Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/253/449/145513/
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 09:48:16+00:00

Document:
It is to be noted that the trial court's reversal of the Commission results not from any disagreement with the Commission's findings of fact that the assailed rates were not shown to be unjust or unreasonable4 , but rather from the trial court's findings that the Commission's conclusion of law that the rates were not otherwise unlawful was erroneous. The conclusion of law by the Commission, which the District Court reversed, was reached by the Commission not in its quasi legislative or rate making capacity wherein it is presumed to be the expert, but in its quasi judicial capacity wherein its adjudications must be governed by applicable statutory provisions. Conclusions of law by the Commission, while entitled to respectful consideration by the Courts, do not have the same finality as its findings of fact. Levinson v. Spector Motor Co., 330 U.S. 649, 67 S. Ct. 931, 91 L. Ed. 1158.
Looking again at Paragraph 3 of Section 6 of the Act, we find the clearly expressed requirement that "no change shall be made in the rates * * except after thirty days' notice to the commission and to the public published as aforesaid * * *", unless the Commission allows changes upon less than the notice specified. The Commission found as a fact that this mandatory provision of the statute concerning publication was not complied with, and "when the facts have been resolved by the Commission upon evidence, there is no escape from the application of the broad provision of the statute". Louisville & N. R. Co. v. U. S., supra, 282 U.S. at page 758, 51 S. Ct. at page 304. No case has been cited by appellants, nor has the Court found one, holding that the Commission has authority to repeal that section of the Act of Congress requiring publication in order to establish rate changes, which the Commission in effect has attempted to do by holding that the increased rate was not "otherwise unlawful", despite its finding that that section of the statute had been violated. The Commission erred, after having found the facts, in failing to "apply the broad provisions of the statute".
Under the Act the shippers have always been required to pay, and carriers collect, the rate specified in the tariff on file with the Commission. Davis v. Portland Seed Co., 264 U.S. 403, 425, 44 S. Ct. 380, 68 L. Ed. 762. However, if this filed rate was proved to be unreasonable upon complaint to the Commission, the shipper was entitled to recover the difference between what he had paid and what the Commission found to be the reasonable rate. Pennsylvania R. Co. v. International Coal Min. Co., 230 U.S. 184, 197, 33 S. Ct. 893, 57 L. Ed. 1446. So in the situation which exists in this case. The shippers were bound to pay the rates specified in the tariff on file with the Commission, but upon proof that the rates were not lawfully established, they became entitled to recover the difference between what they had paid and the lawfully established rate. There is no reason under the Act why a shipper should not be protected in the situation here existing where the rates are unlawful because not lawfully established, just as he is protected in the situation where the rates are unlawful because unreasonable. In either case, the protection is against unlawful rates. Thus under the Act, a rate, to have final lawfulness and validity, must be lawfully established (Sec. 6, Par. 7, 49 U. S.C.A.), must be just and reasonable (Sec. 1(5), 49 U.S.C.A.) and nondiscriminatory and nonprejudicial (Sec. 3, Par. 1, 49 U.S.C.A.). Lacking any of these essentials, it cannot be the valid, lawful rate even though it becomes the applicable rate7 by virtue of being on file with the Commission.
As to the District Court's direction to the Commission to award to appellees all sums paid in excess of the basic rate, without the 6 cents per hundred increase authorized in Ex Parte 162, it need only be pointed out that the 6 cents per hundred increase authorized in Ex Parte 162 had not been, at the time the shipments in question were made, established as the legal rate in the manner provided by law. The Court is without authority to establish rates. United States v. Kansas City Southern Railway Co., 8 Cir., 217 F.2d 763. A rate once fixed remains established until changed in some manner allowed by law. Union Pacific R. Co. v. U. S., 48 Ct. Cl. 99; McCaffrey Brothers Co. v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 114 Neb. 382, 207 N.W. 503. No change having been legally made in the rate which existed before Ex Parte 162, that rate was the only existing, legally established rate and the Court was bound to apply it. U. S. v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co., D.C., 116 F. Supp. 484, 487, reversed on other grounds 217 F.2d 763.
"The cases like Pennsylvania R. Co. v. International Coal Mining Co., 230 U.S. 184, 33 S. Ct. 893, where a party that has paid only the reasonable rate sues upon a discrimination because some other has paid less, are not like the present. There the damage depends upon remoter considerations. But here the plaintiffs have paid cash out of pocket that should not have been required of them, and there is no question as to the amount of the proximate loss. See Meeker v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 236 U.S. 412, 429, 35 S. Ct. 328, 59 L. Ed. 644; Mills v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 238 U.S. 473, 35 S. Ct. 888, 59 L. Ed. 1414."

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