Source: http://www.nzlii.org/nz/journals/CanterLawRw/2008/1.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 18:36:05+00:00

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There is no denying the emotion involved in international child abduction: in the upheaval of removal; the anger of abandonment; and the pain in the breakdown of family relationships. The ill is all apparent. Yet behind the image of abductor-on-the-run, there often rests the ironic calm of a settled child who has put down roots in the midst of this parental storm. Integrated into his new environment, he has friends, family, a school and a home, none of which he wants to leave. What was left behind, is now but a memory, too often tinged with the pain of abuse. The thought of being forced to move, again, is distressing.
The notion of a happy, settled child sits uncomfortably in the international legal framework designed to deal with abduction disputes. Under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction1 (the Convention), procedural mechanisms have been established to secure the prompt return of abducted children to the state from which they were taken. These mechanisms are premised on the assumption that return is in the interests of children, as abduction is a 'universal evil' the effects of which must be promptly undone. The image of a settled child presented above, however, challenges this assumption, as it blurs the distinction between ill effects and good, and raises the uneasy potential for return of the child to in fact result in further harm. In recognition of the need to account for the circumstances of the child, the Convention itself provides exceptions to the policy of prompt return. Settlement itself forms the basis of one of these exceptions, providing that an abducted child need not be returned where more than a year has passed since the abduction, and he or she is now settled in the new environment.
This paper focuses on the issues that have arisen in relation to the settlement exception. More specifically, it considers whether there is a residual discretion to return a settled child and, if so, how it is to be exercised.
While the exceptions have attracted a plethora of litigation and commentary, both literature and case law specific to the settlement exception are sparse.2 However, recent decisions of the highest appellate courts in both New Zealand and the United Kingdom have shed light on this exception, and it is these developments that this paper will address.
This paper is divided into four parts. Part II provides the background to the Convention, highlighting its operation and objectives. Part III then focuses on the settlement exception itself, including discussion as to whether a residual discretion exists. In light of a finding that such a discretion does exists, Part IV traces the developments in judicial approach, highlighting the more child-centric focus that can be seen to have emerged in the recent Supreme Court decision Secretary for Justice v HJ. 3 Particular attention is paid to the impact of concealment on the exception and to how the courts in New Zealand and the United Kingdom have struggled to reconcile the Convention's objectives of prompt return and deterrence with the potential for significant harm to be caused to the individual child involved. Finally, in Part V, the paper addresses the divergence in approach in the decision of HJ. This paper respectfully argues that the majority judgment in HJ fails to convincingly deal with the issue of concealment. While it ostensibly gives pride of place to considerations of the best interests of the child, it continues to leave open the door for them to be outweighed by the policy objective of deterrence. Instead, the approach of Elias CJ that the interests of the child are determinative once the grounds for the exception are established is preferred. It is argued that such an approach does not undermine the effectiveness of the Convention, but results in a more discerning assessment of the 'good' and the 'ill' so that return is ordered only in appropriate cases.
This paper focuses on the exercise of the residual discretion in relation to return under the settlement exception. However, before an analysis of this exception can occur, a cursory overview of the Convention's general operation, application and terminology is required. Application of the Convention is dependent on three jurisdictional requirements. First, the child must be under the age of sixteen;11 secondly, there must have been a wrongful removal or retention in breach of the applicant's custody rights;12 thirdly, he or she must have been habitually resident in a Contracting State immediately prior to this event.13 For the purposes of this paper, the term 'removal' should be read as including retention.
Where these jurisdictional requirements are met, and proceedings are commenced within one year of the wrongful removal, return of the child forthwith is mandatory under art 12.
The Convention does, however, provide six exceptions to the 'basic principle' of prompt return in art 12.14 A court may refuse to order return where either: 1) the applicant was not actually exercising custody rights at the time of removal; 2) the applicant consented or acquiesced to removal; 3) the return poses a 'grave risk' of exposing the child to physical or psychological harm or an intolerable situation; 4) return is not permitted by the fundamental principles relating to human rights and fundamental freedoms of the requested state; 5) the child objects to returning and is of an appropriate age and maturity to have their views considered; and 6) the child is settled in his or her new environment. These exceptions provide the only grounds for non-return under the Convention. Their exceptional nature is further reinforced by the fact that arts 13 and 20 expressly grant the court a residual discretion to order the child's return, notwithstanding the grounds for the exception having been met. The lack of an explicit discretion in art 12(2) has been the subject of considerable debate, the arguments of which shall be canvassed below.
A commitment to uniform interpretation is key to the Convention's success, particularly in light of the number and diversity of jurisdictions in which it operates.19 However, the diverse means by which the Convention has been introduced into domestic law have lead to significant potential for differences to emerge.20 To facilitate uniformity, the 'classic rule' of treaty law applies: the terms of the Convention are interpreted in 'accordance with the ordinary meaning … in their context and in the light of its object and purpose'.21 Their meaning is not dependent on any single legal system, but on the definitions, structure and purposes of the Convention itself.22 It is to these purposes that this paper shall now turn.
The twin objects of the Convention are clearly outlined in art 1. The first is to secure the prompt return of children wrongfully removed to or retained in any contracting state. The second, is to ensure that rights of custody and of access under the law of a contracting state are effectively respected. In the Explanatory Report to the Convention, Pérez-Vera highlights that these two ostensibly distinct objectives are, in reality, 'one single objective considered at two different times'. The first is remedial in that it is designed to re-establish the status quo and undo the effects of abduction, while the second is preventative. In ensuring the effective respect for rights of custody amongst contracting states, the Convention eliminates one of the most frequent causes of child abduction: the search for a more favourable forum.23 These objectives are both considered to be achieved under the basic principle of prompt return.
While Convention jurisprudence clearly states that the best interests test is not to be applied in Convention proceedings, it is however accepted that the interests of a particular child are relevant in the case of the exceptions.35 While the need to uphold the Convention remains a powerful argument, the exceptions recognise that, in limited cases, the Convention's policies cannot be allowed to exact 'too high a price on [children]'.36 The question of when such a case arises, and how the interests are to be taken into account shapes the central discussion of this paper.
The difficulty of this deterrent-focused interpretation of the best interests is that it permits the welfare of a child to be sacrificed in the future interests of an indeterminate group of children, or as the consequence of punishing an abductor. In the oft cited words of Waite J in W v W, it advocates stability for the mass of children at the price of tears for some.37 Such a possibility is anathema not only to most domestic Western legal systems in which welfare of the individual child is paramount,38 but also to the similar principles that exist in international child law, such as in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child.39 The contentious subordination of the welfare of the child is particularly evident in the context of the residual discretion to return a settled child as inherent features of the exception undermine several of the assumptions that support this generalist approach. The remainder of this paper will focus on the courts' approach to this issue.
