Source: https://patentlyo.com/patent/2018/02/eligibility-underlying-surviving.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 05:58:08+00:00

Document:
I respectfully disagree with the majority’s broad statements on the role of factual evidence in a § 101 inquiry. Our precedent is clear that the § 101 inquiry is a legal question. In a manner contrary to that standard, the majority opinion attempts to shoehorn a significant factual component into the Alice § 101 analysis.
The divide among the court is now quite clear — what is needed is an en banc consideration of the issues. Failing that, we will continue to muddle and err.
District Court found the patent claims ineligible; refused to allow the amended complaint; according to the court the amendment would not have made any difference – would not have manufactured a factual dispute – since eligibility is a pure question of law.
On appeal here, the Federal Circuit has vacated the judgment — holding that the complaint raises factual disputes that must be resolved prior to ruling on the eligibility issue.
[The Federal Circuit has previously] held that patent eligibility can be determined at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage. This is true only when there are no factual allegations that, taken as true, prevent resolving the eligibility question as a matter of law.
in this case, but need not reach that issue because it did err when it denied leave to amend without claim construction and in the face of factual allegations, spelled out in the proposed second amended complaint, that, if accepted as true, establish that the claimed combination contains inventive components and improves the workings of the computer.
Following the majority opinion, some plaintiffs will now look to the patentee’s proposed proposed amended complaint as one roadmap establishing a factual dispute sufficient for a patentee to overcome a motion on the pleadings. In particular, the complaint alleges a novel data importation scheme that is database independent and that “eliminat[es] the need for hand typing in the values.” Further, the complaint alleges that the result is “increased the efficiencies of computers processing tax forms” and “saved storage space” on the computers.
Whether the claim elements or the claimed combination are well-understood, routine, conventional is a question of fact. And in this case, that question cannot be answered adversely to the patentee based on the sources properly considered on a motion to dismiss, such as the complaint, the patent, and materials subject to judicial notice.
This quote sets-up the potential en banc case: To what extent does eligibility involved factual disputes; to what extent should extrinsic evidence be available to prove those facts? For patent litigators, these questions look strikingly similar to the decades old dispute over the proper approach to patent claim construction. It is easy to see eligibility following in the same line of reasoning seen in Teva and Phillips that allows for full judicial but opens the door to potential (but often not required) factual findings regarding extrinsic evidence.
Last note here — The claims at issue are claims 1, 2, and 22 of U.S. Patent No. 7,171,615 (“’615 patent”) and claims 1, 13, and 17 of U.S. Patent No.
8,984,393. These patents cover really simple tax prep forms that I expect the Supreme Court would eat for lunch.
Comments 6 and 5.2 were sidetracked by Malcolm’s mindless ad hominem, and comment 2 saw no reply whatsoever.
But the view of “The divide among the court is now quite clear — what is needed is an en banc consideration of the issues. Failing that, we will continue to muddle and err.” remains rebutted.
To even get to needing an en banc decision, we would first need another panel decision that directly conflicts with the series of cases here – and does so in a cogent and legal manner (and NOT simply from one panel merely disregarding the binding effect of an earlier panel).
I look forward to any such decision, and then applying critical thinking to that decision.
Otherwise, let’s keep the anti-patent bias down to a dull roar.
Respectfully, Reyna does not believe that certain factual inquiries require evidence while the Aatrix majority and the Berkheimer panel do. FWIW, I’ve talked to the attorneys who won each of those cases, and they recognize the divide in the courts.
There is a group of us organizing to file amicus briefs on behalf of Berkheimer and Aatrix on the very issue you do not believe exists. I don’t mean to badmouth you in any fashion – I just respectfully assert that you are mistaken.
Is this really an en banc worthy issue? As it stands with this decision, the DCT simply needs to entertain some fact finding and then issue an opinion. It isn’t a case that fundamentally alters any rights.
If the only “harm” to the moving party is a little more briefing before getting the ultimate DCT opinion, I don’t see how this is an issue that warrants an en banc opinion.
Aren’t there many more worth en banc issues than this?
I assure you, there is a great need for an en banc decision. Until that happens, PTO examiners and APJs alike will continue to deny the need for evidence by, for example, citing Electric Power Group and the vast host of other idiotic decisions where no evidence was considered necessary.
