Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&amp;view=article&amp;id=40425:g-r-no-127803-august-28,-2000-people-of-the-phils-v-juanito-abella,-et-al&amp;catid=1396&amp;Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 04:19:43+00:00

Document:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JUANITO ABELLA, DIOSDADO GRANADA, BENJAMIN DE GUZMAN, and EDGARDO VALENCIA, Accused-Appellants.
It all started with an altercation during a basketball game. Three days later, or on 10 March 1992, the bodies of MARLON 1 Ronquillo; JOSEPH Ronquillo; ERWIN Lojero; ANDRES Lojero, Jr.; and FELIX Tamayo were fished out of the murky waters of the Pasig River, filthy, bloated, putrid, and decomposing. Postmortem examinations on the cadavers showed signs of foul play.
That on or about March 8,1992, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and confederating together with others whose true names, real identities and present whereabouts are still unknown and helping one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill and with treachery and evident premeditation, attack, assault and use personal violence upon one Marlon Ronquillo y Alepda [(Criminal Case No. 92-104529), one Felix Tamayo y Pascual (Criminal Case No. 92-104530), one Andres Lojero, Jr. y Pascual (Criminal Case No. 92-104531), one Joseph Ronquillo y Alepda (Criminal Case No. 92-104532), one Erwin Lojero y Pascual (Criminal Case No. 104533)] by then and there hitting his head with guns, kicking him, tying his hands, [neck and private organ (additional allegation in Criminal Case No. 92-104531)] and thereafter throwing his body into the river thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his death thereafter.
Contrary to law. [Enclosures supplied].
Between 8:00 and 9:00 p.m. of the same day, WILFREDO Lojero, a certain Daniel, and the victims were in front of the Ronquillos’ house in Lakas Street, trading stories while awaiting a certain Aling Flor. 12 JOSEPHINE del Rosario was then at the corner of Lakas Street on her way to a friend’s house when the victims called her and asked her about her mother, who was a barangay kagawad at Bacood. They told her that they were waiting for Aling Flor to report to her that JOEY and GENER threw stones at the Ronquillos’ house. 13 Later, EVELYN de la Cruz joined the group in the conversation. 14 The area was then illuminated by a streetlight at the corner of Damayan and Dalisay Streets about ten arms-length away.
C.	To Andres Lojero, Sr.
3.	P1,000,000.00 for exemplary damages.
Appellants claim in their second assignment of error that ELENA’s testimony was a mere concoction with loopholes that were revealed during cross-examination. Her insistence that all the victims were stabbed was disproved by medico-legal findings. Her testimony was uncorroborated by either testimonial or physical evidence and was even contradicted by the ocular inspection as observed by the presiding judge himself. Admittedly holding a grudge against GRANADA, she is a biased witness motivated by vindictiveness.
In their third assignment of error, appellants allege that the circumstances relied upon by the trial court were not established with certainty. The only circumstances proven were the basketball altercation, the stoning of the Ronquillos’ house, FELIX’s attempt to flee and the fact that the victims were fished out of the Pasig River. Testimonies on the abduction are patently inconsistent with each other. Nothing connects the appellants to the basketball altercation or the stoning of the Ronquillos’ house. The link between appellants and the De los Santos brothers is tenuous.
Appellants next assert that their defense of alibi gained strength because they were not positively identified. They further maintain that the use of superior force as a qualifying circumstance was not alleged in the information and could not therefore serve to elevate the killing to murder. Neither could treachery be considered, as there were no witnesses to the actual killing. Lastly, appellants equate their move to "clear their names" to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
We affirm the conviction of appellants. After a careful scrutiny of the witnesses’ testimonies, we find that all the appellants were positively identified as the ones who abducted and killed the victims.
