Source: http://www.lawlink.com/research/CaseLevel3/85431
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 15:46:22+00:00

Document:
VIOLA RIPPON et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. DEBRA BOWEN, as Secretary of State, etc., et al.
Kiesel Boucher Larson, Raymond P. Boucher and Michael Eyerly for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Christopher Krueger, Assistant Attorney General, Stephen Acquisto and Mark R. Beckington, Deputy Attorneys General, for Defendant and Respondent Debra Bowen.
California voters passed Proposition 140 in November 1990, and thereby limited the Legislature's budget and imposed lifetime term limits and pension restrictions for state legislators and other state officers. [160 Cal.App.4th 1311] (Legislature v. Eu (1991) 54 Cal.3d 492, 502, 506 (Eu).) The purpose of the initiative was that incumbent advantages "discourage qualified candidates from seeking public office and create a class of career politicians, instead of the citizen representatives envisioned by the Founding Fathers." (Id. at p. 501.) In this appeal, appellants revisit a constitutional challenge to Proposition 140 raised shortly after its passage; they argue Proposition 140 revised the California Constitution and is therefore invalid.
Except for the pension restrictions, our Supreme Court and an en banc panel of the Ninth Circuit upheld the constitutionality of Proposition 140. (Eu, supra, 54 Cal.3d 492; Bates v. Jones (9th Cir. 1997) 131 F.3d 843 (Bates).) In Eu, our high court concluded "the basic and fundamental structure of the Legislature as a representative branch of government is left substantially unchanged by Proposition 140. Term and budgetary limitations may affect and alter the particular legislators and staff who participate in the legislative process, but the process itself should remain essentially as previously contemplated by our Constitution." (Eu, at p. 508.) Therefore, the high court concluded that Proposition 140 amended the California Constitution; it did not revise the California Constitution, precisely the issue in this case. (Eu, at pp. 510-511.) Following Eu, we affirm the judgment on the pleadings.
Defendant and respondent Debra Bowen is the Secretary of State. Defendant and respondent Dean Logan is the Registrar of Voters in Los Angeles County. Logan takes no position on the issues in this case and "will abide by the laws of the State as written or as finally determined by the Courts."
Appellants filed a complaint seeking injunctive and declaratory relief. Appellants alleged that the term limits and budget restrictions in Proposition [160 Cal.App.4th 1312] 140 revised the California Constitution, divested the Legislature of its constitutionally mandated functions, and must be declared void. According to appellants, a constitutional revision occurred because the initiative fundamentally changed the structure of government and altered the balance of power between the executive and legislative branches of government. Appellants also alleged that Proposition 140 rendered the Legislature unable to competently perform its essential legislative function.
Appellants sought an order declaring Proposition 140 void in its entirety, and declaring that Proposition 140 effected a revision to the California Constitution. They also sought an injunction enjoining respondents from enforcing the term limits contained in section 2, subdivision (a) of article IV of the California Constitution.
The trial court granted the Secretary of State's motion for judgment on the pleadings. The court concluded appellants lack standing to maintain the action. On the merits, the court found that this case is barred by stare decisis because the California Supreme Court already has held that Proposition 140 does not effect a revision to the California Constitution. Appellants timely appealed.
The standard of review for a judgment on the pleadings is the same as for a demurrer. (Schabarum v. California Legislature (1998) [160 Cal.App.4th 1313] 60 Cal.App.4th 1205, 1216 (Schabarum).) All allegations in the complaint and matters upon which judicial notice may be taken are assumed to be true. (Connerly v. Schwarzenegger (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 739, 746.) We begin with a brief description of the difference between a constitutional amendment and a constitutional revision to set the stage for an extended discussion of Eu.
In McFadden, supra, 32 Cal.2d 330, a proposed measure sought to add a new article to the constitution "to consist of 12 separate sections (actually in the nature of separate articles) divided into some 208 subsections (actually in the nature of sections) set forth in more than 21,000 words." (Id. at p. 334.) In comparison, the Constitution at that time "contain[ed] 25 articles divided into some 347 sections expressed in approximately 55,000 words." (Ibid.) The new measure would have altered substantially at least 15 of 25 articles in the constitution and introduced at least four new topics. (Id. at p. 345.) The court found the proposed change to constitute an invalid constitutional revision.
