Source: http://nj.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.19840524_0040896.NJ.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 16:38:22+00:00

Document:
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Bergen County.
King, Dreier and Bilder. The opinion of the court was delivered by Dreier, J.A.D.
The trial judge correctly noted that R. 4:42-9 limits the awarding of attorney's fees to the situations governed by that rule or where otherwise permitted by law, but found this rule of court does not bar the imposition of sanctions through which the court can protect itself from frivolous litigation.
In that case the plaintiff had instituted multiple suits based upon a cause of action that had been fully adjudicated. In the case before us, however, we have the imposition of sanctions upon an attorney, and this requires a different analysis from that in Atkinson. Sanctions are not unknown to our practice, especially if they are sanctions which shift the cost of a proceeding, or some aspect of it, from a party imposed upon to the one whose conduct has necessitated the expense. See R. 4:46-6 (summary judgments opposed by a factual contention "raised in bad faith . . . with knowledge that it was a palpable sham or predicated on facts known or which should have been known . . . to be false."); R. 4:23-3 (costs payable for failing to comply with a proper request for admissions); R. 4:23-5 (sanction for failure to answer interrogatories in a timely manner -- $50 costs imposed against "the delinquent party."); R. 2:11-4 (attorney's fees as sanction for violation of appellate rules); and N.J.S.A. 2A:18-70 (authorizing costs up to $10 for "a frivolous or vexatious claim or defense" in the Small Claims Division).
Sportswear, Inc. further noted that it had inherent power over members of its bar and that "[i]f a court may assess counsel fees against a party who has litigated in bad faith, it certainly may assess those expenses against counsel who willfully abuse judicial process." [574 F. Supp. at 621, quoting from Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 766, 100 S. Ct. 2455, 2464, 65 L. Ed. 2d 488 (1980)]. The court there assessed $20,000 in attorneys' fees against both the plaintiff and its attorneys, jointly and severally.
Similar statutory authority exists in Massachusetts, Mass.Gen.Laws Ann., ch. 231 §§ 6F, 6G, Town of Brookline v. Goldstein, 388 Mass. 443, 447 N.E. 2d 641 (Sup.Jud.Ct.Mass.1983); Wisconsin, Wis.Stats. § 814.025, Radlein v. Industrial Fire and Casualty Ins. Co., 117 Wis. 2d 605, 345 N.W. 2d 874 (1984); Florida, Fla.Stats. § 57.105, Angora Enterprises v. Condominium Association of Lakeside Village, Inc., 432 So. 2d 792 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1983); and under United States Supreme Court Rule 49.2, Tatum v. Regents, U.S. , 103 S. Ct. 3084, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1346 (1983), cited in Atkinson. In addition, sanctions have been specifically authorized in New Jersey in Union and Burlington Counties under the Individualized Case Management Project, there by special order of the Chief Justice.

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