Source: http://nm.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20180712_0001477.DNM.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 23:17:18+00:00

Document:
NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting Commissioner of Social Security,, Defendant.
THIS MATTER is before the Court on the Social Security Administrative Record (Doc. 16) filed July 7, 2017, in support of Plaintiff Christine Perea's (“Plaintiff”) Complaint (Doc. 1) seeking review of the decision of Defendant Nancy A. Berryhill, Acting Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, (“Defendant” or “Commissioner”) denying Plaintiff's claim for Title XVI supplemental security income benefits. On August 30, 2017, Plaintiff filed her Motion to Reverse or Remand and Memorandum Brief in Support (“Motion”). (Docs. 19, 20.) The Commissioner filed a Response in opposition on November 6, 2017 (Doc. 22), and Plaintiff filed a Reply on November 14, 2017. (Doc. 23.) The Court has jurisdiction to review the Commissioner's final decision under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c). Having meticulously reviewed the entire record and the applicable law and being fully advised in the premises, the Court finds the Motion is well taken and is GRANTED.
(4) If, however, the claimant's impairments do not meet or equal in severity one of the listing described in Appendix 1 of the regulations, the ALJ must determine at step four whether the claimant can perform her “past relevant work.” Answering this question involves three phases. Winfrey v. Chater, 92 F.3d 1017, 1023 (10th Cir. 1996). First, the ALJ considers all of the relevant medical and other evidence and determines what is “the most [claimant] can still do despite [her physical and mental] limitations.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)(1), 416.945(a)(1). This is called the claimant's residual functional capacity (“RFC”). Id. §§ 404.1545(a)(3), 416.945(a)(3). Second, the ALJ determines the physical and mental demands of claimant's past work. Third, the ALJ determines whether, given claimant's RFC, the claimant is capable of meeting those demands. A claimant who is capable of returning to past relevant work is not disabled.
See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4) (disability insurance benefits); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4) (supplemental security income disability benefits); Fischer-Ross v. Barnhart, 431 F.3d 729, 731 (10th Cir. 2005); Grogan v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 1257, 1261 (10th Cir. 2005). The claimant has the initial burden of establishing a disability in the first four steps of this analysis. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146, n.5, 107 S.Ct. 2287, 2294, n. 5, 96 L.Ed.2d 119 (1987). The burden shifts to the Commissioner at step five to show that the claimant is capable of performing work in the national economy. Id. A finding that the claimant is disabled or not disabled at any point in the five-step review is conclusive and terminates the analysis. Casias v. Sec'y of Health & Human Serv., 933 F.2d 799, 801 (10th Cir. 1991).
This Court must affirm the Commissioner's denial of social security benefits unless (1) the decision is not supported by “substantial evidence” or (2) the ALJ did not apply the proper legal standards in reaching the decision. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Hamlin v. Barnhart, 365 F.3d 1208, 1214 (10th Cir. 2004); Langley v. Barnhart, 373 F.3d 1116, 1118 (10th Cir. 2004); Casias, 933 F.2d at 800-01. In making these determinations, the Court “neither reweigh[s] the evidence nor substitute[s] [its] judgment for that of the agency.'” Bowman v. Astrue, 511 F.3d 1270, 1272 (10th Cir. 2008). A decision is based on substantial evidence where it is supported by “relevant evidence . . . a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Langley, 373 F.3d at 1118. A decision “is not based on substantial evidence if it is overwhelmed by other evidence in the record[, ]” Langley, 373 F.3d at 1118, or “constitutes mere conclusion.” Musgrave v. Sullivan, 966 F.2d 1371, 1374 (10th Cir. 1992). The agency decision must “provide this court with a sufficient basis to determine that appropriate legal principles have been followed.” Jensen v. Barnhart, 436 F.3d 1163, 1165 (10th Cir. 2005). Therefore, although an ALJ is not required to discuss every piece of evidence, “the record must demonstrate that the ALJ considered all of the evidence, ” and “the [ALJ's] reasons for finding a claimant not disabled” must be “articulated with sufficient particularity.” Clifton v. Chater, 79 F.3d 1007, 1009-10 (10th Cir. 1996).
the claimant may never climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds; occasional climbing of ramps or stairs; occasional crouching, kneeling or crawling; she must avoid concentrated exposure to moving machinery or exposure to heights; she can maintain, understand and remember simple work instructions with only occasional changes in work setting and only occasional interaction with the public and co-workers.
