Source: http://dcwatch.com/issues/voting070124.htm
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 10:27:04+00:00

Document:
Two proposals have been made in the 110th Congress regarding granting the Delegate of the District of Columbia voting rights in the House. On January 9, 2007, Delegate Eleanor Holmes Norton of the District of Columbia introduced H.R. 328, the District of Columbia Fair and Equal House Voting Rights Act of 2007. On January 19, Representative Hoyer introduced H.Res. 78, which proposed House Rule changes allowing the District of Columbia delegate (in addition to the Resident Commissioner of Puerto Rico and the delegates from American Samoa, Guam, and the Virgin Islands) to vote in the Committee of the Whole, subject to a revote in the full House if such votes proved decisive. H.R. 328 has not yet been considered; H.Res. 78 was approved by the House on January 24, 2007, by a vote of 226-91.
These two approaches appear to raise separate, but related, constitutional issues. As to H.R. 328, it is difficult to identify either constitutional text or existing case law that would directly support the allocation by statute of the power to vote in the full House to the District of Columbia Delegate. Further, that case law that does exist would seem to indicate that not only is the District of Columbia not a “state” for purposes of representation, but that congressional power over the District of Columbia does not represent a sufficient power to grant congressional representation.
In particular, at least six of the Justices who participated in what appears to be the most relevant Supreme Court case on this issue, National Mutual Insurance Co. of the District of Columbia v. Tidewater Transfer Co., authored opinions rejecting the proposition that Congress’s power under the District Clause was sufficient to effectuate structural changes to the federal government. Further, the remaining three judges, who found that the Congress could grant diversity jurisdiction to District of Columbia citizens despite the lack of such jurisdiction in Article III, specifically limited their opinion to instances where the legislation in question did not involve the extension of fundamental rights. To the extent that the representation in Congress would be seen as such a right, all nine Justices in Tidewater Transfer Co. would arguably have found the instant proposal to be unconstitutional.
H.Res. 78, on the other hand, is similar to amendments to the House Rules that were adopted during the 103rd Congress. These rule changes survived judicial scrutiny at both the District Court and the Court of Appeals level. It would appear, however, that these amendments were upheld primarily because of the provision calling for a revote by the full House when the vote of the delegates was decisive in the Committee of the Whole.
Although not beyond question, it would appear likely that the Congress does not have authority to grant voting representation in the House of Representatives to the Delegate from the District of Columbia as contemplated under H.R. 328. As the revote provisions provided for in H.Res. 78 would render the Delegate’s vote in the Committee of the Whole largely symbolic, however, the amendments to the House Rules would be likely to pass constitutional muster.
Under H.R. 328, the House would be expanded by two Members to a total of 437 Members, and the first of these two positions would be allocated to create a voting Member representing the District of Columbia.5 Although it is generally accepted that the Delegate for the District of Columbia could be given a vote in the House of Representatives by constitutional amendment, questions have been raised whether such a result can be achieved by statute.
An additional change to the House Rules, however, limits the effect of this voting power when it would be decisive. H.Res. 78 also amended House Rule XVIII, cl. 6 to provide that “whenever a recorded vote on any question has been decided by a margin within which the votes cast by the Delegates and the Resident Commissioner have been decisive, the Committee of the Whole shall automatically rise and the Speaker shall put that question de novo without intervening debate or other business. Upon the announcement of the vote on that question, the Committee of the Whole shall resume its sitting without intervening motion.” Both of these provisions of H.Res. 78 are similar to amendments to the House Rules that were in effect during the 103rd Congress.
Unlike the proposals cited above, H.R. 328 uses language similar to that found in the proposed constitutional amendment, but would instead grant the District of Columbia a voting member in the House by statute. As noted above, H.J Res. 554 would have provided by constitutional amendment that the District of Columbia be treated as a state for purposes of representation in the House and Senate, the election of the President and Vice President, and ratification of amendments of the Constitution. H.R. 328, is more limited, in that it would only provide that the District of Columbia be treated as a state for purposes of representation in the House. Nonetheless, the question is raised as to whether such representation can be achieved without a constitutional amendment.
