Source: http://masscases.com/cases/sjc/290/290mass361.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 20:11:16+00:00

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DONALD SHEA & another vs. TOWN OF LEXINGTON. SAME vs. SAME.
Municipal Corporations, Officers and agents, Liability for tort. Drain. Public Officer. Actionable Tort. Equity Pleading and Practice, Counterclaim, Dismissal of bill without prejudice.
Evidence, showing merely that the laying in 1916 of a drain to carry surface water off a highway in a town was done under the direction of persons who were both selectmen and highway surveyors of the town, without evidence showing specifically in which capacity they acted in giving the direction, did not warrant a finding that they were acting as selectmen and as agents of the town and not as surveyors of highways.
A landowner could not maintain an action of tort against a town for damage done to his land by the maintenance therein of a drain laid in 1916 at the direction of the highway surveyors of the town to carry surface water off a highway, nor for damage done to the land by the discharge thereon of large quantities of water through the drain as a result of the connection thereof with the drainage system of another highway in 1923 at the direction of the road commissioners of the town; in causing such acts to be done, the highway surveyors and road commissioners were public officers and not agents of the town, which was not liable for their acts as public officers or those of their subordinates.
Where, in a suit in equity to enjoin the defendant from maintaining a drain in the plaintiff's land, the defendant filed a counterclaim seeking to have the plaintiff enjoined from interfering with the drain and there was a hearing on applications by both parties for temporary injunctions, it was error to enter thereafter, upon motion by the plaintiff and against the objection of the defendant, a final decree which dismissed the bill without prejudice and also in effect disposed of the counterclaim.
BILL IN EQUITY, filed in the Superior Court on September 14, 1933.
"Count 1. The plaintiffs say that they are the owners of certain property in Lexington and in that part of Lexington called East Lexington, said property being more specifically known and designated as number 483-517 Massachusetts Avenue in said Lexington. The plaintiffs further say that the defendant through its duly authorized agents, servants or workmen, entered upon said land without authorization therefor, and have caused damage to the realty permanent in nature; that said trespass has continued for a great period of time and is continuing at the present time all to their damage as claimed in their writ.
in value and they have been deprived of the use thereof and have been unable to sell the same all to their damage as claimed in their writ."
"1. That the defendant has without right or license or taking trespassed on their land in the laying of a fifteen inch drain through their land in the ground to a depth of five feet more or less, said drain being permanent in nature.
"2. That the defendant has without right or license or taking dumped large quantities of rock on their lands and abandoned the same.
"Concerning count 2 and count 1, the plaintiffs specify that said counts are not for the same cause of action but are so corelated that the proof of count 2 will involve the same evidence to a great degree as count 1.
"3. That the trespasses herein alleged are continuing in nature from the original trespass up to and including the date of these specifications."
The action was heard in the District Court by Green, J. Material evidence is stated in the opinion. The judge found for the plaintiff Justin Shea in the sum of $1, and for the plaintiff Donald Shea in the sum of $8,947.60, as described in the opinion. Upon a report to the Appellate Division for the Northern District, it was ordered that the findings for the plaintiffs be vacated and that "judgment . . . be entered for the defendant on both counts of the declaration as against both plaintiffs." The plaintiffs appealed.
The pleadings in the suit in equity, proceedings therein and a final decree entered by order of Pinanski, J., are described in the opinion. The defendant alleged exceptions and appealed from the decree.
G.A. McLaughlin, (W.H. McLaughlin with him,) for the plaintiffs.
S.R. Wrightington, Town Counsel, for the defendant.
is an action to recover damages alleged to have been caused to certain lands of the plaintiffs in consequence of the construction and maintenance of a drain therein, the dumping of stone thereon and the discharge of surface water thereon through the drain. The answer is a general denial, and certain affirmative defences relative to the drain. Before the case was tried the defendant filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction since this is an action for trespass to land in Lexington and is, therefore, a local action. The motion was denied. On the first count the judge of the District Court found for the defendant as against Donald Shea; and found for the plaintiff Justin Shea in the sum of $1 because of the maintenance upon his land by the defendant of part of the drain above referred to. He found for the defendant on the claim for damages for the dumping of stone. On the second count the judge found for the plaintiff Donald Shea and assessed damages in a substantial amount. At the request of the defendant the case was reported to the Appellate Division.
his bill of complaint. To this the defendant objected on the ground that it had acquired rights by reason of having included in its answer a counterclaim and by reason of the judge's action thereon. The plaintiffs thereafter filed a motion for a final decree dismissing their bill, which was allowed subject to the defendant's exception. A final decree was entered dismissing the bill without prejudice with costs to the defendant. From this decree the defendant appealed. This is the second case before this court, and will hereinafter be considered.
In the action at law the Appellate Division reversed the findings of the trial judge for the plaintiff Justin Shea under the first count of the declaration, and for the plaintiff Donald Shea under the second count, and ordered judgment for the defendant on both counts of the declaration. From this order the plaintiffs appealed.
the records. There was further evidence that the selectmen and surveyors of highways were the same persons; that there was no distinction between the meetings of the surveyors of highways and meetings of the selectmen; and that the records concerning the appointment of White were records of the selectmen although references to action by the surveyors of highways appear in them and there was no separate record of surveyors of highways.
