Source: http://supreme.nolo.com/us/168/1/case.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 04:11:54+00:00

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(3) That in view of the conditions attached to the grant, and of the reservations of power in Congress contained in the act of 1866, such lands became, upon the passage of the Act of July 6, 1886, c. 637, 24 Stat. 123, forfeiting the lands granted to the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Company, the property of the United States, and by force of that act were restored to the public domain, without the Southern Pacific Railroad Company's having acquired any interest therein that affected the ownership of the United States.
A right, question, or fact distinctly put in issue and directly determined by a court of competent jurisdiction as a ground of recovery cannot be disputed in a subsequent suit between the same parties or their privies, and even if the second suit is for a different cause of action, the right, question, or fact once so determined must, as between the same parties or their privies, be taken as conclusively established so long as the judgment in the first suit remains unmodified.
"if any matter alleged in the answer shall make it necessary for the plaintiff to amend his bill, he may have leave to amend the same with or without payment of costs, as the court, or a judge thereof may in his discretion direct"
means, at most, that a general replication is always sufficient to put in issue every material allegation of an answer or amended answer unless the rules of pleading imperatively require an amendment of the bill, and such an amendment is not required in order to set out that which may be used simply as evidence to establish any fact or facts put in issue by the pleadings.
Where a former recovery is given in evidence, it is equally conclusive in its effect as if it were specially pleaded by the way of estoppel.
This suit was brought by the United States to quiet its title to a large tract of land in California, acquired under the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, and now set apart by act of Congress and the President's proclamation, issued thereunder, as part of a public reservation.
The facts involved, and the legislation affecting the rights of the respective parties, do not vary materially from those set forth in United States v. Southern Pacific Railroad, 146 U. S. 570.
to the Southern Pacific Railroad Company to aid in its construction.
2. Under the Act of July 27, 1866, the Atlantic and Pacific Company constructed a part of its road, but did no work west of the Colorado River, the east line of the State of California.
"with the same rights, grants, and privileges, and subject to the same limitations, restrictions, and conditions, as were granted to said Southern Pacific Railroad Company of California by the Act of July 27, 1866, provided, however, that this section shall in no way affect or impair the rights, present or prospective, of the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Company."
4. The Southern Pacific Company constructed such contemplated railroad, and claims in this suit that the lands in dispute passed to it under the act of 1871.
joint resolutions subsequent thereto and relating to the construction of said road and telegraph line be, and the same are hereby, declared forfeited and restored to the public domain."
6. On April 3, 1871, the Southern Pacific Company filed a map of its route from Tehachapa Pass to the Texas Pacific Railroad, and proceeded to construct its road, and finished the entire constriction in 1878. The road crossed the line of the Atlantic and Pacific Company as located. The lands in controversy in the cases reported in 146 U.S. 146 U. S. 570 and 146 U. S. 615 were within the granted or place limits of both the Atlantic and Pacific Company and the Southern Pacific Company at the place where the lines crossed each other. The Southern Pacific Company claimed that, as it had constructed its road, and as the other company had not done the same, the lands became its property. It was to test this claim of title and to restrain trespassed by the railroad company and those claiming title under it that the suits reported in 146 U.S. were instituted.
7. The decisions in those cases were adverse to the Southern Pacific Company. This Court held, as stated in the headnote, that the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Company, having duly filed a valid and sufficient map of definite location of its route from the Colorado River to the Pacific Ocean, which was approved by the Secretary of the Interior, the title to the lands in dispute passed thereby to that company under the grant of July 27, 1866, and remained held by it, subject to a condition subsequent, until the forfeiture under the Act of July 6, 1886, and that by that Act of Forfeiture, the title thereto was retaken by the United States for its own benefit, and not for that of the Southern Pacific Railroad Company, whose grant never attached to the lands so as to give that company any title of any kind to them.
and its privies, the essential facts upon which the government rests.
9. In the former cases, the United States insisted that the controlling matter was whether the maps of location filed by the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Company in 1871, and which were accepted by the Land Department as sufficiently designating that company's line of road under the Act of July 27, 1866, were valid as maps of definite location. The United States contended that they were maps of that character. The Southern Pacific Company contended that they were not. The issue so made was determined in favor of the United States. In this case, the United States insisted that, it having been so determined, and the lands here in dispute being within the limits of the line of road so designated, it was not open to the Southern Pacific Company to question the result reached in the suits reported in 146 U.S. Such maps, it was claimed, sufficiently identified the lands granted by Congress to the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Company by the act of 1866, and were therefore valid maps of definite location.
This suit was brought to obtain a decree quieting the title of the United States to a large body of lands in California acquired under the Treaty of Guadelupe Hidalgo.
sections when the public surveys according to the laws of the United States shall have been extended over such townships -- all of the aforesaid lands being surveyed by San Bernardino base and meridian."
The government suggests that the greater portion of these lands have been set apart under authority of the Act of Congress of March 3, 1891, 26 Stat. 1095, 1103, c. 561, § 24, and by the proclamation of the President of the United States of December 20, 1892, 27 Stat. 1049, as a public reservation.
The principal contention of the United States is that the lands in dispute are in the same category in every respect with those in controversy in United States v. Southern Pacific Railroad, 146 U. S. 570, and United States v. Colton Marble & Lime Co. and United States v. Southern Pacific Railroad, 146 U. S. 615, and that, so far as the question of title is concerned, the judgments in those cases have conclusively determined, as between the United States and the Southern Pacific Railroad Company and its privies, the essential facts upon which the government rests its present claim.
