Source: https://ceas.uc.edu/academics/departments/aerospace-engineering-mechanics/fire-science/fire-service-law/february-2019-fire---ems-law-newsletter.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 03:02:27+00:00

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Community paramedicine / hospital partnerships: March 20, 2019, free seminar, FDs, elected officials and hospital representatives sharing best practices; will be videotaped and posted on our web page.
HAZMAT: Fall, 2019 two-day class, UAVs For Emergency Responders, FST 3055 will include presentations for Incident Commanders [Nov. 8, 2019 at UC Flight Lab] and multi-agency HAZMAT drill [Nov. 9, 2019 at a FD training center]. UC Fire Science Adjunct Professor / Fire Chief (retired) BJ Jetter, PhD will be coordinating the drill.
U.S. Supreme Court: Execution, injunction by 11th Cir. quickly set aside.
IL: State immunity statute only applies when patient is on board ambulance.
KS: Workers Comp - Court orders State BWC to cover FF’s back surgery.
OH: Fire Chief’s age / ADA lawsuit dismissed, did not file with EEOC.
MI – Detroit FD layoffs – Union used FD seniority, per CBA; no evidence race discrimination.
IL – Chicago paramedic entitled to disability retirement; numerous traumatic runs.
MA – Nepotism – Fire Chief’s niece, brother on FD; ethics investigation; lawsuit dismissed.
“On November 6, 2018, the State scheduled … Ray’s execution date for February 7, 2019. Because Ray waited until January 28, 2019 to seek relief, we grant the State’s application to vacate the stay entered by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. See Gomez v. United States Dist. Court for Northern Dist. of Cal., 503 U. S. 653, 654 (1992) (per curiam) (‘A court may consider the last-minute nature of an application to stay execution in deciding whether to grant equitable relief.’).
“JUSTICE KAGAN, with whom JUSTICE GINSBURG, JUSTICE BREYER, and JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR join, dissenting from grant of application to vacate stay.
Holman Correctional Facility, the Alabama prison where Domineque Ray will be executed tonight, regularly allows a Christian chaplain to be present in the execution chamber. But Ray is Muslim. And the prison refused his request to have an imam attend him in the last moments of his life…. Given the gravity of the issue presented here, I think that decision profoundly wrong.
Legal Lessons Learned: The Supreme Court’s five “conservative” Justices have made it clear that last minute stays of execution are not favored.
On Feb. 1, 2019, in Roberto Hernandez v. Lifeline Ambulance, LLC and Joshua M. Nicholas, the Appellate Court of Illinois (First District; Fifth Division) held (2 to 1): “As the ambulance driven by Nicholas was not transporting a patient to a health care facility at the time of the collision with the vehicle driven by the plaintiff, section 3.150(a) of the EMS Act does not provide Nicholas or Lifeline with immunity from liability for any negligent acts or omissions which proximately resulted in damages to the plaintiff.
“In his first amended complaint, the plaintiff alleged that, on March 11, 2016, he was operating his motor vehicle in a westerly direction on Grand Avenue in Chicago when his vehicle was struck by an ambulance traveling southbound on Lake Shore Drive. The complaint alleged that the ambulance was owned by Lifeline and being operated by its employee, Nicholas.
The plaintiff responded, arguing both that the immunity provision of the EMS Act does not apply to the operation of an ambulance until it is engaged in providing medical services to a patient and that there exists an issue of fact on the question of whether the ambulance driven by Nicholas at the time of the collision was being operated in the performance of non-emergency medical services.
“For the reasons which follow, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court dismissing counts I and III of the plaintiff’s first amended complaint and remand the matter for further proceedings.
‘Any person, agency or governmental body certified, licensed or authorized pursuant to this Act or rules thereunder, who in good faith provides emergency or non-emergency medical services *** in the normal course of conducting their duties *** shall not be civilly liable as a result of their acts or omissions in providing such services unless such acts or omissions *** constitute willful and wanton misconduct.’ 210 ILCS 50/3.150(a) (West 2016).
‘medical care *** rendered to patients whose conditions do not meet this Act’s definition of emergency, *** during transportation of such patients to or from health care facilities visited for the purpose of obtaining medical or health care services which are not emergency in nature, using a vehicle regulated by this Act.’ 210 ILCS 50/3.10(g) (West 2016).
