Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/114/622/
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 19:59:23+00:00

Document:
The terms "imports" and "exports" in Art. I, Sec. 10, Clause 2, of the Constitution, prohibiting states, without the consent of Congress, from levying duties on imports or exports, has reference to goods brought from, or carried to foreign countries alone, and not to goods transported from one state to another.
Woodruff v. Parham, 8 Wall. 123, affirmed and applied.
A general state tax laid alike upon all property does not infringe that clause of the Constitution if it happens to fall upon goods which, though not then intended for exportation, are subsequently exported.
the matter is national in character or admits of a uniform system or plan of regulation.
So long as Congress passes no law to regulate interstate commerce of the nature and character which makes its jurisdiction exclusive, its refraining from action indicates its will that that commerce shall be free and untrammeled.
Coal mined in Pennsylvania and sent by water to New Orleans to be sold in open market there on account of the owners in Pennsylvania becomes intermingled, on arrival there, with the general property in the Louisiana, and is subject to taxation under general laws of that state although it may be, after arrival, sold from the vessel on which the transportation was made, and without being landed, and for the purpose of being taken out of the country on a vessel bound to a foreign port.
Such taxation does no violation either to Art I, Sec. 8, Clause 3; Art. I, Sec. 10, Clause 2; or Art. IV, Sec. 2, Clause 1 of the Constitution.
The proper limits of these rulings pointed out.
This was a suit in the nature of a bill in equity to restrain the defendants, who were defendants in error here, from collecting a tax imposed upon personal property by the authorities of the State of Louisiana. The facts which make the case are stated in the opinion of the Court.
of the notice annexed to the petition. The plaintiffs alleged that they were not indebted to the State of Louisiana for said tax; that they were the sole owners of the coal, and were not liable for any tax hereon, having paid all taxes legally due for the year 1880 on said coal in Pennsylvania, and that the said coal was simply under the care of Brown & Jones as the agents of the plaintiffs in New Orleans for sale. They further alleged that said coal was mined in Pennsylvania and was exported from said state and imported into the State of Louisiana as their property, and was then (at the time of the petition), and had always remained, in its original condition, and never had been or become mixed or incorporated with other property in the State of Louisiana; that when said assessment was made, the said coal was afloat in the Mississippi River, in the Parish of Orleans, in the original condition in which it was exported from Pennsylvania, and the agents, Brown & Jones, notified the board of assessors of the parish that the coal did not belong to them, but to the plaintiffs, and was held as before stated, and was not subject to taxation, and protested against the assessment for that purpose. The plaintiffs averred that the assessment of the tax and any attempt to collect the same were illegal and oppressive and contrary to the Constitution of the United States, Article I, Section 8, pars. 1 and 3, and Section 10, par. 2. They therefore prayed an injunction to prevent the seizure and sale of the coal, which, upon giving the requisite bond, was granted.
"OFFICE STATE TAX COLLECTOR, UPPER DISTRICT"
"PARISH OF ORLEANS, No. 24 UNION STREET"
"NEW ORLEANS, Dec. 20, 1880"
"To Brown & Jones, Gravier and Charles Street."
in full on or before the first day of the current month; that you became a delinquent for said taxes on such first day of December; that after the expiration of twenty days from the date of this notice, I, as tax collector of the upper district of the Parish of Orleans, will advertise for sale the movable property on which the said taxes are due in the manner provided by law for judicial sales; that at the principal front door of the courthouse, where the civil district court of said parish is held, I will sell, within the legal hours for judicial sales, for cash, and without appraisement, such portion of the said movable property as you shall point out and deliver to me, and in case you shall not point out sufficient property, that I will at once, and without further delay, sell for cash, without appraisement, the least quantity of said movable property which any bidder will buy for the amount of taxes assessed upon movable property, with interest and costs."
"State Tax Collector, Upper District, Parish of Orleans"
The defendant answered with a general denial, but admitting the assessment of the tax and the intention to sell the property for payment thereof.
interior of the state for plantation use by the flatboat load. Samuel S. Brown, one of the plaintiffs, testified that the plaintiffs were the owners of the coal in question; that it was mined in plaintiffs' mine, in Allegheny County, Pennsylvania; that a tax of two or more mills was paid on it in Pennsylvania as state tax thereon in the year 1880, being the tax of 1880; that a tax was also paid on it to the County of Allegheny for the year 1880; that it was shipped from Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, in 1880, and was received in New Orleans in its original condition and in its original packages, and still owned by the plaintiffs. No other proof was offered in the case.
