Source: http://olsonbrooksby.com/blog/tag/lease-agreements/
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 13:22:57+00:00

Document:
Olson Brooksby works with many commercial industries, including airline owners and airline insurers, regarding lease agreements. A common issue in lease agreements is whether the lessee is totally at the mercy of the lessor if there is a provision in the lease that requires the lessor’s consent. May a lessor unreasonably withhold consent?
Under Oregon law, a lessor may not unreasonably withhold consent to a lease provision.
Take this hypothetical, for example. Let’s say that there is a provision in the lease that requires the lessor’s consent before the lessee can fly the plane over a certain number of miles. What if the lessee unexpectedly needs to exceed the mileage in that lease provision and the lessor refuses to consent? Under Oregon law, a lessor may not unreasonably withhold its consent. To do so would be a violation of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The key issue is what is “unreasonable”? If the lessor proffers a reason that would seem objectively reasonable to an average juror, the lessor has met its burden and the lessee probably may not fly the plane beyond the agreed-upon mileage amount.
The standard is whether an objectively reasonable juror would believe that the lessor’s withholding of consent was unreasonable.
Oregon courts have held that every contract includes an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, also known as a “duty of good faith”. See Uptown Heights Associates v. Seafirst Corp., 320 Or 638, 645, 891 P2d 639 (1995); Pacific First Bank v. New Morgan Park Corp., 319 Or 342, 344 n 1, 876 P2d 761 (1994) (Oregon courts use the terms “duty of good faith” and “duty of good faith and fair dealing” interchangeably). This covenant implies that neither party will engage in any act that will “have the effect of destroying or injuring the right of the other party to receive the fruits of the contract.” Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 235 Or 7, 16, 383 P2d 107, 383 P2d 1002 (1963) (quoting 3 Arthur Linton Corbin, Corbin on Contracts §561, at 278 (1960)). The Oregon Supreme Court has “sought through the good faith doctrine to effectuate the reasonable contractual expectations of the parties.” Pacific First Bank 319 Or at 351 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
The lessee has an objectively reasonable expectation that the lessor will consent, especially if the lessor has no objective reason to refuse consent. See Hampton Tree Farms, Inc. v. Jewett, 320 Or 599, 616, 892 P2d 683 (1995) (“jury could find that [seller’s] unilateral action in discontinuing to supply logs frustrated [buyer’s] objectively reasonable expectation”).
The lessor must act in good faith and within the bounds of the “objectively reasonable expectations” of the parties. Uptown Heights Associates, supra. The express terms of a contract help to define the objectively reasonable expectations of the parties. Uptown Heights Associates, supra; see Pacific First Bank, supra; Stevens v. Foren, 154 Or App 52, 58, 959 P2d 1008 (1998) (“[t]he duty of good faith and fair dealing cannot contradict an express contractual term, nor does it provide a remedy for an unpleasantly motivated act that is permitted expressly by contract”). Reasonable expectations include the right of either party to further its own legitimate business interests. U.S. Genes v. Vial, 143 Or App 552, 559, 923 P2d 1322 (1996).
If there are consent provisions in a lease, it is best if there is an express contractual provision requiring the parties to act in good faith.
It is best if there is an express contractual provision of good faith, but if there isn’t one, you can rely on the common law above to argue that the lessor, by unreasonably withholding consent, is not exercising good faith and fair dealing, which is implied under the contract. Pollock v. D.R. Horton, Inc.-Portland, 190 Or App 1, 12–13, 77 P3d 1120 (2003).
The duty of good faith and fair dealing applies to lease agreements implicitly, even if there is not an explicit provision requiring good faith.
In Pacific First Bank, 319 Or at 353, a landlord-tenant case, the Oregon Supreme Court held that the duty of good faith and fair dealing applies to lease agreements. The court cited Milton R. Friedman, 1 Friedman on Leases § 7.303e2 (3d ed 1990), which notes that, “there is a rapidly growing minority to the effect that if [a] lease states ‘tenant may assign only with landlord’s consent’ or ‘tenant may not assign without landlord’s consent’ there is engrafted on this language by implication the phrase ‘which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld’”. Pacific First Bank, 319 Or at 353. The only way that the lessor could get around this is if there is a “’freely negotiated provision in the lease’” giving the lessor “’an absolute right to withhold consent’”. Id. (quoting Restatement (Second) of Property § 15.2(2) (1977 & 1993 Supp) (emphasis added to the Restatement quotation by the Pacific First Bank court).
The Pacific First Bank case involved a tenant who had merged into its wholly owned subsidiary and a bank, the lessor, who refused to consent to the transfer and who argued that, under the terms of the lease, transferring the lease required the bank’s prior written consent. Id. at 344. The court found in favor of the tenant noting that, although there was a term in the lease that gave the lessor “a unilateral, unrestricted exercise of discretion,” in regard to the lease transfer provision, there was also a term in the lease that provided that the bank would “’not unreasonably withhold its consent to a sublease to a tenant’” Id. at 354 (emphasis added by the Pacific First Bank court).
It would thus be helpful if there is a term in the contract providing that the lessor cannot unreasonably withhold its consent—particularly if the lease also includes a term that gives the lessor a unilateral, unrestricted exercise of discretion in regard to the particular provision at issue. However, in the absence of a unilateral, unrestricted exercise of discretion provision in favor of the lessor, it is not necessary to have a term providing that the lessor will not unreasonably withhold consent, given the court’s Friedman quotation above (“there is engrafted on this language by implication the phrase ‘which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld’”. Id. at 353 (quoting Friedman, supra).
The lessor’s exercise of consent is thus tempered by the lessor’s duty of good faith and the lessor must not “unreasonably restrain” the lessee’s ability to conduct business in a reasonable and efficient manner. Carey v. Lincoln Loan Co., 165 Or App 657, 670 (2000), aff’d, 342 Or 530 (2007). In other words, the provision regarding the lessor’s consent is “not * * * absolute” or subject to the lessor’s “’whim.’” Id.

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