Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&amp;view=article&amp;id=50725:gr-174629-2008&amp;catid=1502&amp;Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 21:48:20+00:00

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G.R. No. 174629 - REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HON. ANTONIO M. EUGENIO, JR., ET AL.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Represented by THE ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING COUNCIL (AMLC), Petitioner, v. HON. ANTONIO M. EUGENIO, JR., AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF RTC, MANILA, BRANCH 34, PANTALEON ALVAREZ and LILIA CHENG, Respondents.
The present petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 assails the orders and resolutions issued by two different courts in two different cases. The courts and cases in question are the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 24, which heard SP Case No. 06-1142001 and the Court of Appeals, Tenth Division, which heared CA-G.R. SP No. 95198.2 Both cases arose as part of the aftermath of the ruling of this Court in Agan v. PIATCO3 nullifying the concession agreement awarded to the Philippine International Airport Terminal Corporation (PIATCO) over the Ninoy Aquino International Airport - International Passenger Terminal 3 (NAIA 3) Project.
Following the December 2005 AMLC Resolution, the Republic, through the AMLC, filed an application21 before the Manila RTC to inquire into and/or examine thirteen (13) accounts and two (2) related web of accounts alleged as having been used to facilitate corruption in the NAIA 3 Project. Among said accounts were the DBS Bank account of Alvarez and the Metrobank accounts of Cheng Yong. The case was raffled to Manila RTC, Branch 24, presided by respondent Judge Antonio Eugenio, Jr., and docketed as SP Case No. 06-114200.
On 12 January 2006, the Manila RTC issued an Order (Manila RTC bank inquiry order) granting the Ex Parte Application expressing therein "[that] the allegations in said application to be impressed with merit, and in conformity with Section 11 of R.A. No. 9160, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Money Laundering Act (AMLA) of 2001 and Rules 11.1 and 11.2 of the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations."22 Authority was thus granted to the AMLC to inquire into the bank accounts listed therein.
On 25 January 2006, Alvarez, through counsel, entered his appearance23 before the Manila RTC in SP Case No. 06-114200 and filed an Urgent Motion to Stay Enforcement of Order of January 12, 2006.24 Alvarez alleged that he fortuitously learned of the bank inquiry order, which was issued following an ex parte application, and he argued that nothing in R.A. No. 9160 authorized the AMLC to seek the authority to inquire into bank accounts ex parte.25 The day after Alvarez filed his motion, 26 January 2006, the Manila RTC issued an Order26 staying the enforcement of its bank inquiry order and giving the Republic five (5) days to respond to Alvarez's motion.
Alvarez filed on 10 May 2006 an Urgent Motion31 expressing his apprehension that the AMLC would immediately enforce the omnibus order and would thereby render the motion for reconsideration he intended to file as moot and academic; thus he sought that the Republic be refrained from enforcing the omnibus order in the meantime. Acting on this motion, the Manila RTC, on 11 May 2006, issued an Order32 requiring the OSG to file a comment/opposition and reminding the parties that judgments and orders become final and executory upon the expiration of fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof, as it is the period within which a motion for reconsideration could be filed. Alvarez filed his Motion for Reconsideration33 of the omnibus order on 15 May 2006, but the motion was denied by the Manila RTC in an Order34 dated 5 July 2006.
On 11 July 2006, Alvarez filed an Urgent Motion and Manifestation35 wherein he manifested having received reliable information that the AMLC was about to implement the Manila RTC bank inquiry order even though he was intending to appeal from it. On the premise that only a final and executory judgment or order could be executed or implemented, Alvarez sought that the AMLC be immediately ordered to refrain from enforcing the Manila RTC bank inquiry order.
On 12 July 2006, the Manila RTC, acting on Alvarez's latest motion, issued an Order36 directing the AMLC "to refrain from enforcing the order dated January 12, 2006 until the expiration of the period to appeal, without any appeal having been filed." On the same day, Alvarez filed a Notice of Appeal37 with the Manila RTC.
