Source: https://www.yalelawjournal.org/comment/reimagining-finality-in-parallel-patent-proceedings
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 07:09:36+00:00

Document:
Parties may challenge the validity of issued patents in federal courts and before the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) and its administrative tribunal, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB). Recently, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over cases arising under the patent laws, has struggled to manage cases contested in parallel judicial and administrative proceedings.
Furthermore, courts could implement the proposed rule without waiting for legislative action. Congress could solve the problems identified in this Comment by limiting administrative reexamination6 or eliminating it entirely.7 However, such a development is unlikely and would run counter to current congressional trends. The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act expanded, rather than limited, reexamination,8 and subsequent legislative proposals have favored patent challengers.9 Consequently, courts remain the actors best positioned to address the problems caused by parallel proceedings.
This Comment proceeds in three Parts. Part I describes patent law’s system of parallel judicial and administrative adjudication. Part II analyzes the Federal Circuit’s finality jurisprudence and arguments for and against the court’s adopted rule. Part III proposes an alternative rule and explains its advantages.
Despite continuing controversy, none of the arguments for or against the Federal Circuit’s finality rule are legally determinative. Precedent neither requires nor forbids the court’s approach.
Similarly, the legal arguments against the Federal Circuit’s rule do not compel its abandonment. Opponents argue that the rule “violates the constitutional plan,” enshrined in Article III, that judgments “may not lawfully be revised, overturned or refused faith and credit by another Department of Government.”67 In other words, they argue, the Federal Circuit’s decision to affirm an administrative finding of invalidity, notwithstanding an apparently contrary court judgment, effectively allows the agency to overturn the lower court.
This conclusion is mistaken. First, from a practical perspective, the constitutional objections are inconsistent with settled understandings regarding the differences between administrative and judicial proceedings. In Ethicon, Inc. v. Quigg, the Federal Circuit held that civil and administrative proceedings involve different inquiries because of their different standards of proof.68 “Courts do not find patents ‘valid,’ only that the patent challenger did not carry the ‘burden of establishing invalidity in the particular case before the court’ . . . .”69 Subsequently, in In re Swanson, the court applied this logic to uphold the constitutionality of parallel reexaminations.70 Second, from a normative perspective, the outcome of the constitutional analysis depends on whether the court’s finality rule is correct. Article III protects final judicial decisions from modification.71 Assuming arguendo that a district court’s judgment is nonfinal, constitutional objections fail.
Thus, just as proponents of the rule err in concluding that the rule is legally necessary, opponents of the rule err in concluding that it is constitutionally prohibited.
As Part II has argued, neither the arguments presented for nor against the Federal Circuit’s finality rule are convincing. In the absence of a legally compelled result this Part recommends that the court replace the rule with a flexible discretionary alternative.
Unfortunately, the Court’s jurisprudence provides little guidance in determining when a right is sufficiently “mature” to justify ignoring an intervening change in law.81 However, the Court’s recognition of fairness interests suggests that, in at least some cases, district courts would be justified in adhering to their prior remedy decisions, notwithstanding intervening judgments of invalidity. Adherence to a prior remedy decision may be appropriate where it is clear that the accused infringer or third party has abused the reexamination system or where the only outstanding issues involve injunctions.
Second, the proposed rule would preserve the viability of injunctions. Orders involving injunctions are subject to interlocutory appeal85 and are commonly vacated or modified.86 Accordingly, injunctions create opportunities for the kinds of delays that, under the Federal Circuit’s finality rule, subject all issues to modification. Faced with this prospect, patentees may be discouraged from pursuing injunctions in cases involving parallel administrative proceedings (or in which parallel proceedings are likely). Yet injunctions are an important remedy. Although injunctions are not always appropriate, “courts have granted injunctive relief upon a finding of infringement in the vast majority of patent cases . . . given the difficulty of protecting a right to exclude through monetary remedies . . . .”87 Allowing district courts to adhere to prior decisions regarding validity and damages, notwithstanding ongoing litigation over injunctions, would maintain the strategic value of seeking injunctive relief.
