Source: https://scocal.stanford.edu/opinion/people-v-one-1941-chevrolet-coupe-26367
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 18:21:46+00:00

Document:
THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. ONE 1941 CHEVROLET COUPE, ENGINE NO. AA430562 et al., Defendants; FRED W. GRAY COMPANY (a Corporation), Appellant.
Macfarlane, Schaefer & Haun, William Gamble and E. J. Caldecott for Appellant.
Fred N. Howser, and Edmund G. Brown, Attorneys General, and Dan Kaufmann, Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent.
"The State instituted this proceeding by filing a 'Notice of Seizure and Intended Forfeiture Proceedings' as provided by sections 11612 and 11613 of the Health and Safety Code. The notice alleged that the automobile had been seized pursuant to section 11611 of that code and that it 'was used to unlawfully conceal, convey, carry or transport marihuana, and marihuana was unlawfully in the possession of an occupant.' The registered owner and the legal owner answered separately, denying the allegations of the notice. The legal owner alleged that, prior to the seizure, it loaned $886.52 to the registered owner and received a chattel mortgage which was duly filed for record and is a first lien on the automobile. It also alleged that, prior to making the loan, it made a 'reasonable investigation of the moral responsibility, character and reputation of the [registered owner] ... and found the same to be good,' and that there was a balance due of $865.57, with interest.
"The court found that the automobile was used contrary to the provisions of section 11610 of the Health and Safety Code and that the legal owner did not, prior to the loan, make a reasonable investigation of the moral responsibility, character and reputation of the registered owner. The legal owner appeals from the judgment.
"Prior to the setting of the cause for trial, appellant filed a demand for trial by jury. Thereafter respondent filed objections to the demand and a notice of motion to set the cause for trial without a jury. The respondent's motion was granted. When the cause came on for trial appellant renewed its demand [37 Cal.2d 286] and moved the trial judge for a trial by jury. The motion was denied.
"Appellant contends it was denied its right to a trial by jury in violation of article I, section 7, of the Constitution of California.
 "There can be no forfeiture of property without notice to the owner and a hearing at which he can be heard, except in a few cases of necessity, i. e., property kept in violation of law which is incapable of lawful use. Where the property is what is sometimes termed innocent property, threatening no danger to the public welfare, the owner must be afforded a fair opportunity to be heard. This is true whether it be a common-law or judicial forfeiture (one which does not take effect until by a judgment the rights of the State have been established in a suit instituted for that purpose), or a statutory or legislative forfeiture (one where the forfeiture is effective on the commission of the offense). In either case the law requires proceedings to be instituted for the purpose of ascertaining the facts of the forfeiture. (People v. Broad, 216 Cal. 1, 3-7 [12 P.2d 941].)  A statutory or legislative forfeiture is in rem against the property itself. A common-law or judicial forfeiture is in personam against a defendant (37 C.J.S. 5, § 2). The forfeiture prescribed by the Health and Safety Code is in rem. (People v. Broad, 216 Cal. 1 [12 P.2d 941]; 37 C.J.S. 5, § 2.) The effect of such a forfeiture is to transfer the title to the vehicle from the owner to the State.
 " 'The right of trial by jury shall be secured to all, and remain inviolate.' (Cal. Const., art. I, § 7; Cal. Const. of 1849, art. I, § 3.) The right to trial by jury guaranteed by the Constitution is the right as it existed at common law [37 Cal.2d 287] at the time the Constitution was adopted. (People v. Richardson, 138 Cal.App. 404, 408 [32 P.2d 433].) The common law at the time the Constitution was adopted includes not only the lex non scripta but also the written statutes enacted by Parliament. (Moore v. Purse Seine Net, 18 Cal.2d 835, 838 [118 P.2d 1].) The common law respecting trial by jury as it existed in 1850 is the rule of decision in this state. (Farrell v. City of Ontario, 39 Cal.App. 351, 356 [178 P. 740].) Any act of the Legislature attempting to abridge the constitutional right is void. (People v. Kelly, 203 Cal. 128, 133 [263 P. 226]; People v. Bruneman, 4 Cal.App.2d 75, 79 [40 P.2d 891]; Cassel v. Gregori, 28 Cal.App.2d Supp. 769, 774 [70 P.2d 721].) fn. 1 It is the right to trial by jury as it existed at common law which is preserved; and what that right is, is a purely historical question, a fact which is to be ascertained like any other social, political or legal fact. The right is the historical right enjoyed at the time it was guaranteed by the Constitution. It is necessary, therefore, to ascertain what was the rule of the English common law upon this subject in 1850.
