Source: https://ylpr.yale.edu/inter_alia/preclearance-without-statutory-change-bail-suits-post-shelby-county
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 14:00:38+00:00

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In the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in Shelby County, voting rights advocates should be cautiously optimistic that the Voting Rights Act’s “bail-in” process, left intact by that decision, can fill the void left open by the Court’s rejection of the preclearance coverage formula. Although statutory change may still be possible and desirable immediate attention should be paid to provisions currently in effect and capable of instant application. The bail-in provision satisfies the constitutional requirements laid out by the Shelby County Court, is immediately available, and, if utilized, represents the remedial option closest to the previously utilized § 5 preclearance structure.
With statutory change uncertain, the logical alternative is to look for increased opportunities to enforce provisions of the VRA unaffected by the Court’s ruling. The Court, while striking down the coverage formula of the Act, left intact the § 5 preclearance requirement. It additionally left untouched a lesser known provision contained in § 3(c) of the Act—sometimes called the “bail-in” procedure or the “pocket trigger” provision.11 The bail-in process allows a court, upon finding a violation of the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendment, to impose a system similar to the § 5 preclearance structure on the offending jurisdiction.12 The bail-in procedure has been infrequently examined by both courts and scholars.13 Only one reported case exists analyzing the standards for bailing-in a jurisdiction.14 This piece attempts to provide an analysis of bail-in suits post-Shelby County by examining the advantages of bail-in litigation, as well as its challenges.
The § 3 bail-in provision does not rely on the § 4 formula, or any other legislative calculation. Rather, jurisdictions become subject to preclearance under § 3 upon an individualized determination by a court, and only after the jurisdiction has been found in violation of the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendment.21 In this way, the § 3 bail-in process is more likely to satisfy constitutional concerns. A jurisdiction bailed in via § 3 can hardly complain it is not being treated equally by the federal government, since it will have had an opportunity to independently litigate before a neutral arbiter whether it should be subject to preclearance. Further, if a jurisdiction is bailed in, its future voting changes will be submitted to the court imposing preclearance.22 This too is different than § 5, where jurisdictions were forced to choose between the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the District of Columbia District Court. The choice between submitting changes to two different federal decision makers, both located in the District of Columbia, has been a point of contention since § 5’s enactment. The ability of states to litigate their § 3 preclearance requests in the federal court located in their state cures this concern.
The § 3 process also permits temporal limitations to be placed on the review process. Courts can order review for only a limited duration of time.23 This is unlike the indefinite § 5 process which can only be terminated if a jurisdiction institutes its own suit, requesting it no longer be subject to review.24 This strengthens the argument that the bail-in process satisfies constitutional requirements by treating states with equal dignity.
There are still a number of hurdles to increased § 3 litigation post-Shelby County. The most significant is establishing a violation of the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendment. For § 3 to apply, it is insufficient that a jurisdiction be found to have violated the VRA or another voting rights statute. Rather, a specific finding must be made that the jurisdiction violated the Constitution.25 This is a demanding requirement, and will likely necessitate proof that a jurisdiction intended to discriminate on the basis of race.26 The § 3 process is also at the mercy of the federal judiciary. Litigants will have to convince a federal judge not only that a violation has occurred, but also that the court should require the jurisdiction to submit future voting changes to the court. Again, this is a challenging burden for litigants, since some judges will prefer to stay out of state political affairs.
However, even with these challenges in mind, it is clear the bail-in process represents the remedial structure most similar to the previously enforced § 5 process, and, as we will see, provides advantages over other VRA alternatives.
Another portion of the VRA left intact post-Shelby County is § 2. Section 2 permits the government or any aggrieved party to bring suit against any jurisdiction for violations of the VRA.27 Since the VRA’s adoption, § 2 has been utilized to enforce voting rights in jurisdictions not covered by the preclearance requirement. Post-Shelby County, § 2 suits are likely to become more prevalent. Indeed, the day after Shelby County was released, a group of plaintiffs filed a § 2 suit against Texas’s voter ID law,28 which had previously been the subject of § 5 litigation.