Third, the proposed rule would encourage the Federal Circuit and district courts to more carefully consider and communicate the implications of their decisions. Fresenius II was controversial, in large part, because the Fresenius I panel did not expressly address the district court’s preverdict damages award in its remand order. Judge Newman believed that the Federal Circuit’s remand order, as issued, was limited to the district court’s injunction and postverdict damages awards,88 while the majority subsequently held that the order was broader in scope.89 In contrast with the Federal Circuit’s finality rule, the proposed rule would encourage clarity. District courts that did not expressly finalize remedies for immunity purposes would lose the protection that finality provides, and the Federal Circuit, if it were unclear about the scope of its remand order, would forgo the opportunity to reopen the district court’s judgment. Thus, the proposed rule recognizes that appellate panels may disagree about how district courts should proceed on remand90 but discourages them from resolving disagreements through ambiguity.
Finally, the proposed rule might appease critics who believe that the Federal Circuit’s finality rule violates Article III. Specifically, the proposed rule avoids the situation in which an agency would “overturn” a court’s decision by allowing a district court to preemptively decide whether its decision will incorporate a future agency finding of invalidity. While this Comment concludes that these Article III concerns are ultimately meritless,91 the proposed rule might have a comparative advantage over the Federal Circuit’s approach in securing approval from the opponents of the current finality rule.
Although the proposed rule would allow for the “peculiar result” in which a patent holder “secure[s] damages for infringement of a patent that has been conclusively found invalid by the PTO,”92 this result is not as strange as it seems. It is well settled that an adjudged infringer may not recover the cost of a final judgment if the patent is subsequently invalidated.93 Thus, if the Federal Circuit had affirmed the PTO’s finding of invalidity after, rather than during, Fresenius’s thirty-day appellate window, the district court’s judgment would have been unassailable. Whatever the case, the proposed rule’s considerable advantages outweigh its potential peculiarities.
The Federal Circuit’s finality rule, which insists that district court decisions remain open to modification by intervening administrative judgments until all issues have been finally adjudicated, remains controversial. This Comment assesses the arguments for and against the rule and argues that neither side’s arguments are legally determinative. Instead, the court should permit district courts to adhere to prior remedy decisions despite intervening administrative judgments of invalidity. Such an approach would have several advantages. It would allow courts to prevent litigants from abusing administrative challenges, preserve the viability of injunctions, and encourage courts to communicate their decisions more carefully.
Moreover, the proposed rule would draw upon decades of appellate experience. Congress established the Federal Circuit to promote uniformity in patent law. Yet, prominent critics contend that the court’s exclusive jurisdiction should be abolished because the court’s specialization breeds insularity.94 Consistent with this critique, this Comment argues that the Federal Circuit would benefit from looking outside of patent law to solve patent law’s problems. The court’s finality rule is a creature of the court’s tendency to search for patent-specific solutions. However, issues concerning parallel litigation are not exclusive to patent law, and over the course of the past century, federal appellate courts have increasingly entrusted these issues—and others involving trial management—to their district-court colleagues. The proposed rule embodies this trust and provides a model for courts to follow in balancing the interests of litigants, courts, and the public.
Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc. (Fresenius II), 721 F.3d 1330, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
H.R. Rep. No. 96-1307, pt. 1, at 3-4 (1980).
35 U.S.C. §§ 302-303 (2012).
See U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Manual of Patent Examining Procedure §§ 2209-2296 (2013).
35 U.S.C. § 306 (2012).
35 C.F.R. § 1.510 (2014).
H.R. Rep. No. 96-1307, pt. 1, at 4 (1980).
See 35 U.S.C. § 315(e) (2012).
See id. §§ 314(b), 316(a)(11).
See Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc. (Fresenius I), 582 F.3d 1288, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
Fresenius I, 582 F.3d at 1306 (Dyk, J., concurring).
Id. at 1305 (Newman, J., concurring).
In re Baxter, Int’l, 678 F.3d at 1365.
See Fresenius II, 721 F.3d 1330, 1340-41 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
Id. at 1347 (Newman, J., dissenting).
Fresenius III, 733 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
See id. at 1370 (Dyk, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc).
ePlus I, 760 F.3d 1350, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b).
See Charles C. Montgomery, Accounting in Patent Cases, 22 J. Pat. Off. Soc’y 654, 654, 656 (1940).
849 F.2d 1422, 1429 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
See id. at 1371 (Dyk, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc).
Bradley v. Sch. Bd. of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696, 720 (1974) (citations omitted).
See Mercado, supra note 6, at 127, 129.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), (c)(1) (2012).
See, e.g., ePlus I, 760 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Fresenius I, 582 F.3d 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
See Fresenius I, 582 F.3d at 1304-05 (Newman, J., concurring).
See Fresenius II, 721 F.3d 1330, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
Moffitt v. Garr, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 273, 283 (1861).
In ePlus, Inc. v. Lawson Software, Inc. (ePlus II), the Federal Circuit, without Judge Chen’s participation, denied the plaintiff’s petition for rehearing en banc by an evenly divided vote. See 790 F.3d 1307, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (Moore, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); id. at 1309 (Newman, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
See ePlus, Inc. v. Lawson Software, Inc. (ePlus I), 760 F.3d 1350, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (O’Malley, J., dissenting); Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc. (Fresenius III), 733 F.3d 1369, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (Newman, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); id. at 1372 (O’Malley, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); Fresenius II, 721 F.3d at 1347 (Newman, J., dissenting); sources cited supra note 2.
See, e.g., Shashank Upadhye & Adam Sussman, A Real Separation of Powers or Separation of Law: Can an Article I Administrative Agency Nullify an Article III Federal Court Judgment?, 25 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 1 (2014). This emphasis likely results, in part, from the existence of similar debates over stays. See, e.g., Letter from Richard A. Epstein, Professor, N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law & F. Scott Kieff, Professor, George Washington Univ. Sch. of Law, to the House Judiciary Comm. 12-13 (Mar. 30, 2011), http://www.scribd.com/doc/57945172/Letter-from-Richard-Epstein-and-F-Scott-Kieff [http://perma.cc/X5D8-TUMY].
This Comment largely evaluates desirability from the perspective of adjudicatory efficiency and patent policy. However, the desirability of the proposed rule might also depend on other considerations—for example, whether district court judges or their administrative counterparts are “better” decision makers. This, in turn, depends on the institutional virtues of courts and administrative agencies. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article III, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 915, 935-43 (1988). For example, prominent commentators have questioned whether district court judges are competent to decide patent cases because of their technical and legal complexity. See Kimberly A. Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped To Decide Patent Cases?, 15 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 1 (2001). Nevertheless, assessing these claims is beyond the scope of this Comment.
Reexamination proceedings are one category of administrative proceedings through which parties may challenge the validity of issued patents. For discussion, see infra Part I. For examples of possible reforms, see Douglas Duff, The Reexamination Power of Patent Infringers and the Forgotten Inventor, 41 Cap. U.L. Rev. 693, 722-26 (2013); Mark D. Janis, Rethinking Reexamination: Toward a Viable Administrative Revocation System for U.S. Patent Law, 11 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 1, 7, 24 (1997); and Raymond A. Mercado, The Use and Abuse of Patent Reexamination: Sham Petitioning Before the USPTO, 12 Colum. Sci. & Tech. L. Rev. 92, 155-58 (2011).
See Stefan Blum, Ex Parte Reexamination: A Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing, 73 Ohio St. L.J. 395, 433-34 (2012).
