Source: https://www.calattorneysfees.com/cases_private_attorney_general_ccp_10215/
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 12:03:50+00:00

Document:
$588,000 Fee Request Gets A Second Study, Based On Whitley And Other Factors.
In City of Oakland v. Oakland Police and Fire Retirement System, Case No. A144653 (1st Dist., Div. 4 Nov. 29, 2018) (published), intervenors sought to recover $588,000 in attorney’s fees under the private attorney general statute (CCP § 1021.5) and the federal civil rights statute (42 U.S.C. § 1988) based on some successes in defending the legitimacy of certain retirement benefits with respect to some public retirees and firefighters. The trial judge denied the fee request altogether, prompting an appeal by intervenors.
The appellate court reversed and remanded, finding section 1021.5 fee recovery was proper under the circumstances.
The first flaw was that the trial judge way overexaggerated the financial benefits being defended by intervenors. The lower court estimated they were $13 million (after making deductions from a “top ceiling” $39 million potential benefit estimated number). However, the appellate court found that they actually were more like $3.5 million in benefits versus the $500,000 in litigation costs which would be incurred. Under Conservatorship of Whitley (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1206, 1215-1216, 1220-1221 [our Leading Case No. 14], a trial judge can award section 1021.5 even if the expected benefits exceed costs by a substantial margin. Here, the expected value figure looked to be overblown, such that the expenses to be borne as compared to the expected benefits justified fee recovery.
The second problem was that the lower court refused to consider the financial status of the litigants in determining an award. After analyzing a number of cases, the 1/4 DCA decided that this is a relevant consideration under section 1021.5.
Although the degree of success can influence both the entitlement to and amount of the award, intervenors were able to halt the Board from demanding repayments of $4.5 million in past benefits by retirees—a strong degree of success and enforcement of pension rights which are of importance. With respect to the significant benefit factor, intervenors protected 590 live pensioners, so that was large enough to warrant section 1021.5 fees. Reversed and remanded.
Adoption of Joshua S. Justified Denial Of The Fee Request.
Plaintiff in Paratransit, Inc. v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., Case No. C080183 (3d Dist. Nov. 27, 2018) (unpublished) won an unemployment insurance dispute, albeit on narrow grounds, before the California Supreme Court. However, the trial judge denied plaintiff’s request for private attorney general fee recovery based on In re Adoption of Joshua S., 42 Cal.4th 945, 949 (2008), which held that a litigant satisfying all the CCP § 1021.5 requirements may still be denied fees where only legal precedent was created not advancing a large public interest and only private rights were essentially vindicated. The Third District concluded the trial judge got it right, discussing many 1021.5 cases arising post-Joshua S. in the process.
Basis Under California’s Private Attorney General Statute—CCP § 1021.5.
In AMN Healthcare, Inc. v. Aya Healthcare Services, Inc., Case No. D071924 (4th Dist., Div. 1 Nov. 1, 2018) (published), individual defendants—former AMN “travel nurses” providing services to medical services throughout the U.S.—had to contest non-recruiting clauses in their AMN contracts when they switched over to competitor Aya. Defendants prevailed via summary judgment motions granted in their favor, principally based under Business and Professions Code section 16600 non-compete principles. Defendants invalidated contractual provisions against non-recruiting violations when they went to work for a different company. The trial judge later granted successful defendants $169,000 in attorney’s fees under the private attorney general statute.
This determination was affirmed on appeal. Clearly, the enforcement of section 16600 rights involved an important public right, and defendants were successful based on winning summary judgment motions interpreting employment contractual provisions which were invalid in nature. With respect to whether their own financial interests were subordinate to the greater public interest, the record showed they pursued an injunctive relief which was granted on the validity of the contractual restrictions—over and above their own interests--such that the Whitley cost/benefit analysis was satisfied.
Action Primarily Affected His Own Interests And Fees Incurred Were Not Out Of Proportion To His Paramount Personal Stake In The Situation.
In People ex rel. City of Commerce v. Argumedo, Case Nos. B280814/285003 (2d Dist., Div. 1 Oct. 17, 2018) (partially published; fee discussion not published), City of Commerce through a quo warranto action sought to oust City Councilman Hugo Argumedo after he pled guilty to a misdemeanor obstruction of justice count. The City lost, because obstruction of justice was not a disqualifying conviction under California Constitution, article VII, section 8(b) and Government Code section 1021—a merits determination affirmed in the published part of the opinion. Later, Mr. Argumedo attempted to recoup the $193,547.50 in attorney’s fees he spent under California’s private attorney general statute. The lower court denied that request, finding that the action benefitted mainly Mr. Argumedo’s personal interests, with the benefit to the electorate only tangential and subordinate to his personal stake in the litigation. In the unpublished portion of the opinion, the appellate panel found this ruling to be no abuse of discretion under CCP § 128.5.
BLOG OBSERVATION—Although the matter was a bench trial involving 60 exhibits and seven witnesses, this goes to show how expensive modern litigation can be for an individual party.

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