On 25 July 2006, or one day after Alvarez filed his motion, the Manila RTC issued an Order41 wherein it clarified that "the Ex Parte Order of this Court dated January 12, 2006 can not be implemented against the deposits or accounts of any of the persons enumerated in the AMLC Application until the appeal of movant Alvarez is finally resolved, otherwise, the appeal would be rendered moot and academic or even nugatory."42 In addition, the AMLC was ordered "not to disclose or publish any information or document found or obtained in [v]iolation of the May 11, 2006 Order of this Court."43 The Manila RTC reasoned that the other persons mentioned in AMLC's application were not served with the court's 12 January 2006 Order. This 25 July 2006 Manila RTC Order is the first of the four rulings being assailed through this petition.
In response, the Republic filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration44 dated 27 July 2006, urging that it be allowed to immediately enforce the bank inquiry order against Alvarez and that Alvarez's notice of appeal be expunged from the records since appeal from an order of inquiry is disallowed under the Anti money Laundering Act (AMLA).
On 1 August 2006, the Court of Appeals, acting on Lilia Cheng's petition, issued a Temporary Restraining Order48 enjoining the Manila and Makati trial courts from implementing, enforcing or executing the respective bank inquiry orders previously issued, and the AMLC from enforcing and implementing such orders. On even date, the Manila RTC issued an Order49 resolving to hold in abeyance the resolution of the urgent omnibus motion for reconsideration then pending before it until the resolution of Lilia Cheng's petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals Resolution directing the issuance of the temporary restraining order is the second of the four rulings assailed in the present petition.
The Court had initially granted a Temporary Restraining Order59 dated 6 October 2006 and later on a Supplemental Temporary Restraining Order60 dated 13 October 2006 in petitioner's favor, enjoining the implementation of the assailed rulings of the Manila RTC and the Court of Appeals. However, on respondents' motion, the Court, through a Resolution61 dated 11 December 2006, suspended the implementation of the restraining orders it had earlier issued.
1. Did the RTC-Manila, in issuing the Orders dated 25 July 2006 and 15 August 2006 which deferred the implementation of its Order dated 12 January 2006, and the Court of Appeals, in issuing its Resolution dated 1 August 2006, which ordered the status quo in relation to the 1 July 2005 Order of the RTC-Makati and the 12 January 2006 Order of the RTC-Manila, both of which authorized the examination of bank accounts under Section 11 of Rep. Act No. 9160 (AMLA), commit grave abuse of discretion?
(c) Is such order susceptible to legal challenges and judicial review?
After the oral arguments, the parties were directed to file their respective memoranda, which they did,63 and the petition was thereafter deemed submitted for resolution.
Petitioner's general advocacy is that the bank inquiry orders issued by the Manila and Makati RTCs are valid and immediately enforceable whereas the assailed rulings, which effectively stayed the enforcement of the Manila and Makati RTCs bank inquiry orders, are sullied with grave abuse of discretion. These conclusions flow from the posture that a bank inquiry order, issued upon a finding of probable cause, may be issued ex parte and, once issued, is immediately executory. Petitioner further argues that the information obtained following the bank inquiry is necessarily beneficial, if not indispensable, to the AMLC in discharging its awesome responsibility regarding the effective implementation of the AMLA and that any restraint in the disclosure of such information to appropriate agencies or other judicial fora would render meaningless the relief supplied by the bank inquiry order.
Petitioner raises particular arguments questioning Lilia Cheng's right to seek injunctive relief before the Court of Appeals, noting that not one of the bank inquiry orders is directed against her. Her "cryptic assertion" that she is the wife of Cheng Yong cannot, according to petitioner, "metamorphose into the requisite legal standing to seek redress for an imagined injury or to maintain an action in behalf of another." In the same breath, petitioner argues that Alvarez cannot assert any violation of the right to financial privacy in behalf of other persons whose bank accounts are being inquired into, particularly those other persons named in the Makati RTC bank inquiry order who did not take any step to oppose such orders before the courts.
Ostensibly, the proximate question before the Court is whether a bank inquiry order issued in accordance with Section 10 of the AMLA may be stayed by injunction. Yet in arguing that it does, petitioner relies on what it posits as the final and immediately executory character of the bank inquiry orders issued by the Manila and Makati RTCs. Implicit in that position is the notion that the inquiry orders are valid, and such notion is susceptible to review and validation based on what appears on the face of the orders and the applications which triggered their issuance, as well as the provisions of the AMLA governing the issuance of such orders. Indeed, to test the viability of petitioner's argument, the Court will have to be satisfied that the subject inquiry orders are valid in the first place. However, even from a cursory examination of the applications for inquiry order and the orders themselves, it is evident that the orders are not in accordance with law.
