Source: http://www.itcblog.com/component/tags/tag/federal-circuit-cases-involving-the-itc?start=40
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 14:24:29+00:00

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On February 29, 2012, the Federal Circuit issued a precedential opinion in General Electric Co. v. ITC(2010-1223). This was an appeal from the Commission’s final determination of no violation of Section 337 in Certain Variable Speed Wind Turbines and Components Thereof (Inv. No. 337-TA-641). See our October 29, 2009 and March 5, 2010 posts for more details. By way of background, the Complainant in this investigation is General Electric Co. (“GE”) and the Respondents are Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd., Mitsubishi Heavy Industries America, Inc., and Mitsubishi Power Systems Americas, Inc. (collectively, “MHI”). GE alleged a violation of Section 337 with respect to U.S. Patent Nos. 7,321,221 (the ‘221 patent), 5,083,039 (the ‘039 patent) and 6,921,985 (the ‘985 patent) with respect to MHI variable speed wind turbines and the specialized power circuits that allow them to safely adapt to modern power grids. The patents-in-suit are generally directed to how the turbines are connected to the power grids. On August 7, 2009, former ALJ Carl C. Charneski issued the initial determination finding that a violation of Section 337 had occurred with respect to claim 121 of the asserted ‘039 patent, and claim 15 of the asserted ‘985 patent. Additionally, ALJ Charneski determined that there was no violation of Section 337 by any party with respect to the ‘221 patent. In its opinion, the Commission reversed the ALJ’s determination of violation of Section 337 with respect to the ‘039 and ‘985 patents, and affirmed the ALJ’s determination of no violation with respect to the ‘221 patent. The Commission also found no infringement of the ‘039 and ‘221 patents, and that GE failed to satisfy the domestic industry requirement with respect to the ‘985 patent. GE appealed the Commission’s decision with respect to claim construction, infringement, and domestic industry, as discussed below. Issues relating to the ‘039 patent were ruled moot by the Federal Circuit since the ‘039 patent expired on February 1, 2011. Claim Construction According to the opinion, infringement of the ‘221 patent was determined based on the construction of the crucial phrase “predetermined value” in claim 5 of the ‘221 patent in relation to when turbine operation can be resumed. GE argued that the term “predetermined value” includes “not only a value of current, but also a predetermined period of time, for the ‘221 patent states that the turbine operation can be resumed under consideration of a predetermined time constant.” The Commission did not agree with GE, and found that the portions of the specification relied on to show that the predetermined value also included time were in relation to an increase in plant safety, and that “the ‘221 specification’s only description of the operation of the invention shows recoupling upon measurement of a predetermined value of current, not upon passage of a pre-set period of time.” The Federal Circuit agreed with the Commission that the ‘221 claims are directed only to resuming the turbines after a predetermined value of current or a proxy for current has been reached, as this “stays true to the claim language and most naturally aligns with the patent’s description of the invention.” Infringement As described above, the ‘221 patent claims were held to be directed to resuming action after a predetermined value in current, rather than time, was reached. Since “it is not disputed that the [MHI] turbines do not measure current or voltage in determining when to resume the feed-in connection after decoupling has occurred,” but rather, after a pre-set period of time, the MHI turbines were held not to infringe the ‘221 claims either directly or under the doctrine of equivalents. Thus, the ruling that MHI’s turbines do not violate Section 337 because they do not infringe was affirmed. Domestic Industry Since the Federal Circuit determined that there was no infringement of the ‘221 patent and no Section 337 violation, it declined to consider whether or not GE’s turbines met the domestic industry requirement in relation to the ‘221 patent. Regarding the ‘985 patent, the Commission found no domestic industry because it construed claim 15, the only claim at issue, in a manner that excluded the GE turbines from the scope of the claim. The point of contention in claim 15 was that it included a converter controller “to shunt current from the inverter and generator rotor” in response to a control signal. According to the opinion, the issue of claim construction with respect to that phrase was “whether claim 15 requires that the circuit that shunts current on signal from the converter controller is located entirely outside of the inverter.” Although the Commission held that the shunt circuit must be separate from the inverter, the ALJ felt differently and held that “the claim does not contain the additional requirement that the shunt circuit is located entirely outside of the inverter.” The Federal Circuit reversed the Commission’s construction and agreed with the ALJ, noting that although claim 15 “requires that the circuit is coupled with the input of the inverter and the converter controller, whereby the current is shunted from the inverter and the rotor; this requirement does not limit the placement of the shunting circuitry to a location entirely external to the inverter.” The Federal Circuit pointed to other cases that similarly hold that a construction to adopt a specific structure is inappropriate when the claimed elements “must only perform their stated functions.” Therefore, the Federal Circuit’s construction of claim 15 allows for GE’s turbines to be covered, meeting the domestic industry requirement. Thus, the ruling that there is no domestic industry corresponding to the ‘985 patent was reversed. Other ‘985 Patent Issues Based on the Commission’s determination of the domestic industry question, it took no position on the ALJ’s initial determination that the MHI turbines infringe the ‘985 patent, that the patent is valid, and that no inequitable conduct had been shown. According to the opinion, the Commission stated that these other issues decided by the ALJ “are not subject to judicial review because they are not a Commission determination.” In other words, the Commission held “that when the full Commission does not review an issue that it noticed for review, that issue is removed from access to judicial review.” Significantly, the Federal Circuit noted that “this interpretation conflicts with the statutory right of judicial review of Commission determinations” in 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c), which also specifies that issues of an initial determination that are “noticed” but not reviewed become the Commission’s determination unless the Commission orders review, and would thus be appealable. As such, “issues not selected for review by the full Commission may be appealed to the Federal Circuit.” The Federal Circuit dismissed the case law and rules the Commission attempted to rely on to support its contrary position, pointing out that “the consequences of this practice are illustrated in this case, for all contested issues concerning the ’985 patent were investigated by the commission, tried to the ALJ, decided by initial determination, yet nearly all were held unavailable for judicial review…thus we are obliged to remand to the commission for undefined further proceedings, for which one may be confident only of further time and cost in the commission and upon reappeal to this court.” In keeping with this statement, the case was remanded for further proceedings with respect to the ‘985 patent.
