Source: https://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-supreme-court/201/156.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 15:38:26+00:00

Document:
In March, 1903, the petitioners filed their bill in the circuit [201 U.S. 156, 157] court of the United States for the southern district of New York against the New England Enameling Company, to restrain the further infringement by that company of letters patent of the United States, No. 527,361, for improvements in enameling metal ware, and to recover damages for past infringement. After answer and proofs, the case came on for hearing, and on July 8, 1905, a decree was entered, reciting that nine of the twelve claims in the patent were good and valid, that three were invalid and void by reason of the fact that the patentee was not the original or first inventor or discoverer, that five of the nine valid claims had been infringed by the defendant, but the remaining four had not been. As to the claims held invalid and those found to have been not infringed, it was ordered that the bill of complaint be dismissed. As to the remaining five claims,-those held to be infringed,-it was ordered that the plaintiffs recover the gains, profits, savings, and advantages which the defendant had derived by reason of the infringement, and that the case be referred to a master to report the amount thereof, and also that an injunction issue against further infringement. On August 1, 1905, the defendant appealed from said decree to the court of appeals and filed its assignment of errors. On August 8 the plaintiffs also appealed to the circuit court of appeals and assigned as errors the rulings in the decree adverse to them. On January 3, 1906, this cross appeal of the plaintiffs was dismissed by the court of appeals, on the ground that it had no jurisdiction thereof. Thereupon the plaintiffs filed in this court this petition for a writ of mandamus, commanding the judges of the circuit court of appeals to take jurisdiction of said cross appeal, and to dispose of it simultaneously with the appeal of the defendant.
Messrs. Louis Marshall, Arthur v. Briesen, and Walter D. Edmonds for petitioners. [201 U.S. 156, 158] Messrs. Robert N. Kenyon, Walter F. Rogers, and Jacob Steinhardt for respondent.
The decree entered by the circuit court was interlocutory, and not final. Barnard v. Gibson, 7 How. 650, 12 L. ed. 857; Humiston v. Stainthorp, 2 Wall. 106, 17 L. ed. 905, and cases cited in note; Estey v. Burdett, 109 U.S. 633, 637 , 27 S. L. ed. 1058, 1059, 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 531; McGourkey v. Toledo & O. C. R. Co. 146 U.S. 536 , 36 L. ed. 1079, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 170 (in this case is a full discussion of the differences between an interlocutory and a final decree); Hohorst v. Hamburg-American Packet Co. 148 U.S. 262 , 37 L. ed. 443, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 590; Smith v. Vulcan Iron Works, 165 U.S. 518 , 41 L. ed. 810, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 407.
Plaintiffs brought one suit upon a single patent. The findings of the circuit court that three of the twelve claims were invalid and that the remaining nine were valid, but that four of them had not been infringed by the defendant, did not break this one suit into twelve. They were a guide to the master in his ascertainment of the damages, and indicated the scope of the final decree.
'In this respect the practice of the United States chancery courts differs from the English practice. For appeals to the House of Lords may be taken from an interlocutory order of [201 U.S. 156, 161] the Chancellor, which decides a right of property in dispute. . . . But the case is otherwise in the courts of the United States, where the right to appeal is by law limited to final decrees.' See also McLish v. Roff, 141 U.S. 661, 665 , 35 S. L. ed. 893, 894, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 118.
In the latter case this was held persuasive against extending the right of review given by 5 of the circuit court of appeals act of March 3, 1891 (26 Stat. at L. 826, chap. 517, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 547), to other cases than those in which there was a final judgment or decree, although the word 'final' is omitted in some of the clauses of the section.
It will be noticed that the appeal is allowed from an interlocutory order or decree granting or continuing an injunction, that it must be taken within thirty days, that it is given precedence in the appellate court, that the other proceedings in the lower court are not to be stayed, and that the lower [201 U.S. 156, 162] court may require an additional bond. Obviously that which is contemplated is a review of the interlocutory order, and of that only. It was not intended that the cause as a whole should be transferred to the appellate court prior to the final decree. The case, except for the hearing on the appeal from the interlocutory order, is to proceed in the lower court as though no such appeal had been taken, unless otherwise specially ordered. It may be true, as alleged by petitioners, that 'it is of the utmost importance to all of the parties in said cause that there shall be the speediest possible adjudication by the United States circuit court of appeals as to the validity of all of the claims of the aforesaid letters patent which are the subject-matter thereof.' But it was not intended by this section to give to patent or other cases in which interlocutory decrees or orders were made any precedence. It is generally true that it is of importance to litigants that their cases be disposed of promptly, but other cases have the same right to early hearing. And the purpose of Congress in this legislation was that there be an immediate review of the interlocutory proceedings, and not an advancement generally over other litigation.
But nowhere in the opinion is it intimated that the plaintiff was entitled to take any cross appeal or to obtain a final decree in the appellate court. This view of the scope of 7 was reaffirmed in Mast, F. & Co. v. Stover Mfg. Co. 177 U.S. 485, 494 , 495 S., 44 L. ed. 856, 860, 861, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 708.
But, as held in Hohorst v. Hamburg-American Packet Co. 148 U.S. 262 , 37 L. ed. 443, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 590, that rule does not apply to cases where the liability of the defendants is alleged to be joint; and, therefore, cannot to a case in which there is but a single defendant.
The rule is discharged, and the application for a writ of mandamus is denied.

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