Source: http://fl.bna.com/fl/19990209/797926.htm
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 08:25:18+00:00

Document:
The administrative child support process created by Minn. Stat. § 518.5511 (1996) violates the separation of powers doctrine by infringing on the district court's original jurisdiction, by creating a tribunal which is not inferior to the district court, and by permitting child support officers to practice law. Therefore, the statute is unconstitutional.
The instant case is the consolidation of three appeals to the court of appeals challenging the constitutionality of Minnesota's administrative child support process. This appeal presents the issue of whether the administrative process, Minn. Stat. § 518.5511 (1996), violates the separation of powers doctrine by impinging upon the original jurisdiction of the district court, by creating a tribunal which is not inferior to the district court, and by permitting child support officers to engage in the practice of law. The court of appeals ruled the administrative process unconstitutional, relying on the separation of powers doctrine. We affirm the court of appeals and hold that the administrative process is unconstitutional because it violates separation of powers.
Timely and equitable distribution of family financial resources is needed to protect our children's well-being. Thus, the efficient administration of child support cases is a laudable goal, and one that all three branches of government share. To this end, the legislature has created an expedited administrative process to adjudicate child support cases involving families receiving certain types of public assistance. While evidence of the administrative child support process' efficacy is hotly disputed by the parties, there is no controversy about the importance of streamlining child support mechanisms. Nonetheless, the importance of this shared goal cannot ignore separation of powers constraints.
We granted and limited review in these consolidated cases to the constitutional issues raised by the administrative child support process.
In determining if the original jurisdiction of the courts is being usurped, we look at the origins of the rights and relief, equitable or statutory, an agency oversees.See footnote 24 In Wulff, a separation of powers challenge to the tax court, the statutory creation of the tax court was upheld largely because "'[t]axation is primarily a legislative function, and the steps taken under the authority of the legislature are administrative in character, in which judicial assistance may be invoked as a matter of convenience * * *. Such functions are 'not judicial' in the strict sense.'"See footnote 25 The Wulff court determined that the type of function delegated, judicial or legislative, plays a critical role in determining whether an administrative action impinges on the district court's original jurisdiction.
Unlike the tax court, the administrative child support process encompasses an area of the law which arises in equity. Family dissolution remedies, including remedies in child support decisions, rely on the district court's inherent equitable powers. Thus, cases involving family law fall within the district court's original jurisdiction.See footnote 26 The legislature's delegation of an area of the district court's original jurisdiction calls for this court's close scrutiny.
Similarly, Minnesota's administrative child support process is mandatory for many parties, removing from the district court a class of cases that fall within its original jurisdiction. Further, under Minnesota's administrative process, ALJs are not only given powers which inherently belong to the district court, but they are placed on par with district courts in deciding child support cases. The statute explicitly grants ALJs "all powers, duties, and responsibilities conferred on judges of district court" to handle child support cases.See footnote 30 Arguably, ALJs are even superior in some respects as ALJs are empowered to modify child support orders granted by district courts.See footnote 31 Finally, ALJ child support orders are given the same deference as district court orders--they are appealable by right and reviewed by the court of appeals under an abuse of discretion standard.
Appellants urge us not to follow Drennen and to instead reconsider the separation of powers test set forth in Breimhorst v. Beckman. Appellants put forward a reformulation of the separation of powers test which has as its central principles efficiency, public policy, and the availability of judicial review. We decline to limit Breimhorst as requested. Such a relaxed test would impinge upon the powers conferred upon the judiciary by the state's constitution. Under appellants' test, it is hard to discern any limiting principle that would not yield to the legislature's sincere efforts to address public concerns with a newly designed, "efficient system" that allows appellate review.
Under the criteria by which our court has measured the constitutional validity of specific statutory schemes, the administrative child support process raises grave separation of powers concerns. With its creation of the administrative process, the legislature has delegated to an executive agency the district court's inherent equitable power. This delegation infringes on the district court's original jurisdiction. Not only are ALJs given responsibilities and powers comparable to a district court, but ALJs also have the power to modify district court decisions. Finally, although appellants encourage us to rely on the availability of appellate review to conclude that there is adequate judicial supervision of the administrative process, the right to appellate review does not provide sufficient judicial oversight of this mandatory, albeit piecemeal, process. We find their contention particularly troubling in this instance, as many participants in the administrative process lack the resources to mount an appeal.
Closely aligned with our separation of powers concerns is our discomfort with the role and powers of CSOs in the administrative process. Courts regulate the practice of law to maintain discipline over attorneys and to protect the public.See footnote 39 "Protection of the public is set at naught if laymen who are not subject to court supervision are permitted to practice law."See footnote 40 This court cannot sacrifice its supervisory powers in the pursuit of efficiency.
