Source: http://www.juricaf.org/arret/CONSEILDELEUROPE-COUREUROPEENNEDESDROITSDELHOMME-19790705-790677
Timestamp: 2016-12-08 02:33:53+00:00

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VAN DROOGENBROECK c. BELGIQUE
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Type d'affaire : DecisionType de recours : Partiellement irrecevable ; partiellement recevableNumérotation : Numéro d'arrêt : 7906/77Identifiant URN:LEX : urn:lex;coe;cour.europeenne.droits.homme;arret;1979-07-05;7906.77 Analyses : (Art. 12) SE MARIER, (Art. 14) DISCRIMINATION, (Art. 3) PEINE DEGRADANTE, (Art. 34) VICTIME, (Art. 8-1) RESPECT DE LA VIE FAMILIALEParties : Demandeurs : VAN DROOGENBROECKDéfendeurs : BELGIQUETexte : APPLICATION/REQUETE NÂ° 7906/77 ValÃ©ry VAN DROOGENBROECK v/BELGIUM ValÃ©ry VAN DROOGENBROECK c/BELGIOU E DECISION of 5 July 1979 on the admissibility of the application DECISION du 5 juillet 1979 sur la recevabilitÃ© de la requÃªte
Artic% 4, paragraph 1 of the Convention : The concept of servitude includes, in addition to the obligation to perform certain services for others, the notion of living on another person's property and being unable to alter ones condition . Article 4, paragraph 3 (a) of the Convention : The question whether the labour required from a detained person is permitted by this provision depends on the preliminary issue whether the detention is in conformity with article 5. Article 5, paragraph 1(a) of the Convention : Deprivation of liberty ordered by the Executive after a judiciat decision placing a convicted recidivist at the Government's disposal. Problem of the existence of a sufficient link between the original judicial decision and the deprivation of liberty . Complaint declared admissible . Article 5, paragraph 4 of the Convention : In the case of a recidivist placed at the disposal of the Government, is the judicial review requested by this provision incorporated in the onginal judicial decision where the Executive is empowered to order or not to order a deprivation of liberty ? Complaint declared admissible :
Article 4, paragraphe 1, de la Convention : En plus de l'obligation de fournir Ã autrui certains services la notion de Â« servitude Â» englobe celle de vivre sur la propriAtÃ© d'autrui et l'impossibilitÃ© de changer de condition . Article 4, paragraphe 3, fitt. e), de la Convention : La question de savoir si le travail requis d'une personne dAtenue est autorisÃ© par cette disposition est subordonnAe Ã celle de savoir si la dÃ©tention est conforme Ã l'article 5 .
Article 5, paragraphe 1, litt . al, de la Convention : Privation de libertÃ© ordonnÃ©e par l'ExÃ©cutif aprÃ©s une dÃ©cision judiciaire mettant R Ã la disposition du Gouvernement Â» un condamnÃ© rÃ©cidiviste . Ouestion de l'existence d'un lien suffisant entre la dÃ©cision judiciaire originaire et la privation de libertÃ© . GriÃ©f dÃ©clarÃ© recevable . Article 5, paragraphe 4, de la Convention : Le contrÃ´le judiciaife voulu par cette disposition est-il incorporÃ© Ã© la dÃ©cision judiciaire originaire dans le cas d'un rÃ©cidiviste mis par le juge Â« Ã© la disposition du Gouvernement Â», l'ExÃ©cutif Ã©tant ensuite libre d'ordonner ou de ne pas ordonner une privation de libertÃ© ? Grief dÃ©clarÃ© recevable .
(English : see p. 67)
Les faits de la cause peuvent se rÃ©sumer comme suit :
Le requÃ©rant, de nationalitÃ© belge, est nÃ© le 26 mai 1940 Ã Etterbeek IBelgiquel . Il est cÃ©libataire . Lors de l'introduction de sa requÃªte, il Ã©tait internÃ© Ã Louvain . Il est reprÃ©sentÃ© devant la Commission, dans le cadre de l'assistance judiciaire, par Maitre Deheselle, avocat Ã Ledeberg . Le 29 juillet 1970 il fut condamnÃ© par le tribunal correctionnel de Bruges Aune peine d'emprisonnement de deux ans pour vol avec effraction et tentative de vol avec effraction . Vu le fait que le requÃ©rant se trouvait en Ã©tat de rÃ©cidive, le tribunal, faisant application de l'article 23 de la loi du 1â¢ 1 juillet 1964 (Loi de DÃ©fense sociale) ordonna sa mise Ã la disposition du Gouvernement pour une durÃ©e de dix ans Ã l'expiration de sa peine . Cette condamnation fut confirmÃ©e le 20 octobre 1970 par la Cour d'appel de Gand et, le 21 janvier 1971, la Cour de cassation rejeta un pourvoi du requÃ©rant .
