Source: http://www.lareau-law.ca/superiortwo.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 08:34:45+00:00

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A person bears no criminal responsibility if he acts to exercise rights or fulfill duties determined by law or an order ruled by a competent authority, unless the order is obviously unlawful.
When the criminal act is committed as a result of an unlawful order, then the person who has given such an order shall be held responsible."
In drafting this section we faced the general problem of whether there were other hierarchical organizations in which obedience to orders ought to be similarly formalized as a defense, having in mind particularly the police as a possibility, but the conclusion of both theadvisors and the Council and the Reporters was that the tradition of individualliability is so strong in relation to these organizations -- these civilian organizations -- that no innovations ought to be suggested. To some extent a mistake of law has been given a little broader scope for the protectionof innocence in the justification section, but we thought that we ought not to go beyond that.
However, in the case of the military you have a special situation. You are dealing with a group which is under its own type of discipline, subject to its own type of punitive sanctions; and, what is more, it surely is the truth that existing laws afford some sanction to this defence. So we decided to include it."
It is an affirmative defense that the actor, inengaging in the conduct charged to constitute an offense, does no morethan execute an order of his superior in the armed services which he doesnot know to be unlawful.
5.0. Quiconque agit en obéissance à des ordres supérieurs ne sera pas exonéré de responsabilité pour son acte s'il avait des raisons sérieuses de croire que son acte constituait un crime et qu'il avait un choix moral de refuser d'obéir à l'ordre.
(iii) doing the act or making the omission is reasonably proportionate to the harm or detriment threatened.
conspiracy rendered himself or herself liable to have such threatsmade to the person.
(2) Whether any particular order so given is or is not manifestly unlawful is a question of law."
(1) It is lawful for any person acting in good faith in obedience to an order, not manifestly unlawful, given by a sheriff or justice for the suppression of a riot, to use such force as he believes on reasonable grounds to be necessary for carrying such order into effect.
(2) It is a question of law whether any particular order is manifestly unlawful or not.
(1) It is lawful for a person who is bound by military law to obey the lawful commands of his superior officer to obey any command given him by such officer for the suppression of a riot, unless the command is manifestly unlawful.
(2) It is a question of law whether any particular command is manifestlyunlawful or not.
But this protection does not extend to an act or omission which would constitute an offence punishable with strict security life imprisonment, or an offence of which grievous bodily harm to the person of another, or an intention to cause such harm, is an element, nor to a person who has, by entering into an unlawful association or conspiracy, rendered himself liable to have such threats made to him.
"Art. 16. The act shall not be considered delinquent if it has been committed in fulfilment of an illegitimate official order, given by the established order, if it does not suppose a crime obvious to the perpetrator."
Apart from soldiers, our law recognizes that 'some persons stand in such a relation of subjection to others that they are bound, within certain limits, to obey the orders given them by such others.' Where this necessitas parendi exists and obedience results in the commission of a crime by the subordinate he is excused from liability provided the crime is not a serious one.
The fact that the defendant acted pursuant to order of his Government or of a superior shall not free him from responsibility, but may be considered in mitigation of punishment if the Tribunal determines that justice so requires."
I. The general rule is that mere command is not a defense to a crime.
A. A servant is criminally responsible for a criminalact even though committed at the command of the master.
B. An infant is criminally responsible for a criminal act although such act was done at the command of the parent.
C. A wife is criminally responsible for the commission of a criminal act, although she acts under a command from her husband.
D. A tenant is criminally responsible for the doing of a criminal act, although such act was done at the command of his landlord.
A. An individual is not criminally responsible for a criminal act committed at the command of a police officer to assist such officer, even though the officer is proceeding without authority.
B. One who commits a criminal act under a command of the law, is excused by reason of such command.
C. One who commits a criminal act under a command of a court is excused from criminal liability in obeying such command.
Nul n'est tenu d'exercer un ordre manifestement illégal, lorsque celui-ci porte atteinte aux droits et libertés de la personne humaine."
"Article 17. Le subordonné est tenu de se conformer aux instructions de l'autorité, sauf dans le cas où l'ordre donné est manifestement illégal et de nature à compromettre gravement un intérêt public. Si le subordonné croit se trouver en présence d'un tel ordre, il a le devoir de faire part de ses objections à l'autorité qui l'a donné, en indiquant expressément la signification illégale qu'il attache à l'ordre litigieux."
N'est pas pénalement responsable la personne qui accomplit un acte prescrit ou autorisé par des dispositions législatives ou réglementaires.