" '... In all this we perceive a common understanding of judges, lawyers and text writers, both before and after the adoption of the Constitution, of the common law nature of the procedure and judgment in rem in forfeiture cases and of its use in such proceedings in the Exchequer and in the American common law courts.
 "The right of trial by jury did not exist at common law in a suit to abate a public nuisance. (People v. McCaddon, 48 Cal.App. 790, 792 [192 P. 325].) Hence it is not a constitutional right now.
"Automobiles, carriages, wagons, horses, and mules, that are ordinarily used for lawful purposes, cannot be classified with narcotics, gambling paraphernalia, counterfeit coins, diseased cattle, obscene books and pictures, decayed fruit and fish, unwholesome meat, infected clothing, or other contraband, [37 Cal.2d 299] which are ordinarily used for an unlawful purpose, and are public nuisances per se. fn. 24 While property kept in violation of law which is incapable of lawful use and declared to be a nuisance per se may be forfeited without a trial by jury under the police power, it does not follow that property ordinarily used for lawful purposes--innocent property--may be forfeited without a trial by jury where an issue of fact is joined as to whether the property was being used for an unlawful purpose or is to be taken from an innocent owner. There is no general constitutional right to a jury trial in actions for the seizure and forfeiture of contraband articles. fn. 25 But property is not contraband or a public nuisance merely because it was instrumental in the commission of a public offense.
 "It is argued that this proceeding for the forfeiture of property used in violation of law is a special proceeding, equitable in nature. ... The right to a trial by jury cannot be avoided by merely calling an action a special proceeding or equitable in nature. If that could be done, the Legislature, by providing new remedies and new judgments and decrees in form equitable, could in all cases dispense with jury trials, and thus entirely defeat the provision of the Constitution. The Legislature cannot convert a legal right into an equitable one so as to infringe upon the right of trial by jury. fn. 26 The provision of the Constitution does not permit the Legislature to confer on the courts the power of trying according to the course of chancery any question which has always been triable according to the course of the common law by a jury. If the action has to deal with ordinary common-law rights cognizable in courts of law, it is to that extent an action at law. fn. 27 In determining whether the action was one triable by a jury at common law, the court is not bound by the form of the action but rather by the nature of the rights involved and the facts of the particular case--the gist of the action. A jury trial must be granted where the gist of the action is legal, where the action is in reality cognizable at law.
 "We conclude that this forfeiture proceeding by the State is the type of action which was cognizable in a common-law court, and triable by a jury in the Court of Exchequer, according to the course of the common law; that trial by jury was recognized as a right in the trial of actions for the forfeiture of property seized because used in violation of law at common law at the time of the adoption of the Constitution of California, and that appellant had a constitutional right to a trial by jury of the issues of fact in this case.
 "The denial of a trial by jury to one constitutionally entitled thereto constitutes a miscarriage of justice and requires a reversal of the judgment. (Cowlin v. Pringle, 46 Cal.App.2d 472, 476 [116 P.2d 109].)"
 The attorney general contends: (1) that this conclusion [37 Cal.2d 301] has been rejected by a majority of the states that have considered the question; (2) that the federal practice denies lienholders a jury trial; (3) that at least three decisions of this state have held that such a proceeding is equitable in nature; (4) and that cases before 1849 in which jury trials were allowed involved forfeitures for violation of revenue and maritime laws and are not authority for forfeitures founded on the police power.
(1) It is true that a number of states have denied the right to a jury trial in forfeiture proceedings. An examination of the cases cited by the attorney general, however, shows that in none of them was the problem adequately discussed in terms of the common law practice in England and the United States before 1850.
The attorney general has cited two federal decisions under the National Prohibition Act that apparently hold that, whatever the rights of the party in possession of the vehicle, a lienholder has no right to a jury trial. (Missouri Investment Corp. v. United States, 32 F.2d 511; C. I. T. Corp. v. United States, 37 F.2d 890, 891.) In the earlier of these cases, cited and followed in the later case, the court stated that, "The nature of the proceedings which may be taken under title 2, section 26, of the National Prohibition Act (27 U.S.C.A. § 40), by the claimant of the seized vehicle, is not made very clear. We think, however, that such a petition as this is in the nature of an intervening petition in equity." (32 F.2d at 511.) Whether or not this interpretation of that act can be considered authoritative in the federal courts (see United States v. Yamoto, 50 F.2d 599, 600), we do not subscribe to the reasoning on which it rests.
