Source: https://casetext.com/case/alameda-cty-man-emp-v-sc
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 16:14:21+00:00

Document:
Appeal from the Superior Court of Alameda County, No. RG09464432, Robert M. Mallano, Judge.
Atkinson, Andelson, Loya, Ruud Romo, Paul M. Loya and Elizabeth P. Lind for Defendant and Respondent.
Generally, an employee organization's claim that a trial court has violated the Act would initially be heard by the Public Employment Relations Board (PERB). (§ 71639.1, subds. (b)., (c).) But under the Act disputes involving management employees, such as those represented by ACMEA, are excluded from PERB's jurisdiction. (§ 71639.1, subd. (e); see § 71637.1 [authorizing trial courts to adopt reasonable rules providing for the designation of management and confidential employees].) Therefore, pursuant to section 71639.5, subdivision (c) and California Rules of Court, rule 10.660(c)(2), the matter was assigned for hearing to the Honorable Robert M. Mallano, Presiding Justice of Division One of the Second Appellate District. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 10.660(b)(3) ["The judge assigned to hear the petition in the superior court must be a justice from a Court of Appeal for a district other than the district for that superior court."]; Orange County Employees Assn., Inc. v. Superior Court (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 287, 296 [ 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 201] ( OCEA) [petitions must be heard by an "out-of-district appellate justice"].) Thus, when we refer to the "trial judge" in this opinion, we mean the justice assigned to hear this matter under the special procedures prescribed by the Act and California Rules of Court, rule 10.660. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 10.660(b)(2), (c)(2).) To avoid unnecessary confusion, we will not refer to the court below as the "trial court."
Petitioners Bridget Conner, Donna Fabian, Linda Fisher, Sylvia Gee, Dena Gomez, Danith Kincaid, Alina Mateo, Denise Martinez, Rosalina Neeley, Nikki Riley, Carla Schengel, Alisa Taylor, and Deborah Williams (collectively the Individual Petitioners) are individuals who were at all relevant times employees of the Court. The Individual Petitioners are "trial court employees" within the meaning of section 71601, subdivision (/) and were members of the bargaining unit represented by ACMEA.
The SEIU MOU includes new language that had not been in any prior MOU. Section 30, entitled "Seniority," states: "Seniority Defined: Except for layoff and recall which utilize classification seniority, seniority shall be measured by hours worked (paid status) using the total service for the Court or the Court and Alameda County if the employee has worked in a classification assigned to the Court prior to January 1, 2001." Section 30.C.4 also includes new language providing that "Seniority shall be terminated by: [¶] . . . [¶] . . . Failure beyond six (6) months to return from a non bargaining unit position."
The questions of statutory interpretation presented by this case are also subject to de novo review. ( City of San Jose v. International Assn. of Firefighters, Local 230 (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 408, 424 [ 100 Cal.Rptr.3d 396].) We do not write on an entirely clean slate, however. Where the language of the Act is "the same or substantially the same" as that of the MMBA, the Legislature has mandated that the provisions of the Act be "interpreted and applied in accordance with the judicial interpretations" of the language of the MMBA. (§ 71639.3; compare § 3505 [definition of "`[m]eet and confer in good faith`" under MMBA] with § 71601, subd. (e) [definition of "`[m]eet and confer in good faith`" under Act].) We therefore look to case law interpreting the MMBA for guidance.
The trial judge held that the Court did not change its rules, policies, or practices by agreeing to the new definition of seniority in section 30.C.4 of the SEIU MOU. Instead, the trial judge found that only a contract between the Court and the SEIU had changed. Although the Personnel Policies supposedly did not change, the trial judge nevertheless went on to hold that ACMEA members had lost their right to demote — a right arising from the Personnel Policies — because of the definition of seniority in the SEIU MOU. Thus, on the one hand, the trial judge found that the Personnel Policies did not change, while on the other, he concluded that the bumping rights ACMEA members had enjoyed under those policies had been lost.
We agree with ACMEA and conclude the trial judge erred in holding the Court did not violate the Act. The parties have stipulated that the Personnel Policies were adopted prior to implementation of the Act and were the product of a meet and confer process involving ACMEA and other labor organizations representing Court employees. The Personnel Policies therefore constitute "personnel rules, policies, and practices . . . in effect at the time of the implementation date" of the Act. (§ 71639, subd. (b).) Those Personnel Policies affected a "matter within the scope of representation" because they conferred seniority and bumping rights on ACMEA members. (§ 71639, subd. (b); see § 71634, subd. (a) [defining scope of representation]; Steele v. L. N. R. Co. (1944) 323 U.S. 192, 203 [ 89 L.Ed. 173, 65 S.Ct. 226] [seniority rights are within scope of representation].) But for the SEIU MOU, the Personnel Policies would have entitled nine of the Individual Petitioners to demote to SEIU classifications in which they had previously held tenure. Indeed, the trial judge specifically found that the definition of seniority in section 30.C.4 of the SEIU MOU deprived the Individual Petitioners of these preexisting seniority rights by preventing them from demoting to SEIU classifications.