A person is not criminally liable who performs an act prescribed or authorised by legislative or regulatory provisions.
"La contrainte morale présente un intérêt particulier en matière d'infractions internationales en raison du rôle que joue dans ce domaine l'ordre hiérarchique(65). Comme nous l'avons déjà constaté, les infractions internationales se caractérisent pour la plupart par le fait que celui qui les commet, ne le fait pas de sa propre inspiration et pour son propre compte: le plus souvent il le fait sur l'ordre reçu de son gouvernement ou de son supérieur hiérarchique. Il suffit, en effet, de penser à des infractions telles que le déclenchement d'une guerre d'agression, aux crimes de guerre, aux crimes contre l'humanité, y compris le génocide, etc.
Paragraph 39 - There is no crime if the act occurs in performance of a duty prescribed by the Code.
(1) If he commits the act in good faith in the performance of his legal duty or if he considers that carrying it out is within his jurisdiction.
(2) If he commits the act in performance of an order from a superior which he is obliged to obey or which he feels he is obliged to obey. It must be established in these circumstances that the belief of the offender in the legitimacy of the act is reasonable and that he committed the act only after taking suitable precautions. Moreover, there is no penalty in the second instance if the Code does not afford the official an opportunity to question the order issued to him."
"Article 51. Exercise of a Right or Performance of a Duty.
The exercise of a right or performance of a duty imposed by law or by lawful order of the public authorities shall preclude punishability.
If an act constituting an offense is committed by order of the authorities, the public officer who has issued the order shall be liable for the offense.
The person who has carried out the order shall also be liable for the offense, except where, owing to error of fact, he believed he was obeying a lawful order.
One who carries out an unlawful order shall not be punishable when the law does not permit him to question the lawfulnesss of the order.
Se un fatto costituente reato è commesso per ordine dell'Autorità, del reato risponde il pubblico ufficiale che ha dato l'ordine.
Risponde del reato altresì chi ha eseguito l'ordine, salvo che, per errore di fatto, abbia ritenuto di obbedire a un ordine legittimo.
L'exercise d'un droit ou l'accomplissement d'un devoir, imposé par une règle juridique ou par ordre légitime de l'Autorité publique, n'est pas punissable.
Si un fait, constituant une infraction, est commis par ordre de l'Autorité publique, le fonctionnaire public qui l'a ordonné en répond toujours.
Celui qui a exécuté l'ordre répond aussi de l'infraction, à moins que, par suite d'une erreur de fait, il n'ait cru obéir à un ordre légitime.
N'est pas punissable celui qui exécute un ordre illégitime, lorsque la loi ne lui accorde aucun moyen de se rendre compte de la légitimité de cet ordre.
1. The causation of damage to interests protected by the present Code by a person who acted in pursuance of an order or instruction obligatory for him shall not be considered a crime. Criminal liability for the causation of such damage shall be borne by a person who issued an illegal order or instruction.
2. A person having committed a deliberate crime in pursuance of an inherently illegal order or instruction, shall bear criminal liability on general bases. Non-execution of a deliberately illegal order or instruction shall exclude criminal liability."
(1) Cpr. Garraud, op. cit., I, p. 391 et suiv.
(2) c. 13, C. XXIII, q. 5.
(3) c. 14, C. XXIII, q. 5; c. 41, ead. causa. -- Cpr. art. 327, C.pén.
Cas dans lesquels il s'agit de l'obéissance d'un inférieur vis-àvis un supérieur. Obéissance hiérarchique .
-- La loi ne peut pas fonctionner par sa seule vertu: elle a besoin d'aide nombreux, se mouvant chacun dans une sphère d'attributions déterminées. Cette masse de fonctionnaires est nécessairement composée de chefs et de subalternes: ceux-ci sont soumis à la direction des premiers et leur doivent obéissance.
Nous allons d'abord étudier l'obéissance hiérarchique, par rapport aux fonctionnaires de l'ordre civil.
Lorsqu'un homme investi d'une fonction publique, donne à son subordonné l'ordre d'exécuter un acte, qu'il était dans ses attributions de commander, le subordonné n'en est pas responsable. Mais il faut remarquer, que l'obéissance n'est due au supérieur que dans la sphère de ses pouvoirs: l'inférieur n'est donc pas dispensé de toute vérification; il a pour droit et pour devoir d'examiner, si l'ordre de son chef se rattache à ses fonctions légales et fait partie de leur exercice.