Two theories appear to underlie the conclusion that a lienholder in a forfeiture action is merely a petitioner in equity. [37 Cal.2d 302] The first theory is that the statute has combined in a single proceeding what were formerly two actions: (1) a common law action for declaration of forfeiture and (2) an equitable suit to foreclose a lien. It is argued that under ordinary circumstances the lienholder has only an equitable remedy to enforce his lien and that he gains no right to a jury trial merely because that remedy is joined with a forfeiture action triable by jury.
Although the suit by the state is nominally in rem against the vehicle itself, in reality it is directed against those who have property interests in the vehicle. The automobile is not itself an offender but has merely been used in the commission of an offense. The statute operates to transfer property rights in the automobile to the state, as a penalty against the owners for this misuse. In People v. Broad, supra, 216 Cal. 1, 3, 7, an earlier statute on this subject was declared unconstitutional because of its failure to provide notice and hearing for interested parties other than the narcotics offender. That case clearly recognized, moreover, that the forfeiture is directed against all owners, and in fact the owner involved in that case was the assignee of the seller under a conditional sale contract. (See, also, Ieck v. Anderson, 57 Cal. 251, 252 [40 Am.Rep. 115].) The present statute provides that notice shall be given to owners (Health & Saf. Code, § 11613), which includes legal owners such as appellant (Veh. Code, §§ 67, 197), and that they may file answers (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11619, 11620).
It is true that the forfeiture does not apply to innocent lienholders. It does not follow, however, that lienholders are not parties to the forfeiture. One of the purposes of the forfeiture proceeding is to determine whether or not the lienholder is in fact "innocent." With respect to the issue of reasonable investigation of the registered owner (Health & Saf. Code, § 11620), as well as the issue of the narcotics offense (Health & Saf. Code, § 11619), the appellant is vitally concerned, for unless there is an adverse decision on both of these issues, appellant's interest in the vehicle is not forfeited to the state. It is therefore a misconception to regard appellant as interested only in the establishment and foreclosure of its lien--it is also interested in protecting that lien from the claim against it that is being asserted by the state.
A second theory underlying the federal cases cited by the attorney general is that a lienholder is an intervener and that, since intervention was not allowed at common law, his [37 Cal.2d 303] position is analogous to that of an intervening petitioner in equity. This argument overlooks the extensive use of intervention permitted under our modern system of code pleading, even as to actions formerly tried in the common law courts. It also overlooks an essential difference between the National Prohibition Act and the statute now before us. By the National Prohibition Act, the declaration of forfeiture was made a part of the criminal action in which the party guilty of illegally transporting liquor was prosecuted; after his conviction, lienholders were permitted to intervene. The present California procedure, however, does not combine the forfeiture action with the criminal prosecution. The forfeiture is litigated in an independent proceeding in which a lienholder is not an intervener but rather, in compliance with People v. Broad, supra, a necessary party defendant. As noted above, the statute itself expressly refers to his pleading as an "answer" (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11619, 11620).
(3) In Traffic Truck Sales Co. v. Justice's Court, 192 Cal. 377, 384 [220 P. 307], it was stated that a forfeiture proceeding such as that under consideration herein is in the nature of an equitable proceeding. No issue of jury trial was presented, however, and the court did not consider the historical background of forfeiture statutes. In reliance on this decision, similar statements appear in People v. One 1941 Mercury Sedan, 74 Cal.App.2d 199, 202 [168 P.2d 443], and People v. One 1941 Chrysler Sedan, 81 Cal.App.2d 18, 30 [183 P.2d 368]. In view of the conclusion reached in the present case, these expressions must now be regarded as disapproved.
True, there are cases which appear to hold to the contrary, but in not one of them was the court's attention directed to the distinction between the position of an owner of property and a mortgagee. The applicant in United States v. Yamoto, 50 F.2d 599, was the holder of a conditional sales contract of a vehicle ordered forfeited under the Volstead Act. No question concerning the right of trial by jury was raised at the trial of the action and the case was heard by the court. On appeal from a judgment in favor of the claimant, it was held that the action was one at law, triable by a jury, and since a jury had not been waived "in the manner prescribed by law," the appellate review was limited to a consideration of the process, pleadings and judgment.