"SECTION 1st. That for the calendar year 1880 and for each and every succeeding calendar year, there are hereby levied annual taxes, amounting in the aggregate to six mills on the dollar of the assessed valuation hereafter to be made of all property situated within the State of Louisiana, except such as is expressly exempted from taxation by the (state) constitution."
The exemptions from taxation under the Constitution of Louisiana do not affect the question.
Upon the case as thus made, the district court of the parish dissolved the injunction and dismissed the suit. On appeal to the Supreme Court of Louisiana, this judgment was affirmed, and the case is now here by writ of error to the judgment of the supreme court.
"The lower court erred in holding:"
"1st. That the tax in question did not violate Article IV, Section 2, cl. 1, of the federal Constitution."
"2d. That it did not violate Article I, Section 8, cl. 3, of the same instrument."
"3d. That it did not violate Article I, Section 10, cl. 2, of the same instrument."
"1. The citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states. "
"2. The Congress shall have power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes."
"3. No state shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any imposts or duties on imports or exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws."
"First. This act [Act No. 77 of 1880] does not in its terms discriminate against the products of other states or the property of the citizens of other states, but subjects all property liable to taxation found within the state, whether of its own citizens or citizens of other states, whether imported from other states or produced here, to the same rate of taxation. . . ."
"Second. The coal in question was taxed in common with all other property found within the state. We held in the case of City of New Orleans v. Eclipse Towboat Company, recently decided by us, but not reported, * that the clause in the federal Constitution giving to Congress the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the states had no immediate relation to or necessary connection with the taxing power of a state. Every tax upon property, it is true, may affect more or less the operations of commerce by diminishing the profits to be derived from the subjects of commerce, but it does not for that reason amount to a regulation of commerce within the meaning of the federal Constitution, and such is the doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court of the United States. State Tax on Railway Gross Receipts, 15 Wall. 293. . . ."
to it and to recognize the alleged prohibition contended for would create an exemption for all goods and merchandise and property of every kind and description brought into the state for sale or use, and by such construction destroy a main source of revenue to the state. As we had occasion to show in the case referred to, the word 'imports' used in the Constitution has been construed to apply not to property brought or imported from other states of the Union, but solely to imports from foreign countries. Woodruff v. Parham, 8 Wall. 122; Pervear v. Commonwealth, 5 Wall. 475, 72 U. S. 479. . . ."
In approaching the consideration of the case, we will first take up the last objection raised by the plaintiff in error, namely, that the tax was a duty on imports and exports.
court, however, after an elaborate examination of the question, held that the terms "imports" and "exports" in the clause under consideration had reference to goods brought from or carried to foreign countries alone, and not to goods transported from one state to another.
it cannot be construed as a duty on exports when falling upon goods not then intended for exportation, though they should happen to be exported afterwards. This is the most that can be said of the goods in question, and we are therefore of opinion that the tax was not a duty on exports any more than it was a duty on imports within a meaning of those terms in the clause under consideration.
But in holding, with the decision in Woodruff v. Parham, that goods carried from one state to another are not imports or exports within the meaning of the clause which prohibits a state from laying any impost or duty on imports or exports, we do not mean to be understood as holding that a state may levy import or export duties on goods imported from or exported to another state. We only mean to say that the clause in question does not prohibit it. Whether the laying of such duties by a state would not violate some other provision of the Constitution -- that, for example, which gives to Congress the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, among the several states, and with the Indian tribes -- is a different question. This brings us to the consideration of the second assignment of error, which is founded on the clause referred to.
