Source: https://ipmall.law.unh.edu/content/ttab-trademark-trial-and-appeal-board-1-amsted-industries-incorporated-v-west-coast-wire
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 09:58:18+00:00

Document:
Opposition No. 70,015, to application Serial No. 438,554, filed August 9, 1983.
Harris Zimmerman for West Coast Wire Rope & Rigging, Inc.
*2 The record in this case consists of the file of the opposed application and trial testimony on behalf of opposer, including thirty-one numbered exhibits introduced in connection with this testimony. Both parties filed briefs and both participated in an oral argument of the issues at a hearing held for this purpose.
A rather unusual aspect of how color is generally applied to one or more strands of wire rope as an industry practice was the subject of considerable testimony and evidence. Even though the third-party registrations attached to applicant's brief are not in evidence, supra, note 4, there is no doubt, on opposer's record, that a number of suppliers of wire rope utilize one or more distinctively colored wire rope strands to serve as indications of origin and have registered these indicia as trademarks. [FN6] The coloring of the strands of the steel wire--in its normal state 'steel' colored--, is accomplished by adding color to the lubricant which covers one or more of the strands. [FN7] As the testimony also relates, what happens appearancewise to wire rope during normal usage by customers is that movement under pressure of the wire rope in the customer's equipment causes uncolored lubricant (usually black) to smear over the outer surface. As a result, the color strand trademarks tend to be obscured.
*3 Although the point was disputed by applicant, opposer's evidence also establishes that a strand having a light color is less apt to be obscured by smearing than a dark color. Thus, the visibility of the yellow strand marking on opposer's wire rope is more apt to be retained, whereas strand colors less visible than yellow, e.g., dark greens, tend to be obscured to greater degree by smearing of the lubricant.
Since applicant put on no witnesses and introduced no evidence, the only admissible information in the record before us disclosing the characteristics of West Coast Wire's green and yellow strand trademark are the drawing in the application file, the description of the mark, and photographs submitted by applicant as specimens. [FN8] We do not know why neither applicant nor opposer introduced actual examples of their products as exhibits in this proceeding, but we do not have any before us. In this regard, the photographic specimens in the application file are of no assistance whatsoever. These photographs are so poor in quality, whether due to fading or some other cause, that it is impossible even to verify from them whether the colored strands are green and yellow, much less to determine the actual shade or hue of the colors in the photographed section of wire rope.
The marks of the parties being orange bands must, notwithstanding any differences in shade or configuration, be considered identical.
*4 The record clearly supports opposer's prior use both of a red strand and the literal equivalent, 'RED-STRAND' as trademarks for wire rope of its manufacture; . . . that notwithstanding applicant's assertions as to the brightness of the color red because of the lubrication process employed on the wire rope, opposer's registrations describe the mark as red, the mark 'RED-THREAD' enhances this description, and opposer's markings on its reels as well as in its product literature unquestionably depicts a readily discernible red cord; and that as a consequence of extensive use and presentation of opposer and its predecessor of the red strand of its wire rope as well as of the word mark 'RED-STRAND' over a considerable period of time, it is an inescapable conclusion that distributors and users of a red strand in wire rope as identifying goods emanating exclusively from opposer with the result that opposer possesses a valuable goodwill and property right therein.
Obviously, having no reliable evidence in the case before us concerning the actual color of applicant's green and yellow strand trademark as it has been used, we have no choice as to whether we should or should not depart from the principle that the description and drawing control. However, that circumstance is not unique to this case because under our practice, an applicant for registration is not obliged in defending against an opposition to registration to submit any evidence in the case, in which event, the burden is still on opposer to establish that it has standing to oppose and that allowance of the registration based on what the application file discloses would be contrary to the statute. See, e.g., Balston, Inc. v. Finite Filter Co., 212 USPQ 210 (TTAB 1981). Thus, in the instant case, as well as in others which may come before us, we may only have the drawing and the description of the mark as set forth in the application to evidence the characteristics of the mark, including the colors, to compare with opposer's registration and/or use in determining the likelihood of confusion issue.