On July 6, 2012, the Federal Circuit issued an order in General Electric Co. v. ITC, (2010-1223) granting the ITC’s petition for panel rehearing for the “limited purpose of withdrawing Part III of the opinion.” This was originally an appeal from the Commission’s decision finding no violation under Section 337 in Certain Variable Speed Wind Turbines and Components Thereof (Inv. No. 337-TA-641). See our October 29, 2009 and March 5, 2010 posts for more details. By way of background, the Complainant in this investigation is General Electric Co. (“GE”) and the Respondents are Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd., Mitsubishi Heavy Industries America, Inc., and Mitsubishi Power System, Inc. (collectively, “MHI”). GE alleged a violation of Section 337 with respect to U.S. Patent Nos. 7,321,221 (the ‘221 patent), 5,083,039 (the ‘039 patent) and 6,921,985 (the ‘985 patent) and MHI’s variable speed wind turbines and the specialized power circuits that allow them to safely adapt to modern power grids. The Federal Circuit previously issued a precedential opinion in this case affirming the determination of no infringement in relation to the ’221 patent, but reversing the Commission’s finding that GE had not established a domestic industry with respect to the ‘985 patent. The Federal Circuit remanded the case to the ITC for further proceedings with respect to the ‘985 patent. The ‘039 patent issues were deemed moot due to its expiration. See our March 1, 2012 post for more details. In its earlier opinion, the Federal Circuit discussed the Commission’s practice of noticing certain issues of an ALJ’s initial determination for review, but taking no position on these issues in its final determination (as it did in this case with respect to the ‘985 patent). According to the earlier opinion, it was the Commission’s position that these other issues decided by the ALJ “are not subject to judicial review because they are not a Commission determination.” The implication of the Commission’s position being “that when the full Commission does not review an issue that it noticed for review, that issue is removed from access to judicial review.” In the now withdrawn Part III of its earlier opinion, the Federal Circuit had dismissed the Commission’s argument as conflicting with statutory and regulatory provisions and as an improper reading of the law established by Beloit Corp. v. Valment Oy, 742 F.3d 1421, 1423 (Fed. Cir. 1984). To summarize, the Court concluded that all items are subject to judicial review, even those noticed and not determined by the Commission. See our April 23, 2012 post for a more detailed discussion of Beloit and the implications of the Court’s earlier opinion. In its July 6, 2012 order, the Federal Circuit has reissued its earlier opinion removing all discussion of judicial review of noticed but not determined issues. Although the order states “the panel offers no decision on the questions raised in Part III” and that these issues “may arise in a future case,” the dissent by Judge Newman considers the opinion withdrawal as “ratif[ication] of the Commission’s authority to negate the finality of these final decisions” and removing any chance of judicial review. According to Judge Newman, it is this approach that will substantially lengthen proceedings at the ITC and on appeal, rather than the Commission’s requirement to decide every issue noticed. In her dissent, Judge Newman elaborates on the content of the now-withdrawn Part III of the Court’s earlier opinion, and concludes that by not addressing the issue “the disservice to the parties and the public looms large, and the benefit to the Commission is elusive.” Judge Newman ends her dissent by urging the Court to take the case en banc to resolve the question of whether judicial review is available for issues noticed but not determined by the Commission.
On August 1, 2012, the Federal Circuit issued its opinion in InterDigital Commc’ns, LLC v. Int’l Trade Comm’n (2010-1093). This was an appeal by InterDigital Communications, LLC and InterDigital Technology Corporation (collectively, “InterDigital”) from the International Trade Commission’s (the “Commission”) final determination in Certain 3G Mobile Handsets and Components Thereof (Inv. No. 337-TA-613) that Nokia Inc. and Nokia Corp. (collectively, “Nokia”) had not violated Section 337 in connection with the importation into the U.S., sale for importation, or sale within the U.S. after importation of certain 3G mobile handsets and components thereof. See our October 19, 2009 post for more details. In the opinion, the Federal Circuit reversed the Commission’s findings that Nokia did not infringe InterDigital’s U.S. Patent Nos. 7,190,966 (the ‘966 patent) and 7,286,847 (the ‘847 patent), and remanded for further proceedings. In particular, the Federal Circuit found that the ITC had erred in its construction of the claim terms “code” and “increased power level,” which in turn had led to erroneous determinations of non-infringement. The Federal Circuit also rejected an argument by Nokia that the Commission’s decision could be upheld because InterDigital’s licensing activities were allegedly insufficient to satisfy the domestic industry requirement. The ‘966 and ‘847 patents relate to wireless cellular telephone technology, and focus on an apparatus and methods for controlling transmission power during the “handshake” portion of a wireless cellular communication. The ‘847 patent is a continuation of the ‘966 patent. At the ITC, former Chief ALJ Paul J. Luckern construed the claim term “code” to mean “a spreading code or a portion of a spreading code.” ALJ Luckern construed the claim term “increased power level” to mean that “the power level of a transmission is higher than that of a previous transmission” and “the power level of a code signal increases during transmission.” See our September 23, 2009 post for more details. The Commission determined not to review these claim constructions. With respect to the claim term “code,” the Federal Circuit found that the ALJ had erred in limiting the term to spreading codes. Instead, the term should have been construed in accordance with its plain meaning, and thus have been found “broad enough to cover both a spreading code and a non-spreading code.” The Federal Circuit relied on the doctrine of claim differentiation in making this determination, finding that since a dependent claim recited, in full, “The subscriber unit of claim 1 wherein the same code is a spreading code,” it was improper to limit the term “code” in claim 1 to a spreading code. Accordingly, under the Federal Circuit’s broader construction, the ALJ’s determination that Nokia did not infringe the ‘966 and ‘847 patents needed to be reversed. With respect to the claim term “increased power level,” the Federal Circuit found that the ALJ had erred in limiting the term to mean that the power level of a code signal increases during transmission. According to the Federal Circuit, the plain language of the claims “clearly covers both continuous and stepped power increases,” and the specification does not restrict the scope of the invention to a system in which the power increases continue in the course of each transmission. Thus, the Federal Circuit found that the ALJ should have construed “increased power level” to include both intermittent and continuous increases in power. Moreover, as with the construction of “code,” the Federal Circuit found that this claim construction error with respect to “increased power level” had led the ALJ to improperly conclude that Nokia had not infringed the ‘966 and ‘847 patents. Nevertheless, Nokia argued that the Commission’s final determination of no violation of Section 337 could be affirmed on alternative grounds. In particular, Nokia argued that InterDigital’s patent licensing activities did not satisfy the domestic industry requirement because InterDigital had failed to establish that there was a U.S. industry “relating to the articles protected by the patent.” However, the Federal Circuit rejected this argument based on the plain language of 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(3)(C), which allows the domestic industry requirement to be satisfied if there is a “substantial investment in [the patent’s] exploitation,” where the exploitation is achieved by various means, including “licensing.” The Federal Circuit also noted that both the legislative history of the statute and numerous prior decisions by the Commission supported the idea that licensing alone could satisfy the domestic industry requirement. Accordingly, the Federal Circuit declined to uphold the Commission’s final determination of no violation on this proposed alternative ground. The Federal Circuit also rejected an argument by Nokia that Nokia could not infringe the ‘966 and ‘847 patents because the scrambling codes in the Nokia system are not transmitted. According to the opinion, neither the ALJ nor the Commission had addressed this argument, and it would therefore have been improper for the Federal Circuit to uphold the Commission’s final determination on this basis. However, the Federal Circuit noted that Nokia was free to raise the issue on remand. In view of the above, the Federal Circuit reversed the Commission’s final determination of no violation of Section 337 and remanded for further proceedings.
