Source: http://bc-injury-law.com/blog/2009/10
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 16:05:51+00:00

Document:
Reasons for judgement were released yesterday (Boyd v. Shortreed) by the BC Supreme Court, New Westminster Registry, dealing with a Low Velocity Impact (LVI). The Plaintiff testified that she was involved in a rear-end crash and that she was injured despite having minimal damage to her vehicle. Interestingly, the Defendant denied that the crash happened at all.
 There were other inconsistencies in the evidence of the defendant which cause me to reject his evidence as to the happening of the incident. Accordingly, wherever the evidence of the plaintiff and the defendant conflict, I accept the evidence of the plaintiff as being the accurate version of events.
 That being found, I conclude that the defendant struck the plaintiff’s car from the rear. While I accept there was a situation of peril created by the driver of the tractor trailer, the proximate cause of the collision between the defendant’s vehicle and that of the plaintiff was the inattention of the defendant by travelling too close to the rear of the plaintiff’s vehicle or, alternatively, the condition of the brakes on his vehicle which did not allow him to slow his vehicle in time to avoid hitting the plaintiff’s vehicle.
 I do not find the plaintiff’s reaction to the danger created by the tractor trailer driver to be wanting and decline to apportion any fault for the accident to her. She reacted appropriately to a situation of emergency created by another driver who is not a party to the action.
 As a result, the defendant is 100% liable for the collision and resultant damages.
 The only new complaint arising from the accident appears to be the onset of mid-back pain. This is based mainly on self report. The extent and duration of these symptoms are described in some detail in the reports of Dr. O’Connor and Dr. McKenzie. This complaint seems to have occasioned the most pain and has persisted, although significantly improved, to the date of trial. Her recovery was estimated by the plaintiff to be at 85% of normal when she last attended Dr. McKenzie in August 2009. There is no ongoing disability related to the complaints nor has there been for some since late in 2007.
 In summary, the plaintiff suffered an exacerbation of her previous symptoms in her neck and lower back. I find these complaints had substantially resolved to their pre-accident condition inside of one year. In April of 2006, according to the notes of Dr. Shah, there was a further onset of lower back pain but, on the whole of the evidence, I cannot relate this flare up to the accident of April 2005. The injury to her mid-back was as a result of the accident. It persisted longer and caused her more discomfort than the exacerbation of her pre-existing symptoms.
 Accordingly, taking all of this into account, I assess general damages in the amount of $25,000 in respect of her soft tissue injuries.
Reasons for judgement were released yesterday dealing with an appropriate award of damages for soft tissue injuries and chronic pain lasting for over 6 years.
In yesterday’s case (Gosal v. Singh) the Plaintiff was involved in 2 BC Car Crashes. The first in 2003, the second in 2005. The first crash was a rear end collision. Fault was admitted. As the Plaintiff was recovering from her injuries from the first collision she was involved in the second collision.
 Ms. Gosal suffered mild to moderate soft tissue injuries to her neck, upper back, shoulders, and mid and lower back, which caused severe headaches. She was treated with physiotherapy, massage, and chiropractic treatments, but her recovery took longer because of her depression and anxiety. She was recovering when the second accident exacerbated her injuries, including her depression and anxiety.
 Dr. Khunkhun states that Ms. Gosal’s long-term prognosis is guarded because her symptoms have not resolved after such a long period of time since the accidents. She does not consider Ms. Gosal to be at an increased risk of any long-term sequelae such as osteoarthritis. She believes Ms. Gosal would continue to benefit from body conditioning and strengthening exercises. She observed that in the past Ms. Gosal benefitted from regular exercise and when she stops exercising regularly, her mood deteriorates and her pain increases.
 Dr. Manchanda last saw Ms. Gosal on September 24, 2008. She told him that she had pain on about four or five days a week, and no pain on about two days a week. She was still looking for employment in counselling. At that time, Dr. Manchanda felt that Ms. Gosal could work in a job that was sedentary or involved light physical duties. He also felt that Ms. Gosal could complete the majority of her household chores, but that she might require a break or assistance with the heavier chores, such as vacuuming or carrying heavy laundry.
