Source: https://santaclaralawtechlawforum.wordpress.com/author/sculawtechlawforum/
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 20:08:47+00:00

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Everyone has a favorite television show, or book, or comic strip. But what are loyal fans to do during the (sometimes lengthy) period of time in between seasons of a TV series or installments of a series of books or movies? Are fans of the Fox series “House, M.D.” supposed to watch the Major League Baseball games that are being broadcast the entire month of October in lieu of regular programming? Reread favorite books until the binding splits or watch videocassettes until they break? For the fan with Internet access, the answer is clearly no. All fans need to do is to type in the name of their favorite book or movie into a search engine, and the answer is at their fingertips. The explosion of fan culture on the World Wide Web is a phenomenon that is impossible to ignore. While some sites serve as a meeting place for fans to discuss aspects of their favorite works, share spoilers for future episodes or novels, or simply commune with other like-minded individuals, a major activity of fan culture is the creation of new works of art or literature featuring their favorite characters in a variety of settings. While most fanfiction is noncommercial in nature (and authors are very vocal about the fact that they make no money), this fact alone does not insulate such authors from legal liability for the body of work that they are posting on the Internet and making available to anyone, in any country, with web access. While suing individual authors of fanfiction may be impracticable, does this mean that the copyright holder is without remedy? After all, the right to create derivative works is one of the six exclusive rights afforded the copyright holder under Section 106 of Title 17.1 What if an author finds a particular category of fanfiction, such as adult-themed work, particularly problematic or offensive? One possible solution is the imposition of third-party liability on the parties who own and operate websites on which the work of many authors is included. Two theories of third-party liability on which authors may rely are contributory infringement and vicarious infringement. Contributory infringement requires both knowledge on the part of the third party and a material contribution to the infringement. “[O]ne who, with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes, or materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another, may be held liable as a ‘contributory’ infringer.”2 A person who deliberately sets up a website for the purpose of posting fanfiction is clearly acting intentionally. Whether he believes that posting such content is an act of infringement is debatable. Questions of fact such as the receipt of cease-and-desist letters by the website owner or any of the authors whose work is posted on his website will certainly be relevant. Under Napster, which I will discuss in greater length below, the court held that actual knowledge of specific infringing uses was not necessary, merely that the owner of the website knows that the site is being used for infringing activity in general.3 The element of contribution can arguably be met; although an fan author could post his work on his own website rather than that of a dedicated “fanfiction” website, the inclusion of many pieces of fiction in one location make such sites more easily accessible and more popular than if the would-be reader had to navigate from individual web page to individual web page. By maintaining a dedicated “fanfiction” page, the owner is inducing others to write their own derivative works and to post them for all to read. While contributory liability stems from enterprise liability, vicarious liability is based on principles of agency law, and requires that the third party have the right and ability to control the infringing conduct as well as a direct financial interest in the infringing conduct.4 Owners of particular websites are ultimately in charge of the content that appears on their various pages. If the owner allows submissions from the general public, he or she also has the ability to delete content with which he disagrees or that he feels will subject him to harassment or potential legal liability. The element of direct financial benefit, on the other hand, will be difficult to prove, as practically nobody makes any money from the authorship of fanfiction. However, the individual fan authoris not the defendant in a third-party case, but the website owner, and many sites to which this work is posted are supported by advertising.5 If these advertising revenues go beyond the cost of setting up and maintaining the sites, this may provide a nexus to commercial gain, which would justify holding the website owner liable under a theory of vicarious infringement. Similarly problematic is the nature of vicarious liability as an offshoot of respondeat superior. Even if both the necessary elements are met, it may be difficult to characterize individual fan authors as agents of the fanfiction website in any context. Perhaps an analogy to a peer-to-peer file sharing case will put the above issues in context. In A&M Records, Inc., v. Napster, Inc.,6 the Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiff had a likelihood of success on the merits for both its claims of contributory and vicarious infringement against Napster, and that a preliminary injunction was appropriate. However, Napster is factually somewhat different from the case of fanfiction websites. The infringing files in Napster were exact copies of plaintiff’s copyrighted works,7 which weighs against the defendant’s claim of fair use,8 as opposed to the transformative nature of most works of fanfiction. Weighing against fanfiction website owners is the fact the court in Napster upheld liability even though the central server did not maintain copies of the works themselves, but merely an index of names which allowed users to obtain the infringing copies from one another, whereas fanfiction sites store and facilitate distribution of potentially infringing content. Moreover, in Napster, even if specific files were removed at the request of the copyright owner, it was highly likely that another individual would “fill the gap” and provide another copy almost immediately. Within the Napster system, there would be a plentitude of anonymous sources of the exact same infringing file. Whereas, once an individual fan author discovered his or her fan authorship had been removed, he or she would be less likely to upload it somewhere else for fear of direct action by the copyright owner. His or her reading public might not have copies of the same authorship to repost. Therefore, in the case of fanfiction, individual instances of infringement could be targeted more effectively and permanently. While, in any case, a suit for direct infringement against the individual authors themselves is always possible, turning off the tide of unauthorized derivative works at the source is far easier and more effective for the copyright owner than to pursue (potentially) millions of individual defendants. Such theories of third party liability as contributory and vicarious infringement make the enforcement of copyright practicable for the modern author of creative work.
