Source: https://caselaw.findlaw.com/ca-court-of-appeal/1094234.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 01:35:09+00:00

Document:
Sam H. FARAHANI, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. SAN DIEGO COMMUNITY COLLEGE DISTRICT et al., Defendants and Appellants.
Stutz Artiano Shinoff & Holtz, Ray J. Artiano and Richard E. Romero, San Diego, for Defendants and Appellants. Grady and Associates, Dennis M. Grady, San Diego, Kenneth W. Baisch, and Bradley K. Moores for Plaintiff and Respondent.
In this case we hold that Education Code section 87485 (undesignated statutory references are to the Education Code) renders “null and void” the “last chance agreement” (Agreement) under which community college faculty member Sam H. Farahani waived his statutory due process rights relating to faculty discipline. The San Diego Community College District (District) terminated Farahani after he allegedly violated his Agreement with the District. The trial court granted Farahani's petition for writ of mandate (Code Civ. Proc., § 1085), ruling that the Agreement violated the Education Code and Farahani's due process rights. The court issued a peremptory writ of mandate under Code of Civil Procedure section 1085 directing the District to: (1) reinstate Farahani with full back pay, interest and benefits and (2) require its governing board to determine whether Farahani should be terminated, “all in compliance with the requirements of the Education Code, including appropriate notice and opportunity to be heard.” The District appeals.
In addition to concluding that Farahani's purported waiver of the right to a hearing in the Agreement and attached General and Special Release and Settlement Agreement (Release) were unenforceable under section 87485, we also reject the District's claim that Farahani's petition was barred by laches, unclean hands, and the failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.
Farahani was a tenured professor of international relations and public policy at Mesa College. He had worked for the District for 18 years prior to his termination in June 2006.
Beginning in 1994, the District received complaints from female students and staff about what they described as unwanted sexual and social advances. In October 2000, after investigating some of these complaints, the District gave Farahani a written reprimand advising him that continued misconduct would result in discipline up to and including termination.
Farahani filed his petition for writ of mandate on March 7, 2007.
The District argues that the Agreement and Release included all the elements of a valid contract, Farahani signed them voluntarily on advice of counsel, and neither document was unlawful or against public policy. We begin with the dispositive question whether the Agreement and Release were invalid and unenforceable, as found by the trial court.
The Education Code sets forth due process rights granted to community college faculty members in disciplinary matters, including the right to notice, opportunity to object, a hearing before an arbitrator or administrative law judge, and a decision by the governing board. (§§ 87669, 87672-87674, & 87678-87680.) The first paragraph of section 87485 expressly provides: “Except as provided in Section 87744, any contract or agreement, express or implied, made by any employee to waive the benefits of this chapter or any part thereof is null and void.” The District contends that section 87485 is inapplicable to the Agreement and Release signed by Farahani, which it describes as a waiver in response to discipline. We conclude that the District interprets section 87485 too narrowly and there was no error in the trial court's ruling.
The rules of statutory construction are well established. Its aim is to ascertain legislative intent in order to effectuate the purpose of the law. (Burden v. Snowden (1992) 2 Cal.4th 556, 562, 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 531, 828 P.2d 672.) Courts generally adopt a literal interpretation of the words of a statute unless the words are ambiguous or the language is inconsistent with the statute's purpose. (White v. Ultramar, Inc. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 563, 572, 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 19, 981 P.2d 944; Lungren v. Deukmejian (1988) 45 Cal.3d 727, 735, 248 Cal.Rptr. 115, 755 P.2d 299.) “If the plain language of a statute is unambiguous, no court need, or should, go beyond that pure expression of legislative intent.” (Kobzoff v. Los Angeles County Harbor/UCLA Medical Center (1998) 19 Cal.4th 851, 861, 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 803, 968 P.2d 514.) Moreover, courts should not read the statutory language in isolation, “but rather in context, keeping in mind the nature and obvious purpose of the statute.” (Covino v. Governing Board (1977) 76 Cal.App.3d 314, 318, 142 Cal.Rptr. 812 (Covino ).) “A corollary to this rule is that the various parts of the statutory enactment must be harmonized by considering the particular phrase, clause or section in the context of the statutory framework as a whole [citations].” (Ibid.) We apply these rules to determine the scope of section 87485.
Title 3, Division 7, Part 51, Chapter 3 of the Education Code governs the employment rights of community college faculty. (Stryker, supra, 100 Cal.App.4th 324, 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 489; § 87400 et seq.) It is significant that section 87485 appears under Article 1, “General Provisions.” By its terms, section 87485 renders null and void any agreement to waive the benefits of Chapter 3, “Employment.” (§ 87485, italics added.) The only exception is an agreement pertaining to reductions in force under section 87744, which appears in the more specific Article 6.5, “Reduction in Services.” Courts have applied section 87485 and its predecessor, section 13338.1, to bar waiver of statutory classification and tenure rights. (See Stryker, supra, 100 Cal.App.4th 324, 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 489; Kalina v. San Mateo Community College Dist. (1982) 132 Cal.App.3d 48, 183 Cal.Rptr. 12; Covino, supra, 76 Cal.App.3d 314, 142 Cal.Rptr. 812.) The common denominator in these cases, and the case before us, is the faculty member's waiver of a statutory right set forth in Chapter 3 of the Education Code. We therefore reject the District's attempt to distinguish Stryker on grounds it did not involve discipline.
