Source: http://courts.mrsc.org/supreme/112wn2d/112wn2d0030.htm
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 06:23:25+00:00

Document:
112 Wn.2d 30, POLICE GUILD v. LIQUOR CONTROL BD.
 Open Government - Public Disclosure - Enjoining Release - Burden of Proof. A party seeking an injunction to prevent a public agency from disclosing a record has the burden of establishing that the standards governing nondisclosure set forth in RCW 42.17.330 are met.
 Open Government - Public Disclosure - Enjoining Release - Standard of Review. In deciding whether to enjoin disclosure of a public record pursuant to RCW 42.17.330, a court reviews the matter de novo and may go beyond the administrative record.
 Open Government - Public Disclosure - Exemptions - Investigative Records - Nondisclosure Essential for Effective Law Enforcement. A decision to disclose a record, made by the investigative agency which prepared the record, is relevant to determining whether the nondisclosure of the record is essential to effective law enforcement under RCW 42.17.310(1)(d).
 Open Government - Public Disclosure - Exemptions - Investigative Records - Nondisclosure Essential To Protect Privacy. For purposes of RCW 42.17.310(1)(d), which exempts from disclosure investigative records if their nondisclosure is essential to protect a person's right to privacy, the right to privacy encompasses only the intimate details of one's personal and private rights. The fact that disclosure would cause inconvenience or embarrassment is not sufficient, by itself, to prevent disclosure.
 Open Government - Public Disclosure - Promise of Confidentiality - Effect. An investigating agency's promise that statements made will be confidential cannot override the disclosure requirements for public records set forth in RCW 42.17.250 ET SEQ.
NAMES OF CONCURRING OR DISSENTING JUDGES: Dolliver, J., Callow, C.J., and Pearson, J., dissent by separate opinion.
NATURE OF ACTION: Action to prevent the Liquor Control Board from releasing an investigative report concerning liquor law violations at a party held on the premises of a police organization.
Superior Court: The Superior Court for Spokane County, No. 87 2-00802-3, John J. Ripple, J., on May 6, 1987, refused to issue an injunction.
Supreme Court: Holding that the plaintiff had not met its burden of proving that the report was exempt from disclosure under the freedom of information act, the court AFFIRMS the judgment.
COUNSEL: KAIN & SNOW, by GREGORY G. STAEHELI, for appellants Spokane Police Guild, et al.
JAMES C. SLOANE, CITY ATTORNEY, and ROCCO N. TREPPIEDI, ASSISTANT, for appellant Spokane.
KENNETH O. EIKENBERRY, ATTORNEY GENERAL, and PAUL D. SOLOMON, ASSISTANT, for respondent State.
WITHERSPOON, KELLEY, DAVENPORT & TOOLE, P.S., by MICHAEL D. CURRIN and DUANE M. SWINTON, for respondent Cowles Publishing Co.
On or about March 19, 1986, a party was held on the Spokane Police Guild Club premises. These were premises licensed by the Washington State Liquor Control Board (Liquor Board). The party has been variously referred to as a bachelor party, stag show and strip show. The party was, in any event, given for a prospective bridegroom by his brother. A dancer performed at the party in a manner which, as it was subsequently determined, violated Liquor Board regulations. Forty or more people were in attendance. Following an investigation by an investigator for the Liquor Board, the club's liquor license was suspended for 21 days.
A reporter for the Spokesman Review and Spokane Chronicle newspapers requested a copy of the Liquor Board's investigative report. The Liquor Board ultimately determined that it would release its full report on the incident. This suit was thereupon commenced by the Spokane Police Guild to enjoin the release of the records. The publisher of the newspapers, Cowles Publishing Company, and the City of Spokane were permitted to intervene in the suit.
public, including the names of persons involved.
Should the Liquor Board's report of its investigation of liquor law violations at a party held on the premises of one of its licensees be exempt from disclosure under the state freedom of information act?
CONCLUSION. We hold that the trial court properly concluded that the records in question were not exempt from disclosure and that a complete and unedited copy of the Liquor Board's report should be made available to the public and news media.
