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Timestamp: 2019-04-25 08:06:36+00:00

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Haven't posted in a long while, but I lurk every week.
I just wanted to encourage you all to keep up the good fight for your children's sake. It is worth it. We will be having our first uninterrupted Father's Day with SS this year. He is 20 now. I came to this site when he was 6 or 7. Up until last year, BM was interfering. Then apparently SS did something that made her turn to him say, "you are every bit as bad as your father ever was" and he left. His rose colored glasses were off. I am sad that SS had to be hurt in order for that to happen, but he is also learning to deal with a mother that has unresolved emotional issues in a way that keeps some healthy boundaries... something we sought for him for years. He is asking questions -- I promised him years ago that I would never lie to a direct question -- sometimes it is hard not to play the blame game and keep my explanations to what we absolutely know.
SS calls 3-4 times a week to ask his Dad if he can come hang out... to ask if they can go do something together...to ask for advice. It is so NORMAL that it brings a tear to my eye.
Like many others here before us, we are passing on the torch.
everybody happy dance for us a minute. CS is done. DH has paid CS for 17 out of SS's 18 years (they were married for one year).
Second Families / Drama. Always Drama.
Background: I have been in SS's life since he was 5. DH and his ex had been divorced over a year when I met him. We were married 5 months later and we've been married ever since (13 years this November).
BM was a hostile agressive parent. SS seemed to buy every word she uttered. She told him that only the people you live with are your REAL family. He even rationalized sodomizing his little brothers because they weren't real. She demonized me for making sure SS was convicted so that he could get the counseling he needed. It has been a long living hell. SS turned 18 in NOV.
Tonight while chatting online (SS was at the library) he admitted to knowing his mom was a hostile agressive parent and that he was better on the street than going back to her home.
Also found out that SS dropped out of school in April 2009. BM got an extra month of support. I am pissed. I am so almost done and now I have to help this kid (he is about 15 mentally) who is 18 learn to use the system to survive, cause I cannot bring him back to our home. My in-laws probably would have helped, but my FIL had 2 heart attacks lately, so that is not an option right now. SS's conviction makes it hard to get him help through shelters. SS needs to finish high school, and wants to, but without somewhere to live and food to eat, he is not likely to go... survival comes first.
DH will not be back from Iraq until August. He is trying to deal with things, but 11 hours and many miles make it HARD.
Yeah, Drama. I think I will go find my panic meds, cause my blood pressure is spiking and my chest hurts.
"You keep bellyaching about me stepping up, I got no problem with that, but first you gotta get the hell off the stairs!"
I just finished a new book out there called The Shack. For fiction, it is a thought provoking work. It is written by William P. Young. (To read more about the book go to www.theshackbook.com.) I am not going to try to sell anyone on reading it or buying it.
That being said, the one thing that was excruciatingly clear is that despite our own perceived failings, God as Father is so incredibly important to our own personal healing, our spiritual and mental health, and our ability to create and maintain relationships with our families, friends and fellow man.
In one part, Mack, the main character asks God, ".. why is there such an emphasis on you being a Father? I mean, it seems to be the way you most reveal yourself."
"Well," responded Papa, turning away from him and bustling around the kitchen, "there are many reasons for that and some of them go very deep.Let me say for now that we knew once Creation was broken, true fathering would be much more lacking than mothering. Don't misunderstand me, both are needed -- but an emphasis on fathering is necessary because of the enormity of its absence."
Now some may think the author is again going down the men bad/woman good path, but having read the rest of the book, I see it as saying that a human being's relationship with one's father is so important, so essential, that God choses to reveal Himself to us as a surrogate Father in order that we not go entirely without. I beleive that God is neither male nor female. And to know that the God of creation choses to limit Himself to one gender to make sure I have a loving father in my life... that is how important fathering is.
During the years after my mother had successfully performed her fatherectomy, I was not much more than a lost child. I turned to God to get through the day to day stuff. I clung to the promise that God will be a father to the fatherless. (And He was, never failing to love me, care for me, provide just what I needed and just when I needed it.) However, in God's infinite wisdom, He provided a reconciliation with my father. My true healing came when I learned to forgive my father for all the hurts, either real or imagined. That moment of restoration of my relationship with my father has been a turning point for me.
Washington State Forum / How do we stop support?
SS turned 18 today. He is set to graduate in June 2009. CS order say through graduation. How do we stop the order without making a big deal?
DO NOT CITE. SEE RAP 10.4(h).
