Source: https://www.finkellaw.com/Published-Works/The-Ability-to-Waive-the-Debtors-Attorney-Client.aspx
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 12:48:48+00:00

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belongs to the client alone." (1) "However, upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition, the relationship between the attorney and his client changes as the Bankruptcy Code provides for the appointment of a trustee who succeeds to many of the interests of the debtor." (2) Based upon this concept, many bankruptcy trustees have advanced the theory that they may, in fulfilling their duties under the Bankruptcy Code, unilaterally waive the debtor's attorney client privilege. By waving the attorney-client privilege, the trustee can effectively complete his discovery process and abide by the rules provided in the bankruptcy code. Therefore, the waiver of the attorney-client privilege will allow the trustee to expedite his assigned tasks and serve legal efficiency.
The attorney-client privilege exists to facilitate free and open communications between the client and the attorney. Such privilege is paramount in our judicial system; free and open communications between the advocate and those who he represents must exist in order to have effective representation. However, the privilege can, and does operate as a barrier to discovering the truth. Nevertheless, the attorney-client privilege only applies regarding communications made in confidence by privileged persons for the purpose of obtaining legal assistance, so outside and casual conversations are not covered by the privilege. (3) At its core, the privilege protects the vulnerable party from producing documents which otherwise are damaging to their case. In recognizing this dilemma, Courts can refuse to apply the privilege's cloak of protection in certain instances that perpetuate a criminal act, such as fraud, or to make disclosures necessary to the client's representation. (4) Invoking the attorney-client privilege can be particularly damaging to the trustee because it prevents the trustee from fully investigating the debtor's claim. These exceptions sometimes cover the trustee's needs, such as when the debtor's attorney must reveal that the debtor is attempting to fraudulently conceal assets, but often the attorney is unaware of the wrongdoing, or causes the wrongdoing, leaving the trustee in a bind and unable to complete his investigation and evaluation of the debtor. Therefore, in ceratin situations, it is critical that the bankruptcy trustee, in fulfilling their duties assigned by the bankruptcy code, have the power to unilaterally waive the attorney-client privilege.
This article first discusses why the trustee needs the power to unilaterally waive the debtor's attorney-client privileges. Next, the article discusses whether the trustee has the power to unilaterally waive the debtor's attorney client privilege in order to eliminate the privilege's barrier of protection which denies the trustee the ability to carry out their duties set forth in the bankruptcy code. Because it is well established that the attorney-client privilege attaches to corporations as well as individuals, the article explores the trustee's waiver for an individual debtor, and for a corporate debtor.
Finally, the article reviews the three methods bankruptcy courts have taken in determining whether the trustee can unilaterally waive the debtor's attorney-client privileges. This article summarily rejects cases that unilaterally waive and bar waiver of the attorney-client privilege in favor of a line of cases in which courts have effectively balanced the interests of the debtors with the duties of the trustee on an individual, case-by-case basis.
I. Why give Trustee's the power?
Why does a bankruptcy trustee need to waive the debtor's attorney-client privilege? As will be discussed, answering this underlying question is central to determining whether the trustee can unilaterally waive the debtor's privileges. Some of the more noted reasons are to assess whether the debtor has a pre-petition civil action against a third party such as an insurance company for bad faith refusal to settle claims. Also, the trustee, in the 2004 meetings, may suspect the debtor of attempting to fraudulently conceal estate assets. Concealment could have disastrous implications in bankruptcy cases, by not only preventing creditors from collecting, but also potentially leading to separate criminal charges.
Lifting the privilege's protection can expose the debtor to potential harm by hindering communication between attorney and client, especially when the trustee and the debtor are in an adversarial relationship, or when the debtor's interest must not only be preserved, but promoted as well. This potential blockade to effective representation, must be balanced against the trustee's ability to carry out their duties pursuant to the Bankruptcy Code in determining whether the trustee can unilaterally waive the individual debtor's attorney-client privileges.
