Source: https://openjurist.org/323/us/310
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 04:03:36+00:00

Document:
The use in juxtaposition, in the statute, of the terms 'jurisdiction' and 'venue' marks a significant distinction. On the one hand, the statute confers power on the Circuit Courts of Appeals generally, to act judicially on petitions for review presented to them—which is 'jurisdiction'. On the other, such of those courts as are specified by the statute, or the stipulation which it authorizes, are designated as the place where, for convenience of the courts or parties or both, the petition will be heard—which is 'venue'.1 Want of jurisdiction, unlike want of venue, may not be cured by consent of the parties; but when the court has jurisdiction, it has power to decide the case brought before it, even though the court having venue is one sitting in another circuit. General Investment Co. v. Lake Shore Ry., 260 U.S. 261, 272, 273, 43 S.Ct. 106, 111, 112, 67 L.Ed. 244; Burnrite Coal Co. v. Riggs, 274 U.S. 208, 211, 212, 47 S.Ct. 578, 579, 71 L.Ed. 1002; General Electric Co. v. Marvel Co., 287 U.S. 430, 434, 435, 53 S.Ct. 202, 204, 77 L.Ed. 408; Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Corp., 308 U.S. 165, 167, 168, 60 S.Ct. 153, 154, 84 L.Ed. 167, 128 A.L.R. 1437; Freeman v. Bee Machine Co., 319 U.S. 448, 453, 63 S.Ct. 1146, 1149, 87 L.Ed. 1509. The right to have a cause heard in the court of the proper venue may be lost unless seasonably asserted; and in that event, the court of trial having jurisdiction but not the proper venue may render a judgment binding on the parties. General Investment Co. v. Lake Shore Ry., supra, 260 U.S. at page 272, 43 S.Ct. at page 111, 67 L.Ed. 244; Commercial Casualty Ins. Co. v. Consolidated Stone Co., 278 U.S. 177, 179, 49 S.Ct. 98, 99, 73 L.Ed. 252; Freeman v. Bee Machine Co., supra, 319 U.S. at page 453, 63 S.Ct. at page 1149, 87 L.Ed. 1509. The government may waive objections to venue, just as any other litigant may, United States v. Hvoslef, 237 U.S. 1, 12, 35 S.Ct. 459, 462, 59 L.Ed. 813, Ann.Cas.1916A, 286; Thames & Mersey Ins. Co. v. United States, 237 U.S. 19, 24, 25, 35 S.Ct. 496, 497, 498, 59 L.Ed. 821, Ann.Cas.1915D, 1087; Peoria & P.U. Railway Co. v. United States, 263 U.S. 528, 535, 536, 44 S.Ct. 194, 196, 197, 68 L.Ed. 427, and here such waiver, by stipulation, is contemplated by § 1141(b)(2).
See Peoria & P.U. Railway Co. v. United States, 263 U.S. 528, 535, 536, 44 S.Ct. 194, 196, 197, 68 L.Ed. 427, where this Court explained the same distinction made in the Urgent Deficiencies Act, 38 Stat. 219, 28 U.S.C. §§ 41(28), 43, 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 41(28), 43.

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