alberta and the Northeast portion of British Columbia, and entered into with the Cree, Dene, Dogrib, and other First Nations.
Treaty 9 (1905) – covering Northern Ontario (James Bay region), an entered into with the Cree, Ojibway, and other First Nations.
Treaty 10 (1906) – covering Northern Saskatchewan (Peace River region), and entered into with the Dene First Nation and Métis Peoples, amongst others.
Treaty 11 (1921) – covering the western portion of the Northwest Territories, and entered into with the Dene First Nation and Métis Peoples of the Mackenzie region, amongst others.
The Canadian federal government and the provinces are co-equal partners in confederation, and so the provinces as “provincial Crowns”, are charged with administering those treaties that touch and concern the lands within their respective boundaries, on behalf of the “federal Crown”. As such, the federal government and the provinces are co-equally bound in entering into, enforcing, and honouring those treaties; indeed so much so, that in a number of cases both the federal and respective provincial governments, will join as parties in treaty disputes and ongoing negotiations under the Crown duty to consult and accommodate. Also, when the federal government is the counterparty, the salutation or caption reads “the Queen in Right of Canada”, and when a province is a party the salutation or caption reads “the Queen in Right of – ” that province.
88. Subject to the terms of any treaty and any other Act of Parliament, all laws of general application from time to time in force in any province are applicable to and in respect of Indians in the province, except to the extent that those laws are inconsistent with this Act or the First Nations Fiscal Management Act, or with any order, rule, regulation or law of a band made under those Acts, and except to the extent that those provincial laws make provision for any matter for which provision is made by or under those Acts.
52(1). The Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada, and any law that is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force or effect.
And, along with fundamental freedoms, mobility rights, legal rights, equality rights, and linguistic rights, there are additional provisions specifically protecting Canada’s Aboriginal peoples. These include sections 22, 25, and 35.
22. Nothing in sections 16 to 20 abrogates or derogates from any legal or customary right or privilege acquired or enjoyed either before or after the coming into force of this Charter with respect to any language that is not English or French. (Emphasis added).
(b) any rights or freedoms that now exist by way of land claims agreements or may be so acquired.
35(1) The existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed.
(4) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, the aboriginal and treaty rights referred to in subsection (1) are guaranteed equally to male and female persons.
Under section 35.1, Canada also undertakes to: (i) convene a constitutional conference, and (ii) “invite representatives of the aboriginal peoples of Canada to participate in the discussions on that item”, before any changes are made to section 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867 (above); section 25 of the Canada Act, 1982 (above); or to section 35 (including by implication any subparts, such as 35.1, also).
Again, however, there are two carve-outs that add a degree of freedom for both the federal and provincial Crowns to temporarily curtail any rights – Aboriginal or non-Aboriginal – through sections 33 and 1.
33(1) Parliament or the legislature of a province may expressly declare in an Act of Parliament or of the legislature, as the case may be, that the Act or a provision thereof shall operate notwithstanding a provision included in section 2 or sections 7 to 15 of this Charter.
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. (Emphasis added).
“To establish that a limit is reasonable and demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society, two central criteria must be satisfied. First, the objective, which the measures responsible for a limit on a Charter right or freedom are designed to serve, must be “of sufficient importance to warrant overriding a constitutionally protected right or freedom,”” (…) (citations omitted).
“Second, once a sufficiently significant objective is recognized, then the party invoking s. 1 must show that the means chosen are reasonable and demonstrably justified. This involves “a form of proportionality test”” (…) (citations omitted).
This case involved a series of questions with regard to Aboriginal Law in Canada. The trial judge had found that: (i) by a given definition of Aboriginal title; (ii) Aboriginal title existed in the subject lands; (iii) (iii) and by breaching its constitutional duty to consult and accommodate prior to issuing logging licenses under the Forest Act of British Columbia with regard to those lands; (iv) the Crown had made an unjustified incursion onto those lands and in violation of that Aboriginal title. Core questions at the Supreme Court of Canada (S.C.C.), were therefore: (a) what is the proper test for Aboriginal title; (b) did the trial judge err in finding that it existed in those lands; (c) did the Crown breach its duty to consult and accommodate before issuing the licenses; and (d) was the incursion unjustified under the law?
