Source: https://veteranclaims.net/2009/04/22/substantive-appeals-and-time-limits-percy-v-shinseki-no-05-2961/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 04:21:27+00:00

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This case rings up several important points regarding time limits. Vets needs to be aware of tiem limits for filinga and abide by them. This case also shows the importance of having personal hearing before the VA.
This case raises the question of whether the requirement that a claimant file a timely Substantive Appeal under 38 U.S.C. § 7105(d)(3) is a jurisdictional predicate to the Board’s adjudication of a matter, considering the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 127 S. Ct. 2360 (2007).
The statute does not operate as a jurisdictional bar to the Board’s consideration of a Substantive Appeal filed more than 60 days after the Statement of the Case (SOC) is mailed.
We further hold that VA waived any asserted defect in Mr. Percy’s Substantive Appeal as to the disability rating matter.
After the parties submitted their initial briefing, but before the Court decided the matter, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Bowles v. Russell. In Bowles, the issue before the Supreme Court was whether 28 U.S.C. § 2107(c), which permits a district court to extend the time to file an appeal for 14 days from the date on which the court enters the order, is a jurisdictional statute, or whether a court of appeals may excuse a failure to file an appeal within that 14-day window for equitable reasons. Bowles, 551 U.S. at __, 127 S. Ct. at 2363.
The RO nevertheless accepted the Substantive Appeal and treated it as timely. Rowell, 4 Vet.App. at 17. In determining the effect of the untimely Substantive Appeal on Mr. Rowell’s appeal, the Court examined the text of the Substantive Appeal requirement and explained that failure to file a timely [Substantive] Appeal does not automatically foreclose an appeal, render a claim final, or deprive the [Board] of jurisdiction. Statutory section 7105(d)(3) and regulation § 19.124 (replaced by § 20.302(b)) provide that 9 an RO may close an appeal for failure to respond to the SOC. However, the statute and regulations do not require an RO to close a claim in that situation; nor do they provide that the claim will become final if the claimant fails to file a timely [Substantive] Appeal. Id. at 17. Therefore, the Court held that the RO had the authority to accept Mr. Rowell’s untimely Substantive Appeal, and that, because the RO did accept that Substantive Appeal and treat it as timely, there was “no problem, with regard to the timeliness of the filing of the [Substantive] Appeal, which would deprive the Board of jurisdiction over this case.” Id. at 17- 18. The Court has subsequently reaffirmed that holding several times. See Gomez v. Principi, 17 Vet.App. 369, 372 (2003); Beyrle, 9 Vet.App. at 28 (holding that, although record did not contain Substantive Appeal as to veteran’s claims, by reviewing those claims, Board waived Substantive Appeal requirement, and citing Rowell for support); see also Hunt v. Nicholson, 20 Vet.App. 519, 524 (2006) (holding that, because Substantive Appeal requirement is nonjurisdictional, equitable tolling applies).
Equitable tolling is not, however, implicated in this case. Properly at issue in this case is whether VA waived the requirement that the appellant timely file his Substantive Appeal with respect to the increased disability rating matter.
In addition to determining that the appellant failed to file a timely Substantive Appeal as to the disability rating matter, the Board also determined that the appellant never filed an “adequate” Substantive Appeal as to that matter. R. at 7. Because we have found that VA waived any objection to the timeliness of the appellant’s Substantive Appeal, this issue is easily resolved.
prudential matter, even though section 7105(d)(3) is not properly termed jurisdictional. See Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 12, 19 (2005) (“[C]laim-processing rules thus assure relief to a party properly raising them, but do not compel the same result if the party forfeits [or waives] them.”); Roy, 5 Vet.App. at 556 (affirming Board decision to dismiss appeal as untimely where veteran did not file timely Substantive Appeal and VA did not waive timely filing requirement); cf. U.S. VET. APP. R. 3(a) (providing that “[f]ailure of an appellant to take any step under these rules . . . does not affect the validity of the appeal, but may be grounds for . . . dismissal of the appeal”); U.S. VET. APP. R. 1(b) (providing that Rule 3(a) does not “limit the jurisdiction of the Court as established by law”).
We hold that, by treating the disability rating matter as if it were part of his timely filed Substantive Appeal for more than five years, VA waived any objections it might have had to the timeliness of filing.4 See Gomez, Gonzalez-Morales, Beyrle, and Rowell, all supra.
M.C. PERCY, APPELLANT, V. ERIC K. SHINSEKI, SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, APPELLEE.
