Source: https://taxkeeda.com/vijay-mohan-singh-vs-state-of-karnataka-on-10-april-2019/
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 02:30:05+00:00

Document:
aside the judgment and order of acquittal dated 20.12.2007 passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Fast Track Court­IV, Bidar (hereinafter referred to as the learned ‘trial Court’), by which the learned trial Court acquitted original accused no.1 (the appellant herein) for the offences punishable under Sections 302 read with 34, 498A, 304­B read with 34 of the IPC, and Sections 3,4 & 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, and consequently convicted original accused No.1 for the offence punishable under Sections 302 of the IPC and sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for life and also convicted the appellant herein under Section 498A of the IPC and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, original accused No.1 has preferred the present appeal.
performed. It is also alleged that after six months of the marriage, all the accused started demanding additional dowry of Rs.50,000/­ for investing it as capital for the electric shop run by original accused No.1 and by demanding so, A1 to A3 gave both mental and physical cruelty to the deceased, despite the advice of PWs 1, 2, 6 and 14 not to do so, but even then they continued it and on 13.2.2005 at 3:15 p.m., they picked up a quarrel on the ground that how the deceased did not bring the said cash of Rs.50,000/­. It is further alleged that with the intervention of the neighbours the deceased and accused were separated and then the deceased phoned to her parents at about 5:00 p.m. It is further alleged that at that time A1(the appellant herein) asked the deceased how and why she phoned to her parents and by saying so he is going to murder her and then A1(the appellant herein) poured kerosene on the deceased and lit fire and ran away from the spot. That the deceased sustained grievous burnt injuries and it is the neighbours who shifted her to the Government Hospital at Bidar and thereafter to Osmania Hospital at Hyderabad and the deceased breathed her last at 5:45 p.m. on 17.02.2005.
committed the case to the learned Principal Sessions Judge, Bidar, which was registered as Sessions Case No. 83/2005. The accused pleaded not guilty, and therefore, all of them came to be tried for the aforesaid offences.
Exhibit P2 as a dying declaration. The learned trial Court also did not accept the demand of dowry.
punishable under Section 302 of the IPC. The High Court has also sentenced original accused No.1 to undergo two years imprisonment and fine of Rs.5,000/­, and in default of payment of fine, to undergo three months rigorous imprisonment for the offence punishable under Section 498A of the IPC. The High Court has also sentenced original accused No.1 to undergo six months and fine of Rs.1,000/­, in default of payment of fine, to undergo simple imprisonment for one month for the offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. The High Court has further directed that all the sentences imposed shall run concurrently.
5.1 It is further submitted by the learned advocate appearing on behalf of the accused that once the learned trial Court gave the cogent reasons while acquitting the accused, though it was permissible for the High Court to re­appreciate the entire evidence on record, the High Court has not at all dealt with and/or considered the reasons which weighed with the learned trial Court while acquitting the accused.
5.2 It is further submitted by the learned advocate appearing on behalf of the accused that while reversing the judgment and order of acquittal passed by the learned trial Court, the High Court has not at all considered the scope and ambit of the appeal against acquittal.
re­appreciating the entire evidence on record to arrive at a just conclusion, however, once there was an order of acquittal passed by the learned trial Court, as while so re­appreciating the evidence, the appellate Court should first analyse the findings of the trial Court and then for valid reasons to be recorded, the appellate Court can reverse such finding of the trial Court. 5.4 It is further submitted by the learned advocate appearing on behalf of the accused that in the present case while re­appreciating the evidence and reversing the order of acquittal passed by the learned trial Court, the High Court has not at all analysed the findings of the trial Court, and has given its own findings without even considering the grounds on which the learned trial Court acquitted the accused. It is submitted that therefore the High Court has exceeded in its jurisdiction while exercising the appellate jurisdiction against the order of acquittal passed by the learned trial Court.