To justify overriding the Aboriginal title-holding group’s wishes on the basis of the broader public good, the government must show: (1) that it discharged its procedural duty to consult and accommodate, (2) that its actions were backed by a compelling and substantial objective; and (3) that the governmental action is consistent with the Crown’s fiduciary obligation to the group: Sparrow.
Prior to the establishment of title, the Crown owes a duty to consult, and accommodate if necessary, the interests of the Aboriginal group concerned. “At this stage, the Crown may continue to manage the resource in question, but the honour of the Crown requires it to respect the potential, but yet unproven claims.” Once title is established, however, a greater duty is owed; all prior actions by the Crown with regard to the land (including legislation, if applicable) must be reconsidered and may be abandoned or recalled if and as necessary to preserve the interests of the Aboriginal group in that land; and absent consent and accommodation, or justified incursion under s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, the project or proposed use cannot lawfully proceed.
The Crown’s duty to consult was breached when Crown officials engaged in the planning process for the removal of timber. The inclusion of timber on Aboriginal title land in a timber supply area, the approval of cut blocks on Aboriginal title land in a forest development plan, and the allocation of cutting permits all occurred without any meaningful consultation with the Tsilhqot’in.
Finding, first, that there was an implied right of the province within the Forest Act, to regulate all lands “under claim for aboriginal title” prior to the actual establishment of Aboriginal title (to avoid the unwelcome result of those vast tracts of British Columbia lands being left entirely unregulated), the S.C.C. considered the doctrine of paramountcy (federal law prevails where it is impossible to comply with both federal and provincial law on the same subject, or where the provincial law “frustrates the purpose” of the federal law); and the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity (“where laws enacted by one level of government impair the protected core of jurisdiction possessed by the other level of government”), to conclude that the trial Judge improperly applied interjurisdictional immunity to find infringement when the same conclusion could have been reached by applying the more “complete and rational” Sparrow factors approach, to an analysis of s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. The S.C.C. therefore allowed the Appeal and granted a declaration of Aboriginal title in favour of the Tsilhqot’in.
Subsequent to Tsilhqot’in, we must consider three additional cases decided on the subject of Aboriginal law in Canada. Grassy Narrows First Nation v. Ontario (Natural Resources) was decided in the S.C.C., Tyendinaga Mohawk Council v. Brant was decided in English-speaking Canada’s Court of Appeal for Ontario, and Corporation Makivik c. Québec (Procureure générale) was decided in French-speaking Canada’s Court of Appeal of Quebec. I will address these cases in their chronological order.
The Grassy Narrows First Nation, successors in interest to the Aboriginal signatories, had originally taken issue with Ontario’s interpretation of Treaty 3 of 1873. The Treaty had been made between the Ojibway and Canada, but the province of Ontario had “stepped into the shoes” of Canada in follow-on implementation that would impact their Aboriginal rights by issuing clear-cut licenses to Resolute FP Canada Inc. (formerly Abitibi-Consolidated Inc.), in 1997. The Grassy Narrows First Nation had launched their action to set aside those licenses for violating their harvesting rights under Treaty 3. Referred to as the Keewatin tract, the disputed portion of land covered by the treaty – originally property of the Dominion of Canada – had later been annexed to Ontario through the Ontario Boundaries Extension Act, S.C. 1912, c. 40. This firmly gave Ontario the right to manage the Treaty and “take-up” the subject lands as and when needed.
The Ojibway yielded ownership of their territory, except for certain lands reserved to them. In return, the Ojibway received annuity payments, goods, and the right to harvest the non-reserve lands surrendered by them until such time as they were “taken up” for settlement, mining, lumbering, or other purposes by the Government of the Dominion of Canada.
Ontario has exclusive authority under the Constitution Act, 1867 to take up provincial lands for forestry, mining, settlement, and other exclusively provincial matters. Federal supervision is not required by the Constitution.
Attempts to cite the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity considered in Tsilhqot’in, as a bar against provincial taking-up of Aboriginal lands and infringing treaty rights, were dismissed as inapplicable.
In a largely internal dispute, the Tyendinaga Mohawk Council sought clarification of the interpretation and application of certain sections of the Indian Act, as they touched and concerned lands on the actual reserve of that First Nation, and a building that was situated on the territory of that First Nation. The Respondents had made an offer to purchase some lands, not followed through, borrowed money and constructed a building on the lands which they occupied for a time, and then abandoned. They never repaid those loans, but returned several years later to make a low offer for the lands (which was rebuffed), and then forcibly re-occupied the building that they had erected, to claim it as their own. Later, they “sold” the land and building to a third party, which then operated there over the Council’s objections.
