Source: https://content.sciendo.com/abstract/journals/bjals/7/2/article-p257.xml?rskey=ZGllDB&amp;result=2
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 11:06:20+00:00

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The two Emoluments Clauses in the U.S. Constitution forbid federal officials from accepting “any present, Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind whatsoever” from foreign or domestic governments. President Donald Trump’s business interests generate numerous opportunities to use public office for his personal benefit. This article examines the history of the Emoluments Clauses and the Framers’ conception of corruption. The conflicts of interest alleged in pending emoluments lawsuits against President Trump would not be allowable in the private sector, and various plaintiffs argue that the Emoluments Clauses apply to all public officials, including the President. The President’s lawyers have claimed he is exempt from the application of these clauses and have raised numerous procedural objections, such as challenging who might have” standing” to bring a lawsuit to compel his compliance with the clauses. Out of three cases filed in 2017, one has been dismissed, while two judges have recognized that the plaintiffs have standing. In each lawsuit, the President’s lawyers insist on a conception of corruption that is quid pro quo, where only bargained for exchanges count as corruption. While the Emoluments Clauses require public officials to get Congressional permission before receiving such benefits, the President’s position is that Congress must first demand an accounting of any personal benefits, rather than the burden being on the President to ask permission. Thus far, two courts have rejected that approach, and as of this writing, further appeals can be expected.
Donald Trump has stated that he can discharge his public duties as President while he benefits from—and his immediate family continues to run—his global businesses without any conflicts of interest. 1 In this article, the ethics of public service and the two Emoluments Clauses 2 of the U.S. Constitution will be examined, along with the first reported federal judicial opinions about who can bring a lawsuit under either of the two Emoluments Clauses, and what “emoluments” meant to the Framers of the Constitution. U.S. law regarding conflicts of interest in the private sector––as well as findings in behavioral psychology––will be used to compare the President’s public duties with the duties of fiduciaries in the private sector.
For business ethics, as well as ethics in public service, Part IV describes the insights of behavioral psychology to demonstrate how often people and politicians overlook their own conflicts of interest, even where those conflicts strongly influence their decisions. 6 Part V summarizes observations related to conflict of interest laws and fiduciary duties in business, lending support to the conclusion that Trump’s attempt to maintain a stake in his private interests while serving in public office would be untenable in other contexts. 7 Returning to legal issues raised by the President’s conflicts of interest, Part VI describes three federal lawsuits filed in 2017, two of which have survived motions to dismiss and have addressed the meaning of “emoluments” as understood by the Framers of the Constitution. 8 We conclude that both the courts and Congress as the ultimate judges of the President’s conflicts of interest should support the original intent and plain meaning of the Emoluments Clauses in the U.S. Constitution.
The Framers saw their work as creating a system that would curb excessive greed and abuses of power. 26 They believed that controlling and channeling the self-interested motives of political leaders was the central political problem of their time. In their deliberations, the Framers expressed deep concern not only about corruption through bribery transactions––the quid pro quo that the U.S. Supreme Court often sees as the only kind of recognizable corruption 27––but also the greater and more insidious potential of public officials being influenced to serve the interests of the powerful by gifts from those who would seek to influence them.
Candidate Trump was expressing the notion––a correct one––that corruption involves more than taking cash in a briefcase in exchange for conferring special favors, or stashing bribe money in offshore accounts. His statements about Ms. Clinton are entirely congruent with the definition that “corruption is the misuse of public power by an elected official or appointed civil servant for private gain.” 39 Clinton could not, according to Trump’s “crooked Hilary” characterization, be an objective public servant for the average American, as she was “bought and paid for” by Wall Street.
Given what the Framers understood of human nature, and what behavioral psychologists confirm empirically, concern over the private interests of public officials was entirely reasonable, and in keeping with the Framers’ intentions in the Emoluments Clauses. Those concerns were amplified when President-Elect Trump said, just before his Inauguration, “I can be President of the United States and run my business 100 percent, sign checks on my business.” 41 Such claims implied that Mr. Trump could not even see that there might be conflicts of interest between his private business interests and the public interest. Mr. Trump then added, “The law is totally on my side, meaning, the president can’t have a conflict of interest.” 42 In saying this, the President-elect arguably (and erroneously) conflated a statement of law with a judgment on what is right, as if the law had already determined that Presidents could never have conflicts of interest. But he is wrong to think that all conflicts of interest are defined and resolved by law, and he is also wrong on what the law requires.
This part proceeds in two sections. First, facts and analysis about known conflicts of interest are listed. Second, Trump’s plan to distance himself from his businesses is examined.