On August 22, 2012 the Federal Circuit issued its opinion in Amkor Tech., Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n(2010-1550). This was an appeal by Amkor Technology, Inc. (“Amkor”) from the International Trade Commission’s (the “Commission”) final determination in Certain Encapsulated Integrated Circuit Devices and Products Containing the Same (Inv. No. 337-TA-501), wherein the Commission determined that U.S. Patent No. 6,433,277 (the ‘277 patent) is invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 102(g)(2). The ‘277 patent relates to a smaller and more reliable integrated circuit package only marginally larger than a semiconductor chip by virtue of encapsulating only a top portion of the package in plastic. The respondents in the investigation, Carsem (M) Sdn Bhd, Carsem Semiconductor Sdn Bhd, and Carsem, Inc. (collectively, “Carsem”), asserted that the ‘277 patent was anticipated by a leadless plastic chip carrier package invented by third parties ASAT, Inc., ASAT Holdings, and ASAT Limited (collectively, “ASAT”). On November 18, 2004, before ASAT produced subpoenaed documents related to its invention, the ALJ issued a first Initial Determination finding no violation of Section 337 on the grounds that the asserted ‘277 patent claims were invalid as either anticipated or indefinite. On review, the Commission modified the ALJ’s claim construction and remanded. On November 9, 2005, the ALJ issued a second Initial Determination finding that, based on the Commission’s claim construction, some of the asserted claims were not invalid as anticipated or obvious, and that Carsem therefore violated Section 337. On July 1, 2009, after finally obtaining the ASAT documents (following two enforcement petitions in district court), the Commission remanded the investigation to the ALJ again to determine whether the ASAT invention qualified as prior art under § 102(g)(2). See our July 2, 2009 post for more details. On October 30, 2009, the ALJ issued a first Supplemental Initial Determination finding that the co-inventor of the ASAT invention conceived of the ASAT invention in a foreign country sometime during April or May, and that Amkor’s ’277 patent technology was conceived sometime during May through August, or on December 10, of that same year. Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that the ASAT invention is not prior art under § 102(g)(2) because Carsem failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that ASAT’s April/May invention date is prior to the May-through-August date of invention accorded the asserted claims of the ‘277 patent. See our November 27, 2009 post for more details. On review, the Commission again reversed and remanded, holding that the ASAT invention is § 102(g)(2) prior art because, under Oka v. Youssefyeh, 849 F.2d 581, 584 (Fed. Cir. 1998), the earliest possible priority date of the ’227 patent must be the last date in the range of dates (i.e., December 10), which falls after the April/May invention date for the ASAT invention. See our February 22, 2010 post for more details. On remand, the ALJ issued a second Supplemental Initial Determination finding all disputed claims of the ’277 patent invalid under § 102(g)(2) in view of the ASAT invention. See our April 9, 2010 post for more details. Amkor appealed the Commission’s holding that the ASAT invention qualifies as § 102(g)(2) prior art. In its opinion, the Federal Circuit reversed the Commission’s priority date determination in connection with the ASAT invention and Amkor’s ‘277 patent. In particular, the Federal Circuit held that the Oka rule – i.e., according the last possible conception date to a party who can only provide a range of dates – does not apply to patent owners like Amkor in validity disputes because the standards that apply to interferences such as in Oka do not necessarily apply to disputes over the validity of issued patents that are entitled to a presumption of validity under 35 U.S.C. § 282. As the court explained, Carsem was required to submit not just a preponderance of evidence but clear and convincing evidence that the ASAT invention was conceived in the United States before Amkor’s invention date to invalidate the ‘277 patent under § 102(g)(2). Because Carsem could only show a range of dates of possible domestic disclosure (the first 30 days of which predated Amkor’s possible conception date, and the last 31 days of which overlapped with Amkor’s possible conception dates), it could only establish that the ASAT inventor might have conceived of the invention first. The Federal Circuit found such a showing insufficient to meet the clear and convincing standard, and thus held that the Commission committed legal error in reversing the ALJ’s first Supplemental Initial Determination based on an erroneous application of the Oka rule to the patent holder. The Federal Circuit also declined to affirm the Commission’s invalidity determination on alternative grounds raised by Carsem. Specifically, the court rejected Carsem’s argument that the Commission erred in its claim construction, finding that Carsem “switche[d] positions on appeal, now arguing in support of the position it opposed below” with respect to the claim term “fully around” and therefore waived its new argument. The court went on to state that even if Carsem had preserved the argument, the Commission properly construed the claims. The Federal Circuit also was not persuaded by Carsem’s contention that certain asserted claims are obvious in view of the JP-456 reference alone or in combination with the JP-964 and/or JP-284 references, finding no evidence of a motivation or a reason to remove the fused lead that interrupts the lip on all four sides of the die pad in JP-456. Accordingly, the Federal Circuit reversed the Commission’s determination that the ’277 Patent is invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 102(g)(2), declined to affirm the Commission’s invalidity determination on the alternative grounds raised by Carsem, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
On November 14, 2012, the Federal Circuit issued a precedential opinion in Norgren Inc., v. ITC(2011-1349). This was an appeal from the International Trade Commission’s (“Commission”) determination of no violation of Section 337 in Certain Connecting Devices (“Quick-Clamps”) for Use with Modular Compressed Air Conditioning Units, Including Filters, Regulators, and Lubricators (“FRL’s”) That Are Part of Larger Pneumatic Systems and the FRL Units They Connect (Inv. No. 337-TA-587), where the Commission concluded that the asserted claims were invalid as obvious. Please note that Oblon Spivak represents Respondents SMC Corporation and SMC Corporation of America (collectively, “SMC”) in this matter. By way of background, Norgren Inc. (“Norgren”) filed a complaint with the Commission asserting that the importation or sale of devices by SMC infringe U.S. Patent no. 5,372,392 (the ‘392 patent). The ALJ originally found no violation of Section 337 based on his findings of no infringement and that the patent was valid under his claim construction of “flange” to require four projecting rims. On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed the noninfringement determination and vacated the validity determination, remanding the case for reconsideration of obviousness in light of the Federal Circuit’s new claim construction. Specifically, the Federal Circuit’s remand order contained instructions “to evaluate obviousness in the first instance based upon the correct construction of the claim term ‘generally rectangular ported flange’ — i.e., a construction that does not require a flange having projections on all four sides.” See our May 28, 2009 post for details of the original Federal Circuit opinion (“Norgren I”). On remand, ALJ Carl C. Charneski focused on the obviousness of the clamp itself, and determined that none of the asserted claims of the ‘392 patent were invalid as obvious. The Commission determined to review the remand initial determination on the issue of obviousness, and reversed the ALJ’s determination with respect to obviousness, and issued a final determination that there was no violation of Section 337. Specifically, the Commission found that a prior art SMC clamp is both four-sided and generally rectangular, and that the addition of a hinge to a prior art rectangular clamp would have been obvious to one skilled in the art. The Commission also found that Norgren was unable to show secondary considerations sufficient to support a determination of nonobviousness. See our June 10, 2011 post for more information on the Commission’s decision. Majority Opinion by Judge Linn (joined by Judge Lourie) According to the opinion, after Norgren I, the correct claim construction is not only that the overall shape of the flange is “generally rectangular,” but furthermore, “the clamp as a whole, and not merely portions of it, must be four-sided and generally rectangular.” The primary dispute on appeal was whether the Commission’s determination that the old-style SMC clamp is four-sided and generally rectangular was correct. The Court approved of the Commission basing its conclusion on an examination of the physical exhibit of an old-style SMC clamp and expert testimony. Based on the physical examination, the Commission concluded that the four outer “sides” of the clamp render the overall shape “generally rectangular.” Furthermore, “these four sides are a substantial part of the outer portion of the old-style SMC clamp, and hence are decisive when defining its shape.” This position was supported by testimony from the experts of both sides. Norgren’s expert “admitted in a deposition that the only difference between the invention … and the old-style SMC connector was the hinge.” Similarly, SMC’s expert testified that the four sides of the old-style SMC clamp are required for its function, and that the shape formed by those sides is generally rectangular. Although Norgren tried to argue that SMC’s expert was “overly qualified” and his testimony should be discounted, the Court disagreed. The opinion stated that “[b]ecause the person having ordinary skill in the art is a theoretical construct and is not descriptive of some particular individual, a person of exceptional skill in the art should not be disqualified because he or she is not ordinary enough.” (Internal quotations omitted). In light of its approval of the Commission’s determination that the old-style SMC clamp was generally rectangular and four-sided, the Court also agreed that one skilled in the art would have been motivated to modify the old-style clamp to add a hinge. The motivation for this modification would have been “to avoid loose parts and for ease of use,” as documented in prior art of record, and as a recognized common sense solution readily known to those skilled in the art. Therefore, the Court concluded that the Commission’s determination that the invention of the ‘392 patent would have been obvious was supported by substantial evidence, and was not arbitrary, capricious, or legally erroneous. Norgren was unable to provide persuasive evidence of secondary considerations to alter this conclusion. Dissent by Judge Moore Judge Moore disagreed with the Commission’s determination that the old-style SMC claim was four-sided and generally rectangular based on a strict interpretation that each edge of the old-style clamp should be counted. In that case, Judge Moore noted that sixteen “sides” can be observed. Therefore, she did not consider the Commission’s opinion to be sufficiently supported by substantial evidence and would have reversed the determination of obviousness.
