Source: https://veteranclaims.net/2009/04/12/fedcir-engaged-in-combat-moran-v-peake-no-2007-7163/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 04:24:58+00:00

Document:
Thus, we hold the term “engaged in combat with the enemy” in § 1154(b) requires that the veteran have personally participated in events constituting an actual fight or encounter with a military foe or hostile unit or instrumentality, as determined on a case-by-case basis.
States Department of Justice, of Washington, DC, argued for respondent-appellee.
General Counsel, United States Department of Veterans Affairs, of Washington, DC.
Before LINN, DYK and MOORE, Circuit Judges.
Board of Veterans’ Appeals (Board) decision denying his claim for service connection for post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Moran v. Nicholson, No. 04-2458 (Vet. App. Jan. 3, 2007). We affirm.
regional office denied Moran’s claim because of the absence of specific information concerning his personal or direct involvement in combat with the enemy. In 2004, after a lengthy procedural history, the Board denied Moran’s claim for service connection for PTSD based upon its finding that he did not serve in combat and that the occurrence of any in-service stressor supporting the current diagnosis of PTSD is not established by credible evidence. In a January 3, 2007 decision, the Veterans Court found that the Board’s finding that Moran did not engage in combat with the enemy was not clearly erroneous.1 Moran appealed.
We review interpretation of statutes by the Veterans Court de novo. Glover v.
West, 185 F.3d 1328, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Further, absent a constitutional issue, we may not review challenges to factual determinations or challenges to the application of a law or regulation to facts. 38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(2).
veteran’s military unit establishes a prima facie showing of service in combat to trigger the evidentiary benefit of 38 U.S.C. § 1154(b).3 The government argues the plain meaning of the phrase “any veteran who engaged in combat with the enemy” requires that the veteran have taken part in a fight with a military adversary or hostile unit or force. We are not persuaded by Moran’s argument.
combat with the enemy” in § 1154(b) with “in a combat zone.” However, Congress has demonstrated that when it chooses to provide benefits to those who serve in combat zones rather than limiting benefits to those who personally engage in combat, it directly does so. See 38 U.S.C. §§ 1710(e)(1)(D) (providing benefits to those who served “in a theater of combat operations”) and 1712A(a)(1)(B)(i)(I) (same); 26 U.S.C. §§ 2(a)(3)(B), 112(a)(1) and (b)(1), 692(a)(1), 2201(b)(1)(A) and (B) (providing benefits to those serving in “combat zone”).
aggravation of such injury or disease . . . .
3 To the extent that Moran argues that he was personally engaged in combat, the Board made a factual finding that he was not, citing contradictory evidence.
Our jurisdiction precludes us from reviewing factual determinations.
A showing of no more than service in a general “combat area” or “combat zone” is not sufficient to trigger the evidentiary benefit of § 1154(b).
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Veterans Court.

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