Stated in another form, the United States insists that in the former cases the controlling matter in issue was whether certain maps filed by the Atlantic & Pacific Railroad Company in 1872, and which were accepted by the Land Department as sufficiently designating that company's line of road under the Act of Congress of July 27, 1866, 14 Stat. 292, c. 278, were valid maps of definite location, the United States contending in those cases that they were and the Southern Pacific Railroad Company contending that they were not, maps of that character; that that issue was determined in favor of the United States, and that, as the lands now in dispute are within the limits of the line of road so designated, it is not open to the Southern Pacific Railroad Company in this proceeding to question the former determination that such maps sufficiently identified the lands granted to the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Company by the act of 1866, and were therefore valid maps of definite location.
former cases. Did the former adjudication have the scope attributed to it by the United States? If it did, the decision of the present case will not be difficult.
It is necessary to a clear understanding of the question just stated that we should first look at the provisions of the several acts of Congress relating to the Atlantic and Pacific and Southern Pacific Railroad Companies, and which were referred to and construed in the former cases.
The Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Company was incorporated by the Act of Congress approved July 27, 1866, 14 Stat. 292, c. 278, with authority to construct and maintain a line of railroad and telegraph from a point at or near Springfield, Missouri, to the western boundary line of that state; thence by the most eligible railroad route, to be determined by the company, to the Canadian River; thence to Albuquerque, on the River Del Norte; thence, by way of Agua Frio or other suitable pass, to the headwaters of the Colorado Chiquito; thence along the thirty-fifth parallel of latitude, as near as might be found most suitable for a railroad route, to the Colorado River at such point as might be selected by the company for crossing, and "thence, by the most practical and eligible route, to the Pacific." § 1. In aid of the construction of that line, Congress granted every odd-numbered section of public land (not mineral) to the amount of twenty alternate sections per mile on each side of such line as the company might adopt through any territory of the United States, and ten alternate sections per mile on each side of the line through any state, to which the United States had full title, and not reserved, sold, granted or otherwise appropriated, and free from preemption or other claims or rights, "at the time the line of said road is designated by a plat thereof filed in the office of the Commissioner of the General Land Office." § 3.
Section 4 made provision for patents to be issued to the company for lands opposite to and coterminous with each section of twenty-five miles of road, completed in a good, substantial, and workmanlike manner.
on both sides of the entire line after the general route was fixed and as fast as the construction of the railroad required; that the grants, rights, and privileges specified in the act of Congress were given and accepted subject to the conditions that the company would commence work within two years from the approval of the act, complete not less than fifty miles per year after the second year; construct, equip, furnish, and complete its main line by July 4, 1878, and if the company made any breach of the conditions imposed, and allowed the same to continue for upward of one year, then at any time thereafter, the United States could do any and all acts and things needful and necessary to insure a speedy completion of the road. §§ 6, 8, and 9.
"shall have similar grants of land, subject to all the conditions and limitations herein provided, and shall be required to construct its road on the like regulations, as to time and manner, with the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad herein provided for."
"namely, to promote the public interest and welfare by the construction of said railroad and telegraph line, and keeping the same in working order, and to secure to the government at all times, but particularly in time of war, the use and benefits of the same for postal, military and other purposes, Congress may at any time, having due regard to the rights of said Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Company, add to, alter, amend or repeal this act."
"upon the construction of each section of said road in the manner and within the time provided by law, and notice thereof being given by the company to the Secretary of the Interior, he shall direct an examination of each such section by commissioners to be appointed by the President, as provided in the act making a grant of land to said company, approved July 27th, 1866, and upon the report of the commissioners to the Secretary of the Interior that such section of said railroad and telegraph line has been constructed as required by law, it shall be the duty of the said Secretary of the Interior to cause patents to be issued to said company for the sections of land coterminous to each constructed section reported on as aforesaid, to the extent and amount granted to said company by the said Act of July 27th, 1866, expressly saving and reserving all the rights of actual settlers, together with the other conditions and restrictions provided for in the third section of said act."
"that, for the purpose of connecting the Texas Pacific Railroad with the City of San Francisco, the Southern Pacific Railroad Company of California is hereby authorized (subject to the laws of California) to construct a line of railroad from a point at or near Tehachapa Pass, by way of Los Angeles, to the Texas Pacific Railroad at or near the Colorado River, with the same rights, grants and privileges, and subject to the same limitations, restrictions and conditions as were granted to said Southern Pacific Railroad Company of California by the Act of July twenty-seven, eighteen hundred and sixty-six: provided, however, that this section shall in no way affect or impair the rights, present or prospective, of the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Company or any other railroad company."
The Southern Pacific Railroad Company constructed the road thus contemplated, and claims that the lands here in dispute passed to it under the above act of 1871.
The Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Company built part of its road east of Colorado River, but did not construct any line west of that river or in California.
"that all the lands, excepting the right of way and the right, power and authority given to said corporation to take from the public lands adjacent to the line of said road material of earth, stone, timber and so forth, for the construction thereof, including all necessary grounds for station buildings, workshops, depots, machine shops, switches, side tracks, turntables and water stations, heretofore granted to the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Company by an act of Congress entitled 'An act granting lands to aid in the construction of railroad and telegraph lines from the states of Missouri and Arkansas to the Pacific Coast,' approved July 27th, 1866, and subsequent acts and joint resolutions of Congress, which are adjacent to and coterminous with the uncompleted portions of the main line of said road, embraced within both the granted and the indemnity limits, as contemplated to be constructed under and by the provisions of the said act of July 27th, 1866, and acts and joint resolutions subsequent thereto and relating to the construction of said road and telegraph, be, and the same are hereby, declared forfeited and restored to the public domain."
defendants. In the other, the same company and trustees, together with the City Brick Company, Thomas Goss, Edward Simmons, and A. A. Hubbard, were defendants.
