Source: https://cbaclelegalconnection.com/2016/11/
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 22:01:29+00:00

Document:
The Rocky Mountain Immigrant Advocacy Network (RMIAN) is a nonprofit legal services organization that believes justice for immigrants means justice for all. RMIAN provides life-changing legal services to vulnerable immigrant children in Colorado, and to adults in immigration detention. Without this assistance from RMIAN’s attorneys, RMIAN’s child clients and individuals in detention would be forced to face immigration court hearings entirely on their own, an injustice by any standard. A national study, headed by a federal judge, found that immigrants with lawyers are five times more likely to win their cases than those without. For many, a loss in immigration court means deportation and a forced return to the persecution, abuse, or other violence from which they fled. For many others, it signifies a permanent and heartbreaking separation from spouses, partners, children, siblings, and other loved ones. RMIAN’s programs are dedicated to ensuring legal representation, due process, and support.
RMIAN’s Children’s Program provides immigration legal services to children through Colorado. Recent clients include a young man who was granted a T visa based on being a victim of human trafficking; several children who won Special Immigrant Juvenile Status as a result of being abused, abandoned or neglected; several young crime victims and their family members who were granted U Visas; and numerous youth who were granted Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals. In the past several years, RMIAN’s Children’s Program has seen an exponential increase in its representation of unaccompanied children who fled horrors in their home countries and who are now seeking asylum and other immigration relief before the Denver Immigration Court. In 2015, RMIAN’s Children’s program directly represented 288 children, conducted 658 intakes and consultations, and referred 205 cases to pro bono attorneys. By providing free legal services to immigrant children, as well as outreach efforts to community partners, RMIAN educates children and their families on the rights and protections to which they are entitled under federal immigration law and works to ensure that Colorado’s communities are safe.
Please consider making a donation to RMIAN today to help us fulfill our values statement, “We believe that justice for immigrants means justice for all.” Donations may be mailed directly to RMIAN at 3489 West 72nd Avenue, Suite 211, Westminster, CO 80030 or via RMIAN’s website at www.rmian.org RMIAN is participating in Colorado Gives Day on Tuesday, December 6, 2016.
The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People in Interest of S.M.-L. on Thursday, November 17, 2016.
Dependency and Neglect—Final and Appealable Order.
The Department of Human Services (Department) filed a dependency and neglect petition regarding S.M-L., B.M-M, and R.S. (the children). The petition named D.S. as R.S.’s biological father and named G.S. as the mother of all of the children. The Department asserted that father had sexually abused his stepdaughter S.M-L. He was arrested and criminally charged with sexual abuse. Father denied the allegations and mother believed S.M-L was lying about them. Mother requested a bench trial and father requested a jury trial.
As to mother, the court found the allegations in the petition had been proven by a preponderance of the evidence and entered an order adjudicating the children dependent and neglected. However, the jury returned a verdict as to father finding that R.S. was not dependent or neglected. The Department moved for an adjudication of father notwithstanding the verdict. The trial court denied the motion and dismissed father from the petition. Both the Department and mother appealed.
The Colorado Court of Appeals issued an order to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed for lack of a final, appealable order, noting that it was unaware of any authority for the proposition that dismissing a parent from a petition based on a jury verdict was a final appealable order. C.R.S. § 19-1-109(2)(c) provides that an order decreeing a child to be neglected or dependent shall be a final and appealable order upon the entry of the disposition. This section does not address the dismissal of a party from the petition based on a jury’s verdict finding a child was not dependent or neglected as to that party. The court also noted that after the jury determined that R.S. was not dependent or neglected as to father, the trial court did not have jurisdiction to enter any orders other than dismissal of the petition. Because a jury’s “no adjudication” verdict is not a proper basis for a motion for adjudication notwithstanding the verdict and thus is not a final appealable order under C.A.R. 3.4(a) or C.R.S. § 19-1-109(2)(c), the Department’s appeal was dismissed.
Mother challenged her adjudication on several grounds, but the court found no reversible error because the evidence supported the trial court’s factual findings.
The Department’s appeal was dismissed and the order adjudicating mother was affirmed.
On Tuesday, November 29, 2016, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued no published opinion and eleven unpublished opinions.
White v. Deere & Co.
The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Maldonado v. Pratt on Thursday, November 17, 2016.
The Pratts and Dennis Pratt II (Pratt Jr.) own adjacent properties near Pueblo, Colorado. Pratt Jr. stored used car parts on his property. He began to suspect that someone was stealing the parts, and on October 16, 2012, he drove to his storage area, and, when he saw three flashlight beams approaching, shot and killed Jacob Maldonado. Pratt Jr. was convicted of negligent homicide and sentenced to six years’ imprisonment.
