Source: http://mncourts.gov/SupremeCourt/CalendarIssueSummaries.aspx?id=138
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 14:26:58+00:00

Document:
Kurt A. Maethner, Respondent vs. Someplace Safe, Inc., Appellant, Jacquelyn Jorud f/k/a Jacquelyn Hanson Maethner, Appellant – Case No. A17-0998: Respondent Kurt Maethner brought defamation claims against appellant Someplace Safe, Inc., a nonprofit organization that provides advocacy services to victims of domestic abuse, and appellant Jacquelyn Jorud, his former wife. The defamation claims stem from statements appellants made about Jorud’s personal experiences as a survivor of domestic abuse. The district court granted appellants’ motions for summary judgment.
Thaleaha McBee, Appellant vs. Team Industries, Inc., Respondent – Case No. A17-0060: Appellant Thaleaha McBee worked as a machine operator on the production line for respondent Team Industries, Inc. Two days after McBee informed Team that her physician had given her a 10-pound lifting restriction, Team terminated her employment. McBee filed suit, asserting claims for disability discrimination, failure to accommodate, and reprisal in violation of the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA), Minn. Stat. §§ 363A.01–.43 (2016). The district court granted summary judgment to Team, in part, because the district court found that the ability to lift more than 10 pounds was “an essential function” of McBee’s position.
Minnesota Department of Natural Resources, Appellant vs. Chippewa/Swift Joint Board of Commissioners, Respondent – Case No. A18-0201: After a landowner requested repairs, respondent Chippewa/Swift Joint Board of Commissioners (Board) determined that a reestablishment of records was necessary for Judicial Ditch No. 9. During the reestablishment proceedings, appellant Minnesota Department of Natural Resources (DNR) raised several concerns with the Board. The DNR claims that the Board disregarded those concerns when it issued an order reestablishing drainage system records pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 103E.101, subd. 4a (2016).
State of Minnesota, Respondent vs. Vern Jason Mouelle, Appellant – Case No. A18-0083: A grand jury indicted appellant Vern Jason Mouelle with several offenses, including premeditated murder and premeditated murder of an unborn child. Mouelle pleaded not guilty and demanded a jury trial. During an ex parte discussion of an issue related to opening statements, defense counsel told the district court that if Mouelle testified, a discussion was needed on the guidelines set forth in Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986) (explaining that threatening to withdraw from representation in an attempt to dissuade a client from committing perjury does not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness). Mouelle later testified without any further discussion of Whiteside. While reading its instructions to the jury, the district court misspoke using the word “or” once when it should have said “and.” After the jury found Mouelle guilty as charged, the district court imposed consecutive sentences of life without the possibility of release for the convictions of premeditated murder and premeditated murder of an unborn child.
Claude Bruton, Jr., Respondent vs. Smithfield Foods, Inc. and ESIS, Inc., Relators – Case No. A18-0914: Employee-respondent Claude Bruton injured his shoulder and face while working at Smithfield Foods. Smithfield paid short-term disability (STD) wage-loss benefits to Bruton. Smithfield later agreed that Bruton was owed workers’ compensation benefits in the form of temporary disability benefits (TTD) from the date of injury and continuing forward. When Smithfield reduced the TDD payments by the amount of STD benefits that were previously paid, Bruton objected to the offset. The parties stipulated that “Smithfield maintained” the STD benefit through a plan, which “is not an ERISA plan” because the funds that pay the plan’s benefits “are funds owned by Smithfield and the plan is administered by Smithfield.” Based on the stipulated facts, the compensation judge agreed that Smithfield was entitled to an offset.
The Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals (WCCA) reversed. According to the WCCA, the plan was not an entity that is authorized to make payment of workers’ compensation benefits because it was not a self-insured employer, the State, the Special Compensation Fund, or a workers’ compensation insurer. Thus, the STD benefits were not workers’ compensation benefits for which an offset could be claimed.
Megan Ashley Olson, et al., Respondents vs. One 1999 Lexus MN License Plate No. 851LDV VIN: JT6HF10U6X0079461, Appellant – Case No. A17-1083: Respondent Megan Ashley Olson was arrested and charged with felony first-degree driving while impaired (DWI), a “designated offense” under Minn. Stat. § 169A.63, subd. 1(e) (2016). Police seized the vehicle that Megan was driving—a 1999 Lexus owned by Megan’s mother, respondent Helen Olson—pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 169A.63, subds. 6, 8 (2016). Respondents received proper and timely notice of the seizure and intent to forfeit pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 169A.63, subd. 8(b)-(c). On October 7, 2015, they filed a timely demand for judicial determination of the vehicle forfeiture in the form of a civil complaint pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 169A.63, subd. 8(e), raising a number of defenses and claiming that the forfeiture statute was unconstitutional. A court trial was set for February 11, 2016. But the trial was rescheduled multiple times pending the outcome of Megan’s related implied-consent and criminal DWI matters. See Minn. Stat. § 169A.63, subd. 9(d) (2016).
On October 14, 2016, respondents moved for summary judgment. A hearing took place on February 23, 2017. The district court granted the respondents’ motion, concluding that Minn. Stat. § 169A.63, subd. 9(d), does not provide for meaningful review after a prehearing vehicle seizure and no meaningful hardship relief and, therefore, violates due process. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that although subdivision 9(d) is constitutional on its face, it is unconstitutional as applied.
