Source: https://govlawweb.typepad.com/government_liability_upda/current_affairs/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 00:59:39+00:00

Document:
In Martin v. City of Boise, published September 4, 2018, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part summary judgment in favor of the defendant city in an action brought by homeless individuals who had been convicted of or cited for violating the city's camping or disorderly conduct ordinances by sleeping outside on nights when they had no alternative shelter available. The district court ruled that Heck v. Humphrey barred the plaintiffs' suits for retrospective relief, because none had appealed their convictions or raised the Eighth Amendment as a defense in their prosecutions. It further ruled that the two plaintiffs who had not been convicted of their citations lacked standing to pursue prospective relief, because the city had amended its ordinances to permit sleeping outside when the homeless shelters in the city self-reported that they were full.
The 9th Circuit affirmed the Heck ruling concerning retrospective relief as to all plaintiffs except the two who were not convicted. The majority held, however, that Heck did not bar prospective relief. It also rejected the standing holding, since the shelters only had to self-report that they were full, and that self-reporting was not reliable. On the merits, the 9th Circuit followed its earlier ruling in Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118, 1138 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated, 505 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2007), which was vacated due to a settlement of the underlying matter. It held that the ordinances, to the extent they barred sleeping outside for those who had no alternative shelter, violated the Cruel and Unusual Punishments clause of the Eighth Amendment by criminalizing conduct that should not be criminalized. The clause imposes substantive limitations on what may be made criminal and punished as such. For the rare Eighth Amendment challenges to the state's power to criminalize particular behavior or status, the plaintiff need prove only prosecution, not conviction. Just as the state may not criminalize being homeless, it may not criminalize conduct that is an unavoidable consequence of being homeless. As long as there is no option of sleeping indoors, the government cannot criminalize indigent, homeless people for sleeping outdoors, on public property, on the false premise they had a choice in the matter. That does not prevent the government from imposing time and place restrictions, or apply to those who choose not to take advantage of available public shelters.
A dissenting judge objected that Heck v. Humphrey, when it applied, should preclude both restrospective and prospective relief.
In American Freedom Defense Initiative v. King County, published August 12, 2015, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a district court decision denying the plaintiff organization a preliminary injunction directing the defendant county's public transit agency to display the organization's advertisement on the exterior of the agency's buses. The State Department had submitted an ad to the agency depicting several faces, calling them "The Faces of Global Terrorism," listing names, and stating, "Stop a terrorist. Save lives. Up to $25 million reward." The agency received complaints from the public about the ad, including concerns that it might increase mistreatment of minorities. The agency began reevaluating the ad, and the State Department pulled it. The plaintiff organization then submitted an almost identical ad, featuring the same headline and photos. It stated, "The FBI is offering up to $25 million reward if you help capture one of these jihadis." This information was false; the State Department, not the FBI, was offering the reward, and the maximum reward for capturing any one of the pictured persons was $5 million. The agency rejected the ad, on the ground (among others) that it was false.
The 9th Circuit noted that it had previously ruled that advertising on the buses was a nonpublic forum. As such, restrictions on advertising accepted did not violate the 1st Amendment if they were reasonable and viewpoint neutral. Barring ads that contain objectively and demonstrably false statements, where the circumstances of the case do not give rise to an inference of unreasonableness or viewpoint-based discrimination, is both reasonable and viewpoint neutral. The court limited its holding to misstatements of fact that can be corrected. It also noted that rejecting advertisements based on trivial misstatements might, depending on circumstances, violate the 1st Amendment.
In Naffe v. Frey, published June 15, 2015, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a district court decision dismissing the portion of a complaint asserting a claim under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 against a deputy district attorney for allegedly violating the plaintiff's free-speech rights under the 1st Amendment. The plaintiff and defendant are both well-known conservative political commentators. The defendant allegedly wrote unfavorable articles about the plaintiff on his blog, and allegedly tweeted harassing and threatening messages about her on his personal Twitter account. The blog posts allegedly revealed private information about the defendant, including her Social Security number. In one Tweet, the defendant allegedly insinuated the plaintiff violated the law. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant acted under color of state law because he abused his position as deputy district attorney by making the posts.
