Source: http://intellectual-thoughts.com/Hurrican%20Katrina%20Gun%20Confiscatio.htm
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 16:28:58+00:00

Document:
In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, New Orleans authorities announced that only police would be allowed to possess firearms and proceeded to seize lawfully-possessed firearms from citizens at gunpoint. Suit was filed alleging that the confiscations violated the right to keep and bear arms under the Federal and Louisiana constitutions, deprived citizens of liberty and property without due process, violated equal protection, and constituted unlawful searches and seizures. The U.S. district court enjoined the mayor and police superintendent from making further seizures and ordered return of the confiscated firearms.2 This Article describes the claims and proceedings in the case.
We went to the police facility where the guns are stored in a double wide trailer and a moving truck. Some are evidence guns (for criminal cases) but most are property guns (confiscated from citizens not accused of any crime). In both the trailer and the truck, there are piles of rifles and shotguns stacked on the floor (mostly hunting type, some military style), and large plastic buckets of handguns. The majority are rusted, some unsalvageable, others in good condition. . . .
The guns in good condition were apparently those seized from persons at their homes or in vehicles. Those in the worst condition may have originated from flooded homes when police conducted house searches for dead bodies and guns. . . .
The guns are tagged. Many tags have no names but only an address, or only the address of the block. . . .
The figure of 1,100 guns at the premises was given, including both evidence and property guns.
Thereafter the NRA and SAF publicized the address and telephone number of the police facility so that owners could retrieve their firearms. While a number of owners went to the facility, most were turned away empty handed. Police requested original bills of sale which flood victims would not have and otherwise told claimants that they could not locate the firearms requested.
Meanwhile, New Orleans filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a viable claim. The motion asserted that “the states, and by extension their political subdivisions, are free to proscribe the possession of firearms, not only because the Second Amendment does not prohibit it but also pursuant to the emergency powers granted to the State and municipality during a state of emergency.”10 Defendants argued that the claim under the Second and Fourteenth Amendments was defective, and that “although plaintiffs also assert due-process, equal-protection, and search-and-seizure claims arising under the U.S. Constitution, none of these other claims stands without their Second Amendment claims.”11 The following summarizes plaintiffs’ response and then the court’s ruling.
Count One of the Complaint alleges that the confiscations abridged and infringed on the right of citizens to keep and bear arms, in violation of U.S. Const., Amends. II and XIV and La. Const., Art. I, § 11. Federal subject matter jurisdiction arises under the Second and Fourteenth Amendments.12 Moreover, violation of the Second and Fourteenth Amendments states a claim on which relief may be granted.
The Second Amendment, like other Bill of Rights guarantees, does not apply directly to the States. However, neither the Fifth Circuit nor the Supreme Court has decided whether the Second Amendment (like other Bill of Rights guarantees) applies to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment.
Senator Jacob Howard, introducing the Fourteenth Amendment in 1866, explained that its purpose was to protect “personal rights” such as “the right to keep and bear arms.”16 The Freedmen’s Bureau Act, passed by over two-thirds of the same Congress which proposed the Fourteenth Amendment, recognized the right to “full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings concerning personal liberty, personal security, and . . . estate, real and personal, including the constitutional right to bear arms.”17 The Amendment protects from State infringement the “indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty and private property,”18 the very rights the Freedmen’s Bureau Act declared to include the right to bear arms.
Since no State action was involved, the Supreme Court never considered in Cruikshank whether the Fourteenth Amendment protected First and Second Amendment freedoms. It noted that the rights “peaceably to assemble” and “of bearing arms for a lawful purpose” long antedated the Constitution, but that the First and Second Amendments protected those rights from “encroachment” or from “be[ing] infringed by Congress,” not by private individuals.21 For protection of these and other rights from private violence, citizens must rely on the States. Cruikshank did not refer to encroachment or infringement by the States, as that was not involved in the case.
Presser v. Illinois (1886) held that requiring a permit for an armed march in a city did not violate the rights to associate or to bear arms, and that in any event the First and Second Amendments did not apply to the States.23 Presser did not consider whether the Fourteenth Amendment protects those rights by incorporating them.
