Source: https://lawreformcommission.sk.ca/handbooksept04.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 18:34:35+00:00

Document:
During its project on Administrative Law, the Commission has considered the needs of professional organizations charged with the duty of disciplining their members. Discipline proceedings are a vital part of the self-governance of professions and other occupational groups, and often one of the most difficult. Saskatchewan legislation governing discipline is generally satisfactory. Statutes regulating self-governing professions contain codes of procedure that protect the interests of complainants, accused members, and the public. But many professional organizations have found that they need more guidance than the statutes provide. This is particularly true of organizations that do not always have ready access to legal advice. This handbook is intended to provide practical guidance to members of Investigation and Discipline Committees.
The discipline process mandated for most professional associations in Saskatchewan follow a procedural format that we have identified as the "standard model." This handbook is designed for the needs of such associations. It does not apply to professional associations such as the Law Society, the Teacher's Federation, and the College of Physicians and Surgeons that have distinctive discipline legislation. The associations following the "standard model" are listed in the introduction to the handbook.
While the Commission has concluded that a handbook would be useful for professional organizations, nd has consulted informally during preparation of this draft, it wants to ensure that the handbook addresses the needs o professional organizations in a practical manner. For that reason, the Commission has issued this draft for comment and for use during consultations with professional associations.
This handbook is a guide to procedure in disciplinary investigations and hearings conducted by most professional associations in Saskatchewan. Of the 36 self-governing professions in the province, 25 are governed by legislation that incorporates what can be called the "standard model" of disciplinary procedure.
The handbook follows the stages of discipline proceedings under the "standard model", from receipt of the complaint to assessment of the penalty. It directs attention to statutory requirements and explains them. Decisions of the courts and general procedural rules are discussed when they are relevant. It should be noted, however, that the law governing professional discipline is constantly evolving. Where there is doubt about the current state of the law, the handbook attempts to identify "good practice" that will likely be approved by the courts.
Apart from professions (such as law, medicine, and teaching) with distinctive discipline systems that have developed independently through long experience, the standard model has been adopted by all Saskatchewan professional associations governed by legislation adopted, or substantially amended, since 1986. However, the version of the standard model in each of the statutes differs in detail from others. This handbook is designed to provide guidance under all versions of the standard model, but does not set out the differences in detail in all cases. Recourse must always be had to the governing statute to determine the specific rules it adopts.
The professions regulated by the standard model are self-governing. Control of the right to practice, and discipline of members who breach ethical and competency requirements, is exercised by the professions themselves, through their professional associations. At one time, only a few long-established traditional professions were self-governing. It is only in the last fifty years that the self-governance model was extended to a wide range of occupations and professions. Most of the professions governed by the standard model are in the latter category, including professions such as occupational therapists, real estate agents, and interior designers. However, the standard model has also been adopted by some more traditional professions such as pharmacy, accounting, and architecture.
But the responsibility of self-governance is a heavy one. Self-governance is an alternative to direct licensing and regulation by government, and exists only because the Legislature has delegated responsibility to the professions. Self-governance is acceptable only if it serves the public interest. The Supreme Court of Canada has stated that it is difficult to overstate the importance of proper regulation of the professions. As the court observed, the primary justification of self-governance is protection of the public [Rocket v. Royal College of Dental Surgeons (Ontario) (1990), 71 DL.R. (4th) 68]. The public interest in professional regulation demands that disciplinary proceedings be fair, transparent, and efficient. The public must be satisfied that complaints are taken seriously and properly investigated.
"The most obvious feature of the power of a self-governing body to discipline its members is clearly that it is a judicial power. . . . It is a power whose exercise may have the most far-reaching effects upon the individual who is disciplined. . . . Where a conviction may result in what has aptly and justifiably been termed "economic death", it is vital that procedural safeguards to ensure fairness be clearly established and rigorously observed." [Ontario Royal Commission Inquiry into Civil Rights, 1968-71].
The importance of procedural rules as a means of protecting the interests of the profession, the public, and the accused can hardly be over-emphasized. Canadian courts have long required all judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings to conform to what have been called the principles of natural justice. In Knight v. Indian Head School Division [(1990), 106 N.R. 17], the Supreme Court of Canada held that the rules of natural justice apply rigorously to professional discipline. The accused must be given a full opportunity to be heard, to know and respond to the allegations made against him or her. Decision makers must "act judicially," that is, in a fair and unbiased manner. Legislation governing professional discipline embodies the rules of natural justice, and the courts will enforce the rules by staying or overturning decisions of disciplinary committees, often going beyond the specific statutory requirements if justice demands.
The standard model mandates a two-tier system. When a complaint against a member of an association is received, it is investigated by a committee of the association referred to in most of the governing statutes as the Investigation Committee (though some statutes adopt the name Professional Conduct Committee or Ethics Committee). If the Investigation Committee concludes that misconduct or incompetence has occurred, the complaint is forwarded to a separate committee appointed by the association, the Discipline Committee, which holds a hearing at which the Investigation Committee prosecutes the complaint, and the accused member has an opportunity to be heard in defence.
This approach to discipline is a relatively new innovation. The separation of investigation of complaints and determination of guilt is intended to avoid bias. The Discipline Committee is required to act as an impartial judge, making its decision on the basis of evidence presented at the hearing by the prosecution and the defence.
In the two-stage disciplinary process established by the standard model, the Investigation Committee is responsible for investigating complaints and determining whether the complaint should be dismissed or forwarded to the Discipline Committee for a hearing. The Investigation Committee is distinct from the Discipline Committee. The size and composition of investigation committees varies, depending on the legislation governing the profession.
appointed by the board, of whom at least three must be members.
(2) No member of the investigation committee shall be a member of the discipline committee.
The purpose of the two-stage process is to separate the functions of the Investigation Committee and the Discipline Committee to ensure that the accused has the right to have his case determined in a hearing before an impartial decision-maker. A decision of Investigation Committee to send a complaint to the hearing stage is sometimes referred to as a "recommendation", but it is more like the decision of the prosecutor in a criminal case to lay charges. The Discipline Committee plays the role of judge.
