Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=82721:56544&catid=1580&Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 10:02:57+00:00

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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. REMMAN ENTERPRISES, INC., REPRESENTED BY RONNIE P. INOCENCIO, Respondent.
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to annul and set aside the Decision2 dated November 10, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA–G.R. CV No. 90503. The CA affirmed the Decision3 dated May 16, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 69, in Land Registration Case No. N–11465.
On December 3, 2001, Remman Enterprises, Inc. (respondent), filed an application4 with the RTC for judicial confirmation of title over two parcels of land situated in Barangay Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila, identified as Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077, Mcadm–590–D, Taguig Cadastre, with an area of 29,945 square meters and 20,357 sq m, respectively.
On June 4, 2002, the LLDA filed its Opposition11 to the respondent’s application for registration, asserting that Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 are not part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. On the other hand, the Republic of the Philippines (petitioner), on July 16, 2002, likewise filed its Opposition,12 alleging that the respondent failed to prove that it and its predecessors–in–interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the subject parcels of land since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Trial on the merits of the respondent’s application ensued thereafter.
The respondent presented four witnesses: Teresita Villaroya, the respondent’s corporate secretary; Ronnie Inocencio, an employee of the respondent and the one authorized by it to file the application for registration with the RTC; Cenon Cerquena (Cerquena), the caretaker of the subject properties since 1957; and Engineer Mariano Flotildes (Engr. Flotildes), a geodetic engineer hired by the respondent to conduct a topographic survey of the subject properties.
For its part, the LLDA presented the testimonies of Engineers Ramon Magalonga (Engr. Magalonga) and Christopher A. Pedrezuela (Engr. Pedrezuela), who are both geodetic engineers employed by the LLDA.
Essentially, the testimonies of the respondent’s witnesses showed that the respondent and its predecessors–in–interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the said parcels of land long before June 12, 1945. The respondent purchased Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 from Conrado Salvador (Salvador) and Bella Mijares (Mijares), respectively, in 1989. The subject properties were originally owned and possessed by Veronica Jaime (Jaime), who cultivated and planted different kinds of crops in the said lots, through her caretaker and hired farmers, since 1943. Sometime in 1975, Jaime sold the said parcels of land to Salvador and Mijares, who continued to cultivate the lots until the same were purchased by the respondent in 1989.
The respondent likewise alleged that the subject properties are within the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, as evidenced by the certifications issued by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
On the other hand, the LLDA alleged that the respondent’s application for registration should be denied since the subject parcels of land are not part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain; it pointed out that pursuant to Section 41(11) of Republic Act No. 485019 (R.A. No. 4850), lands, surrounding the Laguna de Bay, located at and below the reglementary elevation of 12.50 meters are public lands which form part of the bed of the said lake. Engr. Magalonga, testifying for the oppositor LLDA, claimed that, upon preliminary evaluation of the subject properties, based on the topographic map of Taguig, which was prepared using an aerial survey conducted by the then Department of National Defense–Bureau of Coast in April 1966, he found out that the elevations of Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 are below 12.50 m. That upon actual area verification of the subject properties on September 25, 2002, Engr. Magalonga confirmed that the elevations of the subject properties range from 11.33 m to 11.77 m.
On rebuttal, the respondent presented Engr. Flotildes, who claimed that, based on the actual topographic survey of the subject properties he conducted upon the request of the respondent, the elevations of the subject properties, contrary to LLDA’s claim, are above 12.50 m. Particularly, Engr. Flotildes claimed that Lot No. 3068 has an elevation ranging from 12.60 m to 15 m while the elevation of Lot No. 3077 ranges from 12.60 m to 14.80 m.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is rendered confirming the title of the applicant Remman Enterprises Incorporated over a parcels of land [sic] consisting of 29,945 square meters (Lot 3068) and 20,357 (Lot 3077) both situated in Brgy. Napindan, Taguig, Taguig, Metro Manila more particularly described in the Technical Descriptions Ap–04–003103 and Swo–00–001769 respectively and ordering their registration under the Property Registration Decree in the name of Remman Enterprises Incorporated.
The RTC found that the respondent was able to prove that the subject properties form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. The RTC opined that the elevations of the subject properties are very much higher than the reglementary elevation of 12.50 m and, thus, not part of the bed of Laguna Lake. The RTC pointed out that LLDA’s claim that the elevation of the subject properties is below 12.50 m is hearsay since the same was merely based on the topographic map that was prepared using an aerial survey on March 2, 1966; that nobody was presented to prove that an aerial survey was indeed conducted on March 2, 1966 for purposes of gathering data for the preparation of the topographic map.
