Source: http://masscases.com/cases/app/2/2massappct623.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 18:42:11+00:00

Document:
PETER ONANIAN vs. JOHN E. LEGGAT.
Present: HALE, C.J., ROSE, KEVILLE, GOODMAN, GRANT, & ARMSTRONG, JJ.
BILL IN EQUITY filed in the Superior Court on December 31, 1970.
The suit was heard by Mason, J.
Robert F. Murphy, Jr. (John E. Leggat with him) for the defendant.
Benjamin Goldman for the plaintiff.
entitled to the payment of a sum of money, with interest, in lieu of specific performance of an agreement for the purchase of certain real property from the defendant. Since we have before us the judge's findings of fact and a transcript of the evidence heard by him, all questions of law, fact and discretion are open for our decision, and we can and do find facts not expressly found by the judge. Juergens v. Venture Capital Corp. 1 Mass. App. Ct. 274 (1973).
On July 17, 1970, the defendant qualified as executor under the will of one L. Francis F. Knowles. The will devised the decedent's real property to certain persons, but conferred a power of sale thereof upon the defendant as executor. The defendant received at least two offers to purchase the real property, one of which was from the plaintiff. During the last week of November, 1970, the plaintiff and the defendant executed an agreement for the purchase and sale of the property (the agreement) for $32,500, title to pass on or before January 1, 1971. The agreement was in typical form, but contained the following provision: "This conveyance is subject to and contingent upon the issuance of a license to sell from the Probate Court for Middlesex County in the Estate of L. Francis F. Knowles."
larger sum, or at public auction, if he shall think best so to do . . .."
By a letter dated December 29, 1970, the defendant informed the plaintiff that the license had been obtained. In the same letter, however, the defendant stated that another prospective purchaser was interested in the property and that it would be sold to the highest bidder on January 4, 1971. The plaintiff filed his bill in equity on December 31, 1970, seeking specific performance of the agreement and other relief, but, without waiving his rights under the agreement, submitted a bid to the defendant in the amount of $35,155, and obtained title to the property for that price during the pendency of this suit. The decree appealed from declared the defendant indebted to the plaintiff for the difference between that price and the contract price of $32,500, with interest from December 31, 1970.
We are uncertain whether the thrust of the defendant's argument is that his agreement with the plaintiff was not binding upon him or that a condition to which his obligation thereunder was subject was not fulfilled. Under either interpretation the argument is without merit.
is liable on contracts he makes for the benefit of the estate, if at all, individually and not in his representative capacity. Luscomb v. Ballard, 5 Gray 403, 405 (1855). Dresel v. Jordan, 104 Mass. 407, 413-414 (1870). Kingman v. Soule, 132 Mass. 285, 288 (1882). Tomlinson v. Flanagan, 287 Mass. 38, 44-45 (1934). Grueby v. Chase Harris Forbes Corp. 292 Mass. 156, 159 (1935). Anglo-American Direct Tea Trading Co. v. Seward, 294 Mass. 349, 351 (1936). Marsh v. Drowne, 1 Mass. App. Ct. 777, 780, n. 5 (1974). Thus, the two types of duties are enforceable by different persons and, in the eyes of the law, against different persons. See Eaton v. Walker, 244 Mass. 23, 30-32 (1923). The executor or administrator, of course, is entitled to reimbursement for expenses reasonably and necessarily incurred for the benefit of the estate. Tomlinson v. Flanagan, supra, at 45. But whether he can obtain such reimbursement is a question to be answered by the Probate Court in the settlement of his account, a separate proceeding which is not before us (Luscomb v. Ballard, supra), and as to which we make no comment (O'Brien v. Dwight, 363 Mass. 256, 292 ).
