Source: https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_cha_chapter5_rule16
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 23:31:57+00:00

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i) do everything feasible to verify that the objectives to be attacked are neither civilians nor civilian objects and are not subject to special protection but are military objectives within the meaning of paragraph 2 of Article 52 and that it is not prohibited by the provisions of this Protocol to attack them.
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), Geneva, 8 June 1977, Article 57(2)(a). Article 57 was adopted by 90 votes in favour, none against and 4 abstentions. CDDH, Official Records, Vol. VI, CDDH/SR.42, 27 May 1977, p. 211.
a) do everything feasible to verify that the objectives to be attacked are not cultural property protected under Article 4 of the Convention.
The person responsible for ordering or launching an attack shall, first of all: (a) make sure that the objective, or objectives, to be attacked are military objectives within the meaning of the present rules, and are duly identified.
Draft Rules for the Limitation of the Dangers Incurred by the Civilian Population in Time of War, drafted by the International Committee of the Red Cross, September 1956, submitted to governments for their consideration on behalf of the 19th International Conference of the Red Cross, New Delhi, 28 October–7 November, Res. XIII, Article 8.
Louise Doswald-Beck (ed.), San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea, 12 June 1994, Prepared by international lawyers and naval experts convened by the International Institute of Humanitarian Law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1995, § 46(b).
Australia, Manual on Law of Armed Conflict, Australian Defence Force Publication, Operations Series, ADFP 37 – Interim Edition, 1994, § 556(d); see also Law of Armed Conflict, Commanders’ Guide, Australian Defence Force Publication, Operations Series, ADFP 37 Supplement 1 – Interim Edition, 7 March 1994, § 957(a).
Australia’s LOAC Manual (2006) states that it is the duty of Australian Defence Force commanders to do “everything feasible to verify that objects being attacked are military objectives”.
Australia, The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 06.4, Australian Defence Headquarters, 11 May 2006, § 5.61; see also § 5.53.
Belgium’s Teaching Manual for Soldiers considers that an object can be attacked only when it can reasonably be considered to be a military objective and states that armed forces should not shoot first and check later.
Belgium, Droit de la Guerre, Dossier d’Instruction pour Soldat, à l’attention des officiers instructeurs, JS3, Etat-Major Général, Forces Armées belges, undated, p. 21.
Benin, Le Droit de la Guerre, III fascicules, Forces Armées du Bénin, Ministère de la Défense nationale, 1995, Fascicule III, p. 11; see also Fascicule II, p. 6.
Burundi’s Regulations on International Humanitarian Law (2007) states that “belligerents are obliged to endeavour to verify that the envisaged object is well and truly a military objective”.
Burundi, Règlement n° 98 sur le droit international humanitaire, Ministère de la Défense Nationale et des Anciens Combattants, Projet “Moralisation” (BDI/B-05), August 2007, Part I bis, pp. 43–44; see also Part I bis, p. 120.
Cameroon’s Instructor’s Manual (1992) requires that “those who plan or decide upon an attack do everything that is practically possible to verify that the targets to be attacked are military objectives”.
Cameroon, Droit international humanitaire et droit de la guerre, Manuel de l’instructeur en vigueur dans les Forces Armées, Présidence de la République, Ministère de la Défense, Etat-major des Armées, Troisième Division, Edition 1992, p. 82; see also p. 110 (naval warfare) and 113 (air warfare).
… [T]hose who decide or prepare an attack must verify that the objectives to be attacked are military objectives and that the law of armed conflict and international humanitarian law do not prohibit such an attack.
Cameroon, Droit des conflits armés et droit international humanitaire, Manuel de l’instructeur en vigueur dans les forces de défense, Ministère de la Défense, Présidence de la République, Etat-major des Armées, 2006, p. 175, § 481.
Under the heading “Regulations regarding the Means and Methods of Attack”, the manual quotes Article 57(2)(a) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I concerning the verification of military objectives.
Canada, The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Level, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 1999, p. 4-3, § 24(a).
a. to do everything feasible to verify that the objectives to be attacked are in fact legitimate targets and are not entitled to special protection under the LOAC.
Canada, The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Levels, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 13 August 2001, § 417.1.a.
1 Distinction. As a general rule civilians and civilian objects shall not be the object of attack (acts of violence against the adversary, whether in offence or defence). Targets shall be limited strictly to military objectives.
