Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/california/supreme-court/4th/20/371.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 14:59:11+00:00

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RICHARD J. OBERHOLZER, a Judge of the Superior Court, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE, Respondent.
Lewis, D'Amato, Brisbois & Bisgaard, James E. Friedhofer and Lisa K. Roberts for Petitioner.
This original writ proceeding presents the following issues: (1) whether the Commission on Judicial Performance (Commission) [20 Cal. 4th 375] has authority to issue a confidential advisory letter (commonly known as a "stinger" letter); (2) whether the issuance of such a letter amounts to "discipline" that implicates a judge's right to due process of law; (3) whether such a letter may be issued based upon a perceived legal error committed by a judge; and (4) whether petitioner here, Judge Richard J. Oberholzer, committed sanctionable legal error in dismissing a criminal case after the People indicated they were not ready to proceed.
As we shall explain, we conclude that the Commission has authority to issue advisory letters, that such letters are a form of discipline, that the Commission's procedures comport with the requirements of due process of law, and that such letters may be based upon a perceived legal error, if such error clearly and convincingly reflects bad faith, bias, abuse of authority, disregard for fundamental rights, intentional disregard of the law, or any purpose other than the faithful discharge of judicial duty. In the instant case, petitioner's dismissal of a criminal action, following the People's declaration of unreadiness, did not constitute such sanctionable conduct.
Accordingly, we find that the Commission improperly issued its advisory letter to petitioner.
"It is reported that in the criminal case People v. James, Kern County Superior Court case no. 65661, defendant Keith James was charged with one felony count of committing a lewd and lascivious act upon his nine-year-old niece Alicia A. Reportedly, the preliminary hearing was held on January 12, 1996, and on January 17, 1996, an information was filed charging James with the felony. James reportedly successfully moved for one continuance, and the case was set for jury trial to begin on April 8, 1996.
"On April 11, 1996, you were reportedly advised by Deputy District Attorney Elizabeth Anderson that the case had been reassigned from DDA Somers to a different trial attorney the day before; you sent the case to Department 8 (Judge Kenneth C. Twisselman, II) for trial. Reportedly, defendant James and his attorney and Chief Deputy District Attorney Dan Sparks reported to Department 8, where DDA Sparks told Judge Twisselman that the prosecution was not ready to proceed because the case had been assigned to the trial attorney only the day before. Judge Twisselman reportedly told the parties to return to Department 1 to explain to you the prosecution's request for a continuance.
"Reportedly, the parties returned to Department 1. You reportedly sent them back to Department 8, without discussion. You then reportedly had a telephone conversation with Judge Twisselman during which you reportedly suggested that the prosecution's motion to continue should be denied. When the parties appeared in Department 8 for a second time, Judge Twisselman reportedly told them to return to Department 1.
By letter dated January 27, 1997, petitioner responded to the Commission's letter, in pertinent part contending that he had ruled correctly in dismissing People v. James. The response asserted that the deputy district attorney assigned to the case, John Somers, had known in advance that he would be unable to try the case on the assigned date, yet failed to move for a continuance in writing or orally on April 8, 1996.
In his response letter, petitioner asserted that when the foregoing procedural requirements are not met by a prosecuting attorney seeking a continuance, witnesses' lives and schedules are disrupted, appropriate legal redress for victims may be impacted if witnesses are unavailable, defendants are left unable to prepare an opposition to the motion for continuance, and court clerks are denied the opportunity either to work out conflicts and priorities on their own or to expose a lack of true conflict. Relying upon sections 1050, subdivision (c), and 1050.5, petitioner argued that if the moving party fails to show good cause, the motion for continuance must be denied, and the movant's counsel may be subject to a monetary sanction and to the filing of a report with an appropriate disciplinary committee.
Petitioner's response emphasized the People's failure to properly request a continuance. Petitioner contended that Deputy District Attorney Somers appeared before him in department 1, on April 8, 1996, and the jury trial was trailed to the following day. On April 9, the case was put over to April 11, because Somers was in trial on another case. Petitioner informed him that a new prosecutor would have to be assigned in People v. James. On April 11, Deputy District Attorney Elizabeth Anderson appeared before petitioner and stated that, on the previous day, Deputy District Attorney Carla Grabert had been reassigned to replace Somers as trial counsel in James. Petitioner sent the matter to trial before Judge Twisselman, who presided in department 8.