These are the cases reported in 146 U.S. 146 U. S. 570, 146 U. S. 615.
"Your orator alleges that, by and pursuant to said act of Congress, the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Company was created and duly organized, and on November 23, 1866, within the time and in the manner provided in said act, accepted said grant, and did designate the line of its route from Springfield, Missouri, to the Pacific, by maps and plates thereof, which it filed in the office of the Commissioner of the General Land Office in manner following, to-wit: on or about March 9, 1872, said company filed in the office of the Commissioner of the General Land Office maps designating the line of its route, and showing the general features of the country and vicinity, as follows: first, from San Francisco to San Miguel Mission, in California; second, map of its route from San Miguel Mission, via Santa Barbara and San Buenaventura, to a point in township 2 south, range 17 west, San Bernardino base and meridian, in California; third, map of its route from said point last mentioned to a point in township 7 north, range 7 east, San Bernardino base and meridian, in California; fourth, map of its route from said point last named to the Colorado River. And thereafter, on or about March, 1872, said company filed in said office, as aforesaid, its several other maps, designating its route from said point last named to Springfield, in the State of Missouri, making altogether a continuous line, designating its entire route, and showing the general features of the country from said Town of Springfield, Missouri, by way of the points named in said Act of Congress of July 27, 1866, to the Pacific at San Buenaventura, and from there to San Francisco, and in the manner provided in said act, and such designation was accepted by the United States.
Your orator alleges that said several parts of its map, filed as aforesaid, made and constituted the entire route or line of said Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Company, fully designating the whole thereof."
"on March 9, 1872, and on April 22, 1872, the Secretary of the Interior and the Commissioner of the General Land Office, respectively, ordered all the odd sections of land within thirty miles on each side of said designated route of said Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Company reserved from sale and withdrawn;"
"all the lands and rights to lands theretofore granted and conferred upon said Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Company were forfeited, resumed and restored to entry for noncompletion of that portion of said railroad to have been constructed in California."
alleges that the Southern Pacific Railroad Company, which was organized and created on August 12, 1873, by the pretended articles of amalgamation and consolidation of said several railroad companies as heretofore set forth, did construct and complete a railroad from Tehachapi Pass, by way of Los Angeles, to the Colorado River in the manner and within the time prescribed in said act of Congress, in which the Southern Pacific Railroad Company, therein named, was authorized and empowered to do. And thereafter the commissioners appointed under said act for that purpose did unlawfully make and file their alleged acceptance of the whole of said railroad by sections. And there was not, and is not now, any railroad or part thereof constructed or completed under said act or between said points otherwise than as aforesaid."
"on the south side of said route of the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Company, within 30 miles of said route, but also within 20 miles of the pretended designated route of the Southern Pacific Railroad Company, there was not on July 27, 1866, nor on March 12, 1872, nor on April 3, 1871, and is not now, enough public land in the odd sections to equal in amount ten alternate sections per mile of the line of road of said Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Company, within such limits, for that, prior to said date of July 27, 1866, the Mexican government and the United States had sold, granted, reserved, and otherwise disposed of so great a quantity of land in those limits;"
"all of the said lands before described are situated on the south side of the said designated route of the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Company, more than 20 miles but less than 30 miles therefrom, but are less than 20 miles from the said pretended designated route of said Southern Pacific Railroad Company."
defendant herein, but are still owned by the plaintiff,"
and that the Secretary of the Interior, on the 16th day of August, 1887, on behalf of the government and in accordance with law, demanded of said company the relinquishment of its claim to all of the lands described in such patents, and a return of the patents, all of which that company refused to do.
The relief asked was a decree cancelling the patents issued to the Southern Pacific Railroad Company, quieting the title of the government to the lands described therein, and enjoining that company from asserting or claiming any right or title thereto adversely to the United States.
"The defendant admits that, by and under said last-mentioned act of Congress [July 27, 1866], the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Company was created and organized, and did duly accept the provisions of the said law within the time and in the manner provided in said act; but it denies that said Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Company did designate the line of its route from Springfield, in the State of Missouri, to the Pacific Coast, as required by said act."
thereon, are now herein referred to and made part of this answer, and this defendant says that said railroad was not located or attempted to be located on or about March 9, 1872, or at any such time, in California, either in whole or in part, otherwise than as aforesaid by said maps. This defendant denies that the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Company, by or through the filing of said maps, acquired the right to any lands of the United States lying opposite to the lines or route marked on said maps, and denies that said company acquired the right to select any public lands along said routes or lines as 'other lands' in lieu of sections within twenty miles that had been granted, sold, 'reserved, occupied by homestead settlers, or preempted, or otherwise disposed of' by the United States. These maps were sent to the General Land Office by the Secretary of the Interior, with a letter dated March 9, 1872, of which a certified copy is annexed to said answer heretofore filed, marked 'Exhibit B.'"
"This defendant says that the lands mentioned in the amended bill herein lie opposite to the line of route marked on the said map, designated in said letter as 'No. 2' of a portion of the proposed road of the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Company -- that is, a piece of road within the State of California"
"from a point on the western boundary line of Los Angeles County, California, to a point in township seven north, range seven east of San Bernardino meridian, in said state."
"Neither when filed in March, 1872, nor at any such time did it appear that said map represented any part of a line that was, or was intended to be, conjoined to any other part located before that time for the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad."
this defendant, marked 'Exhibit C, Nos. 1 and 2,' and are now herein referred to and made part of this answer. And this defendant denies that said maps constituted a valid location of the parts or fractions of road therein described, and denies that the four maps hereinbefore mentioned of four several parts of the road constituted a valid location of the said Atlantic and Pacific Railroad in California. And it denies that the said Atlantic and Pacific Railroad was ever in any otherwise lawfully located in the State of California. . . . And the defendant says that there is nothing in or upon said maps to identify the same as the line of road mentioned in the said act of Congress."
