Source: https://ukimmigrationjusticewatch.com/2016/06/26/why-is-the-home-office-increasingly-and-routinely-appealing-allowed-ftt-decisions-and-getting-away-with-it/
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 14:50:13+00:00

Document:
“Since that decision was handed down, the House of Lords in AH (Sudan)  UKHL 49 has stressed that appellate courts should not pick over AIT decisions in a microscopic search for error, and should be prepared to give immigration judges credit for knowing their job even if their written determinations are imperfectly expressed …”, Entry Clearance Officer, Mumbai v NH (India)  EWCA Civ 1330, paragraph 28.
One or two decisions from the FTT have just filtered through, granting permission to the Home Office and in one of the appeals, on grounds which were never raised within the refusal decision or by the Presenting Officer at the appeal hearing. There is of course the, “ Robinson obvious” point and am no Judge, however there is sometimes a glaring difference between raising mere disagreements clearly clothed as an argument of point of law and some arguable error point of law issue.
Yes, upon the above reading, the Guidance is just that, ie simply guidance, but if the Guidance is simply a document to glance at then move on, then why have it in the first place? If the intention is to promote consistency then why is the opposite risking becoming the norm in practice? Caselaw itself ie Nixon(permission to appeal), referred to below, states that UTIAC Guidance Note 2011 No 1 must be considered.
Clients need to be given the full picture when their appeals are allowed, not to unsettle them but to brace and prepare them for some fight, just in case, despite all efforts, an appeal that has been allowed now may end up being overturned months later.
if so, to be prepared that an FTT Judge may likely grant permission to appeal to the home office.
Although there might be some areas within a FTT Judge’s decision where a Judge may have seemingly left their decision “ open” to appeal, in the majority of cases, it is the case that until the actual decision on permission from the FTT is forthcoming, weeks or months later, the client will not know why the Home Office have lodged a permission application. A great deal of uncertainty and anxiety is being created in practice with the home office increasingly proceeding to appeal the majority of allowed Tribunal decisions they lay sight upon.
(a) A complaint with an assessment of facts that it was legitimate for the FtT Judge to make (even applying the reasonable degree of likelihood approach applicable to material aspects of protection claims) cannot normally be characterised as a matter of law (but see E & R  EWCA Civ 49).
(b) Whilst disregard or misstatement of evidence that was placed before the FtT may amount to an error of law, or a failure to act fairly, the submission of further evidence following the hearing to contradict a finding (even if it would have been admissible in the original proceedings) cannot usually be said to be an error of law (see CA  EWCA Civ 1165), unless the evidence is submitted to demonstrate unfairness or the decision is based on an entirely false factual hypothesis (see E & R  EWCA Civ 49) or concerns questions of jurisdictional fact.
(c) An error of law on a topic that is completely irrelevant to the substance of the decision in hand is unlikely to justify the grant of permission, unless the point itself is of some general importance in the context of immigration and asylum appeals and deserves further consideration on that basis alone. It is considered that a grant of permission on this basis is more appropriately made by the UT (i.e. on a “second application”).
(d) A point of law that is not arguable whether because the statute is clear, the contention extravagant and unsustainable or there is stable, binding precedent of the higher courts, is unlikely to justify the grant of permission. However, if there is a case for the UT/higher courts to reconsider the point in issue, permission should be granted as a refusal of permission does not give rise to a right of appeal to the Court of Appeal. It will be rare for a judge to decide to grant PTA because he or she considers a binding precedent may be reviewed by a superior court with power to do so. But this may be appropriate in circumstances where, if the matter were before the High Court, the terms of s.12 of the Administration of Justice Act 1969 were engaged and the question of permission to appeal could be leap-frogged to the Supreme Court6. As with (c) above, the UT, rather than the FtT, will be best placed to take a view on a matter of this kind.
(e) Grounds alleging that the FtT erred in failing to adjourn will need to be considered in the context of FtT Rules, r.21(2) and (3) and the overriding objective in rule 4”.