White testified that from time to time his department did work on the Frizelle drain and that he got his directions from the selectmen; that before doing work on the plaintiffs' land he had talked with the selectmen; that he remembered talking with one Spaulding who was at that time a selectman but who is now dead; that he did not remember talking with any other member of the board, and was unable to remember that the men with whom he talked told him in what capacity they were acting; that he remembered that there were at one time surveyors of highways in Lexington; and that he remembered talking with them about different work, but did not recall the exact time when the town ceased to have surveyors of highways.
254. Dupuis v. Fall River, 223 Mass. 73, 75. Malinoski v. D.S. McGrath, Inc. 283 Mass. 1, 9. Acting as such they would be public officers and not agents of the town, and the town would not be liable for their acts, or the acts of their subordinates. Clark v. Easton, 146 Mass. 43. Anglim v. Brockton, 278 Mass. 90. Malinoski v. D.S. McGrath, Inc. 283 Mass. 1. The finding of agency, therefore, upon which the trial judge apparently charged the town with liability was not justified upon the evidence. The cases of Butman v. Newton, 179 Mass. 1, Waldron v. Haverhill, 143 Mass. 582, and Hawks v. Charlemont, 110 Mass. 110, are plainly distinguishable from the present case. As to the contention of the plaintiffs in the specifications as to count 1, that the defendant had dumped stone on their lands, there was no evidence that the town had done this work through its servants or agents. The finding for the defendant with respect to that claim was correct.
and officers, among which were road commissioners. It does not appear when the act was accepted. It is assumed that such acceptance was before the work was done on Oak Street. Road commissioners, when chosen, "shall exclusively have the powers, perform the duties and be subject to the liabilities and penalties of selectmen and surveyors of highways relative to public ways. . . ." G.L.c. 41, § 64. Acting as such they are public officers and not agents of the town. Clark v. Easton, 146 Mass. 43. Wood v. Concord, 268 Mass. 185, 190, and cases cited.
premises, even when the surface water is drained into a culvert or watercourse. The remedy is under the statute. R.L.c. 51, § 15, now St. 1917, c. 344, Part IV, § 21. Woodbury v. Beverly, 153 Mass. 245. Bainard v. Newton, 154 Mass. 255. Holleran v. Boston, 176 Mass. 75." The statutes make provision for damages resulting from repairing highways. G.L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 84, § 10 (R.L.c. 51, § 15). There is also a special provision with regard to drains from ways. G.L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 83, § 4. It is plain that no action of tort would lie against this defendant for the reason that it does not appear that the town ever assumed to perform by means of its agents any of the work performed. Cases like Bates v. Westborough, 151 Mass. 174, and Diamond v. North Attleborough, 219 Mass. 587, cited by the plaintiffs, are not applicable. Contentions based on these cases are disposed of by what was said in Blaisdell v. Stoneham, 229 Mass. 563, 565, and cases there cited. It follows that the plaintiffs are not entitled to recover under the second count of the declaration and the Appellate Division so ruled. Its order that judgment be entered for the defendant on both counts of the declaration as against both plaintiffs was correct.
injunction. Thereafter the plaintiffs filed a formal motion for a final decree dismissing their bill without prejudice, which was allowed subject to the exception of the defendant. A bill of exceptions to that effect was allowed. A final decree was entered dismissing the plaintiffs' bill without prejudice and with costs to the defendant. From that decree the defendant appealed. Under the present practice in equity there may be both exceptions, G.L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 214, § 25A; c. 231, § 113, and appeal from a final decree, c. 214, § 19. Siciliano v. Barbuto, 265 Mass. 390.
& Vose Co. v. Foxborough Water Supply District, 171 Mass. 450, 452. Kyle v. Reynolds, 211 Mass. 110, 111. Bullivant v. First National Bank of Boston, 246 Mass. 324, 330. Bolton v. Van Heusen, 249 Mass. 503, 505. This general rule is applicable after a counterclaim has been filed under Rule 32 of the Superior Court (1932). Thereafter, as before, the defendant's right to insist that the original bill be retained depends upon the existence of circumstances which make it inequitable for the plaintiff to discontinue his suit without a hearing on the merits. "The usual ground for denying a complainant in equity the right to dismiss his bill without prejudice at his own costs is that the cause has proceeded so far that the defendant is in a position to demand on the pleadings an opportunity to seek affirmative relief and he would be prejudiced by being remitted to a separate action. Having been put to the trouble of getting his counter case properly pleaded and ready, he may insist that the cause proceed to a decree." Ex parte Skinner & Eddy Corp. 265 U.S. 86, 93, 94. The only proceeding in the present suit prior to the motion for dismissal, except the filing of an answer containing a counterclaim, was a hearing on the applications for temporary injunctions. It is plain from the record that the trial judge and parties thought that a final decree dismissing the bill was entered which in effect disposed of the counterclaim and put an end to this litigation. The plaintiffs might properly have been allowed to dismiss their bill by an interlocutory decree which would not impair the rights of the defendant to an adjudication upon the counterclaim. Callahan v. Mercantile Trust Co. 188 Mass. 393, 398, and cases cited. It follows that the exceptions must be sustained. The plaintiffs had a right to dismiss their bill and to have an interlocutory decree to that effect, but not to have a final decree disposing also of the counterclaim. The final decree must be reversed.
In the action at law the entry will be order of Appellate Division affirmed. In the suit in equity the entry will be exceptions sustained; decree reversed.

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