Source: https://www.legalethicsforum.com/blog/2011/02/index.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 11:08:22+00:00

Document:
The ABA Journal is now reporting on a story that had been first reported in Mother Jones. According to MoJo, Deputy Attorney General Jeffrey Cox has a history of making inflammatory comments on Twitter and on his personal blog, ProCynic. He became involved in an exchange on Twitter with a MoJo staffer who had Tweeted that police might remove demonstraters from the Wisconsin state capitol building. A Twitter user, identified as JCCentCom, responded, "use live ammunition." In the subsequent corrrespondence, JCCentCom tweeted that the demonstrators were "political enemies" and "thugs" who were "physically threatening legally elected officials" and said, "You're damned right I advocate deadly force." (The MoJo story includes screen captures of the tweets, as well as prior on-line comments of a similar nature.) JCCentCom turned out to be Jeffrey Cox, an attorney in the Indiana AG's office.
Leaving aside whether the right way to characterize JCCentCom's postings is "incivil," the firing raises an interesting First Amendment question. Ordinary citizens can say pretty much what this attorney said and not be punished. Take the case of Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969). The defendant had announced that he would not report for the draft and said, "If they ever make me carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is LBJ." The Court avoided the constitutional issue by concluding that the statute proscribing willful threats against the life of the president was not violated by hyperbolic statements like this. Nevertheless, reading Watts along with contemporaneously decided cases such as Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), yields a well established constitutional principle that the government cannot penalize private citizens for making hyperbolic threats, unaccompanied by a clear and present danger of violence.
The situation is different where lawyers are involved, however. There are some state court cases involving threats by lawyers, in which the courts summarily rejected the lawyers' First Amendment arguments. See, e.g., Florida Bar v. Sayler, 721 So. 2d 1152 (Fla. 1998) (sending adversary a newspaper article about workers’ compensation lawyers who had been murdered); In re Beaver, 510 N.W.2d 129 (Wis. 1994) (threatening to kill adversary); In re Belue, 766 P.2d 206 (Mont. 1988) (threatening to beat up public defender and shoot sheriff’s deputy). In general courts are not very receptive to lawyers making free speech claims, even in contexts in which ordinary citizens would clearly be privileged to say the same thing. Speech critical of judges, for example, is treated very differently where the speaker is a lawyer. And in the Gentile case, citing opinions by Judge Cardozo from the New York Court of Appeals, Justice Rehnquist revived the constitutional right/privilege distinction when he said lawyers representing clients in pending cases are subject to restrictions on speech that would be unconstitutional as applied to the litigants. Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030 (1991).
The fact that Cox was a government lawyer doesn't really simplify the constitutional analysis. Government employees have some rights to say outrageous things. In Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987), for example, an employee of the county sheriff’s office heard that someone had attempted to assassinate President Reagan, and remarked, "[i]f they go for him again, I hope they get him." Applying the test from Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983), the Court reasoned that the sheriff’s interest in the effective functioning of his office did not outweigh the employee’s right to speak out on matters of public concern. But then subsequently, in Waters v. Churchill, 114 S. Ct. 1878 (1994), the Court held that a public hospital employee could be fired for criticizing her department, because the state’s interest in the efficient operation of the hospital outweighed the employee’s free expression rights.
So what's the right resolution of this case? I'm not entirely sure what I think. When I was starting out as a legal ethics scholar I wrote a really terrible article -- bloated, overwritten, and poorly organized -- with the thesis that "the law in this area is a mess." I didn't know at the time that "the law is a mess" is not a suitable thesis for a long, turgid article. More to the point, I still think the law is a mess and don't have a good idea how to rationalize it. As a policy matter, I can see the public interest in believing that government lawyers aren't lawless thugs. On the other hand, I don't think people should be required to surrender their right to say intemperate things just because they have become lawyers (or government lawyers). I'll be interested to hear what people think about this case.