A l'expiration de sa peine, le 18 juin 1972, le requÃ©rant ne fut pas internÃ© mais bÃ©nÃ©ficia d'un rÃ©gime de semi-libertÃ© destinÃ© Ã assurer sa rÃ©intÃ©gration . Stagiaire dans une entreprise, il devait suivre en fin de semaine des cours de formation professionnelle accÃ©lÃ©rÃ©e . Au bout de huit jours, il disparut . ArrÃªtÃ© le 3 octobre 1972, il fut libÃ©rÃ© le 25 juillet 1973, la mÃªme entreprise Ã©tant disposÃ©e Ã la reprendre en service, comme stagiaire chauffagiste . Au dÃ©but du mois de septembre il disparut cependant 8nouveau .
ArrÃªtÃ© le 6 novembre 1973, et placÃ© sous mandat d'arrÃªt du chef de vol qualifiÃ©, il fut condamnÃ© le 16 janvier 1974 par le tribunal correctionnel d'Anvers, Ã trois mois d'emprisonnement . Le 4 fÃ©vrier 1974, Ã l'expiration de -60-
cette peine, il fut libÃ©rÃ© en vue d'une nouvelle tentative de reclassement . Il disparut fin mars 1974 . ArrÃ©tÃ© le 21 mai 1974 et placÃ© sous mandat d'arrÃ©t du chef de vol qualifiÃ©, il fut condamnÃ© le 9 aoÃ»t 1974 par le tribunal correctionnel de Bruxelles Ã huit mois d'emprisonnement . A l'expiration de cette peine, le 16 janvier 1975, il fut internÃ© dans la section de l'Ã©tablissement pÃ©nitentiaire de Merksplas, destinÃ©e aux rÃ©cidivistes mis Ã la disposition du Gouvernement . Il fut libÃ©rÃ© le 11 juillet 1975, en vue d'un reclassement en France, sur avis conforme de la commission pour rÃ©cidivistes internÃ©s Ã la disposition du Gouvernement . Le plan de reclassement s'avÃ©ra irrÃ©alisable . Aussi le requÃ©rant fut-il signalÃ© Ã rechercher en vue de rÃ©intÃ©gration dans la section pour rÃ©cidivistes mis Ã la disposition du Gouvernement, de l'Ã©tablissement de Merksplas . Eprouvant de graves difficultÃ©s financiÃ¨res, il se prÃ©senta le 21 janvier 1976 aux services de la police judiciaire . Il fut aussitÃ´t arrÃ©tÃ© et transfÃ©rÃ© Ã Merksplas . Il comparut le 3 mars 1976 devant la commission prÃ©citÃ©e, laquelle dÃ©cida de revoir le cas en septembre 1976 seulement . Ayant protestÃ© contre l'avis dÃ©favorable ainsi Ã©mis par cette commission, le requÃ©rant fut soumis Ã un rÃ©gime cellulaire jusqu'au 23 septembre 1976 . Lors de sa sÃ©ance du 8 septembre 1976, la commission pour rÃ©cidiviste s constata que, depuis sa rÃ©intÃ©gration, le requÃ©rant avait refusÃ© de travailler et ne disposait, dÃ¨s lors, d'aucun pÃ©cule . Sa mise au travail n'Ã©tant, par ailleurs, pas assurÃ©e, il devait Ãªtre considÃ©rÃ© comme Ã©tant sans moyens d'existence et ne pouvait, dans ces conditions, Ãªtre libÃ©rÃ© . Elle refusait, en consÃ©quence, de proposer sa libÃ©ration et lui fit savoir qu'elle le ferait seulement lorsqu'il se serait constituÃ© par son travail un pÃ©cule de 12 000 FB .
Le montant de cette somme Ã©tait fixÃ© en considÃ©ration d'instructions ministÃ©rielles, donnÃ©esen application de l'article 17 de la loi du 27 novembre 1891 sur le vagabondage, pour la libÃ©ration des vagabonds mis Ã la disposition du Gouvernement . Le 22 septembre 1976 le requÃ©rant fut transfÃ©rÃ© de l'Ã©tablissement pÃ©nitentiaire de Merksplas Ã la prison secondaire de Louvain . Entre-temps, le 12 mai 1976, il avait demandÃ© au Procureur gÃ©nÃ©ral prÃ©s la cour de Gand d'Ãªtre relevÃ© des effets de la dÃ©cision de mise Ã la disposition du Gouvernement . Dans cette demande, introduite conformÃ©ment Ã l'article 26 de la Loi belge de DÃ©fense sociale, il avait notamment fait valoir que sa privation de libertÃ© discrÃ©tionnairement ordonnÃ©e par le Ministre de la Justice, n'Ã©tait pas conforme Ã l'article 5, paragraphe 1, de la Convention europÃ©enne des Droits de l'Homme . - 61 -