On Appeal from the Board of Veterans’ Appeals (Decided April 17, 2009) Terry L. McElyea, of Fort Collins, Colorado, was on the brief for the appellant. R. Randall Campbell, Assistant General Counsel; Edward V. Cassidy, Jr., Deputy Assistant General Counsel; and Deborah A. Hoet, all of Washington, D.C., were on the brief for the appellee. Before MOORMAN, DAVIS, and SCHOELEN, Judges. MOORMAN, Judge: The appellant, veteran M.C. Percy, appeals through counsel a July 14, 2005, decision of the Board of Veterans’ Appeals (Board) holding that it lacked jurisdiction over Mr. Percy’s appeal of the disability rating assigned for residuals of a serviceconnected wound to the suprapubic area, on the grounds that he failed to timely file a Substantive Appeal as to that issue. Record (R.) at 1-7. The Board remanded several other issues, including Mr. Percy’s appeal of the effective date for his service-connected suprapubic wound, to a VA regional office (RO) for further development. R. at 8-12. The remanded matters are not before the Court. Mr. Percy argues on appeal that the Board incorrectly declined to exercise jurisdiction over the increased disability rating matter. Appellant’s Brief (App. Br.) at 4-18. This appeal is timely, and this Court has jurisdiction under 38 U.S.C. §§ 7252(a) and 7266(a).
This case raises the question of whether the requirement that a claimant file a timely Substantive Appeal under 38 U.S.C. § 7105(d)(3) is a jurisdictional predicate to the Board’s adjudication of a matter, considering the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 127 S. Ct. 2360 (2007). On November 18, 2008, the Court requested that the parties submit supplemental memoranda of law concerning this issue. We hold that Bowles is distinguishable because the statutory language of section 7105(d)(3) is clear on its face. The statute does not operate as a jurisdictional bar to the Board’s consideration of a Substantive Appeal filed more than 60 days after the Statement of the Case (SOC) is mailed. We further hold that VA waived any asserted defect in Mr. Percy’s Substantive Appeal as to the disability rating matter. We thus reverse the Board’s determination that it lacked jurisdiction over that matter and remand the matter to the Board for adjudication on the merits.
I. BACKGROUND A. Proceedings Below Mr. Percy served honorably in the U.S. Army from March 1969 to April 1971, including service in the Republic of Vietnam. R. at 17. At some point during service (the record does not disclose when), Mr. Percy suffered several shell fragment wounds from an exploding grenade, including a wound to the suprapubic region. See R. at 1; Supplemental Record (Supp.) at 4. In April 1971, a VA regional office (RO) granted his claim for disability compensation for the residuals of his suprapubic wound, and assigned a disability rating of 0%. See R. at 28 (1998 rating decision listing previous rating decisions). On June 29, 1998, among several other decisions, the RO increased the disability rating for that suprapubic disability to 30%, with an effective date in 1994. R. at 19. On June 24, 1999, Mr. Percy timely filed a Notice of Disagreement (NOD) expressing his dissatisfaction with four of the matters in the June 1998 RO decision, including the disability rating for his suprapubic disability. R. at 31-32. On July 20, 1999, the RO issued an SOC, which included the four issues that Mr. Percy referred to in his NOD. R. at 34-47. On September 20, 1999, Mr. Percy filed a Substantive Appeal, which he presented on a copy of VA Form 9. R. at 49-50. With respect to the issues on appeal, Form 9 allows claimants See VA Form 9, Appeal to Board 1 of Veterans’ Appeals, available at http://www.va.gov/vaforms/va/pdf/VA9.pdf.
II. ANALYSIS A. Statutory and Regulatory Framework The Board has jurisdiction over “[a]ll questions in a matter which under section 511(a) of [title 38, U.S. Code,] is subject to a decision by the Secretary.” 38 U.S.C. § 7104(a). Section 511(a) provides in turn that “[t]he Secretary shall decide all questions of law and fact necessary to a decision by the Secretary under a law that affects the provision of benefits by the Secretary to veterans or the dependents or survivors of veterans.” If a claimant (a veteran, or his or her dependents or survivors) receives an unfavorable decision on a claim for VA benefits, the claimant may initiate appellate review by filing an NOD. 38 U.S.C. § 7105(a). The claimant “shall” file the NOD within one year from the date on which the agency of original jurisdiction (AOJ) (usually an RO) mails notice of the unfavorable decision. 38 U.S.C. § 7105(b)(1). If the claimant does not file an NOD within the one-year period, the AOJ decision “shall become final.” Id. If the claimant does file a timely NOD, the next step in the appellate process is for the AOJ to review its previous decision. 38 U.S.C. § 7105(d)(1). If the AOJ decides to continue its previous decision, the AOJ must send the claimant an SOC. Id. The claimant must then perfect an appeal to the Board by filing a Substantive Appeal.2 38 U.S.C. § 7105(a). The claimant will be afforded a period of sixty days from the date the [SOC] is mailed to file the formal appeal. This may be extended for a reasonable period on request for good cause shown. The appeal should set out specific allegations of error of fact or law, such allegations related to specific items in the [SOC]. The benefits sought on appeal must be clearly identified. The [AOJ] may close the case for failure to respond after receipt of the [SOC], but questions as to timeliness or adequacy of response shall be determined by the Board. 38 U.S.C. § 7105(d)(3); see also 38 C.F.R. § 20.302(b) (2008) (Secretary’s implementing regulation, essentially restating section 7105(d)(3)). By regulation, the Secretary has indicated that the AOJ may make the initial determination as to the timeliness or adequacy of a Substantive Appeal. First, 38 C.F.R. § 19.34 (2008) states: “Whether a . . . Substantive Appeal has been filed on time is an appealable issue.
