Source: http://www.davinburlingham.com/2008/03/
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 22:32:25+00:00

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Did Aryeh Neier see this coming?
I gave a seminar presentation two days ago to a group of fifteen upper-year law students on the topic of hate-speech legislation and why it should be repealed. A very spirited discussion ensued, and although a couple of students became visibly upset at one time or another, generally it was very stimulating and a genuine pleasure to take part in. Not one person who spoke, however, agreed with my thesis that hate-speech laws are 1) enforced in a manner that is procedurally unfair, 2) ineffective at combating racism, and 3) morally indefensible for a host of reasons.
The arguments against my proposals were many, and all very thoughtful. We disagreed over whether certain kinds of expression - such as the Muhammad cartoons and Mark Steyn's article "The future belongs to Islam" - could be considered likely to expose a person or group of persons to 'hatred and contempt' as defined in the Taylor case from 1990 ("unusually strong and deep-felt emotions of detestation, calumny and vilification"). Another argument, as discussed in my last post, was that much of this speech, whether technically hateful or not, had little or no inherent value, and therefore society would not lose much from its suppression.
I won't try to recap the entire discussion now, but I would like to deal with what I (and my interlocutors, I think) consider one of the strongest arguments in favour of hate-speech laws and censorship. This line of reasoning is one I have encountered in conversations with many other people, including some very informed lawyers. It goes something like this: we need reasonable limits on free speech to protect the rights of vulnerable groups in society. These groups have the right to be free from violence, to feel secure in their communities, to have their voices heard. For their sake, it is appropriate to place some restrictions on the speech rights of dominant groups - whites, heterosexuals, Christians.
I mean, it is all well and good to defend the free speech rights of Stephen Boissoin in an abstract, constitutional sense, when the pastor writes an allegedly homophobic letter to his local newspaper (see that case here). "You can defend him," the argument goes, "because you are not a gay teenager in Red Deer - constantly fearing for your safety, feeling like an outcast, wondering when those guys at school are going to attack next, seeing the looks and hearing the jeers of a homophobic community. And sure, it's easy for you free speech absolutists to tell me that Levant and Steyn have a right to publish the things they did, and cite me a stack of old English parchment like the Magna Carta and the Areopagitica. All that is fine for John Milton and those dead barons, but they were never Muslims living in a post-9/11 climate of fear. They never had to deal with the 'no-fly list' or the Patriot Act or CSIS agents coming to their door at 2 a.m. You cannot understand the daily sensation of being under attack in your own country, because you are part of the dominant group. These restrictions on speech are not there for the benefit of you, the powerful; they are there for the benefit of us, the vulnerable. "
Now, how are those in favour of free speech to respond to that argument? I must say that this is the danger inherent when you make constitutional rights versus safety concerns a question of "balance." When you frame the issue like this, whose rights are going to tip that scale? The rights of someone republishing some silly cartoon, or the rights of the helpless teenager threatened by rednecks? Does Mark Steyn's right to say whatever he wants about the Muslim community in Europe outweigh the safety concerns of the Muslim community in Orillia, or Mississauga, or Vancouver?
This argument appears so strong at first, but in fact suffers from a fatal weakness: The one concerned about safety would have the Charter right to free speech eroded for fear of possible hate crimes. Those who advocate free speech argue against such state intervention. Bearing in mind that the Charter is only binding upon the state, those who would have it breached have a much more difficult case to make. We all agree that the victim of a hate crime has had his rights to security of the person (and possibly the right to equality) violated by the criminal. However, the person who suffers censorship has had her rights violated by the state. This is a crucial distinction.