Cette demande fut rejetÃ©e le 13 dÃ©cembre 1976 par la cour d'appel de Gand . Le pourvoi formÃ© contre cet arrÃ©tÃ© fut dÃ©clarÃ© irrecevable par la Cour de cassation le 15 fÃ©vrier 1977 . La cour dÃ©cida en effet que la compatibilitÃ© avec la Convention de la dÃ©cision de mise Ã la disposition du Gouvernement, devenue dÃ©finitive en 1971, ne pouvait plus Ãªtre contestÃ©e Ã l'occasion d'une demande de l'internÃ© visant Ã Ãªtre relevÃ© de ses effets . Le 4 mai 1977, la commission pour rÃ©cidivistes Ã©mit un avis favorable Ã sa libÃ©ration, en tenant compte du fait qu'il avait rÃ©uni un pÃ©cule de 12 868 FB . Un congÃ© renouvelable d'un mois lui fut accordÃ© aprÃ©s une pÃ©riode de travail en semi-libertÃ© Ã la prison de St . Gilles . Le lendemain de sa premiÃ©re sortie, le requÃ©rant ne se reprÃ©senta pas Ã la prison . A la suite de cet Ã©cart, il fut signalÃ© Ã rechercher en vue de rÃ©intÃ©gration Ã la section pour rÃ©cidivistes mis Ã la disposition du Gouvernement, de l'Ã©tablissement de Merksplas . Le 22 septembre 1977, il fut arrÃªtÃ© Ã Bruges en flagrant dÃ©lit de vol dans les troncs d'Ã©glise . EcrouÃ© sous mandat d'arrÃªt, il fut condamnÃ© le 9 dÃ©cembre 1977 par le tribunal correctionnel de Bruges Ã trois mois d'emprisonnement . A l'expiration de cette peine, le 21 dÃ©cembre 1977, il fut internÃ© . Le 3 mai 1978, la commission pour rÃ©cidivistes reporta l'examen de son cas Ã sa sÃ©ance de septembre 1978 . Le 13 septembre 1978, elle proposa d'accorder Ã l'intÃ©ressÃ© un congÃ© renouvelable, lorsqu'il aurait rÃ©uni par son travail une masse de sortie de 12 OOO FB . ; dans la nÃ©gative, le cas devait Ãªtre reprÃ©sentÃ© en mars 1979 . Au cours des sessions de mai et septembre le requÃ©rant avait prÃ©sentÃ© un plan de reclassement, comportant travail, logement, tutelle et assistance mÃ©dicale . L'avis de la commission fut toutefois suivi . Le 3 octobre 1978, des instructions furent donnÃ©es en consÃ©quence, prÃ©voyant en outre que l'intÃ©ressÃ© devait se soumettre Ã la guidance de l'Office de rÃ©adaptation sociale de Bruxelles, travailler rÃ©guliÃ©rement, ne pas changer d'employeur ou d'adresse sans le consentement de l'organisme de guidance, s'abstenir d'abuser de boissons alcooliques, et ne pas frÃ©quenter d'anciens condamnÃ©s . La dÃ©cision de libÃ©ration n'a pu Ãªtre exÃ©cutÃ©e jusqu'Ã© prÃ©sent, le requÃ©rant n'ayant pas encore constituÃ© le pÃ©cule demandÃ© .
Dans une prÃ©cÃ©dente requÃªte INÂ° 6989/751, le requÃ©rant s'Ã©tait dÃ©jÃ plaint d'avoir Ã©tÃ© ainsi livrÃ© Ã l'arbitraire de l'Administration . AprÃ©s commu-62-
nication au Gouvernement belge, cette requÃªte avait toutefois Ã©tÃ© dÃ©clarÃ©e irrecevable le 5 mars 1976, pour non-Ã©puisement des voies de recours internes, l'intÃ©ressÃ© ayant omis de faire valoir ce grief devant la Cour de cassation . Dans la prÃ©sente requÃªte, introduite aprÃ©s le rejet d'un nouveau pourvoi en cassation, le requÃ©rant dÃ©veloppe les griefs suivants :
GRIEFS Le requÃ©rant se plaint d'Ptre maintenu en servitude, en violation d e
l'article 4, paragraphe 1, de la Convention . Il allÃ©gue Ã©galement une violation de l'article 5, paragraphe 1 . En effet, la dÃ©cision judiciaire de mise Ã la disposition du Gouvernement n'ordonne pas la privation de libertÃ© ; elle laisse au pouvoir exÃ©cutif la facultÃ© d'interner effectivement le condamnÃ© durant dix annÃ©es ou de le laisser en libertÃ© pour tout ou partie de cette pÃ©riode de dix ans . Il fait valoir encore que l'article 5, paragraphe 4 n'est pas respectÃ© . Le condamnÃ© internÃ© peut uniquement se pourvoir devant le Ministre de la Justice et, le cas Ã©chÃ©ant, devant le Conseil d'Etat . De tels recours ne sont pas conformes, selon lui, aux exigences du contrÃ´le judiciaire de lÃ©galitÃ© visÃ© par cette disposition . Ayant Ã©tÃ© astreint au travail, le requÃ©rant allÃ©gue par ailleurs la violation de l'article 4, paragraphe 2, de la Convention . Il se plaint enfin d'une atteinte Ã son droit Ã la libertÃ© d'expression, garanti par l'article 10, ses protestations contre les recommandations de la commission pour rÃ©cidivistes ayant entrainÃ©, Ã deux reprises, des sanctions disciplinaires .