This suit was brought under the state freedom of information act, RCW 42.17.250.340 (the act). The parties concede that the Liquor Board's investigative report of the event in question is a public record. Thus, we turn to the act for guidance.
«2» HEARST CORP. v. HOPPE, 90 Wn.2d 123, 127-28, 580 P.2d 246 (1978); RCW 42.17.010(11).
It is a strongly worded mandate for broad disclosure of public records. While mindful of the right of individuals to privacy and of the desirability of the efficient administration of government, full access to information concerning the conduct of government on every level must be assured as a fundamental and necessary precondition to the sound governance of a free society. The provisions of the act are to be liberally construed to promote full access to public records so as to assure continuing public confidence in governmental processes, and to assure that the public interest will be fully protected.
«3» SEE RCW 42.17.010(11); J. Franklin & R. Bouchard, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AND PRIVACY ACTS 1.02 (2d ed. 1988).
Under the act, judicial intervention in the release of public records can come about in one of two ways.
«4» SEE COWLES PUB'G CO. v. STATE PATROL, 109 Wn.2d 712, 748 P.2d 597 (1988); OLIVER v. HARBORVIEW MED. CTR., 94 Wn.2d 559, 618 P.2d 76 (1980); HEARST, at 123; HUDGENS v. RENTON, 49 Wn. App. 842, 746 P.2d 320 (1987); MOSER v. KANEKOA, 49 Wn. App. 529, 744 P.2d 364 (1987); COLUMBIAN PUB'G CO. v. VANCOUVER, 36 Wn. App. 25, 671 P.2d 280 (1983); LABORERS INT'L, LOCAL 374 v. ABERDEEN, 31 Wn. App. 445, 642 P.2d 418, REVIEW DENIED, 97 Wn.2d 1024 (1982); HAFERMEHL v. UW, 29 Wn. App. 366, 628 P.2d 846 (1981).
«5» RCW 42.17.340(1); HEARST, at 130.
«6» RCW 42.17.340(2); HEARST, at 130.
«7» RCW 42.17.340(3); COLUMBIAN PUB'G, at 33.
and irreparably damage vital governmental functions.
«8» SEATTLE FIRE FIGHTERS, LOCAL 27 v. HOLLISTER, 48 Wn. App. 129, 137, 737 P.2d 1302, REVIEW DENIED, 108 Wn.2d 1033 (1987).
«9» CF. 1 J. O'Reilly, FEDERAL INFORMATION DISCLOSURE 10.06, at 10-28 n.13 (1985).
«10» SEATTLE FIRE FIGHTERS, at 138-39.
«11» SMITH v. SKAGIT CY., 75 Wn.2d 715, 718-19, 453 P.2d 832 (1969); EIDEN v. SNOHOMISH CY. CIVIL SERV. COMM'N, 13 Wn. App. 32, 37, 533 P.2d 426 (1975).
«12» RCW 42.17.010 ET SEQ.; HEARST, at 130. SEE ALSO RCW 42.17.255, .260 effective July 26, 1987, which expressly so provide.
«13» SEE STATE HUMAN RIGHTS COMM'N v. SEATTLE, 25 Wn. App. 364, 367, 607 P.2d 332 (1980) (City sought protective order to enjoin disclosure under RCW 42.17.260(1)); VAN BUREN v. MILLER, 22 Wn. App. 836, 839, 592 P.2d 671 (1979) (assessor sought injunction to enjoin disclosure under RCW 42.17.310); CF. RHINEHART v. SEATTLE TIMES CO., 98 Wn.2d 226, 236-37, 654 P.2d 673 (1982), AFF'D, 467 U.S. 20 (1984); COWLES PUB'G, at 723-24. SEE ALSO RCW 42.17.260, as amended effective July 26, 1987, expressly so providing.
«14» SEE RCW 42.17.260(1), and as amended by Laws of 1987, ch. 403, 3(1), p. 1547. SEE ALSO Laws of 1987, ch. 403, 1, p. 1546.
If it is exempted or prohibited, then the judicial inquiry commences.
Deleting the portions of this exemption not here applicable, the act thus declares "exempt from public inspection and copying . . . specific investigative records compiled by investigative . . . agencies, . . . the nondisclosure of which is essential to effective law enforcement or for the protection of any person's right to privacy."