The 'basic principle' of mandatory return under art 12 extends for a period of one year after the wrongful removal. While, under art 12(2) return is possible beyond this time frame, it is subject to the key proviso that the child must not be 'settled in its [sic] new environment'.40 The settlement exception comprises two elements. First, a factual basis must be established for the defence: a period of 12 months must have passed from the date of wrongful removal, and the child must be settled in its new environment. The second, and more controversial element, is the existence of a residual discretion to return the child, even where the grounds of this first element are met.
As with all of the exceptions under the Convention, the settlement exception recognises the possibility that the interests of the individual child are not always best served by return, and that there may in fact be occasion for the individual interests to override the Convention's policy of protecting children generally from the harm of child abduction.41 Specifically, the settlement exception highlights that return may no longer be desirable once a child has spent considerable time in a new environment and has put down roots. Furthermore, given the context of delay and settlement, the child may be occasioned significant harm by further upheaval.42 This potential for harm gives rise to the argument that summary return would be inappropriate and should not be ordered without an examination of the merits of doing so. This is a particularly cogent argument in light of the fact that the Convention's remedy, and its summary nature, are designed to be one of 'hot pursuit'.43 Given the inherent delay in settlement exception cases, they can hardly be described as falling within the parameters of 'prompt' envisaged by the Convention.44 Moreover, prompt return is inappropriate in a context of considerable delay as delay risks the state of refuge, and not the original state of habitual residence, becoming the more appropriate forum in which to determine the merits of the dispute. Significant delay is likely to have weakened any connections the child had with the original state and also increases the likelihood that evidence as to the child's welfare is now more readily available in the state of refuge.
These considerations demonstrate the extent to which delay and settlement strike at the fundamental aims and assumptions of the Convention. The exception challenges the conventional understanding of the 'good' and 'ill' involved in abduction, recognising that return can, somewhat ironically, lead to the very ill against which the Convention was designed to protect. Furthermore, it highlights that not all the effects of abduction are harmful, but that a measure of 'good' can result: the child may be left in a more stable and secure environment with a chance at a new life. Despite the support this lends to an exception approach focused on the individual child, the potential for a liberal application of art 12(2) to frustrate the deterrent purpose of the Convention must be recognised. The unrestrained application of any of the exceptions can be seen to encourage abduction in that it prevents restoration of the status quo. However, the problems underlying art 12(2) are argued to be particularly egregious given their perceived ability to encourage concealment and deceit on the part of the abductor in order to bring about grounds for non-return. As will be discussed below, these concerns have dominated art 12(2) jurisprudence in the past and have proved an insuperable barrier to a child-oriented approach, not only in relation to the exercise of the residual discretion, but also by making it difficult to establish the grounds for the exception.
As previously noted, the focus of this paper is on the exercise of the residual discretion, thereby rendering possible only a brief overview of the grounds themselves. However, such an analysis remains valuable in that it provides a fuller picture of the nature of the judicial approach to the exception.
The 12-month period of delay begins on the date on which the child was wrongfully removed, or, in the case of a wrongful retention, the date on which the child ought to have been returned.45 Article 12(2) clearly refers to the date of commencement of the proceedings as the cut-off date for the year-long period after removal. This date was chosen so as to avoid any prejudice to the applicant that may result from delays on the part of Convention authorities in hearing the proceedings.46 However, it does not protect the applicant from any delays that may arise after proceedings are actually commenced.47 This indicates an adult-focussed approach to the setting of the time period in that it is based on reducing injustice to the left-behind parent.
A further issue of timeframe arises in relation to the date for determining when a child is settled. Here, a desire to protect the applicant from potential delays in proceedings risks disadvantaging the child who becomes settled between this period and the date of the actual hearing. The Supreme Court in HJ acknowledged this potential and highlighted the artificiality of ignoring changes in the child's life. As a result, their Honours considered that the 'proper focus should usually be on the date of hearing the application [as this] best accommodates the necessary consideration of the best interests of the child'.48 This approach aligns with the Australian position that the relevant date will depend on the context of the particular case.49 The English approach, however continues to assess the child's settlement on the date that proceedings commence.50 In light of this comparison with English cases, the majority's approach in HJ demonstrates a greater willingness to interpret ambiguity in the Convention in favour of the interests of the child. It gives weight to the exception by recognising the seriousness of the harm in disturbing a settled child.
The courts in Australia argue that this approach imports an 'improper gloss' on the ordinary meaning of the Convention and that the test is simply whether the child is settled in its new environment.58 However, it is doubtful that a liberal approach to settlement is justifiable within the context of the Convention, in light of the considerable emphasis placed on the need for a narrow approach. Overall, the degree of settlement must be great, as ultimately the court must be satisfied that settlement is of such an extent that it justifies overriding the otherwise mandatory obligation of return.59 While a restrictive approach to settlement is not prima facie child-oriented, in setting a high threshold for settlement, the courts can ensure that the exception applies only where the interests of the individual truly demand it, assuaging fears as to its liberal application. As will be developed below, this allows for greater weight to placed on these interests when the courts engage in the exercise of the residual discretion.
The legislative position in New Zealand as to whether there is a residual discretion to return a child even where the above grounds are established is clear. The permissive language of s 106 expressly states that the court 'may' refuse to order return. The position in the Convention itself, however, is less explicit. Unlike art 13, art 12(2) itself does not expressly adopt the permissive language that the authorities 'are not bound' or 'may refuse to order' return where a relevant ground is made out. Instead, it states only that return 'shall also' be ordered 'unless' the child is settled. This difference in wording has resulted in considerable debate in other Convention jurisdictions as to whether or not a residual discretion exists, what its origins are, and how it is to be exercised.
...[i]t is clear that after a child has become settled in its new environment, its return should take place only after an examination of the merits of the custody rights exercised over it — something which is outside the scope ofthe Convention.
The provisions of this Chapter [arts 3 - 20] do not limit the power of a judicial or administrative authority to order the return of the child at anytime.
