Source: http://masscases.com/cases/distapp/2014/2014massappdiv217.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 14:58:09+00:00

Document:
Present: Greco, P.J., [Note 2] Coven & Singh, JJ.
Kimberly A. Zizza for the plaintiffs.
Pamela J. Khoury for the defendants.
SINGH, J. Having obtained a foreign divorce, plaintiff Kimberly Zizza (Kimberly) and defendant Scott Zizza (Scott) entered into a private agreement regarding property division, child custody, visitation, and support. Kimberly and Scott were to have joint legal custody of their two daughters, while Kimberly retained physical custody. Scott was to pay weekly child support in the amount of $262.00 until the children were emancipated. Additionally, he was to maintain health and dental insurance for the children during that time. Uninsured medical and dental expenses for the children were to be shared. The agreement further provided that it could be modified by written agreement of the parties, but not by any court.
case, rather, as presenting the question of the ability of parties, by contract, to dictate the actions of third parties, including the court.
timely expedited appeal and brief under Dist./Mun. Cts. R. A. D. A. 8A. One month later, the trial court dismissed the appeal, noting that Kimberlys appeal was actually an untimely appeal of the July 7, 2011 judgment, and further that she was attempting to circumvent the rule prohibiting appeals from supplementary process orders. Kimberly thereafter appealed from the dismissal of her appeal.
While that appeal was pending, the parties would appear periodically for payment reviews in the supplementary process session. On October 18, 2013, the court found that Scott had no ability to pay the judgment and indicated that the child support order would therefore have to be modified. Kimberly took another appeal, claiming that the court had no authority to modify the judgment by its own terms.
With respect to the first appeal, we pass the question of whether the trial court had the authority to dismiss the appeal in the manner that it did and proceed to the merits of the underlying appeal, as Kimberly had previously briefed it; it is essentially the same claim raised in the subsequent appeal, namely, whether the trial court had the authority to modify a court order that indicated that it was not modifiable.
In the first appeal, Kimberly claims that the trial court modified the order in its clarification of the judgment by indicating that the DOR was limited to recovering $262.00 from Scotts weekly paycheck, when the original order indicated that the DOR had the ability to enforce the judgment by any and all means allowed by law. [Note 10] We see no contradiction. In delegating to the DOR the responsibility for enforcing the child support provisions of the agreement for judgment, the court correctly informed the DOR of the parties agreement that Scott was obligated to pay $262.00 per week. According to the agreement, the DOR could take any action allowed by law to compel Scotts payment of that obligation. [Note 11] There is no indication that the DOR had at its disposal some available method of compelling Scotts weekly payment of $262.00 that it was prohibited from undertaking due to the courts clarification. Kimberly has therefore failed to establish that the court worked any modification to the agreement. [Note 12] Moreover, at the time of the courts clarification of judgment, the case was pending in supplementary process. There, the court had ordered Scott to pay the judgment in weekly increments of $262.00. Essentially, the court found that Scott had no ability to pay the $50,000.00 judgment and only the ability to meet his ongoing weekly child support obligation. In limiting the DOR to this obligation, the court was also ensuring that the DOR was acting in accordance with the supplementary process order. There is no merit to the first appeal.
Nevertheless, Kimberly contends that the parties intended that only the $50,000.00 money judgment would be subject to supplementary process and that the ongoing payment obligations would remain an order of the court, enforceable by civil contempt. This contention on appeal is belied by her position below that supplementary process applied to ongoing child support. The reference to supplementary process in the agreement for judgment appears in the payment agreement section, where the parties dealt with ongoing child support. Additionally, Kimberlys application for supplementary process stated that it was being filed for child support under contract, rather than to collect on a $50,000.00 judgment. Finally, when the parties first appeared before the court in supplementary process, Kimberly argued that Scott should be held in contempt and jailed for having failed to specifically perform his support obligations. Thus, we reject this contention.
must be dismissed and there can be no order to pay. Id. at 852. Although we do not review supplementary process orders, we see nothing in the record to indicate that Kimberly met her burden. [Note 15] The second appeal is also without merit.