Ray, I do not think what you are suggesting could provide 101 decision at the preliminary 30(b)(6) motion stage, and even 101 summary judgment might be precluded absent at least a partial trial to decide contested extrinsic facts as to what is “well known and conventional.” I.e., much more expensive patent litigation, more and larger settlements, hence the significance of these two new Fed. Cir. decisions.
On the other hand, perhaps the INTRINSIC evidence of the specification could be a determinant in some cases? Merely alleging that a claim element is NOT well known and conventional seems inconsistent with not having any enablement at all for it in the specification?
Well, I disagree. Nothing in this opinion requires any partial trial. The 101 question is an issue of law, and the Court can handle all the factual consideration with a briefing schedule – much like a venue determination.
Unsure what your reference to a “30(b)(6)” motion stage is. In my rule book, 30(b)(6) deals with depositions of a company. Is that a typo of some sort? No company depo is needed to determine the relevant facts for this issue.
Yes. All you need to do is rewrite the Federal Civil Rules of Procedure for every court in the country. Maybe a rule of evidence or two. Hey, who needs juries to determine issues of fact?
Venue, jurisdiction, indefiniteness, enablement, license…are issues of law based on fact that don’t require a jury trial.
101 falls right in line with these. No modification to the rules necessary.
Hate to break it to you but indefiniteness and enablement are often contested and can require a jury trial based on the viewpoint of one of ordinary skill.
That said, we need YOU to make 101 factual findings, because you absolutely know what is and is not well-understood, routine and conventional. Hey, who needs FRE 702 in a patent case anyway?
Jury trial is not required to adjudicate these issues, even if they are contested.
Yes, most judges will submit the issues to the jury, but the Court isn’t bound by the jury’s advisory decision.
Judge Moore didn’t say otherwise.
Whether or not juries get to hear “issues of fact” depends upon the nature of the item being adjudicated.
Make that item into a “public right” as opposed to a “personal property,” and you eliminate that whole “jury” thing, eh?
B, you seem to miss what it means for something to be an issue of law and what factual findings a jury must decide.
Yes, juries are often submitted ultimate issues of law to answer on a jury form. If you think that makes that issue binding, you may want to get a refund on you law degree.
As Ned points out in another comment, issues of law may have factual issues that need a jury to answer – that does not, however, make the issue of law one for the jury.
Btw, you may want to read Markman for the Supreme Court to give you guidance on how claim construction is an issue of law, albeit with some factual findings based on intrinsic evidence and the knowledge of a person of ordinary skill in the art.
Please inform us on how often since Markman has a claim construction issue been submitted to a jury?
No, unlike you I actually know what I’m talking about.
However, if the ruling is that the subject matter claimed is not within 101, the patent is invalid. The 101 issue is a species of patent validity. As we all know, disputed issues of fact regarding patent validity are triable to a jury as a matter of constitutional right.
Issue of law are strictly issues that have no disputed facts.
Issues for the court are issues for which no right to a jury trial ever existed: procedural issues, claim construction, equitable issues that require balancing of harm and fairness.
If you disagree with any of this, please explain.
Where to even start on this nonsense?
First, get a law degree.
Ned, 101, enablement and obviousness are “issues of law.” While there may be some underlying facts that could be triable to a jury, the ultimate issue is not an issue for the jury to decide. A jury may be asked the ultimate issue, but it is actually the Court’s later issued judgment that decides that issue.
I also disagree with you that issues of law are strictly issues that have no disputed facts.
Kinetic Concepts and Wake Forest University v. Smith & Nephew (Fed. Cir. 2012).
Ray, and for the under-educated B as well, let us talk fundamentals.
There are issues for court and issues for the jury. The jury decides facts. The court decides law But it is the court’s job to instruct juries about the law in considering facts that they decide the ultimate issue, which is a mixed question of law or fact.
When there are no substantial facts in dispute, a matter can be resolved as an issue of law.
When a matter has triable issues of fact but never-the-less is decided by a court, we say the issue is one of law, when it really is one for the court as there can be disputed facts.