However, because "the Supreme Court was very careful not to extend its holding in Weintraub to that of an individual debtor," (11) outside the context of a corporate-debtor, there currently exits a split of authority as to whether the bankruptcy trustee can waive the debtors attorney-client privilege. (12) Because a corporation must speak through agents, during insolvency the bankruptcy trustee in essence becomes a sort of agent, effectively speaking for the agent. An individual differs from a corporation because an individual can always act for herself, whether during solvency or insolvency, so control over an individual's attorney-client privilege cannot pass to the trustee using this clear cut corporate agency theory.
"In addition, a few federal courts have adopted a middle-of-the-line approach and have held that the particular circumstances of the case must be examined to determine if the bankruptcy trustee has the power to waive the debtor's attorney-client privilege over his objection." (15) As illustrated in this article, this mainstream approach is pursuant to public interest in protecting the debtor from harm, as well as insuring trustees have a mechanism for exercising their duties provided in the Bankruptcy Code. For these reasons, future courts, in addressing this issue, should follow the balancing approach to ensure both the protection of the debtor's confidentiality and allow the bankruptcy trustee to fully exercise his duties as provided in the bankruptcy code.
determined that a trustee could unilaterally waive a corporation's attorney-client privileges. The decision created an absolute rule allowing a trustee to assume the corporate-debtors confidential information. The Supreme Court has sustained Weintraub for over fifteen (15) years, evidencing that the Court considers the waiver issue for corporate debtors settled law.
Moreover, giving the trustee control over the debtor corporation's attorney client privilege will not destroy the sanctity of confidential attorney-client communications. (29) The trustee's control over the privilege simply places the insolvent corporation in the same position as a solvent corporation whose subsequent purchaser or management waive prior management's attorney-client privilege as to earlier communications. (30) Although management of an insolvent corporation may still be wary of speaking with counsel for fear of loss of attorney-client privilege, they now are in the same position as solvent corporations with respect to the privilege. In keeping with notions of fairness and justice, insolvent corporations do not deserve special treatment with respect to attorney-client privilege, simply because of their insolvency status. (31) Therefore, by giving the trustee the privilege, the trustee can protect attorney-client communications, while ensuring the fair treatment of all corporations, both the insolvent and the solvent.
There is a plethora of case law available which asserts the traditional notions of the attorney client privilege, and that the right to the privilege's protection rests exclusively with the client. While such rule generally rings true, those cases do not address or account for the unique circumstances surrounding a bankruptcy case. (35) Because of the lack of statutory or case law, trustees inevitably face the complex problem of whether or not to attempt to unilaterally waive individual debtor's attorney-client privileges, and the difficulty in forming an argument without statutory authority, or Supreme Court precedent.
Most of the cases addressing the issue of attorney client privilege waiver do so in the context of a corporate debtor. Because "The individual debtor who seeks legal advice on his own behalf is...fundamentally different from the corporate debtor's manager," (36) the Supreme Court's decision in Weintraub (37) does not provide a basis for determining whether a trustee can unilaterally waive the individual debtor's attorney-client privileges. Thus, the only Supreme Court guideline is only applicable to corporate debtors and not to individual debtors.
Despite the lack of precedent Bankruptcy Courts began to address the waiver issue, and in doing so came to contrasting decisions. Some courts were fearful to allow a trustee to unilaterally waive the individual debtor's attorney client privilege, and issued opinions precluding trustees from assuming the debtor's privileges. (38)Other courts took positions at the other end of the spectrum and allowed trustees to always assume the debtor's attorney-client privileges. (39) Because the Supreme Court has not addressed if either of these methods properly determined whether the trustee obtains waiver power over the attorney client privilege, future courts still continue to be influenced by previous opinions. Therefore, both opposing opinions will be discussed throughout this article.
B. Absolute bar against the Trustee having the power to unilaterally waive the individual debtor's attorney client privilege.
