Source: http://sundaysplits.com/category/ip/
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 18:39:15+00:00

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Does Registration Mean Registration: When Can Copyright Holders Sue?
Copyright law protects the exclusive rights of creators of works—like novels, songs, computer software, and even fictional characters. These rights include the distribution and reproduction of copyrighted works and the power to assign or transfer those rights. In the United States, the copyright symbol “©” may serve to provide notice to potential infringers that the creator’s work is protected. But the symbol does not mean that the federal government specifically granted it copyright protections. Copyrights do not need to be registered with the federal government to be protected. Original works are under copyright protection once created and “fixed in a tangible medium of expression.” The owner of a copyright may register it at any time during (or before) the term of the copyright – usually 70 years after an individual creator’s death.
While registration is not required for copyright protection, it is required for filing a lawsuit to enforce a copyright. Before the enactment of the Copyright Act of 1976, copyright law varied from state to state and so did the conditions necessary for copyright enforcement. The act created a uniform system of copyright enforcement. Section 411 of the Copyright Act provides that “no civil action for infringement of the copyright in any United States work shall be instituted until preregistration or registration of the copyright claim has been made in accordance with this title.” The statute prescribes steps in the registration process but does not define when “registration” has occurred to allow a copyright owner’s infringement suit. Courts are split on whether “registration” occurs upon submission of an application for registration (the “application approach”) or upon approval of the registration application (the “registration approach”).
In Cosmetic Ideas v. IAC (2010), the Ninth Circuit adopted the application approach, which relies more on the purpose of the statute than on a plain language interpretation of the text. In trying to interpret “registration” under § 411 of the Copyright Act, the Ninth Circuit started with the plain language of the statute and referred to § 101 of the Act which defines “registration” as “a registration of a claim in the original or the renewed and extended term of copyright.” The court concluded that the definition was “unhelpful” and provided no guidance in interpreting the meaning of “registration.” The court then examined the statute as a whole, finding ambiguity—it then concluded that the Act’s “plain language” unequivocally supported either interpretation, and that it must “go beyond . . . the plain language to determine which approach better carries out the purpose of the statute.” Ultimately, the court adopted the application approach, finding that its efficiency accomplished the central purpose of registration – a robust national register of existing copyrights.
On the other hand, in Fourth Estate Pub. v. Wall-Street.com (2017), the Eleventh Circuit adopted the registration approach. In Fourth Estate, the court based its reasoning primarily on the language of the Copyright Act. It reasoned that the text “makes clear” that the registration approach is correct. The Eleventh Circuit rejected appeals to the legislative history and the policy of the Act, finding that the Act’s words “are unambiguous” and no further inquiry is required.
Despite the registration requirement’s prior treatment by circuit courts as jurisdictional, the US Supreme Court held in Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick (2010) that not fulfilling the registration requirement does not deprive a federal court of subject matter jurisdiction over a case. However, the Court in Reed Elsevier did not tackle the circuits’ different approaches to defining registration. A resolution may nonetheless be on its way thanks to the Fourth Estate case. A petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court filed in October 2017 is currently pending. The Court has invited the Solicitor General to file a brief expressing the views of the United States on the case. There is a good chance that the Supreme Court will grant certiorari given that the case involves statutory interpretation and there is a clear circuit split. Otherwise, an amendment to the statute may be needed to resolve the issue.
Have you ever listened to a song and recognized the melody? Perhaps you have heard something similar in another song? Your first thought might be “they copied my favorite artist!” And you might be right. However, if the appropriate license is obtained, it is completely legal.
Sampling is the “actual physical copying of sounds from an existing recording for use in a new recording, even if accomplished with slight modifications such as changes to pitch or tempo.” Sampling is a common occurrence in the music industry. After all, there are only so many combinations we can come up with using nine notes. This is why sampling music is allowed when it licensed.
Now, try to remember if you’ve ever thought the same way about a particular note or a sound in a song. Probably harder to discern. So, what happens if a sound is sampled? Does that violate copyright laws? The Circuits are split.
For copyrighted sound recordings, any unauthorized copying constitutes infringement, no matter how trivial.
The Court took a “literal reading” approach towards its interpretation of §§ 114(a) and 106 of Title 17 of the United States Code, concluding that while imitating or simulating “the creative work fixed in a recording” is permissible, making an actual copy of any of its contents not. To support its reasoning, the Court made an analogy to pirated music: “If you cannot pirate the whole sound recording, can you ‘lift’ or ‘sample’ something less than the whole.” The Court answered no.
The record industry can work out its own guidelines.
The new rule “should not play any role in the assessment of concepts such as ‘willful’ or ‘intentional’” in cases currently before the courts or in those already decided.
The Court, therefore, held that no de minimis inquiry was needed—where there was no authorization, infringement was established.
Here, the Ninth Circuit took a different approach.
First, the Court looked at the statute and concluded that Congress intended to limit, as opposed to expand, the rights of copyright holders. In addition to its differing approach to statutory interpretation, the Ninth Circuit’s decision also was based on the fact that a de minimis exception has been applied “across centuries of jurisprudence.” Thus, it was applicable in this dispute, directly in conflict with the Sixth Circuit’s holding.