Had the issue of incorporation been decided previously, the Court would have so stated, rather than refusing to consider it because it had not been raised below. Cruikshank decided only that Bill of Rights guarantees do not provide protection from private violation, and Presser and Miller v. Texas decided only that such guarantees do not apply directly to the States, but did not consider whether the Fourteenth Amendment protects the rights set forth in these guarantees.
Based on the above Fifth Circuit and Supreme Court precedents, plaintiffs argued that Count One states a claim on which relief may be granted. It is likely that these courts, if faced squarely with the issue, would decide that the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms is protected from State infringement through incorporation in the Fourteenth Amendment.
The state may regulate “the carrying of weapons concealed on the person,” Art. I, § 11, or require the registration of certain narrowly-defined arms.36 However, a total ban on and confiscation of all firearms in all places, including the home, is plainly unconstitutional.
The governor’s declaration of an emergency may authorize chief law enforcement officers to promulgate orders, to be effective for only five days, “Regulating and controlling the possession, storage, display, sale, transport and use of firearms . . . .”39 That does not authorize a prohibition on firearms possession,40 and may not be interpreted to violate constitutional guarantees.
In sum, in addition to stating a federal claim under U.S. Const., Amends. II and XIV, Count One states a claim on which relief may be granted under Article I, § 11, of the Louisiana Constitution over which the court has supplemental jurisdiction.
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no State shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Count Two alleges that the firearms confiscated by Defendants constituted private property which was lawfully possessed by Plaintiffs pursuant to State and Federal law. Moreover, the manner in which Plaintiffs kept, bore, and possessed such property constituted liberty interests recognized by State and Federal law.
Accordingly, by confiscating firearms from their lawful possessors in their homes, businesses, automobiles, boats, and otherwise, Defendants deprived them of liberty and property without due process of law. Count Two adequately alleges federal jurisdiction and states a valid claim.
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no State shall deny to any person the equal protection of the laws. Count Three alleges that at the same time that Defendants instituted and executed their policy of confiscating firearms from Plaintiffs and other law-abiding citizens and thereby prevented them from protecting their more-modest homes, Defendants allowed selected wealthy persons to keep their firearms and/or to retain armed private security personnel to protect their more expensive homes and properties. One’s ability to exercise one’s rights and to protect life and property depended on whether one had the economic means to retain armed private security personnel.
A less wealthy person who cannot afford a private security service is not more likely to misuse a firearm than is a more wealthy person or a private security guard such person may retain.53 Accordingly, the court has jurisdiction over Count Three, which states a valid claim on which relief may be granted.
“[P]olice officers may stop and briefly detain an individual for investigative purposes if they have reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.”58 Apparent lawful possession of a firearm gives rise to no such reasonable suspicion.
“An officer seizes a person when he, ‘by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen.’”59 Defendants, by their orders or their actions, violated the security of the persons and property of Plaintiffs by restraining their liberty and seizing their firearms.
Defendants violated the Fourth Amendment by searching the persons, homes, businesses, and motor vehicles of Plaintiffs and seizing their firearms. Count Four adequately states federal jurisdiction and a cause of action.
Argument on the motion to dismiss was held on August 16, 2006, before Judge Carl J. Barbier. The court found both that federal jurisdiction existed and that the complaint stated a valid cause of action, and thus denied the motion to dismiss. Although no memorandum opinion was issued, the judge concisely made clear his reasoning from the bench.
The Court: There were many groups down here at the time, but it was my understanding that they were operating under the mayor’s emergency declaration and the orders of the mayor and/or the chief of police in this respect weren’t they?
The Court: There’s not a controlling case that says it doesn’t apply either through the Fourteenth Amendment. The old cases you cited, the Cruikshank case and all didn’t consider that issue, right?
The Court: There is a question of whether the Second Amendment applied directly to the states, and obviously, it doesn’t. . . . So the issue is -- which does seem to be at least Supreme Court level an open question as to whether the Second Amendment is incorporated in the Fourteenth Amendment.
. . . Emerson says that the rights that flow under the Second Amendment are individual rights . . . .