Relying upon the supreme court’s decision in Wilkins v. Williams,2013 IL 114310, the defendants correctly assert that section 3.150(a) immunizes the operator of an ambulance from civil liability for negligence committed in the non-emergency transport of a patient. Id. ¶¶ 21, 59.They argue that immunity from liability for negligence applies to acts or omissions committed from the time that the ambulance is dispatched to provide non-emergency medical transportation of a patient. We believe that the defendants’ reliance upon the holding in Wilkinsis misplaced.¶ 16 In Wilkins,the defendant ambulance driver was transporting a patient on a non-emergency basis from a hospital to a nursing home when the driver was involved in a collision with a vehicle driven by the plaintiff. Wilkins,2013 IL 114310, ¶ 3. The supreme court found that the accident occurred while the ambulance was transporting a patient, and as a consequence, there was no dispute that the ambulance operator was providing non-emergency medical service. Wilkins,2013 IL 114310, ¶ 21. In the instant case, there was no patient being transported at the time of the accident; the ambulance was in route to pick up a patient for non-emergency transport.
Had the legislature intended to provide immunity for the negligence of an ambulance driver while in route to pick up a patient for transport as suggested by the defendants, it could have included the activity within the definition of ‘non-emergency medical services.’ The legislature did not include the activity within the definition of non-emergency medical services, and we are not at liberty to do so under the guise of statutory construction.
Legal Lessons Learned: The Illinois immunity statute broadly includes non-emergency transports, but not so broad as to cover driving ambulance to pick up a patient. Hopefully the ambulance company’s private insurance will cover both the company and its employee.
On January 28, 2016, Schneider filed two applications for hearings, in which he asserted that he had a right to benefits under the Act. In the first application, Schneider stated that his work accident occurred while working for the City on September 21, 2008. In his second application, Schneider stated that his work accident occurred while working for the City on September 27, 2010. Schneider alleged that both of his injuries were to his low back and body as a whole.
The City responded that it intended to deny Schneider's applications for benefits as untimely. Schneider asserted that his applications were timely because the City had provided him authorized medical care for back injuries on December 14, 2015. Schneider argued that the statute of limitations under K.S.A. 44-534(b) was revived upon the City's December 14, 2015 payment.
At the regular hearing before the administrative law judge (ALJ), Schneider testified about his back pain becoming progressively worse after his 2010 injury. He explained that by 2015, it was difficult for him to work. He testified that he went to his personal doctor, Dr. David Fritz, and they discussed him having back surgery. This was the first doctor he had visited since his last physical therapy appointment paid for by the City on February 28, 2012. Schneider testified that his personal health insurance paid for his appointment with Dr. Fritz. Yet, he further testified that his personal health insurance denied his request for back surgery once it learned that his back pain stemmed from work-related injuries. He admitted that after his personal insurance denied his request for back surgery, he contacted the City, and the City sent him to its doctor, Dr. Chris Fevurly.
Dr. Fevurly explained that at the end of the examination, he concluded that Schneider's 2008 and 2010 work injuries were the cause for his current ongoing back pain. Dr. Fevurly also explained that Schneider returned to him for treatment on January 18 and 22, 2016, because of increased back pain. He testified that on those dates, he gave Schneider medicine and modified his duties. Dr. Fevurly testified that he told Schneider to schedule another appointment for February 2016, but Schneider never did so.
Dr. Fevurly testified that he had treated Schneider for the 20 years that Schneider had been employed with the fire department. He testified that he had also examined him annually for the firefighter fitness exam. He explained that for Schneider's 2008 and 2010 work injuries, he had treated Schneider for "spondylolysis of L5 and then spondylolisthesis grade two of L5 and S1." Dr. Fevurly testified that on December 14, 2015, Schneider returned for another examination, complaining of back pain. He testified that at that examination, Schneider told him he was there because his personal insurance denied his back surgery.
27, 2010 injury happened on June 24, 2012. On cross-examination, Cooper agreed that the City paid for Schneider to see Dr. Fevurly when he reported his back problems in December 2015.
The parties filed briefs with the ALJ. The City argued that the ALJ should deny Schneider's claims because he failed to file his application for benefits within three years of his accidents or within two years from the City's last payment as required under K.S.A. 44-534(b). The City cited Graham v. Pomeroy, 143 Kan. 974, 57 P.2d 19 (1936), for the proposition that its payments for Schneider's medical treatment in December 2015 and in January 2016 did not revive the two-year timeline to file an application for hearing….