Petitioner believes that when the parties arrived in department 8, Chief Deputy District Attorney Dan Sparks appeared on behalf of the People, requesting a continuance. Judge Twisselman sent the parties back to department 1, where motions for continuance were considered. Petitioner sent the parties back to department 8, because a motion for a continuance had not [20 Cal. 4th 379] been filed. He recalls that, "It is possible that on this trip Sparks indicated his desire to make a record." Petitioner believes that he informed the prosecutor that the proper place in which to make that record was before Judge Twisselman in department 8.
"The Court: 'Well, I have April 18th as the last day this can go to trial, number one; number two, this case has been on the trial calendar since Monday of this week [April 8]. Mr. Somers was sent out on his case last week. He was sent out on a case that was going to go two weeks. It was known to the District Attorney's Office at that time that he would be unavailable to try this case within the statutory time limit. I had been telling him that it was April 18th, I believe I began telling you that on Monday, and there has been no attempt apparently to reassign the case.
" 'We have courts available, and I have an extremely heavy calendar of cases that have to get out and cases that have to get out next week. This is one of the cases that we show that ha[s] to get out next week. Consequently-there was no motion filed with this Court to continue this case, I've been trailing it on a day-to-day basis, and the Court requires two days notice, pursuant to statute, for a motion to continue. None was ever filed [20 Cal. 4th 380] with the Court, knowing that Mr. Somers was going to be in trial and would not be available to try this case.
"DDA Sparks: 'We will not do that, Your Honor. We refuse to proceed. You can deal with it here, because [Judge Twisselman is] going to send it back up here. I suggest the Court read People v. Ferguson.
"The Court: 'That's the ruling of the Court.' "
In his response to the Commission, dated January 12, 1997, petitioner explained that he "anticipated that the assigned DDA could seek 'logistical remedies' in the form of using the balance of the day (beginning in the afternoon) to pick a jury and/or conduct other preliminary matters which would not have required the actual opening statement and presentation of witnesses until perhaps the following Monday. Indeed, there were in limine motions to deal with as well as a scheduled conditional examination of a witness on the following day, Friday, April 12th."
By letter dated May 8, 1997, petitioner reiterated his belief that he had not violated any statute, court rule, or canon of judicial ethics in connection with his dismissal of People v. James. He asserted that he "made a proper legal ruling, the losing party made 'objections' to that ruling ..., and the Court of Appeal considered and rejected those objections. The lack of success of the writ petition in People v. James demonstrates that the case cited as controlling by the Deputy District Attorney (People v. Ferguson) was not in fact on point." Petitioner's supplemental response opined that further inquiry by the Commission was unwarranted and that no basis existed to impose discipline.
"The matter about which you and commission staff have corresponded was considered by the Commission on Judicial Performance at its July meeting. After reviewing all the information before it, including the letters of January 27 and May 8, 1997, submitted on your behalf by counsel, the commission concluded that further proceedings are not warranted and determined to close the matter with this severe advisory letter.
"In making this determination, the commission strongly disapproved of your handling of the felony child molestation case of People v. James. Your dismissal of the case on April 11, 1996, occurred under circumstances equivalent to those in the earlier case of People v. Ferguson, in which the Court of Appeal reversed your dismissal of the case in a published opinion in 1990. When a judge's order is reversed in a published decision, and the judge repeats the action, such conduct necessarily raises concerns about a reckless disregard of the law, diminishing public confidence in the judiciary in contravention of Canon 2A. When the conduct is repeated against the same party, concerns of bias or a lack of impartiality may also be raised. See Canon 3B(5). As respects your conduct in dismissing the People v. James case, the commission was also particularly disturbed that the People v. Ferguson decision was brought to your attention by counsel before you dismissed the case.
"Article VI, section 18.5 of the California Constitution and Commission Rule 102 set forth the provisions concerning confidentiality of advisory letters.
 (See fn. 5.) Petitioner filed this original writ proceeding on October 3, 1997. fn. 5 He contends: (1) the Commission lacked authority to issue an advisory letter; (2) even if the Commission was empowered to issue such a letter, the Commission's procedure in doing so violated his right to due process of law; (3) the Commission may not issue a stinger letter based upon a perceived legal error committed by a judge; and (4) in the present case, no sanctionable legal error was committed.
