Source: https://openjurist.org/384/us/702
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 10:47:13+00:00

Document:
J. Walter Yeagley, Washington, D.C., for respondent.
This case is a sequel to this Court's decision in Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 82 S.Ct. 1038, 8 L.Ed.2d 240, and companion cases. One of those cases related to the same person who is petitioner here and to the same events.
Petitioner appeared before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Un-American Activities on February 28 and March 1, 1955. He answered certain questions, but refused to answer others concerning his affiliation with the Communist Party, the affiliation of others, and his connection with a 'Peace Crusade.' He had challenged the jurisdiction of the Committee and the Subcommittee, the authorization of each, and the constitutionality of the inquiry in general and with specific reference to the questions which he declined to answer.1 He did not and does not invoke the Fifth Amendment.
Petitioner was thereafter re-indicted. The deficiency in the first indictment was sought to be cured by a recital that '(t)he subject of these hearings was Communist Party activities within the field of labor * * *.' Petitioner was again convicted and given a general sentence of three months' imprisonment and a $200 fine. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed per curiam. 121 U.S.App.D.C. 126, 348 F.2d 355 (1965). We granted certiorari. 382 U.S. 937, 86 S.Ct. 398, 15 L.Ed.2d 348. We reverse. It is now clear that the fault in these proceedings is more fundamental than the omission from the indictment of an allegation of the 'subject of the inquiry' being conducted by the Subcommittee. The subject of the inquiry was never specified or authorized by the Committee, as required by its own rules, nor was there a lawful delegation of authority to the Subcommittee to conduct the investigation.
Petitioner here urges that we reconsider this Court's decision in Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 79 S.Ct. 1081, 3 L.Ed.2d 1115. In Barenblatt this Court upheld the authority of the Committee to investigate Communist infiltration into the field of education. In the circumstances of that case, the Court sustained the constitutionality of the investigation and of the Committee's inquiry into petitioner's alleged membership in the Communist Party. Since we decide the present case on other grounds, it is not necessary nor would it be appropriate to reach the constitutional question.
Rule I of the Rules of Procedure of the House Committee on Un-American Activities provides that 'No major investigation shall be initiated without approval of a majority of the Committee.' Rule XI, par. 26, of the Rules of the House of Representatives requires each Committee of the House to keep a record of all committee actions. There is no resolution, minute or record of the Committee authorizing the inquiry with which we are concerned.
It can hardly be disputed that a specific, properly authorized subject of inquiry is an essential element of the offense under § 192. In Russell, this Court held that the definition of the subject under inquiry is 'the basic preliminary question which the federal courts * * * (would) have to decide in determining whether a criminal offense had been alleged or proved.' 'Our decisions have pointed out that the obvious first step in determining whether the questions asked were pertinent to the subject under inquiry is to ascertain what that subject was.' 369 U.S., at 756—757, 758—759, 82 S.Ct., at 1043—1044. See also Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U.S. 399, 407—409, 81 S.Ct. 567, 572—573; Deutch v. United States, 367 U.S. 456, 467—469, 81 S.Ct. 1587, 1593—1594, 6 L.Ed.2d 693; Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 208—215, 77 S.Ct. 1173, 1189—1193; Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 295—296, 49 S.Ct. 268, 272—273. In United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 73 S.Ct. 543, 97 L.Ed. 770, Mr. Justice Frankfurter observed that the resolution defining the subject of a committee's inquiry is the committee's 'controlling charter' and delimits its 'right to exact testimony.' 345 U.S., at 44, 73 S.Ct., at 545. Cf. Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 295 298, 49 S.Ct. 268, 272—273. This Court made it clear in Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 201, 206, 77 S.Ct. 1173, 1186, 1189, that pertinency is a 'jurisdictional concept' and it must be determined by reference to the authorizing resolution of an investigation. The House Committee on Un-American Activities has itself recognized the fundamental importance of specific authorization by providing in its Rule I that a major inquiry must be initiated by vote of a majority of the Committee. When a committee rule relates to a matter of such importance, it must be strictly observed. Yellin v. United States, 374 U.S. 109, 83 S.Ct. 1828, 10 L.Ed.2d 778. Since the present inquiry is concededly part of a 'major investigation' and the Committee did not authorize it as required by its own Rule I, this prosecution must fail. There is no basis for invoking criminal sanctions to punish a witness for refusal to cooperate in an inquiry which was never properly authorized.
