Source: https://www.specialedlaw.com/database/in-re-adam-and-taunton-public-schools-bsea-17-08888/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 10:29:32+00:00

Document:
The official record of the hearing consists of documents submitted by the Parent and marked as Exhibits P-1 to P-19; documents submitted by the Taunton Public Schools and marked as Exhibits S-1 to S-25; approximately three days of recorded oral testimony and argument; and a three volume transcript produced by a court reporter. As agreed to by the parties the record was held open until noon on May 11, 2017 for submission of closing arguments. Closing arguments were received and the record closed on that date.
Parent filed a Hearing Request against Taunton Public Schools (“Taunton” or “District”) on April 19, 2017 raising several claims in connection with an incident involving her son Adam that occurred on or about March 10, 2016. Specifically, Parent alleged that Taunton failed to offer her son, a tenth grader on an Individualized Education Program (IEP) as of March 10, 2016, a timely manifestation determination meeting (“MDR” or “manifestation determination review”) in connection with discipline for the incident that occurred that day. In fact, no MDR was offered, she alleged, until March 31, 2017, at which time the Team refused to determine whether Adam’s conduct more than a year earlier was a manifestation of his disability. Furthermore, Parent contended that Taunton High School (THS) failed to offer, implement, or make available the accommodations necessary for Adam to make effective progress, per his IEP, and instead engaged in a practice of excluding him from school through suspensions.
As Parent’s appeal involved a manifestation determination, her hearing request received expedited status, and the hearing was scheduled for May 4, 2017.
On April 26, 2017, Taunton filed a Motion for Partial Dismissal with Prejudice and Response to the Remainder of Hearing Request. The basis of its Motion for Partial Dismissal was the District’s contention that because Adam was in the guardianship of his maternal grandmother and uncle at the time of the March 10, 2016 incident and remained in their custody until February 27, 2017, Parent did not have standing to assert any claim that accrued prior to that date.
On May 1, 2017, the undersigned Hearing Officer held a telephonic Motion Session to address the District’s Motion. Parent indicated at that time that her mother would join her as a co-claimant, and later that day Parent re-filed her Hearing Request with her mother’s signature as well as her own. As such, the parties agreed that the Hearing Officer need not address the District’s Motion. Also on that date, the Hearing Officer issued an Order clarifying that the expedited hearing would address only issues that required expedited status: specifically, the manifestation determination and school discipline that had occurred in connection with the March 2016 incident, leading Adam to receive out-of-school tutoring from March 2016 to the time of the hearing. A decision as to whether Adam was receiving a Free Appropriate Public Education (FAPE) up to and at the time of the March 2016 incident was expressly reserved for a later proceeding.
For the reasons below, I find that Taunton’s failure to convene a timely manifestation determination review was a significant procedural error that led to the deprivation of FAPE.
On March 30, 2016, a meeting invitation was issued for a “safety evaluation” meeting to take place on April 1, 2016. (S-10) It appears that no meeting occurred on that day.
Adam’s mother hoped that at this meeting, they would talk about Adam going back to school, since he had been out of school for almost a month already. (Mother) Rather than discuss Adam’s return to THS, District personnel made clear that this was not an option for Adam. (Mother) The District proposed a 40-day placement and evaluation in recognition of the difficulties Adam was having at THS because they believed “this placement and evaluation will provide the necessary information to develop an appropriate IEP addressing [Adam]’s needs.” (S-12) Adam expressed his desire to continue to attend Taunton High School rather than an out-of-district placement or the district’s alternative high school. His mother expressed concern about Adam going backwards to a more restrictive placement such as READS (where he had been before) or South Coast Educational Collaborative (“South Coast”), and both she and Adam explained that they did not want him placed where he might be restrained or observe other children being restrained, as had occurred in his previous out-of-district settings. (S-11; Student, Mother, Fagan) At this time, Adam’s guardians rejected the District’s request that they consent to a 40-day placement and evaluation, as well as the District’s attempt to obtain a release to permit the South Coast program to contact them. Although Adam’s grandmother and uncle appeared open to the options, they wanted time to consider the District’s proposals and discuss things alone before making a decision. (S-12; Fagan) Adam’s guardians also asserted that Adam was not dangerous at home. (S-11) Adam’s mother testified that she began requesting a manifestation determination at this meeting, but neither district personnel nor the record substantiates this claim.
Parent filed her Hearing Request on April 19, 2017.
