Source: https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/jul2017/gr_231658_2017.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 07:00:10+00:00

Document:
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE (DND) SECRETARY DELFIN N. LORENZANA, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT (DILG) SECRETARY (OFFICER-INCHARGE) CATALINO S. CUY, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES (AFP) CHEF OF STAFF GEN. EDUARDO M. AÑO, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE (PNP) CHIEF DIRECTOR GENERAL RONALD M. DELA ROSA, NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER HERMOGENES C. ESPERON, JR., Respondents.
Effective May 23, 2017, and for a period not exceeding 60 days, President Rodrigo Roa Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216 declaring a state of martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao.
WHEREAS, this recent attack shows the capability of the Maute group and other rebel groups to sow terror, and cause death and damage to property not only in Lanao del Sur but also in other parts of Mindanao.
SECTION 1. There is hereby declared a state of martial law in the Mindanao group of islands for a period not exceeding sixty days, effective as of the date hereof.
DONE in the Russian Federation, this 23rd day of May in the year of our Lord, Two Thousand and Seventeen.
Within the timeline set by Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the President submitted to Congress on May 25, 2017, a written Report on the factual basis of Proclamation No. 216.
The Report pointed out that for decades, Mindanao has been plagued with rebellion and lawless violence which only escalated and worsened with the passing of time.
On 23 May 2017, a government operation to capture Isnilon Hapilon, a senior leader of the ASG, and Maute Group operational leaders, Abdullah and Omarkhayam Maute, was confronted with armed resistance which escalated into open hostility against the government. Through these groups' armed siege and acts of violence directed towards civilians and government authorities, institutions and establishments, they were able to take control of major social, economic, and political foundations of Marawi City which led to its paralysis. This sudden taking of control was intended to lay the groundwork for the eventual establishment of a DAESH wilayat or province in Mindanao.
Based on verified intelligence reports, the Maute Group, as of the end of 2016, consisted of around two hundred sixty-three (263) members, fully armed and prepared to wage combat in furtherance of its aims. The group chiefly operates in the province of Lanao del Sur, but has extensive networks and linkages with foreign and local armed groups such as the Jemaah Islamiyah, Mujahidin Indonesia Timur and the ASG. It adheres to the ideals being espoused by the DAESH, as evidenced by, among others, its publication of a video footage declaring its allegiance to the DAESH. Reports abound that foreign-based terrorist groups, the ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) in particular, as well as illegal drug money, provide financial and logistical support to the Maute Group.
• At 1400H members of the Maute Group and ASG, along with their sympathizers, commenced their attack on various facilities - government and privately owned - in the City of Marawi.
• At 1600H around fifty (50) armed criminals assaulted Marawi City Jail being manage by the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP).
• The Maute Group forcibly entered the jail facilities, destroyed its main gate, and assaulted on-duty personnel. BJMP personnel were disarmed, tied, and/or locked inside the cells.
• The group took cellphones, personnel-issued firearms, and vehicles (i.e., two  prisoner vans and private vehicles).
• From 1800H to 1900H, the same members of the Maute Group ambushed and burned the Marawi Police Station. A patrol car of the Police Station was also taken.
• A member of the Provincial Drug Enforcement Unit was killed during the takeover of the Marawi City Jail. The Maute Group facilitated the escape of at least sixty-eight (68) inmates of the City Jail.
• The BJMP directed its personnel at the Marawi City Jail and other affected areas to evacuate.
• By evening of 23 May 2017, at least three (3) bridges in Lanao del Sur, namely, Lilod, Bangulo, and Sauiaran, fell under the control of these groups. They threatened to bomb the bridges to pre-empt military reinforcement.
• As of 2222H, persons connected with the Maute Group had occupied several areas in Marawi City, including Naga Street, Bangolo Street, Mapandi, and Camp Keithly, as well as the following barangays: Basak Malutlot, Mapandi, Saduc, Lilod Maday, Bangon, Saber, Bubong, Marantao, Caloocan, Banggolo, Barionaga, and Abubakar.
• These lawless armed groups had likewise set up road blockades and checkpoints at the Iligan City-Marawi City junction.
• Later in the evening, the Maute Group burned Dansalan College Foundation, Cathedral of Maria Auxiliadora, the nun's quarters in the church, and the Shia Masjid Moncado Colony. Hostages were taken from the church.
• About five (5) faculty members of Dansalan College Foundation had been reportedly killed by the lawless groups.
• Other educational institutions were also burned, namely, Senator Ninoy Aquino College Foundation and the Marawi Central Elementary Pilot School.
• The Maute Group also attacked Amai Pakpak Hospital and hoisted the DAESH flag there, among other several locations. As of 0600H of 24May 2017, members of the Maute Group were seen guarding the entry gates of Amai Pakpak Hospital. They held hostage the employees of the Hospital and took over the PhilHealth office located thereat.
• The groups likewise laid siege to another hospital, Filipino-Libyan Friendship Hospital, which they later set ablaze.
• Lawless armed groups likewise ransacked the Landbank of the Philippines and commandeered one of its armored vehicles.
• Latest information indicates that about seventy-five percent (75%) of Marawi City has been infiltrated by lawless armed groups composed of members of the Maute Group and the ASG. As of the time of this Report, eleven (11) members of the Armed Forces and the Philippine National Police have been killed in action, while thirty-five (35) others have been seriously wounded.
• There are reports that these lawless armed groups are searching for Christian communities in Marawi City to execute Christians. They are also preventing Maranaos from leaving their homes and forcing young male Muslims to join their groups.
These activities constitute not simply a display of force, but a clear attempt to establish the groups' seat of power in Marawi City for their planned establishment of a DAESH wilayat or province covering the entire Mindanao.
The cutting of vital lines for transportation and power; the recruitment of young Muslims to further expand their ranks and strengthen their force; the armed consolidation of their members throughout Marawi City; the decimation of a segment of the city population who resist; and the brazen display of DAESH flags constitute a clear, pronounced, and unmistakable intent to remove Marawi City, and eventually the rest of Mindanao, from its allegiance to the Government.
Law enforcement and other government agencies now face pronounced difficulty sending their reports to the Chief Executive due to the city-wide power outages. Personnel from the BJMP have been prevented from performing their functions. Through the attack and occupation of several hospitals, medical services in Marawi City have been adversely affected. The bridge and road blockades set up by the groups effectively deprive the government of its ability to deliver basic services to its citizens. Troop reinforcements have been hampered, preventing the government from restoring peace and order in the area. Movement by both civilians and government personnel to and from the city is likewise hindered.
The Report highlighted the strategic location of Marawi City and the crucial and significant role it plays in Mindanao, and the Philippines as a whole. In addition, the Report pointed out the possible tragic repercussions once Marawi City falls under the control of the lawless groups.
The groups' occupation of Marawi City fulfills a strategic objective because of its terrain and the easy access it provides to other parts of Mindanao. Lawless armed groups have historically used provinces adjoining Marawi City as escape routes, supply lines, and backdoor passages.
In addition to the Report, representatives from the Executive Department, the military and police authorities conducted briefings with the Senate and the House of Representatives relative to the declaration of martial law.
The Senate's counterpart in the lower house shared the same sentiments. The House of Representatives likewise issued House Resolution No. 105010 "EXPRESSING THE FULL SUPPORT OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES TO PRESIDENT RODRIGO DUTERTE AS IT FINDS NO REASON TO REVOKE PROCLAMATION NO. 216, ENTITLED 'DECLARING A STATE OF MARTIAL LAW AND SUSPENDING THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS IN THE WHOLE OF MINDANAO"'.
On June 5, 2017, Representatives Edcel C. Lagman, Tomasito s. Villarin, Gary C. Alejano, Emmanuel A. Billones, and Teddy Brawner Baguilat, Jr. filed a Petition11 Under the Third Paragraph of Section 18 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
Fourth, the Lagman Petition claims that the declaration of martial law has no sufficient factual basis considering that the President acted alone and did not consult the military establishment or any ranking official27 before making the proclamation.
In a Resolution31 dated June 6, 2017, the Court required respondents to comment on the Lagman Petition and set the case for oral argument on June 13, 14, and 15, 2017.
The Mohamad Petition, denominated as a "Petition for Review of the Sufficiency of [the] Factual Basis of [the] Declaration of Martial Law and [the] Suspension of the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus,"43 labels itself as "a special proceeding"44 or an "appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen"45 authorized under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution.
According to the Mohamad Petition, the factual situation in Marawi is not so grave as to require the imposition of martial law.50 It asserts that the Marawi incidents "do not equate to the existence of a public necessity brought about by an actual rebellion, which would compel the imposition of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus".51 It proposes that "[m]artial law can only be justified if the rebellion or invasion has reached such gravity that [its] imposition x x x is compelled by the needs of public safety"52 which, it believes, is not yet present in Mindanao.
The Mohamad Petition posits that immediately after the declaration of martial law, and without waiting for a congressional action, a suit may already be brought before the Court to assail the sufficiency of the factual basis of Proclamation No. 216.
