Source: http://courts.mrsc.org/supreme/069wn2d/069wn2d0799.htm
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 04:37:12+00:00

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Statutes - Construction - Superfluous Provisions. A statute should, if possible, be construed so that no clause, sentence, or word is superfluous, void, or insignificant, since the courts will not ascribe to the legislature a vain act.
 Taxation - Municipal Corporations - LIDs - Protests - "Total Cost." The words "total cost of the improvement" as used in RCW 35.43.180, which provides that a city will be deprived of jurisdiction to proceed with an LID upon a protest filed by the owners of property subject to 60 per cent or more of the total cost of the improvement, refers to that portion of the project costs assessed against and borne by the property owners, excluding that portion of the costs paid by the city from municipal funds.
 Same - Municipal Corporations - LIDs - Protests - Nature of Right. The legislature having granted, and recognized the significance of, the right of property owners to protest the establishment of an LID and to refuse to pay for local improvements (RCW 35.43.180), such right will not be abrogated or rendered illusory except by clear legislative mandate.
 Statutes - Interpretation by Attorney General - Conclusiveness. While interpretations of state statutes by the Attorney General will be accorded considerable weight, the Supreme Court will not follow such opinions when it feels constrained by reason, legislative history, or other rules of statutory construction to reach a contrary interpretation.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Snohomish County, No. 83212, Thomas R. Stiger, J., entered September 17, 1965. Reversed and remanded.
Action for injunctive relief. Plaintiff appeals from a judgment of dismissal.
A. Wesley Hodge (of Hullin, Ehrlichman, Carroll & Roberts), for appellant.
James A. Murphy (of Ogden, Ogden & Murphy), for respondent.
«*» Reported in 420 P.2d 346.
 See Am. Jur., Statutes (1st ed. § 358).
case and in a companion appeal, Thymian v. Massart, post p. 806, 420 P.2d 351 (1966), concerns the meaning of the words "total cost of the improvement" as they appear in the presently effective version of RCW 35.43.180, which provides for restraint of local improvement projects by protest of the owners of property within the proposed local improvement district. The problem is whether "total cost of the improvement" means the total cost of a project, including the amount proposed to be contributed from municipal funds, or whether it simply refers to the assessed cost as borne by the property owners whose property is specially benefited. Viewed from a slightly different vantage point, the basic issue is whether the legislature intended to allow a municipality to deprive property owners of their right of protest when the municipality involved proposes to provide, from one fund or another, more than 40 per cent of the amount required to finance the local improvement.
The case was heard on a stipulated set of facts. The city of Edmonds, by ordinance No. 1092, ordered the improvement of Ninth Avenue from Main Street to Casper Street in Edmonds, and thereby created Local Improvement District No. 131 (hereinafter referred to as LID 131). The project cost for the proposed LID 131 was estimated at $112,000. Of that amount, $52,661 was to be assessed against the property owners. The balance of $59,339 was to be paid from the respondent city's Arterial Street Fund, if available; otherwise, from the Street Department Fund. Appellant and other property owners to be affected filed timely protests with the city of Edmonds in accordance with the provisions of RCW 35.43.180. These protests represented 88.1 per cent of that part of the cost of the project which was to be assessed against and borne by the property owners. The city ignored the protests, and proceeded with the formation of LID 131. Appellant Kasper brought this action as a representative of a class of similarly situated property owners seeking a writ of prohibition to restrain the respondent city from further proceedings on LID 131. The trial court dismissed appellant's petition, from which judgment this appeal followed.
Restraint by protest. The jurisdiction of the legislative authority of a city or town to proceed with any local improvement initiated by resolution shall be divested by a protest filed with the city or town council within thirty days from the date of passage of the ordinance ordering the improvement, signed by the owners of the property within the proposed local improvement district subject to sixty percent or more of the total cost of the improvement including federally-owned or other nonassessable property as shown and determined by the preliminary estimates and assessment roll of the proposed improvement district [or, if all or part of the local improvement district lies outside of the city or town, such jurisdiction shall be divested by a protest filed in the same manner and signed by the owners of property which is within the proposed local improvement district but outside the boundaries of the city or town, and which is subject to sixty percent or more of that part of the total cost of the improvement allocable to property within the proposed local improvement district but outside the boundaries of the city or town, including federally-owned or other nonassessable property: . . . .
«1» Professor Trautman, in his article, Trautman, Assessments in Washington, 40 Wash. L. Rev. 100, 115 (1965), devotes a paragraph and a footnote to discussion of RCW 35.43.180. He apparently interpreted the statute as does respondent. He largely restates the words of the statute, however, and does not appear to have considered the particular problem involved here.