21. T:	Maliban kina BOBOT, JOEY at GENER, mayroon ka pa bang nakilala?
While ELENA’s testimony on the stabbing does not ring true in the face of the physical evidence, this does not mean that her entire testimony is false or had been contrived. It is significant to note that her identification of the appellants as malefactors was corroborated by the other prosecution witnesses, who pointed to them as the victims’ abductors. Moreover, her testimony that they and their cohorts had beaten the victims by using lead pipes and blunt instruments was corroborated by the autopsy report, which revealed that most of the victims sustained lacerated wounds, contusions and hematoma.
Notwithstanding the false or mistaken statements, the trial judge, Judge Makasiar, found ELENA’s version "impressive, as the manner of her narration was straightforward, sincere, candid, frank and terse." 51 Like the other prosecution witnesses, she had been subjected to "searching, grueling and consuming cross-examination by a determined, brilliant, veteran and astute defense counsel, no less than retired Supreme Court Justice Serafin Cuevas, such that any falsehood and fabrication in [her] narration and identification of the four accused . . . could have been easily detected and exposed." But she passed the test.
While ELENA admitted to having a grudge against GRANADA for arresting his son-in-law sometime in 1991, her identification of him as one of the perpetrators of the crime charged cannot be disregarded because it was strongly corroborated by the three other prosecution witnesses, who categorically pointed to him as one of the abductors. Her honesty in admitting her dislike against GRANADA should be considered in her favor. 55 The existence of such grudge does not automatically render her testimony false and unreliable. 56 It must be noted that she had no known quarrel with the other appellants to be considered as sufficient motive in implicating them. Where there is no evidence and nothing to indicate that a witness for the prosecution was actuated by improper motive, the presumption is that she was not so actuated.
6.	Three days later, or on 10 March 1992, the victims’ bodies were found floating on the Pasig River, showing signs of foul play.
We agree with the trial court that the killing was characterized by treachery. It is true that treachery should normally attend at the inception of the aggression. However, when the victim was first seized and bound and then slain, treachery is present. 61 In this case, it is enough to point out that the victims’ hands were tied at the back when their bodies were found floating in Pasig River. This fact clearly shows that the victims were rendered defenseless and helpless, thereby allowing the appellants to commit the crime without risk at all to their persons.
The circumstance of abuse of superior strength was absorbed in treachery and cannot be considered as an independent aggravating circumstance. It need not be alleged in the information, as treachery was adequate to elevate the killing to murder.
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of Branch 35 of the-Regional Trial Court of Manila in Criminal Cases Nos. 96-104529 to -33 is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that the awards of moral and exemplary damages are hereby reduced from P500,000 to P50,000 each.
Puno, Kapunan, Pardo and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
1.	His name was alternatively spelled Marion in the transcript.
2.	Exhibit "B," Crim. Case No. 104529.
3.	Exh. "B," Crim. Case No. 104531; TSN, 22 September 1992, 11.
4.	Exh. "B," Crim. Case No. 104532.
5.	Exh. "B-Lojero," Crim. Case No. 104533.
6.	Exh. "B-Tamayo," Crim. Case No. 104530.
7.	Rollo, 11-12, 15-16, 19-20, 23-24, 27-28.
8.	Rollo, 13-14, 17-18, 21-22, 25-26, 29-30.
9.	Original Record (OR), 260-261.
10.	TSN, 26 May 1992, 19-21.
12.	TSN, 26 May 1992, 23-24.
13.	TSN, 22 May 1992, 40-43.
14.	TSN, 26 May 1992, 25, 34; 14 July 1992, 5, 14-15.
15.	TSN, 22 May, 1992, 44-45, 51-52; 26 May 1992, 25-27, 31-34; 14 July 1992, 5-8, 14-15.
16.	TSN, 6 December 1995, 6-15, 34-36, 66-79, 95-98; 20 December 1995, 7-8, 61; 10 January 1996, 6-7, 10-11, 35; 24 January 1996, 14, 38, 63-65; 28 February 1996, 21-22.
