Source: http://www.internetlibrary.com/topics/statute_frauds.cfm
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 07:53:48+00:00

Document:
Al-Bawaba.com, Inc. v. Nstein Technologies Corp.
The tangible written text produced by telex, telefacsimile, computer retrieval or other process by which electronic signals are transmitted by telephone or otherwise shall constitute a writing and any symbol executed or adopted by a party with a present intention to authenticate a writing shall constitute a signing.
As a result, the Court denied defendant’s motion, which sought to dismiss the complaint on the grounds of the Statute of Frauds, and allowed plaintiff to pursue discovery concerning the existence of an agreement between the parties. In this suit, plaintiff alleged that defendant had breached a software license between the parties by refusing to license to plaintiff the software in question.
Internal documents, invoices and emails can be used to satisfy the Illinois UCC statute of frauds.
However, because the internal invoices and emails presented to the Court did not adequately demonstrate that the parties had actually entered into the contract claimed by plaintiff – for the sale of 1.5 million tons of coal – the Court held plaintiff’s breach of contract claim barred by the Statute of Frauds, due to the absence of the requisite writing evidencing the oral contract of sale alleged by the plaintiff.
Reversing the District Court, the 7th Circuit holds that emails bearing the name of the sender are writings sufficient to satisfy the Statute of Fraud’s requirement that both contracts for the sale of goods over $500, and modifications thereof, be evidenced by a writing subscribed by the party to be charged. The Court further holds that such emails also satisfy the requirement, contained in the parties’ contract, that modifications of purchase orders be evidenced by a writing reflecting Hasbro’s consent to the modification.
The quantity term in a contract for the sale of goods for more than $500 must be memorialized n a writing signed by the party sought to be held to that term, UCC section 2-201(1) and so, therefore, must a modification of that term. UCC Section 2-209(3) … Kathy Esposito’s emails, plus the notation that we quoted earlier signed by Maryann Ricci, another member of Hasbro’s purchasing department, satisfy the statutory requirement. The UCC does not require that the contract itself be in writing, only that there be adequate documentary evidence of its existence and essential terms, which there was here. … But what shall we make of the fact that Kathy Esposito’s emails contained no signature? … [L]ike the court in Shattuck v. Klotzbach, No. 011109A, 2001 WL 1839720 at *2-3 (Mass. Super. Dec. 11, 2001), we conclude without having to rely on the federal Act that the sender’s name on an email satisfies the signature requirement of the statute of frauds.
As a result, the Seventh Circuit held Hasbro liable for its failure to take delivery of the increased quantity of goods, and remanded the case to the District Court for the determination of the appropriate amount of Cloud Corp.’s damages.
Vincent De Vita, et al. v. Macys East, Inc., et al.
Contrary to the appellants’ contention, a confirmatory email sent to the plaintiffs’ former attorney by counsel to the insurer of one of the defendants, either alone or in conjunction with an email sent by the plaintiffs’ former counsel in response, did not constitute a writing sufficient to bring the purported settlement into the scope of CPLR 2104.
As a result, the Second Department affirmed the decision of the trial court, which denied defendants’ motions to enforce the settlement agreement purportedly evidenced by these emails.
It is not clear from the Court’s decision whether the emails in question bore the typed name/signature of the senders, or were otherwise signed by them.
International Casings Group, Inc. v. Premium Standard Farms, Inc.
Court holds that emails that bear the name of the sender, either typed at the conclusion of the message, or in the email’s header, are writings sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the Missouri Statute of Frauds that contracts for the sale of goods over $500 be in writing where they were sent by individuals who had a present intention to authenticate the document as their own writing. Finding, based on the emails before it, that the plaintiff was likely to establish that the parties had entered into contracts for the purchase and sale of hog casings, the Court issued a preliminary injunction, directing defendant to honor these contracts, and sell hog casings from two of its facilities to plaintiff International Casings Group, Inc.
In reaching this result, the Court relied both on the applicable provisions of the UCC, and the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act, (“UETA”), which has been adopted by Missouri.
Under the Missouri Statute of Frauds, there must be a ‘signed’ writing evidencing a contract for the sale of goods. The UCC defines ‘signed’ to include ‘any symbol executed or adopted by a party with a present intention to authenticate a writing” Mo. Rev. Stat. 400.2-201(39). Under UETA, an electronic signature is defined as ‘an electronic sound, symbol, or process attached to or logically associated with a record and executed or adopted by a person with the intent to sign the record.’ Mo. Rev. Stat. Section 432.205(8). Under UETA, ‘if a law requires a signature, an electronic signature satisfies the law.’ Mo. Rev. Stat. Section 432.230(4).
Hence, although Pummill’s and Sanecki’s signatures were electronic, they satisfy the signature requirement of the UCC’s Statute of Frauds, so long as each had the present intention to authenticate the document.
