Source: https://openjurist.org/445/us/193
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 21:46:22+00:00

Document:
CROWN SIMPSON PULP COMPANY et al.
Douglas M. COSTLE, Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency.
Petitioners operate bleached kraft pulp-mills which discharge pollutants into the Pacific Ocean near Eureka, Cal. In 1976, they sought NPDES permits from the California Regional Water Resources Board, North Coast Region (Regional Board).3 The Director of EPA's Region IX Enforcement Division objected to the permits proposed by the Regional Board. Petitioners sought direct review of the EPA's action in the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petitions for lack of jurisdiction. 599 F.2d 897 (1979). It concluded that it had no jurisdiction under § 509(b)(1)(E) of the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1)(E), which provides for review in the courts of appeals of actions "approving or promulgating any effluent limitation or other limitation . . . ." The Court of Appeals found this subsection inapplicable since EPA did not approve or promulgate anything when it rejected a proposed permit. 599 F.2d, at 902. Further, the court found that the subsection applied to effluent limitations affecting categories of point sources rather than to decisions affecting particular plants only. Ibid.
The court also found jurisdiction lacking under § 509(b)(1)(F) of the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1)(F), which provides for review in the courts of appeals of EPA actions "in issuing or denying any permit under [§ 402 of the Act] . . . ."6 The court recognized that in States where EPA itself administers the permit program, this subsection unquestionably provides for direct review in the courts of appeals. 599 F.2d, at 903. However, because California administers its own permit-issuing program, EPA in the present case did no more than veto an NPDES permit proposed by the state authority. The Court of Appeals found that under its decision in Washington v. EPA, 573 F.2d 583 (1978) (Scott Paper), EPA's veto of a state-issued permit did not constitute "issuing or denying" a permit and therefore did not clothe the court with jurisdiction.
District Judge Renfrew, sitting by designation, concurred in the majority's analysis of § 509(b)(1)(E), and also agreed that the § 509(b)(1)(F) question was foreclosed by Scott Paper. 599 F.2d, at 905. However, Judge Renfrew, believing that Scott Paper was wrongly decided, urged the Court of Appeals to take the present case en banc in order to consider overruling that decision. He argued that vesting jurisdiction in the courts of appeals under § 509(b)(1)(F) would best comport with the congressional goal of ensuring prompt resolution of challenges to EPA's actions and would recognize that EPA's veto of a state-issued permit is functionally similar to its denial of a permit in States which do not administer an approved permit-issuing program.
We agree with the concurring opinion and hold that the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction over this action under § 509(b)(1)(F).7 When EPA, as here, objects to effluent limitations contained in a state-issued permit, the precise effect of its action is to "den[y]" a permit within the meaning of § 509(b)(1)(F). Under the contrary construction of the Court of Appeals, denials of NPDES permits would be reviewable at different levels of the federal-court system depending on the fortuitous circumstance of whether the State in which the case arose was or was not authorized to issue permits.8 Moreover, the additional level of judicial review in those States with permit-issuing authority would likely cause delays in resolving disputes under the Act. Absent a far clearer expression of congressional intent, we are unwilling to read the Act as creating such a seemingly irrational bifurcated system.9 We therefore grant the petition for certiorari, reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Cf. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 127-128, n. 18, 97 S.Ct. 965, 974-975, 51 L.Ed.2d 204 (1977).
Our holding is consistent with the approach taken by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, Republic Steel Corp. v. Costle, 581 F.2d 1228, 1230, n. 1 (1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 909, 99 S.Ct. 1219, 59 L.Ed.2d 457 (1979); Ford Motor Co. v. EPA, 567 F.2d 661, 668 (1977), and with dicta in the Second and Ninth Circuits, Mianus River Preservation Comm. v. Administrator, EPA, 541 F.2d 899, 909 (CA2 1976); Shell Oil Co. v. Train, 585 F.2d 408, 412 (CA9 1978). The Court of Appeals in the present case relied on decisions holding that the EPA's failure to object to a state-issued permit is not reviewable in the courts of appeals under § 509. Save the Bay, Inc. v. Administrator, EPA, 556 F.2d 1282 (CA5 1977); Mianus River Preservation Comm., supra. However, those cases may be distinguishable because EPA's failure to object, as opposed to its affirmative veto of a state-issued permit, would not necessarily amount to "Administrator's action" within the meaning of § 509(b)(1).

References: § 509
 § 1369
 § 509
 § 1369
 v. 
 § 509
 § 509
 § 509
 § 509
 § 509
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 509
 v. 
 § 509