Source: https://es.scribd.com/doc/160041493/Google-Motion-061313
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 12:18:55+00:00

Document:
COOLEY LLP MICHAEL G. RHODES (116127) (rhodesmg@cooley.com) WHITTY SOMVICHIAN (194463) (wsomvichian@cooley.com) KYLE C. WONG (224021) (kwong@cooley.com) 101 California Street, 5th Floor San Francisco, CA 94111-5800 Telephone: (415) 693-2000 Facsimile: (415) 693-2222 Attorneys for Defendant GOOGLE INC.
TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued) Page Federal Law Preempts Any Claim that an ECS Providers Operations Constitute an Illegal Recording under Section 632 ............ 26 E. The CIPA Claim Should Also Be Dismissed Under Choice Of Law Principles ............................................................................................................... 27 CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................. 30 2.
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page CASES Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) .................................................................................................................. 6 Banks v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., No. 11-cv-2022, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37754 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2012)........................... 28 Bayview Hunters Point Cmty. Advocates v. Metro. Transp. Commn, 366 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 2004)................................................................................................... 12 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) .................................................................................................................. 6 Berg v. Traylor, 148 Cal. App. 4th 809 (2007) ................................................................................................. 16 Bohach v. City of Reno, 932 F. Supp. 1232 (D. Nev. 1996) ............................................................................................ 7 Borninski v. Williamson, No. 02-cv-1014, 2005 WL 1206872 (N.D. Tex. May 17, 2005) ............................................ 16 Bunnell v. MPAA, 567 F. Supp. 2d 1148 (C.D. Cal. 2007) .................................................................................. 27 Cavines v. Horizon Cmt. Learning Ctr., Inc., 590 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 2010)..................................................................................................... 6 City of Richmond v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 174 U.S. 761 (1899) ................................................................................................................ 23 Commonwealth v. Blystone, 549 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1988) ............................................................................................................. 5 Commonwealth v. Maccini, No. 06-cv-0873, 2007 WL 1203560 (Mass. Super. Ct. Apr. 23, 2007) .................................. 20 Commonwealth v. Proetto, 771 A.2d 823 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001), affd, 837 A.2d 1163 (Pa. 2003) ................................... 20 Deacon v. Pandora Media, Inc., 901 F. Supp. 2d 1166 (N.D. Cal. 2012) .................................................................................. 23 Deering v. CenturyTel, Inc., No. 10-cv-0063, 2011 WL 1842859 (D. Mont. May 16, 2011).............................................. 16 iii.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 STATUTES 18 Pa. C.S.
934.02 ..................................................................................................................................... 8 934.03 ............................................................................................................................... 5, 14 934.21-23 ............................................................................................................................. 7 vii.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Md. Code, Cts. & Jud. Proc.
the California Invasion of Privacy Act (CIPA), where: The express terms and legislative history of CIPA confirm that the statute excludes email; The only Plaintiffs purporting to bring a CIPA claim are non-California residents who allege no connection with California; CIPA allows a claim only for injured persons and Plaintiffs allege no harm of any kind from the automated processing of their emails. 1.
processing of their emails by virtue of the fact that email cannot be sent or delivered without some form of electronic processing. This combination of express and implied consent bars Plaintiffs claims in their entirety, under both the federal and state wiretap statutes. Third, the CIPA claim brought by certain Plaintiffs is even farther afield than the wiretapping claims above because CIPA does not apply to emails at all, as confirmed by both the express terms and legislative history of the statute. In fact, the California Legislature specifically considered and rejected proposals to expand the statute to cover emails. And even if CIPA could 2.
be interpreted to cover emails, both implied consent and choice of law rules would preclude the CIPA Plaintiffs from relying on the statute. As residents of Alabama and Maryland whose emails have no alleged connection to California, these Plaintiffs cannot invoke the protections of California law and bypass the laws of the states in which they reside simply because they want to avoid the requirements and limitations of their local laws. Last, Plaintiffs claims should be rejected because they would lead to anomalous results with far-ranging consequences beyond the allegations in the Complaint. Plaintiffs theorythat any scanning of email content by ECS providers is illegalwould effectively criminalize routine practices that are an everyday aspect of using email. Indeed, Plaintiffs effort to carve out spam filtering and virus detection from their claims underscores the fact that their theory of liability would otherwise encompass these common services that email users depend on. Notwithstanding these limited carve-outs, Plaintiffs theory would still sweep up a host of common features that benefit consumers. For example, Plaintiffs theory of liability would prevent ECS providers from providing features that allow users to sort their emails using automated filters or even to search their emails for specific wordsbecause these features necessarily involve the scanning of email content and would thus be an illegal interception under Plaintiffs theory. The Court should not allow the Complaint to proceed on this sweeping basis. II. STATEMENT OF FACTS. A. Gmail.