If these roles are allowed to overlap, an appearance of bias almost inevitably results. Although the legislation does not explicitly provide that the Committees must operate at arm's length from each other during the investigation, failure to do so may invite a court challenge. An appearance that the roles of the Investigation and Discipline Committees have been allowed to overlap at the hearing stage has been criticized by Saskatchewan courts [see Bailey v. Registered Nurses Association (1998), 167 Sask. R. 232 (Q.B.)]. It is likely that courts would also find that confusion of roles in the investigation phase is objectionable. Thus good practice demands that members of the Investigation Committee should not consult with members of the Discipline Committee about individual cases, and that the investigation committee should not make information about individual cases available to the discipline committee prior to the disciplinary hearing.
This rule applies to most Investigation Committees. However, the Chartered Accountants Act does define quorum as at least five members of the committee. This provision overrides the Interpretation Act.
The full quorum of members must be involved in the investigation, and participate in making the Committee's decision. However, a full quorum is not required for all investigative activities. For example, a quorum is not required when the Committee interviews the accused or the complainant, so long as the information obtained at the interviews is reviewed by the Committee as a whole.
An investigation is triggered by a complaint alleging professional misconduct or professional incompetence. It is the Investigation Committee's primary function to gather evidence of the alleged misconduct or incompetence. However, during the course of the investigation, evidence of an instance of misconduct other than those alleged in the complaint may be discovered. Although the issue has not been definitively settled by the courts, it seems likely that unless the legislation governing the Investigation Committee explicitly gives the Committee authority to add new allegations to the original complaint, it will be necessary in such cases to initiate a new complaint and investigation. (See discussion of new allegations introduced at the hearing stage, below).
Most of the legislation following the standard model does permit new allegations to be added during the investigation phase. Thus, for example, the Chiropractic Act provides that the recommendation of the Investigation Committee may "relate to any matter disclosed in the complaint received pursuant to subsection (1)[the original complaint] or in the investigation conducted pursuant to subsection (1)" [Section 28(3)]. However, some of the older disciplinary legislation does not include authority to add new allegations.
The standard model provides no time frame for completion of an investigation. However, both the complainant and the accused can reasonably expect that the investigation will be initiated, conducted, and concluded as quickly as possible. The courts have held that timely investigation is a matter of fundamental justice. In Misra v. College of Physicians & Surgeons [(1988), 36 Admin. L.R. 298] the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal found that unreasonable delay violates the Charter of Rights.
Just what would amount to unreasonable delay will depend on the circumstances of the case. Relevant factors include the seriousness of the complaint, whether the accused is under suspension, whether the accused's ability to defend against the alleged complaint has been prejudiced by the delay, and the scope and complexity of the investigation.
No hard and fast rules can be stated. Most of the court decisions in which delay has been found to be objectionable involve inordinately long delays between receipt of the complaint and the hearing. In Misra, a five year delay, during which time the accused doctor was under temporary suspension, was held to be unfair. But shorter delays may also be unfair. A 20 month delay, during which time a witness died, thus prejudicing the accused's ability to make a full defence, has been held to be unfair [Freedman v. College of Physicians & Surgeons (1996), 173 NBR (2nd) 315 (N.B.Q.B.)]. On the other hand, a delay of 30 months was not enough to amount to prejudice in a sexual harassment case before a human rights tribunal [Blencoe v. British Columbia Human Rights Commission,  10 WWR 587 (B.C.S.C.)] because there was no evidence of prejudice.
A recent study conducted by the Manitoba Law Reform Commission concluded, after consultation with professional organizations, that most investigations can be completed in 90 days or less. While this time frame is obviously not practical in all cases, it may be a useful bench mark.
An important part of any investigation is an interview with the member under investigation. The legislation explicitly provides that the Investigation Committee may summon the member to appear before it. While "summoning" may seem to imply a formal hearing before the Investigation Committee, that is not the purpose of the interview, and a formal "summons" may be necessary only if the member is uncooperative. Even then, the legislation does not provide a mechanism to compel attendance at an interview.
The member's right to heard and make a defence is given full protection at the hearing before the Discipline Committee. The purpose of the interview before the Investigation Committee is to gather information and hear the member's side of the issues as part of the investigation to determine whether to proceed to the hearing stage. The courts have held that the requirements of procedural fairness do not apply as strictly to an Investigation Committee as to a Discipline Committee conducting the formal hearing [Knight v. Indian Head School Division (1990), 106 N.R. 17 (S.C.C.)]. While fairness is required in the course of the investigation, a Saskatchewan court has held that it does not extend so far as to convert the interview with the accused into what amounts to"an additional hearing". Thus, while is usually good practice to request that the member appear before the entire Investigation Committee, the court was satisfied that a more informal approach, such as an interview conduced by one member of the Committee, may be acceptable [Hawrish v. Cundall [(1989), 39 Admin. L.R. 255 ].
Dispensing with the interview entirely would be another matter, however. One Canadian decision has suggested that even though only minimal procedural fairness is required at the investigation stage, the Investigation Committee must notify the member that a complaint is being investigated, and to solicit a response [Tanaka v. Certified General Accountants Association [(1996), 38 Admin. L.R. (2nd) 99 (N.W.T. S.C.)].
Section 8 of the Charter of Rights states that "everyone has the right to be secure against unreasonable search and seizure". This section of the Charter has been applied to seizure of an accused professional's records during investigation of misconduct. Older versions of the standard model do not include a provision authorizing search and seizure. If there is no such provision, the Investigation Committee may request that relevant records be made available to it, but since adoption of the Charter, will not be able to seize the records if the accused member does not cooperate [See Lambert v. College of Physicians & Surgeons (1992), 100 Sask. R. 203 (Sask. C.A.)].
Recently adopted versions of the standard model include a provision explicitly authorizing search and seizure. When properly authorized by statute, seizure of records will likely survive a Charter challenge [College of Physicians & Surgeons v. Bishop (1989), 56 DLR (4h) 164 (B.C.S.C.)].
produce any of the member's records or other property that the person designated by the board reasonably believes are required for the purposes of an investigation pursuant to this Act.
(ii) are likely to be found in a specified place.
property demanded pursuant to subsection (2).
(7) A copy or extract of a member's records or other property certified by a person mentioned in subsection (5) who made the copy or extract is admissible in evidence in any action, proceeding or prosecution as proof, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, of the original record or property and its contents without proof of the signature or capacity of the person purporting to have signed the record.
