Source: http://www.lawlink.com/research/CaseLevel3/58141
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 13:01:53+00:00

Document:
ZENITH INSURANCE COMPANY, Petitioner, v. WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD and DOROTHY THWEATT, Respondents.
Chernow & Lieb and Alex S. Chernow for Petitioner.
Banks, Leviton, Kelley, Drass & Kelsey and Seth J. Kelsey for Respondents.
Petitioner Zenith Insurance Company (Zenith), a workers' compensation carrier, seeks review and annulment of a Workers' Compensation Appeals Board decision awarding full death benefits, medical benefits, and burial expenses to the widow of an employee who died of work-induced congestive heart failure. Zenith maintains that 50 percent of the contributing cause of death was a cumulative heart injury sustained by the employee during an earlier period of employment and that therefore the board should have permitted the widow to recover only 50 percent of the death and other benefits from its insured.
In Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Ind. Acc. Com. (1961) 56 Cal.2d 219 [14 Cal.Rptr. 548, 363 P.2d 596], our Supreme Court held that the Legislature made no provision for apportionment of death benefits and that absent express legislative direction, such benefits are not apportionable. [124 Cal.App.3d 179] Zenith contends that Labor Code section 3208.2 which was added in 1968 nullified the Pacific Gas & Elec. decision and mandates apportionment of the death and other benefits awarded in this case. fn. 1 The section provides in pertinent part that when "death results from the combined effects of two or more injuries ... all questions of fact and law shall be separately determined with respect to each such injury, including ... the apportionment between such injuries of liability for ... any death benefit." [1a] For reasons stated below, we hold that the high court's decision has not been abrogated by section 3208.2 and that under our workers' compensation law, death benefits, medical benefits and burial expenses are not apportionable.
The pertinent facts are not in dispute. From July 1963 to July 1967, the decedent was employed by D.N., Inc. In July 1967, while so employed decedent suffered a myocardial infarction necessitating hospitalization for two weeks. He suffered a second attack in 1968 while employed by an insurance company. In 1970 or 1971 he underwent coronary artery bypass surgery. About a month after the surgery decedent was able to resume most of his normal activities. In May or June 1976, he was employed by Grove Gunite Corporation (Grove) in a management capacity. In August 1976, he was again hospitalized for two or three weeks because of his heart condition. In November 1977, he suffered a major attack while on his way to a bank to arrange financing for Grove. Between December 1977 and January 1978, he worked for a few hours a day but after January he ceased working.
At the hearing on the application for death benefits, Grove's compensation carrier argued that section 3208.2 required apportionment of 50 percent of the death benefits to the cumulative heart injury sustained by decedent during his employment with D.N., Inc. so that the award against Grove should be for only 50 percent of the benefits. The judge denied the requested apportionment and awarded the widow (the sole dependent) full death benefits of $50,000, reimbursement of medical expenses in the sum of $6,782.92 and burial expenses of $1,500. The board granted the carriers' petition for reconsideration but in its opinion on reconsideration ruled that section 3208.2 did not require apportionment and affirmed the award after reducing the burial expenses to $1,000, the maximum then allowable. fn. 4 First, the board noted that section 3208.2 has been held to operate prospectively only so that an injury occurring before its operative date (Jan. 1, 1969) may be merged into a later cumulative injury. The board added, however, that even if the statute applied and foreclosed the merger, under the Pacific Gas & Elec. decision, an employer is liable for full death benefits upon a showing that the industrial injury hastened or contributed to the employee's death and the benefits are not apportionable by reason of any predisposing or other contributing cause.
Zenith contends that when death results from the combined effects of two or more injuries, section 3208.2 requires apportionment of death benefits, costs of medical treatment and burial expenses, so that on the basis of the findings made in the employee's disability applications, [124 Cal.App.3d 181] Grove should have been liable to the widow for only 50 percent of the benefits awarded.
Thus, unless the Pacific Gas & Elec. decision has been voided by section 3208.2, death benefits are not apportionable.
