Source: https://www.infolawgroup.com/blog/2014/04/articles/tcpa/two-fcc-tcpa-orders-address-consent-through-an-intermediary-provide-first-tcpa-exemption-and-hint-at-future-directions-2
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 22:30:39+00:00

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The FCC recently issued a Declaratory Ruling and an Order that provide some clarity in the TCPA arena and create a new exemption for certain types of text messages and calls. In sum, the FCC clarified that a company may obtain “prior express consent” through an intermediary for the purpose of sending administrative text messages. In addition, the FCC created an exemption for package delivery companies to send delivery notification text messages and make autodialed calls to mobile numbers in the absence of prior express consent. Even for companies not directly affected by these changes, the ruling and a concurring statement by a new FCC commissioner may provide some guidance for marketing messages and foreshadow the direction of future FCC action. Read our full analysis below.
As an initial matter, it is important to clarify the scope of the GroupMe ruling: It applies only to non-advertising/non-telemarketing messages, which require “prior express consent.” It has no effect on advertising/telemarketing messages, which now require “prior express written consent.” However, the ruling includes several nuggets that may have broader applicability, including within the marketing realm.
GroupMe provides an online service that enables up to fifty individuals to send group text messages to each other. The group creator signs up, agrees to terms of service, which require the group creator to represent that each individual added to the group has consented to be added and to receive text messages, and then provides GroupMe with the mobile phone numbers of the group members. GroupMe then sends up to four text messages to each group member, informing each member of information about the group creator, the names of the individuals who comprise the group, the unique ten-digit number GroupMe assigned to the group, instructions on how to stop receiving text messages associated with the group, and instructions to download the free GroupMe app. GroupMe petitioned the FCC for a declaratory ruling that the message recipient’s consent included the messages that GroupMe sends.
In the declaratory ruling, the FCC ruled that “text-based social networks may send administrative texts confirming consumers’ interest in joining such groups without violating the TCPA because, when consumers give express consent to participate in the group, they are the types of expected and desired communications TCPA was not designed to prohibit, even when that consent is conveyed to the text-based social network by an intermediary.” (GroupMe Ruling, at 1.) In other words, an intermediary may convey a message recipient’s consent to receive non-advertising/telemarketing messages to a social network, and that social network may send its own administrative (i.e., non-advertising/telemarketing) messages to the consumer within the scope of that consent. Nothing in the ruling suggests that the social network may also send marketing messages based on that consent.
The FCC’s ruling adds another wrinkle to the social network’s potential liability: “To the extent that a consumer, in the absence of instructions to the contrary, agrees to participate in a GroupMe group, agrees to receive associated calls and texts, and provides his or her wireless telephone number to the group organizer for that purpose, we interpret that as encompassing consent for GroupMe to send certain administrative texts that relate to the operation of that GroupMe group.” (GroupMe Ruling, at 5 ¶ 11.) Thus, if the consumer actually provides contrary instructions (e.g., “but I do not consent to receive administrative messages from the messaging platform”), the FCC’s ruling may imply that the social network is responsible for honoring those contrary instructions. The intermediary would first need to convey those contrary instructions to the social network, and the social network would then need to have some way of honoring those instructions (or refusing to serve the consumer who provided contrary instructions). If the social network has no way of receiving or processing such “contrary instructions” before delivering text messages, that social network may face TCPA liability.
The FCC’s GroupMe Ruling is actually quite limited. Under its plain terms, the ruling only permits prior express consent to be provided through an intermediary and authorizes a messaging platform to send administrative messages within the scope of the user’s consent.
The FCC’s 1992 Statement Has Continued Vitality. It is also significant that the GroupMe ruling re-emphasizes the continued applicability of the FCC’s 1992 statement that “persons who knowingly release their phone numbers have in effect given their invitation or permission to be called at the number which they have given, absent instructions to the contrary.” (GroupMe Ruling, at 4 ¶ 10.) Although the FCC had not relied on this statement for many years in TCPA orders, there has been a recent trend for district courts to dismiss TCPA cases based on this statement. See, e.g., Kolinek v. Walgreen Co., 2014 WL 518174 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 10, 2014); Baird v. Sabre Inc., 2014 WL 320205, --- F.Supp. 2d ---- (C.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2014); Roberts v. PayPal, Inc., 2013 WL 2384242 (N.D. Cal. May 30, 2013); Pinkard v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2012 WL 5511039 (N.D. Ala. Nov. 9, 2012). The FCC’s affirmation of this statement suggests that these district court cases are on sound legal footing.