See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 6, 125 Stat. 284, 312 (2011) (codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 301, 303 (2012)) (expanding third-party submissions and authorizing the PTO Director to initiate ex parte reexaminations).
See, e.g., Innovation Act, H.R. 9, 114th Cong. § 3 (2015) (heightening pleading requirements for parties alleging infringement and lowering fee-shifting standards).
See Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015, 3015-17 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 302-307 (2012)). Patents consist of “one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming” the patented invention. 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) (2012). Claims may be asserted or canceled independently. Hence, the PTO may find a subset of a patent’s claims invalid without invalidating the entire patent. For an introductory discussion on claims, see 1 Donald S. Chisum, Chisum on Patents § 8.01 (2016).
See In re Swanson, 540 F.3d 1368, 1378-79 (Fed. Cir. 2008). “Prior art” refers to the body of printed publications and other information that existed before a patent’s effective filing date and which may be relevant to the patent’s validity. Novelty and obviousness are assessed in relation to this body of information. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102-03 (2012). Parties may request reexamination by submitting individual prior art references that they believe are relevant to the validity of one or more of the patent’s claims. See id. §§ 301-302.
U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Ex Parte Reexamination Filing Data 1 (Sept. 30, 2014), http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ex_parte_historical_stats_roll_up_EOY2014.pdf [http://perma.cc/RP7G-3EY3].
Specifically, the PTO changed claims in 66% of reexaminations and cancelled all claims in 12%. Id. at 1-2.
See Paul M. Janicke, An Interim Proposal for Fixing Ex Parte Patent Reexamination’s Messy Side, 4 Hous. L. Rev.: Off Rec. 43, 47 (2013).
See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 6, 125 Stat. 284, 299-313 (2011) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 301, 311-319, 321-329 (2012)).
In 1999, Congress established inter partes reexamination proceedings as an adversarial counterpart to ex parte reexamination. See Optional Inter Partes Reexamination Procedure Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, §§ 4601-4608, 113 Stat. 1501A-567 to -572 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 311-318 (2000)). The America Invents Act replaced inter partes reexamination with inter partes and post-grant review, see Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 6, and created a transitional program for reviewing “covered business method patents,” or patents for “performing data processing or other operations used in the practice, administration, or management of a financial product or service,” excluding “technological inventions,” id. § 18(d)(1).
U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, supra note 18, at 1. Some parties might prefer ex parte reexamination to inter partes review to preserve anonymity. In theory, the PTO enforces the America Invents Act’s preclusion provisions against ex parte reexamination requestors. See Changes To Implement Miscellaneous Post Patent Provisions of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 46,615, 46,622 (Aug. 6, 2012) (“If the Office becomes aware of facts that call the certification into question, the Office will determine, on a case-by-case basis, whether the request for ex parte reexamination is prohibited by statute.”). However, the possibility of anonymous requests complicates these efforts.
According to data aggregated by Lex Machina, as of March 18, 2016, inter partes review proceedings require, on average, 536 days to reach a final decision, and the longest pending proceeding required 715 days to reach termination. See Lex Machina, http://www.lexmachina.com [http://perma.cc/TTC7-R2YW].
See Complaint for Declaratory Judgment of Patent Invalidity and Noninfringement at 4, Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., No. C 03-1431 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 4, 2003).
See Defendants’ Answer, Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaims to Plaintiffs’ Complaint for Declaratory Judgment of Patent Invalidity and Noninfringement at 6-13, Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., No. C 03-1431 (N.D. Cal. May 14, 2003).
See Order at 2, 6, Fresenius Med. Care Holdings, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l Inc., No. C 03-1431 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2008), ECF No. 1018; Order at 8-10, Fresenius Med. Care Holdings, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l Inc., No. C 03-1431 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2008), ECF No. 1019. The Patent Act authorizes damages and injunctions for infringement. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 283-284 (2012). Damages shall be “adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer.” Id. § 284. “Preverdict” and “postverdict” damages refer to damages for infringement committed before and after the jury’s verdict.
