Source: https://cbaclelegalconnection.com/tag/evidence/
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 12:08:12+00:00

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The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People v. Jaeb on Thursday, December 28, 2018.
A division of the court of appeals considers whether all types of hearsay evidence are permitted as evidence of value for all cases of theft, pursuant to section 18-4-414(2), C.R.S. 2018, which provides that “[h]earsay evidence shall not be excluded in determining the value of [a] thing.” The division concludes that the statutory hearsay exception is not a blanket exception to the hearsay rule for proof of value of any stolen property but applies only where the hearsay “regard[s] affixed labels and tags, signs, shelf tags, and notices,” or other reliable evidence of “the sale price of other similar property” as specified in section 18-4-414(2).
The division further concludes that the evidence of value offered by the prosecution was hearsay, was not admissible under the business records exception, and that absent such evidence the prosecution failed to provide competent evidence for the value of the stolen property. Because the evidence was insufficient to sustain felony theft conviction but sufficient as to misdemeanor theft, the division reverses the conviction of felony theft and remands for resentencing on the lower charge.
The division also affirms a restitution order for damage to the stolen property.
The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in Ruibal v. People on Monday, December 3, 2018.
Ruibal petitioned for review of the court of appeals’ judgment affirming hisconviction for second degree murder. Over defense objection and without taking evidence or making any findings as to reliability, the trial court admitted expert testimony to the effect that the victim’s injuries in this case demonstrated “overkill,” a formal term describing multiple injuries focused on one area of the victim’s body, which includes blows about the head and face that are numerous and extensive, indicating that the assailant likely had either a real or perceived emotional attachment to the victim. Relying on case law from several other jurisdictions, a treatise dealing with related kinds of injuries, and the witness’s own experience with autopsies involving similar injuries, the court of appeals concluded that the expert opinion was sufficiently reliable and that the trial court had implicitly found as much by granting the prosecution’s proffer.
The supreme court holds that because the trial court made no specific finding that the theory of “overkill” espoused by the witness was reliable, nor was the reliability of that theory either supported by evidence in the record or already accepted in this jurisdiction, its admission amounted to an abuse of discretion. Because there was,	however, overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt quite apart from the expert testimony, the error was necessarily harmless. Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed.
The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in Zapata v. People on Monday, October 15, 2018.
Physician-Patient Privilege—Psychologist-Client Privilege—Competency Evaluations—Res Gestae.
In this case, the trial court declined to give defendant access to, or to review in camera, competency reports regarding another defendant in a factually related but separate case. Over objection, the trial court also admitted uncharged misconduct evidence as res gestae.
The supreme court held that competency reports are protected by the physician-patient or psychologist-client privilege and that the examinee did not waive the privilege as to defendant when he put his competency in dispute in his own case. The court also held that defendant’s confrontation right was not implicated and that defendant did not make a sufficient showing that the competency reports contained exculpatory evidence to justify their release to him or review by the trial court pursuant to due process or Crim. P. 16.
The court further held that any error in admitting the uncharged misconduct evidence as res gestae was harmless given the strong evidence of defendant’s guilt.
The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in Casillas v. People on Monday, September 24, 2018.
In this criminal appeal, the supreme court reviewed whether the exclusionary rule required the suppression of evidence derived from a juvenile probation officer’s unauthorized collection of DNA from a juvenile in violation of C.R.S. § 19-2-925.6 and the Fourth Amendment. The court held that (1) juvenile probation officers are properly considered adjuncts to law enforcement; (2) the officer’s collection of the juvenile’s DNA for uploading to CODIS served an inherent law enforcement function; (3) nothing in the record suggests the officer conducted the buccal swab search in reliance on misinformation provided by a third party; and (4) the unlawful search here was not based on a reasonable misinterpretation of the law. Because suppression would have a deterrent effect by removing incentives to collect DNA from ineligible juvenile offenders, the court held that suppression was warranted. Accordingly, the court reversed the court of appeals’ judgment and remanded the case with instructions to vacate petitioner’s conviction.
The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People v. Allgier on Thursday, August 23, 2018.
Criminal Law—Burglary—Possession of a Weapon by a Previous Offender—Evidence—Hearsay—Prosecutorial Misconduct.
During a burglary, several firearms were stolen. M.S., a suspect in the burglary, told police that he had seen defendant, a previous offender but not one of the burglars, in the back seat of a vehicle next to a box containing some of the stolen firearms. M.S. also said that the firearms might be found at an apartment associated with defendant. The police went to the apartment, seized three of the stolen firearms, and arrested defendant. A jury convicted defendant of possession of a weapon by a previous offender (POWPO).
On appeal, defendant argued that the trial court plainly erred in admitting into evidence the three firearms that were the basis for the POWPO charge, in addition to photographs of them. The prosecution is generally entitled to prove the elements of its case against a defendant by evidence of its own choice. Further, the firearms were accurately described in the photographs admitted into evidence, and defendant did not object to the photographs. Therefore, there was no error in admitting the firearms as the instrumentality of the crime.
Defendant also contended that the trial court erred in admitting hearsay statements of a witness, which improperly bolstered testimony. Here, the court allowed the detective who had interviewed M.S. about the burglary to testify as to that interview. The trial court sustained defendant’s objection to the detective’s more general statements about what M.S. had said, limiting the testimony to whether M.S. changed his story in any significant way. There was no risk of bolstering from this limited testimony.
Defendant further contended that the trial court plainly erred in allowing the prosecutor to mischaracterize the evidence and the law during closing argument. Here, the prosecutor’s statements were few in an otherwise lengthy summation and when read in conjunction with the prosecutor’s other statements, any error was not glaring.
Lastly, defendant contended that the aggregate impact of numerous errors denied his right to a fair trial. Here, the Court of Appeals found only unpreserved errors that were not plain. Accordingly, defendant was not deprived of a fair trial.

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