Petitioner contends that because the constitutional provision cited above makes no reference to advisory letters, the Commission is without jurisdiction to issue them. He further contends that, even if the Commission considers such letters to be "advisory" or "educational" in nature, in fact they represent disciplinary action. The Commission disagrees with these contentions.
Petitioner contends that "not even the minimal requirements of due process of law are ever satisfied before an investigated judge is issued a stinger letter .... There is no hearing at all. There is no right to review the evidence the Commission has reviewed. There is no right to confront adverse witnesses or evidence. There is no established right of review by the judicial branch of State government." Petitioner adds that, in view of article VI, section 18.5, of the California Constitution (authorizing the release of advisory letters to any Governor, the President, and the Commission on Judicial Appointments), the issuance of an advisory letter "is potentially devastating to a judge's chances of future appointments and advancement in the judge's profession." He also notes that the Commission has, in disciplinary proceedings involving other jurists, introduced advisory letters issued to the judge under investigation, "in order to show aggravation, or to show a common pattern of improper behavior, or to show a failure of the judge to heed the Commission's advice." For these reasons, petitioner urges this court to invalidate procedures followed by the Commission in issuing advisory letters.
The Commission's inquiry letter, dated December 6, 1996, provided petitioner with notice of the inquiry and the nature of the charge, and gave him an opportunity to respond. Petitioner presented his case in opposition (by letter dated January 27, 1997), defending his decision to grant the defendant's motion to dismiss People v. James, in substantial part because the prosecution had failed to comply with the statutory requirements applicable to a motion to continue the trial and thereafter had refused to proceed. The Commission subsequently informed petitioner that it had ordered a preliminary investigation, explaining that "[t]he nature of the possible charges" was set forth in the Commission's letter dated December 6, 1996. The reply also afforded petitioner a further opportunity to explain his handling of People v. James. Petitioner thereafter filed a supplemental response, again defending his conduct.
The procedural protections petitioner contends were improperly withheld from him are of the type more appropriately required whenever action by the state significantly impairs an individual's freedom to pursue a private occupation. (Willner v. Committee on Character (1963) 373 U.S. 96, 103-106 [83 S. Ct. 1175, 1180-1182, 10 L. Ed. 2d 224, 2 A.L.R.3d 1254]; accord, Endler v. Schutzbank, supra, 68 Cal. 2d 162, 172-178; see also Rodriguez v. Department of Real Estate, supra, 51 Cal. App. 4th 1289, 1296-1300 [notice and opportunity to provide written argument prior to suspension of broker's license held to comport with principles of due process].) In the present case, however, no such significant impairment was at risk at this early stage in the [20 Cal. 4th 393] disciplinary process. fn. 17 Advisory letters may range from a mild suggestion to a severe rebuke; although they may reduce a judge's chance of being elevated to a higher court (or appointed to some other office), such letters do not inexorably subject a judge to public opprobrium or other inevitable consequences that might impair the individual's freedom to pursue his or her chosen occupation.
The nature of the Commission's investigation was, at its core, a fact-finding mission focused upon petitioner's handling of the case of People v. James. The Commission's inquiry lent itself well to proof though documentary forms of evidence including hearing transcripts and the parties' briefing. In view of these factors, we are satisfied that the Commission's procedures were adequate. They provided petitioner with sufficient notice of the Commission's inquiry, specifically identified the focus of, and evidentiary basis for, the Commission's investigation, and granted petitioner sufficient opportunities to address the Commission's concerns and defend himself against the allegation that he had acted improperly. (See generally, Saleeby v. State Bar, supra, 39 Cal. 3d 547, 565 [in an action seeking a disbursement by the State Bar from the Client Security Fund, this court held that "[a] formal hearing, with full rights of confrontation and cross-examination is not necessarily required"]; see also Shacket v. Osteopathic Medical Board (1996) 51 Cal. App. 4th 223, 231, fn. 4 [58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 715] [medical peer review board was "not required to hold a formal hearing before filing and disseminating" a report involving suspension of physician].) The Commission thus fulfilled its obligation to inform petitioner of all material facts behind the allegations.
Article VI, section 18, subdivision (j), of the California Constitution provides that when the Commission institutes formal proceedings, the notice of charges, the answer, and all subsequent papers and proceedings shall be open to the public. The adoption of petitioner's position that more formal proceedings must be held before an advisory letter may be issued also might invoke the constitutional requirement that such proceedings be made public, thereby eliminating the confidentiality and informality of this form of discipline that makes it less onerous and detrimental to the judge. In short, granting the process requested by petitioner might well end up eliminating the benefits of the form of discipline itself.
