Source: http://ny.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20180801_0001792.SNY.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 00:31:09+00:00

Document:
NYACK COLLEGE, DR. ANDREW MERCURIO, DR. DEANNA KWAN, DR. CAROL ROBLES, MS. ELONA COLLINS, DR. CHARLES JOANIES and NEW YORK STATE DIVISION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, Defendants.
Pro se plaintiff Patricia Gill ("Plaintiff') initiated this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (the "ADA") and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (the "Rehab Act") against Defendants Nyack College ("Nyack"), Dr. Andrew Mercurio, Dr. Deanna Kwan, Dr. Carol Robles, Ms. Elona Collins, Dr. Charles Joanies, and New York State Division of Human Rights ("NYSDHR") (collectively "Defendants"). (See Complaint, ("Compl.") (ECF No. 2).) Presently before this Court is Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint ("Defendants'Motion") filed on October 6, 2017. (See ECF No. 17.) For the following reasons, Defendants' Motion is GRANTED and the Complaint is dismissed with prejudice.
The following procedural facts-which are taken from the Complaint, documents annexed thereto, and matters of which the Court may take judicial notice-are construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, as she is the non-moving party. See, e.g., Kleinman v. Elan Corp., 706 F.3d 145, 152 (2d Cir. 2013); Gonzalez v. Hasty, 651 F.3d 318, 321 (2d Cir. 2011).
On March 9, 2017, Plaintiff initiated the present action alleging claims for disability discrimination and asking this Court to reverse the various state court decisions. Defendants now seek dismissal of her Complaint.
On a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, dismissal is proper "when the district court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate it." Nike, Inc. v. Already, LLC, 663 F.3d 89, 94 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Makarova v. United States, 20\ F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000)). A plaintiff be ars the burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction by preponderance of the evidence. Liranzo v. United States, 690 F.3d 78, 84 (2d Cir. 2012); Morrison v. Nat'l Austl Bank Ltd., 547 F.3d 167, 170 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Makarova, 201 F.3d at 113). "Jurisdiction must be shown affirmatively, and that showing is not made by drawing from the pleadings inferences favorable to the party asserting it." Shipping Fin. Servs. Corp. v. Drakos, 140 F.3d 129, 131 (2d Cir. 1998). Nevertheless, the Court must accept as true all the facts alleged in the complaint. Conyers v. Rossides, 558 F.3d 137, 143 (2d Cir. 2009). The Court may consider, in addition to the factual allegations in the complaint, "[t]he documents attached to the complaint as exhibits, and any documents incorporated in the complaint by reference." McCarthy v. Dun & Bradstreet Corp., 482 F.3d 184, 191 (2d Cir. 2007).
A court lacks subject matter jurisdiction if plaintiff s claim are barred by either the Rooker-Feldman doctrine or res judicata. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits federal cases "that essentially amount to appeals of state court judgments." Vossbrinckv. Accredited Home Lenders, Inc., 113 F.3d 423, 426 (2d Cir. 2014). Whereas, "[u]nder res judicata, a final judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties or their privies from relitigating issues that were or could have been raised in that action." Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980) (citing Cromwell v. SacCty., 94 U.S. 351(1876)).
Defendants' base their motion to dismiss on four arguments. (See generally Defendants' Brief in Support of their Motion to Dismiss ("Defs. Br.") (ECF No. 19).) A threshold argument is that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine renders this Court without subject matter jurisdiction to hear Plaintiffs case. (Id. at 8-10.) Defendants also contend that, irrespective of whether this Court has jurisdiction, Plaintiffs claims are barred by res judicata. (Id. at 10-11.) In the alternative, Defendants move to dismiss on grounds that Plaintiffs claims are time-barred and that the Complaint otherwise fails to state a claim for relief. (Id. at 7-8, 11-14.) In light of this Court's determination, infra I, that it lacks the authority to adjudicate Plaintiffs claims, it declines to ascertain whether dismissal pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) is proper.

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