The panel majority insists that Congress intended to make the ITC remedy of exclusion available to exclude foreign manufactures in the absence of domestic production, although the patentee in this case does not want to exclude the foreign product, but only to obtain a fee for its importation. My colleagues hold that it is irrelevant that no domestic industry is producing, or planning to produce, the patented articles, directly or under license, stating that Congress ‘clearly’ intended to abandon the purpose of Section 337 to serve domestic production. However, that is the purpose of Section 337. The legislative record is clear that the 'licensing' amendment to Section 337 was enacted to encourage and support domestic production of patented products.
On February 14, 2013, a Federal Circuit panel consisting of Judges Moore, Mayer, and Wallach issued a per curiam judgment, pursuant to Federal Circuit Rule 36, affirming the ITC’s final determination in Flashpoint Technology, Inc. v. ITC (2012-1149). By way of background, the underlying investigation in connection with this appeal was Certain Electronic Imaging Devices(Inv. No. 337-TA-726). The Complainant in this investigation was Flashpoint Technology, Inc. and the remaining Respondents were HTC Corp. and HTC America, Inc. As explained in our April 3, 2012 post, the Commission determined that there was no violation of Section 337.
On February 20, 2013, a Federal Circuit panel consisting of Judges Newman and Lourie as well as Chief Judge Leonard Davis of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas issued a per curiam judgment, pursuant to Federal Circuit Rule 36, affirming the ITC’s final determination in Bourdeau Bros., Inc. v. ITC (2012-1262). By way of background, the underlying investigation in connection with this appeal was Certain Agricultural Vehicles and Components Thereof (Inv. No. 337-TA-487). The Complainant in this investigation was Deere & Co. (“Deere”) and the Respondents were Bourdeau Bros., Inc., OK Enterprises, and Sunova Implement Co. (collectively, the “Bourdeau Respondents”). As explained in our April 30, 2012 post, the Commission determined that the Bourdeau Respondents violated Section 337 through gray market sales of self-propelled forage harvesters that infringe Deere’s trademarks. The Commission also reinstated a general exclusion order against the subject harvesters and cease and desist orders that had issued in the original investigation.
On May 13, 2013, the Federal Circuit issued its opinion in Motiva, LLC v. Int’l Trade Comm’n (2012-1252). This was an appeal by Motiva, LLC (“Motiva”) from the International Trade Commission’s (the “Commission”) final determination in Certain Video Game Systems and Controllers (Inv. No. 337-TA-743) that Nintendo Co., Ltd. and Nintendo of America, Inc. (collectively, “Nintendo”) had not violated Section 337 in connection with the importation into the U.S., sale for importation, or sale within the U.S. after importation of certain video game systems and controllers. See our January 24, 2012 post for more details on the Commission's final determination. In the opinion, the Federal Circuit affirmed the Commission’s determination that Motiva had failed to satisfy the economic prong of the domestic industry requirement with respect to U.S. Patent Nos. 7,292,151 (the ‘151 patent) and 7,492,268 (the ‘268 patent). In particular, the Federal Circuit found that substantial evidence supported the Commission’s finding that Motiva’s litigation against Nintendo was not an investment in commercializing Motiva’s patented technology that would develop a licensing program to encourage adoption and development of articles that incorporated Motiva’s patented technology. The Court cited its decision in John Mezzalingua Assocs. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 660 F.3d 1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2011) for the proposition that litigation expenses should not automatically be considered a substantial investment in licensing. See our October 6, 2011 post for more details. According to the Opinion, the Commission found—and Motiva did not dispute—that Motiva’s investments in developing a domestic industry for the ‘151 and ‘268 patents were limited after 2007 to litigation against Nintendo. Thus, since the domestic industry requirement needed to be satisfied at the time the complaint was filed (in this case, September 2010), this meant that expenses associated with the litigation were the only relevant investments that could be used to try to satisfy the economic prong of the domestic industry requirement. The Federal Circuit found that Motiva’s investment in litigation against Nintendo could satisfy the economic prong of the domestic industry requirement if it was substantial and directed toward a licensing program that would encourage adoption and development of articles that incorporated Motiva’s patented technology. However, in this case, the ALJ had found that Motiva’s litigation against Nintendo was not directed at developing such a licensing program, and thus did not satisfy the domestic industry requirement. The Commission adopted this finding, and the Federal Circuit affirmed because the finding was supported by substantial evidence. The Federal Circuit also specifically affirmed the Commission’s use of the date that Motiva had filed its ITC complaint as the relevant date at which to determine if the domestic industry requirement was satisfied. In view of the above, the Federal Circuit affirmed the Commission’s final determination of no violation of Section 337.
