Source: https://content.sciendo.com/abstract/journals/bjals/5/2/article-p315.xml?rskey=QXe4en&amp;result=2
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 18:45:19+00:00

Document:
The negotiations between the European Union (E.U.) and the United States of America (U.S.) regarding a free-trade agreement called the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) were launched in 2013 and are ongoing. Both parties have declared their intention to finish the negotiations by the end of 2016 but this timeline seems unrealistic in view of the (number of) unresolved issues.1 Given the parties’ willingness to negotiate a comprehensive and ambitious agreement,2 it is understandable that the negotiations are not yet completed. There is another reason, though, why the two sides have not yet been able to wrap up their talks: in parallel to their negotiations on TTIP, both parties have pursued further negotiations, at bilateral, plurilateral and multilateral level, which have sapped energy and resources.
But the concerns with TTIP do not stop there. In the European Union in particular, the public in many Member States is worried about what TTIP might mean for them. Three issues seem to attract particular attention: (i) the transparency of the negotiations, (ii) the level of protection in areas such as health, environment, food, and data protection, and (iii) the rules on investment protection and the role of investor-to-state dispute settlement (ISDS) with respect to regulation for legitimate public policy objectives and its relationship with the domestic judicial system.20 The public debate on these and other topics is fierce, although sometimes misinformed and misguided.
What is the basic idea behind TTIP, and on what basis does the European Commission negotiate with the United States?
How are the negotiations structured, and how far have they advanced?
Would TTIP fall within the EU’s exclusive competence for common commercial policy, or would it be a “mixed agreement” which has to be ratified by all EU Member States?
What impact would TTIP have on the multilateral trading system in general and developing countries in particular?
In November 2011, the European Union and the United States established a high level working group on jobs and growth (HLWG).21 The HLWG was asked to pinpoint “policies and measures” that would increase transatlantic trade so as to stimulate economic growth, create jobs and enhance competitiveness.22 After consultations with various stakeholders, public and private, from both sides of the Atlantic, the HLWG issued its final report in early February 2013.
As regards market access, a traditional subject of free-trade agreements, the final report stated that obstacles relating to goods, services, investment and procurement should be addressed in a manner that “goes beyond what the United States and the European Union have achieved in previous trade agreements.”28 Thus, there is an expectation that TTIP should lead to an unprecedented level of market access. Given that the markets of the European Union and the United States are relatively open, a further opening of these markets would require both parties to make concessions in those sectors that they consider as sensitive, in particular as regards services and government procurement.
The HLWG’s final report spells out, in a nutshell, the reasons that speak in favour of negotiating a transatlantic free-trade agreement. These reasons are both economic and political in nature. To a large extent, the economic benefit would come from enhancing the regulatory cooperation and compatibility between the European Union and the United States.33 Yet it is exactly this regulatory part many European and American citizens are concerned about, as they fear a loss of regulatory autonomy and a lowering of safety standards. The European Commission insists, however, that TTIP would not undermine European standards in areas such as the environment and public health but rather maintain parties’ “right to regulate” so as to pursue their legitimate public policy objectives.34 Nonetheless, one wonders whether the HLWG did not underestimate foreseeable public opposition against closer regulatory cooperation and compatibility as an immediate component of a transatlantic agreement instead of opting for a more cautious approach by establishing procedural rules in the agreement that would pave the way for future discussions on a more integrated transatlantic approach to regulation.
On the trade policy side, the HLWG envisages the development of rules and principles that would not only be applicable to the bilateral transatlantic trade relationship but constitute a template for similar rules at the multilateral level. Indeed, representatives of both parties have stressed several times since the negotiations were launched that TTIP should set forth “global” rules on emerging trade issues where no multilateral rules yet exist.35 Interestingly, the same approach is followed by TPP, as was emphasised by U.S. President Barack Obama36 Nevertheless, other countries may feel rather uncomfortable with the notion that two major trading powers aspire to define, within a purely bilateral context, rules that are intended also to serve as blueprint for the multilateral context.
Shortly after the release of the HLWG’s final report, the EU Council adopted the negotiating directives for the Commission, the so-called negotiating mandate.37 It provides binding guidance to the Commission for the negotiations, in terms of the negotiating objectives as well as the negotiating areas. Initially, the negotiating mandate was not made public for reasons of confidentiality. In the meantime, the negotiating mandate has been published, for the sake of transparency.38 It should be noted that the negotiating mandate does not contain any surprises, at least not to the informed observer, as it essentially confirms the objectives put forward by the HLWG’s final report. Nonetheless, the publication is useful in that it dispels any suspicion whether the European Union might pursue secret goals in these negotiations.
In sum, the negotiating mandate reflects the idea that TTIP should lead to a comprehensive and deep economic integration between the European Union and the United States. While this goal has been pursued already in the Union’s trade relations with other countries, such as South Korea, Singapore, and, most recently, Canada, TTIP would take the idea even a step further because of the scope and extent of the transatlantic trade and investment relationship. To achieve said goal, the negotiations should pursue an ambitious outcome in terms of market access for goods and services, possibly going beyond the level of market access achieved under other free-trade agreements of either the European Union or the United States, and lead to a significantly enhanced cooperation between the European Union and the United States on the way they regulate, including through increased cooperation between the respective regulatory authorities, common rules for the process of designing new regulatory measures and an elimination or reduction of existing regulatory differences in specific goods and services sectors.
