Source: https://www.justice.gov/crt/case-document/united-states-v-hatley-brief-appellee
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 19:52:29+00:00

Document:
Court carried with the case.
month term of incarceration on March 28, 2017, and entered its judgment on April 6, 2017.
Court has jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. 3742 and 28 U.S.C. 1291.
officers were charged with federal offenses related to these abuses and subsequent cover-up.
Jury Verdict, United States v. Ackal, No. 16-cr-48 (W.D. La. Nov. 4, 2016).
and he had the opportunity to do so.” ROA.120.
present in the chapel.” See ROA.737-740 (testimony from Byron “Ben” Lassalle—one such participant).
centimeters long by 5 centimeters wide.” ROA.488-489. S.S.’s lip was also swollen. ROA.257. S.S.
being touched as eight on a scale of one to ten. ROA.489.
with at least one other officer around the time he made this false statement. See ROA.599.
U.S.C. 1001, which prohibits making false statements to federal investigators.
recommendation to accept the guilty plea. ROA.27.
The United States Probation Office then prepared a presentence investigation report (PSR).
calculated the Guidelines range as 63 to 72 months.
the Probation Office responded (ROA.157-165).
submitted letters from friends and family members in support of his sentencing arguments.
trial and the Probation Office’s responses to the objections.
surrounding his false statement. ROA.100-107.
The United States rested on its pleadings. ROA.107.
Section 1001 count, running consecutively.
level of 19 with a Guidelines range of 30 to 37 months. See ROA.107; ROA.185.
United States’ Section 5K1.1 motion. See ROA.133-134.
arguments regarding grouping of the offenses and the offense level calculation for his 18 U.S.C.
in effect relied only on the offense level for the Section 242 count.
that resulted from granting the Section 5K1.1 motion.
arguments that he did not make to the district court and that are thus not supported by the record.
that attaches to a within-Guidelines sentence.
This Court’s review of a district court’s sentencing decision is bifurcated. United States v.
sentence imposed under an abuse-of-discretion standard.” United States v.
is separate and apart from the actual assault that he failed to stop. He therefore argues (Br.
violence. See United States v. Reese, 2 F.3d 870, 887-888 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S.
transpiring and did not stop it”), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1086 (1986); Watkins v. Donnelly, 551 F.
to protect inmates from violence inflicted by fellow officials.”).
constitutional duties and make the underlying uses of excessive force worse and harder to stop.
No. 16-cr-35 (W.D. La. Apr. 6, 2017); see also pp. 51-52, infra.
S.S., even though he knew he had a duty to intervene and he had the opportunity to do so.” ROA.120.
the Guidelines range for the Section 242 offense.
of the jointly undertaken criminal activity,” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B).
bodily injury.” U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2 cmt. n.1. It is undisputed that Hatley’s fellow officers beat S.S.
criminal activity that Hatley jointly undertook with his fellow officers by failing to intercede.
an omission, and, under the Guidelines, he is responsible for “all harm that resulted from” it.
was known, or reasonably should have been known, by the defendant.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 cmt.
(8th Cir. 2014) (and so is a baton), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1441 (2015).
used” during the commission of an assault. U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2(b)(2)(B).
force when he was in the chapel before the assault even began.
ROA.120. Moreover, those officers had their batons with them before the assault occurred.
strike S.S., the district court did not err in applying the dangerous weapon enhancement.
sustained, not the actions of the defendant, should be the focus of the inquiry.” United States v.
officers intended to use unlawful force and that S.S. was restrained and compliant. ROA.120.
which Hatley pleaded guilty. See 18 U.S.C. 242; ROA.123.
because he was acting under color of law. This Court should reject Hatley’s argument.
circumstances of the assault and noting that S.S. was kneeling and handcuffed when he was beaten).
district court to apply the enhancement, and Hatley cites no authority to the contrary.
preponderance of the evidence, [his] minor role in the offense.’” United States v.
204 (5th Cir.) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 910 (2005).
than the average participant.” ROA.162.
provided no evidence or testimony at his own sentencing hearing to rebut Broussard’s testimony.
adjustment was plausible in light of the record developed at the Ackal trial. See United States v.
Perez-Solis, 709 F.3d 453, 469 (5th Cir. 2013).
months regardless of any calculation related to the Section 1001 offense. See ROA.145-147; ROA.153.
district court sentenced Hatley to 36 months. See ROA.107.
increasing that offense level” based on the offense level of the lower group. U.S.S.G. § 3D1.4.
more levels less serious than the Group with the highest offense level.” U.S.S.G. § 3D1.4(c).
which it departed downward to arrive at the 30- to 37-month range. See ROA.153; see also ROA.185.
affect the Guidelines calculation for the defendant).
range. U.S.S.G. § 5G1.2 cmt. n.1; see also United States v. Garcia, 322 F.3d 842, 845 (5th Cir.
