Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2d/220/423.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 01:53:36+00:00

Document:
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. WALTER RAYMOND DEMES, Defendant and Appellant.
Morris Lavine for Defendant and Appellant.
Stanley Mosk, Attorney General, William E. James, Assistant Attorney General, and S. Clark Moore, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
In this, the last of three trials, Demes was convicted by a jury of murdering one Browse and of assault with a deadly weapon with intent to murder Adam Safian, a police officer. The first trial resulted in a jury disagreement. At the second trial Demes and his codefendant, Kerfoot, were convicted of both offenses charged in the information. Kerfoot abandoned his appeal. The judgment as to Demes, however, was reversed by this court because of certain procedural errors violative of due process and the reception of inadmissible evidence prejudicial to Demes. (184 Cal. App. 2d 622 [7 Cal. Rptr. 674], sub nom. People v. Kerfoot.) The present appeal is from the judgment and the order denying a new [220 Cal. App. 2d 429] trial, the latter having been made before the effective date of the 1961 amendment to section 1237, Penal Code. An attempted appeal from certain nonappealable orders designated in the notice of appeal must be dismissed.
In conformity with the views of this court on the prior appeal, and at Demes' request for such representation, present counsel was appointed to defend him at the third trial. Defendant personally entered a plea of once in jeopardy. Following the denial of preliminary motions and defendant's admission of the two prior felony convictions alleged in the information, the matter proceeded to trial some two months after the substitution of present counsel. The trial was a lengthy one--the reporter's transcript exceeds 2,500 pages. Upon the denial of a new trial, defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment; the court also made a finding that defendant was an habitual criminal.
"Nathan Fram and Leland Browse were working in Fram's liquor store on Hollywood Boulevard at about 1:20 a.m. or 1:25 a.m. on January 26, 1959. Kerfoot entered the store with a gun in his hand and Fram told him to put the gun away and to get out. Kerfoot went towards Browse and demanded the money. Fram walked behind the counter and saw Adam Safian, a policeman, starting to enter the store. Browse called to Safian, 'Watch this man, he's got a gun!' Kerfoot turned around and started shooting. Browse ran out of the store and Fram heard guns firing. Safian was hit twice and fell backwards. Safian saw that the gun Kerfoot had was a .22 or .25 calibre. Browse was shot and fell down and Kerfoot ran around the corner. Safian fired several shots at Kerfoot as he ran. Kerfoot got into a 1954 or 1955 Pontiac automobile on the passenger's side. The car started moving before the car door closed. Two shots were fired at the car by Safian.
"At about 10 or 15 minutes before 2 a.m. the defendants returned to the bar where they had previously been and were served a drink. They stayed at the bar until between 2:15 and 2:30 a.m. at which time they walked north to Hollywood Boulevard with the bartender.
"At about 2:30 a.m. on January 26, 1959, Officer Kjorlien saw a Pontiac automobile parked near 6709 Selma Street. He noticed a crease on the car over the rear window which appeared to have been made by a bullet. fn.  Officer Seela arrived and opened the trunk of the car and found therein a .38 calibre revolver. The car was locked up again. At about 3:55 a.m. the defendants were walking in a westerly direction on Selma Avenue in the general direction of the Pontiac car. [220 Cal. App. 2d 431] One of the defendants said, 'There it is.' When they reached the parked automobile they kept on walking and turned north on Highland Avenue. The officers followed and saw the defendants standing back of some bushes. The defendants were ordered by the police (who identified themselves as such) to come out with their hands in the air. A second command was given and Kerfoot came to the sidewalk and after a further command Demes came out. The defendants were handcuffed and taken to the vicinity of the parked Pontiac car. Some keys were removed from Demes' pocket which unlocked the doors and the ignition of the Pontiac car. The defendants were taken to the police station. Keys were taken from Kerfoot's pocket which also unfastened the car locks. Two live .22 calibre shells were also found in Kerfoot's pockets.
"Officer Hancock found a pair of sunglasses in the Pontiac car which contained a thumb print which matched a thumb print of Kerfoot. On January 28, 1959, at the rear of 6709 Selma Street, Hancock found a .22 calibre revolver lying under some asparagus fern bushes. Near the gun were some heel prints. A plaster cast of one of the heel prints was taken and later compared with the heel of one of Kerfoot's shoes.
