Source: http://halakhah.com/kethuboth/kethuboth_43.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 08:25:18+00:00

Document:
and one who makes a voluntary admission in a penal case is exempt.1 But the Rabbis are of the opinion that the claim2 is [mainly] in respect of compensation for indignity and blemish.3 On what principle do they4 differ? — R. Papa replied: R. Simeon is of the opinion that a man would not leave that which is fixed5 to claim6 that which is not fixed,7 while the Rabbis hold the view that no man would leave a claim6 from which [the defendant] could not be exempt even if he made a voluntary admission8 and advance a claim9 from which he would be exempt10 if he made a voluntary admission.
Cf. supra p. 236, n. 7.
Of the father, in the Mishnah of Shebu. 36b, cited supra 42a.
R. Simeon and the Rabbis.
The statutory fine, prescribed in Deut. XXII, 29.
Compensation for indignity and blemish.
Since it varies according to the status of each individual.
Cf. p. 241, n. 17.
In accordance with the terms of her mother's kethubah (v. Glos.); cf. infra 52b.
Until she is married. (V. infra 52b).
The sons of her deceased father.
But of that which their father had left them (cf. supra nn. 7 and 8).
Mishnah, infra 59b. As the handiwork of a widow who is entitled to maintenance by the terms of her kethubah belongs to the sons of the deceased, so obviously does that of a daughter who is also maintained by virtue of a claim in the kethubah of her mother. (Cf. supra n. 7).
Her handiwork may, therefore, belong to her.
The parallel passage in B.B. 140b reads, 'Assi'.
Lit., 'at', 'at the side of'.
Which does not suffice for the maintenance of the dependents of the deceased man for a period of twelve months (v. B.B. 139b).
Out of the estate of the deceased.
He feels more humiliation when his widow goes begging than when his daughter does so.
Cf. supra p. 242, n. 13.
It is a father's wish, as a rule, that his daughter shall be enabled to save up some money for her marriage dowry.
Why these BELONG TO HER BROTHERS.
As in the case of COMPENSATION and FINE spoken of in the same Mishnah.
Out of her father's estate by her brothers. How then could R. Shesheth rule that the handiwork of a daughter in such circumstances belongs to her brothers?
Where the deceased, for instance, left no property.
I.e., what need was there for the author of our Mishnah to provide a text from which we are to infer that a daughter's handiwork and anything she finds that originated after her father's death belong to herself?
Deut. XV, 16, He fareth well with thee.
The text of our Mishnah from which the inference mentioned is to be drawn (v. p. 243 n. 11).
Sc. if the daughter's earnings exceeded the cost of her maintenance. Our Mishnah was necessary for the purpose of the inference (cf. p. 243 n. 11) that the surplus also belongs to herself.
Of course he knew and, therefore, he could not possibly have raised an objection in the form attributed to him.
In return for her board. A father is under no legal obligation to maintain his daughter (v. infra 49a) and it was, therefore, enacted that in recognition of his consideration for her all she finds shall belong to him (v. B.M. 12b).
Her father's heirs can lay no claim to her finds because the board they provide for her is not an act of kindness on their part but a legal obligation, cf. supra p. 243, n. 7.
Cf. supra p. 243. n. 9.
Hence the ruling that the handiwork of a daughter, though it belongs to her father, does not belong to her brothers.
Lev. XXV, 46, from which the ruling mentioned (v. supra p. 244, n. 11) has been deduced.
Assault involving bodily injury. V. infra n. 3.
All of which are unusual income and cannot be regarded as an income that brothers might properly expect. Handiwork, however, which may normally be expected, the brothers may justly expect from their sister in return for the maintenance with which they provide her.
Compensation for which is not due even to her father (v. B.K. 87b). What need then was there to exclude his heirs?
Said Abimi b. Papi to him: Shakud6 made this statement.7 Who is Shakud? — Samuel. But, surely, was it not Rab who made this statement? — Read: Shakud also made this statement.
R. Ashi [however] said: The law is in agreement with Rab.9 And the law is to be decided in agreement with the view of Rab.
But could R. Huna, however, have given such a ruling?43 Has it not been stated: If a wife produced against her husband two kethuboth, one for two hundred, and one for three hundred zuz, she may, said R. Huna, distrain from the earlier date if she wishes to collect the two hundred zuz [but if she desires to collect the] three hundred zuz she may distrain from the later date only. Now if the ruling were as stated44 she should be entitled, should she not, to distrain to the extent of two hundred zuz from the earlier date and to that of one hundred from the later date? — But [even] according to your conception [it might equally be objected why] should she [not] distrain for all the five hundred zuz, two hundred from the earlier date and three hundred from the later date? What then is the reason why she cannot distrain for all the five hundred? [Obviously this:] Since the man did not write in her favour,45 'I willingly added to your credit three hundred zuz to the two hundred' he must have meant to imply: 'If you desired to distrain from the earlier date you would recover [no more than] two hundred, and if you desired to distrain from the later date you would receive three hundred'.