For these reasons § 2 suits standing alone fail to fill the void left in the wake of Shelby County. In order to fully realize the promises of the VRA, § 2 litigants should, in addition to their statutory grievances, pursue violations of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth amendments where they exist. If a court finds a violation of the Constitution, it may utilize § 3 to bail-in the jurisdiction and impose preclearance requirements.34 In this way, § 2 litigants can realize their own goals of holding jurisdictions accountable for past and ongoing voting rights violations, while at the same time protecting future voters by barring jurisdictions from replacing old discriminatory laws with new ones.
The bail-in procedure has been utilized sparingly since the VRA’s adoption. Today, with § 4 eliminated, it is important to observe any trends in the limited number of bail-in cases available, in order to determine § 3’s reach.
In viewing the bailed-in jurisdictions, one cannot help but notice the list satisfies many of the concerns raised by the Shelby County Court. The jurisdictions were bailed in at different time periods and by different courts, establishing the dynamic nature of § 3 compared to the more stagnant § 4. The jurisdictions are geographically diverse, alleviating concerns regarding the dignity of each state, and the characterization that § 4 singled out the South. Similarly, the fact that jurisdictions have consented to the bail-in mechanism in lieu of trial demonstrates a benefit to states engaged in protracted litigation. Lastly, the limited duration that jurisdictions are subject to preclearance eases the harsh impact of the requirement.
Following Shelby County, Attorney General Eric Holder made clear that his office would continue to aggressively enforce the provisions of the VRA unaffected by the Supreme Court’s decision.46 One can expect this enforcement effort will include an increased utilization of § 3. Additionally, private actors are likely to pursue more suits involving § 3 as a remedy, with the hopes of placing violating jurisdictions under supervision.
Challenges to voting laws under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth amendments are ongoing as of this writing. Trial is scheduled in November of 2013 for challenges to Wisconsin’s voter identification law.47 A challenge to Ohio’s early voting changes is in the discovery phase, with the District Court set to make a decision on a permanent injunction later this year.48 Neither of these jurisdictions were covered under § 4. However, it seems likely that constitutional claims against previously covered jurisdictions will increase in the immediate future. This is particularly true of states recently the subject of prolonged § 5 litigation—including Florida,49 Texas,50 and South Carolina.51 These three states battled with the DOJ over voting changes in the last three years, with the DOJ largely the victor—successfully blocking a number of changes from being implemented. The successes of those efforts are now reduced to a nullity—since any recent denials of preclearance were voided by the Shelby County decision. Texas announced just hours after the Shelby County decision that it would move forward with its controversial voter photo identification law,52 which was previously denied preclearance by the District Court for the District of Columbia.53 It should be expected that the DOJ or private litigants will continue to pursue these cases, and attempt to halt the implementation of the changes previously denied preclearance. It is much too early to predict if they will succeed. But emphasis in the litigation should be placed on establishing how the changes violate the Constitution. If the government or private litigants are successful on the merits, they should seek to employ the bail-in provision so that the jurisdictions will once again be subject to the demands of preclearance.
In sum, voting rights advocates should remain cautiously optimistic that § 3 can fill the void left open by the Court’s rejection of § 4. Although statutory change may still be possible and desirable,54 immediate attention should be paid to provisions currently in effect and capable of instant application. The bail-in provision satisfies the constitutional requirements laid out by the Shelby County Court, is immediately available, and, if utilized, represents the remedial option closest to the previously utilized § 5 preclearance structure.
1. 570 U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (June 25, 2013). Slip opinion available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/12pdf/12-96_6k47.pdf.
2. Codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 et seq. (2006), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCODE-2010-title42/pdf/USCODE-2010-title42….