Finally, in invoking this Court's power to review the sufficiency ofthe factual basis for the declaration of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the Mohamad Petition insists that the Court may "look into the wisdom of the [President's] actions, [and] not just the presence of arbitrariness".54 Further, it asserts that since it is making a negative assertion, then the burden to prove the sufficiency of the factual basis is shifted to and lies on the respondents.55 It thus asks the Court "to compel the [r]espondents to divulge relevant information"56 in order for it to review the sufficiency of the factual basis.
In closing, the Mohamad Petition prays for the Court to exercise its power to review, "compel respondents to present proof on the factual basis [of] the declaration of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Mindanao"57 and declare as unconstitutional Proclamation No. 216 for lack of sufficient factual basis.
Prescinding from the foregoing, the OSG contends that the sufficiency of the factual basis of Proclamation No. 216 should be reviewed by the Court "under the lens of grave abuse of discretion"64 and not the yardstick of correctness of the facts.65 Arbitrariness, not correctness, should be the standard in reviewing the sufficiency of factual basis.
It is also the assertion of the OSG that the President could validly rely on intelligence reports coming from the Armed Forces of the Philippines;73 and that he could not be expected to personally determine the veracity of thecontents of the reports.74 Also, since the power to impose martial law is vested solely on the President as Commander-in-Chief, the lack of recommendation from the Defense Secretary, or any official for that matter, will not nullify the said declaration, or affect its validity, or compromise the sufficiency of the factual basis.
The facts laid out by the OSG in its Consolidated Comment will be discussed in detail in the Court's Ruling.
a. What are the parameters for review?
b. Who has the burden of proof?
c. What is the threshold of evidence?
b. also nullify the acts of the President in calling out the armed forces to quell lawless violence in Marawi and other parts of the Mindanao region.
After the oral argument, the parties submitted their respective memoranda and supplemental memoranda.
I. Locus standi of petitioners.
Petitioners in the Cullamat Petition claim to be "suing in their capacities as citizens of the Republic;"82 similarly, petitioners in the Mohamad Petition all claim to be "Filipino citizens, all women, all of legal [age], and residents of Marawi City".83 In the Lagman Petition, however, petitioners therein did not categorically mention that they are suing's citizens but merely referred to themselves as duly elected Representatives.84 That they are suing in their official capacities as Members of Congress couLd have elicited a vigorous discussion considering the issuance by the House of Representatives of House Resolution No. 1050 expressing full support to President Duterte and finding no reason to revoke Proclamation No. 216. By such resolution, the House of Representatives is declaring that it finds no reason to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the martial law declaration, which is in direct contrast to the views and arguments being espoused by the petitioners in the Lagman Petition. Considering, however, the trend towards relaxation of the rules on legal standing, as well as the transcendental issues involved in the present Petitions, the Court will exercise judicial self-restraint85 and will not venture into this matter. After all, "the Court is not entirely without discretion to accept a suit which does not satisfy the requirements of a [bona fide] case or of standing. Considerations paramount to [the requirement of legal standing] could compel assumption of jurisdiction."86 In any case, the Court can take judicial cognizance of the fact that petitioners in the Lagman Petition are all citizens of the Philippines since Philippine citizenship is a requirement for them to be elected as representatives. We will therefore consider them as suing in their own behalf as citizens of this country. Besides, respondents did not question petitioners' legal standing.
A plain reading of the afore-quoted Section 18, Article VII reveals that it specifically grants authority to the Court to determine the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
It could not have been the intention of the framers of the Constitution that the phrase "in an appropriate proceeding" would refer to a Petition for Certiorari pursuant to Section 1 or Section 5 of Article VIII. The standard of review in a petition for certiorari is whether the respondent has committed any grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in the performance of his or her functions. Thus, it is not the proper tool to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamationor suspension. It must be emphasized that under Section 18, Article VII, the Court is tasked to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the President's exercise of emergency powers. Put differently, if this Court applies the standard of review used in a petition for certiorari, the same would emasculate its constitutional task under Section 18, Article VII.
the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Lansang.
The third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII was inserted by the framers of the 1987 Constitution to constitutionalize the pre-Marcos martial law ruling of this Court in In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Lansang,92 to wit: that the factual basis of the declaration of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is not a political question but precisely within the ambit of judicial review.
Thus, by inserting Section 18 in Article VII which allows judicial review of the declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the framers of the 1987 Constitution in effect constitutionalized and reverted to the Lansang doctrine.
MR. SUAREZ. Thank you, Madam President.
The Commissioner is proposing a very substantial amendment because this means that he is vesting exclusively unto the President the right to determine the factors which may lead to the declaration of martial law and the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. I suppose he has strong and compelling reasons in seeking to delete this particular, phrase. May we be informed of his good and substantial reasons?
MR. MONSOD. This situation arises in cases of invasion or rebellion. And in previous interpellations regarding this phrase, even during the discussions on the Bill of Rights, as I understand it, the interpretation is a situation of actual invasion or rebellion. In these situations, the President has to act quickly. Secondly, this declaration has a time fuse. It is only good for a maximum of 60 days. At the end of 60 days, it automatically terminates. Thirdly, the right of the judiciary to inquire into the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation always exists, even during those first 60 days.
Whereas, the rebellion and armed action undertaken by these lawless elements of the Communists and other armed aggrupations organized to overthrow the Republic of the Philippines by armed violence and force have assumed the magnitude of an actual state of war against our people and the Republic of the Philippines.
And he gave all reasons in order to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and declare martial law in our country without justifiable reason. Would the Gentleman still insist on the deletion of the phrase 'and, with the concurrence of at least a majority of all the members of the Congress'?
MR. MONSOD. Yes, Madam President, in the case of Mr.Marcos, he is undoubtedly an aberration in our history and national consciousness. But given the possibility that there would be another Marcos, our Constitution now has sufficient safeguards. As I said, it is not really true, as the Gentleman has mentioned, that there is an exclusive right to determine the factual basis because the paragraph beginning on line 9 precisely tells us that the Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof and must promulgate its decision on the same within 30 days from its filing.
To give more teeth to this additional safeguard, the framers of the 1987 Constitution not only placed the President's proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus within the ambit of judicial review, it also relaxed the rule on standing by allowing any citizen to question before this Court the sufficiency of the factual basis of such proclamation or suspension. Moreover, the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII veritably conferred upon any citizen a demandable right to challenge the sufficiency of the factual basis of said proclamation or suspension. It further designated this Court as the reviewing tribunal to examine, in an appropriate proceeding, the sufficiency of the factual basis and to render its decision thereon within a limited period of 30 days from date of filing.
The most important objective, however, of Section 18, Article VII is the curtailment of the extent of the powers of the Commander-in-Chief. This is the primary reason why the provision was not placed in Article VIII or the Judicial Department but remained under Article VII or the Executive Department.
The executive power is vested in the President of the Philippines elected by the people for a six-year term with no reelection for the duration of his/her life. While traditional powers inherent in the office of the President are granted, nonetheless for the first time, there are specific provisions which curtail the extent of such powers. Most significant is the power of the Chief Executive to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or proclaim martial law.
The flagrant abuse of that power of the Commander-in-Chief by Mr. Marcos caused the imposition of martial law for more than eight years and the suspension of the privilege of the writ even after the lifting of martial law in 1981. The new Constitution now provides that those powers can be exercised only in two cases, invasion or rebellion when public safety demands it, only for a period not exceeding 60 days, and reserving to Congress the power to revoke such suspension or proclamation of martial law which congressional action may not be revoked by the President. More importantly, the action of the President is made subject to judicial review, thereby again discarding jurisprudence which render[s] the executive action a political question and beyond the jurisdiction of the courts to adjudicate.
the intent of the Constitution.
To conclude that the "appropriate proceeding" refers to a Petition for Certiorari filed under the expanded jurisdiction of this Court would, therefore, contradict the clear intention of the framers of the Constitution to place additional safeguards against possible martial law abuse for, invariably, the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII would be subsumed under Section 1 of Article VIII. In other words, the framers of the Constitution added the safeguard under the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII on top of the expanded jurisdiction of this Court.
The unique features of the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII clearly indicate that it should be treated as sui generis separate and different from those enumerated in Article VIII. Under the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII, a petition filed pursuant therewith will follow a different rule on standing as any citizen may file it. Said provision of the Constitution also limits the issue to the sufficiency of the factual basis of the exercise by the Chief Executive of his emergency powers. The usual period for filing pleadings in Petition for Certiorari is likewise not applicable under the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII considering the limited period within which this Court has to promulgate its decision.
A proceeding "[i]n its general acceptation, [is] the form in which actions are to be brought and defended, the manner of intervening in suits, of conducting them, the mode of deciding them, of opposing judgments, and of executing."104 In fine, the phrase "in an appropriate proceeding" appearing on the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII refers to any action initiated by a citizen for the purpose of questioning the sufficiency of the factual basis of the exercise of the Chief Executive's emergency powers, as in these cases. It could be denominated as a complaint, a petition, or a matter to be resolved by the Court.
independent of the actions taken by Congress.
