Source: https://caselaw.findlaw.com/hi-intermediate-court-of-appeals/1706708.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 17:12:46+00:00

Document:
Doe Governmental Entities 1–10, Doe Governmental Agencies 1–10, Defendants, (Civil No. 07–1–1122). State of Hawai‘i, by its Attorney General, Plaintiff/Appellant/Cross–Appellee, v. Tropic Seas, Inc.; The Association of Apartment Owners of Diamond Head Beach, Inc.; Diamond Head Apartments, Ltd.; CS Apartments, Ltd.; The Association of Apartment Owners of 2987 Kalakaua Condominium; Tahitienne, Incorporated; The Association of Apartment Owners of 3003 Kalakaua, Inc.; and The Association of Apartment Owners of 3019 Kalakaua, Inc., Defendants/Appellees/Cross–Appellants, Olivia Chen Lum, Trustee of the Olivia Chen Lum Revocable Living Trust; Clarence Kwon Hou Lum, Trustee of the Clarence Kwon Hou Lum Trust and Trustee under the Will and Estate of Chow Sin Kum Lum; Jeanne S.J. Chan and Howard N.H. Chan, Trustees of the Jeanne S.J. Chan Trust; and The Diamond Head Ambassador Hotel, LTD., Defendants/Appellees/Cross–Appellees, John Does 1–20, Doe Corporations 1–20, Doe Partnerships 1–20, Doe Associations 1–20, Doe Governmental Agencies 1–20, and Doe Entities 1–20, Defendants, (Civil No. 10–1–0888).
FOLEY, Presiding J., LEONARD and REIFURTH, JJ. William J. Wynhoff, Deputy Attorney General, on the briefs, for Defendant/Plaintiff/Appellant/Cross–Appellee, State of hawai‘i. Robert G. Klein, Randall K. Schmitt, Jordon J. Kimura, Troy J.H. Andrade, (McCorriston MillerMukai MacKinnion), on the briefs, for Plaintiff/Appellee/Cross–Appellant Gold Coast Neighborhood Association and Defendants/Appellees/Cross–Appellants Tropic Seas, Inc.; The Association of Apartment Owners of Diamond Head Beach, Inc .; Diamond Head Apartments, Ltd.; CS Apartments, Ltd.; The Association of Apartment Owners of 2987 Kalakaua Condominium; Tahitienne, Incorporated; The Association of Apartment Owners of 3003 Kalakaua, Inc.; and The Association of Apartment Owners of 3019 Kalakaua, Inc. Stephen K.C. Mau, (Rush Moore), on the briefs, for Defendant/Appellee/Cross–Appellee Diamond Head, Ambassador Hotel, Ltd.
This consolidated appeal arises from two cases that sought declaratory relief as to the ownership of a certain stretch of dilapidated seawalls at the Diamond Head end of Kalakaua Avenue in Waikiki on O‘ahu. Defendant/Plaintiff/ Appellant/Cross–Appellee State of Hawai‘i (State) appeals from the (1) Final Judgment filed February 3, 2014 and (2) “Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order” (FOFs/COLs/Order) filed November 29, 2013 by the Circuit Court of the First Circuit (circuit court) Plaintiff/Appellee/Cross–Appellant Gold Coast Neighborhood Association (Gold Coast) and Defendants/Appellees/ Cross–Appellants Tropic Seas, Inc. (Tropic Seas); The Association of Apartment Owners of Diamond Head Beach, Inc. (AOAO of DH Beach); Diamond Head Apartments, Ltd. (DH Apartments); CS Apartments, Ltd. (CS Apartments); The Association of Apartment Owners of 2987 Kalakaua Condominium (AOAO of 2987); Tahitienne, Incorporated (Tahitienne); The Association of Apartment Owners of 3003 Kalakaua, Inc. (AOAO of 3003); and The Association of Apartment Owners of 3019 Kalakaua, Inc. (AOAO of 3019) (collectively, the Kalakaua Group) cross-appeal from the circuit court's “Order Denying Plaintiff Gold Coast Neighborhood Association Etal's Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs Filed February 18, 2014” filed May 13, 2014 (Order Denying Fees and Costs).
