Source: http://fr-toen.cocolog-nifty.com/blog/cat30663184/index.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 12:09:28+00:00

Document:
Ziggo and XS4ALL are internet access providers. A significant number of their subscribers use the online sharing platform 'The Pirate Bay'. This platform allows users to share and upload, in segments ('torrents'), works present on their computers. The files in question are, for the most part, copyright-protected works in respect of which the rightholders have not given the operators or users of that platform consent to share those works.
Stichting Brein, a Netherlands foundation which safeguards the interests of copyright holders, has brought proceedings before the courts in the Netherlands seeking an order that would require Ziggo and XS4ALL to block the domain names and IP addresses of 'The Pirate Bay'.
The Hoge Raad der Nederlanden (Supreme Court of the Netherlands), before which the dispute has been brought, has decided to refer questions to the Court of Justice on the interpretation of the EU Copyright Directive. The Hoge Raad wishes, in essence, to ascertain whether a sharing platform such as 'The Pirate Bay' is making a 'communication to the public' within the meaning of the directive and may therefore be infringing copyright.
In today's judgment, the Court holds that the making available and management of an online sharing platform must be considered to be an act of communication for the purposes of the directive.
The Court first draws attention to its previous case-law from which it can be inferred that, as a rule, any act by which a user, with full knowledge of the relevant facts, provides its clients with access to protected works is liable to constitute an 'act of communication' for the purposes of the directive.
In the present case it is common ground that copyright-protected works are, through 'The Pirate Bay', made available to the users of that platform in such a way that they may access those works from wherever and whenever they individually choose.
Whilst it accepts that the works in question are placed online by the users, the Court highlights the fact that the operators of the platform play an essential role in making those works available. In that context, the Court notes that the operators of the platform index the torrent files so that the works to which those files refer can be easily located and downloaded by users. 'The Pirate Bay' also offers - in addition to a search engine - categories based on the type of the works, their genre or their popularity. Furthermore, the operators delete obsolete or faulty torrent files and actively filter some content.
Indeed, a large number of Ziggo's and XS4ALL's subscribers have downloaded media files using 'The Pirate Bay'. It is also clear from the observations submitted to the Court that the platform is used by a significant number of persons (reference is made on the online sharing platform to several tens of millions of users).
Moreover, the operators of 'The Pirate Bay' have been informed that their platform provides access to copyright-protected works published without the authorisation of the rightholders. In addition, the same operators expressly display, on blogs and forums accessible on that platform, their intention of making protected works available to users, and encourage the latter to make copies of those works. In any event, it is clear from the Hoge Raad's decision that the operators of 'The Pirate Bay' cannot be unaware that this platform provides access to works published without the consent of the rightholders.
Lastly, the making available and management of an online sharing platform, such as 'The Pirate Bay', is carried out with the purpose of obtaining a profit, it being clear from the observations submitted to the Court that that platform generates considerable advertising revenues.
18 By its first question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether the concept of 'communication to the public', within the meaning of Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/29, should be interpreted as covering, in circumstances such as those at issue in the main proceedings, the making available and management, on the internet, of a sharing platform which, by means of indexation of metadata relating to protected works and the provision of a search engine, allows users of that platform to locate those works and to share them in the context of a peer-to-peer network.
20 Under that provision, authors thus have a right which is preventive in nature and allows them to intervene between possible users of their work and the communication to the public which such users might contemplate making, in order to prohibit such communication (judgment of 26 April 2017, Stichting Brein, C-527/15, EU:C:2017:300, paragraph 25 and the case-law cited).
21 As Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/29 does not define the concept of 'communication to the public', the meaning and scope of that concept must be determined in light of the objectives pursued by that directive and the context in which the provision being interpreted is set (judgment of 26 April 2017, Stichting Brein, C-527/15, EU:C:2017:300, paragraph 26 and the case-law cited).
22 In that regard, it should be borne in mind that it follows from recitals 9 and 10 of Directive 2001/29 that the latter's principal objective is to establish a high level of protection for authors, allowing them to obtain an appropriate reward for the use of their works, including on the occasion of communication to the public. It follows that the concept of 'communication to the public' must be interpreted broadly, as recital 23 of the directive indeed expressly states (judgment of 26 April 2017, Stichting Brein, C-527/15, EU:C:2017:300, paragraph 27 and the case-law cited).
23 The Court has also specified that the concept of 'communication to the public', within the meaning of Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/29, requires an individual assessment (judgment of 26 April 2017, Stichting Brein, C-527/15, EU:C:2017:300, paragraph 28 and the case-law cited).
24 It is clear from Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/29 that the concept of 'communication to the public' involves two cumulative criteria, namely an 'act of communication' of a work and the communication of that work to a 'public' (judgment of 26 April 2017, Stichting Brein, C-527/15, EU:C:2017:300, paragraph 29 and the case-law cited).
25 In order to determine whether a user is making a 'communication to the public' within the meaning of Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/29, it is necessary to take into account several complementary criteria, which are not autonomous and are interdependent. Consequently, those criteria must be applied both individually and in their interaction with one another, since they may, in different situations, be present to widely varying degrees (judgment of 26 April 2017, Stichting Brein, C-527/15, EU:C:2017:300, paragraph 30 and the case-law cited).
26 Amongst those criteria, the Court has emphasised, firstly, the indispensable role played by the user and the deliberate nature of his intervention. That user makes an act of communication when he intervenes, in full knowledge of the consequences of his action, to give his customers access to a protected work, particularly where, in the absence of that intervention, those customers would not be able to enjoy the broadcast work, or would be able to do so only with difficulty (see, to that effect, judgment of 26 April 2017, Stichting Brein, C-527/15, EU:C:2017:300, paragraph 31 and the case-law cited).
27 Secondly, it has specified that the concept of the 'public' refers to an indeterminate number of potential viewers and implies, moreover, a fairly large number of people (judgment of 26 April 2017, Stichting Brein, C-527/15, EU:C:2017:300, paragraph 32 and the case-law cited).
