Source: https://www.in.gov/judiciary/opinions/previous/archive/122903.jgb.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 10:25:59+00:00

Document:
In this appeal, we examine the scope of the Indiana Civil Rights Commission's remedial powers and revisit the issue of whether the commission can assess punitive and emotional distress damages pursuant to the Indiana Civil Rights Act. Specifically, appellants-respondents the Indiana Civil Rights Commission, Jodie L. Jackson and Larry J. Stovall appeal the trial court's reversal, in part, of the ICRC's order assessing $2,330 in damages against appellees-petitioners Clyde Alder and Barbara Alder, doing business as Stoney Pike Mobile Home Park (Alders), for denying Jackson and Stovall housing in the mobile home park on the basis of race. The ICRC presents several issues for our review, which we consolidate and restate as follows: (1) whether the trial court erred by failing to find that Stovall was denied equal opportunity in housing; and (2) whether the ICRC properly awarded Jackson and Stovall emotional distress and punitive damages. On cross-appeal, the Alders present one issue for our review, which we restate as whether the trial court erred by upholding the ICRC's award of out-of-pocket expenses to Jackson.
In 1985, Jodie Jackson, her husband, Allen, and their two children, all of whom are white, moved into the Stoney Pike Mobile Home Park, which had been owned and operated by the Alders since 1974. Approximately two years later, Jackson and Allen divorced. Although park rules prohibited more than one family to live in each mobile home, Allen continued to live in the mobile home with Jackson and her children for the next nine months. The Alders, however, did not attempt to evict Jackson or her ex-husband.
In September of 1989, Jackson met Stovall, who is an African-American male. Several months later, in January of 1990, Stovall began visiting Jackson at her mobile home and occasionally spent the night. Thereafter, Stovall and several other black men were frequently observed at Jackson's trailer. After the Alders discovered that Stovall and two of his black friends had stayed overnight at Jackson's residence on April 18, 1990, they placed a copy of the park rules in Jackson's mailbox, noting that only "[o]ne family [was allowed] per mobile home, NO EXCEPTIONS or you can move within 30 days." Record at 727. Shortly after Jackson received this warning, she confronted the Alders and informed them that none of the men were residing with her. According to Jackson, Clyde Alder then responded that she would have to move her mobile home because he did not want "people of that kind" in his trailer park. R. at 496. When she asked him what kind of people he meant, Clyde stated "black people, colored people." R. at 497. Clyde contends, however, that he never made these statements.
Jackson. However, the court informed Jackson that if she continued to allow Stovall or any other adults to stay overnight, they would be considered more than occasional guests and the Alders would have a claim for ejectment.
distress and $200 in punitive damages. He then ordered the Alders to do the following: (1) cease and desist from discriminating against residents, guests and applicants for lots in the park due to race; (2) give priority to qualified black applicants who apply for rental of a lot until three lots are inhabited by black adults; (3) immediately give notice to tenants and applicants of their compliance with nondiscriminatory housing practices; (4) comply with ICRC reporting requirements through the year 2000; (5) advertise for minority tenants in a local newspaper each day for four weeks; and (6) arrange to move and reinstall the mobile home on Jackson's former lot in the park or, if the home is no longer moveable, provide, at their expense, a mobile home of equal of greater size which is reasonably acceptable to Jackson's parents. On April 23, 1993, the ICRC issued a final order, adopting the hearing officer's proposed findings and conclusions with minor modifications.
On May 18, 1993, the Alders filed a petition for judicial review. After a hearing on March 22, 1995, the trial court affirmed in part and reversed in part the ICRC's final order. In particular, the court found that there was substantial evidence to support the ICRC's finding of discrimination against Jackson and its award of out-of-pocket losses to her. However, the court concluded that the ICRC exceeded its statutory authority by ordering the Alders to vacate the lot and reinstall Jackson's mobile home and by assessing punitive and emotional distress damages. The trial court did not enter any findings with regard to the ICRC's finding of discrimination against Stovall or its award to him of $15 for out-of-pocket losses. This appeal followed. Additional facts will be supplied as necessary.
