Source: http://supreme.nolo.com/us/446/608/case.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 00:05:09+00:00

Document:
Held: The Buy Indian Act, which permits the Secretary of the Interior to purchase "the products of Indian industry . . . in open market," does not authorize the Department of the Interior's Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) to enter into road construction contracts with Indian-owned companies without first advertising for bids pursuant to Title III of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 (FPASA). There is no such authority even if the Buy Indian Act's language "the products of Indian industry" could be construed to embrace road construction, since, while negotiated procurements "otherwise authorized by law" are one of the specified exceptions to Title III's broad directive in 41 U.S.C. § 252(c) that all procurement by the covered executive agencies (including the BIA) proceed through advertising, such exception is omitted from the list of the exceptions specified in § 252(e) to the requirement that § 252(c) not be construed to permit any road construction contract to be negotiated without advertising. From this omission, only one inference can be drawn: Congress meant to bar the negotiation of road construction projects under the authority of laws like the Buy Indian Act. Pp. 446 U. S. 612-619.
The Buy Indian Act, 35 Stat. 71, as amended, 25 U.S.C. § 47 directs the Secretary of the Interior to employ Indian labor "[s]o far as may be practicable," and permits him to purchase "the products of Indian industry . . . in open market." [Footnote 1] The question presented in this case is whether the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) of the Department of the Interior [Footnote 2] may, on the authority of this legislation, enter into road construction contracts with Indian-owned companies without first advertising for bids pursuant to Title III of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 (FPASA), 63 Stat. 393, as amended, 41 U.S.C. §§ 251-260.
the District Court to set aside the Honobia Road contract and to enjoin the petitioners from engaging in the unadvertised negotiation of contracts on the purported authority of the Buy Indian Act.
"require a considerable 'stretch of the imagination' to conclude that the Congress intended the Buy-Indian Act to apply to road construction projects."
"a primary, significant remedial feature of the advertisement and competitive bidding requirements of the [FPASA] is to obtain the best and lowest bid for the benefit of the American taxpayers in 'high cost' construction categories."
Ibid. (emphasis deleted). We granted certiorari, 444 U.S. 962, to decide a question of importance in the proper exercise by the BIA of its procurement responsibilities.
agencies. [Footnote 16] See 41 U.S.C. § 252(a); 40 U.S.C. §§ 472(a), 474. For covered agencies, one consequence of this legislation was to substitute the advertising requirements set out in Title III of the FPASA for those contained in § 3709 of the Revised Statutes. See 41 U.S.C. § 260; S.Rep. No. 274, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 1, 5 (1965); H.R.Rep. No. 1166, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 7, 9 (1965); 111 Cong.Rec. 27198 (1965) (Rep. Brooks).
Under Title III of the FPASA, the BIA must now adhere to the broad statutory mandate that "[a]ll purchases and contracts for property and services shall be made by advertising. . . ." 41 U.S.C. § 252(c). From this directive, the statute specifically excepts only 15 types of procurements, the 15th covering situations where negotiated procurements are "otherwise authorized by law. . . ." § 252(c)(15) (subsection(c)(15)).
"Any provision of law which authorizes an executive agency . . . to procure any property or services without advertising or without regard to [§ 3709 of the Revised Statutes, 41 U.S.C. § 5] shall be construed to authorize the procurement of such property or services pursuant to section 252(c)(15) of this title without regard to the advertising requirements of . . . this title."
See also S.Rep. No. 274, supra at 5; H.R.Rep. No. 1166, supra at 8. As noted above, the Buy Indian Act has, from its inception, authorized the BIA to "purchas[e] the products of Indian industry" without regard to the advertising requirements of § 3709 of the Revised Statutes.
a road constructed or repaired by an Indian-owned corporation is a "product of Indian industry" within the meaning of the Buy Indian Act and, accordingly, that the Honobia Road project was exempt from the FPASA's advertising rules by operation of subsection (c)(15).
"shall not be construed to . . . permit any contract for the construction or repair of . . . roads . . . to be negotiated without advertising . . unless . . . negotiation of such contract is authorized by the provisions of paragraphs (1), (2), (3), (10), (11), (12), or (14) of subsection (c) of this section. [Footnote 17]"
In an attempt to avoid the obvious import of subsection (e), the petitioners argue that the subsection does not apply at all to cases in which the Buy Indian Act is involved. The petitioners reason that subsection (e) is concerned solely with procurement contracts whose negotiation is "permitted" by § 252, and that the negotiation authority afforded by the Buy Indian Act does not fit this description, because that Act is a statute which, of its own force, operates independently of the FPASA.
