Source: https://connecticut.lexroll.com/200-associates-v-planning-and-zoning-commission-83-conn-app-167-2004/
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 06:16:00+00:00

Document:
Foti, Flynn and Stoughton, Js.
1. The commission could not prevail on its claim that the trial court improperly substituted its judgment for that of the commission and failed to defer to the commission’s interpretation of the cul-de-sac regulation; contrary to the commission’s claim, the trial court properly concluded that the proposed road was not a cul-de-sac as that term is ordinarily used, where, as here, the term cul-de-sac was not defined by the subdivision regulations and the commission construed it to include a loop road configuration, which was not clearly within the ordinary meaning of the term.
2. The trial court improperly concluded that the commission acted arbitrarily and unlawfully in rejecting the plaintiff’s application on the basis of its failure to accept the plaintiff’s open space designation, that court having improperly determined that the commission was obligated either to accept the plaintiff’s open space proposal or to designate an appropriate alternate area of open space that complied with the regulations; accordingly, because the commission failed to state the reasons in support of its decision, the case had to be remanded to the trial court with direction to search the record to determine if there was substantial evidence in the record to support the denial of the plaintiff’s application on the open space issue.
Appeal from the decision by the defendant denying the plaintiff’s application to construct a subdivision, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Windham and tried to the court, Foley, J.; judgment sustaining the appeal, from which the defendant, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court. Reversed in part; further proceedings.
John D. Boland, with whom, on the brief, was William H. St. Onge, for the appellant (defendant).
Robin Messier Pearson, for the appellee (plaintiff).
appeals from the judgment of the trial court sustaining the appeal by the plaintiff, 200 Associates, LLC, from the decision by the commission to deny a subdivision application. On appeal, the commission claims that the court improperly (1) substituted its judgment for that of the commission and failed to defer to the commission’s interpretation of the town’s cul-de-sac regulation, and (2) determined that the commission’s denial of the open space designation in the application was unlawful and arbitrary. We agree with the conclusion of the trial court as to the first issue. We reverse the judgment of the trial court as to the second issue and remand the case for further proceedings on that issue.
The following facts are relevant to our resolution of the issues in this appeal. The plaintiff applied to the commission for approval of a thirty-one lot subdivision on a tract of 56.65 acres located in the town of Thompson. The subdivision included a street 3165 feet in length to be known as Elizabeth Circle. The proposed road runs from Thatcher Road and forms a large circle, or loop, and intersects with itself at what appears to be about 800 feet from its intersection with Thatcher Road.
Inside the circle, there are eight building lots, and there are building lots on the outside of the circle. Traffic is permitted to flow both clockwise and counter-clockwise around the loop.
the court sustained the appeal, finding that the commission had acted unreasonably or arbitrarily in denying the application and that the subdivision plans complied with the Thompson subdivision regulations. The commission challenges the trial court’s decision with respect to only two of the six reasons given for the denial by the commission, and the first of those was the principal issue at the hearing on the plaintiff’s application.
The first reason for the denial was that the proposed new road, Elizabeth Circle, is a cul-de-sac and exceeds 1000 feet. The Thompson subdivision regulations do not define the term “cul-de-sac,” but § XIII D.1.d provides that a cul-de-sac shall not exceed 1000 feet in length. The commission claims that the court improperly construed the applicable zoning regulations and substituted its judgment for that of the commission in determining that Elizabeth Circle was not a cul-de-sac.
the court improperly concluded that the commission applied its power unlawfully and arbitrarily by merely rejecting the plaintiff’s open space proposal and by concluding that it failed to exercise its regulatory authority to designate the open space. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.