Take obviousness. The Supreme Court said that it a question of law based on triable issue of fact. Did they really mean that the jury should not be given the issues to try? If they really meant this, they should have been clearer.
Before 1791, all disputed issues of fact involving patent validity or infringement were decided by juries, with the court instructing the jury on the law. Thus, to the extent that the Federal Circuit refuses to let a particular validity issue go to a jury based on its labeling that issue one of law, it ignores the constitution. The only exception to this rule to date has been claim construction that the Supreme Court could find no pre-1791 support for giving the issue to a jury. I think they were wrong in this as issues of construction were commonly given to juries when validity and infringement were at issue.
Back to 101, clearly it involves an inquiry into whether the otherwise eligible subject matter in a claim is inventive; and this, like obviousness, involves questions of fact. No doubt 101 cannot be an issue for the court because validity including inventiveness is an issue for the jury.
“Ray, and for the under-educated B as well, let us talk fundamentals.
Ned, you prove your vapid nature on a daily basis. What the heck do you think I’ve been arguing? EXACTLY what you stated. Seriously, you have mental issues.
Ray, on this we can agree. For example, if a complaint fails to recite all the elements of a tort, then the complaint may be dismissed as an issue of law regardless of any other facts at issue. Also, if there is a statute precluding the tort, the complaint may be dismissed as an issue of law.
Regarding your comparison of “conventional” to enablement, I agree that they are similar in that you “may” need to look beyond the specification to the knowledge of a person of ordinary skill in the art to understand whether something is actually enabled or is conventional.
You may consider reviewing the Atmel decision regarding indefiniteness for how the factual issues underlying an indefinite charge rely on factual considerations requiring expert testimony.
I think this is exactly the approach 101 is going to encounter – in some cases. In other cases, the Court will be able to perform the necessary factual considerations from the specification – akin to judicial notice of conventional things. e.g. buy low, sell high is pretty conventional and doesn’t require expert testimony.
I once had a Judge take judicial notice that an act that happened in 2011 was adjudicated in a court in 2009? That said, for the 99% of cases were the specification is not filled with self-damning statements, and where there are facts not appropriate for judicial notice, your proposals fail.
It’s not my proposal. It is what the Courts are doing right now.
Respectfully, yes and no. They weren’t taking judicial notice – they were merely assuming facts ipse dixit without giving patent holders an opportunity to be heard under FRE 201(e). The district court judge in Aatrix refused to even allow evidence in. He knew everything about the underlying technology, and didn’t even need a technical degree. Jimmy Reyna is similarly gifted.
Good discussion points B and Ray.
Of course, this brings back into focus the fact that in the first instance of examination, an examiner is very much constrained as to what and how she may make any such “official notice” in regards to.
For example (and it bears repeating): examiners may not take Official Notice in any way to establish the state of the art.
And this is precisely what is happening when an examiner – with no evidence – makes the bald conclusory statement that anything is “generic” or “conventional” as the support for the factual underpinning in a 101 analysis.
1) whether or not the equivalent of “judicial notice” could be taken – in general – (the buy low, sell high situation), the constraint prohibits that equivalent of “judicial notice” for the purpose stated – it does not matter if the equivalent of “judicial notice” is correct – it may not be used in that situation.
2) the bar – or level of what is being proven by the required evidence is a higher one than mere “presence” (novelty) or even similarity (obviousness). “Conventional” means more than just “there” and requires the widespread adoption of the item. Arguments and evidence thereof that may be sufficient for a 102 or 103 position are not necessarily adequate for a 101 factual underpinning.
The ultimate take-away from Green Shades, imo, is to plead facts in the complaint supporting the 101 validity.
At the 12(b)(6) stage, the Court is forced to takes the facts alleged in the pleadings as true. As such, even if there is something the Court could take JN of – it can’t in the face of facts in the pleadings.
While the patent holder may just be kicking the can down the road, because the 101 analysis requires “some” factual findings, alleging such facts in the complaint “should” forestall adverse rulings on the pleadings – and will likely become the new norm.
Ray, but if one contends that the alleged invention improves the functioning of a computer or computer system when it plainly does not, what then?
Ned – you need to adhere to a minimum level of inte11ectual honesty in this conversation.
