Source: https://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-9th-circuit/1392435.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 05:10:41+00:00

Document:
Carol STANTON, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Janice BENZLER, Acting Warden, Respondent-Appellee.
Before: HALL and THOMAS, Circuit Judges, and WHALEY,* District Judge. Sandra Gillies, Woodland, CA, for petitioner-appellant. Shirley A. Nelson, Deputy Attorney General, Sacramento, CA, for respondent-appellee.
Petitioner Carol Stanton was convicted by a jury of first degree murder for poisoning her ex-husband. Her ex-husband's body was found with traces of arsenic trioxide in it.
Secondly, the defendant committed the murder by the administration of poison.
The word ‘poison’ means any substance introduced into the body by any means which by its chemical action is capable of causing death.
Arsenic trioxide is a poison.
Stanton argues that the giving of CALJIC 8.81.19 removed from the jury's consideration the question of whether arsenic trioxide is a poison, thus removing an element of the offense in violation of her federal constitutional rights.1 While a state is generally free within broad limits to define the elements of a particular offense, once it has defined them, due process requires that the jury be instructed on each element and find each element beyond a reasonable doubt before it can convict. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970); United States v. Perez, 116 F.3d 840, 847 (9th Cir.1997) (en banc); Eaglin v. Welborn, 57 F.3d 496, 500 (7th Cir.1995).
Thus, Stanton does not state a claim for which federal habeas relief is available.
Even if this court could somehow second-guess the California court's determination that, as a matter of state law, arsenic trioxide is a poison, Stanton does not show that this error “had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict.” See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993); California v. Roy, 519 U.S. 2, 117 S.Ct. 337, 339, 136 L.Ed.2d 266 (1996) (applying this standard to a claimed omission from a jury instruction). Under this standard, federal habeas relief is warranted only if the record leaves the reviewing court “in grave doubt” as to the effect of the error. See O'Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 436, 115 S.Ct. 992, 130 L.Ed.2d 947 (1995).
In this case, there was never any disagreement among the parties about whether arsenic trioxide is or is not a poison. Indeed, Stanton herself testified that she knew that arsenic trioxide was a poison, and the defense referred to arsenic trioxide as a poison throughout the trial proceedings. Stanton does not now contend that arsenic trioxide is not a poison, nor does she present any factual scenario in which the jury could have found that arsenic trioxide was not a poison.
Thus, there can be no “grave doubt” as to the effect of the instruction that arsenic trioxide was a poison on the outcome of Stanton's trial.
Thus, because the allegedly defective instruction was irrelevant to the jury's verdict, it could not have had a substantial and injurious effect on that verdict. See California v. Roy, 117 S.Ct. at 339.
1. California defines first-degree murder as “[a]ll murder which is perpetrated by means of ․ poison, lying in wait, torture, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated killing․” Cal.Penal Code § 189.
4. Stanton does not contend that state law has been applied inconsistently or unequally in her case.

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 § 189