Because the predictions in Eu were speculative, it showed that nothing contained in the proposition " 'necessarily or inevitably' " altered the basic governmental framework. (See Brosnahan, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 261.) The speculative nature of the arguments was relevant to determining whether the proposition was an amendment; it was not an invitation to subsequently mount an identical challenge to the initiative. Appellants misinterpret Eu by erroneously concluding that the speculative nature of the petitioners' arguments left room for a subsequent challenge to the constitutionality of the initiative on the ground that it is a revision. Under appellants' theory, there would be no limit to the number of times the revision/amendment analysis could be revisited. Amend and revise connote procedures, (McFadden, supra, "32 Cal.2d at p. 347), and an initiative is either one or the other, regardless of the passage of time since the enactment of the initiative.
This is not a case, like those cited by appellants, where the law has changed since it was first considered or where the law arose from an emergency situation and should be deemed terminated once the emergency abated. (See, e.g., Palermo v. Stockton Theatres, Inc. (1948) 32 Cal.2d 53; Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair (1924) 264 U.S. 543; but see Santa Monica Beach, Ltd. v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 952, 1005.) Proposition 140 is the same and the arguments appellants raise are the same as those raised in Eu.
Appellants characterize their challenge as an "as applied" challenge to the constitutionality of Proposition 140. According to their opening brief, appellants "allege that Proposition 140 as applied has achieved a qualitative change in our Constitution; it has altered the basic form of our government."
Notwithstanding appellants' "as applied" label, the challenge is the same facial challenge as that made in Eu, and the relief sought is the invalidation of the entire initiative. The complaint attacks Proposition 140 because of its effects on the California Legislature. For example, appellants support the claim that Proposition 140 resulted in a change to our form of government with the following statements: "[t]he effect of Proposition 140 has been to dramatically reduce the role of the legislative branch and increase the powers vested in the executive branch and the governor. Proposition 140 has fundamentally altered the relationship between the separate branches of government; it has ceded constitutionally vested roles, functions and powers from the legislative branch to the executive branch and other entities. [160 Cal.App.4th 1319] Proposition 140 has subordinated the constitutional role assumed by the legislative branch in our governmental scheme and substantially altered California's preexisting constitutional framework."
 Appellants' challenge is not "as applied" even though they characterize it as such. First, and most significantly, the question of whether an initiative constitutes an amendment or a revision requires analysis of the statute on its face. The purported "as applied" challenge is inconsistent with the test for a constitutional revision that "must necessarily or inevitably appear from the face of the challenged provision." (Eu, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 510.) Therefore, their label simply applies the wrong test to analyze the question they ask.
Second, appellants allege no particularized injury that as applied to them in particular deprived them of a right. Instead, they argue for example that they "seek to undo the damaging effects caused by Proposition 140's legislative term limits on California." They seek to assist all legislatures who are currently subject to term limits to run for office. According to them, "even if Appellants prevail on this appeal, it will be of no consequence to those legislators now facing term limits and their constituents unless Appellants prevail quickly." They do not seek to prevent a specific application of any provision enacted pursuant to Proposition 140, but instead seek to invalidate the initiative as a whole.
 Third, the so-called "as applied" test appellants propose -- to reevaluate the initiative "in light of the actual qualitative consequences now known to have been caused by the initiative" raises a question with respect to the role of the judiciary in deciding, 17 years after the passage of an initiative, the wisdom of an initiative enacted by the People. It is the court's role and obligation to decide if an act is unconstitutional. (Schabarum, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at p. 1213.) That is what the Supreme Court did in Eu.
It is true that our Supreme Court has stressed that analysis of the amendment/revision distinction is not tantamount to an " 'Analysis of the [160 Cal.App.4th 1321] problems which may arise respecting the interpretation or application of particular provisions of the act.' " (Amador, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 219.) Analysis of particular problems " 'should be deferred for future cases in which those provisions are more directly challenged.' " (Ibid.) fn. 4 Here appellants do not seek the interpretation of any particular provision of Proposition 140, but instead seek to invalidate the entire proposition based on their allegations that it revised the Constitution.
In contrast to Schabarum, which involved a challenge to a specific substantive change caused by the initiative, the issue appellants seek to litigate -- whether Proposition 140 constitutes a revision -- is identical to the issue decided in Eu. While appellants allege they now have more conclusive evidence than that presented to our high court in Eu, that evidence is irrelevant to determine whether it appeared from the face of the initiative that, the initiative necessarily and inevitably changed the basic form of government. Nor does the existence of additional evidence relating to the role of the Legislature transform a facial attack on Proposition 140 into an "as applied" constitutional challenge.
?FN *. Judge of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
?FN 1. The complaint also alleged that the initiative violates the Guaranty Clause of article IV, section 4 of the United States Constitution. On appeal, appellants make no argument with respect to this cause of action.
?FN 2. Neither the motion for judgment on the pleadings or opposition briefs the issue of res judicata, but appellants have invoked the public interest exception in their briefs on appeal.

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