If the facts are pled in the pleadings and one disagrees with the facts, the response is first to deny them in an answer.
Next, develop the facts in litigation.
Then, file a motion for summary judgment.
Reyna’s belief expressed in his dissent is not reflected in any other court cases (he cites none for supporting his beliefs).
I do not see a divide among the court.
I see one person expressing a dissenting opinion in one case.
Are you aware of any other cases within the CAFC that actually is on point discussing this very issue?
“Reyna’s belief expressed in his dissent is not reflected in any other court cases (he cites none for supporting his beliefs).” Yep.
LOL – I meant in opposition to this current trend – you know, something that would actually “set the divide” and mot something that shows that Reyna is beginning to recognize the unraveling of the “no facts needed” mantra.
That rather proves my point, does it not?
Respectfully, no. Two weeks doesn’t make a “trend,” and the CAFC has an annoying habit of ignoring limitations and asserted advantages they feel entitled to ignore. Judge Linn commented upon this in his dissent in Smart Systems.
I will grant you that the CAFC is run poorly in how they allow different panels to ignore the binding effects of previous panels.
I will further grant you that the combination of these two things leaves a high degree of uncertainty for future decisions (and the “luck of the draw” aspect remains not only for the factual predicates, but for the larger picture of the legal aspects of 101.
But my point proven here is that the pronouncement of Reyna’s dissent somehow “sets the divide” is false.
No divide has been set. Let’s see a true decision in direct opposition on the explicit point before we make that “set the divide” statement.
Read again my post at 13. That post remains entirely accurate.
Respectfully, there is always some level of uncertainty for almost all cases. Rarely are any two cases squarely the same.
Having some uncertainty, alone, does not warrant an en banc decision. There needs to be a true split.
I believe the “trend” we are seeing is 101 can be handled on the pleadings unless there is an actual dispute whether something is conventional and therefore needs some fact finding to support a decision.
So far, I am unaware of any case that says you never need any fact finding or any case that says you always need fact finding. This is entirely consistent and the reason why as anon states, there is no divide.
Even if the “conventionality” of otherwise eligible (but old) claim elements was some sort of “eligibility test” (and it’s not, because such a test leads to absurd results) it’s not up to the challenger to prove “conventionality”.
It’s up to the patentee or applicant to prove that there is “significantly more” recited in the claim beyond the ineligible subject matter. “Conventional” is just a base line for complete failure.
Of course, we all know what “significantly more” means. It means the recitation of novel non-obvious physical structure or physical transformation, recited in objective structural terms, sufficient to distinguish the claimed invention from the prior art on that basis. Anything less than that is a failure.
This is also why eligibility issues can arise at any time during the course of challenging a claim. There was never any reason — and there will be — for requiring that it be carried out first (i.e., before the 102/103 analysis). In some cases it will be most efficient to do it that way; in other cases it will be less efficient to do it that way (in which case it should be done another way). Basic stuff.
And in case for some reason it’s still too difficult for some readers to follow, look at it this way.
If a series of combined steps/elements are obvious, you can’t “fix” that failure by tossing in some non-obvious ineligible subject matter. Why can’t you do that? Because by doing so you are using the patent system to protect (i.e., own, i.e., take out of the public domain) the ineligible subject matter in the context defined by your recited unpatentable subject matter. That’s not permitted, for reasons that should be clear. But — as always — happy to break it down into even smaller child-size bites for the strugglers out there.
You must definitely CAN “fix” that so-called failure.
NOT only can an additional element – no matter whether that element all on its own is eligible or ineligible, but one may also (still, always) even obtain an eligible claim comprised entirely out of obvious elements. Such entirely depends on the claim as a whole.
Your error here is profound.
You want to try that again in English, Billy? Wow.
Do you really need someone to hold your hand on this fundamental patent law point?
A valid and eligible patent claim can be comprised entirely out of obvious elements.
Therefore, your statement about the “status” of some additional element is clear and unmitigated error.
Billy stands on his lawn at midnight and screams at the sky. The neighbors lock their doors.
Meanwhile, the fact remains: If a series of combined steps/elements are obvious, you can’t “fix” that failure by tossing in some non-obvious ineligible subject matter.
