Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/373/33/
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 15:49:28+00:00

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Justia › US Law › US Case Law › US Supreme Court › Volume 373 › Locomotive Engineers v. Louisville & N. R. Co.
Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v.
Under § 3 First (i) of the Railway Labor Act, a railroad submitted to the National Railroad Adjustment Board a "minor dispute" with a union growing out of the discharge of an employee. The Board sustained the employee's claim for reinstatement and back pay. The railroad reinstated the employee, but a dispute then ensued as to whether the employee was entitled to full pay for the time lost without deduction for money earned from other employers. This dispute led to a threat of a strike, and the railroad sued in a Federal District Court to enjoin the threatened strike.
Held: under the Railway Labor Act, the union could not legally strike for the purpose of enforcing its interpretation of the Board's money award; it must utilize instead the judicial enforcement procedure provided by § 3 First (p) of the Act, and the District Court properly enjoined the threatened strike. Trainmen v. Chicago R. & I. R. Co., 353 U. S. 30. Pp. 373 U. S. 33-42.
the Adjustment Board to resolve the dispute as to the amount due Humphries under the award, asking the Board first for a clarification of its earlier order, and then submitting the disputed issue for resolution in a separate de novo proceeding. The Adjustment Board refused to entertain either petition, stating in its second order that "The matter must be judged res judicata" in light of the original Adjustment Board decision dealing with the Humphries controversy.
After the respondent had submitted the dispute for the second time to the Adjustment Board, the union set a definite strike deadline. The respondent then brought the present lawsuit in a Federal District Court, requesting injunctive relief against the threatened strike. After the Adjustment Board proceedings were completed, the court issued the injunction, holding that, under the Railway Labor Act, the union could not legally strike for the purpose of enforcing its interpretation of the Board's money award, but must instead utilize the judicial enforcement procedure provided by § 3 First (p) of the Act. [Footnote 2] 190 F.Supp.
829. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, 297 F.2d 608, and we granted certiorari to consider an obviously substantial question affecting the administration of the Railway Labor Act. 370 U.S. 908. For the reasons stated in this opinion, we conclude that the District Court and the Court of Appeals correctly decided the issues presented, and we accordingly affirm the judgment before us.
interests involved, settled upon a new detailed and comprehensive statutory grievance procedure.
"if a carrier or a union could choose a court instead of the Board, the other party would be deprived of the privilege conferred by § 3, First (i) . . . , which provides that, after negotiations have failed, 'either party' may refer the dispute to the appropriate division of the Adjustment Board."
case was based upon the conclusion that, when invoked, the remedies provided for in § 3 First were intended by Congress to be the complete and final means for settling minor disputes. 360 U.S. at 360 U. S. 616-617. See also Washington Terminal Co. v. Boswell, 75 U.S.App.D.C. 1, 124 F.2d 235 (per Rutledge, J.), aff'd by an equally divided court, 319 U.S. 732.
It is against this pattern of decisions that we must evaluate the petitioners' claim that the District Court in the present case was wrong in enjoining the threatened strike. The claim, simply stated, is that the power to issue injunctions recognized by the Chicago River decision is limited to those situations in which a strike is called during the proceedings before the Adjustment Board. Once a favorable award has been rendered, say the petitioners, the union becomes free to enforce the award as it will -- by invoking the judicial enforcement procedures of § 3 First (p) or by resorting to economic force. The right to strike, it is argued, is necessary to achieve "the congressional policy of requiring carriers and their employees to settle grievances by the collective bargaining process."
"there was general understanding between both the supporters and the opponents of the 1934 amendment that the provisions dealing with the Adjustment Board were to be considered as compulsory arbitration in this limited field."
353 U.S. at 353 U. S. 39.
computations of Humphries' "time lost" award, an issue wholly separable from the merits of the wrongful discharge issue. This, then, is clearly a controversy concerning a "money award," as to which decisions of the Adjustment Board are not final and binding. [Footnote 13] Instead, the Act provides a further step in the settlement process. If the carrier does not comply with the award, or with the employee's or union's interpretation of it, § 3 First (p) authorizes the employee to bring an action in a Federal District Court to enforce the award. [Footnote 14] The lawsuit is to "proceed in all respects as other civil suits," but the findings and order of the Adjustment Board are to be regarded as "prima facie evidence" of the facts stated in the complaint. The employee is excused from the costs of suit, and, in addition, is awarded attorney's fees if he prevails. The total effect of these detailed provisions is to provide a carefully designed procedure for reviewing money awards, one which will achieve the reviewing function without any significant expense to the employee or his union. See Washington Terminal Co. v. Boswell, supra.
expressly required both parties to follow. In addition, it would obviously render the earlier parts of the grievance procedure totally meaningless.
