Source: https://case-law.vlex.com/vid/545-u-s-844-605875234
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 06:16:27+00:00

Document:
Party Name: MCCREARY COUNTY, KENTUCKY, et al., Petitioners, v. AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF KENTUCKY et al.
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF KENTUCKY et al.
rather than secular, purpose under Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 101 S.Ct. 192, 66 L.Ed.2d 199, and found that the Counties' asserted educational goals crumbled upon an examination of this litigation's history. Affirming, the Sixth Circuit stressed that, under Stone, displaying the Commandments bespeaks a religious object unless they are integrated with a secular message. The court saw no integration here because of a lack of a demonstrated analytical or historical connection between the Commandments and the other documents.
1. A determination of the Counties' purpose is a sound basis for ruling on the Establishment Clause complaints. The Counties' objective may be dispositive of the constitutional enquiry. Pp. 2732-2737.
(a) Lemon's "'secular legislative purpose" enquiry, 403 U.S. at 612, 91 S.Ct. 2105, has been a common, albeit seldom dispositive, element of this Court's cases, Wallace v. Jaffree, at 75, 105 S.Ct. 2479, 86 L.Ed.2d 29. When the government acts with the ostensible and predominant purpose of advancing religion, it violates the central Establishment Clause value of official religious neutrality, there being no neutrality when the government's ostensible object is to take sides. Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter--day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 335, 107 S.Ct. 2862, 97 L.Ed.2d 273. A purpose to favor one faith over another, or adherence to religion generally, clashes with the "understanding . . . that liberty and social stability demand a . . . tolerance that respects the religious views of all citizens." Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 718, 122 S.Ct. 2460, 153 L.Ed.2d 604. Pp. 2732-2733.
(b) The Court declines the Counties' request to abandon Lemon's purpose test. Their assertions that true "purpose" is unknowable, and its search merely an excuse for courts to act selectively and unpredictably in picking out evidence of subjective intent, are as seismic as they are unconvincing. Examination of purpose is a staple of statutory interpretation for every American appellate court, e.g., General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 600, 124 S.Ct. 1236, 157 L.Ed.2d 1094, and governmental purpose is a key element of a good deal of constitutional doctrine, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 48 L.Ed.2d 597. Scrutinizing purpose makes practical sense in Establishment Clause analysis, where an understanding of official objective emerges from readily discoverable fact set forth in a statute's text, legislative history, and implementation or comparable official act. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 73-74, 105 S.Ct. 2479.
[125 S.Ct. 2725] Nor is there any indication that the purpose enquiry is rigged in practice to finding a religious purpose dominant every time a case is filed. Pp. 2733-2735.
satisfy it, and they would cut context out of the enquiry, to the point of ignoring history, no matter what bearing it actually had on the significance of current circumstances. There is no precedent for these arguments, or reason supporting them. Pp. 2735-2737.
(1) A legislature's stated reasons will generally warrant the deference owed in the first instance to such official claims, but Lemon requires the secular purpose to be genuine, not a sham, and not merely secondary to a religious objective, see, e.g., Santa Fe Independent School Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 308, 120 S.Ct. 2266, 147 L.Ed.2d 295. In those unusual cases where the claim was an apparent sham, or the secular purpose secondary, the unsurprising results have been findings of no adequate secular object, as against a predominantly religious one. See, e.g., Stone, supra, at 41, 101 S.Ct. 192. Pp. 2735-2736.
(2) The Counties' argument that purpose in a case like this should be inferred only from the latest in a series of governmental actions, however close they may all be in time and subject, bucks common sense. Reasonable observers have reasonable memories, and the Court's precedents sensibly forbid an observer "to turn a blind eye to the context in which [the] policy arose." Santa Fe, supra, at 315, 120 S.Ct. 2266. Pp. 2736-2737.
2. Evaluation of the Counties' claim of secular purpose for the ultimate displays may take their evolution into account. The development of the presentation should be considered in determining its purpose. Pp. 2737-2741.
(a) Stone is the Court's initial benchmark as its only case dealing with the constitutionality of displaying the Commandments. It recognized that the Commandments are an "instrument of religion" and that, at least on the facts before the Court, their text's display could presumptively be understood as meant to advance religion: although state law specifically required their posting in classrooms, their isolated exhibition did not allow even for an argument that secular education explained their being there. 449 U.S. at 41, n. 3, 101 S.Ct. 192. But Stone did not purport to decide the constitutionality of every possible way the government might set out the Commandments, and under the Establishment Clause detail is key, County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 595, 109 S.Ct. 3086, 106 L.Ed.2d 472. Hence, the Court looks to the record showing the progression leading up to the Commandments' third display, beginning with the first. Pp. 2737-2738.

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