McClarty v. Gudenau illustrates both of these events. In McClarty, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, Southern Division, held that a plaintiff trustee could never waive the debtor's attorney client privilege in an attempt to compel production of documents in an action for legal malpractice, and to move for sanctions against the defendants.
In determining that the trustee could not waive the debtor's attorney client privilege, the court relied on In Re Hunt, (55) a decision concerning the trustee's ability to waive the corporate debtor's privilege and therefore a decision not on point with the current situation in McClarty. (56) The McClarty court recognized the issues in both cases were consistent as to "whether the Independent Trustees can step into the [debtor's] shoes and direct the attorneys to [decline to assert the attorney-client privilege on the clients' behalf]." (57)However, Hunt, specifically addressed the trustee's ability to waive the corporate debtor's attorney client privilege and did not consider the effect or possible necessity of a trustee's waiver of the attorney client privilege on an individual debtor.
Instead of forming precedent for trustees to follow in later individual debtor actions, the McClarty court simply held that individuals are distinctly unique from corporations, so the trustee's ability to waive the corporation's attorney client privilege, should not extend to individuals. McClarty simply contrasted the individual and the corporate entity, without providing significant analysis or justification for their unwillingness to specifically investigate the possibility of waiving an individual debtors attorney client privilege. Specifically, the court held,that a corporate manager does not expect to retain control over the privilege in perpetuity, whereas an individual does reasonably expect to retain such control over her own life, along with the individual debtor's greater interest in privacy, provides convincing reasons to distinguish the individual debtor from the corporate debtor.
The McClarty court's broad language therefore completely precludes a trustee from waiving the individual debtor's attorney-client privilege. However, the McClarty court's decision is fundamentally flawed for a variety of reasons. First, the court incorrectly compares and contrasts individual and corporate debtors, holding that there are fundamental expectation differences concerning the attorney client privilege between the two classes of debtors. Each person, whether acting on their own behalf, or on their company's behalf, will have the same expectations and beliefs concerning the attorney client privilege. Secondly, the court implicitly assumes the individual debtor will cooperate with the trustee's request for a waiver of the privilege when such waiver would benefit the debtor. In essence McClarty holds that a trustee would never actually need to resort to waiving the debtor's attorney-client privilege, because the debtor will always follow the trustee's recommendations. Unfortunately, some debtors try to conceal things from the court, or simply may not trust or believe the trustee, so they may be reluctant to follow the trustee's recommendations. In addition, the individual debtor may be incapable of determining when it is in their best interest to waive their attorney-client privilege. Also, although it appears that a trustee may favor a creditor over a debtor, trustees do not because all trustees are required to act in equity. Trustees must maintain a fiduciary duty with both creditors and debtors, even though in bankruptcy a creditor's needs will usually outweigh the debtor's needs. Finally, the debtor must not always retain the attorney client privilege because the debtor will also obtain the ability to use the privilege as a shield for concealing estate assets and defrauding the court. (61) Debtors often try to defraud the court, so the trustee should be permitted to investigate all potential hidden assets. In these instances, it would be essential for the trustee to obtain the right to waive the attorney client privilege to complete his investigative duties. Therefore, there are certain instances where the trustee must be able to step in and waive the attorney client privilege, in order to complete his duties as prescribed in the bankruptcy code and look out for the best interests of the debtor.
In Re Bazemore is the seminal case which formed the "middle-ground" approach. This approach evaluates the individual merits of each case, and employs a balancing test before determining whether the trustee has the ability to unilaterally waive the individual debtor's attorney client privilege (63) Bazemore's introduction of the balance test signaled a new method of dealing with the issue in the context of the individual debtor. In short, the balancing test entails the court to inquire into the potential harm to the individual debtor, and the ability of the trustee to carry out his statutory duties. The court then balances these two interests. Where the debtor cannot be harmed, the trustee is allowed to unilaterally waive the debtor's attorney-client privileges.