Although, pursuant to article VI, section 18.5, of the California Constitution, information regarding an advisory letter may be requested by the President, a Governor, or the Commission on Judicial Appointments, and thus the confidentiality of the letter no longer is limited to the Commission and the judge (see Cal. Const., art. VI, § 18.5, subds. (a), (b), (c)), we also observe that the judge at that point is provided with information given to the [20 Cal. 4th 395] requesting party (id., subd. (e)), and thus may fully respond, rebut, or otherwise explain the subject matter of the letter to the party that requested it. Moreover, the judge may describe the events that transpired in the period since the letter was issued. This additional opportunity to respond, although less preferable from a judge's standpoint than nondisclosure of the letter, provides a meaningful method to mitigate the potentially adverse impact created by such disclosure. Because the Commission's issuance of an advisory letter has only the potential, tangential effect of inflicting harm upon a judge's career, the implementation of additional procedural safeguards is unnecessary.
Balancing petitioner's private interest in maintaining a judicial career free of the infliction of disciplinary measures, and the Commission's interest in the effective and efficient safeguarding of the public from aberrant action by judicial officers, we are satisfied that due process of law does not require the additional protections urged by petitioner as prerequisites to the Commission's issuance of an advisory letter. The Commission's procedures sufficiently protect a judge's interests from the unreasonable issuance of such a letter, and thus are adequate to satisfy the requirements of due process of law.
Petitioner contends that a prohibition against "legal error investigation" is necessary in order to avoid abuse of the Commission's powers by persons politically or philosophically opposed to a particular jurist. Although we believe that the Commission properly should defer to a Court of Appeal's determination whether legal error in fact has occurred, we agree with the Commission's position that petitioner's proposed remedy is overbroad. A judge may, through repeated legal error, commit acts that would lead to violations of the judicial canons. For example, canon 2A of the California [20 Cal. 4th 398] Code of Judicial Ethics declares that "A judge shall respect and comply with the law and shall act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary." A judge who repeatedly dismisses certain kinds of claims might be subject to discipline if the dismissals are shown to be not only legally erroneous, but also based upon bias, prejudice, or some other improper purpose.
Instead, we agree with the Commission that legal error does not preclude a finding of misconduct, and that the Commission properly may consider surrounding factors in ascertaining whether discipline may be in order. Nevertheless, a judge must be free not only to make the correct ruling for the proper reasons, but also to make an incorrect ruling, believing it to be correct. fn. 21 The determination whether a legal error provides the basis for discipline thus requires an inquiry into additional factors that demonstrate more than legal error, alone.
In summary, a judge who commits legal error which, in addition, clearly and convincingly reflects bad faith (Broadman v. Commission on Judicial Performance, supra, 18 Cal. 4th 1079, 1091-1092), bias (Kennick v. Commission on Judicial Performance (1990) 50 Cal. 3d 297, 327-331 [267 Cal. Rptr. 293, 787 P.2d 591, 87 A.L.R.4th 679]), abuse of authority (Spruance v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications (1975) 13 Cal. 3d 778, 786-795 [119 Cal. Rptr. 841, 532 P.2d 1209]), disregard for fundamental rights (Kloepfer v. Commission on Judicial Performance, supra, 49 Cal. 3d 826, 849-854), intentional disregard of the law (Cannon v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications, supra, 14 Cal. 3d 678, 695-698), or any purpose other than the faithful discharge of judicial duty (Ryan v. Commission on Judicial Performance (1988) 45 Cal. 3d 518, 545-546 [247 Cal. Rptr. 378, 754 P.2d 724, 76 A.L.R.4th 951]), is subject to investigation. (See generally, Shaman et al., Judicial Conduct and Ethics, supra, § 2.02, pp. 32-37.) Mere legal error, without more, however, is insufficient to support a finding that a judge has violated the Code of Judicial Ethics and thus should be disciplined.
We turn now to the facts of this case. As noted, the Commission's advisory letter informed petitioner that the Commission "strongly disapproved" of his handling of the proceedings in People v. James: "Your [20 Cal. 4th 399] dismissal of the case ... occurred under circumstances equivalent to those in the earlier case of People v. Ferguson, in which the Court of Appeal reversed your dismissal of the case in a published opinion in 1990.... As respects your conduct in dismissing the People v. James case, the commission was also particularly disturbed that the People v. Ferguson decision was brought to your attention by counsel before you dismissed the case."