28 The Court has also noted that, according to a settled line of case-law, in order to be categorised as a 'communication to the public', a protected work must be communicated using specific technical means, different from those previously used or, failing that, to a 'new public', that is to say, to a public that was not already taken into account by the copyright holders when they authorised the initial communication of their work to the public (judgment of 26 April 2017, Stichting Brein, C-527/15, EU:C:2017:300, paragraph 33 and the case-law cited).
29 Finally, the Court has underlined, on numerous occasions, that the profit-making nature of a communication, within the meaning of Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/29, is not irrelevant (judgment of 26 April 2017, Stichting Brein, C-527/15, EU:C:2017:300, paragraph 34 and the case-law cited).
30 As regards, in the first place, the question of whether making available and managing an online sharing platform, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, is an 'act of communication' for the purposes of Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/29, it must be noted, as recital 23 of Directive 2001/29 states, that the author's right of communication to the public, provided for in Article 3(1), covers any transmission or retransmission of a work to the public by wire or wireless means, including broadcasting.
31 Furthermore, as is apparent from Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/29, in order for there to be an 'act of communication', it is sufficient, in particular, that a work is made available to a public in such a way that the persons comprising that public may access it, from wherever and whenever they individually choose, irrespective of whether they avail themselves of that opportunity (see, to that effect, judgment of 26 April 2017, Stichting Brein, C-527/15, EU:C:2017:300, paragraph 36 and the case-law cited).
32 The Court has already held, in this regard, that the provision, on a website, of clickable links to protected works published without any access restrictions on another site, affords users of the first site direct access to those works (judgment of 13 February 2014, Svensson and Others, C-466/12, EU:C:2014:76, paragraph 18; see also, to that effect, order of 21 October 2014, BestWater International, C-348/13, not published, EU:C:2014:2315, paragraph 15, and judgment of 8 September 2016, GS Media, C-160/15, EU:C:2016:644, paragraph 43).
33 The Court has also held the same to be the case for the sale of a multimedia player on which there are pre-installed add-ons, available on the internet, containing hyperlinks to websites - that are freely accessible to the public - on which copyright-protected works have been made available without the consent of the rightholders (see, to that effect, judgment of 26 April 2017, Stichting Brein, C-527/15, EU:C:2017:300, paragraphs 38 and 53).
34 It can therefore be inferred from this case-law that, as a rule, any act by which a user, with full knowledge of the relevant facts, provides its clients with access to protected works is liable to constitute an 'act of communication' for the purposes of Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/29.
38 Finally, the operators of the online sharing platform TPB cannot be considered to be making a 'mere provision' of physical facilities for enabling or making a communication, within the meaning of recital 27 of Directive 2001/29. It is clear from the order for reference that that platform indexes torrent files in such a way that the works to which the torrent files refer may be easily located and downloaded by the users of that sharing platform. Moreover, it is clear from the observations submitted to the Court that, in addition to a search engine, the online sharing platform TPB offers an index classifying the works under different categories, based on the type of the works, their genre or their popularity, within which the works made available are divided, with the platform's operators checking to ensure that a work has been placed in the appropriate category. In addition, those operators delete obsolete or faulty torrent files and actively filter some content.
40 In the second place, in order to be categorised as a 'communication to the public', within the meaning of Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/29, the protected works must also in fact be communicated to a 'public' (judgment of 26 April 2017, Stichting Brein, C-527/15, EU:C:2017:300, paragraph 43 and the case-law cited).
41 In that regard, the Court has stated, first, that the concept of 'public' involves a certain de minimis threshold, which excludes from that concept groups of persons concerned which are too small, or insignificant. Second, in order to determine that number, the cumulative effect of making the works available to potential recipients should be taken into account. Thus, it is necessary to know not only how many persons have access to the same work at the same time, but also how many of them have access to it in succession (see, to that effect, judgment of 26 April 2017, Stichting Brein, C-527/15, EU:C:2017:300, paragraph 44 and the case-law cited).
42 In the present case, it is apparent from the order for reference that a large number of subscribers to Ziggo and XS4ALL have downloaded media files using the online sharing platform TPB. It is also clear from the observations submitted to the Court that this platform is used by a considerable number of persons, the operators of TPB claiming, on their online sharing platform, to have several dozens of millions of 'peers'. In this respect, the communication at issue in the main proceedings covers, at the very least, all of the platform's users. These users can access, at any time and simultaneously, the protected works which are shared by means of the platform. Thus, that communication is aimed at an indeterminate number of potential recipients and involves a large number of persons (see, to this effect, judgment of 26 April 2017, Stichting Brein, C-527/15, EU:C:2017:300, paragraph 45 and the case-law cited).
43 It follows that, by a communication such as that at issue in the main proceedings, protected works are indeed communicated to a 'public' within the meaning of Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/29.
44 Furthermore, with regard to the question whether those works have been communicated to a 'new' public within the meaning of the case-law cited in paragraph 28 of the present judgment, the Court, in its judgment of 13 February 2014, Svensson and Others (C-466/12, EU:C:2014:76, paragraphs 24 and 31) as well as in its order of 21 October 2014, BestWater International (C-348/13, not published, EU:C:2014:2315, paragraph 14), has held that such a public is a public that was not taken into account by the copyright holders when they authorised the initial communication.
45 In the present case, it is apparent from the observations submitted to the Court, first, that the operators of the online sharing platform TPB were informed that this platform, which they make available to users and manage, provides access to works published without authorisation of the rightholders and, second, that the same operators expressly display, on blogs and forums available on that platform, their purpose to make protected works available to the users, and encourage the latter to make copies of those works. In any event, it is clear from the order for reference that the operators of the online sharing platform TPB could not be unaware that this platform provides access to works published without the consent of the rightholders, given that, as expressly highlighted by the referring court, a very large number of torrent files on the online sharing platform TPB relate to works published without the consent of the rightholders. In those circumstances, it must be held that there is communication to a 'new public' (see, to that effect, judgment of 26 April 2017, Stichting Brein, C-527/15, EU:C:2017:300, paragraph 50).
