Source: https://www.azcourts.gov/ccsguide/AggravatingCircumstances/ARS%C2%A713-751(F)(13).aspx
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 18:46:33+00:00

Document:
History: The Arizona Legislature amended the capital sentencing statute in 2005 to include this aggravating circumstance. The effective date was August 12, 2005.
Vagueness Challenge: State v. Hausner (230 Ariz. 60, 280 P.3d 604 (2012)) is the first case to review the (F)(13) aggravator. The Arizona Supreme Court found instructive the reasoning of the Florida Supreme Court in connection with its review of statutory language (cold, calculated, and premeditated (CCP)) similar to that of Arizona’s aggravator (omits “premeditated”). Specifically, murders are death-eligible if committed in a “cold, calculated and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification.” Fl.Stat.Ann. § 921.141(5)(i). The Florida court concluded that “[w]ithout the benefit of an explanation that some ‘heightened’ form of premeditation is required to find CCP, a jury may automatically characterize every premeditated murder as involving the CCP aggravator.” (Jackson v. State, 648 So.2d 85, 89 (Fla. 1994).
Further, in Jackson, the Florida court found the jury received “no instruction to illumine the meaning of the terms ‘cold,’ ‘calculated,’ or ‘premeditated.’” 648 So2d at 89-90. Without further instruction, the Jackson court noted, “[i]t would also be reasonable for the general public to consider premeditated first degree murder as ‘cold-blooded murder.’” Id. at 89. On its face, Arizona’s (F)(13) aggravator suffered from the same vagueness infirmity.
An aggravator that is vague on its face can be properly narrowed by a court to bring it within constitutional bounds. State v. Chappell, 225 Ariz. 229, 237 ¶ 26, 236 P.3d 1176, 1184 (2010), cert. denied, 131 S.Ct. 1485 (2011) (“vagueness…. may be remedied with appropriate narrowing instructions.”) (internal quotation omitted); see also State v. Tucker, 215 Ariz. 298, 310 ¶ 28, 160 P. 3d 177, 189 (2008); Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 655 (1990), overruled on other grounds by Ring, 536 U.S. 584. In Jackson, upon remand, Florida’s CCP aggravator was narrowed through jury instructions defining its terms, 648 So.2d at 89-90, and subsequent death sentences in Florida, under these narrowing instructions, have been upheld. See, e.g., McWatters v. State, 36 So.3d 613, 643 (Fla. 2010), cert denied, 131 S.Ct. 510 (2010).
(2) a cool and calm reflection for a substantial period of time before the murder.
This instruction adequately narrowed the aggravator, making it clear that it is not the cold and calculated nature of every murder that will satisfy it, but that the jury must find some degree of reflection and planning that goes beyond the premeditation required to find first degree murder, channeling the jury's discretion by “clear and objective standards” that provide “specific and detailed guidance.” Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428, 100 S.Ct. 1759, 64 L.Ed.2d 398 (1980).
The Court “…review[ed] de novo whether jury instructions adequately state the law.” State v. Gallardo, 225 Ariz. 560, 567 ¶ 30, 242 P.3d 159, 166 (2010) (internal quotation omitted)1. The Court held that the trial court did not incorrectly define the terms of the (F)(13) aggravator.
The Court held that the trial court properly narrowed the (F)(13) aggravator so that it was constitutional, despite its facial vagueness, and the trial court defined the terms to the jury in a permissible manner that did not constitute fundamental error.
The standard used by the Court in reviewing for error by the trial court in applying the (F)(13) aggravator—and the Court did not identify any for reasons explained—was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court may apply “harmless-error analysis when errors [regarding sentencing factors] have occurred in a capital sentencing proceeding,” Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 754, 110 S.Ct. 1441, 108 L.Ed.2d 725 (1990), so long as the errors do not permit the sentencer to consider otherwise inadmissible evidence. Id. n. 5; see Brown v. Sanders, 546 U.S. 212, 220–21, 126 S.Ct. 884, 163 L.Ed.2d 723 (2006) (stating that due process requires reversal of death sentence if invalid sentencing factor allowed sentencer to consider evidence that otherwise would not have been before it); cf. Jennings v. McDonough, 490 F.3d 1230, 1249–50 (11th Cir.2007) (approving Florida Supreme Court's harmless error analysis with regard to vaguely defined aggravator).
The Court concluded that the use of the (F)(13) aggravator did not allow the jury to consider any evidence that otherwise would not have been before it. The jury properly found three other aggravators—the (F)(1), (2), and (6)—with respect to each of the four victims for which it also found the (F)(13). Hausner presented no mitigation evidence. In these circumstances, we conclude that any error regarding the (F)(13) aggravator did not influence the jury's decision to impose death sentences. Cf. State v. Sansing, 206 Ariz. 232, 241 ¶ 38, 77 P.3d 30, 39 (2003) (affirming court-imposed death sentence upon concluding that any reasonable jury would have found the mitigation was not sufficiently substantial to call for leniency).
1 Because Hausner did not object to the (F)(13) instructions on these grounds below, however, the Court review was limited to a showing of fundamental error.
2The Court noted that Hausner did not argue that there was any constitutional error based on the trial court adopting narrowing instructions for (F)(13) that had not been approved by this Court before he committed the relevant murders. Cf. State v. Schmidt, 220 Ariz. 563, 566 ¶ 10, 208 P.3d 214, 217 (2009) (holding that use of vaguely defined statutory aggravator as sole factor to enhance sentence violated due process), and did not address whether the trial court erred in this respect.
(F)(13) finding upheld. With respect to four murders, the jury also found that they were committed in a cold, calculated manner.

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