«15» The Liquor Board is an agency that exercises the State's police power in administering and enforcing the law and regulations pertaining to alcoholic beverage control. RCW 66.44.010(2); WAC 314-60-030.
The agency's decision to voluntarily turn over these records, made as it was by the law enforcement agency which itself prepared the records, convinces us in this case that the nondisclosure of the records is not essential to effective law enforcement. Unlike COWLES PUB'G, which was recently before us, no testimony was taken at the trial court level in this case and there is no finding by the trial court that nondisclosure is essential to effective law enforcement. The legal issue thus becomes whether "nondisclosure [of the records] is essential . . . for the protection of any person's right to privacy." For the reasons which follow, we conclude that it is not.
«16» This definition of the "right to privacy" initially set forth in HEARST, at 135-36, has now been specifically written into the act by the Legislature as RCW 42.17.255 effective July 26, 1987. Laws of 1987, ch. 403, 2, p. 1547.
«17» SEE Restatement (Second) of Torts 652D, at 386 (1977); HEARST, at 138; COWLES PUB'G, at 726.
The case before us, however, concerns antics before a group of some 40 or more people, not at a residence but on premises licensed by the Liquor Board. We perceive no personal intimacy involved in one's presence or conduct at such a well attended and staged event which would be either lost or diminished by being made public.
«18» SEE RCW 42.17.340(2); COLUMBIAN PUB'G, at 30; SEATTLE FIRE FIGHTERS, at 133-36.
«19» See footnote 16, SUPRA.
«20» SEE INTERNATIONAL UNION v. GARNER, 601 F. Supp. 187, 191 (M.D. Tenn. 1985); FRY v. IONIA SENTINEL-STANDARD, 101 Mich. App. 725, 300 N.W.2d 687, 690 (1980); CAPE PUBLICATIONS, INC. v. BRIDGES, 423 So. 2d 426, 427 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982), CERT. DENIED, 464 U.S. 893 (1983).
Thus, the nondisclosure of the Liquor Board's investigation of the party is not "essential . . . for the protection of any person's right to privacy". It is, therefore, unnecessary to address the other aspect of the right to privacy standard, I.E., whether the matter is "of legitimate concern to the public".
The nondisclosure of the records not being essential to law enforcement, and there being no violation of anyone's right to privacy, the parties seeking to enjoin the disclosure of information have not made the requisite showing under the investigative records exception and have not sustained their burden of proof under the injunction statute, RCW 42.17.330. The trial court, therefore, did not err in ruling that the investigative record was not exempt from disclosure under the state freedom of information act.
To this point in the opinion, we have abstained from mentioning the occupations of the attendees at the event. This is because the determinative principles of law enunciated herein apply to everyone alike, hence in the eyes of the law the occupations of the persons involved are irrelevant. The nature of the dissent is such, however, that it becomes necessary to note that at least a number of the attendees were off-duty Spokane police officers.
«21» SEE COWLES PUB'G CO. v. STATE PATROL, 109 Wn.2d 712, 748 P.2d 597 (1988).
they are records of a Liquor Board investigation. The police officers were attending a social event, on their own time, and did not purport to be acting in the line of duty. Accordingly, under the facts presented we perceive no basis in law or logic to allow the request of certain Spokane officials to override the Liquor Board's decision to make public the report of the Liquor Board's own investigative file.
«22» SEE SEATTLE POLICE OFFICERS' GUILD v. SEATTLE, 80 Wn.2d 307, 316, 494 P.2d 485 (1972).
«23» SEE RCW 66.44.175, .180; WAC 314-16-125; Spokane Municipal Code 10.02.030, 10.02.060, 10.02.070, 10.05.040, 10.06.020, 10.08.030, 10.10.020, 10.12.020, 10.20.010 (August 1983).
«24» U.S. Const. amend. 5; Const. art. 1, 9.
«25» HEARST CORP. v. HOPPE, 90 Wn.2d 123, 137, 580 P.2d 246 (1978).
The Liquor Board had every right to consider any such pledge in making its determination whether the nondisclosure of the records is essential to effective law enforcement, but for reasons known only to the Board, it apparently decided that it was not.