much into that decision. Roy simply recognized that, where a veteran does not timely file a Substantive Appeal, and VA does not waive the Substantive Appeal requirement, the Board may decline to exercise jurisdiction over the matter. 5 Vet.App. at 556. Even after the Roy decision, this Court has made it clear that “the Board’s use of a jurisdictional, i.e., nondiscretionary, analysis” in questions of timeliness and adequacy of Substantive Appeals is “not appropriate.” Gomez, 17 Vet.App. at 372. 2. Whether, Under Bowles, the Substantive Appeal Requirement is Jurisdictional If, under Bowles, section 7105(d)(3) must be construed as jurisdictional, then our previous jurisprudence on the matter is no longer valid. The Secretary asserts that, under Bowles, because the 60-day limit to file a Substantive Appeal is expressed in a statute, it is jurisdictional. Sec’y Supp. Mem. at 4-6. We disagree. It would be an unwarranted extension of Bowles to hold that all statutory time limits are necessarily jurisdictional; indeed, Bowles, by its own terms, disclaims that notion. See Bowles, 551 U.S. at __, 127 S. Ct. at 2365 (distinguishing Scarborough v. Principi, 541 U.S. 401, 413 (2004) (concluding that statutory time limit to file well-pled application for fees under Equal Access to Justice Act is not jurisdictional)); see also, e.g., Diaz v. Kelly, 515 F.3d 149, 153 (2d Cir. 2008) (distinguishing Bowles and concluding that statute of limitations prescribed by Anti- Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 is not jurisdictional). Moreover, the structure of the statute in this case is very different from that at issue in Bowles. Whereas in Bowles, the Supreme Court found that, by enacting 28 U.S.C. § 2107(c), Congress intended to “forbid federal courts from adjudicating an otherwise legitimate ‘class of cases’ after a certain period has elapsed from final judgment,” Bowles, 551 U.S. at __, 127 S. Ct. at 2366, we find no congressional intent to forbid VA from adjudicating appeals in which an untimely Substantive Appeals was filed. Rather than forbidding the Board from adjudicating matters for which the claimant has failed to file a timely Substantive Appeal, Congress has explicitly allowed the Board to adjudicate such matters. The statute in this case expressly provides the AOJ the authority to extend the 60-day filing period for an indeterminate period, and the AOJ “may” – but need not – “close the case for failure to respond after receipt of the [SOC].” 38 U.S.C. § 7105(d)(3); see We therefore need not reach the appellant’s argument that Bowles could 3 never apply to proceedings before VA.
prudential matter, even though section 7105(d)(3) is not properly termed jurisdictional. See Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 12, 19 (2005) (“[C]laim-processing rules thus assure relief to a party properly raising them, but do not compel the same result if the party forfeits [or waives] them.”); Roy, 5 Vet.App. at 556 (affirming Board decision to dismiss appeal as untimely where veteran did not file timely Substantive Appeal and VA did not waive timely filing requirement); cf. U.S. VET. APP. R. 3(a) (providing that “[f]ailure of an appellant to take any step under these rules . . . does not affect the validity of the appeal, but may be grounds for . . . dismissal of the appeal”); U.S. VET. APP. R. 1(b) (providing that Rule 3(a) does not “limit the jurisdiction of the Court as established by law”). Because the Secretary’s use of the word “jurisdictional” in 38 C.F.R. § 20.101(c) and (d) is not necessarily contrary to section 7105(d)(3), we need not overrule those regulations. We note, however, that the Supreme Court has recently stated that “[c]larity would be facilitated” if the label “jurisdictional” was used “not for claim-processing rules, but only for prescriptions delineating the classes of cases (subject-matter jurisdiction) and the persons (personal jurisdiction)” falling within a tribunal’s competence to adjudicate. Kontrick, 540 U.S. at 455. As this Court holds that section 7105(d)(3) clearly does not delineate the Board’s subject-matter or personal jurisdiction, the Secretary may wish to consider amending the language of his regulations in order to comport with the Supreme Court’s call for clarity. C. Application of Law to Facts Having held that an untimely Substantive Appeal does not bar the Board’s exercise of jurisdiction over a matter, we now apply that holding to the facts of this case. The appellant here timely filed a Substantive Appeal with respect to the issue of the effective date for his suprapubic disability in September 1999, but did not file any document that the Board construed as a Substantive Appeal with respect to the issue of the disability rating for that disability until October 1999, more than 60 days after the RO issued an SOC. R. at 49, 54. However, for the following five and a half years, until the Board sent its February 2005 letter to the appellant advising him that his Substantive Appeal with respect to the disability rating issue might be defective, VA consistently treated this matter as if it was part of the timely filed Substantive Appeal. The RO certified that matter to the Board for adjudication as part of the Substantive Appeal, and the Board member who rendered the decision on appeal acknowledged that the We note that both the appellant and the Secretary have identified t 4 he appellant’s potential relief as hinging upon the availability of equitable tolling. See App. Supp. Mem. at 4; Sec’y Supp. Mem. at 7-8. Equitable tolling is not, however, implicated in this case. Properly at issue in this case is whether VA waived the requirement that the appellant timely file his Substantive Appeal with respect to the increased disability rating matter.