As discussion turns to the exercise of the discretion itself, it is important to remember the highly contested nature of its existence highlighted above. The international debate as to whether a residual discretion to return a settled child exists continues to be of relevance in New Zealand, despite the permissive language in s 106. The uncertainty surrounding its existence has shaped international jurisprudence on its scope. As Beaumont insightfully notes, the possibility that such discretion was never intended by the Convention's drafters highlights the particularly child-centric nature of the exception itself.77 This supports a more restrictive approach to its exercise. Given the need for uniform interpretation amongst contracting states, the settlement exception in New Zealand should reflect these concerns and developments in international jurisprudence.
The residual discretion to return a settled child has traditionally been treated as analogous to that arising under art 13, that is, by adopting a narrow approach in light of the 'context of the approach of the Convention'.78 The concern that a liberal interpretation would 'drive a coach and four' through the purposes and integrity of the Convention has resulted in only cursory regard being paid to the interests of the child.79 This danger has been perceived as particularly acute in the context of art 12(2). An approach that condoned concealment, it was argued, would not only thwart the Convention's remedial role in returning the particular child, but also hinder its normative objective, by encouraging abducting parents to conceal their children's whereabouts for as extended a period as is possible.80 Thus the discretion has been consumed by the deterrent purpose of the Convention, with the Courts quick to distance themselves from an approach that could be seen as endorsing such behaviour.81 The focus was very much on the conduct of adults, and the best interests of the individual child are accorded little meaningful weight in the discretion.
While in the past the courts paid lip-service to the argument that the exceptions were intended to have a meaningful role by providing an important opportunity to consider the manifest needs of the child concerned, in reality the settlement exception was rendered 'all but redundant'.82 This was achieved not only through adopting a narrow approach to the establishment of the settlement ground, but also by applying an equally return-oriented approach to the residual discretion. As noted in Re M, the courts placed an additional gloss on the residual discretion, allowing it only to be exercised in 'exceptional' cases.83 Therefore, in essence there remained a presumption in favour of return, despite the establishment of the grounds of an exception.84 This approach was facilitated by two factors: first, a failure to recognise the harm protected by the exception as significant; and secondly, by a focus on the nature of the abductor's conduct.
The failure to recognise the true potential for harm occasioned by uprooting a settled child deprived the exception of substance.85 Cases tended to reject submissions that the harm was of any long-term or substantial effect so as to offset the belief that a policy of return was in the child's best interests. Further, even where the child's welfare was accepted as not being served by return, the harm suffered was not such that it outweighed the welfare of other children in ensuring deterrence.86 Thus settlement in itself was considered unlikely to ground a successful defence as it was perceived as insufficient to distinguish a case from being a 'plain case for return' in and of itself.87 Such an approach is illustrated by the High Court's decision in U v R where Judge Green considered that the technical settlement of the child was not in itself sufficient grounds to refuse return where the mother had concealed the children.88 Thus, the focus was clearly on the adult and not the impact upon the child.
Further weight was given to the conduct of parents by adopting a liberal interpretation of what constituted concealment. The simple act of not informing the left-behind parent was alone enough to constitute 'concealment', despite the absence of any vitiating factors of deliberate concealment or subterfuge.96 This broad definition can be seen at work in the Family Court decision in HJ where the mother failed to inform the father of their whereabouts for more than a year after leaving. Judge von Dadelszen held that the mother's failure to inform the father of their whereabouts for more than one year after moving was sufficient 'concealment' to mean that the mother did not come to the Court with 'clean hands'.97 It did not matter that she had not concealed the children's identities and that the father knew of her associations with New Zealand and had the contact details of the mother's brother in New Zealand at all times but failed to use them immediately.98 This is arguably a particularly harsh conclusion, heavily dependent on apportioning blame on the mother without accounting for any contribution to the delay by the father himself.
This section highlights the developments that point to this change in judicial attitude towards the exception, highlighting the shift in focus to the child.
A shift in focus to the individual child has led to a reconsideration of the weight traditionally placed on the abductor's conduct. First, as was recognised by the House of Lords in Re D, the discretion is inevitably exercised against a backdrop of wrongdoing, which alone cannot be determinative.102 Secondly, a more measured response to concealment has emerged, recognising that the fact of concealment does not prevent an abductor relying on the exception, as the two concepts are not mutually inconsistent.103 This is associated with the acknowledgment that there are degrees of concealment. At one end, an abductor simply may not inform the left-behind parent, or, at the other end of the scale, there may be manipulative delay and a deliberate intention to frustrate the purposes of the Convention. These different scenarios were highlighted in Cannon v Cannon, where Thorpe LJ recognised that each attracted a different approach in light of the varying degree of 'turpitude' involved in the abductor's actions.104 According to Thorpe LJ, concealment is not determinative in any of these cases, but is a circumstance to be weighed in the balance. However, he argued that the greater the gravity and deliberation of the actions, the closer the approach came to a principle of disregard. This balancing forms the basis of the majority's approach in HJ, and will be returned to below.
The courts have also accepted that the complex realities of settlement challenge the implicit assumptions and policies underlying the Convention that have traditionally supported the argument for non-return. As was noted by Lady Justice Hale (as she then was), in TB v JB, the policy of the Convention 'weighs rather less heavily when the children wish to remain with their primary carer, particularly where ... the child has had no contact with the other parent for such a long time'.107 Furthermore, the courts are also astute to the fact that delay renders swift, summary return impossible, as settlement exception cases are no longer ones of 'hot pursuit'.108 The effect of the erosion of these assumptions will be discussed in the proceeding Part, where it is argued they provide a justification for a child-oriented approach.
The New Zealand Supreme Court decision in HJ recognises these developments in both New Zealand and the United Kingdom, bringing together the strands from several key cases.
The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Court of Appeal in unanimous agreement that when grounds for the settlement exception were established, there remained no presumption in favour of return.114 However, the Court was divided as to the how the discretion should be exercised, once the ground for resisting mandatory return was established. Both Elias CJ and McGrath J delivered separate judgments.
some feature of the case, such as concealment ... nevertheless requires that the s106(1)(a) discretion be exercised in favour of return so as to avoid the perverse incentive inherent in refusing [such anorder].
The majority decision in HJ affirmed the child-focused approach that emerging in previous cases and confirms that the exercise of the discretion should not be primarily focused on the conduct of the abductor and the policy objectives of the Convention.124 Instead, the focus has shifted to the child.125 While described as a balancing test, the majority arguably give the child's interests the upper hand as they provide the starting point for the exercise. Furthermore, the test asserts that it is the policy objectives that must be found to clearly outweigh the best interests of the child. However, the interests of the child are not determinative and the door remains open to the possibility of their being subordinated to the welfare of the 'mass'.
