Source: https://openjurist.org/108/f3d/1095/corporation-plaintiff-appellant-v-rf-krochalis
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 14:24:52+00:00

Document:
of Seattle, a Municipal Corporation, Defendants-Appellees.
Argued and Submitted Feb. 4, 1997.
Andrew L. Frey, Mayer, Brown, & Platt (argued), Washington, D.C.; Paul R. Taylor, Byrnes & Keller, Seattle, Washington; and Darrin N. Sacks, Rubin, Winston, Diercks, Harris & Cooke, Washington, D.C., for the plaintiff-appellant.
Eleanore S. Baxendale, Assistant City Attorney, Seattle, Washington, for the defendants-appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington, William L. Dwyer, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CV-94-00487-WLD.
Before: BROWNING, RYMER, and T.G. NELSON, Circuit Judges.
This appeal requires us to decide whether Seattle's regulation limiting the construction and relocation of billboards passes constitutional muster as a matter of law under Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 101 S.Ct. 2882, 69 L.Ed.2d 800 (1981), without detailed proof that the billboard regulation will in fact advance the city's interests in traffic safety and esthetics.
Ackerley Communications of the Northwest, Inc., which is in the business of disseminating commercial and public service messages on outdoor advertising signs erected on property leased from private owners, appeals summary judgment in favor of the City of Seattle, its Department of Construction, and R.F. Krochalis, the Department's Director, on its claim that Seattle Municipal Ordinance 116780, prohibiting the construction and relocation of billboards except in certain circumstances, impermissibly restricts commercial speech under the First Amendment. The district court held that Metromedia controls, and we agree. Ackerley contends that the Court's more recent decisions require a searching judicial review of all restrictions on commercial speech, and that Seattle had to (but did not) show that its ordinance in fact advances its goals to a significant degree. However, it is not for us to overrule Supreme Court authority that is squarely on point. Therefore, as we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
because the proliferation and location of billboards in the City can contribute to visual blight, traffic hazards and a reduction of property values, it is in the public interest to further regulate the spacing, dispersion, height, size, location and relocation of billboards.
The practical effect of the ordinance will be a gradual net reduction in the number of billboards in the city. This reduction will occur because the ordinance permits only the relocation or reconstruction of signs that do not currently conform to the Land Use Code. Conforming signs may not be relocated. Thus, whenever Ackerley loses its lease on property on which a conforming sign now sits, it will lose the right to maintain that billboard forever. Because Seattle's Sign Code prohibits the construction of new billboards, the gradual loss of leases to property accommodating conforming signs will reduce the overall number of billboards in the city.
Both parties offered evidence about whether billboards can be traffic hazards, whether they contribute to visual blight, and whether they reduce property values. But the district court relied on Metromedia to hold that no trial was necessary on whether Ordinance 116780 passes the Central Hudson3 test as applied to billboard regulation.4 Since the cases Ackerley relied on involved other types of expression, the court granted Seattle's motion for summary judgment.
Ackerley urges us to reverse because Seattle made no factual showing that the ordinance advances its goals to a material degree. First, it suggests that Metromedia is distinguishable because it came up on stipulated facts and nothing in the record cast doubt on the city's conclusion about the safety or esthetic effects of billboards, whereas here, Ackerley adduced evidence which, it says, does raise doubts about the reasonableness of Seattle's judgment. More substantively, Ackerley submits that since Metromedia, the Court has imposed a greater evidentiary burden on a municipality trying to justify a restriction on commercial speech, see, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 116 S.Ct. 1495, 134 L.Ed.2d 711 (1996); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 115 S.Ct. 1585, 131 L.Ed.2d 532 (1995); Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 113 S.Ct. 1792, 123 L.Ed.2d 543 (1993); and City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 113 S.Ct. 1505, 123 L.Ed.2d 99 (1993), and that we should follow suit in this case.