Thomas said his wife “started her organization to give 24/7 every day in defense of liberty,” and said he shared her principles.
Thomas also warned in dire terms about what he said was the High Court’s straying from an originalist interpretation of the Constitution. Without mentioning the Democratic healthcare overhaul, Thomas singled out the Commerce Clause – which is at issue in the lawsuits challenging the overhaul that are expected to make their way to the Supreme Court – as an example of an area in which the Supreme Court had strayed, said the source.
[edited after reading the complaint] We previously discussed the Hunton & Williams - Wikileaks developments. Now, Above the News carries new news, including a complaint filed with the DC Bar. I've mostly seen accounts of the language of the companies that made pitches to H&W rather than direct proof that H&W crossed a line. But the complaint has extensive quotations from emails of those companies, suggesting some form of interaction with the firm. It will take some painstaking reading to decide what knowledge and interaction the firm had.
And, to follow up on the comments by Steve and Brad and this earlier post by Steve, is there any point where the press criticism -- as opposed to law suits and formal investigations -- unseals the lawyers' lips under 1.6(b)? My sense is "no," because lawyers are supposed to take the heat.
Via How Appealing, we're told that the Supreme Court in Pennsylvania has clarified that the attorney client privilege covers communications from clients to lawyers and from lawyers to client. I confess that when I learned that some states had viewed the privilege as running one way (i.e., only communications from client to lawyer), I wondered how that distinction could work as a practical matter. Do any of our readers know if any states still have "one way" protection?
"Professors Ask Congress for an Ethics Code for Supreme Court"
According to the article, Congress should impose the "appearance of impropriety" and "appearance of influencing the judge" standards on the Supreme Court. What are the odds that Congress's adoption of those standards will lead to mischief, or worse? Especially given that the current movement is plainly partisan and is largely driven by a single matter that is headed toward the court?
Although I continue to oppose this sort of "solution," at the same time, it mystifies me why the judges who like getting out to dinners, conventions, etc., haven't carefully chosen some conspicuous appearances at venues that cover a wide range of the political spectrum. After reading a lot of the recent coverage on this issue, I haven't seen any suggestions that, for example, Justice Scalia has spoken and appeared at events staged by center left or left groups. If he can't show some balance, he should stop speaking at all of those events.
For those interested in metadata, Shira Scheindlin of the SDNY has an interesting opinion in the context of an FOIA request, in National Day Laborer Organizing Network v. US Immigration and Customs Enforcement Agency.
Interesting post at Jotwell, with link to new paper, Suzanne Le Mire, Testing Times: In-House Counsel and Independence, 14 Legal Ethics.
WSJ Law Blog carries the story. In my experience, the costs associated with DQ motions have risen over the years, as the putative former client and the current client both seek a quasi-indemnity from the firm. As this matter shows, even if the firm survives the motion, the putative former client may still bring a claim against the firm.
I encourage all to read the NYT neat page one story yesterday (2/18) by Ben Weiser showing that lawyers have superstitions, too. The trial lawyers who revealed their own superstitions gently mocked themselves and come away looking better for it. It's nice to see that this most logical of all professions (save only perhaps logicians) has rituals that make no sense in reality, but are the psychological equivalent of comfort food.
ALM: A group within the State Bar of California wants diversity stats to count as 15% of the US News & World Report rankings. (h/t: Althouse) Kudos to Dean Polden of Santa Clara (where i often teach), whose school would benefit greatly from the idea, for saying that diversity stats often relate simply to geography.
Wis Law Journal: Wisconsin debates whether to remain a mandatory bar.
Heralds Scotland: A turf fight between Scotland bar associations is breaking out.
Off topic, but dear to my heart: Kevin Underhill discusses the importance of a good stapler. My advice to young lawyers: get good ones and don't share them. And make sure that in addition to a standard stapler and a big swing-arm one, you have an intermediate stapler for when you have a document 20-50 pages. While you're at it, make sure you have at least one good book-weight as well.

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