The above comments were perceptive, in that it is a common error to assume that the Supreme Court has ruled against incorporation of the Secondment Amendment, when actually it has only ruled that the Second Amendment (like the First and Fourth) do not apply directly to the States. As the judge noted above, if the Supreme Court agrees with Emerson’s individual rights interpretation, the Second Amendment may be incorporated under the same standards as other Bill of Rights provisions. Accordingly, the court denied the motion to dismiss in its entirety.
In April 2007, plaintiffs were given access to the police property facility to begin an inventory of the firearms and to record such information about the owners as is on the tags affixed thereon. Plaintiffs’ objectives include giving notice to the owners that their firearms are in the possession of the New Orleans police – to date New Orleans has not done so – and to obtain information about the circumstances of the seizures.
A trial date of February 19, 2008, has been set. Plaintiffs’ litigation goals remain the same as at the beginning of the case – the return of seized firearms to their rightful owners and a permanent injunction against any future unlawful confiscations. The case is constitutionally significant based on the district court’s holding that an action alleging infringement on the right to keep and bear arms by local authorities under the Second and Fourteenth Amendments states a valid federal claim.
1Stephen P. Halbrook (with co-counsel Daniel Holliday) represents the plaintiffs in NRA v. Nagin. He received his Ph.D. in Philosophy from Florida State University and J.D. from Georgetown University Law Center. In addition to arguing Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997), and other cases in the Supreme Court, he is author of Firearms Law Deskbook (2007); Freedmen, the Fourteenth Amendment, & the Right to Bear Arms (1998); That Every Man Be Armed (1984, 2000); A Right to Bear Arms (1989); The Swiss and the Nazis (2006); Target Switzerland (in five languages) (1998). See also www.stephenhalbrook.com.
2National Rifle Association et al. v. Mayor Ray Nagin and Superintendent of Police Edwin Compass, Civil No. 05-4234 (E.D. La. – New Orleans Div.). Warren Riley was later substituted for Compass. In addition to the court’s website, relevant documents may be found at www.stephenhalbrook.com.
http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=nra+news+new+orleans&btnG=Google+Search (visited Sept. 7, 2007). See Konie v. Louisiana State, No. 2:05-cv-06310-MLCF-DEK (E.D. La., filed Nov. 30, 2005).
6NRA v. Nagin, 2005 WL 2428840, *2 (E.D. La, Sept. 23, 2005).
8Complaint ¶ 18, NRA v. Nagin.
9Order granting Motion for Permanent Injunction, Jan. 3, 2006, NRA v. Nagin.
10Defendants’ Memorandum (“Def. Mem.”) at 5.
12See Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 415 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981) (“a claim cannot be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because of the absence of a federal cause of action.”).
13United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 260 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 907 (2002).
14United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 551-53 (1876); Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 265, 267 (1886); Miller v. Texas, 153 U.S. 535, 538 (1894).
15Emerson, 270 F.3d at 221 n.13.
16Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 2765 (May 23, 1866). See S. Halbrook, Freedmen, the Fourteenth Amendment, & the Right to Bear Arms, 1866-1876 (1998).
1714 Stat. 176, § 14 (1866).
18Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-485 n.* (1965).
19United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876).
20United States v. Cruikshank, 25 Fed.Cas. 707, 714-15 (C.C.D.La. 1874).
23Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 265-68 (1886). See id. at 265 (“the amendment is a limitation upon the power of Congress and the National government, and not upon that of the States.”).
24Miller v. Texas, 153 U.S. 535, 538-39 (1894).
25Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281-82 (1897).
26United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990).
27“The key to discovering whether [a right] is ‘fundamental’” is whether it is “explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution.” San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33 (1973).
28Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 484 (1982).
29Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847 (1992).
30Id. at 841 (citation omitted).
32McKellar v. Mason, 159 So.2d 700, 702 (La. App. 7 Cir. 1964) (upholding right to defend home), aff’d, 245 La. 1075, 162 So.2d 571 (1964) (table).
33VII Records of the Louisiana Constitutional Convention of 1973: Convention Transcripts, 45th day at 1211.
