Source: https://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-9th-circuit/1752312.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 23:11:57+00:00

Document:
ESTATE OF MANUEL DIAZ; GENEVIEVE HUIZAR, an individual, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CITY OF ANAHEIM, a California municipal entity; NICK BENNALLACK, Officer, Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Marsha S. Berzon and John B. Owens, Circuit Judges, and Algenon L. Marbley,* District Judge. COUNSEL Dale K. Galipo (argued) and Melanie T. Partow, Law Offices of Dale K. Galipo, Woodland Hills, California; Angel Carrazco, Jr., Carrazco Law, A.P.C., Tustin, California; Paul L. Hoffman, Schonbrun Desimone Seplow Harris & Hoffman, LLP, Venice, California; Humberto Guizar, Humberto Guizar Law Offices, Montebello, California; for Plaintiffs-Appellants. Moses W. Johnson, IV (argued), Assistant City Attorney, Anaheim, California; Steven J. Rothans and Jill Williams, Carpenter, Rothans & Dumont, Los Angeles, California; for Defendants-Appellants. Denise L. Rocawich, James R. Touchstone, and Martin J. Mayer, Jones & Mayer, Fullerton, California, for Amici Curiae California Police Chiefs' Association, California State Sheriffs' Association, and California Peace Officers' Association. Steven J. Renick, Manning & Kass Ellrod Ramirez Trester LLP, Los Angeles, California, for Amicus Curiae International Municipal Lawyers Association.
The panel reversed the district court's judgment, entered following a jury trial in favor of defendants, in an action alleging that a City of Anaheim police officer used excessive force when he shot and killed Manuel Diaz.
The panel held that the district court erred by refusing to bifurcate the liability phase from the compensatory damages phase of the trial and as a result the district court admitted inflammatory evidence introduced by the defendants that had no relevance to the key issue in the case, whether defendant acted within the law when he shot Diaz.
The panel remanded for a new trial with guidance for the district court to: (1) closely review under Federal Rule of Evidence 401 and 403 evidence of Diaz's drug and gang affiliation and admit the evidence only to the degree that it was connected to the reaction of Diaz's mother to his death; (2) not permit expert testimony about gangs to be admitted if plaintiffs are willing to stipulate that Diaz was a gang member; (3) sufficiently consider that a limiting instruction may not sufficiently mitigate the prejudicial impact of certain evidence; and (4) when striking testimony, to clearly identify what testimony was improperly given, and instruct the jury that it may not be considered.
The panel affirmed the district court's denial of plaintiffs' motion for judgment as a matter of law on the excessive force claim, holding that this question was one for the jury. The panel noted that while plaintiffs presented substantial evidence that the force was unreasonable, defendants also presented substantial evidence to support their position.
The opinion filed on August 24, 2016, and reported at 2016 WL 4446114, is hereby amended. The superseding amended opinion will be filed concurrently with this order.
The panel has voted to deny the petition for panel rehearing. Judges Berzon and Owens voted to deny the petition for rehearing en banc, and Judge Marbley so recommends.
The full court has been advised of the suggestion for rehearing en banc, and no active judge has requested a vote on whether to rehear the matter en banc. Fed. R. App. P. 35.
The petition for panel rehearing and rehearing en banc is DENIED.
No further petitions for panel rehearing or petitions for rehearing en banc will be entertained.
As Diaz started to turn, Bennallack claimed to see a black cloth object going over a fence close to Diaz . Bennallack said that he believed Diaz had a gun in a “low-ready” position in front of his body, ready to fire. According to Bennallack, as Diaz turned and Bennallack saw the object in the air, he fired twice. When Bennallack shot Diaz, he could not see any part of his arms or hands. The shots occurred within one to two seconds after Diaz started to slow down; Bennallack made no lethal force warning. The first bullet entered Diaz's right buttock and was lodged in his left thigh. The second bullet entered the right side of Diaz's head, just above and behind his right ear, and exited the left side of his head near his left ear. Diaz was handcuffed and searched. He died shortly thereafter at a nearby hospital. Officers found a black cell phone and narcotics pipe nearby. No firearm was recovered from the scene.