Further, in finding that the elevation of the subject lots are below 12.5 meters, oppositor’s witness merely compared their elevation to the elevation of the particular portion of the lake dike which he used as his [benchmark] or reference point in determining the elevation of the subject lots. Also, the elevation of the said portion of the lake dike that was then under the construction by FF Cruz was allegedly 12.79 meters and after finding that the elevation of the subject lots are lower than the said [benchmark] or reference point, said witness suddenly jumped to a conclusion that the elevation was below 12.5 meters. x x x.
Even supposing that the elevations of the subject properties are indeed below 12.50 m, the RTC opined that the same could not be considered part of the bed of Laguna Lake. The RTC held that, under Section 41(11) of R.A. No. 4850, Laguna Lake extends only to those areas that can be covered by the lake water when it is at the average annual maximum lake level of 12.50 m. Hence, the RTC averred, only those parcels of land that are adjacent to and near the shoreline of Laguna Lake form part of its bed and not those that are already far from it, which could not be reached by the lake water. The RTC pointed out that the subject properties are more than a kilometer away from the shoreline of Laguna Lake; that they are dry and waterless even when the waters of Laguna Lake is at its maximum level. The RTC likewise found that the respondent was able to prove that it and its predecessors–in–interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the subject properties as early as 1943.
The petitioner appealed the RTC Decision dated May 16, 2007 to the CA.
The evidence submitted by the appellee is sufficient to warrant registration of the subject lands in its name. Appellee’s witness Engr. Mariano Flotildes, who conducted an actual area verification of the subject lots, ably proved that the elevation of the lowest portion of Lot No. 3068 is 12.6 meters and the elevation of its highest portion is 15 meters. As to the other lot, it was found [out] that the elevation of the lowest portion of Lot No. 3077 is also 12.6 meters and the elevation of its highest portion is 15 meters. Said elevations are higher than the reglementary elevation of 12.5 meters as provided for under paragraph 11, Section 41 of R.A. No. 4850, as amended.
The CA likewise pointed out that the respondent was able to present certifications issued by the DENR, attesting that the subject properties form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, which was not disputed by the petitioner. The CA further ruled that the respondent was able to prove, through the testimonies of its witnesses, that it and its predecessors–in–interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the subject properties prior to June 12, 1945.
The sole issue to be resolved by the Court is whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC Decision dated May 16, 2007, which granted the application for registration filed by the respondent.
The petitioner maintains that the lower courts erred in granting the respondent’s application for registration since the subject properties do not form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. The petitioner insists that the elevations of the subject properties are below the reglementary level of 12.50 m and, pursuant to Section 41(11) of R.A. No. 4850, are considered part of the bed of Laguna Lake.
That the subject properties are not part of the bed of Laguna Lake, however, does not necessarily mean that they already form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. It is still incumbent upon the respondent to prove, with well–nigh incontrovertible evidence, that the subject properties are indeed part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. While deference is due to the lower courts’ finding that the elevations of the subject properties are above the reglementary level of 12.50 m and, hence, no longer part of the bed of Laguna Lake pursuant to Section 41(11) of R.A. No. 4850, the Court nevertheless finds that the respondent failed to substantiate its entitlement to registration of title to the subject properties.
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors–in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Respecting the third requirement, the applicant bears the burden of proving the status of the land. In this connection, the Court has held that he must present a certificate of land classification status issued by the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) or the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) of the DENR. He must also prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land as alienable and disposable, and that it is within the approved area per verification through survey by the CENRO or PENRO. Further, the applicant must present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be established by the applicant to prove that the land is alienable and disposable.
The DENR certifications that were presented by the respondent in support of its application for registration are thus not sufficient to prove that the subject properties are indeed classified by the DENR Secretary as alienable and disposable. It is still imperative for the respondent to present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary, which must be certified by the legal custodian thereof as a true copy. Accordingly, the lower courts erred in granting the application for registration in spite of the failure of the respondent to prove by well–nigh incontrovertible evidence that the subject properties are alienable and disposable.
Nevertheless, the respondent claims that the Court’s ruling in T.A.N. Properties, which was promulgated on June 26, 2008, must be applied prospectively, asserting that decisions of this Court form part of the law of the land and, pursuant to Article 4 of the Civil Code, laws shall have no retroactive effect. The respondent points out that its application for registration of title to the subject properties was filed and was granted by the RTC prior to the Court’s promulgation of its ruling in T.A.N. Properties. Accordingly, that it failed to present a copy of the original classification covering the subject properties approved by the DENR Secretary and certified by the legal custodian thereof as a true copy, the respondent claims, would not warrant the denial of its application for registration.
Verily, the ruling in T.A.N. Properties was applied by the Court in subsequent cases notwithstanding that the applications for registration were filed and granted by the lower courts prior to the promulgation of T.A.N. Properties.
