Source: http://masscases.com/cases/app/2/2massappct357.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 21:59:34+00:00

Document:
COMMONWEALTH vs. THOMAS L. BARNES (and a companion case [Note 1]).
FOUR INDICTMENTS found and returned in the Superior Court on December 15, 1971.
The cases were heard by Coddaire, J., without jury.
Alfred Paul Farese for the defendants.
John J. Droney, District Attorney, Terence M. Troyer & Barbara A. H. Smith, Assistant District Attorneys, for the Commonwealth.
Acton police stopped the automobile and arrested the occupants. Upon receiving from the Concord police, by radio, information that a stabbing had occurred and that the automobile (including its color and registration number) involved in the incident was heading for Route 2A, Officer Brooks observed the automobile at the intersection of Concord Road and Route 2A, pursued it, and stopped it on Route 2A. Almost immediately thereafter, the Concord police arrived and Officer Alexander took two knives (one of which, on analysis, showed blood stains) from the glove compartment. [Note 2] It appears that something less than one-half hour elapsed from the time of the incident to the time of the arrest. The automobile was towed to the Concord police station. The Concord police obtained a search warrant and made a further search; they seized various weapons.
had probable cause to search the automobile." Commonwealth v. Pignone, 361 Mass. 566 , 568 (1972). In this case the circumstances which provided probable cause to arrest also provided probable cause to search. Where, as here, the occupants of an automobile were arrested upon probable cause to believe that they were fleeing in the automobile from the scene of a stabbing and assault, and that at least one of the occupants had been a participant, these facts also gave rise to probable cause to search the automobile for weapons and evidence of the crime. See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 47-48 (1970). In the circumstances of this case "there was a nexus between . . . [the defendants'] conduct and the vehicle" sufficient to give rise to probable cause to search the vehicle. Commonwealth v. Avery, 365 Mass. 59 , 64 (1974). [Note 3] See Commonwealth v. Jackson, 359 Mass. 759 (1971), and cases cited, in which this analysis is implied. Contrast Commonwealth v. McCleery, 345 Mass. 151 (1962); Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co. Inc. 391 U.S. 216, 221-222 (1968).
automobile was taken to the station was therefore superfluous, and we need not consider the sufficiency of the affidavit before us on which the warrant was based and which the defendants attack. Commonwealth v. Stevens, 362 Mass. 24 , 29 (1972). The trial judge therefore properly refused to suppress the items taken from the automobile and introduced in evidence.
danger of overlapping and had defense counsel pressed his original motion to sequester, it might well have been granted as a matter of discretion. Cf. Commonwealth v. Blackburn, 354 Mass. 200 , 205 (1968). To the extent, if any, that there was some overlapping as the trial developed, it was incidental, and the court was well within its discretion in requiring the trial to continue.
3. The defendants complain that a question and answer on redirect examination of a prosecution witness went beyond matters raised on cross-examination. "The extent to which re-examination of a witness may be carried with reference to matters not testified to on cross-examination is within the discretion of the court." Commonwealth v. Galvin, 310 Mass. 733 , 748 (1942). There was no abuse.
[Note 1] Commonwealth vs. Clifton R. Locke.
[Note 2] He also seized jackets which were rolled up in the automobile. We treat these on the same footing as the knives, though the jackets were "in plain view." That did not affect their seizure since it did not add anything to the pre-existing probable cause vel non by which the seizure may or may not be validated. "[T]hat evidence is in plain view is not by itself legally significant." Commonwealth v. Rand, 363 Mass. 554 , 557 (1973). Cf. Commonwealth v. Haefeli, 361 Mass. 271 , 280 (1972).
[Note 3] In the Avery case the phrase "incidental to arrest" appears to have been eliminated in favor of a straightforward analysis in terms of probable cause and exceptional circumstances justifying a warrantless search. See Commonwealth v. Haefeli, 361 Mass. 271 , 281 (1972); Commonwealth v. Rand, 363 Mass. 554 , 560-561 (1973).
[Note 4] Our consideration of the merits of this contention should not be construed as any indication that the motion to dismiss the indictments, by which the defendants sought to raise the contention, was appropriate.

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