Citing Campbell v. Graham-Armstrong (1973) 9 Cal.3d 482, 486-487, 107 Cal.Rptr. 777, 509 P.2d 689 (Campbell ), the District maintains that the purpose of section 87485 (former section 13338.1) is “to ensure that part-time employment is not outlawed․” It argues that the Legislature took action to enact former section 13338.1 following an earlier Supreme Court decision, because of its concern that school or community college districts “would circumvent the classification system and deprive public employees of the salary that accompanies a proper classification.” The District misreads Campbell. The court's reference to part-time employment was directed to the second paragraph of former section 13338.1, repeated in substance in the second paragraph of section 87485 as: “Notwithstanding provisions of this or any other section of this code, governing boards of community college districts may employ persons in positions requiring certification qualifications on less than a full-time basis.” (Campbell, supra, 9 Cal.3d at p. 487, 107 Cal.Rptr. 777, 509 P.2d 689.) Nothing in Campbell defines or limits the purpose of the first paragraph of former section 13338.1 in the manner the District suggests.
Next, the District cites Civil Code section 3513 and suggests that Farahani could lawfully waive the statutory due process protections because they were solely for his private benefit. In Covino, supra, 76 Cal.App.3d at page 322, 142 Cal.Rptr. 812, the court expressly rejected the same argument and articulated the relevant public policy concerns: “[W]hile as a general rule anyone may waive the advantage of law intended solely for his benefit, a law established for a public reason cannot be waived or circumvented by a private act or agreement (Civ.Code § 3513 ․). Teachers are public employees and their tenure rights elaborately regulated by the Education Code reflect the public policy of the state․ ‘Legislation which is enacted with the object of promoting the welfare of large classes of workers whose personal services constitute their means of livelihood and which is calculated to confer direct or indirect benefits upon the people as a whole must be presumed to have been enacted for a public reason and as an expression of public policy in the field to which the legislation relates.’ ” The statutory due process rights afforded community college faculty reflect the same public policy, which, in our view, outweighs the competing policies cited by the District. Here, the Agreement and Release required Farahani to waive the benefit of those statutory rights in connection with the 2004 complaints as well as in the future, rendering it impossible for Farahani to challenge the substance of the new complaints against him. Civil Code section 3513 does not render lawful Farahani's waiver of due process rights.
In concluding that the Agreement and Release were “null and void” under section 87485, we reject two additional points raised in opposition to Farahani's petition. First, the District argues that the unfairness of the relief sought by Farahani is “strikingly similar” to the unfairness discussed in Leithliter v. Board of Trustees (1970) 12 Cal.App.3d 1095, 91 Cal.Rptr. 215. That case is readily distinguishable. The petitioners in Leithliter did not claim they were terminated without due process. Because they had voluntarily resigned from their teaching position, the court did not apply former section 13338.1 and dismissed the appeals as moot. (Leithliter, supra, at pp. 1097, 1099-1100, 1101, 91 Cal.Rptr. 215.) Second, the District argues without citation to authority that even if the Agreement was void as against public policy, Farahani's petition was barred by the covenant not to sue contained in the Release. The District fails to explain how the waivers contained in the Release were outside the scope of section 87485.
The court rejected the District's three affirmative defenses to Farahani's petition. We address each in turn.
The record supports the court's factual findings on the questions of unreasonableness and prejudice. The question whether Farahani's failure to challenge the Agreement itself constitutes laches is not properly before us. (Cinnamon Square Shopping Center v. Meadowlark Enterprises (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1837, 1844, 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 697 [an appellate court will consider only issues raised below].) We agree with the trial court that the prejudice claimed by the District was the result of the District's own illegal actions terminating Farahani without a hearing and expressly informing him that he had no right to an appeal. The Education Code provides safeguards for both the District and the faculty in the hiring and firing process. (See § 87400 et seq.) In our view, compliance with statutory due process guarantees is consistent with public policy. (See Covino, supra, 76 Cal.App.3d at p. 322, 142 Cal.Rptr. 812.) For these reasons we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting the District's laches defense.
The District argues that because Farahani was advised by the Union attorney that the Agreement was unenforceable, he signed it with no intention of performing. The District therefore contends that “it is inherently inequitable to allow Mr. Farahani to be reinstated and to receive backpay on the basis that he was terminated without a hearing, given that the sole reason he was not provided a hearing is because he agreed to waive such rights and the District believed him.” The trial court found that the doctrine of unclean hands was inapplicable to the facts of this case.
We conclude there was no abuse of discretion. The difficulty with the District's argument is that the Agreement itself was contrary to the express language of section 87485 and unenforceable as a matter of law. Murillo v. Rite Stuff Foods, Inc. (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 833, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 12 and Camp, supra, 35 Cal.App.4th 620, 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 329, the cases cited by the District in support of applying unclean hands in the employment context, are distinguishable. The District presented Farahani with a Hobson's choice between two “bad,” indeed illegal, options. Contrary to the District's argument, there is nothing in the record to suggest that Farahani signed the Agreement with the intent of not performing. The record supports a conclusion that Farahani followed the Union attorney's advice to take the pragmatic course and sign the Agreement.
Here, the record supports the trial court finding that the District was estopped by its own conduct from relying on the exhaustion doctrine. The chancellor's termination letter and the District's subsequent response to the July 14, 2006, letter from Farahani's attorney demonstrate that the District's denial of “appeal rights” was unequivocal and encompassed all avenues of appeal. The trial court could reasonably assume that the chancellor was aware of the two means of challenging the termination. Moreover, the Union president's approval of the Agreement supports a conclusion that the participants were aware of the collective bargaining rights Farahani was signing away. Indeed, the District's trial brief refers to the grievance procedure under the collective bargaining agreement as an “appeal of discipline.” We conclude that the court was correct in finding that the exhaustion of remedies doctrine did not apply.
WE CONCUR: BENKE, Acting P.J., and HUFFMAN, J.

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