Source: https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/263/255
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 16:33:16+00:00

Document:
Messrs. E. L. Mooney and John P. O'Brien, both of New York City, for petitioner.
Mr. Solicitor General Beck, of Washington, D. C., for respondent.
The opinions below are reported in United States v. Craig (D. C.) 266 Fed. 230; Ex parte Craig (D. C.) 274 Fed. 177; United States v. Craig (D. C.) 279 Fed. 900; Ex parte Craig %(c. c. a.) 282 f/ed. 138.
In October, 1919, petitioner Craig, Comptroller of New York City, wrote and published a letter to Public Service Commissioner Nixon, wherein he assailed United States District Judge Mayer because of certain action taken in receivership proceedings then pending. The United States district attorney filed an information charging him with criminal contempt under section 268, Judicial Code (Comp. St. § 1245).
'We command you that the body of Charles L. Craig, in your custody detained, as it is said, together with the day and cause of his caption and detention, you safely have before Honorable Martin T. Manton, United States Circuit Judge for the Second Judicial Circuit, within the circuit and district aforesaid, to do and receive all and singular those things which the said judge shall then and there consider of him in this behalf; and have you then and there this writ.
'Witness the Honorable Martin T. Manton, United States Circuit Judge for the Second Judicial Circuit, this 24th day of February, 1921, and in the 145th year of the Independence of the United States of America.
'Martin T. Manton, U. S. C. J.
The marshal made return, and set up the contempt proceedings in the District Court along with the order of commitment. This was traversed, and Judge Manton heard the cause. He said and ruled: 'Was there a cause pending within the rule of contempt concerning libelous publications? A cause is pending when it is still open to modifications, appeal or rehearing, and until the final judgment is rendered. Did the letter concern a cause pending? If it did not, it could not obstruct the administration of justice. The application before the court, which is the subject-matter of the letter, was the matter of a coreceiver. As to this the court had definitely decided adverse to the comptroller. The court's action was complete in respect to this matter. * * * The District Judge pointed out, as did the information, that the whole railroad situation was before the court, since it was an equity proceeding; but it is not of this that the defendant wrote. This is fully corroborated by the testimony of the defendant. He also testified that he had no intention of obstructing the delivery of justice or misbehaving himself so as to obstruct the administration of justice. He stands convicted upon his letter alone, and such inferences as may be drawn therefrom. His conviction rests upon an issue between the court and the defendant, and it is one of terminology or interpretation. There is no criminal intent discoverable from this record to support the interpretation placed upon it by the court, nor was there pending sub judice a proceeding before the court at the time the letter was written. The conclusion is irresistible that the court exceeded its jurisdiction by an excess of power in adjudging the defendant guilty. The petition for discharge is granted.' 274 Fed. 187.
'We find no reason why this case is not governed by the general rule that a habeas corpus proceeding cannot be used as a writ of error, but must be limited to jurisdictional questions. * * * The sole question which could be considered in the habeas corpus proceedings was as to the jurisdiction of the District Judge. If he had jurisdiction of the person of the petitioner, Craig, and jurisdiction of the subject and authority to render the judgment which he pronounced, there was no right to inquire further in the habeas corpus proceedings, and no right to determine whether or not, in the exercise of that jurisdiction, the District Judge had committed error. If errors were committed, the law afforded a remedy therefor, but not by habeas corpus.' 282 Fed. 151.
It concluded that the District Court, Judge Mayer presiding, had jurisdiction of both offense and person, and reversed the order of discharge.
The court correctly held that United States Circuit Judges, as such, have no power to grant writs of habeas corpus.
Two sections of the Revised Statutes authorize the granting and issuing of such writs.
Comp. St. §§ 1279, 1280.
'For each of the nine existing judicial circuits there shall be appointed a Circuit Judge, who shall reside in his circuit, and shall possess the same power and jurisdiction therein as the justice of the Supreme Court allotted to the circuit.' Section 2.
Sections 751 and 752, Rev. Stats. give authority to grant writs of habeas corpus only to judges and justices of the courts therein specifiedSupreme, Circuit and District. The Judicial Code abolished the Circuit Courts. Only justices of the Supreme Court and judges of District Courts remain within the ambit of the statute.
'See, also Duff v. Carrier, 5 C. C. A. 177, 55 Fed. 433.
'The result is that, unless the Act of March 3, 1891, is construed as lodging in the Circuit Courts of Appeals the appellate jurisdiction, under Section 763, from final decisions of District Judges, that was previously exercised by the Circuit Courts, the right of appeal, plainly granted by that section, from final decisions of District Judges at chambers in habeas corpus cases is lost, and becomes valueless, because no court has been designated to which appeals in such cases may be taken. We think it clear that it was not the purpose of Congress to thus legislate. If it had intended to abolish the right of appeal from the decisions of District Judges in habeas corpus cases, it would doubtless have done so in plain and direct terms.