Under our current statutes, CSOs draft pleadings and appear at hearings to represent the public authority without attorney supervision. A review of the many responsibilities and powers granted to CSOs leads to the inescapable conclusion that CSOs are engaging in the practice of law.See footnote 41 By granting the power to practice law to CSOs, over whom the court does not have disciplinary authority, the legislature has further removed the administrative process from the judiciary's supervision.
The administrative child support process' current structure violates the constitutional constraints on separation of powers for three separate and independent reasons. First, the administrative process infringes on the district court's original jurisdiction in contravention of Minnesota Constitution's article VI, § 1. Second, ALJ jurisdiction is not inferior to the district court's jurisdiction, as mandated by Minnesota Constitution article VI, § 3. Third, the administrative process empowers nonattorneys to engage in the practice of law, infringing on the court's exclusive power to supervise the practice of law. For these three reasons, we hold that the administrative process violates separation of powers and is unconstitutional. Having reached this ruling on separation of powers grounds, we do not reach the issues of whether the administrative process violates equal protection and procedural due process.
We also stay our decision until July 1, 1999, under authority of Northern Pipeline. See footnote 45 In Northern Pipeline, the United States Supreme Court ruled bankruptcy courts unconstitutional under a separation of powers analysis but stayed its decision for over three months to "afford Congress an opportunity to reconstitute the bankruptcy courts or to adopt other valid means of adjudication, without impairing the interim administration of the bankruptcy laws."See footnote 46 In light of the substantial hardship immediate judgment would wreak, we stay our judgment, giving the legislature time to amend the laws in accordance with this decision.
Finally, respondents request attorney fees from the state under the Marriage Dissolution Award of Attorney Fees statute.See footnote 47 This statute requires the court to award attorney fees if the fees are necessary to allow a party to continue an action brought in good faith, the party from whom fees are requested has the means to pay the fees, and the party seeking fees cannot pay the fees.See footnote 48 However, statutes do not apply to the state unless the state is specifically mentioned or "the words of the act are so plain, clear, and unmistakable as to leave no doubt as to the intention of the legislature."See footnote 49 As the Marriage Dissolution Award of Attorney Fees statute contains no indication that the legislature meant it to apply to the state, we deny respondents' request for attorney fees.
The judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed. The judgment shall be effective upon entry as to the parties before us. With respect to other parties and cases, the judgment shall not be effective and the administrative child support process shall remain in place until July 1, 1999. This delay will give the legislature an opportunity to modify the system consistent with this decision.
Footnote: 1 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(2) (1994).
Footnote: 2 Minn. Stat. § 518.551, subd. 10 (Supp. 1987).
Footnote: 6 Minn. Stat. § 518.551, subd. 10 (Supp. 1989).
Footnote: 7 Minn. Stat. § 518.551, subd. 10 (1990).
Footnote: 8 Minn. Stat. § 518.5511, subd. 2 (1996).
Footnote: 9 Minn. Stat. § 518.5511, subd. 5 (1996). Although Minn. Stat. § 518.5511 was further amended in 1997, this appeal concerns the child support enforcement law in effect between August 1, 1996 and July 31, 1997. Nonetheless, we note that under the 1997 amendment, CSOs may also prepare orders, subpoena witnesses, and order genetic testing. Minn. Stat. § 518.5511, subds. 1(f), 2(a) (Supp. 1997).
Footnote: 10 Minn. Stat. § 518.5511, subd. 7 (1996). In the 1997 amendment, the legislature deleted the language prohibiting county attorneys from playing a role in hearings unless requested, but did not set up any supervisory role for them. Minn. Stat. § 518.5511, subd. 1(h) (Supp. 1997).
Footnote: 11 Minn. Stat. § 518.5511, subds. 1(e), 4(d), 4(e), 6 (1996).
Footnote: 12 Minn. Stat. § 518.5511, subds. 1(a), 1(b) (1996).
Footnote: 13 Minn. Stat. § 518.5511, subds. 1(b), 1(e), 4(b) (1996).
Footnote: 14 Holmberg v. Holmberg, 578 N.W.2d 817, 821 (Minn. App. 1998) (relying on In re Lord, 255 Minn. 370, 372, 97 N.W.2d 287, 289 (1959)).
Footnote: 16 227 Minn. 409, 35 N.W.2d 719 (1949).
Footnote: 17 Holmberg, 578 N.W.2d at 821 (citing Breimhorst, 227 Minn. at 433, 35 N.W.2d at 734).
Footnote: 18 Id. at 821-22.
Footnote: 19 Wulff v. Tax Court of Appeals, 288 N.W.2d 221, 222-23 (Minn. 1979).
Footnote: 20 Id. at 223. Indeed, Professor Laurence Tribe suggests characterizing our government structure as one of institutional interdependence rather than functional independence. Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 2-2 (2d ed. 1988).