On June 7, 2013, the Federal Circuit issued its opinion in InterDigital Communications, LLC v. ITC (2012-1628). This was an appeal by InterDigital Communications, Inc., InterDigital Technology Corp., and IPR Licensing, Inc. (collectively, “InterDigital”) from an order of the International Trade Commission (“the Commission”) terminating Investigation No. 337-TA-800 with respect to LG Electronics, Inc., LG Electronics USA, Inc., and LG Electronics Mobilecomm USA, Inc. (collectively, “LG”). As summarized in the opinion, InterDigital and LG had entered into a multi-patent license agreement for devices designed to operate in accordance with second-generation and third-generation wireless standards. According to its terms, the agreement terminated on December 31, 2010, although there were some survival clauses extending beyond the agreement throughout the life of the second-generation products. The agreement also specifies that disputes are to be resolved by arbitration. On July 26, 2011, InterDigital filed a complaint with the Commission asserting that several companies (not including LG) were infringing its patents relating to third-generation wireless technology. See our July 28, 2011 post for more details on InterDigital's original complaint. Three months later, InterDigital successfully moved to amend the complaint to add LG as a respondent. On January 20, 2012, LG moved to terminate the investigation, arguing that the accused third-generation products were still covered by its license with InterDigital, and that any infringement claim was subject to arbitration because it arose under the license agreement between InterDigital and LG. The Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) assigned to the investigation granted the motion to terminate, and the Commission declined to review the decision, making it the final determination of the Commission. InterDigital appealed the order terminating the investigation. According to the opinion, the first issue considered by the Federal Circuit was whether or not the court had jurisdiction over InterDigital’s appeal. LG and the Commission both argued that the Federal Circuit did not have jurisdiction because 18 U.S.C. § 1337(c) provides a right to appeal “a final determination of the Commission under subsection (d), (e), (f), or (g),” and the investigation was terminated under subsection (c), not listed in the statute. The Federal Circuit explained that its predecessor court, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, emphasized that an order should be appealable if “its effect upon appellants is the equivalent of a final determination” and that “substance, not form, must control.” As such, the Federal Circuit concluded that LG and the Commission’s position was too restrictive, and that since the Commission’s decision was the equivalent of a final determination, it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal. Regarding the merits of the case, the Federal Circuit agreed with the ALJ that the proper analysis was whether or not LG’s motion to terminate based on the assertion of arbitrability was “wholly groundless.” However, the Federal Circuit held that the ALJ erred by “failing to assess the text of the parties’ Agreement to determine whether LG’s assertion of arbitrability was ‘wholly groundless.’” The Federal Circuit supported this holding with case law stating that the inquiry necessarily requires the courts to examine and construe the underlying agreement. Dream Theater, Inc. v. Dream Theater, 21 Cal. Rptr. 3d 322, 326 (2004). When the agreement was considered, the Federal Circuit held that LG’s license defense and subsequent assertion of arbitration is simply “not plausible.” Specifically, a “cursory review of the relevant provisions” illustrates that the survival clause only related to second-generation products, and there is “no plausible argument that LG’s license for [third-generation] products survived the termination of the Agreement.” As such, LG’s assertion of arbitrabilty was deemed “wholly groundless” and the Commission’s order terminating the investigation was reversed and remanded. Although agreeing that there was no plausible argument that LG could prevail under its license agreement, Judge Lourie wrote a dissenting opinion based on his belief that the Federal Circuit did not have jurisdiction to hear the appeal. Specifically, Judge Lourie supports a strict reading of the jurisdiction statute limiting appeals to those arising from “a final determination of the Commission under subsection (d), (e), (f), or (g).” Since the investigation was terminated under subsection (c), Judge Lourie would dismiss the case.
On June 19, 2013, the Federal Circuit issued its opinion in Thomson Licensing SAS v. Int’l Trade Comm’n (2012-1536). This was an appeal by Thomson Licensing SAS and Thomson Licensing, LLC (collectively, “Thomson”) from the International Trade Commission’s (the “Commission”) final determination in Certain Liquid Crystal Display Devices, Including Monitors, Televisions, Modules, and Components Thereof (Inv. Nos. 337-TA-741/749). In the opinion, the Federal Circuit affirmed the Commission’s final determination of no violation of Section 337 by Qisda Corp., Qisda America Corp., Qisda Ltd., BenQ Corp., BenQ America Corp., and BenQ Latin America Corp. (collectively, “Qisda”); AU Optronics Corp. and AU Optronics Corp. of America (collectively, “AUO”); and ChiMei Innolux Corp., Innolux Corp., and Chi Mei Optoelectronics USA, Inc. (collectively, “CMI”) with respect to U.S. Patent Nos. 5,978,063 (the ‘063 patent) and 5,648,674 (the ‘674 patent). In particular, the Federal Circuit affirmed the Commission’s determination that the asserted claims of the ‘063 patent are invalid as obvious over U.S. Patent No. 4,568,149 (“Sugata”) in view of U.S. Patent No. 4,775,225 (“Tsuboyama”). The Federal Circuit also affirmed the Commission’s determination that the asserted claims of the ‘674 patent are invalid as anticipated by or obvious over Japanese Patent Application No. JP 06-130415A (“Fujitsu”). According to the opinion, the Commission found that AUO and Qisda infringe certain claims of the ‘063 patent, but CMI does not infringe any claims of the ‘063 patent. However, the Commission further found that all of the asserted ‘063 claims are invalid. In particular, the Commission found that Sugata discloses every limitation of the asserted claims, including anisotropic spacers and mechanical rubbing during the LCD manufacturing process, but concluded that Sugata did not specify when the mechanical rubbing occurred. The Commission further found that Tsuboyama discloses anisotropic spacers that are mechanically rubbed along their long axis after formation. The Commission then found that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine the references to arrive at the claimed invention, based on the references’ common goal of providing spacing elements in a liquid crystal display. Regarding the ‘674 patent, the Commission found that CMI and Qisda infringe certain asserted claims, but that these claims are all either anticipated by Fujitsu or obvious over Fujitsu in view of the demonstrated knowledge of those skilled in the art. See our July 13, 2012 post for more details on the Commission’s final determination. On review, the Federal Circuit found no error in the Commission’s obviousness determination with respect to the ‘063 patent. In particular, the Federal Circuit rejected an argument by Thomson that the Commission had impermissibly shifted the burden of proof during its obviousness analysis. In view of this invalidity finding, the Federal Circuit declined to reach Thomson’s further argument that the Commission had erred in finding that CMI’s LCD modules do not infringe the ‘063 patent. As to the ‘674 patent, the Federal Circuit agreed with the Commission that substantial evidence supports the finding that Fujitsu discloses all of the asserted claim limitations. In view of the above, the Federal Circuit affirmed the Commission’s final determination of no violation of Section 337.
