Source: https://www.wisbar.org/NewsPublications/WisconsinLawyer/Pages/Article.aspx?ArticleID=19800
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 08:18:08+00:00

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Each house of the Wisconsin Legislature has passed a version of legislation reclassifying crimes and otherwise implementing Truth-in-Sentencing, but those two versions have not been reconciled. 1 Until such a reconciled version becomes law, Wisconsin criminal sentencing law is as described in this article.
n recent years many citizens have become concerned that parole and other forms of early release have resulted in a criminal justice system in which many offenders serve less than one-half of their sentences. To provide greater public safety and restore confidence in the criminal justice system the Wisconsin Legislature passed and the governor signed into law 1997 Wis. Act 283, which brought Truth-in-Sentencing to Wisconsin. Under Wisconsin's new determinate sentencing law - for crimes committed on or after Dec. 31, 1999 - offenders will receive a bifurcated sentence that includes a term of confinement in prison and a term of extended supervision in the community.
Before the enactment of Act 283 a judge sentenced an offender to an indeterminate prison sentence. The offender rarely served the prison term actually imposed. An offender served six months or one-quarter of the court-imposed sentence, whichever was greater, before becoming eligible for parole, a decision made by the Parole Commission.2 Absent extenuating circumstances an offender was released after serving two-thirds of the court-imposed sentence, the mandatory release date.3 If parole was granted, the Department of Corrections (DOC) supervised the offender for a period not to exceed the court-imposed sentence, less time already served. This indeterminate sentencing scheme remains in effect for all offenses that occurred on or before Dec. 30, 1999.
Act 283 abolishes parole. It subjects offenders who commit felonies on and after Dec. 31, 1999, to determinate sentencing. For each offender whom a judge intends to imprison, the judge must impose a bifurcated sentence.4 A bifurcated sentence consists of two components: 1) an initial term of confinement in prison of at least one year; and 2) a term of extended supervision (ES). The offender must serve the entire initial term of confinement in prison.5 This term of confinement is followed by a term of extended supervision in the community subject to conditions set by the court and the DOC.6 Violation of ES subjects the offender to return to prison for a period not greater than the ES term.7 The confinement term plus extended supervision term comprises the total length of an offender's term of imprisonment under Act 283. For example, a court may sentence an offender to a four-year term of imprisonment, comprised of two years of confinement followed by two years of extended supervision. See Figure 1 - New Bifurcated Sentence.
Act 283 establishes an informationally accurate system of sentencing. A sentence to one-year confinement in prison means the offender will be incarcerated for exactly 365 days before being released to a term of extended supervision.
This sixth requirement has created some confusion. One possible interpretation of this requirement is that a judicial determination of boot camp eligibility should contain two components. First, the judge must determine whether the offender meets certain statutory criteria for participation related to the offender's age and the type of offense committed.11 Second, the judge then must exercise appropriate sentencing discretion based upon the severity of the offense, the offender's character, and other factors in assessing whether the offender is an appropriate candidate for boot camp. A judicial determination of boot camp eligibility does not guarantee an offender's placement in boot camp. The DOC retains the discretion to choose which "eligible" offenders will enroll in boot camp.
If an offender successfully completes boot camp, the remaining portion of the confinement term is converted to extended supervision time, although the total length of that offender's bifurcated sentence does not change.12 For example, assume an offender receives a four-year bifurcated sentence comprised of two years confinement and two years ES, and the judge finds the defendant eligible and appropriate for boot camp. The DOC places the offender in boot camp. The offender successfully completes the six-month camp. The remaining portion of the offender's initial confinement term (1.5 years) would convert to ES, increasing the offender's ES term from two years to 3.5 years.
Act 283 expands the penalty ranges for all felonies to allow for a period of extended supervision. Currently, Wisconsin's statutes list 484 felonies, 264 of which are classified crimes within the criminal code, and 220 of which are unclassified crimes scattered throughout the state statutes.
