Source: http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law/9780198766063.001.0001/law-9780198766063-chapter-7-div1-64?print
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 12:28:41+00:00

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The definition of refugee explicitly excluded persons that, while fleeing persecution, were not outside their country of origin. This is because, at the time of the drafting and adoption of the Refugee Convention, the vast majority of States believed that internally displaced persons had to be the exclusive responsibility of their governments. Unlike refugees who are aliens in a foreign territory, IDPs can still benefit from the protection of their country of origin and therefore are not in need of international protection.
In the 1990s the phenomenon of internally displaced persons (IDPs) emerged as one of the more ‘challenging humanitarian, human rights and security issues’12 that the international community had to face.
States experiencing displacement began recognizing that addressing the needs of IDPs was necessary in order to achieve stabilization and conflict-resolution. Western States from their part, witnessing with concern the increasing number of refugees arriving on their borders in the post-Cold War era, thought that addressing the issue of and providing assistance to IDPs in their own countries would eliminate reasons for them to flee and seek asylum in Europe and North America.16 The assumption (p. 451) that IDPs exclusive responsibility rested with their governments started to be questioned leaving space to the idea, backed by the newly appointed Representative of the Secretary-General, that when governments are not willing or not able to protect their displaced populations, the involvement of the international community becomes a necessity.
UNHCR and other humanitarian organizations soon realized that they needed a conceptual and legal foundation as a basis for their greater involvement with IDPs. That is when the role of the newly appointment Representative of the Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons (RSC) with the mandate to examining the human rights issues related to the protection of internally displaced persons became central.20 Before looking at the Representative of the Secretary-General’s work that helped towards the development of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, the following sections include an analysis of the protection already provided to internally displaced persons by international humanitarian law and human rights law.
Most of the IHL provisions relating to the prevention of displacement and the protection of IDPs are contained in the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, Additional Protocol I and II of 1977, as well as in customary international humanitarian law.22 States have the responsibility to implement these provisions in their internal legal system. As of today, the international normative framework dedicated to IDPs is of a soft law nature and most branches of international law are not accepted as being applicable to non-State armed groups, the most developed international legal norms protecting conflict-affected IDPs and binding upon all parties to an armed conflict are still to be found in IHL.23 The following two sections will analyse IHL provisions related to the protection of conflict-induced IDPs during the three phases of displacement.
In order to be lawful, displacement of civilians must also be ‘exceptional’ and ‘temporary’. Exceptional, in the sense that the prohibition of forced displacement is the rule and that any displacement that may occur during the conflict must remain the exception; temporary, meaning that displaced persons should be allowed to return by the concerned party within the shortest possible period.32 Should displacement happen, protected persons may only be evacuated to reception centres in the occupied territory in case of an IAC, or in the national territory in case of a NIAC.
IHL provides special protection to children who are displaced and/or separated from their families as a result of an armed conflict. In IACs, parties to the conflict must take the necessary measures to ensure that children under fifteen, who are orphaned or are separated from their families, are not left to their own resources and that their education is facilitated in all circumstances.35 In NIACs, children shall also receive an education, including religious and moral education.36 As in situations of displacements children are more vulnerable to forcible recruitment into armed forces or armed groups, it has to be kept in mind that IHL, as a general rule, prohibits recruitment, forcible or voluntary, of children under fifteen years of age.37 Also, persons over fifteen years of age shall not be subject to discriminatory practices of recruitment as a result of their displacement.
As citizens or residents of their state, IDPs are entitled to all human rights recognized in the said country.40 However, the factual situation characterizing displacement—persons having to leave their homes involuntary or under coercion and being unable to return—makes IDPs particularly vulnerable and creates special needs that are qualitatively different from those of victims of other situations of violence but not forced to flee.41 Particular needs for internally displaced persons are finding a shelter while away from their homes and protection against being coercively returned to danger zones. They also have to deal with the loss of their livelihoods and property and the subsequent difficulties in trying to regain them. Another major difficulty for IDPs in replacing their documents such as identifications cards, school leaving certificates, property deeds in order to access services. IDPs are often unable to exercise their right to vote since this can usually only be done in their place of habitual residence. Moreover, because of their situation and the consequent loss of social networks, IDPs suffer greater risk of being exposed to a variety of human rights abuses such as sexual violence or forced recruitment of children into armed forces or armed groups. They are also more vulnerable to health hazards and have restricted access to health care and other essential services.