On appeal, the State contends the circuit court lacked jurisdiction and erred on the merits, and the Kalakaua Group contends the circuit court erred by not awarding it attorneys1 fees and costs.
Gold Coast further alleged that the State “repaired and rehabilitated the Seawall in 1992”; “appropriated funds for improvements to the Seawall in years since the 1992 rehabilitation, but did not release these funds for actual use”; and despite Gold Coast's “repeated demands[,] ․ has consistently informed [Gold Coast] that the State does not have a duty to maintain the Seawall in a safe condition.” Gold Coast claimed the “State is responsible to maintain and keep the Seawall in a good and safe condition and further, as the Seawall is a public highway, the State has a duty to maintain the Seawall in a condition safe for travel.” Gold Coast sought a declaration “that the State is required to maintain the Seawall and keep it in good and safe condition” and an award of attorneys' fees and costs.
(6) Gold Coast lacked standing.
The State sought “a declaration that it does not own the seawalls or the real property under the seawalls and ․ does not have an easement by prescription or implication over the [Seawall]” and costs.
On June 15, 2010, the State filed a motion to consolidate its case (Civil No. 10–1–0888) with the case brought by Gold Coast against the State (Civil No. 07–1–1122), and the circuit court granted the motion on August 10, 2010.
• AOAO Defendants, DH Ambassador Hotel, and AOAO of 3003 are members of Gold Coast.
• The Seawall is “on, at, or near the seaward boundary of” eleven parcels of real property.
• Tropic Seas, AOAO of DH Beach Hotel, DH Apartments, CS Apartments, AOAO of 2987, Tahitienne, AOAO of 3003, and AOAO of 3019 each own one of the eleven parcels of property, and DH Ambassador Hotel owns three of the eleven parcels.
• “Sometime around 1982,” the Land Division of the State's Department of Land and Natural Resources (DLNR) “repaired and rehabilitated broken sections of the Seawall” that included the portion of the Seawall on the makai boundaries of DH Apartments, CS Apartments, and AOAO of 2987.
• The “Waikiki Seawall, Walkway Rehabilitation, Phase III” affected the portions of the Seawall on the makai boundaries of eight of the eleven parcels at issue, not including the portion on the boundary of Tropic Seas (TMK 3–1–032–030) or the portions on the boundaries of two of DH Ambassador Hotel's three parcels (TMK 3–1–032–029 and TMK 3–1–032–28).
• In September 1993 and pursuant to a Special Management Area Use Permit and Shoreline Setback Variance granted by the City and County of Honolulu, DLNR “built or rebuilt essentially the entire” portion of the Seawall on the makai boundary of the DH Ambassador Hotel (TMK Nos. 3–1–032:026, 027, 028) in response to damage caused by Hurricane Iniki.
• On July 25, 2003, the State granted Gold Coast a “NonExclusive Easement for a term of 55 years for the right, privilege, and authority to construct, use, maintain and repair a ladder ‘in, over, under, and across” a portion of the Seawall on the makai boundary of one of DH Ambassador Hotel's parcels (TMK 3–1–032:027).
• Gold Coast paid the State $2,406 for the Non–Exclusive Easement and procured commercial general liability insurance in accordance with the terms of the NonExclusive Easement.
• On August 12, 2003, Gold Coast installed a sea ladder onto the TMK 3–1–032:027 portion of the Seawall (i.e., a ladder that is bolted to the Seawall and descends into the ocean).
• The portion of the Seawall on the makai boundary of AOAO of 3019's parcel (TMK 3–1–033:009) was apparently worked on in 2006 but the parties do not know who did the work.
• “Since at least 1960[,]” the State has held an express “easement of right of way for pedestrians only over, across and along the seawall along the highwater mark at seashore” with regard to the portion of the Seawall on the makai boundary of AOAO of 3019's parcel.
