Source: https://classactionblawg.com/2013/10/
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 23:18:04+00:00

Document:
If you’re prosecuting or defending a class action or are interested in class action developments (and I’m not sure why on Earth you would be reading this otherwise) you’ll want to know about a great new ABA publication on the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA). The Class Action Fairness Act, Law and Strategy, is a book of collected works written by experts on both sides of the bar and deftly edited by former ABA CADS Committee Chair Gregory C. Cook. Those familiar with CADS (the Class Actions and Derivative Suits Committee of the ABA Section of Litigation) will recognize the names of many of the knowledgeable contributors.
Chapter 3 – Hey CAFA, Is that a Class Action?
Chapter 4 – The Amount in Controversy under CAFA: Have You Got What It Takes for Federal Court?
Be sure to click the link on the title of the book, above, for information about how to get your copy. If you don’t have it, chances are that your opponent will!
Practice Tip: Do You Need to Attach Affidavits to a CAFA Notice of Removal?
One question that defense practitioners often face when preparing a notice of removal under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) is whether they must attach affidavits or other proof of the facts submitted in support of removal at the time the removal notice is filed, or whether the submission of proof can wait until removal jurisdiction is challenged by the plaintiff.
A removal notice is a pleading that requires factual allegations but should not require verification or proof of the facts alleged, and this is how most federal courts interpret the removal statute. See, e.g., Meridian Security Insurance Co. v. Sadowski, 441 F.3d 536, 539-40 (7th Cir. 2006) (“If [the] allegations [by the party asserting jurisdiction] of jurisdictional facts are challenged by his adversary in any appropriate manner, he must support them by competent proof.”) (quoting McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936)). However, some district courts have ordered remand due to a defendant’s failure to attach affidavits or other support for those allegations to the removal notice itself. Recently, in Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Company, LLC v. Owens, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals refused to grant review of a decision by the U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas remanding a class action for this reason. No. 13-603 (10th Cir. Sept. 17, 2013) (refusing to grant review of Owens v. Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC, No. 12-4157-JAR (D. Kan. May 21, 2013)). Because the votes on whether to accept review were evenly divided, the petition for review was denied.
After today’s decision any diligent attorney (and one can assume that an attorney representing a defendant in a case involving at least $5 million—the threshold for removal under CAFA—would have substantial incentive to be diligent) would submit to the evidentiary burden rather than take a chance on remand to state court; if so, the issue will not arise again.
I would add a few words about our discretionary jurisdiction to review removals under CAFA. CAFA is a newcomer to the scene and its intricacies are unfamiliar to many of us. It will always be tempting for very busy judges to deny review of a knotty matter that requires a decision in short order. But we have an obligation to provide clarity in this important area of the law.
Sadly, just as it is tempting for busy appellate judges to avoid having to deal with the intricacies of CAFA jurisdiction, it is tempting for many federal trial judges to look for any excuse to help clear their civil dockets by remanding removed cases. This is of course not true of all federal trial judges, but it happens enough that the appellate courts need to step in from time to time to avoid the law from developing in a way that thwarts CAFA’s legislative purpose of expanding the availability of a federal forum to class action defendants. However, until the appellate courts decide to heed Judge Hartz’s plea to take on more of these issues, the state of the law is likely to continue to be slanted in favor of remand whenever there is the slighest doubt.
In the meantime, as Judge Hartz points out, a diligent defense attorney in the Tenth Circuit will need to submit evidentiary support along with a removal notice. The same is true of any other Circuit where the issue has not been resolved definitively by the Court of Appeals. If the law of the Circuit is clear that factual information need not be attached to the removal notice, then there can be strategic and cost-saving advantages to not attaching the information. However, if the law is not clear, then as the Dart Cherokee Basin case illustrates, a “diligent” attorney should take the safe approach and attach supporting affidavits to the removal notice.
Today, Whirlpool and Sears filed petitions for a writ of certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court asking seeking review of decisions by the Sixth and Seventh Circuits upholding certification orders in class actions alleging that design defects create a tendency for mold to develop in front-loading washing machines manufactured by the defendants. The two lower court decisions, which were discussed in this August 23, 2013 CAB Post, are Butler v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., Nos. 11-8029, 12-8030 (7th Cir., Aug. 22, 2013) (Posner, J.) and In re Whirlpool Corp. Front‐Loading Washer Products Liability Litigation, No. 10-4188 (6th Cir. July 18, 2013). Earlier decisions in both cases had previously been vacated and remanded for reconsideration in light of the Court’s decision in Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, and both the Sixth and Seventh Circuits reached the same conclusion on remand: that class certification was proper even though most potential class members were not actually affected by mold in their washing machines.
1. Whether the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3) is satisfied by the purported “efficiency” of a class trial on one abstract issue, without considering the host of individual issues that would need to be tried to resolve liability and damages and without determining whether the aggregate of common issues predominates over the aggregate of individual issues.
2. Whether a product liability class may be certified where it is undisputed that most members did not experience the alleged defect or harm.
1. Whether the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance requirement can be satisfied when the court has not found that the aggregate of common liability issues predominates over the aggregate of individualized issues at trial and when neither injury nor damages can be proven on a classwide basis.
2. Whether a class may be certified when most members have never experienced the alleged defect and both fact of injury and damages would have to be litigated on a member-by-member basis.

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