Extensive safeguards are built into this section. Note in particular that it requires court approval (though on an ex parte application, that is, without formal notice to the member) of the seizure, and that court-ordered seizure is only available after a request to provide access to records has been denied. The section was clearly designed to avoid a Charter challenge, and is likely effective for that purpose. Legal advice should be obtained when search and seizure of records appears to be required.
The legislation provides little other guidance in regard to conduct of an investigation. The general requirement of fairness applies, but the Investigation Committee has wide latitude in the conduct of the investigation. As Casey, The Regulation of the Professions in Canada, observes, "a variety of structures are utilized by professional bodies in order to perform the necessary investigations." The courts have been reluctant to criticize or review investigative methods unless they are obviously biassed or unfair [See Rotelick v. Institute of Chartered Accountants (1998), 169 Sask. L.R. 180 (Sask. Q.B.)]. Some legislation provides that the Committee may engage legal counsel or other experts to assist in the investigation (see, for example, the Architects Act, section 32), but such assistance is appropriate even if the governing legislation does not explicitly permit it. Even employment of an undercover agent to pose as a client has been approved by Canadian courts [Markandey v. Board of Ophthalmic Dispensers,  O.J. 484 (Ont. C.J.)].
Both good investigative practice and fairness to complainants will usually require the Investigation Committee to interview complainants, or otherwise receive information from them, during the course of an investigation. If a hearing is recommended after the investigation is completed, most versions of the standard model require that notice of hearing be given to complainants, who may then attend the hearing. Otherwise, the legislation does not require the Investigation Committee to communicate with complainants. The courts have not to date imposed any additional requirements in this regard, but some Law Reform agencies have suggested that more attention should be given to the rights of complainants, and the courts may adopt this point of view in the future.
Certainly, some recognition of the complainant's interests is appropriate, but how far the recognition should go is a difficult question. Discipline proceedings are analogous in many respects to criminal prosecutions. Although both involve wrongs done to individuals, the primary goal is protection of the public. Compensation is left to the civil courts. In criminal cases, the complainant cannot insist that the Crown proceed with a prosecution, and is not a party to the proceedings at trial. Nevertheless, suspicion that an Investigation Committee may have buried a legitimate complaint should be avoided. As a matter of good practice, timely communication to complainants concerning the status of an on-going investigation is desirable.
Another issue about which there is little guidance in legislation is mediation as an alternative to a formal hearing and assessment of penalty. Mediation has become increasingly popular as an alternative method of dispute resolution in a wide variety of contexts, including matters coming before disciplinary and other administrative tribunals.
In mediation, an independent third party will guide the parties through a discussion and, ideally, to an agreement that is acceptable to all. A mediator can help parties gain a better understanding of the issues and their impact, as well as identify solutions to address underlying needs and concerns. A mediated settlement can be more creative, and sometimes, more acceptable to the parties, than a decision dictated by the letter of the law. It can be less expensive, less time-consuming, and less traumatic for everyone involved.
That no further action be taken with respect to the matter under investigation because: (i) the matter has been resolved, with the consent of the complainant and the member who is the subject of the investigation [Section 29(2)(b)].
But in most cases, the governing legislation does not specifically provide for mediation. This does not mean that mediation is not an option. An organization may decide to design a mediation program, or to begin using mediation in a less formal way, trying the process in cases which appear suitable.
An organization may also adopt other dispute resolution procedures, either as an alternative to formal mediation, or as a preliminary step. This might, for example, include negotiation between the complainant and the accused, facilitated by the Investigation Committee. Some associations have designed processes that include several "stages" leading up to a disciplinary hearing. For example, the Saskatchewan Registered Nurses Association has developed a process called "low level resolution."
1. Does an open conversation have the potential to repair a relationship, or restore the confidence of the public (or a certain individual) in the profession?
2. Is it possible that an explanation, an apology, or commitments to future change will satisfy both the complainant and the public interest?
3. Has there been a breakdown in communication which has contributed to the problem?
4. Do the allegations include serious incapacity, incompetence, dishonesty, sexual abuse, or situations that might lead to the discovery of additional misconduct? (On most occasions, these will not be appropriate for mediation).
The public protection role of professional regulatory bodies presents a unique challenge. The Manitoba Law Reform Commission has warned that by "focussing on the two parties to the dispute, such a process might ignore the interests of the public generally . . . ." This point of view underscores the importance of designing mediation programs that ensure the broader interests are protected.
Generally, the opportunity for mediation arises once the Investigation Committee has concluded, in at least a preliminary way, that there is evidence of professional misconduct that should be pursued. However, mediation may be an option at any time during the course of a discipline proceeding.
Mediation usually begins with an agreement covering its terms. In this context, it is important for a mediation agreement to clarify issues of confidentiality and privilege. Typically, it is agreed that information shared or statements made during mediation cannot be used in subsequent proceedings and that a mediator cannot be called to testify. These elements are important for achieving openness in the process.
Mediation should not appear to be a way for the accused to escape the consequences of his or her actions. Thus the complainant's agreement to refer the complaint to mediation should be required in all cases. While it is not appropriate for complainants to participate as parties at a formal discipline hearing, participation of the complainant is usually desirable in mediation.
Formal mediation is proceeding presided over by an independent mediator. The professional association will need to determine how or whether it will participate in the process. Some associations appoint a representative to participate in the mediation with the accused and complainant. Others may decide not to participate, but to contribute to the terms of any agreement at the resolution stage. If, after the mediation, a formal finding of misconduct and penalty is appropriate, the Investigation Committee must still lay the complaint before the Discipline Committee, together with a report from the mediator, and formal sanctions must be imposed by the Discipline Committee or Association in accordance with the usual rules.
If an organization is interested in mediation, either in general or in particular cases, there are a number of resources available for assistance. Mediation Saskatchewan maintains a directory of mediators across the province. The Dispute Resolution Office, Saskatchewan Justice, is also available as a resource. Guides to mediation are also available, such as Lisa Feld and Peter Simm's book, Complaint-Mediation in Ontario's Self-Governing Professions (1995, The Fund for Dispute Resolution, Ontario).
