Source: http://www.expvc.com/2013/05/common-law-trademark-caveat-emptor-to.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 06:19:38+00:00

Document:
Caveat Emptor to buyers of domain names--are you buying a domain name already covered by a common law trademark? Stratfor Enterprises, LLC v. Leviticus Wilson . . .quoted in part below, is a good example of how to lose your domain name to a common law trademark holder . . .
Cancellation or transfer of the domain name is the sole remedies provided to the complainant under the Policy, as set forth in paragraph 4(i).
Paragraph 4(c) of the Policy in turn identifies three means through which a respondent may establish rights or legitimate interests in a disputed domain name. Although the complainant bears the ultimate burden of establishing all three elements of paragraph 4(a) of the Policy, UDRP panels have recognized that this could result in the often impossible task of proving a negative, requiring information that is primarily if not exclusively within the knowledge of the respondent. Thus, the consensus view is that paragraph 4(c) of the Policy shifts the burden of production to the respondent to come forward with evidence of a right or legitimate interest in the domain name, once the complainant has made a prima facie showing. See, e.g., Document Technologies, Inc. v. International Electronic Communications Inc., WIPO Case No. D2000-0270.
The Panel initially addresses whether the Complainant has established trademark or service mark rights in STRATFOR. The term “trademark or service mark” as used in paragraph 4(a)(i) of the Policy encompasses both registered marks and common law marks. See, e.g., The British Broadcasting Corporation v. Jaime Renteria, WIPO Case No. D2000-0050; United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc. v. Domains for Sale Inc., WIPO Case No. D2002-0005; and The Professional Golfers’ Association of America v. Golf Fitness Inc., a/k/a Golf Fitness Association, WIPO Case No. D2001-0218.
In the United States, common law rights in a trademark or service mark may be established by extensive or continuous use sufficient to identify particular goods or services as those of the trademark owner. See United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90 (1918). That is to say, the mark must be used such that a relevant segment of the public comes to recognize it as a symbol that distinguishes the Complainant’s goods and services from those of others. Based on evidence submitted by the Complainant attesting to the continuous and exclusive use of the distinctive term STRATFOR for more than 10 years as a designation of source for the Complainant’s services, including the sworn declaration of the Complainant’s marketing director, the Panel is persuaded that the Complainant has demonstrated common law trademark rights in STRATFOR.
Turning to the question of identity or confusing similarity, the Panel finds that the disputed domain name <stratfor.co> is identical to the Complainant’s STRATFOR mark. In considering this issue, the first element of the Policy stands essentially as a standing requirement.1 The threshold inquiry under the first element of the Policy is largely framed in terms of whether the trademark and the disputed domain name, when directly compared, are identical or confusingly similar. In this case, the disputed domain beyond question is identical to the Complainant’s STRATFOR mark for purposes of the Policy. . . ."

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