"on or about March, 1872, the Atlantic and Pacific Company filed in the office of the Commissioner of the General Land Office maps designating its route from the Colorado River to Springfield, in the State of Missouri,"
"said maps made altogether the line of railroad from Springfield, in the State of Missouri, to the Pacific Coast, which was provided for and required by said Act of Congress of July 27, 1866, to be constructed and completed by the said Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Company,"
route of the said Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Company reserved from sale and withdrawn; that about April 22, 1872, the Commissioner of the General Land Office ordered lands withdrawn for thirty miles on each side of the parts of lines of route attempted to be located March 9, 1872, by the two maps hereinbefore mentioned as filed March 9, 1872, his orders being addressed to the register and receiver of the United States land office at San Bernardino, Los Angeles, and Visalia, and were substantially as shown by the certified copy of the commissioner's letter of said date to the officers at Los Angeles, but the defendant denied that the orders of April 22, 1872, had any effect whatever upon its rights and grants, and were intended only to take effect upon public lands not reserved, sold, granted, or otherwise appropriated at the time of filing said maps, March 9, 1872.
"the lands involved in this suit had previously, on the 3d April, 1871, by the filing of the map of definite location of the defendant's railroad, been duly reserved from sale by and under the said 23d section of the Act of Congress of March 3, 1871, and the 6th section of the Act of Congress of July 27, 1866, which said sections are quoted in the bill of complaint herein, and avers also that said lands had been duly withdrawn from market, and appropriated for the use of this defendant by the order of the Commissioner of the General Land Office to the register and receiver of the U.S. land office at Los Angeles, issued April 21, 1871, a copy of which is hereto annexed, marked 'R,' and made a part of this answer."
within thirty miles of such route to be withdrawn from market (certified copy of the map filed by this defendant in the office of the Commissioner of the General Land Office is annexed to the answer heretofore filed by this defendant marked 'Exhibit D,' and the same is now referred to and made part of this answer);"
"it is the same railroad company that constructed the railroad provided for in the 23d section of said Act of Congress of March 3, 1871, and that it fully constructed and completed its road according to said act, and the construction thereof has been accepted and approved by the President of the United States, construction of the last mile of said road having been accepted by President Hayes on the 23d of January, 1878."
"that under and by virtue of said Act of March 3, 1871, and the map of location filed on the 3d day of April, 1871, the lands described in said patent were reserved for and appropriated to this defendant, whose title thereto has become perfect and complete by the construction of its road as prescribed in said act,"
"the said Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Company's pretended line was not located until subsequent to the year 1871; that, when sought or pretended to be located, it was found to be on a wholly unauthorized route, not prescribed or permitted under any act of Congress in relation to or affecting said Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Company."
Railroad Company within such limits, and this defendant admits that the above-described tracts of land are situated more than 20 miles and less than 30 miles from the line of the pretended location of the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad, and less than 20 miles from the said located line of the Southern Pacific Railroad."
"This defendant avers that said tracts of land have been granted by the 23d section of the Act of March 3, 1871, to it, the Southern Pacific Railroad Company. . . ."
"This defendant admits that, under date of March 29, 1876, April 4, 1879, and December 27, 1883, the patents were issued to this defendant for the lands hereinabove described, but denied that such patents were issued inadvertently or without authority. On the contrary, this defendant avers that said patents were issued with due deliberation, and in strict conformity with the law, and that the signatures of the President of the United States and the recorder of the General Land Office thereto were affixed fairly and properly and under the authority of law. This defendant here refers to the Exhibit 1, Nos. 1 and 2, annexed to its answer heretofore filed, and makes the same part of this answer."
"When the grant of lands was made to this defendant, March 3, 1871, and its grant was located, April 3, 1871, all the lands involved in this case were public lands of the United States."
That, the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Company having failed to meet the conditions of the grant by constructing its road in California, the lands to which it had acquired an inchoate title by means of the accepted map designating its line were "restored to the public domain" under the above Act of July 6, 1886, 24 Stat. 123, c. 637, and were not left, upon such statutory forfeiture, to be earned by the Southern Pacific Railroad Company under the junior grant.
That, in any view, the right of the Southern Pacific Railroad Company to those lands attached and became complete upon the forfeiture of the lands and rights granted to the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Company, such forfeiture, it was claimed, not affecting the rights previously acquired by the Southern Pacific Railroad under the accepted maps of the definite location of its line and under the withdrawal from sale of the lands appertaining to that line.
In the former suits, it was conceded that if the maps filed by the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Company in 1872 were valid maps of definite location, sufficiently identifying the lands granted to it, then the lands involved in those suits were within the overlapping limits of the two grants.
"except that the Atlantic and Pacific Company from time to time filed certain fragmentary maps pretending to designate routes, and which, if connected, would not constitute a route such as the act of 1866 authorized it to select."
Southern Pacific Company, to exclude the lands in the overlapping limits at the place of crossing from the latter grant; 3. whether, if such designation was made, the proviso in the 23d section of the above Act of March 3, 1871, protecting the rights, 'present and prospective,' of the Atlantic and Pacific Company, was designed for any other purpose than to save to it any lands which it might eventually earn by a full performance of its undertaking."
Manifestly the fundamental question in the former cases was whether the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Company ever filed any such maps as the act of 1866 contemplated when declaring that the odd-numbered sections granted should be those on the line of the road to which the United States had full title, not reserved, sold, granted, or otherwise appropriated, and free from preemption or other claims or rights, "at the time the line of said road is designated by a plat thereof, filed in the office of the Commissioner of the General Land Office."