As noted previously, a resolution similar to the H.Res. 78 was adopted in the 103rd Congress. It was soon challenged, but it was upheld at both the District Court16 and the Court of Appeals17 level. It would appear, however, that the proposal was upheld primarily because of the provision calling for a revote when the vote of the delegates or residents was decisive in the Committee of the Whole.
As Congress has never granted the Delegate from the District of Columbia a vote in the full House or Senate, the constitutionality of such legislation has not been before the courts. The question of whether the District of Columbia should be considered a state for purposes of having a vote in the House of Representatives, however, was considered by a three-judge panel of the United States District Court of the District of Columbia in the case of Adams v. Clinton.18 In Adams, the panel examined the issue of whether failure to provide congressional representation for the District of Columbia violated the Equal Protection Clause. In doing so, it discussed extensively whether the Constitution, as it stands today, allows such representation.
The court noted that, while the phrase “people of the several States” could be read as meaning all the people of the “United States,” that the use of the phrase later in the clause and throughout the Article19 makes clear that the right to representation in Congress is limited to states. This conclusion has been consistently reached by a variety of other courts,20 and is supported by most, though not all, commentators.21 The plaintiffs in Adams v. Clinton, however, suggested that even if the District of Columbia is not strictly a “state” under Article I, § 2, clause 1, that the citizens of the United States could still have representation in Congress.
The plaintiffs in Adams made two arguments: (1) that the District of Columbia, although not technically a state under the Constitution, should be treated as one for voting purposes or (2) that District citizens should be allowed to vote in the State of Maryland, based on their “residual” citizenship in that state. The first argument was based primarily on cases where the Supreme Court has found that the District of Columbia was subject to various constitutional provisions despite the fact that such provisions were textually limited to “states.”22 The second argument is primarily based on the fact that residents of the land ceded by Maryland continued to vote in Maryland elections during the period between the Act of July 16, 1790, by which Virginia and Maryland ceded lands to Congress for formation of the District, and the Organic Act of 1801,23 under which Congress assumed jurisdiction and provided for the government of the District.
Whether the District of Columbia can be considered a “state” within the meaning of a particular constitutional or statutory provision appears to depend upon the character and aim of the specific provision involved.24 Accordingly, the court in Adams examined the Constitution’s language, history, and relevant judicial precedents to determine whether the Constitution allowed for areas which were not states to have representatives in the House. The court determined that a finding that the District of Columbia was a state for purposes of congressional representation was not consistent with any of these criteria.
The court continued by setting forth the history of the transfer of lands from Maryland and Virginia to the federal government under the Act of July 16, 1790. While conceding that residents of the ceded lands continued to vote in their respective states, the court suggested that this did not imply that there was an understanding that they would continue to do so after the District became the seat of government; it reflected the fact that during this period the seat of government was still in Philadelphia. Thus, upon the passage of the Organic Act of 1801, Maryland citizenship of the inhabitants of these lands was extinguished, effectively ending their rights to vote.
Although the question of whether Congress has such power under the District Clause has not been directly addressed by the courts, the question of whether Congress can grant the District of Columbia representation under a different congressional power was also addressed by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. In the case of Michel v. Anderson,35 the court considered whether the Delegate for the District of Columbia could, by House Rules, be given a vote in the Committee of the Whole of the House of Representatives.
Based on these statements, it is unlikely that these courts would have seen merit in an argument that the Congress could grant the Delegate a vote in the House.
An argument might be made, however, that the decision in Michel v. Anderson can be distinguished from the instant proposal, because Michel concerned a House Rule, not a statute. Under this argument, the House in Michel was acting alone under its power to “Determine the Rules of its Proceedings” pursuant to Article I, section 5.38 Arguably, the court did not consider the issue of whether the Congress as a whole would have had the authority to provide for representation for the District of Columbia under the District Clause. Under this line of reasoning, the power of the Congress over the District represents a broader power than the power of the House to set its own rules.