In Republic v. Medida,37 the application for registration of the subject properties therein was filed on October 22, 2004 and was granted by the trial court on June 21, 2006. Similarly, in Republic v. Jaralve,38 the application for registration of the subject property therein was filed on October 22, 1996 and was granted by the trial court on November 15, 2002. In the foregoing cases, notwithstanding that the applications for registration were filed and granted by the trial courts prior to the promulgation of T.A.N. Properties, this Court applied the pronouncements in T.A.N. Properties and denied the applications for registration on the ground, inter alia, that the applicants therein failed to present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified by the legal custodian thereof as a true copy.
Anent the second and third requirements, the Court finds that the respondent failed to present sufficient evidence to prove that it and its predecessors–in–interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject properties since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
To prove that it and its predecessors–in–interest have been in possession and occupation of the subject properties since 1943, the respondent presented the testimony of Cerquena. Cerquena testified that the subject properties were originally owned by Jaime who supposedly possessed and cultivated the same since 1943; that sometime in 1975, Jaime sold the subject properties to Salvador and Mijares who, in turn, sold the same to the respondent in 1989.
The foregoing are but unsubstantiated and self–serving assertions of the possession and occupation of the subject properties by the respondent and its predecessors–in–interest; they do not constitute the well–nigh incontrovertible evidence of possession and occupation of the subject properties required by Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529. Indeed, other than the testimony of Cerquena, the respondent failed to present any other evidence to prove the character of the possession and occupation by it and its predecessors–in–interest of the subject properties.
Although Cerquena testified that the respondent and its predecessors–in–interest cultivated the subject properties, by planting different crops thereon, his testimony is bereft of any specificity as to the nature of such cultivation as to warrant the conclusion that they have been indeed in possession and occupation of the subject properties in the manner required by law. There was no showing as to the number of crops that are planted in the subject properties or to the volume of the produce harvested from the crops supposedly planted thereon.
Further, assuming ex gratia argumenti that the respondent and its predecessors–in–interest have indeed planted crops on the subject properties, it does not necessarily follow that the subject properties have been possessed and occupied by them in the manner contemplated by law. The supposed planting of crops in the subject properties may only have amounted to mere casual cultivation, which is not the possession and occupation required by law.
Further, the Court notes that the tax declarations over the subject properties presented by the respondent were only for 2002. The respondent failed to explain why, despite its claim that it acquired the subject properties as early as 1989, and that its predecessors–in–interest have been in possession of the subject property since 1943, it was only in 2002 that it started to declare the same for purposes of taxation. “While tax declarations are not conclusive evidence of ownership, they constitute proof of claim of ownership.”41 That the subject properties were declared for taxation purposes only in 2002 gives rise to the presumption that the respondent claimed ownership or possession of the subject properties starting that year. Likewise, no improvement or plantings were declared or noted in the said tax declarations. This fact belies the claim that the respondent and its predecessors–in–interest, contrary to Cerquena’s testimony, have been in possession and occupation of the subject properties in the manner required by law.
Having failed to prove that the subject properties form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain and that it and its predecessors–in–interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the same since June 12, 1945, or earlier, the respondent’s application for registration should be denied.
2 Penned by Associate Justice Agnes Reyes–Carpio, with Associate Justices Fernanda Lampas Peralta and Normandie B. Pizarro, concurring; id. at 33–50.
3 Issued by Judge Lorifel Lacap Pahimna; id. at 64–75.
19 AN ACT CREATING THE LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, PRESCRIBING ITS POWERS, FUNCTIONS AND DUTIES, PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
25Padilla v. Velasco, G.R. No. 169956, January 19, 2009, 576 SCRA 219, 227.
26Republic v. Medida, G.R. No. 195097, August 13, 2012, 678 SCRA 317, 325–326, citing Republic v. Dela Paz, G.R. No. 171631, November 15, 2010, 634 SCRA 610, 621–622.
27 The Property Registration Decree.
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors–in–interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
29See Republic v. Rizalvo, Jr., G.R. No. 172011, March 7, 2011, 644 SCRA 516, 523.
31 578 Phil. 441 (2008).
33 G.R. No. 175846, July 6, 2010, 624 SCRA 116.
35Accenture, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 190102, July 11, 2012, 676 SCRA 325, 339; Senarillos v. Hermosisima, 100 Phil. 501, 504 (1956).
36Eagle Realty Corporation v. Republic, G.R. No. 151424, July 31, 2009, 594 SCRA 555, 558, citing Senarillos v. Hermosisima, id.
37 G.R. No. 195097, August 13, 2012, 678 SCRA 317.
38 G.R. No. 175177, October 24, 2012, 684 SCRA 495.
39See Valiao v. Republic, G.R. No. 170757, November 28, 2011, 661 SCRA 299, 308–309.
40Del Rosario v. Republic of the Philippines, 432 Phil. 824, 838 (2002).
41Alde v. Bernal, G.R. No. 169336, March 18, 2010, 616 SCRA 60, 69.

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