The court reiterated that Aboriginal title was sui generis and quite distinct from fee simple, and the appeal was dismissed with costs.
Despite a finding that there had been significant declines in the caribou populations of the George River herd (eastern area of the subject lands) and the Leaf River herd (western area of the subject lands), and a resulting push by indigenous representatives for a complete moratorium on sport hunting, the Quebec Minister of Natural Resources and Wildlife (the “Minister”) responded to deadlock and impasse on the joint committee by taking unilateral action with regard to hunting season start dates, and the number of permits to be issued. As a result, Aboriginal members of the joint committee demanded that the ministry suspend implementation of the stated measures, a federal representative on the joint committee informed the Minister that he had violated the consultation process in several ways, and the appellants launched their suit in Quebec Superior Court for declaratory and injunctive relief. Then, with an Aboriginal representative in the rotating presidency, the joint committee issued a new recommendation that reflected the Aboriginal wishes, which the Minister refused to accept; opting instead to finalize the ministry’s earlier unilateral actions with Ministerial Order MO 2011-026.
The Quebec Superior Court conceded that changes to the hunting season start date were serious matters that required consultation, but then ruled that the “serious and detailed exchanges” taking place on the joint committee sufficiently apprised the Minister of all party positions that any failure to further consult that committee before finalizing the Caribou hunting regulations, as amended, was a mere good faith “procedural” error not warranting any voiding of that action or of those regulations.
I conclude from this analysis of chapter 24 that the parties to the Convention have established exhaustive procedures for the co-management of hunting, fishing, and trapping in the territory, at the heart of which is found the joint committee, a special entity. (Emphasis added).
Furthermore, the Minister’s obligation to once again consult if he has decided to not follow a recommendation of the joint committee clearly shows the obligation to take into consideration the interests of Aboriginal peoples and respond, rather than to impose his vision of affairs, except in those situations that might justify some curtailment of this co-management process.
Citing to Delgamuukw, Dalphond, J.C.A. first noted that sliding scale in the scope of the Crown’s duty of consultation and accommodation, and then he assessed the specific provisions of Chapter 24 to conclude that the Minister had committed numerous breaches of the agreed process – the unilateral pronouncement of Caribou hunting season date changes, inattention to the concerns of Aboriginal representatives on the joint committee, blatantly ignoring a subsequent resolution of the joint committee without any explanation or reasons given, failing to have follow-up consultations after that resolution, and not submitting proposed regulations to the joint committee prior to their adoption. Furthermore, these violations of treaty rights and of the duty to consult could not be justified for reasons of emergency, conservation, or otherwise under s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982.
As a remedy, Dalphond, J.C.A., noted that invalidation would cause undue complication, as the impugned regulations had been amended several times since their original passage, and also because sudden changes might spur additional court challenges from affected parties. Hence, he recommended that the Quebec Court of Appeal allow the appeal, reverse the decision below of the Superior Court, and welcome the original motion of the appellants for a declaration that the Minister had violated their rights and the duty to consult; while awarding costs to the appellants and preserving their rights to claim compensation for the damages that they had suffered as a result of these violations.
Tsilhqot’in resolved the proper test for Aboriginal title, application of the Crown’s duty to consult and accommodate, and the test for justifications of the breach of Aboriginal rights, being s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. Grassy Narrows considered the respective federal and provincial roles in the “taking-up” of treaty lands, as well as whether paramountcy or interjurisdictional immunity was the proper yardstick to define the limits of their respective jurisdictions. Tyendinaga clarified alleged inconsistencies in the Indian Act and re-affirmed the jurisdiction of Justices of the Superior Courts over all matters properly before them. Finally, Corporation Makivic stands for the dual proposition that the duty to consult cannot be taken lightly, and that historic violations of Aboriginal or treaty rights are not moot issues when the offending legal regimes are still in effect, the circumstances surrounding those past violations are still prevalent, and the parties need the court’s guidance for their future dealings.
This line of cases further clarifies the distinction between Aboriginal rights (whether central or peripheral as “rights short of title”), and Aboriginal title, which is supported by some pre-sovereignty occupation that need not be complete across the entire tract of land (Tsilhqot’in) or unchanging (Delgamuukw).
