Source: https://www.ptab.us/2010/07/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 10:06:29+00:00

Document:
Ex Parte Kincaid 10/184,501 PRATS Opinion dissenting FREDMAN 102(b) AGILENT TECHNOLOGIES INC.
Ex Parte Zhang et al 10/827,494 WARREN 102(b)/103(a) VIDAS, ARRETT & STEINKRAUS, P.A.
Moreover, the artisan is not compelled to blindly follow the teaching of one prior art reference over the other without the exercise of independent judgment, and thus could utilize the existing analog structure of Hines when incorporating a memory to store data as suggested in Yokoi. See Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 733 F.2d 881, 889 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
[O]bviousness must be determined in light of all the facts, and there is no rule that a single reference that teaches away will mandate a finding of nonobviousness. Likewise, a given course of action often has simultaneous advantages and disadvantages, and this does not necessarily obviate motivation to combine. See [Winner Int'l Royalty Corp. v. Wang, 202 F.3d 1340, 1349 n. 8 (Fed. Cir. 2000)] ("The fact that the motivating benefit comes at the expense of another benefit, however, should not nullify its use as a basis to modify the disclosure of one reference with the teachings of another. Instead, the benefits, both lost and gained, should be weighed against one another."). Where the prior art contains "apparently conflicting" teachings (i.e., where some references teach the combination and others teach away from it) each reference must be considered "for its power to suggest solutions to an artisan of ordinary skill.... consider[ing] the degree to which one reference might accurately discredit another." In re Young, 927 F.2d 588, 591 (Fed.Cir.1991).
Thus, while a benefit of Hines' current configuration is real-time data, this does not preclude anyone from modifying Hines to have non-real-time data. For example, some physiological characteristics may not change every 100-500 ms. See Hines, col. 4, ll. 58-61. The obvious tradeoff is data update frequency, but if the characteristic does not change quickly, or it is not as important to have real-time updates, then the benefit of saving power may outweigh a desire to have several updates a second. Appellant has not demonstrated that the tradeoffs involved with modifying Hines to store data and transmit less often to save battery power would prevent one of ordinary skill in the art from considering the combination.
The question of obviousness is resolved on the basis of underlying factual determinations. Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966).
“Title 35 does not require that a patent disclosure enable one of ordinary skill in the art to make and use a perfected, commercially viable embodiment absent a claim limitation to that effect.” CFMT, Inc. v. Yieldup Int’l Corp., 349 F.3d 1333, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2003). See also In re Cortright, 165 F.3d 1353, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (claims to method of “restoring hair growth” encompassed achieving full head of hair but did not require it).
Ex Parte Iwasa et al 11/166,253 HASTINGS 102(b)/103(a) OBLON, SPIVAK, MCCLELLAND MAIER & NEUSTADT, L.L.P.
“[A]bsence from the reference of any claimed element negates anticipation.” Kloster Speedsteel AB v. Crucible, Inc., 793 F.2d 1565, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
Ex Parte Moinet et al 10/497,491 WALSH 103(a) MILLEN, WHITE, ZELANO & BRANIGAN, P.C.
Ex Parte Tian et al 10/695,711 HAIRSTON 102(e)/103(a) BAKER BOTTS L.L.P.
“[The Supreme] Court’s precedents establish that the machine-or-transformation test is a useful and important clue, an investigative tool, for determining whether some claimed inventions are processes under §101. The machine-or-transformation test is not the sole test for deciding whether an invention is a patent-eligible ‘process.’” See Bilski v. Kappos, No. 08-964, 2010 WL 2555192, at *8 (June 28, 2010) (majority slip op. at Part–II–B1).
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) stated the machine-or-transformation test for process claims. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc). The involvement of the machine or transformation in the claimed process must not merely be insignificant extra-solution activity. See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 437 U.S. 584, 590 (1978).
Id. at 72. (Id. at *11 (Part III)).
We thus find that Appellants’ claim 8 is merely an abstract idea in accordance with Benson, a precedential case relied upon in Bilski v. Kappos as a “useful … investigative tool” for determining subject-matter eligibility.
There is no per se prohibition of patenting a “new form” of a compound. To the contrary, there are numerous cases in which a new form of a known compound was determined to be patentable. See, e.g., Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz Inc., 566 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
Though the Examiner finds that “[t]he claims are rejected as falling under the judicial exception of an abstract idea … not statutory within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. 101” (Ans. 3), “an applicant may show that a process claim satisfies § 101 either by showing that his claim is tied to a particular machine, or by showing that his claim transforms an article” into a different state or thing. See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 70 (1972).
For the forgoing reasons we find a disclosed operative embodiment. We, therefore, will not sustain the rejection under § 101 of claims 1-60 because our reviewing court has stated “[t]o violate [35 U.S.C.] § 101 the claimed device must be totally incapable of achieving a useful result.” Brooktree Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 977 F.2d 1555, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (emphasis added).
See Texas Instruments Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 988 F.2d 1165, 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (claim language cannot be mere surplusage; an express limitation cannot be read out of the claim).

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