*5 While the record herein indicates that opposer is not claiming a monopoly for color markings on pipes or that it would be entitled to any such monopoly, it does appear from the record that applicant's position that the color gold is readily distinguishable from the color orange is not well taken. Reference to a standard unabridged dictionary shows that the colors orange and gold are both combinations of red and yellow and that the color orange may vary in its hue, saturation and brilliance. Further, opposer's record reveals that its color mark does vary greatly, both as used and in the advertising thereof, from a deep reddish orange to a light orange. The latter color is virtually indistinguishable from the color gold.
149 USPQ at 657-8. Similarly, in the case before us, the color of the green colored strand subject of West Coast Wire's application may vary in its hue, saturation and brilliance. This is highly significant because the color green is that part of the spectrum lying between blue and yellow, and at the yellow end of spectrum there are only insignificant differences between the hues designated as greenish yellow, yellow green, and yellowish green. See, G & C. Merriam, WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, 449 and plate opposite (Unabridged, 1976). Thus, the green of applicant's mark might be yellowish green, in which case the difference between it and registrant's yellow strand trademark would be insignificant when the wire rope is viewed by a prospective purchaser or by a user.
In arguing that confusion is likely in the case before us, opposer has emphasized four points: (i) that applicant, being a newcomer, had a duty to select a mark which does not impinge upon the rights established by other existing participants in the same area of commerce; (ii) that the pairing of yellow and green strands by applicant happens to be a pairing of colors in which the yellow color predominates; (iii) that the green color selected by applicant is apt to be unnoticed in many viewing situations because of the smearing of the lubricant routinely applied to wire rope when it is put to use; and (iv) that opposer's use of green in combination with yellow on reels and in advertising and promotional pieces constitutes a trade dress by which opposer has identified itself to the wire rope trade.
None of the latter three arguments is persuasive. Whereas opposer may consider yellow to be dominant as compared to green there is no objective evidence that this is the fact in the record before us and the argument seems only to be based a natural bias of opposer that, since it uses yellow, yellow must be the most noticeable color in any other setting.
We are also not persuaded by the fact that the green color may be less noticeable when there is smearing of the colors by lubricant applied to the wire rope in its use. The smearing effect occurs and would have an effect on the confusion issue only after purchase. While we are not, of course, limited in our determination of the issue to confusion of purchasers and may, in appropriate circumstances, also consider the likelihood of mistake in the products' use, see, e.g., Hercules Incorporated v. National Starch and Chemical Corporation, 223 USPQ 1244, 1247, note 10 (TTAB 1984), we nevertheless do not believe that the possible obscuring of the color trademarks can fairly be treated as a factor supporting the likelihood of mistake in the products' use. The reason is clear from the testimony of opposer's witness Spaulding on cross-examination. In discussing the smearing effect, Spaulding indicated that sometimes, after black lubricant of the kind used by Broderick & Bascom, has smeared over the surface of the wire rope following its use, it is necessary to get close to the wire rope in order to see the color and even, in some cases, to open the wire strands up with a spike in order to see the color marking in between the strands. (Spaulding deposition, 50-51, XQ 240 to XQ246.) It is apparent from this testimony and from other testimony of both witnesses that users of wire rope are careful in the interest of safety when using these products. Thus, where there is doubt about the wire rope that is being used, a close inspection would be made in order to ascertain the kind of wire rope to be used for a particular purpose. This would also be the case in distinguishing between different types of rope manufactured by opposer. Thus, opposer sells both the YELLOW STRAND brand wire rope, marked with a single yellow strand, and POWERSTEEL wire rope, marked with two adjacent yellow strands. POWERSTEEL wire rope is expressly designed for heavy duty applications. Consequently, it would be important for users of Broderick & Bascom's wire rope to be able to distinguish between the wire rope having a single yellow strand and the same product having the two yellow strands in order to be sure not to use wire rope of insufficient strength. Obviously, black lubricant on opposer's own wire rope might also lead to confusion between the two types except for the careful inspection which discriminating users would make, as Mr. Spaulding testified. Accordingly, we do not believe mistake in the products' use is likely.