Gmail is one of the most popular web-based email services in the world with over 400 million users. Like all email providers, Google applies automated systems for the delivery of email. As part of this processing, Googles automated systems scan email content to filter out spam, detect computer viruses, and provide various features, including functions that allow users to search their email messages, automatically sort incoming email, and others. These systems are also used to display advertisements targeted to email content, as Google has disclosed since the inception of Gmail nearly a decade ago. The revenues from these advertisements enable Google to provide the Gmail service for free to the public. Gmails advertising-based business model is similar to that of other free email services offered by Yahoo, AOL, and Hotmail. Yahoo, the very 3.
web-based email service one named Plaintiff uses, also generates revenue from scanning email content to deliver targeted advertising.1 The processes related to Googles automated scanning are completely automated and involve no human review. B. Google Apps.
Google Apps is a suite of Google products that includes Gmail. Google Apps enables its userswhich can include businesses, educational organizations, and Internet service providers (ISPs)to provide email services to their employees, students, or customers.2 These email services are operated by Gmail but can be customized in certain ways. Cable One, Inc. (Cable One) is an ISP and the Universities of Hawaii (Hawaii) and of the Pacific (UoP) are two educational institutions that provide email services to their users (including Plaintiffs Dunbar, Castillo, and Fread) through Google Apps. (Compl. 8, 14, 100, 101.) C. Googles Terms and Disclosures.
disclosures are detailed in the Rothman Declaration. D. Plaintiffs, Their Consent to Automated Processing, and Their Claims.
Plaintiffs Brad Scott and Harrington, residents of Maryland and Alabama respectively, seek relief under Californias Invasion of Privacy Act (CIPA), Cal. Penal Code 630-632. These Plaintiffs (collectively, the CIPA Plaintiffs) have non-Gmail email accounts through which they exchanged emails with Gmail users. Plaintiffs Brinkman, Knowles, Brent Scott, Brad Scott, and Harrington are referred to collectively as the non-Gmail Plaintiffs. While Plaintiffs seek to represent eight separate classes of Gmail and non-Gmail users under five causes of action, (Compl. 388-392), all Plaintiffs allege the same core theory of liability: that Googles automated scanning of emails is an illegal interception of their electronic communications without their consent. Plaintiffs claim that Googles systems read each and every message as part of the regular course of providing the Gmail service to its users. (Id. 3.) Plaintiffs purport to carve out spam filtering and virus detection from their claims, (see, e.g., id. 43, 45), but their claims otherwise apply to all forms of scanning, regardless of the purpose or the benefits to Gmail users provided by scanning. III. APPLICABLE STANDARDS. This Motion is governed by Rule 12(b)(6) as interpreted in Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). Under these standards, the court is free to ignore legal conclusions, unsupported conclusions, unwarranted inferences and sweeping legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations. Stanislaus Food Prods. Co. v. USS-POSCO Indus., 782 F. Supp. 2d 1059, 1064 (E.D. Cal. 2011); see also Caviness v. Horizon Cmty. Learning Ctr., Inc., 590 F.3d 806, 812 (9th Cir. 2010). IV. ARGUMENT A. The Wiretapping Claims Fail Because the Alleged Scanning Practices Are Part of Googles Ordinary Course of Business as an ECS Provider. 1. The Wiretap Statutes Exempt ECS Providers from Liability.
The overall structure of ECPA6 reflects Congresss careful effort to ensure that ECPAs 81 (Pa. 1988). For purposes of this motion, the only relevant difference between ECPA and these laws concerns their requirement of dual, as opposed to single, party consent, as discussed below. 6 As background, ECPA amended the Federal wiretap law and was divided into Title I, which governs unauthorized interceptions of electronic communications, 18 U.S.C. 2510-2522, and Title II, which governs unauthorized access to stored communications, 18 U.S.C. 2701-2711. Hall v. EarthLink Network, Inc., 396 F.3d 500, 503 (2d Cir. 2005). 6.