In seeking to maximize the value of the estate, the trustee must have full access to the estate, while balancing the attorney client privilege's purpose of protecting the debtor from harm and protecting the public policy of maintaining free dialog between the lawyer and the client. In this instance, no more harm could possibly come to the Bazemores,(they already had to declare bankruptcy) so the waiver will not intrude on attorney and client communications or on the exercise of their legal rights. In this case, the attorney client privilege was not protecting the client, but being used as a shield for the attorney, to possibly avoid a future claim. The attorney client privilege was and has never been designed to protect attorneys such as this one. Because allowing the trustee to unilaterally waive the Bazemore's attorney-client privilege would not harm the Bazemores, (and might actually benefit them) the policies against granting the trustee such power was not present, thereby allowing the trustee to assume the debtor's attorney-client privilege.
In re Miller (65) also illustrates the growing trend of courts employing a "middle-ground" approach. In In re Miller, the trustee attempted to waive the individual debtors' attorney-client privilege and filed a motion to compel discovery from the debtors' former counsel after the debtors refused produce the documents. The court held the trustee has the ability to waive the debtors' attorney client privilege, and granted the trustee's motion to compel discovery.
Sometime thereafter, in order to gather the information necessary to prove the requirements of the Bankruptcy Code sections providing when a court shall revoke a discharge, (69) the trustee brought a Motion to compel discovery from the debtors' former legal counsel. The reason stated by the Trustee for requiring such information was to determine if the debtors' were "aware that it was unlawful to embark upon the cause upon which they set." (70) Stated otherwise, the trustee was attempting to determine, through the aid of records and other information, whether the debtors knew that they were fraudulently concealing assets.
Nevertheless, in eliminating the absolute bar against the trustee waiving the debtor's attorney-client privileges, the court relied on the Bankruptcy Code's statutory scheme which the trustee can readily obtain needed information. "At the same time, if the trustee were entirely precluded from obtaining information held in confidence by the debtor's attorney, the trustee's ability to perform his duties under the Bankruptcy Code could, in many cases be severely hampered." (78) The Bankruptcy Code expressly provides mechanisms which the trustee has in order to carry out the trustee's duties.
So naturally, the balancing approach sets the perfect balance between Congress's intentions, the Bankruptcy Code and the trsutee's duties within the code and the needs and potential harm to the client-debtors.
The Miller court, after evaluating the individual facts of the case before it and refusing to employ an absolute rule either barring or allowing the trustee to waive the debtors' attorney-client privileges, determined that the case before it did not provide an "appropriate situation" in which the bankruptcy trustee could waive the individual debtors' attorney-client privilege. Of significance in the Miller court's decision was in balancing the facts, the court realized the significance of the trustee's and the debtor's adversarial relationship. As a consequence, "the [t]rustee's assumption of the Debtor's attorney-client privilege could potentially cause the Debtors a great deal of harm, as the Trustee's sole purpose for seeking to waive the Debtors' attorney-client privilege is to use that information directly against" (84) the debtors. Also, given the debtors' potential criminal prosecutions, the degree of harm "becomes particularly acute." (85) In this case, the debtors had just cause for fearing that the trustee would not act in the debtor's best interests.
The balancing approach best allows trustees to fully investigate the debtors and fulfill their duties as stated in the code, while maintaining the protections guaranteed by the attorney client privilege. This approach still protects the debtors from all potential harms and ensures free flowing communication between the lawyer and the client. The approach also gives the trustee a mechanism to prevent fraud and to sometimes aid the debtors. Thus, the balancing approach provides the best method to measure the debtor's need for protection against the trustee's duties under the code to determine if and when it is appropriate to waive the attorney client privilege.