EN DROI T 1 . Le requÃ©rant soutient que les internements rÃ©pÃ©tÃ©s auxquels il a Ã©tÃ© soumis dans le cadre de sa mise Ã la disposition du Gouvernement ont constituÃ© des privations de libertÃ© non conformes Ã l'article 5, paragraphe 1, de la Convention . Aux termes de l'article 5, paragraphe 1, toute personne a droit Ã la libertÃ© et Ã la sOretÃ© . Cette disposition Ã©numÃ©re de faÃ§on limitative les conditions et circonstances dans lesquelles une personne peut Ãªtre privÃ©e de sa libertÃ© . Il est incontestable qu'en l'espÃ©ce seule l'applicabilitÃ© de l'alinÃ©a lal, qui autorise la dÃ©tention aprÃ©s condamnation par un tribunal compÃ©tent, peut Ã©tre envisagÃ©e . - 63 -
Trois conditions doivent Ptre rÃ©unies pour qu'une privation de libertÃ© puisse Ãªtre justifiÃ©e au regard de cette disposition . Il faut, en effet, que la personne ait Ã©tÃ© Â« privÃ©e de sa libertÃ© selon les voies lÃ©gales Â», qu'elle soit Â« dÃ©tenue rÃ©guliÃ©rement Â», qu'elles le soit Â« aprÃ©s condamnation par un tribunal compÃ©tent Â» . Le requÃ©rant a Ã©tÃ© mis A la disposition du Gouvernement en application de l'article 23 de la Loi de dÃ©fense sociale, par un arrÃªt de la cour d'appel de Gand . Il a Ã©tÃ© effectivement internÃ© Ã diverses reprises, du 3 octobre 1972 au 25 juillet 1973, du 16 janvier au 11 juillet 1975 et du 21 janvier 1976 au 5 mai 1977 . Depuis le 21 dÃ©cembre 1977, il est Ã nouveau internÃ© . Les dÃ©cisions d'internement ont Ã©tÃ© prises par l'ExÃ©cutif, 'reprÃ©sentÃ© par le Ministre de la Justice, conformÃ©ment Ã l'article 25 de la loi, conÃ§u comme suit :Â« Les rÃ©cidivistes et dÃ©linquants d'habitude se trouvant Ã la disposition du Gouvernement sont internÃ©s, s'il y a lieu, dans un Ã©tablissement dÃ©signÃ© par arrÃ©tÃ© royal Â» ne parait pas douteux, dÃ©s lors, et au reste il n'est pas sÃ©rieusemen t .Il contestÃ©, que les procÃ©dures prÃ©vues par la loi belge aient Ã©tÃ© respectÃ©es et que les privations de libertÃ© aient Ã©tÃ© rÃ©guliÃ©res au regard du droit interne . Ces privations de libertÃ©, Ã titre de mesure de sÃ»retÃ©, peuvent-elle s toutefois Ãªtre assimilÃ©es Ã une dÃ©tention Â« aprÃ©s condamnation par un tribunal compÃ©tent Â» ? Bien que le texte de la Convention ne fasse aucune rÃ©fÃ©rence explicite aux mesures de sÃ»retÃ©, la Commission a dÃ©jÃ admis Ã de multiples reprises que des privations de libertÃ© de durÃ©e indÃ©terminÃ©e, prononcÃ©es Ã ce titre par des tribunaux en complÃ©ment ou substitution d'une peine, Ã©taient conformes Ã l'article 5, paragraphe 1 (a) . (cf . dÃ©cisions sur la recevabilitÃ© des requÃªtes NÂ° 99/55 Ann . I p . 260, 138/55 Ann . I p . 234, 4324/69 Rec . N' 37 p . 98, dirigÃ©es contre la R .F .A . ; NÂ° 2518/65 Ann . VIII p . 371, contre le Danemark et 2306/64 Rec . 21 p . 23, 2742/66 Ann . IX p . 551, contre l'Autriche) . La difficultÃ©, dans le cas prÃ©sent, est que le juge ne prononce pas lui-mÃ©me l'internement, dont les modalitÃ©s d'exÃ©cution relÃ©vÃ©raient de l'ExÃ©cutif . Il prononce la mise Ã la disposition du Gouvernement, mesure de caractÃ©re gÃ©nÃ©ral pouvant se traduire, selon les cas, par une guidance, une probation, des semi-libertÃ©s, ou l'internement, Â« s'il y a lieu Â», pour des pÃ©riodes variant, en thÃ©orie, de zÃ©ro jour Ã dix ans . Dans ces circonstances, l'internement ou la rÃ©intÃ©gration dans l a colonie pÃ©nitentiaire, sur dÃ©cision ministÃ©rielle, est-il encore la simple exÃ©cution d'une dÃ©cision judiciaire ayant portÃ© condamnation ? Existe-t-il encore un lien suffisamment direct, du point de vue de la garantie des droits individuels, entre la dÃ©cision initiale du tribunal compÃ©tent et la privation de libertÃ© mise en cause 7 -6q-
La Commission estime que les problÃ©mes soulevÃ©s par les griefs du requÃ©rant prÃ©sentent Ã cet Ã©gard des aspects d'une complexitÃ© telle qu'il ne saurait Ãªtre statuÃ© Ã© leur sujet qu'aprÃ©s examen au fond . Il s'ensuit que la requÃªte ne saurait Ã©tre rejetÃ©e pour dÃ©faut manifeste de fondement, au sens de l'article 27, paragraphe 2 de la Convention .
