Source: http://wakeforestlawreview.com/tag/criminal-law/
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 10:10:15+00:00

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In this criminal case, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the sentencing of Darryl Mills for possession of a firearm by a felon, a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). After pleading guilty to the violation, Mills was sentenced to 70 months in prison based on a finding that his prior conviction of assault with a deadly weapon was a “crime of violence.” Mills argued that his prior conviction was not for a crime of violence, and thus his sentence should be reduced to 37 to 46 months, consistent with sentencing guidelines. The Fourth Circuit held because the district court noted that it would have imposed the 70 month prison sentence regardless of whether the prior conviction was a crime of violence and that the sentencing was substantively reasonable.
In this civil case, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Williams brought suit against police officers in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina for using deadly force when arresting him, in violation of his Fourth Amendment Rights. As the officers attempted a traffic stop, Williams drove his car in the direction of one of the officers, prompting them to shoot Williams. The officers filed a motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. The district court denied the motion finding that a reasonable jury could have determined that the car was not going to pass or had already passed the officer, in which case the use of deadly force would have been excessive. The Fourth Circuit agreed.
In this criminal case, the district court revoked the defendant’s supervised release and sentenced him to 36 months in prison after he was found to have committed assault with a deadly weapon on a government official in violation of his release. The district court held that because assault with a deadly weapon on a government official is categorically a “crime of violence,” they were free to revoke his supervised release and implement the 36 month prison sentence. The Fourth Circuit vacated the revocation holding that assault with a deadly weapon on a government official is not categorically a crime of violence, because the offense can be committed without the requisitemens rea to qualify as a crime of violence. Accordingly, the case was remanded to the district court for resentencing.
In this civil case, plaintiff Anthony Robinson appealed the dismissal of his case against the Department of Education. The district court dismissed his case because it lacked jurisdiction over the claim due to the lack of waiver of sovereign immunity for suits under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA). The issue on appeal was whether Congress waived sovereign immunity for suits under the FCRA. The Fourth Circuit ultimately focused on the term “person” in 15 U.S.C. § 1681(n) and § 1681(o). The Fourth Circuit ultimately refuses to read the word “sovereign” into the word “person, and thus affirmed the dismissal by the district court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
The issue this civil case was what exactly the contractual requirements are in a Purchase and Sale Agreement (PSA). Specifically, what the clause that required Equinor USA to “spud” three wells meant. The district court finding, that the term “spud” required Equinor to drill, but not complete, the wells, was appealed by Pine Resources. Pine Resources contended that the parties clearly intended “spud” to mean complete the wells such that they can be used. The Fourth Circuit decided that the district court was correct in their finding. To come to that decision, the Fourth Circuit considered the record as a whole and whether or not it supported the district court’s conclusion as to the intent of the parties. They found that while there was some evidence that Pine Resources believed the PSA required product, the record—considered as a whole—showed that the PSA merely contemplated, but did not require, the completion of the wells. Thus, the decision by the district court was affirmed.
In this civil case, plaintiff David Watts appealed the dismissal of his suit that Watts violated the Virginia Computer Crimes Act and the Federal Stored Communications Act. There were two issues on appeal. The first was whether the district court’s finding that Hately failed to show necessary injury under his state law claim. The second was the district court’s finding that emails stored by a web-based email service were not considered “electronic storage” under federal law. Regarding the first issue, the Fourth Circuit found both that the district court improperly applied the doctrine of collateral estoppel and that Watts had adequately alleged injury to his person or property. Regarding the second issue, the Fourth Circuit found that “previously opened and delivered emails” stored “in a web-based email client” were considered “electronic storage” under the federal Stored Communications Act. Therefore, they reversed the district court on both the state and federal claims and remanded it for trial.
In this criminal case, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the trial court’s convictions of Miguel Zelaya, Luis Ordonez-Vega, Jorge Sosa, and William Gavidia. Each were convicted of participating in a racketeering conspiracy under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”). Some of the defendants were also convicted of committing violent crimes in related and unrelated events. Appellants were members in the gang, MS-13. Each of the defendants were charged with violent action associated with their racketeering activity. Sosa and Gavidia moved for severance because they had not been charged with murder, unlike the other defendants. Ordonez-Vega moved to exclude testimony from New York police officers who had knowledge about his previous gang affiliation in New York. Sosa moved for mistrial based on a witness’ reference to an uncharged MS-13 murder during her testimony to establish Sosa as a gang member. Gavidia moved for a new trial following the verdict. All four Appellants moved for a judgment of acquittal based on insufficient evidence. All of these motions were denied. Appellants raised multiple issues on appeal including the denial of their motion for acquittal. Sosa and Gavidia challenged the denial of their motions for severance and new trials, Ordonez-Vega challenged the admission of certain evidence, Sosa challenged the jury instructions, and Gavidia challenged his sentence. The Fourth Circuit addressed each of these challenges in turn, articulating the relevant standard for each conviction and applying that standard for the facts relevant to each challenge. Essentially, all of these claims turned on whether there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to come to the conclusions from the trial court. In each of these challenges, the Fourth Circuit found that there was sufficient evidence to support all of the jury’s findings. All of challenged trial court holdings were affirmed. Judge Floyd, dissenting in part, argued that, with respect to some of these convictions, the government lacked sufficient evidence to show that the violence was connected to membership in a gang.