Perhaps In Re Ingram, a case ruled upon by the South Carolina Bankruptcy Court, provides a perfect example of how the balancing approach, when properly employed, acts to protect both the individual debtor's and trustee's interests. (88) Of particular interest, the court, following the same line of reasoning as in Bazemore and Miller, specifically stated that when the debtor will not be harmed by lifting the debtor's privileges, the trustee will have the power to unilaterally waive the debtor's attorney client privilege. Of further interest, because I was appointed trustee in the case, I appreciate the frustration a trustee is taxed with when a debtor refuses to waive his attorney client privilege, despite such waiver being in their best interest.
In July, 1993, Trenton B. Ingram ("debtor") was involved in a vehicular collision wherein the car he was driving struck a pedestrian. The car that the debtor was driving was insured by Allstate Insurance Company and Allstate employed an insurance adjuster to represent the debtor in evaluating the claim. Prior to the initiation of a tort suit for the personal injuries, the injured pedestrian offered to settle the case with the debtor if the adjuster would agree to pay the victim $15,000.00, the limit of Allstate's liability coverage. The insurer refused the settlement offer.
In response to Allstate's refusal, the victim initiated a suit against the debtor to recover for medical expenses Plaintiff sustained as a result of her personal injuries. Allstate secured an attorney to represent the debtor in the personal injury suit. Prior to the end of the trial, the victim made additional offers to the debtor to settle the case. Of particular interest, all of the Plaintiff's offers to settle were consistent with, and did not exceed her medical expenses. Allstate's attorney continued to reject all of the victim's offers. A judgment was returned against the Debtor for $150,000.00, exceeding the Plaintiff's settlement offer by approximately $135,000.00.
In response to the large judgment, the Bankruptcy Court entered its Order for Relief under Chapter 7 of the United States Bankruptcy Code, placing the Debtor into an involuntary bankruptcy, and I was appointed trustee. Property of the debtor's estate consisted solely of the debtor's claim against the insurance company.
Specifically, I was appointed on August 20, 1998. The debtor's First Meeting of Creditor's pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §341 (the "First Meeting") was held on October 9, 1998. The debtor failed to attend the First Meeting therefore, I continued the First Meeting until November 6, 1998. I provided the debtor with notice of the continued First Meeting. The debtor did not attend the continued First Meeting. On November 17,1998, I scheduled an examination of the debtor pursuant to Bankr. Rule 2004. A subpoena was issued compelling the debtor's attendance. The debtor did not appear. Therefore, I rescheduled the 2004 examination for December 7, 1998. The debtor attended the rescheduled 2004 examination. At this examination, I inquired as to the Debtor's assets and liabilities including a potential claim against Allstate, and concluded that the debtor did have a claim against Allstate for the bad faith handling of the state court action. On October 28, 1998, I filed an Adversary Proceeding, Adv. Proc. No. 98-80251-W, alleging several causes of action for recovery of a bad faith insurance claim. Further, I submitted written demands on Allstate's attorneys for the turnover of the debtor's client file. Allstate's attorneys refused the requests, citing that the information requested was protected by the attorney client privilege.
lifting the privilege, and production of the files, would only help the debtor. There was no possibility of the debtor's rights being diminished in any way.
Citing the aforementioned reasons, and following the same reasoning as the Miller court, the South Carolina Bankruptcy Court allowed the debtor's attorney-client file to be released without the debtor's approval. In response to this decision, the insurance company appealed, however, prior to outcome of the appeal, the parties settled. While the case disappeared from any court dockets, its legacy as an example of why the trustee should be allowed, in proper situations, the power to unilaterally waive the debtor's attorney client privileges, remains. Surely, similar situations have occurred, and continue to arise throughout the United States. In order to act in the best interests of both the debtor and the trustee, bankruptcy courts should employ the balancing approach test to determine whether the trustee can unilaterally waive the individual debtor's attorney client privileges.
1. Moore v. Eason (In Re Bazemore), 216 B.R. 1020, 1023 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1998).
2. In Re Miller, Op. No. 98-3141, 2000 Bankr. Lexis 355 (N.D. Ohio Feb 1, 2000) (citing Gresk v. Brown [ In Re Brown], 227 B.R. 875, 879 (Bankr. S.C. Ind. 1998).
5. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 356, 105 S.Ct. 1986, 1995 (1985).
6. U.S.C.A. §§ 323, 541.
8. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 353, 105 S.Ct. 1986, 1995(1985).
11. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 356-357, 105 S.Ct. 1986, 1995 (1985).(stating, in relevant part: "our holding today has no bearing on the problem of individual bankruptcy, which we have no reason to address in this case. As we have stated, a corporation, as an inanimate entity, must act through agents. When the corporation is solvent, the agent that controls the corporation's management. Under our holding today, this power passes to the trustee because the trustee's functions are more closely analogous to those of management outside of bankruptcy than are the functions of the debtor's directors. An individual, in contrast, can act for himself; there is no 'management' that controls a solvent individual's attorney-client privilege. If control over that privilege passes to a trustee, it must be under some theory different from the one that we embrace in this case").
12. See In Re Miller, Op. No. 98-3141, 2000 Bankr. Lexis 355, 357 (N.D. Ohio Feb 1, 2000).
13. Id at 357 (citing In Re Smith, 24 B.R. 3, 4 (Bankr. S.D. Fla 1982).
14. Id at 357 (citing In Re Tippy Togs of Miami, Inc., 237 B.R. 236, 239 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1999), and In Re Silvio de Lindegg Ocean Developments of America, Inc., 27 B.R. 28, 28 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982)). See also McClarty v. Gudenau, 166 B.R. 101, 102 (E.D. Mich. 1994).
15. Id at 357 (citing Foster v. Hill, 188 F.3d 1259, 1265-1266 (10th Cir. 1999), In Re Rice, 224 B.R. 464, 469 (Bankr. D. Or. 1998), In Re Bazemore, 216 B.R. 1020, 1022-1024 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1998).
16. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 105 S.Ct. 1986 (1985).
17. See 7 U.S.C.A. §§1 et. seq.
18. In total, Weintraub refused to answer 23 questions.
21. Id. at 353 (stating that the corporation's management could use the attorney-client privilege and inhibit detection of misappropriated or diverted funds and insider fraud.).
23. See Id. at 354-355.
24. See Id. at 354-356.
25. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintrub, 471 U.S. 343, 350, 105 S.Ct. 1986, (1985).
26. See Id. at 350.
27. In re O.P.M. Leasing Serv. Inc., 13 B.R. 54, 70 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
28. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintrub, 471 U.S. 343, 351 105 S.Ct. 1986, (1985) quoting 124 Cong. Rec 32400 (1978) (remarks of Rep. Edwards); id., at 33999 (remarks of Sen. DeConcini).
29. See Id. at 357.
31. Id. (stating that preventing debtor's director from controlling the attorney client privilege does not amount to "economic discrimination").
32. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintrub, 471 U.S. 343, 105 S.Ct. 1986 (1985).
33. See In Re Bazemore, 216 B.R. 1020, 1023-1024 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1998).
34. McClarty v. Gudenau, and Sullivan, Ward, Bone, Tyler & Asher, P.C. , 166 B.R. 101 (E.D. Mich. 1994) (citing Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintrub, 471 U.S. 343, 351-352 (1985)).
35. McClarty v. Gudenau, and Sullivan, Ward, Bone, Tyler & Asher, P.C. , 166 B.R. 101 (E.D. Mich. 1994).
36. McClarty v. Gudenau, and Sullivan, Ward, Bone, Tyler & Asher, P.C. , 166 B.R. 101 (E.D. Mich. 1994) (citing In Re Hunt, 153 Bank. 445, 452 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1992).
37. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 105 S.Ct. 1986 (1985) (stating: "our holding today has no bearing on the problem of individual bankruptcy, which we have no reason to address in this case").
38. See McClarty v. Gudenau, and Sulivan, Ward, Bone, Tyler & Asher, P.C., 166 B.R. 101 (E.D. Mich. 1994); In Re Hunt, 153 B.R. 445 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1992).