Some foreign leaders have already reached out to Mr. Trump through business channels; they could easily believe that pleasing him personally could create personal or public benefits for themselves or their nations. 57 Ingratiating themselves with Mr. Trump, they think, will be generally advantageous. 58 Mr. Trump has also reached out to foreign leaders for reasons not relevant to U.S. policy interests. For example, Mr. Trump opposes wind farms because he believes that they ruin the view from his golf course in Aberdeen, Scotland. While President-Elect, he openly lobbied Nigel Farage—a British political ally of his—to oppose wind farms in the United Kingdom. While this is not an exchange of money, and nowhere near bribery, this use of public office to create private gain conflicts with his duties as a public servant. To put it more bluntly, it does not serve the U.S. public for a U.S. president, or President-elect, to spend any time or effort trying to influence wind farm policy in the United Kingdom.
The lease had provided, pursuant to pre-Inauguration regulations, that “no … elected official of the Government of the United States … shall be admitted to any share or part of this Lease, or to any benefit that may arise therefrom.” This sudden reversal appears to be a clear violation of the Domestic Emoluments clause.
To make matters worse, as mentioned earlier, foreign government officials stay there in order to please the U.S. President, 69 a likely violation of the Foreign Emoluments Clause. With considerable public fanfare, the Kingdom of Bahrain decided to mark the seventeenth anniversary of King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa’s accession to the throne by hosting a reception at the Trump International Hotel. 70 The total value to Mr. Trump from hotel profits could eventually make the diamond-encrusted snuffbox gifts of Louis XVI look comparatively inconsequential. The Framers of the U.S. Constitution included explicit prohibitions on receiving any such benefits, due to a clear awareness of their potentially corrupting effects.
Much of what Trump proposed was more show than substance; handing over control to his sons, with whom he is in regular contact, is anything but a blind trust, which is the gold standard of removing conflicts for public officials. Critical financial matters will almost surely be discussed between father and sons. Despite his pledge to end all new foreign investments, the Trump Organization was reportedly pursuing new investment in the United Arab Emirates. 77 Given the frailties of human nature and Mr. Trump’s particularly strong loss-aversion bias, 78 the better public policy is to follow President Reagan’s “trust, but verify” 79 approach, by requiring transparency and accountability for all public officials. The Framers would undoubtedly agree.
All people have a tendency to gather information in a self-serving way and also to process that information in a way that is self-serving. Fans of two teams watching a video of a football game between the two will tend to disagree completely about which team got the most breaks from the referees. 86 Studies show that even people who are trained to be objective and skeptical, such as auditors and scientists, tend to find more persuasive the information that is consistent with their self-interest or their previously drawn conclusions. In general, people tend to see what they expect to see in the facts that they take in.
In the case of a narcissistic politician, the self-serving bias can become even more pronounced. 87 But there are two other well-known biases that are also exaggerated by this particular personality: loss-aversion and overconfidence. Empirical studies show that people enjoy their gains only about half as much as they suffer from their losses. That is, people feel losses more deeply than gains of the same value. 88 This loss aversion is connected to what Kahneman and Tversky call “the endowment effect,” which is evident in the attachment most people have with what they own, and the “status quo bias,” where people unconsciously yet consistently resist change. 89 For loss aversion, once someone sees an item they identify as “theirs,” it usually becomes more valuable to them, often more than what the market would bear. This may partly explain why Mr. Trump finds it difficult to part with ownership of his assets, even as he cedes temporary control of them to his sons.
This can also lead to a distinct double standard: being overly confident in your own moral compass can short-circuit your own interest in moral self-reflection. If you are overconfident, you already “know” you are a good person, having a “strong but wrong” belief that you are entirely ethical. Numerous empirical studies show otherwise. For example, a large majority of physicians who routinely get free merchandise from drug companies will deny that this compromises their objectivity in any way, but only a small percentage believed that other physicians could retain their objectivity. 92 In short, we humans routinely give our own ethics higher marks than they deserve.
Because of the lack of judicial precedents related to the Emoluments Clauses, it makes sense to look for persuasive legal authority on conflicts of interest in areas other than constitutional law. As a matter of federal statutory law, officers of the executive branch of the federal government are barred from participating in matters that may impact their financial interests. 95 This is unambiguous in the context of federal contracting: losses or bad intent do not need to be shown, and penalties, including nullification of contracts, have been characterized as deliberately harsh. 96 Another area where conflicts of interest are addressed is in corporate governance. Numerous state corporation laws govern the conduct of officers and directors. 97 As discussed above, it is a fair summary to say that the United States now has a chief executive of the federal government, making important domestic and foreign policies, and at the same time having businesses that receive money and benefits from representatives of foreign governments and from states and the District of Columbia. Would an analogous scenario be tolerated in private enterprise? Clearly not.
