Source: https://casetext.com/case/wassam-v-commr-of-soc-sec-admin
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 22:48:20+00:00

Document:
Wassam v. Comm&apos;r of Soc. Sec. Admin.
Wassamv.Comm&apos;r of Soc. Sec. Admin.
The issue before the court is whether the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security ("the Commissioner") denying Plaintiff Michael Scott Wassam's application for Social Security Disability and Supplemental Security Income benefits under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C § 1381 et seq., is supported by substantial evidence and, therefore, conclusive.
Nimberger's name is misspelled "Nimburger" in the hearing transcript. See, doc. 12, tr., at 105, 917.
First, the claimant must demonstrate that he has not engaged in substantial gainful activity during the period of disability. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). Second, the claimant must show that he suffers from a severe medically determinable physical or mental impairment. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). Third, if the claimant shows that his impairment meets or medically equals one of the impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, he is deemed disabled. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). Fourth, the ALJ determines whether, based on the claimant's residual functional capacity, the claimant can perform his past relevant work, in which case the claimant is not disabled. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). Fifth, the ALJ determines whether, based on the claimant's residual functional capacity, as well as his age, education, and work experience, the claimant can make an adjustment to other work, in which case the claimant is not disabled. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v).
The claimant bears the burden of proof during the first four steps, but the burden shifts to the Commissioner at step five. Walters v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 529 (6th Cir.1997).
On January 5, 2012, the second ALJ issued his decision applying the standard five-step analysis to determine whether Wassam was disabled. (Tr., at 10-25.) Based on his review, the ALJ again concluded Wassam was not disabled prior to January 28, 2007, but became disabled on that date and has continued to be disabled through the date of the decision. Further, the ALJ found that Wassam was not under a disability within the meaning of the Social Security Act at any time through September 30, 2006, the date last insured. (Tr., at 14, 24-25.) The Appeals Council denied Wassam's request for review, thus rendering the ALJ's decision the final decision of the Commissioner. (Tr., at 3-5.) Wassam now seeks judicial review of the Commissioner's final decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c).
1. The ALJ erred in determining that the claimant's onset date was January 28, 2007, which was after his date last insured of September 30, 2006.
Wassam got a CPAP machine in May 2005 to help control his OSA with hypersomnia. (Doc. 15, at 6.) That summer and fall, he complained of difficulty with sleep, and being unable to tolerate the CPAP machine. Id.
Other than further treatment history, Wassam does not point to any other medical evaluations of vocational limitations in specific support of his disability claim.
1. The claimant meets the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act through September 30, 2006.
2. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset date (20 CFR 404.1571 et seq., and 416.971 et seq.).
3. Since the alleged onset date of disability, April 2, 2002, the claimant has had the following severe impairments: diabetes mellitus; hepatic cirrhosis; obesity, migraine headaches; neuropathy; sleep apnea; major depressive disorder; anxiety disorder; bipolar disorder; fibromyalgia (20 CFR 404.1520(c) and 416.920(c)).
4. Since the alleged onset date of disability, April 2, 2002, the claimant has not had an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526, 416.920(d), 416.925, and 416.926).
5. After careful consideration of the entire record, I find that prior to January 28, 2007, the date the claimant became disabled, the claimant had the residual functional capacity to perform sedentary work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(a) and 416.967(a) except he must have been allowed to sit and stand at will. He could occasionally operate foot controls. He could frequently reach overhead and reach bilaterally. He could frequently finger objects. He could occasionally climb ramps and stairs[,] and kneel. He could never climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds. He could frequently balance, stoop, crouch, or crawl. He could never be exposed to unprotected heights and moving mechanical parts. He could frequently operate a motor vehicle[,] and frequently be exposed to humidity, wetness and vibration. He could occasionally be exposed to extreme cold and extreme heat. He was not able to perform at a production rate pace, but could perform goal-oriented work. He could frequently interact with supervisors, co-workers or the public.
functional capacity to perform sedentary work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(a) and 416.967(a) except he must be allowed to sit and stand at will. He can occasionally operate foot controls. He can frequently reach overhead and reach bilaterally. He can frequently finger objects. He can occasionally climb ramps and stairs[,] and kneel. He can never climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds. He can frequently balance, stoop, crouch, or crawl. He can never be exposed to unprotected heights and moving mechanical parts. He can frequently operate a motor vehicle[,] and frequently be exposed to humidity, wetness and vibration. He can occasionally be exposed to extreme cold and extreme heat. He is not able to perform at a production rate pace, but can perform goal-oriented work. He can frequently interact with supervisors. He can never interact with co-workers or the public. He will be off-task 15% of the workday.