 I prefer Dr. Sandhu’s opinion that Ms. Gosal is not seeking secondary gains. She was looking after the household and her children’s needs as best she could, and doing her best to continue with her studies. Having observed Ms. Gosal, and on all the evidence, I conclude that she is not malingering and that her complaints of pain and depression are genuine.
 She continues to improve, albeit slowly. I find that there are two to three days a week when she is not in pain. Full-time employment has assisted her both physically and emotionally. Though it is now more than six years since the first accident, and more than four years since the second accident, she still suffers from depression and pain. I anticipate that over the next few years, with a regular daily exercise program, her physical pain and depression will continue to improve but may not resolve completely.
 I find that circumstances of Ms. Gosal’s injuries are similar to those in Foran v. Nguyen, 2006 BCSC 605, 149 A.C.W.S. (3d) 419, where the award for non-pecuniary damages was $90,000, and Jackson v. Lai, 2007 BCSC 1023, 160 A.C.W.S. (3d) 276, where the award was $100,000.
 I consider an award of $95,000 for non-pecuniary damages to be appropriate.
In addition to this case’s value as a precedent for valuing non-pecuniary damages for chronic pain, this case is worth reviewing for the Court’s criticism of the expert witness called by the defense.
I’ve previously written about the duty of experts to the court and highlighted judicial criticism when experts ignore this duty. In today’s case the court made critical findings with respect to Dr. Hymie Davis, a psychiatrist who billed over $290,000 to ICBC in 2008. Specifically Madam Justice Loo found that Dr. Davis “was presenting a case for the defence rather than providing an impartial expert opinion. Dr. Davis’ argument that (the Plaintiff’s) injuries should have healed and that she is seeking secondary gains or malingering, is at odds with his article “The Whiplash Injury“.
When you sue for damages in the BC Supreme Court in an ICBC Injury Claim you are subject to certain rules of compelled disclosure. These rules require you to give verbal, documentary and even physical discovery (independent medical exams).
When ICBC gets access to this private information in the lawsuit process it is subject to an “implied undertaking of confidentiality“. What this means is this information is not to be used by ICBC for purposes outside of the lawsuit.
If you have a further ICBC Claim involving similar injuries making the previous records relevant, can ICBC provide these records to their lawyer to be used against you in a subsequent claim? Reasons for judgement were released today addressing this issue and the answer is no, at least not without your consent or a court order.
 A party who has documents from earlier litigation that are impressed with the implied undertaking simply cannot make use of those documents without the concurrence of the party from whom they were obtained or leave of the court. The implied undertaking protects documents or oral discovery obtained in earlier litigation from being used for any purpose “collateral” to that litigation. Thus, the documents cannot be used for internal strategic review in subsequent litigation. They cannot be used for the purposes of drafting pleadings. They cannot be sent to counsel for the purposes of obtaining an opinion in new litigation. All of these obligations bound the named defendants in the Current Action as well as ICBC in its conduct of that litigation.
 Once one recognizes that a central focus of the implied undertaking rule is to prevent the use of documents in subsequent litigation without consent or leave of the court, it is not sound to assert that Rule 26 displaces the application of the implied undertaking rule. Rule 26 is a rule of broad application and it governs virtually all civil actions. There are like provisions in most other jurisdictions. The result advanced by the defendants would significantly curtail the efficacy and ambit of the rule.
 The submission of the defendants would also significantly erode both policy objectives underlying the rule. It would impair the privacy interests of the party to the earlier action who made disclosure and gave discovery evidence. It would also subvert the policy objective of encouraging parties to “provide a more complete and candid discovery” referred to inJuman at para. 26.
 The intended purview of the “statutory exceptions” rule which is referenced by the Court in Juman, is limited to specific legislation which compels disclosure and which expressly overrides the privilege and/or confidentiality concerns of the holder of the information. Rule 26 does not achieve these objects. Though it requires disclosure from parties to litigation, both Rule 26(2) and the structure of Form 93 recognize the ongoing entitlement of a party to maintain a claim for privilege. While documents covered by an implied undertaking are not, strictly speaking, privileged, I believe that it would be appropriate for a party, from whom document disclosure is sought, to list those documents in its possession which are subject to an implied undertaking under part 3 of its list of documents.