"[t]he authority conferred by [the FPASA] shall be in addition and paramount to any authority conferred by any other law and shall not be subject to the provisions of any law inconsistent herewith. . . ."
clearly expressed congressional intention to the contrary, to regard each as effective."
Morton v. Mancari, supra at 417 U. S. 551. And, although the "rule by which legal ambiguities are resolved to the benefit of the Indians" is to be given "the broadest possible scope," "[a] canon of construction is not a license to disregard clear expressions of . . . congressional intent." DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U. S. 425, 420 U. S. 447.
"So far as may be practicable Indian labor shall be employed, and purchases of the products of Indian industry may be made in open market in the discretion of the Secretary of the Interior."
The Secretary of the Interior has delegated his responsibilities and powers under the Act to the Commissioner of the BIA.
20 BIAM Bull. 1 (Mar. 3, 1976). See also 25 CFR § 162.5a (1978); 41 CFR § 14H-3.215-70 (1977). The Bulletin defined "Indian contractor" as a legal entity that is 100% Indian owned and controlled. An "Indian" was defined as a member of an Indian tribe or as a person otherwise considered to be an Indian by the tribe with which affiliation is claimed.
The Bulletin admonished that, in all events, the contract price must be "fair and reasonable."
At the time, the respondent was on the list of available contractors maintained by the BIA. Previously, the respondent had competitively bid on and been awarded the contract covering another five miles of the Honobia Road.
In procurement parlance, contracts for which bids are publicly invited in advance are said to be let pursuant to "advertising." See 41 U.S.C. § 253; 41 CFR §§ 1-2.101, 1-2.203-1, 2.203-2 (1979). All other contracts are "negotiated." See 41 U.S. C. §§ 252(c), 254; 41 CFR § 11.301-3 (1979).
The BIA's area road engineer had earlier estimated that the job would cost $963,117.48.
The court denied the respondent's request that Indian Nations Construction Co. be made to refund the amounts it had been paid for work already performed on the Honobia Road project before the court's entry of judgment. 451 F.Supp. at 1109, 1112. In this connection, the District Court noted that 9.7% of the construction contract had been completed and paid for at the time of its decision. Id. at 1109.
"That hereafter the purchase of Indian supplies shall be made in conformity with the requirements of section thirty-seven hundred and nine of the Revised Statutes of the United States: Provided, That so far as may be practicable Indian labor shall be employed, and purchases of the products of Indian industry may be made in open market in the discretion of the Secretary of the Interior. All Acts and parts of Acts in conflict with the provisions of this section are hereby repealed."
The origins of this legislation lay in a series of Appropriations Acts concerning the Indian Department of the Department of the Interior. Each of these annual Acts contained a provision whose language was similar to that of the present Buy Indian Act. See, e.g., Act of Apr. 30, 1908, ch. 153, 35 Stat. 70; Act of Mar. 1, 1907, ch. 2285, 34 Stat. 1015.
See Act of Mar. 2, 1861, ch. 84, § 10, 12 Stat. 220.
"All purchases and contracts for supplies or services, in any of the departments of the Government, except for personal services, shall be made by advertising a sufficient time previously for proposals respecting the same, when the public exigencies do not require the immediate delivery of the articles, or performance of the service. When immediate delivery or performance is required by the public exigency, the articles or service required may be procured by open purchase or contract, at the places and in the manner in which such articles are usually bought and sold, or such services engaged, between individuals."
The structure of § 23 of the Act of June 25, 1910, evidences this intent. See n 8, supra. So does the Act's legislative history. The House Report explained that "[w]ith the exceptions noted in the proviso," i.e., the Buy Indian Act, § 23 "will bring the Indian Service, like all other branches of the public service, under the provisions of section 3709 of the Revised Statutes. . . ." H.R.Rep. No. 1135, 61st Cong., 2d Sess., 12 (1910). See also 45 Cong.Rec. 6097 (1910) (Rep. Burke).
In 1926, § 23 of the 1910 Act was split into two parts for codification purposes. The language that required the BIA to adhere to the advertising rules contained in § 3709 of the Revised Statutes was placed in 25 U.S.C. § 93. The proviso respecting the purchase of Indian goods was located in 25 U.S.C. § 47. No contemporaneous suggestion was made that this separation was intended to affect the substance of either segment of the original Act.