A strike in these circumstances would therefore be no less disruptive of the explicit statutory grievance procedure than was the strike enjoined in the Chicago River case. Consequently, the reasons which, in that case, required accommodating the more generalized provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act apply with equal force to the present case. [Footnote 15] We hold that the District Court was not in error in issuing the injunction.
"(i) The disputes between an employee or group of employees and a carrier or carriers growing out of grievances or out of the interpretation or application of agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions, including cases pending and unadjusted on June 21, 1934, shall be handled in the usual manner up to and including the chief operating officer of the carrier designated to handle such disputes; but, failing to reach an adjustment in this manner, the disputes may be referred by petition of the parties or by either party to the appropriate division of the Adjustment Board with a full statement of the facts and all supporting data bearing upon the disputes."
45 U.S.C. § 153 First (i).
"(p) If a carrier does not comply with an order of a division of the Adjustment Board within the time limit in such order, the petitioner, or any person for whose benefit such order was made, may file in the District Court of the United States for the district in which he resides or in which is located the principal operating office of the carrier, or through which the carrier operates, a petition setting forth briefly the causes for which he claims relief, and the order of the division of the Adjustment Board in the premises. Such suit in the District Court of the United States shall proceed in all respects as other civil suits, except that on the trial of such suit the findings and order of the division of the Adjustment Board shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated, and except that the petitioner shall not be liable for costs in the district court nor for costs at any subsequent stage of the proceedings, unless they accrue upon his appeal, and such costs shall be paid out of the appropriation for the expenses of the courts of the United States. If the petitioner shall finally prevail he shall be allowed a reasonable attorney's fee, to be taxed and collected as a part of the costs of the suit. The district courts are empowered, under the rules of the court governing actions at law, to make such order and enter such judgment, by writ of mandamus or otherwise, as may be appropriate to enforce or set aside the order of the division of the Adjustment Board."
45 U.S.C. § 153 First (p).
There can be no doubt that the controversy over the amount of the "time lost" award is a minor dispute, because it involves "the interpretation or application" of the collective agreement between the railroad and the union. See note 1 supra. See also Elgin, J. & E. R. Co. v. Burley, 325 U. S. 711; Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago R. & I. R. Co., 353 U. S. 30.
48 Stat. 1185, 1189 (1934).
44 Stat. 577, 578 (1926).
45 U.S.C. § 153 First (a)-(h).
45 U.S.C. § 153 First (l).
"(m) The awards of the several divisions of the Adjustment Board shall be stated in writing. A copy of the awards shall be furnished to the respective parties to the controversy, and the awards shall be final and binding upon both parties to the dispute, except insofar as they shall contain a money award. In case a dispute arises involving an interpretation of the award, the division of the Board upon request of either party shall interpret the award in the light of the dispute."
45 U.S.C. § 153 First (m).
"(o) In case of an award by any division of the Adjustment Board in favor of petitioner, the division of the Board shall make an order, directed to the carrier, to make the award effective and, if the award includes a requirement for the payment of money, to pay to the employee the sum to which he is entitled under the award on or before a day named."
45 U.S.C. § 153 First (o).
The language of § 3 First (p) is set out in note 2 supra.
"[The Norris-LaGuardia Act was designed primarily] to prevent the injunctions of the federal courts from upsetting the natural interplay of the competing economic forces of labor and capital. Rep. LaGuardia . . . recognized that the machinery of the Railway Labor Act channeled these economic forces, in matters dealing with railway labor, into special processes intended to compromise them. Such controversies, therefore, are not the same as those in which the injunction strips labor of its primary weapon without substituting any reasonable alternative."