It is not clear, however, that the power of Congress at issue in H.R. 328 would be easily characterized as falling within Congress’ power to legislate under the District Clause. While the existing practice of allowing District of Columbia residents to vote for a non-voting Delegate would appear to fall comfortably within its authority under the District Clause, giving such Delegate a vote in the House would arguably have an effect that went beyond District of Columbia. Such a change would not just affect the residents of the District of Columbia, but would also directly affect the structure of and the exercise of power by Congress. More significantly, if the Delegate were to cast the decisive vote on an issue of national import, then the instant legislation could have a significant effect nationwide.
The Significance of the Case of National Mutual Insurance Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co.
On closer examination, however, the Tidewater Transfer Co. case may not support the constitutionality of the instant proposal. Of primary concern is that this was a decision where no one opinion commanded a majority of the Justices. Justice Jackson’s opinion (the Jackson plurality), joined by Justices Black and Burton, held that District of Columbia residents could seek diversity jurisdiction based on Congress exercising power under the District Clause. Justice Rutledge’s opinion (the Rutledge concurrence) joined by Justice Murphy, argued that the provision of Article III that provides for judicial authority over cases between citizens of different states, the “Diversity Clause,”49 permits such law suits, even absent congressional authorization. Justice Vinson’s opinion (the Vinson dissent), joined by Justice Douglas, and Justice Frankfurter’s opinion (the Frankfurter dissent), joined by Justice Reed, would have found that neither the Diversity Clause nor the District Clause provided the basis for such jurisdiction.
Of further concern is that those concurring Justices who did not join in the threejudge plurality opinion were not silent on the issue of Congress’ power under the District Clause. Consequently, it is possible that a majority of the Justices would have reached a differing result on the breadth of Congress’ power. In addition, it would appear that even the three-judge plurality might have distinguished the instant proposal from the legislation which was at issue in the Tidewater Transfer Co.
Thus, a closer analysis of this case should consider the different opinions, how the Justices framed the questions before them, and then the reasoning they used to resolve the issue. To help understand the issues raised by this case and by the instant bill, this analysis should focus on four different issues: 1) whether the District of Columbia is a “state” for purposes of diversity jurisdiction; 2) whether the District of Columbia is a “state” for purposes of voting representation; 3) whether Congress can grant diversity jurisdiction under the District Clause; and 4) whether Congress can provide for a voting Delegate under the District Clause.
As noted, the Court has held since the 1805 case of Hepburn v. Ellzey50 that federal diversity jurisdiction under Article III does not include suits where one of the parties was from the District of Columbia.51 Presaging the Adams v. Clinton52 case by nearly two centuries, this unanimous decision briefly considered the use of the term “state” throughout the Constitution. The Chief Justice noted that the plain meaning of the term “state” in the Constitution did not include the District of Columbia, and further noted that this was the term used to determine representation in the Senate, the House, and the number of Presidential Electors. As there was little doubt that state did not include the District of Columbia in those instances, the Court found no reason that the term should take on a different meaning for purposes of diversity.
The opinion of the these two Justices, however, was not shared by any of the other seven Justices of the Court.56 The Jackson plurality opinion, for instance, specifically rejected such an interpretation. That opinion noted that while one word may be capable of different meanings, that such “such inconsistency in a single instrument is to be implied only where the context clearly requires it.”57 The Jackson plurality found no evidence that the Founding Fathers gave any thought to the issue of the District of Columbia and diversity jurisdiction, and that if they had that they would not have included the District by use of the term “state.” Nor did the Court find this oversight particularly surprising, as the District of Columbia was still a theoretical political entity when the Constitution was ratified, and its nature and organization had not yet been established.
The Vinson dissent summarily dismissed the argument that the Hepburn v. Ellzey decision be overruled.58 The Frankfurter dissent argued vehemently that the use of the term “state” in the clause at issue was one of the terms in the Constitution least amenable to ambiguous interpretation. “The precision which characterizes these portions of Article III is in striking contrast to the imprecision of so many other provisions of the Constitution dealing with other very vital aspects of government.”59 This, combined with knowledge of the distrust that the Founding Fathers had towards the federal judiciary, left Justice Frankfurter with little interest in entertaining arguments to the contrary.