That conclusion was based upon Kennedy v. United States, [37 Cal.2d 305] 44 F.2d 57. The court held that a seizure on land is not within the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States and the proceeding for forfeiture was, therefore, an action at law, triable by jury. In the Yamoto case, no reference was made to cases in which lienholders claimed the right to foreclose but looked only to the place of seizure as the basis for its decision.
For these reasons, I would hold that a mortgagee seeking to establish and to foreclose lien upon seized property is not entitled to a trial by jury upon those issues.
­FN 1. "The right has always been regarded as sacred and has been jealously guarded by the courts. (People v. Peete, 54 Cal.App. 333, 363 [202 P. 51].) 'Trial by juries is the Englishman's birth-right, and is that happy way of trial, which, notwithstanding all revolutions of time, hath been continued beyond all memory to the present day; the beginning whereof no history specifies, it being contemporary with the foundation of this state, and one of the pillars of it, both as to age and consequence." (Burns, Justice of the Peace (23d ed.), vol. III, p. 80.) See also Parsons v. Bedford, 3 Pet. (U.S.) 433 [7 L.Ed. 732, 736].
­FN 2. " 5 Rich. II, stat. 1, ch. 2, act respecting transfer of gold and silver;  2 Hen. IV, ch. 5, act to prevent gold and silver from being carried out of realm;  1 James I, ch. 2, § 43, act re tanners, curriers, shoemakers, etc.;  12 Chas. II, ch. 4, § 5, act providing duties;  12 Chas. II, ch. 18, § 2, act to encourage shipping--Navigation Act;  13 & 14 Chas. II, ch. 11, §§ 14, 17, 22, 23, 26, 31, act for preventing frauds;  14 Chas. II, cap. 7, act to restrain exportation of leather and raw hides;  14 Chas. II, ch. 11, § 1, act to prevent frauds of brewers and other persons;  15 Chas. II, ch. 7, §§ 6, 8, act to encourage trade;  1 W. & M. ch. 32, § 2, act to prevent exportation of wool;  4 & 5 W. & M. cap. 5, § 8, act to prevent frauds in importation of spirits;  11 & 12 Will. III, ch. 10, § 2, act to encourage manufacturers and affecting importations;  8 Anne, ch. 7, § 17, act relating to imports;  5 Geo. I, ch. 11, §§ 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 8, 15, 21, act relating to smuggling;  8 Geo. I, ch. 18, act to prevent clandestine running of goods and infection thereby;  11 Geo. I, ch. 30, § 16, act to prevent frauds and abuses in public revenues;  12 Geo. I, ch. 28 §§ 13, 14, act for improvement of his Majesty's revenues;  1 Geo. II, ch. 17, § 7, act prohibiting certain imports;  9 Geo. II, ch. 35, §§ 22, 23, act relating to revenues;  19 Geo. II, ch. 12, §§ 3, 17, 19, 20, 21, act relating to duties on glass, etc.;  3 Geo. III, ch. 22, §§ 5, 6, 8, act relating to seizures;  5 Geo. III, ch. 43, § 27, act relating to revenues;  6 Geo. III, ch. 19, § 1, act relating to imports;  21 Geo. III, ch. 37, §§ 1, 2, act to prevent exportation to foreign parts of certain goods;  21 Geo. III, ch. 55, §§ 13, 20, 21, 24, 29, 30, act relating to duties and preventing frauds;  24 Geo. III, ch. 19, reenactment of 1 James I, ch. 22, § 43;  24 Geo. III, ch. 47, § 4, act to prevent smuggling;  26 Geo. III, ch. 77, § 10, act relating to duties;  27 Geo. III, ch. 32, §§ 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, act relating to smuggling;  33 Geo. III, ch. 2, § 4, act relating to exportation of arms and ammunition;  34 Geo. III, ch. 50, §§ 2, 8, 9, act relating to imports;  38 Geo. III, ch. 89, § 8, act relating to duties;  39 Geo. III, ch. 59, §§ 5, 14, act relating to imports;  42 Geo. III, ch. 38, § 20, act relating to duties and to prevent frauds;  45 Geo. III, ch. 121, § 6, act to prevent smuggling;  47 Geo. III, ch. 66, §§ 3, 8, 9, 10, 13, 14, act to prevent smuggling;  6 Geo. IV, ch. 107, §§ 64, 71, 128, act regulating customs;  6 Geo. IV, ch. 108, §§ 2, 45, act to prevent smuggling;  3 & 4 Wm. IV, ch. 52, §§ 10, 14, 20, 24, 28, 61, 118, act regulating customs;  3 & 4 Wm. IV, ch. 53, §§ 2, 3, 6, 14, 28, 31, 47, act to prevent smuggling;  5 & 6 Vict. ch. 47, §§ 10, 11, 18, 36, 42, act relating to customs;  5 & 6 Vict. ch. 93, §§ 8, 10, act regulating excise on tobacco.