During the oral argument,105 the OSG urged the Court to give! deference to the actions of the two co-equal branches of the Government: on' the part of the President as Commander-in-Chief, in resorting to his extraordinary powers to declare martial law and suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and on the part of Congress, in giving its imprimatur to Proclamation No. 216 and not revoking the same.
The framers of the 1987 Constitution reformulated the scope of the extraordinary powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief and the review of the said presidential action. In particular, the President's extraordinary powers of suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and imposing martial law are subject to the veto powers of the Court and Congress.
The Court may strike down the presidential proclamation in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen on the ground of lack of sufficient factual basis. On the other hand, Congress may revoke the proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President.
In reviewing the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension, the Court considers only the information and data available to the President prior to or at the time of the declaration; it is not allowed td "undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings."106 On the other hand, Congress may take into consideration not only data available prior to, but likewise events supervening the declaration. Unlike the Court I which does not look into the absolute correctness of the factual basis as will be discussed below, Congress could probe deeper and further; it can delve into the accuracy of the facts presented before it.
In addition, the Court's review power is passive; it is only initiated by the filing of a petition "in an appropriate proceeding" by a citizen. On the other hand, Congress' review mechanism is automatic in the sense that it may be activated by Congress itself at any time after the proclamation or suspension was made.
Thus, the power to review by the Court and the power to revoke by Congress are not only totally different but likewise independent from each other although concededly, they have the same trajectory, which is, the nullification of the presidential proclamation. Needless to say, the power of the Court to review can be exercised independently from the power of revocation of Congress.
MS. QUESADA. Yesterday, the understanding of many was that there would be safeguards that Congress will be able to revoke such proclamation.
MS. QUESADA. But now, if they cannot meet because they have been arrested or that the Congress has been padlocked, then who is going to declare that such a proclamation was not warranted?
Court's pronouncement in Fortun v.
We, therefore, hold that the Court can simultaneously exercise its power of review with, and independently from, the power to revoke by Congress. Corollary, any perceived inaction or default on the part of Congress does not deprive or deny the Court of its power to review.
The President as the Commander-in-Chief wields the extraordinary powers of: a) calling out the armed forces; b) suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and c) declaring martial law.112 These powers may be resorted to only under specified conditions.
b) What really happens during martial law?
The provision is put there, precisely, to reverse the doctrine of the Supreme Court. I think it is the case of Aquino v. COMELEC where the Supreme Court said that in times of martial law, the President automatically has legislative power. So these two clauses denied that. A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution; therefore, it does not suspend the principle of separation of powers.
FR. BERNAS. This phrase was precisely put here because we have clarified the meaning of martial law; meaning, limiting it to martial law as it has existed in the jurisprudence in international law, that it is a law for the theater of war. In a theater of war, civil courts are unable to function. If in the actual theater of war civil courts, in fact, are unable to function, then the military commander is authorized to give jurisdiction even over civilians to military courts precisely because the civil courts are closed in that area. But in the general area where the civil courts are open then in no case can the military courts be given jurisdiction over civilians. This is in reference to a theater of war where the civil courts, in fact, are unable to function.
MR. FOZ. It is a state of things brought about by the realities of the situation in that specified critical area.
FR. BERNAS. That is correct.
MR. FOZ. And it is not something that is brought about by a declaration of the Commander-in-Chief.
Clearly, from the foregoing, while martial law poses the most severe threat to civil liberties,130 the Constitution has safeguards against the President's prerogative to declare a state of martial law.
Indeed, the 1987 Constitution gives the "President, as Commander-in- Chief, a 'sequence' of 'graduated power[s]'. From the most to the least benign, these are: the calling out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare martial law."131 It must be stressed, however, that the graduation refers only to hierarchy based on scope and effect. It does not in any manner refer to a sequence, arrangement, or order which the Commander-in-Chief must follow. This so-called "graduation of powers" does not dictate or restrict the manner by which the President decides which power to choose.
It is thus beyond doubt that the power of judicial review does not extend to calibrating the President's decision pertaining to which extraordinary power to avail given a set of facts or conditions. To do so would be tantamount to an incursion into the exclusive domain of the Executive and an infringement on the prerogative that solely, at least initially, lies with the President.
MR. NATIVIDAD. First and foremost, we agree with the Commissioner's thesis that in the first imposition of martial law there is no need for concurrence of the Members of Congress because the provision says 'in case of actual invasion or rebellion.' If there is actual invasion and rebellion, as Commissioner Crispino de Castro said, there is a need for immediate response because there is an attack. Second, the fact of securing a concurrence may be impractical because the roads might be blocked or barricaded. x x x So the requirement of an initial concurrence of the majority of all Members of the Congress in case of an invasion or rebellion might be impractical as I can see it.
Second, Section 15 states that the Congress may revoke the declaration or lift the suspension.
MR. PADILLA. That is correct especially for the initial suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or also the declaration of martial law.
MR. SUAREZ. So in both instances, the Commissioner is suggesting that this would be an exclusive prerogative of the President?
The Commissioner is proposing a very substantial amendment because this means that he is vesting exclusively unto the President the right to determine the factors which may lead to the declaration of martial law and the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. I suppose he has strong and compelling reasons in seeking to delete this particular phrase. May we be informed of his good and substantial reasons?
MR. MONSOD. Yes, Madam President, in the case of Mr. Marcos[,] he is undoubtedly an aberration in our history and national consciousness. But given the possibility that there would be another Marcos, our Constitution now has sufficient safeguards. As I said, it is not really true, as the Gentleman mentioned, that there is an exclusive right to determine the factual basis because the paragraph being on line 9 precisely tells us that the Supreme court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof and must promulgate its decision on the same within 30 days from its filing.
MR. SUAREZ. Will that prevent a future President from doing what Mr. Marcos had done?
MR. MONSOD. There is nothing absolute in this world, and there may be another Marcos. What we are looking for are safeguards that arereasonable and, I believe, adequate at this point. On the other hand, in case of invasion or rebellion, even during the first 60 days when the intention here is to protect the country in that situation, it would be unreasonable to ask that there should be a concurrence on the part of the Congress, which situation is automatically terminated at the end of such 60 days.
MR. SUAREZ. Would the Gentleman not feel more comfortable if we provide for a legislative check on this awesome power of the Chief Executive acting as Commander-in-Chief?
MR. MONSOD. I would be less comfortable if we have a presidency that cannot act under those conditions.
MR. SUAREZ. But he can act with the concurrence of the proper or appropriate authority?
MR. MONSOD. Yes. But when those situations arise, it is very unlikely that the concurrence of Congress would be available; and, secondly, the President will be able to act quickly in order to deal with the circumstances.
MR. SUAREZ. So, we would be subordinating actual circumstances to expediency?
The foregoing exchange clearly manifests the intent of the Constitution not to allow Congress to interfere a priori in the President's choice of extraordinary powers.
It cannot be overemphasized that time is paramount in situations necessitating the proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. It was precisely this time element that prompted the Constitutional Commission to eliminate the requirement of 1 concurrence of the Congress in the initial imposition by the President of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
Considering that the proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is now anchored on actual invasion or rebellion and when public safety requires it, and is no longer under threat or in imminent danger thereof, there is a necessity and urgency for the President to act quickly to protect the country.138 The Court, as Congress does, must thus accord the President the same leeway by not wading into the realm that is reserved exclusively by the Constitution to the Executive Department.
Even the recommendation of, or consultation with, the Secretary of National Defense, or other high-ranking military officials, is not a condition for the President to declare martial law. A plain reading of Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution shows that the President's power to declare martial law is not subject to any condition except for the requirements of actual invasion or rebellion and that public safety requires it. Besides, it would be contrary to common sense if the decision of the President is made dependent on the recommendation of his mere alter ego. Rightly so, it is only on the President and no other that the exercise of the powers of the Commander-in-Chief under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution is bestowed.
At this juncture, it must be stressed that prior to Proclamation No. 216 or the declaration of martial law on May 23, 201 7, the President had already issued Proclamation No. 55 on September 4, 2016, declaring a state of national emergency on account of lawless violence in Mindanao. This, in fact, is extant in the first Whereas Clause of Proclamation No. 216. Based on the foregoing presidential actions, it can be gleaned that although there is no obligation or requirement on his part to use his extraordinary powers on a graduated or sequential basis, still the President made the conscious anddeliberate effort to first employ the most benign from among his extraordinary powers. As the initial and preliminary step towards suppressing and preventing the armed hostilities in Mindanao, the President decided to use his calling out power first. Unfortunately, the situation did not improve; on the contrary, it only worsened. Thus, exercising his sole and exclusive prerogative, the President decided to impose martial law and suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus on the belief that the armed hostilities in Mindanao already amount to actual rebellion and public safety requires it.
Proclamation No. 216 is being facially challenged on the ground of "vagueness" by the insertion of the phrase "other rebel groups"139 in its Whereas Clause and for lack of available guidelines specifying its actual operational parameters within the entire Mindanao region, making the proclamation susceptible to broad interpretation, misinterpretation, or confusion.