provisions regarding the interception of electronic communications will not interfere with ECS providers ability to engage in their normal business practices. In enacting ECPA, Congress recognized that provider[s] of electronic communications services may have to monitor a stream of transmissions in order to properly route, terminate, and otherwise manage the individual messages they contain, and that such monitoring may be necessary to the provision of an electronic communication service. (Wong Decl., Exh. BB [S. Rep. No. 99-541] at p. 20). With respect to email in particular, Congress noted that the providers of electronic mail create electronic copies of private correspondence for later reference, and that [t]his information is processed for the benefit of the user. Id. at 3 (emphasis added). See also In re DoubleClick Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (explaining that emails must be temporarily stored by electronic communications services incident to their transmission for example, when an email service stores a message until the addressee downloads it). Given these realities, Congress clarified that ECS providers can lawfully receive and access electronic communications involving their usersthe very things that Plaintiffs contend are unlawful. For instance, while Section 2701 generally prohibits parties from accessing electronic communications in electronic storage, this provision does not apply with respect to conduct authorized . . . by the . . . entity providing a wire or electronic communications service. 18 U.S.C. 2701(c)(1). In other words, ECS providers are expressly authorized to access the communications sent to their systems. Title II prohibits ECS providers only from disclosing the electronic communications of their users, which is not at issue here (and even this general bar is subject to specific exceptions that allow an ECS provider to disclose communications in some circumstances). See 18 U.S.C. 2701-2703.7 See, e.g., Bohach v. City of Reno, 932 F. Supp. 1232, 1236 (D. Nev. 1996) (Section 2701 allows service providers to do as they wish when it comes to accessing communications); Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 352 F.3d 107, 115 (3d Cir. 2003) (no ECPA liability under Section 2701 where ECS provider searched the contents of text messages in its systems). The state wiretapping statutes at issue include analogous terms. See Fla. Stat. 934.21-23; Md. Code, Cts. & Jud. Proc. 10-402 to -404; 18 Pa. C.S. 5741-43; see also Appendix. 7.
The state wiretapping statutes at issue include analogous terms. See Fla. Stat. 934.02(4)(a)2; Md. Code, Cts. & Jud. Proc. 10-401(4)(i); 18 Pa. C.S. 5702; see also Appendix. 8.
See also Ideal Aerosmith, Inc. v. Acutronic USA, Inc., No. 07-cv-1029, 2007 WL 4394447, at *4 (E.D. Pa Dec. 13, 2007) (The drive or server on which an email is received does not constitute a device for purposes of the Wiretap Act.). 10 Plaintiffs also note various other alleged purposes for Googles automated scanning, which further confirm that Googles practices are implemented for ordinary business reasons. (See Compl. 288 (alleging that Google scans emails for commercial advantage and profits); id. at 338 (alleging that Google scans emails to reduce certain traffic acquisition costs).) Seeking profits and lowering costs are, of course, normal business purposes. 10.
whether Googles practices conform to an industry standard for the services of an electronic communications service provider (Compl. 262, 264-65), because those considerations are simply irrelevant. The same result applies here: notwithstanding Plaintiffs effort to plead around the ordinary course of business exemption, all wiretapping claims fail for the simple reason that the alleged conduct at issue is undisputedly part of Googles ordinary business practices as an ECS provider (and a provider of a free service at that). 4. Plaintiffs Theory of Liability Would Lead to Absurd Results.
More generally, Plaintiffs wiretapping claims should be rejected because they would criminalize an ECS providers normal methods for processing emails and other electronic communications. Indeed, Plaintiffs theory of liabilitythat the scanning of email content by an ECS provider is an illegal interceptiondirectly conflicts with Title II, which expressly permits an ECS provider to access electronic communications sent to its systems (and even to disclose such communications in certain circumstances). The Court should not allow Plaintiffs to pursue a theory of an illegal interception that creates these sorts of irreconcilable conflicts within the statutory scheme. See Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 101 (2004) (A statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant.) (citation omitted); Bayview Hunters Point Cmty. Advocates v. Metro. Transp. Commn, 366 F.3d 692, 700 (9th Cir. 2004) (A statute should not be interpreted in a way which is internally contradictory or that renders other provisions of the same statute inconsistent or meaningless.) (citation and quotation omitted). In practice, Plaintiffs theory would prevent ECS providers from providing a host of normal services that Congress could not possibly have intended to criminalize as an illegal interception. For example, an ECS provider could not allow users to sort their emails using automated filters because any such system would require scanning the contents of the emails being delivered to the user, thus running afoul of Plaintiffs theory. Nor could an ECS provider provide even basic features like allowing users to search their own emails for particular key terms because doing so would, again, involve the scanning of email content. And while Plaintiffs have 12.
removed spam filtering and virus detection from their claims, these selective carve-outs simply underscore the fact that their sweeping theory of liability would otherwise encompass these basic (and desirable) features of email.11 In short, Plaintiffs interpretation would render large swaths of the statutory scheme meaningless while making it virtually impossible for ECS providers to provide normal services to their users. The Court should not allow Plaintiffs to proceed on this basis. 5. The Pennsylvania Wiretap Statute Applies Only to the Senders, Not the Recipients of a Communication.