The structure of the negotiations follows the agreement’s prospective content. Accordingly, three main parts may be discerned.59 The first part is about market access. Negotiations on market access relate to trade in goods, including customs duties and rules of origin, services and public procurement. The second part concerns regulatory cooperation and compatibility. Negotiations in this area are two-pronged: they seek to establish horizontal as well as sector-specific disciplines. The third part relates to rules on various subject-matters, including investment protection and ISDS, which both the HLWG’s final report and the EU’s negotiating mandate initially envisaged as part of the market access negotiations.
There are two main targets in this area: eliminating customs duties and aligning rules of origin.
Irrespective of the exact location of investment protection and ISDS within the TTIP architecture, the European Union suspended negotiations on this particular issue at the end of 2013 and launched a consultation process with its Member States and their national parliaments, the European Parliament and the public.118 This decision was a result of growing unease within the European Union on the effect that arbitration proceedings, and ensuing awards, in investor-to-state disputes under bilateral investment treaties - and by extension under similar rules in TTIP - could have on the right to regulate,119 notwithstanding the fact that ISDS is a traditional feature of more than 1400 bilateral investment treaties that EU Member States have concluded in the past.120 The consultation process raised a number of questions as to how the current system of investment protection and ISDS could be reformed in order to address the concerns in this respect.
As a result of the consultation process, the Commission presented a draft proposal to the Council and the European Parliament which was published in September 2015.121 The proposal relates to both investment protection as well as ISDS. As regards investment protection, the proposal is moderately reformist, since the standards of protection set out in the proposal are mostly traditional ones.122 But these standards are more clearly defined than has been the case so far, account being taken of prior case law in this area; this is especially true for the standards of “fair and equitable treatment” as well as “expropriation.”123 What is truly new, however, is a provision that safeguards parties’ right to regulate in the public interest and, as a corollary, the right to change the existing legal and regulatory framework, even if such a change negatively affects investors’ expectations of profit.124 Also, the proposal envisages a provision that exempts EU rules on state aid from the standards of protection so that the latter do not constitute a hindrance to enforcing the EU rules on state aid.125 A quick comparison of the standards of protection, as set out in the EU proposal, with the standards of protection provided for in TPP chapter 9 on investment shows that they largely correspond to each other, notwithstanding certain differences.
The EU proposal is much more radical with respect to ISDS in that it completely abandons the present system of ad hoc arbitrations in favour of an Investment Court system; this drastic change must be seen against the Union’s ultimate intention to improve the international investment dispute resolution system through the creation of a permanent multilateral International Investment Court.126 The European Union proposes a two-tiered system, consisting of an “Investment Tribunal”, as first instance, and an “Appeal Tribunal” with the authority to hear appeals.127 This system is similar to the two-tiered system of judicial protection at Union level or the equally two-tiered system of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism.
Apart from the foregoing features, the EU proposal also seeks to introduce other reforms to the way investment dispute settlement proceedings are conducted, amongst others by proposing a ban on forum shopping, full transparency of investment dispute proceedings, early dismissal of unfounded claims, intervention by third parties and the “loser pays” principle.136 These proposed reforms are similar to new features found in TPP chapter 9 on investment.
An interesting - and by no means hypothetical - question is whether the Court of Justice of the European Union would consider the Investment Court System proposed by the European Union to be compatible with EU primary law. The Court of Justice has already been asked on several occasions 140 to consider whether a system of judicial protection established under an international agreement to be concluded by the European Union, would be in conformity with the EU Treaties. The Court of Justice has ruled on this issue most recently in relation to the planned accession of the Union to the European Convention on Human Rights. In its opinion, the Court of Justice acknowledged that the Union’s competence to conclude international agreements “necessarily entail[s] the power to submit to the decisions of a court which is created or designated by such agreements as regards the interpretation and application of their provisions.”141 However, the Court of Justice held that there must be “no adverse effect on the autonomy of the EU legal order.”142 and any decision by such a court “must not have the effect of binding the EU and its institutions, in the exercise of their internal powers, to a particular interpretation of the rules of EU law.”143 It would seem that these requirements are met as regards the investment dispute settlement system proposed by the European Union, since EU law would not constitute applicable law for purposes of investment dispute resolution proceedings,144 the Investment Tribunal would not have jurisdiction to determine the legality of a challenged measure under Union law,145 and the meaning given to Union law by that Tribunal would not be binding on the EU courts or authorities.
V Exclusive Competence of the European Union for Concluding TTIP?
The question whether TTIP would fall within the exclusive competence of the European Union, or whether the competence for concluding TTIP is shared between the European Union, on the one hand, and its Member States, on the other, is of highly practical relevance. If the latter was the case, then TTIP would have to be ratified by all Member States, which means that each and every EU Member State would have an effective veto power over TTIP’s ratification. This is relevant because the mood in some Member States, for instance Belgium, France and Germany, is such that ratification by their national parliaments is all but ensured.