“As a preliminary note, the City also briefly asserts that ‘[t]he uncontroverted evidence in the administrative record does not support that the examination and treatment of Dr. Fevurly in 2015 and 2016 were payment of compensation for the 2008 and 2010 injuries.’ The City contends that each of Schneider's appointments were for ‘acute exacerbation symptoms which the claimant indicated occurred on January 14, 2016.’ This argument, however, is patently meritless because Dr. Fevurly testified that the injuries Schneider presented related to his 2008 and 2010 injuries. Dr. Fevurly merely explained that Schneider's January 29, 2016 appointment also related to an acute aggravation of his injury, which occurred on January 14, 2016.
Indeed, had the Legislature wanted to prevent workers from reviving the statute of limitations as the City argues, the Legislature could have easily included the following language after the above "whichever is later" language in K.S.A. 44-534(b): however, if there is a gap of two years or more from the last payment of compensation, no proceeding will be maintained under the workers compensation act. If the previously italicized language would have more clearly expressed what the Legislature was attempting to say under K.S.A. 44-534(b), the Legislature could have easily included this language in K.S.A. 44-534(b). Nevertheless, the Legislature included no such language in K.S.A. 44-534(b).
This court's first obligation is to determine if a statute has a clear meaning. If it does, then this court merely applies the language of the statute. Here, the language of K.S.A. 44-534(b) is clear and unambiguous. As a result, this court is required to apply K.S.A. 44-534(b) as written.
Legal Lesson Learned: Workers comp statutes of limitation are designed to require prompt disclosure of workplace injuries. The City may decide to appeal this decision to the Kansas Supreme Court.
“As part of the biennial budget process the Ohio General Assembly passed House Bill 27 to create the workers compensation budget for 2018-2019. In addition to establishing the budget the bill also amended sections of the Ohio Revised Code that relate to workers compensation law. Mainly among the changes, the bill shortens the statute of limitations for an employee to file a workers compensation claim against Ohio Employers.
“Plaintiff, Chief Jay W. Keller is a contracted employee with the City of Bucyrus. On July 20, 2017, he was notified and disciplined –while on disability leave for major surgery to his back -in accordance with the due process afforded him under his contract. Unnamed employees accused Chief Keller of essentially using racially insensitive slurs in the workplace and ‘bullying’ employees/ member of the Bucyrus City Fire Department. Thereafter, the City of Bucyrus –under the leadership and direction of Defendant Mayor Jeffrey Reser and Defendant Safety-Service Director Jeffrey Wagner –engaged in a pattern of conduct, using the disciplinary notice of July 20, 2017 as its basis, that created a hostile work environment for Chief Jay W. Keller, violated the terms and conditions of the Defendant City of Bucyrus and Plaintiff’s contract, and engaged in age discrimination and violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act and its state analogue.
Over the course of nearly a year, in order to mitigate his damages and maintain his employment with the Defendant City of Bucyrus, Chief Keller was required by Defendant Mayor Jeffrey Reser and Defendant Safety-Service Director Jeffrey Wagner to undergo unnecessary, age and disability inappropriate trainings and certification for which Plaintiff is now economically liable and for which he has been damaged; Chief Keller was not paid during periods of his contract when he was, in fact, due his normal and regular salary; he was not allowed to work on or otherwise be around the Bucyrus Fire Department for which he was ultimately accountable as chief; he was disciplined for using a device necessary to meet his disability needs in a Defendant City of Bucyrus administrative meeting to which he was invited despite being on leave and under disciplinary sanctions.
During the period of time that Plaintiff has acted as Chief of the Bucyrus City Fire Department, he has had 5 total surgeries for various job and personal related injuries….
“Around 2017, Plaintiff took disability leave for major back surgery. Keller’s back surgery is not result from work-related injuries. In July 2017, while Plaintiff was still on medical leave, Defendants gave Keller a disciplinary notice, citing alleged racial slurs and bullying.
Subsequently, Defendants placed Plaintiff Keller on unpaid leave. Further, they required Keller to pay for professional development and complete a physical examination. Plaintiff satisfied these physical examination and professional development requirements and returned to work.