The legal brain trust behind CREW’s lawsuit was an impressive roster of leading Constitutional law scholars, including Edward Chemerinsky, Laurence Tribe, and Zephyr Teachout. The lawsuit was filed in the Federal Court for the Southern District of New York on January 23rd, and claimed standing on the basis of the considerable drain on the organization’s resources for education and research needed because of Mr. Trump’s continuing foreign interests.
Washington politics––especially the workings of the U.S. Congress for many years––now seem neither purposeful nor noble, and a strong case can be made that because of gerrymandering, money in political campaigns, and other factors, Congress has become radically dysfunctional. 134 While some members of Congress are concerned about the emoluments issue, they are all Democrats, and are–as of the time of this writing–in a minority in both the House and Senate. 200 Democrats brought an emoluments lawsuit in June of 2017, 135 and predictably the threshold arguments were about standing and “the political question” doctrine. 136 Norm Eisen, who is co-counsel on the case and also a principal of CREW, noted that since Judge Daniels had pointed to Congress as the appropriate branch to provide a remedy, members of Congress had “special standing” to claim injury for not being able to vote on (consent to) the President’s ongoing train of emoluments. 137 In moving to dismiss the CREW lawsuit, Department of Justice attorneys had argued that Congress had a special capacity to deal with questions related to emoluments.
Attorneys for the Congressional Democrats argued that members of Congress had an individual right to vote on each emolument. 138 However, the language of the Constitution speaks about Congress collectively, and does not seem to give individual Senators or Representatives a right to vote on every emolument. Accordingly, the President’s attorneys argue that Congress must speak collectively, not individually. 139 But if the President does not ask for Congressional consent, and Mr. Trump clearly will not, what does Congress do then? Suppose a bipartisan resolution asking the President to provide a listing of all emoluments passes both chambers, but Mr. Trump then refuses to comply. Or suppose that, in 2019, the new Chair of the House Ways and Means Committee subpoenas Trump’s tax returns from the IRS? Will the President order the IRS not to cooperate? Could he invoke executive privilege over tax return information about his business dealings undertaken prior to the Presidency?
The attorneys general of Maryland and the District of Columbia do believe that the judiciary has a role to play in interpreting and applying both the foreign and domestic Emoluments Clauses. Shortly before the Congressional Democrats filed their lawsuit, Maryland and the District of Columbia filed suit in the federal district court of Maryland. 142 In March 2018, Judge Peter J. Messitte found that the plaintiffs had standing to bring the lawsuit, and declined to dismiss on the basis of the “political question doctrine.” 143 In July 2018 in a second opinion, Judge Messitte dealt extensively with the definition of emoluments. 144 As these opinions are the most in-depth examination of the two Emoluments Clauses as of September 2018, we will describe his findings and rationale for all three key issues.
The issues on standing are sufficiently complicated that readers may lose patience with all of the argumentation. But for the sake of completeness we will here survey Judge Messitte’s findings and conclusions regarding those issues in the Maryland––D.C. emoluments case against President Trump. In brief, he finds that there are sufficient grounds to grant standing to the plaintiffs, and rejects some of the President’s positions. But, as noted below, his determinations may be overturned on appeal, just as Judge Daniels’ findings as to lack of standing for CREW and its individual plaintiffs may be overturned on appeal.
Judge Messitte recites the usual tests for standing, 145 but emphasizes that states are not “normal litigants for the purposes of invoking federal jurisdiction” and are entitled to “special solicitude” in the standing analysis. 146 There could, he noted, be an “ invasion of three types of unique State interests justifying standing that were identified by the Supreme Court in being (a) sovereign interests; (b) non-sovereign interests; and (c) quasi-sovereign interests.” 147 Judge Messitte’s opinion focuses on the quasi-sovereign interests of both D.C. and Maryland, and includes its capability to sue based on parens patriae, the principle that political authority carries with it the responsibility for protection of citizens.
The President’s position is that these claimed injuries are based on a “speculative chain of possibilities,” such that they cannot be deemed “certainly impending.” 154 Maryland, the President’s lawyers point out, “has not alleged that it is faced with any threatened need to grant concessions to him or his Organization. In fact, according to this argument, the Amended Complaint does not even allege that the Trump Organization or the President do any business in Maryland.” 155 While the District of Columbia is home to the Hotel, the President argues that if the District were to provide special treatment, it would be a “self-inflicted injury.” 156 Moreover, it is “purely conjectural” that other States might grant favors or concessions to the President’s businesses in violation of their own laws, and even more conjectural to suppose that he would retaliate against Plaintiffs if they failed to grant such concessions. 157 Thus, there is no “injury-in-fact” that would grant recognizable standing status under Article III.