Plaintiffs Claims Also Fail Under the Consent Defenses of the Wiretap Statutes at Issue.
In addition to the lack of any illegal interception, the Wiretapping Plaintiffs claims also fail for the additional reason that the senders and recipients of the emails at issue have all The wiretapping claims of Plaintiffs Fread and Carrillo are further undermined by the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 (FERPA). Plaintiffs Fread and Carrillo allege that Google violated the Wiretap Act by processing their emails on behalf of the universities at which they are enrolled. But Plaintiffs admit that Googles actions were taken under contracts with each university, in which the university outsourced its email processing to Google. Even assuming, arguendo, that FERPA applies here, the law permits schools to outsource institutional services or functions, including provision of email services. See 34 C.F.R. 99.31(a)(1)(i)(B). A party such as Google, to whom this function has been outsourced, is deemed a school official, and as such may access and use student records, even without student consent. Id. The Court should not construe an interception under the Wiretap Act in a manner that would criminalize conduct that is expressly permitted under FERPA and its implementing regulations. 13.
necessarily consented to the processing of their emails by Google. The consent defense to a wiretap claim can be based on the terms of an express agreement. See, e.g., Smith v. Trusted Universal Standards in Elec. Transactions, Inc., No. 09cv-4567, 2011 WL 900096, at *10-11 (D.N.J. Mar. 15, 2011) ([B]y subscribing to [Microsofts email service], each Microsoft customer consents to Microsoft intercepting and filtering all of his email communications.). Consent can also be implied from the overall circumstances of a particular communication. See, e.g., United States v. Van Poyck, 77 F.3d 285, 292 (9th Cir. 1996) (consent may be implied in fact from surrounding circumstances . . . ) (citation and quotation omitted). Under federal law, the consent of a single party to a communication is complete defense to any liability and so the consent of the Gmail user alone is sufficient to bar a claim. See 18 U.S.C. 2511(2)(d). The state wiretap statutes at issue also provide a defense where both parties to the communication consent to the alleged interception. Fla. Stat. 934.03(2)(d); Md. Code, Cts. & Jud. Proc. 10-402(c)(3); 18 Pa. C.S. 5704(4). 1. The Gmail Plaintiffs Expressly Consent to Automated Scanning, Precluding Any Claim under ECPA.
COPPA expressly preempts any state law that treats the use of personal information in a manner that inconsistent with COPPA. See 15 U.S.C. 6502(d). This federal statutory scheme bars Plaintiff J.K. from using the California Family Code to invalidate the affirmative express consent that he gave to Googleconsent that Google was not only allowed to obtain but encouraged to obtain from Plaintiff J.K. under COPPA. 3. Plaintiffs Fread and Carrillo Cannot Avoid Their Express Consent by Claiming They Were Pressured into Using Gmail.
Nor can Plaintiffs Fread and Carrillo avoid Googles terms merely by suggesting that they felt pressured to use their university email accounts operated through Google Apps. For example, 17.
As a separate basis for avoiding express consent, Plaintiffs make a vague reference to Section 2511(2)(d), which provides that the consent defense is inapplicable where a communication is intercepted for the purpose of committing any criminal or tortious act . . . (Compl. 281.) This provision applies only where the defendant acted with a specific intent to cause injury. See, e.g., In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d at 515 (discussing Section 2511(2)(d) at length and noting congressional intent to invalidate consent only where the party acts in any way with an intent to injure the other party) (emphasis omitted). Here, the Complaint is devoid of a single allegation to show that Google had the specific intent to harm its Gmail users. 18.
The Non-Gmail Plaintiffs Also Impliedly Consent to the Automated Processing of Their Messages.
ignorance because they voluntarily conveyed emails to Google as an ECS provider and expose[d] that information to [Googles] equipment in the ordinary course of business. 442 U.S. at 744. Under these circumstances, the non-Gmail Plaintiffs have impliedly consented to Googles automated scanning. Thus, in combination with the express consent of the Gmail recipients (as discussed above), their communications are subject to the dual-party consent defenses of the state wiretapping laws and their claims must be dismissed as a matter of law.
See also State v. Roden, 279 P.3d 461, 466 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012) (finding that the defendant impliedly consented to a law enforcement officers interception of his text messages because as a user of text message technology, the defendant necessarily understood that [his drug dealers cell phone] would record and store the text messages that he sent); Commonwealth v. Maccini, No. 06-cv-0873, 2007 WL 1203560, at *3 (Mass. Super. Ct. Apr. 23, 2007) (holding that, given the nature of email communications, law enforcements receipt and recording of the defendants communications was not secret but rather was with the defendants knowledge and implicit consent. (emphasis added)). 18 See Wong. Decl., Exh. EE (J.K. Compl. 21); Exh. FF (Knowles Compl. 20); Exh. GG (Brinkman Compl. 15); Exh. II (Scott II Compl. 15). 20.