However, the European Union also has exclusive competence for the conclusion of an international agreement when its conclusion is provided for in a legislative act of the Union, or is necessary to enable the Union to exercise its internal competence, or insofar as its conclusion may affect common rules or alter their scope.150 The last option in particular could be relevant as regards commitments on transport services under TTIP. But the Court of Justice has already held that any distortions in the flow of (transport) services in the internal market which might arise from international commitments on (transport) services do not in themselves affect the common Union rules on (transport) services and are thus not capable of establishing an (exclusive) external Union competence.151 The same rationale should apply to TTIP.
In addition, there is a second caveat which relates to the area of administrative cooperation, including the cooperation between Member States’ regulatory authorities. In this area, the competence is not even shared between the European Union and its Member States. Rather, the European Union may only “carry out actions to support, coordinate or supplement the actions of Member States.”152 In particular, the European Union is not empowered to adopt measures in the area of administrative cooperation that would lead to a “harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the Member States.”153 This is relevant when it comes to the common commercial policy; although the Union’s competence in this area is exclusive, it is explicitly restricted in that it “shall not lead to harmonisation of legislative or regulatory provisions of the Member States in so far as the Treaties exclude such harmonisation.”154 Yet TTIP’s horizontal chapter on regulatory cooperation and its sector-specific chapters would commit regulatory authorities to pursue a common approach to the process of designing and developing regulatory measures. One might counter that this commitment would not be subject to dispute settlement under TTIP, according to the EU proposal. But this objection would miss the point; the commitment retains a legal nature, nonetheless. Given that international agreements concluded by the European Union are binding on the EU institutions and EU Member States,155 TTIP would lead to a harmonization of the laws and regulations of Member States regarding the regulatory cooperation to be undertaken by their regulatory authorities.156 This would not be compatible with Article 207(6) TFEU read in conjunction with Article 197(2) TFEU.
In conclusion, it is argued that the European Union does not have an exclusive competence for TTIP. Consequently, TTIP would have to be ratified as a “mixed agreement” by both the European Union and its Member States.157 This may complicate the process, possibly to the point where the ratification of TTIP is seriously at risk of being rejected by some Member States.
The impact on developing countries would conceivably be even harsher. In contrast to other developed countries, such as Australia, Canada, New Zealand and South Korea, which intend to negotiate or have already negotiated free-trade agreements with the European Union that incorporate obligations similar to TPP or TTIP, developing countries are either not (yet) in a position or not (yet) willing to negotiate such far reaching agreements. The Economic Partnership Agreements concluded or negotiated by the European Union with several ACP regional groups are not a substitute in this respect.161 This is particularly true for LDCs; while their goods enjoy duty-free, quota-free access to the EU market and, albeit to a more limited extent, the U.S. market, it will prove exceedingly difficult for them to meet the technical regulations and standards that will shape the transatlantic market or engage in the kind of regulatory cooperation envisaged by the two parties.162 They are likely to be further marginalized as regards trade with the European Union and the United States.
TTIP would be a watershed for the multilateral trading system, just as TPP. It risks undermining this system and its pre-eminent institution, the WTO, as the European Union and the United States would attempt to create “a more integrated transatlantic marketplace.”164 They would probably spend considerably less time on multilateral trade issues. This is all the more true if TPP enters into force. TPP parties, including the United States, would also try to build a more integrated transpacific marketplace. This would put the European Union under more pressure to conclude free-trade agreements with those TPP parties with whom it does not yet have such agreements, especially Australia and New Zealand, thereby even further distracting the European Union from the multilateral trading system.
To answer the question posed by the title of this article: TTIP is a golden opportunity to build a transatlantic marketplace, but this opportunity comes with a hefty price tag. Only the future will tell whether that price is worth paying.
EU, US Negotiators Push for 2016 Deal, Though “TTIP Light” Not an Option, 20 Bridges Weekly 1 (May 4, 2016). In a speech before the summer break, Cecilia Malmström stated: “… we are prepared to make the political choices needed to close this deal by the end of the year. But we can only do that if we get the right result. We will not conclude a TTIP light; we want an agreement that will gain approval on both sides”. TTIP: The Finish Line and How to Get There 2-3 (event at Atlantic Council, Washington D.C., Jun. 29, 2016), available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/.
European Commission, Conclusion of the 13th TTIP Negotiation Round 29 April 2016, Statement by Ignacio Garcia Bercero, EU Chief Negotiator for TTIP, available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/april/tradoc_154480.pdf. “It needs to be the most ambitious, balanced and comprehensive agreement ever concluded by either us or the US”, id., at 2.
Trade Talks Lead to ‘Death of Doha and the Birth of a New WTO’, Financial Times, Dec. 21, 2015, at 4.
On ITA 2, see the WTO Ministerial Declaration on the Expansion of Trade in Information Technology Products, WT/MIN(15)/25, Dec. 16, 2015, available at https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news15_e/ita_16dec15_e.htm. On TiSA, see the Report of the Commission on the 19th TiSA negotiation round Jul. 8 - 18, 2016, available at http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/tisa; on EGA, see the Commission’s Report from the 15th round of negotiations for an Environmental Goods Agreement (EGA), available at http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/policy-making/sustainable-development (last visited Sept. 29, 2016).