2 . Le requÃ©rant se plaint encore de n'avoir pu introduire de recours judiciaire contre les dÃ©cisions administratives relatives Ã son internement . Il invoque Ã© cet Ã©gard la violation de l'article 5, paragraphe 4, de la Convention qui garantit Ã Â« toute personne privÃ©e de sa libertÃ© par arrestation ou dÃ©tention le droit d'introduire un recours devant un tribunal, afin qu'il statue Ã bref dÃ©lai sur la lÃ©galitÃ© de sa dÃ©tention et ordonne sa libÃ©ration si la dÃ©tention est illÃ©gale Â» . Certes, dans le cas oÃ¹ la privation de libertÃ© a Ã©tÃ© prononcÃ©e par u n tribunal, pour une durÃ©e dÃ©terminÃ©e et en considÃ©ration d'un comportement dÃ©lictueux antÃ©rieur, le contrÃ´le de lÃ©galitÃ© voulu par cette disposition est incorporÃ© dans la dÃ©cision judiciaire initiale (Cour Eur . D .H ., Affaires de Vagabondage, arrÃªt du 18 juin 1971, par . 75, 76 ; cf . aussi, a contrario, dÃ©cision sur requÃ©te NÂ° 6859/74 c/Belgique, D .R . 3 pp : 139, 1411 . Dans ces cas, l'Etat n'est pas tenu d'ouvrir un nouveau recours auprÃ©s d'un tribunal lorsque l'intÃ©ressÃ© est effectivement internÃ© en vertu de cette dÃ©cision . La Commission a dÃ©jÃ soulignÃ© qu'une telle interprÃ©tation de l'article 5 , paragraphe 4 ne saurait toutefois Ãªtre Ã©tendue telle quelle Ã toutes les hypothÃ©ses de dÃ©tention, notamment l'internement de durÃ©e indÃ©terminÃ©e d'un aliÃ©nÃ© . (DÃ©cision sur requÃªte NÂ° 6859/74 c/Belgique, D et R NÂ° 3 p . 139, Rapport sur requÃªte NÂ° 6301/73, Winterwerp c/Pays-Bas p . 95) . En l'espÃ©ce, eu Ã©gard Ã la pratique suivie par les autoritÃ©s belges dans l'application de la loi de DÃ©tense sociale, le juge semble avoir ouvert en fait un crÃ©dit de privation de libertÃ© ne pouvant excÃ©der 10 ans mais dont la durÃ©e effective est totalement imprÃ©visible et fonction, en prineipe, des nÃ©cessitÃ©s de traitement du requÃ©rant et des besoins de protection sociale . Dans ces conditions, mÃªme si l'internement relÃ¨ve de l'exÃ©cution d'un jugement prononcÃ© par un tribunal, l'article 5, paragraphe 4, n'exige-t-il pas que les dÃ©cisions administratives ordonnant la rÃ©intÃ©gration du requÃ©rant ou refusant son Ã©largissement, puissent faire l'objet d'un recours judiciaire distinct 1 La Commission estime que cette question est suffisamment complexe pour justifier un examen au fond et que le grief ne peut Ã©tre rejetÃ© pour dÃ©faut manifeste de fondement au sens de l'article 27, paragraphe 2 . 3 . Le requÃ©rant allÃ©gue Ãªtre placÃ© dans un Ã©tat de servitude, car il est attachÃ© Ã une colonie pÃ©nitentiaire dans laquelle il doit travailler et dont il ne peut sortir sans l'accord discrÃ©tionnaire de l'ExÃ©cutif . Il se plaint Ã©galement d'Ãªtre contraint de travailler pour amasser un pÃ©cule de 12 000 FB ., prÃ©alable Ã© toui congÃ© . Il invoque Ã cet Ã©gard les paragraphes 1 et 2 de l'article 4 qu i
prohibent l'exclavage ; la servitude et le travail forcÃ© ou obligatoire . La distinction entre a servitude n et Â« travail forcÃ© Â» n'est pas explicitÃ©e . Il y a'lieu toutefois de considÃ©rer qu'en plus de l'obligation de fournir autrui certains services, la notion de servitude englobe l'obligation pour le Â« serf n de vivre sur la propriÃ©tÃ© d'autrui et l'impossibilitÃ© de changer sa condition . A ce sujet, la Commission a notamment Ã©gard Ã l'article 1 de la Convention supplÃ©mentaire relative Ã l'abolition de l'esclavage, de la traite des esclaves et des institutions et pratiques analogues Ã l'esclavage, du 30 avril 1956 . Quoi qu'il en soit, aux termes mÃªmes de l'article 4, paragraphe 3 (a), Â« le travail requis normalement d'une personne soumise Ã la dÃ©tention dans les conditionsprÃ©vues Ã l'article 5 Â» n'est pas considÃ©rÃ© comme un travail forcÃ© . A fortiori, ne saurait-il Ãªtre considÃ©rÃ© comme une forme de servitude . En l'espÃ©ce, il importe donc essentiellement de vÃ©rifier si le requÃ©rant Ã©tait bien dÃ©tenu dans les conditions conformes Ã l'article 5, examen que la Commission a rÃ©servÃ© au fond . Le requÃ©rant se plaint enfin d'avoir Ã©tÃ© sanctionnÃ© disciplinairemen t .4
pour avoir marquÃ© son dÃ©saccord avec des recommandations de la commission pour rÃ©cidivistes, relatives Ã l'obligation de rÃ©unir un pÃ©cule de 12 000 FB . Il allÃ©gue Ã cet Ã©gard une violation de l'article 10 de la Convention qui garantit le droit Ã la libertÃ© d'expression . La Commission constÃ¢te toutefois qu'il ne ressort nullement du dossier que le placement du requÃ©rant en section cellulaire aurait Ã©tÃ© dÃ©cidÃ© Ã titre de sanction disciplinaire visant Ã rÃ©primer l'expression de certaines idÃ©es ou Ã empÃªcher le requÃ©rant de faire usage de sa libertÃ© d'expression . Il apparatt au contraire que ce placement sanctionnerait tout au plus le refus du requÃ©rant de se conformer aux conditions d'exÃ©cution de l'internement et au rÃ¨glement interne des Ã©tablissements pÃ©nitentiaires .