In sum, the Wiretapping Plaintiffs claims fail in their entirety due to both the ordinary course of business exemption and the consent defenses applicable under ECPA and the state wiretapping statutes at issue.19 C. The CIPA Claim Also Fails as a Matter of Law for Multiple Reasons. 1. CIPA Does Not Apply to Email Communications.
The CIPA claim fares no better because the statute, enacted in 1967, was never intended to apply, and by its terms cannot be applied, to emails. On its face, Section 631 of CIPA is limited to interceptions that involve telephone and telegraph communications. See Cal. Penal Code 631.20 The first clause of Section 631 expressly refers to wiretapping of a telegraph or telephone wire, line, cable, or instrument. Id. (emphasis added). The second clause covers other forms of interception that involve read[ing] or learn[ing] the contents of a communication, but reiterates that liability only applies if the communication is in transit or passing over any wire, line, or cable, or is being sent from, or received at any place within this state. Id. (emphasis added). While the term telegraph or telephone is not repeated in the second clause, it would be nonsensical to assume that the Legislature intended to cover two totally different categories of wire[s], line[s], or cable[s] in two clauses of the same single-sentence provision. For this reason, California courts have interpreted Section 631 as focusing on telephone and telegraph communications alone. See People v. Chavez, 44 Cal. App. 4th 1144, 1150 (1996) (explaining that [w]iretapping refers to the interception by any method of telegraphic or telephonic communications) (emphasis added). Section 632 similarly excludes electronic communications. In particular, Section 632 is targeted at [e]avesdropping. See Cal. Penal Code 632. Obviously, one cannot eavesdrop on an email or other purely electronic communication in any normal sense of the word. See These same considerations apply to the Gmail Plaintiffs and CIPA Plaintiffs as well. As to the Gmail Plaintiffs, even if the Court does not find express contractual consent as to the Gmail Plaintiffs, their claims would be barred based on implied consent given their continuing use of their Gmail accounts, even after discovering Googles alleged scanning of their emails. See note 18, supra. Also, CIPA provides for a defense based on consent and should be dismissed on this basis, in addition to the CIPA-specific reasons set forth herein. See Cal. Penal Code 631-632. 20 The full text of Sections 631 and 632 are set forth in the attached Appendix of Relevant Statutes for the courts convenience. 21.
Blacks Law Dictionary, 588 (9th ed. 2009) (defining eavesdropping as [t]he act of secretly listening to the private conversation of others without their consent.). While Section 632 also refers to the record[ing] of confidential communications, that reference must be interpreted consistently with the overall statute, which plainly focuses on oral communications. See Cal. Penal Code 632. Construing these terms, a California court has specifically held that CIPA does not apply to the automated processing of emails in the Gmail system. In Diamond v. Google Inc., No.
plaintiff had not explained how Google could have possibly overheard the emails by means of any electronic amplifying or recording device for purposes of the statute. The court also held that Section 631 cannot be expanded beyond its express limitations to telephone and telegraph equipment, explaining that the words telegraph or telephone can only be reasonably construed to apply to Section 631 as a whole. (See Wong Decl., Exh. LL at p. 2.) The court thus dismissed the Section 631 claim because Plaintiff allege[d] no facts allowing email communications to be characterized as telephone or telegraph transmissions. (Id.) The same common sense analysis should be applied here. Indeed, any contrary interpretation of CIPA as encompassing emails would be nonsensical because the Legislature could not possibly have contemplated email when it enacted the statute in 1967. As the Supreme Court has long cautioned, [i]t is not the function of the judiciary, because of discoveries after the [initial enactment of a statute], to broaden the provisions of that act so that it will include corporations or companies that were not, and could not have been at that time, within the contemplation of Congress. City of Richmond v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 174 U.S. 761, 774-776 (1899) (holding that statute applying to telegraph lines could not be applied to telephone technology implemented after the statutes enactment).21 Plaintiffs claims violate this See also State v. Komisarjevsky, No. CR07241860, 2011 WL 1032111, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 22, 2011) (News reports sent via Twitter do not fall within a rule related to broadcasting because the rule predated Twitter and [c]ourts traditionally have proceeded with caution in extending old legislation to new technologies.) (citation omitted); Deacon v. Pandora Media, Inc., 901 F. Supp. 2d 1166, 1172-75 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (statutory terms related to selling, renting and lending music could not be applied to online music streaming because streaming technology could not have been contemplated at the time of the statutes enactment). 22.