On remand, the district court denied Fresenius’s motion for a new trial to determine preverdict damages on the grounds that the Federal Circuit’s remand order vacated the injunction and postverdict damages, but left preverdict damages intact. Order, Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 2011 WL 2160609, at *1-3 (N.D. Cal. May 26, 2011) (No. C 03-1431).
See Order, Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., No. C 03-1431, 2011 WL 2160609, at *1-2 (N.D. Cal. May 26, 2011).
See Ex parte Baxter Int’l, Inc., No. 2009-006493, 2010 WL 1048980, at *29-34 (B.P.A.I. Mar. 18, 2010).
See Final Judgment, Fresenius Med. Care Holdings, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., No. C 03-1431 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2012).
In re Baxter, Int’l, Inc., 678 F.3d 1357, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2012). The Federal Circuit subsequently denied Baxter’s petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc. See In re Baxter, Int’l, Inc., 698 F.3d 1349, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc). Judge Newman dissented from both decisions. See id. at 1351 (Newman, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing and rehearing en banc); In re Baxter, Int’l, 678 F.3d at 1366 (Newman, J., dissenting).
Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mendenhall v. Barber-Greene Co., 26 F.3d 1573, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).
See id. at 1372 (O’Malley, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); id. at 1382 (Newman, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
ePlus II, 790 F.3d 1307, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (Newman, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); id at 1314 (Moore, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
See William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, Injustice on Appeal: The United States Courts of Appeals in Crisis 3-9 (2013); Pauline T. Kim, Lower Court Discretion, 82 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 383, 425-26 (2007); Richard L. Marcus, Slouching Toward Discretion, 78 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1561, 1574-1615 (2003); Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 374, 425-26 (1982).
Proponents of the Federal Circuit’s finality rule also rely on the court’s decision in Mendenhall v. Barber-Greene Co., 26 F.3d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1994). See, e.g., Fresenius II, 721 F.3d 1330, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (citing Mendenhall, 26 F.3d at 1580). There, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment of infringement, but remanded “for determination of damages and other issues.” Mendenhall, 26 F.3d at 1576, 1580. While remand was pending, the Federal Circuit found the asserted claims invalid in a separate appeal. Id. at 1577. Subsequently, the Federal Circuit required the district court to apply its judgment of invalidity because the district court’s infringement ruling “was not the final judgment in the case.” Id. at 1578, 1580.
However, Mendenhall, like Simmons, does not compel the Federal Circuit’s current rule. First, Mendenhall is distinguishable based on its procedural posture. Mendenhall involved an interlocutory appeal from an infringement determination. At the time of the appeal, the district court had not ruled on any remedy, and no issues were fully adjudicated. See id. at 1576-77. Thus, even if the Federal Circuit were unwilling to overrule Mendenhall, it could adopt the approach proposed in Part III by reading Mendenhall in a less expansive fashion than proponents of the current rule urge. Second, Mendenhall has little independent precedential value. Mendenhall expressly followed Simmons and inherited all of its defects. See id. at 1581 (citing Simmons, 258 U.S. at 89).
Fresenius II, 721 F.3d at 1347 (Newman, J., dissenting) (quoting Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 113 (1948)).
Id. at 1429 n.3 (first quoting Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 810 F.2d 1561, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1987); then quoting Envtl. Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil Co., 713 F.2d 693, 699 n.9 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).
See 540 F.3d 1368, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Since In re Swanson, the Federal Circuit has rejected all invitations to abrogate or narrow this rule. See, e.g., In re Constr. Equip. Co., 665 F.3d 1254, 1256 & n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing In re Swanson, 540 F.3d at 1376-77, 1379).
