Source: https://arizona.lexroll.com/1976-porsche-auto-n-m-lic-no-bne-532-141-ariz-421-app-1984/
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 16:35:22+00:00

Document:
In the Matter of 1976 PORSCHE AUTOMOBILE NEW MEXICO LICENSE NO. BNE-532 VIN: 4762900200 The STATE of Arizona, Plaintiff/Appellee, v. Scott JACOBSEN, Defendant/Appellant.
No. 2 CA-CIV 4936.Court of Appeals of Arizona, Division Two.
Appeal from the Superior Court of Pima County, Cause No. 202511, William E. Druke, J.
Stephen D. Neely, Pima County Atty. by Michael P. Callahan, Deputy County Atty., Tucson, for plaintiff/appellee.
Scott Jacobsen, in pro. per.
This appeal is from a February 11, 1983, judgment to retain a 1976 Porsche automobile as a result of forfeiture proceedings filed under A.R.S. § 13-3409(A)(3).
The facts show that appellant was allegedly involved in two drug transactions in Pima County in May 1982. The Porsche automobile was allegedly used by appellant to transport the narcotics in Tucson on those dates. Appellant was not arrested following the transactions, but rather he returned to New Mexico while negotiations for larger transactions ensued. Tucson police officers and appellant arranged a sale of $1,000 worth of methamphetamines, the sale being consummated on May 25, 1982, in Albuquerque. At this point, a laboratory for the manufacture of narcotics was seized, appellant and others were arrested and federal narcotics prosecutions were instituted. The vehicle in question was seized on June 14, 1982, in Albuquerque by the Albuquerque Police Department at the request of the Tucson Police Department, and was delivered to the Tucson Police Department. Forfeiture proceedings were instituted two days later when an order was issued by Pima County Superior Court Judge William Sherrill authorizing the retention of the automobile. Pleadings were thereafter filed by the state and eventually responsive pleadings were filed by appellant, which were stricken as untimely. A default judgment was eventually entered along with the judgment to retain the vehicle.
Preliminarily, the state has argued that appellant was correctly denied relief below since he failed to timely raise his challenge to the proceedings, citing In the Matter of 1969 Ford Truck I.D. No. E14AHD34733, License No. 2 CB-870, 122 Ariz. 442, 595 P.2d 674 (App. 1979). However, in that case, the appellant was advancing an illegal search and seizure argument in the motion to suppress and was therefore bound by the 20-day requirement of Rule 16.1(b), Rules of Criminal Procedure, 17 A.R.S. Here, appellant has challenged the jurisdiction of the court to conduct the forfeiture proceeding. Lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time and is not subject to the 20-day limitation of Rule 16.1(b).
(1st Cir. 1931). However, courts are divided as to whether an illegal or unauthorized seizure precludes a court from exercising jurisdiction.
(W.D.Pa. 1938); cf. Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 53 S.Ct. 305, 77 L.Ed. 641 (1933) (recognizing this principle, but finding it inapplicable where beyond the territorial limits placed upon the government’s authority by treaty).
the National Prohibition Act. The state officers were not authorized by the act to make the seizure. The court held that where the seizure was made by one having no authority to do so, the government could nevertheless adopt the seizure with the same effect as if it had been originally made by one duly authorized, reasoning that “the jurisdiction of the court was secured by the fact that the res was in the possession of the [party authorized to seize] when the libel was filed.” 272 U.S. at 532, 47 S.Ct. at 192.
It has been pointed out that both Mr. Justice Holmes in Dodge v. United States, supra, and Mr. Justice Brandeis in United States v. One Ford Coupe Automobile, supra, were apparently paraphrasing Mr. Justice Story’s opinion in The Caledonian, 4 Wheat (17 U.S.) 100, 103, 4 L.Ed. 523 (1819), for the proposition that a forfeiture proceeding “quite basically involves the in rem jurisdiction of a court of the United States and that it makes very little difference to any one how initial possession of the res was obtained, so long as the proceeding to enforce the forfeiture accords with due process.” United States v. One 1963 Cadillac Coupe de Ville Two-Door, 250 F. Supp. 183, 186 (W.D.Mo. 1966). In the present case, appellant received notice of the proceedings and did eventually appear, and no due process argument is made.
(1924), and Sampsell v. Superior Court, 32 Cal.2d 763, 197 P.2d 739 (1948). See also People v. One 1951 Chevrolet 2-Door, 157 Cal.App.2d 301, 320 P.2d 881 (1958).
“If there was no legal seizure, then there could be no judgment of forfeiture. `The very foundation of forfeiture is a legal seizure; until this is had, no further proceedings are authorized.’ [Citations omitted]” 85 A. at 1061.
The cases are compiled in the annotation of 8 A.L.R.3d 473, under the lead case of Berkowitz v. U.S., 340 F.2d 168 (1st Cir. 1965), which held that the government could not enforce a forfeiture of money and checks on the ground that the items had been used in violation of internal revenue laws, where the government had seized the property by an invasion of the constitutional rights of the person from whom the property had been seized incident to an unlawful arrest. The court, refusing to allow “the Governmental violators of the Constitution” to “enrich the Treasury by their defiance of fundamental liberties,” applied exclusionary rule reasoning referred to, but not followed, by Mr. Justice Holmes in Dodge v. United States, supra.
1. The seizure is incident to any arrest or any lawful search or seizure or an inspection under the administrative inspection warrant.
2. The seizing officer has probable cause to believe that the property subject to seizure has been the subject of a prior judgment in favor of this state and the seizing officer has probable cause to believe that the property will be destroyed or removed from the jurisdiction of the state before a warrant can be obtained.
3. A peace officer has probable cause to believe that the property is directly or indirectly dangerous to health or safety and that harm may occur before a warrant can be obtained.
It is clear that the property can only be seized pursuant to a court order, unless one of the enumerated exceptions applies, which is not the case here. Indeed, § 13-106(B)(1) contemplates a seizure pursuant to a lawful search or seizure. Since Arizona has aligned itself with those jurisdictions which authorize forfeiture proceedings only where the res is properly brought before the court, we also follow the cases which void the proceeding when the seizing authority has disregarded the statutory requirements for forfeiture. Therefore, the forfeiture order is vacated as having been entered without jurisdiction.
BIRDSALL, C.J., and HOWARD, J., concur.

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