Lorsqu'un subalterne obéit à un ordre injuste, que son supérieur n'avait pas le droit de lui donner, y a-t-il cas de justification?
Nous estimons, qu'il faut résoudre cette question en faisant une distinction: s'il est prouvé que le subordonné a exécuté l'ordre illicite, en connaissant l'injustice, il ne sera pas justifié; si, au contraire, on ne peut prouver, qu'il avait conscience de violer la loi, en accomplissant l'ordre de son supérieur, la présomption est en sa faveur; on ne pourra lui infliger aucune peine.
Cette présomption, est celle de la bonne foi dans laquelle se trouve le subordonné en exécutant l'ordre de son supérieur. Elle doit d'autant plus lui être favorable, que le devoir d'obéissance lui est formellement imposé, comme règle générale sous menace de blâme ou de peines disciplinaires.
Nous allons maintenant nous occuper de l'obéissance hiérarchique, par rapport aux fonctionnaires de l'ordre militaire.
Les conséquences du refus d'obéir, ne sont pas les mêmes pour les fonctionnaires civils, que pour les militaires.
Le délit du militaire résistant à son supérieur, peut avoir des conséquences graves et terribles; il est beaucoup plus grave que du celui fonctionnaire civil. Aussi les codes de l'armée de terre et de l'armée de mer contiennent-ils des dispositions sévères pour le refus d'obéissance (art. 118, C. J. M.; art. 294, C. P.) pour l'armée de mer. Ces dispositions assurent l'accomplissement du devoir d'obéissance. Les exigences de la discipline militaire, veulent une obéissance passive; le militaire n'a pas à apprécier la légitimité et l'opportunité de l'acte qui lui est ordonné. Il ne doit pas raisoner, il doit accomplir le fait qui lui est commandé par son chef, parce que sa mission est toute d'abnégation et d'obéissance. Aussi certains écrivains partisans de la doctrine de l'obéissance passive, que nous considérons comme trop absolue pour être vraie, déclarent-ils le militaire sous les armes non responsable de ses actions.
L'obéissance hiérarchique est l'un des principes fondamentaux de l'ordre social; elle suppose la légitimitéde l'ordre et du commandement, et couvre les agents qui l'ont exécuté. Cependant, il est des cas où, d'après nous, le soldat ne pourra être justifié, s'il accomplit un fait illicite, qui ne se rattache pas au service militaire et dont la criminalité est tellement évidente, qu'elle ne peut lui échapper.
On ne peut pas dire, en effet, que le militaire n'est qu'un instrument matériel, qu'il doit abdiquer sa conscience et être considéré comme privé de discernement lorsqu'il reçoit un ordre lui commandant une entreprise criminelle ou un acte immoral. De même qu'il ne doit obéir qu'aux chefs, sous les ordres desquels il est placé et doit obéissance, qu'autant que les ordres de ces chefs sont pris dans les limites de leur autorité, de même il ne doit pas accomplir l'acte qui lui est ordonné, lorsque la criminalité de cet acte est manifeste, et qu'il n'a pu la croire légitime.
The delegation of the Holy See voted in favour of Article 77. It keenly regrets that this article failed to obtain the necessary majority. By codifying the principle established at Nurnberg, it confirmed a major development in humanitarian law.
Article 77 in no way encouraged indiscipline in the armed forces, as has been claimed, but emphasized and encouraged the responsibility of everyone, whatever his rank. In so doing, it acknowledged the rights and also the obligations of the individual conscience.
By rejecting Article 77, the Conference has placed future combatants in a dilemma: to obey superior orders involving them in grave breaches of the Conventions and the Protocol, with the risk of being brought before a victor's court, as at Nurnberg; or to follow the dictates of their conscience and refuse to obey such orders, with the risk of finding themselves facing the law of their own country in all its stringency.
We may be certain that, in most cases, they will prefer to gamble, so to speak, on their country's victory, and carry out the orders they receive, no matter what their nature.
Thus, in rejecting Article 77, the Conference hasin a sense written off the principles of law established at Nurnberg: inother words, it has taken humanitarian law back a step.
"The situation in which one agent commands another to hurt a third turns up time and again as a significant theme in human relations. It is powerfully expressed in the story of Abraham, who is commanded by God to kill his son. It is no accident that Kierkegaard, seeking to orient his thought to the central themes of human experience, chose Abraham's conflict as the springboard to his philosophy.
