Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/396/142/
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 12:35:29+00:00

Document:
Detroit & Toledo Shore Line R. Co. v.
"where . . . the services of the Mediation Board have been requested by either party . . . , rates of pay, rules, or working conditions shall not be altered by the carrier until the controversy has been finally acted upon . . . by the Mediation Board,"
forbids such unilateral action by the carrier. The District Court dismissed the railroad's complaint, but granted the union's request for an injunction restraining the railroad from establishing any new outlying assignments, despite the absence of a provision prohibiting such assignments in the collective bargaining agreement. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
Held: The status quo that is to be maintained pursuant to § 6 of the Railway Labor Act while the procedures of the Act are being exhausted consists of the actual, objective working conditions out of which the dispute arose, whether or not those conditions are covered in an existing collective bargaining agreement. Order of Conductors v. Pitney, 326 U. S. 561, and Williams v. Terminal Co., 315 U. S. 386, distinguished. Pp. 396 U. S. 148-159.
This case raises a question concerning the extent to which the Railway Labor Act of 1926 [Footnote 1] imposes an obligation upon the parties to a railroad labor dispute to maintain the status quo while the "purposely long and drawn out" [Footnote 2] procedures of the Act are exhausted. Petitioner, a railroad, contends that the status quo which the Act requires be maintained consists only of the working conditions specifically covered in the parties' existing collective bargaining agreement. Respondent railroad brotherhood contends that what must be preserved as the status quo are the actual, objective working conditions out of which the dispute arose, irrespective of whether these conditions are covered in an existing collective agreement. For the reasons stated below, we think that only the union's position is consistent with the language and purposes of the Railway Labor Act.
bargaining agreement to cover the changed working conditions of the employees who would work out of Trenton. Section 6 requires both the carrier and union to give the other party a 30-day notice of an "intended change in agreements affecting rates of pay, rules, or working conditions." [Footnote 6] Since the union thus invoked the "major dispute" settlement procedures of the Railway Labor Act, [Footnote 7] the dispute first went to conference and, when the parties failed to agree between themselves, then to the National Mediation Board.
While the case was pending before the National Mediation Board, the Shore Line announced two new outlying assignments at Dearoad, Michigan, at the northern end of the line. Because work crews could be taken by cab from Dearoad south to Trenton, the railroad concluded that it no longer needed to establish assignments at Trenton, and so advised the Mediation Board. When the Dearoad assignments were announced, the union withdrew from the Mediation Board proceedings, and, before a Special Board of Adjustment convened under § 3 of the Act, [Footnote 8] challenged the railroad's right under the parties' collective agreement to establish outlying assignments.
"In every case where . . . the services of the Mediation Board have been requested by either party . . . , rates of pay, rules, or working conditions shall not be altered by the carrier until the controversy has been finally acted upon . . . by the Mediation Board. . . ."
The District Court dismissed the railroad's complaint, from which no appeal has been taken, but it granted the injunction sought by the union restraining the railroad from establishing any new outlying assignments at Trenton or elsewhere. [Footnote 12] The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the issuance of the injunction against the railroad. 401 F.2d 368 (1968). We granted certiorari, 393 U.S. 1116 (1969).
not be altered" was that rates of pay, rules, or working conditions as expressed in an agreement shall not be altered. And since nothing in the railroad's agreement with the union precluded the railroad from altering the location of work assignments, this working condition was not "expressed in an agreement." Thus, the argument runs, the railroad could make outlying assignments without violating the status quo provision of § 6, and the judgments below must be reversed.
We note at the outset that the language of § 6 simply does not say what the railroad would have it say. Instead, the section speaks plainly of "rates of pay, rules, or working conditions" without any limitation to those obligations already embodied in collective agreements. More important, we are persuaded that the railroad's interpretation of this section is sharply at variance with the overall design and purpose of the Railway Labor Act.
