Source: https://law.geekupd8.com/2013/08/There-is-no-requirement-that-in-the-application-or-complaint-detailed-factual-allegations-should-be-made-No-particular-format-of-application-or-petition-to-Magistrate-under-Section-156-3-is-provided-or-is-required-to-be-made.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 07:27:43+00:00

Document:
Before :- Swatanter Kumar, C.J., A.M. Khanwilkar and Smt. R.S. Dalvi, JJ.
Criminal Writ Petition No. 270 of 2009 along with Criminal Writ Petition Nos. 1445 of 2009, 2031 of 2009, 2408 of 2009, 2737 of 2009 and 2883 of 2009. D/d. 10.12.2009.
IMPORTANT Cognizable offence - Complainant whether file complaint before Court without first lodging a complaint to Police - Held, he cannot do so normally except exceptional cases.
For the Petitioner in W.P. No. 270/2009 :- Mr. D.S. Mhaispurkar, Advocate.
For the Petitioners in W.P. No. 1445/2009 :- Mr. Satish Maneshinde, Senior Advocate, a/w Mr. Ashish Chavan and Mr. Vivek Vashi i/b M/s. Bharucha & Partners.
For the Petitioners in W.P. No. 2031/2009 :- Mr. Shirish Gupte, Senior Advocate, i/b Mr. A.R. Pande, Advocates.
For the Petitioners in W.P. No. 2408/2009 :- Mr. Shirish Gupte, Senior Advocate, a/w Mr. Gaurav Agrawal and Ms. Urvashi Tapas i/b M&M Legal Venture.
For the Petitioners in W.P. No. 2737/2009 :- Mr. Ayaz R. Khan a/w Nilofar Sayed, Advocates.
For the Petitioners in W.P. No. 2883/2009 :- Mr. Shirish Gupte, Senior Advocate, a/w Mr. S.A. Sawant, Mr. H.V. Kode and Mr. Sachin Kadam, Advocates.
For the State in all the Writ Petitions :- Mr. K.V. Sasta, Additonal Public Prosecutor.
For the Respondent Nos. 2 to 4 in W.P. No. 270/2009 :- Mr. Sharif Shaikh, Mr. Y.K. Mirza and Mr. Santosh Pal, Advocates.
For the Respondent No. 2 in W.P. No. 1445/2009 :- Mr. Amit Desai, Senior Advocate, a/w Mr. Samsher Garud, Mr. Pankaj Sutar and Mr. N. Chaudhary i/b. Khaitan & Jayakar, Advocates.
For the Respondent No. 3 in W.P. No. 2031/2009 :- Mr. S.G. Shirsat, Advocate.
For the Respondent No. 1 in W.P. No. 2408/2009 :- Mr. K.G. Menon, Senior Advocate, a/w Mr. J.L. Phoujdar, Advocates.
For the Respondent in W.P. No. 2883/2009 :- Mr. A.P. Mundargi i/b Mr. V.V. Purvant, Advocates.
(1) Normally a person should invoke the provisions of Section 154 of the Code before he takes recourse to the power of the Magistrate competent to take cognizance under Section 190 of the Code, under Section 156(3) - Atleast an intimation to the police of commission of a cognizable offence under Section 154(1) would be a condition precedent for invocation of powers of the Magistrate under Section 156(3) of the Code.
(2) However there can be cases where non-compliance to the provisions of Section 154(3) would not divest the Magistrate of his jurisdiction in terms of Section 156(3). There could be cases where the police fail to act instantly and the facts of the case show that there is possibility of the evidence of commission of the offence being destroyed and/or tampered with or an applicant could approach the Magistrate under Section 156(3) of the Code directly by way of an exception as the Legislature has vested wide discretion in the Magistrate.
Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C. gives right to the person to approach the Court for issuance of direction to a Police Officer to investigate the matter - After completion of investigation Police Officer is required to file report in term of Section 173 of Cr.P.C.
C. Criminal Procedure Code, Section 156(3) - A person making an application before Court for directing the Police to make an investigation into his complaint in exercise of its power under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. - Before approaching the Court, the person should first approach the officer-in-charge of Police Station - Cannot be held that even without approaching the police officer incharge of a police station, a complaint can be made to the Court in terms of Section 156(3) of the Code. AIR 1970 SC 786. relied.
D. Criminal Procedure Code, Section 200 - Criminal complaint filed before Magistrate in terms of Section 200 of Cr.P.C. - Magistrate can issue summons, conduct an inquiry himself or direct an investigation to be made by a Police Officer or such order person as he thinks fit.
E. Criminal Procedure Code, Sections 156(3) and 154 - Complaint before Magistrate in respect of cognizable offence - Magistrate in exercise of power under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. not only can direct to police to investigate but can also direct registration of FIR. 1997(3) RCR(Criminal) 679 and 2006(1) RCR(Criminal) 450 : 2006(1) Apex Criminal 166. relied.
F. Criminal Procedure Code, Sections 156(3), 200, 190 - Complaint lodged with Police in respect of cognizable offence - Police not taking any action - Complaint is not left remediless - He can approach the Court under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. or to file complaint under Section 200 Cr.P.C. at his wisdom.
(1) There is no requirement that in the application or complaint detailed factual allegations should be made - It is sufficient for the person to make averment of facts disclosing cognizable offence further stating that the police has failed to take action despite intimation under Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure - No particular format of application or petition to Magistrate under Section 156(3) is provided or is required to be made - Suffice it for the complainant or aggrieved person to bring it to the notice of the Court under Section 156(3) that despite intimation to the police it has failed to act and investigate a cognizable offence in accordance with law or that in the fact situation of the case it was necessary to directly approach the Court - Petition cannot be rejected by the Court merely on the ground that it does not contain a proper prayer clause insofar as it discloses commission of a cognizable offence. However, where a person files a complaint under Section 200 of Cr.P.C. he is expected to State facts given details and correct versions which would amount to committing of an offence alleged.
(2) A Petition under Section 156(3) cannot be strictly construed as a complaint in terms of Section 2(d) of the Code and absence of a specific or improperly worded prayer or lack of complete and definite details would not prove fatal to a petition under Section 156(3), in so far as it states facts constituting ingredients of a cognizable offence. Such petition would be maintainable before the Magistrate.
H. Criminal Procedure Code, Section 2(d) - Criminal Procedure Code, Sections 190 and 200 - Meaning of word "complaint" explained - The word "complaint" has a wide meaning since it includes even oral allegations - No format is prescribed is which complaint must be made - A petition addressed to the Magistrate containing an allegation that an offence has been committed, and ending with a prayer that the culprits be suitably dealt with is a complaint - There has to be allegation which prima facie discloses commission of a cognizable offence with necessary facts - The complaint could be made orally, or in writing that some person whether known or unknown has committed an offence - A Police report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. is however, not a complaint - Allegations should be such which would constitute an offence under the provisions of the Indian Penal Code or under any other law - An information is a complaint only when it is made to a Magistrate while any information under Section 154 given to a police officer orally and/or in writing can be the basis for the police officer in charge of a police station to proceed with the matter. AIR 1961 SC 986. relied.
"Information" is a wider term than "complaint" and includes any communication relating to the commission of an offence - A complaint is a particular kind of information and is more or less formally made with the definite object that the person to whom the complaint is made will take action under Code of Criminal Procedure - "Information" is the genus of which "complaint" is a species - Further held : Facts giving details and correct versions which word amount to committing of an offence alleged. AIR 1930 Allahabad 820. relied.
(1) Taking cognizance does not involve any formal action or indeed action of any kind but occurs as soon as a Magistrate as such applies his mind to be suspected commission of an offence. Cognizance, therefore, takes place at a point when a Magistrate first takes judicial notice of an offence. AIR 1971 SC 2372. relied.
(3) Cognizance is taken prior to commencement of criminal proceedings. Taking of cognizance is thus a sine qua non or condition precedent for holding a valid trial. It is also settled that cognizance is taken of an offence and not of an offender.
(4) Before it can be said that any Magistrate has taken cognizance of any offence under Section 190(1)(a), Criminal Procedure Code, he must not only have applied his mind to the contents of the petition but must have done so for the purpose of proceeding in a particular way as indicated in the subsequent provisions of this Chapter-proceeding under Section 200 and thereafter sending it for inquiry and report under Section 202. AIR 1959 SC 1118. relied.
(5) While a Magistrate can order the police to investigate the complaint he has no power to compel the police to submit a chargesheet on a final report being submitted by the police. In such cases a Magistrate can either order reinvestigation or dispose of the complaint according to law. AIR 1968 SC 117. relied.
(i) The Court has the power to direct investigation in cognizable cases under Section 156(3) read with Section 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
(ii) A Magistrate can postpone the issue of process and inquire into the case himself under Section 202(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
(iii) When a chargesheet is filed, the court can refuse to accept the same and proceed to take cognizance of the offence on the basis of the materials on record. The court can direct further investigation into the matter.
(iv) The Magistrate may treat a protest petition as a complaint and proceed to deal therewith in terms of Chapter XV of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
(v) Once the case is committed, the Sessions Judge may refer the matter to the High Court.
(vi) In the event, without taking any further evidence, it is found that while passing the order of commitment, the Magistrate has committed an error in not referring the case of an accused or left out an accused after evidence is adduced, the court may proceed against a person who was not an accused provided it appears from the evidence that he should be tried with the accused.