Parent asserts that Adam was entitled to a manifestation determination review within ten (10) days of his suspension for the March 10, 2016 incident, as he had previously been suspended for over ten (10) days during the 2015-16 school year. She contends that Taunton’s failure to convene that meeting resulted in Adam being excluded from school for more than a year and that when Taunton finally did convene the MDR twelve months after the incident, it failed to consider information in its possession regarding his disabilities when it concluded the meeting with no decision. Parent also argues that at the time of his suspension on March 10, 2016, Adam’s IEP was not being implemented as, for example, he was not being provided with clear, consistent limits, expectations and consequences with respect to headphone use at school, and the individual responsible for disciplining him was unaware that he even had an IEP. Parent further contends that Taunton discriminated against Adam on the basis of his disability; and that he and his family were bullied as Taunton attempted to obtain their agreement to an out-of-district evaluation of Adam. Parent requested that Taunton’s manifestation determination decision be overturned and that Adam be allowed to return to his last agreed upon placement in a full inclusion program at Taunton High School.
In order to determine whether Parent is entitled to a decision in her favor, I must consider legal standards governing special education, school discipline, changes in placement, and procedural violations. As the moving party in this matter, Parent bears the burden of proof. To prevail, she must prove – by a preponderance of the evidence – that the District changed Adam’s placement in March 2016 without convening a timely manifestation determination review and/or obtaining parental consent, that such failure was not cured by the September 2016 consent to a 40-day evaluation or the March 2017 MDR, and that these procedural inadequacies constituted a deprivation of FAPE.
Pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and its implementing regulations, school districts may not change the placement of a student with a disability for disciplinary purposes (i.e. via suspension or expulsion) if the conduct triggering the discipline is a manifestation of the student’s disability. In other words, if the student’s conduct was caused by or has a direct and substantial relationship to his disability or disabilities, the school district may not change his placement because of that conduct.
Federal law defines a change in placement for purposes of removal of a child with a disability from the child’s educational placement as occurring if (1) the removal is for more than ten (10) consecutive school days; or (2) the child has been subjected to a series of removals that constitutes a pattern because: (i) the series of removals total more than ten (10) school days in a school year; (ii) the child’s behavior is substantially similar to the child’s behavior in previous incidents that resulted in the series of removals; and (iii) because of such additional factors as the length of each removal, the total amount of time the child has been removed, and the proximity of the removals to one another.
If the student’s conduct is determined not to be a manifestation of his disability, the relevant disciplinary procedures applicable to children without disabilities may be applied in the same manner and for the same duration in which the procedures would be applied to children without disabilities. The school district, however, must still provide the student with FAPE, though this may occur in an interim alternative educational setting.
Although the language of the IDEA allows for an interim change in a student’s then-current educational placement outside of the IEP or disciplinary processes, it permits such a change only “where parents and school officials are able to agree on one.” This prohibition on changes of placement absent parental consent reflects Congress’s intent “to strip schools of the unilateral authority they had traditionally employed to exclude disabled students, particularly emotionally disturbed students, from school.” As such, with the exception of removal to an IAES in the narrow circumstances described above, if a District wishes to change the placement of a student with a disability even temporarily and the parent does not agree to the change, the District must maintain the student’s then-current educational placement until the dispute is resolved.
Taunton acknowledged that with Adam’s three (3)-day suspension starting on March 11, 2016 for the incident that occurred the previous day, he had been suspended for thirty (30) days during the 2015-16 school year. His suspensions were for similar behaviors: insubordination, disrespect, use of vulgar language, and inappropriate behavior. Moreover these suspensions were occurring regularly and resulted in a significant amount of time out of school. Pursuant to the IDEA, this series of removals constitutes a pattern, such that Adam’s suspension on March 11, 2016 constituted a change in placement for purposes of removals of a child with a disability from his educational placement.
Since the suspension, Adam has not been permitted to return to his last accepted placement, a full inclusion program at THS. Taunton personnel made it clear in no uncertain terms that Adam could not attend THS unless and until he underwent an evaluation, communicating multiple times that THS was not an option for him and in fact serving him with a “No Trespass” notice the first time he stepped on campus for a manifestation review.
Taunton offered Adam and his family the option of a one-day evaluation at READS and a 40-day “evaluation placement” at South Coast Educational Collaborative or READS. Neither of these options would have been a placement. In fact, regulations specify that an extended evaluation (which is how I construe a 40-day evaluation “shall not be considered a placement.” Adam’s current placement, according to Taunton, is home tutoring. Given that Adam received tutoring for a maximum of six (6) hours a week, and he does not receive counseling (a service listed on his IEP), there is no question that tutoring “results in dilution of the quality of [his] education or a departure from [his] LRE-compliant setting.” No placement form or “agreement otherwise” was submitted to suggest that Adam’s guardians consented to this change in placement. Moreover Taunton did not file for hearing at the BSEA to obtain an order to support its placement of Adam in tutoring, nor did it identify the 40-day “evaluation placement” as an IAES and proceed to the BSEA for hearing to obtain an order to support such placement.
