Source: http://masscases.com/cases/sjc/276/276mass174.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 06:12:43+00:00

Document:
EDWARD A. MARTELL vs. DAVID W. MOFFATT, administrator, & others. SAME vs. DAVID W. MOFFATT, administrator, & another.
With: EDWARD A. MARTELL vs. DAVID W. MOFFATT, administrator, & others. SAME vs. DAVID W. MOFFATT, administrator, & another.
A delay by a judge of probate in filing a report, requested of him by an appellant under G. L. c. 215, § 11, did not excuse noncompliance by the appellant with the requirement of St. 1929, c. 265, § 1, that he should give the register of probate, within ten days after his appeal, an order in writing for the preparation of the necessary papers for presentation of the appeal to this court.
The amendment of St. 1929, c. 265, § 1, by St. 1931, c. 219, did not affect the rights of parties under a dismissal of an appeal already made under the earlier statutes.
This court has no jurisdiction, either under G. L. c. 215, § 15, or under G. L. c. 211, § 11, to entertain a petition for leave to enter in this court an appeal from a final decree of a probate court after such an appeal has been dismissed for failure by the appellant to observe the requirements of St. 1929, c. 265, § 1.
TWO PETITIONS IN EQUITY, filed in the Probate Court for the county of Middlesex on August 7, 1930, the first against David W. Moffatt, both individually and as administrator of the estate of Mary Ann Martell, and against Charles A. Martell, and the second against David W. Moffatt individually and as administrator of the estate of Judson Gordon Martell.
The petitions were heard by Leggat, J., by whose order final decrees were entered dismissing them. The petitioner appealed. Further proceedings relating to the allowance by the judge of motions to dismiss the appeals are described in the opinion.
PETITIONS for leave to enter late his appeals from the final decrees dismissing his original petitions.
J. T. Pugh, for Edward A. Martell.
R. J. Lane, (D. F. Collins with him,) for David W. Moffatt, administrator, and another.
possible for him to make accurate estimates in the cases at bar until the trial judge had complied with the requirement that he file a report of the material facts found by him. No question arises as to knowledge by the register of the request for such report, because it is a definite fact in the cases at bar that it was made. As matter of precaution and to avoid possibility of misunderstanding, copy of such request with date and affidavit of its having been given ought seasonably to be filed in court by the party making it. Doubtless such request might itself be filed in court provided it reaches the judge within the four days specified in G. L. c. 215, § 11. The appealing party would incur no liability by giving the order in writing for preparation of the papers in such circumstances. He would simply be complying with the statute, and would put upon the register the burden of furnishing him with the estimate. Since the register obviously would be under the necessity of awaiting the filing of the required report by the judge before giving the estimate, the appealing party likewise must wait until notice is given him in writing of the amount of such estimate before taking the next step open to him in prosecuting his appeal. When such estimate has been given, then he must within twenty days after its date pay the amount of the estimate or his appeal will go for naught and his order for preparation of the papers will be cancelled, unless some other form of relief be afforded.
was filed. But, as hitherto pointed out, these matters afford no warrant for failure on the part of the appealing party to comply with the mandate of St. 1929, c. 265, § 1, already quoted. It cannot be presumed that the trial judge would not have filed such report within a reasonable time.
The provisions of St. 1929, c. 265, § 1, have been materially changed by St. 1931, c. 219, enacted since the argument in the cases at bar. That amending statute relates to procedure and not to substantive rights and applies, therefore, to cases pending at the time it became effective. Hanscom v. Malden & Melrose Gas Light Co. 220 Mass. 1, 3. Smith v. Freedman, 268 Mass. 38, 41. Thomes v. Meyer Store Inc. 268 Mass. 587, 588. Wilson v. Grace, 273 Mass. 146, 150-151. But the rights of the parties on this record must be determined according to the statutory practice and procedure in force at the time the decision of the judge now under review was made, and not according to that which would have been in force if such decision were to be made now.
It follows that the motions to dismiss the appeals were allowed rightly.
to the court of common pleas; St. 1859, c. 196; Gen. Sts. c. 112, § 17; Pub. Sts. c. 150, § 17; R. L. c. 156, § 14; Cowley v. Train, 124 Mass. 226, 227; Parker v. Nickerson, 137 Mass. 487, 491.

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