This case also addressed the remedies available when there is a breach of an implied undertaking and these are worth reviewing for anyone interested in BC Privacy Law.
Reasons for judgement were released today addressing the permissible scope of Cross Examination of an expert witness in a BC Injury Claim.
In today’s case (MacEachern v. Rennie) the Defendants called a physician to give expert opinion evidence. This physician happened to be a treating doctor of the Plaintiff’s prior to her injuries. While testifying the doctor was taken through his clinical records by defence counsel on an entry by entry basis. The doctor was asked what happened on each of those clinic visits and in canvassing this the doctor gave evidence about the prognosis and treatment of Hepatitis C (which is an area the doctor apparently was not called to address).
The Plaintiff then wished to cross examine the doctor about treatments and the prognosis for Hepatitis C. The Defence lawyer objected to this on the basis that such a cross examination would “call for new opinion that are not admissible since the Plaintiff has not served the defendants with notice of those opinion“.
 With respect to the first point, the CN Defendants argue that the notice which they served on the plaintiff in connection with Dr. Glynn-Morris contains only treatment opinions and does not touch on the area of the plaintiff’s Hepatitis C. This argument misses the mark. The plaintiff is entitled to respond to all the opinion evidence led by the CN Defendants, not just that which was contained in the written statement of Dr. Glynn-Morris’ opinion. It was counsel for the CN Defendants who chose in direct-examination to ask Dr. Glynn-Morris about testing of the plaintiff for Hepatitis C. It was in direct-examination that Dr. Glynn-Morris opined that in 30 percent of people, Hepatitis C cures itself and disappears, and that he ordered a test to see if that is what had happened in Ms. MacEachern’s case. Having opened up that area in examination-in-chief, the CN Defendants cannot now restrict the plaintiff’s cross-examination about it simply on the ground that it was not covered in the written statement that they had delivered to the plaintiff.
I note Ms. MacEachern had already contracted hepatitis C which with her ongoing ingestion of multiple drugs would likely have progressed with liver damage and possible cirrhosis and eventual liver failure.
 Nevertheless, the CN Defendants argue that even if the proposed line of questioning did not require notice pursuant to the provisions of Rule 40A, notice was still required because of the case management order made in respect of this trial on February 6, 2009, which provided, among other things, that the plaintiff’s reply or rebuttal reports were to be delivered by January 29, 2009. The CN Defendants point out that Dr. Baker’s report was delivered to the plaintiff on December 1, 2008. They submit therefore that any opinion evidence in reply to Dr. Baker’s report should have been delivered to them by January 29, 2009.
 The short answer to this argument is that the deadlines set out in the case management order relate to expert witnesses that each party proposed to call as witnesses in their own case. The order does not, by its terms, require a party to give notice of the questions it proposes to ask in cross-examination of another party’s witnesses, even if those questions in cross-examination have the effect of eliciting an expert rebuttal or reply opinion.
 The case of Canadian National Railway Company v. Canada, 2002 BCSC 1669, 8 B.C.L.R. (4th) 323 cited by the CN Defendants is distinguishable, because that case did not deal with the effect of a case management order on questions asked of an opposing witness in cross-examination.
 To summarize: the questions that the plaintiff proposes to ask in cross-examination of Dr. Glynn-Morris are proper, and to the extent that they elicit expert opinions, those opinions are proper reply or rebuttal. Such reply or rebuttal opinions elicited in cross-examination are not subject to the notice requirements of Rule 40A, or of the case management orders that were made in this case.
Reasons for judgement were released today showing how an effective cross examination of a Defendant can make all the difference in the prosecution of an ICBC Injury Claim.
In today’s case (Mclaren v. Rice) the Plaintiff was involved in a single vehicle accident in February, 2005. The Plaintiff was a passenger. The Defendant lost control of the vehicle and left the roadway. The Plaintiff was injured in this collision. There were no witnesses to the crash itself and the Plaintiff’s injuries were so severe ( a closed head injury and a fractured skull) that he had no memory of the accident. The Defendant denied that he was at fault for losing control of the vehicle.