The court holds that where there is no question as to the source and authenticity of an email, the email is “signed” for purposes of the statute of frauds if defendant’s name clearly appears in the email as the sender. As noted, Edward Price’s name appears as the sender of the “SunOpta” email. Additionally, half an hour later, Edward sent Jerry another email concerning the SunOpta deal which was signed “Edward,” in the traditional letter writing fashion. Thus, the court concludes that the “SunOpta” email was sufficiently signed by Edward Price to satisfy the statute of frauds signature requirement.
Court holds that a License Agreement that appears on-screen in a pop-up window is a writing within the meaning of the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”). As such, the Court directs plaintiffs, in accordance with the terms of their License Agreement with RealNetworks, to arbitrate their claims that RealNetworks was impermissibly invading their privacy and trespassing on their property by secretly monitoring the listening and internet usage habits of users of its products.
To be enforceable under the FAA, an arbitration agreement must be contained in a writing. Popular dictionaries at the time of the statute’s enactment defined a writing as “1. the act or art of forming letters or characters on paper, wood, stone, or other material, for the purpose of recording the ideas which characters and words express, or of communicating them to others by visible signs. 2. Anything written or printed; anything expressed in characters or letters.” Relying on this definition, the Court held that a license agreement that appeared on screen was such a writing, because it constituted letters or characters formed on screen to record or communicate ideas, and could be easily printed and/or saved. Notably, the court reached this latter conclusion despite the absence of a print or save button on the pop-up window in which the License terms appeared. It was sufficient, held the court, that the user’s computer allowed him to right click his mouse over the terms of the License agreement, and copy and paste them into a word processing program. The Court also noted that, once accepted by the user, the License Terms were downloaded to his computer, and stored in a file titled either “RealPlayer License Agreement” or “RealJukebox License Agreement” depending on the product used. As such, held the Court, the agreement between the parties qualified as a written arbitration agreement, which could be enforced in accordance with the FAA.
Finally, the court rejected the intervenor’s challenge to the Arbitration agreement on the grounds of procedural and substantive unconscionability. As a result, the Court affirmed its earlier decision, and directed plaintiffs to arbitrate their disputes with RealNetworks.
Rodger Edwards LLC v. Fiddes & Son, Ltd.
Courts in other jurisdictions have held that emails satisfy the writing and signature requirements of the statutes of fraud. … In the absence of any suggestion by the defendant that Gooding lacked authority to make the representations in his emails or that he did not intend to bind the defendant, I conclude that his emails are sufficient under Maine law to meet the requirements of section 51 [of the statute of frauds].
As a result, the Court rejected defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s breach of contract claims, on statute of fraud grounds.
Nonetheless, finding plaintiff failed to pay for goods delivered, the Court awarded defendant judgment on its counterclaim seeking recovery for such nonpayment. The Court also dismissed so much of plaintiff’s complaint which sought specific performance of the parties’ alleged distributorship agreement, finding that it had been terminated by an email exchange between the parties, initiated by plaintiff’s transmission of an email proclaiming that “I have to assume that by your refusal to provide a letter of our agreement, you do realize it is over. Period. … we are done.” Left for another day was the question of whether plaintiff was due any damages as a result defendant’s alleged breach of the parties’ agreement prior to its termination by plaintiff.
The emails from plaintiff constitute ‘signed writings’ within the meaning of the statute of frauds, since plaintiff’s name at the end of his email signified his intent to authenticate the contents. Similarly, Bloom’s name at the end of his email constituted a ‘signed writing’ and satisfied the requirement of section 13(d) of the employment agreement that any modification be signed by all parties.
Disagreeing with Rosenfeld v. Zerneck, 4 Misc. 3d 193 (Sup. Ct. Kings 2004), the Court holds that an email bearing the typed name of the sender is insufficient to constitute the necessary “writing subscribed by the party to be charged …” NY Gen. Oblig. Law Section 5-703(2) required by the statute of frauds for valid contracts for the sale of real property.
In reaching this result, the Court relied on amendments to the NY Gen. Obligations Law, Section 5-701(b)(4), which provide that such emails can satisfy the statute’s requirements for such a writing in “qualified financial contracts.” This section provides: “For purposes of this subdivision, the tangible written text produced by telex, telefacsimile, computer retrieval or other process by which electronic signals are transmitted … shall constitute a writing.” Because Section 5-701(b)(4) was not made applicable to real estate contracts, the Court concluded the Legislature intended to treat them differently.
The Court accordingly dismissed plaintiff’s claim for specific performance of a contract providing for its purchase of real property, because it was predicated on an email exchange between the parties, and thus, according to the Court, did not pass muster under the Statute of Frauds, and NY General Obligation Law Section 5-703(2), which requires that such contracts be evidenced by a writing signed by the party to be charged, here the defendant.

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