A brief overview of the AMLA is called for.
Money laundering has been generally defined by the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) `as "any act or attempted act to conceal or disguise the identity of illegally obtained proceeds so that they appear to have originated from legitimate sources."64 Even before the passage of the AMLA, the problem was addressed by the Philippine government through the issuance of various circulars by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. Yet ultimately, legislative proscription was necessary, especially with the inclusion of the Philippines in the Financial Action Task Force's list of non-cooperative countries and territories in the fight against money laundering.65 The original AMLA, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9160, was passed in 2001. It was amended by R.A. No. 9194 in 2003.
In addition to providing for the definition and penalties for the crime of money laundering, the AMLA also authorizes certain provisional remedies that would aid the AMLC in the enforcement of the AMLA. These are the "freeze order" authorized under Section 10, and the "bank inquiry order" authorized under Section 11.
Respondents posit that a bank inquiry order under Section 11 may be obtained only upon the pre-existence of a money laundering offense case already filed before the courts.68 The conclusion is based on the phrase "upon order of any competent court in cases of violation of this Act," the word "cases" generally understood as referring to actual cases pending with the courts.
We are unconvinced by this proposition, and agree instead with the then Solicitor General who conceded that the use of the phrase "in cases of" was unfortunate, yet submitted that it should be interpreted to mean "in the event there are violations" of the AMLA, and not that there are already cases pending in court concerning such violations.69 If the contrary position is adopted, then the bank inquiry order would be limited in purpose as a tool in aid of litigation of live cases, and wholly inutile as a means for the government to ascertain whether there is sufficient evidence to sustain an intended prosecution of the account holder for violation of the AMLA. Should that be the situation, in all likelihood the AMLC would be virtually deprived of its character as a discovery tool, and thus would become less circumspect in filing complaints against suspect account holders. After all, under such set-up the preferred strategy would be to allow or even encourage the indiscriminate filing of complaints under the AMLA with the hope or expectation that the evidence of money laundering would somehow surface during the trial. Since the AMLC could not make use of the bank inquiry order to determine whether there is evidentiary basis to prosecute the suspected malefactors, not filing any case at all would not be an alternative. Such unwholesome set-up should not come to pass. Thus Section 11 cannot be interpreted in a way that would emasculate the remedy it has established and encourage the unfounded initiation of complaints for money laundering.
Still, even if the bank inquiry order may be availed of without need of a pre-existing case under the AMLA, it does not follow that such order may be availed of ex parte. There are several reasons why the AMLA does not generally sanction ex parte applications and issuances of the bank inquiry order.
SEC. 11. Authority to Inquire into Bank Deposits. â€• Notwithstanding the provisions of Republic Act No. 1405, as amended, Republic Act No. 6426, as amended, Republic Act No. 8791, and other laws, the AMLC may inquire into or examine any particular deposit or investment with any banking institution or non bank financial institution upon order of any competent court in cases of violation of this Act, when it has been established that there is probable cause that the deposits or investments are related to an unlawful activity as defined in Section 3(i) hereof or a money laundering offense under Section 4 hereof, except that no court order shall be required in cases involving unlawful activities defined in Sections 3(i)1, (2) and (12).
Of course, Section 11 also allows the AMLC to inquire into bank accounts without having to obtain a judicial order in cases where there is probable cause that the deposits or investments are related to kidnapping for ransom,71 certain violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002,72 hijacking and other violations under R.A. No. 6235, destructive arson and murder. Since such special circumstances do not apply in this case, there is no need for us to pass comment on this proviso. Suffice it to say, the proviso contemplates a situation distinct from that which presently confronts us, and for purposes of the succeeding discussion, our reference to Section 11 of the AMLA excludes said proviso.
In the instances where a court order is required for the issuance of the bank inquiry order, nothing in Section 11 specifically authorizes that such court order may be issued ex parte. It might be argued that this silence does not preclude the ex parte issuance of the bank inquiry order since the same is not prohibited under Section 11. Yet this argument falls when the immediately preceding provision, Section 10, is examined.
