Source: http://www.pavlacklawfirm.com/blog/indiana-court-of-appeals-13m-verdict-not-excessive-for-rear-end-collision-not-reversible-error-to-exclude-evidence-of-prior-discipline-of-medical-expert
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 02:42:30+00:00

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This week, a split decision out of the Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed a $1.3 million verdict in a personal-injury case and gives us an excellent opportunity to discuss motions to set aside excessive verdicts, admission of information regarding an expert witness’s licensing, and what courts must do when there are issues during trial with jurors.
In Tunstall v. Manning, the plaintiff suffered a spinal injury as a result of a rear-end collision at an intersection. After a three-day trial, the jury returned a verdict in her favor for $1.3 million. The defendant “filed a motion to correct error, arguing that the verdict was excessive and alleging juror misconduct,” which was summarily denied after briefing and a hearing. On appeal, the defendant argued that the verdict was excessive, that it should have been permitted to enter evidence relating to disciplinary issues with the plaintiff’s medical expert, that the court erred in dismissing a juror during deliberations without making a sufficient record, and that the jury was tainted by comments from a juror.
Although the jury might have assessed higher damages than we would have, we are unpersuaded that the $1.3 million verdict in this case is great enough to be characterized as excessive. In other words, we cannot say as a matter of law that Manning’s pain and suffering since the accident and into the future is worth less than the jury’s award. The verdict fell within the bounds of the evidence, and Tunstall’s attempt to have us reweigh the evidence is improper.
The doctor had been disciplined twice in his 30-year medical career. In 2009, he “entered into a stipulated agreement with the [Indiana Medical Licensing] Board pursuant to which he was fined $500. In January 2016, he was fined $1000 and his license was placed on indefinite probation for a minimum of 1 year with certain terms and conditions.” But his license was back in good standing by the time he testified at the trial.
In Linton, this court held that “the licensure status of a physician who gives an expert opinion is admissible to impeach the doctor’s opinion.” Thus, the Linton court affirmed the . . . admission of evidence that the medical-malpractice defendant, who testified as an expert regarding his compliance with the standard of care, was currently on indefinite probation. Only the final action taken by the Board, however, was admissible.
Unlike in Linton, [plaintiff’s doctor] was in good standing (i.e., not on probation) at the time he testified in this case. Tunstall argues that thisis a distinction without a difference. We are not so sure. Clearly, an expert’s past disciplinary history is, if at all, not as relevant as the expert’s current probationary status.
There are several important differences between Riggs and this case. [The juror] — not the trial court — requested that the alternate replace her. Thus, the trial court did not remove a willing juror. Further, unlike in Riggs, [her] replacement was not based on her being “a dissenting juror” or due to any misconduct. [She] was dismissed because she was experiencing pain in her legs during deliberations, and the trial court informed the remaining jurors that this was the reason for her removal. The most notable distinction is that Tunstall affirmatively agreed to the removal . . . while in Riggs, the defendant vehemently and repeatedly objected.
A defendant who seeks a new trial based on alleged juror misconduct generally must demonstrate that the conduct was gross and that it probably harmed the defendant. For juror misconduct cases not involving out-of-court communications with unauthorized persons, prejudice must be affirmatively demonstrated; it will not be presumed.
Because each challenge against the verdict failed, at least in the eyes of two of the three judges, the verdict was upheld. Barring the Indiana Supreme Court granting transfer, the verdict for Miss Manning should remain undisturbed.
Tunstall v. Manning, ---N.E.3d---, No. 49A04-1711-CT-2572, 2018 Ind. App. LEXIS 287(Ind. Ct. App. Aug. 20, 2018) (Altice, J.; Baker, J., dissenting).
Ritter v. Stanton, 745 N.E.2d 828 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (Barnes, J.),trans. denied.
Linton v. Davis, 887 N.E.2d 960 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (Riley, J.), trans. denied.
Sneed v. Stovall, 22 S.W.3d 277 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999).
Riggs v. State, 809 N.E.2d 322 (Ind. 2004) (Boehm, J.).

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