Initially, we note our standard of review. When reviewing a decision of an administrative agency, appellate courts stand in the same position as the trial court. State Bd. of Registration for Land Surveyors v. Bender, 626 N.E.2d 491, 496 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993). On appeal, we are limited to determining whether the agency possessed jurisdiction over the subject matter, and whether the agency's decision was made pursuant to proper procedures, was supported by substantial evidence, was not arbitrary or capricious and was not in violation of any constitutional, statutory or legal principles. Natural Resources Comm'n v. Sugar Creek Mobile Estates, 646 N.E.2d 61, 63-64 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995), trans. denied. We review the record in the light most favorable to the administrative proceedings and are prohibited from reweighing the evidence or judging the credibility of witnesses. Id. at 64. Additionally, we are bound by the agency's findings of fact if supported by substantial evidence. Hamilton County Dep't of Public Welfare v. Smith, 567 N.E.2d 165, 167-68 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991). However, we are not bound by an agency's interpretation of the law. Ashlin Transp. Serv., Inc. v. Indiana Unemployment Ins. Bd., 637 N.E.2d 162, 165 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994). Although an agency's interpretation of the statutes and regulations which it is charged to enforce is entitled to some weight, the interpretation of a statute or rule is the responsibility of the court and within the exclusive province of the judiciary. Miller Brewing Co. v. Bartholomew County Beverage Co., Inc., 674 N.E.2d 193, 200 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans. denied.
The ICRC first contends that the trial court erred by failing to find that Stovall was denied equal opportunity in housing on the basis of race. Specifically, the ICRC contends that there was substantial evidence presented at the hearing demonstrating that Stovall was prohibited from staying overnight as Jackson's guest or becoming a co-resident at the park because of his race. Therefore, the ICRC argues that the trial court should have affirmed the commission's finding of discrimination against Stovall and its award of out-of-pocket losses to him. We disagree.
The purpose of Indiana's Civil Rights Act, with regard to discriminatory housing practices, is to provide equal opportunities in the "acquisition through purchase or rental of real property including but not limited to housing . . . ." Ind. Code § 22-9-1-2 (a) (emphasis added). In order to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination in housing under this statute, a claimant must present evidence of the following: (1) the claimant is a member of a racial minority; (2) the claimant applied for and was qualified to purchase or rent certain property; (3) the claimant was rejected; and (4) the purchase or rental opportunity remained available thereafter. Indiana Civil Rights Comm'n v. Wellington Village Apartments, 594 N.E.2d 518, 529 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992), trans. denied.
park. R. at 583, 589. Considering that Stovall never applied to move into the mobile home park, we cannot conclude that he was denied an equal opportunity to purchase or rent housing. Thus, the trial court did not err by failing to affirm the commission's finding of discrimination against Stovall and its award of out-of-pocket losses to him.
The ICRC also argues that the trial court erroneously concluded that the commission exceeded its authority by awarding emotional distress and punitive damages. Although the ICRC concedes that this court has recently and repeatedly held that emotional distress and punitive damages are not recoverable under the Civil Rights Act, it contends that we should reconsider our decision for the following reasons: (1) our past decisions rest on an erroneous interpretation of the Civil Rights Act because the Act expressly empowers the ICRC to restore a complainant's losses and only limits the type of losses that may be recovered in the context of employment discrimination; and (2) the denial of emotional distress damages resulting from intentional housing discrimination violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. We will address each argument in turn.
(A) to restore a complainant's losses incurred as a result of discriminatory treatment, as the commission may deem necessary to assure justice; however, this specific provision when applied to orders pertaining to employment shall include only wages, salary, or commissions . . . .
damages to employee for employer's inappropriate sexual advances), trans. denied; Crutcher v. Dabis, 582 N.E.2d 449, 451 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (ICRC's award of $28,000 for emotional distress and $2,000 for punitive damages to interracial married couple who were denied housing due to race exceeded statutory authority), trans. denied.
The ICRC also contends that this court's interpretation of section 6(k) to deny emotional distress damages to victims of housing discrimination violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.See footnote 4 Specifically, the ICRC argues that our interpretation of section 6(k)(1) results in an arbitrary classification which treats victims of discrimination who suffer emotional distress differently than other persons who suffer emotional distress as a result of another person's wrongful acts. We disagree.
recovering emotional distress damages, whereas individuals who are victims of tortious conduct, such as trespass or assault, are permitted to recover emotional distress damages. Unlike trespass or assault, however, Indiana has never recognized a tort of discrimination. Rather, the legislature enacted the Civil Rights Act to provide a right of recovery to victims of discrimination where one did not previously exist. Therefore, instead of denying certain privileges and immunities to victims of discrimination, the statute, and our interpretation of its provisions, affords additional protection and privileges to these individuals.
Finally, we address the Alders' claim that the trial court erred by upholding the ICRC's award of out-of-pocket expenses to Jackson. Specifically, the Alders contend that there was no evidence in the record that Jackson incurred any expenses in moving the mobile home from the park. We disagree.