On March 22, 2011, the circuit court held a bench trial at which June Anderson (Anderson), Robert Gentry (Gentry), and Guy Bishaw (Bishaw) testified for the Kalakaua Group.5 On March 31, 2011, the circuit court conducted a site visit.
• No part of the Seawall existed in 1872; the portion of the Seawall that is on the makai boundaries of four of the eleven parcels existed in 1904; the portion of the Seawall that is on the makai boundaries of five other of the eleven parcels existed in 1912; and the portion of the Seawall that is on the makai boundaries of the two remaining parcels was constructed sometime between 1921 and 1930.
• At high tide, the Seawall exists in contact with the ocean along its entire length.
• The State has never repaired the portion of the Seawall on the makai boundary of the Tropic Seas parcel, and while some of this portion of the Seawall is makai of the shoreline as defined by HRS § 205A–1 (2001 Repl.) 6 and therefore on State land, “nearly” the entire Tropic Seas' portion of the Seawall is on registered land.
• The portion of the Seawall on the makai boundary of the DH Beach Hotel parcel lies on both State land and registered land.
• The portion of the Seawall on the makai boundary of the DH Ambassador Hotel parcel was repaired by the State in 1984, and rebuilt in 1993 after Hurricane Iniki on State land makai of the then shoreline, and lies in part on State land.
• The portion of the Seawall on the makai boundary of the DH Apartments parcel was repaired by the State in 1982 and again sometime after May 1984, and lies in part on State land.
• The portions of the Seawall on the makai boundaries of the CH Apartments, AOAO of 2897, Tahitienne, and AOAO of 3003 parcels were repaired by the State sometime after May 1984, and lie in part on State land.
• The only public beach access route (i.e., public path connecting Kalakaua Avenue to the ocean) along the Gold Coast crosses a parcel that was included in the original complaint but was removed by the first amended complaint (TMK No. 3–1–033:006).
• A person can access the Seawall (1) by using the public beach access route, (2) from the beach in front of two parcels at the Diamond Head end of the Gold Coast, (3) from the beach in front of two parcels at the Waikiki end of the Gold Coast, (4) from the ocean where the Seawall is low enough for the person to climb up onto the Seawall from the ocean, (5) by using the metal steps on the Seawall in front of the DH Ambassador Hotel, and (5) from any of the parcels bordering the Seawall.
• The State owns and is responsible for the portion of the Seawall on the makai boundary of the DH Ambassador Hotel because it substantially rebuilt that portion of the Seawall.
1. The [State] owns the relevant seawall or seawalls in this matter on, at, or near the seaward boundary of [the eleven parcels at issue] (referred to hereinafter as the “Seawall”) and the real property under the Seawall by surrender except as to the portions of the Seawall [on the makai boundaries of DH Beach Hotel and Tropic Seas because they] are on privately owned land registered in the Land Court. The State also hold [sic] an easement by implied dedication over all the entire Seawall including those portions of the Seawall [on the makai boundaries of DH Beach Hotel and Tropic Seas because they] are on privately owned land registered in the Land Court.
2. The State's claim for declaratory judgment ․ is denied and that case is hereby dismissed in its entirety with prejudice.
This Judgment resolves all claims asserted between the parties[.] ․ Each party shall bear its/his/her own attorneys' fees and costs.
it was necessary for Gold Coast to bring the lawsuit to enforce, the duties that the State owed to the public when from 1975–2006, the State acknowledged a public right-of-way over the Seawall, repaired the Seawall to keep it available to the public to use as a walkway, and proposed repairs that were consistent with the acceptance of the Seawall as a public walkway. Also, the State refused to recognize its obligation to maintain and repair the Seawall, and, significantly, filed its own lawsuit against the various landowners adjacent to the Seawall seeking a declaration that the Seawall was not a public highway. Furthermore, Gold Coast was “solely responsible” for challenging the State's erroneous conclusion that it no longer had an obligation to maintain and repair the Seawall to ensure public access to the beach and for clarifying the State's responsibilities under the law.