Just because a driver loses control of a vehicle does not automatically make him at fault for the accident. The Plaintiff still has to prove his/her case on a ‘balance of probabilities‘. So how then, can a plaintiff with no memory of what happened, with no witnesses and with a defendant who denies wrongdoing prove his case? Some of the tools that can be used are pre-trial discovery and cross examination. Today’s case demonstrates that the lawyer involved effectively used these tools to prove that the Driver was responsible for losing control.
It was a pull to the left and then, I just hit the ditch and as we hit the ditch, I tried pulling it to the right and it lost control and, and spinning and from there, it just lost control.
 I find that Jacob Rice failed to apply the brakes in a timely fashion and that he failed to divert the course of the truck so as to avoid the accident which occurred. Whether he fell asleep or was merely momentarily inattentive, his conduct was negligent.
The volume of ICBC and other personal injury cases released by our Superior Courts over the past 2 days has been higher than usual so I present today’s BC Injury Law Update in a ‘round up‘ fashion.
Today the BC Court of Appeal dealt with the issue of what is a ‘reasonable excuse’.
What then is the purpose of the section? Clearly one of the purposes of the section is to enable a municipality to investigate a claim fully. But that purpose is addressed by the second branch of the concluding sentence. The only other purpose I can think of was to protect municipalities against stale claims in order to enable them to estimate their future liabilities and make budgetary provision for them. But I know of no authority for that surmise. It really is difficult to make much sense out of the words “reasonable excuse” in the context….
Ultimately the Court held that ignorance of the law can be a reasonable excuse in certain circumstances under the Local Government Act.
The second case released today dealt with Pain and Suffering Awards for Soft Tissue Injuries. In this case (Robinson v. Anderson) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2005 rear end car crash in Tsawwassen, BC. Liability was admitted leaving the court to deal with the value of the injuries.
 It is not disputed that the plaintiff sustained soft-tissue injuries to her neck, back, left shoulder and right knee in the collision. Similarly, there is no suggestion that the plaintiff is a dishonest witness who is prevaricating or exaggerating in relation to her pain and the various consequences it has wrought upon her life….
 Causation is established where the plaintiff proves that the defendant caused or contributed to the injury: see Athey v. Leonati,  3 S.C.R. 458, 140 D.L.R. (4th) 235. In regard to the instant case, I am satisfied that the plaintiff has proved that the defendant caused or contributed to the injury which has manifested itself in ongoing symptoms of pain. The evidence establishes consistency and continuity in the plaintiff’s symptoms (albeit with some amelioration) and an absence of any intervening cause which might otherwise account for the plaintiff’s current pain. A dearth of objective medical findings is not determinative; this is particularly so for soft tissue injuries.
 Notwithstanding the aforementioned causal link, the evidence strongly supports finding that: (a) the plaintiff’s injuries are not permanent; (b) if the plaintiff takes reasonable steps to improve her fitness level, then significant, if not full, recovery is very likely; and (c) if the plaintiff does take those reasonable steps, then recovery is attainable within a relatively short time frame. In this regard, the medical opinions of both Dr. Hodgson and Dr. Werry (on May 6, 2009 and April 9, 2009 respectively) suggest that the plaintiff’s present symptoms would decrease substantially through a reduction of her “habitus” (body size and shape), increased physical activity, and working through that which is sometimes described as “the pain of reactivation”.
A defendant must take her victim as she finds her, be it with a thin skull or an out of shape musculature. But when it comes to the reasonable efforts expected of a plaintiff to aid her own recovery after the accident, then those reasonable steps include exercise and muscle toning so that an injury may be shaken off more quickly.
 Assessment of just and fair compensation for non-pecuniary losses by reference to other cases is a daunting task. Each case is unique in its plaintiff and set of circumstances; nonetheless, I accept that the cases cited by the parties assist in defining reasonable upper and lower limits for a non-pecuniary damages award in the case at bar. The most salient factors of the case at bar are: (a) the absence of proof of a permanent or long-term injury; (b) the existence of some amelioration of symptoms; and (c) the absence of enduring and incessant debilitating pain. In relation to (c), I accept that the plaintiff has suffered from pain since the accident and that it has had an adverse effect upon many aspects of her life; I simply note that the intensity of the pain has not been to the degree suffered by many other plaintiffs.
 Having due regard to all the foregoing and the cases cited by counsel, I find that a fair and just award for the plaintiff’s non-pecuniary losses is $25,000.
