Source: https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/16/issue/14/european-court-human-rights-protects-migrants-against-%E2%80%9Cpush-back%E2%80%9D
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 18:35:01+00:00

Document:
Between 2007 and 2009, Italy and Libya (then under the rule of Colonel Muammar el-Qaddafi) concluded several agreements to combat clandestine immigration. Pursuant to these agreements, Italy instated a policy of sending undocumented migrants and asylum seekers who had crossed the Mediterranean Sea from Africa back to Libya. In a number of cases, boats were intercepted on the high seas, and those on board were taken back to Libya without a prior individualized assessment of their situation and protection needs.
On February 23, 2012, the European Court of Human Rights issued a landmark judgment in the case of Hirsi Jamaa et al. v. Italy against such âpush backâ operations. The case concerned a group of Somali and Eritrean nationals who tried to reach Europe in May 2009. Italian coast guard and customs vessels intercepted their boats on the high seas, thirty-five nautical miles south of the island of Lampedusa. On board Italian vessels, the men were taken back to Libya, from where they had originally embarked, and handed over to the Libyan authorities.
The Grand Chamber of the European Court, which dealt with the case due to its importance, held that Italy had violated the European Convention on Human Rights and awarded each applicant EUR 15,000 in compensation. The seventeen judges unanimously ruled that Italy had breached its obligation to protect the applicants from torture and inhuman or degrading treatment (Article 3 of the European Convention) as well as the prohibition of collective expulsion of non-nationals (Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 to the European Convention), even though the applicants never reached Italian territorial waters.
The Court thereby clarified and strengthened the extraterritorial protection offered by international human rights law in two important respects.
Under international human rights law, no one may be expelled if substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the person in question, if expelled, would face a real risk of being subjected to torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or comparably serious human rights violations. This principle, known as the principle of non-refoulement, finds its parallel under international refugee law in Article 33 of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (â1951 Refugees Conventionâ) and its 1967 Protocol, prohibiting states from âexpel[ling] or return[ing] (refouler)â refugees to places where their lives or freedoms would be threatened.
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (âUNHCRâ) has long taken the position that the principle of non-refoulement also applies where refugees and others in need of international protection are under the effective control of a state acting outside its territory or territorial waters. UNHCR made this point as an intervening third party in the Hirsi case.
This position contrasts with that of the U.S. Supreme Court, which held in the controversial 1993 judgment of Sale vs. Haitian Centers Council that the Refugee Conventionâs prohibition of non-refoulement did not apply extraterritorially. On this basis, the Supreme Court upheld the practice of the U.S. Coast Guard intercepting Haitians outside U.S. territorial waters and repatriating them directly to a country engulfed in violent turmoil.
In its judgment, the European Court effectively aligns itself with UNHCRâs position by applying its established jurisprudence that a state is bound to respect the rights under the European Convention (and hence also the principle of non-refoulement flowing from these rights) where the state has established effective control and authority outside its territory.
The Court ruled that Italy had exercised both de jure and de facto control over the applicants from the moment they were taken aboard Italian ships. According to the long settled rules of the international law of the sea, the Court observed, anyone on board the Italian ships was legally subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of Italy, the vesselsâ flag state. Noting that the events took place entirely on board of ships of the Italian armed forces, with crews composed of Italian military personnel, the Court also held that Italy exercised de facto control over the applicants, thereby rejecting the Italian governmentâs argument that they had merely rescued the applicants on the high seas and thus exercised only minimal control.
The findings of the Court on the extraterritorial scope of the principle of non-refoulement have implications that extend beyond the case of non-nationals intercepted on the high seas. The judgment implies, for instance, that people who stow away on ships must be protected from refoulement by the flag state, at least as soon as they reach the high seas, where the flag state enjoys exclusive jurisdiction and hence de jure control.
Perhaps even more importantly, the judgment provides further support for the position that people who take refuge in embassies to escape persecution or other serious human rights violations must not be subjected to refoulement by the state to whom the embassy belongs. Indeed, Judge Pinto de Albuquerqueâs concurring opinion in Hirsi specifically draws this conclusion. Like a ship on the high seas, embassy grounds constitute an island of almost exclusive jurisdiction located outside the territory of the embassy state. The embassy state therefore has de jure and de facto effective control over the embassy ground, and it remains fully bound by the prohibition of torture under the European Convention and the prohibition of refoulement flowing from it.
Insisting on the ordinary sense of the word âexpulsion,â Italy strenuously argued that only a person who had actually reached the stateâs territory could be subject to expulsion. The prohibition of collective expulsion, Italy advanced, only came into play when individuals already within the territory of a state, or those who had crossed the national border illegally, were expelled. Conversely, the applicants took the position that pushing back migrants on the high seas could constitute hidden expulsions. They also noted that Italian law considered ships flying the Italian flag to be Italian territory, which implied that removing the applicants from the Italian coast guard vessels was tantamount to expelling them from Italian territory.
The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights expanded on both arguments made by the applicants in her brief as an intervening party in the case. In particular, the High Commissioner invoked the principle of good faith and insisted that a state should not be allowed to circumvent the obligation not to collectively expel non-nationals simply by advancing its interception operations to the high seas.
the purpose of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 is to prevent States being able to remove certain aliens without examining their personal circumstances and, consequently, without enabling them to put forward their arguments against the measure taken by the relevant authority. If, therefore, Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 were to apply only to collective expulsions from the national territory of the States Parties to the Convention, a significant component of contemporary migratory patterns would not fall within the ambit of that provision, notwithstanding the fact that the conduct it is intended to prohibit can occur outside national territory and in particular, as in the instant case, on the high seas.