The approach of Elias CJ adopts a genuine child-oriented approach. In a separate minority judgment, her Honour considers that the exercise of the residual discretion should be determined in accordance with the welfare and best interests of the child. This conclusion is based on her Honour's interpretation of s 4(7) of the COCA which states that the paramountcy principle articulated in s 4(1) does not 'limit' the application of the abduction provisions. Whereas the majority considered that this prevents the application of the paramountcy principle to art 12(2), Elias CJ contended that it did not. In light of the fact that return is no longer mandatory once an exception is established, her Honour reasoned that a consideration of welfare would not 'limit' the decision whether to return a child. As her Honour notes, such an interpretation is further supported by the existence of the exception itself. Its very inclusion is based on a concern for the interests of the child and accepts that these should no longer be 'conclusively treated as ... served by prompt return'.126 Her Honour goes on to recognise that, where settlement occurs, the harmful effects of wrongful removal dissipate significantly.127 In this light, the best interests principle need not be modified by the deterrent policy of the Convention under s 4(7) as, once the grounds for non-return are made out, no conflict exists as to its application.
A level of inherent uncertainty remains in the approach of the majority of the Supreme Court. The very act of 'balancing' and of allocating weight to factors leaves the majority's subtle interest-oriented emphasis open to misinterpretation, or worse, attack. This is particularly so in light of the appeal that policy concerns have held in the past. The potential for misinterpretation has arguably already been realised in the Family Court decision J v M, where a subtle, but significant restatement of the test was applied. The Court in J v M makes clear that the focus is now on the child, and that the abductor's wrongdoing does not influence a principled assessment of the exception's grounds.138 However, in outlining the balance that must be undertaken, the interests of the child appear not to be given the subtle upper hand that they were in HJ. Instead, Judge Green held that it was the welfare considerations of the child that had to clearly outweigh the policy objectives, rather than be outweighed by them.139 It is unclear whether this difference results from a reluctance to accept the interests of the child as the starting point, or simply a misinterpretation of the majority's test. In either case, the difference is important. It demonstrates that under a balancing test, any advancement made towards emphasising the interests of the child can nonetheless be eroded by familiar calls to uphold the Convention's integrity, particularly in a case where the competing factors are more salient.
It is also possible to argue that, in reality, the majority's approach is not convincingly child-focused, as it guarantees the interests of the child only in the most unchallenged cases. In the face of a deliberate intention to frustrate the Convention's purposes, the majority's interest-oriented pre-disposition becomes unstuck. Little guidance is given as to the level of manipulative behaviour required to outweigh the interests of the child, but it is at least notionally clear that such a potential exists under the balancing test. In light of this uncertainty, it is respectfully submitted that the majority approach does not persuasively deal with the issue of concealment in its more invidious forms. It fails to leave future courts in a significantly better position to deal with the true concerns of concealment beyond cases like HJ which, in reality, are hardly concealment cases at all.
In light of this uncertainty and the potential for developments that recognise the substance of the child's interests to be undermined, the approach of Elias CJ is to be preferred. It is only when the interests of the child principally determine the exercise of the residual discretion that meaningful weight is given not only to the welfare of the child, but also to the exception itself. It is recognised that such an approach departs from the general run of cases and challenges traditional interpretations of the Convention's context and approach. However, as the remainder of this paper will demonstrate, significant justifications exist for such an approach and demonstrate that it does not risk undermining the integrity of the Convention. Both the wider context in which the discretion falls to be exercised, and the context of the Convention itself, assists in reconciling the normative aspects of the Convention with an approach focused on the individual child.
The very existence of the settlement exception acknowledges that the welfare of the individual child can take primacy over concerns of concealment and deterrence and that these interests were intended to have a meaningful role.140 While this undoubtedly supports a shift in focus to the child, further justification is necessary to successfully advocate an approach in which the child's interests are determinative. In looking at the nature of settlement, the abduction problem and the exception itself, a persuasive argument can be made demonstrating that a child-oriented approach does not undermine the effectiveness of the Convention.
The overall context in which abduction cases arise has changed significantly since the Convention's inception in 1980. Developments in international and domestic law in relation to the child and in the very nature of the abduction paradigm itself not only support a child-oriented approach, but require one.
Significant developments in the legal and normative frameworks against which the Convention operates have occurred at both an international and domestic level. In New Zealand, the COCA has ushered in a change of emphasis in family law, recognising that parenting is about responsibilities towards the child, and not the rights of adults vis-à-vis each other.141 This approach is clearly in line with a child-oriented approach, as it requires that 'children are to be put first, [with] considerations of the parents' conduct only to be taken into account so far as it is relevant to the welfare and best interests of the child'.142 Similar recognition is also evident at the international level in light of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child adopted in 1989 (UNCRC). As the 'overarching' international instrument for the care and protection of children, its recognition of child rights and the autonomy of the child highlight the need for an approach to the Convention that addresses these concerns.143 Article 3 of the UNCRC itself requires the interests of the child to be a primary consideration in the determination of matters affecting them.144 As Tapp summarises, the effect of these developments in perceptions of childhood and shared parental responsibility have lead to greater recognition of the child 'as a 'person' rather than just an adjunct of its parents'.145 These developments clearly point towards a child oriented approach to the exercise of the residual discretion, as the child is seen as an individual of equal worth whose wellbeing should not be sacrificed in order to punish a parent or protect the future interests of an indeterminate group.
These changes lend credence to the argument that the new environment in which the child finds him or herself may in fact be more meaningful than the one left behind. The child remains with his or her primary carer, often has the familiarity of the mother's family and has escaped a potentially harmful situation in the state of habitual residence. This new pattern challenges the Convention's assumption that the best interests of the child (and children generally) are served by prompt return as such an assumption was, inter alia, premised on the notion that the state of refuge offered little in the interests of the child. Given that this is no longer the situation faced by a majority of abductees today, a case can also be made for the argument that the best interests of children generally are no longer best served by a policy of return without an assessment of their individual interests.
By challenging the strength of the Convention's concepts of best interests and deterrence traditionally found to outweigh a child's interests, the changes in the nature of abduction support a child-oriented approach. They create space for the interests of the individual child to play a greater role in the courts' discretion. Furthermore, in highlighting that the distinction between 'good' and 'ill' is not always apparent in the context of settlement, these changes emphasise the need to consider the interests of the particular case.