Try asking your m0 mmy to help you with this one. She can read it slowly for you and hold your trembling hand.
Your “fact” is not so.
No screaming needed – just an ability to understand the actual law and how a claim – as a whole – works (thus, a claim, as a whole, may indeed be made up of entirely “non eligible” elements, entirely “eligible” but obvious elements, entirely “eligible and non-obvious elements, or any combinations thereof.
Your starting point is itself a failure as you do not take this fact into consideration.
Reading is merely step 1.
He also needs to acknowledge, understand, and incorporate.
12 years now of objective evidence shows that THAT is something that Malcolm is simply unwilling to do.
There was never any reason — and there never will be — for requiring that [the eligiblity analysis] be carried out first (i.e., before the 102/103 analysis), and only first.
Fixed my typo, and edited for clarity.
Lovely strawman – note that NO ONE except you is putting that concept at issue.
note that NO ONE except you is putting that concept at issue.
Remember, folks: this is the same hypocritical doooosh who spends every other post filling his shorts because the rest of us don’t spontaneously address his silly arguments before he makes them.
Look, Billy, we know that the maximalists are struggling and that they are going to continue to struggle. Just dance around in your cl 0wn shoes and s t f u for a change.
Not sure just why you seek to divert any “folks” out there to remember anything (much less your mythical nonsense about what others do) in response to my pointing out your use of a strawman here.
That would be wonderful advice – for you. As is abundantly clear, the issue concerning the factual predicate of the 101 issue has YOU continuing to struggle and dancing around in cl own shoes. You have provided exactly ZERO meaningful comments on the (actual) patent law issue and instead have sought to kick up as much NON-patent law dust as you can.
Do you really think that you are f00ling anyone capable of even the minimal amount of critical thinking?
Except I wrote the most insightful comments here, as usual.
C’mon, Billy. You need to just let go and walk away.
The legend in your own mind continues to grow.
s u c k s to be you!
I have noticed an additional fallacy in your misstatements at post 12.
You appear to need to understand the very basic premise in patent prosecution of prima facie case – and the onus being first on the Office.
When you grasp that FACT – then grasp the FACT that the Office is constrained (by each of the Administrative Procedures Act, it’s own memorandum of how to take Official Notice, and case law which interprets the law as written by Congress) as to just how the Office – in the first instance – can go about its duty to prove that the applicant does not – by law – get a patent.
Your “baseline” comment is woefully inadequate for the point under consideration.
Conventional – rather than some type of “de minimus” item that you wish to intimate – is a substantially higher bar of evidence that needs to be provide; and provided by the Office.
If you were a real attorney with real clients that were seeking patent protection, you would be celebrating this (very just) developing interpretation – instead of bemoaning it and attempting to obfuscate the clear meaning.
You really should get into a line of work in which you could believe in the work product and want what the client wants.
Actually, I know first-hand that, regarding 101, that wasn’t the law 1.5 years ago. Sometimes hand-waving is okay, sometimes it is not. Hopefully, Berkheimer and Aatrix are the start to the end of that nonsense.
Me, I made the mistake of believing Reyna’s and Hughes’ evidence-based proclamations in McRo and Enfish. Apparently, between Moore, Taranto and Hughes, only Moore read the Enfish opinion. Similarly, between Reyna, Taranto and Stoll, only Stoll could be bothered to actually read what was written in McRo.
Unfortunately, B, your experience may have been ultra vires.
Judge Taranto is as consistent as a Washington D.C. winter. Sometimes evidence is important; sometimes it is not; its up to the world to guess which way he will rule in the next case. Funny, however, that whenever the CAFC looks at evidence and every limitation as an ordered combination (rather than making up inane categorical rules) the holding come put patent eligible.
whenever the CAFC looks at evidence and every limitation as an ordered combination (rather than making up inane categorical rules) the holding come put patent eligible.
Where on earth did you dig this up fake “fact” up?
The CAFC, district courts and PTO look at evidence all the time, including looking at “ordered combinations”, and the claims are still ineligible.
That should surprise nobody, of course, when the “ordered combinations” are older than the hills and recognized as such by everyone above the age of ten, including the applicants (who admit as much, expressly or implicitly, over and over and over again in their specifications).