2 All feasible precautions must be taken to verify that the target is a military objective, and not a civilian or a civilian object, and that it is not subject to any of the specialized regimes of protection which prohibit, or severely restrict, attacks on certain persons and objects. Such regimes exist for wounded, sick, prisoners of war, religious, cultural and historic objects, dams, dykes and nuclear generating stations.
Canada, Use of Force for CF Operations, Canadian Forces Joint Publication, Chief of the Defence Staff, B-GJ-005-501/FP-001, August 2008, § 112.2.
- do everything in his power to verify that the target is a military objective. If there is doubt, he must abstain from attacking. The principle of distinction must guide the reflection.
Combatants must do everything in their power to verify that the objects to be attacked are not protected under IHL. In other words, they must not be cultural property, works containing dangerous forces, hospitals, protected zones or localities, nor prisoner-of-war camps.
Côte d’Ivoire, Droit de la guerre, Manuel d’instruction, Livre III, Tome 1: Instruction de l’élève officier d’active de 1ère année, Manuel de l’élève, Ministère de la Défense, Forces Armées Nationales, November 2007, pp. 48 and 49; see also Droit de la guerre, Manuel d’instruction, Livre IV: Instruction du chef de section et du commandant de compagnie, Manuel de l’élève, Ministère de la Défense, Forces Armées Nationales, November 2007, pp. 70–71.
Croatia’s LOAC Compendium (1991) imposes a duty to “verify the military character of objectives and targets”.
Croatia, Compendium “Law of Armed Conflicts”, Republic of Croatia, Ministry of Defence, 1991, p. 43.
Ecuador, Aspectos Importantes del Derecho Internacional Marítimo que Deben Tener Presente los Comandantes de los Buques, Academia de Guerra Naval, 1989, § 8.1.
France’s LOAC Manual (2001) provides that those who plan or decide upon an attack must “verify that the objectives to be attacked are neither civilians nor civilian objects”.
France, Manuel de droit des conflits armés, Ministère de la Défense, Direction des Affaires Juridiques, Sous-Direction du droit international humanitaire et du droit européen, Bureau du droit des conflits armés, 2001, p. 98.
Greece, International Law Manual, Hellenic Navy General Staff, Directorate A2, Division IV, 1995, Chapter 7, Part I, § 2(a).
Hungary’s Military Manual (1992) imposes a duty to “verify the military character of objectives and targets”.
Hungary, A Hadijog, Jegyzet a Katonai, Föiskolák Hallgatói Részére, Magyar Honvédség Szolnoki Repülötiszti Föiskola, 1992, p. 69.
Israel, Laws of War in the Battlefield, Manual, Military Advocate General Headquarters, Military School, 1998, p. 37.
- The attack is directed against specific military targets.
Israel, Rules of Warfare on the Battlefield, Military Advocate-General’s Corps Command, IDF School of Military Law, Second Edition, 2006, p. 26.
Italy, Regole elementari di diritto di guerra, SMD-G-012, Stato Maggiore della Difesa, I Reparto, Ufficio Addestramento e Regolamenti, Rome, 1991, § 52; see also § 66.
Madagascar, Le Droit des Conflits Armés, Ministère des Forces Armées, August 1994, Fiche No. 6-O, § 23.
Nigeria, International Humanitarian Law (IHL), Directorate of Legal Services, Nigerian Army, 1994, p. 45, § 16(a).
Peru’s IHL and Human Rights Manual (2010) states that commanders “must verify the military nature of an objective or a target through reconnaissance and identification”.
Peru, Manual de Derecho Internacional Humanitario y Derechos Humanos para las Fuerzas Armadas, Resolución Ministerial No. 049-2010/DE/VPD, Lima, 21 May 2010, § 52, p. 434.
Philippines, Implementation Guidelines for Presidential Memorandum Order No. 393, dated 9 September 1991, Directing the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippines National Police to Reaffirm their Adherence to the Principles of Humanitarian Law and Human Rights in the Conduct of Security/Police Operations, Joint Circular Number 2-91, Department of National Defense, Department of Interior and Local Government, 1991, § 2(c)(3).
f. Positive Identification (PID) of targets is required prior to engagement. PID is a reasonable certainty that the object of attack is verified and confirmed as a legitimate military target in accordance with this SROE [Standing Rules of Engagement].