"in fact, the line of definite location of the Atlantic and Pacific was established, and maps thereof filed and approved, before any action in that respect was taken by the Southern Pacific Company;"
"there was never a time therefore at which the grant of the Southern Pacific could be said to have attached to these lands, and the plausible argument based thereon, made by counsel for the Southern Pacific Company, falls to the ground;"
"for, when filed, the grant could take effect by relation only as of March 3, 1871 [the date of the grant to it], and at that time, and for nearly five years theretofore, the title to these lands had been in the Atlantic and Pacific;"
"not operate to make the latter grant take effect by relation as of the date of the prior grant and thus subject the grants to the two companies to the rule controlling contemporaneous grants, as established by St. Paul and Sioux City Railroad v. Winona and St. Peter Railroad, 112 U. S. 720, and Sioux City and St. Paul Railroad v. Chicago, Milwaukee &c. Railway, 117 U. S. 406;"
"even if Congress had in terms expressed an intent to that effect in a subsequent act, it was not competent by such legislation to divest the rights already vested in the Atlantic and Pacific Company;"
approved by the Land Department;" and that "unquestionably the grant older in date takes the land;"
"no scramble between companies for the grasping of titles by priority of location, but that it is to be regarded as though title passes as of the date of the act, and to the company having priority of grant, and therefore that, in the eye of the law, it is now as though there never was a period of time during which any title to these lands was in the Southern Pacific,"
"whatever may have been the dates of the filing by the respective companies, the case stands as though the lands granted to the Atlantic and Pacific had been identified in 1866, and title had then passed, and there never was a title of any kind vested in the Southern Pacific Company;"
"if the Act of Forfeiture had not been passed by Congress, the Atlantic and Pacific could yet construct the road, and that, constructing it, its title to these lands would become perfect;"
United States, and the Southern Pacific Railroad Company had "no title of any kind" to them. United States v. Southern Pacific Railroad, 146 U. S. 570, 146 U. S. 607.
v. Northern Pacific Railroad, 139 U. S. 1. Indeed, all the transcontinental roads, it is believed, filed their maps of route in sections. So the question is whether the filing a map of definite location from the Colorado River, through San Buenaventura, to San Francisco, under a claim of right to construct a road the entire distance, is good as a map of definite location from the Colorado River to San Buenaventura, the latter point being the limit of the grant. We think unquestionably it is. Though a party claims more than he is legally entitled to, his claim ought not to be rejected for that to which he has a right. The purpose of filing a map of definite location is to enable the Land Department to designate the lands passing under the grant, and when a map of such a line is filed, full information is given, and, so far as that line may legally extend, the law perfects the title. It surely cannot be that a company must determine at its peril the extent to which its grant may go, or that a mistake in such determination works a forfeiture of all its right to lands."
146 U.S. 146 U. S. 570, 146 U. S. 596.
"Our conclusions, therefore, are that a valid and sufficient map of definite location of its route from the Colorado River to the Pacific Ocean was filed by the Atlantic and Pacific Company and approved by the Secretary of the Interior; that, by such act, the title to these lands passed, under the grant of 1866, to the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Company, and remained held by it subject to a condition subsequent until the Act of Forfeiture of 1886; that, by that Act of Forfeiture, the title of the Atlantic and Pacific was retaken by the general government, and retaken for its benefit, and not that of the Southern Pacific Company, and that the latter company has no title of any kind to these lands."
146 U.S. 146 U. S. 607.
or prospective, of the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Company," operated to except the indemnity lands of the Atlantic and Pacific Company from the grant to the Southern Pacific Company.
The former cases were decided in this Court on the 12th day of December, 1892.
In respect to the "designation of line under the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad maps and the effect and operation thereof."
1877, inclusive, and within the primary and indemnity limits of the grant to the Southern Pacific Railroad Company made by the twenty-third section of the Texas and Pacific Act of March 3, 1871, the 61,939.62 acres patented to that company being opposite to the first and fourth sections of its road. It may be said that the lands here in dispute belong to one or the other of the following classes: lands within the common granted limits of both the Atlantic and Pacific grant of 1866 and the Southern Pacific grant of 1871, lands within the granted limits of the Southern Pacific grant and the indemnity limits of the Atlantic and Pacific grant, lands within the Southern Pacific indemnity limits and the Atlantic and Pacific granted limits, lands within the common indemnity limits of both grants. Of those in dispute, 219,012.93 acres have not been surveyed by the United States.
"are within the limits which would have appertained to the grant to the Atlantic and Pacific upon the 1872 route, if that had been an authorized route and if a definite location had been duly made thereon so as to attach the grant to specific lands."
fixing or locating the line of the road under the act of 1866. The records of those cases having been introduced in the present suit, there is no room for doubt (if those records are competent evidence) as to what was in issue and what was adjudged in the former cases. The maps which in this case are relied upon by the United States as maps of definite location, and which the Southern Pacific Railroad Company denies to be of that character, are the identical maps which the government relied on in the former cases, and the same which that company referred to and made part of its answer in the former litigation, and which were adjudged by this Court, in conformity with the contention of the government, to be valid maps of definite location, the acceptance of which made it impossible for the Southern Pacific Railroad Company to acquire any interest in any lands granted to the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Company that were forfeited to the United States by the act of 1886.
It is said, however, that under the pleadings and evidence in this collateral proceeding, it is open to the Southern Pacific Railroad Company to renew the contest as to the sufficiency of the maps of 1872 filed by the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Company, and to show that they were not maps of definite location.
Is this position consistent with the settled rule of law as to the conclusiveness, between parties and their privies, of the final determination by a court of competent jurisdiction of matters put in issue by the pleadings?