*6 Finally, while we agree that opposer has established on the record that its use of green as part of the trade dress for its product, i.e. on the reels, and in advertising and promotional materials has been extensive, this aspect would only be relevant to the question of registration to the extent that the trade dress was a factor in corroborating bad faith on the part of applicant in adopting its green and yellow strand trademark. Thus, while an allegedly confusingly similar trade dress might give rise to a claim of unfair competition based on a collocation of all features, including the marks and the associated trade dress, such a claim is beyond the jurisdiction of this Board. See, e.g., Stouffer Corporation v. Health Valley Natural Foods, Inc., 1 USPQ 2d 1900, 1903, note 5 (TTAB 1986). As for intent, we find no evidence in this record to support an inference that applicant's green and yellow trademark was adopted in bad faith. Accordingly, there is nothing to corroborate, and the trade dress is otherwise irrelevant.
Insofar as the nature of the use of colored strands in the wire products field is concerned, it is not disputed that it is the custom, as previously indicated, for manufacturers to use different colors for application to their wire rope or cable for identification purposes and that purchasers do recognize the individual colors as source indicia. Considering, however, the limited number of prime colors available for use, it is apparent that a new manufacturer of wire rope, if he is to follow the practice in the trade as he has a right to do, is obligated to utilize secondary colors or combinations of colors, as applicant has done, to identify and distinguish his goods in the trade. If the latter course is chosen, it is likely that one of the colors would be that previously adopted and utilized by itself by a competitor on its goods. This color selection process would normally be known to purchasers and prospective purchasers of wire rope who, because of the very character of the product and the uses to which it is generally applied, would be informed and knowledgeable persons making their selection with care and deliberation. To this scenario must be added our view that applicant's mark is a combination of the colors red and yellow; that the commercial impression is engendered by the use of the color yellow as well as by the color red; and that, in conclusion, applicant's mark is sufficiently different in its field from opposer's 'RED-STRAND' mark so as to preclude confusion in trade as to the source of the goods sold thereunder.
FN1. Serial No. 438,554, filed August 9, 1983, claiming use since June 30, 1983.
and is described in the registration as consisting of the 'yellow marking of one of the helical strands of the rope.' In the drawing, the mark is lined to show the color yellow.
FN3. Registration No. 551,915, issued December 11, 1951, to Broderick & Bascom Rope Company; affidavit § 8 accepted, § 15 received; renewed; record title in Amsted pursuant to status and title copy introduced as exhibit 9 during trial testimony of Donald A. Burns, infra.
FN4. Since applicant took no testimony and introduced no evidence in this proceeding, the affirmative defenses are given no further consideration. For the same reason, the thirty-seven registration copies attached to the answer in reference to one of those pleaded defenses are not evidence of record and have not been considered. See, Trademark Rule 37 CFR § 2.123(1) (1986).
FN5. For example, 1985 'Rigger's Handbook' (exhibit 1)--green and yellow front and back covers and yellow (background) featuring throughout; picture of green and yellow reel on front; 1973 'Rigger's Handbook' (exhibit 2) with the identical coloring; 1985 'Yellow Strand Wire Rope Handbook' (exhibit 3)--green and yellow front and back covers and yellow (background) featuring throughout; picture of yellow and green reel in August 1982 sales brochure (exhibit 4); same (exhibit 11); picture of green and yellow reel and green and yellow masthead in July 1951 issue of 'The Yellow Strand' (exhibit 12); same, Sept. 1950 issue (exhibit 13); picture of green and yellow reel on cover of April 1938 'The Yellow Strand' (exhibit 14); 1966 'Wire Rope Handbook' (exhibit 16)-- green and yellow front and back covers and yellow (outline) featuring throughout, picture of green and yellow reel on cover of 'Yellow Strand Wire Rope Application Handbook' (exhibit 17); same on 1982 print ad (exhibit 18); picture of green and yellow reel with candles in 1976 100th year anniversary ad (exhibits 27a-d); green and yellow tag affixed to reel when shipped (exhibit 28); hard-hat decal depicting green and yellow reel (exhibit 30); and promotional calendars for 1966, 1967, 1969 and 1970, depicting green and yellow reel (exhibit 31a-d). In most of the items on which the reel is depicted, either the yellow strand of opposer's YELLOW STRAND wire rope or the double yellow strand of its POWERSTEEL wire rope is clearly visible.