In 1968 the Legislature responded to the above decisions, particularly DeLuna and Miller, by enacting the anti-merger package. (Swezey, supra, pp. 640-641.) Section 3208.1 defines "specific injury" and "cumulative injury." It defines a cumulative injury as one "occurring as repetitive mentally or physically traumatic activities extending over a period of time, the combined effect of which causes any disability or need for medical treatment" and when enacted provided that "the date of cumulative injury shall be the date of disability caused thereby." fn. 7 Section 3208.2 provides: "When disability, need for medical treatment, or death results from the combined effects of two or more injuries, either specific, cumulative, or both, all questions of fact and law shall be separately determined with respect to each such injury, including, but not limited to, the apportionment between such injuries of liability for disability benefits, the cost of medical treatment, and any death benefit." Finally, section 5303, as amended, provides: "There is but one cause of action for each injury coming within the provisions of this division. All claims brought for medical expenses, disability payments, death benefits, burial expense, liens, or any other matter arising out of such injury may, in the discretion of the appeals board, be joined in the same proceeding at any time; provided, however, that no injury, whether specific or cumulative, shall for any purpose whatsoever, merge into or form a part of another injury; nor shall any award based on a cumulative injury include disability caused by any specific injury or by any other cumulative injury causing or contributing to the existing disability, need for medical treatment or death."
 Zenith's contention that section 3208.2 mandates apportionment of the death and other benefits between the employee's widow and the employer stems from a misreading of the statute. Analysis of the specific language of the section, consideration of the nature of the benefits awarded, and application of the rules governing the interpretation of workers' compensation laws compel the conclusion that the benefits are nonapportionable.
A. The term "apportionment" as used in section 3208.2 refers to the sharing of loss by employers, not apportionment of benefits.
B. The nature of death benefits and applicable rules of statutory interpretation militate against apportionment.
In addition to the history and specific language of section 3208.2, the nature of death benefits and the applicable rules governing interpretation of workers' compensation laws militate against an interpretation that the Legislature intended such benefits to be apportioned.
 Apportionment would frustrate the humanitarian purpose death benefits are intended to serve, that of relieving an employee's dependents of the financial consequences of his or her death in the course of employment. The worker's compensation system must be administered to "accomplish substantial justice in all cases expeditiously, inexpensively, and without incumbrance of any character; ...." (Cal. Const., art. XIV ? 4.) Apportionment could force dependents to file multiple applications for benefits, to undergo protracted and expensive hearings on complex issues of apportionment, and to be relegated to recovery of benefits on a piecemeal basis. The hardship of the delay and expense of recovering full benefits on those who depended upon the deceased employee for support is manifest. The fact that the Legislature fixed the amount of death benefits without regard to the employee's earnings and directed that they be paid "in the same manner and amount as temporary disability payments" (? 4702, subd. (d)) indicates that it intended full benefits to be made available promptly so that they may serve as a substitute for the lost support.
 Workers' compensation laws must be liberally construed for the benefit and protection of persons injured in the course of their employment. (? 3202.) "Accordingly, '[w]here provisions of [the workers' compensation] laws are susceptible of an interpretation either beneficial or detrimental to injured employees or an ambiguity appears, they must be construed favorably to the employees.'" (Department of Corrections v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1979) 23 Cal.3d 197, 203-204 [152 Cal.Rptr. 345, 589 P.2d 853], quoting fromGranado v. Workmen's [124 Cal.App.3d 188] Comp. App. Bd. (1968) 69 Cal.2d 399, 404 [71 Cal.Rptr. 678, 445 P.2d 294];Judson Steel Corp. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1978) 22 Cal.3d 658, 668 [150 Cal.Rptr. 250, 586 P.2d 564].) Those statutory and judicial canons of construction are for the benefit of dependents applying for death benefits as well as employees. (Department of Corrections v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., supra, 23 Cal.3d 197, 203-204; Arndt v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1976) 56 Cal.App.3d 139, 147 [128 Cal.Rptr. 250]; Munoz v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd. (1971) 19 Cal.App.3d 144, 149 [96 Cal.Rptr. 394].) Apportionment of loss between a claimant (employee or dependent) and an employer works to the detriment of the claimant; the employer is the one who benefits from that kind of an apportionment. (SeePullman Kellog v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1980) 26 Cal.3d 450, 456 [161 Cal.Rptr. 783, 605 P.2d 422].) Consequently any ambiguity in sections 3208.2 or 5303 must be resolved against an interpretation which would require or permit apportionment of death benefits.
