Source: https://connecticut.lexroll.com/1049-asylum-v-kinney-pike-ins-no-cv-02-0816344-oct-26-2005/
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 02:11:48+00:00

Document:
On June 26, 2003, the plaintiff, 1049 Asylum Limited Partnership (1049 Asylum), filed an eleven-count complaint against the defendant Peerless Insurance Company (Peerless) and two co-defendants. The complaint alleges in part negligent misrepresentation, breach of contract, breach of good faith and fair dealing, and violations of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA) and the Connecticut Unfair Insurance Practices Act (CUIPA). The complaint arises out of an insurance claim that followed damage to 1049 Asylum’s commercial property. 1049 Asylum alleges that Peerless, the insurance company that provided the policy covering the property, represented falsely that the policy was adequate and consistent with what was requested; represented falsely the calculations to be used in determining the policy’s coinsurance requirement; and breached its contract with 1049 Asylum by calculating that requirement wrongly and failing to pay the full amount of the loss. 1049 Asylum further alleges that Peerless’ conduct amounts to violations of General Statutes §§ 38a-815 and 38a-816(1)(a) (CUIPA) and § 42-110a et seq. (CUTPA).
On March 30, 2005, Peerless filed a motion for partial summary judgment accompanied by a memorandum of law. In support of the motion, Peerless submitted deposition testimony of Bukk Carleton, a representative of 1049 Asylum, as well as a number of other exhibits. On June 10, 2005, 1049 Asylum filed an objection to Peerless’ motion for partial summary judgment accompanied by a memorandum of law. In support of the objection, 1049 submitted deposition testimony and a number of other exhibits.
The following facts are undisputed. Prior to July 28, 2000, a representative for 1049 Asylum contacted Kinney Pike for help in CT Page 13355-al procuring an insurance policy for a building the partnership was preparing to purchase in Hartford, Connecticut. This representative had done business with Kinney Pike for several years. Kinney Pike obtained an insurance binder from Peerless Insurance Company with an effective date of July 31, 2000, with a coverage limit of $5 million. At 1049 Asylum’s request, that limit was lowered to $2.5 million and a new binder was issued. Kinney Pike warned 1049 Asylum’s representatives of the risks of lowering the limit on the policy. On December 28, 2000, a burst pipe in the building flooded the basement, resulting in significant damage. A claim was submitted to Peerless for the loss.
(1983). “In seeking summary judgment, it is the movant who has the burden of showing the nonexistence of any issue of fact. The courts are in entire agreement that the moving party for summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue as to all the material facts, which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)Martel v. Metropolitan District Commission, 275 Conn. 38, 46 (2005). “Once the moving party has met its burden, however, the opposing party must present evidence that demonstrates the existence of some disputed factual issue.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Martel v. Metropolitan CT Page 13355-am District Commission, supra, 275 Conn. 46-47.
In deposition testimony, it was revealed that Peerless was offering “bonus commissions” for the sale of new policies out of its Inland Marine division in order to boost slow sales. 1049 Asylum alleges that its insurance agent, Kinney Pike, failed to procure the specific coverage requested by 1049 Asylum, choosing instead to procure so-called “Builder’s Risk” coverage through the Inland Marine division, resulting in a bonus commission for itself. 1049 Asylum further alleges that it was damaged by this conduct because the coverage under the “Builder’s Risk” policy was inadequate. At the time that Peerless offered the policies through its Inland Marine division, however, no contract existed between it and 1049 Asylum. It was merely making these policies available to Kinney Pike, which chose to offer such a policy to 1049 Asylum. Evidence of “bonus commissions” for the sale of such policies fails to set a factual predicate for a bad faith claim.
1049 Asylum further alleges that Peerless acted in bad faith by suspecting 1049 Asylum of fraud, thereby delaying payment of the claim, and improperly calculating the final value of the property based on an 80% occupancy rate. However, no evidence is presented that Peerless, in investigating a claim for the existence of fraud or in calculating the final value of the building based on completed renovations and 80% occupancy rate, was motivated by a dishonest purpose or sinister motive.
Peerless further moves for partial summary judgment on the grounds that 1049 has failed to allege and prove that Peerless violated either CUIPA or CUTPA. First, Peerless argues that 1049 Asylum is not entitled to recover under CUIPA because the statute does not provide for a private cause of action. The Supreme Court has not yet officially recognized a private cause of action under CUIPA. However, the majority of Superior Courts hold that “there is no express authority under CUIPA for a private cause of action.” See Selle v. Geico General Insurance, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven at Meriden, Docket No. CV 04 4000567 (March 29, 2005, Tanzer, J.). Therefore, as a matter of law, this count cannot stand on its own.
(1991), that “a private cause of action exists under CUTPA to enforce alleged CUIPA violations.” In the complaint, paragraphs one through thirty-eight of the seventh count (the CUIPA claim) are incorporated as allegations under the eighth count (the CUTPA claim). “Under Lees v. Middlesex, the CUIPA allegations brought by the plaintiff under the CUTPA claim provides the means by which a private cause of action against the defendant for the alleged CUIPA violations can be maintained.” Fedora v. Worchester Insurance Co., Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven at Meriden, Docket No. CV 03 0285288 (September 28, 2004, Tanzer, J.).
Based on the foregoing, the defendant Peerless’s motion for partial summary judgment is granted for counts six (breach of implied duty of good faith and fair dealing) and seven (the CUIPA claim), and denied for count eight (the CUTPA claim).
 The other co-defendants to the complaint are Kinney Pike and The Boyden Company. Judgment was entered on March 20, 2005 as to The Boyden Company. Kinney Pike has filed a separate motion for summary judgment in this matter.

References: § 42
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.