2. On February 14, when a representative of petitioner's union appeared to request a postponement, the Chairman of the Committee stated that all of us are interested in seeing your union go out of business.' A similar statement by the Chairman of the Subcommittee was reported in the press on February 15.
3. On February 21, the record shows that a newspaper in St. Joseph, Michigan, reported a statement of the Committee Chairman that the hearing would expose petitioner and another subpoenaed witness as 'card carrying Communists' and that 'The rest is up to the community.' The story noted that the rescheduled hearing would precede by three days a representation election, involving the union, at St. Joseph.
4. Near the close of the testimony of the first witness at the hearing, the Chairman and other members of the Subcommittee disavowed any effort 'to break or bust unions,' but added that the Committee's purpose was to expose and break up Communist control of unions.
It now appears that the investigation and the 'question under inquiry' in petitioner's case were neither properly authorized nor specifically stated. Nor was the purpose of the inquiry clearly understood, apparently, even by the members of the Subcommittee themselves. Although at the outset of the hearings the Subcommittee Chairman did allude to 'Communist Party activities within the field of labor' as the subject-matter under investigation, statements and declarations of Committee members were at variance with this purported purpose. The recital in the second and revised indictment that it was 'Communist Party activities within the field of labor' was therefore based on quicksand. Obviously, this Court's decision in Russell cannot be satisfied by a mere statement in the indictment, having no underpinning in an authorizing resolution, that the recited subject was in fact the subject of the inquiry. Russell called for more than a draftsman's exercise.
There is in this case another fatal defect. The hearings in which petitioner was called to testify were before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Un-American Activities. Pursuant to Committee authorization, the Chairman on February 9, 1955, appointed a Subcommittee of three members to conduct hearings at which three named witnesses, including petitioner, were to be called. Neither the resolution nor any minutes or other records of the Committee stated the subject matter committed to the Subcommittee or otherwise described or defined its jurisdiction in terms of subject matter.11 Once again, we emphasize that we express no view as to the appropriateness of this procedure as a method of conducting congressional business. But, once again, we emphasize that we must consider this procedure from the viewpoint not of the legislative process, but of the administration of criminal justice, and specifically the application of the criminal statute which has been invoked.
Viewed in this perspective, the problem admits of only one answer. Courts administering the criminal law cannot apply sanctions for violation of the mandate of an agency—here, the Subcommittee—unless that agency's authority is clear and has been conferred in accordance with law.
'Even the most liberal construction cannot transform * * * (this) into a resolution of the Committee vesting its authority in a subcommittee * * *.' 303 F.2d, at 487.
See also United States v. Kamin, 136 F.Supp. 791 (D.C.D.Mass.1956).
Absent proof of a clear delegation to the subcommittee of authority to conduct an inquiry into a designated subject, the subcommittee was without authority which can be vindicated by criminal sanctions under § 192, nor was there an authoritative specification of the 'subject matter of the inquiry' necessary for the determination of pertinency required by the section.
While concurring in the Court's judgment and opinion, Mr. Justice BLACK would prefer to reverse the judgment by holding that the House Un-American Activities Committee's inquiries here amounted to an unconstitutional encroachment on the judicial power for reasons stated in his dissent in Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 135, 79 S.Ct. 1081, 1097.
At the outset of the hearings, petitioner's counsel filed a motion which asked that the subpoenas be vacated and the hearings 'set aside' on the grounds, among others, that the Committee was not engaged in 'a legislative investigation for a bona fide legislative purpose,' but rather in an effort to destroy the labor union of which petitioner was an officer; that the 'committee's basic resolution' is unconstitutional because 'no person can determine from it the boundaries of the Committee's power,' and that in any event it did not authorize this investigation; and that the First Amendment forbids compulsory disclosure of political beliefs and affiliations.
The leading case on the requirement of legislative purpose is Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 26 L.Ed. 377. Kilbourn did not arise under § 192, but was a damage suit arising out of a direct exercise by the House of Representatives of a claimed power to punish for contempt. The Court held that since the subject matter of the investigation had not been legislative in character, the order of contempt of the House, directing its Sergeant-at-Arms to imprison the contumacious witness, afforded the Sergeant no protection from liability. See, for cases under § 192, In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661, 667—670, 17 S.Ct. 677, 679—681, 41 L.Ed. 1154; McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 173—180, 47 S.Ct. 319, 328—331, 71 L.Ed. 580; Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 291—295, 49 S.Ct. 268, 271—272, 73 L.Ed. 692; Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 160—161, 75 S.Ct. 668, 672—673, 99 L.Ed. 964; Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187, 200, 77 S.Ct. 1173, 1179, 1185, 1 L.Ed.2d 1273; Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 133, 79 S.Ct. 1081, 1096, 3 L.Ed.2d 1115; Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U.S. 399, 410—412, 81 S.Ct. 567, 573—575, 5 L.Ed.2d 633. See also note 6, infra.