(b) no further action be taken with respect to the matter under investigation.
(3) The formal complaint set out in a written report made pursuant to clause (2)a) may relate to any matter disclosed in the complaint received pursuant to subsection (1) or in the investigation conducted pursuant to subsection (1).
(4) A report signed by a majority of the investigation committee is a decision of that committee.
(c) the member whose conduct is the subject of the complaint.
As suggested above, this step is analogous to the laying of a formal charge by the prosecution in a criminal case. As in the case of a criminal charge, the formal complaint must clearly set out the allegations made against the accused, so that the accused can answer them.
(3) inform the person charged, in general terms, of the charge against him or her, with sufficient particulars to enable the accused to properly prepare a defence.
The first requirement is critical. A professional can be disciplined by his or her association only for behaviour that is recognized as professional misconduct or professional incompetence. What constitutes misconduct or incompetence is outside the scope of this procedural handbook, but it should be noted that, for example, negligence in performance of professional duties may not be severe enough to amount to incompetence. To determine whether behaviour amounts to misconduct or incompetence, recourse must be had to codes of ethics adopted by the association, and the general law governing professional misconduct.
The legislation includes a notice requirement. It will be discussed in the next section.
The third requirement has often caused difficulty. The general rule is that the formal complaint must include enough detail ("particulars") to allow the accused to identify the particular actions that form the basis of the complaint. Thus, for example, when a complaint alleged alteration of records, but failed to specify the particular records that had been altered, the complaint was held to be deficient. [Mondesir v. Manitoba Association of Optometrists (2001), 206 DLR (4th) 163 (Man. C.A.)].
If a complaint does not contain sufficient particulars, the remedy is for the complainant to demand particulars. The discipline proceeding will be stopped by the court, or a decision overturned, only if a reasonable demand for particulars is denied [Sen v. College of Physicians & Surgeons (1969), 6 DLR (3rd) 320 (Sask. C.A.)].
Similar provisions are contained in other versions of the standard model, though the notice period varies. The Licenced Practical Nurses Act, 2000, requires 14 days notice, for example.
Reasonable notice is obviously required to ensure that the accused can exercise the right to be heard, and reply to the case made against him or her. Breach of the notice requirement can be a gound for overturning a decision.
(b) subject to subsection (15), is entitled to attend the hearing.
However, standard model regimes adopted in the 1980's, such as the Veterinarians Act and Ophthalmic Dispensers' Act, make no provision for notification of the complainant.
Perhaps because of the similarity of criminal charges and disciplinary complaints, it has been held that the rule that a person can only be convicted of the offence charged has been applied to disciplinary proceedings. The leading Saskatchewan case is Kapoor v. Law Society [(1986), 52 Sask R. 110 (Sask. C.A.)]. In this case, the misconduct charged was held not to breach professional standards, but the evidence presented at the hearing showed commission of another act amounting to misconduct. The rule laid down in Kapoor requires that, when misconduct is discovered after the laying of the charge, a new disciplinary investigation and hearing must take place.
Thus the formal complaint can be amended if the legislation governing the hearing permits. If the legislation does not include a specific authorization to amend after the formal complaint has been laid, a new investigation and new formal complaint will be required to deal with additional allegations of misconduct or incompetence. Note that while most associations are authorized to add allegations to the original complaint during the investigation, fewer have been given authority to add them after the formal complaint has been layed.
In some cases, suspension from practice of a professional accused of misconduct or incompetence pending the outcome of disciplinary proceedings is in the public interest . However, suspension will deprive the accused of his or her livelihood prior to the final decision of the Discipline Committee. Balancing these competing interests is often difficult. For that reason, the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal held in Brand v. College of Physicians & Surgeons [(1989), 58 DLR (4th) 178] that an interim suspension could be imposed only when authorized by legislation.
made pursuant to section 34.
This and similar provisions are intended to provide safeguards for the accused while allowing suspension when required in the public interest. In particular, it requires judicial approval of the suspension. However, the formula has not proved entirely satisfactory. In practice, obtaining court approval for suspensions is difficult, even impractical in some cases. In Chiropractors' Association v. Potapinski [(2001), 33 Admin. L.R. (3rd) 334 (Sask. Q.B.)], the court required evidence of probable "irreparable harm" if the suspension is not granted. Legal advice should always be obtained before applying for a suspension.
A criminal offence is a ground for disciplinary action in itself under some disciplinary codes and statutes (see for example the Chiropractic Act, section 36). In addition, activities giving rise to an allegation of misconduct may also amount to criminal offences. Because the purposes of criminal prosecution and professional discipline are different, there is no reason in principle why both should not proceed concurrently. However, concurrent proceedings can create problems.
Requests to hold disciplinary hearings in camera (that, is excluding the public and the complainant) or to stay disciplinary proceedings until the criminal charges have been dealt with, are not uncommon. Although the legislation does not explicitly deal with such requests, the courts have held that it is within the scope of a Discipline Committee's authority to grant them. It is appropriate to do so if proceeding with an open hearing might jeopardize the accused's right to a fair trial on the criminal charges. For example, publicizing the evidence presented at the discipline hearing might prejudice potential jurors.
If the accused's right to a fair trial is compromised, the courts may step in to order an in camera hearing or stay the proceedings [See Southam v. LaFrance (1990), 71 DLR (4th) 282 (Que. C.A.), but see also Pilzmaker v. Law Society of Upper Canada (1989), 38 Admin. L.R. 185 (Ont. Div. Ct.) where a stay was denied because the case had already been widely publicized].
Because conviction for a criminal offence is a ground for disciplinary action in itself under some disciplinary codes and statutes, an Investigation or Discipline Committee may elect to suspend proceedings until the criminal charges have been disposed of even if proceeding would not prejudice the accused. This avoids the problems discussed above, and will likely simplify the disciplinary hearing when it is resumed since once a conviction has been obtained, discipline can be imposed on that ground without additional proof of misconduct.
"The professional misconduct is characterized as "unbecoming" because it constitutes a specific crime not yet determined by the courts, the dominant feature and focus of the proceeding is likely to be found to be a substitute police investigation. Such a proceeding is a matter for the police and criminal courts."