Me: You can say you approve of Ezra Levant printing the Muhammad cartoons, or you can say that you disapprove. You have the luxury of being able to make that judgment call. You have the luxury of studying it closely, of deciding for yourself whether it is appropriate, of being personally autonomous, and this is because of the courage of journalists like Levant who published it at risk to themselves. But if we allow the kind of censorship we are seeing from the Alberta Human Rights Tribunal, you won't be able to make that call next time. You won't be able to see the next controversial cartoon, because it won't ever be drawn. Whoever has the idea for a funny cartoon about Vishnu or Moses or Muhammad will think to herself, 'Do I really need the trouble? Is this cartoon worth one hundred thousand dollars in legal fees and endless headaches?' That, or else that cartoonist's editor will spike the work, because that editor has seen what happened to Maclean's magazine. Next time, the censors will have made the call for you.
Other student: You use the word 'luxury' - you say I have the 'luxury' of studying this cartoon. I question that. What do I gain from looking at this cartoon? What inherent value does it have? And if we suppress it, have we really lost anything of value? One has to balance rights in the law. I would say that the possible prejudicial effect of publishing something like this, the only intent of which seems to be to injure the sensibilities of a threatened minority in society and possibly to generate ill will towards that minority, is substantial. Balance this against the inherent value of the expression contained in the cartoon, its artistic merit and whatever other messages it may attempt to convey, and I think it is clear that the scales must tip in favour of a cautious approach. If we allow publication of that cartoon, do we not make it more likely that Muslims, who may already feel insecure in the present political climate, may feel a 'chilling effect' themselves, and be afraid to speak their minds for fear of repercussion? I feel that we must strive not just for a robust public discourse, but one that is respectful of the basic precepts of human dignity, that takes place within a clearly defined framework of equality and mutual understanding.
What inherent value is there in those cartoons, indeed?
That question needs a lot of time to answer, more than I had today.
Now for a trip outside of British Columbia, to the prairies. This case (click here), Owens v. Saskatchewan (Human Rights Commission) (Sask Q.B.) , dates from a while ago, and in fact the Human Rights Tribunal case where it originated was from way back in 1997. Try as I might, I could not find a reported version of the original HRT case, either on the tribunal's website or on Quicklaw or Westlaw. Until I can locate the written reasons of the tribunal from '97 (assuming that the tribunal did write any), it will have to suffice to look at Hugh Owens' appeal to the Saskatchewan Court of Queen's Bench (which is the equivalent of the Supreme Court here in British Columbia - the Court to which you apply if you want to appeal a decision by the HRT).
The Appellant, Bruce Owens, had been found to have breached s. 14(1) of the Saskatchewan Human Rights Code, which in part prohibits the publication of any material "which exposes, or tends to expose, to hatred, ridicules, belittles or otherwise affronts the dignity of any person, any class of persons or a group of persons."Mr. Owens, a Protestant Christian from Regina, placed an advertisement for bumper stickers in the Star-Phoenix, Saskatoon's major daily newspaper. Included in the advertisement was a reproduction of the images on one of the bumper stickers he was putting up for sale. The sticker in the advertisement featured references to four Bible passages - Romans 1, Leviticus 18:22, Leviticus 20:13 and 1 Corinthians 6:9-10 - that condemn homosexuality and sexual immorality, and warn that such acts were contrary to the will of God. Note that the Bible passages themselves were not reprinted in the advertisement, merely cited to chapter and verse. Next to the citations, in the middle of the sticker, was the 'equal' symbol ( = ).
Actually, not only 'forbidden;' because a couple of the passages advocate violent punishment for such sinners. For example, the Romans bit reads, "those who do such things deserve death," and Leviticus says "They must be put to death; their blood will be on their own hands." So, could we formulate the meaning like this: 'Because the Bible says homosexuality is forbidden and gays should be put to death, gays should be put to death'? That may be going a bit too far. The red circle with the slash does not really seem to signify death, as the Court notes. It means something closer to "forbidden, not allowed, or not wanted," as the definition goes.
"It is clear that the advertisement is intended to make the group depicted appear to be inferior or not wanted at best. When combined with the Biblical quotations, the advertisement may result in a much stronger meaning. It is obvious that certain of the Biblical quotations suggest more dire consequences..."