After TPP Deal Reached in Atlanta, Focus Shifts to Ratification, 19 Bridges Weekly 1 (Oct. 8, 2015).
Obama “Confident” of TPP Passage, Touting Trade Benefits During Asia Trip, 20 Bridges Weekly 1 (May 26, 2016). For both economic and geopolitical reasons, it stands to reason that TPP is more important to the United States than TTIP, Gideon Rachman, Obama and the End of the Anglosphere, Financial Times, Apr. 26, 2016, at 9.
EU, Japan Leaders Call for Trade Talks to Conclude in 2016, 20 Bridges Weekly 1 (May 4, 2016); see also The Commission’s Report of the 16th EU-Japan FTA/EPA Negotiating Round Apr. 11 - 20, 2016, available at http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/japan.
The Doha Round Finally Dies a Merciful Death, Financial Times, Dec. 22, 2015, at 8.
See WTO, Annual Report 2016, 83, available at https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/publications_e/anrep16_e.htm; WTO, World Trade Report 2015, Speeding up Trade: Benefits and Challenges of Implementing the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement, available at https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/publications_e/wtr15_e.htm. See also Antonia Eliason, The Trade Facilitation Agreement: A New Hope for the World Trade Organization, 14 World Trade Rev. 643-70 (2015).
The Ministerial Declaration of the WTO Ministerial Conference in Nairobi notes: “We recognize that many Members reaffirm the Doha Development Agenda … and reaffirm their full commitment to conclude the DDA on that basis. Other Members do not reaffirm the Doha mandates, as they believe new approaches are necessary to achieve meaningful outcomes in multilateral negotiations. Members have different views on how to address the negotiations.” WTO, Nairobi Ministerial Declaration of 19 December 2015, WT/MIN(15)/DEC, para. 30, (Dec. 21, 2015), available at https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/mc10_e/nairobipackage_e.htm.
Cecilia Malmström, The WTO after Nairobi - Your Views on the Way Ahead 3-4 (speech at the Civil Society Dialogue meeting on Apr. 26, 2016), available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/html/154474.htm. But after the meeting of OECD ministers in early June 2016, the WTO DG Roberto Azevědo called on WTO Members to move to the next stage by starting to “make concrete proposals on what they would like to see in terms of outcomes at the 11th Ministerial Conference and beyond”, Ministers Support Call for Intensified Efforts to Find Possible Areas of Agreement for MC 11, WTO 2016 News Items, Jun. 2, 2016, available at https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news16_e/minis_02jun16_e.htm.
OECD, 2016 Ministerial Council Statement, Enhancing Productivity Through Inclusive Growth, para. 17, available at http://www.oecd.org/mcm.
See the information on CETA available on the Commission’s website available at http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ceta (last visited Jun. 10, 2016).
Press Release, Karel De Gucht, Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) - Solving the Regulatory Puzzle (Speech/13/801, Oct. 10, 2013), available at http://ec.europa.eu/trade/trade-policy-and-you/publications; Cecilia Malmström, TTIP on Track 2-3, Speech at Bruegel TTIP Workshop (Mar. 12, 2015), available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1275&title=Speech-TTIP-On-Track; Cecilia Malmström, Trade in the 21st Century: The Challenge of Regulatory Convergence (speech, Mar. 19, 2015), available at http://ec.europa.eu/trade/trade-policy-and-you/publications.
See Jeffrey J. Schott, Understanding the Trans-Pacific Partnership: An Overview, PIIE (May 3-5, 2016), https://piie.com/research/trade-investment/trans-pacific-partnership; See also Hans Günter Hilpert, Einigung auf ein Transpazifisches Freihandelsabkommen, 86 SWP-Aktuell, (Oct. 2015), available at http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/aktuell/2015A86_hlp.pdf.
Hendrik Kafsack, In den Krallen des Chlorhuhns, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Feb. 20, 2014, at 9; Marcel Fratzscher, Europe’s Free Trade Deal with America Could be a Costly Error, Financial Times, Feb. 22, 2013, at 9.
See Christian Pitschas, Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership Agreement and the Development of International Standards, 6 Eur. Y.B Int’l Econ. L. 161, 168-69, 183-85 (2015).
See the preliminary analysis by Jim Rollo, Max Mendez Parra & Sarah Ollerenshaw, The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership: Implications for LDCs and Small States, 102 Commonwealth Trade Hot Topics (2013), available at http://www.thecommonwealth-ilibrary.org/commonwealth/trade/trade-hot-topics_20719914. They suggest that the loss of market share or deterioration in terms of trade on EU and U.S. markets are likely to be small, id. at 6.
See Cecilia Malmström, TTIP for the Business Community, 4, Speech at the Swedish Enterprise Event (May 24, 2016), available at http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ttip/documents-and-events/index_en.htm#_documents); Transatlantic Trade: Why a Deal is Hard to Strike, Financial Times, Apr. 26, 2016, at 2; Public Cast Doubt on EU-US Trade Deal, Financial Times, Apr. 10, 2014, at 4.