Appeal as to that matter. R. at 7. Because we have found that VA waived any objection to the timeliness of the appellant’s Substantive Appeal, this issue is easily resolved. The appellant has, on several occasions, indicated that he sought the Board’s review of the disability rating matter. As noted above, the Court has held that, as with the timeliness of a Substantive Appeal, in determining the adequacy of a Substantive Appeal, “the Board’s use of a jurisdictional, i.e., nondiscretionary, analysis [is] not appropriate,” and that VA may waive “any . . . pleading requirements on the part of the appellant.” Gomez, 17 Vet.App. at 372-73. In Gomez, although the veteran’s Substantive Appeal did not allege any error of fact or law in the RO decision at issue, after the 60-day period set out in section 7105 had run, he presented arguments as to asserted errors in that RO decision. Id. at 373. The Court held that VA had waived any objection it might have had to the adequacy of the veteran’s Substantive Appeal. Id. This case compels the same result. Because VA treated the disability rating matter as adequately appealed for more than five years, VA waived any objection it might have had to the content of that appeal. Furthermore, since its inception, this Court has consistently held that there is “nothing magic about the statements actually on the Substantive Appeal form, given the VA’s nonadversarial process.” EF v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 324, 326 (1991). Accordingly, “the Board is required to address all claims reasonably raised in the appellant’s [S]ubstantive [A]ppeal and in all of his documents and oral testimony submitted prior to the Board’s decision.” Solomon v. Brown, 6 Vet.App. 396, 402 (1994) (emphasis added) (citing Myers v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 127, 130 (1991), and EF, 1 Vet.App. at 326); see also Comer, 552 F.3d at 1368-69; Isenbart v. Brown, 7 Vet.App. 537, 541 (1995); Douglas v. Derwinski, 2 Vet.App. 435, 439 (1992) (en banc). The appellant here filed a Substantive Appeal within 60 days of the SOC and, after filing the September 1999 Substantive Appeal, clearly indicated that he sought the Board’s review of the disability rating matter. The Board need hardly have applied a liberal reading of his filings and statements before the Board in order to determine that the appellant sought the As VA clearly waived any possible asserted defect in timeliness 5 of the appellant’s identification of the disability rating issue, the Court finds it unnecessary to address the issue of whether the disability rating issue was sufficiently raised in the originally filed Form 9. However, as the Court previously has observed, VA has a wellrecognized obligation to liberally read such submissions as part of its pro-veteran, non-adversarial process. See Comer, supra. The Board’s consideration of evidence is not limited to that which supports only legal issues raised in the Substantive Appeal, but all matters reasonably raised prior to the Board’s decision. Solomon; Douglas; EF; and Myers, all supra. These precedents, taken together, caution VA against a hyper-technical analysis of the issue content of any Substantive Appeal filed in connection with any appealed claim.
III. CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing analysis and a review of the record on appeal, the Board’s July 14, 2005, decision is REVERSED to the extent that it determined that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain the appellant’s appeal of the disability rating assigned for his suprapubic disability, and the matter is REMANDED for further adjudication consistent with this decision. On remand, the appellant is free to submit additional evidence and argument on the remanded matter, which the Board must consider when readjudicating his claim. See Kay v. Principi,16 Vet.App. 529, 534 (2002); Kutscherousky v. West, 12 Vet.App. 369, 372-73 (1999) (per curiam order). The Board must provide expeditious treatment of this matter on remand. See 38 U.S.C. § 7112.

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