“Because Plaintiff has not exhausted his administrative remedies, the Court dismisses his federal discrimination claims without prejudice.
Footnote 16: The Court notes that Plaintiff Keller may have missed his chance to file claims with the EEOC… Plaintiff was required to file any EEOC complaint within 180 days of the challenged conduct…. Here, the allegedly wrongful conduct appears to have occurred on July 20, 2017 and March 18, 2018.
Legal Lessons Learned: (1) FDs should have written policy regarding when personnel on leave will be required to pass medical or physical fitness for duty testing, and any retraining of job skills; and (2) must timely file EEOC charge to pursue federal ADA case.
“Filing a Complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.
See also Judge Cox’s Jan. 26, 2017 decision where he described the RIF. Peeples v. City of Detroit, 891 F.3d at 627-28.
“On July 18, 2013, the City of Detroit filed for bankruptcy protection. Prior to the filing, on July 2, 2012 the City notified agencies that the City would initiate RIF activities across different agencies, with a goal to lose 2,227 employees through various means, including layoffs. The Detroit Fire Department ("DFD") received notification on June 18, 2012, that the deadline for implementation of layoffs for the July 1, 2012 fiscal year was passing that day, and as of July 2, 2012, the DFD would not be in compliance with its 2012-2013 fiscal budget. Two days later, the City notified the DFFA by letter that layoff notices would be issued in accordance with the collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") between the parties and attached a matrix with the number of reductions to be made, detailed by position. According to this initial matrix, twenty-two firefighters would be laid off.
a class action grievance alleging that the City's proposed RIF violated the parties' CBA. On August 10, 2012, the City proceeded with the RIF by departmental seniority, as urged by the DFFA, and laid off twenty-seven firefighters, including ten of the Plaintiffs. Plaintiff Anthony McCloud was demoted from firefighter to fireboat deckhand.
“The DFFA also moved for summary judgment on June 6, 2016, arguing that Plaintiffs’ claim failed because the DFFA did not breach its duty of fair representation to the Plaintiffs, which it urged is ‘an essential component of a Title VII race discrimination claim against a union.’ The DFFA also argued that Plaintiffs could not prove damages given that they had been reinstated and made whole, and neither compensatory nor punitive damages were available as a matter of law. Finally, the DFFA argued that it should be awarded attorney fees and costs because Plaintiffs’ claims were unmeritorious.
Plaintiffs fail to establish direct evidence proving a fact that requires no inferences or circumstantial evidence to create an inference of discrimination.
On appeal, Plaintiffs assert that they have direct evidence— [Plaintiff Eric] Peeples’ [deposition] testimony that Williams stated that the union wanted to “save” the white firefighters and submitted the layoff list including Plaintiffs to that end…. Peeples stated that Williams, a City employee, had concluded that the DFFA wanted to ‘protect the white boys.’ McCloud testified that he heard from Exander Poe that Williams said that the DFFAdid not want to “lay those white boys off.” Plaintiffs’ argument therefore requires an inference that the City knew of and approved of that discrimination. Accordingly, we find that the statements do not constitute direct evidence of any motive the City harbored.
Plaintiffs and the EEOC, amicus in this case, urge that the standards governing a duty of fair representation claim do not govern Title VII discrimination claims against a union, and that the district court relied on reasoning that has been withdrawn.
Legal Lessons Learned: Plaintiffs failed to establish Title VII liability for City or the Local.
On Feb. 1, 2019, in Leah Siwinski v. The Retirement Board of the Fireman’s Annuity and Benefit Fund of the City of Chicago, the Appellate Court of Illinois (First District) held (3 to 0), “In summary, because the manifest weight of the evidence showed that the plaintiff sustained PTSD arising from an act or acts of duty while working for CFD, and as a result, was disabled from performing any of her assigned duties, we reverse the decision of the Board that denied her a duty disability pension, and reverse the decision of the circuit court, which confirmed the Board’s decision."