1 In order to succeed on a claim of contributory or vicarious infringement, the copyright holder/plaintiff must prove that direct infringement has taken place. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1371 (N.D. Cal. 1995). It is possible that a copyright owner could sue an individual fan author in name, with the understanding that he will seek relief entirely from the named third parties, as was the case in Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. Of America, 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
2 Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971).
3 114 F.Supp.2d 896, 917 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
4 Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F. 3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996).
5 For example, www.fictionalley.org (Harry Potter fanfiction/fanart) features banner advertising at the bottom of the page.
6 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
7 239 F.3d at 1011.
Why is broadband value so poor in the US?
Why can someone in France (and many other European and Asian countries) get better broadband (ie faster service) for less money?
Cicconi tried to talk about population density and regulation but was really stumped when Walt told him he lived in Manhattan and could get better service from a small cable company. They’re also on the defensive for not providing useful information (read: transparency) about what broadband service they’re providing. This was discussed at the State of the Net conference as well. I remember living in Palo Alto in 2003 and still not being able to access broadband (cable or DSL). Friends on the East Coast were stunned. Broadband providers were saying that because some people in my zip code were receiving broadband, they were serving the area. The broadband providers sound like they are on the defensive. They constantly cite statistics about how much money they’ve invested in broadband, how many feet of fiber, they’ve laid across the country, and so on. The crucial question is whether the Internet should be treated like a public utility and if so what is the appropriate regime to serve the public interest. The Big Three (ATT, Verizon and Comcast) have vested interests in ensuring that their billions of dollars invested (some well, some not so well) gets recouped, at least so their management can answer to their boards and shareholders. Cicconi said his company has publicly agreed to not block content or degrade service based on source of content. To those following the debate closely it may or not have appeared disingenuous that he failed to mention that their public position followed their agreement to certain Net Neutrality provisions with the FCC to permit the ATT/BellSouth merger in 2006. Note the partisan divide; one Republican commissioner had excused himself from the vote and the remaining two Democratic commissioners held up the merger until ATT agreed to abide by Net Neutrality provisions. Mossberg’s point (effectively made) was: Why can’t the consumer choose the phone they want and the carrier they want? His reference analogy of the circa 1968 black ATT phone was an unspoken reference to the FCC’s Carterphone ruling, which for the first time made attaching a non ATT phone to the ATT network legal. Cicconi talked about how the phones are subsidized, but he sidestepped the real question about consumer choice. Now Skype has petitioned the FCC, arguing that consumers should be able to attach their chosen device to the Internet via wireless networks. It is trying to take the Net Neutrality debate beyond the terrestrial Internet space and include wireless access as well. Here the large broadband providers believe the investment they made in purchasing spectrum from the government means they need control over those airwaves to ensure a return on their investment. It sounds similar to Whiteacre’s argument for exercising price discrimination on its access to the terrestrial Internet. What’s happening in Congress? In the House, Ed Markey (D MA) has started hearings on Net Neutrality legislation. He hasn’t introduced any bill yet, but when he does it will likely to be similar to his 2006 bill (PDF). It included the principles of probation on blocking, degrading or interfering with user’s accessing content similar to what ATT has agreed to (for limited period) with the FCC. On the issue of prioritization of content, broadband providers have to make all similar content available on the ‘dedicated pipe’ without surcharge. In the Senate, Senators Snowe (R-ME) and Dorgan (D-ND) have re-introduced legislation (from the 109th session) called the Internet Freedom Preservation Act (PDF). It’s similar to the Markey provisions on blocking, degrading, and prioritization of content. It also has a provision about mandating that broadband providers make stand-alone broadband service available to users. Reaction by Presidental contenders to this bill has so far lined up on partisan lines. Notably, Snowe is the only Republican supporting it. Tech LawForum will be following the public policy debate as it unfolds in the 110th Congress. Besides Net Neutrality, Tech LawForum’s Internet law and policy section will be following many other issues and topics including the Google v Perfect 10 case and Congressional efforts to legislate in the areas of music licensing and fair use. Also, articles and blog posts under Net Law will cover updates on cyberspace law topics such as defamation, jurisdiction and privacy.
