Source: https://library.nclc.org/fdc/010408
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 10:10:15+00:00

Document:
318 See In re Pressler & Pressler, L.L.P., Consent Order, 2016-CFPB-0009, 5–6 (C.F.P.B. Apr. 25, 2016) (“Most accounts that are placed with Respondents for collection are transmitted through an electronic system using a collection software network such as ‘You Got Claims’ . . . For such electronically transmitted claims, Respondents normally received only either an Excel spreadsheet or a text file containing specific data regarding each account, or claim for a Debt. The data included in these submissions is provided in summary form only and documentation supporting the data was not included.”); Commonwealth v. Lustig, Glaser & Wilson, P.C., Complaint ¶¶22–23 (Mass. Super. Ct. Dec. 21, 2015) (firm filed more than 100,000 collection lawsuits from 2011 through 2015) (“[T]he Lustig Firm regularly downloaded electronic information about alleged consumer debts from Debt Buyers in large batches . . . This information often consisted of little more than a summary electronic data file from the Debt Buyer. This summary data file was typically unaccompanied by meaningful account-level documentation—such as the original contract, monthly statements, a payment history, dispute history, and chain of title documentation—that would be necessary to establish the existence and accuracy of the debt.”); Miller v. Upton, Cohen & Slamowitz, 687 F. Supp. 2d 86, 92–93 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (creditor granted first law firm access to store’s electronic files on account, but second law firm—where account was transferred to file suit—only had access to consumer’s basic identifying information but not credit card agreement, consumer’s correspondence, payment history, or information about prior collection efforts).
319 See also § 1.5.5, infra (discussing scrubbing).
320 In re Pressler & Pressler, L.L.P., Consent Order, 2016-CFPB-0009, 6 (C.F.P.B. Apr. 25, 2016).
321 Consumer Fin. Protection Bur., Consumer Credit Card Market Report 253 (Dec. 2015).
322 See Consumer Fin. Protection Bur. v. Weltman, Weinberg, & Reis Co., L.P.A., Complaint, 17-cv-817, ¶¶ 23–24 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 17, 2017); Commonwealth v. Lustig, Glaser & Wilson, P.C., Complaint ¶ 26 (Mass. Super. Ct. Dec. 21, 2015).
323 See § 7.6.2, infra.
324 See § 1.4.9.3, infra.
325 See § 1.4.9.4, infra.
326 See § 1.4.9.4, infra.
327 See, e.g., In re Pressler & Pressler, L.L.P., Consent Order, 2016-CFPB-0009, 7 (C.F.P.B. Apr. 25, 2016) (“The signing attorney generally spent less than a few minutes, sometimes less than 30 seconds, reviewing each summons and complaint before approving the filings and directing that a lawsuit be initiated”); Consumer Fin. Protection Bur. v. Frederick J. Hanna & Assoc., Complaint, 14-cv-2211, ¶14 (N.D. Ga. July 14, 2014) (“The Firm’s attorneys gave only cursory review to those suits, checking the pleadings prepared by non-attorney support staff for grammar and spelling errors. The Firm’s attorneys were expected to spend no more than one minute reviewing and signing the pleadings prepared by support staff.”); Bock v. Pressler & Pressler, 30 F. Supp. 3d 283 (D.N.J. 2014) (collection cases were prepared for lawsuit by non-attorneys who prepared a pre-drafted complaint for attorney review; only attorney involvement in filing of the case was four-second “review” before complaint was forwarded for filing). See also § 5.5.6.2, infra (discussing meaningful involvement by attorneys).
328 See, e.g., In re Pressler & Pressler, L.L.P., Consent Order, 2016-CFPB-0009, 7 (C.F.P.B. Apr. 25, 2016); Commonwealth v. Lustig, Glaser & Wilson, P.C., Complaint ¶¶55–63 (Mass. Super. Ct. Dec. 21, 2015); Bock v. Pressler & Pressler, L.L.P., 30 F. Supp. 3d 283, 290 (D.N.J. 2014) (finding a violation of § 1692e where “neither [reviewing attorney] nor any other member of Pressler’s staff reviewed, or otherwise had knowledge of, the contract between Bock and the bank, including any choice of law, choice of venue, or dispute resolution clause governing disputes between Bock and his creditor . . . Nor did [reviewing attorney] or anyone else at Pressler review the agreement by which Bock’s original creditor allegedly assigned this debt to Pressler’s client, Midland.”); Consumer Fin. Protection Bur. v. Frederick J. Hanna & Assoc., Complaint, 14-cv-2211, ¶24 (N.D. Ga. July 14, 2014).
329 See In re Faloni & Assoc., Consent Order, 2016-CFPB-0006 (C.F.P.B. Feb. 23, 2016).
330 See Consumer Fin. Protection Bur. v. Frederick J. Hanna & Assoc., Complaint, 14-cv-2211, ¶23 (N.D. Ga. July 14, 2014).
331 See, e.g., Kaymark v. Bank of Am., 783 F.3d 168 (3d Cir. 2015) (listing fees not yet incurred in foreclosure complaint stated a claim against law firm under FDCPA); McDermott v. Marcus, Errico, Emmer & Brooks, P.C., 911 F. Supp. 2d 1, 60 (D. Mass. 2012) (law firm violated FDCPA by overstating amount of attorney fees owed in collection letter). See also §§ 7.4, 8.4, infra.
332 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Lustig, Glaser & Wilson, P.C., Complaint ¶¶73–80 (Mass. Super. Ct. Dec. 21, 2015); McCollough v. Johnson, Rodenburg & Lauinger, L.L.C., 637 F.3d 939 (9th Cir. 2011) (lawyers filed lawsuit against consumer despite evidence that debt was beyond statute of limitations). See also § 7.2.12.3, infra.
333 See, e.g., Harold v. Steel, 773 F.3d 884, 886 (7th Cir. 2014) (“If a debt collector violates [15 U.S.C. § 1692i], it inflicts an injury measured by the costs of travelling or sending a lawyer to the remote court and moving for a change of venue, no matter how the suit comes out.”); S. Rep. No. 95-382, at 5 (1977), 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 1969 (“This legislation also addresses the problem of ‘forum abuse,’ an unfair practice in which debt collectors file suit against consumers in courts which are so distant or inconvenient that consumers are unable to appear. As a result, the debt collector obtains a default judgment and the consumer is denied his day in court.”). See also § 10.3, infra.
334 See Demarais v. Gurstel Chargo, P.A., 869 F.3d 685 (8th Cir. 2017).
335 See, e.g., Waitkus v. Pressler & Pressler, L.L.P., 2012 WL 686025 (D.N.J. Mar. 2, 2012) (allegations that collection attorneys obtained 100% of consumer’s earnings, violating state procedures to execute on wages and federal and state exemptions of 75% and 90% of earnings, stated claim for violation of § 1692f); Bray v. Cadle Co., 2010 WL 4053794 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 14, 2010) (plaintiff stated claim that defendants engaged in “unfair or unconscionable means to collect” the debt by alleging that: “1) his bank account was exempt by law from garnishment by the Social Security Act; and 2) the defendants garnished the bank account, despite knowing or having reason to know that it contained Social Security funds and despite having failed to conduct pre-garnishment discovery”). See also § 1.4.11, infra (discussing post-judgment remedies).

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