Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/103556/eaton-vs-city-tulsa
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 05:01:34+00:00

Document:
1. The single isolated usage of street vernacular, not directed at the judge or any officer of the court, cannot constitutionally support the contempt conviction, since, under the circumstances, it did not "constitute an imminent . . . threat to the administration of justice." Craig v. Harney, 331 U. S. 367 , 331 U. S. 376 .
Craig v. Harney, 331 U. S. 367 , 331 U. S. 376 (1947). In using the explective in answering the question on cross-examination.
Holt v. Virginia, 381 U. S. 131 , 381 U. S. 136 (1965); see also In re Little, 404 U. S. 553 (1972). In the circumstances, the use of the explective thus cannot be held to "constitute an imminent . . . threat to the administration of justice."
* Assuming, arguendo, (1) that the information sufficiently charged petitioner for both use of the explective and his allegedly "discourteous responses," and (2) that there was evidence of the latter offense, reversal is still required, since the record fails to "negate the possibility," Street v. New York, 394 U. S. 576 , 394 U. S. 588 (1969), that the conviction was based solely or in part on the use of the explective.
Ibid. Cf. Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359 (1931); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516 (1945); Bachellar v. Maryland, 397 U. S. 564 (1970). And this principle is not limited, nor should it be, to cases in which the conviction may have been based on protected speech. See Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U. S. 287 , 317 U. S. 291 -292 (1942). Here, the "Judgment and Sentence" not only does not dispel the possibility that petitioner's conviction was based solely or partially on the use of the explective, but plainly supports the opposite conclusion.
Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U. S. 269 , 317 U. S. 281 (1942). See Stroble v. California, 343 U. S. 181 , 343 U. S. 198 (1952).
"THE WHITENESS: That's fine. I don't feel as though I need to put up with why I received this. "
Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U. S. 196 (1948), was a very different case from the instant one. There, the petitioners were tried under an information charging them only with a violation of a section of a state statute making it an offense to promote an unlawful assemblage during a labor dispute. The trial court had instructed the jury on that section, and the jury had returned a conviction. On appeal to the Supreme Court of Arkansas, petitioners had contended that the section of the state statute violated the Constitution. Without passing on that question, the State Supreme Court sustained petitioners' convictions on the grounds that the information charged and the evidence showed that petitioners had violated an entirely different section of the same statute, which proscribed the distinct offense of using force and violence to prevent a person from engaging in a lawful vocation. This Court reversed, noting that the trial judge had, at the request of the prosecutor, read the former section to the jury and had instructed that the " offense . . . on trial in this case'" is the "`promoting, encouraging or aiding of such unlawful assemblage by concert of action among the defendants as is charged in the information here.'" Id. at 333 U. S. 199 .
Here we have no basis to conclude with any degree of certainty that the petitioner's contempt conviction rests solely on the use of the explective. Both Street v. New York, 394 U. S. 576 (1969), and Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U. S. 287 (1942), were cases where al of the relevant lower court proceedings were incorporated in the record before this Court, and ambiguity was present despite that fact. [ Footnote 2 ] Here, however, there is no such ambiguity arising out of a full record; there is instead a total absence of any record of the trial which resulted in the conviction which the Court now reverses. I have no doubt that a majority of this Court would refuse to reverse petitioner's conviction in this case if it had a full record before it and the record indicated that, at the contempt hearing, the trial judge had made it clear to petitioner that he was being charged with contempt based on the course of conduct beginning with his use of the explective and ending with his discourteous remarks to the judge. Whatever the force of Street and Williams on their own facts, where ambiguity was present despite the fact that there was a full record available in this Court, I would not extend them to reach this case, where petitioner has failed to preserve a full record of what transpired below.

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