Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&amp;view=article&amp;id=45904:156118&amp;catid=1459&amp;Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 08:51:29+00:00

Document:
PABLO T. TOLENTINO and TEMPUS PLACE REALTY MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, Petitioners, v. HON. OSCAR LEVISTE, Presiding Judge, RTC, Quezon City, Br. 97 and SPOUSES GERARDO CINCO, JR. and PAMELA H. CINCO, Respondents.
Petitioners Pablo T. Tolentino and Tempus Place Realty Management Corporation seek the review and reversal of the decision and amended decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 59506 entitled "Tempus Place Realty Management Corporation and Pablo T. Tolentino v. Hon. Oscar Leviste, Presiding Judge, RTC - Quezon City, Branch 97 and Sps. Gerardo Cinco, Jr., and Pamela H. Cinco." The Court of Appeals denied petitioners' petition for annulment of the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 97, on the action for specific performance with damages filed by respondents Spouses Gerardo and Pamela Cinco against them.
1. The judgment in default granted reliefs in excess of what is prayed for in the complaint in gross violation of the clear provisions of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
2. The judgment in default awarded unliquidated damages in palpable violation of the mandatory provision of Section 3[,] Rule 9, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
3. The judgment in default is in gross violation of Section 14, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution and Section 1, Rule 36, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
4. The judgment in default was rendered in violation of the rights of the petitioner to substantive and procedural due process.
5. Corrollarily, the gargantuan award for damages by the court a quo in patent and blatant violation of the law and settled jurisprudence [is] unconscionable and clearly violative of substantial justice and equities of the case.
6. Petitioners have good and substantial defenses in respect of private respondents' claims.
a) Actual damages in the amount of P10,000.00 a month from May 1994, up to the time possession of the condominium units [sic] is delivered to the plaintiffs (private respondents herein) representing the reasonable rental value of the unit.
d) Attorney's fees in the amount of One [H]undred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00).
A. The judgment in default granted reliefs in excess of what is prayed for in the complaint in gross violation of the clear provisions of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
b. The judgment in default awarded unliquidated damages in palpable violation of the mandatory provision of Section 3[,] Rule 9, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
c. The judgment in default is in gross violation of Sec. 14, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution and Sec. 1, Rule 36, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
d. The judgment in default was rendered in violation of the rights of the petitioner to substantive and procedural due process.
2. The petitioners were prevented from having their day in court because of the gross negligence of their former counsel, which gross negligence amounts to extrinsic fraud.
3. The remedies of appeal, petition for relief or other remedies are no longer available through no fault of petitioners.
The issue that needs to be resolved in this Petition for Review is whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition for annulment of judgment filed by petitioners.
Sec. 1. Coverage. - This Rule shall govern the annulment by the Court of Appeals of judgments or final orders and resolutions in civil actions of Regional Trial Courts for which the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner.
Sec. 2. Grounds for annulment. - The annulment may be based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
Under the Rule, an action for annulment of judgments may only be availed of on the following grounds: (1) extrinsic fraud and (2) lack of jurisdiction.
We reiterate the rule that a client is bound by the mistakes of his counsel except when the negligence of his counsel is so gross, reckless and inexcusable that the client is deprived of his day in court.19 Only when the application of the general rule would result in serious injustice should the exception apply.20 We find no reason to apply the exception in this case.
In addition, it is provided in Section 2 of Rule 47 that extrinsic fraud shall not be a valid ground if it was availed of, or could have been availed of, in a motion for new trial or petition for relief. In other words, it is effectively barred if it could have been raised as a ground in an available remedial measure.21 The records show that after petitioners learned of the judgment of default, they filed a motion for new trial on the ground of extrinsic fraud. It was however denied by the trial court. They filed a notice of appeal thereafter. Hence, they are now precluded from alleging extrinsic fraud as a ground for their petition for annulment of the trial court decision.
We are also not persuaded by petitioners' assertion that the trial court judge lacked jurisdiction so as to justify the annulment of his decision in Civil Case No. Q-96-29207. Lack of jurisdiction as a ground for annulment of judgment refers to either lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defending party or over the subject matter of the claim.22 Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant or respondent is acquired by voluntary appearance or submission by the defendant or respondent to the court, or by coercive process issued by the court to him, generally by the service of summons. The trial court clearly had jurisdiction over the person of the defending party, the petitioners herein, when the latter received the summons from the court. On the other hand, jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim is conferred by law and is determined from the allegations in the complaint. Under the law, the action for specific performance and damages is within the jurisdiction of the RTC. Petitioners' submission, therefore, that the trial court lacked jurisdiction does not hold water.
We note that petitioners' arguments to support their stand that the trial court did not have jurisdiction actually pertain to the substance of the decision. Jurisdiction is not the same as the exercise of jurisdiction. As distinguished from the exercise of jurisdiction, jurisdiction is the authority to decide a cause, and not the decision rendered therein. Where there is jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter, the decision on all other questions arising in the case is but an exercise of the jurisdiction. And the errors which the court may commit in the exercise of jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment which are the proper subject of an appeal.23 The errors raised by petitioners in their petition for annulment assail the content of the decision of the trial court and not the court's authority to decide the suit. In other words, they relate to the court's exercise of its jurisdiction, but petitioners failed to show that the trial court did not have the authority to decide the case.
Based on the foregoing discussion, it is clear that petitioners' petition for annulment of judgment had no basis and was rightly dismissed by the Court of Appeals.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition at bar is DENIED.
1 Original Records, pp. 1-4.
2 Original Records, p. 15.
3 Decision, Civil Case No. Q-96-29207, p. 4; CA Rollo, p. 33.
4 Original Records, pp. 81-84.
5 Original Records, p. 102.
6 Original Records, p. 103.
7 Original Records, p. 118.
8 Original Records, p. 119.
9 Petition for Annulment of Judgment, CA G.R. CV No. 59506, p. 6; CA Rollo, p. 7.
10 Decision, CA-G.R. SP No. 59506, Rollo, pp. 53-60.
11 Amended Decision, CA-G.R. SP No. 59506, Rollo, pp. 48-51.
12 Petition for Review, Rollo, pp. 8-43.
13 Teodoro v. Court of Appeals, 388 SCRA 527 (2002).
14 Alarcon v. Court of Appeals, 323 SCRA 716 (2000).
15 Original Records, pp. 8-9.
16 Motion for New Trial, Civil Case No. Q-96-29207, Original Records, pp. 81-86.
17 412 SCRA 54 (2003).
19 Alarcon v. Court of Appeals, supra.
20 Teodoro v. Court of Appeals, supra.
22 Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium vol. 1 (1997), p. 558.
23 Toyota Autoparts, Phils., Inc. v. Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations of the Department of Labor and Employment, 304 SCRA 95 (1999).

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