Several of the traditional assumptions and policy concerns of the Convention are further weakened by the inherent characteristics of delay and settlement involved in an art 12(2) case. One such example is that the inherent period of delay involved in the settlement exception case undermines the Convention's aim of 'prompt' return. Therefore, as it is no longer a case of 'hot pursuit', the weight of this policy concern is significantly reduced.157 As was noted in Re HB (Abduction: Children's objections) (No 2),158 the fact that the opportunity and obligation to return a child 'forthwith' have passed, allows for longer, more detailed proceedings.159 This departure from the normally summary approach to Convention cases highlights the particular leaning of the settlement exception towards a more child-oriented focus.
The challenge raised by art 12(2) to several of the Convention's key policies and assumptions reduces the weight that such factors would normally receive in the exercise of the residual discretion.162 They further highlight the need to take into account the true interests of children in light of the changing nature of the problem at hand.
The factors listed above lend significant support to a child-oriented approach as they highlight the case for the child's interests to be accorded paramount weight. However, alongside these justifications, a case also needs to be made to demonstrate that the approach of Elias CJ can be reconciled with the normative aspects of the Convention. This can be achieved in two ways: first by distinguishing between approaches to establishing the grounds for the exception and approaches to the exercise of the residual discretion; and second, by recognising the impact of the change in the abduction profile on the Convention's normative goals.
It is important to note that the child-oriented approach advocated by Elias CJ does not require the interests of the child to be determinative in every aspect of the settlement exception; it applies only to the exercise of the residual discretion. This distinction is important because it enables the approach to realise both normative and child welfare objectives.
The second way in which the normative aims of the Convention can be reconciled with a child-oriented approach is through assessing the impact that the changed nature of abduction has on the effectiveness of the Convention's deterrent policies. Particular attention should be paid to the change in the prevailing motive for abduction: the flight from domestic abuse. The shift from a calculated attempt to gain custody to an emotional appeal for help challenges the Convention's deterrence mechanism, the policy of prompt return. Prompt return specifically targeted the motive of 'forum-shopping' as it deprived the abductor of the ability to alter the status quo ante by denying the courts in the state of refuge the jurisdiction to determine the dispute. The deterrent effect is, however, arguably weakened in the context of the emotion and fear involved in fleeing abuse as rationality and legal niceties are less likely to hold sway in the mind of the abductor.169 A level of support for this contention can be garnered from the fact that the number of abductions by women grows exponentially while those by males are proportionately rare. This lends weight to the argument that the deterrence effect of the Convention is successful only in the context of the traditional case of the non-custodial father.
The argument that the changing nature of abduction weakens the Convention's deterrence policy casts an interesting shadow over the issue as to whether a child-oriented approach undermines the effectiveness of the Convention. In light of the above possibilities of reconciling the normative and child-focused aims of the Convention, arguably it does not. When assessing the 'effectiveness' of the Convention a change in the predominant perception that a 'good' decision is one in which the child is returned is required. As Schuz observes, success should not only be measured in numbers of return, but more importantly, in terms of whether or not return is in fact appropriate. Where the traditional arguments in favour of return no longer apply, and the harm occasioned to the child is significant then their interests must prevail.
Recognition of the validity of the child's interests, and of the significance of the harm occasioned by delay could also have wider impact beyond the settlement exception. While delay in itself has been rejected as a stand-alone defence, it has been recognised as a component to which the court must have regard when exercising its residual discretion under the other exceptions.172 By emphasising the substantive nature of the harm occasioned to a child by delay and by uprooting a child following settlement, HJ highlights the need to pay particular attention to the interests of the child where return is contemplated after a lengthy period of time.
Ultimately, the child-oriented approach recognises that the context of the Convention does not require an unduly restrictive approach to the exercise of the discretion itself. It makes way for the court to probe the realities of the situation, identifying how changes in the profile of abduction impact upon the policies and assumptions underlying an exception. This potential exists for other exceptions as well. However, this paper's support for a child-oriented approach to the settlement exception rests on the belief that it is the most child-centric of the exceptions.175 Any attempts to apply its reasoning beyond art 12(2) must be aware of these exception-specific qualities and build an independent case, in light of the unique features of the exception.
The traditional approach to the settlement exception has been that a 'good' decision is a return decision, that is, one where the welfare of the individual child subordinates to the normative goal of protecting children generally. This paper has traced the developments in judicial attitudes that have led to the child's interests taking a more prominent role. Two alternatives emerged. The first was a balancing approach in which the competing policy factors had to clearly outweigh the interests of the child in non-return. The second, and ultimately preferred approach, was that the residual discretion is to be exercised principally in accordance with the welfare and best interests of the child.
A child-oriented approach to the settlement exception does not reflect a softening in judicial approach. In setting a high threshold for the establishment of the exception, it ensures against a liberal application that could undermine the Convention's policy of prompt return. Further, the challenge to the Convention's implicit assumptions, policies and effects that arise from the changed nature of abduction and from the inherent characteristics of the settlement exception itself, present a strong case for a child-oriented approach to the exercise of the residual discretion. Where even the deterrence effect of the Convention can be doubted, the traditional interpretation that the 'context and purpose' of the Convention outweigh the interests of the settled child is clearly thrown into doubt. A myopic focus on policy risks cultivating an environment based on the needs of adults and an altogether hollow network of relationships. It ironically risks exacerbating the very 'ill' against which the Convention was designed to protect.
[*] LLB(Hons)/BA. Alana is currently working at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. This paper was awarded the Canterbury Law Review prize for the best undergraduate Honours paper completed in 2007.
 The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction was adopted on 25 October 1980 (Hague Convention). See generally E Pérez-Vera, Explanatory Report on the Hague Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child . For a list of contracting states see <http://www.hcch.net.html> .
 M Everall, N Lowe and M Nicholls, International Movement of Children: Law, Practice and Procedure (2004) 295. A 2001 statistical study indicates that of applications made globally in 1999, only 11% of all refusals were based solely on this ground: Lowe, Armstrong and Mathias, 'A Statistical Analysis of Applications made in 1999 under the Hague Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction', Preliminary Document No 3 (Revised Version, November 2001) available on the Hague convention website: <http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=text.display & tid=21.html> .
 Secretary for Justice v HJ  NZFLR 195.
 Pérez-Vera, above n 1, . For a discussion of the reasons for the increase in international child abduction see P Beaumont and P McEleavy, The Hague Convention on International Child Abduction (1999) 2. Emphasis on the need for comity and cooperation is also evident in Clarke v Carson  1 NZLR 349, 351.