There is some evidence in the record that the House Committee had 'intermittently' (Brief for the United States, p. 4) investigated the union of which petitioner was an officer as a part of its alleged 'continuing investigation.' However, nowhere in the record does any authorization of such a continuing investigation appear. In any event, the authorization of a 'major investigation' by the full Committee must occur during the term of the Congress in which the investigation takes place. Neither the House of Representatives nor its committees are continuing bodies. Cf. Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204, 231, 5 L.Ed. 242; Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U.S. 521, 542, 37 S.Ct. 448, 453, 61 L.Ed. 881. It is the practice of the House to adopt its Rules—including the Rule which establishes the Un-American Activities Committee and defines the scope of its authority—at the beginning of each Congress. See, e.g., 109 Cong.Rec. 14, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963); 101 Cong.Rec. 11, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955).
See, e.g., Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 208, 77 S.Ct. 1173, 1189—1190; Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 755, 82 S.Ct. 1038, 1041—1042; United States v. Lamont, 18 F.R.D. 27, 37 (D.C.S.D.N.Y.1955), aff'd, 236 F.2d 312 (C.A.2d Cir.1956).
For example, in connection with the debates on § 192, Senator Bayard, who bore the brunt of the argument for the bill in the Senate, said: 'It is a rule of law very well settled, that if there is no jurisdiction over the subject-matter, the proceeding is void. In such a case, of course, a court of justice would decide that the witness could not be compelled to answer for want of jurisdiction.' Cong.Globe, 34th Cong., 3d Sess., p. 439 (1857). See also id., at 439—440.
In Russell, this Court said, 'The obvious consequence (of the Congressional purpose in § 192), as the Court has repeatedly emphasized, was to confer upon the federal courts the duty to accord a person prosecuted for this statutory offense every safeguard which the law accords in all other federal criminal cases.' 369 U.S., at 755, 82 S.Ct., at 1042.
In the absence—as here—of any specific authorization of the inquiry and in view of the broad and conflicting statements of the committee members as to the purpose of the inquiry, the present case presents a formidable problem of the 'vice of vagueness' which troubled the Court in Watkins, 354 U.S., at 209, 77 S.Ct., at 1190. We do not reach that problem because we decide the case on other grounds.
'Rep. Francis E. Walter (D., pa.), who will take charge in the new Congress of House activities against communists and their sympathizers, has a new plan for driving Reds out of important industries.
'He said today he plans to hold large public hearings in industrial communities where subversives are known to be operating, and to give known or suspected commies a chance in a full glare of publicity to deny or affirm their connection with a revolutionary conspiracy—or to take shelter behind constitutional amendments.
'Hearings of a similar nature have been held in local areas, but Rep. Walter wants to make them bigger, with the public being urged as well as invited to attend.
"We will force these people we know to be communists to appear by the power of subpena,' Rep. Walter said, 'and will demonstrate to their fellow workers that they are part of a foreign conspiracy."
'We have no doubt that there is no congressional power to expose for the sake of exposure.' Id., at 200, 77 S.Ct., at 1185.
'There is no general authority to expose the private affairs of individuals without justification in terms of the functions of the Congress. * * * Investigations conducted solely * * * to 'punish' those investigated are indefensible.' Id., at 187, 77 S.Ct., at 1179.
See also cases cited at note 3, supra; and see note 6, supra.
In Watkins, 354 U.S., at 200—216, 77 S.Ct., at 1185—1194, this Court considered the bearing upon the statutory requirement of pertinency of the Committee's status as a standing committee, of its vague charter, and of failure to define the scope of its activities within that charter.
The action of the full Committee in reporting petitioner's contempt to the House, and the House's action in certifying the contempt to the United States Attorney for prosecution, cannot be taken as retroactive authorization of the investigation and definition of the delegated authority. Petitioner's 'duty to answer must be judged as of the time of his refusal.' United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 48, 73 S.Ct. 543, 547.
See Cong.Globe, 34th Cong., 3d Sess., particularly at pages 406, 409—410, 427, 435 (1857). See also Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S., at 178, 200—201, 77 S.Ct., at 1185—1186.

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