The Kalakaua Group argued that the third prong of the private attorney general doctrine test was satisfied because “the public at large benefits from the decision[.]” The Kalakaua Group explained that the decision “ensures that the State will continue to repair and maintain the Seawall for the enjoyment of residents and visitors” and “prevents the State from reneging on future obligation to maintain public highways in a safe condition for the public and reaffirms the longstanding public policy in favor of access to Hawai'si [Hawai‘i's] beaches.” The Kalakaua Group argued that “[a]ny defense of sovereign immunity is ‘unavailing and inapposite’ insomuch as the State initiated its own litigation in this case[,]” and that the circuit court has the inherent power to award reasonable attorneys' fees when justice so requires.
The Kalakaua Group argued that Gold Coast was entitled to costs in the amount of $13,707.46 under HRS § 607–24 (1993) because Gold Coast prevailed and had received a final judgment against the State.
On February 28, 2014, the State filed its Memorandum in Opposition to the Kalakaua Group's motion for attorneys' fees and costs. The State argued that the Kalakaua Group's motion for attorneys' fees and costs was barred as untimely filed under HRCP Rule 59(e) because it sought to alter or amend the Final Judgment that ruled “[e]ach party will bear its own fees and costs associated with this legal action.” The State also argued that the Kalakaua Group's motion should be denied because (1) the State did not waive its sovereign immunity with regard to the claim for declaratory relief brought against the State by Gold Coast and (2) the private attorney general doctrine applies to plaintiffs, not defendants.
On May 13, 2014, the circuit court filed its order denying the Kalakaua Group's motion for attorneys' fees and costs based on its conclusion that the “State has not waived its sovereign immunity.” On June 6, 2014, the Kalakaua Group filed its notice of appeal from the circuit court's Order Denying Fees and Costs.
“The existence of jurisdiction is a question of law that [the appellate court reviews] de novo under the right/wrong standard.” Captain Andy's Sailing, Inc., v. Dep't of Land and Natural Res., State of Hawai‘i, 113 Hawai‘i 184, 192, 150 P.3d 833, 841 (2006) (citation, internal quotation marks, and brackets omitted).
“An appellate court may freely review conclusions of law and the applicable standard of review is the right/wrong test. A conclusion of law that is supported by the trial court's findings of fact and that reflects an application of the correct rule of law will not be overturned.” Dan v. State, 76 Hawai‘i 423, 428, 879 P.2d 528, 533 (1994) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
The interpretation of a statute is a question of law reviewable de novo.
In construing an ambiguous statute, the meaning of the ambiguous words may be sought by examining the context, with which the ambiguous words, phrases, and sentences may be compared, in order to ascertain their true meaning. HRS § 1–15(1) (1993). Moreover, the courts may resort to extrinsic aids in determining legislative intent. One avenue is the use of legislative history as an interpretive tool.
The [appellate] court may also consider the reason and spirit of the law, and the cause which induced the legislature to enact it to discover its true meaning. HRS § 1–15(2). Laws in pari materia, or upon the same subject matter, shall be construed with reference to each other. What is clear in one statute may be called upon in aid to explain what is doubtful in another. HRS § 1–16 (1993).
State v. Koch, 107 Hawai‘i 215, 220, 112 P.3d 69, 74 (2005)․ Absent an absurd or unjust result, the [appellate] court is bound to give effect to the plain meaning of unambiguous statutory language; we may only resort to the use of legislative history when interpreting an ambiguous statute.
Silva v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 115 Hawai‘i 1, 6–7, 165 P.3d 247, 252–53 (2007) (citations, internal quotation marks, elipses, and brackets omitted) (format altered).
