Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=82484:56355&catid=1576&Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 22:27:35+00:00

Document:
G.R. No. 199067, November 11, 2013 - NISSAN GALLERY-ORTIGAS, Petitioners, v. PURIFICACION F. FELIPE, Respondent.
NISSAN GALLERY-ORTIGAS, Petitioners, v. PURIFICACION F. FELIPE, Respondent.
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to review, reverse and set aside the June 30, 2011 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 120100,2 and its October 21, 2011 Resolution,3 for being issued in a manner not in accord with law and jurisprudence.
During the preliminary investigation before the Assistant City Prosecutor, Purificacion gave P200,000.00 as partial payment to amicably settle the civil aspect of the case. Thereafter, however, no additional payment had been made.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ACQUITTING accused PURIFICACION FELIPE of the crime of Violation of Batas Pambansa 22. However, accused PURIFICACION FELIPE is ordered to pay private complainant Nissan Gallery Ortigas the amount of SIX HUNDRED SEVENTY FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P675,000.00) with legal interest per annum, from the filing of the information until the finality of this decision.
Purificacion moved for a reconsideration, but her motion was denied.
WHEREFORE, finding merit therefrom, the instant petition is GIVEN DUE COURSE and is hereby GRANTED. The Decision and Order dated December 22, 2008 and May 20, 2009, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 105, Quezon City, in Crim. Case No. Q-08-151734, affirming the Judgment of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 41, Quezon City, for Violation of B.P. 22, acquitting petitioner of the crime charged but ordering the latter to pay respondent the amount of Six Hundred Seventy Five Thousand Pesos (P675,000.00) with 12% legal interest, is SET ASIDE and petitioner is EXONERATED from any civil liability by reason of her issuance of the subject check.
Nissan filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was later denied.
BOTH THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT AND THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT CONCURRED THAT THE ISSUANCE BY RESPONDENT PURIFICACION OF THE SUBJECT BOUNCED CHECK WAS FOR AND IN PAYMENT OF HER SON’S OUTSTANDING OBLIGATION TO NISSAN GALLERY ORIGINATING FROM HIS PURCHASE OF THE SUBJECT MOTOR VEHICLE, NOT MERELY AS A “SHOW CHECK”, HENCE, EVEN IF PURIFICACION IS NOT A PARTY TO THE SALES TRANSACTION BETWEEN NISSAN GALLERY, AS SELLER, AND FREDERICK, AS BUYER, PURIFICACION, AS THE ONE WHO DREW THE BOUNCED CHECK AS AND IN PAYMENT OF THE LONG-UNPAID MOTOR VEHICLE PURCHASED BY HER SON, COULD NOT ESCAPE LIABILITY ON THE CIVIL ASPECT OF THE CASE.
Ultimately, the question presented before the Court is whether or not Purificacion is civilly liable for the issuance of a worthless check despite her acquittal from the criminal charge.
SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. — (a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action (unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action).
(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed.
As can be gleaned from the foregoing, with respect to criminal actions for violation of BP 22, it is explicitly clear that the corresponding civil action is deemed included and that a reservation to file such separately is not allowed.
It can, therefore, be concluded that if the judgment is conviction of the accused, then the necessary penalties and civil liabilities arising from the offense or crime shall be imposed. On the contrary, if the judgment is of acquittal, then the imposition of the civil liability will depend on whether or not the act or omission from which it might arise exists.
The Court is also one with the CA when it stated that the liability of Purificacion was limited to her act of issuing a worthless check. The Court, however, does not agree with the CA when it went to state further that by her acquittal in the criminal charge, there was no more basis for her to be held civilly liable to Nissan. The acquittal was just based on reasonable doubt and it did not change the fact that she issued the subject check which was subsequently dishonored upon its presentment.
Purificacion herself admitted having issued the subject check in the amount of P1,020,000.00 after Frederick asked her to do it as payment for his obligation with Nissan. Her claim that she issued the check as a mere “show check” to boost Frederick’s credit standing was not convincing because there was no credit standing to boost as her son had already defaulted in his obligation to Nissan. Had it been issued prior to the sale of the vehicle, the “show check” claim could be given credence. It was not, however, the case here. It was clear that she assumed her son’s obligation with Nissan and issued the check to pay it. The argument that it was a mere “show check” after her son was already in default is simply ludicrous.
The Court shall not be belabored with the issue of whether or not Purificacion was an accommodation party because she was not. Granting that she was, it is with more reason that she cannot escape any civil liability because Section 2924 of the Negotiable Instruments Law specifically bounds her to the instrument. The crux of the controversy pertains to the civil liability of an accused despite acquittal of a criminal charge. Such issue is no longer novel. In cases like violation of BP 22, a special law, the intent in issuing a check is immaterial. The law has made the mere act of issuing a bad check malum prohibitum, an act proscribed by the legislature for being deemed pernicious and inimical to public welfare. Considering the rule in mala prohibita cases, the only inquiry is whether the law has been breached.25 The lower courts were unanimous in finding that, indeed, Purificacion issued the bouncing check. Thus, regardless of her intent, she remains civilly liable because the act or omission, the making and issuing of the subject check, from which her civil liability arises, evidently exists.
2 Erroneously docketed by the CA as CA-G.R. CR No. 32606, id. at 26, 54-55.
8 CA rollo, MeTC Judgment, p. 34.
9 Id., RTC Decision, pp. 25.
16 Art. 100, Revised Penal Code.
17 Sec. 2, Rule 111, Revised Rules of Court.
18Alferez v. People, G.R. No. 182301, January 31, 2011, 641 SCRA 116, 125.
19Sanchez v. Far East Bank and Trust Company, 511 Phil. 540, 558 (2005), citing Manantan v. Court of Appeals, 403 Phil. 308 (2001).
20Resterio v. People, G.R. No. 177438, September 24, 2012, 681 SCRA 592, 596-597.
21Alferez v. People, supra note 18, at 122.
22San Mateo v. People, G.R. No. 200090, March 6, 2013.
23 CA rollo, p. 33.
24 Sec. 29. Liability of accommodation party. - An accommodation party is one who has signed the instrument as maker, drawer, acceptor, or indorser, without receiving value therefor, and for the purpose of lending his name to some other person. Such a person is liable on the instrument to a holder for value, notwithstanding such holder, at the time of taking the instrument, knew him to be only an accommodation party.
25Palana v. People, 560 Phil. 558, 569 (2007), citing Cueme v. People, 390 Phil. 294 (2000).
26 Nacar v. Gallery Frames and/or Felipe Bordey, Jr., G.R. No. 189871, August 13, 2013.

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