Il s'ensuit que la requÃªte est, Ã cet Ã©gard, .manifestement mal fondÃ©e au sens de l'article 27, paragraphe 2, de la Convention . Par ces motifs, la Commissio n 1 . DÃ©clare la requÃªte irrecÃ¨vable dans la mesure oÃ¹ elle vise une prÃ©tendue atteinte Ã la libertÃ© d'expression ; 2 . DÃ©clare la requÃªte recevable au surplus .
I TRANSLAT/ON I THE FACTS The facts of the case may be summarised as follows : The applicant, of Belgian nationality, was born on 26 May 1940 at Etterbeek (Belgium) . He is unmarried . When his application was lodged, he was being held in detention at Louvain . He is in receipt of legal aid and is represented before the Commission by Mr Deheselle, a barrister at Ledeberg . On 29 July 1970 he was sentenced by the Criminal Court of Bruges to two years' imprisonment for housebreaking and attempted housebreaking . Since he was a previous offender, the Court applied section 23 of th e Act of 1 July 1964 ISocial Protection Act) and ordered that on completing his sentence he should be placed at the Government's disposal for a period of 10 years . The sentence was upheld by the Ghent Court of Appeal on 20 October 1970 and on 21 January 1971 the Court of Cassation rejected an appeal by the applicant . On completing his sentence on 18 June 1972, the applicant was not kept in detention, but was allowed semi-freedom so that he could resettle in normal life . He was taken on by a firm as a trainee and had to attend intensive occupational training classes at weekends . After a week he disappeared . He was arrested on 3 October 1972 and released on 25 July 1973, sinc e the same firm was prepared to take him back as a trainee heating technician . At the beginning of September, however, he again disappeared . He was placed under arrest on 6 November 1973 on a charge of aggravated theft and on 16 January 1974 sentenced to three months' imprisonment by the Antwerp Criminal Court . On 4 February 1974, on completing this sentence, he was released so that another rehabilitation attempt could be made . He disappeared in late March 1974 .
He was arrested on 21 May 1974, detained on a charge of aggravated theft and on 9 August 1974 sentenced to 8 months' imprisonment by the Criminal Court Brussels . On completing this sentence on 16 January 1975, he was detained at Merksplas Prison in the section for recidivists placed at the Government's disposal . He was released on 11 July 1975 with a view to his resettlement in France with the consent of the Board dealing with recidivists placed at the Government's disposal .
The, resettlement plan failed and the applicant was therefore ordered to be traced and returned to Merksplas, to the section for recidivists placed at the Government's disposal . In severe financial difficulties, he gave himself up to the police on 21 January 1972 and was at once arrested and transferred to Merksplas . On 3 March 1976 he appeared before the above-mentioned Board, which decided not to review his case until September 1976 . Having protested against the Board's decision, the applicant was transferred to a prison cell, where he remained until 23 September 1976 . At its meeting of 8 September 1976, the Board noted that since being returned to detention the applicant had refused to work and therefore had no savings . As there was no certainty that he would agree to work, he had to be regarded as without means of subsistence, in which case he could not be released . The Board consequently refused to recommend his release and informed him that it would not do so until such time as he had worked and saved 12,000 FB out of his earnings . This amount was decided in accordance with the ministerial instructions issued in application of section 17 of the Vagrancy Act of 27 November 1891 regarding the release of vagrants placed at the Government's disposal . On 22 September 1976 the applicant was transferred from Merksplas prison to the secondary prison at Louvai n Meanwhile, on 12 May 1976, he had applied to the Chief Publi c Prosecutor otthe Ghent Court to have the decision to place him at the Government's disposal reversed . In his application, lodged in accordance with section 26 of the Belgian Social Protection Act, he claimed that his detention under a discretionary order of the Minister of Justice was contrary to Article 5 .1 of the European Convention on Human Rights . The application was rejected on 13 December 1976 by the Ghent Court of Appeal . The appeal against this decision was declared inadmissible by the Court of Cassation on 15 February 1977 . The Court ruled that the compatibility with the Convention of the decision to place the applicant at the Government's disposal, which had become final in 1971, could not be contested in an application by the detainee to have the effects of the decision lifted .