Neither the Tribunal nor the Court, then, could really settle on an objective meaning. The passage above says that the publication in question "may" go as far as inciting violence, but at the very least contains a message of strong contempt for homosexuals. Whatever the actual message was, it was enough for the Tribunal to find against Mr. Owens. It found that, while the drawing of the stick figures might not have been sufficient to expose gays to "hatred and ridicule," when combined with the references to Bible passages it was strong enough to be caught by the section. The respondent was ordered to pay $1500 dollars in damages to each of the three men who had brought complaints.
Now before Queen's Bench, Mr. Owens made three arguments on his appeal: First, that the Tribunal had misapprehended the facts of the case by finding that he had included four Bible passages instead of four Bible references. This was splitting hairs, and the Court basically said so. Second, he said that the Tribunal had used the wrong legal test in determining whether s. 14(1) of the Code should apply. In considering this, the Court citedHuman Rights Commission (Sask.) v. Engineering Students' Society, that the section's purpose was to discourage or prohibit any activity which "belittles or otherwise affronts the dignity of any person," and that the message in question would need to have a specific effect in order to be caught. The judge found that this was, indeed, the proper test, and that their conclusion about the message's effects was correct.
The Appellant's third ground of appeal was that the Tribunal's ruling had violated his freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter. The Court dealt with this argument very perfunctorily, considering the importance of the right and the gravity of the claim. Citing Chief Justice Dickson's ruling in the famous case of R. v. Taylor by way of Bell, Barclay J. had clear and binding authority to the effect that an infringement of s. 2(b) could be justified as a reasonable limit in circumstances like those at bar. Furthermore, the judge cited Ross v. New Brunswick School District (discussed briefly in a post below), where the SCC said that the legal test was the same for infringements of religious freedoms as for infringements of free speech. Barclay J. then dismissed the appeal.
Mr. Owens would, however, subsequently take his fight to the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal. I will take a look at that case next time.
Here is the story from the Calgary Herald. One is tempted to say that the march represents a black eye for the city, but let us not kid ourselves - any big city in Canada probably boasts a comparable number of such types. Say, then, a black eye for Canada.
I have no idea how Ezra Levant manages to write so much, so fast, so well on this issue. This post is just one example.
Big day for anti-censorship; or, I say, "Blame the chair!"
By which I mean today, Saturday the 22nd, because the National Post published a corker of a story (click here to read) by Joseph Brean that takes a very close look at the workings of and philosophy behind the federal hate speech complaint mechanisms.
"The mere fact that you've got a legal system that allows for a complaint which is maybe wrong doesn't in itself invalidate the system. If somebody tries to hit you with a chair, you don't blame the chair."
That makes sense, no? Must we 'blame the chair,' 'throw the baby out with the bathwater,' 'let a few bad apples spoil the whole bunch?' I mean, does it really matter, in a long-term sense, that there are two very high-profile instances of abuse in the complaints against Ezra Levant and Mark Steyn? Two bad cases in the entire history of the Human Rights Commission is really not so bad a record. Compare that to our criminal justice system, for example. I can cite you a list of wrongful convictions from recent memory, convictions that had far more severe consequences for the defendants than anything the HRCs can do: Guy Paul Morin, David Milgaard, Steven Truscott, Donald Marshall... the list goes on. The criminal justice system has obviously perpetrated its share of injustices. Should we 'blame the chair,' and shut the thing down? Obviously not. Case closed, then?
Well, not exactly. One of the many problems with this line of reasoning is that it assumes that the Human Rights Commissions were doing just fine at enforcing hate speech laws before these bad cases came along. It assumes that, as long as the commissions were going after neo-nazis and homophobes, the system was humming along wonderfully.
But what if that assumption is completely wrong? What if, instead of silencing these neo-nazi types, our prosecutions turned them into heroes for their supporters? What if the system were set up in such a way that it allowed a few serial complainants to use the commissions over and over and over again? And what if, after all these years of fines and 'cease and desist' orders against neo-nazis and other haters, racism continued to rise at an alarming rate? In other words, what if the chair is useless even as a chair?
In that case, I would say it's time for some new furniture.
When is a free speech violation not a free speech violation?
