Source: http://www.lifeissues.net/writers/irv/irv_140correctscience2.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 03:43:13+00:00

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* This paper was delivered by Dr. Irving, representing the Catholic Medical Association of the United States, and the International Federation of Catholic Medical Associations, at the Scientific Congress, "The Guadalupan Appeal: The Dignity and Status of the Human Embryo", Mexico City, Mexico, October 28, 1999. Dr. Irving is a former career-appointed bench research biochemist/biologist (NIH, NCI, Bethesda, MD), an M.A. and Ph.D. philosopher (Georgetown University, Washington, D.C.), and Professor of the History of Philosophy, and of Medical Ethics. Emphases are used throughout only to aid readers from different disciplines. Final editing January 3, 2000.
8 Not only can the use of incorrect science as our starting point negatively impact our understanding of philosophical anthropology (i.e., the study of human nature), but using different ethical principles from different philosophical schools of ethics can also lead to contradictory conclusions about which actions are right or wrong. There seems to be a general sense that secular "bioethics" is equivalent to "medical ethics in general", but this is not accurate. Secular bioethics is actually a very recent phenomenon -- a specific academic theory of ethics which was originated by the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research, and articulated in their 1979 Belmont Report. The bioethical principles they defined (which are their starting points for determining which actions are ethical or unethical) are "autonomy", "justice" and "beneficence". On the other hand, the ethical principles used by the Roman Catholic Church are philosophical natural law, Divine Revelation, and the teachings of the Magisterium (or, the Moral Law). Obviously this explains why these two different ethical systems come to often contradictory ethical conclusions. For a very short history of academic secular bioethics, its theoretical and practical deficiencies, and its comparison with Roman Catholic medical ethics, see DIANNE N. IRVING, "Which ethics for the 21st century?: A comparison of secular bioethics and Roman Catholic medical ethics", paper presented at the John Carroll Society Rose Mass, Washington, D.C., Mar. 14, 1999 (available upon request); ibid., D. IRVING, "Which ethics for science and public policy?", Accountability in Research 1993, 3:2-3:77-99; ibid., "Quality assurance auditors: Between a rock and a hard place", Quality Assurance: Good Practice, Regulation, and Law 1994, 3:1:33-52; ibid., "Maryland State proposed statute for research using 'decisionally incapacited' human subjects: The legalization of a defunct normative bioethics theory", Accountability in Research (in press).
13 The major philosophical issue here is whether or not there is a "mind/body" split (as found, e.g., in Platonic, neoplatonic, many scholastic -- and even some empiricist and existentialist philosophies). A "mind/body split" is both theoretically and practically indefensible, but it seems to have been recycled lately, especially within secular bioethics. A "mind/body split" is, by the way, a theoretical requirement for any argument for "delayed personhood". For realist philosophers, e.g., St. Thomas, Aristotle, etc., there is no mind/body split. A human being comes into existence spontaneously and simultaneously, and dies spontaneously and simultaneously. For a more in depth treatment of this issue, see D.N. IRVING, "Scientific and philosophical expertise: An evaluation of the arguments on 'personhood'", Linacre Quarterly 1993, 60:18-47, also in KISCHER and IRVING (eds.), The Human Development Hoax: Time To Tell The Truth! (1997), pp.129-184.
22 I analyzed 28 of the most representative and influential current arguments for "delayed personhood" (and therefore "pro" human embryo research, abortion, etc.) by secular bioethicists which they use to justify human embryo research in my doctoral dissertation (see note 1, supra). Although there are many excellent works arguing against "delayed personhood", space considerations here allow only for referencing mostly the arguments "pro". For more in-depth referencing of arguments against "delayed personhood", see note 1, supra; see also Juan de Dios Vial Correa and Elio Sgreccia (eds.), Pontificia Academia Pro Vita: The Identity and Status of the Human Embryo", Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1999.
