Source: https://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-supreme-court/324/215.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 19:19:21+00:00

Document:
Mr. Eugene Underwood, of New York City, for petitioner.
The jurisdiction of the United States District Court is based on Section 24 of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C.A. 41. The petition for certiorari was granted, 323 U.S. 688 , 65 S.Ct. 63, because the Circuit Court of Appeals decided a question of general importance relating to the construction of a federal statute. Jurisdiction of this Court rests on Section 240(a) of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C.A. 347(a).
On August 4, 1942, the petitioner, the owners of the steamship Cavelier, filed a libel in personam in admiralty in a federal district court against the United States to recover for damages to its ship, the Cavelier, alleged to have been caused by the negligent operation of the United States Naval patrol boat, YP 249, a public vessel of the United States. The libel averred that on July 7, 1942, the Cavelier, while en route from Canada to Jamaica, was ordered by United States Naval authorities to enter Dela- [324 U.S. 215, 217] ware Bay. Upon approaching the Bay, the Cavelier received further instructions from the naval authorities that in her transit of the waters constituting the entrance to the bay, the Cavelier was to follow directly astern of the patrol boat, YP 249, a public vessel of the United States. While following directly astern of the YP 249, as ordered, the Cavelier struck a submerged wreck and sustained serious damages. It was further alleged that the collision with the wreck was due 'solely to the fault and negligence of the United States vessel YP 249 and those in charge of her.' 4 The libel also stated that petitioner, a Canadian corporation, elected to have its suit proceed in accordance with principles of libels in personam and in rem; that in similar circumstances the Government of the Dominion of Canada allows nationals of the United States to sue in its courts.
The respondent, United States, appeared specially and sought to have the libel dismissed because it failed to state a cause of action for which the United States had consented to be sued. Petitioner, the libellant, opposed this action, relying on Section 1 of the Public Vessels Act, 1925, which provided that a 'libel in personam in admiralty may be brought against the United States ... for damages caused by a public vessel of the United States ....'5 The federal district court dismissed the libel on the ground that the accident alleged in the libel was not caused by the 'negligent operation of the vessel,' that the vessel was [324 U.S. 215, 218] not the 'efficient cause' of the accident but that the accident arose from the 'personal and independent negligence of its officers.' The court held that the Act authorized suit only where the public vessel was the proximate cause of the damage.
The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the action of the district court on the theory that the phrase in the Act 'caused by a public vessel' meant caused by those in charge of the vessel, with the vessel as the 'noxious instrument,' the 'physical instrument,' by which the physical damage was done; that in the instant case the physical cause was the submerged wreck. The Circuit Court also held that the Act did not authorize recovery on the admiralty principles of in rem liability.
The dismissal by the lower court of petitioner's libel raises three questions for consideration by this Court: Does the Public Vessels Act, 1925, authorize suit against the United States where the public vessel is not the physical cause, the 'physical instrument' by which the damage is done; that is, is the Act confined to cases involving the collision situation? If not, does the Act, which authorizes the filing of a libel in personam against the United States, authorize recovery in such suit on admiralty principles of in rem as well as in personam liability? Finally, if the Act authorizes recovery on admiralty principles in rem and in personam, does petitioner's libel state a cause of action under those principles of admiralty law?
The use of the phase 'caused by a public vessel' constitutes an adoption by Congress of the customary legal terminology of the admiralty law which refers to the vessel as causing the harm although the actual cause is the negligence of the personnel in the operation of the ship. Such personsification of the vessel, treating it as a juristic person whose acts and omissions, although brought about by her personnel, are personal acts of the ship for which, as a juristic person, she is legally responsible, has long been recognized by this Court. United States v. The Malek Adhel, 2 How. 210, 233, 234; The China, 7 Wall. 53, 68; Ralli v. Troop, 157 U.S. 386, 402 , 403 S., 15 S.Ct. 657, 663, 664; The John G. Stevens, 170 U.S. 113, 120 , 18 S.Ct. 544; The Barnstable, 181 U.S. 464, 467 , 21 S.Ct. 684, 685. That such was the meaning attributed to this phrase is further evidenced by Section 2 of the Act, relating to venue, which provides that venue shall lie in the district 'in which the vessel or cargo charged with creating the liability is found.' 43 Stat. 1112. The consent to suit embodied in the Act thus extends to cases where the negligence of the personnel of a public vessel in the operation of the vessel causes damage to other ships, their cargoes, and [324 U.S. 215, 225] personnel, regardless of physical contact between the two ships,21 and where principles of admiralty law imposed liability on private parties. There seems no logical reason for allowing recovery for collision and refusing recovery for damages caused by other movements of the offending vessel.
