Source: https://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-supreme-court/276/252.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 21:28:13+00:00

Document:
[276 U.S. 252, 253] Mr. Francis Raymond Stark, of New York City, for petitioner.
[276 U.S. 252, 254] Mr. D. M. Powell, of Greenville, Ala., for respondent.
Through abundance of caution petitioner filed separate petitions here, which were granted, asking that writs of certiorari be directed respectively to the Court of Appeals and to the Supreme Court. But as the Supreme Court of Alabama, by denying the petition for certiorari, on the face of the record did not pass on the merits, the writ of this court in No. 183 was properly directed to the Court of Appeals, and that in No. 189 is dismissed. Norfolk Turnpike Co. v. Virginia, 225 U.S. 264, 269 , 32 S. Ct. 828; Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Crovo, 220 U.S. 364 , 31 S. Ct. 399; compare Matthews v. Huwe, 269 U.S. 262 , 46 S. Ct. 108.
In Primrose v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 154 U.S. 1 , 14 S. Ct. 1098, relied upon by the Supreme Court of Alabama in the earlier appeal as supporting its distinction between ordinary negligence and gross negligence, a contract between the telegraph company and its patron, limiting the liability of the company if the message was not repeated, was upheld as a defense to an action seeking recovery for the negligent transmission of the message. Although it is suggested in the opinion (pages 17-19 (14 S. Ct. 1098)) that as a matter of public policy the company would not have been permitted to stipulate away its liability for gross negligence, the distinction was neither involved in the case nor applied by the court, nor has it been so applied. See Phildelphia & Reading R. R. v. Derby, 14 How. 468, 485, 486; [276 U.S. 252, 259] Steamboat New World v. King, 16 How. 469, 474; Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. v. Arms, 91 U.S. 489 , 493-495.
Since the decision in the Primrose Case the telegraph companies have been brought under the provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act and their tariffs for all interstate service made subject to the approval of the Interstate Commerce Commission. Interstate Commerce Act, 1, as amended by Act of June 18, 1910, c. 309, 7, 36 Stat. 539 (49 USCA 1; Comp. St . 8563). By section 1 of the Interstate Commerce Act it is provided that subject to the approval of the Commission messages received by telegraph companies for transmission may be classified into 'repeated, unrepeated ... and such other classes as are just and reasonable, and different rates may be charged for the different classes of messages.' The established rates for unrepeated messages thus became the lawful rates and the attendant limitation of liability became the lawful condition upon which messages might be sent. Unrepeated Message Case, 44 Interst. Com. Com'n R. 670; Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Esteve Bros. & Co., supra, 571 (41 S. Ct. 584); Postal Telegraph-Cable Co. v. Warren-Godwin Co., 251 U.S. 27 , 40 S. Ct. 69; Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Boegli, 251 U.S. 315 , 40 S. Ct. 167; Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Czizek, 264 U.S. 281 , 44 S. Ct. 328. What had previously been a matter of common-law liability, with such contractual restrictions as the states might permit, then became the subject of federal legislation to secure reasonable and just rates for all without undue preference or advantage to any. Since that end is attainable only by adherence to the approved rate, based upon an authorized classification, that rate 'represents the whole duty and the whole liability of the company.' Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Esteve Bros. & Co., supra. Such being the basis of liability, we do not perceive any adequate ground upon which it may be enlarged merely by the application of a 'vituperative epithet' to the admitted [276 U.S. 252, 260] fault of the petitioner. Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. v. Arms, supra, 494. For if it be assumed that we can weigh and measure degrees of negligence and that a public service company may not by contract alone limit its liability for gross negligence, so called, nevertheless we may not disregard a lawful exercise of the regulatory power which has made no distinction between degrees of negligence, nor may we, upon any theory of public policy, annex to the rate as made conditions affecting its uniformity and equality.
The message here was unrepeated and the loss resulted from a mistake in transmission. The case thus comes within the express provision of clause 1 of the tariff, limiting the liability to the amount received for the service.
The cause will be reversed and remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
'1. The Company shall not be liable for mistakes or delays in the transmission or delivery, or for nondelivery, of an unrepeated message, beyond the amount received for sending the same; nor for mistakes or delays in the transmission or delivery, or for nondelivery, of any repeated message beyond fifty times the sum received for sending the same, unless specially valued; nor in any case for delays arising from unavoidable interruption in the working of its lines; nor for errors in cipher or obscure messages.

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