European Commission’s Memorandum (Feb. 13, 2013), supra note 14.
High Level Working Group on Jobs and Growth, Final Report (Feb. 11, 2013), 1, available at http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ttip/documents-and-events/index_en.htm#negotiation-rounds.
European Commission’s Memorandum (Feb. 13, 2013), supra note 14, notes that “studies show that the additional cost burden due to such regulatory differences is equivalent to a tariff of more than 10%, and even 20% for some sectors, whereas classic tariffs are at around 4%”. Memorandum of the European Commission, Member States Endorse EU-US Trade and Investment Negotiations, Jun. 14 2013, available at http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ttip/documents-and-events/index_en.htm#negotiation-rounds [hereinafter European Commission’s Memorandum (Jun. 14, 2013)] states that the “regulatory area is where the highest potential economic benefit lies”. Economic analysis commissioned by the Commission estimates that up to 80% of the expected economic benefits would result from eliminating or reducing non-tariff barriers, see Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, The Economic Analysis Explained 6, (Sept. 2013), available at http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ttip/documents-and-events/index_en.htm#economic-benefits. See also Chris Giles, In Trade, Geography Matters More Than You Think, Financial Times, Feb. 25, 2016, at 9.
European Commission, TTIP Explained (Mar. 19, 2015), 2 (available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/may/tradoc_152462.pdf; TTIP round 11, Statement by EU Chief Negotiator Ignacio Garcia Bercero, (Miami, Oct. 23, 2015), available at http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ttip/documents-and-events/index_en.htm# negotiation-rounds: “The cooperation is only possible if the level of protection for citizens stays the same or improves … Any form of regulatory cooperation will not change the way we regulate on public policies such as food safety or data privacy. Nor will it affect legislative processes or the independence of our regulators”, id. at 1-2.
Joe Biden, We Cannot Afford to Stand on the Sidelines of Trade, Financial Times, Feb. 28, 2014, at 9 (“We have an opportunity to shape the path of global commerce to spread our values and benefit our people, and we should seize it”); Karel De Gucht, The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership: The Real Debate 4 (Speech/14/406, May 22, 2014), available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/cfm/doclib_search.cfm#more-criteria; (“We, the European Union, want to keep our place in the world. And if we want to continue to shape the norms, rules, standards and disciplines that are so important in a globalised economy, we have to realise that we cannot do this without partners. If the two strongest economies in the world agree on something, then that provides a very strong basis to start talking with the rest of the world”); Malmström, TTIP on Track, supra note 15, at 3 (“Our idea here is to establish disciplines that would set gold standards … and for these, in many cases, to be a starting point for future negotiations on global rules”); Malmström, TTIP for the Business Community, supra note 20, at 4 (“Both the EU and the US believe in open markets, in the rule of law and in high standards of regulatory protection. TTIP can help us ensure that those principles are reflected in global standards in the future”).
“The TPP means that America will write the rules of the road in the 21st century. When it comes to Asia … the rulebook is up for grabs. And if we don’t pass this agreement - if America doesn’t write those rules - then countries like China will. And that would only threaten American jobs and workers and undermine American leadership around the world”, quoted in: TPP Debate Ramps up Following Public Release of Trade Deal Text 19 Bridges Weekly 7 (Nov. 12, 2015).
European Commission’s Memorandum (Jun. 14, 2013), supra note 33.
Council of the EU, Directives for the Negotiation on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership Between the European Union and the United States of America, 11103/13 DCL 1, (Oct. 9, 2014), available at http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ttip/documents-and-events/index_en.htm#eu-position.
European Commission, Inside TTIP. An Overview and Chapter-by-Chapter Guide in Plain English 9 (2015), available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/july/tradoc_153635.pdf.
European Commission, TTIP Explained, supra note 34, at 1; Malmström, TTIP for the Business Community, supra note 20, at 2.
European Commission, Inside TTIP, supra note 59, at 12.
European Commission, The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) - State of Play 4, (Apr. 27, 2016, available at http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ttip/documents-and-events/index_en.htm#transparency.
European Commission, National Treatment and Market Access for Goods in TTIP. An Explanatory Note 2 (Mar. 21,2016, updated on Mar. 22, 2016); European Commission, Report of the 13th Round of Negotiations for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 4, May 24, 2016, available at http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ttip/documents-and-events/index_en.htm#negotiation-rounds.
European Commission, National Treatment and Market Access for Goods in TTIP, supra note 64, at 2.
The term “cumulation” refers to those rules of origin that allow components from and processing in certain third countries to be considered for the acquisition or maintenance of preferential origin (definition according to the customs glossary of European Commission’s DG TAXUD, available athttp://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/glossary/customs-glossary_en).
Council of the EU, Negotiation Directives, supra note 38, para. 11; European Commission, Inside TTIP, supra note 59, at 16.
European Commission, Report of the 13th Round of Negotiations, supra note 64, at 6-1.
European Commission, Inside TTIP, supra note 59, at 13.
European Commission, Reading Guide. Publication of the EU Proposal on Services, Investment and E-commerce for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 1, (Jul. 31, 2015), available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1230&part-1-services.