“The trial court's grant or denial of attorney's fees and costs is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard.” Sierra Club v. Dep't of Transp., State of Hawai‘i, 120 Hawai‘i 181, 197, 202 P .3d 1226, 1242 (2009) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted) (quoting Kamaka v. Goodsill Anderson Quinn & Stifel, 117 Hawai‘i 92, 105, 176 P.3d 91, 104 (2008)).
(2) The State contends the circuit court did not have jurisdiction over the instant case because the only order issued by the circuit court addressed ownership of the Seawall and therefore the case brought by Gold Coast was “a quiet title action” governed by chapter 669 of the HRS. The State contends that Gold Coast may not bring a quiet title action because under HRS § 669–1(a) (1993), plaintiffs without an interest in the subject property may not seek to quiet title in the name of third parties; “the State has sovereign immunity as to a quiet title claim by a stranger to the property”; and HRCP Rule 19(a) requires “the ACTUAL OWNERS OF PROPERTY” to be named as parties.
(3) The State contends the circuit court did not have jurisdiction over the instant case because Gold Coast lacked standing. The State contends Gold Coast lacked standing because, inter alia, the individual members of Gold Coast would have to participate in the litigation because they are necessary parties under HRCP Rule 19(a); the individual members do not have standing to sue in their own right because they did not suffer an actual or threatened injury as a result of the State's conduct; and even if the members of Gold Coast were injured, a favorable decision from the circuit court provides no relief because the courts cannot direct the State to appropriate and expend funds.
(5) The State contends the circuit court erred on the merits when it concluded that the State owns the portions of the Seawall that are not registered in land court and the land under those portions by surrender because the Seawall is not a “trail” or a “public highway” under HRS § 264–1(c).
The Kalakaua Group contends the circuit court did not err because the circuit court did not convert Gold Coast's case from one for a declaratory judgment to one for quiet title, had jurisdiction over Gold Coast's action, and correctly concluded that the State acquired the Seawall by surrender under HRS § 264–1(c) and implied dedication.
DH Ambassador Hotel contends all of the State's arguments are inapplicable to the portion of the Seawall on the makai boundaries of the DH Ambassador Hotel parcels because the parties' SOFs and the circuit court's unchallenged FOFs establish that the State constructed this portion of the Seawall in 1993 and “virtually all of the Seawall fronting [the DH Ambassador Hotel's parcels] is located on State property” and therefore the State owns and is responsible for that portion of the Seawall.
B. The State's jurisdictional arguments are without merit.
The State contends the circuit court did not have jurisdiction over the instant case because: (1) there was no “actual controversy” as implicitly required for a declaratory judgment under HRS § 632–1; (2) Gold Coast's action was in effect one for quiet title and plaintiffs may not bring quiet title actions in the name of third parties; and (3) Gold Coast lacked standing.
§ 632–1 Jurisdiction; controversies subject to.
The circuit court had jurisdiction under HRS § 632–1 because antagonistic claims were present between the parties as indicated by Gold Coast's and the State's filing of reciprocal suits for declaratory relief.
Gold Coast's complaint cannot be treated as an action for quiet title against the State under HRS § 669–1(a) because the State did not claim an interest in the Seawall.9 The circuit court's rulings as to the ownership of the Seawall did not transform the action into one for quiet title because actions for quiet title settle disputes between plaintiffs and defendants who both claim title to the real property at issue, not between plaintiffs and defendants who both seek a declaratory judgment relieving them from any future liability stemming from apparent ownership. See Maui Land & Pineapple Co. v. Infiesto, 76 Hawai‘i 402, 408, 879 P.2d 507, 513 (1994) (“While it is not necessary for the plaintiff to have perfect title to establish a prima facie case [for quiet title], he must at least prove that he has a substantial interest in the property and that his title is superior to that of the defendants.”).
C. The State has a duty to maintain the Seawall as a public walkway because it acquired an easement by implied dedication for that purpose.