The importance of this question, independently of the magnitude of the interests to be affected by our decision and of the earnest contention of learned counsel, justifies a reference to some of the adjudged cases showing the grounds upon which this salutary rule rests.
once so determined must, as between the same parties or their privies, be taken as conclusively established so long as the judgment in the first suit remains unmodified. This general rule is demanded by the very object for which civil courts have been established, which is to secure the peace and repose of society by the settlement of matters capable of judicial determination. Its enforcement is essential to the maintenance of social order, for the aid of judicial tribunals would not be invoked for the vindication of rights of person and property if, as between parties and their privies, conclusiveness did not attend the judgments of such tribunals in respect of all matters properly put in issue and actually determined by them.
Among the cases in this Court that illustrate the general rule are Hopkins v. Lee, 6 Wheat. 109, 19 U. S. 113; Smith v. Kernochen, 7 How. 198, 48 U. S. 216; Thompson v. Roberts, 24 How. 233, 65 U. S. 240; Washington, Alexandria & Georgetown Steam Packet Co. v. Sickles, 24 How. 333, 65 U. S. 340-341, 65 U. S. 343; Russell v. Place, 94 U. S. 606, 94 U. S. 608; Cromwell v. Sac County, 94 U. S. 351; Campbell v. Rankin, 99 U. S. 261; Lumber Co. v. Buchtel, 101 U. S. 638; Bissell v. Spring Valley Township, 124 U. S. 225, 124 U. S. 230, and Johnson Co. v. Wharton, 152 U. S. 253.
"a judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction upon a question directly involved in one suit is conclusive as to that question in another suit between the same parties;"
suit between the same parties;"
in Lumber Co. v. Buchtel, that, in a suit for the amount of the first installment due on a contract for the purchase of timber lands (the defense being that the defendant had been induced to make the contract by false and fraudulent representations), a judgment based upon a finding that no such representations were made was conclusive in respect of that matter in a subsequent action brought on the contract to recover a different installment; in Bissell v. Spring Valley Township, that an adjudication, in an action on coupons of municipal bonds, sustaining the defense that the municipality never executed the bonds, and that the bonds were not its legal obligations, was conclusive in a subsequent action brought by the same party on different coupons of the same bonds, and in Johnson Co. v. Wharton, that in an action to recover stipulated royalties for a named period for guard rails constructed according to the specifications of a certain patent, in which judgment was given for the plaintiff, the defendant in a second suit, brought to recover like royalties for a later period, could not make the same defense, although, by reason of the small amount in dispute, he was precluded from having the judgment in the first suit reviewed upon writ of error, this Court stating that it was a general rule, having its foundation in a wise public policy, that the final judgment of a court at least one of superior jurisdiction, competent under the law of its creation to deal with the parties and the subject matter and having acquired jurisdiction of the parties, concludes those parties and their privies in respect of every matter put in issue by the pleadings and determined by such court. See also Lessee of Parrish v. Ferris, 2 Black 606, 67 U. S. 608; Packet Co. v. Sickles, 5 Wall. 580, 72 U. S. 592; Dowell v. Applegate, 152 U. S. 327, 152 U. S. 342.
alleged to have been legally located, and to belong to the former company, precluded the latter company from contending, in a subsequent action for part of a mineral vein not embraced within the former suit, but within the mining claims involved in the first suit, that the mining claims in question had not been legally located, the Court observing that a judgment by default was just as conclusive an adjudication between the parties of what is essential to support the judgment as one rendered after answer and contest, the essence of estoppel by judgment being that there has been a judicial determination of a fact, and the question always is has there been a determination? and not upon what evidence and by what means was it reached?
"The estoppel resulting from the thing adjudged does not depend upon whether there is the same demand in both cases, but exists, even although there be different demands, when the question upon which the recovery of the second demand depends has, under identical circumstances and conditions, been previously concluded by a judgment between the parties or their privies."
act of 1886 could apply. If those maps were valid maps of definite location, then, according to the settled adjudications of this Court, to which reference has often been made, the right of that company to earn the lands appertaining to it line, thus definitely located, attached, by relation, as of the date of the grant to it in 1866, and in this view the Southern Pacific Railroad Company, holding the junior grant, took none of the lands appertaining to that line by reason of the definite location and construction of its line. Thus also, those lands were in such condition at the date of the Forfeiture Act of 1886 that they could be forfeited as lands in which the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Company then had an interest, and, in accordance with the act of Congress, be fully restored to the public domain for the exclusive benefit of the United States, unaffected by the later grant made to the Southern Pacific Railroad Company.
The only way in which, in the former cases, the court could have avoided a decision as to the character of those maps was to have held that whether they were maps of definite location or not, the rights of the Southern Pacific Railroad Company attached, upon the declaration of forfeiture, to the lands then in dispute, and that Congress was without power to restore them to the public domain. So far from sustaining that view, the court expressly adjudged that, upon the acceptance of the Atlantic and Pacific maps of 1872, the rights of that company in the lands granted attached as of the date of the grant of 1866, and that it was not possible for the Southern Pacific Railroad Company, by the location of its road, whether located before or after the acceptance of the maps of 1872, to acquire any interest whatever in the lands there in dispute that would prevent Congress, upon forfeiting the rights of the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Company, from restoring such lands to the public domain to be disposed of by the United States as it saw proper.