This argument lacks legal basis.
only in free speech cases.
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible 'chilling effect' upon protected speech. The theory is that ' [w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent construction suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution, the transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on overly broad statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow specificity.' The possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the protected speech of others may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes.
This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting from their very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech.
Clearly, facial review of Proclamation No. 216 on the grounds of vagueness is unwarranted. Proclamation No. 216 does not regulate speech, religious freedom, and other fundamental rights that may be facially challenged.148 What it seeks to penalize is conduct, not speech.
As held by the Court in David v. President Macapagal-Arroyo,149 the facial review of Proclamation No. 1017, issued by then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo declaring a state of national emergency, on ground o vagueness is uncalled for since a plain reading of Proclamation No. 10171 shows that it is not primarily directed at speech or even speech-related1 conduct. It is actually a call upon the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence. Like Proclamation No. 1017, Proclamation No. 216 pertains to a spectrum of conduct, not free speech, which is manifestly subject to state regulation.
The contention that the phrase "other rebel groups" leaves Proclamation No. 216 open to broad interpretation, misinterpretation, and confusion, cannot be sustained.
As a rule, a statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men 'of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.' It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targetted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.
The term "other rebel groups" in Proclamation No. 216 is not at all vague when viewed in the context of the words that accompany it. Verily, the text of Proclamation No. 216 refers to "other rebel groups" found in Proclamation No. 55, which it cited by way of reference in its Whereas clauses.
make Proclamation No. 216 vague.
Neither could Proclamation No. 216 be described as vague, and thus void, on the ground that it has no guidelines specifying its actual operational parameters within the entire Mindanao region. Besides, operational guidelines will serve only as mere tools for the implementation of the proclamation. In Part III, we declared that judicial review covers only the sufficiency of information or data available to or known to the President prior to, or at the time of, the declaration or suspension. And, as will be discussed exhaustively in Part VII, the review will be confined to the proclamation itself and the Report submitted to Congress.
Clearly, therefore, there is no need for the Court to determine the constitutionality of the implementing and/or operational guidelines, general orders, arrest orders and other orders issued after the proclamation for being irrelevant to its review. Thus, any act committed under the said orders in violation of the Constitution and the laws, such as criminal acts or human rights violations, should be resolved in a separate proceeding. Finally, there is a risk that if the Court wades into these areas, it would be deemed as trespassing into the sphere that is reserved exclusively for Congress in the exercise of its power to revoke.
VI. Whether or not nullifying Proclamation No.
The Court's ruling in these cases will not, in any way, affect the President's declaration of a state of national emergency on account of lawless violence in Mindanao through Proclamation No. 55 dated September 4, 2016, where he called upon the Armed Forces and the Philippine National 1 Police (PNP) to undertake such measures to suppress any and all forms of lawless violence in the Mindanao region, and to prevent such lawless violence from spreading and escalating elsewhere in the Philippines.
In other words, the President may exercise the power to call out the Armed Forces independently of the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and to declare martial law, although, of course, it may also be a prelude to a possible future exercise of the latter powers, as in this case.
Even so, the Court's review of the President's declaration of martial law and his calling out the Armed Forces necessarily entails separate proceedings instituted for that particular purpose.
This locus standi requirement, however, need not be complied with in so far as the Court's jurisdiction to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the President's declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege ofthe writ of habeas corpus is concerned. In fact, by constitutional design, such review may be instituted by any citizen before the Court,157 without the need to prove that he or she stands to sustain a direct and personal injury as a consequence of the questioned Presidential act/s.
But, even assuming arguendo that the Court finds no sufficient basis for the declaration of martial law in this case, such ruling could not affect the President's exercise of his calling out power through Proclamation No. 55.
b) The operative fact doctrine.
Where the assailed legislative or executive act is found by the judiciary to be contrary to the Constitution, it is null and void. As the new Civil Code puts it: 'When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern. Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution.' The above provision of the Civil Code reflects the orthodox view that an unconstitutional act, whether legislative or executive, is not a law, confers no rights, imposes no duties, and affords no protection. This doctrine admits of qualifications, however. As the American Supreme Court stated: 'The actual existence of a statute prior to such a determination [of constitutionality], is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to the invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects, - with respect to particular regulations, individual and corporate, and particular conduct, private and official.
The orthodox view finds support in the well-settled doctrine that the Constitution is supreme and provides the measure for the validity of legislative or executive acts. Clearly then, neither the legislative nor the executive branch, and for that matter much less, this Court, has power under the Constitution to act contrary to its terms. Any attempted exercise of power in violation of its provisions is to that extent unwarranted and null.
However, it must also be stressed that this "operative fact doctrine" is not a fool-proof shield that would repulse any challenge to acts performed during the effectivity of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, purportedly in furtherance of quelling rebellion or invasion, and promotion of public safety, when evidence shows otherwise.
VII. The Scope of the Power to Review.
Lansang, however, was decided under the 1935 Constitution. The 1987 Constitution, by providing only for judicial review based on the determination of the sufficiency of the factual bases, has in fact done away with the test of arbitrariness as provided in Lansang.
Similarly, under the doctrine of contemporaneous construction, the framers of the 1987 Constitution are presumed to know the prevailing jurisprudence at the time they were drafting the Constitution. Thus, the phrase "sufficiency of factual basis" in Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution should be understood as the only test for judicial review of the President's power to declare martial law and suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution. The Court does not need to satisfy itself that the President's decision is correct, rather it only needs to determine whether the President's decision had sufficient factual bases.
We conclude, therefore, that Section 18, Article VII limits the scope of judicial review by the introduction of the "sufficiency of the factual basis" test.
As Commander-in-Chief, the President has the sole discretion to declare martial law and/or to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, subject to the revocation of Congress and the review of this Court. Since the exercise of these powers is a judgment call of the President, the determination of this Court as to whether there is sufficient factual basis for the exercise of such, must be based only on facts or information known by or available to the President at the time he made the declaration or suspension, which facts or information are found in the proclamation as well as the written Report submitted by him to Congress. These may be based on the situation existing at the time the declaration was made or past events. As to how far the past events should be from the present depends on the President.
Past events may be considered as justifications for the declaration and/or suspension as long as these are connected or related to the current situation existing at the time of the declaration.
As to what facts must be stated in the proclamation and the written Report is up to the President.165 As Commander-in-Chief, he has sole discretion to determine what to include and what not to include in the proclamation and the written Report taking into account the urgency of the situation as well as national security. He cannot be forced to divulge intelligence reports and confidential information that may prejudice the operations and the safety of the military.
Similarly, events that happened after the issuance of the proclamation, which are included in the written report, cannot be considered in determining the sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration of martial law and/or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus since these happened after the President had already issued the proclamation. If at all, they may be used only as tools, guides or reference in the Court's determination of the sufficiency of factual basis, but not as part or component of the portfolio of the factual basis itself.
In determining the sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration and/or the suspension, the Court should look into the full complement or totality of the factual basis, and not piecemeal or individually. Neither should the Court expect absolute correctness of the facts stated in the proclamation and in the written Report as the President could not be expected to verify the accuracy and veracity of all facts reported to him due to the urgency of the situation. To require precision in the President's appreciation of facts would unduly burden him and therefore impede the process of his decision-making. Such a requirement will practically necessitate the President to be on the ground to confirm the correctness of the reports submitted to him within a period that only the circumstances obtaining would be able to dictate. Such a scenario, of course, would not only place the President in peril but would also defeat the very purpose of the grant of emergency powers upon him, that is, to borrow the words of Justice Antonio T. Carpio in Fortun, to "immediately put an end to the root cause of the emergency".166 Possibly, by the time the President is satisfied with the correctness of the facts in his possession, it would be too late in the day as the invasion or rebellion could have already escalated to a level that is hard, if not impossible, to curtail.
Besides, the framers of the 1987 Constitution considered intelligence reports of military officers as credible evidence that the President ca appraise and to which he can anchor his judgment,167 as appears to be the case here.
President Arroyo cannot be blamed for relying upon the information given to her by the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police, considering that the matter of the supposed armed uprising was within their realm of competence, and that a state of emergency has also been declared in Central Mindanao to prevent lawless violence similar to the 'Maguindanao massacre,' which may be an indication that there is a threat to the public safety warranting a declaration of martial law or suspension of the writ.
Corollary, as the President is expected to decide quickly on whether there is a need to proclaim martial law even only on the basis of intelligence reports, it is irrelevant, for purposes of the Court's review, if subsequent events prove that the situation had not been accurately reported to him.
Hence, the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus finds no application in this case. Falsities of and/or inaccuracies in some of the facts stated in the proclamation and the written report are not enough reasons for the Court to invalidate the declaration and/or suspension as long as there are other facts in the proclamation and the written Report that support the conclusion that there is an actual invasion or rebellion and that public safety requires the declaration and/or suspension.