of U.P. (2003) 10 SCC 26 (Paras 18 & 19); Devatha Venkataswamy alias Rangaiah vs. Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P. (2003) 10 SCC 700 (para 5); Main Pal vs. State of Haryana (2004) 10 SCC 692 (Para 12); Chanakya Dhibar (dead) vs. State of W.B. (2004) 12 SCC 398 (Para 18); Kalyan Singh vs. State of M.P. (2006) 13 SCC 303 (Para 7); Bannareddy vs. State of Karnataka (2018) 5 SCC 790 (paras 10 & 11); Madathil Narayanan vs. State of Kerala (2018) 14 SCC 513 (paras 8 & 9); and Mohd. Akhtar @ Kari vs. State of Bihar JT 2018 (12) SC 68 : (2019) 2 SCC 513. 5.6 It is further submitted by the learned advocate appearing on behalf of the accused that even otherwise on merits also, the High Court has committed a grave error in holding the appellant – original accused No.1 guilty for the offences punishable under Sections 302 and 498A of the IPC and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.
submitted that the High Court has failed to appreciate the relevant aspect that the alleged dying declaration was recorded on printed papers with certain corrections and/or different quality of papers with uncertain statements. It is submitted that the High Court has not properly appreciated the relevant aspect that the deceased got burn injuries to the extent of 90% inside the locked room, but the kerosene stove without any lid containing 800 ML of kerosene and the match box which was lying in the same room did not catch fire and for which there was no explanation by the prosecution.
6.3 It is vehemently submitted by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent – State that in the present case, the High Court has considered in detail the medical evidence; the dying declaration and the other prosecution witnesses who fully supported the case of the prosecution that it was the appellant herein – original accused no.1 who committed the crime and therefore the High Court has rightly convicted the appellant herein – original accused no.1.
6.4 It is submitted that if the reasonings and the grounds on which the learned trial Court acquitted the accused are seen, they are perverse and contrary to the evidence on record. It is submitted that while acquitting the original accused, the learned trial Court wrongly gave more importance to some minor contradictions. However, did not consider the overwhelming evidence in the form of medical evidence and the dying declaration which came to be proved. It is submitted that therefore the High Court has rightly convicted the accused by reversing the judgment and order of acquittal passed by the learned trial Court.
Umedbhai Jadavbhai v. State of Gujarat (1978) 1 SCC 228; K.Gopal Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1979) 1 SCC 355; Sambasivan v. State of Kerala (1998) 5 SCC 412; K. Ramakrishnan Unnithan v. State of Kerala (1999) 3 SCC 309. 6.6 Making the above submissions and relying upon the aforesaid decisions of this Court, it is prayed to dismiss the present appeal.
7. We have heard the learned counsel for the respective parties at length.
recorded by the High Court while convicting the appellant – original accused no.1.
the document and along with covering letter, he sent Ex.
marked as Ex.P­2(e) and Ex.P­2(f) is his signature.
“Q.No.7 What happened to you and how the same happened?
Q.No.10 What was the behaviour of your husband Vijay Mohan Singh?
18 My husband would say that I am mad and frequently ask money. He had earlier wife by name Kamaljeet Kaur. She too was burnt by my husband and she died. My husband managed the case and came out. (Patient is in pain). He would ask me to get money from my parents. Q.No.11 How you come out of the room and where was your daughter?
I opened the door and came out and my daughter was in other room and then I fell lot of pain and burning. Q.No.12 What more do you want to say?