39. See In Re Smith 24 B.R. 3 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982).
40. See In Re Bazemore, 216 B.R. 1020,(Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1998); In Re Miller, Op. No. 98-3141, 2000 Bankr. Lexis 355 (N.D. Ohio Feb 1, 2000).
41. See In Re Bazemore, 216 B.R. 1020, 1023-1024 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1998) (citing Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 105 S.Ct. 1986 (1985)).
42. See In Re Bazemore, 216 B.R. 1020 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1998).
43. See In Re Smith, 24 B.R. 3, 4(S.D. Fla. 1982).
44. Rules Bankr.Proc. 205, 11 U.S.C.A.
45. See In Re Smith, 24 B.R. 3, 4(S.D. Fla. 1982).
48. It is interesting to note that in holding that the attorney-client privilege passes from debtor to trustee upon the debtor's entering bankruptcy, this case only cites cases with corporate debtors as precedent. In essence Smith closes the gap between corporate and individual debtors with regard to this topic.
49. See Julianna M. Thomas, Fifteen Years after Weintraub: Who controls the Individual's Attorney-Client Privilege in Bankruptcy?, 80 B.U.L. 635, 658 (2000).
50. Id. at 659. In addition during Weintruab, the Supreme Court declined to address the privilege is property argument. This tactic significantly weakened the argument and no recent court decisions have utilized this concept.
51. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 356, 105 S.Ct. 1986, 1995(1985) ( stating "But our holding today has no bearing on the problem of individual bankruptcy, which we have no reason to address in this case." and that "[a]n individual, in contrast, can act for himself; there is no 'management' that controls a solvent individual's attorney-client privilege.").
52. See McClarty v. Gudenau, and Sullivan, Ward, Bone, Tyler & Asher, P.C. , 166 B.R. 101 (E.D. Mich. 1994).
53. McClarty v. Gudenau, and Sullivan, Ward, Bone, Tyler & Asher, P.C. , 166 B.R. 101 (E.D. Mich. 1994).
55. In Re Hunt, 153 B.R. 445 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1992) (holding that due to the lack of similarities between a corporate debtor and the individual debtor, the issue as to whether a trustee can waive the debtor's attorney-client privilege is "fundamentally different" and the courts should not rely on case law confusing the two types of debtors).
57. In Re Hunt, 153 B.R. 445, 450-51 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1992).
58. This reasoning is fundamentally flawed. How could a long term corporate president or company owner's expectation of the applicability of attorney client privilege differ that much from an individual's expectation of the attorney client privilege.
59. McClarty v. Gudenau, and Sullivan, Ward, Bone, Tyler & Asher, P.C. , 166 B.R. 101, 102 (E.D. Mich. 1994).
60. McClarty v. Gudenau, and Sullivan, Ward, Bone, Tyler & Asher, P.C. , 166 B.R. 101, 102 (E.D. Mich. 1994).
61. McClarty v. Gudenau, and Sullivan, Ward, Bone, Tyler & Asher, P.C. , 166 B.R. 101, 102 (E.D. Mich. 1994) (specifically stating, "[i]t is anticipated that the debtor will cooperate with the Trustee's request for a waiver of the privilege).
62. Another less successful compromise model is the Documents as Property Model. In this model the debtors questionable documents are property whose title transfers to the trustee once the debtor enters bankruptcy. These documents are not privileged and pass by law to the bankruptcy trustee. Here, the debtor still maintains control of her attorney client privilege, which eliminates the hindrance of communication between the lawyer and the client. This approach has several limitations, namely it does not apply to oral communications and many of the documents affected by this approach would not be considered privileged. See Julianna M. Thomas, Fifteen Years after Weintraub: Who controls the Individual's Attorney-Client Privilege in Bankruptcy?, 80 B.U.L. 635, 658 (2000); Ex Parte Fuller, 262 U.S. 91 (1923).