The concept of 'communication to the public', within the meaning of Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, must be interpreted as covering, in circumstances such as those at issue in the main proceedings, the making available and management, on the internet, of a sharing platform which, by means of indexation of metadata relating to protected works and the provision of a search engine, allows users of that platform to locate those works and to share them in the context of a peer-to-peer network.
1.Art. 8 Abs. 3 der Richtlinie 2001/29/EG des Europaischen Parlaments und des Rates vom 22. Mai 2001 zur Harmonisierung bestimmter Aspekte des Urheberrechts und der verwandten Schutzrechte in der Informationsgesellschaft ist dahin auszulegen, dass eine Person, die ohne Zustimmung des Rechtsinhabers Schutzgegenstande im Sinne von Art. 3 Abs. 2 dieser Richtlinie auf einer Website offentlich zuganglich macht, die Dienste des als Vermittler im Sinne von Art. 8 Abs. 3 der Richtlinie anzusehenden Anbieters von Internetzugangsdiensten der auf diese Schutzgegenstande zugreifenden Personen nutzt.
2.Die durch das Unionsrecht anerkannten Grundrechte sind dahin auszulegen, dass sie einer gerichtlichen Anordnung nicht entgegenstehen, mit der einem Anbieter von Internetzugangsdiensten verboten wird, seinen Kunden den Zugang zu einer Website zu ermoglichen, auf der ohne Zustimmung der Rechtsinhaber Schutzgegenstande online zuganglich gemacht werden, wenn die Anordnung keine Angaben dazu enthalt, welche Masnahmen dieser Anbieter ergreifen muss, und wenn er Beugestrafen wegen eines Verstoses gegen die Anordnung durch den Nachweis abwenden kann, dass er alle zumutbaren Masnahmen ergriffen hat; dies setzt allerdings voraus, dass die ergriffenen Masnahmen zum einen den Internetnutzern nicht unnotig die Moglichkeit vorenthalten, in rechtmasiger Weise Zugang zu den verfugbaren Informationen zu erlangen, und zum anderen bewirken, dass unerlaubte Zugriffe auf die Schutzgegenstande verhindert oder zumindest erschwert werden und dass die Internetnutzer, die die Dienste des Adressaten der Anordnung in Anspruch nehmen, zuverlassig davon abgehalten werden, auf die ihnen unter Verletzung des Rechts des geistigen Eigentums zuganglich gemachten Schutzgegenstande zuzugreifen, was die nationalen Behorden und Gerichte zu prufen haben.
80 Mit seiner funften, neunten und zehnten Frage, die zusammen an sechster Stelle zu prufen sind, mochte das vorlegende Gericht wissen, ob Art. 12 Abs. 1 in Verbindung mit Abs. 3 der Richtlinie 2000/31 unter Berucksichtigung der Erfordernisse des Grundrechtsschutzes und der Regelungen der Richtlinien 2001/29 und 2004/48 dahin auszulegen ist, dass er dem Erlass einer Anordnung wie der im Ausgangsverfahren fraglichen entgegensteht, mit der einem Diensteanbieter, der Zugang zu einem Kommunikationsnetz, das der Offentlichkeit Anschluss an das Internet ermoglicht, vermittelt, unter Androhung von Ordnungsgeld aufgegeben wird, Dritte daran zu hindern, der Offentlichkeit mittels dieses Internetanschlusses ein bestimmtes urheberrechtlich geschutztes Werk oder Teile davon uber eine Internettauschborse ("peer-to-peer") zur Verfugung zu stellen, wenn der Diensteanbieter zwar die Wahl hat, welche technischen Masnahmen er ergreift, um dieser Anordnung zu entsprechen, aber bereits feststeht, dass die einzigen Masnahmen, die er in der Praxis ergreifen konnte, in der Abschaltung des Internetanschlusses, dessen Sicherung durch ein Passwort oder der Uberprufung samtlicher mittels dieses Anschlusses ubermittelter Informationen besteht.
81 Zunachst ist offenkundig, dass eine Anordnung wie die vom vorlegenden Gericht im Ausgangsverfahren in Aussicht genommene, da mit ihr dem Anbieter, der Zugang zu dem fraglichen Netz vermittelt, aufgegeben wird, der Wiederholung einer Verletzung eines dem Urheberrecht verwandten Schutzrechts vorzubeugen, den Schutz des Grundrechts auf Schutz des geistigen Eigentums gemas Art. 17 Abs. 2 der Charta der Grundrechte der Europaischen Union (im Folgenden: Charta) beruhrt.
82 Weiter ist festzustellen, dass eine solche Anordnung, da sie zum einen gegen einen solchen Diensteanbieter eine Zwangswirkung entfaltet, die seine wirtschaftliche Tatigkeit beeintrachtigen kann, und zum anderen die Freiheit der Empfanger dieses Dienstes auf Zugang zum Internet einschranken kann, das durch Art. 16 der Charta geschutzte Recht des Anbieters auf unternehmerische Freiheit und das durch Art. 11 der Charta geschutzte Recht der Empfanger auf Informationsfreiheit tangiert.
83 Wenn jedoch mehrere unionsrechtlich geschutzte Grundrechte einander widerstreiten, obliegt es den zustandigen innerstaatlichen Behorden oder Gerichten, ein angemessenes Gleichgewicht zwischen diesen Rechten sicherzustellen (vgl. in diesem Sinne Urteil vom 29. Januar 2008, Promusicae, C-275/06, EU:C:2008:54, Rn. 68 und 70).