In 1940, a further change occurred. As part of an effort to eliminate redundant provisions respecting the operation of federal agencies, 25 U.S.C. § 93 was repealed and 41 U.S.C. § 6a(g) enacted in its place. See Act of Oct. 10, 1940, ch. 851, §§ 2(g), 4(a), 54 Stat. 1110, 1111, 1112. This rearrangement made "no changes in existing law." H.R.Rep. No. 2647, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., 1 (1940). See S.Rep. No. 2135, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., 2 (1940). Then, in 1951, 41 U.S.C. § 6a(g) was repealed. See Act of Oct. 31, 1951, ch. 654, § 1 (107), 65 Stat. 705. Obsolescence seems to have led to the demise of 25 U.S.C. § 93 and 41 U.S.C. § 6a(g). See H.R.Rep. No. 1105, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., 2-3 (1951). By 1951, § 3709 of the Revised Statutes had been amended to require advertising in all cases except where small purchases were involved, where a specific exemption in § 3709 applied, or where "otherwise provided in . . . other law." See 41 U.S.C. § 5 (1946 ed.).
"Unless otherwise provided in the appropriation concerned or other law, purchases and contracts for supplies or services for the Government may be made or entered into only after advertising a sufficient time previously for proposals, except (1) when the amount involved in any one case does not exceed $2,500, (2) when the public exigencies require the immediate delivery of the articles or performance of the service, (3) when only one source of supply is available and the Government purchasing or contracting officer shall so certify, or (4) when the services are required to be performed by the contractor in person and are (A) of a technical and professional nature or (B) under Government supervision and paid for on a time basis."
Since its codification in 1926 in 25 U.S.C. § 47, the Buy Indian Act has undergone no change in phraseology.
See 41 U.S.C. § 252(a) (1964 ed.).
"This section shall not be construed to (A) authorize the erection, repair, or furnishing of any public building or public improvement, but such authorization shall be required in the same manner as heretofore or (b) permit any contract for the construction or repair of buildings, roads, sidewalks, sewers, mains, or similar items to be negotiated without advertising as required by section 253 of this title, unless such contract is to be performed outside the continental United States or unless negotiation of such contract is authorized by the provisions of paragraphs (1), (2), (3), (10), (11), (12), or (14) of subsection (c) of this section."
No contention has been made that paragraphs (1), (2), (3), (11), (12), or (14) of subsection (c) authorized negotiation of the Honobia Road project. As to paragraph (10), see n 20, infra.
"For clarity [subsection(e)] provides that [41 U.S.C. § 252] does not authorize or change the existing requirements for authorization for the erection or repair of buildings, roads, sidewalks, or similar items."
H.R.Rep. No. 670, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, p. 23 (1949); S.Rep. No. 338, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 20 (1949); S.Rep. No. 475, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 25 (1949) . This statement, however, sheds no light on the proper disposition of the instant case. It referred to the provisions of the FPASA at a time when that legislation governed no more than the General Services Administration and a few special procurements.
Alternatively, the petitioners contend that subsection (e) does not govern here because of § 252(a)(2). That provision states that §§ 251 through 260 of Title 41 "d[o] not apply . . . when [those sections are] made inapplicable pursuant to section 474 of title 40 or any other law. . . ." According to the petitioners, the Buy Indian Act is an "other law" within the intendment of § 252(a)(2).
We disagree, reading subsection (a)(2) to refer exclusively to statutory provisions that -- unlike the Buy Indian Act -- in express terms exempt procurements from §§ 251 through 260 of Title 41 or from the FPASA in its entirety. Any broader reading of subsection (a)(2) would render subsection (c)(15) superfluous and would also substantially undermine Congress' desire that the requirements of § 254 apply "to contracts negotiated by executive agencies under any law, not only title III." S.Rep. No. 274, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1965); H.R.Rep. No. 1166, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1965). (Emphasis added.) See id. at 2-3.
The petitioners have requested that, if their basic arguments are rejected, this case, nonetheless, be remanded to the Court of Appeals for further consideration in light of 41 U.S.C. § 252(c)(10), which authorizes the negotiation of Government contracts "for property or services for which it is impracticable to secure competition." The petitioners, however, did not rely on this statutory provision in defending this lawsuit in the District Court, and the Court of Appeals did not consider it. Our affirmance of the judgment of the Court of Appeals does not preclude the petitioners from seeking relief from the outstanding injunction on this ground or any other. See NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U. S. 132, 421 U. S. 165, n. 30. See also Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 60(b).

References: § 252
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 § 162
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 § 1
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