Source: http://pa.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20171117_0003221.MPA.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 12:53:33+00:00

Document:
PNC MORTGAGE, et al., Defendants.
This is a pro se civil action invoking the court's jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). The plaintiff, Camella Pinkney-Price, filed her original complaint on February 1, 2017. (Doc. 1). Thereafter, she filed an amended complaint as a matter of course on March 21, 2017. (Doc. 7). After one of the defendants, PNC Mortgage (“PNC”), appeared and filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint (Doc. 11), Pinkney-Price filed a proposed second amended complaint, together with a brief cover letter (Doc. 19) without leave of court or consent of the parties. Nevertheless, we construed that filing as a motion for leave to file a second amended complaint, which we granted. (Doc. 20). In our order, we deemed the motion to dismiss filed by PNC (Doc. 11) to have been filed in response to the second amended complaint. (Doc. 20). PNC's motion (Doc. 11) is now before us for disposition. For the reasons set forth herein, we recommend that the motion be granted for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and that the second amended complaint be dismissed.
In her second amended complaint, Pinkney-Price alleges that defendant Preservation Field Services, LLC (“Preservation”) erroneously secured and winterized her property located at 1078 Delaware Lane, Stroudsburg, Pennsylvania, (the “Property”) while she was residing therein. She also alleges that Preservation: (1) illegally entered her home; (2) caused substantial damage to the Property and her personal property; and (3) removed certain personal property items from the Property. (Doc. 21, at 6). She further alleges that PNC issued the inspection order to defendant Safeguard Properties Management LLC (“Safeguard”) which thereafter contracted with Preservation.
Pinkney-Price alleges that PNC acted wrongfully by ordering property inspections while the matter was referred to the state court's conciliation program, which had stayed the foreclosure action. She also alleges that PNC acted wrongfully by refusing to work with her and arrive at an acceptable loan modification.
PNC filed a mortgage foreclosure action in the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County, Pennsylvania, on October 5, 2015. That matter was referred to the state court's conciliation program which stayed the foreclosure action. The stay was eventually lifted on November 10, 2016, after the parties had attended several conciliation conferences. Thereafter, PNC obtained a default judgment against Pinkney-Price in the amount of $278, 522.92. The state court denied Pinkney-Price's motion to lift the default judgment and postponed the Sheriff's sale from May 25, 2017, to July 27, 2017.
Rule 12 (b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes a defendant to move to dismiss for “failure to state a claim upon which relief is granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). “Under Rule 12(b)(6), a motion to dismiss may be granted only if, accepting all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, a court finds the plaintiff's claims lack facial plausibility.” Warren Gen. Hosp. v. Amgen, Inc., 643 F.3d 77, 84 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007)). Although the Court must accept the fact allegations in the complaint as true, it is not compelled to accept “unsupported conclusions and unwarranted inferences, or a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Morrow v. Balaski, 719 F.3d 160, 165 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 195 (3d Cir. 2007)).
Under Rule12(b)(6), the defendant has the burden of showing that no claim has been stated. Kehr Packages, Inc. v. Fidelcor, Inc., 926 F.2d 1406, 1409 (3d Cir. 1991); Johnsrud v. Carter, 620 F.2d 29, 32-33 (3d Cir. 1980); Holocheck v. Luzerne County Head Start, Inc., 385 F.Supp.2d 491, 495 (M.D. Pa. 2005). In deciding the motion, the court may consider the facts alleged on the face of the complaint, as well as “documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice.” Tellab, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007).
While Pinkney-Price's complaint is inartfully drafted and lacks clarity, pro se litigants' pleadings are held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). In interpreting the pleadings of pro se litigants, the Third Circuit has held that courts “have a special obligation to construe [the] complaint liberally.” Higgs v. Attorney Gen., 655 F.3d 333, 339 (3d Cir. 2011). Guided by these principles, we construe Pinkney-Price's second amended complaint to allege that PNC improperly ordered property inspections, and that it is vicariously liable to the plaintiff for the alleged conduct of Preservation. Further, we construe the second amended complaint as alleging a cause of action based upon PNC's refusal to grant the plaintiff a loan modification. We find that all of these claims lack merit.
1. Pinkney-Price fails to allege a cause of action based upon PNC's conduct in ordering property inspections.

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