84 Insoweit hat der Gerichtshof bereits entschieden, dass eine Anordnung, nach der es einem Anbieter, der Zugang zu einem Kommunikationsnetz vermittelt, uberlassen bleibt, die konkreten Masnahmen zu bestimmen, die zur Erreichung des angestrebten Ergebnisses zu ergreifen sind, unter bestimmten Voraussetzungen geeignet ist, ein solches angemessenes Gleichgewicht herzustellen (vgl. in diesem Sinne Urteil vom 27. Marz 2014, UPC Telekabel Wien, C-314/12, EU:C:2014:192, Rn. 62 und 63).
85 Im vorliegenden Fall lasst sich dem Vorabentscheidungsersuchen entnehmen, dass das vorlegende Gericht von der Annahme ausgeht, dass die Vorkehrungen, die der von einer Anordnung Betroffene in der Praxis ergreifen konnte, auf drei Masnahmen beschrankt sind, namlich darauf, samtliche uber einen Internetanschluss ubermittelten Informationen zu uberprufen, den Anschluss abzuschalten oder ihn mit einem Passwort zu sichern.
86 Die Vereinbarkeit der in Aussicht genommenen Anordnung mit dem Unionsrecht ist daher vom Gerichtshof allein auf der Grundlage dieser drei vom vorlegenden Gericht genannten Masnahmen zu prufen.
87 Was erstens die Uberprufung samtlicher ubermittelter Informationen angeht, so scheidet eine solche Masnahme von vornherein deshalb aus, weil sie Art. 15 Abs. 1 der Richtlinie 2000/31 zuwiderlauft, wonach Anbietern, die Zugang zu einem Kommunikationsnetz vermitteln, keine allgemeine Verpflichtung zur Uberwachung der von ihnen ubermittelten Informationen auferlegt werden darf.
88 Hinsichtlich, zweitens, der Masnahme einer vollstandigen Abschaltung des Internetanschlusses ist festzustellen, dass ihre Durchfuhrung einen erheblichen Eingriff in die unternehmerische Freiheit des Betroffenen bedeutete, der, und sei es auch nur als Nebentatigkeit, eine wirtschaftliche Tatigkeit ausubt, die darin besteht, Zugang zum Internet zu vermitteln, da ihm damit die Fortfuhrung dieser Tatigkeit faktisch vollstandig untersagt wurde, um einer begrenzten Urheberrechtsverletzung abzuhelfen, ohne die Ergreifung von Masnahmen in Betracht zu ziehen, die diese Freiheit in geringerem Mase beeintrachtigen.
89 Hierin ist daher eine Masnahme zu sehen, die nicht die Anforderung erfullt, ein angemessenes Gleichgewicht zwischen den miteinander in Einklang zu bringenden Grundrechten sicherzustellen (vgl. in diesem Sinne hinsichtlich einer richterlichen Anordnung Urteil vom 24. November 2011, Scarlet Extended, C-70/10, EU:C:2011:771, Rn. 49, und entsprechend Urteil vom 16. Juli 2015, Coty Germany, C-580/13, EU:C:2015:485, Rn. 35 und 41).
90 Was drittens die Masnahme anbelangt, die in der Sicherung des Internetanschlusses durch ein Passwort besteht, so ist sie geeignet, sowohl das Recht des Anbieters, der Zugang zu einem Kommunikationsnetz vermittelt, als auch das Recht der Empfanger dieses Dienstes auf Informationsfreiheit einzuschranken.
91 Gleichwohl ist erstens festzustellen, dass eine solche Masnahme nicht den Wesensgehalt des Rechts des Anbieters von Netzzugangsdiensten auf unternehmerische Freiheit verletzt, da sie darauf beschrankt bleibt, in marginaler Weise eine technische Modalitat fur die Ausubung der Tatigkeit dieses Anbieters festzulegen.
92 Zweitens erscheint eine Masnahme, die in der Sicherung des Internetanschlusses besteht, auch nicht geeignet, den Wesensgehalt des Rechts der Empfanger eines Internetzugangsdienstes auf Informationsfreiheit zu verletzen, weil sie von ihnen nur verlangt, sich ein Passwort geben zu lassen, wobei uberdies vorauszusetzen ist, dass dieser Anschluss nur ein Mittel unter anderen fur den Zugang zum Internet bildet.
93 Drittens ergibt sich zwar aus der Rechtsprechung, dass die ergriffenen Masnahmen in dem Sinne streng zielorientiert sein mussen, dass sie dazu dienen mussen, der Verletzung des Urheberrechts oder eines verwandten Schutzrechts durch einen Dritten ein Ende zu setzen, ohne dass die fur Internetnutzer, die die Dienste dieses Anbieters in Anspruch nehmen, bestehende Moglichkeit, rechtmasig Zugang zu Informationen zu erlangen, dadurch beeintrachtigt wird. Andernfalls ware der Eingriff des Anbieters in die Informationsfreiheit dieser Nutzer gemessen am verfolgten Ziel nicht gerechtfertigt (Urteil vom 27. Marz 2014, UPC Telekabel Wien, C-314/12, EU:C:2014:192, Rn. 56).
94 Jedoch erscheint eine von dem Anbieter, der Zugang zu einem Kommunikationsnetz vermittelt, ergriffene Masnahme, die in der Sicherung des Internetanschlusses besteht, nicht geeignet, die Moglichkeit des rechtmasigen Zugangs zu Informationen zu beeintrachtigen, uber die die Internetnutzer, die Dienste dieses Anbieters in Anspruch nehmen, verfugen, weil sie keine Sperrung einer Website bewirkt.