­FN 3. "For the distinction between Queen's Bench, Common Pleas and Exchequer, see The Attorney-General v. Hallett, 15 M. & W. 97, 153 Eng.Rep. 777, 781."
­FN 4. "See also Cox, Institutions of the English Government, 517. An information filed in the Court of Exchequer was the first judicial proceeding in rem towards the legal condemnation of goods seized as forfeited. The Attorney-General v. Jefferys, 13 Price, 545, Eng. Rep. 1077, 1078.
­FN 5. "Former Dean School of Jurisprudence, University of California, now Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania.
­FN 6. "36 Cal.L.Rev. 173.
­FN 7. "Jenkinson, Select Cases in the Exchequer of Pleas, p. 1; idem. p. lxxxii.
­FN 8. "Jenkinson, Select Cases in the Exchequer of Pleas, p. cxvi, p. 20 (58), p. 37 (88), p. 40 (94, 95), p. 56 (116), p. 66 (128), p. 88 (146), p. 103 (162), p. 116 (171), p. 121 (174), p. 131 (181), p. 133 (183), p. 140 (189), p. 146 (193), p. 150 (198), p. 168 (215), p. 172, (219A), p. 174 (221), p. 180 (227B), p. 183 (228), p. 196 (243), p. 198 (245), p. 200 (246), p. 206 (251)); Case LXII (1457) Jenk. 83, 145 Eng. Rep. 59.
­FN 9. "Jenkinson, Select Cases in the Exchequer of Pleas, p. 168 (215).
­FN 10. "Case LXII  Jenk. 83, 145 Eng. Rep. 59.
­FN 11. " 13 & 14 Chas. II, ch. 11, § 21. See Roe v. Roe --Exchequer--Hardres, 185, 145 Eng. Rep. 443, where it was held that the issue of fact for the jury in an information for selling and importing to be sold foreign woollen contrary to statute was whether such cloth was imported to be sold.
­FN 14. "Anonymous Case LXX , Jenk. 87, 145 Eng. Rep. 62, was for the forfeiture to the King of merchandise alleged to have been shipped with intent to transport it to an unlawful place. The manner of obtaining a jury is discussed. Anonymous Case XCVI , Jenk. 191, 145 Eng. Rep. 128, was an information in behalf of the King for transporting 'cloath,' custom not being paid. The 'cloath' was forfeited to the King. An information against Page , Lane, 19, 145 Eng. Rep. 264, was for buying putter, and selling it at retail contrary to the statute. Book's Case , Hardres, 20, 145 Eng. Rep. 359, was an information for importing 'pottacoes' of tobacco of foreign growth in a foreign vessel. The case was tried by a jury resulting in forfeiture of the tobacco which was later set aside because of defects in the information. Jones v. Clark , Hardres, 46, 145 Eng. Rep. 373, was 'Upon an information for not garbling [culling] two and twenty bags of spice according to the statute of 21 Jacob, whereby it became forfeited.' In Holton v. Raworth [1775 or 1776], Hardres, 358, 145 Eng. Rep. 496, a trial by jury was had on an information upon seizure of wines for not paying custom. In Rex v. Southerby , Bunbury, 4, 145 Eng. Rep. 575, Southerby was outlawed and a writ of execution issued. A trial by jury was then had and 'his house and goods seized by virtue thereof.' Bill v. Robinson , Bunbury, 48, 145 Eng. Rep. 591, was a suit against an informer after a verdict for the defendant on the trial of an information upon seizure. Bradley qui tam v. Long , Bunbry, 78, 145 Eng. Rep. 601, was an information for importing brandy in a collier. Verdict was for the King. Rickson qui tam v. Sandford , Bunbury 192, 145 Eng. Rep. 644, forfeiture of seized wines; Idle qui tam v. Vanheck , Bunbury, 231, 145 Eng. Rep. 657, forfeiture of ships for unlawful importation of goods; Attorney General v. Jackson , Bunbury, 234, 145 Eng. Rep. 658, seizure and forfeiture of ships and goods. Robinson qui tam v. Lequesne , Bunbury, 251, 145 Eng. Rep. 664, was upon 'an information of seizure of Jesuits bark ... for fraudulent exportation of Jesuits bark, two casks out of six being dust.' Scott, who prosecutes for His Majesty and Himself, v. A'Chez, , Parker, 20, 145 Eng. Rep. 702, was an information grounded on the statute of 12 Car. 2 c. 18, the Navigation Act. It alleged that plaintiff seized a ship and goods therein because the goods were imported unlawfully. The prayer was 'that the ship and goods may remain forfeited.' Issue was joined. The penalty provided by the act was forfeiture of the ship and cargo. Attorney-General v. Munn , Parker 91, 145 Eng. Rep. 723, was an information 'on a seizure of several parcels of tobacco stalks as forfeited, by being imported contrary to the act 12 Geo. I, c. 