Philippines, AFP Standing Rules of Engagement, Armed Forces of the Philippines, General Headquarters, Office of the Chief of Staff, 1 December 2005, § 8(f).
6. Double-check your target. Don’t be too hasty and careless in firing at anyone whom you think is a combatant. There are times when it is too late to know that the supposed combatant is just carrying an airgun or a farm tool. Sometimes, friendly troops also become victims of friendly fires. This is also true to field artillery units.
Philippines, Philippine Army Soldier’s Handbook on Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law, A Practical Guide for Internal Security Operations, 2006, p. 60, § 6.
Spain, Orientaciones. El Derecho de los Conflictos Armados, Publicación OR7-004, 2 Tomos, aprobado por el Estado Mayor del Ejército, División de Operaciones, 18 March 1996, Vol. I, § 10.8.e.(2); see also §§ 10.8.f.(1) and 2.3.b.(1).
Spain’s LOAC Manual (2007) states that “those who plan or order an attack must do everything feasible to verify that the objectives that they are targeting are not civilians, civilian property or persons or objects subject to special protection”.
Spain, Orientaciones. El Derecho de los Conflictos Armados, Tomo 1, Publicación OR7–004, (Edición Segunda), Mando de Adiestramiento y Doctrina, Dirección de Doctrina, Orgánica y Materiales, 2 November 2007, § 4.3; see also §§ 2.3.b.(1) and 4.5.a.(1).(a).
Sweden, International Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflict, with reference to the Swedish Total Defence System, Swedish Ministry of Defence, January 1991, Section 3.2.1.5, p. 70.
1 must make sure that the objectives of the attack are neither civilians nor civilian objects.
Switzerland, Bases légales du comportement à l’engagement (BCE), Règlement 51.007/IVf, Swiss Army, issued based on Article 10 of the Ordinance for the Organization of the Federal Department for Defence, Civil Protection and Sports of March 2003, entry into force on 1 July 2005, §§ 165–166(1). The German language version notes in § 166(1): “must do everything feasible … [“hat alles praktisch Mögliche zu tun …”]”.
Togo, Le Droit de la Guerre, III fascicules, Etat-major Général des Forces Armées Togolaises, Ministère de la Défense nationale, 1996, Fascicule III, p. 11; see also Fascicule II, p. 6.
United Kingdom, The Law of Armed Conflict, D/DAT/13/35/66, Army Code 71130 (Revised 1981), Ministry of Defence, prepared under the Direction of The Chief of the General Staff, 1981, Section 4, p. 13, § 4(a).
United Kingdom, The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, Ministry of Defence, 1 July 2004, § 5.32.2.
b. in the light of the information available to them, those who plan, decide upon or execute an attack shall do everything feasible to ensure that attacks are limited to military objectives.
Yugoslavia, Socialist Federal Republic of, Propisi o Primeri Pravila Medjunarodnog Ratnog Prava u Oruzanim Snagama SFRJ, PrU-2, Savezni Sekretarijat za Narodnu Odbranu (Pravna Uprava), 1988, § 72(1).
Under Ireland’s Geneva Conventions Act (1962), as amended in 1998, any “minor breach” of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, including violations of Article 57(2)(a)(i), is a punishable offence.
The precautionary principle is the cornerstone of a number of specific rules which are all considered to have attained customary status and to be applicable in internal armed conflicts … Among these rules is … the obligation of the parties to a conflict to do everything feasible to verify that targets are military objectives.
In 2010, in the Couso case, which concerned the killing of a Spanish journalist in Baghdad on 8 April 2003 by troops of the United States of America, the Criminal Chamber of Spain’s Supreme Court referred to norms of IHL relevant to the case under review, including Article 57(2)(a)(i) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I.
The Report on the Practice of Egypt considers target verification to be an absolute obligation.
- Generally, the collection of information in order to allow the Federal Government to gain an independent picture of the situation.
- Collection of GPS data, in order to prevent attacks against civilian installations protected under the international law of war (schools, hospitals, diplomatic institutions).
In the beginning, the focus of reporting from Baghdad was the identification and attribution of the embassies in Baghdad. The BND headquarters transferred this information to US authorities in order to prevent attacks on installations protected under the international law of war.
