Source: http://masscases.com/cases/sjc/273/273mass557.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 18:30:16+00:00

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WILLIAM H. COOK vs. JAMES COLE.
At the trial of an action of tort for personal injuries sustained while the plaintiff was riding in a motor truck operated by the defendant, a finding, that the plaintiff had been invited by the defendant to ride in the truck, was warranted on evidence that, while the plaintiff was sitting outside a lunch cart in a town, the defendant drove the truck up to the lunch cart and stopped, asking the plaintiff if he were a certain person; that the plaintiff replied in the negative and told the defendant that he was on his way to a certain city; that the defendant then said he was going a part of the way to that city and that the plaintiff could ride along with him; and that the plaintiff said "all right" and got into the truck.
The plaintiff at the trial above described was not bound by testimony of the defendant, whom he had called as a witness, which was in conflict with the plaintiff's contentions.
(5) The plaintiff could not recover.
TORT. Writ dated August 15, 1927.
Material evidence at the trial in the Superior Court before Brown, J., is stated in the opinion. The judge ordered a verdict for the defendant. The plaintiff alleged an exception.
J. C. McDonald, for the plaintiff.
C. C. Milton, (S. B. Milton with him,) for the defendant.
FIELD, J. This is an action of tort to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been received by the plaintiff by reason of the gross negligence of the defendant when the plaintiff, by invitation of the defendant, was riding on a motor truck operated by the defendant. At the close of the plaintiff's case a verdict for the defendant was directed and the plaintiff excepted.
that compensation in any form for the transportation of the plaintiff was paid or promised to the defendant, his employer, or the owner of the truck.
The plaintiff seeks to bring himself within the rule, well established in this Commonwealth, that the operator of a motor vehicle, by analogy to the liability of a gratuitous bailee, is liable for injuries resulting from his gross negligence to an invited person whom he is transporting gratuitously. Massaletti v. Fitzroy, 228 Mass. 487. Flynn v. Lewis, 231 Mass. 550, 554. Burke v. Cook, 246 Mass. 518, 521. Marcienowski v. Sanders, 252 Mass. 65, 67. Manning v. Simpson, 261 Mass. 494. Rog v. Eltis, 269 Mass. 466. The defendant contends that the evidence did not warrant a finding either (a) that the plaintiff was riding on the truck by invitation of the defendant or (b) that the defendant was guilty of gross negligence.
riding on the truck solely for his own purposes, it does not follow necessarily that he was not an invited person within the meaning of the rule. Cases involving the obligation of a landowner to persons going upon the land for their own purposes (see Plummer v. Dill, 156 Mass. 426; Hart v. Cole, 156 Mass. 475; Glaser v. Congregation Kehillath Israel, 263 Mass. 435) are distinguishable because of the difference in the ground of liability, as was pointed out in Massaletti v. Fitzroy, supra, at pages 507-508.
Second. The evidence did not warrant a finding that the defendant was guilty of gross negligence.
bent down with broken limbs" and that the front part of the truck was damaged. There was evidence that the truck operated by the defendant was a "two and one-half ton truck which was registered for six tons." The plaintiff testified that the defendant told him that "the truck was about five hundred pounds overweight, with the load."
The defendant's testimony, the whole or part of which might have been disbelieved, was in substance a denial of the truth of most of the testimony of the plaintiff. His explanation of the cause of the accident was that while passing a larger truck, at the rate of twenty miles an hour, on a straight part of the road, his truck was crowded to the left so that the left front wheel got into the gravel and he was unable to turn the truck back into the road before it reached the tree. He testified that the plaintiff, "who was asleep, had fallen onto the defendant's shoulder" and that he "gave [the plaintiff] a push to the other side of the cab."
Gross negligence was defined and distinguished from ordinary negligence in Altman v. Aronson, 231 Mass. 588, 591-593. (See Learned v. Hawthorne, 269 Mass. 554, 560-562). It was there pointed out that gross negligence differs in degree rather than in kind from ordinary negligence and is "materially more want of care than constitutes simple inadvertence" but need not amount to "such reckless disregard of probable consequences as is equivalent to a wilful and intentional wrong." Various tests of gross negligence were set forth, but it was added that the "definition does not possess the exactness of a mathematical demonstration." Decided eases, however, by the application of the definition to evidence, to some extent have marked the line between ordinary negligence and gross negligence in the operation of motor vehicles.
Tested by the decided cases, the evidence here does not establish gross negligence on the part of the defendant. The fact, unexplained, that the truck went off the road at the left and struck a tree, did not show gross negligence on the part of the defendant. Burke v. Cook, 246 Mass. 518.
Shriear v. Feigelson, 248 Mass. 432. There was no evidence that he was not paying attention to his driving. It does not appear that the operator was asleep or had closed his eyes, as in Blood v. Adams, 269 Mass. 480 (compare Shriear v. Feigelson, supra), or had been drinking intoxicating liquor, as in Learned v. Hawthorne, 269 Mass. 554, and in McCarron v. Bolduc, 270 Mass. 39 (compare Bertera v. Cuneo, 273 Mass. 181), or that his attention was diverted to other matters, as in Rog v. Eltis, supra, and in Kirby v. Keating, 271 Mass. 390. Neither the plaintiff's account of the accident nor that of the defendant showed that the defendant. was driving improperly with relation to other traffic, as in Manning v. Simpson, 261 Mass. 494, where the operator drove across the path of an approaching motor vehicle. Nor do we perceive any combination of the testimony which would warrant a finding of gross negligence in this respect. In view of the meager evidence of unfavorable road conditions, the direct evidence of the speed of the truck: and inferences of such speed from its "lolling" from side to side of the road and from the force of its impact against the tree, though warranting a finding of ordinary negligence, did not warrant a finding of gross negligence. Marcienowski v. Sanders, 252 Mass. 65. See also Burke v. Cook, supra. Healy v. O'Riley, 257 Mass. 413, and Terlizzi v. Marsh, 258 Mass. 156, are distinguishable. Nor was such a finding warranted by the testimony to the plaintiff's requests that the defendant let him off the truck, nor by the testimony that the defendant told the plaintiff that he would be "all right." See Bertelli v. Tronconi, 264 Mass. 235; Bank v. Satran, 266 Mass. 253. As there was no evidence that the road was more than "very slightly down grade" the testimony that the defendant disconnected the gears, thus permitting the truck to coast, did not show gross negligence.
by G. L. c. 90, § 9, as amended by St. 1922, c. 303, § 3, (see now St. 1928, c. 381, § 3), of the operation on any way of an unregistered motor vehicle. No statute prohibits the operation of a motor truck where truck and load exceed the aggregate "weight" and "maximum carrying capacity" for which it is registered, or imposes a penalty therefor unless such operation is in violation of an authorized rule or regulation. See G. L. c. 90, § 20, as amended by St. 1922, c. 130; § 31; § 31A, added by St. 1924, c. 457. Said § 31A expressly authorizes the division of highways to make rules and regulations covering "the establishment of the maximum weight of loads per commercial motor vehicle and per inch of tire in contact with the surface" of ways and imposes a penalty for violation of such a rule or regulation. Since the record, unlike that in Fox v. Pallotta, 274 Mass. 110, discloses no evidence, and not even a suggestion by either party, that such authority has been exercised, we are not called upon to consider the effect of a violation of such a rule or regulation. See Commonwealth v. Crane, 158 Mass. 218; Rogers v. Abbott, 248 Mass. 220; Seemann v. Eneix, 272 Mass. 189, 195-196.

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