Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/103288/preiser-vs-rodriguez
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 04:20:52+00:00

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Held: When a state prisoner challenges the fact or duration of his physical imprisonment and, by way of relief, seeks a determination that he is entitled to immediate release or a speedier release, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus. Pp. 411 U. S. 488 -499.
(a) Although the broad language of § 1983 seems literally to apply, Congress' enactment of the specific federal habeas corpus statute, with its requirement that a state prisoner exhaust state remedies, was intended to provide the exclusive means of relief in this type of situation. Pp. 411 U. S. 488 -490.
(b) The policy of exhaustion in federal habeas corpus actions, which is rooted in considerations of federal state comity, has as much relevance in an attack on the actions of the state prison administration as it does in an attack on the actions of a state court; and that policy applies here, where respondents sought no damages, but only a ruling that they were entitled to immediate release or a speedier release. Pp. 411 U. S. 490 -494.
the conditions of their confinement, not the fact or duration of that confinement itself. Pp. 411 U. S. 498 -499.
STEWART, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and WHITE, BLACKMUN, POWELL, and REHNQUIST, JJ., .joined. BRENNAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which DOUGLAS and MARSHALL, JJ., joined, post, p. 411 U. S. 500 .
The question is of considerable practical importance. For if a remedy under the Civil Rights Act is available, a plaintiff need not first seek redress in a state forum. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167 , 365 U. S. 183 (191); McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U. S. 668 , 373 U. S. 671 (1963); Damico v. California, 389 U. S. 416 (1967); King v. Smith, 392 U. S. 309 , 392 U. S. 312 n. 4 (1968); Houghton v. Shafer, 392 U. S. 639 (1968). If, on the other hand, habeas corpus is the exclusive federal remedy in these circumstances, then a plaintiff cannot seek the intervention of a federal court until he has first sought and been denied relief in the state courts, if a state remedy is available and adequate. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b).
"(c) An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State, within the meaning of this section, if he has the right under the law of the State to raise, by any available procedure, the question presented. [ Footnote 1 ]"
By the time the American Colonies achieved independence, the use of habeas corpus to secure release from unlawful physical confinement, whether judicially imposed or not, was thus an integral part of our common law heritage. The writ was given explicit recognition in the Suspension Clause of the Constitution, Art. I, § 9, cl. 2; [ Footnote 6 ] was incorporated in the first congressional grant of jurisdiction to the federal courts, Act of Sept. 24, 1789, c. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 81-82; and was early recognized by this Court as a "great constitutional privilege." Ex parte Bollman, 4 Cranch 75, 8 U. S. 95 (1807). See Fay v. Noia, supra, at 372 U. S. 399 -415.
We cannot agree. The respondents, we think, view the reasons for the exhaustion requirement of § 2254(b) far too narrowly. The rule of exhaustion in federal habeas corpus actions is rooted in considerations of federal state comity. That principle was defined in Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37 , 401 U. S. 44 (1971), as "a proper respect for state functions," and it has as much relevance in areas of particular state administrative concern as it does where state judicial action is being attacked. That comity considerations are not limited to challenges to the validity of state court convictions is evidenced by cases such as Morrissey v. Brewer, supra, where the petitioners' habeas challenge was to a state administrative decision to revoke their parole, and Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky, supra, where the petitioner's habeas attack was on the failure of state prosecutorial authorities to afford him a speedy trial.
v. Municipal Court, ante at 411 U. S. 349 -350. By contrast, the filing of a complaint pursuant to § 1983 in federal court initiates an original plenary civil action, governed by the full panoply of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. That such a proceeding, with its discovery rules and other procedural formalities, can take a significant amount of time, very frequently longer than a federal habeas corpus proceeding, is demonstrated by the respondents' actions in the present case. Although both Rodriguez and Kritasky initiated their actions before their conditional release dates, the District Court did not reach its decisions until three and 10 months later, respectively -- in both cases, well after the conditional release dates had passed. Only in Katzoff's case was there a speedy determination, and his action was not initiated until after his alleged release date.
Other forms of habeas corpus include habeas corpus ad respondendum; ad satisfaciendum; ad prosequendum, testificandum, deliberandum; and ad faciendum et recipiendum. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391 , 372 U. S. 399 n. 5 (1963). But when the words habeas corpus are used alone, they have been considered a generic term understood to refer to the common law writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum, which was the form termed the "great writ." Ex parte Bollman, 4 Cranch 75, 8 U. S. 95 (1807).