In support of her Motion, Ms. Perea argues that (1) the ALJ failed to assign proper weight to the medical source opinions; (2) the ALJ erred in her analysis under the mental Listings of Impairments; and (3) the ALJ failed to meet her burden at step five. (Doc. 20 at 9-20.) For the reasons discussed below, the Court finds that the ALJ failed to properly weigh the medical source opinion evidence and this case requires remand.
1. State Agency Examining Medical Consultant Scott Evans, M.D.
2. State Agency Nonexamining Medical Consultant Nancy Armstrong, M.D.
3. State Agency Nonexamining Medical Consultant Karine Lancaster, M.D.
“An ALJ must evaluate every medical opinion in the record, although the weight given each opinion will vary according to the relationship between the disability claimant and the medical professional.” Hamlin, 365 F.3d at 1215. Specifically, when assessing a claimant's RFC, an ALJ must explain what weight is assigned to each opinion and why. SSR 96-5p, 1996 WL 374183 at *5. “An ALJ must also consider a series of specific factors in determining what weight to give any medical opinion.” Hamlin, 365 F.3d at 1215 (citing Goatcher v. United States Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 52 F.3d 288, 290 (10th Cir. 1995)). An ALJ need not articulate every factor; however, the ALJ's decision must be “sufficiently specific to make clear to any subsequent reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave to the treating source's medical opinion and the reasons for that weight.” Oldham v. Astrue, 509 F.3d 1254, 1258 (10th Cir. 2007). In deciding how much weight to give a treating source opinion, an ALJ must first determine whether the opinion qualifies for controlling weight. Langley, 373 F.3d at 1119 (citing Watkins v. Barnhart, 350 F.3d 1297, 1300 (10th Cir. 2003)). Even if a treating physician's opinion is not entitled to controlling weight, “[t]reating source medical opinions are still entitled to deference and must be weighed using all of the [regulatory] factors.” Id. Generally the opinion of a treating physician is given more weight than that of an examining consultant, and the opinion of a non-examining consultant is given the least weight of all. Robinson v. Barnhart, 366 F.3d 1078, 1084 (10th Cir. 2004). Ultimately, ALJs are required to weigh medical source opinions and to provide “appropriate explanations for accepting or rejecting such opinions.” SSR 96-5p, 1996 WL 374183 at *5 (emphasis added); see Keyes-Zachary v Astrue, 695 F.3d 1156, 1161 (10th Cir. 2012) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(e)(2)(ii))).
Here, the ALJ failed to properly weigh the medical source opinion evidence related to Ms. Perea's physical impairments as discussed below.
In according partial weight to Dr. Evans' opinion, the ALJ explained, on the one hand, that she found Dr. Evans' report “reasonable, ” and that she assessed an RFC consistent with light work. (Tr. 20.) The ALJ explained, on the other hand, without more, that certain of Dr. Evans' remarks were not supported by evidence in the record. (Id.) The ALJ's explanation, however, is both unclear and confusing because the ALJ's RFC assessment for light work is inconsistent with all of Dr. Evans' functional limitations; i.e., that Ms. Perea could (1) stand for a total of two hours; (2) walk for one hour; (3) sit for two hours; and (4) lift eight pounds regularly and fifteen pounds occasionally. (Tr. 481.) In other words, the ALJ implicitly rejected all of Dr. Evans' assessed functional limitations even though she purported to find it “reasonable, ” to accord it partial weight, and to rely on it to support her RFC determination for light work. The ALJ erred both in failing to make clear to the Court the reasons for the weight she accorded Dr. Evans' opinion and in assessing an RFC that is wholly inconsistent with his opinion to which she purportedly assigned some weight.

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