 A Anton, 'The Hague Convention on International Child Abduction' (1981) 30 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 537, 541. Compare the focus on custody 'decisions' as opposed to 'rights' in the European Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Decisions concerning Custody of Children and on Restoration of Custody of Children, Luxembourg 20 May 1980.
 A Cornec, 'The Hague Convention on abduction and beyond: conflicting aims, different solutions — the French practice' (1993) 23 Family Law 148, 148. See also Nicholls, International Movement of Children 198; A Dyer, 'Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction — towards global cooperation: Its success and failures' (1993) 1 International Journal of Children's Rights 273, 275.
 Lowe, Armstrong and Mathias, above n 2, 34: in 1999, 83% of applications related to protecting rights of custody. See also N Lowe and A Perry 'International Child Abduction — The English Experience' (1999) 48 International and Comparative Law (Quarterly 127, 130.
 For the purposes of this paper the domestic provisions referred to will relate to the Care of Children Act 2004, whether or not the cases involved were decided under the Guardianship Amendment Act 1991.
 M Nixon, 'Legislation and the Hague Convention'  New Zealand Law Journal 91, 93.
 The Hon Douglas Graham, Minister of Justice Parliamentary Debates, Vol 513, 1991, 946, cited in M Nixon, 'Legislation and the Hague Convention'  New Zealand Law Journal 91, 93.
 Hague Convention, art 4; Re H (Abduction: Child of 16)  2 FLR 51.
 For general discussion of the defences see J Caldwell, 'Child welfare defences in child abduction cases — some recent developments' (2001) 13 Child and Family Law Quarterly 121; and for recent developments see L De Jong, 'Hague Convention of the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction' Family Law — Flying High (New Zealand Law Society, Family Law Conference, 2007), 298-304.
 Pérez-Vera, above n 1, ; R Schuz, 'Hague child abduction convention: family law and private international law' (1995) 44 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 771, 776.
 These concerns were noted by Anton, above n 5, 550.
 Pérez-Vera, above n 1, .
 Everall, Lowe and Nicholls, above n 2, 292.
 As highlighted by Lord Browne-Wilkinson in Re H (Abduction: Acquiescence)  1 FLR 872, 881H.
 J Kay, 'The Hague Convention — order or chaos?' (2005) 19 Australian Journal of Family Law 245, 246. In Australia the Convention is not directly incorporated, but implemented through the Family Law (Child Abduction Convention) Regulations 1986. In the UK the Convention is itself directly incorporated into domestic law through the Child Abduction and Custody Act 1985.
 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969, art 31; Pérez-Vera, above n 1, .
 See the conclusions of the Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private International Law Report of the Second Meeting of the Special Commission to Review the Operation of the Hague Convention, 18-21 January 1993, 4. The report can be accessed at <http://www.hcch. net/index_en.php?act=conventions.publications & dtid=2 & cid=24.html> .
 Pérez-Vera, above n 1, ; P Brodkin, 'The application of the Convention — from the practitioner's perspective' (2005) 23 Canadian Family Law Quarterly 219, 221; T Harper, 'The Limitations of the Hague Convention and Alternative Remedies for a Parent Including Re-Abduction' (1995) 9 Emory International Law Review 257, 259.
 S v S  3 NZLF 513, 519.
 See generally Schuz, above n 15.
 Ibid 796: further private international law principles of recognition and enforcement and choice of law rules play a lesser role in the Convention.
 Beaumont and McEleavy, above n 4, 29.
 D McClean, 'International child abduction — back to common law principles' (1995) 7 Child and Family Law Quarterly 128, 128; see K Beevers, 'Child abduction — welfare or comity?' (1996) 26 Family Law 365 as to the application of the principle in non-Convention cases; Pérez-Vera, above n 1,  as to the 'vagueness' of the principle and the difficulties it caused to a uniform approach.
 Thomson v Thomson (1995) 119 DLR (4th) 253, 273 (La Forest J); B v B  NZFLR 337, 348.
 P Boshier, 'Care and protection of children: New Zealand and Australian experience of cross-border cooperation' (2005) 5 New Zealand Family Law Journal 63, 66.
 Schuz, above n 15, 775-6.
 Thomson v Thomson (1995) 119 DLR (4th) 253, 273 (La Forest J).
 Re T (Abduction: Child's objections to return)  2 FLR 192, .
 See the oft cited quote of Waite J that stability for the mass of children may have to come at the price of tears in some individual cases: W v W  2 FLR 211, 220.
 For example, s 4(1) COCA.
 For example, United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989, art 3.
 While the second paragraph of the article is not explicitly numbered, it is commonly referred to as art 12(2). This paper also adopts such an approach.
 Schuz, above n 15, 776.
 Everall, Lowe and Nicholls, above n 2, 294; Schuz, above n 15, 778.
 Re C (Abduction: Grave risk of physical and psychological harm)  2 FLR 478, 488 (Thorpe LJ).
 Beaumont and McEleavy, above n 4, 209.
 See, for example, Wojcik v Wojcik 959 F Supp 413 (ED Mich 1997), cited in Everall, Lowe and Nicholls, above n 2, 296.
 Secretary for Justice v HJ  NZFLR 195,  (Tipping J).
 Director General, Department of Community Services v M and C  24 FLR 168, .
 See, for example, Re N (Minors) (Abduction)  1 FLR 413.
 B v B  NZFLR 337, 344; Everall, Lowe and Nicholls, above n 2, 298.
 This followed the previous approach of the High Court in B v B  NZFLR 337.
 Re N (Minors) (Abduction)  1 FLR 413 (Bracewell J).
 B v B  NZFLR 337, 344.
 Re N (Minors) (Abduction)  1 FLR 413.
 Director General, Department of Community Services v M and C  24 FLR 168.
 Everall, Lowe and Nicholls, International Movement of Children, above n 2, 300.
 Re M (FC) and another (FC) (Children) (FC)  UKHL 55, - (Lord Hope).
 Re C (Abduction: Settlement)  EWHC 1245 (Fam) (Singer J); See also State Central Authority v Ayob (1997) 21 FLR 567 (Kay J).
 Re C (Abduction: Settlement)  EWHC 1245 (Fam),  (Singer J).
 State Central Authority v Ayob (1997) 21 FLR 567. Cf the Full Court of the Family Court in Director General, Department of Community Services v M and C  24 FLR 168. Later cases have since assumed that a discretion existed, see, for example, Director General, Department of Families, Youth and Community Care v Moore (1999) 24 FLR 475; Director General of the Department of Community Services v Apostolakis  FamCA 57; (1996) FLC 92-718.