'The fact that the right of appeal was not thus abolished furnishes a persuasive inference that Congress intended to designate a court to hear and determine such appeals. In McLish v. Roff, 141 U. S. 661, 666, 12 Sup. Ct. 118, and in Lau Ow Bew v. United States, 144 U. S. 47, 12 Sup. Ct. 517, it was said, in substance, by the Supreme Court of the United States that it was the purpose of the Act of March 3, 1891, to distribute the entire appellate jurisdiction theretofore exercised by the federal courts between the Supreme Court of the United States and the Circuit Courts of Appeals that were thereby established. This intent, we think, is plainly apparent from the terms of the act. Moreover, the act in question very much enlarged the right of appeal, and that was one of its chief objects. In no single instance, so far as we are aware, was a previous right of appeal abolished.
'We think, therefore, that it may be fairly concluded that it was the intention of Congress to confer on the Circuit Courts of Appeals the right to hear appeals from final orders made by District Judges in habeas corpus cases, as well as to hear appeals from final decisions of District Courts made in such cases. We can conceive of no reason why the right should be denied in the one case and granted in the other, and such we believe was not the intent of the lawmaker.
See also United States, Petitioner, 194 U. S. 194, 24 Sup. Ct. 629, 48 L. Ed. 931.
Carper v. Fitzgerald, 121 U. S. 87, 7 Sup. Ct. 825, 30 L. Ed. 882, Ex parte Lennon, 150 U. S. 393, 14 Sup. Ct. 123, 37 L. Ed. 1120, McKnight v. James, 155 U. S. 685, 15 Sup. Ct. 248, 39 L. Ed. 310, Lambert v. Barrett, 157 U. S. 697, 15 Sup. Ct. 722, 39 L. Ed. 865, and Harkrader v. Wadley, 172 U. S. 148, 19 Sup. Ct. 119, 43 L. Ed. 399, are cited by petitioner to show that no appeal lay from the order discharging petitioner. These cases relate to the jurisdiction of this court, not the Circuit Court of Appeals. The one first cited and most relied upon was decided in 1887. It recognizes the distinction between orders of a judge, as such, and decrees by the court. It denied the right to appeal here from a judge's order; it did not discuss the power of Circuit Courts to review such orders. The later cited cases go no further than to hold that appeals do not lie to this court from orders by judges at chambers.
Although in point, we cannot agree with Ex parte Jacobi (C. C.) 104 Fed. 681, where the opinion of the Circuit Judge attempts to support denial of an appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals from an order granted at chambers.
On the merits, there is nothing unusual about the cause now before us. Unlike Ex parte Hudgings, 249 U. S. 378, 384, 39 Sup. Ct. 337, 340 (63 L. Ed. 656, 11 A. L. R. 333), it cannot be regarded as 'an exception to the general rules of procedure.' Nor do we think it presents circumstances sufficiently extraordinary to bring it within any class of 'exceptional cases.' Henry v. Henkel, 235 U. S. 219, 228, 35 Sup. Ct. 54, 56 (59 L. Ed. 203).
The course taken indicates studied purpose to escape review of either proceeding by an appellate court. Petitioner may not complain of unfortunate consequences to himself.
The Circuit Court of Appeals correctly applied the well-established general rule that a writ of habeas corpus cannot be utilized for the purpose of proceedings in error. Harlan v. McGourin, 218 U. S. 442, 445, 31 Sup. Ct. 44, 54 L. Ed. 1101, 21 Ann. Cas. 849; Matter of Gregory, 219 U. S. 210, 213, 217, 31 Sup. Ct. 143, 55 L. Ed. 184; Glasgow v. Moyer, 225 U. S. 420, 428, 429, 32 Sup. Ct. 753, 56 L. Ed. 1147. Its decree is affirmed, and the cause will be remanded to the District Court for the Southern District of New York, with directions to vacate the order releasing petitioner; discharge the writ, and take such further proceedings as may be necessary to carry this opinion into effect.
Mr. Chief Justice TAFT, concurring.
I concur fully in the opinion of the Court.
It is of primary importance that the right freely to comment on and criticize the action, opinions and judgments of courts and judges should be preserved inviolate; but it is also essential that courts and judges should not be impeded in the conduct of judicial business by publications having the direct tendency and effect of obstructing the enforcement of their orders and judgments, or of impairing the justice and impartiality of verdicts.
If the publication criticizes the judge or court after the matter with which the criticism has to do has been finally adjudicated and the proceedings are ended so that the carrying of the court's judgment cannot be thereby obstructed, the publication is not contempt and cannot be summarily punished by the court however false, malicious or unjust it may be. The remedy of the judge as an individual is by action or prosecution for libel. If, however, the publication is intended and calculated to obstruct and embarrass the court in a pending proceeding in the matter of the rendition of an impartial verdict, or in the carrying out of its orders and judgment, the court may, and it is its duty to protect the administration of justice by punishment of the offender for contempt.
