Source: https://cbaclelegalconnection.com/tag/jury-trial/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 03:43:10+00:00

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The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in Newman, LLC v. Roberts on Monday, February 8, 2016.
Civil Law—Jury—Overruling Challenges to Jurors—Harmless Error— CRCP 61—Stare Decisis.
The Supreme Court held that allowing a civil litigant fewer peremptory challenges than authorized, or than available to and exercised by the opposing party, does not by itself require automatic reversal. Instead, the reviewing court must determine whether the error substantially influenced the outcome of the case in accordance with C.R.C.P. 61. This conclusion follows from People v. Novotny, 2014 CO 18, in which the Court determined that the automatic reversal rule in the criminal context rested on the assumption that impairment of the ability to shape the jury through peremptory challenges affected a “substantial right” and thus warranted automatic reversal. This same assumption undergirds the Court’s parallel rule in the civil context, but, as it held in Novotny, subsequent developments in the law concerning harmless error analysis and the significance of the right to shape the jury have invalidated that assumption. As such, the Court rejected the automatic reversal rule in the civil context and overruled prior decisions to the contrary. See Blades v. DaFoe, 704 P.2d 317 (Colo. 1985); Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Langdon, 532 P.2d 337 (Colo. 1975); and Denver City Tramway Co. v. Kennedy, 117 P. 167 (Colo. 1911).
The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Roalstad v. City of Lafayette on Thursday, October 8, 2015.
Right to a Jury Trial in Municipal Court—CRS § 16-10-109.
Roalstad was charged with violating Lafayette Municipal Ordinance 25-85, “Vicious animals prohibited,” when her dog allegedly bit the wife of the city’s manager of finance. She entered a not guilty plea and requested a jury trial pursuant to CRS § 16-10-109. The municipal court denied her request and her subsequent request for reconsideration.
Roalstad then filed a complaint in district court for declaratory and injunctive relieve pursuant to CRCP 106(a)(4) and 65, asserting that the municipal court erred as a matter of law in denying her a jury trial request. The city moved to dismiss under CRCP 12(b)(5), arguing that the offense is not a petty offense under CRS § 16-10-109 and that she has no Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. The district court granted the motion to dismiss, and Roalstad appealed.
CRS § 16-10-109 expressly pertains to jury trials for petty offenses. The issue before the Court of Appeals was whether the ordinance at issue was a petty offense. The vicious animal ordinance carries a possible fine of either at least $250 or at least $500, both of which fall under the definition of petty offense in CRS § 16-10-109(1). The Court of Appeals noted that the alleged offense was not a crime at common law, which are excluded from the petty offense definition.
The Court then analyzed whether the alleged offense fell under the exception for a “municipal charter, municipal ordinance, or county ordinance offense which is neither criminal nor punishable by imprisonment under any counterpart state statute.” Roalstad argued and the Court agreed that CRS § 18-9-204.5, “unlawful ownership of a dangerous dog,” is a state statutory counterpart of Lafayette Rev. Mun. Code §§ 25-85 and 25-89. The Court also found that § 25-85 and its sentencing provision were criminal in nature. It therefore explicitly rejected the city’s argument that its Code had “decriminalized” the vicious animal ordinance. Accordingly, the district court’s order granting the city’s motion to dismiss was reversed and the case was remanded with directions to enter judgment for Roalstad on her claim for declaratory relief.

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