Source: http://ca.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20180507_0003173.CCA.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 14:34:01+00:00

Document:
OTIS D. WRIGHT, II UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
April 8, 2015, 6:57 p.m.
April 8, 2015, 9:03 p.m.
On January 29, 2018, the Court entered Judgment in favor of the Ruizes for $170, 076.57. (Judgment, ECF No. 95.) The Judgment included $56, 692.19 in total damages, calculated by adding the purchase price of the vehicle ($55, 970.32), and incidental and consequential damages ($10, 596.50), and subtracting the value of use ($9, 874.63). The value of use was calculated based on the 17, 801 miles the jury found the Ruizes drove the vehicle between purchase and breach. (Spec. Verdict 4- 6.) In addition, the jury awarded twice the total damages ($113, 384.38), as a civil penalty.
Each party requests relief from the Court on distinct procedural bases, and each has its own legal standard.
A court may grant a motion for new trial “for any reason for which a new trial has heretofore been granted in an action at law in federal court.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(a)(1)(A). One such ground is an excessive award of damages. See Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 437-38 n.22 (1996). In reviewing an award for excessiveness, a court reviews the evidence in a light most favorable to the prevailing party, disturbing only those awards that it concludes are “grossly excessive or monstrous” or are “based on passion or prejudice.” Lambert v. Ackerly, 180 F.3d 997, 1011 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (internal citation omitted). Courts generally defer to a jury's award of damages unless it is “clearly not supported by the evidence.” In re First Alliance Mortg. Co., 471 F.3d 977, 1001 (9th Cir. 2006). “Courts are not free to reweigh the evidence and set aside the jury verdict merely because the jury could have drawn different inferences or conclusions or because judges feel that other results are more reasonable.” Tennant v. Peoria & Pekin Union Ry., 321 U.S. 29, 35 (1944); see also Silver Sage Partners, Ltd. v. City of Desert Hot Springs, 251 F.3d 814, 819 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that a court “may not grant new trial simply because it would have arrived at different verdict….”).
A motion for a new trial may be granted on insufficiency of evidence grounds “only if the verdict is against the ‘great weight' of the evidence, or ‘it is quite clear that the jury has reached a seriously erroneous result.'” Venegas v. Wagner, 831 F.2d 1514, 1519 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting Digidyne Corp. v. Data Gen. Corp., 734 F.2d 1336, 1347 (9th Cir. 1984)); see also Union Oil Co. v. Terrible Herbst, Inc., 331 F.3d 735, 742 (9th Cir. 2003). A new trial under Rule 59(a) is only warranted where the moving party can show that the jury's verdict was “contrary to the clear weight of the evidence, based upon false or perjurious evidence, or involved a miscarriage of justice….” Passantino v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Prods., 212 F.3d 493, 510 n.15 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Wharf v. Burlington Northern R.R. Co., 60 F.3d 631, 637 (9th Cir. 1995)).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) allows a party to move to amend the judgment no later than 28 days after the entry of judgment. District courts have “considerable discretion” when addressing motions to amend a judgment under Rule 59(e). Turner v. Burlington N. Santa Fe R.R. Co., 338 F.3d 1058, 1063 (9th Cir. 2003). However, “a Rule 59(e) motion is an extraordinary remedy, to be used sparingly in the interests of finality and conservation of judicial resources.” Wood v. Ryan, 759 F.3d 1117, 1121 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). “There are four grounds upon which a Rule 59(e) motion may be granted: 1) the motion is necessary to correct manifest errors of law or fact upon which the judgment is based; 2) the moving party presents newly discovered or previously unavailable evidence; 3) the motion is necessary to prevent manifest injustice; or 4) there is an intervening change in controlling law.” Turner, 338 F.3d at 1063 (internal quotation marks, citations, and alterations omitted). “Since these criteria are not actually set forth in the text of Rule 59(e), a court ‘enjoys considerable discretion in granting or denying the motion, ' including for grounds other than those listed above.” United States ex rel. Begole v. Trenkle, No. EDCV0601104VAPOPX, 2012 WL 13071028, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2012) (quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v. Herron, 634 F.3d 1101, 1111 (9th Cir. 2011)).
“In an action involving state law claims, we apply the law of the forum state to determine whether a party is entitled to attorneys' fees, unless it conflicts with a valid federal statute or procedural rule.” MRO Commc'ns, Inc. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 197 F.3d 1276, 1282 (9th Cir. 1999). Documentation submitted in support of a motion for attorneys' fees must apprise the Court of the nature of the activity and should be sufficient to satisfy the Court that the hours expended were actual, non-duplicative, and reasonable. See K.M. ex rel. Bright v. Tustin Unified Sch. Dist., 78 F.Supp.3d 1289, 1303 (C.D. Cal. 2015).
Reasonableness is generally determined using the “lodestar” method, where a court considers the work completed by the attorneys and multiplies “the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation by the reasonable hourly rate.” Intel Corp. v. Terabyte Int'l, Inc., 6 F.3d 614, 622 (9th Cir. 1993). The moving party bears the burden of producing evidence that the billing rates and hours worked are reasonable. Id. at 622-23. “Although in most cases, the lodestar figure is presumptively a reasonable fee award, the district court may, if circumstances warrant, adjust the lodestar to account for other factors which are not subsumed within it.” Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 978 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).

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