Source: https://openjurist.org/319/us/44
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 10:31:32+00:00

Document:
BAYLEY et al. RICHARDSON v. JAMES GIBBONS CO.
Argued and Submitted April 5, 1943.
These cases turn upon the interpretation to be given the exemption, by section 13(b)(1) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, of employees 'with respect to whom the Interstate Commerce Commission has power to establish qualifications and maximum hours of service pursuant to the provisions of section 204 of the Motor Carrier Act, 1935 (49 U.S.C.A. § 304).' In the Southland case, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit construed this to exempt employees of private carriers of property from the requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act only after the Interstate Commerce Commission has found need to establish maximum hours for such employees under the authority of section 204(a)(3) of the Motor Carrier Act. Bayley v. Southland Gasoline Co., 131 F.2d 412. The Fourth Circuit in the Gibbons Company case was of the opinion that 'power' in section 13(b) meant the existence of the power and not its actual exercise. 132 F.2d 627; cf. Plunkett v. Abraham Bros. Packing Co., 6 Cir., 129 F.2d 419, 421, C.C.A. 6.
The employers in both cases are concededly private carriers of property, engaged in interstate commerce. All employees are subject to regulation to promote safety of operation under section 204(a)(3). In both cases the employees seek recovery solely for the failure of their employers to pay them the time and a half for overtime as required by section 7 of the Fair Labor Standards Act. There is no claim for unpaid overtime compensation after May 1, 1940, the date that the Interstate Commerce Commission first found need to establish reasonable requirements as to maximum hours to promote safety in the operations of private carriers of property by motor vehicle under section 204(a)(3).
The general purposes of the Fair Labor Standards Act and of the Motor Carrier Act do not point to a different conclusion. With the adoption of the Motor Carrier Act, the national government undertook the regulation of interstate motor transportation to secure the benefits of an efficient system. Safety through the establishment of maximum hours for drivers was an important consideration. Maurer v. Hamilton, 309 U.S. 598, 604, 607, 60 S.Ct. 726, 729, 731, 84 L.Ed. 969, 135 A.L.R. 1347. When Congress later came to deal with wages and hours, its primary concern was that persons should not be permitted to take part in interstate commerce while operating with substandard labor conditions. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 115, 61 S.Ct. 451, 457, 85 L.Ed. 609, 132 A.L.R. 1430. The Fair Labor Standards Act sought a reduction in hours to spread employment as well as to maintain health. Overnight Motor Co. v. Missel, 316 U.S. 572, 576, 577, 62 S.Ct. 1216, 1219, 86 L.Ed. 1682. By exempting the drivers of motors from the maximum hour limitations of the Fair Labor Standards Act, Congress evidently relied upon the Motor Carrier provisions to work out satisfactory adjustments for employees charged with the safety of operations in a business requiring fluctuating hours of employment, without the burden of additional pay for overtime.
'(3) for a workweek longer than forty hours after the expiration of the second year from such date, unless such employee receives compensation for his employment in excess of the hours above specified at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which he is employed.' 52 Stat. 1063.
49 Stat. 543, 49 U.S.C. § 301, 49 U.S.C.A. § 301 et seq.
Cf. Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, § 401, 52 Stat. 1046, 21 U.S.C. 341, 21 U.S.C.A. § 341; Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, § 2, 56 Stat. 24, 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix § 902; Fair Labor Standards Act, § 8(d), 52 Stat. 1064, 29 U.S.C. 208(d), 29 U.S.C.A. § 208(d); Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, § 11, 49 Stat. 820, 15 U.S.C. 79k, 15 U.S.C.A. § 79k; Tariff Act of 1930, § 350(a), 48 Stat. 943, 19 U.S.C. § 1351, 19 U.S.C.A. § 1351; Alien Enemy Act, R.S. § 4067, 50 U.S.C. § 21, 50 U.S.C.A. § 21.
An understanding that the Interstate Commerce Commission had already acted upon maximum hours for drivers may have shortened the discussion of the amendment. 81 Cong.Rec. 7875. Subsequent to this discussion and prior to the passage of the Labor Act, the Commission had acted for common and contract carriers. Ex parte MC-2, 3 M.C.C. 665, 690. Private carriers were held to need regulation by the decision of May 1, 1940, Ex parte MC-3, 23 M.C.C. 1.
81 Cong.Rec. 7875; 34 Stat. 1415, 39 Stat. 721, 45 U.S.C.A. §§ 61—66.
District Courts which have interpreted section 13(b)(1) have reached the same conclusion as we do. Faulkner v. Little Rock Furniture Mfg. Co., D.C., 32 F.Supp. 590; Bechtel v. Stillwater Milling Co., D.C., 33 F.Supp. 1010; Fitzgerald v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., D.C., 45 F.Supp. 812; Gibson v. Wilson & Co., 2 Federal Carriers Cases 9604; Derer et al. v. Snow Ice, Inc., 3 Federal Carriers Cases 80,029. The Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor has taken the position that the Fair Labor Standards Act applies to drivers of private carriers until May 1, 1940, the date the Interstate Commerce Commission determined that need existed for their regulation. Interpretative Bull. No. 9, 5 Wage &3 Hour Rep. 233, 235, March 30, 1942.

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