Source: https://www.justanswer.com/criminal-law/155fm-feloney-record-theft-20-years.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 06:07:33+00:00

Document:
I have a feloney record for theft from over 20 years ago. I am trying to find a job and my background check is stopping me. I have had no other crimes in the past 20 years, not even a speeding ticket. My sentance was 3 years suspended and restitution for $1,400. What can I do?
(B) The person in interest has not been charged for any criminal offense in the fifteen years since the date of the final disposition of all criminal proceedings against the person in interest.
Source: L. 77: Entire part added, p. 1249, § 1, effective December 31. L. 78: (1) and (2) amended, (1.1) to (1.3) and (9) added, and (3)(b) repealed, pp. 403, 406, §§ 2, 3, effective May 5. L. 79: (1)(a), (1.1)(c) to (1.1)(f), and (9) amended and (10) added, p. 975, § 1, effective March 13. L. 81: Entire section R&RE, p. 1238, § 2, effective June 4. L. 82: (2)(b)(I), (2)(b)(II), and (5)(a) amended, p. 655, § 8, effective January 1, 1983. L. 83: (1)(a) amended, p. 680, § 4, effective July 1; (2)(i) and (3)(c)(II) amended, p. 963, § 11, effective July 1, 1984. L. 87: (5)(a) amended, p. 1498, § 8, effective July 1. L. 88: Entire section R&RE, p. 979, § 3, effective April 20. L. 92: (1.5) added, p. 281, § 1, effective July 1; (3) amended, p. 1106, § 7, effective July 1. L. 95: (3)(a) amended, p. 314, § 1, effective July 1. L. 96: (1)(a) amended, p. 736, § 5, effective July 1; (3)(c) amended and (3)(d) added, p. 1587, § 13, effective July 1. L. 2002: (3)(c) amended, p. 1190, § 33, effective July 1. L. 2003: (1)(b)(II) amended, p. 634, § 1, effective March 18. L. 2004: (1)(a) amended, p. 1375, § 1, effective August 4. L. 2006: (1)(a)(II) amended, p. 422, § 4, effective April 13.
Law reviews. For article, "Punitive Damages in Wrongful Discharge Cases", see 15 Colo. Law. 658 (1986). For article, "Sealing Criminal Records in Colorado", see 21 Colo. Law. 247 (1992).
Section indicates the general assembly's intent to preserve the complete criminal justice record, but in a form that protects the individual named from any harmful effects. People v. Wright, 43 Colo. App. 30, 598 P.2d 157 (1979).
Physical destruction of records not generally allowed. By fashioning the remedy of sealing records, the general assembly did not intend that the physical destruction of the records also be allowed in most situations. People v. Wright, 43 Colo. App. 30, 598 P.2d 157 (1979).
The court must balance the competing interests in determining whether criminal records should be sealed, and its decision in this regard may not be overturned on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion. In re T.L.M., 39 P.3d 1239 (Colo. App. 2001).
Since this section concerns the sealing of criminal records and juvenile delinquency proceedings are noncriminal in nature, the trial court should have proceeded under the expungement provisions set forth in § 19-1-306 when considering a petition to seal arrest and criminal records relating to a juvenile delinquency case. C.B. v. People, 122 P.3d 1065 (Colo. App. 2005).
Once the court determines that arrest records and criminal justice information should be sealed, subsection (1)(c) requires the order to be directed to every custodian having custody of any of the records to be sealed. In re T.L.M., 39 P.3d 1239 (Colo. App. 2001).
No irreconcilable conflict or inconsistency between the sealing provisions of this section and § 19-3-313 (7)(a) and (9). Because they deal with the same subject, all of these provisions should be given effect. In re T.L.M., 39 P.3d 1239 (Colo. App. 2001) (decided before the 2004 repeal of § 19-3-313).
There is no basis under either statutory scheme for exempting criminal records held by the Boulder county department of social services from the application of the sealing provisions of this section. Rather, the provisions apply to the police reports in the possession of the Boulder county department of social services, but do not apply to its own investigative records or to the remainder of its files. In re T.L.M., 39 P.3d 1239 (Colo. App. 2001) (decided before the 2004 repeal of § 19-3-313).