The penalty lengths for classified crimes were increased by 50 percent (although a Class E felony was increased from two years to five years). (Please compare Figure 2 with Figure 3.) Thus, for example, a Class B felony, formerly punishable by 40 years in prison, but under which an offender would be released at 26.8 years (two-thirds of the sentence, the mandatory release date), is now punishable by up to a 60-year term of imprisonment, including up to 40 actual years of initial confinement in prison before a 20-year term of extended supervision.
Accordingly, an unclassified crime such as possession with intent to deliver 5 grams or less of cocaine, previously punishable by up to 10 indeterminate years in prison, has a new maximum term of imprisonment of 15 years.14 This offense carries a maximum initial term of confinement of 75 percent of 15 years, or 11.25 years. An offender sentenced to the maximum initial term of confinement could serve no more than 3.75 years of ES, as the maximum term of imprisonment is 15 years.
Indeterminate sentences in Wisconsin allow an offender to earn "good time" credit.15 Determinate sentences for offenses committed on and after Dec. 31, 1999, make no such allowance. Rather, an offender serves the entire term of confinement in prison before the extended supervision term begins. Also, an offender can be assessed "bad time" in the form of extra days in confinement before release to ES.
Act 283 details punishment for violation of disciplinary rules in prison.
In addition to setting the initial term of confinement in prison the sentencing court also must impose a term of extended supervision. The ES portion of the bifurcated sentence must equal at least 25 percent of the term of confinement actually imposed. Act 283 did not specify maximum terms of ES available for specific classified and unclassified offenses. Rather, to calculate the maximum allowable term of ES, a sentencing judge subtracts the initial term of confinement actually imposed from the maximum term of imprisonment possible.
For example, suppose that an offender is found guilty of a Class B felony, which carries the maximum term of imprisonment of 60 years.19 The judge imposes a one-year initial term of confinement, the minimum confinement term allowed for a bifurcated sentence under Act 283. Using the 25 percent rule, the minimum ES term that the court must impose is 25 percent of one year, or three months. The maximum ES time available to the sentencing court is the maximum term of imprisonment (60 years) less the initial term of confinement (one year). Conceivably, a court could sentence an offender convicted of a Class B felony to one year of confinement followed by 59 years of ES.
If an offender violates one or more conditions of ES the revocation procedure is the same as the current procedure for revocation of an offender's parole.23 An offender shall be sentenced back to confinement in prison for the period specified by the DOC if the offender waives a hearing, or by the Department of Administration Division of Hearings and Appeals if the offender loses a contested hearing. The offender does not return to court for sentencing after revocation. Act 283 does not alter current alternatives to revocation or the offender's right to challenge revocation through a writ of certiorari.
Assume the disposition after revocation by the ALJ includes a portion of the ES term in confinement followed by a period of time back on ES. In such a case the offender may end up serving more time on ES than provided for in the original circuit court sentence. That is because Act 283 does not change statutory and administrative code sections which provide that an offender receives no "credit" for time not in confinement (also known as "street time").
For example, assume an offender receives a four-year term of imprisonment: two years of confinement in prison followed by two years of extended supervision. After serving the confinement term, the offender nearly completes the two-year ES term, but then violates ES conditions and is revoked. The ALJ (or DOC, if the offender waives) has two years of ES to use in any combination of confinement in prison and ES. The ALJ could order an additional one-year confinement in prison followed by one year on ES. If the offender serves the year in confinement and behaves while on ES until the final day of this second ES term, but then violates ES conditions and is revoked again, the ALJ could order an additional one-year confinement in prison. In this example the offender served the entire four-year term of imprisonment in confinement, but also spent three years on ES - one more year than the two-year ES term in the original circuit court sentence. Again, this is because the statutes and administrative code only grant credit for time spent in custody, and Act 283 does not alter those provisions.
