Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/274/29/
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 12:10:56+00:00

Document:
1. An order of the Interstate Commerce Commission, in a proceeding to fix reasonable maximum rail-and-water rates, and purporting to do this by adopting the existing all-rail rates with a fixed differential (alleged by complainant to represent the cost of water transportation insurance), should not be construed as an attempt to equalize the two classes of rates merely because of its form or by laying undue stress upon recitals in the report. P. 274 U. S. 32.
2. If the determination of the Commission finds substantial support in the evidence, the courts will not weigh the evidence nor consider the wisdom of the Commission's action. P. 274 U. S. 33.
3. Under the Panama Canal Act, August 24, 1912, par. 13 of § 6, read with par. 4 of § 15 of the Interstate Commerce Act, and the Transportation Act, the Commission has power to require a rail carrier to embrace in a through rail-and-water route less than the entire length of its railroad lying between the termini of the through route proposed, irrespective of whether both rail and water "are used under a common control, management, or arrangement for a continuous carriage or shipment," Interstate Com. Act § 1. P. 274 U. S. 34.
4. The right of the Commission to consider a case under a particular provision of the statute depends on the facts alleged, and not on such provision's being formally referred to in the complaint. P. 274 U. S. 36.
5. To plead the law relied on is no more necessary in a proceeding before the Commission than it is in a judicial proceeding. P. 274 U. S. 36.
Appeal from a decree of the district court dismissing the bill in a suit by the Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific and St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Companies to enjoin enforcement of an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission establishing joint rail and water and rail and water and rail rates on cotton.
modified final order of the Commission required appellants to establish and maintain for the transportation of cotton from Oklahoma points, via Galveston and the lines of the Mallory Steamship Company and the Southern Pacific Company-Atlantic Steamship Lines, to destinations in New England territory, joint rail and water rates not exceeding "rates 4 cents per 100 pounds lower than the present all-rail rates from and to the same points," not, however, lower than $1.50 per 100 pounds. Prior to the Commission's order, no joint rail and water rates on cotton were in effect between the points mentioned. The rate to New York consisted of the local rail rate to Galveston, plus the water rate therefrom and a loading charge. To New England points, the rate was made by adding the rail rate beyond New York. The all-rail routes from Oklahoma to the New England territory points are through St. Louis, Memphis, and other Mississippi crossing, and the joint all-rail rates were lower to New England destinations than the combination of local rail and water rates. On commodities other than cotton, joint rail and water rates were in effect, and these were lower than the all-rail rates. The Commission found that the establishment of joint rail and water rates on cotton between the points in question was desirable in the public interest, and that the existing rates for such transportation were unreasonable to the extent that they exceeded or may exceed rates constructed by the deduction of 4 cents from the present all-rail rates. 87 I.C.C. 392; 93 I.C.C. 268. The court below, consisting of three judges, after a hearing, entered a decree dismissing the bill for want of equity. 6 F.2d 888.
possess; (2) if the order be treated as made under the power to fix reasonable rates, it is arbitrary and without supporting evidence; (3) the result of the order is to short-haul appellants' lines, contrary to paragraph 4, § 15, of the Interstate Commerce Act, as amended by § 418 of the Transportation Act 1920, c. 91, 41 Stat. 456, 485, and (4) the order is based upon paragraph 13 of § 6, added to the Interstate Commerce Act by the Panama Canal Act of August 24, 1912, c. 390, 37 Stat. 560, 568, and is therefore void because the authority of the Commission was not invoked under that paragraph.
but, from a consideration of the entire record, we think it quite unfair to conclude that the Commission undertook to exercise an authority entirely different and distinct from that which the complaint specifically invoked.
There is nothing in Southern Pacific Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 219 U. S. 433, that requires a different conclusion. In that case, it appeared upon the face of the record that the Commission had not exerted its power to correct an unjust and unreasonable rate, but had made the order complained of upon the theory that it possessed the power to set aside a just and reasonable rate whenever the Commission deemed that it would be equitable to shippers in a particular district to put in force a reduced rate. In reaching that conclusion, the court thought that the complaint and answer presented the latter issue; that, while the opinion of the Commission might contain some sentences indicating the contrary, when considered as a whole, in the light of the record, it clearly appeared that the order was based upon that theory, and that this was borne out by the dissenting opinion, which proceeded upon the express ground that the order was an exertion of a power not possessed, with no language in the prevailing opinion to indicate the contrary. Here, it is true, the order fixes the rail and water rate by relating it in terms to the all-rail rate; but, since we accept the view that the former was in fact established as a just and reasonable rate, there can be no objection to the form of words adopted as a method of short and convenient description of that rate. The power of the Commission to equalize rates, if its authority to that end should be invoked, is not involved.
the wisdom of the Commission's action. 261 U. S. 261 U.S. 204; Virginian Ry. Co. v. United States, 272 U. S. 658. The order here does not rest alone upon comparisons with the all-rail rates, as seems to be contended, but is supported by other established facts and circumstances as well. See Western Chem. Co. v. United States, 271 U. S. 268, 271 U. S. 271. Nothing is to be gained by a review of the evidence. It is enough to say that both the Commission and the lower court thought it was ample to justify the order, and, upon a consideration of the entire record, we find no reason to differ with them in that conclusion.
"(a) The transportation of passengers or property wholly by railroad, or partly by railroad and partly by water when both are used under a common control, management, or arrangement for a continuous carriage or shipment. . . ."
C. 91, 41 Stat. 456, 474.
Appellees insist that the rail and water lines here involved come within the italicized portion of this provision.
"When property may be or is transported from point to point in the United States by rail and water through the Panama Canal or otherwise, the transportation being by a common carrier or carriers, and not entirely within the limits of a single state, the Interstate Commerce Commission shall have jurisdiction of such transportation and of the carriers, both by rail and by water, which may or do engage in the same, in the following particulars, in addition to the jurisdiction given by the act to regulate commerce as amended June eighteenth, nineteen hundred and ten:"
"(b) To establish through routes and maximum joint rates between and over such rail and water lines, and to determine all the terms and conditions under which such lines shall be operated in the handling of the traffic embraced."
"the policy of Congress to promote, encourage, and develop water transportation, service, and facilities in connection with the commerce of the United States, and to foster and preserve in full vigor both rail and water transportation."
Section 500, 41 Stat. 499.
These and other provisions emphasize the intention of Congress to broaden the control of the Interstate Commerce Commission over rail and water transportation, and generally to extend the regulatory power of that body over all such transportation in the public interest. It would be quite inconsistent with that broad purpose to adopt the narrow construction of the statutory provisions under review which is advanced by appellants. On the whole, and especially in the light of the definite congressional policy which the legislation reflects, Richardson v. Harmon, 222 U. S. 96, 222 U. S. 104; Holden v. Stratton, 198 U. S. 202, 198 U. S. 213-214; Minnesota v. Hitchcock, 185 U. S. 373, 185 U. S. 385, 185 U. S. 395, we find no difficulty in rejecting the construction thus advanced and adopting that which we have indicated, without at the same time doing violence to the fair meaning of the language actually employed.
under it on the Commission's own motion. But the allegations of the complaint in matters of fact were sufficient to authorize the Commission to consider the case under that provision, as well as others, and this is enough. To plead the law relied on is no more necessary in a proceeding before the Commission than it is in a judicial proceeding.

References: § 6
 § 15
 § 1
 § 15
 § 418
 § 6
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