Conclusive evidence of pre-sovereignty occupation may be difficult to come by. Instead, an aboriginal community may provide evidence of present occupation as proof of pre-sovereignty occupation in support of a claim to aboriginal title. What is required, in addition, is a continuity between present and pre-sovereignty occupation, because the relevant time for the determination of aboriginal title is at the time before sovereignty.
Tsilhqot’in and subsequent caselaw clarified and consolidated the law and the applicable tests to be used when considering questions of Aboriginal title and its elements (Sparrow, Delgamuukw), Aboriginal rights and their contents (Van der Peet, Adams), the spectrum of the Crown’s duty and honour in consultation and accommodation (Haida Nation), which level of government can extinguish Aboriginal rights and/or take-up and further manage Aboriginal lands and treaty compliance (Mikisew, Grassy Narrows), and which level of courts has first instance jurisdiction over matters of Aboriginal law (Tyendinaga). With these better defined rules and parameters, the fact that larger tracts of land may now be subject to central and peripheral aboriginal rights, and that violations of those rights may always be alleged (Ekuanitshit, Wabauskang) should not cause undue consternation to either side. However, this only holds so long as the established processes are followed in good faith, and shortcuts such as those taken in Corporation Makivik, are not resorted to when that critical and mandatory constitutional process (of consultation and accommodation) proves too slow for some. In any case, all matters can always be appropriately reviewed (Dunsmuir, Enge), and judged in accordance with the similarly critical and constitutional process of s. 35 balancing (or Oakes, if applicable), because the courts will not shy-away from declaring violations of rights and processes; that much is crystal clear. Practicality and common sense, though, limit appropriate remedies (Delgamuukw, Tsilhqot’in, Corporation Makivik).
So, even if it takes time and can get a little bit acrimonious, we “really” have no choice but to all just ………………… get along!
Ekundayo George is a lawyer and a sociologist. He has also taken courses in organizational and micro-organizational behavior, and has significant experienced in business law and counseling (incorporations, business plans, contracts and non-disclosure agreements, teaming and joint venture agreements), diverse litigation, and regulatory compliance practice. He is licensed to practice law in Ontario, Canada, as well as in New York, New Jersey, and Washington, D.C., in the United States of America (U.S. business advising, outsourcing and cross-border trade, technology contracts, and U.S. financing). See, for example: http://www.ogalaws.com. A writer, blogger, and avid reader, Mr. George has sector experience in Technology (Telecommunications, eCommerce, Outsourcing, Cloud), Financial Services, Healthcare, Entertainment, Real Estate and Zoning, International/cross-border trade, other services, and Environmental Law and Policy. He is a published author on the National Security aspects of Environmental Law, has represented clients in courts and before regulatory bodies in both Canada and the United States, and he enjoys complex systems analysis in legal, technological, and societal milieux.
Mr. George is also an experienced negotiator, facilitator, team leader, and strategic consultant- sourcing, managing, and delivering on large, strategic projects with multiple stakeholders and multidisciplinary teams. Our competencies include program investigation, sub-contracted procurement of personnel and materiel, and such diverse project deliverables as business process re-engineering, devising and delivering tailored training, and other targeted engagements through a highly-credentialed resource pool with several hundred years of combined expertise, in: Healthcare; Education & Training; Law & Regulation; Policy & Plans; Statistics, Economics, & Evaluations including feasibility studies; Infrastructure; and Information Technology/Information Systems (IT/IS) – sometimes also termed Information Communications Technologies, or ICT). See, for example: http://www.simprime-ca.com.
This article creates no lawyer-client relationship, and is not intended or deemed legal advice, business advice, the rendering any professional service, or attorney advertising where restricted or barred. The author and affiliated entities specifically disclaim and reject any and all loss claimed, no matter howsoever resulting as alleged, due to any action or inaction done in reliance on the contents herein.
 Grassy Narrows First Nation v. Ontario (Natural Resources), 2014 SCC 48 (CanLII), docket number 35379, released July 11, 2014; Tyendinaga Mohawk Council v. Brant, 2014 ONCA 565 (CanLII), docket number C57655, released July 30, 2014; and Corporation Makivik c. Québec (Procureure générale) 2014 QCCA 1455 (CanLII), docket numbers 500-09-022212-112, and 500-09-022213-110 (500-17-064940-110), released August 14, 2014.