It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to sell or sell . . . a patented invention . . . solely for uses reasonably related to the development and submission of information under a federal law which regulates the manufacture, use or sale of drugs.
Elan [the defendant] infringed the 472 and 674 patents when it: 1) studied the effect of food on the bioavailability of Skelaxin; 2) used the study data to identify a new use of the drug; and 3) commercialized the new use.
Even assuming that Elan employed Classen’s patented process when it studied Skelaxin’s bioavailability problem and used the results to repatent the drug, the results of the 2001 study were submitted to the FDA in Elan’s Citizen Petition and labeling supplement to its NDA. Therefore, Elan’s use of the patented process was reasonably related to the submission of information under the FDCA and so is protected under Ã?Â§ 271(e)(1). Accordingly, Elan’s motion for summary judgment will be granted.
Under this reasoning, research tools are not exempted from the safe harbor of Ã?Â§ 271(e)(1). The policy of patent law is being undermined by not exempting research tools. Although maybe technically correct, letÃ¢â?¬â?¢s hope other jurisdictions donÃ¢â?¬â?¢t follow this lead. For further analysis see IPBiz.
Plaintiff, however, put forward no evidence of irreparable harm resulting from defendant’s infringement, for example, market or financial data, to support its sweeping statements.
Plaintiff cites to several recent statements by LendingTree executives in its briefing in support of the proposition that defendant intends to “increase” its infringing activities notwithstanding the jury’s verdict. (D.I. 274 at 4) Plaintiff cites a statement that LendingTree has completed 50% more Qualification Forms for potential borrowers than in the same quarter a year ago. (D.I. 274, ex. A) Further, defendant has publicly stated that: This case will have no meaningful effect on how our lenders and customers interact with LendingTree. LendingTree will continue to provide the same level of quality service to both consumers and lenders. The fundamentals of our consumer protection will remain the same – consumers will continue to use the LendingTree marketplace to find lenders that will compete for their business. (D.I. 261, ex. A) Though these statements appear to support plaintiff’s argument insofar as defendant intends to maintain the status quo, they do not appear to support plaintiff’s argument that defendant plans to “increase” its infringing activity.
Judge Robinson thought the evidence was clearly insufficient so the permanent injunction was denied. The Delaware IP Blog points out Ã¢â?¬Å?Ultimately, the question whether eBay will hamper the frequency in which permanent injunctions have previously been issued must wait for another day: in its Order, the Court granted IMX leave to renew once any appeal on the liability phase is resolved.Ã¢â?¬Â? For more analysis, this case was nicely covered by Peter ZuraÃ¢â?¬â?¢s Two-Seventy-One Blog.
HyperPhrase targeted the Google toolbar interface used in Internet browsers; its AutoLink feature that allows users to link to information on selected Web sites; and AdSense, Google’s technology for placing ads on its site.
There is no basis to argue that the AutoLink process uses the equivalent of data references to locate referenced records. Rather, AutoLink performs a completely different function in a different way to achieve a different result. at 26.
Considering the AdSense product, there are two records involved in the process: the web page and the advertisement. However, to suggest that either of these records “refers” to the other is nonsense. at 31.
Google wins in a decisive victory.
Alberta Telecommunications v. Rambus 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81093 Northern District of California, Decided Oct. 24, 2006 Judge Whyte Alberta alleged an action for interference under 35 U.S.C. Ã?Â§ 291 between one of its patents and an expired patent owned by Rambus. Judge Whyte held Ã¢â?¬Å?[a]bsent interference, a court has no power under Ã?Â§ 291 to adjudicate the validity of any patent.Ã¢â?¬Â? The determinative factor is whether or not an interference has in fact been established. Therefore, the court does not have any jurisdiction to adjudicate validity of a patent unless an interference has been established; an allegation is insufficient. The argument that Rambus purposely allowed the patent to expire did not sufficiently distinguish the case from Albert v. Kevex Corp., 729 F.2d 757 (Fed. Cir. 1984), for Judge Whyte. The rule in Albert said Ã¢â?¬Å?[a] claim under Ã?Â§ 291, however, depends so completely on the existence of interference that lack of it, whenever it becomes apparent, must be deemed fatal to jurisdiction.” Beware, Ã?Â§ 291 shall not be used as a loophole to determine validity.
