Source: https://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-supreme-court/347/637.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 00:07:01+00:00

Document:
Respondent was born a national of the United States in the Philippine Islands, came to the continental United States from the Philippine Islands as a national prior to the Philippine Independence Act of 1934, has remained within this country ever since his arrival, and was sentenced to imprisonment in 1941 and 1950 for terms of one year or more for crimes involving moral turpitude. Held: He may not now be deported under 19 (a) of the Immigration Act of 1917 as an alien who had been so sentenced "after entry." Pp. 638-643.
(a) Respondent is not deportable under 19 (a) of the Immigration Act of 1917 unless he made an "entry" within the meaning of that provision, notwithstanding 8 (a) (1) of the Philippine Independence Act which provides that citizens of the Philippine Islands who are not citizens of the United States shall be considered aliens for immigration purposes. Pp. 639-640.
(b) When respondent came to the United States from the Philippine Islands as a national prior to enactment of the Philippine Independence Act of 1934, he did not make an "entry" into the United States within the meaning of 19 (a) of the Immigration Act of 1917, since he did not come from some "foreign port or place." Pp. 640-643.
Robert W. Ginnane argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Robert L. Stern, then Acting Solicitor General, Assistant Attorney General Olney and Beatrice Rosenberg.
Respondent was born in the Philippine Islands in 1913 and came therefrom to the continental United States in 1930. He has lived here ever since. In 1941, he was convicted in the State of California of assault with a deadly weapon and was sentenced to imprisonment for one year in the Alameda County jail. In 1950, he was convicted in the State of Washington of second degree burglary and was sentenced under the indeterminate sentence law of that State to a minimum term of two years in the state penitentiary. In 1951, after an administrative hearing, he was ordered deported to the Philippine Islands under 19 (a) of the Immigration Act of 1917 as an alien who "after entry" had been sentenced more than once to imprisonment for terms of one year or more for crimes involving moral turpitude. 39 Stat. 889, as amended, formerly 8 U.S.C. 155 (a).
After respondent was taken into custody, he filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. The petition attacked the validity of the deportation order on the ground, among others, that he was not subject to deportation under 19 (a) since he had not made an "entry" within the meaning of that section. The District Court dismissed the petition. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, with one judge dissenting, reversed the District Court's judgment and remanded the case with directions to order respondent's release from custody. 207 F.2d 398. We granted certiorari. 346 U.S. 914 .
The sole question presented is whether respondent - who was born a national of the United States in the Philippine Islands, who came to the continental United States as a national prior to the Philippine Independence Act of 1934, and who was sentenced to imprisonment in 1941 [347 U.S. 637, 639] and 1950 for crimes involving moral turpitude - may now be deported under 19 (a) of the Immigration Act of 1917.
The Government urges that the reference in 8 (a) (1) to "citizens of the Philippine Islands" includes Filipinos then residing in the United States; that by virtue of this provision the respondent was assimilated to the status of an alien for purposes of "immigration, exclusion, or expulsion"; and that, having been twice convicted thereafter of crimes involving moral turpitude, he is deportable under 19 (a) of the Immigration Act of 1917.
The Court of Appeals sustained respondent's contention that he had never made the requisite "entry." With this conclusion, we agree.
[ Footnote 1 ] From the Spanish cession in 1898 until final independence in 1946, the Philippine Islands were American territory subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. See Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652, 674 -676. Persons born in the Philippines during this period were American nationals entitled to the protection of the United States and conversely owing permanent allegiance to the United States. They could not be excluded from this country under a general statute relating to the exclusion of "aliens." See Gonzales v. Williams, 192 U.S. 1, 12 -13; Toyota v. United States, 268 U.S. 402, 411 . But, until 1946, neither could they become United States citizens. See Toyota v. United States, supra; 60 Stat. 416.
[ Footnote 2 ] In the Volpe case, the Court stated: "We accept the view that the word `entry' . . . [in 19 (a)] . . . includes any coming of an alien from a foreign country into the United States whether such coming be the first or any subsequent one. And this requires affirmance of the challenged judgment. . . . That the second coming of an alien from a foreign country into the United States is an entry within the usual acceptation of that word is clear enough from Lewis v. Frick, 233 U.S. 291 ; Claussen v. Day, 279 U.S. 398 . An examination of the Immigration Act of 1917, we think, reveals nothing sufficient to indicate that Congress did not intend the word `entry' in 19 should have its ordinary meaning." (Italics added.) The context of the latter sentence makes it clear that the Court regarded the word's "ordinary meaning" as being "any coming of an alien from a foreign country." In the Delgadillo case, supra, the Court narrowed this definition even further by holding that a resident alien does not make an "entry" from a foreign country if his arrival in the foreign country was unintentional.
[ Footnote 3 ] Section 101 (a) (13) of the 1952 Act, 66 Stat. 167, 8 U.S.C. 1101 (a) (13), provides in pertinent part: "The term `entry' means any coming of an alien into the United States, from a foreign port or place or from an outlying possession . . . ." Section 101 (a) (29), 66 Stat. 170, 8 U.S.C. 1101 (a) (29), defines "outlying possessions" as American Samoa and Swains Island. By a special provision in the 1952 Act, the exclusion process is made applicable to any alien coming to the continental United States from Hawaii, Alaska, Guam, Puerto Rico, or the Virgin Islands. 66 Stat. 188, 8 U.S.C. 1182 (d) (7).
[ Footnote 4 ] The respondent also attacks the validity of the deportation order on the grounds: (1) that he made no "entry" because he was not an alien when he came to this country; (2) that 8 (a) (1) of the 1934 Philippine Independence Act did not apply to Filipinos already residing here and that hence he was not an alien in 1941 when he was sentenced for one of the two crimes involved in this proceeding; (3) that he is not an alien today because Congress lacked the power to deprive him of his status as a national. Our disposition of the case makes it unnecessary to consider these contentions.
But for this Court's holding that 19 (a) of the Immigration Act of 1917 must be construed strictly and the word "entry" given a special meaning, I would be content with the excellent dissent of Judge Bone in the court below. 207 F.2d 398, 402.
"An examination of the Immigration Act of 1917, we think, reveals nothing sufficient to indicate that Congress did not intend the word `entry' in 19 should have its ordinary meaning."
Cf. Eichenlaub v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 521 .
"In this case petitioner, of course, chose to return to this country, knowing he was in a foreign place. But the exigencies of war, not his voluntary act, put him on foreign soil. It would indeed be harsh to read the statute so as to add the peril of deportation to such perils of the sea. We might as well hold that if he had been kidnapped and taken to Cuba, he made a statutory `entry' on his voluntary return. Respect for law does not thrive on captious interpretations." P. 391.
There is nothing captious or fortuitous about this petitioner's "entry" into the United States. He came to this country from outside, as all aliens do. No case by this Court supports the special construction given by the Court to the word "entry."

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