In this civil case, Appellant argued that her unauthorized review and disclosure of confidential personnel files to support her racial and religious discrimination claims constituted protected activity under Title VII. Appellant filed a complaint with her employer and the EEOC. Appellant reviewed, copied, and supplied the confidential personnel files to support her claims. After she was discharged by her employer, she filed a new charge with the EEOC. The EEOC dismissed the charged but allowed her to supplement her existing Title VII discrimination complaint with a new retaliation claim. After discovery, the district court granted summary judgment to Appellant’s employer on all claims. Appellant filed an appeal, challenging only the portion of the district court’s order that concerns her retaliation claim. The Fourth Circuit held that Appellants actions were in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 153A–98(f) which establishes a Class 3 misdemeanor for “knowingly and willfully examin[ing] . . . , remov[ing] or copy[ing] any portion of a confidential personnel file” without authorized access. Further, illegal actions do not constitute a protected activity for participation clause claims under Title VII. Thus, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court.
On August 22, 2018, the Fourth Circuit decided United States v. Hodge, clarifying whether the government may ask a district court to designate a conviction as an Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) predicate conviction, when that conviction was not so designated during the initial sentencing. In 2011, Garnett Hodge pleaded guilty to possession of crack cocaine with intent to distribute and possession of a firearm as a felon. Because of his prior convictions, Mr. Hodge was eligible for a “sentence enhancement” under the ACCA. The ACCA states that a person convicted of possession of a firearm as a felon, who also has three prior “violent felony” or “serious drug offense” convictions, must receive a mandatory minimum of fifteen years in prison. Mr. Hodge’s Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) designated exactly three qualifying, or ACCA predicate, convictions: a July 1992 felony drug possession with intent to distribute, a July 1998 felony drug possession with intent to distribute, and three counts of misdemeanor reckless endangerment in 1998. The drug possession felonies qualified as “serious drug offense[s],” and – at the time – the misdemeanor reckless endangerment qualified as a “violent felony.” But another section of Mr. Hodge’s PSR, labeled “criminal history,” enumerated seven additional convictions. One of those convictions, a March 1992 felony cocaine possession with attempt to distribute, could have been designated in the PSR as an ACCA predicate conviction, as it was identical to the other cocaine possession charges that were so designated. But, for some reason, the Probation Office that prepared the PSR failed to designate the March 1992 felony as a qualifying predicate conviction, and the Government did not object to the Probation Office’s failure to so designate that conviction.
After his plea, Mr. Hodge was sentenced to 188 months of imprisonment on the cocaine charge and 204 months of imprisonment on the firearm charge, running concurrently. In 2014, Mr. Hodge filed his first motion to vacate his sentence in district court, but it was dismissed as untimely. In 2015, however, the United States Supreme Court “substantially narrowed” the ACCA’s definition of a “violent felony” in Johnson v. United States (referred to as Johnson II). Specifically, Johnson II struck down the ACCA’s “residual clause,” which classified “conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another” as a “violent felony” for purposes of sentence enhancement. The Supreme Court then declared in Welch v. United States that Johnson II would apply “retroactively on collateral review.” Pursuant to those rulings, the Fourth Circuit gave Mr. Hodge permission to file another motion to vacate his sentence.
Mr. Hodge asserted that his reckless endangerment conviction was only an ACCA predicate conviction because of the now-unconstitutional residual clause. Because the reckless endangerment conviction no longer qualified as an ACCA predicate conviction, he only had two predicate convictions and the mandatory minimum of fifteen years did not apply.
The Government agreed with Mr. Hodge that the reckless endangerment conviction no longer qualified as an ACCA predicate conviction, and it initially recommended to the district court that Mr. Hodge be resentenced. But ten days after filing papers agreeing with Mr. Hodge, the Government evidently discovered the March 1992 drug conviction could have served as a predicate conviction, if it had been so designated. The Government therefore chose to argue that Mr. Hodge had four predicate convictions, and that the failure to designate the March 1992 conviction on the PSR notwithstanding, that conviction could be substituted for the reckless endangerment conviction that no longer qualified as an ACCA predicate. In order to excuse its failure to object to the Probation Office’s non-designation of the March 1992 conviction, the Government claimed that it would have been superfluous to designate more than three convictions.
When the Government fails to designate a potential ACCA predicate conviction as such, it may not then seek it so designated in later proceedings to support an ACCA enhancement. The Fourth Circuit therefore reversed the district court’s denial of Mr. Hodge’s motion to vacate his sentence and remanded for resentencing. As of this writing, the resentencing hearing has not yet been scheduled.
 902 F.3d 420 (4th Cir. 2018).
 Hodge, 902 F.3d at 424–25.
 136 S. Ct. 1257 (2016).
 Hodge, 902 F.3d at 425.
 Hodge v. United States, No. 1:16-CV-781, 2016 WL 7480397, at *3 (M.D.N.C. Dec. 29, 2016).
 Hodge, 902 F.3d at 426.
 Id. (quoting United States v. O’Neal, 180 F.3d 115, 125–26 (4th Cir. 1999)).
 Id. (quoting United States v. Moore, 208 F.3d 411, 414 (2d Cir. 2000)).
 Id. (quoting United States v. Fernandez-Jorge, 894 F.3d 36, 54 n.16 (1st Cir. 2018)).
 738 F.3d 1253, 1256–57 (11th Cir. 2013), overruled on other grounds by McCarthan v. Dir. of Goodwill Indus.-Suncoast, Inc., 851 F.3d 1076 (11th Cir. 2017).
 703 F.3d 1290 (11th Cir. 2013), abrogated on other grounds by Johnson II, 135 S. Ct. 2551.
 Hodge, 902 F.3d at 430.

References: § 922
 § 1681
 § 1681
 § 153
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