The federal statute concerning contempts as constructed by this court in prior cases vests in the trial judge the jurisdiction to decide whether a publication is obstructive or defamatory only. The delicacy there is in the judge's deciding whether an attack upon his own judicial action is mere criticism or real obstruction, and the possibility that impulse may incline his view to personal vindication are manifest. But the law gives the person convicted of contempt in such a case the right to have the whole question on facts and law reviewed by three judges of the Circuit Court of Appeals who have had no part in the proceedings, and if not successful in that court, to apply to this Court for an opportunity for a similar review here.
The petitioner and his counsel have made such a review impossible. Instead of pursuing this plain remedy for injustice that may have been done by the trial judge and securing by an appellate court a review of this very serious question on the merits, they sought by applying to a single judge of only coordinate authority for a writ of habeas corpus to release the petitioner on the ground that the trial judge was without jurisdiction to make the decision he did. This raised the sole issue whether the trial judge had authority to decide the question, not whether he had rightly decided it.
Relying on a decision of this court made years ago when the statutory provisions were different from those which now apply, the petitioner and his counsel thought that if they could secure a decision from a single Circuit Judge releasing the petitioner, no appeal would lie from his decision and that thus resort to the appellate courts could be avoided. The single judge to whom they applied released the prisoner. They were, however, mistaken in supposing that no appeal lay to the judge's decision on the question of the trial court's jurisdiction. The government prosecuted its appeal, and the only issue presented in that review is the matter of the trial court's jurisdiction which the Circuit Court of Appeals and we uphold. In this way, the petitioner and his counsel threw away opportunity for a review of the case on its merits in the Circuit Court of Appeals and in this court in their purpose to make a short cut and secure final release through the act of a single judge. This is the situation the petitioner finds himself in and we are without power to relieve him.
'The said courts shall have power * * * to punish * * * contempts of their authority: Provided, that such power to punish contempts shall not be construed to extend to any cases except the misbehavior of any person in their presence, or so near thereto as to obstruct struct the administration of justice,' etc. Judicial Code, § 268 (Comp. St. § 1245).
I think that these words should be taken literally and that we do not need a better illustration of the need to treat them as jurisdictional and to confine the jurisdiction very narrowly than the present case. For we must not confound the power to punish this kind of contempts with the power to overcome and punish disobedience to or defiance of the orders of a court, although unfortunately both are called by the same name. That of course a court may and should use as fully as needed, but this, especially if it is to be extended by decisions to which I cannot agree, makes a man judge in matters in which he is likely to have keen personal interest and feeling although neither selfprotection nor the duty of going on with the work requires him to take such a part. It seems to me that the statute on its face plainly limits the jurisdiction of the judge in this class of cases to those where his personal action is necessary in a strict sense in order to enable him to go on with his work. But wherever the line may be drawn it is a jurisdictional line. 'The jurisdiction attaches only when the suit presents a substantial claim under an act of Congress.' Blumenstock Brothers Advertising Agency v. Curtis Publishing Co., 252 U. S. 436, 441, 40 Sup. Ct. 385, 387 (64 L. Ed. 649); Ex parte Hudgings, 249 U. S. 378, 39 Sup. Ct. 337, 63 L. Ed. 656, 11 A. L. R. 333.
I think that the sentence from which the petitioner seeks relief was more than an abuse of power. I think it should be held wholly void. I think in the first place that there was no matter pending before the Court in the sense that it must be to make this kind of contempt possible. It is not enough that somebody may hereafter move to have something done. There was nothing then awaiting decision when the petitioner's letter was published. The English cases show that the law of England at least is in accord with my view. Metzler v. Gounod, 30 Law Times R. (N. S.) 164. But if there had been, and giving the most unfavorable interpretation to all that the letter says, I do not see how to misstate past matters of fact of the sort charged here could be said to obstruct the administration of justice. Suppose the petitioner falsely and unjustly charged the judge with having excluded him from knowledge of the facts, how can it be pretended that the charge obstructed the administration of justice when the judge seemingly was willing to condone it if the petitioner would retract? Unless a judge while sitting can lay hold of any one who ventures to publish anything that tends to make him unpopular or to belittle him I cannot see what power Judge Mayer had to touch Mr. Craig. Even if feeling was tense there is no such thing as what Keating, J., in Metzler v. Gounod calls contingent contempt. A man cannot be summarily laid by the heels because his words may make publich feeling more unfavorable in case the judge should be asked to act at some later date, any more than he can for exciting public feeling against a judge for what he already has done.
TUTUN v. UNITED STATES. NEUBERGER v. SAME.
DRUGGAN v. ANDERSON, U. S. Marshal, et al.

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