In Hayburn’s Case, the Justices declined to comply with an act directing them to review pension applications. See 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409, 410-11 (1792). The act authorized the Secretary of War to review those decisions. See id. at 410. Although the Court’s holding did not describe the reasoning for its decision, the Court subsequently has described this holding as standing “for the principle that Congress cannot vest review of the decisions of Article III courts in officials of the Executive Branch.” Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 218 (1995) (citing Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409). At the same time, the Court has emphasized that Article III prevents Congress from interfering with final judgments. See e.g., id. at 223.
See Fresenius III, 733 F.3d 1369, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (O’Malley, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
The distinction between preclusion and immunity from intervening judgments is arguably rooted in more than formalism. Finality doctrines generally protect parties from the burdens of relitigation and promote judicial economy. See Charles Alan Wright Et Al., Federal Practice & Procedure § 4403 (2d ed. 2015). However, immunity might promote other policies, such as comity between adjudicatory bodies. The principles underlying preclusion may not transfer over to immunity from intervening judgments and vice versa.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) offers a model for how such a rule might operate in practice. Rule 54(b) provides that a district court “may direct entry of a final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims or parties only if the court expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). If the court does not make this express determination, the court’s “order or other decision, however designated, . . . does not end the action . . . and may be revised at any time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the parties’ rights and liabilities.” Id. The proposed rule follows this general structure.
For example, under general law of the case principles, courts recognize changes in law as one of several exceptions to the rule that courts should adhere to their prior decisions. See Wright et al., supra note 75, § 4478.
In Mendenhall, discussed supra note 66, the Federal Circuit held that an intervening judgment of invalidity was one of several “special circumstances” justifying departure from the law of the case. See Mendenhall v. Barber-Greene Co., 26 F.3d 1573, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1994). The court reasoned that the “public policy of full and free competition” outweighed the competing value of “judicial economy.” Id. at 1583. However, this rationale is unpersuasive. Individual decisions are unlikely to have a significant effect on competition, and as the examples below demonstrate, the court’s finality rule also implicates fairness.
See id. at 716-17, 717 n.24 (discussing Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959); Greene v. United States, 376 U.S. 149 (1964)). In Greene v. United States, the Court refused to apply an intervening agency regulation affecting the claimant’s recovery for wrongful discharge. The Court explained that the claimant’s right to recover “matured” under an earlier version of the regulation, which placed fewer restrictions on recovery. See 376 U.S. at 160.
See, e.g., Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 268 (1994) (adopting a clear statement rule for statutory retroactivity and largely obviating the Court’s need to elaborate on its earlier statements regarding intervening changes in law).
See First Amended Complaint & Demand for Jury Trial at 7, Chinook Licensing DE, LLC v. Rozmed LLC, No. 14-598-LPS (D. Del. June 13, 2014) (accusing the defendant of filing “frivolous” inter partes review petitions against “valid and enforceable patents” to “extort” transferable licenses for those patents).
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 395 (2006) (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (emphasis omitted). For practicing entities, which are primarily concerned with preventing competition rather than receiving money, the need for effective injunctive relief is especially acute. See Janicke, supra note 21, at 50.
See generally Adrian Vermeule, The Judiciary Is a They, Not an It: Interpretive Theory and the Fallacy of Division, 14 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 549 (2005) (arguing that courts consist of multiple actors, each of whom may act strategically).
Fresenius III, 733 F.3d 1369, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (Dyk, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc).
See, e.g., Diane P. Wood, Is It Time To Abolish the Federal Circuit’s Exclusive Jurisdiction in Patent Cases?, 13 Chi.-Kent J. Intell. Prop. 1, 7 (2013) (“Law, in the final analysis, governs society. It should not be an arcane preserve for specialists, who never emerge to explain, even to their clients, what the rules are or why one side or the other prevailed.”).
J.D. Candidate, Class of 2016, Yale Law School; Student Fellow, Information Society Project. Thanks to Victoria Cundiff, Drew Days III, Camilla Hrdy, Amanda Lynch, and Alice Wang for generous comments. Thanks also to the editors of the Yale Law Journal for their exceptional editing. All errors are mine.

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