Source: http://masscases.com/cases/sjc/380/380mass869.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 00:37:37+00:00

Document:
CIVIL ACTION commenced in the Superior Court Department on August 17, 1978.
William Link, III (Charles E. Cashman with him) for the plaintiffs.
Timothy S. Hillman for the defendants.
Francis X. Bellotti, Attorney General, Carl Valvo, Assistant Attorney General, & Ann Futter, Legal Assistant to the Attorney General, for the Department of Mental Health, amicus curiae, submitted a brief.
institutionalized but educable adults, with histories of mental difficulties, will live while being trained in skills for independent living, such as self-care, cooking, job seeking, budgeting, and making use of community resources. The Association relies on that provision in G. L. c. 40A, Section 2, as amended through St. 1959, c. 607, Section 1, that provides that no zoning ordinance "which prohibits or limits the use of land . . . for any educational purpose which is . . . public shall be valid." [Note 3] See Attorney Gen. v. Dover, 327 Mass. 601 , 603 (1951). We conclude that the use that the Association intends to make of the premises is a use for a public educational purpose that cannot be prohibited or limited by the provisions of the Fitchburg zoning ordinance.
On May 8, 1978, the Housing Authority applied for a permit to convert a residential building on Prospect Street for use as a community residence. The superintendent of buildings ruled that a community residence was not permitted in the Residence B zoning district in which the premises lay. On May 10, 1978, the Association and the Housing Authority appealed to the city's board of zoning appeals seeking "authorization to operate a residential educational and rehabilitation facility for adults with histories of psychiatric difficulties." The appeal was not founded on a claim that a variance should be granted from the provisions of the zoning ordinance but rather on the theory that the proposed use was permitted as a matter of law. The appeal relied on (1) the language of the zoning ordinance that permitted "Private and Public Schools" in a Residence B zoning district and (2) the provisions of Section 2 of The Zoning Enabling Act.
The issues for decision in the Superior Court were questions of law on the facts found by the judge. No deference to the judgment or discretion of the local zoning board was required. Opinions relied on by the zoning board, defining the role of a Superior Court judge on an appeal from the granting of a variance or a special permit, are inapplicable.
aimed at developing or learning social and interpersonal skills such as learning to keep themselves physically clean, learning to shop and how to use money, [and] learning to cook." The basic purpose would be "to train people to rid themselves of bad habits and teach them habits so that they would be qualified to live independently by themselves in a community." There would be full-time house managers, whose qualifications would include a bachelor's degree in human services. None of the teachers would be certified under G. L. c. 71, Section 38G. In selecting personnel, the emphasis would not be on teaching experience or qualifications, but more on social and psychological training and abilities.
The judge concluded that the proposed facility would not be a school "but a medical facility." [Note 6] He acknowledged the claim that the use was an exempt educational use but did not discuss the question in determining that the facility would not be a school. Judgment was entered that no modification of the decision of the board of zoning appeals was required. We transferred here on our own motion the appeal of the Association and the Housing Authority.
The central issue in this case is one of law, not of fact. The judge's findings are based on the Association's representations at trial concerning its planned use of the premises.
5 Mass. App. Ct. 600 , 603 (1977), discussed infra. The fact that the facility will provide residential accommodations does not interfere with its educational use. President & Fellows of Harvard College v. Assessors of Cambridge, 175 Mass. 145 , 146-147 (1900). Trustees of Phillips Academy v. Andover, 175 Mass. 118 , 125 (1900). The question remains whether the dominant activity will be educational.
There is respectable authority that a residential facility for the education of emotionally disturbed children is an educational use. Our Appeals Court so held in Harbor Schools, Inc. v. Board of Appeals of Haverhill, supra, dealing with Section 2 of The Zoning Enabling Act. In that case, the educational program offered by the facility involved indoctrination in traditional academic subjects and fulfilled the public policy expressed in c. 766 of the Acts of 1972 concerning the education of children with special needs. Id. at 606. State certification of its teachers apparently was not required. Id. at 603. A residential facility approved by a State Department of Education for the education of children with mild emotional disturbances, offering a curriculum comparable to that afforded in the public schools, has been held to be a "school" within the meaning of the word in the local zoning regulations. Armstrong v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Washington, 158 Conn. 158 (1969). The circumstances were substantially similar and the result was the same in Wiltwyck School for Boys, Inc. v. Hill, 11 N.Y.2d 182 (1962). In Areba School Corp. v. Mayor of Randolph, 151 N.J. Super. 336, 341 (1977), the court rejected as clearly erroneous a finding that a residential school for emotionally disturbed children, designed to meet the educational obligations of local school boards, was a therapeutic community with merely an ancillary educational component.