Footnote: 21 Wulff, 288 N.W.2d at 223.
Footnote: 22 Minn. Const. art. VI, § 1.
Footnote: 23 Minn. Const. art. VI, § 3.
Footnote: 24 Cf. Johnston v. Johnston, 280 Minn. 81, 86, 158 N.W.2d 249, 254 (1968) (distinguishing a court's inherent powers to do equity).
Footnote: 25 Wulff, 288 N.W.2d at 224 (quoting State v. Erickson, 212 Minn. 218, 225, 3 N.W.2d 231, 235 (1942)).
Footnote: 26 Cf. Johnston, 280 Minn. at 86, 158 N.W.2d at 254.
Footnote: 27 426 N.W.2d 252 (Neb. 1988).
Footnote: 28 Id. at 259.
Footnote: 30 Minn. Stat. § 518.5511, subd. 1(e) (1996).
Footnote: 31 In re Lord, 255 Minn. at 372, 97 N.W.2d at 289 (holding "the executive shall have no power to interfere with the courts in the performance of judicial functions"). Appellants' suggestion that ALJs hear "different cases" than district court judges in modification hearings because of the changed circumstances has no basis in Minnesota's laws, and is contradicted by federal law. Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1783A (1994).
Footnote: 32 Breimhorst, 227 Minn. at 433, 35 N.W.2d at 734.
Footnote: 33 Id.; see also Wulff, 288 N.W.2d at 223.
Footnote: 34 See Mack v. City of Minneapolis, 333 N.W.2d 744, 753 (Minn. 1983).
Footnote: 35 See Wulff, 288 N.W.2d at 223.
Footnote: 36 See Mack, 333 N.W.2d at 752; Wulff, 288 N.W.2d at 223. In considering appealability, we consider not only whether ALJ decisions are appealable, but how they are appealable. Appeal to the court of appeals may be granted as a matter of right, using the abuse of discretion standard. Alternately, appeal of most administrative decisions is taken by writ of certiorari, and the court determines only whether the decision was "arbitrary, oppressive, unreasonable, [or] fraudulent." Dietz v. Dodge County, 487 N.W.2d 237, 239 (Minn. 1992) (citations omitted); Minn. Stat. § 14.64, 14.69 (1998). While Breimhorst relied on the availability of appellate review by certiorari in upholding workers' compensation, either route to review may provide some indication of appropriate judicial oversight of an administrative scheme. However, the availability of judicial review alone will not provide adequate judicial supervision to protect a system against a separation of powers challenge.
Footnote: 37 See Meath v. Harmful Substance Compensation Bd., 550 N.W.2d 275, 284 (Minn. 1996) (Anderson, Paul H., J., specially concurring); Wulff, 288 N.W.2d at 225.
Footnote: 38 See Minn. Stat. Ch. 176 (1998).
Footnote: 39 "The power to make the necessary rules and regulations governing the bar was intended to be vested exclusively in the supreme court, free from the dangers of encroachment either by the legislative or executive branches." Sharood v. Hatfield, 296 Minn. 416, 425, 210 N.W.2d 275, 280 (1973). In determining whether a nonattorney is engaged in the unauthorized practice of law, the court's abiding concern is protecting the public interest. Cardinal v. Merrill Lynch Realty/Burnet, Inc., 433 N.W.2d 864, 868 (Minn. 1988).
Footnote: 40 Gardner v. Conway, 234 Minn. 468, 478, 48 N.W.2d 788, 795 (1951).
Footnote: 41 In re Discipline of Jorissen, 391 N.W.2d 822, 825 (Minn. 1986) (representing party at workers' compensation hearing and drafting court papers without attorney supervision held to be practice of law). See Cardinal, 433 N.W.2d at 870 (Yetka, J., dissenting) (looking at comprehensive scheme of actions undertaken by nonattorneys in determining that nonattorneys were engaged in practice of law).
Footnote: 42 Turner v. IDS Fin. Serv., Inc., 471 N.W.2d 105, 108 (Minn. 1991).
Footnote: 43 Hoff v. Kempton, 317 N.W.2d 361, 363 (Minn. 1982) (relying on Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106-07 (1971)).
Footnote: 44 McGuire v. C & L Restaurant Inc., 346 N.W.2d 605, 614 (Minn. 1984) (new rule of law applied to parties before court as well as claims arising after date of decision).
Footnote: 45 Northern Pipeline Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
Footnote: 46 Id. at 88.
Footnote: 47 Minn. Stat. § 518.14, subd. 1 (1998).
Footnote: 49 State v. Bentley, 224 Minn. 244, 247, 28 N.W.2d 770, 771 (1947) (holding that statute allowing costs on appeal did not apply to the state acting in its sovereign capacity without specific indication that it applied to the state); see also Minn. Stat. § 645.27 (1998).

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