A most favorable comparison was noted. The trousers of Kerfoot contained some particles of asparagus fern leaves."
 As noted at the outset, the present proceeding was the third time Demes stood trial for the offenses charged; he now contends that he was twice placed in jeopardy because the jury at the first trial assertedly failed to vote on his guilt or innocence and because he was denied the benefit of counsel at the second trial. There is merit to neither contention. The jeopardy defense is not available if the jury is discharged for some recognized proper cause. Section 1141 of the Penal Code provides that "the cause may be again tried" where a jury "is discharged or prevented from giving a verdict by reason of an accident or other cause"; and section 1140 of the same code declares that "the jury cannot be discharged after the cause is submitted to them ... unless, at the expiration of such time as the court may deem proper, it satisfactorily appears that there is no reasonable probability that the jury can agree." The record of the proceedings at the first trial reveals that the jury foreman, in response to the court's questions, stated that seven ballots had been taken; that "right from the first there has been practically no division, no separation from the first ballot"; that "a vote was taken and it was unanimous that we could not come to a decision." After further colloquy between the court and the foreman, a mistrial was declared and the jury discharged.  Although it has been observed that the jurors should ordinarily be questioned individually as to the probability or otherwise of reaching a verdict (Paulson v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 1, 7 [22 Cal. Rptr. 649, 372 P.2d 641]), the statute specifies no [220 Cal. App. 2d 434] particular procedure and the final decision is in effect left to the court's broad discretion.
 In answer to Demes' specific contention that no vote was taken on his guilt or innocence, the record discloses this additional colloquy between the court and the jury foreman: "THE COURT: Have you considered the defendant in your deliberations? THE FOREMAN: We considered Mr. Demes, very much so. THE COURT: Have you balloted on him? THE FOREMAN: It was on both of them we were balloting on."
 Likewise unsustainable is the claim that defendant was placed in jeopardy at the second trial because he was there and then denied the benefit of counsel. Again no authority is cited for this novel contention. Section 1262 of the Penal Code, amended in 1951, provides that a reversal shall be deemed an order for a new trial unless the appellate court shall otherwise direct; on the former appeal this court did not "otherwise direct" and defendant, accordingly, was not entitled to a discharge. See 1 Witkin, California Crimes, section 215, page 205. Too, the United States Supreme Court is apparently not of the view defendant has asked us to adopt; thus, in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 [83 [220 Cal. App. 2d 435] S.Ct. 792, 9 L. Ed. 2d 799] (March 18, 1963) a reversal was ordered on grounds similar to those advanced on the prior appeal herein, but the opinion is devoid of any suggestion that the defendant could not be tried again.
 There is no merit to defendant's next contention that his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment (U.S. Const.) were violated by the reception of evidence establishing a conspiracy, a crime not charged in the information. Such evidence was admitted under the theory that he and Kerfoot conspired to commit a series of robberies which culminated in the crimes upon which they were brought to trial. It has been consistently held that a conspiracy need not be pleaded if the evidence actually shows the existence of one. See People v. Pike, 58 Cal. 2d 70, 87 [22 Cal. Rptr. 664, 372 P.2d 656], and cases there cited.