34Delegate Tapper supported the guarantee to preclude restrictions on “the possession of firearms and weapons for the defense of the innocent people so that a man cannot have a weapon in his business place to protect himself, so that you cannot have a weapon in your home to protect yourself . . . .” Id. at 1213.
35“[I]t is reasonable . . . to regulate the possession of firearms for a limited period of time by citizens who have committed certain specified serious felonies.” State v. Amos, 343 So.2d 166, 168 (La. 1977). That is not the case regarding law-abiding citizens. See State v. Williams, 735 So.2d 62, 70 (La. App. 5 Cir. 1999) (denying that narcotics trafficker “has the equal right to possess or bear arms as does the law-abiding citizen.”) (emphasis added).
36State v. Hamlin, 497 So.2d 1369, 1371 (La. 1986) (sawed-off shotguns).
38LSA-R.S. 29:736(D). The Home Rule Charter of the City of New Orleans, § 4-206(3)(d), authorizes the mayor to declare an emergency, but not to confiscate firearms.
40In contrast to “regulating and controlling” firearms, that section refers to “Prohibiting the sale and distribution of alcoholic beverages.” § 14:329.6.A(4) (emphasis added).
41Act 275, 2006 Regular Session.
43La. Const., Art. I, § 11.
46“Every person has the right to acquire, own, control, use, enjoy, protect, and dispose of private property.” La. Const., Art. I, § 4(A). “Personal effects, other than contraband, shall never be taken.” Id. (C).
4718 U.S.C. § 926A (requiring only that the firearm be unloaded and inaccessible).
48Peoples Rights Organization v. City of Columbus, 925 F. Supp. 1254, 1269 (S.D. Ohio 1996), aff’d in part & rev’d in part on other grounds, 152 F.3d 522 (6th Cir. 1998), citing Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 300 (1982); Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 249 (1983); and Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U. S. 460, 466 (1983).
49Schaper v. City of Huntsville, 813 F.2d 709, 713-14 (5th Cir. 1987), quoting Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
50O’Quinn v. Manuel, 773 F.2d 605, 608 (5th Cir. 1985). See Augustine v. Doe, 740 F.2d 322, 327 (5th Cir. 1984) (complaint adequately alleged that detention of person deprived him of liberty, and seizure of his dog deprived him of property, both without due process).
51Hetherton v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 652 F.2d 1152, 1157-58 (3rd Cir. 1981).
53See Peoples Rights Organization, Inc. v. City of Columbus, 152 F.3d 522, 531-32 (6th Cir. 1998) (invalidating law which allowed some to register and possess certain firearms and prohibited similarly-situated persons from doing so), quoting Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10 (1992) (equal protection clause “keeps governmental decision makers from treating differently persons who are in all relevant respects alike”).
55In Augustine v. Doe, 740 F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 1984), deputy sheriffs, wielding a sawed-off shotgun and other weapons, seized the person of plaintiff in order to seize his dog without a warrant. “The facts alleged in the complaint establish a clear violation of the fourth amendment.” Id. at 325. See Castellano v. Fragozo, 352 F.3d 939, 953-54 (5th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (referring to “events that run afoul of explicit constitutional protection – the Fourth Amendment if the accused is seized and arrested, for example . . . . Such claims of lost constitutional rights are for violation of rights locatable in constitutional text . . . .”).
56Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 613-14 (1994).
57United States v. Anderson, 885 F.2d 1248, 1254 (5th Cir. 1989) (en banc).
58Goodson v. City of Corpus Christi, 202 F.3d 730, 736 (5th Cir. 2000), citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 30.
59Flores v. City of Palacios, 381 F.3d 391, 396 (5th Cir. 2004), quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968) (emphasis added).
60NRA v. Nagin, Transcript of hearing on motion to dismiss 4-5 (Aug. 16, 2006). The transcript is available at www.stephenhalbrook.com.
Here, defense counsel failed to timely answer discovery requests or provide initial disclosures. Defense counsel also ignored the repeated requests of Plaintiffs’ counsel to discuss the matter. . . . Defense counsel has caused time and money to be wasted by Plaintiffs’ counsel and further admits that he has “no good reason” to explain his behavior. This type of conduct is wholly unprofessional and shall not be condoned.

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