The State of Maryland does have 39,000 square feet of meeting and event space at the Bethesda Marriott Conference Center, which competes directly with the Trump Hotel’s 38,000 square feet of meeting and event space. The Conference Center has a large ballroom, has hosted embassy events in the past, and, compared with the Hotel, is roughly equidistant from many foreign embassies. In fact, Plaintiffs cite specific instances of foreign governments foregoing reservations at other hotels in the arena and moving them to the President’s Hotel (noting that both Kuwait and Bahrain moved events from the Four Seasons and Ritz Carlton to the Hotel after the President was elected). 165 Statements from foreign diplomats have confirmed that they will almost certainly be doing likewise.
Against this, the President argues that even if Plaintiffs could bring this suit against the Federal Government, parens patriae standing would still fail because Plaintiffs have not alleged a concrete injury, and to bring a parens patriae action, the State must be “more than a nominal party,” it must allege an injury suffered by a “substantial segment of its population.” 166 According to the President, the Amended Complaint does not plausibly allege such an injury, positing instead a general injury caused by a single Hotel to no more than an “identifiable group of individual residents,” which is not sufficient.
Yet Judge Messitte was satisfied that both the District of Columbia and Maryland are more than nominal parties. “They allege competitive injuries affecting a large segment of their populations. The Amended Complaint alleges that in 2014, visitors to the District of Columbia generated approximately $6.81 billion in spending and drove $3.86 billion in wages for 74,570 employees engaged in the hospitality industry.” 167 In the Court’s view, that is enough, as a “large number of Maryland and District of Columbia residents are being affected and will continue to be affected when foreign and state governments choose to stay, host events, or dine at the Hotel rather than at comparable Maryland or District of Columbia establishments, in whole or in substantial part simply because of the President’s association with it.” 168 He sees the Plaintiffs as trying to protect a large segment of their commercial residents and hospitality industry employees from economic harm.
These arguments could have gone the other way. A different trial judge, like Judge Daniels, could have determined that the damages were speculative, not well-enough defined, and therefore not a traceable “injury-in-fact” that would create standing. As the question of standing is a mixed question of law and fact for judges to determine, appellate judges are free to overturn such findings if they believe the law was incorrectly applied to all the facts of the case that are part of the record on appeal. The Fourth Circuit could so do without having to give a presumption of a fair hearing to the trial judge; ordinarily, appellate courts will accept a trial judge’s findings of fact and conclusions of law that are not “clearly erroneous.” Given the importance of this issue, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals could determine that the motion to dismiss should have been granted, either on standing or the political question doctrine issue.
In his March 2018 opinion on standing, described above, Judge Messitte also addresses the political question doctrine, stating that the Emoluments Clauses do create a private right of action, that equitable relief against the President was well within the Supreme Court’s earlier precedents, and disagrees with the conclusion reached by Judge Daniels in CREW et al. v. Trump that the Framers did not have competitors in mind when they composed the Emoluments Clauses. Judge Messitte writes that this would imply that “no competitors anywhere are ever within the zone of interests of the Clauses. But the Emoluments Clauses clearly were and are meant to protect all Americans.” 169 Under the President’s interpretation, he notes, only Congress would ever be able to enforce these constitutional provisions.
After an extensive review of Executive Branch precedent and practice, 200 Judge Messitte applies the Emoluments Clauses and finds potential violations of the Foreign Emoluments Clause with foreign governments patronizing the Trump International Hotel. 201 As to the Domestic Emoluments Clause, he finds that the President may have unlawfully benefitted from the Government Services Administration (GSA) lease of the Old Post Office Building to the hotel, 202 and from patronage of the Hotel by state governments, and by tax concessions from the D.C. Government. 203 On a motion to dismiss by the President, a trial judge must only judge whether the allegations “plausibly state a claim” under either emoluments clause. Depending on the evidence at trial, then, the plaintiffs could establish that the President’s receipt of these emoluments is unconstitutional. Discovery of relevant evidence for trial purposes was left to a joint recommendation process, with agreement due in September 2018. 204 Regardless of the outcome of the D.C.––Maryland lawsuit and the Congressional Democrats lawsuit, all the emoluments lawsuits filed since the Inauguration of the 45th U.S. President identify a fundamental problem of governance in the public interest colliding with the private interests of Donald J. Trump. He appears to see no separation, and what remains is whether either Congress or the Courts will address a Constitutional issue that has been dormant for nearly 230 years.
The Emoluments Clauses are federal public officials’ equivalent of the fiduciary duty owed by trustees and corporate managers and directors. It is difficult to discern why the public sector should have different “ethics” from the private sector, since both are managed by people with possible conflicts of interest. Absent any specific law on point, one could attempt to argue that there are differences, in that a trustee takes care of other people’s money with very specific obligations to particular people, and a corporate manager has fiduciary duties (“the utmost care”) to the company and its investors, while a public official’s duties are to a more general set of stakeholders. However, as we have reviewed, there is a basis in the U.S. Constitution, the Federalist Papers, historical precedent, and related scholarship that public officials, like private sector managers, have duties to avoid conficts of interest.