[N]o damages shall be recovered by the patentee in any action for infringement, except on proof that the infringer was notified of the infringement and continued to infringe thereafter, in which event damages may be recovered only for infringement occurring after such notice.
[W]here there are both product and method claims being claimed infringed, the patentee must mark the product pursuant to Ã?Â§ 287(a) in order to recover damages.
Judge Thynge determined the wall jack should have been marked and granted AOLÃ¢â?¬â?¢s motion for summary judgment on the issue of pre-suit damages. In the Northern District of California, Judge Fogel held against the DefendantÃ¢â?¬â?¢s motion on pre-suit damages. The Plaintiff showed substantial evidence for there to be a triable issue of material fact as to constructive notice. However, the Judge did side with the Defendants on the issue of actual notice. Plaintiff sent out a vague letter, IÃ¢â?¬â?¢m sure weÃ¢â?¬â?¢re all familiar with, basically stating, as the court put it, Ã¢â?¬Å?we understand that you are entering the SMIF pod field, we have patents in that field, donÃ¢â?¬â?¢t infringe our patents.Ã¢â?¬Â?
This kind of generalized warning does not suffice for actual notice under Ã?Â§ 287(a).
IsnÃ¢â?¬â?¢t this interesting? This kind of warning does not cut it for actual notice under Ã?Â§ 287(a), yet it may open up the defendant to willful infringement charges. Does this result seem correct or am I missing something?
I came across a great article written by Michael Smith, who also runs the Eastern District of Texas Federal Court Practice blog, which summarizes and analyzes District Court decisions that are interpreting eBay. The article also gives interesting background information on some of the Judges of the E.D. of Texas. The article is definitely worth reading and the pdf is available here. I knew the E.D. of Texas was known for returning plaintiffÃ¢â?¬â?¢s verdicts, but I was unaware that the $133 Million verdict in z4 Technologies v. Microsoft was almost as much as all the patent jury verdicts handed down in the E.D. of Texas since 1999 combined! Other results were somewhat surprising. Of the nine cases reviewed at the time the article was written, four of them were denied injunctions (z4 Technologies v. Microsoft, Finisar v. DirectTV, Paice v. Toyota, and Voda v. Cordis Corp.). Also surprising was three out of the four cases that were heard by the E.D. of Texas were denied injunctions. What is the reason for this geographic difference? Perhaps more Ã¢â?¬Å?trollsÃ¢â?¬Â? are filling suit in the E.D. of Texas than elsewhere, causing the Judges to follow Justice KennedyÃ¢â?¬â?¢s concurrence. All cases in which the permanent injunction issued, the plaintiff was a direct competitor and was manufacturing a product. Michael Smith predicts more defendants will litigate the case on the merits and settlements will occur later rather than sooner. Kudos to him for this well written article.
As noted on Patently-O and on the Northern District of CaliforniaÃ¢â?¬â?¢s homepage, the court is looking to improve its local patent rules. You can read the pdf version of the current rules here. If you have input, you are very much encouraged to send your thoughts to patentlocalrulescommittee@gmail.com. This is a great opportunity to make real meaningful change. As the Northern District of California hears the most patent cases in the country (or close to the most, sorry I donÃ¢â?¬â?¢t have the numbers), it can be a model for district courts around the nation to follow. This likely trend is acknowledged by the Chicago IP Litigation Blog, which points out the N.D. Cal. patent rules Ã¢â?¬Å?serve as a pattern for courts across the country.Ã¢â?¬Â? Currently, Judges Armstrong, Hamilton, and White have standing orders listed on the courtÃ¢â?¬â?¢s website specifically labeled for patent cases. They are all substantially similar and all deal with Markman hearings. They should be looked at to gather some ideas on how to amend the local rules. The pdf versions are here: Armstrong, Hamilton, and White. Michael F. Kelleher at the IP Law Observer noted a case that was decided on summary judgment as a result of one of the parties not closely following the Local Patent Rules of N.D. Cal. Although I cannot offer any suggestions on how to improve the local rules, I will quickly offer some principles to consider: Simplicity, Predictability, Fairness, and Cost Sensitivity. The legal community would be much better off if we could all find a way to inject these ideals into our current patent law system. I see no reason why local rules arenÃ¢â?¬â?¢t a great place to start! Please send your thoughts to the email above and comment on this blog and others to get the conversation started.

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