lands. It seems to be forgotten that the amended bill was in exact conformity with the act of 1866, which, in the third section -- the one making the grant -- used the words, "at the time the line of said road is designated by a plat thereof filed in the office of the Commissioner of the General Land Office." The word "designated" in that act meant no more nor less than the words "definitely located" mean. When the Southern Pacific Railroad Company denied that the Atlantic and Pacific line had been sufficiently designated, or that there had been a valid location of it, both litigants, as well as the court, understood, and properly, that the case presented the question whether there had been such a definite location of the Atlantic and Pacific line as the act of Congress required. That that company so understood the word "designated," as used in the third section of the act of 1866, is beyond question, for its answer filed in the former cases on the 30th of December, 1889, in which it claimed the lands then in controversy, refers to the map filed by it on the 3d of April, 1871, as one by which "it designated the line of its said railroad." And when it was adjudged that the maps of 1872 indicated a definite location of the line of the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad, the settled rules of law forbid that the defeated party should reopen that question in another suit, relating to other lands appertaining to the line so designated. The matter alleged by the government, and upon which the recovery proceeded, was, we repeat, the sufficiency of the maps of 1872 to entitle the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Company to earn the lands there in disputed.
other lands embraced by it. Consequently, the former judgment, while unmodified, determined the character of the maps as between the United States and the Southern Pacific Railroad Company. If the court had adjudged in the former cases that those maps were neither filed nor accepted as maps of definite location, but were only maps of general route, could it be doubted that the government would have been estopped from asserting to the contrary in a subsequent suit involving other lands claimed by the Southern Pacific Railroad Company which were covered by the same maps, and appertained to the same line? Must a different principle be applied because the decision was favorable to the government upon the question whether the maps of 1872 were maps of definite location? Certainly not.
But it is earnestly insisted that a prior judgment cannot operate as an estoppel in a subsequent suit between the same parties unless it be pleaded when there is an opportunity to do so, that such an opportunity existed in this suit, and that, the United States having failed to avail itself of that opportunity, it was open to the court to determine the truth of the matter upon all the evidence now before it.
"No special replication to any answer shall be filed. But if any matter alleged in the answer shall make it necessary for the plaintiff to amend his bill, he may have leave to amend the same with or without payment of costs, as the court, or a judge thereof, may in his discretion direct."
Under this rule, it is said, the United States had an opportunity to amend its bill, and in that mode to have met the allegations of the amended answer of 1893, but, having failed to ask leave to amend, it lost the benefit of the former judgment.
or designation as anything else than a designation of a general route, and no right to or interest in any public lands was, or could be, acquired by said railroad company by reason of any such attempted location or designation, or any act of acceptance thereof."
"what is commonly called the charging part of the bill, setting forth the matters or excuses which the defendant is supposed to intend to set up by way of defense to the bill."
If it was competent for the government in this case to have referred in its bill to the former suit, and, in advance, by appropriate allegations, to have met the objections which it supposed the defendant would urge to the former judgment as fixing the character of the maps of 1872, it was not bound to pursue that course, nor to amend its bill and set out what was only evidence of its title to the particular lands in controversy.
decision, and, under the guise of presenting new issues of a substantial character, to enable the railroad company, by introducing additional evidence on its behalf, to retry, in this collateral proceeding, the question as to the sufficiency of the maps of 1872. The pleadings in the prior cases distinctly averred an adequate designation of the line of the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad and the identification of the lands appertaining to that line. The averment in the amended answer of 1893 that the location by the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Company of its route in California "never was or became an actual or definite location," but was only "an attempted or pretended designation of a general route for a railroad from San Francisco to The Needles," and that such designation of its route was "a colorable and fraudulent location or designation of an unauthorized and impracticable line," was not at all necessary, because the defendant company, under its original answer, if not estopped by the former judgment, could have introduced any evidence tending to show that there had been no valid definite location of the line of the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad, and that the maps of 1872 were filed and accepted only for the purpose of indicating a general route. So that, if the government was entitled, under the pleadings as they were when the defendant company filed its amended answer of 1893, to introduce in evidence the record and judgment in the former cases, its right in that respect was not lost by its failure to amend its bill and specially set up that record.
"the weight of authority, at least in the United States, is believed to be in favor of the position that where a former recovery is given in evidence, it is equally conclusive in its effect as if it were specially pleaded by the way of estoppel."
1 Greenleaf on Ev. § 531. This view is in accord with the decisions of this Court above cited. See also Marsh v. Pier, 4 Rawle 272, 288; Lawrence v. Hunt, 10 Wend. 80, 83; Betts v. Stair, 5 Conn. 550; Sawyer v. Woodbury, 7 Gray 499, 502; Jennison v. Inhabitants, 13 Gray 544; Cannon v. Brame, 45 Ala. 262; Trayhern v. Colburn, 66 Md. 277, 278; Garton v. Botts, 73 Mo. 274, 278; Walker v. Chase, 53 Me. 258, 260; Lynch v. Swanton, 53 Me. 100, 102; Prather v. Owens, Cheves (Law) 236; Jones v. Weathersbee, 4 Strob. (Lawe) 50, 54-55; Warwick v. Underwood, 3 Head 238, 240; Isaacs v. Clark, 12 Vt. 692, 694.
"Congress was not only not intending to give to one company that which it had already given to another, but intended that lands previously granted should be definitely excepted from the later grant."
"Again, there can be no question, under the authorities heretofore cited, that if the Act of Forfeiture had not been passed by Congress, the Atlantic and Pacific could yet construct its road and that, constructing it, its title to these lands would become perfect. No power but that of Congress could interfere with this right of the Atlantic and Pacific. No one but the grantor can raise the question of a breach of a condition subsequent. Congress, by the Act of Forfeiture of July 6, 1886, determined what should become of the lands forfeited. It enacted that they be restored to the public domain. The forfeiture was not for the benefit of the Southern Pacific. It was not to enlarge its grant as it stood prior to the Act of Forfeiture. It had given to the Southern Pacific all that it had agreed to in its original grant, and now, finding that the Atlantic and Pacific was guilty of a breach of a condition subsequent, it elected to enforce a forfeiture for that breach, and a forfeiture for its own benefit."