InGranado v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., supra, 69 Cal.2d 399, our high court provided the following summary of its reasons for holding that section 4663 did not permit apportionment of temporary disability: "In view of the ambiguity of the statute, the rule of liberal construction, the delays which will necessarily result if temporary disability is made apportionable, the resulting frustration of the legislative policy of making temporary disability a substitute for lost wages, and our public policy of expeditious payment, we conclude that temporary disability is not apportionable." (Id, at p. 405.) It is for those very same reasons we hold that section 3208.2 does not require or permit death benefits to be apportioned. fn. 10 [1b] What we have said concerning apportionment of death benefits perforce applies to burial expenses; they are nonapportionable.
C. Medical expenses are nonapportionable.
The decision of the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board is affirmed.
Gardner, P. J., and McDaniel, J., concurred.
?FN 1. Unless otherwise indicated, all section references in this opinion are to the Labor Code.
?FN 2. Section 5412 provides: "The date of injury in cases of occupational diseases or cumulative injuries is that date upon which the employee first suffered disability therefrom and either knew, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known, that such disability was caused by his present or prior employment."
?FN 3. The compromise and release agreement is not a part of the record before us.
?FN 5. Section 4663 provides: "In case of aggravation of any disease existing prior to a compensable injury, compensation shall be allowed only for the proportion of the disability due to the aggravation of such prior disease which is reasonably attributed to the injury."
?FN 6. Section 5412 then read: "The date of injury in cases of occupational diseases is that date upon which the employee first suffered disability ...."
The section was amended in 1973 to expressly include "cumulative injuries."
?FN 7. Section 3208.1 was amended in 1973 to provide that "the date of a cumulative injury shall be the date determined under Section 5412."
?FN 8. It has been held that the anti-merger legislation is non-retroactive and that the DeLuna and Miller merger doctrine applies to all cumulative injuries occurring before January 1, 1969. (State Comp. Ins. Fund v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., supra, 1 Cal.App.3d 812, 820; Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd. (1973) 35 Cal.App.3d 329, 335-336 [110 Cal.Rptr. 780]; Gallentine v. Livingston-Graham, Inc., supra, 34 Cal.Comp.Cases 326, 331.) In the instant case, the board and respondent have suggested that to apportion death benefits to the cumulative injury antedating the operative date of the statute would amount to an improper retroactive application of the statute. (See City of Los Angeles v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1978) 88 Cal.App.3d 19, 29, fn. 9 [151 P.2d 679].) Because of our determination that death benefits, medical expenses, and burial expenses are not apportionable under sections 3208.2 and 5303, we need not pass on the retroactivity issue.
?FN 9. In his section on death benefits, Mr. Hanna states: "Prior to 1968 the workers' compensation statutes neither expressly authorized nor prohibited apportionment of death benefits, and the Supreme Court held that, in the absence of express legislative authorization, apportionment of a death benefit was improper. In 1968, however, the Legislature added Section 3208.2 to the Labor Code expressly requiring the apportionment between two or more injuries, either specific, cumulative, or both, of liability for disability benefits, the cost of medical treatment, and any death benefit." (2 Hanna, supra, ? 14.04, pp. 14-40.7--14-40.8; italics supplied; fns. omitted.) By his reference to the Pacific Gas & Electric decision, Hanna seems to imply that section 3208.2 now permits apportionment of death benefits to a dependent. However, in light of his earlier statement concerning the sense in which the word "apportionment" is used in section 3208.2, we believe it is not unfair to interpret his statement that the section now requires apportionment "of liability for ... any death benefit" to mean apportionment of loss among employers.

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