The opinions of the Justices in Tidewater Transfer Co. appear to be no different. As noted above, seven of the nine Justices in that case accepted the reasoning of the Hepburn case as regards diversity jurisdiction, and would certainly have been even less likely to accept the argument that the District of Columbia should be considered a state for purposes of the House of Representatives. It also seems likely that the Justices associated with the Rutledge concurrence would have similarly rejected such an interpretation. As noted, that opinion suggested that the error in Hepburn was the failure to distinguish between how the term “state” should be interpreted when used in the context of the distribution of power among political structures and how it should be interpreted when it is used in relation to the civil rights of citizens.62 Although Justice Rutledge found that a restrictive interpretation of the term state was unnecessarily narrow in the context of diversity jurisdiction, there is no indication that the Justice would have disputed the “plain use” of the term “state” in the context of representation for the District in Congress.
The Jackson plurality opinion considered whether, despite the Court’s holding in Hepburn, Congress, by utilizing its power under the District Clause, could evade the apparent limitations of Article III on diversity jurisdiction. The plurality noted that the District Clause had not been addressed in Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion, and that the Chief Justice had ended his opinion by noting that the matter was a subject for “legislative not for judicial consideration.”63 While admitting that it would be “speculation” to suggest that this quote established that Congress could use its statutory authority rather than proceed by constitutional amendment, the Court next considered whether such power did in fact exist.
Thus, the question arose as to whether a separate power beyond the District Clause was needed here.
The Vinson dissent and the Frankfurter dissent also rejected the reasoning of the plurality as regards Congress power to grant diversity to the District, citing both Article III limitations on federal court and separation of powers. The Vinson dissent argued that the question as to whether Congress could use its legislative authority to evade the limitations of Article III had already been reached in cases regarding whether the Congress could require federal courts to hear cases where there was no case or controversy.71 The Frankfurter dissent made similar points, and also noted the reluctance by which the states had even agreed to the establishment of diversity jurisdiction.72 Thus, considering both the dissents and the concurrence, six Justices rejected the plurality’s expansive interpretation of the District Clause.
The positions of the various Justices on the question of whether Congress can grant diversity jurisdiction for District of Columbia residents would seem to also inform the question as to whether such Justices would have supported the granting of House representation to District citizens. As noted, six Justices explicitly rejected the extension of diversity jurisdiction using Congress’ power under the District Clause. It is unlikely that the Justices in question would have rejected diversity jurisdiction for District of Columbia residents, but would then approve voting representation for those same residents. The recurring theme of both the Hepburn and Tidewater decisions was that the limitation of House representation to the states was the least controversial aspect of the Constitution, and that the plain meaning of the term “state” in regards to the organization of the federal political structures was essentially unquestioned.
Consequently, only three of the Justices in the Tidewater might arguably have supported the doctrine that the Congress’s power over the District of Columbia would allow extension of representation to its citizens. However, even this conclusion is suspect. As noted, the plurality opinion took pains to note the limited impact of their holding — parties in diversity suits with residents of the District of Columbia would have a more convenient forum to bring a law suit. As noted, the plurality specifically limited the scope of its decision to cases which did not involve an extension of any fundamental right.73 Arguably, granting the Delegate a vote in the House does involve such an extension, and would thus be distinguished.
Although an analysis of the constitutionality of such an extension goes beyond the scope of this report, providing House representation to the territories would clearly represent a significant change to the national political structure. Of particular note would be the relatively small number of voters in some of these territories. In particular, granting representation to American Samoa, with a population of about 58,000,78 most of whom are not citizens of the United States,79 would appear to depart significantly from the existing make-up of the House.
As the above discussion is directed at the full House, the question can be raised as to whether it should also apply to the Committee of the Whole. The Committee of the Whole is not provided for in the Constitution, and the nature of the Committee of the Whole appears to have changed over time. Established in 1789, the Committee of the Whole appears to be derived from English Parliamentary practices. It was originally intended as a procedural device to exclude the Speaker of the House of Commons, an ally of the King, from observing the proceedings of the House.82 Since that time, the Committee has evolved into a forum where debate and discussion can occur under procedures more flexible than those otherwise utilized by the House.