In its FOFs/COLs/Order, the circuit court concluded the State “has an easement over and across the Seawall by implied dedication.” The circuit court also concluded that “the State has a prescriptive easement over the Seawall for pedestrian travel as of 1969.” In its Final Judgment, the circuit court ordered that the State holds “an easement by implied dedication over all the entire Seawall including those portions of the Seawall ․ [that] are on privately owned land registered in the Land Court.” While the doctrines of easements by prescription and easements by implied dedication have similarities, they are not one in the same and thus must be examined separately.
A prescriptive easement is acquired “by use and occupation for the period prescribed by law [for adverse possession]․ [T]he use and occupation of the easement must be long, continued, uninterrupted and peaceable.” Lalakea v. Hawaiian Irrigation Co., 36 Haw. 692, 706–07 § Haw. Terr.1944); see also The Nature Conservancy v. Nakila, 4 Haw.App. 584, 598, 671 P.2d 1025, 1035 (1983) (holding that the party claiming the prescriptive easement has the burden of proving “the same elements necessary to prove acquisition of title by adverse possession”). The relevant prescriptive period is twenty years. See HRS § 669–1(b) (1993) (“Action for the purpose of establishing title to a parcel of real property of five acres or less may be brought by any person who has been in adverse possession of the real property for not less than twenty years.”).
A prescriptive easement confers rights in land that “are measured and defined by the use made of the land giving rise to the easement[,]” and unlike adverse possession, does not operate “to divest title to the land at issue.” 25 Am.Jur.2d Easements and Licenses § 39 (West 2015). In other words, “the right to use an easement acquired by prescription cannot exceed the use which was made during the prescriptive period, and an easement holder is not entitled to materially alter the scope or character of its easement.” 25 Am.Jur.2d Easements and Licenses § 66 (West 2015) (footnote omitted).
permits the public to use his or her land for a long period[.] ․ There must be an offer and acceptance of dedication․ [T]he offer may be implied under the circumstances and the acceptance may also be implied by the nature of the public use. In other words, the duration and type of public use can raise both the presumption of the owner's intent (or offer) to dedicate land to public use, as well as constitute acceptance by the public.
Application of Banning, 73 Haw. 297, 304–05, 832 P.2d 724, 728–29 (1992) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Moreover, if “continuous adverse public use” is “the only evidence of dedication,” it must be “unopposed and acquiesced in for a period longer than the prescriptive period to infer public dedication.” Id. at 308, 832 P.2d at 730. (emphases omitted). Exactly how much longer than the prescriptive period, however, is not settled. Id. The relevant prescriptive period is twenty years. Id. at 309, 832 P.2d at 731 (citing HRS § 657–31 (1993), which provides that “No person shall commence an action to recover possession of any lands, or make any entry thereon, unless within twenty years after the right to bring the action first accrued.”).
In addition, pursuant to HRS § 520–7 (2006 Repl.), when the public use of the land is for recreational purposes, the prescriptive period must commence prior to 1969 for any type of easement to arise. See HRS § 520–7 (“No person shall gain any rights to any land by prescription or otherwise, as a result of any usage thereof for recreational purposes as provided in this chapter.”). See also Banning, 73 Haw. at 309, 832 P.2d at 731 (holding that an easement by implied dedication was not established when the only evidence of dedication was the general public's use of a footpath for beach recreational purposes on a regular and continuous basis from 1968 to 1988). Additionally, “[a] permissive use of a right of way will not create an easement, however long continued.” Tagami v. Meyer, 41 Haw. 484, 488 (Haw.Terr.1956).
The State's acceptance of the owners' offer to dedicate the Seawall to public use can be implied from the public's open and continuous non-permissive use10 of the Seawall as a walkway from as early as 1956; the State's recognition of the Seawall as a public walkway for recreational purposes in 1960 with respect to the portion of the Seawall on the makai boundary of AOAO 3019; the State's recognition of the entire Seawall as a public walkway in 1975, 1982, 1984, 1992, and 2006; and the State's repairs to portions of the Seawall in 1982, 1984, and 1993.