28, s. 13.' Malden v. Bartlett , Parker 105, 145 Eng. Rep. 727, was an information by the plaintiff suing for the King and himself. It was alleged that the plaintiff had seized a parcel of tobacco imported unlawfully. The statute provided that the tobacco be forfeited to the King and burned. Bartlett came in and claimed the property. The issues were tried by a jury. The Attorney General v. Parke , 1 Anst. 240, 145 Eng. Rep. 860, was an information for forfeiture for violation of a statute relative to the making of glass. The Attorney General v. Brown , 3 Anst. 720, 145 Eng. Rep. 1018, was an information for forfeiture of a cutter alleged to have been found out of the limits of her license in violation of law. On the same facts The Attorney General v. Roote , 3 Anst. 726, 145 Eng. Rep. 1020. The Attorney General v. Sheriff , Forrest, 41, 145 Eng. Rep. 1107, was an information for the forfeiture of a ship and cargo for unlawfully importing wines. The Attorney General v. Forge , Forrest, 104, 145 Eng. Rep. 1127, was an information for the forfeiture of treble the value of candles possessed unlawfully. The statute also provided for forfeiture of the candles. The Attorney-General v. Wilson , 3 Price, 431 146 Eng. Rep. 311, was an information for condemnation of a ship and her cargo on the ground of illicit importation of flaxseed, etc. The Attorney-General v. Theakstone , 8 Price, 89, 146 Eng. Rep. 1140, was an information for condemnation of a vessel after seizure for having prohibited gunpowder on board. The Attorney-General v. Jefferys , 13 Price, 545, 147 Eng. Rep. 1077, was an information (of seizure in rem) for the condemnation of machines unlawfully packed for export. The statute (21 Geo. III, ch. 37, § 2) provided for forfeiture. The prayer was that the goods 'might remain forfeited.' The Attorney-General v. Vondiere , 1 C. M. & R., 570, 149 Eng. Rep. 1207, was an information for the condemnation of 'silk waistcoats.' The goods had been illegally removed from a warehouse. The statute (3 & 4 Will. IV, ch. 52, sec. 28) provided that the goods 'together with all horses and other animals, and all carriages and other things made use of in the removal of such goods' be forfeited. Attorney-General v. Schiers , 2 C. M. & R. 286, 150 Eng. Rep. 124, was an information praying the forfeiture of a foreign vessel, seized by officers of the customs, for being found on the high seas within one league of the coast of the United Kingdom with contraband spirits aboard. The statute (3 & 4 Will. IV, ch. 53, § 2) provided for forfeiture of the vessel and goods. Attorney-General v. Catt , 3 M. & W. 7, 150 Eng. Rep. 1033, was an information for being concerned in unshipping goods liable to duties; for concealing goods illegally shipped; and for 'harbouring' goods illegally imported. Attorney-General v. Le Revert , 6 M. & W. 405, 151 Eng. Rep. 469, on like facts was tried by a jury and the vessel and goods forfeited. The Attorney-General v. Rogers , 11 M. & W. 670, 152 Eng. Rep. 974, was 'an information filed against the defendant, a tobacconist, for penalties for mixing saccharine matter with tobacco in the course of manufacture, and for having in his possession saccharine matter for the purpose of using it in the manufacture of tobacco.' The statute provided for forfeiture of the tobacco (5 & 6 Vict. c. 93.) The Attorney- General v. Clerc , 12 M. & W. 640, 152 Eng. Rep. 1355, was an information for the condemnation of foreign wines after seizure. The statute (5 & 6 Vict. ch. 47, § 18) provided for forfeiture. See also Anonymous Case XCIV, Jenk. 229, 145 Eng. Rep. 159; The Attorney General v. Woodmass , Bunbury, 246, 145 Eng. Rep. 662; The Attorney-General v. Norstedt , 3 Price, 97, 146 Eng. Rep. 203; The Attorney General v. Stevens , 3 Price, 72, 146 Eng. Rep. 195; The Attorney General v. King , 5 Price, 195, 146 Eng. Rep. 579; The Attorney General v. Delano , 6 Price, 383, 146 Eng. Rep. 841; The Attorney General v. Kent , 7 Price, 533, 146 Eng. Rep. 1052; The Attorney-General v. French , 7 Price, 557, 146 Eng. Rep. 1060; The Attorney-General v. Goodman , 8 Price, 220, 146 Eng. Rep. 1184; The Attorney-General v. Hall , 11 Price, 760, 147 Eng. Rep. 629; Attorney-General v. Greaves , 2 C. M. & R. 669, 150 Eng. Rep. 284. As stated,²all of these cases were tried by a jury.