PER CURIAM - The trial court issued a protection order against Bret Haggerty. He appeals, arguing that insufficient evidence supports the trial court's factual findings and its conclusion that he engaged in domestic violence against his ex-wife, Saiyin. Although he presents a close question, the evidence is sufficient to support the court's determination that Haggerty stalked Saiyin. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by issuing the protection order. We affirm.
person. She claimed he constantly pressured her for time with the children outside of that provided in the parenting plan, and that he continued to violate the plan by keeping the children longer than allowed or showing up at their schools to see them during the week.*2 She stated that Bret's demeanor intimidated her and that she feared him because of his conduct. A court commissioner entered a temporary order and set a return hearing for February 15.
hearing that none of his conduct amounted to domestic violence, and he was in fact the victim of domestic violence by Saiyin. The commissioner issued the protection order and awarded Saiyin $500 in attorney fees.
March 30, 2005. Judge Michael Spearman denied the motion and awarded Saiyin $500 in attorney fees. He concluded that a preponderance of the evidence showed Bret engaged in domestic violence against Saiyin by stalking her.
household members; (b) sexual assault of one family or household member by another; or (c) stalking as defined in RCW 9A.46.110 of one family or household member by another family or household member.
found Bret had a pattern of taking "extreme measures to inflict himself" on Saiyin and the children, based on his multiple harassing phone calls and "at least 11" unfounded referrals to Child Protective Services (CPS). She also found he failed to comply with the parenting plan and violated the February 1 temporary protection order by having his mother call Saiyin to request visitation. She ruled that Saiyin had a reasonable fear of Bret's continued "infliction of imminent physical harm or assault on her and the children directly and/or indirectly."
parenting plan and repeated CPS referrals as further proof of harassment.
boys on Sunday and Wednesday evenings from 7:00 to 7:45 p.m. It granted him visitation rights for one weekend per month, from 4:00 p.m. Friday until 7:00 p.m. Sunday, along with various birthdays, holidays, and school vacations. Saiyin sent Bret a letter on April 22, 2004, indicating her concerns about the increasing conflict between them and specifically telling him that his frequent phone calls and messages were not welcome.
Saiyin into giving him more time with the children than was provided in the parenting plan. They also demonstrate his willingness to threaten legal action to get what he wants. For example, on October 4, 2004, Bret wrote Saiyin telling her that he would be in her area working on his house for most of October and November. He asked if they could "work out a more appropriate visitation schedule between us or do we need to go before a court. Every other weekend I feel would be appropriate during this time frame and some time during the week. What are you willing to work on?" He then says "Your position that I cannot take TJ and Sam out of school and the daycare during the week for lunch is violating my rights as their father. . . . If you will not take care of this on your own I will have no choice but to take legal action against you."
resulted in investigations or safety assessments, and CPS ultimately deemed only one of those four as unfounded. CPS took his other five referrals as information only and did not investigate.*14 The evidence does not support the commissioner's specific finding that he made at least 11 unfounded referrals to CPS. But it does show that he made repeated CPS referrals. We cannot say that the trial court erred by considering the sheer number of referrals along with his other conduct in finding that he harassed Saiyin.
the temporary order cannot be imputed to Bret to show that he violated the protection order. There was no evidence that he instructed his mother to call Saiyin or that he even knew about it ahead of time. Further, the call his mother made after February 1 was in the course of apparently amicable communications about a possible visit with the grandchildren. And Saiyin testified that his mother did not call her back after Saiyin told her to contact her attorney from then on. However, the finding that Bret failed to comply with the temporary protection order was not essential to the ultimate determination that Bret engaged in domestic violence. Judge Spearman did not even mention the alleged violation of the temporary order in denying Bret's motion for revision.
person in fear or intimidate or harass the person.
harasses, or is detrimental to such person, and which serves no legitimate or lawful purpose. The course of conduct shall be such as would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress, and shall actually cause substantial emotional distress to the petitioner, or, when the course of conduct would cause a reasonable parent to fear for the well-being of their child.
included within the meaning of "course of conduct."
pressuring her for additional time with the children, annoyed and harassed Saiyin such that it qualified as "unlawful harassment."*16 He knew or should have known that she felt harassed by his conduct. The record indicates that they were in continuous conflict over the last several years, especially concerning the children. And in her April 2004 letter, Saiyin explicitly told him she was concerned about the increasing conflict and annoyed with the repeated phone calls.
said no, the commissioner ended his cross-examination.
established that his mother had not called Saiyin back once she knew Saiyin wanted her to go through her attorney. He fails to explain why further questioning was necessary. The commissioner properly limited Bret's cross-examination.