It was not until quite recently that habeas corpus was made available to challenge less obvious restraints. In 1963, the Court held that a prisoner released on parole from immediate physical confinement was nonetheless sufficiently restrained in his freedom as to be in custody for purposes of federal habeas corpus. Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U. S. 236 . In Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U. S. 234 (1968), the Court for the first time decided that, once habeas corpus jurisdiction has attached, it is not defeated by the subsequent release of the prisoner. And just this Term, in Hensley v. Municipal Court, ante, p. 411 U. S. 345 , we held that a person who, after conviction, is released on bail or on his own recognizance, is "in custody" within the meaning of the federal habeas corpus statute. But those cases marked no more than a logical extension of the traditional meaning and purpose of habeas corpus -- to effect release from illegal custody.
Post at 411 U. S. 512 -513. (Footnotes omitted.) This statement is apparently based on the assumption that, in those years, the respondents' habeas actions would have been barred by the "prematurity" doctrine, which precluded habeas relief that would have merely reduced the length of the prisoner's confinement, rather than resulting in his immediate release, and which was not rejected until 1968, Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U. S. 54 . We note, however, that the respondent Katzoff initiated his action more than a month after his alleged release date, and, thus, his claim, if accepted, entitled him to immediate release even as of the date on which he brought suit. Although Rodriguez initiated his action 15 days before his alleged release date, and Kritasky six months before such date, in both cases, those dates had long passed at the time of the District Court's decisions, and these respondents were thus entitled to immediate release at that time. In any event, the nature of the respondents' suits was an attack on the legality of their physical confinement itself, and to deal with such attacks on physical custody, however imposed and whether or not related to conviction by a court, is the long-established function of habeas corpus. See supra at 411 U. S. 484 -486.
See supra at 411 U. S. 483 -484.
The dissent argues that the respondents' attacks on the actions of the prison administration here are no different, in terms of the potential for exacerbating federal state relations, from the attacks made by the petitioners in McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U. S. 668 (1963), Damico v. California, 389 U. S. 416 (1967), and Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167 (1961), on the various state administrative actions there. Thus, it is said, since exhaustion of state remedies was not required in those cases, it is anomalous to require it here. Post at 411 U. S. 522 . The answer, of course, is that, in those cases, brought pursuant to § 1983, no other, more specific federal statute was involved that might have reflected a different Congressional intent. In the present case, however, the respondents' actions fell squarely within the traditional purpose of federal habeas corpus, and Congress has made the specific determination in § 2254(b) that requiring the exhaustion of adequate state remedies in such cases will best serve the policies of federalism.
Wilwording v. Swenson, supra, at 404 U. S. 251 .
action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York by filing a combined civil rights complaint and petition for habeas corpus. In each case, the District Court concluded that, since the action was properly brought under § 1983, the prisoner was not bound by the "exhaustion of state remedies" requirement of the federal habeas corpus statute. [ Footnote 2/3 ] On the merits of the three cases, the District Court held that state correctional authorities had deprived each respondent of rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, and directed petitioner, the Commissioner of Correction, to restore the good conduct time credits that each of the respondents had lost.
Id. at 411 U. S. 489 . With regard to such actions, habeas corpus is now considered the prisoner's exclusive remedy. In short, the Court does not graft the habeas corpus exhaustion requirement onto prisoner actions under the Ku Klux Klan Act, but it reaches what is functionally the same result by holding that the District Court's jurisdiction under the Act is in some instances displaced by the habeas corpus remedy. Henceforth, in such cases, a prisoner brings an action in the nature of habeas corpus or he brings no federal court action at all.