­FN 15. "Isabell Fortescues Case , Lane, 91, 145 Eng. Rep. 324, was that a penalty be imposed upon her for recusancy (absence from church). An inquisition issued and the case was tried by a jury. In The Protector v. Sir Thomas Ashfield , Hardres, 62, 145 Eng. Rep. 381, two parts of Ashfield's land were seized for recusancy. He pleaded conformity. The court held that before the lands could be forfeited to the King conformity must be tried by the common law. Stevens v. Duckworth [1775 or 1776], Hardres, 338, 145 Eng. Rep. 486, was an information 'tam quam' for forfeiture of five pounds a day for selling wines without a license. The Attorney General v. Brewster , 2 Anst. 559, 145 Eng. Rep. 966, was an information for a penalty of 500 1. for concealing soap in violation of 1 Geo. I, st. 2, c. 31. The Attorney General v. Brown , Forrest, 110, 145 Eng. Rep. 1129, was an information for penalties, for assisting in unshipping spiritous liquors and tobacco before the duties were paid. The Attorney General v. Saggers , 1 Price, 182, 145 Eng. Rep. 1370, was for treble the value of goods unlawfully imported. The Attorney General v. Farr , 4 Price, 122, 146 Eng. Rep. 414, was for assisting in unshipping prohibited and unaccustomed goods. The prayer was for treble the value of the goods. The Attorney General v. Horton , 4 Price, 237, 146 Eng. Rep. 451, was an information for smuggling salt which had been seized. The Attorney-General v. Key , 1 C. & J. 159, 148 Eng. Rep. 1375. An information for penalties (treble value) for 'harbouring' and concealing smuggled goods. See also The Attorney General v. Courtice , 9 Price, 450, 147 Eng. Rep. 147; The Attorney General v. Vew Llette , 10 Price, 9, 147 Eng. Rep. 225; The Attorney-General v. Freer , 11 Price, 183, 147 Eng. Rep. 441; The Attorney-General v. Bevington , 11 Price, 222, 147 Eng. Rep. 454; The Attorney General v. Tongue , 12 Price, 51, 147 Eng. Rep. 653; The Attorney General v. Woolhouse , 12 Price, 65, 147 Eng. Rep. 657; The Attorney-General v. Hatton , M'Cle. 214 148 Eng. Rep. 91; The Attorney- General v. Good, , M'Cle. & Yo. 286, 148 Eng. Rep. 421; The Attorney-General v. Barrell , 1 Y. & L. 495, 148 Eng. Rep 766; The Attorney-General v. Key , 1 C. & J. 159, 148 Eng. Rep. 1375; The Attorney-General v. Siddon , 1 C. & J. 220, 148 Eng. Rep. 1400; The Attorney General v. Slee , M'Cle. 567, 148 Eng. Rep. 237; The Attorney-General v. Key , 2 C. & J. 2, 149 Eng. Rep. 1; The Attorney-General v. Dyer , 2 C. & M. 664, 149 Eng. Rep. 927; The Attorney General v. Tomsett , 2 C. M. & R. 170, 150 Eng. Rep. 73; The Attorney-General v. Kenifeck , 2 M. & W. 715, 150 Eng. Rep. 944; The Attorney General v. Hurel , 11 M. & W. 585, 152 Eng. Rep. 938; The Attorney-General v. Lockwood , 9 M. & W. 378, 152 Eng. Rep. 160; The Attorney-General v. Bailey , 16 M. & W. 74, 153 Eng. Rep. 1104. See also Hale's Pleas of the Crown, vol. I, pp. 493, 530; Gilbert, a Treatise on the Court of the Exchequer, 62- 64.