145 Mass. 139 , 146 (1887). In the Mount Hermon case, we accepted as a definition of education "the process of developing and training the powers and capabilities of human beings," and embraced the idea that education is the process of preparing persons "for activity and usefulness in life." Id. at 146.
The proposed facility would fulfil a significant educational goal in preparing its residents to live by themselves outside the institutional setting. Instruction in the activities of daily living is neither trivial nor unnecessary to these persons. On the contrary, for the prospective residents of the proposed facility to learn or relearn such skills is an important step toward developing their powers and capabilities as human beings. Inculcating a basic understanding of how to cope with everyday problems and to maintain oneself in society is incontestably an educational process. That is the dominant purpose of the proposed facility.
Similar reasoning guided the court in School Lane Hills, Inc. v. East Hempfield Township Zoning Hearing Bd., 18 Pa. Commw. Ct. 519, 525 (1975), where a center for the training of retarded youth to assume a positive role in society by providing them with industrial skills was held to be "educational in nature" under a local zoning ordinance. The court said that "[w]hile such skills may appear simplistic to a `normal' person, their assimilation nonetheless represents a great improvement in the normal human condition of the trainees. The nature of the Child Development Center is no less educational than that of the most demanding university." Id. at 524. Past and continuing emotional or psychiatric problems may determine the character of the training furnished to residents of the proposed facility, but they do not mark the facility as "medical" or render it any less educational.
The judgment is reversed. Judgment shall be entered declaring that the proposed use is a public educational use that may not be barred under the Fitchburg zoning ordinance and that a permit to use the premises may not be denied to the Association and the Housing Authority on the ground that the proposed use is not permitted as a matter of law.
[Note 1] North Central Massachusetts Mental Health Association, Inc.
[Note 2] Building Inspector of Fitchburg.
[Note 3] This language appears in The Zoning Enabling Act which has been superseded by The Zoning Act, a revised zoning regulatory statute adopted in 1975. St. 1975, c. 808, Section 3. All parties have treated the issue in the court below and here as governed by the quoted language of Section 2 of The Zoning Enabling Act and not by similar language now appearing in Section 3 of The Zoning Act. It appears that, at the time of the filing of the application for authority to use the premises, Section 2 of The Zoning Enabling Act was the controlling statute.
[Note 4] General Laws c. 40A, Section 15, as appearing in St. 1975, c. 808, Section 3, provides in part that "[t]he decision of the board shall be made within seventy-five days after the date of the . . . application . . . [with an exception not relevant here]. Failure by the board to act within said seventy-five days shall be deemed to be the grant of the . . . application . . . sought" subject to judicial appeal. This automatic approval provision changed prior law. See Casasanta v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Milford, 377 Mass. 67 , 69-73 (1979); Cullen v. Building Inspector of N. Attleborough, 353 Mass. 671 (1968). The new statutory provision became effective in Fitchburg on July 1, 1978. Because of the conclusion we reach on the exemption afforded by Section 2 of The Zoning Enabling Act, we need not decide whether the "automatic" approval provision of the new act applied to an appeal submitted to and heard by the board of zoning appeals prior to July 1, 1978. Our opinion in the Casasanta case does not answer this question. We note that the board's decision was rendered within seventy-five days of July 1, 1978.
[Note 5] The only evidence of a need for medical treatment was testimony that 95% of the residents would be taking prescription medicine largely under their own control, although the staff might control and distribute the medication for some residents. There would be neither medically trained personnel nor medical facilities on the premises. The judge found that a staff psychologist would visit periodically and a psychiatrist would be available. Some residents of the facility would be under conservatorship or guardianship. There was evidence that the ten people served by the facility would be in residence for varying periods of time, as long as two years, if necessary. The Association disclaims any intention to accept in the facility individuals whose primary diagnosis is alcoholism, criminality, drug abuse, organic brain disorder, violent behavior, antisocial sexual behavior, or mental retardation.
[Note 6] The question whether the proposed use would be a school and hence a permissible use under the Fitchburg zoning ordinance was not raised in the complaint filed in the Superior Court and, by language in the complaint, was inferentially abandoned as a ground for the appeal. The judge discussed the point. The appellants argue it here. In any event, we need not decide the point because it is made irrelevant by our decision that the proposed use is an educational use.
[Note 7] There is no claim that, if the use is an educational use, it is not a public educational use. The facility will be available to all people in north central Massachusetts, and, therefore, its character as a public use cannot reasonably be, and is not, questioned. See Worcester v. New England Inst. & New England School of Accounting, Inc., 335 Mass. 486 , 488-490 (1957); Assessors of Lancaster v. Perkins School, 323 Mass. 418 . 421 (1948).
[Note 8] On the contrary, the Association will not accept as residents persons whose primary diagnoses suggest the potential for dangerous or antisocial behavior. See note 5, supra.

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