Although oriented towards different purposes, the freeze order under Section 10 and the bank inquiry order under Section 11 are similar in that they are extraordinary provisional reliefs which the AMLC may avail of to effectively combat and prosecute money laundering offenses. Crucially, Section 10 uses specific language to authorize an ex parte application for the provisional relief therein, a circumstance absent in Section 11. If indeed the legislature had intended to authorize ex parte proceedings for the issuance of the bank inquiry order, then it could have easily expressed such intent in the law, as it did with the freeze order under Section 10.
Even more tellingly, the current language of Sections 10 and 11 of the AMLA was crafted at the same time, through the passage of R.A. No. 9194. Prior to the amendatory law, it was the AMLC, not the Court of Appeals, which had authority to issue a freeze order, whereas a bank inquiry order always then required, without exception, an order from a competent court.74 It was through the same enactment that ex parte proceedings were introduced for the first time into the AMLA, in the case of the freeze order which now can only be issued by the Court of Appeals. It certainly would have been convenient, through the same amendatory law, to allow a similar ex parte procedure in the case of a bank inquiry order had Congress been so minded. Yet nothing in the provision itself, or even the available legislative record, explicitly points to an ex parte judicial procedure in the application for a bank inquiry order, unlike in the case of the freeze order.
That the AMLA does not contemplate ex parte proceedings in applications for bank inquiry orders is confirmed by the present implementing rules and regulations of the AMLA, promulgated upon the passage of R.A. No. 9194. With respect to freeze orders under Section 10, the implementing rules do expressly provide that the applications for freeze orders be filed ex parte,75 but no similar clearance is granted in the case of inquiry orders under Section 11.76 These implementing rules were promulgated by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, the Insurance Commission and the Securities and Exchange Commission,77 and if it was the true belief of these institutions that inquiry orders could be issued ex parte similar to freeze orders, language to that effect would have been incorporated in the said Rules. This is stressed not because the implementing rules could authorize ex parte applications for inquiry orders despite the absence of statutory basis, but rather because the framers of the law had no intention to allow such ex parte applications.
Even the Rules of Procedure adopted by this Court in A.M. No. 05-11-04-SC78 to enforce the provisions of the AMLA specifically authorize ex parte applications with respect to freeze orders under Section 1079 but make no similar authorization with respect to bank inquiry orders under Section 11.
The Court could divine the sense in allowing ex parte proceedings under Section 10 and in proscribing the same under Section 11. A freeze order under Section 10 on the one hand is aimed at preserving monetary instruments or property in any way deemed related to unlawful activities as defined in Section 3(i) of the AMLA. The owner of such monetary instruments or property would thus be inhibited from utilizing the same for the duration of the freeze order. To make such freeze order anteceded by a judicial proceeding with notice to the account holder would allow for or lead to the dissipation of such funds even before the order could be issued.
On the other hand, a bank inquiry order under Section 11 does not necessitate any form of physical seizure of property of the account holder. What the bank inquiry order authorizes is the examination of the particular deposits or investments in banking institutions or non-bank financial institutions. The monetary instruments or property deposited with such banks or financial institutions are not seized in a physical sense, but are examined on particular details such as the account holder's record of deposits and transactions. Unlike the assets subject of the freeze order, the records to be inspected under a bank inquiry order cannot be physically seized or hidden by the account holder. Said records are in the possession of the bank and therefore cannot be destroyed at the instance of the account holder alone as that would require the extraordinary cooperation and devotion of the bank.
Interestingly, petitioner's memorandum does not attempt to demonstrate before the Court that the bank inquiry order under Section 11 may be issued ex parte, although the petition itself did devote some space for that argument. The petition argues that the bank inquiry order is "a special and peculiar remedy, drastic in its name, and made necessary because of a public necessity' [t]hus, by its very nature, the application for an order or inquiry must necessarily, be ex parte." This argument is insufficient justification in light of the clear disinclination of Congress to allow the issuance ex parte of bank inquiry orders under Section 11, in contrast to the legislature's clear inclination to allow the ex parte grant of freeze orders under Section 10.