Assuming that the Delegate for the District of Columbia could not cast a vote in the full House, a separate question arises as to whether, as provided for by the House Rules amended by H.Res. 78, the Delegate (along with the territorial delegates) could cast a vote in the Committee of the Whole, subject to a revote when such a vote is determinative. Under Article I of the Constitution, all legislative authority for the United States is to be vested in the Senate and the House of Representatives,86 and under §2 of that Article, the House of Representatives shall be composed of “Members” chosen in conformity with the qualifications and requirements of the Constitution. As the Delegate for the District of Columbia is not a Member for purposes of Article § 2,87 the question arises as to the basis on which delegate could vote in the Committee of the Whole.
The Constitution does not provide for representatives of the District of Columbia or the territories such as the delegate for the District of Columbia or the resident commissioners or delegates for the territories; nor does it appear that these delegates and resident commissioners are required to meet the qualifications or electoral requirements required of Members of Congress.88 Consequently, the Constitution does not appear to provide the basis for a delegate to exercise the power of Members under the Constitution.89 However, the Constitution does not specify whether or not all legislative activities which a Member might engage in are restricted to those Members, thus leaving open the possibility that a delegate may engage in some legislative activities which are not limited to Members.
In sum, it is difficult to identify either constitutional text or existing case law which would directly support the allocation by Congress of the power to vote in the full House on the District of Columbia Delegate. Further, that case law which does exist would seem to indicate that not only is the District of Columbia not a “state” for purposes of representation, but that congressional power over the District of Columbia does not represent a sufficient power to grant congressional representation.
In particular, at least six of the Justices who participated in what appears to be the most relevant Supreme Court case, National Mutual Insurance Co. of the District of Columbia v. Tidewater Transfer Co., authored opinions rejecting the proposition that Congress’ power under the District Clause was sufficient to effectuate structural changes to the political structures of the federal government. Further, the remaining three judges, who found that the Congress could grant diversity jurisdiction to District of Columbia citizens despite the lack of such jurisdiction Article III, specifically limited their opinion to instances where there was no extension of any fundamental right. To the extent that providing District residents with House representation could be characterized as such a right, then one could argue that all nine Justices would have found the instant proposal to be unconstitutional.
Although not beyond question, it would appear likely that the Congress does not have authority to grant voting representation in the House of Representatives to the District of Columbia as contemplated by H.R. 328. On the other hand, because the provisions of H.Res. 78 allowing Delegates a vote in the Committee of the Whole would be largely symbolic, these amendments to the House Rules are likely to pass constitutional muster.
1 110th Cong, 1st Sess.
2 110th Cong, 1st Sess.
3 Although Puerto Rico is represented by a “Resident Commissioner,” for purposes of this report, such representative will be referred to as a delegate.
4 The resolution was passed by a vote of 226-191. Congressional Record, daily edition, vol. 153, January 24, 2007, p. H912.
5 The second position would be allocated in accordance with the 2000 census data and existing federal law. H.R. 328, § 4(b). It would appear that, if the bill was passed today, that the state of Utah would receive the second seat. Mary Beth Sheridan, House Panel Endorses D.C. Vote: Bill Needs Approval From Judiciary Committee, WASH. POST., May 19, 2006 at B1. Common Sense Justice for the Nation’s Capital: An Examination of Proposals to Give D.C. Residents Direct Representation Before the House Committee on Government Reform, 108th Cong., 2nd Sess. at 18 (hereinafter D.C. Hearing). A similar bill introduced in the 109th Congress would have provided that the second representative position be allocated as an at-large seat. Representative Sensenbrenner, then-Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, objected to this provision, suggesting that Utah pass a redistricting plan to accommodate the added seat. Utah has passed a law for this purpose, and the most recent version of the bill does not contemplate an at-large seat. Elizabeth Brotherton, Norton Prepping to Cast D.C.’s First House Vote, ROLL CALL (January 11, 2007).