7. Since April 2, 2002, the claimant has been unable to perform any past relevant work (20 CFR 404.1565 and 416.965).
8. Prior to the established disability onset date, the claimant was younger individual age 18-44. The claimant's age category has not changed since the established disability onset date (20 CFR 404.1563 and 416.963).
9. The claimant has at least a high school education and is able to communicate in English (20 CFR 404.1564 and 416.964).
10. Prior to January 28, 2007, transferability of job skills is not material to the determination of disability because using the Medical-Vocational Rules as a framework supports a finding that the claimant is "not disabled," whether or not the claimant has transferable job skills. Beginning on January 28, 2007, the claimant has not been able to transfer job skills to other occupations (See SSR 82-41 and 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2).
11. Prior to January 28, 2007, considering the claimant's age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity, there were jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant could have performed (20 CFR 404.1569, 404.1569(a), 416.969 and 416.969(a)).
the claimant can perform (20 CFR 1560(c), 404.1566, 416.960(c), and 416.966).
13. The claimant was not disabled prior to January 28, 2007, but became disabled on that date and has continued to be disabled through the date of this decision (20 CFR 404.1520(g) and 416.920(g)).
14. The claimant was not under a disability within the meaning of the Social Security Act at any time through September 30, 2006, the date last insured (20 CFR 404.315(a) and 404.320(b)).
A claimant is entitled to receive Disability Insurance and/or Supplemental Security Income benefits only when he establishes disability within the meaning of the Social Security Act. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 423, 1381. A claimant is considered disabled when he cannot perform "substantial gainful employment by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment that can be expected to result in death or that has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve (12) months." See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1505, 416.905.
Judicial review of the Commissioner's benefits decision is limited to a determination of whether the ALJ applied the correct legal standards, and whether the findings of the ALJ are supported by substantial evidence. Blakley v. Comm'r of Social Security, 581 F.3d 399, 405 (6th Cir. 2009); Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). "Substantial evidence" has been defined as more than a scintilla of evidence but less than a preponderance of the evidence. See Kirk v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 667 F.2d 524, 535 (6th Cir. 1981). Thus, if the record evidence is of such a nature that a reasonable mind might accept it as adequate support for the Commissioner's final benefits determination, that determination must be affirmed. Id.
The Commissioner's determination must stand if supported by substantial evidence, regardless of whether this court would resolve the issues of fact in dispute differently, or substantial evidence also supports the opposite conclusion. See Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 545 (6th Cir. 1986); Kinsella v. Schweiker, 708 F.2d 1058, 1059 (6th Cir. 1983). This court may not try the case de novo, resolve conflicts in the evidence, or decide questions of credibility. See Garner v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 383, 387 (6th Cir. 1984). However, the court may examine all the evidence in the record in making its decision, regardless of whether such evidence was cited in the Commissioner's final decision. See Walker v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 884 F.2d 241, 245 (6th Cir. 1989).
In Gentry, the claimant had argued that the ALJ had ignored objective medical evidence of the severity of her conditions. Gentry, 741 F.3d at 712. The Sixth Circuit found that the ALJ did not properly determine whether the claimant's conditions matched any of the listing in Appendix 1 under step three. Id. at 724. The ALJ had ignored record evidence that supported a finding that her conditions did match. The ALJ also ignored significant evidence that supported the claimant's longstanding complaints of pain, and allegations of restrictions on sitting, standing, and using her hands. Id. at 725. Wassam does not provide a similar specific analysis of a listing which would apply, or evidence to support specific physical limitations.
The Sixth Circuit in Gentry found that the ALJ's decision was not supported by substantial evidence where the ALJ ignored medical evidence from the claimant's treating physicians, which resulted in a "disregard of a substantial body of medical evidence supporting a finding that [the claimant] is disabled." Gentry, 741 F.3d at 729. Here, although Wassam points to evidence in the record of his various physical and mental maladies, he does not point to evidence to support a finding that he cannot perform any substantial gainful employment by reason of those impairments.