Answer: when the case involves either the withdrawal of state funding for your artwork or the loss of a public sector job for speaking your mind. Leaving the issue of Bill C-10 aside for another day, let us consider the latter scenario: say, for example, that you are a public school teacher. You earn your living in the public sector, and are paid with taxpayer money. Your job is to mold young minds, to educate and inspire young ones. But in this hypothetical, you are a racist. Not the subtle kind who mutters epithets in private, or expounds upon loony conspiracy theories among friends. No, you are the type of racist who wants to shout your message from the mountaintops, and so you make your crazy ideas well known to anyone who will listen. Naturally, you are eventually fired from your job.
Has the state violated your freedom of speech? The Supreme Court said yes, but I must respectfully disagree. The case was Ross v. New Brunswick School District No. 15 from 1996. Malcolm Ross, our teacher, had been articulating his anti-semitic views in pamphlets, books, and television interviews. His convictions were fairly well-known in the community, and this led some people to question whether he was really the best man for his position. A parent filed a complaint with the New Brunswick Human Rights Commission, which ordered that Ross be given a non-teaching position.
Has anyone's free speech been violated? I would answer that question in the negative. Ross has the right to promulgate his hateful views. He does not have the right to promulgate his hateful views while being a schoolteacher. Speech will always have consequences, and people will always have to make choices about how much they want to say and when. I do not think this case has anything to do with the current questions about Human Rights Commissions and free speech.
As a bit of a departure from the Doug Collins case, here is one where the defendant was found not to have committed discrimination within the meaning of the BC legislation. The case is Khanna v. Common Ground Publishing Corp.  and is a good illustration of the kinds of publications that can give rise to a complaint that will be taken seriously by the Tribunal (a link to the case is here; all the decisions are available free of charge on the Tribunal's website).
Common Ground magazine bills itself as the most popular monthly magazine in Western Canada devoted to "health, wellness, ecology, personal growth and spirituality." It may be available all over Western Canada, but I only remember seeing it when I moved to Vancouver. In any case, it is a free publication, and it would be stretching things to say that the magazine's is especially edgy or controversial, at least in the sense of something like the late Western Standard. Here is the magazine's website, and as you can see, it mostly features stories about green living and left-wing politics.
The hate speech complaint arose from the cover art on the June 24 issue, which was supposed to illustrate a piece on consumerism. They decided to go with some art involving the Hindu god Shiva, with some icons placed around him representing different facets of whatever the article was going to be discussing. Here is a look at the cover in question, although I don't know whether Common Ground changed the design slightly following the complaint (there was some talk in the case of the god standing on a 'marketing executive,' but that does not appear to be the case now).
Before filing the complaint, the doctor expressed his concerns in an email to the magazine, wherein he claimed that the graphics would cause 'mental pollution' in the reader, making it impossible to appreciate what the god's image was supposed to represent. He asked that the magazine publish letters from some members of the Hindu community on the subject. The editors did not respond to this request, but published a brief explanation in a subsequent issue, which stopped short of an apology. Not satisfied, Dr. Khanna decided to file a human rights complaint.
At the hearing, the complainant summoned as witnesses two priests from local Hindu temples. One of the priests described the image as 'sacrilege' and 'desecration,' while the other testified that he was offended at first, but was mollified after a conversation with the publisher and author. The magazine's chief editor, apparently without the aid of legal counsel, simply argued that the publication was not discriminatory within the meaning s.7 of the Code.
In the end, the tribunal member, T. Beharrel, agreed with the respondents that a prima facie case of discrimination could not be made out on the facts. The image was not indicative of 'extreme ill-will' towards people of the Hindu religion, he writes. While 'provocative,' the member did not find the drawing to carry 'an inherently negative tone.' Common Ground applied for costs against the complainant, arguing that Dr. Khanna had attacked everything the magazine stood for, and claiming that the purpose of the complaint was to extract money. The test for awarding costs in human rights cases in BC, however, is 'improper conduct,' which apparently is rather difficult to meet (one professor of mine has said that the complainant would pretty much have to lie on the witness stand). No costs were awarded to the magazine.
