Source: https://pmlawblog.com/2014/07/16/sleeping-yankee-fan-strikes-out-with-lawsuit-against-espn/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 21:16:42+00:00

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Based on these factual allegations, Plaintiff brings causes of action for defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress, and he ultimately seeks damages in the amount of ten million dollars.
Initially, the defamation claim appears to be improperly pleaded. Under New York law, to properly state a claim for defamation, “the particular words complained of must be set forth in the complaint.” C.P.L.R. § 3016(a). This requirement is strictly enforced and the exact words must be set forth. Varela v. Investors Ins. Holding Corp., 185 A.D.2d 309, 310 (N.Y. App. Div. [2d Dep’t] 1992), aff’d, 81 N.Y.2d 958 (1993). Any qualification in the pleadings renders the complaint defective. Gardner v. Alexander Rent-A-Car, Inc., 28 A.D.2d 667, 669 (N.Y. App. Div. [1st Dep’t]] 1967).
Here, Plaintiff does not satisfy this exacting standard as he fails to set forth the exact words that Kruk and Schulman stated. Additionally, he qualifies his defamation claim by stating that “[a]nnouncers like Dan Shulman and John Kruck [sic]” made disparaging comments and then used the qualifying phrase “includ[ing] but [sic] not limited to” when listing the allegedly defamatory comments.
1 When a plaintiff chooses not to attach to the complaint or incorporate by reference the material upon which it solely relies and which is integral to the complaint, the defendant may submit such material and the court may take that material into consideration in deciding a motion to dismiss. See, e.g., Cortec Indus., Inc. v. Sum Holding L.P., 949 F.2d 42, 47-48 (2d Cir. 1991). Thus, when moving to dismiss the Complaint under C.P.L.R. § 3211(a), the defendants can rightly rely upon the actual transcript of the broadcast at issue. Alternatively, the defendants could file a motion for summary judgment pursuant to C.P.L.R. § 3212.
Further, Plaintiff cannot satisfy the second element of a defamation claim. The First Amendment protects commentary about the public actions of individuals. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269-70 (1964). Rector attended a public baseball game that was being aired on national television. While Rector did not bring attention upon himself by being unruly or out of control, it is a fact that he was in a public setting and was fully aware of the fact that he may be subjected to public viewing, either on the ESPN broadcast or the gigantic screen in center field. This is not a scenario where Plaintiff is suing based on a violation of a private right.
By using this ticket, the bearer agrees that . . . the Yankees, the other participating club, and each of their respective agents and licensees shall have the unrestricted right and license to use the bearer’s likeness in any broadcast, telecast, or photograph taken in connection with the game or other transmission or reproduction, in whole or in part, of the game.
In other words, there is an argument that, by virtue of simply using his ticket to the game, the named defendants had authority to show the plaintiff on camera.
Likewise, the opinion and fair comment privilege and the defense of substantial truth are also applicable in this context. Notably, in his Complaint, Plaintiff concedes that he was, in fact, sleeping at the game. Thus, an announcer pointing this out is simply a fact. All of the other comments by Kruk and Shulman (noting that he was “oblivious” to the game, wondering whether he slept through Beltran’s homerun, that he looked comfortable, that Yankee Stadium is not the best place to sleep, etc.) are clearly opinions and are protected by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Plaintiff’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress also appears to be a losing proposition. Preliminarily, courts will dismiss a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress when the allegations fall within the ambit of other traditional liability, which, in this case, would be a cause of action for defamation. See Fischer v. Maloney, 43 N.Y.2d 553, 558 (1978).
Even if this claim was not subsumed within Plaintiff’s defamation claim, it would still fail on the merits. Two of the necessary elements to such a claim include “extreme and outrageous conduct” and “an intent to cause, or disregard of a substantial probability of causing, severe emotional distress.” Howell v. N.Y. Post Co., Inc., 81 N.Y.2d 115, 117 (1993). New York has a high threshold for conduct that is “extreme and outrageous” to constitute the intentional infliction of emotional distress; the conduct must be “so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized [society].” Murphy v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 303 (1983) (citing Restatement of Torts (Second) § 46 , comment d (1965)). At the pleadings stage, whether sufficient facts have been pleaded to meet this standard is a legal issue for a court to resolve. See, e.g., Herlihy v. Metro. Museum of Art, 214 A.D.2d 250, 262-63 (N.Y. App. Div. [1st Dep’t] 1995). The aforementioned clip does not show any evidence of “extreme and outrageous conduct” on the part of the announcers.
Plaintiff is an unintelligent and stupid individual.
Plaintiff is not worthy to be a fan of the New York Yankees.
Plaintiff is a fatty cow that needs two seats at all times and represents a symbol of failure.
Plaintiff is a confused and disgusted and socially bankrupt individual.
Plaintiff is a confused individual that neither understands nor knows anything about the history and the meaning of the rivalry between the Red Sox and the New York Yankees.
Plaintiff is so stupid that he cannot differentiate between his house and a public place by snoozing throughout the fourth inning of the Yankees game.
2 In fact, many of the alleged defamatory statements were contained in posts or user comments on twitter, blogs, and other websites that have no affiliation with ESPN, the Yankees or MLB.
To the extent that Plaintiff is seeking to hold the defendants responsible for the postings by commenters on their websites, such a claim is not actionable. The Communications Decency Act (“CDA”) is a federal law which protects the owners of websites from liability – such as defamation – when user-submitted content is published on its website. Section 230 of the CDA provides, in relevant part, that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). The CDA operates to prevent claims against interactive service providers for information that originated with a third-party user of the service. See Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997). In other words, the CDA operates to bar claims asserted against providers of interactive services for harm allegedly caused by content provided by a third-party. Gibson v. Craigslist, Inc.,No. 08-CV-7735, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53256, at *8-10 (S.D.N.Y. June 15, 2009).
For Section 230 of the CDA to apply, three elements must be met: (1) the defendant is a service provider of an interactive computer service; (2) the content posted on the interactive computer service was provided by another information content provider; and (3) the cause of action treats the defendant as a publisher or speaker of information. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330.
Based on the allegations, it appears that Plaintiff’s Complaint meets these elements. Plaintiff’s lawsuit is not blaming the defendants for what they actually stated but for what others stated in response to the video clip. Such a lawsuit is clearly prohibited by the express terms of the CDA.
3 In addition to filing motions to dismiss based on the aforementioned grounds, the defendants will likely also seek an award of costs and fees for filing a frivolous lawsuit. See C.P.L.R. § 130-1.1(a)-(d).

References: § 3016
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 § 3211
 § 3212
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 § 46
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 § 230
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 § 130