Finally, although we need not, and do not, reach the issue, we make the following observation concerning the courts authority to modify a private agreement regarding child support. The Legislature has declared that it is against public policy for a court to enforce an agreement between parents if enforcement of the agreement prevents an adjustment or modification of a child support obligation when such adjustment or modification is required to ensure that the allocation of parental resources continues to be fair and reasonable and in the best interests of the child. G.L. c. 119A, § 1. Here, the parties agreement allows modification only by agreement of both parties and not by any court; therefore, if only one party seeks modification, that party has no recourse. The child support obligation thus becomes fixed for all time without any possibility of review due to a change in circumstances, quite possibly to the detriment of the children. To the extent that the parties agreement purports to prohibit any court modification of the agreement, it may well run afoul of public policy, which must take precedence over the parties freedom to enter into a binding agreement. See White v. Laingor, 434 Mass. 64, 66 (2001) (private agreement concerning child support unenforceable without judicial determination that agreement was in best interests of child).
[Note 1] Mikaela Zizza and Brandi Zizza, the daughters of the plaintiff and defendant. They were brought into the litigation and named as party plaintiffs by their mother when they were still minors; they are now both adults.
[Note 2] The Honorable Robert V. Greco, Presiding Justice, participated in the hearing and review of this appeal, but retired before the issuance of this opinion.
[Note 3] We recognize that separation agreements may be enforced by actions for breach of contract in courts other than the Probate and Family Court, see Ratchford v. Ratchford, 397 Mass. 114 (1986) (affirming Boston Municipal Court assuming jurisdiction over breach of contract claim arising out of separation agreement), but note that parties in the ordinary course submit to the Probate and Family Court, which has special expertise in these matters, to resolve issues involving child support.
[Note 4] In 2005, Kimberly became an attorney licensed to practice in Massachusetts and thereafter represented herself and her daughters throughout all of the litigation arising out of the agreement, which was drafted by her.
[Note 5] Judgment was satisfied in the District Court matter, and Kimberly voluntarily dismissed the Probate and Family Court matter within a week of its filing.
[Note 6] The Superior Court dismissed the action in July, 2009, noting that the claims against Scotts employer were patently without merit and warned of the possibility of sanctions under Mass. R. Civ. P. 11 if the same claims were to be refiled in the District Court. Kimberly appealed the dismissal, which was ultimately affirmed by the Supreme Judicial Court in March, 2010. See Zizza v. Zizza, 456 Mass. 401, 410 (2010).
[Note 7] Scotts employer was earlier dismissed from the case upon motion, after three months of litigation in the District Court, following a year and a half where the case traveled from the Superior Court to the Appeals Court, to the Supreme Judicial Court, returning to the Superior Court for dismissal.
589 (1953) (finding of contempt vacated where based on failure to make payment ordered only moments earlier).
[Note 9] The case was transferred to the Newburyport District Court (without change of docket number) and continues with periodic payment reviews.
[Note 10] Kimberly also complains of the courts denial of several of her motions for contempt, arguing that the court failed to enforce its own judgment. Those actions were not timely appealed and are therefore not before us.
[Note 11] We do not interpret the agreement to allow the DOR to change the amount of the obligation, only to enforce the amount that was agreed to by the parties.
[Note 12] To the extent that Kimberly argues that the clarification of judgment prevented the DOR from pursuing Scotts payment of the $50,000.00 judgment, she has not shown that any such effort on the part of the DOR would have been allowed by law. In any event, the DOR enforcement language was not contained within the money judgment section of the agreement form, but only within the payment agreement section, which dealt with ongoing child support.
[Note 13] Kimberly had filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 13 more than two years earlier in March, 2011; that petition was converted to one under Chapter 7 in January, 2013. After Kimberlys challenge, the conversion was affirmed on appeal in October, 2013. See In re Zizza, 500 B.R. 288 (1st Cir. BAP 2013).
[Note 14] There is one exception to the prohibition on appeal, and that is where the creditor alleges fraud. See G.L. c. 224, § 19. The claim must be that, after accruing the debt, the debtor concealed or conveyed away his assets or gambled away his fortune; alternatively, the claim may be that the debtor entered into the payment obligation with no intent to pay from the beginning. Id. Although Kimberly alleges fraud on appeal, she did not follow the procedure required to preserve the claim, and in any event, she did not file the appeal in the correct forum. See id. (charge of fraud must be written and under oath by creditor, and after debtor found to be guilty or not guilty, parties may appeal to Superior Court).
[Note 15] If child support had been pursued through the Probate and Family Court, as suggested by all of the other courts that have heard this matter, the burden would have been on Scott to prove his inability to pay. See Birchall, petitioner, supra at 850 n.13, citing G.L. c. 215, § 34.

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