I know this from countless decisions having no basis in evidence and from personal experience. That said, you need only read Reyna’s dissent in Aatrix Software. Reyna is quite upset about the whole idea of basing a 101 rejection on evidence.
Those “countless decisions” don’t exist except in your mind. Can you count higher than ten?
If you have some cite re “evidence is bad” let’s see it. And let’s see the context.
Perhaps you need to read Electric Power Group, MM, as well as Smart Systems and every other decision based on a categorical exception. The word “evidence” doesn’t appear in any of those decisions. That said, just read Judge Jimmy Reyna’s dissent in Aatrix.
B: The word “evidence” doesn’t appear in any of those decisions.
The word “evidence” doesn’t appear in two (LOL) cases and therefore “whenever the CAFC looks at evidence and every limitation as an ordered combination (rather than making up inane categorical rules) the holding come put patent eligible” <—B's original claim.
You see, folks, it's this kind of nonsense that makes us chuckle at the maximalists. They really are always the least intelligent people in the room. Always.
Renya was put in there by Google and he has a job to do.
MM, you prove my point. You base your opinion on what you believe is true, rather than evidence. Berkheimer is a good example of belief versus evidence. The district court judge made assumptions based on no evidence. In law sch00l we called that “capricious.” Apparently, a portion of the CAFC actually read a few SCOTUS cases, and reversed.
Maybe you’re omniscient and don’t need evidence to determine what is factually true and what isn’t, but us mere mortals have to make due. Golly, we should just fire all the CAFC judges and staff, and let you pronounce your verdicts at 1/1000th the cost of present appellate review.
You don’t need to be “omniscient” (lol) to know how computers work and how they’ve worked for a long time.
I have a MSEE, MM, and have written at least a half-million lines of code. You just lack a basic understanding of law.
I have a MSEE, MM, and have written at least a half-million lines of code.
I’m super impressed. But you forgot to tell us about your awesome video game scores!
None of that, of course, changes the basic facts here which is that there is no “improvement to the workings of a computer” in this case and any modestly educated 12 year old can see that.
But go ahead and stick your head in the sand and tell us about “lines of code” that you’ve written. You’re very special!
Yep, you really a tool.
Obviously you are new here too.
That is just Malcolm being Malcolm. We had a thread here awhile back now on “making a better ecosystem,” and on that thread it was shown that Malcolm has been engaging in the very same type of blight for 12 years now – dating back to February of 2006.
After I posted the item directly above, I see that a post long in the filter has been released – apologies for any comments on repeat due to this occurance.
As long as “capricious” aligns with the desired Ends, Malcolm not only does not care, but Malcolm applauds the arrival.
B, you apparently are new here as well, and this “Ends justifies the Means” position has long been a trademark of Malcolm (aka MM, aka person of the most sockpuppets on patent blogs in the last five years).
In fact, if you check the archives of this blog, the last “let’s make a better ecosystem” thread featured the objective verification that Malcolm’s tactics have not changed over the course of the last dozen years. Even today, he has re-posted a NON-law rant of his feelings, mirroring an item that was expunged as being irrelevant.
He simply does not care about anything but his own feelings.
Dennis, for the sake of accuracy, can you please stop suggesting that it was always or ever established that 101 was ever believed by anyone to always be a “purely legal question”?
We all know how it played out. We were all right here watching in real time. Initially there was the opposite question as to whether 101 could ever be appropriately decided at the 12(b)(6) level. That was answered in the affirmative (which is the correct answer of course).
101 issues come in different flavors. Sometimes there need by no other “factual” analysis other than looking at the first couple of words in the preamble.
But here’s the thing: the “roadmap” to avoiding or overcoming eligibility challenges has always depended on whether one’s innovative contribution to the art resided in eligible subject matter or not. That’s the “roadmap” that I and others have been laying out for years and years, even before the Supremes underscored that fact in Prometheus v. Mayo.
You want to avoid eligibility challenges? Recite novel non-obvious objective structure in your claims. Novel non-obvious objective structure is — by definition — not conventional and not abstract.
