Source: http://campbelllawreview.com/a-plea-to-north-carolina-bring-fairness-to-the-assessment-of-civil-battery-liability-for-defendants-with-cognitive-disabilities/
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 14:48:33+00:00

Document:
Johnny C. Chriscoe1Associate Professor, Campbell University School of Law. The author would like to thank Peter Borden and Campbell Bentson for their research and support.
North Carolina legislators and judges frequently refuse to bow to national majority positions and trends in tort law. For example, North Carolina is one of the few states to continue to recognize contributory negligence as a complete bar to recovery in negligence actions,2See, e.g., Scheffer v. Dalton, 777 S.E.2d 534, 541 (N.C. Ct. App. 2015) (“In North Carolina, a plaintiff’s right to recover in a personal injury or wrongful death action is barred upon a finding of contributory negligence.” (citing Brewer v. Harris, 182 S.E.2d 345, 350 (N.C. 1971); Prior v. Pruett, 550 S.E.2d 166, 173 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001), disc. rev. denied, 563 S.E.2d 572 (N.C. 2002))). to continue to recognize the heart balm torts of alienation of affections and criminal conversation,3In 1984, the North Carolina Court of Appeals attempted to abolish alienation of affections and criminal conversation. See Cannon v. Miller, 322 S.E.2d 780, 804 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984). On appeal, the North Carolina Supreme Court vacated the decision of the court of appeals. Cannon v. Miller, 327 S.E.2d 888 (N.C. 1985) (“It appearing that the panel of Judges of the Court of Appeals to which this case was assigned has acted under a misapprehension of its authority to overrule decisions of the Supreme Court of North Carolina and its responsibility to follow those decisions, until otherwise ordered by the Supreme Court. It is therefore ordered that the petition for discretionary review is allowed for the sole purpose of vacating the decision of the Court of Appeals purporting to abolish the causes of action for Alienation of Affections and Criminal Conversation.” (citing Cannon, 322 S.E.2d 780)). and to continue, against widespread popularity to the contrary, to reject strict liability as a basis for recovery in an action arising out of products liability.4See, e.g., David G. Owen, Products Liability Law § 5.3, at 273 (2005) (“The American Law Institute approved Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A at its annual meeting in 1964 and published it the following year in volume 2 of the Second Restatement. With a gusto unmatched in the annals of Restatements of the Law, the new doctrine swept across the face of America as courts and legislatures embraced § 402A and the bold new doctrine that it proclaimed: ‘strict’ liability in tort for harm caused by defective products. Tort law has probably never witnessed such a rapid, widespread, and altogether explosive change in a rule and theory of legal responsibility.” (footnotes omitted)). But see N.C. Gen. Stat. § 99B-1.1 (2015) (“There shall be no strict liability in tort in product liability actions.”).
North Carolina legislators and judges repeatedly demonstrate a willingness to be innovative in addressing complex legal issues. Examples include the creation of the North Carolina Business Court,5N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-45.3 (2015) (“The Chief Justice may exercise the authority under rules of practice prescribed pursuant to G.S. 7A-34 to designate one or more of the special superior court judges authorized by G.S. 7A-45.1 to hear and decide complex business cases as prescribed by the rules of practice. Any judge so designated shall be known as a Business Court Judge and shall preside in the Business Court.”).designed to address and resolve complex business issues, and the Veterans Court,6Jamie Markham, Veterans Treatment Court, N.C. Crim. L., UNC Sch. of Gov’t: North Carolina Criminal Law (Nov. 12, 2014, 12:35 PM), http://nccriminallaw.sog?.unc.edu/veterans-treatment-court/ [https://perma.cc/C374-TCD4]. a specialized criminal court established to work through the complicated issues experienced by military veterans.
North Carolina is urged to once again stray from the national majority positions in tort law and be innovative in addressing complex legal issues. This time, the issue to be addressed is the intentional tort of battery and the assessment of liability for adults with pertinent and diagnosable cognitive disabilities.
While much of the discussion herein would apply to intentional torts in general, this Article focuses on the intentional tort of battery. Battery appears most prevalently in the cases cited in this Article. Further, battery presents an additional issue of intent with regard to how it is applied to the other operative elements of the tort,7See infra notes 64–98 and accompanying text (discussing the issue of “single intent” versus “dual intent”). which makes battery particularly interesting with respect to its application to defendants with diagnosable cognitive disabilities.
For purposes of the intentional tort of battery, the majority rules and principles of law, under certain circumstances, appear to place adults with cognitive disabilities in a uniquely unfair position. The law of intent, while fair on its face, often applies unfairly because of flawed legal analysis by the courts or, in certain instances, a lack of analysis.
North Carolina currently appears to follow the flawed application of the law, but its law is grounded in a handful of cases that are now decades to a century old.8See infra notes 127–46 and accompanying text. The courts decided these cases at a time when the treatment of persons with cognitive disabilities, in general, was problematic given the basic misunderstanding and lack of knowledge about such disabilities. Many advancements in the understanding of cognitive disabilities have occurred since these decisions were rendered. Thus, North Carolina is now in an excellent position to revisit these rules and to bring honesty and fairness to the application of the law.
This Article is a plea to North Carolina to hold the plaintiff to his burden of proving the prima facie element of intent, for purposes of civil battery, even when the defendant has a pertinent and diagnosable cognitive disability. Such proof requires reliable evidence from qualified witnesses on the defendant’s ability to form the requisite intent. Therefore, specialized courts may be necessary to fully assess such issues, or these cases may of necessity be combined with cases in other courts to the extent they exist, where mental health issues are common.
Part I of this Article discusses courts’ tendencies to fail to analyze or discuss the prima facie element of intent when assessing the civil battery liability of a defendant with a cognitive disability. It further discusses their inclination to focus instead on the inapplicability of the defense of insanity, which they justify with the statement that “the insane are liable for their torts.” Part II explores North Carolina’s early and current position on these issues, which tends to follow the analysis found in other jurisdictions. Part III discusses how North Carolina might lead the way in bringing fairness to the assessment of civil battery liability for defendants with cognitive disabilities.

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