basic rule by rewriting CIPA to encompass email technology that simply did not exist when the statute was enacted. In fact, after CIPAs initial enactment, the Legislature specifically considered and rejected proposals to expand the statute to cover emails. In 1995, the Legislature expanded Penal Code Section 629 (a related statute to CIPA that regulates interception of communications by law enforcement) to cover certain types of electronic communications. In considering the bill, the Senate Judiciary Committee observed that [i]t is not clear that California law specifically protects e-mail and other electronic communications from improper interception by either private parties or law enforcement. (Wong Decl., Exh. MM at p. 4.) It thus posed the question SHOULD, AS A COROLLARY TO THE EXTENSION OF THE WIRETAP LAW [Section 629] TO ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS, THE PRIVACY LAWS [CIPA] BE AMENDED TO EXPRESSLY PROTECT ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS FROM INTERCEPTION . (Id. at 4 (caps in original).) Ultimately, the Legislature opted to amend only Section 629 while declining to expand CIPA in similar fashion. (Id.) In 2010, Section 629 was expanded again to cover additional forms of electronic communications. As the Senate Committee on Public Safety explained, the language of Section 629 at the timewhich was already broader than CIPAstill did not cover emails and other forms of electronic communications. (See Wong Decl. Exh. NN (Senate Analysis stating that [t]his bill updates Californias wiretapping law to include interception of communications by e-mail, blackberry, instant messaging by phone and other forms of contemporaneous two way electronic communication.).) Again, the Legislature decided to amend only Section 629, leaving the limitations of Sections 631 and 632 intact. In sum, the express terms of the statute, the applicable rules of statutory interpretation, and legislative history all confirm that CIPA does not reach email communications. 2. Plaintiffs Also Have No Article III Standing to Pursue a CIPA Claim.
Article III of the Constitution.22 While Ninth Circuit authority may be read to permit standing based on the violation of certain statutory rights without independent allegations of harm, this applies only to statutes that specifically allow persons who meet the express statutory criteria to bring a claim without any showing of injury. In re iPhone Application Litig., No. 11-md-2250, 2011 WL 4403963, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2011) (finding that plaintiffs had no Article III standing because they do not allege a violation of [a] statute which does not require a showing of injury.). In contrast, CIPA expressly provides that a civil claim can be brought only by a person who has been injured. Cal. Penal Code 637.2 (emphasis added). Accordingly, Plaintiffs cannot pursue a CIPA claim without establishing the standing requirements of both CIPA and Article III. Here, the CIPA Plaintiffs fail to allege any concrete injury stemming from the automated processing of the emails they sent to the Gmail system. While they vaguely assert that Google improperly used information contained in their emails, this Court has held that merely alleging the collection and tracking of . . . personal information is insufficient to confer standing under Article III. See In re iPhone Application Litig., 2011 WL 4403963, at *5; see also LaCourt v Specific Media, Inc., No. 10-cv-1256, 2011 WL 1661532, at *3-4 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2011) (plaintiffs had no Article III standing to bring claims involving use of Flash cookies to track Internet activity). Plaintiffs allegations here are no different, and their CIPA claim similarly fails for lack of Article III standing. 3. Plaintiffs Also Fail to Allege Any Connection with California.
Under Article III, a plaintiff must show (1) it has suffered an injury in fact that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant; and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81 (2000). 24.
Smith Barney, Inc., 39 Cal. 4th 95, 119 (2006) (explaining that Section 632 protect[s] against the secret recording of any confidential communication that is sent from or received at any place within California.) (emphasis added). Here, the CIPA Plaintiffs (who reside in Alabama and Maryland) do not allege that any of their emails have any connection to California. For example, they make no effort to allege that they ever sent a single email to a recipient in California, even though that information is obviously within their knowledge. The CIPA claims of these Plaintiffs should be dismissed given this basic failure of pleading. D. The Section 632 Claim Fails for Additional Reasons. 1. Plaintiffs Allege no Facts to Show that Their Emails Were Confidential Communications within the Meaning of the Statute.