In sum, the Court's power to review is limited to the determination of whether the President in declaring martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus had sufficient factual basis. Thus, our review would be limited to an examination on whether the President acted within the bounds set by the Constitution, i.e., whether the facts in his possession prior to and at the time of the declaration or suspension are sufficient for him to declare martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
Section 18, Article VII itself sets the parameters for determining the sufficiency of the factual basis for the declaration of martial law and/or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, "namely (1) actual invasion or rebellion, and (2) public safety requires the exercise of such power."170 Without the concurrence of the two conditions, the President's declaration of martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus must be struck down.
MR. DE LOS REYES. As I see it now, the Committee envisions actual rebellion and no longer imminent rebellion. Does the Committee mean that there should be actual shooting or actual attack on the legislature or Malacañang, for example? Let us take for example a contemporary event - this Manila Hotel incident, everybody knows what happened. Would the Committee consider that an actual act of rebellion?
Art. 134. Rebellion or insurrection; How committed. - The crime of rebellion or insurrection is committed by rising publicly and taking arms against the Government for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to said Government or its laws, the territory of the Philippine Islands or any part thereof, of any body of land, naval or other armed forces, depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives.
To summarize, the parameters for determining the sufficiency of factual basis are as follows: l) actual rebellion or invasion; 2) public safety requires it; the first two requirements must concur; and 3) there is probable cause for the President to believe that there is actual rebellion or invasion.
Having laid down the parameters for review, the Court shall nowproceed to the core of the controversy - whether Proclamation No. 216,Declaring a State of Martial Law and Suspending the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus in the whole of Mindanao, lacks sufficient factual basis.
At this juncture, it bears to emphasize that the purpose of judicial review is not the determination of accuracy or veracity of the facts upon which the President anchored his declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; rather, only the sufficiency of the factual basis as to convince the President that there is probable cause that rebellion exists. It must also be reiterated that martial law is a matter ofurgency and much leeway and flexibility should be accorded the President. As such, he is not expected to completely validate all the information he received before declaring martial law or suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
Petitioners concede that there is an armed public uprising in Marawi City.179 However, they insist that the armed hostilities do not constitute rebellion in the absence of the element of culpable political purpose, i.e., the removal from the allegiance to the Philippine Government or its laws: (i) the territory of the Philippines or any part thereof; or (ii) any body of land, naval, or other armed forces; or (b) to deprive the Chief Executive or Congress, wholly or partially, of any of their powers and prerogatives.
of the writ of habeas corpus.
Thus, the President deduced from the facts available to him that there was an armed public uprising, the culpable purpose of which was to remove from the allegiance to the Philippine Government a portion of its territory and to deprive the Chief Executive of any of his powers and prerogatives, leading the President to believe that there was probable cause that the crime of rebellion was and is being committed and that public safety requires the imposition of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
A review of the aforesaid facts similarly leads the Court to conclude that the President, in issuing Proclamation No. 216, had sufficient factual bases tending to show that actual rebellion exists. The President's conclusion, that there was an armed public uprising, the culpable purpose of which was the removal from the allegiance of the Philippine Government a portion of its territory and the deprivation of the President from performing his powers and prerogatives, was reached after a tactical consideration of the facts. In fine, the President satisfactorily discharged his burden of proof.
x x x [T]he Constitution does not compel the President to produce such amount of proof as to unduly burden and effectively incapacitate her from exercising such powers.
Neither clear and convincing evidence, which is employed in either criminal or civil cases, is indispensable for a lawful declaration of martial law or suspension of the writ. This amount of proof likewise unduly restrains the President in exercising her emergency powers, as it requires proof greater than preponderance of evidence although not beyond reasonable doubt.
Not even preponderance of evidence, which is the degree of proof necessary in civil cases, is demanded for a lawful declaration of martial law.
Weighing the superiority of the evidence on hand, from at least two opposing sides, before she can act and impose martial law or suspend the writ unreasonably curtails the President's emergency powers.
Similarly, substantial evidence constitutes an unnecessary restriction on the President's use of her emergency powers. Substantial evidence is the amount of proof required in administrative or quasi-judicial cases, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.
I am of the view that probable cause of the existence of either invasion or rebellion suffices and satisfies the standard of proof for a valid declaration of martial law and suspension of the writ.
In determining probable cause, the average man weighs the facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of the rules of evidence of which he has no technical knowledge. He relies on common sense. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed and that it was committed by the accused. Probable cause demands more than suspicion; it requires less than evidence that would justify conviction.
The allegation in the Lagman Petition that the facts stated in Proclamation No. 216 and the Report are false, inaccurate, simulated, and/or hyperbolic, does not persuade. As mentioned, the Court is not concerned about absolute correctness, accuracy, or precision of the facts because to do so would unduly tie the hands of the President in responding to an urgent situation.
Statements made by PNP Director General Ronald dela Rosa and Marawi City Mayor Majul Gandamra in the online news reports of ABS-CBN News and CNN Philippines233 denying that the Maute group occupied the Marawi Police Station.
Statement made by the bank officials in the on-line news article of Philstar234 that the Marawi City branch was not ransacked but sustained damages from the attacks.
Statements in the on-line news article of Philstar235 made by the Marawi City Schools Division Assistant Superintendent Ana Alonto denying that the school was burned and Department of Education Assistant Secretary Tonisito Umali stating that they have not received any report of damage.
5. that the Maute Group attacked various government facilities (Proclamation No. 216 and the Report).
Statement in the on-line news article of Inquirer236 made by Marawi City Mayor Majul Gandamra stating that the ASG and the Maute Terror Groups have not taken over any government facility in Marawi City.
However, the so-called counter-evidence were derived solely from unverified news articles on the internet, with neither the authors nor the sources shown to have affirmed the contents thereof It was not even shown that efforts were made to secure such affirmation albeit the circumstances proved futile. As the Court has consistently ruled, news articles are hearsay evidence, twice removed, and are thus without any probative value, unless offered for a purpose other than proving the truth of the matter asserted.237 This pronouncement applies with equal force to the Cullamat Petition which likewise submitted online news articles238 as basis for their claim of insufficiency of factual basis.
Again, it bears to reiterate that the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus finds no application in these cases. As long as there are other facts in the proclamation and the written Report indubitably showing the presence of an actual invasion or rebellion and that public safety requires the declaration and/or suspension, the finding of sufficiency of factual basis, stands.
d) Ruling in Bedol v.
Petitioners, however, insist that in Bedol v. Commission on Elections,239 news reports may be admitted on grounds of relevance, trustworthiness, and necessity. Petitioners' reliance on this case is misplaced. The Court in Bedol made it clear that the doctrine of independent relevant statement, which is an ·exception to the hearsay rule, applies in cases "where only the fact that such statements were made is relevant, and the truth or falsity thereof is immaterial."240 Here, the question is not whether such statements were made by Saber, et. al., but rather whether what they said are true. Thus, contrary to the view of petitioners, the exception in Bedol finds no application here.
and that public safety requires it.
Moreover, the alleged false and/or inaccurate statements are just pieces and parcels of the Report; along with these alleged false data is an arsenal of other independent facts showing that more likely than not, actua1 rebellion exists, and public safety requires the declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. To be precise, the alleged false and/or inaccurate statements are only five out of the severa1 statements bulleted in the President's Report. Notably, in the interpellation by Justice Francis H. Jardeleza during the second day of the oral argument, petitioner Lagman admitted that he was not aware or that he had no personal knowledge of the other incidents cited.241 As it thus stands, there is no question or challenge with respect to the reliability of the other incidents, which by themselves are ample to preclude the conclusion that the President's report is unreliable and that Proclamation No. 216 was without sufficient factual basis.
Verily, there is no credence to petitioners' claim that the bases for the President's imposition of martial law and suspension of the writ of habeas corpus were mostly inaccurate, simulated, false and/or hyperbolic.
Based on the foregoing, we hold that the parameters for the declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ f habeas corpus have been properly and fully complied with. Proclamation No. 216 has sufficient factual basis there being probable cause to believe that rebellion exists and that public safety requires the martial law declaration and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
Considering the nation's and its people's traumatic experience martial law under the Marcos regime, one would expect the framers of the 1987 Constitution to stop at nothing from not resuscitating the law. Yet it would appear that the constitutional writers entertained no doubt about the necessity and practicality of such specie of extraordinary power and thus, once again, bestowed on the Commander-in-Chief the power to declare martial law albeit in its diluted form.
Aside from protecting the security of the country, martial law also guarantees and promotes public safety. It is worthy of mention that rebellion alone does not justify the declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; the public safety requirement must likewise be present.
In Parts IX and X, the Court laid down the arsenal of facts and events that formed the basis for Proclamation No. 216. For the President, the totality of facts and events, more likely than not, shows that actual rebellion exists and that public safety requires the declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Otherwise stated, the President believes that there is probable cause that actual rebellion exists and public safety warrants the issuance of Proclamation No. 216. In turn, the Court notes that the President, in arriving at such a conclusion, relied on the facts and events included in the Report, which we find sufficient.
In fine, not only does the President have a wide array of information before him, he also has the right, prerogative, and the means to access vital, relevant, and confidential data, concomitant with his position as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces.