There is no suggestion that the commercial advertising at issue here involves unlawful activity or is misleading. Nor can there be substantial doubt that the twin goals that the ordinance seeks to further--traffic safety and the appearance of the city--are substantial governmental goals. It is far too late to contend otherwise with respect to either traffic safety or esthetics. Similarly, we reject appellants' claim that the ordinance is broader than necessary and, therefore, fails the fourth part of the Central Hudson test. If the city has a sufficient basis for believing that billboards are traffic hazards and are unattractive, then obviously the most direct and perhaps the only effective approach to solving the problems they create is to prohibit them. The city has gone no further than necessary in seeking to meet its ends.
Id. at 507-08, 101 S.Ct. at 2892-93 (citations and footnote omitted).
We likewise hesitate to disagree with the accumulated, common-sense judgments of local lawmakers and of the many reviewing courts that billboards are real and substantial hazards to traffic safety. There is nothing here to suggest that these judgments are unreasonable. As we said in a different context: "We would be trespassing on one of the most intensely local and specialized of all municipal problems if we held that this regulation had no relation to the traffic problem of New York City. It is the judgment of the local authorities that it does have such a relation. And nothing has been advanced which shows that to be palpably false."
Id. at 509, 101 S.Ct. at 2893 (footnote omitted) (quoting Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 109, 69 S.Ct. 463, 465, 93 L.Ed. 533 (1949)).
It is not speculative to recognize that billboards by their very nature, wherever located and however constructed, can be perceived as an "esthetic harm." San Diego, like many States and other municipalities, has chosen to minimize the presence of such structures. Such esthetic judgments are necessarily subjective, defying objective evaluation, and for that reason must be carefully scrutinized to determine if they are only a public rationalization of an impermissible purpose. But there is no claim in this case that San Diego has as an ulterior motive the suppression of speech, and the judgment involved here is not so unusual as to raise suspicions in itself.
Id. at 510, 101 S.Ct. at 2893-94 (footnotes omitted).
Thus, the Court concluded that the ordinance did not fail directly to advance substantial government interests, and that it met the constitutional requirements of Central Hudson.5 Because Seattle's ordinance is substantially similar to San Diego's, and Ackerley's challenge is virtually identical to Metromedia's, it follows that Seattle's ordinance is likewise constitutional unless Ackerley is correct that Metromedia is no longer good law.
Ackerley argues that the Court's application of Central Hudson to other types of commercial speech restrictions6 has somehow undermined Metromedia 's vitality with respect to billboards. However, the Court itself has never said so. To the contrary, the Court has continued to rely on its conclusion in Metromedia that a city's interest in avoiding visual clutter suffices to justify a prohibition of billboards, and it expressly reaffirmed that conclusion in Members of the City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 807, 104 S.Ct. 2118, 2130, 80 L.Ed.2d 772 (1984) (upholding a Los Angeles ordinance that prohibited the posting of signs on public property).
[W]here a Supreme Court precedent "has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the case which directly controls," leaving to the Supreme Court "the prerogative of overruling its own decisions."
Carlo v. City of Chino, 105 F.3d 493, 499 (9th Cir.1997) (quoting Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484, 109 S.Ct. 1917, 1922, 104 L.Ed.2d 526 (1989)).
Therefore, we hold that Metromedia continues to control the regulation of billboards. See Outdoor Sys., Inc. v. City of Mesa, 997 F.2d 604, 610 (9th Cir.1993) (noting that Metromedia remains the leading decision in the field and upholding a restriction on offsite billboards); National Advertising Co. v. City of Orange, 861 F.2d 246, 248 (9th Cir.1988) (holding that city may prohibit commercial billboards entirely in the interests of traffic safety and aesthetics); cf. Desert Outdoor Advertising v. Moreno Valley, 103 F.3d 814 (9th Cir. Dec.20, 1996) (relying on Metromedia but overturning summary judgment in favor of city that made no effort to show that it enacted its billboard ordinance to further any interest in esthetics or safety). As a matter of law Seattle's ordinance, enacted to further the city's interest in esthetics and safety, is a constitutional restriction on commercial speech without detailed proof that the billboard regulation will in fact advance the city's interests.
E. To protect the right of business to identify its premises and advertise its products through the use of signs without undue hindrance or obstruction.

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