Ante at 411 U. S. 500 . But, even under the Court's approach, there are undoubtedly some instances where a prisoner has the option of proceeding either by petition for habeas corpus or by suit under § 1983.
opinion as rejecting, or even questioning, the rationale of numerous lower court decisions authorizing challenges to prison conditions by suit under § 1983. [ Footnote 2/8 ] Accordingly, one can only conclude that some instances remain where habeas corpus provides a supplementary, but not an exclusive, remedy -- or, to put it another way, where an action may properly be brought in habeas corpus even though it is somehow sufficiently distant from the "core of habeas corpus" to avoid displacing concurrent jurisdiction under the Ku Klux Klan Act. In such a case, a state prisoner retains the option of forgoing the habeas corpus remedy in favor of suit under § 1983.
jurisdiction under § 1983 is displaced by the habeas corpus remedy. Ante at 411 U. S. 487 .
are cases where habeas corpus is an appropriate and available remedy, but where the action falls outside the "core of habeas corpus" because the attack is directed at the conditions of confinement, not at its fact or duration. Notwithstanding today's decision, a prisoner may challenge, by suit under § 1983, prison living conditions and disciplinary measures, [ Footnote 2/10 ] or confiscation of legal materials, [ Footnote 2/11 ] or impairment of the right to free exercise of religion, [ Footnote 2/12 ] even though federal habeas corpus is available as an alternative remedy. It should be plain enough that serious difficulties will arise whenever a prisoner seeks to attack in a single proceeding both the conditions of his confinement and the deprivation of good time credits. And the addition of a plea for monetary damages exacerbates the problem.
If a prisoner's sole claim is that he was placed in solitary confinement pursuant to an unconstitutional disciplinary procedure, [ Footnote 2/13 ] he can obtain federal injunctive relief and monetary damages in an action under § 1983. The unanswered question is whether he loses the right to proceed under § 1983 if, as punishment for his alleged misconduct, his jailers have not only subjected him to unlawful segregation. and thereby inflicted an injury that is compensable in damages, but have compounded the wrong by improperly depriving him of good time credits. Three different approaches are possible.
irresistible, incentive for state prison officials to defeat the jurisdiction of the federal courts by adding the deprivation of good time credits to whatever other punishment is imposed. And if all of the federal claims must be held in abeyance pending exhaustion of state remedies, a prisoner's subsequent effort to assert a damages claim under § 1983 might arguably be barred by principles of res judicata. [ Footnote 2/14 ] To avoid the loss of his damages claim, a prisoner might conclude that he should make no mention of the good time issue, and instead seek only damages in a § 1983 action. That approach (assuming it would not be disallowed as a subterfuge to circumvent the exhaustion requirement) creates its own distressing possibilities. For, having obtained decision in federal court on the issue of damages, the prisoner would presumably be required to repair to state court in search of his lost good time credits, returning once again to federal court if his state court efforts should prove unavailing.
time the exhaustion doctrine was first announced in Ex parte Royall, 117 U. S. 241 (1886), or at the time the requirement was codified in 1948, [ Footnote 2/19 ] it is surely hard to view these acts as a determination to preclude suit under § 1983 and leave habeas corpus the prisoner's only remedy. Nevertheless, to prevent state prisoners from invoking the jurisdictional grant of 1983 as a means of circumventing the exhaustion requirement of the habeas corpus statute, the Court finds it necessary to hold today that, in this one instance, jurisdiction under § 1983 is displaced by the habeas corpus remedy.
"In thus expanding federal judicial power, Congress imposed the duty upon all levels of the federal judiciary to give due respect to a suitor's choice of a federal forum for the hearing and decision of his federal constitutional claims. Plainly, escape from that duty is not permissible merely because state courts also have the solemn responsibility, equally with the federal courts, ' . . . to guard, enforce, and protect every right granted or secured by the Constitution of the United States . . . ,' Robb v. Connolly, 111 U. S. 624 , 111 U. S. 637 ."
Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U. S. 241 , 389 U. S. 248 (1967).
This grant of jurisdiction was designed to preserve and enhance the expertise of federal courts in applying federal law; to achieve greater uniformity of results, cf. 14 U. S. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304, 14 U. S. 347 -348 (1816), and, since federal courts are "more likely to apply federal law sympathetically and understandingly than are state courts," ALI, Study of the Division of Jurisdiction Between State and Federal Courts 166 (1969), to minimize misapplications of federal law. See generally id. at 165-167.
" Willcox v. Consolidated Gas Co., 212 U. S. 19 , 212 U. S. 40 ."
England v. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners, 375 U. S. 411 , 375 U. S. 415 (1964).
Id. at 375 U. S. 416 . The federal courts are, in short, the "primary and powerful reliances for vindicating every right given by the Constitution, the laws, and treaties of the United States." F. Frankfurter & J. Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court: A Study in the Federal Judicial System 65 (1928). See England v. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners, supra, at 375 U. S. 415 .
McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U. S. 668 , 373 U. S. 672 (1963).