The Courtâs findings on collective expulsion reinforce those relating to non-refoulement. While the principle of non-refoulement imposes primarily an obligation of result (requiring that people are not transferred to places where their lives and freedoms are at risk), the prohibition of collective expulsion under international law imposes a duty of due process in that it requires an examination of each applicantâs individual situation. Push back operations without such individualized assessment are therefore generally illegal, regardless of where the victims are pushed back (e.g., a place like Libya under Qaddafi rule or another, more secure state). This implication is significant as Italy and other European states are currently negotiating new agreements to combat clandestine migration with the emerging democracies on the southern rim of the Mediterranean Sea.
In a climate of increasingly stringent migration control measures, the Hirsi judgment sends an important signal for the protection of the human rights of migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers. The decision can be expected to have a jurisprudential impact beyond the reach of the European Convention, because the two principles it rests onâthe principle of non-refoulement and the prohibition of collective expulsionâhave both attainted the status of customary international law and therefore apply across the world.
Australian politicians have already cited the judgment in criticizing Australiaâs own push-back policies. It remains to be seen whether the U.S. Supreme Court will be willing to revisit its interpretation of the principle of non-refoulement, which is more restrictive than that adopted by the European Court in the Hirsi case.
Jan Arno Hessbruegge, Human Rights Officer for Legal Advocacy in the Executive Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, worked on the intervenerâs brief submitted by the High Commissioner in the case of Hirsi Jamaa et al. v. Italy. The article is submitted in a personal capacity, and, unless specifically indicated, the views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of the High Commissioner or the United Nations. The author thanks Paul Oertly for his comments on the initial draft.
 Hirsi Jamaa v. Italy, App. No. 27765/09 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 23, 2012).
 Article 43 of the European Convention on Human Rights provides that the Grand Chamber âshall accept the request if the case raises a serious question affecting the interpretation or application of the Convention or the protocols thereto, or a serious issue of general importance.â See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953).
 In addition, the Court found a violation of the right to an effective remedy (Article 13 of the European Convention) read in conjunction with the cited provisions. See Hirsi Jamaa, supra note 1, Â¶ 270.
 United Nations Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 20, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add. 13, Â¶ 12 (May 26, 2004); Soehring v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), Â¶Â¶ 90-91 (1989); see also Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment art. 3, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force June 26, 1987).
 See Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 33 (1), July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 (entered into force Apr. 22, 1954).
 U.N. High Commâr for Refugees, Advisory Opinion on the Extraterritorial Application of Non-Refoulement Obligations Under the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol (Jan. 26, 2007), http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/45f17a1a4.pdf; see also Haitian Centre for Human Rights v. United States, Case No. 10.675, Inter-Am. Commân H.R., Report No. 51/96, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95 Doc. 7 rev., at 550, Â¶ 157 (1997).
 Submission by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in the Case of Hirsi and Others v. Italy, App. No. 27765/09 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 23, 2012), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/4d92d2c22.pdf.
 Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, 509 U.S. 155 (1993).
 Hirsi Jamaa, supra note 1, Â¶Â¶ 76-82.
 Id. Â¶Â¶ 146-58 (citing Â¶ 151).
 Id. (Pinto de Albuquerque, J., concurring).
 See also Sale, 509 U.S. 191-93 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
 See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 92 (1), Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3.
 See Hirsi Jamaa, supra note 1; see also Al-Saadoon & Mufdhi v. United Kingdom, App. No. 61498/08, 49 I.L.M. 764, Â¶ 139 (2010) (obiter dicta).
 See Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations art. 22, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.N.T.S. 3227 (stating that the onlyâfrom a human rights perspective immaterialâdifference lies in the fact that the embassy grounds remain on the territory of the state from which the victim seeks protection).
 Hirsi Jamaa, supra note 1, Â¶ 185.
 Id. Â¶ 164. For the full text, see Intervener Brief Filed on Behalf of the U.N. High Commâr for Human Rights, Hirsi Jamaa v. Italy, App. No. 27765/09 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 23, 2012), available at http://ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Migration/Pages/StudiesAndReports.aspx.
 Hirsi Jamaa, supra note 1, Â¶Â¶ 173-75.
 See Rep. of the Intâl Law Commân, May 7- June 5, July 9-Aug. 10, 2007, Â¶ 199 (n.400, draft art. 7 (2)), U.N. Doc. A/62/10; GAOR 59th Sess. (2007), available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/reports/2007/english/chp7.pdf.
 Bankovic v. Belgium, App. No. 52207/99, ECHR 2001-XVII (2001) (finding inadmissible claims of Serbian victims of NATO bombings during the Kosovo war given that the alleged violations occurred outside the territory of those states carrying out the bombings and those states never established effective control over the victims).
 Hirsi Jamaa, supra note 1, Â¶ 178; see also Medvedyev v. France, App. No. 3394/03, Â¶ 81 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Mar. 29, 2010).
 See U.N. High Commâr for Refugees, supra note 6; see also U.N. High Commâr for Human Rights, supra note 20.
 Kirsty Needham, Court Rules Against âTurn Back the Boatsâ Policy, Sydney Morning Herald (Feb. 25 2012), http://www.smh.com.au/national/court-rules-against-turn-back-the-boats-policy-20120224-1tti3.html.

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