Source: http://ne.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20180515_0001989.DNE.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 15:24:12+00:00

Document:
ROBERT MADSEN, Nebraska State Penitentiary Warden, Respondent.
Richard G. Kopf, Senior United States District Court Judge.
Petitioner (Magallanes) has filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging his conviction. Respondent has filed an answer, the relevant state court records, and a brief. Petitioner has filed his brief. Respondent has submitted a reply brief.
I now deny the petition with prejudice as all of the claims are procedurally defaulted. Alternatively, and separately, I also deny the ineffective assistance of counsel claim after giving the Nebraska Court of Appeals the deference it is due.
This is an odd case but not a particularly difficult one. However, due to its oddity, it is first helpful to understand the essence of what Petitioner complains about. Petitioner was charged in federal court with federal drug crimes, but that case was dismissed on motion of the government before trial. Petitioner ultimately got convicted in state court on similar crimes.
In 2009, a trooper pulled Petitioner over in a traffic stop on I-80 because Petitioner crossed onto the shoulder or what is otherwise known as the fog line. He did so twice, albeit for only a few seconds. The trooper thought this behavior gave him probable cause for a traffic stop under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 60-6, 142 (West) because that statute plainly provides that “[n]o person shall drive on the shoulders of highways” with certain exceptions that were obviously not applicable to Petitioner.
A motion to suppress was filed. Based upon the recommendation of Magistrate Judge Thalken, Judge Bataillon, my colleague, suppressed the evidence that was seized after the Petitioner gave consent to search the car following the traffic stop. The judge believed that “it is readily apparent that the purpose of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 60-6, 142 is to prevent drivers from using the shoulder as a thoroughfare or primary travel area.” United States v. Magallanes, 8:10CR107 (D. Neb. August 3, 2010). According to the judge, since Petitioner was not using the shoulder as a thoroughfare or primary travel area, the trooper lacked probable cause to make the stop.
Having lost the suppression issue, but prior to trial, the government then moved and on September 22, 2010, was granted leave to dismiss the case under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48(a). Nebraska then decided to prosecute, and Petitioner was ultimately convicted. The prosecutors in these two cases were different-Mr. Sigler, an Assistant United States Attorney, prosecuted the federal case and Mr. Thompson, a Deputy Douglas County Attorney, prosecuted the state case.
As it turns out, our judges' reading of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 60-6, 142 was incorrect. On August 30, 2012, Judge Bataillon acknowledged as much in United States v. Rodriguez, No. 8:12CR170, 2012 WL 5458427, at *1 & n. 2 (D. Neb. Aug. 30, 2012), aff'd, 741 F.3d 905 (8th Cir. 2014), vacated and remanded on other grounds, and aff'd, 799 F.3d 1222 (8th Cir. 2015).
And, shortly thereafter, on December 21, 2012, the Nebraska Supreme Court in Petitioner's direct appeal definitively construed Nebraska law and made it clear that the trooper had probable cause because “ [b]y applying the plain and ordinary meaning of the words in the statute, any crossing of the fog line onto the shoulder constitutes driving on the shoulder and is a violation of § 60-6, 142.” State v. Magallanes, 824 N.W.2d 696, 701 (Neb. 2012) (affirming denial of suppression) (italics added).
Petitioner, having momentarily won the suppression battle in our court, is upset that he lost the suppression war in the Nebraska courts. And, now, I turn to the guts of this case.
Claim One: The prosecution in state court followed the dismissal of a similar prosecution in this federal court (8:10-cr-00107) where this court suppressed evidence eventually resulting in a voluntary dismissal by the United States under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48(a) and therefore the subsequent prosecution in the state court violated the Constitution, for among other reasons, because it (a) placed Petitioner in jeopardy twice and (b) denied Petitioner due process of law. Cf. Chavez v. Weber, 497 F.3d 796 (8th Cir. 2007).
Claim Two: Trial and appellate counsel were both ineffective for failing to assert objections to the state prosecution on the basis of the arguments advanced in Claim One.
Claim Three: Neb. Rev. Stat. § 60-6, 142 (West) (driving on highway shoulders prohibited), the basis for the traffic stop, is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad and thus the prosecution predicated upon evidence derived from the traffic stop violated the Constitution, for among other reasons, because it: (a) denied petitioner due process of law; and (b) denied Petitioner the right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure.

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