Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/131/267/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 04:27:04+00:00

Document:
The courts of the United States have power to punish, by fine or imprisonment at their discretion, misbehavior in their presence, or misbehavior so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice, although the offense is also punishable by indictment under Rev.Stat. § 5399.
Attempting to deter a witness, in attendance upon a court of the United States in obedience to a subpoena and while he is near the court room, in the jury room temporarily used as witness room, from testifying for the party in whose behalf he was summoned, and offering him, when in the hallway of the court, money not to testify against the defendant, is misbehavior in the presence of the court.
Within the meaning of § 720, the court, at least when in session, is present in every part of the place set apart for its own use and for the use of its officers, jurors, and witnesses, and misbehavior anywhere in such place is misbehavior in the presence of the court.
Although the word "summary," as used in the first section of the Act of March 3, 1831, 4 Stat. 487, c. 99, was omitted from the present revision of the statutes, the courts of the United States have the power to punish by fine or imprisonment at their discretion, contempts of their authority in the cases defined in § 725.
In proceeding against a party for contempt, the court is not bound to require service of interrogatories upon the appellant to afford him an opportunity to purge himself of contempt in answering, but may, in its discretion, adopt such mode of determining the question as it deems proper, having due regard to the essential rules that prevail in the trial of matters of contempt.
that the said respondent, Alejandro Savin, did thereby commit a contempt of this Court, for which contempt it is by the court now ordered and adjudged that the said Alejandro Savin be imprisoned in the county jail of Los Angeles County, California, for the period of one year."
"The marshal will execute this judgment forthwith."
"February 28, 1889. Ross, District judge"
Pursuant to that order and in conformity with a warrant reciting that he had been convicted of a contempt of said court, the respondent was committed to jail. In his petition, he claimed that the district court had no jurisdiction or legal authority to try and sentence him in the manner and form above stated, for these reasons: 1. the matters set out in the judgment do not constitute a contempt of court provided for by § 725 of the Revised Statutes of the United States; 2. the proceedings were insufficient to give the court jurisdiction to render judgment; 3. the judgment is not based or founded upon any proceedings in due course of law, and is therefore void.
"That the power of the several courts of the United States to issue attachments and inflict summary punishments for contempts of court shall not be construed to extend to any cases except the misbehavior of any person or persons in the presence of the said courts, or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice, the misbehavior of any of the officers of the said courts in their official transactions, and the disobedience or resistance by any officer of the said courts, party, juror, witness, or any other person or persons, to any lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command of the said courts."
"SEC. 2. That if any person or persons shall corruptly, or by threats or force, endeavor to influence, intimidate, or impede any juror, witness, or officer, in any court of the United States in the discharge of his duty, or shall, corruptly, or by threats or force, obstruct or impede, or endeavor to obstruct or impede, the due administration of justice therein, every person or persons so offending shall be liable to prosecution therefor by indictment, and shall, on conviction thereof, be punished by fine not exceeding five hundred dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding three months, or both, according to the nature and aggravation of the offense."
their authority, provided that such power to punish contempts shall not be construed to extend to any cases except the misbehavior of any person in their presence or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice, the misbehavior of any of the officers of said courts in their official transactions, and the disobedience or resistance by any such officer, or by any party, juror, witness, or other person, to any lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command of the said courts."
"Every person who corruptly or by threats or force endeavors to influence, intimidate, or impede any witness or officer in any court of the United States in the discharge of his duty or corruptly or by threats or force obstructs or impedes or endeavors to obstruct or impede the due administration of justice therein shall be punished by a fine of not more than five hundred dollars or by imprisonment not more than three months, or both."
to be determined according to such established rules and principles of the common law as were applicable to our situation. The act of 1831, however, materially modified that of 1789 in that it restricted the power of the courts to inflict summary punishments for contempt to certain specified cases, among which was misbehavior in the presence of the court or misbehavior so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice. Ex Parte Robinson, 19 Wall. 505, 86 U. S. 511. And although the word "summary" was, for some reason, not repeated in the present revision, which invests the courts of the United States with power "to punish, by fine or imprisonment at the discretion of the court, contempts of their authority" in certain cases defined in § 725, we do not doubt that the power to proceed summarily for contempt in those cases remains, as under the act of 1831, with those courts. It was, in effect, so adjudged in Ex Parte Terry, above cited.
"the grand jury, like the petit jury, is an appendage of the court, acting under the authority of the court, and the witnesses summoned before them are amenable to the court, precisely as the witnesses testifying before the petit jury are amenable to the court."
"The place of justice is an hallowed place, and therefore not only the bench, but the footpace and precincts and purprise thereof, ought to be preserved without scandal and corruption."
to deter him from testifying on behalf of the government, or had there offered him money not to testify against Goujon, it could not be doubted that he would have been guilty of misbehavior in the presence of the court, although the judge might not have been personally cognizant at the time of what occurred. But if such attempt and offer occurred in the hallway just outside of the court room, or in the witness room where Flores was waiting in obedience to the subpoena served upon him or pursuant to the order of the court to be called into the court room as a witness, must it be said that such misbehavior was not in the presence of the court? Clearly not.
We are of opinion that the conduct of the appellant as described in the final order of the district court was misbehavior in its presence for which he was subject to be punished without indictment by fine or imprisonment at its discretion, as provided in § 725 of the Revised Statutes. And this view renders it unnecessary to consider whether, as argued, the words "so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice" refer only to cases of misbehavior outside of the court room or in the vicinity of the court building causing such open or violent disturbance of the quiet and order of the court, while in session, as to actually interrupt the transaction of its business.
"He was afforded ample opportunity to explain the transaction and vindicate his conduct. He introduced testimony upon the matter and was sworn himself. It is not necessary that proceedings against attorneys for malpractice or any unprofessional conduct should be founded upon formal allegations against them. Such proceedings are often instituted upon information developed in the progress of a cause, or from what the court learns of the conduct of the attorney from its own observation. Sometimes they are moved by third parties upon affidavit and sometimes they are taken by the court upon its own motion. All that is requisite to their validity is that when not taken for matters occurring in open court in the presence of the judges, notice should be given to the attorney of the charges made and opportunity afforded him for explanation and defense. The manner in which the proceedings shall be conducted, so that it be without oppression or unfairness, is a matter of judicial regulation."
So, in the present case, if the appellant was entitled of right to purge himself under oath of the contempt, that right was not denied to him, for it appears from the proceedings in the district court, made part of the petition for habeas corpus, not only that he was informed of the nature of the charges against him by the testimony of Flores, taken down by a sworn stenographer at the preliminary examination, but that he was present at the hearing of the contempt, was represented by counsel, testified under oath in his own behalf, and had full opportunity to make his defense.

References: § 5399
 § 720
 § 725
 § 725
 § 725
 § 725