The government’s duty to consult with Aboriginal peoples and accommodate their interests is grounded in the honour of the Crown. The honour of the Crown is always at stake in its dealings with Aboriginal peoples. It is not a mere incantation, but rather a core precept that finds its application in concrete practices.
The Application was dismissed, as the court found that Ontario had both established a reasonable process to determine the degree of consultation required, reasonably carried out that duty in light of any new material arising (Wabauskang, at paras. 202-4), and did not improperly delegate any substantive Crown duty to consult and accommodate, to the mine developer (Wabauskang, at paras. 229-30). The four escalating levels of consultation considered by Ontario and the mine developer, in light of the Haida Nation ruling, were: no consultation, notification only, standard consultation, and enhanced consultation (Wabauskang, at para. 21).
One week prior thereto, the Federal Court of Appeal also dismissed an application for judicial review in another claim of failed and/or insufficient consultation and accommodation, in Council of the Innu of Ekuanitshit v. Canada (Attorney General), 2014 FCA 189 (CanLII), docket number A-196-13, released August 22, 2014. Online: >http://www.canlii.org/en/ca/fca/doc/2014/2014fca189/2014fca189.html?searchUrlHash=AAAAAAAAAAEAFDIwMTQgU0NDIDQ0IChDYW5MSUkpAAAAAgAsL2ZyL2NhL2NzYy9kb2MvMjAxNC8yMDE0Y3NjNDQvMjAxNGNzYzQ0Lmh0bWwALC9lbi9jYS9zY2MvZG9jLzIwMTQvMjAxNHNjYzQ0LzIwMTRzY2M0NC5odG1sAQ< In Ekuanitshit, the issue was consultations prior to an Order of the Governor in Council approving the federal government’s response to the Report of the Joint Review Panel, Lower Churchill Hydroelectric Generation Project, in Newfoundland and Labrador. The Innu of Ekuanitshit (hailing into court the federal ministers of Fisheries and Oceans, Transport, and Natural Resources along with the federal Attorney General and Nalcor Energy, the developer), claimed that a federal conclusion that the energy, socioeconomic, and environmental benefits of the hydroelectric plant project outweighed its adverse environmental effects, was reached without sufficient or even proper consultation. The questions presented were whether the Judge at trial had erred in finding: (i) that the actions of the Governor in Council and others were compliant with law; and (ii) that the Crown had not breached its duty to consult and seek accommodation measures on those Project elements likely to have a prejudicial effect on their Aboriginal rights.
The appellant has not demonstrated, in the circumstances of this case, that the government neglected its duty to consult prior to the issuance of the order. Therefore, in light of the evidence in the record, I am of the view that the judge did not err in finding that the appellant was consulted in an adequate manner and that the mitigating measures address, for now, its concerns. Indeed, the consultation conducted at this stage, given the strength of the claim and the seriousness of the adverse impact that the government-proposed measure would have on the asserted right, meets “the idea of proportionate balancing” referred to in Haida Nation. (Haida Nation at para. 39; Tsilhqot’in Nation at para. 79).
 See Infra, notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
 See e.g. Part 2 of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c-11, Infra, note 16.
 Constitution Act, 1867. Supra, note 8.
 In accordance with this section, the provinces have enacted their various forestry laws and regulations, and the federation has enacted the Indian Oil and Gas Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. I-7, and the Indian Oil and Gas Regulations, 1995, SOR/94-753, as managed by Indian Oil and Gas Canada (IOGC) to regulate the “exploration and development of oil and gas on First Nations Reserve lands in Canada”. Online: >http://www.canlii.org/en/ca/laws/stat/rsc-1985-c-i-7/latest/rsc-1985-c-i-7.html< (Act); >http://www.canlii.org/en/ca/laws/regu/sor-94-753/latest/sor-94-753.html< (Regulations).
 Numbered Treaties Key, Part f, Chapter 6.1.4 – Aboriginal Peoples and the Growing Nation of Canada.
 The Indian Act. Supra, note 6.
 The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Supra, note 9.
The rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter are not, however, absolute. It may become necessary to limit rights and freedoms in circumstances where their exercise would be inimical to the realization of collective goals of fundamental importance. For this reason, s. 1 provides criteria of justification for limits on the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter. These criteria impose a stringent standard of justification, especially when understood in terms of the two contextual considerations discussed above, namely, the violation of a constitutionally guaranteed right or freedom and the fundamental principles of a free and democratic society.