“The consideration of an application for permission to appeal is a judicial decision for the individual judge performing it. The guidance issued to the judiciary does not modify or replace the legal obligations of a judge considering such a matter and it is not considered that they are required to take this guidance into account when making decisions”.
Not needing to be reminded however that Nixon states the Guidance must be considered, if there is indeed no obligation for it to be taken into account, how about FTT Judges routinely considering and then setting out some relevant caselaw within the resulting decision itself indicating whether or not to grant permission? Currently some decisions on permission from the FTT amount to half a page, a page or one and half pages.
Referring to readily sourced caselaw on the relevant point(s) raised in a permission application surely would outwardly appear to contribute to an assurance of considered consistency in decision making at a crucial point in time when error of law considerations issues themselves require engagement with the law- as opposed to a decision on permission which at times may not be apparent on its face as regards what law was taken into account.
The enduring application and pedigree of the Edwards v Bairstow principles is not, so far as we are aware, in question.
22.The Judge found, in terms, that the best interests of the two grandchildren would be promoted by the advent of the Appellant to live with their family and the continued presence of the mother in the family unit. We consider these findings to be unimpeachable. It is clear that the Judge committed no error of law in his approach to the best interests of the grandchildren. In substance, he viewed this as a primary consideration. This consideration is to be evaluated in tandem with the Judge’s other findings and the weight given by him to the cultural issue specifically raised. All of the ingredients in this equation must be considered as a whole. Mr Sheldon’s submission is that they are insufficient to justify a finding of exceptional circumstances. Viewed through the prism of conventional public law litigation, this has all the hallmarks of an irrationality challenge. As the Court of Appeal stated recently in Secretary of State for the Home Department v Boyd  EWCA Civ 1190, at , the question for the appellate court or tribunal in such cases is whether the decision of the first instance tribunal on this issue is “one that was open to it”. Framed in somewhat more elaborate terms, the test is whether it is sustainable by reference to the principles in Edwards v Bairstow, rehearsed above.
23.The elevated hurdle which a challenge of this nature must overcome requires no elaboration. Mr Sheldon submitted that in finding exceptional circumstances the FtT identified two factors only, namely the grandchildren and the “cultural aspects”. This was the core of the Secretary of State’s appellate challenge. We consider this submission unsustainable for two reasons. First, the FtT highlighted these two factors “particularly, not exclusively. Second, the submission focuses on the concluding paragraph of the decision only, neglecting everything which precedes it. We consider that the Judge’s exceptional circumstances finding was based on the whole of the evidential picture. The question for us is whether, viewing the decision of the FtT as a whole, its finding of exceptional circumstances is sustainable in law. This, in the context of an error of law appeal, requires us to pose the question of whether the decision is compatible with the Edwards v Bairstow principles. We consider that this invites an affirmative answer. The Judge’s exceptional circumstances conclusion, uncontaminated by any legal misdirection or other error of law, lay within the range of outcomes reasonably available to him, was not contradicted by the evidence but, rather, had a sufficient evidential foundation and did not leave anything material out of account. Or, to borrow again the recent Court of Appeal phraseology (supra), we are satisfied that this conclusion was “open to” the FtT in the circumstances”.
“18.The Upper Tribunal has the impression that the Secretary of State, as a matter of routine, applies for permission to appeal in every deportation appeal in which the appellant succeeds before the FtT. Furthermore, the grounds of appeal are frequently formulated in bland and formulaic terms. Thirdly, the grounds of appeal rarely, if ever, engage with the governing principles which we have rehearsed above. We would suggest that these observations be carefully considered by those who compile applications for permission to appeal and the Judges who decide them.
“(1)A judge considering an application for permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal must avoid granting permission on what, properly analysed, is no more than a simple quarrel with the First-tier Tribunal judge’s assessment of the evidence.