The fact that the Committee reports on the bill state that the 'chief purpose' of the Act is to authorize recovery in collision cases, that the departmental letters attached to the report consider principally the 'collision' situation, does not require that the statute should be so limited. 22 Respondent relies on The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158 , 23 S.Ct. 483, in which it was held that a Wisconsin statute imposing liability 'for all damages ... done to persons or property by such ship,' Rev.St.Wis.1898, 3348, did not apply to injuries suffered by a member of a ship's crew arising from the negligence of the master of the vessel, since the damage was not 'done by the ship herself, as the offending thing , ....' 189 U.S. 158, 176 , 23 S.Ct. 483, 487. Since that case involved a suit by a member of the crew against his employer-owner of the vessel, the holding in that decision on its facts is clearly inapplicable to the instant case. Moreover, the language in the Wisconsin statute is narrower in scope than that in the Public Vessels Act, 1925, which refers generally to 'damages caused by a public vessel.' Furthermore, the legislative history of the Public Vessels Act requires a different result in so far as the Osceola case interprets the Wisconsin statute to apply only to cases where the vessel is itself the physical cause of the damage. These latter two considerations serve also to distinguish, The Vera Cruz, No. 2, 1884, 9 L.R., Prob.Div. 96. Respondent also relies on [324 U.S. 215, 226] Dobson v. United States, 2 Cir., 27 F.2d 807, and O'Neal v. United States, D.C., 11 F.2d 869. These cases are not apposite on the question under consideration since they also involved suits for damages, for personal injuries sustained by a seaman employee aboard his own ship, against the United States as employer.
Third: Since we hold that the Public Vessels Act was intended to impose on the United States the same liability (apart from seizure or arrest under a libel in rem) as is imposed by the admiralty law on the private shipowner, it remains to be considered whether petitioner states a valid cause of action under general principles of admiralty law, in rem and in personam. Petitioner alleges that the respondent's vessel, having undertaken to guide petitioner's boat, the Cavelier, through the waters at the entrance of the bay, did so in a negligent fashion causing petitioner to strike a submerged wreck, that the accident was caused solely by the negligence of YP 249 and its crew. It needs no extended citation of authority to show that where a tug negligently grounds its tow, the tug and its owner are liable for the damages resulting therefrom. The Quickstep, 9 Wall. 665; The John G. Stevens, 170 U.S. 113 , 18 S.Ct. 544; The Temple Emery, D.C., 122 F. 180; The W. G. Mason, 2 Cir., 142 F. 913; see, The Caspian, D.C., 14 F.2d 1013; The Murrell, D.C., 200 F. 826; The Sally McDevitt v. The J. W. Paxon, D.C., 24 F. 302; The Rescue, D.C., 74 F. 847.30 The fact that the Cavelier was not fastened to the YP 249 by a tow rope is irrelevant. 31 The libel avers that she was under [324 U.S. 215, 229] orders by the naval authorities to proceed directly astern of the YP 249; for all practical purposes she was as firmly fastened to the stern of the YP 249 as if she had been in tow.
The judgment of the circuit court is reversed and the cause remanded to the district court with direction to proceed with consideration of the case on the merits.
[ Footnote 2 ] Canadian Aviator, Ltd., v. United States, D.C.N.J., 52 F.Supp. 211, 1943 A.M.C. 744.
[ Footnote 3 ] Canadian Aviator v. United States, 3 Cir., 142 F.2d 709.
'1. She was not in charge of a competent person.
'2. She failed to keep a good look-out.
'3. She failed to guide the Cavelier safely through the waters constituting the entrance to Delaware Bay.
'4. She led the Cavelier directly over a submerged wreck.
[ Footnote 6 ] Benedict, Admiralty, 6th Ed., vol. 1, 437; Robinson, Admiralty, 266; Lord, Admiralty Claims Against the Government, 19 Columbia L.Rev. 467; Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 Yale L.J. 1, 35-41; 39 Yale L.J. 1189.
[ Footnote 11 ] Hearings of the House Committee on Judiciary, S. 3076 and H.R. 7124, Nov. 13, 1919, 66th Cong., 1st Sess., at p. 7.