Despite the District’s representations to the contrary, had it convened and properly executed a manifestation determination review in March 2016, Adam may not have been suspended for the incident that occurred on March 10, 2016. In fact, had the District convened an MDR at any time after Adam had been suspended for ten (10) days during the 2015-16 school year, it is likely – based on its own Discipline Code – that he would have been referred for an FBA and a behavioral intervention plan (BIP), whether or not the District found his conduct in any of those incident to be a manifestation of his disability. To determine whether the existence of an FBA and a BIP would have altered the course of the events on March 10, 2016 requires too much speculation, but in any event, it would have provided additional information on which the Team could have based its manifestation determination. That his headmaster believed, for some reason, that Adam was no longer on an IEP is no justification for Taunton to have failed to convene an MDR at any point during the 2015-16 school year, up to and including in connection with the March 10th incident.
Even recognizing that behavior and symptomology may change over time, the District had before it sufficient information to determine that Adam’s conduct on March 10, 2016 – up to and including his escalation, foul and aggressive language, agitation, and “physically posturing” toward school staff while waiting in the office for an indeterminate period of time, was “caused by, or had a direct and substantial relationship to” his disabilities. For these reasons, the District’s manifestation determination decision, which it rendered as “inconclusive” in March 2017, cannot stand.
The District argues that it would have required Adam to participate in a 40-day evaluation placement to complete the safety evaluation, which he had to undergo pursuant to the THS Discipline Code, even if it had properly convened a manifestation determination review in March 2016. The Discipline Code, however, provides for a safety evaluation only when a student is suspended for certain behaviors. As Adam’s conduct on March 10, 2016 was a manifestation of his disabilities, he could not have been suspended for the incident. It follows that he could not have been referred for a safety evaluation. The District would not have been able to change his placement, whether to tutoring or an IAES, without parental consent or an order from the BSEA. Furthermore, had the District convened an MDR in March 2016, and suspended him anyway, the procedural safeguards notice that would have been sent by the District to Adam’s guardians may have led them to appeal the MDR. As such, I cannot find that Taunton’s failure to convene an MDR in March 2016 was anything other than egregious. Moreover, Taunton’s refusal to make a determination when it finally convened the MDR in March 2017, instead proposing an evaluation, circumvents the purpose of the process, which aims to prevent a student from being disciplined for conduct that is a manifestation of his disability.
2016, over a year ago. Due to Taunton’s failure to conduct a timely manifestation determination review, and to conclude as a result of that MDR that Adam’s conduct on March 10, 2016 was a manifestation of his disabilities, Adam was referred to a safety evaluation. Taunton’s safety evaluation process is triggered by a suspension; had the MDR been timely convened, Adam’s Team would have recognized that he could not be suspended and as such, could not have prevented him from returning to THS unless and until he agreed to an evaluation. Adam has missed more than one year of academic instruction and therapeutic supports. At most, he received four to six hours of tutoring in some (but not all) of his academic subjects during this time. Although Adam he may have earned some credits and made some academic progress during the course of home tutoring, tutoring is not the placement on his last accepted IEP. Taunton’s procedural errors, without a doubt, impeded Adam’s right to FAPE, as provided in his IEP dated October 29, 2015 to October 28, 2016, and caused him to be deprived of the educational benefits he would have received had he been permitted to return to THS at the conclusion of an MDR within ten (10) days of his suspension.
After reviewing the testimony and documents in the record, I conclude that Parent has met her burden to prove that Taunton failed to convene a timely manifestation determination review for Adam in connection with his suspension for the March 10, 2016 incident and that, as a result of the District’s procedural error, Adam has received minimal educational services for over a year. Taunton did not set forth any valid grounds to mitigate its obligation to conduct a timely MDR. Adam is entitled to return to his last accepted placement, a full inclusion program at Taunton High School, immediately, and he is entitled to compensatory services for the months during which he received home tutoring rather than the program and services to which his IEP entitled him. The District must move forward as though Adam’s conduct on March 10, 2016 was a manifestation of his disabilities by conducting an FBA and developing a BIP as soon as is practicable following his return to school.
I am concerned, following my review of all of the evidence, about Taunton Public School personnel’s lack of understanding of the interplay between school discipline and special education, particularly with respect to manifestation determination reviews and its safety evaluation process. I strongly recommend that Taunton secure training for its staff with respect to discipline of students with disabilities.
