Source: http://www.annalsofhealthlaw.com/annalsofhealthlaw/vol__24_issue_1?pg=141
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 10:15:51+00:00

Document:
354. CTR. FORCONSUMERINFO.&OVERSIGHT,CTRS. FORMEDICARE&MEDICAID SERVS. GENERAL GUIDANCE ON FEDERALLY-FACILITATED EXCHANGES 4 (May 16, 2012), available at http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Fact-Sheets-and-FAQs/Downloads/ffe- guidance-05-16-2012.pdf.
355. McCloskey v. Mueller, 446 F.3d 262, 271 (1st Cir. 2006) (“[ A] section 1983 claim ordinarily will not lie against a federal actor.”); See, e.g., D. C. v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 424- 25 (1973) (“[ A]ctions of the Federal Government and its officers are at least facially exempt from [§ 1983’s] proscriptions.”).
356. 5 U.S. C. A. 501 et seq. Although there was some history of structural reform litigation against federal agencies in the early 1970s, these cases appear to be based on either implied causes of action from the constitution or a federal common law cause of action. See Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159, 1161–62 ( D. C. Cir. 1973). Today, these cases would likely proceed under the APA’s presumption of reviewability of agency inaction. See Salvador v. Bennett, 800 F.2d 97, 99 (7th Cir. 1986) (characterizing Adams v. Richardson as an exception to the principle of un-reviewability of agency inaction). Other litigation against federal agencies has relied on more specific causes of action. For example, in Cobell v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1081, 1086 ( D. C. Cir. 2001), the plaintiffs relied on a violation of their fiduciary duty, which is specific to the Department of the Interior’s role in managing trusts, not a trans-substantive cause of action.
357. See e.g., Salvador v. Bennett, 800 F.2d 97, 99 (7th Cir. 1986) (explaining the general the principle of un-reviewability of agency inaction).
358. See, e.g., Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 64-65 (2004).
359. See id. at 61.

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