Stapleton v. Mitchell, 60 F.Supp. 51, 55 (Kan.1945); quoted with approval in Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. at 389 U. S. 248 ; and McNeese v. Board of Education, supra, at 373 U. S. 674 n. 6. See also Monroe v. Pape, supra, at 365 U. S. 183 ; Moreno v. Henckel, 431 F.2d 1299, 1303-1307 (CA5 1970); H. Friendly, Federal Jurisdiction: A General View 102-103 (1973).
"needless friction between state and federal courts." Oklahoma Packing Co. v. Gas Co., 309 U. S. 4 , 309 U. S. 9 (1940). Although the anti-injunction statute rests in part on considerations as fundamental as the "constitutional independence of the States and their courts," Atlantic C. L. R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 398 U. S. 281 , 398 U. S. 287 (1970), and although exceptions will "not be enlarged by loose statutory construction," ibid., we nevertheless unanimously concluded that § 1983 is excepted from the statute's prohibition -- that the anti-injunction statute does not, in other words, displace federal jurisdiction under the Ku Klux Klan Act.
"rooted in considerations of federal-state comity. That principle was defined in Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37 , 401 U. S. 44 (1971), as 'a proper respect for state functions,' and it has as much relevance in areas of particular state administrative concern as it does where state judicial action is being attacked."
Ante at 411 U. S. 491 . Moreover, the Court reasons that, since the relationship between state prisoners and state officers is especially intimate, and since prison issues are peculiarly within state authority and expertise, "the States have an important interest in not being bypassed in the correction of those problems." Ante at 411 U. S. 492 . With all respect, I cannot accept either the premises or the reasoning that lead to the Court's conclusion.
Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391 , 372 U. S. 419 -420 (1963) (emphasis added), quoting from Darr v. Burford, 339 U. S. 200 , 339 U. S. 204 (1950). See Parker, Limiting the Abuse of Habeas Corpus, 8 F.R.D. 171, 172-173 (1948).
a federal court. Id. at 1094-1095. See, e.g., Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U. S. 19 , 306 U. S. 26 -27 (1939). In such a case, considerations of federalism obviously do not come into play. Yet the exhaustion requirement is nevertheless applied in order to prevent the disruption of the orderly conduct of judicial administration.
these suits, they demand an immediate end to action under color of state law that has the alleged effect of violating fundamental rights guaranteed by the Federal Constitution. The Ku Klux Klan Act was designed to afford an expeditious federal hearing for the resolution of precisely such claims as these. Since I share the Court's view that exhaustion of state judicial remedies is not required in any suit properly brought in federal court under § 1983, ante at 411 U. S. 477 , and since I am convinced that respondents have properly invoked the jurisdictional grant of § 1983, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
Ante at 411 U. S. 499 .
Indeed, one must inevitably wonder whether the "core" of habeas corpus will not prove as intractable to definition as the "core" of another concept that some of us have struggled to define. Cf. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U. S. 184 , 378 U. S. 197 (1964) (STEWART, J., concurring).
That assumes, of course, that a damages claim cannot be raised on habeas corpus, ante at 411 U. S. 494 , and that the special res judicata rules of habeas corpus would not apply. In any case, we have never held that the doctrine of res judicata applies, in whole or in part, to bar the relitigation under § 1983 of questions that might have been raised, but were not, or that were raised and considered in state court proceedings. The Court correctly notes that a number of lower courts have assumed that the doctrine of res judicata is fully applicable to cases brought under § 1983. But in view of the purposes underlying enactment of the Act -- in particular, the congressional misgivings about the ability and inclination of state courts to enforce federally protected rights, see infra at 411 U. S. 515 -518 -- that conclusion may well be in error.
See, e.g., Hensley v. Municipal Court, ante, p. 411 U. S. 345 ; Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U. S. 234 (1968); Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U. S. 236 (1963). These decisions have established habeas corpus as an available and appropriate remedy in situations where the petitioner's challenge is not merely to the fact of his confinement.
See, e.g., Wilwording v. Swenson, supra; King v. Smith, 392 U. S. 309 , 392 U. S. 312 n. 4 (1968); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167 (1961); Bacon v. Rutland R. Co., 232 U. S. 134 (1914); cf. Note, Exhaustion of State Remedies Under the Civil Rights Act, 68 Col.L.Rev. 1201 (1968).

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