Act 283 does not change the attempt statute, which halves the maximum penalty (including the maximum term of imprisonment) for the completed crime.27 But Act 283 does not specify how to calculate the maximum initial term of confinement available for attempted felonies. One interpretation is to halve the maximum initial term of confinement as one would halve the maximum term of imprisonment. An alternative interpretation is to apply the 75 percent rule for unclassified felonies to the halved maximum imprisonment term.
For example, an attempted Class C crime, which under Act 283 has a maximum term of imprisonment of 15 years, would have a maximum term of imprisonment of 7.5 years. Under the first interpretation, the maximum initial term of confinement is one-half the maximum initial term of confinement of 10 years, or five years. Under the second interpretation, the maximum initial term of confinement is 75 percent of the 7.5 year maximum imprisonment term, or 5.625 years.
Under determinate sentencing, if the prosecution pleads and proves a penalty enhancer, the maximum initial term of confinement increases by the length of the penalty enhancer, as does the maximum term of imprisonment.28 Assume an offender is found guilty of committing a burglary, a Class C felony punishable by up to 10 years of initial confinement and 15 years maximum imprisonment, while armed with a dangerous weapon,29 a five-year penalty enhancer on a Class C felony. Under Act 283 the maximum initial term of confinement increases from 10 to 15 years, and the maximum term of imprisonment increases from 15 to 20 years.
The penalty enhancer for habitual criminality works the same way. If an offender commits a Class C felony punishable by up to 10 years of initial confinement and 15 years maximum imprisonment, the maximum term of confinement increases by 10 years (because the underlying crime had a term of imprisonment [15 years] greater than 10 years).30 Accordingly, the maximum term of initial confinement increases by 10 years to 20 years, and the maximum term of imprisonment increases by 10 years to 25 years.
Act 283 applies only to felony sentences, not a misdemeanor term of imprisonment that exceeds one year because of penalty enhancement.31 The judge may not impose a bifurcated sentence on misdemeanants. So, an offender convicted of misdemeanor retail theft who is a habitual criminal has a maximum exposure of three indeterminate years.
As with all other felonies, under Act 283 an offender sentenced to life imprisonment is not eligible for parole. Instead, a judge sentencing a life offender chooses one of three options. The offender: 1) is eligible for extended supervision after serving 20 years of the sentence; 2) is eligible for release to ES on a date set by the court after the minimum of 20 years; or 3) is not eligible for release.32 An offender sentenced to life in prison who is released to ES remains on ES for the rest of that offender's life. That ES may be revoked if the offender violates ES conditions. A life offender on ES who is revoked must serve at least five years of confinement in prison.
Act 283 does not change the law as to the maximum period of time for which an offender found "NGI" may be committed. An offender found NGI may be committed for a period not to exceed two-thirds of the maximum term of imprisonment including penalty enhancers.34 Note that this is two-thirds of the maximum term of imprisonment, not two-thirds of the maximum initial term of confinement.
When considering how an offender serves more than one sentence, note that the confinement and ES terms of a bifurcated sentence are not separable. For example, if an offender receives two bifurcated sentences, the confinement terms of those two sentences cannot run consecutively while the ES terms run concurrently.
Under Act 283 all consecutive sentences are computed as a single sentence. The confinement terms of all sentences are served before ES terms begin.36 This is similar to the treatment of multiple prison sentences and parole under current law.
Act 283 did not change many other areas of criminal sentencing law in Wisconsin. It did not affect any crimes committed before Dec. 31, 1999; offenders who commit such crimes will be sentenced under the current law, and most will be eligible for parole. Also, it did not alter procedures for granting or revoking parole for those offenders with indeterminate sentences.
Act 283 does not alter the existing statutory fine amounts, and it does not affect costs or surcharges.
A sentence to the county jail is not a bifurcated sentence. Bifurcated sentences may not be imposed unless the offense is a felony and the place of confinement is the Wisconsin state prison.38 "Good time" credit rules continue to apply to jail sentences in the "new world" of Truth-in-Sentencing.