1. That the maps filed by the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Company in 1872 were sufficient, as maps of definite location, to identify the lands granted to that company by the act of 1866.
and of the reservations of power in Congress contained in the act of 1866, such lands became, upon the passage of the Forfeiture Act of 1886, the property of the United States, and by force of that act were restored to the public domain without the Southern Pacific Railroad Company's having acquired any interest therein that affected the power of the United States to forfeit and restore them to the public domain.
These grounds being accepted as the basis of our decision, the law in the present case is clearly for the United States, for, as all the lands here in controversy are embraced by the maps of 1872, and therefore appertain to the line located by such maps, it must be, for the reasons stated in the former decision, that the United States is entitled, as between it and the Southern Pacific Railroad Company, to the relief given by the decree below.
Even if we were prepared, upon a reexamination of the former cases, or upon the showing made by the present record, to hold that the maps of 1872 were not valid maps of definite location, we could not, for that reason, in this proceeding, go behind the former adjudication and deny to the United States the benefit of the rulemaking that adjudication, so long at it was unmodified, conclusive, as between the parties to it, of all matters actually determined under the issues in the prior suits.
One other matter deserves attention. The learned counsel for the railroad company, in their extended comments upon the evidence in the present record, insist that under the proof now before the Court, it is indisputable that the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Company did nothing more than file in the Interior Department "a map of general or preliminary route for the purpose of securing a preliminary withdrawal of lands," that the maps of 1872 were neither filed nor accepted as maps of definite location, and that the proof is of such a peculiar character as to demand an examination of it by the court.
"The Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Company respectfully request that the lands embraced in the grant to the company under the provisions of the Act of July 27, 1866, and coterminous with the portions of the line or route designated by the plats herewith filed or heretofore filed by said company, may be withdrawn from sale, entry, or preemption, and reserved for said railroad company according to the provisions of said act."
2. A letter from Secretary Delano to Mr. Hillyer, under date of March 9, 1872, acknowledging the receipt of the latter's letter, "transmitting four maps of the preliminary location of portions of the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad," and saying that said "maps have today been transmitted to the Commissioner of the General Land Office for appropriate action." 3. A letter from the Secretary of the Interior to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, under date of March 9, 1872, saying, "I transmit herewith, for appropriate action, four maps of the preliminary location of portions of the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad," and that said "maps were received yesterday from C. J. Hillyer, Esq., Atty. of the Co. -- in this city."
or in conformity with the directions, of the Secretary; also that corresponding memoranda, in pencil and in the handwriting of that clerk, appear upon those letters and upon the jackets containing them.
"Map of definite location of the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad through the County of Los Angeles and part of San Bernardino, Cal. Received at the G.L.O. with Secretary's letter of March 9, 1872;"
"Gentlemen: I transmit herewith a diagram showing the definite location of the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad under the Act of July 27, 1866, Stat. Vol. 14, p. 292, from a point on the western boundary of Los Angeles County to a point in township 7 N., range 7 E. of the San Bernardino, in your district, showing also the twenty- and thirty-mile limits of the land grant under said act,"
line from the Colorado River, by way of Tehachapi Pass, to San Francisco, referred to and treated the maps of 1872 as maps of definite location. And they were so referred to and treated by Secretary Lamar in his opinion of March 23, 1886, holding that that company was not entitled to construct a road from San Buenaventura to San Francisco. 4 D.L.O. 458.
We cannot concur in the view that the evidence upon this branch of this case is of such nature as to compel the Court, in the interest of truth and justice, not only to consider it but to pass again upon the issue made in the former suits as to the character of the maps of 1872. Whatever is new in the evidence now before us touching that matter is simply cumulative on the one side or the other. The application to consider that evidence is practically an application for a rehearing as to things directly determined in the former suits between the same parties, and which adjudication has never been modified. Such a course of procedure is wholly inadmissible under the settled rule of res judicata. Without, therefore, expressing any opinion as to the effect of this new evidence relating to matters once finally adjudged, we hold that the Southern Pacific Railroad Company cannot, in this proceeding, question the validity of those maps as maps of definite location.
"affect any right which the defendants, or any of them, other than the Southern Pacific Railroad Company, now have or may hereafter acquire in, to, or respecting any of the lands hereinbefore described in virtue of the act of Congress entitled 'An act to provide for the adjustment of land grants made by Congress to aid in the construction of railroads and for the forfeiture of unearned lands, and for other purposes,' approved March 3, 1887."
Southern Pacific Railroad Company, the circuit court should have determined by its final decree what rights those defendants have by virtue of the above Act of March 3, 1887, 24 Stat. 556, c. 376, in the lands, or any of them, now in dispute and claimed by the United States. The effect of the decree is to leave undetermined the question whether the defendants who claim under the Southern Pacific Railroad Company are protected by that or any other act of Congress. The government was entitled to a decree quieting its title to all the lands described in its pleadings, except those, if any, that are protected, in the hands of claimants, by acts of Congress. United States v. Winona & St. Peter Railroad v. United States, 165 U. S. 463; Winona & St. Peter Railroad v. United States, 165 U. S. 483. But, as the government has not appealed, the decree cannot be reversed for the error of the circuit court in not finally disposing of the issues between the United States and the individual defendants who claim under the Southern Pacific Railroad Company.
The result is that the decree must be affirmed in all respects as to the Southern Pacific Railroad Company, as well as to the trustees in the mortgage executed by that company, and affirmed also as to the other defendants, subject, however, to the right of the government to proceed in the circuit court to a final decree as to those defendants, and it is so ordered.

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