Source: https://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/2019/week3/index.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 16:29:39+00:00

Document:
Former Chicago police Officer Jason Van Dyke was sentenced Friday to nearly seven years in prison for the fatal on-duty shooting of Laquan McDonald, bringing to a close one of the most racially fraught and socially significant chapters in recent Chicago history. Van Dyke remained stoic as Cook County Circuit Judge Vincent Gaughan announced the sentence about 5:30 p.m. after a long day of often emotional testimony. Moments later, Van Dyke’s teenage daughter seated in the gallery burst into tears.
In October, Van Dyke became the first Chicago police officer in half a century to be convicted of murder in an on-duty shooting. A jury found him guilty on one count of second-degree murder and 16 counts of aggravated battery — one for each bullet that hit McDonald’s body in October 2014 as the teen walked away from police on Pulaski Road while holding a knife. Graphic police dashboard camera footage of the shooting released more than a year later sparked weeks of chaos and political upheaval, exposing Chicago’s long-standing racial fault lines and exacerbating the already-fraught relationship between police and minority communities.
Gaughan imposed the sentence after a daylong hearing that drew tears from witnesses on the stand and from Van Dyke himself, who sat slouched at the defense table in a bright yellow jail uniform.
While predicting his sentence would disappoint “100 percent” of those in the courtroom, Gaughan made a number of key rulings in favor of the defense. In particular, he sentenced Van Dyke only for the second-degree murder conviction, meaning he will serve just half the sentence if he qualifies for day-for-day good-behavior credit. If instead the judge had sentenced him only on the aggravated battery convictions, Van Dyke could have been subject to a lengthier term behind bars. He also would have had to serve at least 85 percent of that sentence.
In fashioning his decision, Gaughan said the law required him to consider the most serious charge for which Van Dyke was convicted. Common sense, the judge found, dictated that be second-degree murder, not aggravated battery. However, Illinois law considers aggravated battery with a gun the more serious offense of the two, carrying stiffer penalties. “Is it more serious for Laquan McDonald to be shot by a firearm or is it more serious for Laquan McDonald to be murdered by a firearm?” Gaughan said in explaining his reasoning.
McDonald’s great-uncle, the Rev. Marvin Hunter, read from the witness stand a letter he wrote from the perspective of his grand-nephew, saying McDonald’s death devastated the family. The letter said Hunter used McDonald’s last paycheck from his construction job to buy the suit the teen was buried in.
While the many civilian complaints against Van Dyke were not introduced at trial, prosecutors on Friday called four witnesses — all African-American men — who one after another painted Van Dyke as an abusive, out-of-control officer protected by inept police oversight agencies. One man said Van Dyke choked him to try to get him to spit out a cough drop during a DUI stop. Another said the officer berated him using a racial slur. A third said Van Dyke deserved prison time simply for the “chaotic” way he handled a traffic stop.
There are so many substantive and procedural elements to this case, one could probably write an entire law review article about the importance and impact of prosecutorial and judicial discretion as it operates within a controversial high-profile case like this one. For now, I am just inclined to spotlight notable sentencing differences between this case and the arguably comparable case involving former South Carolina police officer Michael Slager who killed Walter Scott on camera. Van Dyke was convicted by a jury in state court of second-degree murder, and then he was sentenced by a local judge to a prison term of 81 months (with it seems the possibility of released in around 40 months). Slager, whose sentence was just affirmed on appeal, pleaded guilty to federal civil rights charges after a state jury could not reach a verdict, and then he was sentenced by a federal judge to a prison term of 240 months (with perhaps the possibility of being released in around 200 months).
As expected, a slew of political candidates rushed to react to the sentencing of Jason Van Dyke. And then there was Patti Blagojevich, wife of a now-disgraced and imprisoned Illinois governor.
It could be another attempt to grab the attention of the last person who apparently can get former Gov. Rod Blagojevich out of jail early: President Donald Trump. And it comes after Patti Blagojevich last year made some other moves seemingly tailor-made to catch Trump’s eye, with an appearance on Fox News in which she slammed Obama. She also has tried to connect her husband’s case to Special Counsel Robert Mueller and Former FBI Director James Comey — favorite Trump targets.