By curtailing the seniority and bumping rights of ACMEA members, it is apparent that the SEIU MOU purported to effect a change in a "rule, policy, or practice that affects [a] matter within the scope of representation." (§ 71639, subd. (b).) As a consequence, before changing that policy, the Court was required to "meet and confer in good faith with the recognized employee organization as provided for in this chapter." (§ 71639, subd. (b).) Because ACMEA is recognized as the exclusive representative of employees affected by the changes, the Court was required to meet and confer in good faith with ACMEA prior to making this change.
Even if we were to accept the trial judge's interpretation of the preface to the Personnel Policies, it could not affect the result we reach, because the Court may not absolve itself of duties imposed by the Act by adopting a policy that conflicts with the statute. (See International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. City of Gridley (1983) 34 Cal.3d 191, 202 [ 193 Cal.Rptr. 518, 666 P.2d 960] [scope of local government's rulemaking power in public sector labor relations is limited by the policies and purposes of the MMBA]; cf. Sierra Craft, Inc. v. Magnum Enterprises, Inc. (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 1252, 1255 [ 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 681] ["local [court] rules and policies may implement but may not be inconsistent with statutory requirements"].) Construing the preface to permit the Court to apply provisions of the SEIU MOU to employees occupying positions in classifications not covered by that MOU would contravene the policies of the Act.
See footnote, ante, page 368.
The trial judge entered judgment in favor of the Court on ACMEA's causes of action alleging violations of the Individual Petitioners' due process rights. In his statement of decision, the trial judge assumed that even if a prelayoff proceeding of some kind was constitutionally required, the Individual Petitioners received all the process that was due to them. The trial judge found that ACMEA had forfeited any claim that the Court did not provide adequate postlayoff hearings by failing to support the claim with "timely, pertinent authority."
On appeal, ACMEA seeks to reframe its argument regarding the allegedly pretextual nature of the layoffs. We reject this argument because we can find no evidence that it was raised below. Moreover, even assuming hearings into such issues would not impermissibly intrude upon the Court's management prerogatives, the Individual Petitioners would have to plead and prove that they were "`not "expendable" at the time`" of their layoffs or demotions. ( Perkowski v. Stratford Bd. of Education, supra, 455 F.Supp.2d at p. 96.) They have not done so.
ACMEA now asserts that "13 of the 28 laid-off ACMEA members . . . had individualized reasons for believing that [the Court], in exercising its discretion to determine which classifications to target for layoff and how many of each classification should be laid off, relied upon disciplinary-type considerations. In other words, [the Individual] Petitioners would present evidence at their due process hearings that [the Court] considered multiple different scenarios for which types of positions to lay off and in what numbers, and that [the Court] looked at which employees would be affected by the different scenarios and then made its decision in certain circumstances based upon which employees it wanted to get rid of or demote for retaliatory and/or disciplinary reasons."
ACMEA's Petition asserted two causes of action alleging violations of the Individual Petitioners' due process rights under the California and federal Constitutions. The titles of both causes of action state that they arise from the Court's "Failure to Provide a Due Process Hearing." In neither of these causes of action did ACMEA make any explicit claim that the Individual Petitioners were improperly deprived of post-layoff hearings. Both simply alleged that the Court had failed to provide "due process hearings." In addition, the allegations referred to the Individual Petitioners`"impending layoffs" and "impending demotions," thus suggesting that ACMEA's claim concerned the failure to provide a pre-layoff hearing. Furthermore, the case ACMEA cited in support of both causes of action was one involving a claim of violation of a public employee's right to a pre-layoff hearing. (See Levine v. City of Alameda (9th Cir. 2008) 525 F.3d 903, 905-906 ( Levine) [city employee had property interest in continued employment and "was entitled to have a hearing before his lay off," italics added].) The only mention of post-layoff hearings in ACMEA' Petition came in its fifth cause of action for declaratory relief, which alleged that an actual and substantial controversy existed between the parties regarding "the nature and/or extent of [the Court's] duty to provide pre-deprivation and post-deprivation due process to laid off and demoted employees. . . ." The Petition's prayer for relief contained no specific request that the trial judge order post-layoff hearings.
In these circumstances, we will not second-guess the trial judge's finding that ACMEA forfeited this issue by failing to present an adequate argument in support of the Individual Petitioners' right to post-layoff hearings. Here, the record is almost entirely silent on the question of post-layoff hearings, and ACMEA failed to present the issue squarely to the trial judge. (See Smith v. Adventist Health System/West (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 729, 745-749 [affirming superior court's implied finding that parties had waived and/or forfeited issue by failing to address issue in legal memoranda or at hearing on motion].) A party may not argue additional theories of the case that it did not present at trial. (E.g., Curcio v. Svanevik (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 955, 960.) Although we have discretion to address pure questions of law presented on the undisputed facts appearing in the record, "`"if the new theory contemplates a factual situation the consequences of which are open to controversy and were not put in issue or presented at trial the opposing party should not be required to defend against it on appeal. [Citations.]"` [Citations.]" ( Ibid) That is the case here.
The parties agree the trial judge erred in finding that the Personnel Policies conferred an express right to a post-lay-off hearing. As we affirm the trial judge's ruling that ACMEA forfeited this issue, we need not address the parties' contentions about the effect of this admittedly erroneous finding.

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