See WTO, Disciplines on Domestic Regulation Pursuant to GATS Article VI.4, para. 2 (Jun. 2011), available at https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/dom_reg_negs_e.htm. See also Martin Wolf, Unilateral Free Trade is a Dangerous Fantasy, Financial Times, Jun. 10, 2016, at 9.
European Commission, Inside TTIP, supra note 59, at 13-14.
Council of the EU, Negotiation Directives, supra note 38, para. 15.
European Commission, Reading Guide, supra note 10, at 3-4 (the EU’s revised offer sets forth reservations for certain sectors where quantitative limitations or discriminatory measures may be maintained or introduced in the future; conversely, a ratchet clause applies to some sectors, thereby making future liberalization binding). On the different approaches to scheduling services commitments used in free-trade agreements, see European Commission, Services and Investment in EU Trade Deals. Using ‘Positive’ and ‘Negative’ Lists (Apr. 2016, available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1230#part-1-services.
European Commission, Reading Guide, supra note 70, at 2. See also European Commission, Protecting Public Services in TTIP and Other EU Trade Agreements, Jul. 13, 2015, available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1230#part-1-services.
Joint Statement on Public Services, Mar. 20, 2015, available at http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ttip/documents-and-events/index_en.htm#eu-position (“Furthermore, no EU or U.S. trade agreement requires governments to privatize any service, or prevents governments from expanding the range of services they supply to the public. Moreover, these agreements do not prevent governments from providing public services previously supplied by private service suppliers; contracting a public service to private providers does not mean that it becomes irreversibly part of the commercial sector”).
European Commission, Transatlantic Trade & Investment Partnership Advisory Group, Meeting Report 19 May 2016, at 3, available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/may/tradoc_154553.pdf.
See Hildegunn K. Nordås, Services Trade Restrictiveness Index (STRI): The Trade Effect of Regulatory Differences, 189 OECD Trade Policy Papers 5 (2016) (pointing out: “as the border restrictions on services trade and investment come down, regulatory cooperation could make the most significant contribution to reducing services trade costs going forward”). See also New Global Trade Under Old National Rules, Financial Times, Mar. 7, 2016, at 8.
European Commission, Inside TTIP, supra note 59, at 13; see also European Commission, Report of the 13th Round of Negotiations, supra note 64, at 6.
European Commission, Inside TTIP, supra note 59, at 14; see also Commission, Report of the 13th Round of Negotiations, supra note 64, at 5-6. It is unclear, however, whether regulatory cooperation in financial services would be part of TTIP, see European Commission, TTIP Advisory Group, supra note 78, at 3.
European Commission, Report of the 13th Round of Negotiations, supra note 64, at 5.
Memorandum of the European Commission, Negotiations for a Plurilateral Agreement on Trade in Services 2 (Feb. 15, 2013), available at http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/tisa (last visited Jun. 14, 2016). See Rudolf Adlung, The Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA) and Its Compatibility with GATS: AnAssessment Based on Current Evidence, 14 World Trade Review 617-41 (2015).
European Commission, Civil Society Dialogue, Meeting on TiSA 1 (Dec. 11, 2015, available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/civilsoc/meetlist.cfm#year-2015. Revised market access offers were submitted in early May 2016 and discussed at the 18th negotiating round, European Commission, Report of the 18th TiSA Negotiation Round, 26 May - 3 June 2016, 1-2, available at http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/tisa.
European Commission, Report of the 17th TiSA negotiation round, supra note 4, at 1-2; European Commission, Report of the 18th TiSA Negotiation Round, supra note 84, at 2-3.
Services Trade in Focus as TISA, TTIP, RCEP Aim for 2016 Conclusion 20 Bridges Weekly 1 (Mar. 4, 2016).
European Commission, Inside TTIP, supra note 59, at 15; European Commission, TTIP - State of Play, supra note 63, at 5.
Council of the EU, Negotiation Directives, supra note 38, para. 24. In her speech to the Atlantic Council in Washington D.C. on Jun. 29, 2016, Cecilia Malmström emphasized again the importance the EU attaches to gaining market access to the U.S. government procurement market at all levels of government: “An ambitious outcome that creates new opportunities at the federal and state level is a sine qua non”, supra note 1, at 3.
European Commission, Report of the 13th Round of Negotiations, supra note 64, at 5; European Commission, TTIP Advisory Group, supra note 78, at 3.
European Commission, TTIP - State of Play, supra note 63, at 5. See TTIP and the End of the Year, 25 Washington Trade Daily 2 (Jun. 15, 2016). The EU chief negotiator for TTIP acknowledged at the end of the 14th negotiation round that: “… we are still very far from achieving that goal”, i.e. substantial improvements in market access at all levels of government, Conclusion of the 14th TTIP Negotiation Round 15 July 2016. Statement by Ignacio Garcia Bercero, EU Chief Negotiator for TTIP, at 2, available at http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ttip.
See Hans-Joachim Prieβ, Neuerungen des Agreement on Government Procurement, in Die WTO nach Bali - Chancen und Risiken 105, 113 (Dirk Ehlers, Christian Pitschas & Hans-Michael Wolffgang eds., 2015).
