Source: https://arizonaestateplanningattorneys.com/attorney-fee-award-against-a-guardian-or-conservator-in-arizona/
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 14:15:39+00:00

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Attorney Fee Award Against a Guardian or Conservator in Arizona.
The Arizona Court of Appeals in a memorandum decision had to address the award of attorney fees in a guardianship and conservatorship case. Mr. Lanfor, individually and as guardian and conservator of the estate of Ms. Quinn appeals from the trial court’s award of compensation to a court-appointed investigator, Ms. Brydges, for her work in the case, along with costs and attorney fees Brydges expended defending her compensation request against Mr. Lanfor’s challenge. For the following reasons, we affirm. Our review of the issues presented on appeal requires a detailed recitation of the procedural history of this case. In July 2016, Mr. Lanfor petitioned the Pima County Superior Court to appoint him Quinn’s guardian and conservator on both a temporary and permanent basis. The trial court set a hearing for August 11, 2016, on Lanfor’s petition and in the interim appointed Brydges as investigator in Quinn’s case.
Mr. Lanfor filed two notices of appeal, one on behalf of the estate and another stating he was appealing “personally and separately.” Two case numbers were generated on appeal, No. 2 CA-CV 2017-0060 and No. 2 CA-CV 2017-0078, but because the briefs in this case address the trial court’s judgment as to both the estate and Lanfor personally, we consider both issues in this appeal. Additionally, although the transcript of the hearing on Brydges’s petition for compensation was filed in No. 2 CA-CV 2017-0078, we have made it a part of the record in the case before us.
Because Mr. Lanfor’s statement of facts does not include citations to the record as required by Rule 13(a)(4), Ariz. R. Civ. App. P., we have disregarded it and relied on Brydges’s statement of facts as well as our own review of the record. See Sholes v. Fernando, 228 Ariz. 455, n.2 (App. 2011). Pursuant to A.R.S. § 14-5303(C), upon a petition for appointment of a guardian, “[t]he alleged incapacitated person shall be interviewed by an investigator appointed by the court” who “also shall interview the person appointed.
The court granted the portion of Mr. Lanfor’s petition asking for his emergency appointment as temporary guardian and conservator. In July 2016, less than two weeks after Brydges’s appointment, Mr. Lanfor petitioned the trial court to remove her as the investigator and appoint another. In his petition, he asserted that “Brydges was extremely rude and demanding” when he contacted her regarding her appointment and displayed “[a] pushy, bullish Gestapo type personality.” He further complained that Brydges had trespassed by going to Quinn’s home without notifying him and “asking for [Quinn’s] consent to [take] her to the court,” prompting Lanfor to contact the police.
Finally, the court arranged a date for Mr. Lanfor to bring Quinn to the courthouse for Brydges to interview her and directed Mr. Lanfor to provide contact information for anyone Brydges wanted to speak with as part of her investigation. The minute entry for that status conference stated, “The Court admonished Mr. Lanfor not to interfere with the duties of the Court-appointed Investigator or the Court-appointed Attorney.” Mr. Lanfor filed a “motion to correct” the minute entry by removing the admonition, asserting “he did never interfere with the duties of the counsel or the court investigator and the statement that suggests he did was unfair and seeking appointment as guardian, visit the present place of abode of the alleged incapacitated person . . . and submit a report in writing to the court.” Section 14-5407(B), A.R.S., similarly provides for the appointment of an investigator upon a petition for conservatorship.
The trial court denied Mr. Lanfor’s earlier motion to strike portions of Brydges’s reports and Mr. Lanfor filed a motion for reconsideration, which the court also denied. The latter motion included objections to Upon receiving a request for instructions from the newly appointed investigator, the trial court directed her to “conduct an investigation as she would any other” “given Mr. Lanfor’s strong objection to the reports submitted by Brydges.” The court also “directed Mr. Lanfor not to interfere with or limit the investigation without Court approval.” The new investigator ultimately recommended Mr. Lanfor’s appointment as Quinn’s permanent guardian and conservator, and the court appointed him.
There was an objection to Brydges’s fees, alleging she had committed “gross negligence” and “crimes” in her investigation, which did not benefit Quinn or the case. The court’s denial of Mr. Lanfor’s motion noted that the fee request had not been filed with the court and “directed Mr. Lanfor to file an Amended Objection with a copy of the Investigator’s invoice and specific objections to the fees claimed,” and, if he wanted “to have a hearing on the Objection, [to] submit a Notice of Hearing along with the Objection.” After Brydges filed her claim for $2,917.53, Mr. Lanfor filed a notice disallowing the claim in full. The trial court set a hearing on the claim for January 2017.