It’s really that simple, and it always has been. This is why most claims that are presented for examination are still not challenged as being ineligible (in spite of the relentless howling of the maximalists to the contrary). The reason that many claims are challenged as ineligible (and successfully so, even at the 12(b)(6) stage) is because there are no reasonably disputable issues of “fact” as to (1) the ineligible subject matter that is the “innovation” and (2) the lack of anything in the claim other than prior art computing hardware (e.g., a “general purpose computer”). There are no “disputes” about the prior art in most cases because most (but certainly not all!) patentees have the bare ethics it takes to avoid contradicting common knowledge and admissions in their own specification. But as we all know the s0 ftie w0 ftie boys struggle with that ethics thing. And we also all know why.
What this faction of the CAFC apparently is unwilling to confront is that you can’t have your cake and eat it, too. You can’t create a special exception for a certain sub-sub-type of ineligible subject matter (e.g., logic or information, e.g., correlations or any other type of data) by fashioning a completely artificial premise around that subject matter (i.e., that data processing methods have “structure”) and then whine that “facts” about these fake “structures” (and worse, alleged “disputed” about them) aren’t being argued about enough. That’s i n s a n e. But that’s where Moore and Reyna are heading.
I’d like to believe that Moore and Reyna are playing some five dimensional chess here but, at least with respect to Moore, I know she’s not that smart. I also know that she’s very prone to fall into the trap of grade school level “this is so cool we must hand out patent!” type of thinking. How do I know that? Because I spent years listening to her over-caffeinated rants in oral arguments.
Wrap up all your canards (including optional claim formats as somehow not being optional) and go back and read the responses to your own “highly caffeinated rants” on these pages.
You have added nothing new to those things already debunked.
You have some legitimate points. Make them. But there is no need for a personal attack on the intelligence of a (very intelligent) federal appellate judge. Every time I have been in front of Judge Moore, she has been not only very intelligent and insightful, but polite. Maybe take a lesson from that?
In my experience, the judges on the Fed. Cir. are incredibly sharp. Generally, when I read a Fed. Cir. opinion, even if I would have favored a different result or approach, I still understand and appreciate the rationale being advanced.
If want to take issue with an opinion, then explain why you disagree or where you think there is a flaw. If you believe that there are policy issues that should be considered, then articulate them. But there was no reason for a personal attack here.
What you see from Malcolm has been documented as the way that he has “expressed himself” for a full dozen years on this blog.
He takes pride in his ways, and refuses to change (or even consider that “HE” is the one that should change.
Every time I have been in front of Judge Moore, she has been not just intelligent and insightful, but polite.
Good for you. I’ve spent years now listening to oral arguments — pretty much every computer logic related oral argument — and my informed impression is that she is more prone than any other judge on the CAFC to go off into the weeds based on some irrelevant or wrong conclusion she’s adopted and then — what’s worse — to get in the attorney’s face about it with a super pi s sy smug attitude.
Like I said, I’d love to believe that she and Reyna have some bigger picture in mind. But they don’t. She doesn’t think big.
Respectfully, you’re way ahead of me, Judge Linn (see Smart Sys v. Chicago) and every examiner I ever talked to.
That said, I most respectfully believe the difference in our positions rests on my belief that the CAFC abrogated the Doctrine of Preemption the day after Alice Corp., and that the CAFC eschews an evidentiary requirement case by case in a most random manner.
I don’t understand the point of this argument. The claim simulates a tax form “on a computer” and fills it out. Not that I know the fee shifting law well, but won’t this just result in a fee shifting after the fact finding? It’s so clearly abstract and even if not obviousness isn’t going to be hard to show (for the same reason its abstract). Why was this case brought?
Tran didn’t think Obviousness was easy to show….
Dennis, don’t show your photo above around your liberal arts department if you don’t want any political incorrectness remarks, especially during the current immigration law debates.
I really doubt that the Supreme Court – properly – resolving something on 102/103 could be called “eat for lunch” when what is being driven at is the improper use of 101 FOR those items which should be taken care of under 102/103.
Quite in fact, a case in which it is SO EASY to use 102/103 properly may help cement the difference between those sections of law and the different section of law that is 101.
Is it really that difficult to want to get 101 correct?
Yes, unfortunately it IS “that difficult to get correct,” largely because the Fed. Cir. has made getting S.J. on 102, 103 or 112 nearly impossible. Even though a D.C. 103 S.J. was affirmed in KSR [after a typical Fed. Cir. summary reversal].