See also Montegna v. Yodle, Inc., No. 12-cv-0647, 2012 WL 3069969, at *3 (S.D. Cal. July 27, 2012)(dismissing Section 632 claim where plaintiff alleged recording of a confidential conversations but failed to allege any facts regarding [the plaintiffs] relationship with [the other parties to the communication] or the content or nature of the calls.); Weiner v. ARS Natl Servs., Inc., 887 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1033 (S.D. Cal. 2012) (dismissing Section 632 claim where plaintiff failed to allege the relationship between the parties to the communication, or that the communication contained any personal information.) 25.
those conclusory assertions, they plead no actual facts to show their emails were sent under circumstances that would reasonably indicate a desire that the emails be confined to the parties. See Cal. Penal Code 632(c). Among other omitted facts, the CIPA Plaintiffs do not describe the content or nature of a single email they sent to a Gmail user24; nor do they describe their prior experiences with email services to suggest any basis for their expectations.25 As in Faulkner, too little is asserted in the complaint about the particular relationship between the parties, and the particular circumstances of the [communications at issue], to lead to the plausible conclusion that an objectively reasonable expectation of confidentiality would have attended such a communication. 706 F.3d at 1020. 2. Federal Law Preempts Any Claim that an ECS Providers Operations Constitute an Illegal Recording under Section 632.
For example, there could be no reasonable expectation of confidentiality if the CIPA Plaintiffs emails with Gmail users were sent to large groups of recipients or were sent with the express expectation that they would be forwarded to others, among other circumstances that would preclude application of Section 632. 25 For example, if Plaintiffs used Yahoo mail, they would have known that automated scanning of emails to deliver advertising is a common industry practice not limited to Gmail. See n.11, supra. 26.
the emails that are sent to Gmail recipients because ECPA specifically allows Google to receive and store electronic such communications in its capacity as an ECS provider. Even if CIPA could be interpreted to apply to emails at all, Plaintiffs Section 632 claim based on Googles recording of emails is preempted as a matter of law because it is in direct conflict with federal law.26 See Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1137 (9th Cir. 2003) (Even where Congress has not entirely displaced state regulation in a specific area, state law is preempted to the extent that it actually conflicts with federal law.); Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 v. IDACORP, Inc., 379 F.3d 641, 650 (9th Cir. 2004) (Under the obstruction strand of conflict preemption, an aberrant or hostile state rule is preempted to the extent it actually interferes with the methods by which the federal statute was designed to reach [its] goal.). E. The CIPA Claim Should Also be Dismissed under Choice of Law Principles.
determines whether the relevant law of each of the potentially affected jurisdictions differ, (2) if there is a difference, the court examines each jurisdictions interest in the application of its own law . . . to determine whether a true conflict exists, and (3) if a true conflict exists, the court must weigh the interest of each jurisdiction in the application of its own law to determine which states interest would be more impaired if its policy were subordinated to the policy of the other state . . . Mazza, 666 F.3d at 590. These standards mandate application of Alabama and Maryland law here. Plaintiffs also refer in conclusory terms to the eavesdropping element of Section 632, but cannot seriously contend that the automated processing of emails by computer systems amounts to eavesdropping on a communication. 27 Choice of law determinations in class actions are routinely resolved at the pleading stage. See, e.g., Frezza v. Google, Inc., No. 12-cv-0237, 2013 WL 1736788, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 22, 2013) (stating that Mazza v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 666 F.3d 581 (9th Cir. 2012) was not only relevant but controlling and dismissing UCL claims because North Carolina law applied); Banks v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., No. 11-cv-2022, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37754, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2012) (dismissing nationwide class action claim predicated on California law because such allegations are inappropriate, pursuant to the Ninth Circuits reasoning in Mazza . . . ). 28 A federal court sitting in diversity must look to the forum states choice of law rules to determine the controlling substantive law. Mazza, 666 F.3d 589-90 (citation omitted). 27.
communication and allows a private right of action for injured persons. (See above). Maryland law also differs materially from CIPA. Maryland does not allow claimants to seek injunctive relief and limits civil recovery to actual damages or liquidated damages computed at the rate of $100 a day for each day of violation or $1,000, whichever is higher. Md. Code, Cts. & Jud. Proc. 10-410(a)(1). In contrast, CIPA allows claimants to seek both injunctive relief and the greater of $5,000 or three times the amount of any actual damages. Cal. Penal Code 637.2(a). In short, CIPA is directly at odds with limitations that Alabama and Maryland have imposed in their respective statutes governing the interception of communications. California has no interest in applying CIPA to the claims of non-residents: On its face, CIPA indicates that its purpose is to protect California residents, not to regulate in-state business practices that might impact non-Californians: The Legislature by this chapter intends to protect the right of privacy of the people of this state. Cal. Penal Code 630 (emphasis added). Reflecting that statement of legislative purpose, the California Supreme Court has recognized that the principal purpose of [CIPA] is to protect the privacy of confidential communications of California residents while they are in California. Kearney, 39 Cal. 4th at 119-120 (italics in original); see also Zephyr v. Saxon Mortg. Servs., Inc., 873 F. Supp. 2d 1223, 1231 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (the purpose of [CIPA] does not appear to be to regulate out-of-state commerce or conduct, but to protect California residents).29 This express purpose makes clear that California has no interest in applying CIPA to See also Kearney, 39 Cal. 4th at 124 (noting that one of the principal purposes underlying [CIPA] was protecting individuals in California); id at 126 (noting Californias concern for the privacy of the states consumers); id. at 125 (noting that CIPA reflects the Legislatures effort to increase the protection of California consumers privacy) (emphases added). 28.
