Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/358/576/
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 12:38:27+00:00

Document:
While fleeing from police after robbing a filling station, petitioner forced his way at gunpoint into the automobile of one Cooke, forced him to drive far into the country, there shot and killed him, and escaped in his car. Charged in an Oklahoma court with murder, he entered a plea of guilty and was sentenced to life imprisonment. Thereafter, he was charged in another Oklahoma court with the kidnaping involved in the same occurrence. While represented by counsel and after being warned by the court that conviction might result in a death sentence, he pleaded guilty and was convicted. Before sentencing him, the court permitted the State's Attorney to make an unsworn statement in which he recounted at length the armed robbery, the chase, the elusion of police, the gruesome details of the kidnaping and murder, and petitioner's past criminal record, and petitioner was sentenced to death on the kidnaping charge. Under Oklahoma law, kidnaping and murder are separate and distinct offenses, and petitioner made no claim prior to his conviction that he was being put twice in jeopardy for the same offense. Under Oklahoma law, the granting of a presentence hearing at which testimony is taken is discretionary with the trial court, and petitioner did not request such a hearing.
Held: Petitioner was not denied due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Pp. 358 U. S. 577-587.
(a) On the record, this Court cannot say that petitioner was deprived of any right or of fundamental fairness by the fact that the trial court did not pursue the presentencing procedures prescribed by the Oklahoma statutes. Pp. 358 U. S. 582-583.
(b) The statement by the State's Attorney of the details of the crime and of petitioner's criminal record -- all admitted by petitioner to be true -- did not deprive petitioner of fundamental fairness or of any right of confrontation or cross-examination. Pp. 358 U. S. 583-584.
(c) On the record in this case, this Court cannot say that the sentencing judge was not entitled to consider the murder, along with all other circumstances involved, in determining the proper sentence for the kidnaping. Pp. 358 U. S. 584-586.
(d) Since kidnaping and murder are separate and distinct crimes under Oklahoma law, the court's consideration of the murder as a circumstance involved in the kidnaping cannot be said to have resulted in punishing petitioner a second time fol the same offense, nor to have denied him due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. P. 358 U. S. 586.
(e) This Court cannot say that the death sentence for kidnaping, which was within the range of punishments authorized for that crime by Oklahoma law, denied to petitioner due process of law or any other constitutional right. Pp. 358 U. S. 586-587.
Upon his plea of guilty to a charge of kidnaping in the District Court of Tulsa County, Oklahoma, petitioner was sentenced to death. On appeal, the Criminal Court of Appeals of Oklahoma affirmed, Okl.Cr., 321 P.2d 990, and certiorari was sought on the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. We granted the writ to determine that question. 357 U.S. 925.
by the files of the Federal Bureau of Investigation; [Footnote 4] and concluding with a request for a death sentence. Counsel for petitioner objected to any reference to the murder on the ground that sentence for that crime had already been imposed by the District Court of Muskogee County and that it could not again lawfully be considered in imposing sentence on the kidnaping charge. The court, expressing the view that it was "proper to advise the court of all the facts [occurring while petitioner] had the victim in his charge and under his control," overruled the objection. After the State's Attorney had concluded, counsel for petitioner put in evidence a transcript of the sentencing proceedings had in the District Court of Muskogee County in the murder case, and made an extended plea for a sentence to life imprisonment, rather than a sentence to death.
"which [had] been stated [by counsel] and which [petitioner had] admitted were [involved in] this crime [of kidnaping], committed in Tulsa County, which resulted in the murder of the victim, [all of] which the Court takes into consideration . . . as a continuing thing."
the life sentence that had earlier been imposed upon him for the "ultimate" crime of murder.
pursuing this method of procedure is a matter of the trial court's sound discretion. Second, its use is further contingent upon the request of either the state or the defendant."
"It is contended that, under the provisions of § 975, it is the mandatory duty of the court to hear witnesses. But, in construing §§ 974 and 975 in light of the provisions of § 973, we are of the opinion that both the provisions of § 974 and § 975 are contingent upon the request for evidence under the provisions of § 973, [and that,] [w]hen the parties fail to make a request for the privilege thereof, the same is waived and some other method of supplying the court with the necessary information for the pronouncement of judgment and sentence may be substituted instead."
This construction of the State's statutes by its court of last resort must be accepted here.
It is not contended that petitioner requested or suggested that the trial court hear evidence in mitigation of the sentence. Nor did petitioner request or suggest that the court require the State to offer evidence in support of the aggravating circumstances. In these circumstances, we cannot say that petitioner was deprived of any right or of fundamental fairness by the fact that the trial court did not pursue the presentencing procedures prescribed by the Oklahoma statutes.
and it held that the State's Attorney's statement was a proper method in these circumstances under the law of Oklahoma. Moreover, after the State's Attorney had made his statement, petitioner, upon interrogation by the court, stated that the recitals of that statement were true. See Note 5 This alone should be a complete answer to the contention. But we go on to consider this Court's opinion in Williams v. New York, 337 U. S. 241. This Court there dealt with very similar contentions, and held that, once the guilt of the accused has been properly established, the sentencing judge, in determining the kind and extent of punishment to be imposed, is not restricted to evidence derived from the examination and cross-examination of witnesses in open court, but may, consistently with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, consider responsible unsworn or "out of court" information relative to the circumstances of the crime and to the convicted person's life and characteristics.