95 Viertens hat der Gerichtshof bereits entschieden, dass die Masnahmen, die vom Adressaten einer Anordnung wie der im Ausgangsverfahren fraglichen bei deren Durchfuhrung getroffen werden, hinreichend wirksam sein mussen, um einen wirkungsvollen Schutz des betreffenden Grundrechts sicherzustellen, d. h., sie mussen bewirken, dass unerlaubte Zugriffe auf die Schutzgegenstande verhindert oder zumindest erschwert werden und dass die Internetnutzer, die die Dienste des Adressaten der Anordnung in Anspruch nehmen, zuverlassig davon abgehalten werden, auf die ihnen unter Verletzung des genannten Grundrechts zuganglich gemachten Schutzgegenstande zuzugreifen (vgl. Urteil vom 27. Marz 2014, UPC Telekabel Wien, C-314/12, EU:C:2014:192, Rn. 62).
96 Insoweit ist festzustellen, dass eine Masnahme, die in der Sicherung des Internetanschlusses durch ein Passwort besteht, die Nutzer dieses Anschlusses davon abschrecken kann, ein Urheberrecht oder verwandtes Schutzrecht zu verletzen, soweit diese Nutzer ihre Identitat offenbaren mussen, um das erforderliche Passwort zu erhalten, und damit nicht anonym handeln konnen, was durch das vorlegende Gericht zu uberprufen ist.
97 Funftens ist darauf hinzuweisen, dass nach den Angaben des vorlegenden Gerichts auser den drei von ihm genannten Masnahmen keine andere Masnahme existiert, die ein Anbieter, der Zugang zu einem Kommunikationsnetz wie dem hier fraglichen vermittelt, in der Praxis ergreifen konnte, um einer Anordnung wie der im Ausgangsverfahren fraglichen nachzukommen.
98 Da die beiden anderen Masnahmen vom Gerichtshof verworfen worden sind, liefe die Auffassung, dass ein Anbieter, der Zugang zu einem Kommunikationsnetz vermittelt, seinen Internetanschluss nicht sichern muss, darauf hinaus, dem Grundrecht auf geistiges Eigentum jeden Schutz zu entziehen, was dem Gedanken eines angemessenen Gleichgewichts zuwiderliefe (vgl. entsprechend Urteil vom 16. Juli 2015, Coty Germany, C-580/13, EU:C:2015:485, Rn. 37 und 38).
99 Unter diesen Umstanden ist eine Masnahme, die in der Sicherung des Internetanschlusses durch ein Passwort besteht, als erforderlich anzusehen, um einen wirksamen Schutz des Grundrechts auf Schutz des geistigen Eigentums zu gewahrleisten.
100 Nach alledem ist unter den im vorliegenden Urteil dargelegten Voraussetzungen die Masnahme, die in der Sicherung des Anschlusses besteht, als geeignet anzusehen, ein angemessenes Gleichgewicht zwischen dem Grundrecht auf Schutz des geistigen Eigentums einerseits und dem Recht des Diensteanbieters, der Zugang zu einem Kommunikationsnetz vermittelt, auf unternehmerische Freiheit sowie dem Recht der Empfanger dieses Dienstes auf Informationsfreiheit andererseits zu schaffen.
101 Daher ist auf die funfte, neunte und zehnte Frage zu antworten, dass Art. 12 Abs. 1 in Verbindung mit Abs. 3 der Richtlinie 2000/31 unter Berucksichtigung der Erfordernisse des Grundrechtsschutzes und der Regelungen der Richtlinien 2001/29 und 2004/48 dahin auszulegen ist, dass er grundsatzlich nicht dem Erlass einer Anordnung wie der im Ausgangsverfahren fraglichen entgegensteht, mit der einem Diensteanbieter, der Zugang zu einem Kommunikationsnetz, das der Offentlichkeit Anschluss an das Internet ermoglicht, vermittelt, unter Androhung von Ordnungsgeld aufgegeben wird, Dritte daran zu hindern, der Offentlichkeit mittels dieses Internetanschlusses ein bestimmtes urheberrechtlich geschutztes Werk oder Teile davon uber eine Internettauschborse ("peer-to-peer") zur Verfugung zu stellen, wenn der Diensteanbieter die Wahl hat, welche technischen Masnahmen er ergreift, um dieser Anordnung zu entsprechen, und zwar auch dann, wenn sich diese Wahl allein auf die Masnahme reduziert, den Internetanschluss durch ein Passwort zu sichern, sofern die Nutzer dieses Netzes, um das erforderliche Passwort zu erhalten, ihre Identitat offenbaren mussen und daher nicht anonym handeln konnen, was durch das vorlegende Gericht zu uberprufen ist.
1. Member States shall provide for an exception to the rights provided for in Article 2 of Directive 2001/29/EC, Articles 5(a) and 7(1) of Directive 96/9/EC and Article 11(1) of this Directive for reproductions and extractions made by research organisations in order to carry out text and data mining of works or other subject-matter to which they have lawful access for the purposes of scientific research.
2. Any contractual provision contrary to the exception provided for in paragraph 1 shall be unenforceable.
3. Rightholders shall be allowed to apply measures to ensure the security and integrity of the networks and databases where the works or other subject-matter are hosted. Such measures shall not go beyond what is necessary to achieve that objective.
4. Member States shall encourage rightholders and research organisations to define commonly-agreed best practices concerning the application or the measures referred to in paragraph 3.
(b) is accompanied by the indication of the source, including the author's name, unless this turns out to be impossible.
2. Member States may provide that the exception adopted pursuant to paragraph 1 does not apply generally or as regards specific types of works or other sutject-matter, to the extent that adequate licences authorising the acts described in paragraph 1 are easily available in the market.
Member States availing themselves of the provision of the first subparagraph shall take the necessary maeasures to ensure appropriate availability and visibility of the licences authorising the acts described in paragraph 1 for educational establishments.
3. The use of works and other subject-matter for the sole purpose of illustration for teaching through secure electronic networks undertaken in compliance with the provisions of national law adopted persuant to this Article shall be deemed to occur solely in the Member State of establishment of the educational establishment.
