Source: https://ads1.morelaw.com/verdicts/case.asp?n=2018-SC-000186-MR&s=KY&d=127481
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 08:03:14+00:00

Document:
stepped off the porch and walked quickly around the side of the house.
family and having come from the Osterhages’ detached garage.
African American on the jury panel. For the reasons stated below, we disagree.
Court: So, what are you telling the court, ma’am?
Juror 433: OK, I don’t know if I live ... I’m like . . .
Court: Oh, you’re determining your residency of Campbell County?
Court: What is your residence address? Is it Campbell County?
Court: And do you, are you a registered voter in the county?
Court: But you think you might not be a resident of the county?
Juror 433: Well, I don’t know.
Court: So, what is your intent, do you receive mail in the county?
reside a few days a week somewhere else?
county, would you use your Campbell County address?
County resident for the purpose of this jury pool.
Commonwealth exercised one of its peremptory strikes against Juror 433.
I don’t know how that [a race-based strike] can be inferred When there’s only one African-American juror on the whole jury. . . . This was the individual who wasn’t even sure if this was her county of residence; she was not even clear if she is a Campbell County resident; she spends half her time out of the county.
For preservation of the record, I do not want an issue on appeal that a person who was not a Campbell County resident ended up serving on a jury ... so in an abundance of caution, I did strike [Juror 433] based on her confusion about her residency.
1 Weinel is white and Juror 433 is African American.
recessed the proceedings to further research the issue.
I think she was still equivocal about where she resides, I think she wasn’t even confident that she was a county resident and should be serving on a jury—that made me uncomfortable. Beyond that, I think her attitude generally, I just got the vibe that she didn’t want to be here and I didn’t think she would be a good juror.
residency. The trial court accordingly denied Weinel’s Batson challenge.
McPherson v. Commonwealth, 171 S.W.3d 1, 3 (Ky. 2005); Johnson v.
34 S.W.3d 376, 380 (Ky. 2000); Johnson, 450 S.W.3d at 702.
2 Abrogated in part by Roe v. Commonwealth, 493 S.W.3d 814, 828 (Ky. 2015).
peremptory strike does not equate to purposeful discrimination. Aleman v.
honest, unintentional mistakes. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 98”).
substantial evidence, and its decision was therefore not clearly erroneous.
It shall be the duty of the court to instruct the jury in writing on the law of the case, which instructions shall be read to the jury prior to the closing summations of counsel. These requirements may not be waived except by agreement of both the defense and the prosecution.
deducible or supported to any extent by the testimony.” Gribbins v.
Commonwealth, 483 S.W.3d 370, 373 (Ky. 2016) (quoting Taylor v.
4 “Findings of fact are not clearly erroneous if they are supported by substantial evidence.” Commonwealth v. Jennings, 490 S.W.3d 339, 346 (Ky. 2016) (citing Simpson v. Commonwealth, 474 S.W.3d 544, 546-547 (Ky.2015)). Substantial evidence means evidence that when “taken alone or in light of all the evidence ... has sufficient probative value to induce conviction in the minds of reasonable men.” Moore v. Asente, 110 S.W.3d 336, 354 (Ky. 2003) (citation omitted); Commonwealth v. Abukar, 497 S.W.3d 231, 237 (Ky. 2016).
5 Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure.
6 Swan v. Commonwealth, 384 S.W.3d 77, 99 (Ky. 2012).
required where the evidence does not support the instruction. Houston v.
Commonwealth, 975 S.W.2d 925, 929 (Ky. 1998).
(a) Is armed with ... a deadly weapon; . . .
satisfied if the defendant steals a firearm during the course of the burglary.
7 A “building,” for the purposes of the burglary statutes, is a building in its ordinary sense plus “any structure, vehicle, watercraft or aircraft: (a) Where any person lives, or (b) Where people assemble for [various] purposes....” KRS 511.010(1). It is uncontested that an unattached garage qualifies as a “building” under this definition.
firing for the firearm to qualify as a deadly weapon. Conyers at 421.
principles. Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999).
thus hold there was no reason for the lesser included instruction.

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