Both the Inter-American and the European Courts of Human Rights have emphasized in their jurisprudence, that the right to freedom of movement, the right to property or the right to private life and home create positive obligations for States to allow return if possible, and/or to create conditions and provide the means to enable return Page Id: 456ReferencesAmerican Convention on Human Rights (Organization of American States [OAS]) OASTS No 36, 1144 UNTS 123, B-32, OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82 doc.6 rev.1, 25Pt.I State Obligations and Rights Protected, Ch.II Civil and Political Rights, Art.22Case of the Mapiripán Massacre v Colombia, 49 victims and their next of kin v Colombia, Merits, reparations and costs, IACHR Series C No 134, IHRL 1518 (IACHR 2005),  IACHR 14, 15th September 2005, Inter-American Court of Human Rights [IACtHR] IHRLConvention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (United Nations [UN]) 1465 UNTS 85, UN Doc A/RES/39/46, UN Reg No I-24841Part I, Art.3Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as amended by Protocols No 11 and 14 (Council of Europe) 213 UNTS 222, ETS No 5, UN Reg No I-2889Section I Rights and Freedoms, Art.3International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (United Nations [UN]) 999 UNTS 171, UN Doc A/6316, UN Doc A/RES/2200(XXI), Annex, UN Reg No I-14668 OXIOPart II, Art.2, (1)Part III, Art.9Part III, Art.12Part III, Art.26Universal Declaration of Human Rights (United Nations [UN]) UN Doc A/RES/217(III) A, UN Doc A/810, 71, GAOR 3rd Session Part I, 71Art.14(p. 457) voluntarily in safety and dignity to their original place of residence.48 Finally, derived from the right to freedom of movement is also the right of IDPs, once displacement has ended, to either voluntarily return to their original place of residence, to stay in the area in which they were displaced or to resettle in another part of the country.
11 See Art. 1(A)(2) of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugee, 1951, emphasis added.
12 Cohen, R., 2014, ‘Protection of Internally Displaced Persons: National and International Responsibilities’. In Research Handbook on International Law and Migration, part IV, edited by Chetail V. and Bauloz, C., Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, p. 589.
13 Contat Hickel, M., 2001. ‘Protection of Internally Displaced Persons Affected by Armed Conflict: Concept and Challenges’, International Review of the Red Cross, September, vol. 83, no. 843, p. 700.
14 UN Press Release, UN Doc. SG/SM/4560, 24 April 1991.
15 Commission on Human Rights, Internally displaced persons, 5 March 1992, UN Doc. E/CN.4/RES/1992/73.
16 Cohen, R., ‘Protection of Internally Displaced Persons’, p. 590.
17 Cohen, R., 2010, ‘Reconciling R2P with IDP Protection’, Global Responsibility to Protect, vol. 2, no. 1-2: 15–37 at p. 17.
18 Ogata, S., 2005, The Turbulent Decade, New York: W. W. Norton & Co., p. 30.
20 Cohen, R., ‘Protection of Internally Displaced Persons’, p. 592.
21 Lavoyer, J.-P., 1995, ‘Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons: International Humanitarian Law and the Role of the ICRC’, International Review of the Red Cross, vol. 305, 30 April, p. 162.
22 Civilians fleeing from a non-international armed conflict (NIAC) enjoy protection very similar to that during international armed conflicts (IACs). Nonetheless provision protecting IDPs in NIACs are overall less detailed that those in IACs. Fortunately, customary IHL, composed of rules coming from a general practice accepted as law, fills the gaps left by treaty law in both IACs and NIACs and so strengthen the protection afforded to victims of armed conflict, including IDPs. See Henckaerts J.M. and Doswald-Beck, L., 2005, Customary International Humanitarian Law, Geneva/Cambridge, ICRC/Cambridge University Press.
23 Ojeda, S., 2014, ‘International Humanitarian Law and the Protection of Internally Displaced Persons’. In Research Handbook on International Law and Migration, part IV, edited by Chetail V. and Bauloz, C., Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, p. 635.
24 Contat Hickel, M., ‘Protection of Internally Displaced Persons’, p. 700.
25 See Common Art. 3 to the four Geneva Conventions; Art. 75 Additional Protocol I; Art. 4 Additional Protocol II; and Chapter 5 of the ICRC Study on Customary IHL, Henckaerts, J.M. and Doswald-Beck, L., 2005, Customary International Humanitarian Law, Geneva/Cambridge, ICRC/Cambridge University Press.
26 See Arts 48, 51-4, and 57-8 of Additional Protocol I; Arts 13 and 14 Additional Protocol II; Chapter I of the ICRC Study on Customary IHL, 2005.