Second, if Plaintiffs are willing to stipulate that Diaz was a gang member (which they claim they tried to do during trial), no expert testimony about gangs—such as gang activities, tattoos, or monikers—should be admitted. Bennallack can certainly testify as to his knowledge about gang activity in the area. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989) (holding that to determine whether police force is excessive, the proper inquiry is “whether the officers' actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them”).
“We review de novo the district court's denial of a Rule 50(b) renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law. The test is whether ‘the evidence, construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, permits only one reasonable conclusion, and that conclusion is contrary to that of the jury.’ ” White v. Ford Motor Co., 312 F.3d 998, 1010 (9th Cir. 2002), amended on denial of reh'g, 335 F.3d 833 (9th Cir. 2003) (footnote omitted) (quoting Forrett v. Richardson, 112 F.3d 416, 419 (9th Cir. 1997)). We “may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000).
Where an “excessive force claim arises in the context of an arrest or investigatory stop of a free citizen, it is most properly characterized as one invoking the protections of the Fourth Amendment.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 394. As with other Fourth Amendment claims, we inquire “whether the officers' actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation.” Id. at 397.
We determine whether challenged state actions are objectively reasonable by balancing “ ‘the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests' against the countervailing governmental interests at stake.” Id. at 396 (quoting Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985)). This demands a “fact-intensive inquiry requiring attention to all circumstances pertinent to the need for the force used.” Velazquez, 793 F.3d at 1024. We “first consider[ ] the nature and quality of the alleged intrusion; we then consider the governmental interests at stake by looking at (1) how severe the crime at issue is, (2) whether the suspect posed an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and (3) whether the suspect was actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Mattos v. Agarano, 661 F.3d 433, 441 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (citing Deorle v. Rutherford, 272 F.3d 1272, 1279–80 (9th Cir. 2001)). These factors are not exclusive. Id.
11. In urging en banc review, amici curiae California Police Chiefs' Association et al. argue that our decision conflicts with Boyd, which upheld a district court's decision to admit drug usage evidence to corroborate the police officers' testimony that the decedent was acting erratically. Boyd, 576 F.3d at 943–45. Yet here, the district court exercised its discretion and prohibited the introduction of Diaz's drug use for liability purposes because there was no evidence that Diaz was acting erratically. See supra at 9. Diaz's drug usage was only admissible to undermine any damages award. See supra at 14–17. The officers did not appeal that ruling, and do not cite Boyd as an alternative means to affirm the judgment. Simply put, the Boyd argument that amici now raise is not an issue in this appeal.
12. In light of our ruling, we do not reach the issue of whether Plaintiffs' failure to make a Rule 50(a) motion as to the unlawful detention claim barred review of the district court's dismissal of that claim sua sponte before the close of evidence. We do observe, however, that requiring a litigant to make a Rule 50(a) motion for judgment as a matter of law on a claim no longer before the jury appears, at first blush, futile. See Velazquez v. City of Long Beach, 793 F.3d 1010, 1018 (9th Cir. 2015) (“A motion for judgment as a matter of law may be granted if ‘the court finds that a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue[.]’ ” (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a))). We also do not reach whether Plaintiffs are entitled to a new trial under Rule 59(a) based on the district court's evidentiary rulings or formulation of jury instructions.
13. See, e.g., Barnett v. Norman, 782 F.3d 417, 422–23 (9th Cir. 2015) (outlining powers of district judge to ensure witness complies with court order); United States v. Panza, 612 F.2d 432, 439 (9th Cir. 1979) (“We can only speculate as to the effect on the jury of the striking of the testimony.” (citing United States v. Cardillo, 316 F.2d 606, 612 n.3 (2d Cir. 1963)); Cardillo, 316 F.2d at 612 n.3 (“The effectiveness of such procedures after the testimony has been heard by the jury has been the subject of speculation, metaphysical and otherwise, by jurists and trial lawyers for generations.”).
14. Cf. United States v. McKoy, 771 F.2d 1207, 1213 (9th Cir. 1985) (“We have often noted that the trial court may be able to ‘neutralize’ the effect of improper prosecutorial remarks by admonishing counsel to refrain from such remarks or by giving appropriate curative instructions to the jury.”).

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