Brydges filed a motion to quash the subpoenas served on her and her attorney, arguing that “discovery was not warranted or appropriate” and the subpoenas “would not lead to admissible evidence” and were “simply a tool to harass.” She also requested “a protective order against any discovery” and “a double damage attorney fees award against . . . Mr. Lanfor personally pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-349” for abuse of discovery. The trial court granted Brydges’s motion in part as to portions of the subpoenas. Mr. Lanfor subsequently filed a motion to dismiss Brydges’s claim for compensation, arguing she “had not complied with the subpoena or the rules of discovery” and was an “incompetent” investigator who spent an excessive amount of time on the case and committed various crimes or other wrongs such that “she must not be allowed to ever again be allowed.
Following the hearing, Mr. Lanfor filed another motion to dismiss Brydges’s claims “as premature and defective” because they had been presented prior to the appointment of a permanent guardian and conservator but not again after his appointment. He further asserted he had timely disallowed the claims and “disputed many of the charges and the format of the billing, which caused confusion with all the decimals preceding the times, and contained ‘Block Billing, ‘time spent on billing activities’ and ‘time and expenses for misfeasance and/or malfeasance. Mr. Lanfor also separately responded to the hearing memorandum, asserting that Brydges had expanded the proceedings through “her determination to unjustly destroy Mr. Lanfor’s credibility through her insane work as a court-appointed investigator.” He also argued that Brydges had billed “over 40 unreasonable and unnecessary hours” including “ridiculous investigations of Mr. Lanfor” himself.
Regarding conservatorships, A.R.S. § 14-5407(B) similarly provides that when a petition is filed on the basis of “mental illness, mental deficiency, or mental disorder . . . , the court shall appoint an investigator to interview the person to be protected” and make a recommendation. In accordance with those provisions, upon receiving Lanfor’s petition alleging Quinn’s “mental illness or incapacity,” the trial court appointed Brydges as investigator in the case, and she visited Quinn at her residence and interviewed her prior to filing a written report and recommendation. Under A.R.S. §§ 14-5314(A) and 14-5414(A), court-appointed investigators who are “not otherwise compensated for services rendered” are “entitled to reasonable compensation from the estate” if the petition is granted or from the petitioner if it is denied. Furthermore, “a conservator must pay from the estate all just claims against the estate . . . arising before or after the conservatorship upon their presentation and allowance.” A.R.S. § 14-5428(A). “A claimant whose claim has not been paid may petition the court for a determination of her claim . . . and, upon due proof, procure an order for its allowance and payment from the estate.” § 14-5428(B).
Mr. Lanfor asserts the trial court abused its discretion by “forcing on him the burden of proving the fees were unreasonable, unnecessary or unjust, in only pleadings and without a hearing or opportunity to question Brydges, and/or a trial with an opportunity for a jury.” He does not, however, identify any authority requiring a court presented with a contested fee request to hold a hearing, let alone a jury trial. Brydges argues that Mr. Lanfor “failed to preserve the issue of personal liability by failing to object to the form of judgment.” In our discretion, however, we address Mr. Lanfor’s argument in full.
Although §§ 14-5303(C) and 14-5407(D) entitle the alleged incapacitated person to a hearing or a jury trial on the issue of a guardian or conservator’s appointment, those provisions do not mention investigator fees or entitle the petitioner to request a hearing or trial. Additionally, Mr. Lanfor did not request a hearing when the trial court expressly told him he could, and the court nevertheless scheduled one after Brydges filed her compensation request. To the extent Mr. Lanfor asserts his due process rights were violated because, “at the hearing set for the issue, the court did not allow [him] to present his case,” our supreme court has noted that “[p]rocedural due process . . . requires nothing more than an adequate opportunity to fully present factual and legal claims.” State v. Hidalgo, 241 Ariz. 543 (2017), quoting Kessen v. Stewart, 195 Ariz. 488 (App. 1999).
Moreover, the trial court specifically directed Mr. Lanfor to Rule 33(D), Ariz. R. Prob. P., which provides “if a petition for compensation or fees is contested, the objecting party shall set forth all specific objections in writing” and does not call for evidentiary hearings on contested petitions for compensation. The opportunity to file written objections afforded sufficient due process in this context, and the court even allowed Lanfor to conduct discovery. Cf. FDIC v. Mallen, 486 U.S. 230, 247- 48 (1988) (“reject[ing] . . . contention that [statute] violates due process because it does not guarantee an opportunity to present oral testimony”).
As the trial court pointed out, Mr. Lanfor did not provide specific objections to Brydges’s compensation request before the scheduled hearing. Rather, he filed numerous subpoenas. The closest Lanfor came to making a specific objection prior to the scheduled hearing was in his first motion to dismiss Brydges’s claim, in which he alleged that Brydges had “trespassed illegally” on Quinn’s property, “invaded the privacy of the petitioner when she unlawfully, and without court order, requested personal and private records that were not relevant,” and “performed unauthorized work to pay her bill.” Those could be construed as allegations of “misfeasance or malfeasance”.
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