18.	TSN, 26 August 1992, 3-12; 13 September 1995, 24, 33, 38-39.
19.	TSN, 6 September 1995, 13-17, 20-22; 27 September 1995, 17-22; 25 October 1995, 7-8.
20.	TSN, 25 October, 1995, 20-21.
21.	TSN, 6 September 1995, 22-25, 78-79.
22.	TSN, 1 February 1995, 15-18, 36; 11 October 1995, 19-23.
23.	TSN, 20 September 1995, 4-8, 19-20, 47-49, 64-67, 71-74.
24.	TSN, 11 October 1995, 36-40, 45.
25.	TSN, 18 October 1995, 59-63.
26.	TSN, 6 September 1995, 38-47, 54, 87-88; 20 September 1995, 34-40; 18 October 1995, 63-69; 25 October 1995, 10-13; 25 March 1996, 10-16, 22-30.
28.	The P50,000 death indemnity for the victims was not mentioned in the dispositive portion but was included in the body of the decision. Rollo, 110.
30.	Appellant’s Brief, Rollo, 156-157.
31.	TSN, 14 July 1992, 6.
32.	People v. Aguilar, 8 SCRA 387 ; People v. Torino, 11 SCRA 287, 293 ; People v. Baligod, 227 SCRA 834, 840 .
33.	People v. Alban, 1 SCRA 931, 933-934  where the mask below the eyes of the accused did not sufficiently hide his identity due to his exposed forehead and physical appearance.
34.	See People v. Tabago, 167 SCRA 65  where only the lower portion of the face was covered; other parts of the body were visible and distinguishable in broad daylight.
35.	People v. Matubis, 288 SCRA 210, 221 .
36.	Exhibit "3" ; OR, 551-552.
37.	See People v. Conde, 252 SCRA 681, 690 .
38.	TSN, 14 July 1992, 7.
39.	People v. Apongan, 270 SCRA 713, 728 , citing People v. Gomez, 251 SCRA 455, 469-470 .
40.	People v. Boniao, 217 SCRA 653, 671 ; People v. Galas, 262 SCRA 381, 391 . See People v. Tulop, 289 SCRA 316, 331 ; People v. Abria, 300 SCRA 556, 563 .
41.	TSN, 6 December 1995, 10.
43.	TSN, 28 February 1996, 35.
44.	TSN, 10 January 1996, 11.
45.	People v. Nepomuceno, 298 SCRA 450, 463 .
46.	People v. Vasquez, 280 SCRA 160, 175 .
47.	TSN, 6 December 1995, 77.
48.	VII VICENTE J. FRANCISCO 443, Part II (1997).
49.	VII VICENTE J. FRANCISCO 443, Part II (1997), Id., 531, 533.
50.	People v. Ruiz, 93 SCRA 739, 763 ; People v. Bibat, 290 SCRA 27, 37-38 .
52.	People v. Quijada, 259 SCRA 191, 212-213 . Citing People v. De Guzman, 188 SCRA 407 ; People v. Delovino, 247 SCRA 637 .
54.	TSN, 6 March 1996, 16-17, 73-74.
55.	See People v. Ilao, 296 SCRA 658, 668 .
56.	See People v. Oliano, 287 SCRA 158, 169 .
57.	TSN, 6 December 1995, 17.
58.	Id., 105; TSN, 20 December 1995, 72-74, 80-81.
59.	People v. Aguiluz, 207 SCRA 187, 195 .
60.	People v. Maqueda, 242 SCRA 565, 591-592 .
61.	See U.S. v. De Leon, 1 Phil. 163, 164 ; U.S. v. Elicanal, 35 Phil. 209, 218 ; People v. Mongado, 28 SCRA 612, 650 ; People v. Ong, 62 Phil. 174, 211 .
62.	People v. Lee, 204 SCRA 900, 911 .
63.	People v. Evangelista, 256 SCRA 611, 625 .

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