On October 3, 2013, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit issued a precedential opinion in Microsoft Corp. v. ITC (2012-1445, -1535). This was an appeal from the International Trade Commission’s (“the Commission”) final determination finding no violation of Section 337 of some of the asserted patents in Certain Mobile Devices, and Related Software Thereof (Inv. No. 337-TA-744). See our June 18, 2012 and December 21, 2011 posts for more details. By way of background, the Complainant in this case is Microsoft Corporation (“Microsoft”) and the Respondent is Motorola Mobility, Inc. (“Motorola”). The technology at issue spans several patents, including a number of functionalities and features that are implemented on desktop computers and mobile devices. On December 20, 2011, ALJ Theodore R. Essex issued the initial determination (“ID”) in this investigation finding a violation of Section 337 with respect to certain claims of U.S. Patent No. 6,370,566 (the ‘566 patent) and finding no violation with respect to certain claims of U.S. Patent Nos. 5,758,352 (the ‘352 patent), 6,826,762 (the ‘762 patent), 6,909,910 (the ‘910 patent), 7,644,376 (the ‘376 patent), 5,664,133 (the ‘133 patent), and 6,578,054 (the ‘054 patent) (collectively, “the asserted patents”). Upon review, the Commission in part found no infringement of the ‘762, ‘054, ‘376, and ‘133 patents, and further, found that Microsoft failed to prove that there was a domestic industry related to articles protected by the ‘054, ‘762, and ‘376 patents. Microsoft appealed this decision. The ‘054 Patent According to the opinion, the ‘054 patent discloses a system and method for synchronizing copies of a data resource (for example, a document) in a client-server environment where multiple clients can make changes to their copy of the resource. The infringement dispute was based on the claim’s requirement of “resource state information.” Although the parties asserted that this term needed no construction, ALJ Essex independently construed it to mean “information that is associated with a resource that allows the server, client computer, or both to determine the version of the resource stored on the server at a particular moment…and to take appropriate action to synchronize the documents if there has been a change.” Based on that construction, the ALJ found that the accused products do not infringe the ‘054 patent because they do not use “resource state information” for synchronization. On appeal, Microsoft did not challenge the finding of infringement (reviewed under the substantial-evidence standard), but instead challenged the ALJ’s claim construction, which is reviewed without deference. Although Microsoft argued that the ALJ imported additional limitations into the claim via this construction, the Federal Circuit agreed with the ALJ. According to the Court, the specification “makes clear, consistent with the invention’s function of synchronizing, that ‘resource state information’ must provide information about the comparative recentness of a particular version,” and thus the Federal Circuit found no error in the ALJ’s construction requiring some information allowing determination of the most recent version. As such, the Commission’s determination that the accused products do not infringe the ‘054 patent was affirmed, and thus there was no violation of Section 337 in relation to the ‘054 patent. The ‘376 Patent According to the opinion, the ‘376 patent is directed to a mechanism for notifying application programs about changes to the state of mobile-device components relevant to the application. The asserted claims include the term “notification broker” which was given its plain and ordinary meaning by the ALJ. The “notification broker” is coupled to the “client applications.” The ALJ found that the requirement of “direct” access meant that the accused products did not infringe. Furthermore, the ALJ concluded that the accused products did not meet the “client applications” limitation, as the “coupled” aspect of the claims meant that these are separate components. The ALJ also determined that Microsoft had failed to show that the technical prong of the domestic industry requirement was met in relation to the ‘376 patent by failing to “offer sufficient proof of articles that were actually protected by the patent.” The Commission agreed, noting that Microsoft’s expert was unable to identify “client applications” in any device. The Court agreed, noting “there is substantial evidence to support the Commission’s determination that Microsoft failed to meet that requirement.” As such, there was no Section 337 violation in relation to the ‘376 patent, with the Court noting that it did not reach Microsoft’s challenge to the non-infringement determination. The ‘762 Patent According to the opinion, the ‘762 patent describes a radio interface layer between radio hardware and software applications in a cell phone, allowing applications to issue commands without knowledge of the underlying radio structure of the phone. The claims include a “hardware-independent” proxy layer. The parties agreed that “hardware-independent” meant “without regard to a specific hardware implementation.” However, this was modified by the ALJ such that a complete lack of knowledge was not required, only that the proxy layer be independent of the network characteristics of the hardware. Based on that construction, the ALJ found that Motorola’s products did not infringe, as they did not contain a “hardware-independent” proxy layer. The ALJ also found that Microsoft was unable to prove that the technical prong of the domestic industry requirement was met in relation to actual products, and this finding was affirmed by the Commission. The Court held that there was substantial evidence to support the Commission’s determination with regard to the domestic industry requirement. According to the opinion, a witness testifying in the investigation “could not identify a single third-party mobile-device manufacturer that implemented Microsoft’s example driver-layer code.” Therefore, since the Commission could find sufficient proof that the domestic industry requirement was not met, it could properly find no Section 337 violation, and again the Court affirmed the finding without reaching the issue of infringement. The ‘133 Patent According to the opinion, the ‘133 patent is directed to a graphical user interface that represents actual computer resources in relation to location and the class of the resource. The ALJ construed phrases including “a menu selection…” as “a choice or option in a menu ….” In light of that construction, the accused products were found not to infringe because each application acts upon only a single class of object, rather than selecting a class from a plurality and then acting upon the class. The ALJ also found that the accused products do not meet the requirement for display of the menu in proximity of a graphical representation of a particular object. Although the menu may on occasion be positioned in proximity to the representation of the selected object, it is not “deliberately” positioned near the on-screen representation. The Federal Circuit reversed the finding of no infringement, holding that the notion of “deliberate” positioning was not present in the claim construction. The Court also found that Motorola’s alternative design also infringed the ‘133 patent. Furthermore, since the ALJ and Commission only addressed direct infringement, the Court remanded the case so that the issue of indirect infringement can be addressed.
On October 15, 2013, the Supreme Court issued an order denying a petition for a writ of certiorari by Nokia Inc. and Nokia Corp. (collectively, “Nokia”) in Nokia Inc., et al. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n (2012-1352). Nokia had appealed the Federal Circuit’s reversal of the International Trade Commission’s (the “Commission”) findings that Nokia did not infringe U.S. Patent Nos. 7,190,966 and 7,286,847 in Certain 3G Mobile Handsets and Components Thereof (Inv. No. 337-TA-613). Specifically, the Federal Circuit had rejected Nokia's argument that the Commission’s decision finding no violation of Section 337 by Nokia could be upheld because Complainants InterDigital Communications, LLC and InterDigital Technology Corporation's (collectively, “InterDigital”) licensing activities were allegedly insufficient to satisfy the domestic industry requirement. The Federal Circuit also held that the Commission erred in its construction of the claim terms “code” and “increased power level” which in turn led to erroneous determinations of non-infringement. See our August 3, 2012 and January 14, 2013 posts for more details on the Federal Circuit’s rulings. Nokia had petitioned for a writ of certiorari on the issues of (1) whether the domestic industry requirement is satisfied by “licensing alone” despite the absence of proof of “articles protected by the patent,” and (2) whether underlying factual determinations in a claim construction ruling should be subject to deferential review by the Federal Circuit. Notably, the Supreme Court declined to take up Nokia’s argument that allowing patentees to satisfy the domestic industry requirement by showing substantial investment in licensing alone – thereby giving non-practicing entities standing to file complaints with the Commission – has made the Commission “a particularly attractive forum for those with the least plausible need for the distinct protection of a specialized international trade tribunal.” Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Breyer took no part in the denial of the petition. The case will be remanded to the Commission for further proceedings.
