Source: https://www.finkellaw.com/Published-Works/Ninth-Circuit.aspx
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 12:43:11+00:00

Document:
Ninth Circuit Rejects Narrow Interpretation of "Responsible Corporate Officer"
Actual knowledge of the alleged violations does not seem to be a factor in determining if a particular corporate officer is eligible for prosecution. The government also does not have to show willful or negligent actions on the part of the corporate officer himself. In dicta, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals stated the addition of "responsible corporate officer" did not limit but expanded the scope of the meaning of "persons" under the CWA. 34 "Under this interpretation, a 'responsible corporate officer,' to be held criminally liable would not have to 'willfully or negligently' cause a permit violation. Instead, " the willfulness or negligence of the actor would be imputed to him by virtue of his position of responsibility." 35 The functional equivalent of a criminal respondeat superior.
The justifications underlying such burdensome criminal liability are rooted in a policy analogous to strict liability in tort for hazardous undertakings. The public should expect those in a position of authority over enterprises and activities that deal with potentially dangerous substances to act when the law requires them to do so. 39 This serves to protect "the lives and health of people which, in the circumstances of modern industrialism, are largely beyond self-protection." 40 However, unlike the civil penalties levied against one found guilty under the tort doctrine of respondeat superior, the criminal liabilities 41 imposed by the CWA coupled with this interpretation of "responsible corporate officer," have the potential to put an otherwise innocent corporate manager or small business owner in jail with a felony conviction for what amounted to an act of omission.
The Ninth Circuit's Iverson decision could have far reaching consequences. If this decision is followed, many executives and officials in both business and government face possible criminal liability for their corporations' or government departments' intentional or negligent violations of the Clean Water Act without regard to their actual knowledge or fault. Furthermore, if viewed in a larger picture of environmental regulations - and the public policies those regulations support - the responsible corporate officer doctrine could bring many otherwise innocent persons within its broad ambit. Under this doctrine, an act of omission is a potentially criminal act.
1 162 F.3d 1015 (9th Cir. 1998).
2 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c) (1994).
3 Iverson, 162 F.3d at 1025 (emphasis added).
8 Iverson, 162 F.3d at 1018.
13 See Wash. Admin. Code §§ 173-216-050(1)(d), (2), & 173-216-060(2)(a) (1998).
14 See Olympia Municipal Code § 13.20.20 (1994).
15 Iverson, 162 F.3d at 1019.
17 See id: see also 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2) (1994).
18 See id: see also 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (1994).
19 40 C.F.R. § 403.5(b)(8).
20 Iverson, 162 F.3d at 1020.
22 Id. (citing Easyriders Freedom F.I.G.H.T. v. Hannigan, 92 F.3d 1486, 1493 (1996) (holding "[a] criminal statute is not vague if it provides adequate notice in terms that a reasonable person of ordinary intelligence would understand that her conduct is prohibited")).
24 Iverson, 162 F.3d at 1022.
25 Id. at 1023 (citing WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1935 (unabridged ed. 1993)).
26 See id. at 1025 (citing Muck v. United States, 3 F.3d 1378, 1380-1381 (10th Cir. 1993) ("The existence of such authority, irrespective of whether that authority is actually exercised, is determinative.")).
27 Iverson, 162 F.3d at 1023.
28 320 U.S. 277 (1943).
29 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (1938).
30 Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 284.
32 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (1938).
33 Park, 421 U.S. at 673.
34 See United States v. Brittain, 931 F.3d 1413, 1419 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding that a public utilities director fell under the definition of "persons" as defined by the CWA); see also 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319(c)(6) & 1362(5) (1994).
35 United States v. Brittian, 931 F.3d 1413, 1419 (10th Cir. 1991) (emphasis added).
36 988 F.2d 946 (9th Cir. 1993).
38 Id. at 948 (citing United States v. Dee, 912 F.2d 741, 744 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding that federal employees acting within the scope of their employment are not immune from prosecution under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901 et seq.)).
39 See Kevin A. Gaynor & Thomas R. Bartman, Criminal Enforcement of Environmental Laws, 10 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 39, 55 (1999).
40 Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 280.
41 See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1) (1994) (specifying criminal penalties for negligent violations).
42 See Joseph G. Block & Nancy A. Voisin, The Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine-Can You Go To Jail for What You Don't Know?, 22 ENVTL. L. 1347, 1372 (1992).
43 Iverson, 162 F.3d at 1025 (citing United States v. Gonzalez-Mendez, 150 F.3d 1059, 1061 (9th Cir. 1998) cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 528 (1998)).
44 Id. at 1025 (quoting Muscarello v. United States, 118 S.Ct. 1911, 1919 (1998)).

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