We contend that, for purposes of interpreting the Emoluments Clauses, it is unlikely that the Framers would have assumed that the President could not have conflicts of interest. Given their historical experience, their reading of Gibbons’ Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, and the influence of John Locke’s philosophy, the Framers would have seen the government generally––and not just particular offices of the government––as being trustee of the rights of the citizenry. 205 To the Framers, the social contract was clear: government received its power from the consent of the governed, and was to insure the rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. The people retained the right to overthrow that government if it failed in its duties to protect those rights. In short, government (including the Executive branch) only has the power accorded to it by the people. Likewise, a trustee or a corporate manager should only exercise the powers given to them, and must do so in care of the rights of others.
This article has tried to make clear that the Framers had a clear understanding of corruption, an understanding that deeply mistrusted power and influence in all of its forms. They hoped for political leaders with civic virtue, but were realistic enough to provide a restraining effect on those public officials that might prefer power and money to serving the public good. We can see this in the separation of powers provided for in the Constitution: “checks and balances” as safeguards against what they understood to be well-known temptations and systemic corruption.
Those safeguards include the Emoluments Clauses. The notion that they were directed only toward quid pro quo exchanges does not withstand historical scrutiny. In that light, President Trump’s businesses, his refusal to divest ownership while carrying out his sworn duties to protect and defend the Constitution of the United States, added to his apparent intention to profit from his position as President, are all violations of the Emoluments Clauses.
As of this writing, the D.C. and Maryland emoluments lawsuit may survive to enter into discovery phase. The 2018 mid-term elections resulted in a Democratic majority in the House of Representatives, triggering possible subpoenas for tax returns and other information by the House Ways and Means Committee. In either scenario, whether it is the result of litigation or a Congressional subpoena, the current constitutional crisis could escalate. Given the complexity of selling of assets that are essentially the Trump name itself, and the probability that Trump might ignore orders to do so, public pressure could increase upon the House of Representatives to take some further action, such as voting on articles of impeachment. But unless two-thirds of the Senate would vote to convict, the President would survive even that process; unless his own party were to agree, which is highly unlikely, there will be no impeachment process for the President’s violations of the Emoluments Clauses.
It is emblematic of the political atmosphere in Washington, D.C. that only Congressional Democrats have brought up the Emoluments Clauses. A sustainable political society requires “an aristocracy of virtue and talent” rather than an aristocracy of power and wealth, and political leaders that will put love for the nation’s well being above love of self or political power. It is likely that some segment of voters in the U.S. 2016 electorate confused power and wealth with virtue and talent.
Revelations related to potential obstruction of justice by Trump and his associates are rapidly emerging as this article is being written. The Trump presidency may well end for reasons other than conflicts of interest and repeated violations of the Emoluments Clauses. However, when a businessperson with an eponymous global brand also serves as the U.S. President, the political and judicial systems of a functioning democracy should be able to determine the boundaries of what is acceptable in terms of conflicts of interest. We remain hopeful that the U.S. judiciary, or perhaps even Congress, will acknowledge the clear text of the Emoluments Clauses, and affirm the Framers’ understanding that a Republic can be corrupted from within by failing to deal with clear conflicts of interest among all of its public officials.
“I can be president of the United States and run my business 100 percent, sign checks on my business.” He also said, “The law is totally on my side, meaning, the president can’t have a conflict of interest.” The Editors, Donald Trump’s New York Times Interview: Full Transcript, N.Y. Times, Nov. 23, 2016 (hereafter, N.Y. Times Interview).
The Foreign Emoluments Clause, U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 8; the Domestic Emoluments Clause, U.S. Const. art II, §1, cl. 7.
See infra notes 9–43 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 44–54 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 55–75 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 76–96 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 97–113 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 114–201 and accompanying text.
U.S. Const. art 1, § 9.
See infra, notes 13-32 and accompanying text.
John Bassett Moore and Francis Wharton, A Digest of International Law (1906), at 579.
Zephyr Teachout, Corruption in America: From Benjamin Franklin’s Snuff Box to Citizens United, 24-25. (2014).
Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, The Federalist (#22), Gideon Edition (1818) at 121-22.
Teachout, supra note 14, at 38.
Id. at 40. Research has shown that a self-interest bias is fairly common, coupled with related biases such as overconfidence and loss-aversion. President Trump is no exception. See infra, notes 85–94 and accompanying text.