26.09.140,23 and RCW 26.50.060(1)(g). Under RAP 18.1, we may award attorney fees "(i)f applicable law grants to a party the right to recover reasonable attorney fees or expenses on review, before either the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court . . . ." Under RCW 26.50.060(1)(g), we may award fees to a party who obtains a protection order.*24 We grant Saiyin her reasonable attorney fees and costs on appeal.
The trial court is affirmed.
protection against Bret. The trial court commissioner entered a temporary order of protection for Saiyin and apparently dismissed Bret's restraining order, although there is no record showing that the restraining order was even discussed.
with Saiyin. It granted Bret various visitation rights.
prejudiced him. The commissioner stated both during the hearing and in the docket judgment that although she struck Bret's motion, she considered his declaration supporting his motion as his response to Saiyin's petition for the protection order. Judge Spearman stated that he considered Bret's pleadings in denying his motion to revise the protection order. If his pleadings were insufficient to defeat Saiyin's petition for a protection order, they would not have been sufficient to support his motion to dismiss her petition and realign the parties.
4 RCW 26.50.060(1); Hecker v. Cortinas, 110 Wn. App. 865, 869, 43 P.3d 50 (2002).
5 State v. Stenson, 132 Wn.2d 668, 701, 940 P.2d 1239 (1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1008 (1998).
Willener v. Sweeting, 107 Wn.2d 388, 393, 730 P.2d 45 (1986)).
7 Pilcher v. Dep't of Revenue, 112 Wn. App. 428, 435, 49 P.3d 947 (2002), review denied, 149 Wn.2d 1004 (2003).
8 Sunnyside Valley Irrigation Dist. v. Dickie, 149 Wn.2d 873, 880, 73 P.3d 369 (2003) (citing Croton Chem. Corp. v. Birkenwald, Inc., 50 Wn.2d 684, 314 P.2d 622 (1957)).
9 City of Tacoma v. State, 117 Wn.2d 348, 351-52, 816 P.2d 7 (1991).
10 Reese v. Stroh, 128 Wn.2d 300, 312, 907 P.2d 282 (1995).
11 Spence v. Kaminski, 103 Wn. App. 325, 331, 12 P.3d 1030 (2000).
witness credibility, and conflicting testimony. State v. Ainslie, 103 Wn.
App. 1, 6, 11 P.3d 318 (2000) (citing State v. Walton, 64 Wn. App. 410, 415-16, 824 P.2d 533, review denied, 119 Wn.2d 1011 (1992)).
daycare employee, respectively, made the other two referrals.
16 Bret claims that he frequently contacted Saiyin because he has a constitutional right to associate with his children and she was not providing him access to them as required in the parenting plan. But Bret can address this problem through the courts without harassing Saiyin. And there is no lawful reason for him to insist on spending time with the children beyond what is provided in the parenting plan. If he wants more time with them he must pursue available legal avenues to amend the parenting plan.
18 See Pilcher, 112 Wn. App. at 435.
purposes of her petition, Saiyin needed only to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Bret's actions constituted domestic violence.
weekend per month, provided that the Mother receives . . . 14 days advance notice from the Father.' But paragraph 15 mentions the weekend visitation rights not to the exclusion of the plan's other visitation rights, but in order to designate specific methods and drop off/pick up locations for the weekend visitations to prevent contact between the parties. The order does not modify the parenting plan.
22 State v. Darden, 145 Wn.2d 612, 619, 41 P.3d 1189 (2002) (citing State v. Campbell, 103 Wn.2d 1, 20, 691 P.2d 929 (1984), review denied, 471 U.S. 1094 (1985)).
23 RCW 26.09.140 does not provide a basis upon which we may award fees in this case. It states a court may award attorney fees for 'any proceeding under this chapter,' but Chapter 26.09 RCW covers dissolution of marriage. This is a protection order proceeding commenced long after the parties divorced.
granted, 154 Wn.2d 1012 (2005).
QUINN-BRINTNALL, C.J. Adam Del Wade Simpson appeals an order finding him in contempt for failure to pay back child support and entering judgment in favor of his former wife, Linda Simpson. He argues that the court erred by (1) refusing to enforce the parties' alternative custody/support agreement as against public policy; and (2) failing to consider fully his laches argument. We reverse and remand for additional proceedings.