Without doubt, a requirement that the application for a bank inquiry order be done with notice to the account holder will alert the latter that there is a plan to inspect his bank account on the belief that the funds therein are involved in an unlawful activity or money laundering offense.80 Still, the account holder so alerted will in fact be unable to do anything to conceal or cleanse his bank account records of suspicious or anomalous transactions, at least not without the whole-hearted cooperation of the bank, which inherently has no vested interest to aid the account holder in such manner.
The necessary implication of this finding that Section 11 of the AMLA does not generally authorize the issuance ex parte of the bank inquiry order would be that such orders cannot be issued unless notice is given to the owners of the account, allowing them the opportunity to contest the issuance of the order. Without such a consequence, the legislated distinction between ex parte proceedings under Section 10 and those which are not ex parte under Section 11 would be lost and rendered useless.
own determinative function in order to be convinced of such fact. The account holder would be certainly capable of contesting such probable cause if given the opportunity to be apprised of the pending application to inquire into his account; hence a notice requirement would not be an empty spectacle. It may be so that the process of obtaining the inquiry order may become more cumbersome or prolonged because of the notice requirement, yet we fail to see any unreasonable burden cast by such circumstance. After all, as earlier stated, requiring notice to the account holder should not, in any way, compromise the integrity of the bank records subject of the inquiry which remain in the possession and control of the bank.
Petitioner argues that a bank inquiry order necessitates a finding of probable cause, a characteristic similar to a search warrant which is applied to and heard ex parte. We have examined the supposed analogy between a search warrant and a bank inquiry order yet we remain to be unconvinced by petitioner.
The Constitution and the Rules of Court prescribe particular requirements attaching to search warrants that are not imposed by the AMLA with respect to bank inquiry orders. A constitutional warrant requires that the judge personally examine under oath or affirmation the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,82 such examination being in the form of searching questions and answers.83 Those are impositions which the legislative did not specifically prescribe as to the bank inquiry order under the AMLA, and we cannot find sufficient legal basis to apply them to Section 11 of the AMLA. Simply put, a bank inquiry order is not a search warrant or warrant of arrest as it contemplates a direct object but not the seizure of persons or property.
Even as the Constitution and the Rules of Court impose a high procedural standard for the determination of probable cause for the issuance of search warrants which Congress chose not to prescribe for the bank inquiry order under the AMLA, Congress nonetheless disallowed ex parte applications for the inquiry order. We can discern that in exchange for these procedural standards normally applied to search warrants, Congress chose instead to legislate a right to notice and a right to be heard' characteristics of judicial proceedings which are not ex parte. Absent any demonstrable constitutional infirmity, there is no reason for us to dispute such legislative policy choices.
One might assume that the constitutional dimension of the right to privacy, as applied to bank deposits, warrants our present inquiry. We decline to do so. Admittedly, that question has proved controversial in American jurisprudence. Notably, the United States Supreme Court in U.S. v. Miller85 held that there was no legitimate expectation of privacy as to the bank records of a depositor.86 Moreover, the text of our Constitution has not bothered with the triviality of allocating specific rights peculiar to bank deposits.
amended, the legal order is obliged to conserve the absolutely confidential nature of Philippine bank deposits.
The AMLA also provides exceptions to the Bank Secrecy Act. Under Section 11, the AMLC may inquire into a bank account upon order of any competent court in cases of violation of the AMLA, it having been established that there is probable cause that the deposits or investments are related to unlawful activities as defined in Section 3(i) of the law, or a money laundering offense under Section 4 thereof. Further, in instances where there is probable cause that the deposits or investments are related to kidnapping for ransom,94 certain violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002,95 hijacking and other violations under R.A. No. 6235, destructive arson and murder, then there is no need for the AMLC to obtain a court order before it could inquire into such accounts.
It cannot be successfully argued the proceedings relating to the bank inquiry order under Section 11 of the AMLA is a "litigation" encompassed in one of the exceptions to the Bank Secrecy Act which is when "the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation." The orientation of the bank inquiry order is simply to serve as a provisional relief or remedy. As earlier stated, the application for such does not entail a full-blown trial.
