Source: http://patentblog.kluweriplaw.com/2018/11/26/the-cjeu-in-teva-gilead-a-word-of-warning-for-upc-seafarers/
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 00:43:36+00:00

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To date, this judgment has been praised for having provided some clarity and a somewhat more balanced test than the obscure tests applied by the CJEU since Medeva (Case C-322/10). In addition, although the question answered by the CJEU dealt with article 3 (a), its legal grounds may also be applied to interpret article 3 (c), as shown by the judgment of 12 March 2015 (Case C-577/13 Actavis v. Boehringer Ingelheim), where the CJEU gave a joint answer to a similar question dealing with both article 3 (a) and (c). One may add that the fact that the judgment of 25 July 2018 has come from the Grand Chamber may mean that this new test might be here to stay.
“46. It follows from the above that the subject matter of the protection conferred by an SPC must be restricted to the technical specifications of the invention covered by the basic patent, such as claimed in that patent.
47. With regard to the implementation of that rule, it must in the first place be stated that, in accordance with a principle shared by the patent laws of the Member States and reflected in Article 1 of the Protocol on the Interpretation of Article 69 of the EPC, the claims of a patent are to be interpreted from the perspective of a person skilled in the art and, therefore, the issue whether the product which is the subject of the SPC necessarily falls under the invention covered by that patent must be assessed from that perspective.
Certainly, the move in judgment of 25 July 2018 will disappoint those who pushed for the removal of substantive patent law from the text of Regulation 1257/2012 implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of the creation of unitary patent protection, hoping that this trick would prevent the CJEU from interpreting substantive patent law. From this perspective, the recent Teva v. Gilead decision may be interpreted as a word of warning for Unified Patent Court (“UPC”) seafarers.
Miguel, whether or not the CJEU has attempted to interpret a provision of non-EU law, the fact remains that the CJEU is not competent to do so. It is simply outside of their jurisdiction.
What this means for the UPC is hard to say, not least because there are good reasons to believe that the Unitary Patent Package is not compatible with EU law. However, the implications for SPCs are far more interesting. This is because it is hard not to conclude that, by indicating how protection under Article 69 EPC is to be interpreted, the CJEU has overstepped its remit.
For all those who might have hoped that the CJEU would keep outside interpretation of the EPC, this decision is a clear warning. One can only agree in this respect with Mr Montana. That this might have an influence on the UPC, should it ever come, is a clear possibility.
That the CJEU might have oversteped its competence is one thing. But even if it continues to do so, what are the means of redress? The ECHR? Probably not, but where then?
It is interesting to note as well that the CJEU only referred to Art 1 of the Protocol on Art 69. It carefully avoided talking about the famous Art 2, which led to a series of decisions on equivalence which have as well shaken the profession.
May be the CJEU was wise enough to realise that Art 2 speaks about equivalents, but without definition of those to be found in the protocol. A proposal was made by the EPO, but was not adopted by the Diplomatic Conference in 2000, so that we have now equivalents in the protocol, but we do not know what those entail.
The question is nevertheless interesting: would the CJEU consider that since due to equivalence, a SPC covering pemetrexed disodium + vitamin B 12 would also cover any pemetrexed ion + vitamin B 12?
I would guess that in view of this judgement, but also previous ones in SPC matters, the answer might be negative. I am looking forward to replies on this point.
You ask what are the means of redress if the CJEU provides a ruling that reaches into areas that exceed its competence. I think that the answer is fairly simple: the national courts distinguish between what the CJEU is and is not competent to rule upon and then only follow the CJEU’s rulings in the former category.
Whilst it might not always be possible to rely upon national courts to take this kind of approach, I would have thought that they would be inclined to maintain a ring-fence around those areas of the law for which they have exclusive competence. I mean, if the CJEU starts interpreting (and attempting to provide binding rulings on) national laws, what would be left for the national courts?
The CJEU did not interpret the EPC. They just quoted from Article 69 and then said how Article 3(a) should be applied.
Thank you for your comment, but I am afraid that there is a very fine line between “quoting” and “interpreting”, and that this time the CJEU crossed that line.
I have to say that I find your perspective on this point to be somewhat “interesting”. To explain: it all boils down to the question of what the CJEU is seeking to achieve. As I see it, there two possible options here.
Option 1: the CJEU wants to understand (ie interpret) what is the extent of protection under Article 69 EPC, and what this therefore means for “protected” means under Article 3(a).
Option 2: the CJEU wants to understand (ie interpret) what “protected” means under Article 3(a) IRRESPECTIVE of the correct interpretation of Article 69 EPC.
Only Option 2 would be consistent with the remit / jurisdiction of the CJEU. However, if the CJEU had no intention of determining (and then applying) the correct interpretation of Article 69 EPC, why would they bother considering that Article at all (instead of simply setting a test based solely upon EU law and then leaving interpretation of Article 69 EPC to the national courts)?
The CJEU has therefore previously indicated that interpreting the claims according to Article 69 EPC is an essential prerequisite to reaching a decision on whether a product is “protected” in the sense of Article 3(a). This hardly seems consistent with a stand-alone (ie EU law-based) definition of “protected” under Article 3(a) … hence why it is hard not to conclude that the CJEU has overstepped their remit by proceeding under Option 1 above.

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