Source: http://www.717madisonplace.com/?m=201609
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 05:21:10+00:00

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One of the basic procedural requirements of administrative rulemaking is that an agency must give adequate reasons for its decisions. The agency “must examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action including a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. of United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U. S. 29, 43 (1983) (internal quotation marks omitted). That requirement is satisfied when the agency’s explanation is clear enough that its “path may reasonably be discerned.” Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 419 U. S. 281, 286 (1974). But where the agency has failed to provide even that minimal level of analysis, its action is arbitrary and capricious and so cannot carry the force of law. See 5 U. S. C. §706(2)(A); State Farm, supra, at 42–43.
Agencies are free to change their existing policies as long as they provide a reasoned explanation for the change. See, e.g., National Cable & Telecommunications Assn. v. Brand X Internet Services, 545 U. S. 967, 981–982 (2005); Chevron, 467 U. S., at 863–864. When an agency changes its existing position, it “need not always provide a more detailed justification than what would suffice for a new policy created on a blank slate.” FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U. S. 502, 515 (2009). But the agency must at least “display awareness that it is changing position” and “show that there are good reasons for the new policy.” Ibid. (emphasis deleted). In explaining its changed position, an agency must also be cognizant that longstanding policies may have “engendered serious reliance interests that must be taken into account.” Ibid.; see also Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N. A., 517 U. S. 735, 742 (1996). “In such cases it is not that further justification is demanded by the mere fact of policy change; but that a reasoned explanation is needed for disregarding facts and circumstances that underlay or were engendered by the prior policy.” Fox Television Stations, supra, at 515–516. It follows that an “[u]nexplained inconsistency” in agency policy is “a reason for holding an interpretation to be an arbitrary and capricious change from agency practice.” Brand X, supra, at 981. An arbitrary and capricious regulation of this sort is itself unlawful and receives no Chevron deference. See Mead Corp., supra, at 227.
The entire decision of ENCINO MOTORCARS, LLC v. Navarro, No. 15-415 (U.S. June 20, 2016) is shown below.
No. 15-415.Supreme Court of the United States.
Argued April 20, 2016.Decided June 20, 2016.KENNEDY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and GINSBURG, BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., joined. GINSBURG, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which SOTOMAYOR, J., joined. THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ALITO, J., joined.
This case addresses whether a federal statute requires payment of increased compensation to certain automobile dealership employees for overtime work. The federal statute in question is the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U. S. C. § 201 et seq., enacted in 1938 to “protect all covered workers from substandard wages and oppressive working hours.” Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 450 U. S. 728, 739 (1981). Among its other provisions, the FLSA requires employers to pay overtime compensation to covered employees who work more than 40 hours in a given week. The rate of overtime pay must be “not less than one and one-half times the regular rate” of the employee’s pay. § 207(a).
A pro se appellant recently showed up at the Federal Circuit to present oral argument — the only problem was that he only speaks Mandarin. I don’t know if there is an official rule; but, generally oral arguments at the Federal Circuit are conducted in English. As luck* would have it, one of Judge O’Malley’s clerks, Dr. Glenn Cheng, was able to step in and translate for the appellant.
The oral argument is short, approximately five minutes, and is available [here].
The decision is available [here].
*Perhaps “luck” isn’t the best word choice — Mandarin is the world’s most popular language and spoken by 14% of the world’s population. English comes in a distant third at 5.5%.
The Federal Circuit has posted more details about its upcoming visit to the LA area to conduct oral arguments. The information from the Federal Circuit Announcement page (last visited 9/19/2016) is shown below. This visit is somewhat unique in that the Federal Circuit is not sitting at any federal courthouses during this trip — all the appearances will be at law schools.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 48, six panels of the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals will hear oral arguments in Los Angeles on October 4 and 5 and in Orange County on October 6. In accordance with routine practice, the names of the panel judges will not be released prior to the morning of scheduled arguments.
Others, as well as myself, have submitted comments to the PTO in the past commenting on the PTO’s Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance and highlighting to the PTO that, under Zurko, evidence is required in the assessment of whether a claim is limited to an abstract idea or natural phenomenon. [Link][Link]. Yesterday’s opinion in McRO v. Bandai supports that observation.
McRO v. Bandai, __ F.3d __ (Fed. Cir. 2016)(slip opinion at page 24)(emphasis added).
The defendants didn’t show by evidence that the claimed process was previously practiced — let alone practiced conventionally. Thus, the defendants failed to prove that the claimed process was merely automating a conventional activity.
You can listen to the oral argument of McRO v. Bandai here: [Link].
Judge Reyna’s well-reasoned opinion for the court in McRO v. Bandai is available [here].
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