Nevertheless, just because the AMLA establishes additional exceptions to the Bank Secrecy Act it does not mean that the later law has dispensed with the general principle established in the older law that "[a]ll deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking institutions in the Philippines x x x are hereby considered as of an absolutely confidential nature."96 Indeed, by force of statute, all bank deposits are absolutely confidential, and that nature is unaltered even by the legislated exceptions referred to above. There is disfavor towards construing these exceptions in such a manner that would authorize unlimited discretion on the part of the government or of any party seeking to enforce those exceptions and inquire into bank deposits. If there are doubts in upholding the absolutely confidential nature of bank deposits against affirming the authority to inquire into such accounts, then such doubts must be resolved in favor of the former. Such a stance would persist unless Congress passes a law reversing the general state policy of preserving the absolutely confidential nature of Philippine bank accounts.
The presence of this statutory right to privacy addresses at least one of the arguments raised by petitioner, that Lilia Cheng had no personality to assail the inquiry orders before the Court of Appeals because she was not the subject of said orders. AMLC Resolution No. 75, which served as the basis in the successful application for the Makati inquiry order, expressly adverts to Citibank Account No. 88576248 "owned by Cheng Yong and/or Lilia G. Cheng with Citibank N.A.,"97 whereas Lilia Cheng's petition before the Court of Appeals is accompanied by a certification from Metrobank that Account Nos. 300852436-0 and 700149801-7, both of which are among the subjects of the Manila inquiry order, are accounts in the name of "Yong Cheng or Lilia Cheng."98 Petitioner does not specifically deny that Lilia Cheng holds rights of ownership over the three said accounts, laying focus instead on the fact that she was not named as a subject of either the Makati or Manila RTC inquiry orders. We are reasonably convinced that Lilia Cheng has sufficiently demonstrated her joint ownership of the three accounts, and such conclusion leads us to acknowledge that she has the standing to assail via certiorari the inquiry orders authorizing the examination of her bank accounts as the orders interfere with her statutory right to maintain the secrecy of said accounts.
While petitioner would premise that the inquiry into Lilia Cheng's accounts finds root in Section 11 of the AMLA, it cannot be denied that the authority to inquire under Section 11 is only exceptional in character, contrary as it is to the general rule preserving the secrecy of bank deposits. Even though she may not have been the subject of the inquiry orders, her bank accounts nevertheless were, and she thus has the standing to vindicate the right to secrecy that attaches to said accounts and their owners. This statutory right to privacy will not prevent the courts from authorizing the inquiry anyway upon the fulfillment of the requirements set forth under Section 11 of the AMLA or Section 2 of the Bank Secrecy Act; at the same time, the owner of the accounts have the right to challenge whether the requirements were indeed complied with.
There is a final point of concern which needs to be addressed. Lilia Cheng argues that the AMLA, being a substantive penal statute, has no retroactive effect and the bank inquiry order could not apply to deposits or investments opened prior to the effectivity of Rep. Act No. 9164, or on 17 October 2001. Thus, she concludes, her subject bank accounts, opened between 1989 to 1990, could not be the subject of the bank inquiry order lest there be a violation of the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws.
No ex post facto law may be enacted,99 and no law may be construed in such fashion as to permit a criminal prosecution offensive to the ex post facto clause. As applied to the AMLA, it is plain that no person may be prosecuted under the penal provisions of the AMLA for acts committed prior to the enactment of the law on 17 October 2001. As much was understood by the lawmakers since they deliberated upon the AMLA, and indeed there is no serious dispute on that point.
Prior to the enactment of the AMLA, the fact that bank accounts or deposits were involved in activities later on enumerated in Section 3 of the law did not, by itself, remove such accounts from the shelter of absolute confidentiality. Prior to the AMLA, in order that bank accounts could be examined, there was need to secure either the written permission of the depositor or a court order authorizing such examination, assuming that they were involved in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials, or in a case where the money deposited or invested was itself the subject matter of the litigation. The passage of the AMLA stripped another layer off the rule on absolute confidentiality that provided a measure of lawful protection to the account holder. For that reason, the application of the bank inquiry order as a means of inquiring into records of transactions entered into prior to the passage of the AMLA would be constitutionally infirm, offensive as it is to the ex post facto clause.