The reasonableness standard is one of deference and involves the review and analysis of the decision-maker’s reasoning process and decision. The question is not whether the decision is correct but whether it is within a range of acceptable and rational outcomes. The focus is on the outcome and on the process of articulating the reasons. Applying the reasonableness standard involves a search for justification, transparency and intelligibility in the decision-making process.
The correctness standard does not involve deference to the decision-maker and a reviewing court will undertake its own analysis of the issues. If the court does not agree with the decision, it will provide the correct answer. The question is whether the decision was correct.
 See generally, The Canadian Encyclopedia. Tsilhqot’in (Chilcotin) – Contemporary Activities. Visited September 24, 2014. Online: >http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/chilcotin-tsilhqotin/< These 6 bands are: the ‘Esdilagh First Nation (Alexandria Band); Tsi Del Del First Nation (Alexis Creek First Nation); Yunesit’in First Nation (Stone Band); Tl’etinqox-t’in First Nation (Anaham Band); Tl’esqox (Toosey Band); and the Xeni Gwet’in First Nation (Nemiah Band), which peoples prevail throughout the Chilcotin Plateau of west-central British Columbia.
 Tsilhqot’in, supra note 22 at para. 3.
In order to make out a claim for aboriginal title, the aboriginal group asserting title must satisfy the following criteria: (i) the land must have been occupied prior to sovereignty, (ii) if present occupation is relied on as proof of occupation pre-sovereignty, there must be a continuity between present and pre-sovereignty occupation, and (iii) at sovereignty, that occupation must have been exclusive.
 Tsilhqot’in, supra note 22 at paras. 5-7.
The picture which emerges from Adams is that the aboriginal rights which are recognized and affirmed by s. 35(1) fall along a spectrum with respect to their degree of connection with the land.
At the one end, there are those aboriginal rights which are practices, customs and traditions that are integral to the distinctive aboriginal culture of the group claiming the right. However, the “occupation and use of the land” where the activity is taking place is not “sufficient to support a claim of title to the land” (at para. 26 (emphasis in original)). Nevertheless, those activities receive constitutional protection.
In the middle, there are activities which, out of necessity, take place on land and indeed, might be intimately related to a particular piece of land. Although an aboriginal group may not be able to demonstrate title to the land, it may nevertheless have a site-specific right to engage in a particular activity.
At the other end of the spectrum, there is aboriginal title itself. As Adams makes clear, aboriginal title confers more than the right to engage in site-specific activities which are aspects of the practices, customs and traditions of distinctive aboriginal cultures. Site-specific rights can be made out even if title cannot. What aboriginal title confers is the right to the land itself. [With additional spacing, here].
What remains, then, of the Crown’s radical or underlying title to lands held under Aboriginal title? The authorities suggest two related elements — a fiduciary duty owed by the Crown to Aboriginal people when dealing with Aboriginal lands, and the right to encroach on Aboriginal title if the government can justify this in the broader public interest under s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. Id. at para. 71.
The right to control the land conferred by Aboriginal title means that governments and others seeking to use the land must obtain the consent of the Aboriginal title holders. If the Aboriginal group does not consent to the use, the government’s only recourse is to establish that the proposed incursion on the land is justified under s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. Id. at para. 76.
 Interestingly, the 3-part test actually applied here by the S.C.C., from Sparrow, differs from the more recent (at that time) 2-part test as later enunciated in Delgamuukw.
The test of justification has two parts, which I shall consider in turn. First, the infringement of the aboriginal right must be in furtherance of a legislative objective that is compelling and substantial.
Delgamuukw, supra note 31, at para. 161.
The second part of the test of justification requires an assessment of whether the infringement is consistent with the special fiduciary relationship between the Crown and aboriginal peoples.
Delgamuukw, supra note 31, at para. 162.
I would like to make it clear that the fact that the nature of occupation has changed would not ordinarily preclude a claim for aboriginal title, as long as a substantial connection between the people and the land is maintained. The only limitation on this principle might be the internal limits on uses which land that is subject to aboriginal title may be put, i.e., uses which are inconsistent with continued use by future generations of aboriginals.
 Supra note 37, at paras. 91-2.
 Delgamuukw, supra note 39, at para. 179. See also Tsilhqot’in, supra note 37 at paras. 105-6.