“8. We have perused the judgment under appeal to ascertain whether the High Court has conformed to the aforementioned principles. We find that the High Court has not strictly proceeded in the manner laid down by this Court in Doshi case (1996) 9 SCC 225 viz. first recording its conclusion on the question whether the approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal or the conclusions arrived at by it were wholly untenable, which alone will justify interference in an order of acquittal though the High Court has rendered a well­considered judgment duly meeting all the contentions raised before it. But then will this non­compliance per se justify setting aside the judgment under appeal? We think, not. In our view, in such a case, the approach of the court which is considering the validity of the judgment of an appellate court which has reversed the order of acquittal passed by the trial court, should be to satisfy itself if the approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal or conclusions arrived at by it are demonstrably unsustainable and whether the judgment of the appellate court is free from those infirmities; if so to hold that the trial court judgment warranted interference. In such a case, there is obviously no reason why the appellate court’s judgment should be disturbed.
eye­witnesses were not at all sound. This Court also observed that as the evaluation of the evidence made by the trial court as manifestly erroneous and therefore it was the duty of the High Court to interfere with an order of acquittal passed by the learned Sessions Judge.
“5. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that the judgment of the trial court being one of acquittal, the High Court should not have set it aside on mere appreciation of the evidence led on behalf of the prosecution unless it came to the conclusion that the judgment of the trial Judge was perverse. In Our opinion, it is not correct to say that unless the appellate court in an appeal under Section 417, Criminal P. C. came to the conclusion that the judgment of acquittal under appeal was perverse it could not set aside that order.
It has been laid down by this Court that it is open to the High Court on an appeal against an order of acquittal to review the entire evidence and to come to its own conclusion, of course, keeping in view the well established rule that the presumption of innocence of the accused is not weakened but strengthened by the judgment of acquittal passed by the trial court which had the advantage of observing the demeanour of witnesses whose evidence have been recorded in its presence. It is also well settled that the court of appeal has as wide powers of appreciation of evidence in an appeal against an order of acquittal as in the case of an appeal against an order of conviction, subject to the riders that the presumption of innocence with which the accused person 24 starts in the trial court continues even up to the appellate stage and that the appellate court should attach due weight to the opinion of the trial court which recorded the order of acquittal.
If the appellate court reviews the evidence, keeping those principles in mind, and comes to a contrary conclusion, the judgment cannot be said to have been vitiated. (See in this connection the very cases cited at the Bar, namely, Surajpal Singh v. The State 1952 CriLJ331; Wilayat Khan v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1953 SC 122. In our opinion, there is no substance in the contention raised on behalf of the appellant that the High Court was not justified in reviewing the entire evidence and coming to its own conclusions.” 11.4 In the case of K.Gopal Reddy(supra), this Court has observed that where the trial Court allows itself to be beset with fanciful doubts, rejects creditworthy evidence for slender reasons and takes a view of the evidence which is but barely possible, it is the obvious duty of the High Court to interfere in the interest of justice, lest the administration of justice be brought to redicule.
trial court and without specifically observing that the reasons are perverse, this Court can still maintain the order of conviction passed by the High Court, if this Court is satisfied itself that the approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal or the conclusions arrived at by it are demonstrably unsustainable and the judgment of the appellate court is free from those infirmities. It also emerges that the High Court is entitled to re­appreciate the entire evidence independently and come to its own conclusion, however, the High Court would not be justified in interfering with the order of acquittal solely on the ground on re­appreciation of the entire evidence that two views are possible.
was justified on a probable view taken by the trial court. On appreciation of evidence, this Court observed that the High Court could not have reversed the judgment of the acquittal merely because another view was possible. In the present case, as observed hereinabove, and on re­appreciation of the entire evidence on record, this is not a case where two reasonable views are possible and so the one which supports the accused should be adopted. As observed hereinabove, the findings recorded by the learned trial court while acquitting the accused are perverse and the approach of the trial court was patently erroneous and the conclusions arrived at by it were wholly untenable. Therefore, considering the aforesaid decisions of this court in the cases of Sambasivan (supra); Umedbhai Jadavbhai (supra) and Atley (supra), we are of the opinion that the impugned judgment and order of conviction passed by the High Court is not required to be interfered with by this Court. The judgment and order under appeal does not warrant any interference. Hence, we find no merit in the appeal and the same deserves to be dismissed, and is accordingly dismissed. …………………………………….J. 28 [L. NAGESWARA RAO] NEW DELHI; ……………………………………J.

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