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted); United States v.
to arrive at a sentencing range.” United States v. Lucas, 157 F.3d 998, 1001 (5th Cir. 1998).
particular offense if the defendant is sentenced on multiple counts.” Lucas, 157 F.3d at 1001.
in more detail below, it exercised reasonably.
sentence for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Diaz Sanchez, 714 F.3d 289, 293 (5th Cir.
the United States’ investigation. None of these arguments is meritorious.
7 Hatley’s counsel stated that he “object[ed] to the sentence as being unreasonable.” ROA.108.
within the Guidelines range, the district court considered the Section 3553(a) factors. Ibid.
factors.” Diaz Sanchez, 714 F.3d at 294.
no objection to the explanation. See, e.g., United States v.
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Hatley cites (Br. 38-39) United States v. Key, 599 F.3d 469 (5th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 562 U.S.
particularly plain error review. See Mondragon-Santiago, 564 F.3d at 365.
respect to other sentences that they impose.”).
“personal history and personal characteristics and involvement in the current offense.” ROA.107.
district court regarding those factors); United States v. Richardson, 87 F.3d 706, 710 (5th Cir.
discuss the Section 3553(a) factors as to each count for which a consecutive sentence is imposed.
generally without requiring specific discussion of the Section 3553(a) factors as to each count.
See, e.g., United States v. Rutherford, 599 F.3d 817, 821-822 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 562 U.S.
provided sufficient reasoning for its selection of a consecutive sentence.
where “the district court had the authority to render the sentence actually imposed”), cert.
because Gonzalez’s sentence is supported by the record and is not contrary to law.”).
for one of his fellow officer-defendants who did testify.
Hatley was deprived of an individualized sentence, Hatley cannot rebut this presumption.
5K1.1 motion. Review of this question, therefore, is for plain error. See Mares, 402 F.3d at 520.
the extent of a departure under § 5K1.1.”). The PSR calculated Hatley’s offense level as 26.
to the 63- to 72-month range in the PSR).
district court’s acceptance of the United States’ recommendation.
abuse-of-discretion standard of review.” United States v. Duhon, 541 F.3d 391, 399 (5th Cir.
particular defendant.” United States v. Campos-Maldonado, 531 F.3d 337, 339 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 555 U.S. 935 (2008).
officers. Neither argument rebuts the presumption of reasonableness.
both that offense and a felony count of violating 18 U.S.C. 1001.
18 U.S.C. 3553(a)(6) (emphasis added).
both that offense and a felony offense of violating Section 1001. See Judgment, United States v.
they had been convicted of different offenses.”), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct.
they also lied to federal investigators. This, however, is not an appropriate disparity theory.
unreviewable prosecutorial discretion. See United States v. Molina, 530 F.3d 326, 331 (5th Cir.
United States v. Stewart, 590 F.3d 93, 184 n.20 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 559 U.S. 1031 (2010).
differences in counts of conviction explain any supposed disparity, as discussed above.
watching the abuses, whereas Hatley failed to intervene without engaging in any such conduct.
2017); Judgment, United States v. Bergeron, No. 16-cr-32 (W.D. La. Apr. 6, 2017).
sentences, not merely that of one co-defendant.
v. Cooks, 589 F.3d 173, 186 (5th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 559 U.S. 1024 (2010).
factor or that it committed clear error in balancing the factors. See Cooks, 589 F.3d at 186.
underlying conduct. See pp. 14-20, supra.
sentencing hearing, where he repeatedly noted that his mistake was failing to act on one instance.
which the district court adopted—also laid out the nature and circumstances of the offense conduct.
overcome the presumption of reasonableness.”), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 459 (2013).
the false statement violation.” Hatley’s argument (Br.
statement within 30 days of making that statement.
district court.’”) (quoting Trinity Indus., Inc. v.
conceded that the district court did not consider the nature of the offense misstates the record.
evidence regarding the speed and motivation for correction of his false statement. Mot. Opp. 6-7.
a deposition in a civil case).
statements from Hatley and his counsel, both of whom addressed each of these issues. ROA.97-107.
trial—appropriately concluded that a within-Guidelines 36-month sentence was appropriate.
This Court should affirm the district court’s judgment and 36-month sentence.
and service will be accomplished by the appellate CM/ECF system.
prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using Word 2013, in 14-point Times New Roman font.

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