­FN 16. " 'Actions qui tam are such as are given by acts of parliament, which impose a penalty, and create a forfeiture for the neglect of some duty, or commission of some crime, to be recovered by action or information, at the suit of him who prosecutes as well in the king's name as in his own.' (Bacon's Abridgement, 5th ed. col. 1, p. 61.) Bacon says that most penal statutes directed that the penalty might be recovered by action or information, and 'a new trial may be had after a verdict for the defendant. Wilson v. Rastall, 4 Term. Rep. 753,' (idem. italics added), and 'Such information may demand what is due to the informer, without mentioning what is due to the king; also, if the quantum depend on what shall be found by the jury, a blank may be left for the sum,' (idem. 63. Italics added) and 'Also where a statute limits suits by an informer qui tam to other courts, yet any one may, by construction of law, exhibit an information in the Exchequer for the whole penalty, for the use of the king,' (idem. 65) and 'If the jury find a general verdict with one penalty for the plaintiff, and he apply it to one count, he shall not be permitted afterwards to apply it to another count. ...' (idem. 69.) 3 Bl. Com. 258, 259; Kent's Commentaries, 13th ed. vol. I, pp. 375-378.
­FN 17. "The procedure under the common law in the Court of Exchequer for the forfeiture of property used in violation of law was similar to that prescribed by the Health and Safety Code. The Attorney General v. Lade , Parker, 57, 145 Eng. Rep. 712; Malden v. Bartlett , Parker, 105, 145 Eng. Rep. 727; 13 & 14 Chas. II, c. 11, s. 28; 31 Eliz. c. 5, s. 5; 3 Geo. III, c. 22, s. 1, 6; 6 Geo. III, c. 19, s. 3, 4, 6, 10; 21 Geo. III, c. 37, s. 6, 7, 8, 9; 26 Geo. III, c. 77, s. 13; 45 Geo. III, c. 121, s. 13, 14.
­FN 19. "See also Garnhart v. U.S., 16 Wall (U.S.) 162 [21 L.Ed. 275, 276]; The J. W. French, 13 F. 916, 924; 651 Chests of Tea v. United States, 1 Paine (U.S. Cir.Ct.) 499; United States v. Yamoto, 9 Cir., 50 F.2d 599.
­FN 20. "See same case below Colon v. Lisk, 13 App.Div. 195 [43 N.Y.S. 364].
­FN 22. "The statute provided that the return of seizure should be tried without a jury. The lower court forfeited the automobile of the appellant because her husband drove it with a pint of whiskey in his pocket. She did not know that her husband carried the whiskey in the car.
­FN 23. "See also Lorance v. State, (Tex. Civ. App.) 172 S.W.2d 386; Donovan v. Mayor etc. of Vicksburg, 29 Miss. 247, 249 [64 Am.Dec. 143].
­FN 24. "See State v. Intoxicating Liquor, 55 Vt. 82; State v. Certain Intoxicating Liquors, 53 Utah 171 [177 P. 235].
­FN 25. "See Moore v. Brett, 193 Okla. 627 [137 P.2d 539, 540]; People v. One Pinball Machine, 316 Ill.App. 161 [44 N.E.2d 950, 957].
­FN 26. "Norris's Appeal, 64 Pa. 275, 280.
­FN 27. "Donahue v. Meister, 88 Cal. 121, 127 [25 P. 1096, 22 Am.St.Rep. 283]; Cassel v. Gregori, 28 Cal.App.2d Supp. 769, 774 [70 P.2d 721].
­FN 28. "Colon v. Lisk, 13 App.Div. 195, 202 [43 N.Y.S. 364, 369]; State v. 1920 Studebaker, 120 Ore. 254 [251 P. 701, 50 A.L.R. 81].
­FN 29. "Wood v. City of Brooklyn, 14 Barb. 425, 432; Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed. vol. I, pp. 668- 674. Cf. Moore v. Purse Seine Net, 18 Cal.2d 835, 837 [118 P.2d 1].
­FN 30. "4 Bl. Com. (12th ed.), ch. 20, 281 et seq.
SCOCAL, People v. One 1941 Chevrolet Coupe , 37 Cal.2d 283 available at: (https://scocal.stanford.edu/opinion/people-v-one-1941-chevrolet-coupe-26367) (last visited Sunday April 21, 2019).

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