In contrast, the Court does not have the same resources available to the President. However, this should not be considered as a constitutiona1 lapse. On the contrary, this is in line with the function of the Court, particularly in this instance, to determine the sufficiency of factual basis of Proclamation No. 216. As thoroughly discussed in Part VIII, the determination by the Court of the sufficiency of factual basis must be limited only to the facts and information mentioned in the Report and Proclamation. In fact, the Court, in David v. President Macapagal-Arroyo,258 cautioned not to "undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings." In this regard, "the Court will have to rely on the fact-finding capabilities of the [E]xecutive [D]epartment;"259 in turn, the Executive Department will have to open its findings to the Court,260 which it did during the closed door session last June 15, 2017.
Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution states that "[i]n case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, [the President] may x x x suspend the privilege of writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law." Clearly, the Constitution grants to the President the discretion to determine the territorial coverage of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. He may put the entire Philippines or only a part thereof under martial law.
This is both an acknowledgement and a recognition that it is the Executive Department, particularly the President as Commander-in-Chief, who is the repository of vital, classified, and live information necessary for and relevant in calibrating the territorial application of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. It, too, is a concession that the President has the tactical and military support, and thus has a more informed understanding of what is happening on the ground. Thus, the Constitution imposed a limitation on the period of application, which is 60 days, unless sooner nullified, revoked or extended, but not on the territorial scope or area of coverage; it merely stated "the Philippines or any part thereof," depending on the assessment of the President.
be discouraged but also avoided.
Considering the country's history, it is understandable that the resurgence of martial law would engender apprehensions among the citizenry. Even the Court as an institution cannot project a stance of nonchalance. However, the importance of martial law in the context of our society should outweigh one's prejudices and apprehensions against it. The significance of martial law should not be undermined by unjustified fears and past experience. After all, martial law is critical and crucial to the promotion of public safety, the preservation of the nation's sovereignty and ultimately, the survival of our country. It is vital for the protection of the country not only against internal enemies but also against those enemies lurking from beyond our shores. As such, martial law should not be cast aside, or its scope and potency limited and diluted, based on bias and unsubstantiated assumptions.
Conscious of these fears and apprehensions, the Constitution placed several safeguards which effectively watered down the power to declare martial law. The 1987 Constitution "[clipped] the powers of [the] Commander-in-Chief because of [the] experience with the previous regime."261 Not only were the grounds limited to actual invasion or rebellion, but its duration was likewise fixed at 60 days, unless sooner revoked, nullified, or extended; at the same time, it is subject to the veto powers of the Court and Congress.
MR. DE LOS REYES. May I explain my vote, Madam President.
It has been said that the "gravamen of the crime of rebellion is an armed public uprising against the government;"266 and that by nature, "rebellion is x x x a crime of masses or multitudes, involving crowd action, that cannot be confined a priori, within predetermined bounds."267 We understand this to mean that the precise extent or range of the rebellion could not be measured by exact metes and bounds.
To illustrate: A contingent armed with high-powered firearms publicly assembled in Padre Faura, Ermita, Manila where the Court's compound is situated. They overpowered the guards, entered the Court's premises, and hoisted the ISIS flag. Their motive was political, i.e., they want to remove from the allegiance to the Philippine government a part of the territory of the Philippines, particularly the Court's compound and establish it as an ISIS-territory.
Based on the foregoing illustration, and vis-a-vis the nature of the crime of rebellion, could we validly say that the rebellion is confined only within the Court's compound? Definitely not. The possibility that there are other rebels positioned in the nearby buildings or compound of the Philippine General Hospital (PGH) or the Manila Science High Schoo1 (MSHS) could not be discounted. There is no way of knowing that all participants in the rebellion went and stayed inside the Court's compound.
Neither could it be validly argued that the armed contingent positioned in PGH or MSHS is not engaged in rebellion because there is no publicity in their acts as, in fact, they were merely lurking inside the compound of PGH and MSHS. However, it must be pointed out that for the crime of rebellion to be consummated, it is not required that all armed participants should congregate in one place, in this case, the Court's compound, and publicly rise in arms against the government for the attainment of their culpable purpose. It suffices that a portion of the contingent gathered and formed a mass or a crowd and engaged in an armed public uprising against the government. Similarly, it cannot be validly concluded that the grounds on which the armed public uprising actually to6k place should be the measure of the extent, scope or range, of the actual I rebellion. This is logical since the other rebels positioned in PGH, MSHS, I or elsewhere, whose participation did not involve the publicity aspect of rebellion, may also be considered as engaging in the crime of rebellion.
Proceeding from the same illustration, suppose we say that the President, after finding probable cause that there exists actual rebellion and that public safety requires it, declares martial law and suspends the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Metro Manila, could we then say that the territorial coverage of the proclamation is too expansive?
To answer this question, we revert back to the premise that the discretion to determine the territorial scope of martial law lies with the President. The Constitution grants him the prerogative whether to put the entire Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. There is no constitutional edict that martial law should be confined only in the particular place where the armed public uprising actually transpired. This is not only practical but also logical. Martial law is an urgent measure since at stake is the nation's territorial sovereignty and survival. As such, the President has to respond quickly. After the rebellion in the Court's compound, he need not wait for another rebellion to be mounted in Quezon City before he could impose martial law thereat. If that is the case, then the President would have to wait until every remote corner in the country is infested with rebels before he could declare martial law in the entire Philippines. For sure, this is not the scenario envisioned by the Constitution.
Going back to the illustration above, although the President is not required to impose martial law only within the Court's compound because it is where the armed public uprising actually transpired, he may do so if he sees fit. At the same time, however, he is not precluded from expanding the coverage of martial law beyond the Court's compound. After all, rebellion is not confined within predetermined bounds.
Public safety, which is another component element for the declaration of martial law, "involves the prevention of and protection from events that could endanger the safety of the general public from significant danger, injury/harm, or damage, such as crimes or disasters."268 Public safety is an abstract term; it does not take any physical form. Plainly, its range, extent or scope could not be physically measured by metes and bounds.
Thus, by the theory of absorption, the crime of murder committed in Makati City, if committed in furtherance of the crime of rebellion being hypothetically staged in Padre Faura, Ermita, Manila, is stripped of its common complexion and is absorbed in the crime of rebellion. This all the more makes it difficult to confine the application of martial law only to the place where the armed public uprising is actually taking place. In the illustration above, Padre Faura could only be the nerve center of the rebellion but at the same time rebellion is also happening in Makati City.
In fine, it is difficult, if not impossible, to fix the territorial scope of martial law in direct proportion to the "range" of actual rebellion and public safety simply because rebellion and public safety have no fixed physical dimensions. Their transitory and abstract nature defies precise measurements; hence, the determination of the territorial scope of martial law could only be drawn from arbitrary, not fixed, variables. The Constitution must have considered these limitations when it granted the President wide leeway and flexibility in determining the territorial scope of martial law.
Moreover, the President's duty to maintain peace and public safety is not limited only to the place where there is actual rebellion; it extends to other areas where the present hostilities are in danger of spilling over. It is not intended merely to prevent the escape of lawless elements from Marawi City, but also to avoid enemy reinforcements and to cut their supply lines coming from different parts of Mindanao. Thus, limiting the proclamation and/or suspension to the place where there is actual rebellion would not only defeat the purpose of declaring martial law, it will make the exercise thereof ineffective and useless.
the confines of its power.
To reiterate, the Court is not equipped with the competence and logistical machinery to determine the strategical value of other places in the military's efforts to quell the rebellion and restore peace. It would be engaging in an act of adventurism if it dares to embark on a mission of deciphering the territorial metes and bounds of martial law. To be blunt about it, hours after the proclamation of martial law none of the members of this Court could have divined that more than ten thousand souls would be forced to evacuate to Iligan and Cagayan de Oro and that the military would have to secure those places also; none of us could have predicted that Cayamora Maute would be arrested in Davao City or that his wife Ominta Romato Maute would be apprehended in Masiu, Lanao del Sur; and, none of us had an inkling that the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) would launch an attack in Cotabato City. The Court has no military background and technical expertise to predict that. In the same manner, the Court lacks the technical capability to determine which part of Mindanao would best serve as forward operating base of the military in their present endeavor in Mindanao. Until now the Court is in a quandary and can only speculate whether the 60-day lifespan of Proclamation No. 216 could outlive the present hostilities in Mindanao. It is on this score that the Court should give the President sufficient leeway to address the peace and order problem in Mindanao.
Madam President, there is a tendency to equate patriotism with rendering the executive branch of the government impotent, as though by reducing drastically the powers of the executive, we are rendering a service to human welfare. I think it is also important to understand that the extraordinary measures contemplated in the Article on the Executive pertain to a practical state of war existing in this country when national security will become a common bond of patriotism of all Filipinos, especially if it is an actual invasion or an actual rebellion, and the President may have to be given a minimum flexibility to cope with such unprecedented threats to the survival of a nation. I think the Commission has done so but at the same time has not, in any manner, shunned the task of putting these powers under a whole system of checks and balances, including the possible revocation at any time of a proclamation of martial law by the Congress, and in any case a definite determination of these extraordinary powers, subject only to another extension to be determined by Congress in the event that it is necessary to do so because the emergency persists.