(vii) The Revisional Court during pendency of the trial may exercise its revisional jurisdiction under Section 397 in which case, it may direct further inquiry in terms of Section 398 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
(viii) The revisional powers of the High Court and the Sessions Court are pointed out in the Code separately from a perusal whereof it would appear that the High Court exercises larger power.
(ix) In the event of any conviction by a Court of Session, an appeal there against would lie to the High Court. The appellate court exercises the power laid down under Section 386 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in which event it may also take further evidence or direct it to be taken in terms of Section 391 thereof.
(x) The High Court has inherent power under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to correct errors of the courts below and pass such orders as may be necessary to do justice to the parties and/or to prevent the abuse of process of Court. 2006(3) RCR(Criminal) 527 : 2006(2) Apex Criminal 566.relied.
Abhinandan Jha v. Dinesh Mishra, AIR 1968 SC 117.
All India Institute of Medical Sciences Employees' Union (Reg.) v. Union of India, 1997(4) R.C.R.(Criminal) 594 : (1996) 11 SCC 582 : 1997 SCC (Cri.) 303.
Darshan Singh Ram Kishan v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1971 SC 2372.
Dharmeshbhai Vasudevbhai v. State of Gujarat, 2009(3) R.C.R.(Criminal) 209 : 2009(3) R.A.J. 629 : (2009) 6 SCC 576.
Divine Retreat Centre v. State of Kerala, 2008(2) R.C.R.(Criminal) 373 : 2008(2) R.A.J. 441 : (2008) 3 SCC 542.
Gangadhar Janardan Mhatre v. State of Maharashtra, 2004(4) R.C.R.(Criminal) 682 : 2004(3) Apex Criminal 648 : 2004(7) SCC 768.
Gopal Das Sindhi v. State of Assam, AIR 1961 SC 986.
Jitendra Chandrakant Mehta v. Shamrock Impex Pvt. Ltd., 2006(3) R.C.R.(Criminal) 652 : 2006 Cri. L.J. 3131.
Kishun Singh v. State of Bihar, 1993(1) R.C.R.(Criminal) 647 : (1993) 2 SCC 16.
Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh, (2008)7 SCC 164.
Laxminarayan Vishwanath Arya v. State of Maharashtra, 2008 Cri. LJ 1.
Madhu Bala v. Suresh Kumar, 1997(3) R.C.R.(Criminal) 679 : (1997) 8 SCC 476.
Minu Kumari v. State of Bihar, 2006(3) R.C.R.(Criminal) 271 : 2006(2) Apex Criminal 473 : (2006) 4 SCC 359.
Mohd. Yousuf v. Afaq Jahan (Smt.), 2006(1) R.C.R.(Criminal) 450 : 2006(1) Apex Criminal 166 : (2006) 1 SCC 627.
Narayandas Bhagwandas Madhavdas v. State of West Bengal, 1960 1 SCR 93.
Panchabhai Popotbhai Butani v. State of Maharashtra, Writ Petition No. 270 of 2009. D/d. 14.08.2009.
Popular Muthiah v. State represented by Inspector of Police,2006(3) R.C.R.(Criminal) 527 : 2006(2) Apex Criminal 566 : (2006) 7 SCC 296.
Rajesh Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi, 1999(2) R.C.R.(Criminal) 160 : (1999) 3 SCC 259.
R.R. Chari v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1951 SCR 312 : AIR 1951 SC 207.
Sakiri Vasu v. Statement of Uttar Pradesh, 2008(1) R.C.R.(Criminal) 392 : 2007(6) R.A.J. 695 : (2008) 2 SCC 409.
Sandeep Rammilan Shukla v. State of Maharashtra, 2009(1) Mh.LJ 97.
Savitri v. Govind Singh Rawat, 1986(1) R.C.R.(Criminal) 83 : AIR 1986 SC 984.
Sheo Pratap Singh v. Emperor, AIR 1930 Allahabad 820.
State of Bihar v. J.A.C. Saldanha, 1980(1) SCC 554.
State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1991(1) R.C.R.(Criminal) 383 : 1992 Supp. (1) SCC 335.
State of Karnataka v. Pastor P Raju, 2006(3) R.C.R.(Criminal) 859 : 2006(2) Apex Criminal 687 : (2006) 6 SCC 728.
State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh, 2004(1) S.C.T. 617 : 1980(2) SCC 471.
State of W.B. v. Mohd. Khalid, 1995(1) R.C.R.(Criminal) 318 : (1995) 1 SCC 684.
Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, West Bengal v. Abani Kumar Banerjee, AIR 1950 Cal. 437.
S.K. Sinha, Chief Enforcement Officer v. Videocon International Ltd., (2008) 2 SCC 492.
S.N. Sharma v. Bipen Kumar Tiwari, AIR 1970 SC 786.
Tula Ram v. Kishore Singh, (1977) 4 SCC 459.
Swatanter Kumar, C.J. - Preamble of our Constitution guarantees to a citizen justice, liberty, equality and fraternity. All these are possible only when there is rule of law. The rule of law could discernibly be dissected into two well accepted concepts : (i) governance and (ii) administration of justice. They are not only the pillars of the Constitutional mandate, but are linchpin to the growth, development and independence of any nation or society. Governance obviously means good governance and it refers to the task of running the Government in an effective manner. Right to a legitimate and accountable government under which fundamental rights and human rights are respected and the Government controlled by the rule of law are the basic elements of good governance. Rule of law indicates good governance which requires fair legal framework that enforce law impartially. Impartial enforcement of laws requires an independent judiciary and an impartial and incorruptible police force.
2. Edward W Younkins in "The Purpose of Law and Constitutions" has noted, "The rule of law requires that people should be governed by accepted rules, rather than by the arbitrary decisions of rulers. These rules should be general and abstract, known and certain, and apply equally to all individuals." Law is the activity of subjecting human behaviour to the rules of governance. The rule of law is concerned with regulating the use of power and its imperative is that this power is not misused. The rule of law ensures that Judges decide disputes in terms of the existing, known and general rules and not according to the perceived desirability of particular outcomes. In a free society, each person has a recognized private sphere, a protected rule which government authority cannot infringe upon and the purpose of law is to preserve freedom and moral agency. (See : www.quebecoislibre.org).
3. Where rule of law is strong, people uphold the law not out of fear but because they have a stake in its effectiveness. Virtually any State, after all, can enact laws and maintain respect and pursue genuine rule of law. Genuine rule of law requires the cooperation of State and society and is an outcome of complex and deeply rooted social processes. (Ref.: "Good Governance : Rule of Law, Transparency and Accountability" by Michael Johnston, Department of Political Science, Colgate University).
4. The primary purpose of law is to regulate the flow of human interaction to prevent and check harm not only to the person and property of an individual but against the society as a whole. Crime is the main reason people believe that societies have law, which is true. If one looks at the expression "crime", it normally could be explained as what society as a whole does not want to be allowed. The Legislature has created laws to have the security to live and work in peace and harmony and not having to worry about concentrating on ways and means to protect themselves against crime of any kind. (Ref.: http://cjencyclopedia.com/index.php ? title Purpose of Law).
5. Within the realm of codified laws, there are generally two forms of laws with which the Courts are mainly concerned. Civil laws are rules and regulations which govern transactions and grievances between individuals, while criminal law is concerned with action which are dangerous or harmful to a society as a whole in which prosecution is pursued not by an individual but rather by the State. The purpose of criminal law is to provide the specific definition of what constitutes a crime and to prescribe punishments for it. In absence of any of these factors probably the essentials of criminal law would not be satisfied. (Ref. : Criminal justice - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia - http://en.wikipedia.org.).
6. It is not only the obligation of the State administration but for that matter even of the Courts to ensure that a fair and effective criminal justice system is in place and is implemented. Administration of criminal justice system has two primary facets - investigation and trial leading to punishing the guilty offender.
7. In India, the administration of criminal justice system is controlled under the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as "the Code"). Like in many other parts of the world, under the Indian criminal jurisprudence, the system accepts two procedures for redressing the grievance of a victim against the offender including that by the State itself. The Criminal Procedure Code is concerned with "how the law is enforced". Criminal law involves "what law is enforced".
8. The two accepted methods for enforcing administration of criminal justice system are a direct access and invocation of the Courts system, while the other is adopting the channel through the State agency. (Police/Investigating agency). The option is available to a complainant or a victim or anybody for that matter and the provisions of the Code provide a detailed statutory scheme for invocation, implementation, trial and punishment of a guilty person under these different methodologies. In the event a person chooses to approach a police station and makes a report of a cognizable offence, the police is under an obligation to register First Information Report (FIR) except in certain exceptional cases where some kind of preliminary inquiry may be necessary in the facts and circumstances of that case before registration of an FIR. However, even there, the officer in charge of a police station is under obligation to make an entry in the daily diary register as per police rules and thereafter within the shortest possible time must register an FIR in accordance with law. (Ref. : Sandeep Rammilan Shukla v. State of Maharashtra, 2009 (1) Mh.LJ 97).