(2) When granting permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal, it is unsatisfactory merely to state that the applicant’s grounds are arguable.
(3) The requirement, emphasised in Nixon (permission to appeal: grounds)  UKUT 368 (IAC), to engage with each and every ground of application, need not involve anything of an unduly elaborate, burdensome or analytical nature. The reasons for granting or refusing permission to appeal, in whole or part, in any given case will almost invariably be capable of being expressed in a concise and focused manner”.
“Appeals should not be mounted on the basis of a litany of forensic criticisms of particular findings of the First Tier Tribunal, whilst ignoring the basic legal test which the appellant has to meet.
In our judgement, the problem with Mr Chelvan’s approach and this appeal is that he has sought to comb through the judgment as if it was a statute and pick bits here and there out of context whilst ignoring the overall findings of the Determination and Reasons and the conclusions.
We see these sorts of manufactured appeals quite often in the Upper Tribunal and deprecate them. It is not necessary for judges to record, analyse, rehearse and repeat the entire interstices of the evidence. The task of the First-tier Tribunal is to make reasoned findings on the key issues in the case and a clear decision”.
“Where there is no reasonable prospect that any error of law alleged in the grounds of appeal could have made a difference to the outcome, permission to appeal should not normally be granted in the absence of some point of public importance that is otherwise in the public interest to determine”.
I announced my decision, with reasons, at the conclusion of the hearing. In brief summary, Mr Smart, representing the Secretary of State, accepted, realistically and correctly, that this is an irrationality challenge. The proportions of the hurdle thereby erected require no elaboration. I am satisfied that the findings and conclusions of the Judge were comfortably open to her, having regard to the documentary evidence (which I have considered) and the oral evidence of those who testified (summarised in the determination). It was plainly open to the Judge to make the omnibus finding that the Appellant and his spouse were living together in a genuine and subsisting relationship. There is no demonstrable error on the face of the determination. Furthermore, sufficient findings are rehearsed, while others can be readily inferred. No piece of material evidence was overlooked by the Judge. Fundamentally, the weight which the Judge determined to accord to certain aspects of the evidence, while attaching correspondingly little or no weight to others, lay comfortably within the bounds of the standard of rationality.
14. In my view, permission to appeal should not have been granted to the Secretary of State in this case. The application for permission fell measurably short of the governing threshold and invited a swift and summary refusal”.
15.It will be noticed that the Master of the Rolls used the words “vital” and “critical” as synonyms of the word “material” which we have used above. The whole of his judgment warrants attention, because it reveals the anxiety of an appellate court not to overturn a judgment at first instance unless it really cannot understand the original judge’s thought processes when he/she was making material findings.
16.What we have said does not absolve an adjudicator of his/her duty of devoting the intense scrutiny to the appellant’s case that is required of a decision of such importance. What we wish to make clear, however, is that the practice of bringing appeals because the adjudicator or immigration judge has not made reasoned findings on matters of peripheral importance must now come to an end”.
Having regard to the above Upper Tribunal caselaw, it cannot be the case these days that just because the Home office have taken the trouble to prepare and lodge a permission application, it should be taken much more seriously than a permission application lodged by an appellant, so as to routinely grant permission.
On 21 April 2016, the Government published a consultation paper proposing new fees for proceedings in the First-tier Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) and Upper. Among other changes in fees, there is also a proposal to introduce a new fee of £455 for an application to the First-tier Tribunal for permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal. If the First Tier Tribunal give the appearance of almost routinely granting permission applications made by the Home Office, then maybe the implementation of the new appeal fees will deter the very lodgment of such applications.
This entry was posted in Appeals, Deportation, EU Free movement, Human Rights, Immigration Rules, Removals, Uncategorized and tagged Error of law ;Grant of permission to appeal by the first tier tribunal; Home Office permission applications; Entry Clearance Officer, Mumbai v NH (India)  EWCA Civ 1330; Guidance Note 2011 No 1:. Bookmark the permalink.

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