Note carefully that this rule does not apply to an accused who has already been convicted, or in a case in which the complaint alleges behaviour that would be misconduct even if it were not also a criminal offence.
Note that this and similar provisions do not require an application to court to suspend pending disposition of a criminal charge. However, the provision applies only if the accused has applied to court to stay the disciplinary proceedings.
Some Discipline Committees have (as under the Chiropractic Act) both a general authority to apply for suspension, and a special authority to suspend pending disposition of a criminal charge. Some Discipline Committees, operating under less recently enacted legislation, have only the authority to suspend pending disposition of a criminal charge. In some recently adopted statutes [e.g. the Licenced Practical Nurses Act, 2000], only the general authority to make interim suspensions is included. The rules applicable in each case are different.
The simplest case is one in which the Committee has authority to suspend pending disposition of a criminal charge, and application to court has been made by the accused to stay the disciplinary proceedings. In this case, the Committee may make the suspension on its own authority without seeking court approval of the suspension. However, if the Committee stays proceedings on its own, it can suspend the accused only under the general authority to suspend. This will require an application to court for approval of the suspension. Because the courts are reluctant to approve suspensions made under the general power (see above), it might be good practice to wait and see if the accused elects to apply to court for a stay, rather than granting the stay on the Committee's authority.
If the Committee has only the special authority to suspend pending the disposition of a criminal charge, it must wait for the accused to apply for a stay in order to preserve the authority to make the suspension. If the Committee has only the general authority to suspend with court approval, that approval must be sought whether the Committee stays proceedings or the accused applies to court for a stay.
33(3) The discipline committee shall hear the complaint and shall decide whether or not the member is guilty of professional misconduct or professional incompetence.
33(2) The investigation committee shall prosecute or direct the prosecution of the complaint, but its members shall not participate in any other manner in the hearing of the complaint, except as witnesses when required.
This contrasts with the procedure often adopted under disciplinary regimes in which a single body, the association board or a discipline committee, lays and determines complaints. It is important to recognize and preserve the distinction between the roles of the Discipline Committee and Investigation Committee. The Discipline Committee must not take on the role of prosecutor, or appear to be collaborating with the Investigation Committee. The courts will overturn a decision if the Discipline Committee does not remain an impartial adjudicator, or even appears to be biased against the accused. For example, in Brett v. Board of Directors of Physiotherapy [(1991), 77 DLR (4th) 421 (Ont.C..A.)], a decision was overturned because a disciplinary board left the impression that "the member was being tried by counsel to the Board".
The role of the Discipline Committee is thus much like that of a panel of judges in a court of law. It has responsibility to control the proceedings and maintain order, but it must allow the prosecution (the Investigation Committee or its legal counsel) and defence (the accused and his or her legal counsel) to make their cases. The Discipline Committee may make rulings on such matters as the admissibility and relevance of evidence (see below), and may question witnesses for clarification so long as it does not usurp the function of the prosecution and defence. Although there are no hard-and-fast rules applying to the way in which evidence is presented, it is usual practice to allow the prosecution to present evidence and call witnesses to make its case against the accused, after which the defence presents its evidence and witnesses. Both parties should be given opportunity to summarize their contentions, and make and respond to any arguments about points of law and procedure that arise.
32(3) The lesser of three or two-thirds of the members of the discipline committee constitutes a quorum.
33(17) A decision signed by a majority of the discipline committee is the decision of that committee.
This presumably means that a majority of the quorum must concur in the decision.
term of office had not expired or been terminated.
The rules under other disciplinary legislation differ in detail. For example, under the Veterinarians' Act, the Discipline Committee consists of "least three persons" (section 21 (1)), and a quorum consists of "three members of the discipline committee". The Act makes no provision in regard to either decision-making by majority rule, or to continuance of members in office to complete a hearing. If a problem arises that is not dealt with by the governing legislation, legal advice should be sought.
33(6) The investigation committee and the discipline committee may employ, at the expense of the association, any legal or other assistance that it considers necessary.
33(7) The member whose conduct is the subject of the hearing, at his or her own expense, may be represented by counsel.
Similar provisions are contained in all other versions of the standard model.
Counsel to the parties play much the same role as lawyers in a court room. They are responsible for making and defending the case against the accused. Counsel to the Discipline Committee has a much different role. Because most Committee members are not legally trained, they may have questions about procedure or matters of law. Counsel to the Committee acts as an advisor in these matters.
The practice of providing the Discipline Committee with a legal advisor is no doubt good policy. There is a danger, however, that counsel will exert excessive influence on the Committee, usurping its function. The Committee must itself control the proceedings before it. Thus a new hearing was ordered in a case in which counsel "generally speaking acted as spokesman for the Committee." [Venzel v. Association of Architects (1990), 41 ).A.C. 50 (Ont. Div. Ct.)]. An appearance of unfairness or bias can occur when counsel, as Casey, The Regulation of Professions in Canada, has put it, "descends into the arena". Thus a decision was overturned where counsel to the tribunal questioned counsel for the parties and made his views of the facts before the tribunal known [Adair v. Ontario Health Disciplines Board, 15 O.R. (3rd) 705 (Ont. Div. Ct.)]. It is appropriate for counsel to the Committee, with the Committee's permission, to ask questions of witnesses for clarification, but counsel should not conduct examinations of either witnesses or counsel to the parties.
A particular problem is participation of counsel to the Committee in the Committee's deliberations, and counsel's role in preparing reasons for decision. There is a danger that the Committee's role may be usurped at this stage as well as during the hearing itself. However, it is an established and acceptable practice for counsel to assist in writing the decision. The more difficult part of the problem is the legal opinions expressed by counsel to the Committee. The problem is avoided if counsel's opinions are expressed in the hearing itself, so counsel to the parties will have an opportunity to reply to them. That opportunity is lost if the opinions are delivered in closed session of the Committee while the decision is being prepared. The Manitoba Court of Appeal has recently suggested that the "desirable practice" would be to require counsel to the Committee to submit all opinions in writing to the parties if they are not delivered in the open hearing, thus giving them an opportunity to reply. However, the court stopped short of making this a binding rule [Snider v. Manitoba Association of Registered Nurses (2000), 142 Man. L.R. (2nd) 308]. 1990, c.H-4, s.12(3)].