War too moves forward on the triad of an authority which commands a person to destroy the enemy, and perhaps all organized hostility may be viewed as a theme and variation on the three elementsof authority, executant, and victim.2 We describe an expirimental program, recently conducted at Yale University ,in which a particular expression of this conflict is studied by experimental means.
In its most general form the problem may be defined thus: if X tells Y to hurt A, under what conditions will Y carry out the command of X and under what conditions will he refuse. In the more limited form possible in laboratory research, the question becomes: if an experimenter tells a subject to hurt another person, under what conditions will the subject go along with this instruction,and under what conditions will he refuse to obey. The laboratory problem is not so much a dilution of the general statement as one concrete expression of the many particular forms this question may assume.
44.1. Causing harm to the rights and interests protected by this Code in the course of fulfilling mandatory orders or decrees shall not constitute a crime. The person giving an illegal order or decree shall be subject to criminal liability for the harm caused.
44.2. A person causing harm to others’ rights and interests protected by this Code by fulfilling a knowingly illegal order or decree shall be subject to criminal liability. A person who fails to fulfill a knowingly illegal order or decree shall not be subject to criminal liability."
(2) It is a question of law whether any particular commandis manifestly unlawful or not."
Tout individu, tout agent de l'État, qui se rendrait coupable d'acte de tortures, de sévices ou de traitements, inhumains ou dégradants dans l'exercice ou à l'occasion de l'exercice de ses fonctions, soit de sa propre initiative, soit sur instructions, sera puni conformément à la loi."
1- The act is not criminally punishable when its unlawfulness is excluded by the legal system considered as a whole.
d) With the consent of the holder of the harmed legal interest."
1 O facto não é punível quando a sua ilicitude for excluída pela ordem jurídica considerada na sua totalidade.
d) Com o consentimento do titular do interesse jurídico lesado."
2. For the purposes of this article, orders to commit genocide or crimes against humanity are manifestly unlawful."
c) L'ordre n'ait pas été manifestement illégal.
2. Aux fins du présent article, l'ordre de commettre un génocide ou un crime contre l'humanité est manifestement illégal."
1. Infliction of harm to legally protected interests shall not beto qualified as an act of crime provided it was caused by a person acting in execution of an order or instruction binding on him. Criminal responsibility for infliction of such harm shall be borne by a person who gave illegal order or instruction.
2. Person who committed intentional offence in execution of order or of instruction known to be illegal, shall be liable under usual terms. Failure to execute order or instruction known to be illegal shall preclude criminal liability."
1. The causing of harm to interests protected by a criminal law by a person acting in performance of an order or instruction binding on him shall not be a crime. The person who gave the illegal order or instruction shall bear criminal responsibility for causing such harm.
SIMPSON, Gerry J., "Didactic and Dissent Histories in War Crimes Trials", (1996-97) 60 Albany Law Review 801-839, and see "Defenses", at pp.
SUPERIOR ORDERS TO EMPLOY FORCE.
In all cases in which force is used against the person of another, both the person who orders such force to be used and the person using that force is responsible for its use, and neither of them is justified by the circumstance that he acts in obedience to orders given him by a civil or military superior, but the fact that he did so act, and the fact that the order was apparently lawful, are in all cases relevant to the question whether he believed, in good faith and on reasonable grounds, in the existence of a state of facts which would have justified what he did apart from such orders,3 or which might justify his superior officer in giving such orders.
(1.) 4A, a marine, is ordered by his superior officer on board a man-of-war to prevent boats from approaching the ship, and has ammunition given him for that purpose. Boats persisting after repeated warnings in approaching the ship A fires at one and kills B. This is murder in A, although he fired under the impression that it was his duty to do so, as the act was not necessary for the preservation of the ship [though desirable for the maintenance of discipline].
4 R. v. Thomas,1 Russ. Cr. 823; 4 M. & S. 441.
(2.) 1A, the driver of an engine, orders B, the stoker (whose duty it is to obey his orders), not to stop the engine. The train runs into another in consequence, and C is killed. B is justified by A's order.
1R. v. Trainer, 4 F. & F. 105; 1 Russ. Cr. (5th ed.) 837, 838. The language of Willes, J., in this case seems to be a little too wide, unless it is taken in connection with the particular facts.