[ Footnote 12 ] H.R. 13591, April 13, 1920, 66th Cong., 2d Sess.; H.R. 6989, February 14, 1924, 68th Cong., 1st Sess.; H.R. 9075, May 5, 1924, 68th Cong., 1st Sess.; H.R. 9535, May 29, 1924, 68th Cong., 1st Sess.
[ Footnote 13 ] See note 1.
[ Footnote 14 ] The Act also contained a special venue provision for cases where the vessel was outside the territorial waters of the United States. 43 Stat. 1112.
[ Footnote 16 ] 43 Stat. 1113: 'Sec. 8. Nothing contained in this Act shall be construed to recognize the existence of or as creating a lien against any public vessel of the United States.
This bill was highly similar to the Public Vessels Act, 1925, 43 Stat. 1112, as finally adopted. A material variance, other than the one mentioned above, was a provision making the consent of the Attorney General a condition precedent to suit under the bill.
[ Footnote 18 ] H. Rep. No. 913, May 31, 1924, 68th Cong., 1st Sess.
[ Footnote 20 ] H. Rep. No. 913, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., at p. 3; S. Rep. No. 941, 68th Cong., 2d Sess., at p. 3; see also H. Rep. No. 1301, 66th Cong., 3rd Sess., Feb. 7, 1921, see especially letter of the Acting Secretary of the Navy, p. 8; Hearings before Committee on Judiciary of the House of Representatives, on H.R. 9075, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., May 21, 1924, pp. 6, 19, 21, 23, 28, 30.
[ Footnote 21 ] See Coastwise Transportation Corp. v. United States, D.C., 43 F.2d 401; The Harding Highway, 3 Cir., 53 F.2d 938.
[ Footnote 22 ] H. Rep. 913, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 1, 6; S. Rep. No. 941, 68th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 1, 6.
[ Footnote 24 ] See note 1, supra. At the time of the Committee reports of H.R. 9535 (which when adopted became the Public Vessels Act), the courts had not yet interpreted the Suits in Admiralty Act, 41 Stat. 525, to authorize recovery on admiralty principles of both in rem and in personam liability. See Eastern Transportation Co. v. United States, 1927, 272 U.S. 675 , 47 S. Ct. 289. We find no discussion of whether Section 2 of the Public Vessels Act imported both principles into its text. The problem had been adverted to in the Attorney General's letters of opinion to the committees considering the problem. H. Rep. No. 913, p. 12, 68th Cong., 1st Sess.; S. Rep. No. 941, p. 12, 68th Cong., 2d Sess.; Hearings before the Committee on Judiciary of the House of Representatives on H.R. 9075, May 21, 1924, pp. 30, 31 and 34.
[ Footnote 25 ] 46 U.S.C. 743, 46 U.S.C.A. 743; see note 9, supra.
[ Footnote 26 ] See note 15, supra.
[ Footnote 27 ] See note 16, supra.
[ Footnote 28 ] See note 20, supra.
[ Footnote 29 ] See note 16, supra.
[ Footnote 30 ] Benedict, Admiralty, 6th Ed., vol. 1, pp. 363-365, 367-369.
[ Footnote 31 ] It is clear that tort liability in admiralty does not require physical contact between the offending vessel and its victim. See Leathers v. Blessing, 105 U.S. 626 , 630: 'Nor is the term 'tort,' when used in reference to admiralty jurisdiction, confined to wrongs or injuries committed by direct force, but it includes wrongs suffered in consequence of the negligence or malfeasance of others, where the remedy at common-law is by an action on the case.' See also Eastern Transportation Co. v. United States, 272 U.S. 675 , 47 S.Ct. 289; Ex parte Fassett, 142 U.S. 479, 485 , 12 S.Ct. 295, 298; Philadelphia, W. & B.R. Co. v. Philadelphia & H., etc., Towboat Co., 23 How. 209, 215, 216; The Lyndhurst, D.C., 92 F. 681; The Kronprinzessin Cecilie, 2 Cir., 192 F. 27; The Campania, 2 Cir., 203 F. 855; The Washington Irving, 2 Cir., 250 F. 797; The Luke, D.C., 19 F.2d 923, affirmed Jacobus-Grauwmiller Co. v. The Alexander Hamilton, 2 Cir., 19 F.2d 925; Coastwise Transportation Corp. v. United States, D.C., 43 F. 2d 401; The J. C. Hart, D.C., 43 F.2d 566; The Favorita, D.C., 43 F.2d 569.

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