Source: http://ky.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20180328_0000263.WKY.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 14:48:53+00:00

Document:
APRIL SMITH, et al., Defendants.
Louisville Metro, Geiser, and Smith have filed motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim (D.N. 4; D.N 5) and a motion to strike Thieneman's response to their motions to dismiss. (D.N. 7; D.N. 8) For the reasons discussed below, the motion to strike will be granted; Louisville Metro and Geiser's motion to dismiss will be granted; and Smith's motion to dismiss will be granted in part and denied in part.
The facts set out below are alleged in the complaint. For purposes of these motions to dismiss, the Court must “construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accept its allegations as true, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Directv, Inc. v. Treesh, 487 F.3d 471, 476 (6th Cir. 2007). While the facts may be disputed, the Court “cannot resolve disputed facts when ruling on a motion to dismiss.” Genton v. Keystone Sporting Arms, Inc., No. Civ.A. 05-274-JBC, 2005 WL 2456252, at *1 (E.D. Ky. Oct. 5, 2005).
Geiser, Louisville Metro, and Smith filed their motions to dismiss on May 17, 2017. (D.N. 4; D.N. 5) Under Local Rule 7.1(c), “a party opposing a motion must file a response within 21 days of service of the motion.” LR 7.1(c). Thieneman did not file his response to the motions to dismiss until December 18, 2017 (D.N. 6), more than six months past the twenty-one-day deadline. Inexplicably, Thieneman did not ask the Court for an extension, seek leave of Court to file his response out of time, or even offer an explanation for his late filing. No. good cause for this significant delay has been suggested, nor has the Court been able to ascertain any such cause. The Court will therefore grant the motion to strike Thieneman's response and will not consider the response in ruling on the defendants' motions to dismiss. See Morgan v. HSBC Mortg. Servs., Inc., 930 F.Supp.2d 833, 835 (E.D. Ky. 2013) (granting motion to strike plaintiff's response to motion to dismiss where response was filed over six months after the motion was filed without a request for an extension or an explanation for its tardiness).
To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible on its face “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. Factual allegations are essential; “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice, ” and the Court need not accept such statements as true. Id. A complaint whose “well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct” does not satisfy the pleading requirements of Rule 8 and will not withstand a motion to dismiss. Id. at 679.
Thieneman asserts claims against Louisville Metro under both state and federal law. The Court will address the state-law claims first, followed by the federal section 1983 claims.
Thieneman asserts claims against Louisville Metro for malicious prosecution, wrongful arrest, and false imprisonment under Kentucky common law. (D.N. 1-1, PageID # 21-24) “Under Kentucky law, it is well established that claims against counties are barred by sovereign immunity.” Reyes v. Salsman, No. 3:15-CV-00587-GNS-DW, 2016 WL 247582, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Jan. 20, 2016) (citing Franklin Cty. v. Malone, 957 S.W.2d 195, 203 (1997)). While Louisville Metro is not a county, it is a consolidated local government. Id. And the Kentucky General Assembly has granted to consolidated local governments “the same sovereign immunity granted [to] counties.” Ky. Rev. Stat. § 67C.101(2)(e); see also Reyes, 2016 WL 247582, at *2. All state-law claims against Louisville Metro must therefore be dismissed on the basis of sovereign immunity.
The Court must address two separate issues when a § 1983 claim is asserted against a municipality: “(1) whether plaintiff's harm was caused by a constitutional violation, and (2) if so, whether the city is responsible for that violation.” Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 120 (1992).

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