I will also be referring this matter to the Massachusetts Department of Elementary and Secondary Education, so that DESE may follow up as it deems appropriate.
Taunton Public Schools is hereby directed to convene a Team meeting within two (2) school days of receipt of this decision to develop a transition plan that will permit Adam to return to Taunton High School next week.
Adam’s Team is hereby to directed arrange for Adam to undergo a Functional Behavioral Assessment and will develop a Behavior Intervention Plan as soon as is practicable following Adam’s return to school. The Team is also hereby directed to initiate the three-year reevaluation process for Adam, to take place at THS unless Parent agrees otherwise, before the end of the 2016-17 school year.
Adam’s Team is hereby directed to convene within thirty days to devise a compensatory services plan to include the manner in which Taunton Public Schools will deliver the services it owes to him. These services will occur at THS, unless an alternate location is agreed to by Adam’s parent, and will focus on credit recovery. The Team will work with Adam, his tutor, and his teachers at THS to maximize the credit he receives for the work he has completed through tutoring.
A Hearing Officer-initiated Conference Call will take place at 11:00 AM on June 2, 2017 to discuss the remainder of Parent’s Hearing Request.
 “Adam” is a pseudonym chosen by the Hearing Officer to protect the privacy of the Student in documents available to the public.
 In her Hearing Request, Parent referred to March 9, 2016, and testimony at hearing referred to both March 9 and March 10, 2016. Documents in evidence suggest that the incident occurred on Marchj 10, 2016.
 Although his current title is Community Facilitator, as of March 10, 2016, Mr. Gregg was a Security Guard at THS.
 The District may have been willing to accept a one-day evaluation, see note 9, supra, though Parent did not understand this to be the case at this time and Adam’s guardians did not testify at the hearing.
 Because she did not have educational decision-making rights at this time, Parent did not have standing to make the request.
 Ms. Mulrooney testified that a manifestation determination review in 2016 would have resulted in a determination of “unsure” or “no,” since “they were looking at it more as behavior than social-emotional.” Had the answer been “unsure,” the parent would be asked to sign a consent to get more information about the student, and ‘we could come to some agreement as to whether the student was returning to school or the student remained in tutoring. Once we got the evaluation information, we would reconvene the team and make a decision as to what was appropriate.” She also testified that if a parent refused to consent to an evaluation, in these circumstances, the District would have offered an interim placement, and that that in Adam’s situation, even if a manifestation determination review had been held in 2016, the safety evaluation still would have been conducted. (Mulrooney).
 At hearing, Parent, who appeared pro se, introduced evidence of the credits and services Adam was denied as a result of the District’s actions and inactions.
 See Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 62 (2008).
 See Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 62; see also Roland M. v. Concord Sch. Comm., 910 F.2d 983, 994 (1st Cir. 1990) (Districts are liable for procedural violations if parents prove both that a violation occurred and that the procedural inadequacies compromised the pupil’s right to an appropriate education, seriously hampered the parents’ opportunity to participate in the formulation process, or caused a deprivation of educational benefits”).
 See 20 U.S.C. §1415(k)(1)(E(i); 34 CFR §300.530(e).
 20 U.S.C. §1415(k)(1)(E)(i); 34 CFR §300.530(e)(2).
 20 U.S.C. §1415(k)(1)(E)(ii); 34 CFR §300.530(e)(2).
 20 U.S.C. §1415(k)(1)(F); 34 CFR §300.530(f).
 20 U.S.C. §§ 1415(k)(1)(C); 34 CFR §300.530(c).
 20 U.S.C. §§ 1415(k)(1)(C), 1412 (a)(1)(A); 34 CFR §300.530(c).
 20 U.S.C. §1415(k)(1)(G); 34 CFR §300.530(g).
 Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 324-25 (1998).
 See 20 U.S.C. §1415 (j).
 See 34 CFR § 300.536(a).
 See A.W. ex rel. Wilson v. Fairfax County Sch. Bd., 372 F.3d 674, 682 (4th Cir. 2004)..
 See 20 U.S.C. §1415(k)(1)(E)(i); 34 CFR §300.530(e)(2). Furthermore, even if District personnel did not recognize the inconsistent enforcement of school rules (such as the wearing of headphones) as a problem for Adam, the District was aware that he was not attending counseling. Best practice would have been for the Team to reconvene to discuss other ways to support him.
 20 U.S.C. §1415(f)(3)(E)(ii); see Roland M., 910 F.2d at 994.
 The Decision issued to the parties on May 18, 2017 inadvertently contained the date May 17, 2017. The date has been corrected on this version.

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