Source: https://onlineliabilityblog.com/doe-v-gte-corporation/
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 20:42:29+00:00

Document:
PLAINTIFFS: John Doe and other members of the football team at Illinois State University, wrestlers at Northwestern University, and varsity athletes from several other universities.
DEFENDANTS: Only defendants remaining on appeal are GTE Corporation and Genuity Inc (formerly known as GTE Internetworking). Both entities are subsidiaries of Verizon Communications and are collectively referred to herein as “GTE”). Other defendants below were the persons and organizations that allegedly offered the tapes for sale, college officials who had allegedly failed to detect the cameras (or prevent their installation), and PSInet (liquidated in bankruptcy).
CAUSES OF ACTION: Violations of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, negligent entrustment of a chattel, public nuisance.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY: The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Charles P. Kocoras, Chief Judge, dismissed action. Athletes appealed.
While the “plaintiffs rely on 18 U.S.C. § 2511 and § 2520, two provisions of that statute” . . . the Court could not identify a “source of liability for a web host” under either statute. The Court also rejected plaintiffs’ “negligent entrustment of a chattel” and public nuisance claims – without any reference to Section 230 – but not before it weighed in with its reading (dictum?) of Section 230(c).
The Court asked “[w]hy should a law designed to eliminate ISPs’ liability to the creators of offensive material end up defeating claims by the victims of tortious or criminal conduct? . . . Why not read § 230(c)(1) as a definitional clause rather than as an immunity from liability, and thus harmonize the text with the caption [the caption reads “Protection for “Good Samaritan” blocking and screening of offensive material”]? . . . On this reading, an entity would remain a “provider or user”-and thus be eligible for the immunity under § 230(c)(2)-as long as the information came from someone else; but it would become a “publisher or speaker” and lose the benefit of § 230(c)(2) if it created the objectionable information. The difference between this reading and the district court’s is that § 230(c)(2) never requires ISPs to filter offensive content, and thus § 230(e)(3) would not preempt state laws or common-law doctrines that induce or require ISPs to protect the interests of third parties, such as the spied-on plaintiffs, for such laws would not be “inconsistent with” this understanding of § 230(c)(1). There is yet another possibility: perhaps § 230(c)(1) forecloses any liability that depends on deeming the ISP a “publisher”-defamation law would be a good example of such liability-while permitting the states to regulate ISPs in their capacity as intermediaries.
However, the panel suggests at least two arguments plaintiffs perhaps should have considered: (i) GTE published the tapes, and thereby may have owed a duty to plaintiffs and/or (ii) by contracting with the sellers, GTE assumed a duty to protect the third-party plaintiffs.

References: § 2511
 § 2520
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