Source: http://in.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20180312_0000316.NIN.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 04:47:49+00:00

Document:
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Schneider Electric's Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 11]. Plaintiff Lisa C. Sturgill has not filed a response. The Defendant filed a Reply [ECF No. 13], asking the Court to consider the Plaintiff's failure to respond as a waiver of argument against the Motion to Dismiss, and to dismiss the case with prejudice.
On November 9, 2017, the Plaintiff filed a Complaint [ECF No. 5] in state court against the Defendant. The Plaintiff alleged that several actions taken by the Defendant (her former employer) violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. (See generally Compl.) The Defendant timely removed [ECF No. 1] the case to this Court, and now moves to dismiss the same.
The Defendant argues that the Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Specifically, the Defendant states that the Plaintiff failed to allege facts to show that she exhausted her administrative remedies before filing suit as required under Title VII. The Defendant also asserts that any claims based on events that occurred prior to her July 2016 discharge are untimely and outside the scope of the 2017 EEOC Charge.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” This pleading standard “does not require ‘detailed factual allegations, ' but it demands more than an unadorned, the- defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.'” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). A complaint does not suffice “if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]' devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.'” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
In ruling on a motion to dismiss brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a court must draw all reasonable inferences that favor the plaintiff, construe the allegations of the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and accept as true all well-pleaded facts and allegations in the complaint. Appert v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, Inc., 673 F.3d 609, 622 (7th Cir. 2012); Thompson v. Ill. Dep't of Prof'l Regulation, 300 F.3d 750, 753 (7th Cir. 2002). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, at 678; Appert, 673 F.3d at 622.
Before bringing a claim under Title VII, plaintiffs must file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC and receive authorization from the EEOC to file a civil action. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b), (f); Conner v. Ill. Dep't Nat'l Res., 413 F.3d 675, 680 (7th Cir. 2005). Once a plaintiff receives authorization from the EEOC (known as a right-to-sue letter) the plaintiff has 90 days to bring suit. § 2000e-5(f)(1).
Failure to exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative defense. Salas v. Wis. Dep't of Corrs., 493 F.3d 913, 921-22 (7th Cir. 2007). As such, dismissal is appropriate only if a “plaintiff pleads herself out of court by alleging facts that affirmatively establish the defense.” Krause v. Turnberry Country Club, 571 F.Supp.2d 851, 858 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Xechem, Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 372 F.3d 899, 901 (7th Cir. 2004) (Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, a complaint need not anticipate or overcome affirmative defenses such as the statute of limitations). Further, a plaintiff is not required to attach a right-to-sue letter to her complaint. Id. at 859 (citing Raymond v. City of Chi., 183 F.Supp.2d 1060, 1066 n.3 (N.D. Ill. 2002)).
In this case, the Plaintiff alleges that she filed a charge with the EEOC, and includes a copy of the 2017 EEOC Charge with her Complaint. Although the Plaintiff did not reference a right-to-sue letter and did not include a copy of the right-to-sue letter, the Defendant has attached to its Motion to Dismiss the Plaintiff's right-to-sue letter pertaining to the 2017 EEOC Charge. (See Def. Mot. to Dismiss Ex. D, ECF No. 11-1.) The Court can take judicial notice of matters of public record without converting a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. See Anderson v. Simon, 217 F.3d 472, 474-75 (7th Cir. 2000) (citing Henson v. CSC Credit Servs., 29 F.3d 280, 284 (7th Cir. 1994)); see also Pierce v. Ill. Dep't of Human Servs., 128 Fed. App'x 534, 535 (7th Cir. 2005) (finding no error where the district court, in deciding a motion to dismiss, considered “numerous documents . . . submitted by the parties from the administrative process” that were not attached to the pleadings because they were “public records”); Anderson v. Ctr. For New Horizons, Inc., 891 F.Supp.2d 956, 959 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (taking judicial notice of EEOC charges attached to the defendant's motion to dismiss). The Court thus takes judicial notice of the right-to-sue letter. Accordingly, the Court does not find any grounds to dismiss the Plaintiff's Complaint for failure to exhaust her administrative remedies.

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 2000
 v. 
 § 2000
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.