9. Where a person has approached the police station under Section 154 but the police station does not register FIR as contemplated under law, he has a right to make a complaint to the higher authorities in terms of Section 154(3) of the Code and such higher authority exercising the powers of an officer-in- charge of a police station would investigate the matter himself or direct the investigation to be conducted by another police officer subordinate to him. In the event the information of any kind received by the police officer incharge of a police station relates to commission of a non-cognizable offence, he is obliged to proceed in accordance with the provisions of Section 155 of the Code. The Legislature provides a specific protection in terms of Section 156(3) of the Code and gives a right to a person to approach the court of competent jurisdiction for issuance of a direction to a police officer to investigate the matter in accordance with law. Once the investigation is completed by the investigating agency, it is required of the said agency to file appropriate report in terms of Section 173 of the Code, whereupon the Court competent to try such an offence would take cognizance and conduct the trial and punish the offender, if found guilty, in accordance with law.
10. The other branch of the procedural law under the Code is where any one may approach the Court of competent jurisdiction by institution of a complaint in terms of Section 200 of the Code. Once such a complaint is filed and it is shown to the satisfaction of the Magistrate taking cognizance of the offence that offence has been committed, he shall follow the procedure prescribed under Chapter XV of the Code. Interestingly, even when a complaint is received by the Magistrate in terms of Section 200 of the Code, he can issue summons, conduct an inquiry himself or direct an investigation to be made by a police officer or such other person as he thinks fit.
11. The Magistrate exercising powers under Section 159 is also expected to proceed with the matter in accordance with the provisions of the Code upon receipt of the report in terms of Sections 157 and 158 and either direct an inquiry by a Magistrate subordinate to him or may direct investigation.
12. This is the entire gamut of procedure for any one desirous of putting a criminal justice system into motion. In fact, as stated by the Supreme Court in the case of A.R. Antulay v. Ramdas Sriniwas Nayak and another, (1984) 2 SCC 500, it was clearly stated that scheme underlying the Code of Criminal Procedure clearly reveals that anyone who wants to give information of an offence may either approach the Magistrate or the officer in charge of a police station. It also stated that it was open to the Magistrate but not obligatory upon him to direct investigation by police. Thus, two agencies have been set up for taking offenders to the Court. These observations of the Supreme Court, of course, were made where the Court was not concerned with the ambit, scope and application of the provisions of Section 154 and for that matter Section 156 of the Code.
13. The purpose of indicating the above enunciated law is to demonstrate that a codified law, as accepted by judicial dictums, only accepts two distinct procedures to be adopted by any one desirous of invoking the provisions and/or putting the mechanism of criminal justice system into motion.
"18. ...... When Vijay Shankar Nigam lodged the report, police registered an offence and started investigation. Thereafter, the said Vijay Shankar Nigam moved the Magistrate having jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence that the false report has been lodged against him and therefore by invoking the powers under section 159 of the Code of Criminal Procedure that investigation may be stopped and the Magistrate may make further preliminary enquiry. The Magistrate allowed that prayer. The matter went to the High Court. The High Court quashed the order of the Magistrate and held that police were at liberty to conclude the investigation and submit their report to the Magistrate. In that background, the matter went to the Supreme Court. Obviously, the issue before the Supreme Court was whether the Magistrate has powers under section 159 of the Criminal Procedure Code to stop investigation, as prayed. In view of this background, the aforesaid observations of the Supreme Court heavily relied upon by Mr. Chitnis are of no use to him. We do not agree with his submissions and his contention that before filing of the complaint before the Magistrate in respect of cognizable offence without approaching the police, is required to be rejected, and is hereby rejected."
"1. This petition raises question about the scope of Section 156(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code as to whether in the absence of a complaint to the police, a complaint can be made directly before a Magistrate. It also raises a question as to whether without filing a complaint within the meaning of Section 2(d) and praying only for an action under Section 156(3) a complaint before a Magistrate was maintainable. There is a judgment of this Court (Jitendra Chandrakant Mehta v. M/s. Shamrock Impex Pvt. Ltd. and others) reported in 2006 (4) Mh.LO.J. 355. We feel large number of cases come to this Court which raises same questions of law and, therefore, this issue needs to be decided by a Larger Bench as we do not find ourselves in agreement with some of the conclusions of the earlier Division Bench. Let the matter be placed before the Hon'ble the Chief Justice for transmission before a Full Bench. ......"
16. From the bare reading of the above Order of Reference, it appears to contain two questions, namely, (i) whether in absence of a complaint to the police, a complaint can be made directly before a Magistrate ? and (ii) whether without filing a complaint within the meaning of Section 2(d) and praying only for an action under Section 156(3), a complaint before a Magistrate was maintainable ?
17. The first question primarily is a question of law simplicitor, while the later relates to the procedural aspect of the same facet of law. The Bench probably was not able to contribute to the view of the Division Bench in Jitendra Mehta (supra) that before filing of a complaint before a Magistrate in respect of a cognizable offence, it was not necessary to approach the police. In other words, the question raised is as to whether filing of a complaint under Section 154 is a condition precedent to invocation of powers of the Magistrate under Section 156(3). The other aspect relates to the format and contents of a complaint/application filed under Section 156(3) of the Code. The earlier Division Bench in Jitendra Mehta (supra) had taken the view that the complaint if not containing detailed facts or where there is absence of any specific prayer would not affect the legality and validity of the complaint and the Magistrate competent to take cognizance under Section 190 of the Code was competent to issue directions for investigation in terms of Section 156(3) of the Code.
18. Number of matters were directed to be placed before the Full Bench in view of the Order of Reference made in Writ Petition No. 270 of 2009. We are of the considered view that it would be appropriate to refer to necessary facts which led to passing of the Order of Reference. We would be referring only to the limited facts and that too in Criminal Writ Petition No. 270 of 2009 and Criminal Writ Petition No. 2883 of 2009.
19. In Criminal Writ Petition No. 270 of 2009, Respondent No. 2 had entered into a registered development agreement on 9th July 1997 with one Krishna Hari Tiwari in respect of a land admeasuring 6309.19 sq.mtrs. of Survey No. 38, Hissa No. 1/1 situated at Mauje Gauripada, Taluka Kalyan, District Thane. Respondent No. 2 was not able to complete the development agreement and he further agreed to transfer the development rights in favour of Petitioner No. 2 by means of a Memorandum of Understanding dated 25th May 2002. Certain rights and obligations were created by the respective parties by means of these documents. Petitioners were to give an additional area of 2000 sq.ft. to the original owner and deposit a sum of Rupees Four lakhs with Respondent No. 2 for due performance of the agreement. To implement the agreement between the parties effectively, Respondent No. 2 also executed a Power of Attorney dated 24th February 2003 in favour of the Petitioners. The Petitioners initially carried out the development of the said property. Certain disputes arose between the parties. According to the Petitioners, they had carried out the development in terms of the agreement between the parties and even handed over the flats to Respondent No. 2, while, according to Respondent No. 2, he had disputed the complete and effective execution of the development agreement which was denied by the Petitioners who stated that disputes created by Respondent No. 2 were frivolous. Certain demands were raised by the respective parties against one another. The original owners of the property also raised a dispute that the flats had not been allotted to them as agreed. The KDMC issued a completion certificate on 16th October 2007. Certain correspondence was exchanged between the parties through their Counsel and allegations made by each other were refuted. Somewhere on 15th April 2008, the Petitioners claimed to have handed over the area of 7000 sq.ft. and the original owners executed a writing releasing the Petitioners as well as Respondent No. 2 from any liability. Respondent No. 2 proceeded with their application that Petitioners had committed the breach of directions of the agreement and not handed over the requisite flat areas to the original owners and the deed was a forged document. On these averments, Respondent No. 2 filed a criminal case being Case No. 344/2008 before the learned JMFC Court No. 1, Kalyan and prayed in the application that under Section 156(3), the Court should direct the police station to investigate the matter and take appropriate action. Upon the application of Respondent No. 2, the Magistrate passed an order directing the concerned police station to investigate the matter. In furtherance thereto, on 8th October 2008, the concerned police station registered an FIR being FIR No. 1/369 for an offence under Sections 420 read with 34 IPC. Upon registration of this FIR, Petitioner Nos. 1 to 3 were arrested and subsequently released on bail. Compelled with these circumstances, the Petitioners filed the present Petition on 31st January 2009 praying that CR No. 1/369 of 2008 under Section 420 read with 34 IPC registered at Mahatma Phule Police Station be quashed with an interim prayers that the proceedings in furtherance thereto be stayed. The quashing of the FIR was prayed on different grounds including the one that it was a dispute of a civil nature, the complaint was mala fide and the offence of forgery was not made out. It may be noticed that when the matters came up for hearing before the Court, the objection was taken that the Respondent in the Petition had not invoked the provisions of Section 154 of the Code before filing an application under Section 156(3).