Besides, nowhere in the legislative record cited by Lilia Cheng does it appear that there was an unequivocal intent to exempt from the bank inquiry order all bank accounts opened prior to the passage of the AMLA. There is a cited exchange between Representatives Ronaldo Zamora and Jaime Lopez where the latter confirmed to the former that "deposits are supposed to be exempted from scrutiny or monitoring if they are already in place as of the time the law is enacted."102 That statement does indicate that transactions already in place when the AMLA was passed are indeed exempt from scrutiny through a bank inquiry order, but it cannot yield any interpretation that records of transactions undertaken after the enactment of the AMLA are similarly exempt. Due to the absence of cited authority from the legislative record that unqualifiedly supports respondent Lilia Cheng's thesis, there is no cause for us to sustain her interpretation of the AMLA, fatal as it is to the anima of that law.
We are well aware that Lilia Cheng's petition presently pending before the Court of Appeals likewise assails the validity of the subject bank inquiry orders and precisely seeks the annulment of said orders. Our current declarations may indeed have the effect of preempting that0 petition. Still, in order for this Court to rule on the petition at bar which insists on the enforceability of the said bank inquiry orders, it is necessary for us to consider and rule on the same question which after all is a pure question of law.
WHEREFORE, the PETITION is DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.
* As replacement of Justice Antonio T. Carpio who inhibited himself per Administrative Circular No. 84-2007.
1 Entitled "In the Matter of the Application for An Order Allowing An Inquiry Into Certain Bank Accounts or Investments and Related Web of Accounts, The Republic of the Philippines Represented by the Anti-Money Laundering Council, Applicant."
2 Entitled "Lilia Cheng v. Republic of the Philippines represented by the Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC), Hon. Antonio M. Eugenio, As Presiding Judge of the RTC Manila, Br. 24; Hon. Sixto Marella, Jr., as Presiding Judge of RTC, Makati City, Br. 38; and John Does."
21 See id. at 109-110.
50 Order dated 15 August 2006, see id. at 71.
57 See id. at 310.
63 See rollo, pp. 786-828; 867-910; 913-936.
64 See Funds derived from criminal activities (FOPAC), (http://www.interpol.int/Public/ FinancialCrime/MoneyLaundering/default.asp, last visited 8 December 2007). See also J.M.B. Tirol, The Anti-Money Laundering Law of the Philippines Annotated (2nd ed., 2007), at 3.
65 Tirol, supra note 64, at 4-6. The Financial Action Task Force was established in 1989 by the so-called Group of 7 countries to formulate and encourage the adoption of international standards and measures to fight money laundering and related activities. Id. at 28.
66 Republic Act No. 9160 (2002), Sec. 4.
67 Republic Act No. 9160 (2002), Secs. 7(3) and (4).
68 See rollo, pp. 809-810, 932.
70 Republic Act No. 9194 (2003), Sec. 11.
71 Under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code.
72 Particularly Sections 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, and 16 thereof.
73 Republic Act No. 9194 (2003), Sec. 10.
74 Unlike in the present law which authorizes the issuance without need of judicial order when there is probable cause that the deposits are involved in such specifically enumerated crimes as kidnapping, hijacking, destructive arson and murder, and violations of some provisions of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. See Sec. 11, R.A. No. 9194, in connection with Section 3(i).
75 "Rule 10.1. When the AMLC may apply for the freezing of any monetary instrument or property.
76 See Rule 11.1, Revised Implementing Rules And Regulations R.A. No. 9160, As Amended By R.A. No. 9194. "Rule 11.1. Authority to Inquire into Bank Deposits With Court Order. Notwithstanding the provisions of Republic Act No. 1405, as amended; Republic Act No. 6426, as amended; Republic Act No. 8791, and other laws, the AMLC may inquire into or examine any particular deposit or investment with any banking institution or non-bank financial institution AND THEIR SUBSIDIARIES AND AFFILIATES upon order of any competent court in cases of violation of this Act, when it has been established that there is probable cause that the deposits or investments involved are related to an unlawful activity as defined in Section 3(j) hereof or a money laundering offense under Section 4 hereof; except in cases as provided under Rule 11.2."
77 Republic Act No. 9160 (See Section 18, AMLA).
78 Effective 15 December 2005.
79 See Title VIII, Sec. 44, Rule Of Procedure In Cases Of Civil Forfeiture, Asset Preservation, And Freezing Of Monetary Instrument, Property, Or Proceeds Representing, Involving, Or Relating To An Unlawful Activity Or Money Laundering Offense Under Republic Act No. 9160, As Amended.