And you missed the whole point, which is that too many cases like this do NOT arrive at the Sup. Ct. for Sup. Ct. decisions on 102 or 103 issues. They arrive there without those issues having been adequately considered by the examiner or the D.C. or the Fed. Cir.
Is that a fact or an opinion?
By that, is it “nearly impossible” because of the nature of the beast, or is it “nearly impossible” because the Fed. Cir. has improperly made these patent items more difficult than any other analogous S.J. motions?
I am not sure that you can read KSR so broadly as to be the indictment that you want to make it out to be.
Your anti-patent bias is showing – you should not have left prosecution those many years ago and taken up the mantle of being someone against patents being enforced.
Is MM on suicide watch?
He has been his usual apoplectic self, responding in his typical ad hominem manner.
MM may be pleased that the CAFC is going to force the USSC’s hand to take a case or cases to clarify the Alice mess. I’m sure he will appear shortly if he is still exchanging gasses with the atmosphere.
12(b)6 is a terrible vehicle for the need, but the need is manifest and must have a vehicle.
The natural and seemingly most appropriate available vehicle is an expanded Markman procedure. The need is to kill weak patents before one or two million dollars is spent to kill them after full-blown discovery, expert reports, etc.
Weak patents mean patents that are intrinsically abstract, and so not proper subject matter of the patent system (or any patent system), or are abstract in their expression of invention (or non-invention), which is often a variable mix of 102/103 and 112 factors where none may individually support a rejection but in concert, do reveal clear invention or non-invention. The CAFC nor anyone else is going to ever going to convince the USSC (or common sense) otherwise.
You use that word, but it appears that you do not understand what that word means.
Lol. No I’m laughing because this nuttiness is only going to hasten the logical endpoint.
(d) a form viewer program operating on the form file and the data file, to perform calculations, allow the user of the data processing system to review and change the data, and create viewable forms and reports.
Claim 1 of the earlier patent.
What remains unclear to me is whether the factual inquiry revols around determines (a) whether the claims “purport” to provide improved technology and/or (b) whether the claimed improvement is in fact an “improvement” over the art.
Right. Make up your own facts! Now there’s s dispute. So no 12(b)(6).
Welcome to Judge Moore’s fantasy world.
…or you can be in Malcolm’s where facts are like totally optional, and a mere “sniff” test and Left-Liberal alignment bucket brigade will do….
Mike, you are asking a right question here. Obviously, what is eligible subject matter is a new or improved machine, etc. It makes a difference what is improved. Thus a generalized improvement over the “art” if the “art” itself is unpatentable subject matter is an inquiry the result of which should make no difference at all to the eligibility issue.
Now in the case at bar, if the allegations of the proposed amended complaint are true that the claimed invention results in more efficient use of computer “resources” in the processing of “existing” tax forms, then the invention seems related to an improvement in the software as opposed to an improvement in a financial or business method or other data manipulation.
I used to be a programmer for the Minuteman III program. It made a lot of difference how efficient a program was that we be able to accomplish the task at hand within the time limits allowed by events. This is an effort of engineering. In contrast, programmers implementing improved business methods simply use conventional software compilers that are notoriously inefficient. There is little attention to conserving computer resources in any way.
Then there was the time before I went to work in how aerospace when I was a more conventional programmer. I made some improvements in a payroll processing program, taking the payroll time to process payroll for the company down from 20 hours to 4 hours. I considered what I did the work of the skilled programmer. Management was somewhat amazed even so.
Time is money, and money is business, and ALL innovation is a business.
Excuse me, but has there been a decision after this series of decisions that actually creates a conflict?
As I noted in a previous thread, the presence of Ryna’s dissent does NOT create such a conflict.
There has been no decision by any court anywhere to support that contention.
Of course, the term “form file creation program” is never used in the specification. Hard to see how this can survive a 112(f) challenge after Williamson.
These claims are D.o.a. And on ajust system the patentee would be sanctioned for bringing them.
o.a. where? “cause they were A. out of the U.S.P.T.O and the F.C has now resuscitated them.

References: § 101
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