Source: http://legalarium.com/ttabquotes/LOC9.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 15:49:51+00:00

Document:
Another du Pont factor to be considered in the case now before us is the variety of goods on which a mark is or is not used (house mark, ‘family' mark, product mark).
Another du Pont factor to be considered in the case now before us is "the variety of goods on which a mark is or is not used (house mark, ‘family' mark, product mark)."...While this factor may favor a finding that confusion is likely even if the goods are not obviously related, the parties' goods in issue, as stated previously, are in-part identical and in-part related. Thus, this factor, as well as the relatedness of the goods, would favor opposer. See Uncle Ben's Inc. v. Stubenberg International Inc., 47 USPQ2d 1310 (TTAB 1998).
Another key DuPont factor in the analysis of likelihood of confusion is the relatedness of the involved goods and services.
Another key DuPont factor in the analysis of likelihood of confusion is the relatedness of the involved goods and services. Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co., 544 F.2d 1098, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (CCPA 1976).
A family of marks are of very limited strength where there are rarely seen together in public.
In short, we find that the record shows that TSAM's family of marks was formed prior to applicant's first use, but its members are not now seen together in public very often and, therefore, the family possesses very limited strength. Certainly, we do not find support for opposer's argument that its family of marks, as opposed to its core marks, is famous.
The strength of a family of marks may be limited to its recited goods/services, especially were there is nothing in the record to support a conclusion that the family would be recognized as extending beyond such goods and services.
Moreover, any strength attaching to TSAM's family of "_______ AUTHORITY" marks is further limited to the retailing of sporting goods and equipment, footwear, apparel and the like. There is nothing in the record to support a conclusion that the family would be recognized as extending beyond such goods and services. Cf. Han Beauty, 236 F.3d 1333, 57 USPQ2d 1557 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (Applicant's mark for hair care products would be perceived as indicating applicant's goods have common origin with opposer's hair care products marketed under family of similar marks); J & J Snack Foods, 932 F.2d 1460, 18 USPQ2d 1889 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (Applicant's marks for frozen soft pretzels would be perceived as indicating applicant's goods have common origin with opposer's wide variety of food products marketed under family of similar marks); and Motorola, Inc. v. Griffiths Electronics, Inc., 317 F.2d 397, 137 USPQ 551 (CCPA 1963) (Applicant's mark for electron gun used in television tubes and other electronic devices "would appear to many to be a member of opposer's family" of similar marks, where parties "obviously in the same general field.").
Case Finding: The TTAB found the marks strong and entitled to a broad scope of protection where the owner had been aggressive in protecting its mark and the absence of any third-party use of similar marks for related goods.
As to the strength of opposers' STARBUCKS mark, the record shows that opposers have been aggressive in taking steps to protect their STARBUCKS mark. Except for several third-party marks that opposers have commenced enforcement actions against, there is no evidence in the record of any third-party use of similar marks for related goods and services. Accordingly, the STARBUCKS and STARBUCKS COFFEE marks are strong and entitled to a broad scope of protection.
Merely because petitioner is an association does not mean that potential members of its association are likely to assume that all somewhat similar marks are somehow associated with petitioner.
Merely because petitioner is an association does not mean that potential members of its association are likely to assume that all somewhat similar marks on electricity generating products are somehow associated with petitioner. Therefore, we cannot discount the significance of the arbitrary word in respondent's mark when it is used as a trademark for its goods.
As it is not unusual for a company to use a variation of its house mark, consumers would be likely to believe the disputed mark is a variation of opposer's house mark and thus likely to believe that the two marks identify different but related product lines from the same source.
The respective products in this case are closely related and the customers for these closely related products are the same. The young women who shop in department stores and who would purchase ARDENBEAUTY fragrances would also shop at opposer's ARDEN B stores and purchase ARDEN B clothing. Also, as discussed earlier, the evidence shows that it is not unusual for a company to use a variation of its house mark when extending its clothing line to fragrances and other cosmetics. Purchasers would be accustomed to seeing these variations of house marks and they are therefore likely to believe that ARDEN B and ARDENBEAUTY identify different but related product lines from the same source.
It is common knowledge, and a fact of which the TTAB can take judicial notice, that the licensing of commercial trademarks on "collateral" products has become a part of everyday life.
It is common knowledge, and a fact of which we can take judicial notice, that the licensing of commercial trademarks on "collateral" products has become a part of everyday life. See Turner Entertainment Co. v. Nelson, 38 USPQ2d 1942, 1945-1946 (TTAB 1996) and cases cited therein.
The mere fact that a collateral product serves the purpose of promoting a party's primary goods or services does not necessarily mean that the collateral product is not a good in trade, where it is readily recognizable as a product of its type, and is sold or transported in commerce.
"We hasten to [note] that the mere fact that a collateral product serves the purpose of promoting a party's primary goods or services does not necessarily mean that the collateral product is not a good in trade, where it is readily recognizable as a product of its type (as would be the case with T-shirts, for example), and is sold or transported in commerce. See, for example: In re Snap-On Tools Corp., 159 USPQ 254 (TTAB 1968) [ball point pens which are used to promote applicant's tools, but which possess utilitarian function and purpose, and have been sold to applicant's franchised dealers and transported in commerce under mark, constitute goods in trade], and In re United Merchants & Manufacturers, Inc., 154 USPQ 625 (TTAB 1967) [calendar which is used as advertising device to promote applicant's plastic film, but which possesses, in and of itself, a utilitarian function and purpose, and has been regularly distributed in commerce for several years, constitutes goods in trade]." Paramount Pictures Corp. v. White, 31 USPQ2d 1768, 1773 (TTAB 1994). Further, we note that use of trademarks on collateral products has become quite common. See Turner Entertainment Co. v. Nelson, 38 USPQ2d 1943 (TTAB 1996) and authorities discussed therein.
Case Finding: Purchasers of computer hardware and software also would be purchasers of, at least, footwear and apparel, and perhaps sporting goods and equipment. There is nothing in the record, however, to suggest that merely because the same consumer may purchase these items, such consumer would consider the goods as likely to emanate from the same source or have the same sponsorship.
We find little likelihood for confusion attributable to channels of trade employed by the parties, notwithstanding that there are no restrictions on the involved identifications. In regard to classes of consumers, the mere fact that both opposer and applicant are presumed to market to general consumers, including businesses and individuals, does not dictate a conclusion that confusion is likely to arise. There is nothing in the record to establish the overlap in purchasing habits of consumers of computer goods and services and consumers of sporting goods, equipment, apparel and footwear. We think it a fit subject for judicial notice that purchasers of computer hardware and software also would be purchasers of, at least, footwear and apparel, and perhaps sporting goods and equipment. There is nothing in the record, however, to suggest that merely because the same consumer may purchase these items, such consumer would consider the goods as likely to emanate from the same source or have the same sponsorship.
The fact that opposer applies its marks to a variety of products makes it more likely that purchasers are likely to believe that products with a similar mark are also being produced by opposer.
The fact that opposer applies its marks to a variety of sports products makes it more likely that purchasers, aware of opposer's use of the mark on a variety of sports products, when seeing a similar mark used in connection with backpacks, duffel bags and other sports bags, are likely to believe that these products are also being produced or sponsored by opposer. See Genesco Inc. v. Martz, 66 USPQ2d 1260, 1271 (TTAB 2003) ("this factor may favor a finding that confusion is likely even if the goods are not obviously related").

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