 We need not enter the debate whether Ferguson and James were distinguishable, nor need we even decide whether petitioner committed "error" in dismissing the James matter. As noted, the critical inquiry is whether petitioner's action clearly and convincingly reflected bad faith, bias, abuse of authority, disregard for fundamental rights, intentional disregard of the law, or any purpose other than the faithful discharge of judicial duty.
In the present case, we conclude that the evidence does not support such a determination. After properly denying an inadequate motion to continue (one that could have led to the imposition of sanctions under section 1050.5), petitioner was confronted with a prosecutor who stated that the People unequivocally refused to proceed. Not unreasonably, petitioner viewed the [20 Cal. 4th 400] prosecutor's challenge as an intolerable affront to the authority of the trial court, one that could have supported imposition of additional sanctions under the court's contempt power. (§ 166.) Our review of the proceedings as a whole suggests that petitioner in fact demonstrated extraordinary patience in dealing with an unprepared and unyielding prosecution. Viewed against the backdrop of the prosecution's recalcitrance to proceed, petitioner's order dismissing the case, even if legally incorrect, fails to "raise concerns" regarding "a reckless disregard of the law, ... bias, or a lack of impartiality," as suggested by the Commission in its advisory letter. To the contrary, we find no evidence that petitioner's order dismissing the James case was motivated by bad faith, bias, abuse of authority, disregard for fundamental rights, intentional (or "reckless") disregard of the law, or any purpose other than the faithful discharge of judicial duty. Accordingly, we reject the Commission's position that petitioner's dismissal of the James case was sanctionable.
The petition for writ of mandate, seeking the withdrawal of the Commission's advisory letter, dated July 14, 1997, is granted. This court's alternative writ of mandate, filed December 31, 1997, is discharged. Each side shall bear its own costs incurred in this action.
Concurring.-Although I agree with the result and with much of the reasoning in the majority opinion, I would take a somewhat different approach to the question of discipline for legal error. The question raised by this case, in my view, is not whether a judge's legal error is itself subject to investigation or discipline by the Commission on Judicial Performance (Commission)-even the Commission concedes it is not, and canon 1 of the California Code of Judicial Ethics so provides. The question, rather, is whether a legal error of the type asserted in the complaint against petitioner has such a tendency to reveal underlying misconduct as to justify investigation and discipline by the Commission. I would answer that question in the negative: Because the judge's position, as revealed in his initial response to the Commission's inquiry, had reasonably arguable merit, and because the Commission had no extrinsic evidence of bad faith, bias, abuse of authority, intentional disregard of the law, or any improper purpose, the Commission should have ended its investigation at the time of that response without any discipline.
The majority opinion (ante, at p. 397) rejects petitioner's "intellectual merit" argument, although we have previously adopted a similar threshold [20 Cal. 4th 401] standard. (See Wenger v. Commission on Judicial Performance (1981) 29 Cal. 3d 615, 647, fn. 13 [175 Cal. Rptr. 420, 630 P.2d 954] [observing that, correct or not, one judge's ruling "had at least enough merit" not to constitute misconduct]; Gubler v. Commission on Judicial Performance (1984) 37 Cal. 3d 27, 47-48 [207 Cal. Rptr. 171, 688 P.2d 551] [stating, with a citation to Wenger v. Commission on Judicial Performance, supra, that "a judge should not be disciplined for mere erroneous determination of legal issues ... that are subject to reasonable differences of opinion"].) The majority, however, in order to explain why the rulings at issue here did not constitute misconduct, is nevertheless compelled to observe that the prosecutor's continuance was "properly" denied, that petitioner's view of the matter was "[n]ot unreasonabl[e]," and that petitioner demonstrated "extraordinary patience" (maj. opn., ante, at pp. 401-402, italics in original), all of which suggest the arguable correctness of petitioner's rulings is what precludes discipline. Rather than reject petitioner's position, then, I would accept it, at least in part: When, as here, the Commission has no extrinsic evidence of bad faith or improper motive-no evidence, that is, apart from the nature of the ruling itself-the Commission generally should not pursue an investigation into, or impose discipline for, a legal ruling that has reasonably arguable merit. In such circumstances, the principle of judicial independence requires that the determination whether the ruling was correct or not be left to a reviewing court.