Maldonado’s estate filed a wrongful death action against Pratt Jr. on September 16, 2014, alleging a single act of negligence in his killing of Maldonado. On April 1, 2015, the Estate moved to amend its complaint to add Premises Liability Act claims against the Pratts, since it had discovered that Maldonado was actually on the Pratts’ property when he was shot. The Pratts filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings and/or summary judgment, arguing the two-year statute of limitations barred the complaint. The Estate countered that the amended complaint related back to the original complaint. The district court disagreed and found that the Pratts did not have actual notice of the lawsuit and would not have expected to be named as defendants in the wrongful death action. The district court granted judgment in the Pratts’ favor.
On appeal, the Estate conceded that the statute of limitations for a PLA claim had run when it filed its amended complaint. However, the Estate contended the new claims related back to the original complaint. The court of appeals disagreed. The court of appeals analyzed the relation-back doctrine, noting that a new claim relates back to the date of the original pleading so long as the new claim or defense arises out of the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence. However, when adding a new party, two additional duties arise: the new party must have received actual notice of the complaint within the time period provided by C.R.C.P. 4(m), and the new party must have known or reasonably should have known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have been brought against him or her.
The court found that the Estate could not prove the Pratts had actual notice of the complaint against Pratt Jr. The Estate argued that notice could be imputed to the Pratts through the “identity of interest” doctrine. The court found the doctrine inapplicable. The court noted that, generally, the identity of interest doctrine is used for corporate entities. The Estate argued that the Pratts had an identity of interest to Pratt Jr., but the court of appeals disagreed. The identity of interest doctrine generally only applies to families if the children are minor and they share an attorney or insurance policy. Here, Pratt Jr. was an adult who lived separately from his parents. Although they spoke daily before the shooting, Pratt Jr. was taken into custody the day of the shooting and was in the DOC when served with the original complaint. The court of appeals declined to extend actual notice from an assumption that Pratt Jr. would have told his parents about the lawsuit.
The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People v. Torres on Thursday, November 17, 2016.
Guilty Plea—Immigration Status—Post-Conviction Motion—Statutory Time Bar—Justifiable Excuse—Excusable Neglect.
Chavez-Torres is a citizen of Mexico who came to the United States with his family when he was a child. While in high school, Chavez-Torres pleaded guilty to first degree criminal trespass. The trial court sentenced him to probation, which he successfully completed.
Seventeen years after his criminal trespass conviction, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings, alleging that Chavez-Torres was not legally present in the United States and had been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. Chavez-Torres moved for post-conviction relief from his criminal trespass conviction under Crim. P. 35(c) based on ineffective assistance of counsel. He alleged that he had informed his plea counsel that he was not a U.S. citizen but counsel advised him to accept the plea agreement without telling him that the guilty plea carried a risk of adverse immigration consequences. He claimed that had he been properly advised he would have insisted on going to trial. He asserted that as a result, his plea and conviction were constitutionally infirm. While acknowledging that his post-conviction motion was untimely, he alleged that these circumstances amount to justifiable excuse or excusable neglect. The trial court denied the motion as untimely, finding that the prejudice to the state would be too great, given the passage of time, and that he failed to assert facts amounting to justifiable excuse or excusable neglect.
On appeal, Chavez-Torres contended that the district court erred in summarily denying his post-conviction motion based on the statutory time bar because he asserted facts that, if true, would establish justifiable excuse or excusable neglect. Here, even though Chavez-Torres had informed plea counsel that he was not a citizen of the United States, counsel had advised him to accept the plea agreement without telling him that the guilty plea carried a risk of adverse immigration consequences. Chavez-Torres subsequently completed his probation and did not learn that his conviction had adverse immigration consequences until the removal proceedings were initiated. Under these circumstances, it cannot be concluded, as a matter of law, that justifiable excuse or excusable neglect did not exist.
Defendant also argued that the finding that the State would suffer “great” prejudice has no record support. The Colorado Court of Appeals determined that the existing record does not support the district court’s finding that the state will suffer great prejudice.
The order denying the post-conviction motion was reversed and the case was remanded to the district court to determine whether Chavez-Torres has established justifiable excuse or excusable neglect for his untimely post-conviction motion. If he can, the court must then consider the merits of his post-conviction motion.
On Wednesday, November 23, 2016, the Colorado Court of Appeals issued no published opinion and 26 unpublished opinions.
On Friday, November 25, 2016, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued one published opinion and one unpublished opinion.
On Wednesday, November 23, 2016, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued no published opinion and eight unpublished opinions.
Lancaster v. Sprint/United Management Co.

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