Source: http://cabfinancial.com/articles/davis-v-international-paper-company/
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 16:29:37+00:00

Document:
United States District Court, E.D. Texas, Marshall Division.
INTERNATIONAL PAPER COMPANY, MANCEL SPRAYBERRY, JOHN SPRAYBERRY D/B/A JWK LOGGING, AND SCOTTY PRINCE D/B/A PINELAND FORESTRY SERVICES, Defendants.
*1 Before the Court is Defendant John Sprayberry d/b/a JWK Logging’s (“JWK Logging”) Motion for Summary Judgment (the “JWK Motion”). (Dkt. No. 85.) Having considered the briefing and the relevant authorities, the Court finds that the JWK Motion should be DENIED-IN-PART and GRANTED-IN-PART for the reasons set forth below.
Summary judgment should be granted when “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (emphasis added); see also Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Under this standard, “the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine [dispute] of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–48 (1986). The substantive law identifies the material facts, and disputes over facts that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not defeat a motion for summary judgment. Id. at 248. A dispute about a material fact is “genuine” when the evidence is “such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. Any evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. See id. at 255 (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158–59 (1970)).
*2 The moving party must identify the basis for granting summary judgment and identify the evidence demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. If the moving party does not have the ultimate burden of persuasion at trial, the party “must either produce evidence negating an essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim or defense or show that the nonmoving party does not have enough evidence of an essential element to carry its ultimate burden of persuasion at trial.” Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Fritz Cos., Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000).
claims for vicarious liability for the alleged negligent acts of MS?
(2) Is summary judgment appropriate on Davis’ “statutory employer” claim under 49 C.F.R § 390.5 and corresponding Texas law?
(3) Is summary judgment appropriate on Davis’ common law negligence claim against JWK Logging for lack of proximate causation?
Under Texas law, a “general contractor can be held vicariously liable for its independent contractor’s actions if [it] retains some control over the manner in which the [independent] contractor performs the work that causes the damage.” Gonzalez v. Ramirez, 463 S.W.3d 499, 506 (Tex. 2015). However, the “general contractor ‘can direct when and where an independent contractor does the work and can request information and reports about the work’ without assuming vicarious liability.” Id. (internal citation omitted). A general contractor’s “right to control must be more than a general right to order work to stop and start, or to inspect progress,” “must relate to the activity that actually caused the injury, and [must] grant…at least the power to direct the order in which work is to be done or the power to forbid it being done in an unsafe manner.” Coastal Marine Serv. of Tex., Inc. v. Lawrence, 988 S.W.2d 223, 226 (Tex. 1999). “A possibility of control is not evidence of a ‘right to control’ actually retained or exercised.” Id.
The Court finds that Plaintiff has presented evidence that could lead a reasonable jury to conclude that JWK Logging retained the right to control and direct MS’s trucking operations with respect to IP. (See Dkt. No. 100-2 at 25:1–29:3 (Deposition of Mancel Sprayberry); Dkt. No. 100-3 15:4–22, 23:21–28:10 (Deposition of John Sprayberry); Dkt. No. 100-4 at 57:7–58:15 (Deposition of Scotty Prince).) As discussed further below, Plaintiff has also presented genuine questions of material fact as to (1) JWK Logging’s status as a motor carrier and statutory employer under Texas Motor Carrier Safety Regulations (“Texas Regulations”), (2) MS’s employee status under the same, and (3) consequently, JWK Logging’s vicarious liability for MS’s alleged negligent acts or omissions. Accordingly, the Court concludes that summary judgment is not appropriate on this issue.
*3 Statutory employment is a theory of vicarious liability created by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations (“Federal Regulations”), and Texas has adopted many—but not all—parts of the Federal Regulations. Omega Contracting, Inc. v. Torres, 191 S.W.3d 828, 848 (Tex. App.— Fort Worth 2006, no pet.); accord Gonzalez v. Ramirez, 463 S.W.3d 499, 503 (Tex. 2015) Under Texas Regulations, ultimate financial responsibility for negligent acts or omissions committed by a driver of a commercial motor vehicle that causes an accident lies with the party determined to be the “motor carrier” at the time of the accident. Ten Hagen Excavating, Inc. v. Castro-Lopez, 503 S.W.3d 463, 472 (Tex. App. 2016); accord Gonzalez, 463 S.W.3d at 503 (Tex. 2015) (citing 37 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 4.11(a), (b)(3); 49 C.F.R. §§ 387.1, 390.3(a), 390.11, 391.1, 396.1). Texas law defines “motor carrier” as “an individual…or other legal entity that controls, operates, or directs the operation of one or more vehicles that transport persons or cargo over a road or highway.” TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 643.001(6); see also 37 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 4.11(b)(1). “What is relevant is whether [JWK Logging] was acting as a motor carrier in the transaction at issue.” See Ten Hagen, 503 S.W.3d at 474.
In light of Plaintiff’s failure to present evidence in its Response that the Federal Regulations apply in this case, the Court finds that JWK Logging is not a statutory employer of MS under Federal Regulations. However, Plaintiff has presented evidence that raises a genuine question of material fact as to JWK Logging’s status as a statutory employer under Texas Regulations. Specifically, whether JWK Logging’s control over MS was indistinguishable from JWK Logging’s relationship with other drivers that it employs and trucks that it owns. (See Dkt. No. 98 at 15; Dkt. No. 100-2 at 14:4–25, 17:24–18:7, 25:1–29:3, 30:7–37:10, 40:20–41:22 (Deposition of Mancel Sprayberry); Dkt. No. 100-3 at 9:15–10:24, 15:4–16:3, 19:16–22:9, 23:21– 28:10, 30:14–32:25, 36:5–38:8, 39:11–40:4 (Deposition of John Sprayberry).) See Sharpless v. Sim, 209 S.W.3d 825, 830 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, pet. denied) (“Regardless of the type of relationship between the carrier and the driver, however, the carrier is not excused from the regulations that treat the driver as a statutory employee for purposes of liability to the general public.”). Accordingly, the Court finds that a reasonable jury could conclude that JWK Logging “control[led], operate[d], or direct[ed] the operation of [MS’s] vehicle[ ] that transport[ed]…cargo over a road or highway in this state,” and would therefore be a motor carrier subject to statutory employer liability under Texas Regulations. See TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 643.001(6).
While JWK Logging’s failure to discipline MS could have conceivably fostered an environment giving rise to MS’s allegedly negligent acts or omissions as related to the collision, this hypothetical link is too tenuous to be a proximate cause for Plaintiff’s injury. See Paroline v. United States, 572 U.S. 434, 445 (2014) (“A requirement of proximate cause thus serves, inter alia, to preclude liability in situations where the causal link between conduct and result is so attenuated that the consequence is more aptly described as mere fortuity.”). Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to present evidence of a genuine dispute of material fact that JWK’s separate acts or omissions proximately caused Davis’ injuries.
For the reasons discussed above, the Court hereby DENIES the JWK Motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s claims against JWK Logging for vicarious liability and statutory employer liability under Texas Regulations. However, the Count GRANTS the JWK Motion for summary judgment in favor of JWK Logging as to Plaintiff’s claims for statutory employer liability under Federal Regulations and common law negligence.

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 390
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 4
 § 643
 § 4
 v. 
 § 643
 v.