July 26, 1987. See Laws of 1987, Vol. 2, p. ii.
Laws of 1987, ch. 403, 1, p. 1546.
It should be noted in this latter regard, however, that the 1987 amendments to the act did not change the law in the respects discussed in this opinion.
CONCURRING JUDGES: Utter, Brachtenbach, Dore, Durham, and Smith, JJ., concur.
While I concur with the disposal of the privacy issue by the majority, I cannot accept its refusal to discuss whether the nondisclosure of the investigation report is "essential to effective law enforcement". I believe it is and thus dissent.
is essential to effective law enforcement.
The matter was before the trial court and is before us solely on the affidavits, documents, and arguments of counsel. No testimony was taken. Under these circumstances, as the majority accurately states, "the appellate court stands in the same position as did the trial court in reviewing the record." (Footnote omitted.) Majority, at 36. Just as the trial court and this court may determine the question of privacy on the record presented, so can this court determine whether nondisclosure is "essential to effective law enforcement". The failure of the trial court even to mention this issue does not bar our addressing the issue. In addition, it should be noted the trial court, in its discussion of the statute, did not have the benefit of our opinion in COWLES.
Majority, at 37. The majority assumes only the effectiveness of the law enforcement agency which prepares the records, here the Liquor Control Board, is protected by RCW 42.17.310(1)(d). The majority fails to consider whether nondisclosure is essential to effective law enforcement of the Spokane Police Department.
internal investigations unit could lead to dismissal.
COWLES, at 730. Accordingly, there are a number of facts, not mentioned by the majority, which I believe are essential to reaching a decision.
1. In a memorandum of November 6, 1986, R.D. Panther, Chief of the Spokane Police Department, directed all members of the Spokane Police Department "to cooperate with the [Liquor Control] Board's investigation [of the Spokane Police Guild Club] pursuant to department Rule 3.27.3." This rule states: "Members shall cooperate with all agencies engaged in the administration of criminal justice and other public agencies . . ." Chief Panther ended his memorandum by stating: "Any member who fails to comply with this or any other rule will be subject to appropriate disciplinary sanctions."
2. Four of the five officers interviewed by the Liquor Control Board- and this was undisputed- stated they were ordered by their employer, the Spokane Police Department, to answer all questions of the Board's investigation. All officers stated they were given assurances of confidentiality. Although this is disputed by the Board and the trial court found the issue of promises or agreement that the officers' statements would be held confidential to be disputed, there is no dispute that the investigatory files were marked "Confidential" by the Liquor Control Board.
suspensions were issued as a result.
hereto and incorporated herein as if fully set forth.
disclosed through other potential resources.
As stated by Assistant Chief Jorgenson, "numerous letters of reprimand and several suspensions were issued as a result" of an investigation of the officers' activities by the internal affairs division of the Spokane Police Department. Given our recent opinion in COWLES, it seems clear that if the statements by the officers in question had been made in an internal investigation, they would have been held confidential under RCW 42.17.310(1)(d).
[or] law enforcement" agency as defined by the statute.
and motivation within the organization.
By affidavit, the City Attorney stated that: "Release of this information, under the circumstances presented by this case, will cause substantial and irreparable damage to the Spokane Police Department's ability to operate as a law enforcement agency, which is a vital governmental function." I find this reasoning compelling. Furthermore, this affidavit is uncontroverted.
Although I strongly dissented in COWLES (SEE COWLES, at 734 (Dolliver, J., dissenting)), it is now the rule in this state. COWLES held compelled officer statements given in an internal police investigation were exempt from disclosure as essential to effective law enforcement. To refuse to extend this analysis and exempt compelled officer statements given in an internal investigation by another law enforcement agency makes little sense. It places the court in the position of appearing to play a game when dealing with these police officers' statutory rights. I would reverse the trial court and order the Liquor Control Board files under consideration here are exempt from disclosure under RCW 42.17.310(1)(d).
CONCURRING JUDGES: Callow, C.J., and Pearson, J., concur with Dolliver, J.
POST-OPINION INFORMATION: Reconsideration denied April 14, 1989.

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