The 9th Circuit ruled that the complaint failed to allege facts establishing that the defendant acted under color of state law. A state employee who is off duty acts under color of state law when (1) the employee purports to or pretends to act under color of law; (2) his pretense of acting in the performance of his duties had the purpose and effect of influencing the behavior of others; and (3) the harm inflicted on the plaintiff related in some meaningful way either to the officer's governmental status or to the performance of his duties. He does not act under color of state law when he pursues private goals via private actions. Under this test, the defendant did not act under color of state law. His duties as prosecutor did not include publicly commenting about conservative politics or current events. No facts alleged indicated that his employer authorized or encouraged his commentary. He used his personal blog and Twitter feed, which included disclaimers that he did not make any comments on behalf of his employer. He did not blog during business hours, or use his employer's resources. His comments did not sufficiently relate to his work as a prosecutor to constitute state action. He did not investigate or prosecute the plaintiff. Rhetorical questions about whether the plaintiff committed a crime do not crate a nexus between the comments and his job. The facts also did not establish that the defendant purported or pretended to act under color of state law. Drawing on his experiences as a prosecutor to inform his blog posts and tweets did not transform his private speech into public action. The fact that the plaintiff knew the defendant was a prosecutor also was insufficient.
In County of Los Angeles Board of Supervisors v. Superior Court (ACLU of Southern California), published April 13, 2015, the Second District Court of Appeal, Division 3, issued a writ of mandate reversing a trial court decision requiring the petitioner county to produce to real party ACLU, under the California Public Records Act, billing invoices from law firms representing the county in lawsuits brought by county jail inmates alleging jail violence. Some of the invoices did not relate to ongoing litigation, so that exception to the CPRA did not apply. The appellate court therefore analyzed whether the CPRA exception for privileged documents. That required the court to address the hitherto undecided question of whether billing invoices were attorney-client communications that were privileged in their entirety. The court determined that they were; because they were communications provided in the course of the attorney-client relationship, related to ongoing representation, they were protected regardless of their content. The court declined to address whether the information could be obtained from other, non-privileged sources.
In City of Montebello v. Vasquez, published May 30, 2014, the Second District Court of Appeal, Division 1, affirmed denial of a special motion to strike under the Anti-SLAPP statute, Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, brought by city council members and a city official in response to a lawsuit filed by the city plaintiff seeking declaratory relief for alleged violations of Government Code section 1090 (prohibiting city officers and employees from having a financial interest in contracts they make in their official capacity). The action arose out of the defendants' approval of a city contract granting a company an exclusive right to provide commercial waste hauling services. The city alleged that the defendants voted to approve the contract with the expectation that the company would contribute to their present or future election campaigns. The defendants filed the Anti-SLAPP motion on the grounds that they were being sued for protected activity, and that the city could ot establish a probability of prevailing on the merits.
The appellate court rejected the city's argument that its lawsuit was exempt from Anti-SLAPP because the public enforcement exemption under the statute applied. Acknowledging a split in authority on the issue, the court sided with the authority that the statute applies only to enforcement actions brought in the name of the state. But the court concluded that the challenged activity, committing the defendants' legislative power to the approval of a city contract, was not protected speech within the meaning of the Anti-SLAPP statute. The vote did not implicate the defendants' right to free speech or convey any symbolic message. Holding otherwise would apply the Anti-SLAPP suit to any challenge to any legislative decision. The same applied to the city official defendant who negotiated the contract. The court noted that it did not hold that a governmental act may never constitute protected speech.
In Dariano v. Morgan Hill Unified School Dist. , published February 27, 2014, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment in favor of an assistant principal in a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 alleging that he had violated the plaintiff high school students' First Amendment, Equal Protection, and Due Process rights. On the day of a Cinco de Mayo celebration at the school, a group of students wore American flag shirts to the school. There was a history of violence at the school, some gang-related and some along racial lines. At the previous year's Cinco de Mayo celebration, there had been confrontations between students flying a makeshift American flag and students celebrating the holiday. School officials were concerned about the safety of the flag-wearing students. The principal asked them to turn their shirts inside-out or take them off. Some of the students declined. The vice-principal told the students of his safety concerns. School officials offered to allow the students who declined to change their shirts to go home, without the absence counting against their attendance records. None of the students were disciplined.