On December 13, 2013, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit issued its opinion in Suprema v. ITC (2012-1170) and Cross Match Tech., Inc. v. ITC (2012-1026, -1024). This was an appeal by Suprema, Inc. (“Suprema”) and Mentalix, Inc. (“Mentalix”) and a cross-appeal by Cross Match Technologies, Inc. (“Cross Match”) from a final determination in Certain Biometric Scanning Devices, Components Thereof, Associated Software, and Products Containing the Same (Inv. No. 337-TA-720). In the opinion, the Federal Circuit affirmed the Commission’s final determination of no violation of Section 337 by Suprema and Mentalix with respect to certain claims of U.S. Patent No. 7,277,562 (the ‘562 patent) and the Commission’s final determination that Suprema violated Section 337 with respect to certain claims of U.S. Patent No. 5,900,933 (the ‘933 patent). The Federal Circuit also vacated and remanded the Commission’s final determination that Suprema and Mentalix violated Section 337 with respect to certain claims of U.S. Patent No. 7,203,344 (the ‘344 patent). The ‘562 Patent According to the opinion, the Commission fully adopted the ALJ’s initial determination regarding the ‘562 patent. The ALJ found that Cross Match failed to prove that any accused Suprema products infringed the asserted claims of the ‘562 patent. On appeal, Cross Match challenged the ALJ’s interpretation of the term “capture” as it appears in the asserted claims of the ‘562 patent. At the ITC, Cross Match proposed to the ALJ that “capture” meant “acquiring, by the scanner, for processing or storage.” The ALJ adopted this construction and relied on it when reaching his initial determination. On appeal, however, Cross Match suggested that the ALJ’s construction of “capture” was wrong and that “acquiring, by the scanner, for processing or storage” does not require the scanner to perform all of the steps of the claimed “capturing” process, and that, instead, the scanner only needs to be involved in the process. In reviewing the claim construction, the Federal Circuit concluded that the ALJ’s construction of the term “capture” was correct and that the ALJ’s finding of infringement was supported by substantial evidence. The Federal Circuit found that there was no real dispute over the construction because the ALJ adopted Cross Match’s proposed construction, and that both the claim language and the specification plainly supported the construction. As such, the Federal Circuit affirmed the Commission’s determination that the ‘562 patent was not infringed and that there was no violation of Section 337. The ‘933 Patent According to the opinion, the Commission adopted the ALJ’s initial determination and found that certain products that Suprema imports infringed certain claims of the ‘993 patent. On appeal, Suprema challenged the ALJ’s claim construction, the infringement finding based on that construction, and the holding that the ‘993 patent was valid and would not have been obvious to a person skilled in the art. The claim construction dispute related to the phrase “said second lens unit being on the image side of the first lens unit.” Suprema argued that the claimed lens system excluded “non-lens elements” and “off-axis optics,” and that therefore, there cannot be “non-lens elements” between the “lens units.” After analysis, the ALJ held that the “optical system” “could include non-lens elements, distortion correction prisms, holographic optical elements, and off-axis optics.” The ALJ relied on the patent’s written description as well as Suprema’s concession that the “optical system” could include the supposedly excluded items and that it was only the lens system that could not include those items. On review, the Federal Circuit looked to the specification of the ‘993 patent and found that the written description only seemed to disclaim prisms, holographic optical elements, and off-axis optics when used as the means to correct distortion. Suprema’s only non-infringement argument based on the disputed claim term was that its mirrors located between the lens elements in its products precluded a finding of infringement. The Court found, however, that Suprema never contended that the mirrors corrected distortion. Therefore, the Federal Circuit concluded that the ALJ’s finding of infringement was supported by substantial evidence. Additionally, the Federal Circuit reviewed the ALJ’s finding that the ‘993 patent was not obvious in light of prior art. The Federal Circuit affirmed the Commission’s holding that Suprema failed to adduce clear and convincing evidence of a motivation to combine the two prior art patents, and that the asserted claims of the ‘993 patent would not have been obvious to a person skilled in the art. Therefore, the Federal Circuit affirmed the Commission’s holding that Suprema directly infringed the ‘993 patent, and left intact the exclusion order regarding the two optical systems that infringed the ‘993 patent. The ‘344 Patent According to the opinion, the Commission found that Suprema was (1) wilfully blind to the ‘344 patent, (2) studied and emulated Cross Match’s products before willfully blinding itself to the infringing nature of Mentalix’s activities, and (3) actively encouraged Mentalix’s infringing activities. Therefore, the Commission found that Suprema had induced infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) and that inducement formed a basis for a finding of a Section 337 violation. On appeal, Suprema contended that it does not import infringing articles because the articles do not directly infringe the method of claim 19 of the ‘344 patent at the time of importation, as the alleged infringement only occurs when the scanners are combined with Mentalix’s domestically developed software. Suprema, therefore, argued that the allegations of induced infringement did not adequately connect the fact of importation to the ultimate infringement. On review, the Federal Circuit conducted a statutory analysis to determine the scope of the Commission’s authority to issue exclusion orders. The Federal Circuit found that under Section 337, the focus of the Commission’s authority is on the infringing nature of articles at the time of importation, not on the intent of the parties with respect to the imported goods. Additionally, the Court found that while an inducing act must precede the infringement act it induces, it is not a completed inducement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) until there has been a direct infringement. Therefore the Federal Circuit held that the statutory grant of authority under Section 337 does not extend to the conduct proscribed in § 271(b) where the acts of the underlying direct infringement occur post-importation. The Court further held that, for inducement, the only pertinent articles are those that directly infringe at the time of importation. Because the Federal Circuit found that the Commission had no authority to premise an exclusion order on inducement when the direct infringement occurred after importation the court vacated the finding of infringement of the ‘344 patent. The Court also vacated both the cease and desist order and limited exclusion order in part, and remanded the case so that the orders could be revised. Judge Reyna Dissenting Opinion Although agreeing with the majority opinion in most respects, Judge Reyna wrote a dissenting opinion based on his belief that the Commission does have the authority to stop induced infringement at the U.S. border. Specifically, Judge Reyna stated that the majority ignored the fact that Section 337 is a trade statute designed to provide relief from specific acts of unfair trade, including those acts that lead to the importation of articles that will result in harm to a domestic industry by infringing a valid and enforceable patent. Therefore, Judge Reyna believed that the majority erred in using § 271 to introduce a temporal limitation on the moment that infringement liability must be complete for the purposes of the Commission’s authority to remedy violations of Section 337.
On December 16, 2013, the Federal Circuit issued its non-precedential opinion in Cognex Corp. v. ITC (2011-1098). This was an appeal by Cognex Corporation and Cognex Technology & Investment Corporation (collectively, “Cognex”) from the International Trade Commission’s (the “Commission”) final determination in Certain Machine Vision Software, Machine Vision Systems, And Products Containing Same (Inv. No. 337-TA-680). In the opinion, the Federal Circuit affirmed the Commission’s final determination of no violation of Section 337 by MVTec Software GmbH and MVTec, LLC (collectively, “MVTec”) with respect to U.S. Patent Nos. 7,016,539 (the ‘539 patent) and 7,065,262 (the ‘262 patent). In particular, the Federal Circuit affirmed the Commission’s determination of non-infringement of the asserted claims of the ‘539 patent. The asserted claims included one independent claim (claim 1), from which the remaining claims were all directly or indirectly dependent. According to the opinion, the Commission found that the accused products did not satisfy five of the seven limitations of claim 1 of the ‘539 patent. Additionally, the Commission found that all of the asserted claims of the ‘539 patent were invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 101 for failing to claim patent eligible subject matter. On review, the Federal Circuit affirmed the Commission’s non-infringement findings with respect to claim limitations 1 and 6 of claim 1, and therefore did not reach the other claim limitations on appeal. Specifically, the Federal Circuit found that Cognex had waived any argument with respect to the Commission’s construction of the term “accept threshold” contained in claim limitation 1. The Federal Circuit reached this conclusion because Cognex had failed to dispute the construction in its opening brief, and, in its reply brief, failed to point out where it had presented the issue in its opening brief. The Federal Circuit also affirmed the Commission’s claim construction with respect to the term “probe” contained in claim limitation 6. In view of the above, the Federal Circuit affirmed the Commission’s non-infringement decision because it was supported by substantial evidence. Additionally, because the Commission’s finding of non-infringement of the ‘539 patent was enough to support its termination of the Section 337 investigation, the Federal Circuit did not address the validity of the ‘539 patent.