Independence of counsel to the Discipline Committee from the prosecution is also obviously important. The Saskatchewan Court of Queen's Bench criticized engaging the same lawyer as prosecutor and counsel to the Discipline Committee. [Bailey v. Registered Nurses Association (1998), 167 Sask. R. 232]. A more difficult question is whether staff counsel to the Association or counsel currently engaged to advise the Association in some other capacity should advise the Committee. Since the complaint is, in a strict sense, brought by the Association, an appearance of conflict of interest may result, and there is a danger that the tribunal will be unduly impressed by advice from an in-house "expert". The problem is compounded if a staff lawyer also acts for the prosecution, as is often the practice. To date, Canadian courts have not ruled on this issue, but it may be good practice to avoid using staff lawyers, or lawyers from a firm on retainer to the association, as both counsel to the Investigation Committee and Discipline Committee.
(11) Where the member whose conduct is the subject of the hearing fails to attend the hearing, the discipline committee, on proof of service of the notice mentioned in subsection 29(1), may proceed with the hearing in his or her absence.
There are cases in which the Discipline Committee would nonetheless not be justified in proceeding in the absence of the accused, due to illness, for example. But these are perhaps obvious.
(b) subject to subsection (15)[relating to in camera hearings], is entitled to attend the hearing.
However, the legislation falls short of giving complainants the right to participate in the hearing. Their role at the hearing is usually confined to giving evidence if called upon to do so by the prosecution. While there may be some room for participation in other ways, such as giving them the right to make a statement when penalty is being assessed, there is a danger that allowing complainants to play a direct role in prosecution of complaints would turn disciplinary hearings into a venue in which private disputes could be pursued. Here again there is a parallel to criminal prosecutions. Neither are designed to replace private law suits as a means of compensating the complainant, and both are justified because they protect the public interest. Discipline proceedings should be open and transparent to the complainant, but the complainant should not be allowed to become a party to the proceedings.
33(1) Where a report of the investigation committee recommends that the discipline committee hear and determine a complaint, the registrar shall [notify the complainant and the accused] . . .
(3) The discipline committee shall hear the complaint and shall decide whether or not the member is guilty of professional misconduct or professional incompetence.
There have been cases in which a professional accused of misconduct has demanded a hearing despite a recommendation from the Investigation Committee that the complaint should not be proceeded with. Presumably, the hearing would "clear the name" of the accused more effectively than a mere decision not to pursue the complaint. However, the courts have not been persuaded that justice requires a hearing in such a case [Von Richter v. Law Society (1991), 293 A.P.R. 325 (N.B.S.C.)].
33 (14) Subject to subsection (15), the discipline committee shall conduct all hearings in public.
(15) The discipline committee may exclude members of the public and the person mentioned in subsection (13) from any part of the hearing when the committee is of the opinion that evidence brought in the presence of the persons to be excluded will unduly violate the privacy of a person other than the member whose conduct is the subject of the hearing.
Although most administrative tribunals are usually required to hold public hearings, professional discipline hearings were traditionally held in private. In camera proceedings protect the privacy of the parties, but there can be little doubt that professional organizations traditionally preferred closed hearings in order to avoid adverse publicity. The change in policy reflects growing concern that the professional discipline should be transparent, and open to public scrutiny. For that reason, the exception to the general rule is now narrow. Note that a hearing cannot be closed merely to protect the privacy or reputation of the accused. The most obvious situation in which a closed hearing would be justified would be protection of professional-client confidentiality at the request of, and to protect the interests of, the client.
There is one circumstance in which the interests of the accused may require a closed hearing. As noted above, the Committee or a court may direct an in camera hearing if the accused has also been charged with a criminal offence, and an open hearing might jeopardize the accused's right to a fair trial.
When a hearing is required, the usual practice is to hold an oral hearing at which the accused has the right to submit evidence, call witnesses, make submissions, and cross-examine prosecution witnesses. The standard model is silent on the form of hearing, though the right to cross-examination accorded the accused suggests that at least an oral component may be required in practice.
Casey, The Regulation of Professions in Canada, argues that "even in the absence of an express legislative right to an oral hearing, it is submitted that common law principles would require such a hearing to be held". However, the issue is not so much the form of the hearing as the opportunity afforded to the accused to be heard and answer the allegations that have been made. In the past, disciplinary authorities routinely limited their inquiry to consideration of written submissions. This amounts to denial of the right to a full hearing, and is likely unacceptable under the standard model.
Nevertheless, some administrative tribunals have experimented with innovative alternatives to the oral hearing. There is growing interest in the potential to use electronic communications, including tele-conferencing, fax, and email, to conduct hearings at which all of the participants are not physically present. In Ontario, the Statutory Powers Procedure Act now permits "written" or "electronic" hearings if a Discipline panel or other tribunal has adopted rules governing hearings in these forms, unless "a party satisfies the tribunal that holding . . . [such a hearing] rather than an oral hearing is likely to cause the party significant prejudice".
There is room under the standard model to experiment with innovations such as these, but only if the parties consent, and clearly thought-out rules governing the alternative forms of hearing have been put in place.
The standard model makes no express provision concerning adjournment of the hearing. However, disciplinary and other tribunals have an inherent power to adjourn proceedings, either on their own initiative, or at the request of a party [Amourgis v. Law Society of Upper Canada (1984), 12 DLR (4th) 759 (Ont. Div. Ct.)].
Refusal to grant an adjournment may compromise a party's ability to make a full defence, and thus amount to a breach of the right to be heard. For example, a disciplinary decision was overturned when an adjournment to give an accused time to produce a witness was refused [Saskatchewan Teachers' Federation v. Demoissac (1973), 38 DLR (3rd) 296 (Sask. C.A.)].
As an essential part of its role as prosecutor, the Investigation Committee will present the evidence it has gathered during the course of its investigation at the hearing before the Disciplinary Committee. The defence will present evidence to attack the case made by the prosecution. The decision of the Discipline Committee must be based on the facts disclosed in the evidence presented to it. Therefore, it is important that evidence is properly introduced at the hearing.