80 Republic Act No. 9160 (2002), Sec. 11.
81 See J. Tinga, Concurring and Dissenting, Gonzales v. Abaya, G.R. No. 164007, 10 August 2006, 498 SCRA 445, 501; citing 12 Words and Phrases (1954 ed.), p. 478-479 and 1 BOUVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed., 1914), p. 858.
82 Const., Art. III, Sec. 2.
83 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 126, Sec. 5.
84 Perhaps the prophecy of Justice Brandeis, dissenting in Olmstead v. U.S., 227 U.S. 438, 473 (1928), has come to pass: "[T] ime works changes, brings into existence new conditions and purposes." Subtler and more far-reaching means of invading privacy have become available to the Government. Discovery and invention have made it possible for the Government, by means far more effective than stretching upon the rack, to obtain disclosure in court of what is whispered in the closet Moreover, "in the application of a constitution, our contemplation cannot be only of what has, been but of what may be." The progress of science in furnishing the Government with means of espionage is not likely to stop with wiretapping. Ways may someday be developed by which the Government, without removing papers from secret drawers, can reproduce them in court, and by which it will be enabled to expose to a jury the most intimate occurrences of the home." Id. at 473-474.
85 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
86 "Even if we direct our attention to the original checks and deposit slips, rather than to the microfilm copies actually viewed and obtained by means of the subpoena, we perceive no legitimate "expectation of privacy" in their contents. The checks are not confidential communications but negotiable instruments to be used in commercial transactions. All of the documents obtained, including financial statements and deposit slips, contain only information voluntarily conveyed to the banks and exposed to their employees in the ordinary course of business. The lack of any legitimate expectation of privacy concerning the information kept in bank records was assumed by Congress in enacting the Bank Secrecy Act, the expressed purpose of which is to require records to be maintained because they "have a high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax, and regulatory investigations and proceedings." Ibid. The passage by the U.S. Congress in 1978 of the Right to Financial Privacy Act was essentially in reaction to the Miller ruling. Tirol, supra note 64, at 155.
87 See Tirol, supra note 64, citing Gabriel Singson, Law and Jurisprudence on Secrecy of Bank Deposits, 46 Ateneo Law Journal 670, 682.
88 See Ople v. Torres, 354 Phil. 948 (1998).
89 "The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law."
90 "Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest."
91 Chavez v. PCGG, 360 Phil. 133, 161, citing V Record of the Constitutional Commission 25 (1986).
92 See Phil. National Bank v. Gancayco, et al., 122 Phil. 503, 506-507 (1965).
93 Section 8 of R.A. Act No. 6770, or the Ombudsman Act of 1989 empowers the Ombudsman to "[a dminister oaths, issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum and take testimony in any investigation or inquiry, including the power to examine and have access to bank accounts and records." See Sec. 8, Rep. Act No. 6770 (1989). In Marquez v. Hon. Desierto, 412 Phil. 387 (2001), the Court, interpreted this provision in line with the "absolutely confidential" nature of bank deposits under the Bank Secrecy Act, infra, and mandated: "there must be a pending case before a court of competent jurisdiction[;] the account must be clearly identified, the inspection limited to the subject matter of the pending case before the court of competent jurisdiction[;] the bank personnel and the account holder must be notified to be present during the inspection, and such inspection may cover only the account identified in the pending case." Id. at 397. With respect to the Ombudsman's power of inquiry into bank deposits, Marquez remains good law. See Ejercito v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. NOS. 157294-95, 30 November 2006, 509 SCRA 190, 224 and 226.
94 Under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code.
95 Particularly Sections 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, and 16 thereof.
96 Republic Act No. 1405 (1955), Sec. 2.
98 A copy of such certification was attached to Cheng's Comment as Annex "2". See id. at 421.
99 Const., Art. III, Sec. 22.
100 In the Matter of the Petition for the Declaration of the Petitioner's Rights and Duties under Sec. 8 of R.A. No. 6132, 146 Phil. 429, 431-432 (1970). See also Tan v. Barrios, G.R. NOS. 85481-82, 18 October 1990, 703.
101 Interpretate fienda est ut res valeat quam pereat.
102 Rollo, p. 818, citing House Committee Deliberations on 26 September 2001.

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