6 H.R. 328, § 3(a).
7 See 2 U.S.C. §2a.
8 H.R. 328, § 3(b).
9 H.R. 328, § 5.
10 The District has never had any directly elected representation in the Senate, and has been represented by a nonvoting Delegate in the House of Representatives for 33 of its 214-year existence. See CRS Report RL31174, District of Columbia Voting Representation in Congress: Background, Issues, and Options for the 107th Congress (available from author).
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States or by Conventions in three fourths thereof . . . .
12 See Johnny Killian, George Costello, Kenneth Thomas, United States Constitution: Analysis and Interpretation 49 (2002 ed.).
15 Id. at 8-12. D.C. Hearing, supra note 5 at 78 (Testimony of Hon. Kenneth W. Starr).
16 Michel v. Anderson, 817 F. Supp. 126 (D.D.C. 1993), affirmed, Michel v. Anderson, 14 F.3d 623 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
17 Michel v. Anderson, 14 F.3d 623 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
18 90 F. Supp. 2d 35 (D.D.C.2000)(cites to later proceedings omitted).
19 See, e.g., U.S. Const. Art. I, § 2, cl. 2 (each representative shall “be an Inhabitant of that State” in which he or she is chosen); id. at Art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (representatives shall be “apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union”); id. (“each State shall have at Least one Representative”); id. at art. I, § 2, cl. 4 (the Executive Authority of the “State” shall fill vacancies); id. at art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (the legislature of “each State” shall prescribe times, places, and manner of holding elections for representatives).
20 See Igartua de la Rosa v. United States, 32 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 1994) (holding that United States citizens in Puerto Rico are not entitled to vote in presidential elections); Attorney Gen. of Guam v. United States, 738 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that United States citizens in Guam are not entitled to vote in presidential and vice-presidential elections).
21 See, e.g., Jon M. Van Dyke, The Evolving Legal Relationships Between the United States and Its U.S. Flag Islands, U. HAW. L. REV. 445, 512 (1992). Even some proponents of D.C. voting rights generally assume the District of Columbia is not currently a state for purposes of Article I, § 2, cl. 1. See, e.g., Viet Dinh and Adam H. Charnes, The Authority of Congress to Enact Legislation to Provide the District of Columbia with Voting Representation in the House of Representatives 9 (2004) (report submitted to the House Committee on Government Reform) available at D.C. Vote Website at [http://www.dcvote.org/ pdfs/congress/vietdinh112004.pdf ]. But see Peter Raven-Hansen, Congressional Representation for the District of Columbia: A Constitutional Analysis, 12 Harv. J. on Legis. 167, 168 (1975); Lawrence M. Frankel, National Representation for the District of Columbia: A Legislative Solution, 139 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1659, 1661 (1991).
22 See, e.g., Loughran v. Loughran, 292 U.S. 216, 228 (1934) (holding that Full Faith and Credit clause binds “courts of the District . . . equally with courts of the States”); Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540, 550 (1888) (holding that the right to trial by jury extends to residents of District).
23 2 Stat. 103 (1801).
24 District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 420 (1973) (application of 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
25 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1.
26 See District of Columbia Self-Government and Governmental Reorganization Act, P.L. 93-198 (1973).
27 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
28 “When vacancies happen in the Representation from any State, the Executive Authority thereof shall issue Writs of Election to fill such Vacancies.” U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 2, cl. 4.
29 For instance, at the New York ratifying convention, Thomas Tredwell argued that “[t]he plan of the federal city, sir, departs from every principle of freedom . . . subjecting the inhabitants of that district to the exclusive legislation of Congress, in whose appointment they have no share or vote....” 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA IN 1787, at 402 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1888), reprinted in 3 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 225 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
30 See, e.g., 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 992 (1801) (remarks of Rep. Smilie) (arguing that upon assumption of congressional jurisdiction, “the people of the District would be reduced to the state of subjects, and deprived of their political rights”).