European Commission, Inside TTIP, supra note 59, at 17.
Id. The EU chief negotiator stated categorically at the end of the 14th negotiation round: “Cooperation will only be possible if the level of protection for citizens improves, or at least stays the same”, Conclusion of the 14th TTIP Negotiation Round 15 July 2016, supra note 90, at 2.
Id. See also European Commission, Regulatory Cooperation in TTIP: The Benefits 2 (Mar. 21, 2016), available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1230#regulatory-cooperation); Daniel R. Pérez & Susan E. Dudley, Experiences in International Regulatory Cooperation: Benefits, Limitations, and Best Practices 4-5 Regulatory Studies, available at https://regulatorystudies.columbian.gwu.edu/us-eu-regulatory-cooperation-lessons-and-opportunities (last visited Jun. 15, 2016); Wolf, supra note 71.
European Commission, Good Regulatory Practices (GRPs) in TTIP. An Introduction to the EU’s Revised Proposal 2 (Mar. 21, 2016), available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1230#regulatory-cooperation.
Id. at 2-3; WTO, Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade, Seventh Triennial Review of the Operation and Implementation of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade Under Article 15.4, 2-3 (G/TBT/37, 3 December 2015), available at https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tbt_e/tbt_triennial_reviews_e.htm (last visited Jun. 15, 2016); Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade, Thematic Session on Good Regulatory Practice (G/TBT/GEN/191, 17 March 2016), available at https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tbt_e/tbt_e.htm.
European Commission, Regulatory Cooperation in TTIP: The Benefits, supra note 95, at 4-5.
European Commission, Regulatory Cooperation in TTIP: The Benefits, supra note 95, at 3; European Commission, TTIP and Regulation: An Overview 9 (Feb. 10, 2015), available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/february/tradoc_153121.pdf.
European Commission, Regulatory Cooperation in TTIP: The Benefits, supra note 95, at 6; European Commission, Good Regulatory Practices (GRPs) in TTIP, supra note 97, at 6.
Statement by EU Chief Negotiator for TTIP, 29 April 2016, supra note 2, at 1; European Commission, TTIP Advisory Group, supra note 78, at 4.
European Commission, TTIP and Regulation, supra note 100, at 10-11.
European Commission, Inside TTIP, supra note 59, at 20; European Commission, TTIP - State of Play, supra note 63, at 5.
Commission, Report of the 13th Round of Negotiations, supra note 64, at 8-9; European Commission, TTIP Advisory Group, supra note 78, at 4.
European Commission, Inside TTIP, supra note 59, at 21; European Commission, TTIP and Regulation, supra note 100, at 11-12.
European Commission, Inside TTIP, supra note 59, at 22.
European Commission, Report of the 13th Round of Negotiations, supra note 64, at 9.
European Commission, TTIP Advisory Group, supra note 78, at 4.
European Commission, Inside TTIP, supra note 59, at 17; European Commission, TTIP and Regulation, supra note 100, at 12-17.
European Commission, Inside TTIP, supra note 59, at 22-34; European Commission, TTIP and Regulation, supra note 100, at 12-17.
These include CETA, see European Commission, CETA - Summary of the Final Negotiating Results 18 (February 2016), available at http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ceta; EU-Singapore FTA, see European Commission, An Informal Overview over the Content of the EU-Singapore FTA 4-6 (20 Sept. 2013), available at http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/singapore; EU - Korea FTA, see European Commission, EU-South Korea Free Trade Agreement: A Quick Reading Guide 3-5 (Oct. 2010), available at http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/south-korea.
European Commission, TTIP Advisory Group, supra note 78, at 5. After the last negotiating round at the end of April 2016, the EU chief negotiator for TTIP noted in this respect: “A lot of technical work has been done, but quite substantial work is also still ahead of us”, supra note 2, at 2.
See Cecilia Malmström, Opening Remarks: Discussion on Investment in TTIP 2-3 Speech at the meeting of the International Trade Committee of the European Parliament, (Mar. 18, 2015), available at http://ec.europa.eu/trade/trade-policy-and-you/publications.
Sections D and F of CETA chapter 8 on investment contain rules on investment protection and the resolution of investment disputes between investors and states, respectively (the CETA text is available at http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ceta (last visited Jun. 20, 2016); as regards the EU-Vietnam FTA, sections two and three of chapter II on investment (which belongs to the title on trade in services, investment and e-commerce) set forth rules on investment protection and the resolution of investment disputes, respectively (the text of the EU-Vietnam FTA is available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1437 (last visited Jun. 20, 2016).
See The Overview of the EU Positions and Texts in the TTIP Negotiations available athttp://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1230 (last visited Jun., 20, 2016).
European Commission, Inside TTIP, supra note 59, at 42; European Commission, TTIP - State of Play, supra note 63, at 6.
See Malmström, Discussion on Investment in TTIP, supra note 114, at 3-4.
European Commission, Inside TTIP, supra note 59, at 41; Malmström, Discussion on Investment in TTIP, supra note 114, at 1.