Teachout, supra note 14, at 40-44.
See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S.310, 360 (2010) (Kennedy, J.). “The McConnell record was ‘over 100,000 pages’ long ... yet it ‘does not have any direct examples of votes being exchanged for ... expenditures,’ .... This confirms Buckley’s reasoning that independent expenditures do not lead to, or create the appearance of, quid pro quo corruption.” Instead of seeing access and influence as corrupting factors, the majority opinion of Justice Kennedy shrank the definition of corruption down to the explicit exchange of money for votes. See also Lawrence Lessig, Republic Lost: How Money Corrupts Congress––and a Plan to Stop It (2011), discussing the moral confusion around corruption in the majority opinion by Justice Kennedy. Id. at 240-45.
Teachout, supra note 14, at 27. Pinckney had “urged the necessity of preserving foreign Ministers & other officers of the U.S. independent of external influence.” Id.
Max Farrand, 3 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, 327 (1911).
See infra, notes 76–89 and accompanying text.
See generally Kevin Phillips, Bad Money: Reckless Finance, Failed Politics, and the Global Crisis of American Capitalism (2008) (describing how the financial sector has hijacked the U.S. political economy). See also Luigi Zingales, A Capitalism for the People (2011) (describing a corrupt crony capitalism and how it has come to replace competition and merit in both business and government).
Philip Bump, Donald Trump’s Favorite Topic While Introducing Mike Pence? Donald Trump. Wash. Post, July 16, 2106.
N.Y. Times interview, supra note 1.
See infra notes 130-32, and 167-73 and accompanying text.
Eisen et al., supra note 32, at 11–12. See also District of Columbia v. Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d 875 (D. Md. 2018) (Messitte, J.).
Eisen et al., supra note 32, at 9–10.
David J. Barron, Applicability of the Emoluments Clause and the Foreign Gifts and Decorations Act to the President’s Receipt of the Nobel Peace Prize, 33 Op. O.L.C. 1, 4 (2009).
Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Re: Emoluments Clause Questions Raised by NASA Scientist’s Proposed Consulting Arrangement with the University of New South Wales.
Memorandum for H. Gerald Staub, Office of Chief Counsel, NASA, from Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Re: Emoluments Clause Questions raised by NASA Scientist’s Proposed Consulting Arrangement with the University of New South Wales at 4–5 (May 23, 1986).
See infra notes 130-32 and notes 167-73 and accompanying text.
51 U.S. (10 How.) 109, 135 (1850).
Sherburne v. United States, 16 Ct. Cl. 491, 496 (1880).
Adam Davidson, A Theory of Trump Kompromat: Why Trump Is So Nice to Putin, Even When Putin Might Not Want Him to Be. New Yorker, July 19, 2018. It would be hard to show that Trump’s indebtedness, and seeming deference to Putin, is a violation of the Foreign Emoluments Clause. The “favors” may not have come from the government itself, but rather a network of people close to the government, yet who are not formally official agents of the government. Davidson however, notes that Trump’s business deals ... were with tertiary figures. Sistema is rooted in local, often familial, trust, so it is common to see networks rooted in ethnic or national identity. My own reporting has shown that Trump has worked with many ethnic Turks from Central Asia, such as the Mammadov family, in Azerbaijan, Tevfik Arif, in New York; and Aras the Mammadov family, in Azerbaijan and Emin Agalarov, in Moscow... . Trump’s partners and their rivals would likely have gathered any incriminating information they could find on him, knowing that it might one day provide some sort of business leverage—even with no thought that he could someday become the most powerful person on Earth ... . Under Putin, sistema has become a method for making deals among businesses, powerful players, and the people. Business has not taken over the state, nor vice versa; the two have merged in a union of total and seamless corruption. (emphasis added).
For U.S. judicial system, however, this seamless union is probably not sufficient to recognize that Russian funds supplied to Trump outside the regular banking system were “emoluments” from the government of Russia or “instrumentalities” of Russia.
Brian Klass, Jamal Khashoggi’s Fate Casts a Harsh Light on Trump’s Friendship with Saudi Arabia, Wash. Post, Oct. 10, 2018.
“In 2015, when asked about his relationship with the Saudis, Trump said: ‘I get along great with all of them. They buy apartments from me. They spend $40 million, $50 million. Am I supposed to dislike them?’” Id.
District of Columbia v. Trump, 291 F. Supp. 3d 725, 741 (2018)(Messitte, J.).
O’Connell & Jordan, supra note 67.
Venook, supra note 71. During January and February of 2017, the Trump organization began moving forward with its plans to expand its golf course in Aberdeen, Scotland. It also renewed discussions with Ricardo and Fernando Hazoury, the brothers who own the Cap Cano resort in the Dominican Republic. Id.