“The plaintiff, in her testimony and affidavit, stated that she began working as a paramedic for CFD in December 2008. Her duties included responding to 911 calls and transporting individuals to hospitals. On December 22, 2010, she and Kelly responded to a “[m]ayday” call involving injured firefighters. When she arrived at the scene, firefighters placed the body of a firefighter whom she recognized on her stretcher. She had transported nonresponsive individuals “quite a few” times without being affected, but “wasn’t prepared to have somebody that [she] had worked with dead on [her] stretcher” and felt like it “could have been [her].” At that moment, she “mentally and emotionally *** turned off” and “couldn’t hear any noise, *** [or] notice any lights.” The rest of the incident was a “blur,” but she finished her shift as required. Later, the plaintiff saw videos and photographs of her carrying the stretcher, and attended the funerals of the firefighters who died.
According to the plaintiff, during the following months, she became hypervigilant, felt startled when the alarm at the firehouse sounded, experienced anxiety while on calls, withdrew from her family and friends, and developed problems in her romantic relationship. In June 2011,she was hospitalized after becoming “near syncopal” while taking a patient’s blood pressure. In August 2011, she went on leave for “non-duty illness,” and multiple doctors told her that the syncope related to anxiety. As she was already seeing a therapist and did not want to “admit” that her syncope was caused by anxiety, she did not seek further treatment and returned to work in March 2012.
The plaintiff stated that, on October 12, 2012, she heard gunshots near her firehouse and was dispatched to the scene of the shooting where a large crowd stood by the body of a victim who had been shot in the head. When the paramedics confirmed that he was dead, people in the crowd closed around them and threw objects, used racial slurs, accused them of not doing their job, and threatened to kill them. Police officers restrained the victim’s sister, who attempted to reach the plaintiff, but she felt ‘frozen in fear’ and thought she would be killed. Although she had been threatened on other calls, that incident caused her to ‘br[eak] down,’ and for several weeks, she feared that she would be “shot in retaliation for not saving [the victim’s] life.” Due to the ‘stigma’ of talking about her feelings as a first responder, she did not tell anyone how she felt and enrolled in college courses to avoid thinking about work. However, she began failing her classes, her romantic relationship ended, and she felt herself ‘spiraling out of control.’ She topped cleaning and cooking, showered less frequently, struggled to leave bed, and developed a shopping addiction.
The plaintiff further testified that, in November 2013, she was dispatched to a hospital to meet with an ambulance crew that had transported a firefighter who shot himself in the head. She knew the firefighter, and saw him on life support when she arrived. The following month, she began cutting herself as a ‘coping mechanism’ when therapy and medication failed to help. She felt ‘hopeless and alone,’ experienced nightmares, anxiety, and depression, and was ‘afraid of [her] job.’ In January 2014, her symptoms became ‘unbearable’ and she ‘decided that [she] needed to get help.’ On January 25, 2014, she ‘explained the situation’ to Chief Bob Ertl, who placed her on medical leave.
October 2014, she began treating with Gilligan, who specialized in PTSD. As of the date of the hearing, she still experienced hypervigilance, isolation, intrusive thoughts, and nightmares. Ambulance lights and sirens produced ‘flashback[s]’ and ‘strong anxiety,’ and wearing a uniform ‘trigger[ed]’ her to cut herself. She could not ‘sleep’ or ‘function’ due to ‘images of calls’ that she had been on and her fear of being ‘violently killed’ like some of the victims she had seen, and added that the December 2010 incident “haunts [her] thoughts every day and night.
“The plaintiff, Leah Siwinski, appeals from an order of the circuit court of Cook County which confirmed a decision of The Retirement Board of the Firemen’s Annuity and Benefit Fund of the City of Chicago (Board), denying her a duty disability pension under section 6-151 of the Illinois Pension Code (Code) (40 ILCS 5/6- 151 (West 2016)). For the reasons which follow, we: (1) reverse the decision of the Board; (2) reverse the decision of the circuit court; and (3) remand the matter to the circuit court, with directions.
Legal Lesson Learned: PTSD is a recognized disability issue in the emergency services.
See this April 13, 2018 article: Study: More firefighters died by suicide than in the line of duty in 2017 - A study found that 103 firefighters and 140 police officers died by suicide in 2017, compared to 93 firefighter and 129 officer line-of-duty deaths.
“The case arises out of a dispute related to the resignation of Kevin Robinson (‘Robinson’ or ‘The Chief’) as the Chief of the Fire Department in Marshfield, Massachusetts. Robinson alleges that he was constructively discharged as Fire Chief in retaliation for lodging internal complaints for age and gender discrimination against other officials in the Town of Marshfield.