This was said in a case where plaintiff in error had been convicted of selling goods without a license under a law of the State of Missouri which prohibited any person from dealing as a peddler without license, and which declared that a peddler was one dealing in goods or wares "not the growth, produce, or manufacture of this state [Missouri] by going from place to place to sell the same." To the same purport, and on the same subject generally, See Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 209; License Cases, 5 How. 575, 46 U. S. 592, 47 U. S. 594, 46 U. S. 600, 46 U. S. 605; Passenger Cases, 7 How. 407, 48 U. S. 414, 48 U. S. 419, 48 U. S. 445, 48 U. S. 462-464; Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35, 73 U. S. 41-49; Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168, 75 U. S. 182-184; Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 418, 79 U. S. 430-431; State Tax on Railway Receipts, 15 Wall. 293; The Lottawanna, 21 Wall. 581; Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U. S. 259; Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U. S. 99; Railroad Co. v. Husen, 95 U. S. 465; Cook v. Pennsylvania, 97 U. S. 566; Guy v. Baltimore, 100 U. S. 434; Tiernan v. Rinker, 102 U. S. 123; Packet Co. v. Catlettsburg, 105 U. S. 559; Transportation Co. v. Parkersburg, 107 U. S. 701; and see Moran v. New Orleans, 112 U. S. 69.
"It seems hardly necessary to argue at length that unless the statute can be justified as a legitimate exercise of the police power of the state, it is a usurpation of the power vested exclusively in Congress. It is a plain regulation of interstate commerce, a regulation extending to prohibition. Whatever may be the power of a state over commerce that is completely internal, it can no more prohibit or regulate that which is interstate than it can that which is with foreign nations."
In short, it may be laid down as the settled doctrine of this Court at this day that a state can no more regulate or impede commerce among the several states than it can regulate or impede commerce with foreign nations.
This being the recognized law, the question then arises whether the assessment of the tax in question amounted to any interference with, or restriction upon, the free introduction of the plaintiffs' coal from the State of Pennsylvania into the State of Louisiana and the free disposal of the same in commerce in the latter state -- in other words, whether the tax amounted to a regulation of or restriction upon commerce among the states, or only to an exercise of local administration under the general taxing power, which, though it may incidentally affect the subjects of commerce, is entirely within the power of the state until Congress shall see fit to interfere and make express regulations on the subject.
continue in that condition for a year or two years, or only for a day. It had become a part of the general mass of property in the state, and as such it was taxed for the current year (1880) as all other property in the City of New Orleans was taxed. Under the law, it could not be taxed again until the following year. It was subjected to no discrimination in favor of goods which were the product of Louisiana, or goods which were the property of citizens of Louisiana. It was treated in exactly the same manner as such goods were treated.
taxing can be deemed a regulation of commerce which would have the objectionable effect referred to.
We do not mean to say that if a tax collector should be stationed at every ferry and railroad depot in the City of New York, charged with the duty of collecting a tax on every wagonload or carload of produce and merchandise brought into the city, that it would not be a regulation of and restraint upon interstate commerce so far as the tax should be imposed on articles brought from other states. We think it would be, and that it would be an encroachment upon the exclusive powers of Congress. It would be very different from the tax laid on auction sales of all property indiscriminately, as in the case of Woodruff v. Parham, which had no relation to the movement of goods from one state to another. It would be very different from a tax laid, as in the present case, on property which had reached its destination, and had become part of the general mass of property of the city, and which was only taxed as a part of that general mass in common with all other property in the city, and in precisely the same manner.
When Congress shall see fit to make a regulation on the subject of property transported from one state to another which may have the effect to give it a temporary exemption from taxation in the state to which it is transported, it will be time enough to consider any conflict that may arise between such regulation and the general taxing laws of the state. In the present case we see no such conflict either in the law itself or in the proceedings which have been had under it and sustained by the state tribunals, nor any conflict with the general rule that a state cannot pass a law which shall interfere with the unrestricted freedom of commerce between the states.
In our opinion, therefore, the second assignment of error is untenable.
case, we have carefully examined the brief of the plaintiffs' counsel for light on the subject, but so far as we can understand the point is not urged. We are certainly unable to see how or in what respect any equality of privileges as citizens has been denied to the plaintiffs by the imposition of the tax. Their property was only taxed like that of all other persons, whether citizens of Louisiana or of any other state or country. Not the slightest discrimination was made.
* The judgment in this case was reversed by this Court in Moran v. New Orleans, 112 U. S. 69, 112 U. S. 75.

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