With a predominantly Muslim population, Marawi City is "the only Islamic City of the South."285 On April 15, 1980, it was conferred the official title of "Islamic City of Marawi."286 The city's first name, "Dansalan," "was derived from the word 'dansal', meaning a destination point or rendezvous. Literally, it also means arrival or coming."287 Marawi lies in the heart of Mindanao. In fact, the Kilometer Zero marker in Mindanao is found in Marawi City thereby making Marawi City the point of reference of all roads in Mindanao.
Thus, there is reasonable basis to believe that Marawi is only the staging point of the rebellion, both for symbolic and strategic reasons. Marawi may not be the target but the whole of Mindanao. As mentioned in the Report, "[l]awless armed groups have historically used provinces adjoining Marawi City as escape routes, supply lines, and backdoor passages;"288 there is also the plan to establish a wilayat in Mindanao by staging the siege of Marawi. The report that prior to May 23, 2017, Abdullah Maute had already dispatched some of his men to various places in Mindanao, such as Marawi, Iligan, and Cagayan de Oro for bombing operations, carnapping, and the murder of military and police personnel,289 must also be considered. Indeed, there is some semblance of truth to the contention that Marawi is only the start, and Mindanao the end.
There were also intelligence reports from the military about offensives committed by the ASG and other local rebel groups. All these suggest that the rebellion in Marawi has already spilled over to other parts of Mindanao.
Moreover, considering the widespread atrocities in Mindanao and the linkages established among rebel groups, the armed uprising that was initially staged in Marawi cannot be justified as confined only to Marawi. The Court therefore will not simply disregard the events that happened during the Davao City bombing, the Mamasapano massacre, the Zamboanga City siege, and the countless bombings in Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Sulu, and Basilan, among others.298 The Court cannot simply take the battle of Marawi in isolation. As a crime without predetermined bounds, the President has reasonable basis to believe that the declaration of martial law, as well as the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao, is most necessary, effective, and called for by the circumstances.
It is also of judicial notice that the insurgency in Mindanao has been ongoing for decades. While some groups have sought legal and peaceful means, others have resorted to violent extremism and terrorism. Rebellion may be subsumed under the crime of terrorism, which has a broader scope covering a wide range of predicate crimes. In fact, rebellion is only one of the various means by which terrorism can be committed.299 However, while the scope of terrorism may be comprehensive, its purpose is distinct and well-defined. The objective of a "'terrorist" is to sow and create a condition of widespread fear among the populace in order to coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand. This condition of widespread fear is traditionally achieved through bombing, kidnapping, mass killing, and beheading, among others. In contrast, the purpose of rebellion, as previously discussed, is political, i.e., (a) to remove from the allegiance to the Philippine Government or its laws: (i) the territory of the Philippines or any part thereof; (ii) any body of land, naval, or armed forces; or (b) to deprive the Chief Executive or Congress, wholly or partially, of any of their powers and prerogatives.
In determining what crime was committed, we have to look into the main objective of the malefactors. If it is political, such as for the purpose of severing the allegiance of Mindanao to the Philippine Government to establish a wilayat therein, the crime is rebellion. If, on the other hand, the primary objective is to sow and create a condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace in order to coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand, the crime is terrorism. Here, we have already explained and ruled that the President did not err in believing that what is going on in Marawi City is one contemplated under the crime of rebellion.
In any case, even assuming that the insurgency in Marawi City can also be characterized as terrorism, the same will not in any manner affect Proclamation No. 216. Section 2 of Republic Act (RA) No. 9372, otherwise known as the Human Security Act of 2007 expressly provides that "[n]othing in this Act shall be interpreted as a curtailment, restriction or diminution of constitutionally recognized powers of the executive branch of the government." Thus, as long as the President complies with all the requirements of Section 18, Article VII, the existence of terrorism cannot prevent him from exercising his extraordinary power of proclaiming martial ' law or suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. After all, the extraordinary powers of the President are bestowed on him by the Constitution. No act of Congress can, therefore, curtail or diminish such powers.
Verily, the Court upholds the validity of the declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao region.
At the end of the day, however ardently and passionately we may believe in the validity or correctness of the varied and contentious causes or principles that we espouse, advocate or champion, let us not forget that at this point in time we, the Filipino people, are confronted with a crisis of such magnitude and proportion that we all need to summon the spirit of unity and act as one undivided nation, if we are to overcome and prevail in the struggle at hand.
Let us face up to the fact that the siege in Marawi City has entered the second month and only God or Allah knows when it would end. Let us take notice of the fact that the casualties of the war are mounting. To date, 418 have died. Out of that were 303 Maute rebels as against 71 government troops and 44 civilians.
Can we not sheathe our swords and pause for a while to bury our dead, including our differences and prejudices?
WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS sufficient factual bases for the issuance of Proclamation No. 216 and DECLARES it as CONSTITUTIONAL. Accordingly, the consolidated Petitions are hereby DISMISSED.
I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
1 Rollo of G.R. No. 231658, p. 37.
32 Rollo of G.R. No. 231771, pp. 80-83; rollo of G.R. No. 231774, pp. 47-50.
33 Rollo of G.R. No. 231771, pp. 4, 7.
35 Id. at 23. Italics supplied.
36 Id. at 23-24. Italics supplied.
43 Rollo of G.R. No. 231774, p. 3.
58 Rollo of G.R. No. 231658, pp. 85-135.
78 See Notice dated June 13, 2017, id. at 211-216.
79 Bernas, Joaquin G., The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, 1996 ed., p. 850.
80 Id., citing People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56, 89 (1937); Police General Macasiano (Ret.) v. National Housing Authority, 296 Phil. 56, 64 (1993).
81 Bernas, Joaquin G., Constitutional Rights and Social Demands, 2010 ed., p. 795.
82 Rollo of G.R. No. 231771, p. 7.
83 Rollo of G.R. No. 231774, p. 6.
84 Rollo of G.R. No. 231658, pp. 4-5.
85 Bernas, Joaquin G., The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, 1996 ed., p. 852.
87 TSN of Oral Argument, June 13, 2017, p. 83.
89 De Jesus v. Garcia, 125 Phil. 955, 959 (1967).
90 Agpalo, Ruben, E., Statutory Construction, 2003 ed., p. 167, citing Pimentel v. Commission on Elections, 189 Phil. 581, 587 (1980) and Dimagiba v. Geraldez, 102 Phil. 1016, 1019 (1958).
91 De Jesus v. Garcia, supra at 960.
92 149 Phil. 547 (1971).
93 Agpalo, Ruben, E., Statutory Construction, 2003 edition, p. 109.
94 Bernas, Joaquin, G ., The Intent of the 1986 Constitution Writers, I 995 ed., p. 456.
95 91 Phil. 882, 887 (1952).
96 In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Lansang, supra note 92 at 585-586.
97 206 Phil. 392 (1983).
99 See also Cruz, Isagani, A., Philippine Political Law, 2002 edition, pp. 225-226.
100 II RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 476-477 (July 30, 1986).
102 "The Supreme Court, sitting en bane, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose."
104 Ballentine, J., Law Dictionary with Pronunciations, 1948 ed., p. 1023; Bouvier, J., Law Dictionary and Concise Encyclopedia, 8th ed., Vol. II, p. 2730.
105 TSN of Oral Argument, June 14, 2017, pp. 99-100.
106 David v. President Macapagal-Arroyo, 522 Phil. 705, 767 (2006), citing Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, 392 Phil. 618, 643 (2000).
107 II RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 503-504 (July 31, 1986).
108 Fortun v. President Macapagal-Arroyo, 684 Phil. 526 (2012).
111 Any reference in the Majority Opinion and in the Dissent of Justice Antonio T. Carpio in Fortun v. President Macapagal-Arroyo to acting ''in tandem", "not only sequentially, but in a sense jointly'', and "sequential or joint" pertains to the interplay of powers/actions between the President and the Congress; not of the Judiciary. See Fortun v. President Macapagal-Arroyo, id. at 557, 560, 604.
112 CONSTITUTION, Article VII, Section 18.
113 Bernas, Joaquin G., The Intent of the 1986 Constitution Writers, 1995 ed., p. 456.
114 David v. President Macapagal-Arroyo, supra note 106 at 780.
115 Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, 392 Phil. 618, 642 (2000).
117 Bernas, Joaquin, G., Constitutional Structure and Powers of Government, Notes and Cases Part I, 2010 ed., p. 472.
118 Bernas, Joaquin, G., Constitutional Structure and Powers of Government, Notes and Cases Part I, 2010 ed., p. 474.
119 Bernas, Joaquin, G., The Intent of the I 986 Constitution Writers, I 995 ed., p. 456.
122 David v. President Macapagal-Arroyo, supra note 106 at 781.
123 Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, supra note 115 at 643.