4. Member States may provide for fair compensation for the harm incurred by the rightholders due to the use of their works or other subject-matter pursuant to paragraph 1.
Member States shall provide for an exception to the rights provided for in Article 2 of Directive 2001/29/EC, Articles 5(a) and 7(1) of Dircctivc 96/9/EC, Arlicle 4(1)(a) of Directive 2009/24/EC and Article 11(1) of this Directive, permitting cultural heritage institutions, to make copies of any works or other subject-matter that are permanently in their collections in any format or medium, for the sole purpose and to the extent necessary for the preservation of such works or other subject-matter.
1. Member States shall provide publishers of news publications with the rights provided for in Articles 2 and 3(2) of Directive 2001/29/EC for the online use of their news publications.
2. The rights granted in accordance with this Article shall leave intact and shall in no way affect any rights provided for in union law to authors and other rightholders, in respect of the works and other subject-matter incorporated in a news publication. Such rights may not be invoked against these authors and other rightholders and in particular, may not deprive them of their right to exploit their works and other subject-matter independently from the news publication in which they are incorporated.
3. Articles 5 to 8 of Directive 2001/29/EC and Directive 2012/28/EU Shall apply mutatis mutandis in respect of the rights set out in this Article.
4. The rights provided for in this Article shall expire 20 years after the publication of the news publication. This term shall be calculated from the first day of January of the year following the date of the publication.
Member States may provide that where an author has transferred a right to a publisher, such a transfer constitutes a sufficient legal basis for the publisher to claim a share of the compensation for the uses or the work made under an exception or limitation to the transferred right.
1. Information society services that store and provide to the public access to large amounts of works or other subject-matter uploaded by their users shall, in cooperation with rightholders, take appropriate and proportionate measures to ensure the functioning of agreements concluded with rightholders and to prevent the availability on their services of works or other subject-matter not covered by such agreements, including throuth the use of effective content identification technologies. The Services shall provide rightholders with adequate information on the functioning and the deployment of the measures, as well as, when relevant, adequate reporting on the identification and use of the works and other subject-matter.
2. Member States shall ensure that the services referred to under paragraph 1 put in place complaints and redress mechanisms that are available to users in case of disputes over the application of the measures referred to in paragraph 1.
3. Member States shall facilitate, where appropriate, the cooperation between the information society services and rightholders through stakeholder dialogues to define best practices, such as appropriate and proportionate content identification technologies, taking into account inter alia, the nature of the services, the availabilily of the technologies and their effectiveness in light of technological developments.
43 Accordingly, it cannot be inferred either from the judgment of 13 February 2014, Svensson and Others, (C-466/12, EU:C:2014:76) or from the order of 21 October 2014, BestWater International, (C-348/13, not published, EU:C:2014:2315) that posting, on a website, hyperlinks to protected works which have been made freely available on another website, but without the consent of the copyright holders of those works, would be excluded, as a matter of principle, from the concept of 'communication to the public' within the meaning of Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/29. Rather, those decisions confirm the importance of such consent under that provision, as the latter specifically provides that every act of communication of a work to the public is to be authorised by the copyright holder.
44 GS Media, the German, Portuguese and Slovak Governments and the European Commission claim, however, that the fact of automatically categorising all posting of such links to works published on other websites as 'communication to the public', since the copyright holders of those works have not consented to that publication on the internet, would have highly restrictive consequences for freedom of expression and of information and would not be consistent with the right balance which Directive 2001/29 seeks to establish between that freedom and the public interest on the one hand, and the interests of copyright holders in an effective protection of their intellectual property, on the other.
47 For the purposes of the individualised assessment of the existence of a 'communication to the public' within the meaning of Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/29, it is accordingly necessary, when the posting of a hyperlink to a work freely available on another website is carried out by a person who, in so doing, does not pursue a profit, to take account of the fact that that person does not know and cannot reasonably know, that that work had been published on the internet without the consent of the copyright holder.
48 Indeed, such a person, by making that work available to the public by providing other internet users with direct access to it (see, to that effect, judgment of 13 February 2014, Svensson and Others, C-466/12, EU:C:2014:76, paragraphs 18 to 23) does not, as a general rule, intervene in full knowledge of the consequences of his conduct in order to give customers access to a work illegally posted on the internet. In addition, where the work in question was already available with unrestricted access on the website to which the hyperlink provides access, all internet users could, in principle, already have access to it even the absence of that intervention.
49 In contrast, where it is established that such a person knew or ought to have known that the hyperlink he posted provides access to a work illegally placed on the internet, for example owing to the fact that he was notified thereof by the copyright holders, it is necessary to consider that the provision of that link constitutes a 'communication to the public' within the meaning of Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/29.
50 The same applies in the event that that link allows users of the website on which it is posted to circumvent the restrictions taken by the site where the protected work is posted in order to restrict the public's access to its own subscribers, the posting of such a link then constituting a deliberate intervention without which those users could not benefit from the works broadcast (see, by analogy, judgment of 13 February 2014, Svensson and Others, C-466/12, EU:C:2014:76, paragraphs 27 and 31).
51 Furthermore, when the posting of hyperlinks is carried out for profit, it can be expected that the person who posted such a link carries out the necessary checks to ensure that the work concerned is not illegally published on the website to which those hyperlinks lead, so that it must be presumed that that posting has occurred with the full knowledge of the protected nature of that work and the possible lack of consent to publication on the internet by the copyright holder. In such circumstances, and in so far as that rebuttable presumption is not rebutted, the act of posting a hyperlink to a work which was illegally placed on the internet constitutes a 'communication to the public' within the meaning of Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/29.
52 However, if there is no new public, there will be no communication to the 'public' within the meaning of that provision in the event that, referred to in paragraphs 40 to 42 of the present judgment, the works to which those hyperlinks allow access have been made freely available on another website with the consent of the rightholder.