"the procedures of the Act are purposely long and drawn out, based on the hope that reason and practical considerations will provide in time an agreement that resolves the dispute. "
The Act's status quo requirement is central to its design. Its immediate effect is to prevent the union from striking and management from doing anything that would justify a strike. In the long run, delaying the time when the parties can resort to self-help provides time for tempers to cool, helps create an atmosphere in which rational bargaining can occur, and permits the forces of public opinion to be mobilized in favor of a settlement without a strike or lockout. Moreover, since disputes usually arise when one party wants to change the status quo without undue delay, the power which the Act gives the other party to preserve the status quo for a prolonged period will frequently make it worthwhile for the moving party to compromise with the interests of the other side, and thus reach agreement without interruption to commerce.
"the rates of pay, rules, or working conditions of its employees, as a class as embodied in agreements except in the manner prescribed in such agreements or in section 6 of this Act. [Footnote 24]"
should be read into the status quo provisions of §§ 5, 6, and 10. We find no merit in this argument. Section 2 Seventh, which was added to the Action in 1934, does not impose any status quo duties attendant upon major dispute procedures. It simply states one category of cases in which those procedures must be invoked. The purpose of § 2 Seventh is twofold: it operates to give legal and binding effect to collective agreements, and it lays down the requirement that collective agreements can be changed only by the statutory procedures. The violation of this section is a criminal offense punishable by imprisonment or fine or both. [Footnote 25] Violations of the status quo provisions of §§ 5, 6, and 10 are only civil wrongs.
interpreting the agreements was the Adjustment Board provided by Congress in the Railway Labor Act, § 3 First (i), for that purpose, and directed the District Court to stay its proceedings accordingly. 326 U.S. at 326 U. S. 567-568. Thus, Pitney, at most, involved a question of the necessity of filing a § 6 notice, and was not at all concerned with the status quo provision of that section.
notified of the "accounting and guarantee" plan, new and independent contracts were formed between each redcap and the terminal. The Court held that these contracts were not affected by the pending request for collective bargaining under the Railway Labor Act. The decision rested partially on the ground that "[i]ndependent individual contracts are not affected by the Act." 315 U.S. at 315 U. S. 399. And the Court also said more narrowly that the status quo requirements of § 6 were inapplicable, since that section applies only when a "change in agreements" is involved. 315 U.S. at 315 U. S. 400. In Williams, there was absolutely no prior history of any collective bargaining or agreement between the parties on any matter. Without pausing to comment upon the present vitality of either of these grounds for dismissing the redcaps' Railway Labor Act claim, it is readily apparent that Williams involved only the question of whether the status quo requirement of § 6 applied at all. The Court in Williams therefore never reached the question of the scope of the status quo requirement in a dispute, such as the one before the Court today, to which that requirement concededly applies.
has it a mandate to issue regulations construing the Act generally. Certainly there is nothing in the Act which can be interpreted as giving the Mediation Board the power to change the plain, literal meaning of the statute, which would be the result were we to adopt its interpretation of § 6.
44 Stat. 577, as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 151 et seq.
Railway Clerks v. Florida E. C. R. Co., 384 U. S. 238, 384 U. S. 246 (1966).
The United Transportation Union, the successor organization to the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, was substituted as party respondent by order of the Court, March 3, 1969. Respondents also include two officers of the BLF&E named in the original complaint.
The parties treat the term "outlying work assignment" as meaning a work assignment with a reporting point for going on and off duty located elsewhere than at the Shore Line's principal yard, Lang Yard in Toledo, Ohio. We adopt that usage here.
"Carriers and representatives of the employees shall give at least thirty days' written notice of an intended change in agreements affecting rates of pay, rules, or working conditions, and the time and place for the beginning of conference between the representatives of the parties interested in such intended changes shall be agreed upon within ten days after the receipt of said notice, and said time shall be within the thirty days provided in the notice. In every case where such notice of intended change has been given, or conferences are being held with reference thereto, or the services of the Mediation Board have been requested by either party, or said Board has proffered its services, rates of pay, rules, or working conditions shall not be altered by the carrier until the controversy has been finally acted upon as required by section 5 of this Act, by the Mediation Board, unless a period of ten days has elapsed after termination of conferences without request for or proffer of the services of the Mediation Board."
A "major dispute" is one arising out of the formation or change of collective agreements covering rates of pay, rules, or working conditions. Elgin, J. & E. R. Co. v. Burley, 325 U. S. 711, 325 U. S. 722-727 (1945).