3. Id. § 1973c (a), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCODE-2010-title42/pdf/USCODE-2010-title42….
4. Id. § 1973b (b), available at http://docs.uscode.justia.com/2010/title42/USCODE-2010-title42/pdf/USCOD….
5. Shelby Cnty., slip op. at 17-18.
6. John Nichols, SCOTUS Voting Rights Act Decision Means We Need “Right To Vote” Amendment, Nation (June 25, 2013, 11:13 AM), http://www.thenation.com/blog/174968/scotus-voting-rights-act-decision-m….
7. Myrna Perez, After Supreme Court, Congress Must Move on Voting Rights Act, Christian Sci. Monitor (June 25, 2013), http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2013/0625/After-Supreme-Cour….
8. Aaron Zelinsky, The Fifty State Solution to Shelby County, Concurring Opinions (June 25, 2013, 4:45 PM), http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2013/06/the-fifty-state-solut….
9. 152 Cong. Rec. H5207 (daily ed. July 13, 2006), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2006-07-13/pdf/CREC-2006-07-13-pt1-PgH… 152 Cong. Rec. S8012 (daily ed. July 20, 2006), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2006-07-20/pdf/CREC-2006-07-20-pt1-PgS….
10. Jeff Zeleny, John Lewis: Court’s Decision Puts “Dagger in Heart of Voting Rights Act,” ABC News (June 25, 2013, 12:16 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2013/06/courts-decision-puts-dagger….
11. See Travis Crum, The Voting Rights Act’s Secret Weapon: Pocket Trigger Litigation and Dynamic Preclearance, 119 Yale L.J. 1992, 1997 (2010).
If in any proceeding instituted by the Attorney General or an aggrieved person … the court finds that violations of the [F]ourteenth or [F]ifteenth [A]mendment justifying equitable relief have occurred … the court, in addition to such relief as it may grant, shall retain jurisdiction for such period as it may deem appropriate and during such period no voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting different from that in force or effect at the time the proceeding was commenced shall be enforced unless and until the court finds that such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color, or in contravention of the voting guarantees set forth in section 1973b(f)(2) of this title … .
42 U.S.C. § 1973a (c) (2006), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCODE-2010-title42/pdf/USCODE-2010-title42….
13. Crum, supra note 11, at 1997.
14. See id. at 2007 n.87 (citing Jeffers v. Clinton, 740 F. Supp. 585, 600 (E.D. Ark. 1990)).
15. Shelby Cnty., Ala. v. Holder, 570 U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 2612, slip op. at 9 (June 25, 2013), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/12pdf/12-96 _6k47.pdf.
19. Id. at 12 (quoting South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966)).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 1973a (c) (2006), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCODE-2010-title42/pdf/USCODE-2010-title42….
24. Id. § 1973b (a)(1), available at http://docs.uscode.justia.com/2010/title42/USCODE-2010-title42/pdf/USCOD….
25. Id. § 1973a (c).
26. See City of Mobile, Ala. v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 62 (1980) (plurality opinion) (“[A]ction by a State that is racially neutral on its face violates the Fifteenth Amendment only if motivated by a discriminatory purpose.”).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (2006), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCODE-2010-title42/pdf/USCODE-2010-title42….
28. Complaint at ¶ 50, Veasey v. Perry, 2:13CV00193 (S.D. Tex. June 26, 2013).
29. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a).
30. Id. § 1973a (c) (providing that, if a suit is bailed in, “no voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting different from that in force or effect at the time the proceeding was commenced shall be enforced unless and until the court finds that such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color”).
31. Todd Ruger, DOJ Denounces Voting Rights Act Decision, Nat’l L.J. (July 1, 2013), http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202608968847&slreturn=2….
32. See Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 140 (1976) (recognizing the “‘common practice in some jurisdictions of staying one step ahead of the federal courts by passing new discriminatory voting laws as soon as the old ones had been struck down’” (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 94-196, at 57-58 (1975))).
33. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2006).
34. Section 2 is not the only statute that could be used in this fashion. Section 3 allows a court to impose preclearance requirements when it finds a constitutional violation in a proceeding brought “under any statute to enforce the voting guarantees of the fourteenth or fifteenth amendment.” Id. § 1973a (c). I have concentrated here on § 2 because it is the most prevalent statute in this area, and is used to combat a wide range of voting violations. I do not discount that other statutes may also be used in this manner.