On December 16, 2013, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit issued its opinion in Motorola Mobility, LLC v. ITC (2012-1535). This was an appeal from the International Trade Commission’s (“the Commission”) final determination finding a violation of Section 337 of one of the asserted patents in Certain Mobile Devices, and Related Software Thereof (Inv. No. 337-TA-744). See our June 18, 2012 and December 21, 2011 posts for more details on this investigation. By way of background, the Complainant in this case is Microsoft Corporation (“Microsoft”) and the Respondent is Motorola Mobility, Inc. (“Motorola”). The technology at issue spans several patents, including a number of functionalities and features that are implemented on desktop computers and mobile devices. On December 20, 2011, ALJ Theodore R. Essex issued the initial determination in this investigation finding a violation of Section 337 with respect to certain claims of U.S. Patent No. 6,370,566 (the ‘566 patent) and finding no violation with respect to certain claims of U.S. Patent Nos. 5,758,352; 6,826,762; 6,909,910; 7,644,376; 5,664,133; and 6,578,054. Upon review, the Commission affirmed ALJ Essex’s finding that Motorola violated Section 337 with respect to the ‘566 patent. Motorola appealed the ITC’s final determination. According to the opinion, two issues were central to the appeal: (1) Motorola’s anticipation and obviousness arguments, and (2) Motorola’s argument that Microsoft failed to meet the economic prong of the domestic industry requirement. Regarding anticipation, Motorola asserted that the synchronization component must necessarily be present in the cited prior art in order to accomplish synchronization. Motorola argued that the “synchronization component” limitation refers to software that facilitates communication and synchronization. The Court noted that the first part of Motorola’s arguments is a claim construction dispute regarding the synchronization component limitation. The Court further noted that neither the ALJ nor the Commission construed this limitation and, therefore, the Court must give the claim term its ordinary meaning. The Court rejected Motorola’s argument that the synchronization component is inherently included in the cited prior art. The Court held that none of Motorola’s prior art necessarily included the synchronization component. The Court found that the prior art may contain a synchronization component but did not necessarily contain a synchronization component. The Court also rejected Motorola’s argument that the synchronization component was inherently included in the prior art based on admissions made by experts for Motorola and Microsoft. The Court held that these admissions were merely conclusory statements and did not rise to the level of clear and convincing evidence. With respect to obviousness, the Court held that Motorola failed to identify the scope and content of the prior art and the differences between the prior art and the asserted claims. The Court held that Motorola’s evidence, alleged admissions by Microsoft’s expert, was insufficient to prove obviousness by clear and convincing evidence. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Commission’s determination that Motorola failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the ‘566 patent was invalid as anticipated or obvious. Lastly, the Court rejected Motorola’s argument that Microsoft failed to meet the economic prong of the domestic industry requirement. Motorola argued that Microsoft was relying on separate products to meet the technical and economic prongs of the domestic industry requirement. Specifically, Motorola asserted that the operating system of a mobile device and the mobile device itself were separate products. The Court affirmed the Commission’s finding that the operating system of a mobile device is a significant component of the mobile device that is specifically tailored to meet the specifications and demands of the mobile device. The Court held that “[a]n investment directed to a specifically tailored, significant aspect of the article is still directed to the article.” Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Commission’s determination that Microsoft satisfied the economic prong of the domestic industry requirement. Therefore, the Court affirmed the Commission’s final determination that Motorola violated Section 337 with respect to the ‘566 patent.
On January 3, 2014, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit issued a nonprecedential order in Microsoft, Corp. v. ITC (2012-1445). This was directed to a motion requesting dismissal of Microsoft, Corp.’s appeal from the International Trade Commission’s (“the Commission”) final determination finding no violation of Section 337 of one of the asserted patents (U.S. Patent No. 5,664,133, “the ‘133 patent”) in Certain Mobile Devices, and Related Software Thereof (Inv. No. 337-TA-744). See our June 18, 2012 and December 21, 2011 posts for more details on this investigation. By way of background, the Complainant in this case is Microsoft Corporation (“Microsoft”) and the Respondent is Motorola Mobility, Inc. (“Motorola”). The technology at issue spans several patents, including a number of functionalities and features that are implemented on desktop computers and mobile devices. On December 20, 2011, ALJ Theodore R. Essex issued the initial determination in this investigation finding a violation of Section 337 with respect to certain claims of U.S. Patent No. 6,370,566 and finding no violation with respect to certain claims of U.S. Patent Nos. 5,758,352; 6,826,762; 6,909,910; 7,644,376; 5,664,133; and 6,578,054. Upon review, the Commission affirmed ALJ Essex’s finding that Motorola violated Section 337 with respect to the ‘566 patent. Both Motorola and Microsoft appealed the ITC’s final determination. See our October 10, 2013 and December 24, 2013 posts for summaries of the Federal Circuit’s opinions in the Microsoft and Motorola appeals, respectively. In relevant portion, the Federal Circuit reversed the finding of no infringement of the ‘133 patent, also holding that Motorola’s alternative design infringed the ‘133 patent and remanding the case so that indirect infringement of the ‘133 patent could be determined. According to the opinion, Motorola filed a motion requesting that the Federal Circuit dismiss Microsoft’s appeal with respect to the ‘133 patent and vacate the portion of their October 1, 2013 opinion addressing that patent. Motorola argued that the dispute over the ‘133 patent is now moot as the patent expired on December 13, 2013. The Federal Circuit denied Motorola’s motion, noting that the controversy between the parties is not moot in light of a still-pending district court litigation (Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., Case No. 2:10-CV-01577-RSM (W.D. Wash. filed Oct. 1, 2010)). Specifically, the Federal Circuit held that its rulings on the ‘133 patent will be relevant to the determinations of damages (if infringement is proved) and invalidity at the district court. The Federal Circuit supported its determination with citations to case law stating that concrete forms of coercive relief are not required for constitutional determination of an actual controversy. The parties’ failure to inform the Court of the imminent expiration of the patent was also noted. Although the case was not found moot, the Federal Circuit explained that, even if it was moot, vacatur is not required, as vacatur is a discretionary matter. Circuit Judge Prost wrote a separate concurring opinion, explaining that she does believe that the appeal is moot, but would still deny the motion as a matter of discretion.

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