20. In other Criminal Writ Petition No. 2883 of 2009, the dispute relates to the property CS No. 1/725 (Part) of Malabar Hill Division, the land which was acquired by the Municipal Corporation consisting of 14 structures with nearly 278 tenants who had formed a society on 9th July 1996 and submitted a proposal under Section 33(7) of the DC Regulations, 1991 to the Competent Authority. This was approved finally vide resolution of the Corporation No. 752 dated 15th October 1996. A Memorandum of Undertaking was executed between M/s. Crescent Builders and the Society on 17th October 1996 for carrying out the redevelopment work. Tripartite agreement was entered into on 16th July 1998 between the Corporation, Society and the Petitioners for providing 278 tenements of 225 sq.ft. each and the Petitioners were permitted to sell 35,392 sq.ft. area in open market. This claim was modified in view of the amendment of Regulation 33(7) of the Development Control Regulations in the year 1999. After issuance of the IOD and NOC in 2005/2006, supplementary agreement was entered into between the Petitioners, Respondent No. 1 for opening an escrow account for depositing capitalized value. The said agreement became redundant and another agreement was entered into on 24th August 2007 between the Petitioner firm and Respondent No. 1 for purchase of additional FSI of approximately 40000 sq.ft. Litigation with the Corporation was also pending in the Court where after Respondent No. 1 filed a Suit in this Court praying that the agreement dated 8th January 1997, 29th June 1997, 24th August 2007 are valid, subsisting and binding and that the Petitioners should be compelled to act in terms thereof. The Petitioners have also filed a Writ Petition No. 72 of 2009 challenging the action of the Corporation. The order passed by the Deputy Municipal Commissioner was upheld by the Court vide its order dated 13th August 2009. The order is assailed before the Supreme Court which is stated to be pending. However, in the meanwhile, on 4th September 2009, Respondent No. 1 filed a complaint under Sections 409, 467, 468, 471, 420 read with 34 and 120B IPC before the Metropolitan Magistrate 29th Court at Dadar, Mumbai, praying that the matter be referred for investigation under Section 156(3) and for a report under Section 173(8) of the Code. On this application, on the same day, the Metropolitan Magistrate passed an order directing the Bhoiwada Police Station to investigate the matter in accordance with law, in furtherance to which on 21st September 2009, FIR No MECR 8/2009 for offences under Sections 409, 467, 468, 471, 420 read with 34 IPC is registered. These Petitioners have, therefore, filed the present Writ Petition No. 2883 of 2009 under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code for setting aside the order dated 4th September 2009 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate and also praying for an interim order for stay of the proceedings.
21. Somewhat similar are the facts in other Writ Petitions which had been listed before us. All these matters relate to disputes which are of commercial nature with regard to the offence of cheating, forgery, etc. Even in Writ Petition No. 2408 of 2009, the concerned Division Bench dealing with the matter on 17th September 2009 passed an order that the question raised in the Petition was similar as raised in Writ Petition No. 270 of 2009 and, therefore, directed that the matter be listed before this Bench. In other words, all these matters have been listed for answering the question of law as framed by the Bench in Criminal Writ Petition No. 270 of 2009.
22. At the very outset, we must notice that none of these cases appears to be of such nature of urgency that time could be treated as the essence. These were primarily commercial transactions and parties themselves have approached the Court by invoking the provisions of Section 156(3) after more than years from the date of entering into agreement and alleged breach of the terms of the agreement or alleged commission of the offence of cheating or forgery.
23. In order to appropriately answer the questions formulated by the Bench in the Order of Reference, it will be desirable to examine the scheme under the Code with particular reference to the matters in issue before us.
(ix) In the event of any conviction by a Court of Session, an appeal thereagainst would lie to the High Court. The appellate court exercises the power laid down under Section 386 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in which event it may also take further evidence or direct it to be taken in terms of Section 391 thereof.
(x) The High Court has inherent power under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to correct errors of the courts below and pass such orders as may be necessary to do justice to the parties and/or to prevent the abuse of process of court."
25. Chapter XII of the Code of Criminal Procedure relates to information to the police and their powers to investigate. The chapter exclusively deals with the information to the police and the manner in which the investigation may be conducted and interestingly provides for the power of the Court to direct investigation under the provisions of Section 156(3), whereupon the police officer is expected to submit a report in terms of Section 173 of the Code which then shall be dealt with by the Court in accordance with the procedure prescribed under Section 190 of the Code. This chapter primarily relates to the commencement of investigation by the police officer upon receiving an intimation in terms of Section 154 in relation to a cognizable offence. Whatever interjection is permissible by the Court has also been stated under the provisions of Sections 156, 159 and 173. In relation to information of claim of non-cognizable cases, the police has to act in accordance with Section 155. It is expected of every person to give information to the police of commission of any cognizable offence and the police is normally bound to register an FIR if a commission of a cognizable offence is made out or atleast make a daily diary entry and then register the FIR within a short time as held by a Full Bench of this Court in the case of Sandeep Rammilan Shukla (supra). Despite such information having been received by the police officer, if an FIR is not registered under Section 154(1), the remedy to the aggrieved person is provided under Section 154(3). If action is not taken by the superior officer under Section 154(3), then any person has a right to invoke the power of the Court under Section 156(3). Section 154 relates to providing of an information to a police officer incharge of a police station, who then in case of a cognizable offence has the power to start investigation forthwith in terms of Section 156(1) where he does not need an order of a Magistrate directing investigation. The investigation by a police officer who may not have been competent or empowered to investigate would not render the investigation illegal or unacceptable in terms of Section 156(2) of the Code. Section 156(3) is a power which could be exercised by the Magistrate directing the investigation to be conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Code. Section 156(3) can hardly come into play if the information of a cognizable offence has been given to a police officer under Section 154 of the Code and he has already started his investigation upon registering of an FIR in terms of Section 156(1) of the Code. The power contemplated under Section 156(3) appears to be the power of the Magistrate which would be exercised primarily in the event of default committed by a police officer or who refuses to register an FIR and exercise investigative powers in terms of Sections 154(1) and 156(1) of the Code. Once the investigation has commenced in terms of Section 154(1) by the police or in furtherance to an order passed by the Magistrate under Section 156(3), then it must culminate in filing of a report under Section 173 or under Section 169 as the case may be. Therefore, right from providing of information of a cognizable offence to all aspects of investigation and the conclusion thereof culminating into furnishing of a report before the Court in terms of Section 173, all matters are regulated under Chapter XII of the Code.
26. Then comes Chapter XIII. This is a Chapter which deals entirely with the jurisdiction of the Court to inquire and try offences and it primarily provides matters relating to jurisdiction and place of trial. Chapter XIV again deals primarily with matters relatable to Court proceedings. Under Section 190, cognizance of an offence can be taken by a Magistrate of the First Class or such other Magistrate as empowered. The source of taking cognizance could be (a) on the basis of the complaint received by him which constitutes an offence; (b) upon police report of such facts and (c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon his own knowledge that such offence has been committed. This Chapter then deals with other matters relating to inquiry or trial, mainly, with cognizance of offence by Courts, sanctions, prosecutions of public servants, etc. These two intervening Chapters, i.e. Chapter XIII and Chapter XIV then lead us to Chapter XV which is the other paramount important Chapter under the Criminal Procedure Code. Under this Chapter, any person can invoke the jurisdiction of the Court and pray before the Court that the person alleged to be guilty of an offence should be summoned, tried and, if found guilty, be punished in accordance with the provisions of the Code. Section 200 gives a right to a complainant to file his complaint before a Magistrate who may take cognizance thereof and proceed with the matter in accordance with the provisions of Sections 200 to 203 of this Chapter and upon taking cognizance he may take the steps and pass order as contemplated under Section 202 of the Code including directing an inquiry or investigation by a police officer of the complaint directly presented to the Magistrate under Section 200 of the Code.
27. We may notice at this stage that Chapter XII is inclusive of powers exercisable by the Magistrate at a precognizance stage, while Chapter XV is a postcognizable proceedings. Reference to Section 190 in the provisions of Section 156(3) is primarily to clarify the jurisdiction of the Court which is competent to pass an order under Section 156(3). Its reference no way renders the proceedings under Section 156(3) before the court as postcognizance stage of proceedings by the Court of competent jurisdiction.
28. It is for this reason that taking cognizance of an offence under Section 190 actually requires a judicious application of mind by the Court with regard to the contents of a complaint and to make up its mind whether the offence alleged appears to have been committed prima facie. It is a stage where the Court should exercise its judicial powers to proceed with the matter further by summoning the accused or by directing investigation on certain issues by the police agency or even requiring the complainant to lead evidence at presummons stage.
"... 'taking cognizance does not involve any formal action or indeed action of any kind but occurs as soon as a Magistrate as such applies his mind to be suspected commission of an offence'".
"Taking cognizance does not involve any formal action or indeed action of any kind but occurs as soon as a Magistrate as such applies his mind to be suspected commission of an offence. Cognizance, therefore, takes place at a point when a Magistrate first takes judicial notice of an offence. This is the position whether the Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence on a complaint, or on a police report, or upon information of a person other than a police officer."
13. It is necessary to mention here that taking cognizance of an offence is not the same thing as issuance of process. Cognizance is taken at the initial stage when the Magistrate applies his judicial mind to the facts mentioned in a complaint or to a police report or upon information received from any other person that an offence has been committed. The issuance of process is at a subsequent stage when after considering the material placed before it the court decides to proceed against the offenders against whom a prima facie case is made out."
30. Similarly, in the case of S.K. Sinha, Chief Enforcement Officer v. Videocon International Ltd. and others, (2008) 2 SCC 492, the Supreme Court explained that expression "cognizance" has not been defined in the Code but the word is not found of indefinite import. It has no esoteric or mystic significance in criminal law. It merely means "become aware of and when used with reference to a Court or a Judge, it connotes "to take notice of judicially". Taking cognizance does not involve any formal action of any kind. It occurs as soon as a Magistrate applies his mind to the suspected commission of an offence. Cognizance is taken prior to commencement of criminal proceedings. Taking of cognizance is thus a sine qua non or condition precedent for holding a valid trial. It is also settled that cognizance is taken of an offence and not of an offender.