«2» Respondent relies in part for its interpretation of the statute on an opinion by the Attorney General, AGO 61-62, No. 109 (1962). The cited opinion makes the preliminary statement that "total cost of the improvement" has been "a source of dispute in several cities and has not been accorded a uniform interpretation," and continues, "We shall therefore proceed under the premise that the phrase is ambiguous."
[1, 2] Even granting the validity of these last two arguments by respondent, we think the important point to be that the legislature has granted the significant right of protest to property owners. If respondent's proposed interpretation prevails, cities and towns have complete, unbridled discretion as to whether a right of protest exists or not. As respondent has pointed out, sections 080, 110, 140, and 190 of RCW 35.43 all make it clear that a municipality can assess "in whole or in part" to property owners any part of a proposed improvement it sees fit (respondent's italics). RCW 35.43.200, RCW 35.43.170, and RCW 35.44.020 are much to the same effect. It seems very unlikely that the legislature would put the power to prohibit protests completely in the unguided discretion of cities and towns. The right of protest is the property owners' limitation on a municipality's power of assessment;«4» in the absence of a clear statement, should a municipality be allowed to control its own limitations?
«3» The author of the cited work, however, cites cases from 27 states which recognize some type of protest right. 13 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations §§ 37.52-37.55 (3d ed. 1949).
«4» Another court considering a different question under a different protest statute recently made an observation which nevertheless seems relevant here: "Since there is a direct correlation between the protest statute and the assessment statute, the protests must be considered on the same basis as the assessments are made." Smith v. City of Bozeman, 144 Mont. 528, 398 P.2d 462, 466 (1965). The holding in Smith may be said to stand for the proposition that a right of protest, once given, will be construed so that a city cannot easily deprive property owners of it.
Adopting the respondent's version of the protest statute would place this court in the peculiar and awkward position of judicially sterilizing the major portion of RCW 35.43.180. The right of protest would become practically a meaningless right. Courts will not ascribe to the legislature a vain act, and " . . . . a statute should, if possible, be so construed that no clause, sentence or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant." Groves v. Meyers, 35 Wn.2d 403, 407, 213 P.2d 483, 486 (1950). It seems, then, more likely that the legislature's intent in enacting the 1957 amendment was merely to insure in a simple manner that nonassessable property was included in the calculations to determine the percentage necessary for a protest.
legislative mandate which is much more explicit than the 1957 amendment before us.
Respondent has brought to our attention an opinion by the Attorney General, AGO 61-62, No. 109 (1962), in which it is concluded that "total cost of the improvement," as used in RCW 35.43.180, includes money contributed by a city to an improvement project. In the cited opinion, construction of RCW 35.43.180 was based primarily upon reference to RCW 35.43.160 and RCW 35.43.130. In RCW 35.43.160 the legislature more clearly expressed that in restraining an improvement initiated by petition the cost involved was that which was to be assessed against property owners in the proposed district. In RCW 35.43.130 "cost and expense of the proposed improvement" is treated as something different from that portion of the cost to be borne by property owners. As to the reference to RCW 35.43.160, the answer is that there is no doubt that the legislature could have expressed itself more clearly than it did; but it is precisely because the protest statute is ambiguous, as the Attorney General's opinion seems to concede, that we must engage in our own construction of it. As to RCW 35.43.130, examination shows that it refers to an estimate, in the singular, of the cost and expense of the proposed improvement, thereby supporting the construction advocated by appellant equally as well as that favored by the Attorney General and respondent. It may be further appropriate to note here that everyone seems to concede that, from the time of our decision in Hapgood v. Seattle, 69 Wash. 497, 25 Pac. 965 (1912), until a year or two after the 1957 amendment to RCW 35.43.180 became law, it was generally and logically assumed that "cost of the improvement" meant cost to the property owners.
State ex rel. Bonsall v. Case, 172 Wash. 243, 19 P.2d 927 (1933); Ernst v. Kootros, 196 Wash. 138, 82 P.2d 126 (1938); State ex rel. Blume v. Yelle, 52 Wn.2d 158, 324 P.2d 247 (1958). We think such a situation is presented by the instant case for the reasons which have been discussed above.
The writ should be granted. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
ROSELLINI, C. J., HILL, DONWORTH, WEAVER, HUNTER, HAMILTON, and HALE, JJ., and BARNETT, J. Pro Tem., concur.

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