Source: http://nv.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20180416_0004806.DNV.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 03:47:45+00:00

Document:
ROBERT C. JONES United States District Judge.
This is an action to quiet title. Now pending before the Court is a motion to dismiss. (Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 5.) For the reasons given herein, the Court grants the motion in part and denies it in part.
In February 2012, Plaintiffs Nicholas and Sandra Schram wanted to purchase a new house at 674 West winds Drive in Dayton, Nevada (“the Property”), but were unable to qualify for a home loan due to a recent foreclosure. They asked their daughter, Defendant Melissa Brown, if she would be willing to obtain a loan and purchase the Property for them. Ms. Brown agreed; however, the precise terms of that agreement, discussed below, are at the heart of this dispute.
Ultimately, Ms. Brown obtained an $88, 000 loan to finance a final purchase price of $110, 000. Mr. and Mrs. Schram funded the down payment and closing costs. Ms. Brown closed on the Property in August 2012, and the Schrams took possession of the home. Since that time, the Schrams have made all payments on Ms. Brown's mortgage, which are alleged to have been approximately $570 per month. (See Compl. ¶ 7, ECF No. 1-5; Mot. Dismiss 8, ECF No. 5.) The Schrams also allege they have made “significant improvements” to the Property, although they do not specify the nature of those improvements.
With this lawsuit, the Schrams seek to quiet title in themselves, on the basis of their alleged oral agreement with Ms. Brown. They have also asserted claims for breach of fiduciary duty and unjust enrichment. Ms. Brown has moved for dismissal.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” in order to “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) mandates that a court dismiss a cause of action that fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the complaint's sufficiency. See N. Star Int'l v. Ariz. Corp. Comm'n, 720 F.2d 578, 581 (9th Cir. 1983). When considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, dismissal is appropriate only when the complaint does not give the defendant fair notice of a legally cognizable claim and the grounds on which it rests. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). In considering whether the complaint is sufficient to state a claim, the court will take all material allegations as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See NL Indus., Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir. 1986). The court, however, is not required to accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences. See Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001).
A formulaic recitation of a cause of action with conclusory allegations is not sufficient; a plaintiff must plead facts pertaining to his own case making a violation “plausible, ” not just “possible.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-79 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556) (“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”). That is, under the modern interpretation of Rule 8(a), a plaintiff must not only specify or imply a cognizable cause of action (Conley review), but also must allege the facts of his case so that the court can determine whether the plaintiff has any basis for relief under the cause of action he has specified or implied, assuming the facts are as he alleges (Twombly-Iqbal review).

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