32 Albaugh v. Tawes, 233 F. Supp. 576, 576 (D. Md. 1964), affirmed 379 U.S. 27 (1964) (per curiam) (residents of D.C. have no right to vote in Maryland).
33 Reily v. Lamar, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 344, 356-57 (1805).
34 See Viet Dinh and Adam H. Charnes, supra note 21, at 12-13; D.C. Hearings, supra note 5, at 83 (testimony of Hon. Kenneth W. Starr); Rick Bress and Kristen E. Murray, Latham & Watkins LLP, Analysis of Congress’s Authority By Statute To Provide D.C. Residents Voting Representation in the United States House of Representatives and Senate at 7-12 (February 3, 2003) (analysis prepared for Walter Smith, Executive Director of DC Appleseed Center for Law and Justice).
35 14 F.3d 623 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
36 Michel v. Anderson, 817 F. Supp. 126, 141 (D.D.C. 1993), aff’d 14 F.3d 623 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
37 While accepting the premise that Membership in the House is restricted to representatives of states, the court found that the Delegate’s vote in the Committee of the Whole was subject to a revote procedure which made the vote only “symbolic.” 14 F.3d at 632.
38 U.S. CONST., Article I, § 5.
39 Compare Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 237 (1993) (issue of whether Senate could delegate to a committee the task of taking testimony in an impeachment case presented political question in light of constitutional provision giving Senate “sole power to try impeachments”) with Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 518-49 (1969) (Court reached merits after finding that power of House to judge elections, returns, and qualifications of its Members restricts House to qualifications specified in Constitution).
40 National Mutual Insurance Co. of the District of Columbia v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 604 (Justices Rutledge and Murphy); District of Columbia v. Thompson, 346 U.S. 100, 108-110 (1953).
41 In the District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970, P.L. 91-358, 111, 84 Stat. 475, Congress specifically declared it was acting pursuant to Article I in creating the Superior Court and the District of Columbia Court of Appeals and pursuant to Article III in continuing the United States District Court and the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. The status of the Article I courts were sustained in Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389 (1973).
42 District of Columbia v. Thompson, 346 U.S. 100, 106-09 (1953).
43 337 U.S. 582 (1949).
44 See, e.g., Viet Dinh and Adam H. Charnes, supra note 21, at 11-13; Rick Bress and Kristen E. Murray, supra note 34, at 9-12.
45 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 445 (1805).
46 Id. at 452. Although, strictly speaking, the opinion was addressing statutory language in Act of 1789, the language was so was so similar to the language of the Constitution that it was an interpretation of the latter which was essential to the Court’s reasoning. See Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. at 586.
47 Act of April 20, 1940, c. 117, 54 Stat. 143.
48 See Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. at 600 (plurality opinion of Jackson, J.).
50 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 445 (1805).
52 90 F. Supp. 2d 35 (D.D.C.2000), affirmed sub nom. Alexander v. Mineta, 531 U.S. 940 (2000).
53 337 U.S. at 619 (Rutledge, J, concurring).
54 The Rutledge opinion conceded that Court’s initial determination that District residents were entitled to a jury trial in criminal cases in Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540 (1888) rested in large measure on the more inclusive language of Article III, § 2: “The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been committed; but when not committed within any State, the Trial shall be at such Place or Places as the Congress may by Law have directed.” But the Court noted that cases relied upon by Callan were based at least in part on the Sixth Amendment. “In Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 154, it was taken for granted that the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution secured to the people of the Territories the right of trial by jury in criminal prosecutions....” Callan, 127 U.S. at 550.
56 Although not addressed by the any opinion of the Court, a separate argument has been made that the extension of diversity jurisdiction to the District of Columbia could also have been made under the Privileges and Immunities Clause. See James E. Pfander, The Tidewater Problem: Article III and Constitutional Change, 79 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1925 (2004).
Constitution, so held. The question is, then, whether this is one of those sections of the Constitution to which time and experience were intended to give content, or a provision concerned solely with the mechanics of government. I think there can be little doubt but that it was the latter. That we would now write the section differently seems hardly a sufficient justification for an interpretation admittedly inconsonant with the intent of the framers. Ours is not an amendatory function.” Id. at 645 (Vinson, J., dissenting).