claims brought by non-California residents, particularly where the communications at issue have no alleged link to California. This lack of a cognizable state interest is dispositive and precludes Plaintiffs from relying on California law. Kearney, 39 Cal. 4th at 109 (If only one of the states has an interest in having its law applied, there is no problem in choosing the applicable rule of law as the law of the state having an interest.) (citation and quotation omitted)). In contrast, Alabama and Maryland have a strong interest in applying their own laws: As a general matter, [e]very state has an interest in having its law applied to its resident claimants. Mazza, 666 F.3d at 591-92 (citation and quotation omitted). Moreover, each state has a valid interest in shielding out-of-state businesses from what the state may consider to be excessive litigation. Id. at 592. As the Ninth Circuit explained: In our federal system, states may permissibly differ on the extent to which they will tolerate a degree of lessened protection for consumers to create a more favorable business climate for the companies that the state seeks to attract to do business in the state . . . Each of our states also has an interest in being able to assure individuals and commercial entities operating within its territory that applicable limitations on liability set forth in the jurisdictions law will be available to those individuals and businesses in the event they are faced with litigation in the future. Id. at 592-93 (citation and quotation omitted).30 Given these considerations, the Ninth Circuit reversed an order applying California law to the claims of non-residents because [t]he district court did not adequately recognize that each foreign state has an interest in applying its law to transactions within its borders and that, if California law were applied to the entire class, foreign states would be impaired in their ability to calibrate liability to foster commerce. Id. at 593. The same considerations preclude the CIPA Plaintiffs from applying CIPA in place of the laws of their local jurisdictions. As in Mazza, both Alabama and Maryland would be impaired in their ability to calibrate liability to foster commerce if the CIPA Plaintiffs were allowed to avoid their local laws and assert a CIPA claim. Id. For example, even though Alabama has Moreover, the CIPA Plaintiffs effort to impose California law on the other 49 states would violate the Dormant Commerce Clause, particularly as applied to communications that have no connection to California. See Healy v. Beer Inst., Inc., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989) (a statute that directly controls commerce occurring wholly outside the boundaries of a State exceeds the inherent limits of the enacting States authority and is invalid regardless of whether the statutes extraterritorial reach was intended by the legislature. The critical inquiry is whether the practical effect of the regulation is to control conduct beyond the boundaries of the State.) 29.
decided that its residents should have no private right of action to challenge an alleged interception, that legislative judgment would be entirely subverted if Alabama residents like Plaintiff Harrington could bring a CIPA claim. Similarly, the limited remedies specified under Maryland law would be meaningless if Maryland residents like Plaintiff Brad Scott could simply ignore those limitations and assert a claim under CIPA. In short, allowing Plaintiffs to bypass the restrictions of their local laws by invoking CIPA would effectively rob Alabama and Maryland of any ability to determine the appropriate scope of liability for claims brought by their residents. Mazza precludes this result. See id. at 591-94. Indeed, the CIPA Plaintiffs effort to impose California law on a nationwide class outside of California is in direct conflict with the claims of other Plaintiffs. While the CIPA Plaintiffs are seeking to impose CIPA to override all other state wiretapping statutes outside of California, Plaintiffs Knowles, Brinkman, and Brent Scott have chosen to rely, not on CIPA, but on the wiretapping statutes of their respective states of residence (Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Florida).31 (See Compl. at 341, 361, 383.) The Court should not allow the CIPA Plaintiffs to force all non-Gmail users outside of California to rely on CIPA when three of their fellow Plaintiffs have expressly rejected the application of California law and insisted that local law must apply to their own claims and the claims of the non-Gmail users in their respective states. V. CONCLUSION. For all of the reasons above, Plaintiffs Complaint should be dismissed in its entirety. Dated: June 13, 2013 COOLEY LLP MICHAEL G. RHODES (116127) WHITTY SOMVICHIAN (194463) KYLE C. WONG (224021) /s/ Whitty Somvichian Whitty Somvichian (194463) Attorneys for Defendant GOOGLE INC.
This inherent conflict is most obvious in the case of Plaintiffs Scott and Knowles. Both are Maryland residents seeking to represent a class that includes non-Gmail users in Maryland yet Scott seeks to impose CIPA whereas Knowles has chosen to rely on Maryland law. 30.

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