Michael B. Brennan, Northwestern 1989, is the judge for Branch 15 of the Milwaukee County Circuit Court. He was the staff counsel for the Criminal Penalties Study Committee, which was charged with implementing truth-in-sentencing in Wisconsin.
Donald V. Latorraca , Washington University in St. Louis 1985, is an assistant attorney general with the Wisconsin Department of Justice. The comments in this article are the authors' and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the attorney general or the Wisconsin Department of Justice.
Act 283 also created the Criminal Penalties Study Committee, an 18-person bipartisan and diverse group of judges, prosecutors, criminal defense lawyers, legislators, academics, corrections and law enforcement officials, and members of the public. The committee met from August 1998 until August 1999, when it issued its final report along with draft legislation. The recommendations in the final report represent the second step of Truth-in-Sentencing in Wisconsin.39 These include a new classification system for all felonies, advisory sentencing guidelines and notes, and a proposed procedure for extended supervision and its revocation. But until a version of this implementing legislation becomes law, Act 283 codifies Wisconsin's new criminal sentencing law.
1 1999 AB 465; 1999 SB 237.
2 Wis. Stat. § 304.06(1)(b).
3 Wis. Stat. § 302.11.
4 Wis. Stat. § 973.01(1).
5 Wis. Stat. § 973.01(2)(b) & (4).
6 Wis. Stat. § 973.01(5).
7 Wis. Stat. §§ 973.01(8)(a)5, 302.113(9).
8 Wis. Stat. § 973.032(1).
9 Wis. Stat. § 973.01(8). Offenders of crimes in Wis. Stat. chapter 940 and many crimes in chapter 948 are not eligible for boot camp.
10 Wisconsin Supreme Court Form No. CR-234.
11 See Wis. Stat. § 302.045(2).
12 See Wis. Stat. § 302.045(3m)(b).
13 Wis. Stat. § 973.01(2)(b)6.
14 Wis. Stat. § 961.41(1m)(cm)1.
15 Wis. Stat. § 302.43.
16 Wis. Stat. §§ 302.113(3)(a), 302.114(3)(a).
17 Wis. Stat. §§ 302.113(3)(b), 302.114(3)(b).
18 Wis. Stat. §§ 302.113(3)(d), 302.114(3)(d).
19 Wis. Stat. § 939.50(2)(b).
20 Wis. Stat. § 302.113(5).
21 Wis. Stat. § 973.01(5).
22 Wis. Stat. § 302.113(7).
23 See Wis. Stat. § 302.113(9); for life sentences, see § 302.114.
24 Wis. Stat. § 302.113(9).
25 Wis. Stat. § 302.113(9)(c).
26 See Wis. Stat. § 973.01(8).
27 Wis. Stat. § 939.32.
28 Wis. Stat. § 973.01(2)(c).
29 Wis. Stat. § 939.63.
30 See Wis. Stat. § 939.62(1).
31 Wis. Stat. § 939.62.
32 Wis. Stat. § 973.014(1g).
33 Wis. Stat. § 302.114(5)(f).
34 Wis. Stat. § 971.17(1).
35 State v. Rohl, 160 Wis. 2d. 325, 466 N.W. 2d 208 (Ct. App. 1991).
36 See Wis. Stat. § 302.113(4).
37 Wis. Stat. § 973.09(2)(b).
38 Wis. Stat. § 973.01(1).
39 The committee's final report is available online.

References: V. 
 § 304
 § 302
 § 973
 § 973
 § 973
 § 973
 § 973
 § 302
 § 302
 § 973
 § 961
 § 302
 § 939
 § 302
 § 973
 § 302
 § 302
 § 302
 § 302
 § 302
 § 973
 § 939
 § 973
 § 939
 § 939
 § 939
 § 973
 § 302
 § 971
 v. 
 § 302
 § 973
 § 973