regulations. . . . The trial court must determine whether the commission has correctly interpreted its regulations and applied them with reasonable discretion to the facts. . . . The plaintiffs have the burden of showing that the commission acted improperly. . . . The trial court can sustain the [plaintiff’s] appeal only upon a determination that the decision of the commission was unreasonable, arbitrary or illegal. . . . It must not substitute its judgment for that of the . . . commission and must not disturb decisions of local commissions as long as honest judgment has been reasonably and fairly exercised. . . . It is an appellate court function to determine whether the judgment of the trial court was clearly erroneous or contrary to the law; appellate review excludes the retrial of the facts. . . . The Appellate Court does not determine whether the trier of facts could have reached a conclusion other than the one reached. It looks both at the conclusion reached and the method by which it was reached to determine whether that conclusion is correct and factually supported.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Gorman Construction Co. v. Planning Zoning Commission, 35 Conn. App. 191, 195-96, 644 A.2d 964 (1994); see also Property Group, Inc. v. Planning Zoning Commission, 226 Conn. 684, 696-97, 628 A.2d 1277 (1993); R. Fuller, 9A Connecticut Practice Series: Land Use Law and Practice (2d Ed. 1999) § 33.8, pp. 173-77.
We seek to determine the intent of the local legislative body as manifested in the words of the regulation; however, as zoning regulations are in derogation of common-law property rights, “the regulation cannot be construed beyond the fair import of its language to include or exclude by implication that which is not clearly within its express terms.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Balf Co. v. Planning Zoning Commission, 79 Conn. App. 626, 636, 830 A.2d 836, cert.
denied, 266 Conn. 927, 835 A.2d 474 (2003). The words employed are to be interpreted in accordance with their natural and usual meaning, and doubtful language will be construed against rather than in favor of a restriction. Id. With the foregoing principles in mind, we turn to the commission’s claim.
At the hearing on the plaintiff’s application, much of the discussion centered on whether Elizabeth Circle was a cul-de-sac. The commission’s chairman expressed the view that it was a cul-de-sac because it was open at one end only. He said that when the regulations were written, the plan was to limit the length of a street with only one opening to 1000 feet, and a cul-de-sac is a street with only one opening. Counsel for the plaintiff opined that Elizabeth Circle was not a cul-de-sac because there is no turnaround, there are two intersections and there is no closed end.
usually with a turnaround at the closed end, which does not describe Elizabeth Circle, a loop road that allows traffic to flow in two directions, and does not require that a vehicle be turned around and driven back along its length in order to return to Thatcher Road.
is ordinarily and usually employed. Accordingly, we conclude that the court properly sustained the plaintiff’s appeal as to that issue.
The commission next claims that the court improperly determined that the commission’s denial of the open space designation was unlawful and arbitrary. Specifically, the commission argues that the court improperly interpreted the regulation and that the commission was not required either to accept the plaintiff’s open space proposal or to provide an alternative. We agree with the commission.
As a preliminary matter, we set forth the proper standard of review and applicable legal principles that govern our resolution of the issue. The issue concerns an interpretation of the Thompson subdivision regulation. Accordingly, our review is plenary. See Balf Co. v. Planning Zoning Commission, supra, 79 Conn. App. 635. “Thus, we must determine whether the conclusions reached by the court are legally and logically correct and supported by the facts in the record.” Id.
the application. That, the court concluded, was an unlawful and arbitrary exercise of its power.
by the commission for the purpose of conserving and protecting resources, they require that a developer of a subdivision reserve open space and permit the developer to use one of five methods that the commission finds appropriate. There is no requirement in the Thompson subdivision regulations that the commission must attempt to designate open space in the subdivision after it rejects a proposed open space reservation. We agree with the commission that the developer would not be apt to accept such a designation without at least some consultation. The developer must reserve open space and may elect one of several methods to submit the designation to the commission for its approval. Thus, the court improperly concluded that the commission was obligated either to accept the open space as provided in the plaintiff’s application or to designate an appropriate area of open space if it rejects the plaintiff’s proposal.
decision.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Azzarito v Planning Zoning Commission, 79 Conn. App. 614, 618, 830 A.2d 827, cert. denied, 266 Conn. 924, 835 A.2d 471 (2003).
