Source: http://www.guywbluff.com/blog
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 00:12:39+00:00

Document:
F. Arizona State University System –Board of Regents Policy Manual §3-804(G & H).
E. Arizona State University System – Az Board of Regents Policy §3-804(G & H).
Determination of the prevailing party for purposes of award of attorneys fees pursuant to ARS §12-341.01 is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. Appellate court will accord deference to the trial court pursuant to §12-341.01 because trial court is better able to evaluate the parties’ positions during the litigation and to determine which party has prevailed. When a case involves several claims based upon different facts or legal theories, the trial court may decline to award fees for those unsuccessful separate and distinct claims.
For purposes of determining an award of awarding attorneys fees pursuant to competing ARS §12-341.01 and Rule 68 offers, the “judgment finally obtained / more favorable judgment” includes the award of damages, plus taxable costs, plus any prejudgment interest.
Lastly, the court held that in order for a party to preserve its right to seek attorneys fees pursuant to a contractual provision (as opposed to a discretionary award pursuant to §12-341.01) requires specific pleading and proof. A general request for attorneys’ fees in the complaint or answer is not sufficient to support an award following trial and the trial court may properly disregard the contractual provisions when making a discretionary award.
Plaintiff requests that this court determine it to be the prevailing party and award its reasonable attorneys fees pursuant to Contract sections 8(a), 14(d), and 15(c), and pursuant to ARS §12-341.01, §32-1129.01(S), §33-998(B) and any other statutory authority which may be applicable in the circumstances.
Towne Bank’s third argument was that Allstate’s lien is invalid because the copy of the preliminary 20-day notice that Allstate averred it served on ALC Builders lacked a form by which ALC Builders could “acknowledge” receipt of the notice. InArizona, a claimant may prove that it served the 20-day notice by recording an acknowledgment of receipt executed by the recipient of the notice. ARS § 33-992.02(1). Alternatively, the claimant may prove it served the notice by recording an affidavit of service together with its lien. ARS § 33-992.02(2). The court held that while the 20 day notice failed to include an “acknowledgment” as provided by statute, this defect was not fatal because Allstate recorded an affidavit of service with its lien – the alternative method of proving delivery. The court further held that failure to provide an acknowledgment form to the recipient of a preliminary 20-day notice does not invalidate the notice or the subsequent notice and claim of lien.
In summary, the Court reaffirmed the long standing rule of law applicable to Arizona Mechanic Liens. Arizona’s lien statutes generally have two purposes: To protect laborers and materialmen who have provided goods and services, and to protect the right of property owners to notice of lien claims against them. See Kerr-McGee Oil Ind., Inc. v. McCray, 89 Ariz. 307, 311, 361 P.2d 734, 736 (1961); Lewis, 114Ariz. at 431, 561 P.2d at 755.
In the case of Williamson v. PVOrbit dba Fountain Hills Door & Supply, (1 CA-CV 10-0390, 01-Sep-2011), Division 1 of the Arizona Court of Appeals finally addressed the longstanding issue of whether title to a residence held in the name of a family trust will still qualify for the protections afforded by Arizona’s Homeowner Exception to the Mechanic Lien Statutes (ARS §33-981). Subject to certain other statutory prerequisites, ARS §33-981 grants a Mechanic’s Lien to every person who labors, furnishes professional services, materials or supplies to the alteration, repair, or new construction of any building, including residential homes.
An exception to this rule is found in ARS §33-1002 — generally referred to the Homeowner Exception to the lien statutes — and provides that absent having a direct contract with the property owner (e.g. the general contractor or architect), no lien may be filed by laborers, subcontractors or material suppliers performing work or supplying materials to the project.
The re-occurring issue addressed by the Williamson court was whether the exception would still apply when legal title to the residence was held, not by a “natural person”, but instead by a family trust which was controlled and operated by the same individuals living in the residence. Transferring legal title to a family trust or other family limited liability company has long been a vehicle for estate planning attorneys to protect the assets of their clients and minimize tax liabilities on the death of the principals.
The Williamson court recognized that in a family trust situation, the Williamsons’, as sole beneficiaries and trustees, still qualified as a “natural person” under the statute and thus were entitled to have the mechanic’s lien discharged. The court held that in a trust, the trustees hold legal title and the beneficiaries hold equitable title, citing Dunlap Investors Ldt v. Hogan, 133 Ariz. 130 (1982). Since the Williamsons’, as the trustees, held legal title, they still qualified for the exemption against liens provided in ARS §33-1002.
The court did not address the issue of whether Williamsons’ also would have qualified to the exception by virtue of the fact that as beneficiaries under the trust, they also held “equitable” title to the property.
An unanswered question also remains as to the issue when the legal title to the residence in held in the name of a Limited Liability Company with the owner(s) of the LLC being the same individuals residing (or intending to reside) in the residence. This author believes that the court would resolve this question in the same manner since similar to the “trustee” under a family trust, the “members” in a limited liability company having been formed for estate planning purposes, effectively hold both legal and equitable title to the property in question.

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