In its letter of inquiry to petitioner, the Commission observed that petitioner had adhered to his dismissal ruling even after the deputy district attorney had drawn his attention to People v. Ferguson (1990) 218 Cal. App. 3d 1173 [267 Cal. Rptr. 528] (Ferguson), in which the Court of Appeal reversed a dismissal under assertedly similar circumstances. I agree with the implication that, in some circumstances, a judge's ruling made in the face of directly contrary binding authority cited to him or her might be evidence of intentional disregard for the law. This was not such a case, however, because Ferguson was not so squarely on point as to absolutely preclude a different ruling in the James case. The Commission should have realized this, at the latest, when it received petitioner's responsive letter, which pointed out three arguably pertinent distinctions between Ferguson and James. fn. 1 In the same letter, petitioner informed the Commission that the Court of Appeal had, despite its own Ferguson precedent, summarily denied [20 Cal. 4th 402] the People's petition for a writ of mandate in James, an act suggesting the reviewing court did not consider Ferguson completely dispositive.
At this point, if not before, the Commission should have realized that this was a garden-variety legal dispute, in which a litigant complaining of an adverse ruling can (and did) seek review from a higher court. That the ruling complained of appeared contrary to a published decision should not, in itself, have concerned the Commission, especially when petitioner provided arguable grounds for distinguishing the precedent. fn. 2 Disputes over whether a prior decision is distinguishable, or whether a particular statute applies, are as common as air in litigation and (to mix metaphors) are typical grist for the appellate mill. In the absence of any evidence of improper motive, such a dispute should not also become the focus of a disciplinary proceeding. Because, in this case, the judicial ruling complained of had at least arguable merit and the Commission cited no extrinsic evidence of improper purpose, the Commission was simply wrong to conclude, as it did in the advisory letter, that petitioner's order of dismissal after Ferguson was brought to his attention, "raises concerns about a reckless disregard of the law, ... bias or a lack of impartiality ...."
For these reasons, I concur in granting the petition.
"(b) To continue any hearing in a criminal proceeding, including the trial, (1) a written notice shall be filed and served on all parties to the proceeding at least two court days before the hearing sought to be continued, together with affidavits or declarations detailing specific facts showing that a continuance is necessary; and (2) within two court days of learning that he or she has a conflict in the scheduling of any court hearing, including a trial, an attorney shall notify the calendar clerk of each court involved, in writing, indicating which hearing was set first. A party shall not be deemed to have been served within the meaning of this section until that party actually has received a copy of the documents to be served, unless the party, after receiving actual notice of the request for continuance, waives the right to have the documents served in a timely manner. Regardless of the proponent of the motion, the prosecuting attorney shall notify the people's witnesses and the defense attorney shall notify the defense's witnesses of the notice of motion, the date of the hearing, and the witnesses' right to be heard by the court. The superior and municipal courts of a county may adopt rules, which shall be consistent, regarding the method of giving the notice or waiver of service required by this subdivision, where a continuance is sought because of a conflict between scheduled appearances in the courts of that county.
"(c) Notwithstanding subdivision (b), a party may make a motion for a continuance without complying with the requirements of that subdivision. However, unless the moving party shows good cause for the failure to comply with those requirements, the court may impose sanctions as provided in Section 1050.5.
"(d) When a party makes a motion for a continuance without complying with the requirements of subdivision (b), the court shall hold a hearing on whether there is good cause for the failure to comply with those requirements. At the conclusion of the hearing the court shall make a finding whether good cause has been shown and, if it finds that there is good cause, shall state on the record the facts proved that justify its finding. A statement of the finding and a statement of facts proved shall be entered in the minutes. If the moving party is unable to show good cause for the failure to give notice, the motion for continuance shall not be granted."
All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
"(1) A fine not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000) upon counsel for the moving party.
"(2) The filing of a report with an appropriate disciplinary committee.
"(b) The authority to impose sanctions provided for by this section shall be in addition to any other authority or power available to the court."
FN 3. The People appealed from petitioner's order dismissing the case, and also sought writ relief. The Court of Appeal summarily denied the writ, and the People abandoned the appeal, instead refiling the case in the trial court. The defendant subsequently was acquitted by a jury.