As an exposed wound decreases her value, compensation is due to her father, since it is he who suffers the loss.
Zera traveled from Babylon to Palestine where he was ordained by R. Johanan and had the title of Rabbi conferred upon him. His former title was only Rab. The following statement was made by him, according to the first reading, before, and according to the second reading after his ordination.
Cf. supra p. 244, n. 11.
[H] 'careful speaker' (cf. Rashi a.l.), 'industrious scholar' (Jast.) 'studious' (Aruk).
The ruling and deduction reported by R. Zera.
V. supra p. 242, n. 12 and text.
In opposition to R. Shesheth.
While she was a minor or a na'arah (v. Glos.).
Of the second, as well as that of the first betrothal.
Because the income of a daughter under the state of bogereth (V. Glos.) belongs to her father.
Whether of the first or the second marriage.
Because a father's control over his daughter, even if she is a minor, ceases as soon as he gives her in marriage; and since the collection of a kethubah, though not its writing, must always follow the marriage the amount collected is the rightful possession of the daughter.
Sc. the kethubah of the first marriage.
Cur. edd. insert in parentheses, 'if'.
Hence it is she who is entitled to receive her kethubah.
For the illustration in the second clause of the Mishnah.
So that it is possible for her to remarry a third time.
Instead of having been divorced.
Of our Mishnah by avoiding any unhappy illustration in which the woman cannot marry again.
If a woman, for instance, was widowed twice she is deemed to be a dangerous companion to men, and is, therefore, forbidden to marry again (v. Yeb. 64b).
Lit., 'them'. The plural referring generally to the two respective amounts of the statutory kethubah, two hundred so for a virgin and one hundred for a widow or divorcee (v. Rashi, s.v. [H]).
When the daughter was still under her father's authority. In the case (if the second kethubah, however, which is subsequent to the first marriage R. Judah agrees, of course, with the Rabbis.
Cf supra p. 246, n. 8.
Sc. the kethubah belongs to herself and not to her father.
That the kethubah should being to the father (cf supra n. 5).
Since such argument, however, was not used the statement attributed above to Rabbah and R. Joseph cannot be authentic.
Lit., 'but if it was said, it was said thus'.
The kethubah for the first marriage. On the use of the pl. [H] cf. supra n. 2. [Although the liability in regard to the kethubah began at betrothal, it was not reduced to writing till nuptials proper; cf. Rashi. For other interpretations v. Asheri].
Unlike the Rabbis who were guided by the time of the collection (cf. supra p. 246, n. 7) R. Judah holds that the date of the writing of the kethubah is the determining factor. Hence his ruling in our Mishnah (where the writing took place while the daughter was in her minority) that the kethubah is the father's property. In the Baraitha cited, however, (where the writing took place when the daughter was already adolescent, I. e., shortly before her marriage) the kethubah rightly belongs no longer to her father but to herself.
From property sold between the date of the betrothal and that on which the kethubah was written.
I.e., does the right of distraint begin on the date of the betrothal (when the man becomes Rabbinically liable for the kethubah) or (as in the case just dealt with) on the date the kethubah was written? (V. Rashi. Cf., however, Tosaf s.v. [H]).
For a widow or a divorcee.
In the case of a virgin.
Since these amounts are statutory liabilities applicable to all.
Which differs according to individual arrangements, v. infra.
When the kethubah is written and formal acquisition (kinyan v. Glos.) is effected.
Having accepted the written kethubah that bore the later date on which her marriage took place the woman is assumed to have surrendered her rights to the statutory amount, which she had acquired earlier on betrothal, in favour of her new advantages as well as any disadvantages that were conferred by the written document.
Lit., 'did H. Huna say so'? That the earlier obligation (statutory kethubah) is recoverable from the earlier date (betrothal). and the latter one (additional jointure) from the later date (marriage).
V. supra note 8. Lit., 'there is'.

References: V. 

V. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 

V.