"Taking cognizance does not involve any formal action or indeed action of any kind but occurs as soon as a Magistrate as such applies his mind to be suspected commission of an offence'".
"It seems to me clear however that before it can be said that any Magistrate has taken cognizance of any offence under Section 190(1)(a), Criminal Procedure Code, he must not only have applied his mind to the contents of the petition but he must have done so for the purpose of proceeding in a particular way as Section 200 and thereafter sending it for inquiry and report under Section 202. When the Magistrate applies his mind not for the purpose of proceeding under the subsequent sections of this Chapter, but for taking action of some other kind, e.g. ordering investigation under Section 156(3), or issuing a search warrant for the purpose of the investigation, he cannot be said to have taken cognizance of the offence."
(c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge, that such offfence has been committed.
"It seems to me clear however that before it can be said that any Magistrate has taken cognizance of any offence under Section 190(1)(a), Criminal Procedure Code, he must not only have applied his mind to the contents of the petition but must have done so for the purpose of proceeding in a particular way as indicated in the subsequent provisions of this Chapter - proceeding under Section 200 and thereafter sending it for inquiry and report under Section 202".
9. It is now well settled by the decision of this Court in Abhinandan Jha v. Dinesh Mishra, AIR 1968 SC 117 that while a Magistrate can order the police to investigate the complaint he has no power to compel the police to submit a chargesheet on a final report being submitted by the police. In such cases a Magistrate can either order reinvestigation or dispose of the complaint according to law.
"Any Magistrate empowered under Section 190 may order such an investigation as above mentioned."
In the instant case as the allegations made against the accused made out a case exclusively triable by the Court of Session the Magistrate was clearly debarred from ordering any investigation, but he was not debarred from making any enquiry himself into the trust of the complaint. This is what exactly the Magistrate purported to have done in the instant case. The Magistrate issued notice to the complainant to appear before him, recorded the statement of the complainant and his witnesses and after perusing the same he acted under Section 204 of the Code by issuing process to the accused appellants as he was satisfied that there was sufficient grounds for proceeding against the accused.
1. That a Magistrate can order investigation under Section 156(3) only at the precognizance stage, that is to say, before taking cognizance under Sections 190, 200 and 204 and where a Magistrate decides to take cognizance under the provisions of Chapter 14 he is not entitled in law to order any investigation under Section 156(3) though in cases not falling within the proviso to Section 202 he can order an investigation by the police which would be in the nature of an enquiry as contemplated by Section 202 of the Code.
(a) He can peruse the complaint and if satisfied that there are sufficient grounds for proceeding he can straightaway issue process to the accused but before he does so he must comply with the requirements of Section 200 and record the evidence of the complainant or his witness.
(b) The Magistrate can postpone the issue of process and direct an enquiry by himself.
(c) The Magistrate can postpone the issue of process and direct an enquiry by any other person or an investigation by the police.
3. In case the Magistrate after considering the statement of the complainant and the witnesses or as a result of the investigation and the enquiry ordered is not satisfied that there are sufficient grounds for proceeding he can dismiss the complaint.
4. Where a Magistrate orders investigation by the police before taking cognizance under Section 156(3) of the Code and receives the report thereupon he can act on the report and discharge the accused or straightaway issue process against the accused or apply his mind to the complaint filed before him and take action under Section 190 as described above."
"What is taking cognizance has not been defined in the Criminal Procedure Code and I have no desire to attempt to define it. It seems to me clear however that before it can be said that any Magistrate has taken cognizance of any offence under Section 190(1)(a), Criminal Procedure Code, he must not only have applied his mind to the contents of the petition but he must have done so for the purpose of proceeding in a particular way as Section 200 and thereafter sending it for inquiry and report under Section 202. When the Magistrate applies his mind not for the purpose of proceeding under the subsequent sections of this Chapter, but for taking action of some other kind, e.g. ordering investigation under Section 156(3), or issuing a search warrant for the purpose of the investigation, he cannot be said to have taken cognizance of the offence"
were approved by this Court in R.R. Chari v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1951 SCR 312 : (AIR 1951 SC 207). It would be clear from the observations of Mr. Justice Das Gupta that when a Magistrate applies his mind not for the purpose of proceeding under the various sections of Chapter XVI but for taking action of some other kind, e.g. ordering investigation under Section 156(3) or issuing a search warrant for the purpose of investigation, he cannot be said to have taken cognizance of any offence. The observations of Mr. Justice Das Gupta above referred to were also approved by this Court in the case of Narayandas Bhagwandas Madhavdas v. State of West Bengal, 1960 1 SCR 93. It will be clear, therefore, that in the present case neither the Additional District Magistrate nor Mr. Thomas applied his mind to the complaint filed on August 3, 1957, with a view to taking cognizance of an offence. The Additional District Magistrate passed on the complaint to Mr. Thomas to deal with it. Mr. Thomas seeing that cognizable offences were mentioned in the complaint did not apply his mind to it with a view to taking cognizance of any offence; on the contrary in his opinion it was a matter to be investigated by the police under Section 156(3) of the Code. The action of Mr. Thomas comes within the observations of Mr. Justice Das Gupta. In these circumstances, we do not think that the first contention on behalf of the appellants has any substance."
33. Reference in this regard can also be made to another judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Kishun Singh and others v. State of Bihar, (1993) 2 SCC 16, where the Supreme Court observed that the object of Section 190 is to ensure safety of a citizen against the vagaries of the police by giving him the right to approach the Magistrate directly if police does not take action or he has reason to believe that no such action will be taken by the police. Even though expression "take cognizance" is not defined, it is well settled, that it effectuates when Magistrate takes notice of accusations and applies his mind to the allegations made in the complaint.
34. Taking cognizance of an offence is distinguishable from initiation of proceedings. In fact, as already noticed, it is a step taken in a proceeding by the Magistrate or the Court of competent jurisdiction. Taking cognizance is not the same thing as issuance of process. Taking cognizance is different from initiation of proceedings. Reference can also be made in this regard to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of State of W.B. and another v. Mohd. Khalid and others, (1995) 1 SCC 684.
35. From this discussion, it is clear that the order under Section 156(3) is passed at a precognizance stage of a proceeding before the Court and is limited to the extent of directing an investigation in accordance with law. Earlier, the settled principle of law in Indian Courts was that the Magistrate while exercising powers under Section 156(3) could only direct investigation of a case and not registration of an FIR. However, with the development and expansion of principles of criminal jurisprudence, this has undergone a definite change. Now, for quite some time the Supreme Court has taken a consistent view that the Magistrate exercising his power under Section 156(3) can direct registration of an FIR and his jurisdiction is not only limited to a direction to investigate the offence.
"10. .... In our opinion, when an order for investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code is to be made the proper direction to the police would be "to register a case at the police station treating the complaint as the first information report and investigate into the same."
"11. The clear position therefore is that any Judicial Magistrate, before taking cognizance of the offence, can order investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code. If he does so, he is not to examine the complainant on oath because he was not taking cognizance of any offence therein. For the purpose of enabling the police to start investigation it is open to the Magistrate to direct the police to register an FIR. There is nothing illegal in doing so. After all registration of an FIR involves only the process of entering the substance of the information relating to the commission of the cognizable offence in a book kept by the office in charge of the police station as indicated in Section 154 of the Code. Even if a Magistrate does not say in so many words while directing investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code that an FIR should be registered, it is the duty of the officer in charge of the police station to register the FIR regarding the cognizable offence disclosed by the complainant because that police officer could take further steps contemplated in Chapter XII of the Code only thereafter."
38. Therefore, it cannot be questioned any longer that an order under Section 156(3) by a Magistrate directing registration of an FIR and investigation thereof in accordance with law is an order precognizance. Section 156(3) is part of Chapter XII of the Code which primarily relates to investigation by police of a cognizable offence. The law casts an abundant statutory duty upon the police officer in charge of a police station to register the case wherever commission of a cognizable offence is brought to his notice in any form. Normally, it will be default of Section 154 which will lead to invoking the power of the Court under Section 156(3) of the Code as if the FIR has been registered and the complaint has been investigated in accordance with law. In other words, the Code takes complete care of dealing with every situation that may arise in the course of the investigation or inquiry being conducted under the two sources to which anybody has an access under the provisions of the Code.
39. Investigation squarely falls within the domain of the investigating agency. It is the phase where the State discharges its obligation through the investigating agency to find out whether the alleged offence was committed or not and if committed by whom and how ? After collecting the entire evidence during the course of investigation, the police officer empowered to investigate is to file a report under Section 173 of the Code.
40. In case of a default in the performance of its statutory duty by the police or the investigating agency, the person aggrieved is not left remediless. He can invoke the provisions of Sections 154(3) and 156(3) as well. This decision is left to the wisdom of the aggrieved person or the complainant, whether he wishes to approach the Court under Section 156(3) or to file a complaint under Section 200 of the Code. There are no limitations and restrictions laid down by the Code for invocation of this power. Section 156(3) in the scheme of the Code appears to be preceding Chapter XV and is referable to the default committed by the police officer in terms of Section 154(1) of the Code.