Therefore, in the Ninth Circuit, the “de minimis” exception does apply to copyrighted sound recordings. Put simply, if a lay person can’t recognize the similarity, there is not infringement.
Depending on which jurisdiction you’re in, sampling a specific sound in a song may get you in trouble for copyright infringement. So, which approach is better: an authorization requirement for any sampling of a sound or just sounds the lay public can recognize?
 VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 875 (9th Cir. 2016).
 Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792 (6th Cir. 2005).
 Bridgeport Music, 410 F.3d at 805.
 VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 883.
 H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 106 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5721 (emphasis added).
 Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 473 (2d Cir. 1946).
 VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 881.
When Congress passed the Stored Communications Act (“SCA”) in 1986, email systems were markedly different. Email systems from the 1970s closely mirrored what we know as instant messaging; both the sender and recipient had to be online to send and receive messages. It was only in the early ‘90s when the current ‘store and forward’ technique became utilized.
Moreover, web-based email (i.e., Gmail and Hotmail) didn’t exist. Instead, email was handled on an intranet, usually within a business, and users would download email messages from a server. The server would typically not backup the message (disk storage space was a luxury back then), and the only copy existed on the user’s computer. Today, we receive emails on our computers, phones, and watches (often simultaneously), and rely on that server to keep those emails in perpetuity.
The act also specifies the legal process the government must use to compel disclosure of messages in “electronic storage.” See 18 U.S.C. § 2703. When it was passed, Congress presumed that any emails left on an email server longer than 180 days were “abandoned,” and thus could be obtained by law enforcement without requiring a warrant (or giving notice to the user).
Courts have agreed that unopened emails residing on a server are protected by SCA; the fiction is that an unopened email is considered to be in “temporary, intermediate storage” pending delivery. See Cruz Lopez v. Pena (N.D. Tex. Mar. 5, 2013) (“§ 2510(17) has been clearly established to protect unopened emails.”); Lazette v. Kulmatycki, (N.D. Ohio 2013) (“[P]laintiff cannot prevail to the extent that she seeks to recover based on a claim that [defendant] violated the SCA when he accessed e-mails which she had opened but not deleted.”).
[a]n obvious purpose for storing a message on an [internet service provider’s (“ISP”)] server after delivery [from the server to the user] is to provide a second copy of the message in the event that the user needs to download it again–if, for example, the message is accidentally erased from the user’s own computer.
At first glance, the definition seems quite broad, allowing for any email to be protected. Parsing through the opinion (which offers little in information on email configuration) it seems clear that Chief Justice Kozinski relied upon the assumption that the users downloaded the emails to their personal computers, noting that if “remote computing service might be the only place a user stores his messages; in that case, the messages are not stored for backup purposes.” Id. at 1077. Other courts have aligned with the similar view concerning email both downloaded and on a server. See, e.g., Shefts v. Petrakis, (C.D. Ill. Nov. 29, 2011) (finding email copies were protected by SCA when plaintiff downloaded them to Outlook); Cornerstone Consultants Inc. v. Prod. Input Solutions LLC, (N.D. Iowa 2011) (same).
• Justice Hearn, joined by Justice Kittredge— based on the meaning of the word “backup” according to a Merriam-Webster Dictionary, a substitute copy has to exist for the email to be a “backup.” Since the only copy of the email was read and stored on Yahoo!’s servers, it follows that the emails are not protected under the SCA.
• Chief Justice Toal, joined by Justice Beatty—the justices believed section (A) and (B) were conjunctive. Unread email on Yahoo!’s server is in “transmission” and “backup” until the user reads them, thus protected by the SCA as “electronic storage.” However, once an email is read, it has reached its destination, and is no longer stored under the definition of the SCA.
• Justice Pleicones—while mostly agreeing with Chief Justice Toal, Pleicones believed that the statute was disjunctive, but still failed to find the email satisfied either provision.
Rejecting the reasoning in Theofel, these three decisions all took the approach that the SCA protects emails from the perspective of Yahoo!, not the user. They also assumed the husband never downloaded his Yahoo! mail onto a computer or other device.
The Eighth Circuit provided a proper circuit split in Anzaldua v. Northeast Ambulance & Fire Protection District. Here, A jilted ex-girlfriend logged on to the plaintiff’s Gmail account and forwarded two emails to the plaintiff’s superior. The plaintiff was later fired due to “inflammatory” remarks found in his emails. The issue on appeal was whether the two emails (one was in the sent folder, the other in the drafts) were considered protected under SCA. The court held neither email were protected.
You have to wonder how we got here. It would seem judicial opinion goes backwards, creating splits along the way, while technology continues to forge on. It is likely necessary to jettison this act and replace it with something that will properly suit modern technology.
In a somewhat fitting analogy, judicial review and legislative amendments of the SCA is akin to what is known in software development as the “Code and Fix” methodology. Here, a developer writes code and then quickly releases the application without testing it. When a user reports a bug, the developer writes some code to patch it up, then releases it again—this cycle continues, the software becomes bloated, and every subsequent bug takes longer to fix. Suffice it say, the methodology is heavily frowned upon. Sometimes, it’s simply prudent to scrap something and start fresh.

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