35. Brief for the Federal Respondent Appendix A, Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (June 25, 2013) (No. 12-96), 2013 WL 315242.
36. Id. at 1a-2a (citing Sanchez v. Anaya, C.A. No. 82-0067M (D.N.M. Dec. 17, 1984) (bailing in New Mexico); Jeffers v. Clinton, 740 F. Supp. 585 (E.D. Ark. May 16, 1990) (bailing in Arkansas)).
38. Id. at 1a (citing United States v. Thurston Cnty., C.A. No. 78-0-380 (D. Neb. May 9, 1979) (bailing in Thurston County, Nebraska); McMillan v. Escambia Cnty., C.A. No. 77-0432 (N.D. Fla. Dec. 3, 1979) (bailing in Escambia County, Florida)).
39. Id. at 3a (citing United States v. Village of Port Chester, C.A. No. 06-CV-15173 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2006) (bailing in the Village of Port Chester, New York)).
41. Id. (identifying Port Chester, New York, Alameda County, California, Alexander County, Illinois, and other jurisdictions not in the Deep South but bailed in through § 3).
42. See Crum, supra note 11, at 2016 (“The section 3 preclearance regimes imposed by district courts have targeted preclearance for only certain voting changes and set a sunset date for coverage.”).
43. Richard Pildes, One Easy, But Powerful, Way To Amend the VRA, Election L. Blog (June 28, 2013, 6:53 AM), http://electionlawblog.org/?p=52349.
45. See Crum, supra note 11, at 2014 (citing Kirkie v. Buffalo Cnty., No. 03-CV-3011, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30960 (D.S.D. Feb. 12, 2004) (consent decree)).
46. See Ruger, supra note 33.
47. Order, Frank v. Walker, No. 11-CV-01128 (E.D. Wis. July 30, 2013), available at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/FrankOrderSett… see also Frank v. Walker, Election L. @ Moritz (July 31, 2013, 9:16 AM), http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/Frank.v.Walker.php (providing links to the court filings in the case).
48. Preliminary Pretrial Order, Obama for Am. v. Husted, No. 2:12-cv-636 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 21, 2013), available at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/PreliminaryPre…. A preliminary injunction was already granted and affirmed by the Sixth Circuit. Obama for Am. v. Husted, 697 F.3d 423, 425 (6th Cir. 2012).
49. See Florida v. United States, 885 F. Supp. 2d 299 (D.D.C. 2012) (approving and denying preclearance to various new provisions of Florida election law).
50. See Texas v. Holder, 888 F. Supp. 2d 113 (D.D.C. 2012) (denying preclearance to Texas’s voter identification requirement), vacated, 133 S. Ct. 2886 (June 27, 2013).
51. See South Carolina v. United States, 898 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2012) (preclearing voter identification law for future elections, but finding it could not be properly implemented in the 2012 election).
52. Matt Vasilogambro, That Was Quick: Texas Moves Forward with Voter ID Law After Supreme Court Ruling, Nat’l L.J. (June 25, 2013), http://www.nationaljournal.com/politics/that-was-quick-texas-moves-forwa….
53. See Texas v. Holder, 888 F. Supp. 2d 113.
54. Some have suggested that § 3 could be amended to be more effective. See Pildes, supra note 43 (suggesting reforms including applying § 3 to violations of statutes and not just the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments). I do not rule out this possibility, but since this paper is geared towards alternatives to statutory change I do not discuss those proposals here.
The author received his J.D. from Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law in 2013. He will serve as a law clerk to Judge Ivan L. R. Lemelle of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana during the 2013 term. Special thanks to the staff of Inter Alia for their comments and edits throughout the process.
, Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. Inter Alia (Sept. 7, 2013, 11:45 AM), https://ylpr.yale.edu/inter_alia/preclearance-without-statutory-change-bail-suits-post-shelby-county.

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