Source: http://wi.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20180323_0000449.EWI.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 11:44:26+00:00

Document:
Plaintiff David W. Hardaway, who is incarcerated in the Dodge County Detention Facility, proceeds in this matter pro se. He filed a complaint alleging that Defendant violated his rights. (Docket #1). This matter comes before the court on Plaintiff's petition to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee (in forma pauperis). (Docket #2). Because of Plaintiff's indigence, the Court waived payment of an initial partial filing fee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4).
The court must screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious, ” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. § 1915A(b).
Plaintiff's allegations are based on a November 28, 2017 parole revocation hearing in Wisconsin state court. (Docket #1 at 2). He states that he appeared at the hearing via video conference. Id. Defendant, his parole officer, also participated in the hearing via real-time video and audio transmission from her office. Id. Plaintiff states that after the hearing concluded, the video conference remained live. Id. According to Plaintiff, Defendant then began to “behave in a very unprofessional manner by violating civil and ethical principles.” Id. Defendant apparently spoke poorly of Plaintiff to the various witnesses who had attended the hearing. Id. at 2-3. She also shared many intimate details about Plaintiff's personal, medical, and criminal history. Id. Throughout, Defendant indicated her personal dislike of Plaintiff. Id. Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant admitted to seeking a more severe form of revocation to ensure that Plaintiff would serve a longer revocation sentence. Id. at 3.
Plaintiff states that Defendant's conduct “violated public and constitutional safeguards” by sharing his personal information. Id. at 4. He claims that Defendant was motivated to prejudice the witnesses against Plaintiff so that her revocation case would be strengthened. Id. Plaintiff views Defendant's actions as “negligence, slander, hatred, maliciousness, and very poor judgment and lack of discretion.” Id. He believes that Defendant “is guilty of acts and omissions unbecoming . . . of one in [her] office and position, which renders suspension, demotion, and discharge” appropriate for Defendant. Id. Plaintiff wants a finding that his “rights on a constitutional, state, and administrative level [were] violated, ” that Defendant be removed as his parole officer, that “any questionable testimony provided against me in the present revocation by the witnesses . . . be closely looked at and dismissed or expunged from all records, ” and finally that he be awarded $4, 000 in damages. Id. at 5.
Plaintiff's allegations fail to state a claim upon which this Court may grant relief. The primary thrust of Plaintiff's allegations are that Defendant acted unprofessionally. This conduct, while not laudable, does not by itself implicate any constitutional or other federal rights. Because this is a federal court of limited jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332, the Court offers no opinion on whether Plaintiff has a state law cause of action against Defendant. If Plaintiff wishes to pursue such a claim, he must do so in Wisconsin state court.
A lesser theme of Plaintiff's pleading is that he feels Defendant's conduct tainted his revocation proceedings. This might implicate Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment due process right to a fair revocation hearing. Alston v. Smith, 840 F.3d 363, 368 (7th Cir. 2016); Scruggs v. Jordan, 485 F.3d 934, 939-40 (7th Cir. 2007). The problem with this claim depends on the status of Plaintiff's revocation, which is unclear from his Complaint. If Plaintiff has not yet been revoked, Supreme Court precedent dictates that this Court must abstain from hearing the claim until the state criminal proceedings have concluded. Gakuba v. O'Brien, 711 F.3d 751, 753 (7th Cir. 2013) (“Younger [v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971)] holds that federal courts must abstain from taking jurisdiction over federal constitutional claims that may interfere with ongoing state [criminal] proceedings.”).
If Plaintiff has been revoked, then viability of the claim turns on the relief he desires. If Plaintiff seeks release from his revocation sentence, something not expressly stated in his Complaint, that may only be achieved through a writ of habeas corpus. Whitfield v. Howard, 852 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2017). As to Plaintiff's claim for money damages, it is prohibited by the doctrine of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). Heck bars “section 1983 suits that d[o] not directly seek immediate or speedier release, but rather s[eek] monetary damages that would call into question the validity of a conviction or term of confinement.” Whitfield, 852 F.3d at 661. Plaintiff may only pursue money damages once “he receives a favorable decision on his underlying conviction or sentence, such as through a reversal or grant of habeas corpus relief.” Id.
Despite the Court's concerns, it will allow Plaintiff an opportunity to amend his complaint. Plaintiff should use the opportunity to clarify the facts underlying his allegations, including the status of his revocation proceedings, and the precise forms of relief he seeks. If he chooses to offer an amended complaint, Plaintiff must do so no later than April 13, 2018. If he does not do so, this action will be dismissed. Plaintiff should be aware that an amended complaint supersedes the prior complaint and must be complete in itself without reference to the original complaint. See Duda v. Bd. of Educ. of Franklin Park Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 84, 133 F.3d 1054, 1056-57 (7th Cir. 1998). In Duda, the Seventh Circuit emphasized that in such instances, the “prior pleading is in effect withdrawn as to all matters not restated in the amended pleading[.]” Id. at 1057 (citation omitted); see also Pintado v. Miami-Dade Housing Agency, 501 F.3d 1241, 1243 (11th Cir. 2007) (“As a general matter, ‘[a]n amended pleading supersedes the former pleading; the original pleading is abandoned by the amendment, and is no longer a part of the pleader's averments against his adversary.'”) (quoting Dresdner Bank AG, Dresdner Bank AG in Hamburg v. M/V OLYMPIA VOYAGER, 463 F.3d 1210, 1215 (11th Cir. 2006)). If an amended complaint is received, it will be screened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

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