54 As regards the case in the main proceedings, it is undisputed that GS Media operates the GeenStijl website and that it provided the hyperlinks to the files containing the photos at issue, hosted on the Filefactory website, for profit. It is also undisputed that Sanoma had not authorised the publication of those photos on the internet. Moreover, it appears to follow from the presentation of the facts, as they result from the order for reference, that GS Media was aware of that latter fact and that it cannot therefore rebut the presumption that the posting of those links occurred in full knowledge of the illegal nature of that publication. In those circumstances, it appears that, subject to the checks to be made by the referring court, by posting those links, GS Media effected a 'communication to the public', within the meaning of Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/29, and it is unnecessary to assess in that context the other circumstances referred to by that court, referred to in paragraph 26 of the present judgment.
55 Having regard to the foregoing considerations, the answer to the questions raised is that Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/29 must be interpreted as meaning that, in order to establish whether the fact of posting, on a website, hyperlinks to protected works, which are freely available on another website without the consent of the copyright holder, constitutes a 'communication to the public' within the meaning of that provision, it is to be determined whether those links are provided without the pursuit of financial gain by a person who did not know or could not reasonably have known the illegal nature of the publication of those works on that other website or whether, on the contrary, those links are provided for such a purpose, a situation in which that knowledge must be presumed.
68. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission, and to the parliaments and governments of the Member States.
25. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission and the parliaments and governments of the Member States.
At a reception held by the city of Ghent to celebrate the New Year, Mr Deckmyn, a member of the Vlaams Belang (a Flemish political party), handed out calendars for the year 2011. The cover page of those calendars featured a drawing which resembled that appearing on the cover of one of the Suske en Wiske - known in English as Spike and Suzy - comic books with the original title 'De Wilde Weldoener' (which may be rendered as 'The compulsive benefactor'), produced in 1961 by Willy Vandersteen. The original drawing represented an allegorical character in the series wearing a white tunic and surrounded by people trying to pick to pick up the coins he was scattering all around. In the drawing appearing on Mr Deckmyn's calendars, that character was replaced by the mayor of the city of Ghent, while the people picking up the coins were replaced by people wearing veils and people of colour.
Taking the view that the drawing and its communication to the public constituted an infringement of their copyright, several of Mr Vandersteen's heirs and other holders of the rights to that comic book series brought an action against Mr Deckmyn and the Vrijheidsfonds (an organisation financing the Vlaams Belang). Mr Deckmyn and the Vrijheidsfonds asserted before the Belgian courts that the drawing at issue constituted a political caricature and, therefore, a parody, with the result that the exception established by the directive for that type of work must apply. By contrast, Mr Vandersteen's heirs and the other rightholders asserted that a parody must itself display originality, which was manifestly not the case here. They also alleged that the drawing in issue conveyed a discriminatory message.
The hof van beroep te Brussel (Court of Appeal, Brussels), hearing the matter on appeal, requested the Court of Justice to clarify the conditions that a work must fulfil in order to be classifiable as parody.
19 It should be noted that, since Directive 2001/29 gives no definition at all of the concept of parody, the meaning and scope of that term must, as the Court has consistently held, be determined by considering its usual meaning in everyday language, while also taking into account the context in which it occurs and the purposes of the rules of which it is part (see, to that effect, judgment in Diakite, C-285/12, EU:C:2014:39, paragraph 27 and the case-law cited).
20 With regard to the usual meaning of the term 'parody' in everyday language, it is not disputed, as the Advocate General stated in point 48 of his Opinion, that the essential characteristics of parody are, first, to evoke an existing work while being noticeably different from it, and, secondly, to constitute an expression of humour or mockery.
21 It is not apparent either from the usual meaning of the term 'parody' in everyday language, or indeed, as rightly noted by the Belgian Government and the European Commission, from the wording of Article 5(3)(k) of Directive 2001/29, that the concept is subject to the conditions set out by the referring court in its second question, namely: that the parody should display an original character of its own, other than that of displaying noticeable differences with respect to the original parodied work; could reasonably be attributed to a person other than the author of the original work itself; should relate to the original work itself or mention the source of the parodied work.
23 The interpretation of the concept of parody must, in any event, enable the effectiveness of the exception thereby established to be safeguarded and its purpose to be observed (see, to that effect, judgment in Football Association Premier League and Others, C-403/08 and C-429/08, EU:C:2011:631, paragraph 163).
24 The fact that Article 5(3)(k) of Directive 2001/29 is an exception does therefore not lead to the scope of that provision being restricted by conditions, such as those set out in paragraph 21 above, which emerge neither from the usual meaning of 'parody' in everyday language nor from the wording of that provision.
26 In addition, as stated in recital 31 in the preamble to Directive 2001/29, the exceptions to the rights set out in Articles 2 and 3 of that directive, which are provided for under Article 5 thereof, seek to achieve a 'fair balance' between, in particular, the rights and interests of authors on the one hand, and the rights of users of protected subject-matter on the other (see, to that effect, judgments in Padawan, EU:C:2010:620, paragraph 43, and Painer, C-145/10, EU:C:2011:798, paragraph 132).
33 Consequently, the answer to the second and third questions is that Article 5(3)(k) of Directive 2001/29 must be interpreted as meaning that the essential characteristics of parody, are, first, to evoke an existing work, while being noticeably different from it, and secondly, to constitute an expression of humour or mockery. The concept of 'parody', within the meaning of that provision, is not subject to the conditions that the parody should display an original character of its own, other than that of displaying noticeable differences with respect to the original parodied work; that it could reasonably be attributed to a person other than the author of the original work itself; that it should relate to the original work itself or mention the source of the parodied work.
A first set of questions sought respondents' views on the possible need to clarify, at EU level, the scope and application of the private copying and reprography exceptions in the digital environment, including in relation to cloud-based online services. Other questions concerned the functioning of levy schemes across the EU and sought respondents' views on the visibility of levies on invoices for products subject to them and with regards to possible undue payments.