Trump himself may have gotten Patti Blagojevich’s hopes up in December, when he tweeted about another TV interview she had done with Fox News, calling her “the wonderful wife” of the imprisoned governor. Patti retweeted the president, and that was the last tweet she had sent until Friday, more than a month later.
Overview and answers to frequently asked questions (published Jan. 18, 2019).
Updated prison and sentencing impact analysis (published Jan. 18, 2019).
Is the Commission making any changes to the Guidelines in response to the Act?
The Act does not contain any directives to the Commission requiring action. As it does with all new crime legislation, the Commission will review the Act to determine whether Guideline changes might be necessary or appropriate. Because the Act did not include “emergency amendment authority,” any changes to the Guidelines in response to the Act may only be made during the Commission’s annual amendment cycle. (See 28 U.S.C. § 994).
During the annual amendment cycle, the Commission must publish proposed guideline amendments and solicit public comment. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(x). In order for an amendment to move forward after that, at least four Commissioners must vote in favor of promulgating the amendment. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(a). Once at least four Commissioners have voted in favor, the Commission must deliver the promulgated amendment to Congress no later than May 1 for the 180-day congressional review period. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(p). If Congress takes no action, the amendment can take effect on November 1 of that year.
The Commission has not yet published any proposed amendments responding to the Act. The Commission currently has two voting members and thus lacks a statutory quorum to promulgate amendments.
NY Times op-ed explores "How to Make New York as Progressive on Criminal Justice as Texas"
In New York, prosecutors operate within a draconian system that gives them free rein to leave defendants in the dark about aspects of their cases for months or even years. In cases big and small, state law authorizes prosecutors to withhold key evidence from defense lawyers and their clients until the eve or sometimes the day of trial. Prosecutors in New York do not have a legal obligation to turn over in a timely fashion all police reports, witness names, DNA evidence, surveillance footage or anything else from their investigative files.
Though a 1963 Supreme Court decision found that prosecutors have a constitutional duty to turn over anything significant that may exonerate a defendant, that ruling has not been consistently enforced because prosecutors who flout the rule are rarely punished. Advocates for defendants say this entrenched legal structure in New York puts a “blindfold” over the eyes of defense lawyers and their clients. And it runs up against Americans’ basic understanding of how fairness is meant to work in the legal system.
By preventing access to even the simplest information about a pending case, prosecutors thumb their noses at the presumption of innocence that is owed to every person accused of a crime. They also run the risk of forcing the accused to make an impossible choice: Plead guilty with little to no information about their case or go to trial and risk an even harsher punishment.
New York’s law means that cases take longer to resolve, leading to backlogs; that defense lawyers are unable to advise their clients about the charges against them, let alone guide them through an often life-altering process; and that wrongful convictions can occur, in both extreme and not-so-extreme cases.
Prosecutors defend New York’s current system not on its merits but with fearmongering, arguing that reforms will leave witnesses and victims at risk. Disclosing the identity of a person with direct knowledge of an incident under investigation, the thinking goes, would hamper the state’s ability to protect him or her and to fight crime.
But there are sensible ways of dealing with witness safety concerns. The Brooklyn district attorney’s office, which has for decades made its evidence files readily available, shows that reform is possible. Likewise, the states that have left the old model behind have seen no need to go back to it. It’s time for New York lawmakers to bring the rest of the state in line with this essential notion of justice.
It took six years of intense wrangling to get the First Step Act passed. Clemency reform, however, requires the action of only one man. The president can act alone to fix what Congress did not.
One problem, as noted above, is that these and other welcome changes do not operate retroactively. People serving sentences now deemed excessive by Congress and the president have no recourse other than clemency to have those sentences rightsized. ​ There are more than 3,000 people left in prison serving mandatory sentences under the old firearm-enhancement law and the three-strikes provision that imposed a life sentence. Add to that the many individuals who are serving excessive sentences because of prosecutorial overcharging, and it is easy to see the urgent need to correct these injustices.
​For clemency to reach those thousands, the country needs a process that fairly, thoroughly, and efficiently evaluates candidates for a commutation (or shortening) of their sentence under the Constitution’s pardon power. At the moment, there are two possible processes, but neither works very well.
The first is informal: The president evaluates individual cases based on personal recommendations. This system does not scale.