44 Stat. 578, as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 153. At this point, the BLF&E was considering the controversy as a "minor dispute," i.e., a dispute arising out of the interpretation or application of collective agreements. Under § 3 of the Railway Labor Act such disputes are settled by an Adjustment Board whose interpretation of the collective agreement is binding on the parties. See Elgin, J. & E. R. Co. v. Burley, supra, at 325 U. S. 722-727.
"What took place here was not a change in the recognized terminal, but simply amounted to an outlying assignment. There is nothing in the rules of agreement which precludes this carrier from establishing an outside assignment."
The Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen was also named a defendant, as were several officers of both unions. The causes of action against the two brotherhoods were completely different, however, and the cases were treated as distinct at trial and on appeal. The Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen is not involved in the present litigation at this stage.
The full section is set out in n 5, supra.
The order of the District Court is unreported. Detroit & Toledo Shore Line R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, No. C66-207 (D.C.N.D. Ohio, filed Nov. 15, 1966). The opinion of the District Court on motion to vacate the judgment is reported at 267 F.Supp. 572 (1967).
"The Brotherhood insists, and we think rightly, that the major purpose of Congress in passing the Railway Labor Act was 'to provide a machinery to prevent strikes.'"
"The Act provides a detailed framework to facilitate the voluntary settlement of major disputes. A party desiring to effect a change of rates of pay, rules, or working conditions must give advance written notice . § 6. The parties must confer, § 2 Second, and if conference fails to resolve the dispute, either or both may invoke the services of the National Mediation Board, which may also proffer its services sua sponte if it finds a labor emergency to exist. § 5 First. If mediation fails, the Board must endeavor to induce the parties to submit the controversy to binding arbitration, which can take place, however, only if both consent. §§ 5 First, 7. If arbitration is rejected and the dispute threatens"
"who may create an emergency board to investigate and report on the dispute. § 10. While the dispute is working its way through these stages, neither party may unilaterally alter the status quo. §§ 2 Seventh, 5 First, 6, 10."
Section 6 is set out in its entirety in n 5, supra.
"If arbitration at the request of the Board shall be refused by one or both parties, the Board shall at once notify both parties in writing that its mediatory efforts have failed and for thirty days thereafter, unless in the intervening period the parties agree to arbitration, or an emergency board shall be created under section 10 of this Act, no change shall be made in the rates of pay, rules, or working conditions or established practices in effect prior to the time the dispute arose."
"As to maintaining the status quo from the time that a dispute is engendered, it is a violation of the duties imposed by this law for either party to take any action to arbitrarily change the conditions until that dispute has been adjusted in accordance with the law. Their primary duty is to exert every reasonable effort to avoid interruptions of commerce through disputes. The 'reasonable efforts' are set forth here that all disputes shall be considered and decided in conference, if possible; that, second, if conference fails, a certain type of disputes shall be carried to the board of adjustment; the other type of disputes, or those not decided by the board of adjustment, may be carried to the board of mediators, and it shall be the duty of the board of mediators to act."
Hearings on E. R. 7180 before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., 92-93 (1926).
"[T]he only thing that can provoke an arbitrary action [referring to strikes] is the power to arbitrarily change the rates of pay or rules of working conditions before the controversy is settled, and it is provided that they shall not be altered during the entire period of utilization of this law."
Hearings on H.R. 7180 before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., 93 (1926).
"As the present act reads, a railroad, by rejecting the Board of Mediation's final recommendation to arbitrate the dispute, is enabled to change the rates of pay, rules, or working conditions arbitrarily, prior to the issuance of an order by the President appointing a factfinding board and maintaining the status quo for 60 days. . . . The railroads have taken advantage of this unintentional hiatus in the present law in several instances. The change now proposed is designed to plug this hole."
Hearings on S. 3266 before the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 21 (1934).
"The thought was to include in the broadest way all the factors which contributed to what is commonly called the status quo. In other words, the conditions may depend upon the dispute, whether it is with regard to rules or with regard to wages."
Hearings on H.R. 7180 before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., 44 (1926).
"What broader phrase could be used than 'conditions out of which the dispute arose' which comprehends all the elements affecting the controversy? It is intended to make it clear that the parties are going to wait and give the Government full opportunity to adjust the controversy."
Hearings on S. 2306 before the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., 88-89 (1926).