63. In Re Bazemore, 216 B.R. 1020, 1023-1024 (Bankr. S.D.Ga. 1998).
65. In Re Miller, Op. No. 98-3141, 2000 Bankr. Lexis 355 (N.D. Ohio Feb 1, 2000).
66. 11 U.S.C. § 341(a) (2000) (providing: "[w]ithin a reasonable time after the order for relief in a case under this title, the United States trustee shall convene and preside at a meeting of creditors").
67. See In Re Miller, Op. No. 98-3141, 2000 Bankr. Lexis 355 (N.D. Ohio Feb 1, 2000) (stating most of the facts cited within this article verbatim as originally provided in the Transcript of Debtors' 341 examination, pgs. 8-12).
68. See In Re Miller, Op. No. 98-3141, 2000 Bankr. Lexis 355 (N.D. Ohio Feb 1, 2000) (stating most of the facts cited within this article verbatim).
69. 11 U.S.C. §§ 727(d)(1) & (2) (2000) (providing: On request of the trustee, a creditor, or the United States trustee, and after notice and a hearing, the court shall revoke a discharge granted under...this section if such discharge was obtained through the fraud of the debtor, and the requesting party did not know of such fraud until after the granting of such discharge, the debtor acquired property that is property of the estate, or became entitled to acquire property that would be property of the estate, and knowingly and fraudulently failed to report the acquisition of or entitlement to such property, or to deliver or surrender such property to the trustee).
70. See In Re Miller, Op. No. 98-3141, 2000 Bankr. Lexis 355 (N.D. Ohio Feb 1, 2000) (stating most of the facts cited within this article verbatim as originally provided in Trustee's Memorandum, dated 7-7-99, p. 2).
71. See Ct. App. R. 407, R.1.6. The crime fraud exemption provides that communications regarding future crimes are not covered under the attorney client privilege.
72. In Re Miller, Op. No. 98-3141, 2000 Bankr. Lexis 355, 357 (N.D. Ohio Feb 1, 2000). Numerous other courts have also followed this balancing approach, some holding that the trustee should hold the privilege and some holding that the debtor should retain the privilege. Whyte v. Williams, 152 B.R. 123 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1992); In Re Foster, 188 F.3d 1259 (10th Cir. 1999); In Re Barne 251 B.R. 367 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2000); In Re Rice, 224 B.R. 464 (Bankr. D. Or. 1998); In Re Fairbanks 135 B.R. 717 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1991).
75. See In Re Hunt, 153 B.R. 445, 453 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1992).
76. In Re Miller, Op. No. 98-3141, 2000 Bankr. Lexis 355, 366 (N.D. Ohio Feb 1, 2000).
79. Id (citing 11 U.S.C § 521(3)).
80. Id (citing 11 U.S.C. § 521(4)). See also In Re Kaufman, 35 B.R. 26, 28 (Bankr. D. Hawaii 1983) (holding that a debtor cannot rely on the Fifth Amendment to avoid turning over to trustee the documents, records and assets belonging to the estate).
81. Id. citing In re GHR Energy Corp., 33 B.R. 451, 453 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1983).
83. See In Re Bazemore, 216 B.R. 1020, 1023-1024 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1998) (citing Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 105 S.Ct. 1986 (1985)).
84. In Re Miller, Op. No. 98-3141, 2000 Bankr. Lexis 355, 371 (N.D. Ohio Feb 1, 2000).
86. In Re Bazemore, 216 B.R. 1020 (Bankr. S.D.Ga. 1998) (holding that determining whether a trustee has the power to unilaterally waive the individual debtor's attorney client privilege rests on the individual facts of the case sub judice).
87. In Re Miller, Op. No. 98-3141, 2000 Bankr. Lexis 355, 362 (N.D. Ohio Feb 1, 2000).
88. See In Re Ingram, Docket No. 98-5909 (Bankr. S.C. 1998).

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