There is no limit on the types of evidence that can be presented at the hearing, though it typically consists of documents and the oral evidence of witnesses. However, the evidence must be relevant and must be accessible to both parties. Evidence is relevant when it bears on the issues the hearing must resolve. The Committee may refuse to hear evidence that is not relevant, though its decision to reject evidence on this ground may be reviewed by the courts. Accessibility means that documents must be presented at the hearing, and available to both parties for examination and use in questioning witnesses.
In a court of law, evidence must also be deemed "admissible" under the rules of evidence. These rules are often complex and technical. They may not be practical or appropriate in discipline hearings, which are usually presided over by a Committee that lacks legal training. It is a well-established principle that administrative tribunals may receive all relevant evidence, even if it would not be admissible in a court of law. In particular, exclusionary rules of evidence such as the hearsay rule, and the technical rules governing admission of documents into evidence, do not ordinarily apply. This principle has been applied by the courts to disciplinary tribunals. [See for example Re Kaliq-Kareemi (1989), 35 Admin. L.R. 131 (N.S.C.A.), affirming that hearsay evidence may be admitted by a disciplinary tribunal].
33(4)The discipline committee may accept any evidence that it considers appropriate and is not bound by rules of law concerning evidence.
However, it must be remembered that the rules of evidence were developed by the courts to prevent unfairness. The notorious rule against hearsay, for example, is intended to prevent weight from being given to statements that cannot be tested by cross-examination. Thus, a witness cannot usually give testimony about wrongs committed by the accused that the witness has merely been told about by others. The hearsay rule requires that the evidence come from a witness with first-hand knowledge. In general, this is probably a good rule, but the exceptions and applications recognized by the courts have produced a complex body of law. The general policy of the rule is something a Discipline Committee should keep in mind as a matter of common sense. At the very least, the reliability of second-hand information should be regarded as more suspect than first-hand information. It would also be open to the Committee to adopt the hearsay rule and refuse to admit second-hand evidence, particularly if better evidence could be presented.
The courts will review decisions about reception of evidence made by Discipline Committees. Although they are generally reluctant to do so, they will overturn a decision if it is based on evidence that was clearly unreliable. On occasion, the courts have appealed to the rules of evidence to justify overturning a decision. For example, the Supreme Court of Canada overturned a disciplinary decision because it relied on second-hand evidence that was clearly open to question. In doing so, the court noted that the evidence would have been inadmissible in court under the hearsay rule. However, the decision was not overturned simply because it breached the rule, but because it was a clear example of the "hearsay dangers" the rule was designed to avoid. [See Mehr v. Law Society of Upper Canada  SCR 344 (S.C.C.)].
Decisions such as this have led some commentators to suggest that Discipline Committees cannot entirely ignore the formal rules of evidence. The Alberta Law Reform Institute, for example, has suggested that a correct and appropriate statement of the law is the proposition that Discipline Committees "are not bound by the formal rules of evidence except to the extent that deviation from these rules would not cause unfairness to the participants." [ Powers and Procedures for Administrative Tribunals, 1999]. This perhaps overstates the extent to which Discipline Committees must be aware of the technical exclusionary rules, but it is useful as a caution that Committees should take care in determining the weight to be given to evidence, and be prepared to reject evidence of low probative value. In this, as in so much else, the fundamental requirement imposed by the courts is fairness to the parties.
"The importance of full disclosure to the fairness of the disciplinary proceedings before the Board cannot be overstated. Although the standards of pre-trial disclosure in criminal matters would generally be higher than in administrative matters, tribunals should disclose all information relevant to the conduct of the case, whether it is damaging to or supportive of the respondent's position , in a timely manner, unless it is privileged as a matter of law. Minimally, it should include copies of all witness statements and notes of the investigators."
This decision has been approved by the Saskatchewan Court of Queens Bench [Thompson v. Chiropractors' Association,  3 WWR 675; Bailey v. Registered Nurses Association (1998), 167 Sask. R. 232].
A disclosure requirement has not yet found its way into Saskatchewan discipline legislation, but must now be regarded as both good practice and a legal requirement.
Administrative tribunals not governed by the two-stage process that separates investigative and adjudicative functions may obtain evidence in the course of their own investigations which is not presented at the hearing. Bu in the context of two-stage disciplinary proceedings, there is little justification for receipt of evidence by the Discipline Committee that is not presented at the hearing by the prosecution or defence. Reception of evidence that is not subject to review and rebuttal by the parties at the hearing undermines the Discipline Committee's responsibility to act as an impartial adjudicator.
To date, the courts have stopped short of laying down a general rule that disciplinary tribunals cannot receive evidence that is not presented at the hearing, but have been critical of the practice. For example, the Alberta Court of Appeal was "at a loss to understand " why a Discipline Committee refused to make certain statements presented to the Committee available to the accused. However, the Court declined to overturn the Committee's decision on the ground that disclosure in this case would not have benefited the accused [Re Solicitor (1967), 64 DLR (2nd) 140 (Alta. C.A.)].
Until recently, some disciplinary tribunals received the evidence of witnesses primarily through written "witness statements"submitted by the parties. Most Discipline Committees now prefer to hear the oral evidence of witnesses. This practice allows questions to be put to witnesses to clarify or expand upon their testimony, and most importantly, allows cross-examination of witnesses. Because disciplinary proceedings are concerned with the livelihood of the accused, the right to call and cross-examine witnesses is appropriate. This is particularly true in the two-stage procedure established by the standard model, in which the Discipline Committee is intended to be an adjudicator in an essentially adversarial hearing. While evidence of witnesses may still be presented in other ways, the courts have been increasingly critical of disciplinary proceedings in which the right to call and cross-examine witnesses is not fully accorded to the parties. [See for example, Willette v. Royal Canadian Mounted Police Commissioner (1984), 10 Admin. L.R. 149 (Fed. C.A.); Kutz v. College of Physicians & Surgeons (1987), 24 Admin. L.R. 187 (B.C.S.C.)].
33 (8) The testimony of witnesses is to be under oath administered by any member of the discipline committee.
(b) to adduce evidence in defence and reply.