In sum, we conclude that the trial court did not err by failing to affirm the commission's finding of discrimination against Stovall or its award of out-of-pocket expenses to him. Further, the trial court properly determined that the ICRC exceeded its statutory authority by awarding emotional distress damages and punitive damages to Jackson and Stovall. Finally, we conclude that the trial court properly affirmed the ICRC's award of out-of-pocket expenses to Jackson.
RUCKER, J., dissents with opinion.
I concur with the majority's decision upholding the Commission's award of out-of- pocket expenses to Jackson. I also concur with the majority's decision affirming the trial court's failure to enter a finding of discrimination against Stovall or to award him out-of- pocket losses. However, I must respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority opinion reversing the Commission's award of emotional distress damages.
For the reasons set forth in my dissent in Indiana Civil Rights Comm'n v. Washburn Realtors, Inc., 610 N.E.2d 293, 297-99 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993), I believe Indiana Civil Rights Comm'n v. Holman, 177 Ind.App. 648, 380 N.E.2d 1281 (1978) was wrongly decided and thus the majority's decision is based on precedent which is fundamentally flawed. As I stated in Washburn, awards of emotional distress damages represent a necessary component of the statutory mandate to enforce the remedial policies expressed in civil rights legislation. Washburn, 610 N.E.2d at 299 (Rucker, J., dissenting). Accordingly, I would apply the plain, everyday, and common meaning of the term "losses" in Ind. Code § 22-9-1-6(k) to include emotional distress damages. Such a construction is consistent with the statute's plenary grant of discretionary remedial power to the Commission as well as with the manifest purpose of the civil rights statute. Id. at 298, 299.
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution as well as the Equal Privileges Clause of Article 1, § 23 of the Indiana Constitution.
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that "[n]o state shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." The threshold question for federal equal protection analysis concerns the level of scrutiny. Those laws which involve a suspect classification, like race or alienage, and those that burden the exercise of fundamental rights, like reproduction or expression, receive the strictest scrutiny. Department of Envtl. Management v. Chemical Waste Management, Inc., 643 N.E.2d 331, 337 (Ind. 1994). In order to survive strict scrutiny a state action must be a necessary means to a compelling governmental purpose and be narrowly tailored to that purpose. Statutes rarely survive this level of scrutiny. Id.
e.g., United States v. Balistrieri, 981 F.2d 916, 932 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 812, 114 S.Ct. 58, 126 L.Ed.2d 28 (1993) (the more inherently degrading or humiliating the defendant's action is, the more reasonable it is to infer that a person would suffer humiliation or distress from that action); Crumble v. Blumthal, 549 F.2d 462, 467 (7th Cir. 1977) (remanding for consideration of emotional damages based on plaintiff's testimony that he was "humiliated and embarrassed" by defendant's conduct); Seaton v. Sky Realty Co., Inc., 491 F.2d 634, 636 (7th Cir. 1974) (humiliation can reasonably be inferred from circumstances as well as established by testimony). Civil rights violations are serious affronts to an individual's personal dignity and the resulting emotional distress is as reasonably foreseeable in those cases as it is where an individual is the victim of an intentional tort. The unequal treatment between those protected under the Civil Rights Act and the larger class of persons who suffer emotional trauma as the result of another's wrongful acts violates the Equal Protection Clause.
situated. Collins v. Day, 644 N.E.2d 72, 80 (Ind. 1994). As to the first component of the test, it has repeatedly been said that the basis for the classification "must inhere in the subject matter." Id. at 78. Stated differently, where the legislature singles out one class of persons to receive a privilege or immunity not equally provided to others, such classification must be based upon distinctive, inherent characteristics which rationally distinguish the unequally treated class, and the disparate treatment accorded by the legislation must be reasonably related to such distinguishing characteristics. Id. at 78-79.
I can discern no distinctive or inherent characteristics which rationally distinguish the class of victims of civil rights violations from the larger class of victims of intentional torts for purposes of the damages recoverable. As previously stated, a person who experiences the pernicious effects of discrimination suffers no less emotional trauma than does the person who is the victim of an intentional tort. In my view the application of I.C. § 22-9-1-6(k) to deny victims of discrimination emotional distress damages places an unequal burden upon victims of discrimination and thereby implicitly grants a special privilege or immunity to victims of intentional torts. Because emotional distress damages are unequally recoverable among differing classes which are not rationally distinguishable, the application of I.C. § 22- 9-1-6(k) to deny such damages to victims of discrimination amounts to a violation of Article 1, § 23.
