Source: http://masscases.com/cases/sjc/282/282mass303.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 14:09:10+00:00

Document:
GRACE D. LEGG vs. HULDA BLOOM. GRACE D. LEGG, administratrix, vs. SAME.
Negligence, Motor vehicle, Contributory, In use of way. Survival of Action.
At the trial of an action for personal injuries sustained by a pedestrian in the daytime when he was struck by an automobile operated by the defendant, the plaintiff testified that, when he was about to cross a street about thirty feet wide, he looked both ways and saw no automobiles in the immediate vicinity; that there was a slight hill to his right, and if an automobile were below the rise it could not be seen; and that he crossed the street diagonally, and was testing with his foot the firmness of a new cement curb at the farther side of the street when he was struck by the automobile, which had approached from his right and rear. Held, that the questions, whether the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence and whether the defendant was negligent, were for the jury.
Whether a right of action by a husband for consequential damages resulting from personal injuries sustained by his wife survives him was not decided.
TWO ACTIONS OF TORT. Writs dated November 12, 1930.
The second action originally was brought by Herbert L. Legg, and after his death was prosecuted by the administratrix of his estate.
The actions were tried together in the Superior Court before Walsh, J. Material evidence is stated in the opinion. The judge ordered a verdict for the defendant in each action and reported them for determination by this court.
J. P. Sylvia, Jr., (R. Clayton with him,) for the plaintiffs.
F. E. Smith, for the defendant.
D. Legg will hereafter be referred to as the plaintiff. At the close of the evidence submitted by the plaintiff the trial judge, on written motions presented by the defendant, directed a verdict for the defendant in each case, subject to the plaintiff's exceptions. The cases are before this court on a report.
time was travelling in an easterly direction. It could have been found that it came up behind the plaintiff when she was on the extreme right hand side of the street.
It could not properly have been ruled as matter of law that the burden of proving contributory negligence of the plaintiff had been sustained by the defendant. "A pedestrian, whether he sees an automobile or not, has a right to rely to some extent on the expectation that any motor vehicle, approaching him, will slow down and give a timely signal and observe the other requirements of G. L. c. 90, § 14, 17." Barrett v. Checker Taxi Co. 263 Mass. 252, 254. Tyrrell v. Caruso, 269 Mass. 379, 380. Hennessey v. Moynihan, 272 Mass. 165, 168. McSorley v. Risdon, 278 Mass. 415, 416. Whether the driver of the automobile was negligent was for the jury. It could have been found that the driver could have seen the plaintiff and have avoided striking her by stopping or by turning to the left and passing her. Mulroy v. Marinakis, 271 Mass. 421, 424. McGuiggan v. Atkinson, 278 Mass. 264, 266. The questions, whether the defendant had maintained the burden of proving negligence of the plaintiff and whether the defendant was negligent, should have been submitted to the jury.
The cases are reported to this court in accordance with the following stipulation entered into by the parties: "If the court erred in directing a verdict for the defendant in said cases, a verdict shall be entered in favor of the plaintiff in the sum of $1,000; otherwise judgment shall be entered for the defendant on the verdicts." The parties agreed at the argument in open court that provided the stipulation became applicable judgments shall be entered for the plaintiff in the first case for $1,000, and for the plaintiff in the second case for $1. The issue whether the second action, for consequential damages, survived need not be considered in view of the agreement for judgment in that action. In the first case judgment is to be entered for the plaintiff for $1,000. In the second case judgment is to be entered for the plaintiff for $1.

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