Source: https://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-supreme-court/240/399.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 01:35:05+00:00

Document:
[240 U.S. 399, 400] Mr. T. Marshall Miller for appellant.
Complaint is made of the findings. They were concurred in by the master and both courts, and therefore should be permitted to stand unless shown to be plainly erroneous. Washington Securities Co. v. United States, 234 U.S. 76, 78 , 58 S. L. ed. 1220, 1222, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 725; Gilson v. United States, 234 U.S. 380, 383 , 58 S. L. ed. 1361, 1362, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 778. Testing them by the evidence, we discover no plain error, but, on the contrary, that they are amply sustained.
That the title was acquired by substituting the minimum price of the land for a part of the required five years of residence and cultivation, as permitted by the commutation provision of the homestead law, is not material, for the agreement to obtain the land for the benefit of another disqualified Causey from acquiring the title in either mode. Bailey v. Sanders, 228 U.S. 603, 608 , 57 S. L. ed. 985, 988, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 602; Gilson v. United States, 234 U.S. 380, 384 , 58 S. L. ed. 1361, 1363, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 778.
The bill, while purporting to be brought in the name and for the benefit of the United States, and bearing the signature of the assistant United States attorney for the district, does not state or show that it is brought with the sanction of the Attorney General, and because of this it is objected, as it was in both courts below, that the bill should not be entertained, but dismissed. In the absence of a controlling statute, and there is none, it is essential to such a suit that it be brought with the Attorney General's approval; and while the usual and better practice is to state or show in the bill that it is brought with his approval, this is not indispensable. The case is argued here on behalf of the government by one of the Assistant Attorneys General, who files a certified copy of a letter [240 U.S. 399, 402] from the Attorney General, authorizing the institution of the suit conformably to a request of the Secretary of the Interior. This sufficiently meets the objection, especially as it is fairly inferable that the letter was exhibited in the courts below. United States v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61, 70 , 25 S. L. ed. 93, 96; McLaughlin v. United States (Western P. R. Co. v. United States) 107 U.S. 526, 528 , 27 S. L. ed. 621, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 802; Mullan v. United States, 118 U.S. 271, 276 , 30 S. L. ed. 170, 172, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1041; United States v. San Jacinto Tin Co. 125 U.S. 273 , 278-287, 31 L. ed. 747, 749-752, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 850.
The further objection is made that the bill cannot be maintained because it does not contain an offer to return the scrip received when the commuted entry was made. The objection assumes that the suit is upon the same plane as if brought by an individual vendor to annul a sale of land fraudulently induced. But, as this court has said, the government, in disposing of its public lands, does not assume the attitude of a mere seller of real estate at its market value. These lands are held in trust for all the people, and in providing for their disposal Congress has sought to advance the interests of the whole country by opening them to entry in comparatively small tracts under restrictions designed to accomplish their settlement, development, and utilization. And when a suit is brought to annul a patent obtained in violation of these restrictions, the purpose is not merely to regain the title, but also to enforce a public statute and maintain the policy underlying it. Such a suit is not within the reason of the ordinary rule that a vendor suing to annul a sale fraudulently induced must offer and be ready to return the consideration received. That rule, if applied, would tend to frustrate the policy of the public land laws; and so it is held that the wrongdoer must restore the title unlawfully obtained and abide the judgment of Congress as to whether the consideration paid shall be refunded. United States v. Trinidad Coal & Coking Co. 137 U.S. 160, 170 , 171 S., 34 L. ed. 640, 644, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 57; Heckman v. United States, 224 U.S. 413, 447 , 56 S. L. ed. 820, 833, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 424. And see Rev. Stat. 2362; Comp. Stat. 1913, 4771; Act June 16, 1880, chap. 244, 2, 21 Stat. at L. [240 U.S. 399, 403] 287, Comp. Stat. 1913, 4596; Hoffeld v. United States, 186 U.S. 273 , 46 L. ed. 1160, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 927; United States v. Commonwealth Title Ins . & T. Co. 193 U.S. 651 , 48 L. ed. 830, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 546; United States v. Colorado Anthracite Co. 225 U.S. 219 , 56 L. ed. 1063, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 617.

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