In re Petition for Reinstatement of Larry Severson, a Minnesota Attorney, Registration No. 0099363 – Case No. A17-0895: An attorney reinstatement matter that presents the issue of whether suspended attorney Larry Severson should be reinstated to the practice of law.
Nonoral: Charles Waters, et al., Relators vs. Commissioner of Revenue, Respondent – Case No. A18-0580: Relators Charles and Anita Waters received a Homestead Credit Refund for property taxes payable in 2014. Concluding that relators under reported their income for purposes of determining refund eligibility by failing to include funds received under a PELL grant, respondent Commissioner of Revenue issued an order assessing relators for the amount of the refund that was allegedly overpaid. The tax court granted the Commissioner’s summary judgment motion, holding that under Minn. Stat. § 290A.03, subd. 3(a)(xiii) (2016) (providing that “income” includes “nontaxable scholarship or fellowship grants”), PELL grants are considered income for purposes of property tax refunds.
State of Minnesota, Respondent/Cross-Appellant vs. Fedor Pakhnyuk, Appellant/Cross-Respondent – Case No. A17-0474: The State charged Fedor Pakhnyuk with several offenses, including interference with the privacy of a minor, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.746, subd. 1(a), (e)(2) (2016). This statute makes it a crime if a person “(1) enters upon another’s property; (2) surreptitiously gazes, stares, or peeps in the window or any other aperture of a house or place of dwelling of another; and (3) does so with intent to intrude upon or interfere with the privacy of a member of the household.” Id., subd. 1(a). Thus, to prove that Pakhnyuk interfered with the privacy of a minor, the State was required to prove, among other things, the entering element, Minn. Stat. § 609.746, subd. 1(a)(1), the gazing element, Minn. Stat. § 609.746, subd. 1(a)(2), and the specific-intent element, Minn. Stat. § 609.746, subd. 1(a)(3).
Following a trial, a jury found Pakhnyuk guilty of all the charged offenses. A divided court of appeals panel affirmed Pakhnyuk’s conviction for interfering with the privacy rights of a minor.
State of Minnesota, Respondent vs. John Lee Bowen, Appellant – Case No. A17-0331: Appellant John Bowen was charged with simple robbery and making threats of violence based on allegations that he walked out of a liquor store without paying for a bottle of alcohol and threatened to return to the store to harm employees. A jury found Bowen guilty of simple robbery but not guilty of making threats of violence.
Bowen appealed his simple robbery conviction, arguing that the bottle of liquor taken from the liquor store does not fall within the definition of “personal property” under Minn. Stat. § 609.24 (2016). The court of appeals affirmed Bowen’s conviction, holding that the term “personal property” in the simple robbery statute includes all property owned by a person or entity, other than real property.
City of Richfield, Respondent vs. Law Enforcement Labor Services, Inc., Appellant – Case No. A17-1275: Respondent City of Richfield terminated the employment of a police officer after an internal investigation concluded that the officer (1) used excessive force during an encounter with an individual, (2) failed to properly document or report his contact with the individual, and (3) violated his training and the standards of conduct reasonably expected of a Richfield police officer. Appellant Law Enforcement Labor Services, Inc., filed a grievance challenging the termination.
State of Minnesota, Respondent vs. Heath Allen Atwood, Appellant – Case No. A17-1463: Appellant Heath Atwood was charged with fourth-degree driving while impaired after causing a motor vehicle accident. Atwood filed a motion to suppress the blood sample used to test his alcohol concentration, arguing that the sample was improperly obtained by law enforcement from the hospital while he was being treated for injuries. The district court granted the suppression motion, holding that the sample was protected by the physician-patient privilege, codified in Minn. Stat. § 595.02 (2016).
The State appealed, and the court of appeals reversed, holding that the term “information” in the statute does not include a blood sample.
David Lee Henson, et al., Respondents vs. Uptown Drink, LLC, Appellant – Case No. A17-1066: Respondents David Henson, et al., asserted negligent-innkeeper and dram-shop claims against appellant Uptown Drink. The claims arose from the death of Maxwell Henson, who was fatally injured while trying to help eject an aggressive patron, Nicholas Anderson, from Uptown Drink. The district court granted Uptown Drink’s motion for summary judgment.
The court of appeals reversed and remanded for further proceedings. With respect to the negligent-innkeeper claim, the court of appeals concluded the district court’s “application of primary assumption of the risk, as a matter of law, was not appropriate.” With respect to the dram-shop claim, the court of appeals concluded there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Anderson’s intoxication was the proximate cause of Maxwell Henson’s injury.
Julie A. Soderberg, Respondent vs. Lucas Anderson, Appellant – Case No. A17-0827: Respondent Julie Soderberg, a ski instructor, sustained significant injuries in a collision with appellant Lucas Anderson, a snowboarder. The collision took place while Soderberg was giving a ski lesson on a trail that was marked as a slow-skiing area. Soderberg brought a negligence action against Anderson, alleging that he failed to snowboard under proper control. The district court granted Anderson’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that the doctrine of primary assumption of the risk bars the negligence action.

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