"By the ordinary principles of the common law they [the soldiers]are, speaking generally, justified only in using such force as is reasonably necessary for the supression of a riot. By the Mutiny Act and the Articles of War they are bound to execute any lawful order which they may receive from their military superior, and an order to fire upon a mob is lawful if such an act is reasonably necessary. An order to do more than might be reasonably necessary for the dispersion of rioters would not be a lawful order. The hardship upon soldiers is, that if a soldier kills a man in obedience to his officer's orders, the question whether what was done was more than was reasonably necessary has to be decided by a jury, propably upon a trial for murder; whereas, if he disobeys his officer's orders to fire because he regards them as unlawful, the question whether they were unlawful as having commanded something not reasonably necessary would have to be decided by a court-martial upon the trial of the soldierfor disobeying orders, and for obvious reasons the jury and the court-martial are likely to take different views as to the reasonable necessity and therefore as to the lawfulness of such an order.
1 Si l'exécution d'un ordre constitue un acte punissable, le chef ou le supérieur qui a donné l'ordre est punissable comme auteur de l'infraction.
2 Le subordonné est aussi punissable s'il s'est rendu compte qu'en donnant suite à l'ordre reçu il participait à la commission d'un acte punissable; le juge pourra atténuer librement la peine (art. 47) ou exempter le prévenu de toute peine.
1 Les supérieurs et les aides de commandement qu'ils ont habilités ont le droit de donner des ordres à leurs subordonnés dans les affaires relevant du service.
2 Les militaires doivent obéissance à leurs supérieurs dans les affaires relevant du service.
- D. 44, 7, 20 : servus non in omnibus rebus sine poena domini dictoaudiens esse solet : sicuti di dominus hominem occidere, aut furtum alicuifacere servum jussisset (...). La glose judicium dare résume ainsi la doctrine sur la contrainte: ... si autem jussudomini et in atrocioribus et in atrocioribus, non excusatur: sed minuspunitur (...) In non atrocioribus in totum excusatur per l. istam (...).
- D. 50, 17, 157 (199): ad ea quae non habent atrocitatem facinoris vel sceleris, ognoscitur servis, si vel dominis, vel his qui vice dominorumsunt (veluti tutoribus et et curatoribus) obtemperaverint.
- Gl. uti sur VIo 5, 11, 11: Et sic mandans et mandatarius eadem poena puniuntur (...), nec excusat hicjussus majoris (...) La référence aux Decisionesde Guy Pape est inexacte: il faut lire qu. 340 et non 240. Le sommaire est le suivant: de jussu judicis. Voici la solution de l'auteur: Nondebet quis obedire judici in his quae a jure fieri prohibentur, alias punitur.
(2) - Gl. ad ea sur D. 50, 17, 157 (199): cf. § 1. Le texte est à peu près celui de la glose judicium daresur D. 44, 7, 20 et que nous avons rapporté supra § 1, note2."
"26. Obedience to superior orders shall be no defence if law enforcement officials knew that an order to use force and firearms resulting in the death or serious injury of a person was manifestly unlawful and had a reasonable opportunity to refuse to follow it. In any case, responsibility also rests on the superiors who gave the unlawful orders."
* In accordance with the commentary to article 1 of the Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, the term ''law enforcement officials" includes all officers of the law, whether appointed or elected, who exercise police powers, especially the powers of arrest or detention. In countries where police powers are exercised by military authorities, whether uniformed or not, or by State security forces, the definition of law enforcement officials shall be regarded as including officers of such services."
"An individual who violates international law cannot avoid his responsibility therefor on the ground that his act was authorized by the State, or even that it was obligatory under internal law.
warfare may be controversial; or that an act otherwise amounting toa war crime may be done in obedience to orders conceived as a measure of reprisal. At the same time it must be borne in mind that members of the armed forces are bound to obey only lawful orders (e. g., UCMJ, Art. 92)".(p. Appendix A-120; note: CCMJ=Uniform Code of Military Justice (64 Stat.108; 50 U.S. C. 551-736).
b. an unlawful order that the person did not know, and could not reasonably be expected to have known, was unlawful.
3. Australian Defence Force Publication 201 Australian Defence Force Discipline Act 1982 Manual Vols 1-2, Canberra, Australian Defence Force.(Henceforth &ldquo;DFDA Manual&rdquo;).
4. DFDA s 27; DFDA Manual 'Commentary on Part III -- Offences' pp. 4-33.
5. DFDA Manual pp. 4-33.
6. DFDA s 27; DFDA Manual pp. 4-32.
7. This defence exculpates subordinates who 'were just following orders'.

References: art. 327
 art. 294
 v. 
 v. 
 § 1
 § 1
 Art. 92