On a positive note, it would seem that the case was handled relatively quickly. It does not say when the complaint was filed, but taking June of 2004 as a starting point and the date of the decision on Sept. 7, 2005 as the end, we can deduce that the complaint ate up just over a year of the respondent's life.
Here is a short video from the CBC on the Ezra Levant hate speech case (click on the video on the lower-left hand side of the screen).
Something interesting from the case of Canadian Jewish Congress v. North Shore Free Press Ltd . The case is about some newspaper articles by one Doug Collins, at which both Harry Abrams and the Canadian Jewish Congress (CJC) took offense. A link to the case is here.
Notice at paragraph 232, the discussion of the 'neutral reporter' defence in hate speech complaints. As some background, it should be understood that in hate speech cases, as with any other complaint of discrimination, intent is not relevant to liability. Meaning, if someone's actions, words, drawings, etc. are found to have been discriminatory, it does not matter whether the discrimination was intentional or not. The main reason for this rule is that human rights laws are supposed to catch systemic types of bigotry and prejudice, which may be unconscious.
The 'neutral reporter' defence would normally be available to someone who was merely repeating the impugned communications of another party for their news value. The tribunal mentions a case from Denmark where a TV news reporter was charged with a criminal offence for presenting an interview with a member of a far-right group. Could something similar happen under s. 7 of the BC Human Rights Code (obviously not a criminal charge, but a complaint?) In my opinion, the tribunal's treatment of the issue is a bit murky, and no doubt there are better explanations in other cases.
In brief, the tribunal says that it would have to consider the "tone and style of the reporting," as well as a number of other factors, such as whether the reporting came under the news or the op/ed section, and the news value of the piece. The tribunal member, Nitya Iyer, then writes that s.7 would likely catch"reporting which exploits and sensationalizes hateful or contemptuous views without regard for the impact, not only of what is reported but also of the report itself, on vulnerable groups."
Suffice to say, that seems to be a pretty broad basis for judicial oversight of the media.
The best way to describe Edmund Burke's nationality is "English, British, Irish," according to this very interesting article by Joseph Morrison Skelly. With his Dublin heritage, Anglican father, Catholic mother and sister, and royalist philosophy, Burke was able to navigate through English political life by embracing this complex identity. It is not a mistake to refer to him as a 'great Irish statesman,' then, as long as one remembers how many layers there really are to that cake.
Reflections has so much in it to discuss and praise, but I will confine myself to a couple of observations. First, his defence of England's limited franchise against Revolutionary France's more general one. He remarks that the revolutionaries harboured real contempt for the masses that sometimes seeped through their statements in support of full representation. At the same time, the architects of the new system and those like-minded sneered at the English voting laws, saying they produced only partial liberty. Burke's rejoinder is that England's process had been proved "perfectly adequate to all the purposes for which a representation of the people can be desired or devised."
Elsewhere, the author is most skeptical about the ameliorative power of 'pure' democracy. Could one argue, then, that the great Irishman is not really a model for conservatives today, who are forever arguing that power should be in the hands of the many, the people, the masses? I mean, in opposition to the appointed judiciary, the unaccountable bureaucrats, or heads of huge conglomerations like the European Union, many of whom are not tested at the polls. I think that, read together with other statements in the book, we can understand his position on the franchise in another way.
Was Burke just reactionary in his condemnation of 1789? No, but he was a man of prudence. There is almost a presumption (rebuttable, but still there) in his thinking that an innovation is worth one-half or less of whatever is impugned. "Rage and phrenzy will pull down more in half an hour, than prudence, deliberation and foresight can build up in a hundred years." It is easy to point out flaws and to tear down, but "to preserve and to reform is quite another thing." The point is that the way democracy evolved - slowly, cautiously - is exactly what Burke had in mind.
I just finished reading one of the great Irishmen of letters, Edmund Burke - his Reflections on the Revolution in France. Will post thoughts later.

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