Reception of oral testimony at a discipline hearing usually follows, at least in general outline, the practice in courts of law. During the course of presenting its evidence, both parties call witnesses. The party (or legal counsel) calling the witness conducts the "examination in chief": The witness is questioned to elicit the facts the party wishes to establish. The opposing party then conducts the "cross-examination": Questions are put to the witness to test the reliability of the evidence given during examination in chief, or to elicit additional facts that may assist the cross-examining party. The trier of fact may permit a reexamination by the party who called the witness if clarification of new matters raised on cross-examination appears to be necessary.
In courts of law, there are some technical rules governing the scope of examination and cross examination. For example, greater latitude to ask "leading questions" is allowed on cross-examination than on examination in chief. Strict adherence to these rules has not been demanded of Disciplinary Committees. The Committee has a wide latitude to control the proceedings. What is important is that the Committee respect to right of the parties to make a full presentation of their cases.
Standard model discipline legislation does not expressly preclude reception of evidence from witnesses by affidavit or some other form of written statement. Although Canadian courts have been critical of substituting affidavit evidence for oral testimony even when the practice is specifically authorized by statute [see e.g. Roenisch v. Veterinary Medical Association (1968), 66 DLR (2d) 358 (Alta. T.D.)], there may still be some place for affidavits and sworn witness statements. This may be the case if the evidence is not controversial, or of such a nature that there would be little point in conducting cross-examination of the witness. In addition, if both parties agree to allow certain evidence to be placed before the Committee in this way, there is usually no reason why the Committee should not agree to dispense with oral testimony.
33(16) A member whose conduct is the subject of a hearing is competent and compellable to give evidence at the hearing.
Note that a "competent" witness is a witness who may be permitted to testify. A "compellable" witness is a witness who can be required to testify if called by a party. Thus, under the standard model, the prosecution may call the accused as a witness.
In civil proceedings before the courts, almost all potential witnesses are competent and compellable. This contrasts with criminal prosecutions, in which the accused (and his or her spouse) is not compellable. The few limitations on competency of witnesses that remain in civil law likely apply to discipline proceedings. These have primarily to do with evidence of minors and mentally incompetent persons. If an issue about reception of evidence from such persons arises, the Discipline Committee should consult the relevant provisions of the Saskatchewan Evidence Act, and seek legal advice.
33(10) On the application of the member whose conduct is the subject of a hearing or a member of the investigation committee, the local registrar of the court at any judicial centre, on payment of the appropriate fees, shall issue writs of subpoena ad testificandum or subpoena duces tecum and, where a writ is disobeyed, the proceedings and penalties are those applicable in civil cases in the court.
The subpoena ad testificandum is a command for an individual to attend to give testimony. The subpoena duces tecum requires a witness to produce books, personal papers, or other relevant material. Use of these technical terms ensures that the law applicable to each species of subpoena will apply.
Note that the Discipline Committee is not given the power to subpoena, but merely to apply for subpoenas. Thus the court issuing the subpoena retains control over the decision to issue it. The court may refuse to issue a subpoena if, for example, the testimony or records are held to be unnecessary for the purpose of prosecuting or defending an allegation of misconduct [See Hanna v. College of Physicians and Surgeons (1999), 179 Sask L.R. 181 (Q.B.)].
It should also be noted that the authority to apply for subpoena of documents is in addition to the authority given to Investigation Committees under some discipline legislation to seize documents in possession of the accused (see above).
The principles of natural justice apply to imposition of a penalty as well as to determination of misconduct. Thus the accused must have an opportunity to make submissions at the penalty stage of the proceedings, and the tribunal must properly consider the relevant evidence before imposing a penalty [see Saskatchewan Teachers' Federation v. Munro,  7 WWR 484 (Sask. C.A.)].
discipline committee concurring in the decision.
section 29, of the day, time and place of the meeting.
subsection (2) fails to attend the meeting, the board, on proof of service of the notice mentioned in clause(2)(b), may proceed with the meeting in his or her absence.
(4) At a meeting called pursuant to subsection (2), the board may make any one or more of the following orders . . . .
"Sentencing (if the term may be used in relation to disciplinary proceedings) is an integral part of the adjudicative process . . . It is a natural conclusion derived from determinations of fact found during the "conviction" process. This proposition applies with no less force in a statutory scheme such as the one under consideration here, where the finder of fact is distinct from the party imposing (or here, imposing or recommending) sentence. To be fair and just, the consequences meted out by the Executive must bear, in our view, a close relation to the determinations of fact made by the Discipline Committee."
30 (1) Where the discipline committee finds a member guilty of professional misconduct or professional incompetence, it may make one or more of the following orders . . .
Separation of the "conviction" and "sentencing" phases of discipline proceedings is acceptable if adequate safeguards are in place, but there is a danger that protections built into the procedure of disciplinary hearings will not be extended to the sentencing process, and that evidence presented at the hearing that is relevant to sentencing will not be properly considered. For that reason, associations operating under legislation that separates "conviction" and "sentencing" must adopt practices that will ensure that (1) The accused is given an opportunity to be heard and make submissions during the penalty phase, and (2) The record of proceedings (see below) is made available to the board that imposes the penalty.
within 15 days of the board's decision.
It has been held that failure to give reasons is not a breach of natural justice [e.g. Kirsten v. College of Physicians & Surgeons (1996), 138 DLR (4th) 335 (Sask Q.B.)], nor does it violate section 7 of the Charter of Rights [Re Khaliq-Kareem (1989), 35 Admin. L.R. 131 (N.S.C.A.)]. However, the Supreme Court of Canada has recently noted "the strong arguments demonstrating the advantages of written reasons", and concluded that "it is now appropriate to recognize that, in certain circumstances, the duty of procedural fairness will require the provision of a written explanation for a decision." It was suggested that decisions "critical to . . .[the] future" of a person affected would generally fall into this category [Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),  2 SCR 817]. Many disciplinary decisions will have this effect.
"It is recognized that it is preferable that reasons be given for administrative decisions. Failure to give reasons tends to undermine the confidence in the tribunal . . . . Further, reasons given by administrative tribunals allow the Court sitting in appeal or on judicial review to access the decision making process."
registrar a copy of any of the documents filed pursuant to subsection (3) on payment of the costs of producing them.
Similar provisions are contained in other discipline legislation. An adequate record of proceedings is necessary if the decision is appealed to the courts. The court will rely primarily on the record in determining whether to uphold or overturn the decision.

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