FN 4. Rule 109 of the Rules of the Commission on Judicial Performance provides that if a complaint against a judge is not obviously unfounded or frivolous, the Commission may make a staff inquiry to determine whether sufficient facts exist to warrant a preliminary investigation and, if so, make a preliminary investigation to determine whether formal proceedings should be instituted and a hearing held. Unless otherwise noted, subsequent references to rules are to the Rules of the Commission on Judicial Performance.
Rule 111(a) provides that "[i]f the Commission commences a preliminary investigation, the judge shall be notified of the investigation and the nature of the charge, and shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity in the course of the preliminary investigation to present such matters as the judge may choose."
Rule 111(c) provides that "[a]t any time after notice of a preliminary investigation and a reasonable opportunity to respond has been given to the judge, the commission may determine that the judge's conduct does not constitute a basis for further proceedings and may terminate the investigation by issuing a confidential advisory letter to the judge."
FN 5. The correct means by which to obtain judicial review of an advisory letter is by a petition for writ of mandate. Because the instant proceeding is neither a "review of a determination by the commission to retire, remove, censure, admonish, or disqualify" a judge (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 18, subd. (d)), nor a legal proceeding requesting "injunctive relief or other provisional remedy" (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 18, subd. (g)), this court is not required to issue its decision within any specific time period.
FN 6. Our alternative writ of mandate set forth in pertinent part: "The petition for writ of mandate on file herein having been considered and good cause appearing for the issuance of this alternative writ of mandate, respondent hereby is commanded to withdraw its advisory letter issued to petitioner, dated July 14, 1997, or, in the alternative, to show cause before this court why the relief sought in the petition should not be granted on the following ground or grounds: (1) the Commission lacks authority to issue confidential letters, (2) if the Commission has such authority, its procedure for doing so is invalid, and (3) if the Commission has such authority, the facts of this case did not warrant issuance of such a letter."
FN 7. Article VI, section 18, subdivision (d), of the California Constitution, provides in pertinent part: "Except as provided in subdivision (f) [which applies to justices and former justices of the California Supreme Court], the Commission on Judicial Performance may (1) retire a judge for disability that seriously interferes with the performance of the judge's duties and is or is likely to become permanent, or (2) censure a judge or former judge or remove a judge for action occurring not more than 6 years prior to the commencement of the judge's current term or of the former judge's last term that constitutes willful misconduct in office, persistent failure or inability to perform the judge's duties, habitual intemperance in the use of intoxicants or drugs, or conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute, or (3) publicly or privately admonish a judge or former judge found to have engaged in an improper action or dereliction of duty...."
FN 9. California Rules of Court, former rule 904.1, provided: "At any time during the course of a staff inquiry, the commission may determine that a judge's conduct does not constitute a basis for further proceedings and may terminate the inquiry by issuing a confidential advisory letter to the judge. Before the commission issues an advisory letter, the judge shall be notified of the inquiry, the nature of the charge, and the name of the person making the verified statement or, if none, that the inquiry is on the commission's own motion. The judge shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity in the course of the inquiry to present such matters as the judge may choose. A reasonable time for a judge to respond to an inquiry letter shall be 20 days from the date the letter was mailed to the judge unless the time is extended for good cause shown.
"The Commission on Judicial Performance uses an informal process of sending letters of caution, disapproval, and correction to judges whose conduct is questionable in some way or which might be considered 'borderline,' but which does not warrant formal discipline. This process is widely referred to as 'the stinger letter.' No specific authority for this procedure is contained in the rules governing commission procedures. The commission proposed that a rule be adopted which would authorize the commission to use this procedure. CJA [the California Judges Association] also supports adding specific authority for this procedure to the rules and clarifying the circumstances warranting its use.
"The committee found that use of an advisory letter procedure appears to be an effective educational tool for the commission and operates to benefit and assist the individual judge attempting in good faith to comply with all ethical duties. The committee further determined that since the letter merely provides advice and counseling, use of the procedure does not constitute a form of discipline. Legitimizing the procedure, the committee decided, need not involve a constitutional amendment and can properly be accomplished by rule.
"The advisory committee therefore recommends adoption of two provisions authorizing issuance of a confidential advisory letter at any time during the course of a staff inquiry or after commencement of a preliminary investigation. The proposed rule changes would require that notice to the judge and an opportunity to respond be afforded prior to issuance of the letter.