See infra, notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
President Reagan had deep suspicions about the Soviets during the “Cold War.” When talks were underway with the Soviets for the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), he often used the Russian proverb “Doveryai, no proveryai” (“Trust, but verify.”).
Dan Ariely, Predictably Irrational (2008). (Ariely makes the case that people are constantly susceptible to irrelevant influences from their immediate environment, shortsightedness, and other forms of irrationality, contrary to the model of “economic man” as a reasoning, calculating utility maximizing machine.).
Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (2011). (Kahneman makes a thorough case that the human animal is systematically illogical. We routinely fail to assess situations, yet do so in fairly predictable patterns that are grounded in our primate ancestry.).
Lessig, supra note 27, at 138.
Id. at 151-52. See also Martin Gillers and Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics, Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens, 12(3) Perspective on Politics 564, at 564 (2014) (“Multivariate analysis indicates that economic elites and organized groups representing business interests have substantial independent impacts on U.S. government policy, while average citizens and mass-based interest groups have little or no independent influence.”).
Robert A. Prentice, Ethical Decision Making: More Needed Than Good Intentions, Fin. Analysts J. 63(6), (2007), at 22.
Albert H. Hastorf & Hadley Cantril, They Saw a Game: A Case Study, 45(1) J. Abnormal Psychol. 129-34 (1954).
Dan P. McAdams, The Mind of Donald Trump, The Atlantic, June 2016, https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/06/the-mind-of-donald-trump/480771/.(“Narcissistic people like Trump may seek glorification over and over, but not necessarily because they suffered from negative family dynamics as children. Rather, they simply cannot get enough.”) Id. It seems likely that it’s just not possible for President Trump to acknowledge that he could be wrong on occasion.
Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch, & Richard H. Thaler, The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, 5(1) J. Econ. Persp. 193, 193-206.
Prentice, supra note 85, at 20.
Marianne M. Jennings, Ethics and Investment Management: True Reform, 61(3) Financial Analysts Journal, 45 (2005). Studies indicate that 74 percent of us believe our ethics are higher than those of our peers and 83 percent of us say that at least one- half of the people we know would list us as one of the most ethical people they know. An amazing 92 percent of us are satisfied with our ethics and character. Id. at 52.
The trustee of a blind trust keeps certain information secret from the trust beneficiaries, who do not know the nature of the assets held in trust. Moreover, they have no power, directly or indirectly, to participate in the management or distribution of those assets. In the case of President Trump, “blindness” would be difficult at best, as he already knows the nature of his real estate assets and where his branded properties are.
18 U.S.C. § 208 as cited in Appendix, 36 Fed. B. News & J. 129 (1989).
Padideh Ala’i, Civil Consequences of Corruption in International Commercial Contracts, 62 Am. J. Comp. L. 185, 191 (2014).
See, e. g., Craig Palm & Mark A. Kearney, A Primer on the Basics of Directors’ Duties in Delaware: The Rules of the Game (Part I) 40 Vill. L. Rev. 1297 (1995).
Claire Hill & Richard W. Painter, Compromised Fiduciaries: Conflicts of Interest in Government and Business, 95 Minn. L. Rev. 1637, 1644 (2011).
See Richard W. Painter, Getting the Government America Deserves: How Ethics Reform Can Make a Difference, 3 (2009).
Hill & Painter, supra note 98, at 1645, citing Kathleen Clark, Do We Have Enough Ethics in Government Yet? An Answer from Fiduciary Theory, 1996 U. Ill. L. Rev. 57, 74 (“Numerous courts have recognized the fiduciary obligation of government employees, even in the absence of specific legislative or regulatory endorsements of such duties, and these courts have imposed fiduciary-like remedies in response to violations of the conflict and influence components of that obligation.”). Hill and Painter also cite Exec. Order No. 12,674 § 101(a), 3 C.F.R. 215 (1990) (“Public service is a public trust.”), as modified by Exec. Order No. 12,731, 3 C.F.R. 306 (1991) (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 7301, 7351, 7353 (2006)).
See David J. Seipp, Trust and Fiduciary Duty in the Early Common Law, 91 B.U. L. Rev. 1011 (2011).
See John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 Yale L. J. 625 (1995).
Julian Velasco, How Many Fiduciary Duties Are There in Corporate Law? 83 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1231, 1233 (2010).
Edwin W. Hecker, Jr., Fiduciary Duties in Business Entities Revisited, 61 U. Kan. L. Rev. 923, 924-25 (2013).
See Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 708-09 & n.37 (Del. 2009) (holding that officers have fiduciary duties equal to those of directors, though consequences may differ), and Lawrence A. Hamermesh & A. Gilchrist Sparks III, Corporate Officers and the Business Judgment Rule: A Reply to Professor Johnson, 60 Bus. Law. 865 (2005) (stating that the protection of the business judgment rule should apply with equally to officers and directors).