The arguments for "delayed personhood" addressed in my dissertation included: RICHARD MCCORMICK, "Who or what is the 'preembryo'?", Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 1991, 1:1:3-15; CLIFFORD GROBSTEIN, "The early development of human embryos", Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 1985, 10:213-236; H. TRISTRAM ENGLEHARDT, The Foundations of Bioethics, New York: Oxford University Press, 1985, 111; WILLIAM A. WALLACE, "Nature and human nature as the norm in medical ethics", in Edmund D. Pellegrino, John P. Langan and John Collins Harvey (eds.), Catholic Perspectives on Medical Morals, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishing, 1989, pp. 23-53; NORMAN FORD, When Did I Begin?, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988, p. 298; JOHN A. ROBERTSON, "Extracorporeal embryos and the abortion debate", Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy 1986, 2;53;53-70; ANTOINE SUAREZ, "Hydatidiform moles and teratomas confirm the human identity of the preimplantation embryo", Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 1990), 15:627-635; CARLOS BEDATE AND ROBERT CEFALO, "The zygote: to be or not be a person", Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 1989, 14:6:641; THOMAS J. BOLE, III, "Metaphysical accounts of the zygote as a person and the veto power of facts", Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 1989, 14:647-653; ibid., "Zygotes, souls, substances, and persons", Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 1990, 15:637-652; HANS-MARTIN SASS, "Brain life and brain death: A proposal for normative agreement", Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 1989, 14, (same article also in Bioethics News 1990, 9:3:9-20); PETER SINGER AND D. WELLS, in D. GARETH JONES, "Brain birth and personal identity", Journal of Medical Ethics 1989, 15:175; MICHAEL LOCKWOOD, "When does life begin?", in Michael Lockwood (ed.), Moral dilemmas in Modern Medicine, New York: Oxford University Press, 1985, p. 10; ibid., "Warnock versus Powell (and Harradine): When does potentiality count?", Bioethics 1988, 2:3:187-213; MICHAEL C. SHEA, "Embryonic life and human life", Journal of Medical Ethics 1985, 11:205-209; R.M. HARE, "When does potentiality count? A comment on Lockwood", Bioethics 1988, 2:3:214; KAREN DAWSON, "Segmentation and moral status", in Peter Singer, Helga Kuhse, Stephen Buckle, Karen Dawson, Pascal Kasimba, Embryo Experimentation, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990, p. 58; STEPHEN BUCKLE, KAREN DAWSON AND PETER SINGER, "The syngamy debate: When precisely does an embryo begin?", in Singer et al, Embryo Experimentation, New York: Cambridge University Press 1990, pp. 213-226; STEPHEN BUCKLE, "Biological processes and moral events", Journal of Medical Ethics 1988, 14:3:144-147.
For additional arguments for "delayed personhood" not addressed in my dissertation, see, e.g.: CLIFFORD GROBSTEIN, "The status and uses of early human developmental stages", in Darwin Cheney (ed.), Ethical Issues in Research, Frederick, MD: The University Publishing Group, Inc.; ibid., "The early development of human embryos", Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 1985, 10:213-236; ibid., Science and the Unborn, New York: Basic Books, 1988, p. 61; ibid., "When does life begin?", Psychology Today 1989, pp. 43-46; ibid., "External human fertilization", Scientific American 1979, 240:57-67; ANNE MCLAREN, "Why study early human development?", New Scientist 1986, 24:49; ibid., "Where to draw the line?", Proceedings of the Royal Institute of Great Britain 1984, 56:101-120; PAUL RAMSEY, "Reference points in deciding about abortion", in J.T. Noonan (ed.), The Morality of Abortion, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970, pp. 60-100; CHARLES E. CURRAN, "Abortion: Contemporary debate in philosophical and religious ethics", in W.T. Reich (ed.), Encyclopedia of Bioethics 1, London: The Free Press, 1978, pp. 17-26; CAROL TAUER, The Moral Status of the Prenatal Human 1981, Dissertation in Philosophy, Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University (Sister Tauer later went on to become the ethics co-chair of the NIH Human Embryo Research Panel 1994); ibid., "The tradition of probabilism and the moral status of the early embryo", in Patricia B. Jung and Thomas A. Shannon, Abortion and Catholicism 1988, New York: Crossroad, pp. 54-84; LISA S. CAHILL, "Abortion, autonomy, and community", in Jung and Shannon, Abortion and Catholicism 1988, pp. 85-98; JOSEPH F. DONCEEL, "A liberal Catholic's view", in Jung and Shannon, Abortion and Catholicism 1988, pp. 48-53; JAMES F. CHILDRESS, "Human fetal tissue transplantation", Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 1991, 1:2:93-122; RICHARD MCCORMICK, "The preembryo as potential: A Reply to John A. Robertson", Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal, 1991, 1:4:303-306; ibid., "Health and Medicine in the Catholic Tradition", New York: Crossroad, 1984 (the "Catholic tradition" is defined here mostly in terms of "proportionalism"; contains references to other Catholic theologians arguing for "delayed personhood"); ANDRE E. HELLEGERS, "Fetal development", Theological Studies 1970, 31:3-9; KEVIN WILDES, "Book Review: Human life: Its beginning and development", L'Harmattan, Paris: International Federation of Catholic Universities 1988; JOHN A. ROBERTSON, "What we may do with preembryos: A response to Richard A. McCormick", Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 1991, 1:4:293-302; ibid., "The case of the switched embryos", The Hastings Center Report 1995, 25:6:13-24; ibid., "Symbolic issues in embryo research", The Hastings Center Report 1995, Jan./Feb. 37-38; RUTH MACKLIN, "Personhood in the bioethics literature", Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly Health and Society 1983, 61:1:37; R.M. HARE, "Embryo experimentation: Public policy in a pluralistic society", in Proceedings of the IVF Conference, Australia: Center for Human Bioethics, Monash University, 1987, pp. 106-123; ROBERT C. CEFALO, "Book Review: Embryo Experimentation", Peter Singer et al (eds.); "'Eggs, embryos and ethics'", Hastings Center Reports 1991, 21:5:41; MARIO MOUSSA and THOMAS A. SHANNON, "The search for the new pineal gland: Brain life and personhood", The Hastings Center Report 1992, 22:3:30-37; MICHAEL SHEA, "Embryonic life and human life", Journal of Medical Ethics 1985, 11:205-209; JOHN M. GOLDENRING, "The brain-life theory: Towards a consistent biological definition of humanness" Journal of Medical Ethics 1985, 11:198-204; TOMASINE KUSHNER, "Having a life versus being alive", Journal of Medical Ethics 1984, 10:5-8; MICHAEL V.L. BENNETT, "Personhood from a neuroscientific perspective", in Edd Doerr and James Prescott (eds.), Abortion Rights and Fetal "Personhood", Long Beach: Crestline Press, 1989, pp. 83-85.
25 Bioethics pervades most academic fields by now, including the law, where legal arguments, based essentially on "delayed personhood" premises, have been constructed and successfully set legal precedents. See, e.g., the "pre-embryo" arguments by JOHN A. ROBERTSON (found in note 22, supra), which have been used in a number of frozen embryo legal cases. See also: JOHN A. ROBERTSON, "What we may do with preembryos: A response to Richard A. McCormick", Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 1991, 1:4:293-302; ibid., "The case of the switched embryos", The Hastings Center Report 1995, 25:6:13-24; ibid., "Symbolic issues in embryo research", The Hastings Center Report 1995, Jan./Feb. 37-38. Robertson represented the father in the Tennessee frozen embryo case, and referred to these human embryos as "pre-embryos", quoting extensively from Clifford Grobstein's "human embryology". The lower court found with internationally renown Dr. Jerome Lejeune's scientific testimony, and concluded that there was no such thing as a "pre-embryo" [see lower court testimony of Lejeune in Davis v. Davis, Tennessee court of Appeals at Knoxville, No. 190, slip op. at 5-6 (Sept 13, 1990)]. However, on appeal to the Tennessee Supreme Court, the judge held that Lejeune's testimony "revealed a profound confusion between science and religion" [Sec. 34, ftnt. 12], accepted the "pre-embryo" arguments of Robertson, and reversed the lower court ruling [842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992)]. Interestingly, the judge also stated: "Left undisturbed, the trial court's ruling would have afforded preembryos the legal status of 'persons' and vested them with legally cognizable interests separate from those of their progenitors. Such a decision would doubtless have had the effect of outlawing IVF programs in the state of Tennessee" (emphasis mine).
For other court cases in which the "pre-embryo" argument has succeeded, see, e.g., Kass v. Kass, 673 N.Y.S.2d 350, 91 N.Y..2d 554 (1998), in which the embryos were actually referred to as "pre-zygotes"; A.Z. v. B.Z., a Massachusetts frozen embryo case on appeal now to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts; J.B. v. M.B. on appeal now to the Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division (Docket No. A-1544--98 T3). Of course, Roe v. Wade [410 U.S. 113 (1973)] referred several times to the fetus as a "potential human being" and as a "potential human person" -- another form of a "delayed personhood" argument. In Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989), Justice O'Conner argued that viability was "far removed, both qualitatively and quantitatively, from that of the four- to eight-cell preembryos in this case." [ftnt. 17].
27 According to the web site for "Preven", "They [the "emergency contraception" pills] may also act by altering tubal transport of sperm and/or ova (thereby inhibiting fertilization), and/or possibly altering the endometrium (thereby inhibiting implantation)[http://www.preven.com/product/02-06.html]. Again, " ... they may produce changes in the lining of the uterus that could prevent implantation of a fertilized egg" [http://www.preven.com/product/02-01.html].

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