 State Central Authority v Ayob (1997) 21 FLR 567.
 Everall, Lowe and Nicholls, above n 2, 304 citing Pérez-Vera, above n 1, .
 Secretary for Justice v HJ  NZFLR 195, .
 As would be the case in New Zealand under s 4(1) COCA. See also recognition that this would be the case in the UK in Re C (Abduction: Settlement)  EWHC 1245 (Fam), .
 Pérez-Vera, above n 1, ; Everall, Lowe and Nicholls, above n 2, 293; see also Chairman of the First Commission in charge of drafting the Convention, Professor A Anton, in Anton, above n 5, 555.
 Re C (Abduction: Settlement)  EWHC 1245 (Fam), .
 Cannon v Cannon  1 FLR 169, .
 Everall, Lowe and Nicholls, above n 2, 294. See, for example, Re S (a Minor) (Abduction)  2 FLR 1, (Court of Appeal); Re N (Minors) (Abduction)  1 FLR 413; and Re L (Abduction pending criminal proceedings)  1 FLR 433. Cf prior comments of P Tapp, 'Welfare of the child and abduction'  New Zealand Law Journal 77, 78-9.
 Armstrong v Evans  NZFLR 984; Everall, Lowe and Nicholls, above n 2, 294. See, for example, in the UK Re L (Abduction pending criminal proceedings)  1 FLR 433.
 Beaumont and McEleavy, above n 4, 209; Pérez-Vera, above n 1, ; Everall, Lowe and Nicholls, above n 2, 293; Anton, above n 5, 555; P Nygh 'The International Abduction of Children' in J Doek and H van Loon (eds), Children on the Move (1996).
 Re A (Minors) (Abduction: Acquiescence)  2 FLR 12, 28F (Lord Donaldson); Clarke v Carson  1 NZLR 349, 351; Armstrong v Evans  NZFLR 984.
 Balcombe LJ in Re E (a Minor) (Abduction)  1 FLR 135, 144-5; see also Re C (Abduction: Grave risk of psychological harm)  1 FLR 1145, 1554. See, for example, Pérez-Vera, above n 1 and report of the Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private International Law Fourth Meeting of the Special Commission to Review the Operation of the Hague Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, 22-28 March 2001, 12. The report can be accessed at <http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.publications & dtid=2 & cid=24.html> .
 Coates v Bowden  (High Court, Auckland CIV 2006-404-7028, 30 May 2007, Winkelmann J), .
 For example U v R  NZFLR 385, 395.
 S v S  3 NZLR 513, 519 (High Court); Re M (Abduction: Psychological harm)  2 FLR 690, 699; see also Judge Boshier, 'Care and protection of children: New Zealand and Australian experience of cross-border cooperation' (2005) 5 New Zealand Family Law Journal 63, 67 in relation to the grave risk exception.
 S v S  3 NZLR 513, 519 (High Court).
 See comments in describing the approach of the Family Court to this effect: Secretary for Justice v HJ  NZFLR 195, .
 For example the extra-judicial comments of Judge Boshier, above n 82, 65 that only the grave risk defence opens up the hearing to consideration of the merits.
 See, for example, M v M  NZFLR 961, 965; Re L (Abduction pending criminal proceedings)  1 FLR 433, 441; see also the emphasis placed on the normative role in S v S  3 NZLR 513, 519.
 Re N (Minors) (Abduction)  1 FLR 413, 419.
 See also M v M  NZFLR 96, .
 Re M (Abduction: Psychological harm)  2 FLR 690, 699.
 Secretary for Justice v HJ (Family Court, Hastings, No 372/02, 15 April 2004, Judge von Dadelszen), ; Re H(Abduction: Child of 16)  2 FLR 51.
 Re H (Abduction: Child of 16)  2 FLR 51, 54.
 Re L (Abduction pending criminal proceedings)  1 FLR 433, 441 (Wilson J).
 This similarity was noted by Singer J in Re C (Abduction: Settlement)  EWHC 1245 (Fam). See Furnes v Reeves 362 F.3d 702 (Fla. 2004).
 See, for example, Re L (Abduction pending criminal proceedings)  1 FLR 433, 441; W v W  2 FLR 211, 220.
 Secretary for Justice v HJ (Family Court, Hastings, No 372/02, 15 April 2004, Judge von Dadelszen), . Affirmed by the High Court in HJ v Secretary for Justice (High Court, Wellington, CIV 2004-441-263 16 June 2004, Justice France).
 Secretary for Justice v HJ (Family Court, Hastings, No 372/02, 15 April 2004, Judge von Dadelszen), .
 Secretary for Justice v HJ  NZFLR 195,  (Supreme Court).
 B v B  NZFLR 337, 348; see also P v B (Hague Convention)  NZFLR 353, 355.
 P v B (Hague Convention)  NZFLR 353, 379, B v B  NZFLR 337, 348; this was shown in P v B (No 2) (Child abduction: Delay)  IESC 32;  4 IR 185 (Supreme Court).
 Re D (Abduction: Rights of custody)  UKHL 51, .
 Re C (Abduction: Settlement)  EWHC 1245 (Fam), , .
 Cannon v Cannon  EWCA Civ 1330;  1 WLR 32;  1 FLR 169  -  (Thorpe LJ).
 Re C (No2)  1 FLR 938 at , ; adopted in Re C (a Child) (Abduction: Settlement)  EWHC 1229 (Fam), ; and Re D (Abduction: Rights of custody)  UKHL 51, .
 Re D (Abduction: Rights of custody)  UKHL 51 at  This was also recognised in Re C (a Child) (Abduction: Settlement)  EWHC 1229 (Fam);  1 FCR 649, .
 TB v JB (Formerly JH)  EWCA Civ 337, .
 Re C (Abduction: Grave risk of physical and psychological harm)  2 FLR 478, 488; Re C (No 2)  1 FLR 938,  (Mostyn J).
 HJ v Secretary for Justice (High Court, Wellington CIV 2004-441-263, 15 June 2004, Ellen France J).
 HJ v Secretary for Justice  NZCA 400;  NZFLR 1005, .
 Secretary for Justice v HJ  NZFLR 195,  (Elias CJ) and  (Tipping J).
 Cannon v Cannon  1 FLR 169.
 Secretary for Justice v HJ  NZFLR 195, 195.
 Ibid -. See, for example, COCA, s 103 and Hague Convention, art 8. See also P v B (No 2) (Child abduction: Delay)  IESC 32;  4 IR 185 (SC) recognising the 'extraordinary' and 'inappropriate' delay of the applicant father.