FN6. This fact was pled by opposer and admitted in applicant's answer (para. 11). It is also demonstrated graphically by opposer's exhibit 11, a four-page brochure of the American Iron and Steel Institute promoting steel wire rope made in the United States of America. In this brochure, twelve brands of different U.S. manufacturers, including Broderick & Bascom's YELLOW STRAND brand, each marked with a single or double colored strand, are depicted.
FN7. Wire rope is lubricated in order to reduce loss of strength due to abrasion of the strands against one another when in use. Additional lubricant must be applied after the original lubricant has squeezed out and rubbed off in use.
XQ290 Have you seen any reels that didn't have the West Coast name on it?
XQ292 What did it have?
A Just said wire rope and had the tag on it.
XQ And what did the tag indicate?
A It did not reference to West Coast wire rope or to any other manufacturer that I was able to identify.
XQ How do you know it was a West Coast product?
A I was told that it was a West Coast product by Mr. Pete Dunabeck.
XQ There was nothing on the product itself that indicated to you who the manufacturer or distributor was?
XQ So, therefore, your sole testimony today in connection with this particular incident is based on what someone else told you where the product came from, is that correct?
A Pretty much so. I was told by Mr. Dunabeck that he had painted out the reference to West Coast wire rope on the reel . . . .
Confirming Spaulding's testimony, the photographs introduced as exhibits bear no visible markings other than 'Acme Rigging Supply' on what appear to be steel bands holding the wire rope together. There is no other evidence on the point.
Applicant also objected to use of the photographs to 'fairly represent the appearance of wire rope having such colored strands.' (Opposer's brief, 1; applicant's brief, 3.) In that Spaulding had used a relatively inexpensive 35 millimeter camera, and took the photographs with a flash rather than in natural light, we agree that in addition to the hearsay objection as to whether the wire rope is that of applicant, the photographs would not in any case have been very reliable evidence to show the actual appearance e.g., to show shade or hue.
FN9. It may be added that, whereas we are required to determine the issue before us based on the limited descriptions and lining now provided in our rules of practice, we think that some attention should be given to whether our present practice of lining for color is adequate to contemporary needs. In In re Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 774 F.2d 1116, 227 USPQ 417 (Fed. Cir. 1985), rev'g 221 USPQ 1195 (TTAB 1984), the Court above has expressed confidence in our ability to exercise judgment in determining the registrability of trademarks based on color, taking into account the differences between color shades. Id., 227 USPQ at 421. See, generally, E.R. Henry, 'Right Hat, Wrong Peg: In re Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corporation and the Demise of the Mere Color Rule', 76 TRADEMARK REPORTER, 389 (September-October, 1986). However, this case highlights an inadequacy concerning the factual basis for such analysis, especially where an applicant introduces no evidence as to the particular shade of color which is in use. Indeed, the same inadequacy would be apparent if an opposer, owning a registration of a color mark in one of the twelve colors defined by our rules opposes registration of a color mark of an applicant based on that registration and no other evidence, also a viable option under our practice. It would seem useful in these circumstances for the Board to have before it, at least, satisfactory photographic evidence of what shade is being claimed by an applicant as well as what shade is comprised in an opposer's registration. Of course, the case before us must be determined on the basis of our present practice and rules, subject to whatever limitations they necessarily impose.

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 8
 § 15
 § 2