 The Pike case also answers the companion claim that it was error to admit evidence of the Nevada and Arizona robberies. There it was likewise argued that certain robberies "were not charged in the information, and hence ... the admission of evidence relating thereto deprived him of a fair trial"; but, the Supreme Court pointed out that "The subject evidence ... was not offered to show a general criminal disposition, but to establish that armed robberies were committed by Pike while the two defendants were together ... shortly before the attempted armed robbery of the Lucky store and the shooting of Officer Kent. The evidence 'tends logically and by reasonable inference' to establish that fact [citation], and hence was admissible to show the common design of the criminal enterprise undertaken by the defendants. [Citations.]" (People v. Pike, supra, 58 Cal. 2d 70, 89.) In the instant case there was sufficient similarity between the prior robberies and the crimes charged in the information to indicate a common plan, pattern or scheme. In each instance [220 Cal. App. 2d 437] the defendant and Kerfoot obtained (or attempted to obtain) money--Kerfoot took affirmative action while defendant stood by. In the Arizona robbery it could be inferred that defendant acted as a lookout; in the subject attempted robbery he performed the same role and also drove the get-away car. Too, evidence of scheme or plan may be shown by the theft of a pistol (in this case, the Reno burglary) and its subsequent use in an attack upon a person (People v. Sykes, 44 Cal. 2d 166, 170 [280 P.2d 769]); and in this connection it has been held that a similarity of the stolen gun to that used in a subsequent robbery will support an inference that defendant had stolen the gun for the felonious purposes later carried out. (People v. Kostal, 159 Cal. App. 2d 444, 450-451 [323 P.2d 1020].) Finally, there is no merit to the point that the prior offenses were committed in other states and therefore evidence pertaining thereto was inadmissible. Neither reason nor authority supports such a far-stretched argument.
[14b] The following circumstances establish the existence of reasonable grounds for the belief there and then entertained by the officers. Officer Kjorlien arrived at the scene of the shooting about 1:30 a.m. He was told that a blue and gray car, possibly a Pontiac, was involved; that it had silver and blue (possibly Nevada) license plates; that shots had been fired at the vehicle. Subsequently the officer was given the description that it was a 1954 or 1955 Pontiac with a gray top and blue on the sides. At approximately 2 a.m. he saw a 1955 Pontiac at 6709 Selma; there were ricochet marks on the top of the car. Officer Seela, who unlocked the trunk, testified that he saw the car at approximately 3 a.m.; it was a two-toned 1955 Pontiac, bearing Nevada license plates. He could find no registration slip on the steering wheel. Further investigation revealed that the radiator was warm, and there was a ricochet mark (as described by Officer Kjorlien). In the above state of the record, it must be held that the several items uncovered by the search were properly received in evidence.
 Defendant complains of certain instructions given the jury. First, on the subject of double jeopardy the court informed the jury that while they were exclusive judges of the facts pointing to defendant's guilt or innocence, an exception arose in the case of the special plea of once in jeopardy. The court then stated: "For purposes of this trial I instruct you with respect to the plea of once in jeopardy that it is not jeopardy where the jury in the first trial did not reach a verdict or verdicts and where it appeared to the trial court in the first trial that there was no reasonable probability that the jury could agree on a verdict or verdicts. In such a case the trial court may declare a mistrial and the case may be retried. It would be extremely difficult, it seems to me, for a jury of laymen to determine such an issue. The jury can resolve the conflicts of evidence and make its determination as to the facts, however, whether or not the facts as so determined establish once in jeopardy presents what is practically a pure question of law. Upon the evidence it is, in my opinion, both as a matter of law and fact, that no verdict or final determination of any issue was ever reached in the first trial and obviously no verdict was ever declared or rendered or recorded in the court in the first trial.
"I therefore advise you to find for the People and against [220 Cal. App. 2d 439] the defendant on this issue. I am required to inform you, and do so, that you do not have to accept this advice and are free to disregard it if you wish because the final judgment in this matter must be yours."
The court did not err in giving the challenged instruction. While he commented on the evidence, as was his privilege (People v. Scott, 53 Cal. 2d 558, 564 [2 Cal. Rptr. 274, 348 P.2d 882]), he left the special plea to the jury for its determination and told them they were not obliged to follow his advice. For a similar situation see People v. Finch, 213 Cal. App. 2d 752, 761-762, [29 Cal. Rptr. 420].
 Certain procedures were followed by the trial court, after the case had been given to the jury, which defendant now claims constituted error. On the third day of their deliberations, the jury stated to the court that they had reached agreement as to one of the verdicts but not as to the others. They requested the reading of the testimony of four witnesses, including that of the defendant. The entire testimony of a prosecution witness, Polly Fornoff, was then read. Immediately after this reading, the jury was taken to lunch; upon their return, the court was advised (through the bailiff) that they did not desire to have any additional testimony read. There was no objection to this procedure by the defendant, his counsel or the prosecution. There appears to be no requirement that the judge have all testimony reread after the jury has indicated that they have heard as much as they desire to hear. (People v. Warren, 130 Cal. 678, 681-682 [63 P. 87].) Too, the failure of defendant or his counsel to object is proof enough of the incident's unimportance. It seems to be suggested by the defendant that the jury's decision not to hear additional testimony should have been communicated in open court; however, any possible prejudice (and we see [220 Cal. App. 2d 440] none) was waived by defendant's silent acquiescence in the procedure followed.