of money damages for emotional trauma. However, in this case the Commission awarded Jackson the modest sum of $80.00 representing damages for her emotional distress. Clearly those damages were an incidental rather than a primary part of the action. The difference in focus was addressed in State Human Rights Comm'n v. Pearlman Realty Agency, 161 W.Va. 1, 239 S.E.2d 145 (1977). In that case the Human Rights Commission determined that the complainant had been the victim of racial discrimination in housing and entered a remedial order requiring, among other things, that the perpetrator cease and desist from discriminatory practices, adopt an appropriate advertising program, make regular compliance reports to the Commission, and pay the complainant $1,000.00 "as compensation and damages for the humiliation, embarrassment, emotional and mental distress, and loss of personal dignity." Id. at 146. On appeal the court held that the Commission could, as part of its cease and desist order, award the complainant incidental damages as compensation for emotional and mental distress without proof of monetary loss. In so doing the court noted that victims of unlawful discrimination have access to the courts when the main object of their complaint is to recover damages. Id. at 148. However, the effect upon the defendant of an incidental monetary award to an injured party as part of a cease and desist order is to secure compliance with the Commission's order and to depress the discriminator's ambition to repeat the misbehavior. Id. at 147. "[A]n award of an incidental amount of money to a complainant is, from the defendant's perspective, nothing more or less than another facet of the Commission's powers of enforcement which require defendant to expend money in order to comply with the cease and desist order and secure his nondiscriminatory conduct in the future." Id. at 148.
In this case the legislative mandate grants the Commission the power to order a perpetrator to comply with a broad range of affirmative remedial actions. See I.C. § 22-9-1- 6(k). Where, as here, a victim suffers incidental emotional distress damages as the result of such discrimination, the Commission should be permitted to compensate the victim as part of its larger mission of effectuating the statute's purposes.
For the foregoing reasons I would reverse that part of the trial court's order concluding that the Commission is without authority to assess emotional distress damages pursuant to the Indiana Civil Rights Act.
Footnote: 1 Oral argument was held on October 29, 1997, in Indianapolis.
Footnote: 2 The record is unclear as to the disposition of the second ejectment action.
Footnote: 3 Despite our past decisions, we note that the ICRC has continued to award emotional distress and punitive damages and has repeatedly raised this issue before this court. The instant case is a prime example. We question the ICRC's continued expenditure of public funds to continually relitigate an established rule of law. If the ICRC desires additional power to ensure the public's compliance with the Civil Rights Act, it should present its request to the legislature, not our courts. Although the Alders have not requested attorney's fees in the present case, we do not condone the continued disregard of our precedent.
Footnote: 4 The ICRC also argues that our interpretation of this provision violates the Equal Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article 1, § 23 of the Indiana Constitution. In its brief, however, the ICRC contends that the analysis under § 23 is identical to federal equal protection analysis. As our supreme court recently explained, Article 1, § 23 is not identical to the Equal Protection Clause and should be given independent interpretation and application. Collins v. Day, 644 N.E.2d 72, 75 (Ind. 1994). Because the ICRC has failed to do so, its argument under Article 1, § 23 is waived. See Humphrey v. State, 680 N.E.2d 836, 842 n.11 (Ind. 1997) (failure to cite authority or present cogent argument results in waiver on appeal).
before an administrative agency, without strict adherence to the rules of evidence and without affording the defendant the right to a jury trial. Further, the agency's award of damages does not require the same level of proof. Rather than a preponderance of the evidence standard, the agency's damage award is upheld if substantial evidence exists to support it.
Footnote: 6 In its brief, the ICRC also argues that the trial court erroneously concluded that the commission exceeded its statutory authority by ordering the Alders to either reinstall Jackson's parents' mobile home in the park or provide Jackson with a mobile home of equal or greater size in exchange for the title on her parents' mobile home. During oral argument, however, the parties stipulated to the fact that the mobile home owned by Jackson's parents is no longer in existence, making it impossible to reinstall the mobile home or provide a comparable mobile home in exchange. We also note that the Alders agreed to set aside a lot for Jackson if she desires to move back to the park. Under these circumstances, this issue is now moot and we need not address it on appeal.
Footnote: 7 In their brief, the Alders also argue, in one sentence, that the evidence was insufficient to support the ICRC's finding of discrimination against Jackson. Other than this brief assertion, however, the Alders have failed to explain how the evidence was deficient or cite a single authority in support of their argument. Apparently aware of this deficiency, the Alders also contend that "it is impossible to brief this issue" because the ICRC failed to provide a transcript of the proceedings before the trial court in the record. Appellee's Brief at 27. However, the Alders have also failed to explain how the lack of a trial transcript precludes our review, especially considering that we have the transcript of the hearing held before the ICRC. As a result, this issue is waived. See Humphrey, 680 N.E.2d at 842 n.11 (failure to cite authority or present cogent argument results in waiver on appeal).

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