​Some states have better systems in place. In Arkansas, Connecticut, Georgia, and South Carolina, among others, an expert board plays a leading role in identifying and evaluating good cases. The best-functioning boards consist of people with expertise in criminal justice, social work, and psychology, and represent key stakeholders such as former judges, defense lawyers, prosecutors, and community activists who share a common belief that the purpose of the pardon power is to temper justice with mercy.
​The members of the bipartisan coalition that pushed through sentencing reform were united by a belief in liberty, a desire to cut costs, a respect for public safety, and a belief in second chances. But as the name of their legislation indicates, sentencing reform was just a first step. Clemency should come next.
In Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010), this Court ruled that the words “physical force” in the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U. S. C. §924(e)(2), denote a heightened degree of force, rather than the minimal contact that would have qualified as “force” for purposes of the common-law crime of battery. Id., at 139–140. This case asks whether Florida robbery requires such “physical force,” and thus qualifies as a “violent felony” under the ACCA, even though it can be committed through use of only slight force. See §924(e)(2)(B). Under Johnson, the answer to that question is no. Because the Court’s contrary ruling distorts Johnson, I respectfully dissent.
Because Justice Kavanaugh is new to the mix, it is not saying much to say this is the first time this group of Justices have come together this way. But I cannot recall many cases in which the Chief Justice was a fourth vote for a criminal defendant but Justice Breyer served as the key fifth vote for the government. Interesting times.
The Senate confirmation hearing for President Trump's nominee to lead the Department of Justice, William Barr, is scheduled to begin tomorrow morning. The headline of this Los Angeles Times article, "William Barr to face tough Senate hearing on attorney general nomination," predict a "tough" experience for Barr. But, from my perspective, what could really make the hearing effective is for there to be a lot of sentencing reform and criminal-justice related questions.
What provisions of the new FIRST STEP Act do you consider the most important and most valuable changes to federal law? Why?
Are there any provisions of the new FIRST STEP Act that you find worrisome? Why?
If members of Congress or the President were to ask you to start drafting the SECOND STEP Act, what kinds of additional federal criminal justice changes would you want to focus on? Why?
What do you make of the new US Sentencing Commission report revealing "increasing differences in sentencing practices" among judges within a single district under the advisory sentencing guidelines? How do you think the Sessions Memo on prosecutorial sentencing practices put into effect in May 2017 impacts this story?
I could go on and on, of course, with questions exploring President Bush's role in ramping up the drug war, President Trump's stated interest in the death penalty for drug dealers, and myriad issues related to federal marijuana prohibition. But at this point I will just link below to prior posts about Bill Barr and again encourage interested readers to make suggestions in the comments.
Hernandez’s was one of ten clemency actions blocked by the court in the final weeks of the Brown administration, the first time since 1930 that it has rejected pardon or commutation requests under consideration by a governor.
The move stunned observers of the California Supreme Court, which under the state constitution must review clemency requests for anyone convicted of felony more than once, and has left them grasping for answers about how to proceed. The court approved 86 other applications over the past eight years.
Even Brown seemed to be unsure what to make of the rejections. He granted a historic 1,332 pardons and 283 commutations during his final two terms, part of a broader push to scale back the state’s tough-on-crime approach that began under his first governorship.
“Read the ones who were approved and read the ones who were disapproved and you tell me what the rule is,” Brown told reporters in early January, shortly before he left office.
The court wrote an administrative order in March about its role in evaluating pardon and commutation applications that stated it was not acting on the merits of the cases but rather to determine whether granting clemency would be an “abuse of power” by the governor.
Santa Clara County District Attorney Jeff Rosen would also like more guidance from the court, which he said could help prosecutors focus their arguments in cases they oppose. His office weighs in on every clemency request that the governor is considering for a case they prosecuted, some of which have also been reviewed by the Supreme Court. He said his team determines a position by looking at criteria like the underlying crime, how the perpetrator has behaved in prison and the wishes of the victim’s family, a particularly important factor in murder cases.
The pervasive problem of over-incarceration in the United States is in part due to lack of correctional facility accountability to the public, and public lack of access to the prisoner experience. In light of the incessant persistence of over-incarceration and “hands off approach” taken by courts in prison administration, this article proposes an unqualified and unfettered prisoner-to-public communication right that would provide prison accountability to the public.

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