59 Id. at 646 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
60 See Peter Raven-Hansen, Congressional Representation for the District of Columbia: A Constitutional Analysis, 12 Harv. J. on Legis. 167, 168 (1975); Lawrence M. Frankel, National Representation for the District of Columbia: A Legislative Solution, 139 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1659, 1661 (1991).
61 6 U.S. at 452 (“When the same term which has been used plainly in this limited sense in the articles respecting the legislative and executive departments, is also employed in that which respects the judicial department, it must be understood as retaining the sense originally given to it”).
62 The two judges noted a distinction to be made between constitutional clauses “affecting civil rights of citizens,” such as the right to a jury trial, and “the purely political clauses,” such as “the requirements that Members of the House of Representatives be chosen by the people of the several states.” Id. at 619-623 (Rutledge, J., concurring). See Adams v. Clinton, 90 F. Supp. 2nd at 55.
63 Hepburn, 6 U.S. at 453.
64 337 U.S. at 509.
65 See O’Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516 (1933) (holding that Article III District of Columbia courts can exercise judicial power conferred by Congress pursuant to Art. I).
66 337 U.S. at 602.
67 Id. at 602-03. 68 Id. at 585.
69 Id. at 604-606 (Rutledge, J., concurring) (“strongly” dissenting from the suggestion that Congress could use Article I powers to expand the limitations of Article III jurisdiction).
70 “The Constitution is not so self-contradictory. Nor are its limitations to be so easily evaded. The very essence of the problem is whether the Constitution meant to cut out from the diversity jurisdiction of courts created under Article III suits brought by or against citizens of the District of Columbia. That question is not answered by saying in one breath that it did and in the next that it did not.” Id. at 605 (Rutledge, J, concurring).
71 Id. at 628-31 (Vinson, J., dissenting). See, e.g., Keller v. Potomac Electric Co., 261 U.S. 428 (1923).
72 Id. at 646-55 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
78 See CIA World Fact book, [ https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html].
79 See Arnold Leibowitz, DEFINING STATUS: A COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS OF UNITED STATES TERRITORIAL RELATIONS (1989) at 41.
80 This authority, it should be noted, has already been granted, but it was done by Constitutional Amendment. See U.S. CONST. Amend. XXIII.
81 U.S. CONST. Art. V.
82 Alexander, De Alva Stanwood, HISTORY AND PROCEDURE OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 257 (1916).
83 W. Oleszak, Congressional Procedures and the Policy Process 128 (1984).
86 U.S. Const. Art. I, § 1.
87 Michel v. Anderson, 14 F.3d 623, 630 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
88 For example, the number of persons who may be represented by each Member must be approximately equal with the number represented by other Members. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1962). The number of persons represented by the District of Columbia delegate is not established in relationship to this number; rather, the delegate represents the entire population of the District of Columbia.
89 Michel v. Anderson, 14 F.3d 623, 630 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
90 See, e.g., H.R. 4718, 102d Cong., 2nd Sess. (a bill submitted by Delegate Eleanor Norton to provide for admission of the State of New Columbia into the Union). Cosponsors are apparently not required. See id.
91 Rule XII, Rules of the House of Representatives.
92 Although a delegate may currently introduce legislation on the House floor, and may engage in floor debate which could ultimately influence how courts interpret a piece of legislation, there appears to have been no clear constitutional basis distinguishing these particular powers from others not granted. For instance, “preliminary” votes in the House, such as on the adoption of Rules or voting to advice conferees, have historically been denied delegates, although these votes are not directly related to the passage of final legislation.
93 14 F.3d 623 (D.C. Cir. 1994).

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 2
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 §2
 § 2
 v. 
 § 4
 § 3
 §2
 § 3
 § 5
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 2
 § 2
 § 2
 § 4
 v. 
 v. 
 § 2
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 1983
 § 2
 § 4
 § 2
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 5
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 2
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 V.

 § 1
 v. 
 v. 
 v.