 Noted in Coates v Bowden  (High Court, Auckland CIV 2006-404-7028, 30 May 2007, Winkelmann J), .
 Andrews v The Secretary for Justice  NZCA 223;  NZFLR 891,  (Court of Appeal).
 Secretary for Justice v HJ  NZFLR 19, .
 Ibid - citing the majority reasons at .
 Re C (Abduction: Residence and contact)  EWHC 2205 (Fam).
 J v M (Family Court, North Shore FAM-2004-004-1857, 25 June 2007, Judge Ryan), .
 Coates v Bowden  (High Court, Auckland CIV 2006-404-7028, 30 May 2007, Winkelmann J) , ; also Andrews v Secretary for Justice  NZLR 891, .
 Re M (Children)  UKHL 55, confirming the more liberal approach to concealment that had developed in cases such as Re C (Abduction: Residence and contact)  EWHC 2205 (Fam).
 Re M(Children)  UKHL 55, .
 Re M (Children)  UKHL 55, .
 Secretary for Justice v HJ  NZFLR 195,  - .
 P v B (Hague Convention) VP v A  NZFLR 353, 355; B v B  NZFLR 337, 348.
 Caldwell, above n 14, 121.
 Judge Boshier, above n 82, 65; see for example COCA, ss 4(3) and 4(1).
 See generally P Mahoney, 'Aspects of International Treaty Law on the Protection of Children: the Hague Conventions' (Paper presented at the New Zealand Law Society Family Law Conference, Christchurch, 31 August - 2 September 1998) 297.
 Judge Boshier, above n 82.
 P Tapp, 'Use of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child in the Family Court' (New Zealand Law Society Family Law Conference 1998), 267.
 Beaumont and McEleavy, above n 4, 219. For a judicial picture of the stereotype see Re L  All ER 913, 925-6 (Buckley LJ). The lack of comprehensive statistics was highlighted in Anton, above, n 5, 537.
 Everall, Lowe and Nicholls, above n 2, 218 citing for example Agopian, 'Parental Child Stealing: Participants and the Victimisation Process' (1980) 2-4 Victimology: An International Journal 5; D Finkelhor, G Hotaling, and A Sedlak, 'Children Abducted by Family Members: A National Household Survey of Incidence and Episode Characteristics' (1991) 53 Journal of Marriage and the Family 805.
 Beaumont, and McEleavy, above n 4, 10; see also J Reddaway and H Keating, 'Child Abduction: Would Protecting Vulnerable Children Drive a Coach and Four Through the Principles of the Hague Convention?' (1997) 5 International Journal of Children's Rights 77, 443.
 See also N Lowe and A Perry 'International Child Abduction — The English Experience' (1999) 48 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 127.
 Lowe, Armstrong and Mathias, above n 2.
 Everall, Lowe and Nicholls, above n 2, 220. The statistic is similar for males.
 Lowe and Perry, above n 149, 136. Noted in cases such as Murray v Director, Family Services (ACT)  FamCA 103; (1993) FLC 92-416, 80 (Nicholson CJ) as referred to in M Kaye, 'The Hague Convention and the Flight from Domestic violence: How Women and Children are Being Returned by Coach and Four' (1999) 13 International Journal of Law, Politics and the Family 191, 193. See for example Everall, Lowe and Nicholls, above n 2, 221 as to the disputed nature of the claim.
 Kaye, above n 152, 197.
 This argument is disputed in Girdner, Chiancone and Johnston 'International Child abductors: Profile of the Abductors Most Likely to Succeed' (Paper presented at the 2nd World Congress on Family Law and the Rights of Children and Youth, San Fancisco, 3 June 1997), cited in Lowe, Armstrong and Mathias, above n 2, which suggests that both mothers and fathers are equally as likely to abduct children.
 For example, P Tapp, 'Welfare of the child and abduction'  New Zealand Law Journal 77, 80. The change in the profile of abductors was noted in TB v JB (Formerly JH)  EWCA Civ 337, 340.
 See, for example, the report of the Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private International Law Third Meeting of the Special Commission to Review the Operation of the Hague Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, 17-21 March 1997, . The report can be accessed at <http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.publications & dtid=2 & cid=24.html> .
 Re C (Abduction: Grave risk of physical and psychological harm)  2 FLR 478, 488.
 Re HB (Abduction: Children's objections) (No 2)  1 FLR 564, 568.
 A possibility also recognised by Pérez-Vera: Pérez-Vera, above n 1, .
 See generally Schuz, above, n 15.
 It is noted that a preference has been shown for the approach in KS v LS  3 NZLR 837 that the exception in art 13(b) should not receive a wide interpretation, thus rejecting the approaches in El Sayed v Secretary for Justice  1 NZLR 349 and DP v Commonwealth Central Authority (2001) 206 CLR 401, however this was in relation to the definitions of 'grave risk' and 'intolerable', and not the exercise of the discretion. The approach advocated above does not support a broad definition of settlement.
 This approach to the impact of settlement and concealment is also the approach adopted by the majority, see Secretary for Justice v HJ  NZFLR 195, ; cf Cannon v Cannon  1 FLR 169 (Thorpe J).
 The concept of setting a 'high threshold' was recognised in U v R  NZFLR 385, 395.
 P Tapp, 'Welfare of the child and abduction'  New Zealand Law Journal 77, 77. The increase in abductions by mothers attempting to escape domestic violence was also discussed in the report of the Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private International Law Third Meeting of the Special Commission to Review the Operation of the Hague Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, 17-21 March 1997, . The report can be accessed at <http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.publications & dtid=2 & cid=24.html> .
 Smith v Adam  NZCA 494;  NZFLR 447,  (Court of Appeal).
 P v B (No 2) (Child abduction: Delay)  IESC 32;  4 IR 185; Coates v Bowden  (High Court, Auckland CIV 2006-404-7028, 30 May 2007, Winkelmann J),  that delay and settlement can go to the weight of the residual discretion even if not exceptions in their own right; Butler v SJ  NZCA 210;  3 NZLR 447, .
 Butler v SJ  NZCA 210;  3 NZLR 447, ; Re C (No 2)  1 FLR 938 (Fam), ; cf. the traditional position as to how grave risk is assessed in A v Central Authority  2 NZLR 517, 522.
 Cf Re L (Abduction pending criminal proceedings)  1 FLR 433.
 Re M (Children) UKHL 55,  (Hale LJ).

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