In addition, Wassam argues that the ALJ based his findings on a function report completed by the claimant in August 2005 concerning his daily activities. Wassam points to cases in which the court found that "the performance of minor daily activities is insufficient to establish the ability to engage in substantial gainful activity." (Doc. 15, at 19, citing Damron v. Secretary, 778 F.2d 279 (6th Cir. 1985), and other cases).
However, the regulations provide that an ALJ may consider household and social activities in evaluating symptoms. Abdelhadi v. Commissioner, No. 5:09CV2551, 2011 WL 867597, at *9-*10 (N.D. Ohio March 10, 2011) (citing Blacha v. Secretary, HHS, 927 F.2d 228, 231 (6th Cir. 1990)). In Abdelhadi, the ALJ found that the claimant's household and social activities were relevant to evaluating the intensity and severity of her symptoms, and that the ALJ did not err in considering the household and social activities. Abdelhadi, 2011 WL 867597, at *10. Similarly here, the ALJ found that Wassam's household and social activities were relevant to evaluating the intensity and limiting effects of his symptoms, and it was not error for the ALJ to consider these activities. See generally tr., at 19-20.
The ALJ violated the agency's own regulations when he "cherry picked" the evidence, discounted significant findings suggestive of disability, and focused on the little that claimant could do to find that he was not disabled prior to his date last insured, which was only four months prior to the finding of disability that was made.
Although Wassam argues that the ALJ is slighting, or ignoring, medical evidence that could lead to a finding of disability, Wassam does not identify any medical or psychological opinion which would support a finding that Wassam could not perform any substantial gainful employment (pre-2007) by reason of any medically determinable, lasting physical or mental impairment. See generally 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1512(a), (c), 416.912(a), (c) (medical and other evidence must be furnished about effects of impairment(s) on ability to work); see also tr., at 423 (noting that no treating or examining source statement regarding claimant's physical capacities was on file).
In addition, the ALJ's findings based on the credibility of the claimant are accorded great weight and deference. Walters v. Commissioner, 127 F.3d 525, 531 (6th Cir. 1997); Gonzalez v. Commissioner, No. 1:06CV687, 2008 WL 584927, at *5 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 17, 2008). Nevertheless, the ALJ's assessment of the claimant's credibility must be supported by substantial evidence. Id.
The ALJ is not permitted to make credibility determinations based solely upon intangible or intuitive notions about an individual's credibility, but rather the ALJ's credibility determinations must be "based on a consideration of the entire case record," and "must find support in the record." Rogers v. Commissioner, 486 F.3d 234, 247-248 (6th Cir. 2007). SSR 96-7p also requires the ALJ explain his credibility determinations in his decision such that it "must be sufficiently specific to make clear to the individual and to any subsequent reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave to the individual's statements and the reasons for that weight." Rogers, 486 F.3d at 248. The court finds that the ALJ's credibility determinations are reasonable, specific, and supported by substantial evidence.
The ALJ identified specific facts supported by the record which cast doubt on the severity of the disabilities as described by Wassam. (Tr., at 17, 19-20.) Because "a reasonable mind might accept [the evidence] as adequate to support" his credibility determination, the court concludes that substantial evidence supports the ALJ's finding. Norris v. Commissioner, No. 11-5424, 2012 WL 372986, at *5 (6th Cir. Feb. 7, 2012) (citing Rogers, 486 F.3d at 241).
Wassam argues that choosing the January 28, 2007, date was arbitrary, and not in the spirit of the Social Security Act, which is remedial legislation, meant to be liberally applied. (Doc. 15, at 20, citing O'Daniel v. Richardson, 458 F.2d 330, 334 (6th Cir. 1972).) Wassam argues that an earlier date, within the insured period, should have been selected, but he does not propose a specific date, nor does he provide any medical or psychological opinion which would support a finding that Wassam could not perform substantial gainful employment by reason of a medically determinable physical or mental impairment as of an earlier date. Wassam states that nothing really changed between September 2006 and January 2007, thus, the choice of the January date was arbitrary. (Doc. 15, at 20.) Given that Wassam had a psychotic episode resulting in hospitalization on January 28, 2007, the court does not find that particular date to be "arbitrary."
For the foregoing reasons, the court finds that the decision of the Commissioner is supported by substantial evidence. The record evidence as discussed in the ALJ's decision is such that a reasonable mind might accept it as adequate support for the Commissioner's final benefits determination. The Commissioner's decision denying benefits is AFFIRMED.
Wilson v. Commissioner of Social Security, 378 F.3d 541, 548 (6th Cir. 2004).

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