 As his next assignment of error, defendant asserts that there was an unlawful communication between the court and the jury; he further contends that the court committed error in refusing to allow him to show such communication. The background facts (developed on the motion for new trial) are as follows: The foreman gave one of the two bailiffs a note, telling the bailiff that the note was to the effect that they were deadlocked. The bailiff then told the trial judge that the jury had a written statement and that they were deadlocked. Asked by defense counsel if the court cared to give his recollection of the episode, the trial judge stated: "The Court's recollection is that this bailiff did come to the Court in the afternoon and advised the Court that the jury had sounded one bell, and that the bailiff then said he went into the jury room, and that he came back into the chambers and advised the Court that he had received a bell, and the Court asked the bailiff whether or not the jury had arrived at a verdict, and he said, 'No,' that the jury wanted to direct some communication to the Court. The Court then stated to the bailiff that this is a matter that was on trial for many, many weeks and that we had, I believe, at that time some case on the calendar--I said to merely advise the jurors to resume their deliberations and 'We will get in touch with them later.' "
Subsequently, the court suggested a stipulation from counsel that he (the court) did not receive any note from the jurors. To this suggestion, defense counsel stated: "Yes, I am willing to include that. Of course, I am willing to include that in the stipulation, but I do wish to make an offer of proof that if this witness were permitted to testify and state the facts, and if he were permitted to produce the note, that there was a note prepared, signed by ten jurors, and that that note set forth that the other two jurors were in some respect in violation of their oaths as jurors, and that there were other matters contained in the note."
Since defense counsel stipulated that the court did not receive a note from the jury, it is difficult to understand the basis of the instant assignment (of error) that there was an unlawful communication between court and jury. It seems to be argued that the trial judge was duty-bound to call the jury into court and ascertain the contents of the note; but the provisions of section 1138 of the Penal Code, governing [220 Cal. App. 2d 441] here, do not call for any such action unless there is disagreement among the jurors as to testimony or if they desire to be informed on any point of law. In view of the foregoing facts and law, the court did not err in denying defense efforts to establish such communication.
 Defendant next contends that the court erroneously adjudged him an habitual criminal; he argues that he was not so charged in the information and that the court erred in taking testimony as to his habitual criminality. The points are without merit, having been expressly rejected in precedent decisions. The information in the instant case is precise insofar as it alleges prior convictions (two in number), the jurisdiction in which each was rendered, the date of each conviction and the service of a prison term pursuant thereto. Furthermore, defendant in open court expressly admitted the matters just mentioned. See People v. Williams, 193 Cal. App. 2d 394 [14 Cal. Rptr. 279], and cases there cited.
 The next contention pertains to the asserted supression of evidence by the prosecution, namely, the Pontiac car used by defendant. But the record shows that he consented to [220 Cal. App. 2d 443] its removal from California to Nevada. Too, photographs were taken of the vehicle and they were available at the trial. There is no merit to the instant claim.
 An examination of the evidence refutes the next assignment (of error) that the court erred in holding that the corpus delicti of murder had been established. The summary of facts, earlier summarized, and competent medical testimony compel no other conclusion than that the victim died from a gunshot wound received during the attempted robbery in question.
 Defendant's final claim charges the prosecutor with prejudicial misconduct in having Kerfoot "paraded" before the jury. At various times, he points out, Kerfoot was brought into court and identified by various witnesses. But, it appears, defense counsel likewise chose to bring in Kerfoot and use him in the manner presently criticized. Complaint cannot, therefore, be made of the prosecutor's tactics, particularly since no objection was made thereto during the course of the trial.
The judgment and order are affirmed; all other purported appeals are dismissed.

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