41. In the case of Devarapalli Lakshminarayana Reddy and others v. V. Narayana Reddy and others, (1976) 3 SCC 252, the Supreme Court specifically held that the order under Section 156(3) is in the nature of a peremptory reminder or intimation to the police to exercise their plenary powers of investigation under Section 156(1) of the Code. Such an investigation embraces the entire continuous process which begins with the collection of evidence under Section 156 and ends with a report or chargesheet under Section 173. In this very case, the Supreme Court also noticed the distinction between an order under Section 156(3) in contra51 distinction to an order under Section 202 of the Code. When the Court orders an investigation within the scope of Section 202, it is not required to initiate a fresh case on a police report but its object is to primarily assist the Court in completing the proceedings already instituted before the Court of competent jurisdiction.
"6. It is well settled that any person may set the criminal law in motion subject of course to the statutory interdicts. When an offence is committed, a first information report can be lodged under Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short "the Code"). A complaint petition may also be filed in terms of Section 200 thereof. However, in the event for some reasons or the other, the first information report is not recorded in terms of subsection (1) of Section 156 of the Code, the Magistrate is empowered under subsection (3) of Section 156 thereof to order an investigation into the allegations contained in the complaint petition. Thus, power to direct investigation may arise in two different situations - (1) when a first information report is refused to be lodged; or (2) when the statutory power of investigation for some reason or the other is not conducted.
7. When an order is passed under subsection (3) of Section 156 of the Code, an investigation must be carried out. Only when the investigating officer arrives at a finding that the alleged offence has not been committed by the accused, he may submit a final form; on the other hand, upon investigation if it is found that a prima facie case has been made out, a chargesheet must be filed."
"23. In Savitri v. Govind Singh Rawat, 1986(1) R.C.R.(Criminal) 83 : AIR 1986 SC 984, this Court held that the power conferred on the Magistrate under Section 125 CrPC to grant maintenance to the wife implies the power to grant interim maintenance during the pendency of the proceeding, otherwise she may starve during this period.
24. In view of the abovementioned legal position, we are of the view that although Section 156(3) is very briefly worded, there is an implied power in the Magistrate under Section 156(3) CrPC to order registration of a criminal offence and/or to direct the officer in charge of the police station concerned to hold a proper investigation and take all such necessary steps that may be necessary for ensuring a proper investigation including monitoring the same. Even though these powers have not been expressly mentioned in Section 156(3) CrPC, we are of the opinion that they are implied in the above provision.
25. We have elaborated on the above matter because we often find that when someone has a grievance that his FIR has not been registered at the police station and/or a proper investigation is not being done by the police, he rushes to the High Court to file a writ petition or a petition under Section 482 CrPC. We are of the opinion that the High Court should not encourage this practice and should ordinarily refuse to interfere in such matters and relegate the petitioner to his alternating remedy, first under Section 154(3) and Section 36 CrPC before the police officers concerned, and if that is of no avail, by approaching the Magistrate concerned under Section 156(3).
26. If a person has a grievance that his FIR has not been registered by the police station his first remedy is to approach the Superintendent of Police under Section 154(3) CrPC or other police officer referred to in Section 36 CrPC. If despite approaching the Superintendent of Police or the officer referred to in Section 36 his grievance still persists, then he can approach a Magistrate under Section 156(3) CrPC instead of rushing to the High Court by way of a writ petition or a petition under Section 482 CrPC. Moreover, he has a further remedy of filing a criminal complaint under Section 200 CrPC. Why then should writ petitions or Section 482 petitions be entertained when there are so many alternative remedies ?
27. As we have already observed above, the Magistrate has very wide powers to direct registration of an FIR and to ensure a proper investigation and for this purpose he can monitor the investigation to ensure that the investigation is done properly (though he cannot investigate himself). The High Court should discourage the practice of filing a writ petition or petition under Section 482 CrPC simply because a person has a grievance that his FIR has not been registered by the police, or after being registered, proper investigation has not been done by the police. For this grievance, the remedy lies under Sections 36 and 154(3) before the police officers concerned, and if that is of no avail, under Section 156(3) CrPC before the Magistrate or by filing a criminal complaint under Section 200 CrPC and not by filing a writ petition or a petition under Section 482 Cr PC."
44. In this very case, the Supreme Court also made an observation that even the investigation can be monitored by the Magistrate exercising powers under Section 156(3). To this, some judgments to the contrary were brought to our notice, but it is not necessary for us to examine the merit or otherwise of this contention inasmuch as that is not the question to be answered by this Bench in light of the Order of Reference.
45. In the case of Divine Retreat Centre v. State of Kerala and others, 2008(2) R.C.R.(Criminal) 373 : 2008(2) R.A.J. 441:(2008) 3 SCC 542, the Supreme Court held that power to investigate an offence is exclusively reserved for the police. This view has predominantly prevailed in the Indian law now and the investigation is stated to be exclusively in the domain of the investigating agency. How such investigation has to be conducted is primarily stated in Chapter XII of the Code which starts with Section 154.
46. To us it appears to be essential that normally a person should invoke the provisions of Section 154 of the Code before he can take recourse to the powers of the Magistrate under Section 156(3). The provisions of Section 156(3) are consequential upon a default of a police officer failing to comply with the requirements of Section 154 to the prejudice of the aggrieved person or the complainant, as the case may be. Once the police officer fulfills his duty/obligation and completes investigation in accordance with law, leading to the filing of the report under Section 173, the provisions of Section 156(3) would stand exhausted and can hardly be taken recourse to. Despite this, we find it difficult to lay down any straitjacket formula in this regard. It may not be very advisable to state it as an absolute proposition of law without any exception. There can be cases where the time lag involved in the commission of the crime, intimation to the police and its inaction in terms of Section 154, make it difficult for a complainant or an aggrieved person including a victim to first take recourse to the provisions of Section 154(3) and then invoke the jurisdiction of the Court under Section 156(3). Such cases could be the ones where there is likelihood of the evidence being destroyed and the delay in investigation may prove fatal to the case of the prosecution or the complainant. In such exceptional circumstances, it cannot be said that any person who has approached the police under Section 154 for registration of information of commission of an cognizable offence and the police instantly fails to act, is debarred from approaching the Court directly under Section 156(3). As a normal proposition of law, invocation of the provisions of Section 154 in its entirety should be treated as a condition precedent to invocation of the powers of the Court under Section 156(3), but there can be exceptions where the facts and circumstances of the case justify directly approaching the Court by the complainant. If a person is desirous of invoking the judicial process at the very first instance, he can always take recourse to Section 200 as contained in Chapter XV of the Code, but if he wishes to invoke the powers of the Court under Section 156(3), normally, he may exhaust the remedy available to him as is provided by the Legislature in terms of Section 154 of the Code.
47. Particularly in light of the facts of the cases where the question has been referred to us, we do not see any reason to say that it would be unfair, unjust or in any way prejudicial to hold that the complainants concerned should have invoked the provisions of Section 154 of the Code before invoking the powers of the Court under Section 156(3) of the Code. We would certainly hasten to add that this cannot be laid down as an absolute proposition of law or a straitjacket formula applicable to all cases uniformly, without reference to the facts and circumstances of a given case. This is a rule which is not free of exception. In other words, there can be cases where strict compliance to the provisions of Section 154(1) and (3) in their entirety may not be insisted upon by the Court. This will be the case where heinous crime is committed and despite intimation to the police, the police failed to take action forthwith and/or cases where there is likelihood of crucial material evidence being destroyed, damaged and/or tampered with to the prejudice of the complainant. In such cases, the Court may have to entertain an application under Section 156(3) without compliance of Section 154(3) but still an averment that the police were approached and have failed to act or why the applicant has chosen to directly approach the Court for issuance of direction under Section 156(3) would be somewhat necessary, to be mentioned in the complaint.
"2(d) "complaint" means any allegation made orally or in writing to a Magistrate, with a view to his taking action under this Code, that some person, whether known or unknown, has committed an offence, but does not include a police report."
As already noticed, the complaint could be made orally, or in writing that some person whether known or unknown has committed an offence but the most important feature of the complaint is that a police report has been excluded from the ambit of a complaint. The police report obviously means a report submitted under Section 173 of the Code. The expression "with a view to his taking action under the Code" is of some significance. This indicates that the allegations should be such which would constitute an offence under the provisions of the Indian Penal Code or under any other law, and therefore, become actionable under the provisions of the Code. In such a complaint, Magistrate may take action in accordance with law keeping in mind the prayer made by the complainant. An information is a complaint only when it is made to a Magistrate while any information under Section 154 given to a police officer orally and/or in writing can be the basis for the police officer in charge of a police station to proceed with the matter. In fact, in terms of Section 41 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, any police officer may arrest any person without an order from a Magistrate and without a warrant from the Court, a person who is concerned in cognizable offence. Section 41 contemplates that a person, whom a police officer can arrest, is a person against whom a reasonable complaint has been made or credible information has been received or a reasonable suspicion exists that he is concerned in a cognizable offence. This indicates that the allegations made in an information given to a police officer should be a reasonable or credible information which would show degree of seriousness about commission of a cognizable offence necessary for curtailing liberty of the accused.
"15. A faint plea was made by learned counsel for Respondent 1 that the petition filed by the appellant was not a complaint in the strict sense of the term. The plea is clearly untenable. The nomenclature of a petition is inconsequential.
"2.(d) 'complaint' means any allegation made orally or in writing to a Magistrate, with a view to his taking action under this Code, that some person, whether known or unknown, has committed an offence, but does not include a police report.
Explanation. A - report made by a police officer in a case which discloses, after investigation, the commission of a noncognizable offence shall be deemed to be a complaint; and the police officer by whom such report is made shall be deemed to be the complainant.