Brief of Railway Labor Executives' Association as amicus curiae 17.
Respondent BLF&E has urged in its brief that we also consider the question whether the Shore Line violated a duty to bargain in good faith, citing Fibreboard Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U. S. 203 (1964), and NLRB v. Katz, 369 U. S. 736 (1962). Deciding the case as we do under the status quo provisions of the Act, we find it unnecessary to reach this argument.
"No carrier, its officers or agents shall change the rates of pay, rules, or working conditions of its employees, as a class as embodied in agreements except in the manner prescribed in such agreements or in section 6 of this Act."
Railway Labor Act, § 2 Tenth, 48 Stat. 1189, 45 U.S.C. § 152 Tenth.
"Section 6 states that, where notice of intended change in an agreement has been given, rates of pay, rules, and working conditions as expressed in the agreement shall not be altered by the carrier until the controversy has been finally acted upon in accordance with specified procedures."
NMB, 34th Ann.Rep. 23 (fiscal year ended June 30, 1968). (Emphasis added.) See also NMB, 33d Ann.Rep. 36 (fiscal year ended June 30, 1967); NMB, 31st Ann.Rep. 25 (fiscal year ended June 30, 1965).
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE joins, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I fully agree that the application of § 6 should not be restricted to only those terms of employment that the parties have seen fit to embody in a written agreement. Section 6 may properly, in some circumstances, be extended to "freeze" de facto conditions of employment. I cannot, however, accept what appears to be the majority's test for determining when a § 6 freeze is appropriate. [Footnote 2/1] Any work practice is, in the words of the majority, an "actual, objective working condition." However, the practice of today may not be the accepted condition of yesterday, but rather a temporary expedient in which neither party acquiesces. I find it difficult to think that Congress intended that either party, by serving a § 6 notice, should be able to shackle his adversary and tie him to a condition that has been historically and consistently controverted.
I favor a more subjective approach than the objective and mechanical one implicit in the majority's language. The question that should be asked is whether, in the context of the relationship between the principals, taken as a whole, there is a basis for implying an understanding on the particular practice involved. To this end, it is necessary to consider not only the duration of the practice, but also all the dealings between the parties, as, for example, whether the particular condition has been the subject of prior negotiations.
While I recognize, of course, that any subjective test is not easily applied, I cannot subscribe to a rule that may have the incongruous effect of perpetuating what both parties, in fact, view as a disputed practice, simply because neither party, for reasons of convenience, has exercised a recognized option of resorting to self-help.
notice seeking to modify the agreement with the railroad. By 1963, the parties had exhausted the statutory mediation route without reconciling their differences and the Mediation Board recommended arbitration to break the impasse. This proposal was rejected by the company, which declared the dispute moot since, by that time, it had abandoned its Trenton project. Meanwhile, the company embarked on a practice of transporting employees at its own expense and on company time from its Dearoad terminal, 11 miles north of Trenton, a practice which is the subject of a separate § 6 notice.
In my opinion, a remand is called for to determine whether the company's voluntary abandonment of its Trenton project, coupled with its undertaking to transport employee from Dearoad at its own cost and the long-established practice prior to 1961, amounted to acceptance in principle of Lang Yard as the reporting location.
For that reason, I respectfully dissent from the Court's affirmance of the Court of Appeals.
The majority first announces a test looking to "actual, objective working conditions," ante at 396 U. S. 153. This is later qualified by a durational requirement, but no general principle of decision is set forth.
While the District Court and the Court of Appeals both properly rejected petitioner's theory, restricting § 6 to terms embodied in a written agreement, it is by no means clear to me precisely what standard they followed in concluding that the Act was applicable.
The District Court, as I read its findings, does not appear to have considered the possible impact of the train of events revealed by the record in connection with 1961-196 proceedings before the Board.

References: v.

 § 6
 v. 
 v. 
 § 3
 § 6
 § 6
 § 2
 § 3
 § 6
 § 6
 § 6
 § 6
 § 151
 v. 
 v. 
 § 153
 § 3
 v. 
 v. 
 § 6
 § 2
 § 5
 § 10
 v. 
 v. 
 § 2
 § 152
 § 6
 § 6
 § 6
 § 6
 § 6