27 For a detailed analysis on what is ‘forced’ displacement as opposed to ‘voluntary’ displacement and the legal consequences they entail, see Ojeda, S., ‘International Humanitarian Law’, p. 639.
28 See Art. 49 of Geneva Convention IV; Arts 51(7), 78(1) of Additional Protocol I; Arts 4(3)(e) and 17 of Additional Protocol II; Rules 129–130 of the ICRC Study on Customary IHL, 2005.
29 See Art. 147 of Geneva Convention IV and Art. 85(4) of Additional Protocol I.
30 If, for instance, a region is threatened by intense bombing, the competent authorities have the right or the duty to evacuate the region in whole or in part, transferring the inhabitants in places of refugee.
31 Sandoz, Y., Swinarski, C., and Zimmermann, B. (eds.), 1987, Commentary on the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflict (Protocol II), Geneva, ICRC/Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, p. 1871, paras 4853–5.
32 Ojeda, S., ‘International Humanitarian Law’, p. 640.
33 See Art. 49 of Geneva Convention IV; Art. 17 Additional Protocol II; Rules 129, 131 of the ICRC Study on Customary IHL, 2005.
34 See Arts 23, 50, 59, 70, and 71 of Additional protocol I; Art. 18 of Additional Protocol II; Rules 55–6 of the ICRC Study on Customary IHL, 2005.
35 See Art. 24(1) of Geneva Convention IV. The same obligation exists for the Occupying power in the territory it occupies, Art. 50(1) of Geneva Convention IV.
36 See Arts 4(3)(a) and 28(2) of Additional Protocol II.
37 See Art. 77(2) Additional Protocol I; Art. 4(3)(c) Additional Protocol II; Rule 136 of the ICRC Study on Customary IHL, 2005 as well as Art. 2 of the 2002 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict raises the age at eighteen years old.
38 See Art. 49 of Geneva Convention IV; Art. 17 of Additional Protocol II and Rules 129 and 132 of the ICRC Study on Customary IHL, 2005.
39 See Arts 26, 27, and 49 of Geneva Convention IV; Art. 74 of Additional Protocol I; Art. 4(3) of Additional Protocol II and Rule 131 of the ICRC Study on Customary IHL, 2005.
40 In times of armed conflict, as previously mentioned, IDPs can also benefit from the protection of IHL.
41 Kälin, W. and Künzli, J., 2009, The Law of International Human Rights Protection, Oxford University Press, p. 502.
42 This interpretation was confirmed by the Human Rights Committee in General Comment No 27, Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 27 (1999), para. 7. Also the Inter-American Court of Human Rights derived the prohibition of forced displacement from the right to freedom of movement, Art. 22 of the American Convention on Human Rights. See, IACtHR, Case of the Mapiripán Massacre v Colombia, Series C, No. 134 (2005), para. 188.
43 Arts 2(1) and 26 of the ICCPR, 1966.
44 Kälin, W. and Künzli, J., The Law of International Human Rights Protection, p. 506.
45 See Art. 12 of the ICCPR and Art. 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).
46 This is based on a similar application of the jurisprudence under Art. 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), Art. 7 of ICCPR, and Art. 3 of the Convention Against Torture (CAT) regarding the inhumanity of forcible return where there is a risk of torture or of deprivation of life.
47 This is derived from an extensive interpretation of Arts 12 and 9 of ICCPR.
48 See IACtHR, Case of Moiwana Community v Suriname, Series C, No. 124 (2005), paras 120–1 refers to the freedom of movement and residence and the right to property, and ECtHR, Dogan and Others v Turkey, App. Nos 8803–8811/02 (2004) which refers to the right to property and the right to private life and home.
49 See Arts 11, 12, and 13 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and Art. 25 of the UDHR.
50 See Art. 8 ECHR, Art. 11(2) ACHR, and Art. 11(1) ICESCR.
51 ECtHR, Akdivar and others v Turkey Judgment, 30 August 1996, §88. For analogous cases see also, ECtHR, Bilgin v Turkey Judgment, 16 November 2000, §108; Ahmet Özkan and others v Turkey Judgment, 6 April 2004, §405, and Dogan and others v Turkey Judgment, 29 June 2004, §159.
52 IACtHR, Ituango Massacres v Colombia Judgment, 1 July 2006, §§194 and 197, see also more recent case: Operación Génesis v Colombia, IACtHR, 20 November 2013, Masacres de el Mozote v El Salvador, 25 October 2012, Masacre de Santo Domingo v Colombia, 5 June 2012.
53 Kälin, W. and Künzli, J., The Law of International Human Rights Protection, p. 507.

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