16. There is no particular format of a complaint. A petition addressed to the Magistrate containing an allegation that an offence has been committed, and ending with a prayer that the culprits be suitably dealt with, as suitably dealt with, as in the instant case, is a complaint."
50. In the case of Rajesh Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi & Ors.,1999(2) R.C.R.(Criminal) 160 : (1999)3 SCC 259, the Supreme Court again reiterated the principle of law that it was not necessary that a complaint should verbatim reproduce in the body of his complaint all the ingredients of the offence he is alleging. Nor is it necessary that the complainant should state in so many words that the intention of the accused was dishonest or fraudulent. Splitting up of the definition into different components of the offence to make a meticulous scrutiny, whether all the ingredients have been precisely spelt out in the complaint, is not the need at this stage. If factual foundation for the offence has been laid in the complaint the court should not hasten to quash criminal proceedings during investigation stage merely on the premise that one or two ingredients have not been stated with details.
"That essential difference between a complaint and information is that a Magistrate acts on a complaint because the complainant has asked him to act, but a Magistrate acts on information on his own initiative. In the case of a complaint the Magistrate is asked to prosecute the person named as accused and he has then to decide whether he will accede to the request or not. If he does not, then he must record his reasons under Section 202(1), and may either make an enquiry himself or direct an inquiry or investigation or dismiss the complaint under Section 203 after recording his reasons. But in the case of receiving information, the Magistrate is not asked by anyone to issue process and if he does not choose to act on the information, he need not record any reason or pass any order. In the case of information there is no complainant to examine on oath. On a complaint the complainant is first examined on oath unless it has been made by a public servant acting to the discharge of his official duty."
53. We have already noticed that the reference to the provisions of Section 190 in the provisions of Section 156(3) is merely to determine jurisdiction of Magistrate to whom an application has to be made by the aggrieved person or a complainant. It no way controls the power of the Court to direct registration and/or investigation as contemplated in Section 156(3). The proceedings under Section 156(3) are precognizance. Once cognizance is taken by the Magistrate under Section 190 of the Code, he could proceed in his discretion treating under Section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It is not the legislative intent that in the complaint or application/petition under Section 156(3) detailed factual allegations containing in detail the happening of events from beginning to end should be made. It is sufficient for the person to make averment of facts disclosing cognizable offence further stating that the police has failed to take action despite intimation under Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Unnecessary emphasis on the prayer cannot be laid. However, it is a settled principle that the Court would normally grant relief to a party as per its prayer.
54. However, keeping in view the principles of criminal jurisprudence again no stringent format can be provided or is necessary in relation to a prayer clause. It is for the complainant or the aggrieved person to decide whether he wishes to refer the matter to investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code or whether his application is to be treated as a regular complaint under Section 200 of the Code. We have no hesitation in holding that no particular format of the application or petition to Magistrate under Section 156(3) is provided or is required to be made. Suffice it for the complainant or aggrieved person to bring it to the notice of the Court under Section 156(3) that despite intimation to the police it has failed to act and investigate a cognizable offence in accordance with law or that in the fact situation of the case it was necessary to directly approach the Court. Once such a petition is presented, the learned Magistrate is free to exercise appropriate jurisdiction in accordance with law and at the request of complainant. But a petition cannot be rejected by the Court merely on the ground that it does not contain a proper prayer clause insofar as it discloses commission of a cognizable offence.
55. Non prescription of statutory or judge made law as to the format of a complaint or a petiton clearly indicates that it would hardly be possible for the Courts to reject a complaint/petition on the ground of its format alone, insofar as it satisfies ingredients of an offence and avers inaction of the police or makes out a case justifying direct intervention of the Court. As already noticed, a crime is an act deemed by law to be harmful to the society in general even though its immediate victim is an individual. (Ref.: Salmond on Jurisprudence, Twelfth Edition by P.J. Fitzgerald). The distinction between infringement of civil rights and committing a cognizable offence within the provisions of the Indian Penal Code or any other law is clear and in the later it is beyond the matter of mere compensation. Even to criminal jurisprudence, the law of pleading is applicable to certain extent. Thus where a person files a complaint under Section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, he is expected to state the facts giving details and correct versions which would amount to committing of an offence alleged. It has to satisfy the basic ingredients of such an offence and it is expected of the complainant to make a proper complaint as contemplated under Section 2(d) of the Code with appropriate prayers. In contradistinction to this, such strict rule of pleadings cannot be made applicable to the provisions of Section 156(3) of the Code as it is result of a default and even intimation in appropriate format may suffice the purpose in some cases. That certainly does not mean that under Section 156(3) properly drafted petition cannot be moved. Rather if a petition with complete facts, stating detailed and definite events essential to constitute the offence alleged to have been committed is presented and the prayers have been made, discretion of the Magistrate would be much wider than merely directing investigation in terms of Section 156(3) and the Court even could take cognizance of the offence if the complaint is filed under Section 200 of the Code. If a complaint does not disclose a cognizable offence with proper facts, it may be liable to be dismissed and/or rejected by the Magistrate.
57. Criminal Procedure Rules 506 of Commonwealth of Pennylvania even provides a format of a private complaint which is filed to a Magisterial District Court after getting approval from Attorney for the Commonwealth office. It will be therefore appropriate to state that rule of pleadings is not strictly applicable to a petition or an application under Section 156(3) of the Code.
"6. In view of the above, we feel that it is high time to give directions to the Governments of all the States and Union Territories besides their Director Generals of Police/Commissioner of Police as the case may be to the effect that if steps are not taken for registration of FIRs immediately and copies thereof are not made over to the complainants, they may move the Magistrates concerned by filing complaint petitions to give direction to the police to register case immediately upon receipt/production of copy of the orders and make over copy of the FIRs to the complainants, within twentyfour hours of receipt/production of copy of such orders. It may further give directionn to take immediate steps for apprehending the accused persons and recovery of kidnapped/abducted persons and properties which were the subjectmatter of theft or dacoity. In case FIRs are not registered within the aforementioned time, and/or aforementioned steps are not taken by the police, the Magistrate concerned would be justified in initiating contempt proceeding against such delinquent officers and punish them for violation of its orders if no sufficient cause is shown and awarding stringent punishment like sentence of imprisonment against them inasmuch as the disciplinary authority would be quite justified in initiating departmental proceeding and suspending them in contemplation of the same."
"70. The provisions of section 154 of the Code impose an absolute obligation and duty upon the officerincharge of a police station to record information in the prescribed book of a cognizable offence (FIR register), but it is difficult for the Court to construe in absence of any express language that this provision forbids any kind even preliminary inquiry prior to registration of the FIR. We are unable to notice anything in the language of the section which by necessary implication debars in law such an inquiry. The Supreme Court in the case of Bhagwant Kishore Joshi (supra), a judgment which was delivered by a three Judge Bench, took the view that such an inquiry, of course for a very limited purpose and bonafide object, was not debarred under the provisions of section 154. Again, a three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Jacob Mathew (supra), in unambiguous terms declared that preregistration inquiry would be permissible, but again for a class of persons i.e. Medical Practitioners. The investigating agency was cautioned in that case not to cause harassment to the Doctors in furtherance to a private complaint unless some prima facie evidence of rash and negligent act on the part of the accused Doctor was brought on record before the investigating officer. The principle enunciated in both these judgments, particularly in the case of Bhagwant Kishore Joshi (supra), is not subjectmatter of a detailed discussion by any of the subsequent Benches of the Supreme Court, except in the case of Rajinder Singh Katoch (supra), a judgment pronounced by a two Judge Bench of the Supreme Court after declaration of law in Prakash Singh Badal's case (supra) which also specifically noticed Ramesh Kumar's case (supra) and declared the principle that some kind of preliminary inquiry would be permissible prior to registration of the case. It needs to be noticed at the cost of repetiton that judgments of the Supreme Court delivered by two Judges Bench have taken the view that there is no option with the police officerincharge of a police station but to register the FIR. The view is obviously relatable to the facts of those cases and in all those cases the conduct of the investigating agency had been deprecated and the Court took the view that reliability, genuineness and credibility of information are not the condition precedent for registration of a case under section 154 and provisions of section 154 are mandatory and officer-in-charge of police station is duty bound to register the case on receiving the information disclosing a cognizable offence. [See Lallan Chaudhary (supra) and Ramesh Kumari (supra)]. However, in the case of Mohindro (supra), the Court observed on facts of that case that for no reason whatsoever the police had not registered the case and proceeded to pass the appropriate direction.
71. Thus it is evident that information must relate to 'commission of a cognizable offence'. If the information given ex facie is so absurd or lacks essential ingredients of the allegedly committed cognizable offence, the investigating officer after making a due entry in the prescribed books like daily dairy, general diary or station diary or daily roznamachar, could step into the limited preliminary inquiry and then within a very short time and most expeditiously register the FIR unless the information does not disclose commission of a congnizable offence. Such exercise has to be bonafide, fair and must stand to the test of judicious exercise of power. Such cases would be by and large very few and rare cases where the police officer has to conduct preliminary inquiry preregistration of a FIR for a very limited period. Taking an example of such rare and exceptional cases, an informant by a telephone makes a call that there has been a blast at a railway station causing injury and death of number of persons and names the persons who has alleged to have effected the bomb blast. A police officer is obliged to make an entry in the daily diary register and at least would verify the same by ringing up the nearest police station or the railway authority in charge of the railway station where such an incident is informed to have been occurred. If no incident has occurred at the railway station, the question of registering the FIR would hardly arise and he could proceed in accordance with law on the basis of the entry made in the daily diary register/station diary/roznamachar. In the case of Tapan Kumar Singh (supra), the Supreme Court has even held that an entry in the daily diary/station diary or rozanamachar itself can be a FIR.