into a contract to do so (compare Weinstein v. Green, 347 Mass. 580 ) and his obligation thereunder has become unconditional (contrast Grennan v. Pierce, 229 Mass. 292, 293-294 ), the contract may well be specifically enforceable against him. See Justice v. Soderlund, 225 Mass. 320, 322-324 (1916); O'Neill v. Niccolls, 324 Mass. 382, 384-385 (1949). We need not decide whether the plaintiff could have obtained a decree ordering the defendant to convey the property, however, as no such decree was necessary. Having already acquired title to the property, the plaintiff received by the decree what amounts to nothing more than money damages in the nature of a refund of the excess of the price he paid over the price stipulated in the agreement -- which he could just as well have recovered in an action at law.
from liability. Scirpo v. McMillan, 355 Mass. 657, 660 (1969). Rather, his liability is governed by "[t]he general rule . . . that . . . one who signs a written agreement is bound by its terms whether he reads and understands it or not . . .." Spritz v. Lishner, 355 Mass. 162, 164 (1969).
2. If the defendant's argument is interpreted as one that his obligation under the agreement was conditional upon his not receiving a higher offer for the property, it must also fail. There was no evidence of any antecedent understanding between the parties in this regard. There was nothing in the agreement itself expressly relieving the defendant of liability upon receipt of a higher offer. The defendant seems to argue, however, that the provision making his obligation conditional upon obtaining a license from the Probate Court impliedly had this effect.
to be one permitting the defendant to sell the property for the stipulated contract price of $32,500.
thereto. Because of the fundamental rule that an unaccepted offer may be withdrawn or rejected at any time before acceptance (see, e.g., Sylvester v. Newton, 321 Mass. 416 ; Weinstein v. Green, 347 Mass. 580 ), it is our opinion that the clear purpose of the words "or for a larger sum" was to permit the defendant to accept a higher offer if one was received by him before he had accepted the lower one. This would ordinarily be the effect of the words "or for a larger sum" -- which, together with the other provisions of the petition and decree quoted in this paragraph, were printed on the form of petition filed by the defendant and the decree entered thereon. Such a decree obviously contemplates that a fiduciary will "avoid getting himself into a position where he cannot accept a higher offer if one is made." Newhall, Settlement of Estates (4th ed.) Section 113, at 345.
auction between them (see Newhall, Settlement of Estates [4th ed.] Section 120), or could even have brought them before the probate judge (see Weathers v. Jarvis, 294 Mass. 227 ). Once the probate decree had been entered the defendant might still have been able to escape liability by seeking its amendment or revocation. See Thornton v. McWalter, 329 Mass. 768 (1953). So far as the record discloses, however, the defendant did none of these things. He must therefore be held liable on his agreement.
3. We note that the defendant is characterized in the pleadings and the decree of the Superior Court as "executor". For the reasons previously stated he is properly before the Superior Court only as an individual, and we treat the bill as having been brought against him in that capacity, the word "executor" being surplusage. See Newhall, Settlement of Estates (4th ed.) Section 254. Since the identification of the defendant in the decree ("as he is the Executor of the Will of L. Francis F. Knowles") might be susceptible of misinterpretation, the decree is to be modified by striking the quoted words therefrom.
This opinion represents the view of a majority of the court. See Rule 1:18 of the Appeals Court, 1 Mass. App. Ct. 892 (1972).
The decree as modified is affirmed.
[Note 1] The reason that the contract in the Dresel case could not have been specifically enforced against the `executors was that they had no power under the will to sell the real estate and the Probate Court at that time had no power to grant an executor a license to sell real estate other than at public auction. Hunt v. Frost, 4 Cush. 54, 59-60 (1849). The statute under which the latter case was decided (Rev. Sts. c. 71, Section 17) was carried over in substantially the same form by Gen. Sts. c. 102, Section 17, and Pub. Sts. c. 134, Section 11. The Probate Courts were first authorized to grant licenses to executors and administrators to sell real property at private sales by St. 1886, c. 137, Section 1, and that authorization exists today under G. L. c. 202, Sections 14, 19.

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