Therefore, the circuit court did not err in concluding that the State “has an easement over and across the Seawall by implied dedication” because Gold Coast sufficiently established that (1) the owners of the Seawall made an offer of dedication as early as 1956, and (2) the State accepted the owners' offer through the public's use of the Seawall since at least 1956, the State's recognition of the Seawall as a public walkway since 1960, and the State's repairs to the Seawall since 1982.
Because the State has a duty to keep the Seawall in repair via its easement by implied dedication, it is unnecessary to address whether or not the circuit court erred in. concluding that the State acquired an easement by prescription. See Levy v. Kimball, 50 Haw. 497, 498, 443 P.2d 142, 144 (1968) (holding “that an owner of and [sic] easement has the right and the duty to keep it in repair” and “is liable in damages for injuries caused by failure to keep the easement in repair”).
D. The State acquired ownership of the portions of the Seawall on non-registered land and the land under those portions by surrender.
§ 264–1 Public highways and trails.
E. The State's consent is not required to establish an easement by implied dedication or a public highway by surrender.
Because the State's argument that neither an easement by implied dedication nor a public highway by surrender may be established without the State's consent under HRS § 171–30, HRS § 26–7, and HRS § 107–10 was raised for the first time on appeal, whether to address the argument is within our discretion. State v. Moses, 102 Hawai‘i 449, 456, 77 P.3d 940, 947 (2003) (holding that “in both criminal and civil cases” and unless justice requires, an appellant waives an argument on appeal if he did not raise it at trial).
“[T]he fundamental starting point for statutory-interpretation is the language of the statute itself․ [W]here the statutory language is plain and unambiguous, our sole duty is to give effect to its plain and obvious meaning.” First Ins. Co. of Hawai‘i v. A & B Prop., 126 Hawai‘i 406, 414, 271 P.3d 1165, 1173 (2012) (quoting State v. Wheeler, 121 Hawai‘i 383, 390, 219 P.3d 1170, 1177 (2009)). The statutory language of HRS §§ 171–30, 26–7, and 107–10 are plain and unambiguous: (1) HRS § 171–30(a)(1)11 makes BLNR responsible for “[a]ll real property or any interest therein” acquired by the State; (2) HRS § 26–712 requires the Department of the AG to approve “all documents relating to the acquisition of any land or interest in lands by the State”; and (3) HRS § 107–1013 places a final check via the Attorney General on the acquisition of land initiated “by the State or any department, agency, board, commission, or officer thereof[.]” The State's argument that these statutory provisions require the State to consent to easements by implied dedication or public highways by surrender is without merit. Both doctrines are well established means for the public to acquire state land without the State's consent via public use. The State's interpretation of HRS §§ 171–30, 26–7, and 107–10 is not only inconsistent with the language of the statutes, but if adopted, would produce an absurd result in that it would silently abolish the doctrines of implied dedication and surrender. See State v. Burgo, 71 Haw. 198, 202, 787 P.2d 221, 223 (1990) (holding that a statute may not be interpreted “in a manner which produces an absurd result”).
The Kalakaua Group contends the circuit court abused its discretion in denying their motion for attorneys' fees and costs because (1) sovereign immunity is not implicated in this case, (2) the circuit court may award reasonable attorneys' fees and costs when justice requires, (3) the Kalakaua Group is entitled to recovery of reasonable attorneys' fees under the private attorney general doctrine, and (4) the Kalakaua Group is entitled to costs under HRS § 607–24.
The State answers that the circuit court did not err because (1) the State did not waive its sovereign immunity as to attorneys' fees; (2) Gold Coast was not the prevailing party; (3) the Kalakaua Group was not entitled to attorneys' fees under the private attorney general doctrine; (4) even if the Kalakaua Group was entitled to attorneys' fees, the amount awarded must be significantly reduced; and (5) the Kalakaua Group is not entitled to costs.