75. The law and particularly the criminal law is an instrument to protect the interest of the society. The distinction between a cognizable offence and noncognizable offence is to be kept in mind by the Court for proper appreciation of the arguments raised before us. The officerincharge of police station has wide powers and complete freedom in investigating the cognizable offence without any check or interference including arresting of the suspect. While in the case of noncognizable offence, the investigating officer is not entitled to even take on investigation much less arrest the suspect without the leave of the Court of competent jurisdiction. In order to prevent abuse of such power it is essential that the discretion given to the officerincharge of a police station is limited to bare minimum necessary and the provision is not given undue liberal construction or meaning. While following the view expressed by the Supreme Court in three Judge Bench cases of Bhagwant Kishore Joshi (supra) and Jacob Mathew (supra), it can safely be stated that the power to make preliminary inquiry to preregistration of a case can be exceptionally or rarely exercised by the officerincharge of a police station that too after he enters the information in the relevant books like daily diary or general diary as known by different nomenclature at different places, and after concluding the preliminary inquiry expeditiously, preferably not exceeding the period of two days register the FIR in accordance with the law and/or proceed under other provisions of the Code as is evident from proviso (b) to section 157(1) of the Code.
(a) The expression "shall" appearing in Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is mandatory. The Section places an 'absolute duty' on the part of the 'officer in charge of a police station' to record information and place substance thereof in the prescribed book, where the information supplied or brought to his notice shows commission of a cognizable offence.
(b) As the law does not specifically prohibit conducting of a limited preliminary inquiry, preregistration of FIR in exceptional and rare cases by the officer in charge of a police station, he may penultimately thus enter upon a preliminary inquiry in relation to information supplied of commission of a cognizable offence but only and only upon making due entry in the Daily Diary/Station Diary/Roznamachar instantaneously with reasons as well as the need for adopting such a course of action. Such inquiry should be completed expeditiously and in any case not later than two days. Thereafter, the FIR should be recorded in the prescribed register and/or the officer should take any other recourse permissible to him strictly in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure under which he is empowered to investigate. Such cases can be illustrated by giving an example i.e. when the information received in regard to commission of a cognizable offence would patently cause absurd results or report of happening of events, authenticity of which ex facie is extremely doubtful.
(c) The law inescapably requires the police officer to register the information (FIR) received by him in relation to commission of a cognizable offence. Under the Scheme of the Code, no choice is vested in the police officer between recording or not recording the information received. The concerned officer would aptly take recourse to clause (a) as a normal rule while could adopt the course of action as stated in clause (b) above as an exceptional and rare case."
"7. ..........It cannot be lost sight of that normally and in fact in accordance with law investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code is preceded by approaching the concerned police station and then higher authorities under Section 154(3). Thus these are the cases where the investigating agency - the police - has failed to act, it presupposes that there has been breach of obligation as contemplated under Section 154(1) of the Code. To illustratively state these are the matters where despite complaint, police did not act or consider it not necessary to act in relation to the allegations made in the complaint. The suspected accused was always free and not the subject matter of investigation or agency. After such breach of duty or wrongful act on the part of the investigating agency, the Court on a petition passes direction under Section 156(3) of the Code directing the police to conduct investigation.
(i) Whether the police have to approach the learned Magistrate and take orders from him before arresting the accused against whom FIR is registered pursuant to the orders issued by the learned Magistrate under Section 156(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 ?
Ans : It is neither obligatory nor mandatory for a Police Officer to obtain the leave of the Court before arresting an accused against whom FIR is registered in pursuance of the order passed by the learned Magistrate under Section 156(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. Certainly, we would hasten to add that exercise of discretion by the arresting officer should be exercised with greater sensitivity and in accordance with the settled canon of criminal jurisprudence, while keeping the facts and circumstances of each case in mind. It needs to be remembered by the Investigating agencies that order under Section 156(3) may be passed by the Court as a result of failure to perform its duty on the part of the investigating agencies. ..............."
"It may also be further noticed that, even in subsection (3) of section 156, the only power given to the Magistrate, who can take cognizance of an offence under section 190, is to order an investigation, there is no mention of any power to stop an investigation by the police. The scheme of these sections, thus, clearly is that the power of the police to investigate any cognizable offence is uncontrolled by the Magistrate, and it is only in cases where the police decide not to investigate the case that the Magistrate can intervene and either direct an investigation, or, in the alternative, himself proceed or depute a Magistrate subordinate to him to proceed to enquire into the case."
"16. When the information is laid with the police, but no action in that behalf is taken, the complainant is given power under Section 190 read with Section 200 of the Code to lay the complaint before the Magistrate having jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence and the Magistrate is required to enquire into the complaint as provided in Chapter XV of the Code. In case the Magistrate after recording evidence finds a prima facie case, instead of issuing process to the accused, he is empowered to direct the police concerned to investigate into offence under Chapter XII of the Code and to submit a report. If he finds that the complaint does not disclose any offence to take further action, he is empowered to dismiss the complaint under Section 203 of the Code. In case he finds that the complaint/evidence recorded prima facie discloses an offence, he is empowered to take cognizance of the offence and would issue process to the accused. These aspects have been highlighted by this Court in All India Institute of Medical Sciences Employees' Union (Reg.) v. Union of India, 1997(4) R.C.R.(Criminal) 594 : (1996) 11 SCC 582 : 1997 SCC (Cri.) 303. It was specifically observed that a writ petition in such cases is not to be entertained."
"68. It is, therefore, manifestly clear that if any information disclosing a cognizable offence is laid before an officer incharge of a police station satisfying the requirements of Section 154(1) of the Code, the said police officer has no other option except to enter the substance thereof in the prescribed form, that is to say, to register a case on the basis of such information.
69. In this connection, it may be noted that though a police officer cannot investigate a noncognizable offence on his own as in the case of cognizable offence, he can investigate a noncognizable offence under the order of a Magistrate having power to try such noncognizable case or commit the same for trial within the terms under Section 155(2) of the Code but subject to Section 155(3) of the Code. Further, under subsection (4) to Section 155, where a case relates to two offences to which at least one is cognizable, the case shall be deemed to be a cognizable case notwithstanding that the other offences are noncognizable and, therefore, under such circumstances the police officer can investigate such offences with the same powers as he has while investigating a cognizable offence.
70. The next key question that arises for consideration is whether the registration of a criminal case under Section 154(1) of the Code ipso facto warrants the setting in motion of an investigation under Chapter XII of the Code.
"The power of the Magistrate under Section 156(3) to direct further investigation is clearly an independent power and does not stand in conflict with the power of the State Government as spelt out hereinbefore. The power conferred upon the Magistrate under Section 156(3) can be exercised by the Magistrate even after submission of a report by the investigating officer which would mean that it would be open to the Magistrate not to accept the conclusion of the investigating officer and direct further investigation. This provision does not in any way affect the power of the investigating officer to further investigate the case even after submission of the report as provided in Section 173(8)."
The above position has been highlighted in State of Haryana and Ors. v. Bhajan Lal and Ors. 1991(1) R.C.R.(Criminal) 383 : (1992 Supp. (1) SCC 335).
"If the use of the power is for the fulfilment of a legitimate object the actuation or catalysation by malice is not legicidal."
73. At this stage it needs to be clarified that the obligation to register a case is not to be confused with the remedy if same is not registered. Issue of the remedy has been decided by this Court in several cases. (See Gangadhar Janardan Mhatre v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. 2004(4) R.C.R.(Criminal) 682 : 2004(3) Apex Criminal 648 : (2004 (7) SCC 768)".
Whether in absence of a complaint to the police, a complaint can be made directly before a Magistrate ?
Normally a person should invoke the provisions of Section 154 of the Code before he takes recourse to the power of the Magistrate competent to take cognizance under Section 190 of the Code, under Section 156(3). Atleast an intimation to the police of commission of a cognizable offence under Section 154(1) would be a condition precedent for invocation of powers of the Magistrate under Section 156(3) of the Code. We would hasten to add here that this dictum of law is not free from exception. There can be cases where noncompliance to the provisions of Section 154(3) would not divest the Magistrate of his jurisdiction in terms of Section 156(3). There could be cases where the police fail to act instantly and the facts of the case show that there is possibility of the evidence of commission of the offence being destroyed and/or tampered with or an applicant could approach the Magistrate under Section 156(3) of the Code directly by way of an exception as the Legislature has vested wide discretion in the Magistrate.
Whether without filing a complaint within the meaning of Section 2(d) and praying only for an action under Section 156(3), a complaint before a Magistrate was maintainable ?
A Petition under Section 156(3) cannot be strictly construed as a complaint in terms of Section 2(d) of the Code and absence of a specific or improperly worded prayer or lack of complete and definite details would not prove fatal to a petition under Section 156(3), in so far as it states facts constituting ingredients of a cognizable offence. Such petition would be maintainable before the Magistrate.
65. We answer the questions of law accordingly. The matters be listed before a appropriate bench for disposal in accordance with law.

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