In the third case released today the Court was asked to deal with the issue of fault when the occupant of a parked car opens his door and is struck by a cyclist.
] On the day of the accident, Mr. Hagreen was wearing a helmet as well as reflective stripes on his jacket and boots and was proceeding eastward. Cars were parked on his right side in the 2400 block of East Broadway, and as a matter of course, the plaintiff said that while monitoring the vehicle traffic in the two lanes to his left, he also monitored the driver’s side of the parked cars, in order to alert himself to any potential risk. Mr. Hagreen estimated his speed at 25 to 30 km/hr when he said, without any warning, the driver’s door of Mr. Su’s vehicle opened; that he, Mr. Hagreen, yelled, “Whoa,” but immediately hit the door. He described his upper body hitting the door, and he injured his ankle as well when he hit the ground. Emergency services were called, the first responder being a fire truck before the ambulance arrived, and Mr. Hagreen was transported to hospital. He indicated that he believes that he passed out in hospital, but after being seen by a physician, he was told that he could go home. Mr. Hagreen said that when he tried to put his shirt on, he could not lift his left arm above his head, and this resulted in x-rays being taken of his left arm region. Mr. Hagreen saw his family doctor, Dr. Montgomery, who prescribed Tylenol and Codeine to treat the pain throughout the plaintiff’s upper body, principally in the area of the right collar bone. As a result of continuing complaints of pain in the left collar bone, the plaintiff was referred for physiotherapy which provided some relief for what he was told were soft tissue injuries. Mr Hagreen was off work for seven days, and on his return, he avoided heavy lifting and stretching which resulted in other employees having to do that work.
 The defendant, Mr. Su, said that on the day of the accident, it was raining and his child was ill, so he had moved the car to the front of the house to take the child to the doctor. He said that he checked what was behind him, and he saw a cyclist about six or seven houses back, and he felt that he had enough time to get out. He said that he put one leg out and turned his body when the bicycle crashed into the door. In cross-examination, Mr. Su acknowledged giving a statement shortly after the accident, and in that statement, he said that he opened the car door slightly and made shoulder check, then he opened the door further and moved both of his legs out, when he saw the bike approaching “really fast” and the resulting collision occurred. Mr. Su had earlier indicated that he had passed the test in English for a second language, although most of his customers speak Chinese rather than English. Mr. Su was asked in cross-examination whether it was true that he did not see the bicycle until the door was opened and that it was then too late, and he acknowledged that that was true but indicated that it was some few years past. It was put to Mr. Su that he did not see the bicycle until it was too late, to which he said yes, and it was put to him that that was the truth, to which he also said yes.
 I find that the defendant, Mr. Su, is wholly responsible for the collision and that the plaintiff took all reasonable steps available to him to avoid the collision, but that the door was not opened by Mr. Su until the plaintiff was so close that he had no opportunity to brake or to take evasive action. I now turn to the question of damages.
The last ICBC related case released today dealt with the issue of costs. In this case (Mariano v. Campbell) the Plaintiff sued for injuries as a result of a car crash. The claim was prosecuted under Rule 66 and the trial took 4 days (which exceeds the 2 days allowed under Rule 66).
When a Plaintiff sues and succeeds in a Rule 66 lawsuit their ‘costs’ are capped at $6,600 “unless the court orders otherwise” as set out in Rule 66(29).
In today’s case the Plaintiff was awarded a total of just over $115,000 after trial. She brought an application to be permitted an additional $3,200 in costs. Madam Justice Loo allowed this application. This case is worth reviewing in full to see some of the factors courts consider when addressing additional costs to the successful party in a Rule 66 Lawsuit.
When you are involved in a suit for damages in an ICBC injury claim can you access the opposing parties driving history? Reasons for judgement were recently brought to my attention making just such an order.
In the recent case (Rothenbusch v. Van Boeyen) the Plaintiff claimed damages against the Defendant. Liability (fault for the car crash) was at issue. During the examination for discovery the Plaintiff’s lawyer asked the Defendant how many speeding tickets he had. He could not recall exactly and indicated “one or two“. The lawyer then asked for him to produce his driving history and he refused.