Adam to pay $454 per month in child support. Although it appears that Adam periodically assumed primary, if not exclusive, custody of the child,* neither party has ever asked the court to modify the 1996 order.
requested that the state terminate these enforcement proceedings.
In June 2004, Linda filed a contempt action asking that the court find Adam in contempt of the 1996 child support order for failure to pay support. She requested a judgment in her favor for back child support, prejudgment interest, and costs and fees.3 In her supporting declaration, she asserted that the 1996 order had not been modified; that Adam had made only 12 partial child support payments since the 1996 order was entered; that he never paid child support voluntarily; and that he was hiding his income in order to avoid making the child support payments.
support of his prior agreement defense, Adam argued that as early as 2000, he and Linda had agreed to share custody equally and to waive any child support. In support of his laches argument, he asserted that Linda knew of the facts constituting the claim of action, that her delay in pursuing the claim was unreasonable, that she had led him to believe they had an operative alternative agreement about child support, and that her representations caused him to rely on this apparent agreement. He also asserted that Linda's failure to participate in the earlier state enforcement actions supported his laches argument.
consistently fought over custody issues; that she did not previously pursue enforcement through the courts because Adam was mentally unstable, abusive, and threatening and she was afraid of him; that Adam believed he was the custodial parent and claimed that Linda had to have his permission to contact the child; and that when she initiated the current proceedings he once again took the child. She further stated that she had not attempted to recover the child through the courts 'because of expense and futility.' Clerk's Papers (CP) at 56.
recently retained counsel argued that Adam was not in contempt because the parties had reached an alternative agreement and laches applied.
through the State's earlier proceedings established unreasonable delay.
The commissioner, apparently addressing this specific argument, stated that the delay in bringing this particular action was 'not unusual.' See Report of Proceedings (RP) (Oct. 12, 2004) at 15.
After considering the pleadings and argument,5 the commissioner stated on the record that he found Adam in contempt and that he refused to consider the purported alternative agreement because such agreements were against public policy.6 In his written findings, the commissioner found that Adam 'intentionally failed to comply' with the 1996 order by failing to pay child support as ordered, CP at 59, and entered a judgment in favor of Linda for $44,961.63 for child support arrearages and $20,362.04 in prejudgment interest. The commissioner's written findings of fact and conclusions of law did not address Adam's defenses or either party's compliance with the parenting plan's residential provisions.
When reviewing a commissioner's ruling on revision, the superior court examines all of the evidence and issues presented to the commissioner de novo. It then applies a de novo review standard to the commissioner's findings of fact and conclusions.9 State v. Ramer, 151 Wn.2d 106, 113, 86 P.3d 132 (2004). Once the superior court makes a decision on revision, any further appeal is from the superior court's decision, not the commissioner's ruling. Ramer, 151 Wn.2d at 113. On appeal, we review a superior court order denying a motion for revision to determine whether the superior court abused its discretion and authority under RCW 2.24.05010 when it denied the motion for revision. In re Marriage of Griffin, 114 Wn.2d 772, 779, 791 P.2d 519 (1990). Under this standard, we do not substitute our judgment for that of the superior court unless its decision rests on unreasonable or untenable grounds. Griffin, 114 Wn.2d at 779.
commissioner's decision on that basis. We agree.
public policy. The commissioner was correct that prospective agreements to alter child support obligations are against public policy because child support is for the child's benefit and the custodial parent has no personal interest in the child support money. Hartman v. Smith, 100 Wn.2d 766, 768, 674 P.2d 176 (1984); Ditmar v. Ditmar, 48 Wn.2d 373, 374, 293 P.2d 759 (1956); In re Marriage of Pippins, 46 Wn. App. 805, 808, 732 P.2d 1005 (1987). But this prohibition on prospective enforcement of alternate child support agreements does not necessarily extend to prohibit the court from considering such agreements for any purpose, such as calculating the proper amount of any past due child support.
support payments. Because payment of past due support reimburses the custodial parent for moneys actually expended, a cause of action for past due support 'lies with the custodial parent--not with the child.' Hartman, 100 Wn.2d at 768. Although retrospective support payments are not generally subject to modification because each payment 'vests when due,' Hartman, 100 Wn.2d at 768, Washington courts will, under the proper circumstances, apply 'equitable principles to mitigate the harshness of particular claims for retrospective support if it will not work an injustice to the custodian or the child.'11 In re Marriage of Capetillo, 85 Wn. App. 311, 316-17, 932 P.2d 691, review denied, 132 Wn.2d 1011 (1997).