FN 12. Rule 110 provides: "(a) (Notice prior to issuance of advisory letter) If the commission makes a staff inquiry, the judge shall be notified of the inquiry and the nature of the charge, before the commission issues an advisory letter. The respondent judge so notified shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity in the course of the inquiry to present such matters as the judge may choose. A reasonable time for a judge to respond to an inquiry letter shall be 20 days from the date the letter was mailed to the judge unless the time is extended pursuant to rule 108.
"(b) (Termination of staff inquiry) If the staff inquiry does not disclose sufficient cause to warrant issuance of a confidential advisory letter or further proceedings, the commission shall terminate the staff inquiry and notify the judge in writing of such action if the judge was notified of the staff inquiry pursuant to subdivision (a).
"(c) (Advisory letter) At any time after notice of a staff inquiry and a reasonable opportunity to respond has been given to the judge, the commission may determine that the judge's conduct does not constitute a basis for further proceedings and issue a confidential advisory letter to the judge."
As noted previously, rule 111(c) similarly provides: "(Advisory letter) At any time after notice of a preliminary investigation and a reasonable opportunity to respond has been given to the judge, the commission may determine that the judge's conduct does not constitute a basis for further proceedings and may terminate the investigation by issuing a confidential advisory letter to the judge."
"(a) Upon request, the Commission on Judicial Performance shall provide to the Governor of any State of the Union the text of any private admonishment, advisory letter, or other disciplinary action together with any information that the Commission on Judicial Performance deems necessary to a full understanding of the commission's action, with respect to any applicant whom the Governor of any State of the Union indicates is under consideration for any judicial appointment.
"(b) Upon request, the Commission on Judicial Performance shall provide the President of the United States the text of any private admonishment, advisory letter, or other disciplinary action together with any information that the Commission on Judicial Performance deems necessary to a full understanding of the commission's action, with respect to any applicant whom the President indicates is under consideration for any federal judicial appointment.
"(c) Upon request, the Commission on Judicial Performance shall provide the Commission on Judicial Appointments the text of any private admonishment, advisory letter, or other disciplinary action together with any information that the Commission on Judicial Performance deems necessary to a full understanding of the commission action, with respect to any applicant whom the Commission on Judicial Appointments indicates is under consideration for any judicial appointment."
FN 15. As noted, the Commission issued its advisory letter to petitioner on July 14, 1997. In view of our holding that article VI, section 18.5, of the California Constitution authorizes the Commission to issue advisory letters, we need not and do not reach petitioner's contention that similar letters issued by the Commission prior to the December 1, 1996, effective date of section 18.5 "are illegal and must be purged from [the Commission's] files."
FN 17. Had the preliminary investigation resulted in a determination by the Commission that a private or public admonishment was appropriate, petitioner would have been entitled to request a hearing and contest the Commission's intended action. (Rules 113-116, 118.) If, after the preliminary investigation, the Commission had concluded that formal proceedings should be instituted (rule 118), petitioner would have been afforded further opportunity to respond in writing (rule 119), as well as a hearing before special masters or the Commission (rules 121, 123-125). The Commission's rules provide the judge with procedural rights in such formal proceedings (rule 126).
FN 18. We also observe that if a full trial-type hearing were held whenever the Commission contemplated the issuance of an advisory letter, the negative impact upon the administration of justice likely would be significant, because such hearings would involve diverting the affected jurists from their courtrooms.
FN 19. We note that the availability of writ review in this court provides an additional due process guarantee for the recipient of an advisory letter.
FN 22. Petitioner also contends that in denying the writ relief sought by the People in James, the Court of Appeal impliedly rejected the Commission's position that Ferguson mandated a result different from that reached by the trial court in James. In view of our analysis and the conclusion we reach in the present opinion, we need not and do not address this contention.
FN 1. Petitioner noted that Ferguson did not involve the mandatory denial of an improper oral motion for continuance (Pen. Code, § 1050, subd. (d)); that in Ferguson the assigned deputy district attorney was temporarily unavailable, while in James a deputy had been assigned who was available but unprepared to try the case; and that in Ferguson the People did not refuse to proceed and could have begun trial as soon as the same afternoon, while in James the chief deputy flatly refused to proceed without a continuance of several days. In addition, petitioner argued the dismissal in James served certain policy objectives the Ferguson court found lacking in that case.
FN 3. To repeat, I speak here only of the case, such as this one, in which the Commission can cite no extrinsic evidence of improper motive or other misconduct.

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