A Text Message Providing A Link to an App May Not Be Advertising in Some Cases. It is noteworthy that the FCC considered “instructions to download the free GroupMe app” to fall under the “administrative text” (i.e., non-advertising/telemarketing) umbrella when the app was not required to use the service. Users could still use the service through SMS, but the app would transmit group messages to be transmitted using data. However, it may be relevant that these instructions were not sent alone: they were accompanied by “information about the group creator, the names of the individuals who comprise the group, the unique ten-digit number GroupMe assigned to the group, [and] instructions on how to stop receiving text messages associated with the group.” (GroupMe Ruling, at 4 n.22.) These precise types of text messages – texts with a link to download an app – had been challenged by the plaintiff in the class action Glauser v. Twilio, Inc. as “advertisements” that are “sent solely to benefit Defendants.” See Complaint, Glauser v. Twilio, Inc., No. CV 11 2584 (N.D. Cal. May 27, 2011), at ¶¶ 23, 25. It appears now that the FCC may not agree with the plaintiff’s allegations.
This ruling also calls to mind the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Chesboro v. Best Buy Stores, L.P., where the appellate court held that robocalls urging a consumer to redeem expiring rewards points were telemarketing calls because they encouraged a future purchase (even though that purchase may have been free). 705 F.3d 913, 918 (9th Cir. 2012). The facts underlying the GroupMe Ruling and Chesboro are similar in the sense that in both cases, consumers provided some degree of consent, and the companies delivered a message that encouraged consumers to act in a way that would benefit both the company and the consumer. Best Buy’s consumers already consented to participate in the rewards program; and the robocall, while benefitting Best Buy by encouraging the customer to come into the store to make a purchase, also benefitted the consumer to use the points which would provide either a discount or possibly free merchandise. GroupMe’s users likewise already consented to participate in the service; and the text message would benefit GroupMe by having more individuals use its app and potentially benefit the consumer by using data instead of SMS messages. Under Chesboro, GroupMe’s act of sending instructions for downloading an app might be considered to be advertising or telemarketing under the theory that it encourages engagement in a commercial activity. Thus, the FCC’s ruling and Chesboro are potentially inconsistent. It will be interesting to see how a court addresses a potential future challenge to Chesboro based on this FCC declaratory order.
In a separate Order, the FCC exercised its statutory authority to create an exemption for companies to send free-to-end-user package delivery notifications via text message and through automated calls in the absence of prior express consent, subject to restrictions established by the FCC in the Order. This is the first time that the FCC has exercised its authority to issue an exemption under the TCPA. Because this exemption is solely for package delivery notifications, the Order does not apply in other contexts.
[These orders] will provide much needed clarity in an area where uncertainty can inhibit legitimate businesses from offering consumer-friendly applications and services, and can breed litigation. They will also directly benefit consumers by enabling them to receive package delivery notifications they want and expect, and by ensuring that they can take advantage of a service that helps connect groups of friends, families, and colleagues.
My only hesitation is on the applicability of the TCPA to text messages. The TCPA was enacted in 1991 – before the first text message was ever sent. I was not at the Commission when it decided that the TCPA does apply to text messages, and I may have approached it differently. It would have been better if the Commission had gone back to Congress for clear guidance on the issue. I will look for opportunities, like the ones presented here, to ensure that our rules do not stand in the way of innovation and certainty that benefits consumers and businesses alike.
To be clear, this concurring statement does not cast doubt on the FCC’s actual ruling that the TCPA applies to text messages. Only time will tell how Commissioner O’Rielly’s stance will affect future FCC decision-making.
 The term “prior express consent” is not defined in the TCPA, and courts have not ruled consistently regarding what constitutes consent. On the one hand, the Ninth Circuit has held that “express consent” under the TCPA means “consent that is clearly and unmistakably stated,” while a growing body of district court decisions hold that a customer’s provision of a phone number is an invitation to be called (or texted), absent instructions to the contrary. Compare Satterfield v. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 569 F.3d 946 (9th Cir. 2009), with Kolinek v. Walgreen Co., 2014 WL 518174 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 10, 2014), Baird v. Sabre Inc., 2014 WL 320205, --- F.Supp. 2d ---- (C.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2014), Roberts v. PayPal, Inc., 2013 WL 2384242 (N.D. Cal. May 30, 2013), and Pinkard v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2012 WL 5511039 (N.D. Ala. Nov. 9, 2012).
 The TCPA defines “prior express written consent” to mean “an agreement, in writing, bearing the signature of the person called that clearly authorizes the seller to deliver or cause to be delivered to the person called advertisements or telemarketing messages using an automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice, and the telephone number to which the signatory authorizes such advertisements or telemarketing messages to be delivered.” 47 CFR 64.1200(f)(8). A “clear and conspicuous disclosure” of certain information is also required. Id. Consent obtained in compliance with the E-SIGN Act satisfies the writing requirement. In re Rules & Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 77 FR 34233, 34236-37 (2012).
 Under the TCPA, the FCC is authorized to issue an exemption for “calls to a telephone number assigned to a cellular telephone service that are not charged to the called party, subject to such conditions as the Commission may prescribe as necessary in the interest of the privacy rights this section is intended to protect.” See 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(2)(C).

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