Press Release, European Commission, Commission Proposes a New Investment Court System for TTIP and Other EU Trade and Investment Negotiations (Sept. 16, 2015), available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1364.
See European Commission, Reading Guide Draft Text on Investment Protection and Investment Court System in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1365 (last visited Jun. 20, 2016).
Id. See also, EU Proposal, supra note 116, ch. II, sec. 2, art. 2.2.
European Commission, Reading Guide, supra note 122; EU Proposal, supra note 116, ch. II, sec. 2, arts 2.3 and 2.4.
European Commission, Reading Guide, supra note 122. See also Cecilia Malmström who stressed in her speech to the Atlantic Council in Washington D.C. that the EU’s new investment court system “is a step towards the global reform we need, ultimately leading to a global court”, supra note 1, at 5.
EU Proposal, supra note 116, ch. II, sec. 3, arts 9. 2, 9.6, 9.7.
Id. at ch. II, sec. 3, art. 28.1.
Id. at ch. II, sec. 3, arts. 13.3, 13.4.
Id. at ch. II, sec. 3, art. 13.3.
Id. at ch. II, sec. 3, art. 13.4.
Id. at ch. II, sec. 3, arts. 10.2, 10.8 and 10.9.
Id. at ch. II, sec. 3, art. 29.1.
Id. at ch. II, sec. 3, art. 11 and annex II.
European Commission, Reading Guide, supra note 122.
European Commission, Report of the Twelfth Round of Negotiations for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) 19 (Mar. 23,2016), available at http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ttip/documents-and-events/index_en.htm#negotiation-rounds.
European Commission, Report of the 13th Round of Negotiations, supra note 64, at 18; European Commission, Report of the 14th Round of Negotiations for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 14 (July 2016, available at http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ttip/); European Commission, TTIP Advisory Group, supra note 78, at 5.
European Commission, Report of the 13th Round of Negotiations, supra note 64, at 18.
See opinion 1/91, EUR-Lex 61991CV0001 (Dec. 14, 1991); opinion 1/09, EUR-Lex 62009CV0001 (Mar. 8, 2011); and opinion 2/13, EUR-Lex 62013CV0002 (Dec. 18, 2014).
Opinion 2/13, supra note 140, para. 182.
See also Christoph Herrmann, The Role of the Court of Justice of the European Union in the Emerging EU Investment Policy, 15 J. World Inv. & Trade 570, 582-83 (2014).
But see Steffen Hindelang, Repellent Forces: The CJEU and Investor-State Dispute Settlement, 53 Archiv des Völkerrechts 68 (2015), who argues that “a tribunal’s damages award […] might de facto impact interpretations and review for legality of EU measures in the light of superior EU law by the CJEU”, id. at 79-80.
Opinion 1/08, EUR-Lex 62008CV0001 (Nov. 30, 2009), para. 164.
TFEU art. 3(2). This provision is also applicable to areas where the competence is, in principle, shared between the Union and its Member States because of its overriding character, Christian Pitschas, Economic Partnership Agreements and EU Trade Policy: Objectives, Competences and Implementation, in EU Bilateral Trade Agreements and Intellectual Property: For Better or Worse? 209, 221 (Josef Drexl et al. eds., 2014).
Case C-476/98, Commission v. Germany, 2002 E.C.R. I-9855. para. 111 (referring to Opinion 1/94, EUR-Lex 61994CV0001 (Nov. 15, 1994), paras. 78 and 79).
Christian Pitschas, Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) und Regulatorische Konvergenz in Die WTO nach Bali - Chancen und Risiken 141, 159 (Dirk Ehlers, Christian Pitschas & Hans-Michael Wolffgang eds., 2015).
This was acknowledged by Karel De Gucht, The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership: The Real Debate 5 (Speech/14/406, May 22, 2014), available at http://ec.europa.eu/trade/trade-policy-and-you/publications.
The EU Proposal for Institutional, General and Final Provisions provides in article X.17 that TTIP “is open to accession by non-Parties possessing full autonomy in the conduct of their external commercial relations and of the other matters provided for in this Agreement as the Parties may agree”, available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1527 (last visited Sept. 29, 2016). The European Commission explained that “there should be a possibility for other countries to join and a geographical limitation on who could join was not deemed necessary”, Transatlantic Trade & Investment Partnership Advisory Group. Meeting Report, 23 June 2016, at 5, available at http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ttip/documents-and-events/index_en.htm#_documents.
Accord Transatlantique: Les négociations avancent lentement, Entreprise Romande, 29 Jan. 2016, 8.
But see Cecilia Malmström, TTIP and Developing Countries 3 (Speech, Jun. 21, 2016), available at http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ttip/documents-and-events/index_en.htm#_documents.
But see Malmström, id, at 2.
Note that the European Commission has requested an opinion from the Court of Justice on whether the free-trade agreement with Singapore falls within the exclusive competence of the Union, see Press Release, European Commission to Request a Court of Justice Opinion on the Trade Deal with Singapore (Mar. 4, 2015), available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1269.
HLWG, Final Report, supra note 22, at 3.

References: art. 2
 art. 28
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 art. 13
 art. 29
 art. 11
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 art. 3
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