In this case, the court never searched the record. Instead, it focused on the issue of whether the commission, after rejecting the plaintiff’s open space proposal, was required to select an alternate location. We have concluded that such a determination by the court was improper. The appropriate remedy, therefore, is to remand the matter to the trial court so that it may fulfill its obligation to search the record and to determine if the record reveals substantial evidence to support the denial of the plaintiff’s application on the open space issue. See Paige v Town Plan Zoning Commission, 235 Conn. 448, 464-65, 668 A.2d 340 (1995); Gagnon v. Inland Wetlands Watercourses Commission, 213 Conn. 604, 611-12, 569 A.2d 1094 (1990).
The judgment is reversed in part and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
 The court heard testimony that the plaintiff was the owner of the land and therefore was aggrieved. See General Statutes §8-8. That finding has not been challenged on appeal.
 See accompanying appendix, a reproduction of the plot plan showing Elizabeth Circle.
 Section VII of the Thompson subdivision regulations provides in relevant part: “A. The land so reserved shall be chosen by the Commission for the purpose of conserving natural or scenic resources; protecting cultural, historic or archeological resources, including but not limited to flood plains, streambelts, wetlands, ponds, aquifers, stone walls, specimen trees exceeding 30′ dbh (diameter breast height), wildlife habitat, outstanding forests, ridges, ravines, and ledge outcroppings and other unusual or fragile features; conserving prime and important farmland soils as defined by the Soil Conservation Service; meeting recreational needs of present and projected populations in the area; adding to or creating linkages between existing open space; providing buffer areas between adjoining land uses; implementing the recommendations of the Thompson Open Space Plan.
“B. A subdivision or resubdivision of any tract of land which results in the creation of 12 or more lots shall reserve open space in an appropriate location for the purpose envisioned by the Commission at the rate of one acre per five lots for public use, except as otherwise provided for in these regulations, as amended. The requirement for open space being dedicated within a subdivision shall be at the option of the Commission.
 Additionally, we note that all of the diagrams depicting a circular cul-de-sac show traffic flowing solely in a counterclockwise direction.
 General Statutes § 1-1 (a) provides: “In the construction of the statutes, words and phrases shall be construed according to the commonly approved usage of the language; and technical words and phrases, and such as have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in the law, shall be construed and understood accordingly.” See also State v. Indrisano, 228 Conn. 795, 809, 640 A.2d 986 (1994) (“[i]f a statute or regulation does not sufficiently define a term, it is appropriate to look to the common understanding of the term as expressed in a dictionary”).
“[Commission member John Rice]: It’s going to be the town’s responsibility to maintain that, then?
“[Civil engineer Janet Blanchette]: That’s correct. It’s part of the open space, and it’s part of, part of the formal letter. . . .
“[Rice]: What’s part of the open space, this?
“[Blanchette]: This one. This area here is part of the open space. This is an open space, and this is an open space.
“[Commission member Charles Paquette]: Now, quite frankly . . . the town has not yet accepted any open space land . . . I think accepting any open space land . . . would have to go through a town meeting, to do so. . . . [I] n the past, we’ve urged other people to assign this land to . . . an association owed by . . . people that buy lots in the subdivision and they would maintain it, as they do in other towns, not something that’s a burden to the town for insurance problems and maintenance problems, and so on and so forth.
“[Civil engineer Dennis Blanchette]: Well, we, we understand that it’s your open right to decide. We do not . . . (inaudible) the proposal. We thought it made sense to contribute the open space to the town, given the location of it, but we realize that ultimately, if you [ask] us to look at alternate mechanisms, we will do that. . . .
 “In appeals from administrative zoning decisions, the commission’s conclusions will be invalidated only if they are not supported by substantial evidence in the record. . . . [E]vidence is sufficient to sustain an agency finding if it affords a substantial basis of fact from which the fact in issue can be reasonably inferred. . . . The [commission’s] decision must be sustained if an examination of the record discloses evidence that supports any one of the reasons given. . . . The evidence . . . to support any such reason [however] must be substantial. . . .” (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Evans v. Planning Zoning Commission, 73 Conn. App. 647, 658, 808 A.2d 1151 (2002); see also Property Group, Inc., v. Planning Zoning Commission, supra, 226 Conn. 697.

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