353 U.S. at 353 U. S. 40-41. Cf. Manion v. Kansas City Terminal R. Co., 353 U. S. 927, which held that injunctive relief is not available if the processes of the Railway Labor Act have not actually been invoked. Compare Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U. S. 195, 370 U. S. 210-212.
this Court in cases such as Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U. S. 564, Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Co., 363 U. S. 574, and Steelworkers v. Enterprise Corp., 363 U. S. 593, and, of course, that the merits of such awards are not subject to de novo consideration upon a petition for judicial enforcement. See Machinists Assn. v. Central Airlines, 372 U. S. 682.
trial before the court, subject only to the limitation, as the statute requires, that the findings of fact of the Board shall constitute "prima facie" evidence. Under such circumstances, the logic of Chicago River in excluding strikes in favor of an exclusive scheme of "compulsory arbitration" seems to me to have no application, for here we are dealing with nonfinal and nonbinding awards, the direct antithesis of a compulsory arbitration scheme.
without effective means to prevent its enforcement. Thus, under today's opinion and the prior cases cited therein, the grievant whose money claim is denied by the Board is wholly without further remedy or recourse.
Such complete foreclosure of a losing money claimant would be less objectionable were it not for the wholly disparate consequences obtaining as a result of today's decision when it is the carrier who loses on a money claim before the Board. If this occurs, the carrier is free to refuse to comply, as it did here; since today's opinion forecloses other avenues of relief to the successful grievant and his union, the carrier, by such recalcitrance, can compel a suit to enforce the award under subsection (p), which requires an entire retrial of the issues in court. During this lengthy procedure, and, presumably, even at its conclusion, the grievant and the union will be left without economic or other recourse. The net result, therefore, is that, on all money claims, the award of the Board is "final and binding," and not subject to further review or other challenge, if the claimant loses, but it is subject to de novo review and trial at the sole behest of the employer if the employer loses. And, in either case, apparently, the union is completely foreclosed even from using its most traditional weapon, the strike. I cannot believe that Congress intended such an unevenhanded application of the statute. Nor can I believe, as the Court holds, that Congress could have contemplated that the protection of the right to strike afforded by the Norris-LaGuardia Act was being rescinded in favor of such an inadequate and unfair procedure as the Court declares the Act to have created.
which provides a semblance of fairness in this situation is one which interprets congressional intent to be that, in money claim cases, at least, the right to strike -- while perhaps suspended during Adjustment Board proceedings -- is available either if the Board decides for the claimant and the carrier does not comply, or if the Board decides for the carrier and the claimant does not acquiesce. This at least would not leave the entire balance in money cases in favor of the carrier.
described as an injunction which "strips labor of its primary weapon without substituting any reasonable alternative." 353 U.S. at 353 U. S. 41. To impute so drastic a result without any clear indication that it was intended seems to me to be unwarranted.
runs directly contrary to the best view of the treatment to be judicially accorded such awards. See, e.g., Steelworkers v. Enterprise Corp., supra, 363 U.S. 363 U. S. 596-599. These latter considerations do not themselves compel my conclusion here, however, for, standing alone, they are the result of policy determinations which, in this instance, either have already been made by, or are more properly committed to, Congress as direct consequences of the literal statutory scheme. They are, nonetheless, relevant factors in appraising the propriety and wisdom of the Court's construction of the statute and its estimate of the intention of its framers.
Thus, with all deference, I must respectfully dissent from today's opinion, since, though neither mandated by this Court's prior holdings nor supported, much less compelled, by specific congressional intent, it creates additional exceptions to the Norris-LaGuardia Act protections, and does so in a fashion which effects, in my view, an unfair imbalance, if not outright clear advantage, in favor of the carrier and against the employee and his union.
See also Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Day, 360 U. S. 548.
Cf. United States v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 337 U. S. 426.
In fact, the manner in which the Court in Price distinguished its earlier decision in Moore v. Illinois Central R. Co., 312 U. S. 630, suggests this very rationale. See 360 U.S. at 360 U. S. 609, n. 8.
While the Adjustment Board handles and disposes of an impressive number of cases each year, the backlog of pending disputes is immense. During its 1962 fiscal year, a total of 997 cases were disposed of by decision, and 383 cases were withdrawn. During the same period, however, 1,873 new cases were docketed. The total of 1,380 cases thus removed from the docket during the year still fell almost 500 cases short of equalling the number of new grievances filed. At the end of the year, the Board had still pending before it some 6,461 cases, of which only 1,679 had been heard. By way of comparison, though there were 4,948 cases pending at the end of fiscal year 1958, only 415 of these had not been heard. In only one of the past five fiscal years has the Board even come close to maintaining an equilibrium in its backlog by being able to dispose of almost as many cases as were docketed during the period. Twenty-eighth Annual Report of the National Mediation Board for fiscal year ended June 30, 1962, pp. 59, 86.

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