 Id. at para. 115. [Emphasis added].
 Tsilhqot’in, supra note 43, at para. 130.
 Tsilhqot’in, supra note 43, at paras. 135, 151-2.
 Id. at para. 153. Despite its having been specifically alluded to in Delgamuukw, (as reproduced verbatim below), it is interesting to note that the S.C.C. made no mention whatsoever of, or provision for, compensation on account of the infringement. I surmise that the issue may well have been left un-pleaded, or already settled.
In keeping with the duty of honour and good faith on the Crown, fair compensation will ordinarily be required when aboriginal title is infringed. The amount of compensation payable will vary with the nature of the particular aboriginal title affected and with the nature and severity of the infringement and the extent to which aboriginal interests were accommodated.
 See supra note 14, and accompanying text. See also Corporation Makivik, at paras. 24, 26. The Wabauskang Nation joined Grassy Narrows First Nation in the Appeal, as their own traditional territory includes lands that run through the Keewatin tract. Alberta, British Columbia, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and several other First Nations were also represented as Intervenors on the Appeal.
 See text, supra, at The Constitution Act, 1867.
 Supra note 51, at para 4.
 Id. at paras. 12, 50. The Ontario trial court, Ontario Court of Appeal, and Supreme Court of Canada all agreed on this limitation.
Thus, although on surrender of aboriginal title the province would take absolute title, jurisdiction to accept surrenders lies with the federal government. The same can be said of extinguishment — although on extinguishment of aboriginal title, the province would take complete title to the land, the jurisdiction to extinguish lies with the federal government. Delgamuukw, at para. 175.
 See supra, note 15, The Indian Act, and accompanying text.
Reserve lands are not subject to seizure under legal process.
or at the instance of any person other than an Indian or a band.
 Supra note 67, at paras. 21-31.
 Id. at para 40, citing to Ordon Estate v. Grail,  3 S.C.R. 437, at paras. 44-45.
The content of aboriginal title contains an inherent limit that lands held pursuant to title cannot be used in a manner that is irreconcilable with the nature of the claimants’ attachment to those lands. This limit on the content of aboriginal title is a manifestation of the principle that underlies the various dimensions of that special interest in land — it is a sui generis interest that is distinct from “normal” proprietary interests, most notably fee simple.
In simple terms, the title holders have the right to the benefits associated with the land — to use it, enjoy it and profit from its economic development. As such, the Crown does not retain a beneficial interest in Aboriginal title land.
These rights will likely be intimately tied to the land and may permit a number of possible uses. However, unlike title, they are not a right to the land itself. Rather, as I have suggested, they are a right to do certain things in connection with that land. If, for example, it were established that the lands near those subject to a title claim were used for hunting by a number of bands, those shared lands would not be subject to a claim for aboriginal title, as they lack the crucial element of exclusivity. However, they may be subject to site-specific aboriginal rights by all of the bands who used it. This does not entitle anyone to the land itself, but it may entitle all of the bands who hunted on the land to hunting rights. Hence, in addition to shared title, it will be possible to have shared, non-exclusive, site-specific rights. Delgamuukw, at para. 159.
 The Treaty is referred to as a “Convention” in the original French text of this judgement. Chapter 24 of that Treaty – Hunting, Fishing and Trapping, covers over 35 pages and is further referred to in this post as “Chapter 24”. See e.g. Infra, note 86 and accompanying text.
 Corporation Makivik, supra note 74, at para. 11-13.
 Id. at paras. 21, 30.
The nature and scope of the duty of consultation will vary with the circumstances. In occasional cases, when the breach is less serious or relatively minor, it will be no more than a duty to discuss important decisions that will be taken with respect to lands held pursuant to aboriginal title. Of course, even in these rare cases when the minimum acceptable standard is consultation, this consultation must be in good faith, and with the intention of substantially addressing the concerns of the aboriginal peoples whose lands are at issue. In most cases, it will be significantly deeper than mere consultation. Some cases may even require the full consent of an aboriginal nation, particularly when provinces enact hunting and fishing regulations in relation to aboriginal lands.
 Id. at paras. 95-99. See also supra, note 17 and accompanying text.
In conclusion, the content of aboriginal title is not restricted to those uses which are elements of a practice, custom or tradition integral to the distinctive culture of the aboriginal group claiming the right.

References: v. 
 v. 
sui generis
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
sui generis