The US side placed requests for information concerning broadly diversified issues. Some of them were answered, also by using reports from the SET.
- Reports dealt with installations protected under the international law of war or with humanitarian concerns (embassies and consulates, synagogue/Torah scrolls, possible location of a missing US pilot). Some of these reports contained geographical coordinates.
3. Support to the coalition troops in avoiding attacks on objects protected under the international law of war.
Germany, Federal Government, Report in response to request by Parliamentary Control Panel (2006), 23 February 2006, pp. 5, 12, 13–14, 18 and 19–21.
On the basis of a reply by Iraq’s Ministry of Defence to a questionnaire, the Report on the Practice of Iraq lists, among the precautions required in attack, the duty to ascertain the purely military nature of a target before taking any action against it.
[W]hen possible, the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] used (in real time) updated and precise intelligence available regarding target identification and the risk of incidental civilian harm. When necessary, it also cross checked intelligence sources before commencing attacks, even in cases in which delaying fire entailed additional risk to both Israeli civilians and IDF forces.
Israel, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Operation in Gaza 27 December 2008–18 January 2009: Factual and Legal Aspects, 29 July 2009, § 254.
The Report on the Practice of Jordan notes that a booklet on the law of armed conflict prepared by the ICRC is used by military commanders. The booklet gives a list of principles to apply in military action, among which is the obligation to verify the military nature of an objective prior to the attack.
Report on the Practice of Jordan, 1997, Answers to additional questions on Chapter 1.6.
According to the Report on the Practice of Malaysia, the obligation to verify that targets are indeed military objectives forms part of Malaysian practice.
In a report submitted to the UN Security Council on operations in the Gulf War, the United Kingdom asserted that UK commanders were briefed on the “locations and significance of sites of religious and cultural importance in Iraq” and that operations would take this information into account.
United Kingdom, Letter dated 21 January 1991 to the President of the UN Security Council, UN Doc. S/22115, 21 January 1991, p. 1; see also Letter dated 13 February 1991 to the President of the UN Security Council, UN Doc. S/22218, 13 February 1991, p. 1.
During the air campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1999, NATO stated on various occasions that the targets attacked were exclusively military. According to NATO, the targets were carefully selected and continuously assessed to avoid collateral damage.
NATO, Press Conferences of 25 and 26 March 1999, 3 and 9 April 1999, 15 and 21 May 1999.
In its judgment in the Kupreškić case in 2000, the ICTY Trial Chamber stated that Article 57 of the 1977 Additional Protocol I was now part of customary international law, not only because it specified and fleshed out general pre-existing norms, but also because it did not appear to be contested by any State, including those that had not ratified the Protocol.
a) to do everything practicable to verify that the objectives to be attacked are military objectives.
ICTY, Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, The Hague, 14 June 2000, § 28.
ICTY, Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, The Hague, 14 June 2000, § 56.
The practical application of the principle of distinction requires that those who plan or launch an attack take all feasible precautions to verify that the objectives attacked are neither civilians nor civilian objects, so as to spare civilians as much as possible.
ICTY, Galić case, Judgment, 5 December 2003, § 58.
The attack may only be directed at a specific military objective. The military objective must be identified as such and clearly designated and assigned. The attack shall be limited to the assigned military objective. The precautions to be taken in targeting are equivalent to those to be respected in the choice of a military objective.
In combat action the military character of the objectives and targets must be verified.
Frédéric de Mulinen, Handbook on the Law of War for Armed Forces, ICRC, Geneva, 1987, §§ 428, 434 and 454.
In an appeal issued in October 1973, the ICRC urged all the belligerents in the conflict in the Middle East (Egypt, Iraq, Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic) to observe forthwith, in particular, the provisions of, inter alia, Article 50(1)(a) of the draft Additional Protocol I, which stated in part: “Those who plan or decide upon an attack shall ensure that the objectives to be attacked are duly identified as military objectives.” (Proposal I). All governments concerned replied favourably.

References: § 46
 § 556
 § 957
 § 5
 § 5
 § 481
 § 24
 § 417
 § 112
 § 8
 § 2
 § 52
 § 66
 § 23
 § 16
 § 52
 § 2
 § 8
 § 6
 § 10
 § 4
 § 166
 § 4
 § 5
 § 72
 § 254
 § 28
 § 56
 § 58