On 4 May 1977 the Board decided that since he had saved 12,868 FB he could be released . Atter a period on work release at St . Gilles prison he was granted one month's leave, renewable . On the day after this first period of leave ended he failed to report back to the prison
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Following this breach of regulations, he was ordered to be traced and returned to the section at Merksplas prison for recidivists placed at the Government's disposal . On 22 September 1977 he was arrested in Bruges in the act of stealing from church offertory boxes . He was remanded in custody and on 9 December 1977 sentenced by the Criminal Court of Bruges to 3 months' imprisonment . On completing this sentence on 21 December 1977, he was placed in detention . On 3 May 1978, the Recidivists Board postponed discussion of his cas e until its meeting in September 1978 . On 13 September 1978, it proposed that he be granted renewable leave when he had worked enough to accumulate release savings of 12,000 FB, failing which his case was to be re-submitted in March 1979 . At the Board's May and September meetings the applicant had submitted a rehabilitation plan covering work, accomodation, after-care and medical assistance . The Board's opinion was, however, acted on . On 3 October 1978, instructions were issued accordingly, which further stipulated that the applicant should place himself under the guidance of the Brussels Social Rehabilitation Office, engage in regular work, change neither employer nor address without the approval of the guidance body, and refrain from overindulging in alcohol or consorting with ex-prisoners . It has so far been impossible to implement the release order, since the applicant has not yet amassed the required savings
The applicant had already complained in a previous application INÂ° 6989/76) that he had been the victim of an arbitrary decision by the authorities . This application was communicated to the Belgian Government, but on 5 March 1976 it was declared inadmissible on the ground of nonexhaustion of domestic remedies, since the applicant had not made this complaint to the Court of Cassation . In this current application, lodged after the rejection by the Court of a Cassation of another plea of nullity, the applicant makes the complaints, set out below .
COMPLAINT S The applicant complains that he is being kept in servitude, in violation of Article 4 .1 of the Convention .
He also alleges a violation of Article 5 .1 . The judicial decision that a person be placed at the Government's disposal is not, in fact,'an order that he be deprived of liberty ; it permits the authorities actually to detain for ten years a person so sentenced or allow him to go free for all or part of the tenyear period . He further alleges that Article 5 .4 is not being observed . A detainee may appeal only to the Minister of JusticÃ© or, if need be to the Conseil d'Etat . He holds that these remedies do not conform to the requirement that the lawfulness of the detention be liable to judicial verification . Having been compelled to undertake work, the applicant alleges violation of Article 4 .2 of the Convention .
Lastly, he complains that his right to freedom of expression, guaranteed by Article 10, has been infringed, since he was twice punished for his protests against the recommendations of the Recidivists Board .
THE LAW 1 . The applicant maintains that the repeated detentions to which he has been subjected while placed at the Government's disposal constitute deprivation of liberty contrary to the terms of Article 5 .1 of the Convention . Article 5 .1 states that everyone has the right to liberty and security of person . It gives a limitative list of the conditions and circumstances in which persons may be deprived of their liberty .
It is indisputable that in the case under consideration only subsection lal, which authorises the detention of a person after conviction by a competent court, can be considered to apply . For deprivation of liberty to be justifiable under this provision, three conditions have to be fulfilled . The person must have been "deprived of his liberty . . . in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law", his detention must be "lawful", and it must be so "after conviction by a competent court" . The applicant was placed at the Government's disposal in application of Section 23 of the Social Protection Act by order . of the Ghent Court of Appeal . He was actually detained on various occasions, from 3 October 1972 to 25 July 1973, from 16 Janua ry to 11 July 1975 and from 21 January 1976 to 5 May 1977 . Since 21 December 1977, he has again been in detention . The decisions to detain him have been taken by the executive, in the person of the Minister of Justice, in accordance with Section 25 of the Act, which states :" Recidivists and habitual offenders placed at the Government' s
disposal shall be detained, where appropriate, in an establishment designated by royal order" . There is no doubt, therefore, and,indeed it is not seriously disputed, that the procedures laid down in Belgian law have been complied with and that the detentions were lawfull from the point of view of domestic law .
