Source: https://h2o.law.harvard.edu/cases/455
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 18:22:27+00:00

Document:
YELLOW CAB CO. OF D. C., Inc.
Mr. Alfred M. Schwartz, Washington, D. C., with whom Mr. Samuel A. Friedman, Washington, D. C., was on the brief, submitted for appellant.
Mr. Harry L. Ryan, Jr., Washington, D. C., with whom Mr. Joseph D. Di Leo, Washington, D. C., was on the brief, submitted for appellee.
The question here concerns contribution between tort-feasors where the judgment creditor is the wife of the tort-feasor against whom contribution is sought.
for varying amounts were entered in favor of all plaintiffs except Dreslin. In addition a declaratory judgment was entered allowing the Cab Co. contribution against Dreslin upon the several judgments except that of Mrs. Dreslin. This was disallowed because, as the Court held, "the right to contribution arises from a joint liability," and as Dreslin was not liable in tort to his wife, there was no joint liability between him and the Cab Co. as to her. This appeal is confined to that single question.
We agree with the conclusion of the trial court. Neither husband nor wife is liable for tortious acts by one against the other. That is the common law rule. It prevails today in the District of Columbia unaffected by 30 D. C. Code (1940) § 208 (Mar. 3, 1901, 31 Stat. 1374, ch. 854, § 1155; May 28, 1926, 44 Stat. 676, ch. 419). Thompson v. Thompson, 1910, 218 U.S. 611, 31 S.Ct. 111, 54 L.Ed. 1180, 30 L.R.A., N.S., 1153, 21 Ann.Cas. 921; Spector v. Weisman, 1930, 59 App.D.C. 280, 40 F.2d 792; Ewald v. Lane, 1939, 70 App.D.C. 89, 104 F.2d 222, certiorari denied 1939, 308 U.S. 568, 60 S.Ct. 81, 84 L.Ed. 477.
The right of contribution arises out of a common liability. The rule "hinges on the doctrine that general principles of justice require that in the case of a common obligation, the discharge of it by one of the obligors without proportionate payment from the other, gives the latter an advantage to which he is not equitably entitled." George's Radio, Inc., v. Capital Transit Co., 1942, 75 U.S.App.D.C. 187, 189, 126 F.2d 219, 221. Contribution, then, depends upon joint liability. An injured party plaintiff in the suit from which a right of contribution develops must have had a cause of action against the party from whom contribution is sought. Here there was no liability by Dreslin to his wife, — no right to action against him and the Cab Co., hence nothing to which a right of contribution could attach.

References: § 208
 § 1155
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