Leo E. Strine, Jr. et al., Loyalty’s Core Demand: The Defining Role of Good Faith in Corporation Law, 98 Geo. L.J. 629, 696 (2010).
E.g., as noted in District of Columbia. v. Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 877-78.
Both the Congressional Democrats case (Blumenthal et al. v. Trump) and the D.C.–– Maryland v. Trump cases have thus far overcome the “standing” objections of the President. See Blumenthal et al. v. Trump, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167411 (Sept. 28, 2018), and District of Columbia v. Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d 875 (D. Md. 2018).
See Adam J. Sulkowski, Ultra Vires Statutes: Alive, Kicking, and a Means of Circumventing the Scalia Standing Gauntlet in Environmental Litigation, 14 J. Envtl. L. & Litig. (2009).
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016) (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)).
Id. at 1548 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560).
Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Washington (CREW) v. Trump, 276 F.Supp.3d 174 (S.D.N.Y. 2017).
Reasonable minds –– and reasonable judges––can and will differ in analyzing standing issues. There is merit in Judge Daniels’ opinion dismissing the CREW lawsuit for lack of standing, and there is merit in Judge Missette ’s opinion approving standing for D.C. and Maryland in their emoluments lawsuit.
CREW v. Trump, 276 F. Supp. 3d at 185.
Citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). Note that “or” denotes that any of these conditions may give rise to judicial abstention in a particular case.
CREW v. Trump,, 276 F. Supp. 3d at 193.
Thomas Mann & Norman Ornstein, The Broken Branch: How Congress is Failing America and How to Get It Back on Track (2006).
Id., at 37-39. Ultimately, Judge Sullivan rejected the President’s arguments, and found that the Congressional plaintiffs have standing to argue for declaratory and injunctive relief on the basis of the foreign Emoluments Clause. Id. at 60-61.
Alicia Parlapiano & Wilson Andrews, Limits on Presidents Acting Alone, N.Y.Times, Jan. 20, 2015.
District of Columbia v. Trump, 291 F. Supp. 3d 725 (D. Md. 2018).
District of Columbia v. Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d 875 (D. Md. 2018).
291 F. Supp. 3d 725,737.
Id. (citing Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 518, 520 (2007).
Id. at 737 (citing Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc., v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 601, at 607).
Id. (citing Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S 529, 544 (2013)). (“At the same time, as we made clear in Northwest Austin, the fundamental principle of equal sovereignty remains highly pertinent in assessing subsequent disparate treatment of States.”).
Id. (citing Georgia v. Pennsylvania Railroad, 324 U.S. 439, 451 (1945)).
Id. at 743 (quoting Sherley v. Sebelius, 610 F.3d 69, 73 (D.C. Cir. 2010)).
Id. at 746 (citing Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel Barez, 458 U.S. at 607 (1982)).
District of Columbia v. Trump, 291 F. Supp. 3d 725, 755 (2018).
See T.J. Halstead, The Separation of Powers Doctrine: An Overview of its Rationale and Application, Congressional Research Service (1999).
Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 703 (1997).
District of Columbia v. Trump, 291 F. Supp. 3d 725, 756 (2018).
District of Columbia v. Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d 875, 901-04 (2018).
Id. at 880 (referencing Def.’s Mot. Dismiss, Sept. 29, 2017).
The argument was made by Professor Seth Tillman, as amicus curiae. Br. for Scholar Seth Barrett Tillman & The Judicial Education Project as Amici Curiae in Support of Def. (Oct. 6, 2017), ECF No. 27- 1 (Professor Tillman), at 2, 4. Tillman’s argument was based on a distinction between appointed positions and elected ones. Judge Messitte noted the potentially “bizarre consequences” from Tillman’s interpretations: District of Columbia v. Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d 875, 884 (fn 17), citing Saikrishna Prakash, Why the Incompatibility Clause Applies to the Office of the President, 4 Duke J. Const. L Pub. Pol’y 143, 149-51 (2009).
District of Columbia v. Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d 881.
Id. at 889 – 94 and 899 –903.
District of Columbia v. Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d 881, at 885-89.
District of Columbia v. Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d 881, at 888.
District of Columbia v. Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d 881 at 891.
District of Columbia v. Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d 881, at 892-93.
District of Columbia v. Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d 881, at 896.
See supra, notes 14-26 and accompanying text.
District of Columbia v. Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 881, 897.
Id., quoting Teachout, supra note 14, at 2.
District of Columbia v. Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d 881, at 898.
See supra notes 95-112 and accompanying text.
District of Columbia v. Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d 875, 901-05 (2018).

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