But, can these deprivations of liberty in the interests of security be assimilated to detention "after conviction by a competent court" ? Although the text of the Convention makes no explicit reference to security measures, the Commission has already conceded many times that deprivation of liberty for an unspecitied period ordered by courts as a security measure in addition to, or instead of, a penalty is consistent with the terms of Article 5 .1 .a (cf . decisions onithe admissibility of applications No . 99/55, Yearbook I, p . 260, No . 138/55,Yearbook I, p . 234, No . 4324/69, Collection No . 37, p . 98, against the Federal Republic of Germany ; No . 2518/65, Yearbook VIII, p . 371, against Denmark, No . 2306/64, Collection 21, p . 23 and No . 2742/66, Yearbook IX, p . 551, against Austria) . The protilem in the present case isthat the judge does not himself order detention whose mode of execution is for the executive to decide . He orders the placing of the offender at the Government's disposal, a general measure which, depending on the case, can take the form of supervision, probation, various types of semi-liberty, or â¢"where appropriate" detention, for periods ranging, in theory, from 0 days .to 10 years . This being so, is detention or return toidetention in a penal settlement by ministerial decision still simply a measure executing a judicial decision embodying a conviction ? From the standpoint of the guarantee of individual rights, is there still a sufficiently direct connection between the court's initial decision and the deprivation of liberty whose,lawfulness is being challenged ? The Commission considers that the problems posed by the applicant's complaints are so complex that no ruling on them is possible until the merits of the case have been examined . It follows that the application cannot be rejected as manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 .2 of the Convention . 2 . The applicant further complains that he has been unable to take judicial proceedings in respect of the administrative decisions taken in connection with his detention . He claims that this constitutes a violation of Article 5 .4 of the Convention which guarantees that "everyone-who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawfulW : . - 71 _ .
True, where a court has pronounced a sentence of deprivation of liberty for a specified period in respect of a previously committed offence, the evidence of its lawfulness required by the article cited is embodied in the initial judicial decision (European Court of Human Rights, Vagrancy cases, judgment of 18 June 1971, paras . 75, 76 ; cf . also, a contrario, decision on application No . 6859/74 against Belgium, Decisions and Reports No . 3, pp . 139, 141) . In such cases the State is not obliged to allow a further judicial proceedings when the offender is actually being detained by virtue of the initial decision . The Commission has, however, already emphasised that this interpretation of Article 5 .4 cannot, as it stands, be extended to all cases of detention, in particular not to the indefinite detention of the insane . (Decision on application No . 6859/74 against Belgium, Decisions and Reports No . 3, p .139, Report on application No . 6301/73, Winterwerp against the Netherlands, p . 95) . In the case under consideration, in the light of Belgian practice in applying the Social Protection Act, the judge's sentence seems in fact to have given initial authorities for detention for a period not exceeding 10 years, but whose actual duration was totally unforeseable and depended, in principle, on the treatment required by the applicant and the need to protect society . This being so, even if the applicant's detention results from the execution of a judgrnent pronounced by a court, does not Article 5 .5 require that the administrative decisions ordering his return to detention or refusing his release be subject to a separate judicial proceedings 7 The Commission considers that this question is sufficiently complex to justify an examination of the merits of the case and that the complaint cannot as being manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 .2 . , 3 . The applicant alleges that he has been placed in a state of servitude, since he is tied to a penal settlement in which he must work and remain at the discretion of the executive authority . He also complains that he is being forced to work to save the 12,000 FB on which any leave is conditional . Here, he rests his case on Article 4 .1 and 2 which prohibit slavery, servitude and forced or compulsory labour . The distinction between "servitude" and "forced labour" is not explicitly stated . It may be considered, however, that in addition to the obligation to perform certain services for others, the notion of servitude embraces the obligation for the "serf" to live on another person's property and the impossibility of altering his condition . Here the Commission is chiefly guided by Article 1 of the Supplementary Convention on the abolition of slavery, the slave trade and institutions and practices similar to slavery of 30 April 1956 . At all events, Article 4 .3 .a clearly states that forced labour does not include "any work required to be dÃ´ne in the ordinary course of detention imposed according to the provisions of Article 5" . It cannot, therefore, a fortiori, be regardedas a form of servitude . In the case at issue, th e
important thing is accordingly to ascertain whether the circumstances of the applicant's detention were in conformity with Article 5 and this question the Commission has reserved for its examination of the merits . 4 . The applicant complains lastly that he suffered disciplinary measures for manifesting his disagreement with the recommendations of the Recidivists Board regarding the saving of 12,000 FB from his earnings . He alleges that this contravenes Article 10 of the Convention which guarantees the right to freedom of expression . The Commission notes, however, that there is no evidence in the file that the applicant was isolated in a cell as a disciplinary measure designed to discourage him from expressing certain views or prevent him from exercising his freedom of expression . On the contrary, it would seem that this measure was, at most, a punishment for the applicant's refusal to conform to the conditions governing the enforcement of his detention and to the regulations applying in penal establishments . It follows that the application is in this respect manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 .2 of the Convention . For these reasons the Commissio n 1 . Declares the application INADMISSIBLE insofar as it complains of an interference with the right to freedom of expression ; 2 . Declares the remainder of the application ADMISSIBLE .
- 73 -Origine de la décision Pays : Conseil de l'EuropeJuridiction : Cour européenne des droits de l'hommeFormation : Commission (plénière)Date de la décision : 05/07/1979Fonds documentaire : HUDOC Haut de page

References: l'article 5
 l'article 23
 l'article 17
 l'article 26
 l'article 5

l'article 4
 l'article 5
 l'article 5
 l'article 4
 l'article 10
 l'article 5
 l'article 5
 l'article 23
 l'article 25
 l'article 5
 l'article 27
 l'article 5
 l'article 5
 l'article 5
 l'article 27
 l'article 4
 l'article 1
 l'article 4
 l'article 5
 l'article 5
 l'article 10
 l'article 27