In October, 2013, the Chief’s niece, Shauna Robinson Patten (‘Ms. Patten’), was selected for a full-time firefighter trainee position with the Marshfield Fire Department. Before Ms. Patten began her employment, the Board of Selectmen (‘the Board’) met with the Chief and he submitted a conflict of interest disclosure form which stated that he would 1) recuse himself from any involvement in the interview or promotion process for which his brother, son or niece (all then employees of his department)became candidates, 2) not make any discretionary assignments resulting in extra pay for his family members and 3) notify the Town of any potential disciplinary situation involving a family member.
During the first year of Ms. Patten’s training, two of her supervisors expressed concerns about her ability to make decisions. Upon hearing about those concerns, the Chief asked that Ms. Patten be transferred to his group and, at one point, despite concerns from supervisors, he placed Ms. Patten on ‘shift strength’ (meaning that she was able to take regular shifts). While defendants contend that Ms. Patten received special treatment during her training, Robinson submits that his niece was subject to gender discrimination by the defendants.
With respect to the Chief’s brother, Shaun Robinson, a captain in the Marshfield Fire Department, defendants argue that the Chief conducted a disciplinary hearing without the presence of the Town Administrator or Town Counsel and later improperly reduced the disciplinary punishment meted out to his brother. The Chief responds that the Town Administrator, Rocco Longo (‘Longo’) gave him permission to reduce the punishment.
Contemporaneously, the Town declined to renegotiate the Chief’s contract, which had expired in 2013, and allegedly encouraged him to retire at least three times. The Town also reported the Chief’s supervision of family employees to the State Ethics Commission (‘the Commission’).
In January, 2015, Chief Robinson filed a complaint with the Board [of Selectmen] alleging that he was a victim of age discrimination and harassment. The Board retained Attorney Regina Ryan who concluded in February that those complaints were meritless.
That same month, Attorney Mark Smith, whose firm had been retained by the Town in November, 2014, to investigate allegations of conflict of interest, issued a report (“the Smith Report”) which concluded that the Chief and his brother violated one or more sections of the Massachusetts conflict of interest laws. He recommended that the matter be referred to the Commission for further proceedings.
“The Chief alleges that he was faced with a take-it-or-leave-it choice: he could retire or be discharged. In support of that claim, he points to a series of incidents in which the Town refused to renegotiate his contract, pressured him to retire, threatened to damage his reputation if he refused to retire, initiated an internal investigation against him and voted to place him on paid administrative leave.
This Court finds that such allegations do not rise to the level of constructive discharge. Despite the Town’s encouragement to retire and refusal to renegotiate his employment contract, the Chief continued his employment until he resigned in 2015. Thus, unlike the employee in Herbert v. Mohawk Rubber Co., the Chief did not suffer a ‘forced choice’ with respect to retirement. Cf. Herbert v. Mohawk Rubber Co.,872 F.2d 1104, 1113 (1st Cir. 1989) (holding that an early retirement offer is distinguished from a discharge when the employee has the choice to remain employed).
As noted previously, the defendants have offered a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for placing the Chief on administrative leave based on the fact that an independent investigation conducted by retained counsel concluded that he had violated several conflict of interest laws.
Legal Lessons Learned: Fire Chiefs, in states that do not prohibit close family members on their FD, must be extremely careful to avoid even an “appearance” of conflicts of interest.
“Petitioner City of Watertown (City) commenced this proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 75 seeking a permanent stay of arbitration of a grievance filed by respondent, the collective bargaining representative for the employees of the City's Fire Department.
In its grievance and demand for arbitration, respondent alleged that the City violated, among other things, certain provisions of the parties' collective bargaining agreement (CBA) relating to minimum staffing levels for shifts and regular operations within the Fire Department (staffing provisions).
“Further, the record establishes that the parties contemplated during their negotiation of the CBA that the staffing provisions were necessary to protect the health, safety and well-being of respondent's members, and, contrary to the City's contention, the staffing provisions are not tantamount to ‘no-layoff’ clauses (see id.). We therefore conclude that the court erred in determining that the staffing provisions are job security provisions that are not subject to arbitration.
Legal Lessons Learned: Courts favor arbitration regarding CBA disputes, unless it involved items that are clearly management right (such as lay-offs).

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