An individual may deny his past criminal record. Subsection (3)(f)(I) (now subsection (1)(f)(I)) clearly allows an individual to deny past criminal involvement if the criminal record has been sealed pursuant to the provisions of subsection (3)(c)(I) (now subsection (1)(c)(I)). In making a determination, the trial court should consider the severity of the offense sought to be sealed, the time which has elapsed since the conviction, the subsequent criminal history of the petitioner, and the need for the government agency to retain the records. D.W.M. v. District Court, 751 P.2d 74 (Colo. 1988); People v. Bushu, 876 P.2d 106 (Colo. App. 1994).
Where a petitioner requests to seal criminal records of an acquittal, the court may also consider factors relating to the strength of the case, petitioner's age and employment history, and various consequences if the records are not sealed. The balance test allows for consideration of other factors on a case-by-case basis. People v. Bushu, 876 P.2d 106 (Colo. App. 1994).
Where all charges against the petitioner were dismissed or resulted in acquittal, the severity of the charges is not a factor supporting denial of a petition to seal the records. If anything, in an acquittal context, the fact that the charges of which the petitioner was acquitted were serious increases the potential harm to the petitioner if the records are not sealed. R.J.Z. v. People, 104 P.3d 278 (Colo. App. 2004).
There is no reason to attach any significance to a brief lapse of time since the trial when the sealing of records is sought after an acquittal. R.J.Z. v. People, 104 P.3d 278 (Colo. App. 2004).
Assessing the strength of the case against a defendant based on the length of jury deliberations is necessarily speculative and does not, without more, establish that the prosecution's case was strong. R.J.Z. v. People, 104 P.3d 278 (Colo. App. 2004).
Where all charges of sexual misconduct were dismissed or resulted in acquittal, the petitioner's desire to pursue employment that will permit the petitioner to supervise and be alone with children could not warrant keeping the records unsealed, given the absence of other factors supporting denial of the petition to seal the records. R.J.Z. v. People, 104 P.3d 278 (Colo. App. 2004).
Petitioner's punishment was increased retroactively in violation of the ex post facto clause of the Colorado Constitution when petitioner was denied the automatic entry of an order limiting access to records relating to the charge against her because the trial court applied an amendment of the statute enacted after petitioner committed her crime. In re R.B., 815 P.2d 999 (Colo. App. 1991).
The opportunity to petition and to have the balancing test applied in a hearing under this section is not a vested or a substantive right. People v. D.K.B., 843 P.2d 1326 (Colo. 1993); E.J.R. v. District Court, County of Boulder, 892 P.2d 222 (Colo. 1995).
Therefore, where petitioner was convicted prior to the 1988 amendment to subsection (1)(a) but did not petition for sealing prior to the amendment, applying the provisions of the amendment to the petitioner did not violate the constitutional prohibition against retrospective legislation. People v. D.K.B., 843 P.2d 1326 (Colo. 1993).
Convicted felon, however, has vested privacy interest in sealed criminal records as of the date of the court's final order to seal the records and expiration of the appeal period, regardless of whether the court, having proper subject matter jurisdiction to seal criminal records, inappropriately authorized the sealing of felony records. The judgment may have been erroneous, but is not void. E.J.R. v. District Court, County of Boulder, 892 P.2d 222 (Colo. 1995).
An order entered under subsection (1)(c) to seal records must be directed to every custodian having custody of any of the records to be sealed. In re Petition of T.L.M., 39 P.3d 1239 (Colo. App. 2001).
A waiver of the right to request sealing of records is not contrary to public policy. Rather, public policy favors the enforcement of a defendant's express waiver of the statutory right to request sealing of criminal records. People v. Ward-Garrison, 72 P.3d 423 (Colo. App. 2003); Walker-Lawrence v. District Court of Teller County, 74 P.3d 521 (Colo. App. 2003).
Applied in Tipton v. City of Lakewood ex rel. People, 198 Colo. 18, 595 P.2d 689 (1979); People v. Whittle, 628 P.2d 169 (Colo. App. 1981); People v. Chamberlin, 74 P.3d 489 (Colo. App. 2003).

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