These considerations make it clear that the State's Attorney's statement of the details of the crime and of petitioner's criminal record -- all admitted by petitioner to be true -- did not deprive petitioner of fundamental fairness or of any right of confrontation or cross-examination.
law or any other constitutional right. Nor, in view of the fact that kidnaping and murder are separate and independent offenses in Oklahoma, is there any merit in petitioner's collateral claim that what he calls "the lesser crime" of kidnaping "merged" in what he calls "the greater crime" of murder, and that the sentence to life imprisonment for the murder was a bar to the imposition of any sentence for the kidnaping, or at least to any greater sentence than was imposed for the murder, and that imposition of a death sentence for the kidnaping deprived him of due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
We have now treated with all of petitioner's claims, and, failing to find any deprivation by the Oklahoma courts of any of his fundamental rights, we must hold that petitioner was not denied due process of law.
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, being of the view that petitioner was in substance tried for murder twice in violation of the guarantee against double jeopardy, dissents.
"Every person convicted of murder shall suffer death, or imprisonment at hard labor in the State penitentiary for life at the discretion of the jury, [nut] upon a plea of guilty the Court shall determine the [punishment]."
"Every person who, without lawful authority, forcibly seizes and confines another, or inveigles or kidnaps another, for the purpose of extorting any money, property or thing of value or advantage from the person so seized . . . , or in any manner threatens [the person so seized] shall be guilty of a felony, and upon conviction shall suffer death or imprisonment in the penitentiary, not less than ten years."
"THE COURT: [T]he Court is advised by the assistant County Attorney and also by your counsel, that, at this time, you wish to withdraw your plea of not guilty, which has heretofore been entered in this case, wherein you are charged with the crime of kidnapping, and enter a plea of guilty to this charge --"
"THE COURT: Is that correct?"
"THE COURT: Now, you understand the nature of this charge, do you?"
"THE COURT: You understand that it is a charge that is punishable with the extreme penalty of life imprisonment, or death in the electric chair?"
"THE COURT: In the light of that knowledge and information and understanding, are you entering this plea freely and voluntarily upon your part?"
"THE COURT: Has there been any representation made to you be counsel, or by anyone else, as to the sentence which you might expect from the Court in this case?"
"MR. WILLIAMS: I was told I could expect the maximum."
"THE COURT: Of death in the electric chair?"
"THE COURT: In the light of that representation made to you by your counsel, you wish to withdraw your plea of not guilty and enter a plea of guilty to the charge?"
As recited by the State's Attorney, the FBI files disclosed the commission of five crimes by petitioner, consisting of grand theft in 1944 at the age of 14, resulting in his release to a juvenile bureau; a Dyer Act violation in 1945, resulting in a three-year sentence to the federal juvenile correctional institution at Inglewood, Colorado; escape from Inglewood and a Dyer Act violation in 1947, resulting in a sentence for a term of 18 months; and armed robbery in 1949, resulting in a sentence for a term of 12 years in the Indiana State Penitentiary.
"THE COURT: Now, at that time on Wednesday, there was a statement of facts made by the State relative to this case and the sequence of events and the facts surrounding the sequence of events and the facts surrounding the commission of this crime. Do you have any correction to make in reference to the statement of counsel for the State in that regard?"
"THE COURT: Those facts were true?"
"THE COURT: And you at this time admit that they were true and that you committed the acts as set forth by the State, that is correct, is it?"
"THE COURT [addressing counsel for petitioner]: All right. Do you have anything further to say on behalf of this defendant?"
"[Counsel for Petitioner]: Nothing further."
"§ 973. After a plea or verdict of guilty in a case where the extent of the punishment is left with the court, the court, upon the suggestion of either party that there are circumstances which may be properly taken into view, either in aggravation or mitigation of the punishment, may in its discretion hear the same summarily at a specified time and upon such notice to the adverse party as it may direct."
"§ 974. The circumstances must be presented by the testimony of witnesses examined in open court. . . ."
"§ 975. No affidavit or testimony, or representation of any kind, verbal or written, can be offered to or received by the court or member thereof in aggravation or mitigation of the punishment, except as provided in the last two sections."
"Homicide is murder in the following cases."
"1. When perpetrated without authority of law, and with a premeditated design to effect the death of the person killed, or of any other human being."
"2. When perpetrated by any act imminently dangerous to others and evincing a depraved mind, regardless of human life, although without any premeditated design to effect the death of any particular individual."
"3. When perpetrated without any design to effect death by a person engaged in the commission of any felony."
Collins v. State, 70 Okl.Cr. 340, 106 P.2d 273; Mowels v. State, 52 Okl.Cr. 193, 11 P.2d 205; Ex parte Zeligson, 47 Okl.Cr. 45, 287 P. 731; Fines v. State, 32 Okl.Cr. 304, 240 P. 1079; White v. State, 23 Okl.Cr. 198, 214 P. 202.

References: § 975
 § 973
 § 974
 § 975
 § 973
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.