Most respondents that provided views on this issue under the category of "end users" were individual consumers and their representative organisations. The vast majority of them consider that the scope and application of the private copying and reprography exceptions should be clarified at EU level. However, opinions are divided on how this should be done. Some consumers claim that the current private copying and reprography schemes need to be completely overhauled as they are at odds with modern technologies and consumption patterns, and, in that context, most of these stakeholders are against the possibility of applying levies to a use that has already been licensed. Respondents argue that copies made in the digital environment in the majority of cases cause no or minimal economic harm to rightholders. In their view, the current regime leads to undue payments (i.e. when fair compensation is paid unduly on top of contractually agreed remuneration). They also call for alternative systems of compensation to be considered.
Others suggest that the private copying exception should be extended to cover the downloading of copyright protected material (irrespective of its source) and/or applied to non-commercial file exchanges (i.e. peer-to-peer sharing). A number of respondents are satisfied with the status quo, and consider that levies are complementary to licences. They also consider that Member States should have great flexibility in the implementation of the private copying and reprography exceptions.
Most respondents in this category consider that levies should be made visible on the invoices for products that are subject to them. They believe that this would enhance transparency and consumers' awareness.
Respondents insist that levy mechanisms are highly disparate and non-transparent, and that they distort the single market. They claim that national schemes do not distinguish sufficiently between transactions involving professional and non-professional operators, which results in undue payments. In their opinion, a common definition of harm should be introduced to ensure consistency, uniformity and transparency in the determination of levies. Consumers also consider that the imposition of levies should be as closely related as possible to the actual use of products for making private copies. Moreover, they advocate the introduction of appropriate ex ante exemption and ex post reimbursement schemes.
Stakeholders in this category are generally against the current situation. They perceive national levy systems as highly disparate and that they are leading to the fragmentation of the single market. This in turn, increases their operating costs or even prevents them from offering goods and services across the borders. In their view, levy systems are out-dated, out of context in the digital environment and at odds with the principles of the single market. They argue that the system was designed for the analogue world and that it is by no means justifiable to extend its application to the on-line environment. Most of these stakeholders see the necessity of updating the private copying and reprography exceptions in the short term and advocate phasing out levies in the long term. Some (and the distributors of products subject to levies in particular) call for the replacement of levies with alternative methods of financing fair compensation (for example payments from state budgets or a special tax on households).
With regard to the functioning of the private copying and reprography exceptions in the on-line environment intermediaries, distributors and service providers generally observe that modern technology has changed the patterns of consumption and the number of copies made by end-users has considerably decreased. Moreover, in their view in the on-line world those copies that are made by end-users are either already paid for in the licence fee or cause no or limited economic harm to rightholders (for example time-shifting and format shifting). Some service providers consider that situations where harm to rightholders is minimal (and hence no compensation is due) should be defined at EU level. Many argue that the possibility to claim levies on top of licence fees leads to instances of what they refer to as 'double dipping'. In their view when a levy is claimed for all type of copies, rightholders often are remunerated twice, i.e. by virtue of a contractually agreed licence-fee and on the basis of exception-based compensation. In their view, a lack of clarity in this field leads to legal uncertainty and negatively affects various business models, particularly on-line business models. In a similar vein, they warn against any attempts to extend levies to on-line services, which they consider would impede their development and have a chilling effect on investment. They also oppose the idea of claiming levies for copies made from illegal sources.
Respondents also highlight that the manner in which levies are calculated lacks transparency and leads to arbitrary and disparate outcomes. Those liable for payments who are involved in negotiations of tariffs with those benefiting from the levies argue that in most Member States such negotiations are long and inefficient. Many of these respondents call for more harmonisation at EU level, in particular with regards to the criteria used for the calculation. Some also call for simplification of the system. Some are of the opinion that a common definition of harm based on the actual economic damage to rightholders could increase predictability and facilitate the currently complex methods of calculation. Moreover, some argue that levies should only be used to compensate rightholders for the harm they suffer because of private copying and reprography and not to subsidise cultural activities in Member States.
Generally, respondents in this category (and the distributors liable for the payment of levies in particular) submit that most Member States have no appropriate ex ante exemption and ex post reimbursement schemes for reducing the number of undue payments by exempting certain transactions upfront and/or allowing reimbursements. In their view, even in Member States where such schemes have been introduced they do not function in practice, making it difficult to obtain an exemption or to be reimbursed. For this reason, they are in favour of imposing an obligation on Member States to introduce schemes that fulfil a number of criteria. Some of them contend that the only means to reduce instances of double payments both for cross-border transactions and transactions involving professional users, would be to shift the payment liability towards the retailer. In their view such a step would not increase administrative burden and costs because the number of retailers in many Member States is limited. By contrast, retailers pledge strongly against any attempts to shift the liability for payment of levies onto them. In their view, such a step would create substantial administrative burden.
Others favour the publication of tariffs at EU level in order to increase transparency, reduce the cost of compliance and facilitate reimbursement. Moreover, although stakeholders in this group generally agree on the 'country-of-destination' principle which was introduced by the case-law of the CJEU (the rule according to which compensation has to be paid in the Member State where the harm arose), some consider that the only solution to reducing undue payments in cross-border situations is to introduce a 'country of origin' principle whereby a levy is paid only once when a product is first introduced on the EU market. Some of these stakeholders are ready to accept the 'country-of-destination' principle provided that it is accompanied by a provision guaranteeing that no payment arises in the Member State where the product is first introduced on the market.
Finally, most stakeholders in this group agree to make levies visible on invoices, as a means to increase transparency, consumer awareness and to facilitate reimbursement. Some respondents warn aganst the possible costs of compliance, calling for the optional nature of such a measure.

References: Art. 3
 Art. 8
 Art. 12
 Art. 17
 Art. 16
 Art. 11
 Art. 15
 Art. 12
 CJEU