The Ninth Circuit rejected the students' argument that the school officials had violated the students' First Amendment right of free expression. To justify prohibition of a certain kind of expression, school officials must be able to show that their action was caused by something more than avoiding an unpopular viewpoint. Officials may prohibit forms of expression that they reasonably forecast would cause disruption of school activities or collide with the rights of other students. Here, the officials acted reasonably in response to their concerns that the shirts might trigger violence or disruption of school activities, based on past experiences. The officials did not punish the students for wearing the shirts. The officials did not violate the students' equal protection rights, because there was no showing that students wearing other types of flags on their shirts were at risk for violence. The court also rejected the students' argument that the school district's dress code, which prohibits clothing that creates a safety hazard or disrupts school activities, violated due process by lacking objective standards.
In City of Bell v. Superior Court (Rizzo), published October 4, 2013, the Second District Court of Appeal, Division Three, addressed whether Government Code section 996.6 permits public entities to enter into defense and indemnity contracts with its employees that would provide a defense against the city's own lawsuit (or a lawsuit brought by the Attorney General on the city's behalf) against the employee for alleged corruption. The court answered the question in the negative. Government Code section 995.8 prevents a public entity from providing its employee a defense to a criminal action unless the public entity determines that the defense would be in the best interests of the public entity and that the public employee had acted in good faith and without malice. Section 996.6 provides that an employee's or former employee's rights under the Government Code are in addition to, and not in lieu of, any rights he may have under a contract or other enactment providing for his defense. The court concluded that under this statute, if an employee has a contractual right to defense (such as his own insurance policy), the entity cannot escape a statutory duty to defend him on the ground that the employee has another source of defense. The statute does not permit the public entity to enter into a defense or indemnity contract that would exceed the entity's statutory powers. Since under section 995.8 the entity has no power to contract to defend or indemnify an employee it is suing (or is sued on the entity's behalf) for corruption, section 996.6 does not permit it to do so.
In Wynar v. Douglas County School Dist., published August 29, 2013, the Ninth Circuit affirmed summary judgment granted to a defendant school district that suspended a student for sending friends instant messages on MySpace bragging about the student's gun collection and ammunition, discussing shooting specific students at school, setting a specific date for the shooting and the types of students he would shoot, and comparing the proposed rampage to the Virginia Tech shootings. His friends, alarmed, reported him to school authorities. The student claimed the instant messages were a joke. The school initially suspended him for 10 days. After giving him written notice and a hearing where he was permitted to call and cross-examine witnesses, it suspended him for 90 days. The student sued the school district, administrators, and officials under 42 U.S.C. section 1983.
After reviewing various circuits' analysis of whether school districts could constitutionally discipline students for off-campus speech, the Ninth Circuit determined that when faced with an identifiable threat of school violence, schools may take disciplinary action in response to off-campus speech that meets the requirements of the U.S. Supreme Court's Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist. decision. Under Tinker, schools may prohibit speech that might reasonably lead school authorities to forecast substantial disruption of or material interference with school activities, or that collides with other students' rights to be secure and to be left alone. The messages here met those standards, whether or not they were protected by the 1st Amendment. Further, the procedural due process the school provided the student satisfied Constitutional requirements. Although the student complained that the initial 10-day suspension did not satisfy all of the school district's procedural requirements for such suspensions, those requirements did not state constitutional minimums for procedure.
In City of Riverside v. Inland Empire Patients Health and Wellness Center, Inc., published May 6, 2013, the California Supreme Court held that California's medical marijuana statutes -- the Compassionate Use Act of 1996 and the Medical Marijuana Program -- do not preempt the police power of cities and counties to ban facilities that distribute medical marijuana. The statutes provide only limited exemptions from state law for medicinal marijuana users, caregivers, and cooperatives. They do not provide exemption from local law. Further, there is no indication that the state statutes were intended to occupy the area of medicinal marijuana regulation, or preempt local regulation.

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