To the extent the commissioner ruled that an agreement between Adam and Linda purporting to end or alter Adam's continuing child support obligation was void as against public policy, the commissioner did not err.
parties for any purpose was improper because the purported agreement was potentially relevant to equitable defenses that Adam was entitled to raise such as laches or equitable estoppel. Adam clearly raised a laches defense and, although his pro se pleadings did not specifically state that he was raising an equitable estoppel argument, his 'prior agreement' argument could be construed as such an argument. Because this error prevented the court from fully examining the merits of Adam's equitable arguments, remand is required.12 We note that on remand the trial court should also address when and to what extent each parent acted as the child's residential parent; whether they actually shared custody; and what effect, if any, the actual custody of the child should have on any child support obligations.
Linda requests attorney fees on appeal under RCW 26.18.160.13 Because Linda is not the prevailing party at this time, her request for attorney fees under RCW 26.18.160 is denied.
Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered.
1 We use the parties' first names for clarity.
2 The record suggests that Adam may have had primary custody of the child as of the time of the contempt hearing in October 2004, but it is unclear whether his custody was exclusive or when it began. Additionally, the record suggests that Adam may have had primary custody of the child (1) from sometime in December 1996, to at least February 12, 1997; and (2) from July 5, 1997, until at least mid-December 1997.
3 Linda also requested 'make up residential time, as may be appropriate.' Clerk's Papers (CP) at 4. Nothing in the record shows that the commissioner considered any custody or visitation issues and neither party raises any custody or visitation issues on appeal.
5 The commissioner did not hear any testimony.
Marriage of Young, 26 Wn. App. 843, 615 P.2d 508 (1980)), State ex rel.
support-related issues come before the Court on contempt. They're subject to contempt, as such. . . .
and so that's what we have to deal with, but that's a significant amount of support, and I'm satisfied that it hasn't been paid unless you have proof that there has been payment. I'm not accepting these agreements of the parties. I don't think they're -- I think they're against public policy, as far as I'm concerned. All right. RP (Oct. 12, 2004) at 22-24.
from the superior court's decision, not the commissioner's.'' State v.
Ramer, 151 Wn.2d 106, 113, 86 P.2d 132 (2004) (quoting State v. Hoffman, 115 Wn. App. 91, 101, 60 P.3d 1261 (2003)). Thus, even though Adam's arguments on appeal focus on the commissioner's actions, he is only entitled to appeal the denial of his motion to revise the commissioner's decision.
decision without reviewing the entire file or the report of proceedings.
Although Adam mentions the possible lack of record on review, he does not raise any arguments related to this alleged deficiency. Furthermore, even if he did, the record does not support such an assertion.
9 Linda argues that Adam failed to present these arguments below and cannot now raise them on appeal. Although Adam does not appear to have raised these same issues in his motion to revise the commissioner's ruling, the record shows that he presented and argued essentially these issues before the commissioner. Given that the superior court reviews all the evidence and issues presented to the commissioner, Adam has not waived these arguments. See Ramer, 151 Wn.2d at 113 (citing In re Marriage of Moody, 137 Wn.2d 979, 993, 976 P.2d 1240 (1999); State v. Wicker, 105 Wn. App. 428, 433, 20 P.3d 1007 (2001)).
entered by the court commissioner, and unless a demand for revision is made within ten days from the entry of the order or judgment of the court commissioner, the orders and judgments shall be and become the orders and judgments of the superior court, and appellate review thereof may be sought in the same fashion as review of like orders and judgments entered by the judge.
retrospectively.' In re Marriage of Hunter, 52 Wn. App. 265, 269, 758 P.2d 1019 (1988), review denied, 112 Wn.2d 1006 (1989).
In any action to enforce a support or maintenance order under this chapter, the prevailing party is entitled to a recovery of costs, including an award for reasonable attorney fees. An obligor may not be considered a prevailing party under this section unless the obligee has acted in bad faith in connection with the proceeding in question.
prove to sustain a conviction.' Black's Law Dictionary 559 (8th ed. 2004).
crime. Cf. State v. Emmanuel, 42 Wn.2d 799, 820, 259 P.2d 845 (1953).
The statute says in relevant part that '(w)henever an order is granted . .
. and the . . . person to be restrained knows of the order, a violation . .
Nothing in the statute requires the State to prove the validity of a Washington no-contact order. "

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