125 II RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 402 (July 29, 1986).
126 Bernas, Joaquin, G. Constitutional Structure and Powers of Government, Notes and Cases Part I, 20 10 ed., p. 473.
129 See Dissenting Opinion of J. Carpio, Fortun v. President Macapagal-Arroyo, supra note 108 at 599.
130 David v. President Macapagal-Arroyo, supra note 106 at 781.
131 SANLAKAS v. Executive Secretary Reyes, 466 Phil. 482, 510-511 (2004).
133 Bernas, Joaquin, G., The Intent of the 1986 Constitution Writers, 1995 ed., p. 464.
134 II RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 469 (July 30, 1986).
135 II RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 470 (July 30, 1986).
136 II RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 471(July30, 1986).
137 II RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 476-477 (July 30, 1986).
138 11 RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 476-477 (July 30, 1986).
140 Ermita-Ma/ate Hotel & Motel Operators Association, Inc. v. Hon. City Mayor of Manila, 127 Phil. 306, 325 (1967).
141 People v. Nazario, 247-A Phil. 276, 286 (1988).
142 Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, 421 Phil. 290, 354 (2001).
143 Disini, Jr. v. The Secretary of Justice, 727 Phil. 28, 122 (2014).
144 Spouses Romualdez v. Commission on Elections, 576 Phil. 357, 390-391 (2008).
145 Separate Opinion of Justice Mendoza in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 142 at 430-432.
147 Romualdez v. Hon. Sandiganbayan, 479 Phil. 265, 283 (2004).
148 Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council, 646 Phil. 452, 490 (2010).
152 690 Phil. 72, (2012).
153 Id. at 91-92. Emphasis supplied.
157 CONSTITUTION, Article VII, Section 18, par. 3.
158 Bernas, Joaquin G., The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary; 1996 ed., p. 865.
159 Id. at 864-865, citing Fernandez v. Cuerva, 129 Phil. 332, 340 (1967).
161 Both the 1935 and 1973 Constitution do not have the equivalent provision of Section 18, par. 3, Article VII, 1987 Constitution.
162 In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Lansang, supra note 92 at 586. See Bernas, Joaquin G., The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, 1996 ed., p.473.
163 Bernas, Joaquin G., The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, 1996 ed., p. 475.
165 According to petitioner Lagman, "the length of the proclamation and the assertion of facts therein is the call of the President; see TSN of Oral Argument, June 14, 2017, p. 67.
166 See Dissenting Opinion of Justice Antonio T. Carpio in Fortun v. President Macapagal-Arroyo, supra note 108 at 607.
167 II RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 470-471(July30, 1986).
MR. NATIVIDAD. And the Commissioner said that in case of subversion, sedition or imminent danger of rebellion or invasion, that would be the causus beli for the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. But I wonder whether or not the Commissioner would consider intelligence reports of military officers as evidence of imminent danger of rebellion or invasion because this is usually the evidence presented.
MR. PADILLA. Yes, as credible evidence, especially if they are based on actual reports and investigation of facts that might soon happen.
MR. NATIVIDAD. Then the difficulty here is, of course, that the authors and the witnesses in intelligence reports may not be forthcoming under the rule of classified evidence of documents. Does the Commissioner still accept that as evidence?
MR. PADILLA. It is for the President as commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces to appraise these reports and be satisfied that the public safety demands the suspension of the writ. After all, this can also be raised before the Supreme Court as in the declaration of martial law because it will no longer be, as the former Solicitor General always contended, a political issue. It becomes now a justiciable issue. The Supreme Court may even investigate the factual background in support of the suspension of the writ or the declaration of martial law.
MR. PADILLA. Yes, because the President, in making this decision of suspending the writ, will have to base his judgment on the document because, after all, we are restricting the period to only 60 days and further we are giving the Congress or the Senate the right or the power to revoke, reduce, or extend its period.
168 See Dissenting Opinion of Justice Presbitero J. Velasco in Fortun v. President Macapagal-Arroyo, supra note 108 at 629.
169 II RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 470-471(July30, 1986).
170 See Dissenting Opinion of Justice Antonio T. Carpio in Fortun v. President Macapagal-Arroyo, supra note 108 at 610.
171 Agpalo, Ruben, E., Statutory Construction, Fifth Edition, 2003, pp. 187-189.
172 See Dissenting Opinion of Justice Antonio T. Carpio in Fortun v. President Macapagal-Arroyo, supra note 108 at 592.
173 II RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 412 (July 29, 1986).
174 See Dissenting Opinion of Justice Antonio T. Carpio in Fortun v. President Macapagal-Arroyo, supra note 108 at 595.
178 Caraig, Benjamin R., The Revised Penal Code, Criminal Law, Book Two, 2008 revised ed., p. 59.
179 Rollo of G.R. No. 231658, p. 267.
181 See Proclamation No. 216, 1st Whereas Clause.
182 See Proclamation No. 216, 4th Whereas Clause.
183 See Proclamation No. 216, 5th Whereas Clause.
184 Rollo of G.R. No. 231658, pp. 187-193.
221 See Proclamation No. 216, 5th Whereas Clause.
222 See Report, p. l, 1st par., rollo of G.R. No. 231658, p. 187.
223 Id. at 3, last par., id. at 189.
224 Id. at 6, 1st par., id. at 192.
225 Id., 2nd par., id.
226 Id., 3rd par., Id.
227 Id., 4th par., Id.
228 Id., 5th par., Id.
229 Id. at 7, penultimate par., id. at 193.
230 Fortun v. President Macapagal-Arroyo, supra note 112 at 595-598.
231 Rollo of G.R. No. 231658, pp. 275-276.
233 Id. at 331-332, 343-344.
237 Feria v. Court of Appeals, 382 Phil. 412, 423 (2000).
238 See rollo of G.R. No. 231771, p. 29.
239 621 Phil. 498 (2009).
241 TSN of the Oral Arguments, June 14, 2017, pp. 10-23.
242 See Report, p. 3, 2" par. Rollo of G.R. No. 231658, p. 189.
243 Id. at 4; id. at 190.
245 Id. at 5; id. at 191.
249 Id. at 6; id. at 192.
252 Id. at 7; id. at 193.
253 I RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 710 (July 17, 1986).
254 I RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 774 (July 18, 1986).
255 TSN of Oral Argument, June 14, 2014, p. 67.
256 II RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 470 (July 30, 1986).
257 II RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 470 (July 30, 1986).
258 David v. President Macapagal-Arroyo, supra note 106 at 767.
259 Bernas, Joaquin G., The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, 1996 ed., p. 486.
261 II RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 394 (July 29, 1986).
262 II RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 482 (July 30, 1986).
263 II RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 483 (July 30, 1986).
264 II RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 485 (July 30, 1986).
265 II RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 509 (July 31, 1986).
266 People v. Lovedioro, 320 Phil. 481, 488 (1995).
267 People v. Geronimo, 100 Phil. 90, 96 (1956); People v. lovedioro, 320 Phil. 481, 488 (1995).
268 Definitions of PUBLIC SAFETY<www.definition.net/definition/PUBLIC SAFETY> (visited July 3, 2017).
269 People v. Dasig, 293 Phil. 599, 608 (1993). Italics supplied.
270 People v. Lovedioro, supra note 266 at 488.
271 People v. Dasig, supra 269 at 608-609.
272 People v. Mangallan, 243 Phil. 286 (1988) cited in People v. Dasig, supra at 609.
273 People v. Lovedioro, supra at 488.
274 Ponce Enrile v. Judge Amin, 267 Phil. 603, 612 (1990).
277 People v. Dasig, supra at 609.
278 Ponce Enrile v. Judge Amin, supra at 603.
279 People v. lovedioro, supra at 490.
280 Ponce Enrile v. Judge Amin, supra at 61l.
281 People v. Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515, 550 (1956).
282 II RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 509 (July 31, 1986).
283 II RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 510 (July 31, 1986). Emphasis supplied.
284 II RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 735 (August 6, 1986). Emphasis supplied.
285 History of Lanao del Sur <https://lanaodelsur.gov.ph/about/history> (visited July 3, 2017).
286 Islamic City of Marawi: Historical Background <https://sites.google.com/site/icomgovph/govemment/historical-background> (visited July 3, 2017).
287 Islamic City of Marawi: Historical Background <https://sites.google.com/site/icomgovph/govemment/historical-background> (visited July 3, 2017).
288 Rollo of G.R. No. 231658, pp. 40-41.
298 President Duterte's Report to Congress, May 25, 2017, p. 3; id. at 37.
(6) Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended (Decree Codifying the Laws on Illegal and Unlawful Possession, Manufacture, Dealing In, Acquisition or Disposition of Firearms, Ammunitions or Explosives).
300 In Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council, supra note 148 at 493, the Court held that the elements of terrorism are as follows: (1) the offender commits an act punishable under any of the cited provisions of the Revised Penal Code, or under any of the enumerated special penal laws; (2) the commission of the predicate crime sows and creates a condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace; and (3) the offender is actuated by the desire to coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand.

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