Source: https://www.classactiondefenseblog.com/category/20class-action-articles/05arbitration/page/2/
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 18:25:22+00:00

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Plaintiff, the general manager of an El Pollo Loco restaurant, filed a putative class action against El Pollo Loco alleging violations of California’s labor code; the class action complaint alleged inter alia that defendant misclassified its general managers as exempt when they “spent the majority of their time performing nonmanagerial tasks” and that it wrongfully denied its general managers overtime compensation and meal breaks. Olvera v. El Pollo Loco, Inc., 173 Cal.App.4th 447, 451 (Cal.App. 2009). As part of his employment, plaintiff received written materials that, in part, required that all work-related disputes be resolved through binding arbitration, governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). Id., 449-50. Class action litigation was prohibited, but the parties were permitted “to conduct discovery and bring motions in an arbitration as provided by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,” id., at 450. Defense attorneys moved to compel arbitration of the class action complaint as to plaintiff’s individual claims only, id., at 451. Plaintiff opposed the motion to compel arbitration, arguing that the arbitration clause was unconscionable; defense attorneys argued that the clause was not unconscionable because employees were not required to sign the acknowledgement form by which they were bound to the arbitration clause. Id., at 452. The trial court denied the motion to compel arbitration, concluding that the clause was both procedurally and substantively unconscionable. Id., at 453. Under California law, an order denying a motion t compel arbitration is an appealable order. Cal. Code Civ. Proc., § 1294. Defendant appealed, and the Court of Appeal affirmed.
After summarizing the relevant law regarding arbitration agreements, see Olvera, at 453-54, the appellate court turned first to the issue of procedural unconscionability. The Court of Appeal explained at page 454, “Procedural unconscionability focuses on oppression or unfair surprise, while substantive unconscionability focuses on overly harsh or one-sided terms.” (Citations omitted.) California courts view these two factors on a sliding scale: “The more procedural unconscionability is present, the less substantive unconscionability is required to justify a determination that a contract or clause is unenforceable. Conversely, the less procedural unconscionability is present, the more substantive unconscionability is required to justify such a determination.” Id., at 454 (citations omitted). The appellate court found that the arbitration clause was procedurally unconscionable because of (1) the unequal bargaining power between the employees and the employer, which “makes it likely that the employees felt at least some pressure to sign the acknowledgment and agree to the new dispute resolution policy” even if the company insists that they were not required to do so, and (2) agreement to the dispute resolution procedure was “not an informed decision” because the description of the dispute resolution policy “was totally inaccurate.” Id., at 455-56.
Plaintiff, a delivery driver for a Domino’s Pizza owned by Western Pizza, filed a putative class action Western Pizza alleging labor law violations; the class action complaint asserted inter alia that defendant failed to reimburse its drivers for business expenses, and failed to pay minimum wage or provide itemized wage statements. Sanchez v. Western Pizza Enterprises, Inc., 172 Cal.App.4th 154 (Cal.App. 2009) [Slip Opn., at 2, 5]. Defense attorneys moved to dismiss the class action and compel arbitration, id., at 6. The parties were subject to an undated arbitration agreement that contained a class action waiver provision, id., at 3-4; the arbitration agreement was “not a mandatory condition of employment,” but it was governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), id., at 3. Further, though Western Pizza would pay all arbitration fees, “Except as otherwise required by law, each party shall bear its own attorney fees and costs.” Id. The arbitration agreement further provided that the arbitrator “shall be responsible for resolving any disputes over the interpretation or application of this Arbitration Agreement.” Id. With respect to the class action waiver, the agreement provided, “[T]he Arbitrator shall not consolidate or combine the resolution of any claim or dispute between the two Parties to this ADR Agreement with the resolution of any claim by any other party or parties, including but not limited to any employee of the Company. Nor shall the Arbitrator have the authority to certify a class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 23, analogous state rules, or Arbitrator’s rules pertaining to class arbitration, and the Arbitrator shall not decide claims on behalf of any other party or parties.” Id., at 4. Plaintiff’s counsel argued that the class action arbitration waiver was unenforceable and that plaintiff would not agree to arbitration unless the class action waiver was stricken. Id., at 5. Defense counsel countered that the enforceability of the arbitration agreement, including the class action waiver, must be determined by the arbitrator. Id., at 6. The trial court denied the motion to compel arbitration, id., at 6-7. The California Court of Appeal affirmed.
After stating that the FAA does not preempt California law because it does not conflict with California law, see Sanchez, at 7-8, the Court of Appeal concluded that the enforceability of the arbitration agreement, including the class action waiver, was properly determined by the trial court rather than the arbitrator, id., at 8-11. The appellate court then turned to the enforceability of the class action arbitration waiver, and held that it was unenforceable as contrary to public policy. See id., at 11-35. We do not discuss the opinion in detail, as it follows the ground set forth in articles summarizing similar opinions that rely on Gentry v. Superior Court, 42 Cal.4th 443 (Cal. 2007) and Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 36 Cal.4th 148 (Cal. 2005). At bottom, the appellate court affirmed the trial court order denying the motion to dismiss the class action and compel arbitration. Id., at 36.
Plaintiff, a trash truck driver, filed a putative class action against his former employer, Athens Disposal, alleging labor law violations; the class action complaint asserted that Athens denied its employees meal and rest periods. Franco v. Athens Disposal Co., Inc., 171 Cal.App.4th 1277 (Cal.App. 2009) [Slip Opn., at 2]. According to the allegations underlying the class action, Athens failed to pay its employees overtime, and failed to provide meal periods or to pay employees an additional hour of compensation for each workday that they missed a meal period. Id., at 3. Defense attorneys moved to dismiss the class action complaint and to compel arbitration based on the terms of the employment agreement with plaintiff, id., at 2. The employment agreement contained an arbitration clause as well as a provision waiving class action relief or the right to bring an action in “a private attorney general capacity.” Id. Plaintiff countered that the class action waiver was unconscionable, id. The trial court disagreed and granted Athens’ motion to compel plaintiff to proceed with arbitration on an individual basis. Id. The California Court of Appeal reversed, concluding that the class action arbitration wavier was unconscionable “given ‘the modest size of the potential individual recovery, the potential for retaliation against members of the class, [and] the fact that absent members of the class may be ill informed about their rights.’” Id. (quoting Gentry v. Superior Court, 42 Cal.4th 443, 463 (Cal. 2007)). The appellate court further held that the arbitration clause was unconscionable in that it sought to prevent plaintiff from serving as a private attorney general, it conflict with California’s Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA). Id.
In its petition to compel arbitration and to dismiss the class action, Athens argued that the arbitration agreement was governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). Franco, at 3-4. Indeed, the employment agreement expressly provided that it was governed by the FAA, and that any arbitration would be conducted under the employment arbitration rules of the American Arbitration Association (AAA). Id., at 4. The petition to compel arbitration was simplicity itself: “Under the FAA, arbitration was mandatory.” Id. Plaintiff argued that the class action waiver was invalid under Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 36 Cal.4th 148 (Cal. 2005), which defense counsel sought to distinguish. Id., at 4-5. The trial court agreed that Discover Bank did not cover employment cases and granted the motion to compel. Id., at 5. Plaintiff sought reconsideration based on Gentry, which the trial court denied based in part on its conclusion that plaintiff’s meal and rest period claims were not suitable for class action treatment because of the specific inquiries that would be required of the various claims. See id., at 5-7.

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