Despite ordering production of this record the Court went on to note that the same may not be admissible at trial. Specifically Master Caldwell held that “Whether or not (the driving record) is relevant and passes the test of admissibility of trial will be up to the trial judge…I will order that the Defendant provide a copy of his driving record for a period of three years prior to the …accident”.
ICBC Part 7 Benefits and the Definition of Vehicle "Occupant"
Reasons for judgment were released today involving a tragic BC Pedestrian/Truck Crash addressing an injured Plaintiff’s entitlement to “no-fault” accident benefits.
In today’s case (Schuk v. York Fire & Casualty Insurance Company) the Plaintiff was outside of the vehicle (which was hauling a trailer) she was riding in for the purpose of putting chains on it. While doing so she was struck by a tractor-trailer unit and suffered catastrophic injuries. Her vehicle and the various trailers of the vehicles involved were insured with different companies. The Plaintiff applied for ‘no-fault‘ accident benefits to all of the insurers and they all refused payment because they could not agree which of them was responsible for paying the benefits.
The obligation for ICBC to pay no-fault benefits turns in part on whether a person is “insured“. The definition of an “insured” is contained in s. 78 of the Insurance (Vehicle) Regulation and includes “an occupant of a vehicle that is licenced in the Province…” and “a pedestrian who collides with a vehicle described in an owner’s certificate” The determination of which insurer was ultimately responsible to pay the Plaintiff her benefits turned on whether she was an “occupant” of her vehicle at the time of this accident or a “pedestrian“.
 However, the definition of “occupant” in the Regulation, and the definition in the policies involved in the other cases I have cited above, do in fact refer to the activity of driving, or getting in or out of a vehicle. On that basis, I do not see a reason for departing from the approach in Kyriazis and the other cases I have cited above.
 Ms. Schuk was not operating or riding in the vehicle, entering into it, nor alighting from it at the time of the accident. Although the purpose of pulling over and getting out the vehicle was to put chains on it, the parties are in accord that Ms. Schuk was not actually working on the vehicle at the time of the collision. Therefore none of the criteria for an occupant contained in the definition are met and she was not an occupant.
 Pedestrian is not defined. However, that was also so in most of the cases I cited above at para. 18. The approach taken in those cases is that for the purposes of the scheme of automobile insurance, a victim of a car accident is either an occupant or a pedestrian; in other words if the victim does not fall within the definition of a passenger, then she is an occupant. That appears to me to be the case with the legislation and regulation in issue in the case at bar. Accordingly Ms. Schuk was a pedestrian at the time of the accident.
 Ms. Shuk was therefore an insured for the purpose of no-fault benefits under both MPIC and ICBC coverage.
Further to my previous posts on Litigation Privilege in British Columbia, reasons for judgement were released today adding further clarity to this area of the law.
it is only common sense that where a claim of privilege is contested, a court would normally require something more than counsel’s opinion offered in the course of argument. As Mr. Cassie argued on behalf of the plaintiff, it has been clear at least since this court decidedHamalainen (Committee of) v. Sippola (1991) 62 B.C.L.R. (2d) 254, 3 C.P.C. (3d) 297 that the party asserting privilege in respect of a document bears the onus of establishing the privilege.
I note that although the defendant was ordered to disclose the minutes, unredacted, to the plaintiff, this does not mean they, or the information they contain, will be admissible at trial. A claim of privilege can still be asserted by the defendants if and when the plaintiff seeks to introduce the minutes into evidence and it will be for the trial judge to determine whether any kind of privilege does indeed attach.
Driving while using a cell phone increases the chances of an accident. In fact, a recent study has shown that distracted drivers can be more likely than impaired drivers to cause an accident.
With statistics like these in mind the BC Government has introduced amendments to the Motor Vehicle Act which come into force in January, 2010 making it unlawful to text/e-mail while driving and also making it unlawful for drivers to use a hand-held cell phone while driving.
VICTORIA – B.C. roads will be safer following legislative changes to prevent the use of hand- held cellphones, portable electronic devices and text messaging while driving, Solicitor General Kash Heed announced today.
In the coming months, government will launch an awareness campaign to educate drivers on the new law and the importance of paying attention to the road, pedestrians and other cars around them.

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