The circuit court denied the Kalakaua Group's motion for attorneys' fees and costs based on its conclusion that the “State has not waived its sovereign immunity.” The circuit court erred in this regard because “the doctrine of sovereign immunity is unavailing and inapposite” when the “case deals with a suit initiated by the State[.]” State ex rel. Anzai v. City and Cnty. of Honolulu, 99 Hawai‘i 508, 515–16, 57 P.3d 433, 440–41 (2002). The State waived its sovereign immunity when it filed its own action for declaratory judgment against the owners of the properties bordering the Seawall and requested and was granted consolidation.
As to costs, the circuit court erred in denying the Kalakaua Group's motion because the Gold Coast prevailed against the State.
In all cases in which a final judgment or decree is obtained against the State, ․ any and all deposits for costs made by the prevailing party shall be returned to the prevailing party, and the prevailing party shall be reimbursed by the State ․ all actual disbursements, not including attorney's fees or commissions, made by the prevailing party and approved by the court.
The Circuit Court of the First Circuit's Final Judgment entered February 3, 2014 and “Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order” entered November 29, 2013 are affirmed. The May 13, 2014 “Order Denying Plaintiff Gold Coast Neighborhood Association Etal's Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs Filed February 18, 2014,” also entered in the First Circuit of the First Circuit, is vacated and remanded for consideration of the Kalakaua Group's motion for attorney fees and the award of costs to the Kalakaua Group.
1. The Honorable Virginia L. Crandall presided.
2. Gold Coast's original complaint addressed twenty-one parcels of real property along the Gold Coast. The first amended complaint dropped ten of the twenty-one properties named in the original complaint and added one property. The second amended complaint removed one of the properties (i.e., the parcel owned by Oceanside Manor Association) and therefore there are eleven properties, which are not all contiguous, that are subject to this suit.
4. “Makai” means seaward in Hawaiian. Pukui, M.K. & Elbert, S.H ., Hawaiian Dictionary: Hawaiian–English, English–Hawaiian at 520 (1986).
5. Russell Tsuji, the State Land Division Administrator, testified for the State.
6. HRS § 205A–1 provides:HRS 5 205A–1 provides:․“Shoreline” means the upper reaches of the wash of the waves, other than storm and seismic waves, at high tide during the season of the year in which the highest wash of the waves occurs, usually evidenced by the edge of vegetation growth, or the upper limit of debris left by the wash of the waves.
7. On February 25, 2014, the State filed its notice of appeal from the circuit court's FOFs/COLs/Order and Final Judgment.
8. On May 7, 2015 and in support of its argument that private parties cannot transfer property to the State without the State's knowledge or consent, the State filed a letter with the appellate clerk that brings to this court's attention HRS § 107–10 (2012 Repl.). The State's letter fails to comply with Hawai‘i Rules of Appellate Procedure (HRAP) Rule 28(j) because HRS § 107–10 was published before the State's opening brief was filed on July 9, 2014. See HRAP Rule 28(j) (“Parties may, by letter to the appellate clerk, bring to the appellate court's attention pertinent and significant authorities published after a party's brief has been filed, but before a decision.” (Emphasis added.)).
10. No evidence was presented to suggest the public ever requested or received permission from any of the owners of the Seawall before accessing the Seawall for recreational purposes.
13. HRS § 107–10 (Supp.2001) provides, in relevant part: § 107–10 Acquiring if real property; prior approval. No real property or any right, title, or interest therein shall be acquired by agreement, purchase, gift, devise, eminent domain, or otherwise, for any purpose, by the State or any department, agency, board, commission, or officer thereof, without the prior approval of the [Department of the AG] as to form, exceptions, and reservations.

References: v. 
 § 205
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 § 1
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 § 1
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 § 669
 § 264
 § 264
 § 632

§ 632
 § 632
 § 669
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 § 669
 § 39
 § 66
 § 657
 § 520
 § 520
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§ 264
 § 171
 § 26
 § 107
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 § 171
 § 26
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 § 607
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 § 205
 § 107
 § 107
 § 107
 § 107